

Ibn al-‘Arabī's Barzakh

Book by Salman H. Bashier

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BOOK REVIEW

al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah

Edited by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Sulṭān al-Manṣūb (Yemen: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa Jumhūriyya al-Yamīniyya, 2010).

‘What did we do before this edition?’ That might be the sentiment of scholars of Ibn ‘Arabī after working with the critical edition of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Sulṭān al-Manṣūb (from Yemen), first printing 2010 (1431 AH). The edition represents eleven years of his work on numerous manuscripts that he studied in libraries in Turkey, Egypt, the Emirates, and elsewhere. The outcome is the first complete, accurate, and thoroughly documented edition of *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah*.

Poetry is an important part of Ibn ‘Arabī’s work, and the vocalization of the poetic passages is welcome. In addition, the editor provides citations for the poetry Ibn ‘Arabī quotes, usually with the line before and after to situate the quote. When there are obscure usages in the prose passages, the editor often vocalizes the relevant words.

The editor’s Introduction covers Ibn ‘Arabī’s name and birth, childhood, parents, uncles, wives, children, study, spiritual quest, great opening, journeys from West to East, teachers, friends, connections with scholars of the time, miraculous events, authorship, death, and legacy. The first ‘draft’ of Ibn ‘Arabī’s magnum opus was started in 599 AH in Makka and finished in Damascus in 629 AH. In 632, he decided to write a second, final draft, which he finished in 636. Remarkably, the manuscript is in his own hand and its existence even up to today hints at forces beyond the ordinary. The manuscript is 10,544 pages, divided into 37 ‘books’ with 560 chapters—the same number of years as from *hijra* to the birth of the Shaykh al-Akbar. It is in six sections, and the architecture of the work is such that these six headings are based on ‘geometries’ ranging from divine names to human faculties to physical dimensions.

The Shaykh wrote his book with a Western, Andalusian hand. Some features of the writing style are unpointed letters, but with markings made to clarify potentially confusing phrases; the *fā’* is usually pointed below the tail; and the *qāf* usually has one dot above.

Questioning Ibn ‘Arabī’s negative reception in much of contemporary Islamic discourse, the editor points to 10,634 references to the Qur’ān, 3,518 citations of *ḥadīth*, and more than 5,000 blessings on the Prophet. From the Introduction, it is clear that the editor would like to reclaim Ibn ‘Arabī as an ‘orthodox’ Muslim thinker for the contemporary world.

The first printed edition of the book (known as *Būlāq*) came out in 1858, based on the Süleymaniye manuscripts, from the first draft Ibn ‘Arabī produced in the years 599–629. The edition has many errors. In 1910 Dār al-Kutub al-‘Arabiyya al-Kubrā in Egypt decreased the number of errors considerably, printing the work

in four volumes. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Manṣūb writes, ‘We found the differences between it and the Qunya edition to be equal to 1 in every 75 words. Considering that the original book has 1,735,000 words, this means no less than 23,000 differences’ (p. 46). He gives eight examples, such as ‘He has *ghalaṭa* [erred] in that, the Messenger of God *ṣalla Allahu ‘alayhi wa salam*, and showed anger at the one who did that’, which is correctly ‘He has *aghlaṭa* [spoken harshly] about that, the Messenger of God *ṣalla Allahu ‘alayhi wa salam*, and showed anger at the one who did that’. There is also an important transposition, where the author of *al-Madīna al-fāḍila* is not one of the *ahl al-kufr* but one of the *ahl al-fikr*.

From 1954 on, Dr. ‘Uthmān Yaḥyā (Osman Yahia) from the Sorbonne with UNESCO and the Cultural Ministry of Egypt undertook to improve the Egyptian editions. He used three original manuscripts: Qunya, based on the second draft; another manuscript based on the first found in the Beyazid Library, Turkey, and the Cairo edition printed 1329 AH. He worked eighteen years in preliminary work to produce in 1972 the first volume. The last volume, the fourteenth, came out in 1992. With his death, there were still twenty-three more volumes left.

‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Manṣūb acknowledges the value of this edition, but makes four criticisms. First, much of the critical apparatus is consumed by stylistic differences in orthography. He says, ‘He perhaps could have saved some time by not repeating each difference, such as *malā’ikat malā’ikah mala’ikat mala’ikah*’ (p. 48). I used to study New Testament texts, where seemingly insignificant variations can be important clues to a manuscript’s history. But in this case, we are dealing simply with regional and stylistic variations. If the four-volume editions are hard to read because of their dense blocking on the page, Osman Yahia’s edition suffers from an overly heavy critical apparatus. The four-volume editions can have over 750 words on a page, with no paragraphing and little punctuation, making the reading more difficult than it possibly needs to be. Osman Yahia’s edition may have only 140 words on a page, with generous spacing of paragraphs and sections, but it also has ten lines of critical apparatus for fifteen lines of text detailing three manuscripts showing, for example, *nasha’*, *nashā’*, and *nashā’h*. The 2010 edition has 4–500 words per page and usually only a few lines below the text.

Second, in Osman Yahia’s comments, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Manṣūb detects an Isma‘ili bias. Third, he takes issue with the use of exclamation marks when referring to the divine, e.g., (*ta‘ālā* !) or the messenger, e.g., (– ‘*alayhi al-salām* ! –). This reviewer also notices an overuse of exclamations in the Osman Yahia edition. Although the extensive punctuation may be helpful at times, it means that there is another opening to error. The 2010 edition is lightly punctuated, and after having worked carefully on translating the first volume over the last six months, I have found the punctuation to be helpful and accurate. Fourth, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Manṣūb says that there have been omissions ‘of many expressions and words from the verified edition, and the advent of words added without indicating that’ (p. 49).

Although ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Manṣūb does not mention the printed edition by Dar al-Kotob (1999), this writer has found numerous errors there, averaging six a page over a hundred pages. The errors are usually clumsy attempts to correct

what did not need correcting. Ironically, the Dar al-Kotob edition may be the easiest to visually search, neither too dense (as with the four volumes) nor too spaced (as with Osman Yahia), and so still has a place on my shelf.

‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Manṣūb welcomes digital editions but has found them to be full of errors. He supplies a long list of the significant errors.

The 2010 edition has indexes for the Qur’ān citations, *ḥadīth*, poems, eyewitness testimonials (to the manuscript’s authenticity), Sufi terms (fully six pages for the first 170 pages of text, including entries such as *al-umm*, *al-ghawth*, and *wārid*), people, places, book titles mentioned, and sects. The indexes of the Dar al-Kotob edition, however, seem to be easier to work with and more extensive (although the entry ‘Muhammad’, found on nearly every page, could have been omitted).

The edition in twelve volumes is bound well and the pages are easy to read. The font is open and light and readable. The work answers the deficiencies of past editions and provides access to this greatest of works by the *akbar* of shaykhs.

Close work with the three editions (Būlāq, Osman Yahia, and 2010) shows this critical edition to be very well conceived. In 600 pages I found only one verse number error in the apparatus. In the same volume, the dozen or so times that textual variants were important were fully documented. The 2010 edition also notes Qur’ānic variants (Ḥaḥṣ and Warsh) used in the text. The Osman Yahia edition over the same portion of the work had perhaps thirty annotations in the critical apparatus that were very helpful and would have improved this critical edition: e.g., references to ideas explored by Henry Corbin, explicit connections made to Greek thought, and theological-philosophical terminologies. What this critical edition has that the Osman Yahia edition does not is the depth of poetry annotations and the frequent use of *Lisān al-‘arab* for classical word usages that are unfamiliar to modern Arabic speakers. From the comparison of the critical apparatus in the two editions, the reader will recognize Osman Yahia’s erudition in modern philosophical thought, especially through the French language, and al-Mansoub’s thoroughly Arabic vantage point, where it is the Arabic that opens up the *Futūḥāt*. From the Introduction to the Qur’ānic citations by *sūra* name (not number), it is clear that this critical edition is placing the work in its fully Arabic Muslim context and as such provides an important counter to a ‘philosophical’ and ‘universalist’ vision of the Shaykh al-Akbar.

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ON MAJESTY AND BEAUTY

*The Kitâb Al-Jalâl Wa-l Jamâl of
Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi*

translated by
Rabia Terri Harris

In the Name of Allah, Most Beneficent, Most Merciful
The power and strength are His.

Praise belongs to Allah the Great; His Majesty is part of the manifestation of His Beauty. In His proximity He is the Near, in His loftiness, the Observer. Power, splendour, grandeur, and magnificence are His whose essence is great beyond any resemblance to other essences. His essence is exalted above all motions and stillnesses, all bewilderment and mindfulness. It is too high to be overtaken by any explanation, express or implied, just as it is too great to be limited and described.

It is beyond any physical descent or ascent, any tangible enthronement upon any throne, any haste to seek an object, and – when an object is gained – any satisfaction at reuniting with something that had been missed.

Just so, it is too great to be described in detail or in summary, to be the basis for creeds, to alter with the differences among creeds, to find pleasure or pain in action, or to be qualified with anything but eternity.

It is too great:

- to draw together or be divided.
- for anything that refers to bodies to refer to it.
- for understanding to encompass the core of its reality.
- to be as imagination would describe it.
- to be as wakefulness or dream would seek to perceive it.

It is too great for times and places to hold it, for the permanence of its being to be measured with the passing of months and years, for above and below, right and left, behind and before.

It is too great for denial or confusion to hinder its majesty.

It is too great to be comprehended by intellectual reflection, by the spiritual practices of masters of illumination, by the Knowers' secrets, by the majestic range of leaders' vision – for it is too great to be confined behind veils and curtains, and so cannot be comprehended by anything but its own light.

It is too great:

- either to exist in the shape of a human being or to lose anything by the existence of particular essences.
 - either to accept an alien condition belonging to the entities it has created, or to be defined by negative conditions (though it is confirmed by faith).
 - either to be the place of manifestations, or to be known as past, present or future time.
- It is too great for the senses to rest upon, for doubt and confusion to affect, for likeness and analogy to comprehend, for material classification, or for the intimacy of the man of knowledge.

It is too great to be the third of three in company.

It is great beyond spouse and parents, beyond there being 'a single thing like unto it' (*Ikhlas*)

4), beyond anything preceding its existence, beyond being attributed limbs, hands, fingers, feet, beyond anything else being with it in eternity.

It is great beyond the laughter and joy promised for the repentance of servants, beyond wrath, beyond habitual wonder, beyond alteration of state as it exists among humankind.

So glory be to Him, Mighty in His magnificence, Grand in His splendour. "There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing." (*Shûrâ* 11)

To proceed:

The matter of *jalal* and *jamal*, the Divine Majesty and the Divine Beauty, has attracted the attention of the witnesses of truth, the Knowers of Allah among the Sufis. Each of them has spoken of these two as was appropriate to his own state. Most, however, have connected the condition of intimacy with Beauty and the condition of awe with Majesty, and things are not as they have said.

Or rather, to a certain extent things are just as they have said – that is, Majesty and Beauty are indeed two attributes of Allah and awe and intimacy two attributes of human beings, and when the souls of the Knowers witness Majesty they feel awe and diminution, while when they witness Beauty they feel intimacy and elation. Because this is so, the Knowers have equated Majesty with Allah's overpowering force and Beauty with His mercy; they came to this decision because of what they experienced in themselves.

I wish, if Allah so wills, to clarify the realities of the two to the extent that Allah enables me to explain them.

I say, first, that Allah's Majesty is a relation that proceeds from Him to Him, and He has prevented us from true knowledge of it. Beauty, though, is a relation that proceeds from Him to us, and it is this which grants us any knowledge we may possess of Him, as well as all revelations, contemplations, and spiritual states. Among us, it has two modalities: awe and intimacy. That is because this Beauty has an exalted aspect and a related aspect. The exalted aspect is called the Majesty of Beauty, and it is this of which the Knowers speak and which appears to them, though they believe that they are speaking of the first Majesty we mentioned.

For us, this Majesty of Beauty has been linked to the state of intimacy, and the closer, related aspect of Beauty has been linked to the state of awe.

When the Majesty of Beauty manifests to us, we are drawn intimately close. Were it not for this, we would be destroyed, for nothing can continue to exist in the face of Majesty and awe together. Thus Majesty in Him is countered by intimacy in us so that we may keep our balance in contemplation and maintain a mental awareness of what we see, rather than falling into distracted terror.

When Beauty manifests to us here – and Beauty is the welcoming openness of the Truth towards us while Majesty is its unattainable exaltation over us – then His expansiveness in His Beauty is countered by our state of awe. For were one expansiveness to be met with another it would lead to unacceptable behaviour, and unacceptable behaviour in the Divine Presence is the cause of expulsion and alienation. On account of this, one of the witnesses of truth who knew its importance said, "Seat yourself upon the prayer-mat (*bisât*) and beware of presumption (*inbisât*)."

Allah's Majesty acting upon us prevents us from unacceptable behaviour in the Divine Presence, as likewise does our awe at His Beauty and expansiveness toward us.

Therefore, what has been spiritually disclosed to our colleagues is sound. It is their judgment – that Majesty in itself closes and diminishes them and that Beauty in itself opens and expands them – that is in error. So long as the divine disclosure is sound, the rest is inconsequential, but Majesty and Beauty, in their essences, are as we have described them.

Know that the Qur'an encompasses Beauty and the Majesty of Beauty. As for Absolute

Majesty, no created being possesses any means of entering into it or bearing witness to it. The Truth has singled it out for Himself. It is the presence in which the Truth sees Himself as He is. Were we to have a means of entering into this, we would possess a comprehensive knowledge of Allah and all that is with Him, and that is impossible.

And know, brother, that since Allah Most High possesses two realities and has described Himself with two Hands¹ and knows us as two "handfuls," the whole of existence has carried out this rule:

There is nothing in existence that does not contain its compensatory opposite.

Out of all this counterposition, we are here especially concerned with what pertains to the Divine Majesty and the Divine Beauty (and I mean by Majesty here the Majesty of Beauty, as mentioned above).

No divine saying related through transmitters from Allah Most High contains anything indicative of Majesty without its being accompanied by something of Beauty to counter it. It is the same way in all revealed scriptures, and in everything.

For example, whenever there is a verse in the Qur'an that speaks of mercy, it has a sister that speaks of retribution to balance it. Thus His calling Himself "Forgiver of sins, Acceptor of repentance" is countered by His calling Himself "Terrible in retribution" (*Mu'min* 3). His saying "Inform My servants that I am All-Forgiving, Most Merciful..." is countered by "...and that My punishment is the painful punishment." (*Hijr* 49-50) His saying, "The Companions of the Right, how happy are the Companions of the Right! amid thornless lote-trees..." as the verses run (*Wâqi'ah* 27-28), is countered by "The Companions of the Left, how wretched are the Companions of the Left! In hot wind and boiling water..." and so forth (*Wâqi'ah* 41-42). "Faces that day will be radiant" (*Qiyâmah* 22) is balanced by "Faces that day will be gloomy" (*Qiyâmah* 24), "On the day when (some) faces will turn white" is balanced by "...and (some) faces will turn black" (*Al 'Imrân* 106). "(Some) faces that day will be downcast, labouring, toiling" (*Ghashiyah* 2-3) is balanced by "(Some) faces that day will be happy and well-pleased because of their striving" (*Ghashiyah* 8-9). "(Many) faces that day will bright, laughing, joyous" (*'Abasa* 38-39) is balanced by "(Many) faces that day will have dust upon them, darkness will cover them" (*'Abasa* 40-41).

If you follow this strand through the Qur'an you will find that all the verses of this type follow this pattern. And it is all for the sake of the two divine watchers [the recording angels of good and bad deeds²] mentioned in His sayings (*Banî Isrâ'îl* 20):

All do We aid, those [who seek this world]
as well as these [who seek the eternal]....

and (*Shams* 8):

He reveals to it its way of evil and its way of good

and his saying about the truthful giver (*Layl* 7):

We facilitate for him the way to ease

¹ *Sâd* 75: "What prevents thee [Satan] from prostrating to one [Adam] whom I have created with My Two Hands?" *Mâ'idah* 64: "...both His hands are spread out, He expends as He pleases The two Hands are often held to be mercy and wrath, or Majesty and Beauty.

² These watchers are mentioned explicitly in *Qâf* 17-18: "When the two receivers receive, sitting on the right and the left. He utters not a word but there is by him a watcher at hand."

which He balances with His saying about the lying miser (*Layl* 10):

We facilitate for him the way to distress
So know.

The verses on the Divine Majesty and Beauty are also arranged like this in the Book of Allah. I would like to mention a few of them and discuss them by means of *ishârât*, hints or indications of what the attentive understanding might grasp in pursuit of these meanings, hallowed as they are above human unclarity and animal lusts. May Allah aid us by protecting us from sin and error in word and action. By His Might. Amin.

We will use the word "hints" instead of "section" or "chapter" and begin with a verse of Majesty, following it with its corresponding verse of Beauty, and then proceed to another verse of Majesty and so on, God willing. It may be that one verse will have two aspects – an aspect of Majesty and an aspect of Beauty. If so, God willing we will cite both its sources, in Majesty and in Beauty, because it contains the whole counterposition.

HINTS OF MAJESTY

Allah Most High said (*Shûrâ* 11),

laysa ka-mithlilihi shay'un
Nothing is like unto Him...

This verse contains its compensatory opposite. It is also countered as a whole by His saying (*Shûrâ* 11):

wa huwa as-samî' ul-basîr
and He is the Hearing, the Seeing.

and by the Tradition of the Prophet (peace be upon him):

Allah created Adam according to His form.³

So know, you who are drowned in the sea of contemplation, that in the reading from Majesty, the likeness referred to in *laysa ka-mithlilihi shay'un* is literal likeness. In the reading from Beauty, it is figurative likeness.

[According to Majesty], this verse denies any equivalence [between Creator and created] based on a sharing of essential properties. There are grand oceans here. For instance, [if two things are equivalent,] the equivalence is not dictated by the perfection of both of them, or their [corresponding] virtues, or anything else: it is only as far as essential properties are concerned that they can be each other's equivalents. As far as other attributes are concerned, they may either resemble or contradict each other, [indifferently].

Thus, two men share in one essential property: though one of them is weak, incapable, ignorant, deaf, dumb and blind, while the other is strong, capable, knowledgeable, and able to hear, speak, and see, they are united by a single definition: for example, that they are mortal rational animals. (Since that is so, it is indicative, so understand.)

³ Hadith recorded in: Ibn Hanbâl, 11:244, 251, 310, 323, 434, 519; Bukharî, *Isti'dhân* 1; Muslim, Barr 115, Jannah 28.

Thus also, there may be a sharing and equivalence of [primary] attributes that does not result in "likeness." The reality of a thing indeed derives from its essential properties, but they are multiple. Another thing may share in some of them without the first thing being "like unto" the other thing in all respects. For instance, the definition "animal" is applied to human beings and brute beasts, but a person is not "the like of," a horse, because one of the conditions of likeness is the sharing of all essential properties, and that cannot occur except in two individuals of the same sort.

The kind of likeness here described is called literal or "intelligible" (*'aqliyyah*). Let us define it as perfect and total equivalence. There is also partial equivalence, which arises when there is sharing of some essential properties. Here likeness exists to the extent of sharing; after that point disjunction occurs.

The realities refuse to accept an equivalence based on secondary, incidental attributes: they do not belong to the reality of the essence to which they are attributed, but are like accidents, even if they are fixed and their nonexistence is inconceivable. In such a case the equivalence could only be drawn between two attributes, not between the two entities in which the two comparable attributes subsist. For instance, one could propose that two "knowers" are equivalent, conceptually or actually, but if they are [genuinely] equivalent it will be for some other reason [than "knowing"].

Secondary attributes take identity from the individuality of that in which they subsist. Their identity is dependent, just as [in philosophy] the place proper to a contingent event depends upon the space occupied by its substrate and is to the extent of its substrate, because the contingent event is sited [in the substrate].

All this indicates that there is no sharing of essential attributes between us and the Creator, whether total or partial. On account of this, from the perspective of the realities, "likeness" between us and Him is denied. Do not deceive yourself that He describes you as He describes Himself – as knowing, willing, and so forth. The brute beasts are described as hearing, seeing, and willing as well. So understand that.

Beauty. The selfsame verse, His saying:

laysa ka-mithlilihi shay'un
Nothing is like unto Him.

is [according to Beauty,] a figurative, "verbal" (*lughawiyyah*) likening, as when people say "Zayd is like a lion." Here the *ka* has the sense of a preposition [meaning "as," instead of being read as part of the compound word *ka-mithlilihi*. The verse then reads:

Nothing is like His likeness.

With this the Truth descends in the station of openness and the attribute of Beauty upon the hearts of the Knowers. In this reading Allah denies that He has made them resemble anything else in His whole creation – just as, in His Majesty, He denies that the creation resembles Him.

In this reading He gives word of the superiority of the human being over all creatures and all else in existence. So the reality of the human being is not bound to one estate. Allah has assured him of the attributes of completeness and perfection, made him overflow with His grace, and given into his possession the keys of the Divine Names. From this figurative likening [of the human and the divine] humanity derives its stewardship of the Creation. By it the two worlds are supported. By it the spirits are subdued; of it Allah spoke (*Jâthiyah* 13):

And He has made subservient to you whatsoever is in the heavens

and whatsoever is in the earth, altogether, from Himself.

This reading points to a divine expansiveness. At the moment in which this expansiveness manifests in the heart of the witness of truth, his state takes on the sense of the preceding reading from Majesty, just as when the Majesty of the verse manifests in his heart, his state immediately takes on the sense of the verse's Beauty. This is the way things are in every manifestation, as we have shown.

The reading from Majesty conforms to obligation and denies similitudes and equivalents [to Allah]; the reading from Beauty conforms to ecstasy and denies [only] equivalents. So Majesty affirms the holiness of the Truth, while Beauty affirms the exalted rank of the servant.

Again, when He says, concerning the realities of His Majesty,

Nothing is like unto Him.

a counterbalance is to be found in the realities of His Divinity. For after this statement its opposite arises: the descent of the Truth to the station of likening with:

[He is] the Hearing, the Seeing.

So understand this hint. The servant, with his own personal attributes, continues to exist only because Allah Himself continues to exist. Even when the servant is invested with attributes of perfection as fixed by divine lordship's appearance in human servanthood, and is preserved by Allah's active continuance of him, this remains the case.

Therefore the one who (through Allah's continuing in Himself) is a witness of truth, is bedazzled: he is engaged in unbroken contemplation, for he is present with the fundamental counterbalance (*taqâbul*). And the one who (through Allah's continuation of his personal being) is not a witness of truth, is also bedazzled: he is veiled by amazement, for he is with Allah, acting upon the universe, by way of His "likening" (*tamâthul*). This is the state of the people of Paradise, who, in Paradise, [with the divine prerogative] will say to a thing they wish "Be," and it will become.⁴

So the witness of truth sees that the coming into existence of the wished-for thing proceeds from the essence of the word uttered and not from the uttering itself. The one who is not a witness of truth sees the thing come to be from the uttering itself, because it happens through him. Both join in denying that the power comes from themselves – so understand.

HINTS OF MAJESTY

Allah Most High said (An'am 103):

lâ tudrikuhu al-absâr
Vision comprehends Him not.

This contains its own contrary.

⁴ 'Abdul-Karim al-Jili cited this report thus: ... it was reported that God sends to the people of the Garden a message with the following contents (and God knows best): "A letter from the Life Everlasting to the Life Everlasting. I say to a thing 'Be,' and it is, and I have made you to say to a thing 'Be,' and it is" – and they do not say to a thing "Be" except that it is. (Ibn 'Arabi, *Journey to the Lord of Power*, p.80). In the Qur'an (*Hâ Mîm Sajdah* 31): "...[In Paradise] you shall have whatever you ask for."

The Prophet (peace be upon him) was asked, "Did you see your Lord?" and replied, "He is a light. How should I see Him? The Veil of Power was still lowered; it is never raised. He is too great for the eyes to pronounce upon Him."⁵ Thus in their contemplation of Him the eyes are in the station of bewilderment and inability, and their vision is not their own. As the Truthful One [Hadrat Abu Bakr] has said, "The inability to attain perception is itself perception."⁶

Hint. The eyes do not perceive the air, because they are immersed in it. Whoever has something in his fist does not perceive that thing.

Hint. The eye wishes to perceive the colour of water, but the contents of the glass are overwhelmingly clear. The eye does not perceive this colour – for if it did, it would limit it – because water resembles vision in clarity. Perception does not perceive itself, for it is within itself while it perceives the water. This is vision envisioned.⁷

Hint. When the eye looks at an object with a polished surface and sees a form in it, its perception of the form is identical with its perception of the polished body. If it strove to discriminate what corresponds to the form in the mirror from the mirror, it would be unable to do so. The mirror cannot be grasped. If you inquire of the eye what it saw, it cannot reply "I saw the mirror," because the mirror is ungraspable and nothing can pronounce upon it. (If someone says this anyway, he is ignorant and has no real understanding in his observation. But if he says, "I saw..." and then gives a report of the form or forms that he saw, he has told the truth.)

These things are exempt from the eye's comprehension despite the fact that they are created so understand – but the eye may perceive them without grasping them. Their assimilation to the forms (reflected within them) is of the essence: the mirror may never be disjoined from the reflected form in the vision of any seer. Such is your own vision, so confirm for yourself what we have said.

Know that Allah Most High is not to be encompassed by any eye or any intellect. Yet stupid speculation measures and defines Him, and weak imagination assigns him form and likeness. Sometimes intelligent people, after having found Him to be free of whatever they imagined and speculated about Him, have afterwards fallen back under the power of imagination and have pronounced upon Him indirectly. It is as Allah has said (*A'raf* 200):

When a visitation from the Devil afflicts them,
they remember, then lo! they see.

That is, they return to the sound proof intellect has given them that Allah is beyond all this.

Beauty. The Beauty corresponding to this Majesty is in His saying (*Qiyâmah* 22-23):

wujûhun yawmâ'idhin nâdiratun ilâ rabbiha nazirah
Faces that day will be radiant, looking upon their Lord.

Allah – glory to Him here opens Himself to us in His Beauty so that we might perceive Him with our eyes, looking upon Him. To this also points the tradition of the Prophet (peace be upon him):

⁵ This report is extremely similar to that in Muslim, Imân 341-2.

⁶ Cited in Abû Nasr al-Sarrâj, *Kitâb al-lumâ'*, ed. R.A. Nicholson, 1914, p.36 [Arabic text].

⁷ This Hint draws on Hadrat Junayd's saying on the relation of the knowledge of Allah to the Knower of Allah – "The colour of the water is the colour of the vessel." (Cited in 'Abdul-Karîm Qushayrî, *Risâlah*, "Ma'rifah.")

You will see your Lord, on the Resurrection Day, as you see the moon on the night when it is full, or as you see the sun at noon in a cloudless sky, and you will not be harmed by your vision of Him.⁸

And also what Allah Most High has said about the denizens of Hell (*Tatfif* 15):

That day they will be veiled from their Lord.

Now in the Arabic language the verb *nazara*, to look, when accompanied by the preposition *ilâ* can only mean to look upon, with the eyes. It is when followed by *fi* that it means to look into, mentally and intellectually, and when followed by *lî* that it means to look after, with compassion; other prepositions lead it to signify encounter, struggle, or delay. Also, the eyes are one of the attributes of the face, while the intellect is not. Consequently the looking mentioned in this verse must be the vision of the eyes.

Allah's saying (*A'raf* 143):

You cannot see Me.

to Moses (peace be upon him) was a decision relevant to a state that may be known from Moses's request [to see his Lord]. We shall not attempt to discuss that here. Yet Allah did make [His vision] lawful to the mountain, which shattered to atoms, while Moses fell into a swoon.⁹

Now, perception does not faint. A particular constitution is not one of its requirements (nor was it a requirement here) – its only requirement is something to subsist in, because it is an intangible. Fainting, though, exists by virtue of a heavy and dense constitution.

When Moses recovered, he glorified Allah. There would be no point to his giving praise when he arose from this state unless he had been granted some sort of contemplation. Next, realization led him to repentance for the conditions imposed by his constitution. Then he avowed that he was (*A'raf* 143):

the first of those who believe

in what he had seen in that swoon, for faith does not take shape without vision, in whatever realm it may be.¹⁰

⁸ Bukharî, *Bad' al-khalq* 7, *Anbiya'* 1; Muslim, *Imân* 380-383, *Jannah* 14-17; Tirmidhi *Qiyâmah* 60, *Jannah* 7; Ibn Mâjah, *Zuhd* 39; Darîmî, *Riqâq* 12; Ibn Hanbal, II:230, 232, 254, 257, 316, 359, 473, 502, 504, 507; III:16; VI:355.

⁹ The whole episode is told in *A'raf* 143: And when Moses came at Our appointed time and His Lord spoke to him, he said: "My Lord, make me see, that I may look upon You." He said: "You cannot see Me, but look at the mountain: if it stays firmly in its place, then you will see Me." So when His Lord manifested Himself to the mountain, it crumbled, and Moses fell down in a swoon. Then when he awakened he said, "Glory to You, I have returned to You, and I am the first of those who believe."

¹⁰ In Chapter 367 of the *Futûhât* (translated by James Morris, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 108:1) Hadrat Ibn 'Arabi reports a visionary conversation with Moses about this event. The Shaykh asks Moses (peace be upon him):

"[How is it that] you requested the vision of God, while the Messenger of God said that 'not one of you will see his Lord until he dies?'"

So he said: "And it was just like that: when I asked Him for the vision, He answered me, so that I fell down stunned. Then I saw Him in my (state of) being stunned."

Concerning this, the Prophet (peace be upon him) asked Harithah, "What is the reality of your faith?"

He replied, "It is as if I am looking upon the Throne of my Lord distinctly..." as the tradition goes.¹¹ He confirmed seeing, in whatever realm, and for that reason the reality of his faith was sound. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) allowed that in this case Harithah possessed true realization and something more: validated faith. For there is no point to faith in the unseen except its connection to vision. Of this there is no doubt.

[As the "first of those who believe"], Moses was, in some sense, the first to see Allah with his eyes. This degree may refer to either a state of experience or to a station of being. If he spoke from his station, Moses was indeed the first person to perceive Allah [continuously]. If he spoke from his state, it may be that others had seen Him, but the rank of "firstness" is reserved for the state of Moses by the perfection of the episode [rather than by historical precedence]. This usage is often found.

If, in contemplation, the Truth opens you to this verse, be content that:

Vision comprehends Him not.

If not, you are ruined, as I have told you. So beware of presumption: indeed, let awe be with you constantly, and it will protect you. So know – and Allah, glory to Him, is the Guide.

HINTS OF MAJESTY

Allah Most High said (*Jinn* 28):

wa ahsâ kulla shay'in 'adadan
And He counts the number of everything.

This is a hint of the comprehensive divine knowledge of all of the names of existing things, whether they existed in the past, exist at present, or will come to exist in the future. This verse applies particularly to actual being that is, was, or will be. It is a connection more specific than that given in His saying (*Talaq* 12):

ahâta bi-kulli shay'in 'ilman
He encompasses all things in knowledge.

I said: "While (you were) dead?"

He said: "While (I was) dead."

He said, "...So I did not see God until I had died. It was then that I awakened, so that I knew Whom I saw. And it was because of that that I said, I have returned to You, since I did not return to anyone but Him." ... He said, "I was seeing Him (all along), and yet I didn't used to know that it was Him! But when my 'dwelling' was changed and I saw Him, then I knew Whom I saw. Therefore when I 'awoke' I was no longer veiled, and my vision went on accompanying me throughout all eternity." (pp. 64-66)

¹¹ The text of this hadith is as follows: It is related from al-Hârith ibn Malik al-Ansâri that he passed by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), who asked him, "How are you, Hârithah?" "I am truly a believer," he replied. "I see what you say," the Prophet told him, "but for every saying there is a reality. What is the reality of your faith?"

Hârithah said, "I have withdrawn myself from this world. My nights are vigils and my days are fasts, and it is as if I am looking upon the Throne of my Lord distinctly. It is as if I am looking upon the people of Paradise visiting each other in Paradise. It is as if I am looking upon the people of Hell spitting each other in Hell." the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said, "O Hârithah, you have realized, now persevere!"

This hadith is traced in Su'ad al-Hakim's *al-Mu'jam al-Sûfi* (Beirut: 1981, pp. 1264-5).

– which means all necessary, all possible, and all impossible things.

(While some theologians will not apply the term "thing" to anything but an actual entity, this need not concern us. Allah certainly encompasses all things in knowledge and He certainly knows the impossible, and if those who prefer such terminology restrict the "encompassing knowledge" of this verse to actually existing entities, they have no proof for it except their own usage.)

Here "all-encompassing knowledge" has a general meaning, while "counting the number" demands finiteness in the thing that is counted. "All-encompassing knowledge" is then particularly an expression for the connection between knowledge and its infinite objects.

While it may be that the significance of "to count" in this verse is largely identical with that of "to encompass," the meanings are not the same in the case of future events. These are infinite [and yet are "counted"] as we have said. For while the things Allah wills are infinite, He knows more than He wills, and what He knows is not the same as what He wills. [The larger infinity of knowledge] is not "counted" because it cannot be; the count would have to include counting itself. And the impossible is not quantified at all, so that "counting" might be applied to it. Only knowledge can comprehend it: that is, that it is a property of Allah's knowledge of things in all aspects.

Since the Truth "counts the number of everything," you are among the things that are counted, and His protection and observation of you follow. When a contemplation ascends from this verse to Him, it wanders lost in the majesty of the Truth, amazed with inspirations, glimpses, flashes, fragrances, and significances of the divine, and all that proceeds in it and from it.

So when this contemplation has become real for you, the Truth opens the verse I shall mention next, which concerns the Beauty of this Majesty. And then together with what intimacy you desire there, He manifests Himself in the Majesty of this verse, which amazes and overwhelms the contemplator. So understand.

Beauty. Allah Most High said (*Saffât* 147):

wa arsalnâhu ilâ mi'ati alfin aw yazîdûn
We have sent it to a hundred thousand or more.

This verse came with the word "or", which pertains to uncertainty, and that is impossible for Allah Most High.

When the Truth descended in His Beauty in this verse, it was in expansiveness toward us. Uncertainty is our characteristic, so [the use of "or"] establishes a type of relationship to the servant. If the servant is ignorant, he will assimilate his Lord to himself and qualify Him with uncertainty, and so fall into error. If he is a confirmer of truth, he will flee to the divine saying:

And He counts the number of everything.

and hold to that secret, and connect this uncertainty to the habitual human way of seeing things, according to the customary mode of expression among the Arabs for the general idea of "many." Uncertainty pertains to the creature, despite his wanting to count exact numbers and, from another perspective, his wanting to declare himself as free of limitation as he has declared his Maker.

So let the reader take this verse as intending the general idea of "many" and not as specifying a number. Although numbers are not absent from the verse, still the Speaker's

intention here is not to signify some particular number; the intention is to signify multitude. This sort of phraseology was in use among those to whom Allah sent His Message, and when they employed it they certainly did not intend that one should insist on some precise number.

And when the servant has borne witness to the intention of multitude here, he will discover the precise enumeration of all that he has known from the moment he came into existence until his present moment, and of what will come to be, without end!

(Actually, some theological scholars disagree with us about whether knowledge can attach to two or more [simultaneous] objects. Some of them hold that this is impossible. Those who allow it include Imam Abû 'Amr al-Silâfi [may Allah be pleased with him], who did not disagree with us on this question. As for the statement of al-Isfara'ini [Abû Ishâq] that the heart can bear no more than one knowledge at a time, it may be that he was hinting at our position. Within the framework of that statement are knowledge, the principles of action that take shape from knowledge, and its mastery, as well as an intimation of [what we have said].

As far as we are concerned, our discourse is only with the masters of realities and secrets among the people of Allah Most High. We have sought to make a connection to some of the sayings of formal scholars in order to set at ease hearts that are straying from this Way with regard to these realities. So know that. Allah speaks the truth and He it is that shows the way.)

HINTS OF MAJESTY

Allah Most High said (*Baqarah* 163; also *Kahf* 110, *Anbiya* 108, *Hajj* 34, *Hâ Mîm Sajdah* 5):

ilâhukum ilâhun wâhidun
Your god is One God.

This also contains its own counterbalancing opposite. It is a statement applying to everything deified and worshipped.

Hint. This is a secret of Allah's Divinity. If it were not for what every worshipper finds in the object of his worship – that is, in his act of worshipping that object – he would not worship it. If [idol-worshippers] were to draw strength from the unequivocalness of this statement, they would say that when Allah the Misleader misleads, He leads astray the relations between Divinity and the one who has no god, while [the idol-worshipper] is merely the servant of a particular object of worship, the secret of whose divinity itself belongs to Allah Most High. That is the soul of His saying (*Baqarah* 163):

Your god is One God: there is no god but He.

So the statement affirms the essential form of a thing rejected in actual practice. People only adopt these [idols] because of the relationship with the divine that they establish by carving them, raising them up, installing them, and submitting their needs to them. So understand that: it is a remarkable secret.

Hint. The partner, which has no being, is denied: therefore nothing is denied. The partner is a postulate, not an existent; postulates are ascriptions, and ascriptions have no reality. The denial of partners to Allah is the affirmation of Divine Singularity (*al-wahdâniyyah*). Affirming Singularity finally comes down to existence, while denying partners finally comes down to nonexistence. So understand.

Hint. Allah's Singularity manifests in the Divine enthronement upon the human throne. This is in contrast to the Beneficent enthronement: The Divine enthronement is at the centre

of the circle, according to His saying:

My earth and My heavens do not contain me,
but the heart of My believing servant contains Me.¹²

while the Beneficent enthronement encompasses the circle, according to His saying (Tâ Hâ 5):

The Beneficent is established upon the Throne.

The Throne of the Universe in the Beneficent enthronement has the dignity of the Truth for the human enthronement, while the human heart in the Divine enthronement has the dignity of the Truth for the Beneficent enthronement.

When the Singularity manifests, the contemplator beholds nothing except himself. Whether he has developed to the stage of his own singularity or is at some other stage, it is the same. If he is at the stage of his own singularity, he is in the position of multiplying unity by unity, which can only produce unity. Thus in arithmetic (by way of metaphor and approximation), if you multiply one by one, the result will be one. And if the contemplator is in a stage other than that of singularity, he is in the position of someone who multiplies one by two: he produces nothing but two. This is the case with all numbers similarly treated: If you multiply one by fifteen, the result is fifteen; if you multiply one by 155, your result will be that by which you multiplied the unity, namely 155. So know that.

Beauty. As for the Beauty corresponding to this Majesty, the Most High said (*Banî Isrâ'îl* 110):

*qul id'û Llâha aw id'ûr-Rahmâna
ayyamâ tad'u fa-lahul-asmâ' ul-husnâ.*

Say: Call upon Allah or call upon the Beneficent:
whichever you call upon, His are the Most Beautiful Names.

The Truth here descends in His Beauty, in expansiveness toward us, with His Beneficence. It is in this name, the Beneficent, that He is established upon the Throne of the Universe. This is the general divine knowledge to which the Knowers of Allah ultimately attain and in which the witnesses of truth are opened and expanded, while the corresponding Majesty closes and contracts them – that is:

Your god is One God.

Where the name "Allah" gathers together all things whatsoever, the name "The Beneficent" gathers together all the realities of the universe and what it contains. From this derives the expression *rahmân ad-dunyâ wal-âkhirah*, "Most Beneficent of this world and the Next," and because of this people are told:

Say: Call upon Allah or call upon the Beneficent:
whichever you call upon, His are the Most Beautiful Names.

People's supplication is only that which connects them to what benefits them, according to

¹² Hadith cited in Ghazali's *Ihya' 'ulum al-dîn*, 15:3 (Hakim 1265-6).

the extent of their knowledge of God. If a prayer is in the name of the Beneficent, that name includes all of the Beautiful Names except "Allah." His are the Most Beautiful Names, The Beneficent, and all that the name "Allah" contains. When you call upon Allah, you are only calling out of Him the Beneficent in particular, while you are calling out of the Beneficent that Name from which you seek the real object of your prayer. Thus the drowning man calls, "O Saviour!" the hungry man, "O Provider!" the sinner, "O All-Forgiving! O Most-Forgiving!" So it is for all of the Names. So understand what we have pointed out to you: It is a great and profitable door.

HINTS OF MAJESTY

Allah Most High said (*Anbiyâ' 23*):

lâ yus'alu 'an ma yaf'alu

He cannot be questioned about what He does...

This verse is connected to irresistible force, the plane of Allah's transcendent power, and the establishment of divine sovereignty over the world. When these attributes become fixed in the servant's heart, it is impossible for him to seek the reason for an occurrence or to raise any objection to it.

Hint. Someone who knows what is within himself does not question himself unless a questioner is appointed for him who undertakes to ask, and so the question arises. Since that is the case,

He cannot be questioned about what He does

because [the questioner, the questioned, and the point of the question are] none other than Allah, His attributes, and His actions. This significance is answered in the reminder of the verse, where He says (*Anbiya' 23*):

wa hum yus 'alûn

...but they will be questioned.

The reality here is single and of a piece. Allah is the one who questions them about His action upon them and what has manifested through them, and they cannot answer except by His action in them. So understand: I have intended to be brief for the sake of people who understand hints.

Beauty. The Beauty corresponding to this verse is His saying (*Nisâ' 77*):

limâ katabta alaynal-qitâl

Why did you ordain fighting for us?

He here descends in His Beauty in expansiveness towards us, so we are enabled to voice a question. The Beauty of this verse is our boldness in our absence of knowledge of the Majesty at that moment.

When such a question arises, the servant must join it with His saying:

He cannot be questioned about what He does.

Hint. For this construction to follow upon the other presents difficulties only for someone who must labour and struggle to fulfil [the questioned order]. By contrast, both [a thing's] creation and its nonexistence are the same to someone who accepts a divine order spontaneously. If a person has done this, he cannot be called other than wise.

Hint. Part of wisdom is to put things in their proper places, and one of its aspects is to restore forms to what the realm they occupy requires. The realm of this world is not like the realm of the Next. It is not necessary that the way things take shape in this world should be the way they take shape in the next. Indeed, the Prophet of Allah (peace be upon him) has spoken of the joy, graciousness, beauty and harmony of the blessed, and of the opposite situation of the damned, while this world is a turbid and mutable confusion, and its mode of life sick, meagre, and gloomy. Of necessity, one must leave it, and so of necessity the level of things must change. Since [the people who asked the question here discussed] realized this, they said what is in the remainder of the verse (*Nisâ' 77*):

lawlâ akhartanâ ilâ ajalîn qarib
Why did You not put it off for us for a little while?

because a change in the level of things was inevitable [and the order to fight would adopt some other aspect in the Next World].

Hint.

Why did you ordain fighting for us?

To fight means to search for knowledge of Allah by means of reflection and the rejection of obscuring imaginations, and to search for contemplative vision through struggle and suffering. All of this was part of the expansiveness of the Truth towards these people. They were sentenced to presumption, and so they behaved badly, and not as witnesses of truth.

HINTS OF MAJESTY

Allah Most High said (*Nisâ' 48, 116*):

inna Llâhu la yaghfiru 'an yushraka bihi
Allah does not forgive that partners be ascribed to Him.

The circle of *lâ ilâha illâ Llâh* – "there is no god but Allah" – encompasses all who testify to the Unity, and none of them shall remain eternally in Hellfire. The real authority of this testimony, however, manifests only in those people who possess no other virtue. Nothing but the Most Merciful of the Merciful in particular will intercede for them. The intercession of that which is other than Allah is only for people who possess *an atom's weight* of good (*zuzal 7*) other than the Testimony of Unity.¹³

¹³ The long hadith in Muslim, *Iman* 352, describes a series of intercessions removing from Hellfire a series of groups of people whose hearts possess smaller and smaller quantities of good. The section concludes: Then Allah Exalted and Great will say: "The angels have interceded, the apostles have interceded, and the believers have interceded, and no one remains (to grant pardon) but the Most Merciful of the Merciful." He will then take a handful of fire and bring out from it people who never did any good and who had been turned into charcoal, and will cast them into a river called the river of life, on the outskirts of Paradise. They will come out as a seed comes out from the silt carried by flood....

The inhabitants of Paradise will recognize them: "These are they who have been set free by the Compassionate One, Who has admitted them into Paradise without any deed that they did or any good that they

Our object, God willing, is to be recorded solely and especially as belonging to *lâ ilâha illâ Llâh* and its people. But the majesty of *lâ ilâha illâ Llâh* is difficult to approach, for it requires that a person rely upon nothing other than this principle, and that is difficult. This greatest of majesties, [the majesty of Unity], opens people to the play of the mystery of divinity as it acts universally in all entities – from the lowest to the highest – that may be served or worshipped. But if people stop at this, they expand into presumption in the matter of intermediate causes, [holding them to be divine]. They then discover what they have created for Him and what He has created for them. So understand that.

Beauty.

inna Llâha yaghfir udh-dhunûba jamî'an
Allah forgives the sins altogether. (*Zumar* 53)

but the ascription of partners to Him is one of the sins, and it is not forgiven. The Truth descends in His Beauty in openness toward us and causes us to see the play of the mystery of divinity in all objects of worship. Consequently, people presume to the extent of attributing partners to Him. Then the Majesty of His saying:

Allah does not forgive that partners be ascribed to Him

chastens them and draws them back.

When they conceal this within themselves so that they show forth the opposite response, Allah conceals the opposition to Him that may arise from them, as a reward for their concealing this in their hearts.

In concealing [their sins] He divides them into two groups. One group He hides from others. Another group He hides from themselves, since He hides them from the origin of the suffering. If you observe, when they enter Hellfire because Allah makes them die in it, that testimony of Unity which they concealed in their hearts itself protectively hides the heart, the site of suffering – or if you will, the origin of suffering.

This is a prodigious hint whose Beauty expands hearts, and whose gentleness and graciousness bequeath boldness.

Hint. When they do not conceal Him, He does not conceal them in any realm, but exposes them for all to see.

Hint. The name "Allah," in the verse we are examining, takes on the sense of *al-Ghaffâr*, the Coverer, the Forgiver, but only because it has come together with the Name *al-Jâmi'*, the Gatherer, present in His saying ["Allah forgives the sins.."] "altogether," *jamî'an*. The

Name *al-Ghaffâr* does not possess in itself the station of synthesis, *jam'*, and so "Allah" was used.

sent in advance."

Then He will say: "Enter My Paradise; whatever you see is yours."

They will say: "O Lord, You have bestowed upon us what You did not bestow upon anyone else in the world...."

In *Iman* 377 the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) speaks of his own repeated intercession for the faithful, down to those with the tiniest particle of good works. Finally, he says:

"O my Lord, permit me regarding him who professed 'There is no god but Allah.'"

The Lord will say, "That does not lie with you, but by My Honour, Glory, Greatness and Might, I will certainly take out the one who professed 'There is no god but Allah.'"

The Shaykh includes with these people – saved not for their works, but for the Testimony of Unity alone – those who have surrendered to Unity any self to which works could be attributed.

HINTS OF MAJESTY

Allah Most High has said (*Zumar* 67; also *An'âm* 91, *Hajj* 74):

wa mâ qadarû Llâha haqqa qadrahu
They do not value Allah at His true value.

Despite all the possible objects of knowledge, divine realization is solely concerned with two things. One of these matters is the truth (*haqq*); the other is reality (*haqîqah*). Truth is known with the intellectual powers as a guide, and reality with the powers of direct perception and contemplative vision. There is certainly no third capacity after these two.

Thus when Harithah said, "I am truly (*haqqan*) a believer," his statement arose from the first capacity. His state was supported by the second capacity, but he remained silent about it. So the Prophet (peace be upon him) asked him, "What is the reality (*haqîqah*) of your faith?" because he saw that Harithah possessed that second capacity. When Harithah responded with high perspective, intimate awareness, and direct perception, the Prophet (peace be upon him) told him, "You have realized; now persevere!" To apply the term "realization," *ma'rifah*, to a thing is not entirely appropriate unless it embraces these two realities: *haqq* and *haqîqah*.

Now Allah Most High has informed us that we are incapable of attaining the truth of His value (*haqqa qadrihi*). How then should we reach the reality of His value? "Value" here is nothing other than realization of the glorification proper to the station of divinity. If we are incapable of that, how much more incapable must we be of the realization of His Essence, magnified and exalted as it is to the greatest and highest?

When the witnesses of truth behold this Majesty and are convinced that they cannot value Him at His value despite all the glorification within them, and have blamed themselves for insufficiency, they realize that it is not within the range of temporal creatures to take the measure of the eternal. For that would be dependent upon some sort of real relationship, and there is no relationship in the deserts of bewilderment of this Majesty.

Beauty. The Beauty corresponding to this Majesty is His saying (*Dhâriyât* 56):

wa mâ kha1aqtul-jinni wal-insi illâ li-ya'buduni
I have not created jinn and men except to worship Me.

With this the souls of the witnesses of truth are drawn to intimacy, and they aver that Allah would not have assigned them to anything that they were not well able to perform, by His leave. So when they have confirmed that through the expansiveness of this station, the Majesty of:

They do not value Allah at His true value

contracts them and draws them back.

Hint. If you wish to know the limits of the realization sought from you in this verse, then look at what He has created for you and placed under your authority, and find within yourself in what way you want what has been created for your sake to know you. That is exactly the way in which the Truth wants you to know Him, without any addition or subtraction. And if you are not able to do this through your lack of grace, take it from what Allah Most High has revealed in the Torah:

O son of Adam, I have created all things for your sake, and you for My sake. So do not subjugate that which I have created for Me to that which I have created for you!

Hint. When someone who has been created for your sake causes you difficulties, do not blame him. The blame is yours, because it only seeks out the doer of the action which does not please you, and that is none other than Allah, who cannot fitly be blamed: You have observed ignorance and bad behaviour in yourself.

Allah's welcoming openness has ramifications. One of them is that our awe should be brought to bear in the presence of Beauty. For if we do not have this at the time of His expansiveness, then:

They do not value Allah...

at the corresponding Majesty – and if not, we are destroyed.

Advice. When something created for your sake causes you difficulties, look at what you would have wanted from it. Then turn to yourself and examine the relationship between this wish of yours and what your Lord has asked of you. You will find that He has sought that same thing from you, while you have caused difficulty and refused: Thus this related matter has caused you trouble. For when Allah Most High burdens you with any desire concerning that which has been created for you – it is all the same whether it be the likes of you or not – then certainly He has sought that from you, while you have been unaware. If you have obeyed Him in regard to that thing, then it will obey you, and if otherwise, then otherwise. Know that Allah has created humankind for the sake of the true human being. Allah Most High said (*Zukhruf* 32):

And We have exalted some of them over others by degrees, so that
some of them may take others in subjection.

So understand this hint and you will be guided, God willing.

HINTS OF MAJESTY

Allah Most High said (*Taghâbun* 16):

fattaqû Llâha ma istata'tum
So fear Allah as much as you can.

There is no verse in the Book of Allah Most High, or any word in existence, that does not possess three perspectives: Majesty, Beauty, and Perfection. Its Perfection is the knowledge of its essence, of the cause of its existence, and of the object of its station. Its Majesty and Beauty are the knowledge of how it confronts those who confront it with awe, intimacy, contraction, expansion, fear, and hope. Each class has its own proper experience. (In this treatise we have turned to mentioning Majesty in one verse and Beauty in a different one only in order to acquaint the Sufi student with the forms of correlation between dissimilars.) No word possesses a fourth station. In theology, the secret of this appears in the knowledge of the Truth Himself and of His two Hands and "handfuls." So know that.

The witnesses of truth are frightened by the Majesty of this verse. When Allah demands that of which they ought to be capable, He casts them into the sea of distance from Him and appears in His Grandeur. For it is not within the scope of any obligated being to live up to his capacity to fear Allah. Thus the majesty of this inaccessible plain destroys them. But when they are nearly destroyed by the intensity of this Majesty, the Truth opens and expands them and brings them close to Him, and shows them:

Fear Allah with His due fear.

Beauty. Allah Most High said (*Al 'Imrân* 102):

Attaqû Llâha haqqa tuqâtahu
Fear Allah with His due fear...

and He descends upon them in His Beauty, in welcoming openness, when He orders them to fulfil the true requirements of religion (*haqq*), so that they draw close and become serene, and fear for themselves the dangers of elation.¹⁴ So they apply their lower and higher selves to:

So fear Allah as much as you can.

and that verse enables them to preserve the behaviour proper to the Presence.

Hint. Fear Allah through Allah: This is the Prophet's saying (peace be upon him), "I take refuge with You from You."¹⁵ Allah Most High said (*Dukhan* 59):

Taste; you, [the sinner in hellfire] indeed, are the mighty,
the generous!¹⁶

and He said (*Mu'min* 37):

Allah seals every proud, commanding heart.

Hint. "Fear Allah" – His being displeased – "through Allah" – His being pleased.

A general universal hint. Fear Allah the Punisher (*al-Mu'âqib*) by means of Allah the Forgiver (*al-Mu'âfi*).

Whoever is acquainted with the realities of the Divine Names has been given the keys of the sciences, and this amount suffices. The object of my recalling these verses in detail has been to teach the means of entry into this art and the understanding of its approach, for it is a powerful method. May Allah protect us and you from pretence.

Advice. Know, brother, that in the Mighty Qur'an the Truth addresses us in two ways. In some verses He speaks to us to acquaint us with the states of other people and what happened to them, with where we have come from, and with where we are going. That is the first way. Other verses He addresses to us so that we may address them to Him. These are again of two types. Some verses call for us to address Him with actions, as for instance (*Hajj* 78; also *Baqarah* 43, 83, 110; *Nisâ'* 77, *Nur* 56, *Muzammil* 20):

Establish prayer and pay the poor-rate...

¹⁴ The remainder of *Al 'Imrân* 102 runs: "...and do not die unless you are Muslims."

¹⁵ The hadith runs: "O Lord, I take refuge in Your good pleasure from Your wrath and in Your pardons from Your punishments. I take refuge in You from You. I cannot count the praises due You. You are as You praise Yourself." It is related by Muslim, Abû Dawûd, Tirmidhî, Nasâ'i, and Ibn Mâjah. [Hakim 1264]

¹⁶ In these verses divine attributes – 'Azîz, Karîm, Mutakabbir, Jabbâr – have been arrogated by the servant.

and (*Baqarah* 196):

Accomplish the Pilgrimage and the Visitation...

and so forth. Others call for us to address Him with words, as for instance

Guide us in the straight path... (*Fâtiḥah* 6)

Our Lord, we believe, so forgive us...(Al 'Imrân 16)

Our Lord, do not punish us if we forget or make mistakes... (*Baqarah* 286)

There are many such verses. The Qur'an does not contain any other sort of address than these. It is necessary for you to be mindful of the distinctions in the Word of Allah Most High when you read it. For instance, they recite:

When they meet those who believe

then a pause, then:

they say "We believe"

then a pause, then say:

and when they are alone with their devils they say

pause; then say:

"We are with you; we were only mocking"

pause; then say:

Allah shall mock. (*Baqarah* 14-15)

If you read it in this fashion you will become acquainted with its secrets and distinguish the circumstances of the addresses and the stories of states, sayings, and deeds, and the harmony of things. So know that.

We have made our object clear, so let us draw back upon the reins. May Allah benefit us and you with knowledge and make us His own. And praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds.

First published in the *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society*, Volume VIII, 1989, pp. 5-32.

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Abstract

This treatise on the nature and levels of the human soul considers the limitations of human senses and our true or theomorphic essence; the various realms or Centers, including Absolute Mind as well as Ordinary Mind and Divine Mind; the nature of firmaments; and the meaning of pleasure and pain.

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English: The illuminated manuscripts collection of the Ottoman rulers, kept at Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, is one of the largest and most priceless collection of Islamic art in the world. The sultans commissioned various masterpieces such as the Siyer-ı Nebi, Surname-ı Vehbi or the Sarayı Albums, as well as collected other pieces from the Arabic world.

Subcategories

This category has the following 13 subcategories, out of 13 total.

A

Al-Jazari (Ms. Ahmet III 3472) (14 F)

Al-Mubashshir Mukhtâr al-hikam wa mahasin al-kalim - Topkapi AhmedIII.3206 (15 F)

D

De materia medica - Topkapi Saray Museum Ms.Ahmed III.2127 (7 F)

H

Hrvoje's Missal (14 F)

J

Jami al-Tawarikh (1317-1425) H.1654, TSMK (1 C, 27 F)

K

Khamsa of Nizami, 1374–5, Shiraz (Topkapı Palace Museum, H.1510) (1 F)

Kitāb Şuwar al-kawākib (al-thābitah) (TSMK, A. 3493) (6 F)

M

Mamluk Ganjifa (8 F)

Manuscripts and illustrations of the Shahnameh in the Topkapi Palace Museum (4 C, 2 F)

P

Persian miniatures in the Topkapi Palace Museum (18 C, 21 F)

Q

Qur'an manuscripts in the Topkapi Palace Museum (1 C, 13 F)

T

Turkish Illuminated manuscripts in the Topkapi Palace Museum (12 C, 28 F)

Topkapı Sarayı Albums (4 C)

Category Slideshow

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History & Culture

Topkapi Palace Collections: From Porcelain to Manuscripts

Explore Topkapi Palace's priceless collections—from Chinese porcelain to rare Islamic manuscripts—that reflect centuries of art, culture, and imperial taste.

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Topkapi Palace Collections: From Porcelain to Manuscripts

The collections of Topkapi Palace are among the most extraordinary in the world, reflecting centuries of Ottoman power, diplomacy, and cultural exchange. Beyond the architecture and courtyards, the treasures inside the palace reveal stories of artistry, religion, and daily imperial life. Here's a guide to the collections you should not miss—from fine porcelain to exquisite manuscripts.

The Chinese Porcelain Collection

One of the largest collections of Chinese porcelain outside China, the Topkapi Palace porcelain halls display nearly 10,000 pieces. Ranging from the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties, these objects arrived as diplomatic gifts or luxury imports. Delicate blue-and-white bowls, celadon dishes, and intricately painted vases highlight the Ottoman taste for refined dining and artistry.

Chinese porcelain in Topkapi Palace

Topkapi's porcelain halls feature rare Song and Ming dynasty pieces.

Manuscripts and Calligraphy

The palace's Library of Ahmed III holds thousands of manuscripts, many decorated with gold leaf and intricate miniatures. These works preserve Islamic scholarship in theology, medicine, astronomy, and poetry. The Holy Quran manuscripts housed here are masterpieces of calligraphy, representing centuries of devotion and art. Visiting this section allows you to glimpse the intellectual richness of the Ottoman court.

Weapons and Armor

Far from just military tools, the Ottoman weapons collection is a showcase of craftsmanship. Swords inlaid with gold, jewel-studded daggers, and ceremonial shields highlight the artistry of imperial armorers. Each

piece reflects the prestige of the sultans and the ceremonial grandeur of the empire's armies.

Ottoman swords and armor in Topkapi Palace

Intricately designed swords and daggers from the Ottoman arsenal.

Jewelry and Imperial Gifts

The Treasury houses opulent imperial jewels, from emerald-studded thrones to the famous Spoonmaker's Diamond. These dazzling objects not only impress with their beauty but also serve as symbols of diplomatic power, often received as gifts from foreign rulers.

Everyday Objects of the Palace

Among the collections are more intimate objects—silver serving sets, crystal cups, and ornate textiles. These items offer a glimpse into the daily lives of the sultans and their families, blending functionality with refinement. Each detail illustrates how art was present in even the smallest aspects of palace life.

Planning Your Visit

The collections are spread across several courtyards and halls, meaning a ticket to Topkapi Palace gives you access to a variety of treasures. To see the highlights without rushing, allocate at least half a day. For art and history enthusiasts, a full day may be necessary.

Conclusion

The collections of Topkapi Palace are more than just displays of wealth; they are windows into centuries of global exchange, devotion, and artistry. From the shimmering porcelain halls to the quiet manuscripts, each artifact tells a story of an empire at the crossroads of East and West. Don't miss the chance to explore them during your visit.

Tags:

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Historic palace complex where Ottoman sultans lived for 400 years from the 15th to 19th centuries.

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This article is about the early Quranic manuscript. For other uses, see Quran (disambiguation).

Page from the Topkapi manuscript with heading for the chapter Ad-Dhuha

The Topkapı manuscript or Topkapı Quran (Also known as Topkapı Qur'ān Manuscript H.S. 32 or Topkapı H.S. 32)^{[1]:81–83} is an early manuscript of the Quran dated to the middle 2nd century AH (mid 8th century AD).^{[1]:81–83}

This manuscript is kept in the Topkapi Palace Museum, Istanbul, Turkey. It is traditionally attributed to Uthman ibn Affan (d. 656).^{[1]:81–83} However, a recent study by Professor Rami Hussein Halaseh indicates that attributing H.S. 32 to "Uthmān or claiming its production during the first/seventh century is historically inaccurate."^{[1]:83}

Similar illuminations can be found in the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus and other Umayyad monuments. The size of this manuscript is 41 cm × 46 cm (16 in × 18 in). According to Halaseh, H.S. 32 currently contains about 97.78% of the text of the Qur'ān.^{[1]:31} With only two pages (23 verses) lacking, this manuscript is the closest to the complete text of the Quran. Mehmed Ali Pasha, Governor of Egypt, sent this manuscript to the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II as a gift in the 19th century (CE).^{[1]:35}^[2]^[3]

The paleographic assessment indicates that the Topkapi manuscript comes closest to those writings that date back to the 8th century. (cf. the examples in Déroche: Abbasid, page 36).^[4] Halaseh also shows that based on the paleography of the manuscript, folios 2r–6v and 11 seems to have been created by another hand and added to the manuscript at a much later stage.^{[1]:43}

According to Tayyar Altıkulaç, the manuscript dates to somewhere in the second half of the first century AH to the first half of the second century AH based on vowelling and dottings.[5]

Also cf. E. İhsanoğlu: "An examination of the Topkapı Muṣḥaf shows that it was written with a developed kufic script. The shape of the letters does not confirm to the writing style of the early Muṣḥafs attributed to Caliph 'Uthmān, which were written on vellum in his period and therefore known as the Muṣḥafs of Caliph 'Uthmān. (...) Apparently this Method of Abū al-Aswad al-Du'alī [invented after the death of Caliph 'Uthmān] was carefully followed in placing the vowel marks of the Topkapı Palace copy. Single dots were placed in red ink above, beside or below the letters." (Altıkulaç, al-Muṣḥāf al-Sharīf (Preface), page 9). [4]

"According to the evaluation of Munadjjid, neither this Muṣḥaf nor the Muṣḥafs located in Tashkent, al-Mashhad al-Ḥusayn in Cairo and in the Museum of Turkish and Islamic Works in Istanbul were the Muṣḥafs attributed to Caliph 'Uthmān; however considering the differences in their script, the centuries when they were copied and their different dimensions, they must have been copied from the Muṣḥafs attributed to Caliph 'Uthmān. For this reason, each of them was called the (Muṣḥaf 'Uthmān)" (Altıkulaç, al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, page 80). [4]

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Manuscripts: The Hunt for Topkapi

Getting images of manuscripts from Topkapi, Istanbul, is notoriously difficult. Here I describe how I succeeded in obtaining them. I am not saying my way is the only way. In fact, if you know of better ways, please do get in contact with me. All I am doing here is share my own experience.

The first step of that experience was to realize, after more than a year, that I was not going to do it without going there myself. I tried several connections, and some of them really went the extra mile for me, but in the end it did not work out.

So, I went there. Istanbul is great and if my readers would like to see a more general guide to manuscript hunting in Istanbul, I would be happy to write it. Please leave a response either here or on Facebook. I planned to stay for a week. This turned out to be too short. My suggestion is to be there for two weeks.

What you need to do at home is:

Know exactly which manuscripts you need. I have found out that the catalogue is lacking many details and contains wrong information. I suggest to use scholarly literature; you need to know about a call number from someone who has seen the manuscript itself. In my case the “Philologika” articles from Helmut Ritter were helpful. There is no reading room at Topkapi and you will not be allowed to peruse a bunch of manuscripts. You can only go there and say: “I want pictures of the manuscript with call number ####”.

What I took with me was:

2 hard copies and a digital copy of the Topkapi CD Request Form.

2 hard copies and a digital copy of my passport.

2 hard copies and a digital copy of a letter of endorsement from my supervisor, printed on paper with university letterhead.

2 hard copies and a digital copy of a letter explaining my purpose.

2 passport quality photographs (did not need them).

I stayed at the Netherlands Institute in Turkey. This came in really handy as I found out that you really need to either speak Turkish or have someone at your disposal who speaks Turkish to make things happen. The librarian was kind enough to help me out. She translated the letter in which I explained my purpose into Turkish.

With her help, calling to Topkapi, I also learned that you first need to get a letter of approval from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. They are located in the Atlas Pasaji, on Istiklal Cadessi. Coming from Taksim, it will be on the left, a little before the Galatasaray Lisesi. In the Atlas Pasaji, the entrance is on the left, right next to the Tattoo Parlor (!). You will need a few Turkish words and a letter in Turkish explaining your purpose to talk yourself in. I had to go to the second floor where I was pointed to a door (they're all bind with no signs). I opened it and saw a civil servant watching a television show on his computer. He only spoke Turkish. A colleague of him came, and his German was very good (English only limited).

The question they will ask you is: "Do you have permission from Ankara?"

The correct answer is: "I do not need to physically hold the manuscript, I only want photographs."

With that established, they were actually very helpful. However, the letter I needed required a signature of someone who was not there. I agreed to come back the next day. Sometime in the morning, the next day, I actually received an e-mail saying the letter was signed. I went to pick it up and went to Topkapi Palace.

Once you have that letter, it is probably better to call ahead to Topkapi and make an appointment. I did not. When you are there, you can speak to the doorkeeper. You will receive a visitor's pass and be on your way, from the entrance you take a right. I ended up talking to a lady who was, yet again, very helpful. I was asked again about Ankara and I repeated again that I only needed photographs. I asked her why it is a bit more difficult to get images from Topkapi than it is from Suleymaniye. She said that when Topkapi Palace was turned into a museum (Topkapi Palace Museum), all the manuscripts were logged as museum items, and so the library (Topkapi Palace Museum Library) uses different protocols in handling the manuscripts than other manuscript libraries do. Unlucky for me, they had not made photos of the manuscripts I was after (ergo: not all manuscripts are digitized). But I was surprised to learn how willing they were to do it, and they did not bill me any extra money.

About the money, the photos are not dirt cheap. For large quantities it is 2 liras per photo. I wanted to see three sizable manuscripts which amounted to €500,-. I think that's a fine price, but I am just saying, it ain't a bargain.

All of the above happened in a span of 3 days. But, of course, those photos needed to be taken, so I returned home empty-handed. She said that from here we would be able to handle it over the Internet. When I had returned home, it took several e-mails and 22 days to finally have the pictures.

In a next post, I will discuss the quality of these pictures, in comparison with other collections that offer digitalization.

Unknown's avatar

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Shiva Mihan's avatarShiva Mihan

June 22, 2021 at 1:57 am

Thanks for this post. Topkapi is definitely not the easiest place to deal with, but the University of Istanbul

is equally difficult, and I am not going to mention impossibilities of the TIEM. Good luck with your research and I look forward to the next part.

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Two Chapters from the *Futûhât al-Makkiyya*

WILLIAM C. CHITTICK

Ibn al-'Arabi's magnum opus, *al-Futûhât al-Makkiyya*, 'The Meccan Openings', is known at least by name to all students of Sufism. In spite of its importance for Islamic thought in general, and Ibn al-'Arabi in particular, few scholars have taken advantage of its enormous riches because of the numerous difficulties connected with reading and understanding the text. Some of those interested in the Greatest Master have made necessity into a virtue by suggesting that, in any case, everything important is contained in Ibn al-'Arabi's *Fusûs al-Hikam*. This statement has a grain of truth to it in the sense that the *mujmal* or 'undifferentiated' level contains within itself the *mufasssal* or 'differentiated' level, much as a seed contains the tree.

One also hears the opinion that the *Fusûs* is more 'esoteric' than the *Futûhât*, and therefore, it seems, more valuable. But this opinion could hardly be expressed by anyone who has carefully studied both texts, since there is hardly an idea in the *Fusûs* not to be found expressed more clearly and in more detail somewhere in the *Futûhât*. Of course, by 'more esoteric' one may simply mean that the *Fusûs* is often more difficult to understand. To the extent this is true, the reason goes back to the point just made: the *Fusûs* is composed largely of brief allusions, while the same doctrines are exposed in full detail in the *Futûhât*. Moreover, there are certain sections of the *Futûhât* (one thinks in particular of the 128-page Chapter 559, which is several times as long as the *Fusûs*), which is more 'esoteric' in every sense of the word than anything found in the *Fusûs* itself.

The real problem facing the student of Ibn al-'Arabi is that the full significance of his undifferentiated teachings as found, for example, in the *Fusûs*, cannot be grasped without clarification from those works which express the same teachings in differentiated and explicit detail. Those who desire to gain a serious understanding of these teachings, even if they maintain that the esoteric marrow is found in the *Fusûs*, have no choice but to study the *Futûhât* and other works to grasp the *Fusûs* full implications.

Some of those unfamiliar with the text of the *Futûhât* and the development of the extensive commentary literature on the *Fusûs* might argue that this or that *Fusûs* commentator gives us all the elucidation that we need, but this is to ignore the fact that the commentary tradition of the *Fusûs* took on a life of its own, much more concerned with contemporary developments in Islamic thought than with the actual content of Ibn al-'Arabi's teachings. Then, as now, authors kept their audience in mind; the *Fusûs* commentaries tell us as much about contemporary intellectual concerns as about the text itself.

Careful study of this literature suggests that different aspects of the *Fusûs* are stressed in different periods and places, and that some of the central discussions of the work are often pushed into the background. It is only by going back to Ibn al-'Arabi's own works that we can bring out the significance of the *Fusûs* for Ibn al-'Arabi and his immediate disciples. Naturally, we are still faced with the problem that 'commentary' is determined as much by the contemporary intellectual situation as the content of the work; moreover, in English there is the added and indeed major problem of 'translation', which needs to be understood in the widest sense, as 'carrying over' a particular world view into an alien intellectual universe. By avoiding the intermediary links in the commentary literature and going directly to the source, we certainly

have something to gain.¹

Until recently only a small number of passages from the *Futûhât* were available in Western languages, mainly French.² This situation has now changed significantly by the publication, under the direction of Michel Chodkiewicz, of an anthology called *Les illuminations de La Mecque / The Meccan Illuminations: Textes choisis / Selected Texts*. In addition, my own recent work, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination*, consists mostly of passages translated from the *Futûhât*. But the task of presenting the *Futûhât* to Western readers has barely begun. The original text is enormously long and extraordinarily full of difficulties. My purpose here is to offer two short chapters as a minor contribution to this ongoing project.

The two chapters below deal with several themes. Among these, two of the central ideas of Ibn al-'Arabi's spiritual universe stand out: the 'Oneness of Being' (*wahdat al-wujûd*) and 'Perfect Man' (*al-insân al-kâmil*). I originally translated the chapters in 1985 during the preliminary stages of preparing my contribution to Chodkiewicz's anthology. Later we decided that the material they deal with was covered sufficiently by other chapters or was not as central to the concerns of that work as we had hoped. As a result I put the chapters aside for some other occasion, which has now presented itself. In what follows I have thoroughly revised the translations and added brief introductions along with minimal notes. Since many of the topics discussed are covered in some form in the two works mentioned above, I usually refer the reader to those works for clarification or elaboration. Most of the themes not explained in the introductions or notes are discussed in those works in some detail.

CHAPTER 317 CONCERNING THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF THE WAYSTATION OF TRIAL AND ITS BLESSINGS³

Introduction

Like many chapters in the *Futûhât*, Chapter 317 deals with a number of topics whose interrelationship is hardly clear at first glance. One might tie together the major subjects as follows: 'Trial' (*ibtilâ'*) is the testing to which God puts human beings and *the jinn*. It results from 'prescription' (*taklîf*), i.e. the fact that God has made incumbent upon them worship (*'ibâda*) as set down in the Shari'a (the revealed Law). Prescription in turn depends upon life in the present world (*al-dunyâ*), which arises from the connection between the spirit (*rûh*) and the body (*jism*). However, there is another kind of life intrinsic to all things which also entails a kind of worship, since, in the words of the Qur'an (in one of many similar verses): 'There is nothing that

¹ We will also lose something, and I am the first to acknowledge this. Much of my earlier research was devoted to Ibn al-'Arabi's most influential disciple, Sadr al-Din Qunawi, as well as other commentators like 'Abd al-Rahman Jami. I still consider study of these figures to be of great importance for understanding the full significance of Ibn al-'Arabi's teachings - especially in their historical extension. The various commentators have much to teach us for many reasons, not the least of these being their involvement with the oral transmission of Ibn al-'Arabi's teachings, their 'verification' (*tahqîq*) of his teachings through the spiritual practices which accompanied the oral transmission, and the monumental intellectual effort they devoted to putting Ibn al-'Arabi's teachings into logical and coherent order.

² See M. Notcutt, 'Ibn 'Arabi: A Handlist of Printed Materials: Part I', *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society* III, 1984, p.58

³ *Futûhât* III 65-8.

does not glorify Him in praise, but you do not understand their glorification' (17:44).⁴

The fact that the life which demands prescription derives from the spirit brings up the question of death, which occurs when the spirit leaves the body, and this in turn calls to mind the *barzakh* (the intermediary stage of existence between death and resurrection) and the 'next world' (*al-âkhira*) properly so-called, in both of which the spirit is once again attached to the body, though the body is manifest in an 'imaginal' rather than corporeal mode.

Ibn al-'Arabi then connects God's trial of mankind with human understanding of the afterlife, i.e. with the question of correct faith and true knowledge. For faith in 'God, the angels, the prophets, the books, and the Last Day' is incumbent upon all Muslims, and if this faith is to be sound, it must be based upon correct knowledge.

Finally Ibn al-'Arabi turns, as he usually does, to the 'divine root' (*al-asl al-ilâhî*) of the discussion at hand, i.e. the divine name or names which manifest their properties through the reality being discussed. In this section of the chapter his particular concern is to show that the spirit manifests the names Living (*al-hayy*) and Light (*al-nûr*) and that, in the last analysis, God Himself is the spirit of the cosmos, while the cosmos is His body. Hence he concludes the chapter by illustrating the nature of the Oneness of Being, although, of course, he does not use the expression *wahdat al-wujûd*, since it was coined by his followers.

Ibn al-'Arabi's not infrequent discussions of 'trial' (*ibtilâ'*) in the *Futûhât* usually have in view those Quranic verses which discuss the trials and tests to which God puts His creatures, such as the following: 'We have made all that is on the earth an adornment for it, and that We may try which of them is fairest in works' (18:7); 'He has raised some of you in rank above others, that He may try you in what He has given you' (6:165), and 'We shall assuredly try you until We know those of you who struggle and are steadfast' (47:31).⁵

In the present chapter, Ibn al-'Arabi takes up specifically the relationship between the following two Quranic verses: 'Blessed be He in whose hand is the Kingdom, who is powerful over everything, who created death and life, that He might try you, which of you is fairest in works' (67:1-2); and 'His Throne is upon the water, that He might try you, which of you is fairest in works' (11:9). In both verses God is alluded to as 'King' (*al-malik*), in the first because He owns the Kingdom (*mulk*) and in the second because He sits upon the Throne (*'arsh*). What needs to be explained is why the King's Throne rests upon the 'water' and what His kingship has to do with trial.

God's argument against human beings depends upon the messages which He sends through the prophets, whereby He prescribes (*taklîf*) for them the commands and prohibitions of the Shari'a. The word *taklîf* means literally 'to impose a burden': God tries people by placing upon them the burden of the revealed Law. Human beings along with the *jinn* are unique among creatures in having this responsibility placed upon them. Even that which appears outwardly as a pure blessing (*ni'ma*) is in fact a trial, since the servant must react to blessings in accordance with prescription. As Ibn al-'Arabi writes:

The blessings with which God blesses His servants in this world are not free of trial, since thanksgiving (*shukr*) is prescribed for the servants, and this is the greatest of trials, since blessings are a greater veil over God than afflictions. (III 209.21)

⁴ Ibn al-'Arabi often formulates these two kinds of worship, known as intrinsic worship and accidental worship, in terms of the 'engendering command' and the 'prescriptive command' (cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 291-4, 311-12).

⁵ The last of these verses is especially interesting, since the words 'until We know' imply that God does not know until He tries us. Ibn al-'Arabi points out, however, that since God in His infinite knowledge knows all things in detail, what is really at issue here is His argument (*hujja*) against us on the Last Day.

We will not be able to make any claims of innocence, since we will recognize that we have failed in the fair trial through which He tested us (cf. the *Futûhât* III 134:21).

Thanksgiving, incidentally, is an important theme of the second chapter translated below.

The present chapter begins with a poem alluding to the human body as a vehicle for the spirit and a locus for the trials which the spirit undergoes. The spirit and the body are the two poles of macrocosmic and microcosmic existence. The spirit is 'of the Breath of God', so its essential attributes are delineated by God's own names. Since the first of the divine names - the 'leader of the leaders' (*imâm al-a'imma*) upon which all others depend - is the Living, the spirit is usually associated with the attribute of life, as we see in the chapter on Jesus in the *Fusûs*. All the other divine attributes follow in the wake of life. Hence the spirit also possesses knowledge and awareness, luminosity, desire, power, speech, generosity, justice, and so on.

The body stands at the opposite pole of cosmic existence; compared to the spirit it possesses hardly any trace of these attributes and can conveniently be referred to by their opposites, such as death, ignorance, darkness, and dumbness. The life and luminosity which we perceive in bodily things derive from the spirit's activity. Hence the cosmos - 'everything other than God' - has two extremes, both macrocosmically and microcosmically. On the luminous extreme, that of spirit, the divine attributes are present in relatively full splendour, while on the dark side, that of the body, they are absent for all practical purposes.⁶

However, nothing in the cosmos is absolute, even if certain things reflect the absolutely Real or Its qualities more directly than others. If in one respect life pertains only to the spirit, this is true when the spirit is envisaged in relationship to the body. Then we may fairly speak of contrasting sets of attributes, such as life and death, light and darkness. But if we look at bodily things inasmuch as they are self-disclosures (*tajallî*) of God, then, like the spirit, they manifest the attributes of God through their very existence, since *wujûd* ('Being' or 'existence' or 'finding') is the Real Himself. To exist is to manifest the divine attributes. As Ibn al-'Arabi's followers expressed this idea, '*Wujûd* descends with all its soldiers.' Even that which is dead or inanimate possesses a certain form of life. That is why the Qur'an says that everything in the universe, animate or inanimate, glorifies God.

Ibn al-'Arabi insists that such verses must not be interpreted in a figurative or symbolic sort of way, as a reference to the 'state' (*hâl*) of the thing - a plant, let us say, glorifying God by making manifest His life-giving power. On the contrary, this glorification is verbal and aware, the proof lying not only in explicit Quranic statements and *hadiths*, but also in the visionary experience of the gnostics, who witness this glorification with the heart's eyes and ears. Hence every existent thing is alive, knowing, desiring, and so on, because these attributes are intrinsic to existence. Ibn al-'Arabi discusses this point in some detail in the middle of the passage.

⁶ On these points, cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 15-17.

Translation of Chapter 317

This is the waystation of the Imam who stands at the left hand of the Pole.⁷

I wonder at the house He has built and shaped,
 placing therein a noble spirit, putting it to the trial.
 He destroyed it utterly, as if He had not built it.
 Who can put it together for me, who can make it last?
 He knew full well what He had set up -
 Would that I knew what He knew!

Why did He not from the first build that house
 as a lasting structure whose life does not disappear?
 It did nothing to make it deserve ruin,
 so why did He raise it up, and why did He lay it waste?
 The hand of trial toyed with us and it
 and after a time restored it and raised it high.
 Returned to the house, the spirit mounted upon its throne
 as a king, making its inhabitants immortal,
 Blessing it with an Eden and an everlasting Garden,
 causing it to dwell in paradise and shelter.

Know (God confirm you, O dear and noble friend!) that life belongs to the spirits - which govern all bodies, whether of fire, earth, or light⁸ just as brightness belongs to the sun. Life is an intrinsic attribute of the spirits, so spirits do not become manifest to anything unless that thing comes to life; the life of the spirit that becomes manifest to it permeates it. In the same way the brightness of the sun permeates the body of the air, the face of the earth, and every place in which the sun becomes manifest.

From here one comes to know who is the spirit of the cosmos, from whom it seeks the replenishment of its life, and what is the meaning of His words, 'God is the light of the heavens and the earth' (Qur'an 24:35). Then [in the rest of verse 24:35] He employs a likeness, for He says, 'The likeness of His light is like a niche wherein is a lamp,' which is the light - and so on to the end of the simile. He who understands this verse knows how God preserves the cosmos.

⁷ The Imam of the Left manifests the name King, a name which, as pointed out above, is alluded to in the two Quranic verses being commented upon in this chapter. The Imams of the Left and of the Right are the viziers of the Pole (*qutb*). As Ibn al-'Arabi points out in Chapter 270, the three stand at the apex of the hierarchy of the Men (*al-rijâl*), those human beings who have attained to high degrees of spiritual realization and have certain functions to play in maintaining the order of the cosmos (Ibn al-'Arabi describes this hierarchy in great detail in Chapter 73 of the *Futûhât*). A comprehensive and concise description of the relationship between the two Imams is found at the beginning of *Manzil al-qutb* (in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabi*) (Hyderabad-Deccan: The *Da'iratu 'l-Ma'ârifu 'l-Osmania*, 1948), where the Imam of the Left is connected to the name Lord and the Imam of the Right to the King. But in the *Futûhât* (II 571.26) and *Mawâqî' al-nujûm* (Cairo: Muhammad 'Al Sabih, 1965, p.139), Ibn al-'Arabi reverses the names to which the two Imams are connected, making the Imam of the Left manifest the name King. This accords with the *Futûhât* II 573, where Ibn al-'Arabi connects the Imam of the Left with the divine names of majesty and severity, both of which are kingly attributes, demanding the sternness and strictness implied by testing and trial. The relationship between the two Imams can be summarized briefly as follows: the Imam of the Left stands in the station of majesty and intimacy, serves the name King, and keeps the visible cosmos in order, while being the 'sword' of the Pole. The Imam of the Right serves the name Lord and is concerned with the world of the disengaged spirits. The Imam of the Left is the higher of the two and will succeed the Pole at his death. For a discussion of the Imams in the broad context of the Men of God, cf. M. Chodkiewicz, *Le Sceau des saints* Gailimard, Paris; 1986, Chapter 6.

⁸ Bodies of fire belong to the *jinn*, those of earth to human beings and animals, and those of light to the angels.

Hence this verse is one of the mysteries of the true knowledge of God in the interrelationship between the God (*al-ilâh*) and the divine thrall (*al-ma'lûh*), or the Lord and the vassal.⁹ If God did not undertake to preserve the thrall and the vassal constantly, they would immediately be annihilated, since nothing would preserve them and keep them in subsistence. Were He to become veiled in the Unseen from the cosmos, the cosmos would become naught. Hence the name 'Manifest' (*al-zâhir*) exercises its properties forever in existence, while the name 'Nonmanifest' (*al-bâtin*) exercises its properties in knowledge and gnosis. Through the name Manifest He makes the cosmos subsist, through the name Nonmanifest we come to know Him, and through the name Light we witness Him.¹⁰

There is life in the human being, who is our object of attention in this chapter - for this chapter deals with trial, which encompasses the two weighty ones [jinn and mankind] for whom prescriptions are made. Nothing other than the two weighty ones is like us in the property of worship (*'ibada*) and prescription (*taklîf*). Hence my words about the human being alone in respect of his life concern everything other than God, while my words about his trial concern everyone for whom prescription is made, i.e. the two weighty ones.

God says, 'His Throne was upon the water' (Qur'an 11:9). Here 'upon' (*'alâ*) means 'in' (*fi*), that is, the Throne was in the water, just as man is 'in' water. In other words, man came to be from (*min*) water, for water is the root of all existent things. It is the throne of the divine life, since 'From water' God created 'every living thing' (Qur'an 21:31), and everything other than God is living, since everything other than God glorifies Him in praise, while glorification cannot take place except in a living thing. Reports have come concerning the life of everything: wet and dry, inanimate, plant, earth, and heaven.¹¹

Here there occurs a dispute between the people of unveiling (*ahl al-kashf*) and certain others who have no unveiling, and between the people of faith and those who do not acknowledge the revealed religions (*sharâ'i*) or who interpret (*ta'wîl*) them in ways in which they have not come, for they say that this glorification takes place 'through the state (*hâl*)'. As for a thing whose life is perceived by the senses, there is no dispute as to its life. The dispute occurs only concerning the cause of its life and that to which its glorifying its Lord in praise goes back, since no one can glorify but him who is alive and intelligent and who understands what he says. The opponent holds that living things other than mankind and jinn have no intelligence, in contrast to what is believed by us and the people of unveiling and sound faith. Here by 'intelligence' (*'aql*) I mean 'knowledge' (*'ilm*).¹²

⁹ Like al-Ghazali in *Mishkât al-anwâr* and many other Muslim thinkers, Ibn al-'Arabi frequently comments upon this famous 'light verse' (cf. indexes of Quranic verses in *Les illuminations* and *Sufi Path*). On Ibn al-'Arabi's teaching that the cosmos and 'the God' demand one another and are inconceivable apart from one another, cf. *Sufi Path* p.60 and passim. As is made clear in that work, Ibn al-'Arabi never suggests that this correlativity of the two sides compromises the independence of the Divine Essence (on which point, see the fourth paragraph of Chapter 339, translated below).

¹⁰ God is the 'Light of the heavens and earth.' According to one definition of light offered by Ibn al-'Arabi, it is 'any divine inrush which dispels engendered existence from the heart' (*Sufi Path* pp.214-15); the opposite of 'engendered existence' (*kawn*) is the Divine Being. Light indeed is identical with the Divine Reality; to perceive it is to perceive God. On light and the witnessing (*shuhûd*) of God, cf. *Sufi Path*, Chapter 13.

¹¹ For a similar passage, cf. *Les Illuminations* p.86. The 'reports' are various *hadîths* and Quranic verses which demand that the things in question be alive, unless one 'interprets' (*ta'wîl*) the verses away - in the manner constantly condemned by Ibn al-'Arabi - by making them metaphors or symbols. Among the reports Ibn al-'Arabi has in view are the words of God to the heavens and the earth, 'Come willingly or unwillingly.' They replied, the Qur'an tells us, by saying 'We come willingly' (41:11). On Ibn al-'Arabi's critical stance toward *ta'wîl*, to which he alludes in the next paragraph, cf. *Sufi Path*, Chapter 12 and passim.

¹² '*Aql* or intelligence is often used in the sense of knowledge, which in any case presupposes awareness and consciousness, but here Ibn al-'Arabi may be adding this proviso in order not to enter a discussion of '*aql* as that attribute which is the defining and specific characteristic of human beings.

In this verse the 'Throne' (*'arsh*) consists of the 'kingdom' (*mulk*).¹³ 'Was' (*kân*) is a word which denotes existence.¹⁴ Hence the meaning is: The kingdom exists in water, or water is the root of the manifestation of the kingdom's entity. Water is as it were the *hylê* of the kingdom; within it become manifest the forms of the cosmos, which is the kingdom of God. The cosmos is restricted to entities and relationships. The entities are existential, while the relationships are intelligible and non-existent.¹⁵ This is 'everything other than God'.¹⁶

Since water is the root of life and of every living thing, while the relationships are subordinate to water, He makes a connection between the Throne placed upon the water and His creation of death and life in trial. He says, 'His Throne is upon the water, that He might try you' (11:9), i.e. test you. The Throne, as I mentioned to you, consists of existent entities and non-existent relationships. He also says, '[Blessed be He . . .] who created death and life, that He might try you' (67:1-2). So life belongs to the entities, and death to the relationships.¹⁷

The spirit's manifestation to the body is the life of that body, just as the sun becomes manifest in order to illuminate those bodies to which it becomes manifest. The spirit's absence from the body is the disappearance of life from it, i.e. death. Hence coming together is life and separation death. Coming together and separation are intelligible relationships with manifest properties, even though they have no existence in entity.

You should know that all the faculties in man and every living thing, like the faculties of sensation, imagination, memory, form-giving, and all the other faculties attributed to all bodies, high and low, belong only to the spirit. They come to be when the spirit exists and bestows life upon the body. When one of the faculties ceases to be, this is because the spirit turns away from the body in the respect in which that specific faculty has come to be. So understand!

When the spirit turns away from the body entirely, all the faculties and life disappear along with the spirit's disappearance. This is called 'death'. It is like night through the absence of the sun. As for sleep, it is not a complete turning away.¹⁸ Rather, it is vaporous veils which come between the faculties and the sensory objects of their perception, while life remains in the sleeper. This is like the sun when clouds come between it and a specific location on the earth. The brightness - like life [in the sleeper] - continues to exist, but the sun cannot be perceived

¹³ The term 'kingdom' is often used together with 'dominion' (*malakût*), in which case the two words refer to the two basic worlds which make up the cosmos: the visible and invisible, or spiritual and corporeal. Here the term is clearly used to refer to everything owned by God, who is, in Quranic terms, both King (*al-malik*, 59:23) and Owner of the Kingdom (*malik al-mulk*, 3:26).

¹⁴ Cf. *Sufi Path* p.393, note 13.

¹⁵ 'Relationship' (*nisba*) is one of Ibn al-'Arabi's key terms, often, as here, juxtaposed with 'entity' (*'ayn*). Every divine attribute (*sifa*) or name (*ism*) specifies a relationship between God and something else, and hence Ibn al-'Arabi uses the expression as a synonym for these two terms. As soon as we discuss anything, we are discussing its entity or essence (*dhât*), which cannot be perceived in itself - since ultimately that is none other than the Divine Essence, the Unknowable - and the qualities or characteristics which it displays. These invariably set up relationships with other things. In the last analysis, all relationships - like all entities - go back to God. In all cases, the entities in themselves are identical with *wujûd* or Being/existence, while the relationships merely describe the relative situation of various entities and do not exist in themselves; hence they are 'nonexistent' (*'adam*). In the specific example which Ibn al-'Arabi is discussing in the next paragraph, human beings exist as entities (whether they be alive or dead), but 'life' and 'death' are two different relationships which are attributed to them according to various situations.

¹⁶ 'Everything other than God' is the standard definition of cosmos.

¹⁷ Apparently this sentence is parenthetical, describing life and death not as relationships (as they are discussed earlier and in the next paragraph) but as intrinsic attributes of entities and relationships, since that which (truly) exists is alive, while that which does not exist has no life.

¹⁸ The connection between sleep and death is immediate in Islamic thought. The Prophet said, 'Sleep is the brother of death,' while the Quranic basis for this connection is the verse, 'God takes the souls at the time of their death, and that which has not died, in its sleep . . .' (39:42).

because of the thickness of the intervening clouds.

When the light of the sun leaves this location on the earth and night comes to its end, the light becomes manifest in another location, illuminating it so that day comes there just as it had come in the first location. In the same way, once the spirit leaves the body that had possessed life through it, it discloses itself to a form in the 'Trumpet' (*sûr*), which is known as the *barzakh* and which is the plural of *sûra* ('form').¹⁹ Then the *barzakh* form comes to life. Similarly the Prophet said that the life-breath (*nasama*) of the person of faith is a green bird [after death]²⁰ That bird is like the body here. It is a form that has come to life through the spirit which had been giving life to the body. Just as the sun will rise up over us again tomorrow, illuminating the existent things by its light, so also the spirit will rise up over the dead bodies on the 'day' of the next world, bringing them to life. This is the Unfolding (*nashr*) and the Uprising (*ba'th*).

You should know that God brought the Trumpet into existence in the form of a horn. It was named the 'Trumpet' in the way that things are named by the name of what is near to them or causes them to be. Since this horn is a locus for all the *barzakh* forms into which the spirits pass after death and in sleep, it was called *sûr*, the plural of 'form'. Its shape is that of a horn: its high end is wide and its low end is narrow, like the shape of the cosmos. How can the wideness of the Throne be compared to the narrowness of the earth?²¹ The faculties pass with the spirit into that *barzakh* form in sleep and death. That is why the spirit perceives [in both of these states] by means of all its faculties without distinction. Thus have I given you knowledge of the actual situation.

It is here that those who uphold transmigration (*tanâsukh*) have slipped. When they saw or heard that the prophets gave news of the passage of the spirits into these *barzakh* forms, within which they come to be in the form of their character traits, and when they saw those character traits in animals, they imagined that the words of the prophets, messengers, and men of

¹⁹ Most Qur'an commentators read the word *sûr* as 'trumpet', and explain that it will be blown by the angel Seraphiel. But a minority have suggested that the word should be read as 'forms'. Although the usual plural of 'form' is *suwar*, some authorities maintain that *sûr* can also be its plural, or a collective noun (cf. Fakhr al-Din Razi, *al-Tafsîr al-kabîr*, commentary on Qur'an 6:73; Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, under *sûr*). Ten Quranic verses mention the 'trumpet' (or the 'forms') always in connection with the verb *nafkh*, which means to blow. For example, 'Upon that day . . . the Trumpet shall be blown,' which, according to the minority interpretation, would be read ' . . . the forms shall be blown into' (18:99). The Qur'an employs the term *nafkh* in three other connections, two of which are highly significant for the present discussion: The Qur'an refers to Jesus as God's spirit, 'blown into' the Virgin Mary (21:91, 66:12), while Jesus brings to life a bird by 'blowing' into it (3:49, 5:110). (As pointed out above, Ibn al-'Arabi discusses Jesus in connection with the spirit in the *Fusûs*). The Qur'an also refers to God's 'blowing' of His spirit into Adam after He had moulded his body out of clay (15:29, 32:9, 38:72). In addition, the Qur'an calls God the 'form-giver' (*al-musawwir*) and, addressing man, tells him that God 'created you, proportioned you, balanced you, and composed you after whatever form He would' (82:7-8). Hence Ibn al-'Arabi has a strong traditional basis for making a connection between *sûr* and 'forms'. Nevertheless, he takes this reading as an 'allusion' (*ishâra*) rather than a definitive interpretation. Hence, for example, he uses the masculine single pronoun to refer to *sur* in this passage, thereby showing that he is reading it to mean 'Trumpet'. He was perfectly aware of the prophetic *hadiths* which explain *sûr* as a 'horn' (*qarn*), as the remainder of the discussion shows. In the present context, the *barzakh* is the World of Imagination inasmuch as it is experienced after death and before the Resurrection, when human beings assume new forms in keeping with their character traits. For a discussion of the 'Trumpet', cf. *Sufi Path*, pp.122-3. On the *barzakh* after death, cf. Chittick, 'Death and the World of Imagination: Ibn al-'Arabi's Eschatology', *The Muslim World* 78 (1988), pp.51-82; *Sufi Path*, passim; *Les Illuminations*, passim.

²⁰ One sound *hadîth* tells us as follows: 'The life-breath of the person of faith will be a bird perching on the trees of the Garden until it returns to his body on the Day of Resurrection' (Ibn Maja, *Zuhd* 32; Nasa'i, *Jana'iz* 117, etc.). 'Green' birds are mentioned in another sound *hadîth*, referring to the situation of martyrs after death: 'Their spirits are inside green birds . . .' (Muslim, *Imara* 122, etc.).

²¹ Note that, in rather typical fashion, Ibn al-'Arabi rejects this interpretation of the horn-attributing it to 'our companions' -in an earlier passage in the *Futûhât*, where he says that the low end is wide and the high end narrow. Cf. *Sufi Path* p.123.

knowledge referred to the animals of this world and that the spirit would be returned for purification, and they mentioned what they had come to know of the prophets' position. Hence they were mistaken in their view and in their interpretation (*ta'wîl*) of the words of the messengers and what the revealed books have said about that. They saw that a dreamer is near to this affair into which they had entered, so they were happy with the position they took. Hence their position only came to them from a bad interpretation of sound words.²²

This is the meaning of His words, 'To try you': to test your rational faculties through death and life. 'Which of you is fairest in works', through pondering and considering the two. Then He will see which of you is correct, and which is mistaken, like those who uphold transmigration.

He made all this a clear proof and set it up as a conclusive demonstration of His name Living, His name Light, and His names Manifest, Non-manifest, First, and Last. Thereby a person may know the relationship between the cosmos and Him who brought it into existence. A person will know that the cosmos is not independent in itself, that its poverty toward God is an intrinsic poverty, not separate from it for the blink of an eye, and that the relationships are constant in property because of the subsistence of the existence of the entities.²³ He is the Inaccessible, Unapproachable, and Unreachable lest His creatures perceive Him and lest 'anything of His knowledge' be comprehended 'save such as He wills' (Qur'an 2:254). He is the All-concealing (*al-ghafûr*)²⁴ who curtains rational faculties from the perception of His own inmost centre or the inmost centre of His majesty.

Know O friend (God give light to your insight!) that it has now been established for you that the life of all bodies derives from the life of the spirits which govern them and that death takes place through the separation of the spirits from them. At this point the order (*nizâm*) of the two disappears, since the faculties which hold fast to the bodies disappear with the disappearance of the spirit which God appointed to govern them.

You should also know that life in all things is two lives: life derived from a secondary cause, i.e. the life which we have mentioned and attributed to the spirits; and another life, which is intrinsic to all bodies just as life is intrinsic to the spirits. However, an effect of the life of the spirits becomes manifest in the governed bodies through the diffusion of the spirits' brightness within them and through the manifestation of the spirits' faculties, which we mentioned. But the life intrinsic to the bodies is not like that, since the bodies were not created to govern. Hence, through their intrinsic life - which cannot disappear from them, since it is an attribute of their own selves (*nafsî*) - they glorify their Lord constantly, whether or not their spirits are within them. Their spirits give them nothing of glorification except a second, accidental, specific condition. When the spirit departs from them, so also does this specific remembrance (*dhikr*), which is the speech (*kalâm*) usual among us, whether it reaches the senses as glorification or something else.

The possessor of unveiling perceives the intrinsic life which is found in all bodies. When something happens to any bodily thing which removes it from its own order, such as the breaking of a dish, the breaking of a stone, or the cutting of a tree, this is like the amputation of a person's hand or leg, whereby the life of the governing spirit disappears from it while its intrinsic life remains. Every form in the cosmos possesses a governing spirit and an intrinsic life. The spirit disappears with the disappearance of the form, like a person who is slain. Likewise the

²² In a similar way Avicenna suggests that those who attribute belief in transmigration to the Greek philosophers are mistaken; the latter were in fact referring through imagery to the base character traits which come to dominate over people in the next life when they fail to perfect their intellects in this life (cf. *Tarjama-yi risâla-yi adhawiyya*, ed. H. Khadiw-jam, Bunyâd-i Farhang, Tehran, (1350/ 1971), pp. 13, 51).

²³ The 'poverty' of the cosmos is what the philosophers and often Ibn al-'Arabi himself refer, to as its 'possibility' (*imkân*). Cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 81-3 and passim.

²⁴ For *al-ghafûr* and similar names in this meaning, cf. *Sufi Path*, index under *maghfira*.

form disappears with the disappearance of the spirit, like a person who dies in his bed without having been struck by a sword. But the intrinsic life that belongs to every indivisible substance (*jawhar fard*) does not disappear.

Through this intrinsic life - toward which God blinds the eyes of some creatures - skin, tongues, arms, and legs will testify against the people on the Day of Resurrection.²⁵ Through it a man's thigh will speak at the end of time, giving news to him of the acts of his wife.²⁶ Through it trees will speak at the end of time when Jews hide behind them and Muslims are seeking them to slay them. A tree will say to a Muslim, when it sees him hunting for the Jew, 'O Muslim, there is a Jew behind me, so slay him,' so he will slay him. But the thornbush (*gharqad*) will conceal the Jew when he comes to it, which is why the Messenger of God cursed it.²⁷ Nor can it be said that the tree only felt pity toward him who relied upon it, like people of noble character, since you should know that God's right has more claim to be observed and that it is more necessary for a person of faith to employ a noble character for God. Do you not see that He says, 'In the matter of God's religion, let no pity for them seize you' (Qur'an 24:2)?

This life is intrinsic to all things only because it derives from the divine self-disclosure (*al-tajallî al-ilâhî*) to each and every existent thing. He created the existent things to worship and know Him.²⁸ But not one of His creatures would know Him unless He disclosed Himself to it, and then it comes to know Him through itself. For no created thing has the capacity to know the Creator, as God said, 'We taught him knowledge from Us' (Qur'an 18:64).²⁹ Self-disclosure continues forever, witnessed by and manifest to all existent things, except the angels, mankind, and the *jinn*, since this constant self-disclosure belongs only to that which has no rational speech (*nutq*), like all inanimate things and plants.³⁰

As for those things which have been given rational speech and the ability to express what is in themselves - that is, the angels, mankind, and the *jinn* in respect of their governing spirits and their faculties - for them self-disclosure occurs from behind the veil of the unseen. Hence the angels' knowledge derives from God's giving knowledge (*ta'rîf*), not from self-disclosure, while the knowledge of mankind and the *jinn* derives from consideration (*nazar*) and reasoning (*istidlâl*). But the knowledge possessed by their bodies and by all other created things derives from the divine self-disclosure.

²⁵ Several Quranic verses refer to this, such as 24:24, 36:65.

²⁶ Ibn al-'Arabi probably has in mind the following *hadîth*: 'By Him in whose hand is my soul, the Hour will not come before wild animals speak to human beings, the tip of a man's whip and the strap of his sandal speak to him, and his thigh gives him news of what his wife will do after him' (Tirmidhi, Fitan 19).

²⁷ One of the *hadîths* Ibn al-'Arabi has in mind is the following: 'The Hour will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews. The Muslims will slay them, until the Jew conceals himself behind rocks and trees. The rock or the tree will say, "O Muslim, O servant of God, there is a Jew behind me, so come and slay him" - except for the thornbush, since it is a tree of the Jews' (Muslim, Fitan 84). A longer version of the same *hadîth* tells us that this event will take place when al-Dajjal (the Antichrist) is in charge of Jerusalem, with 70,000 armed Jews standing behind him. Jesus will look at al-Dajjal, 'and he will melt like salt in water,' and then Jesus will slay him. God will then put the Jews to flight. 'Nothing will remain of what God created behind which a Jew conceals himself without God making it speak, neither stone, nor tree, nor wall, nor crawling creature - except the thorn bush, for it is one of their trees and will not speak . . .' (Ibn Maja, Fitan 33).

²⁸ Allusion to Qur'an 51:56, 'I created *jinn* and mankind only to worship Me,' which Ibn 'Abbas - as Ibn al-'Arabi tells us (*Futûhât* II 214.16) - interpreted to mean 'to know Me'.

²⁹ Here Ibn al-'Arabi is interpreting this verse to mean that knowledge comes only from God and that no creature has the power to know Him by itself. Creatures only know Him when He gives them knowledge, as is stated in Qur'an 2:255: 'They encompass nothing of His knowledge save as He wills.' More commonly, Ibn al-'Arabi refers to this verse in reference to the special 'God-given' (*ladunni*) knowledge which God bestowed upon Khadir. Cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 235-6. On the fact that no one knows God directly, only through himself, cf. *ibid* 341ff.

³⁰ From another point of view, all things possess *nutq*, as Ibn al-'Arabi points out below and towards the end of Chapter 339.

This is because other creatures have an innate disposition to concealment, since they were not given verbal expression to convey knowledge. God desired to conceal this station [of self-disclosure to all things] as a mercy to those for whom religion is prescribed, since He knew from the first that it would be prescribed for them, while He had ordained for them acts of disobedience. And for some of them He had ordained protest in that which was not seemly for them, like the angels, when they said, 'What, wilt Thou set therein one who will do corruption there?' (Qur'an 2:3).³¹ Then there happened to them what happened in the story of Adam. That is why things were concealed from them. If they had disobeyed God by [His] decree and ordainment in spite of self-disclosure and witnessing, this would have been a tremendous lack of reverence and shame, so the retribution would have been tremendous and mercy would never have reached them. But since they disobeyed Him while affairs were concealed, they gained an argument with which to excuse themselves. Hence heedlessness and forgetfulness derive from the mercy which God appointed for His servants so that they might find through it an argument, should objections be made against them. Through it they find an excuse. Hence God did not make prescriptions for any of His creatures save the angels, mankind, and the *jinn*.³²

As for other than these three, the continuity of self-disclosure bestows upon them intrinsic, continuous life. In their glorification they are like us in our breaths, constant and incessant without any hardship felt in breathing. On the contrary, our breaths are identical with ease. Or rather, if it were not for our breaths, we would die. Do you not see the person who is choked? When he is prevented from exhaling his breath, he dies and experiences pain. In such measure is the glorification of all things - if you have understood.

In reality, it is the Real who governs the cosmos, as God says, 'He governs the affair, He differentiates the signs' (13:2). The 'signs' are the proofs of the profession of His Unity: Each created thing gives a proof, specific to itself, of the Unity of Him who brought it into existence.

In each thing He has a sign
proving that He is One.

These are the 'signs' which He 'differentiates', thereby dividing them among His creatures according to the innate dispositions which God has given to them.

So He is the spirit of the cosmos, its hearing, its sight, and its hand. Through Him the cosmos hears, through Him it sees, through Him it speaks, through Him it grasps, through Him it runs, since: 'There is no power and no strength save in God, the All-high, the Tremendous.'³³

This is known only by those who draw near to God through supererogatory good works, just as has been mentioned in the *Sahîh* in the divine prophetic reports: When the servant draws near to Him through supererogatory works, He loves him, and when He loves him He says, 'I am his hearing, his sight, and his hand.' Another version has, 'for him I am hearing, sight, hand, and confirmer.'³⁴

God's words 'I am' show that this was already the situation, but the servant was not aware. Hence the generous gift which this nearness gives to him is the unveiling and knowledge that God is his hearing and his sight. He had been imagining that he hears through his own hearing,

³¹ This protest of the angels to Adam's creation forms the subject of an extended commentary toward the beginning of the first chapter of the *Fusûs*. See also *Sufi Path* pp. 68, 142.

³² Ibn al-'Arabi seems to contradict what he said earlier in the chapter concerning who is given prescription. But in the earlier passage he said that 'nothing other than the two weighty ones is *like us* in the property of worship and prescription,' and elsewhere he makes clear that the angels are indeed given prescriptions, but they are not 'like us' in this since they receive only commandments, not prohibitions (*Futûhât* III 118.35).

³³ This well-known invocatory formula is found in many *hadîths*.

³⁴ On this *hadîth* and Ibn al-'Arabi's interpretation of it, cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 325-31.

but he was hearing through his Lord. In the same way, during his life, man supposes that he hears through his spirit, because of his ignorance, but in actual fact he hears only through his Lord.

Do you not see what the veracious Prophet said concerning the People of the Well? 'You did not hear better than they.' This was when he addressed them with the words, 'Have you found as true what your Lord promised you?', even though they were corpses.³⁵ So there are no creatures that do not hear, but they are given innate dispositions which prevent them from conveying what they know and what they hear. This is the life that becomes manifest to the eyes of the creatures during the miraculous breaking of habits when the dead are brought to life, such as the cow of Moses and other things.³⁶

The name Manifest - if you verify it - is the cosmos, since the cosmos is to the Real as the body is to the governing spirit. And the name Non-manifest belongs to everything that is hidden from the existent things in the relationship of life to themselves. The human being exists through the whole, since he is defined as a 'rational animal'. His animality is his manifest form, since 'animality' denotes the same thing as 'a feeding and sensate body', though more briefly. The word 'animal' (*hayawân*) was preferred in the realm of verbal expression because of its abbreviated form, since it is equivalent in denotation. Man is 'rational' (*nâtiq*) in respect of his supra-sensory reality (*ma'nâ*), and this reality is nothing other than what we mentioned. Hence in our view the whole cosmos, which consists of everything other than God, is a 'rational animal', though its bodies, its feeding, and its sensations are diverse. It is manifest through its animal form and non-manifest through its intrinsic life which comes to exist through the divine self-disclosure, which exists continuously. Hence there is nothing in *wujûd*³⁷ save God, His names, and His acts. He is the First in respect to the name Manifest, and He is the Last in respect to the name Non-manifest. So *wujûd* is all Real (*haqq*). There is nothing of the unreal within it, since what is understood from applying the word 'unreal' (*bâtil*) is some sort of non-existence in that which someone claims is an existence. So understand!

If this were not the case, the creatures alone would perform acts, and the divine power would not pervade all the possible things, or rather, the possibilities would vanish from the divine power. So glory be to the Manifest who is not hidden, and glory be to the Hidden who is not manifest! Through Him the creatures are veiled from knowing Him, and He made them blind through the intensity of His self-manifestation. Hence they are deniers, acknowledgers, waverers, bewildered, correct, mistaken. And praise belongs to God, who favoured us with such

³⁵ The reference is to a *hadîth* found in Muslim (Janna 77) and other sources, the text of which is as follows: 'The Messenger of God abandoned those slain at Badr for three days. Then he came to them, stood over them, and called to them, saying: "O Abu JahI ibn Hisham, O Umayya ibn Khalaf, O 'Utba ibn Rabi'ah, O Shayba ibn Rabi'ah, have you not found what your Lord promised you to be true? For verily, I have what my Lord promised me to be true!" 'Umar heard the words of the Prophet and said, "O Messenger of God! How can they hear and how can they answer? For they are corpses." He replied, "By Him whose hand holds my soul, you do not hear what I am saying better than they, but they are unable to answer." Then he told them to drag them away and throw them into the well of Badr.'

³⁶ On 'miraculous breaking of habits', cf. *Sufi Path* index, s.v. habit. The expression 'Moses' cow' normally refers to the cow mentioned in Qur'an 2:67-71, after which the chapter takes its name, but that cow has nothing especially miraculous about it. Perhaps Ibn al-'Arabi has the golden 'calf' in mind, since he mentions, e.g. at the beginning of the chapter on Jesus in the *Fusûs*, that it manifested the signs of life in a somewhat miraculous way because of the influence of the spirit. See also *Futûhât* III 43.5, 378.18.

³⁷ Up until this point I have been translating *wujûd* as 'existence', but in this case the ambiguity of the term *wujûd*, which refers basically to the underlying substance of the Real, or 'Being', comes to the fore. In *Sufi Path*, I frequently resorted to the expression Being/existence in such a context. Here I will leave the term untranslated. On *wujûd* see *Sufi Path*, especially Chapter 5; also Chittick, 'Ibn al-'Arabi's Doctrine of the Oneness of Being', *Sufi* 4 (1989-90), pp. 6-14.

loci of witnessing and disclosed to our eyes these realities. Our eyes fall only upon Him, and we support ourselves only through Him. 'There is no god but He, the Inaccessible, the Wise' (3:18).

He who desires to know the reality of that to which we have been alluding in this problem should consider the images and forms on the screen (*sitâra*) [of the shadow play].³⁸ In the eyes of the small children far from the veil of the screen set up between them and the person who manipulates the figures and speaks through them, who speaks within these forms? The situation is similar with the forms of the cosmos. The majority of people are these small children whom we have supposed, and you know from whence things come to them. The children in the gathering are happy and delighted. The heedless take it for a sport and diversion. The men of knowledge take heed and know that God has set this up only as a likeness (*mathal*). That is why, at the beginning, a figure comes out known as the narrator (*wassâf*). He delivers an address in which he magnifies and praises God. Then he talks about each kind of form which will come out after him from behind the screen. The gathering comes to know that God has set this up as a likeness for His servants, in order that they might take heed and come to know that the cosmos is related to God just as these forms are related to their mover and that the screen is the veil of the mystery of destiny. In spite of all this, the heedless take it as a sport and a diversion, as God says: 'Those who take their religion for a sport and a diversion' (Qur'an 6:69). Then the narrator goes away. He is like the first person existent among us, i.e. Adam. When he went away, he went away from us to his Lord, behind the screen of the Unseen. 'And God speaks the truth, and He guides on the way' (Qur'an 33:4).

³⁸ Clearly with a few changes the analogy could be extended to the television screen or the cinema. Probably the most famous use of this analogy in Sufi literature is found in Ibn al-Farid's *Nazm al-sulûk*. Cf. R.A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1921, pp. 189-91, 260-2; A.J. Arberry, *The Poem of the Way* Emery Walker, London, 1952, lines 2130-237.

CHAPTER 339
CONCERNING THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF A
WAYSTATION IN WHICH THE SHARI'A KNEELS
BEFORE THE REALITY, SEEKING REPLENISHMENT³⁹

Introduction

The chapter begins with a poem that refers to the demands which are made upon human beings by the nature of their ontological situation; their vicegerency (*khilâfa*) makes their burden a heavy one - *noblesse oblige*.

The chapter then refers to the intimate relationship between the Shari'a and the Reality (*haqîqa*), which in this context denotes God inasmuch as He determines the Shari'a. In certain respects the Shari'a and the Reality are identical, as Ibn al-'Arabi has told us in an earlier chapter.⁴⁰ In another respect, the Shari'a follows the Reality, as this chapter points out. But to understand the way in which the Shari'a follows the Reality, we need the knowledge possessed by perfect man. The station of 'animal man' (*al-insân al-hayawân*) - i.e. all human beings except the prophets and the very highest of the friends of God (*awliyâ Allâh*) - does not allow insight into this mystery. This may explain why Ibn al-'Arabi turns immediately to discussing the station of perfect man, devoting the rest of the chapter to three of his characteristics: the divine form, the subjection of all things in the cosmos to him, and the 'openings' which are given to him inasmuch as he is an inheritor (*wârith*) of the Prophet.

Discussion of these characteristics in turn amounts to commentary on several Quranic verses: 2:30-31, concerning Adam's vicegerency; 31:20, concerning the subjection of all things to man, God's lavishing him with blessings, and those people who dispute about God without knowledge; and 48:1-2, concerning the 'opening' and 'inaccessible help' given to the Prophet. Note that the term 'opening' (*fath* or *futûh*) plays a major role in Ibn al-'Arabi's teachings and is present in its plural form in the word *Futûhât* itself.⁴¹

At the outset, Ibn al-'Arabi tells us that this chapter describes a waystation (*manzil*) in which the second of the 'banners of praise' (*alwiyat al-hamd*) is revealed to the spiritual traveller. This expression derives from a sound *hadîth* in which the Prophet says that he will carry the banner of praise on the Day of Resurrection, and behind him will come Adam and all the other prophets and their followers. Ibn al-'Arabi defines the banner of praise as the most complete praise of God, around which all other praises gather, just as soldiers gather around the standard of the king.⁴² This banner clearly alludes to the fact that, as Ibn al-'Arabi and his followers put it, the Prophet is the most perfect of perfect men, the most complete locus of manifestation for the names of God. Ibn al-'Arabi connects the banner of praise with the 'praiseworthy station' (*maqâm mahmûd*) mentioned in the Qur'an (17:79), a station which, the Prophet tells us in a sound *hadîth*, will be given to him on the Day of Resurrection.⁴³ Insight into this chapter's connection to the 'second' of the seven banners of praise can be gleaned from the beginning of the previous chapter of the *Futûhât* (Chapter 338), where Ibn al-'Arabi writes as follows:

In the Praiseworthy Station within which the Messenger of God will stand on the Day of Resurrection, God has seven banners through His name Praiseworthy, and these are called the 'banners of praise'. The Messenger of

³⁹ *Futûhât* III 150-54.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Sufi Path* p.260.

⁴¹ On this term, cf. *Sufi Path* pp. xii-xiii, 222-3.

⁴² II 88.5 (quoted in *Sufi Path* p.240).

⁴³ Cf. *Sufi Path* p.405, note 4.

God and his inheritors, the Muhammadans,⁴⁴ will be given, within these banners, the names of God by which the Messenger will laud his Lord when he stands in the Praiseworthy Station on the Day of Resurrection. This is referred to by his words, when asked about intercession, 'I will praise God with words of praise which I do not know now.'⁴⁵ This praise is his laudation of God with the names required by that dwelling place.

God is lauded only through His Most Beautiful Names. His names cannot be encompassed in knowledge, for we know that in the Garden there is 'What no eye has seen, what no ear has heard, and what has never passed into the heart of any mortal';⁴⁶ and we know that none of us knows 'what comfort is laid up' for us 'secretly' (Qur'an 32:17). All this is supported by that divine name through which it all becomes manifest when the name makes it manifest.⁴⁷ When He favours us by making a divine name manifest to us, we necessarily know it and laud God through it and praise Him, whether this be a laudation of glorification or a laudation of affirmation.⁴⁸

When I came to know this, I asked about the time appointed for the names through which God will be praised on the Day of Resurrection in the Praiseworthy Station. For I knew that I do not know those names now and that God will not teach them to me, since they are words of praise which pertain exclusively to the Prophet on the Day of Resurrection. But when we hear him praising Him with them on the Day of Resurrection in the Praiseworthy Station and when the banners are spread while the names are written upon them, then in that dwelling place we will come to know them. It was said to me as follows:

'The number of those names is 1,664. Each banner will have ninety-nine names written upon it - he who counts them there will enter the Garden.'⁴⁹ However, one of the banners will have 770 of these names written upon it. The Prophet will praise God with all these words of praise, and each of them comprises the seeking of intercession with God.'

When someone takes up residence in this waystation [i.e. the subject of the present chapter], among the things that he will be given is the witnessing of each of these banners and knowledge of all the names within them; then this inheritor may laud God with them there [in that world]. And here [in this world] each of the banners has a waystation which the Prophet reached, and which is reached by his inheritors, the perfect among his followers.⁵⁰

The beginning of Chapter 339 seems to suggest that it is the second in a series of chapters, but the above passage states rather explicitly that Chapter 338 deals with all seven banners (though little more is said about them), while none of the other banners is mentioned in the several chapters immediately following 339.

⁴⁴ On the station of the Muhammadans, cf. *Sufi Path*, chapter 20.

⁴⁵ This is a sound *hadîth* (cf. *Sufi Path* p.399, note 14).

⁴⁶ This *hadîth* is not found in the usual sources, but it is 'sound' according to Ibn al-'Arabi (cf. *Sufi Path* p.412, note 5).

⁴⁷ On the divine names as 'supports' (*mustanad*), cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 37-8.

⁴⁸ Glorification is connected to God's incomparability (*tanzîh*), and affirmation (*ithbât*) to His similarity (*tashbîh*). These are the two basic modes in which God is known. Cf. *Sufi Path* p.71.

⁴⁹ Reference to the *hadîth*, 'God has ninety-nine names, one hundred less one. He who counts them will enter the Garden,' recorded in Bukhari and other standard sources.

⁵⁰ *Futûhât* III 146-24.

Translation of Chapter 339

[This waystation derives] from the Muhammadan Presence. This is the waystation within which becomes manifest the second of the Banners of Praise, comprising ninety-nine divine names.

Prohibition arises from the stain of temporal origination –

Say not, 'My vicegerency releases me.'

Beware! Your vicegerency limits you!

Where is release when the door of your engendered existence is open?

The heart lies behind the locks of your innate disposition.

The keys are lost and the locks cannot be undone.

Do not rejoice in the expansion of your breast!

It was expanded for you to know that limitations rule.⁵¹

Know (God confirm you, dear friend!) that people talk about the Shari'a and the Reality. God says to His Prophet, commanding him, 'Say, "My Lord, increase me in knowledge!"' (Qur'an 20:113). He means knowledge of Him in respect of the fact that He possesses faces (*wujûh*) in every creature and every originated thing, and this is the knowledge of the Reality.⁵² The Prophet did not seek increase in knowledge of the Shari'a. On the contrary, he used to say, 'Leave aside what I have left aside for you,'⁵³ The knowledge of the Shari'a is the knowledge of a way and a path. It demands a traveller (*sâlik*), and travelling is a hardship, but he wanted a reduction of that.

The ultimate end of the Shari'a's path is sensory felicity.⁵⁴ Its ultimate end is not the Reality in all cases, since some people reach the Reality in the first step they take in the Shari'a's path, for the face of the Real is found in every step. But the face of the Real in every step is not unveiled to every person.

The Shari'a is that on the basis of which rulings (*hukm*) are made for those for whom it has

⁵¹ For a discussion of some of the implications of this poem, cf. Chapter 141 on the station of abandoning freedom (translated into English in *Les Illuminations* 260-64).

⁵² Ibn al-'Arabi finds allusion to this 'face in all things' in Qur'an 28:88, which may be read 'Everything is annihilated except His face,' or 'Everything is annihilated except its face.' In the first case, one can read the verse as referring to the face of God in the thing, and in the second to the face of the thing in God, and of course these two faces are the same face, identical with the thing's reality or immutable entity. Ibn al-'Arabi often refers to face in this sense as the 'specific face' (*al-wajh al-khâss*) possessed by each and every existent thing, i.e. the face of God turned specifically toward that thing to the exclusion of every other thing, thereby bestowing upon it its own uniqueness. On the interpretation of the above Quranic verse in this sense, cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 102, 118; *Les Illuminations* p.95; Chittick and P.L. Wilson (trans.), *Fakhruddin 'Iraqi: Divine Flashes*, Paulist Press, New York, 1981, pp. 126, 165.

⁵³ In another passage, Ibn al-'Arabi explains why the Prophet said this as follows:

'Much of the Shari'a came down because of the asking of the Community. Had they not asked, it would not have been sent down' (*Futûhât* II 562:16; cf. II 685:12). In Bukhari (I'tisâm 2), the text of the hadîth reads as follows: 'Let alone what I have left aside for you. Those who went before you were destroyed only because of their asking from and their divergence over their prophets. If I have forbidden something to you, avoid it, and if I have commanded you to do something, do of it what you can.'

⁵⁴ Sensory 'felicity' (*sa'âda*) is that which is found in paradise, the Garden. Felicity is the result of 'guidance', which is a divine attribute manifested by the prophets, just as wretchedness (*shiqâ*) is the result of misguidance, a divine attribute manifested by Satan. Both the prophets and Satan follow the divine engendering command (*al-amr al-takwîni*), but only the prophets guide according to the prescriptive command (*al-amr al-taklîfi*), which leads to felicity (cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 291-4). Both felicity and wretchedness are 'sensory' because they are perceived by the five senses, as are all imaginal phenomena. But this does not preclude the existence of suprasensory felicity, and Ibn al-'Arabi along with others interprets the 'two gardens' mentioned in Qur'an 55:46 to refer to the simultaneous experience of sensory and suprasensory delights, much as we can experience physical as well as mental pleasure at the same time in this world.

been prescribed. But the Reality is the ruling concerning that through which rulings are made. The Shari'a comes to an end, while the Reality continues, since it subsists through the divine subsistence, while the Shari'a subsists through the divine bestowal of subsistence. Bestowal of subsistence will be abolished, but subsistence will not be abolished.

This waystation will show you the eminence of man over everyone in the heaven and the earth and that he is the Real's sought-after goal among the existent things, since it is he whom God has taken as a locus of self-disclosure (*tajallî*). I mean by 'man' perfect man, since he is perfect only through the form of the Real. In the same way a mirror, though complete (*tâmm*) in creation, is only perfect (*kâmil*) through the disclosure within it of the form of the looker. That is the 'level' of the mirror, and the level is the ultimate end. In the same way the Divinity is complete through the names which it demands from the divine thralls, so It lacks nothing, while Its perfection - I mean the level of which It is worthy - is independence from the worlds. Hence It possesses non-delimited perfection through independence from the worlds.⁵⁵

God willed to give His perfection its due (*haqq*), and He wills this always. He created the cosmos to glorify Him in praise, not for anything else. The glorification (*tasbîh*) is God's, while the glorifier does not possess the state of witnessing (*shuhûd*), since it is annihilated (*fanâ'*) from witnessing. But the cosmos does not lag in glorification for the blink of an eye, since its glorification is inherent (*dhâtî*), like the breathing of a breather. This shows that the cosmos never ceases being veiled and it seeks witnessing through that glorification.

[Since God willed to give perfection its due,] He created perfect man upon His own form and gave news to the angels about his level. He told them that he is the vicegerent in the cosmos and that his home is the earth.⁵⁶ He appointed the earth his abode, since He created him from it. He made the Higher Plenum busy with him in heaven and earth, since 'He subjected' to him 'what is in the heavens and what is in the earth, all together, for him' (Qur'an 45:12), that is, for his sake. Then God veiled Himself, for the deputy (*nâ'ib*) has no property when He who has made him vicegerent is manifest. So 'He is veiled from insights, just as He is veiled from sight'. The Messenger of God, addressing people who resembled man in sensory form but who stood below the level of perfection, said, 'God is veiled from insights just as He is veiled from sight; the Higher Plenum seeks Him just as you yourselves seek Him.'⁵⁷ 'Sight perceives Him not' (Qur'an 6:103), and, in the same way, insights perceive Him not. 'Insights' are rational faculties, which perceive Him not with their reflections, so they are incapable of reaching and winning the object they seek.

'And He taught Adam the names, all of them' (2:31). He commanded him to teach the Higher Plenum. He commanded everything in the heavens and the earth to look after that which was appropriate for this deputy, since He subjected to him everything in the heavens and the earth, even that which is called 'man' in respect of his completeness, not in respect of his perfection.⁵⁸ As long as this kind which shares the name 'man' with perfect man does not attain to perfection, he is one of those who are subjected to the perfect one who, through his perfection, is joined to Him who is Independent of the worlds. He alone - I mean perfect man - worships his Lord who is Independent of him. Perfect man's perfection is that his Lord is not without need for him, since there is no one who worships Him outside the mode of glorification but perfect man, since he receives self-disclosure constantly, and the property of witnessing never leaves him. Hence he is the most perfect of existent things in knowledge of God and the most constant of them in witnessing.

⁵⁵ On the Level of the Divinity as contrasted with the Divine Essence, cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 49-50.

⁵⁶ Reference to Qur'an 2:30, 'And when thy Lord said to the angels, "I am setting in the earth a vicegerent".'

⁵⁷ Ibn al-'Arabi sometimes cites this saying as a *hadîth*.

⁵⁸ On the difference between human 'completion' and 'perfection', cf. *Sufi Path* pp.296-7.

Perfect man has two visions (*nazar*) of the Real, which is why He appointed for him two eyes. With one eye he looks upon Him in respect to the fact that He is Independent of the worlds. So he sees Him neither in any thing nor in himself. Through the other eye he looks upon Him in respect of His name All-merciful, which seeks the cosmos and is sought by the cosmos. He sees His Being permeating all things. Through the vision of this eye he is poor toward everything in respect to the fact that the things are the names of God, not in respect of their own entities. Hence, none is poorer toward the cosmos than perfect man, since he witnesses it subjected to himself.⁵⁹ He knows that if he did not need the cosmos, those things that are subjected to him would not have been subjected to him. He knows in himself that he is more in need of the cosmos than the cosmos is in need of him. His all-inclusive poverty stands in the station of the all-inclusive divine Independence. In respect of poverty, he takes up a position in the cosmos like the position of the Real in respect to the divine names, which demand the displaying of effects in the cosmos. He only becomes manifest in his poverty by the manifestation of the names of the Real.

Perfect man is the Real in his independence from the cosmos, since the cosmos has been subjected for his sake by the divine names that display their effects within it. Nothing is subjected to him except that which possesses the display of effects, without respect to the entity of the cosmos. So he is poor only toward God.

Perfect man is also the Real in his poverty toward the cosmos. He knows that God subjected the cosmos to man only to distract the things, through the subjection imposed upon them, from seeking knowledge in respect to witnessing, for that does not belong to them, since they stand below the level of perfection. Therefore perfect man manifests need for that in which the cosmos has been subjected. Thereby subjection in the cosmos grows stronger, that they may not neglect that of it which the Real commanded them to perform; for 'They disobey not God in what He commands them' (66:6).⁶⁰ By making manifest this poverty, perfect man conforms to the Real in keeping the cosmos distracted.

Hence perfect man is the Real in his poverty, like the names, and the Real in his independence, since he does not see that which is subjected to him, only that which possesses effects. In other words, he sees the divine names, not the entities of the cosmos. Hence he is poor toward God only within the entities of the cosmos, while the cosmos knows nothing of that.

'Heaven moans', because of its inhabitants. The Prophet said, 'It has a right to moan. There is not a span of it without an angel prostrating itself to God.'⁶¹ He said 'prostrating itself to God' to indicate that the vision of every angel in the heaven is toward the earth, since prostration is to make oneself low. The angels know that the earth is the location of the vicegerent and that they were commanded to prostrate themselves [before him]. So they lowered themselves at God's command, gazing toward the place of this vicegerent, so that the prostration would be before him, since God commanded them to prostrate themselves before him. The property of prostration toward Adam and perfect man continues within them forever without cease.

You may object: Things like this prostration will disappear in the next world. We answer: It will not disappear, since the prostration takes place toward the outward form of perfect man, a form which God configures from elemental nature both at the beginning and at the return. At the beginning He made it 'grow up from the earth'; then through death He 'returns it to it'; then He

⁵⁹ Cf. II 469, translated in *Sufi Path* p.46.

⁶⁰ Ibn al-'Arabi usually quotes this verse in connection with angels, as in the Quranic context.

⁶¹ The *hadîth* is found with slight differences in Ibn Maja, Zuhd 19; Tirmidhi, Zuhd 9. The whole text reads as follows: 'I see what you do not see, and I hear what you do not hear. Heaven moans, and it has a right to moan. Within it is not the place of four fingers without an angel placing its forehead in prostration to God. By God, if you knew what I knew, you would laugh little and weep much. You would not take enjoyment with women in bed. You would go out in the roads praying fervently to God. By God, you would wish that you were a felled tree.'

'brings it forth' from the earth at the Uprising (Qur'an 71:16-17). This form has lowness (*sufli*) in level. Through this reality it seeks God, about whom the Prophet said, 'If you let down a rope, it will fall upon God.'⁶² And such must be the situation in itself. So the angels must be constantly in prostration to the Imam in this world and the next.⁶³

Perfect man possesses the form of the cosmos and the form of the Real, and through the whole he gains his superiority. The prostrater and that to which the prostration takes place are in him and from him. Were the situation not like this, he would not be all-comprehensive (*jâmi'*).⁶⁴ Hence within the Higher Plenum there is a crowding to see perfect man, just as people crowd at the vision of an angel when it comes upon them suddenly. Hence heaven moans because of their crowding.

He who knows God through this knowledge knows both the outward and the inward blessings which God has showered down upon him.⁶⁵ Hence he declares himself quit of disputing about God 'without knowledge', i.e. that which is given by considerative proof, and 'without an illuminating book', i.e. those attributes of the Real concerning which communication has come. Hence God says, 'Among men are those that dispute about God without knowledge,' given to him by a proof of his reflection, 'or guidance', i.e. without clarification received through his unveiling, 'or an illuminating book' (Qur'an 22:8). This is knowledge of God communicated through signs sent down in His revealed books, which are described as light, so that through them that with which they are sent down can be unveiled - since through 'light' unveiling takes place. Hence from these people He negated following the authority of the Real, self-disclosure and unveiling, and rational consideration. There is no level of ignorance lower than this.⁶⁶ Hence this level has come from God as the object of blame, whereby He blames everyone who possesses such an attribute.

But, when they know the blessings of God - as we said - this knowledge makes thanksgiving incumbent upon them. Hence they occupy themselves with giving thanks, as did the Messenger of God when it was revealed to him, '... that God may forgive thee thy sins, the former and the latter, and complete His blessing upon thee, and guide thee on a straight path, and that God may help thee with inaccessible help' (Qur'an 48:1-2). He stayed on his feet giving thanks for this blessing until his feet became swollen. Such did he report when something was said to him about this, for he said, 'Should I not be a truly thankful (*shakûr*) servant?'⁶⁷ He employed the form *fa'ûl* [in *shakûr*], which indicates going to great lengths. So his acts of thanksgiving were many, because the blessings were many. Each blessing demanded from him that he give thanks to God for it.

It does not occur to the possessor of this station to seek increase in his thanksgiving, since thanksgiving is an act which demands the past and the actual. Hence, the thanksgiver's reception of increase in blessings is a bounty from God. That is why He named it an increase demanded by the thanksgiving, not by the thanksgiver, though its fruit is eaten by the thanksgiver. It is a

⁶² This sentence is found in a slightly different form in a long *hadîth* commenting on Qur'an 57:4. The relevant sentence reads, 'If you let a man with a rope down to the lowest earth, he would fall upon God' (Tirmidhi, *Tafsîr sûrah 57*).

⁶³ Here Imam refers to perfect man in general, not specifically to one of viziers of the Pole.

⁶⁴ Perfect man is the 'all-comprehensive engendered thing' (*al-kawn al-jâmi'*), as mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1 of the *Fusûs*. Thereby he is the locus in which the 'all-comprehensive name' (*al-ism al-jâmi'*), i.e. Allah, manifests all its properties.

⁶⁵ Allusion to Qur'an 31:20, quoted in the introduction to this chapter. Ibn al-'Arabi has already discussed the nature of the 'subjection' mentioned in the verse, and now he turns to the other qualities.

⁶⁶ Since these are the three possible modes of knowledge. Cf. *Sufi Path* p.188.

⁶⁷ This *hadîth* is found in Bukhari (*Tafsîr sûrah 48, 2*) and several more of the standard sources. Cf. Chittick, 'Ibn 'Arabi's own Summary of the *Fusûs*', *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society* 1(1982), pp. 74-5.

recompense from the thanksgiving to the thanksgiver, for he has brought the entity of thanksgiving into existence and made its configuration an embodied form, glorifying and mentioning God. Hence this form asks God to add blessings to the blessings of this thanksgiver, since he was the cause for the bringing of the entity of thanksgiving into existence. God listens to it and complies with its request. So the thanksgiving asks God to let the thanksgivers know about that, so that they will know that the thanksgiving will fulfil with God the right which the thanksgiver has upon it.⁶⁸ Hence God says to His servants, 'If you are thankful, surely I will increase you' (Qur'an 14:7), thereby telling us about the increase.

The knower of God thanks God in order to create the form of thanksgiving constantly; thereby he makes the glorifiers of God, those who perform His worship, more numerous. When God knows this from him, He increases him in outward and inward blessings, so that he may possess the attribute of creating thanksgiving without cease. This situation belongs to him constantly in this world and the next.

The greatest plane through which thanksgiving becomes manifest within existence is the plane of thanksgiving for the blessing of the Form of Perfection and the plane of thanksgiving for the blessing of subjection. Increase from God to the thanksgiver accords with the measure of the form of the thanksgiving. So know how you give thanks and occupy yourself with the most important of it, then the next most important!

When through his thanksgiving the thanksgiver seeks increase because of what God has promised, God gives him nothing of the blessing of increase except in the measure and form of his seeking, i.e. whether it is mixed or flawless. His increase will be a forgiveness, a pardon, and a passing over, nothing else. In short, such a person is lower in degree than the first - who was given [increase] as a result of thanksgiving's asking [God to give it to him] - because in itself the plane of thanksgiving is free of mixture. If the thanksgiver mixes, his mixing will have no effect upon the form of the thanksgiving. But it has an effect upon the increase, if he gives thanks to acquire increase. So ranking in degrees is established among the thanksgivers as we have described: those who seek increase and those who do not seek it, those who occupy themselves with the most important, and those who do not occupy themselves with it. These are diverse paths to God, as He said: 'To every one of you We have appointed a right way and an open road' (Qur'an 5:52), i.e. the paths. The Reality is One Entity which is the ultimate aim of these paths, as indicated by His words, 'To Him the whole affair will be returned' (Qur'an 11:123).

Let us now turn to His words to His prophet Muhammad in the chapter of 'Opening' (*fath*)

⁶⁸ Ibn al-'Arabi is not speaking in a figurative sense here. Elsewhere he writes, 'The servant speaks no word from which God does not create an angel. If the word is good, it is an angel of mercy, and if it is evil, it is an angel of vengeance' (II 639:25). Ibn al-'Arabi calls these the 'angels created from the works (or the breaths) of human beings.' 'God creates from works angelic, spiritual, corporeal, *barzakh* forms' (II 377.33). We will content ourselves here with quoting one more of many possible passages:

When the servant reaches this waystation of knowledge, 'He will see the works of the wretched embodied and the works of the felicitous embodied in the same way, as subsistent forms aware of the existence of their creator. God places in the souls of these forms a search for the secondary causes which brought them into existence, i.e. the workers, and they are serious in their search. As for the works of the felicitous, these works see on their right hands a path which they follow. It takes them to the witnessing of their possessors, i.e. the felicitous. One of them will choose out the other. They inquire about each other, and then the workers will take them as mounts of triumph and deliverance which carry them to the resting place of mercy. As for the works of the wretched, to them appear many branching and intersecting paths, and they do not know which path they should follow to reach their possessors. They are bewildered and find no guidance, and this derives from God's mercy toward the wretched. Since the works are bewildered, they return to God in worship and remembrance (*dhikr*). (III 141:14) The passage goes on to tell us that some of the works eventually reach their owners and help them attain to felicity. For other passages on this kind of angel, cf. II 109:14, 626:7, 632:9, 635:7, 656:27; III 126:12, 361:10. See also C. Addas, *Ibn 'Arabi*, Gallimard, Paris, 1989 p.127.

(Qur'an 48). This is the opening of unveiling through the Real, the opening of sweetness in the inward dimension, and the opening of expression.⁶⁹ Through this last opening the Qur'an was an inimitable miracle (*mu'jiza*). No one was given the opening of expression in the perfection that it was given to the Messenger of God, for He says, 'If men and *jinn* banded together to produce the like of this Qur'an, they would never produce its like, not though they backed,' [i.e. helped] 'one another' (Qur'an 17:90).

He says to the Prophet, 'Surely We have opened for thee a clear opening' (Qur'an 48:1), through the three kinds of opening. He says, 'opening', using the verbal noun for emphasis. And 'clear', i.e. manifest: Whoever sees it will recognize it through that which discloses itself and that which it comprises. The opening of expression is established for the Arabs because no one is capable of protesting [against the Qur'an's linguistic perfection]. The opening of unveiling is established through the signs that were shown to him on the night of his ascension.

'That God may forgive thee thy sins, the former,' and thus conceal thee from the blame and the taking to task for which the possessor of sins is worthy, 'and the latter' (48:2), thereby concealing thee from sin itself so that it may not find thee and stand up through thee. He let us know through the forgiveness of the latter sins that the Prophet is inerrant (*ma'sûm*), without doubt. What confirms his inerrancy is that God made him an example to be emulated. If God had not placed him in the station of inerrancy, it would be necessary for us to emulate the sins that he committed if there were no text concerning them, like the text He provided concerning 'marriage by gift' (*al-nikâh bi'l-hiba*). This belongs exclusively to him according to the revealed Law, while it is unlawful for us.⁷⁰

'And complete His blessing upon thee' (48:2), by giving His blessing its creation, since He has told us about the 'fully created' and the 'not fully created' kinds, and He gives news through this verse that the blessing He gave Muhammad was 'fully created', i.e. complete in its creation.⁷¹

'And guide thee upon a straight path' (48:2). This is the path upon which is his Lord, as Hud says, 'Verily my Lord is upon a straight path' (Qur'an 11:59). All the revealed laws are lights, but among those lights the revealed law of Muhammad is like the light of the sun among the light of the stars. When the sun is manifest, the lights of the stars are hidden within the sun's light. Their hiddenness is equivalent to that of the revealed laws which is abrogated through his revealed law, even though their entities continue to exist, just as the existence of the lights of the stars is verified. That is why we are obligated in our all-inclusive Law to have faith in all messengers and all revealed laws. They are true, so they do not become false through abrogation - that is the

⁶⁹ Ibn al-'Arabi frequently mentions one or more of these three kinds of opening (cf. *Sufi Path* p.224).

⁷⁰ The reference is to Qur'an 33:50, which deals with the Prophet's wives beyond the four allowed to the believers, and the fact that a believing woman can 'give' herself to the Prophet: 'O Prophet, We have made lawful for thee thy wives. . .; and any woman believer, if she give herself to the Prophet and if the Prophet desire to take her in marriage - for thee exclusively, apart from the believers. We know what We have imposed upon them teaching their wives and what their right hands own. Hence there may be no fault in thee.'

⁷¹ The term 'fully created' (*mukhallaq*) is mentioned in Qur'an 22:5 in a passage describing the formation of the child in the womb: 'Surely We created you of dust then a lump of flesh, fully created and not fully created, that We may make clear to you.' The commentators suggest that the lump of flesh that is not fully created does not receive a spirit, or is aborted, or is born with deformities. Ibn al-'Arabi usually applies the terms to the works that are born as a result of human activity, works which take on an independent existence of their own in the World of Imagination, as we saw above. Fully created works lead to felicity, while works which are not fully created may contribute to wretchedness. He writes:

'The divine spirit gains mastery over this corporeal mount. When it comes to it, the mount becomes pregnant, and works are born, either righteous (*sâlih*), i.e. the fully created, or corrupt (*fâsid*), i.e. the not fully created. These works then become manifest in the form of mounts [i.e. in imaginal forms resembling corporeal mounts]. If they are righteous, they ascend to the high heaven (*'illiyîn*). God says, "To Him good words ascend" (35:10), i.e. the wholesome spirits, for they are the purified words of God . . . and He says, "The righteous work - He lifts it up" (35:10). In the same way, if the work is corrupt, it falls to the lowest of the low' (III 33:11). Cf. II 489:16.

opinion of those who are ignorant.⁷² But all the paths go back to looking toward the path of the Prophet. For if the messengers had lived in his time, they would have followed him, as their revealed laws would follow his revealed law, since he was given the all-comprehensive words.⁷³

'And that God may help thee with inaccessible help' (48:2). The 'inaccessible' is something desired that cannot be reached. Since the messengers are those who seek to reach him, his inaccessibility does not allow them to grasp him, because of his all-inclusive mission, God's bestowing the all-comprehensive words upon him, his lordship through the Praiseworthy Station in the next abode,⁷⁴ and God's making his community 'the best community ever brought forth to mankind' (Qur'an 3:106) - for the community of every prophet is in the measure of the station of its prophet. So know that!

When those who maintain that prophethood can be earned sought to reach him, he was inaccessible to them.⁷⁵ The only thing that can be earned is travelling and reaching the door. As for what lies beyond the door, those who reach the door have no knowledge of him for whom it has been opened. Among mankind are those for whom it is opened because of an all-inclusive faith - which is the clear vision of the Reality - like Abu Bakr, since he never saw anything without seeing God before it. Among them are those for whom it is opened through an all-inclusive news-giving within which there is no Law. These two openings will remain in this community until the Day of Resurrection. Among those who reach the door are those who have it opened for them through a prophecy of Law-giving (*tashrî'*) restricted to themselves, while others have it opened through a messengerhood that gives a revealed Law [for others as well]. But God has forbidden anyone from reaching these two doors - or openings - or having them opened for him except the people of independent effort (*ijtihâd*), since God has caused something of that to remain for them, as affirmed by the revealed Law.⁷⁶ Hence its property belongs to the Law-giver, not to themselves.

Nothing that comes out from behind the door after it is opened has been earned. Prophethood is not earned. Hence 'God' helped him 'with inaccessible help', so he who maintains that prophethood is earned cannot reach him. For, when someone is described as inaccessible, this 'inaccessibility' can only have an entity along with the existence of someone seeking the attribute of him in whom it dwells. So his station and presence are guarded against a seeker reaching it.

The Laws (*sharâ'i'*) based on wisdom (*hikamî*) and government policy (*siyâsî*) that become manifest in the form of divine Laws (*al-sharâ'i' al-ilâhiyya*) do not possess this inaccessible help.⁷⁷ It belongs exclusively to the possessor of the divine revealed Law. Reality embraces both

⁷² As is well known, the 'abrogation' of the previous religions by the Qur'an is one of the basic arguments of exoteric Muslims who want to prove the superiority of Islam.

⁷³ Here allusion is made to two *hadîths*. The first, 'Were Moses alive, he would find it impossible not to follow me,' is not found in the standard sources; while the second, in which the Prophet says he was given the 'all-comprehensive words', is considered sound. Cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 239ff.

⁷⁴ Cf. *Sufi Path* p.239.

⁷⁵ In keeping with Muslim belief in general, Ibn al-'Arabi frequently rejects the suggestion, put forth by some of the Muslim philosophers, that one can become a prophet through one's own works. Cf. *Sufi Path* pp. 219, 261.

⁷⁶ Ibn al-'Arabi alludes to a sound *hadîth*, which he often quotes in the context of the legitimacy of *ijtihâd* (cf. *Sufi Path* p.401, note 8). For some of Ibn al-'Arabi's views on *ijtihâd*, cf. *Les Illuminations* pp. 210-11 and passim.

⁷⁷ Ibn al-'Arabi usually refers to these laws established by wise men but not directly revealed by God as *nomos* (*nâmûs*). The basic difference between the two kinds of laws is that a *nomos* takes care of the best interests (*masâlih*) of people in this world, whereas a shari'a takes into account the best interests of people in both this world and the next. 'The shari'as came only to give knowledge of the situation of the next world. If they were limited to the best interests of this world, the wise law-establishing *nomoi* which God inspired in those of His servants whom He desired would have been sufficient' (II 248:4). Cf. 11117.30; also *Futûhât* Chapter 66, translated by Chittick, 'From the Meccan Openings: The Myth of the Origin of Religion and the Law,' *The World and I* 3/1 (January 1988), pp. 655-65.

Laws, the divine Law and that based on wisdom and government policy. Hence he who possesses the Shari'a - i.e. the person of faith - kneels only before the Verifier, who possesses the Reality, that the latter may explain to him the source of every Law within the Divine Presence.⁷⁸ None knows this but the Possessor of the Reality. That is why this waystation is called 'the Shari'a's Kneeling Before the Reality', since every Law seeks the Reality, since it is the inward dimension of every Law, while the Laws are its outward forms in the visible world. Hence there has been no community without a warner who established its government policy for the sake of the subsistence of its best interest. Whether the Law is divine or based on government policy, the best interest is achieved through it in the generation within which it becomes manifest.

Now that you have come to distinguish the waystation of the Shari'a from that of the Reality - and to this is devoted one of the earlier chapters of this book⁷⁹ - let us mention the sciences comprised within this waystation:⁸⁰

Among these is the science of one specific banner of praise and its names, and the science of the property of this banner's mercy upon the world under it.

Among them is the science of the interrelationships (*munâsabât*) which put formal things into order among themselves so that the entities of certain forms may be established which would not become manifest without this order (*intizâm*). These are the forms which give to the observer the knowledge of their very essence.

Within this waystation is the science of giving knowledge through the waymarks (*a'lâm*) set upon the path for the travellers upon it so that they will not go astray from their goal, which is the ultimate end of their path.

Within it is the science of the kinds of provisions (*rizq*), since these are diverse in keeping with the diversity of those who are provided.

Within it is the science of the profit of the reports (*akhbâr*) through expressions which are given by the contexts of the situations. Is knowledge through that report acquired from the report, from the contexts (*qarâ'in*) of the situations, or from the totality? Or, is the knowledge given by the context of the situation different from the knowledge given by the report? Or, are the two brought together in one place and not brought together in another?

Within it is the science of the difference between the taking enjoyment (*istimtâ'*) which occurs through understanding and [that which occurs through] something else; and the difference between him who is 'he is he' and him who is 'as if he were he' (Qur'an 27:42).

Within it is the science of the recompense (*jazâ'*) specific to each one who is recompensed.

Within it is the science of the general science whose ultimate end (*ghâya*) is works, and another whose ultimate end is not works.

Within it is the science of the relationship of the cosmos to the Real in a specific way.

Within it is the science of the sciences which are produced by reflective thoughts (*afkâr*) within the hearts of the reflective thinkers.

Within it is the science of the stipulation of blessings (*taqrîr al-ni'am*).

Within it is the science of that for which the cosmos was created and of the cause for that which has come between it and that for which it was created, even while that for which it was

⁷⁸ On the high station of the Verifier (*muhaqqiq*) in Ibn al-'Arabi's views, cf. *Sufi Path*, index. Note that *muhaqqiq* derives from the same root as *haqiq* and hence the Verifier is he who has established the Reality within himself.

⁷⁹ Ibn al-'Arabi probably has in mind Chapter 263, 'On the true knowledge of the Reality,' much of which is translated in *Sufi Path* (see index of sources).

⁸⁰ Lists of sciences such as the following are provided at the end of many of the chapters of the *Futûhât*. I retain this list in order to provide the full flavour of the chapter, but I make no attempt to clarify the references and discussions, since some are too allusive to grasp while those which can be deciphered would require several more pages of notes for full clarification. For the significance of these lists and the reason why this chapter corresponds to *Sûrah* 45 of the Qur'an, see M. Chodkiewicz, *Un Ocean sans Rivage*, Seuil, Paris, 1992 pp. 87ff.

created is known, and there is nothing stronger than knowledge, since it possesses all-encompassing-ness. Hence the resistance of the cosmos lies within the compass of knowledge. So from whence does it come?

Within it is the science distinguishing between him who is one of the people of the command (*amr*) and him who is not.

Within it is the science of the ontological, all-pervading friendship (*walâya*) through which the wrongdoers are friends of one another, the people of faith are friends of one another, and God is the friend of the people of faith (*mu'minîn*), since He is the Faithful (*mu'min*). So from whence is He the friend of the self-protectively pious (*muttaqîn*), since He is not described by self-protective piety (*taqwâ*)? Or, is He described by self-protective piety in the respect that He takes the *jinn* and mankind as a protection (*wiqâya*) through which He protects Himself from the ascription to Him of blameworthy attributes, both in common usage and according to the Law? Hence these attributes are ascribed to the *jinn* and mankind, who are the protection through which He protects Himself against this ascription. So He is the friend of the self-protectively pious in respect of His being self-protectively pious. Since He is their friend, there is none but the self-protectively pious. This is good news from God to everyone concerning the all-inclusiveness of mercy and help against wrath, for God is the Friend, the Helper. So understand!

Within it is the science of the levels (*marâtib*) in relation to the Law specifically, not the levels required by existence.

Within it is the science of the Greatest God (*al-ilâh al-a'zam*) who laid down as law taking gods (*âliha*) other than God (Allah).

Within it is the science of bewilderment (*hayrah*) over that concerning which you have certain knowledge. Knowledge is the opposite of bewilderment in an object of knowledge, so what can have caused your bewilderment, given your knowledge?

Within it is the science of the negation of guidance (*hidâya*) from the cosmos, in spite of His words, '[He created man,] He taught him the explication' (Qur'an 55:4), and that is guidance itself.

Within it is the science that distinguishes Time (*al-dahr*) from time (*al-zamân*).

Within it is the science of the middlemost bringing together (*jam'*). For bringing together becomes manifest in three locations: in the taking at the Covenant (*akhdh al-mîthâq*), in the *barzakh* between this world and the next, and in the bringing together in the Uprising after death. There is no all-inclusive bringing together after this, since after the Resurrection each abode is independent along with its inhabitants. Hence the worlds of mankind and the *jinn* never again come together after this bringing together.

Within it is the science of the sects (*nihal*) and the creeds (*umam*) and the science of the all-inclusiveness of the rational speech (*nutq*) pervading the whole cosmos. Rational speech is not the specific characteristic of man as imagined by those who make his constituting differentia the fact that he is a rational animal. Unveiling does not allow that man possess this definition exclusively. Man is defined specifically by the Divine Form. He who does not possess this definition is not a man. Rather he is an animal whose form resembles the outward appearance of man. So seek a definition for the one who has this description, just as you seek it for the other animals!

Within it is the science of the reality of abrogation (*naskh*). Does it or does it not happen among entities - so that it is then called metamorphosis (*maskh*) - just as it happens among [religious] rulings (*ahkâm*)?

Within it is the science of the levels of triumph (*fawz*) - for there is a non-delimited triumph, a triumph delimited by I-ness [?](*anâna*), and one delimited by tremendousness (*'azama*) - as well as [the science] of what is the definition of each of them.

Within it is the science of rightful claims (*istihqâq*).

Within it is the science of certainty, knowledge, conjecture, ignorance, doubt, and consideration.

Within it is the science distinguishing between the property of witnessing (*shuhûd*) and the property of knowledge.

Within it is the science of the one with whom God is not pleased - if He has mercy upon him, He does not have mercy upon him out of good pleasure (*ridâ*) - and of the difference between the object of mercy along with good pleasure and the object of mercy without good pleasure; and of where the stations of each of the two are located within the two abodes.

Within it is the science of magnificence (*kibriyâ*) and invincibility (*jabarût*). When will their all-pervadingness in the cosmos become manifest such that it will be recognized exactly? Right now it is manifest, but only a few people know it. 'And God speaks the truth, and He guides on the way' (Qur'an 33:4).

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Ibn 'Arabi and the Spirituality of Everyday Life

Presented at the Eleventh Annual Gathering of the Threshold Society

By Dr. **James Morris**

Preface

by Kabir Helminski:

Years ago Threshold Books published *What the Seeker Needs*, translated by Shaikh Tosun Bayrak al-Jerrahi. At the time it was not clear to us that that text was as much interpretation and commentary as translation. It incorporated an Ottoman commentary on the text as if it were part of Ibn Arabi's own words, thereby setting Shaykh Al Akbar's surprisingly universal text into a more parochial perspective. Here and now James Morris presents us with a translation of the original text without added commentary. We hope that it will be useful for sincere spiritual seekers.

Ibn 'Arabi on *Our Discovery of 'Revelation' (shar')*

Ibn 'Arabi's 'Book of the Quintessence' is so condensed that almost each line deserves further commentary. However, since he so often refers here-with intentional and very pointed ambiguity-to what is given or even 'said' to the seeker by 'revealed prescription' (shar'), it is very important to understand how broadly, but also very individually, he understands the actual reality/process to which that central term corresponds. The following famous passage is a particularly detailed and important expression of this understanding which is at the very foundation of all his writing:

Now you must know that if a human being (al-insan) renounces their (own personal) aims, takes a loathing to their animal self (nafs) and instead prefers their Sustainer/Teacher (rabb), then the Real will give (that human being) a form of divine guidance in exchange for the form of their carnal self... so that they walk in garments of Light. And (this form) is the Sharia of their prophet and the Message of their messenger. Thus that (human being) receives from their Lord what contains their happiness-and some people see (this divine guidance) in the form of their prophet, while some see it in the form of their (spiritual) state.

In the former case, he continues, 'that (form) is the inner reality of that prophet and his spirit, or the form of an angel like him, (who) knows

his sharia from God.... And we ourselves have often received in this way the form of many things among the divinely revealed judgments (ahkam shar'iya) which we had not learned about from the learned or from books. For if the form is not that of (that person's) prophet, then it still necessarily refers to their spiritual state or to the stage of the shar' with regard to that moment and that (particular) situation in which (that person) saw that vision....'

And even in that instance, 'apart from what is forbidden or enjoined (by the Sharia), there is no restriction on what (that person) accepts from (that vision), whether with regard to beliefs or other things-for God's Presence includes the totality of beliefs (jami' al-'aqa'id).'

**Subject Outline of Ibn 'Arabi's *Book of the Quintessence:*
*Concerning What Is Indispensable For the Spiritual Seeker***

God's All-Unity and Transcendence
Faith in the messengers, companions, 'people of this Path' (Friends of God), and serving the poor
Silence, focus on remembrance of God, and good deeds
Right companion on the spiritual Path.
Sincere intention (sidq) in seeking the right guide
Right livelihood
Eating little
Filling the day with prayer
Sleep, eat, and dress only as really needed
How to read the Qur'an
Keeping track of one's animal self (muhasaba) and shame before God
Staying Conscious: being aware of demands of the 'Instant' and eliminating inner distractions
Purity (tahard)
Striving for good moral character traits
Right attitude toward spiritual 'opponents'
Right Behavior (adab) toward animals, dependents and children
Avoiding the powerful and worldly, while practicing ihsan and sabr
Being present with God at every instant
Generosity (and avoiding stinginess) [Incomplete]
Controlling anger and learning how to (not) react to 'negative' encounters
Practicing Ihsan
Constantly practicing Dhikr/remembrance of God and asking His forgiveness
Repentance and untying the 'knots' of persistence (in opposition to God)

[Incomplete]

Taqwa: Awareness of God and its practical consequences

Avoiding self-deception/Iblis [Incomplete]

Practicing spiritual conscientiousness (ward)

Practicing 'non-attachment' to this lower world (zuhd)

Ibn 'Arabi

The Book of What is Essential, Concerning What Is Indispensable For the Spiritual Seeker

Translated by James Morris

You asked, O seeker, about the essential core of what the seeker must do, so I have answered you in these pages. And it is God Who brings to fulfillment-there is no Rabb but Him!

Know, O seeker-may God bring you and us to the fulfillment of willingly obeying Him, and may He cause us and you to know what pleases Him!-that (our) closeness to God is only known through His informing us of that. Now He has already done that-all thanks and praise be to God!-through His sending the Messengers and sending down the Scriptures and making clear the Paths leading to the eternal bliss. So once we have faith and hold (this) to be true, there only remains putting into practice (a) those actions regarding which one has faith, and (b) through applying the revelation (shar') in its appropriate place, with regard to what has become established in the souls of those who have faith.

[2.] Then after that, o seeker, you should have faith in the Messengers-may God's blessings be upon them-and in what they have brought (from God) and what they have informed us about Him...

Next, you should accept and acknowledge the people of this Path, with regard to all the stories that are recounted about them (i.e., their qualities and accomplishments) and with regard to everything you see from them which the (ordinary) mind and (worldly) knowledge cannot encompass. In general, you should hold a good opinion of everyone, and your heart should be at peace with them. You should pray specially, in secret, for the people of faith. And you should serve the poor, recognizing their excellence and nobility in that they are content with your helping them, and in their bearing patiently with their discomforts and troubles and difficulties.

[3.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is keeping silent (samt),

except for remembering/mentioning God (dhikr Allah), reciting the Noble Qur'an, guiding in the right way someone who's gone astray, exhorting to do what is right and forbidding what is wrong, reconciling those who are disputing, and encouraging acts of charity-indeed every form of good.

[4.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is searching for someone who is right for you, who will help you to (attain) what you are pursuing and to (pursue) the way leading there. For the person of faith means a great deal to his brother, [alluding to such hadith as "the person of faith is the mirror of the person of faith," etc.] And take care to avoid the company of the person who is fundamentally opposed (to your quest).

[5.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is a master and spiritual guide (shaykh, murshid). Now (with regard to finding such a guide), inner sincerity of intention (sidq) is the very watchword of the spiritual seeker, because if the seeker is truly sincere with God, He will turn every (outward) "satan" for that person into an angel guiding them directly to the good; and He will inspire in that person (the awareness of) what is good. For inner sincerity is the ultimate Elixir (the "perfect cure"), one that can only be applied to the heart of our essential being.

[6.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is seeking out this (licit) source of support (luqma: literally, sustaining "morsel" of food), since the very foundation of this Path is a licit livelihood. The pillar of this Path rests on that foundation (of right livelihood): do not burden anyone, and do not accept (inappropriately) from anyone, but earn your own living. And always be attentively conscientious about what you acquire, and about what you say, see, hear and all your other actions.

[7.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is eating little. For hunger brings about an increase in spiritual energy for following God, while it takes away spiritual laziness.

[8.] You should properly cultivate and fill the moments of the night and the day:

[10.] And if you are among those who know how to read, then make it your duty to pray (in addition) a full section of the Qur'an from the written text. In each chapter, ask and inquire (of God) what you ought to ask about, and try to figure out the special relevance (for your immediate case: the i'tibar) of each verse. Continually reflect and meditate on each verse, (to come to understand) what is its relevance and applicability, what those (divine?) Attributes are indicating (to you): reflect on those (Attributes) you have and those which you are missing. Then-give Him thanks for those which you have and those which you haven't (yet) realized! And when you read about the attributes of the hypocrites and those who reject (God), then reflect as to whether or not some of those attributes are also in you.

[11.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is that you should

observe and take account of your carnal soul (muhasabat al-nafs) and pay close attention to your inner thoughts and impulses (khawatir) at every moment of time. After doing so, you should feel shame in your heart before God. For if you are ashamed before God, then He will prevent your heart from experiencing a thought or impulse that is contrary to the revelation (shar') or from carrying out any action displeasing to Him/Right (al-Haqq).

Indeed we once had a master who would record his actions (during the day) in a notebook, and then when night came he would set them out before him and take an account of his carnal soul according to what was noted there. And I added to my master's practice by recording my inner thoughts and impulses as well.

[12.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is continually being aware of (the correspondence between) one's inner thoughts and impulses and the (spiritual demands of) every moment of time....

And if you start to do a religiously prescribed act that brings you closeness (to God), don't tell yourself that you will be alive after that to do something else. Instead, make that your last action in this world, the one in which you will encounter your Lord! For if you do that, you will be released (or completed: khalas)-and with that release comes (God's) acceptance.

[13.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is that you should always sit down in a state of Purity. So when you become impure, purify yourself....

[14.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is to seek to realize the noble virtues of character (makarim al-akhlaq).

[15.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is to keep away from those who are open enemies [literally "opposites," addad: the stress of this term is on the opposition of ends, not on outward relations, beliefs or emotional states of mind.] and those who are not of your (spiritual) like-but without your holding them to be evil, or even ever having such a thought occur to you! Instead, (what is essential is) having your intention (niyct) on keeping company with the Truly Real and His people, and having your preference be for them.

[16.] Likewise, you should treat these animals with loving sympathy and compassion (rahma) for them, because they are among those whom God has caused to be of service (or "subjugated": taskhir) to you. So don't impose on them (work) that is beyond their capacity, and do not mount (or "load") those of them you mount heedlessly.

Likewise with regard to whatever slaves your right hand possesses, because they are your brothers and God has only let you control them so that He can see how you treat them. For you are His slave! So whatever way you would like Him to treat you, then do precisely that with your own male and

female servants. Indeed God will surely requite you (accordingly), so whatever evil and ugly deeds you would love to have Him pass over in your account, act precisely that same way with regard to them. For all (creatures) are God's family, and you are a member of that whole Family. If you have a child... oblige them to observe the appropriate behavior of the revealed Path (adab al-shari'd) and the character traits of true Religion. Induce them to kindness and non-attachment (to this world, zuhd) from infancy onward, so that they become habituated to those qualities. And don't encourage desires and cravings in their heart, but rather diminish the attractions of the life of this world..... But don't do any of that out of stinginess with your money or property!

[17.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is that you shouldn't even come near the gates of the powers-that-be (al-sultan), nor should you keep company with those who are competing and striving for (the things of) this world, since they will distract your heart from God. But if something should force you to keep their company, then behave toward them with frank good counsel (nasihd), and don't try to fool them (by pretending to agree with them). For (in reality) you are (always) doing business with the Truly Real, and whatever you do (i.e., as long as it is for God's sake), they will be made to be of service to you through (their impact on) your wider spiritual situation. Therefore always keep your intention directed toward God, (knowing that) He will deliver you from the situation you are in through the means that are best for you with regard to your true Religion.

[18.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is to always be present with God-may He be exalted!-in all of your actions and all your states of rest. [NB: note that this saying is approximately halfway through the whole treatise.]

[19.] Among what is indispensable for the seeker is to always be giving, whether you have much or little, whether you are in straightened circumstances or at ease.

[20.] You must restrain your anger. For that is a sign of the breadth of capacity of your heart.

Now when you restrain your anger, you please the All-Compassionate (al-Rahman).... You have also brought delight to the heart of the person from whom you withheld your anger, by not requiting them in kind for their (originally offending) action. And that can be a cause of their returning to what is right and just and recognizing their own unjust and offensive treatment of you; indeed they may even repent for what happened as a result of their behavior.

So you must know the right ways to receive and welcome (offense and hostility), and strive to take on that character trait.... So struggle (to realize) the qualities (of Mercifulness and Compassion), since they give

rise to love and affection in people's hearts. Thus the Prophet already ordered us to practice mutual affection and to love one another. And this (i.e., restraining one's anger) is one of the highest of the causes helping to realize Love.

[21.] You must practice ihsan (doing/creating what is good and beautiful), for that is a sign of your shame (or "conscience": haya') before God, and of the glorification of God in the heart of the person who is muhsin. For Gabriel said [in the famous hadith on the 3 aspects of true ReligionA/w]: "What is ihsan? And the Prophet-may God's blessings and peace be upon him!-replied: "It is that you should worship/serve God as though you see Him. For even if you don't see Him, He sees you!"....

[22.] You must practice dhikr (remembering God) and asking His Forgiveness. For (asking His forgiveness) after you've sinned effaces and removes it, while doing so after you've been willingly obedient and done good (ihsan) brings "light upon light" and joy upon joy. As for dhikr, that unifies the (scattered) heart and purifies your inner thoughts and intentions...

[23.] You must strive to loosen the knot of persistence and stubborn insistence (on opposing God: israr) in your heart.

[24.] You must remain cautiously conscious of God (taqwa), both with regard to your inner life and outwardly....

[25.] You must avoid spiritual self-deception (ightirar), which is when your carnal soul deludes you concerning God's graciousness and forbearance, while you are still persisting in your sinful-disobedience.

....

[26.] You must practice spiritual conscientiousness (wara'), which is an intuitive avoiding (of something wrong, illicit, etc.) that you feel in your heart (sadr). The Prophet-may God bless him and give him peace!-said: "Abandon what disturbs you for what does not disturb you." So even if you are in need of that (which disturbs you) and you can't find anything to replace it, then leave that (need) to God: He will provide you in exchange with what is better than that.... For this conscientiousness (wara') is the very foundation of true Religion. So as you begin to apply it in practice, your actions will become purified, your conditions (inner and outer) will become successful, your words will become perfected, blessings of divine grace (karamat) will hasten toward you, and you will be protected and preserved by a divine protection in everything you do, without any doubt. By God, by God, my brother! (Practice) conscientiousness, conscientiousness!

[27.] And you must practice non-attachment (zuhd) regarding this world, reducing your desire for it.... And Praise be to God, the Lord of the Worlds! And God's blessings and peace be upon our master Muhammad and His Family and Companions!

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Ibn al-Qayyim's *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*

Some Literary Aspects

Y. Tzvi Langermann

1. Preface: An Essay in Progress

This project originally grew out of my interest in some early medieval discussions whose purpose is to distinguish between the two concepts, *nafs* and *rūḥ*.¹ Each of the two terms carries a variety of psychological, medical, and metaphysical or religious meanings; some of the earliest writers in Arabic on science and philosophy, such as Qusṭā b. Lūqā (d. 300/912–913) and Isaac Israeli (d. ca. 343/955), perceived a need to sort matters out in special monographs. I was drawn to Ibn al-Qayyim's *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* because it is a vast repository of information, much of it drawn from early sources. As I studied Ibn al-Qayyim's book more closely, my interests expanded, and some additional topics suggested themselves; one study has already appeared. However, it also became increasingly clearer that there are some basic literary issues that must be dealt with. Though I have no reason to doubt that Ibn al-Qayyim authored the materials that make up the book (as we shall see, some do question its authenticity), I do not believe that Ibn al-Qayyim intended to present this book to his audience in the form in which it now circulates. I am more and more convinced that the book that has been such a resounding success was left unfinished by its author.

Kitāb al-Rūḥ is without doubt Ibn al-Qayyim's most successful book, if we measure success in terms of printings, circulation, and so forth. Birgit Krawietz has called it "a real best-seller" and adds that it "gained him a reputation even in circles opposed to him other

1 See Langermann, Y. Tzvi: David Ibn Shoshan on Spirit and Soul, in: *European Journal of Jewish Studies* 1 (2007), pp. 63–86; idem: Abū al-Faraj Ibn al-Qayyim on Spirit and Soul, in: *Le Muséon* 122 (2009), pp. 149–159.

ways.”² It was first printed in Hyderabad, by the Dāʿirat al-maʿārif al-nizāmiyya, in 1318/1900–1901, then again by that same institution in 1324/1906/07 and 1357/1938–1939. For the purposes of this study I have used the most recent version, put out by Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Makkī, and published by Maktabat Nazār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, Mecca, 1425/2004. I have also consulted the second and third Hyderabad printings, the Cairo printing (Maktabat Naṣīr, 1979), and most of the manuscripts as well.³

As far as I know, only two studies on this important book have been published. The very rich article of D. B. Macdonald on the notion of “spirit” in Islam, published in 1931 and cited by Carl Brockelmann in his entry on *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, devotes a considerable amount of space to the book of Ibn al-Qayyim.⁴ Four years later, Francis T. Cooke published a paper devoted entirely to *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*.⁵ The two studies differ considerably. Macdonald exploits a great number of sources, ranging from pre-Islamic literature to the Egyptian press of the early twentieth century; his article supplies rich annotations to the secondary literature available at the time. Cooke, by contrast, limits his focus exclusively to *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, and his study has no footnotes.

On the other hand, both articles share an important common feature: both authors choose to concentrate upon Ibn al-Qayyim because the views he expresses have become dominant in Islam. In other words, whoever wishes to understand what Muslims think about “spirit” had better know what Ibn al-Qayyim says in *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*. Macdonald observes,

A good statement and study of the position of the corporeal school, which is undoubtedly the fundamental position of orthodox Islam, is to

2 Krawietz, Birgit: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. His Life and Works, in: *Mamlūk Studies Review* 10 (2006), pp. 19–64, here p. 34. Langermann, Y. Tzvi: The Naturalization of Science in Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah’s *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, in: Caterina Bori and Livnat Holtzman (eds.): *A Scholar in the Shadow. Essays in the Legal and Theological Thought of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah*, *Oriente Moderno* 15 (2010), pp. 163–180.

3 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad: *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, ed. by Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Makkī, Mecca 1425/2004.

4 Macdonald, Duncan B.: The Development of the Idea of Spirit in Islam, in: *Acta Orientalia* 9 (1931), pp. 307–351. As the author himself (E. E. Calverley) avers, the entry on *nafs* in the second edition of the *EI* (which incorporates the discussion of *rūḥ* as well) is heavily dependent upon Macdonald.

5 Cooke, Francis T.: Ibn al-Qayyim’s *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, in: *Moslem World* 25 (1935), pp. 129–144.

be found in the *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* of Ibn al-Qayyim al-Djawzīya [...] its influence has not been simply among Ḥanbalites and Wahhābites.⁶

Cooke puts it this way: “Ibn al-Qayyim’s view of *al-rūḥ* and *al-nafs* is important, for it represents the belief of the great majority of Muslims to the present day.”⁷

It seems, then, that the concerns of scholarship have come full circle, at least for some, or in some way. Macdonald and Cooke were interested primarily in understanding the contemporary Muslim mind, if I may phrase it that way. Indeed, Macdonald caps his essay with some observations, and impassioned pleas, about the situation in his own day.⁸ He opines that the “nexus of ideas and hypotheses” found in the authors covered in his study – some 25 in addition to Ibn al-Qayyim – represent “the creative religious thought of Islam.” However, this thought “must fight for its life against western influences in education and general civilization which are specifically non-philosophical or materialistic and mechanical in their philosophy.” Moreover, another, even more pernicious element from the West has entered into the fray: “modern spiritism.” Macdonald bemoans the fact that Islam, unlike the West, is not endowed with any such “preliminary prejudice against spiritual manifestations as exists with us.” Hence the danger that spiritism may latch on to the type of ghost stories found, i. a., in the book of Ibn al-Qayyim, and gain thereby legitimacy among Muslims.

For many decades after the appearance of these two studies, it seems that western scholarship on Islamic thought abandoned the concerns expressed by Macdonald and Cooke; research was motivated by an intrinsic interest in the history and transmission of philosophical, religious, and scientific thought, without any abiding worry about “understanding” Muslims or Islam. In recent years, all that has changed, for better or for worse.

2. Manuscripts and Epitomes

Kitāb al-Rūḥ has never been properly edited. The many printings, as far as I can tell, all derive from the original Hyderabad issue. It is not known which manuscript was used for that version; the manuscripts

6 Macdonald, *The Idea of Spirit*, p. 318.

7 Cooke, *Ibn al-Qayyim’s Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, p. 129.

8 Macdonald, *The Idea of Spirit*, p. 349.

known to exist in European and American libraries were almost certainly not consulted. Moreover, *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* has spawned a small satellite literature, mainly in the form of epitomes, and these have not been surveyed. In the following section I present some information about copies that I have seen.

The following manuscript copies of the complete work have come to my attention. The first five are listed by Carl Brockelmann.⁹ I have examined, in part or in their entirety, all but the Princeton manuscript:

- Escorial, Derenbourg 1590, dated 798/1395–1396
- Escorial, Derenbourg 1592
- Escorial, Derenbourg 699, dated 920/1514
- London, British Library, India Office Loth 172
- Vienna, Austrian National Library, Cod. Mixt. 186 (= Flügel 1533)
- Leiden, Or. 3001, dated 1204
- Princeton, Yahuda 3866, ff., 194a–302a, Rajab 1058/1648¹⁰

This list is certainly not complete. The Salafi scholar Mashhūr Salmān owns a manuscript; see below. One would presume that the Hyderabad printing was made from a manuscript found in an Indian library, but I have not been able to learn which.

The earliest dated exemplar is Escorial 1590,¹¹ which was copied just one generation after Ibn al-Qayyim's demise in 1350, and well before the times of al-Biqā'ī (d. 1480), who, as we shall see, may have authored the preface to the printed version of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*.

The colophon to the Leiden manuscript indicates that that text has been abbreviated from the twelfth *mas'ala* onwards.¹² I have looked at the final few folios of this manuscript, and they display the full text; hence the intention of the colophon remains to be established. Another manuscript at Leiden, Or. 12.055, has, beginning on f. 98b, a treatise entitled *Fī Taḥqīq al-rūḥ*, said to be extracted (*lakhkhaṣṭuhu*) from Ibn

9 Brockelmann, Carl: *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, Weimar 1902, vol. 2, p. 106, no. 22.

10 No. 2489 in Mach, Rudolph: *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) of the Garrett Collection*, Princeton 1977. Cécile Bonmariage was kind enough to inform me that the shelfmark in Mach is mistakenly given as 3886.

11 Derenbourg, Hartwig: *Les manuscrits arabes de l'Escorial*, Paris 1884, vol. 3, pp. 147–148; for the dating of manuscripts and the interpretation of colophons, I rely throughout on the published manuscript catalogues.

12 See Voorhoeve, Petrus: *Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the University of Leiden*, Leiden 1957, p. 320. I am extremely grateful to Prof. J.J. Witkam for his very generous help with the Leiden manuscripts.

al-Qayyim's *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*. "Extracts" from *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* are found in three other Yahudah manuscripts now at Princeton: 336Y, 38b-43a; 976Y, 147b-163b; 2798Y, 32a-41b. I have no information about these remains of the text.

The opening folios of the India Office manuscript appear to have undergone serious damage since it was described by Otto Loth well over a century ago.¹³ The manuscript comprises 331 folios, which obviously contained much more than *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* as we know it. It bears the longish title, *Kitāb fī al-Kalām 'alā al-rūḥ al-arwāḥ fī taḥqīq aḥwāl mā ba'd al-mawt wal-ākhirā wal-barzakāh*. Loth of course had no printed version with which to compare his manuscript; nonetheless he indicated the India Office has some materials in addition to Ibn al-Qayyim's book. Loth further observes that "by mistake" only nineteen queries are counted in this manuscript.¹⁴ There certainly was some oversight on the part of the copyist, who gave the seventh query the number five, even though the fifth query had already been correctly numbered earlier on. As we shall see in the following section, the preface in this copy is particularly interesting, though it too is now in a sorry condition.

Several epitomes of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* are known.¹⁵ A small (eight pages) manuscript found at al-Azhar (no. 302737) and available online¹⁶ contains an epitome of the entire text by one Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad b. Rakīn. Ibn Rakīn limits himself to the question posed in the title of each of the 21 queries that make up *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*; nearly all of the numerous proof-texts and sources are omitted, as well as the *fuṣūl* that are found in most of the queries and which treat of diverse issues, closely or distantly related to the question posed at the beginning of the *ma'sala*. For the most part he is interested in the spirits of the dead, their fate after leaving the body, and the implications for the legal and religious status of the graveyard. Interestingly enough, though, he does devote a good

13 Loth, Otto: *A Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office*, London 1877, p. 41.

14 Loth corrects the numbering in the chapter titles that are copied out in his catalogue.

15 Derenbourg, in his description of Escorial 699 (Catalogue, I, pp. 495–496), calls MS Escorial 1591, which is a copy of Ibn al-Qayyim's *Hādī al-arwāḥ*, an abrégé of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*. This is incorrect. *Hādī al-arwāḥ* covers the whole slate of issues connected to *al-janna*, and it has little if anything to do with the topics covered in *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*.

16 Accessible at www.al-mostafa.com via ahlalhadith.com as m000184.pdf (visited 19.12.2012).

deal of space to the numerous theories displayed in response to the 19th query, which asks, “What is the true reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of the soul (*nafs*)?” This is the most philosophical section of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*. As we shall see in the next section, there are reports of an abridged version prepared by Burhān al-Dīn al-Biqāʿī.

3. The Preface to *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*

The printed versions of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* all carry an introduction that is clearly not written by the author, but rather penned by someone else, who observes that the book simply plunges into the topic with a series of queries and replies.¹⁷ *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* clearly stands in need of an introduction, and, therefore, the anonymous prefacer will supply it. Most printings have a note to the passage, indicating that the preface was supplied later by Burhān al-Dīn al-Biqāʿī. The most extensive and penetrating footnote is found in the third Hyderabad printing (1357 A. H.):

You will learn in the course of this address [to the reader] that is not from the pen of Ibn al-Qayyim. Perhaps it is from the pen of al-Biqāʿī. For in *Kashf al-Zunūn*, after mention is made of Ibn al-Qayyim’s *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, are these words: ‘It was epitomized by Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm bin ‘Umar al-Biqāʿī, and he called it *Sirr al-rūḥ*. He died in the year 885/[1480–1481]. The incipit is, *al-ḥamd lil-lāh al-muttaṣif bi-ṣifāt al-kamāl*, etc.’ It seems as if the author of *Kashf al-Zunūn* had some misgivings, so he claimed that al-Biqāʿī epitomized the book of Ibn al-Qayyim.¹⁸ It appears that al-Biqāʿī only supplied the book of Ibn al-Qayyim with this preface. It is as if on his own he called it *Sirr al-rūḥ*, because Ibn al-Qayyim did not give a name to his book. It rather became known as *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, because it is a book about the meaning of *rūḥ*. This [title] then became widely known. God only knows!¹⁹

The anonymous Hyderabad editor picked up the uncertainty of Ḥājji Khalifa, who, so he understands, noticed that the preface is not by Ibn al-Qayyim, and therefore decided that the book that reached us is

17 The web version, available for download at www.al-mostafa.com (accessed April 4, 2010), carries no introduction at all. This has not been scanned from any printing, but rather copied out from one of the printings; I presume that the webmaster(s) decided to dispense with the introduction.

18 Ḥājji Khalifa: *Kashf al-zunūn*, ed. by Şerefeddin Yaltkaya and Rifat Bilge, 6 vols., Istanbul 1941–1955, vol. 5, p. 85.

19 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad: *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, Hyderabad (India), third printing, 1305 A. H., p. 2.

al-Biqā'ī's epitome, known as *Sirr al-rūḥ* ('The Secret of the Soul'). The Hyderabad editor disagrees, apparently (he does not tell us) because there are no internal grounds for questioning the authenticity of Ibn al-Qayyim's authorship. Instead he suggests that al-Biqā'ī merely added the preface.

Note also the remarks about the title in this learned footnote: Ibn al-Qayyim gave the book no title. Eventually, it became known as *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* simply because that seemed to the most appropriate title, given the book's contents. *Sirr al-rūḥ* is not an epitome, according to the writer of this erudite note, but rather the title suggested, unsuccessfully as it turns out, by al-Biqā'ī. In fact, as we shall see, Ibn al-Qayyim mentions more than one title because, as we shall claim, parts of the book were originally intended as independent essays.²⁰

There are other difficulties as well with the anonymous preface. Its author states that this is the first book devoted to the topic of *rūḥ*, but this seems not to be the case. For example, Ibn al-Qayyim himself cites early on p. 35 a *Kitāb al-Nafs wal-rūḥ* by Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥāfiẓ.

Of the manuscripts that I have seen, only the copy in Vienna displays the preface found in the printed edition.²¹ Two of the Escorial manuscripts, nos. 699 and 1592, as well as the copy found at Leiden, have an introduction written in the first person. It purports to be from the pen of Ibn al-Qayyim himself, for all that I can tell, it indeed is. I publish the Arabic text and an English translation as the final section of this study.

Beyond the standard pious remarks of belief and devotion, Ibn al-Qayyim's preface contains only a citation, interspersed with occasional explanations and expansions, from *Sūrat al-Mu'minūn* (Koran 23:12–14), which describes the formation of the human being. In fact the very same verses are cited, along with much the same commentary, in the introduction to Ibn al-Qayyim's *Tuhfat al-mawdūd*.²²

20 Nonetheless, the Hyderabad printing carries a very long title, beginning: *Kitāb al-Rūḥ fī al-kalām 'alā arwāḥ al-amwāt* ... Some manuscripts well have title pages displaying a longish title; in general, we have not paid attention to these in this study.

21 This manuscript has a heavily annotated title page which, however, is quite damaged, and I have not reaped any information from it for the present study. In fact, the Vienna copy has more marginalia and corrections than the others, and for that reason alone it would repay further study.

22 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad: *Tuhfat al-mawdūd*, ed. by Muḥammad 'Alī Abū al-'Abbās, Cairo 1988, p. 10.

Why are these verses, and their proper interpretation, so important for Ibn al-Qayyim? I believe that the answer lies in the fourth query of Ibn Ḥanbal's (d. 241/855) *al-Radd 'alā al-zanādiqa wal-jahmiyya*, a formative text for the Ḥanbalī school.²³ In that query, Ibn Ḥanbal answers the complaint of the heretics that the Koran has a confused, if not self-contradictory, account of the creation of man: in different verses he is said to have been made from earth (*turāb*), clay (*tīn*), choicest clay (*sulāla*), mud (*ḥamā*), or dry clay (*ṣalṣāl*). Ibn Ḥanbal replies that the Koran's account is completely consistent; the different materials mentioned refer to different stages in the formation of man, beginning with earth, the fundamental constituent of the human body, and culminating with the drop of sperm (the Koran's *sulāla*), by means of which the human race propagates itself. The polemical edge to this account was probably lost by Ibn al-Qayyim's day. Nonetheless, Ibn al-Qayyim may well have wanted to remind his readers of the consistent and full description of man's creation found in the Koran, much along the lines that the Shaykh of his *madhhab* had established.

Two manuscripts have other texts in lieu of the preface printed in the Hyderabad editions. Escorial 1590 exhibits at the beginning a brief biography (*tarjama*) of Ibn al-Qayyim, taken from an unidentified source. The India Office manuscript has, or should I say had, an extensive preface; in the present state of the manuscript, I cannot say whether it purports to be written by Ibn al-Qayyim himself. The opening page is now torn and damaged, and the photocopies that I received are barely legible. Loth, however, copied out this opening sentence, which differs from any of the other prefaces I have seen:

الحمد لله معزاً من اطاعه ومذلّ من خالف امره وعساه...

"Praise to God, Who raises in esteem whosoever obeys Him, and humbles whosoever transgresses His command and disobeys Him..."²⁴

The end of the preface is legible; I copy out here the final few lines:

فلم يزل صلى الله عليه وسلم مشهراً في ذات الله لا يرده عنه راد صادعاً بامر له لا يصده عنه صاد حتى طلع فجر الايمان واشرق شمس التوحيد والعرفان وسارت دعوته مسيرة الشمس في الاقطار وبلغ دينه ما بلغ الليل والنهار فصلى الله عليه وعلى آله الطيبين الطاهرين صلوة دائمة بدوام السموات والارضين وسلم وبارك

23 Ibn Ḥanbal's tract has been published several times, and it is available on the web as well. The most widely available version is found in the edition by 'Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār, Alexandria 1971.

24 Loth, *Catalogue*, p. 41 (see note 13 above)

He continued – may the prayer of God and peace be upon him – to proclaim the essence of God. No opponent could stop him. [He continued] to execute His order, and no resister could restrain him, until the dawn of belief rose, and the sun of unicity and gnosis (*irfān*) shone. His call moved along like the sun to the ends of the earth, so that his creed reached what day and night have reached.²⁵ So may the prayer of God be upon him and his kinsfolk, good and pure, an eternal prayer, as eternal as the heavens and earths, and peace and blessing.²⁶

It seems, then, that the preface found in the Hyderabad edition, which so exercised the anonymous editor, is a fluke of whatever manuscript was used for that edition. The Hyderabad printing, unfortunately, gives no information about the manuscript or manuscripts that were utilized. Presumably the manuscript(s) are found in Indian libraries.²⁷ However, the fact that the same preface reappears in all subsequent printings, rather than the authentic preface by Ibn al-Qayyim, proves that all subsequent printings derive from the Hyderabad version. None of the later “editors” seems to have gone to the trouble of checking manuscripts.

4. The Composite Nature of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*

In the opening section of this paper I suggested that *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* was left unfinished by Ibn al-Qayyim. It is my opinion that he intended to form the book out of several essays that he had written, suitably edited and sutured together. He did not finish this project, and the *textus receptus* reveals signs of the composite and unpolished state that it was left in. The most important clue to this state of affairs is found in Ibn al-Qayyim's reference, within *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, to another writing of his, which he calls “our large book on knowing the spirit and the soul” (*kitābunā al-kabīr fī mārifat al-rūḥ wal-nafs*). Specifically, he

25 Just like the nycthemeron encompasses the entire earth, so also has Islam spread throughout the world.

26 Ms India Office, Loth, *Catalogue*, 172, f. 3b.

27 This reticence is the usual practice of the Hyderabad printings. See the worthy efforts of Muhsin Mahdi to identify the manuscripts used for a Hyderabad printing of al-Fārābī in his *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, New York 1962, pp. 152–153. Mahdi was able to establish, with a good deal of probability, that the editors used two manuscripts, one from Rampur and the other from Lucknow.

asserts²⁸ that he will there provide “more than one hundred proofs” in favour of the view of the Sunna that the spirits that depart from the body are “self-standing entities that rise up and go down, join and disengage, etc.”.²⁹ Scholars have noticed this passage and speculated as to the meaning of the reference.³⁰ However, as far as I know, no one has realized that the discussion Ibn al-Qayyim refers to there is found in *maʿāla* 19 of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*. One finds in that chapter 100 proofs for the assertion that “humanity” is “a body different in its quiddity from sensible body, [and also] luminous, supernal, etc.”. The terminology is of course quite different from that found in the cross-reference, but the idea is very much the same: spirit, soul, the essence of humanity, whatever one wishes to call it, is a substance, a self-standing body, different from earthly bodies, and by no means merely an “accident” (in the Aristotelian sense) of the earthly body. It may also be noticed that, as part of the very long title of the nineteenth query, one finds the following: *Mā Ḥaqīqat al-naḥs...wa-bal ḥiya al-rūḥ am lā?* A question of this sort is appropriate for a work entitled *Fī Maʿrifat al-rūḥ wal-naḥs*, and it would fit into the well-established genre of inquiries into the difference (if there is any) between the two terms. Yet this issue is not addressed in the nineteenth query. The twentieth query, however, is devoted entirely to the question, whether soul and spirit are “one thing, or two things, distinct from one another.” Whatever Ibn al-Qayyim may have intended to publish as *kitābunā al-kabīr fī maʿrifat al-rūḥ wal-naḥs*, large chunks of it appear to have been included in *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*.

The composite nature of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* may also be seen, perhaps paradoxically, from the recent publication of its final section (*maʿāla* 21) as a separate volume by one Abū Ḥudhayfa Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad.³¹ The 21st query discusses the three souls recognized by Muslim tradition (*al-ammāra*, *lawwāma*, *mutmaʿinna*, respectively the commanding, the rebuking, and the serene; see the conspectus below).

28 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, p. 44.

29 Ibid., p. 44.

30 A reference in exactly the same words is found in Ibn al-Qayyim's *Miftāḥ dār al-sāʿada*; Abū Zayd takes this to be a reference to our *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* and therefore proof for its authenticity. In his bio-bibliography, item 48 (pp. 258–259), he lists *al-Rūḥ wal-naḥs* as a separate work, no copy of which is known, and which Ibn al-Qayyim refers to three times in *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*.

31 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad: *al-Furūq al-naḥsiyya bayn ṣifat al-naḥs al-ṭayyiba wal-khabītha*, ed. by Abū Ḥudhayfa Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad, Ṭantā n.d.

Abū Ḥudhayfa acknowledges that this section was not presented by Ibn al-Qayyim as an independent literary creation. Nonetheless, by publishing this section separately from the rest of the book, he in fact acknowledges that it can stand alone – and perhaps was meant to, at least when Ibn al-Qayyim first wrote it. Abū Ḥudhayfa offers a few short quotations, without comment, in which Ibn al-Qayyim refers to his writings on this subject, including the reference to the “large book” referred to above. His intent seems to be that Ibn al-Qayyim considered writing an independent book, and, if none has reached us, this section of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* can serve the purpose just as well. As far as I am concerned, the point here is that, as Abū Ḥudhayfa's booklet shows, this section can indeed stand alone as a separate treatise; perhaps, then, that is how it was planned to be by Ibn al-Qayyim.

5. The Authenticity of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*

The authenticity of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* has been challenged in recent years, apparently on dogmatic grounds rather than on the basis of any literary or historical qualms. Information about the debate is found mostly on the internet; the relevant websites will be cited in the notes to this section.

The Saudi scholar Bakr Abū Zayd, author of several books on Ibn al-Qayyim, takes up the question of the book's authenticity. He writes:

Some students have spread the word that *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* of Ibn al-Qayyim is not really by him, or that he wrote it before he came into contact with *shaykh al-islām*, Ibn Taymiyya. This is what some tongues have spread, and this is what has reached [our] ears in various settings and investigations. I have not seen it written down in a book; perhaps something of this has been written down, but it is not easy to get hold of it.³²

Abū Zayd proceeds to refute both allegations by means of a variety of cross-references to *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* in other writings of Ibn al-Qayyim, numerous citations by later authors, and some stylistic and methodological considerations. Similarly he cites several references to Ibn Taymiyya in *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* for proof that the book was written after Ibn al-Qayyim had met his master.³³

32 Abū Zayd, Bakr: *Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Hayātuhu āthāruhu mawāriduhu*, Riyadh 2002, p. 254; <http://saaid.net/Doat/Zugail/61.htm> (accessed April 4, 2010).

33 Ibid.

The same question was taken up, and the same affirmative answer given, by Mashhūr Salmān on a Salafi website in April 2005. In order to come to a decision, Salmān studied the book closely, making use also of a manuscript in his possession. He found a cross-reference to *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* in yet another book of Ibn al-Qayyim, *al-Tabayīn fī aqsām al-qurʾān*.³⁴

It has been intimated that the late ʿAbd al-Azīz b. ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Bāz, “grand mufti” of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was behind the allegations that the book was not written by Ibn al-Qayyim. I gather as much from the response of a Kuwaiti scholar, Sayyid Yūsuf al-Rifāʿī, a respected jurist (of the Shāfiʿī school), a Sufi leader, and a former government minister, in his “Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd”. In section 47, al-Rifāʿī says,

You accuse the Muslims who differ with you of being deviant Jahmis or Muʿtazilīs. The truth is, *you are the Jahmiyya* because you agree with them in some of their doctrines and you are the Muʿtazila because you concur with them in denying sainthood and saints as well as their miraculous gifts, the life of the dead, and the arbitration of reason in matters of the unseen in religious issues.

There is a footnote after the phrase, “the life of the dead”, which reads: “Hence they deny that Ibn al-Qayyim authored *al-Rūḥ*!”³⁵ Another website identifies “ʿAbd al-Azīz b. ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Bāz, the late (d. 1999) nescient mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, government scholar par excellence, and major innovator whose influence on spreading deviant beliefs is incalculable” as the target of al-Rifāʿī’s *Naṣīḥa li-ikhwāninā ʿulamāʾ najd* (Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd).³⁶

34 <http://www.aqsalaf.com/vb/showthread.php?p=12052>, (accessed April 4, 2010).

35 <http://www.rifaieonline.com/advice.htm> (accessed April 4, 2010). The “life of the dead”, I presume, is a poor English rendering of the revivification of the dead. Jahm’s (d. 128/746) role here seems to be very much that of the arch-heretic. Ibn al-Qayyim (*Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, p. 151), beginning of 17 *maṣʾala* accuses the *mutakallimūn* who deny that spirit is created of being followers of Jahm; see also the conspectus of that query below. On Jahm and his connection to the early Muʿtazila, see Pines, Shlomo: *Studies in Islamic Atomism*, Jerusalem 1997, appendix A, pp. 142–150.

36 <http://answeringwhabismandsalafism.wordpress.com/2008/01/11/abd-al-aziz-ibn-abd-allah-ibn-baaz-a-concise-guide-to-another-primary-innovator-in-islam/> (accessed April 4, 2010).

I have found one fatwa (all are published online) in which Ibn Bāz takes note of Ibn al-Qayyim's leniency with regard to prayer and Koran recitation at the gravesite. The fatwa³⁷ addresses the long-standing controversy within Islam whether acts of devotion are permitted in the cemetery. The applicant has heard that Ibn Bāz forbids this, and, moreover, that the mufti has demanded that anyone who allows it should substantiate his view. To this end, the applicant writes to Ibn Bāz that he has found proof in *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*; Ibn Bāz responds that "whatever depends upon the sayings of individuals" carries no weight at all if it contradicts the Koran and the Sunna. Thus, rather than challenging the authenticity of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*, Ibn Bāz rejects its authority, as he consistently rejects outright the right of anyone to rule against the Koran and the traditional sources of legal authority.

I am not worried about the authenticity of the book (which I see no reason to doubt). On the other hand, the allegations are of interest. Neither Abū Zayd nor Salmān intimates why the authenticity of the book has been called into question. Clearly, Ibn al-Qayyim's endorsement of practices that some groups of Muslims find to be both forbidden and reprehensible furnishes a strong incentive to deny that Ibn al-Qayyim authored *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*. Given Ibn al-Qayyim's very high stature within those same groups, the easiest and most logical course would be to reject the book as a forgery. However, the wide-ranging use of philosophical or scientific idiom that is employed in *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* may just as well have aroused the suspicion of some Salafī students (*tullāb*).

6. Conspectus of the Book

We have already observed that the preface found in the various printings is not found in any manuscript that we have seen. However, the basic plan of the book is the same in all the manuscripts, and it indeed conforms to the printings (similarly, spot checks of some passages against manuscripts have not revealed any differences that are worth noting here). *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* is divided into 21 "queries" (*masā'il*) of varying length. Some are subdivided into *fuṣūl* or contain supplementary *fuṣūl* on issues related to the theme of the chapter.

37 Ibid., fatwa no. 4296, Monday, 10 Rabi'a I 1429/[2008].

Here follows a list of the 21 queries, as well as some information about the contents. In order to give the reader a sense of the relative lengths of each section, I put in parentheses the page numbers in the Mecca printing that I have used for this study.

1. Are the dead aware of the visit of the living [to the cemetery] and their greeting, or are they not? (pp. 9–21)
faṣl: Additional proof from the practice of *talqīn al-mayyit*, “whispering” to the recently buried advice as to how the answer *Nakīr* and *Munkar*.³⁸
2. Do the spirits of the dead meet each other, visit each other, and remember each other, or not? (pp. 22–25)
3. Do the spirits of the living meet the spirits of the dead, or not? (pp. 26–39)
4. Does the spirit die, or does death appertain to the body alone? (pp. 40–43)
5. After they [the spirits] depart from the body and become denuded [of matter], by what means are they distinguished one from the other, so that they can be recognized and meet each other? And, after they have become denuded [of matter], do they take the shape of the body that they were once in, garbing themselves in its form; or [if not], then just what is their situation? (pp. 44–46)
6. Does the spirit return to the grave of the departed at the time of the interrogation, or not?³⁹ (pp. 47–66)
 Several *fuṣūl* take up related issues, especially the correct understanding of the “punishment of the grave” and whether it is corporeal as well.
7. The question is posed: what is our reply to the nonbeliever and heretics who deny the punishment in the grave, its wideness or narrowness;⁴⁰ that it is either a pit from among the pits of hell, or a garden from among the gardens of paradise; and that the dead neither sits nor stands in it? (pp. 67–79)

38 *Nakīr* and *Munkar* are the two angels who interrogate the newly departed in the grave.

39 The query refers to the interrogation of the newly departed about his faith, as described in the traditions cited at length by Ibn al-Qayyim.

40 According to Muslim tradition, the grave of the Muslim will be widened (allowing his body to rest in peace), but that of the hypocrite will be so narrowed that his bones will be crushed.

This chapter is divided into ten *fuṣūl*, which function as sub-chapters, each of which is devoted to sequentially numbered issues (*umūr*) related to the question posed. Ibn al-Qayyim knows that much is at stake here. The nonbelievers (*al-malāḥida wal-zanādiqa*), as well as “their brothers”, “the folk of invention and misdirection (*ahl al-bidʿa wal-dalāl*)”, i. e. philosophers and philosophically-inclined *mutakallimūn*, challenge all traditions that appear to be irrational. Ibn al-Qayyim addresses this core issue, as well as the specific punishments said to be meted out in the grave.

8. The question is posed: what is the wisdom in not mentioning the punishment of the grave in the Koran, though there is a strong need to know it and to believe in it, in order that one take heed and take care? (pp. 80–81)
9. The question is posed: what are the causes for punishment of those who are in the grave? (pp. 82–84)
10. The causes relieving one of the punishment of the grave. (pp. 85–89)
11. Is the interrogation in the grave [of the departed] universal, applying to Muslims, Hypocrites (*munāfiqūn*), and Deniers, or is it limited to Muslims and Hypocrites? (pp. 90–92)
12. Is the interrogation of *Nakīr* and *Munkar* limited to this nation [of Islam], or does it hold for others as well? (pp. 93–94)
13. Are children examined in the grave? (pp. 95–96)
14. His statement: is the punishment of the grave eternal or delimited? (pp. 97–98)
15. Where do the spirits settle in [the period] between death and the resurrection? Are they in heaven or on earth? Are they in paradise or not? Are they placed within bodies other than those that they had been in, and enjoy or suffer therein, or are they denuded [of body]? (pp. 99–124)

This is a key question in Islamic theology. Accordingly the chapter is lengthy, and, like the seventh *masʿala*, it is composed of many *fuṣūl*, each of which usually deals with one of the many opinions that have been expressed in reply to the query.

16. Do the spirits of the dead derive benefit from any effort of the living on [their behalf], or not? (pp. 125–150)
- “The living (*al-ahyāʾ*)” refers here to two very distinct groups: it refers to the dead, while they were alive, and it refers as well to those who survive the deceased. In the first instance, the question is this: do the dead derive any benefit from the lasting effects of good works they performed in the course of their lives, e.g., righteous

children? In the second instance, the query once again raises the issue of prayers said for the deceased, or other religious acts that are performed on their behalf. In both cases, Ibn al-Qayyim answers in the affirmative, taking pains to muster the necessary proof texts as well to answer the objections that have been raised. The great bulk of the chapter is concerned with the second instance, raising such particular questions as this: can one dedicate half or quarter of a religious acts for the benefit of the deceased? The *fuṣūl* here function as chapters in a well-constructed essay.

17. Is spirit pre-eternal, or is it generated and created? (pp. 151–163)

Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that the spirit is created, assigning the doctrine of pre-eternality to assorted deviants and heretics.⁴¹ One *faṣl* displays twelve proofs for its being created; the following one answers the claim that the Koran is unclear or equivocal on this issue; and the last answers the claim the human spirit is divine, hence uncreated.

18. Are the spirits created before the bodies, or are they created only after they [the bodies] are? (pp. 164–182)

Ibn al-Qayyim leans towards the second alternative, but he far less insistent than he is in the preceding query. The scriptural and traditional evidence are weighed in several *fuṣūl*; the final *faṣl* displays the clinching proof that the spirit is created after the body.

19. What is the true reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of the soul? Is it one of the parts of the body, or one of its accidents, or a body living together with it (*musākin lahu*) lodged within, or is it a non-material (*muḥarrad*) substance? Are the commanding (*al-ammāra*) soul, the rebuking (*lawwāma*) soul, and the serene (*muṭmaʿinna*) soul [all three of them] one single soul that bears these attributes? (pp. 183–221).

I have already argued that this *maṣʾala* comprises an independent treatise that Ibn al-Qayyim refers to in other writings of his as *kitābunā al-kabīr fī maʿrifat al-rūḥ wal-naḥs* (our great book on knowing the spirit and the soul). The chapter contains much tradition and evidence for irrational (so we would say) phenomena. However, it is mainly concerned with answering the philosophical questions, especially the materiality or immateriality of spirit (or

41 The Jahmiyya are named here in a long citation from Ibn Taymiyya, who in turn refers to Ibn Ḥanbal's *Radd*. Here again we observe Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyya maintaining a firm and consistent line on a point of doctrine first established by Ibn Ḥanbal in his formative manifesto of Islamic belief. Note also the emphatic assertions in this query that the spirit of Jesus is created.

soul), in a philosophical idiom. Despite the last part of the chapter's title, there is no sustained discussion here of the three traditional "souls" (*al-ammāra*, *lawwāma*, *muṭma'inna*), which form instead the first topic in the 21st *maṣ'ala*.

20. Are spirit and soul the same thing, or two different things? (pp. 222–224)

This very short chapter takes up the same questions of the very long chapter that precedes it, repeating some of the answers. It is hard to imagine it forming an independent chapter in a well-planned book. Rather, it would seem to be a short essay on the same theme of the 19th *maṣ'ala*; according to our hypothesis, both would then have been incorporated in the draft of *Kitāb al-Rūḥ*. I presume that Ibn al-Qayyim would have wanted to edit these two essays, so that they would fit together as chapters belonging to a single book.

21. Is the soul one or three? (pp. 225–270) As noted above, this chapter treats of the three souls widely recognized by Muslims. The discussion of the natures of these three souls, all of which have strong religious significance, leads Ibn al-Qayyim to write about the religious mind – for example, the "flashes" (*burūq*) that the faithful can hope for, the tranquillity and certainty of the true believer. The great conflict is between, on the one hand, *al-muṭma'inna*, which is identified with holiness, and, on the other hand, *al-ammāra*, which is associated with damnable thoughts and traits. However, as Ibn al-Qayyim, explains, the Muslim is not always faced with stark alternatives, one of which is clearly good and the other definitely evil. Instead, one must often face up to two aspects of a certain trait or issue, both of which may appear to be laudable, but one of which is surely wrong. "A single thing has a single form, which is split into laudable and disgraceful things; for example, joy and sorrow, regret and anger, self-respect (*ghayra*) which, if innately strong and fortified by the believer, leads to tranquillity and conceit, (...)" (p. 235). Consequently, most of the chapter consists of a series of *fuṣūl*, each of which begins *wal-farq bayna* and elucidates the difference between a pair of antitheses (not necessarily those listed in the sentence just cited).

Hence the great bulk of this very lengthy chapter is an essay on morals. *Rūḥ* is not discussed here at all; the connection with the theme of the book is by way of the three "souls" and the issue, discussed in earlier chapters, whether soul and spirit are the same thing.

The *masā'il* fall quite neatly into three groups, and, in fact, they are organized into three parts (*ajzā'*) in the earliest manuscript, Escorial 699. Part one, comprising *masā'il* 1–16, treats of the spirits of the dead, their status and fate, and, in particular, the legitimacy of practices at the graveyard after interment. Part two (*masā'il* 17–18) delves into the nature of spirit and soul. Part three is made up of the final three *masā'il*. We have already suggested that the nineteenth *mas'ala*, the most “philosophical” of them all, was originally written as an independent treatise. The final *mas'ala* is for the most part a treatise on morals. However, it also contains some emphatic passages of religious insight on epistemology, illumination, and, towards the end, some statements on theology as well.

Each *mas'ala* is well-organized. Some of the longer ones display a clear internal structure. On the other hand, the *masā'il* do not cohere well as chapters in a book. In particular, there seems to be a fair amount of repetition.

Appendix: Ibn al-Qayyim's Preface

I have found thus far two nearly identical prefaces, but the differences between them are significant enough of them that I have chosen to publish them separately, rather than producing a single “edition” of the two texts.⁴² Only in the Escorial version does the preface begin with *qāla al-shaykh [...] Shams al-Dīn [...] Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya*, thus indicating unambiguously that the Ibn al-Qayyim is the author. However, the substantive part of the preface, that is, the section describing the formation of man that I have discussed earlier, is much cleaner in the Leiden manuscript. The Leiden manuscript also hints that the Ibn al-Qayyim answered these queries in response to questions that were posed to him; but this may be a calque on the famous verse of the Koran. Finally, note that the Leiden manuscript alone states clearly that there are 21 queries in the book.

⁴² The preface is found in Escorial 699 as well, but it is badly damaged, and I have not taken it into account here.

A. MS Escorial

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 قال الشيخ الامام العالم العلامة الحجة البارع بقية السلف الكرام احد الانمة الاعلام شمس الدين
 عبد الله محمد بن قيم الجوزية تغمده الله برحمته الحمد لله العلي العظيم الحليم الكريم الغفور
 الرحيم الحمد لله رب العالمين الرحمان الرحيم مالك يوم الدين خلق الانسان من سلالة من طين
 ثم جعله نطفة في قرار مكين ثم خلق النطفة علقة سوداء للناظرين ثم خلق العلقة مضغة قطعة
 لحم بقدر أكلة الماضعين ثم خلق البناء المبين ثم كسا العظام لحما هو لها كالثوب للأيسين ثم انشاه
 خلقا اخر فتبارك الله احسن الخالقين فسبحان من شملت
 قدرته كل مقدور وجرت مشيئته في خلقه بتصاريف الامور وتفرد بملك السموات والارض بخلق
 ما يشاء هو الذي يصوركم في الارحام كيف يشاء لا اله الا هو العزيز الحكيم واشهد ان لا اله
 الا الله وحده لا شريك له الهاجل عن التمثيل والنظير وتعالى عن الشريك والظهير و تقدس عن
 شبه خلقه فليس كمثله شيء وهو السميع البصير واشهد ان محمدا عبده ورسوله وخيرته من خلقه
 وامينه على وحيه في حجته على عبادته ارسله رحمة للعالمينوقدرة للعالمين ومحجة للسالكين
 وحجة على العباد اجمعين فصلى الله وملائكته ورسله عليه وعليه السلام ورحمة الله وبركاته اما
 ... بعد فهذه الكتاب مشتمل على مسائل في الروح ومعانيها. اما المسئلة الاولى

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful;
 Said the Shaykh, the *imām*, the learned, the sign, the proof, the skill-
 ful, the remnant of the forefathers, the noble, the keenest of the leaders
 [and of] the eminent, Shams al-Dīn Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad Ibn
 Qayyim al-Jawziyya, may God protect him in His mercy. Praise to
 God, the Sublime, the Great, the Clement, the Noble, the Forgiving,
 the Merciful; Praise to God, Lord of the Worlds, the Compassionate,
 the Merciful, Sovereign over Judgment Day;

He created man out of the choicest clay; He then made it into a
 drop in a firm abode; He then crafted from the drop a clot, black to
 the beholders; then He made from the clot a lump [of flesh, *mudḡha*],
 that is, a piece of meat, of the size of a chewable portion [literally, “the
 size of the food of those who chew”, *al-māḍighīn*]; He then created
 the evident structure; He then covered the bones with flesh, which is
 like a suit of clothes; then He brought him into being as a different cre-
 ation. Blessed is God, the best of the creators! Praise to Him, Whose
 power (*qudra*) prevails over every capability (*maqdūr*), and Whose
 will pervades His creation in the management of affairs. He is Alone
 in being sovereign over heavens and earth, creating what He wishes.
 It is He Who formed you as He wished in the wombs. There is no
 God other than He, Mighty and Wise! I testify that there is no God
 other than Allah alone. He has no partner, too noble for any likeness
 or equivalent. Exalted is He above any partner or assistant, sanctified

is He above any comparison to His creation; there is nothing like Him. Now, this book comprises queries about *rūḥ* and its meanings. The first query...

B. MS Leiden

ابسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 الحمد لله العلي العظيم الحليم الكريم الغفور الرحيم الحمد لله رب العالمين الرحمن الرحيم مالك يوم الدين خلق الانسان من سلالة من طين ثم جعله نطفة في قرار مكين ثم خلق النطفة سوداء للناظرين ثم خلق العلقة مضغة وهي قطعة لحم بقدر اكلة الماضغين ثم خلق المضغة عظاما مختلفة المقادير والمنافع اساسا يقوم عليه هذه البنا المتين ثم كسا العظام لحما هو لها كالثوب للباسين ثم انشاه خلقا اخر فتبارك الله احسن الخالقين فسبحان من شملت قدرته كل مقدور وجرت مشيته في خلقه بتصاريف الامور وتفرد بملك السموات والارض يخلق ما يشاء هو الذي يصوركم في الارحام كيف يشاء لا اله الا هو العزيز الحكيم واشهد ان لا اله الا الله وحده لا شريك له الاجل عن التمثيل والنظير وتعالى عن الشريك والظهير تقدس عن شبه خلقه فليس كمثل شيء وهو السميع والبصير واشهد ان محمدا عبده ورسوله وخيرته من خلقه وامينه على وحيه في حجته على عبادہ ارسله رحمة للعالمين ومحجة للسالكين وحجة على العباد اجمعين فصلى الله وملائكته ورسله عليه وعليه السلام ورحمة الله وبركاته. اما بعد فهذه الكتاب مشتمل على احدى وعشرين مسائل في الروح وما يتعلق بها الشيخ الامام العالم العلامة ابو عبد الله محمد ابن قيم الجوزية قدس روحه ونور صريحه وقد سئل عن الروح فقال الحمد لله المسئلة الاولى...

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful;
 Praise to God, Lord of the Worlds, the Compassionate, the Merciful,
 Sovereign over Judgment Day; He created man out of the choicest clay;
 He then made it into a drop in a firm abode; He then made the drop
 black to the beholders; then He made from the clot a lump of flesh,
mudgha, that is, a piece of meat, of the size of a chewable portion [literally, "the size of the food of those who chew (*al-māḍighin*)"]; He then
 made from the lump, bones of varying size and utility as a foundation
 upon which this firm structure will be built; He then covered the bones
 with flesh, which is like clothing for them; then He brought him into
 being as a different creation. Blessed is God, the best of the creators!
 Praise to Him, Whose power (*qudra*) prevails over every capability
 (*maqdūr*), and Whose will pervades His creation in the management of
 affairs. He is Alone in being sovereign over heavens and earth, creating
 what He wishes. It is He Who formed you as He wished in the wombs.
 There is no God other than He, Mighty and Wise! I testify that there
 is no God other than Allāh alone. He has no partner, too noble for
 any likeness or equivalent. Exalted is He above any partner or assis-

tant, Sanctified is He above any comparison to His creation; there is nothing like Him. He is the All-hearing and All-seeing. I testify that Muhammad is His servant and messenger, the best of His creation and the trustee of His revelation, His proof to His servants. He sent him out of compassion for humanity and love for those who travel [in the right path], as proof for all of the servants. May God, His angels and messengers, pray for him; peace be upon him, and the compassion and blessings of God as well. Now then [to our topic:] this book comprises 21 queries about *rūḥ*, its meanings, and what pertains to them. The Shaykh, the *imām*, the learned, the sign, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya – may his spirit and the light of his tomb be sanctified – was asked about the *rūḥ*. He said, “Praise to God! The first query ...”

IBN 'ARABI'S OWN SUMMARY OF THE *FUSÛS*

"THE IMPRINT OF THE BEZELS OF THE WISDOM"

WILLIAM C. CHITTICK

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Introduction

THE importance of Ibn 'Arabî for Islamic intellectual history is well-known. His school determines the course of most metaphysical speculation within Sufism from the 7th/13th century onward, and in addition it profoundly influences later Islamic philosophy, especially in Iran.¹ The importance of Ibn 'Arabî's *Fusûs al-hikam* (usually translated as the "Bezels of Wisdom") as the quintessence of his writings and thought and a major source of his influence is also well-known,² and is attested to by the more than one hundred commentaries written upon it.³

Ibn 'Arabî is also the author of a work called *Naqsh al-fusûs* (the "Imprint" or "Pattern of the *Fusûs*"), in which he summarizes briefly the main discussions of the *Fusûs* itself. Because of the importance of the *Fusûs* the *Naqsh al-fusûs* also takes upon a special importance, and for this reason it has been commented by a number of well-known figures of the school of Ibn 'Arabî, including Sadr al-Dîn Qunyawî and 'Abd al-Rahman Jâmî.⁴

Jâmî's work, *Naqd al-nusûs fî sharh naqsh al-fusûs*, written in the year 863/1459 is particularly famous in the East. This is indicated by a number of facts,

¹ On the influence of Ibn 'Arabî in Sufism, philosophy and elsewhere, see S.H. Nasr, "Seventh-Century Sufism and the School of Ibn 'Arabî", *Sufi Essays*, London, 1972, pp.97-103.

² See S.H. Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1964, pp.98-99.

³ See O. Yahya. *Histoire et classification de l'oeuvre d'Ibn 'Arabi*, Damas, 1964 pp. 241-255; also the same author's Arabic introduction to S.H. Amoli, *Le texte des textes*, Tehran-Paris 1975, pp 16-33.

⁴ Yahya lists ten commentaries on this work in *Le texte des textes*, pp.35-6. See also *Histoire et classification*, pp.256-6. Yahya mentions in the latter work, p.407, that *Naqsh al-fusûs* has also been attributed to Isma'îl ibn Sawdakîn al-Nûrî, a disciple of Ibn 'Arabî. But the fact that Qunyawî, Ibn 'Arabî's foremost disciple and according to most accounts his stepson, wrote a commentary upon it as a work of his own master would seem to be sufficient proof of its authenticity. This commentary, one manuscript of which is mentioned by Yahya as existing in Damascus, also exists according to Sayyid Jalâl al-Dîn Âshtiyânî, in a private collection in Mashhad.

including the large number of manuscripts of it which exist in various libraries.⁵ The title of this book, whose text is two-thirds Arabic and one-third Persian, means "Selected Texts in Commenting the *Naqsh al-Fusûs*", and indeed one of the most interesting points of the work is the large number of quotations gathered from various Sufi authors, which Jâmî has chosen with both metaphysical and mystical insight and literary taste.

In the introduction to *Naqd al-nusûs*, Jâmî writes as follows: "These are a few words gleaned from the texts of the spiritual elite which comment upon the meaning of the *Naqsh al-fusûs*, which Ibn 'Arabî . . . abridged from and dedicated to the principles and essential elements of the *Fusûs al-hikam*, which is the seal of his writings . . . (The present work is) like the patch-work cloak of the Sufis, each patch acquired from a different place and sewn to the others with the thread of appropriateness and the tie of harmony . . . Some (of these texts) are the blessed words of the magnanimous Shaykh (Ibn 'Arabî) himself, and some are the sacred sciences expounded by his followers, among the great Masters: such as ... Sadr al-Dîn Muhammad ibn Ishaq al-Qunyawî and his disciples and beneficiaries, including the perfect gnostic, Mu'ayyid al-Dîn al-Jandî, who is the first commentator of the *Fusûs al-hikam*, and Shaykh Sa'd al-Dîn Sa'îd al-Farghânî, who is the commentator of the *Poem of the Way* of Ibn Fârid; and others, . . . especially the commentators of the *Fusûs al-hikam*".

The three names mentioned in the above passage are of particular importance, for they signify that in Jâmî's mind the most important figures in the school of Ibn 'Arabî are, after the Magister Maximus (al-Shaykh al-Akbar) himself, first Sadr al-Dîn Qunyawî (d. 673/1274-5) and then his disciples, Jandî and Farghânî. The fact that Qunyawî is the most important expositor of the doctrines of Ibn 'Arabî in the eastern lands of Islam has indeed been recognized,⁶ although it is remarkable that, as far as the present writer knows, no study of him has been made in Western languages.⁷ The reason that an intellectual figure of his magnitude – who should be considered second only to his master in the exposition of theoretical gnosis (*'irfân-i nazarî*) in Islam – could have gone so completely ignored⁸ can only be his proximity to Ibn 'Arabî, so

⁵ Yahya mentions twenty in *Le texte des textes*, but I was able to find about fifty in the famous catalogues and another 25 in the Solaymaniyyah Library in Istanbul — and by no means can I claim to have done a thorough job of searching. It has also been printed in lithographed editions at least three times in India and Iran.

⁶ See S.H. Nasr, *Sufi Essays*, p.99.

⁷ I am in the process of editing and translating his *Tabsirat al-mubtadi'*, a Persian work which introduces the reader to Ibn 'Arabî's metaphysical universe, but with remarkable simplicity and basing itself almost exclusively on the Quran and Hadith.

⁸ Even in the East it is only scholars like the great contemporary *hakîm* Sayyid Jalâl al-Dîn Âshtiyânî who are fully aware of his importance. See Âshtiyânî's *Sharh muqaddima-yi Qaysari bar Fusûs al-hikam*, Mashhad, 1385/1966, p.337, footnote. The only work of Qunyawî which has been published in a modern edition is *I'jâz al-bayân*, 2nd edition, Hyderabad-Deccan, 1368/1949; also printed in Cairo as *al-Tafsîr al-sûfî lil-Qur'ân*, 1389/1969. Âshtiyânî is in the midst of printing his *Nusûs*. At least

that like the moon he has been effaced by the sun. In any case there is no doubt that all of the followers of Ibn 'Arabî's school in the East see their master through Qunyawî's eyes or the eyes of his immediate disciples. The disciples and students mentioned by Jâmî – only two of dozens of important figures, including such men as Fakhr al-Dîn 'Irâqî and Qutb al-Dîn Shîrâzî – are also of prime importance in Ibn 'Arabî's school and deserve serious study.⁹ Jâmî goes so far as to say that all of the commentaries upon the *Fusûs* go back to that of Jandî,¹⁰ and a study of two of the most famous of these, by Qaysarî and Kâshânî, has shown that at least some of their material has been derived almost word for word from his work.¹¹

What is presented below is a complete translation of Ibn 'Arabî's *Naqsh al-fusûs* along with an abridgement of Jâmî's commentary, representing perhaps 15% of the total work.¹² Because of the extreme conciseness of *Naqsh al-fusûs* it is almost impossible to understand it without a commentary, and in fact a rather detailed one. I have tried to supply the minimum commentary necessary for an understanding of the text, as well as a few gleanings from Jâmî's detailed selections from other texts which comment upon the main themes. The first and last chapters are translated more extensively – but by no means totally – both because of their importance and also to give the reader a better idea of the style of the complete commentary. Certain difficulties in understanding Ibn 'Arabî's work no doubt remain, but it is hoped that the publication of the translation of the whole text with clarifications where necessary will eliminate these. I have not indicated the sources of the material employed by Jâmî, except where he indicates it himself. The indication of sources along with numerous other notes and comments, will have to wait for the publication of the whole book.

The material in darker type is the text of Ibn 'Arabî's work. Additions in parentheses are my own. Finally it should be added that for a good deal of the terminology employed in the translation I am indebted to T. Izutsu's brilliant study of Ibn 'Arabî,¹³ probably the best work in European languages for explaining the intricacies of Ibn 'Arabî's doctrine, including many of the discussions dealt with here.

four of his works were published in lithographed editions in Iran in the nineteenth century.

⁹ Sayyid Jalâl al-Dîn Âshtiyânî has fortunately just recently begun the edition of both works mentioned by Jâmî, Jandî's commentary on the *Fusûs*, which has never been printed and the Persian version of Farghânî's commentary on the *Poem of the Way*. Farghânî also translated this work into Arabic and it was published in 1293 A.H. apparently in Cairo.

¹⁰ *Nafahât al-uns*, ed. by M. Tawhîdpûr, Tehran, 1336/1957, p.558.

¹¹ See my Persian introduction to *Naqd al-nusûs*, in press.

¹² *Naqsh al-fusûs* was published in the *Rasâ'il* of Ibn 'Arabî in Hyderabad-Deccan, 1361/1948, but I have followed the far better text which has been established through a critical edition of Jâmî's *Naqd al-nusûs* based on six manuscripts (five of which were written during Jâmî's lifetime). I have also translated the remainder of *Naqd al-nusûs* and am preparing it for publication.

¹³ *A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Concepts in Sufism and Taoism — Ibn 'Arabî and Lao-Tzû, Chuang-Tzû*, Tokyo, 1966, Part One.

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL

I

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of (the Name) Allah in the Logos of Adam

The *fass* of a thing is its epitome and quintessence. The *fass* or "bezel" of a ring is that with which it is decorated and upon which the name of its owner is written. "Wisdom" is knowledge of the realities, attributes and properties of things as they are in themselves and knowledge of words and of volitional acts in a manner which requires them to be appropriate to the circumstances (when they appear from the possessor of wisdom). *Al-ilâhiyyah* ("the Divinity" or "Allah") is the name of the ontological level which embraces all of the levels of the divine Names and Qualities.

Therefore "the quintessence of the wisdom of (the name) Allah" consists of the epitome of all of the knowledge and religious sciences pertaining to the level of Divinity; or it is the place where that knowledge and those sciences are inscribed, i.e., the heart of the Perfect Man. So the purport of the title of this chapter is that the quintessence of this knowledge and these sciences, or the locus which is receptive toward them, is actualized in the Logos of Adam. And what is meant by "logos" throughout this work is the very prophet in question in respect of his particularities and the allotment determined for him and for his community by God.

Know that the Most Beautiful Divine Names, which if considered in principle number 99 or 1001, but if considered individually and in detail are beyond reckoning, for the Names are the determinations of the Name "Allah" within the realities of the possible beings (*mumkinât*), and they are infinite because of the infinity of the possible beings, **demand in themselves the existence of the world** in order that it become a mirror for their concealed lights and the locus of manifestation of their hidden secrets, in respect to which God said, "I was a hidden treasure and I wanted to be known, so I created the world." And verily the Shaykh (i.e., Ibn 'Arabî) attributed this demand to the Names – which are the Essence qualified by attributes – and not to the Essence Itself, because the Essence in respect of Its absoluteness (*itlâq*) can have no property attributed to It, nor does It become determined by any quality or delimitation. **So God in respect of the Name "Allah" brought the world into being as a body made complete** (and ready for a spirit) **and made Adam its spirit; and I mean by "Adam" the existence of the human microcosm. And He taught him the Names, all of them.**

One of the Sufis has said concerning His words, "He taught Adam the Names, all of them" (Quran II, 31), "i.e., He placed within Adam's primordial nature the subtle essence (*latîfah*) of each of His Names, and through those subtle essences prepared him to realize all of the Names of Majesty (*jalâl*) and Beauty (*jamâl*), which He referred to as His two hands. For He said to Iblîs, 'What prevented thee from falling prostrate before that which I created with My two hands?' (XXXVIII, 76). Everything other than Adam had been created with one hand, because it was the locus of manifestation of either the attributes of Beauty, like the angels of mercy, or those of Majesty, like the angels of chastisement and the satans."

God only taught the Perfect Man His Most Beautiful Names and placed them within him, **because** the Perfect Man is the spirit of the world and the world is his

body – as was mentioned – and because **the spirit governs the body** and exercises free disposal (*tasarruf*) within it **through its** spiritual and corporeal **faculties, just as the Names are like** spiritual and corporeal **faculties for the Perfect Man**. Just as the spirit governs the body and controls it through faculties, in the same way the Perfect Man governs the affairs of the world and controls them by means of the divine Names.

Know that every one of the realities of the essence of the Perfect Man and of his ontological level is an isthmus (*barzakh*) in terms of its comprehensive unity (*ahadiyyat al-jam'*), standing between one of the realities of the Sea of Necessity (*wujûb*) and a reality which is its locus of manifestation within the sea of possibility (*imkân*) and which is its "throne", upon which that Necessary reality is seated.¹⁴ So when the perfect comprehensive theophany (*tajallî*) descends upon its locus of manifestation, the Perfect Man, he receives it through his perfect, comprehensive and unified reality, and that theophany courses through all of the realities within his nature. Then the light of theophany flows out from him onto that which is in conformity with it within the world. Therefore the bounties and blessings which descend upon the realities of the world through the theophany of the All-merciful only reach these realities after having become determined within the Perfect Man and colored by an added hue which did not exist before the determination of the theophany within him. Therefore the realities and archetypes of the world are his subjects, and he is the vicegerent (*khalîfah*) over them. And the vicegerent must look after his subjects in the most fitting and best manner. It is here that some of the Perfect Men are superior to others.

God manifests Himself to the heart of the Perfect Man, who is His vicegerent. And the reflection of the lights of His self-manifestation overflows into the world, which remains in existence by receiving this effusion (*fayd*). As long as this Man is in the world, he seeks from God the aid of the theophanies of the Essence and of the "Merciful" and "Compassionate" Mercy¹⁵ by means of the Names and Qualities of which the beings are the manifestations and the loci upon which they are "seated".¹⁶ So the world is preserved by this seeking of aid and by the effusion of theophanies as long as the Perfect Man remains within it. Therefore no meaning passes from the Inward (*bâtin*) to the Outward (*zâhir*) except by his command. Therefore even if he does not know it because of the domination of his human qualities, he is the isthmus between the two seas – i.e. the two seas of the Outward and the Inward – and the partition between the two worlds. And to him is the reference in His words, "He let forth the two seas that meet together, between them an isthmus they do not overpass" (Quran LV, 19).

Therefore, or because the world is like the body and the Perfect Man is like the spirit, **it is said that the world is a "great man"**, for just as man consists of a body and a spirit which governs it, the world is made up of these two, although it is larger

¹⁴ The terminology here is Quranic, referring to the verse, "The All-Compassionate sat Himself upon the Throne" (XX, 5).

¹⁵ These two kinds of mercy, also called "the mercy of gratuitous gift" and "the mercy of obligation" are explained below in the Wisdom of Hûd (the tenth *fass*).

¹⁶ Again a reference to the verse, "The All-Compassionate sat Himself upon the Throne" (XX, 5).

than man in form; **but** this statement is only true **on condition of** the Perfect **Man's existence within it**, or the world, for if he did not exist within it, it would be like a discarded body without a spirit.

And the Perfect **Man** is a book, **the epitome** and summary of the Mother of the Book, which consists **of the ontological plane of** the comprehensive Unity of the Name "**Allah**", which comprises the Necessary and active realities pertaining to the Names and the subtle essences of the Qualities pertaining to the level of Lordship, such that nothing escapes them, save inherent Necessity (*al-wujûb al-dhâtî*), for the contingent and possible being has no share in that, or else the realities of things would be reversed.

And therefore, i.e. because man is the epitome of the ontological plane of "Allah" and comprises what it contains of the realities of the Names and Qualities in a comprehensive unity, **He singled him out for the divine Form**, even if the world also is in accordance with the Form, for whatever is nearer to oneness is more deserving of being attributed to God and the form of man is the form of His comprehensive Unity, while the form of the world is His particularized form. **For He said** through the mouth of the Holy Prophet, "**Verily God created Adam in His**" divine and perfect "**form**" and according to His own all-comprehensive qualities of Lordship. And since it is possible that the pronoun in "His form" refers to Adam, as some people have claimed, he followed this with his words, **and in another version, "in the form of the All-Merciful"**.

It has been said that "form" means appearance, and so it can only apply to bodies. So what is meant by "form" in this *hadîth* is "attribute", i.e., "Adam was created according to the Attributes of God", or, living, knowing, willing, powerful, hearing, seeing and speaking. Since Reality appears outwardly through form, the term has been applied figuratively to the Names and Qualities; for through them God appears in external reality. This is the point of view of the exoteric authorities.

But in the view of those who have attained the Truth, form is that without which the unseen and disengaged (*mujarrad*) realities cannot be conceived or manifested. And the form of God is Being determined by the other determinations through which It is the source of all acts relating to perfection and all active properties.

One of the Sufis has said, "If a questioner asks how 'form' can be attributed to God, we will answer that according to the exoteric authorities it as a figurative attribution, not a real one, because for them to apply the word 'form' to sensory beings is true and correct, and to intelligible beings is figurative. But for us, since the world in all of its spiritual, corporeal, substantial and accidental parts is the particularized form of the ontological plane of 'Allah', and the Perfect Man is His summary form, the attribution of form to God is true and correct, and to what is other than He is figurative; for in our eyes nothing other than He possesses existence."

And He made him, or the Perfect Man, **the sought-after goal** and the desired end in the creation and maintenance of **the world, like the rational soul**, which is the goal **in** making perfect the body and harmonizing the natural and bodily constitution **of the human individual**.

The universal goal and the primary intention in the creation of the world was the knowledge and vision of the sons of Adam. The lamp of the determinations of contemplation's light and the mirror of the variegations of Being's manifestation are his pure heart and penetrating understanding; and the focus of all of the kinds of

knowledge and perception is the comprehensive unity of his knowledge and perception.

When man's created attributes are transformed into uncreated ones and the eyes of his spiritual insight are anointed with the antimony of Oneness, by means of all of his faculties and sense organs he contemplates the beauty of God and perceives absolute Being in all of the loci of theophany and manifestation. The fruit of the tree of his creation is nothing other than this knowledge and vision.

Man is eye, and the rest is skin: true sight is seeing the Friend.

When there is not sight of the Friend, the eye is better blind; were he Solomon, an ant is better than he.¹⁷

Therefore, or because the goal of the creation and maintenance of the world is the Perfect Man, just as the goal of perfecting the body is the rational soul, **the world is destroyed with his disappearance**, i.e., the disappearance and transferral of the Perfect Man from it, just as the body decays and disappears when the rational soul leaves it; for verily God does not manifest Himself within the world without the intermediary of the Perfect Man. So with his withdrawal the replenishment which brings about the subsistence of its existence and perfections is discontinued. Hence the world is transferred with his transferral, and all of the meanings and perfections which were within it depart for the hereafter.

Sadr al-Dîn al-Qunyawî writes in *al-Fukûk*: "The true Perfect Man is the isthmus between Necessity and possibility and the mirror which embraces the attributes and laws of Eternity together with those of contingency. He is the intermediary between God and creation, and through him and from his ontological plane the divine effusion and grace, which are the reason for the subsistence of 'other than God', reach the world, all of it, both the celestial and the terrestrial. If it were not for his being the isthmus which is not opposed to either of the two sides, nothing in the world would receive the unique succour of God, because of the lack of affinity and relationship; the succour would not reach the world and therefore the world would cease to exist.

"Verily the Perfect Man is the pillar of the Heavens and the earth. And because of this mystery, when he leaves the center of the Universe – that Universe which is the outward form of the divine All-comprehensiveness and of its Unity and the station of the vicegerency of the ontological plane of 'Allah' – and goes back to the Noble Pedestal and the Majestic Throne, which encompass the Heavens and the earth, the order of the Universe will be destroyed and the earth and the Heavens will be changed into other than themselves.

"Therefore the Prophet has said, 'The hour (of the Resurrection) will not come as long as there is someone in the world who says "Allah, Allah".' And he emphasized by repetition that he means, 'as long as there is someone in the world who truly says "Allah", for if he meant 'someone who says the word "Allah", he would not have emphasized it by repetition. And there is no doubt that no one mentions 'Allah' with true mention – and in particular with this greatest and all-embracing Name, which contains in itself all of the Names – except he who knows God with perfect gnosis. It is as if he said, 'The hour will not come as long as there is a Perfect Man in the world.'

¹⁷ These lines are from Rûmî's *Mathnawî*, Book 1, vss. 1406-1407 (Nicholson edition). Unless otherwise indicated the lines of poetry are usually by Jâmî.

It is he who is referred to as 'the maintaining pillar' or 'he for whose sake (the world) is maintained.' So when he is transferred (to the other world), the heaven will be split asunder, the sun will be darkened, the stars will be thrown down and scattered, the mountains will be set moving, the earth will be shaken and the Resurrection will come.¹⁸

"Moreover, if it were not for his immutable permanence – in respect of his being a locus of manifestation – within Paradise, whose place is the Noble Pedestal and the Majestic Throne, the situation of these two would be like that of the earth and the heavens (they would also be destroyed). And verily I have qualified his immutable permanence with my words, 'in respect of his being a locus of manifestation', because of what God has informed me concerning the fact that Paradise does not encompass a Perfect Man. Of his reality there will only be in Paradise what is compatible with that world and what that world necessitates from God in respect to what it contains of man.

"Rather, I even say, 'If hell were empty of him, it would not remain in existence; and it is through him that it is satiated.' The Prophet refers to the Perfect Man with his words 'the Foot of the All-Compeller' in the *hadîth*, 'Verily hell will not cease to say, "Are there any more?", until the All-Compeller places His foot upon it. And when the All-Compeller places His foot upon it, parts of it will withdraw into other parts, and it will say, "Enough! Enough!"' I was told by God that the foot placed in hell is what is left over in this world from the forms of the Perfect Men and is that which does not accompany them in the paradisaal state. And this remnant was alluded to as 'the foot' because of a subtle and sublime correspondence: the foot is the last part of man's body; in the same way his physical form itself is the last of the parts of the absolute human form, for the forms of the world are all like bodily organs of the absolute and true human form. The physical state is the last form in which the human reality appears; and through the absolute and true human form all of the forms which I said were like bodily organs are supported and maintained."

And the edifice is transferred to the hereafter because of him, i.e., because of man, or by reason of his being transferred there. As long as the Perfect Man is in the world, the world is preserved and the divine treasures protected. But when he is transferred from this world to the next **and leaves the lower world to reside in the hereafter, and when no one remains among men who is qualified by the divine perfections and able to take his place, and when God makes him the treasurer of His own treasures, then all of the perfections and meanings which exist in the treasures of the world are removed along with that Perfect Man, the small amount which is in the world joins that which is waiting in the hereafter, and the work of keeping the treasury and being the vicegerent goes to the next world.**

Hence he, or the Perfect Man, **is the first in intention** and desire, since God made him the intended aim and the final cause of the creation of the world. And it is in the nature of the final cause to be prior in knowledge and will, just as it is in its nature to be posterior in existence, as the Shaykh has indicated with his words, **the last**, i.e., the Perfect Man is posterior to other than himself, **in creation** in the chain of existent beings, for the first thing He created in external existence was the Supreme

¹⁸ The last sentence is a reference to a number of Quranic verses: LV, 37; LXXXII; LXXXII, 2; LXXX1,3 and XCIX, 1.

Pen, then the Guarded Tablet, then the Mighty Throne, then the Noble Foot-stool, then the elements, then the seven heavens, then the productions¹⁹ then man: for he is the end of these creatures and the locus of their integration. And man is **the outward**, or that which is perceived, in his elemental and corporeal **form and the inward** also, or that which is not perceived, **in station or rank**, for this is in respect of his spirituality. Or we can say that man is the outward in the realm of concrete existence, through his comprehensive and unified form composed of body, soul, intellect, faculties and other things which can be called "created"; and he is also inward, but through his station, which is his vicegerency.

So in respect of his elemental and corporeal form, or the form of his comprehensive unity, **he is a servant of God** (Allah), created to worship his Lord; **and** in respect of his meaning and spirit, or his station, **a lord**, whose lordship is actualized **in relation to** the individual beings of all **the world**.

The Shaykh writes in *Inshâ' al-dawâ'ir*: "Man is two copies: an outward copy and an inward copy. His outward copy corresponds to the world in its totality, and his inward copy corresponds to the ontological level of the Divinity. Thus man is the universal in reality and unconditionally, for he is the receptacle for all beings, whether eternal or contingent. But beings other than he are not the receptacle for all beings, for the particular beings of the world are not receptacles for Divinity, and God is not a receptacle for servanthood. Rather the whole world is a servant, and God – glory be to Him alone – is a unique and eternal God who cannot be qualified by that which contradicts the attributes of Divinity, just as the world cannot be qualified by that which contradicts the attributes of contingency and servanthood. So man is the owner of two complete relations: a relation through which he enters the ontological level of Divinity, and a relation through which he enters the ontological level of the cosmos. So he is called a 'servant' in respect of his being addressed by revelation and since he was not, then he was, like the world. And he is called a 'lord' in respect of his vicegerency, his Form and his Fairest Stature (Quran XCV, 4)."

For that reason, i.e., because man has an aspect of lordship through which he is in conformity with God, and an aspect of servanthood through which he is in conformity with creation, **He made him a vicegerent and** in the same way He made **his perfect sons vicegerents** in all of the world, and his sons who have not reached perfection vicegerents in that which pertains to them, like the governance of a kingdom by the king and the running of a family by its head. And the lowest form of governing is the governing of the body by the individual. But the Greatest Vicegerency belongs only to the Perfect Man. **And therefore**, i.e., because the meaning of Adam comprises the two aspects of Lordship and servanthood, **none of the creatures of the world has claimed for himself lordship except man, because of what he possesses of power** and mastery, by being qualified by the attributes of Lordship and the active Qualities of the Necessary Being. So when he observed them in himself, but God had not opened the eye of his spiritual insight, he did not understand that they are the attributes of God reflected in the mirror of his preparedness (*istidâd*); and he imagined that they belonged to him personally. Therefore he claimed lordship and divinity, like the pharaohs. **And** in the same way **no one in the world consolidated the station of servanthood in himself** through falling

¹⁹ The "productions" (*muwalladât*) are the three kingdoms: animal, vegetable and mineral.

down to its lowest levels **except man**, for when he observed those attributes and qualities in others and he imagined that they belonged to them personally, he acknowledged his servanthood to them, like those who worship idols. **Therefore he worshipped stones and other minerals, which are the lowest and the most debased kind of being**, for the ontological qualities in their receptive potency, such as life, knowledge and their concomitants, have not become actualized.

So there is nothing greater and of higher rank **than man in his lordship**, or by reason of his being qualified by and manifesting the attributes of Lordship, for no rank is higher than this, **and** in the same way **nothing is more lowly than him in his servanthood**, or by reason of his being qualified by the attributes of servanthood, for just as Lordship is the highest of ranks, its opposite, i.e., servanthood, is the lowest.

Man is a two-sided mirror. On one side the properties of Lordship and on the other the defects of servanthood are reflected. When you look at the properties of Lordship, he is greater than all beings; and when you count the defects of servanthood, he is lower and more insignificant than all creatures.

When I find a trace of Thy Qualities in myself, God forbid that someone should be better than I!

But when my glance falls to my own state, in the two worlds there is none worse than I.

So if you have understood the preceding explanation, **I have explained to you what is meant by "man"**. **Look at his grandeur**, which he has attained **through the Most Beautiful Names**, or having become qualified by them, **and the fact that they seek him** to be their perfect locus of theophany and their all-embracing locus of manifestation. **Through their seeking him** and their requiring his existence, **you will come to understand his majesty** and nobility, for the grandeur and nobility of the sought is only to the extent of the grandeur and nobility of the seeker, **and** in the same way **through his appearance through them**, or through those Names, and his existence through them, although in his own essence he is nonexistent, **you will understand his lowliness**, for there is nothing more lowly than to be subject to the laws of nothingness and to stand in need of another for one's existence. **So understand!**

From this, or from this station, according to which it has been understood that man is a lord in respect of his inward part and a servant in respect of his outward, **it is understood that he, or man, is a copy of the two forms**, and corresponds to them: the form of **God**, which is embraced by the state of his inward all-comprehensiveness and concentration **and** the form of **the world**, which is encompassed by the state of his outward differentiation and dispersion. And these two forms are the two hands of God with which He created man.

What is man? An all-embracing isthmus, the form of creatures and of God placed within him.

He is a copy in synopsis whose content is the Essence of God and His ineffable Attributes.

Connected to the subtleties of the World of Power, inclusive of the verities of the World of Dominion,

His inward is drowned in the sea of Unity, his outward dry-lipped on the shore of separation.

There is not one of the Attributes of God which is not manifest in his essence.

He is knowing, hearing and seeing, speaking, willing, alive and powerful.

In the same way, of the realities of the Universe, everything is incorporated within him:

Take the Heavens or the elements, or take minerals, plants and animals;

The form of good and bad are written within him, the behaviour of devil and beast are kneaded in him.

If he was not the mirror of the Face of the Everlasting, why did the angels prostrate themselves to him?

He is the reflection of the beauty of the Immaculate Presence; if Iblīs cannot fathom this, so what?

II

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of In- and Ex-spiration in the Logos of Seth

The first of the ontological levels which can be conceived of is the determination (*ta'ayyun*) which embraces all determinations and which possesses the comprehensive Unity (*ahadiyyat al-jam'*). The level which follows it is the level of Principiality (*masdariyyah*) and Effusion (*fayyâdiyyah*). Adam was the form of the first level, just as Seth was the locus of manifestation for the second. Therefore the first *fass* to be mentioned was that of Adam, and it was followed by the *fass* of Seth, in keeping with external existence itself.

Since Adam after the loss of Abel sought a gift from the ontological level of God as "the Giver" to alleviate his grief, God bestowed upon him Seth purely as a gift and bestowal. In addition everything which Seth attained came purely as a gift. Therefore the Shaykh inevitably speaks about gifts and some of their kinds in this *fass*: **Know that gifts of God are comprised of numerous kinds: among them is that He should give a gift especially to manifest His bounty**, without expecting anything in exchange from him who benefits, in terms of praise, thanksgiving, or what have you, **by means of His Name "the Giver"**. **And it**, or the gift received from the Name "the Giver", is **of two kinds**: one is **the gift of the Essence**, pertaining to the Unity of all of the Names, for the Essence as It is in Itself does not bestow gifts or manifest Itself through theophanies, **and the second is the gift of a Name**.

Now if you should say, "The gifts pertaining to the Name 'the Giver' are gifts of a Name, so how can they be divided into gifts of the Essence and gifts of a Name?" I would reply, "What is meant by 'gift of the Essence' is the gift whose source is the Essence without taking into account any one of the divine Qualities along with it – even though such a gift is not given without the intermediary of the Names and Qualities, for God does not manifest Himself in terms of His Essence to the existent beings except from behind the veil of one of the Names. And what is meant by 'gift of a Name' is a gift whose source is one of the Attributes in respect of its being distinguished and differentiated from the Essence."

The gifts of the Essence occur only through a "divine" theophany, i.e., through the theophany of the Presence of the all-embracing Name "Allah", which is the comprehensive Unity of all of the Names, not through the manifestation of the Essence, since there are no properties, designations, names, theophanies or anything else within the Unity of the Essence. Therefore the determination of the theophany comes from the ontological level of the divinity, and for this reason the theophany is attributed to the *divine* Essence, not to the Essence without restriction.

And the theophany from the Essence can only be according to the form of the locus of theophany – which is the servant – and according to his preparedness (*isti'dâd*), just as God appears in the mirrors of the beings according to their preparednesses and receptivities, by manifesting His properties within them. Other than this is impossible.

But as for the gifts of a Name, they always are accompanied by a veil, i.e., the veil of determination according to a Name, according to which a particular Name becomes differentiated from the others. **And the recipient does not receive this gift,** whether of the Essence or of a Name, **except according to his actual preparedness,** for the theophanies in the Presence of Holiness and the Spring of Oneness are one and whole in description, but they become colored when they descend according to the preparednesses of the recipients, their spiritual and physical levels, their times and places, and all of the concomitances of these things, like states, constitutions and particular attributes. So people think because of the diversity of effects that the theophanies themselves are multiple in reality, but this is not so. God said, "Our command is but one, as the twinkling of an eye" (Quran LIV, 50). Just as God is one in every respect, so also His effusion and His command have no multiplicity except in relation to the recipients.

It, or the preparedness, is what is meant by His words, "He gave everything its creation" (Quran XX, 50). So from that is the preparedness.

It may be that the gift, whether from the Essence or a Name, **is due to asking** on the part of him who has received it **by the state** of his preparedness, or the state which causes man to ask verbally. **There is no escape from it,** or from asking by the state.

Or it may be that the gift is due to asking verbally. Verbal asking is of two kinds: one is **asking according to nature**, in that the reason for asking is man's natural wish to hurry, for man was created ever hasty, **and** the second, which is asking but not according to nature, is also divided into two kinds. The first is **asking in obedience to the divine command**, according to His words, "Call upon Me and I will answer you" (Quran XL, 60), **and** the second is **asking according to the demands of wisdom and gnosis, for he**, or the asker according to the demands of wisdom and gnosis, **is a commander** who directs his subjects – whether they be all the inhabitants of the world, or those of a kingdom, or his family, or his body, **and a master** of the reins of their affairs, a protector of their interests, and one who knows that there are certain of their interests which divine Providence has ordained to be dependent upon asking. So he asks God and prays to Him to take care of these affairs. **It is obligatory for him**, or that asker, **to strive** to the extent possible **to see that every one** of his subjects **who has a right receives it**; what indicates this obligation is **like his**, i.e. the Prophet's, **words, "Verily you have a duty toward your family"** i.e. those who are worthy of your instruction and education, like wives and children in the macrocosm and like physical and spiritual faculties in the microcosm, **"your soul, your body and your guests."**

III

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the "Most Glorified" in the Logos of Noah

Since the Wisdom of the "Most Glorified" (*al-subbûh*) consists of the knowledge of the sciences pertaining to the "purification" (*tanzîh*) of God, the Shaykh begins the text concerned with this Wisdom with a discussion of purification: **Purification on the part of him, or the servant; who purifies** God of certain things in accordance with the approval or disapproval of his ordinary mind and his reason **is a delimitation** and a specification by him **of Him who is purified**, in terms of what is other than those things purified from Him, **for he has distinguished Him from that which does not accept to be purified** from those things. So by analogy **the absoluty also of whatever must be given this description is a delimitation** through this absoluty. **Therefore there is then naught but a limited being** or a divinity, **which he**, or the servant who purifies it, **has raised up by attributing absoluty to it.**

Just as the knowledge of him who purifies God with his mind is incomplete – for he is restricting the Unrestricted and delimiting the Limitless – in the same way he who "assimilates" (*tashbîh*) God to the creatures without purifying Him is mistaken, for assimilation is also delimitation and restriction of the Unrestricted – who has no limit which defines or confines Him.

But he who combines purification and assimilation, maintains each of them as permanent concerning Him and describes Him by both is the true gnostic and the realized Perfect Man. The Shaykh has said:

If you purify Him, you delimit; if you assimilate Him, you restrict.

But if you do both, you have been shown the right way: you are a leader in the gnostic sciences, a master.

And since the Shaykh has pointed out the deficiency of the knowledge of God according to attributes which only purify Him, and the situation of knowledge which only assimilates Him has become known by analogy, he now mentions explicitly the perfect knowledge of God combining purification and assimilation, which the servant is commanded to attain by the Prophet, and for which according to the religious law he will be rewarded: **Know that the way of the truth through which He has sought that they know Him** in words like the *hadîth*, "I wanted to be known, so I created the world", **is what the tongues of the Revelations have brought. So no intelligence can overstep it.** Rather, everyone must believe in it in the manner in which God meant it and not by interpreting it according to his own ideas. His mental "purification" must be in accordance with what God has sent down upon the tongues of His prophets and within the Books He has revealed to them; for otherwise, God is purified from the purification of the thoughts of human reason, for human reasons, which are determined within the particular and limited faculties of man's constitution, are particular and limited in accordance with these faculties. And how should the limited and particular perceive absolute and disengaged realities in themselves unless it escape from its own limitations, or unless those absolute realities become limited according to its vision and existence?

But before the coming of the Revelations and the acquisition of knowledge and gnosis through them, **knowledge of Him is to purify Him of the characteristics**

of contingency. So the gnostic (*'ârif*) possesses two knowledges: a knowledge acquired by reason and demonstration before the coming of the Revelations, and a knowledge received from the bringer of the Revelation, but whose condition is that he turn over to God the true understanding of that with which they, or the Revelations, have come and stay away from rational demonstration; and that he believe in this knowledge in the way that God meant it without interpreting it with his reason or imposing his own ideas upon it, for verily the Revelations have only been sent by God because it is impossible for human reason to perceive by itself the verities as they really are within the divine Knowledge.

And if He unveils for him the understanding of it, i.e., of what the Revelations have brought, and if He gives him knowledge of what His intention is through the conditions imposed by the divine Law (*shar'*), which the reason cannot attain through its mental processes, that unveiling and awareness is because of the divine Gift relating to the Essence, which was already mentioned in the chapter on Seth.

IV The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the "Most Holy" in the Logos of Idris

The Shaykh saw fit to devote this Wisdom to Idris because he was a prophet who went to the greatest lengths in purifying his soul through arduous ascetic practices and in sanctifying himself from the attributes of animality, until his spiritual nature gained complete sway over his animal nature and he totally cast off his body and made a journey to the Heavens (*mi'râj*), where he spoke to the angels and the disengaged Intellects. And it is said that for sixteen years he neither ate nor slept, until only a transcendent intellect remained.

And since it is mentioned in the Quran concerning Idris that "We raised him up to a high place" (XIX, 57), and since "elevation" is of two kinds, the Shaykh alludes to these with his words, **Elevation is of two kinds**: One of them is **elevation of place** (*makân*), which is attributed to God according to various texts, **like His words, "The All-Merciful sat Himself upon the Throne"** (Quran XX, 5), and **like the cloud** mentioned in the words of the Prophet, "He was in a cloud, above which there was no air, and below which there was no air", in his answer to the bedouin who asked, "Where was our Lord before He created His creation?", **and like the heaven** mentioned in His words, "And it is He who in heaven is God" (Quran XLIII, 84); **and** the second is **elevation of position** (*makânah*) or rank, which must be attributed to God according to verses like: **"All things perish, except His Face"** (Quran XXVIII, 88).

And mankind are described by the two elevations, for they are moving about **between knowledge of God and works for him**. So some of them rise in the levels of the knowledge of God, like the gnostics; and others become ranked in the degrees of works, like the worshippers and ascetics; and some of them combine the two, like those who have reached perfection. **So works pertain to place, i.e., they result in the elevation of place, like Paradise and its various degrees, and knowledge pertains to position, for it results in elevation within the degrees of nearness to God.** This is because position pertains to the Spirit, just as place pertains to the body. So each of them necessitates what resembles and is similar to itself.

Hence elevation of position belongs to him who knows, and elevation of place to him who performs works. And whoso combines the two perfections possesses both elevations.

But as for the elevation of relative superiority (*mufâdalah*), i.e. the elevation in which certain of the elevated are superior in relation to others, **that is His words**, or must be attributed to God according to His words, "**And you are the uppermost, and God is with you**" (Quran XLVII1, 35) where He affirms that those whom He is addressing possess a higher elevation and that He is with them in this elevation. Hence higher elevation must also be attributed to Him. **So this**, i.e., elevation of relative superiority, **refers to His theophany in His loci of self-manifestation**, which are multiple and graded in ranks. It does not refer to the Unity of His Essence. **For in one theophany He is higher in elevation than in another theophany, like** His words in the Quran, "**Nothing is like Him**" (XLII, 11) **and like** "Surely I am with you, I hear and I see" (Quran XX, 46) **and like** His words in the *hadîth*, "**I was hungry and you fed me not**". So it becomes obvious that His elevation of relative superiority is from the point of view of the multiplicity of theophanies and aspects, not in respect to the Unity of the Essence, for verily at the level of Unity there is only real and intrinsic elevation, not relative elevation.

V

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Ecstatic Love in the Logos of Abraham

Since Abraham had realized the state of annihilation (*fanâ'*) in God, and since it is possible that someone might imagine that he who has attained annihilation is purely and simply nothing, and "nothing" cannot be described by positive attributes, the Shaykh rejects this notion with his words, **There is no escape** in the station of annihilation in God **from affirming the real existence of the servant** who has been annihilated within Him, since here by "annihilation" is not meant that the existence of the servant becomes absolutely nothing. Rather, what is meant is that his human aspect is annihilated in his lordly aspect, since every servant possesses an aspect deriving from the divine Presence, which is referred to in His words, "Every man has his direction to which he turns" (Quran II, 148). And annihilation is only attained through perfect attentiveness directed toward the Presence of God, the Absolute, for by means of this the servant's godly aspect is strengthened until it gains ascendancy over the creaturely aspect to the point of subduing and annihilating it. And this attentiveness is only possible through the inherent love hidden within the servant. Its appearance can only come about through avoiding that which opposes it and is incompatible with it, i.e., through fearing God with respect to what opposes it. So love is the mount and godfearingness is the provision. And this annihilation necessitates that the servant become determined with godly determinations and lordly qualities, that he attain subsistence (*baqâ'*) in God. Then these determinations will never disappear from him.

The annihilation of the possible being in the Necessary Being is through the disappearance of the effects of possibility, not the destruction of his reality, like the disappearance of luminosity in the light of the sun.

In the presence of the sun, the lamp is caught between existence and nonexistence.

Shaykh Junayd has said, "When the contingent is joined to the Eternal, not a trace of it remains."

When the Attributes of the Eternal have shone forth, then the mantle of temporality is burned.²⁰

And the disappearance of the effects of possibility takes place in the subtle consciousness of the gnostic, in his awareness and perception, not in his body, spirit and humanity, even though in accordance with the saying, "The earth has a share from the cup of the generous", these also participate to some extent.

O brother, you are this very thought (of yours); as for the rest (of you), you are (only) bone and fiber.²¹

So you are that intelligence, the rest is covering, lose yourself not, busy yourself not with vain striving.

And then, when the existence of the servant who has been annihilated in God is affirmed, **it is correct** for things to be attributed to him and **for God to be his hearing, his sight, his tongue, his hand and his foot.**²² **So He pervades his faculties and his organs with His He-ness (*huwiyyah*) according to the meaning which is appropriate to Him. And this**, or God's being the hearing and seeing of the servant and His pervading all of his other organs and faculties, **is the result of the love pertaining to supererogatory works (*hubb al-nawâfil*)** and the proximity attained through it on the journey undertaken by the lover, within which wayfaring (*sulûk*) takes priority over divine attraction (*jadhbah*) and annihilation precedes subsistence, for God manifests Himself within the Name "the Inward" and becomes the organ of perception for the servant who is the locus of theophany.

But as for the love pertaining to obligatory works (*hubb al-farâ'id*) and the proximity attained through it, or the result achieved through this love and proximity on the journey motivated by the Beloved, within which divine attraction takes priority over wayfaring and the primordial subsistence takes precedence over annihilation, since God manifests Himself in His Name "the Outward" and the servant who is the locus of theophany becomes the organ through which God perceives; **that is that God should hear through you**, in that the perceiver is God, and you are His organ of perception, **and see through you. But** the love pertaining to **supererogatory works**, or its result, **is that you hear and see through Him**, in that God is the organ of your perception.

So you perceive through supererogatory works according to the measure of the preparedness of the locus, which is you yourself, since God has manifested Himself in you through the attributes of hearing, seeing, etc. – for His theophany, according to whatever attribute it may be, is always in keeping with the measure of

²⁰ *Mathnawî*, III, 1391.

²¹ *Mathnawî*, II, 277.

²² Reference to the well-known *hadîth qudsî* which God says (according to one of its versions), "The servant does not cease approaching me through supererogatory work until I love him, and when I love him I am the hearing through which he hears, the sight with which he sees, the tongue with which he speaks, the hand with which he seizes and the foot with which he walks."

the preparedness of the locus of theophany, not according to what He is in Himself, for that cannot be embraced by any locus nor grasped by any place of manifestation. **And He perceives through obligatory works every object of perception**, without one being specified over another, for the perceiver in this case is God, and the effect of His all-embracingness penetrates to the organ. **So understand.**

VI The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Truth in the Logos of Isaac

Since the plane of limited imagination (*khayâl-i muqayyad*) is an image and an exemplar of the World of Absolute Image-Exemplars (*mithâl-i mutlaq*), and since everyone experiences this plane, anyone can find his way to the absolute (image) by observing the relative. By perceiving the characteristics of the branch he can gain insight into the root. Therefore the Shaykh does not refer to the World of Absolute Image-Exemplars, but limits himself to mentioning the plane of limited imagination. He says, **Know that the plane of imagination**, i.e. the level which embraces all of the images which take form within the imaginal faculty (*al-quwwat al-mutakhayyilah*) contiguous to the human level and within any imager whatsoever – a level which is also called "the level of limited image-exemplars", just as the World of Image-Exemplars is called "absolute imagination" – and whose relationship to the World of Image-Exemplars is like the streams which branch off from a great river, **is the plane which encompasses and includes every thing** existent in the external world **and every non-thing, for it possesses the power to represent both. And all of it**, i.e., the plane of imagination and the forms which appear within it, **is veridical** and corresponds to reality **and is divided into two kinds: a kind in which the image imagined corresponds to the form in the external world**, or in a plane external to the plane of imagination; **and this is called "unveiling" (*kashf*)**; **and a kind in which it does not correspond. Within the latter interpretation takes place.**

And mankind here, or in the knowledge of the second kind of dreams and visions, **are of two kinds: the knower**, who knows what God means by the observed image, **and the learner**, who does not know, but who has the aptitude and capacity to advance to the level of knowledge. **The knower is true to the vision**, i.e., he gives it its due; **and the learner deems the vision to be true**, i.e. he takes the observed images as veridical and corresponding to reality in the external world, **until God teaches him what He meant by the image which He has revealed to him** and unveiled for him in the dream, like Abraham, when he saw in his dream that he was sacrificing his son, but it was a ram which appeared in the form of his son. So he deemed his vision to be true and did not interpret it, because the majority of the things which the prophets and the Perfect Men observe take place in the World of Absolute Image-Exemplars. And everything which occurs within it is necessarily true and in correspondence with reality. So he thought he was observing within that world, and hence he did not interpret his dream. Therefore he deemed his vision to be true until God taught him that what was meant by the form of his son was the ram.

VII

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the All-High in the Logos of Ishmael

Since Ishmael was a locus of manifestation of the divine Name "the All-High", which is one of the names of the Essence, the Shaykh decided to explain in his Wisdom the two levels which this Name possesses: the Unity of the Essence, and the Unity of the multiple Names. Therefore he says in order to introduce his subject matter, **The existence of the world – which was not, and then was –**, as the Prophet said, "God was, and nothing was with Him", **necessitates multiple relations (*nisab*) within its Originator, or Names or Attributes, etc., – whatever you like to call them. So say**, for it is incontestable, **"There is no escape, in the existence of the world from that"**, or from the actualization of the multiplicity of the Names in its Originator. **And through the totality of these relations and Names and the Unity of their multiplicity the world comes into existence**, not in respect to the Unity of the Essence, for the One inasmuch as He is One is not the source of multiplicity inasmuch as it is multiplicity, for it is not correct to say that there should appear from something - whatever it may be – what is opposed to it in reality. And it is clear that Unity is opposed to multiplicity and the One to the many. So it is impossible that one of them should originate from the other. However, the One and Unity possess numerous relations, and multiplicity possesses a fixed unity. **So when one of them becomes related to the other, it is in terms of this connecting link.**

So the world with its true multiplicity and relative oneness **comes into existence from** an Originator who is **the One in Essence**, or One with an inherent and true Oneness, **to which is attributed a Unity of the multiplicity of relations in respect to the Names and Qualities, because the realities of the world demand that**, i.e., this Oneness of the multiplicity of the Names, **from It**, i.e., the Originator.

Then the world, if it were not a possible being, would not be a receptacle for existence; but it is a receptacle for existence, so it is possible. And the possible being is that for which existence and nonexistence are equal. So in order to exist, it needs an agent to give predominance to its existence over its nonexistence, as well as receptivity towards existence on its own part. **So the world did not come into existence except from two things: from a divine power, to which is attributed what we mentioned**, i.e. a Unity of the multiplicity of the Names and Qualities in order to give predominance to its existence over its nonexistence, **and from a receptivity towards existence on the part of the world**; for if it had not been receptive, it would not have been a possible being, and its Agent and Originator could not have brought it into existence, **for what is impossible does not accept to be brought into existence. Therefore**, i.e., since the world only exists because of these two things, **when He said "Be"**, which indicates that He possesses the power over the desired thing, **He said "and it is"**, in such places as the verse, "His command, when He desires a thing, is to say to it 'Be', and it is" (XXXVI, 82). **So He attributed the coming into existence to the world in respect of its receptivity.**

One of the Sufis ('Abd al-Razzâq al-Kâshânî) has said, "The essence of the Name 'the Inward' is the same as the essence of the Name 'the Outward'. And the Recipient is the same as the Agent So the uncreated archetype (of every being) is His Essence. And Act and Receptivity are His two hands So He is the Active

Agent with one of His hands, and the Recipient with the other. The Essence is one, and the multiplicity is formed by various imprints and pictures So it is correct to say that He has never brought anything into existence but His Own Self, and there is nothing but His Self-manifestation."

Although forms are many in your eyes, when you look closely, one Being has come repeatedly.

If we possess power and acts, they are not because of us; they are because He has come to appear through us.

VIII The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Spiritual Ease in the Logos of Jacob

"Religion with God is Islam" (Quran III, 19), **and its meaning**, or the literal meaning of the word "Islam", **is obedience. Whoever has something sought from him and obeys the seeker in what he sought is a "Muslim", So understand, for this principle pervades** all the creatures (i.e. all creatures are obedient to God and therefore "Muslim"), whether they are in agreement with or opposed to the divine command (or what God has "sought" from them). As for the extension of this principle to those creatures who are in agreement with and obey the divine commands and prohibitions, the reason is obvious and needs no explanation. But as for those who are opposed to and do not obey God's commands and prohibitions, the reason is that the divine Command is divided into two parts: the "volitive" (*irâdî*) and the "prescriptive" (*taklîfî*). So if certain people are opposed to God and do not obey the prescriptive command (according to which through religion God prescribes what the creatures should and should not do), they do obey the volitive command (or what God wills for them). One of the Sufis has expressed this as follows: "Verily God has an obligatory command and an ontological command; therefore that which cannot be disobeyed is the ontological command." Among the Persian verses which allude to these points are the following:

O Thou for whom everything I have hidden is manifest! I disobeyed Thee only in the hope of Thy forgiveness.

I gather that I have done many things against Thy command: But, did I not do all that Thou desired?

Thou said, "Do it!" and bound my hand; Thou said, "Fire the arrow!" and cut off my thumb.

Although I am not obeying Thy command, in any case I am following Thy will.

And religion is two religions: a religion commanded by God, which is what the prophets have brought; and a religion deemed valid by God in the same way that He deems the religion He has sent valid, for the aim of this second religion is in agreement with what God has desired from the Law established by Him, i.e., the perfection of souls in both knowledge and works. The latter is invention (*al-ibtidâ'*) within which is the glorification of God. So whoso observes it as it should be observed, seeking the good-pleasure of God, has attained salvation.

And the divine command is two commands: a command through an intermediary, or the intermediary of the prophets and messengers; so inasmuch as it is a command through an intermediary and does not take into account the ontological

command, **it contains nothing but its grammatical, i.e., imperative, form; and a command without intermediary. It is the latter** command, the ontological command, which is actualized by the word "Be!" and which pertains to the coming into being of that which possesses no external existence but is known in the divine Knowledge. So it is this command **whose disobeyal cannot be imagined**, because it is impossible for the desired thing to contradict His will, as He says, Our only command "to a thing, when We desire it, is that We say to it 'Be', and it is" (XVI, 41), **while that command through the intermediary may be disobeyed**, or it may be disobeyed by him who is commanded to do something. And that would be when it is not in accordance with the command without intermediary.

Just as the existence of the servant is caused by God's bestowing existence upon him, in the same way the existence of the act which has been commanded is also by His bestowal. So as long as the ontological command does not attach itself to the commanded act, it is impossible for the servant to obey the prescriptive command. Indeed, how can a thing which does not possess existence in itself bestow existence upon another nonexistent entity and bring it from the concealment of nothingness to the wide-open plain of being? My friend, read the verse, "And God created you and what you do" (XXXVII, 96), and know that your being and acts come from the ineffable One.

If someone asks what profit there is in God's commanding the servant to do something and not wanting that thing to come to pass through him, we would answer that prescription is one of the states of the immutable archetype (*'ayn thâbitah*) of the servant, and the servant has a particular preparedness *vis-à-vis* the prescription which is opposed to the obeying of that command. So the archetype of the servant asks God according to its special preparedness to prescribe for it something the possibility of whose acceptance He has not placed within its preparedness. So God prescribes for it according to the wish of the special preparedness, but He does not want the servant to perform the thing which he has been commanded, for He knows that in reality he does not possess the preparedness to accept that thing. Therefore He expects him to perform the opposite of what he has been commanded. And the profit and wisdom in this is the distinguishing of him who has the preparedness to accept the command from him who does not have it. And God knows best.

And that which is commanded without intermediary is nothing but the thing nonexistent in the external world but known in the divine Knowledge and existent with Him who commands in the particular manner (pertaining to the divine Knowledge), **not that which exists** (in the world) before the issuing of the command, for obviously it is impossible to bring into being that which (already) exists. This is in contrast to that which is commanded through an intermediary, for this is nothing but that which exists in the external world, since it is impossible to prescribe commands and prohibitions for that which does not exist externally.

IX The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Light in the Logos of Joseph

Since luminosity dominates the World of Image-Exemplars, because of its proximity to the World of Spirits and the Worlds of the Names and Qualities above it – just as darkness dominates over the forms of the world of generation and corruption, since it

is opposite to the World of the Spirits, which is the World of Light – and since it is the rule concerning everything which is an intermediary between two things that when its relation to one of the two is stronger than its relation to the other it is described by what the dominating side is described by and called by its name, the Shaykh called this Wisdom by the name "light". For in reality it is the wisdom of "brightness" (*diyâ'*), not of pure light (*nûr*), which is not different from the Being of God.

The Shaykh calls brightness "light" when he says, **Light**, or other than true Light, which is the Essence of God, **is unveiled** or perceived in itself, **and through it unveiling**, or perception of other things, **takes place. And the most complete and penetrating light is the light through which it is unveiled** and perceived **what God means by the forms seen by the imagination** in dreams, **i.e., the science of interpretation** (*ta'bîr*); **for a single form appears** in the imagination of different individuals **in many and various meanings**, because of the differences of the preparednesses of these individuals, the discrepancies among their constitutions, their differences in place and time, etc., but **one of which is meant in the case of him who has seen the form. So whoso unveils it**, i.e., the intended meaning, and distinguishes it from other meanings and interprets the form which has been seen, **by means of that complete intelligible light is the possessor of the most complete light**. His light is the most complete light because he discerned by means of it that which was in the extremity of obscurity and at the limit of ambiguity. And we only said that the one form appears in many meanings **because** in a dream **one person** of a group **is called, so he makes the hajj** in the World of Sensory Forms, **and another** of them **is called, so he steals; and the form of the calling is one**, but the interpretation is different, because of the differences between those who see the form. **And** in the same way **another** person sees in a dream that he **is called, so he invites to God with sure knowledge: and another** person sees that he **is called, so he invites to error**. This is because the calling shares with these two invitations in invitation as such; but that to which the viewers invite differs because of their disparity.

Know that everything which appears in the sensory world is like that which appears in sleep. But people are neglectful of perceiving the realities and meanings which are embraced by the forms which appear in the world, just as the Prophet said, "People are asleep, and when they die, they awake." And just as the gnostic knows through interpretation what is meant by the forms which are witnessed in dreams, so the gnostic who knows the realities of things also knows what is meant by the forms which appear in the sensory world. Therefore he passes from them to their intention. So when the gnostic sees a form or hears some words, or when a meaning falls into his heart, he infers from them their principles and knows what God means by them. For this reason it has been said, "Verily all things that happen in the world are messengers from God to the servant delivering their messages. He understands them who understands them, and he turns away from them who is ignorant of them." God said, "How many a sign there is in the heavens and the earth that they pass by, turning away from it" (Quran XII, 105), because of their lack of comprehension and the duration of their forgetfulness.

X

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Unity in the Logos of Hûd

Since Hûd was dominated by the contemplation of the Unity of the multiplicity of Lordship, for he was observing the directing of the one Lord (*rabb*) in the multiple vassals (*marbûbât*) which are His loci of Self-manifestation, the Wisdom of Unity – i.e., the Unity of the Lordship – had to be set aside for his Logos.

The ends of the paths traversed by wayfarers, whether physical or spiritual, are **all at God, and God is their end**. This is because since God encompasses all things in being and knowledge and accompanies all things with a "withness" (*ma'yyah*)²³ pertaining to His Essence and pure of mixture, incarnation, division and all that does not befit His Majesty, He is the end of every path and the goal of every wayfarer. In the Quran He added after His words, "And thou, surely thou guidest unto a straight path – the path of God, to whom belongs whatsoever is in the heavens, and whatsoever is in the earth", the words, "Do not all things reach God at last?" (XLII, 52). Thus He announces that the end of all things is God. And everything walks upon a path, either spiritual or physical according to the traveller. And God is its end, for, "Unto God is the journeying" (Quran III, 26).

So each of them, i.e., each of the paths, is a **straight path**, but there is no glory in His unrestricted relations where all differences are removed, like His unrestricted "withness" and accompaniment (of every being), the unrestricted straightness of His path, the fact that all Paths without restriction lead to Him in respect of His all-embracingness, and the unrestricted attention of His Essence and Attributes to creation – for verily there is no difference between His attention toward creating the Throne and the Supreme Pen on the one hand and His attention toward creating an ant on the other in respect of the Unity of His Essence and in respect of the act of paying attention. He said, "Thou seest not in the creation of the All-Merciful any disparity" (LXVII, 3). And this is also the case with the "withness" and the accompaniment by the Essence, for He encompasses "everything in mercy and knowledge" (Quran XL, 7). And here His mercy is His Being, for it is existence alone which things have in common despite their disparities and differences. And His knowledge at the plane of the Unity of His Essence does not differ from His Essence, nor is it distinguished from it, for here there is no multiplicity in any respect.

Therefore if it is merely established that He is the goal of everything, the end of every path and with everything, and that He encompasses both the inward and outward aspects of all things, the benefit does not become general, nor does felicity become complete. The benefits only appear according to the differentiation of degrees and stations, the differences among directions and paths, and the discrepancy among those things to which He calls and attracts you. Therefore **God calls us to worship**

²³ Just as "God is with the patient" (II, 153), "with the godfearing" (II, 194), "with them while they meditate at night discourse displeasing to Him" (IV, 108), etc., He is also with all other things as well, for He "embraces every thing in mercy and knowledge" (XL, 7). The term "withness" refers to this quality of not being separate from any being.

Him according to the path which connects us to our own particular felicity - which is the attainment of salvation and high degrees – not any path, for surely although every path will take us to Him according to one of the Names – for in one respect, every Name is the same as the Named – this brings no benefit or felicity; for the Names are different in respect of their natures and effects. How is "He who harms" comparable to "Him who gives benefits", or "the Bestower" to "the Preventer"? And how is "the Avenger" comparable to "the Forgiver", or "the Benign Benefactor" to "the Vanquisher"?

And it, i.e., the path which leads to our felicity, **is what He prescribed for us** through the tongue of the Prophet.

So owing to the first thing mentioned, i.e., that He is the end of every path and encompasses all things, **His "mercy embraces all things"** (Quran VII, 156); **therefore the outcome** and the ultimate issue **is felicity, wherever the servant may be**, whether in Paradise or hell. And since someone might imagine that felicity is to reach Paradise and its various degrees – so how should the end of everyone be Paradise, when some of them remain forever in the Fire? – the Shaykh generalizes his statement by saying, **and it**, i.e. felicity, **is attaining that which is in agreement** (*mulâ'im*) with the constitution of the servant, whether it be the degrees of Bliss or the levels of hellfire.

The divine mercy is of two kinds: first is the absolute mercy of the divine Essence, the "mercy of gratuitous gift" (*imtinân*), and it is this mercy which "embraces all things" (Quran VII, 156). From this mercy is derived every gift which is given without having been asked for, without a need existing, and without its being the recipient's due or the result of a merit permanently fixed within him or an act resulting in God's good-pleasure, as for example the blessings which are received in Paradise by a certain people in keeping with the mystery commonly known as "grace" (*inâyah*) and referred to in the *hadîth* of the Prophet which says that there will remain empty places in the Garden which God will fill with some of His creatures who have never done any good, to accomplish His previous decision and His words (in the *hadîth*), "To each one of you two (Heaven and hell) your fill."

The other mercy flows from the mercy of His Essence but is separated from it by certain conditions, including the "prescription" referred to in His words, "Your Lord has prescribed for Himself mercy" (Quran VI, 54) and "I shall prescribe it (My mercy) for those who are godfearing" (Quran VII, 156). So it is limited and conditional upon certain acts, states, etc.

The Shaykh refers to these two kinds with his words, **And among mankind is he who attains mercy from pure gratuitous gift** and sheer grace, without a precedent act which would require it or works which would attract it; on the contrary, by means of it he gains the power to perform all of his acts and works. **And among them is he who attains it in respect of obligation**, or in respect of its being obligatory upon God, since He has obligated Himself to bestow it in recompense for acts which He has prescribed. But this also is a gratuitous gift, for the servant is obliged to obey his master and carry out his commands. So when he obliges himself to give something in return, that is a mercy and gratuitous gift to the servant. The Shaykh refers to this point with his words, **And he attains the reason for gaining it**, i.e., the reason for gaining the "mercy of obligation", which is the obligation itself, **from pure gratuitous gift**.

But as for the godfearing servant, for whom God has prescribed mercy, as He says, "I shall prescribe it for those who are godfearing", **he has two states**: the first of them is **a state in which he is a protection**²⁴ **for God from blameworthy things** and from imperfections, by attributing them to himself, not to Him. And this is necessitated by fathoming the reality of things, for blameworthy and ugly things are all the effects of the nothingness which pertains to the servant, the possible being who receives existence. **And the second is a state in which God is a protection for him** from attributing to himself praiseworthy things, for he attributes virtues, beauties, praiseworthy qualities and perfection to God. So He is a protection for him from attributing to himself those things which do not truly pertain to his individual reality, for they are ontological matters, and Being belongs to God alone, or rather, Being is God in reality. **And it**, or God's being a protection for him, **is obvious**, because things pertaining to Being obviously return to Him.

XI

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Divine Opening in the Logos of Sâlih

Since the realities require and the knowledge of them as they are in themselves demands **that results**, whether in the mind or in the external world, **only issue from numerical oddness, and since three is the first of the odd numbers**, since oddness as usually defined is that a number capable of being subdivided into whole numbers cannot be subdivided into two equal parts, whereas the number one cannot be subdivided into whole numbers; **God brought about the effusion of existence upon the world from three things: His Self or Essence, His Will and His Word. And the Reality**, i.e. the divine He-ness in these three forms, **is one, while the relations are different. Therefore He said**, alluding to the three things, "**Our only words to a thing, when We desire it, is that We say to it 'Be', and it is**" (Quran XVI, 40), thus alluding to the Essence in three places ("We" and "Our"), to the Will in one place ("desire") and to the Word in two places ("words" and "say").

And do not let the combination of the premisses in philosophical reasoning veil you from confirming what we have said about oddness being necessary for a result to be achieved, **even though the premisses are** made up of **four** parts, i.e. the subject and object of each of the two premisses, **for in reality they are three, since a single one of the four**, i.e., the middle term, **is repeated in the two premisses. So understand this. Therefore it remains valid to say that it is triplicity which brings about results**, whether in the mind or in the external world. **And the world is a result, without doubt.**

²⁴ Here it is helpful to know that the word translated as "godfearing" (*al-muttaqî*) comes from the same root as the word for "protection" (*al-wiqâyah*) and means literally "protecting oneself", "being wary", or "fearing", and hence also "protecting God's interest in something", "fearing God with regard to something" or "showing regard for something for God's sake"

XII

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the Heart in the Logos of Shu'ayb

Know that the heart, that is, the heart of the knower of "Allah", for the heart of other than he is not called a heart in Sufi terminology, unless metaphorically, as has been said:

The heart is a window upon the Lord: why do you call the house of the devil a heart?

That which you have metaphorically called a heart – go, throw it to the dogs!

And I said the knower of "Allah", because the heart of the knower of any of the other divine Names does not possess the comprehensiveness which will be mentioned shortly. The Name "Allah" is the comprehensive unity of all of the divine Names. So any heart which comes to know it has come to know all of the Names. But no knower of any of the other Names knows the Name "Allah", for the knowledge of these Names does not necessitate its knowledge. Concerning such a heart the poet has said,

This is a pearl from the ocean of Intimacy, not a heart, the divine Majesty's spring of effusion, not a heart.

The story has become long and words drawn out: it is the sum of the mysteries of God, not a heart.

Although it, or the heart, comes to exist through the mercy of God, it is nonetheless wider than the mercy of God, because God has let us know that the heart of the servant embraces Him, for He said through the tongue of His Prophet, "Neither My earth nor My heaven embrace Me, but the heart of My believing servant does embrace Me". **In contrast His mercy does not embrace Him, for its sway is only exercised over contingent beings. And this is a wondrous matter, if you understand.**

When God – as reported in the collections of hadîth – undergoes constant changes of form on the Day of Resurrection, i.e., the forms of the beliefs of men in accordance with their receptivities and preparednesses, **although in Himself He does not change** from what He is **in respect of Himself, then hearts** which receive theophanies **are for Him like containers for water. The water assumes form according to the form of the containers, although in itself it does not change from its essential reality. So understand** the symbol we have mentioned, in order that you might understand the state of Him who is symbolized, for just as water has no shape in itself by which it becomes determined – rather, it takes the shape of its container – in the same way God, the Absolute, has no particular form in His Essence according to which He manifests Himself. On the contrary, He manifests Himself in the form of the servant who receives the theophany; for theophany only descends upon its loci in accordance with their preparednesses and their ontological receptivities. Likewise their preparednesses within the plane of objective existence are only the result of their Unseen and "unmade" (*al-ghayr al-maj'ûl*) preparednesses in the ontological level of the Essence's Knowledge of Itself. So whenever a locus on the plane of objective existence receives a theophany, it only reaches him in the form of his eternal and immutable archetype.

The theophanies of God follow the beliefs of men, and the beliefs of men follow individual ontological preparedness, and individual ontological preparedness is in accordance with the universal unmanifest preparedness, which is the attribute of the

immutable archetypes of those who receive the theophany. And the immutable archetypes are the effusion of the Most Holy Emanation, which is the theophany of the Essence in the forms and preparednesses of the archetypes. And here there is a great difference, for some of the archetypes are the form of particular Names, with their differences in degree; some of them are the form of universal Names, likewise with their various differences; and some are the form of the Name which embraces all the particulars and universals.

So God has two theophanies: one is the unmanifest theophany of the Essence, which is the effusion of the immutable archetypes along with their general preparednesses – and there is no doubt that the scope and capacity belonging to the preparedness of the locus of theophany is in accordance with the scope and capacity of the archetype. And the second is the ontological and visible theophany, which follows the preparedness, compass and scope of the locus.

And since beliefs are various, and preparednesses are different, whenever God manifests Himself, anyone who has limited Him to the form of a particular description denies Him in other than that form. Whereas whoever has disengaged Him from the limitation of one form other than another – like the Perfect Men and the gnostics – does not deny Him in any form of theophany. Rather, he glorifies Him as he should and performs the worship worthy of His station, for the theophanies of God possess no end at which the perfect gnostic and the understanding knower of God might stop.

Wear the turban, or the dress, or the robe! By thy father, it will only increase my love!

Do you not see that God "Every moment is in a state" (Quran LV, 29)? In the same way, the heart is constantly undergoing transformation in accordance with His transformations **in the states of its consciousness. Therefore He said, "Surely in that",** i.e. in the Quran, **"there is a reminder to him who has a heart"** (L, 37) which undergoes transformation according to different forms and attributes. **He did not say, "who possesses a reason", because the reason becomes limited** according to particular beliefs, so the Divine Reality – Who is infinite – becomes restricted in that which it perceives, **in contrast to the heart**, for since it is a locus for diverse theophanies from the levels of Divinity and Lordship and since it undergoes transformation according to the forms of these theophanies, it remembers its forgotten existence before it appeared in this physical and elemental level, and it finds here what it had lost, as the Prophet said, "Wisdom is the believer's stray camel." **So understand!**

XIII

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the Power in the Logos of Lot

God said, "God is He that created you of weakness, then He appointed after weakness strength, then after strength He appointed weakness" (XXX, 54). Now the first weakness without dispute is the weakness of the constitution in the understanding of both **the majority and the elite** (the exoteric authorities and the Sufis). **And the strength which is after it, or after the original weakness, is the strength of the constitution, to which is added in the understanding of the elite the strength of the spiritual state (hâl),** which gives man the power to exercise free disposal (*tasarruf*) and domination (*ta'thîr*) in the world through Intention (*himmah*).

And the second weakness is the weakness of the constitution, to which is added in the understanding of the elite the weakness attained through knowledge, or the knowledge of God, which weakens man and extracts him from his accidental strength and returns him to his original weakness, **until it joins him to the clay** which was his origin. **So he has no power over anything, and he becomes in himself** and in his own personal essence, disregarding the manifestation of the divine Qualities within him, **in his own eyes like a suckling infant with its mother**, for just as the infant sees no power or strength in itself and entrusts itself completely to its mother, who feeds and nurtures it, the gnostic assumes the same relation to the Real Being and Absolute Lord.

And therefore, because of the weakness resulting from the knowledge of God and the lack of power to exercise free disposal over anything, **Lot said**, "O would that I had power against you", i.e., O would that I had power in the form of a strong Intention with which to resist and oppose you, **"or might take refuge in a strong pillar"** (Quran XI, 80), **meaning** by "strong pillar" according to the exoteric interpretation the strong tribe, which vanquishes its enemies. **And the Prophet says**, indicating what Lot meant by "strong pillar" according to the esoteric interpretation, **"God have mercy on my brother Lot. He was taking refuge in a strong pillar"**, **meaning** by that, **"the weakness resulting from knowledge"**, i.e., through these words he indicates the weakness which had overcome Lot because of his knowledge of God, since he first shows his sympathy for him by praying for mercy for him, and this tells of his weakness and incapacity. Then he links him to himself through brotherhood, which shows that Lot shared with the Prophet in this weakness, which is so obviously actualized in the latter. **So the "strong pillar" is God, who governs him and nurtures him.**

XIV

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Destiny in the Logos of Ezra

"To God belongs the argument conclusive" (Quran VI, 149) **against His creatures, for they are the known** by God, **and the known**, whatever it may be, **bestows upon the knower** of it, whoever he may be, or makes him perceive **what it is in itself**, i.e. in its own essence in terms of the states which occur for it for all eternity and their preparednesses, **and that perception is knowledge. And knowledge has no effect upon what is known**, in the sense that it might occasion within the known that which is outside of its own essence; rather, it follows the known, and judgment concerning the known is subordinate to it. **So there is no judgment** by the knower **concerning the known except according to it.** i.e., according to the known and what it requires in respect of its particular and universal preparedness. Therefore God did not appoint unbelief and disobedience for the creatures by Himself. Rather, He appointed it because of the requirements of their immutable archetypes and because of their seeking through the tongue of their preparedness that He make them unbelievers and disobedient, just as the individual essence of a dog requires the form of a dog and that it be considered ritually impure. And this is the very secret of destiny.

Now if you say, "The archetypes and their preparednesses are an effusion from God; therefore He has made them like that"; I will answer, "The archetypes are not

'made' (*maj'ûl*), they are intelligible forms belonging to the Divine Names which are not posterior to God except at the level of their own reality, but not in respect to time. So they are eternal, unchanging and immutable. When it is said that they are an 'effusion', this means that they are posterior to Him considered at the level of their own reality (not that they are created)."

Know that every messenger is a prophet, and every prophet is a saint; so every messenger is a saint. So the messengers are of the highest rank, since they combine the three levels; then the prophets, since they combine two. But the level of their sanctity is higher than that of their prophecy, and their prophecy is higher than their messengerhood, for their sanctity is their aspect of divinity, since they have been annihilated in God; and their prophecy is their angelic aspect, since through it comes their relation to the angelic world, from which they receive revelation; and their messengerhood is their aspect of humanity, which corresponds to and establishes contact with the human world.

The Shaykh writes, "When you hear from one of the people of God (the Sufis), or it is related to you that he has said, that sanctity is higher than prophecy, he does not mean anything other than what we have said", i.e., that the sanctity of the prophet is higher than his prophecy. "Or if he says that the saint is above the prophet and the messenger, verily he means by that 'in the same person'. This is because the messenger in respect of being a saint is more perfect than he is in respect of his being a prophet or messenger, not that the saint who follows him is higher than he."

XV

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Prophecy in the Logos of Jesus

Among the properties of the spirit, which is a breath of the Merciful possessing life as one of its inherent attributes, **is that it never passes over a thing** from among the receptacles and it never touches anything with its form pertaining to the World of Image-Exemplars **without that thing coming to life. But when that thing comes to life, the power of free disposal of the spirit will be according to that thing's constitution and preparedness, not according to the spirit itself, for it is sacrosanct** and has no fixed measure or particularized aspect. So if that thing possesses a harmonious constitution receptive to life, all of the properties of life including sensation and movement will appear within it according to its particular constitution. And if not, then a trace of life will appear in it, according to its form, like the low of the Calf as will be mentioned.

Do you not see that God's breathing (*nafkh*), or the divine spirit breathed, **into bodies made complete** (and ready) to receive the breathing of the spirit, **in spite of its being pure** of the characteristics of those bodies **and** (in spite of) **the elevation of its ontological level** in itself and the fact that it is situated **at a level where it is** beyond being delimited by their attributes, **how its free disposal**, or the free disposal of the spirit within the body into which it has been breathed or within other things by means of the body, **will be to the extent of the preparedness of that body which is breathed into** and its receptivity, not in accordance with the spirit in itself? **Do you not see how the Samaritan, when he understood the effect of the spirits upon that which they pass over and touch "seized a handful of dust from the messenger's track"** (Quran XX, 96), i.e., from the track of the Faithful Spirit, or Gabriel, whose image-

exemplar had appeared upon Burâq²⁵, who was also a spirit appearing in the form of an image-exemplar? So the spirit affected the dust which it had passed over, causing life to course through it, and the Samaritan knew this through his inner light and the power of his preparedness. So he seized a handful of dust from his track and cast it into the form of the Calf made from the ornaments of the people. **So the Calf lowed** after it came to life (cf. Quran VII, 148), **and that is the result of the preparedness of its constitution**, which followed the form of the Calf. And had it been the form of another animal, the sound appropriate to that form would have been attributed to it.

XVI The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the All-Merciful in the Logos of Solomon

Since she, or Bilqîs (the queen of Sheba), **belonged** sincerely **to him**, or Solomon, in that she was obedient to him and believed in him, without being aware of it, **she said** to her people **concerning the letter of Solomon** when the Hoopoe cast it to her, and she showed it to them (Quran XXVII, 29), **with** the aim of manifesting the **power** of her Intention and exercising free disposal with it among them so that they would obey him, **that it was "an honorable letter"** (Quran XXVII, 29).

When Bilqîs opened Solomon's letter and became aware of its contents, the divine grace which had encompassed her beforehand and the link formed by her innate compatibility came into motion. She believed and obeyed, and presented its contents to her followers and adherents, in order that everyone who shared with her in that homogeneity and compatibility would come forward and accept what the letter had said. For the basis of faith in the prophets and messengers is this compatibility and homogeneity, not the observing of miracles or the witnessing of wonders.

And Âsif, Solomon's **vizier**, **only manifested the power** and concentration of Intention **to bring the throne**, or the throne of Bilqîs from Sheba before the viewer's glance returned to him, **without Solomon**, although Solomon was stronger and more powerful than he, **in order to let the jinn know that Solomon's eminence was mighty, since this ability** and powerful exercise of free disposal **was possessed by one of his attendants**. So what would have been the case if Solomon himself had exercised free disposal?

The superiority of Âsif over that jinn who said, "I will bring it to thee, before thou risest from thy place" (Quran XXVII, 39), was in the exercise of the power of free disposal through his soul with the aid of cosmic influences and the natural properties of things, for the returning of the glance to the viewer is faster than his rising from his place (referring to Âsif's words in the Quran, "I will bring it to thee, before ever thy glance returns to thee" (XXVII, 40). So Âsif's action was more perfect than that of the jinn, for he exercised his free disposal upon the individual essence (*âyn*) of the throne by depriving it of existence and recreating it in one instant. He deprived it of existence in its (original) position and gave it existence in front of Solomon, for the word of the Perfect Man is like the word of God concerning something he wants to come into existence. When he says "Be!", at that very instant

²⁵ Burâq is the celestial steed, famous in particular because upon him the Prophet made his ascension to Heaven (*mi'râj*).

that thing comes into existence – however, with the permission of God – because God has become his members and his physical and spiritual faculties. And it was because of this relationship (between him and God) that this Perfect Man was the vizier of Solomon.

And since she, or Bilqīs, **said** in answer to the question **concerning her throne**, which was, "Is thy throne like this? (Quran XXVII, 42), **"It seems the same"** (XXVII, 42), **one can detect her knowledge of the renewal of creation at each instant, for she said, "It seems"**. **And he showed her the pavillion of crystal**, so she supposed it was **like a spreading water** "and she bared her legs" (Quran XXVII, 44) so the water would not touch her clothing. **But it was not a spreading water** in reality, **just as the visible throne** brought into existence before Solomon **was not the same throne** which she left in Sheba **in respect of its form**, for it had discarded the first form and assumed another, **while the substance**, upon which the two thrones imposed successively their forms, **was one**. So he showed her by that that the state of her throne was like that of the pavillion: as for the throne, because it was deprived of existence, and what the Creator created was similar to that which had vanished; and as for the pavillion, because in its extreme delicacy and limpidity it became similar to clear water, while (in reality) it was different. So he showed her with his actions that she was right in her words, "It seems the same."

And this, or the renewal of creation at each instant, is not particular to the throne of Bilqīs; rather it **is valid in all of the world**, both its celestial and terrestrial parts, for the whole world is in constant change, and the individual determination of everything that changes is perpetually renewed. So in each instant a determination other than the determination which existed in the previous instant comes into being, although the One Essence which undergoes these changes remains in its state; for the One Essence is the Reality of God, which becomes determined according to the First Determination as necessitated by His knowledge of His Essence. And It is the same as the intelligible substance which receives these forms which are called "the world." All of the forms are accidents which It undergoes and which change at every instant. But those who are veiled do not know this, so they are in doubt about this constant renewal in all things (reference to Quran L, 15: "Yet they are in doubt about a new creation.")

The sovereignty which will not belong to anyone after him, referred to in Solomon's prayer, "My Lord! Forgive me and bestow upon me a sovereignty such as shall not belong to any after me" (Quran XXXVIII, 36), **is manifesting** within the visible world (*shahādah*) **the totality** of the sovereignties pertaining to the world **by way of exercising free disposal within it**, i.e., within the world, not manifesting only some of these sovereignties, for each of the individual sovereignties which God bestowed upon Solomon has been shared (by one or another of the prophets and saints); and not the power and ability over the totality without manifesting it, for the Poles and Perfect Men before and after him realized this station, but they did not manifest it.

The subjugation of the winds (cf. Quran XXXVIII, 36) with **which** Solomon was distinguished and preferred over others and which God made part of the sovereignty which was not bestowed upon any one after him, **is the subjugation of the fiery spirits**, which are the spirits of the jinn, as God said, "And He created the jinn of a smokeless fire" (LV, 15), **because they**, or the fiery spirits, **are spirits** which exercise free disposal **in the winds**, which are like their bodies.

God's words, "**Without reckoning**", when He said to Solomon, "This is our gift; bestow or withhold without reckoning" (Quran XXXVIII, 39), mean: **Thou wilt not, O Solomon, be made answerable in the hereafter for them**, or for what God granted thee of sovereignty, wealth, subjugation of the winds, etc. The Shaykh says in the *Fusûs*, "We know from the direct tasting granted in this path that Solomon's asking (for a sovereignty such as would not belong to anyone after him) was by the command of God. And when petition occurs according to the divine command, the petitioner receives the full reward for his petition", because he is obedient to his Lord and following His command. "And if God wills, He fulfills his wish in what he has sought from Him; and if He wills, He withholds, for verily the servant has carried out what God has made obligatory upon him in terms of obeying His command in what he asks of his Lord. Now if he asked this on his own without the command of his Lord, he would be asked for an accounting of it."

XVII

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Existence in the Logos of David

Since the station of prophecy and rank of messengerhood are a distinction conferred by God and one of the infinite divine gifts – not a reward deriving from a previous act, nor a gift springing from the expectation of a subsequent thanksgiving or worship – and in the same way since most of the gifts which derive from this station are effusions of pure bounty and beneficence and of perfect mercy and gratuitous gift, in this Wisdom the Shaykh alludes to some of the gifts which David received with his words, **He gave David as a bounty**, i.e., as grace and gratuitous gift, **knowledge of Himself not necessitated by his works. For if his works had necessitated it, it would have been a reward**, whereas it has already been mentioned that prophecy and messengerhood are a distinction conferred by God and unrelated to acquisition and effort, just as are most of the gifts and favors which pertain to this station. **And in the same way he gave him Solomon, for He said, "And we gave unto David Solomon"** (XXXVIII, 30). **And there remain His words, "And We gave David bounty from Us"** (XXXIV, 10). **Was this gift** referred to as a "giving of bounty" the **giving of a reward for his works, or did it mean a gratuitous gift?** Obviously it is the second, because He mentioned that He gave David bounty, and He did not say that He gave him what He gave him as a reward for his works; and He did not seek recompense from him for that bounty. When He did seek thanksgiving for that through works, He sought it from his House, not from him, as He said, "Perform works, O House of David, as thanksgiving" (XXXIV, 13), because blessings upon the forebears are blessings upon the descendents. So in David's case it was the bestowal of a gratuitous gift and a grace, and recompense was sought from his House. **And He said**, after seeking thanksgiving from the House of David in the form of works, **"and few are those who are truly thankful among My servants"** (XXXIV, 13), **employing the intensive form**, or "truly thankful" (*shakûr*), **in order that it might embrace "prescriptive thanksgiving"** (*shukr al-taklîf*), which the servants are required to perform according to the prescriptions of the Divine Law, **and "voluntary thanksgiving"** (*shukr al-tabarru'*), which is not prescribed, but which the servants perform voluntarily, for to intensify one's thanksgiving is to perform both of its kinds. **Voluntary thanksgiving** is referred to by the words, **"Shall I not be a thankful servant?" – the words of the Prophet**, when he stayed awake the whole night until

his feet became swollen, and it was said to him, "Refrain, for God has forgiven thee thy early sins and the later," and he answered the above. **And prescriptive thanksgiving is that which is commanded** by God, **like** His words, "**And give thanks to God**" (11, 172) and His words, "**And be you thankful for the blessing of God**" (XIV, 114). **And between the two kinds of thanksgiving** there exists a difference of degree or qualitative disparity which is **equivalent to** the difference **between the two kinds of people who render thanks**; so just as he who renders thanks voluntarily is more excellent than he who renders it as a result of prescription, in the same way voluntary thanksgiving is more excellent than prescriptive thanksgiving. This is patent and obvious **for him who understands things from God**, and not on the basis of his own reason.

And David is specifically appointed to the vicegerency (*khilâfah*) by God to judge among men and exercise free disposal among men, for God said, "David, behold, We have appointed thee a vicegerent in the earth, therefore judge between men justly" (XXXVIII, 26); **and the imamate**, i.e., he is also specifically appointed to his imamate, for imamate in relation to vicegerency is like sanctity in relation to prophecy, since every vicegerent is an imam but not the reverse. **Whereas other than he**, or other than David, like Adam or Abraham, **is not so**. As for Abraham, this is because God's words concerning him were, "Behold, I make you an imam for the people" (II, 124). He did not say "vicegerent", even though we know that here the imamate is a vicegerency; but it is not as if He had mentioned it by its most particular name, i.e., vicegerency itself. And as for Adam, although his vicegerency was stipulated by the text of the Quran, it is not like the stipulation concerning David. For God said to the angels, "I am setting in the earth a vicegerent" (II, 30); He did not say, "I am setting Adam as a vicegerent". And what is mentioned afterwards in his story does not indicate that he is that very vicegerent whom God stipulated in the Quran. And also He did not make explicit His appointing him a judge among men. And here we are only talking about explicit mention in the text of the Quran.

And he who has been given general vicegerency by God has been given rule and free disposal in all the world; and David was of this type, and therefore he was given the power of free disposal over the various kinds of beings, as the Shaykh indicates with his words: **the mountains' echoing God's praise with him** – for whenever he chanted and echoed the praise of God, the mountains would chant and echo it with him (cf. Quran XXXIV, 10) – **and likewise the birds' echoing praise with him announce the agreement**, or the agreement of these two kinds of being with him and their obedience to him. And the reason these two kinds were specified as agreeing and concurring is that they are the beings the most disdainful of man, the most elevated above him, and the most inclined to reject obeying him, because of the sway which hardness and lightness hold over them. Obviously both of them refuse to obey or to accept the power of free disposal over them: as for the first, because of the extremity of its "grossness" and heaviness, which refuses to be influenced; and as for the second, because of its extreme lightness and the fact that it is not fixed before the agent when it is influenced and controlled. Evidently if these two extremes with their exaggerated refusal and their disdain do obey David and agree with him, **the agreement of man with him is more suitable**, for man has a position between the mountains and the birds and approaches a state of equilibrium. Necessarily David's relationship to man is firmer and more manifest (i.e., it was much easier for him to exercise free disposal over man).

XVIII

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Breath in the Logos of Jonah

His blessing, or the blessing of Jonah, **returned upon his people**, for they believed, and their belief profited them and removed the chastisement from them (Quran X, 98), **because God attached them to him** in the way that the part is attached to the whole or the branch to the root; and the properties of the root are valid for the branch. Therefore, when the grace and mercy of God reached Jonah, it also reached his people, as He said, "Why was there never a city that believed, and its belief profited it? – Except the people of Jonah" (X, 98). **And that**, or the return of his blessing upon his people, **was in spite of his anger for Him**, when his breast became straitened by the extent to which he reminded them but they did not remember and continued in their disbelief, so he left them. And he thought that would be permissible, since he only did it out of anger for God, zeal in His religion and hatred for disbelief and the disbelievers. But he should have been patient and awaited permission from God to leave them. So he was stricken with the belly of the fish. And since his blessing returned upon them in spite of his being angry with them for God, **how would it have been if his state with them had been the state of satisfaction?**

He thought well of God, as He reported, "And he thought that we would not straiten him" (XXI, 87), or We would not harass him for his leaving his people without waiting for God's command, **so He delivered him out of grief** because of the blessing of that thought. **Even so does He deliver the believers** (cf. Quran XXI, 88), **i.e., those who are sincere in their states**, like Jonah was sincere in his state, i.e., his anger in God. **And in His kindness** and His grace towards him, **He "caused to grow over him a tree of gourds"** (XXXVIII, 146) – for one of the benefits of this kind of tree is that flies do not gather near it – so he took shelter in its shade **when he came out** of the fish's stomach **like a baby bird** without feathers; **for if flies had alighted on him, they would have annoyed him**. Then **when he cast lots with them**, i.e. the people of the ship, when he left his people in anger and boarded the ship, and it stopped; so they said, "There is a runaway among us", it being the belief of sailors that a ship will not move if it is carrying a runaway; **he made himself one of them**, i.e., one of the people of the ship, so he said, "Cast lots", and the lot came out against him, so he threw himself in the water. **So the mercy embraced all of them** as a result of the blessing of his making himself one of them during the casting of lots; for the fish swam along with the ship, lifting its head out of the water while Jonah breathed within it and praised God. And it did not leave them until they reached the shore. It spit him out healthy, nothing of him having changed. So when they saw that, Mercy encompassed them, and they submitted their wills to God.

XIX

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the Unseen in the Logos of Job

Since complaint to God does not contradict patience – and therefore God praised Job for his patience even though he prayed for the removal of his affliction – **nor did he**, i.e., Job, **oppose the divine Omnipotence by being patient** and refraining from complaining to Him; rather he complained and called out to Him, "Behold, affliction

has visited me, and Thou art the most merciful of the merciful" (Quran XXI, 83); **and this** lack of opposition **was known from him, God gave him his household** by bringing to life his sons and daughters who had died **and** He provided him with children **the like of them with them.**

And he stamped his foot at his Lord's command, since God commanded Job with the words, "Stamp thy foot! This is a laving-place cool, and a drink" (XXXV1I1, 42). **So he removed through that stamping his pains** and his ills, **and there sprang up** also through that stamping from beneath his feet **water, which is the secret of life,** and its root, for verily through water come alive those physical and elemental bodies which are alive. Therefore it is the root of life, or the life **which courses through every natural,** or physical and corporeal, **living thing. For from water he was created, and through it he recovered** from his pains and ills. **So He made it a mercy** from Him **and a reminder to us and to him.**

And He treated him kindly in the oath he had made, when he swore during his illness to beat his wife with a hundred lashes if he recovered. So when he recovered, God ordered him to take a bundle of rushes and to strike his wife with it (Quran XXXVIII, 45). So God expiated his oath with the easiest thing for him and for her. And He told us about this **to teach us** and to authorize us **to discriminate among those who fulfill their oaths,** for we still have this authorization (to act gently in fulfilling oaths). It has been related that the Prophet was brought a weakling who had committed adultery with a slave girl. So he said, "Take the branch of a date tree containing a cluster of one hundred stalks, and strike him with it once."

And expiation was appointed and promulgated **in the community of Muhammad to veil them from the punishment directed toward them for breaking oaths.** In this sentence there is an allusion to the fact that the word "expiation" (*kaffârah*) comes from the root "to cover" (*kufra*), since it covers the person who makes the oath and protects him from the punishment for breaking it. **Expiation is an act of worship** which God commanded, **and commanding it** before the fact **is to command the breaking of oaths,** since the actualization of the first is dependent upon the actualization of the second. Therefore breaking oaths is commanded by God, but **when he,** or the person who has made the oath, **has seen something better than what he had sworn to do. Then He will respect the oaths,** i.e., God will respect their right because they include His remembrance (*dhikr*), since He has prescribed expiation as a means to prevent the swearer from being punished. **Even though he is committing an act of obedience, he is remembering God** in his oath with one of his members. **So the member which remembers Him,** which is the tongue, **seeks the result of His remembrance** in terms of mercy, reward and His protecting it – along with the other members – from punishment; for it is the part which remembers which protects the others, just as the world is protected by the existence of the Perfect Man. **The fact that he is disobedient or obedient is another factor, which in no way affects that member which remembers** in terms of reward or punishment; for man in respect of his being compounded of different spiritual and physical realities is a multiplicity, even though he is one in terms of his unified whole. And the obedience or disobedience of one part of him does not necessitate the obedience or disobedience of another part.

XX
**The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Divine Majesty
in the Logos of John**

Know that there is no being in existence whose multiplicity of attributes and acts is consumed by the oneness of its essence in such a way that every number and everything numerable are annihilated within it except God. So part of His grace to John was that He gave him a share of this perfection, and so He placed him in His Own station. He incorporated his name, his qualities and his acts into the oneness of his essence by combining within his name the denotation of all these three. Thus they became united in verbal existence: his name denotes his essence by being his proper name; it denotes his acts because it is a form (Yahyâ) related to a verb which indicates his revivification (*ihyâ'*) of the remembrance of Zachariah; and it denotes his qualities because he only revivified the remembrance of Zachariah by becoming qualified by his attributes and manifesting them.

Since oneness requires priority (*awwaliyyah*) and not being preceded by others, **He placed him**, or John, **in His position in** the priority of **names**, for just as the Name "Allah" possesses priority in that no one was named by it before Him, He bestowed upon him priority in his name; **for He did not appoint for him beforehand a namesake** (Quran XIX, 7). **And after** that, i.e., after He gave him priority in that name, **he was followed in his name** by others, **in order that it might trace back to him** and he might be the source of designation by this name.

The Intention, which is one of the inward causes (of things and events), **of his father**, Zachariah, **affected him when his heart**, or the heart of Zachariah, **was filled with** the love of **Mary**, for verily the first reason for the existence of John was that his father deemed Mary's state to be good. So he concentrated his Intention while seeking refuge in God through supplication, and his Lord answered him and bestowed upon him John. **So He made him chaste through this mental image**, i.e., by reason of Zachariah's forming an image of Mary and deeming her states to be good while he directed his Intention toward the existence of John.

And the philosophers have come to know of the likeness of this, for (they say) **when a person has intercourse with his wife, at the time of discharging sperm** into her womb **he should maintain within his soul** and she should also maintain within her soul **the image of the most excellent of beings, for the child will partake of that** image, from its states, attributes and moral qualities, **to an ample degree** and full share, **if not completely**, for the child only takes form according to those psychic qualities and attitudes, physical contingencies and imaginal and mental forms which hold sway over the parents.

XXI

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the Master in the Logos of Zachariah

You have already come to know that Intention is one of the inward causes, and inward causes are stronger in their domination than ordinary outward causes and more deserving of being attributed to God. For this reason the inhabitants of the World of Command (*amr*) are stronger than the inhabitants of the World of Creation. In addition, let us remember the matter of, "And We set his wife right for him" (Quran XXI, 90), for if it were not for the succour of God to Zachariah and his wife by means of an Unseen power of Lordship outside of ordinary causes, his wife would not have been set aright and she would not have been able to bear a child. Therefore when God gave him the good news of John, he found it strange and said, "O my Lord, how shall I have a son, seeing my wife is barren, and I have attained to the declining of old age" (XIX, 8). So God answered him with His words, "Said He, 'So it shall be; the Lord says, 'Easy is that for Me, seeing that I created thee aforetime, when thou wast nothing '' (XIX, 9); i.e., even if something like this is difficult, or rather impossible, in terms of outward causes, in respect to the Possessor of Perfect Power, of Strength and of Might it is easy. Then just as that power coursed from God into Zachariah and his wife, it went from them to John. Therefore God said to him, "O John, take the Book forcefully" (XIX, 12).

When Zachariah attained to the mercy of Lordship, i.e., God's nurturing him through bounty and succour and accomplishing that which was for his well-being, and also setting things right for him, as indicated by His words, "And We set his wife right for him", **he concealed his call to his Lord** and his prayer to Him **from the hearing of those present. So he called Him in his secret center (*sirr*)** (cf. Quran XIX, 3), in order that his Intention might be the most concentrated and the farthest from dispersion and its effect might be the greatest. **So it**, i.e. his secret call, **gave rise** through the power of its effectiveness **to that which is not usually given rise to**, i.e., John, who was born between a declining old man and a barren old woman, for whom it is not usual to bear children, **for barrenness prevents** production. **Therefore He said, "the barren wind"** (LI, 41), **and He distinguished between it and "the winds fertilising"** (XV, 21), for these are such winds as produce good by bringing forth rain clouds, whereas "the barren wind" is what is opposed to them, for wherever barrenness exists, it prevents production. **And God made John the inheritor of what he**, or Zachariah, **possessed**, i.e., knowledge, prophecy, prayer for guidance, the avoidance of error, etc., **through the blessing of his prayer**, when he said, "So give me from Thee a kinsman who shall be my inheritor and the inheritor of the House of Jacob" (XIX, 5-6). **So he**, or John, **was similar to Mary** in inheritance, for when Zachariah became Mary's guardian, he caused her to be his heir in some qualities of perfection; or (he was similar to her) in being chaste; for she was one of the things which was with Zachariah, because he was her guardian. So when John inherited what was with him, he inherited some of her qualities, so he resembled her in them. **And in the same way He made him inheritor of a group of the House of Abraham**, i.e., prophets, saints and men of knowledge, in the above mentioned things.

XXII

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Logos of Elias

He, that is, Elias, **says**, addressing his people who adhered to the worship of an idol whom they called "Baal", "Do you call on Baal, and abandon **the Best of creators?**" (Quran XXXVII, 125), and thus he makes creatorship a quality shared by God and what is other than He. **And God says, "Is He who creates as he who does not create?"** (XVI, 17), affirming that creation belongs to Him and negating it from others. So apparently there is a contradiction between these two verses. Therefore the Shaykh points to their reconciliation with his words, **so the "creation" by mankind understood from Elias's words is determination (*taqdîr*), and the other creation is the bestowal of existence (*ijâd*).**

XXIII

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Virtue in the Logos of Loqman

Since Loqman knew that associating others with God **is a mighty wrong to that which is being associated with Him**, because that which is associated is a determined being identical with the Absolute Being of God according to the determination, which is one of His states or theophanies; while the associator believes that it is a being other than and sharing with Him in the level of Divinity – thus he has not put it in its place, which is precisely how "wrong" is defined – **then it**, or association, **is one of the wrongs done to the servants** in Loqman's mind, because that which is associated, whatever it is, is one of His servants.

And he, or Loqman, **possessed directives concerning the Divinity**, such as belief in Him, not associating anything with Him, obeying His commands and avoiding what He prohibited, **the directives of the messengers. And God witnessed that He gave him wisdom (*hikmah*)** (Quran XXXI, 12) – **so he bridled (*hakama*) his soul with it** – **and** when He gave him wisdom, He gave him **the comprehensive good**, or the good which comprehends and embraces many particulars, as He said, "And whoso is given wisdom has been given much good" (II, 269).

XXIV

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of the Imamate in the Logos of Aaron

Aaron to Moses, when he made him vicegerent over his people and went to meet his Lord at the appointed time, **is in the position of the deputies (*nawwâb*) of Muhammad** to Muhammad **after his withdrawal** from this physical level of existence on his way **to his Lord**. So just as Muhammad's deputies among the Perfect Men and the Poles are his heirs and vicegerents in his community – they exercise free disposal within it as he did – so Aaron was the heir to Moses and his vicegerent among his people and exercised free disposal among them as he did. **So let the saint who is an heir and inherits from the prophets before him consider from whom he**

inherits, for the heir is either Muhammadan, or non-Muhammadan; and the non-Muhammadan may be the heir to Moses, Jesus, Abraham or others of the prophets; **and** let the heir also consider **in what he is asked to act as deputy** and heir, whether in knowledge, state and station altogether, or in knowledge without state and station, or in knowledge and state without station. So the soundness and strength of his **inheritance** from the prophet **will help him to take his benefactor's place in it**, or take the place of that prophet who is as it were his benefactor in what he has been asked to act as deputy. So he takes knowledge for example from the source from which the prophet from whom he inherits also takes it. For verily the sciences of the prophets are divine gifts and are the result of unveiling through theophany; they are not acquired or earned. Therefore it is necessary that true inheritance also be the result of a gift, not transmitted or rational, and that the saint-inheritor inherits his knowledge from the source from which the prophet and messenger acquired their knowledge. The king of the gnostics Abu Yazid al-Bastami said to some of the exoteric scholars and transmitters of laws, traditions and sayings, "You take your knowledge dead from the dead, and we take our knowledge from the Living who does not die." The same is true of states and stations. So whoso does not take them from God as the men of old took them, but rather memorizes their words and sayings and transmits from them, is not a true inheritor, but is only so figuratively speaking.

So whoever of the saint-inheritors **partakes of his character traits**, i.e., the character traits and attributes of the prophet from whom he inherits, **in his exercise of free-disposal is as if he were he**, as the Prophet said, "The men of knowledge of my community are like the prophets of the Children of Israel."

XXV The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Elevation in the Logos of Moses

Know that when God willed to manifest His perfect signs in the Logos of Moses, and the effect of this will coursed through the celestial and terrestrial causes – such as the positions and movements of the heavens which prepare the substances of the world, the mixtures of the elements, and the preparednesses made receptive and ready to manifest all of this – and when the time of his appearance drew close, numerous human constitutions became determined in accordance with the realities of what existed within Moses's spirit before the determination of his perfect and prophet-worthy constitution, and to these constitutions particular spirits became attached. At the same time the sages of the period told Pharaoh that his end and the end of his kingdom would be at the hand of a child born in that time. So Pharaoh ordered the death of all of the sons born to the Children of Israel as a precaution against what God had foreordained and predestined, not knowing that there is no way to resist His destiny or delay His command. Hence this became the cause of these spirits being combined in their own world, their becoming attached to the spirit of Moses and their not being dispersed and scattered far from him by means of bodily attachments and being immersed in the physical world. Therefore he became strengthened by them, their characteristics combined within him, and he was aided by their faculties. All of this was a particular favor of God to Moses and a confirmation, by aiding him with those spirits, like His aiding him with the celestial Spirits. So when Moses's spirit became attached to his body, those spirits, as well as the celestial Spirits, cooperated

in aiding him with power and victory, and their life coursed into him. To this the Shaykh alludes with his words,

The life of everyone whom Pharaoh killed for his sake coursed into him. Therefore his flight when he was afraid that they would kill him was only to save the life of those who had been killed. So it is as if he fled for the sake of others, i.e., those children who had been killed. **Therefore,** because of his mercy and compassion for others, **God bestowed upon him messengerhood,** which is a particular rank within prophecy, **speaking** (to him) without intermediary (cf. Quran VII, 144) **and the imamate, which is dominion,** or domination over and the exercise of free disposal in the world. Then, since He had given him the gift of speaking (to him), **He spoke to him in the very form of his need,** i.e., in the very form of what he required, or fire, **because of the complete concentration of his Intention upon it. So we come to know** from the theophany of God in the form of the fire because of the concentration of Moses's Intention upon it **that concentration produces effects. And it,** or concentration (*jam'iyyah*), **is acting** and producing effects **through Intention,** which is aspiration and the turning of one's attention toward something with all of one's faculties.

And when the like of this was known by him who knew among the believers and those who obey God, as well as others, **he,** or some of them, **strayed from the path of his own guidance** by acting through the concentration of his Intention in something not pleasing to God, **while other than he was guided by it,** i.e., by acting through the concentration of his Intention in something pleasing to God. **So He put it,** or acting through Intention and concentration, **in the place of the Quran in the similitude struck** concerning it: **He said, "Thereby He leads many astray, and thereby He guides many; and thereby He leads none astray save the ungodly"** (II, 26), **and they,** or the ungodly, **are those who have deviated from the Path of Guidance which is in it.** Here the Shaykh alludes to one of the inner meanings of this verse, for "*Qur'an*" means literally "gathering" and "concentration."

XXVI

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Everlasting Refuge in the Logos of Khalid

He, or Khalid, **made his sign** indicating his prophecy **to be after he departed for his Lord, so he let his sign perish,** since he did not manifest it during his lifetime, **and he let his people perish** also, for he did not show it to them, **so they let him perish. Therefore the Prophet said to Khalid's daughter, "Welcome to the daughter of a prophet whose people let him perish!" And it was only his sons who let him perish,** since they did not let the people who were believers **open his grave because of the shame which befalls the Arabs resulting from their customs** pertaining to the zeal of the "Age of Ignorance" (before Islam).

Khalid's story is as follows: he dwelt with his people in Aden. A great fire came out of a cave and destroyed the farms and flocks, so his people sought refuge with him. Khalid began to beat the fire with his staff until it retreated before him back into the cave. Then he said to his sons, "I shall enter the cave after the fire and extinguish it." And he ordered them to call him after three full days, for if they were to call him before that, he would come out and die. But if they waited three full days, he would come out healthy. So when he entered, they waited two days. Then Satan filled them

with unrest and they did not wait the full three days but thought that he had died. So they called him, and he came out of the cave with a wound on his head which had been produced by their call. So he said, "You have caused me to perish, and you have let my words and instructions perish."

Then he told them that he would die and ordered them to bury him and watch over his grave for forty days, for a flock of sheep would come to them led by a donkey whose tail had been cut off. So when the donkey stopped before his grave, they should open it and he would rise up and tell them about the states of the Isthmus with certainty and having observed them. So they waited forty days, and the flock came led by the bob-tailed donkey. It stopped before his grave, and the believers among his people made as if to open it. But his sons refused to let them in fear of disgrace and lest they be called "the sons of him whose grave was opened." So it was the pagan ignorance of the Arabs which prompted them in this manner, and they caused his instructions to perish and let him perish.

XXVII

The Quintessence of the Wisdom of Singularity in the Logos of Muhammad

The Wisdom of Singularity was dedicated to the Logos of Muhammad because he is the first determination with which the One Essence determined Itself before it manifested Itself in any of the other infinite Self-determinations. And these Self-determinations are ranked according to genus, species, kind and individual, some of them included under the others. So he encompasses all of the Self-determinations, and he is one and singular in existence, without parallel, for no Self-determination is equal to him in rank; and there is nothing above him but the Absolute One Essence, which is "purified" from every determination, attribute, name, designation, definition and description. So to him belongs the absolute singularity. In addition, singularity was actualized for the first time through his immutable archetype, since the first archetype to be effused by means of the Most Holy Emanation was his. So he attained through the unique Essence, the level of Divinity and his immutable archetype the supreme singularity.

His miracle (*mu'jizah*), which proves his prophecy, **is the Quran**, which is his self and his reality in respect of its embracing all realities, or the verbal expression which is indicative of this all-embracingness and which came to him from God. In either case, the Quran is miraculous, for this all-embracingness and concentration is not possessed by any of the realities, because all of the realities are contained within the Muhammadan Reality as the part is contained in the whole; nor does any revealed book denote such an all-embracingness and concentration, for the Quran is the comprehensive unity of all the divine books.

God in His Essence is independent of the world and its inhabitants. But His infinite Names require that each have a locus of manifestation, so that the effect of that Name will appear in that locus, and the Named – which is the Essence – will reveal Itself in that locus to him who professes the divine Unity. For example, "the Merciful", "the Nourisher", and "the Vanquisher" are each a Name of God, and their manifestation takes place through the merciful and the object of mercy, the nourisher and the nourished, and the vanquisher and the vanquished. So as long as there is no merciful or object of mercy in the world, mercifulness will not become manifested;

and in the same way nourishing and vanquishing. Moreover all of the Names must be judged analogously. Therefore the reason for the manifestation of all particular beings is the demand of the Names of God. And all of the Names are under the sway of the Name "Allah", which encompasses and comprehends them. Moreover this Name also necessitates a universal locus of manifestation, which because of its all-comprehensiveness would correspond to the all-comprehensive Name and be the vicegerent of God in conveying effusion and perfections from the Name "Allah" to what is other than it. That all-comprehensive locus is the Muhammadan Spirit, which is referred to by the *hadîths*, "The first thing created by God was my Spirit" or "my Light."

The root and the origin of all creatures is the ontological level of the Reality of Realities, which is the Muhammadan Reality or the Light of Ahmad, the form of the One Unique Presence. That ontological level embraces all divine and cosmic perfections and establishes the measure of all the levels of human, animal and angelic harmonies. The world and its inhabitants are the forms and the parts of his particularization, and Adam and his children are subjugated toward the goal of his perfection. To this reality refer the words of the *hadîths*. "I am the master of the children of Adam" and "Adam and those who come after him are under my banner."

And since one of the inner meanings of the word "Quran" is concentration of the Intention, as was indicated in the chapter on Moses, the Shaykh wants to show that this concentration is also a miracle, so he says, **And concentration upon one thing is a miracle, because of the multifarious realities which man embraces** and his multiple and various spiritual and physical faculties. And each of these realities and faculties has a particular requirement and a determined property which differs from the requirements and properties of the others. So concentration -which is the absorption of that multiplicity by oneness – shatters the habits of the majority, and thus it is a miracle.²⁶ Now man, who is multiple through his different faculties, is **like the Quran**, which is multiple and diverse **through its multiple verses and through its being the Word of God unconditionally**, without quoting the words of others, **and the words of God**, in the sense that He has spoken them, **but quoted by God from others. So in respect of its being the Word of God unconditionally, it is miraculous**, although not in respect of its quoting the words of other speakers; **and it**, or the Quran's being multiple through its multifarious verses and one in its being the Word of God, **is concentration** which demands that it be miraculous. **So also is the concentration of the Intention** of man with its multiple realities..

God said, "**Your companion**", i.e., Muhammad, "**is not possessed**" (LXXXI, 22), the word usually understood to mean "possessed" (*majnûn*) being from the root *jnn*, which means to hide or conceal, **i.e., nothing has been concealed from him; "and he is not niggardly"** (LXXXI, 24), **so he was not niggardly with anything belonging to you**, i.e., with anything which you are worthy of and your preparedness demands; "**and he is not suspected**", as some authorities have read this same verse, **i.e., no one ever suspected him of being niggardly with anything** which he had **from God which belonged to you**, for he delivers to everyone who has a right his due and effuses upon him everything he needs and is entitled to.

²⁶ Two words are commonly used in Arabic for miracle, *mu'jizah* and *khâriq al-âdah*, the latter of which means literally "shattering of habit."

Since fear is not actualized unless **accompanied by being astray** (*dalâl*), which is bewilderment (*hayrah*); for fear is the heart's being stripped of the serenity of security because of expecting the possible occurrence of something distasteful; and there is no doubt that expecting the distasteful without being sure of it is a kind of bewilderment and uncertainty. So since the Shaykh wants to negate fear from him, he points out that he was not astray, just as **God said, "Your companion is not astray, neither errs"** (LIII, 2). But it is necessary to know that "being astray" has three stages: a beginning, a middle and an end, and the straying which is negated from him is the first two stages, for the third stage is his spiritual station in which he sought increase with his words, "My Lord, increase my bewilderment in Thee." It is to this that the Shaykh alludes with his words, **i.e., he did not fear in his bewilderment**, which is the third stage and which is desired by the Perfect Men and never surpassed by them. And he did not fear in this stage **because** it was his nature to know that the ultimate goal in the knowledge of God is bewilderment, and **he who knows that the ultimate goal in the knowledge of God is bewilderment has been guided aright and is thus the possessor of guidance and eloquence in affirming bewilderment.** And bewilderment is the goal, so how should he fear within it?

Know that the first stage of being astray pertains to the bewilderment of the beginners, or the generality of men, the properties of the second appear in those of intermediate rank among those who possess unveiling while still being veiled, and the properties of the third pertain to the greatest of those who have attained to the Truth.

The cause of the first and common bewilderment is that man is an indigent seeker in his essence. So not one instant passes him by without his being in search. In reality this search is directed at the Perfection which is the true goal of the seeker, but the goals become determined according to the aspirations, intentions and relationships which motivate and incite. So as long as a goal to which he gives foremost importance or a religion or belief to which he binds himself does not become determined for man, he remains bewildered and agitated. The first thing which removes this bewilderment is the determination of a quest to which he gives first importance, then the knowledge of the path to attain it, then the factors which can bring about its attainment, then those things to which recourse can be had to attain the goal, then the knowledge of the obstacles and the way of eliminating them. So when these things are actualized, the bewilderment disappears.

Then, once a goal has been determined for man and he has given first importance to something which he sees as his end, his state is one of two kinds: either that thing embraces him in such a way that nothing remains with which to seek for more, such as is for the most part the state of the people of religions and creeds; or some sobriety remains, and you see that although he leans upon a certain state and a particular thing, he sometimes inquires and looks around, wondering if he might not find something more perfect than what he has embraced. So if he finds that which agitates and awakens him, he moves on to the compass of the second stage.

His state in the second stage is like his state in the first in that either he remains listless and indifferent towards seeking for more, or something remains in him which prevents him from finding rest and peace – especially when he sees that the people of the intermediate stage have split up into numerous factions, each of which sees that it and those who agree with it have attained the goal and that others have gone astray. And he sees the source and place of adherence of each denomination and that none of them has a leg upon which to stand. He sees possibilities knocking and contradictions

manifest, so he becomes bewildered and does not know which of the beliefs is the most correct in reality. He remains bewildered until at last the qualities of one of the stations upon which the people of religious beliefs support themselves gain sway over him so that he is attracted to it and gains tranquillity; or else grace – or grace along with his sincerity in aspiration, his earnest determination and his strenuous efforts – lifts from him the veil, so he becomes one of the people of unveiling.

His state at the beginning of the station of unveiling is like his previous states in that when he hears the celestial voice speaking to him, when he contemplates exalted visions and when he sees how well God has dealt with him and all that he has attained which has eluded most of the people of the world, some or all of this either entralls him completely, or there remains something in him of the burning thirst of aspiration. So he looks at God's words, "It belongs not to any mortal that God should speak to him, except by revelation, or from behind a veil, or that He should send a messenger and that he reveal whatsoever He will, by His leave; surely He is All-high, All-wise" (XLII, 51), and its like among the divine allusions and prophetic admonitions, and he becomes aware that in the case of everything that arrives through a veil or becomes determined through an intermediary, necessarily the veil and the intermediary have a certain effect, so that which arrives does not retain its original purity. Then possibilities begin knocking, especially when he comes to know the secret of his spiritual state or station and the attributes which dominate it, and that each of these has an effect which manifests itself to him and is brought into relation with him. So he does not become tranquil, and no desire remains in him for the divine presence from a particular aspect or special point of view. He goes beyond the levels of the Names and Qualities and all of the properties, acts and theophanies which pertain to them. So God does not become determined for him according to a particular spiritual or physical aspect with respect to the Outward or the Inward or according to various fields of knowledge, modes of perception, beliefs, visions, traditions or descriptions, because of his awareness of the Majesty of God and of the fact that He is not limited to all or any of these things, and because he does not become satiated, nor does his Intention stop at one of the goals at which the people of the stopping places²⁷ stop – even though they are right and they have stopped with God, for Him and in Him. Rather he perceives through his primordial nature that without any doubt he has a resting-place within His Being, and he turns toward it with the greatest part of himself, or rather with all of himself, and he places his presence in his attention to God in the manner that God knows Himself in Himself by Himself, not in the way He knows Himself in other than Himself, nor in the way that others know Him, and not in accordance with knowledge accorded by grace or earned.

And this state is the first of the states of the people of the final bewilderment, which is desired by the greatest spiritual luminaries but which they do not exceed; rather they ascend in it for ever and ever, in the world, in the Isthmus and in the Hereafter. They have no fixed goal in the Outward or the Inward, for they do not hold God to be determined by any station according to which He becomes delimited in their inward or outward parts, and therefore distinguished from any other quest. Rather He has shown them that He encompasses them from all of their hidden and

²⁷ *Ahl al-mawâqif*, i.e., those whose archetypes and preparednesses are limited in certain respects and who therefore stop short in the spiritual ascent before attaining the ultimate goal.

manifest directions and that He reveals Himself to them in them, not in any one thing, direction, name or level. So they enter the Trackless Desert in His contemplation, and their bewilderment is from Him, through Him and in Him.

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Divine "Imagination" and the Intermediate World: Ibn 'Arabî on the **Barzakh**.

For centuries after the time of the Andalusian mystic Ibn 'Arabî, his remarkable discussions and conceptions of the "Imagination" (*al-khayâl*) were elaborated by Islamic philosophers, poets, artists and critics in order to explain, interpret and justify the full range of artistic and creative activities carried on within later Islamicate cultures, as far away as India and Indonesia.¹ Modern western students of Ibn 'Arabî writing on such themes have tended to focus on the development of those ideas in his celebrated Fusûs al-Hikam ("The Bezels of Wisdom") and its long line of traditional philosophic commentaries.² But another major source of those classical Islamic understandings of the Imagination was in the Shaykh's many discussions of the eschatological "Barzakh" or "intermediate world" of the divine Imagination--as well as his accounts of his own striking experiences and decisive spiritual encounters there--which are scattered throughout his magnum opus, al-Futûhât al-Makkîya ("The Meccan Illuminations").

One of his most extensive and widely influential discussions of the Imagination/Barzakh, in all its humanly relevant dimensions, was in the set of five eschatological chapters (61-65) within the long opening section of the Futûhât--chapters first brought to the attention of a wider Western audience in the famous studies by Asin-Palacios of Islamic themes in Dante's Divine

¹Thus the incomparable architectural accomplishments of the Tâj Mahâl turn out to have been inspired, from the overall plan down to sometimes minute details, by the elaborate eschatological discussions and diagrams of the Futûhât: see the detailed explanations in W. Begley, The Myth and Meaning of the Taj Mahal. Two of the most elaborate and influential later Islamic philosophic developments of Ibn 'Arabî's eschatological conceptions--including many of the key images mentioned here in chapter 63 of the Futûhât--are the theories of imagination of the Iranian Shiite thinker Mulla Sadra (d. 1640) and the South Asian author, Shah Walîullâh of Delhi (d. 1762). The literal inspiration of Ibn 'Arabî's thought (and indeed of this particular chapter) is clearly visible in such translated works as our The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra (Princeton, 1981) and Shah Walîullâh's Lamahât, tr. G.N. Jalbani (Hyderabad, 1970).

Comedy. Those chapters, whose arrangement follows the traditional popular ordering of the symbolic "events" and "places" of the Resurrection mentioned in Islamic scriptures, begin with descriptions of Gehenna and the "Fires" and other torments of its residents (chapters 61-62) and conclude with the stages of redemption and eventual bliss of souls who have reached the Gardens of paradise (chapters 64-65).³ The chapter translated here⁴ is therefore the centerpiece of this broader eschatological section and focuses relatively more on the "theoretical" dimension of the Imagination, on the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the spiritual experiences and phenomena discussed in greater detail in many other sections of the Futûhât.

It is always a challenge, and often a near-impossibility, to attempt to outline the structure of any of Ibn 'Arabî's writings in a linear and straightforward fashion. (And serious attempts to convey something of their deeper inner structure inevitably require an involved commentary much longer than the mystic's own original text.) However, a few such indications have been added here for the benefit of those who may be encountering his distinctive style of writing for the first time. Like almost all chapters of the Futûhât, chapter 63 opens with a short and highly allusive metaphysical-didactic poem summarizing virtually all the themes treated in the rest of the chapter; the remainder of this eschatological chapter, quite typically, is an extended and (at first glance) apparently somewhat disordered commentary on the topics suggested by those opening verses. In this case, Ibn 'Arabî begins his exposition with [I.] an explanation--at once linguistic, symbolic and philosophic--of the basic notion of a *barzakh*, or "limit" between two metaphysical realms: here, the domains of purely physical and purely intelligible/noetic being, and the mysterious eschatological realm of Imagination that lies between them. The exposition then moves from the ontological-theological mode of discourse to [II.] an openly epistemological

²The classic study from this perspective (including as well many important sections of the Futûhât) remains Henry Corbin's L'Imagination créatrice dans le Soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabî (Paris, 1958), translated (by R. Manheim) as Creative Imagination in the Sûfism of Ibn 'Arabî (Princeton, 1969).

³See our forthcoming study (with complete, fully annotated translations and annotations of these and other eschatological chapters), Ibn 'Arabî's Divine Comedy: an Introduction to Islamic Eschatology and Cosmology. A considerable range of representative translations on this subject are already included in our contributions to Ibn 'Arabî: Les Illuminations de la Mecque/The Meccan Illuminations, ed. M. Chodkiewicz (Paris, 1989) and in the article "Seeing Past the Shadows: Ibn 'Arabî's 'Divine Comedy,'" Journal of the Muhyiddîn Ibn 'Arabî Society XII (1992), pp. 50-69.

and experiential evocation of the kinds of experience (and scriptural allusions) which begin to reveal more clearly the central *existential* importance of this realm of being. Next, working through the rich symbolism of a famous Prophetic statement comparing this reality to the "Horn" that is blown to announce the Resurrection, Ibn 'Arabî begins to develop [III.] the mysterious correspondences between the universal, ontological dimensions of this plane of Imagination and the manifestations of its "Light" in the experiences of each individual. And finally, the Shaykh returns [IV.] to the more explicitly eschatological implications of his earlier discussions, developing the parallels between this universal reality of the Imagination and our more familiar experience of sleep and dreams--an approach to which he later returned in a number of famous passages in his Fusûs al-Hikam.

However, even the most cursory and uninformed reading of this chapter would make quickly make it evident that Ibn 'Arabî's intention was *not* to "clarify" in any sort of rational, conceptual and logical form the different ways in which we can speak of and understand the Imagination--however broadly or narrowly one might define that term--and all its manifestations. In this respect, chapter 63 is an excellent, highly typical introduction to Ibn 'Arabî's unique rhetoric and style, an inimitable form of writing which is always intimately linked to his larger spiritual and didactic intentions. As readers familiar with other texts of his may more quickly recognize, the recurrent mixture of--and sudden shifts between--a whole spectrum of contrasting approaches, images, perspectives and technical vocabularies is not accidental or the result of "bad writing" (or fuzzy thinking), but instead forms a complex, highly self-conscious rhetorical technique. The Shaykh's ultimate aim here, as so often throughout his writings, is not simply heightened intellectual understanding nor a more deeply grounded religious faith and practice--although both of those outcomes may also result from serious study of his writing. Rather, as one can see most clearly at those moments where he suddenly shifts to the singular imperative ("Know!", "Realize!", etc.) it is to bring about in the properly prepared and attentive reader a suddenly transformed state of immediate realization and awareness, in which each of the implicit dualities (or paradoxes) of our usual perception of things--the recurrent categorical suppositions of subject and object, divine and human, spiritual and material, earthly and heavenly--is directly

⁴Vol. IV, pp. 406-425 in the new critical edition of al-Futûhât al-Makkîya, by Dr. O. Yahya (Cairo, 1975/1395); this corresponds to vol. I, pp. 304-307 of the lithographed (Cairo/Beirut) edition cited

transcended in an enlightened, revelatory moment of unitive vision. His ultimate aim in this chapter, as throughout his writings, is to bring his readers to *see*--not just to acknowledge intellectually or theologically--everything as ongoing theophany (*tajalliyât*) and "ever-renewed" divine creation.

In the case of this chapter, Ibn 'Arabî's efforts to break through his readers' ordinarily unquestioned separations between what is "divine" and "human," or "objective" and "subjective," or "this-worldly" and "other-worldly," are repeatedly sustained by certain basic features of the Arabic language that cannot easily be reproduced in a western tongue. For example, his most basic term and underlying subject here, the Arabic expression *al-khayâl*, refers most often, in ordinary contexts, to what we would ordinarily call an "image" or "*object* of imagination," and ultimately to the actual underlying reality of *all* the "imaginal" (*not* "imaginary") objects of our perception in virtually all forms and domains. Given this primacy of the *ontic*, "objective" dimension of the term *al-khayâl*--whether that is expressed in theological or cosmological terms--any translation referring to "imagination"⁵ inevitably risks falling into the psychologizing or individualistic, subjectivist assumptions that are embedded in the usual usages of that concept in western languages, whether the term is being employed positively or pejoratively. In fact, precisely at those points where Ibn 'Arabî wants to refer explicitly to something like a psychological "faculty" or individual activity of "imagination"--or to the individual psychic "objects" of such an activity--he invariably uses separate and quite distinct Arabic terms to emphasize that partial, subjective aspect.

Finally, and again quite typically, a deeper appreciation of Ibn 'Arabî's meaning and intentions here often requires a degree of acquaintance with Islamic scriptures and classical forms of religious learning that can rarely be assumed among modern readers. Thus any effort to communicate fully that web of allusions and assumptions to a modern audience naturally requires a body of notes and commentary several times longer than Ibn 'Arabî's text itself. In this case, given the constraints of article length, we have chosen to translate as much of the chapter itself as possible (omitting only a few repetitive or highly technical sections), at the price of

in most earlier studies of the *Futûhât*.

⁵Such as our frequent use in this case of capitalization ("Imagination") or a parenthetical qualification ("divine," etc.).

eliminating all such explanatory notes⁶--apart from the basic identification of Qur'anic quotations and allusions, which are so often indispensable for understanding the Shaykh's intentions.

⁶Which will be found in great detail in our forthcoming book-length translation of these and other eschatological chapters and sections from the Futûhât (n. 3 above). Omitted sections are indicated in the translated section below by points of suspension [...].

Chapter 63: Concerning Inner Understanding of (How) People Remain in the *Barzakh*
Between This World and the Resurrection (at the Last Day)

Between this world and the Resurrection, for whoever reflects,
there are intermediate (*barzakhîya*) levels, each with their limits:

What they hold is according to the influence of how their possessor is
right now, before dying—***so consider deeply [O people of vision]*** (59:2)!

They have influences and authority over everything, making the wonders
appear; ***they do not spare (anyone), nor leave (anyone) alone*** (74:28).

They have wide-open manifestations in being, without restriction,
yet they are neither essential-realities, nor (mere) effects.

They (have only to) say to God (*al-Haqq*) "***Be!***," and God is (already) creating them--
so how can a mortal-human (*bashar*) escape from their influence?!

Through them are the (forms of) knowing and every chastisement;
through them are the signs (of God) and miracles and exemplary lessons.

Were it not for this (divine) Imagination, today we would be in nothingness:
no goal or purpose would have been accomplished through us!

"*As though* (you saw God)" is Its realm of authority, if you've understood It:
revelation has come through/with It, as have intellect and reflection.

Among the expressions alluding to It is the "***like...***" of the (divine) Attributes:
so *you* are only detached from forms by your bringing (other) forms!

[I.] Our saying "*As though* is Its realm of authority" refers to the authority of the (divine) Imagination (*khayâl*), which is the essential reality of (this) "*as though*" and the inner meaning of (the Prophet's) saying "Worship God as though you see Him... ."

...Know that the word "*barzakh*" is an expression for what *separates* two things without ever becoming either of them, such as the line separating a shadow from the sunlight, or as in His Saying--may He be exalted!: "**He has loosened the two Seas. They meet:/ between them a *barzakh*, they do not go beyond**" (55: 19-20)--meaning that neither of them becomes mixed with the other. But even if our senses are unable to perceive what separates those two things, the intellect judges that there is indeed a divider separating them--and that divider grasped by the

intellect is precisely the *barzakh*. Because if something is perceived by the senses, it must be one of those two things, rather than the *barzakh*. So each of those two things, when they are adjacent to each other, have need of a *barzakh* which is not the same as each of them, but which has in itself the power of each of them.

Now since the Barzakh (of the creative divine Imagination) is something separating what is knowable and unknowable, existent and non-existent, intelligible and unintelligible, affirmed and negated, it has been given the name "Barzakh" as a technical term. It is intelligible in itself, yet it is nothing but the imagined-image (*al-khayâl*)! For when you perceive it--assuming you are in a rational state--you know that you have perceived something existent on which your gaze has fallen; indeed you most definitely know that there is absolutely something there. But what *is* this about which you affirm that it is an existent thing, while at the same time you are also denying that?! For this Imagination-Image (*al-khayâl*) is neither (entirely) existent nor nonexistent, neither (entirely) known nor unknowable, neither (entirely) affirmed nor denied.

This is like a human being perceiving their (reflected) form in the mirror. The person definitely knows that they have perceived their (own) form in a certain respect, while they know just as absolutely that they have not perceived their form in another respect, because of the smallness of the image they see in the mirror, assuming the body of the mirror is small--since they know that their own form is a great deal larger than the one they saw.... So what *is* that reflected form? And *where* is it actually located? And what is its (ontological) status? For it is both affirmed and denied, both existent and nonexistent, both known and unknown.

Now God--may He be praised!--has made this reality appear to His servants, by way of making a fitting image, so that they might know and come to realize that if they are bewildered and incapable of grasping the reality of this phenomenon, which is (only) part of this world, and cannot attain full knowledge of its reality--then how much more incapable and ignorant and bewildered they must be regarding the *Creator* of that reality! In this way God has pointed out to (His servants) that the divine Self-manifestations (*tajalliyât al-Haqq*) to them are even more subtle and delicate than this case in which their intellects are already so bewildered and incapable of perceiving the reality of things....

It is to something like this reality that each human being goes in their sleep and after their death (cf. 39:42). So that person sees (moral and spiritual) qualities and characteristics as self-

subsistent forms that speak to him and with which he converses, as being (human) bodies without any doubt. And the person of spiritual unveiling (*al-mukâshif*) already sees (here), while they are awake, what the sleeper sees in their dream state or the dead person sees after they have died. Likewise they will see the forms of their actions being weighed in the other world (according to the Qur'anic symbolism of the "Scales")--despite their being (apparently non-substantial) qualities and characteristics (in this world)--and they will see death (according to the description in a famous hadith) as "a spotted ram being sacrificed," even though death is (really only) a relation (between two states of being).... So praise to the One Who remains unknowable, so He is not known--and Who is known, so that He is not unknown! [***He is the One Who gives form to you-all in the Wombs, however He wishes:***] ***There is no god but Him, the Unapproachable, the All-Wise*** (3:6)!

[II.] Now there are some people who perceive this imaged-object (*al-mutakhayyal*) with the eye of the (physical) sensation, and there are others who perceive it with the eye of imagination. Of course I'm referring here to (our perceptions) in the waking state, since during sleep (everyone) definitely perceives with the eye of imagination. So if a person wishes to distinguish between (those two modes of perception) in their waking state, whether in this world or at the Day of Resurrection, they can determine (which sort of perception it is) by looking at the imaged-object. Thus if [a] the states of what one is looking at continue to change as it changes its shape and characteristics, even though you can't deny that it is still the same thing, and [b] the fact of observing it does not stop it from changing its shape and formation--as when a chameleon, when you observe it, stops changing its colors--then that is undoubtedly (being seen) with the eye of imagination, not with the eye of the senses. For you perceive what-is-imagined (*al-khayâl*) with the eye of imagination, not with the eye of (physical) sensation.

Indeed few of those who lay claim to the unveiled vision of spirits, whether of fire (i.e., jinn) or of light (angels), really understand how this is. When (those spirits) take on the image of perceptible forms, (most people) don't know whether they are perceiving them with the eye of the imagination or with the eye of (physical) sensation--since both sorts of perception involve the sensing activity of the eye. That (inner sensing activity) is what presents the perception through *both* the eye of imagination and the eye of (physical) sensation. So this is a subtle form of knowledge: I mean the knowledge of the distinction between the two "eyes," and between the sensing activity of the eye and the eye of (physical) sensation. One can know that (what one

perceives) is indeed sensible, not imaginal, and that one has perceived it with the eye of sensation, not the eye of imagination (by the following conditions): [a] when the eye perceives the imaged-object and, without being distracted, sees that its shape and characteristics don't change; [b] when it doesn't see that imaged-object in different places at the same time, assuming it is definitely a single reality; and [c] that imaged-object doesn't become changed or transformed into different states.

This is how you should understand how a human being can perceive their Lord--may He be exalted!--in a dream, even though He transcends any form or image, as well as how that perception of Him takes place and its limitations. And through this you may understand what has come down in the sound report (of the famous hadith) concerning the Creator's "manifesting Himself (to souls at the Resurrection) in the most unlikely of forms among those in which they saw Him," and concerning His "transformation into a form which they knew (before then)," after they had been denying Him and taking refuge from Him (in more agreeable forms of His manifestation).

So you should know with *which* eye you are seeing Him! For I have already let you know that (the divine) Imagination is perceived either through itself--I mean through the eye of imagination--or through the (physical) vision. And which of those two is the sound one on which we should rely?! Regarding that we (wrote these verses):

When my Beloved appears to me, with which eye do I see Him?

With *His* eye, not with mine: for none sees Him but Him!

(This is only) in accordance with the transcendence of His Station and confirming His Words, since He says: "***The gazes do not perceive Him, [but He perceives the gazes...***" (6:103), and He did not specify any particular Abode (of this world or the next), but sent it as an Verse unrestricted (in its applicability) and as a definite, confirmed matter. For none other than Him perceives Him, so it is with *His* eye--may He be praised!--that I see Him, as in (the famous divine saying in) the sound hadith-report: "...I (God) was his gaze through which he sees."

So *wake up*, you who are asleep and heedless of all this, and pay attention! I have opened up for you a door to forms of awareness and inner knowing that thoughts can never reach, though intellects can come to accept them, either through special divine Providence or by "polishing hearts with *dhikr* and recitation (of the Qur'an)." Then the intellect accepts what the divine Self-

manifestation (*tajalli*) gives it and knows that that (imaginal revelation) is beyond its own power with respect to its thinking, indeed that its thinking could never give it that. Therefore (that person) gives thanks to God--may He be exalted!--Who created their constitution (*nash'a*) so that it could receive things like that: this being the constitution of the (divine) Messengers and prophets and those among the saints who are the recipients of special divine Providence. This is so that (such a person) may know that their *receptivity* (to what is bestowed by God) is higher and more noble than their own thinking. So *realize*, o my brother, from now on Who it is that is manifesting Himself to you from behind this door (of the imagination)! For this is a prodigious matter, where even the innermost hearts become bewildered.

[III.] Then the prescriber (of Revelation), who is the truthful speaker, called this thing--which is the (divine) Presence of the Barzakh to which we are brought after death and in which we directly witness our souls--a "Horn" (*al-sûr*) and "Trumpet" (*al-nâqûr*). Here the word *al-sûr* is (also) the plural of the word *sûra*, "form." So (according to the Qur'anic accounts of the Resurrection) "**it is breathed into the Horn/forms**" (6:73, etc.) and "**it is blown upon the Trumpet**" (74:8). And the two of them (the "Horn" and "Trumpet") are exactly the same thing, differing only in the names because of the various states and attributes (of the underlying reality)....

Know that the Messenger of God, when he was asked what this "Horn" (*al-sûr*) was, replied: "It is a horn (*qarn*: an animal horn) of Light upon which (the angel) Isrâfil blows." So he reported that its shape was the shape of (an animal's) horn, described as being broad (at the base) and narrow (at the tip).... Know, then, that the breadth of *this* "Horn" (of the Barzakh-Imagination) is as broad as possible, since none of the generated things are broader than It. That is because through Its reality It has sway over every thing, and (even) over what is not a thing. It gives form (alike) to absolute nothingness and to what is (ontologically) impossible, necessary and contingent, turning what is existent into nothingness and what is non-existent into being. Regarding this divine Presence (i.e., ontological realm of being) the Prophet says: "Worship God as though you see Him..." and "God is in the *qibla* of the person who is praying"--i.e., imagine Him in your direction of prayer and be attentive to Him, so that you are fully mindful of Him and humble before him. And always observe the appropriate courtesy (*adab*) with Him while you are praying, since if you don't do that you are being discourteous and inconsiderate.

Now had the prescriber (of Revelation) not known that there is within you a reality called "imagination" that has this (immense) sway, he would not have said to you "(Worship God) as though you see Him" with your (physical) vision. For the indications of the intellect rule out this "as though," and the intellect holds, with its arguments, that any "likeness" (between God and created things) is impossible: vision can perceive nothing but the wall (in front of the person praying)! Yet we have also learned that the prescriber (of Revelation) called upon you to imagine that you are facing God (*al-Haqq*) in your direction of prayer; indeed it has been prescribed for you to accept that. And God says: "***So wherever you may turn, then there is the Face of God!***" (2:115)--and the "face" (*wajh*) of something is its reality and its individual essence. So the Imagination *has* given form to the One Who, according to the arguments of the intellect, cannot possibly be conceived or given any form. That is why (the Imagination) is so all-encompassing.

But as for the "narrowness" and restrictiveness of the imagination, that is because it does not extend to receiving anything--whether sensible things, or spiritual ones, or relations and connections, or God's Majesty and His Essence--except through some form. If it were to try to perceive something without using a form, its reality would not allow it to do that, since it is precisely the (faculty of) imaginal representation (*wahm*), and nothing else.... So the imagination is the most extensive of all the objects of knowledge--yet despite the immense breadth of its sway, which extends to every thing, it is also incapable of receiving the purely immaterial (noetic) realities (without using some image or likeness). Hence the imagination (as indicated in many familiar hadith) sees knowledge in the form of milk, or honey and wine and pearls; and it sees Islâm in the form a dome and pillars; and it sees the Qur'an in the form of butter and honey; and it sees Religion in the form of a bond; and it sees God (*al-Haqq*) in the form a human being and in the form of light....

As for this "horn" (of the Barzakh/Imagination) being made of "light" (according to the hadith mentioned above), that is because light is the immediate cause for (things) becoming unveiled and clearly appearing, since without light, vision would perceive nothing at all. So God made this Imagination as a "light" through which could be perceived the Bringing-into-form (*taswîr*) of every thing, whatever that might be, as we've already mentioned. His Light passes through the absolute nothingness so that He might shape it into the forms of being. Hence the Imagination is more deserving of the (divine) Name "the Light" (*al-Nûr*) than all the created

things ordinarily described as "luminous," since Its Light does not resemble the (created) lights and through It the divine Self-manifestations are perceived.

And It (or 'He') *is* the Light of the eye of imagination, not the light of the eye of sensation. So understand this! For if you understand how (the divine) Imagination is Light, and you know in what way it is (always) correct, then you will have an advantage over those who don't know that--the sort of person who says: "that is only a false imagination!" That is because such people have failed to understand the perception of the light of imagination which has been given them by God. This is just like their saying that our senses are also "mistaken" in some of their perceptions, when in fact their sense-perceptions are sound, while the judgment (regarding the meaning of those perceptions) belongs to something else, not to the senses themselves. It is the judgment that is false, not the sensation. Likewise the imagination perceives with its light whatever it perceives, without passing judgment. The judgment only belongs to something else, which is the *intellect*, so the error can't be attributed to the imagination. Thus there never is any "false imagination" at all--indeed all of it is correct!

Now as for our companions, they were mistaken in their thinking about this "Horn" (of the Barzakh/Imagination), in that most of the intellectual thinkers represented its narrowest point as the center (of the earthly sphere) and its widest point as the highest, outermost celestial sphere, so that the "forms" which it contains would be the forms of the (physical) world. They considered the wide segment of this Horn its highest part and its narrow section the lowest part of the world--but things are not at all as they claimed! Instead, since the Imagination (even) gives form to God (*al-Haqq*), as well as everything in the world below Him, including even nothingness, its highest section is the narrow one and its lowest section is the wide one. That is just how God created It: for the first thing He created from It was "narrow," while what He created from It later widened out, like the part of a horn adjoining the animal's head.

For there is no doubt that the Presence (i.e., ontological domain) of the divine Actions and States is more extensive (than the higher divine "Presences"). That is why the true Knowers (of God) only find comprehensiveness of knowledge to the extent of what they come to know *from the world*. Then when they want to proceed to knowing the Unicity of God--may He be exalted!--they keep on ascending gradually from that breadth (of worldly objects of knowing) toward what is narrower (in extent). So their forms of knowing (lit.: "knowledges") keep on

becoming less numerous while they ascend in their knowledge of God's Essence, through spiritual unveiling, until they reach the point where they have no object of knowledge but God (*al-Haqq*) alone--which is the narrowest point in that "Horn." For in reality its narrowest part is its highest, which has the most perfect greatness and majesty.

(The reality of this universal creative process of divine "Imagination" resembles) the first part of (an animal's) horn that appears when God has planted it in the animal's head: it continues to grow upward, beginning with that narrow point, as its lower part widens out. So (this narrowest initial "Point") is the first thing created. Don't you see how (likewise) the first thing God--may He be praised!--created was the "Pen" (68:1; 96:4) or the (universal) "Intellect," as he said. So He only created *one* (reality). Then He brought forth the creatures from that one (cf. 6:98), and the world became fully expanded. This is just like the procession of numbers from the initial "one"....

[IV.] Next, now that we have established this, you should know that God--may He be praised!--when He takes the spirits from these physical, material bodies, wherever they may be (at death), deposits those spirits in imaginal-bodily forms within this Horn of Light (of the Barzakh). So all of those things that the human being perceives after death in the Barzakh are only perceived through the eye and with the light of the form in which that person exists in that Horn--and that is a true perception. Among the forms there are [a] some who are restricted in their freedom of activity, and [b] others who are unrestricted, such as the spirits of all the prophets and the spirits of the martyrs; among them are [c] those who are able to look at (what goes on in) this world here-below, even while they are in that Abode (of the Barzakh), and [d] those who manifest themselves to the sleeper in that Presence of the Imagination which is in the person dreaming.

This is why one's dreams are always "true," because every dream in itself is true and not in error. Because if (we say) a dream was "mistaken," it isn't really the dream itself that was mistaken, but rather the *person* who interpreted it incorrectly, in that they didn't recognize the intended meaning of the image in question. Don't you notice what (the Prophet) said to Abû Bakr, when he had interpreted the dream of the person mentioned (in the hadith): "You were right about some of it, and mistaken about some of it." And likewise with what (Muhammad) said to the man who had a dream in which he saw his head cut off and fall to the ground, and then begin to roll around and speak to him. The Messenger of God mentioned to him that Satan

was playing with him. He knew the form of what the man had seen, so he didn't say to him "your *imagination* is false"--because what the man saw was real, only he had been mistaken in his interpretation of it. Instead he informed him about the real meaning of what he had seen while dreaming.

Likewise the supporters of Pharaoh (against Moses) "***are exposed to the Fire***" in *those* forms "***morning and night***" (40:46), without entering Hell, because they are captive within that Horn (of the Barzakh) and in that (imaginal) form. But on the Day of the Rising they enter "***the most intense torment***" (40:46), which is the sensible torment--not the imaginal one--which was theirs in the state of their dying on earth.

Now (sometimes) the eye of imagination perceives *both* imaginal forms and sensible forms together. And sometimes the source of imagination, who is the human being, perceives the object of imagination with the eye of imagination, as in (the Prophet's) saying "The Garden (of Paradise) was portrayed for me on the side of this wall." But he (also) perceived that with the eye of (bodily) sensation. And we only referred to the eye of (bodily) sensation because (according to the hadith report) "he came forward when he saw the Garden, to take a fruit from it," and because (according to another hadith) "he backed up when he saw the Fire (of Hell)" once while he was praying. For we know that (the Prophet) had such power that if he had perceived those visions (only) with the eye of his imagination, and not (also) with the eye of his bodily senses, that would not have influenced his body to move forward and to back up (in those two cases.) Indeed we have also experienced (that bodily influence of imaginal forms and perceptions), and we have neither his power nor his rank.

Therefore every human being in the Barzakh is "***hostage to what they have acquired***" (52:21; 74:38), imprisoned in the forms of their deeds, until they are raised up from those forms, on the Day of the Rising, in "***the state of being of the other world***" (29:20, etc.). ***And God says the Truth and He shows the right Way*** (33:4).

Lataif-e-sitta ([Arabic](#): اللطائف الستة) are special "Organs of Perception" in Sufi spiritual psychology -- subtle human capacities for experience. Depending on context, the Lataif are also understood to be the corresponding qualities of that subtle experience.

The underlying Arabic word "latifa" (singular) means "subtlety" and all Lataif (plural) together are understood to make up the human "[subtle body](#)" ("Jism Latif")^[1]

Realizing (or activating or awakening or "illuminating") the experience of the individual Lataif (and thereby the Jism Latif as a whole) is considered to be a central part of the comprehensive spiritual development that produces the Sufi ideal of a Perfect Man ([Al-Insān al-Kāmil](#)).

□

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Different Interpretations

Descriptions and interpretations of the Lataif differ depending on the specific Sufi tradition and the author representing it. In addition, individual Sufi teachers (see [Sheikh \(Sufism\)](#)) sometimes interpret aspects of Lataif theory and practice

according to how the Lataif have been uniquely revealed to them^[2].

In general, there are at least three historical interpretations of the Lataif:

(1) that derived from the [Kubrāwī](#) order, described in the writings of [Najm al-Din Razi](#) (1177-1256) and [Ala ud-Daula Simnani](#) (Semnani) (1261-1336), which views the Lataif as *potential* psychospiritual organs/capacities that can be realized as progressive stages in those undergoing spiritual development;

(2) that derived from the Mujaddidiyya branch of the [Naqshbandi](#) order, described in the writings of [Ahmad Sirhindi](#) (1564-1624), which views the Lataif as psychospiritual organs/capacities that are *potential* receptors of Divine energy^[3] when activated in those undergoing spiritual development;

(3) that derived from the "Afghan Tradition"^[4] within the Naqshbandi order, described in the writings of [Ikbal Ali Shah](#) (1894-1969) and [Idries Shah](#) (1924-1996), which views the Lataif as *actual* human psychospiritual organs/capacities that are implicit in everyday life and made explicit in those undergoing spiritual development.

Kubrāwī Lataif

According to the view of the Kubrawi order there are seven Lataif. They are understood cosmologically as "descending" levels through which reality is created and structured^[5]. In the process of spiritual development, the individual Sufi is understood to "ascend" to and through these levels progressively (see ontological [Arcs of Descent and Ascent](#) in Sufism). The

attainment of each level is a stage associated with the activation/realization of a corresponding spiritual organ/capacity, interpreted symbolically through Islamic cosmology and the [Prophets and messengers in Islam](#) ^[6]. In ascending order they are:

- **Latifa Qalabiya** ("Mold"), associated with an experience of the color black, represents the acquisition of a new organ, an embryonic [subtle body](#). It is interpreted symbolically as "the Adam of one's being", since Adam was the first human being.
- **Latifa Nafsiya** ("Soul"), color blue, is an organ that corresponds to the animal soul and is a testing ground for struggle with desires and passions. It is interpreted symbolically as "the Noah of one's being", since Noah faced the same situation in dealing with the hostility of his people.
- **Latifa Qalbiya** ("Heart"), color red, is the organ that will develop to become the True Ego, the real personal individuality. It is interpreted symbolically as "the Abraham of one's being", since the prophet Abraham historically represents the establishment of real religion.
- **Latifa Sirriya** ("Secret"), color white, is an organ of superconsciousness. It is interpreted symbolically as "the Moses of one's being", since the prophet Moses participated in spiritual communication with God through this consciousness.

- **Latifa Ruhiya** ("Spirit"), color yellow, is an organ through which an individual becomes capable of acting as vice-regent of God. It is interpreted symbolically as "the David of one's being", since the prophet David fulfilled that role.
- **Latifa Khafiya** ("Inspiration"), color black, is the subtle organ that receives spiritual inspiration. It is interpreted symbolically as "the Jesus of one's being", since the prophet Jesus was characteristic of such inspiration.
- **Latifa Haqqiya** ("Seal"), color green, is the subtle organ that is the final achievement of spiritual development: the True Ego. It is interpreted symbolically as "the Mohammed of one's being", since the prophet Mohammed was the final prophet.

The historical method of [Spiritual practice](#) in this interpretation of the Lataif is unknown^[7].

Naqshbandi Lataif (Mujaddidiyya)

According to the view of the Mujaddidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi order there are five Lataif^[8]. The reception of each Latifa's spiritual energy from its corresponding cosmic realm is interpreted symbolically through the Prophets and messengers in Islam, similar to the interpretation of the Kubrawi order:

- **Qalb** (color yellow; located below left breast) (Adam)
- **Ruh** (color red; located below right breast) (Abraham/Noah)
- **Sirr** (color white; located above left breast) (Moses)
- **Khafi** (color black; located above right breast) (Jesus)
- **Ikhfa** (color green; located at sternum) (Mohammad)

Since, in this interpretation, the Lataif all have their physical location in the chest, they are said to be "of the Heart" ([Qalb](#), used in a different sense than the Latifa named Qalb).

The Lataif are opened through spiritual practice one-by-one in the foregoing order. Viewed as a progressive activation, each Latifa (or progressive combination of Lataif) is considered to be a level of spiritual realization.

The method of opening each Latifa typically begins with a direct transmission by Sufi teacher to student, which can include physical touch (except for women) and the disclosure of the specific one of the [Names of God in Islam](#) that is associated with the Latifa. The student then continues the practice by silent [Dhikr](#) of the Divine Name, focusing attention on the Latifa's location; sometimes a visualization of the Name, the corresponding Prophet, or the teacher is also added.

Naqshbandi Lataif (Afghan Tradition)

According to the view of the Afghan tradition within the Naqshbandi order there are five Lataif^[9]:

- **Qalb** (color yellow; experienced in left side of the body)
- **Ruh** (color red; experienced in right side of the body)
- **Sirr** (color white; experienced below the navel)
- **Khafi** (color black; experienced in forehead)
- **Ikhfa** (color green; experienced in center of chest)

According to Naqshbandi author [Idries Shah](#)^[10] they are understood to be spiritual organs/capacities that also underlie ordinary forms of human consciousness. As such, they are ordinarily only known indirectly through the equivalents (or

their distortions) that they pattern on the conventional psychological/emotional level of human experience.

Sufi inspired teacher Hameed Ali ([A. H. Almaas](#)) (1944-) interprets some of these equivalents (and conditioned distortions) as follows^[11]:

- **Qalb** (Joy/Wanting)
- **Ruh** (Strength/Anger)
- **Sirr** (Will/Anxiety)
- **Khafi** (Peace/Agitation)
- **Ikhfa** (Compassion/Hurt)

With rare exceptions, Lataif are only experienced directly (and unconditioned) in human beings who have undergone a spiritual evolution. The spiritual process of their activation/awakening/illumination consists of various methods, singly or in combination.

One such method, a special form of "[tajalli](#)" ("disclosure" or "illumination"), involves joint receptivity of a Latifa by Sufi teacher and student together.^[12] Another method is the direct activation, called "tawajjuh" ("transmission"), of the Latifa by an intentional interaction between teacher and student. Yet another method, a special kind of "[muraqaba](#)" (meditation), includes having the student concentrate awareness on the part of the body that is related to a Latifa.^[13]

Selections from al-Futuhāt al-Makkiyya

by Shaykh Muhyiddin Ibn al-'Arabi



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CHAPTER THREE

On Allah being disconnected from any connection (tashbih) or embodiment contained in the words which designate Him in His Books or on the tongue of His Messenger

"Allah is Greatly exalted over what the wrongdoers say." (17:43)

In the slave's looking at his Lord
in the purity and disconnection of strength,

And his height from the tools which you connect to "how" and likeness

Is an indication which gives an absolute judgement on the
position of the slave and his praise.

The soundness of knowledge and its affirmation, and
rejection of allegation and distortion.

(All known things were borne by the First Intellect)

Know that the bearer of all known things, celestial and terrestrial, is the Intellect which takes from Allah without intermediary. None of the knowledge of higher and lower being is hidden from it. The self's gnosis of things comes from His giving and generosity, and from His manifestation to it, His light and His purest overflowing. The Intellect learns from Allah and teaches the self. The self learns from the Intellect and action comes from it. This applies to all that knowledge of the Intellect connects to things below it. We are limited by "what is below it" in respect of the learning we mentioned. Be careful when you ponder, remembering that Allah said, "*until We know*" (47:31). He is the All-Knower, so recognise the proper ascriptions!

(..except the Bewildered World)

Know that the Bewildered World does not learn anything from the First Intellect and the First Intellect has no power over those who are bewildered by love. They and it are on the same rank, like individuals among us who are outside of the jurisdiction of the Pole (*Qutb*), even though the Pole is one of the individuals. But the Intellect was selected to inform as the Pole is selected for appointment among the individuals.

(...and except the science of the isolation (*tajrid*) of *tawhid*)

The principle of the Intellect teaching those below it is transpires in all that the knowledge of the Intellect is connected to - except for 'the isolation of *tawhid*'. The science of the isolation of *tawhid* is different from all known things in all aspects since there is no relationship at all between Allah and His creation, even if the 'relationship' is applied to it on a certain day as was done by Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali in his books, and other people. That is a sort of mannerism and very far from the realities. What relationship is there between the in-time and the timeless? Or how can a likeness be made of the One Who does not accept a likeness with someone who does accept a likeness? This is impossible as Abu'l-'Abbas ibn al-'Arif as-Sanhaji said in *Mahasin al-Majalis*, "There is no relationship between Allah and the slaves except concern. There is no cause except judgement and no time except pre-Time. Whatever else is blindness and deceptive ambiguity." One variant has "knowledge" in place of "blindness". See how excellent these words are and how complete this gnosis of Allah is and how pure this contemplation (*mushahada*)! May Allah give us the benefit of what he said!

(The intellect's incapacity for gnosis of Allah)

Knowledge of Allah is too difficult for the faculty of perception of the intellect and the self except for the fact that He exists and is holy! In its reflection and preservation, the sound intellect knows that Allah is different from what is said about Him in respect of creatures or imagined in compounds and other things. That illusion is not permissible in respect of Him nor can that verbal expression be logically applied to Him in the same manner as that which created things accept. If it is applied to Him, it is only used in a manner to facilitate the listener's understanding of the firmness of existence in a manner comprehensible to the listener, not to establish the reality which the Real possesses. Allah says, "*There is nothing like Him.*" (47:19)

Knowledge of Allah, however, is obligatory for us in the *Shari'a* since Allah said to His Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "*Know that there is no god but Allah.*" (47:19). So He is saying, "Know Me from My reports which are in harmony with your reflection so that your belief will give you sound knowledge as your knowledge without belief which comes from definition may be sound." So that matter is like that.

Because of this matter in the view and opinion of certain people, we looked to see how gnosis of Him can be attained. We investigated in a fair and balanced manner. The perfect intellect does not obtain it after effort and striving. We only attained to gnosis of Him by the incapacity to recognise Him because our quest to recognise Him is like our quest to recognise all things in respect of the reality which known things have. When we know that there is something in existence which has no likeness and which cannot be conceived in the mind nor perceived, how then can the intellect master this? This is not permissible even though knowledge of His existence is affirmed. We know that He exists and is One in His essence. This is the knowledge demanded of us, not that we know the reality of His essence which He knows that He has. This is knowledge of the lack of knowledge which is demanded of us. He does not resemble any creature in the view of the intellect nor is any of them like Him. It was obligatory for us, first of all,

when it was said to us, "Know that there is no god but Allah" to know what knowledge is. We have learned it and we have learned what it was first obligatory for us to know of what knowledge is.

(Matrices of the demands of knowledge)

The matrices of the demands of are four: is?, what?, how? and why?. 'Is?' and 'why?' are single spiritual demands accompanied by what it is. 'Is?' and 'why?' are the two sound roots of simple elements because 'what is it?' is a sort of complex one. In these four demands there is no demand which should be asked of Allah in respect of what the reality accords since it is not correct that any of the science of tawhid be recognised except by the negation of what exists except for Him. Therefore He said, "*There is nothing like Him*" (42:11) and "*Glory be to your Lord, the Lord of Might, above what they describe.*" (37:180)

(Knowledge of negation is knowledge of Allah)

Knowledge of negation is knowledge of Allah. Similarly we are not permitted to ask "How?" about spirits (*arwah*). They are too pure for that because their realities are different from this expression. The tools by which one questions are not applied to the spirits, nor is it permitted that they be applied to Allah. The realised unifier who is deprived of the presence of his Originator and Creator must not apply these expressions to Him. The Real is not ever known by these demands.

Section

(What is perceived by its essence, what is perceived by its action and what is not perceived at all)

Then we also looked into all that is other than Allah and found it in two categories: one category is perceived by its essence - which the dense, sensory category; and one category that it is perceived by its action, which is intelligible and subtle. The intelligible is higher than the sensory by this station: it is too pure to have its essence perceived, but its action is perceived. Since these are the qualities of creatures, Allah is too pure to be perceived by His essence like the sensory or by his action like the subtle because there is no relationship at all between Him and His creation. His Essence is not perceived by us so as to be like the sensory nor is His action so as to be like the subtle. The action of the Real is to originate the thing, but not from a thing. The spiritual subtle achieves a thing from other things. So what relationship is there between the two of them? When the relationship is impossible in the action, then it is more fitting that similarity in the essence be impossible.

If you wish to achieve realisation of some of this area, look at the effect (*maf'ul*) of this action according to the ranks of the effects, for instance the effect of handicraft like the shirt and chair. We find that the artisan is not recognised unless he himself has indicated the existence of its maker and his knowledge of his craft. It is the same with the effect of the formation of being - the sphere and stars - which do not

recognise their fashioner nor the one who compounded them. That was the Universal Self which encompasses them. It is also the same with the natural effect - like the products of minerals, plants and animals, who effect a nature which was one of the effects of formation into being. But they do not grasp who acts for them, namely the sphere and the stars.

So knowledge of the spheres is not what you see of their mass and what the senses perceive of them. Where is the mass of the sun in relation to itself in the eyes of one of us who sees it? Knowledge of the spheres comes from their spirit and meaning which Allah brought into existence for them from the encompassing Universal Self which is the cause of the spheres and what is in them.

It is the same with emanating effect which is the Universal Self, emanating from the Intellect as the Dihya [1] form came from the Jibrilian form. The Universal Self does not know what it emanated from at all because it is in its care and encompassed by it as it is one of its thoughts (*khawatir*). So how can the Universal Self know what is above it when what is in the Self from what is above it is only what is in it? It only knows what it has of it. So it knows its self, not its cause!

It is the same with the effect of origination which we call the Muhammadan Reality, and others call the First Intellect. It is the Highest Pen which Allah originated from nothing. It is even more incapable and prevented from perceiving its Doer than every effect already mentioned since between every effect and its doer which have been mentioned there is a sort of relationship and resemblance. So it must know of it according to the amount of relationship there is between them, either in respect of substantiality or otherwise. There is no relationship between the first thing originated and the Real - glory be to Him! It is the most incapable of the effects of causes of recognising its Doer from others. Then the incapacity of the effect, which resembles its active cause from some aspects, is incapable of perceiving it and knowing it. So understand this and realise it. It is very beneficial indeed in the area of *tawhid* and the inability to connect temporal knowledge to Allah the Great.

Section

(The five faculties and their real perceptions)

What we mentioned confirms that man perceives all knowables by one of the five faculties: the senses which are five - smell, taste, touch, hearing and sight. Sight perceives colours, coloured things and individuals according to the known limit of proximity and distance. What he perceives a mile away is not what he perceives at two miles, and that what he perceived at 20 spans is not what he perceives a mile away. What he perceives close to him, like his hand is not what he perceives at 20 spans. At two miles, he perceives an individual shape and does not know whether it is a man or a tree. At one mile, he recognises that it is a man. At 20 spans he recognises that he is white or black. Face to face, he recognises whether it is blue or navy blue. It is like that with all the senses in their perception up close or from afar.

The Creator is not sensed, i.e. He is not perceived by the senses by us while we are seeking to recognise Him. We do not know Him by the means of the senses.

The imaginative (*khayaliyya*) faculty only takes what the senses give it, either in an image or a mental form, from what the senses give to each other. The path of the people of thought in gnosis of Allah ends here (by way of the imaginative faculty). It is their language, not our language. Even if their path is true, we ascribe it to them and it is quoted from them. This imaginative faculty continues as long as it has perception from the senses. We consider any connection of the senses to Allah to be invalid, so the connection of the imagination to Him is also invalid.

As for the meditative faculty, man only ever reflects on things that exist with him which he learns from the senses and the precepts of the intellect and from how thoughts work on them in the repository of the imagination which accords it another knowledge between it and these things in which he conceives of a relationship. There is no relationship between Allah and His creation. Thus knowledge of Him is not valid by way of reflection. Therefore scholars forbid thinking about the Essence of Allah.

As for the faculty of the intellect, it is not valid for the intellect to perceive Him. The intellect only accepts what it knows spontaneously or what reflection accords us. It is invalid for thought to perceive Him, so it is invalid for the intellect to perceive Him via reflection. But whatever the intellect is, its limit is to understand and grasp what it obtains. So it may be that the Real will give it gnosis of Him and it will understand it, but not by means of reflection. This is not impossible. Allah gives this gnosis to whomever He will of His slaves. The intellect does not have sole possession of perception of gnosis, but it accepts it. So neither proof nor demonstration is based on it because gnosis is beyond the scope of the perceptions of the intellect.

These essential attributes cannot be designated because they are beyond exemplification and analogy. "*There is nothing like Him.*" (42:11) Every intellect which does not have some of this gnosis unveiled to it questions another intellect which has had some of it unveiled to it. But it is not in the power of this questioned intellect to express it nor is it possible. That is why Abu Bakr as-Siddiq said, "The inability to perceive is perception." This statement has two ranks, so understand! Whoever seeks Allah through his intellect by means of his thought and investigation is astray. However, his preparation may be enough to receive what Allah gives him of that, so understand!

As for the faculty of memory, there is no way for it to perceive knowledge of Allah. It remembers what the intellect knew before and then was heedless of or forgot unwittingly. So the faculty of memory has no way to Him.

So man's perceptions are limited to what man is, what his essence gives him and he can acquire. All there remains is the preparation of the intellect to accept what Allah gave it of His gnosis. Man will never recognise the Real by deductive proof - except for recognition of existence and that He is the only One who is worshipped. So perceiving man is not capable of perceiving anything at all unless something

like the perceived thing already exists in him. If it had not been for that, he would not have perceived it at all nor recognised it. Since man does not recognise anything unless he has something like that recognised thing, in reality man only recognises what resembles him and is like him. There is nothing like the Creator and nothing has anything like Him, so He will never be recognised!

(Natural things only accept nourishment from their own sort)

Part of what supports what we mentioned is that natural things only accept food from things of their own sort, and absolutely do not accept food from other than their sort. An example of that is that products of minerals, plants and animals are compounded of the four humours, and the products do not accept food from any other source. That is because a portion of them is from them. If a creature had wanted to make the food of his body, which is compounded of these elements, from other than these elements, or what is compounded of others, he would not have been able to do so.

As as it is only possible for natural bodies to accept food from something that is compounded of the same elements as they are, so it is not possible for anyone to know anything unless he has something like it. Don't you see that the self only accepts from the intellect what it shares with it and what resembles it? It does not know what it does not share with it at all. None of Allah is in anyone and it that is not permissible in any aspect, so no one recognises Him from his self and reflection. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Allah is veiled from the intellects as He is veiled from the eyes. The Highest Assembly seek Him as you seek Him." So the Prophet reported that the intellect does not perceive Him by its reflection nor by its inner eye nor does the eye perceive Him. This is what we indicated earlier in the chapter. Praise belongs to Allah for His inspiration and for teaching us what we did not know. The bounty of Allah is immense.

(Disconnection (*tanzih*) and negation of exemplification and connection (*tasbih*))

So there must be disconnection and negation of exemplification and connection. Whoever among those who use connection and go astray only go astray by allegorical interpretation and applying what the *ayats* and traditions bring us which we have not understood without looking into the disconnection which Allah made obligatory. That led them to pure ignorance and clear disbelief. If they had sought soundness and left the traditions and ayats as they had come without modifying anything in them to something else and entrusted the knowledge of that to Allah and His Messenger and said, "We do not know", that would have been better for them.

The words of Allah should be enough for them, "*There is nothing like Him.*" (42:11) When a *hadith* comes to them which contains connections so that Allah is made like something, He negated the likeness in respect of Himself. So all that remains is that that tradition has one of the aspects of disconnection which Allah recognises and it is brought to Arab understanding in whose tongue the Qur'an was revealed.

Actually there is not to be found a single phrase in a tradition or ayat at all which is a text for connection. What you find with the Arabs is that it supports many aspects, one of which leads to connection and one of which leads to disconnection. The allegorical interpreter applies that phrase to the aspect which leads to connection by wronging that phrase since he does not recognise its proper due given to it by what its place in the language demands. He infringes on Allah when He applies to Him what is not proper for Allah. Allah willing, we will present some of the *hadith* which have come with connection and which are not really a text for it. *"To Allah belongs the far-reaching proof. If He had willed, He would have guided you all."* (6:149)

(Connection (*tasbih*) and anthropomorphism in the expressions of the Sunna)

An example of that is when the Prophet said, "The heart of the believer is between two of Allah's fingers." [at-Tirmidhi] The intellect looks at what the subject demands of reality and metaphor and that a 'limb' is impossible for Allah! 'Finger' is a shared expression which can be applied to the limb or applied to blessing. The shepherd said:

Weak of staff [\[2\]](#), of Bedouin origin, you see him over them when
people have not had their blessing end in drought.

He said, "You see him over them" is a good indication of blessing by looking after them well. The Arabs say, "What an excellent finger so-and-so has over his property" meaning that his effect on it is to make his property grow because of his good management of it.

The swiftest turning over of things is what is turned over by the fingers because of their small size and perfect capacity for that. So their movement is swifter than the hand and other things. When Allah turns over the hearts of the slaves, it is the swiftest thing. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was most eloquent to the Arabs in his supplication. using what they understood. Because for us, things are only turned over by the hand, he used turning with 'the fingers' because the fingers are part of the hand and are quicker. Thus the Prophet said in his supplication, "O Overturner of hearts, make my heart firm in Your deen!" [Ibn Majah] Allah's overturning of the hearts is what He creates in them of concern for good and interest in evil. When man senses the succession of thoughts which come to him in his heart, this is referred to as 'Allah turning the heart'. Man's knowledge cannot turn this away from himself. That is why the Prophet said, "O Overturner of hearts, make my heart firm in Your *deen*!"

Regarding this *hadith*, one of his wives said to him, "Do you fear then, Messenger of Allah?" He, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, replied, "The heart of the believer is between the fingers of Allah," so the Prophet indicated the swiftness of the turning from belief to disbelief and what they both contain. Allah said, *"He inspired them with their depravity and godfearing."* (91:8) This inspiration is the turning and the fingers are for speed. The fact that they are two ('two fingers') is the thought of good and the thought of evil.

So 'fingers' should be understood as we have stated. 'Fingers' can mean the limb and it can mean the blessing and good effect. So which of the two aspects will you connect to the limb when these disconnected aspects demand it? Either we will be silent and entrust knowledge of that to Allah and to the one whom Allah has acquainted with it - a sent messenger or an inspired wali as long as the limb is negated, or we are overcome by inquisitiveness which takes control of us, although we ascribe that to an assimilating anthropomorphising innovator. It is not by inquisitiveness, but it is obligatory for the knower in that to clarify the aspects of disconnection in that expression so as to invalidate the argument of every disappointed anthropomorphist. May Allah turn to us and him and provide him with Islam! If we discuss that word which must give rise to tashbih, its explanation must be modified to an aspect which befits Allah - glory be to Him! This is the portion of the intellect in the linguistic convention of the phrase.

The Blowing of a spirit (*ruh*) into a heart (*ru'*)

(The portion of the heart from the two fingers from an unseen aspect)

'The two fingers' are the secret of essential perfection which is such that when it is unveiled to the eyes on the Day of Rising, a man will seize his father if he is an unbeliever and fling him into the Fire, and will not feel any pain in that nor any grief for him due to the secret of these two 'fingers' which has one meaning while the word is in the dual. The Garden and the Fire were created and the name illuminated and darkened, and Blesser and Avenger appeared. So do not imagine that these two fingers are two of ten fingers!

This secret must be pointed out in this chapter in the hadith, "Both of his Hands are right hands." This is gnosis of unveiling. The people of the Garden have two blessings: one is the blessing of the Garden and the other is the blessing of the punishment of the people of the Fire in the Fire. Similarly the people of the Fire have two punishments. Both groups see Allah by the Names just as they did in this world. In 'the two handfuls' which came from the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in respect of Allah is the secret of what we have said and pointed out. *"Allah speaks the truth and guides to the Path."* (33:4)

The handful and the right hand: Allah said, *"The earth all together shall be His handful"* (39:68) and *"the heavens shall be rolled up in His right hand."* (39:68) The intellect should see what the situation requires. First of all, at the beginning of the *ayat*, Allah forbade that He be determined by connection and anthropomorphism which weak intellects already have in the ayats and traditions which give rise to that in any aspect. Then after this disconnection (transcendence) which only those with knowledge understand, Allah said, *"The earth all together shall be His handful."*

One of the conventions of the Arabic language we know that it is said, "So-and-so is in my hand (*qabda*)," meaning under my jurisdiction, even though I have nothing of him at all in my actual hand. But my command is enforced on him and my judgement of him is carried out, just like my judgement over what my hand physically possesses and grasps. I also say, "My property is in my hand", i.e. my ownership and I can dispose of it and there is nothing to prevent me from doing so. When I dispose of it, in the moment in which I dispose of it, I can say, "It is in my hand for me to dispose of," even if that is my slaves who dispose of it with my permission.

Since a limb is impossible for Allah, the intellect must modify the sense, meaning and benefit of the "handful". It is the possession of what it grasps in the moment, even if the grasper does not have anything to grasp with. It is absolutely in the possession of the handful. Thus the universe is in the grasp/handful of the Truly Real. The earth in the Next World is designated as one of the possessions as you say, "My servant is in my grasp", even though the servant is only part of what is in our grasp. I have mentioned him especially because something particular has occurred.

In our view, 'the right hand' is the place of absolute strong transaction. 'The left' does not have the power of the right. So in the Qur'anic *ayat*, the right hand alludes to full mastery. It indicates mastery of power in the action. So the Qur'anic meaning reached the understanding of the Arabs by phrases which they recognised and were quick to grasp. The poet said:

When a banner is raised for glory, 'Araba takes it with the right hand.

Glory does not have a tangible manner, so the "limb" of the right hand does not take it. It is as if he were saying: If glory were to show a tangible banner, its place or bearer would be the right hand of 'Araba al-Awsi [one of the Ansar], meaning that the attribute of glory is complete in him. The Arabs still applies the phrases used for the limbs to things which the actual limb cannot accept because they share in the meaning.

The blowing of a spirit into a heart

(The portion of the heart in the right and left hands: the right and left hands from an unseen aspect)

When the Truly Real manifests Himself to the secret (*sirr*) of a slave who possesses all secrets and joins him to the free men and he has essential freedom of action in respect of the right hand, the honour of the left is by something else and the honour of the right is by its essence. To descend, the honour of the right hand is by the address (*khatab*) and the honour of the left is by presencing (*tajalli*). Man's honour is by recognising his reality and becoming acquainted with it, and it is the left = 'both hands' in respect of man are left just as both of Allah's hands are right!

Referring to the meaning of unification (*ittihad*), both of the hands of the slave are right. Referring to *tawhid*, one of the hands of Allah is right and the other left. Sometimes I am in 'gatheredness' and 'the

gatheredness of gatheredness' and sometimes I am in 'separation' and 'separation of separation' according to the manifestation and the gift (*warid*).

One day when I encountered someone with good fortune (*yaman*),
he was Yemeni.

If I met one going beyond (*mu'addhi*), he was 'Adnani.

Part of that is **wonder, laughter, joy and anger**. Wonder occurs from something existent who did not know that which makes him wonder and then he learns of it and it makes him wonder. So laughter is applied to him. This is impossible for Allah. There is nothing outside His knowledge, so when something occurs in existence which can make us wonder, that wonder and laughter is applied to the One who cannot have either wonder or laughter because the matter which occasions wonder among us, like the young man without youthful passion, is a wondrous matter. With Allah has the position of what would cause us wonder.

Laughter and joy emerge out of acceptance and pleasure. If you do an action for someone and because of it he shows you laughter and joy, he has accepted that action and is pleased with it. So His laughter and joy is His acceptance and pleasure with us. Similarly His anger is disconnected from the boiling of the blood of the heart seeking revenge because He is too pure for corporality and contingency. That refers doing the action of one who is angry who is permitted to be angry. It is His vengeance on the tyrants and those who oppose His command and overstep His bounds. Allah said, "*He is angry with him*" meaning that He repays him as is done with someone who is the object of wrath. So the Requitor is angry and the appearance of the action designates the name.

Smiling is part of laughter. The *hadith* says, "Allah smiles on the man who walks to the mosque for the prayer and remembrance." Since the world is veiled by phenomenal beings and they are occupied with other than Allah, they perform this action in a state of absence from Allah. When they come to Him with one of the varieties of presence, Allah sends down on them in their hearts some of the pleasure of the bliss of being present (*muhadara*), intimate conversation (*munajat*) and contemplation (*mushahada*) which endears itself to their hearts. The Prophet said, "Love Allah for the nourishment He has given you of His blessings." Smiling alludes to this action of His because it is the manifestation of joy when you come to Him. When someone makes it easy for you to come, the sign of his happiness is to display kindness and love to you and to send some of the blessings he has to you. When these things appear from Allah to the slaves who come to him, that is called 'smiling'.

Forgetfulness. Allah said, "*He has forgotten them.*" (9:67) It is not permissible for Him to forget, but when Allah punishes them with eternal punishment and does not give them mercy, they become as if they have been forgotten by Him and it is as if He has forgotten them. This is the action of one who forgets and one who does not remember the pain of the punishment they are in. That is because in their live in this world they forgot Allah, so He repaid them with their own action and their action comes back on them appropriately.

The meaning of "*Allah has forgotten them*" is He has deferred them and the meaning of "they forgot Allah" is they deferred the command of Allah and did not do it. So Allah deferred them in the Fire when He brought out of it the others which He had made enter the Fire. Near this area is describing the Real with devising, mockery and mockery. Allah said, "*Allah mocks them,*" (9:79) "*Allah devises,*" (3:54) and "*Allah will mock them.*" (2:15)

The breath (*nafas*): The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Do not curse the wind. It is from the breath of the Merciful." He also said, "I feel the breath of the Merciful coming to me from the Yemen." All of this is from comforting (*tanfis*). It is as if he were saying, "Do not curse the wind. It is part of what the Merciful uses to comfort (*naffasa*) His slaves." The Prophet said, "You aided with the east wind" as he said. "I feel the breath," i.e. the All-Merciful relieves my grief for me. This was the grief the Prophet had when his people denied him and rejected the command of Allah. He said, "From the direction of the Yemen", so the Ansar were among those by whom Allah relieved His Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, from what grieved him from the deniers. Allah the Great is free of the breath which is the air expelled by the breather. "*Allah is greatly exalted above what the wrongdoers ascribe to Him!*" (See 17:43)

Form (*sura*). Form is applied to a matter and to what is known with people and other things. The *hadith* attributes form to Allah in the *Sahih* and other books. For instance, there is the hadith of 'Ikrima, the Prophet said, "I saw my Lord in the form of a young man." This was a state of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and it is a well-known usage in Arabic. It is like when the Prophet said, "Allah created Adam on His form."

Know that the quality of "likeness" which comes in Qur'an is linguistic, not intelligible, because an intelligible likeness is impossible for Allah. Zayd is a lion in strength. Zayd is a Zuhayr in poetry. When you describe something existent with one or two attributes and then describe another with that attribute, even if there is clear disparity between them in respect of other realities, they share in the spirit of that attribute. It means that each of them has the form of the other in that attribute in particular. So understand and take note!

See that your being indicates Him - glory be to Him! Did you describe Him with an attribute of

perfection other than from you? Understand! When you enter the gate of stripping away equating, you negate imperfections which you are not allowed to do, even if you are not based on that at all. However when the anthropomorphist and assimilator ascribe that to him, you negate that attribution. If the anthropomorphist had not had the illusion, you would not have made any of this negation. Know that even if the form has many openings, but we have refrained from mentioning them since we wish to avoid making this book too long. *"Allah speaks the truth and guides to the Path."* (33:4)

The Arm. It is related in a tradition from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "the molar-tooth of the unbeliever in the Fire is like Uhud and his skin is as thick as forty arm-spans of the arm-span of the Almighty." This is an attribution of honouring by the amount which Allah made attributed to Him. It is like you saying, "This thing is so many arm-lengths of the King," meaning the greatest arm-length which the King makes, even though, for instance, the arm of the King is the limb, like people's limbs and the arm-span which he makes is greater than the King's limb by a half or its like. So in reality it is not his arm, but rather it is the estimate of his share and then it is ascribed to its maker, so know! In language, the "Almighty" is the Immense King.

It is like that with the foot. "The Mighty places His foot (in the Fire)". The foot is the limb. It is said, "So-and-so has a good in the business," meaning he is firm. The foot is a collective noun in creation, so the food is an attribution. The Mighty is the angel and this foot belongs to the angel since the limb is impossible for Allah!

Settling (*istawa*) is also applied to steadiness, direction and overwhelming. Steadiness is one of the qualities of bodies and is not permitted in respect of Allah! except in the aspect of steadiness. Direction is direction is will and it is one of the attributes of perfection. Allah said, *"He lifted (istawa) Himself up to heaven,"* (3:29), i.e. intended. *"He settled on the throne"* (7:54) means occupied.

There are many traditions and *ayats*, some sound, some weak. There is no tradition which does not have one of the aspects of disconnection. If you want to more easily understand that, then apply yourself to the phrase which gives rise to tashbih and take its benefit or its spirit or what comes from it. Put it in what is due to the Truly Real and you will win the degree of disconnection when other people obtain the rank of connection. So act thus and purify your garment! This is enough of these traditions for the topic is long.

The blowing of the Purest Ruh in the Inner Heart

(The symbolic meaning of the phrases of *tashbih* in the Shari'a)

"The blowing of the purest spirit in the inner heart" is in the previous expressions: when the wonderer (the King) wonders at the one who has come out on His form (Adam), His Creator in his inner conscience, rejoicing in his existence, laughing in his witnessing and angry when he turns away, smiling when he comes near, forgetting his outward and breathing. So He let the ships take their course and is firm on His kingdom and rules over His kingdom by decree. What He wills is and the return is to Allah!

These are isolated spirits for which the supporting forms (*ashbah*) wait. When the time comes, moments come to an end, the heaven sways, the sun is rolled up, the earth is changed, the stars are thrown down, things are transformed, the Next World appears and man and others are gathered in the original state (See 19:10). Then the forms will give praise, the spirits will delight, the Opener will be manifested, the lamp will be kindled, the wine sparkle, pure love (*wudd*) appear, beseeching disappear, the wing spread, and the the Dome [3] established from the beginning of night to morning. How glorious a station! How delightful it is to selves in a perfect state. May Allah let us enjoy it!

1. Dihya al-Kalbi, in whose form Jibril appeared to the Prophet.
2. i.e. a good shepherd who tends his camels well.
3. The temple called *al-Bayt al-Ma'mur* corresponding to the Ka'ba in the Fourth Heaven.

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CHAPTER FOUR

The Cause of the Beginning of the World and the Ranks of the Most Beautiful Names in the entire universe

In the cause of the beginning and its rules, and the end
of fabrication and its perception,

And the difference between the subjects of the high
in its origin and its rulers,

The proofs indicate the Maker who has manifested all by His rules.

(The elite of the place and the sensation of the Garden)

The pure *wali* grasped the cause of the beginning of the world in our book entitled, '*Anqa' Mughrib fi ma'rifa khatmi'l-awliya' wa shamsu'l-Maghrib*' and in our book entitled *Insha' ad-Dawa'ir* some of which we wrote in his noble house when we visited him in 598 on our way to *hajj*. His servant, 'Abdu'l-Jabbar (may Allah elevate his worth!) copied out for him what I had written of it. I travelled to Makka with him in this year to finish it there. This book (The *Futuh*) distracted us from it and anything else because of a divine command which came upon us to write it, as well as the desire of some of the brothers and *fuqara'* for me to do that since they desired to increase their knowledge and to receive the blessings of this Blessed Noble House, the place of blessings, guidance and clear signs. In this place we also desired to acquaint the noble pure one, Abu Muhammad 'Abdu'l-'Aziz (al-Mahdawi al-Qurashi), with the blessings Makka gives and that it is the best method of worship and the noblest earthly inanimate station. Perhaps the *himma* of yearning will rise to perform it and the desire for increase in it will descend. It was revealed to the one who "was given all the words" and had eye-witnessing of his Lord, closer than "two bows-lengths", in spite of this most perfect proximity and fullest portion, "Say, 'Lord increase me in knowledge.'" (20:114)

Part of the precondition of the witnessing knower, master of unseen and visible stations, is that he know that places have an effect in the subtle hearts. If the heart were to exist in any place in the most universal existence, its existence would be the most glorious and complete in Makka. As spiritual stages vary in excellence, so do physical stages. Is the pearl like the stone, unless it is with someone in a particular state? The perfected master of the station differentiates between them as the Truly Real differentiates between them. Does the Real equate a house built of bricks and straw with a house built of gold and silver? The sage who has arrived is the one who gives everything with a due its proper due. He is unique in his age and the master of his moment. So there is a great difference between a city most of whose

structures are appetites and a city most of whose structures are clear signs!

Did not my pure friend friend agree with me that the existence of our hearts in certain places is greater in some places than in others. May Allah be pleased with him! He abandoned retreat (*khilwa*) in the houses of the protected minaret in eastern Tunis along the coast and went down to ar-Rabita which is in the middle of the tombs, near the minaret on the side where its door is located. It is traced to al-Khidr. I asked him about that and he said, "I find my heart there more than in the minaret." I also experienced there what the Shaykh had said.

The *wali* knew that to due to whoever inhabits the place is either in the state of the noble angels or sincere jinn, or it is due the *himma* of the one who visits it when it is no longer there - like the house of Abu Yazid which was called "The House of the Pious", or the zawiyya of al-Junayd at Shuniziyya, or the cave of Ibn Adham at Yaqin and other places of the righteous who have departed from this world while their traces remain in their places affecting subtle hearts. This is the reason why mosques vary in excellence in the existence of the heart, but not in the doubling of the reward. You find your heart more in one mosque than another. That is not due to the earth, but to the assembly of comrades and their *himma*. The person who does not find a difference in the existence of his heart between the mosque and markets has a state, not a station.

I do not doubt by unveiling and knowledge that if the angels were to inhabit the entire earth with their rivalry in gnoses and ranks, the highest of them in rank and greatest in knowledge and gnosis would inhabit the Masjid al-Haram. Your existence is according to those whose company you keep. The *himma* of those who sit together has an effect on the one who sits with them and their *himma* is according to their ranks. If the rivalry is based on *himma*, then 124,000 Prophets, not counting the *awliya'*, did *tawaf* of this House. There is no Prophet or *wali* who does not have a *himma* connected to this House.

This city is the sacred city because it is the House which Allah chose over all other houses. It has the secret of firstness in places of worship as Allah said, "*The first house established for the people was that at Bakka, a blessed place, and a guidance to all the worlds. Therein are clear signs - the station of Ibrahim, and whoever enters it is secure*" (3:97) from every fear. There are other *ayats*. If the pure friend had travelled to this noble sacred city, he would have experienced gnoses and increase which he had not seen before that nor had occurred to his mind.

He knew that the self will be gathered on the form of its knowledge while the body will be gathered on the form of its action. The form of knowledge and action are more complete in Makka than elsewhere. If someone with a heart were to enter it for a single hour, it would have that. So how much would it have it if he were to be in its proximity and reside there and performed all the obligations and rules? There is no doubt that his witnessing there would be more complete and sublime, and its gift would be purer, sweeter and more delightful. Then my friend informed me that he felt increase and decrease according to places and natural dispositions, and he knew that that also derives from the reality of the one living there or his *himma* as we mentioned. We have no doubt that recognition of this science, i.e. recognition of

places and the sensation of increase and decrease comes from the completeness of the mastery of the gnostic's recognition and the height of his station and honour over things and the strength of his discrimination. May Allah write a good effect for the *wali* and give him a good report in it since he enjoyed that and was capable of it.

(The Divine Names and realities of existence)

Know, may Allah give success to us, you and all the Muslims! that most of those who know by Allah among the people of unveiling and realities do not possess knowledge of the reason for the beginning of the universe other than the connection of the Timeless to its being brought into existence. Allah gave being to what He knew He would give being to. Here most people stop. We, and those who Allah has acquainted with what he has acquainted us with, have grasped other matters. This is that when you look at the universe in detail with its realities and ascriptions, you find it limited by realities and ascriptions, with known stages and ranks, and finite genera of similar and dissimilar things. If you understand this matter, you know that this has a subtle secret and wondrous matter whose reality is not perceived precisely by reflection or investigation. Rather, it is one of the knowledges given by unveiling and the results of striving which accompanies *himma*. Striving without *himma* does not produce anything nor have any effect in knowledge, but it has effect in the state by the fineness and purity the striver feels.

Know, may Allah teach you the secrets of judgements and give you all the words! that the Most Beautiful Names, which are above the names which can be counted and bring down happiness below the enumerated names, have an effect in this universe. They are the 'first keys' which only He knows. Every reality in existence has one of the names which is particular to it. By reality, I mean a reality which gathers together a genus of the realities. The Lord of that reality is that name and that reality is its slave and under its commission. It is only that.

If something combines several names for you, the matter is not as you imagine it to be. You look at that thing, you find that it has aspects compatible with those names it indicates, which are the realities which we mentioned. That is like what was confirmed for you in the knowledge which is in the outward intellect and under its jurisdiction in respect of a certain existent being singular and indivisible – like the single substance (*jawhar*) which is an indivisible part. In spite of that, this single substance contains numerous realities which demand an equal number of Divine Names. The reality of its being brought into existence demands the name the All-Powerful. From the aspect of its precision it demands the name of the Knowing. The aspect of its selection demands the name the Transformer. The aspect of its manifestation demands the name the Seer and Looker, etc. Even if this substance is but one, it has these and other aspects which we have not mentioned. And each aspect has many aspects which demand their commensurate names. Those aspects are the reality and they are secondary in our opinion and it is difficult to grasp them and even more difficult to obtain them by unveiling.

(The matrices of the Divine Names)

Know that we may leave the Names with their multiplicity when we look at the aspects of those who

seek them in the world. When we do not look at that, we see the matrices of the demands of knowledge which they need and we recognise that the Names which are the matrices on which they stand are also the matrices of the Names. So it is easy to look, complete the goal and it is easy to go beyond these matrices to the offshoots, as it is easy to return the offshoots to the matrices. If you look at all the Names known in the celestial and terrestrial world, you will find seven names designated as the Attributes by those who know the science of *Kalam* which contains them. We have discussed this in our book called *Insha' ad-Dawa'ir*.

Our aim in this book is not in these seven matrices designated as the Attributes, but our aim is the matrices necessary for bringing the universe into existence. Similarly we do not need intellectual proofs of the recognition of the Real beyond the fact that He exists, is Knowing, Transforming, Powerful, Alive. No more is necessary. No more than this is required by responsibility. The Messenger, peace be upon him, made us recognise that He speaks. Responsibility made us recognise that He hears and sees, and so on with other Names. What we need here from recognition of the names is for the existence of the universe. These names are the Lords of the Names and all other names are in their custody as some of these lords have custody of others.

The matrices of the Divine Names are: the Living, the Knowing, the Transforming, the Speaker, the Generous, the Equitable. These are the offspring of two Divine Names: the Manager and the Divider. The Living confirms your understanding after and before your existence. The Knowing confirms your consolidation in your existence, and before your existence confirmed your determination. The Transformer confirms your selection. The Powerful confirms your non-existence. The Speaker confirms your timelessness. The Generous confirms your being brought into existence. The Equitable confirms your rank. The rank is the last of the stages of existence.

These realities must exist, and their names which are their Lords are also necessary. The Living is the Lord of the Lords and the subjects. It is the Imam. Next in rank is the Knower (*al-'Alim*), then the Transformer, then the Speaker, then the Powerful, then the Generous, and last of them, the Equitable. It is the Lord of ranks and it is the last of the stages of existence. The remaining names are under the authority of those Imam-Lords.

(The Imams of the Divine Names)

That is was the reason that those Names turned the rest of the Names with their realities to the name Allah in bringing the universe into existence. In view of the fact that the Imams of the names, without considering the universe, are only these four - the Living, the Speaking, the Hearing and the Seeing - when Allah hears His words and sees His essence, His existence is perfect in His essence without regard for the universe. We only mean the names by which the existence of the universe was established. We have many names, so we turned to their lords and came to them in their presences and only found those which we mentioned. We presented them according to what we saw of them. So this was the reason that the lords of the names turned the rest of the names to the name Allah when our sources were brought into existence.

The first who undertook to demand this universe was the Divine Name, the Manager (*al-Mudabbir*) and the Divine Name, the Divider (*al-Mufasssil*) at the request of the name, the King. Then these two names turned to the thing from which the example (*mithal*) exists in the universe itself without it being from prior non-existence, but rather a prior rank, not a prior existence - like the rising of the sun preceding the beginning of the day. Even if we connect the beginning of the day to the rising of the sun, it is still clear that the cause of the existence of the day is the rising of the sun which accompanies it in existence. This is how the matter is.

Then these two Divine Names managed the universe and divided it without previous ignorance of it or lack of knowledge. So the form of the model grew in the universe itself. Then His name, the Knowing, was connected to that model as it was connected to the form from which it was taken, even if it is not seen because it does not exist as will be mentioned in the chapter. "From what did the universe exist?"

(The first of the names of the universe)

The first of the names of the universe are these two Divine Names: the Manager and the Divider. The name, the Manager, is what realised the determined moment of bringing into existence. The name, the Transformer, is connected to it according to the limit on which the Manager brought it forth and managed. These two names did not do anything of the formation of this model without the participation of the rest of the names, but from behind the veil of these two names. Therefore the Imamate is proper for them, while the others were not aware of that until the form of the model (*mithal*) emerged. Then they saw in it the realities appropriate to themselves which attracted them to affect passion for them. So every name became enamoured of its reality which exists in the Model, but it could not achieve any effect in it since that is not granted by the presence in which this model manifests itself. Thus that love and passion leads them to seeking, striving and the desire to bring the form of that model into existence so that their power might appear and their existence would be valid in reality. There is nothing with a greater *himma* than a mighty one who does not find someone mighty to dominate and abase under his force so that the authority of its might will be valid - or a rich one who does not find someone who needs his wealth! It is the same with all these names. So the rest of the names sought refuge in their Lords, the Seven Imams which we mentioned, asking them to bring the source of this model which they saw in the essence of the one who knew into existence. This is what is designated as the universe.

(The Divine Names are unified in respect of the Essence, separate in respect of connections)

Somone might ask: "O realised one! How can the rest of the Divine Names see this model when the fact is that only the name, the Seeing, sees it and every Divine Name has a reality which another name does not have?" We would reply: May Allah give you success! You should know that every Divine Name contains all the Divine Names and every name is described by all the names on its horizon. Every Name is living, powerful, hearing, seeing, speaking in its horizon and in its knowledge. If not, how could every Divine Name be a lord to the one who serves it? How preposterous! How far from the mark!

However, there is a subtle indication which one is not aware of. That is that you know absolutely that

every grain of wheat or its like contains realities which its sister does not, just as you also know that this seed is not the same as that other seed, even though they both contain similar realities and so are alike. So seek this reality which makes you differentiate between these two seeds and say, "This is not the same as that." This holds true for all similar things in respect of what the resemblance is. It is the same with the Divine Names: every name contains the realities which the names contain. Then you know absolutely that this name is not that other name by that subtle quality (*latifa*) which you used to differentiate between the grains of wheat and everything which is similar. So seek this meaning until you recognise it by *dhikr*, not by reflection.

However, I want to acquaint you with a reality which no one before has mentioned. Perhaps it has not been disclosed or specified and I do not know whether it will be given to anyone after me or not from the presence which gave it to me. If it is read or understood in my book, I am the one who teaches it while the earlier ones did not discover it. That is that every Divine Name, as we stated, contains the realities of the the names while this *latifa* exists which gives you this distinction between two similar things. With the name the Blessor and the name the Punisher which are the Outward and the Inward, each of these names contains what its custodians contain, from their first to their last. However the Lords of the Names and other names have three ranks. Some are connected to the degrees of the Lords of the Names, and some of them have a degree on their own, and some of them are connected to the degree of the Blessor and some of them to the degree of the Punisher. These are the names of the universe which are enumerated, and Allah is the Helper!

(The Greatest Name of Allah)

Then all the names referred back to those Imams and the Imams referred back to the name of Allah and the name of Allah referred back to the Essence since it is independent of the names, and asked for assistance in what the Names had asked it for. So "The Good, the Generous" granted that and said, "Speak to the Imams connected to bringing the universe forth according to what their realities." The name Allah went out to them and told them the news and they became happy, joyful and delighted and they are still like that. They looked at the presence which is mentioned in Chapter Six and brought the universe into existence as we will mention in the following chapters, Allah willing. *"Allah speaks the truth and guides to the path."* (33:4)

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CHAPTER SIX

Concerning the beginning of the spiritual creation.

Who was the first to exist in it? From what did it exist? In what did it exist?

In what manner did it exist? What was its goal?

Concerning the spheres of the Macrocosm and the Microcosm

Look at this well-planned existence.

Our existence is like the designated cloak.

Look at His khalifs in their kingdom,

those who have the clear eloquent tongue (Arabic) and non-Arab tongues.

None of them loves his God without mixing it with love of the dirham.

It is said: This is the slave of gnosis

and this is the slave of the gardens and those are the slaves of Jahannam

Except for a few among a few who are intoxicated with Him

without the sensation of illusion.

They are the slaves of Allah whom none know but Him,

not the slaves of bliss.

He lets them profit from every obscure knowledge

when He wants them to return to their castles.

The knowledge of the antecedant is in the elements alone,

and its basis from it is not decreased.

The reality of the adverb is that which veils it from its likes,

and this likeness is not concealed

And the knowledge of the cause by which the source of

the worlds exists in the oldest species

And the end of the matter which has no end perceived for it

in it is the Mightiest Mighty One.

The knowledges of the spheres of existence, large and small,

are only for the one who does not find fault.

These are the knowledges of the one who has realised their unveiling,
and it guides the hearts to the straightest path.

Praise belongs to Allah who has all its knowledges
and knows what is not known.

Brief Elucidation

The beginning of creation was fine dust, and the first existent in it is the Muhammadan reality of the *Rahman*. It is not contained in any place since it is not contained. From what did the world come into existence? It came into existence from the known reality which is described by neither existence nor non-existence. In what did it exist? It existed in fine dust. In what manner did it exist? It existed on the form known in the self of the Real. Why did it exist? It existed in order to manifest divine realities. What was its goal? Its goal was to be purified of mixture, so that every world would recognise its portion from its origin without mixture. So the goal of the world is to manifest its realities [i.e. the realities of the Real or the realities of creation], and recognition of the spheres of the Macrocosm from the world. In the usage of the [Sufi] community, it is whatever is other than man. The Microcosm, i.e. man, is the spirit, cause and reason for the world. The spheres of the world are its stations, movements and the separation of its classes. This is a summary of all that the chapter contains.

(Man is the Microcosm)

As man is the Microcosm by way of the body, so he is also inconsiderable due to his being in-time. Resembling the divine is valid for him since he is the khalif of Allah in the world and the world is subject to him, a vassal of the divine as man is a vassal of the divine.

Know that the most perfect formation of man is in this world. In the Next world, each man is in one of two parties based on equity in the state, not in knowledge. Each party knows its opposite state. So man is either believer or unbeliever. It is either happiness or misery, bliss or punishment, blessed or punished. Thus the recognition of this world is more complete although the manifestation (*tajalli*) of the Next world is more sublime. So understand! Open this lock! In this station, we have a symbol for whoever is clever and it is an ugly and disgusting expression whose meaning is beautiful and unprecedented:

The spirit of the Macrocosm is this Microcosm

The spirit of the great existence is this small existence.

If it had not been for that, He would not have said,
"I am the great, the powerful.

"My in-timeness should not veil you nor my annihilation nor rising.
"If you reflect on Me, I am the Encompassing, the Great,

"My existence belongs to the ancient, and the new has manifestation."
Allah is Unique, Out-of-time. Deficiency does not touch Him.

Phenomenal being is a new creation which is captive in His hands.

From this it came that I am inconsiderable existence,
And every existence revolves around my existence.

There is no night like my night and no light like my light.
So if someone speaks of me as a slave, I am the poor slave.

Or if he says that I am existence, then I am Aware Existence.

Proclaim a kingdom for me and you will find me or the rabble,
as long as you do not encroach.

O you ignorant of My power! Are you knowing, seeing?

My existence reports about me, although speech can be both truth and lie.

Say to my your people: I am the Compassionate, the Forgiving.

Say: My punishment is the destroying punishment.

Say: I am weak, incapable, a captive.
So how can a person be blessed or destroyed by my hand?

**The expansion and explanation of the chapter.
From Allah comes support and help.
(Four known things of existence)**

Know that known things are four: The Real, who is described with absolute existence because He is neither caused by anything nor the cause of anything. He is the Creator of causes and exists by His Essence from own His Essence. Knowledge of Him refers to knowledge of His existence, and His existence is not other than His essence. However, His Essence is not known, but the attributes ascribed to Him are known. This means the attributes of meanings, which are the attributes of perfection. Knowledge of the reality of the Essence is impossible since it is not known by either proof or logical demonstration and is untouched by definition. Allah is not like anything and nothing is like Him. So how can the one who is like things be like the One who resembles nothing and nothing resembles Him? Gnosis of Him is that "*there is nothing like Him*" (42:10) and "*Allah cautions you about Himself*".(3:27) The *Shari'a* includes the prohibition against reflection about the Essence of Allah.

(The reality of realities)

The second known is the universal reality which belongs to the Real and to the universe, which is not described as existent or non-existent, in-time or out-of-time. It is out-of-time when the out-of-time is described by it, and in-time when the in-time is described by it. In-time and out-of-time known things are not known until this reality is known, but this reality does not exist until the things described by it exist. If something exists without prior non-existence, like the existence of the Real and His attributes, it is said that it is an out-of-time existent since Allah is described by it. If something exists from non-existence like the existence of what is other than Allah, which is in-time and exists by other than itself, it is said that it is in-time. It is in every existent according to its universal reality. It does not accept division, so "each" and "some" do not apply to it. One does not attain to its gnosis free of form by either proof or demonstration. The world exists from this reality by means of the Real. This reality does not exist in its essence, so Allah brings us into existence from an out-of-time existent. Thus out-of-timeness is established for us.

Similarly you should know that this universal reality is not described as being before the world nor is the world described as being after it. Rather, it is the root of existent things in general. It is the source of the substance (*jawhar*), the sphere of life, the truth by which creation takes places [See Qur'an 15:85] and other things. It is the intelligible Encompassing Sphere. If you said that it is the world, you would be speaking the truth. If you said that it is not the world, you would be speaking the truth. If you said that it is the Truth or not the Truth, you would be speaking the truth. It accepts all of this. It multiplies with the multiplicity of persons of the world and is disconnected with the disconnection of the Real.

If you want an example to make it easy for you to understand, look at the woodness in a piece of wood, the chair, the inkwell, the minbar and the box. Look as well at squareness and similar things in forms in every sort of square like the room, box, and piece of paper. Squareness and woodness are by their reality in each of these individual items [without multiplicity or being in part]. Look also at the colours: the whiteness of the garment, jewel, paper, flour, ointment, etc, without the intelligible whiteness in the garment being described as being part of the garment in itself. Rather it is the reality of whiteness which appeared in the garment as it appeared in the paper. It is like that with knowledge, power, will, hearing, sight and all things. This will make this universal known clear to you. We spoke at length on it in our book entitled, *Insha' al-Jadawil w ad-Dawa'ir*.

There is a third known, which is the entire world: angels and spheres and the worlds that they contain, the air and the earth and the world that is between them. It is the Greater Kingdom. Finally there is the fourth known which is man, the Khalif appointed by Allah in this world which is subject to him. Allah said, "*He has subjected to you whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth, all together, from Him.*" (45:12)

Whoever knows these known things, has no other known which he seeks. Among these four knowns is that whose existence is only known - the Real, may He be exalted! His actions and attributes are known by making examples. Some of them are only known by the model (*mithal*) - like knowledge of the Universal Reality. Some of them are known by both aspects, and by whatness (*mahiyya*) and how-ness: the world and man.

Section

(The beginning of the world and its model: dust and the Muhammadan reality)

"Allah was and nothing was with Him." (al-Bukhari) Then he added to this *hadith*, "He is now as He was." No quality which He did not already have refers to Him from the fact that He brought the world into existence. He described Himself before His creation and was named with the Names by which His creation calls upon Him. When He wanted the world to exist and began it according to the limit He knew by His knowledge of Himself, it was effected from that pure will by a sort of prescencing (*tajalli*) from the manifestations of disconnection (*tanzih*) to the Universal Reality. A reality was effected from it called dust or nebula (*haba'*) which like the gypsum the builder casts down in which he can open whatever shapes and forms he wishes. This was the first existent in the universe which was mentioned by 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, Sahl ibn ÔAbdullah at-Tustari and others among the people of realization, the people of unveiling and existence.

Then Allah manifested Himself by His light to that dust. The philosophers call it the primal whole (*al-Hayula al-Kull*). It contains the entire universe by potentiality and by competence. So every thing accepted from Him in that dust according to its potential and predisposition, as the corners of the room accept the light of the lamp, and the intensity of its illumination and acceptance is according to its nearness to that light. Allah said, "*The likeness of His light is as a niche wherein is a lamp.*" (24:35) He makes His light like a lamp. So there was nothing nearer to accepting it in that dust except the reality of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, which is called the Intellect. So it was the master of the entire universe and the first thing to appear in existence. Its existence came from that Divine Light and from the dust and from the Universal Reality. His source existed in the dust. The source of the universe came from his prescencing (*tajalli*). The closest of people to him was ÔAli ibn Abi Talib, and the secrets of the Prophets.

As for the model (*mithal*) on which the entire universe existed without separation, it is the knowledge dependent on the Real. Allah knows us by His knowledge of Himself and brought us into existence according to what He taught us. We have this specific form in His knowledge. If the matter had not been

like that, this form would have come to us by accident, not intention, because He would not have known it. It is not possible that a form issue into existence by accident. If it had not been that this specific form is known by Allah and willed by Him, He would not have brought us into existence on it, and this form could not have been taken from any other since it is confirmed that Allah "was and nothing was with Him". So there only remain the forms He brings out in Himself. He knows it Himself. He knew us before time, not after non-existence. That is how His knowledge of us is. Our model, which is the same as His knowledge of us, is out-of-time with the out-of-timeness of Allah because it is an attribute of His, and in-timeness does not concern Him. He is too majestic for that!

(The goal of the universe)

As for our statement, "Why was the universe brought into existence? What is its goal?" the answer is that Allah says, *"I only created men and jinn to worship Me."* (51:56) He made a clear statement about the reason for which He brought us into existence. It is the same with the entire universe while Allah mentioned us and the jinn in particular. Here the jinn is every hidden thing, be it angel or something else. Allah said about the heavens and the earth, *"Come willingly or unwillingly! They said, 'We come willingly.'"* (41:11) He also said, *"But they refused to carry it."* (33:72). That is because it was a offer. If it had been a command, they would have obeyed and carried it since it is inconceivable that they rebel. They were created for that [obedience], but the fiery jinn and men were not so endowed.

(All the universe is alive and articulate)

Similarly there are philosophers among the people of investigation and proofs who are confined to the senses, necessities and proofs, who say that the obligated person must have intellect in respect of understanding what is said to him. They spoke the truth. The matter is like that with us since the entire universe is intelligent, living, and articulate. This is confirmed in respect of unveiling by the breaking of norms (miracles) which people have, i.e. our obtaining knowledge of this. However they say, "This is an unintelligible inanimate object." They stopped at what their eyes told them. According to us, the matter is different from that.

When it is reported from a Prophet that a stone spoke, or a sheep-shoulder or the trunk of a tree or a beast, they say that Allah created life and knowledge in it at that moment. [\[1\]](#) That is not what we consider the matter to be. It is the secret of life which flows through the entire universe and all "who hear the *mu'adhdhan*, moist or dry, will testify for him" [Ibn Majah, Nasa'i, Abu Dawud] and it only testifies from knowledge. This is confirmed by unveiling with us, not by the deduction of whoever looks into what the apparent information indicates and no more. Whoever wants to grasp it should travel the path of the Men and cling to retreat and *dhikr*. Then Allah will acquaint him with all of this directly. So he will know that people are blind to the perception of these realities.

(The existence of the universe is the manifestation of the Power of the Names)

Allah brought the universe into existence in order to manifest the power of the Names. Power without

the object of power, generosity without gift, provider without provided for, helper without helped, merciful without object of mercy are realities devoid of effect. Allah made the universe in this world a mixture as He mixed the two handfuls in the clay. Then He separated individuals from it and made one handful enter into the other handful. Each handful is mixed with its brother, but the states are unknown. Scholars vary in excellence in extracting the foul from the good and the good from the foul. The goal is purification from this mixture and the distinguishing the two handfuls until this one is alone with its world and that one is alone with its world. It is as Allah said, *"until He shall distinguish the corrupt from the good. He will put some of the corrupt on others, and so He will pile it up altogether and put it in Jahannam."* (8:37)

Whoever has some of that mixture remaining in him when he dies is not gathered on the Day of Rising among the trusty. [See Qur'an 15:46; 34:37; 41:40; 44:55, but esp. 27:89.] However, some people are freed of this mixture in the Reckoning, and some are only freed in *Jahannam*. When he is purified, he comes out. They are the people of intercession. As for the one who is distinguished into one of the two handfuls here, he moves by a reality to the Next World from his grave to bliss, or to punishment and *Jahim*. He is already purified.

This is the clarification of the goal of the world. These two handfuls are two realities which refer back to an attribute which the Real has in His Essence (like the two feet). From here we say that the people of the Fire see Him as Punishing and the people of the Garden see Him as Blessing. This is a noble secret. Perhaps you will grasp it in the Next Abode by witnessing, Allah willing. Those of realisation obtain it in this world.

(The celestial and terrestrial knowledges and their likes in man)

As for what we said in this chapter concerning the spheres of the Macrocosm and the Microcosm which is man, by it I mean the worlds of its totalities and genera. Its amirs are those who have effect on others. I have made the spheres of the Macrocosm and the Microcosm reciprocal. This one is a copy of that one. We gave them orbits in the forms of the spheres and their order in the book, *Insha' ad-Dawa'ir wa'l-Jawadil* which we began to write in Tunis in the house of Imam Abu Muhammad ÔAbdu'l-'Aziz (al-Mahdawi al-Qurashi) [2], our friend and guardian, may Allah have mercy on him! In this chapter we have put a summary of what is connected to it.

We say that the worlds are four: the celestial world, which is the world of going-on; then the world of change, which is the world of annihilation; then the world of habitation which is the world of going-on and annihilation; and then there is the world of ascriptions. These worlds are in two places: in the Macrocosm, which is what is outside of man, and in the Microcosm, which is man.

The highest world is the Muhammadan Reality. Its sphere is life. It has an equivalent in man in the *latifa* and the Pure *Ruh*. It includes the Encompassing Throne whose equivalent in man is the body. There is also the Footstool, whose equivalent in man is the self. There is also the Inhabited House whose equivalent in man is the heart. There are also the angels whose equivalent in man are the spirits and

capacities in him. There is also Saturn and its sphere, whose equivalent in man is the faculty of knowledge and the breath. There is Jupiter and its sphere whose equivalent in man is the faculty of memory and rear part of the brain. There is also Mars and its sphere whose equivalent in man is the faculty of intellect and the crown of the head. There is the Sun and its sphere whose equivalent is the faculty of reflection and the middle of the brain. There is Venus and its sphere whose equivalent in man is the faculty of illusory imagination (imagination) and the animal spirit. There is Mercury and its sphere and its equivalent in man is the faculty of the imagination (*khayal*) and the front of the brain. Then there is the moon and its sphere whose equivalent is the sensory faculty and the limbs which have sensation. These are the classes of the upper world and their equivalents in man.

The world of change includes the orb of the ether whose spirit is hot and dry. It is the orb of fire and its equivalent in man is yellow bile whose spirit is the power of digestion. It includes the air whose spirit is hot and wet and is equivalent to the blood. Its spirit is the faculty of attraction. It includes water whose spirit is cold and wet and whose equivalent is phlegm. Its spirit is the faculty of expulsion. It includes earth whose spirit is cold and dry and whose equivalent is black bile. Its spirit is the faculty of retention.

There are seven classes of the earth: black earth, dusty earth, red earth, yellow earth, white earth, blue earth and green earth. The equivalents of these seven in man's body are: skin, fat, flesh, veins, nerves, muscles and bones.

The world of inhabitation includes the *Ruhaniyyun* whose equivalents are the faculties in man. It includes the world of animal whose equivalent is what is sensed in man. It includes the world of plants whose equivalent is whatever grows in man. It also includes the world of inanimates whose equivalent is what is not sensed in man.

The world of ascriptions includes the non-essential (*aÔrad*) whose equivalent is black and white, colours and beings (*akwan*). Then there is "how" whose equivalent is states like healthy and ill. Then there is "How many" whose equivalent is "the thigh is longer than the forearm". Then there is "where" whose equivalent is the neck as a place for the head and the lerg as a place for the thigh. Then there is "time" whose equivalent is "I move my head at the moment when my hand moves." Then there is the relative (*idafa*) whose equivalent is, "This is my father, so I am his son." There is place whose equivalent is "my language and my dialect." There is the active verb whose equivalent is "I ate". There is the passive verb whose equivalent is "I became full." Some of them have different forms in the matrices [the other three] like elephants, donkeys, lions and cockroaches. The equivalent of this is the human capacity which accepts forms of meanings which are both blameworthy and praiseworthy. "This one is clever so he is an elephant. That one is stupid so he is a donkey. This one is brave so he is a lion. This one is a coward so he is cockroach."

"Allah speaks the truth and guides to the path." (33:4)

1. Referring to specific *hadiths* from the Prophet.

2. A disciple of Abu Madyan who died in 621 AH.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

The Beginning of Human Bodies (The last thing to come into existence in the Macrocosm and the last class of products)

The reality of the inward of man grew
into a strong kingdom with manifest power.

Then his essence sat on the throne of Adam
as the Throne was sat on by the Merciful.

The reality of his body appeared in its source-form,
and the kingdom of the second existence is completed by it.

The gnoses of his knowledge appeared in his articulation
among the noble and the hateful.

So their dreams became paltry because of his knowledges,
and the accursed shaytan became proud.

They sought nearness to Allah in His *Malakut*,
but a little shaytan brought loss to them.

(Making the natural world inhabited)

Know –may Allah support you! – that the time of the habitation of the natural world which is limited by time and contained in place is 71,000 of the years known in this world. This length of time is 11 days of days of other names, and one and two-fifths days of the days of the Possessor of Ascents. There are different sorts of days. Allah says, "*In a day whose measure was 50,000 years*" (4:70) and "*a day with your Lord is like 1000 years of your counting.*" (22:47) The smallest of the days is that which is measured by the movement of the encompassing sphere which appears in our day of 24 hours. The smallest of the days with the Arabs, which is this, belongs to the largest sphere. That is due to its influence on the spheres inside of it since the movement of what is below it in night and day its surface movement which forces the rest of the spheres which it encompasses.

(The natural and surface movement of the spheres)

Every sphere has a natural movement which it has along with the surface movement. Every sphere below it has two movements in the same movement: a natural movement and a surface movement.

Every natural movement in every sphere has a particular day whose measure is counted by the days occurring from the Encompassing Sphere which is designated in His words, *"of your counting"*. All of them intersect the Encompassing Sphere. Whenever it intersects it completely, its day belongs to it and the orbit revolves. So the smallest of its days is 28 days *"of your counting"*. It is the measure of the intersection of the moon's movement in the Encompassing Sphere.

Allah set up these seven planets in the heavens so that human sight might perceive the intersection of their spheres in the Encompassing Sphere *"in order to know the number of years and the reckoning."* (10:5) *"He determined it by stations so that you might know the number of years and the reckoning."* "We shall distinguish everything." (17:11) *"That is the determination of the Mighty, the Knowing."* (6:96) Every planet has a determined day by which they are distinguished from each other according to the speed of their natural movements or the smallness or largeness of their spheres.

(The Creation of the Pen and the Tablet)

Know that Allah then created the Pen and the Tablet and called them the Intellect and the Spirit (*Ruh*). He gave the *Ruh* two attributes: an attribute of knowledge and an attribute of action. He made the Intellect teach it and inform it with use of immediate witnessing, as it derives cutting from the form of the knife without it saying anything about that. Allah created a substance (*jawhar*) without a self which is the aforementioned Spirit which He called dust. This is the naming which has come down to us from 'Ali ibn Abi Talib.

(Creation of dust (*haba'*))

Dust is mentioned in the Arabic language. Allah said, *"it was scattered dust"*. (56:6) It was like that when 'Ali ibn Abi Talib saw it, meaning that this substance is scattered in all natural forms, and there is no form free of it since the form only exists in this substance called dust. It is with every form by its reality. It is not divisible nor separated nor described with decrease. It is like the whiteness existing in every white thing by its essence and reality. It is not said that there is a decrease of whiteness according to what this white thing receives of whiteness. This resembles the state of this substance.

(The Four ranks between the Spirit and Dust)

Allah apportioned four ranks between this Spirit described with the two attributes and the dust. He made each rank a stage for four angels. He appointed these angels as guardians over what He originated of the world below them, from the *'Illiyun'* to the *"lowest of the low"*. He gave each of those angels a knowledge which he wants to carry out in the world.

The first thing that Allah brought into existence in source-forms which is connected to the knowledge and management of these angels is the Universal Body. The first shape which Allah opened in this body is the global spherical form since it is the best of forms. Then Allah descended by bringing-into-existence and creation to the completion of the manufacture, and made all that He created the domain of

these angels. He entrusted them with its affairs in this world and the Next World and safeguarded them from opposing what He commanded them to do. He told us that they *"do not disobey Allah in what He commands them and they do what they are commanded."* (66:6)

(The creation of products (*muwalladat*))

Then He finished the creation of the products of inanimates, plants and animals at the end of 71,000 years of the years of this world which you count and ordered the world in a wise ordering. From the very first existent to the last product, which is animal, He did not use both His hands in the creation of anything except man. Man is this bodily organism of dust. Everything except for that He created from a Divine command or by one hand. Allah said, *"Our word to a thing when We will it is that We say to it, 'Be!' and it is."* (16:40) This is from a Divine command. It is reported in tradition that Allah created the Garden of Eden with His hand, wrote the Torah with His hand, planted the tree of *Tuba* [in Paradise] with His hand and created Adam, who is man, with both His hands. In order to show honour to Adam, Allah said to Iblis, *"What prevented you from prostrating to what I created with My hands?"* (38:75)

(The Lowest Sphere and the Twelve Constellations (*al-Buruj*: the Zodiac))

When Allah created the lowest sphere, which is the first one mentioned above, He divided it into twelve parts called "mansions (constellations)". Allah said, *"and the heaven with constellations"*. (85:1) Each division has a constellation and those divisions have four natures. He repeated each of the four natures in three places. He made these divisions like the stages and watering-spots where the travellers alight and in which the voyagers travel while they are travelling and journeying so these stages are arrived at in the journey of the planets through them. What Allah originated in this sphere of the planets whose course passes through these constellations was in order that Allah, through their intersection and journey, Allah might originate what He wishes of the natural and elemental world. He made them waymarks of the effect of the movement of the sphere of constellations, so know that!

(Natures and the four elements)

The nature of one division of these four is hot and dry; the second is cold and dry; the third is hot and wet; and the fourth is cold and wet. He made the fifth and ninth divisions like the first, the sixth and tenth like the second, the seventh and eleventh like the third, and the eighth and twelfth like the fourth in nature. So Allah contained natural bodies by difference, and elemental bodies without difference, in these four which are: hot, cold, dry and wet. Even though they are four matrices, Allah made two of them the basis for the existence of the other two. Heat produces dryness and cold produces wetness. So wetness and dryness exist from the two causes of heat and cold. This was mentioned by Allah when He said, *"There is no fresh (wet) or withered (dry), but it is in a Clear Book"* (6:59) because the caused, inasmuch as it is caused, must have the existence of a cause, or if it is an effect, then it must have a cause, however you want to put it. The existence of a cause does not necessitate the existence of

something caused.

(The Starless Heaven (*al-Falak al-Atlas*))

When Allah created this first sphere, it revolved with an orbit whose end is only known by Allah because there were no limited bodies above it to intersect it. It was the first of diaphanous bodies. Movements were numbered and made distinct. Allah did not create anything inside of it. Then movements became distinct and ended at the one who is inside of it. If it has not been so, the movements in it would not have been distinct at all because there is no planet in the Starless Sphere, and it resembles itself. So the measure of one movement in it is neither known nor determined. If there had been part of it in it different from the rest of the parts, then without a doubt its movements would have been numbered by it. But Allah knew its measure and its end and its repetition. The day occurred from that movement. There was neither night nor day in that 'day'.

Then the motions of this sphere continued and Allah created 35 angels in addition to the 16 angels we mentioned. So the sum was 411 angels. These angels included Jibril, Mikail, Israfil and 'Azra'il. Then He created 974 angels and added them to the angels already mentioned. He revealed to them and commanded them regarding that they had in His creation. They said, *"We do not come down, save at the command of your Lord. To Him belongs all that is before us and all that is behind us, and all between that. And your Lord is never forgetful."* (19:64) Allah said of them, *"They do not disobey Allah in what He commands them."* (66:6) These are among the angels who are the guardians in particular. Allah created the angels who are the inhabitants of the heavens and the earth to worship Him. There is no place in the heaven or the earth that does not have an angel in it. Allah continues to create angels from the breaths of the world as long as they continue to breathe.

(Creation of the Nearest Abode)

When the movements of this sphere, whose duration is 54,000 years of your counting, was complete, Allah created this world and appointed for it a known term at which it will end and its form will come to an end. It will be changed from being an abode for us and accepting a particular form, which is what we see today, to "the earth changing to other than the earth, and the heavens as well." When 63,000 years of your counting were complete of the movements of this sphere, Allah created the Next World: the Garden and the Fire which Allah has prepared for His slaves, both the happy and the wretched. There were 9000 years of your counting between the creation of this world and the creation of the Next World. That is why it is called the *"the Next"*, since its creation was delayed until after the creation of this world which is called the first" because it was created before it. Allah said, *"The Next will be better for you than the first."* (97:4) He addressed His Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and did not give the Next World a term at which it will cease to be. It has constant going-on.

(The ceiling of the Garden is the Starless Heaven)

Allah made this sphere the ceiling of the Garden. We call it the Throne whose movement is not specific nor distinct. It has a continuous, unending movement. None of creation which we mentioned was created without the second goal of it attaching itself to the existence of man who is the Viceregent in the world. I said "the second goal" since the first goal of creation is to recognise Allah and worship Him since it was this for which the entire universe was created. There is nothing but that it glorifies His praise. The meaning of the second goal and the first is the connection of the will, not the in-timeness of the will, because the will of Allah is an out-of-time pre-temporal attribute by which His essence is described as is the case with all of His attributes.

(The movement of the heavens and the movement of the earth)

Then Allah created these spheres and heavens, and inspired every heaven with its command and ordered their lights and lamps in them and filled them with angels and caused them to move. So they moved out of obedience to Allah, coming to Him, seeking perfection in the slaveness proper to them, because Allah summoned the heaven and the earth and said to them, *"Come willingly or unwillingly"* by a command defined for them. They said, *"We come willingly."* So they are constantly coming and continue to move, even though the movement of the earth is hidden from us. It moves around the centre because it turns. As for the heaven, it came willingly when Allah commanded it to come. The earth came willingly when it knew itself to be compelled and that Allah must bring it when He said "or unwillingly". That is what was meant when He said "or unwillingly". It came willingly unwillingly! *"He established them as seven heavens in two days, and He inspired each heaven with its command."* (41:12)

(The creation of the earth and the determination of its foods)

Allah created the earth and determined its foods in it in respect of its products. He meant it a treasury for their foods. We already mentioned the organisation of the formation of the world in the book, *al-'Aql al-Mustawfir*. Part of the determination of its foods is the existence of water, air and fire, as well as what it contains of vapours, clouds, lightning, thunder, and celestial effects. *"That is the determination of the Mighty, the Knowing."* (6:96) He created the jinn from fire and the birds, reptiles of land and sea, and insects from the decay of the earth so that the air would be pure for us, free of the vapours of decay which, if mixed with the air in which Allah entrusted life and well-being for man and animals, would have made him sick, weak and ailing. So Allah purified the atmosphere for him as a kindness on His part when He formed these creatures from decayed things. So there were few illnesses and diseases.

(The creation of man)

And then the Kingdom was settled and prepared and none of these creatures knew from what sort this Viceregent would be for whose existence Allah had prepared this kingdom. When the specified time in His knowledge came to bring this Viceregent into existence 17,000 years after this world had been populated and 8000 years after the Next world, which has no end, was populated, Allah commanded some of the angels to bring Him a handful of every kind of dust of the earth. There is a long tradition

about the angels bringing this to him which is well-known among people. Allah took it and kneaded it with His hands. This is His words, *"what I created with My hands."* (38:75)

Allah entrusted each of the angels which we have mentioned with a trust for Adam. He said, *"I am creating a man from clay".*(38:71). These trusts which you have belong to him. When I have created him, each of you give him what you have which I have entrusted you with for him. *'When I have fashioned him and breathed My spirit into him, then prostrate yourselves to him.'* (15:29)" Then Allah kneaded the clay of Adam with His hands until he altered its smell which had been fetid mud. That is the part which is air in the structure. He made its outward part the place for the wretched and the happy of his progeny. He entrusted in in what was in His hands. Allah tells us that the happy are in His right hand and the wretched are in His left hand. "Both hands of My Lord are blessed right hands." He said, "Those are for the Garden and do the deeds of the people of the Garden. Those are for the Fire and do the deeds of the people of the Fire."

He entrusted the whole in the clay of Adam and joined the opposites in him by the principle of proximity. He formed him on the straight movement, and that is in the domain of Virgo. He made the six directions for him: above, which is beyond his head, below opposite it, which is below his feet, right, which follows his strong side, and left opposite it, which follows his weak side, in front, which is before his face, and behind opposite it, which is behind his neck. He formed, balanced and shaped him. Then He breathed into Him of His spirit which is related to Him. When He breathed into it, the four humours were originated as it spread into all his parts. They are: yellow bile, black bile, blood and phlegm.

Yellow bile is from the element of fire from which Allah formed him when He said, *"from a clay like the potters."* (55:14) Black bile is from earth which is His words, *"He created him from earth."* (15:26). Blood is from air, and it is His word, *"fetid mud"*. Phlegm is from water with which earth is kneaded and becomes mud. Then Allah originated in the power of attraction by which the animal attracts food, then the power of grasping by which the animal holds what will nourish it, then the power of digestion by which food is digested, and then the expelling power by which he expels excretions from himself - sweat, vapour, wind, excrement, etc.

As for the spread of the vapours and the division of the blood in the veins from the liver and every part of the animal, that is by the power of attraction, not by the power of expelling. The portion of the power of expelling is only what it expels, as we said, of excreta. Then Allah originated in it the powers of feeding, growing, senses, imagination, illusion, retention and memory. All this is in man inasmuch as he is an animal, not inasmuch as he is man except for these four powers: the powers of imagination, illusion, retention and memory. They are stronger in man than animal.

Then He bestowed on man the faculty of conception, thought and intellect, and so he is distinct from the animal. He put all these powers in the body as tools for the Articulate Self to reach all the benefits of the senses and meanings. *"Then He formed it with another creation"* (23:14) which is humanity. He made him perceptive by these powers, and he is living, knowing, capable, willing, speaking, hearing, and seeing according to a known limit in his acquisition. *"Blessed is Allah, the Best of Creators."* (23:14)

Then Allah did not name Himself with any of the names without putting some of the character of that name into man as a portion from Him which is manifest in the world according to what is proper to him. For that reason, some people interpret the words of the Prophet, "Allah created man in His form" to have this meaning. He sent him down as a Viceregent for Him in His earth since the earth is part of the world of change and alteration, as opposed to the Higher World. Judgements occurred among the inhabitants of the earthly world according to the change which occurs in the celestial world. Thus the principle of all the divine names appeared. Thus Adam is the Viceregent in the earth rather than heaven and the Garden. There whatever He commanded was: the knowledge of the Names, the prostration of the angels, and the refusal of Iblis as will be all mentioned in its proper place, Allah willing.

(Human bodies and types)

This chapter is devoted to the beginning of human bodies. They are of four types: the body of Adam, the body of Eve, the body of Jesus and the bodies of the children of Adam. Each of these bodies has a formation different from the formation of the other bodies in causality, in spite of the common physical and spiritual form. We said this, and spoke on it in order that the weak intellect might not imagine that divine power or realities do not great that this human organism be from only one cause whose essence grants this formation. Allah refutes this doubt as this human formation appeared in Adam in a way in which it did not appear in the body of Eve; the body of Eve appeared by a means by which the body of Adam did not appear; and the body of the children of Adam appeared by a means by which the body of Jesus did not appear. Each of these are called men by definition and reality. That is so that it be known that Allah has knowledge of everything and that He has the power to do anything.

Then Allah joined together these four types of creation in an *ayat* of the Qur'an in the *Surat al-Hujurat*. (49:13) He said, "*O People, We have created you*" meaning Adam "*from male*" meaning Hawwa' "*and from female*" meaning Jesus, and joined "*from male and female*" meaning by means of marriage and birth. This *ayat* is part of "all the words" and "distinction of speech" which was given to Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

(The body of Adam and the body of Eve (Hawwa'))

Then the body of Adam appeared as we mentioned, and he had no appetite for marriage. Allah already knew to bring birth, procreation and marriage into existence in this abode. Marriage in this abode is for the continuation of the species. Then He brought out Eve from the smallest rib of Adam. For that reason, woman has a lesser degree than man as Allah said, "*men have a degree over them*". (2:228) So women never overtake them. Eve had the bentness which is in the ribs so that by that she might incline to her child and husband. The man's inclination (=tenderness) for the woman is his inclination for himself since she is a part of him. The woman inclines to the man since she was created from the rib, and the rib has curvature and inclination.

(...the love of Adam and the love of Eve)

Allah filled the place in Adam from which Eve emerged with appetite for her since there was not be a void in existence. When He filled him with passion, Adam yearned for her as he yearns for himself because she is a part of him. She yearned for him because he is her home in which she was formed. Eve's love is love of the homeland, and Adam's love is love of himself. For that reason, man's love for woman appeared since she is the same as him, and woman was given the faculty designated as modesty in love for men. She is capable of secrecy because the homeland is not joined to her as Adam is joined to her.

Allah fashioned in that rib all that He fashioned and created in the body of Adam. The formation of Adam's body in his form was like what the potter fashions from clay and baking. The formation of the body of Eve was like what the carpenter carves of forms in wood. When he carved her in the rib and set up her form, shaped and balanced it, he breathed into her of His spirit. She stood up as a living, speaking female in order to make her a place for procreation. He feels at home with her and she feels at home with him. She is a "garment for him and he is a garment for her." Allah says, *"They are a garment for you and you are a garment for them."* (2:187) Appetite diffused through all his parts and he sought her.

(The formation of the third type of body)

Then Adam covered her and cast water into her womb and by that drop of water, the blood of menstruation flowed which Allah had written for women, and in that body was formed a third body different than how the body of Adam and body of Eve had been formed. This is the third body. Allah took charge of the formation in the womb state by state by the change from water to sperm to a bloodclot to a lump of flesh to bone. Then Allah clothed the bones in flesh. When the animal growth was complete, He formed another creature and so breathed the human spirit into it. *"Blessed is Allah, the best of creators."* (23:14)

Were it not that it would take too long, we would have explained man's formation in the womb state by state, and the guardian angels who are in charge of forming the embryo in the womb until it emerges. But we want to talk about human bodies. Although they are same in definition, reality, sensory and significative form, the reasons for their composition are different lest one imagine that that belongs to the essence of the cause. Exalted is Allah! That refers to the chosen Actor who does what He wishes when He wishes without interdiction or inability in one matter rather than another. *"There is no Allah except Him, the Mighty, the Wise."* (3:18)

(The formation of the body of Jesus)

Then the naturalists say that the water of woman does not have anything formed from it - even the embryo which is in the womb is from the man's water. Therefore we made the formation of the body of Jesus another formation, even though its regulation in the womb was the same as the regulation of the bodies of sons. The formation of the body of Jesus was from the water of the woman since the Spirit appeared to her as a man without fault, or it was from the breath without water. In any case, the body of Jesus is a fourth body with a different type of formation than the other bodies. Therefore Allah said,

"Truly, the likeness of Jesus" (2:56) i.e. the formation of Jesus, "with Allah is as Adam's likeness. He created him from dust." The pronoun refers to Adam. The likeness refers to his creation without a father, i.e. the quality of his formation is like that of Adam, even though He created Adam from dust. Then Allah said to him, "Be!"

Then Jesus, as was said, did not remain in Mary's womb the length of time that children customarily remain because he formed quicker because Allah wanted to make him a sign for people and use him to refute the naturalists when they judge nature according to what custom accord, not by the secrets and wondrous formations which Allah entrusted in it. Some of the intelligent people establish this matter as nature and said, "We only know of it what You have given us, and it contains things which we do not know."

(Man on the earth is like the intellect in the heaven)

This is why we mentioned the beginning of human bodies and the fact that there are four bodies formed differently as we confirmed and that man is the last of the products. Thus he is like the intellect and is connected to it because existence is a circle. The beginning of the circle is the existence of the First Intellect which has been reported in tradition: "The first thing that Allah created was the Intellect." It is the first of the genera. Creation ends in the human species and so the circle is complete and man is joined to the intellect, as the end of the circle is joined to its beginning. So it is a circle. Between the two ends of the circle is all the genera which Allah created in the world, between the First Intellect, which is the Pen, and man, who is the last existent.

Then lines emerge from the dot which is in the centre of the circle to the circumference which exists from it, and come out equally to each part of the circumference. It is the same with Allah's relationship to all existent things. It is the same relationship. Change does not occur at all. All things look at Him and receive from Him what He gives them as the parts of the circumference look at the dot.

Allah set up this human form by the straight movement as the form of the stick is to the tent. He made him the support of the dome of these heavens. Allah keeps them from descending because of him. So we consider man to be the tent-stick/support. When this human form is annihilated, and none of them remains breathing on the face of the earth, and the heaven is split, on that day it will fall because the support which is man has vanished.

Then habitation will move to the Next Abode since man has moved there. This world will become a ruin because he has left it. So we know absolutely that man is the source meant by Allah for the world and he is truly the Viceregent and he is the site of the manifestation of the Divine names. He brings together all the realities of the world - angel, sphere, spirit, body, nature, inanimate, and animal. This is in respect of what he alone is given of the knowledge of the Divine Names, in spite of the smallness of his size and mass. Allah said of him, *"Certainly the creation of the heavens and the earth is greater than the creation of men"* [40:57] because man was produced from the heaven and the earth, so they are like his parents. Allah elevated their value because of him, *"but most men know it not"*. (7:187) He did not mean

greatness in size, for that is known by the senses.

(The Testing of the the Greatest Man (*al-Insan al-Akbar*))

However, Allah tested man with a test which He did not use on any of His creation, either because He will make him happy or because He will make him wretched according to what He lets him use. The trial by which He tested him is that He created in him a capacity called thought (*fikr*) and made this capacity serve another faculty called intellect. He made the intellect, even though it is the master of thought, take what thought gives it. He did not give thought any scope except in the faculty of imagination. He made the faculty of imagination a place for gathering what the sensory faculties give it. He also gave it a faculty called conceptualization. So in the faculty of imagination, nothing is acquired except what the senses give it or what the conceptual faculty gives it. The substance of conceptualization comes from sensory things. It puts together forms which did not have a source, even though all its parts existed in the senses.

That is because the intellect was created guileless without any of speculative knowledges. Thought was told, "Distinguish between the true and the false which is in this imaginative faculty. Thought investigates according to what it has. He may obtain doubt and it may obtain proof without it knowing that even though it claims that it knows the forms of doubts from the proofs. It obtains knowledge while it has not regarded the shortcoming of the substance on which it relies in the acquisition of knowledges. The intellect accepts from it and judges by it. So its ignorance can be much greater than its knowledge!

Then Allah commanded this intellect to recognise Him so that it might refer to Him in it, not to something else. The intellect understood the opposite of what the Truly Real wanted from it when He said, "*Have they not considered?*" (7:184, etc.) "*To a people who reflect.*" (10:24 etc.) It relied on thought and made it an Imam to be followed and neglected what Allah had meant when He mentioned reflection. He told it to reflect so that it would see that there is no way to know Allah except by being given gnosis of Allah. Therefore the matter would be unveiled to it for what it really is. Not every intellect has this understanding - it is only the intellects selected by Allah from His Prophets and saints.

Would that I knew if they had said, "*Yes indeed*" with their thoughts when Allah made them testify against themselves [to the lordship of Allah before their creation] in the handful of the progeny of the descendants of Adam! His making them testify to that when He took them from their loins is from solicitude. However, when they reverted to taking from their reflective capacities in gnosis of Allah, they did not agree at all on even a single judgement in gnosis of Allah. Each group formed a school, and the statments about the protected divine presence multiplied. These thinkers were as bold as possible towards Allah. All of this is part of the test which we mentioned when Allah created thought in man.

The people of Allah are in need of Him in the belief in Him which He was obliged of them in His gnosis. They know that what is desired of them is that they refer to Him in that, and in every state. Some of them said, "Glory be to One who made no way to recognise Him except the inability to recognise Him!" Some said, "The inability to reach perception is perception." The Prophet, may Allah bless him

and grant him peace, said, "I cannot ennumerate Your praise!" Allah said, *"They do not encompass Him in knowledge."* (20:110) They refer to Allah in recognition of Him and abandon thought about His rank and fulfil His due. They do not put Him in what should not be thought of Him. It has been reported that it is forbidden to reflect on the Essence of Allah. Allah says, *"Allah warns you that you should beware of Him."* (3:28,30) Allah gave them the gnosis of Himself that He gave them and made them witness of His creatures and manifestations what He made them witness. So they knew that what is logically impossible by means of thought, is not impossible by divine relation. Some of that will be found in the next chapter on "The Earth created from what was left of the clay of Adam" and elsewhere.

That which the man of intellect is that he is indebted to Allah in himself got knowing that Allah has the power to do anything, possible or impossible - and not everything is impossible. He has effective power and vast of gifts. There is no repetition of His bringing into existence - rather similar things occur in a substance which He brought into existence and wishes to continue. If he had so willed, it would have been annihilated with the breaths. *"There is no Allah but Him, the Mighty, the Wise."* (3:18)

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CHAPTER NINE

The Existence of Spirits Created from Smokeless Fire (jinn)

He mixed fire and plants, so the form of the jinn was set up
as an interspace between two things

It is between a bodily spirit with a place in depth
and a spirit without "where".

That which accepts embodiment seeks for food for
nourishment without falsehood,

And that which accepts the angels, accepts the heart in
taking shape in the source.

For this reason, it obeys one moment and rebels the next.
He will repay those of them who disobey with two fires.

(Creation of the Jinn, angels and man)

Allah says, *"He created jinn from a fusion of smokeless fire."* (55:14) It is reported in sound *hadith* [saying of the Prophet], "Allah created the angels from light and Allah created the jinn from fire and He created man from what you were told." As for what the Prophet said about the creation of man "from what you were told", he was concise and did not specify it as he did in the case of the creation of the angels and the jinn. The Prophet "was given all the words". This is part of them. The basic creation of angels and jinn did not vary. The creation of man is varied as there are four categories of man's creation. The creation of Adam does not resemble the creation of Eve. The creation of Eve does not resemble the creation of the rest of the children of Adam. The creation of Jesus does not resemble the creation of the others. Here the Messenger of Allah was concise. He has transmitted to us the details of the creation of man. Adam was created from clay, Eve from a rib, 'Isa is from the blowing of a spirit, and the children of Adam from "a contemptible water". (77:20)

(The conceptual cohesion of heaven and earth)

When Allah set up the four basic elements and smoke rose to the bottom of the Sphere of Fixed Stars, the seven heavens unwound themselves in that smoke, each separate from each other. He *"revealed, in every heaven, its ordinance"* after *"He established in it its nourishment"* and all that was "in four days". Then he said *"to the heavens and the earth: Come willingly or unwillingly."* (41:9-11) i.e. they answer when they are called to produce what He wants them to produce. They said, "we come willingly."

Then Allah established a conceptual cohesion between heaven and earth and a direction by which He desires to bring into existence products in this earth in the form of minerals, plants and animals. He made the earth like the wife and the heaven like the husband. The heaven casts to earth the command of Allah in it as a man casts water into a woman in intercourse. In that casting, the earth brings forth the types of formations which Allah has hidden in its.

(The four elements and the formation of man and jinn)

When air is ignited and heated, it burns like the lamp. The burning of that fire is the flame which is the burning of the air and this is smokeless (*marj*, jumbled) because it is mixed with the air and is the burning air. *Marj* is mixture and from this the smokeless is *marj* since the plants are mixed in it.

The jinn are composed of the two elements of fire and air, as man is composed of the two elements of water and earth kneaded together which produced the name mud. Similarly the mixture of air and fire has the name 'smokeless fire'. Allah created the form of jinn in that smokeless fire. Because of the air which is in the jinn, they can assume whatever form they wish. Because of the fire which is in them, they are insubstantial and very subtle, and they seek dominance, pride and might since fire has the highest position of the elements and it has great power to change things as nature demands. That is reason why he [the jinn Iblis] was too proud to prostrate to Adam when Allah commanded him to do so, because of his own estimation of himself. He said, "*I am better than Him*" (7:12), i.e. meaning according to the basis by which Allah preferred fire among the four elements.

The jinn did not know that the power of water from which Adam was created was stronger than fire for it extinguishes it and earth is firmer than fire by cold and dryness. Adam has strength and constancy by the dominance of the two elements from which Allah derived him. Even though he also possesses the rest of the elements - air and fire, they do not have the authority in him. The jinn also have the rest of the elements...

Adam was given humility on account of the clayness of his nature. When he is proud, that is incidental (and not intrinsic to his nature). He accepts that because of the element of fire in him as his imagination and states accept different forms because of the element of air in him. The jinn are given pride by the nature of fire in them. If they are humble, that is something incidental which they accept because of the element of earth in them. They also accept fixation in enticement if they are devils and fixation in acts of obedience if they are not devils.

(The jinn when *Surat ar-Rahman* (Chapter 55 of the Qur'an) was recited

When the Prophet recited *Surat ar-Rahman* to his Companions, he said, "I was reciting it for the jinn. They listened to it better than you. When I said, '*So which of your Lord's blessings will you deny?*'" they stated, 'We do not deny any of the blessings of our Lord'. They affirmed them and did not quake when they were told, "*So which of your Lord's blessings will you deny?*" in his recitation. That is by is in the nature of the jinn of earth and of water which remove the fieriness of fire. Some of them are obedient to

Allah and some are rebellious, like us; but they can take on forms as can the angels.

(Their basic form is spiritual)

Allah has made them invisible to us so we do not see them except when Allah wishes to lift the veil for certain individuals who then see them. Since the jinn are insubstantial and subtle, they can take form in whatever sensory form they wish. Their basic form is the spiritual one which was the first form the first jinn accepted when Allah brought him into existence. Then he took on various forms according to what Allah willed. If Allah had opened our eyes so that we could see what the forms conceived by the conceptual faculty through the imagination (*khayal*), then at different times you would have seen man in various forms which are unlike one another.

(Procreation in jinn and men)

Then Allah breathed the spirit into the flame which was full of turbulence because of its insubstantiality. The blowing increased the turbulence and air dominated it and it did not remain in the same condition. The world of the jinn appeared in that form. As intercourse occurred in mankind by the casting of water in the womb and progeny and birth occurs in this mortal Adamic species, so procreation occurs in the jinn by casting air into the womb of their female, and progeny and birth occurs in the jinn. They exist by Sagittarius and it is fiery. That was mentioned by the one who arrived - may Allah preserve him!

(The years between the creation of jinn and men)

There were 60,000 years between the creation of Jann (the first jinn) and the creation of Adam. This is necessary according to the claim of some people that birth will cease among the jinn after 4000 years and that birth will end with man after 7000 years. However, things do not occur on that basis. Things will occur according to what Allah wills. The jinn still procreate and we still procreate. So when did man begin, how many years of progeny does he have left and how much time remains until the end of this world and the annihilation of mankind on the face of the earth and their transfer to the Next World? This is not the stance taken by those who are firmly rooted in knowledge. It is stated by a small group of people and will not be repeated.

(The Jinn are an interspace between angels and men)

The angels are spirits breathed into lights. The jinn are spirits breathed into winds. Men are spirits breathed into shapes. It is said that a female was not separated from the first existing jinn as Eve was separated from Adam. One of them said Allah created a vulva in the first existent jinn, so part of him mated with the other part and offspring like those of Adam were born to him: a male and female who married each other. So the jinn's nature was hermaphrodite. For that reason the jinn are part of the world of the interspace: they resemble men and resemble angels as the hermaphrodite resembles both the male and female.

(The food and marriage of the jinn)

The elements of air and fire dominate the jinn. For that reason, their food is what the air carried by of fat in bones. Allah made their provision in them. So we see that the bone and its flesh is not decreased at all and we know that Allah gave them their sustenance in the bones. This is why the Prophet said about bones, "They are sustenance for your brothers among the jinn." In a *hadith*, "Allah appoints their sustenance in them." Someone to whom this was unveiled reported to us that he saw the jinn come to some bones and sniff them like beasts of prey sniff. Then they went back having taken their sustenance. Their food was taken in that sniffing. Glory be to the Subtle, the All-Aware!

As their union with each other in marriage, it is in the form of twisting - like what you see of smoke issuing from a kiln or a pottery oven. The smoke intermingles and each of the two individuals enjoys that mutual entry. Their ejaculation resembles like the seed of the palm and is in the form of pure scent, just as is the case with their food.

(The tribes and clans of the jinn)

They have tribes and clans. It is said that they are contained in twelve tribes and then they branch into subtribes. There are great wars between them, and some whirlwinds are, in fact, the centre of their battles. The whirlwind is the mutual opposition of two opposing winds, each preventing its companion from passing through. So that barrier leads to the circle witnessed visually in the physical dust which is the effect of the mutual opposition of the two winds. Their battles are like that, but not every whirlwind is on of their battles. The story of 'Amr the jinn is famous. He was killed in a whirlwind which was seen. It dispersed from him while he was dying. It did not take long for him to die. He was a pious jinn. If the basis of this book had been to present traditions and tales, we would have mentioned some of them, but this is a book about the science of meanings. You can look for their stories elsewhere in book of history and poems.

(The manner in which the spiritual world appears in forms)

When this spiritual world takes on shape and appears in a sensory form, the eyes confine it since it cannot abandon that form as long as the eye continues to look at it although that it is the human being which is looking. When human eye defines it and continues to look at it, the spiritual (*ruhani*) being does not have a place into which it can disappear, so this spiritual being manifests a form which it puts on itself like a veil. Then the spiritual being makes the person imagine that that form has left him in a particular direction, so his eye follows it. When his eye follows it, the spiritual being leaves its confinement and vanishes. When it disappears, that form vanishes from the sight of the one who is looking at it and following it with his eye. In relation to the spiritual being, that form is like light is in the case of a lamp whose light is diffused in the corners. When the body of the lamp is absent, the light is lost. It is thus with this form. If someone knows this and wants to confine that spiritual being, he should not follow the form with his eye. This is one of the divine secrets which are only known by the instruction of Allah. The form is not other than spiritual being. Indeed it is the same, even if it is in a

thousand places, or in every place, with different shapes.

If it happens that one of those forms is slain and apparently dies, that spiritual being moves from the life of this world to the interspace just as we move when we die. No information about it remains in this world, just as is the case with us. Those sensory forms in which the spiritual beings appear are called 'bodies'. It is the words of Allah, *"We cast a mere body on his throne"* (38:34) and *"We did not give them bodies which did not eat food."* (21:8) The difference between jinn and angels, even though they share in spirituality, is that the food of the jinn consists of foods found in natural bodies. The angels are not like that. That is why Allah mentioned in the story of the guests of Abraham, *"When he saw that their hands were not reaching for it, he was suspicious of them"* (11:70) i.e. the angels did not reach for the roasted calf and they did not eat it which made him afraid.

(The formation of the world of the jinn)

When the time for the formation of the world of the jinn came, He directed three of the trusty angels in the first sphere who took their deputies which they needed for this formation from the second heaven. Then they descended to the heavens and took two deputies from the second and the sixth there. They descended to the elements and prepared the place. Three other guardians followed them, and they took whatever deputies they needed from the second heaven, and then descended to the third heaven, and to the fifth from there. They took two angels. They passed by the sixth heaven and took another deputy from the angels. Then they descended to the elements in order to complete the formation. The remaining six descended and took the remaining deputies in the second heaven and the heavens. All were gathered for the ordering of this formation by the permission of the All-Knowing, the All-Wise.

When the formation of the world of the jinn was complete, Allah directed the spirit from the World of Command and breathed a spirit into that form by which life flowed into it. It stood uttering the praise and glorification of the One Who brought it into existence: this is the natural disposition on which He fashioned it. Within it there was might and immensity whose cause is not recognised nor discovered since at that time there was no another creature in existence in the world of nature other than it. It remained worshipping its Lord, proclaiming His power, humble to the lordship of the One who brought it into existence by what was in its being until Adam was created. When the jinn saw his form, one of them, whose name was Harith, was overcome with hatred for that organism and he glowered at the sight of the form of Adam. The rest of his species saw that and they censured him for that since they saw that he had grief and sorrow because of it. When Adam's business was complete, al-Harith displayed what he felt in himself and refused to obey the command of his Creator to prostrate to Adam and became arrogant towards Adam because of his own constitution and he boasted of his origin [from fire which he said was better than earth]. He failed to see the secret of the power of that water from which Allah created every living thing, and from which comes the life of the jinn although they are not aware of it.

(The creation of Adam and the formation of man)

If you are among the people of unveiling, reflect on the words of Allah, *"and His throne was upon the*

waters." (11:7) So the throne and the creatures around it were brought to life by water. *"There is nothing which does not glorify His praise."* (17:44) He used the negative. Only the living glorifies. In an excellent hadith from the Messenger of Allah said, "The angels said, 'O Lord (in a long *hadith*)! have You created anything stronger than fire?' He replied, 'Yes, water.'" So He made water stronger than fire. If the element of air in the structure of the jinn had not been ignited by fire, the jinn would have been stronger than the children of Adam, for air is stronger than water. In this *hadith*, the angels asked, "O Lord, have You created anything stronger than air?" He replied, "Yes, the children of Adam." Allah made the human organism stronger than air. Water is stronger than fire, and it is the main element in man as fire is the main element in the jinn. This why Allah said about Shaytan (Satan), *"Surely the guile of Shaytan is ever feeble."* (4:76) He did not ascribe any strength to him at all. He did not deny it to the Governor (of Egypt) when he said, *"surely your guile is great"* (12:27) ...

The reason for that is that the human organism accords deliberateness in matters, perseverance, meditation and reflection due to the predominance of the elements of earth and water in the human temperament. Thus the human being has ample intellect because earth holds him back and restrains him while water makes him supple and easy. The jinn are not like that. The jinn's intellect does not possess that which will enable him to hold to something as the human being does. This is why we say, "So-and-so is 'light' of intellect and dim-witted" when he is frivolous and foolish! This is the attribute of the jinn, and by it the jinn strays from the path of guidance due to the frivolous nature of his intellect and his lack of firmness in his thought. So he said, *"I am better than him,"* (7:12) and combined ignorance and bad manners because of his frivolous nature.

(The first shaytan of the jinn)

So any jinn who rebels is shaytan, i.e. one who is far from the mercy of Allah. Al-Harith was the first jinn to be called shaytan. Allah drove him to despair, i.e. drove him out of His mercy and repelled mercy from him. From him all the shaytans branch out. Any jinn who believe, like Hama ibn Alham ibn Laqis ibn Iblis, join the believing jinn. Any who remains an unbeliever is a shaytan. It is a matter of some dispute among the scholars of the Shari'a). Some of them say that the shaytan never submits, deriving this from what the Prophet said about his shaytan who was the companion entrusted to him, "Allah gave me power over him and he submitted (*aslama*)."

The one who interprets what he said as "*aslamu*" takes it to mean: "I am safe from him" and he has no way against me. Thus the interpretation varies. If it is interpreted as "*aslama*" is it submission. It means that he submitted although he was an enemy and so he only commands me to good, compelled to do so by Allah and as a protection for the Messenger of Allah. The opponent says that "*aslama*" means that he believed in Allah as the unbeliever becomes Muslim and thus becomes a believer. This is more appropriate and acceptable.

(Iblis was the first of the wretched jinn)

Most people claim that al-Harith was the first of the jinn, and that he was in the same position to the rest of the jinn as Adam is to mankind. We do not think that that is the case. Al-Harith was one of the jinn, but the first among them who is in the same position as Adam is to mankind was someone else. That is

why Allah says, "*Iblis was one of the jinn*" (18:50) i.e. he was from this category of creation. Similarly Qabil (Cain) was one of mankind, but Allah wrote him down among the wretched. He was the first of the wretched among mankind, and Iblis was the first of the wretched among the jinn. The majority of the punishment of the shaytans of the jinn in Hellfire is by severe cold, not by heat, although they may be punished with fire. Most of the punishment of the descendants of Adam is through fire.

One day I came upon one of the saints whose intellect was deranged. He was weeping and saying to the people, "Do not stop with His words, '*I shall assuredly fill Hellfire with you*' (38:85) and apply them to Iblis alone. Look how He alluded to you when He said, '*...Hellfire with you*'. Iblis was created from fire, so he returns to his source - may Allah curse him! If Iblis is punished with it, the punishment of pottery by fire is greater, so take heed!"

When Hellfire (*Jahannam*) was mentioned, this saint only thought of fire in particular, and was heedless of the fact that Jahannam is a name for both its intense heat and its intense cold. It is called Jahannam by its frowning (*jahama*. *Jahuma* means "to have an ugly face") because its appearance is hateful. Jaham is the word for clouds which have already poured out their water. Abundant rain is the mercy of Allah. When Allah has removed the rain from the clouds, then the name *jaham* is applied to them. since the mercy, which was abundant rain, has vanished. Similarly, Allah has removed mercy from Jahannam which is hateful in appearance and report. It is also called Jahannam because of its great depth. One says, "the depths of Jahannam" when something is very deep. We ask Allah Almighty, to give us and the believers security from it!

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Concerning the Bearers of the Throne

By Allah, the Throne bears the Merciful, and they bear it -
this statement is intelligible.

What power is there for a creature and what strength,
if it had not been for that which the intellect and Revelation brought?

Body and spirit and nutrients and rank.
There is nothing else which division arranges.

That is the Throne, if you but realise its eminence!
The One who settles on it in the name of the Merciful is hoped-for.

They are eight, and Allah knows them. Today there are four,
and there is no fault in them:

Muhammad, then Ridwan and Malik, Adam
and the Friend (Ibrahim) and then Jibril,

Joined by Mika'il and Israfil. There are only eight here -
nourished by "there is no god but Allah".

(The Throne ('*Arsh*) in Arabic)

May Allah support the *wali*! Know that in Arabic 'the Throne' is a designation by which the kingdom is meant. It is said, "The king's throne is toppled," when there is a disturbance in his kingdom. Throne also designates and means the seat. When the Throne designates the kingdom, its bearers are its supporters. When the Throne is the seat, its bearers are the legs which support it, or whoever carries it on their sacks. Number enters into the bearers of the Throne. The Messenger said that they are four in this world, and eight on the Day of Rising. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, recited, "*Upon that day eight shall carry above them the Throne of your Lord*," (69:17) and then he said, "Today they are four," meaning in this world. Allah said, "Upon that day they shall be eight," meaning in the Next World.

(The Throne is contained in body, spirit, nourishment and rank)

We related from Ibn Masarra al-Jabali, one of the greatest of the People of the Path in knowledge, state,

and unveiling, "The carried Throne is the kingdom. It is contained in body, spirit, nourishment and rank." Adam and Israfil belong to forms; Jibril and Muhammad to spirits; Mika'il and Ibrahim to provisions; and Malik and Ridwan to the Promise and the Threat. There is only in the kingdom what was mentioned. Nourishment, which is provision, is both sensory and spiritual. That which we will mention in this chapter is the one method, which has the meaning of kingdom, through which benefit is connected. "Its bearers" designates those who undertake its management. One manager is an elemental form or a luminous form; one manager is a spirit; one manager belongs to an elemental form; one manager is a spirit and one managed and compelled by a luminous form. Nourishment belongs to an elemental form and the nourishment of knowledges and gnoses of spirits. There is a sensory rank of happiness achieved by entering the Garden and a sensory rank of wretchedness achieved by entering Hellfire (*Jahannam*) and a spiritual rank of knowledge.

This chapter is based on four issues. The first question is form; the second is the spirit; the third is nourishment; and the fourth is the rank, which is the end. Each of these questions has two divisions, so there are eight. They are the bearers of the Throne, i.e. when the eight appeared, the kingdom was established and appeared, and its King sat on it.

(Luminous bodies and Archangels)

The first question concerns form and it has two divisions: an elemental bodily form which contains the imaginative bodily form, and the other division which is a luminous physical body. We will begin with the luminous body. The first bodies which Allah created were the bodies of the angelic spirits wandering with love in the majesty of Allah. They include the First Intellect and the Universal Self, and the luminous bodies created from the light of majesty end there. None of these angels exist by any other means than the Self which is below the Intellect. Every angel created after these angels is subject to the jurisdiction of nature. They are from the genus of the spheres from which they were created and which they inhabit. It is the same with the angels of the elements. The last rank of angels are the angels created from the deeds and breaths of the worshippers. We will mention them class by class in this chapter, Allah willing.

Know that Allah was before He created creation when there was no beforeness in time. That is an expression of connection which indicates a relationship by which the goal is obtained in the listener. Allah was in the Mist ('*ama*') below and above which there is no air. It was the first Divine manifestation to appear in which the light of the Essence flowed, as is clear in His words, "*Allah is the light of the heavens and the earth.*" (24:35) When that Mist was coloured by light, He opened in it the forms of the angels bewildered with love who are above the world of natural bodies. No throne or creature preceded them. When He brought them into existence, He gave them a manifestation. That manifestation became unseen for them, and that unseen was a spirit for them, i.e. for those forms. He gave them a manifestation in His name, the Beautiful, so they wandered distraught with love in the majesty of His beauty, and they do not recover from it.

(The First Intellect is the Axis of the World of Registration and Recording)

When Allah wanted to create the world of recording and writing, He specified one of those *Karubiyin* angels. He was the first angel of that light called the Intellect and the Pen. He was given a presencing (*tajalli*) in the place where given (*wahabi*) knowledge is manifested according to the bringing-into-existence He desired for His creation, not for an end and a limit. By its essence, the Intellect accepted what will be and the Divine Names which desire the issuance of this created world. From this Intellect was derived another existent thing called the Tablet. He commanded the Pen to descend to it and entrust in it only all that will be until the Day of Rising. He gave this Pen 360 years of penness, i.e. being a Pen. From its being Intellect, Allah gave this Pen 360 presencings (*tajalliyat*) or *raqa'iq* (filaments). Every year or filament extracts 360 varieties of comprehensive knowledges, and the Pen details them in the Tablet. This encompasses the knowledges in the universe until the Day of Rising. The Tablet knows them when the Pen entrusts them to it. That is part of the knowledge of nature, and it is the first knowledge which this Tablet acquires of the knowledges of what Allah has willed for His creation. That is nature rather than the self. All of that is in the world of pure light.

(The Throne and its angelic inhabitants)

Then Allah brought into existence the pure darkness which is opposite this light, which is in the position of absolute non-existence opposite absolute existence. When He brought it into existence, that light flowed onto it with an essential outflowing with the help of nature. So that light repaired its disarray and the body appeared which is designated as the Throne. Then the name the Rahman settled on it by the name, the Outwardly Manifest. That was the first of the world of creation to appear. From that mixed light, which is like the light of dawn, He created the angels which encircle the Seat. That is His words, "*You will see the angels encircling the Throne proclaiming the praise of their Lord.*" (39:75) They have no other occupation than to encircle the Throne, proclaiming His praise. We explained the creation of the universe in our book, '*Uqla al-Mustawfiz*. We have used the principles for this chapter.

(The Footstool (*Kursi*) and the angels who inhabit it)

Then He brought the Footstool into existence inside this Throne and put angels of its own nature in it. Each sphere was the basis for its inhabitants which were created in it just like the elements from which its inhabitants were created. So Adam was created from earth and he and his sons filled the earth. In this noble Footstool the Word was divided into report and judgement: these are the two feet which descend from the Throne as reported in the report of the Prophet. Then inside the Footstool Allah created spheres, one inside the other. In each sphere He created a world from it which they inhabit which He named angels, i.e. messengers. He adorned the spheres with stars, and inspired every heaven with its command until He created the forms of products (*muwalladat*).

(The spirits and luminous forms, imaginative forms and elemental forms)

When Allah completed these luminous and elemental forms which were without spirits which were unseen by these forms, He gave a manifestation to every class of these forms according to what they are based in. The spirits of forms took on being from the forms and from the presencing (*tajalli*). This is the

second question. Allah created the spirits and commanded them to manage the forms and He made them indivisible, a single essence but made them distinct from one another. They are distinct according to the forms they accept from that presencing. The forms do not belong to these spirits in reality according to "wherenesses". These forms belong to the spirits as the kingdom in respect of the elemental forms, and like places of manifestation in respect of all forms.

Then Allah originated the imaginative physical forms by another presencing between the *lata'if* (subtleties) and forms, and luminous and fiery forms appeared to the eye in those physical bodies. The sensory forms manifested carry forms of meaning in these physical forms in sleep, after death and before the resurrection - it is the interspace of form. It is a horn of light whose top is wide and bottom is narrow. Its highest part is the Mist and the lowest is the earth. These bodies of form in which the jinn and angels and inward part of man appear are outward in sleep and the forms of the Market of the Garden. It is this form which populates the earth of the imagination which we already spoke about in this proper chapter.

(The nourishment of the spirits and the nourishment of forms)

Then Allah appointed nourishment for these forms and these spirits. They are the subject of the third question. They subsist by that nourishment. It consists of sensory nourishment and nourishment of meaning. The nourishment of meaning is the nourishment of knowledges, presencings (*tajalliyat*) and states (*ahwal*). Sensory nourishment is well known. It is what the forms of food and drink bear of spiritual meanings, i.e. faculties. Each form, be it luminous, animal or physical, is nourished by what is suitable for it. It would take too long to give the details of that.

(Ranks of the world in happiness and wretchedness)

Then Allah gave every world a rank in happiness and wretchedness and a station; and the details are innumerable. Its happiness is according to it: some of it is happiness of desire, happiness of perfection, happiness of being filled, and happiness of place, i.e. the Shari'a. Wretchedness is like that in division in what is not in accordance with desire, perfection, temperament (which is not being filled), and is not the Shari'a. All of that is sensory and intelligible. The sensory part of it is what is connected to the Abode of wretchedness, of pains in this world and the Next, and connected to the Abode of happiness of pleasures in this world and the Next. Some is pure and some mixed. The pure is connected to the Next Abode. The mixed is connected to this Abode. So the happy might appear in the form of the wretched and the wretched in the form of the happy while they will be distinct in the Next Abode. It may be that the wretched manifests his wretchedness in this world and it is connected to the wretchedness of the Next world. This is also the case with the happy. However, they are not known in this world, but they are distinct in the Next World: "*Now keep yourselves apart, you wrongdoers, on this day!*" (39:59) So there the ranks are connected to their people with a connection which is not broken nor changed.

(The bearers of the Throne is in this world and the Next)

So the meaning of the eight, which is the sum of the Kingdom designated by the Throne, has been made clear to you. This is the fourth question. The meaning of the eight is clear to you. These eight belong to the eight Divine ascriptions by which Allah is described. They are: life, knowledge, power, will, speech, hearing, sight, and the perfection of the tasted, smelt and felt with the attribute connected to him. This perception of them has a connection, like hearing perceiving heard things and sight perceiving seen things. Thus the Kingdom is contained in eight. Four of them are manifest in this world: form, food, and the two ranks. On the Day of Rising, all of the eight will be visible to the eyes. It is what Allah said, *"Upon that day eight shall carry above them the Throne of Your Lord."* (69:17) The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Today they are four." This is in the explanation of the Throne as the Kingdom.

As for the Throne, which is the seat, it belongs to Allah and the angels bear it on their backs. Today they are four, and tomorrow they will be eight in respect to bearing in the land of gathering. It is related of the forms of those four bearers what approximates what Ibn Masarra said. It is said that one has the form of man, one of a lion, one of an eagle and the fourth of a bull. It was what the Samiri saw and imagined that it was the god of Musa. So he built the calf for his people and said, *"This is your god and the god of Musa"* (20:88) in the tale. Allah speaks the truth and guides to the Path.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

On the reason for the increase and decrease of knowledges and the words of Allah, "Say: 'Lord, increase me in knowledge!' and the words of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "Allah does not restrict knowledge, plucking from the breasts of the scholars, but He removes it by removing the scholars."

The *tajalli* of the existence of the Truly Real in the sphere of the self is evidence of decrease in knowledges.

If one is unconscious of that *tajalli* by his self,
can he then perceive Him through investigation and inquiry?

If multiplicity of knowledge appears in the self,
realised veiling is confirmed by the text.

Nothing except the disk of the sun of existence appeared
and its light fell on the world of spirits.

The Source is only perceived when there is manifestation,
even if man is destroyed by the intensity of greed.

There is no doubt in the statement which I unfolded;
and it is not misrepresenting lie or conjecture.

(Knowledges: its ranks and stages)

Know that every living thing and everyone described by perception, is in a new knowledge in every breath in respect to that perception. However, it may be that the perceiving individual is not one of those who is mindful of that knowledge. In fact, it is knowledge, so knowledges can be described as being in decrease in respect of the one with knowledge. It results from the fact that there would be perception had not a barrier intervened between him and many things which he perceives, as is the case with someone who happens to be blind or deaf or the like.

Therefore knowledges rise and descend according to what is known. That is why when aspirations (*himma*) are connected to sublime noble knowledges by which man is described, his *nafs* (self) is purified and his rank exalted. The highest rank in knowledge is knowledge of Allah. The highest of the

paths to the knowledge of Allah is the knowledge of *tajalliyat*. Below it is the knowledge of intellectual examination (*nadhar*). There is no divine knowledge below examination. There are creeds for the general people, not knowledges.

These knowledges are those in which Allah commanded His Prophet to seek increase. Allah said, "*and do not rush ahead with the Qur'an before its revelation to you is complete and say, 'O Lord, increase me in knowledge!'*" (20:114) i.e. increase me with Your words that You want me to know. Here increase in knowledge is knowledge of the nobility of slowness in the revelation, out of adab with the teacher who brings it to him from his Lord. For this reason, He put this verse after His word, "*and faces will be humbled unto the Living, the All-Sustaining,*" (20:111) i.e. humbled. He meant the knowledges of *tajalli*. *Tajalli* is the noblest path for obtaining knowledges - they are the knowledges of immediate tasting.

(Knowledge: its increase and decrease)

We will mention increase and increase of knowledge in another chapter, Allah willing. That is that Allah gave everything - and the self (*nafs*) of man is one of these things - an outward and inward. The self of man outwardly perceives matters by the eye, and inwardly perceives matters by knowledge. Allah is the Outward, the Inward. It is by Him that perception occurs. It is not in the power of whatever is other than Allah to perceive anything by itself. He perceives by what Allah puts in him and the *tajalli* of Allah. Whoever has a *tajalli* from any world, be it the Visible or Unseen world, is from the Name, the Outward. As for the name, the Inward, part of the reality of this relationship is that there is no *tajalli* ever in it, not in this world or the Next since *tajalli* designates Allah's manifestation to the one who receives that manifestation. That belongs to the name, the Outward. The intelligibility of relationships does not change, even if they do not have any source by which they exist. However, they do have logical existence, so they are intelligible.

When Allah grants a *tajalli*, either as a free gift or as answer to a request, he gives the *tajalli* to the outward of the self, and perception by the senses occurs in the form and that takes place the interspace of making likenesses. So the one who receives the manifestation has an increased knowledge of judgements if he is one of the scholars of the Shari'a, increased knowledge of the criteria of meanings if he is a dialectician, and increased knowledge of the measure of speech if he is a grammarian. It is the for with the master of each of the knowledges of beings and non-beings. He has increase in himself in the knowledge with which he is occupied.

The people of this path know that this increase is comes from the Divine *tajalli* to those classes, so they cannot deny what has been unveiled to them. Non-agnostics sense increase and ascribe that to their thoughts. Others than these two experience increase but do not know that they are being increased in anything. In likeness "*their likeness is that of a donkey loaded with weighty tomes. How evil is the likeness of those who deny Allah's Signs!*" (62:5). The signs are this increase and the source of the increase. Astonishment is expressed about those who ascribe that to their own thoughts! They do not know that their thought, reflection and investigation in any question is part of the increase of knowledges in themselves which comes from that *tajalli* which we mentioned. The thinker is

preoccupied with the connection of his thought and the end of his quest. He is veiled to knowledge of the true state. His knowledge is increasing, but he is not aware of it.

When *tajalli* occurs, it is by the name the Outward to the inward part of the self. Perception occurs the insight into the world of realities and meanings divested of physical matter. These are designated as "texts" since Divine texts do not have any ambiguity or probability by a certain aspect. That only takes place in the meanings. So the one with meanings has rest from the labour of thought, and in the *tajalli* he is increased in divine knowledges, the knowledges of the secrets and knowledges of the inward, and what is connected to the Next World. This is particular to the people of our Path - it is the path of our knowledge.

(Knowledge: its decrease)

Knowledge decreases for two reasons, either by evil nature in the basis of the organism or an incidental imperfection in the faculty connected to that. This evil nature in the basis of the organism cannot be mended, as al-Khidr said about the boy, "*his nature was an unbeliever.*" (18:80) This is in the basis of the organism. As for the incidental imperfection, it can vanish - if it is in the faculty - by medicine. If it is in the self, as when love of leadership and following appetites distract him from acquiring knowledges which contain his honour and happiness, this can also be removed when the Truth calls from his heart and he returns to sound reflection, and he knows that this world is one of the stages of the traveller and a bridge to be crossed, and that if man does not furnish himself with knowledges, noble character and the attributes of the Higher Assembly here in the form of purification and freedom from natural appetites which distract him from sound reflection, he will have no way to achieve eternal happiness. Therefore he sets out on that. This imperfection is also a reason for the decrease of knowledges.

I do not mean that when s decrease it is a fault in man - except in the case of Divine knowledges. The reality accords that there is no decrease at all and that man is always and constantly in increase of knowledge and in respect to what his senses give him, the fluctuations of states and passing thoughts in himself. He his knowledge is increasing, but there is no benefit in it. Opinion, doubt, speculation, ignorance, heedlessness and forgetfulness: all of this and things like them are not accompanied by knowledge of what you are in in respect of opinion, doubt, speculation, ignorance, heedlessness or forgetfulness.

(The knowledges of *tajalli*: their increase and decrease)

As for decrease and increase in the knowledges of *tajalli*, man is in either one of two states: how the Prophets bring them forth by transmission, or the *awliya'* by the principle of being the heirs of the Prophets. This is like what was said to Abu Yazid al-Bistami when the robe of of delegation was placed on him, "Go out to My creation by My attribute. Whoever sees you has seen Me!" He could do nothing but obey his Lord's command. He took a step towards himself from his Lord and swooned. There was a cry, "Return My lover to Me! He cannot endure being apart form Me!" He was absorbed in the Real, like Abu 'Iqal al-Maghribi, so the spirits entrusted with him and who supported him when he was

commanded to go out returned him to the station of absorption (*istihlak*) in Him. He was returned to Allah and the robes of humility, poverty, and abasement were placed on him. Life was pleasing and he saw his Lord and was increased in intimacy and had rest from the "lent trust (*amana*)" (33:72) which had to be taken from him.

(The Ascent of Man on the Ladder of Gnosis)

From the moment man starts up the ladder of ascent, he has a divine *tajalli* according to the ladder of his ascent. Each person among the people of Allah has a ladder particular to him by which no one else ascends. If someone could ascend by the ladder of someone else, then prophethood would be acquirable. By its essence, every ladder gives a rank particular to the one who ascends in it. If it would otherwise, the scholars would climb the ladder of the Prophets and obtain prophethood by doing so. The business is not like that. 'Divine capacity' would vanish if the matter would be repeated. In our view, it is confirmed that there is no repetition in that presence.

However, all the steps of the meanings - for Prophets, *awliya'*, believers, and messengers - are the same. One ladder does not have more steps than another ladder. The first step is Islam. It is submission. The last step is in annihilation in the ascent and going-on in the going-out. What remains is between the two of them. It is belief (*iman*), *ihsan* (excellence), knowledge, pure oneness (*taqdis*), disconnection (*tanzih*), wealth, poverty, abasement, might, change (*talwin*), establishment in change, annihilation if you go out and going-on if you enter. Every step in which you leave it decreases the knowledges of *tajalli* in your inward commensurate with what is increased in your outward until you reach the last step.

If you go out and reach the last step, then He is manifested by His essence in your outward in accordance with your worth and you manifest Him in His creation. In your inward there is nothing left at all and the *tajalliyat* of the inward leave you totally. When you are called to enter, this call is the first step to be manifested to you by *tajalli* in your inward according to what is decreased of that *tajalli* in your outward, until you reach the last step. Then He is manifested to your inward by His essence and no *tajalli* at all remains in your outward. The reason for that is that the slave and the Lord continue to be together, each one with perfect existence for himself: the slave is still the slave and the Lord is still the Lord, in spite of this increase and decrease.

This is the reason for the increase and decrease of the knowledges of *tajalliyat* in the outward and the inward. The reason for that is constitution. This is why all that Allah created and brought into existence in its source is composite - it has an outward and an inward. That which we refer to as the simple elements (*basa'it*) are intelligible matters which have no existence in their sources. Every existent thing, other than Allah, is composite. We learned this by sound unveiling with no doubt in it. It obliges a corresponding need of Him, since it is an essential description of Him.

If you understand, we have clarified the way for you and set up the ascent for you. So travel! And rise! You will see and witness what we have made clear to you. We have specified the steps of the ascent for you which we retained for you in the good advice when the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him

and grant him peace commanded us to give [in sound *hadith*]. If we had described the fruits and results to you without specifying the path to it for you, we would have made you yearn for an immense business which you would not know how to reach. By the One who has my self in His hand, it is the Ascent (*Mi'raj*). *"Allah speaks the truth and guides to the Path."*

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CHAPTER FIFTY-NINE

Concerning existent time and determined time

When you ascertain that the substance of time
is determined and known by illusions,

Like nature in effecting its power.
The source in nature and time is are non-existent.

Things are specified by it, but it does not
have a source by which it is judged.

The intellect cannot perceive its form.
For that reason, we say that time is illusory.

If it had not been for disconnection, the existence of Allah would not be
designated by it. So He has exaltation in the heart.

When you are fair about the root of time from before-time
its judgement is of pre-time, and it is governed

Like emptiness whose extension does not have an end in
other than body by the illusion of embodiment in it.

(The firstness of the Real and His existence and the firstness of the universe and its existence)

Know, first of all, that Allah is the First and there is nothing else has firstness before Him, and nothing which depends on Him has firstness nor is there anything which was coterminous with Him. He is the One - glory be to Him! in His firstness. There is nothing whose existence is necessary by itself except Him. He is Rich by His essence absolutely above need of any being. Allah says, "*Allah is Rich beyond need of any being.*" (3:97) by the proof of logic and the Shari'a.

So the existence of the universe is must of either have its existence be from Allah to Himself, or an extra matter which is not Him since, if it had been Him, it would not be extra. If it had also been Him, it would have been a complex matter in itself and firstness would have belonged to that extra matter. We have stipulated that there is no firstness to anything with Him nor before Him.

Since that extra matter is not Himself, it must be existence or not existence. It is impossible that it be not existence. Not existence cannot have the effect of bringing into existence in what is described by not-existence, which is the universe. So neither of the two is more likely to have the effect of bringing-into-existence than the other since both of them are not existence. Not-existence has no effect because it is non-existence.

It is impossible that it be existence. So in that it must either be existence by itself or not. It is impossible that its existence be by itself, for the proof has been established of the impossibility of there being in existence two whose existence is necessary by themselves. So there only remains its existence by other than itself, and there is no meaning for the possibility of the universe unless its existence is by other than it. So then it is the universe or from the universe.

If the existence of the universe had been from Allah by a certain relationship, if it had not been for that relationship, the universe would not have existence. That relationship is called will or volition or knowledge or whatever you like of what the existence of the possible demands. So the Real without a doubt would only do something by that relationship. Need has no meaning except this, and it is impossible for Allah. Allah has absolute wealth and he is, as He said, *"Allah is Rich beyond need of any being."* (3:97)

If it is said that what is meant by this relationship is the same as His Essence, we said that the thing is not in need of itself. He is Rich in himself. So the one thing is in need inasmuch as it is not rich. All of that in respect of Himself is impossible. We negated the extra matter. That obliges therefore that the existence of the universe be, inasmuch as it exists from other than it, tied to the Necessary of existence by Himself. It is impossible that the source of the possible effect the Necessary of existence by Himself with bringing-into-existence. The matter is only intelligible like that.

His will, volition, knowledge and power are His essence. Allah is be exalted very greatly in His essence. Indeed, He has absolute oneness, and He is the One, the Unique, Allah, the *Samad* "who did not beget" which would be a precedent "nor was He begotten" which would be a result, "and there is nothing equal to Him," (112:3-4) so the existence of the world by Him would be from two premises - from the Real and the equal. Exalted is Allah!

He described Himself like this in His Book when the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was asked about the attribute of his Lord. Then the *Surat al-Ikhlās* was sent down and freed him of being associated with other. Allah is exalted in that pure attributes and descriptions. There is nothing which He negates or affirms in this *sura* but that that affirmer or negator is what some people say about Allah.

(The relationship of Pre-time (*Azal*) to Allah is like the relationship of time to mortals)

We have explained to you how we must be in need of Him - and He is Allah, glory be to Him! We will

further clarify it . Know that the relation of pre-time to Allah is like the relationship of time to us. The relationship of pre-time is a negative attribute without source. Existence is not from this reality. So time belongs to the possible with a relationship whose existence is illusory, not existent, because in the case of anything you can apportion, you can ask "when" about it. When is a question is about time, time must be an illusory matter, not existence. For this reason, Allah applied it to Himself when He said, *"and Allah has knowledge of everything"* (33:40) *"and to Allah belongs the command before and after."* (30:4) In the *Sunna* the words of the asker are confirmed when he asked, "Where was our Lord before He created His creation?" If time had been a matter of existence in itself, Allah's being pure above limitation would not be valid since the principle of time would limit Him. So we recognise that these shapes do not have a matter of existence under them.

(Time: intelligible and proven)

Then we say that people differ about the expression "time" and what is understood by it and proven by it. The sages apply it to different matters. Most of them say that it is an illusory period which is intersected by the movement of the spheres. The *mutakallimun* apply it to something else: the comparison of an in-time to an in-time about which it is asked, "When?" The Arabs use it to mean night and day. It is our aim in this chapter. Night and day divide the day. From the rising of the sun to its setting is called "daytime", and from the setting of the sun to its rising is called "night". This divided source is called the day. This day manifests the existence of the greater movement. There is only in specific existence the existence of the Mover. It is not the source of time. The outcome of that referring to time is an illusory matter with no reality.

Since this is confirmed, the intelligible which is determined is designated by existent time. By it weeks, months, years and eons are manifested. They are called days and are determined by the small ordinary day which is divided into night and day. "Determined time" is what is extra to this small day by which all the great days are determined. It is said, *"on a day whose measure is a thousand years of your reckoning,"* (32:5) and *"on a day whose measure is fifty thousand years."* (70:4)

(How days are reckoned in the time the Dajjal)

The Prophet said, "In the days of the Dajjal, a day will be like a year, a day will be like a month, and a day will be like a week, and all his days are like your days." This may due to intense terror. He removed ambiguity outwardly at the end of the hadith when 'A'isha said, "How will one do the prayer on that day?" He said, "One will determine." If it had not been that the matter in the movements of the spheres remained what it was without being upset, it would not be valid that it be determined by the hours by whose form the people of this knowledge act and by which they know the times in cloudy days when the sun does not appear.

At the beginning of the emergence of the Dajjal, there will be many clouds and they will follow one another to such an extent that the existence of the day and night will appear the same to the naked eye. That is one of the rare forms which will occur at the end of time. Those piled-up clouds will come

between us and the sky, but the celestial movements will be as they are. So the movements will appear in the actual occupations which are known by the people of occupation with knowledge of the appearance and course of the stars. By them they determine the night and days and the hours of the prayer without doubt.

If that day which is like a year been a single day, it would not be obliged for us to determine the prayers. We would wait for noon of the sun. If it did not descend, we would not pray the prescribed *Dhuhr*. If the sun stopped and did not descend for twenty thousand years, Allah would not oblige us anything else. When the Lawgiver commanded us to worship by determination, we knew that the movement of the spheres is in the area and their structure is not broken.

(Single time and the single jawhar)

We have informed you about what time is and what is the meaning of the relationship of existence of it and the relationship of determination. There are many days, both small and great. The smallest of them is single time on whose basis emerges "*every day He is in one affair.*" (55:29) Single time (*zaman fard*) is called a day because the "affair" spoken about is the smallest and finest of times. There is no limit to the greatest of days at which it stops. Between them are the middle days, the first of which is the ordinary well-known day divided into hours. The hours are divided into degrees and the degrees divided into minutes and the minutes divided into seconds, and so on *ad infinitum* according to some people. They divide the minutes into seconds. When the judgement of number enters them, its judgement is that of number, and number does not end and hence the division does not end.

Some people speak of an ending in that and look at it in respect of the numbered. They are the ones who state that time has an existent source. All that enters into existence comes to an end without a doubt. Their opponent says that the "numbered" inasmuch as it is numbered, does not enter into existence and so it is not described as coming to an end for number is not described as coming to an end. The one who denies the "single essence (*jawhar*)" advances this as an argument. The body is divided *ad infinitum* in the intellect. It is a matter of dispute among the people of speculation which occurs from a lack of just treatment and investigation into what is proven by expressions. It is related in sound tradition that time (*dahr*) is one of the names of Allah. The intelligibility of time is well-known and we will mention that, Allah willing, in this book. "*Allah speaks the truth and guides to the path.*"

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CHAPTER SIXTY-SIX

Concerning the secret of the Shari'a, outward and inward, and which Divine Name brought it into existence

The Majestic demands majesty from the Majestic.
So the Majestic refused to witness other than majesty.

When he saw the existence of the might of Allah,
the slave of Allah became coquettish.

He was secure with himself,
proud, haughty, self-exalted, arrogant.

He informed him of a protected Shari'a
so its power greatly abased him.

The slave calls out by loss and abasement,
"O You whose dignity is blessed and exalted!"

The Divine Names are the language of the state accorded by the realities

Allah says, *"Say: Had there been in the earth angels walking at peace, We would have sent down upon them out of heaven an angel as a Messenger."* (17:95) and He says, *"We do not punish until We send a Messenger."* (17:15)

Know that the Divine Names have a tongue of state which is accorded them by their realities. Occupy yourself with what you hear and do not imagine multiplicity or existential gathering. In this chapter many intelligible realities will be arranged in respect to relationship, not in respect to existential source. The essence of Allah is One inasmuch as it is essence. From the point of view of our existence, need and possibility, we know that we must have something probable on which to rely. That basis from which our existence is demanded must have various ascriptions. The Lawgiver [Prophet] has called them the *ÒMost Beautiful NamesÓ*. He called Himself "Speaking" by them inasmuch as He speaks in an existential rank of His Divine existence which cannot be shared in. *ÒHe is one god. There is no god but Him.Ó*

The confluence of the Names in the presence of the Named and the manifestation of their judgements

After this confirmation in the beginning of this matter and preference and dominance in the possible

world, I say that the names gathered together in the presence of the Named. They looked at their realities and meanings and asked for the manifestation of their judgements so that their sources would be set apart by their effects. The Creator is He who is the Determiner, the Knower, the Manager, the Distinguisher, the Originator, the Fashioner, the Provider, the Reviver, the One who makes dies, the Inheritor, the Thankful. All the Divine Names looked at their essences, but did not see the created, managed, distinguished or provided for. They said, "How can there be action unless these sources are manifest in which our judgements appear so our authority is manifest?"

So after the manifestation of the source of the world, the Divine Names which some of the realities of the world demanded sought the protection of the Name, the Originator. (*al-Bari*). They said to Him, "Would You will bring into existence these sources to manifest our judgements and establish our authority since the presence we are in does not accept our effect?" The Originator said, "That must be referred to the Name, the Powerful. I am under His control."

The possibles in the state of their non-existence and how their sources appeared

The basis of this is that in the state of their non-existence, the possibles made a request to the Divine Names from a state of abasement and need. They said to them, "Non-existence has blinded us to the perception of one another and to recognition of what we owe you. If you were to manifest our sources and clothe us in the robe of existence, you would have blessed us with that and we would have undertaken the glorification and exaltation is obliged in respect of you. Authority is valid for you in our actual manifestation. Today you are masters over us by power and competence. This which we seek of you. is more abundant than it is in respect of us." The Names said, "This which the possibles mentioned is valid." They moved to seek that.

Then they resorted the name, the Powerful (*al-Qadir*). He said, "I am under the control of the Transformer. I cannot bring any source among you into existence except by His direction. Nothing is possible for me in itself except that a command from the Commander comes to it from its Lord. When He commands it to take form and says to it, 'Be!' then I can do it and connect it to bringing into existence, so I give it form from that moment. Go to the name, the Transformer. Perhaps He will prefer and make dominant the aspect of existence over the aspect of non-existence. The Commander, the Speaker and Myself will be joined together and bring you into existence."

They came to the name, the Transformer, and said to Him, "We asked the name, the Powerful, to bring our sources into existence. He referred the matter to You. What do you say?" The Transformer said, "The Powerful spoke the truth, but I have no news about what the name, the Knowing, has judged regarding you and whether His knowledge of bringing you into existence has preceded in particular or not. I am under the control of the name, the Knowing. Go to Him and tell Him your business."

They then went to the name, the Knowing, and told Him what the name, the Transformer, had told them. The Knowing said, "The Transformer spoke the truth. My knowledge of your coming into existence has already preceded, but *adab* is more fitting. There is a presence which controls us, and it is the name

Allah. We must appear before Him, for it is the presence of gatheredness."

All the names gathered in the presence of Allah. He said, "What is your concern?" They told him. He said, "I am the Name which gathers together your realities. I am the proof of the Named, and it is the pure Essence which has the attributes of perfection and disconnection. Stay until I go in to My proven." He went in to His proven and told Him what the possibles had told Him and what the names conferred about. He said, "Go out and tell each of the Names to attach itself to what its reality demands in the possibles. I am the One by Myself in respect to Myself. The possibles demand My rank, and My rank demands them. All the Divine Names belong to the rank, not to Me, except for the One. It is a name particular to Me, and none shares with Me in its reality in any aspect, either among the names, the ranks, or the possibles.

The known balance, prescribed limit and protected Imam

The name Allah came out, and with Him came the name, the Speaker, to interpret for Him to the possibles and the Names. He mentioned to them what the Named had mentioned. So the Knower, the Transformer, the Speaker and the Powerful were connected, and the first possible appeared by the selection of the Transformer and the judgement of the Knowing.

When the sources and effects appeared in beings, some began to subdue others and prevail over them according to what they are based on among the names and this led to dissension and strife. They said, "We fear that our order will be corrupted and we will be joined to the non-existence which we were in it." The possibles warned the Names about what they were informed of by the Names, the Knowing and the Manager. They said, "O Names! If your judgement is on a known balance, and prescribed limit by an Imam to which you refer, our existence will be preserved for us and we will preserve your effects on us for you. That would be better for us and you. Go to Allah. Perhaps He will advance someone who will prescribe limits for you to stop at. If not, we will be destroyed and become void." They said, "This is useful and a proper opinion." So they did that. They said, "The Name, the Manager, is the One who decides your affair." They went to the Manager with the matter. He said, "I will do it."

He entered and emerged by the command of the Real to the Name, the Lord. He said to Him, "Do what benefit demands to make the sources of these possibles go on." He appointed two ministers to help Him, as He was commanded. One was the name the Manager and the other was the name the Distinguisher. Allah says, *"He manages the affair and distinguishes the signs. Perhaps you will be certain in the encounter with your Lord."* (13:2) who is the Imam. So look at how wise are the words of Allah when He brought a phrase in accordance with the state which obliges that the business be based on it!

Wise policy and conventional laws

The name, the Lord, prescribed limits for them and placed rules for them for the best interests of the kingdom and to test which of them is the best in actions. Allah put that into two categories. One category is called wise policy which He put in the nature of the selves of the great people. They prescribed limits

and set down laws by a power which they find in themselves in each city, direction and climate, according to what the disposition of that area and their tempers demand by their knowledge of what wisdom accords. By that means the property of people and their blood, family, kin and relations is preserved. They call them laws (*nawamis*) which means "causes of good" since in technical usage, the *Namus* is that which brings good. The spy (*jasus*) is the one who deals with evil.

The *nawamis* are laws of wisdom which men of intellect set down which originate from Allah's inspiration while they are not aware of that. They are meant for the benefit of the world, its order and connection in places which do not have a Divine Shari'a sent down nor knowledge of the One setting down these laws and that these matters draw near to Allah, inherit the Garden or the Fire nor anything of the causes of the Next World. They do not know that there is a Next World and a physical resurrection after death in natural bodies and that in it will be food, drink, clothes, intercourse and joy, and that in it will be punishment and pains. The existence of that is possible, and its non-existence is also possible. They have no proof that one of the two possibles will outweigh the other. "*They originated monkhood.*" (57:27) Therefore the basis of their laws and benefits is to make benefit endure in this abode.

Within themselves, they possess Divine knowledges: the *tawhid* of Allah and the exaltation and glorification which He must have, the attributes of disconnection (*tanzih*) and non-existence of any peer or like. The one who perceived that and the one who knew that notified those who did not perceive it. They encouraged people to sound investigation and taught them that the intellects, in respect to their thoughts, have a limit at they stop and cannot exceed, and that Allah grants divine overflowing to the hearts of some of His slaves by which He teaches them knowledges directly from Him so that that is not impossible for them. Allah has entrusted in the celestial world matters which they infer by the existence of their effects on the elemental world. It is His word, "*He revealed in every heaven its command.*" (41:12)

They seek the realities of themselves by what they see - when the bodily form dies, none of the limbs is lacking. Thus they know that the perceiver and the mover of this physical body is another matter additional to it. They seek that extra matter, so they recognise themselves. Then they see what it knows after it was ignorant. They know that even if it is the most noble of bodies, it is accompanied by poverty and loss. They seek the cause by investigation, moving from one thing to another. Whenever they reach something, they see that it is in need of something else until examination leads them to something not in need of anything nor like anything more resembling anything nor having anything resemble it. They stop at it and say, "This is the First." It must be One by its essence in respect to its essence, and its firstness does not accept a second, nor does His oneness because He has no like nor commensurate. They unify Him with the *tawhid* of existence. When they see that, by themselves, possibles have no dominance by their essence, they know that this One gives them existence. They are in need of Him and His might to negate from them all that their essences are described by. This is the limit of the intellect [in its thought]

The policy of the Shari'a and Divine rules

We have clarified them like that. When a person of their sort arises whom they do not consider to have any rank in knowledge so as they believe that he has sound thought and appropriate investigation and then tells them, "I am the Messenger of Allah to you," they say, "Justice is more fitting. Look at the heart of the claim. Does he claim what is possible or what is impossible?" They said, "It is established with us that Allah has Divine overflowing which He can bestow on whomever He will as He made that overflow onto the spirits of these spheres and these intellects. All share in the possibility. Not one of the possibles is more entitled than others in what is possible. It only remains for us to look into the truthfulness of the person making a claim or see whether he lies or not. We do not advance either of these two judgements without proof. It is bad *adab* with our knowledge."

They say, "Do you have a proof of the truthfulness of what you claim?" He brings them proofs, and they look at his exposition and his proofs. They look to see what this person has of information about the results of thoughts and what he does not recognise of that. They know that part of what was revealed in every heaven by the One who revealed in every heaven its command is the existence of this person and what he brings. They hasten to him with belief and affirm him. They know that Allah has acquainted him with what He entrusted in the celestial world of gnosers which their thoughts do not reach. Then He gave him some of the gnosis of Allah which they do not possess.

They see that His sending-down knowledge of Allah to the common person, weak of opinion, is with that which is suitable for his intellect in that, and to the person with great intellect and sound examination it is also with that which is propitious for his intellect in that. They know that the man has received Divine overflowing which is beyond the level of the intellect, and that Allah has given him some knowledge of Him and power over it which he did not give them. They speak of His bounty and His advancing him above them. They believe in him and affirm and follow him. He appoints for them acts which bring a person near to Allah and he teaches them what Allah creates of possibles which are unseen for them, and what He will form in them in the future. He tells them about the Resurrection, the Rising, the Gathering, the Garden and the Fire.

The basis of the establishment of the Divine Shari'a in the world

Then Messengers followed one another in different times and different situations. Each of them affirmed his companion. They do not differ at all in the basic principles on which they rely and which they designate, even if judgements differ. Divine laws were sent down and judgements were sent down. Judgement is according to the time and the state as He said, "*We have appointed a law (Shari'a) and a practice for every one of you.*" (5:48) Their basic principles agree without there being any difference in any of it.

They differentiate between these prescribed prophetic procedures from Allah and what the metaphysicians stipulate of aphoristic procedures which their thought process demands. They know that this matter is more complete and that it is from Allah without a doubt. Therefore they accept what he teaches them from the unseen worlds and they believe in the Messengers. None of them resists but that he has not given faithful to himself in his knowledge and he has "*followed his passion*" (7:176) and

sought leadership over his fellow species. He is ignorant of his true self and its value, and he is ignorant of his Lord.

The root and cause of setting down the Shari'a in the world is to put the world in order and recognition of what was unknown from Allah which the intellect does not accept, i.e. what the intellect does not possess alone in respect of its examination. So Books were sent down containing this knowledge, and the tongues of the Prophets and Messengers articulated it. Thus the men of intellect knew that they are lacking in matters in knowledge of Allah which the Messengers complete.

The real men of intellect and those who only possess anxiety, disputation and words

By men of intellect, I do not mean the *mutakallimun* of today in wisdom. By men of intellect, I mean whoever follows the path of the Prophets by being occupied with his self, forms of self-discipline, striving, retreat and preparation for the *wâridât* which will come to them in their hearts when their attributes are part of the higher world in which revelation is given in the high heavens. These, i.e. the men of intellect, have chatter, speech and argument with those who use their thoughts in the matters of articulation which issued from earlier ones. They do not see the matter from which those men derived it. As those like this with us today, they have no value with any man of intellect. They mock the *deen* and belittle the slaves of Allah, and they only respect the one who is with them on their level. Love of this world has settled in their hearts as well as ambition for rank and leadership. Allah abases them as they abase knowledge and He degrades them and humiliates them. He makes them have recourse to the doors of ignorant kings and governors. The kings and governors abase them.

The words of men like this are of no importance. Allah has sealed their hearts (7:2), "*made them deaf and blinded their eyes*" (47:23) in spite of their vast claim that they are the best of the world. The *faqih* and *mufti* in the *deen* of Alla has a better state than these people in spite of his lack of scrupulousness in every aspect. The one with belief, in spite of the fact that he takes it through imitation, has a better state than these men of intellect in their claim. Far be it from the man of intellect that he be the like this!

We have perceived a few who had their state. They were the most knowledgeable of people about the scope of the Messengers and who was the greatest of them in following the *Sunna* of the Messenger, and the strongest of them in preserving his *Sunna*, gnostic of what is necessary for the majesty of the Real in exaltation, knowing what Allah has given His slaves among the Prophets and their followers among the *awliya'* in the way of knowledge of Allah from the direction of divine overflowing of election outside of ordinary teaching in the way of lessons and striving which the intellect cannot reach in respect of its thought.

I heard one of their great men, who had seen part of what Allah had opened upon me of knowledge of Him without reflection or reading. It was from a certain retreat which I did with Allah while I was not among the people of the quest. He said, "Praise be to Allah who has let me be in a time in which I saw one to whom Allah has brought mercy from Him and knowledge from His presence!" Allah bestows His mercy on whomever He will, and Allah has great bounty.

"Allah speaks the truth and guides to the Path." (33:4)

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CHAPTER 71

On the Secrets of Fasting

O you who laugh in the form of the weeper!
By us you are the complaint and the complainer.

Is the fast abstention without elevation
or elevation without restraint?

They are both together
for the one who affirms *tawhId* by association.

Intellects are trapped and prevented
from their freedom of action without nets or snares.

Intellects are impaired from their freedom of action,
severely cut off by the Shari'a.

They surrender to what their proof refutes
and they believe without perception.

The star of guidance carries them along,
swimming between the angels of the spheres.

My self, had it not been for you, I would not have been
as if I were Him, were it not for you! Were it not for you!

Fast from phenomenal being and do not break your fast!
The God of creation will bring you close, taking charge of you by that.

Inasmuch as it is a fast, intend that. By nature it is your nourishment.

If you reflect on it, there is a meaning in the fast
whenever a creature alights at your abode.

"There is nothing like the fast."
The Lawgiver said that to me, so reflect on that!

This is because it is non-action. Where is that
which you have done and where is your claim?

The matter has returned to its root.
My Lord has seized control of you by that.

If you reflect on the principle of the fast
and the basis of its meaning by your meaning,

Someone with news came from Him
about your prescribed fast which will divest you.

The fast belongs to Allah, so do not be ignorant.
You are merely the place of its manifestation.

The fast belongs to Allah,
and yet you are the one dying of hunger, so know that!

The Merciful made you feminine because of what appears
from you when He fashioned you (the self).

Glory be to the One who fashioned you! Welcome to Him!
He only gave that to you!

You, like the earth, are a bed for it
and your source-spring (eye) is described as weeping.

You see the source of the handiwork of Allah
between the two of you, so where is your manifestation?

When you called on Allah out of abasement to Him, the Great,
He said, "At your service" to you.

The highest pen in His Tablet
wrote your pure description from Him.

You are the source of all, not His source.
He brought you near from one aspect and put you far from another.

Beware of being content with what pleases you

for the sake of what He makes pleasing to you.

Remain with your root in all He desires.
Do not forget so as to be forgotten.

This is the knowledge
which came to me from one who does not lie.

He brought it down at the command of the One who has the most
knowledge of what is between the ascetics and devout.

Praise be to Allah who bestowed on me knowledge of lights and darkness.
He gave me a form whose perfection is only by your shelter.

Fasting is abstention and elevation

May Allah support you! Know that fasting (*sawm*) is both abstention and elevation. One says "the day has reached its full height (*sama*)" when it has reached its highest point. (The poet) Imru'l-Qays said:

When the day reached its height (*sama*) and its heat was intense,

i.e. the day reached its fullest extent. It is because the fast has a higher degree than all other acts of worship that it is called "fast" (*sawm*). Allah elevated it by denying that it is like any other act of worship as we will discuss. He denied its ownership to His servants although they worship Him by it and ascribed the fast to Himself. Part of its affirmation is that He rewards the one who is described by it by His hand even though He connected it to Himself when He stated that it is not like anything else.

Fasting in reality is non-action, not action

(In reality, fasting is non-action, not action. The negation of likeness is a negative attribute. Therefore the relationship between it and Allah is strengthened. Allah Almighty says about Himself, "*There is nothing like Him.*" (42:11) He denied that there is anything like Him and so there is nothing like Him by logical proofs and by the Shari'a. An-Nasa'i related that Abu Umama said, "I came to the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and said, 'Give me something that I can take from you.' He said, 'You must fast. There is nothing like it.'" He denied that it was like any of the acts of worship which are prescribed for the servants of Allah.

Anyone who recognises that it is a negative attribute – since it consists of abandoning things which break it – knows absolutely that there is nothing like it since it has no source which is described by understood existence. This is why Allah said, "The fast is Mine." In reality, it is neither worship or action. It is permissible to apply the name 'action' to it, as the application of the expression 'existent' can be applied to Allah. We understand that it is allowed although the ascription of existence to He whose

existence is the same as His Essence is not like the ascription of existence to us. "*There is nothing like Him.*" (42:11)

Every action of the son of Adam is His except fasting. It belongs to Allah.

Quotation of a Divine Prophetic *hadith*:

Muslim transmitted in the *Sahih* that Abu Hurayra reported from the Messenger of Allah that Allah said, "Every action of the son of Adam belongs to him except the fast. It is Mine, and I repay him for it. Fasting is a protection. When one of you has a day of fasting, he should then speak neither obscenely nor too loudly; and if someone seeks to curse him or fight with him, let him say, 'I am fasting.' By Him in whose hand is the soul of Muhammad, the smell of the mouth of the one who fasts is more delectable to Allah than the scent of musk. The one who fasts has two joys in which to delight: when he breaks his fast, he rejoices; and when he meets his Lord, he rejoices in his fast." (Muslim: 13:163)

The delight of the faster lies in his attachment to the degree of the negation of likeness

Know that since the Prophet denied that there is anything like the fast, as is established in the *hadith* of an-Nasa'i, and "Allah has nothing like Him," the faster meets his Lord described as "having nothing like him". He sees Him by it, and He is the Seer-Seen. This is why the Prophet said, "he rejoices in his fast" and not "He rejoices in meeting his Lord." Joy does not rejoice in itself; he is made to rejoice by it. Whoever has Allah as his sight when he sees and contemplates Him, only sees himself by seeing Him.

The faster rejoices at having the rank of negation of likeness. He rejoices in breaking the fast in this world since that gives the animal self its due since intrinsically seeks food. When the gnostic sees that his animal self needs food and sees that it exists by the nourishment which he gives it, then he fulfils its due which Allah has made obligatory for him and put in the position of being described as a right. He gives by the hand of Allah as He sees Allah in the encounter by the eye of Allah. This is why he rejoices at breaking the fast as he rejoices in his fast when he meets his Lord.

Fasting is a *samadiyya* attribute and the Real repays it

Clarification of what this tradition contains:

The slave is described as having a fast and being entitled to the name 'faster' by this attribute. After affirming his fast, then Allah strips it from him and ascribes it to Himself. He said, "Fasting is Mine," meaning the attribute of timeless self-reliance (*samadiyya*). It is disconnection from food. "It is only Mine, even if I have described you with it. I described you with a certain limited qualification of disconnection, not by the disconnection (*tanzih*) which My majesty deserves. I said, 'I repay him for it.'" Allah repays the fast of the faster when it is transferred to his Lord and he meets Him with an attribute unlike any other: which is the fast, since "the One who has nothing like Him" is only seen by the one who has nothing like him. This is like the text from Abu Talib al-Makki, one of the masters of the

people of tasting. "Its reparation shall be him in the saddlebags of whom it is discovered" (12:75) It is what is obliged by this ayat in this state.

The difference between negation of likeness from Allah and from fasting

Then He said, "Fasting is a protection," and it is a safeguard as He said, "*Fear Allah*," (2:194) i.e. take Him as a safeguard and also be a safeguard for Him. He put the fast in His position in acting as a safeguard. "There is nothing like Him," and fasting has no like among the acts of worship. One does not say that there is nothing like the fast. The thing is a matter of permanence or existence. Fasting is non-action. It is a non-existent intelligible and negative attribute. It has no like. It is not that there is nothing like it. This is the difference between the attribute of Allah in the negation of likeness and the way that the fast is described by it.

The faster being forbidden obscenity, shouting and strife

Then the Lawgiver placed prohibitions on the faster. The prohibition is non-action and a negative attribute. He said, "he should then speak neither obscenely nor shout." He did not command him to an action, but forbade that he be described by certain actions. Fasting is non-action, so the relationship between fasting and what he forbade the faster is valid. Then he commanded that he say to the one who curses him or fights with him, "I am fasting," i.e. I am leaving this action which you are doing, fighter or curser, to me. By the command of his Lord, he disconnects himself from this action. He reports that he is not acting, i.e. he does not have the attribute of cursing or fighting for the one who curses and fights him.

The smell of the mouth of the faster with Allah

Then he swore, "By the One who holds the soul of MUhammad in His hand, the changed breath of the faster..." This is the changed smell of the mouth of the faster which only exists by respiration. He respire these good words by which he is commanded. These words are: "I am fasting." These words and every breath of the faster is "more delectable on the Day of Rising," the day when people are resurrected for the Lord of the worlds, "with Allah." He used the name which joins all of their names and he used the name which has no like since only Allah is named by this name. It is in harmony with fasting which has no like.

He said, "more delectable than the scent of musk." The scent of musk is an existential matter which is perceived by smell. The person who has a balanced constitution enjoys it. The scent of changed breath is considered more fragrant with Allah than that, because the ascription of the perception of scents to Allah does not resemble the perception of scents to the smeller. We find it unpleasant, while with Him this breath is more sublime than the scent of musk. It is a described *ruh* which has no like as He described it. This scent is not like that scent. The scent of the faster comes from respiration. The scent of musk does not come from the respiration of musk.

Ibn 'Arabi with Musa ibn Muhammad al-Qabbab at the minaret in the Haram of Makka

Something like of this happened to me. I was with Musa ibn Muhammad al-Qabbab at the minaret in the Haram of Makka at the Hazawwara door. The *adhan* was being given. He had some food which had a very offensive smell to everyone who smelled it. I had heard in Prophetic tradition that the angels take offence at that to which the children of Adam take offence and that it is forbidden to go near the mosques with the smell of garlic, onions and leeks. I spent the night resolved to tell that man to remove that food from the mosque for the sake of the angels. Then I saw Allah Almighty in a dream in which He told me, "Do not tell him about that food. Its smell with Me is not like its smell with you." In the morning, he came to us as he usually did and I told him what had transpired. He wept and prostrated to Allah out of thankfulness. Then he told me, "My master, in spite of this, *adab* with the Shari'a is better," and he removed it from the mosque, may Allah have mercy on him.

Celestial natures are averse to foul odours

Sound natural constitutions in man and angel flee from foul unpleasant odours due to the offensiveness which they sense arising out of lack of harmony. The aspect of the Truth in foul odours is only perceived by Allah and whoever has the disposition to accept it among animals and men who have the nature of that animal. This is not the case with the angel. This is why he said, "with Allah". Inasmuch as the faster is a human being with sound constitution, he dislikes the bad breath of fasting in himself and others.

Do any creatures with sound constitution realise by their Lord a moment or in witnessing so that they absolutely perceive foul odours as pleasant? We have not heard of this. We said "absolutely" because some constitutions dislike the smell of musk and the rose, especially the hot constitution. That which is found to be offensive is not pleasant for the one with this constitution. This is why we said "absolutely" since most constitutions find musk, rose and the like fragrant. It is a rare constitution, i.e. unusual, which finds these pleasant smells offensive.

I do not know whether Allah has granted anyone the perception of the equality of scents since nothing has a foul smell with Him. We have not tasted this ourselves and it has not been transmitted to us that anyone else perceived that. Moreover, it is related that perfect men and the angels find these foul smells offensive. Only Allah perceives that as pleasant. This is transmitted. I also do not know what the case is with animals outside of man regarding that because Allah has not established me in the form of an animal other than man as He established me in the forms of His angels at times. Allah knows best.

The Gate of Quenching by which fasters enter the Garden

By way of the meaning, the Shari'a has described fasting with the perfection above which there is no perfection. This is because Allah gave it a special door with a special name which demands perfection. It is called the Door of the Quenched. The fasters enter it. Quenching is a degree of perfection in drinking. After being quenched, the drinker does not accept any more to drink to all. Whenever he accepts, then he was not quenched, whether it is a land or not a land among the lands of the animals.

Muslim related from the *hadith* of Sahl ibn Sa'd that the Messenger of Allah said, "There is a door in the Garden called the Quenching. The fasters will enter it on the Day of Rising. None except them will enter it. It will be said, 'Where are the fasters?' and they will enter it. When the last of them has gone in it, it will be locked and no one else will enter it." That is not said about any of the commanded or forbidden acts of worship except for the fast. By "the Quenching," He made it clear that they obtain the attribute of perfection in action since they are described by that which has no like as we already said. In reality, the one who has no like is the perfect. The fasters among the gnostics enter it here, and there they will enter it with the knowledge of all creatures.



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Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Testament on the Mantle of Initiation (*al-Khirqah*)

Gerald Elmore

Introduction

The short work translated here in its entirety is important for at least three reasons: Firstly, in its conclusion it gives the precise line of descent, or derivation (*nasab*) – actually, four of them – of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s formal spiritual affiliation with the hierarchic Messenger of God as represented by the Shaykh himself. Second, the main body of the text constitutes an attractive literary composition which begins by adumbrating the author’s view on the tradition of investiture of the Ṣūfī ‘mantle of initiation’ (*ilbās al-khirqah*), then proceeds to offer an extended string of moral imperatives – pearls of wisdom (*ḥikam*) cultivated over a long life of intensive mystical experience. At the time of setting the *Nasab al-khirqah* to paper that full, rich life was drawing to its natural close – which brings us to the third distinction of the book: the fact that it represents Ibn al-‘Arabī’s maturest thought on the right conduct of life.

The *Nasab* seems to have been composed in Damascus in or sometime before 633/1236 – that is, presumably around the time of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s autobiibliography written for al-Malik al-Muẓaffar (viz., the *Ijāzah*) and a few years after the one he drew up for Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (the *Fihrist*), neither of which list the work. As it is not mentioned by the author anywhere else either, the only evidence of it that we have is the assortment of two-dozen or so manuscripts listed by Yahia, ‘Awwād and Brockelmann.¹ There the situation is somewhat ambiguous. The good news is that the book is definitely by Ibn al-‘Arabī and it survives reasonably intact in many of the said manuscripts. What is *not* so encouraging, however, is the quality of the source-material when compared to most of the Shaykh’s other major works. The fact that none of the extant sources appear to be older than the 10th/16th century is both

1. See Osman Yahia, *Histoire et classification de l’oeuvre d’Ibn ‘Arabī* (Damascus, 1964), pp. 407–8, no. 530, where most of the references of Brockelmann and ‘Awwād are also given. In addition, Claude Addas has discovered several more manuscripts at the Zāhirīyah archive in Damascus (see her translation, cited below) and there are two copies at Princeton University. Surely many others will yet turn up, but it is not so likely that any will be greatly superior to those described below.

substantively unfortunate and worrisome in its implications: How has it come to pass that all of the earlier copies of such a manifestly significant document have disappeared? Might this not portend that for one cause or another, accidental or otherwise, the later transcripts do not perfectly reflect the original text? When we examine the material closely these suspicions are hardly allayed. Most of the known codices which I inspected in Turkey were very late and inferior.²

The four most serviceable manuscripts of the *Nasab* that I have seen are MSS. *Esad Efendi* 1507/ff. 87–98b, *Şehid Ali Paşa* 1344/156b–159b, *Zāhirīyah* 5924/21b–25,³ and *Nafiz Paşa* 384/228b–235. Of these, *Şehid Ali*, copied in 948/1541, is materially the earliest, but *Esad Efendi* purports to be based on a certified master-copy in the author's own hand, which was dated 633/1236. For the most part that claim may be taken at face value, so *Esad* – along with *Şehid Ali* and *Zāhirīyah* – will form the basis of the text translated here.⁴ *Nafiz* is also useful, however, for being fully vocalized.

The *Nasab al-khirqah* was published in Cairo in 1987 ('Ālam al-Fikr) by 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ḥasan Maḥmūd as an appendix to his edition of Ibn al-'Arabī's *K. al-Masā'il* (under the title of *Al-Tanazzulāt al-laylīyah fī l-aḥkām al-ilāhīyah*), on pp. 79–96 [hereafter, C]. The source of this text was a learned (but uncritical) monograph entitled *Al-Burhān al-jalī fī taḥqīq intisāb al-ṣūfīyah li-'Alī* (published in the Cairene journal, *Liwā' al-Islām*, from Feb., 1979 to May, 1981)⁵ by a Moroccan *sharīf* and Shādhilite traditionist then resident in Egypt, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Şiddīq al-Ghimārī al-Ḥasanī al-Idrīsī, who quoted Ibn al-'Arabī's *Nasab* to show that the Ṣūfīs recognized that their *khirqah* did not actually extend back continuously to the Prophet's noble house. The material appropriated by Maḥmūd was only part of the *Nasab* offered in Shaykh al-Ghimārī's study, however, so the journal series must still be consulted for about a third of the work (including the chains of transmission). But as far as it goes, the printed Arabic text is fairly sound, so that the manuscript basis – whatever it may

2. Included in that category would be MSS. *Hafid Efendi* 482, *Halet Ef.* 93, and *Hacı Mahmud* [= *Yahya*] *Ef.* 2415, 2718 & 5322 (all kept at the Süleymaniye). *Carullah* 2111 may have been produced as early as 915/1509, but it is incomplete and corrupt. *Nafiz* 384 is very neat but probably quite late. Besides the other sources mentioned *infra*, I have also consulted two late manuscripts at the Firestone Library in Princeton (*Yahuda* 4235 & 4098) and several others in Istanbul.

3. I am indebted to Jane Clark, librarian of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabī Society (Oxford), for providing me with a photocopy of this transcript. The other three manuscripts listed here were consulted at the Süleymaniye.

4. For a fuller account of the manuscript basis of the *Nasab*, see my review of Claude Addas's translation of the work (in this issue, pp.133–7) [included as appendix at the end of this article].

5. Vol. 33, no. 7, to vol. 35, nos. 9–10. The bulk of the first two-thirds of the *Nasab* may be found in the issue of June–July, 1980, pp. 39–42. The *silsilahs* are on p. 40 of the June, 1979, and p. 33 of the July issues. The journal ceased appearing for a year after President Sadat was assassinated, and, indeed, never resumed with its former quality.

have been – apart from the omissions, was evidently quite as good as those sources mentioned above.

Latest in time but certainly not least in authority, the recent French translation of the *Nasab* by Claude Addas – “Le Livre de la filiation spirituelle” (*‘Ayn al-Ḥayāt*, 5 [1999], pp. 5–44) – has greatly assisted me in the final revision of my own translation presented here, and I cannot fail to express my admiration for Addas’s scholarship and insight even where we, quite naturally, take a different view on this or that issue. Here and there we have established/interpreted the Arabic text of the *Nasab* differently, as well, and it is this that justified the publication of my own attempt, even after Addas’s superb accomplishment.

I first edited and translated the *Nasab al-khirqah* in the spring of 1993 during a study-mission to the magnificent Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul. At the time I did not know that Addas had already reached an advanced stage of work on the same project, and having completed my immediate task involving the *‘Anqā’ mughrīb* source-material, I decided to take the opportunity to collate the text of the *Nasab* on the basis of the best manuscripts available in Turkey. Later this collation was expanded to include two sources at Princeton and photocopies of other manuscripts. Meanwhile, my provisional rendition had undergone several recensions before I belatedly learned of my colleague’s final preparations to publish the same work just last year. It is hoped that this sudden *embarras de richesses* concerning a book which had barely been discussed until this year⁶ will not disappoint those students of the Shaykh who are so rightly aware of the need for scholars to economize their energies in tapping the great Ibn al-‘Arabian Reservoir.

At a later date I plan to publish my edition of the Arabic text of the *Nasab*, along with a more detailed study of the form and content of the document. For the time being, however, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s own voice remains clear enough herein (despite the inevitable distortions of translation) that we may trust him to speak for himself. My own close work with this little book has affected me more personally than with any other writing by the Shaykh. If that counts for companionship (*ṣuḥbah*), then we all might be ‘Akbarians’ who read the present work with attention, *in shā’ al-Lāh*!

6. That is, beyond the several adversions to the *Nasab* (and relevant translated passages) in Addas’s *Quest for the Red Sulphur* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 42–6 and 316–7, *et al.*

The Descent of the Mantle of Initiation (*Nasab al-Khirqah*)

of the poor Servant of God,
Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Ibn al-‘Arabī
(May God grant him success!)

In the name of God, the Merciful Mercifier!

PRAISE BELONGS TO GOD, Who confers upon His Servants, the People of Providence, His Beautiful Names, that He might transport them (*li-yuḥilla-hum*) in that most-radiant, noble Place of abiding (*al-maḥall*).⁷ Thus, God caused to ascend (*‘arraja*) the one who ascended by [His Names],⁸ who was among those whom He chose for His worship and bound to Himself up to [the Station of] “Two bows’ length or closer” (*qāb qawsayn aw adnā*).⁹ On account of that Divine Closeness (*al-qurb al-ilāhī*) God’s Servants live the most carefree and agreeable way of life. Moreover, He declares to them: “Know that it is not possible for one who is from Us to take aught from anyone but Us!”

Among [God’s chosen Servants, the Prophets] is the one who is at rest [at the summit] of his Ascent (*mi‘rāju-hu*), though he was not adopted as a son;¹⁰ and among them is the one who perseveres in his Night-journey (*isrā’u-hu*) and who agonizes [in his continuing struggle], though he cares not what troubles he may meet along the way if he attains the intended Object [in the end].¹¹ And among them is he whom God takes as a Companion and a Confidant, a beloved Friend and an Intimate¹² – the whole

7. Elect man is invested with the Divine names (attributes) as a robe of honor (*khil’ah*, cognate with the first verb used here). The *maḥall*, or ‘location’, is man’s heart, which – according to the celebrated tradition quoted below (at n. 36) – is the only thing that may ‘contain’ God. The ‘translocation’ of the mystic, then, is something of a *transubstantiation*, or apotheosis.

8. An allusion to the Prophet Muḥammad, who ascended to the highest heavens in his *Mi‘rāj*.

9. *Qur.* 53: 9, referring to the Angel Gabriel’s appearance to Muḥammad.

10. *Wa-in lam yutabanná*. The reference, I think, is to Jesus, who – though he is “at rest” with God after being raised up to Him (see *Qur.* 3: 55) – is not himself Divine as the false Christians suppose.

11. That is, Muḥammad, who journeyed by night from Mecca to Jerusalem (see *Qur.* 17: 1). While he may be said to remain in a condition of ‘becoming ever closer’ to God, he is not thereby inferior to one (such as Jesus) who has already ‘arrived.’

12. *Ṣafī wa-naḥī wa-ḥabīb wa-khidn*. The terms (which are virtually synonymous, all signifying a ‘friend’) could be construed to refer to the prophets, Adam, Moses, Abraham and David (among others).

[of mankind] by predestination being Lords of the ‘People of the Trusteeship’ (*sādāt ahl al-amānah*), who are trustworthy.¹³

There [in Destiny] he who stands with the Divine Spirit and he who stands with the one sprung “from spilled semen”¹⁴ shall be distinguished, there being naught but two groups [of creatures in the Hands of the Creator] (*qabḍatān*) – one of the Left, which is lesser, and another of the Right, made fortunate.¹⁵ But Mercy encompasses every single thing,¹⁶ by virtue of which God enables the distant to become the close, if He so will, that he might be distinguished by Closeness [to God – that is, saintliness]¹⁷ at the time of the Setting-forth [for Judgment] on account of His Foreknowledge that he was one who had attained unto [that Closeness], having reached his Destiny [in pre-eternity]. For the Real had spoken to him in his Innermost being (*sirru-hu*) in the silent ‘Voice of Reality’ (*lisān al-ḥāl*): “That is only by Our Will!” And He averred in the breasts of His Servants that the Divine Presence comprehends both the very highest and the lowest attribution.

I praise God with the Praise of one who speaks by the [Divine] ‘He’, not by the [human] ‘I’¹⁸ – and when [that Divine Praise] is delivered to its keeper and [revealed] within its vessel,¹⁹ it brings great benefit! And I bless His chosen Messenger who does not cease chanting the Qur’ān (May God bless and keep him!) as long as letter joins to letter and meaning to meaning, and the meanings take the utterance of the articulator (*kalimat al-lāfīz*) as a dwelling . . .²⁰

NOW THEN, after Praise and Blessings and [mention of] the abundant gifts and delights which God granted us when we sought refuge in Him, I say: “*Praise belongs to God, Who guides us to this – and we would not be well-guided were not God to guide us. Verily, the Messengers*

13. See *Qur.* 33: 72, where man accepts the “trusteeship” over which all other creatures demurred.

14. An allusion to *Qur.* 75: 37, referring to the man (*al-insān*) of physical nature.

15. That is, the damned and the blessed.

16. Cf. *Qur.* 7: 156.

17. *Al-qurb* = *walāyah* (sainthood, “closeness,” ‘nearness, or proximity’ to God).

18. See Addas’s perceptive comment in “La Filiation spirituelle”, n. 70.

19. *Al-ḥāfiẓ wa-l-inā’*. The Divine praise of al-Bisṭāmī (“Glory be to Me!”) is tantamount to the “I am the Real!” of al-Ḥallāj, and both indicate the sense of the genuine Divinity of Christ as the Word of God delivered to the Virgin Mary (in *Qur.* 4: 171).

20. This line has puzzled the copyists, who all offer different readings of it. The meaning is evidently as Addas has suggested: The Prophet’s recitation of the Scripture lives on, as it were, in the continuous chanting of it on the lips of his followers, the Ṣūfīs. Each clause of the opening poem, which is simply a stylized *basmalah*, rhymes in *-nā*. Note also that the section contains no mention of the proper theme of the present work (although an oblique reference was noted in the first sentence).

of our Lord have brought the Truth!"²¹ And one of the verses brought from 'the Exalted, the Wise' [Matrix of the Scripture]²² by the Noble Messenger in the Scripture sent-down, which is the Glorious Qur'ān, [is the following]:

O Children of Adam, We have sent down upon you a Vestment (*libās*) to cover your shameful parts, and beautiful Raiment (*rīsh*); and the Robe of God-fearing (*libās al-taqwā*) – that is best. [*Sūrat al-A'raf*: 26]

The 'indispensable' [aspect] of the Outer Vestment (*al-libās al-ẓāhir*) is that which covers the shameful parts – that being the "Robe of God-fearing" [*i. e.*, decency] – for the sake of protection.²³ The "beautiful Raiment" is what exceeds that, in which there is adornment (*al-zīnah*) – "the Adornment of God which He brings forth for His Servants"²⁴ from the treasures of His Transcendencies, and which He has made a Saving grace (*khālīṣah*)²⁵ for the Believers during the life of this World and on the Day of Resurrection,²⁶ when they shall not be called to account for it. But if they wear it and adorn themselves therein without this Intent and without this Presence,²⁷ wearing it in vanity and conceit, then that is "the adornment of the life of this World (*al-ḥayāh al-dunyā*)."²⁸ For the cloth (*al-thawb*) is one, but the judgment upon it is various, in accordance with the variety of intentions.²⁹

Again, the [real] Robe of God-fearing – which is the "Best" Vestment [in the above-quoted verse] – was sent down into the hearts of the Servants of God, it being in the exact form of the Outer Vestment.³⁰ Like the latter, it is an 'indispensable' vestment (*libās ḍarūrī*) which covers the shameful things of the Inner aspect (*saw'āt al-bāṭin*) –

21. Qur. 7: 43.

22. God is described by the epithets, *al-'Alī al-Ḥakīm*, in Qur. 42: 51 (and, separately, in many places). Just six verses later, in 43: 4, however, the same terms are applied to the celestial prototype, or metaphysical matrix, of the Qur'ān (the *umm al-kitāb*), and our present passage is not without a like ambiguity.

23. In current usage, *libās al-taqwā* has become an expression for modesty, or common 'decency'.

24. Qur. 7: 32.

25. An allusion to the second half of the verse just quoted; but the key-word, *khālīṣah*, is explained more clearly in Qur. 38: 46: "Verily, We have saved them with a Saving qualification (*khālīṣah*) – the recollection of the Final Abode."

26. Maḥmūd (the editor of C) reads "the day of Establishment" (*iqāmah* instead of *qiyāmah*) in the eternal Abode (*dār al-muqāmah*), with reference to Qur. 35: 35.

27. That is, without the intent to recollect the Hereafter and, hence, be *present* therein even now (see n. 25).

28. See Qur. 18: 28 & 46; and cf. 57: 20.

29. The "beautiful Raiment" and the "Adornment of God" are the spiritual-intellectual endowments and virtues which, in the Ṣūfīs, bring the recollection of eternity, and are the 'saving grace' which purifies them for eternal bliss in the Hereafter; but in the worldly these same endowments are mere vainglory, leading to damnation.

30. Note that the Shaykh already identified the *outer* most garment as the prerequisite *libās al-taqwā*

that being fear of God regarding everything forbidden (*taqwá l-mahārim*), in principle. In it, also, is that which is like the “beautiful Raiment” in the Outer aspect – that being the Vestment of the Noble Moral qualities (*makārim al-akhlāq*), such as the supererogatory acts of devotion, like forgiveness and peace-making in cases when the Lawgiver has permitted you to assert your right.³¹ But the relinquishing of one’s right is one of the things whereby Man may adorn himself within, for that is the Adornment of God in the Inner aspect – that being every Inner Vestment to which the Law shows you the way.³²

The Inner Vestment has been realized in the form of the Outer as to the Law; and, even as the Outer is various in its purposes and intents, so the Inner Vestment differs in intents and purposes. When this was determined in the minds of the People of God,³³ they desired to bring together the two modes of Vestiture (*libsatān*) and to adorn themselves with the two types of Adornment in order to combine the two Most-excellent Qualifications (*al-ḥusaynayayn*)³⁴ and, thus, come back from the two extremes.³⁵ For the cause of their donning this Distinguished Mantle (*al-khirqah al-ma’lūmah*) is that it might be an indication (*tanbīh*) of that to which they aspire for the Vestment of their Inner parts; and they deem that [to be a sign of] good Companionship and Moral instruction (*ṣuḥbah wa-adab*).

The origin of this Vestment, in my view – according to what was revealed to my Innermost being – is God’s own ‘putting on’ the Heart of His Servant. For verily, He has declared: “My Earth and My Heaven do not contain Me, but the Heart of My faithful Servant contains Me.”³⁶ For the clothing ‘contains’ its Wearer. When that [*i.e.*, the Divine presence] was decreed in my Innermost being, and my standing among the Knowers of God became magnified, I composed these verses on the subject:

(= basic decency), but this, the glorified *inner* one, is the “best” of them – the *bona fide* robe of God-fearing/piety, which, however, takes the same generic form as the outer.

31. Such as, for instance, turning the other cheek if someone should strike you without cause (see *Matt.* 5: 39). Most of the commandments of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount would be classed as acts of supererogation (*nawāfil*). It is precisely their voluntary (creative) nature that lends them salvific efficacy.

32. That is, as an ideal (not a mandatory) objective.

33. “When this was determined”: that is, in the mid-4th/10th century, when the tradition of the symbolic mantle of initiation was first instituted by Ṣūfīs like al-Shiblī and Ibn Khafīf, as we will see below (at nn. 40–1).

34. See E. W. Lane, *Arabic–English Lexicon* (rep., Cambridge, 1984), s.v. *ḥusaynā*.

35. *Fa-yathābū minā l-ṭarafayni*. The verb is cognate with the word, *thawb* (clothing; garment). The “two extremes,” or ‘extremities’, have various significations in proverbs (see *ibid.*, s.v. *ṭaraf*), but the usage here is probably rhetorical.

36. On this very popular (but non-canonical) *ḥadīth qudsī*, see Su’ād al-Ḥakīm, *Al-Mu’jam al-ṣūfī* (Beirut, 1981), pp. 1265–6.

[THE MANTLE OF THE HEART]³⁷

Of knowers, am I not most avaricious
 with my Way and my Secret³⁸ – most ungenerous?
 No! This is not avarice, but, rather,
 it is the most *generous* form of Favor:
 I will accommodate [my Lord] whenever
 my knowing Heart realizes His [Presence]!
 I am the Sun, disclosed by my own Essence,
 if I will; and the waning Moons reveal me
 When I will *that* – All of this in accordance
 with my Station. And the Stars will reveal me
 When the Night becomes most dark from my Absence
 and the World benighted loses sight of me.
 But when my Mantle ‘covers’ [God’s] Essence,³⁹
 all will be bewildered by its brilliance!

Now, the combination of the two types of Vestiture appeared from the time of [the tenth-century Eastern Ṣūfī masters] al-Shiblī⁴⁰ and Ibn Khafīf,⁴¹ *et cetera*, and our own course has followed their way (*madhhab*) in that.⁴² We have donned [the Mantle] at the hands of a number of noble Ṣūfī masters⁴³ after having been their companion and followed their Moral example, so that my wearing of the Vestment might be authenticated, both externally and internally. But *our* way regarding the investiture of

37. The poem is included in the *Dīwān Ibn al-‘Arabī* (Bulaq, 1855), p. 58 (no. 147). The metre is *al-mutaqārib*.

38. *Dīn-ī wa-sirr-ī*. For the many possible connotations of these two words, see Lane, *Lexicon*, s.v.

39. *Idhā labbisat khirqat-ī dhāta-hu*. God ‘wears’ the mantle of the Ṣūfī’s heart, which is His proper ‘garment’ – the only created thing that might be said to contain Him.

40. Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Dulaf b. Jaḥdar al-Shiblī of Baghdad (d. 945). See also at n. 116, below.

41. Abū ‘Abd al-Lāh Muḥammad Ibn Khafīf b. Isfakshādh of Shiraz (d. 982). See also at n. 135.

42. Al-Shiblī was the initiator of the first formal investiture, or line of descent, listed below which ultimately was received by Ibn al-‘Arabī, and Ibn Khafīf instituted the second. In each case these masters had themselves been the final link in a chain leading back to God (through Gabriel and the Prophet), but the associations before the mid-tenth century had not been formalized by an actual hierurgic rite of investiture (as is clear from the technical language used in the *silsilahs* themselves).

43. The word translated “a number” here actually implies a rather numerous company (*jammah*), raising at least the possibility that Ibn al-‘Arabī may have received *other* than the four investitures certified in the *Nasab*.

Aspirant-disciples (*libās murīd al-tarbīyah*) is different from what is current today⁴⁴ – and that is that the Master should carefully examine the Aspirant who aspires to be invested with the Mantle, since any spiritual State (*ḥāl*) in which the Disciple finds himself may be for him a deficiency.⁴⁵ So the Master ‘invests’ himself in that State in order to ascertain the reality of it as it inundates him, the power of the State flowing into the garment (*al-thawb*) that the Master happens to be wearing. Then he takes off the garment while in that State, and clothes him – the Aspirant – in it, so that the flow of spiritual ‘Wine’ (*sarayān al-khamr*) might permeate him, pervading his members, and inundate him, perfecting the State for him. But nowadays this [sort of initiatic procedure] is quite rare,⁴⁶ and when the spiritual energies (*himam*) of people fall short of the kinds of things of which we have just been speaking, they degenerate to the level of the common masses. Even then, however, they stipulate therein certain conditions (*shurūṭ*) – this Distinguished Mantle being conditional on the form of what the Real has proclaimed with regard to covering shameful things (*sitr al-saw’āt*):

For the shameful of falsehood should be covered with the vestment of Truthfulness (*libās al-ṣidq*); and the shameful of treachery with the garment of Trustworthiness (*thawb al-amānah*);

And perfidy is covered with the mantle of Fidelity (*khirqat al-wafā’*); and hypocrisy with the mantle of Sincerity (*al-ikhlāṣ*);

And foolish morals are covered by the mantle of Noble morals (*makārim al-akhlāq*); and reprehensible acts by the mantle of Praiseworthy acts (*al-maḥāmid*); and every base nature with the mantle of every Sublime nature (*khuluq sanī*);

And the mere renouncing of [belief in] the secondary causes (*al-asbāb*) must be covered with the Absolute Affirmation of the ONE (*tawḥīd al-tajrīd*);

And trust in finite entities (*al-tawakkul ‘alā l-akwān*) is covered with complete Trust in God alone;

44. This line is only found in some of the sources; and although it is probably an interpolation, it could well have been added by the author himself.

45. For instance, a highly intelligent disciple might lack compassion or common sense, and even one who is very virtuous may still suffer from spiritual pride (*à la* the young man in *Matt.* 19: 16–23).

46. Recall that this was written at the end of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s career. A similar glimpse into the Shaykh’s empirical teaching method may be found in an early work, the *‘Anqā’ mughrīb* (Cairo, 1954), pp. 11–12 (translated in G. Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time* [Leiden, 1999], pp. 264–5); and an even more germane passage is in the *Futūḥāt al-makkīyah* (Cairo, 1911), vol. I, pp. 186–7, translated below (n. 147).

And thanklessness (*kufr al-ni'mah*, the 'unbelief of the benefit') with Thankfulness towards the Benefactor (*shukr al-Mun'im*).⁴⁷

Then adorn yourself in the Adornment of God (*zīnat al-Lāh*) with vestiture of the Praiseworthy Morals (*malābis al-akhlāq al-maḥmūdah*), such as:

Silence (*al-ṣamt*) regarding what does not concern you,
Averting the eyes from what is improper to gaze upon,
Inspecting the bodily members with timorousness,
Relinquishing mistrust of people,

Perusing (*taṣaffuh*) the daily pages of your actions and what the pens of the Noble Scribes record against you,⁴⁸

Contentment (*al-qanā'ah*) with little sustenance – not looking for an increase in anything but good deeds,⁴⁹

Examination of the soul's dispositions (*akhlāq al-naḥs*),
Repeatedly seeking God's Forgiveness (*ta'āhud al-istighfār*) and turning to recite the Qur'ān,

Adherence to the edifying manners of Prophetary Culture (*al-ādāb al-nabawīyah*) and studying the morals of the Righteous (*akhlāq al-ṣāliḥīn*),

Striving emulously (*al-munāfasah*) in matters of Religion and Kinship relations,
Diligence in friendliness towards neighbors,

And the expending of one's very self/honor (*badhl al-'ird*). The Messenger of God (May God bless and keep him!) spoke of that, saying: "Is anyone of you able to be as Abū Ḍamḍam? When he woke up in the morning he used to declare, 'O God! Verily, I give my self/honor ('ird-ī) as alms to Your Servants.'"⁵⁰

[Similarly,] you must be generous of soul (*sakhā' al-naḥs*, = 'ready to relinquish what one has') – that is, expend the soul/self to satisfy the needs of mankind;⁵¹

Do favors (*iṣṭinā' al-ma'rūf*) for both friend and foe, treating all alike with humility, gentleness and long-suffering;

47. These first 'ten commandments' correspond to the "indispensable" aspect of the robe of God-fearing. What follows represents the pearls of cultivated virtue, which adorn those more spiritual whose "treasures are in Heaven."

48. Cf. *Qur.* 82: 10–13.

49. The second clause is added only in E (and those sources based on it) and C.

50. Not included in any of the major collections of *ḥadīth*, but compare the saying of Abū Dardā': "Lend from your self/honor for the day of your need." Though it may connote 'honor' (*ḥasab, sharaf*), 'ird' is a synonym of *naḥs* (self); hence, Abū Dardā''s maxim is similar to the lines following.

51. From this point I have translated the continuous series of recommended virtues as imperatives (although the author does not actually begin using the imperative mode until later).

Overlook the misstep of Brethren;

Do not go into the disputes that broke out among the Companions [of the Prophet] and the great ones of the past;⁵²

Abandon the company of the heedless, except to call them to the Recollection of God or to mention His Name in their presence;

Refrain from becoming engrossed in the subject of the non-essential accidents (*al-a'rāḍ*) or in the Signs of God (*āyāt al-Lāh*);⁵³

Abstain from speaking evil of rulers⁵⁴ and of sinners in the Community of Muḥammad (May God bless and keep him!);

Renounce anger – except over violation of the Sacred things of God (*maḥārim al-Lāh*) – and relinquish malice and spite in your heart;

Pardon the one who has harmed you – that is, do not even defend yourself [from harm];⁵⁵

“Annul the inadvertent stumblings” of men of Virtue (*ahl al-murū'ah* = ‘gentlemen’), “those of Goodly-qualities” (*dhawū l-hay'āt*);⁵⁶

Maintain the protection of women (*ahl al-sitr* = ‘ladies’);

Revere Religious scholars (*al-'ulāmā'*) and all people of Religion (*ahl al-dīn*);

Honor the aged;⁵⁷ and honor the ‘Honored one of the nation’ (*karīmat al-qawm*) – whoever that may be, whether Muslim or infidel – all of that in accordance with the Divine-legal statute as to how you should honor that personage;⁵⁸

Show ‘courtesy’ (*ḥusn al-adab*) toward God and toward everyone else – living or dead, present or absent;

Refute the slander against a Muslim’s reputation;

Beware of much talking, affectation and bragging – for, truly, much talk leads to a fall;

But have due respect for the great, kindness for the weak, and mercy for him of little stature – seeking out those who are needy to share your possessions with them by means of charitable donation and gift;

52. This is found only in E and C and, indeed, a similar dictum is given below (at n. 74).

53. The accidents are unintelligible in their phenomenal nature and the Signs of God are inscrutable as noumena.

54. “Of rulers”: only in E and C.

55. Only he who does not resist evil can sincerely pardon it, because he has not personally interacted with it.

56. An allusion to the *ḥadīth*, “Annul the inadvertent stumblings of those of goodly qualities” (see *Musnad Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal* [Cairo, 1894–6], vol. VI, p. 181; and *Sunan Abī Dā'ūd* [Cairo, 1950], vol. IV, p. 189, no. 4).

57. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 361, no. 23: “Part of the honoring (*ijlāl*) of God is the honoring (*ikrām*) of the aged.”

58. The reference, I think, is to the *de facto* ruler of the land (who, in Crusader times, might well be a Christian or an Ismā'īlī).

Be easy-going in your speech and guidance,⁵⁹ and entertain the guest;

Disseminate peace and long life [in your social greetings] to people, pursuant to the Divine-legal statute, and be not one who curses and defames, finds fault and loudly scolds;

Requite no one with evil though you be in your right, except by way of doing good (*iḥsān^{an}*);⁶⁰

Give “sincere counsel (*al-naṣīḥah*) for the sake of God, His Messenger and the leaders of the Muslims and their common people”;⁶¹

Do not look for misfortunes for anyone, and curse no one – specifically, one of God’s Servants [i.e., any human being] – whether living or dead. For you cannot know what will be the end of the infidel who is still living, nor [do you know] what was the end of the departed [if he was not an unbeliever].⁶²

Do not condemn any of those addicted to carnal appetites (*al-shahawāt*) for their lusts;

Do not urge leadership (*al-riyāsah*) upon anyone;

Do not hold down your children to serve your own interests;

Beware lest you let people ‘urinate’ in your ear by passing on to you what you will be sorry to hear about yourself or another;⁶³

And, certainly, you should love the Believers, *all* of them – those who do you harm and those who are good to you – because of their love of God and His Messenger. Do not despise them on account of their contempt for you or anyone else other than God and His Messenger. This I was advised by the Messenger of God (May God bless and keep him!) in a Dream (*al-manām*) concerning someone [namely, Abū ‘Abd al-Lāh al-Ṭarṭūsī] who had slandered my Master [Abū Madyan] so that I became angry with him.⁶⁴ Then I saw the Messenger of God (May God bless and keep him!) in the Dream, and he asked me:

59. Or perhaps this word should go with the following clause: ‘Guide and entertain the travelling guest.’

60. Maḥmūd cites *Qur.* 41: 34 in this connection.

61. This is part of a well-known *ḥadīth* (recorded by both al-Bukhārī and Muslim) which identifies ‘sincere counsel’ as the very essence of religion (see A. J. Wensinck, *et al.*, *Concordance et indices de la tradition musulmane* [Leiden, 1936–69], s.v. *naṣīḥah*, for references to this and related traditions). Addas points out that Ibn al-‘Arabī has discussed this *ḥadīth* at length in the *Futūḥāt* (IV, 468–70).

62. The unbeliever who is still alive may repent before his death, and even a professed Muslim who has died may not have his belief accepted by God. (One can be sure only of the fate of unbelievers who have died). This passage can be read otherwise, however, by taking the mention of the infidel’s end (*mā yakhtimu la-hu*) as a reference to *Qur.* 2: 7, *et al.*, where it is said of the unbelievers that “God has sealed (*khatama*) their hearts,” etc.

63. Some sources read: “What will delight you to hear.”

64. We are told the identities of those concerned in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *Al-Durrah al-fākhirah* (MS. Esad Ef. 1777,

“Why are you angry with So-and-so?” “Because of *his* anger,” I answered, “and his slandering my Master.”

Then he said (Peace be upon him!): “Do you not know that he loves God and he loves me?” I answered, “Yes, of course.”

“Then why do you not love him for his love of me,” he asked, “when you are angry with him because of his anger for your Master?” “O Messenger of God,” I replied, “from this very moment I will do so! There is no better Teacher (*mu‘allim*) than you, who have called my attention to something of which I had been forgetful.”

Take no joy in a reputation flattering to yourself spreading among the general public, even if you deserve it. For you never know – will it *remain* with you or be stripped from you?⁶⁵

Do not set yourself apart from the Believers by a praiseworthy, extraordinary Virtue (*khulq gharīb maḥmūd*) distinguished from you, except you be counted among those who merely seek to emulate that Virtue.⁶⁶

Do not put on a display of humility (*al-khushū‘*) in your outward behavior (*zāhiru-ka*) by casting yourself supine on the ground, unless you are really so disposed in your Inner being (*bātinu-ka*).

Desire not vain increase (*al-takaththur*) from the World.

Care nothing for the ignorance of him who does not know your worth; rather, it is not seemly that there be any sense of your worth even in your own eyes.

Have no desire that people should listen to your speech.

Be not anxious⁶⁷ to give answer to anything displeasing said about you.

Be patient ‘with’ the Real and ‘along with’ the Real:⁶⁸ “And be patient⁶⁹ along with those who call upon their Lord, morning and evening, seeking His Face. Do not look beyond them, desiring the adornment of the life of this World (*zīnat al-ḥayāh*

f. 105, translated by Ralph W. J. Austin in *Sufis of Andalusia* [London, 1971], p. 155), and in the *Futūḥāt* (IV, 498, ll. 27–33seq.) we learn that the episode took place in Tlemcen in 1194.

65. As a coat of arms is stripped from a fallen enemy.

66. That is, your ‘genius’ is the “virtue” (*khulq*: ‘natural disposition; moral characteristic’), not yourself.

67. *Lā tajza‘u*. The verb is the contrary of *iṣbir* (“be patient”) in the next line.

68. *Wa-ṣbir li-l-Ḥaqqi wa-ma‘a l-Ḥaqqi*. The first verbal phrase has ‘with’ (*li-*) in the sense of *against*: ‘withstand, endure’; and the second is its contrary: ‘along with’ (*ma‘a*). Thus, the Divine reality is to be viewed as both ‘Agent’ and ‘Patient’ of the trials of life requiring endurance – both “those who call” for help and their “Lord” to Whom they appeal in the verse following.

69. *Wa-ṣbir nafsa-ka*. The object here is actually redundant, being implicit in all intransitive usages of this verb. Moreover, God is the implicit cause of the afflictions requiring the soul’s patience, as we may see in ‘Amr b. ‘Uthmān’s definition of *ṣabara* (quoted by Lane): “to maintain patience with/against God and to receive His trials with an unstrained mind” (*Lexicon*, s.v.).

al-dunyā), and obey not him whose heart We have made heedless of Our Remembrance, who follows his pleasure and whose affair is lost.⁷⁰ Say: 'The Real/Truth is from your Lord!' So, whoever will, may he believe; and whosoever will, let him disbelieve."⁷¹

Be equitable in the face of [the demands of] your lower-soul, but do not demand equity from anyone else in regard to your own right.

Greet Muslims in the first place; and return the greeting of Peace upon whomever greets you – loud enough that he can hear.

Be careful not to speak evil of the wealthy when they are niggardly or of worldly people when they vie with each other in the World, and do not covet what they have.

Invoke God in favor of the rulers and those in authority, not against them, even when they are oppressive.

Strive against your lower-soul and your passion, for, truly, it is your greatest enemy.⁷²

Do not sit much in the market-streets, nor even stroll therein.

Forbear presenting your [complaint of] damage to the Religious authorities (*a'immat al-dīn*), and do not even bear testimony against the people of the *Qiblah* (*viz.*, Muslims) in anything that may lead the hearer thereof to depart from the Community.⁷³

Hold back from going into what was disputed among the Companions [of the Prophet] – indeed, regarding [anything having to do with the condition of] the dead, "for they have reached what they sent ahead".⁷⁴

Abandon him who is a hypocrite (*al-murā'*) with regard to [faith in] the Qur'ān and Predestination (*al-qadar*).⁷⁵

70. *Qur.* 18: 28. The ostensible purpose for quoting this verse in this context is the mention of *zīnah* (adornment; clothing). The adornment of this world are pleasures (*ahwā'*), while the 'Adornment of God' is the saving grace of His Remembrance (*dhikr*), made manifest within in the moral teachings which are the subject of this portion of the *Nasab*.

71. *Qur.* 18: 29. "The Real/Truth is from your Lord": *Al-ḥaqq min Rabbi-kum*. That is, while we are to be patient "along with" those who believe and "call upon their Lord" through the trials of life, we are also to remind ourselves that the reality of our suffering has its true source in God, and we are, thus, to be patient with/against Him as the Lord even as we are *along* with Him in the company of His servants.

72. The 'greater *jihād*' is the struggle of one's true, higher self and intellect (*'aql*) against the lower-self (*nafs*) and passion (*hawā'*).

73. That is, to turn away from the *qiblah* (the direction of Mecca, which all Muslims face in prayer).

74. *Fa-anna-hum afdaw ilā mā qaddamū*. This is a quote from a *ḥadīth* which begins: "Do not revile the dead..." (see al-Bukhārī, *Al-Jāmi' al-ṣaḥīḥ*, 23: 97 and 81: 42; and *Musnad*, VI, 180, *et al.*). The point is that all we can really know about the state of the Afterlife (*mā ba'd al-mawt*) is that it is determined by our actions in this life. And it was precisely such matters as eschatology and the Hereafter on which the Companions did not always agree.

75. That is, faith in the eternity (uncreatedness) of the Qur'ān as the Speech of God and in predestination as a sixth tenet of Islam (after belief in God, His angels, His books, His prophets, and the Resurrection of the body).

Avoid the company of sectarians and innovators (*ahl al-ahwā' wa-l-bida'*) pernicious to Religion and secular authority (*al-dīn wa-l-mulk*).⁷⁶

You must expel greed, envy and vanity from your heart when you give free rein to these qualities in other than their legitimate places (*al-mawāṭin al-mashrū'ah*).⁷⁷

You must enter into the company of people (*al-jamā'ah*), for 'the wolf eats none but the stray [sheep]'.⁷⁸

Beware of haste in your affairs, except in five things: in Prayer, to begin at the right time; in undertaking the Pilgrimage as soon as you are able; in giving food to guests before beginning conversation; in preparation of the dead for burial; and the marrying-off of the virgin as soon as she reaches maturity.

Exert every effort in the sincere counsel (*naṣḥ*) of God's Servants – whether Muslim, infidel or polytheist – with knowledge and practical advice.⁷⁹

Cut off the causes/opportunities of carelessness [in matters of formal Religion], and uphold the performance of [the five daily] Prayers and the perfection of their ritual form.

Carry out a reckoning (*al-ḥisbah*) upon the lower-soul [before you are called to the Reckoning].⁸⁰

Depart from ignorance in the pursuit of Knowledge: And [an instance of that is] that you have the best intentions towards anyone pursuing Knowledge; and regret any neglect in putting those intentions to good use.⁸¹

Shun passions and the Abode of Illusion (*dār al-ghurūr*) [= this World].⁸²

Believe that the lower-soul (*al-naḥs*) is loathsome, for the lower-soul – in the belief of the People of God – is every objectionable thought/inclination (*khāṭir madhmūm*).

Oppose acts of injustice;

Improve your eating habits;⁸³

76. The last word is read as *mulūk* (kings), *milk* (property), and *milal* (minority religious communities) by the various sources, and is omitted by others.

77. Greed for knowledge, envy of the virtuous and pride in accomplishment may not always be wrong.

78. '*Ilm wa-siyāsah*. From this point on in the series, the 'praiseworthy morals' (*akhlāq maḥmūdah*) are no longer phrased as imperatives in the Arabic, though I have continued to render them as such for stylistic reasons.

79. As Maḥmūd suggests, this could be reminiscent of the *ḥadīth*, "Call your selves to reckoning before you are called to the Reckoning" (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Tirmidhī* [Cairo, 1931], 35: 25).

80. Like Jesus, Ibn al-'Arabī often takes a general moral platitude and expands upon it in provocative new ways.

81. An allusion to *Qur.* 57: 20, describing the life of this world.

82. *Ṭī'mah*: 'one's manner of eating'. To be *ṭayyib al-ṭī'mah* is to be careful to eat only what is lawful (see *Lexicon*, s.v. *ṭī'mah*). In a tradition (quoted by Maḥmūd), the Prophet told a companion that if he

Strive to reconcile discord⁸³ – for God will bring together His Servants on the Day of Resurrection;

Drop suspicion [of people], but always be cautious;

And have fear and anxiety (*al-khashiyah wa-l-hamm*) only with respect to [the Judgment of] God.

And have love and hate (*al-hubb wa-l-bughd*) for the sake of Him, loving affection (*al-mawaddah*) for the Family of God's Messenger – May God bless and keep him! – and friendship (*al-muwālāh*) for the Righteous.

Weep much [for the love of God];

Implore God and supplicate Him, night and day;

Flee from the path of leisurely comforts;

Humble yourself in every circumstance (*hāl*) before God – Be He exalted!;

Watch out for inordinate sadness and spoiling life by mulling over the debt you owe the Benefactor (*shukr al-Mun'im*) for all that He has bestowed upon you.

Aspire to God in every circumstance you are in;

Help each other to Piety and Fear of God (*al-birr wa-l-taqwā*);

[Answer the call of the Summoner (*ijābat al-dā'ī*)];⁸⁴

Support the oppressed (*nuṣrat al-maẓlūm*) and answer the one who calls out for help;⁸⁵

Aid the one who is grieving and dispel the sorrow of the sorrowful;

Fast by day and rise to pray at night – and if it be to spend the whole night in prayer (*al-tahajjud*), that is better.

Commemorate the dead and undertake to visit their graves, but do not use evil speech (*hujr*) while you are there.⁸⁶

Give your blessing to funeral processions and follow in them – in the forefront if you are on foot, and at the rear if you are riding.

Stroke the heads of orphans,⁸⁷ visit the sick, dispense free-will offerings of charity

improved his eating habits his prayer would be answered. We could also read *tu'mah* (means of subsistence; manner of gain, livelihood).

83. Cf. *Qur.* 8: 1 and 49: 9–10.

84. Only in E and C (the first of which evinces Imāmīte sympathies).

85. The Egyptian editor of C opines that this applies to the obligation to help Muslim countries under attack by infidels.

86. The last clause is omitted in E. *Hujr* here probably refers to some kind of tabu language related to pagan superstitions concerning supplication of the dead. As we may infer from many traditions cited by Wensinck (see *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition* [rep., Leiden, 1971], s.v. grave[s]), visiting cemeteries was at first prohibited by Islamic law, but later allowed.

87. Cf. *Musnad*, II, 263 & 287 and V, 250.

[to the poor] (*al-ṣadaqāt*), and love those who are good (*ahl al-khayr*).⁸⁸

Continuously remember [the Names of God] and fear [Him] (*dawām al-dhikr wa-l-murāqabah*).⁸⁹

Have your soul keep strict account of its actions (*muḥāsabat al-nafs ‘alā l-af‘āl*), external and internal.

Become intimately familiar with the Speech of God [*viz.*, the Qur’ān] (*uns bi-kalām al-Lāh*).

Take wisdom (*al-ḥikmah*) from the words of every speaker – indeed, from your observation of everything seen.

Bear patiently with God’s Judgments (*aḥkām al-Lāh*) – for, verily, you are before His Eye (*bi-‘ayni-hi*), as He has declared to you: “Wait patiently for your Lord’s Judgment, for, indeed, you are before Our Eyes.”⁹⁰

Give preference/your whole attention to the Command/Affair of God (*al-uthrah li-amr al-Lāh*),⁹¹ and resist [turning to] every secondary cause brought close (*sabab muqarrab*) to Him.⁹²

Use all of your strength (*tāqah*) to satisfy the ‘conditions’ of God’s Love and His Acceptance (*maḥābb al-Lāh wa-marādī-hi*).⁹³

Be content with [God’s] Decree (*al-qadā’*) – not necessarily with each thing decreed (*al-maqḍī*), but, rather, with its Decree itself⁹⁴ – and receive with joy whatever may come from Him (Be He exalted!).⁹⁵

88. That is, treat all for the best according to their circumstances.

89. *Murāqabah* means to ‘observe carefully, watch out for, keep an eye on’, but the undertood object is God, not the heart (as is frequently assumed by westerners); so, unless otherwise qualified, the expression should best be translated as ‘fear of God’ in the sense of constant watchfulness.

90. *Qur.* 52: 48. The verse actually applied specifically to Muḥammad.

91. C alone reads *īthār*, which is a synonym of *uthrah*. *Athira li-l-amri*: ‘He gave his whole attention to the matter to the exclusion of all other things’ (see *Lexicon*, s.v. *athira*, *uthrah* and *atharah*). The *double entendre* seems to comprise both meanings: ‘Give the first choice in any matter to the Command of God’; ‘Give your whole attention to the Affair of God’.

92. Compare this with a similar counsel among the first ten listed above. It would be equally plausible to read the last clause (as Addas has): ‘Inquire into everything that might bring you closer to God’.

93. *Maḥābb* is the plural of *maḥabbah* in the sense of ‘something which causes love’; while *marād* ⁱⁿ is the plural of *marḍāh* (something that causes/occasions satisfaction).

94. Maḥmūd indicates that this is the subject of one of the *masā’il* (questions) in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s book of that title (edited by him on the basis of an Azhar manuscript under the title of *Al-Tanazzulāt al-layliyah* [Cairo, 1987], p. 28, no. 46), which may also be found in the *Futūḥāt* (I, 45, ll. 26–7); and Addas points out that the same idea is treated in the context of Job’s patience in the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (see R. W. J. Austin, trans., *The Bezels of Wisdom* [New York, 1971], pp. 216–17).

95. It is very hard to see how this does not contradict the preceding clause: Does not the “thing decreed” proceed directly from the Divine “Decree” itself? But inasmuch as different conditioned resolutions may result from a transcendent imperative, some, of course, will be preferable to others.

Be the Friend/Partisan of the Real (*muwālāt al-Ḥaqq*) in being with Him always – ‘for He is with His Servants wherever they may be’⁹⁶ – and turn with the Real wheresoever He may turn;⁹⁷

And rid yourself of falsehood (*al-bāṭil*).⁹⁸

Be patient in times of trial;

Be abstemious even regarding what is lawful;

Concern yourself with what is most important at the time;

Seek Paradise with all longing for its being the place where you will see the Real (*maḥall ru’at al-Ḥaqq*);

Keep company respectfully with those undergoing tribulation; converse with the poor, sitting down with them in their humble quarters; and give assistance to him whose condition demands that you assist him.

Be of sound heart (*salāmat al-ṣadr*);

Pray for the Believers in secret, and serve the Poor [in spirit] (*al-fuqarā’*).⁹⁹

Be *for* other people and against your *self*, for it is when you are *against* it that you are really *for* it.¹⁰⁰

Take joy in the goodness of the Community (*ṣalāḥ al-ummah*), and be sad at its corruption (*fasādu-hā*).

Give priority to the one to whom God (Exalted be He!) and His Messenger have given priority in that [degree to which] he has been given priority; and hold back the one whom God and His Messenger have held back inasmuch as he has been held back.¹⁰¹

Now if you have ‘put on’ these [foregoing] Vestments (*al-malābis*), then it is permissible for you to be seated in the forefront of the Assemblies before God (*al-majālīs ‘inda l-Lāh*) – Be He exalted! – and be among the People of the First Ranks (*ahl al-ṣufūf al-uwal*),¹⁰² for this is the vestiture of those who fear God (*malābis ahl al-taqwā*), which

96. A paraphrase of *Qur.* 58: 7 (cf. also 57: 4).

97. The final clause is only in E and C.

98. Cf. *Qur.* 17: 81: “Say: ‘The Real has come and falsehood has passed away!’ Truly, falsehood was ever passing away.” The present dictum and the one preceding it may be understood in the light of *Qur.* 55: 26–7: “All that dwells on the earth is passing away (*fān* ⁱⁿ); but the Face of your Lord shall remain (*yabqā*)...”

99. Or else the believers, having means, might repay you; while the “poor” (viz., the Ṣūfīs) have nothing with which to recompense you but their prayers, so your reward will be in Heaven (cf. *Luke* 14: 12–14 and *Matt.* 6: 5–6).

100. Cf. *Matt.* 16: 24–5 and *John* 12: 25.

101. Addas indicates that Ibn al-‘Arabī often makes this point, particularly when enjoining the (Zāhirite) principle of following the literal order of enumerations figuring in the Scripture (see *Futūḥāt*, I, 560, ll. 21 seq.).

102. Cf. *Qur.* 18: 48. In a canonical tradition the “first ranks” are said to be formed by angels in the presence of God (see *Concordance*, III, 323, l. 29).

is the “*Best Vestment*”.¹⁰³ Strive, therefore, to make this *your* clothing – or, at least, most of it – for [the Initiate-Ṣūfīs are] all in the state of [God-fearing]. In it Shaqīq of Balkh,¹⁰⁴ for instance, invested the likes of Ḥātim ‘the Hard-of-hearing’ (al-Aṣamm).¹⁰⁵ He was not really deaf, you know, but a certain woman came to speak with him one day and [as she was about to ask a question] some wind suddenly broke from her – that is, she farted. The poor woman was mortified before the Shaykh, of course, but he simply called out to her, as if she had just said something to him, “Speak louder, please!” – pretending that he had not heard [her fart]. So her shame was relieved as she said to herself, “He didn’t hear me.” And, thus, he was known as Ḥātim the Hard-of-hearing.¹⁰⁶

[All of the Ṣūfīs] have proceeded in accordance with such Moral qualities as these, that being their vestiture and their ornament (*libāsu-hum wa-ḥilyatu-hum*). And I, too, have ‘put on’ such vestiture, and I have invested whom I have invested¹⁰⁷ accordingly, for God’s sake – praised be He for that!¹⁰⁸

[*The Qādirite Investiture*]

I HEREBY INVEST YOU by my own hand with [the Mantle of Initiation as a sign] of Companionship and Moral instruction, O my saintly Friend, Muwaffaq al-Dīn Aḥmad b. ‘Alī b. Aḥmad al-‘Absī of Seville.¹⁰⁹ I myself was invested with the Mantle at the hand of the Master, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūnus b. Yaḥyá b. Abī l-Ḥasan al-‘Abbāsī al-Qaṣṣār,¹¹⁰ in the Sacred Precincts of Mecca [in 1202–03], before the Sublime Ka’bah. Yūnus had

103. That is, fear of God is the “best vestment” (see above, before n. 30).

104. Abū ‘Alī Shaqīq b. Ibrāhīm al-Balkhī (d. 809), a disciple of Ibrāhīm Ibn Ad’ham (see at nn. 139–40).

105. Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ḥātim al-Aṣamm (d. 851), also from Balkh in Khurāsān.

106. In his *Tadhkirat al-awliyā’* Farīd al-Dīn al-‘Attār adds that for fifteen years, as long as the woman remained alive, Ḥātim continued to feign deafness so that no one would tell her that he really could hear (see A. J. Arberry, trans., *Muslim Saints and Mystics* [London, 1966], p. 150).

107. “I...have put on” (*labistu*): ‘I have been invested with/dressed in the mantle of initiation’; “I have invested” (*albastu*): ‘I have attired (someone)/passed on the mantle of initiation.’ From here on I will translate these verbs according to their technical connotations.

108. C ends at this point.

109. I have been unable to obtain further information on this person. He is thus named as the addressee of the *Nasab* in most of the extant manuscripts (but another name, given by Addas, is substituted in those sources based on E). Conceivably he is related (a grandson?) to the Aḥmad al-Ishbīlī portrayed in the *R. Rūḥ al-quḍḥ* as a childhood neighbor and friend of Ibn al-‘Arabī, who later died in Egypt (see *Sufis of Andalusia*, pp. 91–5, no. 10).

110. D. 1211. Addas notes that he was a well-known Qādirite *muḥaddith* from Baghdad, under whom Ibn al-‘Arabī studied traditions in Mecca (see “La Filiation spirituelle,” p. 41, n. 123, for references). This was actually the third time Ibn al-‘Arabī had received the mantle.

received it from the Master of the Age, ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Abī Ṣāliḥ b. ‘Abd al-Lāh al-Jīlī,¹¹¹ who received it from Abū Sa‘īd al-Mubārak b. ‘Alī al-Mukharrimī,¹¹² who, in turn, had it from Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Hakkārī,¹¹³ who had it from Abū l-Faraj al-Ṭarsūsī,¹¹⁴ who had it from Abū l-Faḍl ‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Tamīmī,¹¹⁵ who had it from Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Jaḥdar al-Shiblī,¹¹⁶ who was a companion of (*ṣaḥība*) Abū l-Qāsim al-Junayd,¹¹⁷ whose moral instruction he followed (*ta’addaba bi-hi*).

Al-Junayd, in turn, was the companion of his maternal uncle, Sarī al-Saqaṭī,¹¹⁸ whose moral instruction he followed, as Sarī had been the companion of Ma‘rūf al-Karkhī,¹¹⁹ whose moral instruction *he* followed. Similarly, Ma‘rūf accompanied and followed ‘Alī [al-Riḍā],¹²⁰ who accompanied and followed his father, Mūsā [al-Kāẓim],¹²¹ who accompanied and followed *his* father, Ja‘far [al-Ṣādiq],¹²² who accompanied and followed his father, Muḥammad [al-Bāqir],¹²³ who accompanied and followed his father, ‘Alī [Zayn al-‘Ābidīn],¹²⁴ who accompanied and followed his father, al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī,¹²⁵ who accompanied and followed both his grandfather, Muḥammad, the Messenger of God (May God bless and keep him!), and his father, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib,¹²⁶ who also accompanied and followed the Messenger of God.

111. Known best as ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, in whose name the Qādirīyah order of Ṣūfism was founded. He died in Baghdad in 1166 (one year after the birth of Ibn al-‘Arabī).

112. Ḥanbalite legal scholar, judge and head of a law school in Baghdad (d. 1119).

113. ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Qurashī al-Hakkārī (*fl.* late 11th century). The *nisbah* is Kurdish, related to the region south of Lake Van. Addas supposes him to be the same individual listed in the second *khirqah*, below, as the initiator of Ibn Khafīf (d. 982; see at n. 134, *infra*; and *Quest*, pp. 316–17), but that would hardly be chronologically possible.

114. I have not been able to further identify this individual. His surname relates him to Tarsus in Cilicia.

115. ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Tamīmī (d. *circa* 1011–19), a Ḥanbalite scholar of Baghdad (see Louis Massignon, *The Passion of al-Ḥallāj* [rep., Princeton, 1982], vol. II, p. 135).

116. See n. 40, above. One source inserts at this point: “Down to here the [formal] investiture of the mantle (*libās*) extends, and what follows is [informal] companionship (*ṣuḥbah*) only” – which, indeed, seems to be the case.

117. D. 910 in Baghdad. For an account of al-Shiblī’s apprenticeship to al-Junayd, see *Muslim Saints and Mystics*, pp. 278–9.

118. Abū l-Ḥasan Sarī b. al-Mughallis al-Saqaṭī of Baghdad (d. 867).

119. Abū Maḥfūẓ Ma‘rūf b. Fayrūz al-Karkhī of Baghdad (d. 815).

120. Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Mūsā al-Riḍā (d. 818), the eighth Shī‘ite imām. The legend that had Ma‘rūf converted to Islam by ‘Alī al-Riḍā is generally rejected by modern scholarship. He was more credibly said to have been the disciple of Dā‘ūd al-Ṭā‘ī (d. *circa* 782).

121. Abū l-Ḥasan Mūsā b. Ja‘far al-Kāẓim (d. 799), the seventh imām.

122. Abū ‘Abd al-Lāh Ja‘far b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq (d. 765), the celebrated sixth imām.

123. Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Bāqir (d. 735), the fifth imām.

124. Abū Muḥammad ‘Alī b. al-Ḥusayn, known as Zayn al-‘Ābidīn (the ornament of the worshippers), the fourth imām (d. 712–13).

125. The third imām (after his elder brother, al-Ḥasan), who was martyred at Karbalā on ‘Āshūrā’ in 680.

126. The cousin of the Prophet and husband of his daughter, Fāṭimah, the fourth and last Rightly-guided

And Muḥammad ‘took from’ the Angel Gabriel (Upon him be peace!), and Gabriel ‘took from’ God (Be He exalted!). I asked Shaykh Yūnus: “What did [Muḥammad/Gabriel] ‘take’ from [Gabriel/God]?” and he replied: “I asked Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qādir [that same question] – or, it was asked of him – and he declared: ‘He took from Him Knowledge and Moral instruction (*al-‘ilm wa-l-adab*).’ ”

[The Maḥmūdite Investiture]

LIKEWISE, I hereby invest you, also, with the Mantle which I received (in the city of Fez at the Azhar Mosque in the quarter of the Horse Well in 593 [= 1197])¹²⁷ at the hand of Abū ‘Abd al-Lāh Muḥammad b. Qāsim b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Tamīmī¹²⁸ of Fez and from Taqī al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Alī b. Maymūn b. Ābb al-Tawzarī of Egypt.¹²⁹ Both of them told me that they received the Mantle from Abū l-Faṭḥ Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad b. Maḥmūd al-Maḥmūdī,¹³⁰ who received it from Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Muḥammad of Basra,¹³¹ who had it from Abū l-Faṭḥ b. Shaykh al-shuyūkh,¹³² who had it from Abū Ishāq b. Shahriyār al-Murshidī,¹³³ who had it from

caliph and first Shī‘ite imām, who was murdered in Kufa in 661.

127. This information is supplied only in E, and it may well be a false interpolation by the copyist, since the same place and date is mentioned in the *Futūḥāt* (II, 486, ll. 23–4; IV, 503, ll. 23–5; and I, 491, l. 7), as Addas points out.

128. D. 1206. He was the sometime imām of the Azhar Mosque in Fez (see *ibid.*, IV, 503 [23–5]), all of whose writings Ibn al-‘Arabī studied, according to his declaration in the *Ijāzah li-l-Malik al-Muẓaffar* (A. R. Badawī, ed., “Autobibliografía”, in *Al-Andalus*, 20 [1955], p. 120). He also received traditions from him – Prophetary *ḥadīth* and *akhbār* of Ṣūfīs of Fez (see *Futūḥāt*, IV, 541 [22–3] & 549 [25–6]) – which al-Tamīmī collected from many teachers over a fifteen-year tour of the East (see Ibn al-Abbār, *Al-Takmilah li-Kitāb al-Ṣilah* [Madrid, 1886], vol. I, pp. 374–5, no. 1064). Ibn al-Abbār, by the way, did not have a favorable opinion of al-Tamīmī’s accuracy as a transmitter, accusing him of publishing “conjectures and errors” (*awḥām wa-aghlat*).

129. *Al-Miṣrī* is found only in al-Ghimārī’s text (see n. 5; and cf. n. 147), who also asserts that this investiture took place in 1190. Addas shows that al-Tawzarī is the ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. ‘Alī...b. Maymūn...al-Qaṣṭallānī treated briefly by Ibn al-Abbār (in *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 591, no. 1654), and gives some further particulars about his family (which hailed from Tozeur/Qaṣṭīliyah in southern Tunisia) in *Quest*, p. 143 (and nn. 42–4). The only other occasion known to me that Ibn al-‘Arabī mentions him, in *Futūḥāt*, I, 186–7 (translated below, n. 147) brings up a whole other problem which is outlined in *Quest*, pp. 144–5, but which need not concern us at this time.

130. Or: Abū l-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad Faṭḥ Maḥmūd al-Maḥmūdī (see *The Passion of al-Ḥallāj*, vol. II, p. 477).

131. I have not verified the identities of this or the next individual listed.

132. The office of *shaykh al-shuyūkh* was ostensibly in charge of the general superintendence of Ṣūfī convents for a particular city or region (see *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 44, for an interesting case).

133. Or: Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm al-Murshid b. Shahriyār al-Kāzarūnī (d. 1033), founder of the Kāzarūnīyah/Murshidīyah order in Fars. He was a descendent of Salmān al-Fārisī, and, according to Massignon, his *khirqah* extended to Salmān as well as Uways (see *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 186–7).

Ḥasan or Ḥusayn al-Akkār,¹³⁴ who had it from Abū ‘Abd al-Lāh Ibn Khafīf,¹³⁵ who was the companion of Ja‘far al-Ḥadhdhā’.¹³⁶

Al-Ḥadhdhā’, in turn, was the companion of his master, Abū ‘Amr al-Iṣṭakhrī,¹³⁷ who was the companion of his master, Abū Turāb al-Nakhshabī,¹³⁸ who accompanied his master, Shaqīq of Balkh,¹³⁹ who accompanied his master, Ibrāhīm Ibn Ad’ham,¹⁴⁰ who accompanied Mūsā b. Zayd al-Rā‘ī,¹⁴¹ who accompanied Uways al-Qaranī,¹⁴² who accompanied ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb¹⁴³ and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib,¹⁴⁴ who both accompanied the Messenger of God (May God bless and keep him!).

[The Khaḍirite Investiture]

LIKEWISE, I invest you, also, with the Mantle which I received at the hand of Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Lāh Ibn Jāmi’¹⁴⁵ (in his garden in al-Miqlā, on the outskirts of Mosul, in the year 601 [= 1204–05]).¹⁴⁶ Ibn Jāmi’ had been the companion of al-Khaḍir (Peace be upon him!), whose Moral instruction he followed and from whom he acquired

134. Thus in all of the sources. He is Abū ‘Alī Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Akkār (or: ‘Akkār) Bāzyār Firūzābādī al-Jūrī (d. 1001; see *ibid.*). Cf. n. 113.

135. See n. 41, above; and *ibid.*, pp. 182–6 *et seq.* Ibn Khafīf was also said to have received the mantle of Ruwaym b. Aḥmad (d. 915).

136. D. 952. The name (meaning ‘the cobbler’) is given thus in most of the *Nasab* sources, but it was also frequently spelled *al-Ḥaddā’* (the cameleer).

137. The name is thus in most sources, but the correct reading is perhaps Abū ‘Umar – in which case the reference could be to the son of ‘Umar b. Shallūyah al-Iṣṭakhrī (see *ibid.*, p. 110, n. 17).

138. D. 859. He was a celebrated exponent of *tawakkal* (trust in God), who was devoured by lions in the desert.

139. See n. 104.

140. Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Ad’ham al-Tamīmī al-‘Ijlī of Balkh (d. *circa* 782), who left Khurāsān for Syria.

141. I have not been able to identify this individual, whose surname means ‘the shepherd’. We might speculate that the name is a confabulation inspired by the early precedent of Abū Ḥalīm b. Salīm al-Rā‘ī, who was a companion of Salmān al-Fārisī and who, according to al-Hujwīrī, was renowned for performing a miracle like that of Moses in *Qur.* 7: 160 (see R. A. Nicholson, trans., *The Kashf al-Maḥjūb* [London, 1936], pp. 90–1).

142. Uways b. ‘Āmir b. Jaz’ b. Mālīk al-Qaranī of Yemen (d. after 657), the very type of the independent, ‘masterless’ *walī*.

143. The second Rightly-guided caliph, who was assassinated in 644.

144. See n. 126. Actually, according to legend, it was ‘Umar and ‘Alī who sought the company of Uways in Yemen (see my paper, “The Uwaysī Spirit of Autodidactic Sainthood as the Breath of the Merciful,” forthcoming in this journal).

145. He was a disciple of ‘Alī al-Mutawakkil and of the well-known Ṣūfī, Abū ‘Abd al-Lāh Qaḍīb al-Bān (see n. 147).

146. This and the parenthetic statement at the end of the paragraph are found only in E, and they may have been added by the copyist on the basis of the material found in *Futūḥāt*, I, 187 [1–3] (see next note).

Knowledge. (On the same spot that Ibn Jāmi' donned the Mantle he invested me with it, and in the exact same manner – without addition or omission).¹⁴⁷

[A Fourth Investiture]

SIMILARLY, I myself had also been the companion of al-Khaḍir (Peace be upon him!), whose Moral instruction I followed and from whom I learned [by way of advice (*waṣīyah*) which he entrusted to me orally]¹⁴⁸ correct submission to the pronouncements of masters (*al-taslīm li-maḡālāt al-shukūkh*) – as to the letter [if not the spirit], 'from his mouth to my mouth'¹⁴⁹ – and other points of Knowledge.¹⁵⁰ (I have seen

147. Ibn al-'Arabī describes this investiture (signified by the placing of a small cotton cap) in his entry devoted to Ibn Jāmi' in the *Durrah al-fākhirah* (see *Sufis of Andalusia*, p. 157). In addition, the following account occurs in *Futūḥāt*, I, 186–7 (translated also by Henry Corbin in *Creative Imagination in the Sūfism of Ibn 'Arabī* [Princeton, 1969], pp. 64–5; and in *Quest*, pp. 145–6): "One of our *shaykhs* had consociated with al-Khaḍir. He was 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Lāh Ibn Jāmi' – a companion of 'Alī al-Mutawakkil and Abū 'Abd al-Lāh Qaḍīb al-Bān – who used to live in al-Miqlā, outside Mosul, in a garden he owned. Al-Khaḍir had invested him with the Mantle in the presence of Qaḍīb al-Bān, and the Shaykh, in turn, transmitted it to me in the very same place in his garden [but indoors, according to the *Durrah* description] and observing the same procedure that al-Khaḍir had used in his investiture of *him*. I had already received the Mantle of al-Khaḍir – but in a way quite different from this – at the hand of our companion, Taqī al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Alī b. Maymūn b. Ābb al-Tawzarī, who received it in Egypt from Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibn Ḥamawayh, the *Shaykh al-shuyūkh* [of Damascus (d. 1219)], whose grandfather, in turn, had it from al-Khaḍir.

"From that time onward I professed the Sūfī doctrine of the Mantle of Initiation (*libās al-khirqah*) and I invested other people with it, since I saw how al-Khaḍir had esteemed it. But before that I had *not* espoused the doctrine of the Mantle as it is generally known today. For, really, the Mantle with us [latter-day Sūfīs] is simply a symbol for Companionship, Moral instruction and 'Assimilation to the Divine Character-traits' (*al-takhalluq*) – for which reason no Vestiture going all the way back to the Messenger of God will be found but, rather, only Companionship and Moral instruction. And this is all that is meant by the 'Robe of God-fearing.'

"It is the custom among Masters of the spiritual States (*aṣḡāb al-aḡwāl*) that when they discern a deficiency in some matter in one of their companions and they want to perfect his State for him, the *shaykh* [mentally] becomes one with him (*ittahāda bi-hi*). Then, when he has done so, the *shaykh* takes the garment that he was wearing when he was in that State, removes it and casts it (*afraqha-hu*) on the man so that the [psychic power of the] State flows into him, perfecting him. That, then, is the 'Investiture' as it is known among us and transmitted by the Fully-realized (*al-muḡaqqiqūn*) among our *shaykhs*."

148. Only in E.

149. *Naṣṣ^{an} min fi-hi ilā fīya*. That is, submit to the rightful authorities externally even if they are wrong (unless, of course, it is a matter of Divine law), but reserve your internal assent, allowing al-Khaḍir to speak through your mouth, as it were, with the proper intent (cf. *Luke* 12:11–12). For a description of the circumstances in which al-Khaḍir gave this instruction to Ibn al-'Arabī in Seville in 1196, see *Futūḥāt*, I, 336–7, translated by Addas in *Quest*, pp. 63–4.

150. At this juncture all of the sources except for E (and those based on it) proceed to the sentence after the next, then conclude with the 'addendum'.

al-Khaḍir perform three miracles: I saw him walk on the water, ‘roll up’ the earth, and pray in the air).¹⁵¹

All of these [four above-mentioned Masters, along with al-Khaḍir] have authorized me to invest with the Mantle of Initiation whomever I will.¹⁵² Then may my Friend [Muwaffaq al-Dīn Aḥmad] (May God grant him success!) invest with this Mantle in this same Lineage whomever he will and whomsoever he like – young or old, male or female – of the Believers, in accordance with the above-mentioned condition.¹⁵³

God willing, I will now quote one of our poems on this Mantle and this special discipline:¹⁵⁴

151. In *Futūḥāt*, I, 186 (12–18), Ibn al-‘Arabī describes a memorable moonlit night on a boat in the harbor of Tunis when he saw al-Khaḍir walking to him on the water. After talking to the Shaykh in a mode of expression peculiar to him, al-Khaḍir saluted him and suddenly traversed the distance to a lighthouse over two miles away in two or three steps. This supernatural transport over space is what is meant by ‘rolling, or folding up the earth’. The story of al-Khaḍir’s praying in mid-air is recounted in ll.18–26 on the same page (both passages are translated by Austin in *Sufis of Andalusia*, pp. 27 & 28–9).

152. This and the last sentence of the preceding paragraph are only found in E.

153. This presumably refers to the general condition of moral fitness (summed up in the fear of God) stated at the conclusion of the list of counsels (“Now if you have put on these vestments...”), making one suited to join the Ṣūfī brotherhood. The original recension of the *Nasab al-khirqah* probably ended here.

154. The poem, minus the first verse, may be found in the *Dīwān* (p. 52, no. 129), where it is the first of 26 occasional pieces devoted to the subject of investiture. The metre is *al-basīt*.

[THE MANTLE OF GOD-FEARING]

Put on the Mantle, for Man's "Best Vestment" is God-fearing,
 which is the truest Religion and the strongest World.
 None fear God except every discerning one,
 chosen and guided, whom God has distinguished:
 He interrupts the night with Praise unto his Lord,
 bleary-eyed [from rising] in the darkest hours;
 He entreats: "My Master, O End-all of my hope,
 who but his Lord shall have Mercy on His slave?"
 God is much more Kind than this created Nature
 and Attribute; for if they call Him, He complies!¹⁵⁵
 Were it not for Him, earth would not break out in laughter
 with her flowers, nor reproving clouds overcome her.
 God it is Who prefers [that a thing come into being],
 God Who completes, balances and sets it in order.
 O Essence of Religion, You are *All* of Religion:
 Heaven is redolent with the fragrance of Your Name!¹⁵⁶

[Addendum]¹⁵⁷

There is no condition in the investiture of this Mantle, or Companionship, that it can only be received from one person. No one ever imposed such a condition. On the contrary, one Ṣūfī is known to have said that whoever wanted to see three-hundred men in one need only look at him, for he had been the companion of three-hundred masters and he had acquired a Moral quality (*khulq*) from each one. And just look at the Epistle [on Ṣūfism] by al-Qushayrī,¹⁵⁸ whenever he mentions any one of the Ṣūfīs – he hardly ever does so without saying that "he accompanied Such-a-one and

155. This line is garbled in the *Dīwān*. "Nature": *sajīyah*. "Attribute": *na't*. These are both 'creation' as the manifestation of the merciful Divine Essence.

156. The poem has only been included in those sources which are based on E.

157. I am not convinced that this would-be 'epilogue' is actually the work of Ibn al-'Arabī (for reasons which I will give in a later study).

158. The *Risālah fī 'ilm al-taṣawwuf*, by Abū l-Qāsim 'Abd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 1074), is one of the standard manuals of Ṣūfism from the middle-classical period of consolidation. It has been translated by Richard Gramlich as *Das Sendschreiben al-Qushayrīs über das Sufitum* (Stuttgart, 1989).

Such-another.” Investiture of the Mantle is nothing but Companionship and Moral instruction, and that is unrestricted. But a group of ignorant ‘Şūfis’ (*tā’ifat juhalā*) having no knowledge has sprung up, and they imagine that a man may not receive investiture except from a single person. But no one ever said that before. God is the Giver of success! There is no Lord other than He.

Appendix

“Ibn ‘Arabī: Le Livre de la filiation spirituelle” [*Nasab al-khirqah*]. Translated by Claude Addas. *‘Ayn al-Hayāt*, 5, 1999. 44 pages.

The recent annotated French translation of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *K. Nasab al-khirqah* by Claude Addas, entitled “Le Livre de la filiation spirituelle”, marks the culmination of that scholar’s committed study of this important work which began with an initial translation of it as part of her Master’s thesis (*memoire de Maîtrise*), submitted in 1980. With the publication of Addas’s revised doctoral dissertation, *La Quête du soufre rouge*, in 1989 some passages and other significant information gleaned from the *Nasab* was made available for the first time in any western language.¹ In the subsequent English version of her book (*Quest*, 1993) a schematic *silsilah* of the ‘Akbarian’ mantle was featured as an appendix (pp. 316–17) diagramming all four lines of master-initiators claimed by Ibn al-‘Arabī as his formal spiritual pedigree and detailed by him in the *Nasab* (and *Futūḥāt al-makkīyah*). With the appearance of “La Filiation spirituelle” (including critical introduction and a *Note complémentaire* on the hierurgy of Şūfī initiation by the translator’s esteemed father, Michel Chodkiewicz) the entire *Nasab al-khirqah* has finally become accessible to non-specialists, marking yet another milestone in Addas’s career of original scholarship.

The quality of translation is exemplary (a fine comprehension of the Arabic rendered lucidly in French), but the greatest asset of Addas, as I have observed elsewhere, is her extraordinary familiarity with an extensive range of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s writings,

1. Although Ralph Austin had read the *Nasab* in manuscript (see his *Sufis of Andalusia* [London, 1971], p.39, n.1), and, of course, Osman Yahia had described it in *Histoire et classification de l’oeuvre d’Ibn ‘Arabī* (Damascus, 1964), pp.407–8, no.530.

particularly the whole gargantuan corpus of the *Meccan Revelations*. An instance of this capacity for in-depth contextualizing may be appreciated in her note 71, where an obscure passage in the *Nasab* concerning the Prophet Muḥammad's perpetual chanting (*taghann^m*) of the Qur'ān is explicated by Addas with reference to descriptions in the *Futūḥāt* of the 'pentecostal' descent of the Scripture on the Prophet's followers, the *awliyā'*, by whose tongues his blessed enunciation may be said to live on. Some of the translator's comments are less illuminating but illustrative, nonetheless; as when she points out (in n. 75) that *Qur.* 7: 32 ("the Adornment of God which He brings forth for His servants", quoted in the *Nasab*) is cited in the *Futūḥāt* (vol. I, p. 560, ll. 24seq.) as a proof-text in support of Ibn al-'Arabī's (typically Zāhirite) literalist rejection of luxury-taxes. Other examples of researcher-friendly footnotes: 80, 82, 91, 94, 99, 102, 104 and 118.²

Apart from the rhymed-prose prologue and densely-woven beginning of the work, most of the *Nasab al-khirqah* is relatively painless to read – at least by Akbarian standards. The 'genealogies' may offer little of interest to any but historians and specialists (who can argue about their tenability and whether or not a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, after all) but the heart of the book, the long series of moral instructions, or exhortations (*waṣāyā*), will be found refreshingly attractive to the general reader – precious counsels to be cherished in practice by serious students of the Shaykh. The more substantive differences between Addas's presentation of the *Nasab* and my own (on pp. 1–33 of this issue) will be treated in a later study incorporating the Arabic text. In this review I will only address some technical matters and a rather important point of general interpretation affecting the whole perspective of Ibn al-'Arabī's various receptions of the mantle of initiation.

As a fellow text-critic I would have liked to see from my colleague a fuller description of the sources she used to establish her text. But since I myself thought best to burden the reader with even fewer technical details, let me say more precisely that Addas's account of two of her sources might have been less misleading. Specifically, *MS. Esad Efendi 1507* (E), which she declares as her basic text, is not as good as her brief description tends to imply, and the 1987 Cairo edition of A. R. H. Maḥmūd (C) not really so bad as she states (p. 24). In fact, the two are quite comparable, sharing most of the additional content not found in other sources, and they differ primarily

2. While Addas has made a promising start, a desideratum which remains would be a thorough critical comparison of the teachings in the *Nasab* with those of Ibn al-'Arabī's other practical treatises, such as *Al-Amr al-muḥkam* and *Kunh mā lā budda li-l-murīd min-hu*, as well as the *waṣāyā*-chapter (560) of the *Futūḥāt* (IV, 444seq.).

in two respects only: E is marred by a number of careless errors of the copyist (even evincing a non-native grasp of Arabic grammar), whereas C is quite scrupulously printed;³ but the Cairo edition *does* suffer from several gaping lacunae – notably, the *sajʿ* prologue and the chains of transmission – and, so, only about two-thirds of the *Nasab* is represented in C. Most of the absent material was provided in Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ghimārī’s very serviceable study, *Al-Burhān al-jalī* (from which C was excerpted), published in 1979–80 in the journal, *Liwāʾ al-Islām* (see n. 5 of my translation), however, and Addas might have avoided a problem in her reading of the first two investitures by consulting that publication (see my n. 113). As it is, her suggestion (in n. 90) that a missing passage describing Ibn al-ʿArabī’s empirical method of initiation was deliberately “omitted” from C is a bit unfair since, in fact, a comparable description from *Futūḥāt*, I: 186–7, was quoted at length by al-Ghimārī – who, by the way, was personally very favorable towards Ibn al-ʿArabī (as was Maḥmūd). The manuscript basis of C is not identified⁴ but, as far as can be determined, it was quite as good as any other primary source I have examined.

As for E, although it does, indeed, appear to be a genuine copy of an original transcript of the *Nasab* read before Ibn al-ʿArabī in the summer of 633/1236 at his home (with his son, Saʿd al-Dīn Abū Saʿūd, and others present) by a disciple, Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Lāh al-ʿAlawī of Hama – that does not necessarily mean that it was *well* copied or that the form in which we have it now is free of interpolations. The full name of the original copyist (see “La Filiation spirituelle,” at n. 121) makes clear that he was a *sharīf*, and there is evidence in E that either he or the second scribe harbored Imāmite sympathies (see n. 84 in my translation). That al-ʿAlawī was a serious student of the Shaykh al-Akbar is proven by the existence of *samāʾ*’s certifying his reading of portions of the *Futūḥāt*. But that really has no bearing on the credibility of the second (that is, the actual) copyist of E, who may have been a very late inheritor of the original manuscript. It is unlikely that *MS. Esad Ef. 1507*, for all its interest and value, is nearly as old as *MS. Şehid Ali Paşa 1344*, which dates from the mid-10th/16th century.

A more significant criticism that I have of Addas’s representation of the *khirqah* motif does not relate, strictly speaking, to the content of the *Nasab* itself but, rather, to her reading of the important passage from *Futūḥāt*, I: 186–7, translated by her

3. For instance, C is the only source to give the correct reading of *lā tajzaʿu* (be not anxious), where the verb is the contrary of *işbir* (be patient) in the line following (see n. 67 of my translation). All of the manuscript sources contain at least as many mistakes as the Cairo edition.

4. As al-Ghimārī studied at the Azhar, we may conjecture that his source was *MS. Azhar 1070* [33580], ff. 29–36 (mentioned by Yahia).


in *Quest* (p. 145) and in “La Filiation spirituelle” (pp. 14–15). In the first version she left out the lines referring to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s investiture at the hand of al-Tawzarī – (compare my translation in n. 147), thus giving the false impression that what was mentioned before, the investiture by Ibn Jāmi’ in Mosul, was what caused the Shaykh to “revise his opinion . . . of the *libs al-khirqah*.” (She reiterates the same interpretation in “La Filiation spirituelle,” p. 16, even though there the entire passage was given.) But in the original Arabic it is the Khāḍirite investiture of al-Tawzarī which is clearly the point of reference of the words, “from that time”. The precise date and place of that first initiation remains uncertain (and the *Nasab* material only makes the question more complicated). Addas suggests that it took place in Seville in 595/1196 on the authority of a single anonymous manuscript (A) of dubious provenience, supplied to her by Osman Yahia. Al-Ghimārī’s source, however, asserts that the date was 586/1190; and Austin, for his part, assumed that it was six years earlier, when Ibn al-‘Arabī first encountered the mysterious, immortal Khāḍir. But whatever the case, it was obviously that first Khāḍirite initiation in the Maghrib that was the occasion of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s realizing the legitimacy of the practice of investiture (despite its not being an actual Prophetic institution, as he himself stipulates).

Finally, I should mention that *‘Ayn al-Ḥayāt* is a recently-founded journal of the *ṭarīqah Naqshbandīyah*, published privately in Italy and with a limited circulation. As the quality of the contributions (from such scholars as Addas and Hamid Algar) has so far been very high, there is certain to be an unrequited demand for issues of the journal, which, at least, will hopefully be available in the US through Interlibrary Loan (otherwise, copies may perhaps be acquired through the good offices of the librarian of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī Society Oxford).

Gerald Elmore

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Diagram of Lataif of the Heart



Naqshbandi Aliya Teachings of Levels of the Heart and The 9 Lataif / Points & Realities of The Cave

From the Teachings of Shaykh Abdullah Daghestani [Q] through the teachings of Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani in Naqshbandi Sufi Way Guidebook.

The Golden Chain

Shaykh Sharafuddin (q) asked Shaykh `Abdullah (q) to host their guest. Shaykh `Abdullah recounted the events of the meeting to several of his murids many years later. As soon as they met, Shaykh `Abdullah said, "You are interested in the knowledge of the Nine Points. We can speak on it in the morning after Fajr prayer. Now you eat something and rest." At Fajr time Shaykh `Abdullah called Gurdjieff to come and pray with him. As soon as the prayer finished, the Shaykh began to recite Surat Ya Sin from the Holy Qur'an. As he finished reading, Gurdjieff approached him and asked if he could speak of what he had just experienced. Gurdjieff said:

A Meeting With Gurdjieff

Through your spiritual power I was able to ascend to the knowledge of the power of the Nine Points. Then a voice, addressing me as `Abd an-Nur, said: 'This light and knowledge have been granted to you from the Divine Presence of Allah to bring peace to your heart. However, you must not use the power of this knowledge.' The voice bid me farewell with the salutation of Peace and the vision ended as you were finishing the recitation from the Qur'an." The Enneagram image above Holds the Secret of The 9 Points , 9 States of Humanity, 9 Sultan al Awliya Shaykh `Abdullah replied, "Surat Ya Sin was called 'the Heart of the Qur'an' by the Holy Prophet and the knowledge of these Nine Points was opened to you through it.

The vision was by the blessings of the verse: 'Peace! a Word (of salutation) from a Lord Most Merciful' [36:58]. "Each of the Nine Points is represented by one of nine Saints who are at the Highest Level in the Divine Presence.

They are the keys to the untold powers within man, but there is no permission to use these keys. This is a secret that in general will not be opened until the Last Days when the Mahdi (as) appears and Jesus (as) returns. "This meeting of ours has been blessed. Keep it as a secret in your heart and don't speak of it in this life. 'Abd an-Nur, for that is your name with us, you are free to stay or go as your responsibilities allow. You are always welcome with us. You have attained safety in the Divine Presence. May Allah bless you and strengthen you in your journey

His States and Discourses After His Second Seclusion At 30 years of age, Shaykh Abdullah was ordered to enter a second long seclusion for five years. During that seclusion, many visions and states were granted to him, which it would be impossible to describe within the span of this book. After he completed this second seclusion, the power of his spiritual attraction increased. He became so renowned that even during his Shaykh's lifetime, people used to come from everywhere to learn from him. Following are some of his discourses: "I do not speak to you about any Station (*Maqam*), Manifestation (*Tajalli*), or Rank (*Rutbah*) without my having already entered that station or position and experienced that Manifestation. I am not like many others, I do not speak separating my sight from my heart, enumerating the Stations (*Maqamat*) for you without my knowing their Reality (*Haqiqat*). No! First of all I followed that path and saw what it was. I learned those Realities and Secrets which may be found along it, and I worked my way along it until I obtained the

- Knowledge of Certainty (*'ilm al-yaqin*),
- the Eye of Certainty (*'ayn al-yaqin*), and
- the Truth of Certainty (*haqq al-yaqin*).
- Only then do I speak to you, giving you a tiny taste of what I have tasted, until I am able to make you reach that station without tiring you and without difficulties.

Stations of the Heart – Lataiful Qalb

"There are five stations of the Heart: *Qalb*, *Sirr*, *Sirr as-Sirr*, *Khafa* and *Akhfa*.

- *Qalb* is the Heart,
- *Sirr* is the Secret,
- *Sirr as-Sirr* is the Secret of the Secret,
- *Khafa* is the Hidden, and
- *Akhfa* the Most Hidden. The secret of this Tariqat is based on these five *lata'if* (Subtle Things), the Stations of the heart.

"*Latifat al-qalb*, the stage of the Heart, is under the authority of Sayyidina Adam, because it represents the physical aspect of the heart.

Latifat as-sirr, the station of the Secret, is under Sayyidina Nuh , because it is the Vessel which is saved from the Ocean of Darkness, salvation from the flood of ignorance.

Latifat Sirr as-Sirr, the station of the Secret of the Secret, is under two Prophet s: Ibrahim and Masa , who represent Allah's Divine Presence on Earth. Allah made Ibrahim the symbol of all His Khalifs on this Earth, as mentioned in the verse of the creation of mankind, "I will create a vicegerent on earth." [2:30]. Musa was blessed with hearing and speaking to Allah which are the two essential attributes of knowledge.

"*Latifat al-khafa*, the Hidden Station, is under Sayyidina Isa { Jesus }. Because of his relationship with Hidden Knowledge, he represents spiritual understanding.

"*Latifat al-Akhfa*, the Most Hidden Station, is under the Reality of Sayyidina Muhammad , because he was granted a station high above that of all other Prophet s and messengers. He was the one who was raised up, in the Night of Ascension, to the Divine Presence. This is represented by the *Kalima* (Sacred Phrase), because there is no *la ilaha illallah* without *Muhammadun Rasulullah*. "The lights of these stations have been shown to me.

- The light of the Heart is a yellow hue;
- the light of the Secret is red;
- the light of the Secret of the Secret is white;
- the light of the Hidden Station is green; and
- the light of the Most Hidden Station is black."

These Five Stations are the center of the Nine Points

which represent the locus of Revelation and Inspiration of the Divine Presence in the heart of the human being. These Nine Points are located on the chest of each person and they represent nine different hidden states in every human being. Every state is connected to a saint, who has the authority to control that point.


"If the seeker in the Naqshbandi Way is able to unveil and to make spiritual contact with the authorized master controlling these points, he may be given knowledge of and power to use these nine points.

"The conditions related to opening these nine points can only be alluded to obliquely.

1. The first station involves the power of imprisoning the ego
2. The key to the second state is Dhikr with *la ilaha illallah*.
3. The third state consists in witnessing the engraving of Allah's name on the heart (*naqsh*).
4. The fourth state relates to the meaning of that engraving on the heart.
5. The fifth state is to imprint the engraving with your dhikr.
6. In the sixth state the heart is made to stop pumping at will and to start pumping at will.

7. The seventh state is to be aware of the number of times one stops the heart from pumping and the number of times one restores the pumping of the heart.
8. "In the eighth state one mentions the phrase Muhammadun Rasulullah in every cessation of the heart and every restoration of its pumping.
9. The ninth stage is to return to your Cave, as Allah mentioned in Surat al-Kahf, "When ye turn away from them and the things they worship other than Allah, betake yourself to the Cave: your Lord will shower His mercies on you..." [18:16]. *{ 9:40 This the Power of 9 Importance of the King, Return to the King, 12 Veil of Power 9 in Holy Quran Tauba Surah 9 Verse 40 is the Beginning of entrance to the THAWR Cave}*

"The Cave is the Divine Presence. Here one utters the cherished prayer of the Prophet : 'O God, You are my destination and Your Pleasure is what I seek.' The heart, as it cycles between the cessation and restoration of its pumping, is existing at the level of the Essence of the Divine Presence. Because that Divine Essence is the source of all created being, that heart will be at one with every minutest creation in this universe. The heart which has reached the secrets of the nine points will be able to see everything, hear everything, know everything, taste everything, sense everything, 'Until He will be the ears with which he hears, the eyes with which he sees, the tongue with which he speaks, the hand with which he grasps, and the feet with which he walks. He will be Lordly, he only need say to a thing Be! and it will be.'" { This is Perfectly Manifested in Sayedena Muhammad {s} Our Eternal Messenger of Allah.}



Why did he go to that cave? The 'Cave of Silence' as it has been called? Indeed, it is the 'Cave of Silent Secrets'. Why was the Prophet ordered by God to go to that cave, which is one day's travel from Makkah, when he had a distance of fifteen days journeying to go?

"29" When the Prophet went into that cave, a spider and a dove came and made a house over the door in order that no one would know what was inside. { The Spider is 29th Surah directing us that the secrets of 29 and the Lam Alif is the seal for the entry into the divine presence | The Dove is the Angelic Realm and Eggs are the story of Creation.} 29 Secretly encoded Surahs .

Knowledge of Letters , Fawatih Letters of Mugatta'at and Secrets of Numbers

This is common knowledge. As for the secret, look to love. When love for someone is pure, God will never forget that person. Before leaving Makkah for Madinah, the Prophet put someone in his bed because the ignorant people came to his door intent on killing him. He put Ali (as) in his bed. There is a secret to that, it means that he made Ali (as) his representative, in his place. He did not put Umar (r) there. He did not put Uthman (r)-none of the Companions, but someone of his own flesh and blood.

The Full Moon has 2 Faces

The Full Moon has 2 Faces One That Shines on Earth the Other Dark side is Hidden. The Prophet took with him as company his other mirror-image, Abu Bakr (r), to the cave. He said, "I am the city of knowledge and Ali is the door." {You Must Be Ahl Bayt, Either Pure Blood Line or By Way of Sayedena Saliman Farsi (AS) in Service to the Rasul} The door is something physical, external. When you want to enter the house, how do you enter? Through the door. In order to enter to the Prophet and to come to the knowledge that the Prophet is giving, you have to enter through the door. That door is Ali (r). The Prophet () also said, "Whatever God has poured into my heart, I poured into the heart of Abu Bakr as-Siddiq."3 The Prophet (s) referred again to the secret of Abu Bakr (r) when he said, "Abu Bakr does not surpass you because of fasting or praying more, but because of a secret that took root in his heart." So inside the house, we find Abu Bakr (r) and outside the house, we find Ali (as).

That is why, of the two sources of Sufi knowledge, one came from Abu Bakr (r) and the other from Ali (as). From the time of the different schools of Divine Law, Muslims have agreed that the knowledge of the heart came from these two paths. Justice and laws, on the other hand, came from Hadrat Umar (r). The Prophet's comment about Abu Bakr (r) is the secret of the cave. To represent his body, the Prophet put Ali (as) in his bed prior to his departure from Makkah to Madinah. This means that Ali (as) represented the external. But he took Abu Bakr (r) to the cave for the cave represents what is interior.

Shaykh Sharafuddin on Will and Destiny

"It is known that there are two types of destiny. The first kind of destiny is termed qada'an mucallaq, which means Suspended or Mutable Destiny. It is written on the Lawh al-Mahfoudh (the Preserved Tablet). This will vary according to will and behavior, cause and effect. All saints can change this kind of destiny for their murids, in order to train them and to influence their destiny by changing their actions and behavior. The authority to change the Mutable Destiny is given to the Shaykhs for their murids because they are connected to each other by Divine Will.

"The second type of destiny is contained in Umm al-Kitab, the Mother of the Book, as mentioned in the ayat:

13:39 – "Yamho Allahu ma yashao wa yuthbitu, wa 'indahu ommu al kitab."

*"Allah eliminates what He wills or confirms, and **with Him is the Mother of the Book.**" (Holy Quran, The Thunder 13:39)*

And is called qada'an mubram, which means Fixed Destiny. Saints never interfere in that Fixed Destiny, which is in the Hand of the Creator. "Allah gave the authority to change the Fixed Destiny only to the Nine Saints who are at the highest level in the Divine Presence by permission from the Prophet who is first to take that power from Allah.

They control the Nine Points of human consciousness related to the different stages of the Ascent of an Individual on his path to the Divine Presence. Allah gave these Nine Saints, whose number has not changed from the time of the Prophet until today, the power to use Sultan adh-dhikr, the Greatest Remembrance.

"Everyone knows that Dhikr is primarily the repetition of la ilaha illallah, and that is what is practiced by all tariqats, including the Naqshbandiyya. But the Sultan adh-dhikr is a completely different type of Dhikr.

*Allah said, "Inna nahnu nazzalna-dh-dhikra wa inna lahu la-hafidhun [15:9],
"We have revealed the Dhikr, and we are the One to protect that Dhikr in you."*

The Dhikr mentioned here is the Holy Qur'an. The Dhikr of these nine saints, besides la ilaha illallah, is the Secret of the Holy Qur'an. They recite the Qur'an, not as we recite it reading from beginning to end, but they recite it with all its secrets and inner realities. Because Allah said,

6:59 – "Wala ratbin wala yabisin illa fee kitabin mubeenin.

"Nor is there anything fresh or dry but is inscribed in a clear Record."

None of God's creations in all the created universes has not been mentioned already, with all its secrets, in the Clear Book, the Qur'an.

"The saint reciting the Qur'an in Sultan adh-Dhikr is therefore reciting it with all the secrets of every creation, from beginning to end. Allah gave every letter of the Qur'an, according to the Nine Highest Masters of the Naqshbandi Order [this was the first time the Shaykh ever mentioned this secret], twelve thousand knowledge's.

The Qur'an contains around 600,000 letters, so for every letter, these saints are able to take 12,000 knowledge's!

"Each of these nine saints differs from the other in his level as well. We may see that one of them, for example, was able to recite the Holy Qur'an by the power of Sultan adh-Dhikr, which is to grasp 12,000 meanings on every letter, only once in his life.

Another was able to recite it three times in his life.

The third was able to do it nine times in his life.

Another was able to recite it 99 times in his life.

"This secret differed from one saint to another.

- Shah Mawlana Naqshband (q) was able to do it 999 times in his life.
- Our Master Ahmad al-Faruqi was able to recite it 9,999 times in his life.
- Shaykh Sharafuddin was able to recite it 19,999 times."

- Here Shaykh `Abdullah stopped. Shaykh Nazim said,
- "In every breath Grandshaykh `Abdullah Daghestani was exhaling with Sultan adh-Dhikr and inhaling with Sultan adh-Dhikr.
- He used to complete the secret of Qur'an twice in every breath."
- Mawlana Shaykh Nazim Inheritor of This Trust



Grandshaykh Abdullah
ad-Daghestani at over age 85.

مشكاة الأنوار

أبو حامد الغزالي

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

رب أنعمت فزد بفضلك

الحمد لله فائض الأنوار وفتاح الأبصار. وكاشف الأسرار ورافع الأستار. والصلاة على محمد نور الأنوار وسيد الأبرار وحبیب الجبار وبشير الغفار ونذير القهار، وقامع الكفار وفاضح الفجار؛ وعلى آله وأصحابه الطيبين الطاهرين الأخيار. أما بعد فقد سألتني أيها الأخ الكريم قيضك الله لطلب السعادة الكبرى، ورشحك للعروج إلى الذروة العليا، وكحل بنور الحقيقة بصيرتك، ونقى عما سوى الحق سريرتك، أن أثبت إليك أسرار الأنوار الإلهية مقرونة بتأويل ما يشير إليه ظاهر الآيات المتلوة والأخبار المروية مثل قوله تعالى (الله نور السموات والأرض) ومعنى تمثيله ذلك بالمشكاة والزجاجة والمصباح والزيت والشجرة، مع قوله عليه السلام (إن لله سبعين حجاباً من نور وظلمة وإنه لو كشفها لأحرقت سبحات وجهه كل من أدركه بصره).

ولقد ارتقيت بسؤالك مرتقى صعباً تنخفض دون أعاليه أعين الناظرين؛ وقرعت باباً مغلقاً لا يفتح إلا للعلماء الراخسين. ثم ليس كل سر يكشف ويفشى، ولا كل حقيقة تعرض وتجلي، بل صدور الأحرار قبور الأسرار

ولقد قال بعض العارفين (إفشاء سر الربوبية كفر) بل قال سيد الأولين والآخرين صلى الله عليه وسلم (إن من العلم كهيئة المكنون لا يعلمه الا العلماء بالله). فإذا نطقوا به لم ينكره إلا أهل الغرة بالله، ومهما كثر أهل الاغترار وجب حفظ الأسرار على وجه الإسرار. لكني أراك مشروح الصدر بالله بالنور، منزه السر عن ظلمات الغرور فلا أشح عليك في هذا الفن بالإشارة إلى لوامع ولوائح والرمز إلى حقائق ودقائق. فليس الخوف في كف العلم عن أهله بأقل منه في بثه إلى غير أهله.

وَمَنْ مَنَعَ الْمُسْتَوْجِبِ

عِلْمًا أَضَاعَهُ

فانفع بإشارات مختصرة وتلويحات موجزة؛ فإن تحقيق القول فيه يستدعي تمهيد أصول وشرح فصول ليس يتسع الآن لها وقتي، وليس ينصرف إليه همي وفكرتي. ومفاتيح القلوب بيد الله يفتحها إذا شاء كما شاء بما يشاء. وإنما الذي يفتح في الوقت فصول ثلاثة.

الفصل الأول

في بيان أن النور الحق هو الله تعالى

وأن اسم النور لغيره مجاز محض لا حقيقة له

وبيانه بأن يعرف معنى النور بالوضع الأول عند العوام، ثم بالوضع الثاني عند الخواص، ثم بالوضع الثالث عند خواص الخواص. ثم تعرف درجات الأنوار المذكورة المنسوبة إلى خواص الخواص وحقائقها لينكشف لك عند ظهور درجاتها أن الله تعالى هو النور الأعلى الأقصى، وعند انكشاف حقائقها أنه النور الحق الحقيقي وحده لا شريك له فيه.

أما الوضع الأول عند العامي فالنور يشير إلى ظهوره، والظهور أمر إضافي: إذ يظهر الشيء لا محالة الإنسان ويطن عن غيره: فيكون ظاهراً بالإضافة وباطناً بالإضافة. وإضافة ظهوره إلى الإدراكات لا محالة. وأقوى الإدراكات وأجلاها عند العوام الحواس، ومنها حاسة البصر.

والأشياء بالإضافة إلى الحس البصري ثلاثة أقسام: منها ما لا يبصر بنفسه كالأجسام المظلمة. ومنها ما يبصر بنفسه ولا يبصر به غيره كالأجسام المضيئة كالكوكب وجمرة النار إذا لم تكن مشتعلة. ومنها ما يبصر بنفسه ويبصر به أيضاً غيره كالشمس والقمر والسراج والنيران المشتعلة. والنور اسم لهذا القسم الثالث. ثم تارة يطلق على ما يفيض من الأجسام على ظاهر الأجسام الكثيفة، فيقال استنارت

الأرض ووقع نور الشمس على الأرض ونور السراج على الحائط والثوب. وتارة يطلق على نفس هذه الأجسام المشرقة

لأنها أيضاً في نفسها مستنيرة.

وعلى الجملة فالنور عبارة عما يبصر بنفسه ويبصر به غيره كالشمس. هذا حده وحقيقته بالوضع الأول.

دقيقة

لما كان سر النور وروحه هو الظهور للإدراك، وكان الإدراك موقوفاً على وجود النور وعلى وجود العين الباصرة أيضاً: إذ النور هو الظاهر المظهر؛ وليس شيء من الأنوار ظاهراً في حق العميان ولا مظهرًا. فقد تساوى الروح الباصرة والنور الظاهر في كونه ركناً لا بد منه للإدراك ثم ترجح عليه في أن الروح الباصرة هي المدركة وبها الإدراك. وأما النور فليس بمدرك ولا به الإدراك، بل عنده الإدراك. فكان اسم النور بالنور الباصر أحق منه بالنور المبصر. وأطلقوا اسم النور على نور العين المبصرة فقالوا في الخفاش إن نور عينه ضعيف، وفي الأعمش إنه ضعيف نور بصره،

وفي الأعمى إنه فقد نور البصر، وفي السواد إنه يجمع نور البصر ويقويه، وإن الأجفان إنما خصتها الحكمة بلون السواد

وجعل العين مخفوفة بها لتجمع ضوء العين. وأما البياض فيفرق ضوء العين ويضعف نوره، حتى إن إدامة النظر إلى البياض

المشرق، بل إلى نور الشمس يبهر نور العين ويمحقه كما ينمحق الضعيف في جنب القوى.

فقد عرفت بهذا أن الروح الباصر سمى نورا، وأنه لم سمى نورا، وأنه لم كان بهذا الاسم أولى. وهذا هو الوضع الثاني وهو

وضع الخواص.

دقيقة

إعلم أن نور بصر العين موسوم بأنواع النقصان: فإنه يبصر غيره ولا يبصر نفسه، ولا يبصر ما بعد منه، ولا يبصر ما هو وراء حجاب.

ويبصر من الأشياء ظاهرها دون باطنها؛ ويبصر من الموجودات بعضها دون كلها. ويبصر أشياء متناهية ولا يبصر ما لا نهاية له. ويغلط كثيرا في إبصاره: فيرى الكبير صغيرا والبعيد قريبا والساكن متحركا والمتحرك ساكنا. فهذه سبع نقائص لا تفارق العين الظاهرة. فإن كان في العين عين منزهة عن هذه النقائص كلها فليت شعري هل هو أولى باسم النور أم لا.

واعلم أن في قلب الإنسان عينا هذه صفة كمالها وهي التي يعبر عنها تارة بالعقل وتارة بالروح وتارة بالنفس الإنساني. ودع عنك العبارات فإنها إذا كثرت أوهمت عند ضعيف البصيرة كثرة المعاني. فنعني به المعنى الذي يتميز به العاقل عن الطفل الرضيع وعن البهيمة وعن المجنون. ولنسمه (عقلا) متابعة للجمهور في الاصطلاح فنقول: العقل أولى بأن يسمى نورا من العين الظاهرة لرفعة قدره عن النقائص السبع وهو أن العين لا تبصر نفسها، والعقل يدرك غيره ويدرك صفات نفسه: إذ يدرك نفسه عالما وقادرا؛ ويدرك علم نفسه ويدرك علمه بعلم نفسه وعلمه بعلمه بعلم نفسه إلى غير نهاية. وهذه خاصية لا تتصور لما يدرك بآلة الأجسام. ووراء سر يطول شرحه.

والثاني أن العين لا تبصر ما بعد منها ولا ما قرب منها قربا مفرطا: والعقل يستوي عنده القريب والبعيد: يعرج في تطريفه إلى أعلى السموات رقبيا، وينزل في لحظة إلى تخوم الأرضين هربا. بل إذا حقت الحقائق يكشف أنه منزّه عن أن تخوم بجنات قدسه معاني القرب والبعد الذي يفرض بين الأجسام، فإنه أتمودج من نور الله تعالى، ولا يخلو الأتمودج عن محاكاة، وإن كان لا يرقى إلى ذروة المساواة. وهذا ربما هزك للتفتن لسر قوله عليه السلام (إن الله خلق آدم على صورته) فلست أرى الخوض فيه الآن.

الثالث أن العين لا تدرك ما وراء الحجب، والعقل يتصرف في العرش والكرسي وما وراء حجب السموات، وفي الملاء الأعلى والملكوت الأسمى كتصرفه في عالمه الخاص ومملكته القريبة أعني بدنه الخاص. بل الحقائق كلها لا تحتجب عن العقل. وأما حجاب العقل حيث يحجب فمن نفسه لنفسه بسبب صفات هي مقارنة له تضاهي حجاب العين من نفسه عند تغميض الأجفان. وستعرف هذا في الفصل الثالث من الكتاب.

الرابع أن العين تدرك من الأشياء ظاهرها وسطحها الأعلى دون باطنها؛ بل قوالبها وصورها دون حقائقها. والعقل

يتغلغل إلى بواطن الأشياء وأسرارها ويدرك حقائقها وأرواحها، ويستتبط سببها وعلتها وغايتها وحكمتها، وأنها من خلق، وكيف خلق، ولم خلق، ومن كم معنى جمع وركب، وعلى أي مرتبة في الوجود نزل، وما نسبته إلى خالقها وما نسبتها إلى سائر مخلوقاته، إلى مباحث أخر يطول شرحها نرى الإيجاز فيها أولى.

الخامس أن العين تبصر بعض الموجودات إذ تقصر عن جميع المعقولات وعن كثير من المحسوسات: إذ لا تدرك الأصوات والروائح والطعوم والحرارة والبرودة والقوى المدركة: أعني قوة السمع والبصر والشم والذوق، بل الصفات الباطنة النفسانية كالفرح والسرور والغم والحزن والألم واللذة والعشق والشهوة والقدرة والإرادة والعلم إلى غير ذلك من موجودات لا تحصى ولا تعد؛ فهو ضيق المجال مختصر المجرى لا تسعة مجاوزة الألوان والأشكال وهما أخس الموجودات: فإن الأجسام في أصلها أخس أقسام الموجودات، والألوان والأشكال من أخس أعراضها.

فالموجودات كلها مجال العقل؛ إذ يدرك هذه الموجودات التي عددها وما لم نعددها، وهو الأكثر: فيتصرف في جميعها

ويحكم عليها حكما يقينا صادقا. فالأسرار الباطنة عنده ظاهرة، والمعاني الخفية عنده جلية. فمن أين للعين الظاهرة

مساماته ومجاراته في استحقاق اسم النور كلا إنها نور بالإضافة إلى غيرها لكنها ظلمة بالإضافة إليه. بل هي جاسوس

من جواسيسه وكله بأخس خزائنه وهي خزانة الألوان والأشكال لترفع إلى حضرته أخبارها فيقضي فيها بما يقتضيه رأيه

الثاقب وحكمه النافذ.

والحواس الخمس جواسيسه. وله في الباطن جواسيس سواها من خيال ووهم وفكر وذكر وحفظ؛ ووراءهم خدم وجنود

مسخرة له في عالمه الخاص يستسخروهم ويتصرف فيهم استسخر الملك عبيده بل أشد. وشرح ذلك يطول. وقد ذكرناه في

كتاب (عجاب القلب) من كتاب الإحياء.

السادس ان العين لا تبصر ما لانهاية له، فإنها تبصر صفات الأجسام والأجسام لا تتصور إلامتناهية. والعقل يدرك

المعلومات، والمعلومات لا يتصور أن تكون متناهيه.

نعم إذا لاحظ العلوم المفصلة فلا يكون الحاضر الحاصل عنده إلا متناهيًا. لكن في قوته إدراك ما لا نهاية له. وشرح ذلك يطول.

فإن أردت له مثالا فخذ من الجليات، فإنه يدرك الأعداد ولا نهاية لها؛ بل يدرك تضعيفات الإثنين والثلاثة وسائر الأعداد ولا يتصور لها نهاية. ويدرك أنواعا من النسب بين الأعداد لا يتصور التناهي عليها: بل يدرك علمه بالشيء وعلمه بعلمه بالشيء، وعلمه بعلمه بعلمه. فقوته في هذا الواحد لا تقف عند نهاية.

السابع أن العين تبصر الكبير صغيرا، فترى الشمس في مقدار مجن والكواكب في صور دنائير ماثورة على بساط أزرق. والعقل يدرك أن الكواكب والشمس أكبر من الأرض أضعافا مضاعفة؛ والعين ترى الكواكب ساكنة، بل ترى الظل بين يديه ساكنا، وترى الصبي ساكنا في مقداره، والعقل يدرك أن الصبي متحرك في النشوء والتزايد على الدوام، والظل متحرك دائما، والكواكب تتحرك في كل لحظة أميالا كثيرة كما قال صلى الله عليه وسلم لجبريل عليه السلام: (أزالت الشمس) فقال لا: نعم قال كيف قال (منذ قلت لا إلى أن قلت نعم): قد تحرك مسيرة خمسمائة سنة).

وأنواع غلط البصر كثيرة، والعقل منزه عنها. فإن قلت: نرى العقلاء يغلطون في نظرهم فاعلم أن فيهم خيالات وأوهاما واعتقادات يظنون أحكامها أحكام العقل؛ فالغلط منسوب إليها. وقد شرحنا مجامعها في كتاب (معيان العلم) وكتاب

(محك)

النظر).

فأما العقل إذا تجرد عن غشاوة الوهم والخيال لم يتصور أن يغلط؛ بل رأى الأشياء على ما هي عليه، وفي تجريده عسر عظيم. وإنما يكمل تجرده عن هذه النوازع بعد الموت، وعند ذلك ينكشف الغطاء وتنجلي الأسرار ويصادف كل أحد ما قدم من خير أو شر محضراً؛ ويشاهد كتاباً لا يغادر صغيرة ولا كبيرة إلا أحصاها، وعنده يقال، فكشفنا عنك غطاءك فبصرك اليوم حديد. وإنما الغطاء غطاء الخيال والوهم وغيرهما؛ وعنده يقول المغرور بأوهامه واعتقاداته الفاسدة وخیالاته الباطلة (رَبَّنَا أَبْصَرْنَا وَسَمِعْنَا فَارْجِعْنَا نَعْمَلْ صَالِحاً) الآية.

فقد عرفت بهذا أن العين أولى باسم النور من النور المعروف، ثم عرفت أن العقل أولى باسم النور من العين. بل بينهما من التفاوت ما يصح معه أن يقال إنه أولى بل الحق أنه المستحق للاسم دونه.

دقيقة

اعلم أن العقول وإن كانت مبصرة، فليست المبصرات كلها عندها على وتيرة واحدة، بل بعضها يكون عندها كأنه حاضر كالعلوم الضرورية مثل علمه بأن الشيء الواحد لا يكون قديماً حادثاً ولا يكون موجوداً معدوماً، والقول الواحد لا يكون صدقاً وكذباً، وأن الحكم إذا ثبت للشيء جوازه ثبت لمثله، وأن الأخص إذا كان موجوداً كان الأعم واجب

الوجود: فإذا وجد السواد فقد وجد اللون، وإذا وجد الإنسان فقد وجد الحيوان. وأما عكسه فلا يلزم في العقل، إذ لا يلزم من وجود اللون وجود السواد ولا من وجود الحيوان وجود لإنسان إلى غير ذلك من القضايا الضرورية في الواجبات والجائزات والمستحيلات. ومنها ما لا يقارن العقل في كل حال إذا عرض عليه بل يحتاج إلى أن يهز أعطافه ويستوري زناده وينبه عليه بالتنبيه كالنظريات. وإنما ينبهه كلام الحكمة، فعند إشراق نور الحكمة يصير العقل مبصراً بالفعل بعد أن كان مبصراً بالقوة. وأعظم الحكمة كلام الله تعالى. ومن جملة كلامه القرآن خاصة، فتكون منزلة آيات القرآن عند عين العقل منزلة نور الشمس عند العين الظاهرة إذ به يتم الإبصار. فبالحرى أن يسمى القرآن نورا كما يسمى نور الشمس نورا فمثال القرآن نور الشمس ومثال العقل نور العين. وبهذا نفهم معنى قوله: (فَأْمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ وَالنَّورِ الَّذِي أَنْزَلْنَا)، وقوله: (قَدْ جَاءَكُمْ بُرْهَانٌ مِنْ رَبِّكُمْ وَأَنْزَلْنَا إِلَيْكُمْ نُوراً مُبِيناً).

تكملة هذه الدقيقة

فقد فهمت من هذا أن العين عيان: ظاهرة وباطنة: فالظاهرة من عالم الحس والشهادة، والباطنة من عالم آخر وهو عالم الملكوت. ولكل عين من العينين شمس ونور عنده تصوير كاملة الإبصار إحداها ظاهرة والأخرى باطنة؛ والظاهرة من عالم الشهادة وهي الشمس المحسوسة. والباطنة من عالم الملكوت وهو القرآن وكتب الله تعالى المنزلة.

ومهما انكشف لك هذا انكشافا تاما فقد انفتح لك أول باب من أبواب الملكوت. وفي هذا العالم عجائب يستحق بالإضافة إليها عالم الشهادة. وإن لم يسافر إلى هذا العالم، وقعد به القصور في حضيض عالم الشهادة فهو بهيمة بعد، محروم عن خاصية الإنسانية؛ بل أضل من البهيمة إذ لم تسعد البهيمة بأجنحة الطيران إلى هذا العالم. ولذلك قال الله تعالى: (أُولَئِكَ كَالْأَنْعَامِ بَلْ هُمْ أَضَلُّ).

وأعلم أن الشهادة بالإضافة إلى عالم الملكوت كالقشر بالإضافة إلى اللب، وكالصورة والقلب بالإضافة إلى الروح، وكالظلمة بالإضافة إلى النور، كالسفل بالإضافة إلى العلو. ولذلك يسمى عالم الملكوت العالم العلوي والعالم الروحاني والعالم النوراني. وفي مقابلته السفلي والجسماني والظلماني.

ولا تظن أننا نعني بالعالم العلوي السموات فإنها علو وفوق في حق عالم الشهادة والحس، ويشارك في إدراكه البهائم. وأما العبد فلا يفتح له باب الملكوت ولا يصير ملكوتيا إلا ويبدل في حقه الأرض غير الأرض والسموات فيصير كل داخل تحت الحس والخيال أرضه ومن جملة السموات، وكل ما ارتفع عن الحس فسماءه وهذا هو المعراج الأول لكل سالك ابتداء سفره إلى قرب الحضرة الربوبية. فالإنسان مردود إلى أسفل السافلين، ومنه يترقى إلى العالم الأعلى. وأما الملائكة فإنهم جملة عالم الملكوت عاكفون في حضرة القدوس، ومنها يشرفون إلى العالم الأسفل. ولذلك قال عليه السلام (إن الله خلق الخلق في ظلمة ثم أفاض عليهم من نوره) وقال: (إن لله ملائكة هو أعلم بأعمال الناس منهم) والأنبياء إذا بلغ معراجهم

المبلغ الأقصى وأشرقوا منه إلى السفلى ونظروا من فوق إلى تحت اطلعوا أيضا على قلوب العباد وأشرفوا على جملة من علوم الغيب: إذ من كان في عالم الملكوت كان عند الله تعالى - (وَعِنْدَهُ مَفَاتِحُ الْغَيْبِ) أي من عنده تنزل أسباب الموجودات في عالم الشهادة؛ وعالم الشهادة أثر من آثار ذلك العالم، يجري منه مجرى الظل بالإضافة إلى السبب. ومفاتيح معرفة المسببات لا توجد إلا من الأسباب، ولذلك كان عالم الشهادة مثالا لعالم الملكوت كما سيأتي في بيان المشكاة والمصباح والشجرة: لأن المسبب لا يخلو عن موازنة السبب ومحاكاته نوعا من المحاكاة على قرب أو على بعد. وهذا لأن له غورا عميقا ومن اطلع على كنه حقيقته انكشف له حقائق أمثلة القرآن على يسر.

دقيقة ترجع إلى حقيقة النور

فنقول إن كان ما يبصر نفسه وغيره أولى باسم النور، فإن كان من جملة ما يبصر به غيره أيضا مع أنه يبصر نفسه وغيره، فهو أولى، باسم النور من الذي لا يؤثر في غيره أصلا، بل بالحري أن يسمى سراجا منيرا لفيض أنواره على غيره. وهذه الخاصية توجد للروح القدس النبوي إذ تفيض بواسطته أنواع المعارف على الخلائق. وبهذا نفهم معنى تسمية الله محمدا عليه السلام سراجا منيرا. والأنبياء كلهم سرج، وكذلك العلماء. ولكن التفاوت بينهم لا يحصى.

دقيقة

إذا كان اللائق بالذي يستفاد منه نور الإبصار أن يسمى سراجا منيرا فالذي يقتبس منه السراج في نفسه جدير بأن يكنى عنه بالنار. وهذه السرج الأرضية إنما تقتبس في أصلها من أنوار علوية. فالروح القدسي النبوي يكاد زيتة يضيء ولو لم تمسسه نار. ولكن إنما يصير نورا على نور إذا مسته النار. وبالحرى أن يكون مقتبس الأرواح الأرضية هي الروح الإلهية العلوية التي وصفها علي وابن عباس رضي الله عنهما فقالا: (إن لله ملكا) له سبعون ألف وجه في كل وجه سبعون ألف لسان يسبح الله بجميعها) وهو الذي قوبل بالملائكة كلهم فقيل (يوم القيامة) يَوْمَ يَقُومُ الرُّوحُ وَالْمَلَائِكَةُ صَفًّا) فهي إذا اعتبرت من حيث يقتبس منها السرج الأرضية لم يكن لها مثال إلا النار، وذلك لا يؤانس إلا من جانب الطور.

دقيقة

الأنوار السماوية التي تقتبس منها الأنوار الأرضية إن كان لها ترتيب بحيث يقتبس بعضها من بعض، فالأقرب من المنبع الأول أولى باسم النور لأنه أعلى رتبة. ومثال ترتيبه في عالم الشهادة لا تدركه إلا بأن يفرض ضوء القمر داخلا في كوة بيت واقعا على مرآة منصوبة على حائط، ومنعكسا منها إلى حائط آخر في مقابلتها ثم منعظا منه إلى الأرض بحيث تستنير الأرض. فأنت تعلم أن ما على الأرض من النور تابع لما على الحائط وما على الحائط تابع لما على المرآة، وما

على المرآة تابع لما في القمر، وما في القمر تابع لما في الشمس: إذ منها يشرق النور على القمر. وهذه الأنوار الأربعة مرتبة بعضها أعلى وأكمل من بعض، ولكل واحد مقام معلوم ودرجة خاصة لا يتعدها. فاعلم أنه قد انكشف لأرباب البصائر أن الأنوار الملكوتية إنما وجدت على ترتيب كذلك، وأن المقرب هو الأقرب إلى النور الأقصى. فلا يبعد أن تكون رتبة إسرافيل فوق رتبة جبريل، وأن فيهم الأقرب لقرب درجته من حضرة الربوبية التي هي منبع الأنوار كلها، وأن فيهم الأدنى، وبينهما درجات تستعصي على الإحصاء. وإنما المعلوم كثرتهم وترتيبهم في مقاماتهم وصفوفهم، وأنهم كما وصفوا به أنفسهم إذ قالوا: (وَإِنَّا لَنَحْنُ الصَّاقُونَ. وَإِنَّا لَنَحْنُ الْمُسَبِّحُونَ).

دقيقة

إذا عرفت أن الأنوار لها ترتيب فاعلم أنه لا يتسلسل إلى غير نهاية، بل يرتقي إلى منبع أول هو النور لذاته وبداته، ليس يأتيه نور من غيره، ومنه تشرق الأنوار كلها على ترتيبها. فانظر الآن اسم النور أحق وأولى بالمستنير المستعير نوره من غيره، أو بالنير في ذاته المنير لكل ما سواه فما عندي أنه يخفى عليك الحق فيه. وبه يتحقق أن اسم النور أحق بالنور الأقصى الأعلى الذي لا نور فوقه، ومنه ينزل النور إلى غيره.

حقيقة

بل أقول ولا أبالي إن اسم النور على غير النور الأول مجاز محض: إذ كل ما سواه إذا اعتبر ذاته فهو في ذاته من حيث ذاته لا نور له: بل نورانيته مستعارة من غيره ولا قوام لنورانيته المستعارى بنفسها، بل بغيرها. ونسبة المستعار إلى المستعير مجاز محض. أفترى أن من استعار ثيابا وفرسا ومركبا وسرجا، وركبه في الوقت الذي أركبه المعير، وعلى الحد الذي رسمه، غنى بالحقيقة أو بالمجاز؟ وأن المعير هو الغنى أو المستعير؟ كلا، بل المستعير فقير في نفسه كما كان. وإنما الغنى هو المعير الذي منه الإعارة والإعطاء، وإليه الاسترداد والانتزاع. فإذا النور الحق هو الذي بيده الخلق والأمر، ومنه الإنارة أولا والإدامة ثانيا. فلا شركة لأحد معه في حقيقة هذا الاسم ولا في استحقاقه إلا من حيث يسميه به ويتفضل عليه بتسميته تفضل المالك على عبده إذا أعطاه مالا ثم سماه مالكا. وإذا انكشف للعبد الحقيقة علم أنه وماله لملكه على التفرد لا شريك له فيه أصلا وألبته.

مهما عرفت أن النور يرجع إلى الظهور والإظهار ومراتبه، فاعلم أنه لا ظلمة أشد من كتم العدم: لأن المظلم سمي مظلماً لأنه ليس للإبصار إليه وصول، إذ ليس يصير موجوداً للبصير مع أنه موجود في نفسه.

فالذي ليس موجوداً لا لغيره ولا لنفسه كيف لا يستحق أن يكون هو الغاية في الظلمة وفي مقابله الوجود فهو النور:

فإن الشيء ما لم يظهر في ذاته لا يظهر لغيره.

والوجود ينقسم إلى ما للشيء من ذاته وإلى ماله من غيره. وما له الوجود من غيره فوجوده مستعار لا قوام له بنفسه. بل

إذا اعتبر ذاته من حيث ذاته فهو عدم محض. وإنما هو موجود من حيث نسبته إلى غيره، وذلك ليس بوجود حقيقي كما

عرفت في مثال استعارة الثوب والغنى. فالموجود الحق هو الله تعالى، كما أن النور الحق هو الله تعالى.

حقيقة الحقائق

من هنا ترقى العارفون من حضيض المجاز إلى يفاع الحقيقة، واستكملوا معراجهم فرأوا بالمشاهدة العيانة أن ليس في الوجود إلا الله تعالى، وأن (كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلَّا وَجْهَهُ) لا أنه يصير هالكا في وقت من الأوقات، بل هو هالك أزلا وأبدا لا يتصور إلا كذلك، فإن كل شيء سواه إذا اعتبر ذاته من حيث ذاته فهو عدم محض؛ وإذا اعتبر من الوجه الذي يسري إليه الوجود من الأول الحق رؤى موجودا لا في ذاته لكن من الوجه الذي يلي موجدته فيكون الموجود وجه الله تعالى فقط. فلكل شيء وجهان: وجه إلى نفسه ووجه إلى ربه؛ فإذا لا موجود إلا الله تعالى ووجهه. فإذا كل شيء هالك إلا وجهه أزلا وأبدا. ولم يفتقر هؤلاء إلى يوم القيامة ليسمعوا نداء الباري تعالى (لِمَنِ الْمُلْكُ الْيَوْمَ لِلَّهِ الْوَاحِدِ الْقَهَّارِ) بل هذا النداء لا يفارق سمعهم أدبا. ولم يفهموا من معنى قوله (الله أكبر) أنه أكبر من غيره، حاش لله، إذ ليس في الوجود معه غيره حتى يكون أكبر منه؛ بل ببس لغيره رتبة المعية، بل رتبة التبعية. بل ليس لغيره وجود إلا من الوجه الذي يليه. فالموجود وجهه فقط. ومحال أن يقال إنه أكبر من وجهه. بل معناها أنه أكبر من أن يقال له أكبر بمعنى الإضافة والمقايسة، وأكبر من أن يدرك غيره كنهه كبريائه، نبيا كان أو ملكا. بل لا يعرف الله كنه معرفته إلا الله. بل كل معروف داخل في سلطة العارف واستيلائه دخولا ما، وذلك ينافي الجلال والكبرياء. وهذا له تحقيق ذكرناه في كتاب (المقصد الأسنى) في معاني أسماء الله الحسنى).

إشارة

العارفون - بعد العروج إلى سماء الحقيقة - اتفقوا على أنهم لم يروا في الوجود إلا الواحد الحق. لكن منهم من كان له هذه الحال عرفانا علميا، ومنهم من صار له ذلك حالا ذوقيا. وانتفت عنهم الكثرة بالكلية واستغرقوا بالفردانية المحضة واستوفيت فيها عقولهم فصاروا كالمبهوتين فيه ولم يبق فيهم متسع لا لذكر غير الله ولا لذكر أنفسهم أيضا. فلم يكن عندهم إلا الله، فسكروا سكرا دفع دونه سلطان عقولهم، فقال أحدهم (أنا الحق) وقال الآخر (سبحاني ما أعظم شأنني) وقال آخر (ما في الجبة إلا الله) وكلام العشاق في حال السكر يطوى ولا يحكى. فلما خف عنهم سكرهم وردوا إلى سلطان العقل الذي هو ميزان الله في أرضه، عرفوا أن ذلك لم يكن حقيقة الاتحاد بل شبه الاتحاد مثل قول العاشق في حال فرط عشقه (أنا من أهوى ومن أهوى أنا) ولا يبعد أن يفاجيء الإنسان مرآة فينظر فيها ولم ير المرأة قط، فيظن أن الصورة التي رآها هي صورة المرأة متحدة بها، ويرى الخمر في الزجاج فيظن أن الخمر لون الزجاج. وإذا صار ذلك عنده مألوفاً ورسخ فيه قدمه استغفر وقال:

فَتَشَاهَا فَتَنَ

وَكَأَمَّا قَدْ

تِ الْحَمْرُ

قَدْ خُ

وفرق بين أن يقول: الخمر قدح، وبين أن يقول: كأنه قدح. وهذه الحالة إذا غلبت سميت بالإضافة إلى صاحب الحالة (فناء) بل (فناء الفناء): لأنه فنى عن نفسه وفنى عن فناءه، فإنه ليس يشعر بنفسه في تلك الحال ولا يعدم شعوره بنفسه. ولو شعر بعدم شعوره بنفسه لكان قد شعر بنفسه. وتسمى هذه الحالة بالإضافة إلى المستغرق به بلسان المجاز اتحاداً أو بلسان الحقيقة توحيداً. ووراء هذه الحقائق أيضاً أسرار يطول الخوض فيها.

خاتمة

لعلك تشتهي أن تعرف وجه إضافة نوره إلى السموات والأرض، بل وجه كونه في ذاته نور السموات والأرض، فلا ينبغي أن يخفى ذلك عليك بعد أن عرفت أنه النور ولا نور سواه وأنه كل الأنوار، وأنه النور الكلي، لأن النور عبارة عما ينكشف به الأشياء، وأعلى منه ما ينكشف به وله، وأعلى منه ما ينكشف به وله ومنه، وأن الحقيقي منه ما ينكشف به وله، وأعلى منه ما ينكشف به وله ومنه، وأن الحقيقي منه ما ينكشف به وله ومنه، وليس فوقه نور منه اقتباسه واستمداده: بل ذلك له في ذاته من ذاته لذاته لا من غيره. ثم عرفت أن هذا لن يتصف به إلا النور الأول. ثم عرفت أن السموات والأرض مشحونة نورا من طبقتي النور: اعني المنسوب إلى البصر والبصيرة: أي إلى الحس والعقل. أما البصر فما نشاهده في السموات من الكواكب والشمس والقمر، وما نشاهده في الأرض من الأشعة المنبسطة على كل ما على الأرض حتى ظهرت به الألوان المختلفة خصوصا في الربيع، وعلى كل حال في الحيوانات والمعادن وأصناف الموجودات. ولولاها لم يكن للألوان ظهور، بل وجود. ثم سائر ما يظهر للحس من الأشكال والمقادير يدرك تبعا للألوان ولا يتصور إدراكها إلا بواسطتها. وأما الأنوار العقلية المعنوية فالعالم الأعلى مشحون بها، وهي جواهر الملائكة، والعالم الأسفل مشحون بها وهي الحياة الحيوانية ثم الإنسانية. وبالنور الإنساني السفلي ظهر نظام عالم السفلى كما بالنور الملكي ظهر نظام عالم العلو. وهو المعنى بقوله (أنشأكم من

الأَرْضِ وَاسْتَعْمَرَكُمْ فِيهَا) (وقال تعالى:)لَيْسَتْ خَلْقُهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ (وقال:)وَيَجْعَلُكُمْ خُلَفَاءَ الْأَرْضِ(، وقال:)إِنِّي جَاعِلٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ خَلِيفَةً(.

فإذا (عرفت هذا عرفت أن العالم بأسره مشحون بالأنوار الظاهرة البصرية والباطنة العقلية، ثم عرفت أن السفلية فائضة بعضها من بعض فيضان النور من السراج وأن السراج هو الروح النبوي القدسي، وأن الأرواح النبوية القدسية مقتبسة من الأرواح العلوية اقتباس السراج من النور؛ وأن العلويات بعضها مقتبسة من البعض، وأن ترتيبها ترتيب مقامات. ثم ترقى جملتها إلى نور الأنوار ومعدنها ومنبعها الأول؛ وأن ذلك هو الله تعالى وحده لا شريك له، وأن سائر الأنوار مستعارة، وإنما الحقيقي نوره فقط؛ وأن الكل نوره، بل هو الكل، بل لا هوية لغيره إلا بالجاز. فإذا لا نور إلا نوره، وسائر الأنوار أنوار من الذي يليه لا من ذاته. فوجه كل ذي وجه إليه ومولّ شطره:)فَأَيْنَمَا تُوَلُّوا فَثَمَّ وَجْهُ اللَّهِ(فإذا لا إله إلا هو: فإن الإله عبارة عما الوجه موليه نحوه بالعبادة والتأله: أعني وجوه القلوب فإنها الأنوار. بل كما لا إله إلا هو، فلا هو إلا هو: لأن (هو) عبارة عما إليه إشارة كيفما كان، ولا إشارة إلا إليه. بل كل ما أشرت إليه فهو بالحقيقة إشارة عليه وإن كنت لا تعرفه أنت لغفلتك عن حقيقة الحقائق التي ذكرناها. ولا إشارى إلى نور الشمس بل إلى الشمس. فكل ما في الوجود فنسبته إليه في ظاهر المثل كنسبة النور إلى الشمس. فإذا (لا إله إلا الله) توحيد العوام، و (لا إله إلا هو) توحيد الخواص، لأن هذا أتم وأخص وأشمل وأحق وأدق وأدخل بصاحبه في الفردانية المحضة والوحدانية الصرفة. ومنتهى معراج الخلائق مملكة الفردانية. وليس وراء ذلك مرقى: إذ الترقى لا يتصور إلا بكثرة: فإنه نوع إضافة يستدعى ما منه الارتقاء وما إليه الارتقاء. وإذا ارتفعت الكثرة حقت الوحدة وبطلت الإضافات وطاحت الإشارات ولم يبق علو وسفل ونازل ومرتفع: واستحال الترقى فاستحال العروج. فليس وراء الأعلى علو، ولا مع الوحدة كثرة، ولا مع انتفاء الكثرة عروج، فإن كان من تغير حال. فالنزول إلى سماء الدنيا: أعني بالإشراف من علو إلى سفل لأن الأعلى له أسفل وليس له أعلى. فهذه هي غاية الغايات ومنتهى الطلبات: يعلمه من يعلمه وينكره من يجهله. وهو من العلم الذي هو كهيئة المكنون الذي لا يعلمه إلا العلماء بالله. فإذا نطقوا به لم ينكره إلا أهل الغرة بالله. ولا يبعد أن قال العلماء إن النزول إلى السماء الدنيا هو نزول ملك: فقد توهم العلماء ما هو أبعد منه؛ إذ قال هذا المستغرق بالفردانية أيضا له نزول إلى السماء الدنيا: فإن 1 ذلك هو نزوله إلى استعمال الحواس أو تحريك الأعضاء. وإليه الإشارة بقوله (صرت سمعه الذي يسمع به وبصره الذي يبصر به ولسانه الذي ينطق به) فإذا كان هو سمعه وبصره ولسانه، فهو السامع والباصر والناطق إذن لا غيره؛ وإليه الإشارة بقوله: (مرضت فلم تعدني) الحديث.

فحركات هذا الموحد من السماء الدنيا وإحساساته كالسمع والبصر من سماء فوقه، وعقله فوق ذلك. وهو يترقى من

سواء العقل إلى منتهى معراج الخلائق. ومملكة الفردانية تمام سبع طبقات ثم بعده يستوي على عرش الوجدانية، ومنه يدبر الأمر لطبقات سمواته.

فرما نظر الناظر إليه فأطلق القول بأن الله خلق آدم على صورة الرحمن، إلى أن يعين النظر فيعلم أن ذلك تأويل كقول القائل (أنا الحق) و (سبحاني) بل كقوله لموسى عليه السلام: (مرضت فلم تعديني) و (كنت سمعه وبصره ولسانه) وأرى الآن قبض البيان فما أراك تطيق من هذا القدر أكثر من هذا القدر. (مساعدة) لعلك لا تسمو إلى هذا الكلام بهمتك، بل تقصر دون ذروته همتك، فخذ إليك كلاماً أقرب إلى فهمك وأوفق لضعفك.

واعلم أن معنى كونه نور السموات والأرض تعرفه بالنسبة إلى النور الظاهر البصري. فإذا رأيت أنوار الربيع وخضرته مثلاً في ضياء النهار فلست تشك في أنك ترى الألوان. وربما ظننت أنك لست ترى مع الألوان غيرها، فإنك تقول لست أرى مع الخضرة غير الخضرة. ولقد أصر على هذا قوم فزعموا أن النور لا معنى له، وأنه ليس مع الألوان غير الألوان، فأنكروا وجود النور مع أنه أظهر الأشياء، وكيف لا وبه تظهر الأشياء، وهو الذي يبصر في نفسه ويبصر به غيره كما سبق. لكن عند غروب الشمس وغيبية السراج ووقوع الظل أدركوا تفرقة ضرورية بين محل الظل وبين موقع الضياء فاعترفوا بأن النور معنى وراء الألوان يدرك مع الألوان حتى كأنه لشدة انجلائه لا يدرك، ولشدة ظهوره يخفى. وقد يكون الظهور سبب الخفاء. والشيء إذا جاوز حده انعكس علي ضده.

فإذا عرفت هذا فاعلم أن أرباب البصائر ما رأوا شيئاً إلا رأوا الله معه. وربما زاد على هذا بعضهم فقال (ما رأيت شيئاً إلا

رأيت الله قبله) لأن منهم من يرى الأشياء به ومنهم من يرى الأشياء فيراه بالأشياء. وإلى الأول الإشارة بقوله تعالى: (أَوَلَمْ

يَكْفِ بِرَبِّكَ أَنَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ شَهِيدٌ؛ وعلى الثاني الإشارة بقوله تعالى: (سُئِلَهُمْ آيَاتِنَا فِي الْآفَاقِ) فالأول صاحب

مشاهدة، والثاني صاحب الاستدلال عليه، والأول درجة الصديقين، والثاني درجة العلماء الراسخين، وليس بعدهما إلا

المحجوبين.

الغافلين

درجة

وإذ قد عرفت هذا فاعلم أنه كما ظهر كل شيء للبصر بالنور الظاهر، فقد ظهر كل شيء للبصيرة الباطنة بالله. فهو مع

كل شيء لا يفارقه ثم يظهر كل شيء، كما أن النور مع كل شيء وبه يظهر. ولكن بقي ها هنا تفاوت: وهو أن النور

الظاهر يتصور أن يغيب بغروب الشمس ويحجب حتى يظهر الظل، وأما النور الإلهي الذي به يظهر كل شيء، لا يتصور

غييبته بل يستحيل تغييره. فيبقى مع الأشياء دائما، فانقطع طريق الاستدلال بالتفرقة. ولو تصور غييبته لالتهدت السموات

والأرض، ولأدرك به من التفرقة ما يضطر معه إلى المعرفة بما به ظهرت الأشياء. ولكن لما تساوت الأشياء كلها على نمط

واحد في الشهادة على وحدانية خالقها ارتفع التفريق وخفي الطريق: إذ الطريق الظاهر معرفة الأشياء بالأضداد فما لا

ضد له ولا تغير له تتشابه الأحوال في الشهادة له. فلا يبعد أن يخفى ويكون خفاؤه لشدة جلائه والغفلة عنه لإشراق

ضياءه. فسبحان من اختفى عن الخلق لشدة ظهوره، واحتجب عنهم لإشراق نوره. وربما لم يفهم أيضا كنه هذا الكلام

بعض القاصرين، فيفهم من قولنا (إن الله مع كل شيء كالنور مع الأشياء) (أنه في كل مكان؛ تعالى وتقدس عن النسبة

إلى المكان. بل لعل الأبعد عن إثارة هذا الخيال أن نقول إنه قبل كل شيء؛ وإنه فوق كل شيء؛ وإنه مظهر كل شيء.

والمظهر لا يفارق المظهر في معرفة صاحب البصيرة فهو الذي نعني بقولنا عنه مع كل شيء. ثم لا يخفى عليك أيضا أن المظهر وفوقه مع أنه معه بوجه: لكنه معه بوجه وقبله بوجه. فلا تظن أنه متناقض، واعتبر بالمحسوسات التي هي درجتك في العرفان؛ وانظر كيف تكون حركة اليد مع حركة ظل اليد وقبلها أيضا. ومن لم يتسع صدره لمعرفة هذا فليهجر هذا النمط من العلم، فلكل علم رجال؛ وكل ميسر لما خلق له.

الفصل الثاني

في بيان مثال المشكاة والمصباح

والزجاجة والشجرة والزيت والنار

ومعرفة هذا يستعدي تقديم قطبين يتسع المجال فيهما إلى غير حد محدود. لكنني أشير إليهما بالرمز والاختصار: أحدهما في بيان سر التمثيل ومنهاجه ووجه ضبط أرواح المعاني بقوالب الأمثلة، ووجه كيفية المناسبة بينها، وكيفية الموازنة بين عالم الشهادة التي منها تتخذ طينة الأمثال، وعالم الملكوت الذي منه تستنزل أرواح المعاني.

والثاني في طبقات أرواح الطينة البشرية ومراتب أنوارها؛ فإن هذا المثال مسوق لبيان ذلك؛ إذ قرأ ابن مسعود (مثل نوره

في قلب المؤمن كمشكاة) وقرأ أبي بن كعب: (مثل نور قلب من آمن).

الأول في سر التمثيل ومنهاجه

اعلم أن العالم عالمان: روحاني وجسماني: وإن شئت قلت: حسي وعقلي؛ وإن شئت علوي وسفلي. والكل متقارب، وإنما تختلف باختلاف الاعتبار: فإذا اعتبرتهما في أنفسهما قلت جسماني وروحاني، وإن اعتبرتهما بالإضافة إلى العين المدركة لهما قلت حسي وعقلي. وإن اعتبرتهما بإضافة أحدهما إلى الآخر قلت علوي وسفلي. وربما سميت أحدهما عالم الملك والشهادة والآخر عالم الغيب والملكوت. ومن نظر إلى الحقائق من الألفاظ ربما تحير عند كثرة الألفاظ وتخيل كثرة المعاني. والذي تنكشف له الحقائق يجعل المعاني أصلاً والألفاظ تابعاً. وأمر الضعيف بالعكس؛ إذ يطلب الحقائق من الألفاظ. وإلى الفريقين الإشارة بقوله تعالى: (أَفَمَنْ يَمْشِي مُكِبًّا عَلَى وَجْهِهِ أَهْدَى أَم مَّن يَمْشِي سَوِيًّا عَلَى صِرَاطٍ مُسْتَقِيمٍ).

وإذ قد عرفت معنى العالمين فاعلم أن العالم الملكوتي عالم غيب؛ إذ هو غائب عن الأكثرين. والعالم الحسي عالم شهادة إذ يشهده الكافة. والعالم الحسي مرقاة إلى العقل. فلو لم يكن بينهما اتصال ومناسبة لانسد طريق الترقى إليه. ولو تعذر ذلك لتعذر السفر إلى حضرة الربوبية والقرب من الله تعالى. فلم يقرب من الله تعالى أحد ما لم يطأ بجبوحة حظيرة القدس.

والعالم المرتفع عن إدراك الحس والخيال هو الذي نعينه بعالم القدس. فإذا اعتبرنا جملته بحيث لا يخرج منه شيء ولا يدخل فيه ما هو غريب منه سميناه حظيرة القدس. وربما سميناه الروح البشري الذي هو مجرى لوائح القدس (الوادي المقدس). ثم هذه الحظيرة فيها حظائر بعضها أشد إمعاناً في معاني القدس. ولكن لفظ الحظيرة يحيط بجميع طبقاتها. فلا تظن أن هذه الألفاظ طامات غير معقولة عند أرباب البصائر. واشتغالي الآن بشرح كل لفظ مع ذكره يصدني عن المقصد. فعليك التشمير لفهم هذه الألفاظ فأرجع إلى الغرض وأقول: لما كان عالم الشهادة مرقاة إلى عالم الملكوت، وكان سلوك الصراط المستقيم عبارة عن هذا الترقى؛ وقد يعبر عنه بالدين وبمنازل الهدى - فلو لم يكن بينهما مناسبة واتصال لما تصور

الترقي من أحدهما إلى الآخر - جعلت الرحمة الإلهية عالم الشهادة على موازنة عالم الملكوت: فما من شيء من هذا العالم إلا وهو مثال لشيء من ذلك العالم. وربما كان الشيء الواحد مثالا لأشياء من عالم الملكوت. وربما كان للشيء الواحد من الملكوت أمثلة كثيرة من عالم الشهادة. وإنما يكون مثالا إذا ماثله نوعا من المماثلة، وطابقه نوعا من المطابقة. وإحصاء تلك الأمثلة يستدعي استقصاء جميع موجودات العالمين بأسرها، ولن تفي به القوة البشرية وما اتسع لفهمه القوة البشرية. فلا تفي بشرحه الأعمار القصيرة. فغاييتي أن أعرفك منها أنموذجا لتستدل باليسير منها على الكثير، وينفتح لك باب الاستعبار بهذا النمط من الأسرار فأقول: إن كان في عالم الملكوت جواهر نورانية شريفة عالية يعبر عنها بالملائكة، منها تفيض الأنوار على الأرواح البشرية، ولأجلها قد تسمى أربابا، ويكون الله تعالى رب الأرباب لذلك، ويكون لها مراتب في نورانياتها متفاوتة، فبالحرى أن يكون مثالا من عالم الشهادة الشمس والقمر والكواكب.

والسالك للطريق أولا ينتهي إلى ما درجته درجة الكواكب فيتضح له إشراق نوره وينكشف له أن العالم الأسفل بأسره تحت سلطانه وتحت إشراق نوره؛ ويتضح له من جماله وعلو درجته ما يبادر فيقول: (هذا ربي) ثم إذا اتضح له ما فوقه مما رتبته رتبة القمر، رأى دخول الأول في مغرب الهوى بالإضافة إلى ما فوقه فقال: (لا أحب الآفلين) وكذلك يترقى حتى ينتهي إلى ما مثاله الشمس فيراه أكبر وأعلى، فيراه قابلا للمثال بنوع مناسبة له معه. والمناسبة مع ذي النقص نقص وأقول أيضا. فمنه يقول: (وَجْهْتُ وَجْهِي لِلَّذِي فَطَرَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ حَنِيفًا) ومعنى (الذي) إشارة مبهمة لا مناسبة لها: إذ لو قال قائل ما مثال مفهوم (الذي) لم يتصور أن يجاب عنه. فالمتنزه عن كل مناسبة هو الأول الحق. ولذلك لما قال بعض الأعراب لرسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: (ما نسب الإله؟) نزل في جوابه (قُلْ هُوَ اللَّهُ أَحَدٌ. اللَّهُ الصَّمَدُ. لَمْ يَلِدْ وَلَمْ يُولَدْ) إلى آخرها، معناه أن التقديس والتنزه عن النسبة نسبته. ولذلك لما قال فرعون لموسى: (وَمَا رَبُّ الْعَالَمِينَ) كالمطالب لماهيته لم يجب إلا بتعريفه بأفعاله، إذ كانت الأفعال أظهر عند السائل فقال: (رَبِّ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ)، فقال فرعون لمن حوله (أَلَا تَسْمَعُونَ) كالمنكر عليه في عدوله في جوابه عن طلب الماهية، فقال موسى: (رَبُّكُمْ وَرَبُّ آبَائِكُمُ الْأُولِينَ) فنسبه فرعون إلى الجنون إذ كان مطلبه المثال والماهية؛ وهو يجيب عن الأفعال، فقال: (إِنَّ رَسُولَكُمْ الَّذِي أُرْسِلَ إِلَيْكُمْ لَمَجْنُونٌ).

ولنرجع إلى الأنموذج فنقول علم (التعبير) يعرفك منهاج ضرب المثال؛ لأن الرؤيا جزء من النبوة. أما ترى أن الشمس في الرؤيا تعبيرها السلطان، لما بينهما من المشاركة والمماثلة في معنى روحاني - وهو الإستعلاء على الكافة مع فيضان الآثار على الجميع. والقمر تعبيره الوزير لإفاضة الشمس نورها بواسطة القمر على العالم عند غيبتها كما يفيض السلطان أنواره بواسطة الوزير على من يغيب عن حضرة السلطان. وأن من يرى أنه في يده خاتم يختم به أفواه الرجال وفروج النساء

فتعبيره أنه مؤذن يؤذن قبل الصبح في رمضان. وأن من يرى أنه يصب الزيت في الزيتون فتعبيره أن تحته جارية هي أمه وهو لا يعرف. واستقصاء أبواب التعبير يزبك أنسا بهذا الجنس، فلا يمكنني الاشتغال بعدها: بل أقول: كما أن في الموجودات العالية الروحانية ما مثاله الشمس والقمر والكواكب، فكذلك فيها ما له أمثلة أخرى إذا اعتبرت منه أوصاف أخر سوى النورانية.

فإن كان في تلك الموجودات ما هو ثابت لا يتغير وعظيم لا يستصغر، ومنه ينفجر إلى أودية القلوب البشرية مياه المعارف ونفائس المكاشفات فمثاله (الطور)؛ وإن كان ثم موجودات تتلقى تلك النفائس بعضهم أولى من بعض فمثالها الوادي. وإن كانت تلك النفائس بعد اتصالها بالقلوب البشرية تجري من قلب إلى قلب، فهذه القلوب أيضا أودية. ومفتتح الوادي قلوب الأنبياء ثم العلماء ثم من بعدهم. فإن كانت هذه الأودية دون الأول وعنهما تغترف، فبالحرى أن يكون الأول هو الوادي الأيمن لكثرة يمنه وعلو درجته. وإن كان الوادي الأيمن يتلقى من آخر درجات الوادي الأيمن فمغترفه شاطئ الوادي الأيمن دون لجته ومبدئه. وإن كان روح النبي سراجا منيرا، وكان ذلك الروح مقتبسا بواسطة وحي (كما قال:) أوحينا إليك روحاً من أمرنا (فما منه الإقتباس مثاله النار، وإن كان المتلقون من الأنبياء بعضهم على محض التقليد لما سمعه، وبعضهم على حظ من البصيرة، فمثال حظ المقلد الخبر، ومثال حظ المستبصر الجذوة والقبس والشهاب. فإن صاحب الذوق مشارك للنبي في بعض الأحوال. ومثال تلك المشاركة الإصطلاء. وإنما يصطلي بالنار من معه النار، لا من يسمع خبرها. وإن كان أول منزل الأنبياء الترقى إلى العالم المقدس عن كدورة الحس والخيال، فمثال ذلك المنزل الوادي المقدس.

وإن كان لا يمكن وطء ذلك الوادي المقدس إلا باطراح الكونين - أعني الدنيا والآخرة - والتوجه إلى الواحد الحق، ولأن الدنيا والآخرة متقابلتان متحاذيتان وهما عارضان للجوهر النوراني البشري يمكن اطراحهما مرة والتلبس بهما أخرى، فمثال اطراحهما عند الإحرام للتوجه إلى كعبة القدس خلع النعلين. بل نترقي إلى حضرة الربوبية مرة أخرى ونقول:

إن كان في تلك الحضرة شيء بواسطته تنتقش العلوم المفصلة في الجواهر القابلة لها فمثاله (القلم). وإن كان في تلك الجواهر القابلة ما بعضها سابق إلى التلقي، ومنها تنتقل إلى غيرها، فمثالها (اللوحة المحفوظ) و (الرق المنشور). وإن كان فوق الناقش للعلوم شيء هو مسخر فمثاله (اليدين) وإن كان لهذه الحضرة المشتعلة على اليد واللوحة والقلم والكتاب ترتيب

منظوم فمثاله (الصورة) وإن كان يوجد للصورة الإنسانية نوع ترتيب على هذه الشاكلة، فهي على صورة الرحمن. وفرق بين أن يقال (على صورة الرحمن) وبين أن يقال (على صورة الله) لأن الرحمة الإلهية هي التي صورت الحضرة الإلهية بهذه الصورة.

ثم أنعم على آدم فأعطاه صورة مختصرة جامعة لجميع أصناف ما في العالم حتى كأنه كل ما في العالم أو هو نسخة من العالم مختصرة. وصورة آدم- أعني هذه الصورة- مكتوبة بخط الله. فهو الخط الإلهي الذي ليس برقم حروف، إذ تنزه خطه عن أن يكون رقما وحروفا كما تنزه كلامه عن أن يكون صوتا وحرفا، وقلمه عن أن يكون خشبا وقصبا، ويده عن أن تكون لحما وعظما. ولولا هذه الرحمة لعجز الآدمي عن معرفة ربه: إذ لا يعرف ربه إلا من عرف نفسه. فلما كان هذا من آثار الرحمة صار على صورة الرحمن لا على صورة الله: فإن حضرة الإلهية غير حضرة الرحمة وغير حضرة الملك وغير حضرة الربوبية. ولذلك أمر بالعباد بجميع هذه الحضرات فقال: (قُلْ أَعُوذُ بِرَبِّ النَّاسِ، مَلِكِ النَّاسِ، إِلَهِ النَّاسِ) ولولا هذا المعنى لكان ينبغي أن يقول على صورته واللفظ الوارد في الحديث الصحيح على صورة الرحمن. ولأن تمييز حضرة الملك عن الإلهية والربوبية يستدعي شرحا طويلا فلنتجاوز، ويكفيك من الأنموذج هذا القدر، فإن هذا بحر لا ساحل له. فإن وجدت في نفسك نفورا عن هذه الأمثال فآن قلبك بقوله تعالى: (أَنْزَلَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَسَالَتْ أَوْدِيَةٌ بِقَدَرِهَا) الآية، وأنه كيف ورد في التفسير أن الماء هو المعرفة والقرآن والأودية القلوب.

خاتمة واعتذار

لا تظنن من هذا النموذج وطريق ضرب المثال رخصة مني في رفع الظاهر واعتقادا في إبطالها حتى أقول مثلاً لم يكن مع موسى نعلان، ولم يسمع الخطاب بقوله: (اخلع نعليك) حاش لله فإن إبطال الظواهر رأى الباطنية الذين نظروا بالعين العوراء إلى أحد العالمين ولم يعرفوا الموازنة بين العالمين، ولم يفهموا وجهه. كما أن إبطال الأسرار مذهب الحشوية. فالذي يجرد الظاهر حشوى، والذي يجرد الباطن باطني. والذي يجمع بينهما كامل. ولذلك قال عليه السلام: (للقرآن ظاهر وباطن وحدٌ ومطلع) وربما نقل هذا عن عليٍّ موقوفاً عليه. بل أقول فهم موسى من الأمر بخلع النعلين اطراح الكونين فامتثل الأمر ظاهراً بخلع نعليه، وباطناً باطراح العالمين. وهذا هو (الاعتبار) أي العبور من الشيء إلى غيره، ومن الظاهر إلى السر. وفرق بين من يسمع قول رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: (لا يدخل الملائكة بيتاً فيه كلب) فيقتنى الكلب في البيت ويقول ليس الظاهر مراداً، بل المراد تخلية بيت القلب عن كلب الغضب لأنه يمنع المعرفة التي هي من أنوار الملائكة: إذا الغضب غول العقل، وبين من يمتثل الأمر في الظاهر ثم يقول: الكلب ليس كلباً لصورته بل لمعناه - وهو السبعية والضراوة - وإذا كان حفظ البيت الذي هو مقر الشخص والبدن واجبا عن صورة الكلب، فبأن يجب حفظ بيت القلب - وهو مقر الجوهر الحقيقي الخاص - عن شر الكلبة أولى. فأنا أجمع بين الظاهر والسر جميعاً، فهذا هو الكامل: وهو المعنى بقولهم (الكامل من لا يطفئ نور معرفته نور ورعه) ولذلك ترى الكامل لا تسمح نفسه بترك حد من حدود الشرع مع كمال البصيرة. وهذه مغلطة منها وقع بعض السالكين إلى الإباحة وطى بساط الأحكام ظاهراً، حتى أنه ترك أحدهم الصلاة وزعم أنه دائماً في الصلاة بسره. وهذا سوى مغلطة الحمقى من الإباحية الذين مأخذهم ترهات كقول بعضهم (إن الله غني عن عملنا) وقول بعضهم إن الباطن مشحون بالخبائث ليس يمكن تركيته ولا يطمع في استئصال الغضب والشهوة لظنه أنه مأمور باستئصالها: وهذه حماقات.

فأما ما ذكرناه فهو كبوة جواد وهفوة سالك حسده الشيطان فدلاًه بجبل الغرور. وأرجع إلى حديث النعلين فأقول:

ظاهر خلع النعلين منبه على ترك الكونين. فالمثال في الظاهر حق وأدائه إلى السر الباطن حقيقة. وأهل هذا التنبيه هم

الذين بلغوا درجة الزجاجة كما سيأتي معنى الزجاجة؛ لأن الخيال الذي من طبيئته يتخذ المثال صلب كثيف يحجب

الأسرار ويحول بينك وبين الأنوار؛ ولكن إذا صفا حتى صار كالزجاج الصافي غير حائل عن الأنوار، بل صار مع ذلك مؤدياً للأنوار، بل صار مع ذلك حافظاً للأنوار عن الانطفاء بعواصف الرياح. وستأتيك قصة الزجاجية. فاعلم أن العالم الكثيف الخيالي السفلي صار في حق الأنبياء زجاجة ومشكاة للأنوار ومصفاة للأسرار، ومرفقة إلى العالم الأعلى. وبهذا يعرف أن المثال الظاهر حق ووراءه سر. وقس على هذا (الطور) و (النار) وغيرهما.

دقيقة

إذا قال الرسول عليه السلام: (رأيت عبد الرحمن بن عوف يدخل الجنة حبوا) فلا تظن أنه لم يشاهده بالبصر كذلك، بل رآه في يقظته كما يراه النائم في نومه؛ وإن كان عبد الرحمن مثلاً نائماً في بيته بشخصه، فإن النوم إنما أثر في أمثال هذه المشاهدات لقهره سلطان الحواس عن النور الباطن الإلهي، فإن الحواس شاغلة له وجاذبة إياه إلى عالم الحس، وصارفة وجهه عن عالم الغيب والملكوت. وبعض الأنوار النبوية قد يستعلي ويستولي بحيث لا تستجره الحواس إلى عالمها ولا تشغله، فيشاهد في اليقظة ما يشاهد غيره في المنام. ولكنه إذا كان في غاية الكمال لم يقتصر إدراكه على محض الصورة المبصرة، بل عبر منها إلى السر فانكشف له أن الإيمان جاذب إلى العالم الذي يعبر عنه بالجنة؛ والغنى والثروة جاذب إلى الحياة الحاضرة وهي العالم الأسفل. فإن كان الجاذب إلى أشغال الدنيا أقوى أو مقاوماً للجاذب الآخر صد

عن المسير إلى الجنة. وإن كان جاذب الإيمان أقوى أورث عسرا وبطئا في سيره؛ فيكون مثاله من عالم الشهادة (الخبو) فكذاك تتجلى له أنوار الأسرار من وراء زجاجات الخيال. ولذلك لا يقتصر في حكمه على عبد الرحمن وإن كان إبصاره مقصورا عليه، بل يحكم به على كل من قويت بصيرته واستحكم إيمانه، وكثرت ثروته كثرة تزاحم الإيمان لكن لا تقاومه لرجحان قوة الإيمان.

فهذا يعرفك كيفية إبصار الأنبياء الصورة وكيفية مشاهدتهم المعاني من وراء الصور. والأغلب أن يكون المعنى سابقا إلى المشاهدة الباطنة ثم يشرق منها على الروح الخيالي فينتبع الخيال بصورة موازنة للمعنى محاكية له. وهذا النمط من الوحي في اليقظة يفتقر إلى التأويل، كما أنه في النوم يفتقر إلى التعبير. والواقع منه في النوم نسبته إلى الخواص النبوية نسبة الواحد إلى ستة وأربعين. والواقع في اليقظة نسبته أعظم من ذلك. وأظن أن نسبته إليه نسبة الواحد إلى الثلاثة. فإن الذي انكشف لنا من الخواص النبوية ينحصر شعبها في ثلاثة أجناس، وهذا واحد من تلك الأجناس الثلاثة.

القطب الثاني

في بيان مراتب الأرواح

البشرية النورانية إذ بمعرفتها تعرف أمثلة القرآن

فالأول منها الروح الحساس وهو الذي يتلقى ما تورده الحواس الخمس، وكأنه أصل الروح الحيواني وأوله، إذ به يصير الحيوان حيواناً. وهو موجود للصبي الرضيع.

الثاني الروح الخيالي، وهو الذي يستثبت ما أورده الحواس ويحفظه مخزوناً عنده ليعرضه على الروح العقلي الذي فوقه عند الحاجة إليه. وهذا لا يوجد للصبي الرضيع في بداية نشوئه: ولذلك يولع بالشيء ليأخذه، فإذا غاب عنه ينساه ولا تنازعه نفسه إليه إلى أن يكبر قليلاً فيصير بحيث إذا غُيب عنه بكى وطلب ذلك لبقاء صورته محفوظة في خياله. وهذا قد يوجد لبعض الحيوانات دون بعض، ولا يوجد للفراش المتهافت على النار لأنه يقصد النار لشغفه بضياء النهار: فيظن أن السراج كوة مفتوحة إلى موضع الضياء فيلقي نفسه عليه فيتأذى به. لكنه إذا جاوزه وحصل في الظلمة عاوده مرة بعد مرة. ولو كان له الروح الحافظ المستثبت لما أداه الحس إليه من الألم لما عاوده بعد أن تضرر مرة به فالكلب إذا ضرب مرة بخشبة، فإذا رأى الخشبة بعد ذلك من بعد هرب.

الثالث الروح العقلي الذي به تدرك المعاني الخارجة عن الحس والخيال، وهو الجوهر الإنسي الخاص، ولا يوجد لا للبهائم

ولا للصبيان. ومدرجاته المعارف الضرورية الكلية كما ذكرناه عند ترجيح نور العقل على نور العين.

الرابع الروح الفكري، وهو الذي يأخذ العلوم العقلية المحضة فيوقع بينها تأليفات وازدواجات ويستنتج منها معارف

شريفة. ثم إذا استفاد نتيجتين مثلاً، ألف بينهما مرة أخرى واستفاد نتيجة أخرى. ولا يزال يتزايد كذلك إلى غير نهاية.

الخامس الروح القدسي النبوي الذي يختص به الأنبياء وبعض الأولياء، وفيه تتجلى لوائح الغيب وأحكام الآخرة وجملة

من معارف ملكوت السموات والأرض، بل من المعارف الربانية التي يقصر دونها الروح العقلي والفكري. وإليه الإشارة

بقوله تعالى: (وَكَذَلِكَ أَوْحَيْنَا إِلَيْكَ رُوحاً مِّنْ أَمْرِنَا مَا كُنْتَ تَدْرِي مَا الْكِتَابُ وَلَا الْإِيمَانُ، وَلَكِنْ جَعَلْنَاهُ نَوْراً تَهْدِي بِهِ)

الآية. فلا يبعد أيها العاكف في عالم العقل أن يكون وراء العقل طور آخر يظهر فيه ما لا يظهر في العقل، كما لا يبعد

كون العقل طورا وراء التمييز والإحساس تنكشف فيه غرائب وعجائب يقصر عنها الإحساس والتمييز. ولا تجعل أقصى الكمال وقفا على نفسك. وإن أردت مثالا مما نشاهده من جملة خواص بعض البشر فانظر إلى ذوق الشعر كيف يختص به قوم من الناس وهو نوع إحساس وإدراك، ويحرم عنه بعضهم حتى لا تتميز عندهم الألحان الموزونة من المنزحفة. وانظر كيف عظمت قوة الذوق في طائفة حتى استخرجوا بها الموسيقى والأغاني والأوتار وصنوف الدستانات التي منها المحزن ومنها المطرب ومنها المنوم ومنها المضحك ومنها المجنن ومنها القاتل، ومنها الموجب للغشى. وإنما تقوى هذه الآثار فيمن له أصل الذوق. وأما العاقل عن خاصية الذوق فيشارك في سماع الصوت وتضعف فيه هذه الآثار، وهو يتعجب من صاحب الوجد والشغى. ولو اجتمع العقلاء كلهم من أرباب الذوق على تفهيمه معنى الذوق لم يقدروا عليه.

فهذا مثال في أمر خسيس لكنه قريب إلى فهمك. فقس به الذوق الخاص النبوي واجتهد أن تصير من أهل الذوق بشيء من ذلك الروح: فإن للأولياء منه حظا وافرا. فإن لم تقدر فاجتهد أن تصير بالأقيسة التي ذكرناها والتنبيهات التي رمزنا إليها من أهل العلم بها. فإن لم تقدر فلا أقل من أن تكون من أهل الإيمان بها: و (يَرْفَعُ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ وَالَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ دَرَجَاتٍ). والعلم فوق الإيمان، والذوق فوق العلم. فالذوق وجدان والعلم قياس والإيمان قبول مجرد

بالتقليد. وحسن الظن بأهل الوجدان أو بأهل العرفان.

فإذا عرفت هذه الأرواح الخمسة فاعلم أنها بجملتها أنوار لأنها تظهر أصناف الموجودات، والحسى والخيالي منها، وإن كان يشارك البهائم في جنسها، لكن الذي للإنسان منه نمط آخر أشرف وأعلى؛ وخلق الإنسان لأجل غرض أجل وأسمى. أما الحيوانات فلم يخلق ذلك لها إلا ليكون آلتها في طلب غذائها في تسخيرها للآدمي. وإنما خلق للآدمي ليكون شبكة له يقتنص بها من العالم الأسفل مبادئ المعارف الدينية الشريفة. إذ الإنسان إذا أدرك بالحس شخصا معيناً اقتبس عقله منه معنى عاماً مطلقاً كما ذكرنا في مثال حبو عبد الرحمن بن عوف. وإذا عرفت هذه الأرواح الخمسة فلنرجع إلى عرض الأمثلة.

بيان أمثلة هذه الآيات

اعلم أن القول في موازنة هذه الأرواح الخمسة للمشكاة والزجاجة والمصباح والشجرة والزيت يمكن تطويله، لكنني أوجزه وأقتصر على التنبيه على طريقه فأقول: أما الروح الحساس فإذا نظرت إلى خاصيته وجدت أنواره خارجة من ثقب عدة كالعينين والأذنين والمنخرين وغيرها. وأوفق مثال له من عالم الشهادة المشكاة. وأما الروح الخيالي فنجد له خواص ثلاثاً: إحداهما: أنه من طينة العالم السفلي الكثيف: لأن الشيء المتخيل ذو مقدار وشكل وجهات محصورة مخصوصة. وهو على نسبة من المتخيل من قرب أو بعد. ومن شأن الكثيف الموصوف بأوصاف الأجسام أن يحجب عن الأنوار العقلية المحضة التي تنتزه عن الوصف بالجهات والمقادير والقرب والبعد. الثانية: أن هذا الخيال الكثيف إذا صفى ودقق وهذب وضبط صار موازياً للمعاني العقلية ومؤدياً لأنوارها، غير حائل عن إشراق نورها منها. الثالثة: أن الخيال في بداية الأمر محتاج إليه جداً ليضبط به المعارف العقلية فلا تضطرب ولا تتزلزل ولا تنتشر انتشاراً يخرج

عن الضبط. فنعم المعين المثالات الخيالية للمعارف العقلية. وهذه الخواص الثلاث لا نجد لها في عالم الشهادة بالإضافة إلى الأنوار المبصرة إلا للزجاجة: فإنها في الأصل من جوهر كثيف لكن صفى ورقق حتى لا يحجب نور المصباح بل يؤديه على وجهه، ثم يحفظه عن الانطفاء بالرياح العاصفة والحركات العنيفة. فهي أول مثال له. وأما الثالث وهو الروح العقلي الذي به إدراك المعارف الشريفة الإلهية فلا يخفى عليك وجه تمثيله بالمصباح. وقد عرفت هذا فيما سبق من بيان كون الأنبياء سرجاً منيرة.

وأما الرابع وهو الروح الفكري فمن خاصيته أنه يبتدىء من أصل واحد ثم تتشعب منه شعبتان، ثم من كل شعبة شعبتان وهكذا إلى أن تكثر الشعب بالتقسيمات العقلية، ثم يفضي بالآخرة إلى نتائج هي ثمراتها. ثم تلك الثمرات تعود فتصير بذوراً لأمثالها: إذ يمكن أيضاً تلقيح بعضها ببعض حتى يتمادى إلى ثمرات وراءها كما ذكرناه في كتاب القسطاس المستقيم. فبالحرى أن يكون مثاله من هذا العالم الشجرة. وإذا كانت ثمراته مادة لتضاعف أنوار المعارف وثباتها وبقائها فبالحرى ألا تمثل بشجرة السفرجل والتفاح والرمان وغيرها، بل من جملة سائر الأشجار بالزيتونة خاصة: لأن لب ثمرها هو الزيت الذي هو مادة المصابيح، ويختص من سائر الأدهان بخاصة زيادة الإشراق مع قلة الدخان. وإذا كانت الماشية التي يكثر نسلها والشجرة التي تكثر ثمرتها تسمى مباركة، فالتى لا يتناهى ثمرتها إلى حد محدود أولى أن تسمى شجرة مباركة. وإذا كانت شعب الأفكار العقلية المحضة خارجة عن قبول الإضافة إلى الجهات والقرب والبعد، فبالحرى أن تكون لا شرقية ولا غربية.

وأما الخامس: وهو الروح القدسي النبوي المنسوب إلى الأولياء إذا كان في غاية الصفاء والشرف وكانت الروح المفكرة منقسمة إلى ما يحتاج إلى تعليم وتنبيه ومدد من خارج حتى يستمر في أنواع المعارف، وبعضها يكون في شدة الصفاء كأنه يتنبه بنفسه من غير مدد من خارج، فبالحرى أن يعبر عن الصافي البالغ الاستعداد بأنه يكاد زيتته يضيء، ولو لم تمسسه نار: إذ من الأولياء من يكاد يشرق نوره حتى يكاد يستغني عن مدد الأنبياء؛ وفي الأنبياء من يكاد يستغني عن مدد الملائكة. فهذا المثال موافق لهذا القسم.

وإذا كانت هذه الأنوار مترتبة بعضها على بعض: فالحسى هو الأول، وهو كالتوطئة والتمهيد للخيالي، إذ لا يتصور الخيالي إلا موضوعاً بعده؛ والفكري والعقلي يكونان بعدهما؛ فبالحرى أن تكون الزجاجة كالمحل للمصباح والمشكاة كالمحل للزجاجة: فيكون المصباح في زجاجة، والزجاجة في مشكاة.

وإذا كانت هذه كلها أنواراً بعضها فوق بعض فبالحرى أن تكون نورا هذا المثال إنما يتضح لقلوب المؤمنين أو لقلوب الأنبياء والأولياء لا لقلوب الكفار: فإن النور يراد للهداية. فالمصروف عن طريق الهدى باطل وظلمة، بل أشد من الظلمة: لأن الظلمة لا تهدي إلى الباطل كما لا تهدي إلى الحق. وعقول الكفار انتكست، وكذلك سائر إدراكاتهم

وتعاونت على الإضلال في حقهم. فمثالهم كرجل في (بَحْرٍ لُجِّيٍّ يَغْشَاهُ مَوْجٌ مِّنْ فَوْقِهِ مَوْجٌ مِّنْ فَوْقِهِ سَحَابٌ ظُلُمَاتٌ بَعْضُهَا فَوْقَ بَعْضٍ) والبحر واللجِّي هو الدنيا بما فيها من الأخطار المهلكة والأشغال المردية والكدورات المعمية. والموج الأول موج الشهوات الداعية إلى الصفات البهيمية والإشتغال بالذات الحسية وقضاء الأوطار الدنيوية حتى إنهم يأكلون ويتمتعون كما تأكل الأنعام. وبالحرى أن يكون هذا الموج مظلماً لأن حب الشيء يعمى ويصم. والموج الثاني موج الصفات السبعية الباعثة على الغضب والعداوة والبغضاء والحقد والحسد والمباهاة والتفاخر والتكاثر. وبالحرى أن يكون مظلماً لأن الغضب غول العقل. وبالحرى أن يكون هو الموج الأعلى: لأن الغضب في الأكثر مستول على الشهوات حتى إذا هاج أذهل عن الشهوات وأغفل عن اللذات المشتهاة. وأما الشهوة فلا تقاوم الغضب الهائج أصلاً. وأما السحاب فهو الاعتقادات الخبيثة، والظنون الكاذبة، والخيالات الفاسدة التي صارت حجباً بين الكافرين وبين الإيمان ومعرفة الحق والاستضاءة بنور شمس القرآن والعقل: فإن خاصية السحاب أن يحجب إشراق نور الشمس.

وإذا كانت هذه كلها مظلمة فبالحرى أن تكون ظلمات بعضها فوق بعض. وإذا كانت هذه الظلمات تحجب عن معرفة الأشياء القريبة فضلاً عن البعيدة، ولذلك حجب الكفار عن معرفة عجائب أحوال النبي عليه السلام مع قرب متناوله وظهوره بأدنى تأمل، فبالحرى أن يعبر عنه بأنه لو أخرج يده لم يكدرها. وإذا كان منبع الأنوار كلها من النور الأول الحق كما سبق بيانه فبالحرى أن يعتقد كل موحد أن (وَمَنْ لَّمْ يَجْعَلِ اللَّهُ لَهُ نَوْراً فَمَا لَهُ مِنْ نَّورٍ) فيكفيك هذا القدر من أسرار هذه الآية فاقنع به.

الفصل الثالث

في معنى قوله عليه السلام

إن لله سبعين حجاباً من نور وظلمة

لو كشفها لأحرقت سبحات وجهه كل من أدركه بصره

وفي بعض الروايات سبعمائة، وفي بعضها سبعين ألفاً: فأقول: إن الله تعالى متجل في ذاته لذاته، ويكون الحجاب بالإضافة إلى محجوب لا محالة؛ وإن المحجوبين من الخلق ثلاثة أقسام: منهم من حجب بمجرد الظلمة؛ ومنهم من حجب بالنور المحض؛ ومنهم من حجب بنور مقرون بظلمة. وأصناف هذه الأقسام كثيرة أتتقق كثرتها، ويمكنني أن أتكلف حصرها في سبعين، لكن لا أثق بما يلوح لي من تحديد وحصر، إذ لا أدري أنه المراد بالحديث أم لا. أما الحصر إلى سبعمائة وسبعين ألفاً فذلك لا يستقل به إلا القوة النبوية، مع أن ظاهر ظني أن هذه الأعداد المذكورة للتكثير لا للتحديد؛ وقد تجري العادة بذكر عدد ولا يراد به الحصر بل التكثير. والله أعلم بتحقيق ذلك، فذلك خارج عن الوسع. وإنما الذي يمكنني الآن أن أعرفك هذه الأقسام وبعض أصناف كل قسم فأقول:

القسم الأول

وهم المحجوبون بمحض الظلمة، وهم الملحدة الذين لا يؤمنون بالله واليوم الآخر. وهم الذين استحبوا الحياة الدنيا على الآخرة لأنهم لا يؤمنون بالآخرة أصلاً وهؤلاء صنفان: صنف تشوف إلى طلب سبب لهذا العالم فأحاله إلى الطبع: والطبع عبارة عن صفة مركوزة في الأجسام حالة فيها؛ وهي مظلمة إذ ليس لها معرفة وإدراك ولا خبر لها من نفسها ولا مما يصدر منها؛ وليس لها نور يدرك بالبصر الظاهر أيضاً.

والصنف الثاني: هم الذين شغلوا بأنفسهم ولم يفرغوا لطلب السبب أيضاً، بل عاشوا عيش البهائم، فكان حجبهم نفوسهم الكدرة، وشهواتهم المظلمة، ولا ظلمة أشد من الهوى والنفس: ولذلك قال الله تعالى: (أَفَرَأَيْتَ مَنْ اتَّخَذَ إِلَهُهُ هَوَاءً) وقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: (الهوى أبغض إله عبد في الأرض) وهؤلاء انقسموا فرقا: فرقة زعمت أن غاية الطلب في الدنيا هي قضاء الأوطار ونيل الشهوات وإدراك اللذات البهيمية من منكح ومطعم وملبس. فهؤلاء عبيد اللذة، يعبدونها ويطلبونها ويعتقدون أن نيلها غاية السعادات: رضوا لأنفسهم أن يكونوا بمنزلة البهائم بل أخس منها. وأي ظلمة أشد من ذلك فقد حجب هؤلاء بمحض الظلمة.

وفرقة رأت أن غاية السعادات هي الغلبة والاستيلاء والقتل والسبي والأسر، وهذا مذهب الأعراب والأكراد وكثير من الحمقى، وهم محجوبون بظلمة الصفات السبعية لغلبتها عليهم وكون إدراكها مقصود أعظم اللذات. وهؤلاء قنعوا بأن يكونوا بمنزلة السباع بل أخس.

وفرقة ثالثة رأت أن غاية السعادات كثرة المال واتساع اليسار لأن المال هو آلة قضاء الشهوات كلها، وبه يحصل للإنسان الاقتدار على قضاء الأوطار. فهؤلاء همته جمع المال واستكثار الضياع والعقار والخيول المسومة والأنعام والحرث وكنز الدنانير تحت الأرض. فترى الواحد يجتهد طول عمره يركب الأخطار في البوادي والأسفار والبحار ويجمع الأموال ويشح بها على نفسه فضلا عن غيره: وهم المرادون بقوله عليه السلام: (تعس عبد الدراهم، تعس عبد الدنانير). وأي ظلمة أعظم مما يلبس على الإنسان؟ إن الذهب والفضة حجران لا يرادان لأعيانهما. وهي إذا لم يقض بها الأوطار ولم تنفق فهي والحصباء بمثابة، والحصباء بمثابة.

وفرقة رابعة ترقى عن جهالة هؤلاء وتعاقلت، وزعمت أن أعظم السعادات في اتساع الجاه والصيت وانتشار الذكر وكثرة

الأتباع ونفوذ الأمر المطاع. فتراها لا هم لها إلا المراءاة وعمارة مطارح أبصار الناظرين حتى إن الواحد قد يجوع في بيته

ويحتمل الضر ويصرف ماله إلى ثياب يتجمل بها عند خروجه كي لا ينظر إليه بعين الحقارة. وأصناف هؤلاء لا يحصون،

وكلهم محجوبون عن الله تعالى بمحض الظلمة، وهي نفوسهم المظلمة.

ولا معنى لذكر آحاد الفرق بعد وقوع التنبيه على الأجناس. ويدخل في جملة هؤلاء جماعة يقولون بلسانهم (لا إله إلا

الله)، لكن ربما حملهم على ذلك خوف أو استظهار بالمسلمين وتحمل بهم أو استمداد من مالهم؛ أو لأجل التعصب

لنصرة مذهب الآباء. فهؤلاء إذا لم تحملهم هذه الكلمة على العمل الصالح فلا تخرجهم الكلمة من الظلمات إلى النور،

بل (أولياؤهم الطاغوت يُخْرِجُونَهُمْ مِنَ النُّورِ إِلَى الظُّلُمَاتِ). أما من أثرت فيه الكلمة بحيث ساءت سيئته وسرته حسنته

فهو خارج عن محض الظلمة وإن كان كثيرا المعصية.

القسم الثاني

طائفة حجبوا بنور مقرون بظلمة وهم ثلاثة أصناف: صنف منشأ ظلمتهم من الحس، وصنف منشأ ظلمتهم من الخيال، وصنف منشأ ظلمتهم من مقاييسات عقلية فاسدة.

الصنف الأول المحجوبون بالظلمة الحسية وهم طوائف لا يخلو واحد منهم عن مجاوزة الالتفات إلى نفسه وعن التأله والتشوف إلى معرفة ربه. وأول درجاتهم عبدة الأوثان وآخرهم الثنوية، وبينهما درجات. فالطائفة الأولى عبدة الأوثان: علموا على الجملة أن لهم ربا يلزمهم إثارة على نفوسهم المظلمة، واعتقدوا أن ربهم أعز من كل شيء ولكن حجبهم ظلمة الحس عن أن يجاوزوا العالم المحسوس فاتخذوا من أنفس الجواهر كالذهب والفضة والياقوت أشخاصا مصورة بأحسن الصور واتخذوها آلهة. فهؤلاء محجوبون بنور العزة والجمال، والعزة والجمال من صفات الله وأنواره، ولكنهم ألصقوها بالأجسام المحسوسة وصدهم عن ذلك ظلمة الحس، فإن الحس ظلمة بالإضافة إلى العالم الروحاني العقلي كما سبق. الطائفة الثانية جماعة من أقاصي الترك ليس لهم ملة ولا شريعة يعتقدون أن لهم ربا وأنه أجمل الأشياء، فإذا رأوا إنسانا في

غاية الجمال أو شجرا أو فرسا أو غير ذلك سجدوا له وقالوا إنه ربنا. فهؤلاء محجوبون بنور الجمال مع ظلمة الحس، وهم أدخل في ملاحظة النور من عبدة الأوثان لأنهم يعبدون الجمال المطلق دون الشخص الخاص فلا يخصصونه بشيء؛ ثم يعبدون الجمال المطبوع لا المصنوع من جهتهم وبأيديهم.

وطائفة ثالثة قالوا ينبغي أن يكون ربنا نورانيا في ذاته بهيا في صورته، ذا سلطان في نفسه، مهيبا في حضرته، لا يطاق القرب منه، ولكن ينبغي أن يكون محسوسا؛ إذ لا معنى لغير المحسوس عندهم. ثم وجدوا النار بهذه الصفة فعبدها واتخذوها ربا. فهؤلاء محجوبون بنور السلطنة والبهاء: وكل ذلك من أنوار الله تعالى.

وطائفة رابعة زعموا أن النار نستولى عليها نحن بالإشعال والإطفاء، فهي تحت تصرفنا فلا تصلح للإلهية، بل ما يكون بهذه الصفات ولم يكن تحت تصرفنا ثم نكون نحن تحت تصرفه ويكون مع ذلك موصوفا بالعلو والارتفاع. ثم كان المشهور فيما بينهم علم النجوم وإضافة التأثيرات إليها. فمنهم من عبد الشّعرى، ومنهم من عبد المشتري إلى غير ذلك من الكواكب بحسب ما اعتقدوه في النجوم من كثرة التأثيرات. فهؤلاء محجوبون بنور العلو والإشراف والإستلاء، وهي من أنوار الله تعالى. وطائفة خامسة ساعدت هؤلاء في المأخذ ولكن قالت لا ينبغي أن يكون ربنا موسوما بالصغر والكبر بالإضافة إلى الجواهر النورانية، بل ينبغي أن يكون أكبرها، فعبدوا الشمس وقالوا هي أكبر. فهؤلاء محجوبون بنور الكبرياء مع بقية الأنوار مقرونا بظلمة الحس.

وطائفة سادسة ترقوا عن هؤلاء فقالوا: النور كله لا ينفرد به الشمس بل غيرها أنوار، ولا ينبغي للرب شريك في نورانيته فعبدوا النور المطلق الجامع لجميع أنوار العالم وزعموا أنه رب العالم والخيرات كلها منسوبة إليه. ثم رأوا في العالم شرورا فلم يستحسنوا إضافتها إلى ربهم تنزيها له عن الشر، فجعلوا بينه وبين الظلمة منازعة، وأحالوا العالم إلى النور والظلمة، وربما سموها (يزدان) و (أهرمن)، وهم الثنوية. فيكفيك هذا القدر تنبيهها على هذا الصنف، فهم أكثر من ذلك.

الصنف الثاني المحجوبون ببعض الأنوار مقرونا بظلمة الخيال، وهم الذين جاوزوا الحس، وأثبتوا وراء المحسوسات أمرا،

لكن لم يمكنهم مجاوزة الخيال، فعبدوا موجودا قاعدا على العرش. وأخسهم رتبة المجسمة ثم أصناف الكرامية بأجمعهم. ولا

يمكنني شرح مقالاتهم ومذاهبهم فلا فائدة في التكاثر. لكن أرفعهم درجة من نفى الجسمية وجميع عوارضها إلا الجهة

المخصوصة بجهة فوق: لأن الذي لا ينسب إلى الجهات ولا يوصف بأنه خارج العالم ولا داخله لم يكن عندهم موجودا إذ

لم يكن متخيلا. ولم يدركوا أن أول درجات المعقولات تجاوز النسبة إلى الجهات. الصنف الثالث المحجوبون بالأنوار الإلهية مقرونة بمقاييس عقلية فاسدة مظلمة فعبدوا إلهها سميعا بصيرا متكلمة عالما قادرا مريدا حيا، منزها عن الجهات، لكن فهموا هذه الصفات على حسب مناسبة صفاتهم. وربما صرّح بعضهم فقال: (كلامه صوت وحرف ككلامنا) وربما ترقى بعضهم فقال: (لا بل هو كحديث نفسنا ولا هو صوت ولا حرف) وكذلك إذا طولبوا بحقيقة السمع والبصر والحياة رجعوا إلى التشبيه من حيث المعنى وإن أنكروها باللفظ إذ لم يدركوا أصلا معاني هذه الإطلاقات في حق الله تعالى. ولذلك قالوا في إرادته إنها حادثة مثل إرادتنا. وإنها طلب وقصد مثل قصدنا. وهذه مذاهب مشهورة فلا حاجة إلى تفصيلها. فهؤلاء محجوبون بجملة من الأنوار مع ظلمة المقاييس العقلية. فهؤلاء أصناف القسم الثاني الذين حجبوا بنور مقرون بظلمة. وبالله التوفيق.

القسم الثالث

ثم المحجوبون بمحض الأنوار وهم أصناف ولا يمكن إحصاؤهم: فأشير إلى ثلاثة أصناف منهم. الأول- طائفة عرفوا معاني الصفات تحقيقا وأدركوا أن إطلاق اسم الكلام والإرادة والقدرة والعلم وغيرها على صفاته ليس مثل إطلاقه على البشر؛ فتحاشوا عن تعريفه بهذه الصفات وعرفوه بالإضافة إلى المخلوقات كما عرّف موسى عليه السلام في جواب قول فرعون: (وَمَا رَبُّ الْعَالَمِينَ) فقالوا إن الرب المقدس المنزه عن معاني هذه الصفات هو محرك السموات ومدبرها).

والصنف الثاني ترقوا عن هؤلاء من حيث ظهر لهم أن في السموات كثرة، وأن محرك كل سماء خاصة موجود آخر يسمى ملكا، وفيهم كثرة، وإنما نسبتهم إلى الأنوار الإلهية نسبة الكواكب. ثم لاح لهم أن هذه السموات في ضمن فلك آخر يتحرك الجميع بحركته في اليوم والليلة مرة فالرب هو المحرك للجرم الأقصى المنطوي على الأفلاك كلها إذ الكثرة منفية عنه. والصنف الثالث ترقوا عن هؤلاء وقالوا: إن تحريك الأجسام بطريق المباشرة ينبغي أن يكون خدمة لرب العالمين وعبادة له وطاعة من عبد من عباده يسمى ملكا: نسبتهم إلى الأنوار الإلهية المحضة نسبة القمر في الأنوار المحسوسة. فزعموا أن الرب هو المطاع من جهة هذا المحرك؛ ويكون الرب تعالى محركا لكل بطريق الأمر لا بطريق المباشرة. ثم في تقسيم ذلك الأمر وماهيته غموض يقصر عنه أكثر الأفهام ولا يحتمله هذا الكتاب.

فهؤلاء الأصناف كلهم محجوبون بالأنوار المحضة. وإنما الواصلون صنف رابع تجلّى لهم أيضا أن هذا (المطاع) موصوف بصفة تنافي الوحدانية المحضة والكمال البالغ لسر لا يحتمل هذا الكتاب كشفه: وأن نسبة هذا (المطاع) نسبة الشمس في الأنوار. فتوجهوا من الذي يحرك السموات ومن الذي يحرك الجرم الأقصى، ومن الذي أمر بتحريكها إلى الذي فطر السموات وفطر الجرم الأقصى وفطر الأمر بتحريكها، فوصلوا إلى موجود منزّه عن كل ما أدركه بصر من قبلهم فأحرقت سبحات وجهه الأول الأعلى جميع ما أدركه بصر الناظرين وبصيرتهم فإذا وجدوه مقدسا منزها عن جميع ما وصفناه من قبل.

ثم هؤلاء انقسموا: فمنهم من احترق منه جميع ما أدركه بصره وانمحق وتلاشى، لكن بقي هو ملاحظا للجمال والقدس وملاحظا ذاته في جماله الذي ناله بالوصول إلى الحضرة الإلهية. فأنمحت فيه المبصرات دون المبصر. وجاوز هؤلاء طائفة هم خواص الخواص فأحرقتهم سبحات وجهه وغشيتهم سلطان الجلال فأنمحقوا وتلاشوا في ذاتهم ولم يبق لهم لحظ إلى أنفسهم لفنائهم عن أنفسهم. ولم يبق إلا الواحد الحق. وصار معنى قوله: (كل شيء هالك الا وجهه) لهم ذوقا وحالا. وقد أشرنا إلى ذلك في الفصل الأول، وذكرنا أنهم كيف أطلقوا الاتحاد وكيف ظنوه. فهذه نهاية الواصلين.

ومنهم من لم يتدرج في الترقى والعروج على التفصيل الذي ذكرناه ولم يطل عليهم الطريق فسبقوا في أول وهلة إلى معرفة القدس وتنزيه الربوبية عن كل ما يجب تنزيهه عنه، فغلب عليهم أولا ما غلب على الآخرين آخرًا، وهجم عليهم التجلي دفعة فأحرقت سبحات وجهه جميع ما يمكن أن يدركه بصر حسي وبصيرة عقلية. ويشبه أن يكون الأول طريق (الخليل) والثاني طريق الحبيب صلى الله عليه وسلم، والله أعلم بأسرار أقدامهما وأنوار مقامهما.

فهذه إشارة إلى أصناف المحجوبين، ولا يبعد أن يبلغ عددهم إذا فصلت المقالات وتتبع حجب السالكين سبعين ألفا. ولكن إذا فتشت لا تجد واحدا منها خارجا عن الأقسام التي حصرناها: فإنهم إنما يحجبون بصفاتهم البشرية، أو بالحس

أو بالخيال أو بمقايضة العقل، أو بالنور المحض كما سبق. فهذا ما حضرني في جواب هذه الأسئلة، مع أن السؤال صادفني والفكر متقسم، والخاطر متشعب، والهم إلى غيرها هذا الفن منصرف، ومقترحي عليه أن يسأل الله تعالى العفو عما طغى به القلم، أو زلت به القدم؛ فإن خوض غمرة الأسرار الإلهية خطير، واستشفاف الأنوار الإلهية من وراء الحجب البشرية عسير غير يسير.

مكتبة مشكاة الإسلامية

تم نسخه من موقع الوراق ...

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Seeing With Three Eyes

Ibn al-ʿArabī's *barzakh* and the Contemporary World Situation

Abstract

The author of this paper attempts to write about the mystery of the barzakh in and from Ibn al-ʿArabī's perspective. Ibn al-ʿArabī's perspective observes things from three dimensions: the two dimensions of the positive and negative, which are familiar to us by means of our ordinary binary perception, and in addition the third dimension that belongs neither to the one, nor to the other. This is the dimension of the barzakh, which can be called tertiary, since it is unitive and inclusive of the two familiar dimensions. "Seeing" the third dimension of the barzakh is not accessible to ordinary binary perception; it is accessible, according to Ibn al-ʿArabī, only to those who possess a special kind of seeing; they are the ahl al-kashf, those who "see" with three eyes, as it were. Nevertheless, between the binary and the tertiary/unitive perceptions there is a pervasive tension of relatedness. It is a dynamic tension that makes its mark on all levels of existence, whether consciously or unconsciously. In other words, although the barzakh belongs to the dimension of the mysterious "third", it is powerfully present and influential all around. It manifests itself as the cognitive function that Ibn al-ʿArabī calls 'imagination' (al-khayāl). For him, the barzakh-imagination is the most powerful cognitive function in the human makeup, and it hinges on a paradox: it makes everything that it conceives an "it/not it". God, too, from this perspective, is "He/not He". Following from the cognitive field that evolves from the tertiary-barzakh-imaginative perspective, I consider the notion coincidentia oppositorum ('the union of the opposites', al-jamʿ bayna al-ḡiddayn). Finally, I apply the insights stemming from Ibn al-ʿArabī's perspective to the question of 'identities' and to the ethical dilemmas of our contemporary world.

Keywords

apophasis, *barzakh*, binary perception, *coincidentia oppositorum*, Ibn al-ʿArabī, imagination, paradox, tertiary perception

Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Ibn al-ʿArabī,¹ known also as *al-Shaykh al-akbar* (the Great Master), was born in Murcia in 1165 to a respectable Andalusian family. In his twenties, probably in Seville, he was formally initiated into the Sufi Path, and, during many years and in several localities, studied with several Sufi teachers, among them women. However, he claimed to be, and has thus been considered, an *Uwaisī*, that is to say, a mystic, whose inspiration and training in the deepest sense have come not from an earthly master, but from *al-Khaḍir* (= *al-Khiḍr*), the undying teacher of those who do not have a flesh-and-blood one.² In 1200, already widely known as a stimulating

1

In this paper referred to as Ibn al-ʿArabī or IA.

2

For more on the mysterious figure of Khidr see below, footnote 10.

spiritual authority with several literary works to his name, he left al-Andalus and the West for the Islamic East. After much traveling, he settled in Damascus, where he died in 1240. During his wandering years, he started working on his huge opus, *The Meccan Revelations* (*al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*). This, as well as the *Bezels of Wisdom* (*Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*) – the work on the cosmic panorama of prophets and prophecy – were completed in Damascus during the last years of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s life.³

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At the threshold of writing this paper, I stand perplexed; who would not, in view of the formidable corpus of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s works,⁴ and the daunting volume of the scholarly discussions on him.⁵ But the bulk of these literary corpora is the least of my concerns; it is IA’s visionary perspective in front of which I stand perplexed. IA is a master of creating unique, grand patterns – conceptual as well as linguistic – by interlacing diverse themes and syntactical patterns together. Unravelling his complex and interconnected lacework and sorting out neatly its fine threads, often results in an obfuscated view, unwieldy style and watered-down account. Still, the work of scholars is precisely this: to sort, classify, paraphrase, compare, analyze, and reduce. Moreover, whereas IA’s writing stems from an inclusive, visionary perspective that transcends conventional forms and structures, his interpreter, by definition, must limit her reproductions to the level of the familiar and comprehensible. This is bound to be frustrating, especially when the binary cognition of the interpreter is the tool by which she faces IA’s *barzakh*, what I have termed his *tertiary-imaginative vision*. Is scholarly hermeneutics suitable at all to review a visionary writing such as IA’s? Can we see what he sees in the unitive perspective from which he sees it?⁶

IA often warns his readers that to understand what he is writing, one should be either a ‘mystic’, that is, one who possesses visionary seeing (*min ahl al-kashf*), or a pure and simple believer (*min al-mu’minīn*). Those who belong to either of these two groups may follow his view without speculative argumentations or sophisticated interpretations.⁷ But for most, the experience of reading him will result in the perplexity (*ḥayra*) about which I am complaining.⁸ Out of frustration and perplexity the interpreter may relegate IA’s writing to the category of apophysis, the language of unsaying, of paradox, of negative theology. But would such a classification help make the objects of IA’s vision satisfyingly meaningful?

For all these inhibitions, I ask myself why not give up, from the outset, writing on IA, either in general or on any specific theme. Well, there is an answer and it is simple: his writing is magnetically captivating and his visionary perspective alluring; not unlike a detective’s obsession with deciphering the mystery behind a complex crime. His daring syntactical structures and the intricacy and mistiness of his writing seem to suggest that behind them hides a field of truths (*ḥaqā’iq*) and meanings (*ma’ānī*) worth unravelling; if only one could see it with IA’s eyes.

One mystery in particular has lured me to search for a meaning. It concerns IA’s mysterious *barzakh*, the middle, the ‘third’ principle which challenges and even overrides the binary structure of our cognitive faculties. Through their in-built predilection to hover between the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’, between viewing something as ‘positive’ and its opposite as ‘negative’, between an ‘I’ and an ‘other’, our conceptions and ideologies, even the most precious among

them, are built on dichotomies. IA's *barzakh* is that fine line, which belongs neither to the side of the 'yes' nor to the side of the 'no'. How are we to conceive it? And, since our minds are bound by spatial configurations – *where* is this line to be found? Sensing that at the heart of the *barzakh* nests the key to IA's all-embracing outlook, I have been driven, despite my inhibitions, to ponder this enigma from Ibn al-'Arabī's perspective; to enter his mind, as it were.

In my attempt at making some sense of these questions, I have found it helpful to juxtapose various passages from IA's writing and use them as road signs. I shall start by introducing the *barzakh* in IA's own words. In chapter 72 of *The Meccan Revelations* (= *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*), he writes:

"The 'middle', that which separates between two sides and makes them distinguished from one another, is more hidden than they are (*akhfā minhumā*). For example, the line that separates between the shadow and the sun; or the *barrier* (*barzakh*) between the two seas – the sweet one and the bitter one; or that which separates between black and white. We know that there is a separating line there, but the eye does not perceive it; the intellect acknowledges it, though it does not conceive of what it is, namely, it does not conceive its 'whatness' (quiddity)."³

By "the two seas" IA alludes to "the sweet one and the bitter one" of the Qur'ānic verse 25:53. The verse runs as follows:

"And it is He who has released the two seas, one fresh and sweet and one salty and bitter, and He placed between them a barrier (*wa-jā'ala baynahumā barzakhān*) and a prohibiting partition."

These two seas, undeniably, are contrary to one another, entirely different from one another, characterized by opposite attributes, yet contiguous, sharing an imaginary line, which keeps them apart and prevents their waters from mixing. The features of "sweet water" versus "bitter water" are thus kept intact thanks to a *barzakh*, which IA describes as "more hidden than they are". What is, and where is, this "hidden" line that carries out concurrently two

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For a comprehensive and scholarly biography of IA, see Claude Addas, *Quest for the Red Sulphur: The Life of Ibn 'Arabī*, trans. by Peter Kingsley, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1993. See, also, Stephen Hirstenstein, *The Unlimited Mercifier: The Spiritual Life and Thought of Ibn 'Arabī*, Oxford, Ashland: Anqa Publishing, White Cloud Press, 1999.

4

See Jane Clark, Stephen Hirstenstein, "Establishing Ibn 'Arabī's Heritage: First Findings from the MIAS Archiving Project", *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society*, No. 52, 2012, pp. 1–32, <http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/articlespdf/clark-hirstenstein-jmias-v52.pdf>.

5

See, e.g., the list of articles on the webpage of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society, <http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/articlelist.html>. Indispensable for any study concerning IA are also the two volumes by William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) and *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-*

'Arabī's Cosmology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).

6

For a fine scholarly elaboration of the *barzakh*, see Salman H. Bashier, *Ibn al-'Arabī's Barzakh: The Concept of the Limit and the Relationship between God and the World*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.

7

See, e.g., IA's "Introduction" in the first volume of his *Meccan Revelations*; Ibn al-'Arabī, Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī, *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1994, Vol. 1, Supplement (*tatimma*), p. 169.

8

On the people of reason (*ahl al-ra'y*) and their perplexity (*ḥayra*) versus the people of mystical seeing (*ahl al-kashf*), see, e.g., *ibid.*, Vol. 1, Ch. 50: "Concerning Men of Perplexity and Incapacity (*ajz*)", pp. 611–615.

9

See *ibid.*, Vol. 2, Ch. 72, p. 536; for an almost exact parallel, see *ibid.*, Vol. 1, Ch. 63, pp. 680–681.

contradictory functions – separating between two opposites yet holding them together?

The “two seas” of the Q. 25:53 are obviously associated with the “the two seas” of the Q. 18:60. The group of verses 60–82 of Sura 18, the Sura of the Cave (*sūrat al-kahf*), presents one of the most enigmatic passages in the Qur’ān. The protagonist of this Qur’ānic passage is Moses. He and his servant are supposed to meet an enigmatic person, whom God names “one of Our servants” (*‘abdan min ‘ibādīnā*) and to whom God has given special knowledge (*‘allamnāhu min ladunnā ‘ilman* [18:65]). The meeting place is identified only as being “the confluence of the two seas” (*majma‘ al-baḥrayn*). Apparently – the Qur’ānic verses are not explicit about this – Moses sets out to seek the enigmatic servant of God¹⁰ at this wondrous place in order to learn from him the divine knowledge (*al-‘ilm al-ladunnī*) bestowed on him. This is why Moses is resolved to search for this person until he reaches “where the two seas meet (*majma‘ al-baḥrayn*)”, though, he vows, “I may march on for ages”. Moses thus sets out to face three mysteries: a place, a person and knowledge; and all these as a preamble to the later stage of his search, in which he will have to face odd, seemingly unreasonable and unjust deeds performed by this servant of God (see verses 66–82). Indeed Sura 18 is replete with wonders and enigmas,¹¹ and thus concurs with IA’s pursuit of the extraordinary and mysterious *barzakh*.

The enigmatic *barzakh* of the Qur’ānic verses is, from IA’s perspective, a paradox, a contradiction in terms: “that which separates between two sides and makes them distinguished from one another” and yet, “is more hidden than they are”. “More hidden”, that is to say, belongs to an imperceptible dimension, the dimension of the unseen, or that which can be revealed only by means of the ‘imagination’ (*al-khayāl*). Here, in paradoxical terms, is how IA describes the *barzakh* in chapter 63 of *The Meccan Revelations*:

“Since the *barzakh* is something that separates what is knowable and what is unknowable (*ma’lūm wa-ghayr ma’lūm*); non-existent (*ma’dūm*) and existent (*mawjūd*); intelligible and un-intelligible (*ma’qūl wa-ghayr ma’qūl*); negated (*manfiyy*) and affirmed (*muthbat*) – it has been given the term *barzakh*. In itself it is intelligible (*ma’qūl*), though there is nothing there but imagination (*khayāl*) [...]. For imagination is neither existent nor non-existent; neither known nor unknown; neither negated nor affirmed.”¹²

By endorsing the linguistic, or ‘nominal’, validity of the *barzakh* (“it has been given the term *barzakh*”, *summiya barzakhan iṣṭilāḥan*), IA asserts that it has an ontic existence of sorts,¹³ while immediately negating it:

“When you grasp it, being intelligent, you will know that you have grasped an existent thing (*adrakta shay‘an wujūdiyyan*) on which your gaze has fallen, while you [also] know categorically, with proof (*qaṭ‘an bi-dalīl*), that there is nothing there to begin with and in principle (*ra‘ṣan wa-aṣlan*); what is this thing for which you have affirmed an ontic existence (*shay‘iyya wujūdiyya*) and at the moment of your affirmation you have denied it?”¹⁴

With such contradictory attributes of the *barzakh* and the perception of it, IA takes us to the field of paradox and apophysis, to the “mystical languages of unsaying”, to borrow the phrasing of Michael Sells’ brilliant title.¹⁵ But beyond this comparative classification, may we not consider the meaning of the epistemological and existential challenges with which IA presents us in these passages? May we not ask how to ‘see’ the *barzakh*, while with our binary perception we can only perceive the contrasting features of objects such as “the two seas”? And consequently, how to *know* what is between, or beyond, the two seas? Is there anything beyond our binary perception and, if so, what is it? And another question lurks in the vision of the *barzakhi* confluence of the two seas: from this ‘third-dimensional’ perspective, do the separate

identities of the “two seas” merge and annihilate in the *barzakh*, and hence lose their identifying individual features of “sweetness” and “bitterness”; or are their ontological identities kept intact notwithstanding such conflation? IA, it seems to me, encourages us to ponder these questions, since, by saying “When you grasp it, being intelligent, you will know...” (ch. 63), as well as “the intellect acknowledges it, though it does not conceive of what it is, namely, it does not conceive of its ‘whatness’” (ch. 72), he suggests that the ‘intellect’ can grasp something of this tertian universe, at least the enigma behind our existential-epistemological grasp of reality.

In my attempt to grasp the elusive *barzakh* that emerges from the Qur’ānic passages above, I muse over another facet of its polar nature and ask: Being a *majmaʿ*, is the *barzakh* a ‘coincidence of opposites’? Can we qualify it with this concept borrowed from the field of the study of religions?¹⁶ On the linguistic level, *al-jamʿ bayna al-diddayn* is precisely identical to the Latin term *coincidentia oppositorum*. Looked at from the Arabic terminology, *majmaʿ* (as in *majmaʿ al-bahrayn*) shares the root *j-m-* with *jamʿ*. Lexically, *majmaʿ* denotes a *place* of coming together and *jamʿ* the *act* of gathering and holding diverse things together, as well as the *state* that results from such an act – collectedness, aggregation, unity. In IA’s writing, *jamʿ* and its antonym *farq* (separation, differentiation) are cardinal concepts upon which his understanding of the God-Creation relationship is built. Their juxtaposition indicates indeed a coincidence of opposites.¹⁷ Notably, IA often quotes a saying which he ascribes to the ninth-century Sufi Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz. When Abū Saʿīd was asked “By what means have you known God?”, he answered:

“God is only known by bringing together the opposites (*bi-jamʿihi bayna al-diddayn*).”

10

Islamic tradition identifies this person with Khadr/Khiḍr; in the Sufi tradition, Khiḍr is the divine teacher of those who do not have a flesh-and-blood one. For a discussion on this Qur’ānic story, see Sara Sviri, *The Taste of Hidden Things: Images on the Sufi Path*, Inverness: The Golden Sufi Center, 1997, Ch. 4: “Where the Two Seas Meet: The Story of Khiḍr”, pp. 77–101; see also above, footnote 2.

11

Note that the root ‘-j-b, denoting wonder, appears twice in this Sura – see verses 9 and 63; see also above, footnote 2.

12

Ibn al-ʿArabī, *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, Vol. 1, Ch. 63, pp. 680–681.

13

The link between ‘words’ and ‘beings’ is one of the core themes in IA’s worldview, but it calls for a separate discussion.

14

See Ibn al-ʿArabī, *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, Vol. 1, Ch. 63, pp. 680–681.

15

See Michael A. Sells, *Mystical Languages of Unsayings*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. See, also, Michael A. Sells, “Ibn ʿArabī’s Polished Mirror: Perspective

Shift and Meaning Event”, *Studia Islamica*, No. 67, 1988, pp. 121–149, doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/1595976>, esp. p. 129: “the *aporia* of trying to use language based upon delimitation to refer to the unlimited”.

16

See, e.g., John Valk, “The Concept of the Coincidentia Oppositorum in the Thought of Mircea Eliade”, *Religious Studies*, Vol. 28 (1992), No. 1, pp. 31–41, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500021351>.

17

See, e.g., the poetic verse in Ibn al-ʿArabī, *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, Vol. 6, Ch. 364, p. 47: *fa-ʿayn al-jamʿ ʿayn al-farq fa-nʿzur / bi-ʿaynika li-ʾjtimāʾ fi-l-iftirāq*: “the essence of *jamʿ* is the essence of *farq* look / in your essence (also: with your eye) for togetherness (*ijtimāʾ*) in separation (*iftirāq*)”. For *jamʿ* and *farq* (also *tafriqa*) in Sufi technical terminology, see, e.g., [Abū al-Ḥasan Hujwīrī, ʿAlī ibn ʿUthmān] *The Kashf al-Mahjūb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufism by ʿAlī B. Uthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī*, trans. by Reynold A. Nicholson, London: Luzac, 1976, pp. 251–260 et passim. On the topic of ‘coincidence of opposites’, see Sara Sviri, “Between Fear and Hope: On the Coincidence of Opposites in Islamic Mysticism”, *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, No. 9, 1987, pp. 316–349.

Then he recited:

“He is the First and the Last, the Apparent and the Hidden, (*huwa al-awwal wa-l-ākhir wa-l-ẓāhir wa-l-bāṭin*) and He has knowledge of all things (Q. 57:3).”¹⁸

So how does IA perceive the ‘coincidence’? How does he perceive the nature of reality in the realm of the *barzakh*? What happens to the differentiated identities which are held there together? Or does he leave it out of his existential map as a transcendent territory to which no man has access? In pursuing these questions, I find help in another passage from *The Meccan Revelations*.

Chapter 24 of *The Meccan Revelations* is not a long chapter, but it has a lengthy title. Here is the rendering of its first part: “The Twenty-Fourth Chapter Concerning the Knowledge that derives from the Ontological Sciences (... *jā’at ‘an al-‘ulūm al-kawniyya*) and the Wonders that it Contains”.¹⁹ Indeed, the chapter deals with various ‘ontological’ themes that can be cumulatively described as concerning the relationship of God – qua King and Owner (*mālik*) – with man and the world – qua kingdom and property (*mulk*) subsumed under God’s kingship and ownership. But the picture that IA paints in this chapter is not of a hierarchical relationship; what interests him specifically is the fate of the ‘property’, the ‘owned’, the ‘created’ within this interwoven existence. Or, to put it differently: how can the ‘property’ hold on to its differentiated, individual identity and attributes within such a close-knit relationship with its ‘owner’? Here, towards the last third of the chapter, IA introduces another concept worth contemplating: God’s ‘expansiveness’ (*al-tawassu’ al-ilāhī*). He writes:

“God’s expansiveness (*al-ittisā’ al-ilāhī*) entails that ‘God is He who gave everything its creation’ (Q. 20:50) and distinguished each and every thing in this world by this [creative] decree. He is he who distinguished it from any other; this is the [individual] unity of each and every thing; hence, *no two things are merged in one mixture (fa-mā ijtama’a ithnāni fī mizāj wāhid)*. [...] There is nothing but the [individual] unity of each and every thing; never do two things merge where differentiation has occurred [...]. From this point you will know [how] the large can mount the small and the broad the narrow without the broad becoming narrow or the narrow broad; in other words: nothing in their [contrasting] states changes [...].”²⁰ Concerning this, Abū Sa’īd al-Kharrāz said: ‘God is only known by bringing opposites together.’ Then he recited: ‘He is the First and the Last, the Apparent and the Hidden’ (Q. 57:3). He meant from one face (*min wajh wāhid*), not from diverse references (*min nisab mukhtalifa*).”²¹

In this extraordinary passage IA asserts the singular individuality and particularity of every existing thing. Every created thing is unique. God does not clone. Hence, nothing really merges with anything to the point of losing one’s pre-ordained individual and distinct identity. Unlike some theologians and philosophers, IA does not subscribe to the theory of generalized, abstract, isolated ‘ideas’ as the transcendent exempla of all that is. Everything that *is* has its own individual blueprint and its existence is concrete and tangible inasmuch as its fullness is hidden and unknown. Nothing is the same as anything else. And yet all are embraced by God, who thus becomes known, according to Al-Kharrāz’s saying and the supporting Qur’ānic proof, as a *coincidentia oppositorum*. This is the embrace of the ‘First-Last-Apparent-Hidden’ totality in an inclusive unity of polar opposites. This unity is “the one face” by which God is known, not unlike the proverbial elephant who, in order to be known qua ‘elephant’, must be known through all its parts and members.²² At the same time, none of the individual attributes is obliterated in this ‘knowing’. Each and every thing has its place in the unity of opposites. Thus, the *coincidentia oppositorum* is not a fuzzy mixture of different aspects or attributes, but a unity in which diverse parts co-exist. Such unity in all its fullness, sug-

gests IA, is the paradigm for everything that is, and it allows for wonders and possibilities beyond the grasp of the binary thought.

* * *

The ethical implications of this vision are far-reaching, especially at the global moment in which this essay is written. There is nothing more remote in this moment than the vision of a *coincidence of opposites* seen from the tertiary dimension of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s *barzakh*. Ours is a world of binary thinking, dichotomies, polarization, opposing opinions and antagonistic value-systems: ‘right’ is contrary to ‘wrong’; ‘good’ contrary to ‘bad’; ‘just’ to ‘unjust’; ‘sacred’ to ‘profane’. Right, good, just and sacred are praiseworthy; wrong, bad, unjust and profane are blameworthy. In our world-existence, wherever we are, wars of identities and values are raging from unrelenting convictions all-round – right, left and center. Far be it for us is to know how to hold on to our singular, individual identities without devouring the individual identities of others; they seem, to us, set on cancelling us and each one out. Hence, to preserve our identity demands that we defend it against its enemies at all cost; ironically, to the point of sacrificing it. When we tenaciously cling on to what, in our fancy, makes up our ‘identity’, we are perceived as loyal; when, out of the fold, we pledge the viability and validity of other identities, we are perceived as traitors. We pay lip service to the politics of the ‘other’, but culturally, religiously, socially and politically, in the name of ‘identities’ and under the umbrella of values, ideologies and dogmas, a culture of blame, self-righteousness and victimhood thrives. It is never ‘I’ who is responsible for this or that, it is always ‘you’; and so on, and so forth.

The state of dynamic perplexity vis-à-vis the shifting faces of reality, and the practice of ‘seeing with three eyes’ derived from Ibn al-‘Arabī’s vision of the *barzakh*, suggest that the two-dimensional and binary limits of our cognition miss out on glimpsing a larger, more inclusive and unitive picture. Ibn al-‘Arabī’s perspective teaches that beyond the dichotomies at the root of our cultural, religious, moral and political viewpoints – and even beyond the benign slogans of peace and love – there stretches a larger and wider perspective; if you wish, you can call it ‘mystical’, of a land of marvels, where “the large can mount the small and the broad the narrow without the broad becoming narrow or the narrow broad”.²³ From this perspective, the singularity of

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See Ibn al-‘Arabī, *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, p. 447. For further references and elaborations of this saying, see Henry Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sūfism of Ibn ‘Arabī*, trans. by Ralph Manheim, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 188; W. C. Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 67 et passim; W. C. Chittick, *The Self-Disclosure of God*, pp. 173, 236–237.

19

Ibn al-‘Arabī, *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, Vol. 1, pp. 443–448.

20

The expression *irād al-kabīr ‘alā al-ṣaghīr*, translated here as “[how] the large can mount the small...”, occurs also in Ch. 8 of *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, in the description of

one of the marvels witnessed in “the Land of Reality” (*ard al-ḥaqīqa*) by people of mystical seeing (*ahl al-kashf*); see *ibid.*, p. 339. “In this land”, IA writes, “there are orchards and gardens, animals and minerals whose measure only God knows. Everything there, is a living-speaking being” (*ibid.*, p. 338).

21

See *ibid.*, pp. 446–447.

22

For the “Elephant in a Dark Room” fable, see, e.g., [Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī] *The Mathnawī of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī*, trans. by Reynold A. Nicholson, Leyden, London: Brill, Luzac, 1926, Book III, pp. 1259–1274.

23

See above, footnote 20.

all things becomes both an apparent and a marvelous phenomenon. This singularity is not lost within the mesh of variant and contrasting identities; it is never annihilated in what is named the ‘Oneness of Being’ (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), or the ‘Coincidence of Opposites’ (*al-jam’ bayna al-ḍiddayn*). The water of the “bitter sea” remains bitter and that of the “sweet sea” sweet. In view of the divine ‘expansiveness’, nothing is lost, for it allows that in each and every thing there exists its singular and concrete existence while co-existing even alongside its opposite.

Sara Sviri

Videnje trima očima

Ibn al-‘Arabījev barzakh i suvremena svjetska situacija

Sažetak

Autorica ovog rada nastoji pisati o misteriji barzakh u perspektivi Ibn al-‘Arabīja i iz njegove perspektive. Ibn al-‘Arabījeva perspektiva motri stvari iz tri dimenzije: dvije dimenzije pozitivnog i negativnog, koje su nam bliske zbog naše svakidašnje binarne percepcije, i dodatne, treće dimenzije, koja ne pripada ni jednoj ni drugoj. To je dimenzija barzakh, koju možemo nazvati terciarnom jer ona ujedinjuje i uključuje ove dvije poznate dimenzije. »Videnje« treće dimenzije, barzakh, nije dostižno uobičajenoj binarnoj percepciji, nego je dostižno, sukladno Ibn al-‘Arabīju, samo onima koji posjeduju naročitu vrstu videnja; oni su ahl al-kashf, oni koji, takoreći, »vide« trima očima. Ipak, između binarnih i terciarnih/ujedinjujućih percepcija postoji sveprožimajuća veza napetosti. To je dinamična napetost koja obilježava sve stupnjeve postojanja, svjesno ili nesvjesno. Drugim riječima kazano: iako barzakh pripada dimenziji mističnog »trećeg«, snažno je prisutan i utjecajan posvuda. Manifestira se kao kognitivna funkcija koju Ibn al-‘Arabī naziva ‘imaginacijom’ (al-khayāl). Za njega je barzakh-imaginacija najsnažnija kognitivna funkcija u ljudskom ustrojstvu i ona ovisi o paradoksu: ona čini sve što koncipira »to/nije to«. Također, Bog, motren iz ove perspektive, jest »On/nije On«. Kako slijedi iz kognitivnog polja koje nastaje iz terciarne-barzakh-imaginativne perspektive, smatram da je taj pojam coincidentia oppositorum (‘jedinstvo suprotnosti’, al-jam’ bayna al-ḍiddayn). Konačno, primjenjujem uvide koji proistječu iz Ibn al-‘Arabījeve perspektive na pitanje ‘identiteta’ i na etičke dileme našeg suvremenog svijeta.

Ključne riječi

apofazija, barzakh, binarna percepcija, coincidentia oppositorum, Ibn al-‘Arabī, imaginacija, paradoks, terciarna percepcija

Sara Sviri

Sehen mit drei Augen

Ibn al-‘Arabīs barzakh und die zeitgenössische Weltsituation

Zusammenfassung

Die Verfasserin dieses Beitrags macht den Versuch, über das Mysterium von barzakh in und aus Ibn al-‘Arabīs Perspektive zu schreiben. Ibn al-‘Arabīs Blickwinkel beobachtet die Dinge aus drei Dimensionen: zwei Dimensionen des Positiven und Negativen, die uns dank unserer alltäglichen binären Wahrnehmung vertraut sind, und darüber hinaus eine dritte Dimension, die weder der einen noch der anderen angehört. Dies ist die Dimension des barzakh, die man tertiär nennen kann, da sie vereinigend ist und die beiden bekannten Dimensionen einbezieht. Das „Sehen“ der dritten Dimension des barzakh ist nicht erreichbar für gewöhnliche binäre Wahrnehmung; es ist, Ibn al-‘Arabī zufolge, nur für jene realisierbar, die über eine besondere Art des Sehens verfügen; sie sind die ahl al-kashf, also diejenigen, die sozusagen mit drei Augen „sehen“. Nichtsdestoweniger existiert zwischen den binären und den tertiären/vereinigenden Wahrnehmungen eine durchdringende Spannung der Verwandtschaft. Es ist eine dynamische Spannung, die auf allen Ebenen der Existenz, ob bewusst oder unbewusst, ihre Spuren hin-

terlässt. Mit anderen Worten, obzwar das barzakh zur Dimension des mysteriösen „Dritten“ gehört, ist es allenthalben stark präsent und einflussreich. Es manifestiert sich als kognitive Funktion, die Ibn al-‘Arabī „Imagination“ (al-khayāl) nennt. Für ihn ist die barzakh-Imagination die stärkste kognitive Funktion in der Struktur eines Menschen, wobei sie von einem Paradox abhängt: Alles, was sie konzipiert, macht sie zu einem „es/nicht es“. Aus dieser Perspektive ist Gott ebenfalls ein „Er/nicht Er“. Mit dem Ausgangspunkt im kognitiven Feld, das sich aus der tertiär-barzakh-imaginativen Perspektive herausbildet, nehme ich den Begriff *coincidentia oppositorum* („Zusammenfall der Gegensätze“, al-jam‘ bayna al-diddayn) in Augenschein. Schließlich verwende ich die Einsichten, die aus Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Perspektive hervorgehen, bei der Frage der „Identitäten“ sowie bei ethischen Dilemmas unserer zeitgenössischen Welt.

Schlüsselwörter

Apophasie, *barzakh*, binäre Wahrnehmung, *coincidentia oppositorum*, Ibn al-‘Arabī, Imagination, Paradox, tertiäre Wahrnehmung

Sara Sviri

Voir avec trois yeux

Le *barzakh* d’Ibn al-‘Arabī et la situation mondiale contemporaine

Résumé

L’auteur de ce travail entreprend d’écrire sur le mystère du *barzakh*, dans et à partir de la perspective d’Ibn al-‘Arabī. La perspective d’Ibn al-‘Arabī observe les choses sur la base de trois dimensions : deux dimensions, celle du positif et celle du négatif, qui nous sont proches car notre perception quotidienne binaire reposent sur elles, et une troisième dimension en plus, qui n’appartient ni à l’une ni à l’autre. C’est la dimension du *barzakh*, que l’on pourrait appeler de tertiaire car elle unit et inclut les deux dimensions qui nous sont bien connues. « Voir » la troisième dimension du *barzakh* n’est pas accessible à la perception binaire ordinaire; elle est accessible, selon Ibn al-‘Arabī, seulement à ceux qui possèdent une qualité particulière dans « le voir » : ce sont des *ahl al-kashf*, ceux qui, pour ainsi dire, « voient » avec trois yeux. Néanmoins, il existe entre les perceptions binaires et tertiaires/unissantes une intime et omniprésente connexion de l’ordre d’une tension dynamique qui révèle tous les niveaux de l’existence, conscients ou inconscients. En d’autres termes, bien que le *barzakh* appartienne à la dimension mystique du « troisième », il est fortement présent et exerce son influence en tout lieu. Il se manifeste comme une fonction cognitive que Ibn al-‘Arabī nomme « imagination » (al-khayāl). Pour lui, l’imagination-*barzakh* est la plus puissante des fonctions cognitives présentes dans la constitution de l’Homme et repose sur un paradoxe : elle forme tout ce qui conçoit le « cela/cela n’est pas ». De même, Dieu, pensé à partir de cette perspective est « Lui/n’est pas Lui ». Sur la base du champ cognitif qui est apparu à partir de l’idée de l’imaginative-*barzakh*-tertiaire, je pense qu’il est question du concept de *coincidentia oppositorum* (« l’unité des opposés », al-jam‘ bayna al-diddayn). Enfin, j’applique les idées qui découlent de la perspective d’Ibn al-‘Arabī à la question des « identités » et aux dilemmes éthiques de notre monde contemporain.

Mots-clés

apophasie, *barzakh*, perception binaire, *coincidentia oppositorum*, Ibn al-‘Arabī, imagination, paradoxe, perception tertiaire

Fusus al-Hikam

The Seals of Wisdom

Muhi-e-Din Ibn Arabi

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1) The Seal of Divine Wisdom in the Word of Adam

When Allah - glory be to Him! - willed that the source of His most Beautiful Names - which are beyond enumeration - be seen (or you can equally say that He willed His source to be seen), He willed that they be seen in a microcosmic being which contained the entire matter, (1) endowed with existence, and through which His secret was manifested to Him. For how a thing sees itself through itself is not the same as how it sees itself in something else which acts as a mirror for it. So He manifests Himself to Himself in a form which is provided by the place in which He is seen. He would not appear thus without the existence of this place and His manifestation (tajalli) to Himself in it.

Allah brought the entire universe into existence through the existence of a form fashioned without a spirit (rûh), like an unpolished mirror. Part of the divine decree is that He does not fashion a locus without it receiving a divine spirit, which is described as being "blown" (2) into it. This is nothing other than the result of the predisposition of that fashioned form to receive the overflowing perpetual tajalli which has never ceased and which will never cease. Then we must speak of the container (qâbil). The container comes from nothing other than His most sacredly pure Overflowing. So the whole affair has its beginning from Him, and its end is to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) as it began from Him. Thus the command decreed the polishing of the mirror of the universe. Adam was the very polishing of that mirror and the spirit of that form.

The angels are some of the faculties of that form which is the form of the universe, which the Sufis designate in their technical vocabulary as the Great Man (al-Insân al-Kabîr), for the angels are to it as the spiritual (rûhânî) and sensory faculties are to the human organism. Each of these faculties is veiled by itself, and it sees nothing which is superior to its own essence, for there is something in it which considers itself to be worthy of high rank and an elevated degree with Allah. It is like this because it has an aspect of the divine synthesis (jam'îya). In it is something which derives from the divine side and something which derives from the side of the reality of the realities. This organism carries these attributes as determined by the universal nature which encompasses the containers of the universe from the most exalted to the basest. However, the intellect cannot perceive this fact by means of logical investigation for this sort of perception only exists through divine unveiling by which one recognises the basis of the forms of the universe which receive the spirits.

This being was called both a human being (insân) and khalif. As for his humanness, it comes from the universality of his organism and his ability to embrace all of the realities. He is in relation to Allah as the pupil, (3) being the instrument of vision, is to the eye. This is why he is called "insân". It is by him that Allah beholds His creatures and has mercy on them. So he is a human being, both in-time [in his body] and before-time [in his spirit], an eternal and after-time organism. He is the word which distinguishes and unifies. The universe was completed by his existence. He is to the universe what the face of the seal is to the seal - for that is the locus of the seal and thus the token with which the King places the seal on his treasures.

Allah named him khalif for this reason, since man guards His creation as treasure is guarded with the seal. As long as the seal of the King is on the treasure, no one dares to open it without his permission. He made him a khalif in respect of safeguarding the universe, and it

continues to be guarded as long as this Perfect Man is in it. Do you not see then, that when he disappears and is removed from the treasury of this world, nothing that Allah stored in it will remain? Everything that was in it will leave it, and all the parts will become confused, and everything will be transferred to the Next World. Then Man will be the seal on the treasury of the Next World for endless time and after-time. All the Divine Names contained in the divine form (4) appear in this human organism. Thus it possesses the rank of containing and integrating this existence. It was by this that Allah set up the proof against the angels, (5) so remember that! Allah admonishes you through others. Look at where that originates and where it ends up. The angels did not realise what was implied by the organism of the khalif, nor did they realise what the presence of the Truth demanded as 'ibâda (6) (worship). Each one only knows from Allah what his essence accords him. The angels do not possess the universality of Adam, and they did not understand the Divine Names with which he has been favoured, and by which he praises Allah and proclaims His purity. They only knew that Allah had names whose knowledge had not reached them, so they could not praise Him nor proclaim His purity through them. What we mentioned overcame them and this state overpowered them. They said about this organism, "Why put on it one who will cause corruption on it?" (2:30) This is only the argument which they were voicing.

What they said regarding Adam is exactly the state they were with regard to Allah. Had it not been that their nature was in accord with it, they would not have said what they said in respect of Adam, "and yet they were not aware." If they had had true recognition of themselves, they would have had knowledge, and had they been in possession of knowledge, they would have been protected and would not have resisted by belittling Adam and thus exceeding their claim of what they possessed of His praise and glorification. Adam was in possession of Divine Names which the angels did not have, so that their praise and glorification of Him was not the same as Adam's praise and glorification of Him. Allah describes this to us so that we may ponder it and learn adab (7) with Allah, and so that we will not lay claim to what we have not realised or possessed by pinning down. How can we allege something which is beyond us and of which we have no knowledge? We will only be exposed. This divine instruction is part of Allah's discipline of those of His slaves who are well-mannered, trusting and khalifs.

Let us return to the wisdom under discussion. Know that universal matters which have no existence in themselves are without a doubt intelligible and known in the mind. They are hidden and continue in their invisible existence. These universal matters have jurisdiction and effect on everything which has an individual existence. Indeed, they are the same thing and nothing else, i.e. the sources of existent individual things, and they continue to be intelligible in themselves. They are manifest in respect of the sources of existent things just as they are hidden in respect of their intelligibility. Each individual existent thing depends on these universal matters which cannot be dislodged from the intellect, nor would their existence be possible in the source once they ceased to be intelligible, whether that individual existent is in-time or out-of-time. The relationship of that which is in-time or out-of-time to this universal intelligible matter is the same. This universal matter only has jurisdiction in individual existent things according to what the realities of these individual existent things demand of it. It is like the relationship of knowledge to the knower, and life to the living. Life is an intelligible reality; knowledge is an intelligible reality. Knowledge is as distinct from life as life is distinct from knowledge. So we say that Allah has knowledge and life, and that He is the Living, the Knowing. We also say that the angel has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. We say that man has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. The reality of knowledge is one thing and the reality of life is another, and their relationship to the

knowing and the living is the same relationship. We say that the knowledge of Allah is in non-time and the knowledge of man is in-time. So look at the evaluation that this relationship has brought about in this intelligible reality!

Examine this connection between individual intelligibles and stence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself. As knowledge determines the one who participates in it as he is called knowing so the one who is described by it can determine the knowledge. It is in-time in relation to the one in-time and non-time in relation to the one in non-time. Each of the two is determining and determined. It is known that these universal matters, even if they are intelligible, lack a source although they still have an authority. When they are determined, since they are ascribed to an individual existent thing, they accept the principle in the existent sources and do not accept distinction or fragmenting, for that is impossible for them. They themselves are in everything described by them, as humanity is in every person of this particular species, without distinction or the numbering which affects individuals; and it continues to be intelligible.

Now, as there is a connection between that which has an individual existence and that which does not have one and it is a non-existent relationship so the connection of existents to each other is easier to conceive because, in any case, there is a common factor between them which is individual existence. In the other, there is no common factor, yet there is a connection despite the lack of a common factor. So it is stronger and more real when there is a common factor. Without a doubt, the in-time establishes itself as being put into time and it needs something in time to put it into time. It has no place in itself so it exists from something other-than-it, and it is linked to That by the dependence of need. This dependence must be on That whose existence is necessary, which is independent in Its existence by Itself without need. It is That which, by Its own essence, gives existence to the in-time which depends on It. Since the existence of Its essence is necessary and what appears from It depends on It for its essence, it nevertheless depends on its form for everything which is from a name or attribute, except for the essential necessity. That is not the property of it in-time, even if its existence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself.

Since the matter is based on what we said about its manifestation in its form, Allah communicates to us knowledge of Himself through contemplation of the in-time. He tells us that He shows us His signs in the in-time, (8) so we draw conclusions about Him through ourselves. We do not describe Him with any quality without also possessing that quality, with the exception of that essential autonomy. Since we know Him by ourselves and from ourselves, we attribute to Him all that we attribute to ourselves. For that reason, divine communications came down on the tongues of our interpreters, (9) and so He described Himself to us through ourselves. When we witness, He witnesses Himself. We are certainly numerous as individuals and species, yet we are based on a single reality which unites us. So we certainly know that there are distinctions between individuals. If there were not, there would be no multiplicity in the One.

Similarly we are described in all aspects by that by which He describes Himself, but there must be a disinction and it is none other than our need of Him in our existence. Our existence depends on Him by virtue of our possibility and He is independent of that which makes us dependent on Him. Because of this, one can apply before-timeness and timelessness to Him which negates that firstness which is the opening to existence from non-existence. Although He is the First, firstness is not ascribed to Him, and for this reason, He is called the Last. Had His firstness been the firstness of the existence of determination, it would not have been valid

for Him to be the Last of the determined because the possible has no last - for possibilities are endless. So they have no last. Rather, He is the Last because "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) after its attribution to us. So He is the Last in the source of His firstness and the First in the source of His lastness.

Then know that Allah has described Himself as the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden; (10) He brought the universe into existence as a Visible world and an Unseen world so that we might know the Hidden by the Unseen and the Manifest by the Visible. He described Himself with pleasure and wrath, and so He brought the world into existence as a place of fear and hope so we fear His wrath and hope for His pleasure. He described Himself with majesty and beauty, so He brought the universe into existence with awe and intimacy. It is the same for all that is connected with Him, may He be exalted, and by which He calls Himself. He designates these pairs of attributes by the two hands (11) which He held out in the creation of the Perfect Man. Man sums up all the realities of the universe and its individuals. So the universe is seen and the Khalif is unseen. It is with this meaning that the Sultan veils himself, even as Allah is mentioned and described as having with veils (12) of darkness, which are natural bodies, and luminous veils which are subtle spirits (arwâh). The universe is composed of both the gross and the subtle.

The universe is its own veil on itself and cannot perceive the Truth since it perceives itself. It is continuously in a veil which is not removed, since it knows that it is distinct from its Creator by its need of Him. It has no portion of that essential necessity which belongs to the existence of Allah, so it can never perceive Him. In this respect, Allah is never fully known by the knowledge of tasting and witnessing because the in-time has no hold on that.

Allah only applied "between His two hands" to Adam as a mark of honour, and so He said to Iblis, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My two Hands?" (38:76) That is none other than the union in Adam of the two forms - the form of the universe and the form of the Real: (13) and they are the two hands of Allah. Iblis is only a fragment of the universe and does not possess this comprehensive quality. It is because of this quality that Adam was a khalif. Had he not had the form of the One who appointed him khalif, he would not have been khalif. If there were not in him all that is in the world, and what his flocks, over whom he is khalif, demand of him because of their dependence on him (and he must undertake all they need from him) he would not have been khalif over them.

The khalifate is only valid for the Perfect Man, whose exterior form comes from the realities of the universe and its forms, and whose inner form is based on His form, may He be exalted! For that reason, Allah has said of him, "I am his hearing and his sight." (14) He did not say, "his eye and his ear." So He differentiated between the two forms. It is the same for every existent in the universe which appears according to what the reality of that existent demands of it. Nonetheless no one totally comprehends what the khalif has. One only surpasses others by this comprehensiveness. If it were not for the diffusion of Allah into the existents by the form, the universe would not have any existence. Similarly, were it not for these universal intelligible realities, no principle would have appeared in individual existent things. From this reality the universe depends on Allah for its existence. So all is in need, and nothing is independent.

This is the truth
and we have not spoken metaphorically.
If I speak of a something independent

without any need, you will know Who I mean by it.
The whole is tied to the whole
and cannot be separated from it, so understand what I have said!

Now, you have learnt of the formation of the body of Adam his outer form and the formation of his spirit, his inner form, so he is the Real and a created being. Now you have learnt of the formation of his rank which is the comprehensiveness by virtue of which he is worthy of the khalifate. Adam is the unique self from which the perfect human species was created according to His words, "O mankind, be fearful of your Lord who created you from a single self, and created its mate from it, and disseminated many men and women from the two of them." (4:1)

His words, "Be fearful of your Lord," mean to make of what has appeared from you a safeguard for your Lord and make what is concealed of you, which is your Lord, a safeguard for yourselves. The matter consists of blame and praise, so be His safeguard in the blame and your safeguard in the praise, so that you will be among those of knowledge and adab. Then He showed him what He had placed in him, and He put that in His two hands - one handful contained the universe and the other handful contained Adam and his descendants - and He showed them their ranks in Adam.

Then Allah informed me in my inner heart (sirr) of what He placed in this Imam, the great progenitor. I have put in this book some of what was allotted to me but not all of what I realised. A book could not contain that and not even the present existent universe could contain it. I have put some of what I have witnessed in this book, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, defined it. It was the divine wisdom in the word of Adam, that is, this chapter.

Then there is the wisdom of the breath of angelic inspiration in the word of Shith (Seth), the wisdom of divine inspiration in the word of Nuh (Noah), the wisdom of purity in the word of Idris, the wisdom of being lost in love in the word of Ibrahim (Abraham), the wisdom of truth in the word of Ishaq (Isaac), the wisdom of the elevation of the word in the name of Isma'il (Ishmael), the wisdom of the spirit in the word of Yusuf (Joseph), the wisdom of unity in the word of Hud, the wisdom of revelation in the word of Salih, the wisdom of the heart in the word of Shu'ayb, the wisdom of the power of the word of Lut (Lot), the wisdom of the decree in the word of 'Uzayr (Ezra), the wisdom of prophethood in the word of 'Isa (Jesus), the wisdom of mercy in the word of Sulayman (Solomon), the wisdom of existence in the word of Da'ud (David), the wisdom of the soul in the word of Yunus (Jonah), the wisdom of the unseen in the word of Ayyub (Job), the wisdom of majesty in the word of Yahya (John the Baptist), the wisdom of possession in the word of Zakariya (Zachariah), the wisdom of intimacy in the word of Ilyas (Elias), the wisdom of benevolence in the word of Luqman, the wisdom of the Imam in the word of Harun (Aaron), the wisdom of sublimity in the word of Musa (Moses), the wisdom of what one turns to in the word of Khalid, and the wisdom of uniqueness in the seal of Muhammad.

There is a seal for each wisdom. So I have condensed these wisdoms according to what is established in the Mother of the Book, and I complied with what was written out for me, and stopped at what was set as a limit for me. Even if I had desired to do more than that, I would not have been able to do so. Indeed, the Presence forbids that, and Allah is the One who grants success. There is no Lord but Him.

Notes to Chapter 1:

1. al-Insân al-Kâmil, the Perfect Man.
2. Nafkh, Qur'an 32:9, etc.
3. Insan, as well as meaning human being, also means the pupil of the eye.
4. The form chosen by Allah for the human being.
5. Qur'an 2:30-33.
6. 'Ibada: All the acts of worship: giving, praying, fasting, etc..
7. Adab: Manners. Here meaning the much deeper quality of spiritual manners, that is a courtesy engendered in the ritual acts of worship, the prostrations of the prayer, the fast, and giving gifts to the needy. Such a quality is imbued with awareness that you are the dependent, and the Real is the independent. You are poor, He is rich.
8. Qur'an 41:53, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves..."
9. i.e. the Prophets.
10. Qur'an: 57:3.
11. Qur'an 38:75, "What I created with My two hands."
12. Hadith: "Allah has 70,000 veils of light and darkness. If they were to be removed, the splendour of His face would consume."
13. Hadith: "Allah created Adam on His form."
14. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)

2) The Seal of Wisdom of the Breath of Angelic Inspiration (1) in the Word of Shith (Seth)

Know that the gifts and favours which appear in phenomenal being through human beings or without them fall into two categories: the gifts of the Essence and the gifts of the Divine Names. These two categories are distinct among the people of tasting according to whether as they come from a specific request for a specific thing, from a general request, or without any request. This applies whether they are gifts of the Essence or gifts of the Divine Names. They are specific when someone says, "O Lord, give me such-and-such a thing," and specifies something which occurs to him. They are general when someone says, "Give me what You know is good for all my parts, subtle and gross," without specifying it.

The askers fall into two groups - one group makes the request from a natural impulse to hasten its attainment, "for man is impetuous;" (17:11) and the other group asks because they know that there are matters with Allah which, in the foreknowledge of Allah, are only obtained after a request. They say, "Perhaps what I ask of Him is something of that sort." Their request takes into consideration this possibility. They do not know what is in the knowledge of Allah, nor what their capacity to receive will grant them. This is because it is one of the most difficult things to know capacity at any moment, for it refers to the capacity of the individual at that time. Furthermore, had he not been disposed by his capacity to make the request, he would not have made that particular request.

The goal of the people of presence, (2) who do not possess such a knowledge, is to know it in the moment in which they find themselves. They know by their state of presence what Allah has given them in that moment. and they only receive it by their predisposition for it. They are of two sorts: one group knows their predisposition from what they have already received, and the other group knows what they are going to receive based on their predisposition. This latter group has the most perfect recognition of predisposition.

Among this group are those who make a request, neither to hasten it nor for the possibilities of favour, but rather to comply with the command of Allah when He says, "Call on Me and I will answer you." (40:60) This sort of person is the pure slave and when he asks, his aspiration (himma) is not attached to what he asks for, be it specific or not, rather his aspiration is merely in or not, rather his aspiration is merely in obedience to his Lord's command. When his state requires, he asks for slavehood, and when it requires entrustment [to Allah] and silence, he is silent. So Ayyub and others were tried, and they did not ask Allah to remove their affliction from them. Then at another moment, their state required that they ask that it be removed, and Allah removed it from them.

The immediate granting of a request, or its deferment, depends on the decree which has been determined for it by Allah. If the request coincides with the moment, the answer comes quickly, and if the moment is deferred - either in this world or the next, the answer is also deferred except for the answer from Allah which is, "At your service" (3) - so understand this well!

As for the second category, it is received without making a request, and by "without request" we mean verbal expression of it. In actuality, there must always be a request - be it articulated, or by a state, or from a predisposition. Similarly, unrestricted praise only takes place through verbal expression. The state determines the meaning, for that which induces

you to praise Allah is determined for you by a Name of Action (4) or a Name of Disconnection. (5) In the case of the predisposition of the slave, its possessor is not conscious of it, but he is aware of his state because he knows both what his motive is and the state itself. Predisposition is the most hidden form of making requests.

That which prevents some people from asking is their knowledge that Allah has predetermined their destiny, so they have prepared themselves to receive whatever comes from Him, and they have withdrawn from their selves and their desires.

Among these people are those who know that the knowledge which Allah has of them in all their states is their basic constitution in the state of their permanent source-form from before existence. They know that Allah will only give them what their source allows them according to Allah's knowledge of it when they were in their permanent source-forms. Thus these people know that Allah knows the way they will obtain anything.

There is no higher, nor more unveiled group among the People of Allah than this group, who understand on the secret of the Decree. They, in turn, fall into two sorts: those who know it in general and those who know it in particular. Those who know it in particular are higher and nearer perfection than those who know it in general. Such a person knows what is in the knowledge of Allah for him - be it by Allah informing him of the knowledge his own source has accorded to Him, or be it by direct unveiling to him from his permanent source-form whose unfolding states are endless. So he, in his knowledge of himself, is in the position of having Allah's knowledge of him, because it is derived from the same source. In respect of the slave, concern from Allah is predestined for him, and it is constituted by the sum of the states of his source which the possessor of this unveiling perceives when Allah allows him to perceive it, i.e. the states of his source. When Allah informs him of the states of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of these permanent sources in the state of their non-existence, since they are but essential relations without any form. In this respect, we say that divine concern precedes the slave's need because of this equivalence in the communication of knowledge.

In this way Allah speaks so that we will know, and it is an expression which is completely specific - not as is imagined by those who do not drink from this source. The goal of disconnection is to make that in-timeness in knowledge belong to Knowledge. It is the highest aspect of this question which the mutakallim (6) can comprehend with his intellect - unless he considers knowledge to be distinct from the Essence. If he does this, he ascribes relativity to knowledge, and not to the Essence, and because of this, he sets himself apart from the realised ones among the People of Allah, who are endowed with unveiling and real existence.

Let us return to those gifts which are either the gifts proceeding from the Essence or the Names. As for the favours, gifts and graces of the Essence, they only come by means of divine tajalli. (7) Tajalli only comes from the Essence by means of the form of the predisposition of the one to whom the tajalli is made. It never occurs otherwise. The one who receives the tajalli will only see his own form in the mirror of the Real. He will not see the Real, for it is not possible to see Him. At the same time, he knows that he sees only his own form. It is the same as a mirror in the Visible world inasmuch as you see forms in it or

your own form but do not see the mirror. At the same time, however, you know that you see the forms, or your own form, only by virtue of the mirror. Allah manifests that as a model (8) appropriate to the tajalli of His Essence, so that the one receiving the tajalli knows that he does not see Him. There is no model nearer or more appropriate to vision and tajalli than this. When you see a form in a mirror, try to see the body of the mirror as well - you will never see it. It is true that some people who perceive this say that the reflected form is imposed between the vision of the seer and the mirror. This is the most that it is possible to say, and the matter is as we have mentioned. We have clarified this in the The Makkan Revelations.

If you wish to taste this, then experience the limit beyond which there is no higher limit possible in respect of the creature. Neither aspire to, nor tire yourself out in trying to go beyond this degree, for in principle, there is only pure non-existence after it.

Thus Allah is your mirror in which you see yourself, and you are His mirror in which He sees His Names. His Names are not other than Himself, as you know. The matter is confusing. One of us implied ignorance of the matter as part of knowledge and said, "The incapacity to achieve perception is perception." (9) Some of us know but do not express it in this way, even though it is the highest of words. Knowledge does not give incapacity to know as the first one said, but rather knowledge gives him the same silence which incapacity gives. This is the highest level of those who have knowledge of Allah.

This knowledge only belongs to the Seal of the Messengers and the Seal of the Awliyâ'. The Messengers and Prophets only see it from the niche of the Messenger who is the Seal. The awliyâ' only see it from the niche of the walî who is the Seal. Even the Messengers only see it to the extent that they see it from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya', for Message and Prophethood - by which I mean the Prophethood of bringing the Sharî'a and its message - ceases, but wilâya never ceases. Thus the Messengers, inasmuch as they are awliya', see what we have mentioned only from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya'. How could it be different for other awliyâ'? Although the Seal of the Awliyâ' is subject to the judgement which the Seal of the Messengers brought through the Sharî'a, that does not diminish his station nor does it detract from what we have said, for something which is lower from one point of view can be higher from another. Confirmation of this occurred in the history of our Sharî'a in the excellence of the judgement of 'Umar regarding the prisoners of Badr (10) and their treatment, and in the story of fertilization of the date-palms. (11) It is not necessary that the perfect have precedence in everything and in every rank. The Rijâl (12) regard precedence as being in the degrees of knowledge of Allah. Here is their goal. As for the things which are in-time, they do not attach their thoughts to them, so realise what we have mentioned!

Al-Khidr said to Musa, "I have knowledge which Allah has taught me, and which you do not know, and you have knowledge which Allah has taught you and which I do not know." (13)

It is like the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in relation to a brick wall which was complete except for one brick, (14) and the Prophet was that one brick although he himself only saw the place for the single brick. The Seal of the Awliyâ' must also have this sort of vision. He sees the same as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, saw, but he sees a place for two bricks in the wall, and that the bricks are made of gold and silver. He sees that there are two bricks missing in the wall, and he sees that they are a silver brick and a gold brick. He must see himself as being disposed by nature to fill the place of these two bricks. The Seal of the Awliyâ' is these two bricks by which the wall is completed. The necessary reason for which he sees himself as two bricks is that he follows

the Shari'a of the Seal of the Messengers outwardly - which is the place of the silver brick. This means the outward Sharî'a with all that pertains to it of ordinances which are taken from Allah by the secret, according to the outward form which conforms to the secret because he sees the matter for what it really is. He must see the matter in this manner, for it is the place of the golden brick in the inwardly hidden. It is taken from the source from which the angel brought it, the same angel who brought the revelation to the Messengers. If you have understood what I have alluded to, then you have indeed acquired useful knowledge!

All the Prophets, from Adam to the last of the Prophets, take their light from the niche of the Seal of the Prophets, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Even though the existence of his clay was deferred, the last Prophet was nevertheless present in his reality, according to his statement, "I was a Prophet when Adam was between water and clay." (15) Every other Prophet only became a Prophet by being described by divine qualities inasmuch as Allah is described as the Praiseworthy Wali.(16)

The Seal of the Messengers, in respect to his wilâya, is connected to the Seal of the Awliyâ' in the same way in which Prophets and Messengers are connected to it. He is a walî, Messenger, and Prophet. The Seal of the Awliyâ' is a walî and the heir who takes directly from the source, contemplating the ranks. He is the most beautiful of the beauties of the Seal of the Messengers, Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, the overseer of the community, and the master of the sons of Adam by reason of opening the door of intercession. He specified a particular state which is not universal. (17) In this special state, he has precedence over the Divine Names. So the All-Merciful only mediates with the Avenger for the people of affliction through the intercession of the mediators. Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, obtained mastery in this special station. Whoever understands the ranks and the stations does not find this discourse difficult.

As for the gifts of the Names, know that Allah bestows mercy on His creation which is wholly from the names. Either it is a pure mercy, like the excellence of the provision which they have in this world or on the Day of Rising which is bestowed by that name, the Merciful, and so is a gift of mercy, or it is a mixed mercy like the taking of a disagreeable remedy which is followed by relief - it is still a divine gift. Divine gifts can only possibly be given through the intermediary of the guardians of the Names. Sometimes Allah gives it to the slave by means of the All-Merciful, and so the gift is pure from any adulteration which would be contrary to the nature of the moment, otherwise he would not receive the object and what would resemble it. Sometimes He gives by means of the the Boundless, so it is general - or by the Wise, so He looks at what is fitter at the moment, or by the Giving, who gives what is good without those who receive it having to compensate for it by gratitude or deed. He gives by the Compeller, and so He looks at the environment and what is necessary to it. He gives by the Forgiving and so He looks to the environment and what is happening to the individual. If he is in a state which merits punishment, He veils him from it, and if he is in a state which does not merit punishment, He protects him from a state which would merit it. He is "protected from wrong action", "safeguarded", and other descriptions of that sort. The Giver is Allah in the sense that He is the Treasurer of all that is in His treasury, and Allah only brings forth from it according to a predestined decree through the intermediary of a name particular to that matter. So He gives everything its created form (18) according to the name, the Just, and its brothers.

The Names of Allah are endless because they are known by what comes from them, and what comes from them is endless, even though they can be traced back to the limited roots which

are the matrices of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but one of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but One Reality which assumes all these relations and aspects which are designated by the Divine Names. The Reality grants that each of the Names, which manifest themselves without end, has a reality by which it is distinguished from another Name. It is that reality by which it is distinguished which is the Name itself - not that which it shares.

It is the same with the gifts - every gift is distinct from another by personal nature, although they come from a single source. It is evident that this one is not that one. That is because the Names are distinct. Because of its boundlessness, in the Divine Presence there is nothing at all which repeats itself. This is the truth which is determined.

This was the knowledge of Shith, peace be upon him, and its spirit aids every spirit which discusses the like of this, except for the spirit of the Seal who receives replenishing knowledge directly from Allah, not from any spirit. No, rather it is from his spirit that his substance flows to all spirits, although he may not perceive that of himself at the time when his elemental body existed. However, in respect to his reality and his rank, he knows all of that essentially, just as he is ignorant of the composition of the elements (of his body). So he has knowledge and is ignorant, and he is capable of being described by contrary attributes even as the Origin admits of description with opposites such as the Majestic and the Beautiful, the Outward and the Inward, the Last and the First - and they are the same, and not other than Him. Therefore, he knows and does not know, and he perceives and does not perceive, and he sees and does not see. It is by this knowledge that Shith received his name because it means "the gift". In His hand is the key to the gifts in their various types and relationships So Allah gave him to Adam, and he was the first gift, and He only gave it from Himself.

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All gifts in phenomenal being are manifested in this fashion - so no one receives anything from Allah and no-one receives anything which does not come from himself. Not everyone recognises this. Only a few of the people of Allah know it. When you see one who recognises that, rely on him, for that one is the source of the purest purity and the elite of the elite of the Men of Allah. Whenever a person of unveiling sees a form which communicates to him gnosis which he did not have and which he had not been able to grasp before, that form is from his own source, no other. From the tree of himself he gathers the fruits of his cultivation, as his outer form opposite the reflected body is nothing other than himself, even

though the place of the presence in which he sees the form of himself presents him with an aspect of the reality of that presence through transformation. The large appears small in the small mirror and tall in the tall, and the moving as movement. It can reverse its form from a special presence, and it can reflect things exactly as they appear, so the right side of the viewer is his right side, while the right side can be on the left. This is generally the normal state in mirrors, and it is a break in the norm when the right side is seen as the right and inversion occurs. All this is from the gifts of the reality of the Presence in which it is manifested and which we have compared to the mirror.

Whoever recognises his predisposition, recognises what he will receive. Not everyone who knows what he will receive, knows his predisposition, unless he knows it after receiving it, and this one knows it in a general way. Some people who are weak of intellect think that since it confirmed with them that Allah does what He wills, they deem it admissible that He could contradict wisdom and what the matter is in itself. (19) Because of this, some of them go so far as to deny the possibility and affirm that which is necessary by essence and by other. The man who has achieved realisation, however, admits the possibility and knows its presence and knows what is possible and how it is possible, since in its source it is necessarily existent because of something other-than-it. From where is the name of other, which determines its necessity, valid for it? No one knows this distinction except those with particular knowledge of Allah.

It is in the footsteps of Shith that the last of this human species will be born, and he will carry his secrets. There will none of this species born after him, so he will be the Seal of the Begotten. A sister will be born with him, and she will emerge before him, and he will follow her with his head at her feet. He will be born in China, and he will speak the language of his country. Sterility will spread in men and women, so there will be much cohabitation without conception. He will call people to Allah, but will not be answered. When Allah takes him and the believers of his time, those who remain will be like beasts, not knowing what is lawful (halâl) from what is unlawful (harâm). They will act according to their natural instincts with lust, devoid of reason and law. Upon them the Last Hour will occur.

Notes to to Chapter 2:

1. Nafth, to puff, blow or spit, hence inspiration. Hadith, "He (Jibril) inspired or put (nafatha) into my heart..." Hence poetry is called the nafth of Shaytan.
2. The people of the presence are those who see everything as coming to them from Allah and everything as effected by Allah.
3. Labbayk.
4. Like the Giving, the Provider.
5. Tanzih, making Allah free of any connection to His creation. Names like the Absolutely Pure (al-Quddûs).
6. The people of words - theologians and philosophers. They are unable to enter the realm of reflection and meditation that is the Sufic domain, and thus some of them oppose the Sufic teaching - mistaking the doctrine's meanings since they cannot intellectually identify them with a specific set of physical practices and direct inner experience.
7. A manifestation by which something is made clear and unobscured, as the bride is displayed to the husband or the rust removed from a sword or mirror so that it shines. The tajalli is the unveiling of a spiritual reality in the realm of vision. It is a direct-seeing into the nature of existence, a showing forth of the secrets of the One in the celestial and terrestrial realms.

8. Mithâl, a Qur'anic term which indicates learning not by logical but by analogical method. It is simply the ACCESS to the parable and not the parable or any idea that the "metaphor" equals its interpretation. It has no specificity. Mithal is grasped "on the wing" so to speak. It cannot be explored or analysed or extended. That is to say it must not be approached rationally but emphatically with direct and clear seeing-into.
9. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq.
10. After Badr, Abu Bakr asked the Prophet to either forgive or allow the prisoners to be ransomed. 'Umar said that they should be killed. Eventually, the Muslims reached a consensus that the captives should be ransomed and they were. Later the verse was revealed, "It is not for a Prophet to take captives..." (8:67)
11. When the Prophet had been asked about whether palm-trees should be pollinated and then later said, "You have the best knowledge of these things of your world."
12. Rijal (sing. rajul): The men. Meaning the men of gnosis and illumination. Those who know - that is - who know how-it-is, and not the veiled fantasy experience of so-called ordinary sensory perception which is, as we now know, in direct contradiction to the physical reality of matter according to high-energy physics.
13. cf. Qur'an 18:65.
14. Hadith in al-Bukhari (2815) and Muslim.
15. Hadith in at-Tirmidhi and Musnad Ibn Hanbal.
16. Qur'an 42:28, "It is He who sends down abundant rain after they have lost all hope, and He unfolds His mercy; He is the Praiseworthy, the Wali."
17. He only can open the door of intercession because it is a special gift to him alone.
18. Qur'an 20:50: "Our Lord is He who gives each thing its created form and then guides it."
19. i.e. they permit that He do the impossible, like making existence non-existence or non-existence existence.

3) The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath of Divine Inspiration (1) In the Word of Nuh (Noah)

Know that disconnection (tanzîh) among the people of realities in respect to Allah is the same as limitation and qualification, so the one who disconnects is either ignorant or ill-mannered if he only applies disconnection to Him and believes that about Him. (2) When the believer who follows the Sharî'a disconnects and stops at that, and does not see anything else, he displays ill manners and slanders Allah and the Messengers - may the blessings of Allah be upon them! - although he is not aware of it. He imagines that he has reached the target and yet he has missed it, so he is like the one who believes in part and rejects part. (3)

One especially knows that when the language of the various Sharî'as speaks about Allah as they do, they speak to the common people in the first sense, and to the elite in every sense which can be understood from the various aspects of that expression in any language in the usage of that language.

Allah manifests Himself in a special way in every creature. He is the Outwardly Manifest in every graspable sense, and He is the Inwardly Hidden from every understanding except the understanding of the one who says that the universe is His form (4) and His He-ness (huwiyya), and it is the name, the Outwardly Manifest. Since He is, by meaning, the spirit of whatever is outwardly manifest, He is also the Inwardly Hidden. His relation to whatever is manifested of the forms of the world is the relation of the governing spirit to the form. The definition of man, for example, includes both his inward and outward; and it is the same with every definable thing. Allah is defined in every definition, yet the forms of the universe are not held back and He is not contained by them. One only knows the limits of each of their forms according to what is attained by each knower of his form. For that reason, one cannot know the definition of Allah, for one would only know His definition by knowing the definition of every form. This is impossible to attain, so the definition of Allah is impossible. Similarly, whoever connects without disconnection has given limits to Allah and does not know Him. Whoever combines connection and disconnection in his gnosis, and describes Allah with both aspects in general - because it is impossible to conceive in detail because we lack the ability to encompass all the forms which the universe contains - has known Him in general and not in particular, as he knows himself generally and not in particular. For that reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, linked knowledge (ma'rifa) of Allah to knowledge of oneself and said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Allah says, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons (what is outside of you) and in themselves (what is your source) until it is clear to them (the contemplators) that it is the Truth," (41:53) inasmuch as you are His form and He is your spirit. You are to Him as your body-form is to you, and He is to you as the spirit which governs the body.

The definition contains your inwardness and outwardness, for the form remains when the spirit which governs it departs, and it is no longer man, but one can speak of it as resembling the form of man. There is no difference between it and the form made of wood or stone, upon which the name of man is only applied by metaphor and not by reality. Allah cannot vanish from the forms of the universe, as His definition of His divinity is by reality, not metaphor, as the definition of man applies only so long as he is alive. As the exterior of the form of man praises both his spirit, and the self governed by it, with his tongue, similarly Allah made the forms of the universe which glorify His praise, but we do not understand their glorifying. (5) We do not embrace all forms in the universe. All are tongues of Allah uttering the praise of

Allah and for that reason He said, "Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," (1:1) i.e. all types of praise refer to Him. He is the Praiser and the One praised.

If you speak of disconnection, you limit Him,
and if you speak of connection, you define Him.
If you speak of the two together,
then you are free of error
and you are an Imam and a master in knowledges of gnosis.

He who affirms duality, falls into shirk, and whoever speaks of uniqueness is a unifier. (6)
Take care lest you be a dualist by connection, and take care lest you be a isolator by disconnection.

You are not Him, rather you are Him
and you see Him in the source of thing,
absolute and limited at the same time.

Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," and so He disconnects, "and He is the Hearing, the Seeing," (42:11) so He connects. Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," so He connects and doubles it, (7) and "He is the Hearing, the Seeing." Then He uses disconnection and makes Himself Unique.

If Nuh had combined these two calls for his people, they would have answered him. He called them openly (71:8), and he called them secretly (71:9). Then he said to them, "Ask forgiveness of your Lord. Truly He is Endlessly Forgiving." (71:10) He said, "I have called my people night and in the day, but my calling has only made them more evasive" (71:5-6) because they knew what they had to do in answering his call.

So the knowledge of those who know Allah is what Nuh indicated in respect to his people by praising them through blame. He knew that they would not answer his call because of the furqân (8) it contained. The command is the Qur'an, not the Furqân. Whoever is established in the Qur'an does not incline to the Furqân. Even if the Furqân is in the Qur'an, the Qur'an contains the Furqân but the Furqân does not contain the Qur'an. For this reason, no one was favoured by the Qur'ân except Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and this community which is the "best community ever to be produced before mankind." (3:110)

So "there is nothing like Him" unified several matters in one single matter. If Nuh had articulated something like of this âyat, his people would have responded to him, because it contains connection and disconnection in a single âyat, rather in half an âyat.

Nuh, peace be upon him, peace be upon him, called on his people at night in respect to their intellects and spirituality (rûhânîyya), which are unseen; and by day he called on them in respect to their outer forms and arrival. In his call, he did not unify with anything, like "there is nothing like Him." So their inward had a distaste for this separation, and it increased them in evasion. Then he said of himself that he called upon them that He might forgive them, not that He be unveiled to them. They understood that from him. That is why "they put their fingers in their ears and wrapped themselves in their clothes," (71:7) and this is the form of veiling to which he called them. So they answered his call by action, not by saying, "At your service."

There is both the confirmation of likeness and its negation in "There is nothing like Him." For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said of himself, "I have been given all the words." (9) Muhammad, peace be upon him, did not call on his people by night and day, but rather he called upon them by night in the day and by day in the night. Nuh said in his wisdom to his people, "He will send heaven down on you in abundant rain," (71:11) which is intellectual gnosis in meanings and metaphorical speculation, and "He will reinforce you with wealth," i.e. by what comes to you from Him.

Thus it is your wealth in which you have seen your form. So whoever among you imagines that he has seen Him, does not have gnosis, and whoever of you knows that he has seen himself, he is the gnostic. For this reason people are divided into those who know Allah and those who do not know. "And sons" is what results from their logical speculation while the knowledge of the business (to which Nuh called them) is based upon contemplation which is far from the results of thought. Their trade did not profit them, (10) so what they had in their hands, which they only imagined they possessed, vanished from them.

The kingdom belongs to the people of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, for Allah says "Give of that to which He has made you successors." (11) (57:7) For the people of Nuh it is, "Do not take anyone besides Me as a guardian." (17:2) The kingdom was confirmed for the people of Muhammad, and the guardianship in it belongs to Allah. The people of Muhammad are the khalifs in it. The kingdom belongs to Allah and He is their guardian, and that is the kingdom of being appointed khalif. For this reason, Allah is the "King of the kingdom" (12) as at-Tirmidhi says. "They have hatched a mighty plotting," (71:22) because calling to Allah is the plotting of the the One called; since He does not lack the beginning, He is called to the end, so they call to Allah. This is the source of devising according to inner sight. Nuh said, "The affair belongs entirely to Him," so they answered Him with plotting as He called them.

The people of Muhammad came and knew what the call to Allah was in respect of its He-ness, rather what it is in respect to His Names. Allah says, "The day those who are godfearing are gathered to the All-Merciful." (13) So He used the "particle of the end" (ilâ - to) and joined it to that Name, and we recognise that the universe is under the care of a Divine Name which requires them to be among the "godfearing". The reality of taqwâ (14) is that man avoids ascribing blessings, perfections and praiseworthy attributes to himself or to others, except for Allah. He fears Allah through His acts and attributes. These things are evils from the spring of possibilities. They said in their plotting, "Do not abandon your gods. Do not abandon Wadd or Suwa' or Yaghuth or Ya'uq or Nasr." (71:22) Then they abandoned them ignorant of the Truth according to what they left of the idols. Allah has an aspect in every worshipped thing. Whoever recognises it, recognises, and whoever is ignorant of it is ignorant among the people of Muhammad. Your Lord decreed that you should worship only Him that is the judgement of your Lord.

The one who possesses knowledge knows who the slave is and in what form he is manifested as far as he is a slave. Separation and multiplicity are like the limbs of the sensory form and like faculties of meaning (15) of the spiritual form. He only worships Allah in every worshipped object. The lowest one is the one who imagines that godness is contained in it. Were it not for this illusion, stones and other things would not have been worshipped. This is why He said, "Say: Name them!" (13:33) If they had named them, they would have named stone, tree, or star. If they had been asked, "Who do you worship?" they would have replied, "God". They would not say "Allah" or "the god".

The highest knower does not use this imagination, (16) but rather he says that this is a divine tajalli which one must exalt, and he does not restrict himself. The lowest one is the one possessed of fantasy: "We only worship them so that they bring us neared to Allah." (39:3) The highest knower says, "Your god is One God, so submit to Him," (22:34) wherever He is manifest, "and give good news to the humble-hearted" who humble the fire of their nature. They spoke to it (the fire), and did not say "nature". "They have misguided many people," (71:24) i.e. they perplexed many in the multiplicity of the One by aspects and relations. "Do not increase not the wrongdoers" because their selves are from the totality of the chosen ones who inherited the Book and they are the first of the three, (17) which precedes the ambivalent and the outdoer, "in anything but misguidance", except in the perplexity of the man of Muhammad who says, "Increase me in perplexity." (18) "Every time it shines on them, they walk in it. When the darkness comes over them, they stop." (2:20) So the perplexed one turns about, and the circular movement is about the axis which he does not leave.

The one who has a stretched-out path is inclined to leave the goal, seeking what the possessor of imagination has in it, and his end is that imagination. He has "from" and "to" and what is between them. The one who has a circular movement has no beginning, "from", which clings to him, and no end, "to", is judged of him. Thus he has the most perfect existence. He "is given all the words" (19) and wisdoms. "And because of their errors" which is that which is recorded for them, "they were drowned" in the seas of the knowledge of Allah which is perplexity among the men of Muhammad. When the seas were heated up, (20) "they were put into a fire" in the source of water, "and they found no one to help them besides Allah." (71:25) Allah is the source of their helpers, and so they were destroyed in it for time without end. If He had brought them out to the shore, the shore of nature, He would have brought them down from this high degree. All belongs to Allah and is by Allah, rather it is Allah.

Nuh said, "My Lord!" and he did not say, "My God," for the Lord has immutability, and "God" differs according to the Names. So "every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29) By Lord, he meant something with an immutable quality. "Do not leave upon the earth" and he called on them to go into its Muhammadan interior. "If you let down a rope, it would fall on Allah," (21) "to Him belongs what is in the heavens and what is in the earth." When you are buried in it, you are in it and it is your container, and "We will return you into it and We will bring you forth from it again," (20:55) by the difference of existence. "...of the unbelievers" who wrap themselves in their garments and put their fingers in their ears, seeking veiling because he called on them that He might forgive them. Forgiveness is the veiling of wrong actions, "not even one" so that the benefit will become universal like the call. "If You leave any," i.e. if You call them and then leave them, "they will misguide Your slaves," i.e. confuse them and so bring them out of their service to what they have of the secrets of lordship. They will think themselves lords after they were slaves in themselves. Thus they are slaves and lords. "They will spawn nothing" i.e. they will not have any result or manifest anything except their being shameless that is, the manifestation of what veils the unbelievers is that they were veiled from what appeared after their manifestation. They manifested that which veils, so they were veiled after their appearance.

The thinker is confused and does not recognise the goal of the shameless in shamelessness, (22) or the unbeliever in his disbelief, yet the person is but one. "My Lord, forgive me," i.e. veil me and that which concerns me so that my rank and station are unknown, as the rank of Allah are unknown in His statement, "They do measure Allah with His true measure"; (23) "and my parents" of whom I am a result, and they are the intellect and nature; "and all who enter my house," i.e. my heart, "as believers" believing in what it contains of divine reports,

and it is what their selves occasioned, "And all the believers, men (the intellects) and women (the selves)."

"Do not increase the wrongdoers (dhâlimîn)" who are from the darkness (dhulumât), the people of the unseen, hiding behind the veils of darkness, "except in ruin" i.e. in destruction. Thus, they do not recognise themselves because they see the Face of Allah outside of them. Among the men of Muhammad, "All things are passing except His Face." (28:88) Ruin is destruction. Whoever wishes to understand the secrets of Nuh must rise into the sphere of Nuh. (24) It is in our book, at-Tanazzulat al-Mawsuliyya.

Notes to Chapter 3:

1. Subbûh, name applied to Allah, the All-Perfect, disconnected from imperfections.
2. If he does not go on to include tashbih, connection.
3. cf. Qur'an 4:149: "Those who reject Allah and His Messengers and desire to make division between Allah and His Messengers, saying, 'We believe in some and reject some.'"
4. By manifesting His attributes and Essence since everything is a proof and indication of Him.
5. Ref. to Qur'an 17:44, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise, but you do not understand their glorification."
6. In this case, ignorant of the multiplicity of His Names and Attributes.
7. "Like Him" = "ka-mithlihi", the word "like" occurs twice: "ka" and "mithl", so like negates like, like a double negative.
8. Furqan: One of the names of the Qur'an, meaning a "discrimination" that which separates or distinguishes. Here presented as an opposite in a dyad: Qur'an/furqan, that is, discrimination/gathering.
9. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
10. Reference to Qur'an, 2:16, "Those are the people who have sold guidance for misguidance. Their trade has brought no profit. They are not guided."
11. Khalifs.
12. Since He answers His slave who is the "kingdom". Technical term used by al-Hakim at-Tirmidhi and Abu Madyan, discussed by Ibn al-'Arabi in the Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Chapter 24, vol. I, p. 182.
13. ref. Qur'an 19:85.
14. Fearfulness of Allah which is reflected in one's behaviour.
15. Meaning. Meaning does not carry the ordinary connotative significance that it has in the science of semantics. In the Sufic science meaning is not allied, but inseparable from the experience of the recognition of meaning. In other words, it is not a "thing" which can be apprehended with the qualities of thingness. It is a mode of experiencing which takes place in a zone of awareness that is in itself a realm of the inward reality cognised in the waking state. Meaning/sensory, ma'na/hiss.
16. Khayal: An important term. Khayal means imagination, but in the special technical language of Ibn al-'Arabi the khayal contains an outer and inner meaning. Its outer (not inner) meaning is imagining in the ordinary sense of a "tangible reality" which is experienced mentally yet remains unreal, that is, untouchable and non-physical. Its inner meaning, however, is that faculty by which we solidify the objects - which are according to unveiling basically "not-there" - spatiality itself. There is much resistance to this in "rational" and programmed intellects as there is of the hand to the rock in "common sense" experience. The rock is there, it does not budge. There is, it must not be forgotten, a threshold situation where this is not so, for if the

subject were brain-damaged, subjected to a hallucinogen, or hypnotic trance, then the object would experientially melt away. That is still not the same as seeing in which things are seen as-they-as in one unified field without differentiation, while alert within that condition of experiencing. And this state brings with it wisdom beyond the recognition of how-it-is at that moment - in other words a new understanding is established by the experience.

17. Ref to Qur'an 35:32, "...but some of them wrong themselves, some are ambivalent, and some outdo each other in good."

18. Hayra: Bewilderment. A Key term. Hayra is not a negative situation - it is the condition in which the seeker finds every intellectual channel blocked, every pathway of reason clashing against the other in contradiction so that it induces in the seeker a state of intensity. This intensity by virtue of its inner tension creates a condition we call hayra. It is a collapse of separation - a kind of "white hole" - which results in gatheredness. That is, the hayra creates a new condition which is its result and that result is a breakthrough into an illumination of the Real.

19. Meaning the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, who was given all the words.

20. By the oven (from which the water gushed out of the earth in the Flood.)

21. Hadith.

22. The manifestation of lordship.

23. 6:91, 22:84, 39:67.

24. The Sphere of the Sun.

4: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sanctification (Quddûs) in the Word of Idris

Elevation has two references - one of place and one of rank. Elevation of place is "We raised him up to a high place," (19:57) and the highest of places is that upon which the mill of the world of the spheres revolves. It is the sphere of the sun and in it is the station of the spirituality of Idris, peace be upon him! There are seven heavens under it and seven heavens above it, and it is the fifteenth. That which is above it is the red heaven, i.e. Mars, the heaven of Jupiter, Saturn, the heaven of fixed stars, the Starless Heaven and the heaven of the constellations, the heaven of the Kursi and the heaven of the 'Arsh. That which is below it is the heaven of Venus, Mercury, the Moon, the circle of ether, the circle of air, the circle of water, and the circle of earth. It is the axis of the heavens, and it is a "high place".

As for the elevation of rank, it is for us, the people of Muhammad. Allah said, "When you are uppermost and Allah is with you" (47:35) in this height. He exalts Himself above place, not above rank. When the selves of those among us who do deeds are afraid, He follows the mention of "being with" with His words, "He would not cheat you of your deeds." The deed demands place and knowledge demands rank. So He joined the two heights for us - elevation of place by deed and elevation of rank by knowledge. Then to disconnect the association of being with, He said, "Glorify the name of your Lord, the Most High," (87:1) above this association in meaning.

It is one of the most wondrous of matters that man is the highest of existent things - I mean the Perfect Man, and elevation is only attributed to him by subordination either to place or rank which is a degree. So he is not high by his essence, he is high by the height of place and the height of rank, for these possess height. Height of place is like the All-Merciful settling on the throne, (1) and it is the highest of places. Height of rank is "All things are passing except His Face," (28:88) and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:123) and nothing has existence along with Allah.

When Allah said, "We raised him up to a high place," He made high an adjective for place. Since your Lord said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif in the earth," (2:30) this is height of rank. He said about the angels, "Were you overcome by arrogance, or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) so He gave elevation to the angels. If the angels had possessed that elevation by simple virtue of the fact that they are angels, then all the angels would have been included in this elevation. It was not common to them in the definition of angel. We recognise that this is elevation of rank with Allah. It is the same for the khalifs of the people. If their elevation with the khalifate had been an elevation by essence, every man would have it. It is not general and so we know that that elevation is by rank.

One of His names is the High. Over whom, when there is nothing except Him? So He is the High by His Essence. Is He is High over that which is particular, when there is no He except Him? His elevation is by virtue of Himself, and He, in respect to existence, is the source of existents. Those in-time things which He calls high in themselves are not other than Him. He was the High when there was no height of relativity because the source-forms in non-existence had not smelt the scent of existence. They remain in their state in spite of the multiplicity of forms in existents, but the source is the same from the whole in the whole. The existence of multiplicity lies in the names which are the relationships, and they are non-existent matters. There is only the source which is the Essence. He is High through Himself,

not by any ascription to another. From this standpoint, there is no height of relative relation in the universe, but the aspects of existence which are distinct. The height of relativity exists in the one Source in respect of the many aspects. For that reason, you say of Him, Him and not Him, and you and not you.

Al-Kharraz, (2) may Allah have mercy on him, who is one of the aspects of Allah and one of His tongues with which He speaks of Himself, said that one only has gnosis by joining opposites together in respect of Him. "He is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden." (57:3) He is the source of what appears and the source of what is hidden in the state of its manifestation. There is none who sees Him other than Him and there is none who is hidden from Him. So He is manifest to Himself and hidden from Himself. He is called Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz and other than that from the names of things in-time.

The Hidden says "No" while the Manifest says, "Me," and the Manifest says, "No" while the Hidden says, "Me". This is found in every opposite, yet the speaker is one, and he is the same as the hearer in the statement of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, about what their selves say, (3) for they speak and hear what they say, and know what their selves say. The source is but one, even if the judgements are different. There is no way that anyone can be ignorant of this sort of thing. Every man knows from himself, and it is the form of the Real.

So things are mixed and numbers appear by the one in the known ranks. Thus "one" brought number into existence, and number divides the One. The principle of number only appeared through the numbered. Part of the numbered is non-existent, and part is existent. The thing is non-existent in relation to the senses while it is existent in relation to the intellect. There must be number and numbered. That must grow from one and it grows because of it. Every rank of the numbers has one reality like 9, for example, and 10 and down to 2, and upwards without end, and its reality is not a sum.

A name is not perceived by the addition of ones. 2 is one reality, and 3 is one reality, and so on until the end of these ranks. Even though the source [of numbers] is one, the source of one of them is not the source of the others. Addition encompasses them all, and it speaks of them from them and judges them by them. Twenty ranks (4) appeared in this statement, so composition entered into them. You will continue to affirm the source of what you deny in itself. Whoever recognises what we have related of the numbers, and that negation is the same as their affirmation, knows that the Real, who is disconnected by disconnection, is creature by connection, even though the creature is distinct from the Creator. The matter is the creature/Creator and it is the Creator/creature. That is from one source, rather is is the One source and it is many sources. Look at what you see!

Ibrahim's son told him, "My father, do what you are ordered." (37:102) The child is the same as his father, so he only saw himself sacrificing himself, "and He ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." (5) That which was manifested as a ram was manifested in the form of a human, and manifested in the form of a son. Rather, it is by the principle of the son being the same as the father. "He created from (one self) his mate." (4:1) He (6) married his own self, and from him are both his companion and his child. The matter is one in number. It is the same for nature and what is manifested from it. We do not see it diminishing by what appears from it nor increasing by the lack of what other than it manifests. That which is manifested is not other than it, nor is it the same as what is manifested according to the variety of forms in principle. This one is cold and dry, and that one is hot and dry. They are joined by dryness,

and distinct by another quality. The common source is nature, and the world of nature is composed of forms in one mirror. Rather, it is one form in different mirrors.

There is only bewilderment (hayra) by the dispersal of perspectives. Whoever knows what we have said is not bewildered. If he increases in knowledge, it is only from the principle of place, and place is the same as the source-form in which the Real varies in the locus of His tajalli. Conditions vary, so He assumes every condition. There is no condition except for the source in which He make tajalli of Himself, and there is nothing except this.

By this aspect, Allah is creature, so interpret!
And by this aspect, He is not creature, so remember!
The inner sight of whoever understands
what I have said is not confused, and only
the one who perceives it possesses sight.
The source of joining and separating is the same,
and it is multiplicity which never remains or departs.

The One who is High in Himself is the One who possesses the perfection in which all matters of existence are absorbed, as are all non-existent relations, inasmuch as it is not possible that any of these attributes be lacking from Him, be they praiseworthy by custom, logic, or law, or blameworthy by custom, logic or law. That belongs only to the One named Allah. As for what is named other-than-Allah, it is either a locus of His tajalli or a form which is in it. If it is the locus of His tajalli, it contains distinction. Be-cause of that, there must be distinction between the One who makes tajalli and the place of tajalli; if it is a form in it, that form is the source of the essential perfection because it is the same as what is manifested in it. That which belongs to Allah belongs to that form. However, it is not said that it is Him nor that it is other-than-Him.

Abu-l-Qasim ibn Qasi (7) indicated this in his book, *The Removal of the Sandals*, and he said, "Each Divine Name is qualified by all the Divine Names, and described by their description." It is so. Each Name indicates the Essence and the meaning which is set out for it and which demonstrates it. In respect to its indication of the Essence, it possesses all the names, and in respect to its indication of the meaning which is singular to it, it is distinct from others, such as the Lord, the Creator, the Fashioner, etc. The Name is the same as the Named in respect to the Essence, and the Name is other than the Named in respect to the meaning which is particular to it.

If you have understood that the "high" is as we have mentioned, you know that it is neither place nor height of rank, for height of rank is particular to the administration of authority, like the Sultan and the judge, wazirs and qadis, and all who have rank, be they worthy of that rank or not. Height is by attributes which are not like that. The most knowledgeable of people can be ruled by the person with the position of power, even if that person is the most ignorant of people. This is the height of rank according to the principle of what he has over me in himself. When he retires, his high rank vanishes. The one with knowledge is not like that.

Notes to Chapter 4:

1. Qur'an 7:54, "...then He settled Himself firmly on the Throne."
2. Abu Sa'id Ahmad ibn 'Isa al-Kharraz, died in Cairo 286/899. He said, "I only knew Allah by joining the opposites," and then recited, "He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the

Inward."

3. Hadith, "Allah forgives my people what their selves say to then as long as they do not act upon that."

4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 1000.

5. "And We ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." Qur'an: 37:107.

6. Adam.

7. Sufi leader of rebellion against the Murabitun in the Algarve.

5: The Seal of the Wisdom of Being Lost in Love (1) in the Wisdom of Ibrahim (Abraham)

Ibrahim is called the intimate friend, and he was an intimate friend (khalîl), because he was penetrated (takhallal) and gathered all the qualities of the Divine Essence. The poet says:

You pervaded the course of my spirit,
and that is why the intimate friend is called the intimate friend.

It is like the colour which permeates the coloured, so it is a non-essential matter ('arad) in respect to its essential substance (jawhar), and it is not like the place and that which it occupies. Or it means the penetration of the Real into the existence of the form of Ibrahim. Each of these two principles is true as was mentioned, for each points to an aspect which appears without overstepping it.

Do you not see that the Real is manifest in the qualities of beings in-time and He gives news of that from Himself, and He is even manifest in the attributes of imperfection and the attributes of blame? Do you not see that the creature is manifest with the qualities of the Real from first to last, and all of them belong to him as the attributes of in-time things belong to the Real? "Praise belongs to Allah," so the results of praise from every praiser and one praised go back to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:132) It includes what is blameworthy and praiseworthy, and there is only one or the other.

Know that when something is penetrated by something the first is contained by the second, so the penetrating is the name of the actor veiled by the penetrated, which is the name of the one acted upon, and it is the Outwardly Manifest. The name of the actor is the Veiled, the Inwardly Hidden. It is its food, as water permeates wool and so makes it expand. If the Real is the Outwardly Manifest, then the creature is veiled within Him, and creation is all the Names of the Real, His hearing and seeing, and all His ascriptions and discernments. If the creature is outwardly manifest, then the Real is veiled and hidden in him, and so the Real is the hearing of the creature, and his seeing, hand and foot, and all his faculties as it related in sound hadith. (2)

If the Essence were exempt from these relations, it would not be divinity. These relations are made by our sources, so we make Him god by our dependence on His godness. He is not recognised until we are recognised. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Such a person is the creature with the most knowledge of Allah. Some sages, especially Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, claim that one can have gnosis of Allah through disregarding the world. This is false. Indeed, the non-time pre-time is not recognised as god until that which depends on its being God is known. Thus it is a proof of Him. Then after this, in the second state, (3) unveiling accords you that the Real Himself is the source of the proof of Himself and His godness. The universe is but His tajalli in the forms of their source-forms whose existence is impossible without Him. He assumes various forms and modes according to the realities of these sources and their states, and this is after our knowledge of Him that He is our God.

Then the last unveiling comes, so our forms appear to you in Him, and some of us appear to others in the Real, and then some of us recognise each other and some of us are distinct from one another. Among us are those who recognise that our recognition of ourselves occurs in

the Real, and some of us are unaware of the presence in which this recognition of ourselves takes place. "I seek refuge with Allah from being one of the ignorant." (2:67)

By the two unveilings together, He only judges us by ourselves, rather we judge ourselves by ourselves, but through Him. That is why He says, "Allah's is the conclusive argument," (6:149) meaning against those who are veiled when they say to the Real, in conformity with their desires, "Why did you do this or that to us?", thinking that it was not in conformity with their desires. "On the Day when the legs are bared," (68:42) means the matter which the gnostics unveil here. They see that the Real did not do to them what they allege that He did, but that it was from themselves. For He only lets them know what they are in themselves. From this their argument will dissolve, and the decisive proof of Allah will remain.

If you say, what is the benefit of His words, "If He had willed, He could have guided every one of you," (6:149; 16:9) we say in If He willed "if (law)" is a particle of impossibility showing impossibility. He only willed the matter as it is. But the source of possibility accepts the thing and its opposite in the principle of logical proof, and it is the same with any two logical principles. That which occurs is that which the possibility implies in the state of its immutability. The meaning of "If We had guided you" is, had He shown you the Truth. Allah does not open the inner eye of every possibility in the universe to the perception of the matter as it is. There are those who know and those who are ignorant. Allah did not so will, so He did not guide all of them, and He will not will it, and it is the same as if He had willed it. How would He will this which is not? His volition is unified in its connections. It is a relationship dependent on the known, and the known is you and your states. Knowledge does not have an effect on the known, rather the known has an effect on knowledge, and so it accords from itself what it is in its source.

Divine discourse relates according to what agrees with the ones addressed and what logical reflection accords it. It does not come according to what unveiling gives. For that reason, there are many believers, but the gnostics who possess unveiling are few. "There is not one of us who does not have a known station," (37:164) and it is what you are in your state of immutability which you manifest in your existence. This is if it is confirmed that you have existence. If existence is confirmed to the Real and not to you, the judgement is yours without a doubt in the existence of the Real. If it is confirmed that you are existent, then the judgement is yours without a doubt, even if the judge is the Real. It is only the overflowing of existence on you.

You only praise yourself and you only blame yourself, and praise is only due to Allah for the overflowing of existence, for that is His, not yours. You are His nourishment by conditions, and He is your nourishment by existence. He is specified by what specifies you. The command comes from Him to you, and from you to Him, even though you are called obligated, a passive name (mukallaf), and He is not called obligated since there is no imposition upon Him.

He praises me, and I praise Him.
He serves me and I serve Him.
In one state I draw near to Him,
and in sources I deny Him.
So He knows me and I do not know Him,
and I know Him and I witness Him.
Where is independence

when I help Him and assist Him?
That is why the Real brought me into existence.
Then I knew Him and manifested His existence.
Hadith (4) brought us that,
and in me He achieved His goal.

Then the intimate friend, Ibrahim, peace be upon him!, possessed this rank by virtue of which he was called the intimate friend. For that reason, he made hospitality to guests a sunna. Ibn Masarra (5) associates him with the angel Mika'il in respect to provisions. Provision is that which nourishes those provided for: when provision permeates the essence of the one provided for until nothing remains in it except permeation and nourishment flows in all the parts of the one nourished. There are no parts in divinity, so all the divine stations are penetrated which are designated by the Names, and by which His Essence is manifested.

We are His as our proofs confirm,
and we are ours.
Only my being belongs to Him,
and we are His as we are ours.
I have two aspects: Him and me,
but He does not have "me" through me.
However, His place of manifestation is in me,
so we are His - like me.
"Allah speaks the truth, and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 5:

1. Huyûm is the intense love and passion which causes bewilderment and distraction.
2. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)
3. The first unveiling was annihilation (fanâ') and the second is going-on (baqâ').
4. "I created existence so that I might be known."
5. Muhammad ibn Masarra al-Jabali, Andalusian Sufi and thinker, born in Granada 269 /883 and died near there in 319/931.

6: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Real in the Word of Ishaq (Isaac)

The ransom of a Prophet by an animal's sacrifice
as an offering!
How can the bleating of a ram be equal
to the voice of a man?
Allah Almighty magnified the ram out of concern for us or for it,
but I do not see by what measure.
There is no doubt that the bodies
of cows and camels are larger,
but they relinquished the rank of sacrifice
to the offering of the ram.
Would that I knew how a ram
replaced the khalif of the All-Merciful with its small body!
Do you not see that the command to sacrifice
implies correspondence and promises gain and diminishes loss?
There is no creature higher than the mineral,
and after it comes the plant according to its ranks and measures.
The animal comes after the plant,
and each one had gnosis of its Creator by unveiling and evident proof.
As for the one named Adam, he is limited
by intellect, thinking, and the conventions of belief.
It is that which Sahl (at-Tustari) (1) and the realizer
said as we do (2) - because we and they are in the degree of Ihsan.
Whoever witnesses the matter I have witnessed
will say what I have said, both secretly and openly.
Do not pay any attention to words
which contradict our words and do not sow grain in the land of the blind!
They are the "deaf and dumb" in the text of the Qur'an
which the one protected from wrong action brought for our ears.

Know, may Allah support us and you! that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, peace be upon him, told his son, "I saw in a dream that I must sacrifice you." (37:102) He did not interpret it although the dream is the presence of the imagination (khayâl). It was a ram which appeared in the form of Ibrahim's son, and Ibrahim confirmed the vision. So his Lord ransomed his son from Ibrahim's illusion with the "mighty sacrifice", which was the interpretation of the vision with Allah, but Ibrahim was not aware of it.

The tajalli of form in the presence of the imagination requires another knowledge by which one can perceive what Allah means by that form. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said to Abu Bakr when he interpreted a dream, "You have guessed part of it rightly, and you have missed part of it." Abu Bakr asked him to inform him of what was right in it and what was wrong, but the Prophet did not do so.

Allah said to Ibrahim when He called him, "Ibrahim, you have discharged your vision." (37:105) He did not say to him, "You have confirmed the vision that it is your son" because he did not interpret it. He took what he dreamt literally, whereas dreams require interpretation. That is why the 'Aziz, the ruler of Egypt, said, "...if you can interpret dreams."

(12:43) The meaning of interpretation is the transposition from the form of what one dreamt to another form. The cattle represented the hard years and the fertile years. If Ibrahim had been faithful to the dream, he would have sacrificed his son, since he believed in the dream that it really was his son, whereas with Allah it meant the "mighty sacrifice" in the form of his son. He ransomed him by what occurred in Ibrahim's mind, but it was not ransomed in actuality with Allah.

There is a common form to the sensory form of the sacrifice and the imaginary form of Ibrahim's son. If he had seen a ram in his imagination, he would have interpreted it as his son or something else. Then Allah said, "This was a most manifest trial," (37:106) i.e. his clear test, meaning his experience in knowledge - whether or not he knew what the perspective of the dream required in the way of interpretation. He knew that the place of the imagination required interpretation, but he neglected it and the condition inherent in it, and for this reason he believed in the vision.

Taqi ibn Mukhallad, the transmitter of traditions, did so too, having heard in a tradition he was sure of, that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Whoever sees me in a dream, sees me when awake, for Shaytan cannot assume my form." (3) So Taqi ibn Mukhallad saw the Prophet in a dream in which the Prophet gave him milk to drink. Taqi ibn Mukhallad believed his dream, but he made himself vomit and threw up the milk. If he had interpreted the dream, he would have known that milk means knowledge, equal to the quantity that he drank. Do you not see that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received a goblet of milk in a dream and he said, "I drank it until satiety came out of my nails, and then I gave the surplus to 'Umar." It was said, "Messenger of Allah, what do you interpret it as?" He replied, "Knowledge." (4) He did not leave it as milk in its dream form since he had knowledge of the state of dreams and how they must be interpreted. It is known that the form of the Prophet, peace be upon him, which the senses see, is buried in Madina, and that the form of his spirit and his subtle form have never been seen by anyone nor by himself. For this reason, the spirit of the Prophet takes on material existence in the form of his body as he died, and nothing is missing from it. So it is Muhammad, peace be upon him, who appears in dreams through his spirit in a bodily form which resembles his buried body, for Shaytan cannot assume the form of his body, (5) may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and Allah protects the one who sees him. For this reason, whoever sees this form takes from it all that it orders or prohibits or gives good news of, even as he takes judgements from him in the life of this world - according to what they indicate from text, immediate or implicit. If he gives him something, that thing is subject to interpretation, unless it is manifest in the senses as it is in the imagination, and so does not require interpretation. It is based on this aspect that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, relied, even as Taqi ibn Mukhallad did. The vision has these two aspects. (6)

Allah taught us adab in what He did with Ibrahim and what He said to him when He gave him the station of prophethood. We know that when we see Allah in a form which logical reason rejects, we must interpret that form according to the Sharf'a, whether it is in the state of the one who sees Him, or in the place in which He is seen, or the two together. If logical reason does not refute it, then we take it as we saw it, just as when we see Allah in the Next World.

So the One, the All-Merciful,
has forms in every place from what is hidden and what is manifest.
If you said, "This is the Real!" you spoke truly;

and if you said, "It is something else," you interpreted.
His principle is not in one place rather than another,
but it brings the Real to the creatures.
When He manifests Himself to the eyes,
the intellects deny him by insistent proofs.
He is accepted in the tajalli to the intellects,
and in that which is called the imagination (khayâl).
That which is sound is the seeing.

Abu Yazid, (7) may Allah be pleased with him, says of this station, (8) "Had the Throne, and all it contains a hundred million times over, been in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have felt it." This is the magnitude of Abu Yazid in the world of bodies, but I say, "If the limitlessness of that which exists could be conceived of as being limited, and had it been contained as an existent source in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have been aware of it in his knowledge." For it is confirmed that the heart contains Allah, although it is not described by satiety. Had it been filled, it would have saturated.

Abu Yazid also said, "We have pointed to this station, saying:
O Creator of things in Yourself,
You encompass all You have created!
You create that whose being has no end in You,
for You are narrow and vast!
Had that which Allah created shone in my heart,
this shining dawn would not have shone.
But that which contains Allah
does not exclude creation.
How is that, O Hearing?"

Anyone can create by illusion in his imagination that which has no existence save in the imagination. This is a common matter. By aspiration (himma), the gnostic creates that which has an outside existence in his aspiration. However, it continues only as long as the aspiration continues to preserve it without being tired by preserving what it created. (9)

When it happens that the gnostic neglects to preserve what he created by concentration, that creature ceases to exist, unless the gnostic has mastered all the presences and does not neglect anything. Rather, he must witness at least one of these presences. If the gnostic creates something by his aspiration and possesses this encompassment, that creature's form will appear in every presence, and the form will preserve itself. If the gnostic neglects a presence or many presences while seeing one of the presences, and while preserving the form of what he created in the presence he is in, all the forms will be preserved by the preservation of that form in the presence which he does not neglect. For neglect is never universal, either among the common or the elite. I have exposed a secret here which the People of Allah have guarded jealously, for it contains a refutation of their allegation of being the Real. For the Real is never unconscious of anything, and the slave must be unconscious of something in favour of something else. Inasmuch as he preserves that which he has created, he says, "I am the Real," (10) but he does not maintain it the way the Real maintains it that is the difference. Inasmuch as he is unconscious of any form and its presence, the slave is distinguished from the Real. He must be distinct, although all the forms are maintained by his preservation of a single one of these in the presence of which he is conscious. This is preservation by inclusion, and the

preservation of the Real of what He created is not like that. Rather, His preservation is of each form in particular. This matter which I have just communicated has never been written about by anyone - neither by me nor by any others - except in this book. It is unique in time. Take care lest you forget it!

The presence which you remain conscious of, with the form which resembles it, is like the Book about which Allah said, "We have not omitted anything from the Book." (6:38) It therefore integrates the tangible and the intangible. None will recognise what we have said except the one who is himself a Qur'an. (11) The one who fears Allah will have a furqân, (12) which is, as we mentioned, this matter in which the slave is distinct from the Lord. This furqân is the highest furqân.

At one moment, the slave is the Lord without a doubt,
and at another the slave is most certainly the slave.
If he is the slave, he is vast by Allah,
and if he is the Lord, he is in a restricted life.
Insofar as he is the slave,
he sees the source of himself,
and without a doubt
his hopes expand from him.
Inasmuch as he is a lord, he sees all of creation,
from the presence of angels and the kingdom, demanding from him,
And he is unable to answer their demands by his essence.
For this reason, some of the gnostics weep.
Be the slave of a Lord, and do not be the lord of His slave,
so you will not be suspended and tested in the fire.

Notes to Chapter 6:

1. Famous Sufi who studied under Sufyan ath-Thawri. d. 282/896. Wrote a short commentary on the Qur'an.
2. That the inanimate has more greater gnosis of Allah and obeys Him more than other creatures.
3. Al-Bukhari (6592); Muslim 42:10.
4. In Abu Dawud and Ibn Hanbal.
5. As in the hadith of al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. Either it remains on its dream form or it is subject to interpretation.
7. Al-Bistami, d. 261/874. Famous Sufi known for his ecstatic expressions.
8. The station of the vastness of the heart.
9. Language derived from Qur'an 2:255, "...their preservation does not tire him."
10. Al-Hallaj.
11. i.e. The Perfect Man.
12. Qur'an 8:29, "O you who believe! If you have fear of Allah, He will give you a furqan..."

7: The Seal of the Wisdom of Elevation in the Word of Isma'il (Ishmael)

Know that the one called Allah is Unique (Ahad) by Essence and by all His names, and every existent thing is only attached to Allah by its own lord exclusively, for it is impossible for an existent to possess the whole. As for Divine Unity (ahadiyya), no existent possesses any of it because one cannot have one part of it while another has another part. Unity does not admit of divisibility. His Unity integrates all of Him by potentiality.

The happy one is the one who is the one "who was pleasing to his Lord." (19:55) There is no one who is not pleasing to his Lord because it is by him that lordship (rububiyyah) (1) is sustained. He is pleasing to Him, and so he is happy. This is why Sahl at-Tustari said, "Lordship has a secret, and this secret is you." He was addressing every source. "Had the secret been disclosed, lordship would have been invalidated." He used the word "law" (2) which is the particle of impossibility - so it is never manifested, and lordship is never invalidated - for the source has no existence except by its Lord. The source is always existent, therefore lordship is never invalidated.

He who is pleasing is beloved, and all that the beloved does is beloved, so everything is pleasing, because the source could not act unless the act belonged to its Lord. The source is made tranquil by having an act attributed to it, but it is content with what appears in it and from it of the acts of its Lord, and is pleased with these acts, because every doer and producer is pleased with his act and product. He completes his act and product according to its basis. "He gives each thing its created form and then guides it," (20:50) that is, He revealed to it that He gave everything its creation, so it does not admit of decrease.

Isma'il, peace be upon him, by his discovery of what we mentioned "was pleasing to his Lord." In the same way, every existent thing who is pleasing to its Lord is also pleasing to the Lord of another, because lordship is only obtained from each of the names, not from the One of Unity. What is specific to it from the whole is only what is attributed to it. So He is its Lord. None is attached to Him in respect of His Unity. For this reason, the people of Allah are forbidden tajalli in the Unity. If you look at Him by Him, He is the One who is looking at Himself, and He continues to be Himself looking at Himself by Himself. If you look at Him by yourself, unity vanishes because of you. If you look at Him both through Him and through you, Unity also vanishes because the pronoun of the second person implies that there is something else besides that which is regarded. There must be some relationship which necessitates the duality of the regarder and regarded, and so Unity vanishes, even though there only exists the One who sees Himself by Himself. It is known that in this description, He is the Regarder and the Regarded.

It is not possible that the one who is pleasing be totally pleasing, unless all that he manifests comes from the act of the One who is pleased with him. Isma'il was distinguished from other individuals by how Allah described him, namely, that "he was pleasing to his Lord."

It is the same for every "self at peace" to which it is said, "Return to your Lord." He only commanded it to return to its Lord who called it, and so it recognised Him among the totality, "well-pleasing and well-pleased. Enter among My slaves!" (89:28) to the degree that they have this station. The slaves mentioned here refer to every slave who has gnosis of his Lord, who is content with Him, and does not turn to the Lord of another while preserving the unity

of the source which is necessary. "Enter My Garden," which is My veil, (3) and My Garden is not other than you, so you veil Me by your essence. There is only gnosis of Me by you and you only exist by Me, so whoever has gnosis of you has gnosis of Me, and there is no gnosis of Me, for there is no gnosis of you. If you enter into the Garden, you enter into yourself, so you will know yourself by a gnosis other than the gnosis by which you had knowledge when you knew your Lord. You will have two sorts of gnosis: gnosis of Him in respect of yourself, and gnosis of yourself and Him in respect of Him, not in respect of you.

You are a slave and you are a lord
to whomever you are a slave in respect of.
And you are a lord and you are a slave
to whoever possesses the covenant in speech.
Every knot has a person over it who unravels it
by one who has another knot.

Allah is pleased with His slaves, and "they are well-pleasing and well-pleased with Him." He is pleasing, so the two presences confront each other and accept likes, and the likes are opposites because the two likes are a single reality which does not unify them since they would not then be distinct. There is only the distinct, so there is no like. There is no like in existence, and so there is no opposite in existence. Existence is one reality, and the thing is not opposite to itself.

Only the Real remains,
no phenomenal being remains.
There is nothing connected, nothing distinct.
For that reason, the proof of the eye-witness came,
so I only see His source with my eye when I see!

That is for "the one who fears his Lord" lest He makes distinction by his knowledge. By that distinction, we indicated the ignorance of sources in existence according to what the knower brought, so distinction occurs among the slaves, and distinction occurs among the lords. If distinction had not occurred, one divine name would have been interpreted in all its aspects by that by which another name is interpreted. The explanation of the Exalter is not that of the Abaser, and so on, but from the aspect of unity, as we said, every name indicates the Essence and its reality in respect to what it is. The One Named is but One. The Exalter is the Abaser in respect to the Named. It is not the Abaser in respect to itself and its reality. That which is understood differs in the understanding in respect to each of them.

Do not look at the Real.
Free Him from creation.
Do not look at creation,
and garb it in other than the Real.
Disconnect Him and connect Him,
and stand in a seat of honour. (4)
Stay in the state of gatheredness (jam') if you wish,
and, if you wish, in the forms in separateness (farq).
You will win all,
even if all set out to carry the day.
You will not be annihilated
and you will not have going-on

and the forms will not be annihilated
and will not have going-on.
Revelation will not be given to you
in respect to another, and you will not receive it.

Praise is by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat. The Divine Presence demands praise which is praiseworthy in itself. So one extols the Divine Presence by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat, for one goes beyond it, "and do not imagine that Allah break His promise to His Messengers." (14:47) He did not say, "and his threat", rather He said that He will pass over their wrong actions even though he threatens not to. He praised Isma'il because "he was true to his promise." (19:54) Possibility vanishes in respect to the Real, since in it is that which demands the probable.

Nothing remains except the One
who is true to His promise alone,
and an eye does not remain
seeing the threat of the Real.
If they enter the abode of misery,
in it they are in possession of delight, and a different bliss.
Than the bliss of the gardens of endless-time, but the matter is the same.
The difference between them occurs in the tajalli.
It is called punishment ('adhab) from the sweetness ('udhuba) of its food,
that is like the husk of it, and the husk protects it.

Notes to Chapter 7:

1. Rububiyah: Lordship, the quality of being a lord. A term derived from the Qur'anic descriptions of Allah's lordship over creation. One might say the ecology of natural existence. It is an essential element in Sufic cosmology and is a most sophisticated concept which surpasses the crude specificity and mechanistic views of evolutionist biology. It is an energy system of relationships in constant change and altering dynamics. It functions through the different realms, the atomic, the mineral, the plant, and so on. It relates the levels of living organisms from the uni-cellular up to man, and the interpenetrations of organism and environment. It re-defines "event" from crude historicity to a picture of organism/event in a unified field. It is the underlying concept which allows us to abandon the dead mind/body split of the dying culture. It permits us to utilise and develop the energy concepts of Islamic/Chinese medicine - which hold a common energy concept at base. Rububiyya permits us to observe ONE PROCESS at work throughout every level of the creational realities.
2. "Law" (if, but probably not) expresses an unlikely condition, while "in" (if, but probably yes) expresses a probable condition.
3. Garden, Janna, also carries the connotation of veiling, concealing.
4. Qur'an 54:53-55, "The fearfully aware will be amid Gardens and Rivers on seats of honour in the presence of an All-Powerful King."

8: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Spirit (Rûh) in the Word of Ya'qub (Jacob)

The Din (1) is two Dins: the Din with Allah and with the one whom the Real knows, and who has recognition of the fact that the Real knows him; and the Din with creation; and Allah takes account of it since its goal is conformity with what Allah has willed of the Shari'a set down with Him. Allah said, "Ibrahim directed his sons to this, as did also Ya'qub, 'My sons! Allah has chosen this Din for you, so do not die except as Muslims'" (2:132) that is obeying Him. The Din brought the alif and the lam (2) of definition and acquaintance. It is the recognised Din. It is His words, "The Din with Allah is Islam," (3:19) and it is submission. So the Din is an expression of your obedience. That which is from Allah is the road which leads you to Him. Din is submission and the law (namus) is the road which Allah has set down.

Anyone who is described by submission to what Allah has prescribed for him is the one who has based himself on the Din, and it raises him up and establishes him as does the prayer. The slave is the product of the Din. Allah sets down judgements, and thus submission is the source of your action, and so Din is from your action. You will only achieve happiness by what comes from you. As happiness is established for you by your actions, so the Divine Names are only established by His actions, which are you and which are in-time. As He is called god by His effects, so you are called happy by your effects.

Allah bestowed His rank upon you since you established the Din and obeyed what He prescribed for you. I will enlarge on that, if Allah wills, in a useful manner, after we have clarified the Din which creation has which Allah takes account of when He says, "The Din is Allah's alone," (8:39) and all of it is from you, and not from Him except in respect to origin. Allah says, "They invented monasticism," (57:27) and monasticism consists of arbitrary esoteric rules (an-nawâmis al-hikmiya) which the known Messenger did not bring to the people from Allah by the traditional Prophetic method. When wisdom and clear benefit corresponded to these rules regarding the divine decision about the goal of the Shari'a of Allah, (3) Allah took it into account according to what He Himself prescribed. Allah did not prescribe it for them. Then Allah opened between Himself and their hearts the door of divine concern and mercy while they were not aware of it, and in their hearts He made them esteem their rules by which they seek "the pleasure of Allah" beyond the Prophetic method known by Divine definition. Allah says, "They did not observe it" those people who devised these rules and what was prescribed for them "as it should have been observed" - "unless it was purely out of the desire to gain the good pleasure of Allah." That was what they believed about it.

"To those of them who believed We gave their reward, but many of them are deviators." (57:27) "Many of them," i.e. those who have this worship prescribed for them, "are deviators," that is, do not submit to it and observe it properly. Allah does not accord to the one who does not obey it, a law which pleases Him, but the command requires submission. Its proof is that the one who is obligated either obeys with agreement or opposes it. The one who agrees and is obedient has no need of any discourse on it to prove it. The one who opposes it is seeking one of two matters from Allah to be judged regarding him: either overlooking of wrong actions and forgiveness, or being taken to task for that. One of the two is necessary because the command is true in itself. In any state, it is true that Allah guides His slave by his actions whatever state he is in, and so the state is the influencing factor.

Thus the Din is a reward, that is, the exchange for what is easy and for what for is not easy. "Allah is pleased with them, and they are pleased with Him" (97:8, 58:22) is the easy reward, and "As for any one of you who has done wrong, We will make him suffer great punishment" (25:19) is the reward of what is not easy. He passes over their wrong actions and this is their reward. It is proven that the Din is the reward. As the Din is Islam, and Islam is the same as being led, it leads to what is easy (the reward) and what is not easy (the punishment), and so it is the repayment. This is the language of the people of outwardness.

As for its secret and inwardness, it manifests itself in the mirror of the existence of Allah, so it does not refer to possibilities from Allah other than what their essences in their states accord. They have a form in every state, and their forms differ according to the difference of their states. The tajalli differs according to the difference of the state. The effect occurs in the slave according to what he is. None gives him good except himself, and none gives him the opposite of good except himself. Thus he gives bliss to his essence, and he also punishes it. He only blames himself and only praises himself. "Allah's is the conclusive argument" (6:149) in His knowledge of them since knowledge depends on the known.

The secret which is above this in this sort of question is that possibilities are based on their origin from non-existence. The existence of the created reality is only by the forms of the states on which the possibilities are based in themselves and their sources. Thus you know who has pleasure and who has pain, and from each of these states you know what follows ('aqaba); and since it follows, you derive punishment ('uquba) and penalty ('iqab) from it. It permits good and evil as two opposites which custom calls the good reward, and the evil punishment.

For this reason, He designates and elucidates the Din by custom because He relates to it what is necessary and what his state demands. Din is custom or habit, and the poet said, "Like your habit (Din) with the mother of little Harith...", that is, like your custom. What is understood by custom or habit is that the matter itself recurs. This is not the case in Din. Custom is repetition, but custom is only one intelligible thing while resemblance in forms exists. We know that Zayd is the same as 'Amr in respect to humanness, but humanness does not recur since, had it done so, it would have multiplied. It is but one reality, and the one does not multiply itself. We know that Zayd is not the same as 'Amr in respect to personality. The person of Zayd is not the person of 'Amr in spite of the realisation that personality is common to both. In the sensory, we say that humanness recurs because of this resemblance, and we say in sound judgement that it does not. From one aspect, there is no habit in reward, and from another aspect, there is habit even as there is reward by one aspect and no reward by another aspect. Thus reward is also a state in the possible. This is a question about which those who know this matter are unaware, and it is part of the secret of the Decree which governs creatures. Know that it is as if it were said of the doctor that he is the servant of nature - in the same way, it is said of the Messengers and heirs 4 that they are the servants of the Divine Command among people. In the heart of the matter, they serve the states of possible things, and their service derives from the sum of their own states on which they are based in the state of the immutability of their sources. See how wondrous this is!

Is not the the desired servant here the one who performs what is commanded by the one who is served, either by state or by word? So it is valid that the doctor be called the servant of nature if he acts according to the principle of assisting it. Nature produces in the body of the one who is ill a special state of being by which he is called "ill". If the doctor were to assist nature by service, he would also increase the magnitude of the illness by it when he wants to

repel the illness, seeking health. Health is also a part of nature by the growth of another state of being which differs from this state of being. Then the doctor is not the servant of nature, and yet he serves it inasmuch as he only heals the body of the one who is ill and changes that aspect, not the general one, for generalities are not valid in this sort of question. Thus the doctor is both a servant and is not a servant of nature.

In the same way, the Messengers and their heirs are in the service of the Real, and the Real has two aspects of judgement in respect to the states of the obligated. The matter proceeds from the slave according to what the will of Allah demands of it, and the will of Allah is attached to it according to what the knowledge of Allah demands of it. The knowledge of Allah is attached to it according to what the known accords it of its essence. The known only appears in its form. The Messenger and the heir serve the divine command by will, and yet they do not serve the will. The Messenger answered it seeking the happiness of the one who is under obligation. Had he served the Divine Will, he would not have given counsel, and yet he only gave counsel by it, i.e. the will. The Messenger and the heir are the doctors of the selves for Next life, obedient to the command of Allah when He commands them. So he looks at Allah's command, and sees that He has commanded him to do that which opposes His will. The command is only what He wills, and for this reason, it is the command.

He wills the command and it occurs, and He did not will the occurrence of what He commanded the commanded one to do, and so it did not occur from the commanded one therefore it is called opposition and rebellion. The Messenger conveys the news, and this is why he said, "The Sura of Hud (and its like) made me white-haired," when they came to him from His words, "Go straight as you have been commanded." (11:112) He did not know whether he was commanded to what complies with the will, so that it occurs, or to what does not comply with the will, so that it does not occur.

No one recognises the judgement of the will except after what is willed takes place, unless he is one whose inner eye has been unveiled by Allah. If he is, he will perceive the source-forms of the possibilities in their fixed state for what they really are. Then he judges according to what he sees. This belongs to certain people at certain moments, but they do not have it all the time. The Messenger said, "I do not know what He will do with me or with you." (5) So he made the veil clear, and he only meant that it emerges in a particular command, and no more.

Notes to Chapter 8:

1. Din: The life transaction, literally the debt or exchange situation between two parties, in this usage the Creator and the created, or as some say between the conditioned and the unconditioned, the limited and the limitless, or the many and the One.
2. The definite article.
3. Which is the achievement of human perfection through knowledge and actions.
4. Hadith, "The people of knowledge are the heirs of the Prophets."
5. Hadith in al-Bukhari.

9: The Seal of the Wisdom of Light in the Word of Yusuf (Joseph)

This luminous wisdom spreads its light on the presence of the imagination (khayal), and it is the first of the beginnings of divine revelation in the people of divine concern. 'A'isha, may Allah be pleased with her, said, "The first of what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had of revelation was the true dream. Then he only saw dreams which came like the breaking of dawn, and there was nothing hidden in it," (1) and her knowledge only extended to this. This lasted for six months, and then the angel came to him. She did not know that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had said, "People are asleep, and when they die, they waken up." Everything seen in the state of wakefulness is of that sort, although states differ. She spoke of six months, but all his life in this world was like that, as a dream in a dream.

Everything reported of this nature is called the world of the imagination (khayal), and for this reason, there must be interpretation: the matter which has a form in itself appears in a form other than it. The interpreter passes from these forms which the sleeper sees to the form upon which the matter is based. If he is correct, as in knowledge appearing in the form of milk, then he interprets the source of the form of knowledge from the form of milk, He discovers the source and says, "This form of milk refers to the form of knowledge."

When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received revelation, he was taken from the ordinary sensory world. He was covered and withdrew from those who were present with him. When that left him, he returned, and he only received revelation in the "presence of the imagination", although it could not be said of him that he had been asleep.

It was the same when the angel appeared to him as a man. That was also from the presence of the imagination, for it was not a man, but rather an angel who had entered into the form of a man. The gnostic onlooker interpreted it until he reached its form in reality. Then he said, "This is Jibril who came to teach you your deen." (2) He told them, "Answer the greeting of the man," so he called him a man in respect to the form in which he appeared to them. Then he said, "This is Jibril," and he looked at the form to which this imaginary man would return. He spoke the truth both times, with the truth of the vision of the physical eye, and the truth in that this was Jibril without a doubt.

Yusuf, peace be upon him, said, "I saw eleven stars and the sun and the moon prostrate themselves in front of me." (12:4) He saw his brothers in the form of the stars and his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon. This is from the point of view of Yusuf. Had it been from the point of view of what was seen, the appearance of his brothers in the form of stars and the appearance of his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon would have been from their volition. Since they had no knowledge of what he saw, that which Yusuf perceived was in the repository of his imagination.

Ya'qub knew that when he related it to him, so he said, "O my son, do not tell your vision to your brothers in case they should devise some scheme to injure you." (12:5) Then he absolved his sons of deceit and ascribed it to Shaytan, who is the source of deceit. He said, "In truth, Shaytan is a clear-cut enemy to man," i.e. he manifests enmity. Then Yusuf said at the end of the affair, "This is now the interpretation of the dream that I had. My Lord has made it all come true," (12:100) that is, that He manifested it in the world of senses after it

was in the form of the imagination.

The Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said about it, "People are asleep". Yusuf spoke of what his Lord had rendered true in the status of one who dreams that he has awakened from his dream and interprets it, and does not know that he is still asleep. Then later when he wakes up, he says, "I dreamt such-and-such a thing, and then I dreamt that I woke up and interpreted in such-and-such a way." This is similar to that. Look at how great the difference of perception is between Muhammad, peace be upon him, and Yusuf, peace be upon him, at the end of the affair when Yusuf said, "This is the interpretation of my dream of long ago which my Lord has rendered true," that is, made sensory or sensed. It was always sensed, since the imagination only gives out sensed things, and it has nothing other than that. See how noble is the knowledge of the heirs of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace!

I would say more on this presence on the Muhammadan tongue of Yusuf, as you will soon understand, if Allah wills. Know that that which is referred to as other-than-Allah, or the universe, is related to Allah as the shadow is related to the person. The universe is the shadow of Allah. It is the same as the relation of existence to the universe, since the shadow exists in the senses without a doubt. But there must be something by which that shadow appears. If one were to remove that by which the shadow appears, the shadow would be intelligible but would not exist in the senses. Rather, it would be a potential in the essence of the person on whom it depends. The locus of the manifestation of this divine shadow called the "universe" is the sources of the possibilities by which this shadow extends itself. This shadow is perceived according to what it projects itself on from the existence of this essence, but perception occurs through His name, the Light. This shadow is projected on the sources of possibilities in the form of the unknown unseen.

Do you not see that shadows incline to the darkness, indicating the hiddenness they contain because of the distance of the relationship between them and the persons who project them? Even if the person is white, his shadow is like this. Do you not see that when mountains are distant from the eye of the onlooker, they appear black? In their actual sources they are other than the colour the senses perceive. This is only due to the effect of distance. It is like the blue of the sky. This is the effect distance has on the senses with non-luminous bodies. It is the same for the sources of possibilities which are non-luminous because they are non-existent. Even if they are described as unchanging, they are not described by existence since existence is light. Distance makes luminous bodies appear small in the senses, so this is another effect of distance. The senses perceive them as small in size, whereas in their sources they are large according to that degree and greater in magnitude. One knows by proof that the sun is larger than the earth, but it appears to be the size of a shield. That is also an effect of distance.

You only know the universe according to the amount you know the shadows, and you are ignorant of the Real according to what you do not know of the person on which that shadow depends. Inasmuch as He has a shadow, He is known, and inasmuch as one is ignorant of what is in the essence of the shadow of the form which projects the shadow, he is ignorant of Allah. For that reason, we say that Allah is known to us from one aspect and not known to us from another aspect. "Do you not see how your Lord stretches out shadows? If He had wished, He could have made them stationary," (25:45) i.e. it still would be a potential in Himself. It is as He said, that Allah would not give a tajalli of Himself to possibilities until He manifests the shadow. The shadow is as if it remains outside of the possibilities which do

not have a source manifested for them in existence.

"Then We appoint the sun to be a pointer to them," that is to His name, the Light of which we spoke, and the senses witness it, for shadows have no source in the absence of light. "Then We draw them back to Ourselves, in gradual steps," so Allah draws it back to Himself because it is His shadow which appeared from Him, and it is not other-than-Him. All that you perceive is the existence of Allah in the sources of possibilities. Inasmuch as the He-ness of Allah is He, it is His existence. Inasmuch as forms differ in it, it is the sources of possibilities. As the name of the shadow does not leave it by the difference of forms, in the same way the name of the universe or the name other-than-Allah does not leave it by the difference of forms. In regard to the Divine Unity of His being, the shadow is Allah, because He is the One, the Unique; and in respect to the multiplicity of forms, it is the world, so understand and realise what I have explained to you! Since the matter is as I mentioned, the universe is illusory, and it does not have a real existence. This is the meaning of the imagination, that is, you imagine that the universe is an autonomous extra thing outside of Allah. It is not like that in itself. Do you not see that in the senses, the shadow is connected to the person who projects it, and it is impossible that it be detached from that connection since it is impossible for something to be detached from its own essence? Recognise your source ('ayn), and who you are, what is your he-ness and what your relation to Allah is, and by what You are the Truth and by what you are the universe, "other", and whatever resembles these expressions. In this, those that know vie in excellence, so there is the one who knows and the one who is more knowing.

The Real is, in relation to a particular shadow, small or large, pure or more pure, as light is in relation to what veils it from the onlooker through coloured glass which tints it. At the same time, it has no colour, and so you see it as making a mirror-image of your reality to your Lord. If you say that the light is green by the greenness of the glass, you will have spoken the truth as your sensory vision testifies. If you say that it is not green and has no colour as evidence accords you, you will have spoken the truth as sound logical consideration testifies. This is light projected across the shadow, and it is the same as the glass which is a luminous shadow because of its purity. It is the same for one of us who has realised the Real. His form manifests itself in him more than it manifests itself in another. Among us there is the one for whom Allah is his hearing, seeing, and all his faculties and limbs, (3) according to the signs which the Shari'a gives in a transmission from Allah. In spite of this, the source of the shadow exists, so the pronoun of "his hearing" refers to him. Other slaves are not like this. The relation of this slave is nearer to the existence of Allah than the relation of other slaves.

Then the matter is as we have confirmed. So know that you are imagination and that which you perceive and of which you say, "It is not me" is also imagination. All of existence is imagination within imagination. True existence is Allah, the Real, in particular in respect to essence and source, not in respect to His Names, because the Names have two meanings. One meaning is His source which is the same as the "Named", and the other meaning is what it indicates and that by which the Name is separate from this other Name, and so distinct. The Ever-Forgiving is separate from the Manifest and the Hidden, and the First is distinct from the Last. Thus it is clear to you that each Name is the same as the other Name, and yet it is not the other Name. Inasmuch as the Name is the same, it is the Real, and inasmuch as it is not it, it is the imaginary Real which we discussed.

Glory be to the One who is only proven by Himself and Whose being is only confirmed by His source! The Hidden is pure non-existence, so whoever holds to multiplicity, holds to the

universe and the Divine Names and the names of the world. Whoever holds to Divine Unity holds to Allah in respect to His Essence which is independent of the universe, not in respect to its divinity and form. If the Essence is independent of the universe, then He is the source of its independence from the ascriptions of the Names, because it has the Names, and they indicated it as they indicate other named things in which their effect is realised. "Say: He is Allah, Absolute Oneness" (112:1) in respect of his source, "Allah, the Everlasting Sustainer of all" in respect to our dependence on Him. "He has not given birth" in respect to His He-ness and us, "and was born born" the same way, "and no one is comparable to Him" in the same way.

This is His description so He singled out His Essence in His statement, "Allah is Unique (Ahad)". Multiplicity appears by His attributes which are known with us. We beget and are begotten, we depend on Him, and we are equals to one another. This is the One who is pure above these attributes. He is independent of them as He is independent of us. There is no description of Allah except for this sura, the Sura al-Ikhlās (112), and it was revealed in that. The Divine Unity (ahadiyya) of Allah is in respect to the Divine Names which demand the unity of multiplicity on our part, and the Divine Unity of Allah, in respect to His independence from us and from the names, is the Divine Unity of the source. Both of them are included in the name, the Unique One (al-Ahad).

Know that Allah has not manifested the shadows and made them prostrate themselves, casting themselves to the left and the right, (4) except as indications for you of yourself and Him. In this way you are able to recognise who you are and what your relationship to Him is, and what His relationship to you is, until you know from where and by which divine reality that which is other-than-Allah is described, through its complete poverty to Him as well as the relative poverty of some to others. In this way also, you are able to know from where and by what reality it is that Allah is described by independence from people and the universe, and the universe is described by independence, i.e. the independence of some from others in an aspect which is the source of its need of some. For the universe is in need of causes without a doubt by essential need. The greatest of its causes is the causality of Allah, and there is no causality of Allah by which the universe is in need except for the Divine Names. The universe is in need of each of the Divine Names, whether from the universe like it or, from Allah Himself. Thus it is Allah, and not other-than-Him.

This is why Allah said, "Mankind! you are the poor in need of Allah whereas Allah is the Rich Beyond Need, the Praiseworthy." (35:15) It is known that we depend on each other. Our names are the Names of Allah since everything is, without a doubt, in need of Him. At the same time, our sources are His shadow, and not other-than-Him. So He is our he-ness, and He is not our he-ness. We have prepared the way for you, so look!

Notes to Chapter 9:

1. In al-Bukhari and elsewhere.
2. In Muslim, also an-Nawawi's Forty Hadith.
3. Hadith, see. p.11.
4. Ref. Qur'an 16:48, "Do they not see the things that Allah has created, casting their shadows to the right and to the left, prostrating themselves before Allah incomplete humility."

10: The Seal of the Wisdom of Divine Unity (Ahadiyya) in the Word of Hud

Allah has the straight path which is manifest
and unhidden among the common people.
Its source exists in great and small,
in those who are ignorant of matters
and those who know.

For this reason, 'His mercy encompasses everything,' (1) great and small. "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) So all that walks on the Straight Path of the Lord, and is not of those "against whom Allah is wrathful" from this aspect, nor is he "astray". (2) As being astray is a non-essential quality, so divine wrath is also a non-essential quality. The source to which they return is the "mercy which extends to all things", and which preceded wrath. Everything which is other-than-Allah is a creature which crawls and which has a spirit. There is nothing which crawls by itself, rather it crawls by other than it. It crawls by the principle of following the One who is on a Straight Path. It is only a path by virtue of the fact that it is walked on.

If creation draws near you, Allah draws near you.
If Allah draws near you, creation does not follow.
So realise what we say on it,
and everything I have said to you is true.
There is no existent thing in phenomenal being
that you see which does not have articulation.
The eye only sees of creation
that its source is Allah.
But He is stored in it,
and for this reason, its forms are true.

Know that divine knowledges of taste (dhawq) which are acquired by the people of Allah differ according to the different faculties acquired from them, even though they derive from a single source. Allah said, "I am his hearing by which he hears and his sight by which he sees and his hand by which he strikes and his foot by which he walks." (3) So He mentioned that His He-ness is the source of the limbs which are the same as the slave. Thus He-ness is one, but the limbs are different, and every limb has one of the knowledges of taste which are specified from a single source, and differ according to the different limbs. It is like water which is but a single reality, yet differs in taste according to the different locations. The water of the Euphrates is sweet, and brackish water is salty, yet it is water in all its states and its reality does not change, even though the taste differs.

This wisdom is from the wisdom of the feet. It is the words of Allah, that whoever establishes His Books will eat "from beneath their feet" (5:66). The path which is the Straight Path is travelling on it, and walking and running on it. It is only by the feet. So this witnessing of the taking by the forelock by the hand of the One who is one the Straight Path only results in this special art from the knowledges of taste. "We will drive the evildoers" (19:86), (4) who are those who deserve the station to which they are sent, and destroy them by the west wind. (5) The wind takes them by the forelocks and carries them on, and it is the source of the passions which take them to Jahannam. It is the distance (6) which they imagined. When it carried

them to that abode, they reached the source of nearness, and so distance vanished. What is called Jahannam vanished in respect to them. They win the bliss of nearness in respect to merit since they were wrong-doers.

This pleasurable station of taste was not given to them as a favour. They received it by what they realities merited from the acts which they were doing. They were running with their actions on the Straight Path of the Lord because their forelocks were in the hand of the One who has this attribute. They did not walk by themselves, but by the principle of compulsion to reach the source of nearness. "We are nearer to him than you, but you cannot see." (56:85) Rather it is seen, and so the covering is stripped away, and "his sight is sharp." (7) What is specified as dead is from the dead, i.e. what distinguishes the happy from the wretched in usage. "We are nearer to him than his jugular vein." (50:16) What is specified as man is from man, so divine nearness is from distance as is not hidden in divine transmissions. There is no nearness nearer than that His He-ness be the source of the limbs of the slave and his faculties. The slave is not other than these limbs and faculties, so he is Allah witnessed in illusory creation. Creation is intelligible and Allah is felt and witnessed with the believers and the people of unveiling. Allah is intelligible with other classes, and creation is witnessed. So they are in the station of the salty, brackish water. The first group is the station of the sweet water which is pleasant to drink.

People are of two classes those who walk on the path recognising it and its end, for it is a straight path in respect to him; and those who walk on the path being ignorant of it and not knowing its end. It is the same path which the other class knows. The gnostic calls to Allah by inner sight, and the non-gnostic calls to Allah by limitation and ignorance. This is a special knowledge which comes from the lowest of the low (8) because the feet are the lower part of the person, and what is lower than them is none other than the path. Whoever recognises that Allah is the same as the Path, recognises the matter for what it is. Then Allah is travelling on it since there is no known except Him, and He is the source of the wayfarer and the traveller. There is no knower except Him. He is you, so know your reality and your Path (tariqa). The matter has been made clear to you on the tongue of the interpreter, (9) if you but understand. It is the true tongue, so the only one who will understand is the one whose understanding is Real.

Allah has many ascriptions and their existence varies. See how 'Ad, the people of Hud, said, "This is a storm cloud which will give us rain." (46:24) They thought good of Allah, and He is with the opinion of His slave. (10) Allah turned this word away from them. He informed them of what was more perfect and higher in nearness. When it rained upon them, that was the earth's portion and the seed was watered. He told them, "No, rather it is what you desired to hasten a wind containing painful punishment." He made the wind (rîh) an indication of what rest (râha) it contained for them. By this wind, He gladdens their spirits (arwah), delivering them from dark forms, difficult paths and black veils. There is punishment ('adhab) in this wind, i.e. a matter which they find sweet (ista'dhaba) when they taste it. It only pains them by the separation from familiar things. Thus punishment gives them good news. And the command is nearer to them than they imagine.

"Destroying everything at its Lord's command ! When morning came you could see nothing but their dwellings." (46:25) That is, their corpses, in which their true spirits lived, so the trueness of this special relation vanished from them; and a special life in their forms remains to them from Allah of which their skins, hands, and feet speak, (11) so does the punishment of the blows and thighs. (12) All that is related in a divine text.

Allah described himself by jealousy (ghayra). Out of jealousy He forbade actions unrestrained by limits (fawahish). The unrestrained act is only what is evident. As for the unrestrained which is hidden, it belongs to the one who manifests it. When He made the unrestrained haram, that it, forbade that the reality of what we mentioned be known, and that is the source of things, He hid it by other (ghayr). So other says: hearing is Zayd's hearing. The gnostic says that hearing is Allah. Thus nothing remains of the faculties and limbs. Therefore not everyone recognises Allah. People vie in excellence and ranks are differentiated, and the exceeding and exceeded are clear.

Know that Allah revealed to me and caused me to witness in a vision, which I received in Cordoba in 586, the sources of His Messengers and all His Prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. None of this group spoke to me except for Hud, peace be upon him. He told me why they were gathered together. I saw that he was a very large man of good appearance, subtle in reply, gnostic in matters of unveiling. My proof of his unveiling is His words, "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) What gift to creatures is greater than this? Then it is from the bestowal of favours on us by Allah that this speech reached us from Him in the Qur'an.

Then Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant us peace, completed its gathering for everyone by what he was told by Allah, for He is the source of "hearing, sight, the hand, the foot and tongue the source of the senses. The spiritual faculties are nearer than the senses. He is content with the defined and distant more than with the defined unknown which is nearer. Allah translated the speech of Hud to his people to inform us, and the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, translated the speech of Allah in turn to give us good news. Knowledge is perfected in the breasts of those who are given knowledge, "and none denies Our signs but the unbelievers," (29:47) for they cover up the signs when they recognise them through envy, meanness and injustice. We only see from Allah in respect of Himself disconnection (tanzih) or non-disconnection by definition in any ayat which He has sent down or in transmissions which have reached us from Him. Otherwise He has the Great Mist (al-'Ama') (13) which has no air above it and no air beneath it. Allah was in it before He created creation. Then He mentioned that He "established Himself firmly on the Throne." (57:4) This is also definition. Then He mentioned that "He descends to the nearest heaven." (14) This is also definition. Then He said that "He is in the heaven and in the earth," (15) and "He is with us wherever we are." (16) and He tells us that He is our source. We are limited, so He only describes Himself by limitation.

His statement, "There is nothing like Him," (42:11) is also limitation if we take the kaf ("like") as an appendage to other than the attribute. Whoever is distinct from the defined is defined by his phenomenal being which is not the source of what is defined. Freedom from limitation is limitation, and the absolute is limited by absoluteness for whoever has understanding. If we attach the kaf of ka-mithli (like) to the attribute, we define it. If we take "There is nothing like Him" as the negation of "like (mithl)", we realise the given and the sound transmissions that He is the source of things, and that things are defined. If their definitions differ, He is defined by the definition of everything with a definition. Nothing is defined unless it is a definition of Allah's. He moves in the designation of creatures and creation. Had the matter not been like that, existence would not have been valid, for He is the source of existence. He preserves everything by His Essence, and the preserving of something does not oppress Him. (17) His preserving of all things is His preserving of His form in that the thing is other than His form. Only this is valid. He is the witness in the

witness and the witnessed in the witnessed. (18) He is the spirit of the universe which is managed by Him, and it is the Macrocosmic or Great man (al-insan al-kabir).

He is all phenomenal being
and He is the One (al-Wahid)
who establishes my phenomenal being by His being,
For that reason, I said that He is nourished.
So my existence is His food, and we imitate Him in Him from Him,
if you look by the aspect of my taking refuge.

For his sorrow breathed, so the breath is related to the All-Merciful because He is Merciful by it. Divine ascriptions demand it from the bringing into existence of the form of the universe which we have said is what is manifest by Allah since He is the Manifest. It is His inward since He is the Hidden; and He is the First since He was when they were not. He is the Last since their source is in their manifestation. The Last is the source of the Manifest, and the Hidden is the source of the First. He has knowledge of all things since he knows Himself. When He brought forms into existence in the Breath, and the power of the ascriptions designated by the names appeared, the divine ascriptions then became valid for the universe. They depend on Allah. He said, "Today, I set down your ascriptions and raise up My ascriptions," i.e. I take from you your dependence on yourselves and return to you your dependence on Me. Where are those who are fearful of Allah? (19) they those who take Allah as a safeguard. Allah is their manifest part, i.e. the source of their manifest forms. They are the greatest of people, the most pure and the strongest among all. The one who has taqwa is the one who makes himself a safeguard for Allah by His form since the He-ness of Allah is the faculties of the slave. The one called the slave makes a safeguard for the One called Allah based on witnessing, so that the knower is distinct from the one who does not know. "Say: 'Are they the same those who know and those who do not know?' It is only people of intelligence who pay heed," (39:9) and they see into the core of the thing (20) which is sought from that thing. The negligent one does not precede the diligent, and similarly the hireling does not resemble the slave, Since Allah is a safeguard for the slave by one aspect, the slave is a safeguard for Allah by another aspect. Say what you like about phenomenal being. If you like, say that it is creation. If you like, say that is the Real. If you like, say that it is both the Real and creation. If you like, say that it is not Real from every point of view and not creation from every point of view. If you wish, say it is bewilderment in that. The goals are made clear by your specification of ranks. If it had not been for definition, the Messengers would not have reported the changing of the Real in forms, nor would they have described Him by the dropping of forms from Himself.

The eye only looks to Him,
and authority only rests with Him.

We are His, and by Him, in His hand, in every state, so we are with Him. For that reason, He is denied and recognised, disconnected and described. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by His eye is a gnostic. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by his own eye is not a gnostic. The one who does not see Allah from Him nor in Him, and waits to see Him by his own eye is veiled and ignorant.

On the whole, each person must have some doctrine of his Lord by which he refers to Him and in which he seeks Him. So when Allah manifests Himself to him in it, he knows Him and goes near Him. If He manifests Himself to him in other than it, he denies Him and takes

refuge from Him and has bad adab in that matter while claiming he shows adab with Him. (21) He only believes in a divinity according to the [subjective] form he gives that in himself. The divinity of creeds is based on subjective positing. People only see themselves and what they formulate in themselves.

Look at the ranks of people in knowledge of Allah. That is the source of their ranks in vision on the Day of Rising; and I have taught you the necessary cause of it. Take care lest you be limited by a particular creed and deny what is other than it, so that a great blessing may pass you by. Indeed, knowledge of what the matter is based on may pass you by.

Make yourself a vessel for all the forms of belief. Surely Allah is vaster and greater than being contained by one creed rather than another. So Allah says, "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." (2:115) He did not mention one "where" less than another. He said there is the face of Allah. The face of the thing is its reality. By this He spoke to the hearts of the gnostics, that they might not occupy themselves with non-essentials in this life through seeking the like of this. The slave does not know in which breath he will be taken. He may be taken at the time of his negligence, and then he will not be equal to the one taken in a state of presence.

Then the slave who is perfect knows that this is linked to exterior form and to the state limited by turning the prayer toward the Masjid al-Haram. He believes that Allah is in his qibla when he prays. Those are some of the ranks of Allah from "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." The direction of the Masjid al-Haram is one of them. In it is the face of Allah, but do not say "He is here", rather stop with what you perceive and cling to adab in turning towards the Masjid al-Haram, and cling to adab in the non-encompassment of the face in this particular whereness. Rather whereness is part of the sum of directions to which one turns. So Allah makes it clear to you that He is in the "where-ness" of every direction.

There are only creeds, so all directions are correct. Every correct thing has a reward. Every rewarded thing is happy. Every happy one is approved. If he is wretched at one time in the Next Abode, the people of preservation experience illness and pain in this life in spite of our knowledge that they are happy and the people of Allah. Among the slaves of Allah are those who are overtaken by these pains in the other life in an abode called Jahannam. Even so, none of the people of knowledge to whom the matter is unveiled for what it is declares that they do not possess a bliss particular to them in this abode. As for the loss of pain, they denied it, and so it was lifted from them. Their bliss is their rest from feeling that pain, or else bliss is particular and extra as is the bliss of the people of the Garden in the Garden. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 10:

1. ref. Qur'an 7:156, "My mercy extends to all things."
2. ref. Qur'an 1:7.
3. Hadith qudsi.
4. "We will drive the evildoers to Jahannam."
5. The worst of winds which does not fertilise trees or raise clouds. It is said that it was a west wind which destroyed 'Ad. It blows in the hot season and is very thirsty.
6. Jahannam comes from a root which means "deep", as in a deep well.
7. See Qur'an 50:22.
8. Ref. Qur'an 95:5, "We reduced him to the lowest of the low."

9. The Messenger of Allah in the hadith, "...I am his hearing, his sight, etc."
10. Hadith qudsi, "I am according to My slave's opinion of Me..."
11. Ref. Qur'an 41:21, "...that your hearing, eyes, and skin should not testify against you."
12. In the grave according to hadith.
13. "He was in the Great Mist with air neither above nor below it. "Hadith in Ibn Majah, Ibn Hanbal and at-Tirmidhi.
14. Hadith qudsi from Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim: "Our Lord who is blessed and exalted descends every night to the lowest heavens when two-thirds of the night has passed and says, 'Who supplicates to me so that I may answer him?"
15. Qur'an 6:3, "He is Allah in the heavens and the earth."
16. cf. Qur'an 57:4.
17. Qur'an: 2:255.
18. cf. Qur'an 85:3.
19. i.e. have taqwa.
20. Lubb means both the core of a thing and or understanding.
21. Hadith in Muslim (Belief, 302) about the Day of Rising.

11: The Seal of the Wisdom of Revelation (Futuh) (1) in the Word of Salih

Among the signs are the signs of the mounts. (2)
That is due to the difference in destinations.
Among those with mounts are those
who make their mounts stand by the command of Allah,
and among them are those who cross
the deserts with their mounts.
As for those who stand,
they are the people of the source, (3)
and those who cross the deserts are the aliens.
Each of these has the revelation (futuh) of the Unseen worlds
brought to him from Allah on every side.

Know, may Allah grant you success, that the business (of bringing into existence) is based on uniqueness (fardiyya), and uniqueness has triplicity which is from three and upwards. Three is the first singular. The universe exists from this Divine Presence. Allah, may He be exalted!, says, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, 'Be' and it is." (16:40) This is an essence which has volition and speech. (4) Had it not been for this essence and its volition, which is connecting attention to something particular in order to bring anything into being (and when He turns to that thing, He says, "Be"), that thing would not have been. Then tripartite uniqueness also appeared in that thing, and it is by this uniqueness in respect to the thing that it is valid that it take and that it be described by existence. Its triplicity is its thingness, its hearing, and obeying the command of the One who gives it form by bringing it into existence. It accepted three by the threeness of its fixed essence when it was in the state of its non-existence in counterbalance to the essence of the One who brought it into existence. Its hearing is in counterbalance to the volition of the One who brought it into existence. Its agreeing to comply with the command to take form is in counterbalance to His word "'Be!' and it is." Taking form is thus related to the thing. If it not had the capacity to take form from within itself when this is said, it would not have been. Allah only brought the thing into existence after it was not in the command of taking form, by the thing itself.

Allah confirmed that taking-form (takwin) belongs to the thing itself, not to Allah; and that that which belongs to Allah is His command. Similarly, He told us about Himself when He said, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, "Be!" and it is." He ascribed taking-form to the thing itself from the command of Allah. Allah speaks the truth, so this is understood in the command itself. Someone who is feared and not disobeyed commands His slave: "Stand!" and the slave stands in obedience to his master's command. When this slave stands, the master only has the command to the slave to stand. Standing is the slave's action, not the master's action.

Thus taking-form is based on triplicity, i.e. from three, on both sides the side of Allah and the side of creation. That applies to bringing meanings into existence by proofs. The proof must be compounded of three in a special structure and special condition. There must be a result from it. The result is that the thinker constructs his proof from two propositions. Each one proposition contains two singulars, and so it four. One of the four is repeated in the two propositions in order to link one to the other as is marriage. It is three and no more because of one is repeated in both of them. That is how it is the goal exists. Then this compound occurs

in a special aspect which is that the two propositions are connected to each other by the repetition of that one singular, by which triplicity, and the special condition that the principle be more general by cause or equal to it, is valid. Then the principle is true. If it is not like that, then it will give a result which is not true. This existent thing in the universe is like the ascription of actions to the slave, removed from their ascription to Allah, or the ascribing of taking form, the object of our discussion, to Allah absolutely. But Allah only ascribed it to the thing which was told, "Be!" A representation of that is if we wish to prove that the universe exists from a cause, (5) we say that every thing which is in-time has a cause. (6) Thus we have the in-time and the cause. Then in the other proposition we say that the universe is in time. The "in-time" is repeated in the two propositions. The third singular is "the universe". From this it follows that the universe has a cause and the conclusion appears in what was mentioned in the first proposition - that is the cause.

The special aspect is the repetition of the "in-time", and the special condition is the generality of the cause ('illa) because the cause is what effects the existence of the in-time. The principle is general in the in-timeness of the universe in relation to Allah.

We therefore make the judgement that every being which is "in-time" has a cause, i.e. in the greater proposition, unless that cause is equal to the principle or the principle is more general than the cause. So the universe would thus fall under the principle of the cause [in both cases]. The result is true.

The principle of triplicity also appears in bringing meanings into existence, which makes use of proofs. The root of phenomenal being is triplicity. For this reason, the wisdom of Salih, peace be upon him, is what Allah manifested in the delay of three days when He promised to punish the people of Salih, and the promise was kept. The truth was the result, and it was the Cry by which Allah destroyed them, and "morning found them lying flattened in their homes." (11:67) On the first of the three days, the faces of the people became yellow, and on the second day red, and on the third day black. When the three days had passed, their predisposition was proved and corruption appeared in them. That manifestation was called "destruction".

The yellowing of the faces of the wretched is in counterbalance to the shining of the faces of the happy in the words of Allah, "Some faces on that day will be radiant (musfira)" (80:38) which comes from sufur, when the dawn becomes white. This is a manifestation as the yellowing of the faces on the first day was the manifestation of the sign of the wretchedness of Salih's people. Then came the counterbalance offered to His word about the happy, "laughing".(80:39) Laughter is one of the causes which produces redness in the face. Among the happy, it is the cheeks which are red.

Then He made the complexion of the wretched turn black as a counterbalance to His word, "joyous (mustabshira)". (7) That is the effect that joy has on their skins as black effected the skins of the wretched. For this reason, He spoke of the two groups with good news (bushra). He spoke a word to them which affected their skin (bashara) which turned a colour by which skin had not been described before this event. Allah said in regarding the happy, "Their Lord gives them the good news of His mercy and good pleasure," (9:21) and He said about the wretched, "Give them the news of a painful punishment." (9:34) There was an effect on the skin of each group because of the effect of the discourse on them. It only appeared in them outwardly by virtue of the understanding which was fixed inside them. So it is them who have that effect on themselves just as taking form only comes from them. "Allah's is the

conclusive argument." (6:149) Whoever understands this wisdom and confirms it in himself and witnesses it, gives his self rest from connection to other. He knows that good and evil only come from him. By good, I mean what agrees with his goal and suits his nature and temperament. By evil, I mean what does not agree with his goal or suit his nature and temperament. The one who possesses this witnessing makes out excuses for all existent beings, even if they do not make excuses. He knows that all he has for himself is from himself, as we mentioned at the beginning, since knowledge follows the known. When something which does not agree with his goal comes to him, he tells himself , "Clench your fists and puff out your cheeks!" "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 11:

1. Opening. Salih has this in view of the fact that the mountain split open to reveal the she-camel, he opened belief to those who believed in him. The camel is a mount.
2. Mounts which are miracles proving the truthfulness of the Prophets - like the Buraq of Muhammad and the she-camel of Salih.
3. Eyewitnessing.
4. i.e. a triplicity: Essence, volition, and speech (qawl).
5. Here he uses sabab, something by which something is brought about, rather than 'illa, which is something which alters or effects something, as in cause and effect. 'Illa is the reason behind judicial reasoning.
6. First proposition.
7. Comes from a root meaning skin (bashara), the root of bashshara, to give good news, is to announce something which produces a change in the complexion.

12: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Heart in the Word of Shu'ayb (Jethro)

Know that the heart of the gnostic of Allah is from the mercy of Allah, and it is vaster than mercy. The heart encompasses Allah, but His Mercy does not encompass Him. (1) This is the language of the general public from the door of indication (ishara). Allah is merciful (rahim) and is not the one to whom mercy is shown (marhum). Mercy has no power over Him. As for the indication from the tongue of the elite, Allah describes Himself by the breath which is from breathing. The Divine Names are the same as the Named, and the breath is none other than Him. They require what they give the breath of realities, so the realities which the Names demand are not other than the universe. Thus divinity (ulûhîya) demands the object of worship (ma'luh) and sovereignty (rubûbiya) demands the object of lordship (marbub). (2) They have no source except by the universe in existence and determination (taqdir). Allah, in respect to His essence, is independent of the universe, but sovereignty does not possess this principle. The matter remains between what the sovereignty demands and what the essence deserves of independence from the universe. Sovereignty is based on reality and the description is only the same as this essence.

Then the matter changes according to the relationships. It is reported that Allah only describes Himself with compassion for His slaves. The first of what was breathed from sovereignty by Himself is related to the Merciful by His bringing into being the universe, which sovereignty demands by its reality and all the Divine Names. By this aspect it is confirmed that "His mercy encompasses everything." (3) It encompasses Allah. It is wider than the heart or equal to it in capacity.

Know that Allah, as it is confirmed in sound tradition, changes in the forms of the tajalli. When the heart contains Allah, it does not contain other-than-Him of creatures along with Him. It is as if He filled it, and the meaning of this is, that when it looks to Allah in His tajalli to it, it is not possible to look at another with Him.

The heart of the gnostic in respect to vastness is as Abu Yazid al-Bistami said, "If the Throne and what surrounds it a million times over were in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he still would not feel it." Al-Junayd said about this meaning, "If the in-time were compared to the out-of-time, not a trace of it would remain." The heart encompasses the out-of-time, so how can it sense the in-time as existent? If Allah varies His tajalli in forms, then by necessity, the heart is expanded and contracted according to the form in which the divine tajalli occurs. There is nothing left in the heart apart from the form in which the tajalli occurs. So in relation to the seal, the heart of the gnostic or the Perfect Man, is at the stage of the place that is the face of the seal. It does not exceed it, rather it is its size and shape in respect to roundness. The face is round, square, hexagonal, octagonal, etc. in form. If the face is square, hexagonal, octagonal or whatever form, its place in relation to the seal is like it and it is not like other than it.

This is the opposite of what one group alluded to, saying that Allah gives a tajalli according to the predisposition of the slave. This is not how it is. The slave is manifest to Allah according to the form in which Allah gives him a tajalli of Himself.

The exact clarification of this question is that Allah has two tajalli: an unseen tajalli and a visible tajalli. From the unseen tajalli He accords the predisposition on which the heart is

based, and it is the tajalli of the Essence of which the Unseen is the reality. It is the He-ness which merits it by His word from Himself: "He". His He-ness is always He. If this predisposition comes to the heart, then the visible tajalli is manifested to it in the Visible world, so the heart sees it. He is manifest by the form of whatever tajalli he has, as we mentioned. Allah gives it the predisposition by His word, "He gave everything its creation, then guided it." (20:50) Then He lifted the veil between Him and His slave, so He sees Him in the form of his belief in Allah. Allah, who is in the belief, is He whose form the heart contains. He is the One who gives it a tajalli, and so it knows Him. The eye only sees by belief, not hidden in the varieties of belief.

Whoever limits Allah, denies Allah in other than what he limits Allah to, and confirms Allah in what he limits Him by, when Allah gives him a tajalli. Whoever frees Allah from limitation does not deny Allah, and so confirms Allah in every form in which Him changes. He is given from himself according to the form in which the tajalli infinitely occurs. The forms of the tajalli are without end. Similarly knowledge of Allah has no limit in the gnostic who understands the forms. Rather, he is a gnostic at every moment, seeking increase of knowledge by "Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge!" (4)

The business is endless from both sides. This is as if you said: Allah and creation. If you looked at His words, "I am his foot by which he runs, and his hand with which he strikes and his tongue by which he speaks," and so on of the faculties whose location are the limbs which are not separate, then you said that the matter is all Allah or the matter is all creation. It is creation by one ascription and it is Allah by another ascription, yet the source is one. The source of the form is what gives the tajalli of the source of the form which did not exist before the tajalli. It is the one giving the tajalli and the one receiving it. See how wondrous is the command of Allah in respect to His He-ness and in respect to His relationship to the universe in the realities of His most Beautiful Names!

Who is He and what is He and what is His source?

He is He!

Whoever is of His commonality is of His elite,
and whoever is of His elite is of His commonality.

There is no source except source,
so the light of His source is His darkness.

Whoever is ignorant of this
experiences grief in himself

And none recognises what we have said
except for the slave who has aspiration (himma).

He said, "There is a reminder in that for anyone who has a heart," (50:37) because the heart (qalb) is transformed (taqallaba) in the various forms and attributes. He did not say, "to him who has an intellect" because the intellect limits. (5) It confines the matter to a single description, but reality refuses to be contained. It is also a reminder for those who have intellect, and they are those who have creeds by which some deny others, and some curse others, and they do not have helpers. (6) The god of the one with a creed does not have jurisdiction over the god of someone with another creed. The one who has a creed defends it; he defends the matter which he believes of his god, and supports it. He does not support that which is not in his creed. For this reason, he has no effect on the creeds of his dissenters, and similarly his dissenters have no help from the god who is in his creed; so they have no

helpers. Allah excluded help from the divinity of creed based on the isolation of one creed to the exclusion of others. The helped is gathered and the helper is gathered.

For the gnostic, Allah is the Recognised Who is not denied. The people of recognition in this world are the people of recognition in the Next World. This is why Allah said, "anyone who has a heart (qalb)" (50:37) since he knows the transformation (taqlib) of Allah in forms by the transformation in shape. He recognises himself from himself. His self is not other than the He-ness of Allah. There is nothing in phenomenal being from what is, or what will be, which is other than the He-ness of Allah. Rather, He is the source of He-ness. So He is the gnostic and the knower and the acknowledger in this form. He is the one who is neither gnostic nor knower. He is also the one who denies Him in the other form. This is the portion of the one who knows Allah from the tajalli and the witnessing in the source of gatheredness (jam'). It is His word, "anyone who has a heart" which transforms the shapes by His transforming.

As for the people of belief (iman), they are the ones who imitate those who imitated the Prophets and Messengers in what they transmitted from Allah. They are not those who imitate the people of concepts and those who interpret the transmissions received by basing them on their logical proofs. These are the ones who imitate the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace. They are the ones who are meant by His words, "or listens well" (50:37) to what divine transmissions relate of the sunna of the Prophets. He means this is the one who "will listen well, having seen the evidence" (50:37) with awareness of the presence of the imagination and its use.

That is what the Prophet said about ihsan, "Worship Allah as if you saw Him," (7 and "Allah is in the qibla of the one who prays." (8) For that reason, he is a witness. Anyone who imitates the people of logical speculation and is limited by them is not the one who will listen well. The one who will listen well must witness what we have mentioned. When he does not witness what we have mentioned, he is not the one meant by this ayat. These are those of whom Allah has said, "When those who were followed disown those who followed them." (2:166) The Messengers do not disown their followers who follow them.

Realise, my friend, what I have mentioned to you in this wisdom of the heart. As for its specification with Shu'ayb, there is some branching off (tash'ib). Its branches are not numbered because every creed has a branch, and so they are all branches or creeds. If the covering is removed, it is removed for everyone in accordance with his creed. The covering might be removed in a manner contrary to his creed in principle. It is His words, "What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with." (39:47) Most of them in principle are like the Mu'tazilites, believing that Allah will execute the threat on the rebel should he die without repentance. If he dies and is given mercy from Allah, then concern preceded it, for He did not punish him. Thus he found Allah Ever-Forgiving, All-Merciful, and there appeared to him from Allah something he did not reckoned with.

As for He-ness (huwiya), some people are firm in their belief that Allah is such-and-such. When the covering is removed, they see the form of their belief, and it is true. They believe in it. Then the knot is unravelled and the creed vanishes and becomes knowledge through contemplation (mushahada). After vision is sharpened, weak vision does not return. It appeared to some people by the variety of the tajalli in forms through vision, since the tajalli is not repeated. He verifies it in he-ness; and there appeared to them from Allah in Allah's He-ness what they never reckoned with before the covering was removed. (9)

We mentioned the form of the ascent in divine recognitions after death in our Book of the Tajalliyat, in which we mentioned what we gathered from the group regarding unveiling, and the benefits we derived from them in the question that they did not know about. One of the most wondrous of matters is that man is always in ascent, but is not aware of that due to the fineness of the veil and its delicateness. It is like His words, "They were only given a simulation of it." (2:25)

He, the One, is not the same as the Last. Therefore the two semblances with the gnostic are similar dissimilars. The one possessed of realisation sees multiplicity in One, as he knows what the Divine Names indicate. Although their realities differ and are numerous, it is yet One Source. It is an intelligible multiplicity in the source of One. In the tajalli, it is multiplicity witnessed in the one source even as it matter which you obtain in the definition of each form. It and the multiplicity of forms and their variety derive, in fact, from one substance (jawhar). It is its own matter (hayula). Whoever recognises himself with this recognition recognises his Lord. Allah is in His creation due to His form, rather He is the source of its he-ness and its reality.

For this reason, the only ones among the 'ulama' who tumble on the recognition of the self (nafs) and its reality are the divinely inspired messengers and the great among the Sufis. As for the philosophers and masters of thought among the ancients and the mutakallimun in their discourse on the self and its whatness, none of them stumbled on its reality, and logical speculation can never provide it. (10) He who seeks knowledge of it by means of logical speculation, swells himself up and boasts without vigour or substance. "They are those whose efforts in the life of this world are misguided while they suppose that they are doing good." (18:104) He who seeks the matter by other than its path will not achieve its realization.

How excellent is what Allah said about the universe - He changes it with the breaths into a new creation in one source. He said in respect to some, rather to most of the world, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) This means that they do not know the renewal of the command in breaths. However, the Ash'arites stumbled on it in some existent things, and these are non-essentials (a'râd). The Hisbaniya (11) stumbled on it regarding the entire universe. The logical philosophers consider them ignorant of it. However, the two groups erred. As for the error of the Hisbaniya, in spite of what they said regarding change in the entire universe, they did not stumble on the oneness of the source of the intelligible substance (jawhar) which underlies the form. The universe only exists by the oneness, as the oneness is only intelligible by the universe. If they had said that, they would have obtained the degree of realisation in the matter.

As for the Ash'arites, they do not know that the entire universe consists of a collection of non-essentials (a'râd). It changes in every moment since accidents do not last for two moments. That appears in their definition of things. So when they defined the thing, its phenomenal being is clear in the definition of non-essential matters. These non-essentials mentioned in its definition are actually the source of this independent substance and its reality. Inasmuch as it is a non-essential, it is not independent, but by the sum of what is not independent, comes what is independent. It is like occupation of space in the definition of the independent essential substance, and its acceptance is non-essential in its essential definition. There is no doubt that that the containing-of-form is an accident since it is only in the container, and that is not independent it is in the essential nature of the substance. Occupation of space is a non-essential, and it only occurs in the thing occupying space, and so it is not independent. Occupation of space and containing-of-form are not based on the source of the

defined substance by an extra matter, since essential

definitions are the source of the defined and its he-ness.

That which does not last two moments becomes that which lasted two moments or indeed several moments! What was not independent became independent in their view! They do not understand the basis of this, and these people "are dubious about the new creation."

As for the people of unveiling, they see Allah in a tajalli of Himself in every breath, and there is no repetition of the tajalli. They also see by witnessing that every tajalli grants a new creation and takes away a creation. Thus its departure is annihilation in the presence of the tajalli, and it is going-on by what the other tajalli grants. So understand!

Notes to Chapter 12:

1. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My earth nor My heaven contain Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."
2. lit. "god-ed" and "Lord-ed".
3. cf. Qur'an 7:156.
4. Ref Qur'an 20:114: "Say, 'My Lord, increase me in knowledge!'"
5. The root meaning from which intellect ('aql) comes means to hobble a camel.
6. ref to Qur'an 29:25, "You have adopted idols apart from Allah as tokens of mutual affection in this world. But then on the Day of Rising you will reject one other and curse one another. The Fire will be your shelter. You will have no helpers."
7. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari.
8. Hadith in al-Bukhari.
9. Ref. Qur'an 39:47, "If those who did wrong were to possess all that If those who did wrong owned everything on earth, and the same again with it, they would offer it as a ransom to save themselves from the evil of the punishment on the Day of Rising. What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with. them from Allah that they never reckoned with."
10. Being veiled by limitation.
11. The Hisbaniya were sophists, a group known in the history of philosophy for doubts, scepticism and sophism who held that the universe changes at every moment since there is no objective Reality. All is subjective.

13: The Seal of the Wisdom of Power (Malk) in the Word of Lut (Lot)

Malk is power and force, and the strong man with power says, "I have power over the kneading, since I am forceful in kneading it." When the poet, Qays ibn al-Hatim, described his attack with a spear in verse, he said:

I have power over it
and so I made its rupture wide,
and you see standing under it what was behind it.

That is to say that he used enough force in the thrust. It was what Allah said regarding Lut, peace be upon him, "If only I had the power to combat you, or could take refuge in some powerful support!" (11:80) The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Allah showed mercy to my brother Lut, and he took refuge in a powerful support." So the Prophet said that Lut was with Allah who is strong. It was Allah whom Lut, peace be upon him, meant by the strong pillar, and resistance when he said, "If only I had the power". Here it is aspiration (himma) in relation to man in particular.

The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "From that time, the time in which Lut, peace be upon him, said, 'or could take refuge in some powerful support,' after that, Prophets have only been sent with some power from their people." His tribe protected him as Abu Talib protected the Messenger of Allah. His words, "If only I had the power to combat you" is because he heard Allah say, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning," (30:54) by origin, "and then after weakness, gave you strength." Strength is by appointing, and it is non-essential strength. "Then after strength ordained weakness and grey hair." Appointing is connected to grey hair. As for weakness, it returns to the basis of its creation as He said, "He created you from a weak beginning." Allah returns him to that from which He created him, as He says, "then some of you revert to the lowest form of life that, so after having knowledge, they may know nothing at all." (16:70) Allah mentions that he returns to the first weakness. The old man is judged to be as weak as the child is. A Prophet is only sent after he has reached the age of forty. It is the time which is the beginning of decrease and weakness. For this reason, Lut said, "If only I had the power to combat you," although that demands effective aspiration (himma). If you were to ask: "What prevents him from using effective aspiration while it is present in the wayfarers (sâlikûn) among the followers when the Messengers are more entitled to that?" you spoke the truth. However, you lack another knowledge, which is that gnosis does not leave the aspiration freedom of action. Whenever gnosis is great, then its freedom of action with the aspiration is weak. That has two reasons one is his realisation of the station of slavery and his regarding the root of his natural creation; (1) and the other reason is the oneness of the actor and the acted upon. The aspiration of a Messenger does not appear, since the latter aspect prevents it.

In this witnessing, he sees that his opponent does not turn from the reality on which he is based in the state of his source-form and the state of his non-existence. He only appears in existence through what he had in the state of non-existence by his source-form. He does not overstep his reality nor does he abandon his path. That is called dissent; yet it is a non-essential matter manifested by the veil which is over the eyes of the people, as Allah says, "but most people do not know." They know what is manifest and outward of the life of this world, but they are ignorant of the Next life. It is the other way round, so it is from their

words, "our hearts are veiled," (2) that is, in coverings. It is a covering which veils them from perceiving the matter for what it is. This and its like prevent the gnostic from acting freely in the world.

Shaykh Abu 'Abdullah ibn al-Qa'id said to Shaykh Abu's-Su'ud ibn ash-Shibli, "Why do you not act freely?" Abu's-Su'ud replied, "I have left Allah to act for me as He wishes." He meant the command of Allah, "so take Him as your Guardian." (73:9) The Guardian is the one with freedom of action, especially as He heard Allah saying, "Give of that to which He has made you successors (khalifs)." (57:7) Abu's-Su'ud knew, and the gnostics know that the command which he has is not his, and he is only a successor to it. Allah told him, "this command is the deen to which I have you successors and over which I have given you power, so take Me for a guardian in it," Abu's-Su'ud obeyed the command of Allah and took Him for a Guardian.

How can there remain any aspiration for the one who witnesses the like of this command? Aspiration (himmah) only acts by the property of concentration that which its possessor does not have, and acts on other than his concentration. This gnosis separates him from that property of concentration. The complete gnosis manifests gnosis at the end of incapacity and weakness. One of the Abdal (3) said to Shaykh 'Abdu'r-Razzaq, (4) "After you greet Shaykh Abu Madyan, (5) tell him, 'O Abu Madyan! Why is nothing difficult for us, yet things are difficult for you, and we long for your station and you do not long for ours?'" Similarly, although Abu Madyan had that station as well as the other, we are more complete than him in the station of weakness and incapacity. His badl said this to him; he did not say it.

The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said that this station is from the command of Allah to him: "I do not know what He will do to me or you. I only follow what is revealed to me." The Messenger acts according to what is revealed to him. He does not have anything else. If He reveals to him that he should act by ordinance, he acts. If he is prevented from acting, he does not act. The best part of choice is to abandon freedom of action unless the person is deficient in gnosis.

Abu's-Su'ud ash-Shibli said to his believing companions, "Allah gave us freedom of action fifteen years ago, and we abandoned it through politeness." This is the language of conceit. As for us, we did not abandon it through politeness, for abandoning would imply preference. Rather, we abandoned it by the perfection of gnosis. Gnosis does not oblige it on the strength of choice. When the gnostic acts by aspiration in the world, it is from divine command and compulsion, not by choice.

There is no doubt that the station of the Messenger demands freedom of action for the acceptance of the Message which he brings. Allah informs him of what will be accepted in his community and among his people in order to manifest the deen of Allah. The wali is not like that. Nevertheless, the Messenger does not seek Him in the manifest, because the Messenger has compassion for his people. He does not want them to exceed by having the proof appear against them because that would entail their destruction. He spares them.

The Messenger also knew that when something inimitable (6) is manifested to the community, some of them believe in it, and some recognise it but deny it out of injustice, arrogance or envy. Some of them attribute it to magic and deception. The Messenger sees that, and he also sees that no one will believe unless Allah illuminates his heart by the light of belief. When the person does not look by that light called belief, the inimitable miracle has no benefit for him. Their aspiration does not seek inimitable matters, since the effect is not

uniform among those who see it, nor is it in their hearts as He said in respect to the most perfect of Messengers and the most knowing of creation and the most truthful in state, "You cannot guide those you would like to but Allah guides those He wills." (28:56)

If aspiration did have an effect, no one would be more perfect than the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, nor have a higher nor stronger aspiration than him, yet even so his aspiration did not bring about Abu Talib, his uncle, becoming Muslim, and it was to the Prophet that the ayat which we mentioned was revealed. Similarly, Allah said of the Messenger, "It is only his to deliver the message." (7) And He said, "You are not responsible for their guidance, but Allah guides whoever He wills," (2:272) and He added in Surat al-Qasas, "He has best knowledge of the guided," (28:56) those to whom knowledge of their guidance was given in the state of their non-existence in their source-forms. It is established that knowledge follows the known. Whoever is a believer in his source-form and in the state of his non-existence, appears in that form in the state of his existence. Allah knew that of him, so that is what he is like. For that reason, Allah said, "He has best knowledge of the guided."

When Allah said the like of that, He also said, "My Word, once given, is not subject to change," (50:29) because My Word is based on My knowledge of My creation. "and I do not wrong My slaves," that is, I do not decree that disbelief (kufr) on them which makes them wretched and then I demand of them what is not in their capacity to do. Rather, We only deal with them according to what We gave them knowledge of, and We only gave them knowledge of what they gave Us from themselves by that on which they are based. So if they do wrong, they are the ones who are unjust. For this reason, He said, "but they wronged themselves. Allah did not wronged them." (8) Finally, We only said to them what Our essence accorded that We say to them. Our Essence is known to Us by what it is based on; so, if We say this, and do not say that, then We only spoke by what We knew to say. We spoke the word from Us, and obedience or lack of obedience is up to those who hear.

So all is from Us and from them, (9)
and acceptance is from Us and from them.
If they are not from Us,
We, without a doubt, are from them.

So,. my friend, realise this wisdom of power in the word of Lut. It is a gate which belongs to gnosis. The secret (10) has been made clear for you, and the command is clear. It is included in the even which is called the odd.

Notes to Chapter 13:

1. Which is weakness, and the slave obeying the command of the Master, as in Qur'an 30:54, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning."
2. Two places: 2:88; 4:155.
3. Abdal, plural of badl, a substitute. Shaykh al-Akbar says, "They are seven. Whoever travels from one place and leaves his body in its form so that no one recognises that he has gone, that one is only a badl. He is modelled on the heart of Ibrahim, peace be upon him."
4. A jurist and one of Abu Madyan's disciples.
5. Abu Madyan: Shu'ayb ibn al-Husayn al-Andalusi, great Maghribi Sufi, born ca. 520/1126 near Seville and died near Tlemcen in 594/1197.
6. Mu'jiza, a miracle performed by a Prophet to prove his truthfulness and which others are

unable to do.

7. Ref. Qur'an 5:99 and several other places.

8. 2:57, 9:70, etc. in many places in the Qur'an.

9. The apparent sources. The Word is from him and obedience from them.

10. The secret of the Decree.

14: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Decree (Qadar) in the Word of 'Uzayr (Ezra)

Know that fate (qada') is the judgement of Allah on things, and Allah's judgement on things is according to His knowledge in them and of them. The knowledge of Allah in things is based on that which known things accord Him of what they are in themselves. The decree (qadar) is the timing of how things are in their source without increase. (1) Fate is only decreed for things by themselves. This is the source of the secret of the Decree for the one who has a heart or gives ear. He is a witness "Allah's is the conclusive argument." (6:149)

Properly speaking, the judge (hâkim) studies the source of the question which he judges according to what its essence demands. The one sentenced to what is due him is, in fact, a judge over the judge when he sentences him to that. Every "judge" is sentenced to what he sentences, and in it he is the judge, whoever he is. Grasp this question! The decree is only unknown by the force of its appearance. It is not recognised, so there is much seeking and earnest request in it.

Know that the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, inasmuch as they are Messengers not inasmuch as they are awliya' and gnostics are in ranks according to that on which their communities are based. They only have the knowledge with which they were sent, according to what the community of that Messenger needs, no more and no less. Communities differ, some have more need than others, so Messengers differ in the knowledge of the message just as their communities differ. It is what Allah said: "Those Messengers: We favoured some of them over others." (2:253)

In the same way, they also differ in what springs from their essences, peace be upon them, in the varieties of knowledges and judgements they have according to their predispositions. This is what Allah said: "We have preferred some of the Prophets over others." (17:55) And Allah said in respect of creation, "Allah has favoured some of you over others in provision." (16:71) Provision from Allah can be spiritual like knowledges and sensory like food. Allah "only sent it down in a known measure." (15:21) It is the due which creation seeks. Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) He sends down according to what He wills. (2) He only wills what He knows, and so He commands it. What He knows is as we have stated. It is only by what the known accords.

Timing basically belongs to the known. Fate, knowledge, will and volition follow the Decree. So Allah only gives the understanding of the secret of the decree in respect to knowledges to the one who has been given complete gnosis. Knowledge gives complete rest to the knower, and it gives painful punishment to the knower as well. It gives two opposites. By knowledge, Allah describes Himself with both wrath and pleasure, and by knowledge the Divine Names are opposite one another. A reality (3) governs the absolute existent and the limited existent. It is not possible that there be something more complete than it or stronger or greater than it, because of the universality of its jurisdiction, both limited and unlimited.

The Prophets, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, only take their own knowledges from a particular divine revelation. Their hearts are free of logical speculation because they know the limitations of the intellect in respect to its cognitive perception. The intellect is unable to perceive matters for what they really are. Simple communication is also unable to perceive that which is only accorded by taste (dhawq). Perfect knowledge remains only in the

divine tajalli and in what Allah removes of veils from the springs of the inner sight and the eyes. They perceive matters - their non-time and in-time, their non-existence and existence, their impossibility, necessity and possibility - for what they truly are in their realities and sources.

Since the request of 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, occurred on the elite path, censure fell on him as is related in tradition. (4) Had he sought the unveiling which we mentioned, perhaps censure in that would not have fallen on him. The proof of the simplicity of his heart is in his statement, "How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?" (2:259) His form, peace be upon him, is in this statement of his, as the form of Ibrahim is in His words, "Show me how You bring the dead to life." (2:260) That necessitates the response by the action which Allah manifested when He said, "Allah caused him to die a hundred years, then He brought him back to life," and He said, "Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh." So he saw how bodies grow with the witnessing of realisation. He showed him how it was. He asked about the decree which is only perceived by unveiling to things in the state of their permanence in their non-existence. That was not granted. That is one of the properties of divine cognisance, so it is impossible that any except Allah know it. They are the keys of the First (5) the keys of the unseen which only He knows. Allah informs only those slaves whom He wills on such matters.

Know that they are only called keys in the state of opening. (6) The state of opening is the state of connecting taking-form to things, or rather the state of connecting the decree to the decreed. None has any taste in that except Allah. Neither tajalli nor unveiling occur in it since only Allah has power and action in view of the fact that He has absolute existence which is unlimited.

When we saw that Allah censured 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, when he asked about the Decree, we knew that 'Uzayr was seeking this cognisance. Thus he was seeking to possess the power (qudra) which is connected to the decreed (maqdur). That is only claimed by the One Who has absolute existence. Thus he sought the impossible. How-things-are is only perceived by taste.

As for what we relate of what Allah revealed to him, "If you do not desist, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood," it means I will remove the path of transmission from you and give you matters based on tajalli. Tajalli only occurs according to what you have of the predisposition by which the perception of taste occurs. You know that you only perceive according to your predisposition. You look at this matter which you are seeking. If you do not see it, you know that you do not have the predisposition which it requires. That is one of the properties of the Divine Essence. You have learned that Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) So if He did not give you this particular predisposition, then it is not your creation. If it had been your creation, then Allah, who informed you that "He gives everything its created for," would have given it to you. It is you who desist from this sort of question in yourself. There is no need for any other prohibition. This is a mark of concern Allah showed to 'Uzayr, peace be upon him. He knew that from his own knowledge and was ignorant of that from his own ignorance.

Know that wilaya (7) is the universal encompassing sphere. This why it is not intersected, and so it is informed about things. As for the prophethood of law-giving and the Message, it is intersected, and it was cut off in Muhammad, peace be upon him. There will be no Prophet after him, either giving law or bound by law. There is no Messenger after him, and he is the

lawgiver. This hadith (8) is a fragment of the manifestation of the awliya' of Allah, because it contains the cutting off of the taste of complete perfect slavery, so the name of slavery, which is particular to it, was not used. The slave does not want to share with his Lord, who is Allah, in the same name. Allah is not called "prophet" or "messenger." However, He is called Wali and is described by that name. (9) Allah says, "Allah is the Wali of those who believe," (2:257) and He says, "He is the Wali, the Praiseworthy." (42:28) This name, "wali", continues to be applied to the slaves of Allah both in this world and the Next. A name which is particular to the slave and not to Allah no longer remains since prophethood and the message have been cut off.

"Allah is gentle to His slaves," (42:19) so they still have the general prophethood in which there is no law (shari'a), and they still have the law in striving in the confirmed ordinances. They still have heirs in the laws. The Prophet said, "The 'ulama' (men of knowledge) are the heirs of the Prophets." (10) The only inheritance here is that they strive with the ordinances, and so they legislate them.

If you see a Prophet speaking a language outside the simple ordinances of the Shari'a, that is due to the fact that he is a wali and a gnostic. For this reason, his station in respect to his being a man of knowledge and a wali is more perfect and complete than it is due to the fact that he is a Messenger or someone who legislates and has a Shari'a. If you hear one of the People of Allah speaking, or it is related to you that he said, "Wilaya is higher than prophethood," that speaker only means what we mentioned. Or if he says that the wali is above the Prophet or the Messenger, he means in the same person. He is the Messenger, and inasmuch as he is a wali, he is more complete than he is by simply being a Prophet. It does not mean that the wali who follows him is higher than him. The follower never overtakes the followed in that in which he follows him. If he had overtaken him, then he would not be his follower. So understand that!

The starting point of the Messenger or Prophet who brings a Shari'a is wilaya and knowledge. Do you not see that Allah commanded him to seek increase of knowledge, not increase of anything other than it? Allah commanded him, "Say: 'Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" ((20:114) This means: you know that the Shari'a consists of making certain deeds obligatory and prohibiting certain actions. These actions take place in this world, so they come to an end. Wilaya is not like that. If it had been cut off, it would have been cut off in respect to itself just as the message is cut off in respect to itself. If it had been cut off, it would not still have a name. Wali is a name which Allah will continue to have. (11) This belongs to the slaves by following a model, realisation and attachment. (12)

He told 'Uzayr, "If you do not desist from asking about how the decree is, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood. The business will come to through unveiling by tajalli and the name "prophet" and "messenger" will vanish from you." Allah will still have his wilaya. The context of the state indicated that this speech came as a threat. Whoever has this state when he is addressed in this fashion, knows that he is threatened with the cutting off of some of the special ranks of wilaya in this abode, since prophethood and the message are a special rank in wilaya based on some of the ranks which wilaya contains. He knows that he is higher than the wali who has neither law-giving prophethood nor the message.

If someone has another state which necessitates that the rank of prophethood be confirmed for him, that then is the promise and not the threat. 'Uzayr's question was accepted because the Prophet is the elite wali. Because of the context, he knows that since the prophet has this

prerogative in wilaya, he cannot engage in what he knows that Allah will dislike him doing. He cannot engage in what he knows it is impossible for him to attain. When these circumstances exist for the one who has them and they are affirmed, then this divine statement, "I will efface your name for the register of prophethood" becomes a promise. Thus it becomes a transmission indicating a lasting rank. It is a lasting rank for the Prophets and Messengers in the Next Abode, which is not a place where a Shari'a is prescribed for any of Allah's creatures after they have entered the Garden or the Fire.

We define that as an entry into the two abodes of the Garden and the Fire. When the Day of Rising begins for the people who lived in the times of the gaps between the Prophets, (13) young children, and madmen, all of them will be gathered on one plain for the establishment of justice, recompense for wrong actions and the rewards for works which are due to the people of the Garden. Then they will be gathered separate from other people on one plain, (14) and a Prophet from the best of them will be sent among them. The Fire will be shown to them. This Messenger sent to these people will bring it, and he will say to them, "I am the Messenger of Allah to you." Some will affirm him and others will deny him. Then he will say to them, "Plunge into this fire. Whoever obeys me will be saved and will enter the Garden. Whoever disobeys me and opposes my command will be destroyed and he will be one of the people of the Fire." Whoever obeys his command and casts himself into this fire will be happy and receive his reward. He will find this fire to be "coolness and peace".(15) Whoever disobeys him deserves the punishment and will enter the Fire and descend into it because of his deed of opposition so that that justice from Allah might be set up among His slaves.

That is like the words of Allah, "Upon the day when legs are bared," (68:42) (16) i.e. for one of the immense matters of the Next World, "and they are called on to prostrate." This is obligation and Shari'a. Some will be able to prostrate and some will not be able to do so. (17) These are the one about whom Allah says, "They are called on to prostrate, but they will not be able to do so," just as some of the slaves cannot obey the command of Allah in this world like Abu Jahl (18) and others. This is according to what remains of the Shari'a in the Next Abode on the Day of Rising before people enter the Garden and the Fire. This is why we have written it down, and praise belongs to Allah, the Wali.

Notes to Chapter 14:

1. Qadar has a specific time and qada' does not. So qadar refers to the particular instances of qada'.
2. Ref. Qur'an, "Were Allah to expand the provision of His slaves, they would act as tyrants on the earth. But He sends down whatever He wills in a measured way." (42:27)
3. The secret of the decree.
4. Qur'an 2:259 "Or the one who passed by a town which had fallen into ruin. He asked, 'How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?' Allah caused him to die a hundred years then brought him back to life. Then He asked, 'How long have you been here?' He replied, 'I have been here a day or part of a day.' He said, 'Not so! You have been here a hundred years. Look at your food and drink it has not gone bad and look at your donkey so We can make you a Sign for all mankind. Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh.'" According to 'Ali, Ibn Jarir, Ibn 'Abbas, al-Hasan and Qatada, that is 'Uzayr.
5. The realities of sources.
6. Miftah, key, comes from the root, fath, opening.
7. According to the commentator, wilaya is annihilation in Allah, and Allah encompassed all, and "All things are passing except His face." (28:88).

8. "I am the Seal of the Messengers."
9. Wali means the friend of Allah, and refers to the gnostic. It is also one of the Divine Names which means the Guardian or the One who manages people's affairs.
10. Al-Bukhari.
11. As Yusuf said about Allah, "...You are my Wali in this world and the Next." (12:101).
12. According to al-Qashani, it is acquired and realised through annihilation in the Divine Attributes and Essence and attached by the going-on (baqa') after annihilation in the station of drawing near.
13. i.e. those who did not have a Prophet to follow.
14. According to the commentator, al-Qashani, the plain on which they are gathered may be as-Sahira, as in the Qur'an (79:14), "But it shall be but a single scare, and behold they are at as-Sahira!" As-Sahira which, according to some, is the earth Allah will create anew on the Day of Rising.
15. As was the case with Ibrahim, Qur'an 21:69.
16. The expression means to get ready for something difficult.
17. This is also reflected in a hadith in al-Bukhari in which the Prophet said, "Our Lord will unveil what is hidden, and every believer, man and woman, will prostrate to Him. Those who prostrated out of eyeservice and reputation in this world will go to prostrate and find their backs rigid."
18. The Prophet's uncle who was a violent opponent of Islam.

15: The Seal of the Wisdom of Prophethood in the Word of 'Isa (Jesus)

He was manifested from the water of Maryam
and the breath of Jibril in the form of man existing from clay.
The spirit was in an essence purified of nature
which it called prison.

For that reason, the spirit stayed in it
for more a thousand years in the designation of time. (1)

A spirit from Allah, no other.

For that reason, he revived the dead and formed the bird from clay.

Since his relation with his Lord is proven,
by it he has effective action in both the higher and lower worlds.
Allah purified his body, and made his spirit pure,
and He made him a model of taking-form.

Know that among the special qualities of the spirits (arwah) is whenever they touch anything life flows into it. This is why the Samiri (2) seized a handful of dust from the track of the messenger, who was Jibril, and he is the Spirit. The Samiri had knowledge of this matter. When he recognised that it was Jibril, he knew that life would flow into whatever he had walked on, so he took a handful of dust (3) from the track of the messenger or he filled his hand or the ends of his fingers, (4) and threw it into the Calf. The Calf made a noise like the sound of a cow mooing. If it had been in another form, the name of that form's sound would have been ascribed to it - as grumbling to the camel, baa-ing to rams, bleating to sheep, and voice or articulation and speech to man. That power from the life which flows in things is called lâhût. The nâsût is the locus on which the spirit is based. The nâsût may be called a spirit by what is based on it.

When the Trusty Ruh, who is Jibril, presented himself to Maryam, peace be upon her, in the form of a "handsome, well-built man", (5) she imagined that he was a man wishing to have intercourse with her. She took refuge with Allah from him with all her being, with the whole of her existence, that Allah might save her from him since she knew that that was among the things which are not permitted. She was given a complete presence with Allah, and it is the meaning-without-form spirit. If Jibril had breathed into her at that moment in this state, 'Isa would have been born in such a manner that no one could tolerate him due to the harshness of his nature which was the state of his mother.

When he said to her, "I am only your Lord's messenger of your Lord so that He can give you a pure boy," she relaxed from that contraction (qabd) and her breast expanded. It was at that time that Jibril breathed 'Isa into her. Jibril conveyed the word of Allah to Maryam as the Messenger conveyed the word of Allah to his community. 'Isa was "His word that He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him." (6) Then appetite filled Maryam. The body of 'Isa was created from the actual water of Maryam and from the imaginary water of Jibril which was infused in the moisture of that breath, since the breath of the living is moist because of the water content in it. So the body of 'Isa is from imaginary water and real water. He emerged in the form of a man in respect to his mother and inasmuch as Jibril had appeared in the form of a man, since taking-form only occurs in the human species according to the normal principle.

'Isa brought the dead to life because he is the Divine Spirit, and bringing to life belongs to

Allah. The breath which 'Isa has is like the breath which Jibril has. The word belongs to Allah. The bringing the dead to life by 'Isa is an actual revival inasmuch as it was manifested from his breath as he was manifested from the form of his mother. His bringing to life is also imagined to be from him, but it actually belongs to Allah. He joined the two by the reality on which he is based even as we said that he is created from imaginary water and actual water. Bringing-to-life is ascribed to him by means of actualisation in one aspect, and by imagination in another aspect. In respect to actualisation, it is said of him that he brings the dead to life. In respect to imagination (tawahhum), it is said that he breathes into it and it becomes a bird by the leave of Allah. (7) The agent is in the prepositional phrase "by Allah's permission", even though He did not breathe into it. It is also possible that the agent is the one who breathes into it. It became a bird as regards physical form. In the same way, 'Isa healed the blind and the lepers.

All was ascribed to 'Isa as being "by Allah's permission." (8) "Permission" (idhn) is an indirect expression, as in His words, "By My permission" (9) and "by the permission of Allah". If the prepositional phrase is connected to breathing, the breather has leave in the breathing, and so it is a bird by the leave of Allah. If the breather breathed not by leave, then the taking form of the bird as a bird is not by the leave of Allah. The agent in that is then the verb "it becomes (yakûn)." If there had not been something real and something imaginary in the matter, then these forms would not have accepted these two aspects. Rather, it has these two aspects because the constitution of 'Isa accords that. 'Isa showed humility to the extent that he prescribed that his community "pay the jizya (10) tax with their hands in a state of willing submission," (11) and that if one of them were slapped on the cheek, he should offer the other cheek to the one who slapped him, and not rise up against him nor seek revenge. This came from his mother's side. Since the woman is lower, she has humility because she is subject to the man legally and physically. The power to bring to life and heal that he had came to him the side of the breath of Jibril in the form of a man. 'Isa brought the dead to life by the form of man. If Jibril had not come in the form of man, but in another of the elemental forms of phenomenal beings from the animals, plants or minerals, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life without taking on that form for that moment and appearing in it. If Jibril had come in a luminous form beyond the elements and natural humours, since luminosity is part of his nature, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life unless he appeared in that form of non-elemental light, while still maintaining the human form in respect of his mother.

When he brought the dead to life, it was said that it was him and not him. The onlookers fell into bewilderment (hayra) just as the man of intellect becomes bewildered in his logical reflection when he sees an individual human being bringing the dead to life, as that is one of the divine qualities - bringing to life with speech, not mere bringing with animation. (12) The beholder is bewildered because he sees the form of a man who possesses a divine effect. That led some of them to speak of that as "incarnation" and say that 'Isa was Allah since it was by Him that 'Isa brought the dead to life. Thus they are charged with disbelief (kufr) which is the veil because they veil Allah, who brings the dead to life, by the human form of 'Isa. Allah said, "They are unbelievers who say, 'Allah is the Messiah, the son of Maryam.'" (13) They fell into both error and disbelief at the end of all they said, not because they say that he is Allah nor by calling him the son of Maryam. But they made the attribution that Allah, insofar as He brought the dead to life, was contained in the human form of the nasut which is called the son of Maryam. There is no doubt that 'Isa was the son of Maryam. The hearer imagines that they have attributed divinity to the form, and so they make divinity the same as the form. That is not what they do. Rather, they make divine He-ness the subject in the human form

which is the son of Maryam. They should differentiate between the form of 'Isa and the divine principle because they have made the form the same as the principle. Jibril was in the form of man who did not breathe and then he breathed. One differentiates between the form and the breath, and the breath from the form. The form existed without the breath - thus the breath is not part of its essential definition. For that reason, differences occurred among the people of different [Christian] parties regarding 'Isa and what he was. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal human form, says that he is the son of Maryam. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal representational form relates him to Jibril. Whoever looks at him in respect to what was manifested from him of bringing the dead to life, relates him to Allah by the quality of the spirit, and says that he is the Spirit of Allah, (14) that is, by Him life was manifested in whomever received his breath. Sometimes Allah is imagined to be the passive principle in 'Isa, and sometimes the angel is imagined in him, and sometimes mortal humanity is imagined in him. So the conception of everyone is based on what predominates that person. 'Isa is the Word of Allah, (15) the Spirit of Allah, (16) and the slave of Allah. (17) That is something which no one else has in the sensory form. Indeed, each person is attached to his father of form, not to the One who breathed his spirit into the human form. When Allah fashioned the human body as He said, "When I have shaped him," (15:29;38:72) then He breathed into Him, that was from His spirit. Thus in its being and source, the spirit is ascribed to Allah. That is not the case with 'Isa. The shaping of his body and mortal form is implied in the breath of the spirit. Others, as we mentioned, are not like that.

All existent things are the words of Allah which are inexhaustible (18) because they are from "kun" and "kun" is the word of Allah. Is the word ascribed to Him according to what He really is? His what-ness is not known. Or is it that Allah descends to the form of the one who says, "kun", and so the word "kun" is the reality of that form to which he descended or in which He is manifest? Some of the gnostics take one side and some take the other side, and some of them are bewildered in the business and do not know. This is a question which can only be recognised by taste (dhawq), as was the case with Abu Yazid al-Bistami when he breathed into the ant which he had killed and it returned to life. He knew in that action by Whom he had breathed, and that was an 'Isawian witnessing. As for the revival of meaning by knowledge, that is the divine life, essential, eternal, sublime, and luminous, about which Allah said, "Is someone who was dead and whom We brought to life, supplying him with a light by which to walk among the people..." (6:123) Whoever gives life to a dead soul by the life of knowledge in a particular problem connected to knowledge of Allah, has brought him to life by it, and it is "a light for him by which he walks among the people, i.e. among his likes in form.

Were it not for Him and not for us,
that which is would not have been.
I worship Him in truth,
and Allah is our Master.
I am his source so know!
If you said, "man,"
Then do not be veiled by "man".
He has given you a proof.
So be Allah and be creation,
and you will be merciful by Allah.
Feed His creation through Him,
and you will be spirit and sweet scent.
We give Him what appeared by Him in us,

and He gave to us.
The command is apportioned between Him and us.
My heart was given life by the One who knew it
when He gave us sensory life.
At that time (before time),
we were beings, sources and times in Him.
That did not endure in us, but that gave us life.

Part of what proves what we mentioned concerning the breath (nafkh) of the spirit with the elemental form is that Allah has described Himself by the "breath of the All-Merciful". Everyone described by an attribute must follow the attribute and all that attribute demands of him. You realise that breath is necessary for the one who breathes. For that reason, the divine breath accepts the forms of the universe. It is like the primordial substance, (19) which is not other than the source of nature.

The elements are one of the forms of nature, and what is above the elements and what issues from them are also part of the forms of nature. They are sublime spirits going right up to the seven heavens. As for the spirits of the seven heavens and their sources, they are elemental, so they issue from the vapour of the elements. The angels from every heaven are from the elements, so they are made from the elements, and there are no beings of nature above them. For this reason, Allah described them with dispute, (20) i.e. the Highest Assembly, because nature has polarisation. Polarisation is that which is in the Divine Names, and they are ascriptions given by the "breath of the All-Merciful." Do you not see how the Essence is not subject to this principle, and that it is independent of the worlds? This is why the world appeared in the form of the One who brought it into being, and it is not other than the divine breath.

The divine breath ascends by what it has of heat, and descends by what it has of humidity and cold, and fixes itself and solidifies by what it has of dryness. Thus precipitation comes from cold and humidity. Do you not see that when the doctor wants to give someone a remedy, he looks at his water (urine) in a long-necked bottle? If he sees precipitation, he knows that the digestion is complete. He gives the remedy to speed progress. The precipitation is produced by his natural coldness and humidity.

Then Allah kneaded the clay of this human person with "His two hands." These are opposite to each other. Even though each of these two hands may be a right hand, the distinction between them is not hidden. They are only two in themselves - two hands because He only causes effects in nature according to what is in conformity with it. Nature consists of opposites, so He said "two hands". Then He brought man into existence with two hands, and called him man (bashar). (21) This refers to the direct contact (mubashara) of the two hands as befits the Divine Presence. That arises from His concern for this human species. Then Allah said to the one who refused to prostrate himself before Adam, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My Own Hands? Were you overcome with arrogance (towards the one who is your like, made of the elements) or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) meaning those who are above the elements. "You are not like that."

By the exalted, (22) He means those who, by their essence, are above being elemental by their luminous constitution, even though they are part of nature. Man is only better than the other species by virtue of his being made of clay (bashar). He is the best species of all that was created from the elements by direct contact with the two hands. So in rank, man is above

the terrestrial and celestial angels, although the lofty angels are better than the human species according to a divine text. (23)

If anyone wishes to recognise the divine breath (nafas), let him recognise the universe, because "whoever knows himself knows his Lord" (24) who is manifest in him. The universe was manifested in the breath of the Merciful which Allah breathed from the Divine Names. They brought the manifestation of their effects into existence from the non-manifestation of their effects. He was generous to Himself by what He brought into existence in Himself. The first effect of the breath took place in that Presence. Then the command continued to descend (25) by breathing out from the universal to the last of what Allah brought into existence.

All is contained in the source of the breath,
like light is contained in the essence of darkness
at the end of the night before daylight.
Knowledge comes by proof at the end of the day
for the one who is sleepy.
He sees what I have said as a dream which indicates the breath,
And it gives him relief from every grief.
In the recitation of the Qur'an, it is, "He frowned." (26)
He has given a tajalli of Himself
to the one who came to fetch a firebrand. (27)
So Musa saw Him as a fire, while He is a light
for kings and seekers.
If you have recognise what I said,
then know that you are in a state of grief. (28)
If Musa had sought something else
(other than the brand),
he still would have seen Him in that,
and not the opposite.

When Allah establishes this 'Isawian word in the Station (29) so that we would know and he would be known, 'Isa will be asked about what was ascribed to him and whether or not it was true, even though Allah already knew whether or not that matter had taken place. Allah will say to him, "Did you say to people: 'Take me and my mother as gods, besides Allah?'" (30)

Adab demands a response to the one asking the question because when He gave him a tajalli in this station and form, wisdom necessitated the response in separation by the source of gatheredness. So he put disconnection first and said, "Glory be to You!" using the kaf (pronoun of the second person singular) which defines who is indicated by encounter and speech. "It is not mine," inasmuch as I belong to myself rather than You, (31) "to say what I have no right to," that is, what my he-ness rather than my essence necessitates. "If indeed I said it, You know it," because You are the Speaker, and whoever says something knows what he has said. You are the tongue by which I speak, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, reported to us in a divine transmission in which Allah said, "I am his tongue by which he speaks." He made His He-ness the same as the tongue of the speaker, but ascribed the speech to His slave.

Then the man of right action completed his response by saying, "You know what is in my self," and the speaker is Allah, "and I do not know what is in it," so this is in knowledge of the he-ness of 'Isa in respect of His He-ness, not in respect of the fact that 'Isa speaks and has

an effect. "It is You", so He brought distinction and support to confirm the proof and dependence on Him, since Allah only knows the Unseen. So He separated and gathered, unified and made many, made wide and narrow.

To end his reply, 'Isa said, "I said to them nothing but what You ordered me to say." He negated to begin with, (32) alluding to the fact the he has no existence. The statement required adab with the questioner. If he had not acted thus, he would have been described as lacking knowledge of the realities, but he certainly was not like that! Thus he said, "only what You ordered me," and it is You are the One who speaks on my tongue, and You are my tongue. Observe this divine polarity of the spirit! What is finer and more subtle than this!

'Isa said that he said, "Worship Allah." So he used the name of Allah because slaves differ in forms of worship and Shari'a. So he did not specify one name rather than another name. Instead he used the name which joins all of them. Then he went on, "my Lord and your Lord." It is known that His relationship to one existent being by lordship (rubûbiya) is not the same as His relationship with another existent being. That is why he made a distinction when he said, "my Lord and your Lord," by two references one to the speaker and one to the one addressed. He said, "nothing but what You ordered me," and thus he affirmed that he is one who is commanded. The quality of being commanded is not other than slavery, since one is only commanded when obedience is expected of one, even if one does not comply.

Since the command descends according to ranks, all that appears in a certain rank is coloured with what the reality of that rank gives it. The rank of the one commanded has a principle which appears in everyone who is commanded. The rank of the commander has a principle which appears in every command. Allah said, "Establish the prayer." He is the commander and the one who is subject to the obligation is the commanded. The slave says, "Forgive me!" so he commands and Allah is the commanded. What Allah demands of His slave by His command is the same as what the slave demands of Allah by his command. This is why every supplication is answered, and it must be answered, even if the answer is delayed, just as some who are under obligation delay the prayer. Whoever who is obligated to perform the prayer and does not pray it at its proper time, delays obedience and prays it at another time when he is able to perform it. There must be an answer, if only by intention.

Then he said, "I was a witness against them (and he did not say over himself with them as when he said, 'my Lord and your Lord') as long as I remained among them" because the Prophets are witnesses over their communities as long as they are in them. "But when You took me (i.e. raised me) back to You," and You veiled them from me and me from them, "You were the One Watching over them," no longer in my substance, but in their substance, since You are their eye which necessitates observation.

He wanted to make a distinction between him and his Lord so that it would be known that he was a slave and that Allah is Allah and He is his Lord. He referred to himself as a witness (shahid) and he referred to Allah as the Watcher (raqib). He mentioned "them" before himself when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them," (33) preferring them in priority and with adab. He put "them" after Allah in relationship to Him when he said, "You were the One Watching over them" because of what the Lord merits in priority of rank.

Then know that Allah has the name the Watcher (Ra'iqib) which 'Isa applied to Him, and He is the Witness in His words, "a witness against them," and "You are Witness of all things."

(5:117) He referred to all things and "thing" is the most indefinite of things. He used the name, "The Witness," and Allah is the Witness over every witnessed thing according to what the reality of that witnessed things demands. He indicated that Allah was the Witness over the people of 'Isa when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them." This is the witnessing of Allah in the substance of 'Isa, as it is confirmed that Allah is his tongue, hearing and sight.

Then he said something which is both 'Isawian and Muhammadan. As for its being 'Isawian, that is the speech of 'Isa by the transmission of Allah from him in His Book. As for its being Muhammadan, it happened that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood in one place for an entire night reciting it without turning to anything else until dawn broke. It is, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves. If You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (34) "They" is the pronoun of those who are absent as "he" is the pronoun of someone who is absent. as He said, "they are those who disbelieve," with the pronoun of those who are not present. Absence is their veil to what is meant by the witnessed one who is present. He said, "If you punish them," with the pronoun of the absent, and that absence is the source of the veil which hides them from the Real.

The Prophet mentioned them to Allah before the time when they are present (35) so that when the actual time came when they were present, the heaven would already have acted on the dough, and the dough might have had time to become equal to the heaven. (36)

Then by "they are Your slaves," he singled out the unity (tawhid) on which they are based. There is no submissiveness greater than the submissiveness of slaves because they have no freedom of action with themselves. They act according to what their master wishes of them when he has no partner in them. He said, "Your slaves," and singled out what was meant of the punishment which is their humiliation. There are none more lowly than them since they are slaves. Thus their essence necessitates that they be lowly, so You do not degrade them, for You do not degrade them with anything more lowly than the fact that they are slaves.

"If You forgive them," if You veil them from the punishment which they deserve because of their opposition if You put forgiveness on them, You veil them from the punishment and protect them from it, "You are the Almighty," the Protector, the Guardian. When Allah gives this name ('aziz) to one of His slaves, then Allah is called the Exalter (Mu'izz). This name is given to him by the 'Aziz, so he has strong protection from the revenge and punishment which the Avenger and Punisher desire for him. He also used distinction and dependence to confirm the proof, and so the ayat is the same sort of His words, "You are the Knower of the Unseen Worlds," and "You are the Watcher over them," and "You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (37)

The question from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and his supplication to his Lord in which he repeated the phrase for the entire night until dawn was a request for the answer. If he had heard the answer in the first questioning, he would not have repeated it. Allah showed him the judgements in detail by which they deserved punishment. As each instance was presented to him and specified, the Prophet said to Him, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves, and if You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." If he had seen in what was presented to him anything which would make it necessary that Allah had already decided and that His presence must be preferred, he would have invoked Allah against them rather than for them. So what they deserved is changed by what this ayat accords of submission to Allah and exposing themselves to His pardon.

The Prophet related that when Allah loves the voice of His slave when he makes supplication to Him, He delays the answer to his supplication so that the slave will repeat the supplication. This comes from His love for the slave, not because He has turned away from him. For that reason, the Prophet mentioned the name of the Wise, and the Wise is the one who puts everything in its proper place, and who does not turn away from the qualities which their realities necessitate and demand; so the Wise is the One who knows the order of things. When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, kept repeating this ayat, he was in possession of a great knowledge from Allah. If anyone recites it, let him recite it in that manner. (38) Otherwise, it is better that he remain silent. When Allah lets the slave articulate any request, He does so when He wants to answer it and grant his need. Let no one be slow in whatever has been guaranteed to him, but let him persevere as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, persevered with this ayat in all his states, so that he either hears with His ear, or with hearing, whichever you like. How else will Allah make you hear the answer? If He permits the question on your tongue, He will let you hear the answer with your ear. If He permits the meaning to you, He will let you hear the answer by your hearing.

Notes to Chapter 15:

1. As he was born more than five centuries before the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and is still alive, waiting to descend.
2. The story is found in the Qur'an 20:75-95, where as-Samiri convinces the tribe of Israel to cast their ornaments into the fire out of which he brought the figure of a Calf which lowed, and which they worshipped. He told Musa, "I beheld what they did not behold, and I seized a handful of dust from the messenger's track and cast it into the thing."
3. With dad, qabda.
4. With sad, qabsa.
5. Qur'an 19:17.
6. Qur'an 4:171, "The Messiah, 'Isa son of Maryam, was only the Messenger of Allah and His Word, which He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him."
7. Qur'an 3:49; 5:110.
8. Qur'an 3:49.
9. Qur'an 5:110.
10. The tax paid by the People of the Book to the Muslim State.
11. Qur'an 9:29.
12. i.e. the dead person can speak and answer him. This not simply causing the dead limbs to move of their own accord.
13. Qur'an 5:17, 5:72.
14. Ruh Allah.
15. See Qur'an 3:45, 4:171.
16. Qur'an 14:171.
17. Qur'an 19:30.
18. See Qur'an 18:109, "Say: 'If all the sea was ink to write down the Words of my Lord, it would run out long before the Words of my Lord ran out,' even if We were to bring the same amount of ink again."
19. Al-jawhar al-hayulani.
20. Qur'an 38:69, "I had no knowledge of the Highest Assembly when they disputed." It can also mean mutual rivalry.
21. Qur'an 15:28, "I am creating a mortal (bashar)."
22. "The exalted" are the angels who wander in love and those who are near, like Jibril and

the angels of the Throne.

23. "Or are you one of the exalted?" 38:75.

24. As the Prophet said.

25. See Qur'an 65:12, "It is Allah who created the seven heavens and of earth their like, the Command descending down through all of them."

26. Sura 80.

27. Musa in Qur'an 20:10; 27:7. Refers to empirical knowledge, but he found unveiling in the form of the Burning Bush.

28. By standing behind the veil or seeking other-than-Him.

29. On the Last Day.

30. Qur'an 5:116.

31. To slaveness rather than lordship.

32. (ma qulta = I did not say).

33. Literally in the Arabic, "I was against them a witness."

34. This is the end of what 'Isa said in this verse.

35. On the Day of Gathering.

36. According to the commentator, the leaven is the predisposition for the arrival in the presence of Allah. The dough is the clay of his substance.

37. All used in this verse.

38. i.e. with knowledge, weeping, and maintaining adab.

16: The Seal of the Wisdom of Mercy in the Word of Sulayman (Solomon)

Bilqis said, (1) "It (the letter) is from Sulayman and it says 'In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, Most Merciful.'" Some people criticise the fact that the name of Sulayman comes before the name of Allah. That is not the case, and in saying this they say something that does not befit the gnosis which Sulayman, peace be upon him, had of his Lord. How could what they say be connected to him when Bilqis said of it, "a noble letter had been delivered to me," that is, a letter which honoured her. In this they were influenced by the story of how Chosroes tore up the letter of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. (2) He did not tear it up until he had read all of it and knew what it contained. It was the same with Bilqis. Had she not accepted what was established, respect for its author would not have prevented her from tearing up the letter, whether his name, peace be upon him, had been mentioned before or after the name of Allah.

Sulayman mentioned the two mercies: the mercy of graciousness and the mercy of obligation, and they are ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. So Allah freely dispenses His bounty by the Rahman, and it is incumbent on Him by the Rahim. This obligation comes from graciousness, so Rahim is contained in Rahman. Allah "has prescribed mercy for Himself," glory be to Him! in order that the slave might have what Allah spoke about of the deeds which this slave brings, expecting his due from Allah who has required Himself to have this mercy for them, the mercy of obligation. When one of the slaves is like this, he knows that He is the author of the deed.

The deed is divided according to the eight organs of man. Allah informed us that He is the He-ness of each organ. So the author of the action is none other than Allah while the form is that of the slave. He-ness is embodied in him, i.e. only in his name because Allah is the source of what is manifested and which is called "creation". Because of this, the names of the Manifest and the Last belong to the slave since he was not and then was. By the fact that his manifestation depends on Him and action issues from Him, there is the name the Hidden and the First. Thus, when you see creation, you see the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

This recognition was not hidden from Sulayman, peace be upon him. Indeed, it is a part of a kingdom which "belonged to no one after him," (3) in terms of its manifestation in the visible world. Muhammad, peace be upon him, was given what Sulayman was given, but he did not manifest it. Allah gave him the power to vanquish the 'ifrit (4) who came in the night to attack him. (5) When the Prophet wanted to take the 'ifrit and tie him to the one of the columns of the mosque until morning so that the children of Madina could play with him, he remembered the prayer of Sulayman, and so Allah made him drive the 'ifrit off in disgrace. The Prophet did not manifest his power as Sulayman had done. He spoke of "a kingdom" which is not universal, and we know that he meant a particular kingdom. We see that the Prophet shared in every part of the Kingdom which Allah had given him and so we know by this that he is privileged with the whole kingdom. In the story of the 'ifrit, he was only given the manifestation while Sulayman might have been given the whole and the manifestation. If the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had not said in the story of the 'ifrit, "and Allah gave me power over him," we would have said that when he wanted to seize the 'ifrit, Allah reminded him of Sulayman's prayer so that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, would know that Allah had not given him power to seize him.

He then made him send off the 'ifrit off in disgrace.

When he said, "Allah gave me power over him," we knew that Allah had given him freedom of action in that. Then Allah reminded him and he remembered Sulayman's prayer and showed adab towards him. We know from this that that no creature after Sulayman had the general manifestation of that kingdom.

Our goal in this question is only discussion and instruction about the two mercies which Sulayman mentioned in the two names which are expressed in Arabic as ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. (6) Allah stipulated the mercy of obligation (7) and made the application of the mercy of graciousness universal when He said, "My mercy extends to all things," (7:156) even the Divine Names, which are the realities of ascriptions. He was gracious to us in them. We are the result of the mercy of graciousness by the Divine Names and divine ascriptions of lordship. Then He prescribed mercy for Himself by our own manifestation. He informed us that He is our He-ness, that we might know that He obliged mercy on Himself only for Himself. Mercy never departs from Him. Who could be gracious to you when there is only Him?

There must be a principle for clarifying differences in merit this is in relation to what is manifested of the differences in merit that creatures have in knowledge, so that it might be said that this person knows more than that person, even though the source is but one. This means the shortcoming connected to the will (irada), apart from the connection of knowledge. This difference in merit exists in the divine attributes. (8) The connection and merit of will and its increase is connected to power. In the same way, hearing, sight and all the divine names are arranged in ranks, some having more merit than others. Similarly what is manifested in creation differs in ranks of merit, so that it can be said that this person knows more than that person even though the source is the same.

As each Divine Name which I have set forth is implied by all the Names and described by them, similarly that which creation manifests accepts all of that which is subject to differences of merit. Each part of the universe is from all the universe, i.e. it is a vessel for all the separate realities of the universe. Our statement that Zayd is inferior to 'Amr in knowledge does not contradict the fact that the He-ness of Allah is the source of both Zayd and 'Amr, but it is more perfect and knowing in 'Amr than in Zayd, even as the Names differ in merit. They are not other-than-Allah. Allah, inasmuch as He is Knowing, has a more encompassing connection than Allah as the Transformer, the All-Powerful. But He is still He and not other-than-Him.

O my friend! do not then know Him in one aspect and be ignorant of Him in another! Do not negate Him here and affirm Him there, unless You affirm Him by an aspect through which He affirms Himself and negate Him by an aspect through which He negates Himself, as in the ayat which combines affirmation and negation in respect to Him when He said, "Nothing is like Him," negating, "and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (42:11) and so He affirmed an attribute which is general to every hearing and seeing living being. Nothing exists but that it is alive, although this is hidden in the world from the perception of some people. It will appear to all people in the Next World, for it is the Abode of the Living (ad-Dar al-Hayawan). Similarly, the life of this world is only veiled from some of the slaves so that election and difference of merit might be manifested among the slaves of Allah according to what they perceive of Him from the realities of the universe.

In one whose attainment is more comprehensive, Allah is in principle more manifest in him than in someone who does not have this comprehensiveness. So do not be veiled by the difference in merit and say that it is not correct to say that creation is the He-ness of Allah after we have shown you the difference in merit in the Divine Names. You have no doubt about them being Allah, and what is designated by them is not other than Allah.

How then could Sulayman place his name before the name of Allah as they allege? He is part of the whole which the mercy of graciousness brought into existence. The name, ar-Rahman ar-Rahim, must come first for the dependence of the one receiving this mercy to be valid. Advancing the one who should come afterwards and delaying the one who should come before in the place he merits is contrary to the realities.

Part of the wisdom of Bilqis and the sublimity of her knowledge lies in the fact that she did not mention who cast the letter to her. She only did that so that her companions would know that she had communications on matters whose means they did not know. This is part of divine management in ruling because when the means of communication reaching the ruler are unknown, the people of the government fear for themselves in their actions. Therefore they only act with prudence in a matter because that will reach their ruler, and they are guarding themselves from the potential danger of that action. If they knew precisely by whom information reached their ruler, they would have tried to flatter him and bribe him so that they could do whatever they wanted without their ruler hearing about it. Therefore the Queen said, "a noble letter has been delivered to me," without naming the one who cast it. That was an act of policy on her part would insure respect for her among the people of her kingdom and the nobles under her rule. By this, she merited her superiority over them.

As regards the superiority of the human man of knowledge over the man of knowledge of the jinn in the secrets of the disposal of things and the special properties of thing, that is known by the amount of time, for the movement of the eye in perceiving what it perceives is quicker than the movement of the body when it moves. (9) The moment in which the eye moves is the same moment which it connects to the object, in spite of the distance between the viewer and the object. The moment that the eyes open is the moment in which they are connected to the heaven of the fixed stars. The moment when its glance returns is the same moment that its perception is absent.

Rising from one's place is not like that. It does not possess this speed. Asaf ibn Barkhiya (10) was more perfect in the deed than the jinn was. What Asaf ibn Barkhiya said is the same as the action in the same moment. Sulayman, peace be upon him, at the same moment saw Bilqis' throne "settled before him" so one must not imagine that he perceived it while it was in its original place without being moved. We do not think that the displacement takes place in one and the same moment, but that it involves going into non-existence and returning to existence inasmuch as the only one who is aware of that is the one who has recognition of it. This is what Allah said, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) Not a moment passes them but that they see what they saw. Since it is like this, the time of its non-existence (the absence of the throne from its place) is the same as the time of its existence with Sulayman because of the renewal of creation with the "breaths". No one knows this power, or rather, man is not aware with regard to himself that he ceases to exist in each breath and then is again.

Do not think that "this" (thumma) implies a delay. That is not true. However, it demands a high rank of knowledge in Arabic, as when the poet says:

As he brandished the straight Rudayni, (11) it quivered.

There is no doubt that the moment of brandishing the spear is without a doubt the same as the moment of quivering of the thing which is brandished. It happened without delay. It is the same with the renewal of creation with breaths. The time of non-existence coincides with the time of the existence of its like. It is similar to the renewal of accidents in the theory of the Ash'arites [tajrîd al-a'râd].

The question involving the moving of Bilqis' throne is one of the most difficult problems, except for someone who has recognition of what we have mentioned in its story. Asaf did not have any merit except for acquiring renewal in the assembly of Sulayman, peace be upon him. The throne was not moved across place nor did it rise above the earth nor break the laws of space for the one who understands what we mentioned. That was done by one of the companions of Sulayman in order to elevate Sulayman's honour in the selves of those who were present with Bilqis and her suite. The reason for that was that Sulayman was Allah's gift to Da'ud as He said, "We gave Sulayman to Da'ud," (38:30) so the gift is the giving of the donor by providing a blessing, not by means of fitting recompense or merit. So he is the abundant blessing, the decisive word and the cutting sword.

As for the knowledge of Sulayman, Allah said of him, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it (in spite of his opposite judgement to that of Da'ud), and Allah "gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79) Da'ud's knowledge was knowledge given by Allah, and Sulayman's knowledge was the knowledge of Allah in the matter inasmuch as He is the Judge without intermediary. So Sulayman is the interpreter of Allah in the seat of sincerity.(12) It is like the man who is striving to hit on the judgement of Allah by which Allah would judge the question. If he were to find it by himself or by what was revealed to His Messenger, then he would have two rewards. The one who errs in this particular judgement has one reward as well as its being knowledge and judgement. The community of Muhammad was given the rank of Sulayman in judgement (13) and the rank of Da'ud in wisdom, (14) so there is no better community than it.

When Bilqis saw her throne, and she knew how great the distance was and the impossibility of moving it in that space of time, she said, "It seems the same." (28:42, lit. "it is as if it were.") She spoke the truth according to what we mentioned regarding the renewal of creation by similarity. It was it. The matter is true, as you are the same at the time of renewal as you were in past time. Part of the perfection of Sulayman's knowledge was in the instruction he gave regarding the pavilion when he told Bilqis, "Enter the courtyard." (15) The courtyard was very smooth without any curvature in its glass. When Bilqis saw it, she thought that it was water and had depth, so she bared her legs so as not to let the water dampen her clothes. By that, Sulayman informed her that the throne which she saw was of this sort. This is the utmost fairness. He informed her that she had hit the mark when she said, "It seems the same." At that point, she said, "My Lord, I have wronged myself but I have submitted with Sulayman to the Lord of all the worlds."

So she did not submit to Sulayman, but to the Lord of the worlds, and Sulayman was part of the worlds. She did not restrict her submission as the Messengers do not restrict their belief in Allah, contrary to Pharaoh who said, "to the Lord of Musa and Harun." (26:48) Although this submission is related to Bilqis' submission in a certain respect, it does not have the same force. She had more discernment than Pharaoh in submission to Allah. Furthermore, Pharaoh was governed by the principle of the moment when he said, "I believe in the One in whom

the Children of Israel believe." (10:90) He specified, but he also specified when she saw the sorcerers articulate their belief in the "Lord of Musa and Harun." The Islam of Bilqis was the Islam of Sulayman since she said, "with Sulayman." She followed him in all that he adhered to in the way of beliefs.

This is how we are on the straight path which the Lord is on, for our forelocks are in His hand, (16) and it is impossible for us to separate from Him. We are with Him implicitly, and He is with us by open declaration. Allah said, "He is with you wherever you are," (57:4) and we are with Him as He takes us by our forelocks. He, may He be exalted! is with Himself wherever He goes with us on His path. So everyone in the world is on a straight path, and it is the path of the Lord. It is this that Bilqis learned from Sulayman, so she said, "To Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," without referring to a particular world.

As for the subjection which was the privilege of Sulayman, peace be upon him, and by which he was distinguished from others, and the kingdom which Allah gave him which none after him would have, it is from his command when He said, "We gave him the fiercely blowing wind, speeding at his command." (21:81) It was not subjection in itself, for Allah said in respect of each of us without exception, "He has made everything in the heavens and everything on the earth subservient to you." (45:13) He also mentioned the subjection of the winds, stars and other things, (17) but that is not by our command. It is from the command of Allah. If you reflect with your intellect, Sulayman was privileged by this command neither by mental concentration nor by aspiration (himma) rather, it was by nothing more than the command itself. We said that because we recognise that the physical bodies of the world can be affected by the himma of the self when someone is in the station of concentration. We have seen such things happen in this Path. Sulayman only had to articulate the command in whatever he wished to subject without either concentration or himma.

Know, may Allah support us and you by a spirit from Him, that when any slave receives a gift like this, that does not detract from his portion of the kingdom of the Next World, nor is he called to account for it. That was true of Sulayman. Although he sought it from his Lord, the tasting (dhawq) of the Path (18) demands that it was advanced to him from what was stored up for others, and He will call him to account for it when he wants it in the Next World. Allah told him. "This is Our gift (and He did not say "to you: or to anyone else); bestow or withhold without reckoning." (38:39) We knew by the tasting of the Path that his request was from the command of his Lord. Thus the request was from the divine command, and the one who requested it received full recompense for his request.

If the Creator wishes, He grants his need in what he seeks from Him, and if He wishes, He withholds it. The slave has fulfilled what Allah demanded of him to obey His command in what he asked of his Lord. If he had asked that from himself without his Lord commanding him to do that, then he would be held to account for it.

That is true in all that Allah is asked for, as He said to His Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "Say: 'O Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" He obeyed his Lord's command and sought increase in knowledge to such an extent that each time he was given milk, he interpreted it to be knowledge even as he interpreted it as knowledge in a dream in which he received a glass of milk. In the dream, he drank the milk, and gave the rest of it to 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. The people asked, "What is its interpretation?" He replied, "Knowledge." Similarly, when Allah took him on his Night Journey, the angel gave him a vessel which contained milk and a vessel which contained wine. The Prophet drank the milk,

and the angel said, "You have chosen the true nature (fitra). Allah has bestowed you on your community!" When milk appeared, it was the form of knowledge. Therefore it is knowledge taking on the form as milk, just as Jibril came to Maryam in the form of "a handsome, well-built man." (19:16)

When the Prophet said, "People are asleep and when they die, they wake up," he meant that everything that man sees in the life of this world is in the rank of the dreams of someone who is asleep, so it must be interpreted. Phenomenal being is imagination (khayal), but it is Allah in reality. (19) Whoever understands this has received the secrets of the Path. When the Prophet was offered milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and increase us in it" because he saw it as the form of knowledge, and he had been commanded to seek increase in knowledge. When he was offered something other than milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and give us better than it."

When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it to him by a request which arises from a divine command, He does not take him to account for it in the Next Abode. When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it by a request which is not by a divine command, the business in it is up to Allah. If He wishes, He will take him to account for it, and if He wishes, He will not take him to account for it. I hope for knowledge from Allah in particular for which He will not call one to account, for He commanded the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, to seek increase of knowledge, and it is the same command which is addressed to the Prophet's community. Allah said, "You have an excellent model in the Messenger of Allah," (33:21) and what greater model is there than this model who is a source of solace (20) to the one who possesses understanding from Allah?

Had we discussed the station of Sulayman in its entirety, you would have seen a matter whose revelation would have struck you with terror. Most of the men of knowledge of this Path have no knowledge of the state and rank of Sulayman. The business is not as they claim. (21)

Notes to Chapter 16:

1. In Qur'an 27:30. The story is found in Sura 27. When Sulayman hears of the kingdom of Queen Bilqis in Sheba', he sends the hoopoe to take a letter to her.
2. When the Prophet sent Chosroes or Khosrau a letter inviting him to Islam, he tore it up after it was read to him.
3. Ref. Qur'an 38:35, where Sulayman says, "My Lord, forgive me, and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me."
4. Type of malicious jinn.
5. Hadith. "Yesterday Shaytan rushed up suddenly to stop my prayer. Allah gave me power over him and I seized him. I wanted to tie him to one of the pillars of the mosque so that all of you could look at him, but then I remembered the supplication of my brother Sulayman, 'O Lord, forgive me and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me.' (38:35) Allah turned him away in humiliation." via Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful.
7. When He said, "I will write (mercy) for those who are godfearing...." (Qur'an 7:156)
8. i.e. Knowledge is more perfect than will.
9. Sulayman asked his council, "'O Council, who among you will bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?' An 'ifrit of the jinn said, 'I will bring it to you before you get

up from your seat...' He who possessed knowledge of the Book said, 'I will bring it to you before your glance returns to you.'" (27:38-40)

10. The name of the man of knowledge in Sulayman's council.

11. Rudayna was a woman who was famous for straightening spear shafts which were tested by shaking.

12. See Qur'an 54:55.

13. i.e. by the Qur'an and hadith.

14. By ijtiḥad.

15. This is in the same sura (27), ayat 44.

16. Qur'an Ref. 11:56, "I have believed in Allah, my Lord and your Lord. There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a straight path."

17. Various places in the Qur'an: 14:32, 16:12, 22:65, 31:20.

18. One variant has "reality" instead of Path (Tariq).

19. Inasmuch as phenomenal being is a divine shadow.

20. Uswa is model, or a person to be imitated and through whose emulation one gains consolation. The source of solace is the verbal noun from Form V of this verb, ta'assa, which means to become consoled by the example of another who had suffered in a similar fashion and been patient in it.

21. His kingdom does not decrease what he has in the Next world.

17: The Seal of the Wisdom of Existence (Wujud) in the Word of Da'ud (David)

"We subjected the mountains to glorify with him in the evening and sunrise, and also the birds, flocking together, all of them turned to him." Then Allah combined the kingdom and speech and prophethood in Da'ud when He says, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech." (1) Allah clearly and openly appointed Da'ud Khalif. This was Da'ud, peace be upon him. His freedom of action in the kingdom with this subjection was by a mighty command which was not completed in him alone. Allah also gave it to Sulayman who shared in it as He says, "And We gave knowledge to Da'ud and Sulayman who said, 'Praise be to Allah who has favoured us.'" (27:15) He says, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it. We gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79)

Know that since prophethood and the message are a divine privilege, and cannot be acquired. This is the prophethood which lays down a Shari'a. It is Allah's gift to them. Gifts of this sort are not recompense, nor is recompense demanded from them for these gifts. Allah bestows it on them as pure blessing and favour. So He says, "We gave him (i.e. Ibrahim) Ishaq and Ya'qub." (2) He says of Ayyub, "We gave him his family, and the same again with them." (38:43) He says of Musa, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet," (19:53). There are more instances like that. What they received first of all is what they will receive at the last in the totality of their states, or most of them. It is only His name, the Giver.

Allah says in respect of Da'ud, "We gave Da'ud great favour from Us." (34:10) He did not accompany that with a demand for recompense from Da'ud, nor did He say that He gave him what He mentioned as a reward. When He demanded gratitude for that by action, He demanded it of the people of Da'ud, and did not mention Da'ud himself, asking Da'ud's people to thank Him for the blessing which He gave to Da'ud. For Da'ud himself, it is a gift of pure blessing and favour. It is not like that for his people, but rather like the demands of barter. So Allah said, "Work, family of Da'ud, in thankfulness! But very few of My slaves are thankful." (3)

If the Prophets, peace be upon him, thanked Allah for what He had bestowed on them and given to them, that was not from the command of Allah. They undertook that freely from themselves, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood thanking Allah until his feet were swollen, when Allah had forgiven Him his wrong actions, past and present. When people commented what he did, he said, "Am I not a thankful slave?" Allah said that Nuh was a thankful slave. (4) So the thankful among the slaves are few.

The first blessing which Allah bestowed on Da'ud was that He gave him a name which does not have any connected letters in it:

D W D

By this, He cut him off from the world and He told us this by the name itself which is dâl, alif, and wâw. Allah named Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, with both connected and separated letters:

So in this Allah both joined him and separated him from the world. He combined the two

states for him in his name as He combined the two states for Da'ud through meaning (ma'na) (5) although He did not put that in his name. That was a privilege which Muhammad had above Da'ud, i.e. calling him by this name. The matter was thus completed for Muhammad in all its aspects. It is the same in his name Ahmad.

AHMAD

That is from the wisdom of Allah.

Then He spoke about the blessing He gave Da'ud in the mountains' echoing of glorification with him. (6) So they glorified with his glorification that the deed might be his. It was the same with the birds. He gave him power and described him by it, (7) and He gave him wisdom and decisive speech.(8)

Then the greatest blessing and nearest rank which Allah appointed for him was that his khalifate was mentioned in the divine text. He did not do that with any of his kind, and there were khalifs among them. Allah said, "Da'ud, We have made you a khalif on the earth, so judge between people with truth and do follow your own desires," i.e. whatever comes to your mind in judgement without revelation from Me, "letting them misguide you from the Way of Allah," (38:26) from the path which I revealed to My Messengers. Then Allah showed adab with him and said, "Those who are misguided from the Way of Allah will receive a harsh punishment since they forgot the Day of Reckoning." He did not say to him, "If you go astray from My Path, there is a terrible punishment for you." If you said that Adam is mentioned as the Khalif in divine text, we will say that it is not the same as in the text regarding Da'ud, for Allah said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif on the earth." (2:30) He did not say, "I am making Adam a khalif." Even if He had said that, it still would not be the same as His words, "We have made you a khalif," in respect of Da'ud. One is implied and the other is explicit. Mentioning Adam in the story after that did not indicate that he is the same as the khalif of whom Allah spoke. Occupy your mind with the transmissions of Allah on His slaves when He transmits them. It is the same in respect to Ibrahim the friend, "I will make you an Imam for the people." (2:124) He did not say "a khalif". We know that the imamate here means the khalifate, but it is not the same because He did not mention it by the most specific of its names which is the khalifate.

Then part of bestowing the khalifate on Da'ud is that He made him a khalif of judgement. That is only from Allah. He told him, "Judge between people with the truth." (5:42) The khalifate of Adam was not of this rank. Da'ud's khalifate was that he follow what was in it previously, not that he delegated with the divine judgement of Allah in His creation. If that had been the case, it would have occurred. However, our discourse is only regarding the khalifs on the earth from Allah, and they are Messengers. As for the khalifate today, it is from the Messengers, not from Allah, so they only judge by what the Messengers prescribed for them. They do not go beyond that except when there is a small point which is only known by those like us. That is in taking what they judge by, from what is in the Shari'a of the Messenger, peace be upon him.

The khalifate is from the Messenger. He takes the judgement from him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, by transmission or by ijtiḥad, whose basis is also transmitted from him. Some of us think that the one who takes the judgement takes it from Allah, for he is a khalif from Allah by the source of that judgement. The substance is his inasmuch as it was the Messenger's - the source of his judgement is that of the Messenger's. Outwardly he follows,

not disputing his judgement, as will be the case with 'Isa when he descends and judges. It is the same when the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Those are the ones whom Allah has guided, so be guided by their guidance." (9) This relates to what he recognises as one who is singled out and one who conforms. It is in him by the degree of what the Prophet established of the Shari'a which from the previous Messengers since he confirmed it. We follow him in relation to its confirmation, not because it is a Shari'a of someone else before him. In the same way, the Khalif takes from Allah the same thing that he takes from the Messenger.

In the language of unveiling, we call him "the khalif of Allah", and with outward knowledge, we say "the khalif of the Messenger of Allah". For this reason, the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, died and did not transmit the khalifate from himself to anyone else for he knew that among the slaves of Allah are those who will take the khalifate from their Lord. Thus the khalif from Allah is in conformity with the judgements of the Shari'a. Since the Prophet knew that, he did not hinder the matter. Allah has khalifs in His creation who take from the mine of the Messenger and the Messengers that which the Messengers took. They recognise the virtue of their predecessor there because the Messenger is a vessel for increase. The khalif is not a container for the increase which, had he been the Messenger, he would have received. He only gives knowledge and judgement in what he legislates through the specific legislation of the Messenger. Outwardly he follows the Messenger without opposition.

Do you not see that in the case of 'Isa, peace be upon him, when the Jews imagined that he did not add to Musa, as is the case with what we said about the Khalifate today with the Messenger, they accepted him and confirmed him? When he added judgement and abrogated judgement, Musa confirmed it, for 'Isa was a Messenger. They did not accept that because he differed from their creed, and the Jews did not know the matter for what it was - this is why they sought to kill him. His story is what Allah relates to us about them and him in His Mighty Book. He was a Messenger before increase. As for decrease of the judgement or its increase, it is confirmed since decrease is increase of judgement without a doubt.

The khalifate today does not have this rank, but it decreases or increases based on the Shari'a which is confirmed by itjihad, not on the Shari'a which Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, articulated. The khalif might do something which is counter to a hadith in a certain judgement, and so he imagines that that comes from ijthihad. That is not the case, but rather this Imam has not confirmed that the transmission with respect to unveiling is from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. If it had been confirmed, he would have judged by it. If the path in it is fairness in justice, he is not protected from illusion. It is not by transmission in meaning.

Something like this occurs in the khalif today. Similarly, it also applies to 'Isa for, when he descends, he will remove much of the Shari'a established by itjihad. By removing that, he will clarify the form of the legislated truth which he had, especially when the judgements of the Imams differ in the same event. We know absolutely that when revelation descended, it descended in a certain way. That is the divine judgement and none other! Allah confirmed it and it is the Shari'a of confirmation by the removal of interdiction from this community and the vastness of its judgements in it.

As for the statement of the Prophet, "If there are two khalifs, then slay one of them," this is the outward khalifate which has the sword. If they are in agreement, then one of them must

be killed by the conflict of the khalifate of meaning. There is no actual killing in it, but killing comes with the outward khalifate. If the khalif does not possess this station, being the khalif of the Messenger of Allah - it is just being from the principle of the basis by which the existence of two gods could be imagined: "If there had been any gods besides Allah in heaven or earth, they would both be ruined," (21:22) even if they are in agreement. We know that if they differ implicitly, the judgement of one of the two will be valid. The one with the operative judgement is the god properly speaking. The one whose judgement is not operative is not god.

From this, we know that every valid judgement in the world today is the judgement of Allah even if it differs from the established judgement in its outward manifestation called the Shari'a. The only judgement which is valid belongs to Allah in the heart of the matter, because the matter which occurs in the world is based on the judgement of the Divine Will, not on the judgement of the established Shari'a, (10) whose establishment itself comes from the Will. For that reason, He put His determination into effect. Therefore, Will only has determination in the matter, not in the act which it brings.

The power of the Will (mashi'a) is immense. (11) This is why Abu Talib (12) considered it to be the Throne of the Essence, since the will itself necessitates judgement. Nothing occurs in existence nor disappears from it without the Will. When there is opposition to the divine command here, it is called "rebellion". It is only commanding the means, not the command which brings things into being. None opposes Allah at all in what He does in respect to the command of the Will. Opposition only occurs in respect of the command of means. So understand that!

Properly speaking, the command of the Will is directed to bringing the action itself into existence, not to the one at whose hands the action manifests itself. It is impossible that the action should not be. However it takes place in a particular locus, and so, at one moment, it is called opposition to the command of Allah, and at another moment it is called agreement and obedience to the command of Allah. The language of praise and blame follow the action accordingly.

Since the matter itself is based on what we have stated about it, creation of all sorts therefore hopes for happiness. He designated this station as "mercy which encompasses everything." (13) It preceded divine wrath, and the predecessor comes before as is its right. That which the latter judges is what the former judged. Mercy obtained it since nothing preceded it, so this is one meaning of "His mercy preceded His wrath" that mercy judges the one who reaches it. It stands at the end. Therefore the end must be reached, and thus mercy and parting from wrath must be reached. It has jurisdiction over everything which reaches it according to what is given to it by the state of the one who arrives.

Whoever possesses understanding
witnesses what we have said.
If they do not understand,
they should take it from us.
There is only what we mentioned in this matter,
so rely on it and be in it now as we were.
What we recited to you came from it to us,
and from us to you is what we gave you from us.

As for the softening of iron, (14) hard hearts are softened by reprimand and threat as fire softens iron. The hardness of hearts is a stronger hardness than that of stone. Fire breaks stone, calcifies it and does not soften it. Iron was only softened for him so that protective coats of mail could be fashioned. This is an instruction from Allah that the thing is only protected by itself.¹ Mail protects against the spearhead, the sword, the knife and the arrowhead - protection against iron is by iron. The Muhammadan Shari'a brings, "I take refuge with You from You." Understand this! This is the spirit of the softening of iron. He is the Avenger, the Merciful, and Allah grants success.

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. Qur'an 38:18-20.
2. 6:84;19:49; 21:72; 29:29.
3. Qur'an 34:13.
4. Qur'an 17:3.
5. As he had prophethood, the message, the khalifate, the kingdom, knowledge, wisdom, and discrimination.
6. Qur'an 34:10, "O mountains and births! echo with him in his praise!"
7. Qur'an 38:17, "Remember Our slave Da'ud, who possessed true strength."
8. Qur'an 38:20, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech."
9. Qur'an 6:90.
10. See the Qur'an 74:54-56, "It is truly a reminder to which anyone who wills may pay heed. But they will only pay heed if Allah wills."
11. The reality of the will necessitates judgement because it is the same as making a demand.
12. Al-Makki.
13. Qur'an 7:156, also 40:7.
14. Qur'an 34:10, "We softened iron for him: 'Fashion wide coats of mail and measure well the links.'"

18: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath (Nafas) in the Word of Yunus (Jonah)

Know that this human organism in its perfection consists of spirit (ruh), body and self (nafs). Allah created it in His form. The disintegration of its structure is only undertaken by the One who created it either by His hand - and it is only that - or by His command. Whoever undertakes to do that without the command of Allah has wronged himself and exceeded the limits of Allah in it and rushed to the ruin of the one whom Allah has commanded to thrive. Know that compassion to the slaves of Allah is more proper through preservation than jealousy in Allah.

Da'ud, peace be upon him, wanted to build the Bayt al-Muqaddas, (1) and built it many times. Whenever he finished it, it was destroyed. He complained about that to Allah. Allah revealed to him, "This House of Mine will not be built by the hands of one who has shed blood." Da'ud said, "O Lord, was that not for Your sake?" Allah said, "Yes, but are they not My slaves?" Da'ud said, "O Lord, let it be built at the hands of someone who is from me!" Allah revealed to him, "Your son Sulayman will build it."

What is meant in this story is that the preservation and maintenance of this human organism is better than its destruction. Do you not see that Allah has prescribed jizya (2) and research of peace with those who had opposed the Din in order to spare them. He said, "If they incline to peace, you too incline to it, and put your trust in Allah." (8:61)

Do you not see that for the one who has responsibility for retaliation, accepting blood-money or pardoning is prescribed for the next-of-kin who is the responsible guardian? If he refuses to accept either, then the killer can be slain in retaliation. Do you not see how when the next-of-kin consists of a group of people, and one of them accepts the blood-money or pardons the person while the rest of the group want him killed, Allah observes the one who pardoned and prefers him to the one who did not pardon. Do you not see that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever is in a position to retaliate and slays the person is like him"? Allah says, "The repayment of a bad action is one equivalent to it," (42:40) so He made retaliation an evil deed, i.e. that deed is evil even though it is part of the Shari'a. Whoever pardons and makes amends has a reward due from Allah because he is based on His form. Whoever pardons and does not slay, his reward is due to the One on whose form he is based, because the One who fashioned is more entitled to it, and his existence only appeared by the name the Manifest.

Whoever preserves the person, preserves Allah. Man is not blameable by his source, but by his action, and his action is not the same as him. We are discussing his action, and action belongs only to Allah, even though some actions are blamed and some are praised. The language of blame in respect to purpose which is reprehensible with Allah, and the only thing reprehensible is what is made to be so by the Shari'a. The Shari'a makes something reprehensible because of what Allah made known or which He made known through someone He has instructed. So Allah prescribed retaliation by necessity for the preservation of the human race and to prevent people exceeding the limits of Allah. Allah says, "There is life for you in retaliation, O you who possess intelligence (lit. cores)!" (3) (2:179) They are the people of the core who stumble onto the secret of divine laws and wisdoms.

Since you know that Allah preserves this organism and preserves its continuance, you should also preserve it since you have that happiness. While man is still alive, he hopes that he will

obtain the attribute of perfection for which he was created. Whoever strives to destroy it, strives to prevent the acquisition of that for which he was created. How excellent is what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Shall I tell you what is better and more excellent for you when you meet your enemies, smite their necks and they smite yours? Remembering Allah."

That is because the only one who knows the value of this human organism is the one who remembers Allah with the invocation (dhikr) demanded of him. (4) Allah sits with the one who remembers Him, (5) and the sitter is witnessed by the one doing the invocation. When the one doing the invocation does not witness Allah who sits with him, then he is not doing invocation. When Allah is mentioned, He flows in all parts of the slave, not just in his invocation with the tongue. Allah, at that moment, is only the Companion of the tongue in particular. The tongue sees Him, inasmuch as the man, (6) in respect of his sight does not see Him. (7)

Understand this secret in the invocation of those who are heedless! The heedless person who does invocation is present without a doubt, and the One mentioned sits with him and so he witnesses Him. In respect of his heedlessness, this person does not do invocation and Allah does not sit with the heedless. Man is many but with a single source. Allah is one source but has many Divine Names, just as man has many parts. What is required of the invocation of one part is not the invocation of another part. Allah sits with the part which is invoking Him, and the other part is described as heedless. There must be some part of man doing invocation, so Allah sits with that part, and He preserves the rest of the parts by His concern.

When Allah undertakes the destruction of this organism by what is called "death", that is not negation (i'dam) , but rather separation. He takes man to Him, and what is meant is only Allah's taking man to Him, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." (11:123) When He takes him to Him, He fashions him a different composition than this composition. The new composition is from the genus of the abode to which he has moved, that is, the Abode of Going-on, because equilibrium exists. The creature thus will never die, i.e. his parts will never be separated.

As for the people of the Fire, they will return to bliss, but it will be in the Fire since after the end of the duration of punishment, it must become cold and peace according to the mercy which preceded it. This is their bliss. The bliss of the people of the Fire, after claims are settled, is the bliss of the friend of Allah, Ibrahim, when he was thrown into the Fire.⁸ He was punished by the sight of it since his knowledge told him that it is a form which causes pain to any living being which is near it. He did not know what Allah intended by it and from it in respect to him.

So after the existence of these pains, he will find cold and peace in spite of the fact that he still witnesses the phenomenal form which is fire in the eyes of the people. The single thing has various modes in the eyes of the onlookers. The divine tajalli is also like that. If you wish, you could say that the tajalli of Allah resembles this, and if you wish, you could say that the world is in the eye of the beholder which contains the parable of Allah in the tajalli, and so it takes on various modes in the eye of the onlooker according to the onlooker's disposition. The onlooker's disposition varies with the modalities of the tajalli. All of this is permissible in the realities.

Had a slain person or one who had died not returned to Allah when he died or was slain,

Allah would not have decreed their deaths nor prescribed their slaying. All is in His hand, and there is no loss in respect to Him. He prescribes slaying and decrees death by His knowledge that His slave will not pass from Him, for he returns to Him as Allah says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." So freedom of action occurs in it, and He is the One with freedom of action. Nothing is outside of Him of which He is not the source. Rather, His He-ness is the source of that thing, and He is the One who gives it its unveiling when He says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned."

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. The Temple (Beth ha-Mikdash) in Jerusalem. The chapter is an evident proof against the lies circulated by the occupier of al-Aqsa, Mr. 'Ikrimah Sabri, after the Ahlu-s-Sunnah were expelled from it.
2. Poll tax paid by non-Muslims.
3. Lubb: In Arabic there is no word for mind. However, in the Qur'an the word that designates a central locus of awareness in the human being is lubb, which means core. It is the heart viewed as an organ of gnosis and not merely as a valve which pumps blood to the head. Ibn al-'Arabi says that it is that part of knowledge which is protected from the hearts which are attached to phenomenal being.
4. Which is to remember Allah on the tongues while banishing passing thoughts and the chatter of the nafs while you watch Allah with the heart.
5. Hadith qudsi, "The people of My dhikr are the people I sit with..." in Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Majah, etc.
6. Insan - also the pupil of the eye.
7. "Eyesight cannot perceive Him but He perceives eyesight. He is the All-Penetrating, the All-Aware." (Qur'an 6:103)
8. See Qur'an 21:69.

18: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath (Nafas) in the Word of Yunus (Jonah)

Know that this human organism in its perfection consists of spirit (ruh), body and self (nafs). Allah created it in His form. The disintegration of its structure is only undertaken by the One who created it either by His hand - and it is only that - or by His command. Whoever undertakes to do that without the command of Allah has wronged himself and exceeded the limits of Allah in it and rushed to the ruin of the one whom Allah has commanded to thrive. Know that compassion to the slaves of Allah is more proper through preservation than jealousy in Allah.

Da'ud, peace be upon him, wanted to build the Bayt al-Muqaddas, (1) and built it many times. Whenever he finished it, it was destroyed. He complained about that to Allah. Allah revealed to him, "This House of Mine will not be built by the hands of one who has shed blood." Da'ud said, "O Lord, was that not for Your sake?" Allah said, "Yes, but are they not My slaves?" Da'ud said, "O Lord, let it be built at the hands of someone who is from me!" Allah revealed to him, "Your son Sulayman will build it."

What is meant in this story is that the preservation and maintenance of this human organism is better than its destruction. Do you not see that Allah has prescribed jizya (2) and research of peace with those who had opposed the Din in order to spare them. He said, "If they incline to peace, you too incline to it, and put your trust in Allah." (8:61)

Do you not see that for the one who has responsibility for retaliation, accepting blood-money or pardoning is prescribed for the next-of-kin who is the responsible guardian? If he refuses to accept either, then the killer can be slain in retaliation. Do you not see how when the next-of-kin consists of a group of people, and one of them accepts the blood-money or pardons the person while the rest of the group want him killed, Allah observes the one who pardoned and prefers him to the one who did not pardon. Do you not see that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever is in a position to retaliate and slays the person is like him"? Allah says, "The repayment of a bad action is one equivalent to it," (42:40) so He made retaliation an evil deed, i.e. that deed is evil even though it is part of the Shari'a. Whoever pardons and makes amends has a reward due from Allah because he is based on His form. Whoever pardons and does not slay, his reward is due to the One on whose form he is based, because the One who fashioned is more entitled to it, and his existence only appeared by the name the Manifest.

Whoever preserves the person, preserves Allah. Man is not blameable by his source, but by his action, and his action is not the same as him. We are discussing his action, and action belongs only to Allah, even though some actions are blamed and some are praised. The language of blame in respect to purpose which is reprehensible with Allah, and the only thing reprehensible is what is made to be so by the Shari'a. The Shari'a makes something reprehensible because of what Allah made known or which He made known through someone He has instructed. So Allah prescribed retaliation by necessity for the preservation of the human race and to prevent people exceeding the limits of Allah. Allah says, "There is life for you in retaliation, O you who possess intelligence (lit. cores)!" (3) (2:179) They are the people of the core who stumble onto the secret of divine laws and wisdoms.

Since you know that Allah preserves this organism and preserves its continuance, you should also preserve it since you have that happiness. While man is still alive, he hopes that he will

obtain the attribute of perfection for which he was created. Whoever strives to destroy it, strives to prevent the acquisition of that for which he was created. How excellent is what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Shall I tell you what is better and more excellent for you when you meet your enemies, smite their necks and they smite yours? Remembering Allah."

That is because the only one who knows the value of this human organism is the one who remembers Allah with the invocation (dhikr) demanded of him. (4) Allah sits with the one who remembers Him, (5) and the sitter is witnessed by the one doing the invocation. When the one doing the invocation does not witness Allah who sits with him, then he is not doing invocation. When Allah is mentioned, He flows in all parts of the slave, not just in his invocation with the tongue. Allah, at that moment, is only the Companion of the tongue in particular. The tongue sees Him, inasmuch as the man, (6) in respect of his sight does not see Him. (7)

Understand this secret in the invocation of those who are heedless! The heedless person who does invocation is present without a doubt, and the One mentioned sits with him and so he witnesses Him. In respect of his heedlessness, this person does not do invocation and Allah does not sit with the heedless. Man is many but with a single source. Allah is one source but has many Divine Names, just as man has many parts. What is required of the invocation of one part is not the invocation of another part. Allah sits with the part which is invoking Him, and the other part is described as heedless. There must be some part of man doing invocation, so Allah sits with that part, and He preserves the rest of the parts by His concern.

When Allah undertakes the destruction of this organism by what is called "death", that is not negation (i'dam) , but rather separation. He takes man to Him, and what is meant is only Allah's taking man to Him, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." (11:123) When He takes him to Him, He fashions him a different composition than this composition. The new composition is from the genus of the abode to which he has moved, that is, the Abode of Going-on, because equilibrium exists. The creature thus will never die, i.e. his parts will never be separated.

As for the people of the Fire, they will return to bliss, but it will be in the Fire since after the end of the duration of punishment, it must become cold and peace according to the mercy which preceded it. This is their bliss. The bliss of the people of the Fire, after claims are settled, is the bliss of the friend of Allah, Ibrahim, when he was thrown into the Fire.⁸ He was punished by the sight of it since his knowledge told him that it is a form which causes pain to any living being which is near it. He did not know what Allah intended by it and from it in respect to him.

So after the existence of these pains, he will find cold and peace in spite of the fact that he still witnesses the phenomenal form which is fire in the eyes of the people. The single thing has various modes in the eyes of the onlookers. The divine tajalli is also like that. If you wish, you could say that the tajalli of Allah resembles this, and if you wish, you could say that the world is in the eye of the beholder which contains the parable of Allah in the tajalli, and so it takes on various modes in the eye of the onlooker according to the onlooker's disposition. The onlooker's disposition varies with the modalities of the tajalli. All of this is permissible in the realities.

Had a slain person or one who had died not returned to Allah when he died or was slain,

Allah would not have decreed their deaths nor prescribed their slaying. All is in His hand, and there is no loss in respect to Him. He prescribes slaying and decrees death by His knowledge that His slave will not pass from Him, for he returns to Him as Allah says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." So freedom of action occurs in it, and He is the One with freedom of action. Nothing is outside of Him of which He is not the source. Rather, His He-ness is the source of that thing, and He is the One who gives it its unveiling when He says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned."

Notes to Chapter 18:

1. The Temple (Beth ha-Mikdash) in Jerusalem. The chapter is an evident proof against the lies circulated by the occupier of al-Aqsa, Mr. 'Ikrimah Sabri, after the Ahlu-s-Sunnah were expelled from it.
2. Poll tax paid by non-Muslims.
3. Lubb: In Arabic there is no word for mind. However, in the Qur'an the word that designates a central locus of awareness in the human being is lubb, which means core. It is the heart viewed as an organ of gnosis and not merely as a valve which pumps blood to the head. Ibn al-'Arabi says that it is that part of knowledge which is protected from the hearts which are attached to phenomenal being.
4. Which is to remember Allah on the tongues while banishing passing thoughts and the chatter of the nafs while you watch Allah with the heart.
5. Hadith qudsi, "The people of My dhikr are the people I sit with..." in Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Majah, etc.
6. Insan - also the pupil of the eye.
7. "Eyesight cannot perceive Him but He perceives eyesight. He is the All-Penetrating, the All-Aware." (Qur'an 6:103)
8. See Qur'an 21:69.

19: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Unseen in the Word of Ayyub (Job)

Know that the secret of life flows in water, for it is the basis of the components and the basic elements. For this reason, Allah made every living thing of water. (1) There is nothing which is not alive, so there is nothing which does not proclaim His praise, but their extolling is only understood by divine unveiling. (2) Nothing extols unless it is alive. So the basis of everything is water. Do you not see how the Throne is on the water because it was formed from it? (3) It oppresses the water while the water underneath it maintains it. In the same way, Allah created man a slave. Then he was haughty towards his Lord and put himself above Him. In spite of this, Allah preserves him from underneath in respect of the height of this slave who is ignorant of himself. This is what the Prophet said, "If you let a rope fall, it would fall on Allah." So he indicated that "below" is related to Him as "above" is related to Him when He said, "They fear their Lord above them," (16:50) and "He is the Absolute Master over His slaves." (6:18; 6:61) So He has "above" and "below" For this reason, the six directions only appeared in respect of man, who is on the form of the All-Merciful.

There is no nourisher except Allah. He said of one group, "If they had implemented the Torah and the Gospel," using the indefinite and being general, "and what was sent down to them from their Lord," and this includes every judgement sent down on the tongue of a Messenger or someone inspired, "they would have been fed from above their heads," and He is the Nourisher in respect of the aboveness which is ascribed to Him, "and beneath their feet," (5:66) as He is the Nourisher in respect of the belowness which He ascribes to Himself on the tongue of His Messenger, who translates from Him. If the Throne had not been on the water, its existence would not have been maintained. The existence of the living sustains life. Do you not see that when the living dies the customary death, the parts of his structure disintegrate and his faculties are eliminated from that particular structure? Allah said to Ayyub, "Stamp your foot! Here is a cool bath," (38:42) meaning that since he had an excess of the heat of pain, He would alleviate it by the coolness of the water. For this reason, the medicine was decrease from excess and excess in decreasing. What is meant is the demand of balance, and the only way to it is by approaching it.

However, we said that there is no way achieve equilibrium because realities and witnessing constantly accord taking-form with every single breath. (4) Taking-form (takwin) only comes from an inclination which is called deviation or decomposition in nature. In Allah it is the will, and it is inclination to one particular goal rather than another. Equilibrium denotes sameness in all, but this does not occur. For this reason, we are deprived of the principle of equilibrium. Allah's description with pleasure and anger and the attributes is related in prophetic divine knowledge. Pleasure obliterates anger, and anger obliterates pleasure from the pleasing. Perfect equilibrium would mean that anger and pleasure are the same. The Wrathful would not be wrathful towards the one he is angry with, but would be pleased with him. He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him that is, inclination. And Allah would not be pleased with the one He is pleased with and would be angry with him, and so He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him - that is, inclination.

We said this, however, in respect of the one who thinks that Allah's wrath will continue against the people of the Fire forever, as he claims. So they do not have the principle of pleasure from Allah. What is meant is true. It is as we have said, so the hopes of the people of the Fire lies in the removal of pains. Even if they still dwell in the Fire, that is pleasure, so

wrath is removed when the pains are removed since the source of pain is the source of wrath if you understand! Whoever is wrathful has suffered hurt. He only strives to avenge the object of his wrath by causing him suffering so that the wrathful might find relief by that. He transfers the pain which he has to the object of his wrath. If you separate Allah from the universe, then High indeed is He exalted above this attribute! If Allah is the He-ness of the universe, then all principles appear only in Him and from Him. It is His word, "to Him the entire affair will be returned" in reality and unveiling, "so worship Him and put your trust in Him" (11:123) in veil and covering. There is nothing in the realm of possibility more original than this universe because it is based on the form of the Merciful which Allah brought into existence - He manifested His existence by the existence of the universe as man manifests the existence of the natural form. We are His manifest form, and His He-ness is the spirit of this form which governs it. There is no management except in Him as it is only from Him. He is the First by meaning and the Last by form, and the Manifest by the changing of judgements and states, and the Inner by management. "He has knowledge of all things." "He witnesses everything" (5) so He knows by direct witnessing, not by thought. It is the same with the knowledge of tasting (dhawq) which does not derive from thought. Tasting is sound knowledge. Other things are only conjecture and surmise, and that is not knowledge at all.

Then Ayyub had that water to drink to remove the pain of thirst which was from the weariness and punishment with which shaytan (6) had touched him, (7) that is, distance from the realities which he perceived for what they were. Ayyub perceived them for what they were, and by his perception, he was in the place of nearness. Every witnessed one is close to the eye ('ayn=source), even if it is far away by the interval of distance. Vision reaches it, since it is witnessing. If it had not been for that, he would not witness it, nor would what is witnessed be reached by vision, however you want to put it. The witnessed is near between the sight and the seer. This is why Ayyub alluded to touch and ascribed it to Shaytan in spite of the nearness of touch. He said, "The one distant from me is near because of his power over me."

You know that distance and nearness are two relative matters, for they are two ascriptions. They have no existence in the source in spite of the fact that there judgements are established in the far and near. Know that the secret of Allah in Ayyub (whom He made an example for us in a written existing book which this Muhammadan community reads in order to learn what is in it, and they attach honor to the one who possesses it), is that Allah praised him for his patience in his supplication to remove affliction from him. We know that when the slave calls on Allah to remove affliction from him without that lessening his patience, then he is patient and the best of the slaves, as Allah said, "What an excellent slave! He truly turned to his Lord." (8) (38:44) This means he goes back to Allah, not back to the cause.

Allah affects by the cause because the slave depends on it since the causes which will remove any one matter are many, but the Causer is but one. It is more fitting that the slave return to the One Source in order to remove that pain by the cause of that than to the particular cause. It may be that it will not conform to Allah's knowledge in it, and then some will say, "Allah did not answer me." Yet he did not call on him, but he inclined to a particular cause which neither the time nor the moment requires. Ayyub acted by the wisdom of Allah since he was a Prophet. He knew that with one group, patience is what holds the self back from complaint. That is not our definition of patience (sabr). Its definition is to hold the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah, not to Allah. The first group is veiled in their view that the complainer is lessened in contentment (rida) with the decree by complaint. That is not the case.

Contentment with the decree is not lessened by complaint to Allah or to others, but contentment with the decreed is lessened. We are not speaking about contentment with the decreed. Affliction is what is decreed and not the same as the Decree. Ayyub knew that holding the self back from complaint to Allah for the removal of affliction is to oppose divine force. It is ignorance if, when Allah afflicts someone by what gives him pain, he does not call on Allah to remove that painful matter from him. The one who has realization must supplicate and ask Allah to remove that from him. For that gnostic who possesses unveiling, that removal comes from the presence of Allah. Allah describes Himself as "hurt", so He said, "those who hurt Allah and His Messenger." (33:57) What hurt is greater than that Allah test you with affliction in your heedlessness of Him or a divine station which you do not know so that you return to Him with your complaint so that He can remove it from you? Thus the need which is your reality will be proven. The hurt is removed from Allah by your asking Him to repel it from you, since you are His manifest form.

One of the gnostics was hungry and wept. Someone who had no tasting (dhawq) in that area censured him for that. The gnostic said, "But Allah makes me hungry so that I might weep. He tests me by affliction so that I might ask Him to remove it from me. This does not lessen my being patient." We know that patience is holding the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah.

By "other" I mean a particular aspect of Allah. Allah specified a particular one of Allah's aspects, and it is called the aspect of He-ness, so he calls on Him from that aspect to remove affliction from him, not from the other aspects called causes. They are only Him in respect to elaboration of the matter in itself. The gnostic's request does not veil him from the He-ness of Allah in removing affliction from him and the fact that all the causes are Him from a particular point of view. This path is only obliged on the people of adab among the slaves of Allah who are entrusted with the secrets of Allah. Allah has guardians whom only Allah recognizes, and some of them recognize each other. We have counselled you, so strive, and ask of Allah!

Notes to Chapter 19:

1. Qur'an See 21:30.
2. See Qur'an 17:44.
3. See 11:7. As for the connection between Water (al-ma') and the Throne (al-'arsh), see the hadith narrated by Imam al-Bukhari, "Allah existed and there was nothing with Him, then His Throne was on the water, and then He created the heavens and the earth."
4. Tajdid al-khalq, instantaneous renewal of creation.
5. See Qur'an 5:117; 22:17, etc.
6. The root of the name Shaytan is shaytana, meaning "to be remote from".
7. Qur'an 38:41.
8. Awwab, which means one who frequently turns to Allah.

20: The Seal of the Wisdom of Majesty in the Word of Yahya (John the Baptist)

This is the wisdom of firstness in the names. Allah called him Yahya, i.e. the dhikr of Zakariyya was Yahya brought to life by him, and "a name We have given to no one else before." (19:7) He joined the attainment of the attribute, which is in the one who has passed on but left a son to revive his memory and his name through him. He called him "Yahya". His name Yahya is like knowledge by tasting. The memory of Adam, peace be upon him, was revived by Shith and that of Nuh by Sam. It is the same with the Prophets, peace be upon them; but Allah did not combine the name of knowledge from Him and the attribute for anyone before Yahya. It was an act of concern for Zakariyya from Allah, since Zakariyya said, "Give me an heir from You." (19:5) He mentioned Allah before the mention he mentioned his son, as Asiya (1) mentioned the neighbor before the abode when she said, "Build a house in the Garden for me in Your presence." (66:11) Allah was generous to Zakariyya, for He granted his need and named him by His attribute. Yahya's name was a remembrance for what His Prophet Zakariyya asked of Him; because he preferred the going-on of dhikr-Ullah after his death, since the son is the secret of his father.

He said, "to be my inheritor and the inheritor of the family of Ya'qub." (19:6) Nothing is inherited in respect of these except for the station of dhikr-Ullah and calling to Him. Then Allah gave him the good news of what He appointed for him from His words, "Peace be upon him the day he was born, and the day he dies, and the day he is raised up again alive." (19:15) He brought the attribute of life, which is his name, and He informed him of His peace upon him. His words are true. He completed it, even if it is the word of the spirit, "Peace be upon me the day I was born, the day I die, and the day I am raised up again alive," (19:33) and this is more sublime and more perfect in oneness and belief in the interpretation. That in which the order of nature (2) was broken in respect to 'Isa was articulation. His intellect was given mastery and perfected at that time when Allah made him speak. In any case, mastery of articulation is not necessary.

'Isa spoke the truth in what he articulated but this is different than the one who was testified to, as in the case of Yahya. (3) Allah's greeting on Yahya was higher than the greeting of 'Isa on himself in this way since the ambiguity occurring in divine concern was removed. The immediate circumstances indicate his proximity to Allah in that and his sincerity, since he spoke in the cradle the form which indicated the innocence of his mother. He was one of the two witnesses. The other witness was the shaking of the dried trunk of the palm tree. (4) Fresh, ripe dates came tumbling down without the male palm tree or pollination. In the same way, Maryam bore 'Isa without a man, that is, without normal and customary intercourse. If a Prophet had said, "My sign and my miracle is that this wall will speak," and then the wall speaks and says, "You have lied, you are not the Messenger of Allah," then the sign is proven and it is confirmed by it that he is the Messenger of Allah. One does not pay any attention to what the wall said.

He introduces this probability into the words of 'Isa when his mother pointed to him while he was in the cradle. Allah's greeting on Yahya is higher than this element. The passage which indicates that he is the slave of Allah is in respect of the claim made about him that he was the son of Allah. The indication is completed by sheer articulation. He is the slave of Allah according to another group who speak of Prophethood. It increases the principle of probability in logical thought until his truthfulness appeared in the future regarding all that he

spoke about when he was in the cradle. So understand our allusion!

Notes to Chapter 20:

1. The wife of Pharaoh who was one of the perfect women.
2. Kharq al-'adat, miracle, literally, the breaking of the normal pattern of things.
3. 'Isa was a witness, not one who is the object of witness, since he testified on behalf of his mother.
4. See Qur'an 19:29.

21: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sovereignty (1) in the Word of Zakariyya (Zachariah)

Know that the mercy of Allah encompasses everything in existence and judgement, and the existence of wrath comes from the mercy of Allah by wrath. His mercy preceded His wrath, that is, the ascription of mercy to Him preceded the ascription of wrath. Then every source has an existence which demands that Allah's mercy encompass every source. For that reason, we say that the mercy of Allah encompasses all things in existence and principle.

The Divine Names are "things", but they derive from a single Source. The first thing that His mercy encompassed before time was its thingness, that source which gives existence to mercy by mercy. Thus the first thing that His mercy encompassed was itself, then the thingness indicated, then the thingness of every existent existing without end in this world and the Next, non-essential ('arad) and substance (jawhar), composite and simple. Neither the acquisition of a goal nor harmony of nature is taken into account rather, harmonious and inharmonious things are all encompassed by divine mercy in existence. We mentioned in The Makkan Revelations that effect only belongs to the non-existent, not the existent. If the existent had it, it is by the principle of the non-existent. It is a strange knowledge and a rare question. Only those who possess illusions (awhâm) know its realisation, and that is by their tasting (dhawq). (2)

The mercy of Allah pervades phenomenal beings, and circulates in essences and sources. The most ideal position of mercy is when it is known from witnessing with sublime thoughts. Everyone mercy designates is happy. There is only what mercy designates, and the mention of the mercy of things is the source of its bringing them into existence. Every existent thing has been shown mercy. O friend! Do not be veiled from the perception of what we have said by what you see of the troubles people experience and what you believe about the pains of the Next Abode which will not depart from the one whom they afflict.

First of all, know that mercy is in bringing-into-existence in general. In mercy by pains, only pains come into existence. So mercy has an effect in two ways - the first effect is by the essence, which is its bringing every existent source into existence. It does not regard desire or lack of it, suitability or lack of suitability. It looks at the source of every existent before its existence, or rather, it looks at its source-form. For this reason, it saw Allah-as-creature in creeds as a single source-form among the source-forms. Its mercy to itself is by bringing-into-existence. This is why we said that Allah-as-creature in creeds is the first thing shown mercy after its mercy to itself in its connection of bringing those shown mercy into existence.

It has another effect by request. Those who are veiled ask Allah to have mercy on them in their beliefs, and the people of unveiling ask for the mercy of Allah to settle on them. They ask for it by the name of Allah, and so they say, "O Allah! Have mercy on us!" and He only has mercy on them by carrying out mercy through them. It has authority because authority in reality belongs to the meaning based on place.

He is the Merciful in reality, so Allah is only merciful to His slaves, attentive to them by mercy. When mercy settles on them, they experience its authority through taste (dhawq). The one designated by mercy has had mercy known to him. The active participle is the Merciful (Rahîm) and the Mercy-Giver (Râhim), and this principle does not describe creatures because it is a matter of directing meanings to their essences.

States are neither existent nor non-existent they have no source in existence because they are relationships. They are not non-existent in principle because what knowledge establishes is called the "knower", and it is a state. The knower is an essence described by knowledge, but it is not the same as the essence nor is it the same as knowledge. There is only knowledge and the essence on which this knowledge is established. The being of the knower is a state of this essence when it is described by this meaning. The relationship of knowledge occurred to him, so he is called knowing. Mercy, properly speaking, is a relationship from the Mercy-giver, and it is necessarily part of the principle, so it is merciful. The One who brought it into existence in the one shown mercy did not bring it into existence in order to be shown mercy by it; He brought it into existence to show mercy to the one on whom it settled.

Allah is not in a place by events, so He is not in a place by bringing mercy into existence. He is the Mercy-Giver, and the Mercy-Giver is only Mercy-Giver by the establishment of mercy. He confirmed that He is the source of mercy. Whoever has not tasted this matter and has no part in it, does not dare to say that He is the source of mercy or the source of the attribute. Such a person says, "He is not the same as the attribute nor other than it." In his view, the attributes of Allah with Him are not Him, nor are they other-than-Him because he cannot deny them nor can he make them the same as Him. Thus he (3) moves to this interpretation, and it is a good interpretation. Yet there is another interpretation more appropriate to the matter than this one, and more likely to remove ambiguity. It is to deny the sources of the attributes any existence based on the essence of the one described. Rather, they are relationships and relative ascriptions between the one described by them and their intelligible sources. Although mercy is common to all of them, it is different in relationship to each Divine Name. (4)

For this reason, Allah is asked to show mercy by each Divine Name, so the mercy of Allah and its indirect reference, which is that which encompasses everything, has many branches according to the number of the Divine Names. It is not general in relation to that particular divine name in the statement of the one who asks, "O Lord, have mercy!" and other Divine Names, even the Avenger. So he says, "O Avenger, have mercy on me!" That is because these Names indicate the designated Essence and, by their realities, indicate different meanings. They call on Him by these Names in mercy with respect to their indication of the Essence called by that Name and no other not by what is indicated by that Name, separating it from another and distinguishing it. The Name is not distinguished from another, and with him it is the indication of the Essence. It is distinguished in itself from other-than-it by its essence, as it is generally agreed that, by any expression, this Name is a reality distinct in its essence from other-than-it.

The whole is set forth to indicate one designated source. There is no disagreement that each name has an authority which another does not have. That also must be taken into account, as one takes into account their indications of the named essence.

For this reason, Abu'l-Qasim ibn Qasi said regarding the Divine Names that each Name is, in its isolation, designated by all of the Divine Names since they preceded in mentioning its description by all the Names, that is, by their indication of one source. Although the Names based on it are many and their realities differ, i.e. the realities of these Names, the mercy is obtained by two means. The first is the path of obligation, and it is His word, "I shall prescribe it for those who are godfearing and pay zakat," (7:156) and He binds them by it through the attributes of knowledge and action. The other path by which mercy is obtained is the path of divine graciousness which is not connected to action. It is His words, "My mercy

embraces all things." Of this, it is said, "So that Allah may forgive you your earlier errors and any later ones." (48:2) And of this, there are His words, "Do what you want, I have already forgiven you." (5) So know that!

Notes to Chapter 21:

1. Al-Mâlikiyya. His state was dominated by the name al-Mâlik, the Sovereign, who prevails in His orders. This strength was shown in his himma whose fruit was Yahya.
2. Because they connect the imagination (wahm) to things and bring them into existence and thus have experiential knowledge of this. As for the one on whom illusion has no effect, he is far from this question.
3. The Imam of Ahlu-s-Sunnah wa-l-Jama'ah, Shaykh Abu-l-Hasan al-Ash'ari.
4. There is a specific mercy of Allah, of al-Rahman, of ar-Rahim, of al-Malik, etc.
5. This refers to an incident involving Hatib ibn Abi Balta'a. When the Muslim army prepared to set out to conquer Makka, Hatib sent a letter to warn the Quraysh which was intercepted. 'Umar wanted kill him for intelligence with the nemy in war, but the Prophet said, "O 'Umar, perhaps Allah has looked with favor on those who already fought at Badr and said, 'Do whatever you want. I have already forgiven you.'"

22: The Seal of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Word of Ilyas (Elijah)

Ilyas (Elijah) is none but Idris (Enoch), peace be upon him. He was a Prophet before Nuh, and Allah raised him to a high place. (1) He dwells in the heart of the spheres, the sphere of the sun. Then he was sent to the town of Baalbek (Ba'labakk). Baal is the name of an idol and "bakk" is the power of the village. The idol was called Baal and was singled out with domination. It was Ilyas who was Idris, who was given the example of the splitting of the mountain called "Lubnan (Lebanon)" which comes from lubana (desire, goal). What he needed was a horse of fire with all its trappings of fire. When he saw it, he rode it and appetite fell from him, and so there was intellect without appetite. There remained for him no connection with that which is connected to the desire of the self. For him, Allah was pure without connection. He had only half of gnosis of Allah. When the intellect is free of the self in respect to gathering knowledges by its discernment, its gnosis of Allah is based on disconnection (tanzih) not connection (tashbih).

When Allah gives gnosis by tajalli, then gnosis of Allah is perfected.
Disconnection is used in one place and connection in another place.

The gnostic sees the diffusion of Allah by existence in natural and elemental forms. There is no form but that he sees the source of Allah in its source. This is the complete perfect gnosis which is brought the roads (shara'i) revealed from Allah. By this recognition, all illusions (awham) have authority. For this reason, illusion has a stronger power in this human organism than the intellect, because the man of intellect even if his intellect reaches maturity is not free of the power which illusion has over him and over the formation of what he reasons. Illusion is the greatest power in this perfect human organism. The revealed roads brought it, and so you use both connection and disconnection. You use connection in disconnection by illusion, and disconnection in connection by the intellect. So the whole is connected to the whole. It is not possible that disconnection be free of connection nor connection from disconnection. Allah said, "Nothing is like Him," so He used connection and disconnection. "He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (2) and He used connection, and yet it is the greatest of ayat revealed on disconnection. Even so, it is not free of connection because of the Kayf (like).

So He has the most knowledge of Himself of those who know. He only designated Himself by what we mentioned. Then He said, "Glory be to your Lord, the Lord of Might, beyond anything they describe," (37:180) and they only describe according to what these realities accord them. He exalted Himself above their disconnection since they limit Him by that disconnection. That is due to the inability of the intellect to perceive the like of this.

Then all the roads (Shara'i) brought what the illusions dominate. They do not free Allah of an attribute in which He is manifest as they said. They brought that, and so communities acted on it. Allah granted them the tajalli. The heirs followed the Messengers closely, and said what the Messengers of Allah said. Allah knows best where He puts His message, and so Allah knows best who turns his face to Him in a particular aspect by transmission to the Messenger of Allah. One aspect of His begins with "He knows best where to place His message." (6:124) There is a reality in each of the two aspects for that reason, we speak of connection and disconnection, and disconnection and connection. After this (3) is established, we will lower the screens and drop the veils on the eye of the critic (4) and the one who simply follows a

creed. Both of them are among the forms in which Allah gives tajalli, but He has commanded the veil for us in order that different levels of excellence of the predisposition of forms might appear. One is given a tajalli in a form according to the predisposition of that form. What its reality and exigencies accord him is ascribed to him. That must be. The example of the one who sees Allah when he is asleep and does not deny it is this. Without a doubt, it is Allah Himself. He attaches to it the exigencies of that form and its realities in which He gives the tajalli in sleep. Then after that, he interprets, i.e. he transfers it to another matter which disconnection logically demands. If the one who interprets it has unveiling and belief (iman), then he does not transfer it to disconnection at all. Rather, he gives it the disconnection that is due it and what is due to that which is manifest in it, i.e. its connection/resemblance. Properly speaking, "Allah" is an expression for the one who understands the indication (ishara). (5)

The spirit of this wisdom and its seal is that the command is divided into the effector and the one effected. These are two expressions. The effector in every aspect and in every state and in every presence is Allah. The effected by every aspect and in every state and in every presence is the universe, even if it is Allah who comes. (6) Allah is everything at its foundation which corresponds. That which appears is forever and ever a branch from the root; divine love is a branch from the supererogatory acts of the slave. So this is an effect between the effector and the effected. Allah is the hearing of the slave and his sight and faculties from this love. (7) This is an established effect which, if you believe, you cannot deny because it is confirmed by the Shari'a.

As for the person of sound intellect, he is either in possession of a divine tajalli in a natural locus of tajalli, (8) so he recognizes what we have said, or else he is a believing Muslim who believes in what was reported in sound tradition. The power of illusion must govern the man of intellect investigating what has been brought to him in this form because he believes in that form. As for the one who is not a believer, he judges illusion by illusion; and so he imagines by his logical discernment that he assigns to Allah what the tajalli gives him in dream. Illusion in that does not depart from him inasmuch as he is not aware because of his disregard for himself. From that is what Allah says, "Call on Me and I will answer You." (40:60) Allah also says, "If My slaves ask you concerning Me, I am near. I answer the call of the caller when he calls on Me," (2:186) since He only answers when there is someone who calls to Him. The source of the caller is the source of the answerer, but there is no disagreement about the difference of forms. They are two forms without a doubt.

All these forms are like Zayd's limbs. It is known that Zayd is one reality in personality, yet his hand is not the form of his foot nor his head nor his eye nor his eyebrow. He is one multiple - multiple by forms, one by source. That is like man who is one by source without a doubt. There is no doubt that 'Umar is not Zayd nor Khalid nor Ja'far, and that the individual persons of this one source are endless in existence. Even if man is one by source, he is many by forms and persons. If you are a believer, you know absolutely that Allah Himself will appear in a tajalli in a form on the Day of Rising. He will be recognized and then He will change form and be denied. (9) Then He will change from it again into another form and will not be recognized. He is the One giving tajalli and it is not other than Him in each form, even though it is known that this form is not that other form.

It is one source which has the same function as the mirror. When the viewer looks in it at the form of his belief in Allah, he recognizes Him, and so draws near Him. When it happens that he sees in it the belief of someone else, he denies Him since he sees his form and the form of someone else in the mirror. The mirror is but a single source while the forms are many in the

eye of the viewer. There is no form in the mirror which comprises them all at once. Although the phenomenal being of the mirror has an effect on the forms from one aspect, it does not have an effect on the forms from another aspect. The effect which it has makes the form change shape in smallness, largeness, length, and width, so it has an effect in quantities. This is attributable to it, but this changing of it is by the difference of the size of the mirrors. In the example, look at one of these mirrors, and do not look at all of them. It is your perception in respect to His being essence, and so He is independent of the universe, and in respect to the divine names. In that moment He is like the mirrors. Whatever Divine Name in which you look at yourself or simply look at. He manifests the reality of that Name in whoever looks. The matter is thus. If you understand, do not be anxious, and do not fear. Allah loves bravery, even to the extent of killing a snake. The snake is not other than your self, and the snake is alive through its self in form and reality. The thing is not killed by itself, even if the form is destroyed in the senses, The definition determines it, and imagination does not make it depart.

Since the matter is based on this, this is the safeguard of the essences and might and invincibility. You cannot destroy the definition. What might is greater than this might? You imagine by illusion that you have killed. By intellect and illusion, the form does not vanish from existence in the definition. The proof of that is, "You did not throw when you threw, but Allah threw." (8:17) The eye only perceived the form of Muhammad which had the throwing confirmed to it in the senses. It is what Allah denied the throwing to at first, and then confirmed in the middle, only to return to the perception that Allah was the One who threw in the form of Muhammad. One must believe this. So look at this effector when Allah descended into a Muhammadan form. Allah Himself informs His slaves of that, and none of us said that of Him, rather He said it of Himself. His report is true, and it is obligatory to believe it whether or not you perceive the knowledge of what He said, being a knower or believing Muslim.

Part of what shows you the weakness of the intellect's discernment in respect to its thought, since the intellect passes judgement on cause ('illa), is that cause is not an effect of the one who is the cause. This is the judgement of the intellect which is evident. There is only this in the knowledge of tajalli, and it is that the cause is an effect to whoever is the cause. That which the intellect governs is sound when discernment is clarified. Its goal in that is that, when it sees the matter differently than what logical proof would accord it, it says that the source after it is confirmed that it is one in this multiple, and inasmuch as it is cause in one of these forms belonging to any effect is not an effect of its effect, so that its effect would become a cause to it. This is his goal when he sees the matter for what it was, although he does not continue in his logical discernment.

Since the command in causality is of this sort, your opinion by the scope of logical discernment is not in other than this narrow limit. None are more reasonable than the Messengers, may the blessings of Allah be upon them, and they brought what they brought in transmission from the Divine Presence. They confirmed what the intellect confirmed. Then they gave more in what the intellect alone does not possess by its perception and what the intellect does not imagine directly, but one draws near to it in the divine tajalli. When he is alone with himself after the tajalli, he is confused about what he saw. If he is the slave of a Lord, his intellect returns to him, and if he is the slave of reasoning, Allah gives him back judgement. This is only as long as he is veiled in the dimension of this world from his dimension in the Next World.

The gnostics appear here as if they possessed the form of this world by virtue of the fact that its principles operate on them. However, Allah has transformed them inwardly to the dimension of the Next World. That must be the case. They are unknown by form except to whomever has had his inner eye unveiled by Allah so that he perceives. (10) There is no gnostic of Allah in respect of divine tajalli who is not based on the dimension of the Next World. He has been gathered in this lower world of his and has been called from his grave. He sees what they do not see, and he witnesses what they do not witness - as a mark of concern from Allah to some of His slaves in that respect.

Whoever wishes to find this wisdom of Ilyas-Idris to whom Allah gave two formations, so that he was a Prophet before Nuh, and then he raised him up and brought him down after that as a Messenger and so Allah joined for him the two degrees, let him descend from the authority of his intellect to his appetite and be an absolute animal so that he will be shown what every creature that crawls is shown except for the jinn and men. Then he will know that he has realized his animality, and it has two tokens. One is this unveiling so he sees who is punished in his grave and who has bliss. He sees the dead alive and the silent speaking and the sitting walking. The second token is muteness since, had he wanted to utter what he had seen, he would be unable to do so. Thus he has realized his animality. We had a pupil who acquired this unveiling although dumbness did not take hold of him, and so he did not fully realize his animality. When Allah established me in this station, I realized my animality with a complete realization. So I was seeing and wishing to utter what I was witnessing but I could not. So there was no difference between me and the mute who cannot speak.

When he realizes what we have mentioned, he will move to being pure intellect in natural matter. He will witness matters which are the roots of what is manifested in natural forms. He will know from where this principle is manifest in the natural form with the knowledge of tasting. Had it been unveiled that nature is the source of the breath of the All-Merciful, he would have been given much good. If he is restricted in what we have mentioned, this power from the gnosis which governs his intellect will be enough for him. He keeps company with gnostics, and by that he knows tasting. "You did not kill them, it was Allah who killed them," (8:17) yet only iron, the blow and that which is behind this form killed them. In the whole, killing and throwing took place. So he witnesses matters by their roots and by their forms, and he is complete. When he witnesses the breath, he is completely perfect. The breath of the All-Merciful is the source of the overflowing of existence and life on all, rather the source of Allah's descent to all forms.

Notes to Chapter 22:

1. A place from which, according to Sidi Muhiddin, Idris (Enoch) descended in order to become Ilyas (Elijah). See Qur'an 19:57, "Mention Idris in the Book. He was a true man and a Prophet. We raised him up to a high place."
2. Qur'an 42:11.
3. The rule of joining tanzih and tashbih.
4. The one who uses logical proof.
5. i.e. what he recognises from the word "Allah" extends only so far as his predisposition and understanding.
6. In the wârid.
7. "When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks".
8. i.e. the human form.

9. Hadith in Muslim: 1: 299, 302.

10. See Qur'an 50:22, "We have stripped you of your covering and today your sight is sharp."

23: The Seal of the Wisdom of Ihsan in the Word of Luqman

If Allah wishes, He wills provision for Him,
so all of phenomenal being is His food.
If Allah wishes, He wills provision for us,
so He is our food as He wishes.
His volition is His will, so say that He wished it.
So it is wished.
He wills increase and decrease.
So what He wishes is wished.
This is the distinction between them, (1)
so understand!
From a certain point of view,
their source is the same.

Allah says, "We gave Luqman wisdom," (31:12) and He says, "Whoever has been given wisdom has been given much good." (2:269) By the divine text, Luqman had much good as Allah has testified. The example of what Luqman said to his son is, "My son, even if something weighs as little as a mustard-seed, and it is inside a rock or anywhere else in the heavens or earth, Allah will bring it out." (31:16) This is a wisdom which is articulated, and that wisdom is his setting out that Allah is the One who brings forth. Allah confirmed that in His Book and did not refute what the speaker said.

As for the silent wisdom in it, and you know it by the circumstances, he is silent about the one to whom that grain is given. He did not mention him nor did he say to his son, "Allah will bring it to you or to other than you." He used bringing in general terms and denoted the thing brought in the heavens or in the earth as an instruction that the looker might regard His words, "He is Allah in the heavens and in the earth." (6:3) Luqman gave instruction by what he said and by what he remained silent on, so Allah is the source of every knowing thing because the known is more universal than the thing, so it denies unknown things.

Then he completed the wisdom and brought it to its full value in order that the structure might be complete in it. He said, "Allah is Latif (Subtle, Kind)." (31:16) Part of His subtleness (*latâfa*) and His kindness (*lutf*) is that He is in the thing named by such-and-such a definition in such-and-such a source of that thing, so it is only what its name indicates by convention and usage. It is said that these are names: heaven, earth, rock, tree, animal, angel, provision and food, and yet the source of everything is One. Thus the Ash'arites say about this that the entire universe is homogeneous in substance (*jawhar*), so it is one single substance.

It is the same as our statement that the source is One. They said that it varies by non-essentials. Thus our statement that it varies and becomes many through forms and relationships so as to provide distinction. It is said, "This is not that in respect to its form or its non-essential or natural disposition (*mizâj*)." Say whatever you like, but this is the same as that in respect to its substance. For this reason, the source of the substance is put in the definition of every form and disposition. However, we say that it is not other-than-Allah. The *mutakallim* thinks that it is called substance. Even though it is true, it is not the source of Allah of which the people of unveiling and *tajalli* speak. This is the wisdom of the "Latîf".

Then He is described when He says "the All-Aware (Khabir)," the One who knows by experience. It is His words, "We will test you until We know." (47:31) This is the knowledge of tastes. Allah put Himself with His knowledge of what the matter is in (our) profitable knowledge. No one can deny what Allah has written about Himself. Allah differentiated the knowledge of tasting and absolute knowledge. The knowledge of tasting is limited by the faculties. He said of Himself that He is the source of the faculties of His slave when He said, "I am his hearing," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his sight," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his tongue," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his foot and his hand." He did not restrict Himself to specifying the faculties, but He mentioned the members. The slave is not other than his members and faculties. The source called the slave is the Real, but the source of the slave is not the Compassionate Master.

Relationships are distinct by their essence. The one brought into relationship is not distinct. (2) Then He equalized His source in all relationships, for it is but one source with various ascriptions, relationships and attributes. Part of the completeness of Luqman's wisdom in instructing his son is what has come in the ayat of these two Divine Names, Latif and Khabir - Allah is called by them. If He had put that in phenomenal being (kawn) which is existence, and said, "He was (kana)," it would have been more complete in wisdom and more eloquent in admonition. Allah related the words of Luqman in meaning as he said it and did not add anything to it. His statement that Allah is the Latif, the Aware, is from the statement of Allah. Then Allah knew of Luqman that, had he said it (kana), it would have been utterly perfected by this.

As for his words, "If it should be but the weight of one grain of mustard-seed," it is for the one who has it as food. It is only the atom mentioned in His words, "Whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it." (99:7-8) A mustard-seed is the smallest thing consumed. If there had been anything smaller, Allah would have used it as He said, "He is not ashamed to make an example of a gnat." (2:26) Then since He knew that there is anything smaller than the gnat, He said "or of an even smaller thing," i.e. in smallness. This is the word of Allah, and that which is in the Sura of the Earthquake (az-Zalzal, 99) is also the word of Allah. So know that! That which is smaller than the gnat is the atom, and then there is another subtlety (latîfa). That is that the atom, in spite of its smallness, is also lighter in weight because it is alive, since the living is lighter than the dead. So the meaning is that when the deed is the weight of an atom in smallness and lightness, the recompense must be seen. We know that Allah did not restrict Himself to the weight of the atom, and there is nothing smaller than it. He used it by way of intensification, and Allah knows best.

When Luqman used the diminutive for his son, (3) it was the diminutive of mercy and thereby he gave him a legacy which contains his happiness if he acts according to it. The wisdom of Luqman's legacy lies in his prohibition to his son, "Do not associate anything with Allah. Associating others with Him is a terrible wrong." (31:13) The one wronged establishes apportioning in respect to His description even though it is the same source. So he is only associating His source with Him, and this is the very greatest ignorance.

The reason for this is that the person who has no recognition of the matter nor of the reality of the thing, does not know that diversity is actually contained in a single source although forms vary in that single source. So such a person puts the form shared by another in that station, and so he makes every form a part of that station. It is known of the associate that the matter which indicates him through what occurs in him of partnership is not the source of the other

with whom he is associated, since it is the other. In reality, there is no associate. Everyone is based on his portion whenever it is said about him that there is a partnership between the two in it. The reason for that joint association, if it is joint, is that the action of one of them eliminates the collective aspect. "Say: Call on Allah or call on the All-Merciful." (17:110) This is the very heart of the question.

Notes to Chapter 23:

1. The difference between volition (mashi'a) and will (irada).
2. In respect of its reality, the Essence is not distinguishable.
3. Bunayya, "little son".

24: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Imam in the Word of Harun (Aaron)

Know that the existence of Harun, peace be upon him, was from the presence of mercy (rahamut) by His words, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet." (19:53) So his Prophethood was from the presence of the Rahamut. He was older than Musa, and Musa was greater than him in Prophethood. The Prophethood of Harun is from the presence of mercy (rahma) and, for that reason, he said to his brother Musa, peace be upon him, "O son of my mother!" (7:150) So he called to him by his mother, not by his father, since, in principle, mercy belongs in greater abundance to the mother than the father. Were it not for that mercy, the mother would not have the patience necessary for upbringing. Then he said, "do not seize me by the beard or by the hair," (20:94) and do not let my enemies gloat over me. All this is one of the breaths of mercy. The reason for that is the lack of ascertainment in looking at the tablets which had been given into his hands. If he had looked at them with ascertainment, he would have found guidance and mercy in them.

Musa would have found guidance, which is an elucidation of what happened in the matter which made him angry and of which Harun was innocent, and mercy towards his brother. He did not take him by the beard because of that state in which he saw his people because of his age, for Harun was older than him. That was compassion for Musa from Harun because the Prophethood of Harun is from the mercy of Allah. Only the like of that issued from him.

Then Harun said to Musa, "I was afraid that you would say: 'You have caused division in the Tribe of Israel'," (20:94) and you would make me the cause of their division since the worship of the Calf divided them. There were some of them who worshipped it following and imitating the Samiri, and there were some of them who refused to worship it until Musa returned to them so that they might question him regarding it. Harun was afraid that he would have that division between them attributed to him.

Musa knew the matter better than Harun because by his knowledge he knew the One the people of the Calf worshipped since Allah decreed that only He would be worshipped. When Allah decrees something, it must occur. Musa chided his brother Harun since the business consisted of disavowal and inadequacy. The gnostic is the one who sees Allah in everything, rather he sees Him as the source of everything. Musa was teaching Harun with the instruction of knowledge even though Musa was younger than him in age.

For that reason, when Harun said what he said, he turned to the Samiri and said to him, "What did you think you were doing, O Samiri," i.e. what were you doing in turning aside to the form of the Calf, and in your making this shape from the jewelry of the people so that you captured their hearts for the sake of their wealth? 'Isa used to say to the Tribe of Israel, "O Tribe of Israel! Every man turns to where his wealth is, so put your wealth in heaven, and then your hearts will be in heaven." Wealth is only called that (mâl) because by essence it inclines (yumîl) the hearts to worship. It is the greatest and most exalted goal in the hearts since they need it. Forms have no going-on, so the form of the Calf must vanish. If Musa had not hastened to burn it, jealousy would have overcome him. So he burned it and then scattered the ashes of that form in the sea. He told the Samiri, "Behold your god." He called it a god to alert him in order to teach him that he did know some of the places of divine tajalli, "I will surely burn it!"

The animality (hawayâniyya) of man has freedom of action over the animality of animals since Allah has subjected animals to man, especially in view of the fact that man's origin is not animal. Man has greater subjugation because that which is not-animal does not possess will. In fact, the non-animal is under the jurisdiction of whoever administers it without any recalcitrance whatsoever. The animal, on the other hand, has both will and instinct. Recalcitrance appears in some of its actions. If it has the power to manifest that, reluctance and resistance to what man wants appears from it. If it does not have that power or if what the man wants agrees with what the animal itself wants, then the animal obediently follows what is wanted of it.

Even so, man's "like" follows a command in whatever Allah has called him to in respect of the wealth which he hopes for from Him, which is designated in some states by "the other World" as when Allah says, "We have raised some of them above others in rank so that some of them are subservient to others." (43:32) His like is only subjugated to him by his animality, not by his humanness. The two likes are two opposites. The higher is degree subjugates the lower in degree by wealth or by rank with his humanness, and that other was subjected to him either by fear or greed from his animality, not from his humanness, so his like is not subjected to him.

Do you not see that what is among the beasts in the way of jostling against one another is because they are likes? Two likes are two opposites. That is why He said, "and He raised some of them above others in rank," so he is not with him in rank, and so subjugation occurs in respect of rank. Subjection is of two kinds. First, there is subjection intended by the subjector like the active conqueror when he subjects this subjected person - like the subjugation by the master of his slave although he is his like in humanness, and like the subjugation of the Sultan of his subjects who are his like in humanness, He subjugated them by rank.

The second sort is subjugation by the subjects of the king establishing their command that he drive harm away from them, protect them, do battle against those who attack them, and preserve their property and lives. All this is subjection through state by the subjects who subjugate their king in this act. In reality, it is called the subjection of rank. Rank has jurisdiction over him by this act. There are kings who work just for themselves, and there are those who recognize the matter and know that their subjects' subjugation of them is by rank. He knows their power and rights. Allah rewards him for that with the reward of those who know. The reward of the like of this is up to Allah, in Allah's being involved in the affairs of His slaves, for all the universe is subjected by state. Who is there who cannot be referred to as being "subjected"? Allah said, "Every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29)

Lack of power was in fact the armour of Harun which saved him from the people of the Calf by mastery over the Calf as Musa had mastery over it. This is a wisdom from Allah which is manifest in existence that He should be worshipped in every form. When the form departed after that, it only departed after it had been clad with divinity by its worshipper. For this reason, there is no species but that it is worshipped, either by the worship of making divine or by the worship of subjugation. That must be so for the one who has intellect.

Nothing is worshipped in the universe except after it is clad in elevation for the worshipper and its rank is manifest in his heart. For that reason, Allah called Himself for us, "the Exalter of ranks," and He did not say the "Exalter of rank," for ranks are many in the same source. He decreed that we worship only Him in many ranks. Each rank accords a divine locus of tajalli

which is worshipped in it, and the greatest locus of tajalli in which He is worshipped and the highest, is passion (hawa). As He said, "Have you seen him who takes his passion to be his god?" (45:23) It is the greatest idol. Nothing is worshipped except by it, and it is only worshipped by itself. Of it I say:

The truth of passion is
that passion is the cause of passion.
If there had not been passion in the heart,
passion would not have been worshipped.

Do you not see how perfect Allah's knowledge of things is? How it is completed in respect of the one who worships his passion and takes it as a god? He said, "he who Allah has misguided knowingly." (45:23) Being astray is bewilderment (hayra). That is when this worshipper sees that what he worships is only his passion, by following it in obedience to Him in what He commanded him of worship of whichever person worships Him, until his worship is for Allah the Great. That too is from passion because if passion had not occurred in him in that pure presence and it is the will to love he would neither have worshipped Allah nor preferred Him to others. In the same way, everyone worships a certain form among the forms of the universe, and takes it as a god, and he only takes it by passion. The worshipper is under the power of his passion. Then he sees that idols take on various forms among the worshippers. Each worshipper, for some reason, denies the one who worships another. What he has is a nearer perception which is confused by the unity (ittihâd) of passion, rather by the oneness (ahadiyya) of passion as He mentioned. It is the same source in every worshipper. Allah led him astray, i.e. confused him in respect to a knowledge that every worshipper only worships his own passion, and only seeks to worship his passion whether or not it agrees with the command of the Shari'a.

The complete gnostic is the one who sees that every idol is a locus of Allah's tajalli in which He is worshipped. For that reason, they are all called "god" in spite of having a particular name of a stone, tree, animal, man, star, or angel. This is the nature of the personality in it. Divinity is a rank which the worshipper imagines it to have, and it is the rank of his idol. In reality, it is a locus for the tajalli of Allah belonging to the sight of this particular worshipper devoted to this idol in this particular locus of tajalli.

This is why some of those who did not recognize an ignorant statement said, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" (39:3) although they called them "god", as they said, "Has he turned all the gods into One God? That is truly astonishing." (38:5) They do not deny Him, rather they are amazed. They stop at the multiplicity of possible forms and the ascription of divinity to them. That is why the Messenger came and called them to one God who is recognized and not witnessed by their witnessing. They confuse Him with them and believe in Him when they say, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" by their knowledge of those forms in stones. This is why the proof went against them when He said, "Say: Name them!" and they only named them by what they know those names to have in reality.

As for those who recognize the matter for what it is, they manifest the form of denying what is worshipped in the way of forms because their rank is in knowledge, and their rank is in accord with their being based on the principle of the moment, since they know that the moment is one of the mighty places of the tajalli of Allah in which He gives tajalli at each moment by some of His attributes. This is why time (ad-Dahr) is one of Allah's Names. The

Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Do not curse time, for time is Allah!" At every moment, people are overcome by the principle of the quality in which He gives tajalli at that particular moment. The Messenger who is sent in that moment is the greatest manifestation of the perfection of that quality. He calls creation to Allah, manifested by tajalli in him, by obedience to him, which is obedience to Allah, as Allah says, "Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah." (4:80) This is why it is obligatory to trust in him and obey him.

However, the gnostics know that they do not worship the forms themselves. Rather, they worship Allah in them according to the power of the tajalli which they know of these forms. The one who denies and has no knowledge of what Allah has manifested in tajalli is ignorant of this. The complete gnostic veils himself from the Prophet and Messenger and their heirs. He commands himself to leave that form which the Messenger of the moment left in order to follow the Messenger desiring Allah's love for them by His words, "Say: if you love Allah, then follow me and Allah will love you." (3:31) He called on a God to whom one has recourse and Who is known in respect to the whole and is not witnessed, "nor do the eyes perceive Him, but He perceives the eyes" (6:103) by His lutf and His diffusion in the source of things. The eyes do not perceive Him as they do not perceive their spirits which govern their shapes and outward forms. "...He is the Latif, the All-Aware."

Experience is tasting, and tasting is tajalli. Tajalli occurs in forms. They must be and it must be, and the one who sees Him by his passion must worship Him, if you only knew! Allah possesses the goal of the path.

25: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sublimity in the Word of Musa (Moses)

The wisdom of the killing of the male children in respect to Musa was in order to give him the support of the life of each of those killed for his sake because each of them was killed for being Musa. There is no ignorance, so the life of the one killed for his sake had to return to Musa. It is pure life in the natural state (fitra). The desires of the self have not soiled it; rather, it is in its natural state of "Yes (bala)." (1) Musa was the sum of the lives of those killed for being him. All that was prepared for the murdered ones in the way of the predisposition of their spirits was in Musa, peace be upon him. This is a divine favour to Musa which no one before him had.

The wisdoms of Musa are numerous. If Allah wills, I will enumerate them in this chapter according to what the divine command puts into my mind. This is the first about which I shall speak in this chapter.

Musa was only born being a synthesis of many spirits. He was a concentration of effective forces since the young have an effect on the old. Do you not see how the child has an effect on the older person by the special quality the child has? The older person descends from his leading position to play with the child and rock him in his arms and to show himself at the child's level of intellect he descends to the level of the child's intellect. He is under subjugation even though he is not aware of it. He occupies himself with instructing and protecting the child, seeing to his needs and consoling him so that the child is not distressed.

All this is part of the effect of the young on the old. That is due to the strength of his station. The young has a new covenant with his Lord because he has newly come into being. The old person is further from Him. Whoever is nearer to Allah subjects whoever is further away from Him, just as the elite of the near angels subject the further ones. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to expose himself to the rain when it came down and to uncover his head so that it would fall on him. He said that it has a new covenant with Allah. Look at this recognition of Allah on the part of this Prophet! What is more glorious, more sublime and clearer than this? The rain subjected the best of men due to its proximity to its Lord. That is a likeness of the Messenger on whom the revelation descends. The rain called him by its own state, (2) and so he exposed himself to the rain in order to receive from it what it brought from his Lord. If he had not received this divine benefit from it by the rain, he would not have exposed himself to it. This is the message of water from which Allah has fashioned every living thing (3) - so understand! As for the wisdom of Musa being put into the ark and then cast into the river, the ark (tâbût) is his human nature (nâsût). The river is what he received of knowledge through his body by what the power of discernment and the sensory imaginative faculties accorded him. Only by the existence of this elemental body does the human self have these faculties or their like. When the self comes to this body and is commanded to freely dispose of it and manage it, Allah gives it these faculties as instruments by which it obtains what Allah wills that it obtain in the management of this ark which contains the sakina (4) of the Lord. Musa was cast into the river in order to receive various knowledges by these faculties. Thus Allah taught him that the spirit which manages him is the ruler. He is only managed by it. It gives him the command of these faculties of phenomenal being which are in this nâsût that is designated by the ark in the field of indications and wisdoms.

Allah manages the universe in the same way, and it is only managed by it or by its form. It is only managed by Him inasmuch as the arrival of the one begotten depends upon its being brought into existence by the begetter. Caused things depend on their causes, proven things depend on their proofs, and true things depend on their realities. All of this is part of the universe, and it is Allah's management of it, and he only manages by it.

As for our statement, "or by its form," I mean the form of the universe, and by it I mean the Most Beautiful Names and sublime attributes by which Allah is named and described. Nothing of a name by which He is called has reached us but that we found the meaning and spirit of that name in the universe. The universe is also only managed by the form of the universe.

For that reason, the Prophet said in respect of the creation of Adam who is the blueprint which gathers all the attributes of the Divine Presence which is the essence, the attributes and the actions: "Allah created Adam in His form." His form is only the Divine Presence. In this noble epitome, which is the Perfect Man, He brought into existence all the Divine Names and the realities of that which is outside of him in the Macrocosm separate from him. He made Adam a spirit (rûh) for the universe, and so He subjected to him the high and the low through the perfection of his form. As there is nothing in the universe that "does not glorify Allah's praise," (5) in the same way, there is nothing in the world which is not subject to this man according to what the reality of his form accords him. Allah says, "He has made everything that is in the heavens and the earth subservient to you. It is all from Him." (22:65) All that is in the universe is subject to man. He who knows that from his knowledge is the Perfect Man. He who is ignorant of that is the Animal Man.

The form of casting Musa into the ark and then casting the ark into the river is outwardly a form of destruction. Inwardly, it was his rescue from being killed. He was brought to life as the self is brought to life by knowledge from the death of ignorance as Allah says, "Is someone who was dead (i.e. by ignorance) and whom We brought to life (with knowledge) and supplied with a light by which to walk among the people (which is guidance) the same as someone who is in utter darkness (in being astray) unable to emerge from it (i.e. will never be guided)?" (6) In itself the matter has no end at which it stops.

Guidance is that man is guided to bewilderment (hayra). He knows that the business is bewilderment. Bewilderment is being unsettled and movement. Movement is life. There is no non-movement nor death. There is existence and not non-existence. It is the same with the water which gives life to the earth. Its movement is His word, "so it quivers" and conceives, "and swells" with pregnancy, "and sprouts plants in beautiful pairs." (7) It only gives birth to what resembles it, i.e. has a nature like it. It has being linked in pairs (zawjiya) which is the state of being doubled by what is born from it and what appears from it.

Similarly, the existence of Allah has multiplicity and the many Names. It is this or that according to what appears from it of the universe which demands the realities of the Divine Names by its development. They are doubled by it and stand in opposition to the unity of multiplicity. It is one by source in respect to its essence, as the primal substance (hayûla) is a single source in respect to its essence, while it has many forms which it supports by its essence. It is the same with Allah through the forms of tajalli which are manifested from Him. So the locii of the tajalli are the forms of the universe, in spite of the intelligible unity (ahadiyya). Look at the excellence of this divine instruction which Allah gives by granting its recognition to whoever He wishes among His slaves.

When the family of Pharaoh found him in the river by the tree, Pharaoh called him Musa. Mu is water in Coptic and sha is tree. He named him by where he found him, for the ark stopped by the tree in the river. Pharaoh wanted to kill him. His wife, speaking by divine articulation in what she said to Pharaoh about Musa since Allah had created her for perfection as Allah said about her when He testified that she and Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, have the perfection which men have (8) - said, "he may be a source of delight for me and for you." (28:9) She would be consoled by him with the perfection which she received as we have said.

The consolation of Pharaoh was with the belief Allah gave him when he was drowning. So Allah took him pure and purified. There was no impurity in him since He took him in his belief before he had acquired any wrong actions. Islam effaces what was before it. He made him a sign of His concern so that none might despair of the mercy of Allah, for "no one despairs of solace from Allah except for the unbelievers." (12:87) If Pharaoh been of those who despair, he would not have embarked on belief. Musa, peace be upon him, was, as the wife of Pharaoh said, "a source of delight for me and for you. Do not kill him. It may well be that he will be of use to us." That is what happened. Allah gave them use of Musa, although they were not aware that he was a prophet who would destroy the kingdom of Pharaoh and his family.

When Allah protected him from Pharaoh, his mother's heart was freed of the anxiety which had befallen her. Then Allah forbade him to be suckled until he had received his mother's breast, so she suckled him that Allah might complete her joy. The knowledge of the roads (sharâ'i) is like that. It is as Allah said, "to each We have made a road," (5:48) i.e. a path (tariq), "and a direction (minhaj)" from that path. This statement is an indication of the root from which he came (minhuja). It is his food as the tree has branches and yet is only nourished by its root. What is haram in one Shari'a can be halal in another Shari'a - I mean in a certain form it can be halal, while in the heart of the matter it is not really the same as what passed because the matter is new creation, not repetition. This is what we instruct you! It is referred to in connection with Musa when the wet-nurses were made haram.

In reality, the one who suckled him, not the one who bore him, is his mother. The mother of birth carried him in regard to the trust. He is formed within her and fed by her menstrual blood without any volition on her part in that, so that does not come from her benevolence towards him. He is only fed by what would destroy her or make her ill had he not been nourished on it, or had that blood not gone out of her. The embryo is a gift to its mother since it feeds on what would cause her harm had that blood remained with her and not gone out of her, or had not the embryo been nourished on it.

Suckling is not the same. By her suckling, she intends to give him life and to sustain him. Allah gave that to Musa in the mother who bore him. No woman outside of his mother by birth had any right over him that she also might find consolation in bringing him up and watching him grow in her room, and so she was not sad.

Allah saved him from the grief of the ark, so he pierced natural darkness by what Allah gave him of divine knowledge, while he did not depart from nature. He tested him with many trials (9) and gave him experience in many places so that he might realize patience in himself in the trials Allah gave him.

The first of Allah's trials was the killing of the Copt which Allah inspired him to do and gave him success in his secret yet he did not know this. However, Musa did not feel any anxiety

over killing him, although he was unsure until the command of his Lord told him, since the Prophet is inwardly protected without being aware of it until he is informed, until transmission comes to him. For this reason, al-Khidr showed him the killing of the boy, (10) so Musa criticized the killing but did not remember how he had killed the Copt. Al-Khidr told him, "I did not do it of my own volition," (18:82) and he informed him of his rank before he told him that his movement was protected in reality, but he was not aware of it.

Al-Khidr also showed him the piercing of the ship. Outwardly it was destruction, but inwardly it was rescue from the hand of the tyrant. He made that an analogy of the ark which was in the river its outward aspect was destruction, while inwardly it was rescue, for his mother did it fearing the hand of the tyrant, who was Pharaoh, that he might not kill Musa in captivity. She looked at him with the revelation Allah had inspired in her while she was not aware of it. She felt in herself that she would suckle him. When she feared for him, she cast him into the river because, as the proverb says, "What the eye does not see does not afflict the heart." She did not fear for him with the fear of the witnessing of the eye, and she was not sad with the sorrow of seeing him. It came over her thoughts that perhaps Allah would return him to her, for she had a good opinion of Him. She lived by this thought in herself and by the hope which was opposite fear and despair. When she was inspired to do this, she said, "Perhaps he is the Messenger who will destroy Pharaoh and the Copts." She lived and took joy in this, which was illusion and thought in respect of herself, but, in the heart of the matter, it is knowledge.

When they searched for Musa (after he had killed the Copt), he left in flight, fearful outwardly and in the meaning, it was love of deliverance for movement is always by love, but the onlooker is veiled from it by other causes, which are not the movement. This is because the root is the movement of the universe from non-existence which was immobile in existence. That is why it is said that the matter is movement from immobility. The movement which is the existence of the universe is the movement of love. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, quoting Allah, "I was a hidden treasure, therefore I wanted (lit. loved) to be known." (11)

If it had not been for this love, the universe would not have appeared in its source. Its movement from non-existence to existence is the movement of the love of the One who brings into existence for this purpose. The universe also loves to witness itself in existence as it was witnessed in immutability. Thus by every aspect, the movement from immutable non-existence to the existence of the sources is a movement of love, both in respect of Allah and in respect to itself.

Perfection is loved for itself. Allah's knowledge of Himself is His, since He is independent of the worlds. It belongs only to Him. The perfection of the rank of knowledge only remains by the in-time knowledge which comes from these sources. When the sources of the universe exist, then the forms of perfection appear with timeless and in-time knowledge. Thus the rank of knowledge is perfected by two aspects.

In the same way, the ranks of existence are perfected. Existence from it is before-time and not before-time, which is in-time. Pre-temporal (azali) time is the existence of Allah by Himself, and non-pre-temporal-time is the existence of Allah by the forms of the immutable universe. It is called in-time because it manifests some parts to others. He is manifest to Himself by the forms of the universe, and so existence is perfected.

The movement of the universe is by love of perfection, so understand! Do you not see how what the Divine Names bring into existence is breathed from the absence of the manifestation of their effects in a entity called the universe? It loves rest (12) which is only reached by the existence of form, high and low. Thus it is confirmed that movement occurs by love. The only movement in the entire cosmos is by love.

Among the 'ulama' are those who know that and those who are veiled by the nearer cause because it rules their state (hâl) and overpowers them. Musa was aware of his fear by what occurred through his killing the Copt. That fear implied love of deliverance from killing. So he fled by fear. In the meaning, he fled when he loved deliverance from Pharaoh and his deeds. He mentioned the nearest cause which he was aware of at that moment, which is like the form of the body of man, and love of deliverance is contained in it as the body contains the spirit which manages it.

The Prophets had the language of the outward with which they addressed people in general and on which they relied to make the one who listened understand what was said. The Messengers make allowances for people in general by their knowledge of the rank of the people of understanding. It is as the Prophet, peace be upon him, said about gifts, "I give to this man, while another man is more beloved to me than him for I fear that Allah might throw him down into the Fire." He made allowances for those whose intellect and discernment are weak and who are overcome by greed and nature.

Similarly, what they brought of knowledges, they brought wearing a robe (13) which nearer to the understanding, so that the one who has no "diving" might stop at the robe and say, "How excellent this robe is!" and he will see it as the limit of rank. Because of what this robe from the king demands, the one with subtle understanding, the one who dives for the pearls of wisdom, looks at the quality of the robe and its type of material. By it, he knows the degree of the one it covers, and so he stumbles onto a knowledge which no one else has obtained from those without knowledge of such matters.

Then the Prophets and Messengers and heirs knew that in this world and in their communities, there are those who, in this manner, express themselves in the outward language which the elite and common share. The one who is elite understands of it what the common understand, and more, inasmuch as it is valid that he be called elite. He is distinguished from the blind. Those who have obtained knowledges are content with this. This is the wisdom of his words, "I fled from you when I was in fear of you," (14) but he did not say, "I fled from you by love of safety and well-being."

Musa came to Madyan and found two women and got water for them without being paid for it. Then he turned away to the divine shade and said, "O my Lord, I am truly in need of any good You have in store for me." (28:24) He made the source of his getting water the same as the good which Allah sent down to him, and he described himself as being in need of Allah in the good which he had. Al-Khidr showed him the setting-up of the wall without wage, but Musa chided him for it. So al-Khidr reminded him of his drawing water without wage, and other things which were not mentioned. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, wished that Musa had remained silent and had not left him so that Allah would have related more about them.

Al-Khidr alerted Musa to the fact that what had come to him and would come to him was by the command of Allah and His will which it is impossible to contradict. Knowledge of that is

one of the prerogatives of wilaya. As for the Messenger, He might not acquaint him with it, for it is the secret of the decree.(15) If He had acquainted him with that, it might have been a reason for his lassitude in conveying what he was commanded to convey. Allah withholds the knowledge of this from some of the Messengers as a mercy to them from Him. He did not withhold it from our Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, because of the strength of his state. This is why our Prophet said, "I call on Allah by inner sight." (75:14)

By this he knew what Musa had succeeded in had been without knowledge on his part. If it had been from knowledge, Musa would not have criticized what al-Khidr did, since Allah had testified before Musa as to al-Khidr's purity and justice. In spite of this, Musa was heedless of the fact that Allah had made him pure, and of the conditions set down for following him. This was a mercy for us if we forget the command of Allah. If Musa had known that, al-Khidr would not have said to him, "What you have never encompassed in your knowledge," meaning I have a knowledge which you have not received by tasting as you have a knowledge which I do not know. He was just.

As for the wisdom of his parting from him, it is because Allah said of the Messenger, "Take what the Messenger brings you, and avoid what he prohibits you." (59:7) The 'ulama' of Allah who recognize this quality of the Message and the Messenger stop at this statement. Al-Khidr knew that Musa was the Messenger of Allah. He regarded what came from him to preserve the adab which is due to the Messengers. Musa said to him, "If I ask you about anything after this, then you should no longer keep me company." So he forbade al-Khidr to keep his company. When that occurred for the third time, al-Khidr therefore said, "This is where you and I part company," Musa did not tell him, "Do not do it," nor did he seek to keep him company for he knew the level of the rank he was in when he spoke of the prohibition against keeping him company. Musa was silent, and the parting took place.

Look at the perfection of these two men in knowledge and the completion of divine adab as right, and the justice of al-Khidr, peace be upon him, in what he acknowledged to Musa when he said, "I have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know, and you have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know." This information which al-Khidr imparted to Musa was a remedy for the wound inflicted on him in his words, "How indeed could you bear with patience something you have not encompassed in your knowledge?" (18:68) although he knew the sublimity of his rank with the message, and al-Khidr did not have this rank.

This appeared in the community of Muhammad in the hadith regarding the fertilization of the date tree. The Prophet, peace be upon him, told his Companions, "You know more about the matters of your daily life."16 There is no doubt that the knowledge of the thing is better than ignorance of it. Allah praises Himself, saying, "He has knowledge of all things." The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, acknowledged to his Companions that they knew more about the exigencies of this world than him because he had no experience of them. It is knowledge of tasting (dhawq) and experience, and the Prophet, peace be upon him, had not occupied himself with this sort of knowledge. Rather, he was occupied with what was more important. I have informed you about a great adab by which will benefit you if you occupy yourself with it.

Musa's statement, "My Lord gave me right judgement," (26:21) means the khilafah, "and made me one of the Messengers," means the message. Not every Messenger is a Khalif. The Khalif has a sword, duties and governance. The Messenger is not the same rather, he

transmits what he has been sent to transmit. If he does battle and defends with the sword, then he is both Khalif and Messenger.

As for the wisdom of Pharaoh's question regarding divine whatness (mâhiya) when he said, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" (26:23) that question did not arise from ignorance, but it was posed in order to test Musa and to see what answer he would give when he claimed that he had a message from his Lord. Pharaoh knew the rank of the Messengers in knowledge of Allah and he wanted to test Musa's answer to ascertain the validity of his claim. In order to inform those present, he invited an answer which would have been misleading as far as they were concerned since they did not know what Pharaoh himself knew about the question. Musa answered him with the answer of those who have knowledge of the matter. Then Pharaoh, in order to preserve his position, asserted that Musa had not answered his question. So because of the inadequacy of their understanding, it seemed clear to those who were present that Pharaoh knew more than Musa. For this reason, when Musa answered him with what was not appropriate and outwardly it is not an answer to what he was asked about and Pharaoh knew that he would only give that answer, Pharaoh then said to his companions, "Your Messenger" who was sent to you "is mad" since the knowledge of what I question him about is veiled from him (17) since it is inconceivable that it be known at all.

The question is valid. The question of the what-ness is a question about the reality of what is asked about - it must be real in itself. As for those who make definitions which consist of category and genus, these are matters shared by various things. Whoever has no category must have a reality in Himself which belongs to no other. The question is invalid in the school of the People of Allah, sound knowledge and sound intellect. The only answer to it is the answer Musa gave.

Here is a great secret! He mentioned the "act" in giving the answer to the one who asked for a definition of essence. He made the essential definition the source of the attribution to what appeared of Him in the forms of the universe, or what appeared in Him of the forms of the universe. In answer to, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" he said that He is the One in whom the forms of the universe are manifest on high which is the heaven - and below - which is the earth, "if you but have certainty," (18) or He who is manifest by them.

When Pharaoh told his companions that Musa was mad, (majnûn) in the sense that he was possessed, Musa added to the elucidation in order to inform Pharaoh of his rank in divine knowledge because he knew that Pharaoh already knew that. Musa said, "The Lord of the East and the West," bringing what was manifest and what was hidden, in the outward and the inward, "and what between them is" which is Allah's words, "He has knowledge of everything," "if you have intellect," (19) i.e. if you possess qualification since this comes from intellect.

The first answer is for those who are certain, and they are the people of unveiling and existence. Musa said, "If you have certainty," i.e. if you are the people of unveiling and existence. I have given you knowledge of what you are already certain about in your witnessing and existence. If you are not of this category, I have answered you in the second answer: if you are among the people of intellect and qualification, and you limit Allah according to what the proofs of your intellects accord.

Thus Musa manifested both aspects in order to inform Pharaoh about his question and his veracity. Musa knew that Pharaoh knew that because he asked about the what-ness of Allah.

He knew that his question was not couched in the language the ancients used in their questioning by means of what. That is why he answered him. If he had known anything else from him, he would have been mistaken in the question. Musa treated that about which he was asked as the source of the universe, and Pharaoh addressed him by this language (20) although the people present were not aware of that.

Pharaoh said to him, "If you take any god other than me, I will certainly make you one of the imprisoned." (26:29) The letter sin in prison (sijn) is one of the letters of increase, (21) meaning I will veil you, for you answered by what supported me so that I might say the same to you. If you say to me, "O Pharaoh! I do not I do not recognize your threat to me while the source is but one, so how can you separate?" Then Pharaoh replied, "The ranks are separate, but the source is not separate and it is not divided in its existence. My rank right now is power over you by actual fact, O Musa! I am you by the source and other than you by rank!"

When Musa understood that from him, he gave him his due in respect to himself and told him, "You will not be able to do that." Pharaoh's rank gave him power and influence over Musa because Allah is in the rank of Pharaoh in respect of the outward form which has authority over the rank in which Musa appeared in that assembly.

Therefore Musa told him that Allah had manifested a barrier to his hostility against Musa. He said, "Even if I were to bring you something undeniable?" Pharaoh could only reply, "Produce it then, if you are someone telling the truth" so that Pharaoh would not appear to be unjust among those of his nation who were weak-minded. They had doubts about him, and they were the group Pharaoh made unsteady. However, they obeyed Pharaoh because they were a corrupt people; (22) that is, lacking sound intellects' rejection of taking Pharaoh's claims literally. The intellect stops at a certain limit, and only those of unveiling and certainty can cross that limit. This is why in his answer, Musa first addressed those of certainty and then address those of the intellect.

"So he drew down his staff ('asa)" (26:32) which is the form with which Pharaoh defied (23) ('asa) Musa when he refused to answer his call. "And there it was, unmistakably a snake," i.e. an evident snake. Thus rebellion, which is evil, changed into obedience, which is good, as Allah says, "Allah will transform their evil deeds into good deeds," (25:70) meaning in judgement. Here the judgement manifested a differentiated source in a single substance (jawhar) so it is a staff, a snake, and a manifest serpent. It devoured its likes among the snakes in the form of a snake, and the staffs in the form of a staff. The proof of Musa overcame the proofs of Pharaoh in the form of staffs, snakes and ropes. The sorcerers had ropes, but Musa did not have a rope. The "rope" is the small hill; (24) that is, their powers in relation to the power of Musa is as the hills are to the lofty mountains.

When the sorcerers saw that, they recognized Musa's rank in knowledge and they saw that he possessed a power which was not mortal. If it had been within the power of a mortal, it would only belong to someone who could distinguish sure knowledge from imagination and illusion. So they believed in "the Lord of the Worlds, the Lord of Musa and Harun" - that is, the Lord to whom Musa and Harun summoned them because they knew that the people understood that they were not being called to Pharaoh. Pharaoh was in the position of authority, and he was the master of the moment since he was the Khalif with the sword, even though he broke the customary divine laws when he said, "I am your Lord most high" - i.e. since all are lords, (25) I am the highest of them through the power which you have outwardly given me over you. The sorcerers knew that he spoke the truth in what he said, and

they did not deny it. They affirmed that to Pharaoh, and said, "You only judge in this passing life, so judge as you like, for the kingdom is yours." So the statement of Pharaoh, "I am your Lord most high," was valid. Although the source is from Allah, the form is Pharaoh's. He cut off the hands and feet, and crucified through a real source in false form in order to attain the ranks which are only attained by that act.

There is no way to neutralize causes because the source-forms necessitate them. They only appear in existence by the form on which they are based at the source since "there is no changing the words of Allah." (10:64) The words of Allah are not other than the sources of existent things. Timelessness is ascribed to Him in respect to their permanence, and in-time ness is ascribed to them in respect of their existence and appearance. Thus we say, a certain man or guest happened (26) to be with us today." That does not mean that he did not have any existence before this event. For that reason, Allah says about His Mighty Word which is timeless, "No reminder (dhikr) from their Lord comes to them lately renewed (27) without their listening to it as if it were a game," (21:2) and "but no fresh (28) reminder reaches them from the All- Merciful, without their turning away from it." (26:5) The Merciful only brings mercy, and whoever turns away from mercy advances the punishment which is the absence of mercy.

As for the words of Allah, "but their belief when they saw Our violent force was of no use to them. That is the pattern Allah has always followed with His slaves," (29) (40:85) that did not mean that it did not profit them in the Next World through His exception, "except for the people of Yunus." He meant that that did not prevent them being punished in this world. For that reason, Pharaoh was seized in spite of the existence of his belief even though his affair was that of someone who is certain that his death is approaching. The circumstances accord that he was not certain that he was going to die because he saw the believers walking on the dry path which had appeared when Musa struck the sea with his staff. Pharaoh was not certain that he would perish since he believed that he would not die until the moment actually reached him. He believed in the One in whom the Tribe of Israel believed, in certainty of his deliverance.

It was indeed certain, but it was in a form other than the one he wanted. He was saved from the punishment of the Next World in himself and his body was saved as Allah says, "Today We will save your body that you might be a sign for those after you," (10:92) because, if his form had vanished, his people might have said that he had gone into occultation. His known form appeared as a corpse that it might be known that it was really him. Deliverance was encompassed both in the senses and in the meaning.

The one who has the word of the punishment in the Other World realized for him (30) will not believe, even if every ayat had been brought to him, "so that they might see the painful punishment," that is, taste the punishment of the Next World. Pharaoh left this class of people. This is the literal meaning of what the text of the Qur'an brought us. We say, and the matter belongs to Allah, that the fixed idea which the common people have regarding the wretchedness of Pharaoh is not based on anything in the divine text. As for his family, that is another judgement. This is not the place to mention it.

Know that Allah only takes someone while he believes that is, affirms what divine transmissions bring, and I mean those who are consciousness at death. This is why dislikes sudden death and being killed while unaware is disliked. The definition of sudden death is that the incoming breath goes out and the outcoming breath does not come in. This is sudden

death and when that happens, one is not conscious of death.

It is the same if a man is killed unawares by a blow from behind on the back of the neck. He is then taken with whatever belief or disbelief he possesses at that moment. For that reason, the Prophet said, "One will be gathered in the state in which one dies," as one is taken in whatever one is doing at the time. The one who is conscious of death is only the one who sees it coming. He believes what he sees. He is only taken in what he is doing because that is an existent expression connected to time by the circumstances. We distinguish between the unbeliever who is conscious at death and the unbeliever either killed while unaware or who dies suddenly as we have said in the definition of sudden death.

As for the wisdom of tajalli and the discourse on the form of the fire, this was because it was the object of Musa's desire. Allah gave him a tajalli in what he was searching for so that Musa would turn to Him and not turn away. If Allah had given the tajalli in other than the form which he was seeking, Musa would have turned away because his interest was concentrated on a particular goal. If he had turned away, his action would have rebounded on him, and Allah would have turned away from him. Musa was the chosen one and the one brought near. When Allah brings someone near to Him, He gives him a tajalli in the object he desires, without him knowing it.

Like the Fire of Musa
which he saw as what he needed.
It was Allah,
but he did not perceive it.

Notes to Chapter 25:

1. "Yes, we testify." Qur'an 7:172. Before the selves were created, Allah asked them, "Am I not your Lord?" They replied. "Yes, we testify."
2. In the form of knowledge and life descending from Allah.
3. See Qur'an 21:30.
4. Divine Presence which causes calmness and tranquillity in the hearts of the Believers. It is also related to the Ark of the Covenant and to Bayt al-Maqdis, when the invisible Sakina/Shechina descends from above. See 2:249: "The sign of his kinship is that the Ark will come to you, containing a Sakina from your Lord, and certain relics left by the families of Musa and Harun left. It will be borne by angels."
5. Qur'an 17:44.
6. Qur'an 6:122.
7. Qur'an 22:5.
8. Qur'an 66:11: "Allah has made an example for the believers - the wife of Pharaoh when she said, 'My Lord, build a house in the Garden for me in Your Presence, and rescue me from Pharaoh and his deeds.'"
- Also the hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Musa, "Many men have been perfect, but among women only Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, and Asiya, wife of Pharaoh, were perfect."
9. See Qur'an 20:40, "We rescued you from trouble and tested you with many trials."
10. See the story in the Qur'an 18:65-82.
11. Hadith qudsi.
12. i.e. reaching the perfection of love. This is called or love or yearning after the parting.
13. khil'a, a robe of honor.
14. Qur'an 26:21.

15. Sirr al-Qadar.
16. Hadith narrated by Imam Muslim.
17. Madness "junun" is related to veils.
18. "The Lord of the heavens and the earth and what is between them is you have certainty." Qur'an 26:24.
19. Qur'an 26:28.
20. of unveiling.
21. Zawa'id, the augmentative letters, i.e. the ten letters which are added to the radical letters in Arabic words sin, hamza, alif, lam, ta', mim, waw, nun, ya' and ha'. If you take away the sin from sijn (prison), you get "jinn" meaning veil.
22. See Qur'an 43:54, "In that way he swayed his people and they succumbed to him. They were a people of deviators."
23. 'Asâ as a noun means "staff", and 'Asâ as a verb means "to rebel against , oppose."
24. Habl meaning "rope" also means mound or small hill.
25. Lord being a relative name, demanding a subject, also because it means owner, so one says the lord of the house, the "lord" of a herd, etc. Also one who looks after, the "lord" of a child.
26. Huduth means coming into existence for the first time. It also means an event or occurrence.
27. Muhdath.
28. Muhdath.
29. It like is in Qur'an 10:98, where the punishment is removed from the people of Yunus after they believed.
30. See Qur'an 39:71.

26: The Seal of the Wisdom of What One Turns to (as-Samad) in the Word of Khalid

As for the wisdom of Khalid ibn Sinan, (1) by his call he manifested the Prophethood of the interspace. He claimed that he would tell them about what happens after death. He commanded that he should be disinterred and questioned in order that he might report that the judgement in the Interspace occurs in the form of the life of this world. Thus it would be known that all the Messengers spoke the truth in what they related in this life regarding what happens after death. Khalid's goal was that all the world would believe in what the Messengers brought so that there would be mercy for all. He was honored by his Prophethood being near the time of the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. He knew that Allah had sent Muhammad as a mercy to the worlds, but Khalid was not a Messenger. He wanted to receive a generous share of this mercy contained in the message of Muhammad. He was not commanded to convey the message, but he wanted to have that share in the Interspace so that there would be stronger knowledge about the creation, and for this reason his people squandered him.

The Messenger of Allah described them as having squandered their Prophet because they did not do what he wanted them to do. Did Allah give him the reward for what he wanted? There is no doubt and no disagreement that he had the reward of what he wished, but there is doubt and disagreement about the reward of the goal. Is wishing for it the same in the Next World as its occurrence even though it did not occur or not? In the Shari'a, equality is not supported in many places such as in the case of the one who performs the prayer in the group. (2) The one who prays it in the group has a reward from the presence of the group. He is like the person who, in spite of poverty, desires to be able to give charity as the people of wealth and property do. He has the like of their rewards, but the like of their rewards can be in their intentions or their deeds. The people had both the intention and the action. The Prophet, peace be upon him, did not prescribe both of them, nor one of them, and outwardly they are not the same. For that reason, Khalid ibn Sinan sought the proclamation to confirm for him the station of joining both matters so that he would receive two rewards. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 26:

1. Al-Qashani, the commentator, says that Khalid lived in Aden, and was a man of great himma who was overcome in the contemplation of divine unity. One day a great fire appeared from a cave among his people. It destroyed the crops and the livestock, and the people called on him to protect them from it. He struck the fire with his staff, saying, "Away! Away!" until it became cold and retreated to the cave. Then he told his people that he would enter the cave in order to extinguish the fire, and he told them to call him after three full days had passed. Should he call him before that, he would come out and die. If they were patient, he would emerge in good health.

They waited two days, and then Shaytan made them restless, and doubts came to them and they were afraid that he might have been destroyed. They shouted to him. He emerged from the cave with his hand on his head from the pain their shouting had caused him. He told them, "You have killed me and squandered my word and my covenant." He then told them of his death and commanded them to bury him and then watch for forty days. Then, he said, a flock of sheep led by a donkey with slit ears and its tail cut off would come to them. When it stood opposite his grave, they were to disinter him and he would rise and tell them of the true state of things after death from witnessing and vision so that all creation would receive certainty as to what the Messenger related. Then he died and they buried him.

They waited until the forty days had passed. The flock of sheep came led by a donkey with slit ears. It stopped opposite his grave, so they understood that they should disinter Khalid as he had commanded them so that he might inform them as to the truth of the Prophets. Some of his older sons were adverse to that and said that it would shame them among the Arabs and that they would be called, "the sons of the disinterred one." There was the vehemence of the Jahiliya in that. They squandered their legacy and destroyed him. After the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was sent, a daughter of Khalid came to him, and he said to her, "Greetings to you, O daughter of a Prophet whose people squandered him!"

2. His Prophethood did not appear in this world.

27: The Seal of the Unique Wisdom in the Word of Muhammad

Muhammad's wisdom is uniqueness (fardiya) because he is the most perfect existent creature of this human species. For this reason, the command began with him and was sealed with him. He was a Prophet while Adam was between water and clay, (1) and his elemental structure is the Seal of the Prophets. The first singular is three, and what is more than this firstness of individuals comes from three. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is the surest proof of his Lord, so he was given all the words, (2) which are everything that is named by the names of Adam. (3) He resembles the proof in its threefoldness, and the proof is a proof of itself. Then his reality grants the first uniqueness which is threefold in structure. For that reason, speaking about the domain of love which is the root of existence, he said, "I was made to love three things in your world," (4) because of what this world has of threefoldness. Then he mentioned women, and perfume, and that the coolness of his eye was in the prayer.

The Prophet began by mentioning women and ended with the prayer. That is because woman is part of man in the root of the manifestation of her source, and because man's recognition of himself preceded his recognition of his Lord. That is why the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." If you wish, you can say that this tradition is the forbidding of gnosis and stating the inability to attain to Him - and that is a permissible statement; and, if you wish, you can say that it is the affirmation of gnosis. The first is that if you do not know yourself, so you will not know your Lord. The second is that you recognize yourself, so you do recognize your Lord. Muhammad was the clearest proof of his Lord. Every part of the world indicates its root which is its Lord, so understand!

The Prophet was made to love women, so he yearned for them because as the whole yearns for what is part of it. The matter is self-evident through what Allah says regarding this elemental human constitution, "and I breathed My Ruh into him." (15:29; 38:72) Then He described Himself with intensity of yearning to meet those who yearn for Him. He said, "O Dawud! I have intense yearning for them," i.e. those who yearn for Him, and it is a particular encounter. The Prophet said in a hadith about the Dajjal, "None of you will see his Lord until after he dies." (5) Allah must yearn for those near ones - because even though He sees them and wants them to see Him, that encounter is still prevented by man's station. That is like His words "until We know" although He is Knowing. He yearns for this particular attribute which only is achieved existence through death.

By this, He tests their yearning for Him as He said in the hadith of hesitation which concerns this matter, "I do not hesitate in anything I do, but I hesitate to take the breath of My believing slave because he hates death, and I hate to make him die. But He must meet Me." He gave him good news and did not say to him, "he must die" because He did not want to distress him by mentioning death. Man only meets Allah after death as the Prophet says, "None of you will see his Lord until he dies." That is why Allah says, "He must meet Me," for Allah desires the existence of this relationship. He made it clear that He breathed into him some of His spirit (rûh) so He only yearns for him. Do you not see that He created him on His form because he is from His Spirit?

Man's constitution is based on these four elements which are called the "humors" in his body. The combustion of the moisture found in the body occurs from his breath. The spirit of man

is fire as regards his constitution. For this reason, Allah only spoke to Musa in the form of fire, (6) and put his need in it. If his constitution had been from nature, (7) then his spirit would have been light. Allah alluded to it with the blowing (nafkh) which indicates that it is from the breath (nafas) of the All-Merciful. It is by this breath, which is the blowing-out that he manifested from Him, and by the predisposition of the one blown into, that combustion is fire and not light. The breath of Allah is hidden in that by which man is man.

From man, He derived a person in his form called "woman". She appeared in his form, and he yearned for her with the longing of that thing has for itself, and she yearned for him with the longing of that thing has for its home. Allah made him love women. Allah loves the one whom He created in His form, and He made the luminous angels, in spite of the power of their might and their station and the sublimity of their natural constitution, prostrate to him. (8) From this comes the affinity which occurs in the form which man and woman share, which is like that between Allah and man. The form has the greatest affinity, as well as the most glorious and perfect. It makes a pair that is, doubles the existent belonging to Allah, as the woman, by her existence, doubles man, and makes him one of a pair. So three appeared: Allah, man and woman. Man yearns for his Lord who is the origin as woman yearns for man.

His Lord made him love women as Allah loves the one who is in His form. Love only occurred by the One by whom he is formed. His love was for the One he was formed by, and He is Allah. This is why the Prophet said, "He made me love...", and he did not say, "I loved" as coming from himself because his love is connected to his Lord in Whose form he is. In his love for his wife, he loves her by Allah's love for him as a divine nature. (9)

When a man loves a woman, he desires union, that is, the goal of union which exists in love. In the elemental form, there is no greater union than marriage. (10) By this appetite encompasses all parts. For that reason, complete ritual washing is prescribed after intercourse. Purification envelops him as annihilation in the woman was complete in the obtainment of appetite. Allah is very jealous of His slave if He believes that he finds pleasure in other than Him. So man purifies himself by ritual washing in order to return to Him in whom he was annihilated, since that is all there is.

When man witnesses Allah in women, his witnessing is in the passive; when he witnesses Him in himself, regarding the appearance of woman from Him, he witnesses Him in the active. When he witnesses Him from himself without the presence of any form from him, his witnessing is in the passive directly from Allah without any intermediary. So his witnessing of Allah in the woman is the most complete and perfect because he witnesses Allah inasmuch as He is both active and passive. Regarding himself, He is passive in particular. For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, loved women because of the perfection of the witnessing of Allah in them since one does not ever witness Allah free of matter. Allah by His essence is independent of the worlds. So from this aspect, the business is impossible, yet witnessing only occurs in matter. The witnessing of Allah in women is the greatest and most perfect witnessing. The greatest union is marriage.

It is like the projection of His will on the one He created in His form in order to create him. He sees His form in him, rather, He sees Himself. He fashioned him and balanced him and breathed into him of His spirit (rûh) which is His breath. Outwardly he is creation, and inwardly he is Allah. For this reason, Allah describes Himself with having management of this frame. He "directs the whole affair from the heaven," which is the height of the earth, "to earth," (32:5) which is the lowest of the low, because it is the lowest of all the elements.

He called them women (an-nisâ') which is a plural which does not have a singular form. For that reason, he said, "He made me love three things in your world: women..." and he did not say, "woman". He took note of the fact that they came after him in existence. The word an-nisa' also means postponement. Allah says, "The month postponed is an increase in disbelief," (9:37) and the sale of "nasi'a" is said to be by postponement, that is, by credit. That is why he said an-nisa'. He loved them only by rank, and they are the place of the passive. They are to him as nature is to Allah in which Allah opened the forms of the world by the projection of the will and the divine command which is marriage in the world of elemental forms, and aspiration (himma) in the world of luminous spirits, as in the order of premises and their meanings through deduction. All of that is the marriage of the first uniqueness in each of these aspects. Whoever loves women in this measure, loves with a divine love. Whoever loves them in respect to natural appetite in particular, deprives himself of the knowledge of this appetite. For him it is a form without a spirit (rûh). That form in the heart of the matter is the essence of a spirit, but it is not witnessed by the one who comes to his wife or any woman by pure gratification, and he does not perceive the one it is for even so, he has no knowledge of himself, as others have no knowledge of him, since he has not been verbally named so that he could be known.

One of them said:
It is confirmed with people
that I am a passionate lover,
although they do not know
the object of my passion.

It is the same with the one who loves gratification - he loves the place in which it occurs, being the woman, but the spirit of the question is obscure to him. If he had known it, he would have known by whom he has pleasure and who it is that has pleasure. He would have been perfect.

Similarly, the woman has a lower degree than the man by the words of Allah, "As for men, they have a degree over them." (2:228) The one created on the form is lower in degree than the one who is fashioned in His form, (11) even though he is in His form. This is the degree by which He is distinguished from the form. So Allah is independent of the universe, and He is the first Doer. The form is the second doer, and does not have the firstness which Allah has. Sources are distinguished by ranks. "He gives each thing its creation," (12) as every gnostic gives each thing with a right its due.

That love that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had for women came from divine love. "Allah gives everything its creation," and that is the source of its truth. He only gave creation to it by merit, so it merits what He called it that is, by the essence of the created thing.

He put women first because they are the place of the passive as nature precedes that which exists from it by means of form. Nature in reality is only the breath of the Merciful. The forms of the universe, high and low, are introduced into it by the diffusion of the breath (nafkha) in the primal substance (jawhar hayulânî), particularly in the world of bodies. As for its diffusion by the existence of the luminous spirits and non-essentials (a'râd), that is another kind of diffusion.

In this tradition, the Prophet put the feminine before the masculine because he meant to attach

importance to women. He said, "Three (thalath, the feminine form of the number) and he did not say thalatha (the masculine) with the ha' which is by the number of the masculine since scent (tīb) is one of the three, and it is masculine. The custom among the Arabs is that the masculine takes precedence over the feminine. When they say, "The Fatimas and Zayd went out," they saw kharajû (mas. pl) and do not say kharajna (fem. pl). The masculine, even if it is only one, take precedence over the feminine, even if they are a group. The Prophet was Arab, so he respected the meaning which was intended by showing love for what did not happen through his own love. Then Allah informed him of what he did not know, and Allah's bounty to him was great. (13) The feminine took precedence over the masculine by his word, thalath without ha'. Who knew the realities better than him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace? Who had greater care to observe rights and dues?

Then he placed the seal with what was like the first since it is also feminine (salat, prayer, is feminine), and he placed the masculine between them, as in existence. He began with "women" and ended with "prayer", both of which are feminine while perfume is masculine. The man is between the essence from which he appeared and then the woman appeared from him. So man is between two feminines, the form of the Essence (14) from which he appeared, and a real feminine, woman, who appeared from him. Similarly, women is a real feminine, and the prayer is not a real feminine. Scent is the masculine between the two, as Adam is between the essence from which he has existence and Hawwa' (Eve), who existed from him. If you wish, you can say "attribute (sifa)" which is also feminine. If you wish, you can say, "power (qudra)" and it is feminine. Be of whatever school you wish. You will always find that the feminine takes precedence, even among the people of cause ('illa) who make Allah a cause in the existence of the form, and cause is also feminine.

As for the wisdom of the perfume which he mentioned after women, because women have fragrance in their form, the most fragrant of perfumes is the embrace of the lover as they say in the common example. When the Prophet was created a slave, by the nobility of his origin, he did not lift his head at all to mastery rather, he continued to prostrate himself in humility and to remain passive in spite of who he was until Allah formed from Him what He had intended. He gave him the rank of action in the world of breaths, and the breaths are fragrant scents. So Allah made him love perfume. For that reason, he put perfume after women.

He observed the ranks which belong to Allah in His words, "Raiser of ranks is He, Possessor of the throne" (40:15) by His sitting on it by the name of the All-Merciful. There is none among those that the Throne encompasses but that divine mercy touches him. That is the words of Allah, "My mercy embraces all things," (7:156) and the Throne encompasses everything, and the One who sits on it is the Merciful. By its reality, mercy is diffused through the universe as we explained in another part in this book and in The Makkan Revelations.

Allah put perfume in this marital connection in the innocence of 'A'isha, (15) may Allah be pleased with her! He said, "Corrupt (16) men are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; and good (17) women are for good men, and good men are for good women. The latter are innocent of what they say." (24:26) He made their scent fragrant because the word is breath, and it is the source of the scent. It goes out with fragrance and putrefaction according to what appears in the form of speech. As it is divine by the nobility of its origin, it is all good, and so it is good. As for what is not praised and is censured, it is good and bad. The Prophet said in respect to the badness of garlic, "It is a plant whose scent I dislike." He did not say, "I dislike it." The source is not disliked, but he disliked what appeared from it.

Dislike for that is either by custom or unsuitability of nature, by something in the Shari'a, or a lack of perfection or something other than what we have mentioned.

Since the command is divided into corrupt and good as we confirmed, he was made to love perfume rather than repulsive odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. Since there is putrefaction in this elemental structure as it is created of "dry clay from mud moulded (or fetid)," (18) so the angels dislike it by essence. The nature of the dung-beetle is offended by the scent of the rose which is one of the pleasant scents. For the dung-beetle, the scent of the rose is not a pleasant scent. If someone has the same sort of nature (as the dung beetle) in meaning and form, the truth offends him when he hears it, and he is gladdened by the false. It is what Allah said, "those who believe in falsehood and reject Allah." (29:52) He described them with loss, and said, "those, they are the losers" who have lost themselves. Whoever does not distinguish goodness from corruption, has no perception.

Allah made the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, love only the good (the perfume) of everything, and there is only that. Can it be conceived that there is a disposition in the universe which only finds good in everything but does not recognize the bad? We say that there is not. We find it in the very root from which the universe appeared which is Allah; we find that He hates and loves. The corrupt is only that which He hates, and the good is only that which He loves. The universe is the form of Allah, and man is in both forms. There is no nature which only perceives one matter in everything - rather, the nature distinguishes the good from the corrupt in spite of the fact that it knows that it is corrupt by tasting and good without tasting. The perception of the good in it diverts him from the sensation of its corruptness. This can happen. As for the removal of the corrupt from the universe that is, from phenomenal being it is not admissible. The mercy of Allah extends to both the corrupt and the good. The corrupt considers itself good, but the good in itself is corrupt. There is nothing but good but that an aspect of its disposition is bad, and vice versa.

As for the third by which uniqueness (fardiyya) is completed, it is the prayer. The Prophet said, "and the coolness of the eye (19) is in the prayer" because it is contemplation. That is because it is intimate discourse between Allah and His slave as Allah says, "Remember Me, and I will remember you." (2:152) It is worship ('ibâda) which is divided in two parts between Allah and His slave one part belongs to Allah and one part to His slave, as has come in sound transmission from Allah in which He says, "I divided the prayer into two parts between Me and My slave. One part is Mine and one part is My slave's, and My slave will receive what he asks for. The slave says, 'In the name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has mentioned Me.' Then the slave says, 'Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds,' and Allah says, 'My slave has praised Me.' The slave says, 'The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has glorified Me. My slave has given Me authorisation.'" (20) All this part belongs purely to Allah.

"Then the slave says, 'You alone we worship. You alone we ask for help,' and Allah says, 'This is between Me and My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" Sharing occurs in this ayat. "The slave then says, 'Guide us in the straight path, the path of those You have blessed, not of those with anger on them nor of the misguided,' and Allah says, 'This is for My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" This is purely for His slave as the first part is purely for Allah. The knowledge of this makes the recitation of the Fatiha obligatory. Whoever does not recite it has not prayed the prayer establish between Allah and His slave.

The prayer is then a secret conversation (munajat). It is remembrance/invocation (dhikr). When someone mentions Allah, he sits with Allah and Allah sits with him. It is a sound divine transmission that Allah said, "I sit with the one who mentions Me." (21) Whoever sits with the One he mentions and has sight, sees the One with whom he sits. This is contemplation (mushahada) and vision. If he does not have sight, he does not see Him. Thus the one who prays knows his rank, and whether or not he sees Allah with this vision in the prayer. If he does not see Him, then let him worship Him by belief (iman) as if he saw Him, imagining Him to be in the qibla of his conversation, and let him listen for Allah's reply.

Without a doubt, everyone who prays is an Imam, so the angels pray behind the slave when he prays alone, as is related in tradition. If he is the Imam for his particular world and the angels pray with him, then he has attained the rank of the Messenger in his prayer which is deputyship from Allah. When he says, "Allah hears whoever praises Him," (22) he informs himself and whoever is behind him that Allah has heard him. The angels and those present say, "Our Lord, praise belongs to You."

Allah says on the tongue of the slave, "Allah hears whoever praises Him." Look at the sublimity of the rank of the prayer and where it takes the one who has it! Whoever does not achieve the rank of vision in the prayer has not reached the goal nor does he have the coolness of the eye in it because he does not see the One he addresses. If he does not hear the answer of Allah, he is not one of those who listen. Whoever is not present in the prayer with his Lord, and does not hear nor see Him, is not one who prays at all, and he is not along those "who listen well, having seen the evidence." (30:37)

The prayer is the only form of 'ibada during which one is forbidden to perform any other action. The mention of Allah in it is greater than the words and actions it contains. We mentioned the attribute of the perfect man in the prayer in The Makkan Revelations and his nature, because Allah says that "the prayer precludes indecency and wrongdoing" (29:45) since it is set down in the Shari'a that the one performing the prayer cannot act in anything except this 'ibâda as long as he is in it, and he is called the one the prays (musalli). "The remembrance of Allah is greater still" (29:45) in it that is, the mention which is from Allah to His slave when He answers him in his request, and his praise of Him is greater than the mention of the slave of his Lord in it, because greatness belongs to Allah. (23) This is why He says, "Allah knows what you do," and He says, "He who listen well, having seen the evidence" he gives ear to what Allah mentions in the prayer.

Therefore, since existence is from an intelligible movement which transported the universe from non-existence to existence, the prayer encompasses all movements. There are three movements: vertical, which is the state of standing in the prayer, the horizontal, which is the state of bowing, and the downward movement, which is the state of prostration. The movement of man is vertical, the movement of the animal is horizontal, and the movement of plants is downward. The inanimate does not have a movement from its essence. If a rock moves, it moves by other means than itself.

As for the words of the Prophet, "The coolness of my eye is in the prayer," he did not ascribe the action of putting it there to himself, so Allah gives the one who prays a tajalli which stems from Him, not from the one who prays. If he had not mentioned this attribute from himself, he would have commanded the prayer without tajalli from Him to him. Since that is from Him by means of graciousness, the contemplation is also through graciousness. He said, "the coolness of my eye is in the prayer," and it is only contemplation of the Beloved by

which the eye of the lover is delighted by continuance. The eye remains seeing Allah. It does not look with Him to other than Him in anything, and for that reason, it is forbidden to turn away in the prayer. The glance is something which Shaytan steals from the prayer of the slave in order to forbid him the contemplation of the Beloved. (24) If Allah had truly been the Beloved of the one who turns aside, he would not have turned aside in his prayer to another qibla. Man knows his state in himself, whether he is like that in this particular act of worship or not. "Man will be clear proof against himself in spite of any excuses he might offer." (75:14) He recognizes his lie apart from his truth in himself, because man is not ignorant of his state, his state has tasting (dhawq) for him.

The prayer has another portion. Allah commanded us to pray to Him, and He told us that He prays for us. The prayer is from us and from Him. When He prays, He prays by His name, the Last, for it comes after the existence of the slave, and it is the source of Allah which the slave created in his qibla by logical discernment or by imitation. He is the God of the one who has a creed. It varies according to what the place of the tajalli has and according to the established predisposition as al-Junayd said when he was asked about recognition of Allah and the gnostic. He said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel." It is a masterly answer giving information about the matter for what it is. This is Allah who prays for us. If we pray, we have the name, the Last, so we are in it, as we mentioned, in the state of the One who has this name we are with Him according to our state. He only regards us by the form which we bring to Him.

The one who prays is behind the one who precedes him in the place. It is His words, "Each one knows its prayer and its glorification " (24:41) that is, its rank in being behind the worship of its Lord and the extolling which his predisposition accords him of disconnection (tanzih). "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise" of its Lord, the Forbearing, the Forgiving. For that, we do not understand the extolling of the universe distinctly, (25) creature by creature.

Then a rank refers the pronoun to the extolling slave in His words, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise," that is, the praise of that thing. The pronoun which is in His word, "His praise (bi-hamdihi)" refers to the thing - that is, with the praise that is from it.

As we said of the one who has a creed other than Islam, he praises the God who is in his creed and attaches himself to Him. What is from his work returns to him, so he only praises himself. It is from the praise of fabrication the artisan is praised without a doubt, and so the excellence of what he creates or its lack of excellence returns to the artisan. The god of a creed is the product of the one who looks at it, and it is his fabrication; his praise for what he believes is his praise for himself. For this reason, he condemns the creed of another if he had been fair, he would not have done that. Indeed, the possessor of this particular object of worship is certainly ignorant in his rejection of other than what he believes about Allah, since had he recognized what al-Junayd said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel," he would have conceded to everyone who has a creed what he believed in, and he would have recognized Allah in every form of worship of every person with a creed, He has opinion but does not know it. For that reason, Allah says, "I am in My slave's opinion of Me," (26) that is, I only appear to him in the form of his creed. If he wishes, he generalizes, and if he wishes, he limits. The god of creeds is taken from definition, so He is the God which the heart of His slave encompasses. (27)

The Absolute Divinity is not encompassed by anything because He is the source of things and

the source of Himself. It is not said of the thing that it encompasses itself, not that it does not encompass itself, so understand! "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 27:

1. Hadith, "I was a Prophet when Adam was still between water and clay."
2. Hadith, "I was given all the words."
3. Qur'an 2:31, "And He taught Adam the names of all things..."
4. Hadith in an-Nasa'i and Ibn Hanbal: "I was made to love three things in your world: women, perfume, and the coolness of my eye in the prayer."
5. Hadith in Muslim (fitan:95) and at-Tirmidhi.
6. The Burning Bush.
7. i.e. from the nature of the world of Purity.
8. Qur'an 2:34.
9. Since his nature (khuluq) was immense or mighty ('adhim) as Allah said, "You are truly immense in character," (68:4) and as 'A'isha said of the Prophet, "His nature was the Qur'an."
10. Nikah, or marriage, actually means lawful intercourse.
11. See Qur'an 6:98.
12. See Qur'an 20:50.
13. Qur'an 4:113, "Allah's favour to you is indeed immense."
14. Dhat, essence, is feminine.
15. The following verse was revealed about 'A'isha in the affair of the Lie and declared her innocence in the affair.
16. Khabith, also meaning with a repulsive odor.
17. Tayyib, means good, wholesome, fragrant, from the same root as perfume, tîb.
18. See Qur'an 15:26.
19. i.e. that which delights me.
20. Muslim 4:38, 41, etc.
21. Hadith qudsi in Ibn Majah and Ibn Hibban.
22. When he comes up from ruku' in the prayer.
23. See Qur'an: 45:37.
24. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim. "(Looking aside in the prayer) is something which Shaytan snatches from a slave's prayer."
Also the hadith in Ibn Hanbal and elsewhere: "Allah continues to turn favorably towards a slave while he is engaged in the prayer as long as he does not look to the side. But if he does so He departs from him."
25. See Qur'an 17:44, "The seven heavens and the earth and everyone in them glorify Him. There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise; but you do not understand their glorification. He is the All-Forbearing, Ever-Forgiving."
26. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari, "I am in My slave's opinion and I am with him when he remembers Me..."
27. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My heaven nor My earth contains Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."

THE GOOD END

(OF ONES LIFE)
IT MEANS, PORTENTS AND THE WARNING
OF THE BAD END

حسن الخاتمة وسوء الخاتمة

Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Al-Mutlaq

International Islamic Publishing House
IIPH

Dar Ibn Hazm

In the Name of Allah the All-Beneficent, All-Merciful

The Good End

Praise be to Allah whose Mercy embraced each and every thing and who keeps account of all things (i.e. He knows the exact number of every thing). He had mercy on whom He willed through that which he enjoined (on them to perform) on this world which (if they perform them) consequently raise their ranks on the Hereafter, so they (Muslims) were perseverant in His obedience and strove in His worship; if they are inflicted with calamities and show patience it will be good for them (in the Hereafter), and if favours are bestowed to them [by Allah] and they are thankful and grateful [for Allah], it will be good for them in the Hereafter, and concerning them Allah said:

“Only those who are patient shall receive their rewards in full, without reckoning”. [Az-Zumar (10)]

I bear witness that there is no true God but Allah who has no partner, and I bear witness that Muhammad ﷺ is His Slave and Messenger who sent as a mercy for the Alamin, prayers from Allah be on him, his household and his reverend Companions.

A portion (of good) for a man in this world is his lifetime; if he makes good use of it in things that benefit him in the eternal abode (Paradise), then his trade will be of a great profit. But if he misuses it (his life) by committing sins and disobedience till he meets Allah in such a state, he is surely of those who are losers; how many of them in the graves?! He who is of a sound sense calls himself for account before Allah calls him to account (on the Day of Account), and fears his sins (and consequently get faraway from them) before they lead him to destruction (i.e. HellFire). Ibn Mas'ood ؓ said:

“The (true) believer sees his sins (and himself) as if he is sitting at the side of a mountain which he fears it will soon fall upon him” [Bukhari (11/88-89) and Muslim]

How many a man who persisted on committing a small sin and was familiar with it and considered it to be nothing, and never thought of the greatness of the One whom he (the sinner) disobeyed and so it (this small sin) was the bad end (of his life and so he was admitted to Hell-Fire). Anas Ibn Malik ؓ said:

**"You do deeds, which you consider smaller than a hair,
we used to consider as major sins at the time of Prophet
ﷺ" [Bukhari (11/283)]**

Allah the All-Mighty drew the believers attention in the Holy Qur'an to the importance of the good end (of one's life and deeds); He says:

"O you who believe! Fear Allah [by doing all that He has ordered and by abstaining from all that He has forbidden] as He should be feared, and die not except in a state of Islam [as Muslims] with complete submission to Allah." (Qur'an 3: 102)

He also said:

"And worship your Rabb [Lord] until there comes unto you the certainty [i.e. death]." (Qur'an 15: 99)

The order (in the previous verses) to fear Allah and worship Him (Alone) continues till one dies so that good end (of one's life and deeds) could be achieved. The Prophet ﷺ informed us that there are some people who strive in doing obedience for a long time of their lives but shortly before they die they commit sins and disobediences and end their lives in such a state (and consequently they are admitted to Hell-Fire). The Prophet ﷺ said:

"A man may do deeds characteristic of the people of the (Hell) Fire, so much so that there is only the distance of a cubit between him and it, and then what has been written (by the angel) surpasses, and so he starts doing deeds characteristic of the people of Paradise and enters Paradise. Similarly, a person may do deeds characteristic of the people of Paradise, so much so that there is only the distance of a cubit between him and it, and then what has been written (by the angel) surpasses, and he starts doing deeds of the people of (Hell-) Fire and enters Hell-Fire." [Bukhari (11/417), and Muslim Narration no. (2643)- I translated the complete hadith for more benefit to the reader (Translator)].

Sahl Ibn Sa'd As-Saidi رضي الله عنه, narrated that during one of his battles, the Prophet ﷺ encountered the disbelievers (polytheists, pagans, and idolaters), and the two armies fought, and each of them turned to their army camps. Amongst the (army of the) Muslims there was a man who would follow every single isolated pagan and strike him with his sword. It was said: "O Allah's

Messenger! None has fought so satisfactory as so-and-so (namely, that brave Muslim)." The Prophet ﷺ said: **"He is from the dwellers of the Hell-Fire."** Then a man from amongst the people said: "I will follow him and accompany him in his fast and slow movements." The (brave) man got wounded, and wanting to die at once; he put the handle of his sword on the ground and its tip in between his breast, and then threw himself over it, committing suicide. Then the man (who had watched the deceased) returned to the Prophet ﷺ, and said: "I testify that you are the Messenger of Allah." The Prophet ﷺ said: **"What is this?!"** The man told him the whole story. The Prophet ﷺ said:

"A man may do what may seem to the people as the deeds of the dwellers of Paradise, but he is of the dwellers of Hellfire and a man may do what may seem to the people as the deeds of the dwellers of Hell-Fire, but he is from the dwellers of Paradise." [Fath al Bari the explanation of Sahih Bukhari (7/538-4202) page 538. The first edition of Dar Ar-Rayyan (1988)].

Allah the All-Mighty, described His believing slaves (in the Holy Qur'an) as the ones who joined between fear of Allah's punishment and sincerity in worship in their hearts. He the All-Mighty, said:

"Verily! Those who live in awe for fear of their Rabb [Lord]; And those who believe in the Ayat [proofs, verses, lessons,...] of their Rabb; And those who join not anyone [in worship] as partners with Allah; And those who give that [their charity] which they give [and also do other good deeds] with their hearts full of fear [whether their alms and charities are accepted or not], because they are sure to return to their Rabb [for reckoning]. It is those who race for good deeds and they are foremost in them [e.g. offering the compulsory, Salat [prayers] in their [early] stated, fixed times and so on] (Qur'an 23: 57-61).

This was the state of the reverend Companions. Ahmad narrated from Abu Bakr-As-Siddiq ؓ that he said:

"I wish I was a hair in a believer's body."

And he ؓ used to hold his tongue and say:

"This is the thing that led me to the ways (of destruction)."

Ali Ibn Abi Talib ؑ used to fear two things: the long hope, and following desires. He ؑ said:

"Long hope makes (you) forget all about the Hereafter, and following desires hinders (you) from the way of Truth (i.e. Islamic monotheism, good deeds, obedience, etc.)",

and also he used to say:

"Verily, this world has run away and the Hereafter is coming forward (to us) very fast. And there are sons for each one of them, so be of the sons of the Hereafter [i.e. loving the Hereafter and do good deeds that Allah has enjoined so that He may admit you to Paradise], and do not be of sons of this world (i.e. who love this world and who live their lives committing sins, disobedience, etc.) for in this world there are deeds and no accounts but Tomorrow (Day of Account) there will be only account and no deeds (that could be done)."

Sudden death was a detested thing in Islam because it comes to a person all of a sudden and gives him no time (to repent), he might be doing something evil and so his life will end on such a state.

The righteous predecessors (the reverend Companions and their followers) used to fear the bad end of one's life with a great fear. Sahl At-Tusturi said: "The Siddiqun (truthful persons) used to fear the bad end of one's life in any move or at any moment and they were described by Allah in the Holy Qur'an as: **'their hearts are full of fear'**" [Qur'an 23: 20]

The fear of the bad end (of one's life) should be present in front of one's eye in each and every moment for fear induces (the person) to work (i.e. do good deeds). The Prophet ؐ said:

"Whoever fears (should) walk at night (i.e. begins early and work very hard to complete his journey; that is he races for good deeds) and who walks at night, reaches home (Paradise). Allah's good is expensive, Allah's good is Paradise." [At-Tirmithi no. 2452].

But when the death of a person becomes very near and he is about die, he should have more hope in Allah and he should look forward to the meeting with Him for whoever likes the meeting with Allah, Allah likes the meeting with him. The Prophet ﷺ said:

"None of you (Muslims) should die but having a good thought of Allah, the All-Majestic, the All-Mighty."

But most of the ignorant Muslim common folk depended on Allah's spacious mercy, pardoning, and forgiveness and kept on committing disobedience and did not abstain from doing sins, on the contrary, their knowledge of Allah's attributes (i.e. Forgiveness, Mercy, etc.) induced them to commit more sins and this is a destructive mistake and a destructive inference (of Allah's Attributes) for Allah is the All-Merciful, the Oft-Forgiving and (He is) the severest in punishment as Allah, the All-Mighty, stated in many of His Holy Verses; He the All-Majestic said:

"Declare [O Muhammad] unto My slaves, that truly, I am the Oft-Forgiving, the All-Merciful. And that My Torment is indeed the most painful torment." [Qur'an 15: 49-50]

And He also said:

"Ha-Meem. The revelation of the book [this Qur'an] is from Allah, the All-Mighty, the All-Knower. The Forgiver of sin, the Acceptor of repentance, the Severe in punishment,..." [Qur'an 40: 1-3].

Ma'ruf Al-Karkhi said: "Your hope in the mercy of the One whom you do not obey is foolishness and disappointment (for you)." Some of the scholars said: "The One who enjoined that your organ (i.e. your hand) should be cut off for the stealing of 3 dirhams (1/4 of a gold coin), do not feel safe of his punishment in the Hereafter that it would be the like of it."

A Muslim should always be keen to pay back people's debts and give them their due rights for whatever right is with a person which is due to his (Muslim) brother, the latter will surely take it back on the Day of Resurrection. If the former has no rewards in his scale, the latter's sins will be laid on the former's scale of sins (and eventually be admitted to Hell). The Prophet ﷺ informed (us) that the believer's soul is hindered (from getting into Paradise) by his debts till they are paid on his behalf back to its owner.

The Bad End

Now I will explain things that cause the bad end (of one's life):

First - Delaying Repentance:

Turning in repentance unto Allah from all sins is an enjoined duty on every mature Muslim at any moment as is stated in the words of Allah:

“And all of you beg Allah to forgive you all, O believers, that you may be successful.” [Qur'an 24:31].

The Prophet ﷺ used to ask Allah's forgiveness one hundred times every day although Allah has already forgiven him his sins. Al-`Aghar Al-Muzni said that the Prophet ﷺ said:

“O people! Turn in repentance to Allah. Verily! I turn in repentance to Him one hundred times every day.”
[Muslim 2702].

The Prophet ﷺ stated that the one who turn in repentance to Allah (sincerely) from a sin is as the one who has (committed) no sin. [Ibn Majah (4250) and this (hadith) have a sound chain of narrators]. One of the Satan's tricks by which he beguiles people is delaying repentance. He (Satan) insinuates to the sinner to delay his repentance for he has enough times to do that and if he wants to repent now and commits the same sin afterwards then his repentance will never be accepted again, and he will be of those who are admitted in Hell. Or he (Satan) insinuates to him (sinner) that who he (the sinner) reaches the age of fifty or sixty he may then turn into repentance - sincere repentance - and may retire in the mosque (for optional prayers) and may do many optional good deeds, but now he is in his youth hood and his golden age. So he should entertain himself and not to exhaust it with obedience.

These are some of Satan's tricks by which he induces people to delay their repentance. Some of the righteous predecessors (reverend Companions and their followers) said:

“I warn you of ‘I will’ (i.e. do not say I will repent later) for they are (i.e. these words) one of Satan's most atrocious forces. The similitude of the firm believer who turn in repentance to Allah from each and every sin and at any time out of fear of the bad end (of his life) and out of love to Allah, and the careless one who delays his repentance as the similitude of a group of people who are on a journey and entered a village; the firm believer bought whatever helps him to complete

his journey and waited ready for the day to leave (the village) and the careless one would always say: "I will get ready tomorrow." Then the leader of the journey announced the departure and this careless one has nothing (to help him continue his journey). This similitude is for the people of this world; the firm believer never regrets on any thing when death comes to him but the careless sinner will say when he is resurrected from death: "O my Rabb (Lord), send me back (to the world) so that I may do good deeds in that world (which I left behind)."

Second - Hope in long life:

It is the reason behind the misery of many people when Satan beguiles them and makes them think that they have a long time to live and successive years in which one can dream of things and achieve them, so Satan induces them to spend these years achieving their hopes and making real their dreams and forgetting all about the Hereafter and making no mention of death and if one makes mention of death they feel annoyed because it makes their lives distressed and spoils their desires. The Prophet ﷺ warned us of these two things which is a great warning saying:

"I mostly fear for you two things: Following desires, and the long hope (in life); following desires hinders you from (accepting) the Truth (i.e. Islamic Monotheism, etc.), and long hope is (going to lead you towards) loving this world to a extent that you will stop thinking in the Hereafter and the Islamic obligations enjoined on you."

[Ibn Abu Ad-Dunya narration with a weak chain of narrators. AI-Iraqi (commentary) on AI-Ihya (4/433)].

If a man loves this world more than the Hereafter, he will prefer it (this world) and strive hard to gain its delights, enjoyments and pleasures and forgets all about the Hereafter and all about building his 'house' in Paradise near his Rabb with those whom Allah has favoured of the Prophets, truthful, martyrs, and the righteous ones, and best are those as a company.

Having short hope in life will appear (in one's deeds) as stepping towards doing good deeds and making good use of one's life for the days of one's life are preordained and one's breath is counted already and what passes away (of one's life) will never come back or restored, and on the way (of one's life)

there are many obstacles which the Prophet ﷺ mentioned in his hadith saying:

"Step towards (good) deeds before seven [obstacles hinder you from doing them (deeds)]:

Do you wait but for abject poverty that makes you forget (Islamic obligations on you), extravagant richness, destructive diseases, detested senility, death, or Pseudo Messiah;

(these are all) absent evils that are being waited or the Hour (which is also being waited) and it is more detested and harder (on you than all these)." [At-Tirmidhi (2408) and he said: "This hadith is a sound one"].

Abdullah Ibn `Umar (may Allaah be pleased with them) said: The Prophet ﷺ once held my shoulders and said:

"Live in this world as (if you are) a wayfarer or a stranger (who will sooner or later leave the town he is staying in)." And Ibn `Umar (may Allaah be pleased with them) used to say: "If you will live till night, do not wait for the next day (i.e. do not have hopes that you will live to the next day), and if you wake up in the morning do not have hope that you will live till night. And take (advantage) from your health for (the times when you are afflicted with) diseases (and can not perform any obedience) and take advantage of your life for death (i.e. do every possible obedience in your life before death comes to you for then no deeds can be performed." [Bukhari (11/190-200) and At-Tirmidhi no. 2334].

The Prophet ﷺ, guided the believers to the way they should follow to get rid of the long hope in life and to think thoroughly of (the truth of our existence in) this world; he ﷺ ordered them to remember death and visit the graves frequently, to wash the dead before putting them in their graves, to follow the funeral processions, to visit sick people and to visit the righteous people because all these matters awaken the heart and deliver it from its unawareness and lighten it (with the light of Truth and) with the things and affairs he will later face (in the Hereafter) in order to get ready for them. You will be (dear reader) provided with some details.

(A) - As for remembering death, it induces one to lead an ascetic life, and long for the Eternal World (in Paradise) and consequently it induces the person to strive in doing righteous deeds and not to incline to one's forbidden

desires in this world, which is not permanent. Abu Hurairah ؓ narrated that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"Make mention of the destroyer of desires (i.e. death) very often." [At-Tirmidhi no. 2049 and he said: "This hadith has a sound chain of narrators." It is also narrated by Ibn Majah no. 4258].

Ibn Umar (may Allaah be pleased with them) said that a man from Ansar¹ asked:

"O Messenger of Allah, who is the soundest of people and most generous (in manners)?" The Prophet ﷺ said: "The soundest of people and most generous in manners is the one who makes mention of death very often and prepares himself fully for it; Verily, these are the ones who are the soundest of people. They gained the honour in this world and the glory in the Hereafter." [Ibn Majah no. 4259 with a weak chain of narrators. Ibn Abu Ad-Dunya also narrated it with a good chain of narrators; AI-Iraqi also narrated it in his book "Takhrij Ahadith Al-Ihya" (4/451)].

Footnote 1 ANSAR: The Companions of the Prophet ﷺ from the inhabitants of Madinah, who embraced Islam and supported it and who received and entertained the Muslim emigrants from Makkah and other places.

The person then thinks thoroughly of these dead people in the graves; weren't they once those of strong bodies, and of great wealth, commanding orders and forbidding (things), and this day (in their graves) their bodies are being eaten by worms and their bones are perished. Then this person thinks, can he escape death or death will inescapably take him and consequently prepares himself fully for the Hereafter by doing righteous deeds for they are the beneficial currency in the Hereafter.

(B) - As for visiting cemeteries and seeing graves, it is regarded as the best admonition for the hearts, when man sees these digged dark places and when; he remembers the moment when the beloved ones of the dead person pour sand over him after placing him in his tomb and closing it with some clay bricks, then they disperse away from him and inherit his money and own his properties (according to the Islamic laws of inheritance), and his women will marry other men after his death and after a little while he will be forgotten although he was the one who is obeyed if he ordered for something to happen and the one who is not disobeyed when he forbids something. When a person thinks of all that while visiting the cemetery, he will realize the benefit of the Prophet's hadith: **"Visit the graves for they remind you of death."** [Muslim narration no. 976]

(C) - Washing the dead and following funeral processions:

Turning the dead body of the dead from one side to the other while washing it is a great admonition (for us and for the one who does the washing) for when he (this dead person) was alive, none could turn him to any side or even get nearer to him except with his permission, and he may be of those who were of a great strength and a tremendous awe but now (as a dead) he is a unmoving body that the washer can turn it to the side he wants.

Mukhul Ad-Dimashqi used to say - whenever he sees a funeral: "Go ahead (i.e. and follow the funeral) for we will all going to die, (this is) a great admonition (for us), a swift unawareness (is our state in this world), the first and the last (of us) will go away (die) bearing no mind (out of fear)." Usman رضي الله عنه used to cry whenever he follows a funeral procession and stands on a grave. It was said to him: "When you make mention of Paradise and Hell-Fire you do not cry but whenever you stand near a grave you cry!" He said: 'I heard the Prophet ﷺ say:

"(Being in) the grave is the first stage of the stages of the Hereafter, if he (i.e. the dead person) was delivered [by Allah] safely from it, what follows it is much easier, but if he is not delivered from it, then that which is after (this stage) is much worse." Ahmad and At-Tirmidhi narrated it. Ibn Majah and Al-Hakim said: "It is a sound hadith." [Al-Musnad (1/63), At-Tirmidhi narration no. 2309]

(D) - Visiting Righteous People:

Visiting righteous people awakens the heart and encourages the soul (to do righteous deeds) for when the visitor sees how the righteous people strive in doing good deeds and how they compete each other in doing obedience to seek the pleasure of Allah only, and to win His Paradise paying no attention to this world and its attractions for these hinder them from walking on the honoured path (i.e. Islamic Monotheism, obedience...). Allah, the All-Mighty, ordered His Prophet ﷺ to accompany such people and show perseverance in doing that:

"And keep yourself [O Muhammad] patiently with those who call on their Rabb [i.e. your companions who remember their Rabb with glorification, praising prayers, and other righteous deeds] morning and afternoon, seeking His Face, and let not your eyes overlook them desiring the pomp and glitter of the world; and obey not him whose heart We have made heedless of Our Remembrance, one who follows his own lusts, and his own affairs [deeds] has been lost.)
[Qur'an 18:28].

Al-Hasan was asked: "O Abu Hasan (father of Al-Hasan)! What shall we do? Shall we sit with people who make-our hearts in our mouths (out of fear)?" He

said: "By Allah! To sit with people who make you fear (now) so that you would feel safe later (in the Day of Resurrection) is better than sitting with people who make you feel safe (in this world) till fear comes to you (on the Day of Resurrection)."

Third - Loving the sin and getting used to it:

If a person gets used to any sin and ever repents from it, Satan (Shaitan) will seize his heart (over power it), and it (the sin) will be the only thing that he thinks of even in the last moments of his life, and if his friends induce him to utter the two testifications at time of death - so that the last thing he would say is "La ilaha-illa Allah [There is no God but Allah]" - sin will have control over his mind and he will utter only what he used to commit of sins. The following are some real stories:

There was a man who used to work as an auctioneer in the market. When death came to him his sons induced him to utter the two testifications [i.e. saying: "Ashhadu Anna La Illaha IllaAllah Wa'anna Muhammadan Rasul Allah - There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger]," the father only said: "Four and half, four and half."

It was said to another: Say, "La ilaha-illa Allah" she said: "Many times she would say that she had got tired."

It was said to a third person: Say, "La ilaha-illa Allah" but he sang.

And death may reach the person (who insists on committing sins) while he is committing the sin and he will meet Allah on such a state and He (Allah) would be angry with him. The Prophet ﷺ said:

"He who dies on something (i.e. doing it), Allah will resurrect him on the same state (he was in) before his death." Al-Hakim narrated it and he said: "It is authentic according to the conditions that Muslim put for the authentic ahadith," and At-Thahabi agreed with him." [Al-Mustadrak (1/340)]

Fourth - Suicide:

If a Muslim is afflicted with a calamity and shows patience and seeks Allah's pleasure in that, this calamity will increase his rewards. But if the Muslim gives up (of Allah's mercy) and feels unsatisfied with his life and thinks that the best way to get rid of his problems and agonies is to commit suicide, in

that case he chose disobedience and incurred Allah's anger on himself and killed his own self without just cause. Bukhari narrated that Abu Hurairah رضي الله عنه said: The Prophet ﷺ said:

"He who commits suicide by throttling shall keep on throttling in the Hell-Fire (forever) and he who commits suicide by stabbing himself shall keep on stabbing himself in the Hell-Fire (forever)." [Bukhari (3/180)].

Bukhari and Muslim, may Allah have mercy on them both, narrated that Abu Hurairah رضي الله عنه said:

"A man witnessed the battle of Khaibar with the Prophet ﷺ, and he رضي الله عنه said about a man claiming to be a Muslim: "This (man) is from the dwellers of Hell-Fire." When the battle began, the man [whom the Prophet ﷺ talked about strove satisfactorily and he was wounded badly. Then it was said to the Prophet ﷺ: "The man you talked about earlier strove in the battle satisfactorily and died (isn't he a martyr?!)." The Prophet ﷺ said: "To Hell-Fire (he shall go)." Doubt sneaked to the hearts of the Muslims. While being in such a state, it was said that the man did not actually die but wounded badly. When night came, the man could not bear the pains and killed himself (i.e. committed suicide). The Prophet ﷺ was told the matter and then he رضي الله عنه said: "I bear witness that I am Allah's Slave and Messenger." Then he رضي الله عنه ordered Bilal رضي الله عنه to announce for people that: "None will enter Paradise but a believer. And verily, Allah may support this religion (Islam) with a wicked (sinful) man." [Bukhari narration (6/125) and Muslim (111)].

Portents of Good End

The Prophet ﷺ informed us of some of the good end portents which if the person's death was with one of them then it will be a good omen and a glad tidings. Some of these portents are:

(1) -To utter the testification of faith [i.e. "La ilaha-illa Allah" - None has the right to be worshipped but Allah] at the time of death. Al-Hakim narrated that Mu`ath Ibn Jabal ؓ said: The Prophet ﷺ said:

"He whose last words (in life) were ' La ilaha-illa Allah', None has the right to be worshipped but Allah shall enter Paradise" [Abu Dawud narration (3116), Al-Hakim (1/351) and regarded it authentic hadith and At-Thahabi agreed with him].

(2) - To die as a martyr while striving to Allah's word (i.e. Islamic Monotheism) superior. Allah said:

"Think not of those who are killed In the way of Allah as dead. Nay they are alive, with their Rabb and they have provision. They rejoice in what Allah has bestowed upon them of His Bounty, rejoicing for the sake of those who have not yet joined them, but are left behind [not yet martyred] that on them no fear shall come, nor shall they grieve. They rejoice in a Grace and a Bounty from Allah, and that Allah will not waste the reward of the believers". [Quran 3:169-171]

(3) - To die while preparing for a battle in Allah's Cause, or while performing Hajj (pilgrimage). The Prophet ﷺ said:

"Whoever is killed in Allah's Cause he is (regarded as) a martyr (he will gain the reward of that of a martyr) and whoever dies in Allah's Cause, he is a martyr." Muslim and Ahmad narrated this hadith.

The Prophet ﷺ said - about the man who was performing Hajj and fell down from his she-camel and died:

"Wash him with water and (the leaves of) the lotte tree, and shroud him with two sheets and do not cover his head for he will be resurrected on the Day of Resurrection saying the "talbia " (devotional calls recited

when one performs Hajj or Umra; they are as follows:
Labbaika Allahumma Labbaik..O Allah, here I am
responding, here I am worshipping You).

(4) - To die exactly after performing an obedience to Allah (i.e. this obedience be the last thing one did). Abu Huthifa رضي الله عنه said that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"He who says 'La ilaha-illa Allah' [i.e. no one has the right to be worshipped but Allah] seeking Allah's Countenance (and pleasure) and is the last thing he does (in his life) will enter Paradise. And he who fasts a day seeking Allah's Countenance (and pleasure) and happened to be the last day in his life, will enter Paradise. And he who gives money as a charity seeking Allah's Countenance (and pleasure) and this was his last thing he did, will enter Paradise." (Ahmad 5/391).

(5) - To die while striving to defend the five things that the Islamic law preserved (for Muslims, i.e. none should transgress to deprive a Muslim from them) and they are: religion, soul, wealth, honour and mind. Said Ibn Zaid رضي الله عنه narrated that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"He who dies while defending his wealth (from the one who wants to take it away from him by force) is a martyr, he who dies while defending his household (from those who want to cause harm for them) is a martyr, he who dies while defending his religion (i.e. fighting the disbelieving transgressors) is a martyr, and he who dies while defending his soul (from the one who wants to kill him) is a martyr." (At-Tirmidhi and Abu Dawud)

(6) - To die because of one of the epidemic diseases. The Prophet ﷺ informed us of some of them; they are:

A - Plague: Anas Ibn Malik رضي الله عنه narrated that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"Plague is a cause of martyrdom for every Muslim (who dies because of it)." [Abu Dawud (4772), and At-Tirmidhi no. (1418 and 1421)].

B - Tuberculosis: Rashid Ibn Hubaish said that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"Dying during fighting in Allah's Cause is (the cause of) martyrdom, Plague is (a cause of) martyrdom (for every Muslim who dies because of it), dying because of delivery is (the cause of) martyrdom (for any Muslim woman) and tuberculosis is (the cause of) martyrdom (for a Muslim who dies because of it)." (Ahmad 3/289)

C - Abdominal diseases: Narrated Abu Hurairah ؓ that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"He (a Muslim) who dies because of an abdominal disease is a martyr." [Muslim no.1915]

D - Pleurisy: Jabir Ibn Atik narrated that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"The one who dies because of pleurisy is a martyr." (i.e. he will be given a reward equals to that of a fight martyr) This hadith will later be narrated fully.

(7) - The dying of a (Muslim) woman because of delivery or in her after-birth state: Ubadah Ibn As-Samit ؓ narrated that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"And the woman who dies because of her son, after her delivery, her son will drag her with his umbilical cord to Paradise." [Ahmad (4/201) and (5/323).

(8) - Dying because of drowning, being underneath debris, and bums: Abu Hurairah ؓ narrated that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"Martyrs are (of) five (kinds): The one who dies because of plague, abdominal diseases, drowning, and the one who dies underneath debris." [At-Tirmidhi (1063) and Muslim no. (1915) the like of it].

Jabir Ibn Atik said that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"The martyrs other than being killed in Allah's Cause are, (of) seven (kinds): the one who dies because of plague is a martyr, the drowned (Muslim) is (regarded as) a martyr, the one who dies because of pleurisy is a martyr, the one who dies because of abdominal diseases

is a martyr, the one who dies because of burns is a martyr, the one who dies because of being underneath debris is a martyr, and the (Muslim) woman who dies because of delivery is a martyr." This hadith was narrated by Ahmad, Abu Dawud, An-Nisai, and Al-Hakim who classified it as an authentic hadith and Ath-Thahabi agreed with him." [Ahmad (5/446), Abu Dawud (3111), An-Nisai (4/13-14) and Al-Hakim (1/352)].

(9) - To die on the Thursday night or on the daytime of Friday: Abdullah Ibn Amru رضي الله عنه said that the Prophet ﷺ said:

"No Muslim dies on Friday or on the night of Thursday but Allah will deliver him from the trials of the grave."
[Ahmad (2/176) and At-Tirmidhi (1080) and he said "This is a strange hadith that has no connected chain of narrators"]

(10) - Sweat on the Forehead: Narrated Buraidah from Al-Husaib رضي الله عنه that he said: The Prophet ﷺ said:

"A believer dies with sweat on his forehead." [At-Tirmidhi no. (982), An-Nisai (4/6) and this hadith has a good chain of narrators]

Conclusion

At the end of this book, it is better to sum up some of the means that Allah made ways to lead Muslims to the good end (of one's life), and they are:

a) To fear Allah in secrecy and in public and to hold fast with that which the Prophet ﷺ gave us (of laws) for these are the ways of salvation. Allah, the All-Mighty said:

“O you who believe! Fear Allah [by doing all that He has ordered and by abstaining from all that He has forbidden] as He should be feared, and die not except in the state of Islam [as Muslims] with complete submission to Allah.” [Qur'an 3:102]

And a (Muslim) slave should ward off sins completely for major sins lead one to Hell and persisting on committing minor sins will make them major sins. And the committing of minor sins and turning not in repentance to Allah nor asking his forgiveness will turn into "Ran" (covering of sins and evil deeds) on the heart. The Prophet ﷺ said:

“Beware of minor sins, (for they are) as travelling people who wanted to take a rest in a valley, this brought a piece of fuel wood and that brought another piece of fuel wood till they managed to cook their bread (or meal). If one commits minor sins persistently they will lead him to destruction (i.e. Hell-Fire).” [Ahmad 5331].

b) Remembering Allah all the time:

He who remembers Allah all the time and the last thing he says in his life was: 'La ilaha illa Allah' [there is no true God worthy of worship but Allah], he would entertain the Prophet's glad tiding for he ﷺ said:

“He whose last words were 'La ilaha illa Allah' enters paradise. [Abu Dawud (3116) and Al-Hakim (1/351) and classified it as an authentic hadith and Ath-Thahabi agreed with him].

Abu Dawud narrated this hadith and Said Ibn Mansoor narrated it from Al-Hassan that he said: The Prophet ﷺ was asked: 'Which deeds are the best in Allah's view?' He said:

"To die while remembering Allah very much with your tongue." [Al-Mughni by Ibn Qadamah 2/450].

O Allah make our deeds (in this life) the best ones, and the best of our days the days when we meet You and make us of those whom You have favoured with bounties in Your Paradise and Your Presence, and may Allah's prayers and peace be on our Prophet Muhammad ﷺ his households and Companions.

Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy

Muhammad Kamal

MULLA SADRA'S TRANSCENDENT PHILOSOPHY

Sadradin Shirazi (1571–1640), known also as Mulla Sadra, spoke of the primacy of Being and promoted a new ontology, founding a new epistemology. Mulla Sadra's ontology is an important philosophical turn and contribution to the understanding of the development of Muslim philosophy and thought.

This comprehensive study of Mulla Sadra's philosophical thought explores his departure from tradition; his turn to the doctrine of the primacy of Being; the dynamic characteristics of Being and the concept of substantial change; comparisons with Heidegger's fundamental ontology; and the influence of Mulla Sadra's ontology on subsequent Muslim philosophy. Of particular value to students of philosophy, Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, philosophy of religion, and general readers who seek to understand Muslim philosophy, this book explores the significance of the doctrine of Mulla Sadra and its impact on subsequent debates in the Muslim world.

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Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy

MUHAMMAD KAMAL

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What is all about beauty in the world? The image,
Like quivering boughs reflected in a stream,
Of that eternal Orchard which abides
Unwithered in the hearts of perfect men.

Jalal al-Din Rumi

Introduction

In the post Ibn Sinan period, the primacy of essence (*asalat al-mahiyah*) was one of the prime philosophical issues for Muslim thinkers. The school of illumination, headed by Suhrawardi, held the view that ‘essence’ not ‘existence’ was the only reality. Nothing in the external world corresponded to ‘existence’, and hence ‘existence’ remained an empty concept and an intellectual property, whereas ‘essence’ was real and primary. By contrast, Sadr al-Din Shirazi (1571–1640), known also as Mulla Sadra,¹ spoke of the primacy of Being (*asalat al-wujud*) and promoted a new ontology.

From the twelfth century CE, the school of illumination occupied a focal place in the intellectual life of Muslims, particularly in the Persian-speaking world. The philosophical thought of this school marked a vivid departure from rationalism to Gnosticism, or knowledge by illumination (*al-ishraq*). Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi (1171–1208), the founder of this school, believed that knowledge of an object in the world came only through revealing its essence or quiddity. The Being of the object, unlike its essence, was a mental concept and had no external reality. To prove this point, Suhrawardi developed the argument that there were two possible ways of understanding the meaning of Being: either as a universal concept shared by all existent beings or as a particular being. In the first case, Being remains a mental concept, but in the second it depends on its essence to exist because a particular being is equivalent to its essence, which makes the being the way it is.²

A universal concept such as ‘blackness’ is conceived only in respect of a particular black object; existence, then, as a universal concept, reveals itself through a particular being. Thinking of existence as a universal concept, and then of its reliance on a particular type of being for its existence is similar to Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between universals and particulars. Aristotle, in rejecting the Platonic view of reality, argued for the dependence of universal determinations on particular beings and against the ontological status of universal determinations. In projecting his own views, Suhrawardi, on one hand, relied on Aristotle’s argument, and, on the other, reversed the argument. He came closer to Plato by insisting on the dependence of particular beings on their universal determinations, not vice versa.³

Suhrawardi’s thought influenced the dominant philosophical tradition in Isfahan, where Mulla Sadra studied. Mulla Sadra’s teacher, Mir Muhammad Baqir al-Astarabadi (d. 1630), also known as Mir Damad, was one of the leading figures of the doctrine of illumination. But it seems that Mir Damad

was not a blind follower of Suhrawardi, because he tried to reconcile the Gnostic ideas of Illuminationism with Ibn Sina's ontology, or, as Nasr remarks, he provided the illuminationsit interpretation of Ibn Sina.⁴ Mulla Sadra, at the beginning of his philosophical career, and under the influence of Mir Damad and this dominant philosophical trend in Isfahan, advocated the doctrine of the primacy of essence and was one of the followers of Illuminationism. To understand his turn from or criticism of Suhrawardi's metaphysics it is also of the utmost importance to take into account the influence of Ibn Sina (979–1037) and Ibn al-'Arabi (1163–1240) in Mulla Sadra's project of a new type of metaphysics based on the primacy of Being. This project meant destroying the foundation of essentialism in pursuit of a serious ontological investigation into the truth of Being. To achieve this, Mulla Sadra had to admit his disillusionment with essentialism and abandon the notion of the primacy essence.

Mulla Sadra belonged to the *ishraqi* philosophical tradition. He changed his position and became a defender of the doctrine of the primacy of Being under the influence of 'spiritual inspiration' rather than a rationalistic discourse and logical investigation. He clearly states 'until my God guided me and showed me his proof', which expresses the occurrence of a mystical experience for Mulla Sadra. From then on, Mulla Sadra devoted his time to defending his ontological position and the general principles of his transcendent philosophy. The 'darkness of illusion' described here is indicative of the domain of Suhrawardi's metaphysics, in which a state of untruth reigns over the whole of reality so that the meaning of Being becomes unattainable. It is reflected in the 'abandonment of Being' or 'nihilism' discussed by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and is a philosophical position from Plato to Nietzsche representing a history of negligence of the question of Being.⁵ In both the Western philosophical tradition and Suhrawardi's metaphysics, what is lost or abandoned is the being of beings as a whole, which has led to the 'disintegration of truth' or the 'forgottenness' of truth and the thinking of Being as 'essence'.⁶

Turning from this type of metaphysics became a serious philosophical enterprise for Mulla Sadra after his departure for Kahak, a village near Qum, and his choosing a solitary life for more than a decade. The overcoming of the 'darkness of illusion' would be achieved by deconstructing Suhrawardi's metaphysics and in reconstructing an ontology based on the primacy of Being. The new ontology dealt with the primordial philosophical question of the meaning of the being of beings, rather than with familiarity with beings or essence. Overcoming Suhrawardi's metaphysics meant a radical change to recognizing the priority of the question of the meaning of Being.

The reason for Mulla Sadra's self-imposed exile was reportedly political. His fame in Isfahan had met with jealousy on the part of a group of religious scholars who were politically ambitious and determined to gain patronage

from the rulers of the day.⁷ There was, however, more to this opposition than jealousy. Fazlur Rahman stated that, in addition to his sympathy for Ibn al-'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being, Mulla Sadra's ideas were too radical for the religious circle of the time.⁸ The political position of his father at the Safawid court played an important role in saving him, but he was forced to make a choice between defending his views and turning to seclusion. He chose the latter, with a sense of disillusionment with the rational method of the Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophy and essentialism of the school of illumination. After his time in solitude, he returned to Shiraz, where he founded a school, where he taught thinkers such as Mulla Muhsin Fayd Kashani and 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Husayn al-Lahiji. In later centuries, Persian Muslim thinkers such as Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, Mulla Ali Nuri and Mulla Ali Mudarris Zunuzi came under his influence. Today, Muslim thinkers such as Abdul Hasan Qazwini, Muhammad Kazim Assar and Muhammad Hussain Tabatab'i adhere to Mulla Sadra's philosophy.⁹

As mentioned earlier, the turn from the primacy of essence to the primacy of Being in Mulla Sadra's thought belonged to his period of solitude and to his teaching in Shiraz. During that time the question of Being rather than essence proved to be 'the foundation of the principles of philosophy'.¹⁰ For him, the primacy of Being was fundamental in the sense that Being and not essence was the only reality on which the multiplicity of beings (*essents*) stands.

Certainly, what Mulla Sadra tried to prove in his ontological enterprise of discovering a unified ground had been discussed earlier by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, Book VII. For Aristotle, the diversity of the modes of Being leads to the question of its underlying unity. But the difference between Aristotle and Mulla Sadra arises with the doctrine of the categories and the epistemological significance of this doctrine for knowing reality. Aristotle proposed ten categories, of which the most fundamental was substance, with others, for example quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, state, action, and passion, dependent for their existence on substance. These categories are classes or genera, the application of which makes possible knowledge of every mode of being and reality. Mulla Sadra's metaphysics asserts the realm of this principle of unity beyond the domain of the categories. For this reason, Being remains indefinable.¹¹ It is neither a genus for another entity, *differentia*, or species, nor a common or specific accident. Understanding its meaning cannot be based on anything more prevalent than itself.¹² This negative approach, however, does not mean that nothing about Being or this unifying principle can be known. The indefinability of Being points out the inherent shortcomings of Aristotle's logic and rational apprehension; meanwhile the inability of this type of logic and epistemology should not eliminate the question of its meaning. The failure of the rational apprehension of Being was not an obstacle to Mulla Sadra's ontological enterprise or to inquiry into its meaning. He denounced pure rationality, and

relied instead on intuition or mystic experience for knowing the inner reality of Being:

As it has been stated the reality of existence is neither genus, nor species, nor accident, since it is not a natural universal. Instead, its inclusion happens in another mode of inclusion, and no one has gnosis of it except the mystics, i.e. 'those who are firmly grounded in mystical knowledge' [3:7]. Sometimes it is interpreted as the spiritual soul [i.e. Holy Spirit], other times as that grace 'which extendeth to all things' [7:156]. Sometimes [it is as the] 'reality from which entities have been created', according to the mystics. [Also, it is] the expansion of the light of existence to the structures of contingent entities, and the essences, which are receptive to it; finally [they speak of] its descent towards the abodes of inner natures.¹³

The rationalist preoccupation with epistemology does not constitute a reawakening of the question of Being because it presupposes a subject–object dichotomy. It depends on having turned away from Being to beings. Mulla Sadra's epistemology is significant for eliminating the subject–object dichotomy and reawakening the question of Being. According to Fazlur Rahman, it also shows a resemblance to the epistemological positions of Plotinus (205–270) and Henri Bergson (1859–1941). The latter, for example, insists on the point that 'duration' as an experience cannot be rationally apprehended and is a matter of intellectual intuition.¹⁴ It is worth mentioning that, in inquiring into the meaning of Being, Mulla Sadra agreed with Suhrawardi that Being was not apprehended rationally and that the Aristotelian logic failed to reveal its truth, whereas essence was conceived rationally. Essence did not exist by itself but arose in thinking when a particular mode of Being was conceived. For this reason, essence should be thought of as a mental phenomenon that exists in thinking and for thinking and not as an external reality or something with its own ontological status.

Mulla Sadra's criticism of Suhrawardi's metaphysics became explicit in his philosophical turn when he formed the contrary philosophical view that Being was not a mental property but an objective reality outside the domain of rational thinking. For this reason, Being could be perceived and understood through its illuminative presence by a new cognitive tool. Only in this way was doubt about the inner nature of reality superseded. Based on such intuitive experience, Being appeared the most evident of all things. It was the principle without which even 'non-being' was unthinkable.¹⁵ This ontological enterprise parallels in some ways that of Martin Heidegger, except that Mulla Sadra's ontology is entangled with theology. Otherwise, both thinkers advocate the primacy of Being. Heidegger, in interpreting the history of metaphysics, thinks that the abandonment of Being is rooted in Platonism; for Mulla Sadra it was inherited in Suhrawardi's thought. Meanwhile, they share the view that Aristotle's logic is incapable of revealing the meaning of Being.

Reliance on the Aristotelian system of logic brings shortcomings into our ontological inquiry. According to Heidegger, for instance, this reliance led the post-Aristotelian thinkers to neglect Being and to turn towards studying ontic entities instead.¹⁶

For Mulla Sadra, the doctrine of the primacy of essence led to the concealment of the truth. Its advocates neglected fundamental philosophical questions in favour of investigating the nature of something less fundamental or grounded that could not exist by itself. The reason for this, as explained by Mulla Sadra, lay in the reliance on the rational apprehension of Being.¹⁷ Heidegger, in *Being and Time* (1927), concurs, arguing that the post-Aristotelian thinkers accepted the dogma of negligence, and withdrew themselves from the genuine philosophical question about the meaning of Being, for three reasons. First, they thought that Being was the most universal concept, and that its universality 'transcended' any universality of genus. Second, since Being is the most universal concept, and is not an entity, it is therefore indefinable and escapes all attempts to define it in accordance with the rules of 'definition' provided in Aristotelian logic. Third, Being is self-evident.¹⁸ Heidegger rejects the three presuppositions and argues against the post-Aristotelian thinkers that the universality of the concept of Being does not guarantee the clarity of its meaning, and that the meaning of this concept is still the darkest of all. He also, like Mulla Sadra, says that Being is not an entity and is thus indefinable, and that Aristotle's concept of definition '*definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*' is not applicable to it. Heidegger also believes that the indefinableness of Being does not invalidate the question of its meaning, and should not hinder us from investigating that meaning.¹⁹

There are, however, three ontological positions in dealing with the primacy of Being or essence. Either Being is prior to essence or posterior to it, or they co-exist. When Being is thought of as prior to essence, it signifies that Being can stand by itself without, or prior to, its essence. If, however, the primacy of essence is accepted as true, it implies that essence exists without Being. But for this, essence has to exist or needs another existence to rely on, and for Mulla Sadra this is a vicious regress. The third position is that existence and essence co-exist. This ontological view involves the notion that essence is with existence and not in it. In this case, essence again relies for its existence on another existence. As a consequence of this, essence cannot be without prior existence.²⁰

In arguing against these three ontological positions, Mulla Sadra concluded that the qualification of essence by existence, unlike the qualification of a body by colour, is an intellectual operation. Neither existence nor essence is prior to the other, nor do they have a state of simultaneity, since nothing can be prior, posterior or simultaneous to itself. Both are ontologically inseparable and differ only in thinking:

What has been said earlier is sufficient to refute this claim, for existence is identical with essence in the external [realm] but different from it mentally. Therefore, there is no relation between them except in intellectual consideration. In [such an intelligible] consideration, the relation will have existence which in its inner reality is identical with it, but is different from it in the realm external [to the mind]. This kind of as infinitum is stopped when the intelligible consideration is ceased.²¹

What, then, does the primacy of Being mean if these three positions are refuted? How can we talk about the primacy of Being? In answering these questions, we can think of the primacy of Being over essence and its modes like the primacy of a ground over the grounded. Mulla Sadra believes that Being and essence, like the ground and the grounded, are ontologically inseparable; they are different realities in thinking only.²² When a being is conceived and analysed into its determinations, the Being of this being appears in thinking to be distinct from these determinations. This intellectual apprehension does not coincide with the inner reality of Being, because essence is not distinct from Being, nor is existence an addition to essence. It is only in thinking that the priority of one over the other, in particular of essence, becomes evident, because thinking analyses each entity into existence and essence. The latter appears as the prior factor due to its nature as a universal determination and something apprehended by the intellect, whereas existence is not apprehended. Here, the primacy of essence becomes a mental factor, and Being remains an ontological ground inaccessible to rational thinking. The distinction between Being and essence in the intellectual sphere is not similar to that between an object and its accident. Instead, it is like the connection that exists in the species between a genus and its *differentia*.²³ Being is a being of an object; when we abstract an essence from it that essence will not subsist. Although an accident seems to be identical to the existence of an object, it is not the being of that object. Mulla Sadra supports this view by relying on Ibn Sina's ontology, agreeing with him that an accident needs an object to become existent, whereas the case with existence and essence is different.²⁴ Being for Mulla Sadra has four characteristics:

- i Being stands as a unitary ground for its own modifications or the grounded.
- ii Being is separated from essence in thinking.
- iii Being is equivocal or systematically ambiguous.
- iv Being is dynamic and changes itself substantially.

In arguing for the primacy of Being and searching for a unitary ground, Mulla Sadra holds the view that essence is what distinguishes all entities from one another and limits them. When we say '*p*' is '*q*', the predicate '*q*' distinguishes and limits '*p*' by excluding other possibilities that can be predicated

of it. Once the implication of this view is taken into account and Being is thought of as a mere mental concept, as advocated by Suhrawardi and his followers, we realize the following. First, there will be limitation in reality. Second, God's existence as pure Being will not only suffer limitation by His essence but will also become a mental concept that has no ontological status but is 'unlike everything, which is other than it [lit. non-existence i.e., essence], because every other thing, to be existent requires that existence be taken into consideration and joined to it'.²⁵

According to the first characteristic, Being stands as an ontological reality for all kinds of ontic entities or modes of Being. This relationship between Being and its ontic modifications is also similar to that between phenomenon and appearance in Heidegger's ontology. Heidegger makes a distinction between phenomenon and appearing. Phenomenon is something that shows itself or is manifest.²⁶ This showing itself is the way in which a phenomenon appears and is apprehended. The relationship between these two ontological spheres is illustrated in the metaphor of '*Krankheitserscheinungen*' (symptoms of illness). The symptoms of influenza, such as high temperature and bodily pain, indicate a phenomenon that does not show itself, namely influenza. The phenomenon of this illness announces itself through its symptoms or signs. Appearing is, therefore, not a phenomenon but an announcing of a phenomenon, and a phenomenon is that which announces itself through its appearance.²⁷ In understanding the ontological division of Being into the ground and the grounded, or Being and its modes when it is understood in the light of emanation, we arrive at the conclusion that existence requires the grounded or its manifested modes to announce itself and to make itself intelligible, while the grounded depends on the ground for its existence.²⁸ Being, in this regard, is not one but many. The multiplicity of the grounded is based on the oneness of the ground. This describes Being as equivocal, as something used ambiguously in more than one sense (*tashkik al-wujud*).²⁹

The systematic ambiguity of Being represents the truth of Being as becoming and is also systematic and a perpetual progression without repeating itself. It is an intentional progress from the more indeterminate to the more determinate or concrete mode of Being. Thus, Being is a unitary ground that manifests itself in a variety of modes and gradations, vertically as well as horizontally. The modes of Being are different from one another in terms of prior and posterior, perfection and imperfection, strength and weakness.³⁰ As a consequence, Being is neither unity nor diversity, but unity in diversity. The degrees of diversity are different in intensity and perfection. Being continues beyond this diversity without ceasing to be a unity. To elucidate this point, Mulla Sadra utilized the Sufi interpretation of the unveiling of God (*al-tajalli*). From God, all modes of Being flow constantly in all realms of the microcosm and to the prime matter, which is capable only of accepting forms. In this way

Mulla Sadra conjoins a multi-dimensional conception of reality itself, which has become an open field, with possibilities. His ontology is, thereby, intended to be opposed to the monolithic system.

Since Being is equivocal and the only reality, it acts as the principles of identity and difference. The modes of Being are identical in their inner reality but different in terms of prior and posterior, perfection and imperfection, strength and weakness. This relationship between these two principles of Being becomes clear when the modes of Being are interpreted as gradations in terms of less and more perfect. For example, plants are less perfect than animals and animals less perfect than human beings. Being, therefore, has two different poles of perfection, but at the same time it can be achieved when Being shows itself as pure existence rather than essence.

Even at the level of regional ontology or ontic entities, the existence–essence dualism remains a mental factor. The systematic ambiguity of Being, as we see, is downward (*tanzil*), from pure to concrete modes of Being. This irreversible process, when it is understood in light of emanation, becomes problematic. Emanation, as a vertical systematic ambiguity, begins with the highest form of Being to the lowest. In this respect it cannot be seen as progress, but as a journey towards darkness and the unreal, while the systematic ambiguity of Being is an irreversible progress from less perfect to more perfect. In this case, it is not a journey towards the dark corners of existence, but rather a movement similar to the dialectic movement of *Geist* in Hegel's philosophy for accomplishing absoluteness. Only in this context of understanding it dialectically can the systematic ambiguity of Being be seen as progress.³¹ Although Hegel, unlike Mulla Sadra, sees the world as rational and holds the view that human inquiry must grasp this rationality in order to have an adequate apprehension of reality, the dialectic movement of *Geist* shares commonality with the ambiguity of Being. This commonality, however, does not deny the fundamental ontological differences between Hegel and Mulla Sadra's thought. For Hegel, reality is a range of universal thought determinations or categories: 'Metaphysics is nothing but the range of universal thought determinations and is as it were diamond-net into which we bring every thing in order to make it intelligible.'³² In considering reality as 'the range of universal thought determinations', Hegel lapses into the 'darkness of illusion' or 'nihilism' in the Heideggerian sense.

For Aristotle and Muslim peripatetic thinkers, substance, unlike accident, is unchangeable. Substance cannot become more or less substance. We can think of change in quality or of an object's becoming more or less white, but a substance such as an animal cannot become more or less animal. The species 'animal', despite changing qualities, remains the same. Keeping substance aloof from change and from all accidental qualities under the sway of change is, for Mulla Sadra, again based on the illusion of subject–object dualism, which he refutes. Since this dualism is a mental factor, the dynamic character

of Being should be described as a substantial change (*al-haraka al-jawhariyyah*), according to which everything is continuously transformed. Such transformation implies that change is not limited to the four accidental categories of quality, quantity, place and position. In addition, there is a more fundamental change, that of substance itself.³³ Under the influence of change, Being transforms itself without losing its identity or unity. This transformation should be understood in the light of the principles of identity and difference mentioned earlier. Based on this view, Being passes through infinite accidental forms and substantial changes in an evolutionary manner.

From this survey of Mulla Sadra's doctrine of the primacy of Being, we see that his turn is as significant to Western thought as was Martin Heidegger's. Unfortunately, Mulla Sadra has received little attention in the West. This, to a great extent, as Nasr remarks, is due to the fact that the works of this Muslim thinker, unlike those of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, were not translated into Latin.³⁴ Mulla Sadra's ontology is important for understanding the development of Muslim philosophy in the post Ibn Sinan era. It brings a new philosophical insight in dealing with the nature of reality and creates a major transition from essentialism to existentialism.

Mulla Sadra's ontological turn is dealt with in this book in six chapters. Chapter One is an introduction to the nature of this investigation and outlines the conflict between the doctrines of the primacy of Being and the primacy of essence. Chapter Two explores the philosophy of Suhrawardi and his doctrine of the primacy of essence. It discusses his arguments justifying this doctrine and the influence of the doctrine on the Islamic intellectual life in Isfahan. It also explains Suhrawardi's interpretation of the history of philosophy and Plato's influence on Suhrawardi's metaphysics, which has great significance for understanding Mulla Sadra's ontology and for comparing Mulla Sadra's ontology with that of Heidegger. Chapter Three deals with the development of the Isfahan school of philosophical thought during the Safawid dynasty. Mulla Sadra was a student of that school. Chapter Three also explores the ideas of thinkers such as Mir Damad, Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i, the Suhrawardi tradition in the school, the life and philosophical development of Mulla Sadra and the major changes in his metaphysical position, namely his turn to the doctrine of the primacy of Being. The chapter concludes with Mulla Sadra's influence on the subsequent philosophical development in Persia and other parts of the Muslim world, particularly the rise of the philosophical schools in Teheran and Sabzawar during the Qajar period.

Chapter Four focuses on Mulla Sadra's ontological turn and his doctrine of the primacy of Being. This is compared with the ontological enterprise of Heidegger. The similarities between them are explained on the ground of three points: their criticism of Platonism, the primacy of Being, and the shortcomings of the Aristotelian logic and rationalistic discourse for understanding the meaning of Being. Also explained is how Mulla Sadra's ontology

differs from that of Heidegger. Chapter Five investigates the nature of trans-substantial change as one of the central doctrines in Mulla Sadra's ontology and his interpretation of change as a clear departure from Platonism. Trans-substantial change is also compared with Hegel's and Bergson's understanding of the constant renewal of the world. The religious and philosophical consequences of this doctrine and its impact on the human understanding of truth, values and knowledge are considered.

Chapter Six explores Mulla Sadra's interpretation of knowledge by both the presence and the failure of the rationalistic apprehension of Being. Mulla Sadra's rejection of pure rationality and his reliance instead on intuition or mystic experience for knowing the inner reality of Being is explained. The analysis includes the nature and different kinds of intuitive knowledge (*al-idrak*), beginning from sense-perception to intellectual perception. Two major epistemological issues discussed by many Muslim philosophers apart from Mulla Sadra are also addressed in this chapter. These are the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible, and God's knowledge of the world. Mulla Sadra's analysis of these issues is a significant part of the chapter.

Chapter Seven crystallizes the book and presents the contribution of Mulla Sadra's philosophy to the development of intellectual life in the Muslim world. His significance is seen in terms of his ontology in dealing with the doctrine of the primacy of Being, the gradations and trans-substantial change of the modalities of Being, and finally the role of his metaphysics in determining the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible, which makes reality accessible to the human mind.

In interpreting Mulla Sadra's main philosophical doctrines I have tried to compare them with philosophical views and doctrines of some Western philosophers such as Hegel, Heidegger and Bergson. At a number of places the similarity between the existentialist views of this Muslim philosopher and the ontological enterprise of Heidegger are elucidated. It should also be remembered that Mulla Sadra and these Western philosophers, in particular Heidegger, not only come from different cultural background; their metaphysical objectives will remain parallel. I have used the original works of Mulla Sadra in Arabic and in working on this project over the last two years I have benefited from the writing of Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Fazlur Rahman on Mulla Sadra in English. Although few works are published on Mulla Sadra in English, recently much interest has been shown in rereading of his philosophy. In 1913 Max Horten wrote *Das Philosophische System von Schirazi*. This was followed by Henry Corbin's edition of a selection of Mulla Sadra's writings in French. Thinkers such as William Chittick and Oliver Leaman have contributed articles on Mulla Sadra's epistemology in the *Journal of Transcendent Philosophy*, a special issue on Mulla Sadra (Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2000). In 1981 James Morris translated Mulla Sadra's *al-Hikma al-'Arshiyyah* (*The Wisdom of the Throne*) into English. Seyyed Hossein

Nasr, Hossein Ziai and Muhammad Abdul Haq have published articles on Mulla Sadra's life and aspects of his philosophy. However, the only systematic work to date in English is Fazlur Rahman's *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra* (1975). According to Nasr, this work is a rationalistic interpretation of Mulla Sadra's transcendent philosophy without recourse to the living oral tradition and consideration of the spiritual and Gnostic background of Mulla Sadra, which are significant for understanding his ideas. In 1992 Parviz Morewedge translated Mulla Sadra's *al-Mash'ir* into English, a work that summarizes Mulla Sadra's metaphysical system. An investigation into the philosophy of this Muslim thinker, as we see, is beset with some difficulties. Mulla Sadra's major philosophical work *Al-Asfar*, which presents his entire philosophical system, has not been translated into Persian and Urdu but not into English. With the exception of Fazlur Rahman's work no comprehensive book on his philosophy is available. In addition to this limitation in accessing Mulla Sadra's philosophy in English, his style of writing is sophisticated and complex. It covers a broad area of metaphysics, Gnosticism and theology. It deals with the views of Mulla Sadra's predecessors critically Mulla Sadra's new philosophical ideas are presented or constructed. Despite these difficulties it should be remembered that Mulla Sadra's philosophy is the product of the sixteenth century but quite relevant to our understanding of reality and contemporary society. His doctrine of the trans-substantial change and his views on novelty and constant transformation of history could play a profound role on our ethical as well as political life in the Muslim world.

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The School of Illuminationism and the Doctrine of the Primacy of Essence

Al-Ghazali's (1058–1111) polemic of rationalistic philosophy, along with the Seljuq dynasty's revival of Ash'ari Sunni theology, contributed to the eclipse of philosophical discourse in some parts of the Muslim world.¹ These two factors, however, did not disrupt the intellectual continuity of Shi'i twelfth century, Muslim philosophical thinking forged two different directions: the rationalistic discourse re-emerged under the influence of Aristotelian philosophy in Spain led by Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Bajjah (1106–1139), Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185) and Ibn Rushd (1126–1198); and Illuminationism (*al-ishraqiyyah*) spread in Persia.

The school of Illuminationism, which is significant for our understanding of Mulla Sadra's philosophy, was founded by Shahab al-Din Yahya b. Habash b. Amirak Suhrawardi, known also as Shaykh al-Ishraq, the master of illumination. Suhrawardi's date of birth is not known precisely. We only know that he was born in Suhraward or 'Suhrabard', a Kurdish village between Zenjan and Bijar. According to Mulla Salih Ibrahimi, Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi was originally Kurdish and the nephew of Mulla Omer Suhrawardi, another Kurdish Muslim scholar from the same village and of Sunni-Islamic origin. Mulla Omer and Shahab al-Din also wrote poetry in Kurdish; some poems of the latter were published by Ibrahimi. It is also reported in *Nuzat al-arwah e rawzat al-afrah* by Shams al-Din Shahrazuri that 'Shuraward' was a Kurdish village.² In the tenth century, the village was destroyed by the Mongols. According to Noldeke and Marquart, its name derived from Suhrab, who was a Persian governor of Hira.³ Today, Suhraward (*Suhrabard*) is located in the municipality of Azerbaijan in Iran. For this reason, some people, without knowing the ethnic make-up of the region, think that Suhrawardi was originally Turkish or Persian.

Shahrazuri states that Suhrawardi was born in 1166 or 1171.⁴ Nasr also gives two dates. In one of his early works, Nasr says that Suhrawardi was born in 1153;⁵ later, in his introduction to *Opera Metaphysica et Mystical*, he indicates that Suhrawardi was born in 1171.⁶ After receiving an Islamic education, Suhrawardi travelled through Persia to Anatolia and Syria. He was a contemporary and classmate of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi; the two had studied under Shaykh Mujjad al-Din Jili and later under Zahi al-Din Qari in Isfahan. On one of his journeys from Damascus to Aleppo, the capital city of the Ayyubid Sunni dynasty,⁷ Suhrawardi met Malik Zahir, the governor of Aleppo and the

son of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, who patronized him and engaged him in conversation on thorny philosophical and theological issues with a cluster of the *'ulama* in Aleppo.⁸ Another reason for travelling to Aleppo – a centre of the new political conflict between Islam and Christendom – rather than to a peaceful region, might be seen in Suhrawardi's ethnic affiliation with the Ayyubi family.

The political situation in Syria at that time could be defined as crucial and in turmoil. The Shi'ite Muslims who had long ruled Syria and North Africa, particularly Egypt, lost their hegemony to the Sunni Muslims. Salaha al-Din destroyed the Fatimid Shi'i dynasty in Egypt and Syria. In addition to this internal conflict between Sunnism and Shi'ism over political hegemony, the Crusaders appeared as an eminent external force against the Muslim world. Salah al-Din Ayyubi, who represented the Sunni political hegemony, was seen as the only one with authority to protect the interest of Sunni Islamic civilization from these external and internal rivalries. Under such unfavourable circumstances for the development of philosophy, it seems that, by travelling to the heart of this turmoil, Suhrawardi chose a wrong direction and time to advocate his philosophical ideas. The Sunni Islamic world, facing threats from Christendom represented by the Crusaders and from Shi'ism, was not resilient to change and could not tolerate innovation. The Sunni *'ulama*, considering themselves the guardians and protectors of Islamic faith and identity, were looking at any philosophical inclination or intellectual contention with suspicion. Suhrawardi's philosophical ideas, in the court of Malik Zahir, were seen in this political context; on them were visited the hostility and rejection of the institution of the *'ulama*. The *'ulama* branded Suhrawardi's ideas as heretical and asked Malik Zahir to put the young philosopher to death. Malik Zahir was reluctant to do this against his master and friend, so the *'ulama* approached Salah al-Din, who ordered his son to act. Suhrawardi was finally executed in 1208 at the age of thirty-eight. According to Shahrazuri, there are several accounts of his death. One reports that he was starved to death in prison. Another states that Suhrawardi himself fasted until he died. Some held the view that he was suffocated, executed or thrown from the wall of the fortress and then burned.⁹

The term *'ishraq*', which is Arabic for 'illumination', was used before Suhrawardi by Ibn Sina in his *Mantiq al-Mashriqiyyan*, where he talks about the oriental wisdom as a superior source of knowledge to the rationalistic discourse. Suhrawardi was aware of the significance of Ibn Sina's view but believed that Ibn Sina was unable to comprehend the importance of oriental cognition as he did not have the proper epistemological tools or access to the sources of *ishraqi* wisdom (Gnosticism). He states in his treatise *Risaleh safari Simurgh* that seeking the Truth through rationalistic discourse is like seeking the sun with a lamp.¹⁰

In Suhrawardi's view, the history of philosophy did not begin with Thales in 600 BC. Instead Hermes is considered by this Muslim thinker to be the

father of illuminative philosophical thinking or wisdom. Hermes was followed by sages from Greece, Persia and the Muslim world. In Greece, this type of philosophical thinking came to an end with Aristotle, who replaced the cognitive tool of illumination with the rationalistic discourse. But the illuminative philosophy continued to develop in Persia, and after the advent of Islam was continued by Muslim Sufis such as Dhu al-Nun al-Misri, Abu Salih Tustari, Abu Yazid Bistami, Mansur al-Hallaj, Abu Hassan Kharraqain and finally Suhrawardi himself.

What is important for us in understanding the history of philosophy described by Suhrawardi and for developing our argument is that this Muslim thinker acknowledged the connection between Plato's thought and his own metaphysics. The depiction of this connection is significant when we try to compare Mulla Sadra's metaphysical background and criticism of Illuminationism and Heidegger's interpretation of 'nihilism' in the West by tracing them back to Plato. To demonstrate similarities between Mulla Sadra's opposition to Illuminationism, in particular the doctrine of the primacy of essence, and Heidegger's negative attitude towards nihilism, we need to highlight the relationship between Plato's metaphysics and Illuminationism. We begin by explaining how Suhrawardi, in his introduction to *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, refers explicitly to Plato and the place of his ideas in the development of the illuminative philosophy,

In all I have said about the science of lights and that which is not based upon it, I have been assisted by those who have travelled the path of God. This science is the very intuition of the inspired and illumined Plato, the guide and master of philosophy, and of those who came before him from the time of Hermes, 'the father of philosophy' upon Plato's time, including such mighty pillars of philosophy as Empedocles, Pythagoras, and others.¹¹

It is customary in the history of Western philosophy to begin with Thales (a Milesian philosopher of 640–546 BC) as the father of Western philosophy. To understand the development of Greek philosophy we must also distinguish between the pre-Socratic and the post-Socratic periods. But for Suhrawardi, philosophy began with Hermes and Plato rather than with Thales. For Suhrawardi, this was the demarcation between two stages of development in the history of this type of philosophical thinking. The science of light or the illuminative philosophy came down from Hermes to the sages of ancient Iran and Egypt and thence to Plato. Greek, ancient Iranian, Egyptian and Islamic sources have become the foundation of this type of philosophy. In dealing with these historical roots and sources, Suhrawardi mentions the ancient Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism, several times. But as John Walbridge argues, this in no way indicates a revival of pre-Islamic religious belief or an endorsement of metaphysical dualism in Suhrawardi's philosophical system.¹² This Muslim thinker also describes

the original form of Zoroastrianism as monotheism, to which King Gushtasp later introduced dualism.¹³ He believes that Zoroastrianism as a religion is different from the teachings of the Zoroastrian sages that he follows, such as Kiumarsh, Faridun and Kaikhusraw, who guided their community towards the light by their illuminated wisdom, and who were in turn different from the so-called Manichaeans.¹⁴

As far as Greek thought is concerned, Plato's metaphysics and his allegory of the cave were an inspiration for Suhrawardi.¹⁵ He sees the ascent of the human being from the cave towards the light as a real liberation from the domain of shadows of the contingent world. Attaining the Truth is determined by this journey of the seeker of the Truth who attempts to liberate him/herself from the dogma of the cave and look into the light. In Plato's philosophy, those who liberate themselves from the shadows of the cave and are unshackled will be able to see the sun. In his short treatise *Al-Qissa al-Ghurbat al-Gharbiyyah (Story of the Occidental Exile)*, Suhrawardi pursues Plato's allegory with some modification. In this work, the seeker of the Truth, like the prisoner freed from the cave, must undertake the spiritual journey of his/her liberation from the occident, which is the world of darkness and material existence, to the orient, the world of light and archangels. In Suhrawardi's allegory, human beings are not shackled in a cave but are imprisoned at the bottom of a well and left in total darkness. These prisoners were originally from Yemen (a land between the occident and the orient of the Muslim world), and were sent into exile to Qirawan, a city in Tunis, in the west of the orient. Like the prisoner unshackled from the cave, the escapee from the well will return to the well after seeing the light of the orient because he has not discarded all his bonds.

In the context of Plato's metaphysical analysis, according to Suhrawardi, the rationalistic approach of Aristotle broke the chain of continuity of the Platonic philosophical tradition. Discursive knowledge and rationalistic thinking replaced intuitive knowledge. For this reason and due to the dominance of Plato's metaphysics in the history of Illuminationist philosophy, thinkers like al-Jurjani define the adherents of Illuminationism as "philosophers whose master was Plato".¹⁶ In *al-Talwihat*, Suhrawardi, besides discussing his doctrine of the principality of essence, presents a critical study of Aristotle's categories. First he argues that the categories were discovered by Archytas (a Pythagorean thinker) before Aristotle. Second he reduces their number from ten to four and adds 'motion' as a new category.¹⁷ In this work, Suhrawardi encounters Aristotle (the master of discursive knowledge) in a state between dreaming and being awake; it is in this state that their discussion on the origin of Illuminationism, the distinction between discursive and intuitive knowledge, takes place.¹⁸

Suhrawardi not only incorporated Plato's metaphysics into his own but he also considered his philosophy of illumination as the continuation of

Platonism. He recognizes Plato not as a philosopher but as one of the masters of Illuminationism:

Plato and his companions showed plainly that they believed the Maker of the universe and the world of intellect to be the light when they said that the pure light is the world of intellect. Of himself, Plato said that in certain of his spiritual conditions he would shed his body and become free from matter. Then he would see light and splendour within his essence. He would ascend to that all-encompassing divine cause and would seem to be located and suspended in it, beholding a mighty light in that lofty and divine place.¹⁹

At another place, Suhrawardi compares Plato's philosophy with the allusions of the prophets,²⁰ and describes himself not as the founder of Illuminationism but as a follower of masters such as Hermes and Plato.²¹ In classifying seekers of knowledge, Suhrawardi also places Plato among those who possess perfect discursive knowledge and illumination. A philosopher like Plato, in possession of these two faculties of knowledge, is the vicegerent of God and a person wise enough to be a leader or ruler of society and a philosopher king. By contrast, the rationalist philosophers such as Aristotle, proficient only in discursive knowledge, are not suitable candidates for such elevated positions in society.

It is worth mentioning that, although it does not have a direct relationship with the essence of things, Suhrawardi still considers discursive knowledge to be one of the cognitive tools. But for Suhrawardi, a true philosopher is one who is capable, like Plato, of possessing discursive as well as intuitive knowledge and using both, in particular the latter, for understanding the nature of reality and knowing the Truth. Suhrawardi's opposition to Aristotle, and to Muslim Peripatetic thinkers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, can thus be elucidated in the light of Aristotle's metaphysical position, his criticism of Plato, and his reliance on discursive knowledge in his epistemology. Aristotle's philosophy is seen as a philosophical tendency hostile towards Platonism and as a philosophical position yielding a distorted notion of reality.

Plato assumed that the plurality of individual objects could be unified under common essences or Ideas.²² The essences have their own reality as objective essences rather than mere universal concepts that exist only in thinking. To Plato, referring to the universal concept or quiddity of an object also means referring to its objective essence. Besides, essences do not rely on individual objects to exist, because they are transcendent and spatially detached from them. The essences constitute the reality of individual objects but do not reside in them in the sensible world.

How does the human mind know and reach these transcendent essences? In the *Symposium*, Plato describes a procedure or 'itinerary' for this. For example, one can arrive at realizing the essence of 'beauty' by ascending

from beautiful objects to the pure notion of beauty and thence to the form of this essence, which is universal and self-subsistent.²³ Individual objects, which are detached from these essences, are objects of ‘opinion’ and ‘sense-experience’. In contrast, the essences are not in the domain of ‘opinion’ and ‘sense-experience’ but objects that can be ‘known’. Here and in the Platonic context, true knowledge corresponds to the apprehension or intelligibility of the essences when the human mind is turned upwards in the method of ascent.²⁴ This kind of knowledge and way of knowing became in the *Republic* a prerogative of the philosophers who seek to turn their minds upwards in order to see the universal transcendent essences. A philosopher should not be interested in a multiplicity of individual objects of the sensible world but in their unified essences or the source of their existence in the ideal world. For Suhrawardi, this upward turn or the sight of the sun in Plato’s theory of cognition is illumination (*al-ishraq*) and the source of true knowledge through which the human mind can apprehend the transcendent reality.

There is more than a convergence of views between Platonism and Illuminationism; in my opinion the latter has a parasitical relationship with the former. Further similarity between these two philosophical schools can be found in Plato’s analogy of the idea of Good with Light. Among all essences, the Form of the Good is both supreme and the source of all other essences. This notion of the Good is also compared to the sun or the ‘Light’, shining upon all other essences and making them visible and intelligible:

This, then, which imparts truth to the things that are known and the power of knowing to the knower, you may affirm to be the Form of the good. It is the cause of knowledge and truth, and you may conceive it as being known, but while knowledge and truth are both beautiful, you will be right in thinking it other and fairer than these. And as in the other world it is right to think light and sight sun-like, but not right to think them the sun, so here it is right to think both knowledge and truth like the good, but not right to think either of them the good. The state or nature of the good must be honoured still more highly.²⁵

The Form of the Good is to an extent the foundation of all other essences. Their existence and intelligibility are thinkable only in their relation to the Good. In understanding this relationship Heidegger remarks that ‘the highest idea, although itself barely visible, is what makes possible both being and unhiddenness, i.e. it is what empowers being and unhiddenness as what they are. The highest idea, therefore, is this empowering; the empowering for being which as such gives itself simultaneously with the empowerment of unhiddenness as occurrence.’²⁶ This empowering is the characteristic and the essential quality of the Form of the Good, which corresponds to the symbol of light. Similarly for Suhrawardi the world is made up of contingent light, which depends for its existence on the ultimate light or the Light of lights (*nur al-anwar*): ‘Accident

light is not light in itself, since its existence is in another. Thus, it can only be light due to another. The incorporeal pure light is light in itself. Therefore, everything that is light in itself is incorporeal pure light.²⁷

The world is indebted to the Light of lights or the form of the Good not only for being visible and comprehended but also for what it is. The coming into being and ceasing to be of everything in the contingent world is empowered by the Light of lights. In the realm below the empowering Light there are four forms of light: immaterial, luminous, accidents and bodies. The immaterial light is the cause of the other three lights and is also a self-conscious substantial light. God, the intellects of the spheres, human intellect and animal soul are all immaterial lights, which cause the other three forms of light to exist. Since the contingent lights belong to a lower ontological division, they are less bright. They also share the same essence, as all of them spring from the same source. They are also gradations of the same reality but different in their intensity and perfection in brightness. This ground for making a distinction between one contingent light and another is not the realization of their '*differentia*' or '*accidents*'. It is due to their rank in the hierarchy of emanation. Two contingent lights are different because they vary in perfection or the intensity of light. Human beings, for example, are more perfect than animals. They both belong to two different ranks of existence. The vertical emanation from the Light of lights goes from the Intellects of the celestial sphere to the individualization of light in accidents and bodies. Based on the relationship between the immaterial light and the other three forms, the immaterial light is divided into dominating and managing light. The former functions like the Platonic Forms and the latter is the individual soul in an individual body:

Even though the managing light comes from one of the exalted dominating lights and accepts many illuminations, it is not like a dominating light in perfection of its substance. The dominating light brings into being the managing incorporeal light only due to perfections of the barrier acquired from the mighty lords and in order to manage it in the way appropriate for controlling barriers of finite power. By this, it strengthens its connection with the barrier.²⁸

In explaining this relationship among various forms of light, Suhrawardi thinks in line with Plato, but at the same time he does not repeat the Platonic doctrine of Ideas without alteration. For him, the dominating light is concerned with species. Every species that exists as a dominating light has a universal form called '*Lord of the Species*'. These Lords of Species or Forms are not universal essences shared by all particulars. They exist at a higher realm and are independent of particulars. Their universality is determined by the same relationship to all particulars of the same species. The Lords of Species are the causes of the particulars and are universals in the sense that they have this causal relationship to all particulars of the same species. For

example, the universal Form of 'cat' has the same causal relationship to all individual cats in the material world. This can be seen as a difference between Suhrawardi's understanding of the universal Forms and that of Plato. Another essential difference to be noted here is that Suhrawardi, unlike Plato, believes that the domain of the Forms is beyond the cognitive capacity of reason and is to be apprehended intuitively. In this way, Suhrawardi followed Plato but at the same time offered his own point of view and contribution to the doctrine of the Forms. He accepts the doctrine but thinks of the Forms as causes of individual beings, not as a universal predicate shared by all of them. The question that arises here is how a multiplicity of contingent lights can arise from the simple and indivisible nature of the Light of lights.

Suhrawardi found a Neoplatonic answer to this question: from the Light of lights emanates the lower levels of contingent lights, the angelic order, and the archetypes. The Light of lights is the single origin of all things and gives constant illumination to them. It is the highest in the metaphysical hierarchy of being, not only in terms of rank but also as the most perfect source and origin of all contingent lights. The emanated realms, unlike the Light of lights, are different in their degree of perfection and remoteness from their illuminating source. They are either self-subsistent or dependent on something else. In addition to this classification they can be distinguished by their degree of self-consciousness. A self-conscious being is either self-subsistent, as in the case of the Light of lights, the angels and the human consciousness, or depends on something other than itself for its self-awareness, as in the case of stars or fire. Another division of the lights is based on their degree of self-awareness. A light is either self-aware of or obvious to itself. The self-aware light is either self-subsistent or depends on something other than itself in order to become aware of itself. The classification continues and the differences between all things at various levels of this hierarchy of light depend on the intensity of light manifested in each kind of being. But the illuminating source or the Light of lights is not affected by this multiplicity of its own manifestation and gradation:

Multiplicity cannot conceivably result from the Light of lights in its unity, nor can any darkness be conceived to result from a dusky substance or state, nor yet two lights result from the Light of lights in its unity. Therefore, that which first results from the Light of lights must be a single incorporeal light. This then cannot be distinguished from the Light of lights by any dark state acquired from the Light of lights. This would imply the multiplicity of aspects in the Light of lights in contradiction to the demonstration that the lights, particularly the incorporeal lights, do not differ in their realities. Therefore, the Light of lights and the first light that results from it are only to be distinguished by perfection and deficiency.²⁹

The descending process of emanation of the multiplicity of contingent lights from a single indivisible source can best be understood against the hierarchy

of being in the ontological system of other Muslim emanationists such as al-Farabi (c. 870–950). According to this Muslim philosopher, the first emanation from the 'One' was not a multiplicity of contingent beings but the first intellect capable of knowing the 'One' as well as itself. The second intellect emanates from the first intellect and the third from the second intellect, which gives rise to the sphere of the fixed stars. This process of emanation continues until the emanation of the tenth intellect is reached, and with it the corresponding spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Venus, Mercury and the moon. At the lowest level of emanation lies the 'prime matter'. This contains the four elements of water, air, fire and earth. These include minerals, plants, animals and finally human beings.³⁰ Similarly, from the Light of lights emanates the first light, and from this the incorporeal light and barrier. This emanation continues until there are the nine spheres and the series of lights from which no other incorporeal light emanates. Suhrawardi also believes that emanation is a pre-eternal process because the Light of lights neither changes nor withers away.³¹ His analysis of human existence is also based on his understanding of reality. As a thinker who believes in the reality of the incorporeal realm, he divides human beings into two parts: incorporeal (soul) and corporeal (body). These two parts represent light and darkness. Nor is a relationship between them necessary. The incorporeal soul, although attached to the body, is independent and survives without embodiment. The corporeality of human existence has at the same time an attachment to darkness, which is a barrier that foils the human soul's access to knowledge of the reality. Identifying the human soul with light and the body with darkness represents for Suhrawardi two aspects of human existence, which are essentially distinct and belong to two different ontological ranks. The human soul is also in constant struggle to keep itself aloof from the influence of the body in order to reach perfection, which can be obtained by giving up worldly pleasure and the demands of corporeal life. This is a journey in human life towards the abode of pure light and the Sufi path of self-purification and elevation.³²

As mentioned earlier, Suhrawardi acknowledges his debt to Plato, under whose influence he rejects the question of the primacy of being and treats being as nothing, and develops arguments for the primacy of essence (*asalat al-mahiyyah*). For him, something exists when its essence becomes cognizant; its reality relies on its essence. The arguments in vindication of this metaphysical position rotate around the philosophical conviction that existence is conceptual and has no reality of its own in the external world. It has no representation outside the human mind. Before explaining Suhrawardi's main arguments it is important to mention some considerations discussed by him in Section Three of the Third Discourse ('Concerning the Illuminationsit Judgments on Certain Points') in *Hikmat al-Ishraq*. These considerations are:

- Against Muslim Aristotelian–Neoplatonic thinkers he argues that ‘There is nothing in existence, which is itself the quiddity of existence; for as soon as we conceive its concept, we may wonder whether or not it has existence.’³³ This will eventually result in an infinite regress, because existence would have another existence and so on.
- If we think that essence has existence, then it should have a relation to it. This relation would also need existence, which stands in a relation to the previous relation and so on. This would continue to infinity.³⁴
- If existence were in entities and were not an essence, then it would become a state in them. In this case existence would become dependent on them. ‘Thus its locus would be actualized, but it would exist before its locus. Its locus could not be actualized simultaneously with it, since its locus would exist with the existence, not by the existence – which is absurd.’³⁵
- According to Muslim Aristotelian–Neoplatonic thinkers, the locus is prior to an accident. Thus, as pointed out by Suhrawardi, the existence would be prior to existence; this is not only absurd, but also impossible.³⁶
- Muslim Aristotelian–Neoplatonic thinkers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina believed that ‘existence’ was added to ‘essence’ of an entity as an accident. But, according to Suhrawardi, if we think of existence as an accident, it should subsist in its locus. In this case existence would need its locus for its realization. Since the locus is existent, then its subsistence would be circular, and this is again absurd for Suhrawardi.

Let us now turn to Suhrawardi’s main argument for the primacy of essence. In this argument he tries to prove that existence is either a universal concept or a particular. If it is a universal concept and shared like any other universal concept by all particular existents, existence remains in the domain of thinking as something conceptual. If existence is a particular, it is dependent on its essence. Let us say that ‘existence’ is a universal concept because all things that exist do so equally – or they share existence. In this case, ‘existence’ as a universal concept becomes a universal nature. But there are other universal concepts such as ‘blackness’ or ‘whiteness’ of the same nature. Could we say that existence, like these universal concepts, is a universal essence? If the answer to this question is ‘yes’, then existence becomes a universal concept; otherwise we have to think of it as a particular entity.³⁷ If existence is thought to be a particular entity, it still remains a mental concept, and essence becomes real in which a particular existence is actualized. A particular existence is nothing more than its essence. As Suhrawardi argues, ‘existence’ is conceived in respect to a particular existence and the particular existence is also equivalent to essence. Existence is thus contingent on a particular existence. To clarify this metaphysical position Suhrawardi states:

Next we argue that if blackness is non-existent, then its existence is not actual. Therefore its existence is not existent, since its existence is also non-existent. If we do intellect existence and judge that it is not existent, then the concept of existence is distinct from the concept of existent. We might say that blackness, which we had taken as non-existent, now exists and that its existence was not yet actual but then becomes actual. If so, the actuality of the existence would not be the existence itself, and the existence would have existence. This same argument applies to the existence of existence, and so on to infinity. But a simultaneous ordered infinity of attributes is absurd.³⁸

What we understand from this is that 'existence' cannot be a primordial ontological condition for a thing. That primordial ontological condition is 'essence', which occupies a primary position on which the existence of all things relies and which supports the contingency of existence.

In Suhrawardi's philosophy 'essence' is also equated with 'light'. God, who is the Essence of the essences, is the Light of lights. Here we find a lucid distinction between the Light of lights as the cause and empowering light of all lights and the contingent or caused and empowered lights. The Light of lights cannot be thought of as another contingent light; all contingent lights are dependent on something other than them to exist and the Light of lights is their final cause, which has no cause. It is that being that does not fail to exist and so is necessary. This argument, which is originally Aristotelian, is also used by Muslim theologians and philosophers in a variety of forms to prove the existence of God. The Light of lights provides constant illumination and brings all contingent lights into existence. These lights are either self-subsistent, for example incorporeal lights, or they are accidental and their subsistence relies on something other than themselves.

The individual self, which is a contingent light, is more illuminated as it nears its source. This increase in the intensity of illumination occurs with the abolition of the ontological distance between the Light of lights and the self. Suhrawardi calls this proximity to the Light of lights 'presence', the awareness of which is 'knowledge by presence', which is considered to be the most reliable source of cognition. 'Knowledge by presence' or intuitive knowledge, however, had a significant impact on Mulla Sadra's epistemology, which is discussed in Chapter Six.

The thinkers who were responsible for the early transmission of Suhrawardi's ideas and were known for their writings on Illuminationism were Shams al-Din Muhammad al-Shahrazuri (d. 1288), Sa'ad b. Mansur Ibn Kammunah (d. 1284) and Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi (d. 1311). Al-Shahrazuri is considered to be the first major commentator on Suhrawardi's thought. Ibn Kammunah wrote on Suhrawardi in *al-Talwihat*, a book studied widely by the advocates of Illuminationism in Persia. Al-Shirazi incorporated Illuminationism into Ibn Sina's ontology and the doctrine of the Unity of Being of Ibn 'Arabi.³⁹ From the thirteenth century onwards, other thinkers,

such as Muhammad b. Zayn al-Din b. Ibrahim Asha‘i (d. 1479) and Giyath al-Din Mansur Dashtaki (d. 1541), wrote under the influence of Suhrawardi’s illuminative philosophy.

Suhrawardi’s Illuminationism changed philosophical tradition in the Muslim world by bridging the gulf between Gnosticism and rationalism. It left a great mark on the development of intellectual life in the Muslim world. Its influence can be found in Persia and the Indian subcontinent to the present day. The magnitude of this influence will be discussed in the next chapter on the Safawid period in Isfahan, when Mulla Sadra came under the sway of this philosophical tradition at the beginning of his philosophical training and vocation.

The School of Isfahan and Mulla Sadra's Departure from Suhraward's Tradition

Suhrawardi died young but the impact of his philosophy on Muslim intellectual life was outstanding. He advocated the doctrine of the primacy of essence and established harmony between discursive and intuitive knowledge, with an emphasis on the latter as a reliable source of knowing the Truth. The predominance of Suhrawardi's philosophy was greatly felt in Persia and his school, namely Illuminationism, flourished in Isfahan during the Safawid dynasty (1051–1732), attracting a number of Shi'ite thinkers, including Mulla Sadra. To understand the popularity of Illuminationism during that period it is helpful to discern the origin and development of the Safawid dynasty and to explain why the Safawid rulers patronized this type of philosophy in their dynasty.

The Safawid was originally a Sufi order whose founder, Shaykh Safi al-Din (1252–1334), was a Sunni Sufi master descended from a Kurdish family in north-western Iran.¹ Nasr, in his article 'The School of Isfahan', does not mention the ethnic and sectarian origin of the order, but he gives the title Ardibili to the founder because the family of Safi al-Din had settled at Ardibil and Shaykh Safi al-Din died there.² At another place, Nasr acknowledges that the order belonged originally to Sunni Islam as an offshoot of the Qadiriyyah order founded in Baghdad.³ According to Percy Sykes, however, the dynasty traces its descent from Musa al-Kazim (745–799), the seventh Shi'i imam for the Twelvers. Sykes does not say whether this Shi'i genealogy of the order was given by Shaykh Safi al-Din or was fabricated at the later stage of the encroachment of the order into Shi'i Imamism.

The political orientation of the order and the transformation of the sect to Shi'i Islam began with Shaykh Junayd (d. 1460), the grandson of Shaykh Safi al-Din, and his son 'Ali (d. 1496). Shaykh Junayd advocated the idea of *jihad* (holy war) against non-Muslims as well as corrupt Muslim rulers in Persia. He recruited supporters from Turkish and Kurdish tribes and called them *Qizilbash* (those who wore red headgear with twelve gores for the twelve Shi'i imams). But the total conversion of the order to Shi'i Islam and the establishment of the dynasty took place at the time of Isma'il (1487–1524), also known as Shah Isma'il, the grandson of Junayd who marched on Tabriz in 1501 and designated himself a king (*shah*).⁴ The conversion of the order by Shah Isma'il, as it is seen in the political history of the order, provided a *terra firma* for consolidating Shah Isma'il's own political hegemony. Relying on the notion of the messianic or the Shi'i doctrine of the imamate, Shah Isma'il

claimed to be *imam al-muntazr* (Awaited One) or the Mahdi. On this matter, Nasr asserts that the veneration of 'Ali in the inner tendency of the order was responsible for this conversion:

Both Shah Ni'mat Allah who came to Persia from Aleppo, and Shaikh Safi al-Din from Ardabil were at first Sufis of Sunni background such as the Shaziliyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods. But the inner belief in the *valayat* of 'Ali gradually transformed the outer form of the orders as well into thoroughly Shi'i organizations, although the inward structure of these orders, being sufi, remained above the Shi'i-Sunni distinctions.⁵

In my opinion Shah Isma'il combined political and divine authority by seeking absolute power and devotion from his followers. This claim, however, was challenged by the followers after Shah Isma'il's defeat by the Sunni Ottoman Empire during the reign of Selim I (r. 1512–1520) at the battle of Chaldiran in 1514.⁶ To neutralize the tension and avoid humiliation before his followers the defeated Shah Isma'il adopted a softer theological position by making Twelver Shi'ism the official religion of the state. He also began to force the Sunni population to convert in the areas he controlled in Persia. Many Shi'i scholars such as Shaykh 'Ali b. Abd al-'Ali Karaki, Shaykh Baha al-Din 'Amili and Ni'mat Allah Jaza'iri were invited from Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain to participate in the establishment of Shi'i educational institutions in Persia. Further to this, the Safawid state embarked on a plan to eliminate the rival sects, in particular those with antagonistic attitude towards Shi'ism. The messianic-extremist Shi'i sects and Sufi orders such as Naqshabandiyyah and Khalwatiyyah were banned; Sunni Muslims and other religious minority groups were persecuted. It was during this time that Persia was transformed from a predominantly Sunni Islam to a Shi'i Islamic dynasty.⁷

There were, however, three groups that contributed to the foundation of the Safawid state and its development: the Qizilbash, who represented the popular Sufi movement; the institution of the '*ulama* or salaried clergy; and finally, at the top, the ruler. The first group was gradually suppressed for political reasons and the second group drew closer to the royal court. With the advent of Shah Tahmasib (1524–1576), the state openly supported the '*ulama* against the Qizilbash and other Sufi orders. Shah Abbas I (1571–1629) recruited many '*ulama* in different administrative positions. But his support for the scholars of Gnosticism and real Sufis never ceased. The development of philosophy in Isfahan is indebted to Shah Abbas's patronage of scholars of theology and Gnosticism. It was during his reign that the philosophy of illumination received official recognition and was advocated by some influential Shi'i thinkers who remained close to the monarch. As we see, on one side the Safawid dynasty stood hostile towards Sunni thought and Sufism, while on the other side it did not curtail the development of illuminative philosophy of Suhrawardi and theological debates on various religious matters.⁸

This Shi'i state, like other Islamic states, was supportive of a philosophical discourse favourable to the metaphysical foundation of its political power. Intellectual endeavour was consequently subject to the favour of despotic rulers who were either for or against it. This was characteristic of the political environment in which ideas were shaped in the Muslim world. Philosophy, unlike religious discourse, never enjoyed a long-term engagement and relationship to the state and was forced by the clergy to stand outside the educational institutions most of the time. Nevertheless, there were reasons for the revival of Illuminationism during the Safawid dynasty. As mentioned earlier, the Safawid was a gnostic Sufi order that was transformed into a political movement. Unlike other Islamic dynasties it was not based purely on military insurgence. It was expected to incline towards a type of metaphysics that could easily be manipulated for political ends. Illuminationism, as Amin Razavi remarks, provided such a philosophical foundation for the political convictions of the dynasty.⁹ The contribution of some great Shi'i thinkers with political influence was to promote Suhrawardi's philosophy; this played a remarkable role in having Illuminationism recognized as an influential philosophical trend of the time.

During the Safawid dynasty, Muslim thinkers in Persia continued the post Ibn Sinan intellectual tradition. They were able to establish systems of thought that were neither purely philosophical nor gnostic but a combination of both. They intended to develop a theosophical tradition rather than a rationalistic philosophy based purely on discursive knowledge. Thinkers such as Ghyas al-Din Mansur and later Mir Damad interpreted Ibn Sina's Peripatetic doctrine in the light of the illuminative philosophy of Suhrawardi. Other thinkers, such as Abd al-Razzaq Kashani, Sa'ad al-Din Hamuya, Aziz al-Din Nasafi, Fakhr al-Din Araqi, Auhad al-Din Kirmani and Abdul Rahman Jami, were influenced by Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the unity of being. They incorporated this gnostic doctrine into their philosophical systems.¹⁰ In the fourteenth century, Sayyid Haider Amuli, Ibn Abi Jumhur and Rajab Basri, whose theosophical doctrines were developed under the influence of Ibn 'Arabi, contributed to the integration of Gnosticism in Shi'i Islam during the Safawid period. Sayyid Sharif Jurjani and Jalal al-Din Dawani also tried to bridge the gulf between philosophy and theology.¹¹

Among these Muslim Shi'i thinkers, Mir Damad is of great importance because, with Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i, he belonged to the first generation who were the main thinkers behind the establishment of the School of Isfahan. The name of this school was employed recently by Henri Corbin, Nasr and Ashtiyani. Corbin includes Mir Damad, Mulla Sadra and Qadi Sa'id Qummin as its main figures. Nasr gives a longer list of names but emphasizes Mir Damad, Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i as the forerunners of the school. These three thinkers were also patronized by Shah Tahmasp and Shah Abbas, the Safawid ruler. It is reported that Shah Abbas visited them

frequently at their place of residence and developed a kind of friendship with them.¹²

Mir Burhan al-Din Muhammad Baqir Damad was known as Mir Damad and was also given the title of 'Third Teacher' following Aristotle and al-Farabi.¹³ Another title by which he was known was Sayyid al-Afdil, 'Master of the Most Learned'.¹⁴ This Muslim thinker was born in 1561 in Ashtarabad. His father, Mir Shams al-Din, was the son-in-law of Shaykh 'Ali b. Abd al-'Ali Karaki, a distinguished Shi'i cleric (d. 1538) and the author of the theological discourse *al-Najmiyyah* and several other commentaries on religious subjects. Shaykh 'Ali Karaki migrated to Persia after the establishment of the Safawid dynasty and during the reign of Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524–1576) enjoyed patronage and power. Mir Damad gained his education in the major Shi'i cities of Persia. He studied philosophy, transmitted sciences (*'ulum al-naqliyyah*) and natural sciences and closely studied Ibn Sina's philosophical texts. He became the leading authority on philosophy, theology, jurisprudence and natural sciences. During the time of Shah Abbas he went to Isfahan to teach, where he attracted a large number of disciples. Among them were Mulla Khalil Qazwini, Sayyid Ahmed 'Alawi, Qutb al-Din Ashkiwari and Mulla Sadra.¹⁵ Mir Damad wrote various religious and philosophical titles in Arabic and Persian; for example *Qabasat*, *Taqdisat*, *Taqim al-imam*, *al-Sirat al-mustaqim* and *al-Ufuq al-mubin* were in Arabic. He also wrote *Jazarat* and *Sirat al-muntaha* in Persian. These works included discussions on philosophical matters such as being, time, eternity, the relationship between eternal and temporal, creation and God's knowledge of particulars. He also wrote poems under the pen name *Ishraq*. At the age of twenty, Mir Damad was recognized as a philosopher and was admired by people in the intellectual circles of Mashad and Isfahan. In 1631 he died on his way to Kerbela and was buried in Najaf, a city in present-day Iraq.

It should be remembered that philosophical discourse in the Muslim world has always been looked at with suspicion. The powerful, dogmatic and politically greedy clergy thought of philosophy as poisonous to the religious mind. During the Safawid dynasty, the hostility towards intellectual discourse continued and the Shi'i clergy, like the Sunni clergy, expressed no sympathy with philosophy. The establishment of the School of Isfahan can be attributed less to intellectual tolerance and freedom of expression in the Safawid dynasty than to other factors such as the political position and power of the families of Muslim thinkers like Mir Damad and Mulla Sadra in Shiraz and Isfahan. Mir Damad's father and grandfather were among the influential Shi'i clergy of their time and enjoyed the patronage and support of the Safawid rulers. Mir Damad also was known for his devotion and religiosity. He was highly revered by the *'ulama* and by the seekers of *irfan* (Gnosticism). His style of writing was also complicated and difficult for the clergy to understand, particularly those who were not familiar with theosophy and

Gnosticism. Nor should we forget Shah Abbas's personal interest in intellectual debate and philosophy and his encouragement of learning and his friendship with Mir Damad, Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i. All these factors contributed to the establishment and development of the School of Isfahan and rescued its founders from persecution by the clergy.

Mir Damad's philosophy is characterized by a fusion of Suhrawardi's Illuminationism and Ibn Sina's ontology. For him, there is a clear distinction between Hellenistic philosophy and Islamic thought. Islamic thought is the source of illumination and theosophy, whereas Hellenistic philosophy represents rationalistic discourse. Illuminationism, as explained by Suhrawardi in *Hikmat al-Ishraq* (see Chapter Two), was the continuation of a philosophical tradition from Hermes to Plato and then to Eastern thinkers such as himself.¹⁶ Mir Damad, however, kept Platonism outside Hellenistic thought, because Platonism belonged to the philosophical tradition of the illuminative philosophy. Nasr also mentions that eternal creation, *huduth-i dahri*, is the central idea of Mir Damad's thought.¹⁷ This idea is better understood in light of Mir Damad's division of essence based on Suhrawardi's metaphysics, which eventually leads to different concepts of time. Admittedly, in dealing with the idea of eternal creation, Mir Damad endeavoured to solve the contradictions between the views of Muslim philosophers on creation. He put forward an answer to the question of whether the world was created in time or is eternal. This issue was discussed from the beginning of the rise of Muslim philosophy by thinkers such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Some Muslim philosophers stated that the world was created in time, while others held that it was eternal. The second view was also attacked by al-Ghazali in his *Tahafut al-falasifa*; he branded it heretical. Mir Damad took another metaphysical position by synthesizing these two antagonistic claims and advocating the idea that the world was eternally created. For him, the essence of God is absolutely simple and transcends all distinctions, limitations and qualities. It is the source of divine attributes, which are one with it and at the same time different. The divine essence and divine attributes enjoy a necessary and unchangeable relationship, which is eternal or *sarmadi*, having neither beginning nor end.¹⁸

The divine attributes are similar to the universal Forms in the ideal world in Plato's metaphysics. Even they have a similar relationship to the particular objects of the material world: they are unchangeable but are capable of generating change. The relationship between this unchangeable sphere of the divine attributes and the changing world leads to the rise of another form of time called *dahr*. The third form of time, called *zaman* by Mir Damad, is the measure of the quantitative change in the material world.¹⁹ What is the significance of this division of time? How does Mir Damad solve the contradiction between the views of those who advocate the paradigm of creation in time and those who believe in the eternity of the world?

Mir Damad's solution to the relationship between *dahr* and *zaman* is that the two forms of time belong to two different spheres of existence. The former time is for the unchangeable and necessary relationship between the divine attributes and the material world. For this Muslim thinker, as for Plato, the material world is distinct from the divine attributes (or the universal Forms in the ideal world). The material world also relies on the divine attributes for its existence. The creation of the world is, therefore, preconditioned by the divine attributes, but it did not occur in the form of time called *zaman* (time as a quantitative change), because *zaman* cannot exist without the material world or before the creation of material objects. The world, which exists in *zaman* and depends on the divine attributes, is also outside the sphere of *dahr*. Conversely, the divine attributes are in *dahr* but not in *zaman*. Something that exists in *zaman* is non-existent in *dahr*, and vice versa. Above them, *sarmad* or the temporality of the divine essence transcends both forms of time. The divine essence is neither in *dahr* nor in *zaman* but is aloof from them and their influence.²⁰ Divine essence is the source of everything and everything as essence is identified with light. Following Suhrawardi's doctrine of the primacy of essence, and thinking of everything in the world as the originated light, Mir Damad believes that the essence is the only reality and existence is an accident. Accepting the emanationist doctrine of Neoplatonism, he believed that the world came into existence in the process of emanation. This process is characterized by a descending and ascending order. From the divine essence emanated the divine attributes or the archetypal lights, and the universal intellect was the first component of this emanation. From this emanated the heavenly soul, of which the universal soul is a member. From the universal soul emanated the natural souls. In the final stage, matter emanated. This process is described as a descending order from the most to the least perfect form of existence. At the lowest stage of emanation the process takes an ascending order from minerals to animals and the human species.²¹ Sufism also inspired Mir Damad. In *Jadhawat*, he describes the ascending journey undertaken by the seekers of redemption to employ intuitivemystic knowledge (*'irfan*) for understanding the Truth and to devote time to serious spiritual contemplation.

Another Muslim thinker who played a role in Mulla Sadra's intellectual life in Isfahan, and who was a member of the School of Isfahan, was Mir Abdul Qasim Findiriski (d. 1641). Mir Findiriski taught philosophy, mathematics and medicine. Many of his students, for example Rafi'a Gailani, Aqa Husayn Kundsari, Mulla Muhammad Baqir Sabzwari and Mulla Rajab 'Ali Tabrizi, became well-known scholars. However, according to Nasr, it is debatable whether Mulla Sadra studied under him. Mulla Sadra, however, was introduced to Mir Findiriski and the two knew one another well. Mir Findiriski lived longer and died in the same year as Mulla Sadra or one year later.²² Mir Findiriski was acquainted with non-Islamic religious and philo-

sophical traditions in India and Persia. He travelled to India and studied Hinduism as well as Zoroastrianism. He wrote *Usul al-fusul* on Indian philosophy and a commentary for the Persian translation of the *Yoga Vasistha* by Nizam al-Din Paniputi. He was also interested in the fine arts and wrote *Sana'iyyah*, a treatise on the arts and sciences in society.²³ He wrote poetry and lived simply, mixing with the common people and identifying with them. Nasr narrates a story from *Riyad al-aarifin* that Mir Findiriski's attitude towards the common people annoyed Shah Abbas. One day Shah Abbas said, 'I hear some of the leading scholars and sages have been attending cock-fights in the bazaar.' Mir Findiriski, realizing that the remark was meant for him, replied, 'Your majesty, rest assured, I was present but I saw none of the *'ulama* there.'²⁴

Another important figure of the first generation of scholars of the School of Isfahan was Shaykh Baha al-Din 'Amili, known also as Shaykh Baha'i. His father Shaykh Husayn, the son of Shaykh Abdul Samad 'Amili, was originally an Arab from Lebanon, and was sent at the age of thirteen to Persia. He became one of the leading theologians and jurists of his time, a Sufi, a poet, and the leader of the *'ulama* in Isfahan.²⁵ He was also a close friend of Mir Findiriski and Mir Damad. The friendship between these three thinkers is revealed in a fresco in the ruins of a Safawid royal building in Isfahan.

This fresco depicts a famous story, according to which one day Mir Damad and two of his prominent contemporaries, Shaykh Baha'i and Mir Findiriski, were sitting in a royal hall, engaged in a philosophical discussion. Suddenly a lion that had escaped from the royal zoo enters the hall. The fresco depicts Shaykh Baha'i as collecting himself with signs of fear on his face, Mir Damad as prostrating in gratitude, and Mir Findiriski as utterly indifferent to the lion's presence. The three distinguished friends were later obliged to provide an explanation of their immediate reactions. Shaykh Baha'i is reported to have said that by the power of reason he knew that unless the lion was hungry, it would not attack him, and yet instinctively he was moved to protect himself. Mir Damad explained that, being the descendant of the Prophet, he knew that the lion would not attack him, so he prostrated himself and thanked God for being a descendant of the Prophet. And Mir Findiriski is reported to have said that he mastered the terrifying beast by the power of his inner serenity and self-control.²⁶

This story, besides disclosing the friendship between these three thinkers, is indicative of the three forms of discourse, namely rational thinking, doctrinal faith and mystical tendency, combined in the intellectual tradition of the Safawid period. The writings of Shaykh Baha'i on theology and astronomy, and his commentaries on the Qur'an and on Arabic grammar were widely used in Persia. He wrote poems under the influence of Rumi (1207–1273), a Persian Sufi and poet and the founder of the Mawlawiyyah Sufi order.²⁷ Like his two friends, Shaykh Baha'i was Gnostic and believed that intuitive knowledge was superior to discursive or rationalistic knowledge. Needless to

say, these three thinkers played a remarkable role in the flourishing of the School of Isfahan. The theosophical activities of the school attracted many students from other cities in Persia; Mulla Sadra belonged to its second generation of students.

Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Shirazi Qawami), also known as *Sadr al-Muta'allihin* and *Akhund*, was born in Shiraz. Although the exact date of his birth is unknown he was probably born in 1572 because it is recorded that he died in 1640 at the age of seventy on his seventh pilgrimage to Mecca. He was buried in Basra, a city in southern Iraq. His father, Mirza Ibrahim b. Yhya Qawami, was a religious scholar and a Shiraz noble. He was also said to have held a ministerial post in the government of Fars province. Shiraz was the capital city of Fars, and, like Isfahan, was well known for its cultural and educational tradition. Mulla Sadra, being the only child of a wealthy, educated and politically powerful family, received the best education possible under the tutelage of his father. Later, after the death of his father in 1587, the adolescent decided to go to Isfahan to pursue his religious studies.²⁸ The intellectual life in Isfahan, in particular under the influence of Shaykh Baha'i and Mir Damad, enabled Mulla Sadra to develop a keen interest in philosophy and Gnosticism ('*irfan*'). He studied the transmitted sciences ('*ulum al-naqliyyah*') with Shaykh Baha'i and philosophy with Mir Damad.

According to Mulla Sadra's confession in *al-Masha'ir*, he was a follower of Suhrawardi's metaphysics and advocated the doctrine of the principality of essence.²⁹ His subsequent dissatisfaction with this philosophy, however, suggests that the foundation of his conviction was not firm. His philosophical interest changed from the primacy of essence to the primacy of being. He became more concerned with Ibn Sina's ontology, and later in his book *Tarh al-kawnayn* he engages himself with Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being.³⁰ But the change in Mulla Sadra's thinking was received with hostility by the '*ulama*' in Isfahan. Some interpreted Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being as the identification of God with nature, or belief in an immanent God, contrary to the concept of the transcendent God accepted by the majority of Muslims. Also, the philosopher Ibn 'Arabi belonged to the Sunni theological tradition and was venerated by some Sunni Sufi orders, for example the Naqshabandiyyah, who were hostile towards Shi'ism. This may be seen as one of the reasons contributing to the marginalization of Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy by the Shi'i '*ulama*' and to the condemnation of his metaphysical views as heretical.

For Ibn 'Arabi, the 'Unity of Being' means that there is only one Being, and existence is nothing but the manifestation or outward radiance of that One Being.³¹ In this regard, being rather than quiddity becomes the ruling principle of and reason for the existence of everything. Being is also one and manifests itself at all ranks of existence. Apparently, this multiplicity is not

the negation of unity but gradations of the manifestation of the unity. William Chittick, in *Ibn 'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination*, tries to explicate the meaning of this doctrine, first by relating the 'Unity of Being' to 'the profession of God's Unity' (*al-tawhid*) in Islam, and second by making a distinction between this Sufi doctrine and pantheism in occidental philosophy. It is noteworthy that the concept of the unity of God (*al-tawhid*) is distinct in connotation from the concept of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujud*). The latter identifies God with Being or renders God and Being as synonymous. The Qur'anic concept of the Unity of God does not mean that nothing other than God exists. It is a simple denial of the polytheism that was a common belief among some Arab tribes of the pre-Islamic period: 'Your God is One God. There is no god but He, the Compassionate, the Merciful';³² 'Allah bear witness that there is no god but He, and so do the angels and men of learning. He upholds justice. There is no god but He, the Mighty and Wise One.'³³ The statement "There is no God but Allah" (*la ilaha ila Allah*) vividly expresses the existence of one God. It stresses monotheism and rejects other deities beside Allah. The advocates of the Unity of Being altered the first part of this statement 'There is no God . . .' (*la ilah*) to 'There is no being . . .' (*la maujud*). The original Qur'anic verse is the denial of polytheism, and the Sufi version of the unity is an assertion that there is no existence except God, which is an emphasis on the immanence of God rather than His transcendence. Fariduddin al-Attar (1119–1230) illustrated this unity by the analogy of water, saying that: 'Water is water in the boundless ocean; and in the jug too it is the same water.'³⁴ Again for al-Attar, that which unites the multiple particularization of Reality is being and not quiddity. Likewise all the various gradations of being such as human beings, animals, trees and so on enjoy this unity. In *Fusus al-Hikam*, Ibn 'Arabi also considered God to be the totality of beings: 'God, by virtue of being, is the same as the things that are, because there is no existence other than His Being.'³⁵

William Chittick's distinction between the Unity of Being and pantheism in occidental philosophy is not convincing. In my opinion these two doctrines are similar in several ways. Both of them put away duality without insisting on the identification of God with the world. For Spinoza, one of the advocates of pantheism in the West, everything exists through the 'Substance', and beings are particularizations of the manifestation of the attributes of Substance. Meanwhile, Substance is, and at the same time is not, a being: 'God (*Deus*) I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.'³⁶ He adds: 'Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God.'³⁷ Spinoza rejects the notion of transcendent God; for him, God's causality is immanent causality, in the sense that God is an indwelling power, but is not identical with his creation or gradations. It is true that Spinoza's concept of God as the only Reality (which is also the view of

the advocates of the doctrine of the Unity of Being) can be mistaken for the identification of God with nature, but nature for Spinoza is one of the infinite attributes of God. Furthermore, Spinoza makes a distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, an indication of a certain self-differentiation in God, implying two distinguishable though inseparable aspects of the same reality.³⁸

In the face of the hostility from the official 'ulama, Mulla Sadra was left with two options: to defend his philosophical position or to retreat from public life. He chose the second and in 1610 left Isfahan for isolation in Kahak, a village near Qum. According to Fazlur Rahman, there was more to this intense opposition and criticism. In fact, the 'ulama were offended by Mulla Sadra's philosophical ambition. This is shown by the apology offered by the publisher in the introduction to *al-Asfar* stating that the philosopher's ideas in the work represent nothing to do with religious essence.³⁹ It is also reported that Mulla Sadra was critical of the official 'ulama and attacked them for using their political position for worldly and material gains. He called them ignorant of the states and stations of the human soul. His relationship with and attitude towards the institution of the 'ulama can be described as aggressive and un-compromising.⁴⁰ He removed himself from public life for a decade, and focused on strengthening the foundation of his philosophical thought and spiritual life. This period of solitude and retreat from public life was the most fruitful time in the intellectual development of Mulla Sadra: 'He was, therefore, in search of a method that would give him certainty and would transform rational propositions into experienced truth.'⁴¹ His intellectual situation, as Fazlur Rahman describes it, was similar to that of al-Ghazali and also of Descartes (1596–1650) when the latter was writing the *Meditations*. The difference was in al-Ghazali's fierce opposition to philosophy and Descartes's reliance on rationalistic discourse. Mulla Sadra neither tried to base truth on dogmatic theology nor accepted the validity of rational principles beyond doubt and limitation. Not much is known about Mulla Sadra during his stay in Kahak, but it is obvious that, although he was forced to choose solitude, this period in his life was significant for the development of a new philosophical ground and for his breaking away from Suhrawardi's metaphysical tradition.⁴² He refers to this in *al-Masha'ir*, where he describes the shift from Suhrawardi's doctrine of the primacy of essence to the doctrine of the primacy of Being as turning away from the 'darkness of illusion' to the daylight:

In the past, I used to be firm on the defence of the principality of essence, making existence a [mentally dependent] abstract entity, until my God guided me and showed me his proof. It became clear to me that the issue is opposite of what has been conceived and determined. Thank God who took me out of the darkness of illusion through the light of comprehension, who removed from my heart the clouds of these doubts through the rise of the sun of truth, and who held me close

to the true discourse in this life and the life after. Existences are genuine [determinate] realities and essences are the eternal 'thisnesses' which have never inhaled the perfume of real existence at all. These existences are merely the rays and reflected lights of The True Light and of the Eternal Existence. Exalted Be His Sublimity! However, each of them has essential predicates and contains intelligible concepts called essences.⁴³

This confession is the confirmation of Mulla Sadra's turn from the philosophical position of essentialism and his departure from Illuminationism, which affirms the primacy of essence and the nullity of being. It is the total conversion from the metaphysical position of Suhrawardi and his *ishraqi* followers to a position where being becomes primary. In this new philosophical position, essence rather than being is considered predicated or conceptual. This turn is seen by Mulla Sadra as a departure from the 'darkness of illusion' to the 'light of the day', which in my opinion has Platonic overtones. It resembles the journey of a liberated prisoner from the cave towards the light of the sun.

In 1625, at the age of fifty-three and having spent more than a decade in solitude, Mulla Sadra decided to return to his own city, Shiraz, on the request of the governor of Fars, Allahwirdi Khan (d. 1613) to teach in a religious school (*madrasa*) that he had recently established. The philosopher resumed teaching and writing and trained a number of notable disciples, among them 'Abdul Razzaq al-Husayn Lahiji and Muhammad al-Murthada, known also as Mulla Muhsin Fayd Kashani and Hakim Mulla Muhammad Aqa Jani. Lahiji is also known as Fayyadh. He married Um Kalthum, the eldest daughter of Mulla Sadra who was also a scientist and poetess. Lahiji studied in Mashad and travelled to Qum where he met Mulla Sadra and became his student. He has written on philosophy and theology. His main works include *Shawariq al-ilham*, *Gohar murad*, a commentary on Suhrawardi's *al-Nur* and *Sharhi isharat*. Faydh Kashani was an expert on Islamic jurisprudence, *hadith* (the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad), Gnosticism and ethics. He also studied under the instruction of Mulla Sadra in Qum and travelled to Shiraz with his master and married his daughter (Zubaydah). Fayd Kashani returned to his own town, Kashan, where he established a school to teach philosophy and theology. He wrote Gnostic poems and a number of books in Arabic. Among them are *Mafatih*, *al-Wafi*, *Usul al-ma'arif* and *al-Mahajj al-bayza*. Mulla Muhammad Aqa Jani is known for his commentary on Mir Damad's book *al-Qasabat*.

Mulla Sadra's philosophical development can be divided into three periods: in the first period he studied in Isfahan with Shaykh Baha'i and Mir Damad and came under the influence of Illuminationism. Mulla Sadra describes this period in *al-Asfar* as a time of intensive research and investigation of the ideas of Greek philosophers, of Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, of Muslim philosophers from Spain

(al-Andalus) represented by Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Rushd and Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy, and of the wisdom of the Illuminationists.⁴⁴ In *al-Masha'ir* this period of his intellectual development is identified with disillusionment with the doctrine of the primacy of essence. It was also at this time that Mulla Sadra faced hostility from the 'ulama in Isfahan. The second period, in Kahak, is characterized by deep philosophical meditation and solitude. The third period was marked by his return to society and the commitment to write and teach in Shiraz, which he did until his death. Although these three periods are interconnected and equally important for understanding his philosophy, the second and the third represent Mulla Sadra's authentic way of understanding reality on a new philosophical ground and the maturity of his thinking. His metaphysical position designates not only a conversion but also a new beginning or a new episode in Islamic philosophical tradition in which 'Being' is not the needfulness of essence; rather, it is the ground without which nothing is thinkable.

Although no definitive chronological order has been established for Mulla Sadra's writings, a list of thirty-three treatises on religion and philosophy is provided by Shaykh Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar in his introduction to Mulla Sadra's *al-Asfar*.⁴⁵ Nasr listed forty-six works of Mulla Sadra and six treatises whose authorship remains uncertain.⁴⁶ Professor S. M. Khamenei provided a list of thirty-nine works.⁴⁷ Abu Abdullah al-Zanjani also listed twenty-six philosophical works by Mulla Sadra in his *Life and Main Philosophical Teaching of the Great Iranian Philosopher Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi*.⁴⁸ Since Mulla Sadra's ontology is our primary interest, the present book deals with the writing of the third period of the philosopher's life. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that even his religious treatises, such as his commentaries on the Qur'anic verses, are related to his philosophical conviction. His major philosophical work and the fountainhead of his thought is *Al-Hikma al-muta'aliyah fi al-asfar al-'aqliyyah al-arba'a*, known also as *al-Asfar* (it is referred to in this book as *al-Asfar*).⁴⁹ This work was first published in four volumes in 1865, with a commentary by Mulla Hadi Sabzawari on three volumes. The most recent edition, by Rida Lutfi, was published in nine volumes in 1958. It was also published in Teheran with a Persian commentary by Ayatullah Abdulla Jawadi Amili in 1989. One of Mulla Sadra's early works before *al-Asfar* was *Tarh al-kawnayn*, which was written under the influence of Ibn 'Arabi's pantheistic philosophy and marked the beginning of Mulla Sadra's move away from Suhrawardi's philosophical tradition; this work was also branded as heretical by the institution of 'ulama in Isfahan. The book was later published under the title *Risalat seryan al-wujud*. Other important philosophical works include *al-Masha'ir*, which is a summary of Mulla Sadra's philosophical project in *al-Asfar* and was published in 1897. It was later published in Persian in 1964 by Dr Karim Mujtahidi, a professor at Teheran University, and was translated into English

by Parviz Morewedge and published by the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science (SSIP) in 1992. Other philosophical works, for example *Al-Hikma al-'arshiyyah*, *al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah fi asrar al-'ulum al-kemaliyyah*, *Risala fi al-haraka al jawheriyyah* and *al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad*, deal with various philosophical and theological issues. Mulla Sadra also wrote a treatise on subject-object dichotomy, *Risala fi itihad al-'aql w al-ma'qul*, and *Hashiyyah 'ala sharih hikmat al-ishraq lil Suhrawardi*. The latter was published in 1898. A treatise on Ibn Sina's philosophy, *Sharih ilahiyyah al-shifa*, was published in 1885. Mulla Sadra also wrote *Mafatih al-ghayb*, on metaphysics, cosmology and eschatology. *Al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad* was revised and published by Jalal al-Din Ashtiani in Mashad in 1921. This book was also published in Tunisia in 1972 by Nur al-Din al-Ali, and by the Iranian Academy of Philosophy in Teheran in 1975. The book has two main sections: the knowledge of God and Resurrection. In the last part of the section on Resurrection under the title 'Prophecy', Mulla Sadra deals with the relationship between religion and politics. *Al-Shawahid al-Rububiyyah* is a summary of his teachings and was published for the first time in 1869. It is considered to be his last work.⁵⁰ The book was recently edited by Jalal al-Din Ashtyani and was published with Mulla Hadi Sabzawari's commentary in 1967. A collection of his treatises was published in 1996 under the title *Majmu'a rasa'ile-falsafi Sadr al-muta'ahilin*, with an introduction in Persian by Hamid Naji Isfahani. This collection includes important philosophical treatises by Mulla Sadra such as *Risalat itihad 'aql e ma'qul*, *Risalat isalat ja'il al-wujud* and *Risalat shawahid al-rububiyyah*.

Mulla Sadra's major philosophical work, *Al-Hikma al-muta'aliyah fi al-asfar al-'aqliyyah al-arba'a*, or *al-Asfar (The Transcendent Philosophy Concerning the Four Intellectual Journeys of the Soul)*, stands as the most valuable philosophical product. It is a work that has remained unknown to a great extent in the West. This work not only contains Mulla Sadra's philosophical system but presents his rich understanding and evaluation of the earlier Muslim philosophical, theological and Sufi traditions. The title of this work indicates four intellectual journeys, which lead human existence from the lowest to the highest rank. These journeys complete one another and describe Mulla Sadra's philosophical system. The four intellectual journeys are:

- A journey from creation to the Truth or Creator
- A journey from the Truth to the Truth
- A journey that stands in relation to the first journey because it is from the Truth to creation with the Truth
- A journey that stands in relation to the second journey because it is from the Truth to the creation.

The first journey, from creation to the Creator, deals with general principles of philosophy or rather metaphysical questions in order to found the transcendent philosophy as a divine science. This journey also addresses philosophical issues such as the definition and meaning of philosophy, the primacy of Being over essence, the gradation of Being, the trans-substantial change (*al-Haraka al-jawhariyyah*), Platonic ideal forms, time, and the dichotomy of the subject-object relationship. The second journey represents Mulla Sadra's natural philosophy and his criticism of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories. It explains the existence of natural entities, matter and forms, substance and accident and the hierarchy of the natural beings in the world. It includes Mulla Sadra's views on the problem of the creation *ex nihilo* and the eternity of the world. It explores the views of the Greek philosophers such as Thales, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. At the end of this journey Mulla Sadra discusses the relationship between nature and its metaphysical principles. He advocates his own opinion of change as the continuous renewal of the world. In the third journey, Mulla Sadra constructs his own theological ideas or a divine science in a particular sense. It includes the nature of God's existence, divine unity and attributes, God's knowledge of the world, good and evil and the divine law. He also gives different proofs for the existence of God, God's knowledge of the world, the nature of divine will, and the role of love (*ishq*) in the evolutionary process of change. The fourth journey is the end of the intellectual progress of Mulla Sadra where he explains his own understanding of rational psychology and eschatology. It begins with a discussion on different types of the soul, the proofs for its existence, and the possibility of the separation of the soul from the corporeal world. Mulla Sadra also deals critically with the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul. He explains the condition of the human souls who reside in heaven and hell quoting from Ibn 'Arabi's *al-Futuhat al-makiyyah* at the end.

These four intellectual journeys in *al-Asfar* are not only descriptive of Mulla Sadra's philosophical ideas, but also critical of almost all views held by his predecessors. Fazlur Rahman describes this style of Mulla Sadra as hypercritical because all alternative solutions to the philosophical problems are rejected; meanwhile the new solutions he suggests seem not to be essentially different or in disagreement with those of his predecessors. For example, in his discussion on eschatology he rejects al-Ghazali's solution but his own solution on physical resurrection is not distinguishable from that offered by al-Ghazali. The only texts and thinkers that did not come under Mulla Sadra's critical scrutiny were the foundation texts of Islam, the views of the Shi'i imams, and Ibn 'Arabi.⁵¹

The third period of Mulla Sadra's intellectual development gave rise to a new type of ontology based on the doctrine of the primacy of Being. This ontology, although it had similarities with Ibn Sina's ontology and Ibn

'Arabi's theosophy, offered a new philosophical foundation distinct from that of Illuminationism. Although not recognized immediately by the intellectual circle of its time, Mulla Sadra's philosophical achievement gradually inscribed its effect in the Muslim philosophical tradition, particularly during the Qajar dynasty. Today it is almost impossible to understand the development of Muslim philosophy without understanding Mulla Sadra's ontological enterprise and his influence in the Persian-speaking world.

The influence of Mulla Sadra's transcendent philosophy and the doctrine of the primacy of Being was felt later in the post Isfahan era. This era is characterized by the political changes to Shi'ite Islamic power after the collapse of the Safawid dynasty in 1732 and the shift of the centre for Islamic philosophical studies from Isfahan, capital of the Safawids, to Teheran following the establishment of the Qajar in 1779 by Agha Muhammad Khan.⁵² The Safawid dynasty witnessed the culmination of the Shi'ite political and philosophical fusion, but it remained a target of sectarian antagonism by the Sunni neighbouring political hegemony and tribes. It is reported that Mir Vais, a Sunni Muslim leader of the Ghilzai tribe in Qandahar, travelled through Isfahan on his way to Mecca in 1707. He collected some material containing matters repugnant to Sunni Islam. After showing them to the Sunni '*ulama* in Makkah he obtained a *fatwa* (religious verdict) from them authorizing *jihad* (holy war) against the Shi'ites and their dynasty in Isfahan. The holy war began with an attack on the Shi'ite minority in Qandahar and ended with the fall of Isfahan in 1722. In 1723 another *fatwa* was issued against the Shi'ites by the Shaykh al-Islam (of the chief '*ulama*) in Istanbul,⁵³ in which it was stated that the blood of male Shi'ites was to be shed and even their women and children to be taken captive.⁵⁴ In 1743, in this hostile atmosphere, Nadir Shah tried to promote a revised form of Shi'ite Islam. He sponsored a meeting between Shi'ite and Sunnite '*ulama* in Najaf and later succeeded in having the Shi'ites recognized as the followers of the Ja'afari School of law (*mazhab*), the fifth Islamic school of law, by the Ottoman empire. Unfortunately Nadir Shah was assassinated soon after this achievement.⁵⁵

The Qajar dynasty, unlike the Safawid, was characterized by constant internal tension between the political hegemony of the monarch and the institution of the '*ulama*. The Qajar monarchs did not claim religious authority for themselves through alleged imamate descent. They, however, sought the favour of some '*ulama* by patronizing the Shi'ite holy shrines of the imams and offering other services.⁵⁶ The Qajar monarchs' alienation of the official '*ulama* from the political hegemony and the tenuous relationship between the state and religious authority made the '*ulama* stronger as an opposition so that their religious actions were intensified politically in the community. Various religious schools were established for promoting religious studies. Sufi orders such as Shaykhism, Ni'mat Allahi, Zahabis and Khaksar gained popularity.⁵⁷ The Shaykhi order eventually became the birthplace of the Babi

movement with its doctrine of the messianic return of the hidden imam, which later developed into Baha'ism.⁵⁸ The '*ulama* stressed the external dimension and rituals of the faith in light of the instructions of the imams, while the Sufi movement justified the significance of the internal dimension of the faith, but again for its effectiveness turned to the teachings of the imams.

Parallel to this development in the Qajar period, the teaching of Mulla Sadra's philosophy added another element of diversity to the cultural progress of Shi'i Islam. The school of Isfahan, where Mulla Sadra studied under the direction of Mir Damad, Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i, was dominated by the 'Essentialism' of the *ishraqi* metaphysical tradition of Suhrawardi. By contrast, the philosophical school of Teheran flourished under the sway of Muslim 'Existentialism' or the metaphysical tradition of Mulla Sadra. This metaphysical tradition became 'central to the intellectual life of Qajar Persia and was of great importance not only for those who considered themselves as his followers, but even by those who opposed him, as is seen in the writings of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, the founder of the Shaykhi movement and Sayyid Muhammad the Bab, the founder of Babism.'⁵⁹ Although the school of Teheran was founded at the end of the eighteenth century with the advent of the Qajar dynasty, the teaching of Mulla Sadra's philosophy actually began with Mulla Ali Nuri (d. 1830–1831) in Isfahan, the former Safawid capital of Persia in the early Qajar period. Mulla Ali Nuri was a great Islamic scholar and his teaching of Mulla Sadra's philosophy in that city continued without opposition from the official '*ulama*.⁶⁰ Ali Nuri also wrote commentaries on *al-Asfar*, *al-Masha'ir* and *Sharh usul al-kafi*. His pupils included Mulla Muhammad Isma'il Isfahani, Mulla Abdullah Zunuzy, and his son Mulla Ali Mudarris Zunuzy, Mulla Muhammad Ja'afar Langarudi, Mulla Isma'il Khajaw'i, and finally Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, who studied philosophy for seven years in Isfahan and was responsible for the revival of the Existentialist school of Mulla Sadra in the Qajar period.⁶¹ The philosophical school of Teheran, however, became the centre for studying Mulla Sadra's philosophy on one hand and Islamic esotericism or Gnosticism on the other. The latter was advocated by Sayyid Radi Larijani, known also as *Malik a-Batini* (the Professor of the Esoteric).⁶²

Mulla Sadra's philosophy was also taught on the Indian subcontinent for the first time by Muhammad Salih Kashani, a disciple of Mulla Sadra who migrated to India. Indian Muslim scholars such as Muhammad Amjad al-Sadiqi (d. 1727), Mulla Hasan Laknawi (d. 1783), Muhammad A'lam Sindili (d. 1834) and Abdul Ali Bahr al-'Ulum (died in the nineteenth century) wrote commentaries on the works of Mulla Sadra.⁶³ As mentioned earlier, one of the most influential figures in the promotion of the philosophy of Mulla Sadra during the Qajar dynasty was Mulla Hadi Sabzawari. This Muslim thinker was born in 1797 in Sabzawar in north-eastern Iran. He studied metaphysics,

logic, mathematics and jurisprudence in Mashhad. He then moved to Isfahan to study philosophy with Mulla Isma'il Isfahani and Mulla Ali Nuri, the interpreter of Mulla Sadra's philosophy of that time. Although he studied with Mulla Ali Nuri for about three years, Sabzawari hints in his autobiography at "illuminati" rather than Mulla Sadra's philosophy as the motive behind his inclination for philosophy and traveling to Isfahan:

I spent a total of ten years in the pious circle of the late Mulla [Mulla Husayn Sabzawari in Mashhad], until the time that my passion for learning was intensified. From Isfahan the whisper of the 'illuminati' reached my heart, at a time when, by the grace of God, I found great pleasure as well as competence in theological studies. I then left Khurasan for Isfahan leaving behind a considerable amount of property and goods. I stayed there for eight years gaining, with God's aid, an ascetic temperament, free of excessive passions, as well as success in my studies of the sciences and the *shari'a*; however, I spent most of my time studying philosophy of the illuminationsit school. For five years I studied with that supreme doctor of theology (glory of truth seekers, shining light of savants and teachers, possessing the virtuousness of the divines – nay the virtues of God, that knower of the Truth), Akhund Mulla Isma'il Isfahani (may al-Sharif (God) sanctify his heart).⁶⁴

After the death of Mulla Isma'il Isfahani, Sabzawari studied with Mulla Ali Nuri: 'When I returned to Khurasan, I continued my studies of *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and *tafsir* (commentary) for five years, for scholars (there) favoured these two subjects and offered deep understanding of *hikmat* (philosophy). For this reason I rely mostly on *hikmat*, especially *ishraqi* (Illuminationism).'⁶⁵ After returning from pilgrimage to Mecca, Sabzawari spent the rest of his life in his own town teaching philosophy and theology. He soon earned a reputation as a great thinker of the Qajar dynasty; even Nasir al-Din Shah (the Qajar king who died in 1896) visited him in 1867. Sabzawari died in 1873 and was recognized as the founder of the Sabzawar philosophical school. He was called, as Henri Corbin states, 'the Plato of his time', and was also said to be its Aristotle.⁶⁶ One of the most famous philosophical works of Sabzawari is *Ghurur al-Fara'id*, in which he gives a systematic account of Mulla Sadra's existential philosophy together with *Sharh al-manzumah* in poetic verses. Mulla Sadra's doctrine of the primacy of Being, modalities and the systematic ambiguity of Being are discussed in the first part of this work. Sabzawari wrote three other commentaries on *Al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah*, *al-Mabda' wa al-mi'ad* and *Mafatih al-ghayb*. Another work, *Asrar al-hikma*, deals in detail with the origin of being, eschatology and the esoteric meaning of liturgical practices. At the request of Nasir al-Din Shah (the Qajar monarch) Sabzawari produced a summary of this work entitled *Hidayat al-talibin*.⁶⁷

In modern times, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatab'i (professor at the theological University of Qum) is considered to be one of the philosophers and Gnostic thinkers of Persia who were inspired by Mulla Sadra's

philosophy. He was born in Tabriz in 1903 and died in 1981. He wrote numerous books, one being a new edition of Mulla Sadra's *al-Asfar*. Tabatab'i was also engaged in a philosophical debate with Henri Corbin from 1958 to 1977. These debates were arranged by Sayyid Hossein Nasr (1933–) and conducted before a small audience. Among those who attended were Ayatollah Mutahari and Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani.⁶⁸ Many other Persian Muslim thinkers have followed Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Among them are Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Rafi'i Qazwini, Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani (1925–), a professor of theology at Mashhad who edited Mulla Sadra's *Al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah*, *al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah* and Sabzawari's *Majmu'ai i-rasa'il*, and Sayyid Muhammad Kazim 'Assar (1885–1975), professor of theology at the University of Teheran, Mahdi Illahi Qumsha'i, professor of philosophy at the University of Teheran, and 'Allamah Muhammad Salih Ha'iri Simnani.⁶⁹ At present, Sayyid Muhammad Khamenei, the director of Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute in Teheran, and Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani, a professor of philosophy at the University of Teheran, are working on Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Mulla Sadra's philosophy is also studied widely at the universities and religious schools (*madrassa*) in Iran.

The Doctrine of the Primacy of Being: An Ontological Turn

As a dedicated and critical thinker, Mulla Sadra investigated deeply into almost the entire corpus of philosophical, theological and mystical Islamic thought. Under the influence of his teacher, Mir Damad, he became one of the followers of Illuminationism.¹ Like his teacher, he was also interested in Ibn Sina's ontology and studied Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy. Suhrawardi, Ibn Sina and Ibn 'Arabi had a notable impact on Mulla Sadra's thinking and played a significant role in facilitating his ontological turn from the doctrine of the primacy of essence to the primacy of being and in his development of a new ontological system. Mulla Sadra's ideas were formed in the matrix of the dominant philosophy of Suhrawardi in the school of Isfahan. As discussed previously in Chapter Two, Suhrawardi held the metaphysical view that being was a mere mental concept and that essence was the only reality. Human knowledge of an object was also possible only through the revealing of its essence. A relationship was suggested between Suhrawardi's Illuminationism and Plato's metaphysics; this relationship was seen as important in comparing Mulla Sadra's ontology with that of Heidegger.

From the second period of his intellectual development, Mulla Sadra began to express dissatisfaction with the metaphysics of Illuminationism, in particular with the doctrine of the primacy of essence and declared, on the contrary, the doctrine of the primacy of Being. This ontological turn could not have occurred without the influence of Ibn Sina and Ibn 'Arabi. Mulla Sadra's teacher, Mir Damad, also tried to combine Suhrawardi's *ishraqi* thought with the Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophy of Ibn Sina. The philosophical tradition of the Isfahan school could not be characterized by blind imitation of Suhrawardi's Illuminationism. There was an inclination towards newly creative ideas and an attempt to amalgamate Suhrawardi's thought with that of Ibn Sina. Mulla Sadra, however, crossed the boundary set by the official interpretation of Islamic thought when he expressed his interest in Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujud*). In addition to the influence of this doctrine, another visible influence on Mulla Sadra was the psychological-eschatological role of the realm of images. In this realm, according to Ibn 'Arabi, images are as real as they are perceptible. The images in the human soul in the hereafter, since they are not attached to material objects, are more vivid and real than the images in the material world. This idea was used by Mulla Sadra to prove his view on bodily resurrection in his eschatological doctrine.²

For Ibn Sina, existence and essence were both real. Existence was of two kinds: necessary and contingent. He illustrated the difference between them in two ways. First, the necessary being is dependent on itself to exist and its existence is inseparable from its essence, or rather it is pure existence. By contrast, contingent beings are not self-dependent and derive from necessary beings. Their essences are also separable or are additional to them.³ Following Ibn Sina's ontological division and his distinction between existence and essence, the problem of whether existence or essence constitutes reality emerged in subsequent philosophical debates among Muslim thinkers. Suhrawardi, as one of the followers of Platonism, argued against Ibn Sina's ontology and insisted on the non-reality of existence and advocated the idea that essence was the only reality.⁴ Mulla Sadra contradicted Suhrawardi's doctrine and rejected the Platonic-Illuminationist metaphysical view that nothing in the real world corresponds to existence or nothing exists but ideas or essence. He, on the contrary, believed that nothing is real but existence.

In seeking to clarify the similarities between Mulla Sadra and Heidegger in relation to the doctrine of Being, it is important to note three points:

- Mulla Sadra and Heidegger stress the principality of Being and the reality of Being as a pre-ontological condition for the existence of all beings.
- Both thinkers argue against Plato's metaphysics, which reduces everything to ideas or their essences.
- They hold the view that Aristotle's logic and rationalist cognition are incapable of revealing the meaning of Being. As a result, a new cognitive instrument is required to apprehend the meaning of Being.

Mulla Sadra conceived of no more difficult task than marking a departure from the dominant philosophical tradition of his time and developing a new ontological system capable of rendering being meaningful. The task could be accomplished, however, by being essentially critical as well as creative through challenging Illuminationism. A new philosophical beginning was required, which should begin with a shift to the doctrine of the primacy of Being. In Chapter Three the shift in the direction of his thought from the second period of his intellectual development was described as a 'turn' from the core elements of Suhrawardi's metaphysics which neglected fundamental philosophical questions in favour of investigating the nature of something less fundamental or grounded that could not exist by itself. Heidegger, in *Being and Time* (1927), similarly sought a new ontological system based on understanding of the meaning of Being as the most fundamental philosophical concern. In order to prove this, Heidegger argues that the post Aristotelian thinkers accepted the dogma of negligence or the abandonment of Being. They withdrew themselves from the genuine philosophical question about the meaning of Being, for three reasons. First, they thought that Being was the

most universal concept, and that its universality 'transcended' any universality of genus. Second, since Being is the most universal concept, and is not an entity, it is therefore indefinable and escapes all attempts to define it in accordance with the rules of 'definition' provided in Aristotelian logic. Third, Being is self-evident.⁵ Heidegger rejects these three presuppositions and argues against the post Aristotelian thinkers that the universality of the concept of Being does not guarantee the clarity of its meaning, and that the meaning of this concept is still the darkest of all. He also, like Mulla Sadra, says that Being is not an entity and is thus indefinable, and that Aristotle's definition by genus and difference, '*definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*' or connotative definition, which is the most important kind of definition, is not applicable to it but appropriate only for defining beings. Heidegger also believes that the indefinableness of Being does not invalidate the question of its meaning, and should not hinder us from investigating that meaning:

Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that 'Being' no longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that 'Being' cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a quite justifiable way of defining 'beings'. The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face.⁶

To clarify Mulla Sadra's view on the indefinableness of Being, Mulla Hadi Sabzawari states that even the positive attributes by which we try to define Being will neither render a definition nor a description, because whatever attribute is employed is not applicable to this reality. Sabzawari's argument is based on the notion of the 'simplicity' of Being. Since Being is simple, it has no differentia or genus on which its definition will become possible. Attaching positive attributes to Being cannot be a description because Being has no accidental properties to ascribe to it.⁷ As a result, Sabzawari suggests that the meaning of Being will be understood through negative attributes. Being, for example, is neither a substance nor an accident. Substance is essence and since it has no substratum cannot be an accident. Another way of understanding the meaning of Being is that Being has neither an opposite nor anything with similarity, because Being has no genus or *differentia*. It is not distinct or different from anything. That is why there is nothing to be opposed to it. Because Being also has no essence to share with another being, it is not possible to think of anything similar to Being. We can also say that Being is not a part and has no parts.⁸ The negative attributes listed here reveal some aspects of the nature of Being; but again, like positive attributes, these are neither definitions nor descriptions of Being.

Mulla Sadra describes the metaphysics of Suhrawardi in his book *al-Masha'ir* (the illusion of darkness, or the concealment of the truth):

Existences are genuine [determinate] realities and essences are the eternal 'thisnesses' which have never inhaled the perfume of real existence at all. These existences are merely the rays and reflected lights of the True Light and of the Eternal Existence—Exalted Be His Sublimity! However, each of them has essential predicates and contains intelligible concepts called essences.⁹

The 'darkness of illusion' is indicative of Suhrawardi's metaphysics. It is the state of untruth that reigns over the whole of reality in such a way that the meaning of Being remains unattainable and concealed. For Heidegger, the 'darkness of illusion' is the 'abandonment of Being', which led to 'nihilism' in the occidental thought of Plato, whom Suhrawardi considered the master of Illuminism, and finally of Nietzsche. It represents a history of negligence of the most fundamental philosophical question. In *An Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger states:

Where is nihilism really at work? Where men cling to familiar *essents* and suppose that it suffices to go on talking about *essents* as essents, since after all that is what they are. But with this they reject the question of being and treat being like a nothing (*nihil*) which in a certain sense it is, insofar as it has an essence. To forget being and cultivate only the essent – that is nihilism . . . By contrast, to press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of nothingness to draw nothingness into the question of being – this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true transcending of nihilism.¹⁰

In *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)* Heidegger explains this metaphysical position in detail and points out four forms of nihilism: actual nihilism, the greatest nihilism, the most disastrous nihilism, and finally crude nihilism.¹¹ These forms of nihilism have no historical sequence as any one can emerge in one historical epoch together with the abandonment of Being. Nihilism is also described as the epoch of total lack of questioning in which

problems will pile up and rush around, those types of 'questions', which are not really questions, because their response dare not have anything binding about them, insofar as it immediately becomes a problem again. This says exactly and in advance that nothing is immune to dissolution and that deconstruction [*Auflösung*] is only a matter of numbers regarding time, space, and force.¹²

The reconstruction of new metaphysical thought based on the principality of Being means destroying the foundation of nihilism; this should be the priority of this project for Mulla Sadra as well as for Heidegger. Ontology needs to become the foundation of philosophical thinking; even philosophy has to be defined as an inquiry into the meaning of Being: 'Initially and throughout the long history between Ahaximander and Nietzsche, inquiring into being is

only a question concerning the being of beings.'¹³ Both Mulla Sadra and Heidegger developed, by revolting against the dominant Platonic tradition, a new ontology at two different times and against two different cultural backgrounds. At the end of this revolt, Suhrawardi for Mulla Sadra and Nietzsche for Heidegger represent the final stage in the development of an antagonistic metaphysical tradition. The 'darkness of illusion' or 'abandonment of Being' is not simply an effacement for these two thinkers, but a serious philosophical problem that reigns over the whole domain of thinking in such a way that the truth of Being recedes into the darkness or, as Heidegger states, into the 'disintegration of truth' and finally the thinking of Being as essence.¹⁴ Beginning with Plato, Being was understood as 'Idea' and was interpreted as mere representation in the domain of thinking. As a consequence, in Plato's metaphysics, the Being of beings as a whole was relegated to darkness. In Heidegger's view, the concealment of truth about the reality of Being in the history of occidental thought from the time of Plato is like 'the process in which the light of a star that has been extinguished for millennia will gleam but its gleaming nonetheless remains a mere appearance'.¹⁵ Overcoming this type of metaphysics is possible only by turning to, and not in a mere conversion of, the metaphysics of Being by positing the most fundamental philosophical question concerning the meaning of Being and its principality. It is possible to turn to the metaphysics of Being, as described by Heidegger in *Being and Time* and *Contributions to Philosophy*, by making Being the grounding question and by allowing the re-emergence of the truth of Being as the only inner reality of all ontic beings. For Mulla Sadra, as he writes in *al-Masha'ir*, this is a departure from the 'darkness of illusion' to the daylight of the Truth.

The theme of ontology in Mulla Sadra's philosophy is the sum of the multiplicities of being grounded on the principle of unity. In this kind of system, in which unity and multiplicity are taken into consideration, the relation of unity to multiplicity and of identity to difference is decisive. In this system of ontology, the principal reality, Being, unlike Plato's universal Forms in the ideal world, is not multiple. It is a unity or identity manifesting itself in multiple gradations (difference). In this case this unity in multiplicity or identity in difference is best understood in the light of Hegel's dialectic logic rather than Aristotle's, because it is not abstract identity. It is not a simple unity of Being with itself but a relation to itself. By virtue of this relation of identity, beings or the multiple modalities of Being exist, and Being becomes the unified ground for them. In identity, Being and the modalities of Being belong together. This metaphysical principle is one of the most general and encompassing determinations on which all modalities of Being depend. Precisely, it indicates that Being functions as the foundation on which we can grasp the nature of the relationship between unity and multiplicity. It shows that unity and multiplicity are two different aspects of the same reality. Unity

contains multiplicity and vice versa. But taking Being as a unified ground of grounded multiplicity resembles to a great extent Aristotle's understanding of Being in the *Metaphysics*. For Aristotle, general ontology must study unity and its varieties. He insists that there is a unity beneath the diversity of phenomenal objects and that unity is Being *qua* being. There is also a single science known as 'general ontology', which investigates Being as well as its varieties. But the difference between Aristotle and Mulla Sadra arises with the doctrine of the categories and the rationalistic apprehension of this unified ground or Being *qua* being. Aristotle listed ten categories, of which the most fundamental was substance. The other categories, such as quality, quantity, relation, place, time, posture, state, action and passion, are dependent on substance to exist and cannot be by themselves. Meanwhile, these categories are classes or genera and their applications render our knowledge of the phenomenal world possible.¹⁶ In Mulla Sadra's ontology, Being, as the principle of the unity beneath the multiplicity of the phenomenal objects, is beyond the domain of the applicability of these categories. Hence Being remains indefinable. It is not a genus, *differentia*, species or a common and specific accident. In this case, understanding the meaning of Being cannot be based on anything other than itself:

It [existence] cannot be described [defined], because description is due to either a definition or a [distinguishing] mark. Thus, it cannot be described by definition. Since it has neither a genus nor *differentia*, it does not have a definition. Nor can it [be described] by a distinguishing mark, since its understanding cannot be supplied by anything more manifest and prevalent than it. It is a mistake to attempt to describe existence, for it would need to be described by something more hidden than the [entity] itself – unless the aim were to [approach it by] either an indication or a notification, or some description; the latter is merely a syntactical [lit. linguistic] inquiry.¹⁷

Being is then not conditioned by any sort of determination and limitation. If it is defined it is limited and conditioned by its determinations, for every affirmation is a negation. Kant, in the second and third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, draws a similar conclusion. He limits the application of the categories to the multiple forms of the phenomenal world, and the 'thing-in-itself' or *noumenon* is kept beyond the applicability of the categories of human understanding and hence remains unknowable. These two conclusions look similar as each recommends the employment of the categories for revealing beings rather than their inner reality; but Mulla Sadra and Heidegger disagree with Kant on the unknowability of reality. For them, the shortcoming in the application of the categories to the realm of Being does not hinder an investigation into the meaning of Being. The unknowability and indefinability of Being, as indicated here, refer to the inherent shortcoming of Aristotle's logic and rationalistic apprehension, which becomes an explicit

problem in the epistemological inquiry of Kant. Nevertheless, this shortcoming does not negate the task of ontological inquiry. Mulla Sadra and Heidegger searched for a new epistemological tool and methodology that was different from the Aristotelian form of cognition. Mulla Sadra, in particular, relied on intuitive knowledge or knowledge by presence for investigating the meaning of Being. It is a cognitive tool associated with the mystic way of apprehending the reality:

As it has been stated, the reality of existence is neither genus, nor species, nor accident, since it is not a natural universal. Instead, its inclusion happens in another mode of inclusion, and no one has gnosis of it except the mystics; i.e. those who are firmly grounded in mystical knowledge. Sometimes it is interpreted as the spiritual soul [i.e., Holy Spirit], other times as the grace 'which extendeth to all things'. Sometimes [it is interpreted as the] 'Reality from which beings have been created', according to the mystics. [Also, it is] the expansion of the light of existence to the structures [lit. figures] of contingent beings, and the essences which are receptive to it; finally, [they speak of] its descent towards the abodes of inner-natures.¹⁸

For Heidegger, the universality of Being is also not a natural universal like the universality of 'whiteness'. Its universality 'transcends' any universality of genus. Those who follow Aristotle's rule for definition arrive at a negative conclusion in defining Being, simply because Being is not a genus and has no *differentia*. But does this mean that no further attempt should be made to understand the meaning of this indefinable reality? Indeed, if the horizon of thinking is limited by Aristotle's doctrine of the task and application of the categories, the answer to this question is in the affirmative. Mulla Sadra and Heidegger, although inspired by Aristotle's ontology, denounced his logic and his rationalistic apprehension of Being. An inquiry into the meaning of Being is not in the scope of rational epistemology or regional ontology, because Being is distinct from beings. Similar to Aristotle's First Principle, it is a prior condition not only for beings but also for all scientific inquiries, yet it cannot be studied scientifically. 'Fundamental ontology', which takes Being into account, is substantially distinctive and its subject matter is neither this nor that kind of being but Being *per se*: 'Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its own most aim, if it has not adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.'¹⁹ Mulla Sadra also believes that the question of the meaning of Being becomes a prior condition and the foundation of all kinds of scientific discourse and knowledge:

The question of existence is the foundation of the principles of wisdom, the basis of philosophical theology, and the nexus of [concern] of those in the circle [lit. the millstone; i.e., the centre] of the sciences of unity, the resurrection of souls and

bodies, and of much else that only we have developed and articulated. It gives them a synthesis [lit. a unity] through its explication. Anyone who is ignorant of the gnosis of existence is also ignorant of the major subjects and most significant quests and misses the refinements of gnosis and its subtleties, the science of the divine and the prophets, the gnosis of the soul, and its connection and return to the [primordial] source and destiny [i.e., *telos*].²⁰

As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, in *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, Suhrawardi acknowledges his debt to Plato and considers him to be one of his spiritual masters and a great Illuminationist sage and thinker. However, Mulla Sadra's attack on Suhrawardi's philosophy is a direct criticism of Platonism.²¹ In addition, while Mulla Sadra and Heidegger came from different cultural backgrounds, the similarity in their thought is within the framework of their ontology and criticism of Platonism; that is, represented by Illuminationism of Suhrawardi in Persia and the nihilism of occidental thought. These two philosophical traditions, one Eastern and one Western, belong to Platonism, which has led to the 'abandonment of Being'. They stand in opposition to the type of metaphysics founded and advocated by Mulla Sadra and Heidegger.

The new ontological enterprise of Mulla Sadra is explained in the first journey of *al-Asfar* and is continued in *al-Masha'ir* and *al-Shawahid al-Rububiyyah*. Mulla Sadra was convinced that Being is self-evident; in *al-Masha'ir*, in the Third Prehension, under the title 'An Analysis of the [Extra-Mental] Existence Having a Determinate [Concrete, Fully Determined] Status', he tried to prove the principality of Being in eight ways or by eight arguments that he called evidences.

The First Evidence

'The reality of anything is its existence, which ranks with its effects and implications. Existence, therefore, must be the most real of all things for it is the possessor of reality, because whatever possesses reality possesses reality only due to it.'²² Being in this evidence becomes an *a priori* ontological condition for the existence of all things. Everything finds its way into the light of being or the objective reality only through Being and by relying on Being rather than its essence.

The Second Evidence

In this evidence, Mulla Sadra states that when the principality or the reality of essence is affirmed there will be no distinction between external and mental realities, but that 'this however is absurd'. He also states that if something exists in the external world or intellectually, it does not signify that these two

domains (external and intellectual) stand for that thing as containers in which the existence of that thing is established. It simply means that it has an existence from which some effects and consequences are derived.²³

The Third Evidence

If the reality of things is in their essences, then it is impossible to predicate essences of one another. Predication is the union of two concepts. This implies that when one thing is predicated of another, the two will be united in existence but be different from one another in their essences:

If things exist by their essences and not by the [mediation] of something else, it would not be possible to predicate them on each other, such as 'Zaid is an animal' or 'Man walks'. It is so, because the use and the truth of predication is a union between different concepts in existence. Thus the judgment made of something predicated on something else is an expression of their unity in existence, though they be diverse as concepts and in terms of their essences.²⁴

If the reality of a thing is its essence, then there will be no distinction between a subject and its predicate on the bases of unity and diversity.

The Fourth Evidence

Here Mulla Sadra supposes that if Being is non-existent then nothing has existed. Since the non-existence of things is false, the non-existence of existence is necessarily false. Also, if we think of essence as not in a union with existence, then it is non-existent in any mode. If there is no existence, then the predication of an essence is impossible, as affirming a predicate presupposes the existence of the subject. The adjunction of a non-existent thing to another non-existing thing has no validity.²⁵

The Fifth Evidence

This evidence is another version of the previous evidence. Before, Mulla Sadra states that without Being nothing can exist; here he holds the view that if Being has no concrete form or external actualization, then no species will have particulars or individuals: 'If existence is not realized in the individuals of a species, no one of the [individuals of the species] is realized in the external realm.'²⁶ For the actualization of an individual a species is required, which also relies on existence to be, and nothing (for example, another universal concept) other than existence can qualify as a necessary condition for this purpose.

The Sixth Evidence

Again, in proving the principality of Being, Mulla Sadra argues that there are two kinds of accidents: accidents of existence such as ‘whiteness’ for a body, and accidents of essence such as *differentia* for a genus. Some thinkers believe that the qualification of essences by existence, and the presentation of existence to the essences, is not a case of an external type of qualification or an occurrence of an accident to its subject, because this implies that the object of qualification enjoys a certain degree of reality. The occurrence of accidents of essences (*differentia* to genus) does not contradict their unity in the real world. This can be held true for the relationship between existence and essence. Existence as an accident of essence must be united with it, and this implies that existence as an objective reality should be realized: ‘Existence, therefore, must be something by the mediation of which an essence exists and with which it is united in [the externally determined realm of] existence.’²⁷

The Seventh Evidence

In this evidence, the reality of existence is explained through the relationship of an accident with its subject. It is believed that the existence of an accident is nothing in itself but is something for its subject; that is, the existence of an accident is ‘identical with its incarnation [i.e., instantiation] in its subject’.²⁸ This incarnation of an accident in its subject takes place in the real world. It is also clear that the subject of an accident is not included in its essence or its definition but in its existence. The category of accident depends on something other than itself, namely a subject, to be manifest. Keeping this in mind, we can conclude that if existence (the subject) is not real, then the accident is a mental concept. The existence of blackness, for example, would be a concept rather than an incarnation in a body, which is an actual base for the meaning of blackness. This also leads to the denial of the separation of existence from essence in the realm of accident, whereas the reality of this separation has already been agreed upon.²⁹

The Eighth Evidence

Again, if existence is a mental concept and not real, as stated by Suhrawardi and other *ishraqi* thinkers, then ‘an infinite number of species could be realized between any two limits’. There would be no specific number of specific essences, and no specific number of species would be realized between any two limits of intensity, which is necessarily false. According to Mulla Sadra, the doctrine of the primacy of Being offers a solution to this

problem, because it advocates the idea that the structure of all essences stands on the foundation of a single unity (i.e., Being) and one incessant form. In this incessant form, the unity of being is actual and its multiplicities will be in the potential mode without opposing or negating one another.³⁰

It is worth mentioning that these evidences do not explain the meaning of Being but only its principality. Being, which reflects the reality of all things, cannot be known rationally or conceptually. It can only be experienced intuitively. Mulla Hadi Sabzawari also restated these evidences of Mulla Sadra for the primacy of Being, but reduced them to six. According to Dinani, there is a slight difference between Sabzawari and Mulla Sadra in the evidences. In reality, the material used by the former is same as that developed by the latter.³¹ Sabzawari also presented six arguments to prove the validity of Mulla Sadra's doctrine of the primacy of Being; some of them are not significantly different from those of Mulla Sadra's evidences. In the first argument, Sabzawari insists that the self-evidence of Being becomes the fountainhead of all values in human life because values are not attributed to concepts, which are mentally posited. The second argument is the realization of the distinction between external and internal (mental) modifications of Being: 'So if existence is not realized, and if what were realized were quiddity – and quiddity is kept in both modes of being without any difference – there would be no distinction between the external and the mental. But since this consequence is absurd, the antecedent must also be the same.'³² The third argument deals with the priority of cause to its effect in relation to the reality of Being. The cause, as we know, necessarily precedes the effect logically as well as in time. If we suppose that Being, as stated by the *ishraqi* thinkers, is not real but is mentally posited, then a specific quiddity of fire as a cause would be prior to the specific quiddity of fire as the effect, which becomes posterior. In this manner the generic quiddity of a substance as a cause would be prior to a posterior substance, which is caused by the former. This will necessitate a priority–posteriority relationship in the quiddities. In the doctrine of the primacy of Being, Being is considered to be real, and things, which are prior or posterior, are quiddities; yet only Being can confirm their priority or posteriority.

Arguments four and six of Sabzawari are similar. Each deals with the reality of Being as a unity beneath the scattered quiddities and multiplicities of beings. In the fourth argument, the primacy of Being is established on the gradual increase in the evolutionary movement of the world. This movement, in which various species with quiddities are posited, is both continuous and infinite. If the philosophical position of Illuminationism is true and Being is mental, then the species will be bound by the beginning and the end, because Being is one and many in accordance with the things from which the concept of being is abstracted. In this case, Being will not be present as a single reality and unity and the quiddities will be dispersed without a connection among

them.³³ The sixth argument takes Being as uniting the multiplicity in the phenomenal world of beings. It argues that Being should be fundamentally real in order to be a unitary ground for all beings.³⁴ In the fifth argument, Sabzwari says that if Being is a mental reality, then ‘what could have made the quiddities leave the state of equality, and by what have they come to deserve the predicate “existence”?’³⁵

Being is the primordial reality on which everything stands; but the reality of all things cannot be described in common language as something that exists, because it is not an ontic existent but the Being of beings or ontological reality. It is simply existence *par excellence*.³⁶ What is real in everything is its being rather than its essence. In this sense, Being is equivocal, not univocal. It is a common characteristic of all things or the Being of them but with different intensity and weakness. The Being of beings and beings are not two different realities, but one and the same. The reality of Being is, therefore, objective or an ontological reality of all beings. It is what constitutes the very Being of everything. For Mulla Sadra, Being, unlike beings, and unlike the view of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, is not something accidental occurring to its essence. Accidents are caused but Being is uncaused and nothing is prior to it. If we think of Being as something accidental, then it should have a cause. The cause must also be prior to it. If a being that is caused by another being is unified with it, the being that is caused is prior to itself as a cause, or is *causa sui*, which will lead to an infinite regress.³⁷

Since Being is not this or that ontic being, it has no describable property. Its abode is not the mind but outside the human mind; it has a dynamic character that creates all modalities of ontic beings, which results in the rise of essences in thinking. Essence, by contrast, is a mental factor and exists for the mind when beings are comprehended.³⁸ Although Being is that reality without which nothing is possible, its meaning is still obscure. It requires further investigation for Mulla Sadra as well as Heidegger. But in my opinion, Heidegger’s understanding of the meaning of Being is beset with ambiguity. It is for this reason that Heidegger’s commentators have discussed and understood the meaning of Being in different ways. Kockelmans interprets Heidegger’s Being as a process, an activity in which its self-manifestation becomes a truth:

As the clearing process which sheds light on itself and on beings by the very fact that it illuminates everything, Being may thus be correctly called truth. Yet the term truth here obviously does not mean “agreement”; rather, it means clearing, illumination, original self-manifestation, the emergence of Being and of all beings.³⁹

Kockelmans is convinced that Being, like the *Geist* in Hegel’s philosophy, is a dynamic ontological reality, which has the character of a happening that comes to manifest itself as a truth.

This interpretation can be supported by Heidegger's own understanding of the meaning of Being in *On the Essence of Truth* (1930), in which he states: 'The primordial disclosure of being as a whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a "time" which, itself immeasurable, first opens up the open region for every measure.'⁴⁰ The interpretation by Kockelmans becomes adequate and reasonable when Heidegger's understanding of 'Time' and 'Temporality' is taken into account: 'In contrast to all this, our treatment of the question of meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenology of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case.'⁴¹ If Being is conceived in terms of time, then it should be dynamic and eventful; it only becomes concealed in this temporal character and its concealment is an active process through the ecstatic projection of *Dasein*. Dreyfus rejects Kockelmans's interpretation. He does not believe that Heidegger regards Being as a process or a happening: 'Heidegger must have been aware of this danger, since at the point where he says being is not an entity, he writes in the margin of his copy of *Being and Time*, "No! One cannot make sense of being with the help of these sorts of concepts". To think of being in terms of concepts like entity, or process, or event is equally misleading.'⁴² Richardson takes the view that in the early works of Heidegger, 'Being' and the world were considered to be equivalent.⁴³ At the same time he suggests that, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Being is understood as the pure horizon of meaning, within which the process of the clearing described by Kockelmans takes place.⁴⁴ The notion of 'Pure', which is mentioned here and is used again by Heidegger in 'Letter on Humanism', can be understood in the Kantian sense. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant presents a list of pure categories of understanding within which all material collected by sensibility (*Anschauung*) becomes thought and acquires meaning.⁴⁵ For example, the sensuous notions of colour, taste and odour can be kept in the pure category of 'Quality'. Quality is called pure because it is independent of all empirical experiences. It is neither redness nor sweetness, but a category transcending all empirical notions.

When we say that Being is pure, we simply mean that Being transcends all empirical beings, and that the possibility of understanding the meaning of an empirical entity is conditioned by understanding the meaning of Being. Zimmerman has another interpretation: Being for Heidegger is history shaping ways in which beings can reveal themselves and become real.⁴⁶ Okrent tried to connect this 'shaping ways of Being in history' with the pragmatic signification of each kind of being that shows itself to us.⁴⁷ On the question of Being (*Seinfrage*), Heidegger claims that the question of the meaning of Being constitutes a philosophical inquiry about the meaning of what is asked about. It presupposes guidelines or knowledge, which are

already available to us in some way or another. But raising this question is an indication of our intellectual dissatisfaction with available guidelines, and available knowledge. Being, at this stage, is known and yet not known, or it is obscure and concealed.

Heidegger explicitly states that the subject matter of this inquiry is the Being of beings, which is not an entity.⁴⁸ One cannot think of Being as an entity like a tree, a table, a horse or a mountain, and hence it cannot be grasped in terms of empirical concepts; meanwhile, it is also not the *summum genus* of Aristotle's First Philosophy. For this reason, Being is transcendent and a presupposition, for nothing can be presented to us without having been articulated in its Being.⁴⁹ As a consequence of this, in order to understand an entity, we need to look into its Being. Our philosophical knowledge is incomplete without apprehending the meaning of its Being. By saying that Being is not an entity, we draw an ontological distinction between Being and beings, but at the same time Being cannot be distinct because no entity can exist without it. In 'Letter on Humanism', Heidegger raises another meaning of Being, defining it as power: 'As the element, Being is the "quiet power" of favouring-enabling, that is, of the possible'.⁵⁰ He also tries to use Hölderlin's elegy "Homecoming" to interpret the meaning of Being. Finally, in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger states,

All things we have named are, and yet, when we wish to apprehend beings, it is always as though we were reaching into the void. The being after which we inquire is almost like nothing, and yet we have always rejected the contention that the *essent* in its entirety is not. But Being remains indefinable, almost like nothing or ultimately quite so.⁵¹

Elsewhere, Heidegger takes the view that our attempts to understand the meaning of Being are futile because Being is inaccessible and its meaning cannot be apprehended completely. The reason for this lies in the way Being reveals itself to *Dasein*:

Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as it constitutes its meaning and its ground.⁵²

In this paragraph, Heidegger clearly states that the meaning of Being is completely inaccessible, because it 'for the most part does not show itself at all'. This hiddenness of Being is not something insignificant or temporary that will not influence our philosophical understanding of reality; rather, it is essential and constitutes its meaning. The hiddenness of Being cannot be neglected, but at the same time we find ourselves helpless in our search for its

meaning as the greatest part of it 'does not show itself at all'. In addition to this hiddenness, Being can be obscured. Further, a phenomenon that is uncovered at some point can deteriorate to the point of being obscured again. This deterioration or recovering of Being leads to disguise: 'and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn'.⁵³ Despite the perplexity of this issue, Heidegger suggests that the meaning of Being can be revealed in an existential analysis of an entity that has an ontic–ontological significance. That entity is the being of *Dasein* and has the power to question the meaning of its own being and Being as such. This inquiry into the meaning of Being, unlike Mulla Sadra's ontological inquiry, begins with a particular type of being. The hermeneutic circle of this inquiry moves from a part to the whole, or, more specifically, from the being of a particular entity, namely *Dasein*, to Being in general. This can be seen as the line of demarcation between the ontological inquiries of Mulla Sadra and Heidegger. No matter how similar the two inquiries are, they still differ in methodology and metaphysical conclusions. For Heidegger, the existential analysis of the being of *Dasein* reveals the structure of fundamental ontology. An investigation into the meaning of Being thus explains the existence of *Dasein*. The hermeneutic circle then moves from *Dasein* to Being and from Being to *Dasein*.

In rejecting the Cartesian analysis of human existence as a thinking substance, Heidegger describes human being as '*Dasein*' (being-there), because *res cogitans* presupposes its own ontological ground and there can be no thinking without being. *Dasein* is an entity that intends itself and understands its own being. This attitude of *Dasein* is at the same time the realization of its own possibilities, and its existence is always towards these possibilities. For that reason, and in order to make a clear distinction between *Dasein* and other beings, Heidegger ascribes 'existence' (*Existenz*) to *Dasein* rather than '*Existentia*', which describes the being of other beings. *Existenz*, not *existential*, captures the unique meaning of human existence because it is incomplete and dynamic and is a being towards possibilities. On the contrary, *Existentia* signifies the being of a static existence, a term used by medieval metaphysicians to describe something actual. With *Dasein*, its being is at issue; it has to decide about its own being and then comports itself towards that. In opposition to *res cogitans*, *Dasein*'s authentic existence is possibility, not actuality. This terminology and subdivision of Being into *Existenz* and *Existentia* is not found at the beginning of Mulla Sadra's ontological inquiry. Instead he uses common philosophical terminology such as Necessary Being, contingent being, existence, essence, substance, cause, effect and accident. Unlike Heidegger, he did not try to invent a new philosophical language for establishing his new philosophical system and accomplishing his break away from the philosophical tradition of his time.

Mulla Sadra rejects the idea that Being is an entity; the being of an entity is not different from the entity itself. He is also against the description of

‘Being’ as a universal concept, because a universal concept cannot be used to represent the being of particular beings. This would be equal to saying that ‘whiteness’ is a white entity.⁵⁴ The reality of the relationship between Being and beings is not like that between universals and particulars. The reason for this, as explained earlier, is that Being does not stand as a genus or species for ontic beings. If Being is a genus, it will become an abstract universal concept which can then be apprehended rationally. Mulla Sadra argues from the very beginning of his ontology that Being is neither a concept (such as genus, species, *differentia* or accident) nor conceived rationally: ‘and no one has gnosis of it except the mystics, that is, “those who are grounded in mystical knowledge”’.⁵⁵ The reality of every ontic entity is in its being. Being is therefore the real ground of everything, including essences. Essences are determined not by their own inner structure but by Being.⁵⁶ This, at the same time, claims identity between Being and beings or between beings and their Being. The dynamic movement of Being in modifying itself and manifesting all ontic beings with their essences also determines its completion. The more we move towards Being, the less of essence is exhibited. Essence is then the negation of Being.⁵⁷ In my opinion, Mulla Sadra borrowed this idea from Ibn Sina, who described God (the Necessary Being) as an existence without essence. More specifically, we can say that God’s essence is inseparable from His existence. Only in case of contingent beings can essences be distinguished from their existences. Existence is positive and real while essence is negative and unreal. For this reason it is more correct to say ‘This is a tree’ than ‘Tree exists’, because essence does not exist by itself. It should be attached to existence.⁵⁸ However, this interpretation of the relationship between existence and essence should not be understood in terms of metaphysical dualism. For Mulla Sadra, essences are not real beings. They come into existence when Being creates its own modalities or ontic beings, and then essences arise as the result and are joined to them. In the downward movement of Being, when the multiplicity of ontic beings emerges, these beings exhibit diverse essences. With the upward evolutionary movement, this duality gradually disappears until, at the end, being can be grasped in its absolute positivity without essence. According to Fazlur Rahman, this view marks a distinction between Mulla Sadra’s ontology and that of the Aristotelian–Neoplatonic Muslim thinkers. The latter believed that a concrete being is the combination of existence and essence. Each of these two aspects of a concrete being is real and could exist by itself.⁵⁹ Mulla Sadra advocates ontological monism. For him, there are not two realities such as existence and essence, but only existence. It is worth mentioning that Suhrawardi is also a monist thinker, but for him the single reality is essence rather than Being.

Having established the principality and reality of Being, Mulla Sadra deals with the modality or individuation of Being in his philosophical system. This, in my opinion, should be seen as similar to Heidegger’s attempt to divide

Being into various ontological regions because every system of ontology requires this division. Generally speaking, in the ontological division of Mulla Sadra there are three modalities of Being: the realm of unity and simplicity includes the Necessary Being, heavenly spheres and the intellect in human existence; the modalities in the realm of diversity and multiplicity consist of the ontic beings and the perceptive soul in human existence; finally, at the lowest level of ontological division, there is the realm of matter with pure potentiality to receive forms. This realm also includes the human body. Human existence is shared by all three modalities. The human intellect is in the first realm, the perceptive faculty belongs to the second, and the body to the third.

The modality of unity and simplicity is the realm of Being, which is identified with God. Being, for both Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina, is Pure Being because it is without essence and at the same time it is the Being of all beings in the two lower realms of existence. At the rank of Pure Being multiplicity is dissolved, and everything merges into a unity or into a 'simple' and 'One' mode of Being.⁶⁰ It is also important to mention that for Mulla Sadra ontology is not separate from theology because he thinks of Being as the highest ground above all beings, as the grounding ground and cause of all being without having a cause or a ground for itself. This grounding ground of all beings is also at the same time conscious of both itself and beings and determines their destination. This can be seen as the distinction between Mulla Sadra's ontology and that of Heidegger. Here, Mulla Sadra's ontology could be described as onto-theology, a Heideggerian term used to define this type of metaphysics.⁶¹ In Heidegger's ontology, Being is neither transcendent in this sense nor a rational cause for all beings. It is the Being of beings and their inner reality. God does not enter into Heidegger's metaphysics; his metaphysics remains as ontology.

In the second division, or the modality of diversity and multiplicity, there are ontic beings such as heavenly bodies, souls, animals and inanimate beings. This is the realm of individual beings.⁶² Every ontic being in this realm is in constant flux and evolutionary change towards a higher realm to achieve perfection. These beings reach perfection in human existence, as human beings are more intelligent than animals. Some human beings reach a higher rank of existence and become more perfect in their intelligence than others; this is the highest form of Being in the realm of multiplicity beneath the realm of unity.⁶³

The lowest degree of modality of Being is the realm of prime matter, which is nothing more than the potentiality to receive forms.⁶⁴ Following the doctrine of emanation introduced earlier by some Muslim thinkers such as the members of Ikhwan al-Safa (The Brethren of Purity), al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra believes that prime matter is emanated from Being eternally because Being is not in time. Prime matter represents the lowest level of existence and

becomes existent through receiving specific forms in the evolutionary process from potentiality to actuality. It is also the beginning of the movement towards perfection in the universe, which will be explained in Chapter Five in the discussion on trans-substantial change (*al-haraka al-jawhariyyah*). The two lower realms, namely the realms of potentiality and diversity, originated from the realm of unity and are dependent on that realm ontologically:

All contingent beings, whatever their distinctions and their ranks of [relative] deficiency and perfection, are existentially dependent, being indigent in their inner-realities towards It, and enriched by It. Thus, these contingent beings are contingent by virtue of their own inner-realities. Due to the First Necessity, The Exalted, however, they are [conditionally] necessary. They are inoperative and perishable only from the perspective of their own inner-reality [and thus are not categorically necessities]. They become a reality due to the Absolute Reality [*aletheia*], [being] the One and the Only: 'Everything that exists will perish except His own face'. His relation to other beings is like sunlight, such that [in itself] it depends on its own inner reality, [while other] bodies are enlightened by it; [they, however] are dark from [the perspective of] their own inner-reality.⁶⁵

Mulla Sadra's division of the ontological realms attributes principality and priority to the realm of unity. To clarify the principality of this realm, he explains three ontological positions, in each of which the nature of this principality is vindicated. He argues that the relationship between being and essence should be understood in three different ways: we think of Being as prior to essence or posterior to it or we state that both of them co-exist simultaneously. When Being is thought of as prior to essence, it simply signifies that Being is independent and can stand by itself without relying on essence. If the primacy of essence is accepted, as stated in the second case, then essence would exist independent of Being and be prior to it, but then for essence to exist it needs existence to rely on and this is a vicious regress. The third position is that essence co-exists with Being simultaneously, and not in it; therefore it relies on another existence for its existence. As a consequence of this, essence cannot be without prior existence:

If being exists [lit. if the being of existence were an existent], then either it is prior to the essence or posterior to it, or they are simultaneous. If the first is the case, its realization necessarily follows independently without the essence. This implies that priority of the attribute is prior to the subject of its attribution as well as its realization without it. If the second is the case, it necessarily follows that essence exists prior to it [existence] before being, which implies a vicious regress. If the third is the case, it necessarily follows that essence exists with it [i.e., existence] and not in it. Therefore, there would be another existence for it [i.e., for essence]; this [state] implies what has been mentioned. The falsity of the consequences always implies the falsity of the antecedents.⁶⁶

After arguing for the primacy of Being, Mulla Sadra stresses the view that essences belong to the realms of potentiality and multiplicity and are insepa-

rable from beings ontologically. Their separation is only an intellectual fact, which occurs in the realm of thinking. Beings and essences are united in the world but separated in thinking:

What has been said earlier is sufficient to refute this claim, for, existence is identical with essence in the external [realm] but different from it mentally. Therefore, there is no relation between them except in intellectual consideration. In [such an intelligible] consideration, the relation will have existence which is in its inner-reality is identical with it, but is different from it in the realm external [to the mind]. This kind of *ad infinitum* is stopped when the intelligible consideration is ceased.⁶⁷

However, it is clear that the only ontological position accepted by Mulla Sadra is the affirmation of the primacy of Being and the intellectually posited status of essence. What he has argued here, then, or has tried to prove, is that Being, not essences, is the sole reality. Essences exist in the mind or only in thinking, not in the external world. The dualism of existence and essence arises only when we think to define a being or understand its nature. More precisely, essences emerge when Being modifies itself in the downward process of further diversified ontic beings. We can talk about essences when these ontic modes of Being are perceived or thought about. But gradually essences disappear when we move upwards to apprehend Being in its pure absoluteness. According to Fazlur Rahman, this view draws a line of demarcation between Mulla Sadra's ontology and that of the Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers.⁶⁸ The latter accepted the reality of existence and essence outside the domain of thinking and did not insist on the subjectivity of the latter.⁶⁹ In contrast, essence here is considered a mode of Being that exists only in thinking; that is, it has mental reality. It is the intellect that conceives essence and separates it from existence; otherwise, there is only existence and nothing else as an ontological reality and the foundation of all ontic modes. It may be possible to find a resemblance between this view of the ontological status of essence and the subjective categories in Kant's philosophy. Our knowledge of the phenomenal world, as described by Kant, is produced through the application of these subjective categories that define the essence of every phenomenon with the assistance of sensibility. This claim is an obvious contradiction with Suhrawardi's metaphysical conviction, in which essence has become real and Being a mere mental concept having no ontological reality of its own. Mulla Sadra, again in his arguments against the doctrine of the primacy of essence, insists that Suhrawardi's conviction can be taken into account when the dual reality of essence and existence is accepted.⁷⁰ For Mulla Sadra, Being is real and essence unreal; Being is positive, light, and makes all essences exist, whereas essence is negative, darkness, and imposes limitation on beings. The essence of each Being, which is other than Being, does not exist by itself. It exists by virtue of Being.

Being is, then, an ontological reality while essence lacks that reality and this rank of existence.⁷¹ The problem that arises in describing essence as subjective is with the possibility of understanding essence as something illusory. What does Mulla Sadra mean by insisting on the principality and reality of being? Is there a unity of being and essence in reality? Does that unity make them one real thing? Does that unity presuppose their previous ontological distinction? In answering these questions the ontological status of essences and their relationship to Being can be seen from two perspectives: first, the essences are illusory or images in the mind and have a mental existence like the subjective categories of the faculty of understanding in Kant's epistemology; second, the essences are real and their reality is of the second degree and is not equal with the reality of Being.

The first perspective is also found as a mystic point of view and analogous to the metaphysical position of some Indian thinkers who consider the world to be *maya* or unreal. Based on this type of metaphysical belief the essence of an entity or its being in the sensible world is seen as an illusion. But is this Mulla Sadra's position? Does this Muslim thinker say that the essence of the table I am now using for writing is only mental and has no reality outside my mind? In my opinion, Mulla Sadra's understanding of this problem belongs to the second perspective, which is similar to the view of Ibn Sina and to Hegel's interpretation of unity and diversity. Indeed, even explaining some similarities between Mulla Sadra's interpretation of the meaning of Being and its relationship with essence with that of Kantian metaphysical dualism will not be of great help here. The best way to approach this problem is through Hegel's analysis of the external reality and his interpretation of the world as the self-manifestation of *Geist*. In other words, we need to understand Being as an objective reality that exhibits itself in various forms and gives rise to the multiple beings and their essences. Being in this sense is a dynamic fountainhead of all things as well as their essences. This view is also shared by Heidegger, with the exception that Heidegger's ontology leaves no room for a rational teleology. Also, Hegel's concept of essence should not be taken for the Platonic Forms or the Kantian *noumena*. It is the negation of Being and is derived from the last category in the sphere of Being in dialectical logic. Essence, therefore, cannot exist by itself without relying on Being, but unlike Being, which is immediacy, essence is mediated and known through reflection or understanding.⁷² This discussion, in some ways, brings us closer to Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the unity of being. Mulla Sadra also wrote on the graded unity of being in order to justify his doctrine of the ambiguity of Being (*tashkik al-wujud*). In his discussion on the relationship between cause and effect he draws a conclusion on the personal unity of being in line with Ibn 'Arabi.⁷³ This discussion on the causal relationship also leads to the ontological division of Being stated by Ibn Sina, because Being that is a cause for its own multiple modality or the emergence of the effects becomes a

Necessary Being as in Ibn Sina's ontology and the effects of possible beings. The existence of a cause does not rely on its effects, because it is independent and self-subsistent. Dependence and reliance on something other than itself is the character of the effects. The effects become both necessary when they are accompanied by their perfect cause and impossible in the absence of this perfect cause. When a cause produces an effect, that effect gives rise to its own essence in the mind, and in this way essence is derived from the existence of the effect. An effect, for example the world, is real when it is seen only in its relationship to its cause. This relationship is described as that of a speech to the speaker. The moment the speaker halts speaking, speech becomes impossibility.⁷⁴ The necessary relationship between a cause and its effect determines the existence of the effect but the cause (Being) remains without relying on anything for its existence. Can we say that Being causes essences? What is important to remember here is that essences have no reality for Mulla Sadra. They exist in the mind or intellectually. Being as a perfect cause gives rise to its effects or possible beings, and essences affect the possible beings and emerge only in the mind when the possible beings are thought about or conceived. Essences have no existence at all, either primary or attributive.

Essences belong to contingent beings in the realm of diversity and multiplicity. These contingent beings emanate from Being and give rise to essence in the mind.⁷⁵ Existence and essence, as mentioned in *al-Masha'ir*, are not separate in the external world; their separation is merely mental. This, however, does not mean that existence and essence are two different realities having a unity. Mulla Sadra plainly rejects the external reality of essences. For him, essences belong to contingent beings; if these beings have more essences they possess less being. Yet their being will never vanish, as nothing can exist as pure essence. The essences become 'concepts' through which we come to know about contingent beings. It is worth mentioning here that Suhrawardi is right in stating that what is known is essence not existence. But in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, knowledge is preconditioned by Being, or epistemology by ontology. Essences, as internal realities, are dependent on the external reality of Being. Although at the highest level of the hierarchy of Being there is pure Being, a kind of existence without essence, we cannot state that at the lowest level there is pure essence or essence without existence. Essences are always with ontic beings and do not exist in themselves. Their relationship as universal concepts to ontic beings (phenomena) remains; as long as one particular or ontic being exists, the essence will also exist. This can be seen as a one-to-one relationship.⁷⁶

The ontological division of Being in Mulla Sadra's philosophy does not depict the world as an aggregate of ontic beings or a container of them. Mulla Sadra sees the world as an organic body in which the evolutionary process of trans-substantial change takes place towards perfection. When an ontic being is described as something 'in' the world, this spatial relationship is not

external like the case of a table in the room. The existence of the table is not dependent on the room, while its existence as an ontic being is unthinkable without its being in the world. Mulla Sadra's understanding of the relationship between Being and beings has similarity with Heidegger's existential analysis of *in-der-Welt-sein*, where being-in-the-world becomes an ontological condition for the existence of *Dasein*.⁷⁷ Yet this condition does not constitute the essence of this entity. This relationship between Being and beings is often elucidated metaphorically. As stated by John Quinn, for example, it is like the relationship of ink to written words.⁷⁸ One is usually not aware of the ink while reading the words. But in reality it is the ink that is seen and the words do not exist without it. Beings are similarly dual in nature. They have the character of identity as, like the words, they share the ink, but at the same time they represent multiplicity as the words are different from one another in form and meaning. Every being is then identical and different, eternal and temporal, divine and profane, because they are the intensive modifications of Being. By reflecting on this distinction and the ontological difference between the realms of Being we find a way to Being. This is Mulla Sadra's objective in *al-Asfar*. His aim is to move away from the 'darkness of illusion' to the daylight of the truth of existence.

The Systematic Ambiguity of Being and the Trans-Substantial Change in the World Order

All beings in the sensible world are actual in some ways or potential in others. In the former, they have been changed from potential to actual but do not possess perfection completely. Their state of actuality is not yet pure and final. It is merely a new state of potentiality for another actuality, without which they will remain immutable without transition from one rank of being to another. The change from potential to actual will be in a state of constant flux, with beings undergoing sudden or gradual change. The state of potentiality, which is prior to the state of actuality, is weak and imperfect. But in order to become more perfect and reach a higher rank, beings need to become actual again. To achieve this, they must be elevated to a higher mode of being where perfection is articulated or actualized.

In this discussion about change we encounter one of the most important philosophical issues in Mulla Sadra's ontology: trans-substantial change (*al-haraka al-jawhariyyah*). This is, in my opinion, the lynchpin of his cosmology and the key concept for understanding the world order. Mulla Sadra's interpretation of the meaning of the world is also based on understanding of trans-substantial change; hence his interpretation of the world is deeply rooted in his metaphysical system. In Mulla Sadra's philosophy, the world is not a mere material realm like that of Aristotle in which beings are causally and mechanically connected, but a world with integrated parts of a single system with a pre-given purpose. The world is not built on blind and aimless regulation and mechanical self-repetition. It is created by a perfect cause that has determined its meaning and destination.

In advocating this teleological metaphysics for understanding the world Mulla Sadra draws closer to Hegel rather than to Heidegger, and moves away from Aristotle. For Hegel, the world is the self-objectification of the *Geist*; it moves dialectically onward to accomplish perfection and overcome its alienation from *Geist*. The world is seen as an organic whole that changes itself for a purpose predetermined by *Geist*.¹ *Geist* is in a process of transformation in history through contradictions that determine the development of the world. Hegel elaborated this process in the *Phenomenology of Mind* as a temporal structure, which moves from idea to nature and then back to the idea in a better form and with richer content. This dialectical movement is carried

forward by the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Synthesis, which is the union of thesis and antithesis, is richer than the previous movements in content because it supersedes both and becomes a new thesis for another antithesis, which unites to produce a new synthesis, which in turn becomes a new thesis in a new triad. This dialectic movement from thesis to antithesis and then to unity in synthesis is an irreversible process that continues until *Geist*, as the only sovereignty of the world, achieves self-completion at the final stage of historical development when the estranged world is appropriated by consciousness and transformed.

What Mulla Sadra explains in his doctrine of trans-substantial change can be separated from Hegel's description of the dialectical movement in three ways: first, Mulla Sadra does not advocate the idea of the dialectical movement of the world; second, although the emanation of the world is a temporal generation of the modalities of Being, time and change do not affect Being. Third, God is not immanent but transcendent, so Mulla Sadra's metaphysics should be understood in terms of panentheism rather than pantheism, the former being the metaphysical view that the world is part of God rather than being identical with Him. The world of multiplicity and God are in communion with each other because the former originated from the latter. But at the same time God is transcendent and separated from the world. Mulla Sadra, unlike Hegel, thinks of being in the world as temporality, but this temporality is external to the realm of Being. This is also in contradiction with Heidegger's description of Being as temporality. In Hegel's *Phenomenology*, as in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, temporality is the reality of *Geist*; for example Hegel states:

Time is just the notion definitely existent, and presented to consciousness in the form of empty intuition. Hence spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it does not grasp its pure intuition, i.e. so long as it does not annul time. Time is the pure self in external form, apprehended in intuition, and not grasped and understood by the self; it is the notion apprehended only through intuition. When this motion grasps itself, it supersedes its time character, (conceptually) comprehends intuition, and is intuition comprehended and comprehending. Time therefore appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete within itself; it is the necessity compelling spirit to enrich the share self-consciousness has in consciousness, not put into motion the immediacy of the inherent nature (which is the form in which the substance is present in consciousness); or, conversely, to realize and make manifest what is inherent, regarded as inward and immanent, to make manifest that which is at first within – i.e. to vindicate it for spirit's certainty of self.²

The world is not separated from *Geist*, which functions as an immanent cause in the dialectical process of evolution. The actualization of *Geist* happens only in time through stages of development in nature and history. Since the essence of *Geist* is self-determined, history is the realization of freedom

determined by *Geist*. It is a purposeful transition towards the absolute idea where all differences are united in absolute consciousness.

Another distinction between Mulla Sadra's ontology and that of Heidegger lies in the doctrine of emanation. Mulla Sadra, following the Neoplatonist Muslim thinkers such as Ikhwan al-Safa, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, describes the creation of the world as emanation. From the realm of unity or Pure Being emanates the realm of prime matter (potentiality) and the realm of diversity (ontic beings). Accordingly, Being remains both transcendent and the origin and grounding of all that is grounded; in other words, the inner reality of all things. The emanation begins from Pure Being and moves downwards to the lowest level, where the ontic beings, although they do not vanish as beings, are dominated by their essences. Like the dialectic movement in Hegel's logic, this descending process of emanation is from the most general and indeterminate form to the most concrete, but it loses perfection on the way. Descendence is a gradual distance from perfection. At the abyss of this descending process there are beings with more essence but less existence.

In the light of the doctrine of emanation all ontic beings are the same and share identity because they spring from a single fountainhead. In all of them, Being becomes a common character and the inner identity. We can describe all beings in the three ontological realms as things that are. Meanwhile, emanation from Being downwards explains various stages of being with different degrees of perfection. In this case, all beings are not equal or the same in sharing the reality of Being. This unequal distribution of the character of Being with different gradations of the Being of their beings is called the systematic ambiguity of Being (*tashkik al-wujud*):

The relation between generated creatures and the creator is that of deficiency to perfection, and of weakness to strength. It has been established already that what is realized in a determinate manner are real existents and not essences. Moreover, it has been established that existence is a simple reality which has neither genus, nor a persisting difference, nor species, nor dividing difference, nor individuation. Rather, its individuation is due to its simple essence and the essential distinction between its units and identity [occurs] only by means of [their] being the strongest and being the weakest; and distinction into accidents happens only in bodies. There is no doubt that the Creator in existence is The Most Perfect and in realization The Most Complete [in encounter] with the created. The created is like an emanation of its Creator. In reality [the creature] is not even an effect, except in light of its unfolding [lit. modification] by the Maker, in light of Its Unfolding and Activities.³

The systematic ambiguity of Being is another way of expressing the principle of identity in difference and is determined by the descending process of emanation from Being to the lowest ontic beings. Being, as the reality of all ranks of ontic beings, is one and identical in its relation to them, but at the same time it becomes multiplicitous and different. From the perspective of

this principle, there will be no distinction between diverse ontic beings and Being, as all of them belong together. They are only different in their perfection, deficiency, richness and indigence.⁴ It should be remembered that imperfection and deficiency infect only the realms of prime matter and diversity. These terms cannot be employed to describe the realm of Being because Being is a unity and pure and has no essence; otherwise, as Mulla Sadra states, 'It would not be the case that a Necessary Existent could exist.'⁵ Deficiency and imperfection are not the characteristics of the inner reality of Being. They are characteristics of its gradation in the rank of contingent and posterior beings. Deficiency, limitation and privation are the characteristics of beings rather than Being. They are generated during the process of emanation because 'It is necessarily the case that the created thing is not equal to the creator, nor does emanation equal the source of emanation in terms of rank of existence.'⁶ The gradation of Being is also systematic because it is purposeful, unidimensional and determined by Being. It does not leave the emanation of the ontic beings in the world to the caprice of blind chance.

The world of multiplicity and difference is a temporal occurrence and a gradation of Being, because everything emanates from Being and is grounded in it. The non-existence of a particular being precedes its existence in time, and is in the state of non-existence prior to its existence caused by Being. In this process of creation or coming into being of the non-being, an individual being requires a new identity constantly and its existence is not fixed.⁷ Mulla Sadra supports this view of the constant renewing of being in the world by quoting Qur'anic verses. He believes that the renewal of ontic beings is a necessary, autonomous or innate process, because all ontic beings are in a relation of identity to Being. Their existence is based on the reality of Being: 'The Maker, in virtue of His durability and endurance, created this creature which is self-renewal in terms of its essence and identity.'⁸

The systematic ambiguity of Being is the particularization of Being in which Being becomes manifest in its own individual modalities. It is not a process similar to the emanation of particulars from the universal Platonic Forms or to Suhrawardi's Lord of Species, simply because the Necessary Being or the source of this particularization is not a universal form but a single transcendent Being. This can be seen as a significant difference between Mulla Sadra's understanding of the Platonic Forms and Suhrawardi's. Although Plato thinks of the universal forms in the immaterial world as ideas or essences in the Suhrawardian sense, Mulla Sadra insists that they are beings rather than essences and placed at a higher rank of existence in the gradation of Being. Besides, he believes that they are not universal ideas but individual beings responsible for generating species at a lower rank of existence. Having discussed the gradation of Being briefly it is useful at this point to explain more precisely Mulla Sadra's interpretation of emanation for understanding his doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of Being. The process

of emanation begins with Pure Being and proceeds to its own particularization, which gives rise to the creation of all beings. This pure Being, as stated before, is neither genus nor species, but a mere identity and simplicity. On the ground of identity, its relationship to beings is equivocal. From this transcendent single and simple Being emanates only one being; the diversity of the ranks belongs to the lower stages of emanation and has no direct contact with the transcendent source. At this stage in understanding Mulla Sadra's ontology, we can state that there are two regions of ontology: the region of Pure Being and that of becoming. The former is characterized by unity and sameness (identity) and the latter by difference, multiplicity and change. These two regions of being are necessarily connected as the former is an ontological ground for the latter. As a consequence of this necessary relationship between ground and grounded, we can conclude that there is no multiplicity without unity. The principle of identity in difference becomes an essential characteristic of the two regions of Being and becoming. Difference becomes possible only on the ground of identity. The presence of unity in emanation is an ontological condition of the equivocal ground for the multiplicity of the grounded.

The systematic ambiguity of Being brings us to the individuation (*al-tashakhus*) of Being, which is discussed by Mulla Sadra in the second volume of *al-Asfar*. The meaning of individuation as understood by him signifies the division of a species into undivided units. For example, Socrates as an individual human being is a member of the human species. The concept of human being can be applied to all members of this species, in which case the universal concept cannot become an individuation. On the other hand, an individual human being is not a universal concept, and cannot be applied to all individuals. The main characteristic of individuation is, then, its inapplicability, unlike a universal concept, to other or multiple things.⁹ The individuation of an ontic being is not in its quiddity and it is not something caused by its accident. It is in its existence, which constitutes the reality of its individual existence even in a material form:

The subsequent deficiency is not from the Principle of Existence. But, it is due to its actualization in [its being in] the second rank and thereafter. Deficiencies and privations happen due to the secondary [existence] due to the fact that they are secondary and posterior [in relation to the First Existence]. The First Being [exists], since its perfection is complete, [and thus] it has no limit. Privation and indigence are derived from the emanation and creation, because it is necessarily the case that the created thing is not equal to the creator, nor does emanation equal the source of emanation in terms of rank of existence.¹⁰

In the systematic ambiguity of Being imperfection emerges with individuation, which compels all beings to undergo the evolutionary changes towards perfection. Being, as the inner transcendent reality of all beings, is not totally

involved in this evolutionary process, but at the same time it is not detached from it because it is the ontological originator of the beings and their evolutionary movement. Being is a unity and a non-conditional origin of all things. Otherwise, it cannot exist necessarily without a beginning. Perfection is in contrast to individuation, and distancing of beings is in proximity to Being.

The notion of becoming gives rise to the idea of time or the temporality of the realm of multiplicity. As mentioned earlier, Being, as the origin and the cause of becoming, is not affected by time. Time belongs only to the world of multiplicity of ontic beings. Mulla Sadra's understanding of the concepts of time and change is different from that of Aristotle. In *al-Masha'ir*, he states that the concept of 'change' described by some philosophers as a mediation between the realm of Being and becoming does not suit our ontological enterprise, because they understand change to be .an additional intelligible affair, which indicates the transition of a thing from potentiality to actuality, rather than the means by which this transition is made.'¹¹ Change, for Mulla Sadra, is a constant transition of substance and time is the measure of trans-substantial change. With this kind of change we encounter an ascending process of evolution towards perfection. Becoming is, then, the reverse of the descending process of the individuation of Being. The descending process is a movement from Being to the lowest rank of beings with less of being and more essence. The universality of Being is reduced until it arrives at the stage of individuals where no universality is further possible. The ascending movement is from the lowest rank to the highest, from the least perfect to the most perfect rank of existence. The doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of Being is nothing more than the increase and decrease of the reality of Being and identity in all ontic beings. The beings are distributed among various ranks due to their being prior or posterior, perfect or imperfect, strong or weak. There is always less and more of Being in the real world. It should be remembered that Mulla Sadra is not the first philosopher to advocate the idea of constant flux. Before him Heraclitus held this view on change. This Greek thinker is known for sayings attributed to him such as 'All things are in a state of flux', and 'You cannot step twice into the same stream'.¹² Being, in this constant flux, particularizes itself and gives rise to multiplicity. Heraclitus also believed that reality was an eternal vital fire, kindled in measures and extinguished in measures. These philosophical views were in contradiction to the views of Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, who argued against the possibility of motion, multiplicity and difference. Parmenides thought of Being as consisting of the same stable reality. Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides, went further to prove the ideas of his teacher by arguments known as Zeno's paradoxes.¹³ The foundation of Heraclitus' ontology, however, has four principles: first, Being is one in many or unity in multiplicity; second, everything changes constantly; third, Being as a living fire is governed by logos; and fourth, Being includes non-being and both generate becoming. After

Heraclitus, the notion of becoming became one of the pivotal categories in Hegel's logic. Being and non-being (Nothingness) in dialectical logic are identical because neither has determinations and both are abstractions and also different. But it is a contradiction for two things to be identical and different. This contradiction propels the dialectical progress further. As a consequence of this and as the synthesis of being and non-being, 'becoming' prevails when being passes into non-being and non-being into being. These two movements determine the coming to be and ceasing to be of the beings in the world. Although the notion of trans-substantial change was not used by Heraclitus and Hegel, their interpretation of change and motion, particularly where Heraclitus states that one cannot step twice into the same stream, might be interpreted as trans-substantial change because one cannot have the same kind of being at different times. In the case of accidental change, it is true that the substance remains the same without losing its own identity. For example, when water is cold it receives the form of cold. It becomes hot only when it receives the form of heat by throwing off its previous form; water cannot be cold and hot at the same time. In this kind of change, when a being receives a new form – a bud blossoms and becomes a flower – it does not throw away its previous form. The object becomes perfected and elevated to a higher level of existence by receiving a new and better form without negating the previous one. We can say, in the Hegelian sense, that the previous form is superseded (*aufgehoben*), preserved and elevated. The trans-substantial change consists of preserving the past forms and yet transcending them. But it does not leave 'substance' without affecting it like its accidents.

In Mulla Sadra's ontology, as in Heraclitus, change is a constant renewal and an evolutionary process towards perfection. It is not a movement from one place to another like the movement of an arrow in space or a train from one station to another. It is a substantial change that dominates all beings in the ontological region of becoming. The causal foundation of this change in beings is not something stable or unchangeable such as substance in Aristotle's metaphysics; rather, it signifies a being that is at the same time affected by change. There is in every accidental change a substantial change; to put it another way, change in accidents is caused by change in substance. This change is a fundamental transformation of a being from one rank of existence to another.¹⁴ All beings come under the influence of this change; nothing remains outside the domain of change and nothing remains the same for ever. If we think of time as the measure of change, then in this context time for Mulla Sadra becomes the measure of this trans-substantial transformation of beings. It is a dominant reality in the span of life of every ontic being and constitutes the ontological structure of the region of becoming.

Change in the four categories or accidents, an idea advocated by Aristotle and Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophers, is possible with change in substance. As a consequence of this, with the exception of change nothing

remains durable in the region of becoming. For Mulla Sadra the cause of change is a self-moving substance called the inner reality of Being, which is equivocally shared by all beings. It is, as stated by Fazlur Rahman, the specific nature commonly supposed to create the species in the world.¹⁵ This nature is not stable; it is subject to constant change and brings about accidental changes with itself. The arguments developed by Mulla Sadra to support his notion of change are easy to understand. He states that, since the changeable accidents of beings are caused by their substances, substance itself should be changeable because a motionless cause cannot produce a moved accident. A change in accident should be caused by a change in substance. Otherwise there would be no causal relationship between substance and its accidents. In another argument, he insists that change is an evolution towards perfection. Perfection is achieved when there is a substantial change from a less perfect state to a more perfect state of existence, following which there will be no distinction between the accidental and substantial changes in the world because every accidental change is caused by substantial change. The moving being does not remain the same at the moment of change and throughout the change.

For Aristotle, substance is the primary category and is of two kinds: primary and secondary. Primary substance, such as individuals, is neither a predicate of a subject nor in a subject. Secondary substance, such as genera and species, which includes primary substance, is a predicate of a subject in a proposition but not in a subject. All other nine categories are present in the subject. Substance is also considered a stable nucleus. Changes occur only in the four categories of quality, quantity, place and position. For this reason, Aristotle talks about four kinds of change: in a being itself, in quality, in quantity and in place. A change involving the being of a thing is generation and corruption; a change in quality is alteration, in quantity it is increase and decrease, and a change in place is locomotion. These changes will be from a certain status in an entity to its contrary. Substance as the substratum presupposed by the categories has no contrariety so is not affected by change.¹⁶ Some Muslim theologians, such as the Mu'tazilites (with the exception of al-Nazzam), the Ash'arites, and Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina and his followers, agreed with Aristotle and accepted the interpretation of the possibility of change in accident. In rejecting the idea of change in substance, Ibn Sina, for example, states:

However, if it is claimed that motion occurs in substance, then this is a figurative expression. No motion occurs in substance because if a nature of a substance deteriorates, it will be sudden. And if it is originated, it is still sudden. There is no middle perfection between potency and mere act. Substantial form is not subject to increase and decrease, nor is it subject to intensity and weakness. The reason is that if it is subject to these factors, then inevitably either it will remain within the increasing or decreasing of its species, and the substantial form does not change.

The change rather occurs in the accident of the form, since what was weak and was intensified later is annihilated, whereas the substance is not annihilated.¹⁷

Ibn Sina, in his discussion on the existence of the physical world in *al-Shifa*, insists that the archetype of the beings remains stable from the beginning to the end of motion in all situations. If we accept this point, then the substance will not require change. The resulting change and motion in beings occurs only in one or more than one of the four categories of substance indicated by Aristotle.

The question that arises here is how can we think of identity when everything is subject to constant substantial change? How can we think that a being which undergoes trans-substantial change is the same being or has an identity? These questions also remind us the problem of personal identity discussed by David Hume in his refutation of the Cartesian concept of self-substance. In criticizing the Cartesian theory, Hume argued that nothing remains the same in the world and that resemblance is the cause of the mistake in substituting the notion of identity: 'For when we attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is not confined to the expression, but is commonly attended with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fiction.'¹⁸ The notion of personal identity in this case is fictitious and a product of our imagination, because the changes that happen in a being are slow and gradual. In trans-substantial change, all beings (corporeal and non-corporeal) change constantly. They are originated and renewed at each moment. No single being remains permanently the same. Every being is different and new at every new moment. Mulla Sadra's view regarding this problem is in one respect similar to that of Hume. First, he states that trans-substantial change occurs unnoticed because it is gradual and slow. We think that the change has not occurred and that the being is the same. Second, we attribute sameness to a being because the mind employs universal concepts for describing the essences, which are static. Trans-substantial change is usually noticed when the being of a being arrives at a crucial stage of modification or undergoes a sudden change. In addition to this, Mulla Sadra believes that the identity of a person relies on the intellectual form of that person, which exists in the mind of God. For God, a person is the same; otherwise he or she is not the same.¹⁹ From this interpretation, we can conclude that the renewal process of the world is not externally caused or is not something in contrast to Being. Whatever goes through change is one of the modalities of Being, which has a temporal dimension and belongs to the region of becoming. Since change is the mode of beings, then Being, its modalities and the process of becoming are necessarily connected. Change does not take place in beings as an external event; instead, beings originate change internally, and the external conditions, such as being in the

world and being an individuation, facilitate that change. If we understand the relationship between Being and its modalities without making a substantial distinction between them, all their differences on the ground of their ontological unity and identity disappear. A human being, as a combination of intellect and body, is nothing more than a modality of Being; or, more precisely, an individuation of Being aiming at its own transcendence through the gateway of self-understanding and approximation to Being. In this process of change, this modality of Being rises above the boundaries of its own finitude and limitation as it is capable of understanding the meaning of its own existence and seeks the Truth. It is on the foundation of this ontology and the gradations of the modalities of Being that the meaning of (humanity) within the intentionality of the upward movement should be understood. The way in which Mulla Sadra looks at the gradations of the modality of Being in the trans-substantial change from less perfect to more perfect can be used to address humanity in plurality. Within the development of this modality towards perfection, and by realizing the end in the 'perfect human being', we come across a range of human existence at different ontological-historical stages and different kinds of humanity. Particularly in the light of this kind of change, it is possible for us to talk about less or more humanity at different ranks of existence in the same way we describe a being as smaller or larger.

Mulla Sadra's ontology, in particular the doctrine of systematic ambiguity of Being, bridges the gulf between monism and pluralism. This can be elucidated in considering the principle of identity in difference. Identity is established on the ground of the reality of Being as a simple reality that contains the multiplicity of its own modification. The external reality as Being and the modifications of Being, which have less or more of being, are characterized by unity and diversity. Diversity is a mode of the single and simple reality of Being. The multiple modalities of Being do not exist in themselves as separate realities, as is the case in pluralism. Here, Being is one and all other things that exist are the modalities of this reality.

Since the systematic ambiguity of Being is nothing more than an increase or decrease in the intensity of Being, the trans-substantial change is an existential movement. It happens to Being as a change in the intensification of Being rather than a change in essence. Nor is change in the categories of quality and quantity a gradual or continuous intensification of quality and quantity in a particular type of being; it is their replacement by a new one. Here, Mulla Sadra is talking about the definite quality and quantity of a being.²⁰ Intensification of a quality, for example 'whiteness' in a body, is not an increase in intensity of the same quality of 'whiteness'. It is a replacement of the former 'whiteness' by another 'whiteness' with more intensity in its 'being' white. This kind of change can be seen as the mutation of the former definite quality and the emergence of a totally new quality. This is the case also with a definite quantity of ontic beings. In a quantitative change, a new

quantity replaces the old quantity. As a result, beings in the world are in constant change and renewal until they reach their own perfection, where no further change is thinkable. What undergoes change but at the same time endures in this evolutionary process is Being as the being of all beings and their unity.²¹ Since beings are the modalities of Being, undergo through constant change we can conclude that all kinds of change occur in beings are also Being and by Being. Being is, therefore, in a self-evolutionary process that has no cause except Being itself. Being is the origin of change but still unchangeable.

The existential movement of Being begins with emanation or the descending movement from the realm of unity to the realms of potentiality and multiplicity, which are called the region of 'becoming'. We also call this downward process the particularization of Being. The second phase of change, by contrast, is the ascending movement of the particularization of Being through trans-substantial change upward towards perfection. This descending-ascending process can also be described as a movement from perfection to imperfection and then from imperfection to perfection; from Being to its own particularization and then from the particularization of Being back to Being. The distinctiveness of this two-fold movement of Being is that no accidental change takes place without substantial change. Furthermore, the existential movement of Being is both vertical and horizontal. In the vertical direction, the movement is from the lowest rank to the highest and is governed by the objective of achieving perfection or arriving at the highest rank of being. Here it seems that Mulla Sadra is in agreement with Proclus (410–485), a Hellenic philosopher of the Anaximander School of Neoplatonism who subdivides the process of emanation into horizontal and vertical. For both thinkers, the vertical movement ends with arriving at the most perfect state of existence.

In his discussion of the ascending process and the vertical movement of all beings towards the goal of perfection, Mulla Sadra understood the significance of human existence for the realization of this goal. The foundation of human existence, in the systematic ambiguity of Being, is potentiality. Human existence gradually fulfils itself by moving away from potentiality to actuality. At the start, there is only the realm of pure potentiality emanated from Being, but, in the evolutionary process of vertical trans-substantial change, human existence moves towards the realm of actuality. The journey ends with the emergence of the perfect human being (*al-insan al-kamil*), who attains unity with the Intelligences or divine attributes: 'These Intelligences themselves have little to attain by way of perfection, since all their perfections are already realized, for, as Divine Attributes, they are united with God's existence.'²² The other direction of change, namely horizontal movement, determines the transformation of the world through a succession of infinite forms. This movement is infinite in the sense that it has no end and, unlike the

vertical movement, is not determined by the realization of the end. The trans-substantial movement also resembles the idea of the creative evolution advocated by Bergson, for whom the world is in a constant, multidimensional and vertical process of creative evolution.

Dissatisfied with the mechanistic explanation presented by Laplacean scientific theory and the Darwinian concept of natural selection, Bergson argued that 'mechanism' was inadequate for understanding reality as it neglected other aspects of reality such as duration and creative evolution. The mechanistic account of evolution was also directionless and an outcome of mere chance.²³ For Bergson, the directionality of evolution was a vital field of constant renewal and creativity in which 'duration' rather than physical time played a significant role in transforming life from a lower to a higher state. Evolution was conceived in terms of an unbroken continuation of life in multiple directions. Duration, as the temporality of life, was a single indivisible continuity in which all three elements of past, present and future became integrated parts. To explain this, Bergson presents the analogy of human personality. We are aware of the development in our personality and this development is not seen as a mechanical change in which one state of existence is replaced by another. The change persists and is secured by memory, which establishes the connection between past, present and future.²⁴ The dissimilarities between Mulla Sadra's trans-substantial change and Bergson's creative evolution arise with directionality and purpose. The former kind of change is unidirectional in its vertical movement and culminates in the perfect human being. The latter is multidirectional and infinite. Another dissimilarity is in the teleological conception of evolution in trans-substantial change, which is that evolution fulfils a predetermined plan of Being. In contrast, creative evolution in Bergson's philosophy is a constant growth, like a snowball rolling down a slope. This growth is also without a predetermined purpose and is thus an ontological foundation for free will.

Mulla Sadra's doctrine of trans-substantial change is directly related to the notion of time and the temporality of the ontic beings in the world. It leads at the same time to the problem of the creation of the world in time. In the history of Islamic thought the Qur'anic paradigm of 'creation *ex nihilo*', which is in contradiction to the Hellenistic principle of '*ex nihilo nihil fit*', created a problem for some Muslim thinkers. Al-Kindi (d. 866) for example used Aristotelian principles and self-evident propositions in order to demonstrate the finitude of the world and to vindicate the Qur'anic paradigm of creation *ex nihilo*.²⁵ For al-Kindi and the adherents of the Qur'anic paradigm, the world had a beginning and was created in time by God. Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina found a solution to this contradiction between the Qur'anic paradigm of 'creation *ex nihilo*' and the Hellenistic principle in the doctrine of emanation provided by Plotinus, which enabled them to argue that the world was created neither *ex nihilo* nor from the eternal prime matter of Aristotle, but emanated

from God eternally. In trans-substantial change, the creation of the world is viewed from the perspective of the doctrine of emanation, but at the same time this perspective is not void of problems. It is also important to understand that in Mulla Sadra's ontology the world is an event and is originated, which means that it is temporal. At the same time, the emanation of the world still appears to be a-temporal simply because God, who is the efficient cause and the source of the emanation, is eternal and not in time. God's time, as stated by Mir Damad, the teacher of Mulla Sadra, is eternal '*sarmad*'.²⁶ In addition to this conception of time, Mir Damad refers to '*dahr*' perpetuity and '*zaman*' cosmological time as two different forms of time belonging to two different spheres of Being. *Dahr* describes the relation between the unchangeable divine attributes and the sensible world. *Zaman* is used for the temporality of the ontic beings in the sensible world. *Zaman*, therefore, cannot exist without the world and did not exist before the creation of material objects. The sensible world, which exists in *zaman* and depends on the divine attributes to exist, is outside the sphere of *dahr* and *sarmad*, whereas the divine attributes are in *dahr* but not in *zaman*.²⁷ Since the creation of the world is in *zaman*, and the sensible world is real, *zaman* should also have an objective reality. It cannot be a mere subjective notion in the Kantian sense. Mulla Sadra accepted the division of time by his teacher, but believed that it required further investigation. On one hand, time is said not to exist objectively. On the other hand, the relation of time to the existential movement in the world provides an ontological ground for the objectivity of time. One can claim that, since existential movement is objective, time as the measure of that movement is also objective. Even the notion of time, which is subjective and exists only in the mind, should be caused by something external and must have a connection with the objective existential movement in the world. This, however, does not mean that time is a quality of the existential movement. It should also be remembered that we cannot think of time without the existential movement in the world.²⁸ Since the emanation of the world from the divine attributes of God did not happen in *zaman* because *zaman* is not prior to the creation of the world, the world is, then, a-temporally originated.

In trans-substantial change, the only being not affected is Being, because Being is pure actuality and perfect. It can still be argued, however, that since the world is originated from Being and is part of it, then it is Being that changes and transforms itself by itself into its own modalities. This view is also the foundation of the mystic conviction held by some Sufis, who rejected the dichotomy of reality and appearance. From this understanding of time it should be clear that Mulla Sadra's concept of the temporality of the world is different from the concept of the creation of the world in time. Here the world is not in time but exists with time or is substantially temporal. The sensible world and time co-exist and belong together. Temporality is not an indication of the beginning and the end of the world because the world does not end in

Mulla Sadra's ontological interpretation. Temporality is simply the measure of trans-substantial change, and the origination of the world should be understood as a consequence of this change. Every moment in this trans-substantial change is a beginning as well as an end, in this constant and endless process of change. The world is, therefore, endless or eternal but does not stay the same, since the creation of a new substance is the annihilation of the previous one. The world is temporal as it goes through change but is a-temporal because change is permanent and remains for ever; it does not fall into the abyss of nothingness. In each moment there is a being that did not exist before, and this determines the temporal dimension of existence.

Without the objective existence of the existential movement there will not be an objective space-time continuum. The objectivity of time is a logical requirement of the objectivity of the existential movement of Being. At this point, Mulla Sadra's view contradicts Ibn Sina's understanding of the subjectivity of the notion of time, which is derived from movement as continuity or passage from the beginning to the end as a whole.²⁹ But does this mean that time is something real? If it is real, we need to assert its objectivity just as the objectivity of the world is asserted. But Mulla Sadra insists that time is not independent of the existential movement of Being. It is not like a container in which all events occur. It is one of the dimensions of the world that cannot be separated from it.³⁰ Elsewhere he states that the existential movement of Being is not different from time because 'the measure and the measured are the same'.³¹ On one hand, Mulla Sadra believes that time is not independent of the existential movement of the world and not something real like a being; on the other hand, he identifies time as the measure of the trans-substantial change that accompanies the existential movement. In this way Mulla Sadra's interpretation of time is different from that of his predecessors. Time is neither subjective nor objective, because it is not a mere concept or a fancy that has no representation in the external world. nor can it be seen as something that exists outside human thinking. Time is, rather, a subjective-objective, existential and non-existential dimension of reality. It is the measure of an objective existential movement, and an inherent function of the world, which is conceived intellectually.

Time is also eternal. The temporality of time is eternity for two reasons: first is emanation, through which the world came into existence and which is eternal. Second, whatever is thought to be prior to time is necessarily in time, because priority involves time.³² Time, in this respect, is distinct from space, because the finitude of space does not involve space beyond space. The notion of time prior to time involves real time because, as Mulla Sadra believes, the reality of time is in the mind.³³ Here, Mulla Sadra thinks of time as something subjective. Does his notion of subjectivity prove time to be an essence because essence for him is an intellectual property? Time is not a mere subjective notion; it has a reality of its own as well. In this case, the status of

time is not like that of essence. For this reason, Mulla Sadra insists that time is something positive and has a peculiar existence, and has an essence as well.³⁴ Time, therefore, has existence as well as essence. The existence of time is the reality of time inherent in the trans-substantial movement of Being, while its essence, or the mental concept of time, is the relational factor of the continuity.³⁵ Mulla Sadra does not claim that time is subjective or objective; it is only from his conceptions of the systematic ambiguity of Being and trans-substantial change that we arrive at this inference.

To return to the differences between Mulla Sadra's and Heidegger's ontology, one is that this Muslim philosopher accepted the doctrine of emanation. For Mulla Sadra, the world emanated or originated from Pure Being. Emanation can be seen as a temporal origination of the world, as everything in the world is determined by trans-substantial movement. All beings in the world go through change and are preceded by the temporal non-existence of their beings. Ontic beings continually come into existence and pass away. Every moment in this substantial change is death and rebirth of the same being with a new substance and a new form. Death exists only in this sense as a constant substantial change. Non-being, like being, becomes the reality of all beings. The world is, thus, a temporal surfacing of the reality of Being, which continues eternally. It is a temporal origination from a non-temporal origin. The temporal originality of the world and the notion of perpetual trans-substantial change seem to contradict one another. It is stated on one hand that the world is originated and on the other Mulla Sadra insists on the idea permanent change. Here, perpetuity does not mean that the world is eternal in the sense that it has no beginning, or that everything existed eternally without beginning. If the world is in a state of flux, nothing will remain perpetual, and only in this regard can we say that the world is in constant change and renewal. This interpretation is also doomed to failure, because the vertical direction of existential movement has a definite objective end. The trans-substantial change ceases when it reaches the highest rank of its existence and perfection. In addition, nothing attains or rises above the supreme level of the ontological rank of Being, and change does not govern beings, which are pure actuality. If we consider an immaterial being such as 'intellect' to be entirely actuality without potentiality, the intellect will not change. Change is a movement from potentiality to actuality but not in an Aristotelian sense because it includes change in substance. It is for this reason that Pure Being and the divine attributes are not affected by change. Potentiality is the state of imperfection while actuality is not. What does Mulla Sadra mean by perpetual change? Does he mean that the realm of potentiality and multiplicity remains eternally? Does this movement end by attaining perfection or the highest possible rank of existence?

Since emanation is thought to be eternal and constant, it seems that 'becoming', in Mulla Sadra's systematic ambiguity of Being, is endless. In

their various ontological ranks, ontic beings differ in their intensity, priority, posteriority, perfection and imperfection. They succeed one another vertically as well as horizontally. There will be a beginning and an end for an ontic being that exists at a particular time and space but that is not the case with Being as the inner reality of that ontic being, because trans-substantial change will elevate this being from a lower to a higher rank of existence with a new substance and form. There is a constant substantial change, which gives a new identity to the existents at every moment. In the region of becoming, nothing remains the same and nothing resists the stream of this continuous flux and renewal. Finality can be achieved only in the realm of unity with Pure Being. In the ontological region of history truth, knowledge and moral values, under the impact of this flux of becoming, also change constantly. Nothing in the human world can be seen as eternally existent. Another important point is that, with this great novelty in the world, trans-substantial change, like the dialectical movement in Hegel's philosophy, is necessary and determines the progress towards perfection without leaving individuals room for free choice. This point can be challenged, however, on the same ground as in Hegel's philosophy: since trans-substantial change occurs in Being by Being, it is self-determined and hence a free existential movement. Freedom in this case is interpreted on the ground of necessity. The plausibility of this argument is, however, in the premise that the changeable world is not to be different from what determines the change. But what determines the change is not individual free will. It is something beyond that, which brings everything under its own determination. This argument is better understood in the light of Hegel's category of being-for-itself. In the sphere of 'Determinate Being' in his logic, there are two dialectical aspects: being-in-itself (positive) and being-for-other (negative). These two aspects unite and their union becomes True Infinite. The essential character of this new category is being-for-itself.³⁶ The new category is without external limitation and its otherness is not something other than itself. Consciousness, for example, as being-for-itself, is self-consciousness. It is aware of itself as well as the external world. The external world, at the same time, is nothing but the self-manifestation of consciousness. It is idea in its otherness. In this case the contradictions between consciousness and the external world (its otherness) are negated and consciousness becomes self-related and a being-for-itself. It has no otherness and no external limitation. This is thought to be a necessary ground for freedom in Hegel's philosophy. Similarly in Mulla Sadra's ontology being determines its own modalities and transforms them constantly.

The existential movement of the world is not blind or capricious. It is for a purpose. Being, which is identical with God in Mulla Sadra's onto-theology, has no direct causal relationship with this continuity or with the trans-substantial change of its own modalities. There is an intrinsic motive vehicle responsible for accomplishing this task. This motive is the mystic force of

love (*'ishq*), which is present in everything and creates in lower-ranked beings the desire to long for beings in the higher ranks of existence. The notion of love as the main force in the world depicts a mystic (Sufi) influence on Mulla Sadra's metaphysical thinking. Before Mulla Sadra, Ibn Sina expressed similar views in *Risala fil 'Ishq (A Treatise on Love)*, in which he stated that all entities in the world, including matter, move under the sway of cosmic love.³⁷ The relationship between the self and the Reality in Sufism is primordially emotional rather than theoretical. It is the emotional motive (*'ishq*) which leads to the rise of the mystic way of cognition (*ma'rifah*). The emotional motive is not only primordial; it is also the ontological constitution of the world, including the self. Ibn Sina also believed that the self was born with this intrinsic motive: 'Ardent love is innate' all things flow from God in a process of necessary emanation and return to Him in a process of necessary love.'³⁸ The primacy of emotion, however, does not nullify the significance of cognition. The self can approach Reality passionately without appropriating it epistemologically. It is also this emotional motive that elevates the self to the stage where it can experience Reality.

Mulla Sadra is in agreement with Ibn Sina that even prime matter is infected by love. His argument supporting this idea is based on the positivity of prime matter. Prime matter is the realm of potentiality and potentiality is something positive, or that which exists. Being is a reality commonly shared by all existents, including prime matter. To all beings, whether at the level of potentiality or actuality, the divine attributes (knowledge, will and power) function with various degrees of intensity. These attributes belong to Being or the inner reality of all beings. Prime matter, which is at the bottom of the descending process of emanation and is considered to be pure potentiality, is capable of receiving forms and becoming actual. More specifically, it has longing and affection for forms. This mystic love penetrates all modalities of being as a motive to assist their progress towards perfection. It prevails everywhere, and wherever there is existence there will be love and longing for perfection.³⁹ In clarifying this point, Fazlur Rahman remarks that the degree of intensity of 'love' is not only in consciousness, such as in human beings. It also exists equally in all beings. Matter, as the most deficient and lowly ranked of all beings, should have a high degree of intensity of 'love' for the higher ranks.⁴⁰ As a consequence, the world, including inanimate beings, can be seen as a loving body with various degrees of intensity of love and longing for perfection. When human beings attain unity with Intellects or divine attributes through the form of the perfect human being, their yearning reaches the point of satisfaction. They no longer yearn for a higher rank of existence, because their longing for perfection will no longer exist. The world is, therefore, characterized by renewal; the things and events of the past are in the past and those of the future are yet to come. Temporality is the progress of the world as a constant becoming and creation. Every new

moment is a non-existence that comes into being through trans-substantial change.

The main consequences of the doctrine of trans-substantial change are religious; for example its impact on the notions of resurrection and divine retribution. They can also be philosophical. It cannot be denied that the doctrine expounded by Mulla Sadra changes our understanding of the two religious notions and also opens a discussion on the transmigration of the soul. The transmigration of the soul has been discussed in the history of Muslim philosophy by Muslim philosophers such as Abu Bakr al-Razi, Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, in addition to Mulla Sadra. They raised the possibility of the transmigration of the soul from one species to another, for example the human soul to animals or plants. Of particular importance to Mulla Sadra's ideas is Suhrawardi's understanding of this question. Suhrawardi deals with the transmigration of the soul in several books, but in *Hikmat al-Ishraq* he argues that human bodies are in a position to receive a managing rational soul or managing light, while animals receive only imperfect human souls:

Whatever moral habit captures the commanding light, whatever dark state becomes established in it and becomes its support, the commanding light must transfer its attachment after the corruption of its fortress to a fortress corresponding to that dark state: a fortress of one of the brute animals. When the commanding light departs from the human fortress, it is darkened and desirous of darkness. It does not know its source or the world of light. Wicked states have become fixed in it, and it is drawn to the brute fortress of other animals, and the darkness beckons to it.⁴¹

Suhrawardi argues for the transmigration of the soul by insisting that the condition of life after death is dependent on the balance of knowledge and action in the previous life. With regard to the new form obtained by the human soul, he puts forward the notion of 'suspended forms' (*suwar al-mu'allaq*). These forms, like the Platonic forms, are transcendent but are not in the immutable rank of existence. Some are dark (evil) and some luminous (good). After death, the wicked souls, those that failed to live a balanced life between knowledge and action, are gathered in hell and deprived of their suspended form in accordance with their character in the previous life.⁴² Shahrazuri, the disciple of Suhrawardi, clarifies the position of his master by saying that Suhrawardi accepted the transmigration of the human soul to an animal body, but rejected the transmigration of the human soul into plants and they will be given bodies of the lower rank of existence.⁴³ When we come to discuss transmigration in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, particularly in the light of trans-substantial change, we expect him to argue against it. Trans-substantial change is an irreversible progress and cannot be seen as a movement from a more perfect or developed to a less perfect and undeveloped rank of existence. A being, like a human soul in a developed human body, is not expected to take

an animal body, which is less perfect than a human body and is at a lower rank of being. In other words, demotion in trans-substantial change is not only absurd but impossible.⁴⁴ Mulla Sadra's denial of the transmigration of the soul, according to Fazlur Rahman, is beset with a problem. In Islam, the notion of bodily resurrection implies the transmigration of the soul in so far as it is thought to be a reunion of the soul with a new body.⁴⁵ Mulla Sadra's treatment of this matter takes the middle position between the views of those who believe in the survival of the intellect after death, and those who accept the survival of the body as well. He explains that in the afterlife the human intellect is able to apprehend the general ideas in the rational realm in the way it apprehends and perceives different physical objects in this world. But the apprehended general ideas are not mere concepts without a reality of their own. They are real, ontological and identical with actual existence, and are experienced by the human intellect. What then happens to the human body at death? Is it disjoined from the soul and does it then decay? Will the human soul be given a new body? To answer these questions Mulla Sadra, like Suhrawardi, talks about the World of the Images (*'alam al-khayal*). The bodies of the undeveloped souls, the souls that have committed sins, deteriorate at the time of death and are not reassembled as before. In order to survive physically, they create a material body for themselves by externalizing their inner psychic states in the form of a body in the World of the Images. Thus a human soul that is guilty of committing a sin will imagine itself as an animal.⁴⁶ The important questions that arise here are: what is the destiny of the human soul that has gone through trans-substantial change? Am I the same sinner of yesterday who committed a sin to be punished or substantially transformed into another human being? If I am not the same person, why should I be punished for the sins committed by me in the past? There is, no doubt, a problem here. But Mulla Sadra provides two different answers to these questions. On one hand, he believes that the identity of a person relies on the intellectual form of that person, which exists in the mind of God.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the soul is thought to survive throughout the evolutionary changes, and that this helps the person to retain an identity.⁴⁸ This solution, which has similarity with Descartes's view on the human soul as the self-substance, is in my opinion in contradiction with the implication of the trans-substantial change.

The philosophical consequences of trans-substantial change can be summarized in three points: the temporal contingency of the world; the infection of being by non-being or nothingness; and the relativity of truth and values.

Mulla Sadra demonstrates that the world is in constant substantial change. This ontological view is an indication of the non-being of beings that have not yet come into existence. Non-being or nothingness is at the heart of the world. That is to say, an existent is preceded by its own non-existence.⁴⁹ The passage

of being into non-being and of non-being into being is 'becoming', which was also demonstrated by Hegel and discussed earlier, and in contradiction of Aristotle's understanding of Nothingness. In Aristotle's ontology, non-being is neither in motion nor at rest, because for non-being to move it should be in a place, which it is not, and if it were it would be somewhere.⁵⁰ Mulla Sadra seems to have borrowed the idea of coming-into-being from Mir Damad. Sabzawari, in explaining the relationship between eternities and becoming in time, states that becoming through perpetual duration or constant creation was proposed by Mir Damad. He further maintains that, for Mir Damad, the coming-into-being of the world by way of becoming through perpetual duration is a temporal coming-into-existence, or 'the precedence of "preceding non-existence" over the existence of a thing by way of separable precedence of it, i.e., of the non-existence'.⁵¹ This is an interesting point in Hegel's logic as well as in the phenomenological interpretation of the structure of consciousness in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. Being, for Hegel, is an undeduced beginning and pure because it has no determination or qualification. It is the most abstract category in his dialectical logic. It is nothing more than a simple 'isness'.⁵² Since this undeduced beginning has not passed over into another or its opposition, it is self-identical. When it produces its opposite it undergoes change and becomes different. But saying that Being is an immediacy and has no determination except 'isness' implies mere emptiness and the equivalent of 'Nothing' or non-being.⁵³ Being, therefore, becomes the birthplace of nothingness, and the two categories become the first two oppositions in Hegel's logic holding the relationship of identity in difference. When 'Being' and 'Nothingness' pass over into one another they produce the category of 'becoming'. When understood in the light of the dialectical interpretation in Hegel's logic, the meaning and significance of becoming as an important category in Mulla Sadra's ontology can be grasped. It is a process that involves being and nothingness. Being of a being is subsequent to its nothingness; this is the temporal origination of the ontic being in the realm of potentiality and diversity. Sartre also deals with the problem of Nothingness in detail. But, unlike Mulla Sadra and Hegel, he insists that Pure Being cannot become the source of Nothingness and that the only being responsible for bringing nothingness into the world with itself is consciousness. This is described by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* as follows:

We perceived that nothingness can be conceived neither outside of being, nor as a complementary, abstract notion, nor as an infinite milieu where Being is suspended. Nothingness must be given at the heart of being, in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which we have called *négarités*. But this intra-mundane Nothingness cannot be produced by Being-in-itself; the notion of Being as full positivity does not contain Nothingness as one of its structures. We cannot even say that Being excludes it. Being lacks all relations to it.

Hence the question which is put to us now with a particular urgency: if Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of Being, nor in terms of Being, and if on the other hand, since it is non-being, it cannot derive from itself the necessary force to 'nihilate itself', where does Nothingness come from?⁵⁴

To prove his point, Sartre gives the example of finding Pierre in the café where Sartre tries to say that Nothingness is experienced by consciousness. Sartre also argues with Kant's view that negation is the quality of a judgment (proposition), and Nothingness is logically prior to negation; that we experience Nothingness and negation before making a judgment.⁵⁵ The distinction between the existentialist views of Mulla Sadra and Sartre is in the origin or birthplace of Nothingness. Mulla Sadra insists that all contingent beings, including the human intellect, are preceded by their own non-existence in the world. For Sartre, Nothingness is a characteristic of the ontological structure of consciousness. The being of non-conscious being is not infected by Nothingness.

As far as the distinction between Being and Nothingness is concerned, it is clear, at least for Sartre, that both can be experienced intuitively as two realities. In Hegel's dialectical logic, they pass over into one another and their causal relationship can be recognized. But what is the distinction between one non-being (nothingness) and another? Is there a causal relationship between them? Mulla Sadra does not engage in this discussion, but Sabzawari, one of the followers of Mulla Sadra, says that the distinction between non-beings is imaginary and they have no causal relationship: a non-being cannot be a cause for another non-being. Is it possible, then, to say that the non-being of clouds is a cause for the non-being of rain? Or that the non-existence of oxygen is a cause for the non-being of human life? Sabzawari would say that such statements, which show the causal connection between two non-beings, are only the realization of the absence of beings such as the non-presence of clouds and rain, and that in reality we are not dealing with non-being or nothingness.⁵⁶ But when we study read Sartre we find out that the realization of the non-presence of a being, as in the case of searching for Pierre in the café, is a legitimate ground for experiencing the non-being of Pierre. It is the non-being or non-presence of Pierre that produces a negative proposition such as 'There is no Pierre in the café'. If we go back to the causal relationship between the non-existence of oxygen in space and the non-existence of human life and say that 'Such a void is the cause of death', we are making an affirmative proposition that explicates the causal relationship between two non-beings in an affirmative way. Meanwhile, we cannot deny that every affirmation is a negation. Void, here, can be understood as the absence of oxygen; so that the non-being of oxygen in space causes death or the non-being of life. Sabzawari's argument for the non-existence of the causal relationship between non-beings can thus be refuted.

Another philosophical consequence is that trans-substantial change leads to the relativity of truth and values. The doctrine of trans-substantial change deconstructs the metaphysical foundation of universal truth and values, as nothing is considered to be eternal and stable in the world. Everything is in constant change, including human society and our understanding of reality. As a consequence of this, no system of belief can claim to be absolute and final, because the novelty prevails. This consequence also had a profound impact on Mulla Sadra's understanding of politics, in particular political Islam, which proclaims the divinity and universality of its discourse. Mulla Sadra made a vivid distinction between religion and politics or between religious laws and political laws and rejected the identity of the former with the latter. Religious laws are characterized by generality and necessity, and political laws by particularity and dependence on the human situation.⁵⁷ This distinction between religion and politics in Mulla Sadra's philosophy stands in contradiction to Shi'ite political thought, which claims a necessary link between religion and politics, and states that no true Islamic political system is established without religious laws. A true Islamic political system is possible on the foundation of the religious laws and the presence of an imam (a spiritual leader and a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) to implement the law. Although Mulla Sadra is a Shi'ite thinker and accepts the doctrine of the imamate, he still believes in constant change in nature and history. For him, however, trans-substantial change rules over both nature and history; ontology and social system are necessarily interconnected. It is not possible to understand Mulla Sadra's political philosophy without understanding his metaphysics. For him, as for Hegel, metaphysics is the foundation of all natural and historical phenomena.⁵⁸

Any socio-political system existing at any stage of human history is not final and should be superseded by a social system richer and more perfect in content. According to Mulla Sadra, in a perfect society all members live together in harmony and cooperate to achieve the highest good and the full realization of Truth. In contrast, in an imperfect society the members cooperate to execute evil.⁵⁹ Since change is the essential characteristic of the world, the imperfect society should also be seen in the light of the evolutionary process of the existential movement of the world. The evolutionary process of the world is towards perfection rather than deterioration. Mulla Sadra's view on political leadership in a perfect society is similar to that of al-Farabi in *Mabadi Ara Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila*. Al-Farabi, like Mulla Sadra, makes his metaphysical interpretation of reality the foundation of his political philosophy. The socio-political system in a 'perfect society' needs to function in harmony with the system of the universe designed by the First Cause. For al-Farabi, this interconnection is founded on the doctrine of emanation. Following this doctrine, al-Farabi places his view of the relationship between the state and civil society in the hierarchy of the system of the universe, in

which the emanation of various forms of being flows from the First Cause. This metaphysical structure is a political model.⁶⁰ The diversity of emanation represents varying social groups and political institutions, which are subordinated to the authority or to the will of the supreme statesman. Mulla Sadra, like al-Farabi, holds the view that a leader of the perfect society should be someone of sound mind and body who has attained the rank of actual intellect:

That man [the leader] is a person over whom nobody has any sovereignty whatsoever. He is a man who has reached his perfection and has become actual intellect and actual being thought (intelligized), his representative faculty having by nature reached its utmost perfection in the way stated by us; this faculty of his is predisposed by nature to receive, either in waking life or in sleep, from the Active Intellect the particulars, either as they are or by imitating them, and also the intelligibles, by imitating them. His Passive Intellect will have reached its perfection by [having apprehended] all the intelligibles, so that none of them is kept back from it, and it will have become actual intellect and actual being thought.⁶¹

The leader of the perfect society is not the lawmaker but the executor of the law, which is divine and pre-given. Like the ruling organ in the human body, the leader is chiefly responsible for the rise and fall of state and society. The bearer of such responsibility must further possess two kinds of qualities: natural (inborn) and acquired. Natural qualities are beyond one's capacity to choose or acquire after birth. For example, the statesman cannot choose which family or situation to be born into. The prime inborn quality, which precedes all other qualities, is that a statesman is born as an *imam*; in the Shi'ite context, he should be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, a male from his household, *ahl al-Bayt*:

This is the sovereign over whom no other human being has any sovereignty whatsoever; he is the *imam*, he is the first sovereign of the excellent city, he is the sovereign of the excellent nation, and the sovereign of the universal state (the *oikumene*).⁶²

Although al-Farabi does not mention in *Ara* that the leader should be from *ahl al-bayt*, it is clear that the notion of the imam, which is explicitly expressed in *Ara*, logically presupposes this understanding of leadership. The imam is the only statesman qualified to lead a perfect society, politically as well as spiritually. He is a leader who is granted revelation or is in contact with God, receiving inspiration from the First Principle to guide his perfect society. For Mulla Sadra, the leader should be a theosopher (*hakim*) who, on attaining perfection in all intellectual faculties, becomes a prophet.⁶³ This view seems incompatible with Mulla Sadra's idea of the distinction between religion and politics. The leader as theosopher and prophet in a perfect society has reli-

gious as well as political authority. His rule becomes the execution of the divine will and law. The compatibility of religion and politics belongs to the realm of becoming, where nothing remains stable, or where politics, like religion, becomes universal. But since nothing escapes trans-substantial change, religion and politics must each go through change from a less perfect to a more perfect stage of existence.⁶⁴ The purpose of political life, in the perfect society, is spiritual salvation, so the political order will be divinely oriented and the state will be based on the divine creeds. Mulla Sadra's analysis of politics is, in the light of his metaphysics, an intellectual attempt to explain the place of human beings in the world for achieving collectivism and divinity. He believes that politics is the social sphere where the individual soul experiences belonging to a social system and works with other individuals for a better form of collective life.⁶⁵ He also believes that the leadership in the perfect society is the real guardian of social justice and the divine laws.⁶⁶ Political life is, therefore, imperative in the evolutionary process of existence. The achievement of perfection and the realization of Truth are possible in history. The worldly life is a ladder to ascend to another form of living in the Hereafter as another aspect of existence.

As mentioned earlier, Muslim philosophers before Mulla Sadra, under the influence of Aristotle, tended to acknowledge the reality of change only in the form of accidentality. For Mulla Sadra what was foremost in his mind was change in the form of becoming, with substantial and accidental changes. His novel interpretation of the world is a genuinely innovative philosophical project which involves the development of a new intellectual outlook, conceptual framework and values. The task of philosophy is to actively interpret reality rather than give a mere conceptual translation of it. To achieve this, the creative interpretation should break from tradition and prepare the way for the future. Next, in the light of this innovative interpretation, Mulla Sadra's existential philosophy proves to be far from infected by dogmatism and prejudice, because for him every philosophical conviction remains transitory. Virtually everything about the world, human society, truth, values and knowledge, becomes a prey to change and nothing is immutable in the world except novelty.

Mulla Sadra and the Problem of Knowledge

This chapter contains an account of Mulla Sadra's theory of knowledge. From the outset, it should be remembered that the problem of knowledge in Mulla Sadra's philosophy developed out of his ontological system. I also argue that his epistemology should be understood in the light of his interpretation of reality. The doctrine of the primacy of Being is the foundation of the possibility of knowledge. It suggests that in order to know something we need to begin with its existence. Being becomes an ontological condition for knowing. To make this issue more adequately appropriated, our task will be at the start to trace the notion of intuitive knowledge in the history of Muslim philosophy, which plays a significant role in Mulla Sadra's epistemology, and then continues with an explanation of Mulla Sadra's understanding of knowledge and its source.

Before Mulla Sadra, Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi and the Sufis advocated the idea that reality should be apprehended directly by intuition rather than by rationalistic discourse. Because Mulla Sadra's treatment of the problem of knowledge is so similar to Suhrawardi's, it is difficult to make a distinction between them. Nevertheless, what is apprehended by intuition for Mulla Sadra is the reality of Being rather than essence. Being and knowledge are not two different things, but are intertwined. Being, by revealing itself or being revealed, renders knowledge possible and knowledge makes the truth of Being comprehensible.

Intuition is the source of knowledge for Ibn Sina. Knowledge is obtained intuitively by the human mind when it comes into contact with the external reality; the active intellect responds by providing the content of intuition. The content of intuition, as Kant also states in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, is provided from outside. However, Kant does not deal with the external source of knowledge in a mystical way. For him, the faculties of sensibility and understanding are limited and determined by the external content of the phenomenal world and by the subjective necessary conditions or forms such as space and time, in the case of sensibility, and the table of the categories in the case of understanding. Also, for Ibn Sina and Kant, the human mind is empty without the given external content, and knowledge is possible as the result of the interaction between internal and external conditions. To clarify this point, Ibn Sina uses the metaphor of a mirror, saying that the human mind before acquiring knowledge is like a tarnished mirror, which can be polished by knowledge if it is turned to the light of the sun (the active intellect).¹ The

human mind then acquires knowledge by intuition and does not rely on the phenomenal world as do sense-experience or rationalistic discourse for obtaining intuitive knowledge. This kind of knowledge, as Majid Fakhry remarks, 'stems from that supernatural or supermundane agency, which governs all the process of generation and corruption, including the process of cognition, in this world, i.e., the active intellect'.²

Acquiring knowledge by intuition varies from individual to individual. Those who get closer to the active intellect are enlightened by attaining the intelligible forms stored in the active intellect, and rely totally on intuitive knowledge rather than discursive knowledge to reach the rank of the prophethood.³ Intuitive knowledge is, therefore, not the product of the human intellect but springs from a divine source. It is the radiation of the active intellect upon the intellect of the seekers of the truth. Here, Ibn Sina makes a distinction between four types of human beings: the highest are those who have acquired prophecy and can create miracles due to the development of their intuitive and their imaginative power and their contact with the active intellect. The second type includes those who have developed their intuitive but not their imaginative powers. The third type is those who have developed their theoretical power but not their practical power. Finally, there are the human beings who have developed only their practical power.⁴

Another important thinker after Ibn Sina is Suhrawardi, to be discussed here, whose epistemology had a significant impact on Mulla Sadra. As mentioned in Chapter Two, this Muslim thinker is critical of discursive knowledge and, like Ibn Sina, relies on intuition or knowledge by illumination (*ishraq*); Nevertheless he does not discard discursive knowledge. He even finds sense-perception necessary for acquiring knowledge as he believes that there are certain things which can be known only by perception.

Suhrawardi's epistemology, discussed in *Hikmat al-Ishraq* and *al-Mutarahat*, begins with a critical evaluation of Aristotle's analysis of knowledge by definition. Against Aristotle, he argues that knowledge by definition does not necessarily include the essential characteristics of an entity. Other non-essential qualities or attributes should also be taken into account. He develops an argument against the definition of definition as '*definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*', or connotative definition. His argument, however, is grounded on the idea that certain things cannot be defined in accordance with this rule in Aristotelian logic. To render definition possible, Aristotle insists on the point that a genus plus a *differentia* are required. When human beings are defined as 'rational animals', rationality becomes a *differentia* and animal a genus. But 'colour', for instance, cannot be known by definition because it is a genus without *differentia*. It is a simple idea and a simple truth that has nothing other than itself to become a predicate for.⁵ This view of Suhrawardi is reminiscent of G. E. Moore's argument against the definition of goodness. In *Principia Ethica* Moore states:

My point is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is. Definitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you can no longer define those terms.⁶

Mehdi Amin Razavi believes that Suhrawardi's criticism of knowledge by definition is a 'radical departure from Aristotle.'⁷ In my opinion, Suhrawardi's point of view, which is similar to that of Moore, was originally from Socrates (Socrates' view on definition is discussed in Plato's *Meno*). In this dialogue, Socrates presents the ground for definition as a response to questions such as 'What is excellence?' or 'What is health?' In answering these questions, Socrates tries to define a term first by stating what is common to it. In this case, Aristotle's later definition of genus with *differentia* is one of the possible ways but not the only way of defining a term:

Well, is it only concerning excellence that you think this, Meno, that there is one excellence of a man, another of a woman and so on; or do you think the same about health, too, and size and strength? Do you think health is one thing in a man, another in a woman? Or is it the same pattern everywhere if indeed it is health, whether it is in a man or in anything else whatever?⁸

Socrates also remarks that in some cases there are other ways of defining the same thing. For example, in defining figure, colour, smell or taste, we cannot follow the previous rule of definition, because no *differentia* is involved in defining these terms:

What then is this which has this name 'shape'? Try to say. Suppose you said to the person who asked you in this way either about shape or colour, 'I don't even understand what you mean, sir, nor yet do I know what you are saying'; perhaps he would be surprised and say, 'Don't you understand that I am looking for what is the same in the case of all these?' Or would you not even be able to answer in this case, Meno, if someone were to ask you 'What is it that is the same in the case of all these, the curved and straight and all the other things that you call shapes?' Try to say, so that you can indeed practise for the answer concerning excellence.⁹

In defining figure or colour, Socrates thinks of the second alternative, that of assuming the definition of terms such as figure or colour not by a genus and *differentia* because they do not have *differentiae*. Suhrawardi also, like Socrates, believes that colour is pure genus without *differentia*, and therefore should be known by another cognitive tool directly, namely perception rather

than definition. This introduces the role and significance of sense-perception in Suhrawardi's epistemology.

According to this Muslim thinker, knowledge by definition is not free of shortcomings. All aspects and qualities of a term are not revealed in a definition. There will always be unknown aspects of the entities defined that are not given in a definition. The human mind, therefore, will not be able to cognize the truth of an entity completely by definition. In order to surmount the shortcoming of knowledge by definition, Suhrawardi also talks about innate ideas. He insists that every kind of knowledge begins with a sort of knowledge about the object of inquiry. It is not possible to begin an investigation into the nature of an entity without having any idea about it at all. It is true that an inquiry begins with a conviction that we do not know enough about the object we inquire about. For this reason the inquiry is carried out. Meanwhile we do know something about it. Knowledge always begins with presuppositions and pre-given ideas; these presuppositions are not produced by previous experiences but are innate:

Knowledge is either innate or not innate. When an unknown thing cannot be made known by pointing it out or bringing it to mind and it is something that cannot be attained by the true visions of the great sages, then knowledge of it must depend on things leading to it that are in an order and that are ultimately based on innate knowledge. Otherwise knowledge of anything that man desires to know will depend on previously obtaining an infinite number of things, and he will not even be able to obtain the first step in knowledge – which is absurd.¹⁰

In another argument, Suhrawardi states that the process of defining a term will continue *ad infinitum*, because if a term is defined by an attribute, that attribute needs to be defined by another attribute, and so on. In this case, nothing will be known, which is also absurd. There must be a first principle or a beginning against which our definition of a term and innate ideas can be measured.¹¹ The possibility of knowledge by definition stands on pre-given knowledge. Pre-given knowledge can be seen as *a priori* in the Kantian sense or as a condition that renders knowledge possible. The last and most reliable source of knowledge for Suhrawardi, after knowledge by sense-perception, definition and innate ideas, is intuition or knowledge by illumination (*al-ishraq*). Intuitive knowledge, like perception, is direct and non-representational. There is no mediation between the knower and the known. It is knowledge by 'presence' in which the distinction between the known and the knower is abolished. One object that is really grasped by intuition, as stated by Suhrawardi, is the 'self'. In self-knowledge, which is knowledge by illumination, the object (the self, which is known) is present in the self, which is the knower. Self-knowledge, like the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*, goes beyond doubt and is undeniable. If I doubt, for example, the status of my existence, then I need to exist in order to experience the doubt about my own existence.

Intuitive knowledge is also not confined to the apprehension of the self. It is vital for knowing the intelligences or the inner reality of the world; it is a different way of knowing and does not require intermediate concepts. The intelligence (whether God's or the human mind) knows its object directly. Cognition is, therefore, not necessarily conceptual but the outcome of illuminative intuition, which requires the 'presence' of its object and direct apprehension of it.

Mulla Sadra's epistemology deals extensively with knowledge by intuition (*al-idrak*). This Arabic term has been translated as 'perception', but the term semantically means the act of comprehending, apprehending, attaining, grasping, and then finally perceiving in the sense of knowing something directly without mediation.¹² It is used to describe the process of directly apprehending and attaining the quiddity of objects outside the human mind in order to make it intelligible. It is a direct epistemological encounter with the external world through which the potentiality of knowing becomes actuality. This definition also includes sense-experience. For this reason, Mulla Sadra thinks of sense-perception as the first and the lowest modality of intuition (*al-idrak*). William Chittick and S. M. Khamenei (director of the Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute in Teheran) have translated *al-idrak* as perception.¹³ Perception, then, rather than apprehension, is a unique cognitive power; due to various levels or degrees of intensity of existence cognition also has different modalities and cognitive stages. These stages of cognition in Mulla Sadra's theory of knowledge are in some ways similar to the hierarchy of knowledge in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, with the exception that Hegel's epistemology does not go beyond rational knowledge. According to Hegel, reason can be applied to solve the contradictions between the known and the knower, and in rational knowledge the truth for consciousness becomes consciousness itself.¹⁴ To reach this form of cognition, it is essential for consciousness to move from sense-certainty to perception, and from there to understanding and finally to reason, which is the birthplace of absolute knowledge.¹⁵

For Mulla Sadra, attaining the highest stage of cognition for knowing the Truth does not rely on rationalistic discourse. It is the task of intellectual perception, a cognitive power that transcends the power of reason. How does Mulla Sadra arrive at this conviction? How does he deal with the unity of the known and the knower in his epistemology? When we understand Mulla Sadra's epistemology in the context of his metaphysics we realize that, in his view, knowledge deals mainly with the problem of the relationship between existence as an external reality outside the human mind and the transformation of external reality into mental existence, which is another form of Being.¹⁶ In this way, his understanding of knowledge as the conceptualization of external reality for the sake of unity between the known and the knower is in agreement with Hegel's dialectic process of consciousness described in the

Phenomenology of Mind. It is also important to investigate the nature of this relationship between external and mental existence because it resolves the dichotomy of subject and object and the appropriation of the latter by the former. The transformation of external existence into mental existence is accomplished by conceptualizing the modalities of Being. But Being, unlike its modalities, cannot be known conceptually as it has no essence or universal determinations. Whatever is known through the revelation of universal determinations is a modality of Being. The human mind knows various modalities of Being, which are different in their degrees of perfection and proximity to Being. The possibility of knowing, whether acquired by our sense-experience or intellect, is based on the 'presence' of Being in one form or another. The reality of knowledge is inseparable from the reality of existence. The variety of levels of the modalities of Being is revealed to different levels of perception (*al-idrak*). Since there are three levels of existence there will be three levels of perception: sense-perception, imaginal perception and intellectual perception.¹⁷

In sense-perception, the human soul reflects upon the external object using five senses. Each of these senses is given a specific task and receives a particular form of the sensuous quality of the external object. This passive attitude of the human soul in sense-perception is followed by attention and awareness.¹⁸ These two activities of the soul are interconnected and the former leads to the latter; unless we pay attention to sensuous quality such as sound we will not be aware of it. What is acquired by the five senses is at the same time a confirmation of the 'presence' of the external object for the soul. Awareness, which is the result of the presence of the object to the senses, is direct and necessary: direct because it does not require the conceptualization of its object and is not mediated by representations; necessary because sense-perception will not be able to receive its object unless the object is present. After receiving the sensuous qualities and being aware of the external object, the human soul endeavours to create the sensuous form of this object and to reveal its quiddity. Here, it seems that the passive act of receiving the sensuous qualities of an object is transformed into the activity of constructing the notion of the object by apprehending its quiddity. This stage, in Kant's epistemology, is in the domain of the faculty of understanding rather than sense-perception (sensibility). Understanding and not sense-perception is responsible for constructing the quiddity of a phenomenal object through the application of the subjective categories.¹⁹ The question that arises here is whether the sensuous qualities of the known object exist externally. The answer, for Mulla Sadra, is in the negative. Sense organs are mere instruments and channels required for perception; otherwise it is the human soul not the sense organs that experiences sensation. The eyes do not see colour. They are only organs through which the soul becomes aware of the colour. They are sense organs for seeing but strictly speaking they see nothing, because seeing is perceiving and perception is a faculty of the human soul and not the sense

organ. If we think of the human body as an accidental fact, then the body plays its role in perception as an instrument; it is not intrinsic to this kind of knowledge. Mulla Sadra also believes that the human soul can still perceive if separated from the body without being assisted by sense organs. To return to the question, the sensuous qualities are neither in the senses nor present externally in the object. They are subjective forms and are displayed by the soul when an external object is presented to the sense organs. Empirical cognition is produced as the result of this relationship and the interaction between the subjective forms and the presence of the external object to the senses.²⁰ This view of Mulla Sadra is incompatible with the idea of perception as a passive acceptance of the qualities of an external and independent object. The human soul does not abstract the empirical determinations of an object but transforms the object into something mental. It imposes another form on it, which is pre-existent in the soul. The corporeal form of the object creates only an occasion for revealing the subjective forms that exist in the human soul.

What I understand from this account of perception by Mulla Sadra is that the human soul does not rely completely on the external object for empirical cognition. Rather, the external object stimulates the soul through the mediation of the sense organs to yield the cognized forms that transform the object into a new kind of being, a mental being, or a being that is known by the soul. If we think of cognition as the appropriation of the estranged object by the intelligence, then the material existence of the object cannot become the subject matter of cognition. In perception, the human soul experiences a form that belongs to the material object. This form has a mental character and is internal and subjective. For this reason, cognition is possible by distancing the intelligence from matter. Meanwhile, the cognitive form that becomes explicit at the time of presenting a material object to the senses is not the 'essence', as thought by Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophers and the *ishraqi* thinkers. It is another aspect of being that exists internally in the mind. Since the possibility of epistemology is grounded on ontology, whatever is perceived and known is nothing but another form of Being. In perception, the human soul transforms an object that exists externally (*al-wujud al-'aini*) into mental existence (*al-wujud al-dihni*) after this interaction between the intelligence and the external form of existence.

Although it is difficult to accept that sense-perception in Mulla Sadra's epistemology is mere passivity or acquisition, we can still state that imagination, unlike sense-perception, requires some skilful activity. The human soul creates its own images without relying on the external world to produce them. The power of imagination at the same time is not limited to the creation of these subjective images; it transcends the realm of subjectivity and attains the 'World of Images' (*'alam al'khayal*), which is held by thinkers such as Ibn 'Arabi and Suhrawardi to be a real world beyond the world of corporeal beings.²¹ In this case, there will be two kinds of images: subjective images,

which are created by the power of imagination, and objective images, with their own ontological reality outside the human soul.

The human soul, after becoming aware of the form of the external object by sense-perception, is able to recall that form and reflect upon it by imagination (*takhayul*), even when the object is not present.²² This power of imagination is conditioned by the sensuous forms, and relies on them. Not having the sense-perception of an object means not being able to imagine what it looks like. Mulla Sadra talks about another kind of imagination between sense-perception and intellectual perception. He calls it *tawahum* or *wahm*.²³ The literal meaning of this term in Arabic is 'illusion', 'delusion', 'fancy', 'misapprehension' or 'imagination'. But for Mulla Sadra, the philosophical meaning of this term is far from illusion or delusion. He uses it to designate the creative power of imagination in individuals. William Chittick translates this term as 'sense-intuition' and adds that the medieval scholars translated it as '*estimatio*'.²⁴ This type of imagination is for the apprehension of the intelligible universal forms without relying on a particular being. In this way, *tawahum* is more significant than *takhayul* for three reasons: first it is not conditioned by the objects of sense-perception; second, it is closer to the intellectual intuition as it apprehends the universal forms disjoined from the corporeal objects; and third, it is a creative power in the human soul.

Ibn Sina has also written on this cognitive tool before Mulla Sadra. He believes that *wahm* functioned as a faculty in the human mind and was mainly responsible for apprehending particular ideas in particular corporeal objects. The realization of love, for example, in a particular person, or being fearful in facing a particularly dangerous phenomenon, is the task of *wahm*. Mulla Sadra, however, says that Ibn Sina's form of realization is the function of reason attached to imagination. A person, for example, is afraid of an external threat because he/she reasons about it. Mulla Sadra's view was rejected by Sabzawari, one of the followers of the metaphysics of Mulla Sadra who remarks that, since animals become fearful in the face of danger, *wahm* should not be attached to reason, because animals do not have reason yet experience fear.

It is important to mention here that the idea of *tawahum* as a type of imagination was not originally Mulla Sadra's. Thinkers before him, such as Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi, endorsed it in their epistemology. Each believed that imagination is an important faculty of the human mind for grasping the realm of ideas between the physical and intellectual worlds. As we see, and as also stated by Oliver Leaman, Mulla Sadra employed the technical language of Ibn 'Arabi in dealing with the problem of cognition. That language also influenced Mulla Sadra's understanding of the mystical implications of knowledge.²⁵ According to Ibn 'Arabi, imagination is in the domain of the human soul and a faculty between sense-perception and intellect.²⁶ The knowledge produced by imagination is of the *Barzakh* and the world of the

corporeal bodies through which spiritual entities manifest themselves.²⁷ The world of imagination is an intermediary realm between the corporeal and non-corporeal worlds. It is divided into unbounded or absolute imagination (*al-khayal al-mutlaq*) and bounded imagination (*al-khayal al-muqayyad*). In the unbounded abode of imagination between the being of God and nothingness, all beings come into existence. The bounded imagination is the creative power of individuals that functions as an intermediary power between the corporeal and the spiritual worlds.²⁸ The bounded imagination is further subdivided by Ibn 'Arabi into contiguous (*al-muttasil*) and discontinuous (*al-munfasil*). The former lies in the individual soul's production of images with the aid of perception, while the latter lies between the corporeal and spiritual worlds and has no relation to perception or images produced with the aid of perception. For Ibn 'Arabi, *Barzakh* is the world of creative imagination and he describes it as (*'alam al-mithal*), the ideal world, where all opposites become self-manifest.²⁹ This task of imagination, namely bringing the opposites together, is inherited from the creative nature of imagination. When two opposites meet, as in Hegel's dialectic, their synthesis, or the third element, emerges. The emergence of this new element takes place in the realm of *Barzakh*.³⁰ The world of imagination plays a significant role ontologically in the rise of new entities in the corporeal world. Mulla Sadra himself is aware of the influence of Ibn 'Arabi on his theory of knowledge and discusses the views of his predecessors in detail in *al-Asfar*. But, unlike Suhrawardi or Ibn 'Arabi, he does not think of the world of imagination as something ontological that exists independent of the human mind. It is subjective and is created by the mind, but when the created ideas of imagination are externalized, for example in works of art, they become objective realities.

Moving away from the realm of sense-perception is not a venture into the realm of abstraction. It is an endeavour towards grasping the higher levels of existence until the human mind is able to attain utmost proximity to Being.³¹ With intellectual intuition, another source of knowledge, the human mind tries to realize its spiritual ambition. At this stage, epistemology becomes a vehicle for the human mind to obtain its ultimate goal by moving away from the philosophical and scientific boundaries of cognition to the mystical and theosophical. This shift is determined by trans-substantial changes in the world and in the human soul. The aim of epistemology is, then, not cognition or understanding of external reality, but, as in Plato, the transformation and elevation of the human soul from a lower rank of existence to a higher where it can unite with the Active Intellect. The position of seeker of knowledge at this level of being resembles the position of the freed prisoner in the allegory of the cave in the *Republic*. It is liberation of the human soul from the bondage of shadows and material existence, that is, from a less perfect level of existence. When the freed prisoner sees the light of the sun and arrives at a

higher level of existence, he or she does not reject other faculties of knowledge such as perception and imagination. The freed person is perfected and substantially changed from a lower to a higher level of existence. Hence the journey through trans-substantial change means that the soul is changed through acquiring knowledge and has become a better (higher-rank) human being.

In intellectual intuition, the human intelligence becomes aware of the transcendent forms that exist ontologically in a Platonic sense. These transcendent forms, however, are not universals; each is seen as an individual, non-corporeal being. The forms also unite and become identical with the intelligence when they are grasped by intellectual intuition. This awareness of the non-corporeal forms and their unity with the intelligence is determined by the spiritual station of the human soul. The intelligence is unable to apprehend these forms unless it moves away from obsession with the material world. This epistemological development is also a dynamic process based on the dynamic nature of its object. Since everything in the world is in constant substantial change, the knower and the known never remain the same. Also, the nature of the reality of being and of trans-substantial change cannot be grasped fully by rationalistic discourse, or by representation. The rationalistic discourse is incapable of understanding the true nature of reality. This view is similar to that of Henri Bergson in his understanding of reality and 'duration'. In making a clear distinction between analytic or scientific knowledge and metaphysical knowledge, Bergson concludes that 'duration' as a restless continuity in the evolutionary process of life, and consciousness can be attained by intuition. In intuition, consciousness comes in direct contact with reality without being mediated by representations. This kind of knowledge, which is not representational or translated into concepts, is absolute and perfect in comparison with knowledge by representations or scientific knowledge.³²

The realm of intellectual intuition contains the transcendent Platonic Forms. It is also the realm of the Active Intellect. The human intelligence becomes one with the forms through its union with the Active Intellect. This union between the Active Intellect and multiple individual souls does not affect the simplicity in the nature of the former. The Active Intellect and its knowledge of the realm of the Platonic Forms remain simple and identical, because this rank of being is perfect and remote from the abode of multiplicity and the influence of trans-substantial change.

Knowledge by presence has characteristics of its own that distinguish it from knowledge by representation. It is direct and unmediated by concepts, and indubitable. Since it is neither representational nor non-propositional, it is neither false nor true. Its truth is beyond empirical verification and assertion in propositions. Furthermore, in knowledge by presence the distinction between intelligent and intelligible disappears. The knower and the known

object unite as one being. Finally, this type of knowledge is beyond the domain of demonstration by reason. The intellectual intuition as the source of knowledge by presence becomes a mystical tool of cognition (*al-kashif*), or in the Bergsonian sense it becomes the fountainhead of metaphysical knowledge beyond the reach of scientific analysis.

Mulla Sadra deals with 'knowledge by presence' and intellectual intuition in another work, *Se Asl* ('Three Principles'), written in Persian. He explains in this work that there are three hindrances in the human mind to obtaining knowledge by presence and experiencing intellectual intuition. These hindrances are not related to the nature of knowledge obtained and verified by the human soul. They are simply conditions influencing the soul and become impediments to the spiritual progress of the individual. These hindrances are the non-realization of the inner nature of the self on the part of individuals, seeking lust and wealth, and the temptation of the commanding self to pursue evil as excellence and excellence as evil.³³ These three principles, which are not epistemological and are not in the quality of knowledge obtained, are necessary conditions of the spiritual path of the human soul towards the realization of Truth.

Generally speaking, intellectual initiation is successful when the individual soul realizes its own reality and knows itself as a spiritual entity rather than a material body. This is the first station of the spiritual guidance for attaining the Truth by gnosis (*irfan*) or knowledge by presence. The second hindrance is inherited from the relationship between the soul and the material world. This relationship becomes a hindrance when the soul is attracted towards entertaining the body and seeking lust and material possessions. 'Allamah Tabataba'i, who adheres to the existentialist school of Mulla Sadra, believes that lust and material interest conceal the love and passion for divine beauty and perfection. This love manifests itself in the heart of the seeker of the Truth only through regular and persistent self-control (*muraqabah*) and the renunciation of desire for the material world.³⁴ It is worth mentioning that Mulla Sadra's advocacy of intellectual intuition and knowledge by presence is not the negation of knowledge by representation and demonstration. In his epistemology, all sources of knowledge have their own function and participate in unveiling the truth of Being. His position, like Hegel's in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, is to accommodate various cognitive sources at different levels of the revelation of Being because the gradations of Being are known by different cognitive tools. Yet it is intellectual intuition not reason that is able to grasp reality fully and directly. Science, philosophy and theosophy (*hikmah*) are interconnected in the sense that they are ontologically conditioned by the presence of Being, and each deals with one aspect of Being, with the exception of theosophy, which relies on intellectual intuition to attain the truth of Being.³⁵ This antagonism with the rationalist philosophers in respect of demonstrative knowledge is grounded mainly on the

intrinsic limitation of discursive knowledge for understanding the meaning of Being directly. Mulla Sadra, under the sway of Sufism in general and the *ishraqi* epistemology (Illuminationism) in particular, does not allow this limitation to curtail the endeavour of the human mind to 'un-conceal' Being. By insisting on knowledge by presence, Mulla Sadra transcends the limitation of reason and the boundaries of discursive knowledge. The unlimited power of intellectual intuition compensates for that constraint and goes beyond the power of reason.

Another important point to be mentioned here is the union of the intelligent (*al-'aqil*) and the intelligible (*al-ma'qul*). In the history of Muslim philosophy this epistemological matter is also discussed by Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers such as Ibn Sina. The truth of the external reality for Ibn Sina and other Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers was based on correspondence between the external object and its representation in the mind. Although this idea is ascribed to Aristotle, it is difficult to claim that Aristotle made a clear distinction between intelligent and intelligible at all levels of cognition in his epistemology. In *Metaphysics* and *De Anima*, Aristotle refers to the incorporeal intelligible substances as intelligibles that unite with their intellect.³⁶ This Aristotelian notion of unity was later expressed by Alexander of Aphrodisia (active c. 200 AD) in *De Intellectu* and by Porphyry (c. 232–304) as the unity of the intelligible with the intelligent. Mulla Sadra also discusses the ideas of these thinkers in *al-Asfar* when he argues against the Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers.³⁷ Ibn Sina considers this unity a poetical nonsense and meaningless.³⁸ However, in *Al-Mabda' wal-ma'ad*, particularly in the discussion on the nature of knowledge of the Necessary Being, Ibn Sina, like Aristotle, holds the view that in the Necessary Being intelligent and intelligible are one and united.³⁹ In criticizing Ibn Sina's position, Mulla Sadra claims that Ibn Sina was under the sway of Aristotle's cosmology. He does not accept the emergence of a new element resulting from a unity at the expense of terminating the two opposing elements.⁴⁰ Mulla Sadra also discusses this problem in *Risala fi Ittihad al-'aaqil wal-ma'qul* ('Treatise on the Unity of the Intelligent and the Intelligible').⁴¹ How does Mulla Sadra solve this epistemological problem? On what ground does he demonstrate the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible? Mulla Sadra's solution can be divided into two parts. The first is based on his ontological system of the primacy of Being and the understanding of the meaning of Being as the principle of unity beneath the multiplicity of the phenomenal world. The second part is an exposition argued from correlativity or correlation.

I will begin with the argument based on the doctrine of the primacy of Being and explain how the intelligent and the intelligible become one ontologically. It is apparent, and we may agree with Ibn Sina in his criticism of this unity, that it is not possible for two different things to unite but that there can be a connection between them. Mulla Sadra's ontology makes it clear that

the different elements are all bound together by their inner reality. Difference is only one aspect of reality; there is a unity beneath this interconnection. All elements are gradations of Being; they are only different in their intensity of perfection due to their distance and proximity to Being. There is neither being for itself, nor is there anything that can stand by itself alone. All beings including intelligence are taken as real on the ground of the reality of Being as their ontological foundation. What appears for intelligence as intelligible is at the same time nothing other than a modality of Being as the ontological foundation. The intelligent and the intelligible might be conceived as two different things phenomenologically, but, ontologically, they are the same in existing.⁴² As Fazlur Rahman says, the external world is not a different reality that contains entities distinct from mental existents; it

merely denotes a status or level of existence, i.e., a level where things operate with their natural properties. When, again, something is said to be 'in the mind', the mind cannot in this use be conceived of as a 'container', but it simply means that the mind has a set of properties or essences, which is able to apply to the external reality and to classify things.⁴³

The outcome of this view is that truth does not reside in the object known externally, but is defined in terms of its being known internally. This epistemological interpretation of the mental existents is reminiscent of Kant's analysis of the application of the table of the categories in the faculty of understanding. The categories also exist in the mind and their application renders knowledge of the external world possible. Mulla Sadra also tried to establish the unity between the intelligent and the intelligible by focusing on the point that these two elements are not substantially dissimilar. They both belong to the reality of Being. In order to elucidate this point it is helpful to mention Hegel's view of cognition as a process of conceptualization or idealization of the external object by consciousness in which consciousness transforms the object into something mental which then becomes the property of consciousness and unites with it. The external object, after being conceptualized, no longer posits itself as something external and different.⁴⁴ The experience that consciousness undergoes brings consciousness to know itself through knowing its object. The object known to consciousness is thus another aspect of consciousness. It is posited and developed by consciousness. Cognition, which is always relational under the transformation of the known object, becomes consciousness of consciousness or self-consciousness. In self-consciousness all distinctions between consciousness and its external object disappear and the object is reduced to mere concepts and hence is inseparable from consciousness. The difference between Hegel's view and that of Mulla Sadra is that Mulla Sadra does not intend to transform the object into mere concepts, nor does he deny its external reality of it. He insists on this unity through his understanding of the doctrine of the primacy

of Being, a significant ontological doctrine that considers intelligent and intelligible to be two sides of the same coin. Therefore, there is no distinction between intelligent and intelligible and between mental and external existents, as both belong to Being.

In the second part of his argument, Mulla Sadra proves the truth of this unity by arguing from correlativity. He demonstrates that there is an inherent correlation between the intelligent and the intelligible. By this he means that their joint occurrence is not accidental but is essentially connected. This correlation, like that between cause and effect, is necessary and undeniable. Whenever there is a cause, that cause has an effect, and an effect is always produced by a cause. Likewise, the 'existence' of the intelligible is possible through the 'existence' of the intelligent.⁴⁵ To explain this correlativity, Mulla Sadra makes a distinction between two kinds of intelligible: the first kind is accidental and dependent on the material existence of the object; the second is essential and does not depend on the material existence of the object. It is a separate intellectual form that relies on the mind. The essential intelligible, which is at the same time the actuality of a being, is inseparable from the intelligent.⁴⁶ In this case the intelligent, in intellectualizing the intelligible, intellectualizes itself, and their complete unity is established as they depend on each other to exist.

Another important philosophical issue discussed by Mulla Sadra within the problem of knowledge is God's knowledge of particulars. Generally speaking, there are two opposing views in Islamic thought on understanding God's knowledge of particulars: philosophical and religious. The religious viewpoint, which is not the subject of our discussion here, relies on the authority of the foundation text of Islam, the Qur'an, and asserts God's knowledge of the infinite number of particular beings created by Him. Muslim philosophers have put forward different views on this. Some reject it and others assert God's knowledge of Himself as well as of the world. The Peripatetic Neoplatonist Muslim philosophers, in particular Ibn Sina, held the view that God's knowledge is not derived from the external objects outside His mind; otherwise His knowledge would be conditioned by and dependent on them. To Ibn Sina, God's mind should be creative rather than receptive, active and not passive. He also states that God knows particulars not as particulars but in a universal way. Other thinkers identified God's knowledge with Platonic Forms and discussed the relationship of these Forms with the essence of God. The problem which arises here is that of the nature of God's knowledge and the way He knows the world. Is God's knowledge dependent on the world? Is it prior to the creation of the world? Or, more specifically, should we ask how God knows the world?

In Ibn Sina's ontology God is the Necessary Being and identical with His essence. From the Necessary Being emanates the first intellect alone, because the Necessary Being is absolutely simple. Only one thing emanates from its

existence. The first intellect, which is the first possible existence and is actualized by the Necessary Being, is no longer absolutely simple. It has a dual nature and gives rise to two entities: the second intellect and the highest sphere. This dual process of emanation continues until the tenth intellect and the sublunary world are emanated. The Necessary Being remains absolutely simple and aloof from the domain of multiplicity. But how does the Necessary Being know the world of multiplicity without having multiplicity in its essence? Before answering this question it is worth mentioning that for Ibn Sina God knows Himself as well as the world, because He is the originator of the world, but His knowing of the world is different from the way human beings come to learn about external objects and is at the same time unique. For example, Ibn Sina says:

It is necessary to know first that the knowledge (*'ilm*) of the Necessary Being is not like our knowledge nor is it analogous (*qiyas*) to our knowledge. The first [kind of knowledge] requires multiplicity, and the second does not. That which requires multiplicity is called 'psychological' knowledge and that which does not require [it] is called 'intellectual' knowledge.⁴⁷

The uniqueness of the Necessary Being's knowledge is due to the ontological status enjoyed by this being. Its being is unlike the being of the ontic beings in the world: it is absolutely simple and disjoined from matter. For this reason, God's knowledge also does not happen in time (history) and is not related to the changeable world.⁴⁸ Time, multiplicity and change belong to the sublunary world and not to the realm of the Necessary Being. Accordingly, the knowledge possessed by the Necessary Being does not change because it neither happened in time nor is empirical:

It cannot be that the knowledge (*'ilm*) of the Necessary Being happens within time, so that it could sat that now it is so and tomorrow it is not so, and [so that] its judgment is according to how It exists today and It will be tomorrow, and then afterwards how It is tomorrow [and] It is not [any longer] today.⁴⁹

In contrast to the human way of obtaining knowledge, the Necessary Being becomes aware of the particulars not empirically by perception but in a universal way. He knows, for example, that there is war in the world and knows all the antecedents and consequences of war. He knows that wars will happen and how to differentiate war from peace or distinguish war by conventional weapons from war by non-conventional weapons; but where and when a particular war will occur is not known to the Necessary Being, because this happens in a particular space and at a specific time in the human history.

Those who affirm God's knowledge of particulars argue that God's knowledge is either identical with His essence or separate. The first view was advocated by the Mu'tazilites, a group of Muslim rationalist theologians in

Basrah and Baghdad.⁵⁰ They claimed that there was a new relationship between the essence of God and the divine attributes by saying that God neither possessed the attributes nor were they in His essence, but the divine essence and the attributes were identical and the same. For example, God's knowledge is eternal and not something other than God; otherwise knowledge becomes another independent eternal being. First, in the sense of numerical unity or absolute unity, this denies the existence of more than one God, or polytheism. This meaning of unity (*al-tawhid*) is in agreement with the Qur'anic notion of monotheism. Second, it is used in the sense of internal unity and simplicity, meaning that God's essence is free from essential plurality and composition.

If we go back to the history of Judeo-Christian theology, we find that the argument for the unity of God was propounded by Judaeus Philo (20 BCE–40 CE) and restated by Spinoza (1632–1677) in his pantheistic philosophy. For Philo, eternity is an essential quality of God; no other being but He can be eternal. This view represents the established Judeo-Christian and Islamic principle of monotheism. Its denial constitutes the rejection of monotheism in these three Semitic religions.

Spinoza espouses the Philonic principle by putting the argument into another logical form, saying that if there are two substances such as incorporeal God and the corporeal world, they should be absolutely different or absolutely the same. If there were two substances having nothing in common and being absolutely different, one could not become the 'cause' of the other. If the existence of two different substances is not logically possible, then we must consider the case of the existence of two similar substances which are absolutely alike. Such substances cannot be distinct, that is two, unless, in addition to their common qualities, they possess some other quality in which they differ. As Spinoza concludes, 'Two substances would be granted as having the same attribute, which is absurd.'⁵¹

The Mu'tazilites also claimed that 'essences' are known by God in the state of their 'subsistence', in the state of non-existence, or before coming into the realm of existence. Ibn 'Arabi shares this view and argues that the essences were in God's mind prior to their actual existence in the real world. Some Muslim thinkers also identified God's knowledge with the Platonic Forms, which were considered separate from God with their own ontological reality. This approach, which was taken by some Sufis, was in agreement with the Hanbali School, the followers of which argued for the reality and eternity of the divine attributes. Knowledge as one of the attributes was considered both non-identical with the divine essence and eternal.⁵² Suhrawardi had a different idea. He insisted that God's knowledge was separate and its objects included all things emanated from Him. The emanated objects are multiple and under the sway of change, but God's knowledge is not.⁵³ Suhrawardi also thinks of God's knowledge of the world in the context that God is perfect and the knowledge of His perfection cannot be denied.

In Mulla Sadra's ontology, essences belong to the realm of the contingent beings, which are finite. By contrast, God is pure Being and the finite attributes of the contingent beings or essences cannot be ascribed to Him. Here, Mulla Sadra distances himself from the views of the Mu'tazilites and Ibn 'Arabi. His criticism of those who think of God's knowledge as a Platonic Form is based on two points. First, he states that if knowledge is separate from God and is not something in the mind of God, it is essential to find out how God knows this separate and distant form. Second, the Platonic Forms are posterior to God's existence, so how can we say that God's knowledge, which is identical to the Platonic Forms, is eternal? Also, if God's knowledge is a separate form, *a priori* knowledge is required for knowing that form, which will become an endless process.⁵⁴

Mulla Sadra's main confrontation on God's knowledge of the particulars is with Ibn Sina. While he agrees with him that knowledge does not affect God's simplicity, he is critical of Ibn Sina's indifference towards the union of the intelligent (*al-'aaqil*) and the intelligible (*al-ma'qul*). According to Mulla Sadra, on the ground of this union it is possible to conclude that Being is the only reality and that knowledge is derived from Being. Since Being produces a systematic ambiguity of gradation or its own modalities, knowledge should be seen in this way. Another difference between Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina is on God's knowledge as 'accident', in which God's knowledge is described as *a posteriori*, conditioned by and dependent on the objects known outside God's mind. Hence the mind of God remains receptive rather than creative.⁵⁵ Against this, Mulla Sadra developed three arguments. In the first argument, he maintains that knowledge, as one of the divine attributes, can be neither mental nor non-existential. To prove this point, Mulla Sadra classifies the attributes into three types. The first two are subjective, existing only in the mind, and existential, meaning ontological, and attributes as properties of their accidents' 'essences'. For him, it is impossible to think of the divine attributes as subjective or mere properties of the mind. The third type of attributes become existential reality when the essences emerge in the world or come into existence with the ontic beings. As a consequence of this, knowledge as one of the divine attributes cannot be described as something mental. Therefore, it must be an existential reality.⁵⁶

The second argument deals with the principle that obtaining perfect knowledge of an effect is acquired only through its cause. This principle appears to be self-contradictory, because it does not mean that the effect is known only through knowing its cause. In thinking of the primordialness of Being in Mulla Sadra's ontology, we should insist that this principle stand on the ground of 'existential' cause and 'existential' effect. The proposition 'Whenever there is *p*, then there will be *q*' should be modified into 'This is *p*, hence there is *q*'. The second is an existential proposition, and an indication of existential *q*, which is directly caused by *p*. Hence the forms, which are

caused by God's mind, are directly known by Him as existential realities rather than *a posteriori* concepts.⁵⁷ In the third argument, Mulla Sadra, in rejecting the idea of God's knowledge as mental or subjective, disagrees that something at a lower rank of existence can become the source and the cause of an entity at a higher rank of existence. Since God's knowledge is the cause of the contingent world, it is not mental but a real existence. Otherwise, God's knowledge as the cause of the contingent world will stay at a lower rank of existence and the contingent world at a higher.⁵⁸

Having critically evaluated the views of his predecessors, Mulla Sadra relies on his own ontological understanding of reality to solve this problem. As is mentioned in Chapter Four, Being is the primordial reality on which the multiplicity of the contingent world stands. But Being itself, as the reality of all things, is simple: what is real in everything is its being rather than its essence. Being is, in this sense, equivocal and not univocal. It is the reality and a common ground of all things or the Being of them, but with different intensity and weakness. The Being of a thing and a thing are not two different realities, but one and the same. The reality of Being is, therefore, objective or an ontological reality of all things. The multiplicity of the contingent world does not affect the simple nature of Being. The principle of unity for them as well as their diversity is something grounded on the unified ground because nothing grounded exists without its own ground. This understanding of Being and its relationship with the contingent world of beings helps us to understand God's cognitive relationship with multiplicity. All things are present in God's simple being. When God thinks about Himself and this self-knowledge does not involve duality of the intellect and the intelligible, God comes to know about everything, including all particulars, without suffering multiplicity.⁵⁹ Although Being or God is the cause of multiplicity and all contingent beings are modalities of the systematic ambiguity of Being, Being is not affected by them. God's knowledge of particulars or His modalities is nothing more than self-knowledge; this does not infect the simplicity and infinity of His existence with multiplicity and finitude. God, which is pure Being for Mulla Sadra, has no essence, but His being is inclusive of all forms and knows them in an order as His affects. He knows all of them simply by contemplating Himself. The self-knowledge of God passes through three stages. In the first stage, God realizes His own absolute unity. In the second, various attributes become manifest in His knowledge, but since all of them belong to the same source they have an underlying unity. Finally, at the third stage, God's knowledge gives rise to the Platonic Forms in the non-corporeal world. Here every Platonic Form stands by itself as a unique form; for this reason it is called the stage of distinction.⁶⁰ At this stage the contingent modalities of Being such as different corporeal entities come into existence. As a consequence of this, the self-knowledge of God is the knowledge of the world, because the world is the self-manifestation of God.

In Conclusion

The significance of Mulla Sadra's philosophy should not be seen in the light of its role in the continuity of the intellectual and philosophical tradition in the Muslim world. Its task was not to replicate what was produced before; instead, it represented a break with the philosophical tradition and the emergence of a new philosophical system based on a new ontology. This new development was antagonistic to the dominant philosophical thought of its time and stood against the 'essentialist' intellectual persuasion of the school of Illuminationism of Suhrawardi.

From the very beginning of this book it was argued that Mulla Sadra's philosophical 'turn' or shift from the philosophical position of the primacy of essence to the primacy of Being and to thinking of Being as the primordial metaphysical reality is similar to the ontological enterprise of *Being and Time* by Martin Heidegger. To elucidate this claim I have tried, first, to suggest a commonality of philosophical tradition against which Mulla Sadra and Heidegger communicate their discontent. Second, the similarities between Mulla Sadra's ontology and that of Heidegger are explained in the stream of thought in this work where the need for comparison arises.

Similarities between the ontological enterprises of these two thinkers are discussed mainly on the grounds that Mulla Sadra and Heidegger advocated the primordialness of Being and held the view that Aristotle's logic was incapable of revealing the meaning of Being. Both thinkers also argued against Plato's metaphysics as a foundation of the philosophical tradition on which the essentialism of Suhrawardi and the nihilism of Western thought relied.

Mulla Sadra's new ontological system begins with the primordialness of Being. Unlike Suhrawardi, who thought that 'essences' were real, Mulla Sadra argued for the primacy of Being. This shift from the primacy of essence to the primacy of Being is described as a 'turn' from the core elements of Suhrawardi's metaphysics towards a contrary ontological view. The essentialism of Suhrawardi, according to Mulla Sadra in *al-Masha'ir*, led to the 'darkness of illusion' and neglected the fundamental philosophical questions concerning the meaning of Being in favour of investigating the nature of something less fundamental. It sacrificed the ground for the grounded.

Mulla Sadra's description of the dominant metaphysical tradition of his time as the 'darkness of illusion' is reminiscent of Heidegger's notion of the 'abandonment of Being' or the 'concealment of the truth' in his understanding of the Platonic and the post-Platonic traditions in the West. Both philosophical traditions (Illuminationism and Platonism) abandoned or shrouded

in darkness the Being of beings as the inner reality and the ground on which all beings stand. This led to the oblivion of Being and to the thinking of Being as 'essence'. In Heidegger's view, the oblivion of Being is a process in which the truth of Being is concealed; as described by Mulla Sadra it is the state of untruth or 'darkness of illusion'. Suhrawardi's metaphysics is, therefore, like that of Plato, in that it represents 'nihilism' or the thinking of Being as nothing or un-real. Overcoming the 'darkness of illusion' or 'nihilism' is possible only through turning to Being as the sole fundamental metaphysical reality. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger describes this turning as another beginning, a new epoch, and a transition from the withdrawal of Being to its re-emergence behind the appearance of beings. In insisting on similarities between Mulla Sadra's and Heidegger's metaphysics I do not intend to neglect their differences. It is clear that Mulla Sadra describes Being as a conscious transcendent reality that has a purpose in manifesting itself. It is the first principle beyond the gradations of its own modalities. For this reason, Mulla Sadra's metaphysics, unlike that of Heidegger, should be seen as an onto-theological system with a metaphysical objective and a realized end.

In his critical evaluation of essentialism or the illuminative philosophy of Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra examines three ontological positions: Being is prior to essence, posterior to it, or Being and essence co-exist simultaneously. Thinking of Being as prior to essence signifies that Being can stand by itself without its essence. This ontological position at the rank of Pure Being is accepted because Pure Being is without essence; but a problem arises if we think of essence as prior to being, or conversely of being as posterior to essence. If the primacy of essence is accepted by Mulla Sadra as true, it implies that essence exists without Being. But for this, essence has to exist or needs another being to rely on, which leads to a vicious regress. The third position is that existence and essence co-exist simultaneously. This ontological view involves the notion that essence is in existence. In this case, essence again needs another existence to rely on for its existence. As a consequence of this, essence cannot be without prior existence.

Mulla Sadra concludes that the qualification of essence by existence is an intellectual operation. Neither existence nor essence is prior to the other, nor do they have a state of simultaneity, since nothing can be prior, posterior or simultaneous to itself. Both are ontologically inseparable in the ranks below the rank of Pure Being and are different only in thinking when the human mind apprehends an ontic being.

What, then, does the primacy of Being mean if these three positions are refuted? How can we talk about the primacy of Being? In my opinion Mulla Sadra's argument against the second and the third ontological positions should be understood with reference to the existence of the ontic beings. There is no doubt that Pure Being is without essence and we cannot talk about the priority or posteriority of its essence. Mulla Sadra believes that Being and

essence, like the ground and the grounded, are ontologically inseparable, and are different realities in the ontological region of becoming only in thinking and for thinking. When a being is conceived and analysed into its determinations, the Being of this being appears in thinking to be distinct from these determinations. This intellectual apprehension does not coincide with the inner reality of Being, because essence is not distinct from an ontic entity, nor is existence an addition to essence. It is only in thinking that the priority of one over the other, in particular of essence, becomes evident, because thinking analyses each entity into existence and essence. Essence appears as the prior factor due to its nature as a universal determination apprehended by the intellect, whereas existence is not apprehended. Here, the primacy of essence becomes a mental factor, and Being remains as an ontological ground inaccessible to rational thinking. Mulla Sadra elucidates the distinction between Being and beings in a number of ways: as the division of Being into unity and multiplicity (modalities), as necessary and contingent; and then as independent and dependent (connective). In these divisions, multiplicity, contingent and dependent are understood in their relationship with Being, which stands as their unity or necessary and independent reality. For example, multiplicity is possible only on the ground of unity, because the beings are nothing more than the self-manifestation of a single, simple reality in its own modalities. Whatever exists and the human intellect becomes aware of in intellectual experience, including the 'self', is nothing but a modality of Being.

The distinction between beings (phenomena) and their essences arises when beings are analysed intellectually into categorical determinations. In the world external to the intellect, these beings are not separable from their essences. The case with Being is completely distinct, because Being (or *Sein* in the Heideggerian sense) is Pure Being and has no universal determinations. This description of Being as a reality without universal determinations retains Being beyond the domain of Aristotle's logic and rationalistic apprehension. All beings are grounded on Being and are known by it, but at the same time Being cannot be defined. Being, then, is the ontological as well as epistemological precondition for the world and our cognizance of beings, but the logical definition of genus and specific difference is not applicable to it. In this traditional way (by relying on Aristotelian rule for definition), Being is indefinable.

Another important point is the systematic ambiguity of the gradation of Being (*tashkik al-wujud*). In this process, Being manifests itself vertically as well as horizontally. It begins with the most perfect rank of Being to the least perfect, such as prime matter. The other direction of *tashkik* determines the transformation of the world horizontally through successive and infinite forms. This is analogous to the gradation of light in Suhrawardi's metaphysics, but for Mulla Sadra it is Being rather than light (essence) that creates

its own modalities. Being is viewed as equivocal and not univocal. This is a common characteristic of all things or the Being of beings, but it differs in its intensity and weakness. The Being of a thing and a thing are not two different realities but one thing and the same at the same time. Being is a single reality but with ranks and grades of its own modalities. All beings are but ontic *coagula* of a single ontological reality. This reality should not be understood as this or that being but as the Being of beings and something transcendent and grasped intuitively.

I have interpreted Mulla Sadra's concept of the 'transcendence' of Being in two ways: ontologically and epistemologically. Ontologically, Being is the Being of all beings and their source. All things emanate from Being. The relationship between Being and beings in terms of the doctrine of emanation is that Being, as the fountainhead of all emanated beings, is not immanent but a reality that transcends them. Epistemologically, Being can be seen as a precondition for our knowledge of the world as well as our own existence, because it is a reality on which the existence of all beings relies. Our experience and knowledge of beings is possible only by virtue of their 'Being', and Being at the same time is beyond the domain of perception and rationalistic discourse. It is neither this nor that being of our experience but something transcendent.

Mulla Sadra's ontology, in particular the doctrine of systematic ambiguity of Being, as analysed in Chapter Five, bridges the gulf between unity and multiplicity. This bridging is realized on the ground of the principle of identity in difference or unity in diversity. Being as a unity and identity contains the multiplicity of its own modification. The external world is characterized by unity and diversity. Diversity is a mode of the single and simple reality of Being that exists only on the ground of unity.

The systematic ambiguity of Being is an increase and decrease in the intensity of existence. For this reason, I conclude that it is not a change in the 'essence' of a being but an existential movement in the core of its existence. The qualitative and quantitative change in a being is not seen as a gradual intensification of a particular quality, i.e., whiteness, but rather a replacement of a former quality by a new one. This is also the case with a definite quantity of an ontic being: a new quantity replaces the old quantity. As a result, the world is in constant change and Being is in a pattern of renewal and evolution until it reaches its own culmination where no further change is thinkable. What undergoes change and at the same time endures in this evolutionary process of the world is Being. All changes occur in Being and by Being, which is called trans-substantial change. This doctrine is the keystone of Mulla Sadra's ontology and the ground for developing other aspects of his philosophy. It is the ground for our understanding of the world and of human knowledge. Being is, then, in a self-evolutionary process and it is the only cause that determines this process. Nor does Mulla Sadra see this existential

movement of the world as blind or capricious. It has a purpose and a realized end. The inner motive for accomplishing this task is a mystic force of love (*'ishq*), present in all beings and causing the lower-ranked beings to long for beings of the higher ranks of existence to obtain perfection. The vertical direction, in contrast to the horizontal direction of the systematic ambiguity of Being, is one from potentiality to actuality for the sake of perfection. It finally reaches its goal in human existence with the rise of the perfect human being (*al-insan al-kamil*), who apprehends the divine realm and attains unity with the Intelligences or divine attributes. I also argue that the vertical direction of this movement is similar to the dialectical movement in Hegel's philosophy and to the idea of creative evolution in Bergson's thought.

I have also mentioned that the concept of trans-substantial change has religious as well as philosophical consequences. It can change our understanding of the notions of resurrection and divine retribution and initiate discussion on the transmigration of the soul. All these notions deal with the identity of the human existence that undergoes trans-substantial change. On one hand, Mulla Sadra believes that the identity of the self depends on the intellectual form of a person, which exists in the mind of God. On the other hand, he states that the self will survive throughout the evolutionary changes, which will help the self to retain its own identity. This position is, however, similar to that taken by Descartes in developing his theory of self-substance in the second and third meditations and is in contradiction with Mulla Sadra's doctrine of trans-substantial change.

The philosophical consequences of trans-substantial change are summarized in three points: the temporal contingency of the world, the infection of being by non-being or nothingness, and the relativity of truth and values. Trans-substantial change is an indication of the non-being of beings that have not yet come into existence. Every being is preceded by its own non-being. The passage of being into non-being and non-being into being is 'becoming'. Based on this understanding of the reality of beings, two new regions of being and becoming arise. The region of becoming is the result of the passage of non-being into being and vice versa. It is also argued that Mulla Sadra's interpretation of the relationship between being and nothingness is closer to Sartre's than Hegel's. Mulla Sadra and Sartre agree that nothingness is in the world due to the existence of the ontic beings, but for Sartre, more specifically, the ontic being means the human consciousness. Mulla Sadra insists that all contingent beings, including the human consciousness, are preceded by their own non-existence in the world. In the region of becoming, where the evolutionary process rules and changes in substance as well as accidents take place, there is no room for deterioration or corruption. All beings strive to move upwards from a lower to a higher rank of existence. Change, as we have discussed, in Mulla Sadra's ontology is evolution and an irreversible progress.

Another philosophical consequence of this doctrine that can have a significant impact on the intellectual development in the Muslim world is that trans-substantial change leads to the relativity of truth and values. The application of this doctrine deconstructs the metaphysical foundation of universal truth and values. Relying on this doctrine for understanding the structure of the world means that nothing can be considered eternal or stable. Everything is in constant change, including human society and our understanding of reality. A consequence of this is that no system of belief can claim absoluteness and finality for itself because novelty prevails. This consequence also had a profound impact on Mulla Sadra's understanding of politics, in particular political Islam, which proclaims divinity and universality in its discourse. Mulla Sadra makes a vivid distinction between religion and politics and between religious laws and political laws, and rejects the identification of the former with the latter. I have also attempted to explain that trans-substantial change encompasses both nature and history. Ontology and social systems are necessarily interconnected. It is hard to understand Mulla Sadra's political and social philosophy without understanding his metaphysics. For him, metaphysics is the foundation of history and nature.

Mulla Sadra's interpretation of the world is an innovative philosophical project and a clear departure from Illuminationsim. It involves the development of a new intellectual discourse in the Muslim world that might have a strong influence on Islamic socio-political and theological theories, conceptual frameworks and values. The task of philosophy, for Mulla Sadra, is initially an active interpretation of the world and the realization of substantial change in all beings. This realization also leads to an antagonistic stand vis-à-vis tradition and leaps towards future possibilities in the vertical movement of evolution.

In Chapter Six, I explained Mulla Sadra's analysis of human knowledge, the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible, and God's knowledge of the world. Although Mulla Sadra's metaphysics is characterized by strong opposition to Illuminationism, his understanding of the human knowledge of the world was greatly influenced by Suhrawardi's theory of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Mulla Sadra departs from Suhrawardi in believing that anything that is in reality is a 'being' (Suhrawardi called it 'essence'). Without being, it is impossible to think of knowing.

Mulla Sadra, like Suhrawardi, advocates the priority of knowledge by 'presence' rather than 'representation'. Knowledge by presence has the advantage of apprehending the known object directly without mediation by concepts. The human intellect does not only know the object, it also experiences it. Knowledge by presence in Mulla Sadra's epistemology is neither subjective nor objective. It is the product of the application of some innate cognitive forms and the presence of the objects apprehended by perception. The gradation of being is seen at different ranks and levels of perfection

(*al-idrak*), and this conditions human knowledge. Accordingly there are different stages and kinds of knowledge. Also, since whatever is known is 'being' and being undergoes change, our knowledge of the world is also in constant change and is always both relational and temporal, with the exception of the objects of intellectual perception such as the divine attributes, which are perfect and remain the same.

The unity of the intellect and the intelligible occupies an important place in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. This problem has been discussed from antiquity, including by some Muslim philosophers before him, but Mulla Sadra expressed dissatisfaction with their positions and sought to solve this problem on his own metaphysical foundation of the primacy of Being. In Chapter Six I discussed two possible ways to understand Mulla Sadra's solution: ontological and epistemological. Ontologically, whatever is known by the intellect is neither a distinct reality nor different. The intellect and the intelligible are both beings and modalities of the same reality. They are identical because they share the principle of identity, but are separate in belonging to the same reality in different ways. Their difference, which cannot be understood without their identity, is due to their proximity to and remoteness from Being. As all beings are modalities of Being, the intellect and the intelligible enjoy a unity. Epistemologically, the object known after being apprehended by the intellect is conceptualized and becomes a mental property. It is also important to understand that in Mulla Sadra's metaphysics it is not possible to think of the separation of the intellect from the intelligible. His metaphysics can also be seen as the unity of Being; but that unity, which is the ontological condition for the existence of the intellect and the intelligible, remains transcendent.

Although Mulla Sadra was a Muslim philosopher who developed a new philosophical system for interpreting the structure of nature and history, the influence of his thought on intellectual life was felt mainly in Persia in the Qajar era. At present, his philosophy is widely read and studied in Iran but little is known about him in Western academic circles. I hope that this book will serve by encouraging discussion of Mulla Sadra. This great thinker deserves wider attention for his place in Eastern and Western civilization and thought.

Finally, this presentation of his transcendent philosophy is a modest attempt to project the main ideas of Mulla Sadra. If my book has value it is in starting a discussion on him. I am hopeful that this beginning will lead to further fruitful research and debate on the ideas and contribution of this thinker to the intellectual life of our civilization.

Notes

Chapter One

1. Mulla is a religious title given to religious scholars in some parts of the Muslim world.
2. Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, translated by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Porov, Utah, 1999), p. 45.
3. Suhrawardi, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 45.
4. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Spiritual Movement, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Iran', in P. Lackson (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran* (7 vols, Cambridge, 1991), vol. 6, p. 672.
5. Mulla Sadra, Muhammad b. Ibrahim (Sadr al-Din) Shirazi, *Al-Masha'ir*, translated by Parviz Morewedge (New York, 1992), p. 43.
6. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1987), p. 203. See also Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)*, translated by Perviz Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, 1999), pp. 96–98.
7. Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)*, p. 79.
8. Al-Uzbeki, Seyyed Muhammad Jamal, *Ghazbat al-Falasifa al-Ghazba al-Muta'aliyah* (Teheran, 1999), p. 403.
9. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra* (Albany, 1975), p. 2. Safawid was the first Islamic Shi'ite dynasty founded by Shah Isma'il in 1501 to rule Iran. It flourished particularly during the reign of Shah Abbas (1571–1629), who attempted to establish a new centralized administration and to revive the economy. In the process, he created the new Safawid city of Isfahan. After the death of Abbas I, the Safawid state declined, and its rule effectively ended in Iran in 1732.
10. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra), his Life, Doctrines and Significance', in *Islamic Studies* (Beirut, 1967), pp. 121–122.
11. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 3.
12. Mulla Sadra, Muhammad b. Ibrahim Sadr al-Din Shirazi, *Al-Asfar al-Arba'ah*, Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i (ed.), *Da'irat al-Ma'arif al-Islamiyah* (9 vols, Qum, 1958), vol. 1, p. 25.
13. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 7.
14. Ibid., p. 9, also see Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, p. 315.
15. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 4, see also Henri Bergson in Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey (eds), *Key Writings* (New York, 2002), pp. 215–217.
16. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 26.
17. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London, 1997), pp. 22–25.
18. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 43.
19. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 22–23.
20. Ibid.
21. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 28.
22. Ibid., p. 33.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 40.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 24.
27. Ibid., p. 53.
28. Ibid., p. 55.

29. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 35.
30. Ibid., p. 433; see also Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 55.
31. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 290.
32. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature (Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences)*, edited and translated by M.J. Petry (London, 1970), p. 202.
33. Muslim Peripatetic philosophers denied change in substance and believed that the four categories of quality, quantity, place and position were subject to change.
34. Nasr, 'Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra)', p. 114. In 1913 Max Horten wrote *Das Philosophische System von Shirazi*. This was followed by Henry Corbin's edition of a selection of Mulla Sadra's writings in French. In 1981 James Morris translated Mulla Sadra's *al-Hikma al-'Arshiyyah* ('The Wisdom of the Throne') into English. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hossein Ziai and Muhammad Abdul Haq have published articles on Mulla Sadra's life and aspects of his philosophy. However, the only systematic work to date in English is Fazlur Rahman's *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra* (1975). This applies modern philosophical terminology to Mulla Sadra's philosophical system. In 1992 Parviz Morewedge translated Mulla Sadra's *al-Mash'ir* into English. This work summarises Mulla Sadra's metaphysical system.

Chapter Two

1. The Seljuqs were a Turkish Sunni dynasty controlling large parts of the Middle East from 1038 to 1092. Seljuq forces captured Baghdad and gained control of the caliphate in 1055, thus becoming an empire stretching from Khurasan to Iraq. Their forces then entered Armenia, Azerbaijan and Anatolia, where in the battle of Manzikert in 1071, the Seljuq leader Alp Arslan defeated the Byzantine army and captured Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes. This dynasty fell apart following the death of Malik Shah in 1092.
2. Mulla Salih Ibrahim is a professor of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Religious Studies at the University of Teheran. When I met him at his home in Teheran he gave me a photocopy of his published monograph on Suhrawardi and his Kurdish origins. Ibrahim has also investigated this matter in *Jiyaneway Zanayani Kurd le Jihani Islami*, published by Meharet in Teheran in 1974 (p. 880). See also Shahrazuri, *Nuzhat al-arwah wa rawdat al-afrah*. 'Suhraward' or 'Suhrabard' is neither Persian nor Arabic but Kurdish. 'Suh' means red and 'bard' rock. The rocks in this area are red and the village is called *Surabard* (or Redrock); it is populated by Kurds.
3. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. IX (Leiden, 1995), p. 777.
4. Mehdi Amin Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination* (London, 1997), p. 1.
5. Sayyed Hossein Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages* (Cambridge, 1964), p. 56. Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Mahmud al-Shahrazuri (date of birth and death unknown) was an illuminationist thinker of the thirteenth century AD. His book *Nuzhat al-arwah wa rawdat al-afrah* is a biographical account of a number of philosophers including Suhrawardi. Another book by him, *Risalat al-shajara al-ilahiyyah*, is an encyclopaedia of philosophy. He expressed his own illuminationist ideas in two commentaries on Suhrawardi's philosophy.
6. Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystical 3*, an introduction by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Teheran, 1993), p. 12. See also Henry Corbin, *Ta'rikh al-falsafa al-Islamiyyah*, with an introduction by Musa al-Sadr (Beirut, 1973), p. 304.
7. The Ayyubid Sunni Dynasty was founded by Salah al-Din Ayyubi (1138–1193). He was a military leader of Kurdish origin who became sultan of Egypt and all Muslim lands between the Nile and the Tigris. He declared *jihad* against the Crusaders and the substitution of Sunni for Shi'i Islam in Egypt. He defeated the Crusaders in the battle of Siffin in 1187 and captured Jerusalem. In the same year he seized most of the remaining Christian strongholds in Syria and Palestine.
8. Mehdi Amin Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 2.
9. Ibid., pp. 2–3. See also Muhammad 'Ali Abu Rayyan, *Ta'rikh al-fikr al-Falsafi fi al-Islam* (Beirut, 1973), pp. 409–10.

10. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi', in M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (2 vols, Wiesbaden, 1963), vol. 1, p. 380.
11. Hermes (Hermeticism) was considered the founder of the natural sciences by many and of the philosophy of Illuminationism by Suhrawardi. He is known by Muslim thinkers as Idris, one of the prophets whose name is mentioned in chapters 19, 21, 96 of the Qur'an. He is also known as the Thoth of the Egyptians, the Enoch of the Hebrews and Hushang of the Persians.
12. Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, translated by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Utah, 1999), p. 2. *Hikmat al-Ishraq* is one of the major philosophical works of Suhrawardi and provides a profound account of the philosophy of Illuminationism. The three philosophical works written before *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, *Talwihat*, *Muqawamat* and *Mutarahat*, deal with Aristotle's philosophy. All four works are written in Arabic. The shorter treatises of Suhrawardi are written in Persian with the exception of some, which are partly in Arabic.
13. John Walbridge, *The Wisdom of the Mystic East: Suhrawardi and Platonic Orientalism* (Albany, 2001), p. 61.
14. Ibid.
15. Nasr, 'Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 375–376.
16. It is important to mention that even the Qur'an in one place describes God as light: 'Allah is the light of heavens and the earth. The parable of His Light is as a niche and within it a lamp: the lamp is in a glass as it were a brilliant star, lit from a blessed tree, an olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil would almost glow forth, through no fire touched it. Light upon Light! Allah guides to His Light whom He wills. And Allah sets forth parables for mankind, and Allah is All-Knower of every-thing.' See the Qur'an, 24:35.
17. Nasr, 'Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi', p. 62.
18. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 9.
19. Ibid., p. 10.
20. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 110.
21. Ibid., p. 107.
22. Ibid., p. 110.
23. Plato, *Republic*, 596 a 6–7; *Phaedo*, 102 b.
24. Plato, *Symposium*, 210 e 1–212; a 7.
25. Plato, *Republic*, 509 b 6–10.
26. Ibid.
27. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth*, translated by Ted Sadler (London, 2002), p. 72.
28. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 79.
29. Ibid., p. 123.
30. Ibid., p. 91.
31. Abu Nasr Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Turkhan b. Awzalugh al-Farabi, *Mabadi' Ara Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila*, translated by Richard Walzer (Oxford, 1985), p. 59.
32. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 120.
33. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 65.
34. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 46.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 45.
38. Ibid.
39. Hossein Ziai, 'The Illuminationist tradition', in Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds), *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Routledge History of World Philosophies (2 vols, London and New York, 1996), vol. 1, p. 469.

Chapter Three

1. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 8, p. 766. See also Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 284.
2. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 905.
3. Sir Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia* (2 vols, London, 1930), vol. 2, p. 158.
4. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 8, p. 768.
5. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Period', in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6, p. 657.
6. H.R. Roemer, 'The Safawid Period', in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6, p. 224.
7. Naqshabandiyyah and Khalwatiyyah were two popular Suuni Sufi orders in Persia and Anatolia. Both were influenced by Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being, at least until the time of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), who brought radical changes into the mystical doctrine of this order. Naqshabandiyyah was also hostile towards Shi'i Islam. Sirhind, as one of the spiritual masters of the order in India, declared holy war against Shi'ism and the eclectic system of religious belief endorsed by Akbar, the Mughal Emperor (r. 1542–1605), and branded them heretical.
8. According to Lapidus, the Safawid rulers were less hostile towards the Armenian Christians in Persia because of their conflict with the Greek Orthodox Church, whose base was in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. See Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, p. 297.
9. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 122.
10. Nasr, 'Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Period', p. 659.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 660.
12. Hamid Dabashi, 'Mir Damad and the Foundation of the School of Isfahan', in *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 623.
13. Nasr, 'Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Period', p. 670.
14. Dabashi, 'Mir Damad and the Foundation of the School of Isfahan', in *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 603.
15. Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 914.
16. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 2.
17. Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', p. 915.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 916.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, p. 917.
21. Dabashi, 'Mir Damad and the Foundation of the School of Isfahan', p. 615.
22. Fazlur Rahman and Seyyed Muhammad Jamal al-Uzbeki hold contrary views. They believe that Mulla Sadra studied with Mir Findiriski. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Period', p. 678 and Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 1. Also, al-Uzbeki, *Ghazbat al-Falasifa al-Ghazba al-Muta'aliyah*, p. 173.
23. Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', p. 922.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, p. 910.
26. Dabashi, 'Mir Damad and the Foundation of the School of Isfahan', p. 606.
27. Mawlawiyyah is an Islamic Sufi order founded by Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (1207–1273). It is well known in Turkey and Persia and its followers are called the 'Whirling Dervishes'. The order was officially banned with the establishment of modern Turkey by the government of Mustafa Kamal in 1925.
28. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 3.
29. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, translated by Parviz Morewedge (New York, 1992), p. 43.
30. Ibn 'Arabi, Muhy al-Din Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad b. 'Ali b. Muhammad (1165–1240). One of the great Sufi masters, born at Murcia (al-Andalus) in Spain. He advocated the doctrine of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujud*). He is the author of *The Meccan Revelations (al-Futuhat al-Makkiyah)* and *The Bezels of Wisdom (Fusus al-Hikam)*.

31. Chittick, William C., *Ibn al-Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of Knowledge* (New York, 1989), p. 79.
32. Qur'an, 2:163.
33. Ibid., 3:17, see also 4:171, 16:51, 112:1.
34. Abdul Hakim Khalifa, *The Metaphysics of Rumi: A Critical and Historical Sketch* (Islamabad, 1959), p. 145.
35. Ibn 'Arabi, Muhy al-Din Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad b. 'Ali b. Muhammad, *Fusus al-Hikam*, vol. 2, translated by Bulent Rauf (Oxford, 1986), p. 337.
36. Spinoza, Baruch (Benedict), *Ethics*, translated by Andrew Boyle (London, 1970), I. Definition VI, p. 4.
37. Ibid., Proposition XV, p. 11.
38. T. M. Forsyth, 'Spinoza's Doctrine of God in His Relation to His Concept of Reality', in S. Paul Kashap (ed.), *Studies in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretative Essays* (Berkeley, 1972), p. 7.
39. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 3.
40. Mohammad Faghfoory, 'Sadr al-Din Shirazi in the Context of Safavid History', in *Islam-West Philosophical Dialogue, The papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Teheran)*, (7 vols, Teheran, 1999), vol. 1, p. 94.
41. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 3, see also Abu Abdullah Al-Zanjani, *Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi: Hayatuhu u Usul falsafatuhu* (Teheran, 2001), p. 22.
42. In a discussion with Prof. Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani on Mulla Sadra at the University of Teheran in May 2004, I wanted to know why Mulla Sadra chose Kahak after leaving Isfahan. Prof. Dinani held the view that perhaps Mulla Sadra went to Kahak because he had connections with Isam'ilis in this region and was invited to stay there by some Shi'i Isma'ili family.
43. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 3.
44. Ibid.
45. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 43.
46. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Sadr al-Din Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy* (Teheran, 1997), pp. 40–50.
47. S. Muhammad Khamenei, *Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy* (Teheran, 2004), pp. 24–31.
48. Al-Zanjani, *Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi: Hayatuhu u Usul falsafatuhu*, pp. 23–26.
49. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, pp. 4–5.
50. Ibid., introduction by Shaykh Muhammad Rida al-Muzafar, pp. 17–22.
51. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, pp. 8–9.
52. The Qajar dynasty was founded in Iran in 1779, following the death of Karim Khan Zand, the head of the Zand dynasty of southern Iran. Agha Muhammad Khan, the founder of this dynasty, defeated numerous rivals and brought all of Iran under his rule, establishing the Qajar dynasty with its territory from Georgia and the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. The Qajars established their capital at Teheran, a village near the ruins of the ancient city of Rayy. In 1796 Agha Muhammad Khan was formally crowned as a new king. This dynasty was destroyed by a military coup in February 1921 by Reza Shah, who ousted Ahmed Shah, the last Qajar king. Ahmed Shah was officially removed from office by the Iranian national assembly in October 1925 while he was in Europe and the Pahlavi dynasty was established.
53. Hamid Algar, 'Religious Forces in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Iran', in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, p. 706.
54. Ibid., p. 708.
55. Ibid., p. 709.
56. Ibid., pp. 714–715.
57. Since we are dealing with the development of Shi'ite thought the Sunni Sufi orders are not discussed here.
58. Babism is a religious sect founded by Mirza 'Ali Muhammad (1819–1266/1850), who was born in Shiraz and executed in Tabriz. He claimed to be the *bab*, the 'gate' or the intermediary between the hidden imam and the Shi'ite community. His followers came to believe that he was the new Messiah

or the imam, which he himself did not deny. His new movement was regarded by the official 'ulama as a threat to authority and dangerous. He was summoned to Teheran, where he was arrested then executed. One of his followers, Mirza Husayn 'Ali Nuri, developed Babism further, establishing a new sect called Baha'ism, after which he assumed the name Baha'ullah. Baha'ullah was arrested in 1852 and imprisoned in Teheran. Later, in 1853, he was deported to Baghdad and claimed to be a new prophet. He was subsequently confined by the Ottomans in Adrianople and then in Acre in Palestine (now 'Akka, in Israel). The followers of Baha'ism were mainly Iranians; today many of them live in Western countries such as the United States of America, Canada and Australia.

59. Algar, 'Religious Forces in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Iran', p. 726.
60. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'The Metaphysics of Sadr al-Din Shirazi and Islamic Philosophy in Qajar Iran', in Edmund Bosworth and Carole Hillenbrand (eds), *Qajar Iran: Political, Social and Cultural Change 1800–1925* (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 177. See also Nasr, *Sadr al-Din Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy*, pp. 99–100.
61. Ibid.
62. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatab'i, *Kernel of the Kernel: Concerning the Wayfaring and Spiritual Journey of the People of Intellect*, compiled, edited and expanded by Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, translated by Mohammad H. Faghfoory, foreword by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (New York, 2003), in the foreword, p. xiv.
63. Nasr, 'Sadr al-Din (Mulla Sadra)', p. 960.
64. Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, *The Metaphysics of Subzawari*, translated by Mehdi Mohaghegh and Toshihiko Izutsu (New York, 1977), p. 12. Sabzawari's autobiography is translated by Paul Sprachman from the Persian introduction to an Arabic text, taken from an article by Dr Kasim Ghani published in *Yadgar*, No. 3, pp. 45–47.
65. Sabzawari, *The Metaphysics of Subzawari*, p. 13.
66. Henry Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy* (London, 1993), p. 358.
67. Ibid., p. 361.
68. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West* (New York, 1996), p. 126.
69. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (eds), *Shi'ism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality* (New York, 1988), p. 348.

Chapter Four

1. See Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 43. Mulla Sadra also wrote *Hashiyya 'ala sharh hikmat al-ishraq lil Suhrawardi* on Suhrawardi (published in 1898), and *Hashiyya 'ala al-rawashi lil sayyid Damad* about his teacher.
2. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 12.
3. Ibn Sina, 'On the Nature of God', in *Avicenna on Theology*, translated by Arthur J. Arberry (London, 1951), p. 25.
4. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 46.
5. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 22–25.
6. Ibid.
7. Sabzawari, *The Metaphysics of Subzawari*, p. 31.
8. Ibid., pp. 70–71.
9. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 43.
10. Heidegger, Martin, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 203. See also *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)*, translated by Perviz Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, 1999), pp. 96–98, 'The Question of being (Letter to Ernst Junger "Concerning "The Line"') (1955)', in Manfred Staseen (ed.), *Philosophical and Political Writings* (New York, 2003), p. 143.
11. Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)*, p. 97.

12. Ibid., p. 86.
13. Ibid., p. 299.
14. Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 46.
15. Heidegger, Martin, 'Nihilism', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York, 2000), p. 849.
16. Kant has provided a table of twelve categories based on twelve possible judgments. The categories for Kant are subjective forms of the faculty of 'understanding', which generate our knowledge of the phenomenal world with the assistance of 'sensitivity'. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by F. Max Muller (New York, 1960), p. 71.
17. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, pp. 6–7.
18. Ibid., p. 9.
19. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 31.
20. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, pp. 3–4. See also Mulla Sadra, 'Risalat isalat ja'il al-wujud', in *Majmu'at rasa'il falsafi Sadr al-Nut'ahilin*, Hamid Naji Isfahani (Teheran, 1997), p. 182.
21. Suhrawadi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 2.
22. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 10.
23. Ibid., p. 13.
24. Ibid., p. 14.
25. Ibid., pp. 15–16.
26. Ibid., p. 17.
27. Ibid., p. 19.
28. Ibid., p. 20.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 21.
31. Gholam Hossein Ebrahim Dinani, 'The Evidences of the Principality of Existence', in *Islam–West Philosophical Dialogue, The papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Teheran)*, vol. 5 (Teheran: Sadra, 1999), p. 241.
32. Sabzwari, *The Metaphysics of Subzwari*, p. 34.
33. Ibid., p. 35.
34. Ibid., p. 37.
35. Ibid., p. 36.
36. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 39, see also Mulla Sadra's 'Risalat isalat ja 'l al-wujud', in *Majmu'a rasa'il falsafi Sadr al-Nuta'ahilin*, pp. 182–183.
37. Sabzwari, *The Metaphysics of Subzwari*, p. 47.
38. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 49, see also Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 38.
39. Joseph, J. Kockelmans, *On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Bloomington, 1984), p. 54.
40. Heidegger, 'On the Essence of Truth', in *Basic Writings*, p. 127.
41. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 40.
42. Hubert. L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Massachusetts, 1991), p. 11. Professor S.M. Khamenei has mistakenly used the Heideggerian term *Dasein* for the particularization of Being. He states that 'although existence is indivisible and even indefinable reality, its degrees of radiation upon objects could create several existences, each different from the other, and each possessing a specific definition and some features such as time and space. We might call each of them a Dasein'. See S.M. Khamenei, *Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy* (Teheran, 2004), pp. 57–58. In Heidegger's ontology the term *Dasein* is used to describe human existence only and not the particularization of Being in all ontic beings. Heidegger clearly states that 'Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus *Dasein* is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their Being is "a matter of indifference"; or more precisely, they "are" such that their Being can be neither the matter of indifference to them nor the opposite. Because *Dasein* has in each case mineness

[*Jemeinigkeit*], one must always use a *personal* pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am.', 'You are.'" See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 67–68. Elsewhere, Heidegger also states that 'Dasein is not a "thing" like a piece of wood not such a thing as a plant—nor does it consist of experiences, and still less is it a subject (an ego) standing over against objects (which are not the ego). It is a distinctive being [*Seiendes*] which precisely insofar as it "is there" for itself in an authentic manner is not an object-in formal terms: toward-which of a being-directed toward it by mean-ing it.' See Martin Heidegger, *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, translated by John van Buren (Bloomington, 1999), p. 17.

43. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague, 1963), pp. 147–152.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A79: B104.
46. Michael Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, Technology, Politics, Art* (Bloomington, 1990), p. 116.
47. Mark Okrent, *Heidegger's Pragmatism. Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphysics* (New York, 1988), p. 7.
48. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 26.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
50. Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', *Basic Writings*, p. 220.
51. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1959), pp. 35–36.
52. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 40.
53. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 59.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 9.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
57. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 36; see also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 30.
58. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 87.
59. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 31.
60. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 69.
61. Heidegger, 'The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics', in *Identity and Difference*, translated with an introduction by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, 2002), pp. 54–55.
62. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 229.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
65. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, pp. 60–61.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
68. Although Ibn Sina is considered a Peripatetic thinker, in my opinion his philosophy is an amalgamation of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas. I prefer to call him Aristotelian–Neoplatonist.
69. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 31.
70. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 60.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.
72. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Science of Logic*, vol. 1, translated by W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers, with an introductory preface by Viscount Haldane of Cloan (London, 1929), p. 389.
73. Abbas Yazdani, 'The Doctrine of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujud*) in Mulla Sadra's Philosophy', in *Islam–West Philosophical Dialogue, The papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Teheran)*, vol. 2, p. 66.
74. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 216. It is also important to mention that Mulla Sadra in *Al-Asfar* states that the multiplicities and the ontic beings are illusory or shadows of reality. If this is the case, the ontological relationship between the reality of Being and the ontic beings will be proved to be false. See Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 47.

75. Ibid., p. 56.
76. Ibid., p. 8. See also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 45.
77. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 92.
78. John F. Quinn, 'Mulla Sadra's Theocentrism and Trans-Substantial Motion: A Critique of Western Cosmologies', in *Islam–West Philosophical Dialogue, The papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Teheran)*, vol. 3, p. 27.

Chapter Five

1. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie (New York, 1967), p. 800.
2. Ibid.
3. See Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, pp. 55–56 and see *al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 35.
4. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 61. Heidegger also mentions gradations of unhiddenness or the truth in his lectures on Plato's 'Allegory of the Cave'. See Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth*, p. 25 and pp. 48–53.
5. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 61.
6. Ibid., p. 86.
7. Ibid., p. 80.
8. Ibid., p. 81.
9. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 2, p. 12.
10. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 86.
11. Ibid., p. 81.
12. Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (9 vols, New York, 1993), vol. 1, p. 39.
13. Ibid., p. 58.
14. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 61, see also Mulla Sadra, *Al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah*, with an introduction by S. Muhammad Khamenei (Teheran), 2000, p. 65.
15. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 96.
16. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book Lambda, translated by Richard Hope (Michigan, 1992), p. 249.
17. Ibn Sina, *Fann-i sama-'i tabi'i*, translated by Muhammad Ali Furuqi (Teheran, 1982), p. 123.
18. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, second edition with revised text and notes by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1985), p. 255.
19. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 64.
20. Ibid., p. 80.
21. Ibid., p. 84.
22. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 117.
23. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, translated by Arthur Mitchell (New York, 1944), p. 38.
24. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 3.
25. George Atiyeh, *Al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs* (Rawalpindi, 1966), p. 53.
26. Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 916.
27. Ibid.
28. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 141.
29. Ibn Sina makes a distinction between two concepts of time derived from two different types of movement. The first type of movement is not observable, such as continuity or motion from beginning to the end. This movement for him is subjective and a mental image. The second type, such as the movement of a body from one point to another in space, is observable. The first movement gives rise to the idea of time as an extension because the observation in this case is concerned with time-instances. He also refuses to call time an extension or subjective. Time is continuity like the measure of the moving body in space. See Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 95.

30. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 140.
31. Ibid., p. 147.
32. Ibid., p. 148.
33. Ibid., pp. 149–150; see also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 110.
34. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 151.
35. Ibid.
36. For the category of being-for-itself see George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I, translated by William Wallace (London, 1985), p. 141.
37. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 235, and Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 116.
38. See Ibn Sina, 'Al-Risala fi al-'ishq', *Medieval Studies*, vol. 7, 1945, p. 214.
39. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 239.
40. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 116.
41. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 142.
42. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 42.
43. Muhammad b. Mahmud Shahrazuri, *Sharh Hikmat al-ishraq* ed. H. Diya'i (Teheran, 1993), p. 520.
44. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 16.
45. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 248, see also Mulla Sadra's view on this matter in *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 6.
46. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 64.
47. Ibid., p. 17.
48. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 248.
49. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 2, p. 116.
50. Sabzwari, *The Metaphysics of Subzwari*, p. 124.
51. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 2, p. 68.
52. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I, p. 123, see also Hegel's *Science of Logic*, vol. 1, p. 86.
53. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I, p. 125.
54. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (London, 1996), p. 22.
55. Ibid., p. 8.
56. Sabzwari, *The Metaphysics of Subzwari*, p. 79.
57. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah*, pp. 147–148.
58. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Part Two: *The Philosophy of Nature* edited and translated by M.J. Petry (London, 1970), p. 202, see also Hegel's *Introduction to Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, translated by T.M. Knox and A.V. Miller (Oxford, 1985), p. 27.
59. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad*, with an introduction by Jalal al-Din Ashtiani (Teheran, 1975), p. 490.
60. Abu Nasr Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Turkhan b. Awzalugh Al-Farabi, *Mabadi' Ara Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila*, translated by Richard Walzer (Oxford, 1985), p. 239.
61. Ibid., p. 241.
62. Ibid., p. 245.
63. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad*, p. 564.
64. Mulla Sadra, unlike al-Farabi, does not elaborate his political philosophy in a single book. He discusses this matter briefly in *al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad*, *al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah*, *al-Shawahid al-rububiyah*, *kasir al-asnam al-jahiliyyah* and *Sih asl*, which is written in Persian.
65. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Shawahid al-rububiyah fi al-manahig al-slukiyyah* (Beirut, 1996), p. 365.
66. Mulla Sadra mentions several intellectual and physical qualities and conditions to be present in a person for that person to become a leader of the perfect society. See Mulla Sadra, *Al-mabda' wa al-Ma'ad*, pp. 493–494.

Chapter Six

1. Fazlur Rahman, 'Ibn Sina', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 497.
2. Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York, 1970), p. 162.
3. Muhammad Abdul Rahman Merhaba, *Min al-falsafa al-yunaniyyah ila al-falsafa al-islamiyyah* (Beirut, 2000), p. 586.
4. Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, pp. 164–165.
5. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 94.
6. George Edward Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge, 1966), p. 7.
7. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-ishraq*, p. 10. See also Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 94.
8. Plato, *Meno*, edited with translation and notes by R.W. Sharples (London, 1985), 72, 5e.
9. Plato, *Meno*, 75, 5b.
10. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-ishraq*, p. 8.
11. Ibid.
12. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 360.
13. See William Chittick, 'On the Teleology of Perception', in *Transcendent Philosophy*, an international journal of comparative philosophy and Mysticism, London, vol. 1, no. 1, 2000, p. 2. See also Khamenei, *Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy* (Teheran, 2004), p. 91.
14. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 219.
15. Ibid., p. 798.
16. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 364.
17. Ibid., pp. 360–362.
18. Ibid.
19. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A: 83, B: 109–112.
20. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 39.
21. Ibid., p. 236.
22. Ibid., p. 361.
23. Ibid.
24. Chittick, 'On the Teleology of Perception', p. 4.
25. Mualla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 216, see also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 228.
26. Oliver Leaman, 'Mulla Sadra: Perception and Knowledge by Presence', in *Transcendent Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2000, p. 34.
27. William C. Chittick, *The Self-Disclosure of God* (New York, 1998), pp. 332–333.
28. Ibn 'Arabi, *Futuhat al-Makiyyah*, vol. 4 (Beirut, 1972), pp. 393–410.
29. Ibid., pp. 325–332.
30. Henry Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn al-'Arabi* (Princeton, 1969), pp. 219–220.
31. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 297.
32. Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by T.E. Hulme, with an introduction by Thomas A. Goudge (Indianapolis, 1976), p. 23.
33. Mulla Sadra, *Se Asl*, Seyyed Hossein Nasr (ed.), (Teheran, 1961), p. 32.
34. Ibid.
35. Tabataba'i, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn, *Kernel of the Kernel: Concerning the Wayfaring and Spiritual Journey of the People of Intellect*, pp. 10–20.
36. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 307.
37. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 1074b–1075a, and see also *De Anima*, translated [from the Greek] with introduction and notes by D.W. Hamlyn (Oxford, 1968), 492b–430a.
38. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, pp. 428–433. The unity of intelligent and intelligible is also discussed in *al-Asfar*, vol. 9, pp. 149–165.
39. Ibn Sina, *Al-Isharat wal-Tanbihat*, vol. 3, p. 293.

40. Ibn Sina, *Al-Mabda' wal-ma'a*, p. 6.
41. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 322.
42. Although Aqa Buzurg reports in *al-Dhari'ah*, vol. 1, p. 81 that the treatise was published in Teheran, Nasr says that the printed version of this work is not available. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Sadr al-Din Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy*, p. 42.
43. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, pp. 324–325.
44. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, pp. 215–216. See also Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 311.
45. There is also another argument based on the dialectical relationship between thesis and antithesis in Hegel's philosophy that demonstrates the unity of consciousness and its known object. Here I have mentioned only the argument, which I believe is similar to what Mulla Sadra tried to prove in *Al-Asfar*.
46. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, pp. 324–325.
47. Ibn Sina, 'Ilahiyyat', in Syyed Hossein Nasr and Mehdi Aminrazavi (eds) *An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia* (New York, 1999), pp. 200–201.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 202.
50. Mu'tazilite was a rationalist theological school founded in Basrah by some pupils of Hasan al-Basri (642–728) who had seceded from him. The Mu'tazilites interpreted the dogmas of faith in the light of human reason. They believed in the unity of God and the notion of divine justice, which led them to reject the idea of predestination and advocate the doctrine of free will or *al-qadariyyah*. A branch of this school was founded by Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir (d. 825) in Baghdad and was patronized by the 'Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 813–833), who began an 'Inquisition' under the influence of the Mu'tazilites against those who believed in the uncreatedness of the Qur'an.
51. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Proposition III, Prop. V, p. 3.
52. Hanbalis were the followers of the Hanbali School of law, which was named after its founder Ahmed b. Hanbal (780–855). Before the 'Inquisition' of caliph al-Ma'mun, Ahmed b. Hanbal denied that the Qur'an was created, for which he was imprisoned. In 848, the caliph al Mutawakkil reversed this policy, abandoned the Mu'tazilite doctrine and accepted the idea of the uncreatedness of the Qur'an. The traditionalist theology of Ahmad b. Hanbal was subsequently revived. Ahmed b. Hanbal was a great scholar of Hadith and his main work is the *Musnad*.
53. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 147.
54. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 176.
55. Ibid., p. 188.
56. Ibid., p. 198.
57. Ibid., p. 228.
58. Ibid., p. 229.
59. Ibid., p. 232.
60. Ibid., p. 269.

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Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy

Muhammad Kamal

MULLA SADRA'S TRANSCENDENT PHILOSOPHY

Sadradin Shirazi (1571–1640), known also as Mulla Sadra, spoke of the primacy of Being and promoted a new ontology, founding a new epistemology. Mulla Sadra's ontology is an important philosophical turn and contribution to the understanding of the development of Muslim philosophy and thought.

This comprehensive study of Mulla Sadra's philosophical thought explores his departure from tradition; his turn to the doctrine of the primacy of Being; the dynamic characteristics of Being and the concept of substantial change; comparisons with Heidegger's fundamental ontology; and the influence of Mulla Sadra's ontology on subsequent Muslim philosophy. Of particular value to students of philosophy, Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, philosophy of religion, and general readers who seek to understand Muslim philosophy, this book explores the significance of the doctrine of Mulla Sadra and its impact on subsequent debates in the Muslim world.

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Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy

MUHAMMAD KAMAL

ASHGATE

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What is all about beauty in the world? The image,
Like quivering boughs reflected in a stream,
Of that eternal Orchard which abides
Unwithered in the hearts of perfect men.

Jalal al-Din Rumi

Introduction

In the post Ibn Sinan period, the primacy of essence (*asalat al-mahiyah*) was one of the prime philosophical issues for Muslim thinkers. The school of illumination, headed by Suhrawardi, held the view that ‘essence’ not ‘existence’ was the only reality. Nothing in the external world corresponded to ‘existence’, and hence ‘existence’ remained an empty concept and an intellectual property, whereas ‘essence’ was real and primary. By contrast, Sadr al-Din Shirazi (1571–1640), known also as Mulla Sadra,¹ spoke of the primacy of Being (*asalat al-wujud*) and promoted a new ontology.

From the twelfth century CE, the school of illumination occupied a focal place in the intellectual life of Muslims, particularly in the Persian-speaking world. The philosophical thought of this school marked a vivid departure from rationalism to Gnosticism, or knowledge by illumination (*al-ishraq*). Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi (1171–1208), the founder of this school, believed that knowledge of an object in the world came only through revealing its essence or quiddity. The Being of the object, unlike its essence, was a mental concept and had no external reality. To prove this point, Suhrawardi developed the argument that there were two possible ways of understanding the meaning of Being: either as a universal concept shared by all existent beings or as a particular being. In the first case, Being remains a mental concept, but in the second it depends on its essence to exist because a particular being is equivalent to its essence, which makes the being the way it is.²

A universal concept such as ‘blackness’ is conceived only in respect of a particular black object; existence, then, as a universal concept, reveals itself through a particular being. Thinking of existence as a universal concept, and then of its reliance on a particular type of being for its existence is similar to Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between universals and particulars. Aristotle, in rejecting the Platonic view of reality, argued for the dependence of universal determinations on particular beings and against the ontological status of universal determinations. In projecting his own views, Suhrawardi, on one hand, relied on Aristotle’s argument, and, on the other, reversed the argument. He came closer to Plato by insisting on the dependence of particular beings on their universal determinations, not vice versa.³

Suhrawardi’s thought influenced the dominant philosophical tradition in Isfahan, where Mulla Sadra studied. Mulla Sadra’s teacher, Mir Muhammad Baqir al-Astarabadi (d. 1630), also known as Mir Damad, was one of the leading figures of the doctrine of illumination. But it seems that Mir Damad

was not a blind follower of Suhrawardi, because he tried to reconcile the Gnostic ideas of Illuminationism with Ibn Sina's ontology, or, as Nasr remarks, he provided the illuminationsit interpretation of Ibn Sina.⁴ Mulla Sadra, at the beginning of his philosophical career, and under the influence of Mir Damad and this dominant philosophical trend in Isfahan, advocated the doctrine of the primacy of essence and was one of the followers of Illuminationism. To understand his turn from or criticism of Suhrawardi's metaphysics it is also of the utmost importance to take into account the influence of Ibn Sina (979–1037) and Ibn al-'Arabi (1163–1240) in Mulla Sadra's project of a new type of metaphysics based on the primacy of Being. This project meant destroying the foundation of essentialism in pursuit of a serious ontological investigation into the truth of Being. To achieve this, Mulla Sadra had to admit his disillusionment with essentialism and abandon the notion of the primacy essence.

Mulla Sadra belonged to the *ishraqi* philosophical tradition. He changed his position and became a defender of the doctrine of the primacy of Being under the influence of 'spiritual inspiration' rather than a rationalistic discourse and logical investigation. He clearly states 'until my God guided me and showed me his proof', which expresses the occurrence of a mystical experience for Mulla Sadra. From then on, Mulla Sadra devoted his time to defending his ontological position and the general principles of his transcendent philosophy. The 'darkness of illusion' described here is indicative of the domain of Suhrawardi's metaphysics, in which a state of untruth reigns over the whole of reality so that the meaning of Being becomes unattainable. It is reflected in the 'abandonment of Being' or 'nihilism' discussed by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and is a philosophical position from Plato to Nietzsche representing a history of negligence of the question of Being.⁵ In both the Western philosophical tradition and Suhrawardi's metaphysics, what is lost or abandoned is the being of beings as a whole, which has led to the 'disintegration of truth' or the 'forgottenness' of truth and the thinking of Being as 'essence'.⁶

Turning from this type of metaphysics became a serious philosophical enterprise for Mulla Sadra after his departure for Kahak, a village near Qum, and his choosing a solitary life for more than a decade. The overcoming of the 'darkness of illusion' would be achieved by deconstructing Suhrawardi's metaphysics and in reconstructing an ontology based on the primacy of Being. The new ontology dealt with the primordial philosophical question of the meaning of the being of beings, rather than with familiarity with beings or essence. Overcoming Suhrawardi's metaphysics meant a radical change to recognizing the priority of the question of the meaning of Being.

The reason for Mulla Sadra's self-imposed exile was reportedly political. His fame in Isfahan had met with jealousy on the part of a group of religious scholars who were politically ambitious and determined to gain patronage

from the rulers of the day.⁷ There was, however, more to this opposition than jealousy. Fazlur Rahman stated that, in addition to his sympathy for Ibn al-'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being, Mulla Sadra's ideas were too radical for the religious circle of the time.⁸ The political position of his father at the Safawid court played an important role in saving him, but he was forced to make a choice between defending his views and turning to seclusion. He chose the latter, with a sense of disillusionment with the rational method of the Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophy and essentialism of the school of illumination. After his time in solitude, he returned to Shiraz, where he founded a school, where he taught thinkers such as Mulla Muhsin Fayd Kashani and 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Husayn al-Lahiji. In later centuries, Persian Muslim thinkers such as Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, Mulla Ali Nuri and Mulla Ali Mudarris Zunuzi came under his influence. Today, Muslim thinkers such as Abdul Hasan Qazwini, Muhammad Kazim Assar and Muhammad Hussain Tabatab'i adhere to Mulla Sadra's philosophy.⁹

As mentioned earlier, the turn from the primacy of essence to the primacy of Being in Mulla Sadra's thought belonged to his period of solitude and to his teaching in Shiraz. During that time the question of Being rather than essence proved to be 'the foundation of the principles of philosophy'.¹⁰ For him, the primacy of Being was fundamental in the sense that Being and not essence was the only reality on which the multiplicity of beings (*essents*) stands.

Certainly, what Mulla Sadra tried to prove in his ontological enterprise of discovering a unified ground had been discussed earlier by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, Book VII. For Aristotle, the diversity of the modes of Being leads to the question of its underlying unity. But the difference between Aristotle and Mulla Sadra arises with the doctrine of the categories and the epistemological significance of this doctrine for knowing reality. Aristotle proposed ten categories, of which the most fundamental was substance, with others, for example quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, state, action, and passion, dependent for their existence on substance. These categories are classes or genera, the application of which makes possible knowledge of every mode of being and reality. Mulla Sadra's metaphysics asserts the realm of this principle of unity beyond the domain of the categories. For this reason, Being remains indefinable.¹¹ It is neither a genus for another entity, *differentia*, or species, nor a common or specific accident. Understanding its meaning cannot be based on anything more prevalent than itself.¹² This negative approach, however, does not mean that nothing about Being or this unifying principle can be known. The indefinability of Being points out the inherent shortcomings of Aristotle's logic and rational apprehension; meanwhile the inability of this type of logic and epistemology should not eliminate the question of its meaning. The failure of the rational apprehension of Being was not an obstacle to Mulla Sadra's ontological enterprise or to inquiry into its meaning. He denounced pure rationality, and

relied instead on intuition or mystic experience for knowing the inner reality of Being:

As it has been stated the reality of existence is neither genus, nor species, nor accident, since it is not a natural universal. Instead, its inclusion happens in another mode of inclusion, and no one has gnosis of it except the mystics, i.e. 'those who are firmly grounded in mystical knowledge' [3:7]. Sometimes it is interpreted as the spiritual soul [i.e. Holy Spirit], other times as that grace 'which extendeth to all things' [7:156]. Sometimes [it is as the] 'reality from which entities have been created', according to the mystics. [Also, it is] the expansion of the light of existence to the structures of contingent entities, and the essences, which are receptive to it; finally [they speak of] its descent towards the abodes of inner natures.¹³

The rationalist preoccupation with epistemology does not constitute a reawakening of the question of Being because it presupposes a subject–object dichotomy. It depends on having turned away from Being to beings. Mulla Sadra's epistemology is significant for eliminating the subject–object dichotomy and reawakening the question of Being. According to Fazlur Rahman, it also shows a resemblance to the epistemological positions of Plotinus (205–270) and Henri Bergson (1859–1941). The latter, for example, insists on the point that 'duration' as an experience cannot be rationally apprehended and is a matter of intellectual intuition.¹⁴ It is worth mentioning that, in inquiring into the meaning of Being, Mulla Sadra agreed with Suhrawardi that Being was not apprehended rationally and that the Aristotelian logic failed to reveal its truth, whereas essence was conceived rationally. Essence did not exist by itself but arose in thinking when a particular mode of Being was conceived. For this reason, essence should be thought of as a mental phenomenon that exists in thinking and for thinking and not as an external reality or something with its own ontological status.

Mulla Sadra's criticism of Suhrawardi's metaphysics became explicit in his philosophical turn when he formed the contrary philosophical view that Being was not a mental property but an objective reality outside the domain of rational thinking. For this reason, Being could be perceived and understood through its illuminative presence by a new cognitive tool. Only in this way was doubt about the inner nature of reality superseded. Based on such intuitive experience, Being appeared the most evident of all things. It was the principle without which even 'non-being' was unthinkable.¹⁵ This ontological enterprise parallels in some ways that of Martin Heidegger, except that Mulla Sadra's ontology is entangled with theology. Otherwise, both thinkers advocate the primacy of Being. Heidegger, in interpreting the history of metaphysics, thinks that the abandonment of Being is rooted in Platonism; for Mulla Sadra it was inherited in Suhrawardi's thought. Meanwhile, they share the view that Aristotle's logic is incapable of revealing the meaning of Being.

Reliance on the Aristotelian system of logic brings shortcomings into our ontological inquiry. According to Heidegger, for instance, this reliance led the post-Aristotelian thinkers to neglect Being and to turn towards studying ontic entities instead.¹⁶

For Mulla Sadra, the doctrine of the primacy of essence led to the concealment of the truth. Its advocates neglected fundamental philosophical questions in favour of investigating the nature of something less fundamental or grounded that could not exist by itself. The reason for this, as explained by Mulla Sadra, lay in the reliance on the rational apprehension of Being.¹⁷ Heidegger, in *Being and Time* (1927), concurs, arguing that the post-Aristotelian thinkers accepted the dogma of negligence, and withdrew themselves from the genuine philosophical question about the meaning of Being, for three reasons. First, they thought that Being was the most universal concept, and that its universality 'transcended' any universality of genus. Second, since Being is the most universal concept, and is not an entity, it is therefore indefinable and escapes all attempts to define it in accordance with the rules of 'definition' provided in Aristotelian logic. Third, Being is self-evident.¹⁸ Heidegger rejects the three presuppositions and argues against the post-Aristotelian thinkers that the universality of the concept of Being does not guarantee the clarity of its meaning, and that the meaning of this concept is still the darkest of all. He also, like Mulla Sadra, says that Being is not an entity and is thus indefinable, and that Aristotle's concept of definition '*definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*' is not applicable to it. Heidegger also believes that the indefinableness of Being does not invalidate the question of its meaning, and should not hinder us from investigating that meaning.¹⁹

There are, however, three ontological positions in dealing with the primacy of Being or essence. Either Being is prior to essence or posterior to it, or they co-exist. When Being is thought of as prior to essence, it signifies that Being can stand by itself without, or prior to, its essence. If, however, the primacy of essence is accepted as true, it implies that essence exists without Being. But for this, essence has to exist or needs another existence to rely on, and for Mulla Sadra this is a vicious regress. The third position is that existence and essence co-exist. This ontological view involves the notion that essence is with existence and not in it. In this case, essence again relies for its existence on another existence. As a consequence of this, essence cannot be without prior existence.²⁰

In arguing against these three ontological positions, Mulla Sadra concluded that the qualification of essence by existence, unlike the qualification of a body by colour, is an intellectual operation. Neither existence nor essence is prior to the other, nor do they have a state of simultaneity, since nothing can be prior, posterior or simultaneous to itself. Both are ontologically inseparable and differ only in thinking:

What has been said earlier is sufficient to refute this claim, for existence is identical with essence in the external [realm] but different from it mentally. Therefore, there is no relation between them except in intellectual consideration. In [such an intelligible] consideration, the relation will have existence which in its inner reality is identical with it, but is different from it in the realm external [to the mind]. This kind of as infinitum is stopped when the intelligible consideration is ceased.²¹

What, then, does the primacy of Being mean if these three positions are refuted? How can we talk about the primacy of Being? In answering these questions, we can think of the primacy of Being over essence and its modes like the primacy of a ground over the grounded. Mulla Sadra believes that Being and essence, like the ground and the grounded, are ontologically inseparable; they are different realities in thinking only.²² When a being is conceived and analysed into its determinations, the Being of this being appears in thinking to be distinct from these determinations. This intellectual apprehension does not coincide with the inner reality of Being, because essence is not distinct from Being, nor is existence an addition to essence. It is only in thinking that the priority of one over the other, in particular of essence, becomes evident, because thinking analyses each entity into existence and essence. The latter appears as the prior factor due to its nature as a universal determination and something apprehended by the intellect, whereas existence is not apprehended. Here, the primacy of essence becomes a mental factor, and Being remains an ontological ground inaccessible to rational thinking. The distinction between Being and essence in the intellectual sphere is not similar to that between an object and its accident. Instead, it is like the connection that exists in the species between a genus and its *differentia*.²³ Being is a being of an object; when we abstract an essence from it that essence will not subsist. Although an accident seems to be identical to the existence of an object, it is not the being of that object. Mulla Sadra supports this view by relying on Ibn Sina's ontology, agreeing with him that an accident needs an object to become existent, whereas the case with existence and essence is different.²⁴ Being for Mulla Sadra has four characteristics:

- i Being stands as a unitary ground for its own modifications or the grounded.
- ii Being is separated from essence in thinking.
- iii Being is equivocal or systematically ambiguous.
- iv Being is dynamic and changes itself substantially.

In arguing for the primacy of Being and searching for a unitary ground, Mulla Sadra holds the view that essence is what distinguishes all entities from one another and limits them. When we say '*p*' is '*q*', the predicate '*q*' distinguishes and limits '*p*' by excluding other possibilities that can be predicated

of it. Once the implication of this view is taken into account and Being is thought of as a mere mental concept, as advocated by Suhrawardi and his followers, we realize the following. First, there will be limitation in reality. Second, God's existence as pure Being will not only suffer limitation by His essence but will also become a mental concept that has no ontological status but is 'unlike everything, which is other than it [lit. non-existence i.e., essence], because every other thing, to be existent requires that existence be taken into consideration and joined to it'.²⁵

According to the first characteristic, Being stands as an ontological reality for all kinds of ontic entities or modes of Being. This relationship between Being and its ontic modifications is also similar to that between phenomenon and appearance in Heidegger's ontology. Heidegger makes a distinction between phenomenon and appearing. Phenomenon is something that shows itself or is manifest.²⁶ This showing itself is the way in which a phenomenon appears and is apprehended. The relationship between these two ontological spheres is illustrated in the metaphor of '*Krankheitserscheinungen*' (symptoms of illness). The symptoms of influenza, such as high temperature and bodily pain, indicate a phenomenon that does not show itself, namely influenza. The phenomenon of this illness announces itself through its symptoms or signs. Appearing is, therefore, not a phenomenon but an announcing of a phenomenon, and a phenomenon is that which announces itself through its appearance.²⁷ In understanding the ontological division of Being into the ground and the grounded, or Being and its modes when it is understood in the light of emanation, we arrive at the conclusion that existence requires the grounded or its manifested modes to announce itself and to make itself intelligible, while the grounded depends on the ground for its existence.²⁸ Being, in this regard, is not one but many. The multiplicity of the grounded is based on the oneness of the ground. This describes Being as equivocal, as something used ambiguously in more than one sense (*tashkik al-wujud*).²⁹

The systematic ambiguity of Being represents the truth of Being as becoming and is also systematic and a perpetual progression without repeating itself. It is an intentional progress from the more indeterminate to the more determinate or concrete mode of Being. Thus, Being is a unitary ground that manifests itself in a variety of modes and gradations, vertically as well as horizontally. The modes of Being are different from one another in terms of prior and posterior, perfection and imperfection, strength and weakness.³⁰ As a consequence, Being is neither unity nor diversity, but unity in diversity. The degrees of diversity are different in intensity and perfection. Being continues beyond this diversity without ceasing to be a unity. To elucidate this point, Mulla Sadra utilized the Sufi interpretation of the unveiling of God (*al-tajalli*). From God, all modes of Being flow constantly in all realms of the microcosm and to the prime matter, which is capable only of accepting forms. In this way

Mulla Sadra conjoins a multi-dimensional conception of reality itself, which has become an open field, with possibilities. His ontology is, thereby, intended to be opposed to the monolithic system.

Since Being is equivocal and the only reality, it acts as the principles of identity and difference. The modes of Being are identical in their inner reality but different in terms of prior and posterior, perfection and imperfection, strength and weakness. This relationship between these two principles of Being becomes clear when the modes of Being are interpreted as gradations in terms of less and more perfect. For example, plants are less perfect than animals and animals less perfect than human beings. Being, therefore, has two different poles of perfection, but at the same time it can be achieved when Being shows itself as pure existence rather than essence.

Even at the level of regional ontology or ontic entities, the existence–essence dualism remains a mental factor. The systematic ambiguity of Being, as we see, is downward (*tanzil*), from pure to concrete modes of Being. This irreversible process, when it is understood in light of emanation, becomes problematic. Emanation, as a vertical systematic ambiguity, begins with the highest form of Being to the lowest. In this respect it cannot be seen as progress, but as a journey towards darkness and the unreal, while the systematic ambiguity of Being is an irreversible progress from less perfect to more perfect. In this case, it is not a journey towards the dark corners of existence, but rather a movement similar to the dialectic movement of *Geist* in Hegel's philosophy for accomplishing absoluteness. Only in this context of understanding it dialectically can the systematic ambiguity of Being be seen as progress.³¹ Although Hegel, unlike Mulla Sadra, sees the world as rational and holds the view that human inquiry must grasp this rationality in order to have an adequate apprehension of reality, the dialectic movement of *Geist* shares commonality with the ambiguity of Being. This commonality, however, does not deny the fundamental ontological differences between Hegel and Mulla Sadra's thought. For Hegel, reality is a range of universal thought determinations or categories: 'Metaphysics is nothing but the range of universal thought determinations and is as it were diamond-net into which we bring every thing in order to make it intelligible.'³² In considering reality as 'the range of universal thought determinations', Hegel lapses into the 'darkness of illusion' or 'nihilism' in the Heideggerian sense.

For Aristotle and Muslim peripatetic thinkers, substance, unlike accident, is unchangeable. Substance cannot become more or less substance. We can think of change in quality or of an object's becoming more or less white, but a substance such as an animal cannot become more or less animal. The species 'animal', despite changing qualities, remains the same. Keeping substance aloof from change and from all accidental qualities under the sway of change is, for Mulla Sadra, again based on the illusion of subject–object dualism, which he refutes. Since this dualism is a mental factor, the dynamic character

of Being should be described as a substantial change (*al-haraka al-jawhariyyah*), according to which everything is continuously transformed. Such transformation implies that change is not limited to the four accidental categories of quality, quantity, place and position. In addition, there is a more fundamental change, that of substance itself.³³ Under the influence of change, Being transforms itself without losing its identity or unity. This transformation should be understood in the light of the principles of identity and difference mentioned earlier. Based on this view, Being passes through infinite accidental forms and substantial changes in an evolutionary manner.

From this survey of Mulla Sadra's doctrine of the primacy of Being, we see that his turn is as significant to Western thought as was Martin Heidegger's. Unfortunately, Mulla Sadra has received little attention in the West. This, to a great extent, as Nasr remarks, is due to the fact that the works of this Muslim thinker, unlike those of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, were not translated into Latin.³⁴ Mulla Sadra's ontology is important for understanding the development of Muslim philosophy in the post Ibn Sinan era. It brings a new philosophical insight in dealing with the nature of reality and creates a major transition from essentialism to existentialism.

Mulla Sadra's ontological turn is dealt with in this book in six chapters. Chapter One is an introduction to the nature of this investigation and outlines the conflict between the doctrines of the primacy of Being and the primacy of essence. Chapter Two explores the philosophy of Suhrawardi and his doctrine of the primacy of essence. It discusses his arguments justifying this doctrine and the influence of the doctrine on the Islamic intellectual life in Isfahan. It also explains Suhrawardi's interpretation of the history of philosophy and Plato's influence on Suhrawardi's metaphysics, which has great significance for understanding Mulla Sadra's ontology and for comparing Mulla Sadra's ontology with that of Heidegger. Chapter Three deals with the development of the Isfahan school of philosophical thought during the Safawid dynasty. Mulla Sadra was a student of that school. Chapter Three also explores the ideas of thinkers such as Mir Damad, Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i, the Suhrawardi tradition in the school, the life and philosophical development of Mulla Sadra and the major changes in his metaphysical position, namely his turn to the doctrine of the primacy of Being. The chapter concludes with Mulla Sadra's influence on the subsequent philosophical development in Persia and other parts of the Muslim world, particularly the rise of the philosophical schools in Teheran and Sabzawar during the Qajar period.

Chapter Four focuses on Mulla Sadra's ontological turn and his doctrine of the primacy of Being. This is compared with the ontological enterprise of Heidegger. The similarities between them are explained on the ground of three points: their criticism of Platonism, the primacy of Being, and the shortcomings of the Aristotelian logic and rationalistic discourse for understanding the meaning of Being. Also explained is how Mulla Sadra's ontology

differs from that of Heidegger. Chapter Five investigates the nature of trans-substantial change as one of the central doctrines in Mulla Sadra's ontology and his interpretation of change as a clear departure from Platonism. Trans-substantial change is also compared with Hegel's and Bergson's understanding of the constant renewal of the world. The religious and philosophical consequences of this doctrine and its impact on the human understanding of truth, values and knowledge are considered.

Chapter Six explores Mulla Sadra's interpretation of knowledge by both the presence and the failure of the rationalistic apprehension of Being. Mulla Sadra's rejection of pure rationality and his reliance instead on intuition or mystic experience for knowing the inner reality of Being is explained. The analysis includes the nature and different kinds of intuitive knowledge (*al-idrak*), beginning from sense-perception to intellectual perception. Two major epistemological issues discussed by many Muslim philosophers apart from Mulla Sadra are also addressed in this chapter. These are the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible, and God's knowledge of the world. Mulla Sadra's analysis of these issues is a significant part of the chapter.

Chapter Seven crystallizes the book and presents the contribution of Mulla Sadra's philosophy to the development of intellectual life in the Muslim world. His significance is seen in terms of his ontology in dealing with the doctrine of the primacy of Being, the gradations and trans-substantial change of the modalities of Being, and finally the role of his metaphysics in determining the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible, which makes reality accessible to the human mind.

In interpreting Mulla Sadra's main philosophical doctrines I have tried to compare them with philosophical views and doctrines of some Western philosophers such as Hegel, Heidegger and Bergson. At a number of places the similarity between the existentialist views of this Muslim philosopher and the ontological enterprise of Heidegger are elucidated. It should also be remembered that Mulla Sadra and these Western philosophers, in particular Heidegger, not only come from different cultural background; their metaphysical objectives will remain parallel. I have used the original works of Mulla Sadra in Arabic and in working on this project over the last two years I have benefited from the writing of Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Fazlur Rahman on Mulla Sadra in English. Although few works are published on Mulla Sadra in English, recently much interest has been shown in rereading of his philosophy. In 1913 Max Horten wrote *Das Philosophische System von Schirazi*. This was followed by Henry Corbin's edition of a selection of Mulla Sadra's writings in French. Thinkers such as William Chittick and Oliver Leaman have contributed articles on Mulla Sadra's epistemology in the *Journal of Transcendent Philosophy*, a special issue on Mulla Sadra (Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2000). In 1981 James Morris translated Mulla Sadra's *al-Hikma al-'Arshiyyah* (*The Wisdom of the Throne*) into English. Seyyed Hossein

Nasr, Hossein Ziai and Muhammad Abdul Haq have published articles on Mulla Sadra's life and aspects of his philosophy. However, the only systematic work to date in English is Fazlur Rahman's *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra* (1975). According to Nasr, this work is a rationalistic interpretation of Mulla Sadra's transcendent philosophy without recourse to the living oral tradition and consideration of the spiritual and Gnostic background of Mulla Sadra, which are significant for understanding his ideas. In 1992 Parviz Morewedge translated Mulla Sadra's *al-Mash'ir* into English, a work that summarizes Mulla Sadra's metaphysical system. An investigation into the philosophy of this Muslim thinker, as we see, is beset with some difficulties. Mulla Sadra's major philosophical work *Al-Asfar*, which presents his entire philosophical system, has not been translated into Persian and Urdu but not into English. With the exception of Fazlur Rahman's work no comprehensive book on his philosophy is available. In addition to this limitation in accessing Mulla Sadra's philosophy in English, his style of writing is sophisticated and complex. It covers a broad area of metaphysics, Gnosticism and theology. It deals with the views of Mulla Sadra's predecessors critically Mulla Sadra's new philosophical ideas are presented or constructed. Despite these difficulties it should be remembered that Mulla Sadra's philosophy is the product of the sixteenth century but quite relevant to our understanding of reality and contemporary society. His doctrine of the trans-substantial change and his views on novelty and constant transformation of history could play a profound role on our ethical as well as political life in the Muslim world.

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The School of Illuminationism and the Doctrine of the Primacy of Essence

Al-Ghazali's (1058–1111) polemic of rationalistic philosophy, along with the Seljuq dynasty's revival of Ash'ari Sunni theology, contributed to the eclipse of philosophical discourse in some parts of the Muslim world.¹ These two factors, however, did not disrupt the intellectual continuity of Shi'i twelfth century, Muslim philosophical thinking forged two different directions: the rationalistic discourse re-emerged under the influence of Aristotelian philosophy in Spain led by Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Bajjah (1106–1139), Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185) and Ibn Rushd (1126–1198); and Illuminationism (*al-ishraqiyyah*) spread in Persia.

The school of Illuminationism, which is significant for our understanding of Mulla Sadra's philosophy, was founded by Shahab al-Din Yahya b. Habash b. Amirak Suhrawardi, known also as Shaykh al-Ishraq, the master of illumination. Suhrawardi's date of birth is not known precisely. We only know that he was born in Suhraward or 'Suhrabard', a Kurdish village between Zenjan and Bijar. According to Mulla Salih Ibrahimi, Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi was originally Kurdish and the nephew of Mulla Omer Suhrawardi, another Kurdish Muslim scholar from the same village and of Sunni-Islamic origin. Mulla Omer and Shahab al-Din also wrote poetry in Kurdish; some poems of the latter were published by Ibrahimi. It is also reported in *Nuzat al-arwah e rawzat al-afrah* by Shams al-Din Shahrazuri that 'Shuraward' was a Kurdish village.² In the tenth century, the village was destroyed by the Mongols. According to Noldeke and Marquart, its name derived from Suhrab, who was a Persian governor of Hira.³ Today, Suhraward (*Suhrabard*) is located in the municipality of Azerbaijan in Iran. For this reason, some people, without knowing the ethnic make-up of the region, think that Suhrawardi was originally Turkish or Persian.

Shahrazuri states that Suhrawardi was born in 1166 or 1171.⁴ Nasr also gives two dates. In one of his early works, Nasr says that Suhrawardi was born in 1153;⁵ later, in his introduction to *Opera Metaphysica et Mystical*, he indicates that Suhrawardi was born in 1171.⁶ After receiving an Islamic education, Suhrawardi travelled through Persia to Anatolia and Syria. He was a contemporary and classmate of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi; the two had studied under Shaykh Mujjad al-Din Jili and later under Zahi al-Din Qari in Isfahan. On one of his journeys from Damascus to Aleppo, the capital city of the Ayyubid Sunni dynasty,⁷ Suhrawardi met Malik Zahir, the governor of Aleppo and the

son of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, who patronized him and engaged him in conversation on thorny philosophical and theological issues with a cluster of the *'ulama* in Aleppo.⁸ Another reason for travelling to Aleppo – a centre of the new political conflict between Islam and Christendom – rather than to a peaceful region, might be seen in Suhrawardi's ethnic affiliation with the Ayyubi family.

The political situation in Syria at that time could be defined as crucial and in turmoil. The Shi'ite Muslims who had long ruled Syria and North Africa, particularly Egypt, lost their hegemony to the Sunni Muslims. Salaha al-Din destroyed the Fatimid Shi'i dynasty in Egypt and Syria. In addition to this internal conflict between Sunnism and Shi'ism over political hegemony, the Crusaders appeared as an eminent external force against the Muslim world. Salah al-Din Ayyubi, who represented the Sunni political hegemony, was seen as the only one with authority to protect the interest of Sunni Islamic civilization from these external and internal rivalries. Under such unfavourable circumstances for the development of philosophy, it seems that, by travelling to the heart of this turmoil, Suhrawardi chose a wrong direction and time to advocate his philosophical ideas. The Sunni Islamic world, facing threats from Christendom represented by the Crusaders and from Shi'ism, was not resilient to change and could not tolerate innovation. The Sunni *'ulama*, considering themselves the guardians and protectors of Islamic faith and identity, were looking at any philosophical inclination or intellectual contention with suspicion. Suhrawardi's philosophical ideas, in the court of Malik Zahir, were seen in this political context; on them were visited the hostility and rejection of the institution of the *'ulama*. The *'ulama* branded Suhrawardi's ideas as heretical and asked Malik Zahir to put the young philosopher to death. Malik Zahir was reluctant to do this against his master and friend, so the *'ulama* approached Salah al-Din, who ordered his son to act. Suhrawardi was finally executed in 1208 at the age of thirty-eight. According to Shahrazuri, there are several accounts of his death. One reports that he was starved to death in prison. Another states that Suhrawardi himself fasted until he died. Some held the view that he was suffocated, executed or thrown from the wall of the fortress and then burned.⁹

The term *'ishraq*', which is Arabic for 'illumination', was used before Suhrawardi by Ibn Sina in his *Mantiq al-Mashriqiyyan*, where he talks about the oriental wisdom as a superior source of knowledge to the rationalistic discourse. Suhrawardi was aware of the significance of Ibn Sina's view but believed that Ibn Sina was unable to comprehend the importance of oriental cognition as he did not have the proper epistemological tools or access to the sources of *ishraqi* wisdom (Gnosticism). He states in his treatise *Risaleh safari Simurgh* that seeking the Truth through rationalistic discourse is like seeking the sun with a lamp.¹⁰

In Suhrawardi's view, the history of philosophy did not begin with Thales in 600 BC. Instead Hermes is considered by this Muslim thinker to be the

father of illuminative philosophical thinking or wisdom. Hermes was followed by sages from Greece, Persia and the Muslim world. In Greece, this type of philosophical thinking came to an end with Aristotle, who replaced the cognitive tool of illumination with the rationalistic discourse. But the illuminative philosophy continued to develop in Persia, and after the advent of Islam was continued by Muslim Sufis such as Dhu al-Nun al-Misri, Abu Salih Tustari, Abu Yazid Bistami, Mansur al-Hallaj, Abu Hassan Kharraqain and finally Suhrawardi himself.

What is important for us in understanding the history of philosophy described by Suhrawardi and for developing our argument is that this Muslim thinker acknowledged the connection between Plato's thought and his own metaphysics. The depiction of this connection is significant when we try to compare Mulla Sadra's metaphysical background and criticism of Illuminationism and Heidegger's interpretation of 'nihilism' in the West by tracing them back to Plato. To demonstrate similarities between Mulla Sadra's opposition to Illuminationism, in particular the doctrine of the primacy of essence, and Heidegger's negative attitude towards nihilism, we need to highlight the relationship between Plato's metaphysics and Illuminationism. We begin by explaining how Suhrawardi, in his introduction to *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, refers explicitly to Plato and the place of his ideas in the development of the illuminative philosophy,

In all I have said about the science of lights and that which is not based upon it, I have been assisted by those who have travelled the path of God. This science is the very intuition of the inspired and illumined Plato, the guide and master of philosophy, and of those who came before him from the time of Hermes, 'the father of philosophy' upon Plato's time, including such mighty pillars of philosophy as Empedocles, Pythagoras, and others.¹¹

It is customary in the history of Western philosophy to begin with Thales (a Milesian philosopher of 640–546 BC) as the father of Western philosophy. To understand the development of Greek philosophy we must also distinguish between the pre-Socratic and the post-Socratic periods. But for Suhrawardi, philosophy began with Hermes and Plato rather than with Thales. For Suhrawardi, this was the demarcation between two stages of development in the history of this type of philosophical thinking. The science of light or the illuminative philosophy came down from Hermes to the sages of ancient Iran and Egypt and thence to Plato. Greek, ancient Iranian, Egyptian and Islamic sources have become the foundation of this type of philosophy. In dealing with these historical roots and sources, Suhrawardi mentions the ancient Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism, several times. But as John Walbridge argues, this in no way indicates a revival of pre-Islamic religious belief or an endorsement of metaphysical dualism in Suhrawardi's philosophical system.¹² This Muslim thinker also describes

the original form of Zoroastrianism as monotheism, to which King Gushtasp later introduced dualism.¹³ He believes that Zoroastrianism as a religion is different from the teachings of the Zoroastrian sages that he follows, such as Kiumarth, Faridun and Kaikhusraw, who guided their community towards the light by their illuminated wisdom, and who were in turn different from the so-called Manichaeans.¹⁴

As far as Greek thought is concerned, Plato's metaphysics and his allegory of the cave were an inspiration for Suhrawardi.¹⁵ He sees the ascent of the human being from the cave towards the light as a real liberation from the domain of shadows of the contingent world. Attaining the Truth is determined by this journey of the seeker of the Truth who attempts to liberate him/herself from the dogma of the cave and look into the light. In Plato's philosophy, those who liberate themselves from the shadows of the cave and are unshackled will be able to see the sun. In his short treatise *Al-Qissa al-Ghurbat al-Gharbiyyah (Story of the Occidental Exile)*, Suhrawardi pursues Plato's allegory with some modification. In this work, the seeker of the Truth, like the prisoner freed from the cave, must undertake the spiritual journey of his/her liberation from the occident, which is the world of darkness and material existence, to the orient, the world of light and archangels. In Suhrawardi's allegory, human beings are not shackled in a cave but are imprisoned at the bottom of a well and left in total darkness. These prisoners were originally from Yemen (a land between the occident and the orient of the Muslim world), and were sent into exile to Qirawan, a city in Tunis, in the west of the orient. Like the prisoner unshackled from the cave, the escapee from the well will return to the well after seeing the light of the orient because he has not discarded all his bonds.

In the context of Plato's metaphysical analysis, according to Suhrawardi, the rationalistic approach of Aristotle broke the chain of continuity of the Platonic philosophical tradition. Discursive knowledge and rationalistic thinking replaced intuitive knowledge. For this reason and due to the dominance of Plato's metaphysics in the history of Illuminationist philosophy, thinkers like al-Jurjani define the adherents of Illuminationism as "philosophers whose master was Plato".¹⁶ In *al-Talwihat*, Suhrawardi, besides discussing his doctrine of the principality of essence, presents a critical study of Aristotle's categories. First he argues that the categories were discovered by Archytas (a Pythagorean thinker) before Aristotle. Second he reduces their number from ten to four and adds 'motion' as a new category.¹⁷ In this work, Suhrawardi encounters Aristotle (the master of discursive knowledge) in a state between dreaming and being awake; it is in this state that their discussion on the origin of Illuminationism, the distinction between discursive and intuitive knowledge, takes place.¹⁸

Suhrawardi not only incorporated Plato's metaphysics into his own but he also considered his philosophy of illumination as the continuation of

Platonism. He recognizes Plato not as a philosopher but as one of the masters of Illuminationism:

Plato and his companions showed plainly that they believed the Maker of the universe and the world of intellect to be the light when they said that the pure light is the world of intellect. Of himself, Plato said that in certain of his spiritual conditions he would shed his body and become free from matter. Then he would see light and splendour within his essence. He would ascend to that all-encompassing divine cause and would seem to be located and suspended in it, beholding a mighty light in that lofty and divine place.¹⁹

At another place, Suhrawardi compares Plato's philosophy with the allusions of the prophets,²⁰ and describes himself not as the founder of Illuminationism but as a follower of masters such as Hermes and Plato.²¹ In classifying seekers of knowledge, Suhrawardi also places Plato among those who possess perfect discursive knowledge and illumination. A philosopher like Plato, in possession of these two faculties of knowledge, is the vicegerent of God and a person wise enough to be a leader or ruler of society and a philosopher king. By contrast, the rationalist philosophers such as Aristotle, proficient only in discursive knowledge, are not suitable candidates for such elevated positions in society.

It is worth mentioning that, although it does not have a direct relationship with the essence of things, Suhrawardi still considers discursive knowledge to be one of the cognitive tools. But for Suhrawardi, a true philosopher is one who is capable, like Plato, of possessing discursive as well as intuitive knowledge and using both, in particular the latter, for understanding the nature of reality and knowing the Truth. Suhrawardi's opposition to Aristotle, and to Muslim Peripatetic thinkers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, can thus be elucidated in the light of Aristotle's metaphysical position, his criticism of Plato, and his reliance on discursive knowledge in his epistemology. Aristotle's philosophy is seen as a philosophical tendency hostile towards Platonism and as a philosophical position yielding a distorted notion of reality.

Plato assumed that the plurality of individual objects could be unified under common essences or Ideas.²² The essences have their own reality as objective essences rather than mere universal concepts that exist only in thinking. To Plato, referring to the universal concept or quiddity of an object also means referring to its objective essence. Besides, essences do not rely on individual objects to exist, because they are transcendent and spatially detached from them. The essences constitute the reality of individual objects but do not reside in them in the sensible world.

How does the human mind know and reach these transcendent essences? In the *Symposium*, Plato describes a procedure or 'itinerary' for this. For example, one can arrive at realizing the essence of 'beauty' by ascending

from beautiful objects to the pure notion of beauty and thence to the form of this essence, which is universal and self-subsistent.²³ Individual objects, which are detached from these essences, are objects of 'opinion' and 'sense-experience'. In contrast, the essences are not in the domain of 'opinion' and 'sense-experience' but objects that can be 'known'. Here and in the Platonic context, true knowledge corresponds to the apprehension or intelligibility of the essences when the human mind is turned upwards in the method of ascent.²⁴ This kind of knowledge and way of knowing became in the *Republic* a prerogative of the philosophers who seek to turn their minds upwards in order to see the universal transcendent essences. A philosopher should not be interested in a multiplicity of individual objects of the sensible world but in their unified essences or the source of their existence in the ideal world. For Suhrawardi, this upward turn or the sight of the sun in Plato's theory of cognition is illumination (*al-ishraq*) and the source of true knowledge through which the human mind can apprehend the transcendent reality.

There is more than a convergence of views between Platonism and Illuminationism; in my opinion the latter has a parasitical relationship with the former. Further similarity between these two philosophical schools can be found in Plato's analogy of the idea of Good with Light. Among all essences, the Form of the Good is both supreme and the source of all other essences. This notion of the Good is also compared to the sun or the 'Light', shining upon all other essences and making them visible and intelligible:

This, then, which imparts truth to the things that are known and the power of knowing to the knower, you may affirm to be the Form of the good. It is the cause of knowledge and truth, and you may conceive it as being known, but while knowledge and truth are both beautiful, you will be right in thinking it other and fairer than these. And as in the other world it is right to think light and sight sun-like, but not right to think them the sun, so here it is right to think both knowledge and truth like the good, but not right to think either of them the good. The state or nature of the good must be honoured still more highly.²⁵

The Form of the Good is to an extent the foundation of all other essences. Their existence and intelligibility are thinkable only in their relation to the Good. In understanding this relationship Heidegger remarks that 'the highest idea, although itself barely visible, is what makes possible both being and unhiddenness, i.e. it is what empowers being and unhiddenness as what they are. The highest idea, therefore, is this empowering; the empowering for being which as such gives itself simultaneously with the empowerment of unhiddenness as occurrence.'²⁶ This empowering is the characteristic and the essential quality of the Form of the Good, which corresponds to the symbol of light. Similarly for Suhrawardi the world is made up of contingent light, which depends for its existence on the ultimate light or the Light of lights (*nur al-anwar*): 'Accident

light is not light in itself, since its existence is in another. Thus, it can only be light due to another. The incorporeal pure light is light in itself. Therefore, everything that is light in itself is incorporeal pure light.²⁷

The world is indebted to the Light of lights or the form of the Good not only for being visible and comprehended but also for what it is. The coming into being and ceasing to be of everything in the contingent world is empowered by the Light of lights. In the realm below the empowering Light there are four forms of light: immaterial, luminous, accidents and bodies. The immaterial light is the cause of the other three lights and is also a self-conscious substantial light. God, the intellects of the spheres, human intellect and animal soul are all immaterial lights, which cause the other three forms of light to exist. Since the contingent lights belong to a lower ontological division, they are less bright. They also share the same essence, as all of them spring from the same source. They are also gradations of the same reality but different in their intensity and perfection in brightness. This ground for making a distinction between one contingent light and another is not the realization of their '*differentia*' or '*accidents*'. It is due to their rank in the hierarchy of emanation. Two contingent lights are different because they vary in perfection or the intensity of light. Human beings, for example, are more perfect than animals. They both belong to two different ranks of existence. The vertical emanation from the Light of lights goes from the Intellects of the celestial sphere to the individualization of light in accidents and bodies. Based on the relationship between the immaterial light and the other three forms, the immaterial light is divided into dominating and managing light. The former functions like the Platonic Forms and the latter is the individual soul in an individual body:

Even though the managing light comes from one of the exalted dominating lights and accepts many illuminations, it is not like a dominating light in perfection of its substance. The dominating light brings into being the managing incorporeal light only due to perfections of the barrier acquired from the mighty lords and in order to manage it in the way appropriate for controlling barriers of finite power. By this, it strengthens its connection with the barrier.²⁸

In explaining this relationship among various forms of light, Suhrawardi thinks in line with Plato, but at the same time he does not repeat the Platonic doctrine of Ideas without alteration. For him, the dominating light is concerned with species. Every species that exists as a dominating light has a universal form called '*Lord of the Species*'. These Lords of Species or Forms are not universal essences shared by all particulars. They exist at a higher realm and are independent of particulars. Their universality is determined by the same relationship to all particulars of the same species. The Lords of Species are the causes of the particulars and are universals in the sense that they have this causal relationship to all particulars of the same species. For

example, the universal Form of 'cat' has the same causal relationship to all individual cats in the material world. This can be seen as a difference between Suhrawardi's understanding of the universal Forms and that of Plato. Another essential difference to be noted here is that Suhrawardi, unlike Plato, believes that the domain of the Forms is beyond the cognitive capacity of reason and is to be apprehended intuitively. In this way, Suhrawardi followed Plato but at the same time offered his own point of view and contribution to the doctrine of the Forms. He accepts the doctrine but thinks of the Forms as causes of individual beings, not as a universal predicate shared by all of them. The question that arises here is how a multiplicity of contingent lights can arise from the simple and indivisible nature of the Light of lights.

Suhrawardi found a Neoplatonic answer to this question: from the Light of lights emanates the lower levels of contingent lights, the angelic order, and the archetypes. The Light of lights is the single origin of all things and gives constant illumination to them. It is the highest in the metaphysical hierarchy of being, not only in terms of rank but also as the most perfect source and origin of all contingent lights. The emanated realms, unlike the Light of lights, are different in their degree of perfection and remoteness from their illuminating source. They are either self-subsistent or dependent on something else. In addition to this classification they can be distinguished by their degree of self-consciousness. A self-conscious being is either self-subsistent, as in the case of the Light of lights, the angels and the human consciousness, or depends on something other than itself for its self-awareness, as in the case of stars or fire. Another division of the lights is based on their degree of self-awareness. A light is either self-aware of or obvious to itself. The self-aware light is either self-subsistent or depends on something other than itself in order to become aware of itself. The classification continues and the differences between all things at various levels of this hierarchy of light depend on the intensity of light manifested in each kind of being. But the illuminating source or the Light of lights is not affected by this multiplicity of its own manifestation and gradation:

Multiplicity cannot conceivably result from the Light of lights in its unity, nor can any darkness be conceived to result from a dusky substance or state, nor yet two lights result from the Light of lights in its unity. Therefore, that which first results from the Light of lights must be a single incorporeal light. This then cannot be distinguished from the Light of lights by any dark state acquired from the Light of lights. This would imply the multiplicity of aspects in the Light of lights in contradiction to the demonstration that the lights, particularly the incorporeal lights, do not differ in their realities. Therefore, the Light of lights and the first light that results from it are only to be distinguished by perfection and deficiency.²⁹

The descending process of emanation of the multiplicity of contingent lights from a single indivisible source can best be understood against the hierarchy

of being in the ontological system of other Muslim emanationists such as al-Farabi (c. 870–950). According to this Muslim philosopher, the first emanation from the 'One' was not a multiplicity of contingent beings but the first intellect capable of knowing the 'One' as well as itself. The second intellect emanates from the first intellect and the third from the second intellect, which gives rise to the sphere of the fixed stars. This process of emanation continues until the emanation of the tenth intellect is reached, and with it the corresponding spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Venus, Mercury and the moon. At the lowest level of emanation lies the 'prime matter'. This contains the four elements of water, air, fire and earth. These include minerals, plants, animals and finally human beings.³⁰ Similarly, from the Light of lights emanates the first light, and from this the incorporeal light and barrier. This emanation continues until there are the nine spheres and the series of lights from which no other incorporeal light emanates. Suhrawardi also believes that emanation is a pre-eternal process because the Light of lights neither changes nor withers away.³¹ His analysis of human existence is also based on his understanding of reality. As a thinker who believes in the reality of the incorporeal realm, he divides human beings into two parts: incorporeal (soul) and corporeal (body). These two parts represent light and darkness. Nor is a relationship between them necessary. The incorporeal soul, although attached to the body, is independent and survives without embodiment. The corporeality of human existence has at the same time an attachment to darkness, which is a barrier that foils the human soul's access to knowledge of the reality. Identifying the human soul with light and the body with darkness represents for Suhrawardi two aspects of human existence, which are essentially distinct and belong to two different ontological ranks. The human soul is also in constant struggle to keep itself aloof from the influence of the body in order to reach perfection, which can be obtained by giving up worldly pleasure and the demands of corporeal life. This is a journey in human life towards the abode of pure light and the Sufi path of self-purification and elevation.³²

As mentioned earlier, Suhrawardi acknowledges his debt to Plato, under whose influence he rejects the question of the primacy of being and treats being as nothing, and develops arguments for the primacy of essence (*asalat al-mahiyyah*). For him, something exists when its essence becomes cognizant; its reality relies on its essence. The arguments in vindication of this metaphysical position rotate around the philosophical conviction that existence is conceptual and has no reality of its own in the external world. It has no representation outside the human mind. Before explaining Suhrawardi's main arguments it is important to mention some considerations discussed by him in Section Three of the Third Discourse ('Concerning the Illuminationsit Judgments on Certain Points') in *Hikmat al-Ishraq*. These considerations are:

- Against Muslim Aristotelian–Neoplatonic thinkers he argues that ‘There is nothing in existence, which is itself the quiddity of existence; for as soon as we conceive its concept, we may wonder whether or not it has existence.’³³ This will eventually result in an infinite regress, because existence would have another existence and so on.
- If we think that essence has existence, then it should have a relation to it. This relation would also need existence, which stands in a relation to the previous relation and so on. This would continue to infinity.³⁴
- If existence were in entities and were not an essence, then it would become a state in them. In this case existence would become dependent on them. ‘Thus its locus would be actualized, but it would exist before its locus. Its locus could not be actualized simultaneously with it, since its locus would exist with the existence, not by the existence – which is absurd.’³⁵
- According to Muslim Aristotelian–Neoplatonic thinkers, the locus is prior to an accident. Thus, as pointed out by Suhrawardi, the existence would be prior to existence; this is not only absurd, but also impossible.³⁶
- Muslim Aristotelian–Neoplatonic thinkers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina believed that ‘existence’ was added to ‘essence’ of an entity as an accident. But, according to Suhrawardi, if we think of existence as an accident, it should subsist in its locus. In this case existence would need its locus for its realization. Since the locus is existent, then its subsistence would be circular, and this is again absurd for Suhrawardi.

Let us now turn to Suhrawardi’s main argument for the primacy of essence. In this argument he tries to prove that existence is either a universal concept or a particular. If it is a universal concept and shared like any other universal concept by all particular existents, existence remains in the domain of thinking as something conceptual. If existence is a particular, it is dependent on its essence. Let us say that ‘existence’ is a universal concept because all things that exist do so equally – or they share existence. In this case, ‘existence’ as a universal concept becomes a universal nature. But there are other universal concepts such as ‘blackness’ or ‘whiteness’ of the same nature. Could we say that existence, like these universal concepts, is a universal essence? If the answer to this question is ‘yes’, then existence becomes a universal concept; otherwise we have to think of it as a particular entity.³⁷ If existence is thought to be a particular entity, it still remains a mental concept, and essence becomes real in which a particular existence is actualized. A particular existence is nothing more than its essence. As Suhrawardi argues, ‘existence’ is conceived in respect to a particular existence and the particular existence is also equivalent to essence. Existence is thus contingent on a particular existence. To clarify this metaphysical position Suhrawardi states:

Next we argue that if blackness is non-existent, then its existence is not actual. Therefore its existence is not existent, since its existence is also non-existent. If we do intellect existence and judge that it is not existent, then the concept of existence is distinct from the concept of existent. We might say that blackness, which we had taken as non-existent, now exists and that its existence was not yet actual but then becomes actual. If so, the actuality of the existence would not be the existence itself, and the existence would have existence. This same argument applies to the existence of existence, and so on to infinity. But a simultaneous ordered infinity of attributes is absurd.³⁸

What we understand from this is that 'existence' cannot be a primordial ontological condition for a thing. That primordial ontological condition is 'essence', which occupies a primary position on which the existence of all things relies and which supports the contingency of existence.

In Suhrawardi's philosophy 'essence' is also equated with 'light'. God, who is the Essence of the essences, is the Light of lights. Here we find a lucid distinction between the Light of lights as the cause and empowering light of all lights and the contingent or caused and empowered lights. The Light of lights cannot be thought of as another contingent light; all contingent lights are dependent on something other than them to exist and the Light of lights is their final cause, which has no cause. It is that being that does not fail to exist and so is necessary. This argument, which is originally Aristotelian, is also used by Muslim theologians and philosophers in a variety of forms to prove the existence of God. The Light of lights provides constant illumination and brings all contingent lights into existence. These lights are either self-subsistent, for example incorporeal lights, or they are accidental and their subsistence relies on something other than themselves.

The individual self, which is a contingent light, is more illuminated as it nears its source. This increase in the intensity of illumination occurs with the abolition of the ontological distance between the Light of lights and the self. Suhrawardi calls this proximity to the Light of lights 'presence', the awareness of which is 'knowledge by presence', which is considered to be the most reliable source of cognition. 'Knowledge by presence' or intuitive knowledge, however, had a significant impact on Mulla Sadra's epistemology, which is discussed in Chapter Six.

The thinkers who were responsible for the early transmission of Suhrawardi's ideas and were known for their writings on Illuminationism were Shams al-Din Muhammad al-Shahrazuri (d. 1288), Sa'ad b. Mansur Ibn Kammunah (d. 1284) and Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi (d. 1311). Al-Shahrazuri is considered to be the first major commentator on Suhrawardi's thought. Ibn Kammunah wrote on Suhrawardi in *al-Talwihat*, a book studied widely by the advocates of Illuminationism in Persia. Al-Shirazi incorporated Illuminationism into Ibn Sina's ontology and the doctrine of the Unity of Being of Ibn 'Arabi.³⁹ From the thirteenth century onwards, other thinkers,

such as Muhammad b. Zayn al-Din b. Ibrahim Asha‘i (d. 1479) and Giyath al-Din Mansur Dashtaki (d. 1541), wrote under the influence of Suhrawardi’s illuminative philosophy.

Suhrawardi’s Illuminationism changed philosophical tradition in the Muslim world by bridging the gulf between Gnosticism and rationalism. It left a great mark on the development of intellectual life in the Muslim world. Its influence can be found in Persia and the Indian subcontinent to the present day. The magnitude of this influence will be discussed in the next chapter on the Safawid period in Isfahan, when Mulla Sadra came under the sway of this philosophical tradition at the beginning of his philosophical training and vocation.

The School of Isfahan and Mulla Sadra's Departure from Suhraward's Tradition

Suhrawardi died young but the impact of his philosophy on Muslim intellectual life was outstanding. He advocated the doctrine of the primacy of essence and established harmony between discursive and intuitive knowledge, with an emphasis on the latter as a reliable source of knowing the Truth. The predominance of Suhrawardi's philosophy was greatly felt in Persia and his school, namely Illuminationism, flourished in Isfahan during the Safawid dynasty (1051–1732), attracting a number of Shi'ite thinkers, including Mulla Sadra. To understand the popularity of Illuminationism during that period it is helpful to discern the origin and development of the Safawid dynasty and to explain why the Safawid rulers patronized this type of philosophy in their dynasty.

The Safawid was originally a Sufi order whose founder, Shaykh Safi al-Din (1252–1334), was a Sunni Sufi master descended from a Kurdish family in north-western Iran.¹ Nasr, in his article 'The School of Isfahan', does not mention the ethnic and sectarian origin of the order, but he gives the title Ardibili to the founder because the family of Safi al-Din had settled at Ardibil and Shaykh Safi al-Din died there.² At another place, Nasr acknowledges that the order belonged originally to Sunni Islam as an offshoot of the Qadiriyyah order founded in Baghdad.³ According to Percy Sykes, however, the dynasty traces its descent from Musa al-Kazim (745–799), the seventh Shi'i imam for the Twelvers. Sykes does not say whether this Shi'i genealogy of the order was given by Shaykh Safi al-Din or was fabricated at the later stage of the encroachment of the order into Shi'i Imamism.

The political orientation of the order and the transformation of the sect to Shi'i Islam began with Shaykh Junayd (d. 1460), the grandson of Shaykh Safi al-Din, and his son 'Ali (d. 1496). Shaykh Junayd advocated the idea of *jihad* (holy war) against non-Muslims as well as corrupt Muslim rulers in Persia. He recruited supporters from Turkish and Kurdish tribes and called them *Qizilbash* (those who wore red headgear with twelve gores for the twelve Shi'i imams). But the total conversion of the order to Shi'i Islam and the establishment of the dynasty took place at the time of Isma'il (1487–1524), also known as Shah Isma'il, the grandson of Junayd who marched on Tabriz in 1501 and designated himself a king (*shah*).⁴ The conversion of the order by Shah Isma'il, as it is seen in the political history of the order, provided a *terra firma* for consolidating Shah Isma'il's own political hegemony. Relying on the notion of the messianic or the Shi'i doctrine of the imamate, Shah Isma'il

claimed to be *imam al-muntazr* (Awaited One) or the Mahdi. On this matter, Nasr asserts that the veneration of 'Ali in the inner tendency of the order was responsible for this conversion:

Both Shah Ni'mat Allah who came to Persia from Aleppo, and Shaikh Safi al-Din from Ardabil were at first Sufis of Sunni background such as the Shaziliyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods. But the inner belief in the *valayat* of 'Ali gradually transformed the outer form of the orders as well into thoroughly Shi'i organizations, although the inward structure of these orders, being sufi, remained above the Shi'i-Sunni distinctions.⁵

In my opinion Shah Isma'il combined political and divine authority by seeking absolute power and devotion from his followers. This claim, however, was challenged by the followers after Shah Isma'il's defeat by the Sunni Ottoman Empire during the reign of Selim I (r. 1512–1520) at the battle of Chaldiran in 1514.⁶ To neutralize the tension and avoid humiliation before his followers the defeated Shah Isma'il adopted a softer theological position by making Twelver Shi'ism the official religion of the state. He also began to force the Sunni population to convert in the areas he controlled in Persia. Many Shi'i scholars such as Shaykh 'Ali b. Abd al-'Ali Karaki, Shaykh Baha al-Din 'Amili and Ni'mat Allah Jaza'iri were invited from Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain to participate in the establishment of Shi'i educational institutions in Persia. Further to this, the Safawid state embarked on a plan to eliminate the rival sects, in particular those with antagonistic attitude towards Shi'ism. The messianic-extremist Shi'i sects and Sufi orders such as Naqshabandiyyah and Khalwatiyyah were banned; Sunni Muslims and other religious minority groups were persecuted. It was during this time that Persia was transformed from a predominantly Sunni Islam to a Shi'i Islamic dynasty.⁷

There were, however, three groups that contributed to the foundation of the Safawid state and its development: the Qizilbash, who represented the popular Sufi movement; the institution of the '*ulama* or salaried clergy; and finally, at the top, the ruler. The first group was gradually suppressed for political reasons and the second group drew closer to the royal court. With the advent of Shah Tahmasib (1524–1576), the state openly supported the '*ulama* against the Qizilbash and other Sufi orders. Shah Abbas I (1571–1629) recruited many '*ulama* in different administrative positions. But his support for the scholars of Gnosticism and real Sufis never ceased. The development of philosophy in Isfahan is indebted to Shah Abbas's patronage of scholars of theology and Gnosticism. It was during his reign that the philosophy of illumination received official recognition and was advocated by some influential Shi'i thinkers who remained close to the monarch. As we see, on one side the Safawid dynasty stood hostile towards Sunni thought and Sufism, while on the other side it did not curtail the development of illuminative philosophy of Suhrawardi and theological debates on various religious matters.⁸

This Shi'i state, like other Islamic states, was supportive of a philosophical discourse favourable to the metaphysical foundation of its political power. Intellectual endeavour was consequently subject to the favour of despotic rulers who were either for or against it. This was characteristic of the political environment in which ideas were shaped in the Muslim world. Philosophy, unlike religious discourse, never enjoyed a long-term engagement and relationship to the state and was forced by the clergy to stand outside the educational institutions most of the time. Nevertheless, there were reasons for the revival of Illuminationism during the Safawid dynasty. As mentioned earlier, the Safawid was a gnostic Sufi order that was transformed into a political movement. Unlike other Islamic dynasties it was not based purely on military insurgence. It was expected to incline towards a type of metaphysics that could easily be manipulated for political ends. Illuminationism, as Amin Razavi remarks, provided such a philosophical foundation for the political convictions of the dynasty.⁹ The contribution of some great Shi'i thinkers with political influence was to promote Suhrawardi's philosophy; this played a remarkable role in having Illuminationism recognized as an influential philosophical trend of the time.

During the Safawid dynasty, Muslim thinkers in Persia continued the post Ibn Sinan intellectual tradition. They were able to establish systems of thought that were neither purely philosophical nor gnostic but a combination of both. They intended to develop a theosophical tradition rather than a rationalistic philosophy based purely on discursive knowledge. Thinkers such as Ghyas al-Din Mansur and later Mir Damad interpreted Ibn Sina's Peripatetic doctrine in the light of the illuminative philosophy of Suhrawardi. Other thinkers, such as Abd al-Razzaq Kashani, Sa'ad al-Din Hamuya, Aziz al-Din Nasafi, Fakhr al-Din Araqi, Auhad al-Din Kirmani and Abdul Rahman Jami, were influenced by Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the unity of being. They incorporated this gnostic doctrine into their philosophical systems.¹⁰ In the fourteenth century, Sayyid Haider Amuli, Ibn Abi Jumhur and Rajab Basri, whose theosophical doctrines were developed under the influence of Ibn 'Arabi, contributed to the integration of Gnosticism in Shi'i Islam during the Safawid period. Sayyid Sharif Jurjani and Jalal al-Din Dawani also tried to bridge the gulf between philosophy and theology.¹¹

Among these Muslim Shi'i thinkers, Mir Damad is of great importance because, with Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i, he belonged to the first generation who were the main thinkers behind the establishment of the School of Isfahan. The name of this school was employed recently by Henri Corbin, Nasr and Ashtiyani. Corbin includes Mir Damad, Mulla Sadra and Qadi Sa'id Qummin as its main figures. Nasr gives a longer list of names but emphasizes Mir Damad, Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i as the forerunners of the school. These three thinkers were also patronized by Shah Tahmasp and Shah Abbas, the Safawid ruler. It is reported that Shah Abbas visited them

frequently at their place of residence and developed a kind of friendship with them.¹²

Mir Burhan al-Din Muhammad Baqir Damad was known as Mir Damad and was also given the title of 'Third Teacher' following Aristotle and al-Farabi.¹³ Another title by which he was known was Sayyid al-Afdil, 'Master of the Most Learned'.¹⁴ This Muslim thinker was born in 1561 in Ashtarabad. His father, Mir Shams al-Din, was the son-in-law of Shaykh 'Ali b. Abd al-'Ali Karaki, a distinguished Shi'i cleric (d. 1538) and the author of the theological discourse *al-Najmiyyah* and several other commentaries on religious subjects. Shaykh 'Ali Karaki migrated to Persia after the establishment of the Safawid dynasty and during the reign of Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524–1576) enjoyed patronage and power. Mir Damad gained his education in the major Shi'i cities of Persia. He studied philosophy, transmitted sciences (*'ulum al-naqliyyah*) and natural sciences and closely studied Ibn Sina's philosophical texts. He became the leading authority on philosophy, theology, jurisprudence and natural sciences. During the time of Shah Abbas he went to Isfahan to teach, where he attracted a large number of disciples. Among them were Mulla Khalil Qazwini, Sayyid Ahmed 'Alawi, Qutb al-Din Ashkiwari and Mulla Sadra.¹⁵ Mir Damad wrote various religious and philosophical titles in Arabic and Persian; for example *Qabasat*, *Taqdisat*, *Taqim al-imam*, *al-Sirat al-mustaqim* and *al-Ufuq al-mubin* were in Arabic. He also wrote *Jazarat* and *Sirat al-muntaha* in Persian. These works included discussions on philosophical matters such as being, time, eternity, the relationship between eternal and temporal, creation and God's knowledge of particulars. He also wrote poems under the pen name *Ishraq*. At the age of twenty, Mir Damad was recognized as a philosopher and was admired by people in the intellectual circles of Mashad and Isfahan. In 1631 he died on his way to Kerbela and was buried in Najaf, a city in present-day Iraq.

It should be remembered that philosophical discourse in the Muslim world has always been looked at with suspicion. The powerful, dogmatic and politically greedy clergy thought of philosophy as poisonous to the religious mind. During the Safawid dynasty, the hostility towards intellectual discourse continued and the Shi'i clergy, like the Sunni clergy, expressed no sympathy with philosophy. The establishment of the School of Isfahan can be attributed less to intellectual tolerance and freedom of expression in the Safawid dynasty than to other factors such as the political position and power of the families of Muslim thinkers like Mir Damad and Mulla Sadra in Shiraz and Isfahan. Mir Damad's father and grandfather were among the influential Shi'i clergy of their time and enjoyed the patronage and support of the Safawid rulers. Mir Damad also was known for his devotion and religiosity. He was highly revered by the *'ulama* and by the seekers of *irfan* (Gnosticism). His style of writing was also complicated and difficult for the clergy to understand, particularly those who were not familiar with theosophy and

Gnosticism. Nor should we forget Shah Abbas's personal interest in intellectual debate and philosophy and his encouragement of learning and his friendship with Mir Damad, Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i. All these factors contributed to the establishment and development of the School of Isfahan and rescued its founders from persecution by the clergy.

Mir Damad's philosophy is characterized by a fusion of Suhrawardi's Illuminationism and Ibn Sina's ontology. For him, there is a clear distinction between Hellenistic philosophy and Islamic thought. Islamic thought is the source of illumination and theosophy, whereas Hellenistic philosophy represents rationalistic discourse. Illuminationism, as explained by Suhrawardi in *Hikmat al-Ishraq* (see Chapter Two), was the continuation of a philosophical tradition from Hermes to Plato and then to Eastern thinkers such as himself.¹⁶ Mir Damad, however, kept Platonism outside Hellenistic thought, because Platonism belonged to the philosophical tradition of the illuminative philosophy. Nasr also mentions that eternal creation, *huduth-i dahri*, is the central idea of Mir Damad's thought.¹⁷ This idea is better understood in light of Mir Damad's division of essence based on Suhrawardi's metaphysics, which eventually leads to different concepts of time. Admittedly, in dealing with the idea of eternal creation, Mir Damad endeavoured to solve the contradictions between the views of Muslim philosophers on creation. He put forward an answer to the question of whether the world was created in time or is eternal. This issue was discussed from the beginning of the rise of Muslim philosophy by thinkers such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Some Muslim philosophers stated that the world was created in time, while others held that it was eternal. The second view was also attacked by al-Ghazali in his *Tahafut al-falasifa*; he branded it heretical. Mir Damad took another metaphysical position by synthesizing these two antagonistic claims and advocating the idea that the world was eternally created. For him, the essence of God is absolutely simple and transcends all distinctions, limitations and qualities. It is the source of divine attributes, which are one with it and at the same time different. The divine essence and divine attributes enjoy a necessary and unchangeable relationship, which is eternal or *sarmadi*, having neither beginning nor end.¹⁸

The divine attributes are similar to the universal Forms in the ideal world in Plato's metaphysics. Even they have a similar relationship to the particular objects of the material world: they are unchangeable but are capable of generating change. The relationship between this unchangeable sphere of the divine attributes and the changing world leads to the rise of another form of time called *dahr*. The third form of time, called *zaman* by Mir Damad, is the measure of the quantitative change in the material world.¹⁹ What is the significance of this division of time? How does Mir Damad solve the contradiction between the views of those who advocate the paradigm of creation in time and those who believe in the eternity of the world?

Mir Damad's solution to the relationship between *dahr* and *zaman* is that the two forms of time belong to two different spheres of existence. The former time is for the unchangeable and necessary relationship between the divine attributes and the material world. For this Muslim thinker, as for Plato, the material world is distinct from the divine attributes (or the universal Forms in the ideal world). The material world also relies on the divine attributes for its existence. The creation of the world is, therefore, preconditioned by the divine attributes, but it did not occur in the form of time called *zaman* (time as a quantitative change), because *zaman* cannot exist without the material world or before the creation of material objects. The world, which exists in *zaman* and depends on the divine attributes, is also outside the sphere of *dahr*. Conversely, the divine attributes are in *dahr* but not in *zaman*. Something that exists in *zaman* is non-existent in *dahr*, and vice versa. Above them, *sarmad* or the temporality of the divine essence transcends both forms of time. The divine essence is neither in *dahr* nor in *zaman* but is aloof from them and their influence.²⁰ Divine essence is the source of everything and everything as essence is identified with light. Following Suhrawardi's doctrine of the primacy of essence, and thinking of everything in the world as the originated light, Mir Damad believes that the essence is the only reality and existence is an accident. Accepting the emanationist doctrine of Neoplatonism, he believed that the world came into existence in the process of emanation. This process is characterized by a descending and ascending order. From the divine essence emanated the divine attributes or the archetypal lights, and the universal intellect was the first component of this emanation. From this emanated the heavenly soul, of which the universal soul is a member. From the universal soul emanated the natural souls. In the final stage, matter emanated. This process is described as a descending order from the most to the least perfect form of existence. At the lowest stage of emanation the process takes an ascending order from minerals to animals and the human species.²¹ Sufism also inspired Mir Damad. In *Jadhawat*, he describes the ascending journey undertaken by the seekers of redemption to employ intuitivemystic knowledge (*'irfan*) for understanding the Truth and to devote time to serious spiritual contemplation.

Another Muslim thinker who played a role in Mulla Sadra's intellectual life in Isfahan, and who was a member of the School of Isfahan, was Mir Abdul Qasim Findiriski (d. 1641). Mir Findiriski taught philosophy, mathematics and medicine. Many of his students, for example Rafi'a Gailani, Aqa Husayn Kundsari, Mulla Muhammad Baqir Sabzwari and Mulla Rajab 'Ali Tabrizi, became well-known scholars. However, according to Nasr, it is debatable whether Mulla Sadra studied under him. Mulla Sadra, however, was introduced to Mir Findiriski and the two knew one another well. Mir Findiriski lived longer and died in the same year as Mulla Sadra or one year later.²² Mir Findiriski was acquainted with non-Islamic religious and philo-

sophical traditions in India and Persia. He travelled to India and studied Hinduism as well as Zoroastrianism. He wrote *Usul al-fusul* on Indian philosophy and a commentary for the Persian translation of the *Yoga Vasistha* by Nizam al-Din Paniputi. He was also interested in the fine arts and wrote *Sana'iyyah*, a treatise on the arts and sciences in society.²³ He wrote poetry and lived simply, mixing with the common people and identifying with them. Nasr narrates a story from *Riyad al-aarifin* that Mir Findiriski's attitude towards the common people annoyed Shah Abbas. One day Shah Abbas said, 'I hear some of the leading scholars and sages have been attending cock-fights in the bazaar.' Mir Findiriski, realizing that the remark was meant for him, replied, 'Your majesty, rest assured, I was present but I saw none of the *'ulama* there.'²⁴

Another important figure of the first generation of scholars of the School of Isfahan was Shaykh Baha al-Din 'Amili, known also as Shaykh Baha'i. His father Shaykh Husayn, the son of Shaykh Abdul Samad 'Amili, was originally an Arab from Lebanon, and was sent at the age of thirteen to Persia. He became one of the leading theologians and jurists of his time, a Sufi, a poet, and the leader of the *'ulama* in Isfahan.²⁵ He was also a close friend of Mir Findiriski and Mir Damad. The friendship between these three thinkers is revealed in a fresco in the ruins of a Safawid royal building in Isfahan.

This fresco depicts a famous story, according to which one day Mir Damad and two of his prominent contemporaries, Shaykh Baha'i and Mir Findiriski, were sitting in a royal hall, engaged in a philosophical discussion. Suddenly a lion that had escaped from the royal zoo enters the hall. The fresco depicts Shaykh Baha'i as collecting himself with signs of fear on his face, Mir Damad as prostrating in gratitude, and Mir Findiriski as utterly indifferent to the lion's presence. The three distinguished friends were later obliged to provide an explanation of their immediate reactions. Shaykh Baha'i is reported to have said that by the power of reason he knew that unless the lion was hungry, it would not attack him, and yet instinctively he was moved to protect himself. Mir Damad explained that, being the descendant of the Prophet, he knew that the lion would not attack him, so he prostrated himself and thanked God for being a descendant of the Prophet. And Mir Findiriski is reported to have said that he mastered the terrifying beast by the power of his inner serenity and self-control.²⁶

This story, besides disclosing the friendship between these three thinkers, is indicative of the three forms of discourse, namely rational thinking, doctrinal faith and mystical tendency, combined in the intellectual tradition of the Safawid period. The writings of Shaykh Baha'i on theology and astronomy, and his commentaries on the Qur'an and on Arabic grammar were widely used in Persia. He wrote poems under the influence of Rumi (1207–1273), a Persian Sufi and poet and the founder of the Mawlawiyyah Sufi order.²⁷ Like his two friends, Shaykh Baha'i was Gnostic and believed that intuitive knowledge was superior to discursive or rationalistic knowledge. Needless to

say, these three thinkers played a remarkable role in the flourishing of the School of Isfahan. The theosophical activities of the school attracted many students from other cities in Persia; Mulla Sadra belonged to its second generation of students.

Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Shirazi Qawami), also known as *Sadr al-Muta'allihin* and *Akhund*, was born in Shiraz. Although the exact date of his birth is unknown he was probably born in 1572 because it is recorded that he died in 1640 at the age of seventy on his seventh pilgrimage to Mecca. He was buried in Basra, a city in southern Iraq. His father, Mirza Ibrahim b. Yhya Qawami, was a religious scholar and a Shiraz noble. He was also said to have held a ministerial post in the government of Fars province. Shiraz was the capital city of Fars, and, like Isfahan, was well known for its cultural and educational tradition. Mulla Sadra, being the only child of a wealthy, educated and politically powerful family, received the best education possible under the tutelage of his father. Later, after the death of his father in 1587, the adolescent decided to go to Isfahan to pursue his religious studies.²⁸ The intellectual life in Isfahan, in particular under the influence of Shaykh Baha'i and Mir Damad, enabled Mulla Sadra to develop a keen interest in philosophy and Gnosticism ('*irfan*'). He studied the transmitted sciences ('*ulum al-naqliyyah*') with Shaykh Baha'i and philosophy with Mir Damad.

According to Mulla Sadra's confession in *al-Masha'ir*, he was a follower of Suhrawardi's metaphysics and advocated the doctrine of the principality of essence.²⁹ His subsequent dissatisfaction with this philosophy, however, suggests that the foundation of his conviction was not firm. His philosophical interest changed from the primacy of essence to the primacy of being. He became more concerned with Ibn Sina's ontology, and later in his book *Tarh al-kawnayn* he engages himself with Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being.³⁰ But the change in Mulla Sadra's thinking was received with hostility by the '*ulama*' in Isfahan. Some interpreted Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being as the identification of God with nature, or belief in an immanent God, contrary to the concept of the transcendent God accepted by the majority of Muslims. Also, the philosopher Ibn 'Arabi belonged to the Sunni theological tradition and was venerated by some Sunni Sufi orders, for example the Naqshabandiyyah, who were hostile towards Shi'ism. This may be seen as one of the reasons contributing to the marginalization of Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy by the Shi'i '*ulama*' and to the condemnation of his metaphysical views as heretical.

For Ibn 'Arabi, the 'Unity of Being' means that there is only one Being, and existence is nothing but the manifestation or outward radiance of that One Being.³¹ In this regard, being rather than quiddity becomes the ruling principle of and reason for the existence of everything. Being is also one and manifests itself at all ranks of existence. Apparently, this multiplicity is not

the negation of unity but gradations of the manifestation of the unity. William Chittick, in *Ibn 'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination*, tries to explicate the meaning of this doctrine, first by relating the 'Unity of Being' to 'the profession of God's Unity' (*al-tawhid*) in Islam, and second by making a distinction between this Sufi doctrine and pantheism in occidental philosophy. It is noteworthy that the concept of the unity of God (*al-tawhid*) is distinct in connotation from the concept of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujud*). The latter identifies God with Being or renders God and Being as synonymous. The Qur'anic concept of the Unity of God does not mean that nothing other than God exists. It is a simple denial of the polytheism that was a common belief among some Arab tribes of the pre-Islamic period: 'Your God is One God. There is no god but He, the Compassionate, the Merciful';³² 'Allah bear witness that there is no god but He, and so do the angels and men of learning. He upholds justice. There is no god but He, the Mighty and Wise One.'³³ The statement "There is no God but Allah" (*la ilaha ila Allah*) vividly expresses the existence of one God. It stresses monotheism and rejects other deities beside Allah. The advocates of the Unity of Being altered the first part of this statement 'There is no God . . .' (*la ilah*) to 'There is no being . . .' (*la maujud*). The original Qur'anic verse is the denial of polytheism, and the Sufi version of the unity is an assertion that there is no existence except God, which is an emphasis on the immanence of God rather than His transcendence. Fariduddin al-Attar (1119–1230) illustrated this unity by the analogy of water, saying that: 'Water is water in the boundless ocean; and in the jug too it is the same water.'³⁴ Again for al-Attar, that which unites the multiple particularization of Reality is being and not quiddity. Likewise all the various gradations of being such as human beings, animals, trees and so on enjoy this unity. In *Fusus al-Hikam*, Ibn 'Arabi also considered God to be the totality of beings: 'God, by virtue of being, is the same as the things that are, because there is no existence other than His Being.'³⁵

William Chittick's distinction between the Unity of Being and pantheism in occidental philosophy is not convincing. In my opinion these two doctrines are similar in several ways. Both of them put away duality without insisting on the identification of God with the world. For Spinoza, one of the advocates of pantheism in the West, everything exists through the 'Substance', and beings are particularizations of the manifestation of the attributes of Substance. Meanwhile, Substance is, and at the same time is not, a being: 'God (*Deus*) I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.'³⁶ He adds: 'Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God.'³⁷ Spinoza rejects the notion of transcendent God; for him, God's causality is immanent causality, in the sense that God is an indwelling power, but is not identical with his creation or gradations. It is true that Spinoza's concept of God as the only Reality (which is also the view of

the advocates of the doctrine of the Unity of Being) can be mistaken for the identification of God with nature, but nature for Spinoza is one of the infinite attributes of God. Furthermore, Spinoza makes a distinction between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, an indication of a certain self-differentiation in God, implying two distinguishable though inseparable aspects of the same reality.³⁸

In the face of the hostility from the official 'ulama, Mulla Sadra was left with two options: to defend his philosophical position or to retreat from public life. He chose the second and in 1610 left Isfahan for isolation in Kahak, a village near Qum. According to Fazlur Rahman, there was more to this intense opposition and criticism. In fact, the 'ulama were offended by Mulla Sadra's philosophical ambition. This is shown by the apology offered by the publisher in the introduction to *al-Asfar* stating that the philosopher's ideas in the work represent nothing to do with religious essence.³⁹ It is also reported that Mulla Sadra was critical of the official 'ulama and attacked them for using their political position for worldly and material gains. He called them ignorant of the states and stations of the human soul. His relationship with and attitude towards the institution of the 'ulama can be described as aggressive and un-compromising.⁴⁰ He removed himself from public life for a decade, and focused on strengthening the foundation of his philosophical thought and spiritual life. This period of solitude and retreat from public life was the most fruitful time in the intellectual development of Mulla Sadra: 'He was, therefore, in search of a method that would give him certainty and would transform rational propositions into experienced truth.'⁴¹ His intellectual situation, as Fazlur Rahman describes it, was similar to that of al-Ghazali and also of Descartes (1596–1650) when the latter was writing the *Meditations*. The difference was in al-Ghazali's fierce opposition to philosophy and Descartes's reliance on rationalistic discourse. Mulla Sadra neither tried to base truth on dogmatic theology nor accepted the validity of rational principles beyond doubt and limitation. Not much is known about Mulla Sadra during his stay in Kahak, but it is obvious that, although he was forced to choose solitude, this period in his life was significant for the development of a new philosophical ground and for his breaking away from Suhrawardi's metaphysical tradition.⁴² He refers to this in *al-Masha'ir*, where he describes the shift from Suhrawardi's doctrine of the primacy of essence to the doctrine of the primacy of Being as turning away from the 'darkness of illusion' to the daylight:

In the past, I used to be firm on the defence of the principality of essence, making existence a [mentally dependent] abstract entity, until my God guided me and showed me his proof. It became clear to me that the issue is opposite of what has been conceived and determined. Thank God who took me out of the darkness of illusion through the light of comprehension, who removed from my heart the clouds of these doubts through the rise of the sun of truth, and who held me close

to the true discourse in this life and the life after. Existences are genuine [determinate] realities and essences are the eternal 'thisnesses' which have never inhaled the perfume of real existence at all. These existences are merely the rays and reflected lights of The True Light and of the Eternal Existence. Exalted Be His Sublimity! However, each of them has essential predicates and contains intelligible concepts called essences.⁴³

This confession is the confirmation of Mulla Sadra's turn from the philosophical position of essentialism and his departure from Illuminationism, which affirms the primacy of essence and the nullity of being. It is the total conversion from the metaphysical position of Suhrawardi and his *ishraqi* followers to a position where being becomes primary. In this new philosophical position, essence rather than being is considered predicated or conceptual. This turn is seen by Mulla Sadra as a departure from the 'darkness of illusion' to the 'light of the day', which in my opinion has Platonic overtones. It resembles the journey of a liberated prisoner from the cave towards the light of the sun.

In 1625, at the age of fifty-three and having spent more than a decade in solitude, Mulla Sadra decided to return to his own city, Shiraz, on the request of the governor of Fars, Allahwirdi Khan (d. 1613) to teach in a religious school (*madrasa*) that he had recently established. The philosopher resumed teaching and writing and trained a number of notable disciples, among them 'Abdul Razzaq al-Husayn Lahiji and Muhammad al-Murthada, known also as Mulla Muhsin Fayd Kashani and Hakim Mulla Muhammad Aqa Jani. Lahiji is also known as Fayyadh. He married Um Kalthum, the eldest daughter of Mulla Sadra who was also a scientist and poetess. Lahiji studied in Mashad and travelled to Qum where he met Mulla Sadra and became his student. He has written on philosophy and theology. His main works include *Shawariq al-ilham*, *Gohar murad*, a commentary on Suhrawardi's *al-Nur* and *Sharhi isharat*. Faydh Kashani was an expert on Islamic jurisprudence, *hadith* (the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad), Gnosticism and ethics. He also studied under the instruction of Mulla Sadra in Qum and travelled to Shiraz with his master and married his daughter (Zubaydah). Fayd Kashani returned to his own town, Kashan, where he established a school to teach philosophy and theology. He wrote Gnostic poems and a number of books in Arabic. Among them are *Mafatih*, *al-Wafi*, *Usul al-ma'arif* and *al-Mahajj al-bayza*. Mulla Muhammad Aqa Jani is known for his commentary on Mir Damad's book *al-Qasabat*.

Mulla Sadra's philosophical development can be divided into three periods: in the first period he studied in Isfahan with Shaykh Baha'i and Mir Damad and came under the influence of Illuminationism. Mulla Sadra describes this period in *al-Asfar* as a time of intensive research and investigation of the ideas of Greek philosophers, of Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, of Muslim philosophers from Spain

(al-Andalus) represented by Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Rushd and Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy, and of the wisdom of the Illuminationists.⁴⁴ In *al-Masha'ir* this period of his intellectual development is identified with disillusionment with the doctrine of the primacy of essence. It was also at this time that Mulla Sadra faced hostility from the 'ulama in Isfahan. The second period, in Kahak, is characterized by deep philosophical meditation and solitude. The third period was marked by his return to society and the commitment to write and teach in Shiraz, which he did until his death. Although these three periods are interconnected and equally important for understanding his philosophy, the second and the third represent Mulla Sadra's authentic way of understanding reality on a new philosophical ground and the maturity of his thinking. His metaphysical position designates not only a conversion but also a new beginning or a new episode in Islamic philosophical tradition in which 'Being' is not the needfulness of essence; rather, it is the ground without which nothing is thinkable.

Although no definitive chronological order has been established for Mulla Sadra's writings, a list of thirty-three treatises on religion and philosophy is provided by Shaykh Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar in his introduction to Mulla Sadra's *al-Asfar*.⁴⁵ Nasr listed forty-six works of Mulla Sadra and six treatises whose authorship remains uncertain.⁴⁶ Professor S. M. Khamenei provided a list of thirty-nine works.⁴⁷ Abu Abdullah al-Zanjani also listed twenty-six philosophical works by Mulla Sadra in his *Life and Main Philosophical Teaching of the Great Iranian Philosopher Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi*.⁴⁸ Since Mulla Sadra's ontology is our primary interest, the present book deals with the writing of the third period of the philosopher's life. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that even his religious treatises, such as his commentaries on the Qur'anic verses, are related to his philosophical conviction. His major philosophical work and the fountainhead of his thought is *Al-Hikma al-muta'aliyah fi al-asfar al-'aqliyyah al-arba'a*, known also as *al-Asfar* (it is referred to in this book as *al-Asfar*).⁴⁹ This work was first published in four volumes in 1865, with a commentary by Mulla Hadi Sabzawari on three volumes. The most recent edition, by Rida Lutfi, was published in nine volumes in 1958. It was also published in Teheran with a Persian commentary by Ayatullah Abdulla Jawadi Amili in 1989. One of Mulla Sadra's early works before *al-Asfar* was *Tarh al-kawnayn*, which was written under the influence of Ibn 'Arabi's pantheistic philosophy and marked the beginning of Mulla Sadra's move away from Suhrawardi's philosophical tradition; this work was also branded as heretical by the institution of 'ulama in Isfahan. The book was later published under the title *Risalat seryan al-wujud*. Other important philosophical works include *al-Masha'ir*, which is a summary of Mulla Sadra's philosophical project in *al-Asfar* and was published in 1897. It was later published in Persian in 1964 by Dr Karim Mujtahidi, a professor at Teheran University, and was translated into English

by Parviz Morewedge and published by the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science (SSIP) in 1992. Other philosophical works, for example *Al-Hikma al-'arshiyyah*, *al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah fi asrar al-'ulum al-kemaliyyah*, *Risala fi al-haraka al jawheriyyah* and *al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad*, deal with various philosophical and theological issues. Mulla Sadra also wrote a treatise on subject-object dichotomy, *Risala fi itihad al-'aql w al-ma'qul*, and *Hashiyyah 'ala sharih hikmat al-ishraq lil Suhrawardi*. The latter was published in 1898. A treatise on Ibn Sina's philosophy, *Sharih ilahiyyah al-shifa*, was published in 1885. Mulla Sadra also wrote *Mafatih al-ghayb*, on metaphysics, cosmology and eschatology. *Al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad* was revised and published by Jalal al-Din Ashtiani in Mashad in 1921. This book was also published in Tunisia in 1972 by Nur al-Din al-Ali, and by the Iranian Academy of Philosophy in Teheran in 1975. The book has two main sections: the knowledge of God and Resurrection. In the last part of the section on Resurrection under the title 'Prophecy', Mulla Sadra deals with the relationship between religion and politics. *Al-Shawahid al-Rububiyyah* is a summary of his teachings and was published for the first time in 1869. It is considered to be his last work.⁵⁰ The book was recently edited by Jalal al-Din Ashtyani and was published with Mulla Hadi Sabzawari's commentary in 1967. A collection of his treatises was published in 1996 under the title *Majmu'a rasa'ile-falsafi Sadr al-muta'ahilin*, with an introduction in Persian by Hamid Naji Isfahani. This collection includes important philosophical treatises by Mulla Sadra such as *Risalat itihad 'aql e ma'qul*, *Risalat isalat ja'il al-wujud* and *Risalat shawahid al-rububiyyah*.

Mulla Sadra's major philosophical work, *Al-Hikma al-muta'aliyah fi al-asfar al-'aqliyyah al-arba'a*, or *al-Asfar (The Transcendent Philosophy Concerning the Four Intellectual Journeys of the Soul)*, stands as the most valuable philosophical product. It is a work that has remained unknown to a great extent in the West. This work not only contains Mulla Sadra's philosophical system but presents his rich understanding and evaluation of the earlier Muslim philosophical, theological and Sufi traditions. The title of this work indicates four intellectual journeys, which lead human existence from the lowest to the highest rank. These journeys complete one another and describe Mulla Sadra's philosophical system. The four intellectual journeys are:

- A journey from creation to the Truth or Creator
- A journey from the Truth to the Truth
- A journey that stands in relation to the first journey because it is from the Truth to creation with the Truth
- A journey that stands in relation to the second journey because it is from the Truth to the creation.

The first journey, from creation to the Creator, deals with general principles of philosophy or rather metaphysical questions in order to found the transcendent philosophy as a divine science. This journey also addresses philosophical issues such as the definition and meaning of philosophy, the primacy of Being over essence, the gradation of Being, the trans-substantial change (*al-Haraka al-jawhariyyah*), Platonic ideal forms, time, and the dichotomy of the subject-object relationship. The second journey represents Mulla Sadra's natural philosophy and his criticism of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories. It explains the existence of natural entities, matter and forms, substance and accident and the hierarchy of the natural beings in the world. It includes Mulla Sadra's views on the problem of the creation *ex nihilo* and the eternity of the world. It explores the views of the Greek philosophers such as Thales, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. At the end of this journey Mulla Sadra discusses the relationship between nature and its metaphysical principles. He advocates his own opinion of change as the continuous renewal of the world. In the third journey, Mulla Sadra constructs his own theological ideas or a divine science in a particular sense. It includes the nature of God's existence, divine unity and attributes, God's knowledge of the world, good and evil and the divine law. He also gives different proofs for the existence of God, God's knowledge of the world, the nature of divine will, and the role of love (*ishq*) in the evolutionary process of change. The fourth journey is the end of the intellectual progress of Mulla Sadra where he explains his own understanding of rational psychology and eschatology. It begins with a discussion on different types of the soul, the proofs for its existence, and the possibility of the separation of the soul from the corporeal world. Mulla Sadra also deals critically with the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul. He explains the condition of the human souls who reside in heaven and hell quoting from Ibn 'Arabi's *al-Futuhat al-makiyyah* at the end.

These four intellectual journeys in *al-Asfar* are not only descriptive of Mulla Sadra's philosophical ideas, but also critical of almost all views held by his predecessors. Fazlur Rahman describes this style of Mulla Sadra as hypercritical because all alternative solutions to the philosophical problems are rejected; meanwhile the new solutions he suggests seem not to be essentially different or in disagreement with those of his predecessors. For example, in his discussion on eschatology he rejects al-Ghazali's solution but his own solution on physical resurrection is not distinguishable from that offered by al-Ghazali. The only texts and thinkers that did not come under Mulla Sadra's critical scrutiny were the foundation texts of Islam, the views of the Shi'i imams, and Ibn 'Arabi.⁵¹

The third period of Mulla Sadra's intellectual development gave rise to a new type of ontology based on the doctrine of the primacy of Being. This ontology, although it had similarities with Ibn Sina's ontology and Ibn

'Arabi's theosophy, offered a new philosophical foundation distinct from that of Illuminationism. Although not recognized immediately by the intellectual circle of its time, Mulla Sadra's philosophical achievement gradually inscribed its effect in the Muslim philosophical tradition, particularly during the Qajar dynasty. Today it is almost impossible to understand the development of Muslim philosophy without understanding Mulla Sadra's ontological enterprise and his influence in the Persian-speaking world.

The influence of Mulla Sadra's transcendent philosophy and the doctrine of the primacy of Being was felt later in the post Isfahan era. This era is characterized by the political changes to Shi'ite Islamic power after the collapse of the Safawid dynasty in 1732 and the shift of the centre for Islamic philosophical studies from Isfahan, capital of the Safawids, to Teheran following the establishment of the Qajar in 1779 by Agha Muhammad Khan.⁵² The Safawid dynasty witnessed the culmination of the Shi'ite political and philosophical fusion, but it remained a target of sectarian antagonism by the Sunni neighbouring political hegemony and tribes. It is reported that Mir Vais, a Sunni Muslim leader of the Ghilzai tribe in Qandahar, travelled through Isfahan on his way to Mecca in 1707. He collected some material containing matters repugnant to Sunni Islam. After showing them to the Sunni '*ulama* in Makkah he obtained a *fatwa* (religious verdict) from them authorizing *jihad* (holy war) against the Shi'ites and their dynasty in Isfahan. The holy war began with an attack on the Shi'ite minority in Qandahar and ended with the fall of Isfahan in 1722. In 1723 another *fatwa* was issued against the Shi'ites by the Shaykh al-Islam (of the chief '*ulama*) in Istanbul,⁵³ in which it was stated that the blood of male Shi'ites was to be shed and even their women and children to be taken captive.⁵⁴ In 1743, in this hostile atmosphere, Nadir Shah tried to promote a revised form of Shi'ite Islam. He sponsored a meeting between Shi'ite and Sunnite '*ulama* in Najaf and later succeeded in having the Shi'ites recognized as the followers of the Ja'afari School of law (*mazhab*), the fifth Islamic school of law, by the Ottoman empire. Unfortunately Nadir Shah was assassinated soon after this achievement.⁵⁵

The Qajar dynasty, unlike the Safawid, was characterized by constant internal tension between the political hegemony of the monarch and the institution of the '*ulama*. The Qajar monarchs did not claim religious authority for themselves through alleged imamate descent. They, however, sought the favour of some '*ulama* by patronizing the Shi'ite holy shrines of the imams and offering other services.⁵⁶ The Qajar monarchs' alienation of the official '*ulama* from the political hegemony and the tenuous relationship between the state and religious authority made the '*ulama* stronger as an opposition so that their religious actions were intensified politically in the community. Various religious schools were established for promoting religious studies. Sufi orders such as Shaykhism, Ni'mat Allahi, Zahabis and Khaksar gained popularity.⁵⁷ The Shaykhi order eventually became the birthplace of the Babi

movement with its doctrine of the messianic return of the hidden imam, which later developed into Baha'ism.⁵⁸ The *'ulama* stressed the external dimension and rituals of the faith in light of the instructions of the imams, while the Sufi movement justified the significance of the internal dimension of the faith, but again for its effectiveness turned to the teachings of the imams.

Parallel to this development in the Qajar period, the teaching of Mulla Sadra's philosophy added another element of diversity to the cultural progress of Shi'i Islam. The school of Isfahan, where Mulla Sadra studied under the direction of Mir Damad, Mir Findiriski and Shaykh Baha'i, was dominated by the 'Essentialism' of the *ishraqi* metaphysical tradition of Suhrawardi. By contrast, the philosophical school of Teheran flourished under the sway of Muslim 'Existentialism' or the metaphysical tradition of Mulla Sadra. This metaphysical tradition became 'central to the intellectual life of Qajar Persia and was of great importance not only for those who considered themselves as his followers, but even by those who opposed him, as is seen in the writings of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, the founder of the Shaykhi movement and Sayyid Muhammad the Bab, the founder of Babism.'⁵⁹ Although the school of Teheran was founded at the end of the eighteenth century with the advent of the Qajar dynasty, the teaching of Mulla Sadra's philosophy actually began with Mulla Ali Nuri (d. 1830–1831) in Isfahan, the former Safawid capital of Persia in the early Qajar period. Mulla Ali Nuri was a great Islamic scholar and his teaching of Mulla Sadra's philosophy in that city continued without opposition from the official *'ulama*.⁶⁰ Ali Nuri also wrote commentaries on *al-Asfar*, *al-Masha'ir* and *Sharh usul al-kafi*. His pupils included Mulla Muhammad Isma'il Isfahani, Mulla Abdullah Zunuzi, and his son Mulla Ali Mudarris Zunuzi, Mulla Muhammad Ja'afar Langarudi, Mulla Isma'il Khajaw'i, and finally Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, who studied philosophy for seven years in Isfahan and was responsible for the revival of the Existentialist school of Mulla Sadra in the Qajar period.⁶¹ The philosophical school of Teheran, however, became the centre for studying Mulla Sadra's philosophy on one hand and Islamic esotericism or Gnosticism on the other. The latter was advocated by Sayyid Radi Larijani, known also as *Malik a-Batini* (the Professor of the Esoteric).⁶²

Mulla Sadra's philosophy was also taught on the Indian subcontinent for the first time by Muhammad Salih Kashani, a disciple of Mulla Sadra who migrated to India. Indian Muslim scholars such as Muhammad Amjad al-Sadiqi (d. 1727), Mulla Hasan Laknawi (d. 1783), Muhammad A'lam Sindili (d. 1834) and Abdul Ali Bahr al-'Ulum (died in the nineteenth century) wrote commentaries on the works of Mulla Sadra.⁶³ As mentioned earlier, one of the most influential figures in the promotion of the philosophy of Mulla Sadra during the Qajar dynasty was Mulla Hadi Sabzawari. This Muslim thinker was born in 1797 in Sabzawar in north-eastern Iran. He studied metaphysics,

logic, mathematics and jurisprudence in Mashhad. He then moved to Isfahan to study philosophy with Mulla Isma'il Isfahani and Mulla Ali Nuri, the interpreter of Mulla Sadra's philosophy of that time. Although he studied with Mulla Ali Nuri for about three years, Sabzawari hints in his autobiography at "illuminati" rather than Mulla Sadra's philosophy as the motive behind his inclination for philosophy and traveling to Isfahan:

I spent a total of ten years in the pious circle of the late Mulla [Mulla Husayn Sabzawari in Mashhad], until the time that my passion for learning was intensified. From Isfahan the whisper of the 'illuminati' reached my heart, at a time when, by the grace of God, I found great pleasure as well as competence in theological studies. I then left Khurasan for Isfahan leaving behind a considerable amount of property and goods. I stayed there for eight years gaining, with God's aid, an ascetic temperament, free of excessive passions, as well as success in my studies of the sciences and the *shari'a*; however, I spent most of my time studying philosophy of the illuminations school. For five years I studied with that supreme doctor of theology (glory of truth seekers, shining light of savants and teachers, possessing the virtuousness of the divines – nay the virtues of God, that knower of the Truth), Akhund Mulla Isma'il Isfahani (may al-Sharif (God) sanctify his heart).⁶⁴

After the death of Mulla Isma'il Isfahani, Sabzawari studied with Mulla Ali Nuri: 'When I returned to Khurasan, I continued my studies of *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and *tafsir* (commentary) for five years, for scholars (there) favoured these two subjects and offered deep understanding of *hikmat* (philosophy). For this reason I rely mostly on *hikmat*, especially *ishraqi* (Illuminationism).'⁶⁵ After returning from pilgrimage to Mecca, Sabzawari spent the rest of his life in his own town teaching philosophy and theology. He soon earned a reputation as a great thinker of the Qajar dynasty; even Nasir al-Din Shah (the Qajar king who died in 1896) visited him in 1867. Sabzawari died in 1873 and was recognized as the founder of the Sabzawar philosophical school. He was called, as Henri Corbin states, 'the Plato of his time', and was also said to be its Aristotle.⁶⁶ One of the most famous philosophical works of Sabzawari is *Ghurur al-Fara'id*, in which he gives a systematic account of Mulla Sadra's existential philosophy together with *Sharh al-manzumah* in poetic verses. Mulla Sadra's doctrine of the primacy of Being, modalities and the systematic ambiguity of Being are discussed in the first part of this work. Sabzawari wrote three other commentaries on *Al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah*, *al-Mabda' wa al-mi'ad* and *Mafatih al-ghayb*. Another work, *Asrar al-hikma*, deals in detail with the origin of being, eschatology and the esoteric meaning of liturgical practices. At the request of Nasir al-Din Shah (the Qajar monarch) Sabzawari produced a summary of this work entitled *Hidayat al-talibin*.⁶⁷

In modern times, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatab'i (professor at the theological University of Qum) is considered to be one of the philosophers and Gnostic thinkers of Persia who were inspired by Mulla Sadra's

philosophy. He was born in Tabriz in 1903 and died in 1981. He wrote numerous books, one being a new edition of Mulla Sadra's *al-Asfar*. Tabatab'i was also engaged in a philosophical debate with Henri Corbin from 1958 to 1977. These debates were arranged by Sayyid Hossein Nasr (1933–) and conducted before a small audience. Among those who attended were Ayatollah Mutahari and Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani.⁶⁸ Many other Persian Muslim thinkers have followed Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Among them are Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Rafi'i Qazwini, Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani (1925–), a professor of theology at Mashhad who edited Mulla Sadra's *Al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah*, *al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah* and Sabzawari's *Majmu'ai i-rasa'il*, and Sayyid Muhammad Kazim 'Assar (1885–1975), professor of theology at the University of Teheran, Mahdi Illahi Qumsha'i, professor of philosophy at the University of Teheran, and 'Allamah Muhammad Salih Ha'iri Simnani.⁶⁹ At present, Sayyid Muhammad Khamenei, the director of Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute in Teheran, and Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani, a professor of philosophy at the University of Teheran, are working on Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Mulla Sadra's philosophy is also studied widely at the universities and religious schools (*madrassa*) in Iran.

The Doctrine of the Primacy of Being: An Ontological Turn

As a dedicated and critical thinker, Mulla Sadra investigated deeply into almost the entire corpus of philosophical, theological and mystical Islamic thought. Under the influence of his teacher, Mir Damad, he became one of the followers of Illuminationism.¹ Like his teacher, he was also interested in Ibn Sina's ontology and studied Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy. Suhrawardi, Ibn Sina and Ibn 'Arabi had a notable impact on Mulla Sadra's thinking and played a significant role in facilitating his ontological turn from the doctrine of the primacy of essence to the primacy of being and in his development of a new ontological system. Mulla Sadra's ideas were formed in the matrix of the dominant philosophy of Suhrawardi in the school of Isfahan. As discussed previously in Chapter Two, Suhrawardi held the metaphysical view that being was a mere mental concept and that essence was the only reality. Human knowledge of an object was also possible only through the revealing of its essence. A relationship was suggested between Suhrawardi's Illuminationism and Plato's metaphysics; this relationship was seen as important in comparing Mulla Sadra's ontology with that of Heidegger.

From the second period of his intellectual development, Mulla Sadra began to express dissatisfaction with the metaphysics of Illuminationism, in particular with the doctrine of the primacy of essence and declared, on the contrary, the doctrine of the primacy of Being. This ontological turn could not have occurred without the influence of Ibn Sina and Ibn 'Arabi. Mulla Sadra's teacher, Mir Damad, also tried to combine Suhrawardi's *ishraqi* thought with the Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophy of Ibn Sina. The philosophical tradition of the Isfahan school could not be characterized by blind imitation of Suhrawardi's Illuminationism. There was an inclination towards newly creative ideas and an attempt to amalgamate Suhrawardi's thought with that of Ibn Sina. Mulla Sadra, however, crossed the boundary set by the official interpretation of Islamic thought when he expressed his interest in Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujud*). In addition to the influence of this doctrine, another visible influence on Mulla Sadra was the psychological-eschatological role of the realm of images. In this realm, according to Ibn 'Arabi, images are as real as they are perceptible. The images in the human soul in the hereafter, since they are not attached to material objects, are more vivid and real than the images in the material world. This idea was used by Mulla Sadra to prove his view on bodily resurrection in his eschatological doctrine.²

For Ibn Sina, existence and essence were both real. Existence was of two kinds: necessary and contingent. He illustrated the difference between them in two ways. First, the necessary being is dependent on itself to exist and its existence is inseparable from its essence, or rather it is pure existence. By contrast, contingent beings are not self-dependent and derive from necessary beings. Their essences are also separable or are additional to them.³ Following Ibn Sina's ontological division and his distinction between existence and essence, the problem of whether existence or essence constitutes reality emerged in subsequent philosophical debates among Muslim thinkers. Suhrawardi, as one of the followers of Platonism, argued against Ibn Sina's ontology and insisted on the non-reality of existence and advocated the idea that essence was the only reality.⁴ Mulla Sadra contradicted Suhrawardi's doctrine and rejected the Platonic-Illuminationist metaphysical view that nothing in the real world corresponds to existence or nothing exists but ideas or essence. He, on the contrary, believed that nothing is real but existence.

In seeking to clarify the similarities between Mulla Sadra and Heidegger in relation to the doctrine of Being, it is important to note three points:

- Mulla Sadra and Heidegger stress the principality of Being and the reality of Being as a pre-ontological condition for the existence of all beings.
- Both thinkers argue against Plato's metaphysics, which reduces everything to ideas or their essences.
- They hold the view that Aristotle's logic and rationalist cognition are incapable of revealing the meaning of Being. As a result, a new cognitive instrument is required to apprehend the meaning of Being.

Mulla Sadra conceived of no more difficult task than marking a departure from the dominant philosophical tradition of his time and developing a new ontological system capable of rendering being meaningful. The task could be accomplished, however, by being essentially critical as well as creative through challenging Illuminationism. A new philosophical beginning was required, which should begin with a shift to the doctrine of the primacy of Being. In Chapter Three the shift in the direction of his thought from the second period of his intellectual development was described as a 'turn' from the core elements of Suhrawardi's metaphysics which neglected fundamental philosophical questions in favour of investigating the nature of something less fundamental or grounded that could not exist by itself. Heidegger, in *Being and Time* (1927), similarly sought a new ontological system based on understanding of the meaning of Being as the most fundamental philosophical concern. In order to prove this, Heidegger argues that the post Aristotelian thinkers accepted the dogma of negligence or the abandonment of Being. They withdrew themselves from the genuine philosophical question about the meaning of Being, for three reasons. First, they thought that Being was the

most universal concept, and that its universality 'transcended' any universality of genus. Second, since Being is the most universal concept, and is not an entity, it is therefore indefinable and escapes all attempts to define it in accordance with the rules of 'definition' provided in Aristotelian logic. Third, Being is self-evident.⁵ Heidegger rejects these three presuppositions and argues against the post Aristotelian thinkers that the universality of the concept of Being does not guarantee the clarity of its meaning, and that the meaning of this concept is still the darkest of all. He also, like Mulla Sadra, says that Being is not an entity and is thus indefinable, and that Aristotle's definition by genus and difference, '*definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*' or connotative definition, which is the most important kind of definition, is not applicable to it but appropriate only for defining beings. Heidegger also believes that the indefinableness of Being does not invalidate the question of its meaning, and should not hinder us from investigating that meaning:

Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. But does this imply that 'Being' no longer offers a problem? Not at all. We can infer only that 'Being' cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 'definition' as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within certain limits, provides a quite justifiable way of defining 'beings'. The indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look that question in the face.⁶

To clarify Mulla Sadra's view on the indefinableness of Being, Mulla Hadi Sabzawari states that even the positive attributes by which we try to define Being will neither render a definition nor a description, because whatever attribute is employed is not applicable to this reality. Sabzawari's argument is based on the notion of the 'simplicity' of Being. Since Being is simple, it has no differentia or genus on which its definition will become possible. Attaching positive attributes to Being cannot be a description because Being has no accidental properties to ascribe to it.⁷ As a result, Sabzawari suggests that the meaning of Being will be understood through negative attributes. Being, for example, is neither a substance nor an accident. Substance is essence and since it has no substratum cannot be an accident. Another way of understanding the meaning of Being is that Being has neither an opposite nor anything with similarity, because Being has no genus or *differentia*. It is not distinct or different from anything. That is why there is nothing to be opposed to it. Because Being also has no essence to share with another being, it is not possible to think of anything similar to Being. We can also say that Being is not a part and has no parts.⁸ The negative attributes listed here reveal some aspects of the nature of Being; but again, like positive attributes, these are neither definitions nor descriptions of Being.

Mulla Sadra describes the metaphysics of Suhrawardi in his book *al-Masha'ir* (the illusion of darkness, or the concealment of the truth):

Existences are genuine [determinate] realities and essences are the eternal 'thisnesses' which have never inhaled the perfume of real existence at all. These existences are merely the rays and reflected lights of the True Light and of the Eternal Existence—Exalted Be His Sublimity! However, each of them has essential predicates and contains intelligible concepts called essences.⁹

The 'darkness of illusion' is indicative of Suhrawardi's metaphysics. It is the state of untruth that reigns over the whole of reality in such a way that the meaning of Being remains unattainable and concealed. For Heidegger, the 'darkness of illusion' is the 'abandonment of Being', which led to 'nihilism' in the occidental thought of Plato, whom Suhrawardi considered the master of Illuminism, and finally of Nietzsche. It represents a history of negligence of the most fundamental philosophical question. In *An Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger states:

Where is nihilism really at work? Where men cling to familiar *essents* and suppose that it suffices to go on talking about *essents* as essents, since after all that is what they are. But with this they reject the question of being and treat being like a nothing (*nihil*) which in a certain sense it is, insofar as it has an essence. To forget being and cultivate only the essent – that is nihilism . . . By contrast, to press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of nothingness to draw nothingness into the question of being – this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true transcending of nihilism.¹⁰

In *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)* Heidegger explains this metaphysical position in detail and points out four forms of nihilism: actual nihilism, the greatest nihilism, the most disastrous nihilism, and finally crude nihilism.¹¹ These forms of nihilism have no historical sequence as any one can emerge in one historical epoch together with the abandonment of Being. Nihilism is also described as the epoch of total lack of questioning in which

problems will pile up and rush around, those types of 'questions', which are not really questions, because their response dare not have anything binding about them, insofar as it immediately becomes a problem again. This says exactly and in advance that nothing is immune to dissolution and that deconstruction [*Auflösung*] is only a matter of numbers regarding time, space, and force.¹²

The reconstruction of new metaphysical thought based on the principality of Being means destroying the foundation of nihilism; this should be the priority of this project for Mulla Sadra as well as for Heidegger. Ontology needs to become the foundation of philosophical thinking; even philosophy has to be defined as an inquiry into the meaning of Being: 'Initially and throughout the long history between Ahaximander and Nietzsche, inquiring into being is

only a question concerning the being of beings.’¹³ Both Mulla Sadra and Heidegger developed, by revolting against the dominant Platonic tradition, a new ontology at two different times and against two different cultural backgrounds. At the end of this revolt, Suhrawardi for Mulla Sadra and Nietzsche for Heidegger represent the final stage in the development of an antagonistic metaphysical tradition. The ‘darkness of illusion’ or ‘abandonment of Being’ is not simply an effacement for these two thinkers, but a serious philosophical problem that reigns over the whole domain of thinking in such a way that the truth of Being recedes into the darkness or, as Heidegger states, into the ‘disintegration of truth’ and finally the thinking of Being as essence.¹⁴ Beginning with Plato, Being was understood as ‘Idea’ and was interpreted as mere representation in the domain of thinking. As a consequence, in Plato’s metaphysics, the Being of beings as a whole was relegated to darkness. In Heidegger’s view, the concealment of truth about the reality of Being in the history of occidental thought from the time of Plato is like ‘the process in which the light of a star that has been extinguished for millennia will gleam but its gleaming nonetheless remains a mere appearance’.¹⁵ Overcoming this type of metaphysics is possible only by turning to, and not in a mere conversion of, the metaphysics of Being by positing the most fundamental philosophical question concerning the meaning of Being and its principality. It is possible to turn to the metaphysics of Being, as described by Heidegger in *Being and Time* and *Contributions to Philosophy*, by making Being the grounding question and by allowing the re-emergence of the truth of Being as the only inner reality of all ontic beings. For Mulla Sadra, as he writes in *al-Masha’ir*, this is a departure from the ‘darkness of illusion’ to the daylight of the Truth.

The theme of ontology in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is the sum of the multiplicities of being grounded on the principle of unity. In this kind of system, in which unity and multiplicity are taken into consideration, the relation of unity to multiplicity and of identity to difference is decisive. In this system of ontology, the principal reality, Being, unlike Plato’s universal Forms in the ideal world, is not multiple. It is a unity or identity manifesting itself in multiple gradations (difference). In this case this unity in multiplicity or identity in difference is best understood in the light of Hegel’s dialectic logic rather than Aristotle’s, because it is not abstract identity. It is not a simple unity of Being with itself but a relation to itself. By virtue of this relation of identity, beings or the multiple modalities of Being exist, and Being becomes the unified ground for them. In identity, Being and the modalities of Being belong together. This metaphysical principle is one of the most general and encompassing determinations on which all modalities of Being depend. Precisely, it indicates that Being functions as the foundation on which we can grasp the nature of the relationship between unity and multiplicity. It shows that unity and multiplicity are two different aspects of the same reality. Unity

contains multiplicity and vice versa. But taking Being as a unified ground of grounded multiplicity resembles to a great extent Aristotle's understanding of Being in the *Metaphysics*. For Aristotle, general ontology must study unity and its varieties. He insists that there is a unity beneath the diversity of phenomenal objects and that unity is Being *qua* being. There is also a single science known as 'general ontology', which investigates Being as well as its varieties. But the difference between Aristotle and Mulla Sadra arises with the doctrine of the categories and the rationalistic apprehension of this unified ground or Being *qua* being. Aristotle listed ten categories, of which the most fundamental was substance. The other categories, such as quality, quantity, relation, place, time, posture, state, action and passion, are dependent on substance to exist and cannot be by themselves. Meanwhile, these categories are classes or genera and their applications render our knowledge of the phenomenal world possible.¹⁶ In Mulla Sadra's ontology, Being, as the principle of the unity beneath the multiplicity of the phenomenal objects, is beyond the domain of the applicability of these categories. Hence Being remains indefinable. It is not a genus, *differentia*, species or a common and specific accident. In this case, understanding the meaning of Being cannot be based on anything other than itself:

It [existence] cannot be described [defined], because description is due to either a definition or a [distinguishing] mark. Thus, it cannot be described by definition. Since it has neither a genus nor *differentia*, it does not have a definition. Nor can it [be described] by a distinguishing mark, since its understanding cannot be supplied by anything more manifest and prevalent than it. It is a mistake to attempt to describe existence, for it would need to be described by something more hidden than the [entity] itself – unless the aim were to [approach it by] either an indication or a notification, or some description; the latter is merely a syntactical [lit. linguistic] inquiry.¹⁷

Being is then not conditioned by any sort of determination and limitation. If it is defined it is limited and conditioned by its determinations, for every affirmation is a negation. Kant, in the second and third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, draws a similar conclusion. He limits the application of the categories to the multiple forms of the phenomenal world, and the 'thing-in-itself' or *noumenon* is kept beyond the applicability of the categories of human understanding and hence remains unknowable. These two conclusions look similar as each recommends the employment of the categories for revealing beings rather than their inner reality; but Mulla Sadra and Heidegger disagree with Kant on the unknowability of reality. For them, the shortcoming in the application of the categories to the realm of Being does not hinder an investigation into the meaning of Being. The unknowability and indefinability of Being, as indicated here, refer to the inherent shortcoming of Aristotle's logic and rationalistic apprehension, which becomes an explicit

problem in the epistemological inquiry of Kant. Nevertheless, this shortcoming does not negate the task of ontological inquiry. Mulla Sadra and Heidegger searched for a new epistemological tool and methodology that was different from the Aristotelian form of cognition. Mulla Sadra, in particular, relied on intuitive knowledge or knowledge by presence for investigating the meaning of Being. It is a cognitive tool associated with the mystic way of apprehending the reality:

As it has been stated, the reality of existence is neither genus, nor species, nor accident, since it is not a natural universal. Instead, its inclusion happens in another mode of inclusion, and no one has gnosis of it except the mystics; i.e. those who are firmly grounded in mystical knowledge. Sometimes it is interpreted as the spiritual soul [i.e., Holy Spirit], other times as the grace 'which extendeth to all things'. Sometimes [it is interpreted as the] 'Reality from which beings have been created', according to the mystics. [Also, it is] the expansion of the light of existence to the structures [lit. figures] of contingent beings, and the essences which are receptive to it; finally, [they speak of] its descent towards the abodes of inner-natures.¹⁸

For Heidegger, the universality of Being is also not a natural universal like the universality of 'whiteness'. Its universality 'transcends' any universality of genus. Those who follow Aristotle's rule for definition arrive at a negative conclusion in defining Being, simply because Being is not a genus and has no *differentia*. But does this mean that no further attempt should be made to understand the meaning of this indefinable reality? Indeed, if the horizon of thinking is limited by Aristotle's doctrine of the task and application of the categories, the answer to this question is in the affirmative. Mulla Sadra and Heidegger, although inspired by Aristotle's ontology, denounced his logic and his rationalistic apprehension of Being. An inquiry into the meaning of Being is not in the scope of rational epistemology or regional ontology, because Being is distinct from beings. Similar to Aristotle's First Principle, it is a prior condition not only for beings but also for all scientific inquiries, yet it cannot be studied scientifically. 'Fundamental ontology', which takes Being into account, is substantially distinctive and its subject matter is neither this nor that kind of being but Being *per se*: 'Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its own most aim, if it has not adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.'¹⁹ Mulla Sadra also believes that the question of the meaning of Being becomes a prior condition and the foundation of all kinds of scientific discourse and knowledge:

The question of existence is the foundation of the principles of wisdom, the basis of philosophical theology, and the nexus of [concern] of those in the circle [lit. the millstone; i.e., the centre] of the sciences of unity, the resurrection of souls and

bodies, and of much else that only we have developed and articulated. It gives them a synthesis [lit. a unity] through its explication. Anyone who is ignorant of the gnosis of existence is also ignorant of the major subjects and most significant quests and misses the refinements of gnosis and its subtleties, the science of the divine and the prophets, the gnosis of the soul, and its connection and return to the [primordial] source and destiny [i.e., *telos*].²⁰

As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, in *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, Suhrawardi acknowledges his debt to Plato and considers him to be one of his spiritual masters and a great Illuminationist sage and thinker. However, Mulla Sadra's attack on Suhrawardi's philosophy is a direct criticism of Platonism.²¹ In addition, while Mulla Sadra and Heidegger came from different cultural backgrounds, the similarity in their thought is within the framework of their ontology and criticism of Platonism; that is, represented by Illuminationism of Suhrawardi in Persia and the nihilism of occidental thought. These two philosophical traditions, one Eastern and one Western, belong to Platonism, which has led to the 'abandonment of Being'. They stand in opposition to the type of metaphysics founded and advocated by Mulla Sadra and Heidegger.

The new ontological enterprise of Mulla Sadra is explained in the first journey of *al-Asfar* and is continued in *al-Masha'ir* and *al-Shawahid al-Rububiyyah*. Mulla Sadra was convinced that Being is self-evident; in *al-Masha'ir*, in the Third Prehension, under the title 'An Analysis of the [Extra-Mental] Existence Having a Determinate [Concrete, Fully Determined] Status', he tried to prove the principality of Being in eight ways or by eight arguments that he called evidences.

The First Evidence

'The reality of anything is its existence, which ranks with its effects and implications. Existence, therefore, must be the most real of all things for it is the possessor of reality, because whatever possesses reality possesses reality only due to it.'²² Being in this evidence becomes an *a priori* ontological condition for the existence of all things. Everything finds its way into the light of being or the objective reality only through Being and by relying on Being rather than its essence.

The Second Evidence

In this evidence, Mulla Sadra states that when the principality or the reality of essence is affirmed there will be no distinction between external and mental realities, but that 'this however is absurd'. He also states that if something exists in the external world or intellectually, it does not signify that these two

domains (external and intellectual) stand for that thing as containers in which the existence of that thing is established. It simply means that it has an existence from which some effects and consequences are derived.²³

The Third Evidence

If the reality of things is in their essences, then it is impossible to predicate essences of one another. Predication is the union of two concepts. This implies that when one thing is predicated of another, the two will be united in existence but be different from one another in their essences:

If things exist by their essences and not by the [mediation] of something else, it would not be possible to predicate them on each other, such as 'Zaid is an animal' or 'Man walks'. It is so, because the use and the truth of predication is a union between different concepts in existence. Thus the judgment made of something predicated on something else is an expression of their unity in existence, though they be diverse as concepts and in terms of their essences.²⁴

If the reality of a thing is its essence, then there will be no distinction between a subject and its predicate on the bases of unity and diversity.

The Fourth Evidence

Here Mulla Sadra supposes that if Being is non-existent then nothing has existed. Since the non-existence of things is false, the non-existence of existence is necessarily false. Also, if we think of essence as not in a union with existence, then it is non-existent in any mode. If there is no existence, then the predication of an essence is impossible, as affirming a predicate presupposes the existence of the subject. The adjunction of a non-existent thing to another non-existing thing has no validity.²⁵

The Fifth Evidence

This evidence is another version of the previous evidence. Before, Mulla Sadra states that without Being nothing can exist; here he holds the view that if Being has no concrete form or external actualization, then no species will have particulars or individuals: 'If existence is not realized in the individuals of a species, no one of the [individuals of the species] is realized in the external realm.'²⁶ For the actualization of an individual a species is required, which also relies on existence to be, and nothing (for example, another universal concept) other than existence can qualify as a necessary condition for this purpose.

The Sixth Evidence

Again, in proving the principality of Being, Mulla Sadra argues that there are two kinds of accidents: accidents of existence such as ‘whiteness’ for a body, and accidents of essence such as *differentia* for a genus. Some thinkers believe that the qualification of essences by existence, and the presentation of existence to the essences, is not a case of an external type of qualification or an occurrence of an accident to its subject, because this implies that the object of qualification enjoys a certain degree of reality. The occurrence of accidents of essences (*differentia* to genus) does not contradict their unity in the real world. This can be held true for the relationship between existence and essence. Existence as an accident of essence must be united with it, and this implies that existence as an objective reality should be realized: ‘Existence, therefore, must be something by the mediation of which an essence exists and with which it is united in [the externally determined realm of] existence.’²⁷

The Seventh Evidence

In this evidence, the reality of existence is explained through the relationship of an accident with its subject. It is believed that the existence of an accident is nothing in itself but is something for its subject; that is, the existence of an accident is ‘identical with its incarnation [i.e., instantiation] in its subject’.²⁸ This incarnation of an accident in its subject takes place in the real world. It is also clear that the subject of an accident is not included in its essence or its definition but in its existence. The category of accident depends on something other than itself, namely a subject, to be manifest. Keeping this in mind, we can conclude that if existence (the subject) is not real, then the accident is a mental concept. The existence of blackness, for example, would be a concept rather than an incarnation in a body, which is an actual base for the meaning of blackness. This also leads to the denial of the separation of existence from essence in the realm of accident, whereas the reality of this separation has already been agreed upon.²⁹

The Eighth Evidence

Again, if existence is a mental concept and not real, as stated by Suhrawardi and other *ishraqi* thinkers, then ‘an infinite number of species could be realized between any two limits’. There would be no specific number of specific essences, and no specific number of species would be realized between any two limits of intensity, which is necessarily false. According to Mulla Sadra, the doctrine of the primacy of Being offers a solution to this

problem, because it advocates the idea that the structure of all essences stands on the foundation of a single unity (i.e., Being) and one incessant form. In this incessant form, the unity of being is actual and its multiplicities will be in the potential mode without opposing or negating one another.³⁰

It is worth mentioning that these evidences do not explain the meaning of Being but only its principality. Being, which reflects the reality of all things, cannot be known rationally or conceptually. It can only be experienced intuitively. Mulla Hadi Sabzawari also restated these evidences of Mulla Sadra for the primacy of Being, but reduced them to six. According to Dinani, there is a slight difference between Sabzawari and Mulla Sadra in the evidences. In reality, the material used by the former is same as that developed by the latter.³¹ Sabzawari also presented six arguments to prove the validity of Mulla Sadra's doctrine of the primacy of Being; some of them are not significantly different from those of Mulla Sadra's evidences. In the first argument, Sabzawari insists that the self-evidence of Being becomes the fountainhead of all values in human life because values are not attributed to concepts, which are mentally posited. The second argument is the realization of the distinction between external and internal (mental) modifications of Being: 'So if existence is not realized, and if what were realized were quiddity – and quiddity is kept in both modes of being without any difference – there would be no distinction between the external and the mental. But since this consequence is absurd, the antecedent must also be the same.'³² The third argument deals with the priority of cause to its effect in relation to the reality of Being. The cause, as we know, necessarily precedes the effect logically as well as in time. If we suppose that Being, as stated by the *ishraqi* thinkers, is not real but is mentally posited, then a specific quiddity of fire as a cause would be prior to the specific quiddity of fire as the effect, which becomes posterior. In this manner the generic quiddity of a substance as a cause would be prior to a posterior substance, which is caused by the former. This will necessitate a priority–posteriority relationship in the quiddities. In the doctrine of the primacy of Being, Being is considered to be real, and things, which are prior or posterior, are quiddities; yet only Being can confirm their priority or posteriority.

Arguments four and six of Sabzawari are similar. Each deals with the reality of Being as a unity beneath the scattered quiddities and multiplicities of beings. In the fourth argument, the primacy of Being is established on the gradual increase in the evolutionary movement of the world. This movement, in which various species with quiddities are posited, is both continuous and infinite. If the philosophical position of Illuminationism is true and Being is mental, then the species will be bound by the beginning and the end, because Being is one and many in accordance with the things from which the concept of being is abstracted. In this case, Being will not be present as a single reality and unity and the quiddities will be dispersed without a connection among

them.³³ The sixth argument takes Being as uniting the multiplicity in the phenomenal world of beings. It argues that Being should be fundamentally real in order to be a unitary ground for all beings.³⁴ In the fifth argument, Sabzwari says that if Being is a mental reality, then ‘what could have made the quiddities leave the state of equality, and by what have they come to deserve the predicate “existence”?’³⁵

Being is the primordial reality on which everything stands; but the reality of all things cannot be described in common language as something that exists, because it is not an ontic existent but the Being of beings or ontological reality. It is simply existence *par excellence*.³⁶ What is real in everything is its being rather than its essence. In this sense, Being is equivocal, not univocal. It is a common characteristic of all things or the Being of them but with different intensity and weakness. The Being of beings and beings are not two different realities, but one and the same. The reality of Being is, therefore, objective or an ontological reality of all beings. It is what constitutes the very Being of everything. For Mulla Sadra, Being, unlike beings, and unlike the view of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, is not something accidental occurring to its essence. Accidents are caused but Being is uncaused and nothing is prior to it. If we think of Being as something accidental, then it should have a cause. The cause must also be prior to it. If a being that is caused by another being is unified with it, the being that is caused is prior to itself as a cause, or is *causa sui*, which will lead to an infinite regress.³⁷

Since Being is not this or that ontic being, it has no describable property. Its abode is not the mind but outside the human mind; it has a dynamic character that creates all modalities of ontic beings, which results in the rise of essences in thinking. Essence, by contrast, is a mental factor and exists for the mind when beings are comprehended.³⁸ Although Being is that reality without which nothing is possible, its meaning is still obscure. It requires further investigation for Mulla Sadra as well as Heidegger. But in my opinion, Heidegger’s understanding of the meaning of Being is beset with ambiguity. It is for this reason that Heidegger’s commentators have discussed and understood the meaning of Being in different ways. Kockelmans interprets Heidegger’s Being as a process, an activity in which its self-manifestation becomes a truth:

As the clearing process which sheds light on itself and on beings by the very fact that it illuminates everything, Being may thus be correctly called truth. Yet the term truth here obviously does not mean “agreement”; rather, it means clearing, illumination, original self-manifestation, the emergence of Being and of all beings.³⁹

Kockelmans is convinced that Being, like the *Geist* in Hegel’s philosophy, is a dynamic ontological reality, which has the character of a happening that comes to manifest itself as a truth.

This interpretation can be supported by Heidegger's own understanding of the meaning of Being in *On the Essence of Truth* (1930), in which he states: 'The primordial disclosure of being as a whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a "time" which, itself immeasurable, first opens up the open region for every measure.'⁴⁰ The interpretation by Kockelmans becomes adequate and reasonable when Heidegger's understanding of 'Time' and 'Temporality' is taken into account: 'In contrast to all this, our treatment of the question of meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenology of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case.'⁴¹ If Being is conceived in terms of time, then it should be dynamic and eventful; it only becomes concealed in this temporal character and its concealment is an active process through the ecstatic projection of *Dasein*. Dreyfus rejects Kockelmans's interpretation. He does not believe that Heidegger regards Being as a process or a happening: 'Heidegger must have been aware of this danger, since at the point where he says being is not an entity, he writes in the margin of his copy of *Being and Time*, "No! One cannot make sense of being with the help of these sorts of concepts". To think of being in terms of concepts like entity, or process, or event is equally misleading.'⁴² Richardson takes the view that in the early works of Heidegger, 'Being' and the world were considered to be equivalent.⁴³ At the same time he suggests that, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), Being is understood as the pure horizon of meaning, within which the process of the clearing described by Kockelmans takes place.⁴⁴ The notion of 'Pure', which is mentioned here and is used again by Heidegger in 'Letter on Humanism', can be understood in the Kantian sense. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant presents a list of pure categories of understanding within which all material collected by sensibility (*Anschauung*) becomes thought and acquires meaning.⁴⁵ For example, the sensuous notions of colour, taste and odour can be kept in the pure category of 'Quality'. Quality is called pure because it is independent of all empirical experiences. It is neither redness nor sweetness, but a category transcending all empirical notions.

When we say that Being is pure, we simply mean that Being transcends all empirical beings, and that the possibility of understanding the meaning of an empirical entity is conditioned by understanding the meaning of Being. Zimmerman has another interpretation: Being for Heidegger is history shaping ways in which beings can reveal themselves and become real.⁴⁶ Okrent tried to connect this 'shaping ways of Being in history' with the pragmatic signification of each kind of being that shows itself to us.⁴⁷ On the question of Being (*Seinfrage*), Heidegger claims that the question of the meaning of Being constitutes a philosophical inquiry about the meaning of what is asked about. It presupposes guidelines or knowledge, which are

already available to us in some way or another. But raising this question is an indication of our intellectual dissatisfaction with available guidelines, and available knowledge. Being, at this stage, is known and yet not known, or it is obscure and concealed.

Heidegger explicitly states that the subject matter of this inquiry is the Being of beings, which is not an entity.⁴⁸ One cannot think of Being as an entity like a tree, a table, a horse or a mountain, and hence it cannot be grasped in terms of empirical concepts; meanwhile, it is also not the *summum genus* of Aristotle's First Philosophy. For this reason, Being is transcendent and a presupposition, for nothing can be presented to us without having been articulated in its Being.⁴⁹ As a consequence of this, in order to understand an entity, we need to look into its Being. Our philosophical knowledge is incomplete without apprehending the meaning of its Being. By saying that Being is not an entity, we draw an ontological distinction between Being and beings, but at the same time Being cannot be distinct because no entity can exist without it. In 'Letter on Humanism', Heidegger raises another meaning of Being, defining it as power: 'As the element, Being is the "quiet power" of favouring-enabling, that is, of the possible'.⁵⁰ He also tries to use Hölderlin's elegy "Homecoming" to interpret the meaning of Being. Finally, in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger states,

All things we have named are, and yet, when we wish to apprehend beings, it is always as though we were reaching into the void. The being after which we inquire is almost like nothing, and yet we have always rejected the contention that the *essent* in its entirety is not. But Being remains indefinable, almost like nothing or ultimately quite so.⁵¹

Elsewhere, Heidegger takes the view that our attempts to understand the meaning of Being are futile because Being is inaccessible and its meaning cannot be apprehended completely. The reason for this lies in the way Being reveals itself to *Dasein*:

Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as it constitutes its meaning and its ground.⁵²

In this paragraph, Heidegger clearly states that the meaning of Being is completely inaccessible, because it 'for the most part does not show itself at all'. This hiddenness of Being is not something insignificant or temporary that will not influence our philosophical understanding of reality; rather, it is essential and constitutes its meaning. The hiddenness of Being cannot be neglected, but at the same time we find ourselves helpless in our search for its

meaning as the greatest part of it 'does not show itself at all'. In addition to this hiddenness, Being can be obscured. Further, a phenomenon that is uncovered at some point can deteriorate to the point of being obscured again. This deterioration or recovering of Being leads to disguise: 'and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn'.⁵³ Despite the perplexity of this issue, Heidegger suggests that the meaning of Being can be revealed in an existential analysis of an entity that has an ontic–ontological significance. That entity is the being of *Dasein* and has the power to question the meaning of its own being and Being as such. This inquiry into the meaning of Being, unlike Mulla Sadra's ontological inquiry, begins with a particular type of being. The hermeneutic circle of this inquiry moves from a part to the whole, or, more specifically, from the being of a particular entity, namely *Dasein*, to Being in general. This can be seen as the line of demarcation between the ontological inquiries of Mulla Sadra and Heidegger. No matter how similar the two inquiries are, they still differ in methodology and metaphysical conclusions. For Heidegger, the existential analysis of the being of *Dasein* reveals the structure of fundamental ontology. An investigation into the meaning of Being thus explains the existence of *Dasein*. The hermeneutic circle then moves from *Dasein* to Being and from Being to *Dasein*.

In rejecting the Cartesian analysis of human existence as a thinking substance, Heidegger describes human being as '*Dasein*' (being-there), because *res cogitans* presupposes its own ontological ground and there can be no thinking without being. *Dasein* is an entity that intends itself and understands its own being. This attitude of *Dasein* is at the same time the realization of its own possibilities, and its existence is always towards these possibilities. For that reason, and in order to make a clear distinction between *Dasein* and other beings, Heidegger ascribes 'existence' (*Existenz*) to *Dasein* rather than '*Existentia*', which describes the being of other beings. *Existenz*, not *existential*, captures the unique meaning of human existence because it is incomplete and dynamic and is a being towards possibilities. On the contrary, *Existentia* signifies the being of a static existence, a term used by medieval metaphysicians to describe something actual. With *Dasein*, its being is at issue; it has to decide about its own being and then comports itself towards that. In opposition to *res cogitans*, *Dasein*'s authentic existence is possibility, not actuality. This terminology and subdivision of Being into *Existenz* and *Existentia* is not found at the beginning of Mulla Sadra's ontological inquiry. Instead he uses common philosophical terminology such as Necessary Being, contingent being, existence, essence, substance, cause, effect and accident. Unlike Heidegger, he did not try to invent a new philosophical language for establishing his new philosophical system and accomplishing his break away from the philosophical tradition of his time.

Mulla Sadra rejects the idea that Being is an entity; the being of an entity is not different from the entity itself. He is also against the description of

‘Being’ as a universal concept, because a universal concept cannot be used to represent the being of particular beings. This would be equal to saying that ‘whiteness’ is a white entity.⁵⁴ The reality of the relationship between Being and beings is not like that between universals and particulars. The reason for this, as explained earlier, is that Being does not stand as a genus or species for ontic beings. If Being is a genus, it will become an abstract universal concept which can then be apprehended rationally. Mulla Sadra argues from the very beginning of his ontology that Being is neither a concept (such as genus, species, *differentia* or accident) nor conceived rationally: ‘and no one has gnosis of it except the mystics, that is, “those who are grounded in mystical knowledge”’.⁵⁵ The reality of every ontic entity is in its being. Being is therefore the real ground of everything, including essences. Essences are determined not by their own inner structure but by Being.⁵⁶ This, at the same time, claims identity between Being and beings or between beings and their Being. The dynamic movement of Being in modifying itself and manifesting all ontic beings with their essences also determines its completion. The more we move towards Being, the less of essence is exhibited. Essence is then the negation of Being.⁵⁷ In my opinion, Mulla Sadra borrowed this idea from Ibn Sina, who described God (the Necessary Being) as an existence without essence. More specifically, we can say that God’s essence is inseparable from His existence. Only in case of contingent beings can essences be distinguished from their existences. Existence is positive and real while essence is negative and unreal. For this reason it is more correct to say ‘This is a tree’ than ‘Tree exists’, because essence does not exist by itself. It should be attached to existence.⁵⁸ However, this interpretation of the relationship between existence and essence should not be understood in terms of metaphysical dualism. For Mulla Sadra, essences are not real beings. They come into existence when Being creates its own modalities or ontic beings, and then essences arise as the result and are joined to them. In the downward movement of Being, when the multiplicity of ontic beings emerges, these beings exhibit diverse essences. With the upward evolutionary movement, this duality gradually disappears until, at the end, being can be grasped in its absolute positivity without essence. According to Fazlur Rahman, this view marks a distinction between Mulla Sadra’s ontology and that of the Aristotelian–Neoplatonic Muslim thinkers. The latter believed that a concrete being is the combination of existence and essence. Each of these two aspects of a concrete being is real and could exist by itself.⁵⁹ Mulla Sadra advocates ontological monism. For him, there are not two realities such as existence and essence, but only existence. It is worth mentioning that Suhrawardi is also a monist thinker, but for him the single reality is essence rather than Being.

Having established the principality and reality of Being, Mulla Sadra deals with the modality or individuation of Being in his philosophical system. This, in my opinion, should be seen as similar to Heidegger’s attempt to divide

Being into various ontological regions because every system of ontology requires this division. Generally speaking, in the ontological division of Mulla Sadra there are three modalities of Being: the realm of unity and simplicity includes the Necessary Being, heavenly spheres and the intellect in human existence; the modalities in the realm of diversity and multiplicity consist of the ontic beings and the perceptive soul in human existence; finally, at the lowest level of ontological division, there is the realm of matter with pure potentiality to receive forms. This realm also includes the human body. Human existence is shared by all three modalities. The human intellect is in the first realm, the perceptive faculty belongs to the second, and the body to the third.

The modality of unity and simplicity is the realm of Being, which is identified with God. Being, for both Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina, is Pure Being because it is without essence and at the same time it is the Being of all beings in the two lower realms of existence. At the rank of Pure Being multiplicity is dissolved, and everything merges into a unity or into a 'simple' and 'One' mode of Being.⁶⁰ It is also important to mention that for Mulla Sadra ontology is not separate from theology because he thinks of Being as the highest ground above all beings, as the grounding ground and cause of all being without having a cause or a ground for itself. This grounding ground of all beings is also at the same time conscious of both itself and beings and determines their destination. This can be seen as the distinction between Mulla Sadra's ontology and that of Heidegger. Here, Mulla Sadra's ontology could be described as onto-theology, a Heideggerian term used to define this type of metaphysics.⁶¹ In Heidegger's ontology, Being is neither transcendent in this sense nor a rational cause for all beings. It is the Being of beings and their inner reality. God does not enter into Heidegger's metaphysics; his metaphysics remains as ontology.

In the second division, or the modality of diversity and multiplicity, there are ontic beings such as heavenly bodies, souls, animals and inanimate beings. This is the realm of individual beings.⁶² Every ontic being in this realm is in constant flux and evolutionary change towards a higher realm to achieve perfection. These beings reach perfection in human existence, as human beings are more intelligent than animals. Some human beings reach a higher rank of existence and become more perfect in their intelligence than others; this is the highest form of Being in the realm of multiplicity beneath the realm of unity.⁶³

The lowest degree of modality of Being is the realm of prime matter, which is nothing more than the potentiality to receive forms.⁶⁴ Following the doctrine of emanation introduced earlier by some Muslim thinkers such as the members of Ikhwan al-Safa (The Brethren of Purity), al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra believes that prime matter is emanated from Being eternally because Being is not in time. Prime matter represents the lowest level of existence and

becomes existent through receiving specific forms in the evolutionary process from potentiality to actuality. It is also the beginning of the movement towards perfection in the universe, which will be explained in Chapter Five in the discussion on trans-substantial change (*al-haraka al-jawhariyyah*). The two lower realms, namely the realms of potentiality and diversity, originated from the realm of unity and are dependent on that realm ontologically:

All contingent beings, whatever their distinctions and their ranks of [relative] deficiency and perfection, are existentially dependent, being indigent in their inner-realities towards It, and enriched by It. Thus, these contingent beings are contingent by virtue of their own inner-realities. Due to the First Necessity, The Exalted, however, they are [conditionally] necessary. They are inoperative and perishable only from the perspective of their own inner-reality [and thus are not categorically necessities]. They become a reality due to the Absolute Reality [*aletheia*], [being] the One and the Only: 'Everything that exists will perish except His own face'. His relation to other beings is like sunlight, such that [in itself] it depends on its own inner reality, [while other] bodies are enlightened by it; [they, however] are dark from [the perspective of] their own inner-reality.⁶⁵

Mulla Sadra's division of the ontological realms attributes principality and priority to the realm of unity. To clarify the principality of this realm, he explains three ontological positions, in each of which the nature of this principality is vindicated. He argues that the relationship between being and essence should be understood in three different ways: we think of Being as prior to essence or posterior to it or we state that both of them co-exist simultaneously. When Being is thought of as prior to essence, it simply signifies that Being is independent and can stand by itself without relying on essence. If the primacy of essence is accepted, as stated in the second case, then essence would exist independent of Being and be prior to it, but then for essence to exist it needs existence to rely on and this is a vicious regress. The third position is that essence co-exists with Being simultaneously, and not in it; therefore it relies on another existence for its existence. As a consequence of this, essence cannot be without prior existence:

If being exists [lit. if the being of existence were an existent], then either it is prior to the essence or posterior to it, or they are simultaneous. If the first is the case, its realization necessarily follows independently without the essence. This implies that priority of the attribute is prior to the subject of its attribution as well as its realization without it. If the second is the case, it necessarily follows that essence exists prior to it [existence] before being, which implies a vicious regress. If the third is the case, it necessarily follows that essence exists with it [i.e., existence] and not in it. Therefore, there would be another existence for it [i.e., for essence]; this [state] implies what has been mentioned. The falsity of the consequences always implies the falsity of the antecedents.⁶⁶

After arguing for the primacy of Being, Mulla Sadra stresses the view that essences belong to the realms of potentiality and multiplicity and are insepa-

rable from beings ontologically. Their separation is only an intellectual fact, which occurs in the realm of thinking. Beings and essences are united in the world but separated in thinking:

What has been said earlier is sufficient to refute this claim, for, existence is identical with essence in the external [realm] but different from it mentally. Therefore, there is no relation between them except in intellectual consideration. In [such an intelligible] consideration, the relation will have existence which is in its inner-reality is identical with it, but is different from it in the realm external [to the mind]. This kind of *ad infinitum* is stopped when the intelligible consideration is ceased.⁶⁷

However, it is clear that the only ontological position accepted by Mulla Sadra is the affirmation of the primacy of Being and the intellectually posited status of essence. What he has argued here, then, or has tried to prove, is that Being, not essences, is the sole reality. Essences exist in the mind or only in thinking, not in the external world. The dualism of existence and essence arises only when we think to define a being or understand its nature. More precisely, essences emerge when Being modifies itself in the downward process of further diversified ontic beings. We can talk about essences when these ontic modes of Being are perceived or thought about. But gradually essences disappear when we move upwards to apprehend Being in its pure absoluteness. According to Fazlur Rahman, this view draws a line of demarcation between Mulla Sadra's ontology and that of the Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers.⁶⁸ The latter accepted the reality of existence and essence outside the domain of thinking and did not insist on the subjectivity of the latter.⁶⁹ In contrast, essence here is considered a mode of Being that exists only in thinking; that is, it has mental reality. It is the intellect that conceives essence and separates it from existence; otherwise, there is only existence and nothing else as an ontological reality and the foundation of all ontic modes. It may be possible to find a resemblance between this view of the ontological status of essence and the subjective categories in Kant's philosophy. Our knowledge of the phenomenal world, as described by Kant, is produced through the application of these subjective categories that define the essence of every phenomenon with the assistance of sensibility. This claim is an obvious contradiction with Suhrawardi's metaphysical conviction, in which essence has become real and Being a mere mental concept having no ontological reality of its own. Mulla Sadra, again in his arguments against the doctrine of the primacy of essence, insists that Suhrawardi's conviction can be taken into account when the dual reality of essence and existence is accepted.⁷⁰ For Mulla Sadra, Being is real and essence unreal; Being is positive, light, and makes all essences exist, whereas essence is negative, darkness, and imposes limitation on beings. The essence of each Being, which is other than Being, does not exist by itself. It exists by virtue of Being.

Being is, then, an ontological reality while essence lacks that reality and this rank of existence.⁷¹ The problem that arises in describing essence as subjective is with the possibility of understanding essence as something illusory. What does Mulla Sadra mean by insisting on the principality and reality of being? Is there a unity of being and essence in reality? Does that unity make them one real thing? Does that unity presuppose their previous ontological distinction? In answering these questions the ontological status of essences and their relationship to Being can be seen from two perspectives: first, the essences are illusory or images in the mind and have a mental existence like the subjective categories of the faculty of understanding in Kant's epistemology; second, the essences are real and their reality is of the second degree and is not equal with the reality of Being.

The first perspective is also found as a mystic point of view and analogous to the metaphysical position of some Indian thinkers who consider the world to be *maya* or unreal. Based on this type of metaphysical belief the essence of an entity or its being in the sensible world is seen as an illusion. But is this Mulla Sadra's position? Does this Muslim thinker say that the essence of the table I am now using for writing is only mental and has no reality outside my mind? In my opinion, Mulla Sadra's understanding of this problem belongs to the second perspective, which is similar to the view of Ibn Sina and to Hegel's interpretation of unity and diversity. Indeed, even explaining some similarities between Mulla Sadra's interpretation of the meaning of Being and its relationship with essence with that of Kantian metaphysical dualism will not be of great help here. The best way to approach this problem is through Hegel's analysis of the external reality and his interpretation of the world as the self-manifestation of *Geist*. In other words, we need to understand Being as an objective reality that exhibits itself in various forms and gives rise to the multiple beings and their essences. Being in this sense is a dynamic fountainhead of all things as well as their essences. This view is also shared by Heidegger, with the exception that Heidegger's ontology leaves no room for a rational teleology. Also, Hegel's concept of essence should not be taken for the Platonic Forms or the Kantian *noumena*. It is the negation of Being and is derived from the last category in the sphere of Being in dialectical logic. Essence, therefore, cannot exist by itself without relying on Being, but unlike Being, which is immediacy, essence is mediated and known through reflection or understanding.⁷² This discussion, in some ways, brings us closer to Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the unity of being. Mulla Sadra also wrote on the graded unity of being in order to justify his doctrine of the ambiguity of Being (*tashkik al-wujud*). In his discussion on the relationship between cause and effect he draws a conclusion on the personal unity of being in line with Ibn 'Arabi.⁷³ This discussion on the causal relationship also leads to the ontological division of Being stated by Ibn Sina, because Being that is a cause for its own multiple modality or the emergence of the effects becomes a

Necessary Being as in Ibn Sina's ontology and the effects of possible beings. The existence of a cause does not rely on its effects, because it is independent and self-subsistent. Dependence and reliance on something other than itself is the character of the effects. The effects become both necessary when they are accompanied by their perfect cause and impossible in the absence of this perfect cause. When a cause produces an effect, that effect gives rise to its own essence in the mind, and in this way essence is derived from the existence of the effect. An effect, for example the world, is real when it is seen only in its relationship to its cause. This relationship is described as that of a speech to the speaker. The moment the speaker halts speaking, speech becomes impossibility.⁷⁴ The necessary relationship between a cause and its effect determines the existence of the effect but the cause (Being) remains without relying on anything for its existence. Can we say that Being causes essences? What is important to remember here is that essences have no reality for Mulla Sadra. They exist in the mind or intellectually. Being as a perfect cause gives rise to its effects or possible beings, and essences affect the possible beings and emerge only in the mind when the possible beings are thought about or conceived. Essences have no existence at all, either primary or attributive.

Essences belong to contingent beings in the realm of diversity and multiplicity. These contingent beings emanate from Being and give rise to essence in the mind.⁷⁵ Existence and essence, as mentioned in *al-Masha'ir*, are not separate in the external world; their separation is merely mental. This, however, does not mean that existence and essence are two different realities having a unity. Mulla Sadra plainly rejects the external reality of essences. For him, essences belong to contingent beings; if these beings have more essences they possess less being. Yet their being will never vanish, as nothing can exist as pure essence. The essences become 'concepts' through which we come to know about contingent beings. It is worth mentioning here that Suhrawardi is right in stating that what is known is essence not existence. But in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, knowledge is preconditioned by Being, or epistemology by ontology. Essences, as internal realities, are dependent on the external reality of Being. Although at the highest level of the hierarchy of Being there is pure Being, a kind of existence without essence, we cannot state that at the lowest level there is pure essence or essence without existence. Essences are always with ontic beings and do not exist in themselves. Their relationship as universal concepts to ontic beings (phenomena) remains; as long as one particular or ontic being exists, the essence will also exist. This can be seen as a one-to-one relationship.⁷⁶

The ontological division of Being in Mulla Sadra's philosophy does not depict the world as an aggregate of ontic beings or a container of them. Mulla Sadra sees the world as an organic body in which the evolutionary process of trans-substantial change takes place towards perfection. When an ontic being is described as something 'in' the world, this spatial relationship is not

external like the case of a table in the room. The existence of the table is not dependent on the room, while its existence as an ontic being is unthinkable without its being in the world. Mulla Sadra's understanding of the relationship between Being and beings has similarity with Heidegger's existential analysis of *in-der-Welt-sein*, where being-in-the-world becomes an ontological condition for the existence of *Dasein*.⁷⁷ Yet this condition does not constitute the essence of this entity. This relationship between Being and beings is often elucidated metaphorically. As stated by John Quinn, for example, it is like the relationship of ink to written words.⁷⁸ One is usually not aware of the ink while reading the words. But in reality it is the ink that is seen and the words do not exist without it. Beings are similarly dual in nature. They have the character of identity as, like the words, they share the ink, but at the same time they represent multiplicity as the words are different from one another in form and meaning. Every being is then identical and different, eternal and temporal, divine and profane, because they are the intensive modifications of Being. By reflecting on this distinction and the ontological difference between the realms of Being we find a way to Being. This is Mulla Sadra's objective in *al-Asfar*. His aim is to move away from the 'darkness of illusion' to the daylight of the truth of existence.

The Systematic Ambiguity of Being and the Trans-Substantial Change in the World Order

All beings in the sensible world are actual in some ways or potential in others. In the former, they have been changed from potential to actual but do not possess perfection completely. Their state of actuality is not yet pure and final. It is merely a new state of potentiality for another actuality, without which they will remain immutable without transition from one rank of being to another. The change from potential to actual will be in a state of constant flux, with beings undergoing sudden or gradual change. The state of potentiality, which is prior to the state of actuality, is weak and imperfect. But in order to become more perfect and reach a higher rank, beings need to become actual again. To achieve this, they must be elevated to a higher mode of being where perfection is articulated or actualized.

In this discussion about change we encounter one of the most important philosophical issues in Mulla Sadra's ontology: trans-substantial change (*al-haraka al-jawhariyyah*). This is, in my opinion, the lynchpin of his cosmology and the key concept for understanding the world order. Mulla Sadra's interpretation of the meaning of the world is also based on understanding of trans-substantial change; hence his interpretation of the world is deeply rooted in his metaphysical system. In Mulla Sadra's philosophy, the world is not a mere material realm like that of Aristotle in which beings are causally and mechanically connected, but a world with integrated parts of a single system with a pre-given purpose. The world is not built on blind and aimless regulation and mechanical self-repetition. It is created by a perfect cause that has determined its meaning and destination.

In advocating this teleological metaphysics for understanding the world Mulla Sadra draws closer to Hegel rather than to Heidegger, and moves away from Aristotle. For Hegel, the world is the self-objectification of the *Geist*; it moves dialectically onward to accomplish perfection and overcome its alienation from *Geist*. The world is seen as an organic whole that changes itself for a purpose predetermined by *Geist*.¹ *Geist* is in a process of transformation in history through contradictions that determine the development of the world. Hegel elaborated this process in the *Phenomenology of Mind* as a temporal structure, which moves from idea to nature and then back to the idea in a better form and with richer content. This dialectical movement is carried

forward by the triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Synthesis, which is the union of thesis and antithesis, is richer than the previous movements in content because it supersedes both and becomes a new thesis for another antithesis, which unites to produce a new synthesis, which in turn becomes a new thesis in a new triad. This dialectic movement from thesis to antithesis and then to unity in synthesis is an irreversible process that continues until *Geist*, as the only sovereignty of the world, achieves self-completion at the final stage of historical development when the estranged world is appropriated by consciousness and transformed.

What Mulla Sadra explains in his doctrine of trans-substantial change can be separated from Hegel's description of the dialectical movement in three ways: first, Mulla Sadra does not advocate the idea of the dialectical movement of the world; second, although the emanation of the world is a temporal generation of the modalities of Being, time and change do not affect Being. Third, God is not immanent but transcendent, so Mulla Sadra's metaphysics should be understood in terms of panentheism rather than pantheism, the former being the metaphysical view that the world is part of God rather than being identical with Him. The world of multiplicity and God are in communion with each other because the former originated from the latter. But at the same time God is transcendent and separated from the world. Mulla Sadra, unlike Hegel, thinks of being in the world as temporality, but this temporality is external to the realm of Being. This is also in contradiction with Heidegger's description of Being as temporality. In Hegel's *Phenomenology*, as in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, temporality is the reality of *Geist*; for example Hegel states:

Time is just the notion definitely existent, and presented to consciousness in the form of empty intuition. Hence spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time as long as it does not grasp its pure intuition, i.e. so long as it does not annul time. Time is the pure self in external form, apprehended in intuition, and not grasped and understood by the self; it is the notion apprehended only through intuition. When this motion grasps itself, it supersedes its time character, (conceptually) comprehends intuition, and is intuition comprehended and comprehending. Time therefore appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete within itself; it is the necessity compelling spirit to enrich the share self-consciousness has in consciousness, not put into motion the immediacy of the inherent nature (which is the form in which the substance is present in consciousness); or, conversely, to realize and make manifest what is inherent, regarded as inward and immanent, to make manifest that which is at first within – i.e. to vindicate it for spirit's certainty of self.²

The world is not separated from *Geist*, which functions as an immanent cause in the dialectical process of evolution. The actualization of *Geist* happens only in time through stages of development in nature and history. Since the essence of *Geist* is self-determined, history is the realization of freedom

determined by *Geist*. It is a purposeful transition towards the absolute idea where all differences are united in absolute consciousness.

Another distinction between Mulla Sadra's ontology and that of Heidegger lies in the doctrine of emanation. Mulla Sadra, following the Neoplatonist Muslim thinkers such as Ikhwan al-Safa, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, describes the creation of the world as emanation. From the realm of unity or Pure Being emanates the realm of prime matter (potentiality) and the realm of diversity (ontic beings). Accordingly, Being remains both transcendent and the origin and grounding of all that is grounded; in other words, the inner reality of all things. The emanation begins from Pure Being and moves downwards to the lowest level, where the ontic beings, although they do not vanish as beings, are dominated by their essences. Like the dialectic movement in Hegel's logic, this descending process of emanation is from the most general and indeterminate form to the most concrete, but it loses perfection on the way. Descendence is a gradual distance from perfection. At the abyss of this descending process there are beings with more essence but less existence.

In the light of the doctrine of emanation all ontic beings are the same and share identity because they spring from a single fountainhead. In all of them, Being becomes a common character and the inner identity. We can describe all beings in the three ontological realms as things that are. Meanwhile, emanation from Being downwards explains various stages of being with different degrees of perfection. In this case, all beings are not equal or the same in sharing the reality of Being. This unequal distribution of the character of Being with different gradations of the Being of their beings is called the systematic ambiguity of Being (*tashkik al-wujud*):

The relation between generated creatures and the creator is that of deficiency to perfection, and of weakness to strength. It has been established already that what is realized in a determinate manner are real existents and not essences. Moreover, it has been established that existence is a simple reality which has neither genus, nor a persisting difference, nor species, nor dividing difference, nor individuation. Rather, its individuation is due to its simple essence and the essential distinction between its units and identity [occurs] only by means of [their] being the strongest and being the weakest; and distinction into accidents happens only in bodies. There is no doubt that the Creator in existence is The Most Perfect and in realization The Most Complete [in encounter] with the created. The created is like an emanation of its Creator. In reality [the creature] is not even an effect, except in light of its unfolding [lit. modification] by the Maker, in light of Its Unfolding and Activities.³

The systematic ambiguity of Being is another way of expressing the principle of identity in difference and is determined by the descending process of emanation from Being to the lowest ontic beings. Being, as the reality of all ranks of ontic beings, is one and identical in its relation to them, but at the same time it becomes multiplicitous and different. From the perspective of

this principle, there will be no distinction between diverse ontic beings and Being, as all of them belong together. They are only different in their perfection, deficiency, richness and indigence.⁴ It should be remembered that imperfection and deficiency infect only the realms of prime matter and diversity. These terms cannot be employed to describe the realm of Being because Being is a unity and pure and has no essence; otherwise, as Mulla Sadra states, 'It would not be the case that a Necessary Existent could exist.'⁵ Deficiency and imperfection are not the characteristics of the inner reality of Being. They are characteristics of its gradation in the rank of contingent and posterior beings. Deficiency, limitation and privation are the characteristics of beings rather than Being. They are generated during the process of emanation because 'It is necessarily the case that the created thing is not equal to the creator, nor does emanation equal the source of emanation in terms of rank of existence.'⁶ The gradation of Being is also systematic because it is purposeful, unidimensional and determined by Being. It does not leave the emanation of the ontic beings in the world to the caprice of blind chance.

The world of multiplicity and difference is a temporal occurrence and a gradation of Being, because everything emanates from Being and is grounded in it. The non-existence of a particular being precedes its existence in time, and is in the state of non-existence prior to its existence caused by Being. In this process of creation or coming into being of the non-being, an individual being requires a new identity constantly and its existence is not fixed.⁷ Mulla Sadra supports this view of the constant renewing of being in the world by quoting Qur'anic verses. He believes that the renewal of ontic beings is a necessary, autonomous or innate process, because all ontic beings are in a relation of identity to Being. Their existence is based on the reality of Being: 'The Maker, in virtue of His durability and endurance, created this creature which is self-renewal in terms of its essence and identity.'⁸

The systematic ambiguity of Being is the particularization of Being in which Being becomes manifest in its own individual modalities. It is not a process similar to the emanation of particulars from the universal Platonic Forms or to Suhrawardi's Lord of Species, simply because the Necessary Being or the source of this particularization is not a universal form but a single transcendent Being. This can be seen as a significant difference between Mulla Sadra's understanding of the Platonic Forms and Suhrawardi's. Although Plato thinks of the universal forms in the immaterial world as ideas or essences in the Suhrawardian sense, Mulla Sadra insists that they are beings rather than essences and placed at a higher rank of existence in the gradation of Being. Besides, he believes that they are not universal ideas but individual beings responsible for generating species at a lower rank of existence. Having discussed the gradation of Being briefly it is useful at this point to explain more precisely Mulla Sadra's interpretation of emanation for understanding his doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of Being. The process

of emanation begins with Pure Being and proceeds to its own particularization, which gives rise to the creation of all beings. This pure Being, as stated before, is neither genus nor species, but a mere identity and simplicity. On the ground of identity, its relationship to beings is equivocal. From this transcendent single and simple Being emanates only one being; the diversity of the ranks belongs to the lower stages of emanation and has no direct contact with the transcendent source. At this stage in understanding Mulla Sadra's ontology, we can state that there are two regions of ontology: the region of Pure Being and that of becoming. The former is characterized by unity and sameness (identity) and the latter by difference, multiplicity and change. These two regions of being are necessarily connected as the former is an ontological ground for the latter. As a consequence of this necessary relationship between ground and grounded, we can conclude that there is no multiplicity without unity. The principle of identity in difference becomes an essential characteristic of the two regions of Being and becoming. Difference becomes possible only on the ground of identity. The presence of unity in emanation is an ontological condition of the equivocal ground for the multiplicity of the grounded.

The systematic ambiguity of Being brings us to the individuation (*al-tashakhus*) of Being, which is discussed by Mulla Sadra in the second volume of *al-Asfar*. The meaning of individuation as understood by him signifies the division of a species into undivided units. For example, Socrates as an individual human being is a member of the human species. The concept of human being can be applied to all members of this species, in which case the universal concept cannot become an individuation. On the other hand, an individual human being is not a universal concept, and cannot be applied to all individuals. The main characteristic of individuation is, then, its inapplicability, unlike a universal concept, to other or multiple things.⁹ The individuation of an ontic being is not in its quiddity and it is not something caused by its accident. It is in its existence, which constitutes the reality of its individual existence even in a material form:

The subsequent deficiency is not from the Principle of Existence. But, it is due to its actualization in [its being in] the second rank and thereafter. Deficiencies and privations happen due to the secondary [existence] due to the fact that they are secondary and posterior [in relation to the First Existence]. The First Being [exists], since its perfection is complete, [and thus] it has no limit. Privation and indigence are derived from the emanation and creation, because it is necessarily the case that the created thing is not equal to the creator, nor does emanation equal the source of emanation in terms of rank of existence.¹⁰

In the systematic ambiguity of Being imperfection emerges with individuation, which compels all beings to undergo the evolutionary changes towards perfection. Being, as the inner transcendent reality of all beings, is not totally

involved in this evolutionary process, but at the same time it is not detached from it because it is the ontological originator of the beings and their evolutionary movement. Being is a unity and a non-conditional origin of all things. Otherwise, it cannot exist necessarily without a beginning. Perfection is in contrast to individuation, and distancing of beings is in proximity to Being.

The notion of becoming gives rise to the idea of time or the temporality of the realm of multiplicity. As mentioned earlier, Being, as the origin and the cause of becoming, is not affected by time. Time belongs only to the world of multiplicity of ontic beings. Mulla Sadra's understanding of the concepts of time and change is different from that of Aristotle. In *al-Masha'ir*, he states that the concept of 'change' described by some philosophers as a mediation between the realm of Being and becoming does not suit our ontological enterprise, because they understand change to be .an additional intelligible affair, which indicates the transition of a thing from potentiality to actuality, rather than the means by which this transition is made.'¹¹ Change, for Mulla Sadra, is a constant transition of substance and time is the measure of trans-substantial change. With this kind of change we encounter an ascending process of evolution towards perfection. Becoming is, then, the reverse of the descending process of the individuation of Being. The descending process is a movement from Being to the lowest rank of beings with less of being and more essence. The universality of Being is reduced until it arrives at the stage of individuals where no universality is further possible. The ascending movement is from the lowest rank to the highest, from the least perfect to the most perfect rank of existence. The doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of Being is nothing more than the increase and decrease of the reality of Being and identity in all ontic beings. The beings are distributed among various ranks due to their being prior or posterior, perfect or imperfect, strong or weak. There is always less and more of Being in the real world. It should be remembered that Mulla Sadra is not the first philosopher to advocate the idea of constant flux. Before him Heraclitus held this view on change. This Greek thinker is known for sayings attributed to him such as 'All things are in a state of flux', and 'You cannot step twice into the same stream'.¹² Being, in this constant flux, particularizes itself and gives rise to multiplicity. Heraclitus also believed that reality was an eternal vital fire, kindled in measures and extinguished in measures. These philosophical views were in contradiction to the views of Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, who argued against the possibility of motion, multiplicity and difference. Parmenides thought of Being as consisting of the same stable reality. Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides, went further to prove the ideas of his teacher by arguments known as Zeno's paradoxes.¹³ The foundation of Heraclitus' ontology, however, has four principles: first, Being is one in many or unity in multiplicity; second, everything changes constantly; third, Being as a living fire is governed by logos; and fourth, Being includes non-being and both generate becoming. After

Heraclitus, the notion of becoming became one of the pivotal categories in Hegel's logic. Being and non-being (Nothingness) in dialectical logic are identical because neither has determinations and both are abstractions and also different. But it is a contradiction for two things to be identical and different. This contradiction propels the dialectical progress further. As a consequence of this and as the synthesis of being and non-being, 'becoming' prevails when being passes into non-being and non-being into being. These two movements determine the coming to be and ceasing to be of the beings in the world. Although the notion of trans-substantial change was not used by Heraclitus and Hegel, their interpretation of change and motion, particularly where Heraclitus states that one cannot step twice into the same stream, might be interpreted as trans-substantial change because one cannot have the same kind of being at different times. In the case of accidental change, it is true that the substance remains the same without losing its own identity. For example, when water is cold it receives the form of cold. It becomes hot only when it receives the form of heat by throwing off its previous form; water cannot be cold and hot at the same time. In this kind of change, when a being receives a new form – a bud blossoms and becomes a flower – it does not throw away its previous form. The object becomes perfected and elevated to a higher level of existence by receiving a new and better form without negating the previous one. We can say, in the Hegelian sense, that the previous form is superseded (*aufgehoben*), preserved and elevated. The trans-substantial change consists of preserving the past forms and yet transcending them. But it does not leave 'substance' without affecting it like its accidents.

In Mulla Sadra's ontology, as in Heraclitus, change is a constant renewal and an evolutionary process towards perfection. It is not a movement from one place to another like the movement of an arrow in space or a train from one station to another. It is a substantial change that dominates all beings in the ontological region of becoming. The causal foundation of this change in beings is not something stable or unchangeable such as substance in Aristotle's metaphysics; rather, it signifies a being that is at the same time affected by change. There is in every accidental change a substantial change; to put it another way, change in accidents is caused by change in substance. This change is a fundamental transformation of a being from one rank of existence to another.¹⁴ All beings come under the influence of this change; nothing remains outside the domain of change and nothing remains the same for ever. If we think of time as the measure of change, then in this context time for Mulla Sadra becomes the measure of this trans-substantial transformation of beings. It is a dominant reality in the span of life of every ontic being and constitutes the ontological structure of the region of becoming.

Change in the four categories or accidents, an idea advocated by Aristotle and Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophers, is possible with change in substance. As a consequence of this, with the exception of change nothing

remains durable in the region of becoming. For Mulla Sadra the cause of change is a self-moving substance called the inner reality of Being, which is equivocally shared by all beings. It is, as stated by Fazlur Rahman, the specific nature commonly supposed to create the species in the world.¹⁵ This nature is not stable; it is subject to constant change and brings about accidental changes with itself. The arguments developed by Mulla Sadra to support his notion of change are easy to understand. He states that, since the changeable accidents of beings are caused by their substances, substance itself should be changeable because a motionless cause cannot produce a moved accident. A change in accident should be caused by a change in substance. Otherwise there would be no causal relationship between substance and its accidents. In another argument, he insists that change is an evolution towards perfection. Perfection is achieved when there is a substantial change from a less perfect state to a more perfect state of existence, following which there will be no distinction between the accidental and substantial changes in the world because every accidental change is caused by substantial change. The moving being does not remain the same at the moment of change and throughout the change.

For Aristotle, substance is the primary category and is of two kinds: primary and secondary. Primary substance, such as individuals, is neither a predicate of a subject nor in a subject. Secondary substance, such as genera and species, which includes primary substance, is a predicate of a subject in a proposition but not in a subject. All other nine categories are present in the subject. Substance is also considered a stable nucleus. Changes occur only in the four categories of quality, quantity, place and position. For this reason, Aristotle talks about four kinds of change: in a being itself, in quality, in quantity and in place. A change involving the being of a thing is generation and corruption; a change in quality is alteration, in quantity it is increase and decrease, and a change in place is locomotion. These changes will be from a certain status in an entity to its contrary. Substance as the substratum presupposed by the categories has no contrariety so is not affected by change.¹⁶ Some Muslim theologians, such as the Mu'tazilites (with the exception of al-Nazzam), the Ash'arites, and Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophers such as al-Farabi and Ibn Sina and his followers, agreed with Aristotle and accepted the interpretation of the possibility of change in accident. In rejecting the idea of change in substance, Ibn Sina, for example, states:

However, if it is claimed that motion occurs in substance, then this is a figurative expression. No motion occurs in substance because if a nature of a substance deteriorates, it will be sudden. And if it is originated, it is still sudden. There is no middle perfection between potency and mere act. Substantial form is not subject to increase and decrease, nor is it subject to intensity and weakness. The reason is that if it is subject to these factors, then inevitably either it will remain within the increasing or decreasing of its species, and the substantial form does not change.

The change rather occurs in the accident of the form, since what was weak and was intensified later is annihilated, whereas the substance is not annihilated.¹⁷

Ibn Sina, in his discussion on the existence of the physical world in *al-Shifa*, insists that the archetype of the beings remains stable from the beginning to the end of motion in all situations. If we accept this point, then the substance will not require change. The resulting change and motion in beings occurs only in one or more than one of the four categories of substance indicated by Aristotle.

The question that arises here is how can we think of identity when everything is subject to constant substantial change? How can we think that a being which undergoes trans-substantial change is the same being or has an identity? These questions also remind us the problem of personal identity discussed by David Hume in his refutation of the Cartesian concept of self-substance. In criticizing the Cartesian theory, Hume argued that nothing remains the same in the world and that resemblance is the cause of the mistake in substituting the notion of identity: 'For when we attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is not confined to the expression, but is commonly attended with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fiction.'¹⁸ The notion of personal identity in this case is fictitious and a product of our imagination, because the changes that happen in a being are slow and gradual. In trans-substantial change, all beings (corporeal and non-corporeal) change constantly. They are originated and renewed at each moment. No single being remains permanently the same. Every being is different and new at every new moment. Mulla Sadra's view regarding this problem is in one respect similar to that of Hume. First, he states that trans-substantial change occurs unnoticed because it is gradual and slow. We think that the change has not occurred and that the being is the same. Second, we attribute sameness to a being because the mind employs universal concepts for describing the essences, which are static. Trans-substantial change is usually noticed when the being of a being arrives at a crucial stage of modification or undergoes a sudden change. In addition to this, Mulla Sadra believes that the identity of a person relies on the intellectual form of that person, which exists in the mind of God. For God, a person is the same; otherwise he or she is not the same.¹⁹ From this interpretation, we can conclude that the renewal process of the world is not externally caused or is not something in contrast to Being. Whatever goes through change is one of the modalities of Being, which has a temporal dimension and belongs to the region of becoming. Since change is the mode of beings, then Being, its modalities and the process of becoming are necessarily connected. Change does not take place in beings as an external event; instead, beings originate change internally, and the external conditions, such as being in the

world and being an individuation, facilitate that change. If we understand the relationship between Being and its modalities without making a substantial distinction between them, all their differences on the ground of their ontological unity and identity disappear. A human being, as a combination of intellect and body, is nothing more than a modality of Being; or, more precisely, an individuation of Being aiming at its own transcendence through the gateway of self-understanding and approximation to Being. In this process of change, this modality of Being rises above the boundaries of its own finitude and limitation as it is capable of understanding the meaning of its own existence and seeks the Truth. It is on the foundation of this ontology and the gradations of the modalities of Being that the meaning of (humanity) within the intentionality of the upward movement should be understood. The way in which Mulla Sadra looks at the gradations of the modality of Being in the trans-substantial change from less perfect to more perfect can be used to address humanity in plurality. Within the development of this modality towards perfection, and by realizing the end in the 'perfect human being', we come across a range of human existence at different ontological-historical stages and different kinds of humanity. Particularly in the light of this kind of change, it is possible for us to talk about less or more humanity at different ranks of existence in the same way we describe a being as smaller or larger.

Mulla Sadra's ontology, in particular the doctrine of systematic ambiguity of Being, bridges the gulf between monism and pluralism. This can be elucidated in considering the principle of identity in difference. Identity is established on the ground of the reality of Being as a simple reality that contains the multiplicity of its own modification. The external reality as Being and the modifications of Being, which have less or more of being, are characterized by unity and diversity. Diversity is a mode of the single and simple reality of Being. The multiple modalities of Being do not exist in themselves as separate realities, as is the case in pluralism. Here, Being is one and all other things that exist are the modalities of this reality.

Since the systematic ambiguity of Being is nothing more than an increase or decrease in the intensity of Being, the trans-substantial change is an existential movement. It happens to Being as a change in the intensification of Being rather than a change in essence. Nor is change in the categories of quality and quantity a gradual or continuous intensification of quality and quantity in a particular type of being; it is their replacement by a new one. Here, Mulla Sadra is talking about the definite quality and quantity of a being.²⁰ Intensification of a quality, for example 'whiteness' in a body, is not an increase in intensity of the same quality of 'whiteness'. It is a replacement of the former 'whiteness' by another 'whiteness' with more intensity in its 'being' white. This kind of change can be seen as the mutation of the former definite quality and the emergence of a totally new quality. This is the case also with a definite quantity of ontic beings. In a quantitative change, a new

quantity replaces the old quantity. As a result, beings in the world are in constant change and renewal until they reach their own perfection, where no further change is thinkable. What undergoes change but at the same time endures in this evolutionary process is Being as the being of all beings and their unity.²¹ Since beings are the modalities of Being, undergo through constant change we can conclude that all kinds of change occur in beings are also Being and by Being. Being is, therefore, in a self-evolutionary process that has no cause except Being itself. Being is the origin of change but still unchangeable.

The existential movement of Being begins with emanation or the descending movement from the realm of unity to the realms of potentiality and multiplicity, which are called the region of 'becoming'. We also call this downward process the particularization of Being. The second phase of change, by contrast, is the ascending movement of the particularization of Being through trans-substantial change upward towards perfection. This descending-ascending process can also be described as a movement from perfection to imperfection and then from imperfection to perfection; from Being to its own particularization and then from the particularization of Being back to Being. The distinctiveness of this two-fold movement of Being is that no accidental change takes place without substantial change. Furthermore, the existential movement of Being is both vertical and horizontal. In the vertical direction, the movement is from the lowest rank to the highest and is governed by the objective of achieving perfection or arriving at the highest rank of being. Here it seems that Mulla Sadra is in agreement with Proclus (410–485), a Hellenic philosopher of the Anaximander School of Neoplatonism who subdivides the process of emanation into horizontal and vertical. For both thinkers, the vertical movement ends with arriving at the most perfect state of existence.

In his discussion of the ascending process and the vertical movement of all beings towards the goal of perfection, Mulla Sadra understood the significance of human existence for the realization of this goal. The foundation of human existence, in the systematic ambiguity of Being, is potentiality. Human existence gradually fulfils itself by moving away from potentiality to actuality. At the start, there is only the realm of pure potentiality emanated from Being, but, in the evolutionary process of vertical trans-substantial change, human existence moves towards the realm of actuality. The journey ends with the emergence of the perfect human being (*al-insan al-kamil*), who attains unity with the Intelligences or divine attributes: 'These Intelligences themselves have little to attain by way of perfection, since all their perfections are already realized, for, as Divine Attributes, they are united with God's existence.'²² The other direction of change, namely horizontal movement, determines the transformation of the world through a succession of infinite forms. This movement is infinite in the sense that it has no end and, unlike the

vertical movement, is not determined by the realization of the end. The trans-substantial movement also resembles the idea of the creative evolution advocated by Bergson, for whom the world is in a constant, multidimensional and vertical process of creative evolution.

Dissatisfied with the mechanistic explanation presented by Laplacean scientific theory and the Darwinian concept of natural selection, Bergson argued that 'mechanism' was inadequate for understanding reality as it neglected other aspects of reality such as duration and creative evolution. The mechanistic account of evolution was also directionless and an outcome of mere chance.²³ For Bergson, the directionality of evolution was a vital field of constant renewal and creativity in which 'duration' rather than physical time played a significant role in transforming life from a lower to a higher state. Evolution was conceived in terms of an unbroken continuation of life in multiple directions. Duration, as the temporality of life, was a single indivisible continuity in which all three elements of past, present and future became integrated parts. To explain this, Bergson presents the analogy of human personality. We are aware of the development in our personality and this development is not seen as a mechanical change in which one state of existence is replaced by another. The change persists and is secured by memory, which establishes the connection between past, present and future.²⁴ The dissimilarities between Mulla Sadra's trans-substantial change and Bergson's creative evolution arise with directionality and purpose. The former kind of change is unidirectional in its vertical movement and culminates in the perfect human being. The latter is multidirectional and infinite. Another dissimilarity is in the teleological conception of evolution in trans-substantial change, which is that evolution fulfils a predetermined plan of Being. In contrast, creative evolution in Bergson's philosophy is a constant growth, like a snowball rolling down a slope. This growth is also without a predetermined purpose and is thus an ontological foundation for free will.

Mulla Sadra's doctrine of trans-substantial change is directly related to the notion of time and the temporality of the ontic beings in the world. It leads at the same time to the problem of the creation of the world in time. In the history of Islamic thought the Qur'anic paradigm of 'creation *ex nihilo*', which is in contradiction to the Hellenistic principle of '*ex nihilo nihil fit*', created a problem for some Muslim thinkers. Al-Kindi (d. 866) for example used Aristotelian principles and self-evident propositions in order to demonstrate the finitude of the world and to vindicate the Qur'anic paradigm of creation *ex nihilo*.²⁵ For al-Kindi and the adherents of the Qur'anic paradigm, the world had a beginning and was created in time by God. Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina found a solution to this contradiction between the Qur'anic paradigm of 'creation *ex nihilo*' and the Hellenistic principle in the doctrine of emanation provided by Plotinus, which enabled them to argue that the world was created neither *ex nihilo* nor from the eternal prime matter of Aristotle, but emanated

from God eternally. In trans-substantial change, the creation of the world is viewed from the perspective of the doctrine of emanation, but at the same time this perspective is not void of problems. It is also important to understand that in Mulla Sadra's ontology the world is an event and is originated, which means that it is temporal. At the same time, the emanation of the world still appears to be a-temporal simply because God, who is the efficient cause and the source of the emanation, is eternal and not in time. God's time, as stated by Mir Damad, the teacher of Mulla Sadra, is eternal '*sarmad*'.²⁶ In addition to this conception of time, Mir Damad refers to '*dahr*' perpetuity and '*zaman*' cosmological time as two different forms of time belonging to two different spheres of Being. *Dahr* describes the relation between the unchangeable divine attributes and the sensible world. *Zaman* is used for the temporality of the ontic beings in the sensible world. *Zaman*, therefore, cannot exist without the world and did not exist before the creation of material objects. The sensible world, which exists in *zaman* and depends on the divine attributes to exist, is outside the sphere of *dahr* and *sarmad*, whereas the divine attributes are in *dahr* but not in *zaman*.²⁷ Since the creation of the world is in *zaman*, and the sensible world is real, *zaman* should also have an objective reality. It cannot be a mere subjective notion in the Kantian sense. Mulla Sadra accepted the division of time by his teacher, but believed that it required further investigation. On one hand, time is said not to exist objectively. On the other hand, the relation of time to the existential movement in the world provides an ontological ground for the objectivity of time. One can claim that, since existential movement is objective, time as the measure of that movement is also objective. Even the notion of time, which is subjective and exists only in the mind, should be caused by something external and must have a connection with the objective existential movement in the world. This, however, does not mean that time is a quality of the existential movement. It should also be remembered that we cannot think of time without the existential movement in the world.²⁸ Since the emanation of the world from the divine attributes of God did not happen in *zaman* because *zaman* is not prior to the creation of the world, the world is, then, a-temporally originated.

In trans-substantial change, the only being not affected is Being, because Being is pure actuality and perfect. It can still be argued, however, that since the world is originated from Being and is part of it, then it is Being that changes and transforms itself by itself into its own modalities. This view is also the foundation of the mystic conviction held by some Sufis, who rejected the dichotomy of reality and appearance. From this understanding of time it should be clear that Mulla Sadra's concept of the temporality of the world is different from the concept of the creation of the world in time. Here the world is not in time but exists with time or is substantially temporal. The sensible world and time co-exist and belong together. Temporality is not an indication of the beginning and the end of the world because the world does not end in

Mulla Sadra's ontological interpretation. Temporality is simply the measure of trans-substantial change, and the origination of the world should be understood as a consequence of this change. Every moment in this trans-substantial change is a beginning as well as an end, in this constant and endless process of change. The world is, therefore, endless or eternal but does not stay the same, since the creation of a new substance is the annihilation of the previous one. The world is temporal as it goes through change but is a-temporal because change is permanent and remains for ever; it does not fall into the abyss of nothingness. In each moment there is a being that did not exist before, and this determines the temporal dimension of existence.

Without the objective existence of the existential movement there will not be an objective space-time continuum. The objectivity of time is a logical requirement of the objectivity of the existential movement of Being. At this point, Mulla Sadra's view contradicts Ibn Sina's understanding of the subjectivity of the notion of time, which is derived from movement as continuity or passage from the beginning to the end as a whole.²⁹ But does this mean that time is something real? If it is real, we need to assert its objectivity just as the objectivity of the world is asserted. But Mulla Sadra insists that time is not independent of the existential movement of Being. It is not like a container in which all events occur. It is one of the dimensions of the world that cannot be separated from it.³⁰ Elsewhere he states that the existential movement of Being is not different from time because 'the measure and the measured are the same'.³¹ On one hand, Mulla Sadra believes that time is not independent of the existential movement of the world and not something real like a being; on the other hand, he identifies time as the measure of the trans-substantial change that accompanies the existential movement. In this way Mulla Sadra's interpretation of time is different from that of his predecessors. Time is neither subjective nor objective, because it is not a mere concept or a fancy that has no representation in the external world. nor can it be seen as something that exists outside human thinking. Time is, rather, a subjective-objective, existential and non-existential dimension of reality. It is the measure of an objective existential movement, and an inherent function of the world, which is conceived intellectually.

Time is also eternal. The temporality of time is eternity for two reasons: first is emanation, through which the world came into existence and which is eternal. Second, whatever is thought to be prior to time is necessarily in time, because priority involves time.³² Time, in this respect, is distinct from space, because the finitude of space does not involve space beyond space. The notion of time prior to time involves real time because, as Mulla Sadra believes, the reality of time is in the mind.³³ Here, Mulla Sadra thinks of time as something subjective. Does his notion of subjectivity prove time to be an essence because essence for him is an intellectual property? Time is not a mere subjective notion; it has a reality of its own as well. In this case, the status of

time is not like that of essence. For this reason, Mulla Sadra insists that time is something positive and has a peculiar existence, and has an essence as well.³⁴ Time, therefore, has existence as well as essence. The existence of time is the reality of time inherent in the trans-substantial movement of Being, while its essence, or the mental concept of time, is the relational factor of the continuity.³⁵ Mulla Sadra does not claim that time is subjective or objective; it is only from his conceptions of the systematic ambiguity of Being and trans-substantial change that we arrive at this inference.

To return to the differences between Mulla Sadra's and Heidegger's ontology, one is that this Muslim philosopher accepted the doctrine of emanation. For Mulla Sadra, the world emanated or originated from Pure Being. Emanation can be seen as a temporal origination of the world, as everything in the world is determined by trans-substantial movement. All beings in the world go through change and are preceded by the temporal non-existence of their beings. Ontic beings continually come into existence and pass away. Every moment in this substantial change is death and rebirth of the same being with a new substance and a new form. Death exists only in this sense as a constant substantial change. Non-being, like being, becomes the reality of all beings. The world is, thus, a temporal surfacing of the reality of Being, which continues eternally. It is a temporal origination from a non-temporal origin. The temporal originality of the world and the notion of perpetual trans-substantial change seem to contradict one another. It is stated on one hand that the world is originated and on the other Mulla Sadra insists on the idea permanent change. Here, perpetuity does not mean that the world is eternal in the sense that it has no beginning, or that everything existed eternally without beginning. If the world is in a state of flux, nothing will remain perpetual, and only in this regard can we say that the world is in constant change and renewal. This interpretation is also doomed to failure, because the vertical direction of existential movement has a definite objective end. The trans-substantial change ceases when it reaches the highest rank of its existence and perfection. In addition, nothing attains or rises above the supreme level of the ontological rank of Being, and change does not govern beings, which are pure actuality. If we consider an immaterial being such as 'intellect' to be entirely actuality without potentiality, the intellect will not change. Change is a movement from potentiality to actuality but not in an Aristotelian sense because it includes change in substance. It is for this reason that Pure Being and the divine attributes are not affected by change. Potentiality is the state of imperfection while actuality is not. What does Mulla Sadra mean by perpetual change? Does he mean that the realm of potentiality and multiplicity remains eternally? Does this movement end by attaining perfection or the highest possible rank of existence?

Since emanation is thought to be eternal and constant, it seems that 'becoming', in Mulla Sadra's systematic ambiguity of Being, is endless. In

their various ontological ranks, ontic beings differ in their intensity, priority, posteriority, perfection and imperfection. They succeed one another vertically as well as horizontally. There will be a beginning and an end for an ontic being that exists at a particular time and space but that is not the case with Being as the inner reality of that ontic being, because trans-substantial change will elevate this being from a lower to a higher rank of existence with a new substance and form. There is a constant substantial change, which gives a new identity to the existents at every moment. In the region of becoming, nothing remains the same and nothing resists the stream of this continuous flux and renewal. Finality can be achieved only in the realm of unity with Pure Being. In the ontological region of history truth, knowledge and moral values, under the impact of this flux of becoming, also change constantly. Nothing in the human world can be seen as eternally existent. Another important point is that, with this great novelty in the world, trans-substantial change, like the dialectical movement in Hegel's philosophy, is necessary and determines the progress towards perfection without leaving individuals room for free choice. This point can be challenged, however, on the same ground as in Hegel's philosophy: since trans-substantial change occurs in Being by Being, it is self-determined and hence a free existential movement. Freedom in this case is interpreted on the ground of necessity. The plausibility of this argument is, however, in the premise that the changeable world is not to be different from what determines the change. But what determines the change is not individual free will. It is something beyond that, which brings everything under its own determination. This argument is better understood in the light of Hegel's category of being-for-itself. In the sphere of 'Determinate Being' in his logic, there are two dialectical aspects: being-in-itself (positive) and being-for-other (negative). These two aspects unite and their union becomes True Infinite. The essential character of this new category is being-for-itself.³⁶ The new category is without external limitation and its otherness is not something other than itself. Consciousness, for example, as being-for-itself, is self-consciousness. It is aware of itself as well as the external world. The external world, at the same time, is nothing but the self-manifestation of consciousness. It is idea in its otherness. In this case the contradictions between consciousness and the external world (its otherness) are negated and consciousness becomes self-related and a being-for-itself. It has no otherness and no external limitation. This is thought to be a necessary ground for freedom in Hegel's philosophy. Similarly in Mulla Sadra's ontology being determines its own modalities and transforms them constantly.

The existential movement of the world is not blind or capricious. It is for a purpose. Being, which is identical with God in Mulla Sadra's onto-theology, has no direct causal relationship with this continuity or with the trans-substantial change of its own modalities. There is an intrinsic motive vehicle responsible for accomplishing this task. This motive is the mystic force of

love (*'ishq*), which is present in everything and creates in lower-ranked beings the desire to long for beings in the higher ranks of existence. The notion of love as the main force in the world depicts a mystic (Sufi) influence on Mulla Sadra's metaphysical thinking. Before Mulla Sadra, Ibn Sina expressed similar views in *Risala fil 'Ishq (A Treatise on Love)*, in which he stated that all entities in the world, including matter, move under the sway of cosmic love.³⁷ The relationship between the self and the Reality in Sufism is primordially emotional rather than theoretical. It is the emotional motive (*'ishq*) which leads to the rise of the mystic way of cognition (*ma'rifah*). The emotional motive is not only primordial; it is also the ontological constitution of the world, including the self. Ibn Sina also believed that the self was born with this intrinsic motive: 'Ardent love is innate' all things flow from God in a process of necessary emanation and return to Him in a process of necessary love.'³⁸ The primacy of emotion, however, does not nullify the significance of cognition. The self can approach Reality passionately without appropriating it epistemologically. It is also this emotional motive that elevates the self to the stage where it can experience Reality.

Mulla Sadra is in agreement with Ibn Sina that even prime matter is infected by love. His argument supporting this idea is based on the positivity of prime matter. Prime matter is the realm of potentiality and potentiality is something positive, or that which exists. Being is a reality commonly shared by all existents, including prime matter. To all beings, whether at the level of potentiality or actuality, the divine attributes (knowledge, will and power) function with various degrees of intensity. These attributes belong to Being or the inner reality of all beings. Prime matter, which is at the bottom of the descending process of emanation and is considered to be pure potentiality, is capable of receiving forms and becoming actual. More specifically, it has longing and affection for forms. This mystic love penetrates all modalities of being as a motive to assist their progress towards perfection. It prevails everywhere, and wherever there is existence there will be love and longing for perfection.³⁹ In clarifying this point, Fazlur Rahman remarks that the degree of intensity of 'love' is not only in consciousness, such as in human beings. It also exists equally in all beings. Matter, as the most deficient and lowly ranked of all beings, should have a high degree of intensity of 'love' for the higher ranks.⁴⁰ As a consequence, the world, including inanimate beings, can be seen as a loving body with various degrees of intensity of love and longing for perfection. When human beings attain unity with Intellects or divine attributes through the form of the perfect human being, their yearning reaches the point of satisfaction. They no longer yearn for a higher rank of existence, because their longing for perfection will no longer exist. The world is, therefore, characterized by renewal; the things and events of the past are in the past and those of the future are yet to come. Temporality is the progress of the world as a constant becoming and creation. Every new

moment is a non-existence that comes into being through trans-substantial change.

The main consequences of the doctrine of trans-substantial change are religious; for example its impact on the notions of resurrection and divine retribution. They can also be philosophical. It cannot be denied that the doctrine expounded by Mulla Sadra changes our understanding of the two religious notions and also opens a discussion on the transmigration of the soul. The transmigration of the soul has been discussed in the history of Muslim philosophy by Muslim philosophers such as Abu Bakr al-Razi, Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, in addition to Mulla Sadra. They raised the possibility of the transmigration of the soul from one species to another, for example the human soul to animals or plants. Of particular importance to Mulla Sadra's ideas is Suhrawardi's understanding of this question. Suhrawardi deals with the transmigration of the soul in several books, but in *Hikmat al-Ishraq* he argues that human bodies are in a position to receive a managing rational soul or managing light, while animals receive only imperfect human souls:

Whatever moral habit captures the commanding light, whatever dark state becomes established in it and becomes its support, the commanding light must transfer its attachment after the corruption of its fortress to a fortress corresponding to that dark state: a fortress of one of the brute animals. When the commanding light departs from the human fortress, it is darkened and desirous of darkness. It does not know its source or the world of light. Wicked states have become fixed in it, and it is drawn to the brute fortress of other animals, and the darkness beckons to it.⁴¹

Suhrawardi argues for the transmigration of the soul by insisting that the condition of life after death is dependent on the balance of knowledge and action in the previous life. With regard to the new form obtained by the human soul, he puts forward the notion of 'suspended forms' (*suwar al-mu'allaq*). These forms, like the Platonic forms, are transcendent but are not in the immutable rank of existence. Some are dark (evil) and some luminous (good). After death, the wicked souls, those that failed to live a balanced life between knowledge and action, are gathered in hell and deprived of their suspended form in accordance with their character in the previous life.⁴² Shahrazuri, the disciple of Suhrawardi, clarifies the position of his master by saying that Suhrawardi accepted the transmigration of the human soul to an animal body, but rejected the transmigration of the human soul into plants and they will be given bodies of the lower rank of existence.⁴³ When we come to discuss transmigration in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, particularly in the light of trans-substantial change, we expect him to argue against it. Trans-substantial change is an irreversible progress and cannot be seen as a movement from a more perfect or developed to a less perfect and undeveloped rank of existence. A being, like a human soul in a developed human body, is not expected to take

an animal body, which is less perfect than a human body and is at a lower rank of being. In other words, demotion in trans-substantial change is not only absurd but impossible.⁴⁴ Mulla Sadra's denial of the transmigration of the soul, according to Fazlur Rahman, is beset with a problem. In Islam, the notion of bodily resurrection implies the transmigration of the soul in so far as it is thought to be a reunion of the soul with a new body.⁴⁵ Mulla Sadra's treatment of this matter takes the middle position between the views of those who believe in the survival of the intellect after death, and those who accept the survival of the body as well. He explains that in the afterlife the human intellect is able to apprehend the general ideas in the rational realm in the way it apprehends and perceives different physical objects in this world. But the apprehended general ideas are not mere concepts without a reality of their own. They are real, ontological and identical with actual existence, and are experienced by the human intellect. What then happens to the human body at death? Is it disjoined from the soul and does it then decay? Will the human soul be given a new body? To answer these questions Mulla Sadra, like Suhrawardi, talks about the World of the Images (*'alam al-khayal*). The bodies of the undeveloped souls, the souls that have committed sins, deteriorate at the time of death and are not reassembled as before. In order to survive physically, they create a material body for themselves by externalizing their inner psychic states in the form of a body in the World of the Images. Thus a human soul that is guilty of committing a sin will imagine itself as an animal.⁴⁶ The important questions that arise here are: what is the destiny of the human soul that has gone through trans-substantial change? Am I the same sinner of yesterday who committed a sin to be punished or substantially transformed into another human being? If I am not the same person, why should I be punished for the sins committed by me in the past? There is, no doubt, a problem here. But Mulla Sadra provides two different answers to these questions. On one hand, he believes that the identity of a person relies on the intellectual form of that person, which exists in the mind of God.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the soul is thought to survive throughout the evolutionary changes, and that this helps the person to retain an identity.⁴⁸ This solution, which has similarity with Descartes's view on the human soul as the self-substance, is in my opinion in contradiction with the implication of the trans-substantial change.

The philosophical consequences of trans-substantial change can be summarized in three points: the temporal contingency of the world; the infection of being by non-being or nothingness; and the relativity of truth and values.

Mulla Sadra demonstrates that the world is in constant substantial change. This ontological view is an indication of the non-being of beings that have not yet come into existence. Non-being or nothingness is at the heart of the world. That is to say, an existent is preceded by its own non-existence.⁴⁹ The passage

of being into non-being and of non-being into being is 'becoming', which was also demonstrated by Hegel and discussed earlier, and in contradiction of Aristotle's understanding of Nothingness. In Aristotle's ontology, non-being is neither in motion nor at rest, because for non-being to move it should be in a place, which it is not, and if it were it would be somewhere.⁵⁰ Mulla Sadra seems to have borrowed the idea of coming-into-being from Mir Damad. Sabzawari, in explaining the relationship between eternities and becoming in time, states that becoming through perpetual duration or constant creation was proposed by Mir Damad. He further maintains that, for Mir Damad, the coming-into-being of the world by way of becoming through perpetual duration is a temporal coming-into-existence, or 'the precedence of "preceding non-existence" over the existence of a thing by way of separable precedence of it, i.e., of the non-existence'.⁵¹ This is an interesting point in Hegel's logic as well as in the phenomenological interpretation of the structure of consciousness in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. Being, for Hegel, is an undeduced beginning and pure because it has no determination or qualification. It is the most abstract category in his dialectical logic. It is nothing more than a simple 'isness'.⁵² Since this undeduced beginning has not passed over into another or its opposition, it is self-identical. When it produces its opposite it undergoes change and becomes different. But saying that Being is an immediacy and has no determination except 'isness' implies mere emptiness and the equivalent of 'Nothing' or non-being.⁵³ Being, therefore, becomes the birthplace of nothingness, and the two categories become the first two oppositions in Hegel's logic holding the relationship of identity in difference. When 'Being' and 'Nothingness' pass over into one another they produce the category of 'becoming'. When understood in the light of the dialectical interpretation in Hegel's logic, the meaning and significance of becoming as an important category in Mulla Sadra's ontology can be grasped. It is a process that involves being and nothingness. Being of a being is subsequent to its nothingness; this is the temporal origination of the ontic being in the realm of potentiality and diversity. Sartre also deals with the problem of Nothingness in detail. But, unlike Mulla Sadra and Hegel, he insists that Pure Being cannot become the source of Nothingness and that the only being responsible for bringing nothingness into the world with itself is consciousness. This is described by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* as follows:

We perceived that nothingness can be conceived neither outside of being, nor as a complementary, abstract notion, nor as an infinite milieu where Being is suspended. Nothingness must be given at the heart of being, in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which we have called *négarités*. But this intra-mundane Nothingness cannot be produced by Being-in-itself; the notion of Being as full positivity does not contain Nothingness as one of its structures. We cannot even say that Being excludes it. Being lacks all relations to it.

Hence the question which is put to us now with a particular urgency: if Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of Being, nor in terms of Being, and if on the other hand, since it is non-being, it cannot derive from itself the necessary force to 'nihilate itself', where does Nothingness come from?⁵⁴

To prove his point, Sartre gives the example of finding Pierre in the café where Sartre tries to say that Nothingness is experienced by consciousness. Sartre also argues with Kant's view that negation is the quality of a judgment (proposition), and Nothingness is logically prior to negation; that we experience Nothingness and negation before making a judgment.⁵⁵ The distinction between the existentialist views of Mulla Sadra and Sartre is in the origin or birthplace of Nothingness. Mulla Sadra insists that all contingent beings, including the human intellect, are preceded by their own non-existence in the world. For Sartre, Nothingness is a characteristic of the ontological structure of consciousness. The being of non-conscious being is not infected by Nothingness.

As far as the distinction between Being and Nothingness is concerned, it is clear, at least for Sartre, that both can be experienced intuitively as two realities. In Hegel's dialectical logic, they pass over into one another and their causal relationship can be recognized. But what is the distinction between one non-being (nothingness) and another? Is there a causal relationship between them? Mulla Sadra does not engage in this discussion, but Sabzawari, one of the followers of Mulla Sadra, says that the distinction between non-beings is imaginary and they have no causal relationship: a non-being cannot be a cause for another non-being. Is it possible, then, to say that the non-being of clouds is a cause for the non-being of rain? Or that the non-existence of oxygen is a cause for the non-being of human life? Sabzawari would say that such statements, which show the causal connection between two non-beings, are only the realization of the absence of beings such as the non-presence of clouds and rain, and that in reality we are not dealing with non-being or nothingness.⁵⁶ But when we study read Sartre we find out that the realization of the non-presence of a being, as in the case of searching for Pierre in the café, is a legitimate ground for experiencing the non-being of Pierre. It is the non-being or non-presence of Pierre that produces a negative proposition such as 'There is no Pierre in the café'. If we go back to the causal relationship between the non-existence of oxygen in space and the non-existence of human life and say that 'Such a void is the cause of death', we are making an affirmative proposition that explicates the causal relationship between two non-beings in an affirmative way. Meanwhile, we cannot deny that every affirmation is a negation. Void, here, can be understood as the absence of oxygen; so that the non-being of oxygen in space causes death or the non-being of life. Sabzawari's argument for the non-existence of the causal relationship between non-beings can thus be refuted.

Another philosophical consequence is that trans-substantial change leads to the relativity of truth and values. The doctrine of trans-substantial change deconstructs the metaphysical foundation of universal truth and values, as nothing is considered to be eternal and stable in the world. Everything is in constant change, including human society and our understanding of reality. As a consequence of this, no system of belief can claim to be absolute and final, because the novelty prevails. This consequence also had a profound impact on Mulla Sadra's understanding of politics, in particular political Islam, which proclaims the divinity and universality of its discourse. Mulla Sadra made a vivid distinction between religion and politics or between religious laws and political laws and rejected the identity of the former with the latter. Religious laws are characterized by generality and necessity, and political laws by particularity and dependence on the human situation.⁵⁷ This distinction between religion and politics in Mulla Sadra's philosophy stands in contradiction to Shi'ite political thought, which claims a necessary link between religion and politics, and states that no true Islamic political system is established without religious laws. A true Islamic political system is possible on the foundation of the religious laws and the presence of an imam (a spiritual leader and a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) to implement the law. Although Mulla Sadra is a Shi'ite thinker and accepts the doctrine of the imamate, he still believes in constant change in nature and history. For him, however, trans-substantial change rules over both nature and history; ontology and social system are necessarily interconnected. It is not possible to understand Mulla Sadra's political philosophy without understanding his metaphysics. For him, as for Hegel, metaphysics is the foundation of all natural and historical phenomena.⁵⁸

Any socio-political system existing at any stage of human history is not final and should be superseded by a social system richer and more perfect in content. According to Mulla Sadra, in a perfect society all members live together in harmony and cooperate to achieve the highest good and the full realization of Truth. In contrast, in an imperfect society the members cooperate to execute evil.⁵⁹ Since change is the essential characteristic of the world, the imperfect society should also be seen in the light of the evolutionary process of the existential movement of the world. The evolutionary process of the world is towards perfection rather than deterioration. Mulla Sadra's view on political leadership in a perfect society is similar to that of al-Farabi in *Mabadi Ara Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila*. Al-Farabi, like Mulla Sadra, makes his metaphysical interpretation of reality the foundation of his political philosophy. The socio-political system in a 'perfect society' needs to function in harmony with the system of the universe designed by the First Cause. For al-Farabi, this interconnection is founded on the doctrine of emanation. Following this doctrine, al-Farabi places his view of the relationship between the state and civil society in the hierarchy of the system of the universe, in

which the emanation of various forms of being flows from the First Cause. This metaphysical structure is a political model.⁶⁰ The diversity of emanation represents varying social groups and political institutions, which are subordinated to the authority or to the will of the supreme statesman. Mulla Sadra, like al-Farabi, holds the view that a leader of the perfect society should be someone of sound mind and body who has attained the rank of actual intellect:

That man [the leader] is a person over whom nobody has any sovereignty whatsoever. He is a man who has reached his perfection and has become actual intellect and actual being thought (intelligized), his representative faculty having by nature reached its utmost perfection in the way stated by us; this faculty of his is predisposed by nature to receive, either in waking life or in sleep, from the Active Intellect the particulars, either as they are or by imitating them, and also the intelligibles, by imitating them. His Passive Intellect will have reached its perfection by [having apprehended] all the intelligibles, so that none of them is kept back from it, and it will have become actual intellect and actual being thought.⁶¹

The leader of the perfect society is not the lawmaker but the executor of the law, which is divine and pre-given. Like the ruling organ in the human body, the leader is chiefly responsible for the rise and fall of state and society. The bearer of such responsibility must further possess two kinds of qualities: natural (inborn) and acquired. Natural qualities are beyond one's capacity to choose or acquire after birth. For example, the statesman cannot choose which family or situation to be born into. The prime inborn quality, which precedes all other qualities, is that a statesman is born as an *imam*; in the Shi'ite context, he should be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, a male from his household, *ahl al-Bayt*:

This is the sovereign over whom no other human being has any sovereignty whatsoever; he is the *imam*, he is the first sovereign of the excellent city, he is the sovereign of the excellent nation, and the sovereign of the universal state (the *oikumene*).⁶²

Although al-Farabi does not mention in *Ara* that the leader should be from *ahl al-bayt*, it is clear that the notion of the imam, which is explicitly expressed in *Ara*, logically presupposes this understanding of leadership. The imam is the only statesman qualified to lead a perfect society, politically as well as spiritually. He is a leader who is granted revelation or is in contact with God, receiving inspiration from the First Principle to guide his perfect society. For Mulla Sadra, the leader should be a theosopher (*hakim*) who, on attaining perfection in all intellectual faculties, becomes a prophet.⁶³ This view seems incompatible with Mulla Sadra's idea of the distinction between religion and politics. The leader as theosopher and prophet in a perfect society has reli-

gious as well as political authority. His rule becomes the execution of the divine will and law. The compatibility of religion and politics belongs to the realm of becoming, where nothing remains stable, or where politics, like religion, becomes universal. But since nothing escapes trans-substantial change, religion and politics must each go through change from a less perfect to a more perfect stage of existence.⁶⁴ The purpose of political life, in the perfect society, is spiritual salvation, so the political order will be divinely oriented and the state will be based on the divine creeds. Mulla Sadra's analysis of politics is, in the light of his metaphysics, an intellectual attempt to explain the place of human beings in the world for achieving collectivism and divinity. He believes that politics is the social sphere where the individual soul experiences belonging to a social system and works with other individuals for a better form of collective life.⁶⁵ He also believes that the leadership in the perfect society is the real guardian of social justice and the divine laws.⁶⁶ Political life is, therefore, imperative in the evolutionary process of existence. The achievement of perfection and the realization of Truth are possible in history. The worldly life is a ladder to ascend to another form of living in the Hereafter as another aspect of existence.

As mentioned earlier, Muslim philosophers before Mulla Sadra, under the influence of Aristotle, tended to acknowledge the reality of change only in the form of accidentality. For Mulla Sadra what was foremost in his mind was change in the form of becoming, with substantial and accidental changes. His novel interpretation of the world is a genuinely innovative philosophical project which involves the development of a new intellectual outlook, conceptual framework and values. The task of philosophy is to actively interpret reality rather than give a mere conceptual translation of it. To achieve this, the creative interpretation should break from tradition and prepare the way for the future. Next, in the light of this innovative interpretation, Mulla Sadra's existential philosophy proves to be far from infected by dogmatism and prejudice, because for him every philosophical conviction remains transitory. Virtually everything about the world, human society, truth, values and knowledge, becomes a prey to change and nothing is immutable in the world except novelty.

Mulla Sadra and the Problem of Knowledge

This chapter contains an account of Mulla Sadra's theory of knowledge. From the outset, it should be remembered that the problem of knowledge in Mulla Sadra's philosophy developed out of his ontological system. I also argue that his epistemology should be understood in the light of his interpretation of reality. The doctrine of the primacy of Being is the foundation of the possibility of knowledge. It suggests that in order to know something we need to begin with its existence. Being becomes an ontological condition for knowing. To make this issue more adequately appropriated, our task will be at the start to trace the notion of intuitive knowledge in the history of Muslim philosophy, which plays a significant role in Mulla Sadra's epistemology, and then continues with an explanation of Mulla Sadra's understanding of knowledge and its source.

Before Mulla Sadra, Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi and the Sufis advocated the idea that reality should be apprehended directly by intuition rather than by rationalistic discourse. Because Mulla Sadra's treatment of the problem of knowledge is so similar to Suhrawardi's, it is difficult to make a distinction between them. Nevertheless, what is apprehended by intuition for Mulla Sadra is the reality of Being rather than essence. Being and knowledge are not two different things, but are intertwined. Being, by revealing itself or being revealed, renders knowledge possible and knowledge makes the truth of Being comprehensible.

Intuition is the source of knowledge for Ibn Sina. Knowledge is obtained intuitively by the human mind when it comes into contact with the external reality; the active intellect responds by providing the content of intuition. The content of intuition, as Kant also states in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, is provided from outside. However, Kant does not deal with the external source of knowledge in a mystical way. For him, the faculties of sensibility and understanding are limited and determined by the external content of the phenomenal world and by the subjective necessary conditions or forms such as space and time, in the case of sensibility, and the table of the categories in the case of understanding. Also, for Ibn Sina and Kant, the human mind is empty without the given external content, and knowledge is possible as the result of the interaction between internal and external conditions. To clarify this point, Ibn Sina uses the metaphor of a mirror, saying that the human mind before acquiring knowledge is like a tarnished mirror, which can be polished by knowledge if it is turned to the light of the sun (the active intellect).¹ The

human mind then acquires knowledge by intuition and does not rely on the phenomenal world as do sense-experience or rationalistic discourse for obtaining intuitive knowledge. This kind of knowledge, as Majid Fakhry remarks, 'stems from that supernatural or supermundane agency, which governs all the process of generation and corruption, including the process of cognition, in this world, i.e., the active intellect'.²

Acquiring knowledge by intuition varies from individual to individual. Those who get closer to the active intellect are enlightened by attaining the intelligible forms stored in the active intellect, and rely totally on intuitive knowledge rather than discursive knowledge to reach the rank of the prophethood.³ Intuitive knowledge is, therefore, not the product of the human intellect but springs from a divine source. It is the radiation of the active intellect upon the intellect of the seekers of the truth. Here, Ibn Sina makes a distinction between four types of human beings: the highest are those who have acquired prophecy and can create miracles due to the development of their intuitive and their imaginative power and their contact with the active intellect. The second type includes those who have developed their intuitive but not their imaginative powers. The third type is those who have developed their theoretical power but not their practical power. Finally, there are the human beings who have developed only their practical power.⁴

Another important thinker after Ibn Sina is Suhrawardi, to be discussed here, whose epistemology had a significant impact on Mulla Sadra. As mentioned in Chapter Two, this Muslim thinker is critical of discursive knowledge and, like Ibn Sina, relies on intuition or knowledge by illumination (*ishraq*); Nevertheless he does not discard discursive knowledge. He even finds sense-perception necessary for acquiring knowledge as he believes that there are certain things which can be known only by perception.

Suhrawardi's epistemology, discussed in *Hikmat al-Ishraq* and *al-Mutarahat*, begins with a critical evaluation of Aristotle's analysis of knowledge by definition. Against Aristotle, he argues that knowledge by definition does not necessarily include the essential characteristics of an entity. Other non-essential qualities or attributes should also be taken into account. He develops an argument against the definition of definition as '*definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*', or connotative definition. His argument, however, is grounded on the idea that certain things cannot be defined in accordance with this rule in Aristotelian logic. To render definition possible, Aristotle insists on the point that a genus plus a *differentia* are required. When human beings are defined as 'rational animals', rationality becomes a *differentia* and animal a genus. But 'colour', for instance, cannot be known by definition because it is a genus without *differentia*. It is a simple idea and a simple truth that has nothing other than itself to become a predicate for.⁵ This view of Suhrawardi is reminiscent of G. E. Moore's argument against the definition of goodness. In *Principia Ethica* Moore states:

My point is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is. Definitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you can no longer define those terms.⁶

Mehdi Amin Razavi believes that Suhrawardi's criticism of knowledge by definition is a 'radical departure from Aristotle.'⁷ In my opinion, Suhrawardi's point of view, which is similar to that of Moore, was originally from Socrates (Socrates' view on definition is discussed in Plato's *Meno*). In this dialogue, Socrates presents the ground for definition as a response to questions such as 'What is excellence?' or 'What is health?' In answering these questions, Socrates tries to define a term first by stating what is common to it. In this case, Aristotle's later definition of genus with *differentia* is one of the possible ways but not the only way of defining a term:

Well, is it only concerning excellence that you think this, Meno, that there is one excellence of a man, another of a woman and so on; or do you think the same about health, too, and size and strength? Do you think health is one thing in a man, another in a woman? Or is it the same pattern everywhere if indeed it is health, whether it is in a man or in anything else whatever?⁸

Socrates also remarks that in some cases there are other ways of defining the same thing. For example, in defining figure, colour, smell or taste, we cannot follow the previous rule of definition, because no *differentia* is involved in defining these terms:

What then is this which has this name 'shape'? Try to say. Suppose you said to the person who asked you in this way either about shape or colour, 'I don't even understand what you mean, sir, nor yet do I know what you are saying'; perhaps he would be surprised and say, 'Don't you understand that I am looking for what is the same in the case of all these?' Or would you not even be able to answer in this case, Meno, if someone were to ask you 'What is it that is the same in the case of all these, the curved and straight and all the other things that you call shapes?' Try to say, so that you can indeed practise for the answer concerning excellence.⁹

In defining figure or colour, Socrates thinks of the second alternative, that of assuming the definition of terms such as figure or colour not by a genus and *differentia* because they do not have *differentiae*. Suhrawardi also, like Socrates, believes that colour is pure genus without *differentia*, and therefore should be known by another cognitive tool directly, namely perception rather

than definition. This introduces the role and significance of sense-perception in Suhrawardi's epistemology.

According to this Muslim thinker, knowledge by definition is not free of shortcomings. All aspects and qualities of a term are not revealed in a definition. There will always be unknown aspects of the entities defined that are not given in a definition. The human mind, therefore, will not be able to cognize the truth of an entity completely by definition. In order to surmount the shortcoming of knowledge by definition, Suhrawardi also talks about innate ideas. He insists that every kind of knowledge begins with a sort of knowledge about the object of inquiry. It is not possible to begin an investigation into the nature of an entity without having any idea about it at all. It is true that an inquiry begins with a conviction that we do not know enough about the object we inquire about. For this reason the inquiry is carried out. Meanwhile we do know something about it. Knowledge always begins with presuppositions and pre-given ideas; these presuppositions are not produced by previous experiences but are innate:

Knowledge is either innate or not innate. When an unknown thing cannot be made known by pointing it out or bringing it to mind and it is something that cannot be attained by the true visions of the great sages, then knowledge of it must depend on things leading to it that are in an order and that are ultimately based on innate knowledge. Otherwise knowledge of anything that man desires to know will depend on previously obtaining an infinite number of things, and he will not even be able to obtain the first step in knowledge – which is absurd.¹⁰

In another argument, Suhrawardi states that the process of defining a term will continue *ad infinitum*, because if a term is defined by an attribute, that attribute needs to be defined by another attribute, and so on. In this case, nothing will be known, which is also absurd. There must be a first principle or a beginning against which our definition of a term and innate ideas can be measured.¹¹ The possibility of knowledge by definition stands on pre-given knowledge. Pre-given knowledge can be seen as *a priori* in the Kantian sense or as a condition that renders knowledge possible. The last and most reliable source of knowledge for Suhrawardi, after knowledge by sense-perception, definition and innate ideas, is intuition or knowledge by illumination (*al-ishraq*). Intuitive knowledge, like perception, is direct and non-representational. There is no mediation between the knower and the known. It is knowledge by 'presence' in which the distinction between the known and the knower is abolished. One object that is really grasped by intuition, as stated by Suhrawardi, is the 'self'. In self-knowledge, which is knowledge by illumination, the object (the self, which is known) is present in the self, which is the knower. Self-knowledge, like the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*, goes beyond doubt and is undeniable. If I doubt, for example, the status of my existence, then I need to exist in order to experience the doubt about my own existence.

Intuitive knowledge is also not confined to the apprehension of the self. It is vital for knowing the intelligences or the inner reality of the world; it is a different way of knowing and does not require intermediate concepts. The intelligence (whether God's or the human mind) knows its object directly. Cognition is, therefore, not necessarily conceptual but the outcome of illuminative intuition, which requires the 'presence' of its object and direct apprehension of it.

Mulla Sadra's epistemology deals extensively with knowledge by intuition (*al-idrak*). This Arabic term has been translated as 'perception', but the term semantically means the act of comprehending, apprehending, attaining, grasping, and then finally perceiving in the sense of knowing something directly without mediation.¹² It is used to describe the process of directly apprehending and attaining the quiddity of objects outside the human mind in order to make it intelligible. It is a direct epistemological encounter with the external world through which the potentiality of knowing becomes actuality. This definition also includes sense-experience. For this reason, Mulla Sadra thinks of sense-perception as the first and the lowest modality of intuition (*al-idrak*). William Chittick and S. M. Khamenei (director of the Sadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute in Teheran) have translated *al-idrak* as perception.¹³ Perception, then, rather than apprehension, is a unique cognitive power; due to various levels or degrees of intensity of existence cognition also has different modalities and cognitive stages. These stages of cognition in Mulla Sadra's theory of knowledge are in some ways similar to the hierarchy of knowledge in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, with the exception that Hegel's epistemology does not go beyond rational knowledge. According to Hegel, reason can be applied to solve the contradictions between the known and the knower, and in rational knowledge the truth for consciousness becomes consciousness itself.¹⁴ To reach this form of cognition, it is essential for consciousness to move from sense-certainty to perception, and from there to understanding and finally to reason, which is the birthplace of absolute knowledge.¹⁵

For Mulla Sadra, attaining the highest stage of cognition for knowing the Truth does not rely on rationalistic discourse. It is the task of intellectual perception, a cognitive power that transcends the power of reason. How does Mulla Sadra arrive at this conviction? How does he deal with the unity of the known and the knower in his epistemology? When we understand Mulla Sadra's epistemology in the context of his metaphysics we realize that, in his view, knowledge deals mainly with the problem of the relationship between existence as an external reality outside the human mind and the transformation of external reality into mental existence, which is another form of Being.¹⁶ In this way, his understanding of knowledge as the conceptualization of external reality for the sake of unity between the known and the knower is in agreement with Hegel's dialectic process of consciousness described in the

Phenomenology of Mind. It is also important to investigate the nature of this relationship between external and mental existence because it resolves the dichotomy of subject and object and the appropriation of the latter by the former. The transformation of external existence into mental existence is accomplished by conceptualizing the modalities of Being. But Being, unlike its modalities, cannot be known conceptually as it has no essence or universal determinations. Whatever is known through the revelation of universal determinations is a modality of Being. The human mind knows various modalities of Being, which are different in their degrees of perfection and proximity to Being. The possibility of knowing, whether acquired by our sense-experience or intellect, is based on the 'presence' of Being in one form or another. The reality of knowledge is inseparable from the reality of existence. The variety of levels of the modalities of Being is revealed to different levels of perception (*al-idrak*). Since there are three levels of existence there will be three levels of perception: sense-perception, imaginal perception and intellectual perception.¹⁷

In sense-perception, the human soul reflects upon the external object using five senses. Each of these senses is given a specific task and receives a particular form of the sensuous quality of the external object. This passive attitude of the human soul in sense-perception is followed by attention and awareness.¹⁸ These two activities of the soul are interconnected and the former leads to the latter; unless we pay attention to sensuous quality such as sound we will not be aware of it. What is acquired by the five senses is at the same time a confirmation of the 'presence' of the external object for the soul. Awareness, which is the result of the presence of the object to the senses, is direct and necessary: direct because it does not require the conceptualization of its object and is not mediated by representations; necessary because sense-perception will not be able to receive its object unless the object is present. After receiving the sensuous qualities and being aware of the external object, the human soul endeavours to create the sensuous form of this object and to reveal its quiddity. Here, it seems that the passive act of receiving the sensuous qualities of an object is transformed into the activity of constructing the notion of the object by apprehending its quiddity. This stage, in Kant's epistemology, is in the domain of the faculty of understanding rather than sense-perception (sensibility). Understanding and not sense-perception is responsible for constructing the quiddity of a phenomenal object through the application of the subjective categories.¹⁹ The question that arises here is whether the sensuous qualities of the known object exist externally. The answer, for Mulla Sadra, is in the negative. Sense organs are mere instruments and channels required for perception; otherwise it is the human soul not the sense organs that experiences sensation. The eyes do not see colour. They are only organs through which the soul becomes aware of the colour. They are sense organs for seeing but strictly speaking they see nothing, because seeing is perceiving and perception is a faculty of the human soul and not the sense

organ. If we think of the human body as an accidental fact, then the body plays its role in perception as an instrument; it is not intrinsic to this kind of knowledge. Mulla Sadra also believes that the human soul can still perceive if separated from the body without being assisted by sense organs. To return to the question, the sensuous qualities are neither in the senses nor present externally in the object. They are subjective forms and are displayed by the soul when an external object is presented to the sense organs. Empirical cognition is produced as the result of this relationship and the interaction between the subjective forms and the presence of the external object to the senses.²⁰ This view of Mulla Sadra is incompatible with the idea of perception as a passive acceptance of the qualities of an external and independent object. The human soul does not abstract the empirical determinations of an object but transforms the object into something mental. It imposes another form on it, which is pre-existent in the soul. The corporeal form of the object creates only an occasion for revealing the subjective forms that exist in the human soul.

What I understand from this account of perception by Mulla Sadra is that the human soul does not rely completely on the external object for empirical cognition. Rather, the external object stimulates the soul through the mediation of the sense organs to yield the cognized forms that transform the object into a new kind of being, a mental being, or a being that is known by the soul. If we think of cognition as the appropriation of the estranged object by the intelligence, then the material existence of the object cannot become the subject matter of cognition. In perception, the human soul experiences a form that belongs to the material object. This form has a mental character and is internal and subjective. For this reason, cognition is possible by distancing the intelligence from matter. Meanwhile, the cognitive form that becomes explicit at the time of presenting a material object to the senses is not the 'essence', as thought by Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic philosophers and the *ishraqi* thinkers. It is another aspect of being that exists internally in the mind. Since the possibility of epistemology is grounded on ontology, whatever is perceived and known is nothing but another form of Being. In perception, the human soul transforms an object that exists externally (*al-wujud al-'aini*) into mental existence (*al-wujud al-dihni*) after this interaction between the intelligence and the external form of existence.

Although it is difficult to accept that sense-perception in Mulla Sadra's epistemology is mere passivity or acquisition, we can still state that imagination, unlike sense-perception, requires some skilful activity. The human soul creates its own images without relying on the external world to produce them. The power of imagination at the same time is not limited to the creation of these subjective images; it transcends the realm of subjectivity and attains the 'World of Images' (*'alam al'khayal*), which is held by thinkers such as Ibn 'Arabi and Suhrawardi to be a real world beyond the world of corporeal beings.²¹ In this case, there will be two kinds of images: subjective images,

which are created by the power of imagination, and objective images, with their own ontological reality outside the human soul.

The human soul, after becoming aware of the form of the external object by sense-perception, is able to recall that form and reflect upon it by imagination (*takhayul*), even when the object is not present.²² This power of imagination is conditioned by the sensuous forms, and relies on them. Not having the sense-perception of an object means not being able to imagine what it looks like. Mulla Sadra talks about another kind of imagination between sense-perception and intellectual perception. He calls it *tawahum* or *wahm*.²³ The literal meaning of this term in Arabic is 'illusion', 'delusion', 'fancy', 'misapprehension' or 'imagination'. But for Mulla Sadra, the philosophical meaning of this term is far from illusion or delusion. He uses it to designate the creative power of imagination in individuals. William Chittick translates this term as 'sense-intuition' and adds that the medieval scholars translated it as '*estimatio*'.²⁴ This type of imagination is for the apprehension of the intelligible universal forms without relying on a particular being. In this way, *tawahum* is more significant than *takhayul* for three reasons: first it is not conditioned by the objects of sense-perception; second, it is closer to the intellectual intuition as it apprehends the universal forms disjoined from the corporeal objects; and third, it is a creative power in the human soul.

Ibn Sina has also written on this cognitive tool before Mulla Sadra. He believes that *wahm* functioned as a faculty in the human mind and was mainly responsible for apprehending particular ideas in particular corporeal objects. The realization of love, for example, in a particular person, or being fearful in facing a particularly dangerous phenomenon, is the task of *wahm*. Mulla Sadra, however, says that Ibn Sina's form of realization is the function of reason attached to imagination. A person, for example, is afraid of an external threat because he/she reasons about it. Mulla Sadra's view was rejected by Sabzawari, one of the followers of the metaphysics of Mulla Sadra who remarks that, since animals become fearful in the face of danger, *wahm* should not be attached to reason, because animals do not have reason yet experience fear.

It is important to mention here that the idea of *tawahum* as a type of imagination was not originally Mulla Sadra's. Thinkers before him, such as Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi, endorsed it in their epistemology. Each believed that imagination is an important faculty of the human mind for grasping the realm of ideas between the physical and intellectual worlds. As we see, and as also stated by Oliver Leaman, Mulla Sadra employed the technical language of Ibn 'Arabi in dealing with the problem of cognition. That language also influenced Mulla Sadra's understanding of the mystical implications of knowledge.²⁵ According to Ibn 'Arabi, imagination is in the domain of the human soul and a faculty between sense-perception and intellect.²⁶ The knowledge produced by imagination is of the *Barzakh* and the world of the

corporeal bodies through which spiritual entities manifest themselves.²⁷ The world of imagination is an intermediary realm between the corporeal and non-corporeal worlds. It is divided into unbounded or absolute imagination (*al-khayal al-mutlaq*) and bounded imagination (*al-khayal al-muqayyad*). In the unbounded abode of imagination between the being of God and nothingness, all beings come into existence. The bounded imagination is the creative power of individuals that functions as an intermediary power between the corporeal and the spiritual worlds.²⁸ The bounded imagination is further subdivided by Ibn 'Arabi into contiguous (*al-muttasil*) and discontinuous (*al-munfasil*). The former lies in the individual soul's production of images with the aid of perception, while the latter lies between the corporeal and spiritual worlds and has no relation to perception or images produced with the aid of perception. For Ibn 'Arabi, *Barzakh* is the world of creative imagination and he describes it as (*'alam al-mithal*), the ideal world, where all opposites become self-manifest.²⁹ This task of imagination, namely bringing the opposites together, is inherited from the creative nature of imagination. When two opposites meet, as in Hegel's dialectic, their synthesis, or the third element, emerges. The emergence of this new element takes place in the realm of *Barzakh*.³⁰ The world of imagination plays a significant role ontologically in the rise of new entities in the corporeal world. Mulla Sadra himself is aware of the influence of Ibn 'Arabi on his theory of knowledge and discusses the views of his predecessors in detail in *al-Asfar*. But, unlike Suhrawardi or Ibn 'Arabi, he does not think of the world of imagination as something ontological that exists independent of the human mind. It is subjective and is created by the mind, but when the created ideas of imagination are externalized, for example in works of art, they become objective realities.

Moving away from the realm of sense-perception is not a venture into the realm of abstraction. It is an endeavour towards grasping the higher levels of existence until the human mind is able to attain utmost proximity to Being.³¹ With intellectual intuition, another source of knowledge, the human mind tries to realize its spiritual ambition. At this stage, epistemology becomes a vehicle for the human mind to obtain its ultimate goal by moving away from the philosophical and scientific boundaries of cognition to the mystical and theosophical. This shift is determined by trans-substantial changes in the world and in the human soul. The aim of epistemology is, then, not cognition or understanding of external reality, but, as in Plato, the transformation and elevation of the human soul from a lower rank of existence to a higher where it can unite with the Active Intellect. The position of seeker of knowledge at this level of being resembles the position of the freed prisoner in the allegory of the cave in the *Republic*. It is liberation of the human soul from the bondage of shadows and material existence, that is, from a less perfect level of existence. When the freed prisoner sees the light of the sun and arrives at a

higher level of existence, he or she does not reject other faculties of knowledge such as perception and imagination. The freed person is perfected and substantially changed from a lower to a higher level of existence. Hence the journey through trans-substantial change means that the soul is changed through acquiring knowledge and has become a better (higher-rank) human being.

In intellectual intuition, the human intelligence becomes aware of the transcendent forms that exist ontologically in a Platonic sense. These transcendent forms, however, are not universals; each is seen as an individual, non-corporeal being. The forms also unite and become identical with the intelligence when they are grasped by intellectual intuition. This awareness of the non-corporeal forms and their unity with the intelligence is determined by the spiritual station of the human soul. The intelligence is unable to apprehend these forms unless it moves away from obsession with the material world. This epistemological development is also a dynamic process based on the dynamic nature of its object. Since everything in the world is in constant substantial change, the knower and the known never remain the same. Also, the nature of the reality of being and of trans-substantial change cannot be grasped fully by rationalistic discourse, or by representation. The rationalistic discourse is incapable of understanding the true nature of reality. This view is similar to that of Henri Bergson in his understanding of reality and 'duration'. In making a clear distinction between analytic or scientific knowledge and metaphysical knowledge, Bergson concludes that 'duration' as a restless continuity in the evolutionary process of life, and consciousness can be attained by intuition. In intuition, consciousness comes in direct contact with reality without being mediated by representations. This kind of knowledge, which is not representational or translated into concepts, is absolute and perfect in comparison with knowledge by representations or scientific knowledge.³²

The realm of intellectual intuition contains the transcendent Platonic Forms. It is also the realm of the Active Intellect. The human intelligence becomes one with the forms through its union with the Active Intellect. This union between the Active Intellect and multiple individual souls does not affect the simplicity in the nature of the former. The Active Intellect and its knowledge of the realm of the Platonic Forms remain simple and identical, because this rank of being is perfect and remote from the abode of multiplicity and the influence of trans-substantial change.

Knowledge by presence has characteristics of its own that distinguish it from knowledge by representation. It is direct and unmediated by concepts, and indubitable. Since it is neither representational nor non-propositional, it is neither false nor true. Its truth is beyond empirical verification and assertion in propositions. Furthermore, in knowledge by presence the distinction between intelligent and intelligible disappears. The knower and the known

object unite as one being. Finally, this type of knowledge is beyond the domain of demonstration by reason. The intellectual intuition as the source of knowledge by presence becomes a mystical tool of cognition (*al-kashif*), or in the Bergsonian sense it becomes the fountainhead of metaphysical knowledge beyond the reach of scientific analysis.

Mulla Sadra deals with 'knowledge by presence' and intellectual intuition in another work, *Se Asl* ('Three Principles'), written in Persian. He explains in this work that there are three hindrances in the human mind to obtaining knowledge by presence and experiencing intellectual intuition. These hindrances are not related to the nature of knowledge obtained and verified by the human soul. They are simply conditions influencing the soul and become impediments to the spiritual progress of the individual. These hindrances are the non-realization of the inner nature of the self on the part of individuals, seeking lust and wealth, and the temptation of the commanding self to pursue evil as excellence and excellence as evil.³³ These three principles, which are not epistemological and are not in the quality of knowledge obtained, are necessary conditions of the spiritual path of the human soul towards the realization of Truth.

Generally speaking, intellectual initiation is successful when the individual soul realizes its own reality and knows itself as a spiritual entity rather than a material body. This is the first station of the spiritual guidance for attaining the Truth by gnosis (*irfan*) or knowledge by presence. The second hindrance is inherited from the relationship between the soul and the material world. This relationship becomes a hindrance when the soul is attracted towards entertaining the body and seeking lust and material possessions. 'Allamah Tabataba'i, who adheres to the existentialist school of Mulla Sadra, believes that lust and material interest conceal the love and passion for divine beauty and perfection. This love manifests itself in the heart of the seeker of the Truth only through regular and persistent self-control (*muraqabah*) and the renunciation of desire for the material world.³⁴ It is worth mentioning that Mulla Sadra's advocacy of intellectual intuition and knowledge by presence is not the negation of knowledge by representation and demonstration. In his epistemology, all sources of knowledge have their own function and participate in unveiling the truth of Being. His position, like Hegel's in the *Phenomenology of Mind*, is to accommodate various cognitive sources at different levels of the revelation of Being because the gradations of Being are known by different cognitive tools. Yet it is intellectual intuition not reason that is able to grasp reality fully and directly. Science, philosophy and theosophy (*hikmah*) are interconnected in the sense that they are ontologically conditioned by the presence of Being, and each deals with one aspect of Being, with the exception of theosophy, which relies on intellectual intuition to attain the truth of Being.³⁵ This antagonism with the rationalist philosophers in respect of demonstrative knowledge is grounded mainly on the

intrinsic limitation of discursive knowledge for understanding the meaning of Being directly. Mulla Sadra, under the sway of Sufism in general and the *ishraqi* epistemology (Illuminationism) in particular, does not allow this limitation to curtail the endeavour of the human mind to 'un-conceal' Being. By insisting on knowledge by presence, Mulla Sadra transcends the limitation of reason and the boundaries of discursive knowledge. The unlimited power of intellectual intuition compensates for that constraint and goes beyond the power of reason.

Another important point to be mentioned here is the union of the intelligent (*al-'aqil*) and the intelligible (*al-ma'qul*). In the history of Muslim philosophy this epistemological matter is also discussed by Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers such as Ibn Sina. The truth of the external reality for Ibn Sina and other Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers was based on correspondence between the external object and its representation in the mind. Although this idea is ascribed to Aristotle, it is difficult to claim that Aristotle made a clear distinction between intelligent and intelligible at all levels of cognition in his epistemology. In *Metaphysics* and *De Anima*, Aristotle refers to the incorporeal intelligible substances as intelligibles that unite with their intellect.³⁶ This Aristotelian notion of unity was later expressed by Alexander of Aphrodisia (active c. 200 AD) in *De Intellectu* and by Porphyry (c. 232–304) as the unity of the intelligible with the intelligent. Mulla Sadra also discusses the ideas of these thinkers in *al-Asfar* when he argues against the Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonic thinkers.³⁷ Ibn Sina considers this unity a poetical nonsense and meaningless.³⁸ However, in *Al-Mabda' wal-ma'ad*, particularly in the discussion on the nature of knowledge of the Necessary Being, Ibn Sina, like Aristotle, holds the view that in the Necessary Being intelligent and intelligible are one and united.³⁹ In criticizing Ibn Sina's position, Mulla Sadra claims that Ibn Sina was under the sway of Aristotle's cosmology. He does not accept the emergence of a new element resulting from a unity at the expense of terminating the two opposing elements.⁴⁰ Mulla Sadra also discusses this problem in *Risala fi Ittihad al-'aaqil wal-ma'qul* ('Treatise on the Unity of the Intelligent and the Intelligible').⁴¹ How does Mulla Sadra solve this epistemological problem? On what ground does he demonstrate the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible? Mulla Sadra's solution can be divided into two parts. The first is based on his ontological system of the primacy of Being and the understanding of the meaning of Being as the principle of unity beneath the multiplicity of the phenomenal world. The second part is an exposition argued from correlativity or correlation.

I will begin with the argument based on the doctrine of the primacy of Being and explain how the intelligent and the intelligible become one ontologically. It is apparent, and we may agree with Ibn Sina in his criticism of this unity, that it is not possible for two different things to unite but that there can be a connection between them. Mulla Sadra's ontology makes it clear that

the different elements are all bound together by their inner reality. Difference is only one aspect of reality; there is a unity beneath this interconnection. All elements are gradations of Being; they are only different in their intensity of perfection due to their distance and proximity to Being. There is neither being for itself, nor is there anything that can stand by itself alone. All beings including intelligence are taken as real on the ground of the reality of Being as their ontological foundation. What appears for intelligence as intelligible is at the same time nothing other than a modality of Being as the ontological foundation. The intelligent and the intelligible might be conceived as two different things phenomenologically, but, ontologically, they are the same in existing.⁴² As Fazlur Rahman says, the external world is not a different reality that contains entities distinct from mental existents; it

merely denotes a status or level of existence, i.e., a level where things operate with their natural properties. When, again, something is said to be 'in the mind', the mind cannot in this use be conceived of as a 'container', but it simply means that the mind has a set of properties or essences, which is able to apply to the external reality and to classify things.⁴³

The outcome of this view is that truth does not reside in the object known externally, but is defined in terms of its being known internally. This epistemological interpretation of the mental existents is reminiscent of Kant's analysis of the application of the table of the categories in the faculty of understanding. The categories also exist in the mind and their application renders knowledge of the external world possible. Mulla Sadra also tried to establish the unity between the intelligent and the intelligible by focusing on the point that these two elements are not substantially dissimilar. They both belong to the reality of Being. In order to elucidate this point it is helpful to mention Hegel's view of cognition as a process of conceptualization or idealization of the external object by consciousness in which consciousness transforms the object into something mental which then becomes the property of consciousness and unites with it. The external object, after being conceptualized, no longer posits itself as something external and different.⁴⁴ The experience that consciousness undergoes brings consciousness to know itself through knowing its object. The object known to consciousness is thus another aspect of consciousness. It is posited and developed by consciousness. Cognition, which is always relational under the transformation of the known object, becomes consciousness of consciousness or self-consciousness. In self-consciousness all distinctions between consciousness and its external object disappear and the object is reduced to mere concepts and hence is inseparable from consciousness. The difference between Hegel's view and that of Mulla Sadra is that Mulla Sadra does not intend to transform the object into mere concepts, nor does he deny its external reality of it. He insists on this unity through his understanding of the doctrine of the primacy

of Being, a significant ontological doctrine that considers intelligent and intelligible to be two sides of the same coin. Therefore, there is no distinction between intelligent and intelligible and between mental and external existents, as both belong to Being.

In the second part of his argument, Mulla Sadra proves the truth of this unity by arguing from correlativity. He demonstrates that there is an inherent correlation between the intelligent and the intelligible. By this he means that their joint occurrence is not accidental but is essentially connected. This correlation, like that between cause and effect, is necessary and undeniable. Whenever there is a cause, that cause has an effect, and an effect is always produced by a cause. Likewise, the 'existence' of the intelligible is possible through the 'existence' of the intelligent.⁴⁵ To explain this correlativity, Mulla Sadra makes a distinction between two kinds of intelligible: the first kind is accidental and dependent on the material existence of the object; the second is essential and does not depend on the material existence of the object. It is a separate intellectual form that relies on the mind. The essential intelligible, which is at the same time the actuality of a being, is inseparable from the intelligent.⁴⁶ In this case the intelligent, in intellectualizing the intelligible, intellectualizes itself, and their complete unity is established as they depend on each other to exist.

Another important philosophical issue discussed by Mulla Sadra within the problem of knowledge is God's knowledge of particulars. Generally speaking, there are two opposing views in Islamic thought on understanding God's knowledge of particulars: philosophical and religious. The religious viewpoint, which is not the subject of our discussion here, relies on the authority of the foundation text of Islam, the Qur'an, and asserts God's knowledge of the infinite number of particular beings created by Him. Muslim philosophers have put forward different views on this. Some reject it and others assert God's knowledge of Himself as well as of the world. The Peripatetic Neoplatonist Muslim philosophers, in particular Ibn Sina, held the view that God's knowledge is not derived from the external objects outside His mind; otherwise His knowledge would be conditioned by and dependent on them. To Ibn Sina, God's mind should be creative rather than receptive, active and not passive. He also states that God knows particulars not as particulars but in a universal way. Other thinkers identified God's knowledge with Platonic Forms and discussed the relationship of these Forms with the essence of God. The problem which arises here is that of the nature of God's knowledge and the way He knows the world. Is God's knowledge dependent on the world? Is it prior to the creation of the world? Or, more specifically, should we ask how God knows the world?

In Ibn Sina's ontology God is the Necessary Being and identical with His essence. From the Necessary Being emanates the first intellect alone, because the Necessary Being is absolutely simple. Only one thing emanates from its

existence. The first intellect, which is the first possible existence and is actualized by the Necessary Being, is no longer absolutely simple. It has a dual nature and gives rise to two entities: the second intellect and the highest sphere. This dual process of emanation continues until the tenth intellect and the sublunary world are emanated. The Necessary Being remains absolutely simple and aloof from the domain of multiplicity. But how does the Necessary Being know the world of multiplicity without having multiplicity in its essence? Before answering this question it is worth mentioning that for Ibn Sina God knows Himself as well as the world, because He is the originator of the world, but His knowing of the world is different from the way human beings come to learn about external objects and is at the same time unique. For example, Ibn Sina says:

It is necessary to know first that the knowledge (*'ilm*) of the Necessary Being is not like our knowledge nor is it analogous (*qiyas*) to our knowledge. The first [kind of knowledge] requires multiplicity, and the second does not. That which requires multiplicity is called 'psychological' knowledge and that which does not require [it] is called 'intellectual' knowledge.⁴⁷

The uniqueness of the Necessary Being's knowledge is due to the ontological status enjoyed by this being. Its being is unlike the being of the ontic beings in the world: it is absolutely simple and disjoined from matter. For this reason, God's knowledge also does not happen in time (history) and is not related to the changeable world.⁴⁸ Time, multiplicity and change belong to the sublunary world and not to the realm of the Necessary Being. Accordingly, the knowledge possessed by the Necessary Being does not change because it neither happened in time nor is empirical:

It cannot be that the knowledge (*'ilm*) of the Necessary Being happens within time, so that it could sat that now it is so and tomorrow it is not so, and [so that] its judgment is according to how It exists today and It will be tomorrow, and then afterwards how It is tomorrow [and] It is not [any longer] today.⁴⁹

In contrast to the human way of obtaining knowledge, the Necessary Being becomes aware of the particulars not empirically by perception but in a universal way. He knows, for example, that there is war in the world and knows all the antecedents and consequences of war. He knows that wars will happen and how to differentiate war from peace or distinguish war by conventional weapons from war by non-conventional weapons; but where and when a particular war will occur is not known to the Necessary Being, because this happens in a particular space and at a specific time in the human history.

Those who affirm God's knowledge of particulars argue that God's knowledge is either identical with His essence or separate. The first view was advocated by the Mu'tazilites, a group of Muslim rationalist theologians in

Basrah and Baghdad.⁵⁰ They claimed that there was a new relationship between the essence of God and the divine attributes by saying that God neither possessed the attributes nor were they in His essence, but the divine essence and the attributes were identical and the same. For example, God's knowledge is eternal and not something other than God; otherwise knowledge becomes another independent eternal being. First, in the sense of numerical unity or absolute unity, this denies the existence of more than one God, or polytheism. This meaning of unity (*al-tawhid*) is in agreement with the Qur'anic notion of monotheism. Second, it is used in the sense of internal unity and simplicity, meaning that God's essence is free from essential plurality and composition.

If we go back to the history of Judeo-Christian theology, we find that the argument for the unity of God was propounded by Judaeus Philo (20 BCE–40 CE) and restated by Spinoza (1632–1677) in his pantheistic philosophy. For Philo, eternity is an essential quality of God; no other being but He can be eternal. This view represents the established Judeo-Christian and Islamic principle of monotheism. Its denial constitutes the rejection of monotheism in these three Semitic religions.

Spinoza espouses the Philonic principle by putting the argument into another logical form, saying that if there are two substances such as incorporeal God and the corporeal world, they should be absolutely different or absolutely the same. If there were two substances having nothing in common and being absolutely different, one could not become the 'cause' of the other. If the existence of two different substances is not logically possible, then we must consider the case of the existence of two similar substances which are absolutely alike. Such substances cannot be distinct, that is two, unless, in addition to their common qualities, they possess some other quality in which they differ. As Spinoza concludes, 'Two substances would be granted as having the same attribute, which is absurd.'⁵¹

The Mu'tazilites also claimed that 'essences' are known by God in the state of their 'subsistence', in the state of non-existence, or before coming into the realm of existence. Ibn 'Arabi shares this view and argues that the essences were in God's mind prior to their actual existence in the real world. Some Muslim thinkers also identified God's knowledge with the Platonic Forms, which were considered separate from God with their own ontological reality. This approach, which was taken by some Sufis, was in agreement with the Hanbali School, the followers of which argued for the reality and eternity of the divine attributes. Knowledge as one of the attributes was considered both non-identical with the divine essence and eternal.⁵² Suhrawardi had a different idea. He insisted that God's knowledge was separate and its objects included all things emanated from Him. The emanated objects are multiple and under the sway of change, but God's knowledge is not.⁵³ Suhrawardi also thinks of God's knowledge of the world in the context that God is perfect and the knowledge of His perfection cannot be denied.

In Mulla Sadra's ontology, essences belong to the realm of the contingent beings, which are finite. By contrast, God is pure Being and the finite attributes of the contingent beings or essences cannot be ascribed to Him. Here, Mulla Sadra distances himself from the views of the Mu'tazilites and Ibn 'Arabi. His criticism of those who think of God's knowledge as a Platonic Form is based on two points. First, he states that if knowledge is separate from God and is not something in the mind of God, it is essential to find out how God knows this separate and distant form. Second, the Platonic Forms are posterior to God's existence, so how can we say that God's knowledge, which is identical to the Platonic Forms, is eternal? Also, if God's knowledge is a separate form, *a priori* knowledge is required for knowing that form, which will become an endless process.⁵⁴

Mulla Sadra's main confrontation on God's knowledge of the particulars is with Ibn Sina. While he agrees with him that knowledge does not affect God's simplicity, he is critical of Ibn Sina's indifference towards the union of the intelligent (*al-'aaqil*) and the intelligible (*al-ma'qul*). According to Mulla Sadra, on the ground of this union it is possible to conclude that Being is the only reality and that knowledge is derived from Being. Since Being produces a systematic ambiguity of gradation or its own modalities, knowledge should be seen in this way. Another difference between Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina is on God's knowledge as 'accident', in which God's knowledge is described as *a posteriori*, conditioned by and dependent on the objects known outside God's mind. Hence the mind of God remains receptive rather than creative.⁵⁵ Against this, Mulla Sadra developed three arguments. In the first argument, he maintains that knowledge, as one of the divine attributes, can be neither mental nor non-existential. To prove this point, Mulla Sadra classifies the attributes into three types. The first two are subjective, existing only in the mind, and existential, meaning ontological, and attributes as properties of their accidents' 'essences'. For him, it is impossible to think of the divine attributes as subjective or mere properties of the mind. The third type of attributes become existential reality when the essences emerge in the world or come into existence with the ontic beings. As a consequence of this, knowledge as one of the divine attributes cannot be described as something mental. Therefore, it must be an existential reality.⁵⁶

The second argument deals with the principle that obtaining perfect knowledge of an effect is acquired only through its cause. This principle appears to be self-contradictory, because it does not mean that the effect is known only through knowing its cause. In thinking of the primordialness of Being in Mulla Sadra's ontology, we should insist that this principle stand on the ground of 'existential' cause and 'existential' effect. The proposition 'Whenever there is *p*, then there will be *q*' should be modified into 'This is *p*, hence there is *q*'. The second is an existential proposition, and an indication of existential *q*, which is directly caused by *p*. Hence the forms, which are

caused by God's mind, are directly known by Him as existential realities rather than *a posteriori* concepts.⁵⁷ In the third argument, Mulla Sadra, in rejecting the idea of God's knowledge as mental or subjective, disagrees that something at a lower rank of existence can become the source and the cause of an entity at a higher rank of existence. Since God's knowledge is the cause of the contingent world, it is not mental but a real existence. Otherwise, God's knowledge as the cause of the contingent world will stay at a lower rank of existence and the contingent world at a higher.⁵⁸

Having critically evaluated the views of his predecessors, Mulla Sadra relies on his own ontological understanding of reality to solve this problem. As is mentioned in Chapter Four, Being is the primordial reality on which the multiplicity of the contingent world stands. But Being itself, as the reality of all things, is simple: what is real in everything is its being rather than its essence. Being is, in this sense, equivocal and not univocal. It is the reality and a common ground of all things or the Being of them, but with different intensity and weakness. The Being of a thing and a thing are not two different realities, but one and the same. The reality of Being is, therefore, objective or an ontological reality of all things. The multiplicity of the contingent world does not affect the simple nature of Being. The principle of unity for them as well as their diversity is something grounded on the unified ground because nothing grounded exists without its own ground. This understanding of Being and its relationship with the contingent world of beings helps us to understand God's cognitive relationship with multiplicity. All things are present in God's simple being. When God thinks about Himself and this self-knowledge does not involve duality of the intellect and the intelligible, God comes to know about everything, including all particulars, without suffering multiplicity.⁵⁹ Although Being or God is the cause of multiplicity and all contingent beings are modalities of the systematic ambiguity of Being, Being is not affected by them. God's knowledge of particulars or His modalities is nothing more than self-knowledge; this does not infect the simplicity and infinity of His existence with multiplicity and finitude. God, which is pure Being for Mulla Sadra, has no essence, but His being is inclusive of all forms and knows them in an order as His affects. He knows all of them simply by contemplating Himself. The self-knowledge of God passes through three stages. In the first stage, God realizes His own absolute unity. In the second, various attributes become manifest in His knowledge, but since all of them belong to the same source they have an underlying unity. Finally, at the third stage, God's knowledge gives rise to the Platonic Forms in the non-corporeal world. Here every Platonic Form stands by itself as a unique form; for this reason it is called the stage of distinction.⁶⁰ At this stage the contingent modalities of Being such as different corporeal entities come into existence. As a consequence of this, the self-knowledge of God is the knowledge of the world, because the world is the self-manifestation of God.

In Conclusion

The significance of Mulla Sadra's philosophy should not be seen in the light of its role in the continuity of the intellectual and philosophical tradition in the Muslim world. Its task was not to replicate what was produced before; instead, it represented a break with the philosophical tradition and the emergence of a new philosophical system based on a new ontology. This new development was antagonistic to the dominant philosophical thought of its time and stood against the 'essentialist' intellectual persuasion of the school of Illuminationism of Suhrawardi.

From the very beginning of this book it was argued that Mulla Sadra's philosophical 'turn' or shift from the philosophical position of the primacy of essence to the primacy of Being and to thinking of Being as the primordial metaphysical reality is similar to the ontological enterprise of *Being and Time* by Martin Heidegger. To elucidate this claim I have tried, first, to suggest a commonality of philosophical tradition against which Mulla Sadra and Heidegger communicate their discontent. Second, the similarities between Mulla Sadra's ontology and that of Heidegger are explained in the stream of thought in this work where the need for comparison arises.

Similarities between the ontological enterprises of these two thinkers are discussed mainly on the grounds that Mulla Sadra and Heidegger advocated the primordialness of Being and held the view that Aristotle's logic was incapable of revealing the meaning of Being. Both thinkers also argued against Plato's metaphysics as a foundation of the philosophical tradition on which the essentialism of Suhrawardi and the nihilism of Western thought relied.

Mulla Sadra's new ontological system begins with the primordialness of Being. Unlike Suhrawardi, who thought that 'essences' were real, Mulla Sadra argued for the primacy of Being. This shift from the primacy of essence to the primacy of Being is described as a 'turn' from the core elements of Suhrawardi's metaphysics towards a contrary ontological view. The essentialism of Suhrawardi, according to Mulla Sadra in *al-Masha'ir*, led to the 'darkness of illusion' and neglected the fundamental philosophical questions concerning the meaning of Being in favour of investigating the nature of something less fundamental. It sacrificed the ground for the grounded.

Mulla Sadra's description of the dominant metaphysical tradition of his time as the 'darkness of illusion' is reminiscent of Heidegger's notion of the 'abandonment of Being' or the 'concealment of the truth' in his understanding of the Platonic and the post-Platonic traditions in the West. Both philosophical traditions (Illuminationism and Platonism) abandoned or shrouded

in darkness the Being of beings as the inner reality and the ground on which all beings stand. This led to the oblivion of Being and to the thinking of Being as 'essence'. In Heidegger's view, the oblivion of Being is a process in which the truth of Being is concealed; as described by Mulla Sadra it is the state of untruth or 'darkness of illusion'. Suhrawardi's metaphysics is, therefore, like that of Plato, in that it represents 'nihilism' or the thinking of Being as nothing or un-real. Overcoming the 'darkness of illusion' or 'nihilism' is possible only through turning to Being as the sole fundamental metaphysical reality. In *Contributions to Philosophy*, Heidegger describes this turning as another beginning, a new epoch, and a transition from the withdrawal of Being to its re-emergence behind the appearance of beings. In insisting on similarities between Mulla Sadra's and Heidegger's metaphysics I do not intend to neglect their differences. It is clear that Mulla Sadra describes Being as a conscious transcendent reality that has a purpose in manifesting itself. It is the first principle beyond the gradations of its own modalities. For this reason, Mulla Sadra's metaphysics, unlike that of Heidegger, should be seen as an onto-theological system with a metaphysical objective and a realized end.

In his critical evaluation of essentialism or the illuminative philosophy of Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra examines three ontological positions: Being is prior to essence, posterior to it, or Being and essence co-exist simultaneously. Thinking of Being as prior to essence signifies that Being can stand by itself without its essence. This ontological position at the rank of Pure Being is accepted because Pure Being is without essence; but a problem arises if we think of essence as prior to being, or conversely of being as posterior to essence. If the primacy of essence is accepted by Mulla Sadra as true, it implies that essence exists without Being. But for this, essence has to exist or needs another being to rely on, which leads to a vicious regress. The third position is that existence and essence co-exist simultaneously. This ontological view involves the notion that essence is in existence. In this case, essence again needs another existence to rely on for its existence. As a consequence of this, essence cannot be without prior existence.

Mulla Sadra concludes that the qualification of essence by existence is an intellectual operation. Neither existence nor essence is prior to the other, nor do they have a state of simultaneity, since nothing can be prior, posterior or simultaneous to itself. Both are ontologically inseparable in the ranks below the rank of Pure Being and are different only in thinking when the human mind apprehends an ontic being.

What, then, does the primacy of Being mean if these three positions are refuted? How can we talk about the primacy of Being? In my opinion Mulla Sadra's argument against the second and the third ontological positions should be understood with reference to the existence of the ontic beings. There is no doubt that Pure Being is without essence and we cannot talk about the priority or posteriority of its essence. Mulla Sadra believes that Being and

essence, like the ground and the grounded, are ontologically inseparable, and are different realities in the ontological region of becoming only in thinking and for thinking. When a being is conceived and analysed into its determinations, the Being of this being appears in thinking to be distinct from these determinations. This intellectual apprehension does not coincide with the inner reality of Being, because essence is not distinct from an ontic entity, nor is existence an addition to essence. It is only in thinking that the priority of one over the other, in particular of essence, becomes evident, because thinking analyses each entity into existence and essence. Essence appears as the prior factor due to its nature as a universal determination apprehended by the intellect, whereas existence is not apprehended. Here, the primacy of essence becomes a mental factor, and Being remains as an ontological ground inaccessible to rational thinking. Mulla Sadra elucidates the distinction between Being and beings in a number of ways: as the division of Being into unity and multiplicity (modalities), as necessary and contingent; and then as independent and dependent (connective). In these divisions, multiplicity, contingent and dependent are understood in their relationship with Being, which stands as their unity or necessary and independent reality. For example, multiplicity is possible only on the ground of unity, because the beings are nothing more than the self-manifestation of a single, simple reality in its own modalities. Whatever exists and the human intellect becomes aware of in intellectual experience, including the 'self', is nothing but a modality of Being.

The distinction between beings (phenomena) and their essences arises when beings are analysed intellectually into categorical determinations. In the world external to the intellect, these beings are not separable from their essences. The case with Being is completely distinct, because Being (or *Sein* in the Heideggerian sense) is Pure Being and has no universal determinations. This description of Being as a reality without universal determinations retains Being beyond the domain of Aristotle's logic and rationalistic apprehension. All beings are grounded on Being and are known by it, but at the same time Being cannot be defined. Being, then, is the ontological as well as epistemological precondition for the world and our cognizance of beings, but the logical definition of genus and specific difference is not applicable to it. In this traditional way (by relying on Aristotelian rule for definition), Being is indefinable.

Another important point is the systematic ambiguity of the gradation of Being (*tashkik al-wujud*). In this process, Being manifests itself vertically as well as horizontally. It begins with the most perfect rank of Being to the least perfect, such as prime matter. The other direction of *tashkik* determines the transformation of the world horizontally through successive and infinite forms. This is analogous to the gradation of light in Suhrawardi's metaphysics, but for Mulla Sadra it is Being rather than light (essence) that creates

its own modalities. Being is viewed as equivocal and not univocal. This is a common characteristic of all things or the Being of beings, but it differs in its intensity and weakness. The Being of a thing and a thing are not two different realities but one thing and the same at the same time. Being is a single reality but with ranks and grades of its own modalities. All beings are but ontic *coagula* of a single ontological reality. This reality should not be understood as this or that being but as the Being of beings and something transcendent and grasped intuitively.

I have interpreted Mulla Sadra's concept of the 'transcendence' of Being in two ways: ontologically and epistemologically. Ontologically, Being is the Being of all beings and their source. All things emanate from Being. The relationship between Being and beings in terms of the doctrine of emanation is that Being, as the fountainhead of all emanated beings, is not immanent but a reality that transcends them. Epistemologically, Being can be seen as a precondition for our knowledge of the world as well as our own existence, because it is a reality on which the existence of all beings relies. Our experience and knowledge of beings is possible only by virtue of their 'Being', and Being at the same time is beyond the domain of perception and rationalistic discourse. It is neither this nor that being of our experience but something transcendent.

Mulla Sadra's ontology, in particular the doctrine of systematic ambiguity of Being, as analysed in Chapter Five, bridges the gulf between unity and multiplicity. This bridging is realized on the ground of the principle of identity in difference or unity in diversity. Being as a unity and identity contains the multiplicity of its own modification. The external world is characterized by unity and diversity. Diversity is a mode of the single and simple reality of Being that exists only on the ground of unity.

The systematic ambiguity of Being is an increase and decrease in the intensity of existence. For this reason, I conclude that it is not a change in the 'essence' of a being but an existential movement in the core of its existence. The qualitative and quantitative change in a being is not seen as a gradual intensification of a particular quality, i.e., whiteness, but rather a replacement of a former quality by a new one. This is also the case with a definite quantity of an ontic being: a new quantity replaces the old quantity. As a result, the world is in constant change and Being is in a pattern of renewal and evolution until it reaches its own culmination where no further change is thinkable. What undergoes change and at the same time endures in this evolutionary process of the world is Being. All changes occur in Being and by Being, which is called trans-substantial change. This doctrine is the keystone of Mulla Sadra's ontology and the ground for developing other aspects of his philosophy. It is the ground for our understanding of the world and of human knowledge. Being is, then, in a self-evolutionary process and it is the only cause that determines this process. Nor does Mulla Sadra see this existential

movement of the world as blind or capricious. It has a purpose and a realized end. The inner motive for accomplishing this task is a mystic force of love ('*ishq*'), present in all beings and causing the lower-ranked beings to long for beings of the higher ranks of existence to obtain perfection. The vertical direction, in contrast to the horizontal direction of the systematic ambiguity of Being, is one from potentiality to actuality for the sake of perfection. It finally reaches its goal in human existence with the rise of the perfect human being (*al-insan al-kamil*), who apprehends the divine realm and attains unity with the Intelligences or divine attributes. I also argue that the vertical direction of this movement is similar to the dialectical movement in Hegel's philosophy and to the idea of creative evolution in Bergson's thought.

I have also mentioned that the concept of trans-substantial change has religious as well as philosophical consequences. It can change our understanding of the notions of resurrection and divine retribution and initiate discussion on the transmigration of the soul. All these notions deal with the identity of the human existence that undergoes trans-substantial change. On one hand, Mulla Sadra believes that the identity of the self depends on the intellectual form of a person, which exists in the mind of God. On the other hand, he states that the self will survive throughout the evolutionary changes, which will help the self to retain its own identity. This position is, however, similar to that taken by Descartes in developing his theory of self-substance in the second and third meditations and is in contradiction with Mulla Sadra's doctrine of trans-substantial change.

The philosophical consequences of trans-substantial change are summarized in three points: the temporal contingency of the world, the infection of being by non-being or nothingness, and the relativity of truth and values. Trans-substantial change is an indication of the non-being of beings that have not yet come into existence. Every being is preceded by its own non-being. The passage of being into non-being and non-being into being is 'becoming'. Based on this understanding of the reality of beings, two new regions of being and becoming arise. The region of becoming is the result of the passage of non-being into being and vice versa. It is also argued that Mulla Sadra's interpretation of the relationship between being and nothingness is closer to Sartre's than Hegel's. Mulla Sadra and Sartre agree that nothingness is in the world due to the existence of the ontic beings, but for Sartre, more specifically, the ontic being means the human consciousness. Mulla Sadra insists that all contingent beings, including the human consciousness, are preceded by their own non-existence in the world. In the region of becoming, where the evolutionary process rules and changes in substance as well as accidents take place, there is no room for deterioration or corruption. All beings strive to move upwards from a lower to a higher rank of existence. Change, as we have discussed, in Mulla Sadra's ontology is evolution and an irreversible progress.

Another philosophical consequence of this doctrine that can have a significant impact on the intellectual development in the Muslim world is that trans-substantial change leads to the relativity of truth and values. The application of this doctrine deconstructs the metaphysical foundation of universal truth and values. Relying on this doctrine for understanding the structure of the world means that nothing can be considered eternal or stable. Everything is in constant change, including human society and our understanding of reality. A consequence of this is that no system of belief can claim absoluteness and finality for itself because novelty prevails. This consequence also had a profound impact on Mulla Sadra's understanding of politics, in particular political Islam, which proclaims divinity and universality in its discourse. Mulla Sadra makes a vivid distinction between religion and politics and between religious laws and political laws, and rejects the identification of the former with the latter. I have also attempted to explain that trans-substantial change encompasses both nature and history. Ontology and social systems are necessarily interconnected. It is hard to understand Mulla Sadra's political and social philosophy without understanding his metaphysics. For him, metaphysics is the foundation of history and nature.

Mulla Sadra's interpretation of the world is an innovative philosophical project and a clear departure from Illuminationsim. It involves the development of a new intellectual discourse in the Muslim world that might have a strong influence on Islamic socio-political and theological theories, conceptual frameworks and values. The task of philosophy, for Mulla Sadra, is initially an active interpretation of the world and the realization of substantial change in all beings. This realization also leads to an antagonistic stand vis-à-vis tradition and leaps towards future possibilities in the vertical movement of evolution.

In Chapter Six, I explained Mulla Sadra's analysis of human knowledge, the unity of the intelligent and the intelligible, and God's knowledge of the world. Although Mulla Sadra's metaphysics is characterized by strong opposition to Illuminationism, his understanding of the human knowledge of the world was greatly influenced by Suhrawardi's theory of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Mulla Sadra departs from Suhrawardi in believing that anything that is in reality is a 'being' (Suhrawardi called it 'essence'). Without being, it is impossible to think of knowing.

Mulla Sadra, like Suhrawardi, advocates the priority of knowledge by 'presence' rather than 'representation'. Knowledge by presence has the advantage of apprehending the known object directly without mediation by concepts. The human intellect does not only know the object, it also experiences it. Knowledge by presence in Mulla Sadra's epistemology is neither subjective nor objective. It is the product of the application of some innate cognitive forms and the presence of the objects apprehended by perception. The gradation of being is seen at different ranks and levels of perfection

(*al-idrak*), and this conditions human knowledge. Accordingly there are different stages and kinds of knowledge. Also, since whatever is known is 'being' and being undergoes change, our knowledge of the world is also in constant change and is always both relational and temporal, with the exception of the objects of intellectual perception such as the divine attributes, which are perfect and remain the same.

The unity of the intellect and the intelligible occupies an important place in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. This problem has been discussed from antiquity, including by some Muslim philosophers before him, but Mulla Sadra expressed dissatisfaction with their positions and sought to solve this problem on his own metaphysical foundation of the primacy of Being. In Chapter Six I discussed two possible ways to understand Mulla Sadra's solution: ontological and epistemological. Ontologically, whatever is known by the intellect is neither a distinct reality nor different. The intellect and the intelligible are both beings and modalities of the same reality. They are identical because they share the principle of identity, but are separate in belonging to the same reality in different ways. Their difference, which cannot be understood without their identity, is due to their proximity to and remoteness from Being. As all beings are modalities of Being, the intellect and the intelligible enjoy a unity. Epistemologically, the object known after being apprehended by the intellect is conceptualized and becomes a mental property. It is also important to understand that in Mulla Sadra's metaphysics it is not possible to think of the separation of the intellect from the intelligible. His metaphysics can also be seen as the unity of Being; but that unity, which is the ontological condition for the existence of the intellect and the intelligible, remains transcendent.

Although Mulla Sadra was a Muslim philosopher who developed a new philosophical system for interpreting the structure of nature and history, the influence of his thought on intellectual life was felt mainly in Persia in the Qajar era. At present, his philosophy is widely read and studied in Iran but little is known about him in Western academic circles. I hope that this book will serve by encouraging discussion of Mulla Sadra. This great thinker deserves wider attention for his place in Eastern and Western civilization and thought.

Finally, this presentation of his transcendent philosophy is a modest attempt to project the main ideas of Mulla Sadra. If my book has value it is in starting a discussion on him. I am hopeful that this beginning will lead to further fruitful research and debate on the ideas and contribution of this thinker to the intellectual life of our civilization.

Notes

Chapter One

1. Mulla is a religious title given to religious scholars in some parts of the Muslim world.
2. Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, translated by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Porov, Utah, 1999), p. 45.
3. Suhrawardi, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 45.
4. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Spiritual Movement, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Iran', in P. Lackson (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran* (7 vols, Cambridge, 1991), vol. 6, p. 672.
5. Mulla Sadra, Muhammad b. Ibrahim (Sadr al-Din) Shirazi, *Al-Masha'ir*, translated by Parviz Morewedge (New York, 1992), p. 43.
6. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1987), p. 203. See also Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)*, translated by Perviz Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, 1999), pp. 96–98.
7. Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)*, p. 79.
8. Al-Uzbeki, Seyyed Muhammad Jamal, *Ghazbat al-Falasifa al-Ghazba al-Muta'aliyah* (Teheran, 1999), p. 403.
9. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra* (Albany, 1975), p. 2. Safawid was the first Islamic Shi'ite dynasty founded by Shah Isma'il in 1501 to rule Iran. It flourished particularly during the reign of Shah Abbas (1571–1629), who attempted to establish a new centralized administration and to revive the economy. In the process, he created the new Safawid city of Isfahan. After the death of Abbas I, the Safawid state declined, and its rule effectively ended in Iran in 1732.
10. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra), his Life, Doctrines and Significance', in *Islamic Studies* (Beirut, 1967), pp. 121–122.
11. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 3.
12. Mulla Sadra, Muhammad b. Ibrahim Sadr al-Din Shirazi, *Al-Asfar al-Arba'ah*, Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i (ed.), *Da'irat al-Ma'arif al-Islamiyah* (9 vols, Qum, 1958), vol. 1, p. 25.
13. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 7.
14. Ibid., p. 9, also see Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, p. 315.
15. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 4, see also Henri Bergson in Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey (eds), *Key Writings* (New York, 2002), pp. 215–217.
16. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 26.
17. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London, 1997), pp. 22–25.
18. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 43.
19. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 22–23.
20. Ibid.
21. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 28.
22. Ibid., p. 33.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 40.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 24.
27. Ibid., p. 53.
28. Ibid., p. 55.

29. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 35.
30. Ibid., p. 433; see also Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 55.
31. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 290.
32. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature (Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences)*, edited and translated by M.J. Petry (London, 1970), p. 202.
33. Muslim Peripatetic philosophers denied change in substance and believed that the four categories of quality, quantity, place and position were subject to change.
34. Nasr, 'Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra)', p. 114. In 1913 Max Horten wrote *Das Philosophische System von Shirazi*. This was followed by Henry Corbin's edition of a selection of Mulla Sadra's writings in French. In 1981 James Morris translated Mulla Sadra's *al-Hikma al-'Arshiyyah* ('The Wisdom of the Throne') into English. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hossein Ziai and Muhammad Abdul Haq have published articles on Mulla Sadra's life and aspects of his philosophy. However, the only systematic work to date in English is Fazlur Rahman's *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra* (1975). This applies modern philosophical terminology to Mulla Sadra's philosophical system. In 1992 Parviz Morewedge translated Mulla Sadra's *al-Mash'ir* into English. This work summarises Mulla Sadra's metaphysical system.

Chapter Two

1. The Seljuqs were a Turkish Sunni dynasty controlling large parts of the Middle East from 1038 to 1092. Seljuq forces captured Baghdad and gained control of the caliphate in 1055, thus becoming an empire stretching from Khurasan to Iraq. Their forces then entered Armenia, Azerbaijan and Anatolia, where in the battle of Manzikert in 1071, the Seljuq leader Alp Arslan defeated the Byzantine army and captured Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes. This dynasty fell apart following the death of Malik Shah in 1092.
2. Mulla Salih Ibrahim is a professor of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Religious Studies at the University of Teheran. When I met him at his home in Teheran he gave me a photocopy of his published monograph on Suhrawardi and his Kurdish origins. Ibrahim has also investigated this matter in *Jiyaneway Zanayani Kurd le Jihani Islami*, published by Meharet in Teheran in 1974 (p. 880). See also Shahrazuri, *Nuzhat al-arwah wa rawdat al-afrah*. 'Suhraward' or 'Suhrabard' is neither Persian nor Arabic but Kurdish. 'Suh' means red and 'bard' rock. The rocks in this area are red and the village is called *Surabard* (or Redrock); it is populated by Kurds.
3. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. IX (Leiden, 1995), p. 777.
4. Mehdi Amin Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination* (London, 1997), p. 1.
5. Sayyed Hossein Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages* (Cambridge, 1964), p. 56. Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Mahmud al-Shahrazuri (date of birth and death unknown) was an illuminationist thinker of the thirteenth century AD. His book *Nuzhat al-arwah wa rawdat al-afrah* is a biographical account of a number of philosophers including Suhrawardi. Another book by him, *Risalat al-shajara al-ilahiyyah*, is an encyclopaedia of philosophy. He expressed his own illuminationist ideas in two commentaries on Suhrawardi's philosophy.
6. Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystical 3*, an introduction by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Teheran, 1993), p. 12. See also Henry Corbin, *Ta'rikh al-falsafa al-Islamiyyah*, with an introduction by Musa al-Sadr (Beirut, 1973), p. 304.
7. The Ayyubid Sunni Dynasty was founded by Salah al-Din Ayyubi (1138–1193). He was a military leader of Kurdish origin who became sultan of Egypt and all Muslim lands between the Nile and the Tigris. He declared *jihad* against the Crusaders and the substitution of Sunni for Shi'i Islam in Egypt. He defeated the Crusaders in the battle of Siffin in 1187 and captured Jerusalem. In the same year he seized most of the remaining Christian strongholds in Syria and Palestine.
8. Mehdi Amin Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 2.
9. Ibid., pp. 2–3. See also Muhammad 'Ali Abu Rayyan, *Ta'rikh al-fikr al-Falsafi fi al-Islam* (Beirut, 1973), pp. 409–10.

10. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi', in M.M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (2 vols, Wiesbaden, 1963), vol. 1, p. 380.
11. Hermes (Hermeticism) was considered the founder of the natural sciences by many and of the philosophy of Illuminationism by Suhrawardi. He is known by Muslim thinkers as Idris, one of the prophets whose name is mentioned in chapters 19, 21, 96 of the Qur'an. He is also known as the Thoth of the Egyptians, the Enoch of the Hebrews and Hushang of the Persians.
12. Shahab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, translated by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Utah, 1999), p. 2. *Hikmat al-Ishraq* is one of the major philosophical works of Suhrawardi and provides a profound account of the philosophy of Illuminationism. The three philosophical works written before *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, *Talwihat*, *Muqawamat* and *Mutarahat*, deal with Aristotle's philosophy. All four works are written in Arabic. The shorter treatises of Suhrawardi are written in Persian with the exception of some, which are partly in Arabic.
13. John Walbridge, *The Wisdom of the Mystic East: Suhrawardi and Platonic Orientalism* (Albany, 2001), p. 61.
14. Ibid.
15. Nasr, 'Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 375–376.
16. It is important to mention that even the Qur'an in one place describes God as light: 'Allah is the light of heavens and the earth. The parable of His Light is as a niche and within it a lamp: the lamp is in a glass as it were a brilliant star, lit from a blessed tree, an olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil would almost glow forth, through no fire touched it. Light upon Light! Allah guides to His Light whom He wills. And Allah sets forth parables for mankind, and Allah is All-Knower of every-thing.' See the Qur'an, 24:35.
17. Nasr, 'Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi', p. 62.
18. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 9.
19. Ibid., p. 10.
20. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 110.
21. Ibid., p. 107.
22. Ibid., p. 110.
23. Plato, *Republic*, 596 a 6–7; *Phaedo*, 102 b.
24. Plato, *Symposium*, 210 e 1–212; a 7.
25. Plato, *Republic*, 509 b 6–10.
26. Ibid.
27. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth*, translated by Ted Sadler (London, 2002), p. 72.
28. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 79.
29. Ibid., p. 123.
30. Ibid., p. 91.
31. Abu Nasr Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Turkhan b. Awzalugh al-Farabi, *Mabadi' Ara Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila*, translated by Richard Walzer (Oxford, 1985), p. 59.
32. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 120.
33. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 65.
34. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 46.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 45.
38. Ibid.
39. Hossein Ziai, 'The Illuminationist tradition', in Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds), *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Routledge History of World Philosophies (2 vols, London and New York, 1996), vol. 1, p. 469.

Chapter Three

1. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 8, p. 766. See also Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 284.
2. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 905.
3. Sir Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia* (2 vols, London, 1930), vol. 2, p. 158.
4. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 8, p. 768.
5. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Period', in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6, p. 657.
6. H.R. Roemer, 'The Safawid Period', in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 6, p. 224.
7. Naqshabandiyyah and Khalwatiyyah were two popular Suuni Sufi orders in Persia and Anatolia. Both were influenced by Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Unity of Being, at least until the time of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), who brought radical changes into the mystical doctrine of this order. Naqshabandiyyah was also hostile towards Shi'i Islam. Sirhind, as one of the spiritual masters of the order in India, declared holy war against Shi'ism and the eclectic system of religious belief endorsed by Akbar, the Mughal Emperor (r. 1542–1605), and branded them heretical.
8. According to Lapidus, the Safawid rulers were less hostile towards the Armenian Christians in Persia because of their conflict with the Greek Orthodox Church, whose base was in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. See Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, p. 297.
9. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 122.
10. Nasr, 'Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Period', p. 659.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 660.
12. Hamid Dabashi, 'Mir Damad and the Foundation of the School of Isfahan', in *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 623.
13. Nasr, 'Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Period', p. 670.
14. Dabashi, 'Mir Damad and the Foundation of the School of Isfahan', in *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 603.
15. Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 914.
16. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 2.
17. Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', p. 915.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 916.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, p. 917.
21. Dabashi, 'Mir Damad and the Foundation of the School of Isfahan', p. 615.
22. Fazlur Rahman and Seyyed Muhammad Jamal al-Uzbeki hold contrary views. They believe that Mulla Sadra studied with Mir Findiriski. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safawid Period', p. 678 and Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 1. Also, al-Uzbeki, *Ghazbat al-Falasifa al-Ghazba al-Muta'aliyah*, p. 173.
23. Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', p. 922.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, p. 910.
26. Dabashi, 'Mir Damad and the Foundation of the School of Isfahan', p. 606.
27. Mawlawiyyah is an Islamic Sufi order founded by Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (1207–1273). It is well known in Turkey and Persia and its followers are called the 'Whirling Dervishes'. The order was officially banned with the establishment of modern Turkey by the government of Mustafa Kamal in 1925.
28. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 3.
29. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, translated by Parviz Morewedge (New York, 1992), p. 43.
30. Ibn 'Arabi, Muhy al-Din Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad b. 'Ali b. Muhammad (1165–1240). One of the great Sufi masters, born at Murcia (al-Andalus) in Spain. He advocated the doctrine of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujud*). He is the author of *The Meccan Revelations (al-Futuhat al-Makkiyah)* and *The Bezels of Wisdom (Fusus al-Hikam)*.

31. Chittick, William C., *Ibn al-Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of Knowledge* (New York, 1989), p. 79.
32. Qur'an, 2:163.
33. Ibid., 3:17, see also 4:171, 16:51, 112:1.
34. Abdul Hakim Khalifa, *The Metaphysics of Rumi: A Critical and Historical Sketch* (Islamabad, 1959), p. 145.
35. Ibn 'Arabi, Muhy al-Din Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad b. 'Ali b. Muhammad, *Fusus al-Hikam*, vol. 2, translated by Bulent Rauf (Oxford, 1986), p. 337.
36. Spinoza, Baruch (Benedict), *Ethics*, translated by Andrew Boyle (London, 1970), I. Definition VI, p. 4.
37. Ibid., Proposition XV, p. 11.
38. T. M. Forsyth, 'Spinoza's Doctrine of God in His Relation to His Concept of Reality', in S. Paul Kashap (ed.), *Studies in Spinoza: Critical and Interpretative Essays* (Berkeley, 1972), p. 7.
39. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 3.
40. Mohammad Faghfoory, 'Sadr al-Din Shirazi in the Context of Safavid History', in *Islam-West Philosophical Dialogue, The papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Teheran)*, (7 vols, Teheran, 1999), vol. 1, p. 94.
41. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 3, see also Abu Abdullah Al-Zanjani, *Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi: Hayatuhu u Usul falsafatuhu* (Teheran, 2001), p. 22.
42. In a discussion with Prof. Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani on Mulla Sadra at the University of Teheran in May 2004, I wanted to know why Mulla Sadra chose Kahak after leaving Isfahan. Prof. Dinani held the view that perhaps Mulla Sadra went to Kahak because he had connections with Isam'ilis in this region and was invited to stay there by some Shi'i Isma'ili family.
43. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 3.
44. Ibid.
45. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 43.
46. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Sadr al-Din Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy* (Teheran, 1997), pp. 40–50.
47. S. Muhammad Khamenei, *Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy* (Teheran, 2004), pp. 24–31.
48. Al-Zanjani, *Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi: Hayatuhu u Usul falsafatuhu*, pp. 23–26.
49. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, pp. 4–5.
50. Ibid., introduction by Shaykh Muhammad Rida al-Muzafar, pp. 17–22.
51. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, pp. 8–9.
52. The Qajar dynasty was founded in Iran in 1779, following the death of Karim Khan Zand, the head of the Zand dynasty of southern Iran. Agha Muhammad Khan, the founder of this dynasty, defeated numerous rivals and brought all of Iran under his rule, establishing the Qajar dynasty with its territory from Georgia and the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. The Qajars established their capital at Teheran, a village near the ruins of the ancient city of Rayy. In 1796 Agha Muhammad Khan was formally crowned as a new king. This dynasty was destroyed by a military coup in February 1921 by Reza Shah, who ousted Ahmed Shah, the last Qajar king. Ahmed Shah was officially removed from office by the Iranian national assembly in October 1925 while he was in Europe and the Pahlavi dynasty was established.
53. Hamid Algar, 'Religious Forces in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Iran', in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, p. 706.
54. Ibid., p. 708.
55. Ibid., p. 709.
56. Ibid., pp. 714–715.
57. Since we are dealing with the development of Shi'ite thought the Sunni Sufi orders are not discussed here.
58. Babism is a religious sect founded by Mirza 'Ali Muhammad (1819–1266/1850), who was born in Shiraz and executed in Tabriz. He claimed to be the *bab*, the 'gate' or the intermediary between the hidden imam and the Shi'ite community. His followers came to believe that he was the new Messiah

or the imam, which he himself did not deny. His new movement was regarded by the official 'ulama as a threat to authority and dangerous. He was summoned to Teheran, where he was arrested then executed. One of his followers, Mirza Husayn 'Ali Nuri, developed Babism further, establishing a new sect called Baha'ism, after which he assumed the name Baha'ullah. Baha'ullah was arrested in 1852 and imprisoned in Teheran. Later, in 1853, he was deported to Baghdad and claimed to be a new prophet. He was subsequently confined by the Ottomans in Adrianople and then in Acre in Palestine (now 'Akka, in Israel). The followers of Baha'ism were mainly Iranians; today many of them live in Western countries such as the United States of America, Canada and Australia.

59. Algar, 'Religious Forces in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Iran', p. 726.
60. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 'The Metaphysics of Sadr al-Din Shirazi and Islamic Philosophy in Qajar Iran', in Edmund Bosworth and Carole Hillenbrand (eds), *Qajar Iran: Political, Social and Cultural Change 1800–1925* (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 177. See also Nasr, *Sadr al-Din Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy*, pp. 99–100.
61. Ibid.
62. Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabatab'i, *Kernel of the Kernel: Concerning the Wayfaring and Spiritual Journey of the People of Intellect*, compiled, edited and expanded by Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Husayni Tihrani, translated by Mohammad H. Faghfoory, foreword by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (New York, 2003), in the foreword, p. xiv.
63. Nasr, 'Sadr al-Din (Mulla Sadra)', p. 960.
64. Mulla Hadi Sabzawari, *The Metaphysics of Subzawari*, translated by Mehdi Mohaghegh and Toshihiko Izutsu (New York, 1977), p. 12. Sabzawari's autobiography is translated by Paul Sprachman from the Persian introduction to an Arabic text, taken from an article by Dr Kasim Ghani published in *Yadgar*, No. 3, pp. 45–47.
65. Sabzawari, *The Metaphysics of Subzawari*, p. 13.
66. Henry Corbin, *History of Islamic Philosophy* (London, 1993), p. 358.
67. Ibid., p. 361.
68. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West* (New York, 1996), p. 126.
69. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (eds), *Shi'ism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality* (New York, 1988), p. 348.

Chapter Four

1. See Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 43. Mulla Sadra also wrote *Hashiyya 'ala sharh hikmat al-ishraq lil Suhrawardi* on Suhrawardi (published in 1898), and *Hashiyya 'ala al-rawashi lil sayyid Damad* about his teacher.
2. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 12.
3. Ibn Sina, 'On the Nature of God', in *Avicenna on Theology*, translated by Arthur J. Arberry (London, 1951), p. 25.
4. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 46.
5. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 22–25.
6. Ibid.
7. Sabzawari, *The Metaphysics of Subzawari*, p. 31.
8. Ibid., pp. 70–71.
9. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 43.
10. Heidegger, Martin, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 203. See also *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)*, translated by Perviz Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, 1999), pp. 96–98, 'The Question of being (Letter to Ernst Junger "Concerning "The Line"') (1955)', in Manfred Staseen (ed.), *Philosophical and Political Writings* (New York, 2003), p. 143.
11. Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Enowning)*, p. 97.

12. Ibid., p. 86.
13. Ibid., p. 299.
14. Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 46.
15. Heidegger, Martin, 'Nihilism', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York, 2000), p. 849.
16. Kant has provided a table of twelve categories based on twelve possible judgments. The categories for Kant are subjective forms of the faculty of 'understanding', which generate our knowledge of the phenomenal world with the assistance of 'sensitivity'. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by F. Max Muller (New York, 1960), p. 71.
17. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, pp. 6–7.
18. Ibid., p. 9.
19. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 31.
20. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, pp. 3–4. See also Mulla Sadra, 'Risalat isalat ja'il al-wujud', in *Majmu'at rasa'il falsafi Sadr al-Nut'ahilin*, Hamid Naji Isfahani (Teheran, 1997), p. 182.
21. Suhrawadi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 2.
22. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 10.
23. Ibid., p. 13.
24. Ibid., p. 14.
25. Ibid., pp. 15–16.
26. Ibid., p. 17.
27. Ibid., p. 19.
28. Ibid., p. 20.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 21.
31. Gholam Hossein Ebrahim Dinani, 'The Evidences of the Principality of Existence', in *Islam–West Philosophical Dialogue, The papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Teheran)*, vol. 5 (Teheran: Sadra, 1999), p. 241.
32. Sabzwari, *The Metaphysics of Subzwari*, p. 34.
33. Ibid., p. 35.
34. Ibid., p. 37.
35. Ibid., p. 36.
36. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 39, see also Mulla Sadra's 'Risalat isalat ja 'l al-wujud', in *Majmu'a rasa'il falsafi Sadr al-Nuta'ahilin*, pp. 182–183.
37. Sabzwari, *The Metaphysics of Subzwari*, p. 47.
38. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 49, see also Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 38.
39. Joseph, J. Kockelmans, *On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Bloomington, 1984), p. 54.
40. Heidegger, 'On the Essence of Truth', in *Basic Writings*, p. 127.
41. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 40.
42. Hubert. L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Massachusetts, 1991), p. 11. Professor S.M. Khamenei has mistakenly used the Heideggerian term *Dasein* for the particularization of Being. He states that 'although existence is indivisible and even indefinable reality, its degrees of radiation upon objects could create several existences, each different from the other, and each possessing a specific definition and some features such as time and space. We might call each of them a Dasein'. See S.M. Khamenei, *Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy* (Teheran, 2004), pp. 57–58. In Heidegger's ontology the term *Dasein* is used to describe human existence only and not the particularization of Being in all ontic beings. Heidegger clearly states that 'Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus *Dasein* is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their Being is "a matter of indifference"; or more precisely, they "are" such that their Being can be neither the matter of indifference to them nor the opposite. Because *Dasein* has in each case mineness

[*Jemeinigkeit*], one must always use a *personal* pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am.', 'You are.'" See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 67–68. Elsewhere, Heidegger also states that 'Dasein is not a "thing" like a piece of wood not such a thing as a plant—nor does it consist of experiences, and still less is it a subject (an ego) standing over against objects (which are not the ego). It is a distinctive being [*Seiendes*] which precisely insofar as it "is there" for itself in an authentic manner is not an object-in formal terms: toward-which of a being-directed toward it by mean-ing it.' See Martin Heidegger, *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, translated by John van Buren (Bloomington, 1999), p. 17.

43. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague, 1963), pp. 147–152.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A79: B104.
46. Michael Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, Technology, Politics, Art* (Bloomington, 1990), p. 116.
47. Mark Okrent, *Heidegger's Pragmatism. Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphysics* (New York, 1988), p. 7.
48. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 26.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
50. Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', *Basic Writings*, p. 220.
51. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1959), pp. 35–36.
52. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 40.
53. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 59.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 9.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
57. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 36; see also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 30.
58. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 87.
59. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 31.
60. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 69.
61. Heidegger, 'The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics', in *Identity and Difference*, translated with an introduction by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, 2002), pp. 54–55.
62. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 229.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
65. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, pp. 60–61.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
68. Although Ibn Sina is considered a Peripatetic thinker, in my opinion his philosophy is an amalgamation of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas. I prefer to call him Aristotelian–Neoplatonist.
69. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 31.
70. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 60.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.
72. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Science of Logic*, vol. 1, translated by W.H. Johnston and L.G. Struthers, with an introductory preface by Viscount Haldane of Cloan (London, 1929), p. 389.
73. Abbas Yazdani, 'The Doctrine of the Unity of Being (*wahdat al-wujud*) in Mulla Sadra's Philosophy', in *Islam—West Philosophical Dialogue, The papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Teheran)*, vol. 2, p. 66.
74. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 216. It is also important to mention that Mulla Sadra in *Al-Asfar* states that the multiplicities and the ontic beings are illusory or shadows of reality. If this is the case, the ontological relationship between the reality of Being and the ontic beings will be proved to be false. See Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 47.

75. Ibid., p. 56.
76. Ibid., p. 8. See also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 45.
77. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 92.
78. John F. Quinn, 'Mulla Sadra's Theocentrism and Trans-Substantial Motion: A Critique of Western Cosmologies', in *Islam–West Philosophical Dialogue, The papers presented at the World Congress on Mulla Sadra (May 1999, Teheran)*, vol. 3, p. 27.

Chapter Five

1. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, translated with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie (New York, 1967), p. 800.
2. Ibid.
3. See Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, pp. 55–56 and see *al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 35.
4. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 61. Heidegger also mentions gradations of unhiddenness or the truth in his lectures on Plato's 'Allegory of the Cave'. See Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth*, p. 25 and pp. 48–53.
5. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 61.
6. Ibid., p. 86.
7. Ibid., p. 80.
8. Ibid., p. 81.
9. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 2, p. 12.
10. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Masha'ir*, p. 86.
11. Ibid., p. 81.
12. Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (9 vols, New York, 1993), vol. 1, p. 39.
13. Ibid., p. 58.
14. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 61, see also Mulla Sadra, *Al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah*, with an introduction by S. Muhammad Khamenei (Teheran), 2000, p. 65.
15. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 96.
16. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book Lambda, translated by Richard Hope (Michigan, 1992), p. 249.
17. Ibn Sina, *Fann-i sama-'i tabi'i*, translated by Muhammad Ali Furuqi (Teheran, 1982), p. 123.
18. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, second edition with revised text and notes by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1985), p. 255.
19. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 64.
20. Ibid., p. 80.
21. Ibid., p. 84.
22. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 117.
23. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, translated by Arthur Mitchell (New York, 1944), p. 38.
24. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 3.
25. George Atiyeh, *Al-Kindi: The Philosopher of the Arabs* (Rawalpindi, 1966), p. 53.
26. Nasr, 'The School of Isfahan', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 916.
27. Ibid.
28. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 141.
29. Ibn Sina makes a distinction between two concepts of time derived from two different types of movement. The first type of movement is not observable, such as continuity or motion from beginning to the end. This movement for him is subjective and a mental image. The second type, such as the movement of a body from one point to another in space, is observable. The first movement gives rise to the idea of time as an extension because the observation in this case is concerned with time-instances. He also refuses to call time an extension or subjective. Time is continuity like the measure of the moving body in space. See Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 95.

30. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 140.
31. Ibid., p. 147.
32. Ibid., p. 148.
33. Ibid., pp. 149–150; see also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 110.
34. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 151.
35. Ibid.
36. For the category of being-for-itself see George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I, translated by William Wallace (London, 1985), p. 141.
37. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 235, and Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 116.
38. See Ibn Sina, 'Al-Risala fi al-'ishq', *Medieval Studies*, vol. 7, 1945, p. 214.
39. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 239.
40. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 116.
41. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-Ishraq*, p. 142.
42. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 42.
43. Muhammad b. Mahmud Shahrazuri, *Sharh Hikmat al-ishraq* ed. H. Diya'i (Teheran, 1993), p. 520.
44. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 16.
45. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 248, see also Mulla Sadra's view on this matter in *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 6.
46. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 64.
47. Ibid., p. 17.
48. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 248.
49. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 2, p. 116.
50. Sabzwari, *The Metaphysics of Subzwari*, p. 124.
51. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 2, p. 68.
52. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I, p. 123, see also Hegel's *Science of Logic*, vol. 1, p. 86.
53. Hegel, *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, Part I, p. 125.
54. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (London, 1996), p. 22.
55. Ibid., p. 8.
56. Sabzwari, *The Metaphysics of Subzwari*, p. 79.
57. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah*, pp. 147–148.
58. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Part Two: *The Philosophy of Nature* edited and translated by M.J. Petry (London, 1970), p. 202, see also Hegel's *Introduction to Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, translated by T.M. Knox and A.V. Miller (Oxford, 1985), p. 27.
59. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad*, with an introduction by Jalal al-Din Ashtiani (Teheran, 1975), p. 490.
60. Abu Nasr Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Turkhan b. Awzalugh Al-Farabi, *Mabadi' Ara Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila*, translated by Richard Walzer (Oxford, 1985), p. 239.
61. Ibid., p. 241.
62. Ibid., p. 245.
63. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad*, p. 564.
64. Mulla Sadra, unlike al-Farabi, does not elaborate his political philosophy in a single book. He discusses this matter briefly in *al-Mabda' wa al-ma'ad*, *al-Mazahir al-ilahiyyah*, *al-Shawahid al-rububiyah*, *kasir al-asnam al-jahiliyyah* and *Sih asl*, which is written in Persian.
65. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Shawahid al-rububiyah fi al-manahig al-slukiyyah* (Beirut, 1996), p. 365.
66. Mulla Sadra mentions several intellectual and physical qualities and conditions to be present in a person for that person to become a leader of the perfect society. See Mulla Sadra, *Al-mabda' wa al-Ma'ad*, pp. 493–494.

Chapter Six

1. Fazlur Rahman, 'Ibn Sina', in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 497.
2. Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York, 1970), p. 162.
3. Muhammad Abdul Rahman Merhaba, *Min al-falsafa al-yunaniyyah ila al-falsafa al-islamiyyah* (Beirut, 2000), p. 586.
4. Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, pp. 164–165.
5. Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 94.
6. George Edward Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge, 1966), p. 7.
7. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-ishraq*, p. 10. See also Razavi, *Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination*, p. 94.
8. Plato, *Meno*, edited with translation and notes by R.W. Sharples (London, 1985), 72, 5e.
9. Plato, *Meno*, 75, 5b.
10. Suhrawardi, *Hikmat al-ishraq*, p. 8.
11. Ibid.
12. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 360.
13. See William Chittick, 'On the Teleology of Perception', in *Transcendent Philosophy*, an international journal of comparative philosophy and Mysticism, London, vol. 1, no. 1, 2000, p. 2. See also Khamenei, *Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy* (Teheran, 2004), p. 91.
14. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 219.
15. Ibid., p. 798.
16. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 364.
17. Ibid., pp. 360–362.
18. Ibid.
19. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A: 83, B: 109–112.
20. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 39.
21. Ibid., p. 236.
22. Ibid., p. 361.
23. Ibid.
24. Chittick, 'On the Teleology of Perception', p. 4.
25. Mualla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 4, p. 216, see also Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 228.
26. Oliver Leaman, 'Mulla Sadra: Perception and Knowledge by Presence', in *Transcendent Philosophy*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2000, p. 34.
27. William C. Chittick, *The Self-Disclosure of God* (New York, 1998), pp. 332–333.
28. Ibn 'Arabi, *Futuhat al-Makiyyah*, vol. 4 (Beirut, 1972), pp. 393–410.
29. Ibid., pp. 325–332.
30. Henry Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn al-'Arabi* (Princeton, 1969), pp. 219–220.
31. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 297.
32. Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by T.E. Hulme, with an introduction by Thomas A. Goudge (Indianapolis, 1976), p. 23.
33. Mulla Sadra, *Se Asl*, Seyyed Hossein Nasr (ed.), (Teheran, 1961), p. 32.
34. Ibid.
35. Tabataba'i, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn, *Kernel of the Kernel: Concerning the Wayfaring and Spiritual Journey of the People of Intellect*, pp. 10–20.
36. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 307.
37. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 1074b–1075a, and see also *De Anima*, translated [from the Greek] with introduction and notes by D.W. Hamlyn (Oxford, 1968), 492b–430a.
38. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, pp. 428–433. The unity of intelligent and intelligible is also discussed in *al-Asfar*, vol. 9, pp. 149–165.
39. Ibn Sina, *Al-Isharat wal-Tanbihat*, vol. 3, p. 293.

40. Ibn Sina, *Al-Mabda' wal-ma'a*, p. 6.
41. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 322.
42. Although Aqa Buzurg reports in *al-Dhari'ah*, vol. 1, p. 81 that the treatise was published in Teheran, Nasr says that the printed version of this work is not available. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Sadr al-Din Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy*, p. 42.
43. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, pp. 324–325.
44. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, pp. 215–216. See also Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 1, p. 311.
45. There is also another argument based on the dialectical relationship between thesis and antithesis in Hegel's philosophy that demonstrates the unity of consciousness and its known object. Here I have mentioned only the argument, which I believe is similar to what Mulla Sadra tried to prove in *Al-Asfar*.
46. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, pp. 324–325.
47. Ibn Sina, 'Ilahiyyat', in Syyed Hossein Nasr and Mehdi Aminrazavi (eds) *An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia* (New York, 1999), pp. 200–201.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 202.
50. Mu'tazilite was a rationalist theological school founded in Basrah by some pupils of Hasan al-Basri (642–728) who had seceded from him. The Mu'tazilites interpreted the dogmas of faith in the light of human reason. They believed in the unity of God and the notion of divine justice, which led them to reject the idea of predestination and advocate the doctrine of free will or *al-qadariyyah*. A branch of this school was founded by Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir (d. 825) in Baghdad and was patronized by the 'Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 813–833), who began an 'Inquisition' under the influence of the Mu'tazilites against those who believed in the uncreatedness of the Qur'an.
51. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Proposition III, Prop. V, p. 3.
52. Hanbalis were the followers of the Hanbali School of law, which was named after its founder Ahmed b. Hanbal (780–855). Before the 'Inquisition' of caliph al-Ma'mun, Ahmed b. Hanbal denied that the Qur'an was created, for which he was imprisoned. In 848, the caliph al Mutawakkil reversed this policy, abandoned the Mu'tazilite doctrine and accepted the idea of the uncreatedness of the Qur'an. The traditionalist theology of Ahmad b. Hanbal was subsequently revived. Ahmed b. Hanbal was a great scholar of Hadith and his main work is the *Musnad*.
53. Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*, p. 147.
54. Mulla Sadra, *Al-Asfar*, vol. 3, p. 176.
55. Ibid., p. 188.
56. Ibid., p. 198.
57. Ibid., p. 228.
58. Ibid., p. 229.
59. Ibid., p. 232.
60. Ibid., p. 269.

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A MEDIAEVAL MYSTICAL GUIDEBOOK FOR THE VOYAGERS TOWARDS GOD: NAĞM AD-DĪN AL-KUBRĀ'S *FAWĀ'IH AL-ĠAMĀL* *WA-FAWĀTIH AL-ĠALĀL*

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1 In a previous article (Iványi 2022) pieces of evidence were collected to prove that al-Kubrā's main objective in the the *Fawā'ih al-ġamāl* was to teach his disciples (*murīdūn*) whom he calls voyagers (*sayyārūn*) the voyage (*sayr*) on the path (*ṭarīqa*) to God by using simple devices to make them understand the complicated mystical notions and experiences.¹ At the same time, my aim was also to point out the orderliness of al-Kubrā's work against opinions on the contrary.² For this purpose I

¹ The full title is: *Fawā'ih al-ġamāl wa-fawātiḥ al-ġalāl* ("The fragrance of the (divine) Beauty and the commencements of the (divine) Glory"). The edition of Yūsuf Zaydān, 1993, was used, the text of which overlaps with (or possibly was even taken over from) the first edition of Meier 1957. The text of Zaydān's edition, however, is more readable than Meier's and it has many useful explanations of the original text. There are some speculations, that al-Kubrā (died 1221) wrote his work originally in Persian, based on Ḥāḡḡī Ḥalīfa, *Kašf az-ẓunūn* II, 1292–1293, where he states that the *Fawātiḥ al-ġamāl* (a third version of the title) is an epistle written in Persian (*risāla fārisiyya*). He even says that it was al-Būnī who mentioned the full title of al-Kubrā's work – which is interesting since al-Būnī (died 1225), who lived in Egypt, died only five years later than al-Kubrā. It shows al-Kubrā's strong links with the Egyptian Ṣūfis from whom he learned so much in his youth. However, this weak supposition of the original Persian version of the *Fawā'ih* was refuted in Iványi 2022:73. According to some opinions, e.g., DeWeese 1999:121, there are apparent Ṣūfite tendencies in al-Kubrā's works, but in the *Fawā'ih* I did not find any trace of this. See also Molé 1961.

² See Meier 1957:65: "Kubrā gibt yedoch keine systematische Darstellung und auch kein zusammenhangendes Bild der Weltanschauung, aus der er die Deutungen bezieht. So ergibt sich für uns die Aufgabe, das Material in eine Ordnung zu bringen." (italics by T.I.). This is accepted without further discussion by Schimmel 1975:254 ff. This view is based on the false presumption that the ideal Ṣūfī handbook is that of al-Quṣayrī's *Risāla*. Corbin 1978:62, in contrast, recognises that al-Kubrā's book is a spiritual journey, but denies its didactic character, which was emphasised in Iványi 2022.

presented the similes and metaphors, the quotations from former Šūfī masters and Arab poets, pedagogical references and the author's personal mystical experiences.³

This article is intended to continue the presentation of the main characteristics of the *Fawā'ih al-ġamāl*. I assume, as a starting point, that it is basically a guidebook for beginners who naturally become themselves masters after voyaging together with the guidance of al-Kubrā to realise (*taḥqīq*) the dual purpose of acquiring the knowledge of God (*ma'rifa*) and the divine love (*maḥabba*). To reach this goal, an attempt is made to explore the fundamental structure of this mystical guidebook.⁴

2 Nağm ad-Dīn al-Kubrā

The full name of our author is Aḥmad b. 'Umar b. Muḥammad Abū Ğannāb Nağm ad-Dīn al-Kubrā al-Ḥwārizmī al-Ḥīwaqī. His most important honorary name is Šānī' al-Awliyā' (maker of God's friends').⁵ His most famous name is al-Kubrā,⁶ which became the eponym of his later followers, the Kubrāwīs and the Kubrāwī Šūfī path or order (*ṭarīqa kubrāwiyya*).⁷

He was born in Ḥīva, in the district of Ḥwārizm (Khorezm, today Uzbekistan), about 540/1145, at that time a flourishing region of Central Asia, where he lived most of his life and died heroically in 618/1221 – thus receiving the attributive 'the

³ It is to be noted here that Nağm ad-Dīn al-Kubrā does not use the word Šūfī in the *Fawā'ih al-ġamāl* for earlier masters or for his disciples, the voyagers towards God. He uses it only once, in connection with the *ḥirqa*, the Šūfī cloak, which he calls the *libās aṣ-šūfī* (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 242). In my previous article, Iványi 2022 I had recourse to using the term Šūfī for the sake of simple reference. In this article, however, this term was avoided since in analysing the work I tried to stick to the vocabulary of the author. I only used the denomination Šūfī if it refers to Islamic mysticism in general or another mystical master in particular. al-Kubrā only differentiates between voyagers (*sayyārūn*) and common people (*al-'amma*).

⁴ In the last two decades some scholars who made mention of the *Fawā'ih al-ġamāl*, recognised the special character of this work. See Waley 1999:289: "(It) is a kind of *didactic journal* of the author's spiritual experiences, written to inform and warn the Sufi seeker about the states, interior events (*waqā'i'*), and stations of the Path." Knysh 2000:236 is less decided in his definition of this work, but also recognises its *guide-book* character to help the mystical wayfarers. On the contrary, Ernst 1997 follows the footsteps of those who recognise some interesting details of the book, but do not consider it as a unified work. He mentions only the intensive concentration on *ḍikr* as the main character of the *Fawā'ih*.

⁵ This name also refers to the role which he considered the most important in his life, that is, teaching and guiding his disciples on the mystical path to God's proximity.

⁶ According to the medieval sources, as a student his talent for theological disputation earned him the epithet al-Kubrā, an abbreviated form of the Qur'ānic phrase, *aṭ-ṭamma al-kubrā* "the greatest calamity" (Qur'ān 79:34) since he had always defeated his opponents in religious debates. See, e.g., al-Ḥwānsārī, *Rawḍāt* I, 295.

⁷ For the *ṭarīqa kubrāwiyya*, see Gramlich 1965 and 1976, Trimmingham 1973:55–57, and Waley 1997:80–104.

Martyr' (aš-Šahīd) – fighting against the Mongol invaders of Genghis Khan together with his disciples.⁸

After having completed the usual elementary religious education in his homeland, he spent several years in travelling following the course of the *ṭalab al-'ilm* ('the quest for knowledge'), knowledge meaning the Prophetic tradition, *ḥadīṭ*, which had been his main interest in his early years. However, during his voyages to Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt,⁹ he met several Ṣūfī masters whose teachings greatly impressed him, so after returning home his attention turned to transferring his mystical knowledge to the growing number of his disciples. This activity is reflected in his literary output, in which, in addition to his Qur'ān commentary, mystical teachings dominate.

3 The aim of al-Kubrā's book

The author defines the aim of his book when he praises God on the first page for teaching mankind the speech of the birds, that is, to be able to catch the meaning of the divine inspirations, for safeguarding against the calamities of everything outside the divine realm (*al-ḡayr*), and for showing the signs of the voyage (*'alāmāt as-sayr*). al-Kubrā evades to call the voyager Ṣūfī, not because he would oppose the usage of the term, but because he considers this voyage and the following of God's signs as a voyager (*sayyār*) the only natural mode of true life. Even the term generally used for the disciple, 'seeker' (*murīd*), he uses only once at the beginning of his work when he emphasises that God is the one to whom we seek (*al-murād*), while the seeker is only a light from Him (*nūr minhu*).

In a short didactic treatise, al-Kubrā points out the difference between the way on which he starts his disciples and all the other ways of religious activity: There are three types of the path towards God: 1. Through formal religiosity, 2. through religious practice going beyond the prescriptions of Islam, 3. the path of the voyagers towards God who fly by the help of God. This is the path of the clever one among the lovers of God who is voyaging towards Him by way of His attraction (al-Kubrā, *Uṣūl* 15–16).

The structure of the book follows the voyage step by step from the beginning to the self-realisation of the voyager. Therefore the *Fawā'ih al-ḡamāl* is not a taxonomically arranged work such as the Ṣūfī handbook of al-Quṣayrī (*ar-Risāla*)¹⁰

⁸ See al-Ḥwānsārī, *Rawḍāt* I, 297, Trimmingham 1973:56, Waley 1997:81, Lewisohn 2019:25. For a summary of al-Kubrā's life, see Ḥanafī 2003:491–494.

⁹ For details, see al-Ḥwānsārī, *Rawḍāt* I, 296, Trimmingham 1973:55 and Waley 1997:81–82.

¹⁰ I mean by the taxonomical arrangement that al-Quṣayrī lists the different mystical states and stations presenting a wide circle of often contradictory sayings and opinions of Ṣūfī masters of previous ages, completing them sometimes with his own definitions. For a detailed analysis of al-Quṣayrī's *Risāla*, see Hartmann 1914. An even earlier work of similar

and its seemingly disarranged style deceived many scholars who dealt with the interpretation of the *Fawā'ih*¹¹ and praised the work for some of its innovations, but stated that its material is not organized and needs to be 'remediated', ie, rearranged according to the researcher's opinion.¹² al-Kubrā did not want to make his disciples and followers aware of the different, sometimes contradictory, opinions of the earlier generations of the Ṣūfis regarding the stations of the mystical voyage. On the contrary, he gives the explanations of earlier mystics only in a very limited number and only if he sees it absolutely necessary. His main aim was practical, with the intention, by teaching to guide, to serve the spiritual education of those who aspire to achieve the realisation of their mystical goal. He followed the most important Ṣūfī instruction: Ṣūfism is not 'ilm (knowledge received from books), but 'amal (mystical practice).¹³

4 The voyage (sayr) towards God – structure and stations

4.1 Preparations for the voyage (tamhīd)

The work, naturally, begins with glorifying the omniscient God (*tanā'*), but as is usual in mediaeval Muslim mystical writings, the author has chosen the content of the glorification itself to refer to the objective of the book, that is, the divine guidance during the mystical voyage. The three key words are "teaching" (*ta'līm*), "ensuring" (*ta'mīn*) and "making see" (*tabṣīr*): God has taught us the speech of birds,¹⁴ ensured us against the dangerous calamities of turning to other than God¹⁵ and making see the landmarks of the voyage.¹⁶ These are also important symbols of the mystical voyage.

At the beginning of the voyage the author explains to his disciples their place in connection with God. God is the final goal (*murād*) of the seekers, while the seeker (*murīd*) is the one who receives light from Him.¹⁷ This anticipates at the same time

arrangement, though much less known than the *Risāla* of al-Quṣayrī (died 1072), is the *Tahdīb* of al-Ḥarkūṣī (died 1016).

¹¹ See, for example, Meier 1957, Schimmel 1975 and Corbin 1978.

¹² It was 'committed' by Meier 1957, the result being the disruption of the original intention of the author in his, otherwise excellent and thoroughful, analysis.

¹³ Written in the Arabic script this saying contains a paronomasia (*ġinās*).

¹⁴ Qur'ān 27:16. This expression may refer to both the extraordinary knowledge of the prophet Solomon and the famous work of Farīd ud-Dīn 'Aṭṭār, *Manṭiq at-ṭayr*. See al-Kubrā, *Tafsīr* IV, 328: *ay al-ḥawāṭira l-malā'ikiyyatu wa-r-rūḥāniyya*, that is, the angelic and spiritual thoughts.

¹⁵ Qur'ān 2:173. Cf. al-Kubrā, *Tafsīr* I, 248.

¹⁶ Qur'ān 16:15, 16 *wa-alqā fi l-arḍ ... 'alāmātin wa-bi-n-nağmi hum yahtadūna*.

¹⁷ The interpretation of these two terms reflects a totally new approach by al-Kubrā. The traditional interpretations are found in the *Risāla* of al-Quṣayrī: "When someone asked al-Junayd about the *murīd* and the *murād*, he answered: 'The *murīd* is governed by religious

the fundamental teaching of the *Fawā'ih* about the significance of the lights that accompany the voyager throughout his path. Light leads, while darkness (*ḡalām*) misleads, causing vices. “But God did not do wrong (*mā ḡalama*) to anyone”, al-Kubrā says, making use of the twofold meaning of the word. On the contrary, God “gave him hearing and sights, and heart”.¹⁸ This would fill the prospective seeker, whom the author addresses as ‘my dear’ (*ḡabībī*),¹⁹ with hope and good expectations. The prospective seekers are now blind and waiting for God to remove the cover from their eyes. It will happen only during their spiritual mystical voyage, since “the cover is not external from them, but it is a part of them. It darkens their existence” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 122).

al-Kubrā gives a sincere advice to the disciple who begins the voyage: “Close your eyes and see what you see, and if you said: I do not see anything – it is your mistake and if you want to find (God), behold him in front of you, even if your eyes are closed” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 122). At the same time, he considers it important that his disciples, who may still have been in their youth, can have the agreement of their parents in joining his circle of mystical practice.²⁰

4.2 Pious endeavours needed at the start of the voyage on the path²¹

The master points out to the disciple the ways of striving for the repulsion of everything that is ‘other’ (*ḡayr*), rather than God. This means ‘killing the (individual) existence, the lower soul (*nafs*) and the devil (living in him)’.²² The ways of striving are as follows: (i) Continuous decrease in eating. (ii) Leaving his own choice of action, that is, his free will (*iḡtiyār*) and its annihilation, submitting himself to the divine choice with the direction of a reliable *Šayḡ*. (iii) Following al-ḡunayd’s method which has eight conditions: constant ablution, fasting, silence, seclusion (*ḡalwa*), and remembrance (*dīkr*), attachment of the heart to the *Šayḡ*. making use of knowledge of the events that occurred to him, refusing the despicable thoughts and

science (*ilm*), whereas the *murād* stays under God’s protection – praise be to Him’. Therefore, the *murād* walks, while the *murād* flies” (al-Quṣayrī, *Risāla*, English tr. by Knysh, 217). See also al-Kalābādī, *Ta’arruf* 107, who explains these two terms similarly to al-Quṣayrī.

¹⁸ Cf. Qur’ān 46:26, with a small alteration that the pronoun, instead of the plural, is in the singular.

¹⁹ This intimate address attracted the attention of the writer of a modern *Šūfī* encyclopaedia, who otherwise did not remark the special didactic character of the *Fawā'ih*. See Ḥanafī 2003:493.

²⁰ Cf. al-Kubrā, *Ādāb* 73: “The first condition of this voyage is the permission of the parents.” It also means that the voyage is used here in two senses: the voyage in the heart of the seeker and an actual voyage seeking knowledge from other masters.

²¹ I.e., self-exertion: *muḡāhada*.

²² *ma’nā l-muḡāhadati qatlu l-aḡyāra wa-l-aḡyāra l-wuḡūdi wa-n-nafsi wa-š-šayṡān* (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 122).

finally, repudiating the objection to anything received from God, either good or bad²³ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 123–124).

There is a substantial point in al-Ġunayd's method described above which formed the basis and guideline of the *Fawā'ih* throughout the work: acquiring the knowledge of the personal experiences of the master and making benefit and profit from them. That is the reason why al-Kubrā included in his book the description of his twenty events and visions, which can be described as direct contemplation of God and divine realities by the voyager.²⁴ This approach differs largely from the usual impersonal way of teachings found in the Ṣūfī manuals, and it shows how deeply the psychological and mystical guidance of his disciples concerned him. He regarded them as his spiritual children which is manifested by several similes related to small children and their behaviour in different situations.²⁵

4.3 *His existence defines the endeavours of the seeker*

The author prepares his disciples for the tiring voyage full of hardships and difficulties. The preparatory section described above promotes the different kinds of hallucinations and visions that form the different stations of the mystical path. He advises the seeker before beginning his wayfaring to the depths of the heart that he should investigate thoroughly the first station of his voyage, the true vision (*muṣāhada*),²⁶ in order to clarify his concept of the three notions that are 'other than God' and their differences: his existence, his soul, and the devil that wants to enter him. As a result of his contemplation, his existence may move from the darkness towards light. Then he explains the difference between the soul and the devil by

²³ This saying cannot be found in the well-known sources. The closest to it is what al-Quṣayrī cites in his *Risāla* (English tr. by Knysh 43, Arabic ed. 79): "I heard al-Junayd say: 'We learned Sufism not through words but through hunger, the renunciation of this world, and through depriving ourselves from the things which we are accustomed to and in which we take delight'". Kubrā's quotations are either not found in the extant written sources of Ṣūfism or they are found in different versions. This can only be explained by assuming that he had learnt these stories and teachings from his mystical masters in Baghdad and Alexandria through oral communication. He did not quote al-Quṣayrī's work despite the note in his biography by al-Ḥwānsārī, *Rawḍāt* I. 298–299, where he said that al-Kubrā had read the *Risāla* continuously from the beginning (of his mystical teachings) till the end (of his life) and he had even written a four-line poem on the cover of his copy praising the work and its author.

²⁴ Whether the mystical term *muṣāhada* is best translated as vision or contemplation depends on the context. One may think that the two words, put together, reflect the real meaning of this term, like 'contemplation by vision'.

²⁵ For this see Iványi 2022: 62 ff., subchapter 3.3 on similes and metaphors.

²⁶ I.e., contemplation.

means of the different colours²⁷ and by similes of the springs²⁸ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 125–126). The colours alternate in the existence of the seeker according to his progress, starting from dark colours and becoming clearer and clearer through contemplation.²⁹ He states that the existence is compounded from four pillars: the earth, the water, the fire, and the air, following the classical teaching which can already be found in ‘the father of Arab philosophy’, al-Kindī,³⁰ though the source of al-Kubrā is not known³¹ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 128). However, he considers these elements as “darkness above darkness”,³² which make pressure on the seeker, and he can only depart from their attachment if he finds connection (*īṣāl*) to whom He deserves it (*al-mustaḥiqq*, God). The second part of this sentence shows that he only needed this philosophical summarisation of the worldly elements to encourage the disciples to refuse everything material.

4.4 Taking a rest by remembrance (*ḍikr*)

In cutting the bonds that connect him to this world, al-Kubrā emphasises from time to time the significance of the remembrance to God (*ḍikr*) which must accompany the voyager throughout the mystical path and describes its characteristics. These descriptions, however, never mean repetition but rather deeper and deeper analyses of the effects of the remembrance on the rememberer (*ḍākir*), following the way of the well-known mystical spiral. In the struggle against darkness, it is also the remembrance that can help the seeker, but this time it is a stronger and overwhelming remembrance according to the author, describing it by way of a vivid metaphor: The remembrance enters the house of the rememberer, and its fire burns in his heart

²⁷ Not excluding the possibility of external, mainly ancient Iranian influence on al-Kubrā's light and colour theories as stated by Corbin 1978, one should also take into consideration the natural experiences of lights and colours appearing, for instance, on the verge of sleep and wakefulness or in a feverish state. al-Kubrā frequently makes use of everyday phenomena in his work for explaining his experiences and those of his disciples.

²⁸ See, e.g., the simile of the *fayaḍān*: “The deluge of the soul springs forth on his existence, and either the good or the wrong will grow from it” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 126).

²⁹ See in detail in Iványi 2022:54.

³⁰ See, e.g., al-Kindī, *Rasā'il* II, 40, 45, 67–68. Cf Adamson 2007:66, 86, 170.

³¹ The early mediaeval Šūfī literature does not deal with the four elements, but in the 14th century, al-Ġilī, *Šarḥ muškilāt* 210 ff, speaks about them although they are not found in Ibn 'Arabī's *Futūḥāt*. However, al-Kubrā was an eminent *ḥadīṭ* scholar, too, and in the *ḥadīṭ* literature one can find similar statements. See, e.g., Ibn Raḡab, *Laṭā'if* 59, where he quotes the 9th century *ḥadīṭ* scholar, al-Ġūzaḡānī speaking about the elements of which the created beings are composed.

³² Cf. Qur'ān 24:40.

similarly as the fire burns in the dry wood with pure flames. This fire (*nār*) turns the darkness in the house into light (*nūr*)³³ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 127).

In this state of mind, after the exhausting and thorough remembrance ritual, the voyager is immersed in the true contemplations of God (*mušāhadāt*). al-Kubrā characterises them by natural images. Their origin is not mentioned in the book. They may have come from the author's own experience or his pedagogical vein, but I guess these natural similes may have been told by his disciples as their visions during contemplation. All these images refer to the difference in the (worldly) existence between appearance and (true) reality. First, a Qur'ānic *āya* is quoted about this phenomenon:³⁴ "And you (*sing.*) will see the mountains that you supposed to be firm passing by like clouds – the work of God, who has perfected everything". al-Kubrā then cites further similes: "If you travel on a ship, you think the bank of the sea is moving, not you. When you are in the well, you see as if the well descended upon you from above, although it is you who went up. If you go by a tugboat on the seaside and drop in it, it seems as if the sea would sink into it not you" (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 129). These similes are supplemented with the theory of 'degrees of existence' (*marātib al-wuḡūd*), according to which there are several types of existence one above the other, at the bottom of the created world and at the top God's uncreated and eternal universe³⁵ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 134). True contemplation of these can be

³³ al-Kubrā adds, in his usual pragmatic way: "as one can observe." The *nūr* – *nār* type of paronomasia is also one of his favourite means of teaching. He cites Qur'ān 24:35, which mentions the blessed tree which lights even though it was not touched by fire (*nār*), gives light upon light, *nūrun 'alā n-nūr*.

³⁴ Qur'ān, 27:88, tr. by Jones 2007. This image is similar to what al-Ġunayd said in connection with his behaviour during the *samā'* ritual (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 192). Cf. al-Kubrā, *Tafsīr* IV, 351: 'You see the persons in the state of their attributes and then their characters and their stations will be changed.'

³⁵ Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūḥāt* ed. by Yahyā III. 56, chapter 17, and many other places, contain similar notions concerning the grades of existence, but here he mentions only four degrees. The same topic is also dealt with in great detail in his *Inšā' ad-dawā'ir*, where the existence is always connected with the non-existence ('*adam*'). Ibn 'Arabī mentions the four degrees of the existence for the human being (*Inšā' ad-dawā'ir*, 7): *li-kulli šay'in fī l-wuḡūdi arba'u marātiba illā llāha ta'ālā fa-inna lahu fī l-wuḡūdi l-muḏāfi talāta marātib*. See also aṣ-Ṣādiqī, *Iškāliyyāt* chapter 4: *Marātib al-wuḡūd*, 447 ff, where the author could refer only to different places in Ibn 'Arabī's works without finding similar notions in the previous Ṣūfī literature. Chittick (1989:xviii, 3, 12, 36) deals exhaustively with the different usages of the term *wuḡūd* in the works of Ibn 'Arabī, but he did not find any external reference either. al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmidī, whose writings frequently gave inspiration to Ibn 'Arabī, did not deal with *wuḡūd*. al-Kubrā might have had a common source with Ibn 'Arabī, but I could not find it. However, Corbin (1993:296) states: "This central Asian Sufism was dominated at that time by the great figure of Najm al-Din al-Kubra, and the encounter of his followers with the followers of Ibn al-'Arabī is of capital and decisive importance for the spiritual future of Oriental Islam."

achieved for the voyager only with the help of four angels who raise him to this elevated station (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 135).

4.5 The first visions: The interpretation of the colours and the lights

When the voyager reached this step in his endeavours, he would receive the first visions containing different colours and lights.³⁶ Mystical meanings are communicated to the seeker through two 'tongues': tasting and contemplation. Tasting means experiencing the way, while contemplation is used to absorb this experience. After some theosophical explanation of the meaning of the different colours and lights, the author helps his disciples understand the mystical phenomena by giving examples from the life of plants that have different colours in the different phases of their life.³⁷ Two states overwhelm him at this station: the (spiritual) wakefulness (*yaqza*) and the absence from this world (*ḡayba*). These are characterised with sensual images of 'the well which surrounds you' from every direction causing the state of intimacy (*uns*) in wakefulness awe-inspiring appearance in the state of absence. "You see at the bottom of this well the existence as a green light, which means that it is the end of temporal and incidental existence (*al-wuḡūd wa-l-ḥudūt*) and the beginning of God's infinite pre-existence (*al-qidam*)" (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 133). This vision of different colours, aside from having mystical relevance, can easily be accepted by the disciple as a natural result of his being in a disturbed state of mind as a consequence of the mystical practices described above: constant insomnia, hunger, and continuous remembrance. al-Kubrā describes the diversity of colours in these ecstatic states of the seeker as 'tasting the contradictory states in one state' (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 134).

While the voyager is in the depth of the well (which symbolises his heart), he witnesses another vision, when the angels descend in his heart and their descent causes relaxation and calm in his heart. Furthermore, at this moment you feel the presence of the Prophet with you since his greeting (*at-taṣliya*) runs on your tongue unwillingly (*min ḡayri iḥtiyārik*). The description of this vision is intended to illustrate that the voyage happens in the heart of the voyager without the necessity of appearing external signs on him (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 136).

³⁶ Here the author also uses paronomasia to enlighten the understanding of the quasi-philosophical speculations: *qalb* – *qalīb* – *tataqallab* (heart, well, and to be altered), *alwān* – *talwīn* – *tatalawwan* (colours, changing the colours and variation of the colours). The words *talwīn* and *tatalawwan* are also used in the meaning 'altering', 'alteration' without referring to colours. Similar paronomasias are used by al-Kubrā to describe the mental state of the lover of God: "The lover, fearing of the blame of the blamer, seeking (*tālib*) (God) in his heart (*qalb*) and fleeing (*hārib*) (from the world) in his outward form (*qālab*), is still strengthening God's light in his heart" al-Kubrā, *Hā'im* 23.

³⁷ For details, see Iványi 2022:54.

Then al-Kubrā supplements his teaching with three experiences of his,³⁸ all dealing with different visions (not clear whether in a dream or awake) the aim of which is, as in all similar cases, to make his teachings clearer and more personal, and to bring the disciples closer to their comprehension. All three personal experiences are related to God's glorification and are complemented with similes from everyday life, for example, the fear of angels is made similar to the child's fear of his father (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'iḥ* 137). He also emphasises the role of the master in difficult situations, such too deep immersion in the remembrance of God.³⁹ He may have used at this point his small treatise, which contains the strict rules and usages of conduct for the voyagers towards God to make sure the sincerity of their visions. This can be reached only by acknowledging the attributes of their souls.⁴⁰

4.6 *The two worlds of absence and presence*

At this stage of the voyage, the disciple succeeds in transgressing the boundaries of the world of witnessing (*ṣahāda*), in which he lives as a seeker and enters the world of absence, God's unseen world (*ḡayb*). This state can only be reached by leaving the earthly existence⁴¹ and receiving divine inspiration (*ilhām*). When the voyager is absent from his existence, that is, he reaches the state of intoxication (*sukr*), he can taste the noble spirits (*al-arwāḥ aš-ṣarīfa*) that live there. He may receive inspiration when he is present in his presence in the state of sobriety (*ṣaḥw*), too, but it is more concealed than the first state. However, in both cases, the same utmost tranquility would be felt in his heart (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'iḥ* 139). This last remark is meant to reassure the disciples that their inner consistence is not in danger, and they should not feel disturbed by their experience. He also emphasises that the wide range of feelings which fill the heart of the voyager – desire, longing, yearning, recklessness, the feeling of flying, fierce intention, love, utter confusion, ardour, passion, and the craziness in the Real One (God) – raise him above the level of the angels and give him preference before God.⁴² Then al-Kubrā cites a vision by al-Ḥaraqānī, in which

³⁸ See Iványi 2022:58 ff.

³⁹ See Iványi 2022:58 and fn. 43.

⁴⁰ al-Kubrā, *Ādāb* 72. He uses a paronomasia to illuminate the significance of the voyage in this respect, too. At the same time there is a metaphor in this sentence, since the original meaning of the verb *saḡara* refers to the the unveiled women: *wa-s-saḡaru innamā tusammā saḡaran li-'annahu yasfiru 'ani l-aḡlāq*, "The voyage is only called voyage (*saḡar*) since it removes the veil (*saḡara*) from the attributes."

⁴¹ The underlying idea by 'leaving the earthly existence' is that there is no real existence, only the existence of God. Cf. al-Ġīlī, *Insān kāmil* 266: *fa-mā fī l-wuḡūd ṣay'un illā llāhu ta'ālā*. Cf. Morrissey 2021:8.

⁴² Reference to the Qur'ān 2:34 where the angels are ordered to adore Ādam. al-Ḥaraqānī explains why the angels could not follow him in his visionary circumambulation: "Because my quickness is the result of the fire of yearning (*nār aš-ṣawq*), and the angels have no

the angels could not follow him in his rapid circumambulation around the throne of God (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 140). The explanation lies, according to the author, in the utmost longing of mystics for the divine love in which the angels cannot take part.⁴³

4.7 The different kinds of passing secret thoughts (*ḥawāṭir*), which visit the voyager

At this stage of the mystical voyage, when the disciple reaches an ecstatic state of feeling overwhelming excitement, he is easily assaulted by blameworthy and distracting thoughts originating from his soul (*nafs*) or by the Satan,⁴⁴ which he cannot differentiate from those of the Real One (al-Ḥaqq). al-Kubrā, however, puts forward his views on the soul, which is, generally speaking, attracted to earthly things, but his views are much subtler than usual in the Ṣūfī literature. He accepts that if the soul becomes pure and clean (*ṭaharat wa-zakat*), its thoughts can lead to relaxation (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 141). In that case, this relaxation promotes the performance of religious duties and good deeds, but if it remains dirty (*ḥabīṭa*) the soul always engages in wrongdoing (*ammāra bi-s-sū*).⁴⁵ This state of the soul causes pain and fear in the heart. This feeling is likened to the horror of a small boy (*ṣabī*), who had stolen an egg and ran away, since the soul is considered in the whole mystical literature as a child.⁴⁶ That means that in this case the disciple cannot find his station in the way and feels he is errant.

The disciple can only be supported by his master from whom he must ask advice in case an external secret thought descends in his heart, trusting in him sincerely,⁴⁷ but never trusting the cheating Satan. Each thought must be tasted to realise whether it is sweet like the honeycomb (*ṣahd*), or bitter like the colocynth (*ḥanḏal*).⁴⁸

yearning.” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 140) The same opinion is treated in detail in several places in Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Futūḥāt*, where he uses the word *ṣahwa* instead of *ṣawq*, e.g., XI, 76: *wa-lammā kānat al-malā’ika lā ṣahwata lahum kānū muṭī’ina bi-d-dāti wa-lam yaqum bihim māni’u ṣahwatīn yaṣrifuhum ‘an ṭā’ati rabbihim*. These are summarised (and partly refuted) by al-Ğīlī in his *Muṣkilāt* (chapter x, and esp. 224–225).

⁴³ The description of this vision cannot be found in any written source before al-Kubrā’s time. Although ‘Aṭṭār, *Taḏkira*, dedicates a long chapter to al-Ḥaraqānī, it only contains a similar story but not this one. Cf. Iványi 2022:72.

⁴⁴ On the *nafs* and Satan in al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih*, see Meier, 1957:155 ff.

⁴⁵ See Qur’ān 12:53. The first part of the saying, when the soul becomes pure, is also based on the same Qur’ānic *āya*, since it continues: “except so far as my Lord has mercy”, and the purification of the soul can only be done by God’s mercy.

⁴⁶ In the 12th–13th centuries we find frequent mentions of this, using different words for the child, such as *ġulām* or *ṭifl*. See Ibn al-Fārid, *Tā’iyya*, line 715: *qataltu ġulāma nafsi*, and al-Būṣīrī, *Burda*, line 19: *wa-n-nafsu ka-ṭ-ṭiflī*.

⁴⁷ *fa-kun yā ḥabībī muḥliṣan* (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 142).

⁴⁸ The colocynth is a frequently used cliché in the early Arabic poetry, which seems to be well known by al-Kubrā. See, e.g., the *Mu’allaqa* poem of Imru’ al-Qays, line 4, where the

However, this requires right practice during the long spiritual voyage, because if one's taste becomes corrupted (*fasada*) he will find even the sweet bitter (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 145). He cites for this an example from a poem of al-Mutanabbī: "Whoever has a sick bitter mouth, tastes even the sweet water bitter in his mouth".⁴⁹

The seclusion forms one of the most important mystical practices, but at the same time it also poses a threat and danger of the appearance of the Satan which lures the voyager. Therefore, he needs most of all to follow the advice of his master. This is supported by two personal experiences of the author, when Satan demanded him to write a book with the title "The ruses of the sick against the seeker" (*Ḥiyal al-marīḍ 'alā l-murīd*) without the permission of his Ṣayḥ. al-Kubrā mentions here for the first time his *ṣayḥ fī l-ġayb* (master in God's unseen world) who helps him when his earthly master is absent in seclusion⁵⁰ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 143–145).

4.8 The service of God (ʿibāda, taʿabbud)

The primary task of the voyager must be the service of God, his Lord and Lover. al-Kubrā emphasises that the service of God may be tasted by continuous remembrances. The essence of this service is immersion (*ingimās*) in it and complete renunciation (*zuhd*) of everything other than God. In the tradition of Islamic mysticism, it is Jesus (ʿĪsā bnu Maryam) who is considered the ideal of poverty and renunciation of this world, but according to a story, even he committed a fault once, of which Satan immediately tried to take advantage.⁵¹ At the same time, the author calls the attention of his disciples to the fact that after a while the hardship disappears from the service of God and only the pleasure remains.⁵²

bitterness of the colocynth symbolises the sorrow and confusion of the poet felt because of the departure of the tribe of his beloved one (az-Zawzanī, *Ṣarḥ al-Muʿallaqāt* 19–20).

⁴⁹ al-ʿUqbārī, *Ṣarḥ Dīwān al-Mutanabbī*, III 228. (*qāfiya: al-ġamālā*): *wa-man yaku dā famin murrin marīḍin – yaḡidu murrān bihi l-māʿa z-zulālā*.

⁵⁰ Corbin translates *ṣayḥ fī l-ġayb* as 'maître intérieur' or 'témoin dans le ciel'. The first translation seems to be suitable, while the second is too interpretative. The *ṣayḥ fī l-ġayb* may have been thought by al-Kubrā to dwell in the innermost heart (*sirr*) of the mystic (see below). Corbin (1972:297–298) deals with this master whom he translates as 'le Guide supra-sensible'. He sees a parallel view in the teaching of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla as-Samnānī (died in 1336), a Persian follower of the Kubrāwīyya order, about the *ustād ḡaybī*, le maître et guide invisible. See also Lewisohn, 2019:182.

⁵¹ See the story of Jesus and Satan in Iványi 2022:56, fn. 30.

⁵² "The secret conversation with Satan is hard and troublesome, whilst the secret conversation with God (i.e., the prayer) is the most delightful occupation" (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 146–147).

4.9 Tasting by alteration (*tabdīl aḍ-ḍawq*)⁵³

In the following, the Master, al-Kubrā, explains the connection and difference between two very important states of existence which the voyager meets in this phase of his voyage. These are the vision (*mušāhada*)⁵⁴ and the tasting (*ḍawq*), which are 'stable together', that is, they form a strong connection, although they are obtained by different means (*sabab*). Vision can be obtained when one opens his mental perception (*baṣīra*) by pulling the cover from it, while tasting can be obtained by altering the existence and the spirits (*arwāḥ*). "Tasting comes to you with a passionate excitement (*wiġdān*)". Then the five senses, which formed the previous existence, are changed to other kind of sensations (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 150).

The author exemplifies all this through sleep, which is stable in reality for the common people (*al-'amma*), but whenever they sleep, they remove the burdens of their existence, their senses become blocked in the seas of existence and new senses open up for them in the direction of the (invisible world of) absence, and by this they reach a more perfect existence. They can do in their sleep and dream everything that would be impossible in awakesness: they walk on the water, fly in the air, enter the fire, eat, and find the delight of the food after awakening. For them, in dream, there are no distances, and they can speak to anyone who ever existed. The sleepers do not find this new existence haphazard or random but a sensible reality. That's why dream is the brother (likeness) of death.

This detailed presentation serves twofold aim: on the one hand, it brings the mystical vision closer to the beginner in his voyage (*sayr*), on the other hand, it makes it easier to make acceptable his vision for "what the common man finds in his sleep the voyager finds when he is between sleep and awakening, 'dreaming awake',⁵⁵ because of the weakness of his bodily existence and the strength of this new noble and precious existence" This explanation gives another well-perceptible example of the educational method of al-Kubrā in guiding his disciples and helping the interpretation of their experiences. The voyager, in this intermediate existence, finds the same things that ordinary people find in sleep and dream and feels real (*yaḍūqu ḥaqqan*) and enters the world of vision (*mušāhada*), which has different degrees: first images and imaginations, then essences (*ḍawāt*), and finally they also disappear and immerse themselves in the Only Essence (Being), God.⁵⁶ This elucidation is topped by an extraordinarily graphic simile, that of the hunter and

⁵³ This is one of the few parts of the book which bear the divisions of the author and not the editor. He calls it *faṣl*, section. This title means: 'How tasting can be obtained by alteration'.

⁵⁴ By another interpretation 'contemplation'.

⁵⁵ This idea is comparable to the famous monologue of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*:112, (Act 3, Scene 1).

⁵⁶ On dream and mystical experience in al-Kubrā's *Fawā'ih*, see Meier 1957:98 ff.

hunting⁵⁷ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 150–151). In this simile the visions, experienced by the voyager, appear in the form of different animals (dog, lion, etc.) moulded by the ‘shaper of ideas’ (*muṣawwira*) and the power of imagination (*muḥayyila*). All this means denying the previous perception (*al-ḥiss al-awwal*) which works in the world of presence⁵⁸ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 152). Reaching this stage in his path, the voyager feels ease after the troubles of his previous (spiritual) efforts (*muḡāhada*) and it manifests itself also in the green colour seen by him⁵⁹ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 153). But if this colour appears when the heart is absent from this world (*ḡayba*),⁶⁰ being in the divine world, this means that he is no more a beginner, but has reached the final stage of his voyage (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 154).

4.10 The complete immersion⁶¹ in the remembrance of God (ḡikr)

The first degree of immersion is the immersion of the existence in remembrance. It is always accompanied by disturbing musical voices in the head of the rememberer, which causes fright and fear of death (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 155). This remark is followed by a description of a relevant personal experience of al-Kubrā. He writes: “Once when doing remembrance (*ḡikr*) in seclusion (*ḡalwa*), my head was filled with frightening sounds of musical instruments, and therefore I was scared. Thus, my master advised me to stop remembrance to avoid death”⁶² (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 155–156). Even so, he notes that in true remembrance, everything other than God must be driven away from the heart. The influence of remembrance, if perfect, continues after it has ended, mainly by means of hearing different kinds of frightening voice.

The second degree of immersion follows immediately after the first when the rememberer (*ḡākir*) feels as if his head was open, a round hole became created in his temple and descended upon him from above, first the darkness of existence, then the fire of remembrance, and finally the greenness of the heart, since remembrance means ‘good word’ (*kalima ṭayyiba*) which is immersed in the heart (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 157). Remembrance endures for a long time and needs to be interrupted.

⁵⁷ For a detailed description of the hunting simile, see Iványi 2022:57, fn. 37, and p. 67 in the subchapter 3.3, on the similes.

⁵⁸ Here al-Kubrā uses an interesting simile for the acknowledgement of reality: It resembles the way in which the Sophist is forced to acknowledge the realities by experiencing the pain when beating his head and cutting his stomach. This might have been at his time a customary way of characterising the Sophists who did not care about the truth till they themselves did not feel it.

⁵⁹ On the significance and meaning of the colours in the *Fawā'ih* see Iványi 2022 subchapter 3.1 and especially 54, fn. 22.

⁶⁰ For the use of this term see Iványi 2022:54, fn. 24.

⁶¹ *faṣl al-istiḡrāq*, one of the few chapters which were made by the author in his book.

⁶² See Iványi 2022:58 and fn. 43.

Whenever the voyager stops in it, his heart moves in his breast, like the child moves in the belly of his mother, demanding the continuation of the remembrance.

Then, al-Kubrā says,⁶³ the sign⁶⁴ of the immersion of the remembrance into the heart of the voyager, which is the third immersion, is that he sees a spring in front of him of which a light emerges, which causes great ease and tranquillity for him, since he becomes aware that the remembrance reached the innermost secret depth of his heart (*sirr*), the abode of the divine attributes, first of all Unity. In this state, he loses his consciousness of the remembrance and finds in his heart only the remembered (i.e., God). Finally, the voyager perceives the effect of his remembrance inside himself and in the outside world, as if everything has changed around him, because of the lights of the remembrance (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 159). He finds that there are three kinds of remembrance: remembrance of the tongue by sounds (*hurūf*) without the presence of God, remembrance of the heart feeling the presence of God in it, and finally remembrance of the inner heart without consciousness of the presence of the remembered, which means perfect immersion in the remembrance of God.

4.11 *The degrees of the lower soul (nafs)*

At this stage, the author finds it necessary to interpolate a long explication of the three types or rather degrees of the behaviour and nature of the soul that are, as usual, based on the Qur'ān: the soul that participates in wrong doing (*an-nafs al-ammāra bi-s-sū'*, Qur'ān 12:53), the self-reproaching soul (*an-nafs al-lawwāma*, Qur'ān 75:2), and finally the peaceful soul (*an-nafs al-muṭma'inna*, Qur'ān 89:27) (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 161). These three categories are then relevant in relation to remembrance. The soul that involves wrongdoing is the soul of the common people.⁶⁵ al-Kubrā likens the soul to a house in which the remembrance serves like a lamp that makes light in the darkness. At that point the soul becomes reproaching soul, since it perceives that his house is full of dirt and reprehensible animals (dog, donkey, bull, lion, and other similar beasts), which symbolise the blameworthy human characters. Then the rememberer makes efforts to deliberate his house from these ugly inhabitants, transforming his bad attributes to good ones, and this way he can incessantly adhere to the remembrance of God, returning (*ināba*) to him. In the end, the power of remembrance triumphs over these animals, expelling them from his house.⁶⁶ After this, his soul is approaching the peaceful state by rearranging the

⁶³ I mean the word 'says' *verbatim*, since I suppose that the composition of the *Fawā'ih* is the result of several sessions of dictations in the presence of his disciples.

⁶⁴ The author calls the attention of his disciples to the various signs (*'alāma*), which God sends them to follow in their voyage reassuring them about their progress.

⁶⁵ *nafs al-'amma* – but as it becomes clear from the following lines the beginners in the voyage also belong to them.

⁶⁶ This simple simile also points to the pedagogical character of this work, which uses abundantly similar similes borrowed from everyday life. All these activities of the voyager

furniture of his house decorating it with commendable ones. In this way, his house becomes suitable for the Sulṭān to house it – so God has appeared⁶⁷ and the soul reached the peaceful degree.

At this point, al-Kubrā supports his teaching with another simile. Every degree of the soul has its signs: changes in the colour of the face, different colours appearing during his vision (*muṣāhada*), and towards the end of the voyage, circles appear on the face. “When your soul is in the state of peace, the circle on your face will be of pure light, like a polished looking glass (*saḡanḡal*). But when the light ascends to your face, it would vanish in this light. Sometimes you may observe it from a distance as if it were in the absent world, and between you and the light there are a thousand stations (*manzila*) and if you tried to approach any one of them, you would be burned” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 162–163). After presenting the different circles and their respective meanings, the author inserts a personal experience which happened in his seclusion (*ḥalwa*), when he felt he had become absent and finally annihilated in a circle of light. But before that he had had the vision that he had been led up to the Sun and entered it. Then he told his experience to his master, who, interestingly enough, had a parallel vision and was very glad for the coincidence of the two events. The author interprets this vision in two different ways. First: In his opinion, the spirit (*rūḥ*), which inhabits the voyager and the heavens, is one and the same, so their encounter and merger is not to be considered curious. Second: If the human being is sincere in his yearning and search for the truth, he will eventually find his heavenly roots (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 164). The primary aim of this passage is, however, to show the relevance of the strict connection between the disciple and the Ṣayḥ, which can lead to parallel dreams at night.

4.12 The vision of the Divine Attributes (ṣifāt)

Since the continuous remembrance of God influences the consciousness of the voyager to a great extent and has a significant pressure on his senses, it is by no means surprising that in this stage of the mystical practices the voyager frequently has visions. Thus, al-Kubrā explains and classifies here the different varieties of visions. The important thing for the reader (or originally, the listener) is, however, the personal character of these explanations and admonitions, the way he calls the attention of his disciple to the mystical realities, saying ‘know!’, ‘you’, or ‘from you’ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 171). Of course, one should say that ‘you’ (*anta*) is the so-called general subject in Arabic, but here the context is always very personal, and the author does not speak in the general sense.

are put into the second person singular which emphasises that it is about a master–disciple relation.

⁶⁷ There is a triple pun (*ḡinās*) here: *taḥallā* (got rid of), *taḥallā* (became decorated) and *taḡallā* (appeared), which also helps to understand the situation for the disciples.

Then al-Kubrā speaks about the presences (*maḥādir*) of the different attributes of God, which are the essential elements of the visions in this stage of the voyage. He explains the two types of visions: one is the so called ‘lower’ (*adnā*) vision, which is linked to earthly phenomena. But what are seen in the state of absence from his senses (*ḡayb*), is not identical with the ones seen in the state of conscious witnessing (*ṣahāda*). These are similar to the mirages: images, colours, seas, lights, deserts, villages, wells, castles, and the like. The second type is the ‘upper’ (*a’lā*) vision, which is linked to heaven: the Sun, the Moon, the stars, the constellations of the stars and the lunar mansions. The principle of the visions, of which al-Kubrā gives a detailed presentation, is that in every human being there are jewels from every metal and the seeker (*tālib*) finds these metals and the jewels made from them by his pure volition and truthfulness. During his upper vision he can perceive only those celestial bodies of which he found in himself the appropriate metals, i.e., jewels. When he sees more and more celestial bodies, he becomes gradually purer and purer. The meaning of this explanation is that visions must be acquired by previous spiritual activities of the voyager (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 165–166).

These visions help the voyager to become in possession of divine attributes. God, al-Kubrā says, has several presences and each of them differs from all the others, since these are the presences of the divine attributes. These attributes manifest themselves (*taḡalliyāt*) one by one for the voyager if he glorifies the Lord by different kinds of glorification (*tasbīḥāt*), that is, it means a higher degree of the usual remembrance. The rapid and long-lasting repetition of the *tasbīḥāt* assures him of the manifestation of the attributes, saying: *subḥāna l-’alī*, *subḥāna l-a’lā*, *rabbī wa-qādirī*, *aḥadun aḥad*.⁶⁸ The use of the *misbaḥa* for this purpose, though not mentioned by al-Kubrā, has always been a well-known practice of the Sūfis in their private remembrances up to our time.

The author then explains why these manifestations may become possible. Because the heart of the seeker has a share of every divine attribute, although the possessors (i.e., the friends of God) of the hearts are dissimilar in this respect, everyone has his own share according to his endeavours. This explanatory model is intended to show the disciples how to interpret two basic mystical teachings: (i) The (mystical) path leads to God in the depth of the heart (*sirr* or *sarīra*) and (ii) the friends of God must strive to strip one’s worldly attributes (*taḡrīd*) and replace them (*tabdīl*) with divine attributes, exclusively concentrating on them (*tafrīd*). Consequently, all this is only possible because the human heart is so created as to be capable of taking in the manifestation of the divine presences, which contain the

⁶⁸ “The High be praised, the Most High be praised, My Lord and My Possessing Power, (the) One, One (be praised)”. According to a *ḥadīth*, it was Bilāl, the first *mu’addin* of Islam, who used the expression “One, One” every time when he was tortured by the pagan Meccans. See, e.g., Ibn Raḡab, *Ġāmi’* 934.

divine attributes. The manifestation is first through knowledge, by knowing the worlds, their beginnings, and the return to God in the paradise, then by means of vision, and finally by way of getting into the possession of the given attribute (*ittiṣāf*). This happens as if the heart melted into the divine presence, gradually acknowledging the character of his attributes and the supremacy of God's attributes (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 167).

At this point, as in some other parts of the *Fawā'ih*, the train of the thought is incomplete, and the author does not explain *verbatim* the purpose of the description of one or more mystical visions and their correlation with the previous part. However, we may suppose that the listeners⁶⁹ of al-Kubrā's teaching put questions asking for clarification, which had not been inserted into the book. That is why some modern scholars consider the *Fawā'ih*, although it contains valuable thoughts and rare descriptions, unordered and inconsequent.

After explaining the character and modes of the divine manifestation, the author continues, without any introductory notes, with the description of the lights which ascend and descend, the ascending lights coming from the heart, and the descending ones coming from the divine throne (*'arṣ*).

The encounter of the two types of light realises what the Qur'ān says: *nūr 'alā nūr*.⁷⁰ This is meant to interpret the previous discussion about the possibility of the divine manifestation and the reception of the divine attributes – all of this is the result of the activities of these divine lights. The encounter of the lights also means the reality (*ḥaqīqa*), that “a state of merging with God” (*ḡam'iyya*)⁷¹ comes into being on the basis of mutual longing between the friend of God and God”, because “a door opens from the heart to the Throne and as the heart longs for the Throne, the Throne longs for the heart”. This term refers to the state when the voyager refuses to accept

⁶⁹ I also suppose, as mentioned above, that the book was put in writing during one or more *imlā'* sessions.

⁷⁰ Qur'ān 24:35: “God is the light of the heavens and the earth. ... Light upon light. God guides to his light those whom He wishes, and God coins parallels for the people. God knows everything.” Jones's translation. al-Quṣayrī (*Laṭā'if* II, 368) gives the following mystical interpretation of the three words: “*nūr 'alā nūr*: there is a (human) light what they received by their endeavours (*ḡuhūd*), reasoning (*naẓar*) and argumentation (*istidlāl*), and there is a (divine) light what they found by the grace of God. It is an explanation (*bayān*) which He added to their argument (*burhān*), or insight (*'iyān*) which He added to their explanation. So, it is (the meaning of) light upon light”.

⁷¹ This term was coined by al-Kubrā instead of the usual Sūfī term *ḡam'*, perhaps to evade the possibility of confusing it with the everyday meaning of the word *ḡam'*, or even more possibly, to emphasise the special reference given to the word by him.

everything – human creatures, this world, and the afterlife - except for God.⁷² It is explained as the state of being in the presence of God (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 168).

The driving force, 'the secret of voyage and attraction',⁷³ behind the endeavour to approach God, to be near Him (*qurb*) is divine love, so not surprisingly al-Kubrā discusses at this point the role and possibility of love:⁷⁴ "There is a precious jewel in you and it grants you a state in which you can see its likeness in the heaven: the fire of yearning (*šawq*), love (*maḥabba*) and passion ('*išq*').⁷⁵ Every time a light ascends from you, another light descends upon you (from the heaven)"⁷⁶ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 168–169). That means, according to the author, that the aim of the mystical journey is nothing more than to purify this jewel to repair its imperfection to be suitable for the attraction of the heavenly jewel, which is stronger and more perfect (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 169).

Then al-Kubrā addresses his pupils: "You have to know that the soul, the Satan, and the angel are not (existing) outside of you but within you."⁷⁷ Then he adds: "The heavens, the earth and the Divine Footstall (*al-kursī*)⁷⁸ are also not things (*ašyā'*) (existing) outside of you,⁷⁹ as well as the Paradise and Hell, death and life are all

⁷² It is stated by many mediaeval authorities that the basis of this term and its usage is a Qur'ānic *āya* (3:18): *šahida llāhu annahu lā ilāha illā huwa*, "God bears witness that there is no god but Him", considering that caring for anything else is unbelief (*širk*). The Šūfis contrast this state with the 'departure' (*tafriqa*), which necessarily follows immediately after the former state. See as-Sarrāğ, *Luma'* 283 ff.

⁷³ *sirru s-sayri wa-l-ğadb*, (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 168).

⁷⁴ On the relation of '*išq*' and *maḥabba*, see ad-Daylamī, '*Aṭf al-alif* 49 ff.

⁷⁵ On the relation of the two terms, see ad-Daylamī, '*Aṭf al-alif* 12–14, chapter 2: *hal yağūz iṭlāq al-'išq 'alā llāh wa-min Allāh?* Bell, English tr. 8–9: "May the word '*išq*' be applied to love for God and from God?"

⁷⁶ *nūr 'alā nūr*.

⁷⁷ Literally: "but you are them (*bal anta hum*)". This is the basic idea and *leitmotif* that directs Ibn al-Ğawzī throughout his famous work, *Talbīs Iblīs*. See, e.g., *Talbīs* 32: *ḍikr al-i'lāmi bi-'anna ma'a kulli insānin šayṭānan* ('Mentioning the information that each human has a devil accompanying him'), or *Talbīs* 33: (*innahu*) *bayānun anna š-šayṭāna yağrī min ibni ādama mağrā d-dam*. ('It is obvious that the devil flows through the human being like blood'). Although the *Talbīs* had been written in the youth of al-Kubrā, so he may have read it when he stayed in Baghdad, there is no evidence that he actually did it.

⁷⁸ Cf. al-Ğilī, *Insān kāmil* 145: *al-kursiyyu 'ibāratun 'an tağallī ğumlati š-šifāti l-fi'liyyati fa-huwa mağharu l-iqtidāri l-ilāhī ... markazu l-farqi wa-l-ğam'*. 'The Footstall means the revelation of all the active divine attributes. It is the manifestation of the divine might ... and the centre of gathering and separation.' Cf. Qur'an 2:255: "His Footstall extends over the heavens and the earth" (T.I.'s translation). See also Miftāḥ 2019:34. Cf. also Ibn 'Arabī, *Futūḥāt* I, 289: *kursī aš-šifāt*. For a summary of the use of the term *kursī* in Šūfism, see al-Āğam, 1999: 789. Cf. Morrissey 2020:39.

⁷⁹ Since it surrounds everything in the created world. See al-Kubrā, *Tafsīr* I, 330.

things within you. When you make your voyage and become pure, you will see all these things clearly”⁸⁰ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 171).

4.13 *The lights of the heavens and the earth*

About these lights, al-Kubrā says the following: “When the circle of the face has become pure, the lights pour out as the water bubbles from the spring, and the voyager feels that these lights are gushing forth from the circles of his face. The lights are coming and going, like the Sun during the day or the seesaw of the children. This outpouring takes place between the two eyes and between the eyebrows. Finally, it spreads to cover the whole face. At that moment, before you, before your face, there is another face also of light, irradiating lights, while behind its translucent veil a sun becomes visible, seemingly animated by a movement to and fro in the body of the voyager. He has the sensory perception of this irradiation of lights that proceed through the whole of his person. Often the veil falls, and the total reality of the person is revealed, and then with the whole of his body, he perceives it. The opening of the inner sight, the visual organ of light (*baṣīra*) begins in the eyes, then in the face, then in the chest, and then in the entire body. Next, the whole of his person is immersed in purity, and suddenly he senses the emergence of the light of the man of light, who is his supervisor (*muqaddam*), and the master in the (divine) unseen world, his ‘suprasensory personal Guide’ (*ṣayḥ al-ḡayb*),⁸¹ or in another name, the balance of the unseen world” (*mīzān al-ḡayb*).⁸²

“He is an inner guide”, al-Kubrā continues, “whose existence is in the voyager from the beginning of his voyage. But then he is black as an African (*zanḡī*), because darkness dominates the voyager “since the clothes of existence are dark”. Then he seemingly disappears from the side of the voyager, but in reality “you are him; he enters you and becomes united with you (*yattaḥidu bika*)”⁸³ (al-Kubrā *Fawā’ih* 170–171).

⁸⁰ Cf. al-Ġīlī, *Insān kāmil* 61: *taḡallī l-ḥaqq subḥānahu wa-ta’ālā fī af’ālihi ‘ibāratun ‘an maṣḥadin yarā fīhi l-‘abdu ḡarayāna l-quḍrati fī l-aṣyā’* “The revelation of God in His Activities corresponds to a contemplative state (*maṣḥad*) where the servant sees the Divine Power (*quḍra*) evolve in things.”, tr. by Burckhardt 1983:35.

⁸¹ See Corbin 1978:10.

⁸² This name refers to his role of one who weighs the activities and the feelings of the voyager.

⁸³ According to Corbin (1978:10): “(The wayfarer), accompanied by the *shaykh al-ḡayb*, his ‘suprasensory personal Guide’, is led and directed toward his own center.” Thus, he unequivocally regards this guide as existing outside the ‘seeker’ (*murīd*), though al-Kubrā, in my interpretation, considers this master (Ṣayḥ) identical with the seeker, united with him in his inner heart – in common language we should call it ‘his better half’ whom he attained through a rough journey. This *ṣayḥ al-ḡayb* may be identical with the *imām mubīn* at al-Ġīlī, *Marātib* 28–29, which is interpreted by Nicholson 1921:83–84 as the ‘human spirit’. Cf.

Then he continues: “(This inner guide) is only black because of the clothes of the dark (worldly) existence. When you had annihilated the existence (removing it) from him, and the lights of remembrance and yearning had burnt his (black) clothes, the essence took off its (outer) clothes and also became luminous” (al-Kubrā *Fawā’ih* 171). The author emphasises the importance and origin of these lights. For this purpose, he uses several Qur’ānic verses. In Qur’ān 24:35 God is called the light of the heavens and the earth, and this light is identical to the source of the light of the Prophet through the power of God.⁸⁴ al-Kubrā says that the friends of God and all the believers receive light⁸⁵ from this power⁸⁶ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 172).

This absent master is no one other than his innermost self, who develops together with his spiritual development during his voyage. The author says: “Know, that the voyager has a witness who is called ‘the master in absence’. He raises the voyager towards the heaven, so that he (finally) emerges into the heaven. This is the proof that he is his witness, and is even identical with him, since the voyager moves with his movement, reposes with his reposing, his heart overflows (*yafīḍu*)⁸⁷ with divine emanation with his overflowing (*fayaḍān*), he becomes in the state of ‘extension’ (*bast*),⁸⁸ because of his appearance, and becomes in the state of ‘constriction’ (*qabḍ*)⁸⁹ because of his disappearance.⁹⁰ This, when (the hidden master) became clear and illuminated (*tanawwara*), indicates that the scale of the balance had inclined towards him. But when he blackened or disappeared or hid behind the

Morrissey 2020:39. The expression goes back to Ibn ‘Arabī, *Futūḥāt*, ed. by Yaḥyā, III, 149 ff., where a whole sub-chapter bears the title “*Fī manzil al-manāzil aw al-imām al-mubīn*”.

⁸⁴ ‘izza, see Qur’ān 35:10.

⁸⁵ Although European scholars have always sought for external influences, in the case of the light theory of al-Kubrā ‘the neo-Zoroastrian Platonism’ (Corbin 1978:6), there are no positive facts which would support these views. On the contrary, there is the Light verse of the Qur’ān which may have been the sole source of al-Kubrā’s theory as he states. Furthermore, the concepts of the black light and the light of night are natural phenomena and hardly need to be traced back to old Iranian origin. See Corbin 1978:5.

⁸⁶ Cf. Qur’ān 63:8: *li-llāhi l-‘izzatu wa-li-rasūlihi*. Muḥāsibī (*Ādāb an-nufūs* 76 ff.) treats ‘izz and ‘izza in detail, saying that attributing power or glory (‘izz) to the soul (*nafs*) causes illness in the heart (*qalb*) and only real truthfulness (*sidq*) can fight against it, since, as the Qur’ānic *āya* 35:10 states, all the power belongs exclusively to God.

⁸⁷ See Ağam, 1999:741: *al-fayḍu (huwa) t-taḡallī d-dā’imu llaḡī lam yazal wa-lā yazāl*, “the overflowing (emanation) is the constant manifestation (of God), which did not cease and will not cease”. Cf. al-Ğilānī, *Fuyūḍāt* 5, where God is the one who is present in every movement and reposing of the ‘Greatest Succour’, i.e., ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Ğilānī.

⁸⁸ ‘Elation’ or ‘expansion’, psychologically ‘extroversion’.

⁸⁹ ‘Contraction’, psychologically ‘introversion’. See in detail Iványi 2012.

⁹⁰ The two words originate from the Qur’ān 2:245: *wa-llāhu yaqbiḍu wa-yabsuṭu*. “God straitens and is bountiful”, tr. by Jones 2007.

curtain (*hiğāb*), it indicates that the scale of the balance had decreased in weight” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 172).

When the voyager reaches this state, he can visualise the books of God’s unseen world (*gayb*), which God has written partly with letter points (*naqt*), partly with vowel signs (*aškāl*), and partly simply with letter forms (*hurūf*). These have strange names, such as ‘the spring of the pious’, or ‘the collection of secrets’. In the beginning, he sees books which are understandable and reasonable, written fully vocalised, like the Qur’ān. Then he arrives at the innermost secret (*sirr*) which he may understand, or he may not, because of the darkness of the forgotten material existence, which may retract him. Then he sees books written with points and quadrangle vowel signs and finds with joy that he reads them and understands them and gets acquainted with the knowledge imparted by God (*‘ilm ladunī*).⁹¹ After returning to the material existence, he forgets all this, but the sweetness of understanding will remain in his heart. He believes in it and this causes him to wish, and yearn for love, and passion in his heart (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 173).

4.14 Visions seen in heaven during remembrance (*ḍikr*)

Then during the remembrance of God, heaven with its planets may appear to him as the Qur’ān which he can read and understand from the meaning of the points of the letters (*naqt*) (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 174). The *ḍikr* is never mentioned in the *Fawā’ih* as a congregational event or as an individual function, prescribed to the disciple by his master at certain definite times. Such remembrance rituals may have possibly been performed during the ‘voyage’ of the disciple, but what al-Kubrā mentions here and earlier is the remembrance of God, which is caused by visions experienced during his ecstatic states. That kind of remembrance can be called spontaneous or automatic *ḍikr*. Now looking at heaven, he can receive mystical knowledge: “Perhaps the most luminous star, the Canopus of the remembrance will appear for him from a distance and the Venus of the joy by God.”⁹² This leads to the final aim of the voyager, the love of God.⁹³

⁹¹ On the significance of this divine knowledge, see the near contemporary Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Futūḥāt*, III, 275, where he considers it equal to a prophetic revelation. (*fa-innahu kāna yanbağī lahu an lā yağma’a bayna l-ḥaqqi wa-l-ḥalqi fī ḍamīrin wāḥidin illā bi-iğnin ilāhiyyin min rasūlin aw ‘ilmin ladunī*.)

⁹² In this passage of his work al-Kubrā may have been influenced by the great Muslim astronomer, the Persian ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān aṣ-Ṣūfī (died 986) and his book written in Arabic *Šuwar al-kawākib at-tamāniya wa-l-arba’in*.

⁹³ al-Huğwīrī says explaining a saying of aṣ-Šiblī (died 946) on poverty and trouble: “Their spiritual state (is changed) into love and their love into contemplation, so that finally the brain of the aspirant becomes wholly a centre of vision through the predominance of his imagination: he sees without eye, and hears without ear” (al-Huğwīrī, *Kaṣf* 27).

At this stage, each and every voyager receives one of the names of God, while His secret Greatest Name would spring from their hearts.⁹⁴ The author now presents his disciples with the miracles of knowledge (*ma'rifā*) and love (*maḥabba*), signifying the end of their destination (*nihāyat al-amr*) (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 177). He writes: “Love is the yield of knowledge, since whoever does not have knowledge cannot love. But His love for us precedes our love for Him. Who loves a thing remembers it constantly, as God the Sublime says:⁹⁵ “He had lied, who had claimed that he had loved Me, then when the night descended, forgot Me”, that is, falling asleep.

The miracles of love are made more personal and understandable for the voyagers by mystical love stories, like that of Samnūn al-Muḥibb (‘the Lover’)⁹⁶ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 177–178). Another similar story is quoted from al-Ġunayd about a blind man and a boy (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 180–181).⁹⁷ At the end of this section, the author tells his own love story to characterise the fire of passion: “The passionate lover may become (totally) absorbed in (his) passionate love, so that the lover will become the same as his love, then this passionate love will become (totally) absorbed in the beloved one (that is, God)”⁹⁸ al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 182–183). “Passionate love of God

⁹⁴ On the Greatest Name of God (*al-ism al-a'ẓam*) in the *Fawā'ih*, see Iványi 2022:61–62. Cf. Meier 1957:150 ff.

⁹⁵ al-Kubrā presents this saying as a *ḥadīṭ qudsī*: *yaqūlu subḥānahu wa-ta'ālā “kaḍība man idda'ā maḥabbatī tumma idā ǧannahu l-laylu nāma 'annī”*. It is, however, not included into the known collections and not accepted by the religious scholars as one. See al-Quṣayrī, *Risāla*, tr. by Knysh 394: ‘They say that God Most High revealed to David – peace be upon him: “Whoever falls asleep when the night comes, lies when he claims that he loves Me.”’ This translation, however, omits the most important word, ‘*annī*’. In Arabic, see al-Quṣayrī, *Risāla*, ed. by Maḥmūd et al. 609: The saying there corresponds with al-Kubrā’s text but it is introduced with “It is said” (*qīla*). This saying has often been attributed to such early Ṣūfīs as al-Fuḍayl b. ‘Iyād and Abū Sulaymān ad-Dārānī. See, e.g., Abū Nu’aym, *Ḥilya* VIII, 99–100. Also in Ibn al-‘Adīm, *Buġya* 1455: *qāla (al-Fuḍaylu) yanzilu llāhu kulla laylatin ilā s-samā’i d-dunyā wa yaqūlu (ilā āḥirihi)*. Cf. aṭ-Tuyūrī, *Tuyūriyyāt* 1034, where it is also ad-Dārānī who quotes God’s saying but with a small change in the sentence: *idā nāmati l-‘uyūnu kaḍība man idda'ā maḥabbatī idā ǧannahu l-laylu nāma 'annī*. In both works the saying continues with a detailed explanation from God of what the behaviour of the true lover should be like, together with a reference to the Last Judgement. Something similar can be found in al-Ġilānī, *Ġunya* II. 99

⁹⁶ Abū l-Ḥasan Samnūn b. Ḥamza al-Ḥawwās (died between 909 and 912) was called ‘The Lover’ because he wrote several love poems to God. See the story in Iványi 2022:70. Cf. as-Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt*, ed. by ‘Aṭā 158–162.

⁹⁷ See Iványi 2022:71.

⁹⁸ *qad yafnā l-‘āšiqu fī l-‘išqi fa-yakūnu l-‘āšiqu huwa l-‘išqa tumma yafnā l-‘išqu fī l-ma’šūq*.

may result in annihilation of the consciousness of the voyager, since God raises him to Himself" (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 179).

4.15 Explanation of the terms station and state

At this stage of the voyage the author feels necessary to explain the essence of the mystical states and stations,⁹⁹ their roles and their connections.¹⁰⁰ Here, I want to highlight only the simplest and most easily comprehensible definition ever given to these two fundamental categories of the mystical voyage, proving at the same time the basic teaching intention why the *Fawā'ih* was written: "State means food provisions and beverages, and vessel of the voyage, while station means alighting and rest from the fatigue of the voyage" (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 185–186). The author here presents the states and stations with descriptions, which are always of pedagogical character and are quite different from those found in the well-known Šūfī handbooks. His short characterisations contain mainly similes and metaphors taken from everyday life¹⁰¹ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 181 ff).

At this point, the author explains how he interprets the two divine attributes¹⁰² in the title of his book, Beauty or Kindness (*ḡamāl*) and Glory or Majesty (*ḡalāl*): the first is equal to mercy (*raḥma*) and favour (*faḍl*), while the second is equal to respect (*hayba*) and might (*ḡabarūt*) (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 190–191). The divine Beauty comes necessarily first in the title¹⁰³ since this attribute encourages the voyager to start on his way and ensures him during the voyage of the loving providence and benevolence of God. However, al-Kubrā says, he must always be aware of the fact that it is God the Almighty who arranges and directs his voyage and it is He who decides on the fortune of his endeavours (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 191).

The author then makes a comparison in his customary way by simile between knowledge and love on the one hand and the annihilation of consciousness (*fanā'*)¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ *ḥāl wa-maqām*.

¹⁰⁰ See details in Iványi, 2022:67 ff.

¹⁰¹ See Iványi 2022:66.

¹⁰² Cf. al-Quṣayrī, *Risāla*, ed. by Maḥmūd et al. 245.

¹⁰³ Although there are manuscripts with the reverse order of the divine names, that is, *al-ḡalāl wa-l-ḡamāl*, or with the reverse order of the modified nouns (*al-muḍāf*): *Fawātiḥ al-ḡamāl wa-fawā'ih al-ḡalāl*. This order of the title is found in Hāḡḡī Ḥalīfā, *Kaṣf az-zunūn* II, 1293, and al-Ḥwānsārī, *Rawḍāt* I. 297, as well.

¹⁰⁴ There are scholars, in the East and the West, who consider that the term *fanā'* reflects the influence of Buddhism. There may be two objections to this view: First, *fanā'* always occurs together with its counterpart, *baqā'*, so its meaning is not 'total annihilation' but only that of the worldly attributes, second, it is unnecessary to search always for outside influences, when the Qur'ān itself contains this pair of terms, see 55:26–27: *kullu man 'alayhā fānin wa yabqā waḡhu rabbika*. "Everyone on it (on earth) perishes, but the face of your (sing.) Lord." Tr. by Jones. Cf. al-Ḡīlānī, *Futūḥ* 12, where the author defines *fanā'* as the annihilation of the worldly connections and the annihilation of the worldly passion and

and its survival in God (*baqā'*) on the other: "The wings of knowledge and love do not stay firm together. Indeed, the wing of knowledge precedes the wing of love, although knowledge is always inseparable from love, like the shadow of a thing that joins it in its increase and decrease. The same holds true for annihilation and survival as well. Every time he becomes annihilated from others than Him, he survives by Him. Every time he becomes separated from others than Him, he becomes united with Him." (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 194–195). But there are prerequisites to reach the final stations of annihilation of the self and survival in God: the stations of effacement and fixing (*maqāmāt al-maḥw wa-l-iṭbāt*) and the stations of sobriety and inebriety (*aṣ-ṣaḥw wa-s-sukr*). "Every time the voyager becomes sober from others than God, he becomes inebriated by the drink of witnessing His presence (*ṣuhūd*). Every time the Truth effaces him, that is, his worldly attributes, He fixes him in the state of being in his intimate proximity" (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 195).

The disciples may have asked their Master, al-Kubrā, about the nature of their desire to reach divine love and intimacy, since the author writes the following explanation: "If someone asked: What is the pair of the longing from among the wings? Or is it a wing having no pair? We would answer: It is in the position (*manzila*)¹⁰⁵ of love, so its pair is the knowledge (*'irfān*), since the voyager longs according to the degree of his knowledge". Then the different degrees of knowledge are presented by easily understandable similes¹⁰⁶ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 195–196).

4.16 The Divine Love

After reaching the station of knowledge of God, al-Kubrā makes the voyager turn his attention to the Divine love.¹⁰⁷ His most important teaching for him is the generally accepted idea that he can only reach the station of the love of God by His love of him, not as a result of his own endeavour – but the prerequisite is that he should feel a true love for God and become annihilated in this love. Only then would his love and the love of the Beloved (God) be united¹⁰⁸ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 196).

human will. He explains the expression by a parable taken from the life of the royal courts. See *ibid.* 97. See also Ritter 2003 in many places under the terms 'extinction' and 'immersion'.

¹⁰⁵ This term had been first used by al-Harawī, *Manāzil*, and it did not occur in another work before al-Kubrā's time, although it cannot be taken for sure that al-Kubrā knew al-Harawī's work.

¹⁰⁶ See Iványi 2022:67, fn. 103. Ibn 'Arabī calls it *al-'irfānu l-ilāhī*, which can be reached through Divine Unification (*at-tawḥīd*). See *Futūḥāt*, ed. by Yaḥyā, XI, 460.

¹⁰⁷ Since I presented all his examples and similes related to the term 'love' in Iványi 2022, I do not wish to repeat them here.

¹⁰⁸ Worded with a nice paronomasia: *fa-iḍā fanā l-muḥibbu fī l-maḥabbati ttahadat maḥabbatuhu bi-maḥabbati l-ḥabīb*. Similar notions can be found in the following century in Rūmī's love poetry, see Chittick 1983:179–180.

The Divine love can only be achieved if the heart of the voyager is exclusively occupied and concentrated on God on his voyage.¹⁰⁹ This concentration has a beginning and an end. Its beginning is volition (*irāda*), then quest for the Real One, (*ṭalab al-Ḥaqq*), then binding the heart to its innermost part (*marār*),¹¹⁰ then free disposal (*taṣarruf*) of the volition over the world of things perceptible through the senses. The next step is ‘being’ (*kawn*), that is, the creation of concentration power to allow it to percept sensible images¹¹¹ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 199).

The author states that concentration is the fruit of gathering in love with God (*ḡam ‘iyya*) and also forms its deepest secret (*sirr*), in contrast to separation from God (*tafriqa*).¹¹² “There is no greater blessing than gathering and no greater torture than separation, since the heart reaches the Divine Throne (*al-‘arṣ*) through gathering, or the Divine Throne reaches the heart, or they may meet in the middle of the road. The even higher rank of gathering¹¹³ means that both the heart and the Throne vanish in The Real One”. The time God settles on the Throne is like the time he settles on the heart. The difference is that while His settling on the Throne comes from His Glory (*ḡalāl*), His settling himself in the heart comes from His Grace (*ḡamāl*). This is the meaning of the attributes *ar-raḥmān ar-raḥīm*:¹¹⁴ the first means ‘He is settled on His Throne’, while the second means ‘He is manifested in the hearts’¹¹⁵ (al-Kubrā,

¹⁰⁹ The words ‘occupation’ or ‘concentration’ are meant here to be the translation or rather paraphrasing of the term *himma* (resolution).

¹¹⁰ That means, the quest for the Divine secret hidden by God.

¹¹¹ The following event from the life of the author is related here to explain this term (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 199–200): In his early youth he spent the night alone in their house and was trusted with keeping an eye on the household material against the thieves. At night the devil did not cease to speak to him, and his soul (*nafs*) was also telling him that the door might have been opened and a thief had entered the house, till his (disquieting) concern created a non-existent thief through his deceived senses, fear, and false imagination. Later, he found the door closed and there was no sign of the presence of a thief in the house this night, thus it was his resolution (*himma*) that created these things. Although according to this story, his concentration deceived him in his youth, the narration of this event serves to emphasise the creative power of the concentration and concern. This narrative can be considered unique in that it tells a story of a childhood experience for the explanation of a mystical notion. It also confirms the greatly pedagogical character of the *Fawā’ih*.

¹¹² These terms of al-Kubrā correspond to the usual Ṣūfī terms *ḡam*’ and *farq*, cf. al-Quṣayrī, *Risāla*, ed. by Maḥmūd et al., 144 ff.

¹¹³ ‘The gathering of the gathering’, *ḡam ‘iyyatu l-ḡam ‘iyya*. Cf. al-Quṣayrī, *Risāla*, ed. by Maḥmūd et al., 146 ff., where he uses the term *ḡam ‘u l-ḡam*’ in a similar meaning.

¹¹⁴ ‘The Merciful and the Compassionate’.

¹¹⁵ Here al-Kubrā refers to a Qur’ānic *āya* (20:5) the interpretation of which caused problems for both the Qur’ān exegesists and the theologians: “The Merciful [who] settled himself on the throne.” (tr. by Jones) or according to another translation: “The Beneficent who is established on the Throne” (tr. by Pickthall). The verb in the Qurān is *istawā* and this

Fawā'ih 200–201). Then he turns to his disciples and interprets this for them: “If you mention, or remember, the word *ar-rahmān* or hear it from someone else, you taste all the attributes of the Divine Glory (*ğalāl*). ... If you mention, or remember, the word *ar-rahīm* or hear it from someone else, you taste all the attributes of the Divine Grace (*ğamāl*).” The cause of this difference, he continues, lies in the fact that “... the *alif*¹¹⁶ is heavenly while the *yā*¹¹⁷ is earthly. God, in His heavens, represents grandeur, majesty, power, might, sublimeness, high degree of force and strength.¹¹⁸ On the contrary, God, when He turns towards the earth and fills the heart of His friend, represents mercy, benevolence, affection, peace and blessing”¹¹⁹ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 201). To exemplify his instructions, al-Kubrā speaks about his youthful vision when the words of the *basmala*¹²⁰ were written for him in his spiritual tablet and these were the signs of knowledge he had obtained in his heart (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 205).

4.17 The secrets of the letters

The above explication induces the author to enter into a long section about the letters of the Arabic alphabet, their significance on the mystical voyage and their secrets, the knowledge of which is incumbent on the voyager (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 202). This passage introduces the disciples to the symbolic allusions that bind the shape of the letters to some natural and supernatural beings. For instance, the sun and the moon and other celestial bodies and the seven heavens the first of which consists of the letters of the Arabic alphabet, in form and meaning.

He says that the circle of the letter '*ayn*¹²¹ which symbolises the moon, does not appear at once but only slowly, it grows slowly as the new moon grows from the first day to the middle of the month.¹²² The voyager can taste, when writing this letter, the taste of the moon and the lunar mansions the number of which is 28 just like the number of Arabic letters. This circle – the circle of the letter '*ayn* and the moon – does not remain in the same state; it changes its colour and size depending on the extent of the voyage.

same verb is used by al-Kubrā here twice in its infinitive form *istiwā'*. Cf. al-Kubrā, *Tafsīr* IV, 186: *ay 'alā 'arši qalbika*.

¹¹⁶ In the word *rahmān*, since the *alif*, a straight line, points upwards to the heaven.

¹¹⁷ In the word *rahīm*, since the *yā*', with two points under the line of the script, points downwards to the earth.

¹¹⁸ The Arabic terms of these divine attributes are *kibriyā'*, '*aẓma*, *qudra*, '*izza*, *ta'ālā*, *šiddatu l-baṭṣ* and *quwwa*, respectively.

¹¹⁹ The Arabic terms of these divine attributes are *rahma*, *karam*, '*atf*, *salām* and *ni'ma*, respectively.

¹²⁰ *bismi llāhi r-rahmāni r-rahīm*, “In the name of the Merciful and Compassionate God”.

¹²¹ He may mean here the independent form of the letter, which contains two circles.

¹²² He may refer here to the process of writing the letter.

The letters (*hurūf*) are connected with everything in the life of the voyager: the number of the letters are 28 or 29¹²³ as the number of the days in the Islamic month, the number of the declination¹²⁴ of the moon in its house¹²⁵, the 32 teeth in his mouth which is the pivot of the letters. This passage reminds at the same time the disciples to their study in Arabic, which is not their mother tongue. The author says: “God writes His volition and decisions with His pen on the well-preserved tablet¹²⁶ (written in Arabic) which are fixed and are not voluntary”. These words of God appear in the spirit (*rūh*) and when the voyager is in the mystic state of the knowledge of the secret of the letters these inscriptions may even take visible shapes for him. The final result of knowing the secrets of these divine letters is that the voyager discovers the deep sense of what the prophet Muḥammad said, on the authority of God: “Then he speaks by Me”, that is, the friend of God (*walī Allāh*) can always speak, walk, practice strength only by God’s volition and power¹²⁷ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 214).

4.18 The extension (bast) of the heart of the voyager after a long constriction (qabḍ)¹²⁸

Then the voyager’s efforts result in reaching the apex, but not the end, of his voyage: “When the voyager reaches this station he drives away the worries of his voyage and relaxes,¹²⁹ the respect (*hayba*) changes to the joy of intimacy (*uns*)¹³⁰ with the Real One, instead of the previous constriction, that is, distress, the heart becomes the place of extension, that is, relief. When the voyager completely submerges in this new feeling, he is obliged to say such expressions as like al-Biṣṭāmī: *subḥānī, subḥānī, mā a’ẓama ša’nī*, ‘my majesty, my majesty, how great is my rank’.¹³¹ But if he

¹²³ The 29th letter is the *lām alif*, not always considered an independent letter.

¹²⁴ In Arabic *inḥirāf*, a paronomasia for the letters, *hurūf*, since both words originate from the same consonantal stem.

¹²⁵ Another reference to the correspondence between the number of the Arabic letters and the number of the days in the lunar calendar.

¹²⁶ *al-lawḥu l-mahfūz*.

¹²⁷ This is a so called *ḥadīṭ qudsī*, i.e., when the Prophet is only the mouth which utters the words of God – but its authenticity does not reach that of the text of the Qur’ān.

¹²⁸ For the use of the two terms, see Iványi 2012.

¹²⁹ *faraḡun ba’da š-šidda*.

¹³⁰ Cf. al-Ġazālī, *Iḥyā’* IV, 329: “Intimacy and fear are both signs of the (divine) love.”

¹³¹ Cf. Badawī, *Šaṭaḥāt* 143. This saying was not known by the great encyclopaedias of Šūfism, like as-Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt*, as-Sulamī, *Muqaddima*, al-Kalābādī, *Ta’arruf*, al-Quṣayrī, *Risāla*, or al-Ḥuḡwīrī, *Kašf*, and it is not contained in Baqlī’s *Šarḥ*, either. as-Sarrāḡ, *Luma’* 472 contains only the first part of this saying: *subḥānī, subḥānī*, while the whole saying can be found in Aṭṭār, *Taḍkira*, (English tr. by Arberry 141, Persian text, ed. by Nicholson, vol. I, 140. Badawī’s quotation is based on Abū Ṭayfūr as-Saḥlaḡī’s *Manāqib Abī Yazīd*. We cannot know, however, al-Kubrā’s source, since Aṭṭār’s work was finished in 1221 shortly

abstains, he only says: *subḥānahu, subḥānahu, mā a'ẓama ša'nuhu*, 'His majesty, His majesty, how great is His rank' (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 206).

4.19 The fires of remembrance¹³²

At this station of relaxation and joy the voyager should submerge in continuous remembrance. If he starts remembering God, the soldiers of remembrance attack him from every direction like a swarm of locusts, and the noise made by them sounds like the reverberation of his voice repeating God's names. The remembrance falls in his heart, his power of mental perception opens up, and he takes a liking to seclusion (*ḥalwa*). Then, at this stage, his heart becomes the hiding place of the fires of remembrance¹³³ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 207). Remembrance must not be interrupted and if it has reached the highest degree¹³⁴ it continues in the heart even when the rememberer falls asleep. It happens when the heart and spirit succeeded in eliminating their earthly parts (*ağzā' turābiyya*), that is, the earthly attachments, and becoming strong in spirituality (*rūḥāniyya*). al-Kubrā then gives instructions to his disciple how to perform this last great remembrance, when he prepares for sleeping by lying on his side. He feels, without doubt, as if he were sitting when remembering God,¹³⁵ although he is still lying on the earth. It will be such an unconscious act that it surprises even him. al-Kubrā, however, gives again a simile of everyday life: A man who had been accustomed to being always in an upright position when he once sat down would feel the sensation of being still in an upright position. Thus, when he lies down during his remembrance, he continues it without noticing the change of his position and he can remember God even in his sleep (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 209).

4.20 The secrets of seclusion (*ḥalwa*)

After this final remembrance, the voyager should enter seclusion according to the instructions of his Šayḫ. The adherent of the seclusion, who is separated from the world to God, must be in the state of constant perception of everything that he was associated with outside his seclusion by way of imagination and vision. If he proved to be weak, the outside world would attract him and pull him out of his seclusion.

after al-Kubrā's death in the same year. It may have been, as in other cases, one of his teachers' oral communications.

¹³² *nīrānu ḡ-dīkr*. It is an unusual description of the remembrance.

¹³³ The description of the remembrance is followed by an episode of a personal experience told for teaching purpose, related in detail in Iványi 2022:59.

¹³⁴ There are degrees of the remembrance, *marāqī ḡ-dīkr*. Although this kind of systematic view of the remembrance of God can be first found in al-Harawī, *Manāzil* 70–71. (See fn. 101)

¹³⁵ According to al-Kubrā, the obligatory position in remembrance is sitting.

But if he proved to be strong, he would be separated from the past by his strength.¹³⁶ Then al-Kubrā explains how important the role of the Šayḥ is: If the voyager can remain in his seclusion, it shows the strength of his Šayḥ. But if he comes out of it before the end of the prescribed period, it proves the weakness of the Šayḥ, since he made his disciple, the voyager, enter seclusion without separating him from the worldly attractions (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 209–210).

At this point of his instructions, al-Kubrā inserts the relation of his first experience with seclusion.¹³⁷ This story, without a doubt, serves the encouragement and exhortation of the disciples and shows them the tribulations and spiritual exultations of seclusion. “When I first entered seclusion, there was a kind of hypocrisy and reputation in my heart. I searched for a speech that was appropriate to my way (*ṭarīq*) to be able to admonish people from the top of the pulpits. I had thought I was right, but it became clear later that my imagery of the seclusion had been false because my aim had not been right, and my intention had not been sincere. After eleven days, my wish to look at some books of mine drove me out of my seclusion without the permission of the Šayḥ. Then I remained outside the seclusion until the pain imposed on me by it had ceased. Afterwards, when I returned to the seclusion and entered with pure soul and sincere intention, I succeeded in purifying and humiliating myself in the eyes of the people and I reached the real goals through my seclusion. All this was the consequence of my strong yearning to seek release (*nağāt*). So, when I entered the seclusion this way, I did not leave it only with the permission of my Šayḥ” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 210–211).

Remembrance should continue incessantly during and after seclusion, until the voyager becomes “immersed in his remembrance in such a way that the remembrance could be heard from his heart (*ṣadr*). But when he hears a voice or sees something from the outside world, the remembrance becomes confused for him, his heart becomes anguished, he becomes vexed, and he refuses to do anything with the remembrance” After telling this story to his disciples, the Šayḥ (i.e., al-Kubrā) continued: “Do not be similar to him”, that is, rectify your intimacy with God so that nothing could confuse your remembrance¹³⁸ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 213–214).

¹³⁶ As al-Makkī says, *Qūt* II, 819: “It means the necessity of the absolute detachedness (from this world)” (*ḍarūratu t-tağarrudi t-tāmm*).

¹³⁷ al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 210, missing from the list of personal experiences in Iványi 2022.

¹³⁸ A quotation in the *Fawā'ih* from as-Suhrawardī, not found in his only mystical work, *Ādāb*. Cf. Iványi 2022:72. It is to be noted that the aforementioned work does not deal with the Sūfī rituals, like remembrance (*ḍikr*), since its main focus is the appropriate behaviour (*ādāb*) of the disciples, with the exception of the audition (*samā'*), but even this is treated only from the point of view of good behaviour.

4.21 *The secrets of remembrance* (asrār aḡ-ḡikr)

The voyager after a long remembrance of the tongue reaches the station called ‘do not remember’, “for the remembrance may see how it remembers you”, because the voyager is the remembered, not the rememberer. He is remembered by God, but only he has no knowledge of this because of the multitude of sins and the thickness of the veils, he does not see and find this. When he is submerged in the remembrance, the Ṣayḥ orders him to stop the remembrance so that nothing will stand in the way of his separation from everything except for God. This is a customary way of mystical thinking – even the most important religious and mystical practices can form a barrier in the path towards God if they become self-serving and not serving the approach to God. At this point the heart dislikes the remembrance of the tongue because it disturbs it, so the heart prevents the remembrance of the tongue, and the remembrance continues incessantly in the heart (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 215–216).

4.22 *The fruits of seclusion*

al-Kubrā values seclusion, putting it on the same level with the basic tenets of Islam, and describes it with metaphors: “Its benefit becomes clear, since it is seclusion that moves out the mirror of the heart from the various forms that have been carved in it since the time it had reason and became associated with the world and what it contains. These forms are darknesses (*ẓulumāt*), which are in conform with each other and are superimposed one upon the other. They cause rustiness (*ṣada’*) of the heart, which is negligence (*ḡafla*). However, with the help of seclusion, remembrance, fasting, ritual purity, keeping silence, refusal of erroneous inner thoughts, establishing ties (*rabṭ*) (with God) and the unification of the quest (*tawḥīd al-maṭlab*), the mirror of the heart can be removed from the rust. Seclusion is the smelting furnace (*kūra*), fasting and purity are the instrument of polishing (*taṣqīl*), silence and refusal of wrong thoughts mean the refusal of the inspirations of darkness, the establishment of the ties is (the task of) the pupil, while the unification of the quest (*maṭlab*) is (the task of) the teacher” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 220).

After the seclusion and final remembrance had ended, al-Kubrā introduced two new terms for the instruction of his disciples, not found in the earlier Ṣūfī literature or in the later one: *al-ḡumūd* and *al-ḥumūd*.¹³⁹ These are not really ‘technical terms’, but rather form a sensitive description of the state in and after seclusion. al-Kubrā says: “The revelation is the fruit of seclusion” (*at-taḡallī tamratu l-ḥalwa*). The voyager at this state of the voyage has two distinct but strictly intertwined feelings: A freezing, frozen state (*aḥwālu l-ḡumūd*) and the extinction of the fire (*wa-l-*

¹³⁹ The editor of the *Fawā’ih*, Yūsuf Zaydān thinks that *ḥumūd* is the closest to these two terms of al-Kubrā which occurs in one of the sayings in Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh, *Ḥikam*, comm. Zarrūq 36: *idfin wuḡūdak fī arḡi l-ḥumūd*, meaning ‘inactivity, indifference’. See al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 217 fn. 1.

humūd). He was the first to use these two expressions: When the fire extincts, its place freezes, these are two consecutive stations, which refer to the benefits of seclusion (*ḥalwa*). It helps to avoid negligence (*ḡafla*) together with continuous remembrance of God (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 217).

The extinction here means the extinction of the blameworthy fires, such as “the fire of the carnal passion, the doggish insatiable hunger and thirst,¹⁴⁰ and the fire of the Satan and the fire of the carnal soul, and all other blameworthy characteristics (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 217–218).

4.23 God's name 'Allāh'

The author considered this topic so important that it is one of the few chapters which is denoted by him as such. There may be two possible causes for this. First, it is the most frequently used name of God during remembrance. Second, since the ending of this name (*-hu*) is very appropriate for the use in loud inhalation and exhalation during remembrance, it is frequently used this way. However, it has always evoked opposition by the men of religion, and so the Sūfīs have always tried to give a rational explanation for this usage. al-Kubrā says: “Remembrance, which flows in the soul of every living creature, whether it is wanted or not, consists of two different kinds of breath. One is ascending, the other is descending. In every breath, the name of Allāh ascends and descends, and it is the *hā'*. The source of ascending *hā'* is the heart, while the source of the descending *hā'* is the Divine Throne. The *wāw* in the word *huwa* is the name of the spirit (*rūḥ*), because it is one of the servants of the presence of the Divine Essence (*huwiyya*), so it was made to gain this communion (of lovers of divine love)”¹⁴¹ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 223).

4.24 Wearing the Sūfī cloak (*ḥirqa*)

Approaching the end of his mystical education, al-Kubrā calls the attention of his disciples to the importance of proper dressing and the true meaning of the Sūfī cloak. The author first describes his cloak: “The cloak that I have wearied all my life consists of different kinds of patches sewn together (*muraqqa'a*). I sew my patch cloak out of incapacity and brokenheartedness, not for the sake of ostentation and demonstration of power and excellence” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 242).

Then he continues to give general instruction to his disciples regarding the proper wear of the right clothes in the appropriate place: “This is the secret of wearing the *ḥirqa* among the Sūfīs and this is its true meaning. Human beings only wear clothes that suit them. As for Muslims and believers, they are God's choice (among people,

¹⁴⁰ The mediaeval Muslim doctors considered it a grave illness.

¹⁴¹ On Sahl at-Tustarī's famous saying about the different usages and forms of this *hā'*, see Iványi 2022:70.

'*uyūn*) on Earth. So, if one of them is seen in the Šūfī cloak in a tavern (*ḥarāba*),¹⁴² even if he was a godless, sinful person, he would be severely criticised and reproached (as if he were a Šūfī), or he could be beaten and ejected from the place, although he was in reality a regular guest at the tavern. However, if he was dressed in ordinary clothes, even if he was in secret a friend of God, he was forgiven – considering that the outward shape is more decisive than the inward meaning” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 243).

5 Conclusion of the voyage

5.1 Reaching the degree of friendship with God (*darağat ḥuṣūli l-walāya*)

al-Kubrā summarises the different phases of the mystical path, which he calls ‘degrees’ (*darağāt*), as his spiritual book of instruction is nearing the end. The degree of ‘friendship with God’ (*walāya*) is the third degree that the voyager can reach, the first degree being the ‘inconstancy’ (*talwīn*),¹⁴³ the second the ‘stability’ (*tamkīn*).¹⁴⁴ This third degree is the final formation (*takwīn*) of the spiritual state of the voyager.

Then he adds that there are other ways of characterising these degrees. The first is the degree of knowledge, or stripping of the worldly attributes (*tağrīd*), or fear and hope (*ḥawf* and *rağā'*) or the vision of the outer forms (*ṣuwar*). The second is the exclusive concentration on God’s attributes (*tafrīd*), or the distress and relief (*qabḍ* and *baṣṭ*), or the vision of the inner essences (*ma'ānī*). The third is the degree of unification of God (*tawhīd*), respect and intimacy (*hayba* and *uns*), or annihilation (*fanā'*) of the vision. In short: First, the renunciation of this world (*taḥallī*), then the revelation (*tağallī*) and finally the friendship or protection of God (*tawallī*)”¹⁴⁵ (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 248–249).

The above descriptions do not contain abstract mystical terms; they are based on the long-term observation of the states of mind of the disciples, whom the master has introduced to the sometimes exhausting mystical practices, such as the long lasting remembrances and seclusions.

At the end of their voyage, the voyagers must be prepared to meet the requirements of God’s benevolent friendship and protection. As Prophet Muḥammad says according to the Qur’ān 7:196: “My protecting friend / my protector is God”.¹⁴⁶ The continuation of the *āya* illuminates what is required of God’s friends: “He

¹⁴² A Persian word.

¹⁴³ *Verbatim* the changing of the colours.

¹⁴⁴ *Verbatim* strengthening one’s state.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. al-Quṣayrī, *Risāla* tr. by Maḥmūd and al. 198, where the saying of Abū ‘Alī ad-Daqqāq is cited about the same thoughts.

¹⁴⁶ *inna waliyyiyya llāhu*. The first is Pickthall’s translation, the second is that of Jones, which is the generally accepted interpretation of the word *waliyyun*, although in a mystical text the first counts as appropriate.

befriendeth the righteous / He gives protection to the righteous”¹⁴⁷ (*huwa yatawallā ṣ-ṣāliḥīna*)¹⁴⁸

5.2 *The highest degree of the voyage* (muntahā s-sayr)

5.2.1 *The highest degree of remembrance* (muntahā d-dīkr)

“When the remembrance finally arrives in the innermost heart (*sirr*), it continues incessantly even if the voyager remains silent, as if the needle stitches were fixed on his tongue. Or as if the whole of his face were a tongue that remembers God by the light that pours forth from it” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 255). That is, at this high state, the rememberer unconsciously performs the remembering of God.

5.2.2 *The highest degree of the voyage* (muntahā s-sayr)

“When the voyager became pure and the power of resolution grew in him,¹⁴⁹ he always finds another power, the power of the heart (*yad al-qalb*), by which he performs every activity in God’s unseen world” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 255). All this results from the highest degree of remembrance.¹⁵⁰

5.2.3 *The veils of God*

“God (al-Ḥaqq) is veiled in both the visible world (*‘ālam aš-ṣahāda*) by discernible signs (*dalā’il zāhira*) and the unseen world (*ḡayb*) by hidden miraculous indications (*āyāt bāṭina*). The visible world contains light and darkness, both of which form veils, as well as the unseen world contains light and darkness, both of which form veils.¹⁵¹ However, light and darkness in the visible world are only the names of light and darkness, while light and darkness in the unseen world are the spiritual contents of these two (material) names of the visible world. ... The knowledge of the voyager grows by the appearance of hidden indications of the unseen world. Then his knowledge grows again by the annihilation of these indications” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā’ih* 256–257).

¹⁴⁷ This metaphor means that the remembrance, similarly to the needle in the clothes, is fixed in the tongue of the rememberer.

¹⁴⁸ The two translations correspond to those mentioned in fn. 141. The interpretation of this portion of the *āya* in al-Kubrā, *Tafsīr* III, 100: “They can do righteous acts by His (friendly) protection. Were they all left to their own will, they could only do wrong things.”

¹⁴⁹ I.e., the energy for concentrating exclusively on God.

¹⁵⁰ Since al-Kubrā’s book is one of the earliest (or possibly the earliest) Ṣūfī work which lays such an overwhelming importance on remembrance (*dīkr*), some Western scholars consider it the principal characteristics of the *Fawā’ih al-ḡamāl*. See, e.g., Ernst, 1997:114 “(al-Kubrā) combined intensive concentration on *dhikr* recitation as a purification of the heart.”

¹⁵¹ As the *ḥadīṭ* says: *inna li-llāhi ta’ālā sab’īna ḥiḡāban min nūrin wa-ḡulma*. See ar-Rāzī, *Tafsīr* XXIII, 231 ff.

al-Kubrā here pointed out the significance of annihilation for the last time in the final phase of his voyage to God, when the seeker or voyager should forget everything, even his previous praiseworthy practices and give way to submerging into the blessed effects of God's nearness.

5.2.4 *The basis of the mystical tasting* (qā'ida dawqiyya)

The author then emphasises the essential message of his didactic handbook for the seekers of divine knowledge and divine love: The instruction and guidance of the Šayḥ only turn out to be useful if the disciple enters upon the voyage and goes along the way leading to the proximity of God. He should perceive during his voyage the blameworthy and praiseworthy things in God's unseen world. Even those who are attracted to (*mağdūb*) God by God and so taste what is aimed at (*maqṣūd*) in their endeavours, must taste the way and the stations of the voyage. It is an important conclusion: Although there is no mystical voyage without a master, the master is not enough alone. As in every form of teaching, there should be a symmetric relationship between teacher and pupil (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 257–258).

5.2.5 *Confusion near the end of the voyage* (taḥayyur)

al-Kubrā gives the following description of this confusion: “When the voyager reached near the end of the way, after he had reached his goal of gaining knowledge of discernible and hidden miraculous indications, and the Divine attributes and essence had been revealed to him, and his desire to reach Him had become violent, heaven and earth became prison, jail, deep well, and forest for him in which he was imprisoned. Every time he had tried to escape from it he was confronted with signs and miraculous indications from the earth and the heaven. Sometimes these heavenly indications suited him in his confusion, some other times suited him in his sorrow so much that he started to weep” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 258–260).

5.2.6 *The final station*

The author describes the last steps of the voyage as follows: “If the voyager reached the station called *qif* (stop!) on the way to connection and disjunction (*waṣl wa-faṣl*), and got as far as the most respected power of the Oneness (*'izzat al-waḥdāniyya*) and became disjuncted from human rules, this would be an event that a human being cannot bear, and even tongues cannot bear its description. In this spiritual state, there are things that no eye has ever seen, and no ear has ever heard, and which did not occur to the human heart” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 260).

6 The author's final words

6.1 The termination of the book

“All those signs, indications and manifestations that we have mentioned (earlier in this book) have been the blameworthy or praiseworthy results of the mutual relationship of the worshipper and his worshipped. These (signs) also form the rules of the worshipper's association with Him. They may serve as a model for those who are moving towards God and who are willing to know the taste of the tasters, the ardour of the passionate lovers, the light of those who have known God, the fire of the lovers, the speed of those who are yearning, the ecstasy of those who are in ecstatic love, the fruits of those who reveal God's manifestations, the secrets of those who make intimate conversation with God, and the method of those who will be saved” (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 261).

6.2 Explanation of the title

The author asks: “Why did I call my book ‘The fragrance of the (divine) Beauty and the commencements of the (divine) Glory’? I used this title to remind those who succeeded in cutting their worldly bindings and to instruct the sincere”¹⁵² (al-Kubrā, *Fawā'ih* 262).

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¹⁵² *wa-sammaytu l-kitāb: Fawā'ih al-ḡamāl wa-fawātiḥ al-ḡalāl tadkiratan li-l-munqaṭi'īna wa-tabṣīratan li-l-muḥliṣīn*.

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The Mausoleum of Nağm ad-Dīn al-Kubrā
in Kunya-Urgench, Turkmenistan

Fusus al Hikm Ibn Arabi English translation

هو
121

Fusus al- Hikam

The Seals of Wisdom

Muhi-e-Din Ibn Arabi

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1) The Seal of Divine Wisdom in the Word of Adam

When Allah - glory be to Him! - willed that the source of His most Beautiful Names - which are beyond enumeration - be seen (or you can equally say that He willed His source to be seen), He willed that they be seen in a microcosmic being which contained the entire matter, (1) endowed with existence, and through which His secret was manifested to Him. For how a thing sees itself through itself is not the same as how it sees itself in something else which acts as a mirror for it. So He manifests Himself to Himself in a form which is provided by the place in which He is seen. He would not appear thus without the existence of this place and His manifestation (tajalli) to Himself in it.

Allah brought the entire universe into existence through the existence of a form fashioned without a spirit (rûh), like an unpolished mirror. Part of the divine decree is that He does not fashion a locus without it receiving a divine spirit, which is described as being "blown" (2) into it. This is nothing other than the result of the predisposition of that fashioned form to receive the overflowing perpetual tajalli which has never ceased and which will never cease. Then we must speak of the container (qâbil). The container comes from nothing other than His most sacredly pure Overflowing. So the whole affair has its beginning from Him, and its end is to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) as it began from Him. Thus the command decreed the polishing of the mirror of the universe. Adam was the very polishing of that mirror and the spirit of that form.

The angels are some of the faculties of that form which is the form of the universe, which the Sufis designate in their technical vocabulary as the Great Man (al-Insân al-Kabîr), for the angels are to it as the spiritual (rûhânî) and sensory faculties are to the human organism. Each of these faculties is veiled by itself, and it sees nothing which is superior to its own essence, for there is something in it which considers itself to be worthy of high rank and an elevated degree with Allah. It is like this because it has an aspect of the divine synthesis (jam'îya). In it is something which derives from the divine side and something which derives from the side of the reality of the realities. This organism carries these attributes as determined by the universal nature which encompasses the containers of the universe from the most exalted to the basest. However, the intellect cannot perceive this fact by means of logical investigation for this sort of perception only exists through divine unveiling by which one recognises the basis of the forms of the universe which receive the spirits.

This being was called both a human being (insân) and khalif. As for his humanness, it comes from the universality of his organism and his ability to embrace all of the realities. He is in relation to Allah as the pupil, (3) being the instrument of vision, is to the eye. This is why he is called

"insân". It is by him that Allah beholds His creatures and has mercy on them. So he is a human being, both in-time [in his body] and before-time [in his spirit], an eternal and after-time organism. He is the word which distinguishes and unifies. The universe was completed by his existence. He is to the universe what the face of the seal is to the seal - for that is the locus of the seal and thus the token with which the King places the seal on his treasures.

Allah named him khalif for this reason, since man guards His creation as treasure is guarded with the seal. As long as the seal of the King is on the treasure, no one dares to open it without his permission. He made him a khalif in respect of safeguarding the universe, and it continues to be guarded as long as this Perfect Man is in it. Do you not see then, that when he disappears and is removed from the treasury of this world, nothing that Allah stored in it will remain? Everything that was in it will leave it, and all the parts will become confused, and everything will be transferred to the Next World. Then Man will be the seal on the treasury of the Next World for endless time and after-time. All the Divine Names contained in the divine form (4) appear in this human organism. Thus it possesses the rank of containing and integrating this existence. It was by this that Allah set up the proof against the angels, (5) so remember that! Allah admonishes you through others. Look at where that originates and where it ends up. The angels did not realise what was implied by the organism of the khalif, nor did they realise what the presence of the Truth demanded as 'ibâda (6) (worship). Each one only knows from Allah what his essence accords him. The angels do not possess the universality of Adam, and they did not understand the Divine Names with which he has been favoured, and by which he praises Allah and proclaims His purity. They only knew that Allah had names whose knowledge had not reached them, so they could not praise Him nor proclaim His purity through them. What we mentioned overcame them and this state overpowered them. They said about this organism, "Why put on it one who will cause corruption on it?" (2:30) This is only the argument which they were voicing.

What they said regarding Adam is exactly the state they were with regard to Allah. Had it not been that their nature was in accord with it, they would not have said what they said in respect of Adam, "and yet they were not aware." If they had had true recognition of themselves, they would have had knowledge, and had they been in possession of knowledge, they would have been protected and would not have resisted by belittling Adam and thus exceeding their claim of what they possessed of His praise and glorification. Adam was in possession of Divine Names which the angels did not have, so that their praise and glorification of Him was not the same as Adam's praise and glorification of Him. Allah describes this to us so that we may ponder it and learn adab (7) with Allah, and so that we will not lay claim to what we have not realised or possessed by pinning down. How can we allege something which is beyond us and of which we have no knowledge? We will only be exposed.

This divine instruction is part of Allah's discipline of those of His slaves who are well-mannered, trusting and khalifs.

Let us return to the wisdom under discussion. Know that universal matters which have no existence in themselves are without a doubt intelligible and known in the mind. They are hidden and continue in their invisible existence. These universal matters have jurisdiction and effect on everything which has an individual existence. Indeed, they are the same thing and nothing else, i.e. the sources of existent individual things, and they continue to be intelligible in themselves. They are manifest in respect of the sources of existent things just as they are hidden in respect of their intelligibility. Each individual existent thing depends on these universal matters which cannot be dislodged from the intellect, nor would their existence be possible in the source once they ceased to be intelligible, whether that individual existent is in-time or out-of-time. The relationship of that which is in-time or out-of-time to this universal intelligible matter is the same. This universal matter only has jurisdiction in individual existent things according to what the realities of these individual existent things demand of it. It is like the relationship of knowledge to the knower, and life to the living. Life is an intelligible reality; knowledge is an intelligible reality. Knowledge is as distinct from life as life is distinct from knowledge. So we say that Allah has knowledge and life, and that He is the Living, the Knowing. We also say that the angel has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. We say that man has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. The reality of knowledge is one thing and the reality of life is another, and their relationship to the knowing and the living is the same relationship. We say that the knowledge of Allah is in non-time and the knowledge of man is in-time. So look at the evaluation that this relationship has brought about in this intelligible reality!

Examine this connection between individual intelligibles and stence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself. As knowledge determines the one who participates in it as he is called knowing so the one who is described by it can determine the knowledge. It is in-time in relation to the one in-time and non-time in relation to the one in non-time. Each of the two is determining and determined. It is known that these universal matters, even if they are intelligible, lack a source although they still have an authority. When they are determined, since they are ascribed to an individual existent thing, they accept the principle in the existent sources and do not accept distinction or fragmenting, for that is impossible for them. They themselves are in everything described by them, as humanity is in every person of this particular species, without distinction or the numbering which affects individuals; and it continues to be intelligible.

Now, as there is a connection between that which has an individual existence and that which does not have one and it is a non-existent relationship so the connection of existents to each other is easier to

conceive because, in any case, there is a common factor between them which is individual existence. In the other, there is no common factor, yet there is a connection despite the lack of a common factor. So it is stronger and more real when there is a common factor. Without a doubt, the in-time establishes itself as being put into time and it needs something in time to put it into time. It has no place in itself so it exists from something other-than-it, and it is linked to That by the dependence of need. This dependence must be on That whose existence is necessary, which is independent in Its existence by Itself without need. It is That which, by Its own essence, gives existence to the in-time which depends on It. Since the existence of Its essence is necessary and what appears from It depends on It for its essence, it nevertheless depends on its form for everything which is from a name or attribute, except for the essential necessity. That is not the property of it in-time, even if its existence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself.

Since the matter is based on what we said about its manifestation in its form, Allah communicates to us knowledge of Himself through contemplation of the in-time. He tells us that He shows us His signs in the in-time, (8) so we draw conclusions about Him through ourselves. We do not describe Him with any quality without also possessing that quality, with the exception of that essential autonomy. Since we know Him by ourselves and from ourselves, we attribute to Him all that we attribute to ourselves. For that reason, divine communications came down on the tongues of our interpreters, (9) and so He described Himself to us through ourselves. When we witness, He witnesses Himself. We are certainly numerous as individuals and species, yet we are based on a single reality which unites us. So we certainly know that there are distinctions between individuals. If there were not, there would be no multiplicity in the One.

Similarly we are described in all aspects by that by which He describes Himself, but there must be a distinction and it is none other than our need of Him in our existence. Our existence depends on Him by virtue of our possibility and He is independent of that which makes us dependent on Him. Because of this, one can apply before-timeness and timelessness to Him which negates that firstness which is the opening to existence from non-existence. Although He is the First, firstness is not ascribed to Him, and for this reason, He is called the Last. Had His firstness been the firstness of the existence of determination, it would not have been valid for Him to be the Last of the determined because the possible has no last - for possibilities are endless. So they have no last. Rather, He is the Last because "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) after its attribution to us. So He is the Last in the source of His firstness and the First in the source of His lastness.

Then know that Allah has described Himself as the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden; (10) He brought the universe into existence as a Visible world and an Unseen world so that we might know the Hidden

by the Unseen and the Manifest by the Visible. He described Himself with pleasure and wrath, and so He brought the world into existence as a place of fear and hope so we fear His wrath and hope for His pleasure. He described Himself with majesty and beauty, so He brought the universe into existence with awe and intimacy. It is the same for all that is connected with Him, may He be exalted, and by which He calls Himself. He designates these pairs of attributes by the two hands (11) which He held out in the creation of the Perfect Man. Man sums up all the realities of the universe and its individuals. So the universe is seen and the Khalif is unseen. It is with this meaning that the Sultan veils himself, even as Allah is mentioned and described as having with veils (12) of darkness, which are natural bodies, and luminous veils which are subtle spirits (arwâh). The universe is composed of both the gross and the subtle.

The universe is its own veil on itself and cannot perceive the Truth since it perceives itself. It is continuously in a veil which is not removed, since it knows that it is distinct from its Creator by its need of Him. It has no portion of that essential necessity which belongs to the existence of Allah, so it can never perceive Him. In this respect, Allah is never fully known by the knowledge of tasting and witnessing because the in-time has no hold on that.

Allah only applied "between His two hands" to Adam as a mark of honour, and so He said to Iblis, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My two Hands?" (38:76) That is none other than the union in Adam of the two forms - the form of the universe and the form of the Real: (13) and they are the two hands of Allah. Iblis is only a fragment of the universe and does not possess this comprehensive quality. It is because of this quality that Adam was a khalif. Had he not had the form of the One who appointed him khalif, he would not have been khalif. If there were not in him all that is in the world, and what his flocks, over whom he is khalif, demand of him because of their dependence on him (and he must undertake all they need from him) he would not have been khalif over them.

The khalifate is only valid for the Perfect Man, whose exterior form comes from the realities of the universe and its forms, and whose inner form is based on His form, may He be exalted! For that reason, Allah has said of him, "I am his hearing and his sight." (14) He did not say, "his eye and his ear." So He differentiated between the two forms. It is the same for every existent in the universe which appears according to what the reality of that existent demands of it. Nonetheless no one totally comprehends what the khalif has. One only surpasses others by this comprehensiveness. If it were not for the diffusion of Allah into the existents by the form, the universe would not have any existence. Similarly, were it not for these universal intelligible realities, no principle would have appeared in individual existent things. From this reality the universe depends on Allah for its existence. So all is in need, and nothing

is independent.

This is the truth
and we have not spoken metaphorically.
If I speak of a something independent
without any need, you will know Who I mean by it.
The whole is tied to the whole
and cannot be separated from it, so understand what I have said!

Now, you have learnt of the formation of the body of Adam his outer form and the formation of his spirit, his inner form, so he is the Real and a created being. Now you have learnt of the formation of his rank which is the comprehensiveness by virtue of which he is worthy of the khalifate. Adam is the unique self from which the perfect human species was created according to His words, "O mankind, be fearful of your Lord who created you from a single self, and created its mate from it, and disseminated many men and women from the two of them." (4:1)

His words, "Be fearful of your Lord," mean to make of what has appeared from you a safeguard for your Lord and make what is concealed of you, which is your Lord, a safeguard for yourselves. The matter consists of blame and praise, so be His safeguard in the blame and your safeguard in the praise, so that you will be among those of knowledge and adab. Then He showed him what He had placed in him, and He put that in His two hands - one handful contained the universe and the other handful contained Adam and his descendants - and He showed them their ranks in Adam.

Then Allah informed me in my inner heart (sirr) of what He placed in this Imam, the great progenitor. I have put in this book some of what was allotted to me but not all of what I realised. A book could not contain that and not even the present existent universe could contain it. I have put some of what I have witnessed in this book, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, defined it. It was the divine wisdom in the word of Adam, that is, this chapter.

Then there is the wisdom of the breath of angelic inspiration in the word of Shith (Seth), the wisdom of divine inspiration in the word of Nuh (Noah), the wisdom of purity in the word of Idris, the wisdom of being lost in love in the word of Ibrahim (Abraham), the wisdom of truth in the word of Ishaq (Isaac), the wisdom of the elevation of the word in the name of Isma'il (Ishmael), the wisdom of the spirit in the word of Yusuf (Joseph), the wisdom of unity in the word of Hud, the wisdom of revelation in the word of Salih, the wisdom of the heart in the word of Shu'ayb, the wisdom of the power of the word of Lut (Lot), the wisdom of the decree in the word of 'Uzayr (Ezra), the wisdom of prophethood in the word of 'Isa (Jesus), the wisdom of mercy in the word of Sulayman (Solomon), the wisdom of existence in the word of Da'ud (David), the wisdom of the soul in the word of Yunus (Jonah), the wisdom of the

unseen in the word of Ayyub (Job), the wisdom of majesty in the word of Yahya (John the Baptist), the wisdom of possession in the word of Zakariya (Zachariah), the wisdom of intimacy in the word of Ilyas (Elias), the wisdom of benevolence in the word of Luqman, the wisdom of the Imam in the word of Harun (Aaron), the wisdom of sublimity in the word of Musa (Moses), the wisdom of what one turns to in the word of Khalid, and the wisdom of uniqueness in the seal of Muhammad.

There is a seal for each wisdom. So I have condensed these wisdoms according to what is established in the Mother of the Book, and I complied with what was written out for me, and stopped at what was set as a limit for me. Even if I had desired to do more than that, I would not have been able to do so. Indeed, the Presence forbids that, and Allah is the One who grants success. There is no Lord but Him.

Notes to Chapter 1:

1. al-Insân al-Kâmil, the Perfect Man.
2. Nafkh, Qur'an 32:9, etc.
3. Insan, as well as meaning human being, also means the pupil of the eye.
4. The form chosen by Allah for the human being.
5. Qur'an 2:30-33.
6. 'Ibada: All the acts of worship: giving, praying, fasting, etc..
7. Adab: Manners. Here meaning the much deeper quality of spiritual manners, that is a courtesy engendered in the ritual acts of worship, the prostrations of the prayer, the fast, and giving gifts to the needy. Such a quality is imbued with awareness that you are the dependent, and the Real is the independent. You are poor, He is rich.
8. Qur'an 41:53, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves..."
9. i.e. the Prophets.
10. Qur'an: 57:3.
11. Qur'an 38:75, "What I created with My two hands."
12. Hadith: "Allah has 70,000 veils of light and darkness. If they were to be removed, the splendour of His face would consume."
13. Hadith: "Allah created Adam on His form."
14. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)

2) The Seal of Wisdom of the Breath of Angelic Inspiration (1) in the Word of Shith (Seth)

Know that the gifts and favours which appear in phenomenal being through human beings or without them fall into two categories: the gifts of the Essence and the gifts of the Divine Names. These two categories are distinct among the people of tasting according to whether as they come from a specific request for a specific thing, from a general request, or without any request. This applies whether they are gifts of the Essence or gifts of the Divine Names. They are specific when someone says, "O Lord, give me such-and-such a thing," and specifies something which occurs to him. They are general when someone says, "Give me what You know is good for all my parts, subtle and gross," without specifying it.

The askers fall into two groups - one group makes the request from a natural impulse to hasten its attainment, "for man is impetuous;" (17:11) and the other group asks because they know that there are matters with Allah which, in the foreknowledge of Allah, are only obtained after a request. They say, "Perhaps what I ask of Him is something of that sort." Their request takes into consideration this possibility. They do not know what is in the knowledge of Allah, nor what their capacity to receive will grant them. This is because it is one of the most difficult things to know capacity at any moment, for it refers to the capacity of the individual at that time. Furthermore, had he not been disposed by his capacity to make the request, he would not have made that particular request.

The goal of the people of presence, (2) who do not possess such a knowledge, is to know it in the moment in which they find themselves. They know by their state of presence what Allah has given them in that moment. and they only receive it by their predisposition for it. They are of two sorts: one group knows their predisposition from what they have already received, and the other group knows what they are going to receive based on their predisposition. This latter group has the most perfect recognition of predisposition.

Among this group are those who make a request, neither to hasten it nor for the possibilities of favour, but rather to comply with the command of Allah when He says, "Call on Me and I will answer you." (40:60) This sort of person is the pure slave and when he asks, his aspiration (himma) is not attached to what he asks for, be it specific or not, rather his aspiration is merely in or not, rather his aspiration is merely in obedience to his Lord's command. When his state requires, he asks for slavehood, and when it requires entrustment [to Allah] and silence, he is silent. So Ayyub and others were tried, and they did not ask Allah to remove their affliction from them. Then at another moment, their state required that they ask that it be removed, and Allah removed it from them.

The immediate granting of a request, or its deferment, depends on the decree which has been determined for it by Allah. If the request coincides with the moment, the answer comes quickly, and if the moment is deferred - either in this world or the next, the answer is also deferred except for the answer from Allah which is, "At your service" (3) - so understand this well!

As for the second category, it is received without making a request, and by "without request" we mean verbal expression of it. In actuality, there must always be a request - be it articulated, or by a state, or from a predisposition. Similarly, unrestricted praise only takes place through verbal expression. The state determines the meaning, for that which induces you to praise Allah is determined for you by a Name of Action (4) or a Name of Disconnection. (5) In the case of the predisposition of the slave, its possessor is not conscious of it, but he is aware of his state because he knows both what his motive is and the state itself. Predisposition is the most hidden form of making requests.

That which prevents some people from asking is their knowledge that Allah has predetermined their destiny, so they have prepared themselves to receive whatever comes from Him, and they have withdrawn from their selves and their desires.

Among these people are those who know that the knowledge which Allah has of them in all their states is their basic constitution in the state of their permanent source-form from before existence. They know that Allah will only give them what their source allows them according to Allah's knowledge of it when they were in their permanent source-forms. Thus these people know that Allah knows the way they will obtain anything.

There is no higher, nor more unveiled group among the People of Allah than this group, who understand on the secret of the Decree. They, in turn, fall into two sorts: those who know it in general and those who know it in particular. Those who know it in particular are higher and nearer perfection than those who know it in general. Such a person knows what is in the knowledge of Allah for him - be it by Allah informing him of the knowledge his own source has accorded to Him, or be it by direct unveiling to him from his permanent source-form whose unfolding states are endless. So he, in his knowledge of himself, is in the position of having Allah's knowledge of him, because it is derived from the same source. In respect of the slave, concern from Allah is predestined for him, and it is constituted by the sum of the states of his source which the possessor of this unveiling perceives when Allah allows him to perceive it, i.e. the states of his source. When Allah informs him of the states of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of these permanent sources in the state of

their non-existence, since they are but essential relations without any form. In this respect, we say that divine concern precedes the slave's need because of this equivalence in the communication of knowledge.

In this way Allah speaks so that we will know, and it is an expression which is completely specific - not as is imagined by those who do not drink from this source. The goal of disconnection is to make that intimentness in knowledge belong to Knowledge. It is the highest aspect of this question which the mutakallim (6) can comprehend with his intellect - unless he considers knowledge to be distinct from the Essence. If he does this, he ascribes relativity to knowledge, and not to the Essence, and because of this, he sets himself apart from the realised ones among the People of Allah, who are endowed with unveiling and real existence.

Let us return to those gifts which are either the gifts proceeding from the Essence or the Names. As for the favours, gifts and graces of the Essence, they only come by means of divine tajalli. (7) Tajalli only comes from the Essence by means of the form of the predisposition of the one to whom the tajalli is made. It never occurs otherwise. The one who receives the tajalli will only see his own form in the mirror of the Real. He will not see the Real, for it is not possible to see Him. At the same time, he knows that he sees only his own form. It is the same as a mirror in the Visible world inasmuch as you see forms in it or your own form but do not see the mirror. At the same time, however, you know that you see the forms, or your own form, only by virtue of the mirror. Allah manifests that as a model (8) appropriate to the tajalli of His Essence, so that the one receiving the tajalli knows that he does not see Him. There is no model nearer or more appropriate to vision and tajalli than this. When you see a form in a mirror, try to see the body of the mirror as well - you will never see it. It is true that some people who perceive this say that the reflected form is imposed between the vision of the seer and the mirror. This is the most that it is possible to say, and the matter is as we have mentioned. We have clarified this in the The Makkan Revelations.

If you wish to taste this, then experience the limit beyond which there is no higher limit possible in respect of the creature. Neither aspire to, nor tire yourself out in trying to go beyond this degree, for in principle, there is only pure non-existence after it.

Thus Allah is your mirror in which you see yourself, and you are His mirror in which He sees His Names. His Names are not other than Himself, as you know. The matter is confusing. One of us implied ignorance of the matter as part of knowledge and said, "The incapacity to achieve perception is perception." (9) Some of us know but do not express it in this way, even though it is the highest of words. Knowledge does not give incapacity to know as the first one said, but rather knowledge gives him the same silence which incapacity gives. This is the highest level of those who have knowledge of Allah.

This knowledge only belongs to the Seal of the Messengers and the Seal of the Awliyâ'. The Messengers and Prophets only see it from the niche of the Messenger who is the Seal. The awliyâ' only see it from the niche of the walî who is the Seal. Even the Messengers only see it to the extent that they see it from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya', for Message and Prophethood - by which I mean the Prophethood of bringing the Sharî'a and its message - ceases, but wilâya never ceases. Thus the Messengers, inasmuch as they are awliya', see what we have mentioned only from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya'. How could it be different for other awliyâ'? Although the Seal of the Awliyâ' is subject to the judgement which the Seal of the Messengers brought through the Sharî'a, that does not diminish his station nor does it detract from what we have said, for something which is lower from one point of view can be higher from another. Confirmation of this occurred in the history of our Sharî'a in the excellence of the judgement of 'Umar regarding the prisoners of Badr (10) and their treatment, and in the story of fertilization of the date-palms. (11) It is not necessary that the perfect have precedence in everything and in every rank. The Rijâl (12) regard precedence as being in the degrees of knowledge of Allah. Here is their goal. As for the things which are in-time, they do not attach their thoughts to them, so realise what we have mentioned!

Al-Khidr said to Musa, "I have knowledge which Allah has taught me, and which you do not know, and you have knowledge which Allah has taught you and which I do not know." (13)

It is like the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in relation to a brick wall which was complete except for one brick, (14) and the Prophet was that one brick although he himself only saw the place for the single brick. The Seal of the Awliyâ' must also have this sort of vision. He sees the same as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, saw, but he sees a place for two bricks in the wall, and that the bricks are made of gold and silver. He sees that there are two bricks missing in the wall, and he sees that they are a silver brick and a gold brick. He must see himself as being disposed by nature to fill the place of these two bricks. The Seal of the Awliyâ' is these two bricks by which the wall is completed. The necessary reason for which he sees himself as two bricks is that he follows the Shari'a of the Seal of the Messengers outwardly - which is the place of the silver brick. This means the outward Sharî'a with all that pertains to it of ordinances which are taken from Allah by the secret, according to the outward form which conforms to the secret because he sees the matter for what it really is. He must see the matter in this manner, for it is the place of the golden brick in the inwardly hidden. It is taken from the source from which the angel brought it, the same angel who brought the revelation to the Messengers. If you have understood what I have alluded to, then you have indeed acquired useful knowledge!

All the Prophets, from Adam to the last of the Prophets, take their light

from the niche of the Seal of the Prophets, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Even though the existence of his clay was deferred, the last Prophet was nevertheless present in his reality, according to his statement, "I was a Prophet when Adam was between water and clay." (15) Every other Prophet only became a Prophet by being described by divine qualities inasmuch as Allah is described as the Praiseworthy Wali. (16)

The Seal of the Messengers, in respect to his wilâya, is connected to the Seal of the Awliyâ' in the same way in which Prophets and Messengers are connected to it. He is a walî, Messenger, and Prophet. The Seal of the Awliyâ' is a walî and the heir who takes directly from the source, contemplating the ranks. He is the most beautiful of the beauties of the Seal of the Messengers, Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, the overseer of the community, and the master of the sons of Adam by reason of opening the door of intercession. He specified a particular state which is not universal. (17) In this special state, he has precedence over the Divine Names. So the All-Merciful only mediates with the Avenger for the people of affliction through the intercession of the mediators. Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, obtained mastery in this special station. Whoever understands the ranks and the stations does not find this discourse difficult.

As for the gifts of the Names, know that Allah bestows mercy on His creation which is wholly from the names. Either it is a pure mercy, like the excellence of the provision which they have in this world or on the Day of Rising which is bestowed by that name, the Merciful, and so is a gift of mercy, or it is a mixed mercy like the taking of a disagreeable remedy which is followed by relief - it is still a divine gift. Divine gifts can only possibly be given through the intermediary of the guardians of the Names. Sometimes Allah gives it to the slave by means of the All-Merciful, and so the gift is pure from any adulteration which would be contrary to the nature of the moment, otherwise he would not receive the object and what would resemble it. Sometimes He gives by means of the the Boundless, so it is general - or by the Wise, so He looks at what is fitter at the moment, or by the Giving, who gives what is good without those who receive it having to compensate for it by gratitude or deed. He gives by the Compeller, and so He looks at the environment and what is necessary to it. He gives by the Forgiving and so He looks to the environment and what is happening to the individual. If he is in a state which merits punishment, He veils him from it, and if he is in a state which does not merit punishment, He protects him from a state which would merit it. He is "protected from wrong action", "safeguarded", and other descriptions of that sort. The Giver is Allah in the sense that He is the Treasurer of all that is in His treasury, and Allah only brings forth from it according to a predestined decree through the intermediary of a name particular to that matter. So He gives everything its created form (18) according to the name, the Just, and its brothers.

The Names of Allah are endless because they are known by what comes from them, and what comes from them is endless, even though they can be traced back to the limited roots which are the matrices of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but one of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but One Reality which assumes all these relations and aspects which are designated by the Divine Names. The Reality grants that each of the Names, which manifest themselves without end, has a reality by which it is distinguished from another Name. It is that reality by which it is distinguished which is the Name itself - not that which it shares.

It is the same with the gifts - every gift is distinct from another by personal nature, although they come from a single source. It is evident that this one is not that one. That is because the Names are distinct. Because of its boundlessness, in the Divine Presence there is nothing at all which repeats itself. This is the truth which is determined.

This was the knowledge of Shith, peace be upon him, and its spirit aids every spirit which discusses the like of this, except for the spirit of the Seal who receives replenishing knowledge directly from Allah, not from any spirit. No, rather it is from his spirit that his substance flows to all spirits, although he may not perceive that of himself at the time when his elemental body existed. However, in respect to his reality and his rank, he knows all of that essentially, just as he is ignorant of the composition of the elements (of his body). So he has knowledge and is ignorant, and he is capable of being described by contrary attributes even as the Origin admits of description with opposites such as the Majestic and the Beautiful, the Outward and the Inward, the Last and the First - and they are the same, and not other than Him. Therefore, he knows and does not know, and he perceives and does not perceive, and he sees and does not see. It is by this knowledge that Shith received his name because it means "the gift". In His hand is the key to the gifts in their various types and relationships So Allah gave him to Adam, and he was the first gift, and He only gave it from Himself.

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means "the gift". In His hand is the key to the gifts in their various types and relationships So Allah gave him to Adam, and he was the first gift, and He only gave it from Himself.

All gifts in phenomenal being are manifested in this fashion - so no one receives anything from Allah and no-one receives anything which does not come from himself. Not everyone recognises this. Only a few of the people of Allah know it. When you see one who recognises that, rely on him, for that one is the source of the purest purity and the elite of the elite of the Men of Allah. Whenever a person of unveiling sees a form which communicates to him gnosis which he did not have and which he had not been able to grasp before, that form is from his own source, no other. From the tree of himself he gathers the fruits of his cultivation, as his outer form opposite the reflected body is nothing other than himself, even though the place of the presence in which he sees the form of himself presents him with an aspect of the reality of that presence through transformation. The large appears small in the small mirror and tall in the tall, and the moving as movement. It can reverse its form from a special presence, and it can reflect things exactly as they appear, so the right side of the viewer is his right side, while the right side can be on the left. This is generally the normal state in mirrors, and it is a break in the norm when the right side is seen as the right and inversion occurs. All this is from the gifts of the reality of the Presence in which it is manifested and which we have compared to the mirror.

Whoever recognises his predisposition, recognises what he will receive. Not everyone who knows what he will receive, knows his predisposition, unless he knows it after receiving it, and this one knows it in a general way. Some people who are weak of intellect think that since it confirmed with them that Allah does what He wills, they deem it admissible that He could contradict wisdom and what the matter is in itself. (19) Because of this, some of them go so far as to deny the possibility and affirm that which is necessary by essence and by other. The man who has achieved realisation, however, admits the possibility and knows its presence and knows what is possible and how it is possible, since in its source it is necessarily existent because of something other-than-it. From where is the name of other, which determines its necessity, valid for it? No one knows this distinction except those with particular knowledge of Allah.

It is in the footsteps of Shith that the last of this human species will be born, and he will carry his secrets. There will none of this species born after him, so he will be the Seal of the Begotten. A sister will be born with him, and she will emerge before him, and he will follow her with his head at her feet. He will be born in China, and he will speak the language of his country. Sterility will spread in men and women, so there will be much cohabitation without conception. He will call people to Allah, but will not be answered. When Allah takes him and the believers of his time, those who remain will be like beasts, not knowing what is lawful (halâl) from what is unlawful (harâm). They will act according to their natural

instincts with lust, devoid of reason and law. Upon them the Last Hour will occur.

Notes to Chapter 2:

1. Nafth, to puff, blow or spit, hence inspiration. Hadith, "He (Jibril) inspired or put (nafatha) into my heart..." Hence poetry is called the nafth of Shaytan.
2. The people of the presence are those who see everything as coming to them from Allah and everything as effected by Allah.
3. Labbayk.
4. Like the Giving, the Provider.
5. Tanzih, making Allah free of any connection to His creation. Names like the Absolutely Pure (al-Quddûs).
6. The people of words - theologians and philosophers. They are unable to enter the realm of reflection and meditation that is the Sufic domain, and thus some of them oppose the Sufic teaching - mistaking the doctrine's meanings since they cannot intellectually identify them with a specific set of physical practices and direct inner experience.
7. A manifestation by which something is made clear and unobscured, as the bride is displayed to the husband or the rust removed from a sword or mirror so that it shines. The tajalli is the unveiling of a spiritual reality in the realm of vision. It is a direct-seeing into the nature of existence, a showing forth of the secrets of the One in the celestial and terrestrial realms.
8. Mithâl, a Qur'anic term which indicates learning not by logical but by analogical method. It is simply the ACCESS to the parable and not the parable or any idea that the "metaphor" equals its interpretation. It has no specificity. Mithal is grasped "on the wing" so to speak. It cannot be explored or analysed or extended. That is to say it must not be approached rationally but emphatically with direct and clear seeing-into.
9. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq.
10. After Badr, Abu Bakr asked the Prophet to either forgive or allow the prisoners to be ransomed. 'Umar said that they should be killed. Eventually, the Muslims reached a consensus that the captives should be ransomed and they were. Later the verse was revealed, "It is not for a Prophet to take captives..." (8:67)
11. When the Prophet had been asked about whether palm-trees should be pollinated and then later said, "You have the best knowledge of these things of your world."
12. Rijal (sing. rajul): The men. Meaning the men of gnosis and illumination. Those who know - that is - who know how-it-is, and not the veiled fantasy experience of so-called ordinary sensory perception which is, as we now know, in direct contradiction to the physical reality of matter according to high-energy physics.
13. cf. Qur'an 18:65.
14. Hadith in al-Bukhari (2815) and Muslim.
15. Hadith in at-Tirmidhi and Musnad Ibn Hanbal.

16. Qur'an 42:28, "It is He who sends down abundant rain after they have lost all hope, and He unfolds His mercy; He is the Praiseworthy, the Wali."

17. He only can open the door of intercession because it is a special gift to him alone.

18. Qur'an 20:50: "Our Lord is He who gives each thing its created form and then guides it."

19. i.e. they permit that He do the impossible, like making existence non-existence or non-existence existence.

3) The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath of Divine Inspiration (1)

In the Word of Nuh (Noah)

Know that disconnection (tanzîh) among the people of realities in respect to Allah is the same as limitation and qualification, so the one who disconnects is either ignorant or ill-mannered if he only applies disconnection to Him and believes that about Him. (2) When the believer who follows the Sharî'a disconnects and stops at that, and does not see anything else, he displays ill manners and slanders Allah and the Messengers - may the blessings of Allah be upon them! - although he is not aware of it. He imagines that he has reached the target and yet he has missed it, so he is like the one who believes in part and rejects part. (3)

One especially knows that when the language of the various Sharî'as speaks about Allah as they do, they speak to the common people in the first sense, and to the elite in every sense which can be understood from the various aspects of that expression in any language in the usage of that language.

Allah manifests Himself in a special way in every creature. He is the Outwardly Manifest in every graspable sense, and He is the Inwardly Hidden from every understanding except the understanding of the one who says that the universe is His form (4) and His He-ness (huwiyya), and it is the name, the Outwardly Manifest. Since He is, by meaning, the spirit of whatever is outwardly manifest, He is also the Inwardly Hidden. His relation to whatever is manifested of the forms of the world is the relation of the governing spirit to the form. The definition of man, for example, includes both his inward and outward; and it is the same with every definable thing. Allah is defined in every definition, yet the forms of the universe are not held back and He is not contained by them. One only knows the limits of each of their forms according to what is attained by each knower of his form. For that reason, one cannot know the definition of Allah, for one would only know His definition by knowing the definition of every form. This is impossible to attain, so the definition of Allah is impossible. Similarly, whoever connects without disconnection has given limits to Allah and does not know Him. Whoever combines connection and disconnection in his gnosis, and describes Allah with both aspects in general - because it is impossible to conceive in detail because we lack the ability to encompass all the forms which the universe contains - has known Him in general and not in particular, as he knows himself generally and not in particular. For that reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, linked knowledge (ma'rifa) of Allah to knowledge of oneself and said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Allah says, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons (what is outside of you) and in themselves (what is your source) until it is clear to them (the contemplators) that it is the Truth," (41:53) inasmuch as you are His

form and He is your spirit. You are to Him as your body-form is to you, and He is to you as the spirit which governs the body.

The definition contains your inwardness and outwardness, for the form remains when the spirit which governs it departs, and it is no longer man, but one can speak of it as resembling the form of man. There is no difference between it and the form made of wood or stone, upon which the name of man is only applied by metaphor and not by reality. Allah cannot vanish from the forms of the universe, as His definition of His divinity is by reality, not metaphor, as the definition of man applies only so long as he is alive. As the exterior of the form of man praises both his spirit, and the self governed by it, with his tongue, similarly Allah made the forms of the universe which glorify His praise, but we do not understand their glorifying. (5) We do not embrace all forms in the universe. All are tongues of Allah uttering the praise of Allah and for that reason He said, "Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," (1:1) i.e. all types of praise refer to Him. He is the Praiser and the One praised.

If you speak of disconnection, you limit Him,
and if you speak of connection, you define Him.
If you speak of the two together,
then you are free of error
and you are an Imam and a master in knowledges of gnosis.

He who affirms duality, falls into shirk, and whoever speaks of uniqueness is a unifier. (6) Take care lest you be a dualist by connection, and take care lest you be an isolator by disconnection.

You are not Him, rather you are Him
and you see Him in the source of thing,
absolute and limited at the same time.

Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," and so He disconnects, "and He is the Hearing, the Seeing," (42:11) so He connects. Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," so He connects and doubles it, (7) and "He is the Hearing, the Seeing." Then He uses disconnection and makes Himself Unique.

If Nuh had combined these two calls for his people, they would have answered him. He called them openly (71:8), and he called them secretly (71:9). Then he said to them, "Ask forgiveness of your Lord. Truly He is Endlessly Forgiving." (71:10) He said, "I have called my people night and in the day, but my calling has only made them more evasive" (71:5-6) because they knew what they had to do in answering his call.

So the knowledge of those who know Allah is what Nuh indicated in respect to his people by praising them through blame. He knew that they would not answer his call because of the furqân (8) it contained. The command is the Qur'an, not the Furqân. Whoever is established in the

Qur'an does not incline to the Furqân. Even if the Furqân is in the Qur'an, the Qur'an contains the Furqân but the Furqân does not contain the Qur'an. For this reason, no one was favoured by the Qur'ân except Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and this community which is the "best community ever to be produced before mankind." (3:110)

So "there is nothing like Him" unified several matters in one single matter. If Nuh had articulated something like of this âyat, his people would have responded to him, because it contains connection and disconnection in a single âyat, rather in half an âyat.

Nuh, peace be upon him, peace be upon him, called on his people at night in respect to their intellects and spirituality (rûhânîyya), which are unseen; and by day he called on them in respect to their outer forms and arrival. In his call, he did not unify with anything, like "there is nothing like Him." So their inward had a distaste for this separation, and it increased them in evasion. Then he said of himself that he called upon them that He might forgive them, not that He be unveiled to them. They understood that from him. That is why "they put their fingers in their ears and wrapped themselves in their clothes," (71:7) and this is the form of veiling to which he called them. So they answered his call by action, not by saying, "At your service."

There is both the confirmation of likeness and its negation in "There is nothing like Him." For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said of himself, "I have been given all the words." (9) Muhammad, peace be upon him, did not call on his people by night and day, but rather he called upon them by night in the day and by day in the night. Nuh said in his wisdom to his people, "He will send heaven down on you in abundant rain," (71:11) which is intellectual gnosis in meanings and metaphorical speculation, and "He will reinforce you with wealth," i.e. by what comes to you from Him.

Thus it is your wealth in which you have seen your form. So whoever among you imagines that he has seen Him, does not have gnosis, and whoever of you knows that he has seen himself, he is the gnostic. For this reason people are divided into those who know Allah and those who do not know. "And sons" is what results from their logical speculation while the knowledge of the business (to which Nuh called them) is based upon contemplation which is far from the results of thought. Their trade did not profit them, (10) so what they had in their hands, which they only imagined they possessed, vanished from them.

The kingdom belongs to the people of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, for Allah says "Give of that to which He has made you successors." (11) (57:7) For the people of Nuh it is, "Do not take anyone besides Me as a guardian." (17:2) The kingdom was confirmed for the people of Muhammad, and the guardianship in it belongs to Allah.

The people of Muhammad are the khalîfs in it. The kingdom belongs to Allah and He is their guardian, and that is the kingdom of being appointed khalif. For this reason, Allah is the "King of the kingdom" (12) as at-Tirmidhi says. "They have hatched a mighty plotting," (71:22) because calling to Allah is the plotting of the the One called; since He does not lack the beginning, He is called to the end, so they call to Allah. This is the source of devising according to inner sight. Nuh said, "The affair belongs entirely to Him," so they answered Him with plotting as He called them.

The people of Muhammad came and knew what the call to Allah was in respect of its He-ness, rather what it is in respect to His Names. Allah says, "The day those who are godfearing are gathered to the All-Merciful." (13) So He used the "particle of the end" (ilâ - to) and joined it to that Name, and we recognise that the universe is under the care of a Divine Name which requires them to be among the "godfearing". The reality of taqwâ (14) is that man avoids ascribing blessings, perfections and praiseworthy attributes to himself or to others, except for Allah. He fears Allah through His acts and attributes. These things are evils from the spring of possibilities. They said in their plotting, "Do not abandon your gods. Do not abandon Wadd or Suwa' or Yaghuth or Ya'uq or Nasr." (71:22) Then they abandoned them ignorant of the Truth according to what they left of the idols. Allah has an aspect in every worshipped thing. Whoever recognises it, recognises, and whoever is ignorant of it is ignorant among the people of Muhammad. Your Lord decreed that you should worship only Him that is the judgement of your Lord.

The one who possesses knowledge knows who the slave is and in what form he is manifested as far as he is a slave. Separation and multiplicity are like the limbs of the sensory form and like faculties of meaning (15) of the spiritual form. He only worships Allah in every worshipped object. The lowest one is the one who imagines that godness is contained in it. Were it not for this illusion, stones and other things would not have been worshipped. This is why He said, "Say: Name them!" (13:33) If they had named them, they would have named stone, tree, or star. If they had been asked, "Who do you worship?" they would have replied, "God". They would not say "Allah" or "the god".

The highest knower does not use this imagination, (16) but rather he says that this is a divine tajalli which one must exalt, and he does not restrict himself. The lowest one is the one possessed of fantasy: "We only worship them so that they bring us neared to Allah." (39:3) The highest knower says, "Your god is One God, so submit to Him," (22:34) wherever He is manifest, "and give good news to the humble-hearted" who humble the fire of their nature. They spoke to it (the fire), and did not say "nature". "They have misguided many people," (71:24) i.e. they perplexed many in the multiplicity of the One by aspects and relations. "Do not increase not the wrongdoers" because their selves are from the totality of the chosen ones who inherited the Book and they are the first of the three, (17)

which precedes the ambivalent and the outdoor, "in anything but misguidance", except in the perplexity of the man of Muhammad who says, "Increase me in perplexity." (18) "Every time it shines on them, they walk in it. When the darkness comes over them, they stop." (2:20) So the perplexed one turns about, and the circular movement is about the axis which he does not leave.

The one who has a stretched-out path is inclined to leave the goal, seeking what the possessor of imagination has in it, and his end is that imagination. He has "from" and "to" and what is between them. The one who has a circular movement has no beginning, "from", which clings to him, and no end, "to", is judged of him. Thus he has the most perfect existence. He "is given all the words" (19) and wisdoms. "And because of their errors" which is that which is recorded for them, "they were drowned" in the seas of the knowledge of Allah which is perplexity among the men of Muhammad. When the seas were heated up, (20) "they were put into a fire" in the source of water, "and they found no one to help them besides Allah." (71:25) Allah is the source of their helpers, and so they were destroyed in it for time without end. If He had brought them out to the shore, the shore of nature, He would have brought them down from this high degree. All belongs to Allah and is by Allah, rather it is Allah.

Nuh said, "My Lord!" and he did not say, "My God," for the Lord has immutability, and "God" differs according to the Names. So "every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29) By Lord, he meant something with an immutable quality. "Do not leave upon the earth" and he called on them to go into its Muhammadan interior. "If you let down a rope, it would fall on Allah," (21) "to Him belongs what is in the heavens and what is in the earth." When you are buried in it, you are in it and it is your container, and "We will return you into it and We will bring you forth from it again," (20:55) by the difference of existence. "...of the unbelievers" who wrap themselves in their garments and put their fingers in their ears, seeking veiling because he called on them that He might forgive them. Forgiveness is the veiling of wrong actions, "not even one" so that the benefit will become universal like the call. "If You leave any," i.e. if You call them and then leave them, "they will misguide Your slaves," i.e. confuse them and so bring them out of their service to what they have of the secrets of lordship. They will think themselves lords after they were slaves in themselves. Thus they are slaves and lords. "They will spawn nothing" i.e. they will not have any result or manifest anything except their being shameless that is, the manifestation of what veils the unbelievers is that they were veiled from what appeared after their manifestation. They manifested that which veils, so they were veiled after their appearance.

The thinker is confused and does not recognise the goal of the shameless in shamelessness, (22) or the unbeliever in his disbelief, yet the person is but one. "My Lord, forgive me," i.e. veil me and that which concerns me

so that my rank and station are unknown, as the rank of Allah are unknown in His statement, "They do measure Allah with His true measure"; (23) "and my parents" of whom I am a result, and they are the intellect and nature; "and all who enter my house," i.e. my heart, "as believers" believing in what it contains of divine reports, and it is what their selves occasioned, "And all the believers, men (the intellects) and women (the selves)."

"Do not increase the wrongdoers (dhâlimîn)" who are from the darkness (dhulumât), the people of the unseen, hiding behind the veils of darkness, "except in ruin" i.e. in destruction. Thus, they do not recognise themselves because they see the Face of Allah outside of them. Among the men of Muhammad, "All things are passing except His Face." (28:88) Ruin is destruction. Whoever wishes to understand the secrets of Nuh must rise into the sphere of Nuh. (24) It is in our book, at-Tanazzulat al-Mawsuliyya.

Notes to to Chapter 3:

1. Subbûh, name applied to Allah, the All-Perfect, disconnected from imperfections.
2. If he does not go on to include tashbih, connection.
3. cf. Qur'an 4:149: "Those who reject Allah and His Messengers and desire to make division between Allah and His Messengers, saying, 'We believe in some and reject some.'"
4. By manifesting His attributes and Essence since everything is a proof and indication of Him.
5. Ref. to Qur'an 17:44, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise, but you do not understand their glorification."
6. In this case, ignorant of the multiplicity of His Names and Attributes.
7. "Like Him" = "ka-mithlihi", the word "like" occurs twice: "ka" and "mithl", so like negates like, like a double negative.
8. Furqan: One of the names of the Qur'an, meaning a "discrimination" that which separates or distinguishes. Here presented as an opposite in a dyad: Qur'an/furqan, that is, discrimination/gathering.
9. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
10. Reference to Qur'an, 2:16, "Those are the people who have sold guidance for misguidance. Their trade has brought no profit. They are not guided."
11. Khalifs.
12. Since He answers His slave who is the "kingdom". Technical term used by al-Hakim at-Tirmidhi and Abu Madyan, discussed by Ibn al-'Arabi in the Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Chapter 24, vol. I, p. 182.
13. ref. Qur'an 19:85.
14. Fearfulness of Allah which is reflected in one's behaviour.
15. Meaning. Meaning does not carry the ordinary connotative significance that it has in the science of semantics. In the Sufic science meaning is not allied, but inseparable from the experience of the recognition of meaning. In other words, it is not a "thing" which can be

apprehended with the qualities of thingness. It is a mode of experiencing which takes places in a zone of awareness that is in itself a realm of the inward reality cognised in the waking state. Meaning/sensory, ma'na/hiss.

16. Khayal: An important term. Khayal means imagination, but in the special technical language of Ibn al-'Arabi the khayal contains an outer and inner meaning. Its outer (not inner) meaning is imagining in the ordinary sense of a "tangible reality" which is experienced mentally yet remains unreal, that is, untouchable and non-physical. Its inner meaning, however, is that faculty by

which we solidify the objects - which are according to unveiling basically "not-there" - spatiality itself. There is much resistance to this in "rational" and programmed intellects as there is of the hand to the rock in "common sense" experience. The rock is there, it does not budge. There is, it must not be forgotten, a threshold situation where this is not so, for if the subject were brain-damaged, subjected to a hallucinogen, or hypnotic trance, then the object would experientially melt away. That is still not the same as seeing in which things are seen as-they-as in one unified field without differentiation, while alert within that condition of experiencing. And this state brings with it wisdom beyond the recognition of how-it-is at that moment - in other words a new understanding is established by the experience.

17. Ref to Qur'an 35:32, "...but some of them wrong themselves, some are ambivalent, and some outdo each other in good."

18. Hayra: Bewilderment. A Key term. Hayra is not a negative situation - it is the condition in which the seeker finds every intellectual channel blocked, every pathway of reason clashing against the other in contradiction so that it induces in the seeker a state of intensity. This intensity by virtue of its inner tension creates a condition we call hayra. It is a collapse of separation - a kind of "white hole" - which results in gatheredness. That is, the hayra creates a new condition which is its result and that result is a breakthrough into an illumination of the Real.

19. Meaning the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, who was given all the words.

20. By the oven (from which the water gushed out of the earth in the Flood.)

21. Hadith.

22. The manifestation of lordship.

23. 6:91, 22:84, 39:67.

24. The Sphere of the Sun.

4: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sanctification (Quddûs) in the Word of Idris

Elevation has two references - one of place and one of rank. Elevation of place is "We raised him up to a high place," (19:57) and the highest of places is that upon which the mill of the world of the spheres revolves. It is the sphere of the sun and in it is the station of the spirituality of Idris, peace be upon him! There are seven heavens under it and seven heavens above it, and it is the fifteenth. That which is above it is the red heaven, i.e. Mars, the heaven of Jupiter, Saturn, the heaven of fixed stars, the Starless Heaven and the heaven of the constellations, the heaven of the Kursi and the heaven of the 'Arsh. That which is below it is the heaven of Venus, Mercury, the Moon, the circle of ether, the circle of air, the circle of water, and the circle of earth. It is the axis of the heavens, and it is a "high place".

As for the elevation of rank, it is for us, the people of Muhammad. Allah said, "When you are uppermost and Allah is with you" (47:35) in this height. He exalts Himself above place, not above rank. When the selves of those among us who do deeds are afraid, He follows the mention of "being with" with His words, "He would not cheat you of your deeds." The deed demands place and knowledge demands rank. So He joined the two heights for us - elevation of place by deed and elevation of rank by knowledge. Then to disconnect the association of being with, He said, "Glorify the name of your Lord, the Most High," (87:1) above this association in meaning.

It is one of the most wondrous of matters that man is the highest of existent things - I mean the Perfect Man, and elevation is only attributed to him by subordination either to place or rank which is a degree. So he is not high by his essence, he is high by the height of place and the height of rank, for these possess height. Height of place is like the All-Merciful settling on the throne, (1) and it is the highest of places. Height of rank is "All things are passing except His Face," (28:88) and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:123) and nothing has existence along with Allah.

When Allah said, "We raised him up to a high place," He made high an adjective for place. Since your Lord said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif in the earth," (2:30) this is height of rank. He said about the angels, "Were you overcome by arrogance, or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) so He gave elevation to the angels. If the angels had possessed that elevation by simple virtue of the fact that they are angels, then all the angels would have been included in this elevation. It was not common to them in the definition of angel. We recognise that this is elevation of rank with Allah. It is the same for the khalifs of the people. If their elevation with the khalifate had been an elevation by essence, every

man would have it. It is not general and so we know that that elevation is by rank.

One of His names is the High. Over whom, when there is nothing except Him? So He is the High by His Essence. Is He is High over that which is particular, when there is no He except Him? His elevation is by virtue of Himself, and He, in respect to existence, is the source of existents. Those in-time things which He calls high in themselves are not other than Him. He was the High when there was no height of relativity because the source-forms in non-existence had not smelt the scent of existence. They remain in their state in spite of the multiplicity of forms in existents, but the source is the same from the whole in the whole. The existence of multiplicity lies in the names which are the relationships, and they are non-existent matters. There is only the source which is the Essence. He is High through Himself, not by any ascription to another. From this standpoint, there is no height of relative relation in the universe, but the aspects of existence which are distinct. The height of relativity exists in the one Source in respect of the many aspects. For that reason, you say of Him, Him and not Him, and you and not you.

Al-Kharraz, (2) may Allah have mercy on him, who is one of the aspects of Allah and one of His tongues with which He speaks of Himself, said that one only has gnosis by joining opposites together in respect of Him. "He is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden." (57:3) He is the source of what appears and the source of what is hidden in the state of its manifestation. There is none who sees Him other than Him and there is none who is hidden from Him. So He is manifest to Himself and hidden from Himself. He is called Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz and other than that from the names of things in-time.

The Hidden says "No" while the Manifest says, "Me," and the Manifest says, "No" while the Hidden says, "Me". This is found in every opposite, yet the speaker is one, and he is the same as the hearer in the statement of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, about what their selves say, (3) for they speak and hear what they say, and know what their selves say. The source is but one, even if the judgements are different. There is no way that anyone can be ignorant of this sort of thing. Every man knows from himself, and it is the form of the Real.

So things are mixed and numbers appear by the one in the known ranks. Thus "one" brought number into existence, and number divides the One. The principle of number only appeared through the numbered. Part of the numbered is non-existent, and part is existent. The thing is non-existent in relation to the senses while it is existent in relation to the intellect. There must be number and numbered. That must grow from one and it grows because of it. Every rank of the numbers has one reality like 9, for example, and 10 and down to 2, and upwards without end, and its reality is not a sum.

A name is not perceived by the addition of ones. 2 is one reality, and 3 is one reality, and so on until the end of these ranks. Even though the source [of numbers] is one, the source of one of them is not the source of the others. Addition encompasses them all, and it speaks of them from them and judges them by them. Twenty ranks (4) appeared in this statement, so composition entered into them. You will continue to affirm the source of what you deny in itself. Whoever recognises what we have related of the numbers, and that negation is the same as their affirmation, knows that the Real, who is disconnected by disconnection, is creature by connection, even though the creature is distinct from the Creator. The matter is the creature/Creator and it is the Creator/creature. That is from one source, rather is is the One source and it is many sources. Look at what you see!

Ibrahim¹'s son told him, "My father, do what you are ordered." (37:102) The child is the same as his father, so he only saw himself sacrificing himself, "and He ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." (5) That which was manifested as a ram was manifested in the form of a human, and manifested in the form of a son. Rather, it is by the principle of the son being the same as the father. "He created from (one self) his mate." (4:1) He (6) married his own self, and from him are both his companion and his child. The matter is one in number. It is the same for nature and what is manifested from it. We do not see it diminishing by what appears from it nor increasing by the lack of what other than it manifests. That which is manifested is not other than it, nor is it the same as what is manifested according to the variety of forms in principle. This one is cold and dry, and that one is hot and dry. They are joined by dryness, and distinct by another quality. The common source is nature, and the world of nature is composed of forms in one mirror. Rather, it is one form in different mirrors.

There is only bewilderment (hayra) by the dispersal of perspectives. Whoever knows what we have said is not bewildered. If he increases in knowledge, it is only from the principle of place, and place is the same as the source-form in which the Real varies in the locus of His tajalli. Conditions vary, so He assumes every condition. There is no condition except for the source in which He make tajalli of Himself, and there is nothing except this.

By this aspect, Allah is creature, so interpret!
And by this aspect, He is not creature, so remember!
The inner sight of whoever understands
what I have said is not confused, and only
the one who perceives it possesses sight.
The source of joining and separating is the same,
and it is multiplicity which never remains or departs.

The One who is High in Himself is the One who possesses the perfection in which all matters of existence are absorbed, as are all non-existent

relations, inasmuch as it is not possible that any of these attributes be lacking from Him, be they praiseworthy by custom, logic, or law, or blameworthy by custom, logic or law. That belongs only to the One named Allah. As for what is named other-than-Allah, it is either a locus of His tajalli or a form which is in it. If it is the locus of His tajalli, it contains distinction. Be-cause of that, there must be distinction between the One who makes tajalli and the place of tajalli; if it is a form in it, that form is the source of the essential perfection because it is the same as what is manifested in it. That which belongs to Allah belongs to that form. However, it is not said that it is Him nor that it is other-than-Him.

Abu-l-Qasim ibn Qasi (7) indicated this in his book, *The Removal of the Sandals*, and he said, "Each Divine Name is qualified by all the Divine Names, and described by their description." It is so. Each Name indicates the Essence and the meaning which is set out for it and which demonstrates it. In respect to its indication of the Essence, it possesses all the names, and in respect to its indication of the meaning which is singular to it, it is distinct from others, such as the Lord, the Creator, the Fashioner, etc. The Name is the same as the Named in respect to the Essence, and the Name is other than the Named in respect to the meaning which is particular to it.

If you have understood that the "high" is as we have mentioned, you know that it is neither place nor height of rank, for height of rank is particular to the administration of authority, like the Sultan and the judge, wazirs and qadis, and all who have rank, be they worthy of that rank or not. Height is by attributes which are not like that. The most knowledgeable of people can be ruled by the person with the position of power, even if that person is the most ignorant of people. This is the height of rank according to the principle of what he has over me in himself. When he retires, his high rank vanishes. The one with knowledge is not like that.

Notes to Chapter 4:

1. Qur'an 7:54, "...then He settled Himself firmly on the Throne."
2. Abu Sa'id Ahmad ibn 'Isa al-Kharraz, died in Cairo 286/899. He said, "I only knew Allah by joining the opposites," and then recited, "He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward."
3. Hadith, "Allah forgives my people what their selves say to then as long as they do not act upon that."
4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 1000.
5. "And We ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." Qur'an: 37:107.
6. Adam.
7. Sufi leader of rebellion against the Murabitun in the Algarve.

5: The Seal of the Wisdom of Being Lost in Love (1) in the Wisdom of Ibrahim (Abraham)

Ibrahim is called the intimate friend, and he was an intimate friend (khalîl), because he was penetrated (takhallal) and gathered all the qualities of the Divine Essence. The poet says:

You pervaded the course of my spirit,
and that is why the intimate friend is called the intimate friend.

It is like the colour which permeates the coloured, so it is a non-essential matter ('arad) in respect to its essential substance (jawhar), and it is not like the place and that which it occupies. Or it means the penetration of the Real into the existence of the form of Ibrahim. Each of these two principles is true as was mentioned, for each points to an aspect which appears without overstepping it.

Do you not see that the Real is manifest in the qualities of beings in-time and He gives news of that from Himself, and He is even manifest in the attributes of imperfection and the attributes of blame? Do you not see that the creature is manifest with the qualities of the Real from first to last, and all of them belong to him as the attributes of in-time things belong to the Real? "Praise belongs to Allah," so the results of praise from every praiser and one praised go back to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:132) It includes what is blameworthy and praiseworthy, and there is only one or the other.

Know that when something is penetrated by something the first is contained by the second, so the penetrating is the name of the actor veiled by the penetrated, which is the name of the one acted upon, and it is the Outwardly Manifest. The name of the actor is the Veiled, the Inwardly Hidden. It is its food, as water permeates wool and so makes it expand. If the Real is the Outwardly Manifest, then the creature is veiled within Him, and creation is all the Names of the Real, His hearing and seeing, and all His ascriptions and discernments. If the creature is outwardly manifest, then the Real is veiled and hidden in him, and so the Real is the hearing of the creature, and his seeing, hand and foot, and all his faculties as it related in sound hadith. (2)

If the Essence were exempt from these relations, it would not be divinity. These relations are made by our sources, so we make Him god by our dependence on His godness. He is not recognised until we are recognised. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Such a person is the creature with the most knowledge of Allah. Some sages, especially Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, claim that one can have gnosis of Allah through disregarding the world. This is false. Indeed, the non-time pre-time is not recognised as god until that

which depends on its being God is known. Thus it is a proof of Him. Then after this, in the second state, (3) unveiling accords you that the Real Himself is the source of the proof of Himself and His godness. The universe is but His tajalli in the forms of their source-forms whose existence is impossible without Him. He assumes various forms and modes according to the realities of these sources and their states, and this is after our knowledge of Him that He is our God.

Then the last unveiling comes, so our forms appear to you in Him, and some of us appear to others in the Real, and then some of us recognise each other and some of us are distinct from one another. Among us are those who recognise that our recognition of ourselves occurs in the Real, and some of us are unaware of the presence in which this recognition of ourselves takes place. "I seek refuge with Allah from being one of the ignorant." (2:67)

By the two unveilings together, He only judges us by ourselves, rather we judge ourselves by ourselves, but through Him. That is why He says, "Allah's is the conclusive argument," (6:149) meaning against those who are veiled when they say to the Real, in conformity with their desires, "Why did you do this or that to us?", thinking that it was not in conformity with their desires. "On the Day when the legs are bared," (68:42) means the matter which the gnostics unveil here. They see that the Real did not do to them what they allege that He did, but that it was from themselves. For He only lets them know what they are in themselves. From this their argument will dissolve, and the decisive proof of Allah will remain.

If you say, what is the benefit of His words, "If He had willed, He could have guided every one of you," (6:149; 16:9) we say in If He willed "if (law)" is a particle of impossibility showing impossibility. He only willed the matter as it is. But the source of possibility accepts the thing and its opposite in the principle of logical proof, and it is the same with any two logical principles. That which occurs is that which the possibility implies in the state of its immutability. The meaning of "If We had guided you" is, had He shown you the Truth. Allah does not open the inner eye of every possibility in the universe to the perception of the matter as it is. There are those who know and those who are ignorant. Allah did not so will, so He did not guide all of them, and He will not will it, and it is the same as if He had willed it. How would He will this which is not? His volition is unified in its connections. It is a relationship dependent on the known, and the known is you and your states. Knowledge does not have an effect on the known, rather the known has an effect on knowledge, and so it accords from itself what it is in its source.

Divine discourse relates according to what agrees with the ones addressed and what logical reflection accords it. It does not come according to what unveiling gives. For that reason, there are many believers, but the gnostics who possess unveiling are few. "There is not

one of us who does not have a known station," (37:164) and it is what you are in your state of immutability which you manifest in your existence. This is if it is confirmed that you have existence. If existence is confirmed to the Real and not to you, the judgement is yours without a doubt in the existence of the Real. If it is confirmed that you are existent, then the judgement is yours without a doubt, even if the judge is the Real. It is only the overflowing of existence on you.

You only praise yourself and you only blame yourself, and praise is only due to Allah for the overflowing of existence, for that is His, not yours. You are His nourishment by conditions, and He is your nourishment by existence. He is specified by what specifies you. The command comes from Him to you, and from you to Him, even though you are called obligated, a passive name (mukallaf), and He is not called obligated since there is no imposition upon Him.

He praises me, and I praise Him.
He serves me and I serve Him.
In one state I draw near to Him,
and in sources I deny Him.
So He knows me and I do not know Him,
and I know Him and I witness Him.
Where is independence
when I help Him and assist Him?
That is why the Real brought me into existence.
Then I knew Him and manifested His existence.
Hadith (4) brought us that,
and in me He achieved His goal.

Then the intimate friend, Ibrahim, peace be upon him!, possessed this rank by virtue of which he was called the intimate friend. For that reason, he made hospitality to guests a sunna. Ibn Masarra (5) associates him with the angel Mika'il in respect to provisions. Provision is that which nourishes those provided for: when provision permeates the essence of the one provided for until nothing remains in it except permeation and nourishment flows in all the parts of the one nourished. There are no parts in divinity, so all the divine stations are penetrated which are designated by the Names, and by which His Essence is manifested.

We are His as our proofs confirm,
and we are ours.
Only my being belongs to Him,
and we are His as we are ours.
I have two aspects: Him and me,
but He does not have "me" through me.
However, His place of manifestation is in me,
so we are His - like me.
"Allah speaks the truth, and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 5:

1. Huyûm is the intense love and passion which causes bewilderment and distraction.
2. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)
3. The first unveiling was annihilation (fanâ') and the second is going-on (baqâ').
4. "I created existence so that I might be known."
5. Muhammad ibn Masarra al-Jabali, Andalusian Sufi and thinker, born in Granada 269 /883 and died near there in 319/931.

6: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Real in the Word of Ishaq (Isaac)

The ransom of a Prophet by an animal's sacrifice
as an offering!
How can the bleating of a ram be equal
to the voice of a man?
Allah Almighty magnified the ram out of concern for us or for it,
but I do not see by what measure.
There is no doubt that the bodies
of cows and camels are larger,
but they relinquished the rank of sacrifice
to the offering of the ram.
Would that I knew how a ram
replaced the khalif of the All-Merciful with its small body!
Do you not see that the command to sacrifice
implies correspondence and promises gain and diminishes loss?
There is no creature higher than the mineral,
and after it comes the plant according to its ranks and measures.
The animal comes after the plant,
and each one had gnosis of its Creator by unveiling and evident proof.
As for the one named Adam, he is limited
by intellect, thinking, and the conventions of belief.
It is that which Sahl (at-Tustari) (1) and the realizer
said as we do (2) - because we and they are in the degree of Ihsan.
Whoever witnesses the matter I have witnessed
will say what I have said, both secretly and openly.
Do not pay any attention to words
which contradict our words and do not sow grain in the land of the blind!
They are the "deaf and dumb" in the text of the Qur'an
which the one protected from wrong action brought for our ears.

Know, may Allah support us and you! that Ibrahim, the intimate friend,
peace be upon him, told his son, "I saw in a dream that I must sacrifice
you." (37:102) He did not interpret it although the dream is the presence
of the imagination (khayâl). It was a ram which appeared in the form of
Ibrahim's son, and Ibrahim confirmed the vision. So his Lord ransomed
his son from Ibrahim's illusion with the "mighty sacrifice", which was the
interpretation of the vision with Allah, but Ibrahim was not aware of it.

The tajalli of form in the presence of the imagination requires another
knowledge by which one can perceive what Allah means by that form.
The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said
to Abu Bakr when he interpreted a dream, "You have guessed part of it
rightly, and you have missed part of it." Abu Bakr asked him to inform
him of what was right in it and what was wrong, but the Prophet did not
do so.

Allah said to Ibrahim when He called him, "Ibrahim, you have discharged your vision." (37:105) He did not say to him, "You have confirmed the vision that it is your son" because he did not interpret it. He took what he dreamt literally, whereas dreams require interpretation. That is why the 'Aziz, the ruler of Egypt, said, "...if you can interpret dreams." (12:43) The meaning of interpretation is the transposition from the form of what one dreamt to another form. The cattle represented the hard years and the fertile years. If Ibrahim had been faithful to the dream, he would have sacrificed his son, since he believed in the dream that it really was his son, whereas with Allah it meant the "mighty sacrifice" in the form of his son. He ransomed him by what occurred in Ibrahim's mind, but it was not ransomed in actuality with Allah.

There is a common form to the sensory form of the sacrifice and the imaginary form of Ibrahim's son. If he had seen a ram in his imagination, he would have interpreted it as his son or something else. Then Allah said, "This was a most manifest trial," (37:106) i.e. his clear test, meaning his experience in knowledge - whether or not he knew what the perspective of the dream required in the way of interpretation. He knew that the place of the imagination required interpretation, but he neglected it and the condition inherent in it, and for this reason he believed in the vision.

Taqi ibn Mukhallad, the transmitter of traditions, did so too, having heard in a tradition he was sure of, that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Whoever sees me in a dream, sees me when awake, for Shaytan cannot assume my form." (3) So Taqi ibn Mukhallad saw the Prophet in a dream in which the Prophet gave him milk to drink. Taqi ibn Mukhallad believed his dream, but he made himself vomit and threw up the milk. If he had interpreted the dream, he would have known that milk means knowledge, equal to the quantity that he drank. Do you not see that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received a goblet of milk in a dream and he said, "I drank it until satiety came out of my nails, and then I gave the surplus to 'Umar." It was said, "Messenger of Allah, what do you interpret it as?" He replied, "Knowledge." (4) He did not leave it as milk in its dream form since he had knowledge of the state of dreams and how they must be interpreted. It is known that the form of the Prophet, peace be upon him, which the senses see, is buried in Madina, and that the form of his spirit and his subtle form have never been seen by anyone nor by himself. For this reason, the spirit of the Prophet takes on material existence in the form of his body as he died, and nothing is missing from it. So it is Muhammad, peace be upon him, who appears in dreams through his spirit in a bodily form which resembles his buried body, for Shaytan cannot assume the form of his body, (5) may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and Allah protects the one who sees him. For this reason, whoever sees this form takes from it all that it orders or prohibits or gives good news of, even as he takes judgements from him in the life of this world - according to what they indicate from text, immediate or

implicit. If he gives him something, that thing is subject to interpretation, unless it is manifest in the senses as it is in the imagination, and so does not require interpretation. It is based on this aspect that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, relied, even as Taqi ibn Mukhallad did. The vision has these two aspects. (6)

Allah taught us adab in what He did with Ibrahim and what He said to him when He gave him the station of prophethood. We know that when we see Allah in a form which logical reason rejects, we must interpret that form according to the Shari'a, whether it is in the state of the one who sees Him, or in the place in which He is seen, or the two together. If logical reason does not refute it, then we take it as we saw it, just as when we see Allah in the Next World.

So the One, the All-Merciful,
has forms in every place from what is hidden and what is manifest.
If you said, "This is the Real!" you spoke truly;
and if you said, "It is something else," you interpreted.
His principle is not in one place rather than another,
but it brings the Real to the creatures.
When He manifests Himself to the eyes,
the intellects deny him by insistent proofs.
He is accepted in the tajalli to the intellects,
and in that which is called the imagination (khayâl).
That which is sound is the seeing.

Abu Yazid, (7) may Allah be pleased with him, says of this station, (8)
"Had the Throne, and all it contains a hundred million times over, been in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have felt it." This is the magnitude of Abu Yazid in the world of bodies, but I say, "If the limitlessness of that which exists could be conceived of as being limited, and had it been contained as an existent source in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have been aware of it in his knowledge." For it is confirmed that the heart contains Allah, although it is not described by satiety. Had it been filled, it would have saturated.

Abu Yazid also said, "We have pointed to this station, saying:
O Creator of things in Yourself,
You encompass all You have created!
You create that whose being has no end in You,
for You are narrow and vast!
Had that which Allah created shone in my heart,
this shining dawn would not have shone.
But that which contains Allah
does not exclude creation.
How is that, O Hearing?

Anyone can create by illusion in his imagination that which has no

existence save in the imagination. This is a common matter. By aspiration (himma), the gnostic creates that which has an outside existence in his aspiration. However, it continues only as long as the aspiration continues to preserve it without being tired by preserving what it created. (9)

When it happens that the gnostic neglects to preserve what he created by concentration, that creature ceases to exist, unless the gnostic has mastered all the presences and does not neglect anything. Rather, he must witness at least one of these presences. If the gnostic creates something by his aspiration and possesses this encompassment, that creature's form will appear in every presence, and the form will preserve itself. If the gnostic neglects a presence or many presences while seeing one of the presences, and while preserving the form of what he created in the presence he is in, all the forms will be preserved by the preservation of that form in the presence which he does not neglect. For neglect is never universal, either among the common or the elite. I have exposed a secret here which the People of Allah have guarded jealously, for it contains a refutation of their allegation of being the Real. For the Real is never unconscious of anything, and the slave must be unconscious of something in favour of something else. Inasmuch as he preserves that which he has created, he says, "I am the Real," (10) but he does not maintain it the way the Real maintains it that is the difference. Inasmuch as he is unconscious of any form and its presence, the slave is distinguished from the Real. He must be distinct, although all the forms are maintained by his preservation of a single one of these in the presence of which he is conscious. This is preservation by inclusion, and the preservation of the Real of what He created is not like that. Rather, His preservation is of each form in particular. This matter which I have just communicated has never been written about by anyone - neither by me nor by any others - except in this book. It is unique in time. Take care lest you forget it!

The presence which you remain conscious of, with the form which resembles it, is like the Book about which Allah said, "We have not omitted anything from the Book." (6:38) It therefore integrates the tangible and the intangible. None will recognise what we have said except the one who is himself a Qur'an. (11) The one who fears Allah will have a furqân, (12) which is, as we mentioned, this matter in which the slave is distinct from the Lord. This furqân is the highest furqân.

At one moment, the slave is the Lord without a doubt,
and at another the slave is most certainly the slave.
If he is the slave, he is vast by Allah,
and if he is the Lord, he is in a restricted life.
Insofar as he is the slave,
he sees the source of himself,
and without a doubt
his hopes expand from him.
Inasmuch as he is a lord, he sees all of creation,

from the presence of angels and the kingdom, demanding from him,
And he is unable to answer their demands by his essence.
For this reason, some of the gnostics weep.
Be the slave of a Lord, and do not be the lord of His slave,
so you will not be suspended and tested in the fire.

Notes to Chapter 6:

1. Famous Sufi who studied under Sufyan ath-Thawri. d. 282/896. Wrote a short commentary on the Qur'an.
2. That the inanimate has more greater gnosis of Allah and obeys Him more than other creatures.
3. Al-Bukhari (6592); Muslim 42:10.
4. In Abu Dawud and Ibn Hanbal.
5. As in the hadith of al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. Either it remains on its dream form or it is subject to interpretation.
7. Al-Bistami, d. 261/874. Famous Sufi known for his ecstatic expressions.
8. The station of the vastness of the heart.
9. Language derived from Qur'an 2:255, "...their preservation does not tire him."
10. Al-Hallaj.
11. i.e. The Perfect Man.
12. Qur'an 8:29, "O you who believe! If you have fear of Allah, He will give you a furqan..."

7: The Seal of the Wisdom of Elevation in the Word of Isma'il (Ishmael)

Know that the one called Allah is Unique (Ahad) by Essence and by all His names, and every existent thing is only attached to Allah by its own lord exclusively, for it is impossible for an existent to possess the whole. As for Divine Unity (ahadiyya), no existent possesses any of it because one cannot have one part of it while another has another part. Unity does not admit of divisibility. His Unity integrates all of Him by potentiality.

The happy one is the one who is the one "who was pleasing to his Lord." (19:55) There is no one who is not pleasing to his Lord because it is by him that lordship (rububiyyah) (1) is sustained. He is pleasing to Him, and so he is happy. This is why Sahl at-Tustari said, "Lordship has a secret, and this secret is you." He was addressing every source. "Had the secret been disclosed, lordship would have been invalidated." He used the word "law" (2) which is the particle of impossibility - so it is never manifested, and lordship is never invalidated - for the source has no existence except by its Lord. The source is always existent, therefore lordship is never invalidated.

He who is pleasing is beloved, and all that the beloved does is beloved, so everything is pleasing, because the source could not act unless the act belonged to its Lord. The source is made tranquil by having an act attributed to it, but it is content with what appears in it and from it of the acts of its Lord, and is pleased with these acts, because every doer and producer is pleased with his act and product. He completes his act and product according to its basis. "He gives each thing its created form and then guides it," (20:50) that is, He revealed to it that He gave everything its creation, so it does not admit of decrease.

Isma'il, peace be upon him, by his discovery of what we mentioned "was pleasing to his Lord." In the same way, every existent thing who is pleasing to its Lord is also pleasing to the Lord of another, because lordship is only obtained from each of the names, not from the One of Unity. What is specific to it from the whole is only what is attributed to it. So He is its Lord. None is attached to Him in respect of His Unity. For this reason, the people of Allah are forbidden *tajalli* in the Unity. If you look at Him by Him, He is the One who is looking at Himself, and He continues to be Himself looking at Himself by Himself. If you look at Him by yourself, unity vanishes because of you. If you look at Him both through Him and through you, Unity also vanishes because the pronoun of the second person implies that there is something else besides that which is regarded. There must be some relationship which necessitates the duality of the regarnder and regarded, and so Unity vanishes, even though there only exists the One who sees Himself by Himself. It is known that in this description, He is the Regarnder and the Regarded.

It is not possible that the one who is pleasing be totally pleasing, unless all that he manifests comes from the act of the One who is pleased with him. Isma'il was distinguished from other individuals by how Allah described him, namely, that "he was pleasing to his Lord."

It is the same for every "self at peace" to which it is said, "Return to your Lord." He only commanded it to return to its Lord who called it, and so it recognised Him among the totality, "well-pleasing and well-pleased. Enter among My slaves!" (89:28) to the degree that they have this station. The slaves mentioned here refer to every slave who has gnosis of his Lord, who is content with Him, and does not turn to the Lord of another while preserving the unity of the source which is necessary. "Enter My Garden," which is My veil, (3) and My Garden is not other than you, so you veil Me by your essence. There is only gnosis of Me by you and you only exist by Me, so whoever has gnosis of you has gnosis of Me, and there is no gnosis of Me, for there is no gnosis of you. If you enter into the Garden, you enter into yourself, so you will know yourself by a gnosis other than the gnosis by which you had knowledge when you knew your Lord. You will have two sorts of gnosis: gnosis of Him in respect of yourself, and gnosis of yourself and Him in respect of Him, not in respect of you.

You are a slave and you are a lord
to whomever you are a slave in respect of.
And you are a lord and you are a slave
to whoever possesses the covenant in speech.
Every knot has a person over it who unravels it
by one who has another knot.

Allah is pleased with His slaves, and "they are well-pleasing and well-pleased with Him." He is pleasing, so the two presences confront each other and accept likes, and the likes are opposites because the two likes are a single reality which does not unify them since they would not then be distinct. There is only the distinct, so there is no like. There is no like in existence, and so there is no opposite in existence. Existence is one reality, and the thing is not opposite to itself.

Only the Real remains,
no phenomenal being remains.
There is nothing connected, nothing distinct.
For that reason, the proof of the eye-witness came,
so I only see His source with my eye when I see!

That is for "the one who fears his Lord" lest He makes distinction by his knowledge. By that distinction, we indicated the ignorance of sources in existence according to what the knower brought, so distinction occurs among the slaves, and distinction occurs among the lords. If distinction had not occurred, one divine name would have been interpreted in all its aspects by that by which another name is interpreted. The explanation of

the Exalter is not that of the Abaser, and so on, but from the aspect of unity, as we said, every name indicates the Essence and its reality in respect to what it is. The One Named is but One. The Exalter is the Abaser in respect to the Named. It is not the Abaser in respect to itself and its reality. That which is understood differs in the understanding in respect to each of them.

Do not look at the Real.
Free Him from creation.
Do not look at creation,
and garb it in other than the Real.
Disconnect Him and connect Him,
and stand in a seat of honour. (4)
Stay in the state of gatheredness (jam') if you wish,
and, if you wish, in the forms in separateness (farq).
You will win all,
even if all set out to carry the day.
You will not be annihilated
and you will not have going-on
and the forms will not be annihilated
and will not have going-on.
Revelation will not be given to you
in respect to another, and you will not receive it.

Praise is by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat. The Divine Presence demands praise which is praiseworthy in itself. So one extols the Divine Presence by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat, for one goes beyond it, "and do not imagine that Allah break His promise to His Messengers." (14:47) He did not say, "and his threat", rather He said that He will pass over their wrong actions even though he threatens not to. He praised Isma'il because "he was true to his promise." (19:54) Possibility vanishes in respect to the Real, since in it is that which demands the probable.

Nothing remains except the One
who is true to His promise alone,
and an eye does not remain
seeing the threat of the Real.
If they enter the abode of misery,
in it they are in possession of delight, and a different bliss.
Than the bliss of the gardens of endless-time, but the matter is the same.
The difference between them occurs in the tajalli.
It is called punishment ('adhab) from the sweetness ('udhuba) of its food,
that is like the husk of it, and the husk protects it.

Notes to Chapter 7:

1. Rububiyyah: Lordship, the quality of being a lord. A term derived from the Qur'anic descriptions of Allah's lordship over creation. One might say the ecology of natural existence. It is an essential element in Sufic

cosmology and is a most sophisticated concept which surpasses the crude specificity and mechanistic views of evolutionist biology. It is an energy system of relationships in constant change and altering dynamics. It functions through the different realms, the atomic, the mineral, the plant, and so on. It relates the levels of living organisms from the unicellular up to man, and the interpenetrations of organism and environment. It re-defines "event" from crude historicity to a picture of organism/event in a unified field. It is the underlying concept which allows us to abandon the dead mind/body split of the dying culture. It permits us to utilise and develop the energy concepts of Islamic/Chinese medicine - which hold a common energy concept at base. Rububiyya permits us to observe ONE PROCESS at work throughout every level of the creational realities.

2. "Law" (if, but probably not) expresses an unlikely condition, while "in" (if, but probably yes) expresses a probable condition.

3. Garden, Janna, also carries the connotation of veiling, concealing.

4. Qur'an 54:53-55, "The fearfully aware will be amid Gardens and Rivers on seats of honour in the presence of an All-Powerful King."

8: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Spirit (Rûh) in the Word of Ya'qub (Jacob)

The Din (1) is two Dins: the Din with Allah and with the one whom the Real knows, and who has recognition of the fact that the Real knows him; and the Din with creation; and Allah takes account of it since its goal is conformity with what Allah has willed of the Shari'a set down with Him. Allah said, "Ibrahim directed his sons to this, as did also Ya'qub, 'My sons! Allah has chosen this Din for you, so do not die except as Muslims'" (2:132) that is obeying Him. The Din brought the alif and the lam (2) of definition and acquaintance. It is the recognised Din. It is His words, "The Din with Allah is Islam," (3:19) and it is submission. So the Din is an expression of your obedience. That which is from Allah is the road which leads you to Him. Din is submission and the law (namus) is the road which Allah has set down.

Anyone who is described by submission to what Allah has prescribed for him is the one who has based himself on the Din, and it raises him up and establishes him as does the prayer. The slave is the product of the Din. Allah sets down judgements, and thus submission is the source of your action, and so Din is from your action. You will only achieve happiness by what comes from you. As happiness is established for you by your actions, so the Divine Names are only established by His actions, which are you and which are in-time. As He is called god by His effects, so you are called happy by your effects.

Allah bestowed His rank upon you since you established the Din and obeyed what He prescribed for you. I will enlarge on that, if Allah wills, in a useful manner, after we have clarified the Din which creation has which Allah takes account of when He says, "The Din is Allah's alone," (8:39) and all of it is from you, and not from Him except in respect to origin. Allah says, "They invented monasticism," (57:27) and monasticism consists of arbitrary esoteric rules (an-nawâmis al-hikmiya) which the known Messenger did not bring to the people from Allah by the traditional Prophetic method. When wisdom and clear benefit corresponded to these rules regarding the divine decision about the goal of the Shari'a of Allah, (3) Allah took it into account according to what He Himself prescribed. Allah did not prescribe it for them. Then Allah opened between Himself and their hearts the door of divine concern and mercy while they were not aware of it, and in their hearts He made them esteem their rules by which they seek "the pleasure of Allah" beyond the Prophetic method known by Divine definition. Allah says, "They did not observe it" those people who devised these rules and what was prescribed for them "as it should have been observed" - "unless it was purely out of the desire to gain the good pleasure of Allah." That was what they believed about it.

"To those of them who believed We gave their reward, but many of them are deviators." (57:27) "Many of them," i.e. those who have this worship

prescribed for them, "are deviators," that is, do not submit to it and observe it properly. Allah does not accord to the one who does not obey it, a law which pleases Him, but the command requires submission. Its proof is that the one who is obligated either obeys with agreement or opposes it. The one who agrees and is obedient has no need of any discourse on it to prove it. The one who opposes it is seeking one of two matters from Allah to be judged regarding him: either overlooking of wrong actions and forgiveness, or being taken to task for that. One of the two is necessary because the command is true in itself. In any state, it is true that Allah guides His slave by his actions whatever state he is in, and so the state is the influencing factor.

Thus the Din is a reward, that is, the exchange for what is easy and for what for is not easy. "Allah is pleased with them, and they are pleased with Him" (97:8, 58:22) is the easy reward, and "As for any one of you who has done wrong, We will make him suffer great punishment" (25:19) is the reward of what is not easy. He passes over their wrong actions and this is their reward. It is proven that the Din is the reward. As the Din is Islam, and Islam is the same as being led, it leads to what is easy (the reward) and what is not easy (the punishment), and so it is the repayment. This is the language of the people of outwardness.

As for its secret and inwardness, it manifests itself in the mirror of the existence of Allah, so it does not refer to possibilities from Allah other than what their essences in their states accord. They have a form in every state, and their forms differ according to the difference of their states. The tajalli differs according to the difference of the state. The effect occurs in the slave according to what he is. None gives him good except himself, and none gives him the opposite of good except himself. Thus he gives bliss to his essence, and he also punishes it. He only blames himself and only praises himself. "Allah's is the conclusive argument" (6:149) in His knowledge of them since knowledge depends on the known.

The secret which is above this in this sort of question is that possibilities are based on their origin from non-existence. The existence of the created reality is only by the forms of the states on which the possibilities are based in themselves and their sources. Thus you know who has pleasure and who has pain, and from each of these states you know what follows ('aqaba); and since it follows, you derive punishment ('uquba) and penalty ('iqab) from it. It permits good and evil as two opposites which custom calls the good reward, and the evil punishment.

For this reason, He designates and elucidates the Din by custom because He relates to it what is necessary and what his state demands. Din is custom or habit, and the poet said, "Like your habit (Din) with the mother of little Harith...", that is, like your custom. What is understood by custom or habit is that the matter itself recurs. This is not the case in Din. Custom is repetition, but custom is only one intelligible thing while

resemblance in forms exists. We know that Zayd is the same as 'Amr in respect to humanness, but humanness does not recur since, had it done so, it would have multiplied. It is but one reality, and the one does not multiply itself. We know that Zayd is not the same as 'Amr in respect to personality. The person of Zayd is not the person of 'Amr in spite of the realisation that personality is common to both. In the sensory, we say that humanness recurs because of this resemblance, and we say in sound judgement that it does not. From one aspect, there is no habit in reward, and from another aspect, there is habit even as there is reward by one aspect and no reward by another aspect. Thus reward is also a state in the possible. This is a question about which those who know this matter are unaware, and it is part of the secret of the Decree which governs creatures. Know that it is as if it were said of the doctor that he is the servant of nature - in the same way, it is said of the Messengers and heirs⁴ that they are the servants of the Divine Command among people. In the heart of the matter, they serve the states of possible things, and their service derives from the sum of their own states on which they are based in the state of the immutability of their sources. See how wondrous this is!

Is not the the desired servant here the one who performs what is commanded by the one who is served, either by state or by word? So it is valid that the doctor be called the servant of nature if he acts according to the principle of assisting it. Nature produces in the body of the one who is ill a special state of being by which he is called "ill". If the doctor were to assist nature by service, he would also increase the magnitude of the illness by it when he wants to repel the illness, seeking health. Health is also a part of nature by the growth of another state of being which differs from this state of being. Then the doctor is not the servant of nature, and yet he serves it inasmuch as he only heals the body of the one who is ill and changes that aspect, not the general one, for generalities are not valid in this sort of question. Thus the doctor is both a servant and is not a servant of nature.

In the same way, the Messengers and their heirs are in the service of the Real, and the Real has two aspects of judgement in respect to the states of the obligated. The matter proceeds from the slave according to what the will of Allah demands of it, and the will of Allah is attached to it according to what the knowledge of Allah demands of it. The knowledge of Allah is attached to it according to what the known accords it of its essence. The known only appears in its form. The Messenger and the heir serve the divine command by will, and yet they do not serve the will. The Messenger answered it seeking the happiness of the one who is under obligation. Had he served the Divine Will, he would not have given counsel, and yet he only gave counsel by it, i.e. the will. The Messenger and the heir are the doctors of the selves for Next life, obedient to the command of Allah when He commands them. So he looks at Allah's command, and sees that He has commanded him to do that which opposes His will. The command is only what He wills, and for this reason,

it is the command.

He wills the command and it occurs, and He did not will the occurrence of what He commanded the commanded one to do, and so it did not occur from the commanded one therefore it is called opposition and rebellion. The Messenger conveys the news, and this is why he said, "The Sura of Hud (and its like) made me white-haired," when they came to him from His words, "Go straight as you have been commanded." (11:112) He did not know whether he was commanded to what complies with the will, so that it occurs, or to what does not comply with the will, so that it does not occur.

No one recognises the judgement of the will except after what is willed takes place, unless he is one whose inner eye has been unveiled by Allah. If he is, he will perceive the source-forms of the possibilities in their fixed state for what they really are. Then he judges according to what he sees. This belongs to certain people at certain moments, but they do not have it all the time. The Messenger said, "I do not know what He will do with me or with you." (5) So he made the veil clear, and he only meant that it emerges in a particular command, and no more.

Notes to Chapter 8:

1. Din: The life transaction, literally the debt or exchange situation between two parties, in this usage the Creator and the created, or as some say between the conditioned and the unconditioned, the limited and the limitless, or the many and the One.
2. The definite article.
3. Which is the achievement of human perfection through knowledge and actions.
4. Hadith, "The people of knowledge are the heirs of the Prophets."
5. Hadith in al-Bukhari.

9: The Seal of the Wisdom of Light in the Word of Yusuf (Joseph)

This luminous wisdom spreads its light on the presence of the imagination (khayal), and it is the first of the beginnings of divine revelation in the people of divine concern. 'A'isha, may Allah be pleased with her, said, "The first of what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had of revelation was the true dream. Then he only saw dreams which came like the breaking of dawn, and there was nothing hidden in it," (1) and her knowledge only extended to this. This lasted for six months, and then the angel came to him. She did not know that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had said, "People are asleep, and when they die, they waken up." Everything seen in the state of wakefulness is of that sort, although states differ. She spoke of six months, but all his life in this world was like that, as a dream in a dream.

Everything reported of this nature is called the world of the imagination (khayal), and for this reason, there must be interpretation: the matter which has a form in itself appears in a form other than it. The interpreter passes from these forms which the sleeper sees to the form upon which the matter is based. If he is correct, as in knowledge appearing in the form of milk, then he interprets the source of the form of knowledge from the form of milk. He discovers the source and says, "This form of milk refers to the form of knowledge."

When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received revelation, he was taken from the ordinary sensory world. He was covered and withdrew from those who were present with him. When that left him, he returned, and he only received revelation in the "presence of the imagination", although it could not be said of him that he had been asleep.

It was the same when the angel appeared to him as a man. That was also from the presence of the imagination, for it was not a man, but rather an angel who had entered into the form of a man. The gnostic onlooker interpreted it until he reached its form in reality. Then he said, "This is Jibril who came to teach you your deen." (2) He told them, "Answer the greeting of the man," so he called him a man in respect to the form in which he appeared to them. Then he said, "This is Jibril," and he looked at the form to which this imaginary man would return. He spoke the truth both times, with the truth of the vision of the physical eye, and the truth in that this was Jibril without a doubt.

Yusuf, peace be upon him, said, "I saw eleven stars and the sun and the moon prostrate themselves in front of me." (12:4) He saw his brothers in the form of the stars and his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon. This is from the point of view of Yusuf. Had it been from the point of view of what was seen, the appearance of his brothers in the form of

stars and the appearance of his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon would have been from their volition. Since they had no knowledge of what he saw, that which Yusuf perceived was in the repository of his imagination.

Ya'qub knew that when he related it to him, so he said, "O my son, do not tell your vision to your brothers in case they should devise some scheme to injure you." (12:5) Then he absolved his sons of deceit and ascribed it to Shaytan, who is the source of deceit. He said, "In truth, Shaytan is a clear-cut enemy to man," i.e. he manifests enmity. Then Yusuf said at the end of the affair, "This is now the interpretation of the dream that I had. My Lord has made it all come true," (12:100) that is, that He manifested it in the world of senses after it was in the form of the imagination.

The Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said about it, "People are asleep". Yusuf spoke of what his Lord had rendered true in the status of one who dreams that he has awakened from his dream and interprets it, and does not know that he is still asleep. Then later when he wakes up, he says, "I dreamt such-and-such a thing, and then I dreamt that I woke up and interpreted in such-and-such a way." This is similar to that. Look at how great the difference of perception is between Muhammad, peace be upon him, and Yusuf, peace be upon him, at the end of the affair when Yusuf said, "This is the interpretation of my dream of long ago which my Lord has rendered true," that is, made sensory or sensed. It was always sensed, since the imagination only gives out sensed things, and it has nothing other than that. See how noble is the knowledge of the heirs of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace!

I would say more on this presence on the Muhammadan tongue of Yusuf, as you will soon understand, if Allah wills. Know that that which is referred to as other-than-Allah, or the universe, is related to Allah as the shadow is related to the person. The universe is the shadow of Allah. It is the same as the relation of existence to the universe, since the shadow exists in the senses without a doubt. But there must be something by which that shadow appears. If one were to remove that by which the shadow appears, the shadow would be intelligible but would not exist in the senses. Rather, it would be a potential in the essence of the person on whom it depends. The locus of the manifestation of this divine shadow called the "universe" is the sources of the possibilities by which this shadow extends itself. This shadow is perceived according to what it projects itself on from the existence of this essence, but perception occurs through His name, the Light. This shadow is projected on the sources of possibilities in the form of the unknown unseen.

Do you not see that shadows incline to the darkness, indicating the hiddenness they contain because of the distance of the relationship between them and the persons who project them? Even if the person is white, his shadow is like this. Do you not see that when mountains are

distant from the eye of the onlooker, they appear black? In their actual sources they are other than the colour the senses perceive. This is only due to the effect of distance. It is like the blue of the sky. This is the effect distance has on the senses with non-luminous bodies. It is the same for the sources of possibilities which are non-luminous because they are non-existent. Even if they are described as unchanging, they are not described by existence since existence is light. Distance makes luminous bodies appear small in the senses, so this is another effect of distance. The senses perceive them as small in size, whereas in their sources they are large according to that degree and greater in magnitude. One knows by proof that the sun is larger than the earth, but it appears to be the size of a shield. That is also an effect of distance.

You only know the universe according to the amount you know the shadows, and you are ignorant of the Real according to what you do not know of the person on which that shadow depends. Inasmuch as He has a shadow, He is known, and inasmuch as one is ignorant of what is in the essence of the shadow of the form which projects the shadow, he is ignorant of Allah. For that reason, we say that Allah is known to us from one aspect and not known to us from another aspect. "Do you not see how your Lord stretches out shadows? If He had wished, He could have made them stationary," (25:45) i.e. it still would be a potential in Himself. It is as He said, that Allah would not give a *tajalli* of Himself to possibilities until He manifests the shadow. The shadow is as if it remains outside of the possibilities which do not have a source manifested for them in existence.

"Then We appoint the sun to be a pointer to them," that is to His name, the Light of which we spoke, and the senses witness it, for shadows have no source in the absence of light. "Then We draw them back to Ourselves, in gradual steps," so Allah draws it back to Himself because it is His shadow which appeared from Him, and it is not other-than-Him. All that you perceive is the existence of Allah in the sources of possibilities. Inasmuch as the He-ness of Allah is He, it is His existence. Inasmuch as forms differ in it, it is the sources of possibilities. As the name of the shadow does not leave it by the difference of forms, in the same way the name of the universe or the name other-than-Allah does not leave it by the difference of forms. In regard to the Divine Unity of His being, the shadow is Allah, because He is the One, the Unique; and in respect to the multiplicity of forms, it is the world, so understand and realise what I have explained to you! Since the matter is as I mentioned, the universe is illusory, and it does not have a real existence. This is the meaning of the imagination, that is, you imagine that the universe is an autonomous extra thing outside of Allah. It is not like that in itself. Do you not see that in the senses, the shadow is connected to the person who projects it, and it is impossible that it be detached from that connection since it is impossible for something to be detached from its own essence? Recognise your source ('ayn), and who you are, what is your he-ness and what your relation to Allah is, and by what You are the Truth and by what

you are the universe, "other", and whatever resembles these expressions. In this, those that know vie in excellence, so there is the one who knows and the one who is more knowing.

The Real is, in relation to a particular shadow, small or large, pure or more pure, as light is in relation to what veils it from the onlooker through coloured glass which tints it. At the same time, it has no colour, and so you see it as making a mirror-image of your reality to your Lord. If you say that the light is green by the greenness of the glass, you will have spoken the truth as your sensory vision testifies. If you say that it is not green and has no colour as evidence accords you, you will have spoken the truth as sound logical consideration testifies. This is light projected across the shadow, and it is the same as the glass which is a luminous shadow because of its purity. It is the same for one of us who has realised the Real. His form manifests itself in him more than it manifests itself in another. Among us there is the one for whom Allah is his hearing, seeing, and all his faculties and limbs, (3) according to the signs which the Shari'a gives in a transmission from Allah. In spite of this, the source of the shadow exists, so the pronoun of "his hearing" refers to him. Other slaves are not like this. The relation of this slave is nearer to the existence of Allah than the relation of other slaves.

Then the matter is as we have confirmed. So know that you are imagination and that which you perceive and of which you say, "It is not me" is also imagination. All of existence is imagination within imagination. True existence is Allah, the Real, in particular in respect to essence and source, not in respect to His Names, because the Names have two meanings. One meaning is His source which is the same as the "Named", and the other meaning is what it indicates and that by which the Name is separate from this other Name, and so distinct. The Ever-Forgiving is separate from the Manifest and the Hidden, and the First is distinct from the Last. Thus it is clear to you that each Name is the same as the other Name, and yet it is not the other Name. Inasmuch as the Name is the same, it is the Real, and inasmuch as it is not it, it is the imaginary Real which we discussed.

Glory be to the One who is only proven by Himself and Whose being is only confirmed by His source! The Hidden is pure non-existence, so whoever holds to multiplicity, holds to the universe and the Divine Names and the names of the world. Whoever holds to Divine Unity holds to Allah in respect to His Essence which is independent of the universe, not in respect to its divinity and form. If the Essence is independent of the universe, then He is the source of its independence from the ascriptions of the Names, because it has the Names, and they indicated it as they indicate other named things in which their effect is realised. "Say: He is Allah, Absolute Oneness" (112:1) in respect of his source, "Allah, the Everlasting Sustainer of all" in respect to our dependence on Him. "He has not given birth" in respect to His He-ness and us, "and was born born" the same way, "and no one is comparable to Him" in the same

way.

This is His description so He singled out His Essence in His statement, "Allah is Unique (Ahad)". Multiplicity appears by His attributes which are known with us. We beget and are begotten, we depend on Him, and we are equals to one another. This is the One who is pure above these attributes. He is independent of them as He is independent of us. There is no description of Allah except for this sura, the Sura al-Ikhlās (112), and it was revealed in that. The Divine Unity (ahadiyya) of Allah is in respect to the Divine Names which demand the unity of multiplicity on our part, and the Divine Unity of Allah, in respect to His independence from us and from the names, is the Divine Unity of the source. Both of them are included in the name, the Unique One (al-Ahad).

Know that Allah has not manifested the shadows and made them prostrate themselves, casting themselves to the left and the right, (4) except as indications for you of yourself and Him. In this way you are able to recognise who you are and what your relationship to Him is, and what His relationship to you is, until you know from where and by which divine reality that which is other-than-Allah is described, through its complete poverty to Him as well as the relative poverty of some to others. In this way also, you are able to know from where and by what reality it is that Allah is described by independence from people and the universe, and the universe is described by independence, i.e. the independence of some from others in an aspect which is the source of its need of some. For the universe is in need of causes without a doubt by essential need. The greatest of its causes is the causality of Allah, and there is no causality of Allah by which the universe is in need except for the Divine Names. The universe is in need of each of the Divine Names, whether from the universe like it or, from Allah Himself. Thus it is Allah, and not other-than-Him.

This is why Allah said, "Mankind! you are the poor in need of Allah whereas Allah is the Rich Beyond Need, the Praiseworthy." (35:15) It is known that we depend on each other. Our names are the Names of Allah since everything is, without a doubt, in need of Him. At the same time, our sources are His shadow, and not other-than-Him. So He is our he-ness, and He is not our he-ness. We have prepared the way for you, so look!

Notes to Chapter 9:

1. In al-Bukhari and elsewhere.
2. In Muslim, also an-Nawawi's Forty Hadith.
3. Hadith, see. p.11.
4. Ref. Qur'an 16:48, "Do they not see the things that Allah has created, casting their shadows to the right and to the left, prostrating themselves before Allah incomplete humility."

10: The Seal of the Wisdom of Divine Unity (Ahadiyya) in the Word of Hud

Allah has the straight path which is manifest
and unhidden among the common people.
Its source exists in great and small,
in those who are ignorant of matters
and those who know.

For this reason, 'His mercy encompasses everything,' (1) great and small.
"There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a
Straight Path." (11:56) So all that walks on the Straight Path of the Lord,
and is not of those "against whom Allah is wrathful" from this aspect, nor
is he "astray". (2) As being astray is a non-essential quality, so divine
wrath is also a non-essential quality. The source to which they return is
the "mercy which extends to all things", and which preceded wrath.
Everything which is other-than-Allah is a creature which crawls and
which has a spirit. There is nothing which crawls by itself, rather it
crawls by other than it. It crawls by the principle of following the One
who is on a Straight Path. It is only a path by virtue of the fact that it is
walked on.

If creation draws near you, Allah draws near you.
If Allah draws near you, creation does not follow.
So realise what we say on it,
and everything I have said to you is true.
There is no existent thing in phenomenal being
that you see which does not have articulation.
The eye only sees of creation
that its source is Allah.
But He is stored in it,
and for this reason, its forms are true.

Know that divine knowledges of taste (dhawq) which are acquired by the
people of Allah differ according to the different faculties acquired from
them, even though they derive from a single source. Allah said, "I am his
hearing by which he hears and his sight by which he sees and his hand
by which he strikes and his foot by which he walks." (3) So He mentioned
that His He-ness is the source of the limbs which are the same as the
slave. Thus He-ness is one, but the limbs are different, and every limb
has one of the knowledges of taste which are specified from a single
source, and differ according to the different limbs. It is like water which
is but a single reality, yet differs in taste according to the different
locations. The water of the Euphrates is sweet, and brackish water is
salty, yet it is water in all its states and its reality does not change, even
though the taste differs.

This wisdom is from the wisdom of the feet. It is the words of Allah, that whoever establishes His Books will eat "from beneath their feet" (5:66). The path which is the Straight Path is travelling on it, and walking and running on it. It is only by the feet. So this witnessing of the taking by the forelock by the hand of the One who is one the Straight Path only results in this special art from the knowledges of taste. "We will drive the evildoers" (19:86), (4) who are those who deserve the station to which they are sent, and destroy them by the west wind. (5) The wind takes them by the forelocks and carries them on, and it is the source of the passions which take them to Jahannam. It is the distance (6) which they imagined. When it carried them to that abode, they reached the source of nearness, and so distance vanished. What is called Jahannam vanished in respect to them. They win the bliss of nearness in respect to merit since they were wrong-doers.

This pleasurable station of taste was not given to them as a favour. They received it by what they realities merited from the acts which they were doing. They were running with their actions on the Straight Path of the Lord because their forelocks were in the hand of the One who has this attribute. They did not walk by themselves, but by the principle of compulsion to reach the source of nearness. "We are nearer to him than you, but you cannot see." (56:85) Rather it is seen, and so the covering is stripped away, and "his sight is sharp." (7) What is specified as dead is from the dead, i.e. what distinguishes the happy from the wretched in usage. "We are nearer to him than his jugular vein." (50:16) What is specified as man is from man, so divine nearness is from distance as is not hidden in divine transmissions. There is no nearness nearer than that His He-ness be the source of the limbs of the slave and his faculties. The slave is not other than these limbs and faculties, so he is Allah witnessed in illusory creation. Creation is intelligible and Allah is felt and witnessed with the believers and the people of unveiling. Allah is intelligible with other classes, and creation is witnessed. So they are in the station of the salty, brackish water. The first group is the station of the sweet water which is pleasant to drink.

People are of two classes those who walk on the path recognising it and its end, for it is a straight path in respect to him; and those who walk on the path being ignorant of it and not knowing its end. It is the same path which the other class knows. The gnostic calls to Allah by inner sight, and the non-gnostic calls to Allah by limitation and ignorance. This is a special knowledge which comes from the lowest of the low (8) because the feet are the lower part of the person, and what is lower than them is none other than the path. Whoever recognises that Allah is the same as the Path, recognises the matter for what it is. Then Allah is travelling on it since there is no known except Him, and He is the source of the wayfarer and the traveller. There is no knower except Him. He is you, so know your reality and your Path (tariqa). The matter has been made clear to you on the tongue of the interpreter, (9) if you but understand. It is the true tongue, so the only one who will understand is the one whose

understanding is Real.

Allah has many ascriptions and their existence varies. See how 'Ad, the people of Hud, said, "This is a storm cloud which will give us rain." (46:24) They thought good of Allah, and He is with the opinion of His slave. (10) Allah turned this word away from them. He informed them of what was more perfect and higher in nearness. When it rained upon them, that was the earth's portion and the seed was watered. He told them, "No, rather it is what you desired to hasten a wind containing painful punishment." He made the wind (rîh) an indication of what rest (râha) it contained for them. By this wind, He gladdens their spirits (arwah), delivering them from dark forms, difficult paths and black veils. There is punishment ('adhab) in this wind, i.e. a matter which they find sweet (ista'dhaba) when they taste it. It only pains them by the separation from familiar things. Thus punishment gives them good news. And the command is nearer to them than they imagine.

"Destroying everything at its Lord's command ! When morning came you could see nothing but their dwellings." (46:25) That is, their corpses, in which their true spirits lived, so the trueness of this special relation vanished from them; and a special life in their forms remains to them from Allah of which their skins, hands, and feet speak, (11) so does the punishment of the blows and thighs. (12) All that is related in a divine text.

Allah described himself by jealousy (ghayra). Out of jealousy He forbade actions unrestrained by limits (fawahish). The unrestrained act is only what is evident. As for the unrestrained which is hidden, it belongs to the one who manifests it. When He made the unrestrained haram, that it, forbade that the reality of what we mentioned be known, and that is the source of things, He hid it by other (ghayr). So other says: hearing is Zayd's hearing. The gnostic says that hearing is Allah. Thus nothing remains of the faculties and limbs. Therefore not everyone recognises Allah. People vie in excellence and ranks are differentiated, and the exceeding and exceeded are clear.

Know that Allah revealed to me and caused me to witness in a vision, which I received in Cordoba in 586, the sources of His Messengers and all His Prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. None of this group spoke to me except for Hud, peace be upon him. He told me why they were gathered together. I saw that he was a very large man of good appearance, subtle in reply, gnostic in matters of unveiling. My proof of his unveiling is His words, "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) What gift to creatures is greater than this? Then it is from the bestowal of favours on us by Allah that this speech reached us from Him in the Qur'an.

Then Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant us peace, completed its

gathering for everyone by what he was told by Allah, for He is the source of "hearing, sight, the hand, the foot and tongue the source of the senses. The spiritual faculties are nearer than the senses. He is content with the defined and distant more than with the defined unknown which is nearer. Allah translated the speech of Hud to his people to inform us, and the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, translated the speech of Allah in turn to give us good news. Knowledge is perfected in the breasts of those who are given knowledge, "and none denies Our signs but the unbelievers," (29:47) for they cover up the signs when they recognise them through envy, meanness and injustice. We only see from Allah in respect of Himself disconnection (tanzih) or non-disconnection by definition in any ayat which He has sent down or in transmissions which have reached us from Him. Otherwise He has the Great Mist (al-'Ama') (13) which has no air above it and no air beneath it. Allah was in it before He created creation. Then He mentioned that He "established Himself firmly on the Throne." (57:4) This is also definition. Then He mentioned that "He descends to the nearest heaven." (14) This is also definition. Then He said that "He is in the heaven and in the earth," (15) and "He is with us wherever we are." (16) and He tells us that He is our source. We are limited, so He only describes Himself by limitation.

His statement, "There is nothing like Him," (42:11) is also limitation if we take the kaf ("like") as an appendage to other than the attribute. Whoever is distinct from the defined is defined by his phenomenal being which is not the source of what is defined. Freedom from limitation is limitation, and the absolute is limited by absoluteness for whoever has understanding, If we attach the kaf of ka-mithli (like) to the attribute, we define it. If we take "There is nothing like Him" as the negation of "like (mithl)", we realise the given and the sound transmissions that He is the source of things, and that things are defined. If their definitions differ, He is defined by the definition of everything with a definition. Nothing is defined unless it is a definition of Allah's. He moves in the designation of creatures and creation. Had the matter not been like that, existence would not have been valid, for He is the source of existence. He preserves everything by His Essence, and the preserving of something does not oppress Him. (17) His preserving of all things is His preserving of His form in that the thing is other than His form. Only this is valid. He is the witness in the witness and the witnessed in the witnessed. (18) He is the spirit of the universe which is managed by Him, and it is the Macrocosmic or Great man (al-insan al-kabir).

He is all phenomenal being
and He is the One (al-Wahid)
who establishes my phenomenal being by His being,
For that reason, I said that He is nourished.
So my existence is His food, and we imitate Him in Him from Him,
if you look by the aspect of my taking refuge.

For his sorrow breathed, so the breath is related to the All-Merciful

because He is Merciful by it. Divine ascriptions demand it from the bringing into existence of the form of the universe which we have said is what is manifest by Allah since He is the Manifest. It is His inward since He is the Hidden; and He is the First since He was when they were not. He is the Last since their source is in their manifestation. The Last is the source of the Manifest, and the Hidden is the source of the First. He has knowledge of all things since he knows Himself. When He brought forms into existence in the Breath, and the power of the ascriptions designated by the names appeared, the divine ascriptions then became valid for the universe. They depend on Allah. He said, "Today, I set down your ascriptions and raise up My ascriptions," i.e. I take from you your dependence on yourselves and return to you your dependence on Me. Where are those who are fearful of Allah? (19) they those who take Allah as a safeguard. Allah is their manifest part, i.e. the source of their manifest forms. They are the greatest of people, the most pure and the strongest among all. The one who has taqwa is the one who makes himself a safeguard for Allah by His form since the He-ness of Allah is the faculties of the slave. The one called the slave makes a safeguard for the One called Allah based on witnessing, so that the knower is distinct from the one who does not know. "Say: 'Are they the same those who know and those who do not know?' It is only people of intelligence who pay heed," (39:9) and they see into the core of the thing (20) which is sought from that thing. The negligent one does not precede the diligent, and similarly the hireling does not resemble the slave, Since Allah is a safeguard for the slave by one aspect, the slave is a safeguard for Allah by another aspect. Say what you like about phenomenal being. If you like, say that it is creation. If you like, say that is the Real. If you like, say that it is both the Real and creation. If you like, say that it is not Real from every point of view and not creation from every point of view. If you wish, say it is bewilderment in that. The goals are made clear by your specification of ranks. If it had not been for definition, the Messengers would not have reported the changing of the Real in forms, nor would they have described Him by the dropping of forms from Himself.

The eye only looks to Him,
and authority only rests with Him.

We are His, and by Him, in His hand, in every state, so we are with Him. For that reason, He is denied and recognised, disconnected and described. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by His eye is a gnostic. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by his own eye is not a gnostic. The one who does not see Allah from Him nor in Him, and waits to see Him by his own eye is veiled and ignorant.

On the whole, each person must have some doctrine of his Lord by which he refers to Him and in which he seeks Him. So when Allah manifests Himself to him in it, he knows Him and goes near Him. If He manifests Himself to him in other than it, he denies Him and takes refuge from Him and has bad adab in that matter while claiming he shows adab with Him.

(21) He only believes in a divinity according to the [subjective] form he gives that in himself. The divinity of creeds is based on subjective positing. People only see themselves and what they formulate in themselves.

Look at the ranks of people in knowledge of Allah. That is the source of their ranks in vision on the Day of Rising; and I have taught you the necessary cause of it. Take care lest you be limited by a particular creed and deny what is other than it, so that a great blessing may pass you by. Indeed, knowledge of what the matter is based on may pass you by.

Make yourself a vessel for all the forms of belief. Surely Allah is vaster and greater than being contained by one creed rather than another. So Allah says, "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." (2:115) He did not mention one "where" less than another. He said there is the face of Allah. The face of the thing is its reality. By this He spoke to the hearts of the gnostics, that they might not occupy themselves with non-essentials in this life through seeking the like of this. The slave does not know in which breath he will be taken. He may be taken at the time of his negligence, and then he will not be equal to the one taken in a state of presence.

Then the slave who is perfect knows that this is linked to exterior form and to the state limited by turning the prayer toward the Masjid al-Haram. He believes that Allah is in his qibla when he prays. Those are some of the ranks of Allah from "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." The direction of the Masjid al-Haram is one of them. In it is the face of Allah, but do not say "He is here", rather stop with what you perceive and cling to adab in turning towards the Masjid al-Haram, and cling to adab in the non-encompassment of the face in this particular whereness. Rather whereness is part of the sum of directions to which one turns. So Allah makes it clear to you that He is in the "where-ness" of every direction.

There are only creeds, so all directions are correct. Every correct thing has a reward. Every rewarded thing is happy. Every happy one is approved. If he is wretched at one time in the Next Abode, the people of preservation experience illness and pain in this life in spite of our knowledge that they are happy and the people of Allah. Among the slaves of Allah are those who are overtaken by these pains in the other life in an abode called Jahannam. Even so, none of the people of knowledge to whom the matter is unveiled for what it is declares that they do not possess a bliss particular to them in this abode. As for the loss of pain, they denied it, and so it was lifted from them. Their bliss is their rest from feeling that pain, or else bliss is particular and extra as is the bliss of the people of the Garden in the Garden. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 10:

1. ref. Qur'an 7:156, "My mercy extends to all things."
2. ref. Qur'an 1:7.
3. Hadith qudsi.
4. "We will drive the evildoers to Jahannam."
5. The worst of winds which does not fertilise trees or raise clouds. It is said that it was a west wind which destroyed 'Ad. It blows in the hot season and is very thirsty.
6. Jahannam comes from a root which means "deep", as in a deep well.
7. See Qur'an 50:22.
8. Ref. Qur'an 95:5, "We reduced him to the lowest of the low."
9. The Messenger of Allah in the hadith, "..I am his hearing, his sight, etc."
10. Hadith qudsi, "I am according to My slave's opinion of Me..."
11. Ref. Qur'an 41:21, "...that your hearing, eyes, and skin should not testify against you."
12. In the grave according to hadith.
13. "He was in the Great Mist with air neither above nor below it. "Hadith in Ibn Majah, Ibn Hanbal and at-Tirmidhi.
14. Hadith qudsi from Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim: "Our Lord who is blessed and exalted descends every night to the lowest heavens when two-thirds of the night has passed and says, 'Who supplicates to me so that I may answer him?"
15. Qur'an 6:3, "He is Allah in the heavens and the earth."
16. cf. Qur'an 57:4.
17. Qur'an: 2:255.
18. cf. Qur'an 85:3.
19. i.e. have taqwa.
20. Lubb means both the core of a thing and or understanding.
21. Hadith in Muslim (Belief, 302) about the Day of Rising.

11: The Seal of the Wisdom of Revelation (Futuh) (1) in the Word of Salih

Among the signs are the signs of the mounts. (2)
That is due to the difference in destinations.
Among those with mounts are those
who make their mounts stand by the command of Allah,
and among them are those who cross
the deserts with their mounts.
As for those who stand,
they are the people of the source, (3)
and those who cross the deserts are the aliens.
Each of these has the revelation (futuh) of the Unseen worlds
brought to him from Allah on every side.

Know, may Allah grant you success, that the business (of bringing into existence) is based on uniqueness (fardiyya), and uniqueness has triplicity which is from three and upwards. Three is the first singular. The universe exists from this Divine Presence. Allah, may He be exalted!, says, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, 'Be' and it is." (16:40) This is an essence which has volition and speech. (4) Had it not been for this essence and its volition, which is connecting attention to something particular in order to bring anything into being (and when He turns to that thing, He says, "Be"), that thing would not have been. Then tripartite uniqueness also appeared in that thing, and it is by this uniqueness in respect to the thing that it is valid that it take and that it be described by existence. Its triplicity is its thingness, its hearing, and obeying the command of the One who gives it form by bringing it into existence. It accepted three by the threeness of its fixed essence when it was in the state of its non-existence in counterbalance to the essence of the One who brought it into existence. Its hearing is in counterbalance to the volition of the One who brought it into existence. Its agreeing to comply with the command to take form is in counterbalance to His word "'Be!' and it is." Taking form is thus related to the thing. If it not had the capacity to take form from within itself when this is said, it would not have been. Allah only brought the thing into existence after it was not in the command of taking form, by the thing itself.

Allah confirmed that taking-form (takwin) belongs to the thing itself, not to Allah; and that that which belongs to Allah is His command. Similarly, He told us about Himself when He said, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, "Be!" and it is." He ascribed taking-form to the thing itself from the command of Allah. Allah speaks the truth, so this is understood in the command itself. Someone who is feared and not disobeyed commands His slave: "Stand!" and the slave stands in obedience to his master's command. When this slave stands, the master only has the command to the slave to stand. Standing is the slave's

action, not the master's action.

Thus taking-form is based on triplicity, i.e. from three, on both sides the side of Allah and the side of creation. That applies to bringing meanings into existence by proofs. The proof must be compounded of three in a special structure and special condition. There must be a result from it. The result is that the thinker constructs his proof from two propositions. Each one proposition contains two singulars, and so it four. One of the four is repeated in the two propositions in order to link one to the other as is marriage. It is three and no more because of one is repeated in both of them. That is how it is the goal exists. Then this compound occurs in a special aspect which is that the two propositions are connected to each other by the repetition of that one singular, by which triplicity, and the special condition that the principle be more general by cause or equal to it, is valid. Then the principle is true. If it is not like that, then it will give a result which is not true. This existent thing in the universe is like the ascription of actions to the slave, removed from their ascription to Allah, or the ascribing of taking form, the object of our discussion, to Allah absolutely. But Allah only ascribed it to the thing which was told, "Be!" A representation of that is if we wish to prove that the universe exists from a cause, (5) we say that every thing which is in-time has a cause. (6) Thus we have the in-time and the cause. Then in the other proposition we say that the universe is in time. The "in-time" is repeated in the two propositions. The third singular is "the universe". From this it follows that the universe has a cause and the conclusion appears in what was mentioned in the first proposition - that is the cause.

The special aspect is the repetition of the "in-time", and the special condition is the generality of the cause ('illa) because the cause is what effects the existence of the in-time. The principle is general in the in-timeness of the universe in relation to Allah.

We therefore make the judgement that every being which is "in-time" has a cause, i.e. in the greater proposition, unless that cause is equal to the principle or the principle is more general than the cause. So the universe would thus fall under the principle of the cause [in both cases]. The result is true.

The principle of triplicity also appears in bringing meanings into existence, which makes use of proofs. The root of phenomenal being is triplicity. For this reason, the wisdom of Salih, peace be upon him, is what Allah manifested in the delay of three days when He promised to punish the people of Salih, and the promise was kept. The truth was the result, and it was the Cry by which Allah destroyed them, and "morning found them lying flattemed in their homes." (11:67) On the first of the three days, the faces of the people became yellow, and on the second day red, and on the third day black. When the three days had passed, their predisposition was proved and corruption appeared in them. That manifestation was called "destruction".

The yellowing of the faces of the wretched is in counterbalance to the shining of the faces of the happy in the words of Allah, "Some faces on that day will be radiant (musfira)" (80:38) which comes from sufur, when the dawn becomes white. This is a manifestation as the yellowing of the faces on the first day was the manifestation of the sign of the wretchedness of Salih's people. Then came the counterbalance offered to His word about the happy, "laughing".(80:39) Laughter is one of the causes which produces redness in the face. Among the happy, it is the cheeks which are red.

Then He made the complexion of the wretched turn black as a counterbalance to His word, "joyous (mustabshira)". (7) That is the effect that joy has on their skins as black effected the skins of the wretched. For this reason, He spoke of the two groups with good news (bushra). He spoke a word to them which affected their skin (bashara) which turned a colour by which skin had not been described before this event. Allah said in regarding the happy, "Their Lord gives them the good news of His mercy and good pleasure," (9:21) and He said about the wretched, "Give them the news of a painful punishment." (9:34) There was an effect on the skin of each group because of the effect of the discourse on them. It only appeared in them outwardly by virtue of the understanding which was fixed inside them. So it is them who have that effect on themselves just as taking form only comes from them. "Allah's is the conclusive argument." (6:149) Whoever understands this wisdom and confirms it in himself and witnesses it, gives his self rest from connection to other. He knows that good and evil only come from him. By good, I mean what agrees with his goal and suits his nature and temperament. By evil, I mean what does not agree with his goal or suit his nature and temperament. The one who possesses this witnessing makes out excuses for all existent beings, even if they do not make excuses. He knows that all he has for himself is from himself, as we mentioned at the beginning, since knowledge follows the known. When something which does not agree with his goal comes to him, he tells himself , "Clench your fists and puff out your cheeks!" "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 11:

1. Opening. Salih has this in view of the fact that the mountain split open to reveal the she-camel, he opened belief to those who believed in him. The camel is a mount.
2. Mounts which are miracles proving the truthfulness of the Prophets - like the Buraq of Muhammad and the she-camel of Salih.
3. Eyewitnessing.
4. i.e. a triplicity: Essence, volition, and speech (qawl).
5. Here he uses sabab, something by which something is brought about, rather than 'illa, which is something which alters or effects something, as in cause and effect. 'Illa is the reason behind judicial reasoning.

6. First proposition.

7. Comes from a root meaning skin (bashara), the root of bashshara, to give good news, is to announce something which produces a change in the complexion.

12: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Heart in the Word of Shu'ayb (Jethro)

Know that the heart of the gnostic of Allah is from the mercy of Allah, and it is vaster than mercy. The heart encompasses Allah, but His Mercy does not encompass Him. (1) This is the language of the general public from the door of indication (ishara). Allah is merciful (rahim) and is not the one to whom mercy is shown (marhum). Mercy has no power over Him. As for the indication from the tongue of the elite, Allah describes Himself by the breath which is from breathing. The Divine Names are the same as the Named, and the breath is none other than Him. They require what they give the breath of realities, so the realities which the Names demand are not other than the universe. Thus divinity (ulûhîya) demands the object of worship (ma'luh) and sovereignty (rubûbiya) demands the object of lordship (marbub). (2) They have no source except by the universe in existence and determination (taqdir). Allah, in respect to His essence, is independent of the universe, but sovereignty does not possess this principle. The matter remains between what the sovereignty demands and what the essence deserves of independence from the universe. Sovereignty is based on reality and the description is only the same as this essence.

Then the matter changes according to the relationships. It is reported that Allah only describes Himself with compassion for His slaves. The first of what was breathed from sovereignty by Himself is related to the Merciful by His bringing into being the universe, which sovereignty demands by its reality and all the Divine Names. By this aspect it is confirmed that "His mercy encompasses everything." (3) It encompasses Allah. It is wider than the heart or equal to it in capacity.

Know that Allah, as it is confirmed in sound tradition, changes in the forms of the tajalli. When the heart contains Allah, it does not contain other-than-Him of creatures along with Him. It is as if He filled it, and the meaning of this is, that when it looks to Allah in His tajalli to it, it is not possible to look at another with Him.

The heart of the gnostic in respect to vastness is as Abu Yazid al-Bistami said, "If the Throne and what surrounds it a million times over were in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he still would not feel it." Al-Junayd said about this meaning, "If the in-time were compared to the out-of-time, not a trace of it would remain." The heart encompasses the out-of-time, so how can it sense the in-time as existent? If Allah varies His tajalli in forms, then by necessity, the heart is expanded and contracted according to the form in which the divine tajalli occurs. There is nothing left in the heart apart from the form in which the tajalli occurs. So in relation to the seal, the heart of the gnostic or the Perfect Man, is at the stage of the place that is the face of the seal. It does not exceed it, rather it is its size and shape in respect to roundness. The face is round, square, hexagonal, octagonal, etc. in form. If the face is square,

hexagonal, octagonal or whatever form, its place in relation to the seal is like it and it is not like other than it.

This is the opposite of what one group alluded to, saying that Allah gives a tajalli according to the predisposition of the slave. This is not how it is. The slave is manifest to Allah according to the form in which Allah gives him a tajalli of Himself.

The exact clarification of this question is that Allah has two tajalli: an unseen tajalli and a visible tajalli. From the unseen tajalli He accords the predisposition on which the heart is based, and it is the tajalli of the Essence of which the Unseen is the reality. It is the He-ness which merits it by His word from Himself: "He". His He-ness is always He. If this predisposition comes to the heart, then the visible tajalli is manifested to it in the Visible world, so the heart sees it. He is manifest by the form of whatever tajalli he has, as we mentioned. Allah gives it the predisposition by His word, "He gave everything its creation, then guided it." (20:50) Then He lifted the veil between Him and His slave, so He sees Him in the form of his belief in Allah. Allah, who is in the belief, is He whose form the heart contains. He is the One who gives it a tajalli, and so it knows Him. The eye only sees by belief, not hidden in the varieties of belief.

Whoever limits Allah, denies Allah in other than what he limits Allah to, and confirms Allah in what he limits Him by, when Allah gives him a tajalli. Whoever frees Allah from limitation does not deny Allah, and so confirms Allah in every form in which Him changes. He is given from himself according to the form in which the tajalli infinitely occurs. The forms of the tajalli are without end. Similarly knowledge of Allah has no limit in the gnostic who understands the forms. Rather, he is a gnostic at every moment, seeking increase of knowledge by "Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge!" (4)

The business is endless from both sides. This is as if you said: Allah and creation. If you looked at His words, "I am his foot by which he runs, and his hand with which he strikes and his tongue by which he speaks," and so on of the faculties whose location are the limbs which are not separate, then you said that the matter is all Allah or the matter is all creation. It is creation by one ascription and it is Allah by another ascription, yet the source is one. The source of the form is what gives the tajalli of the source of the form which did not exist before the tajalli. It is the one giving the tajalli and the one receiving it. See how wondrous is the command of Allah in respect to His He-ness and in respect to His relationship to the universe in the realities of His most Beautiful Names!

Who is He and what is He and what is His source?

He is He!

Whoever is of His commonality is of His elite,
and whoever is of His elite is of His commonality.

There is no source except source,
so the light of His source is His darkness.
Whoever is ignorant of this
experiences grief in himself
And none recognises what we have said
except for the slave who has aspiration (himma).

He said, "There is a reminder in that for anyone who has a heart," (50:37) because the heart (qalb) is transformed (taqallaba) in the various forms and attributes. He did not say, "to him who has an intellect" because the intellect limits. (5) It confines the matter to a single description, but reality refuses to be contained. It is also a reminder for those who have intellect, and they are those who have creeds by which some deny others, and some curse others, and they do not have helpers. (6) The god of the one with a creed does not have jurisdiction over the god of someone with another creed. The one who has a creed defends it; he defends the matter which he believes of his god, and supports it. He does not support that which is not in his creed. For this reason, he has no effect on the creeds of his dissenters, and similarly his dissenters have no help from the god who is in his creed; so they have no helpers. Allah excluded help from the divinity of creed based on the isolation of one creed to the exclusion of others. The helped is gathered and the helper is gathered.

For the gnostic, Allah is the Recognised Who is not denied. The people of recognition in this world are the people of recognition in the Next World. This is why Allah said, "anyone who has a heart (qalb)" (50:37) since he knows the transformation (taqlib) of Allah in forms by the transformation in shape. He recognises himself from himself. His self is not other than the He-ness of Allah. There is nothing in phenomenal being from what is, or what will be, which is other than the He-ness of Allah. Rather, He is the source of He-ness. So He is the gnostic and the knower and the acknowledger in this form. He is the one who is neither gnostic nor knower. He is also the one who denies Him in the other form. This is the portion of the one who knows Allah from the tajalli and the witnessing in the source of gatheredness (jam'). It is His word, "anyone who has a heart" which transforms the shapes by His transforming.

As for the people of belief (iman), they are the ones who imitate those who imitated the Prophets and Messengers in what they transmitted from Allah. They are not those who imitate the people of concepts and those who interpret the transmissions received by basing them on their logical proofs. These are the ones who imitate the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace. They are the ones who are meant by His words, "or listens well" (50:37) to what divine transmissions relate of the sunna of the Prophets. He means this is the one who "will listen well, having seen the evidence" (50:37) with awareness of the presence of the imagination and its use.

That is what the Prophet said about ihsan, "Worship Allah as if you saw

Him," (7 and "Allah is in the qibla of the one who prays." (8) For that reason, he is a witness. Anyone who imitates the people of logical speculation and is limited by them is not the one who will listen well. The one who will listen well must witness what we have mentioned. When he does not witness what we have mentioned, he is not the one meant by this ayat. These are those of whom Allah has said, "When those who were followed disown those who followed them." (2:166) The Messengers do not disown their followers who follow them.

Realise, my friend, what I have mentioned to you in this wisdom of the heart. As for its specification with Shu'ayb, there is some branching off (tash'ib). Its branches are not numbered because every creed has a branch, and so they are all branches or creeds. If the covering is removed, it is removed for everyone in accordance with his creed. The covering might be removed in a manner contrary to his creed in principle. It is His words, "What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with." (39:47) Most of them in principle are like the Mu'tazilites, believing that Allah will execute the threat on the rebel should he die without repentance. If he dies and is given mercy from Allah, then concern preceded it, for He did not punish him. Thus he found Allah Ever-Forgiving, All-Merciful, and there appeared to him from Allah something he did not reckoned with.

As for He-ness (huwiya), some people are firm in their belief that Allah is such-and-such. When the covering is removed, they see the form of their belief, and it is true. They believe in it. Then the knot is unravelled and the creed vanishes and becomes knowledge through contemplation (mushahada). After vision is sharpened, weak vision does not return. It appeared to some people by the variety of the tajalli in forms through vision, since the tajalli is not repeated. He verifies it in he-ness; and there appeared to them from Allah in Allah's He-ness what they never reckoned with before the covering was removed. (9)

We mentioned the form of the ascent in divine recognitions after death in our Book of the Tajalliyat, in which we mentioned what we gathered from the group regarding unveiling, and the benefits we derived from them in the question that they did not know about. One of the most wondrous of matters is that man is always in ascent, but is not aware of that due to the fineness of the veil and its delicateness. It is like His words, "They were only given a simulation of it." (2:25)

He, the One, is not the same as the Last. Therefore the two semblances with the gnostic are similar dissimilars. The one possessed of realisation sees multiplicity in One, as he knows what the Divine Names indicate. Although their realities differ and are numerous, it is yet One Source. It is an intelligible multiplicity in the source of One. In the tajalli, it is multiplicity witnessed in the one source even as it matter which you obtain in the definition of each form. It and the multiplicity of forms and their variety derive, in fact, from one substance (jawhar). It is its own

matter (hayula). Whoever recognises himself with this recognition recognises his Lord. Allah is in His creation due to His form, rather He is the source of its he-ness and its reality.

For this reason, the only ones among the 'ulama' who tumble on the recognition of the self (nafs) and its reality are the divinely inspired messengers and the great among the Sufis. As for the philosophers and masters of thought among the ancients and the mutakallimun in their discourse on the self and its whatness, none of them stumbled on its reality, and logical speculation can never provide it. (10) He who seeks knowledge of it by means of logical speculation, swells himself up and boasts without vigour or substance. "They are those whose efforts in the life of this world are misguided while they suppose that they are doing good." (18:104) He who seeks the matter by other than its path will not achieve its realization.

How excellent is what Allah said about the universe - He changes it with the breaths into a new creation in one source. He said in respect to some, rather to most of the world, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) This means that they do not know the renewal of the command in breaths. However, the Ash'arites stumbled on it in some existent things, and these are non-essentials (a'râd). The Hisbaniya (11) stumbled on it regarding the entire universe. The logical philosophers consider them ignorant of it. However, the two groups erred. As for the error of the Hisbaniya, in spite of what they said regarding change in the entire universe, they did not stumble on the oneness of the source of the intelligible substance (jawhar) which underlies the form. The universe only exists by the oneness, as the oneness is only intelligible by the universe. If they had said that, they would have obtained the degree of realisation in the matter.

As for the Ash'arites, they do not know that the entire universe consists of a collection of non-essentials (a'râd). It changes in every moment since accidents do not last for two moments. That appears in their definition of things. So when they defined the thing, its phenomenal being is clear in the definition of non-essential matters. These non-essentials mentioned in its definition are actually the source of this independent substance and its reality. Inasmuch as it is a non-essential, it is not independent, but by the sum of what is not independent, comes what is independent. It is like occupation of space in the definition of the independent essential substance, and its acceptance is non-essential in its essential definition. There is no doubt that that the containing-of-form is an accident since it is only in the container, and that is not independent it is in the essential nature of the substance. Occupation of space is a non-essential, and it only occurs in the thing occupying space, and so it is not independent. Occupation of space and containing-of-form are not based on the source of the defined substance by an extra matter, since essential

definitions are the source of the defined and its he-ness.

That which does not last two moments becomes that which lasted two moments or indeed several moments! What was not independent became independent in their view! They do not understand the basis of this, and these people "are dubious about the new creation."

As for the people of unveiling, they see Allah in a tajalli of Himself in every breath, and there is no repetition of the tajalli. They also see by witnessing that every tajalli grants a new creation and takes away a creation. Thus its departure is annihilation in the presence of the tajalli, and it is going-on by what the other tajalli grants. So understand!

Notes to Chapter 12:

1. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My earth nor My heaven contain Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."
2. lit. "god-ed" and "Lord-ed".
3. cf. Qur'an 7:156.
4. Ref Qur'an 20:114: "Say, 'My Lord, increase me in knowledge!'"
5. The root meaning from which intellect ('aql) comes means to hobble a camel.
6. ref to Qur'an 29:25, "You have adopted idols apart from Allah as tokens of mutual affection in this world. But then on the Day of Rising you will reject one other and curse one another. The Fire will be your shelter. You will have no helpers."
7. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari.
8. Hadith in al-Bukhari.
9. Ref. Qur'an 39:47, "If those who did wrong were to possess all that If those who did wrong owned everything on earth, and the same again with it, they would offer it as a ransom to save themselves from the evil of the punishment on the Day of Rising. What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with. them from Allah that they never reckoned with."
10. Being veiled by limitation.
11. The Hisbaniya were sophists, a group known in the history of philosophy for doubts, scepticism and sophism who held that the universe changes at every moment since there is no objective Reality. All is subjective.

13: The Seal of the Wisdom of Power (Malk) in the Word of Lut (Lot)

Malk is power and force, and the strong man with power says, "I have power over the kneading, since I am forceful in kneading it." When the poet, Qays ibn al-Hatim, described his attack with a spear in verse, he said:

I have power over it
and so I made its rupture wide,
and you see standing under it what was behind it.

That is to say that he used enough force in the thrust. It was what Allah said regarding Lut, peace be upon him, "If only I had the power to combat you, or could take refuge in some powerful support!" (11:80) The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Allah showed mercy to my brother Lut, and he took refuge in a powerful support." So the Prophet said that Lut was with Allah who is strong. It was Allah whom Lut, peace be upon him, meant by the strong pillar, and resistance when he said, "If only I had the power". Here it is aspiration (himma) in relation to man in particular.

The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "From that time, the time in which Lut, peace be upon him, said, 'or could take refuge in some powerful support,' after that, Prophets have only been sent with some power from their people." His tribe protected him as Abu Talib protected the Messenger of Allah. His words, "If only I had the power to combat you" is because he heard Allah say, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning," (30:54) by origin, "and then after weakness, gave you strength." Strength is by appointing, and it is non-essential strength. "Then after strength ordained weakness and grey hair." Appointing is connected to grey hair. As for weakness, it returns to the basis of its creation as He said, "He created you from a weak beginning." Allah returns him to that from which He created him, as He says, "then some of you revert to the lowest form of life that, so after having knowledge, they may know nothing at all." (16:70) Allah mentions that he returns to the first weakness. The old man is judged to be as weak as the child is. A Prophet is only sent after he has reached the age of forty. It is the time which is the beginning of decrease and weakness. For this reason, Lut said, "If only I had the power to combat you," although that demands effective aspiration (himma). If you were to ask: "What prevents him from using effective aspiration while it is present in the wayfarers (sâlikûn) among the followers when the Messengers are more entitled to that?" you spoke the truth. However, you lack another knowledge, which is that gnosis does not leave the aspiration freedom of action. Whenever gnosis is great, then its freedom of action with the aspiration is weak. That has two reasons one is his realisation of the station of slavery and his regarding the root of his natural creation; (1) and the other reason is the oneness of the actor and the acted upon. The

aspiration of a Messenger does not appear, since the latter aspect prevents it.

In this witnessing, he sees that his opponent does not turn from the reality on which he is based in the state of his source-form and the state of his non-existence. He only appears in existence through what he had in the state of non-existence by his source-form. He does not overstep his reality nor does he abandon his path. That is called dissent; yet it is a non-essential matter manifested by the veil which is over the eyes of the people, as Allah says, "but most people do not know." They know what is manifest and outward of the life of this world, but they are ignorant of the Next life. It is the other way round, so it is from their words, "our hearts are veiled," (2) that is, in coverings. It is a covering which veils them from perceiving the matter for what it is. This and its like prevent the gnostic from acting freely in the world.

Shaykh Abu 'Abdullah ibn al-Qa'id said to Shaykh Abu's-Su'ud ibn ash-Shibli, "Why do you not act freely?" Abu's-Su'ud replied, "I have left Allah to act for me as He wishes." He meant the command of Allah, "so take Him as your Guardian." (73:9) The Guardian is the one with freedom of action, especially as He heard Allah saying, "Give of that to which He has made you successors (khalifs)." (57:7) Abu's-Su'ud knew, and the gnostics know that the command which he has is not his, and he is only a successor to it. Allah told him, "this command is the deen to which I have you successors and over which I have given you power, so take Me for a guardian in it," Abu's-Su'ud obeyed the command of Allah and took Him for a Guardian.

How can there remain any aspiration for the one who witnesses the like of this command? Aspiration (himma) only acts by the property of concentration that which its possessor does not have, and acts on other than his concentration. This gnosis separates him from that property of concentration. The complete gnosis manifests gnosis at the end of incapacity and weakness. One of the Abdal (3) said to Shaykh 'Abdu'r-Razzaq, (4) "After you greet Shaykh Abu Madyan, (5) tell him, 'O Abu Madyan! Why is nothing difficult for us, yet things are difficult for you, and we long for your station and you do not long for ours?'" Similarly, although Abu Madyan had that station as well as the other, we are more complete than him in the station of weakness and incapacity. His badl said this to him; he did not say it.

The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said that this station is from the command of Allah to him: "I do not know what He will do to me or you. I only follow what is revealed to me." The Messenger acts according to what is revealed to him. He does not have anything else. If He reveals to him that he should act by ordinance, he acts. If he is prevented from acting, he does not act. The best part of choice is to abandon freedom of action unless the person is deficient in gnosis.

Abu's-Su'ud ash-Shibli said to his believing companions, "Allah gave us freedom of action fifteen years ago, and we abandoned it through politeness." This is the language of conceit. As for us, we did not abandon it through politeness, for abandoning would imply preference. Rather, we abandoned it by the perfection of gnosis. Gnosis does not oblige it on the strength of choice. When the gnostic acts by aspiration in the world, it is from divine command and compulsion, not by choice.

There is no doubt that the station of the Messenger demands freedom of action for the acceptance of the Message which he brings. Allah informs him of what will be accepted in his community and among his people in order to manifest the deen of Allah. The wali is not like that. Nevertheless, the Messenger does not seek Him in the manifest, because the Messenger has compassion for his people. He does not want them to exceed by having the proof appear against them because that would entail their destruction. He spares them.

The Messenger also knew that when something inimitable (6) is manifested to the community, some of them believe in it, and some recognise it but deny it out of injustice, arrogance or envy. Some of them attribute it to magic and deception. The Messenger sees that, and he also sees that no one will believe unless Allah illuminates his heart by the light of belief. When the person does not look by that light called belief, the inimitable miracle has no benefit for him. Their aspiration does not seek inimitable matters, since the effect is not uniform among those who see it, nor is it in their hearts as He said in respect to the most perfect of Messengers and the most knowing of creation and the most truthful in state, "You cannot guide those you would like to but Allah guides those He wills." (28:56)

If aspiration did have an effect, no one would be more perfect than the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, nor have a higher nor stronger aspiration than him, yet even so his aspiration did not bring about Abu Talib, his uncle, becoming Muslim, and it was to the Prophet that the ayat which we mentioned was revealed. Similarly, Allah said of the Messenger, "It is only his to deliver the message." (7) And He said, "You are not responsible for their guidance, but Allah guides whoever He wills," (2:272) and He added in Surat al-Qasas, "He has best knowledge of the guided," (28:56) those to whom knowledge of their guidance was given in the state of their non-existence in their source-forms. It is established that knowledge follows the known. Whoever is a believer in his source-form and in the state of his non-existence, appears in that form in the state of his existence. Allah knew that of him, so that is what he is like. For that reason, Allah said, "He has best knowledge of the guided."

When Allah said the like of that, He also said, "My Word, once given, is not subject to change," (50:29) because My Word is based on My knowledge of My creation. "and I do not wrong My slaves," that is, I do

not decree that disbelief (kufr) on them which makes them wretched and then I demand of them what is not in their capacity to do. Rather, We only deal with them according to what We gave them knowledge of, and We only gave them knowledge of what they gave Us from themselves by that on which they are based. So if they do wrong, they are the ones who are unjust. For this reason, He said, "but they wronged themselves. Allah did not wronged them." (8) Finally, We only said to them what Our essence accorded that We say to them. Our Essence is known to Us by what it is based on; so, if We say this, and do not say that, then We only spoke by what We knew to say. We spoke the word from Us, and obedience or lack of obedience is up to those who hear.

So all is from Us and from them, (9)
and acceptance is from Us and from them.
If they are not from Us,
We, without a doubt, are from them.

So,. my friend, realise this wisdom of power in the word of Lut. It is a gate which belongs to gnosis. The secret (10) has been made clear for you, and the command is clear. It is included in the even which is called the odd.

Notes to Chapter 13:

1. Which is weakness, and the slave obeying the command of the Master, as in Qur'an 30:54, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning."
2. Two places: 2:88; 4:155.
3. Abdal, plural of badl, a substitute. Shaykh al-Akbar says, "They are seven. Whoever travels from one place and leaves his body in its form so that no one recognises that he has gone, that one is only a badl. He is modelled on the heart of Ibrahim, peace be upon him."
4. A jurist and one of Abu Madyan's disciples.
5. Abu Madyan: Shu'ayb ibn al-Husayn al-Andalusi, great Maghribi Sufi, born ca. 520/1126 near Seville and died near Tlemcen in 594/1197.
6. Mu'jiza, a miracle performed by a Prophet to prove his truthfulness and which others are unable to do.
7. Ref. Qur'an 5:99 and several other places.
8. 2:57, 9:70, etc. in many places in the Qur'an.
9. The apparent sources. The Word is from him and obedience from them.
10. The secret of the Decree.

14: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Decree (Qadar) in the Word of 'Uzayr (Ezra)

Know that fate (qada') is the judgement of Allah on things, and Allah's judgement on things is according to His knowledge in them and of them. The knowledge of Allah in things is based on that which known things accord Him of what they are in themselves. The decree (qadar) is the timing of how things are in their source without increase. (1) Fate is only decreed for things by themselves. This is the source of the secret of the Decree for the one who has a heart or gives ear. He is a witness "Allah's is the conclusive argument." (6:149)

Properly speaking, the judge (hâkim) studies the source of the question which he judges according to what its essence demands. The one sentenced to what is due him is, in fact, a judge over the judge when he sentences him to that. Every "judge" is sentenced to what he sentences, and in it he is the judge, whoever he is. Grasp this question! The decree is only unknown by the force of its appearance. It is not recognised, so there is much seeking and earnest request in it.

Know that the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, inasmuch as they are Messengers not inasmuch as they are awliya' and gnostics are in ranks according to that on which their communities are based. They only have the knowledge with which they were sent, according to what the community of that Messenger needs, no more and no less. Communities differ, some have more need than others, so Messengers differ in the knowledge of the message just as their communities differ. It is what Allah said: "Those Messengers: We favoured some of them over others." (2:253)

In the same way, they also differ in what springs from their essences, peace be upon them, in the varieties of knowledges and judgements they have according to their predispositions. This is what Allah said: "We have preferred some of the Prophets over others." (17:55) And Allah said in respect of creation, "Allah has favoured some of you over others in provision." (16:71) Provision from Allah can be spiritual like knowledges and sensory like food. Allah "only sent it down in a known measure." (15:21) It is the due which creation seeks. Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) He sends down according to what He wills. (2) He only wills what He knows, and so He commands it. What He knows is as we have stated. It is only by what the known accords.

Timing basically belongs to the known. Fate, knowledge, will and volition follow the Decree. So Allah only gives the understanding of the secret of the decree in respect to knowledges to the one who has been given complete gnosis. Knowledge gives complete rest to the knower, and it gives painful punishment to the knower as well. It gives two opposites. By knowledge, Allah describes Himself with both wrath and pleasure, and by knowledge the Divine Names are opposite one another. A reality

(3) governs the absolute existent and the limited existent. It is not possible that there be something more complete than it or stronger or greater than it, because of the universality of its jurisdiction, both limited and unlimited.

The Prophets, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, only take their own knowledges from a particular divine revelation. Their hearts are free of logical speculation because they know the limitations of the intellect in respect to its cognitive perception. The intellect is unable to perceive matters for what they really are. Simple communication is also unable to perceive that which is only accorded by taste (dhawq). Perfect knowledge remains only in the divine tajalli and in what Allah removes of veils from the springs of the inner sight and the eyes. They perceive matters - their non-time and in-time, their non-existence and existence, their impossibility, necessity and possibility - for what they truly are in their realities and sources.

Since the request of 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, occurred on the elite path, censure fell on him as is related in tradition. (4) Had he sought the unveiling which we mentioned, perhaps censure in that would not have fallen on him. The proof of the simplicity of his heart is in his statement, "How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?" (2:259) His form, peace be upon him, is in this statement of his, as the form of Ibrahim is in His words, "Show me how You bring the dead to life." (2:260) That necessitates the response by the action which Allah manifested when He said, "Allah caused him to die a hundred years, then He brought him back to life," and He said, "Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh." So he saw how bodies grow with the witnessing of realisation. He showed him how it was. He asked about the decree which is only perceived by unveiling to things in the state of their permanence in their non-existence. That was not granted. That is one of the properties of divine cognisance, so it is impossible that any except Allah know it. They are the keys of the First (5) the keys of the unseen which only He knows. Allah informs only those slaves whom He wills on such matters.

Know that they are only called keys in the state of opening. (6) The state of opening is the state of connecting taking-form to things, or rather the state of connecting the decree to the decreed. None has any taste in that except Allah. Neither tajalli nor unveiling occur in it since only Allah has power and action in view of the fact that He has absolute existence which is unlimited.

When we saw that Allah censured 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, when he asked about the Decree, we knew that 'Uzayr was seeking this cognisance. Thus he was seeking to possess the power (qudra) which is connected to the decreed (maqdur). That is only claimed by the One Who has absolute existence. Thus he sought the impossible. How-things-are is only perceived by taste.

As for what we relate of what Allah revealed to him, "If you do not desist, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood," it means I will remove the path of transmission from you and give you matters based on tajalli. Tajalli only occurs according to what you have of the predisposition by which the perception of taste occurs. You know that you only perceive according to your predisposition. You look at this matter which you are seeking. If you do not see it, you know that you do not have the predisposition which it requires. That is one of the properties of the Divine Essence. You have learned that Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) So if He did not give you this particular predisposition, then it is not your creation. If it had been your creation, then Allah, who informed you that "He gives everything its created for," would have given it to you. It is you who desist from this sort of question in yourself. There is no need for any other prohibition. This is a mark of concern Allah showed to 'Uzayr, peace be upon him. He knew that from his own knowledge and was ignorant of that from his own ignorance.

Know that wilaya (7) is the universal encompassing sphere. This why it is not intersected, and so it is informed about things. As for the prophethood of law-giving and the Message, it is intersected, and it was cut off in Muhammad, peace be upon him. There will be no Prophet after him, either giving law or bound by law. There is no Messenger after him, and he is the lawgiver. This hadith (8) is a fragment of the manifestation of the awliya' of Allah, because it contains the cutting off of the taste of complete perfect slavery, so the name of slavery, which is particular to it, was not used. The slave does not want to share with his Lord, who is Allah, in the same name. Allah is not called "prophet" or "messenger." However, He is called Wali and is described by that name. (9) Allah says, "Allah is the Wali of those who believe," (2:257) and He says, "He is the Wali, the Praiseworthy." (42:28) This name, "wali", continues to be applied to the slaves of Allah both in this world and the Next. A name which is particular to the slave and not to Allah no longer remains since prophethood and the message have been cut off.

"Allah is gentle to His slaves," (42:19) so they still have the general prophethood in which there is no law (shari'a), and they still have the law in striving in the confirmed ordinances. They still have heirs in the laws. The Prophet said, "The 'ulama' (men of knowledge) are the heirs of the Prophets." (10) The only inheritance here is that they strive with the ordinances, and so they legislate them.

If you see a Prophet speaking a language outside the simple ordinances of the Shari'a, that is due to the fact that he is a wali and a gnostic. For this reason, his station in respect to his being a man of knowledge and a wali is more perfect and complete than it is due to the fact that he is a Messenger or someone who legislates and has a Shari'a. If you hear one of the People of Allah speaking, or it is related to you that he said, "Wilaya is higher than prophethood," that speaker only means what we

mentioned. Or if he says that the wali is above the Prophet or the Messenger, he means in the same person. He is the Messenger, and inasmuch as he is a wali, he is more complete than he is by simply being a Prophet. It does not mean that the wali who follows him is higher than him. The follower never overtakes the followed in that in which he follows him. If he had overtaken him, then he would not be his follower. So understand that!

The starting point of the Messenger or Prophet who brings a Shari'a is wilaya and knowledge. Do you not see that Allah commanded him to seek increase of knowledge, not increase of anything other than it? Allah commanded him, "Say: 'Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" ((20:114) This means: you know that the Shari'a consists of making certain deeds obligatory and prohibiting certain actions. These actions take place in this world, so they come to an end. Wilaya is not like that. If it had been cut off, it would have been cut off in respect to itself just as the message is cut off in respect to itself. If it had been cut off, it would not still have a name. Wali is a name which Allah will continue to have. (11) This belongs to the slaves by following a model, realisation and attachment. (12)

He told 'Uzayr, "If you do not desist from asking about how the decree is, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood. The business will come to through unveiling by tajalli and the name "prophet" and "messenger" will vanish from you." Allah will still have his wilaya. The context of the state indicated that this speech came as a threat. Whoever has this state when he is addressed in this fashion, knows that he is threatened with the cutting off of some of the special ranks of wilaya in this abode, since prophethood and the message are a special rank in wilaya based on some of the ranks which wilaya contains. He knows that he is higher than the wali who has neither law-giving prophethood nor the message.

If someone has another state which necessitates that the rank of prophethood be confirmed for him, that then is the promise and not the threat. 'Uzayr's question was accepted because the Prophet is the elite wali. Because of the context, he knows that since the prophet has this prerogative in wilaya, he cannot engage in what he knows that Allah will dislike him doing. He cannot engage in what he knows it is impossible for him to attain. When these circumstances exist for the one who has them and they are affirmed, then this divine statement, "I will efface your name for the register of prophethood" becomes a promise. Thus it becomes a transmission indicating a lasting rank. It is a lasting rank for the Prophets and Messengers in the Next Abode, which is not a place where a Shari'a is prescribed for any of Allah's creatures after they have entered the Garden or the Fire.

We define that as an entry into the two abodes of the Garden and the Fire. When the Day of Rising begins for the people who lived in the times of the gaps between the Prophets, (13) young children, and madmen, all

of them will be gathered on one plain for the establishment of justice, recompense for wrong actions and the rewards for works which are due to the people of the Garden. Then they will be gathered separate from other people on one plain, (14) and a Prophet from the best of them will be sent among them. The Fire will be shown to them. This Messenger sent to these people will bring it, and he will say to them, "I am the Messenger of Allah to you." Some will affirm him and others will deny him. Then he will say to them, "Plunge into this fire. Whoever obeys me will be saved and will enter the Garden. Whoever disobeys me and opposes my command will be destroyed and he will be one of the people of the Fire." Whoever obeys his command and casts himself into this fire will be happy and receive his reward. He will find this fire to be "coolness and peace".(15) Whoever disobeys him deserves the punishment and will enter the Fire and descend into it because of his deed of opposition so that that justice from Allah might be set up among His slaves.

That is like the words of Allah, "Upon the day when legs are bared," (68:42) (16) i.e. for one of the immense matters of the Next World, "and they are called on to prostrate." This is obligation and Shari'a. Some will be able to prostrate and some will not be able to do so. (17) These are the one about whom Allah says, "They are called on to prostrate, but they will not be able to do so," just as some of the slaves cannot obey the command of Allah in this world like Abu Jahl (18) and others. This is according to what remains of the Shari'a in the Next Abode on the Day of Rising before people enter the Garden and the Fire. This is why we have written it down, and praise belongs to Allah, the Wali.

Notes to Chapter 14:

1. Qadar has a specific time and qada' does not. So qadar refers to the particular instances of qada'.
2. Ref. Qur'an, "Were Allah to expand the provision of His slaves, they would act as tyrants on the earth. But He sends down whatever He wills in a measured way." (42:27)
3. The secret of the decree.
4. Qur'an 2:259 "Or the one who passed by a town which had fallen into ruin. He asked, 'How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?' Allah caused him to die a hundred years then brought him back to life. Then He asked, 'How long have you been here?' He replied, 'I have been here a day or part of a day.' He said, 'Not so! You have been here a hundred years. Look at your food and drink it has not gone bad and look at your donkey so We can make you a Sign for all mankind. Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh.'" According to 'Ali, Ibn Jarir, Ibn 'Abbas, al-Hasan and Qatada, that is 'Uzayr.
5. The realities of sources.
6. Miftah, key, comes from the root, fath, opening.
7. According to the commentator, wilaya is annihilation in Allah, and Allah encompassed all, and "All things are passing except His face." (28:88).

8. "I am the Seal of the Messengers."
9. Wali means the friend of Allah, and refers to the gnostic. It is also one of the Divine Names which means the Guardian or the One who manages people's affairs.
10. Al-Bukhari.
11. As Yusuf said about Allah, "...You are my Wali in this world and the Next." (12:101).
12. According to al-Qashani, it is acquired and realised through annihilation in the Divine Attributes and Essence and attached by the going-on (baqa') after annihilation in the station of drawing near.
13. i.e. those who did not have a Prophet to follow.
14. According to the commentator, al-Qashani, the plain on which they are gathered may be as-Sahira, as in the Qur'an (79:14), "But it shall be but a single scare, and behold they are at as-Sahira!" As-Sahira which, according to some, is the earth Allah will create anew on the Day of Rising.
15. As was the case with Ibrahim, Qur'an 21:69.
16. The expression means to get ready for something difficult.
17. This is also reflected in a hadith in al-Bukhari in which the Prophet said, "Our Lord will unveil what is hidden, and every believer, man and woman, will prostrate to Him. Those who prostrated out of eyeservice and reputation in this world will go to prostrate and find their backs rigid."
18. The Prophet's uncle who was a violent opponent of Islam.

15: The Seal of the Wisdom of Prophethood in the Word of 'Isa (Jesus)

He was manifested from the water of Maryam
and the breath of Jibril in the form of man existing from clay.
The spirit was in an essence purified of nature
which it called prison.

For that reason, the spirit stayed in it
for more a thousand years in the designation of time. (1)

A spirit from Allah, no other.

For that reason, he revived the dead and formed the bird from clay.

Since his relation with his Lord is proven,
by it he has effective action in both the higher and lower worlds.
Allah purified his body, and made his spirit pure,
and He made him a model of taking-form.

Know that among the special qualities of the spirits (arwah) is whenever they touch anything life flows into it. This is why the Samiri (2) seized a handful of dust from the track of the messenger, who was Jibril, and he is the Spirit. The Samiri had knowledge of this matter. When he recognised that it was Jibril, he knew that life would flow into whatever he had walked on, so he took a handful of dust (3) from the track of the messenger or he filled his hand or the ends of his fingers, (4) and threw it into the Calf. The Calf made a noise like the sound of a cow mooing. If it had been in another form, the name of that form's sound would have been ascribed to it - as grumbling to the camel, baa-ing to rams, bleating to sheep, and voice or articulation and speech to man. That power from the life which flows in things is called lâhût. The nâsût is the locus on which the spirit is based. The nâsût may be called a spirit by what is based on it.

When the Trusty Ruh, who is Jibril, presented himself to Maryam, peace be upon her, in the form of a "handsome, well-built man", (5) she imagined that he was a man wishing to have intercourse with her. She took refuge with Allah from him with all her being, with the whole of her existence, that Allah might save her from him since she knew that that was among the things which are not permitted. She was given a complete presence with Allah, and it is the meaning-without-form spirit. If Jibril had breathed into her at that moment in this state, 'Isa would have been born in such a manner that no one could tolerate him due to the harshness of his nature which was the state of his mother.

When he said to her, "I am only your Lord's messenger of your Lord so that He can give you a pure boy," she relaxed from that contraction (qabd) and her breast expanded. It was at that time that Jibril breathed 'Isa into her. Jibril conveyed the word of Allah to Maryam as the Messenger conveyed the word of Allah to his community. 'Isa was "His word that He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him." (6) Then appetite

filled Maryam. The body of 'Isa was created from the actual water of Maryam and from the imaginary water of Jibril which was infused in the moisture of that breath, since the breath of the living is moist because of the water content in it. So the body of 'Isa is from imaginary water and real water. He emerged in the form of a man in respect to his mother and inasmuch as Jibril had appeared in the form of a man, since taking-form only occurs in the human species according to the normal principle.

'Isa brought the dead to life because he is the Divine Spirit, and bringing to life belongs to Allah. The breath which 'Isa has is like the breath which Jibril has. The word belongs to Allah. The bringing the dead to life by 'Isa is an actual revival inasmuch as it was manifested from his breath as he was manifested from the form of his mother. His bringing to life is also imagined to be from him, but it actually belongs to Allah. He joined the two by the reality on which he is based even as we said that he is created from imaginary water and actual water. Bringing-to-life is ascribed to him by means of actualisation in one aspect, and by imagination in another aspect. In respect to actualisation, it is said of him that he brings the dead to life. In respect to imagination (tawahhum), it is said that he breathes into it and it becomes a bird by the leave of Allah. (7) The agent is in the prepositional phrase "by Allah's permission", even though He did not breathe into it. It is also possible that the agent is the one who breathes into it. It became a bird as regards physical form. In the same way, 'Isa healed the blind and the lepers.

All was ascribed to 'Isa as being "by Allah's permission." (8) "Permission" (idhn) is an indirect expression, as in His words, "By My permission" (9) and "by the permission of Allah". If the prepositional phrase is connected to breathing, the breather has leave in the breathing, and so it is a bird by the leave of Allah. If the breather breathed not by leave, then the taking form of the bird as a bird is not by the leave of Allah. The agent in that is then the verb "it becomes (yakûn)." If there had not been something real and something imaginary in the matter, then these forms would not have accepted these two aspects. Rather, it has these two aspects because the constitution of 'Isa accords that. 'Isa showed humility to the extent that he prescribed that his community "pay the jizya (10) tax with their their hands in a state of willing submission," (11) and that if one of them were slapped on the cheek, he should offer the other cheek to the one who slapped him, and not rise up against him nor seek revenge. This came from his from his mother's side. Since the woman is lower, she has humility because she is subject to the man legally and physically. The power to bring to life and heal that he had came to him the side of the breath of Jibril in the form of a man. 'Isa brought the dead to life by the form of man. If Jibril had not come in the form of man, but in another of the elemental forms of phenomenal beings from the animals, plants or minerals, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life without taking on that form for that moment and appearing in it. If Jibril had come in a luminous form beyond the elements and natural humours, since luminosity is part of his nature, 'Isa

would not have been able to bring the dead to life unless he appeared in that form of non-elemental light, while still maintaining the human form in respect of his mother.

When he brought the dead to life, it was said that it was him and not him. The onlookers fell into bewilderment (hayra) just as the man of intellect becomes bewildered in his logical reflection when he sees an individual human being bringing the dead to life, as that is one of the divine qualities - bringing to life with speech, not mere bringing with animation. (12) The beholder is bewildered because he sees the form of a man who possesses a divine effect. That led some of them to speak of that as "incarnation" and say that 'Isa was Allah since it was by Him that 'Isa brought the dead to life. Thus they are charged with disbelief (kufr) which is the veil because they veil Allah, who brings the dead to life, by the human form of 'Isa. Allah said, "They are unbelievers who say, 'Allah is the Messiah, the son of Maryam.'" (13) They fell into both error and disbelief at the end of all they said, not because they say that he is Allah nor by calling him the son of Maryam. But they made the attribution that Allah, insofar as He brought the dead to life, was contained in the human form of the nasut which is called the son of Maryam. There is no doubt that 'Isa was the son of Maryam. The hearer imagines that they have attributed divinity to the form, and so they make divinity the same as the form. That is not what they do. Rather, they make divine He-ness the subject in the human form which is the son of Maryam. They should differentiate between the form of 'Isa and the divine principle because they have made the form the same as the principle. Jibril was in the form of man who did not breathe and then he breathed. One differentiates between the form and the breath, and the breath from the form. The form existed without the breath - thus the breath is not part of its essential definition. For that reason, differences occurred among the people of different [Christian] parties regarding 'Isa and what he was. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal human form, says that he is the son of Maryam. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal representational form relates him to Jibril. Whoever looks at him in respect to what was manifested from him of bringing the dead to life, relates him to Allah by the quality of the spirit, and says that he is the Spirit of Allah, (14) that is, by Him life was manifested in whomever received his breath. Sometimes Allah is imagined to be the passive principle in 'Isa, and sometimes the angel is imagined in him, and sometimes mortal humanity is imagined in him. So the conception of everyone is based on what predominates that person. 'Isa is the Word of Allah, (15) the Spirit of Allah, (16) and the slave of Allah. (17) That is something which no one else has in the sensory form. Indeed, each person is attached to his father of form, not to the One who breathed his spirit into the human form. When Allah fashioned the human body as He said, "When I have shaped him," (15:29;38:72) then He breathed into Him, that was from His spirit. Thus in its being and source, the spirit is ascribed to Allah. That is not the case with 'Isa. The shaping of his body and mortal form is implied in the breath of the spirit. Others, as we

mentioned, are not like that.

All existent things are the words of Allah which are inexhaustible (18) because they are from "kun" and "kun" is the word of Allah. Is the word ascribed to Him according to what He really is? His what-ness is not known. Or is it that Allah descends to the form of the one who says, "kun", and so the word "kun" is the reality of that form to which he descended or in which He is manifest? Some of the gnostics take one side and some take the other side, and some of them are bewildered in the business and do not know. This is a question which can only be recognised by taste (dhawq), as was the case with Abu Yazid al-Bistami when he breathed into the ant which he had killed and it returned to life. He knew in that action by Whom he had breathed, and that was an 'Isawian witnessing. As for the revival of meaning by knowledge, that is the divine life, essential, eternal, sublime, and luminous, about which Allah said, "Is someone who was dead and whom We brought to life, supplying him with a light by which to walk among the people..." (6:123) Whoever gives life to a dead soul by the life of knowledge in a particular problem connected to knowledge of Allah, has brought him to life by it, and it is "a light for him by which he walks among the people, i.e. among his likes in form.

Were it not for Him and not for us,
that which is would not have been.
I worship Him in truth,
and Allah is our Master.
I am his source so know!
If you said, "man,"
Then do not be veiled by "man".
He has given you a proof.
So be Allah and be creation,
and you will be merciful by Allah.
Feed His creation through Him,
and you will be spirit and sweet scent.
We give Him what appeared by Him in us,
and He gave to us.
The command is apportioned between Him and us.
My heart was given life by the One who knew it
when He gave us sensory life.
At that time (before time),
we were beings, sources and times in Him.
That did not endure in us, but that gave us life.

Part of what proves what we mentioned concerning the breath (nafkh) of the spirit with the elemental form is that Allah has described Himself by the "breath of the All-Merciful". Everyone described by an attribute must follow the attribute and all that attribute demands of him. You realise that breath is necessary for the one who breathes. For that reason, the divine breath accepts the forms of the universe. It is like the primordial

substance, (19) which is not other than the source of nature.

The elements are one of the forms of nature, and what is above the elements and what issues from them are also part of the forms of nature. They are sublime spirits going right up to the seven heavens. As for the spirits of the seven heavens and their sources, they are elemental, so they issue from the vapour of the elements. The angels from every heaven are from the elements, so they are made from the elements, and there are no beings of nature above them. For this reason, Allah described them with dispute, (20) i.e. the Highest Assembly, because nature has polarisation. Polarisation is that which is in the Divine Names, and they are ascriptions given by the "breath of the All-Merciful." Do you not see how the Essence is not subject to this principle, and that it is independent of the worlds? This is why the world appeared in the form of the One who brought it into being, and it is not other than the divine breath.

The divine breath ascends by what it has of heat, and descends by what it has of humidity and cold, and fixes itself and solidifies by what it has of dryness. Thus precipitation comes from cold and humidity. Do you not see that when the doctor wants to give someone a remedy, he looks at his water (urine) in a long-necked bottle? If he sees precipitation, he knows that the digestion is complete. He gives the remedy to speed progress. The precipitation is produced by his natural coldness and humidity.

Then Allah kneaded the clay of this human person with "His two hands." These are opposite to each other. Even though each of these two hands may be a right hand, the distinction between them is not hidden. They are only two in themselves - two hands because He only causes effects in nature according to what is in conformity with it. Nature consists of opposites, so He said "two hands". Then He brought man into existence with two hands, and called him man (bashar). (21) This refers to the direct contact (mubashara) of the two hands as befits the Divine Presence. That arises from His concern for this human species. Then Allah said to the one who refused to prostrate himself before Adam, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My Own Hands? Were you overcome with arrogance (towards the one who is your like, made of the elements) or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) meaning those who are above the elements. "You are not like that."

By the exalted, (22) He means those who, by their essence, are above being elemental by their luminous constitution, even though they are part of nature. Man is only better than the other species by virtue of his being made of clay (bashar). He is the best species of all that was created from the elements by direct contact with the two hands. So in rank, man is above the terrestrial and celestial angels, although the lofty angels are better than the human species according to a divine text. (23)

If anyone wishes to recognise the divine breath (nafas), let him recognise

the universe, because "whoever knows himself knows his Lord" (24) who is manifest in him. The universe was manifested in the breath of the Merciful which Allah breathed from the Divine Names. They brought the manifestation of their effects into existence from the non-manifestation of their effects. He was generous to Himself by what He brought into existence in Himself. The first effect of the breath took place in that Presence. Then the command continued to descend (25) by breathing out from the universal to the last of what Allah brought into existence.

All is contained in the source of the breath,
like light is contained in the essence of darkness
at the end of the night before daylight.
Knowledge comes by proof at the end of the day
for the one who is sleepy.

He sees what I have said as a dream which indicates the breath,
And it gives him relief from every grief.

In the recitation of the Qur'an, it is, "He frowned." (26)

He has given a tajalli of Himself
to the one who came to fetch a firebrand. (27)
So Musa saw Him as a fire, while He is a light
for kings and seekers.

If you have recognise what I said,
then know that you are in a state of grief. (28)

If Musa had sought something else
(other than the brand),
he still would have seen Him in that,
and not the opposite.

When Allah establishes this 'Isawian word in the Station (29) so that we would know and he would be known, 'Isa will be asked about what was ascribed to him and whether or not it was true, even though Allah already knew whether or not that matter had taken place. Allah will say to him, "Did you say to people: 'Take me and my mother as gods, besides Allah'?" (30)

Adab demands a response to the one asking the question because when He gave him a tajalli in this station and form, wisdom necessitated the response in separation by the source of gatheredness. So he put disconnection first and said, "Glory be to You!" using the kaf (pronoun of the second person singular) which defines who is indicated by encounter and speech. "It is not mine," inasmuch as I belong to myself rather than You, (31) "to say what I have no right to," that is, what my he-ness rather than my essence necessitates. "If indeed I said it, You know it," because You are the Speaker, and whoever says something knows what he has said. You are the tongue by which I speak, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, reported to us in a divine transmission in which Allah said, "I am his tongue by which he speaks." He made His He-ness the same as the tongue of the speaker, but ascribed the speech to His slave.

Then the man of right action completed his response by saying, "You know what is in my self," and the speaker is Allah, "and I do not know what is in it," so this is in knowledge of the he-ness of 'Isa in respect of His He-ness, not in respect of the fact that 'Isa speaks and has an effect. "It is You", so He brought distinction and support to confirm the proof and dependence on Him, since Allah only knows the Unseen. So He separated and gathered, unified and made many, made wide and narrow.

To end his reply, 'Isa said, "I said to them nothing but what You ordered me to say." He negated to begin with, (32) alluding to the fact the he has no existence. The statement required adab with the questioner. If he had not acted thus, he would have been described as lacking knowledge of the realities, but he certainly was not like that! Thus he said, "only what You ordered me," and it is You are the One who speaks on my tongue, and You are my tongue. Observe this divine polarity of the spirit! What is finer and more subtle than this!

'Isa said that he said, "Worship Allah." So he used the name of Allah because slaves differ in forms of worship and Shari'a. So he did not specify one name rather than another name. Instead he used the name which joins all of them. Then he went on, "my Lord and your Lord." It is known that His relationship to one existent being by lordship (rubûbiya) is not the same as His relationship with another existent being. That is why he made a distinction when he said, "my Lord and your Lord," by two references one to the speaker and one to the one addressed. He said, "nothing but what You ordered me," and thus he affirmed that he is one who is commanded. The quality of being commanded is not other than slavery, since one is only commanded when obedience is expected of one, even if one does not comply.

Since the command descends according to ranks, all that appears in a certain rank is coloured with what the reality of that rank gives it. The rank of the one commanded has a principle which appears in everyone who is commanded. The rank of the commander has a principle which appears in every command. Allah said, "Establish the prayer." He is the commander and the one who is subject to the obligation is the commanded. The slave says, "Forgive me!" so he commands and Allah is the commanded. What Allah demands of His slave by His command is the same as what the slave demands of Allah by his command. This is why every supplication is answered, and it must be answered, even if the answer is delayed, just as some who are under obligation delay the prayer. Whoever who is obligated to perform the prayer and does not pray it at its proper time, delays obedience and prays it at another time when he is able to perform it. There must be an answer, if only by intention.

Then he said, "I was a witness against them (and he did not say over himself with them as when he said, 'my Lord and your Lord') as long as I remained among them" because the Prophets are witnesses over their

communities as long as they are in them. "But when You took me (i.e. raised me) back to You," and You veiled them from me and me from them, "You were the One Watching over them," no longer in my substance, but in their substance, since You are their eye which necessitates observation.

He wanted to make a distinction between him and his Lord so that it would be known that he was a slave and that Allah is Allah and He is his Lord. He referred to himself as a witness (shahid) and he referred to Allah as the Watcher (raqib). He mentioned "them" before himself when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them," (33) preferring them in priority and with adab. He put "them" after Allah in relationship to Him when he said, "You were the One Watching over them" because of what the Lord merits in priority of rank.

Then know that Allah has the name the Watcher (Ra'iqib) which 'Isa applied to Him, and He is the Witness in His words, "a witness against them," and "You are Witness of all things." (5:117) He referred to all things and "thing" is the most indefinite of things. He used the name, "The Witness," and Allah is the Witness over every witnessed thing according to what the reality of that witnessed things demands. He indicated that Allah was the Witness over the people of 'Isa when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them." This is the witnessing of Allah in the substance of 'Isa, as it is confirmed that Allah is his tongue, hearing and sight.

Then he said something which is both 'Isawian and Muhammadan. As for its being 'Isawian, that is the speech of 'Isa by the transmission of Allah from him in His Book. As for its being Muhammadan, it happened that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood in one place for an entire night reciting it without turning to anything else until dawn broke. It is, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves. If You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (34) "They" is the pronoun of those who are absent as "he" is the pronoun of someone who is absent. as He said, "they are those who disbelieve," with the pronoun of those who are not present. Absence is their veil to what is meant by the witnessed one who is present. He said, "If you punish them," with the pronoun of the absent, and that absence is the source of the veil which hides them from the Real.

The Prophet mentioned them to Allah before the time when they are present (35) so that when the actual time came when they were present, the leaven would already have acted on the dough, and the dough might have had time to become equal to the leaven. (36)

Then by "they are Your slaves," he singled out the unity (tawhid) on which they are based. There is no submissiveness greater than the submissiveness of slaves because they have no freedom of action with themselves. They act according to what their master wishes of them

when he has no partner in them. He said, "Your slaves," and singled out what was meant of the punishment which is their humiliation. There are none more lowly than them since they are slaves. Thus their essence necessitates that they be lowly, so You do not degrade them, for You do not degrade them with anything more lowly than the fact that they are slaves.

"If You forgive them," if You veil them from the punishment which they deserve because of their opposition if You put forgiveness on them, You veil them from the punishment and protect them from it, "You are the Almighty," the Protector, the Guardian. When Allah gives this name ('aziz) to one of His slaves, then Allah is called the Exalter (Mu'izz). This name is given to him by the 'Aziz, so he has strong protection from the revenge and punishment which the Avenger and Punisher desire for him. He also used distinction and dependence to confirm the proof, and so the ayat is the same sort of His words, "You are the Knower of the Unseen Worlds," and "You are the Watcher over them," and "You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (37)

The question from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and his supplication to his Lord in which he repeated the phrase for the entire night until dawn was a request for the answer. If he had heard the answer in the first questioning, he would not have repeated it. Allah showed him the judgements in detail by which they deserved punishment. As each instance was presented to him and specified, the Prophet said to Him, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves, and if You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." If he had seen in what was presented to him anything which would make it necessary that Allah had already decided and that His presence must be preferred, he would have invoked Allah against them rather than for them. So what they deserved is changed by what this ayat accords of submission to Allah and exposing themselves to His pardon.

The Prophet related that when Allah loves the voice of His slave when he makes supplication to Him, He delays the answer to his supplication so that the slave will repeat the supplication. This comes from His love for the slave, not because He has turned away from him. For that reason, the Prophet mentioned the name of the Wise, and the Wise is the one who puts everything in its proper place, and who does not turn away from the qualities which their realities necessitate and demand; so the Wise is the One who knows the order of things. When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, kept repeating this ayat, he was in possession of a great knowledge from Allah. If anyone recites it, let him recite it in that manner. (38) Otherwise, it is better that he remain silent. When Allah lets the slave articulate any request, He does so when He wants to answer it and grant his need. Let no one be slow in whatever has been guaranteed to him, but let him persevere as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, perserved with this ayat in all his states, so that he either hears with His ear, or with hearing, whichever

you like. How else will Allah make you hear the answer? If He permits the question on your tongue, He will let you hear the answer with your ear. If He permits the meaning to you, He will let you hear the answer by your hearing.

Notes to Chapter 15:

1. As he was born more than five centuries before the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and is still alive, waiting to descend.
2. The story is found in the Qur'an 20:75-95, where as-Samiri convinces the tribe of Israel to cast their ornaments into the fire out of which he brought the figure of a Calf which they loved, and which they worshipped. He told Musa, "I beheld what they did not behold, and I seized a handful of dust from the messenger's track and cast it into the thing."
3. With dad, qabda.
4. With sad, qabsa.
5. Qur'an 19:17.
6. Qur'an 4:171, "The Messiah, 'Isa son of Maryam, was only the Messenger of Allah and His Word, which He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him."
7. Qur'an 3:49; 5:110.
8. Qur'an 3:49.
9. Qur'an 5:110.
10. The tax paid by the People of the Book to the Muslim State.
11. Qur'an 9:29.
12. i.e. the dead person can speak and answer him. This not simply causing the dead limbs to move of their own accord.
13. Qur'an 5:17, 5:72.
14. Ruh Allah.
15. See Qur'an 3:45, 4:171.
16. Qur'an 14:171.
17. Qur'an 19:30.
18. See Qur'an 18:109, "Say: 'If all the sea was ink to write down the Words of my Lord, it would run out long before the Words of my Lord ran out,' even if We were to bring the same amount of ink again."
19. Al-jawhar al-hayulani.
20. Qur'an 38:69, "I had no knowledge of the Highest Assembly when they disputed." It can also mean mutual rivalry.
21. Qur'an 15:28, "I am creating a mortal (basha)."
22. "The exalted" are the angels who wander in love and those who are near, like Jibril and the angels of the Throne.
23. "Or are you one of the exalted?" 38:75.
24. As the Prophet said.
25. See Qur'an 65:12, "It is Allah who created the seven heavens and of earth their like, the Command descending down through all of them."
26. Sura 80.
27. Musa in Qur'an 20:10; 27:7. Refers to empirical knowledge, but he found unveiling in the form of the Burning Bush.

28. By standing behind the veil or seeking other-than-Him.
29. On the Last Day.
30. Qur'an 5:116.
31. To slaveness rather than lordship.
32. (ma qulta = I did not say).
33. Literally in the Arabic, "I was against them a witness."
34. This is the end of what 'Isa said in this verse.
35. On the Day of Gathering.
36. According to the commentator, the leaven is the predisposition for the arrival in the presence of Allah. The dough is the clay of his substance.
37. All used in this verse.
38. i.e. with knowledge, weeping, and maintaining adab.

16: The Seal of the Wisdom of Mercy in the Word of Sulayman (Solomon)

Bilqis said, (1) "It (the letter) is from Sulayman and it says 'In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, Most Merciful.'" Some people criticise the fact that the name of Sulayman comes before the name of Allah. That is not the case, and in saying this they say something that does not befit the gnosis which Sulayman, peace be upon him, had of his Lord. How could what they say be connected to him when Bilqis said of it, "a noble letter had been delivered to me," that is, a letter which honoured her. In this they were influenced by the story of how Chosroes tore up the letter of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. (2) He did not tear it up until he had read all of it and knew what it contained. It was the same with Bilqis. Had she not accepted what was established, respect for its author would not have prevented her from tearing up the letter, whether his name, peace be upon him, had been mentioned before or after the name of Allah.

Sulayman mentioned the two mercies: the mercy of graciousness and the mercy of obligation, and they are ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. So Allah freely dispenses His bounty by the Rahman, and it is incumbent on Him by the Rahim. This obligation comes from graciousness, so Rahim is contained in Rahman. Allah "has prescribed mercy for Himself," glory be to Him! in order that the slave might have what Allah spoke about of the deeds which this slave brings, expecting his due from Allah who has required Himself to have this mercy for them, the mercy of obligation. When one of the slaves is like this, he knows that He is the author of the deed.

The deed is divided according to the eight organs of man. Allah informed us that He is the He-ness of each organ. So the author of the action is none other than Allah while the form is that of the slave. He-ness is embodied in him, i.e. only in his name because Allah is the source of what is manifested and which is called "creation". Because of this, the names of the Manifest and the Last belong to the slave since he was not and then was. By the fact that his manifestation depends on Him and action issues from Him, there is the name the Hidden and the First. Thus, when you see creation, you see the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

This recognition was not hidden from Sulayman, peace be upon him. Indeed, it is a part of a kingdom which "belonged to no one after him," (3) in terms of its manifestation in the visible world. Muhammad, peace be upon him, was given what Sulayman was given, but he did not manifest it. Allah gave him the power to vanquish the 'ifrit (4) who came in the night to attack him. (5) When the Prophet wanted to take the 'ifrit and tie him to the one of the columns of the mosque until morning so that the children of Madina could play with him, he remembered the prayer of Sulayman, and so Allah made him drive the 'ifrit off in disgrace. The Prophet did not manifest his power as Sulayman had done. He spoke of

"a kingdom" which is not universal, and we know that he meant a particular kingdom. We see that the Prophet shared in every part of the Kingdom which Allah had given him and so we know by this that he is privileged with the whole kingdom. In the story of the 'ifrit, he was only given the manifestation while Sulayman might have been given the whole and the manifestation. If the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had not said in the story of the 'ifrit, "and Allah gave me power over him," we would have said that when he wanted to seize the 'ifrit, Allah reminded him of Sulayman's prayer so that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, would know that Allah had not given him power to seize him. He then made him send off the 'ifrit off in disgrace.

When he said, "Allah gave me power over him," we knew that Allah had given him freedom of action in that. Then Allah reminded him and he remembered Sulayman's prayer and showed adab towards him. We know from this that that no creature after Sulayman had the general manifestation of that kingdom.

Our goal in this question is only discussion and instruction about the two mercies which Sulayman mentioned in the two names which are expressed in Arabic as ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. (6) Allah stipulated the mercy of obligation (7) and made the application of the mercy of graciousness universal when He said, "My mercy extends to all things," (7:156) even the Divine Names, which are the realities of ascriptions. He was gracious to us in them. We are the result of the mercy of graciousness by the Divine Names and divine ascriptions of lordship. Then He prescribed mercy for Himself by our own manifestation. He informed us that He is our He-ness, that we might know that He obliged mercy on Himself only for Himself. Mercy never departs from Him. Who could be gracious to you when there is only Him?

There must be a principle for clarifying differences in merit this is in relation to what is manifested of the differences in merit that creatures have in knowledge, so that it might be said that this person knows more than that person, even though the source is but one. This means the shortcoming connected to the will (irada), apart from the connection of knowledge. This difference in merit exists in the divine attributes. (8) The connection and merit of will and its increase is connected to power. In the same way, hearing, sight and all the divine names are arranged in ranks, some having more merit than others. Similarly what is manifested in creation differs in ranks of merit, so that it can be said that this person knows more than that person even though the source is the same.

As each Divine Name which I have set forth is implied by all the Names and described by them, similarly that which creation manifests accepts all of that which is subject to differences of merit. Each part of the universe is from all the universe, i.e. it is a vessel for all the separate realities of the universe. Our statement that Zayd is inferior to 'Amr in

knowledge does not contradict the fact that the He-ness of Allah is the source of both Zayd and 'Amr, but it is more perfect and knowing in 'Amr than in Zayd, even as the Names differ in merit. They are not other-than-Allah. Allah, inasmuch as He is Knowing, has a more encompassing connection than Allah as the Transformer, the All-Powerful. But He is still He and not other-than-Him.

O my friend! do not then know Him in one aspect and be ignorant of Him in another! Do not negate Him here and affirm Him there, unless You affirm Him by an aspect through which He affirms Himself and negate Him by an aspect through which He negates Himself, as in the ayat which combines affirmation and negation in respect to Him when He said, "Nothing is like Him," negating, "and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (42:11) and so He affirmed an attribute which is general to every hearing and seeing living being. Nothing exists but that it is alive, although this is hidden in the world from the perception of some people. It will appear to all people in the Next World, for it is the Abode of the Living (ad-Dar al-Hayawan). Similarly, the life of this world is only veiled from some of the slaves so that election and difference of merit might be manifested among the slaves of Allah according to what they perceive of Him from the realities of the universe.

In one whose attainment is more comprehensive, Allah is in principle more manifest in him than in someone who does not have this comprehensiveness. So do not be veiled by the difference in merit and say that it is not correct to say that creation is the He-ness of Allah after we have shown you the different in merit in the Divine Names. You have no doubt about them being Allah, and what is designated by them is not other than Allah.

How then could Sulayman place his name before the name of Allah as they allege? He is part of the whole which the mercy of graciousness brought into existence. The name, ar-Rahman ar-Rahim, must come first for the dependence of the one receiving this mercy to be valid. Advancing the one who should come afterwards and delaying the one who should come before in the place he merits is contrary to the realities.

Part of the wisdom of Bilqis and the sublimity of her knowledge lies in the fact that she did not mention who cast the letter to her. She only did that so that her companions would know that she had communications on matters whose means they did not know. This is part of divine management in ruling because when the means of communication reaching the ruler are unknown, the people of the government fear for themselves in their actions. Therefore they only act with prudence in a matter because that will reach their ruler, and they are guarding themselves from the potential danger of that action. If they knew precisely by whom information reached their ruler, they would have tried to flatter him and bribe him so that they could do whatever they wanted without their ruler hearing about it. Therefore the Queen said, "a noble

letter has been delivered to me," without naming the one who cast it. That was an act of policy on her part would insure respect for her among the people of her kingdom and the nobles under her rule. By this, she merited her superiority over them.

As regards the superiority of the human man of knowledge over the man of knowledge of the jinn in the secrets of the disposal of things and the special properties of thing, that is known by the amount of time, for the movement of the eye in perceiving what it perceives is quicker than the movement of the body when it moves. (9) The moment in which the eye moves is the same moment which it connects to the object, in spite of the distance between the viewer and the object. The moment that the eyes open is the moment in which they are connected to the heaven of the fixed stars. The moment when its glance returns is the same moment that its perception is absent.

Rising from one's place is not like that. It does not possess this speed. Asaf ibn Barkhiya (10) was more perfect in the deed than the jinn was. What Asaf ibn Barkhiya said is the same as the action in the same moment. Sulayman, peace be upon him, at the same moment saw Bilqis' throne "settled before him" so one must not imagine that he perceived it while it was in its original place without being moved. We do not think that the displacement takes place in one and the same moment, but that it involves going into non-existence and returning to existence inasmuch as the only one who is aware of that is the one who has recognition of it. This is what Allah said, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) Not a moment passes them but that they see what they saw. Since it is like this, the time of its non-existence (the absence of the throne from its place) is the same as the time of its existence with Sulayman because of the renewal of creation with the "breaths". No one knows this power, or rather, man is not aware with regard to himself that he ceases to exist in each breath and then is again.

Do not think that "this" (thumma) implies a delay. That is not true. However, it demands a high rank of knowledge in Arabic, as when the poet says:

As he brandished the straight Rudayni, (11) it quivered.

There is no doubt that the moment of brandishing the spear is without a doubt the same as the moment of quivering of the thing which is brandished. It happened without delay. It is the same with the renewal of creation with breaths. The time of non-existence coincides with the time of the existence of its like. It is similar to the renewal of accidents in the theory of the Ash'arites [tajrîd al-a'râd].

The question involving the moving of Bilqis' throne is one of the most difficult problems, except for someone who has recognition of what we have mentioned in its story. Asaf did not have any merit except for

acquiring renewal in the assembly of Sulayman, peace be upon him. The throne was not moved across place nor did it rise above the earth nor break the laws of space for the one who understands what we mentioned. That was done by one of the companions of Sulayman in order to elevate Sulayman's honour in the selves of those who were present with Bilqis and her suite. The reason for that was that Sulayman was Allah's gift to Da'ud as He said, "We gave Sulayman to Da'ud," (38:30) so the gift is the giving of the donor by providing a blessing, not by means of fitting recompense or merit. So he is the abundant blessing, the decisive word and the cutting sword.

As for the knowledge of Sulayman, Allah said of him, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it (in spite of his opposite judgement to that of Da'ud), and Allah "gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79) Da'ud's knowledge was knowledge given by Allah, and Sulayman's knowledge was the knowledge of Allah in the matter inasmuch as He is the Judge without intermediary. So Sulayman is the interpreter of Allah in the seat of sincerity.(12) It is like the man who is striving to hit on the judgement of Allah by which Allah would judge the question. If he were to find it by himself or by what was revealed to His Messenger, then he would have two rewards. The one who errs in this particular judgement has one reward as well as its being knowledge and judgement. The community of Muhammad was given the rank of Sulayman in judgement (13) and the rank of Da'ud in wisdom, (14) so there is no better community than it.

When Bilqis saw her throne, and she knew how great the distance was and the impossibility of moving it in that space of time, she said, "It seems the same." (28:42, lit. "it is as if it were.") She spoke the truth according to what we mentioned regarding the renewal of creation by similarity. It was it. The matter is true, as you are the same at the time of renewal as you were in past time. Part of the perfection of Sulayman's knowledge was in the instruction he gave regarding the pavilion when he told Bilqis, "Enter the courtyard." (15) The courtyard was very smooth without any curvature in its glass. When Bilqis saw it, she thought that it was water and had depth, so she bared her legs so as not to let the water dampen her clothes. By that, Sulayman informed her that the throne which she saw was of this sort. This is the utmost fairness. He informed her that she had hit the mark when she said, "It seems the same." At that point, she said, "My Lord, I have wronged myself but I have submitted with Sulayman to the Lord of all the worlds."

So she did not submit to Sulayman, but to the Lord of the worlds, and Sulayman was part of the worlds. She did not restrict her submission as the Messengers do not restrict their belief in Allah, contrary to Pharaoh who said, "to the Lord of Musa and Harun." (26:48) Although this submission is related to Bilqis' submission in a certain respect, it does not have the same force. She had more discernment than Pharaoh in submission to Allah. Furthermore, Pharaoh was governed by the principle of the moment when he said, "I believe in the One in whom the

Children of Israel believe." (10:90) He specified, but he also specified when the saw the sorcerers articulate their belief in the "Lord of Musa and Harun." The Islam of Bilqis was the Islam of Sulayman since she said, "with Sulayman." She followed him in all that he adhered to in the way of beliefs.

This is how we are on the straight path which the Lord is on, for our forelocks are in His hand, (16) and it is impossible for us to separate from Him. We are with Him implicitly, and He is with us by open declaration. Allah said, "He is with you wherever you are," (57:4) and we are with Him as He takes us by our forelocks. He. may He be exalted! is with Himself wherever He goes with us on His path. So everyone in the world is on a straight path, and it is the path of the Lord. It is this that Bilqis learned from Sulayman, so she said, "To Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," without referring to a particular world.

As for the subjection which was the privilege of Sulayman, peace be upon him, and by which he was distinguished from others, and the kingdom which Allah gave him which none after him would have, it is from his command when He said, "We gave him the fiercely blowing wind, speeding at his command." (21:81) It was not subjection in itself, for Allah said in respect of each of us without exception, "He has made everything in the heavens and everything on the earth subservient to you." (45:13) He also mentioned the subjection of the winds, stars and other things, (17) but that is not by our command. It is from the command of Allah. If you reflect with your intellect, Sulayman was privileged by this command neither by mental concentration nor by aspiration (himma) rather, it was by nothing more than the command itself. We said that because we recognise that the physical bodies of the world can be affected by the himma of the self when someone is in the station of concentration. We have seen such things happen in this Path. Sulayman only had to articulate the command in whatever he wished to subject without either concentration or himma.

Know, may Allah support us and you by a spirit from Him, that when any slave receives a gift like this, that does not detract from his portion of the kingdom of the Next World, nor is he called to account for it. That was true of Sulayman. Although he sought it from his Lord, the tasting (dhawq) of the Path (18) demands that it was advanced to him from what was stored up for others, and He will call him to account for it when he wants it in the Next World. Allah told him. "This is Our gift (and He did not say "to you: or to anyone else); bestow or withhold without reckoning." (38:39) We knew by the tasting of the Path that his request was from the command of his Lord. Thus the request was from the divine command, and the one who requested it received full recompense for his request.

If the Creator wishes, He grants his need in what he seeks from Him, and if He wishes, He withholds it. The slave has fulfilled what Allah

demanding of him to obey His command in what he asked of his Lord. If he had asked that from himself without his Lord commanding him to do that, then he would be held to account for it.

That is true in all that Allah is asked for, as He said to His Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "Say: 'O Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" He obeyed his Lord's command and sought increase in knowledge to such an extent that each time he was given milk, he interpreted it to be knowledge even as he interpreted it as knowledge in a dream in which he received a glass of milk. In the dream, he drank the milk, and gave the rest of it to 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. The people asked, "What is its interpretation?" He replied, "Knowledge." Similarly, when Allah took him on his Night Journey, the angel gave him a vessel which contained milk and a vessel which contained wine. The Prophet drank the milk, and the angel said, "You have chosen the true nature (fitra). Allah has bestowed you on your community!" When milk appeared, it was the form of knowledge. Therefore it is knowledge taking on the form as milk, just as Jibril came to Maryam in the form of "a handsome, well-built man." (19:16)

When the Prophet said, "People are asleep and when they die, they wake up," he meant that everything that man sees in the life of this world is in the rank of the dreams of someone who is asleep, so it must be interpreted. Phenomenal being is imagination (khayal), but it is Allah in reality. (19) Whoever understands this has received the secrets of the Path. When the Prophet was offered milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and increase us in it" because he saw it as the form of knowledge, and he had been commanded to seek increase in knowledge. When he was offered something other than milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and give us better than it."

When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it to him by a request which arises from a divine command, He does not take him to account for it in the Next Abode. When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it by a request which is not by a divine command, the business in it is up to Allah. If He wishes, He will take him to account for it, and if He wishes, He will not take him to account for it. I hope for knowledge from Allah in particular for which He will not call one to account, for He commanded the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, to seek increase of knowledge, and it is the same command which is addressed to the Prophet's community. Allah said, "You have an excellent model in the Messenger of Allah," (33:21) and what greater model is there than this model who is a source of solace (20) to the one who possesses understanding from Allah?

Had we discussed the station of Sulayman in its entirety, you would have seen a matter whose revelation would have struck you with terror. Most of the men of knowledge of this Path have no knowledge of the state and rank of Sulayman. The business is not as they claim. (21)

Notes to Chapter 16:

1. In Qur'an 27:30. The story is found in Sura 27. When Sulayman hears of the kingdom of Queen Bilqis in Sheba', he sends the hoopoe to take a letter to her.
2. When the Prophet sent Chosroes or Khosrau a letter inviting him to Islam, he tore it up after it was read to him.
3. Ref. Qur'an 38:35, where Sulayman says, "My Lord, forgive me, and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me."
4. Type of malicious jinn.
5. Hadith. "Yesterday Shaytan rushed up suddenly to stop my prayer. Allah gave me power over him and I seized him. I wanted to tie him to one of the pillars of the mosque so that all of you could look at him, but then I remembered the supplication of my brother Sulayman, 'O Lord, forgive me and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me.' (38:35) Allah turned him away in humiliation." via Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful.
7. When He said, "I will write (mercy) for those who are godfearing...." (Qur'an 7:156)
8. i.e. Knowledge is more perfect than will.
9. Sulayman asked his council, "'O Council, who among you will bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?' An 'ifrit of the jinn said, 'I will bring it to you before you get up from your seat...' He who possessed knowledge of the Book said, 'I will bring it to you before your glance returns to you.'" (27:38-40)
10. The name of the man of knowledge in Sulayman's council.
11. Rudayna was a woman who was famous for straightening spear shafts which were tested by shaking.
12. See Qur'an 54:55.
13. i.e. by the Qur'an and hadith.
14. By ijtiḥad.
15. This is in the same sura (27), ayat 44.
16. Qur'an Ref. 11:56, "I have believed in Allah, my Lord and your Lord. There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a straight path."
17. Various places in the Qur'an: 14:32, 16:12, 22:65, 31:20.
18. One variant has "reality" instead of Path (Tariq).
19. Inasmuch as phenomenal being is a divine shadow.
20. Uswa is model, or a person to be imitated and through whose emulation one gains consolation. The source of solace is the verbal noun from Form V of this verb, ta'assa, which means to become consoled by the example of another who had suffered in a similar fashion and been patient in it.
21. His kingdom does not decrease what he has in the Next world.

17: The Seal of the Wisdom of Existence (Wujud) in the Word of Da'ud (David)

"We subjected the mountains to glorify with him in the evening and sunrise, and also the birds, flocking together, all of them turned to him." Then Allah combined the kingdom and speech and prophethood in Da'ud when He says, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech." (1) Allah clearly and openly appointed Da'ud Khalif. This was Da'ud, peace be upon him. His freedom of action in the kingdom with this subjection was by a mighty command which was not completed in him alone. Allah also gave it to Sulayman who shared in it as He says, "And We gave knowledge to Da'ud and Sulayman who said, 'Praise be to Allah who has favoured us.'" (27:15) He says, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it. We gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79)

Know that since prophethood and the message are a divine privilege, and cannot be acquired. This is the prophethood which lays down a Shari'a. It is Allah's gift to them. Gifts of this sort are not recompense, nor is recompense demanded from them for these gifts. Allah bestows it on them as pure blessing and favour. So He says, "We gave him (i.e. Ibrahim) Ishaq and Ya'qub." (2) He says of Ayyub, "We gave him his family, and the same again with them." (38:43) He says of Musa, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet," (19:53). There are more instances like that. What they received first of all is what they will receive at the last in the totality of their states, or most of them. It is only His name, the Giver.

Allah says in respect of Da'ud, "We gave Da'ud great favour from Us." (34:10) He did not accompany that with a demand for recompense from Da'ud, nor did He say that He gave him what He mentioned as a reward. When He demanded gratitude for that by action, He demanded it of the people of Da'ud, and did not mention Da'ud himself, asking Da'ud's people to thank Him for the blessing which He gave to Da'ud. For Da'ud himself, it is a gift of pure blessing and favour. It is not like that for his people, but rather like the demands of barter. So Allah said, "Work, family of Da'ud, in thankfulness! But very few of My slaves are thankful." (3)

If the Prophets, peace be upon him, thanked Allah for what He had bestowed on them and given to them, that was not from the command of Allah. They undertook that freely from themselves, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood thanking Allah until his feet were swollen, when Allah had forgiven Him his wrong actions, past and present. When people commented what he did, he said, "Am I not a thankful slave?" Allah said that Nuh was a thankful slave. (4) So the thankful among the slaves are few.

The first blessing which Allah bestowed on Da'ud was that He gave him a

name which does not have any connected letters in it:

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By this, He cut him off from the world and He told us this by the name itself which is dāl, alif, and wâw. Allah named Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, with both connected and separated letters:

So in this Allah both joined him and separated him from the world. He combined the two states for him in his name as He combined the two states for Da'ud through meaning (ma'na) (5) although He did not put that in his name. That was a privilege which Muhammad had above Da'ud, i.e. calling him by this name. The matter was thus completed for Muhammad in all its aspects. It is the same in his name Ahmad.

AHMAD

That is from the wisdom of Allah.

Then He spoke about the blessing He gave Da'ud in the mountains' echoing of glorification with him. (6) So they glorified with his glorification that the deed might be his. It was the same with the birds. He gave him power and described him by it, (7) and He gave him wisdom and decisive speech.(8)

Then the greatest blessing and nearest rank which Allah appointed for him was that his khalifate was mentioned in the divine text. He did not do that with any of his kind, and there were khalifs among them. Allah said, "Da'ud, We have made you a khalif on the earth, so judge between people with truth and do follow your own desires," i.e. whatever comes to your mind in judgement without revelation from Me, "letting them misguide you from the Way of Allah," (38:26) from the path which I revealed to My Messengers. Then Allah showed adab with him and said, "Those who are misguided from the Way of Allah will receive a harsh punishment since they forgot the Day of Reckoning." He did not say to him, "If you go astray from My Path, there is a terrible punishment for you." If you said that Adam is mentioned as the Khalif in divine text, we will say that it is not the same as in the text regarding Da'ud, for Allah said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif on the earth." (2:30) He did not say, "I am making Adam a khalif." Even if He had said that, it still would not be the same as His words, "We have made you a khalif," in respect of Da'ud. One is implied and the other is explicit. Mentioning Adam in the story after that did not indicate that he is the same as the khalif of whom Allah spoke. Occupy your mind with the transmissions of Allah on His slaves when He transmits them. It is the same in respect to Ibrahim the friend, "I will make you an Imam for the people." (2:124) He did not say "a khalif". We know that the imamate here means the khalifate, but it is not the same because He did not mention it by the most specific of its names which is

the khalifate.

Then part of bestowing the khalifate on Da'ud is that He made him a khalif of judgement. That is only from Allah. He told him, "Judge between people with the truth." (5:42) The khalifate of Adam was not of this rank. Da'ud's khalifate was that he follow what was in it previously, not that he delegated with the divine judgement of Allah in His creation. If that had been the case, it would have occurred. However, our discourse is only regarding the khalifs on the earth from Allah, and they are Messengers. As for the khalifate today, it is from the Messengers, not from Allah, so they only judge by what the Messengers prescribed for them. They do not go beyond that except when there is a small point which is only known by those like us. That is in taking what they judge by, from what is in the Shari'a of the Messenger, peace be upon him.

The khalifate is from the Messenger. He takes the judgement from him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, by transmission or by ijtiḥad, whose basis is also transmitted from him. Some of us think that the one who takes the judgement takes it from Allah, for he is a khalif from Allah by the source of that judgement. The substance is his inasmuch as it was the Messenger's - the source of his judgement is that of the Messenger's. Outwardly he follows, not disputing his judgement, as will be the case with 'Isa when he descends and judges. It is the same when the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Those are the ones whom Allah has guided, so be guided by their guidance." (9) This relates to what he recognises as one who is singled out and one who conforms. It is in him by the degree of what the Prophet established of the Shari'a which from the previous Messengers since he confirmed it. We follow him in relation to its confirmation, not because it is a Shari'a of someone else before him. In the same way, the Khalif takes from Allah the same thing that he takes from the Messenger.

In the language of unveiling, we call him "the khalif of Allah", and with outward knowledge, we say "the khalif of the Messenger of Allah". For this reason, the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, died and did not transmit the khalifate from himself to anyone else for he knew that among the slaves of Allah are those who will take the khalifate from their Lord. Thus the khalif from Allah is in conformity with the judgements of the Shari'a. Since the Prophet knew that, he did not hinder the matter. Allah has khalifs in His creation who take from the mine of the Messenger and the Messengers that which the Messengers took. They recognise the virtue of their predecessor there because the Messenger is a vessel for increase. The khalif is not a container for the increase which, had he been the Messenger, he would have received. He only gives knowledge and judgement in what he legislates through the specific legislation of the Messenger. Outwardly he follows the Messenger without opposition.

Do you not see that in the case of 'Isa, peace be upon him, when the Jews

imagined that he did not add to Musa, as is the case with what we said about the Khalifate today with the Messenger, they accepted him and confirmed him? When he added judgement and abrogated judgement, Musa confirmed it, for 'Isa was a Messenger. They did not accept that because he differed from their creed, and the Jews did not know the matter for what it was - this is why they sought to kill him. His story is what Allah relates to us about them and him in His Mighty Book. He was a Messenger before increase. As for decrease of the judgement or its increase, it is confirmed since decrease is increase of judgement without a doubt.

The khalifate today does not have this rank, but it decreases or increases based on the Shari'a which is confirmed by itjihad, not on the Shari'a which Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, articulated. The khalif might do something which is counter to a hadith in a certain judgement, and so he imagines that that comes from ijtiihad. That is not the case, but rather this Imam has not confirmed that the transmission with respect to unveiling is from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. If it had been confirmed, he would have judged by it. If the path in it is fairness in justice, he is not protected from illusion. It is not by transmission in meaning.

Something like this occurs in the khalif today. Similarly, it also applies to 'Isa for, when he descends, he will remove much of the Shari'a established by itjihad. By removing that, he will clarify the form of the legislated truth which he had, especially when the judgements of the Imams differ in the same event. We know absolutely that when revelation descended, it descended in a certain way. That is the divine judgement and none other! Allah confirmed it and it is the Shari'a of confirmation by the removal of interdiction from this community and the vastness of its judgements in it.

As for the statement of the Prophet, "If there are two khalifs, then slay one of them," this is the outward khalifate which has the sword. If they are in agreement, then one of them must be killed by the conflict of the khalifate of meaning. There is no actual killing in it, but killing comes with the outward khalifate. If the khalif does not possess this station, being the khalif of the Messenger of Allah - it is just being from the principle of the basis by which the existence of two gods could be imagined: "If there had been any gods besides Allah in heaven or earth, they would both be ruined," (21:22) even if they are in agreement. We know that if they differ implicitly, the judgement of one of the two will be valid. The one with the operative judgement is the god properly speaking. The one whose judgement is not operative is not god.

From this, we know that every valid judgement in the world today is the judgement of Allah even if it differs from the established judgement in its outward manifestation called the Shari'a. The only judgement which is valid belongs to Allah in the heart of the matter, because the matter

which occurs in the world is based on the judgement of the Divine Will, not on the judgement of the established Shari'a, (10) whose establishment itself comes from the Will. For that reason, He put His determination into effect. Therefore, Will only has determination in the matter, not in the act which it brings.

The power of the Will (mashi'a) is immense. (11) This is why Abu Talib (12) considered it to be the Throne of the Essence, since the will itself necessitates judgement. Nothing occurs in existence nor disappears from it without the Will. When there is opposition to the divine command here, it is called "rebellion". It is only commanding the means, not the command which brings things into being. None opposes Allah at all in what He does in respect to the command of the Will. Opposition only occurs in respect of the command of means. So understand that!

Properly speaking, the command of the Will is directed to bringing the action itself into existence, not to the one at whose hands the action manifests itself. It is impossible that the action should not be. However it takes place in a particular locus, and so, at one moment, it is called opposition to the command of Allah, and at another moment it is called agreement and obedience to the command of Allah. The language of praise and blame follow the action accordingly.

Since the matter itself is based on what we have stated about it, creation of all sorts therefore hopes for happiness. He designated this station as "mercy which encompasses everything." (13) It preceded divine wrath, and the predecessor comes before as is its right. That which the latter judges is what the former judged. Mercy obtained it since nothing preceded it, so this is one meaning of "His mercy preceded His wrath" that mercy judges the one who reaches it. It stands at the end. Therefore the end must be reached, and thus mercy and parting from wrath must be reached. It has jurisdiction over everything which reaches it according to what is given to it by the state of the one who arrives.

Whoever possesses understanding
witnesses what we have said.
If they do not understand,
they should take it from us.
There is only what we mentioned in this matter,
so rely on it and be in it now as we were.
What we recited to you came from it to us,
and from us to you is what we gave you from us.

As for the softening of iron, (14) hard hearts are softened by reprimand and threat as fire softens iron. The hardness of hearts is a stronger hardness than that of stone. Fire breaks stone, calcifies it and does not soften it. Iron was only softened for him so that protective coats of mail could be fashioned. This is an instruction from Allah that the thing is only protected by itself.¹ Mail protects against the spearhead, the sword, the

knife and the arrowhead - protection against iron is by iron. The Muhammadan Shari'a brings, "I take refuge with You from You." Understand this! This is the spirit of the softening of iron. He is the Avenger, the Merciful, and Allah grants success.

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. Qur'an 38:18-20.
2. 6:84;19:49; 21:72; 29:29.
3. Qur'an 34:13.
4. Qur'an 17:3.
5. As he had prophethood, the message, the khalifate, the kingdom, knowledge, wisdom, and discrimination.
6. Qur'an 34:10, "O mountains and births! echo with him in his praise!"
7. Qur'an 38:17, "Remember Our slave Da'ud, who possessed true strength."
8. Qur'an 38:20, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech."
9. Qur'an 6:90.
10. See the Qur'an 74:54-56, "It is truly a reminder to which anyone who wills may pay heed. But they will only pay heed if Allah wills."
11. The reality of the will necessitates judgement because it is the same as making a demand.
12. Al-Makki.
13. Qur'an 7:156, also 40:7.
14. Qur'an 34:10, "We softened iron for him: 'Fashion wide coats of mail and measure well the links.'"

18: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath (Nafas) in the Word of Yunus (Jonah)

Know that this human organism in its perfection consists of spirit (ruh), body and self (nafs). Allah created it in His form. The disintegration of its structure is only undertaken by the One who created it either by His hand - and it is only that - or by His command. Whoever undertakes to do that without the command of Allah has wronged himself and exceeded the limits of Allah in it and rushed to the ruin of the one whom Allah has commanded to thrive. Know that compassion to the slaves of Allah is more proper through preservation than jealousy in Allah.

Da'ud, peace be upon him, wanted to build the Bayt al-Muqaddas, (1) and built it many times. Whenever he finished it, it was destroyed. He complained about that to Allah. Allah revealed to him, "This House of Mine will not be built by the hands of one who has shed blood." Da'ud said, "O Lord, was that not for Your sake?" Allah said, "Yes, but are they not My slaves?" Da'ud said, "O Lord, let it be built at the hands of someone who is from me!" Allah revealed to him, "Your son Sulayman will build it."

What is meant in this story is that the preservation and maintenance of this human organism is better than its destruction. Do you not see that Allah has prescribed jizya (2) and research of peace with those who had opposed the Din in order to spare them. He said, "If they incline to peace, you too incline to it, and put your trust in Allah." (8:61)

Do you not see that for the one who has responsibility for retaliation, accepting blood-money or pardoning is prescribed for the next-of-kin who is the responsible guardian? If he refuses to accept either, then the killer can be slain in retaliation. Do you not see how when the next-of-kin consists of a group of people, and one of them accepts the blood-money or pardons the person while the rest of the group want him killed, Allah observes the one who pardoned and prefers him to the one who did not pardon. Do you not see that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever is in a position to retaliate and slays the person is like him"? Allah says, "The repayment of a bad action is one equivalent to it," (42:40) so He made retaliation an evil deed, i.e. that deed is evil even though it is part of the Shari'a. Whoever pardons and makes amends has a reward due from Allah because he is based on His form. Whoever pardons and does not slay, his reward is due to the One on whose form he is based, because the One who fashioned is more entitled to it, and his existence only appeared by the name the Manifest.

Whoever preserves the person, preserves Allah. Man is not blameable by his source, but by his action, and his action is not the same as him. We are discussing his action, and action belongs only to Allah, even though some actions are blamed and some are praised. The language of blame in respect to purpose which is reprehensible with Allah, and the only thing

reprehensible is what is made to be so by the Shari'a. The Shari'a makes something reprehensible because of what Allah made known or which He made known through someone He has instructed. So Allah prescribed retaliation by necessity for the preservation of the human race and to prevent people exceeding the limits of Allah. Allah says, "There is life for you in retaliation, O you who possess intelligence (lit. cores)!" (3) (2:179) They are the people of the core who stumble onto the secret of divine laws and wisdoms.

Since you know that Allah preserves this organism and preserves its continuance, you should also preserve it since you have that happiness. While man is still alive, he hopes that he will obtain the attribute of perfection for which he was created. Whoever strives to destroy it, strives to prevent the acquisition of that for which he was created. How excellent is what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Shall I tell you what is better and more excellent for you when you meet your enemies, smite their necks and they smite yours? Remembering Allah."

That is because the only one who knows the value of this human organism is the one who remembers Allah with the invocation (dhikr) demanded of him. (4) Allah sits with the one who remembers Him, (5) and the sinner is witnessed by the one doing the invocation. When the one doing the invocation does not witness Allah who sits with him, then he is not doing invocation. When Allah is mentioned, He flows in all parts of the slave, not just in his invocation with the tongue. Allah, at that moment, is only the Companion of the tongue in particular. The tongue sees Him, inasmuch as the man, (6) in respect of his sight does not see Him. (7)

Understand this secret in the invocation of those who are heedless! The heedless person who does invocation is present without a doubt, and the One mentioned sits with him and so he witnesses Him. In respect of his heedlessness, this person does not do invocation and Allah does not sit with the heedless. Man is many but with a single source. Allah is one source but has many Divine Names, just as man has many parts. What is required of the invocation of one part is not the invocation of another part. Allah sits with the part which is invoking Him, and the other part is described as heedless. There must be some part of man doing invocation, so Allah sits with that part, and He preserves the rest of the parts by His concern.

When Allah undertakes the destruction of this organism by what is called "death", that is not negation (i'dam) , but rather separation. He takes man to Him, and what is meant is only Allah's taking man to Him, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." (11:123) When He takes him to Him, He fashions him a different composition than this composition. The new composition is from the genus of the abode to which he has moved, that is, the Abode of Going-on, because equilibrium exists. The creature thus will never die, i.e. his parts will never be separated.

As for the people of the Fire, they will return to bliss, but it will be in the Fire since after the end of the duration of punishment, it must become cold and peace according to the mercy which preceded it. This is their bliss. The bliss of the people of the Fire, after claims are settled, is the bliss of the friend of Allah, Ibrahim, when he was thrown into the Fire.⁸ He was punished by the sight of it since his knowledge told him that it is a form which causes pain to any living being which is near it. He did not know what Allah intended by it and from it in respect to him.

So after the existence of these pains, he will find cold and peace in spite of the fact that he still witnesses the phenomenal form which is fire in the eyes of the people. The single thing has various modes in the eyes of the onlookers. The divine tajalli is also like that. If you wish, you could say that the tajalli of Allah resembles this, and if you wish, you could say that the world is in the eye of the beholder which contains the parable of Allah in the tajalli, and so it takes on various modes in the eye of the onlooker according to the onlooker's disposition. The onlooker's disposition varies with the modalities of the tajalli. All of this is permissible in the realities.

Had a slain person or one who had died not returned to Allah when he died or was slain, Allah would not have decreed their deaths nor prescribed their slaying. All is in His hand, and there is no loss in respect to Him. He prescribes slaying and decrees death by His knowledge that His slave will not pass from Him, for he returns to Him as Allah says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." So freedom of action occurs in it, and He is the One with freedom of action. Nothing is outside of Him of which He is not the source. Rather, His He-ness is the source of that thing, and He is the One who gives it its unveiling when He says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned."

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. The Temple (Beth ha-Mikdash) in Jerusalem. The chapter is an evident proof against the lies circulated by the occupier of al-Aqsa, Mr. 'Ikrimah Sabri, after the Ahlu-s-Sunnah were expelled from it.
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19: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Unseen in the Word of Ayyub (Job)

Know that the secret of life flows in water, for it is the basis of the components and the basic elements. For this reason, Allah made every living thing of water. (1) There is nothing which is not alive, so there is nothing which does not proclaim His praise, but their extolling is only understood by divine unveiling. (2) Nothing extols unless it is alive. So the basis of everything is water. Do you not see how the Throne is on the water because it was formed from it? (3) It oppresses the water while the water underneath it maintains it. In the same way, Allah created man a slave. Then he was haughty towards his Lord and put himself above Him. In spite of this, Allah preserves him from underneath in respect of the height of this slave who is ignorant of himself. This is what the Prophet said, "If you let a rope fall, it would fall on Allah." So he indicated that "below" is related to Him as "above" is related to Him when He said, "They fear their Lord above them," (16:50) and "He is the Absolute Master over His slaves." (6:18; 6:61) So He has "above" and "below" For this reason, the six directions only appeared in respect of man, who is on the form of the All-Merciful.

There is no nourisher except Allah. He said of one group, "If they had implemented the Torah and the Gospel," using the indefinite and being general, "and what was sent down to them from their Lord," and this includes every judgement sent down on the tongue of a Messenger or someone inspired, "they would have been fed from above their heads," and He is the Nourisher in respect of the aboveness which is ascribed to Him, "and beneath their feet," (5:66) as He is the Nourisher in respect of the belowness which He ascribes to Himself on the tongue of His Messenger, who translates from Him. If the Throne had not been on the water, its existence would not have been maintained. The existence of the living sustains life. Do you not see that when the living dies the customary death, the parts of his structure disintegrate and his faculties are eliminated from that particular structure? Allah said to Ayyub, "Stamp your foot! Here is a cool bath," (38:42) meaning that since he had an excess of the heat of pain, He would alleviate it by the coolness of the water. For this reason, the medicine was decrease from excess and excess in decreasing. What is meant is the demand of balance, and the only way to it is by approaching it.

However, we said that there is no way achieve equilibrium because realities and witnessing constantly accord taking-form with every single breath. (4) Taking-form (takwin) only comes from an inclination which is called deviation or decomposition in nature. In Allah it is the will, and it is inclination to one particular goal rather than another. Equilibrium denotes sameness in all, but this does not occur. For this reason, we are deprived of the principle of equilibrium. Allah's description with pleasure and anger and the attributes is related in prophetic divine knowledge. Pleasure obliterates anger, and anger obliterates pleasure from the

pleasing. Perfect equilibrium would mean that anger and pleasure are the same. The Wrathful would not be wrathful towards the one he is angry with, but would be pleased with him. He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him that is, inclination. And Allah would not be pleased with the one He is pleased with and would be angry with him, and so He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him - that is, inclination.

We said this, however, in respect of the one who thinks that Allah's wrath will continue against the people of the Fire forever, as he claims. So they do not have the principle of pleasure from Allah. What is meant is true. It is as we have said, so the hopes of the people of the Fire lies in the removal of pains. Even if they still dwell in the Fire, that is pleasure, so wrath is removed when the pains are removed since the source of pain is the source of wrath if you understand! Whoever is wrathful has suffered hurt. He only strives to avenge the object of his wrath by causing him suffering so that the wrathful might find relief by that. He transfers the pain which he has to the object of his wrath. If you separate Allah from the universe, then High indeed is He exalted above this attribute! If Allah is the He-ness of the universe, then all principles appear only in Him and from Him. It is His word, "to Him the entire affair will be returned" in reality and unveiling, "so worship Him and put your trust in Him" (11:123) in veil and covering. There is nothing in the realm of possibility more original than this universe because it is based on the form of the Merciful which Allah brought into existence - He manifested His existence by the existence of the universe as man manifests the existence of the natural form. We are His manifest form, and His He-ness is the spirit of this form which governs it. There is no management except in Him as it is only from Him. He is the First by meaning and the Last by form, and the Manifest by the changing of judgements and states, and the Inner by management. "He has knowledge of all things." "He witnesses everything" (5) so He knows by direct witnessing, not by thought. It is the same with the knowledge of tasting (dhawq) which does not derive from thought. Tasting is sound knowledge. Other things are only conjecture and surmise, and that is not knowledge at all.

Then Ayyub had that water to drink to remove the pain of thirst which was from the weariness and punishment with which shaytan (6) had touched him, (7) that is, distance from the realities which he perceived for what they were. Ayyub perceived them for what they were, and by his perception, he was in the place of nearness. Every witnessed one is close to the eye ('ayn=source), even if it is far away by the interval of distance. Vision reaches it, since it is witnessing. If it had not been for that, he would not witness it, nor would what is witnessed be reached by vision, however you want to put it. The witnessed is near between the sight and the seer. This is why Ayyub alluded to touch and ascribed it to Shaytan in spite of the nearness of touch. He said, "The one distant from me is near because of his power over me."

You know that distance and nearness are two relative matters, for they are two ascriptions. They have no existence in the source in spite of the fact that there judgements are established in the far and near. Know that the secret of Allah in Ayyub (whom He made an example for us in a written existing book which this Muhammadan community reads in order to learn what is in it, and they attach honor to the one who possesses it), is that Allah praised him for his patience in his supplication to remove affliction from him. We know that when the slave calls on Allah to remove affliction from him without that lessening his patience, then he is patient and the best of the slaves, as Allah said, "What an excellent slave! He truly turned to his Lord." (8) (38:44) This means he goes back to Allah, not back to the cause.

Allah affects by the cause because the slave depends on it since the causes which will remove any one matter are many, but the Causer is but one. It is more fitting that the slave return to the One Source in order to remove that pain by the cause of that than to the particular cause. It may be that it will not conform to Allah's knowledge in it, and then some will say, "Allah did not answer me." Yet he did not call on him, but he inclined to a particular cause which neither the time nor the moment requires. Ayyub acted by the wisdom of Allah since he was a Prophet. He knew that with one group, patience is what holds the self back from complaint. That is not our definition of patience (sabr). Its definition is to hold the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah, not to Allah. The first group is veiled in their view that the complainer is lessened in contentment (rida) with the decree by complaint. That is not the case.

Contentment with the decree is not lessened by complaint to Allah or to others, but contentment with the decreed is lessened. We are not speaking about contentment with the decreed. Affliction is what is decreed and not the same as the Decree. Ayyub knew that holding the self back from complaint to Allah for the removal of affliction is to oppose divine force. It is ignorance if, when Allah afflicts someone by what gives him pain, he does not call on Allah to remove that painful matter from him. The one who has realization must supplicate and ask Allah to remove that from him. For that gnostic who possesses unveiling, that removal comes from the presence of Allah. Allah describes Himself as "hurt", so He said, "those who hurt Allah and His Messenger." (33:57) What hurt is greater than that Allah test you with affliction in your heedlessness of Him or a divine station which you do not know so that you return to Him with your complaint so that He can remove it from you? Thus the need which is your reality will be proven. The hurt is removed from Allah by your asking Him to repel it from you, since you are His manifest form.

One of the gnostics was hungry and wept. Someone who had no tasting (dhawq) in that area censured him for that. The gnostic said, "But Allah makes me hungry so that I might weep. He tests me by affliction so that I might ask Him to remove it from me. This does not lessen my being

patient." We know that patience is holding the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah.

By "other" I mean a particular aspect of Allah. Allah specified a particular one of Allah's aspects, and it is called the aspect of He-ness, so he calls on Him from that aspect to remove affliction from him, not from the other aspects called causes. They are only Him in respect to elaboration of the matter in itself. The gnostic's request does not veil him from the He-ness of Allah in removing affliction from him and the fact that all the causes are Him from a particular point of view. This path is only obliged on the people of adab among the slaves of Allah who are entrusted with the secrets of Allah. Allah has guardians whom only Allah recognizes, and some of them recognize each other. We have counselled you, so strive, and ask of Allah!

Notes to Chapter 19:

1. Qur'an See 21:30.
2. See Qur'an 17:44.
3. See 11:7. As for the connection between Water (al-ma') and the Throne (al-'arsh), see the hadith narrated by Imam al-Bukhari, "Allah existed and there was nothing with Him, then His Throne was on the water, and then He created the heavens and the earth."
4. Tajdid al-khalq, instantaneous renewal of creation.
5. See Qur'an 5:117; 22:17, etc.
6. The root of the name Shaytan is shaytana, meaning "to be remote from".
7. Qur'an 38:41.
8. Awwab, which means one who frequently turns to Allah.

20: The Seal of the Wisdom of Majesty in the Word of Yahya (John the Baptist)

This is the wisdom of firstness in the names. Allah called him Yahya, i.e. the dhikr of Zakariyya was Yahya brought to life by him, and "a name We have given to no one else before." (19:7) He joined the attainment of the attribute, which is in the one who has passed on but left a son to revive his memory and his name through him. He called him "Yahya". His name Yahya is like knowledge by tasting. The memory of Adam, peace be upon him, was revived by Shith and that of Nuh by Sam. It is the same with the Prophets, peace be upon them; but Allah did not combine the name of knowledge from Him and the attribute for anyone before Yahya. It was an act of concern for Zakariyya from Allah, since Zakariyya said, "Give me an heir from You." (19:5) He mentioned Allah before the mention he mentioned his son, as Asiya (1) mentioned the neighbor before the abode when she said, "Build a house in the Garden for me in Your presence." (66:11) Allah was generous to Zakariyya, for He granted his need and named him by His attribute. Yahya's name was a remembrance for what His Prophet Zakariyya asked of Him; because he preferred the going-on of dhikr-Ullah after his death, since the son is the secret of his father.

He said, "to be my inheritor and the inheritor of the family of Ya'qub." (19:6) Nothing is inherited in respect of these except for the station of dhikr-Ullah and calling to Him. Then Allah gave him the good news of what He appointed for him from His words, "Peace be upon him the day he was born, and the day he dies, and the day he is raised up again alive." (19:15) He brought the attribute of life, which is his name, and He informed him of His peace upon him. His words are true. He completed it, even if it is the word of the spirit, "Peace be upon me the day I was born, the day I die, and the day I am raised up again alive," (19:33) and this is more sublime and more perfect in oneness and belief in the interpretation. That in which the order of nature (2) was broken in respect to 'Isa was articulation. His intellect was given mastery and perfected at that time when Allah made him speak. In any case, mastery of articulation is not necessary.

'Isa spoke the truth in what he articulated but this is different than the one who was testified to, as in the case of Yahya. (3) Allah's greeting on Yahya was higher than the greeting of 'Isa on himself in this way since the ambiguity occurring in divine concern was removed. The immediate circumstances indicate his proximity to Allah in that and his sincerity, since he spoke in the cradle the form which indicated the innocence of his mother. He was one of the two witnesses. The other witness was the shaking of the dried trunk of the palm tree. (4) Fresh, ripe dates came tumbling down without the male palm tree or pollination. In the same way, Maryam bore 'Isa without a man, that is, without normal and customary intercourse. If a Prophet had said, "My sign and my miracle is that this wall will speak," and then the wall speaks and says, "You have lied, you are not the Messenger of Allah," then the sign is proven and it is

confirmed by it that he is the Messenger of Allah. One does not pay any attention to what the wall said.

He introduces this probability into the words of 'Isa when his mother pointed to him while he was in the cradle. Allah's greeting on Yahya is higher than this element. The passage which indicates that he is the slave of Allah is in respect of the claim made about him that he was the son of Allah. The indication is completed by sheer articulation. He is the slave of Allah according to another group who speak of Prophethood. It increases the principle of probability in logical thought until his truthfulness appeared in the future regarding all that he spoke about when he was in the cradle. So understand our allusion!

Notes to Chapter 20:

1. The wife of Pharaoh who was one of the perfect women.
2. Kharq al-'adat, miracle, literally, the breaking of the normal pattern of things.
3. 'Isa was a witness, not one who is the object of witness, since he testified on behalf of his mother.
4. See Qur'an 19:29.

21: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sovereignty (1) in the Word of Zakariyya (Zachariah)

Know that the mercy of Allah encompasses everything in existence and judgement, and the existence of wrath comes from the mercy of Allah by wrath. His mercy preceded His wrath, that is, the ascription of mercy to Him preceded the ascription of wrath. Then every source has an existence which demands that Allah's mercy encompass every source. For that reason, we say that the mercy of Allah encompasses all things in existence and principle.

The Divine Names are "things", but they derive from a single Source. The first thing that His mercy encompassed before time was its thingness, that source which gives existence to mercy by mercy. Thus the first thing that His mercy encompassed was itself, then the thingness indicated, then the thingness of every existent existing without end in this world and the Next, non-essential ('arad) and substance (jawhar), composite and simple. Neither the acquisition of a goal nor harmony of nature is taken into account rather, harmonious and inharmonious things are all encompassed by divine mercy in existence. We mentioned in The Makkan Revelations that effect only belongs to the non-existent, not the existent. If the existent had it, it is by the principle of the non-existent. It is a strange knowledge and a rare question. Only those who possess illusions (awhâm) know its realisation, and that is by their tasting (dhawq). (2)

The mercy of Allah pervades phenomenal beings, and circulates in essences and sources. The most ideal position of mercy is when it is known from witnessing with sublime thoughts. Everyone mercy designates is happy. There is only what mercy designates, and the mention of the mercy of things is the source of its bringing them into existence. Every existent thing has been shown mercy. O friend! Do not be veiled from the perception of what we have said by what you see of the troubles people experience and what you believe about the pains of the Next Abode which will not depart from the one whom they afflict.

First of all, know that mercy is in bringing-into-existence in general. In mercy by pains, only pains come into existence. So mercy has an effect in two ways - the first effect is by the essence, which is its bringing every existent source into existence. It does not regard desire or lack of it, suitability or lack of suitability. It looks at the source of every existent before its existence, or rather, it looks at its source-form. For this reason, it saw Allah-as-creature in creeds as a single source-form among the source-forms. Its mercy to itself is by bringing-into-existence. This is why we said that Allah-as-creature in creeds is the first thing shown mercy after its mercy to itself in its connection of bringing those shown mercy into existence.

It has another effect by request. Those who are veiled ask Allah to have mercy on them in their beliefs, and the people of unveiling ask for the

mercy of Allah to settle on them. They ask for it by the name of Allah, and so they say, "O Allah! Have mercy on us!" and He only has mercy on them by carrying out mercy through them. It has authority because authority in reality belongs to the meaning based on place.

He is the Merciful in reality, so Allah is only merciful to His slaves, attentive to them by mercy. When mercy settles on them, they experience its authority through taste (dhawq). The one designated by mercy has had mercy known to him. The active participle is the Merciful (Rahîm) and the Mercy-Giver (Râhim), and this principle does not describe creatures because it is a matter of directing meanings to their essences.

States are neither existent nor non-existent they have no source in existence because they are relationships. They are not non-existent in principle because what knowledge establishes is called the "knower", and it is a state. The knower is an essence described by knowledge, but it is not the same as the essence nor is it the same as knowledge. There is only knowledge and the essence on which this knowledge is established. The being of the knower is a state of this essence when it is described by this meaning. The relationship of knowledge occurred to him, so he is called knowing. Mercy, properly speaking, is a relationship from the Mercy-giver, and it is necessarily part of the principle, so it is merciful. The One who brought it into existence in the one shown mercy did not bring it into existence in order to be shown mercy by it; He brought it into existence to show mercy to the one on whom it settled.

Allah is not in a place by events, so He is not in a place by bringing mercy into existence. He is the Mercy-Giver, and the Mercy-Giver is only Mercy-Giver by the establishment of mercy. He confirmed that He is the source of mercy. Whoever has not tasted this matter and has no part in it, does not dare to say that He is the source of mercy or the source of the attribute. Such a person says, "He is not the same as the attribute nor other than it." In his view, the attributes of Allah with Him are not Him, nor are they other-than-Him because he cannot deny them nor can he make them the same as Him. Thus he (3) moves to this interpretation, and it is a good interpretation. Yet there is another interpretation more appropriate to the matter than this one, and more likely to remove ambiguity. It is to deny the sources of the attributes any existence based on the essence of the one described. Rather, they are relationships and relative ascriptions between the one described by them and their intelligible sources. Although mercy is common to all of them, it is different in relationship to each Divine Name. (4)

For this reason, Allah is asked to show mercy by each Divine Name, so the mercy of Allah and its indirect reference, which is that which encompasses everything, has many branches according to the number of the Divine Names. It is not general in relation to that particular divine name in the statement of the one who asks, "O Lord, have mercy!" and other Divine Names, even the Avenger. So he says, "O Avenger, have

mercy on me!" That is because these Names indicate the designated Essence and, by their realities, indicate different meanings. They call on Him by these Names in mercy with respect to their indication of the Essence called by that Name and no other not by what is indicated by that Name, separating it from another and distinguishing it. The Name is not distinguished from another, and with him it is the indication of the Essence. It is distinguished in itself from other-than-it by its essence, as it is generally agreed that, by any expression, this Name is a reality distinct in its essence from other-than-it.

The whole is set forth to indicate one designated source. There is no disagreement that each name has an authority which another does not have. That also must be taken into account, as one takes into account their indications of the named essence.

For this reason, Abu'l-Qasim ibn Qasi said regarding the Divine Names that each Name is, in its isolation, designated by all of the Divine Names since they preceded in mentioning its description by all the Names, that is, by their indication of one source. Although the Names based on it are many and their realities differ, i.e. the realities of these Names, the mercy is obtained by two means. The first is the path of obligation, and it is His word, "I shall prescribe it for those who are godfearing and pay zakat," (7:156) and He binds them by it through the attributes of knowledge and action. The other path by which mercy is obtained is the path of divine graciousness which is not connected to action. It is His words, "My mercy embraces all things." Of this, it is said, "So that Allah may forgive you your earlier errors and any later ones." (48:2) And of this, there are His words, "Do what you want, I have already forgiven you." (5) So know that!

Notes to Chapter 21:

1. Al-Mâlikiyya. His state was dominated by the name al-Mâlik, the Sovereign, who prevails in His orders. This strength was shown in his himma whose fruit was Yahya.
2. Because they connect the imagination (wahm) to things and bring them into existence and thus have experiential knowledge of this. As for the one on whom illusion has no effect, he is far from this question.
3. The Imam of Ahlu-s-Sunnah wa-l-Jama'ah, Shaykh Abu-l-Hasan al-Ash'ari.
4. There is a specific mercy of Allah, of al-Rahman, of ar-Rahim, of al-Malik, etc.
5. This refers to an incident involving Hatib ibn Abi Balta'a. When the Muslim army prepared to set out to conquer Makka, Hatib sent a letter to warn the Quraysh which was intercepted. 'Umar wanted kill him for intelligence with the nemy in war, but the Prophet said, "O 'Umar, perhaps Allah has looked with favor on those who already fought at Badr and said, 'Do whatever you want. I have already forgiven you.'"

22: The Seal of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Word of Ilyas (Elijah)

Ilyas (Elijah) is none but Idris (Enoch), peace be upon him. He was a Prophet before Nuh, and Allah raised him to a high place. (1) He dwells in the heart of the spheres, the sphere of the sun. Then he was sent to the town of Baalbek (Ba'labakk). Baal is the name of an idol and "bakk" is the power of the village. The idol was called Baal and was singled out with domination. It was Ilyas who was Idris, who was given the example of the splitting of the mountain called "Lubnan (Lebanon)" which comes from lubana (desire, goal). What he needed was a horse of fire with all its trappings of fire. When he saw it, he rode it and appetite fell from him, and so there was intellect without appetite. There remained for him no connection with that which is connected to the desire of the self. For him, Allah was pure without connection. He had only half of gnosis of Allah. When the intellect is free of the self in respect to gathering knowledges by its discernment, its gnosis of Allah is based on disconnection (tanzih) not connection (tashbih).

When Allah gives gnosis by tajalli, then gnosis of Allah is perfected. Disconnection is used in one place and connection in another place.

The gnostic sees the diffusion of Allah by existence in natural and elemental forms. There is no form but that he sees the source of Allah in its source. This is the complete perfect gnosis which is brought the roads (shara'i) revealed from Allah. By this recognition, all illusions (awham) have authority. For this reason, illusion has a stronger power in this human organism than the intellect, because the man of intellect even if his intellect reaches maturity is not free of the power which illusion has over him and over the formation of what he reasons. Illusion is the greatest power in this perfect human organism. The revealed roads brought it, and so you use both connection and disconnection. You use connection in disconnection by illusion, and disconnection in connection by the intellect. So the whole is connected to the whole. It is not possible that disconnection be free of connection nor connection from disconnection. Allah said, "Nothing is like Him," so He used connection and disconnection. "He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (2) and He used connection, and yet it is the greatest of ayat revealed on disconnection. Even so, it is not free of connection because of the Kayf (like).

So He has the most knowledge of Himself of those who know. He only designated Himself by what we mentioned. Then He said, "Glory be to your Lord, the Lord of Might, beyond anything they describe," (37:180) and they only describe according to what these realities accord them. He exalted Himself above their disconnection since they limit Him by that disconnection. That is due to the inability of the intellect to perceive the like of this.

Then all the roads (Shara'i) brought what the illusions dominate. They do not free Allah of an attribute in which He is manifest as they said. They brought that, and so communities acted on it. Allah granted them the tajalli. The heirs followed the Messengers closely, and said what the Messengers of Allah said. Allah knows best where He puts His message, and so Allah knows best who turns his face to Him in a particular aspect by transmission to the Messenger of Allah. One aspect of His begins with "He knows best where to place His message." (6:124) There is a reality in each of the two aspects for that reason, we speak of connection and disconnection, and disconnection and connection. After this (3) is established, we will lower the screens and drop the veils on the eye of the critic (4) and the one who simply follows a creed. Both of them are among the forms in which Allah gives tajalli, but He has commanded the veil for us in order that different levels of excellence of the predisposition of forms might appear. One is given a tajalli in a form according to the predisposition of that form. What its reality and exigencies accord him is ascribed to him. That must be. The example of the one who sees Allah when he is asleep and does not deny it is this. Without a doubt, it is Allah Himself. He attaches to it the exigencies of that form and its realities in which He gives the tajalli in sleep. Then after that, he interprets, i.e. he transfers it to another matter which disconnection logically demands. If the one who interprets it has unveiling and belief (iman), then he does not transfer it to disconnection at all. Rather, he gives it the disconnection that is due it and what is due to that which is manifest in it, i.e. its connection/resemblance. Properly speaking, "Allah" is an expression for the one who understands the indication (ishara). (5)

The spirit of this wisdom and its seal is that the command is divided into the effector and the one effected. These are two expressions. The effector in every aspect and in every state and in every presence is Allah. The effected by every aspect and in every state and in every presence is the universe, even if it is Allah who comes. (6) Allah is everything at its foundation which corresponds. That which appears is forever and ever a branch from the root; divine love is a branch from the supererogatory acts of the slave. So this is an effect between the effector and the effected. Allah is the hearing of the slave and his sight and faculties from this love. (7) This is an established effect which, if you believe, you cannot deny because it is confirmed by the Shari'a.

As for the person of sound intellect, he is either in possession of a divine tajalli in a natural locus of tajalli, (8) so he recognizes what we have said, or else he is a believing Muslim who believes in what was reported in sound tradition. The power of illusion must govern the man of intellect investigating what has been brought to him in this form because he believes in that form. As for the one who is not a believer, he judges illusion by illusion; and so he imagines by his logical discernment that he assigns to Allah what the tajalli gives him in dream. Illusion in that does not depart from him inasmuch as he is not aware because of his disregard for himself. From that is what Allah says, "Call on Me and I will

answer You." (40:60) Allah also says, "If My slaves ask you concerning Me, I am near. I answer the call of the caller when he calls on Me," (2:186) since He only answers when there is someone who calls to Him. The source of the caller is the source of the answerer, but there is no disagreement about the difference of forms. They are two forms without a doubt.

All these forms are like Zayd's limbs. It is known that Zayd is one reality in personality, yet his hand is not the form of his foot nor his head nor his eye nor his eyebrow. He is one multiple - multiple by forms, one by source. That is like man who is one by source without a doubt. There is no doubt that 'Umar is not Zayd nor Khalid nor Ja'far, and that the individual persons of this one source are endless in existence. Even if man is one by source, he is many by forms and persons. If you are a believer, you know absolutely that Allah Himself will appear in a tajalli in a form on the Day of Rising. He will be recognized and then He will change form and be denied. (9) Then He will change from it again into another form and will not be recognized. He is the One giving tajalli and it is not other than Him in each form, even though it is known that this form is not that other form.

It is one source which has the same function as the mirror. When the viewer looks in it at the form of his belief in Allah, he recognizes Him, and so draws near Him. When it happens that he sees in it the belief of someone else, he denies Him since he sees his form and the form of someone else in the mirror. The mirror is but a single source while the forms are many in the eye of the viewer. There is no form in the mirror which comprises them all at once. Although the phenomenal being of the mirror has an effect on the forms from one aspect, it does not have an effect on the forms from another aspect. The effect which it has makes the form change shape in smallness, largeness, length, and width, so it has an effect in quantities. This is attributable to it, but this changing of it is by the difference of the size of the mirrors. In the example, look at one of these mirrors, and do not look at all of them. It is your perception in respect to His being essence, and so He is independent of the universe, and in respect to the divine names. In that moment He is like the mirrors. Whatever Divine Name in which you look at yourself or simply look at. He manifests the reality of that Name in whoever looks. The matter is thus. If you understand, do not be anxious, and do not fear. Allah loves bravery, even to the extent of killing a snake. The snake is not other than your self, and the snake is alive through its self in form and reality. The thing is not killed by itself, even if the form is destroyed in the senses, The definition determines it, and imagination does not make it depart.

Since the matter is based on this, this is the safeguard of the essences and might and invincibility. You cannot destroy the definition. What might is greater than this might? You imagine by illusion that you have killed. By intellect and illusion, the form does not vanish from existence

in the definition. The proof of that is, "You did not throw when you threw, but Allah threw." (8:17) The eye only perceived the form of Muhammad which had the throwing confirmed to it in the senses. It is what Allah denied the throwing to at first, and then confirmed in the middle, only to return to the perception that Allah was the One who threw in the form of Muhammad. One must believe this. So look at this effector when Allah descended into a Muhammadan form. Allah Himself informs His slaves of that, and none of us said that of Him, rather He said it of Himself. His report is true, and it is obligatory to believe it whether or not you perceive the knowledge of what He said, being a knower or believing Muslim.

Part of what shows you the weakness of the intellect's discernment in respect to its thought, since the intellect passes judgement on cause ('illa), is that cause is not an effect of the one who is the cause. This is the judgement of the intellect which is evident. There is only this in the knowledge of tajalli, and it is that the cause is an effect to whoever is the cause. That which the intellect governs is sound when discernment is clarified. Its goal in that is that, when it sees the matter differently than what logical proof would accord it, it says that the source after it is confirmed that it is one in this multiple, and inasmuch as it is cause in one of these forms belonging to any effect is not an effect of its effect, so that its effect would become a cause to it. This is his goal when he sees the matter for what it was, although he does not continue in his logical discernment.

Since the command in causality is of this sort, your opinion by the scope of logical discernment is not in other than this narrow limit. None are more reasonable than the Messengers, may the blessings of Allah be upon them, and they brought what they brought in transmission from the Divine Presence. They confirmed what the intellect confirmed. Then they gave more in what the intellect alone does not possess by its perception and what the intellect does not imagine directly, but one draws near to it in the divine tajalli. When he is alone with himself after the tajalli, he is confused about what he saw. If he is the slave of a Lord, his intellect returns to him, and if he is the slave of reasoning, Allah gives him back judgement. This is only as long as he is veiled in the dimension of this world from his dimension in the Next World.

The gnostics appear here as if they possessed the form of this world by virtue of the fact that its principles operate on them. However, Allah has transformed them inwardly to the dimension of the Next World. That must be the case. They are unknown by form except to whomever has had his inner eye unveiled by Allah so that he perceives. (10) There is no gnostic of Allah in respect of divine tajalli who is not based on the dimension of the Next World. He has been gathered in this lower world of his and has been called from his grave. He sees what they do not see, and he witnesses what they do not witness - as a mark of concern from Allah to some of His slaves in that respect.

Whoever wishes to find this wisdom of Ilyas-Idris to whom Allah gave two formations, so that he was a Prophet before Nuh, and then he raised him up and brought him down after that as a Messenger and so Allah joined for him the two degrees, let him descend from the authority of his intellect to his appetite and be an absolute animal so that he will be shown what every creature that crawls is shown except for the jinn and men. Then he will know that he has realized his animality, and it has two tokens. One is this unveiling so he sees who is punished in his grave and who has bliss. He sees the dead alive and the silent speaking and the sitting walking. The second token is muteness since, had he wanted to utter what he had seen, he would be unable to do so. Thus he has realized his animality. We had a pupil who acquired this unveiling although dumbness did not take hold of him, and so he did not fully realize his animality. When Allah established me in this station, I realized my animality with a complete realization. So I was seeing and wishing to utter what I was witnessing but I could not. So there was no difference between me and the mute who cannot speak.

When he realizes what we have mentioned, he will move to being pure intellect in natural matter. He will witness matters which are the roots of what is manifested in natural forms. He will know from where this principle is manifest in the natural form with the knowledge of tasting. Had it been unveiled that nature is the source of the breath of the All-Merciful, he would have been given much good. If he is restricted in what we have mentioned, this power from the gnosis which governs his intellect will be enough for him. He keeps company with gnostics, and by that he knows tasting. "You did not kill them, it was Allah who killed them," (8:17) yet only iron, the blow and that which is behind this form killed them. In the whole, killing and throwing took place. So he witnesses matters by their roots and by their forms, and he is complete. When he witnesses the breath, he is completely perfect. The breath of the All-Merciful is the source of the overflowing of existence and life on all, rather the source of Allah's descent to all forms.

Notes to Chapter 22:

1. A place from which, according to Sidi Muhiddin, Idris (Enoch) descended in order to become Ilyas (Elijah). See Qur'an 19:57, "Mention Idris in the Book. He was a true man and a Prophet. We raised him up to a high place."
2. Qur'an 42:11.
3. The rule of joining tanzih and tashbih.
4. The one who uses logical proof.
5. i.e. what he recognises from the word "Allah" extends only so far as his predisposition and understanding.
6. In the wârid.
7. "When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks".
8. i.e. the human form.

9. Hadith in Muslim: 1: 299, 302.

10. See Qur'an 50:22, "We have stripped you of your covering and today your sight is sharp."

23: The Seal of the Wisdom of Ihsan in the Word of Luqman

If Allah wishes, He wills provision for Him,
so all of phenomenal being is His food.
If Allah wishes, He wills provision for us,
so He is our food as He wishes.
His volition is His will, so say that He wished it.
So it is wished.
He wills increase and decrease.
So what He wishes is wished.
This is the distinction between them, (1)
so understand!
From a certain point of view,
their source is the same.

Allah says, "We gave Luqman wisdom," (31:12) and He says, "Whoever has been given wisdom has been given much good." (2:269) By the divine text, Luqman had much good as Allah has testified. The example of what Luqman said to his son is, "My son, even if something weighs as little as a mustard-seed, and it is inside a rock or anywhere else in the heavens or earth, Allah will bring it out." (31:16) This is a wisdom which is articulated, and that wisdom is his setting out that Allah is the One who brings forth. Allah confirmed that in His Book and did not refute what the speaker said.

As for the silent wisdom in it, and you know it by the circumstances, he is silent about the one to whom that grain is given. He did not mention him nor did he say to his son, "Allah will bring it to you or to other than you." He used bringing in general terms and denoted the thing brought in the heavens or in the earth as an instruction that the looker might regard His words, "He is Allah in the heavens and in the earth." (6:3) Luqman gave instruction by what he said and by what he remained silent on, so Allah is the source of every knowing thing because the known is more universal than the thing, so it denies unknown things.

Then he completed the wisdom and brought it to its full value in order that the structure might be complete in it. He said, "Allah is Latif (Subtle, Kind)." (31:16) Part of His subtleness (latâfa) and His kindness (lutf) is that He is in the thing named by such-and-such a definition in such-and-such a source of that thing, so it is only what its name indicates by convention and usage. It is said that these are names: heaven, earth, rock, tree, animal, angel, provision and food, and yet the source of everything is One. Thus the Ash'arites say about this that the entire universe is homogeneous in substance (jawhar), so it is one single substance.

It is the same as our statement that the source is One. They said that it

varies by non-essentials. Thus our statement that it varies and becomes many through forms and relationships so as to provide distinction. It is said, "This is not that in respect to its form or its non-essential or natural disposition (mizâj)." Say whatever you like, but this is the same as that in respect to its substance. For this reason, the source of the substance is put in the definition of every form and disposition. However, we say that it is not other-than-Allah. The mutakallim thinks that it is called substance. Even though it is true, it is not the source of Allah of which the people of unveiling and tajalli speak. This is the wisdom of the "Latîf".

Then He is described when He says "the All-Aware (Khabir)," the One who knows by experience. It is His words, "We will test you until We know." (47:31) This is the knowledge of tastes. Allah put Himself with His knowledge of what the matter is in (our) profitable knowledge. No one can deny what Allah has written about Himself. Allah differentiated the knowledge of tasting and absolute knowledge. The knowledge of tasting is limited by the faculties. He said of Himself that He is the source of the faculties of His slave when He said, "I am his hearing," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his sight," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his tongue," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his foot and his hand." He did not restrict Himself to specifying the faculties, but He mentioned the members. The slave is not other than his members and faculties. The source called the slave is the Real, but the source of the slave is not the Compassionate Master.

Relationships are distinct by their essence. The one brought into relationship is not distinct. (2) Then He equalized His source in all relationships, for it is but one source with various ascriptions, relationships and attributes. Part of the completeness of Luqman's wisdom in instructing his son is what has come in the ayat of these two Divine Names, Latif and Khabir - Allah is called by them. If He had put that in phenomenal being (kawn) which is existence, and said, "He was (kana)," it would have been more complete in wisdom and more eloquent in admonition. Allah related the words of Luqman in meaning as he said it and did not add anything to it. His statement that Allah is the Latif, the Aware, is from the statement of Allah. Then Allah knew of Luqman that, had he said it (kana), it would have been utterly perfected by this.

As for his words, "If it should be but the weight of one grain of mustard-seed," it is for the one who has it as food. It is only the atom mentioned in His words, "Whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it." (99:7-8) A mustard-seed is the smallest thing consumed. If there had been anything smaller, Allah would have used it as He said, "He is not ashamed to make an example of a gnat." (2:26) Then since He knew that there is anything smaller than the gnat, He said "or of an even smaller thing," i.e. in smallness. This is the word of Allah, and that which is in the Sura of the Earthquake (az-Zalzal, 99) is also the word of Allah. So know that! That which is smaller than the gnat is the atom, and then there is another

subtlety (latîfa). That is that the atom, in spite of its smallness, is also lighter in weight because it is alive, since the living is lighter than the dead. So the meaning is that when the deed is the weight of an atom in smallness and lightness, the recompense must be seen. We know that Allah did not restrict Himself to the weight of the atom, and there is nothing smaller than it. He used it by way of intensification, and Allah knows best.

When Luqman used the diminutive for his son, (3) it was the diminutive of mercy and thereby he gave him a legacy which contains his happiness if he acts according to it. The wisdom of Luqman's legacy lies in his prohibition to his son, "Do not associate anything with Allah. Associating others with Him is a terrible wrong." (31:13) The one wronged establishes apportioning in respect to His description even though it is the same source. So he is only associating His source with Him, and this is the very greatest ignorance.

The reason for this is that the person who has no recognition of the matter nor of the reality of the thing, does not know that diversity is actually contained in a single source although forms vary in that single source. So such a person puts the form shared by another in that station, and so he makes every form a part of that station. It is known of the associate that the matter which indicates him through what occurs in him of partnership is not the source of the other with whom he is associated, since it is the other. In reality, there is no associate. Everyone is based on his portion whenever it is said about him that there is a partnership between the two in it. The reason for that joint association, if it is joint, is that the action of one of them eliminates the collective aspect. "Say: Call on Allah or call on the All-Merciful." (17:110) This is the very heart of the question.

Notes to Chapter 23:

1. The difference between volition (mashi'a) and will (irada).
2. In respect of its reality, the Essence is not distinguishable.
3. Bunayya, "little son".

24: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Imam in the Word of Harun (Aaron)

Know that the existence of Harun, peace be upon him, was from the presence of mercy (rahamut) by His words, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet." (19:53) So his Prophethood was from the presence of the Rahamut. He was older than Musa, and Musa was greater than him in Prophethood. The Prophethood of Harun is from the presence of mercy (rahma) and, for that reason, he said to his brother Musa, peace be upon him, "O son of my mother!" (7:150) So he called to him by his mother, not by his father, since, in principle, mercy belongs in greater abundance to the mother than the father. Were it not for that mercy, the mother would not have the patience necessary for upbringing. Then he said, "do not seize me by the beard or by the hair," (20:94) and do not let my enemies gloat over me. All this is one of the breaths of mercy. The reason for that is the lack of ascertainment in looking at the tablets which had been given into his hands. If he had looked at them with ascertainment, he would have found guidance and mercy in them.

Musa would have found guidance, which is an elucidation of what happened in the matter which made him angry and of which Harun was innocent, and mercy towards his brother. He did not take him by the beard because of that state in which he saw his people because of his age, for Harun was older than him. That was compassion for Musa from Harun because the Prophethood of Harun is from the mercy of Allah. Only the like of that issued from him.

Then Harun said to Musa, "I was afraid that you would say: 'You have caused division in the Tribe of Israel'," (20:94) and you would make me the cause of their division since the worship of the Calf divided them. There were some of them who worshipped it following and imitating the Samiri, and there were some of them who refused to worship it until Musa returned to them so that they might question him regarding it. Harun was afraid that he would have that division between them attributed to him.

Musa knew the matter better than Harun because by his knowledge he knew the One the people of the Calf worshipped since Allah decreed that only He would be worshipped. When Allah decrees something, it must occur. Musa chided his brother Harun since the business consisted of disavowal and inadequacy. The gnostic is the one who sees Allah in everything, rather he sees Him as the source of everything. Musa was teaching Harun with the instruction of knowledge even though Musa was younger than him in age.

For that reason, when Harun said what he said, he turned to the Samiri and said to him, "What did you think you were doing, O Samiri," i.e. what were you doing in turning aside to the form of the Calf, and in your

making this shape from the jewelry of the people so that you captured their hearts for the sake of their wealth? 'Isa used to say to the Tribe of Israel, "O Tribe of Israel! Every man turns to where his wealth is, so put your wealth in heaven, and then your hearts will be in heaven." Wealth is only called that (mâl) because by essence it inclines (yumîl) the hearts to worship. It is the greatest and most exalted goal in the hearts since they need it. Forms have no going-on, so the form of the Calf must vanish. If Musa had not hastened to burn it, jealousy would have overcome him. So he burned it and then scattered the ashes of that form in the sea. He told the Samiri, "Behold your god." He called it a god to alert him in order to teach him that he did know some of the places of divine tajalli, "I will surely burn it!"

The animality (hawayâniyya) of man has freedom of action over the animality of animals since Allah has subjected animals to man, especially in view of the fact that man's origin is not animal. Man has greater subjugation because that which is not-animal does not possess will. In fact, the non-animal is under the jurisdiction of whoever administers it without any recalcitrance whatsoever. The animal, on the other hand, has both will and instinct. Recalcitrance appears in some of its actions. If it has the power to manifest that, reluctance and resistance to what man wants appears from it. If it does not have that power or if what the man wants agrees with what the animal itself wants, then the animal obediently follows what is wanted of it.

Even so, man's "like" follows a command in whatever Allah has called him to in respect of the wealth which he hopes for from Him, which is designated in some states by "the other World" as when Allah says, "We have raised some of them above others in rank so that some of them are subservient to others." (43:32) His like is only subjugated to him by his animality, not by his humanness. The two likes are two opposites. The higher is degree subjugates the lower in degree by wealth or by rank with his humanness, and that other was subjected to him either by fear or greed from his animality, not from his humanness, so his like is not subjected to him.

Do you not see that what is among the beasts in the way of jostling against one another is because they are likes? Two likes are two opposites. That is why He said, "and He raised some of them above others in rank," so he is not with him in rank, and so subjugation occurs in respect of rank. Subjection is of two kinds. First, there is subjection intended by the subjector like the active conqueror when he subjects this subjected person - like the subjugation by the master of his slave although he is his like in humanness, and like the subjugation of the Sultan of his subjects who are his like in humanness, He subjugated them by rank.

The second sort is subjugation by the subjects of the king establishing their command that he drive harm away from them, protect them, do

battle against those who attack them, and preserve their property and lives. All this is subjection through state by the subjects who subjugate their king in this act. In reality, it is called the subjection of rank. Rank has jurisdiction over him by this act. There are kings who work just for themselves, and there are those who recognize the matter and know that their subjects¹ subjugation of them is by rank. He knows their power and rights. Allah rewards him for that with the reward of those who know. The reward of the like of this is up to Allah, in Allah¹'s being involved in the affairs of His slaves, for all the universe is subjected by state. Who is there who cannot be referred to as being "subjected"? Allah said, "Every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29)

Lack of power was in fact the armour of Harun which saved him from the people of the Calf by mastery over the Calf as Musa had mastery over it. This is a wisdom from Allah which is manifest in existence that He should be worshipped in every form. When the form departed after that, it only departed after it had been clad with divinity by its worshipper. For this reason, there is no species but that it is worshipped, either by the worship of making divine or by the worship of subjugation. That must be so for the one who has intellect.

Nothing is worshipped in the universe except after it is clad in elevation for the worshipper and its rank is manifest in his heart. For that reason, Allah called Himself for us, "the Exalter of ranks," and He did not say the "Exalter of rank," for ranks are many in the same source. He decreed that we worship only Him in many ranks. Each rank accords a divine locus of tajalli which is worshipped in it, and the greatest locus of tajalli in which He is worshipped and the highest, is passion (hawa). As He said, "Have you seen him who takes his passion to be his god?" (45:23) It is the greatest idol. Nothing is worshipped except by it, and it is only worshipped by itself. Of it I say:

The truth of passion is
that passion is the cause of passion.
If there had not been passion in the heart,
passion would not have been worshipped.

Do you not see how perfect Allah's knowledge of things is? How it is completed it in respect of the one who worships his passion and takes it as a god? He said, "he who Allah has misguided knowingly." (45:23) Being astray is bewilderment (hayra). That is when this worshipper sees that what he worships is only his passion, by following it in obedience to Him in what He commanded him of worship of whichever person worships Him, until his worship is for Allah the Great. That too is from passion because if passion had not occurred in him in that pure presence and it is the will to love he would neither have worshipped Allah nor preferred Him to others. In the same way, everyone worships a certain form among the forms of the universe, and takes it as a god, and he only takes it by passion. The worshipper is under the power of his passion.

Then he sees that idols take on various forms among the worshippers. Each worshipper, for some reason, denies the one who worships another. What he has is a nearer perception which is confused by the unity (ittihâd) of passion, rather by the oneness (ahadiyya) of passion as He mentioned. It is the same source in every worshipper. Allah led him astray, i.e. confused him in respect to a knowledge that every worshipper only worships his own passion, and only seeks to worship his passion whether or not it agrees with the command of the Shari'a.

The complete gnostic is the one who sees that every idol is a locus of Allah's tajalli in which He is worshipped. For that reason, they are all called "god" in spite of having a particular name of a stone, tree, animal, man, star, or angel. This is the nature of the personality in it. Divinity is a rank which the worshipper imagines it to have, and it is the rank of his idol. In reality, it is a locus for the tajalli of Allah belonging to the sight of this particular worshipper devoted to this idol in this particular locus of tajalli.

This is why some of those who did not recognize an ignorant statement said, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" (39:3) although they called them "god", as they said, "Has he turned all the gods into One God? That is truly astonishing." (38:5) They do not deny Him, rather they are amazed. They stop at the multiplicity of possible forms and the ascription of divinity to them. That is why the Messenger came and called them to one God who is recognized and not witnessed by their witnessing. They confuse Him with them and believe in Him when they say, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" by their knowledge of those forms in stones. This is why the proof went against them when He said, "Say: Name them!" and they only named them by what they know those names to have in reality.

As for those who recognize the matter for what it is, they manifest the form of denying what is worshipped in the way of forms because their rank is in knowledge, and their rank is in accord with their being based on the principle of the moment, since they know that the moment is one of the mighty places of the tajalli of Allah in which He gives tajalli at each moment by some of His attributes. This is why time (ad-Dahr) is one of Allah's Names. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Do not curse time, for time is Allah!" At every moment, people are overcome by the principle of the quality in which He gives tajalli at that particular moment. The Messenger who is sent in that moment is the greatest manifestation of the perfection of that quality. He calls creation to Allah, manifested by tajalli in him, by obedience to him, which is obedience to Allah, as Allah says, "Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah." (4:80) This is why is obligatory to trust in him and obey him.

However, the gnostics know that they do not worship the forms themselves. Rather, they worship Allah in them according to the power of the tajalli which they know of these forms. The one who denies and has

no knowledge of what Allah has manifested in tajalli is ignorant of this. The complete gnostic veils himself from the Prophet and Messenger and their heirs. He commands himself to leave that form which the Messenger of the moment left in order to follow the Messenger desiring Allah's love for them by His words, "Say: if you love Allah, then follow me and Allah will love you." (3:31) He called on a God to whom one has recourse and Who is known in respect to the whole and is not witnessed, "nor do the eyes perceive Him, but He perceives the eyes" (6:103) by His lutf and His diffusion in the source of things. The eyes do not perceive Him as they do not perceive their spirits which govern their shapes and outward forms. "...He is the Latif, the All- Aware."

Experience is tasting, and tasting is tajalli. Tajalli occurs in forms. They must be and it must be, and the one who sees Him by his passion must worship Him, if you only knew! Allah possesses the goal of the path.

25: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sublimity in the Word of Musa (Moses)

The wisdom of the killing of the male children in respect to Musa was in order to give him the support of the life of each of those killed for his sake because each of them was killed for being Musa. There is no ignorance, so the life of the one killed for his sake had to return to Musa. It is pure life in the natural state (fitra). The desires of the self have not soiled it; rather, it is in its natural state of "Yes (bala)." (1) Musa was the sum of the lives of those killed for being him. All that was prepared for the murdered ones in the way of the predisposition of their spirits was in Musa, peace be upon him. This is a divine favour to Musa which no one before him had.

The wisdoms of Musa are numerous. If Allah wills, I will enumerate them in this chapter according to what the divine command puts into my mind. This is the first about which I shall speak in this chapter.

Musa was only born being a synthesis of many spirits. He was a concentration of effective forces since the young have an effect on the old. Do you not see how the child has an effect on the older person by the special quality the child has? The older person descends from his leading position to play with the child and rock him in his arms and to show himself at the child's level of intellect he descends to the level of the child's intellect. He is under subjugation even though he is not aware of it. He occupies himself with instructing and protecting the child, seeing to his needs and consoling him so that the child is not distressed.

All this is part of the effect of the young on the old. That is due to the strength of his station. The young has a new covenant with his Lord because he has newly come into being. The old person is further from Him. Whoever is nearer to Allah subjects whoever is further away from Him, just as the elite of the near angels subject the further ones. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to expose himself to the rain when it came down and to uncover his head so that it would fall on him. He said that it has a new covenant with Allah. Look at this recognition of Allah on the part of this Prophet! What is more glorious, more sublime and clearer than this? The rain subjected the best of men due to its proximity to its Lord. That is a likeness of the Messenger on whom the revelation descends. The rain called him by its own state, (2) and so he exposed himself to the rain in order to receive from it what it brought from his Lord. If he had not received this divine benefit from it by the rain, he would not have exposed himself to it. This is the message of water from which Allah has fashioned every living thing (3) - so understand! As for the wisdom of Musa being put into the ark and then cast into the river, the ark (tâbût) is his human nature (nâsût). The river is what he received of knowledge through his body by what the power of discernment and the sensory imaginative faculties accorded him. Only by the existence of this elemental body does the human self

have these faculties or their like. When the self comes to this body and is commanded to freely dispose of it and manage it, Allah gives it these faculties as instruments by which it obtains what Allah wills that it obtain in the management of this ark which contains the sakina (4) of the Lord. Musa was cast into the river in order to receive various knowledges by these faculties. Thus Allah taught him that the spirit which manages him is the ruler. He is only managed by it. It gives him the command of these faculties of phenomenal being which are in this nâsût that is designated by the ark in the field of indications and wisdoms.

Allah manages the universe in the same way, and it is only managed by it or by its form. It is only managed by Him inasmuch as the arrival of the one begotten depends upon its being brought into existence by the begetter. Caused things depend on their causes, proven things depend on their proofs, and true things depend on their realities. All of this is part of the universe, and it is Allah's management of it, and he only manages by it.

As for our statement, "or by its form," I mean the form of the universe, and by it I mean the Most Beautiful Names and sublime attributes by which Allah is named and described. Nothing of a name by which He is called has reached us but that we found the meaning and spirit of that name in the universe. The universe is also only managed by the form of the universe.

For that reason, the Prophet said in respect of the creation of Adam who is the blueprint which gathers all the attributes of the Divine Presence which is the essence, the attributes and the actions: "Allah created Adam in His form." His form is only the Divine Presence. In this noble epitome, which is the Perfect Man, He brought into existence all the Divine Names and the realities of that which is outside of him in the Macrocosm separate from him. He made Adam a spirit (rûh) for the universe, and so He subjected to him the high and the low through the perfection of his form. As there is nothing in the universe that "does not glorify Allah's praise," (5) in the same way, there is nothing in the world which is not subject to this man according to what the reality of his form accords him. Allah says, "He has made everything that is in the heavens and the earth subservient to you. It is all from Him." (22:65) All that is in the universe is subject to man. He who knows that from his knowledge is the Perfect Man. He who is ignorant of that is the Animal Man.

The form of casting Musa into the ark and then casting the ark into the river is outwardly a form of destruction. Inwardly, it was his rescue from being killed. He was brought to life as the self is brought to life by knowledge from the death of ignorance as Allah says, "Is someone who was dead (i.e. by ignorance) and whom We brought to life (with knowledge) and supplied with a light by which to walk among the people (which is guidance) the same as someone who is in utter darkness (in being astray) unable to emerge from it (i.e. will never be guided)?" (6) In

itself the matter has no end at which it stops.

Guidance is that man is guided to bewilderment (hayra). He knows that the business is bewilderment. Bewilderment is being unsettled and movement. Movement is life. There is no non-movement nor death. There is existence and not non-existence. It is the same with the water which gives life to the earth. Its movement is His word, "so it quivers" and conceives, "and swells" with pregnancy, "and sprouts plants in beautiful pairs." (7) It only gives birth to what resembles it, i.e. has a nature like it. It has being linked in pairs (zawjiya) which is the state of being doubled by what is born from it and what appears from it.

Similarly, the existence of Allah has multiplicity and the many Names. It is this or that according to what appears from it of the universe which demands the realities of the Divine Names by its development. They are doubled by it and stand in opposition to the unity of multiplicity. It is one by source in respect to its essence, as the primal substance (hayûla) is a single source in respect to its essence, while it has many forms which it supports by its essence. It is the same with Allah through the forms of tajalli which are manifested from Him. So the locii of the tajalli are the forms of the universe, in spite of the intelligible unity (ahadiyya). Look at the excellence of this divine instruction which Allah gives by granting its recognition to whoever He wishes among His slaves.

When the family of Pharaoh found him in the river by the tree, Pharaoh called him Musa. Mu is water in Coptic and sha is tree. He named him by where he found him, for the ark stopped by the tree in the river. Pharaoh wanted to kill him. His wife, speaking by divine articulation in what she said to Pharaoh about Musa since Allah had created her for perfection as Allah said about her when He testified that she and Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, have the perfection which men have (8) - said, "he may be a source of delight for me and for you." (28:9) She would be consoled by him with the perfection which she received as we have said.

The consolation of Pharaoh was with the belief Allah gave him when he was drowning. So Allah took him pure and purified. There was no impurity in him since He took him in his belief before he had acquired any wrong actions. Islam effaces what was before it. He made him a sign of His concern so that none might despair of the mercy of Allah, for "no one despairs of solace from Allah except for the unbelievers." (12:87) If Pharaoh been of those who despair, he would not have embarked on belief. Musa, peace be upon him, was, as the wife of Pharaoh said, "a source of delight for me and for you. Do not kill him. It may well be that he will be of use to us." That is what happened. Allah gave them use of Musa, although they were not aware that he was a prophet who would destroy the kingdom of Pharaoh and his family.

When Allah protected him from Pharaoh, his mother's heart was freed of the anxiety which had befallen her. Then Allah forbade him to be suckled

until he had received his mother's breast, so she suckled him that Allah might complete her joy. The knowledge of the roads (sharâ'i) is like that. It is as Allah said, "to each We have made a road," (5:48) i.e. a path (tariq), "and a direction (minhaj)" from that path. This statement is an indication of the root from which he came (minhuja). It is his food as the tree has branches and yet is only nourished by its root. What is haram in one Shari'a can be halal in another Shari'a - I mean in a certain form it can be halal, while in the heart of the matter it is not really the same as what passed because the matter is new creation, not repetition. This is what we instruct you! It is referred to in connection with Musa when the wet-nurses were made haram.

In reality, the one who suckled him, not the one who bore him, is his mother. The mother of birth carried him in regard to the trust. He is formed within her and fed by her menstrual blood without any volition on her part in that, so that does not come from her benevolence towards him. He is only fed by what would destroy her or make her ill had he not been nourished on it, or had that blood not gone out of her. The embryo is a gift to its mother since it feeds on what would cause her harm had that blood remained with her and not gone out of her, or had not the embryo been nourished on it.

Suckling is not the same. By her suckling, she intends to give him life and to sustain him. Allah gave that to Musa in the mother who bore him. No woman outside of his mother by birth had any right over him that she also might find consolation in bringing him up and watching him grow in her room, and so she was not sad.

Allah saved him from the grief of the ark, so he pierced natural darkness by what Allah gave him of divine knowledge, while he did not depart from nature. He tested him with many trials (9) and gave him experience in many places so that he might realize patience in himself in the trials Allah gave him.

The first of Allah's trials was the killing of the Copt which Allah inspired him to do and gave him success in his secret yet he did not know this. However, Musa did not feel any anxiety over killing him, although he was unsure until the command of his Lord told him, since the Prophet is inwardly protected without being aware of it until he is informed, until transmission comes to him. For this reason, al-Khidr showed him the killing of the boy, (10) so Musa criticized the killing but did not remember how he had killed the Copt. Al-Khidr told him, "I did not do it of my own volition," (18:82) and he informed him of his rank before he told him that his movement was protected in reality, but he was not aware of it.

Al-Khidr also showed him the piercing of the ship. Outwardly it was destruction, but inwardly it was rescue from the hand of the tyrant. He made that an analogy of the ark which was in the river its outward aspect

was destruction, while inwardly it was rescue, for his mother did it fearing the hand of the tyrant, who was Pharaoh, that he might not kill Musa in captivity. She looked at him with the revelation Allah had inspired in her while she was not aware of it. She felt in herself that she would suckle him. When she feared for him, she cast him into the river because, as the proverb says, "What the eye does not see does not afflict the heart." She did not fear for him with the fear of the witnessing of the eye, and she was not sad with the sorrow of seeing him. It came over her thoughts that perhaps Allah would return him to her, for she had a good opinion of Him. She lived by this thought in herself and by the hope which was opposite fear and despair. When she was inspired to do this, she said, "Perhaps he is the Messenger who will destroy Pharaoh and the Copts." She lived and took joy in this, which was illusion and thought in respect of herself, but, in the heart of the matter, it is knowledge.

When they searched for Musa (after he had killed the Copt), he left in flight, fearful outwardly and in the meaning, it was love of deliverance for movement is always by love, but the onlooker is veiled from it by other causes, which are not the movement. This is because the root is the movement of the universe from non-existence which was immobile in existence. That is why it is said that the matter is movement from immobility. The movement which is the existence of the universe is the movement of love. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, quoting Allah, "I was a hidden treasure, therefore I wanted (lit. loved) to be known." (11)

If it had not been for this love, the universe would not have appeared in its source. Its movement from non-existence to existence is the movement of the love of the One who brings into existence for this purpose. The universe also loves to witness itself in existence as it was witnessed in immutability. Thus by every aspect, the movement from immutable non-existence to the existence of the sources is a movement of love, both in respect of Allah and in respect to itself.

Perfection is loved for itself. Allah's knowledge of Himself is His, since He is independent of the worlds. It belongs only to Him. The perfection of the rank of knowledge only remains by the in-time knowledge which comes from these sources. When the sources of the universe exist, then the forms of perfection appear with timeless and in-time knowledge. Thus the rank of knowledge is perfected by two aspects.

In the same way, the ranks of existence are perfected. Existence from it is before-time and not before-time, which is in-time. Pre-temporal (azali) time is the existence of Allah by Himself, and non-pre-temporal-time is the existence of Allah by the forms of the immutable universe. It is called in-time because it manifests some parts to others. He is manifest to Himself by the forms of the universe, and so existence is perfected.

The movement of the universe is by love of perfection, so understand! Do

you not see how what the Divine Names bring into existence is breathed from the absence of the manifestation of their effects in a entity called the universe? It loves rest (12) which is only reached by the existence of form, high and low. Thus it is confirmed that movement occurs by love. The only movement in the entire cosmos is by love.

Among the 'ulama' are those who know that and those who are veiled by the nearer cause because it rules their state (hâl) and overpowers them. Musa was aware of his fear by what occurred through his killing the Copt. That fear implied love of deliverance from killing. So he fled by fear. In the meaning, he fled when he loved deliverance from Pharaoh and his deeds. He mentioned the nearest cause which he was aware of at that moment, which is like the form of the body of man, and love of deliverance is contained in it as the body contains the spirit which manages it.

The Prophets had the language of the outward with which they addressed people in general and on which they relied to make the one who listened understand what was said. The Messengers make allowances for people in general by their knowledge of the rank of the people of understanding. It is as the Prophet, peace be upon him, said about gifts, "I give to this man, while another man is more beloved to me than him for I fear that Allah might throw him down into the Fire." He made allowances for those whose intellect and discernment are weak and who are overcome by greed and nature.

Similarly, what they brought of knowledges, they brought wearing a robe (13) which nearer to the understanding, so that the one who has no "diving" might stop at the robe and say, "How excellent this robe is!" and he will see it as the limit of rank. Because of what this robe from the king demands, the one with subtle understanding, the one who dives for the pearls of wisdom, looks at the quality of the robe and its type of material. By it, he knows the degree of the one it covers, and so he stumbles onto a knowledge which no one else has obtained from those without knowledge of such matters.

Then the Prophets and Messengers and heirs knew that in this world and in their communities, there are those who, in this manner, express themselves in the outward language which the elite and common share. The one who is elite understands of it what the common understand, and more, inasmuch as it is valid that he be called elite. He is distinguished from the blind. Those who have obtained knowledges are content with this. This is the wisdom of his words, "I fled from you when I was in fear of you," (14) but he did not say, "I fled from you by love of safety and well-being."

Musa came to Madyan and found two women and got water for them without being paid for it. Then he turned away to the divine shade and said, "O my Lord, I am truly in need of any good You have in store for

me." (28:24) He made the source of his getting water the same as the good which Allah sent down to him, and he described himself as being in need of Allah in the good which he had. Al-Khidr showed him the setting-up of the wall without wage, but Musa chided him for it. So al-Khidr reminded him of his drawing water without wage, and other things which were not mentioned. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, wished that Musa had remained silent and had not left him so that Allah would have related more about them.

Al-Khidr alerted Musa to the fact that what had come to him and would come to him was by the command of Allah and His will which it is impossible to contradict. Knowledge of that is one of the prerogatives of wilaya. As for the Messenger, He might not acquaint him with it, for it is the secret of the decree.(15) If He had acquainted him with that, it might have been a reason for his lassitude in conveying what he was commanded to convey. Allah withholds the knowledge of this from some of the Messengers as a mercy to them from Him. He did not withhold it from our Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, because of the strength of his state. This is why our Prophet said, "I call on Allah by inner sight." (75:14)

By this he knew what Musa had succeeded in had been without knowledge on his part. If it had been from knowledge, Musa would not have criticized what al-Khidr did, since Allah had testified before Musa as to al-Khidr's purity and justice. In spite of this, Musa was heedless of the fact that Allah had made him pure, and of the conditions set down for following him. This was a mercy for us if we forget the command of Allah. If Musa had known that, al-Khidr would not have said to him, "What you have never encompassed in your knowledge," meaning I have a knowledge which you have not received by tasting as you have a knowledge which I do not know. He was just.

As for the wisdom of his parting from him, it is because Allah said of the Messenger, "Take what the Messenger brings you, and avoid what he prohibits you." (59:7) The 'ulama' of Allah who recognize this quality of the Message and the Messenger stop at this statement. Al-Khidr knew that Musa was the Messenger of Allah. He regarded what came from him to preserve the adab which is due to the Messengers. Musa said to him, "If I ask you about anything after this, then you should no longer keep me company." So he forbade al-Khidr to keep his company. When that occurred for the third time, al-Khidr therefore said, "This is where you and I part company," Musa did not tell him, "Do not do it," nor did he seek to keep him company for he knew the level of the rank he was in when he spoke of the prohibition against keeping him company. Musa was silent, and the parting took place.

Look at the perfection of these two men in knowledge and the completion of divine adab as right, and the justice of al-Khidr, peace be upon him, in what he acknowledged to Musa when he said, "I have a knowledge which

Allah has taught me which you do not know, and you have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know." This information which al-Khidr imparted to Musa was a remedy for the wound inflicted on him in his words, "How indeed could you bear with patience something you have not encompassed in your knowledge?" (18:68) although he knew the sublimity of his rank with the message, and al-Khidr did not have this rank.

This appeared in the community of Muhammad in the hadith regarding the fertilization of the date tree. The Prophet, peace be upon him, told his Companions, "You know more about the matters of your daily life."¹⁶ There is no doubt that the knowledge of the thing is better than ignorance of it. Allah praises Himself, saying, "He has knowledge of all things." The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, acknowledged to his Companions that they knew more about the exigencies of this world than him because he had no experience of them. It is knowledge of tasting (dhawq) and experience, and the Prophet, peace be upon him, had not occupied himself with this sort of knowledge. Rather, he was occupied with what was more important. I have informed you about a great adab by which will benefit you if you occupy yourself with it.

Musa's statement, "My Lord gave me right judgement," (26:21) means the khilafah, "and made me one of the Messengers," means the message. Not every Messenger is a Khalif. The Khalif has a sword, duties and governance. The Messenger is not the same rather, he transmits what he has been sent to transmit. If he does battle and defends with the sword, then he is both Khalif and Messenger.

As for the wisdom of Pharaoh's question regarding divine whatness (mâhiya) when he said, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" (26:23) that question did not arise from ignorance, but it was posed in order to test Musa and to see what answer he would give when he claimed that he had a message from his Lord. Pharaoh knew the rank of the Messengers in knowledge of Allah and he wanted to test Musa's answer to ascertain the validity of his claim. In order to inform those present, he invited an answer which would have been misleading as far as they were concerned since they did not know what Pharaoh himself knew about the question. Musa answered him with the answer of those who have knowledge of the matter. Then Pharaoh, in order to preserve his position, asserted that Musa had not answered his question. So because of the inadequacy of their understanding, it seemed clear to those who were present that Pharaoh knew more than Musa. For this reason, when Musa answered him with what was not appropriate and outwardly it is not an answer to what he was asked about and Pharaoh knew that he would only give that answer, Pharaoh then said to his companions, "Your Messenger" who was sent to you "is mad" since the knowledge of what I question him about is veiled from him (17) since it is inconceivable that it be known at all.

The question is valid. The question of the what-ness is a question about the reality of what is asked about - it must be real in itself. As for those who make definitions which consist of category and genus, these are matters shared by various things. Whoever has no category must have a reality in Himself which belongs to no other. The question is invalid in the school of the People of Allah, sound knowledge and sound intellect. The only answer to it is the answer Musa gave.

Here is a great secret! He mentioned the "act" in giving the answer to the one who asked for a definition of essence. He made the essential definition the source of the attribution to what appeared of Him in the forms of the universe, or what appeared in Him of the forms of the universe. In answer to, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" he said that He is the One in whom the forms of the universe are manifest on high which is the heaven - and below - which is the earth, "if you but have certainty," (18) or He who is manifest by them.

When Pharaoh told his companions that Musa was mad, (majnûn) in the sense that he was possessed, Musa added to the elucidation in order to inform Pharaoh of his rank in divine knowledge because he knew that Pharaoh already knew that. Musa said, "The Lord of the East and the West," bringing what was manifest and what was hidden, in the outward and the inward, "and what between them is" which is Allah's words, "He has knowledge of everything," "if you have intellect," (19) i.e. if you possess qualification since this comes from intellect.

The first answer is for those who are certain, and they are the people of unveiling and existence. Musa said, "If you have certainty," i.e. if you are the people of unveiling and existence. I have given you knowledge of what you are already certain about in your witnessing and existence. If you are not of this category, I have answered you in the second answer: if you are among the people of intellect and qualification, and you limit Allah according to what the proofs of your intellects accord.

Thus Musa manifested both aspects in order to inform Pharaoh about his question and his veracity. Musa knew that Pharaoh knew that because he asked about the what-ness of Allah. He knew that his question was not couched in the language the ancients used in their questioning by means of what. That is why he answered him. If he had known anything else from him, he would have been mistaken in the question. Musa treated that about which he was asked as the source of the universe, and Pharaoh addressed him by this language (20) although the people present were not aware of that.

Pharaoh said to him, "If you take any god other than me, I will certainly make you one of the imprisoned." (26:29) The letter sin in prison (sijn) is one of the letters of increase, (21) meaning I will veil you, for you answered by what supported me so that I might say the same to you. If you say to me, "O Pharaoh! I do not I do not recognize your threat to me

while the source is but one, so how can you separate?" Then Pharaoh replied, "The ranks are separate, but the source is not separate and it is not divided in its existence. My rank right now is power over you by actual fact, O Musa! I am you by the source and other than you by rank!"

When Musa understood that from him, he gave him his due in respect to himself and told him, "You will not be able to do that." Pharaoh's rank gave him power and influence over Musa because Allah is in the rank of Pharaoh in respect of the outward form which has authority over the rank in which Musa appeared in that assembly.

Therefore Musa told him that Allah had manifested a barrier to his hostility against Musa. He said, "Even if I were to bring you something undeniable?" Pharaoh could only reply, "Produce it then, if you are someone telling the truth" so that Pharaoh would not appear to be unjust among those of his nation who were weak-minded. They had doubts about him, and they were the group Pharaoh made unsteady. However, they obeyed Pharaoh because they were a corrupt people; (22) that is, lacking sound intellects' rejection of taking Pharaoh's claims literally. The intellect stops at a certain limit, and only those of unveiling and certainty can cross that limit. This is why in his answer, Musa first addressed those of certainty and then address those of the intellect.

"So he drew down his staff ('asa)" (26:32) which is the form with which Pharaoh defied (23) ('asa) Musa when he refused to answer his call. "And there it was, unmistakably a snake," i.e. an evident snake. Thus rebellion, which is evil, changed into obedience, which is good, as Allah says, "Allah will transform their evil deeds into good deeds," (25:70) meaning in judgement. Here the judgement manifested a differentiated source in a single substance (jawhar) so it is a staff, a snake, and a manifest serpent. It devoured its likes among the snakes in the form of a snake, and the staffs in the form of a staff. The proof of Musa overcame the proofs of Pharaoh in the form of staffs, snakes and ropes. The sorcerers had ropes, but Musa did not have a rope. The "rope" is the small hill; (24) that is, their powers in relation to the power of Musa is as the hills are to the lofty mountains.

When the sorcerers saw that, they recognized Musa's rank in knowledge and they saw that he possessed a power which was not mortal. If it had been within the power of a mortal, it would only belong to someone who could distinguish sure knowledge from imagination and illusion. So they believed in "the Lord of the Worlds, the Lord of Musa and Harun" - that is, the Lord to whom Musa and Harun summoned them because they knew that the people understood that they were not being called to Pharaoh. Pharaoh was in the position of authority, and he was the master of the moment since he was the Khalif with the sword, even though he broke the customary divine laws when he said, "I am your Lord most high" - i.e. since all are lords, (25) I am the highest of them through the power which you have outwardly given me over you. The sorcerers knew

that he spoke the truth in what he said, and they did not deny it. They affirmed that to Pharaoh, and said, "You only judge in this passing life, so judge as you like, for the kingdom is yours." So the statement of Pharaoh, "I am your Lord most high," was valid. Although the source is from Allah, the form is Pharaoh's. He cut off the hands and feet, and crucified through a real source in false form in order to attain the ranks which are only attained by that act.

There is no way to neutralize causes because the source-forms necessitate them. They only appear in existence by the form on which they are based at the source since "there is no changing the words of Allah." (10:64) The words of Allah are not other than the sources of existent things. Timelessness is ascribed to Him in respect to their permanence, and in-time ness is ascribed to them in respect of their existence and appearance. Thus we say, a certain man or guest happened (26) to be with us today." That does not mean that he did not have any existence before this event. For that reason, Allah says about His Mighty Word which is timeless, "No reminder (dhikr) from their Lord comes to them lately renewed (27) without their listening to it as if it were a game," (21:2) and "but no fresh (28) reminder reaches them from the All-Merciful, without their turning away from it." (26:5) The Merciful only brings mercy, and whoever turns away from mercy advances the punishment which is the absence of mercy.

As for the words of Allah, "but their belief when they saw Our violent force was of no use to them. That is the pattern Allah has always followed with His slaves," (29) (40:85) that did not mean that it did not profit them in the Next World through His exception, "except for the people of Yunus." He meant that that did not prevent them being punished in this world. For that reason, Pharaoh was seized in spite of the existence of his belief even though his affair was that of someone who is certain that his death is approaching. The circumstances accord that he was not certain that he was going to die because he saw the believers walking on the dry path which had appeared when Musa struck the sea with his staff. Pharaoh was not certain that he would perish since he believed that he would not die until the moment actually reached him. He believed in the One in whom the Tribe of Israel believed, in certainty of his deliverance.

It was indeed certain, but it was in a form other than the one he wanted. He was saved from the punishment of the Next World in himself and his body was saved as Allah says, "Today We will save your body that you might be a sign for those after you," (10:92) because, if his form had vanished, his people might have said that he had gone into occultation. His known form appeared as a corpse that it might be known that it was really him. Deliverance was encompassed both in the senses and in the meaning.

The one who has the word of the punishment in the Other World realized for him (30) will not believe, even if every ayat had been brought to him,

"so that they might see the painful punishment," that is, taste the punishment of the Next World. Pharaoh left this class of people. This is the literal meaning of what the text of the Qur'an brought us. We say, and the matter belongs to Allah, that the fixed idea which the common people have regarding the wretchedness of Pharaoh is not based on anything in the divine text. As for his family, that is another judgement. This is not the place to mention it.

Know that Allah only takes someone while he believes that is, affirms what divine transmissions bring, and I mean those who are consciousness at death. This is why dislikes sudden death and being killed while unaware is disliked. The definition of sudden death is that the incoming breath goes out and the outgoing breath does not come in. This is sudden death and when that happens, one is not conscious of death.

It is the same if a man is killed unawares by a blow from behind on the back of the neck. He is then taken with whatever belief or disbelief he possesses at that moment. For that reason, the Prophet said, "One will be gathered in the state in which one dies," as one is taken in whatever one is doing at the time. The one who is conscious of death is only the one who sees it coming. He believes what he sees. He is only taken in what he is doing because that is an existent expression connected to time by the circumstances. We distinguish between the unbeliever who is conscious at death and the unbeliever either killed while unaware or who dies suddenly as we have said in the definition of sudden death.

As for the wisdom of tajalli and the discourse on the form of the fire, this was because it was the object of Musa's desire. Allah gave him a tajalli in what he was searching for so that Musa would turn to Him and not turn away. If Allah had given the tajalli in other than the form which he was seeking, Musa would have turned away because his interest was concentrated on a particular goal. If he had turned away, his action would have rebounded on him, and Allah would have turned away from him. Musa was the chosen one and the one brought near. When Allah brings someone near to Him, He gives him a tajalli in the object he desires, without him knowing it.

Like the Fire of Musa
which he saw as what he needed.
It was Allah,
but he did not perceive it.

Notes to Chapter 25:

1. "Yes, we testify." Qur'an 7:172. Before the selves were created, Allah asked them, "Am I not your Lord?" They replied. "Yes, we testify."
2. In the form of knowledge and life descending from Allah.
3. See Qur'an 21:30.
4. Divine Presence which causes calmness and tranquillity in the hearts of the Believers. It is also related to the Ark of the Covenant and to Bayt

al-Maqdis, when the invisible Sakina/Shechina descends from above. See 2:249: "The sign of his kinship is that the Ark will come to you, containing a Sakina from your Lord, and certain relics left by the families of Musa and Harun left. It will be borne by angels."

5. Qur'an 17:44.

6. Qur'an 6:122.

7. Qur'an 22:5.

8. Qur'an 66:11: "Allah has made an example for the believers - the wife of Pharaoh when she said, 'My Lord, build a house in the Garden for me in Your Presence, and rescue me from Pharaoh and his deeds.'"

Also the hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Musa, "Many men have been perfect, but among women only Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, and Asiya, wife of Pharaoh, were perfect."

9. See Qur'an 20:40, "We rescued you from trouble and tested you with many trials."

10. See the story in the Qur'an 18:65-82.

11. Hadith qudsi.

12. i.e. reaching the perfection of love. This is called or love or yearning after the parting.

13. khil'a, a robe of honor.

14. Qur'an 26:21.

15. Sirr al-Qadar.

16. Hadith narrated by Imam Muslim.

17. Madness "junun" is related to veils.

18. "The Lord of the heavens and the earth and what is between them is you have certainty." Qur'an 26:24.

19. Qur'an 26:28.

20. of unveiling.

21. Zawa'id, the augmentative letters, i.e. the ten letters which are added to the radical letters in Arabic words sin, hamza, alif, lam, ta', mim, waw, nun, ya' and ha'. If you take away the sin from sijn (prison), you get "jinn" meaning veil.

22. See Qur'an 43:54, "In that way he swayed his people and they succumbed to him. They were a people of deviators."

23. 'Asâ as a noun means "staff", and 'Asâ as a verb means "to rebel against , oppose."

24. Habl meaning "rope" also means mound or small hill.

25. Lord being a relative name, demanding a subject, also because it means owner, so one says the lord of the house, the "lord" of a herd, etc. Also one who looks after, the "lord" of a child.

26. Huduth means coming into existence for the first time. It also means an event or occurrence.

27. Muhdath.

28. Muhdath.

29. It like is in Qur'an 10:98, where the punishment is removed from the people of Yunus after they believed.

30. See Qur'an 39:71.

26: The Seal of the Wisdom of What One Turns to (as-Samad) in the Word of Khalid

As for the wisdom of Khalid ibn Sinan, (1) by his call he manifested the Prophethood of the interspace. He claimed that he would tell them about what happens after death. He commanded that he should be disinterred and questioned in order that he might report that the judgement in the Interspace occurs in the form of the life of this world. Thus it would be known that all the Messengers spoke the truth in what they related in this life regarding what happens after death. Khalid's goal was that all the world would believe in what the Messengers brought so that there would be mercy for all. He was honored by his Prophethood being near the time of the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. He knew that Allah had sent Muhammad as a mercy to the worlds, but Khalid was not a Messenger. He wanted to receive a generous share of this mercy contained in the message of Muhammad. He was not commanded to convey the message, but he wanted to have that share in the Interspace so that there would be stronger knowledge about the creation, and for this reason his people squandered him.

The Messenger of Allah described them as having squandered their Prophet because they did not do what he wanted them to do. Did Allah give him the reward for what he wanted? There is no doubt and no disagreement that he had the reward of what he wished, but there is doubt and disagreement about the reward of the goal. Is wishing for it the same in the Next World as its occurrence even though it did not occur or not? In the Shari'a, equality is not supported in many places such as in the case of the one who performs the prayer in the group. (2) The one who prays it in the group has a reward from the presence of the group. He is like the person who, in spite of poverty, desires to be able to give charity as the people of wealth and property do. He has the like of their rewards, but the like of their rewards can be in their intentions or their deeds. The people had both the intention and the action. The Prophet, peace be upon him, did not prescribe both of them, nor one of them, and outwardly they are not the same. For that reason, Khalid ibn Sinan sought the proclamation to confirm for him the station of joining both matters so that he would receive two rewards. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 26:

1. Al-Qashani, the commentator, says that Khalid lived in Aden, and was a man of great himma who was overcome in the contemplation of divine unity. One day a great fire appeared from a cave among his people. It destroyed the crops and the livestock, and the people called on him to protect them from it. He struck the fire with his staff, saying, "Away! Away!" until it became cold and retreated to the cave. Then he told his people that he would enter the cave in order to extinguish the fire, and he told them to call him after three full days had passed. Should he call

him before that, he would come out and die. If they were patient, he would emerge in good health.

They waited two days, and then Shaytan made them restless, and doubts came to them and they were afraid that he might have been destroyed. They shouted to him. He emerged from the cave with his hand on his head from the pain their shouting had caused him. He told them, "You have killed me and squandered my word and my covenant." He then told them of his death and commanded them to bury him and then watch for forty days. Then, he said, a flock of sheep led by a donkey with slit ears and its tail cut off would come to them. When it stood opposite his grave, they were to disinter him and he would rise and tell them of the true state of things after death from witnessing and vision so that all creation would receive certainty as to what the Messenger related. Then he died and they buried him.

They waited until the forty days had passed. The flock of sheep came led by a donkey with slit ears. It stopped opposite his grave, so they understood that they should disinter Khalid as he had commanded them so that he might inform them as to the truth of the Prophets. Some of his older sons were adverse to that and said that it would shame them among the Arabs and that they would be called, "the sons of the disinterred one." There was the vehemence of the Jahiliya in that. They squandered their legacy and destroyed him. After the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was sent, a daughter of Khalid came to him, and he said to her, "Greetings to you, O daughter of a Prophet whose people squandered him!"

2. His Prophethood did not appear in this world.

27: The Seal of the Unique Wisdom in the Word of Muhammad

Muhammad's wisdom is uniqueness (fardiya) because he is the most perfect existent creature of this human species. For this reason, the command began with him and was sealed with him. He was a Prophet while Adam was between water and clay, (1) and his elemental structure is the Seal of the Prophets. The first singular is three, and what is more than this firstness of individuals comes from three. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is the surest proof of his Lord, so he was given all the words, (2) which are everything that is named by the names of Adam. (3) He resembles the proof in its threefoldness, and the proof is a proof of itself. Then his reality grants the first uniqueness which is threefold in structure. For that reason, speaking about the domain of love which is the root of existence, he said, "I was made to love three things in your world," (4) because of what this world has of threefoldness. Then he mentioned women, and perfume, and that the coolness of his eye was in the prayer.

The Prophet began by mentioning women and ended with the prayer. That is because woman is part of man in the root of the manifestation of her source, and because man's recognition of himself preceded his recognition of his Lord. That is why the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." If you wish, you can say that this tradition is the forbidding of gnosis and stating the inability to attain to Him - and that is a permissible statement; and, if you wish, you can say that it is the affirmation of gnosis. The first is that if you do not know yourself, so you will not know your Lord. The second is that you recognize yourself, so you do recognize your Lord. Muhammad was the clearest proof of his Lord. Every part of the world indicates its root which is its Lord, so understand!

The Prophet was made to love women, so he yearned for them because as the whole yearns for what is part of it. The matter is self-evident through what Allah says regarding this elemental human constitution, "and I breathed My Ruh into him." (15:29; 38:72) Then He described Himself with intensity of yearning to meet those who yearn for Him. He said, "O Dawud! I have intense yearning for them," i.e. those who yearn for Him, and it is a particular encounter. The Prophet said in a hadith about the Dajjal, "None of you will see his Lord until after he dies." (5) Allah must yearn for those near ones - because even though He sees them and wants them to see Him, that encounter is still prevented by man's station. That is like His words "until We know" although He is Knowing. He yearns for this particular attribute which only is achieved existence through death.

By this, He tests their yearning for Him as He said in the hadith of hesitation which concerns this matter, "I do not hesitate in anything I do, but I hesitate to take the breath of My believing slave because he hates death, and I hate to make him die. But He must meet Me." He gave him

good news and did not say to him, "he must die" because He did not want to distress him by mentioning death. Man only meets Allah after death as the Prophet says, "None of you will see his Lord until he dies." That is why Allah says, "He must meet Me," for Allah desires the existence of this relationship. He made it clear that He breathed into him some of His spirit (rûh) so He only yearns for him. Do you not see that He created him on His form because he is from His Spirit?

Man's constitution is based on these four elements which are called the "humors" in his body. The combustion of the moisture found in the body occurs from his breath. The spirit of man is fire as regards his constitution. For this reason, Allah only spoke to Musa in the form of fire, (6) and put his need in it. If his constitution had been from nature, (7) then his spirit would have been light. Allah alluded to it with the blowing (nafkh) which indicates that it is from the breath (nafas) of the All-Merciful. It is by this breath, which is the blowing-out that he manifested from Him, and by the predisposition of the one blown into, that combustion is fire and not light. The breath of Allah is hidden in that by which man is man.

From man, He derived a person in his form called "woman". She appeared in his form, and he yearned for her with the longing of that thing has for itself, and she yearned for him with the longing of that thing has for its home. Allah made him love women. Allah loves the one whom He created in His form, and He made the luminous angels, in spite of the power of their might and their station and the sublimity of their natural constitution, prostrate to him. (8) From this comes the affinity which occurs in the form which man and woman share, which is like that between Allah and man. The form has the greatest affinity, as well as the most glorious and perfect. It makes a pair that is, doubles the existent belonging to Allah, as the woman, by her existence, doubles man, and makes him one of a pair. So three appeared: Allah, man and woman. Man yearns for his Lord who is the origin as woman yearns for man.

His Lord made him love women as Allah loves the one who is in His form. Love only occurred by the One by whom he is formed. His love was for the One he was formed by, and He is Allah. This is why the Prophet said, "He made me love...", and he did not say, "I loved" as coming from himself because his love is connected to his Lord in Whose form he is. In his love for his wife, he loves her by Allah's love for him as a divine nature. (9)

When a man loves a woman, he desires union, that is, the goal of union which exists in love. In the elemental form, there is no greater union than marriage. (10) By this appetite encompasses all parts. For that reason, complete ritual washing is prescribed after intercourse. Purification envelops him as annihilation in the woman was complete in the obtainment of appetite. Allah is very jealous of His slave if He believes that he finds pleasure in other than Him. So man purifies himself by

ritual washing in order to return to Him in whom he was annihilated, since that is all there is.

When man witnesses Allah in women, his witnessing is in the passive; when he witnesses Him in himself, regarding the appearance of woman from Him, he witnesses Him in the active. When he witnesses Him from himself without the presence of any form from him, his witnessing is in the passive directly from Allah without any intermediary. So his witnessing of Allah in the woman is the most complete and perfect because he witnesses Allah inasmuch as He is both active and passive. Regarding himself, He is passive in particular. For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, loved women because of the perfection of the witnessing of Allah in them since one does not ever witness Allah free of matter. Allah by His essence is independent of the worlds. So from this aspect, the business is impossible, yet witnessing only occurs in matter. The witnessing of Allah in women is the greatest and most perfect witnessing. The greatest union is marriage.

It is like the projection of His will on the one He created in His form in order to create him. He sees His form in him, rather, He sees Himself. He fashioned him and balanced him and breathed into him of His spirit (rûh) which is His breath. Outwardly he is creation, and inwardly he is Allah. For this reason, Allah describes Himself with having management of this frame. He "directs the whole affair from the heaven," which is the height of the earth, "to earth," (32:5) which is the lowest of the low, because it is the lowest of all the elements.

He called them women (an-nisâ') which is a plural which does not have a singular form. For that reason, he said, "He made me love three things in your world: women..." and he did not say, "woman". He took note of the fact that they came after him in existence. The word an-nisa' also means postponement. Allah says, "The month postponed is an increase in disbelief," (9:37) and the sale of "nasi'a" is said to be by postponement, that is, by credit. That is why he said an-nisa'. He loved them only by rank, and they are the place of the passive. They are to him as nature is to Allah in which Allah opened the forms of the world by the projection of the will and the divine command which is marriage in the world of elemental forms, and aspiration (himma) in the world of luminous spirits, as in the order of premises and their meanings through deduction. All of that is the marriage of the first uniqueness in each of these aspects. Whoever loves women in this measure, loves with a divine love. Whoever loves them in respect to natural appetite in particular, deprives himself of the knowledge of this appetite. For him it is a form without a spirit (rûh). That form in the heart of the matter is the essence of a spirit, but it is not witnessed by the one who comes to his wife or any woman by pure gratification, and he does not perceive the one it is for even so, he has no knowledge of himself, as others have no knowledge of him, since he has not been verbally named so that he could be known.

One of them said:
It is confirmed with people
that I am a passionate lover,
although they do not know
the object of my passion.

It is the same with the one who loves gratification - he loves the place in which it occurs, being the woman, but the spirit of the question is obscure to him. If he had known it, he would have known by whom he has pleasure and who it is that has pleasure. He would have been perfect.

Similarly, the woman has a lower degree than the man by the words of Allah, "As for men, they have a degree over them." (2:228) The one created on the form is lower in degree than the one who is fashioned in His form, (11) even though he is in His form. This is the degree by which He is distinguished from the form. So Allah is independent of the universe, and He is the first Doer. The form is the second doer, and does not have the firstness which Allah has. Sources are distinguished by ranks. "He gives each thing its creation," (12) as every gnostic gives each thing with a right its due.

That love that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had for women came from divine love. "Allah gives everything its creation," and that is the source of its truth. He only gave creation to it by merit, so it merits what He called it that is, by the essence of the created thing.

He put women first because they are the place of the passive as nature precedes that which exists from it by means of form. Nature in reality is only the breath of the Merciful. The forms of the universe, high and low, are introduced into it by the diffusion of the breath (nafkha) in the primal substance (jawhar hayulânî), particularly in the world of bodies. As for its diffusion by the existence of the luminous spirits and non-essentials (a'râd), that is another kind of diffusion.

In this tradition, the Prophet put the feminine before the masculine because he meant to attach importance to women. He said, "Three (thalath, the feminine form of the number) and he did not say thalatha (the masculine) with the ha' which is by the number of the masculine since scent (tîb) is one of the three, and it is masculine. The custom among the Arabs is that the masculine takes precedence over the feminine. When they say, "The Fatimas and Zayd went out," they saw kharajû (mas. pl) and do not say kharajna (fem. pl). The masculine, even if it is only one, take precedence over the feminine, even if they are a group. The Prophet was Arab, so he respected the meaning which was intended by showing love for what did not happen through his own love. Then Allah informed him of what he did not know, and Allah's bounty to him was great. (13) The feminine took precedence over the masculine by his word, thalath without ha'. Who knew the realities better than him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace? Who had greater care to

observe rights and dues?

Then he placed the seal with what was like the first since it is also feminine (salat, prayer, is feminine), and he placed the masculine between them, as in existence. He began with "women" and ended with "prayer", both of which are feminine while perfume is masculine. The man is between the essence from which he appeared and then the woman appeared from him. So man is between two feminines, the form of the Essence (14) from which he appeared, and a real feminine, woman, who appeared from him. Similarly, women is a real feminine, and the prayer is not a real feminine. Scent is the masculine between the two, as Adam is between the essence from which he has existence and Hawwa' (Eve), who existed from him. If you wish, you can say "attribute (sifa)" which is also feminine. If you wish, you can say, "power (qudra)" and it is feminine. Be of whatever school you wish. You will always find that the feminine takes precedence, even among the people of cause ('illa) who make Allah a cause in the existence of the form, and cause is also feminine.

As for the wisdom of the perfume which he mentioned after women, because women have fragrance in their form, the most fragrant of perfumes is the embrace of the lover as they say in the common example. When the Prophet was created a slave, by the nobility of his origin, he did not lift his head at all to mastery rather, he continued to prostrate himself in humility and to remain passive in spite of who he was until Allah formed from Him what He had intended. He gave him the rank of action in the world of breaths, and the breaths are fragrant scents. So Allah made him love perfume. For that reason, he put perfume after women.

He observed the ranks which belong to Allah in His words, "Raiser of ranks is He, Possessor of the throne" (40:15) by His sitting on it by the name of the All-Merciful. There is none among those that the Throne encompasses but that divine mercy touches him. That is the words of Allah, "My mercy embraces all things," (7:156) and the Throne encompasses everything, and the One who sits on it is the Merciful. By its reality, mercy is diffused through the universe as we explained in another part in this book and in The Makkan Revelations.

Allah put perfume in this marital connection in the innocence of 'A'isha, (15) may Allah be pleased with her! He said, "Corrupt (16) men are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; and good (17) women are for good men, and good men are for good women. The latter are innocent of what they say." (24:26) He made their scent fragrant because the word is breath, and it is the source of the scent. It goes out with fragrance and putrefaction according to what appears in the form of speech. As it is divine by the nobility of its origin, it is all good, and so it is good. As for what is not praised and is censured, it is good and bad. The Prophet said in respect to the badness of garlic, "It is a plant whose

scent I dislike." He did not say, "I dislike it." The source is not disliked, but he disliked what appeared from it. Dislike for that is either by custom or unsuitability of nature, by something in the Shari'a, or a lack of perfection or something other than what we have mentioned.

Since the command is divided into corrupt and good as we confirmed, he was made to love perfume rather than repulsive odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. Since there is putrefaction in this elemental structure as it is created of "dry clay from mud moulded (or fetid)," (18) so the angels dislike it by essence. The nature of the dung-beetle is offended by the scent of the rose which is one of the pleasant scents. For the dung-beetle, the scent of the rose is not a pleasant scent. If someone has the same sort of nature (as the dung beetle) in meaning and form, the truth offends him when he hears it, and he is gladdened by the false. It is what Allah said, "those who believe in falsehood and reject Allah." (29:52) He described them with loss, and said, "those, they are the losers" who have lost themselves. Whoever does not distinguish goodness from corruption, has no perception.

Allah made the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, love only the good (the perfume) of everything, and there is only that. Can it be conceived that there is a disposition in the universe which only finds good in everything but does not recognize the bad? We say that there is not. We find it in the very root from which the universe appeared which is Allah; we find that He hates and loves. The corrupt is only that which He hates, and the good is only that which He loves. The universe is the form of Allah, and man is in both forms. There is no nature which only perceives one matter in everything - rather, the nature distinguishes the good from the corrupt in spite of the fact that it knows that it is corrupt by tasting and good without tasting. The perception of the good in it diverts him from the sensation of its corruptness. This can happen. As for the removal of the corrupt from the universe that is, from phenomenal being it is not admissible. The mercy of Allah extends to both the corrupt and the good. The corrupt considers itself good, but the good in itself is corrupt. There is nothing but good but that an aspect of its disposition is bad, and vice versa.

As for the third by which uniqueness (fardiyya) is completed, it is the prayer. The Prophet said, "and the coolness of the eye (19) is in the prayer" because it is contemplation. That is because it is intimate discourse between Allah and His slave as Allah says, "Remember Me, and I will remember you." (2:152) It is worship ('ibâda) which is divided in two parts between Allah and His slave one part belongs to Allah and one part to His slave, as has come in sound transmission from Allah in which He says, "I divided the prayer into two parts between Me and My slave. One part is Mine and one part is My slave's, and My slave will receive what he asks for. The slave says, 'In the name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has mentioned Me.' Then

the slave says, 'Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds,' and Allah says, 'My slave has praised Me.' The slave says, 'The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has glorified Me. My slave has given Me authorisation.'" (20) All this part belongs purely to Allah.

"Then the slave says, 'You alone we worship. You alone we ask for help,' and Allah says, 'This is between Me and My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" Sharing occurs in this ayat. "The slave then says, 'Guide us in the straight path, the path of those You have blessed, not of those with anger on them nor of the misguided,' and Allah says, 'This is for My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" This is purely for His slave as the first part is purely for Allah. The knowledge of this makes the recitation of the Fatiha obligatory. Whoever does not recite it has not prayed the prayer establish between Allah and His slave.

The prayer is then a secret conversation (munajat). It is remembrance/invocation (dhikr). When someone mentions Allah, he sits with Allah and Allah sits with him. It is a sound divine transmission that Allah said, "I sit with the one who mentions Me." (21) Whoever sits with the One he mentions and has sight, sees the One with whom he sits. This is contemplation (mushahada) and vision. If he does not have sight, he does not see Him. Thus the one who prays knows his rank, and whether or not he sees Allah with this vision in the prayer. If he does not see Him, then let him worship Him by belief (iman) as if he saw Him, imagining Him to be in the qibla of his conversation, and let him listen for Allah's reply.

Without a doubt, everyone who prays is an Imam, so the angels pray behind the slave when he prays alone, as is related in tradition. If he is the Imam for his particular world and the angels pray with him, then he has attained the rank of the Messenger in his prayer which is deputyship from Allah. When he says, "Allah hears whoever praises Him," (22) he informs himself and whoever is behind him that Allah has heard him. The angels and those present say, "Our Lord, praise belongs to You."

Allah says on the tongue of the slave, "Allah hears whoever praises Him." Look at the sublimity of the rank of the prayer and where it takes the one who has it! Whoever does not achieve the rank of vision in the prayer has not reached the goal nor does he have the coolness of the eye in it because he does not see the One he addresses. If he does not hear the answer of Allah, he is not one of those who listen. Whoever is not present in the prayer with his Lord, and does not hear nor see Him, is not one who prays at all, and he is not along those "who listen well, having seen the evidence." (30:37)

The prayer is the only form of 'ibada during which one is forbidden to perform any other action. The mention of Allah in it is greater than the words and actions it contains. We mentioned the attribute of the perfect man in the prayer in The Makkan Revelations and his nature, because

Allah says that "the prayer precludes indecency and wrongdoing" (29:45) since it is set down in the Shari'a that the one performing the prayer cannot act in anything except this 'ibâda as long as he is in it, and he is called the one the prays (musalli). "The remembrance of Allah is greater still" (29:45) in it that is, the mention which is from Allah to His slave when He answers him in his request, and his praise of Him is greater than the mention of the slave of his Lord in it, because greatness belongs to Allah. (23) This is why He says, "Allah knows what you do," and He says, "He who listen well, having seen the evidence" he gives ear to what Allah mentions in the prayer.

Therefore, since existence is from an intelligible movement which transported the universe from non-existence to existence, the prayer encompasses all movements. There are three movements: vertical, which is the state of standing in the prayer, the horizontal, which is the state of bowing, and the downward movement, which is the state of prostration. The movement of man is vertical, the movement of the animal is horizontal, and the movement of plants in downward. The inanimate does not have a movement from its essence. If a rock moves, it moves by other means than itself.

As for the words of the Prophet, "The coolness of my eye is in the prayer," he did not ascribe the action of putting it there to himself, so Allah gives the one who prays a tajalli which stems from Him, not from the one who prays. If he had not mentioned this attribute from himself, he would have commanded the prayer without tajalli from Him to him. Since that is from Him by means of graciousness, the contemplation is also through graciousness. He said, "the coolness of my eye is in the prayer," and it is only contemplation of the Beloved by which the eye of the lover is delighted by continuance. The eye remains seeing Allah. It does not look with Him to other than Him in anything, and for that reason, it is forbidden to turn away in the prayer. The glance is something which Shaytan steals from the prayer of the slave in order to forbid him the contemplation of the Beloved. (24) If Allah had truly been the Beloved of the one who turns aside, he would not have turned aside in his prayer to another qibla. Man knows his state in himself, whether he is like that in this particular act of worship or not. "Man will be clear proof against himself in spite of any excuses he might offer." (75:14) He recognizes his lie apart from his truth in himself, because man is not ignorant of his state, his state has tasting (dhawq) for him.

The prayer has another portion. Allah commanded us to pray to Him, and He told us that He prays for us. The prayer is from us and from Him. When He prays, He prays by His name, the Last, for it comes after the existence of the slave, and it is the source of Allah which the slave created in his qibla by logical discernment or by imitation. He is the God of the one who has a creed. It varies according to what the place of the tajalli has and according to the established predisposition as al-Junayd said when he was asked about recognition of Allah and the gnostic. He

said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel." It is a masterly answer giving information about the matter for what it is. This is Allah who prays for us. If we pray, we have the name, the Last, so we are in it, as we mentioned, in the state of the One who has this name we are with Him according to our state. He only regards us by the form which we bring to Him.

The one who prays is behind the one who precedes him in the place. It is His words, "Each one knows its prayer and its glorification " (24:41) that is, its rank in being behind the worship of its Lord and the extolling which his predisposition accords him of disconnection (tanzih). "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise" of its Lord, the Forbearing, the Forgiving. For that, we do not understand the extolling of the universe distinctly, (25) creature by creature.

Then a rank refers the pronoun to the extolling slave in His words, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise," that is, the praise of that thing. The pronoun which is in His word, "His praise (bi-hamdihi)" refers to the thing - that is, with the praise that is from it.

As we said of the one who has a creed other than Islam, he praises the God who is in his creed and attaches himself to Him. What is from his work returns to him, so he only praises himself. It is from the praise of fabrication the artisan is praised without a doubt, and so the excellence of what he creates or its lack of excellence returns to the artisan. The god of a creed is the product of the one who looks at it, and it is his fabrication; his praise for what he believes is his praise for himself. For this reason, he condemns the creed of another if he had been fair, he would not have done that. Indeed, the possessor of this particular object of worship is certainly ignorant in his rejection of other than what he believes about Allah, since had he recognized what al-Junayd said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel," he would have conceded to everyone who has a creed what he believed in, and he would have recognized Allah in every form of worship of every person with a creed, He has opinion but does not know it. For that reason, Allah says, "I am in My slave's opinion of Me," (26) that is, I only appear to him in the form of his creed. If he wishes, he generalizes, and if he wishes, he limits. The god of creeds is taken from definition, so He is the God which the heart of His slave encompasses. (27)

The Absolute Divinity is not encompassed by anything because He is the source of things and the source of Himself. It is not said of the thing that it encompasses itself, not that it does not encompass itself, so understand! "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 27:

1. Hadith, "I was a Prophet when Adam was still between water and clay."
2. Hadith, "I was given all the words."

3. Qur'an 2:31, "And He taught Adam the names of all things..."
4. Hadith in an-Nasa'i and Ibn Hanbal: "I was made to love three things in your world: women, perfume, and the coolness of my eye in the prayer."
5. Hadith in Muslim (fitan:95) and at-Tirmidhi.
6. The Burning Bush.
7. i.e. from the nature of the world of Purity.
8. Qur'an 2:34.
9. Since his nature (khuluq) was immense or mighty ('adhim) as Allah said, "You are truly immense in character," (68:4) and as 'A'isha said of the Prophet, "His nature was the Qur'an."
10. Nikah, or marriage, actually means lawful intercourse.
11. See Qur'an 6:98.
12. See Qur'an 20:50.
13. Qur'an 4:113, "Allah's favour to you is indeed immense."
14. Dhat, essence, is feminine.
15. The following verse was revealed about 'A'isha in the affair of the Lie and declared her innocence in the affair.
16. Khabith, also meaning with a repulsive odor.
17. Tayyib, means good, wholesome, fragrant, from the same root as perfume, tib.
18. See Qur'an 15:26.
19. i.e. that which delights me.
20. Muslim 4:38, 41, etc.
21. Hadith qudsi in Ibn Majah and Ibn Hibban.
22. When he comes up from ruku' in the prayer.
23. See Qur'an: 45:37.
24. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim. "(Looking aside in the prayer) is something which Shaytan snatches from a slave's prayer."
Also the hadith in Ibn Hanbal and elsewhere: "Allah continues to turn favorably towards a slave while he is engaged in the prayer as long as he does not look to the side. But if he does so He departs from him."
25. See Qur'an 17:44, "The seven heavens and the earth and everyone in them glorify Him. There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise; but you do not understand their glorification. He is the All-Forbearing, Ever-Forgiving."
26. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari, "I am in My slave's opinion and I am with him when he remembers Me..."
27. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My heaven nor My earth contains Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."

DISCOURSES OF RUMI

(OR *FIHI MA FIHI*)

TRANSLATED BY A.J. ARBERRY



OMPHALOSKEPSIS BOOKS

preface

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The poetry of Jalal al-Din Rumi has recently become popular and well known, thanks to new translations by Coleman Barks, Robert Bly and others. Anyone who is looking to experience Rumi's incandescent love need go no further than his volumes of verse, but if you want to see the subtleties of his wisdom and find insights into the real meaning of his poetry, then Rumi's Discourses hold the key.

Until this publication, as far as the publishers know, all previous translations of Rumi's Discourses into English have been made by scholars, written from the world of academia. While their books were published with care to preserve the accuracy of Rumi's literary meaning, this publication available here strives to restore the subtle impacts of Rumi's words that carry his real message.

Rumi is not just telling stories that teach, or relating his philosophical and religious understanding, as the previous translations have focused on, but his words have been crafted to transmit something of great substance. As the Sufis have often said, this matter cannot be studied from the outside, it can only be discovered from within. No doubt such statements will raise disagreements, but we need only refer to Rumi's own discourses to see his own opinions on this very subject. Over and over Rumi criticizes those who study at length the outward sense of things, but miss the inner Truth.

It is likely that the Discourses of Rumi will only appeal to those who are willing to make some effort to study his words. But if the reader is willing to read carefully, he or she should be able to find a greater glimpse of Rumi's relationship with life and his spiritually intoxicating intimacy with the Path of Love.

Comments, suggestions and questions are welcome. Contact us at: LKPublictn@aol.com

introduction

Recognized as perhaps the greatest mystical poet of Islam, Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207-1273) communicated something through his writing that has attracted spiritual seekers from almost every religion in the world, for hundreds of years. Even in his day, Rumi was sought out by merchants and kings, devout worshippers and rebellious seekers, famous scholars and common peasants, men and women. At his funeral, Muslims, Christians, Jews, Arabs, Persians, Turks and Romans honored him. Listen to his call for seekers of truth:

Come, come, whoever you are.
Wanderer, worshipper, lover of leaving.
It doesn't matter.
Ours is not a caravan of despair.
Come, even if you have broken your vow
a hundred times.
Come, yet again, come, come.

Rumi's love and honor for all religious traditions was not always popular in his day, and often provoked criticism from the more dogmatic. A story is told that one such public challenge came from a Muslim dignitary, Qonavi, who confronted Rumi before an audience. "You claim to be at one with 72 religious sects," said Qonavi, "but the Jews cannot agree with the Christians, and the Christians cannot agree with Muslims. If they cannot agree with each other, how could you agree with them all?" To this Rumi answered, "Yes, you are right, I agree with you too."

Although kings were his followers, Rumi's critics could never understand why Rumi's greatest love and dedication went to what they called, "the tailors, the cloth-sellers, and the petty shopkeepers - uncouth and uncultured ruffians." Yet even amongst these, his dearest companions, Rumi allowed no vanity. The story is told that one day, while Rumi was in deep contemplation, surrounded by his disciples, a drunkard walked in shouting and stumbling. The man staggered toward Rumi, and then fell on him. To Rumi's followers such a disgrace of their teacher was intol-

erable, and they rose as one to rush the ignorant fool. Rumi stopped them with his raised hand, saying, "I thought this intruder was the one who was intoxicated, but now I see it is not he, but my own students who are drunk!"

There are thousands who believe that Rumi's presence (baraka) still exists today, and still teaches. If this is true, it is certainly largely due to the remarkable vitality that can be found in his writings and poetry, and a relevancy they contain that reaches to our inner core. Rumi's poetry has captured the hearts of spiritual seekers around the world because of its depth and beauty. His verses sketch out the whole panorama of life, from human sorrow and devotion, to the universal breadth of God's hidden plan. His poetry seems fathomless and endless.

Rumi has also left to us another manuscript that is not so well known - the collection of discourses given at the gatherings with his students. *It Is What It Is* (Fihi ma Fihi) is a record of these spiritual discussions that often followed music and dance, the reciting of sacred poems and phrases, and the now famous Whirling Dervish

exercise that Rumi originated to enliven and bring spiritual opening to the rather somber people of Konya, Turkey, in his day.

This present book is edited and rewritten from A. J. Arberry's original English translation, published in 1961 as *Discourses of Rumi*. Arberry himself admitted that his scholastic, literal, work "is not an easy book to read...and the original is by no means easy always to understand." According to more recent studies of the original manuscript (Chittick and Shah, for example,) Arberry's translation also has some technical errors, and better understandings of Rumi's subtle spiritual teachings have come to light. I hope this edition will help illuminate and clarify such passages, and to build on Professor Arberry's contribution.

If you were to compare the original manuscript of Rumi's discourses with this present book, the first change you might notice would be the dropping of phrases like, "may Allah bless him and give him peace," after every reference to a saint or prophet, which was the proper and respectful way of speaking in Rumi's day, and

still is today in some parts of the world. Also, Rumi makes numerable references to the Koran and quotes from it frequently. Since Rumi's listeners knew the Koran well, such quotes were familiar and personal brush strokes. However, to many readers of this book this will not be so. Therefore, I have removed a few quotes that could prove confusing to those who do not know the Koran, or might disturb the direction of Rumi's message.

Rumi's reference to God is always deeply personal. Whether he uses the masculine term "Allah," or refers to God as "The Beloved," it is nearness and closeness to God that Rumi is expressing. Unfortunately, the English language has no personal, neutral pronoun for God. To always use "He" in referring to God, to mankind, or to any general person, was common practice when Arberry released his edition, but seems too masculine today. In Rumi's Persian language, "God" has no gender, and Rumi's symbolic portrayal of God uses images of the Lover, and the Ocean, as often as the King. Therefore, I have used "It" to refer to God in places, to help rise

above gender, but have also used “He” and “Beloved” to give the personal closeness of Rumi’s message.

The flow, rhythm and impact of Rumi’s images are what I have tried to preserve, over everything else. These inner subtleties are, paradoxically, more important than the apparent point he is making. For example, in discourse Twenty-Six Rumi says, “Beware! Do not say, ‘I have understood.’ The more you understand and grasp these words, the farther you will be from understanding them. Their meaning comes in not understanding.” Such insights can not be explained, we must catch them inwardly, with only the subtle clues that Rumi leaves to guide us.

Follow Rumi closely in this way, and you will see a string that holds one pearl to the next on this necklace. Each story, each image, is a new moment in Rumi’s discourse, yet rarely is it broken from the last moment. Step by step, Rumi is dancing. We must be limber and flexible to follow without losing that thread. Yet, hidden in the rhythm and pattern of Rumi’s dance is his true intention.

Even today, Rumi challenges many of our basic cultural assumptions, and often in ways we may not notice if we aren't careful. It is easy to make the mistake of rejecting an idea on the grounds that it is out of date, or that it sounds merely like a traditional, orthodox opinion. I would caution about ever jumping to this conclusion with Rumi, since you will more likely find that he has caught you making the very same error.

For example, in discourse Twelve, Rumi asks the question, "If a saint, who carries God's secret jewel [spiritual grace], strikes someone and breaks their nose and jaw, who is the wronged party?" Rumi claims it is the saint who has been wronged. "Since the saint is consumed in God, their actions are God's actions. God is not called a wrongdoer."

At first glance, this smacks of religious zealotry. The same sort that brought about the killings and murders of the Inquisition. No different than any other self-justified excuse. Anyone can blame God for their own choices, we say. But read Rumi's words closely; he is not talking about justifying violence. He is asking

what makes an act right or wrong, good or bad. He is asking us to look beneath our cultural ideas of right and wrong to see the true cause: God's will.

But the problem doesn't stop here, since we have not yet caught Rumi's vision. Our culture rejects ideas of Absolute Right or Wrong. We have learned that each person must decide for themselves what is true, and no outside authority has the right to force their perspective. And so, after centuries of petty religious battles and church-state slaughters, we have solved the problem socially by placing relative truth above Absolute Truth. In other words, we still don't believe the saint has the right to strike out.

Rumi knows all this, and is way ahead. He goes on to say, "A westerner lives in the West. An oriental comes to visit. The westerner is a stranger to the oriental, but who is the real stranger? Is not the oriental a stranger to all the West?" In other words, sure the idea of a Holy War, or a true saint using violence sounds strange and wrong to us, but does that mean it is wrong? Who is the real stranger to Truth?

Rumi continues, “This whole world is but a house, no more. Whether we go from this room to that room, or from this corner to that corner, still are we not in the same house? But the saints who possess God’s jewel have left this house, they have gone beyond. Mohammed said, ‘Islam began a stranger and will return a stranger as it began.’

In this way, Rumi’s words come right through time and ask us today, “Can you accept that a true Lover of God could carry God’s authority? Can you see, because of what they carry, they will always be a stranger to this world?” So who is out of date? Certainly anyone bound by the culture of their time, anyone who is not moved by something greater.

If you see what is happening here, you will see that Rumi is using our own unexamined aversions and dislikes to teach us. Some of Rumi’s most profound poetry is ignored because of such thorns, prompting him to say, in discourse Thirty-Five: “How wonderfully gracious God is! It sets a seal on those who listen and do not understand, argue and yet learn nothing. God is gracious. Its wrath is gracious, and even Its lock is gracious.

But Its lock is nothing next to Its unlocking, for the grace of that is indescribable. If I shatter into pieces, it is through the infinite grace of God's unlocking."

This raises an interesting observation. Rumi was never general in his discussions, he always spoke to specific situations. He addressed the particular beliefs and conflicts of those around him, and he was a witness and spokesman for The Way as it was manifesting in his day. And still his words can teach us now.

If a traveler tripped over a rock in their path 700 years ago, and from this event altered the course of their life, we might conclude the rock was only incidental. But if that same rock trips thousands, through the centuries, each walking away with a different message and a different lesson, then can we call this incidental? When foolish people trip, they get up and walk away as if nothing happened. They learn nothing. A wise person will find a greater meaning for their fall. But a rock that trips travelers in every age, each time imparting a different meaning, that is not just a rock. That is God.

Many of the terms Rumi uses have a very different meaning in their Islamic context than they do in their Christian sense. For example, the word “faith” amongst many Sufis is much closer to what we might call “knowingness.” This is not the same as “belief,” which refers to how a person chooses to see things. The Quakers had a term known as “convincement” that expresses some of this, but still betrays too much of man’s choice in the matter. As Rumi uses the word “faith,” he is talking more about the effect of having experienced something that changes how we see life, than he is talking about having been sold on some doctrine.

Likewise, when Rumi refers to Islam, he is talking about The Way. He is not talking about the preconceived notions that people have about Islam today, or even in his day, but the spiritual path itself and the religious tradition. It is not always easy to understand this as Rumi meant it, just as Rumi’s use of Mohammed as the Prophet and Voice of God is easily interpreted as traditional belief, which is only the outward cloak of what Rumi is really saying. It is just this sort of

blindness that Rumi is speaking to when he says, in discourse Seventy: “Wherever men or women put a big lock, that is a sign of something precious and valuable. Just like the snake that guards a treasure, do not regard what repels you, but look instead at the preciousness of the treasure.”

The title of Rumi’s discourses, *Fihi ma Fihi*, was translated by Arberry to *In It What Is In It*, but I believe *It Is What It Is* comes closer to Rumi’s intent. In any case, this title is filled with multiple meanings, just as all of Rumi’s works are. This may be a foreign idea, that someone could be communicating many things, at many levels, at the same time, but let us look closely at this title for a moment.

First, it is making a very specific, physical reference. “It,” meaning this manuscript, is the same as what is in “It,” meaning Rumi’s most famous work, his six volume poem, the *Masnavi*. In other words, the *Fihi ma Fihi* provides explanations and keys to unlock the meaning of the *Masnavi*. The two works were written parallel to each other, and contain many references and stories that are continued from one to the other. This being true,

it is quite surprising that Rumi's discourses have not gained more attention. But this is only one of the title's meanings, and by no means the most important.

At another level, *It Is What It Is* asks us not to put into this manuscript more or less than what it is. It is not clothed in the high cloth of religious sanctity, nor does it speak as some authority. Rumi wants us simply to see it for what it is. He wants us to be emotionally honest and not to get carried away with the form. In other words, don't become attached to the beauty of this vase, it is merely a holder of The Rose.

At the same time, "It" refers to God. Therefore God is what God is. This is the same as the Muslim saying, "There is no God but God." In other words, Rumi asks, "What more is there to say?" All the words here, all the stories and explanations are saying nothing more than this. There is no more to reality than reality. God is. Reality is. It is what it is. Explanations cannot explain it. Words cannot reveal it.

And so, "It," meaning the manuscript, is what "It," meaning God or reality, is. Therefore, the

Fihi ma Fihi is cut from the same cloth as reality,
it is the same substance as God.

If you can see these many meanings, all swimming like fish in the ocean that is the title, then you will know how to read Rumi. May it also help you catch real fish as well.

- Doug Marman

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discourse 1

Rumi stated: Mohammed, the great Prophet, once said, “The worst of scholars are those who visit princes, and the best of princes are those who visit scholars. Wise is the prince who stands at the door of the poor, and wretched are the poor who stand at the door of the prince.”

Now, taking the outward sense of these words, people think that scholars should never visit princes or they will become the worst of scholars. That is not the true meaning. Rather, the worst of scholars are those who depend upon princes, and who revolve their life and purpose around the attention and favor of princes. Such scholars take up learning in hopes that princes will give them presents, hold them in esteem, and promote them to office.

Therefore, such scholars improve themselves and pursue knowledge on account of princes. They become scholars from their fear of princes. They subject themselves to the princes’ control. They conform themselves to the plans that princes

map out for them. So, whether they visit a prince, or a prince visits them, still in every case they're the visitors, and it is the prince who is visited.

However, when scholars do not study to please princes, but instead pursue learning from first to last for the sake of truth—when their actions and words spring from the truth they have learned and put to use because this is their nature and they cannot live otherwise—just as fish can only thrive in water—such scholars subject themselves to the control and direction of God. They become blessed with the guidance of the prophets. Everyone living in their time is touched by them and derives inspiration from their example, whether they are aware of the fact or not.

Should such scholars visit a prince, they are still the ones visited and the prince is the visitor, because in every case it is the prince who takes from these scholars and receives help from them. Such scholars are independent of the prince. They are like the light-giving sun, whose whole function is giving to all, universally, converting stones into rubies and carnelians, changing mountains into mines of copper, gold, silver and iron, mak-

ing the earth fresh and green, bringing fruit to the trees, and warmth to the breeze. Their trade is giving, they do not receive. The Arabs have expressed this in a proverb: "We have learned in order to give, we have not learned in order to take." And so in all ways they are the visited, and the prince is the visitor.

The thought comes to me at this point to comment on a verse of the Koran, although it is not related to the present discourse. However, this idea comes to me now, and I want to express it so that it can go on record.

*O Prophet, say to the prisoners in your hands,
‘If God knows of any good in your hearts,
He will give you more than He has taken,
And He will forgive you.
Surely God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate.’*

This verse was revealed when Mohammed had defeated the unbelievers, slaying, plundering and taking prisoners, whom he tied hand and foot. Amongst the prisoners was his uncle, ‘Abbas. The chained people wept and wailed all night in their helpless humiliation. They had given up all hope of their lives, expecting the sword and slaughter. Mohammed, seeing this, laughed.

“Look!” the prisoners exclaimed. “He shows the traits of a person after all. This claim that he is superhuman is not true. There he stands looking at us prisoners in these chains, enjoying it. Just like everyone ruled by their passions—when they gain victory over their enemies and see their opponents vanquished to their will, they rejoice and feel happiness.”

“Not so,” answered Mohammed, seeing what was in their hearts. “Never would I laugh at the sight of enemies conquered by my hand, or the sight of your suffering. But I do rejoice, in fact I laugh, because with inner vision I see myself dragging and drawing people by collars and chains, out of the black smoke of Hell into Paradise, while they complain and cry, ‘Why are you pulling us from this pit of self-destruction into that garden of security?’ So, laughter overcomes me.

“But since you have not yet been granted the vision to see what I am saying, listen. God commands me to say this to you: First you gathered your forces and mustered your might, trusting completely in your own virtue and valor. You said

to yourselves, ‘We will conquer the Muslims and vanquish them.’ But you did not see that One Power more powerful than yourselves. You did not know the One Force above your force. And so all that you planned turned out the opposite. Even now in your fear, you still hold onto your beliefs and do not see the One Reality over you. Rather than facing that Power, you see my power, because it is easier for you to see yourselves conquered by me.

“But even in your present state, still I say to you: If you recognize my power, and accept yourselves vanquished to my will in all circumstances, I can still deliver you from this grief. He, who is able to bring forth a black bull from a white bull, can also produce a white bull from a black bull. Turn away from your former ways, and likewise I will return to you all the property that has been taken from you, in fact many times as much. Even more, I will absolve you of all blame, and grant you prosperity in this world and the world to come.”

“I have repented,” said ‘Abbas. “I have turned from my former ways.”

Mohammed said, "God demands a token of this claim you make, for easy it is to boast of love, but other is the proof thereof."

"In God's name, what token do you demand?" asked 'Abbas.

"Give all the properties that remain to you for the army of Islam, so the army of Islam may be strengthened," said Mohammed. "That is, of course, if you have truly become a Muslim and desire the good of Islam and Muslimdom."

"Prophet of God, what remains to me?" said 'Abbas. "They have taken everything, leaving me not so much as an old reed-mat."

"You see," said Mohammed, "you have not yet given up your old ways. You have not yet seen the light of truth. Should I tell you how much property you still have? Where you have hidden it? To whom you have entrusted it? Where you concealed and buried it?"

"God forbid!" exclaimed 'Abbas.

"Did you not entrust so much property specifically to your mother?" asked Mohammed. "Did you not bury your gold under such and such a wall? Did you not tell your mother in detail, 'If I return, give this back to me. But if I do not return

safely, then spend so much upon such and such an object, and give so much to So-and-So, and so much is to be for yourself’?”

When ‘Abbas heard these words he raised his hand in complete acceptance. “Prophet of God,” he said, “truly, I have always thought you carried the fortune of the old kings, such as Haman, Shaddad, Nimrod and the rest. But now that you have spoken I know this favor is divine, from the world beyond, from the throne of God.”

“Now you have spoken truly,” said Mohammed. “This time I have heard the snapping of the girdle of doubt, that you had within you. I have an ear hidden within my inmost Soul, and with that hidden ear I can hear the snapping of doubt within anyone. Now it is true for a fact that you believe.”

I have told this story to the Amir for this reason: In the beginning you came forward as a champion of Muslimdom. “I ransom myself,” you said. “I sacrifice my own desires, considerations and judgement so that Islam will remain secure and strong.” But because you put your trust in your own plans, loosing sight of God, and forgetting that all things proceed from God, all

your intentions have turned out the opposite. Having struck a bargain with the Tartars, you are unintentionally giving them assistance to destroy the Syrians and the Egyptians, which in the end may bring ruin to the realm of Islam. So God has turned this plan you made for the survival of Islam, into its own destruction.

Turn your face to God, for things are in a dangerous condition. Yet, even in your present state, my friend, do not give up hope, but look to God and give yourself up to Its will. You thought your own strength of spirit proceeded from yourself, just as 'Abbas and the prisoners did, thus you have fallen into weakness. But do not give up hope, because He, who can produce weakness from strength, can bring forth an even greater strength from this weakness. Just as Mohammed rejoiced during the prisoners' grief, so too I find joy in your present embarrassment, because from this weakness and suffering can come something greater than has been lost. Therefore, do not give up hope, for

*"Of God's comfort no one despairs,
Except the unbelievers."*

My purpose in speaking this way to the Amir was so that he could see the matter correctly, and accept the will of God humbly. He has fallen out of an exceedingly high state into a low state, yet in this way he may grow. Life can show the most wonderful things, but behind all of them lies a trap should we forget the source of this wonder. God has devised this plan so that we will learn not to claim, out of arrogance and vanity, these ideas and plans as our own.

If everything were in truth as it appears to be, Mohammed, endowed as he was with a vision so penetrating, so illuminated, would never have cried,

“Lord, show me things as they are.

You show a thing as fair, and in reality it is ugly.

You show a thing as ugly, and in truth it is beautiful.

Show us everything just as it is,

So that we will not fall into the snare.”

Now, your judgement, however good and luminous it may be, is certainly not better than the Prophet’s judgement. So do not put your trust in every idea and every notion, but only in God and Its wisdom.

discourse 2

Someone said: “Our Master does not utter a word.”

Rumi answered: Well, it was the thought of me that brought you to my presence. This thought of me did not speak with you saying, “How are things with you?” The thought without words drew you here. If the reality of me draws you without words and transports you to another place, what is so wonderful with words? Words are the shadow of reality, a mere branch of reality. Since the shadow draws, how much more the reality!

Words are a pretext. It is the inner bond that draws one person to another, not words. If someone should see a hundred thousand miracles and divine blessings, still, without an inner connection to that saint or prophet who was the source of those miracles, all these phenomena would come to nothing. It is this inward element that draws and moves us. If there were no element of amber

in straw, the straw would never be attracted to the amber [Rumi is referring to static electricity here]. They would not cling to each other, even if you rubbed the amber with fur. This exchange between them is hidden, not a visible thing.

It is the thought that brings us. The thought of a garden brings us to the garden. The thought of a shop brings us to the shop. However, within these thoughts is a secret deception. Have you never gone to a certain place thinking it would be good, only to find disappointment? These thoughts then are like a shroud, and within that shroud someone is hidden. The day reality draws you and the shroud of thought disappears, there will be no disappointment. Then you will see reality as it is, and nothing more.

“Upon that day when the secrets are tried.”

So, what reason is there for me to speak? In reality that which draws is a single thing, but it appears to be many. We are possessed by a hundred different desires. “I want vermicelli,” we say. “I want ravioli. I want halvah. I want fritters. I want fruit. I want dates.” We name these one by one, but the root of the matter is a single thing:

the root is hunger. Don't you see how, once we have our fill of but one thing, we say, "Nothing else is necessary?" Therefore, it was not ten or a hundred things, but one thing that drew us.

"And their number

We have appointed only as a trial."

The many things of this world are a trial appointed by God, for they hide the single reality. There is a saying that the saint is one, humankind is a hundred, meaning the saint's whole attention remains upon the one truth, while people are scattered over a hundred appearances. But which hundred? Which fifty? Which sixty? Lost in this world of mirrored reflections, they are a faceless people without hands and feet, without mind and Soul, quivering like a magic talisman, like quicksilver or mercury. They do not know who they are. Call them sixty or a hundred or a thousand, and the saint is one, but is not this view a trial itself? For the truth is that the hundreds are nothing, while the saint is a thousand, and a hundred thousand, and thousands of thousands.

A king once gave a single soldier the rations for a hundred men. The army protested, but the king

said nothing. When the day of battle arrived, all the men fled the field, except that one soldier who fought alone. “There you are,” the king said. “It was for this I fed one man as a hundred.”

It behooves us to strip away all our prejudices and seek out a friend of God. However, when we’ve spent our whole life in the company of people who lack discrimination, then our own discriminative faculty becomes weak, and that true friend may pass us by unrecognized.

Discrimination is a quality that is always hidden in a person. Don’t you see that an insane person possesses hands and feet but lacks discrimination? Discrimination is a subtle essence within you. Yet, day and night you have been occupied with nurturing the physical form that does not know right from wrong. Why have you devoted all your energies to looking after the physical, entirely neglecting that subtle essence? The physical exists through that essence, but that essence in no way depends on the physical.

The light that shines through the windows of the eyes and ears—if those windows did not exist, the light would not stop. It would find other win-

dows to shine through. If you bring a lamp before the sun, do you say, "I see the sun by means of this lamp"? God forbid! If you did not bring the lamp, the sun would still shine. What need is there for a lamp?

This is the danger in associating with kings. It is not that you may lose your life—we must lose our life in the end anyway, whether today or tomorrow does not matter. The danger arises from the fact that when kings enter upon the scene, and the spell of their influence gains strength, becoming like a great lamp, the person who keeps company with them, claims their friendship, and accepts money from them will inevitably speak in accordance with their desires. That person will listen to the kings' mundane views with the utmost attention, and will not be able to deny them.

That is where the danger lies, it leads to a fading respect for the true source. When you cultivate the interest of kings, that other interest which is fundamental to the spiritual life becomes a stranger to you. The more you proceed down the path of kings, the more that direction where the

Beloved dwells becomes lost. The more you make your peace with worldly people, the more the Beloved turns away from you. Going in their direction renders you subject to their rule. Once you have turned down their path, in the end God gives them power over you.

It is a pity to reach the ocean, and to be satisfied with a little pitcherful from the sea. After all, there are pearls in the sea, and from the sea come a myriad of precious things. What is the value in just taking water? What pride can intelligent people have in that? This world is a mere foam fleck of the True Sea. That Ocean is the science of the saints, and within that Water is the Pearl Itself.

This world is but foam full of floating jetsam. Yet, through the turning of the waves, and the rhythmic surging of the sea in constant motion, this foam takes on a certain beauty. But this beauty is a borrowed thing coming from elsewhere. It is a false coin that sparkles to the eye.

People are the astrolabe of God, but it requires an astronomer to use the astrolabe. If a vegetable-seller or a greengrocer should find the astrolabe, what good would it do them? From that astro-

labe, what could they know of the movements of the circling stars and the positions of the planets, their influences and so forth? But in the hands of the astronomer, the astrolabe becomes truly valuable.

Just as this copper astrolabe reflects the movements of the heavens like a mirror, so the human being is the astrolabe of God.

“We have honored the children of Adam.”

Those who have been moved by God to see the one reality and learn Its ways through the astrolabe of their own being, behold moment by moment, flash by flash, the testament of God. Indeed, it is an infinite beauty that never leaves their mirror.

God has servants who cloak themselves in a wisdom, knowingness and grace invisible to others. Out of their excessive jealousy and love for God these servants cloak themselves, just like Mutanabbi says of beautiful women:

*Figured silks they wore, not to beautify
But to guard their beauty from lustful eyes.*

discourse 3

The Amir said: “Night and day my heart and Soul are intent upon serving God, but because of my responsibilities with Mongol affairs I have no time for such service.”

Rumi answered: Those works too are work done for God, since they are the means of providing peace and security for your country. You sacrifice yourself, your possessions, your time, so the hearts of a few will be lifted to peacefully obeying God’s will. So this too is a good work. God has inclined you towards such good work, and your great love for what you do is proof of God’s blessing. However, if your love of work were to weaken, this would be a sign of grace denied, for God leads only those who are worthy into those right attitudes that will earn spiritual rewards.

Take the case of a hot bath. Its heat comes from the fuel that is burned, such as dry hay, firewood, dung and the like. In the same way, God uses what to outward appearance looks evil

and nasty, yet in reality is the means to cleanliness and purity. Like the bath, the man or woman fired by the efforts of work becomes purified and a benefit to all people.

(At this point some friends arrived. Rumi excused himself and said:) If I do not attend to you, and do not welcome you or ask after you, this is really a mark of respect. Respect is what is appropriate for the occasion. When someone is at prayer, they should not stop to greet their father and brother. Disregard of friends while being engaged in prayer is the highest regard, and the greatest courtesy, since that person does not break away from absorption with God on account of dear ones. This saves those loved ones from being subject to Divine reproach. Therefore, true respect is not a social pleasantry, but is concern for the spiritual honor of others.

Someone asked: "Is there any way nearer to God than prayer?"

Rumi answered: Yes, but it is also prayer. It is prayer without the outward form. This outer form of prayer is the body of prayer, since it has a beginning and ending. Everything that has a

beginning and ending is a body. All words and sounds have a beginning and an end, and therefore are form and body. But the inner soul of prayer is unconditioned and infinite, and has neither beginning nor end.

Now, Mohammed, who invented the Muslim prayer, said, "I have a time with God not contained by any prophet, nor limited by any angel next to God." Hence we realize that the soul of prayer is not the outer form alone. Rather it is a complete absorption, a state without room for these outward forms. Gabriel himself, who is pure reality, cannot be found therein.

It is related that one day friends found my father in a state of complete absorption. The hour of prayer arrived, and these friends called out to my father, "It is time for prayer." My father did not heed their words, so they arose and occupied themselves with the prayer. However, two friends stayed with my father and did not stand up to pray.

Now, one of those who were praying was named Khvajagi. It was shown to him clearly, in his inward heart, that all those who were at

prayer were standing behind the Prophet with their backs turned to Mecca, while the two who were with my father were facing Mecca. Since my father had passed away from any sense of personal identity, his self no longer remaining, having been consumed in the Light of God, he had become the Light of God.

Whoever turns their back on the Light of God, and faces the wall of their prayer-niche, has surely turned their back on Mecca. For God's light is the soul of the Mecca-ward direction.

Mohammed once rebuked a friend, saying, "I called you. Why didn't you come?" The friend replied, "I was occupied with prayer." The Prophet said, "Well, wasn't I calling you for God?" The friend answered, "I am helpless."

It is good to feel helpless every moment, seeing yourself helpless in success, just as in failure. For above your capacity there is a greater Capacity, and your will is subject to that greater Will in every case. You are not divided into two halves, now capable, now helpless. You are always helpless, only sometimes remembering, sometimes for-

getting. When you remember, then the heart of that moment becomes visible, and the way opens up before you. Indeed, what is our condition, seeing that lions, tigers and crocodiles are all helpless and tremble before God? Even the heavens and earth are helpless and subject to His decree.

God is a mighty emperor. Its Light is not like the light of the moon or sun where some form abides in its place. When God's Light shines forth unveiled, neither heaven nor earth remain. Neither sun nor moon. Nothing remains but that great Reality.

A certain king said to a dervish, "In the moment when you find revelation and propinquity in the Court of God, remember me." The dervish replied, "When I come into that Presence, and the Light of that Sun shines upon me, I will no more remember myself. How then can I remember you?"

Even still, make a request of such a dervish, who is utterly absorbed, and even without them mentioning you or your needs in God's presence still the request is fulfilled.

There was once a king who had a favorite and highly confidential servant. Whenever that servant set out for the royal palace, people who had a request to make presented him with their histories and their letters, begging him to submit them to the king. He would place the documents in his wallet. On coming into the king's presence, he could not endure the splendor of the king's beauty, and would fall down dumfounded. The king would then, in a loving manner, put his hand into his wallet, saying, "What does this servant of mine have here, who is utterly absorbed in my beauty?"

In this way he found the letters and would endorse the petitions of every man and woman, and then return the documents into the wallet. So he would attend to the needs of every one of them, without that servant ever submitting them, so that not a single one was rejected. On the contrary, their demands were granted many times over, and they attained far more than they had asked for. But in the case of other servants who retained consciousness, and were able to present and indicate to the king the histories of the people

in need—out of a hundred requests and a hundred needs, only one might be fulfilled.

discourse 4

Someone said: “There is something I have forgotten.”

Rumi replied: There is one thing in this world that must never be forgotten. If you were to forget all else, but did not forget that, then you would have no reason to worry. But if you performed and remembered everything else, yet forgot that one thing, then you would have done nothing whatsoever.

It is just as if a king sent you to the country to carry out a specific task. If you go and accomplish a hundred other tasks, but do not perform that particular task, then it is as though you performed nothing at all. So, everyone comes into this world for a particular task, and that is their purpose. If they do not perform it, then they will have done nothing.

All things are assigned a task. The heavens send rain and light for the herbs of the field to germinate and spring into life. The earth receives the

seeds and bears fruit, it accepts and reveals a hundred thousand marvels too numerous to tell. The mountains give forth mines of gold and silver. All these things the heavens, the earth and the mountains do, yet they do not perform that one thing; that particular task is performed by us.

*“We offered the Trust to the heavens,
The earth and the mountains,
They refused to carry it and were afraid of it,
But humans carried it.
Surely they are foolish and sinful.”*

So, people are given a task, and when they perform it all their sinfulness and foolishness is dissolved.

You say, “Look at all the work I do accomplish, even if I do not perform that task.” You weren’t created for those other tasks! It is just as if you were given a sword of priceless Indian steel, such as can only be found in the treasuries of kings, and you were to treat it as a butcher’s knife for cutting up putrid meat, saying, “I am not letting this sword stand idle, I am using it in so many useful ways.” Or it is like taking a solid gold bowl to cook turnips in, when a single grain of that gold could buy a hundred pots. Or it is as if you

took a Damascene dagger of the finest temper to hang a broken gourd from, saying, "I am making good use of it. I am hanging a gourd on it. I am not letting this dagger go to waste." How foolish that would be! The gourd can hang perfectly well from a wooden or iron nail whose value is a mere farthing, so why use a dagger valued at a hundred pounds?

A poet once said:

You are more precious than heaven and earth.

What more can I say?

You do not know your own worth.

God says, "I will buy you...your moments, your breaths, your possessions, your lives. Spend them on Me. Turn them over to Me, and their price is divine freedom, grace and wisdom. This is your worth in My eyes." But if we keep our life for ourself, then we lose what treasures we have been granted. Like the person who hammered the dagger, worth a hundred pounds into the wall to hang a gourd upon, their great fortune was reduced to a nail.

Still you offer another excuse, saying, "But I apply myself to lofty tasks. I study law, philosophy, logic, astronomy, medicine and the rest."

Well, for whose sake but your own do you study these? If it is law, it is so nobody can steal a loaf from you, strip you of your clothes, or kill you—in short, it is for your own security. If it is astronomy, the phases of the spheres and their influence upon the earth, whether they are light or heavy, portending tranquility or danger, all these things are concerned with your own situation, serving your own ends. If it is medicine, it is related to your own health and also serves you. When you consider this matter well, the root of all your studies is yourself. All these lofty tasks are but branches of you.

If these subjects are filled with so many marvels and worlds of knowledge without end, consider what worlds you pass through who are the root! If your branches have their laws, their medicines, their histories, think of what transpires within you who are the source; what spiritual laws and medicines affect your inward future and fate, what histories portray your struggles of the heart!

For Soul there is other food besides this food of sleeping and eating, but you have forgotten that other food. Night and day you nourish only your body. Now, this body is like a horse, and this

lower world is its stable. The food the horse eats is not the food of the rider. You are the rider and have your own sleeping and eating, your own enjoyment. But since the animal has the upper hand, you lag behind in the horse's stable. You cannot be found among the ranks of kings and princes in the eternal world. Your heart is there, but since your body has the upper hand, you are subject to its rule and remain its prisoner.

When Majnun, as the story goes, was making for his beloved Laila's home, as long as he was fully conscious he drove his camel in that direction. But when for a moment he became absorbed in the thought of Laila and forgot his camel, the camel turned in its tracks toward the village where its foal was kept. On coming to his senses, Majnun found that he had gone back a distance of two day's journey. For three months he continued this way, coming no closer to his goal. Finally he jumped off the camel, saying, "This camel is the ruin of me!" and continued on foot, singing:

My camel's desire is now behind,

My own desire is before.

Our purposes were crossed,

We can agree no more.

Burhan al-Din was once greeted by someone, who said, "I have heard praises of you sung by friends." Burhan al-Din answered, "Wait until I meet your friends to see whether they know me well enough to praise me. If they know me only by word of mouth, then they do not truly know me. For words do not endure. Syllables and sounds do not endure. This body, these lips and this mouth will not endure. All these things are mere accidents of the moment. But if they know me by my works, and they know my essential self, then I know they are able to praise me, and that praise will go where it belongs."

This is like the story they tell of a certain king. This king entrusted his son to a team of learned scholars. In due course, they taught him the sciences of astrology, geomancy, and the interpretation of signs, until he became a complete master, despite his utter stupidity and dullness of wit.

One day the king took a ring in his fist and put his son to the test.

"Come, tell me what I am holding in my fist."

"What you are holding is round, yellow, inscribed and hollow," the prince answered.

“You have given all the signs correctly,” the king said. “Now say what it is.”

“It must be a sieve.” the prince replied.

“What?” cried the king. “You know all the minute details, which would baffle the minds of anyone. How is it that out of all your powerful learning and knowledge, the small point has escaped you that a sieve will not fit in a fist?”

In this same way, the great scholars of the age split hairs on details of all matters. They know perfectly and completely those sciences that do not concern Soul. But as for what is truly of importance and touches us more closely than anything else, namely our own Self, this your great scholars do not know. They make statements about everything, saying, “This is true and that is not true. This is right and that is wrong.” Yet, they do not know their own Self, whether it is true or false, pure or impure.

Now being hollow and yellow, inscribed and circular, these features are accidental; cast the ring into the fire and none of them will remain. It becomes its essential self, purified of all appearances. So it is with the knowledge of scholars;

what they know has no connection with the essential reality that alone exists when all these “signs” are gone. They speak wisely, expound at great length, and finally pronounce that what the king has in his hand is a sieve. They have no knowledge about the root of the matter: life’s purpose.

I am a bird. I am a nightingale. If they say to me, “Make some other kind of sound,” I cannot. My tongue is what it is. I cannot speak otherwise. However, those who learn the song of birds are not birds themselves—on the contrary, they are the enemies of birds and their captors. They sing and whistle so others will take them for birds. Ask them to produce a different sound and they can do so, because that sound is merely assumed by them. It is not truly their own. Like the scholars, they are able to sing other songs because they have learned to rob those songs, and to show off a different tune stolen from every breast.

discourse 5

The Amir, surprised by an unexpected visit from Rumi, said: “Master, how gracious of you to honor me in this way. I never expected this. It never even entered my mind that I could be worthy of such an honor. By rights I should be standing night and day in the ranks and company of your servants and attendants. I’m not even worthy of that. How gracious this is!”

Rumi said: It is all because of your lofty spiritual aspirations. The higher and greater your rank and the more you become occupied with important, exalted worldly affairs, the more you consider yourself to have fallen short of your spiritual purpose. You are not satisfied with what you have achieved, thinking that you have too many obligations. Since none of these attainments can blind you from that divine attainment, my heart is moved to serving you. And yet for all that, still, I wanted to pay you formal honor as well.

Form too possesses great importance. No, much more than importance—it is of true sub-

stance. Just as the body will fail if it lacks a heart, so too it fails without a skin. If you plant a seed with no husk, it cannot grow, but if you bury it in the earth with its shell, then it germinates and becomes a great tree. So, form is a great and necessary principle, and without it our task fails and our purpose is not attained. Yes, this principle is reality in the eyes of those who know reality and have become reality!

A dervish once entered the presence of a king. The king addressed him, "Oh, ascetic."

"You are the ascetic," the dervish answered.

"How can I be an ascetic," the king demanded, "since the whole world belongs to me?"

"Ah, you see things the opposite of what they are," replied the dervish. "This world and the next and all that there is to possess, these all belong to me. I have seized the whole world. It is you who have become satisfied with a mouthful and a rag."

Wherever you turn, there is the Face of God. This Face runs and extends infinitely and forever. True spiritual lovers have sacrificed themselves for the sake of that Face, desiring nothing in return. The rest of the human race are like cattle.

Yet, even though they are cattle, still they deserve favor. They may live in the stable, yet they are accepted by the Lord of the stable. If He so desires, He transfers them from this stable into His private pen. So, in the beginning God brought men and women into existence, and then transferred them from the pen of spiritual existence into the world inanimate. Then from the pen of the world inanimate into the vegetable world. Then from vegetable into animal. From animal to human, human to angel, and so on forever. He manifested all these forms so that you would know His pens are many, and that each one is loftier than the next.

God revealed this present world so that you could accept the other stages that lie ahead. He did not reveal it so that you would say, "This is all there is." The masters of crafts demonstrate their abilities and arts so their apprentices will find faith in them, and will believe in the other arts they have not yet demonstrated. A king bestows robes of honor and lavishes kindness on his subjects because they look forward to receiving other gifts from him, and hang hopefully upon future

purses of gold. He does not grant these things for them to say, "This is all there is. The king will not give out any other blessings," and so make do with that amount. If the king knows any subjects are going to say that, and take such gifts for granted, he will never bestow any blessings whatsoever upon them.

The ascetic is one who sees the hereafter, while the worldling sees only the stable. But the chosen ones of God, who have true knowledge, see neither the hereafter nor the stable. Their eyes are fixed on the first principle, the source of all things. When the chosen one sows wheat they know that wheat will grow, because they see the end from the beginning. So it is with barley and rice and all things—seeing the beginning, their eyes are not fixed on the end. They know the conclusion from the start. Such men and women are rare.

It is pain that guides us in every enterprise. Until there is an ache within, a passion and a yearning for that thing arising within us, we will never strive to attain it. Without pain it remains beyond our reach, whether it is success in this world or salvation in the next, whether we aim at

becoming a merchant or a king, a scientist or an astronomer. It was not until the pains of birth manifested in Mary that she made for the tree. Those pangs drove her to the tree, and the tree that was withered became fruitful.

We are like that story of Mary in the Koran. Every one of us has a Jesus within, but until the pangs manifest, our Jesus is not born. If the pangs never come, then our child rejoins its origin by the same secret path through which it came, leaving us empty, without the birth of our true self.

Your inward soul is hungry.

Your outward flesh is over fed.

The devil has gorged to sickness.

The king begs even for bread.

The cure is found while Jesus is here on earth!

But once he returns to heaven,

all hope will have fled.

discourse 6

Rumi said: These words are for the sake of those who need words to understand. But as for those who understand without words, what use have they for speech? The heavens and earth are words to them, sent forth themselves from the Word of God. Whoever hears a whisper, what need have they for shouting and screaming?

An Arabic speaking poet once came into the presence of a king. Now the king was a Turk, and did not even know Persian. The poet had composed in his honor some brilliant verses in Arabic, and had brought these with him. When the king had taken his seat on the throne and the courtiers were all present and duly stationed, commanders and ministers each in their place, the poet rose to his feet and began to recite his poem. At every passage deserving applause the king nodded his head, while at every passage provoking astonishment he looked amazed. Similarly, he responded to every passage expressing submission. The courtiers were astounded.

“Our king did not know a word of Arabic,” they murmured amongst themselves. “How is it that he nodded his head so correctly? He must have known Arabic all these years and kept it hidden from us. If we have ever uttered incivilities in Arabic, then woe is us!”

Now the king had a favorite slave. So the courtiers assembled together and gave the slave a horse, a mule, and a sum of money, and they promised to give him this much again. “Just find out whether or not the king knows Arabic,” they said to him. “If he does not, how was it that he nodded just at the right places? Was it a miracle? Was it divine inspiration?”

Finally one day the slave found his opportunity. The king was out hunting, and the slave perceived that he was in a good mood, since the hunt had gone well. So he asked the king point blank. The king burst out laughing.

“By God, I don’t know Arabic,” he said. “As for nodding and applauding, I knew of course what the poet’s object was in composing that poem, and so I nodded and applauded.”

So it was realized that the root of the matter was the purpose desired; the poem itself was

merely the branch of that purpose. If it had not been for that purpose, the poet would never have composed that poem.

If our real purpose is kept in view, duality vanishes. Duality shows the branches, but the root is one. It is the same with Sufi sheikhs. Although to outward appearance they have various styles of teaching and differ widely in their social standing, even in their action and words, yet from the standpoint of their purpose they all have one goal, namely the quest for God.

Take the case of the wind. When it blows through a house it lifts the edges of the carpet, and the rugs flap and move about. It whisks sticks and straws into the air, ruffles the surface of the pool until it looks like a coat of mail, sets trees and twigs and leaves a-dancing. All those conditions appear distinct and different, yet from the standpoint of the object, the root and reality, they are one thing—the movement of the wind.

Someone said: “I have neglected that true purpose.”

Rumi replied: When this thought enters a person’s mind and they criticize themselves, saying, “What am I about, and why do I do these

things?” When this happens, it is a sure proof that God loves them and cares for them. “Love continues so long as reprimands continue,” said the poet. We may reprimand our friends, but we never reprimand a stranger.

Now there are levels of reprimand. When a person is stung by it and sees the truth in it, that is a sign that God loves them and cares for them. But if the reprimand flies by that person without causing any pain at all, then this is no sign of love. When a carpet is beaten to get rid of the dust, intelligent people do not call that a reprimand. But if a woman beats her own darling child, then that is called a reprimand and is a proof of her love. Therefore, as long as you find pain and regret within yourself, that is a proof of God’s love and guidance.

If you find fault in your brother or sister, the fault you see in them is within yourself. The true Sufi is like a mirror where you see your own image, for “The believer is a mirror of their fellow believers.” Get rid of those faults in yourself, because what bothers you in them bothers you in yourself.

An elephant was led to a well to drink. Seeing itself in the water, it shied away. It thought it was shying away from another elephant. It did not realize it was shying away from its own self.

All evil qualities—oppression, hatred, envy, greed, mercilessness, pride—when they are within yourself, they bring no pain. When you see them in another, then you shy away and feel the pain. We feel no disgust at our own scab and abscess. We will dip our infected hand into our food and lick our fingers without turning in the least bit squeamish. But if we see a tiny abscess or half a scratch on another's hand, we shy away from that person's food and have no stomach for it whatsoever. Evil qualities are just like scabs and abscesses; when they are within us they cause no pain, but when we see them even to a small degree in another, then we feel pain and disgust.

Just as you shy away from your brother or sister, so you should excuse them for shying away from you. The pain you feel comes from those faults, and they see the same faults. The seeker of truth is a mirror for their neighbors. But those who cannot feel the sting of truth are not mirrors

to anyone but themselves.

A certain king was sitting, dejected, on the bank of a river. The generals were nervous and afraid of him. His face would not clear up no matter what they tried. Now he had a jester whom he treated as a great favorite. The generals promised the jester a certain sum of money if he could make the king laugh. So the jester approached the king, but despite all his efforts the king would not so much as look at him. The king kept staring into the river and did not lift his head at all.

“What do you see in the water?” the jester asked the king.

“I see the husband of an unfaithful wife,” the king replied.

“King of the world,” the jester said, “your slave is also not blind.”

So it is in your own case. If you see something in your fellow that pains you, after all they also are not blind. They see exactly what you see.

In God’s presence two I’s cannot exist. You cannot know your self and God’s Self; either die before God, or God will die before you so that

duality will not remain. But as for God's dying, that is both impossible and inconceivable, for God is the Living, the Immortal. So gracious is He that if it were at all possible He would die for your sake. Since that is not possible, then you must die so that God can reveal Himself to you, and duality can vanish.

Tie two birds together, and despite their familiarity and the fact that their two wings have been changed to four, they will not fly. That is because duality exists. But let one bird give up its life and the other—even though tied to the first—will fly, because duality has vanished.

Shams-i-Tabriz was a servant of God who had the power to sacrifice himself for the sake of a friend. He prayed to God for that friend, but God did not accept his petition. "I do not want you to help him," came a voice. Shams, that son of the Sun [Shams-i-Tabriz means literally Sun of Tabriz,] persisted and would not cease his requests, saying, "O God, you have implanted this desire for him, and it will not leave me." Finally a voice came saying, "Do you desire that this should come to pass? Then sacrifice your self,

and become nothing. Do not wait, and leave this world behind.” “Lord,” Shams answered, “I am content.” So he did; he gambled away his life for the sake of that Friend, and his desire was accomplished. [The friend in this story is Rumi himself. Shams was chased away by jealous followers of Rumi, but Rumi sent for Shams and Shams eventually returned. It is said that those jealous followers, including one of Rumi’s own sons, later murdered Shams. Rumi’s search for the missing Shams, only to find the One he sought for within himself, is the source of many of Rumi’s poems.]

If a servant of God can possess such grace as to sacrifice his life, of which one day’s portion is worth the life of all the world from first to last, does not the Source of that grace also possess this love? It would be absurd to think otherwise. But since it is not possible for God to pass away, at least you can.

A fool came and sat in a seat above one of the great saints. What difference does it make to the saints whether such a person is above or below the lamp? If the lamp wants to be on high, it does not desire that for its own sake. Its purpose is for

the benefit of others, so they can enjoy their share of the light. Wherever the lamp may be, whether below or above, it is still the lamp of the Eternal Sun. If the saint seeks worldly rank and office, it is for this purpose: They desire to snare those worldlings, who do not have the vision to see their true elevation, with a trap of worldly rank. Through this they may find their way to the higher worlds, and fall into the trap of divine grace.

In this same way, the Prophet, Mohammed did not conquer Mecca and the surrounding lands because he was in need of them. He conquered in order to give life and grant light to all people. "This is a hand accustomed to give, it is not accustomed to take." The saints beguile people in order to bestow gifts on them, not to take anything away.

When someone lays a trap and catches little birds to eat and sell, that is called cunning. But if a king lays a trap to capture an untutored and worthless hawk, having no knowledge of its own true nature, to train it to his own forearm so that it may become ennobled, that is not called cunning. Though to outward appearance it is cun-

ning, yet it is known to be the very acme of caring and generosity, restoring the dead to life, converting the base stone into a ruby, and far more than that. If the hawk knew for what reason the king wanted to capture it, it would not require any bait. It would search for the trap with soul and heart, and would fly to the king's hand.

People only listen to the outward significance of the saints' words. They say, "We've heard plenty of this. Our hearts are stuffed full of words of this kind." God says, "God forbid that you should be full of them! You are full of your own whisperings and vain conceits. You are full of illusion and greed. Nay, you are full of cursing."

If only they were empty of such ravings! Then they would be open to receive these words. But they are not open to receive them. God has set a seal upon their ears and eyes and hearts. Their eyes see things the opposite of what they are; they hear wisdom as gibberish and raving. Their hearts have been transformed into a home of self-love and vanity. A winter's tangle of dark shapes and pride has possessed them. Their hearts are hardened with ice and frost.

*“God has set a seal on their hearts
And their hearing,
And on their eyes is a covering.”*

How likely is it that such people could be full of these true words? They have never caught so much as a whiff of them. They have never tasted a drop in all their lives—neither they nor those they worship, nor their miserable household. God shows a pitcher to everyone. To some It shows the pitcher full of water, and they drink until they are sated. But to some God shows it empty. What thanks can someone give for an empty pitcher? Only those, whom God shows the pitcher full, find thanks for this gift.

discourse 7

The son of the Amir entered. Rumi said: Your father is always occupied with God. His faith is overwhelming, and reveals itself in his words. One day your father said, “The people of Rum have urged me to give my daughter in marriage to the Tartars, so that our religion may become one, and this new religion of Muslimdom can disappear.”

I said, “When has religion ever been one? There have always been two or three, and they have always had war and fighting between them. How do you expect to make religion one? It will be one only in the next world, at the resurrection. As for this present world, it isn’t possible here, for here each religion has a different desire and design. Here unity is impossible. It will be possible only at the resurrection, when humanity becomes one and all people fix their eyes on one place, and all have one ear and one tongue.”

Within us are many things. There is mouse in us, and there is bird. The bird carries the cage

upwards, while the mouse drags it down. A hundred thousand different wild beasts are together within us, but they are all converging on that moment when the mouse will renounce its mousehood and the bird its birdhood, and all become one. For the goal is neither going up or down. When the goal shows itself clearly, it will be neither above nor below.

A woman lost something. She looks left and right, in front and behind. Once she has found that thing she no longer searches above and below, left and right, in front or behind. All at once she becomes calm and collected. Similarly, on the resurrection day all people will be of one eye, tongue, ear and understanding.

When ten friends share a garden or a shop in common, they speak as one, they plan as one, and their work is with one thing since their objective is the same. So, on the resurrection day, since the affair of all will be with God, they will all be one.

In this world everyone is preoccupied with a separate affair. One is in love with women, one is in love with wealth, another is engaged in acquiring possessions, another in acquiring knowledge. Everyone believes that their cure, their joy, their

pleasure and comfort can be found in that one thing. And that is a Divine mercy, because when they search they cannot find, and so they return. After they have waited a while, they say again, "That joy and pleasure must be looked for. Perhaps I didn't try hard enough. I will search again." Then they look again, but still they cannot find their desire. So they continue, until that time when Truth removes Its veil. Then they know.

But God has certain servants who know even before the resurrection. Ali [cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed] said, "Even if the veil was removed, my faith would not increase." That is to say, "Even when the body is gone and the resurrection appears, my certainty can become no greater." This is like a group of people at prayer on a dark night; they turn their faces in every direction, being unable to see. When day comes they all turn themselves around, except for that one individual who through the night was facing towards Mecca. Why should that individual turn around? So, those special servants of God keep their faces towards the One even in the night, and

have turned their faces away from all else. Therefore, for them, the resurrection is already manifest and present.

There is no end to words, but they are given according to the capacity of the seeker.

Wisdom is like the rain. Its supply is unlimited, but it comes down according to what the occasion requires—in winter and spring, in summer and autumn, always in due measure, more or less, but the source of that rain is the oceans itself, which has no limits. Druggists put sugar or drugs in a twist of paper, but sugar is not limited by the amount in the paper. The stocks of sugar and the stocks of drugs are unlimited and unbounded; how can a piece of paper contain them?

Some people uttered taunts at Mohammed, saying, “Why does the Koran come down upon you word by word? Why not chapter by chapter?” Mohammed answered, “What do these fools say? If it were to come down upon me all at once, I would dissolve and vanish away.”

Those who truly understand a little, understand much; of one thing, many things; of one line, whole volumes. It is like when a group is

seated listening to a story, but one woman knows all the circumstances, having been there when it occurred. From the first hint she understands it all. She turns pale, then crimson, changing from one feeling to another. The others understand only as much as they hear, since they do not know what really happened. But the one who knows understands the whole story from even a few words.

To return: When you come to the druggist, they have sugar in abundance. But they see how much money you brought, and give accordingly. By “money” is meant sincerity and faith. The words are imparted according to one’s sincerity and faith. When you come seeking sugar, they examine your bag to see what its capacity is, then they measure out accordingly, one bushel or two. But if someone brings a string of camels, they call the weighmen to be help.

So, someone comes along whom oceans do not satisfy; another finds a few drops enough and any more would be harmful.

This applies not only to the world of ideas, sciences and wisdom. It is true of everything.

Property, wealth, gold, all are unbounded and infinite, but they are imparted according to the capacity of the individual. Who could support an endless supply without being driven mad? Do you not see how Majnun and Farhad, and the other famous lovers, took to the mountain and desert for the love of a woman, when they were filled with a passion beyond their power to control? Do you not see how Pharaoh, when empire and wealth were showered upon him without end, laid claim to being a god?

Yes, indeed these people have faith, but they do not know what that faith is in. In the same way a child has faith it will have bread to eat, but they don't know where this bread comes from. It is the same with all things that grow. A tree turns yellow and dry of thirst, but it doesn't know what thirst really is.

Our faith is like a flag. First we set the flag fluttering in the air to proclaim our belief, and then send troops to the foot of that flag from every direction to support and defend it. We send reason, understanding, fury and anger, forbearance and liberality, fear and hope, on and on

without end. Whoever looks from afar sees only the flag, but those who see from close at hand know the essences and realities that reside within us.

Someone came in and Rumi said: Where have you been? We have been longing to see you. Why have you stayed away?

The visitor replied, "It was just how things conspired."

Rumi said: We, for our part, have been praying that this conspiracy of things might come to an end. A conspiracy of things that produces separation is an improper conspiracy. Yes, by God, it too comes from God, and in relation to God is good. It is a true saying, that all things are good and perfect in relation to God, but in relation to us, how can this be true? Fornication and purity, avoiding prayer and praying, unbelief and Islam, idolatry and God's unity—with God all these are good. But to us, fornication and thieving, unbelief and idolatry are bad, while God's unity and prayer are good. Even though in relation to God all are good.

A king has in his realm prisons and gallows, robes of honor and wealth, estates and attendants in waiting, feasting and celebration, drums and flags. In relation to the king all these things are good. Just as robes of honor are the perfect flourish for his kingdom, in the same way gallows and prisons are perfect ornaments. In relation to him all these things are perfect, but in relation to his people how could robes of honor and the gallows be one and the same?

discourse 8

Someone asked: "What is greater than prayer?"

Rumi said: One answer is that the soul of prayer is greater than prayer, as I have already explained. A second answer is that faith is greater.

Prayer is a series of daily actions, while faith is continuous. Prayer can be dropped for a valid reason, or can be postponed, but it is impossible to drop or postpone faith for any excuse. And where prayer without faith gains nothing, as in the case of hypocrites, faith without prayer is valuable. Another point: while the prayer of every religion is each quite different, still, faith does not change from religion to religion. The states that it produces, its place in life, and its effects are the same everywhere.

There are other advantages to faith, but their discovery depends upon the inward awareness of the listener. Each listener is like flour in the hands of a dough-maker. Words are like water sprinkled on the flour according to the moisture needed. But unless the water soaks in, it cannot make dough.

A poet said:

My eye is fixed upon another, what shall I do?

Look to yourself, for that eye's light is you.

“My eye is fixed upon another.” That means you are seeking something apart from yourself, like the dryness of the flour that longs for water from the dough-maker’s hand. “What can I do?” Know that you seek only yourself, that longing is for you. The light you seek is your own light reflected, but you will not escape this blinding glare of the outward lights until your own Inner Light becomes a hundred thousand times greater.

There was once a skinny person, feeble as a sparrow, and exceedingly ugly. He was so ugly that even other ugly people looked on him with contempt and gave thanks to God, though before seeing him they used to complain of their own ugliness. Yet, for all that, he was very rude in his way of speaking and bragged enormously. He was in the court of the king, and his behavior pained the vizier, but the vizier swallowed it down. Then one day the vizier lost his temper.

“People of the court,” he shouted. “I picked this creature out of the gutter and nourished him. By eating my bread and sitting at my table, by

enjoying my charity and my wealth, and that of my ancestors, he became somebody. Now he has reached the point of saying such things to me!”

“People of the court,” cried the man, springing up in the vizier’s face, “and nobles and pillars of the state! What he says is quite true. I was nourished by his wealth and charity and that of his ancestors until I grew up, contemptible and crude as you see me. If I had been nourished by someone else’s bread and wealth, surely my appearance, my manners and my worth would have been better than this. He picked me out of the gutter; but all I can say is; Oh, I wish that I were dust. If someone else had picked me out of the gutter, I would not have been such a laughing stock.”

The disciple, who is fed at the table of a lover of God, has a clean and true spirit. But those who are nourished by the hands of an imposter and a braggart, learning the science from them, become just like their teacher, contemptible and feeble, weak and unable to make up their minds about anything.

Within our being all sciences were originally joined as one, so that our spirit displayed all hid-

den things, like clear water shows everything within it—pebbles, broken shards and the like—and reflects the sky above from its surface like a mirror. This is Soul's true nature, without treatment or training. But once Soul has mingled with the earth and its earthly elements, this clarity leaves it and is forgotten. So God sends forth the prophets and saints, like a great translucent ocean that accepts all waters, and yet no matter how dark or dirty are the rivers that pour into it, that ocean remains pure. Then Soul remembers. When it sees its reflection in that unsullied water, it knows for sure that in the beginning it too was pure, and these shadows and colors are mere accidents.

The prophets and the saints, therefore, remind us of our original state; they do not implant anything new. Now, every water, no matter how dark, that recognizes that great water, saying, "I come from this and I belong to this," is truly a part of that ocean. But the dark elements that do not recognize that ocean and believe they are kin to another kind, they make their home with the colors and shadows of the earth.

It was for this reason that the Prophet said, "Now there comes to you a Messenger from amongst yourselves." In other words, the great ocean is that same substance as your own water, it is all from one self and one source. But for those elements that do not feel the attraction of familiarity, this failure does not come from the water itself, but from the pollution in that water. This pollution is mixed in so closely that the water does not know whether its own shying away from the ocean comes from itself, or from the essence of that pollution. And so, evil men do not know whether their attraction toward evil springs from their own nature, or from some dark element mingled in.

Every line of poetry the saints and prophets bring forth, every tradition, every verse they write, is like a witness bearing testimony. They bear witness to every situation according to the nature of the situation. In the same way we have two witnesses at the inheritance of a house, two witnesses at the sale of a shop, two witnesses at a marriage. So too, the saints bear witness. The inner form of their testimony is always the same;

it is the outer meaning that differs. I pray that God may cause these words to bear witness to God and you alike.

discourse 9

Someone said: “A man came who wanted to see you. He kept saying, ‘I wish I could have seen the Master.’”

Rumi said: He does not see the Master at this moment because in truth the desire that filled him, namely to see the Master, was a veil hiding the Master. So it is with all desires and affections, all loves and fondnesses that people have for every variety of thing—father, mother, heaven, earth, gardens, palaces, knowledge, things to eat and drink. The lover of God realizes all these desires are truly the desire for God, and they are all veils covering humanity’s eyes. When we pass into the next world and behold Reality without these veils, then we realize all those were veils and coverings, and that our true quest in reality is for one thing. All difficulties are then resolved, we hear in our hearts the answer to all questions, and everything is seen clearly face to face.

It is not God’s way to answer every problem separately, but with one answer all questions are

satisfied. All at once the total struggle is resolved. In the same way, in winter everyone puts on warm clothes and a leather jacket, and then creeps for shelter from the cold. So too all plants, trees, and shrubs, bitten by the cold, remain without leaves and fruit, storing and hiding their goods and nourishment inwardly so that the grasp of winter will not reach them. When spring, in a single epiphany, answers their requests, then all their various problems, whether human, animal or plant, are resolved, and those secondary symptoms disappear. Then all put forth their heads, and realize the cause of their misery.

God has created these veils for a good purpose. For if God's beauty were displayed without a veil, we would not have the power to endure it. Through the intermediary of these veils we derive life and enjoyment.

Look at the sun. Through its light we can distinguish good from bad, and find warmth. Trees and orchards become fruitful from its heat, and their fruits—unripe, sour and bitter, become mature and sweet. Through its influence, mines of gold and silver, rubies and carnelians are produced. But if the sun were to come nearer it

would bring no benefit whatsoever. On the contrary, the whole world and every creature would be burned up and destroyed.

When God reveals Itself through a veil to the mountain, those slopes become fully arrayed in trees and flowers and verdure. However, when God brings revelation without a veil, It destroys the mountain and breaks it into atoms.

Someone asked: "Well, isn't this the same sun in the winter?"

Rumi answered: Our purpose here was to draw a comparison. It is not a matter of atoms, or Adam. Similarity is one thing, comparison is another. Although our mind cannot comprehend that reality, yet how can mind abandon the effort? If our reason gave up the struggle, it would no longer be reason. Reason is that thing that perpetually, night and day, is restless while thinking and struggling, striving to comprehend, even though God is unknowable and incomprehensible.

Reason is like a moth, and the Beloved is like a candle. Whenever the moth dashes itself against the candle, it is consumed and destroyed, but the

moth is this way by nature. No matter how much that consuming flame and agony may hurt, the moth cannot fly from the candle. If there were another creature like the moth that could not fly away from the light of the candle, and dashed itself against that light, that would not be a mere comparison, that would be a moth itself. But if the moth dashed itself against the light of the candle and the moth were not consumed, that indeed could not be a candle.

Therefore, the human being who can do without God, lacking even the desire, that is no human being at all. But if they are able to comprehend God, that indeed could not be God. So, the true lover is never free from striving, they revolve restlessly and ceaselessly around the light of God. And God consumes them, making them nothing, destroying the veil of their reason.

discourse 10

The Amir said to Rumi: “Before you arrived just now, your eldest son, Baha al-Din, excused himself to me, saying, ‘My father said that he doesn’t want to put you to any trouble when you come to visit him. He says, “I am subject to various states of consciousness. In one state I speak, and in another I do not. In one state I attend to the affairs of others, and in another state I withdraw and go into retreat, while in yet another state I am utterly absorbed and beyond this world. I do not wish the Amir to come when I’m in a state of being that is disagreeable, when I am unable to counsel and converse with him. Therefore, it is better that when I am free and able to attend

to my friends and do them some good, that I should go out and visit them.””

The Amir went on: “I answered Baha al-Din, saying, ‘I do not come here so that our Master should attend to me and converse with me. My purpose in coming is to have the honor of being

amongst the company of his servants.’ For example, just now you were preoccupied and did not show yourself until you had kept me waiting for a long time. This was so I would realize how difficult and disagreeable it is if I keep others waiting when they come to my door and I do not readily admit them. You have made me taste the bitterness of that and have given me a lesson so that I will not act like that with others.”

Rumi answered: That’s not true. On the contrary, my keeping you waiting is an expression of utmost loving-kindness. Just as God declares, “O my child, I would answer your smallest petition and slightest complaint without delay, if it weren’t that the voice of your complaint is so sweet to my ears. My answer lingers unspoken in hopes that you might complain again and again, for the sound of your voice is so sweet to me.”

For example, two beggars come to the door of a certain person. One is highly loved and sought after, while the other is disliked. The owner of the house says to a slave, “Give that hated one a piece of bread quickly and without delay, so he will leave right away.” To the other beloved beggar

the owner makes promises, saying, "The bread is not yet baked. Wait patiently until the bread is properly cooked and baked."

My greater desire is to see my friends, to gaze my fill upon them and they on me. For when friends see deeply into one another here, below, and they are raised into the other world after become very familiar here, they quickly recognize one another there. Knowing how closely they were together in the world of mortality, their reuniting brings great joy.

For all too quickly we lose our friends. Do you not see how in this mortal world you become the friend and darling of some person, and they become the very Joseph of beauty in your eyes. Then, on account of a single shameful act they vanish from your sight, and you lose them completely? That Joseph-like form is changed into a wolf. This very same one you once saw as Joseph you now see as a wolf. Yet, their actual form has not changed, but is still the same as it always was. By that one accidental act you lost them. Tomorrow, when this present essence is changed

into another essence, since you never really knew that person deeply, and never penetrated thoroughly into their essence, how are you going to recognize them?

The lesson to be learned from this is that we must see one another very well indeed. We must pass beyond the good and bad qualities that are present temporarily in everyone, and must enter into the other's very essence. We must see with exceptional clarity that these qualities people observe in one another are not their original qualities.

The story is told of a man, who said, "I know that fellow very well. I will give his distinguishing mark." His friends said, "Please do." The man answered, "He was a muleteer of mine. He had two black cows." People talk in this same way. "I consider So-and-so my friend. I know them." Yet every distinguishing mark they give is just like the two black cows. Those are not distinguishing marks. Those marks are of no use whatever.

So, we must pass beyond the good and evil in others and enter into their essence to see what

they really are. That is truly seeing and knowing.

It astonishes me how some people say, "How do saints and lovers of God find love in the eternal world beyond form, space and time? How can they gain strength and help? How are they affected by things without body or shape?"

Is not all life, night and day, engaged with these very things? One person loves another person and derives help through that love. They find care and grace, kindness and knowledge, happiness and sorrow. All these belong to that formless world. Moment by moment they receive benefits from these abstractions and are affected by them. However, this doesn't surprise the doubters. Yet they are amazed that saints can find love in the invisible worlds, and derive help without form.

Once there was a philosopher who denied this reality. One day he became so sick he could not leave his bed, and his illness dragged on a long time. A certain theologian went to visit him.

"What are you seeking?" the theologian asked.

"Health," said the philosopher.

"Tell me how this health is shaped, so that I may find it for you."

“It has no shape,” said the philosopher. “It is indescribable.”

“If it is indescribable, then how can you look for it?” the theologian demanded.

“All I know,” answered the philosopher, “is that when health arrives I grow in strength. I become plump, fresh and alive.”

“From illness we learn of health,” said the theologian. “From what is describable we learn of what is indescribable. Now abandon your doubting ways and I will return you to your vital self.”

Though spiritual truth is inscrutable, still we all benefit from it through the embodiment of form. Just as you see the changes brought by the stars, moon and sun turning in the sky, the rain from clouds in due season, summer and winter, and all the transformations of time. You see all these things happen, and know that it is right and in accordance with wisdom. But how does that distant cloud know it is necessary to rain at its appointed time? Or how does this earth, when it receives a seed, know to return it tenfold? Well, Someone does this. Behold that Someone through the embodiment of this world, and find nourish-

ment. Just as you use the body of another person to contact their essence, use the embodiment of this world to touch That reality.

When the Prophet was transported out of himself and spoke, he used to say, “God says.” Now, from the standpoint of embodiment, it was his tongue that spoke; but he wasn’t there at all. That speaker was greater than he was. Mohammed, knowing himself to be ignorant and without knowledge of such words, when he heard the wisdom coming through his own lips, he realized that he was no longer what he had been. Something greater moved him. He reported stories about past people and prophets who lived thousands of years before, and he told what would come to pass even to the end of the world. His being was but a thing of years. A mortal being surely can’t describe such things. How can a creature born in time give information about the eternal? And so it became known that it was not he who was speaking. God was speaking.

God is wholly free of form and words. Its speech is beyond letters and voice. Yet, It delivers Its message by any letters and voice and tongue It desires.

People have carved the figures of men, women and birds of stone along the banks of pools on the highways and in the caravansaries, and through the mouths of those statues water pours into the pool. Anyone with any sense knows that this water does not begin in the mouth of a stone bird, it comes from some other source.

If you want to get to know people, engage them in speech. By their words you will know them. If they are imposters, even if someone told them that people can be recognized by their words and they watch their words carefully to avoid being caught, still, in the end you will come to understand who they are.

This is illustrated by the story of the child and her mother. A child in the desert said to her mother, "On dark nights a horrible demon appears to me, and I am terribly afraid."

"Don't be afraid," said her mother. "The next time you see that form, attack it bravely. Then you see clearly that it is nothing but a fantasy."

"But mother," said the child, "what if the horrible demon's mother has given him similar advice? What shall I do if she has taught him, saying, 'Don't give in, so she will think you are real

and powerful. And don't say a word, so that you won't be exposed?' How shall I recognize him then?"

"Keep silent, yield to his form as it is, and wait with patience," her mother answered. "Sooner or later some word will leap from his mouth. Or if it does not, from your own heart some words will spring forth unconsciously, or into your mind some thoughts or ideas will spring up, so that out of those thoughts you will know him for what he is. For this is how he has affected you. This is a reflection of his true self and his real feelings that have sprung up inside of you."

Sheikh Sar-razi was seated one day amongst his disciples. One of the disciples had a longing for some roasted sheep's head. The Sheikh called to his servant, saying, "Bring him some roasted sheep's head."

"How did you know that he wanted roasted sheep's head?" the disciples asked.

"Because it is now thirty years since such desires have filled me," the Sheikh answered. "I have cleansed and purified myself of all desires and have become clear as a polished mirror. When

the thought of roasted sheep's head entered my mind, whetted my appetite and became a desire, I knew it belonged to our friend. For a mirror shows no image of itself. Any image it reflects is the image of another."

A worthy man once shut himself in a cave for forty days discipline, seeking spiritual enlightenment. A voice came to him, saying, "Such a lofty goal will never be attained by forty days discipline. Abandon your cave so the love of a great saint may reach you and your goal can be realized."

"Where shall I find that great one?" the man asked.

"In the congregational mosque," came the answer.

"In such a throng of people, how shall I recognize which one he is?" he inquired.

"Go," said the voice, "he will recognize you and will gaze upon you. The sign that his love has fallen upon you will be when the pitcher drops from your hand and you become unconscious. Then you will know that his gaze has reached you."

The man acted accordingly. He filled a pitcher with water and went around the congregation in the mosque like a water-carrier. He was wandering between the ranks of the worshippers when suddenly he was seized with ecstasy. He uttered a loud cry, and the pitcher fell from his hand. He remained in a corner of the mosque unconscious. All the people left. When he came to his senses he saw that he was alone. He could not see the spiritual king who had gazed upon him, but he had gained his goal.

There are certain lovers of God, who, because of their great majesty and jealousy for God, do not show themselves openly, but they cause disciples to attain important goals and bestow gifts upon them. Such mighty spiritual saints are rare and precious.

Someone said: "Do the great ones come before you?"

Rumi answered: There is no "before" left to me. It has been a long time since I have had any "before." If they come, they come before an image they believe to be me. Some people said to Jesus, "We will come to your house." Jesus

replied, “Where is my house in this world, and how could I have a house?”

It is related that Jesus was wandering in the desert when a great rainstorm broke. He went to take shelter in the den of a jackal, in the corner of its cave, until the rain ceased. A revelation came to him, saying, “Get out of the jackal’s den, for the jackal’s little ones cannot rest on account of you.” He cried aloud, “Lord, the jackal’s pups have a shelter, but the son of Mary has no place to call home.”

Although the jackal’s whelp has a cave to live in, still it has no Beloved to drive it out of its home. But you do have such a One driving you out. If you have no home, what does that matter? The loving-kindness of such a Driver, and the grace from such a robe of honor that singles you out to be driven forth, is worth far more, exceeding a hundred thousand heavens and worlds here and beyond.

After the Amir left, Rumi said: The fact that the Amir came and I didn’t show my face at once should not worry him. His purpose in coming was either to pay honor to me or to himself. If it was

to pay honor to me, then the longer he sat and waited, the greater the honor he gained. If, on the other hand, his object was to honor himself and to seek a reward, then since he waited and endured the pain of waiting his reward will be all the greater. In either case his object in coming was realized many times over, so he should feel thankful and fortunate.

discourse 11

Rumi said: The saying, “Hearts bear witness to one another,” refers to a hidden reality. If all reality were openly revealed, what need would there be for words? Similarly, when the heart bears witness, what need is there for the testimony of the tongue?

The Amir said: “Certainly the heart bears witness. But the heart plays one part by itself, the ear another, the eye another, the tongue another. There is need for each one, so that the whole can be realized.”

Rumi said: If the heart is totally absorbed, then all the other senses are obliterated in it, and there is no need for the tongue. Take the case of Laila: She was not a spiritual being, but of flesh, fashioned of water and clay. Yet passion for her produced such absorption, and so utterly seized and overwhelmed Majnun, that he had no need to see Laila with his eyes, no need to hear her voice. He

could not separate himself from the thought of her, causing him to cry:

Your name is upon my tongue.

Your image is in my sight.

Your memory in my heart,

Where can I send these words I write?

The physical has such power that passion can bring us into a state where we are never apart from our beloved. All our senses are absorbed: sight, hearing, smell and the rest. No sense seeks a separate view, all being united. If each sense plays its part in full, all are immersed in one experience and desire nothing else. Seeking for a separate view proves that one sense has not found its true, whole allotment. It is enjoying an incomplete portion and therefore is not immersed, nor fulfilled. Then the other senses begin seeking their own part, and all become divided.

From the viewpoint of reality, all the senses see one thing, but from the standpoint of outward form they are each different from the other. When one sense is moved to absorption, all the senses become absorbed in it. When a fly flies upward it moves its wings, its head and its whole body sep-

arately; but when it is immersed in honey, then all its parts are alike—none can move at all.

Absorption is such that whoever enters it is no longer there. They make no more efforts, they cease to act and move. They are immersed in the water. No action is their action; it is the action of the water. But if they flail about in the water with their hands and feet, they are not truly submerged. If they utter a cry, “I am drowning,” this too is not absorption.

Take the famous utterance, “I am God.” Some people think this is a great pretension, but “I am God” is in fact a great humility. Those who say, instead, “I am a servant of God” believe that two exist, themselves and God. But those who say, “I am God” have become nothing and have cast themselves to the winds. They say, “I am God” meaning, “I am not, God is all. There is no existence but God. I have lost all separation. I am nothing.” In this the humility is greater.

This is what ordinary people don’t understand. When they render service in honor of God’s glory, their servanthood is still present. Even though it is for the sake of God, they still see themselves and

their own actions as well as God—they are not drowned in the water. That person is drowned when no movement, nor any action belongs to them, all their movements spring from the movement of the water.

A lion was chasing a deer, and the deer was fleeing. There were two beings evident: the lion and the deer. But when the lion caught up with the deer, and the deer was overpowered beneath the lion's clutch, and out of terror became unconscious and senseless, collapsing before the lion in that moment only the lion remained. The deer was effaced and no longer existed.

True absorption is when God creates in saints a fear. This is not the fear of men and women who are scared of lions, leopards and death. Rather, it is the fear of separation. This fear is a gift from God, just as security, pleasure and joy, eating and sleeping—all these are gifts from God.

God shows the saints, while they are fully conscious, forms that only they can see. The inner form of the lion, leopard, and fire become visible so they will know that reality is not of this world,

but of the world unseen, projected forth to them. In the same way, they are shown their own Self in magnificent form. Likewise, gardens and rivers, maids of Paradise and palaces, all types of food and drink, robes of honor, fleet steeds, cities, castles and every kind of marvel—they know these are not of this world. God shows and reveals these secrets before their eyes. Thus they come to know with certainty that fear of separation comes from God, as do security, comfort and all spiritual displays.

Now this fear of separation does not resemble the fears that most men and women know, because it is a result of revelation and experience. God clearly shows the saint that all things belong to God. The philosophers may know this, but they know it by intellectual proof, and proof is not permanent. The pleasure that comes from proof will not last. When the memory of the proof passes, its warmth and thrill pass away as well.

Thus, we know by proof that this house had a builder. We know by proof that this builder had eyes and was not blind, had power and was not

powerless, was living and not dead, and existed before the house was built. All these facts we know, but we know them by proof. Such proof is not permanent, and is soon forgotten. Lovers of God, however, being absorbed in God, have come to know the Builder and have seen with the eye of knowingness. They have eaten bread and salt together, and mingled the two. The Builder is never absent from their heart and their gaze. Men and women such as this pass away in God. With them, sin is not sin, and crime is not crime, since they are absorbed.

A certain king ordered his slaves, every one, to take in their hand a golden cup to greet a guest. His favorite slave was also commanded to take a cup. When the king showed his face, that special slave, on beholding the king, lost control of himself and was overwhelmed. The cup fell from his hand and was shattered. When the other slaves saw this they said, "Perhaps we should do this as well," and they cast down their cups deliberately.

"Why did you do that?" the king scolded them.

“He was your favorite, and that was what he did,” they replied.

“Fools!” the king cried out. “He didn’t do that. I did it.”

To outward eyes, all of the slaves were sinful. But that one act was the very acme of obedience. Indeed, it transcended obedience and sin. Of them all, the true lover was that one slave. The others were but followers of the king. Thus, they followed that slave, since he had become the essence of the king, only outwardly wearing the form of slavery. He was filled with the beauty of the king.

God declares, “If it weren’t for you, I would never have created the heavens.” This is the same as “I am God.” It means, “I created the heavens for I love you as Myself.” This is “I am God” in another language and another tongue.

Though the words of the great saints appear in a hundred different forms, since God is one and the Way is one, how can their words be different? Though their teachings appear to contradict, their meaning is one. Separation exists in their outward form only; in inner purpose they all agree.

A prince orders a tent to be stitched. One person twists the rope, another strikes the pegs, another weaves the cloth, another stitches, another rends, another uses a needle. Though to outward appearance they are diverse and different, in inner purpose they are united and performing a single task.

So it is with the affairs of this world. When you look at it carefully, all are doing God's service; reprobate and righteous, sinner and disciple, devil and angel. For example, the king wants to test and try his slaves so the steadfast can be sorted from the weak-hearted, the loyal from the traitor, the faithful from the fake. If he did not have tempters and provokers, how could he test his slaves' loyalty? So, the tempters and provokers are serving the king, since it is by the king's will that they act. He sends a wind to show the difference between the stable and the unstable, to separate the gnat from the sparrow-hawk, so the gnat will vanish and the sparrow-hawk remain.

A certain king ordered a slavegirl to adorn herself and offer herself to his slaves, so their loyalty could be revealed. Though the girl's action

appears sinful outwardly, in reality she is doing the king's work.

The great saints have seen for themselves, not by proof and rote, but face to face and unveiled, that all people—good or evil—are obedient servants of God. Nothing exists that does not proclaim God's praise. Therefore, to the saints, this world itself is the resurrection, since the resurrection means all people serving God and doing no other work but God's work. These saints perceive this truth even here below, for even were the veil removed they would not increase in their certainty.

All may be servants, but some have been raised above others in their closeness to God. To those who are absorbed, all differences are lost. To those who have not yet arrived, many stages appear between one and another.

Let me cite a parallel. A gardener planted a tree, and the tree bore fruit. Surely, this tree that bore fruit is better than a hundred trees that are barren. It is possible those other trees may never bear at all, since there are many stages of growth where disease might attack. A pilgrim who reach-

es the Kaaba is better than the pilgrim who is still travelling in the desert. The one in the desert fears they may not pass the many landmarks and reach the Kaaba, while the former has already reached their destination. One certainty is better than a hundred doubts.

The Amir said: "Those who have not arrived still have hope."

Rumi answered: What is the hopeful person compared to one who has arrived? There is a vast difference between fear and attainment. Why should I speak of such a difference when it is obvious to all? What I am speaking about is attainment, since there are many differences between the stations of attainment.

It is possible to indicate the various stages of fear and the stations of fear, but the stations of attainment have no indication. In the world of fear everyone decides what they will devote to honor God. One person gives through physical efforts, another donates their wealth, another sacrifices their life. One worships with fasting, another with prayer, another by ten prostrations, another by a hundred. These stages are very dif-

ferent and can easily be distinguished. In the same manner there are stages of travel from Konya to Caesarea that are distinct and well-known: One must pass Qaimaz, Uprukh, Sultan, and so forth. But the stages by sea from Antalya to Alexandria are without landmarks. The ship's captain knows the signs, but they are not shared with landsmen since landsmen cannot understand.

The Amir said: "But even speaking about it imparts some benefit. We may not know everything, yet still we learn a little, and can find out and guess the rest."

Rumi replied: Yes indeed, by God! Someone sits wakeful through the dark night, thinking of some way to find the day. Though they do not know how to get there, still, in waiting for daylight, the day approaches. Another person is travelling by caravan upon a dark night in a storming rain. They do not know where they have gone, which way they are passing, or what distance they have covered, but when day comes they see the results of that travelling and go on from there. Whoever labors for the glory of God, though both their eyes are sealed, their labor is not lost. Even

an atom's weight of good is not lost. Though all within is dark and veiled, and they do not see how far they have progressed, still in the end they will know. "This world is the seedplot of the world to come." Whatever they sow here, they will reap in the next world.

Jesus laughed a lot. John wept a lot. John said to Jesus, "You have become exceedingly carefree against all the subtle deceits, that you laugh so much." Jesus replied, "You have become exceedingly unmindful of the subtle, mysterious, wonderful graces and loving kindness of God, that you weep so much." One of God's saints was present at this incident. He asked God, "Which of these two has the higher station?" God answered, "He who thinks better of Me." In other words, "I come when you think of Me. Each person has an image and an idea of Me. Whatever picture he forms of Me, there I am. I fill that picture where God dwells. I care nothing for that point of view where God does not exist. Cleanse your thoughts, O human, for they are My abode and dwelling place."

Now test yourself as to weeping and laughter, fasting and prayer, solitude and company, and the rest. Which of these is more profitable to you? Whichever brings you straighter on the road and gains you the greatest advancement, choose that task. Take counsel from your heart, even though others may disagree. The truth is within you. Compare it with what others say. When they agree, then follow that course.

The physician comes to someone who is sick and questions the inward doctor; for within you there is a doctor, namely your natural temperament, instincts and inclinations. Therefore the external physician questions it: "This food that you ate, how was it? Was it light? Was it heavy? How was your sleep?" From what the inward doctor answers, the external physician makes their prescription. Therefore the root of the matter is the inward doctor; the patient's own response. When this inner doctor is feeble and its temperament is corrupt, the sick person sees things incorrectly and gives skewed indications. They say that sugar is bitter, vinegar is sweet.

Therefore they need the external physician to guide them until their own instinct is restored. After that they consult only their own inward doctor to find the counsel they need.

We have a similar doctor within our spiritual being. When this higher Self is feeble, our inward senses perceive falsely, and whatever we follow is contrary to the truth. So the saints are physicians who guide a person until their instinct is restored to its right balance, and their religion and their heart have gathered strength.

“Show me things as they truly are.”

Humanity is a mighty volume. Within the people of this world all things are written, but veils and darkness do not allow men and women to read the knowledge within themselves. The veils and darkneses are those many preoccupations, worldly desires and thoughts of every kind. Yet, though they are wrapped in darkness and are hidden by so many veils, they can still read something and therefore learn. Consider when these darkneses and veils are removed, what they will learn then, and what varieties of knowledge they will discover within!

After all, all these trades and professions—tailoring, building, carpentry, goldsmithery, science, astronomy, medicine and the rest of the world's countless and innumerable callings—all these were discovered from within by some person, they were not revealed through stones and dirt. When they say that a raven taught people to bury the dead, even that was due to the reflection of a human being. Someone's own inner urge drove them to learn that. After all, the instincts of the bird are but a part of humanity, but a part does not command the whole.

After the Amir left, someone said: "When the Amir comes, the Master utters mighty words. The words never stop, because he is a master of words. Words flow from him without interruption."

Rumi said: If in winter time the trees do not put forth leaves and fruit, people should not think they are not working. They are continually at work. Winter is the season of gathering; summer is the season of spending. Everyone sees the spending, but they do not see the gathering in. In the same way, a person gives a party and spends

all sorts of money on it. Everyone sees this, but no one sees the gathering in and collecting little by little for the sake of that entertainment. No one sees any of that. Yet the ingathering is the root of the matter, for the spending comes out of that income.

Whoever we are in unison with, we communicate with them every moment, even in silence, in absence and presence alike. Even in battle with others, we are together. We may strike against others with our fists; still, we are speaking to them and are absorbed in one action with them. Therefore we are in unison. Don't become distracted by the fists—in those fists are spiritual gifts. You don't believe this? Then open those fists, and see the difference between the sweet joy of unison, and pearls of great price.

Many people speak fine, graceful sayings and lofty wisdom in verse and prose. The inclination of the Amir towards us is not on account of lofty wisdom, graceful sayings and sermonizing. Things of that kind are to be found everywhere, and are by no means in short supply. His loving me and his inclination towards me is not for those

things. He sees something else. He sees a light transcending what he finds from others.

It is related that a certain king summoned Majnun before him.

“What has happened to you. What has befallen you?” the king inquired. “You have disgraced yourself, forsaken your hearth and home, become wasted and utterly destroyed. What is Laila? What beauty is hers? I will show you many beautiful and lovely girls. Name your ransom and I will bestow them upon you.”

When they were brought to court, Majnun and the lovely girls were duly introduced. Majnun kept his head cast down, staring in front of him.

“Well now, lift up your head and look!” the king commanded.

“I am afraid,” Majnun replied. “My love for Laila is a drawn sword. If I raise my head, that blade will strike it off.”

Majnun had become immersed in his love for Laila. Yet, the other girls also had eyes and lips and hair. What then had he found in Laila to come to such a state?

discourse 12

After the Amir arrived, Rumi said: I've been longing to call on you. But, knowing you were busy with the interests of the people, I spared you the trouble.

The Amir answered: "This duty has been pressing upon me. Now that the emergency has ended, from now on I will wait upon you."

Rumi said: There is no difference. It is all the same thing. You are so gracious that all things are the same to you. Since today it is you who are occupied with good deeds and charities, naturally I am able to call on you.

Just now some of us were discussing this question: If a saint, who carries God's secret jewel [God's grace], strikes someone, breaking their nose and jaw, who is the wronged party? Everyone says the one hurt has been wronged, but in reality the wronged person is the saint who is striking the blow. The one who was punched and had their head broken is the wrongdoer, and the

saint is surely the wronged party since they carry God's jewel. The saint is consumed in God, and therefore their actions are God's actions. We wouldn't call God a wrongdoer.

The Prophet raided, killed and spilled blood, but the unbelievers were the wrongdoers, and Mohammed was wronged. For example, a westerner lives in the West. An oriental comes to visit. The westerner is a stranger to the oriental, but who is the real stranger? Is not the oriental a stranger to the entire western world?

Still, this whole world is but a house, no more. Whether we go from this room to that room or from this corner to that corner, are we still not in the same house? But the saints who possess God's jewel have left this house. They have gone beyond. Mohammed said, "Islam began a stranger and will return a stranger as it began." Yet is not this world the real stranger? Therefore, when the Prophet was defeated he was the wronged party, and when he defeated his enemies, he was still the wronged party. For in both cases he was in the right, and the wronged party is the one who is in the right.

Mohammed's heart ached for his prisoners. To comfort the Prophet, God sent down a revelation saying: O Prophet, say to the prisoners in your hands, "If you turn to truth and the righteous way, God will deliver you out of bondage. He will restore everything you have lost, and much more, including treasures in the world to come."

The Amir asked: "When a servant of God performs a service, does the grace and good arise from that action, or is it the gift of God?"

Rumi answered: It is the gift of God and the grace of God. Yet God, out of Its exceeding love gives credit for both the action and the grace to the servant, declaring, "Both are yours."

The Amir said: "Since God has such love, then everyone who seeks in truth shall find."

Rumi said: But without a guide this does not come to pass. So, when the Israelites were obedient to Moses, ways were opened up to them even through the sea. But when they were disobedient, they remained in the wilderness for many years. The leaders of a given time are charged to secure the welfare of those who are bound to them and

are strictly obedient. For instance, if a group of soldiers follow the orders of their commander, he too cares for their welfare and is duty bound to work at securing it. But if they are not obedient, how can he be expected to look after their interests?

The mind is the commander of the human body. So long as the parts of the body surrender to it, all the body's affairs proceed perfectly, but when they disobey, the whole natural order breaks down. Haven't you seen when a man is drunk, his hands and feet and tongue refuse to obey him? Then on the following day, when he is sober again, he cries, "What have I done? Why did I do and say such horrible things?"

In the same way, a village works together in perfect order only when there is a leader that the villagers follow.

Just as the mind is commander in the midst of the body, so all the different beings who make up humankind, together with their many minds, knowledge, speculation and learning, are the body of humanity, and the saint is the mind in the

midst of them. Now when these people, who are the body, do not follow that mind, their affairs all fall into confusion and conflict.

They must surrender in such a fashion that no matter what the saint does, they accept it without the argument of their own mind. For often, with their own mind, they cannot understand the saint's actions. Therefore, they must submit to whatever the saint says. Similarly, when a child is apprenticed to a tailor they must obey whatever they are told to do. If they are given a patch to sew, they must sew it. If they are given a hem, they must sew that hem. If they wish to learn their trade, they must surrender their own desires completely and become submissive to the tailor's orders.

*"The Night of Power is better
Than a thousand months."*

God offers us divine guidance and care, which are superior to a hundred thousand strivings and struggles. One tug from God is better than the efforts of all our powers. That is to say, when divine care intervenes it does the work of a hundred thousand struggles and more. Struggling is

fine, and useful, but what is it compared to God's guidance and care?

The Amir asked: "Does God's care create struggles?"

Rumi answered: Why shouldn't it? When divine care arrives, struggling begins. Jesus—what a struggle he made! Yet John the Baptist recognized that gift while still in Mary's womb. Grace comes first. Then if, by accident, awareness enters in, this is the fruit of God's grace—the pure gift of the Lord. If this were not true, then how could Jesus' disciples have received such blessings?

Grace and submission are like a spark of fire that leaps. First we receive the gift. But if you add cotton and nurse that spark until it grows, then that is submission. In the beginning your spark is small and weak. But once you have nursed that weakling fire it spreads across the world and sets the universe aflame. The little spark becomes a great and powerful blaze.

Someone said to the Amir: "Our Master loves you very much."

Rumi replied: Neither my coming nor my speaking is an indication of my love. I say what-

ever comes into me. If God wills, It makes these few words profitable so they will grow within your heart, bringing great rewards. If God wills not, if even a hundred thousand words are spoken, they will not lodge in the heart but will pass by and be forgotten. If a spark of fire lands upon a burnt rag and God wills, that one spark will take and engulf the rag. If God wills not, a hundred sparks will fall on that tinder and leave no mark.

These words are God's army. By God's authority they open and seize fortresses. If God commands thousands of horsemen to go and show their faces at such and such a fortress but not to capture it, so it will be. If It commands a single horseman to seize that fortress, that same single horseman will open the fortress gates and capture it.

God sent a gnat against Nimrod and it destroyed him. "Equal in the eyes of the Gnostic are a penny and a dollar, a lion and a cat." If God bestows Its blessing, one penny does the work of a thousand dollars and more. If God withholds Its blessing from a thousand dollars, they cannot do the work of one penny. So too, if God commis-

sions the cat it destroys the lion, as the gnat destroyed Nimrod. In short, when we realize that all things are of God, all things become one and the same in our eyes.

I hope, too, that you will hear these words within your hearts, for that would be profitable. But if a thousand thieves come from outside, they cannot open the door without some fellow-thief inside who can unlock that door. Speak a thousand words from the outside, still, so long as there is none to answer from within, the door never opens. So too with a tree—as long as there is no moist thirst in its roots, even if you poured a thousand torrents of water over it, it would accomplish nothing. First there must be a thirst in its roots for the water to nourish it. Although the whole world is ablaze with the sun's light, unless there is that spark of light within the eye, no one can behold that light. The root of the matter is the receptiveness within Soul.

Soul is one thing and spirit is another. Don't you see during sleep how Soul travels abroad? Spirit remains in the body, keeping it alive, but Soul wanders and is transformed. When Mohammed said, "He who knows his own self

knows his Lord,” he was speaking of knowing Soul.

If we say that he was speaking of this soul or that soul, that is something very different. On the other hand, if we explain it as meaning Soul, Itself, the listener may still think we mean one soul, since they do not yet know Soul, Itself. Mere words cannot convey this spiritual understanding. Words only reveal what the heart has an ear to hear.

Beyond this world is another world for us. This world and its delights cater to the animal within us. These pleasures all fill our animal nature, while our real self slowly dies. They say, “The human being is a rational animal,” yet we consist of two things. Lusts and desires feed our animality in this material world. But as for our true essence, its food is knowledge, wisdom, and the sight of God. The animality within us flees away from God, while our spiritual self flees away from this world.

*“One of you is an unbeliever,
And one of you a believer.”
Two people are warring within you.
Who shall succeed?
The one that Fortune makes her friend.*

This world is a world of winter. Isn't the name "solid" given to inanimate things? These stones and mountains, and the garments worn by this world, are all solidified. The inner essence of this world can be known by its effects: it is wind and bitter cold. It is like the winter season when all things are frozen. What manner of winter is it? A winter of the mind. When that divine zephyr comes along, these mountains will begin to melt, and the solidity of this world will dissolve—just like when the warmth of summer comes along, all the snow and ice turn to water. On the resurrection day, when that zephyr blows, all things will melt away.

God makes these words an army to surround you and protect you against the enemy, and to be the means of overwhelming the enemy. For there are enemies—enemies within and enemies without. Yet they are really nothing—what could they be?

Don't you see how a thousand godless people submit themselves to one leader who becomes their ruler, and that ruler is captive to his own thoughts? From this it is easy to see the effect of thoughts, since through one feeble and muddled

thought thousands of people and worlds are taken prisoner. Consider then, those whose thoughts are without limitations—what grandeur and splendor they possess, how easily they overwhelm the enemy, and what worlds they subdue!

When I see the limitless wisdom that exists, while armies unending stretch through waste upon waste, all prisoners of one person, and that person the prisoner of a contemptible little thought—where do they all stand compared to thoughts of powerful depths, infinite light, holy, and sublime?

Therefore thoughts have real effects. In this physical world all living things merely follow and act as instruments of thought. Without thought they are inanimate and solid. In the same way, those who understand only the outer form are also solid. They cannot penetrate the meaning. They are children, spiritually, and immature even if they are Sufi sheikhs, a hundred years old.

*"We have returned from the lesser holy war
To fight the Greater Holy War."*

We all see the battle with outward things and people, and we draw up our forces against these

formal adversaries. We must also draw up our forces against the armies of thoughts, so that desirable thoughts will defeat destructive thoughts and drive them out of the kingdom of our bodies. This then is indeed the greater struggle and the greater war.

Thoughts have their effect. They work beyond the influence of the body like the Laws of Nature without any instrument keep the heavens turning. Therefore philosophers say that thoughts don't require a body. After all, the body is but an accident. Why should anyone dwell on an accident?

Reality is like a musk-pod, and this material world and its delights are merely the scent of that musk. This scent is but transient, a mere accident. The individual who seeks the musk itself, not content with only the scent, that person is wise. But whoever is satisfied to possess the scent is a fool. They have chased after a thing their hand cannot grasp, for the scent is merely an attribute of the musk. So long as the musk is present in this world, its scent comes to the nostrils. However, when it leaves this world and crosses that invisible veil, all those who lived by its scent die. The

scent follows the musk, and goes wherever the musk goes.

Fortunate is the person who finds the musk from following its scent and then becomes one with the musk. They never die, but become an eternal part of the musk's essence, imbued with the qualities of the musk. They will carry its scent to the world, and the world is revived by them. Only the name of what that person used to be survives, as with a horse or any other animal that has turned to salt in the desert, only the name of horse remains to it. In effect and in truth it has now become a part of that great ocean of salt. What good or harm can a name do? It will not bring it out of its saltiness. And if you give some other name to this salt-mine, it will not change its taste.

So it behooves us to turn away from the pleasures and delights of this world, that are the rays and reflections of God. We must not become content with this much, even though this much exists through God's grace and the radiance of God's beauty. Still, it is not eternal. From God's viewpoint it is eternal, but from our viewpoint it is not. It is like the rays of the sun that shine into

our house, for though they are rays of the sun and are light, yet they belong to the sun. When the sun sinks, the light disappears too. Therefore it behooves us to become the Sun, so the fear of separation cannot cloud our life.

There is giving, and there is knowingness. Some have generosity and compassion but no true knowledge. Some have knowledge but no self-sacrifice. When both are present, that person is blessed and prosperous. Such a being is truly incomparable.

A stranger is going along a road, but does not know where the road begins or ends, or whether they have wandered the wrong way. They go on blindly, hoping that perhaps a cock will crow, or some other sign of habitation will appear. How can such a stranger be compared with those who know the road and travel at ease, not needing sign or waymark? They have their assigned task clearly before them. Therefore, knowing exceeds all else.

discourse 13

Mohammed said, “The night is long, do not shorten it with your sleep. The day is bright, do not darken it with your sins.”

The night is long for you to voice your inmost secrets and ask for your needs without the distraction of others, without the disturbance of friends and foes. You are granted peace and privacy as God draws down the veil before the eyes of others, so your acts may be honest, truthful and done wholly for God.

At night the hypocrite is exposed. The world may be hidden by the dark and shown clearly by the light of day, but at night the hypocrite stands revealed from the sincere.

“Since nobody is watching,” the hypocrite says, “for whose sake should I pretend?”

Somebody is watching, but the hypocrite’s eyes are closed and cannot see that One.

In times of distress everyone calls for help; in times of toothache, and earache, in doubt, fear and insecurity. In secret everyone calls out hoping

that One will hear and grant their requests. Privately, secretly, people perform good deeds to ward off weakness and restore their strength, trusting that Life will accept their gifts and efforts. When they are restored to health and peace of mind, then suddenly their faith leaves, and the phantom of anxiety soon returns.

“O God,” they cry again, “we were in such a terrible state when, with all sincerity, we called upon you from our prison corner. For a hundred prayers you granted our requests. Now, freed of the prison, we are still as much in need. Bring us out of this world of darkness into that world of the prophets, the world of light. Why can freedom not come without prisons and pain? A thousand desires fill us, both good and deceitful, and the conflict of these phantoms brings a thousand tortures that leave us weary. Where is that sure faith that burns up all phantoms?”

God answers, “The seeker of pleasure in you is your enemy and My enemy.

*‘Do not take your enemy
and My enemy for a friend.’*

When your pleasure-seeking self is imprisoned, filled with trouble and pain, then your freedom

arrives and gathers strength. A thousand times you have proved that freedom comes to you out of toothache, headache and fear. Why then are you chained to bodily comfort? Why are you always occupied with tending the flesh? Do not forget the end of that thread: unravel those bodily passions till you have attained your eternal passion, and find freedom from the prison of darkness."

discourse 14

Sheikh Ibrahim said: “Whenever Saif-al-Din Farrukh ordered someone to be given a beating, he would immediately occupy himself until the beating was over, so that no one could intercede.”

Rumi said: Whatever you see in this world corresponds exactly with what is in the world beyond. All these realities are samples of the other Reality. Whatever exists in this world has come from there.

The bald man of Baalbek carried on his head trays and samples of various herbs—a pinch of pepper, a pinch of mastic, a pinch from every heap. The heaps were infinite, but there was no room on his tray for more. People are like the bald man of Baalbek, they are loaded with pinches and pieces out of the treasuries of God, some known and some hidden—a piece of hearing, a piece of speech, a piece of reason, a piece of generosity, a piece of knowledge. For this reason our work is always a reflection of God.

There are beings who are hawkers of God. Night and day they fill trays. By day you spend away your portion to make your living, by night these beings replenish your tray.

For instance, in the other world there are sights and visions of many kinds. A sample of those has been sent to you to see in this world. Sight is not limited to this world only, but the human body cannot bear more than this.

Thousands of people, generation after generation, have come and filled themselves from that Sea, returning again and again. That source is infinite. The longer we stay upon that Infinite Sea, the colder our heart grows for this world of samples.

This world is coined in that Mint and must return to that Mint again. All our parts have issued from that Mint, are samples of that Mint, and must return again—small and great, for all living creatures. Yet upon the tray of this world life becomes visible; without the tray it is not visible.

That infinite world is a subtle world and does not reveal itself openly—yet look how wonderfully it makes its appearance here! Don't you see

how the spring breeze becomes visible in the trees and grasses, the rose-beds and sweet herbs? Through the swaying of fields and flowers you witness the beauty of spring. But when you look upon the breeze itself, you see nothing. This isn't because the beauty of those rose-beds are outside the reality of the breeze, for the spring breeze contains images of swaying rose-beds and sweet herbs, but those images are subtle and invisible. Only through some medium are they revealed out of their subtlety.

Likewise in the human being these qualities are hidden and only become manifest through an inward or outward medium; one person through speech, another through work, another during times of war or peace. You cannot see these attributes within yourself—look and you will find nothing there—so you believe yourself empty of these infinite attributes. These attributes do not come forth and change you into something else from what you were. Rather, these qualities are hidden in you, like the water in the sea.

Water cannot leave the sea except through the sun's heat in the form of a cloud; it cannot become visible except in a wave. Your wave is a

commotion visible within you, but so long as the sea is still, you see nothing. Your body is on the shore of the sea, and Soul is a part of the ocean itself. Do you not see how many fishes, snakes, birds, and creatures of all kinds come forth and show themselves, and then return to the sea? Your attributes such as patience, friendship, loyalty and the rest, come forth from this sea.

These qualities are subtle lovers of God. You can only glimpse them through the medium of the tongue. But because of their subtlety, without speech they are naked and they retreat back out of sight into the arms of God.

discourse 15

Within people there is a longing and a desire such that, even if a hundred thousand worlds were theirs to own, still they would find no rest or comfort. They try every trade and craft, studying astronomy, medicine and every other subject, but they reach no completion, for they have not found their true desire. Poets call the Beloved “heart’s ease,” because there the heart finds ease. How can we find peace and rest in anything but the Beloved?

All these pleasures and pursuits are like a ladder. The rungs of a ladder are not a place to make one’s home; they are for passing by. Fortunate are those who learn this. The long road becomes short for them, and they do not waste their lives upon the steps.

Someone asked: “The Mongols have seized property by force, and from time to time they give this property back to us. This is a strange situation. Is it lawful to accept this property? What is your ruling?”

Rumi answered: Whatever the Mongols seize and give up returns into the grasp and treasury of God. For example, when you fill a jug or a barrel from the river and carry it away, that becomes your property. So long as it is in the jug or barrel, nobody has the right to interfere. Whoever takes the jug without permission is guilty of theft. But once they pour the water back into the river, it passes out of ownership and is lawful for anyone to take once again. So our property is unlawful to them, while their property is lawful to us since by their giving it up they have returned it to the treasury of God.

Someone said: "When the Mongols first came to these parts they were naked and bare. They rode on bullocks and their weapons were made of wood. Now they are sleek and well-fed, they have splendid Arab horses and carry fine arms."

Rumi said: When they were desperate and weak and had no strength, God helped them and answered their prayer. Now, when they are so powerful and mighty, God is destroying them with the comforts of the feeblest, so they will realize it was through God's bounty and support that

they captured the world, and not by their own force and power.

They used to live in a wilderness, far from civilization, without means, poor, naked and needy. By chance, some of them came to trade in the territory of the Khvarizmshah. They began to buy and sell, purchasing muslin to clothe their bodies. The Khvarizmshah stopped them, ordering them to be put to death, and forcing payment from the rest of them. The Mongols went humbly before their king, saying, "They have killed us." Their king asked for ten days, and then entered a deep cave where he fasted and humbled himself. On the tenth day a proclamation came from God, "I have accepted your supplication. Come forth! Wherever you go, you shall be victorious." So it was. When they came forth, by God's command they won the victory and captured the world.

Someone said: "The Mongols also believe in the resurrection and say that there will be a judgment."

Rumi said: They lie, desiring to be accepted by Muslims. If they really believe in the resurrection, where is the evidence to prove it? The sins,

wrongs and evils they commit are like snow and ice piled together as high as a mountain. When thoughts of the resurrection come to us, like the sun it melts those snows of sinfulness as the sun in the heaven melts anything hard. How can the summer sun come and leave the snow and ice of winter intact? Seeing their snow and ice piled heap upon heap is proof that the sun has not shone upon them.

Although God has promised that all good and evil will be rewarded justly on the last day, yet a sample of this comes to pass every moment and in every instant. If happiness enters into someone's heart, that is his or her reward for making another happy. If they become sorrowful, it is because they have brought sorrow to another. These are gifts from the other world and tokens of that day of rewards, so that by these little things we may come to understand those great matters, just as a handful of corn is offered as a token of the whole heap.

The Prophet, for all his majesty and greatness, one night felt pain in his hand. It was revealed to him that this pain was the effect of a pain in the

hands of ‘Abbas. For he had taken ‘Abbas captive and had bound his hands together with all the prisoners. Although the tying of his hands was done at God’s order, still the Prophet had to suffer. These troubles and depressions that come to you are the effect of some injury and wrong you have committed. Even if you cannot remember in detail what you have done, still from the results you can know the deed. You may not remember whether it came from your own negligence or ignorance, or because others swayed you into wrongful action. But look at the results: how much did you fall from grace, or how much has your heart expanded? Certainly a fall from grace is the response of disobedience to God, and expansion of the heart is the reward of obedience. Why, the Prophet himself was rebuked because he turned a ring on his finger. He was told, “We did not create you for idleness and play.” From this decide for yourself whether your day is passed in obedience or disobedience. Moses was occupied with the affairs of his people. Although he was at God’s command and completely served God, yet one side of him was occupied with humanity for

the general good. Khadir was occupied with God completely; he hid himself from the sight of others. Mohammed was occupied at first wholly with God, then he was told, "Call the people. Counsel them and reform them." Mohammed wept and lamented, saying, "Oh, my Lord, what sin have I committed? Why do you drive me from Your presence? I have no desire for this world." God said to him, "Mohammed, do not despair, I will not abandon you. Even in the midst of others you shall be with Me. When you are occupied with people, not one hair of the head of this hour with Me, not one, will be taken from you. In whatever work you are engaged, you will be in very union with Me." Someone asked: "The eternal decrees that God has predestined, do they ever change?" Rumi answered: How could God say, "Do evil to find good?" If someone sows wheat, can they gather barley? Or if they sow barley, will they gather wheat? That is impossible. All the saints and prophets have said that good is the reward of good, evil the reward of evil." And whoever does an atoms weight of good shall see it, And whoever does an atoms weight of evil shall

see it.”Someone interjected: “But we see wicked people turn virtuous, and virtuous people turn wicked.”Rumi answered: Well, those wicked men and women did some good, or thought good things, which brought them virtue. And those virtuous people did some evil act, or contemplated evil things, turning them wicked. Someone asked: “What is the meaning of the saying, ‘Blessings upon the Prophet?’”Rumi answered: It means that our acts of adoration, service and worship do not belong to us, they come from God. Just like the season of spring brings the planting of seeds, and jaunts into the wilderness. They are the gift and bounty of spring. The people of this world see secondary causes and think they are the origin of everything. God’s saints see the actualities as they are created and come into being. Secondary causes are only a veil to occupy the common people. God promised Zachariah, “I will give you a son.” Zachariah cried, “I am an old man, and my wife is old. My instrument of lust has become feeble, and my wife can no longer conceive. Lord, how can a son be born?”The answer came, “Take heed Zachariah! You have lost the clue. I have

shown you a hundred thousand times that actualities have no causes. This very moment, I could produce out of you a hundred thousand sons without a wife and without pregnancy. Indeed, if I make the sign, a whole people will come forth, completely formed and grown. Did I not bring you into being in the world of spirits without a mother or father? Why do you forget these things?" The rank and substance of the prophets and saints and the many states of humanity can be set forth in a parable: Slaves are brought out of the heathen lands into the realm of Muslimdom, where they are sold. Some are brought at the age of five years, some are ten, and some are fifteen years old. Those who were brought as children, having been nurtured for many years amongst Muslims, completely forget their homeland. No trace of it remains in their memory. Those brought a little older remember a little. Those much older remember much more. In the world beyond, all are in the Presence of God. The food and sustenance there is the speech of God, without letters and without sounds. Those who are brought into this world as children, when they hear that Speech, remember nothing of their for-

mer state and see themselves as strangers to that Speech. They are veiled from God, being wholly sunk in forgetfulness. Some remember a little bit, and the longing and yearning for the other side is quickened in them. They seek out Truth. They are the believers. Some, when they hear that Speech, the Presence of God becomes manifest before their eyes, even as it was long ago. The veils are entirely removed, and they are joined in that union. These are the prophets and the saints. Now I say this to you earnestly, when the brides of heavenly truth show their faces within you and their secrets are revealed, beware, do not tell this to strangers. Do not describe what you have witnessed to others, and do not tell everyone these words of mine." Do not impart wisdom to those not worthy, lest you do wisdom wrong. And, do not withhold from the worthy, lest you do them wrong." If a fair and adorable lover surrenders to you privately in your house, saying, "Show me to no one, for I belong to you," it would never be proper for you to parade her in the bazaars and to call out, "Come and see this beauty!" That would never be agreeable to such an adorable one. She would be enraged against you. God has made

these words unlawful to some. Even so, dwellers in Hell cry out to the dwellers in Paradise, saying, "Where is your generosity and your humanity? Out of those gifts and bounties that God has given to you, out of charity and common kindness if you sprinkle just a little upon us, could that be so difficult? We are burning and melting in this fire. Out of those fruits, or out of those clear waters of Paradise, if you sprinkle a drop or two upon our souls, what would that be?" The dwellers in Paradise answer, "God has forbidden that to you. The seed of this bliss came from our earlier deeds. Since you did not sow and cultivate with faith, sincerity and good works, what should you gather here? Even if out of generosity we should share with you, since it is not your reward it would burn your throats and stick in your gullets." A crowd of hypocrites and strangers came into the presence of Mohammed. They began to talk about mysteries and praised the Prophet. Mohammed turned to his companions and said, "Cover up your vessels." He meant, "Conceal wisdom from strangers, and in their presence stop up your mouths and tongues, for they are mice and not worthy of this wisdom and grace." The

Amir who has just left our company—though he did not understand in detail what we were saying, yet he realizes in general that we were calling him to God. I take the wagging of his head, his smile of affection and his flush of passion as a sign of his understanding. If people from the country come into the city and hear the call to prayer, though they do not know in detail the meaning of the call, still they understand its purpose.¹⁶ Rumi said: Whoever is loved is beautiful, but this doesn't mean that whoever is beautiful is loved." There are girls more beautiful than Laila," they used to tell Majnun. "Let us bring some to you." "I do not love Laila for her form," Majnun would reply. "Laila is like a cup in my hand. I drink wine from that cup. I am in love with that wine. You only have eyes for the goblet and do not know the wine. A golden goblet studded with precious stones, but containing only vinegar, what use is that to me? An old broken gourd with wine is better in my eyes than a hundred goblets of gold." A person must be moved with passion and yearning for them to tell the wine from the cup. This is the same as someone who is hungry, who hasn't eaten for ten days, and another who has eaten five times

a day. Both see a loaf of bread. The full one sees only more food, but the hungry person sees life, itself. To the hungry, this bread is a goblet, and the life it brings is wine. Such wine cannot be known except through hunger and yearning. Acquire this appetite so you will not only see the appearances of form, but will find the Beloved everywhere.

The forms of this world are cups. Science, art and knowledge are inscriptions upon the cup. When the cup is broken, those inscriptions disappear. Therefore, those who drink the wine see “the eternal reality, the deeds of holiness...”

Anyone asking a question must first come to the awareness that their knowledge is incomplete, and secondly that there is wisdom they know nothing about. Hence, the saying, “Asking is half of knowing.”

But there must always be one in this world who knows. Everyone looks to someone, because ultimately we are looking for God. But there must always be one who can distinguish those who are hitting the mark from those who have been struck by the arrow of someone else's bow.

If you hear words coming through a wall, you know that wall isn't speaking and that voice belongs to someone else. The saints are like this. They have died before death, and have become like doors and walls. Not even a hair's tip of separate existence remains in them. In the hands of Reality, they are shields—but the shield doesn't move under its own power. Thus the saints say, "I am the Truth," meaning, "I am nothing at all, I move by the Hand of God." Look upon such shields as God. Do not take up violence against God. Striking blows against such shields are just like declaring war against God, Itself.

Every saint is God's proof. The rank and station of men and women is determined by how they treat the saint. If they are hostile to the saint, they are acting hostile against God. If they befriend the saint, they have made friendship with God.

*"Whoever has seen them has seen Me.
Whoever finds them has found Me."*

God's saints are familiar with the secrets of His refuge. They have become intimate with the Divine Mysteries that "none but the purified shall

touch.” If they turn their backs on the tomb of a great saint, it is not out of disobedience or neglect. They have turned their faces toward that saint’s essence, for these words spoken here are their essence. There is no harm in turning away from the body to face the soul.

It is a custom of mine that I want no heart to become distressed through me. During our meetings, sometimes a great multitude thrust themselves upon me and some of my friends try to fend them off. That disturbs me. I have said a hundred times, “Say nothing on my account. I am content with that.” I care to such a degree that when such friends come to me, I dread the thought of boring them, so I speak poetry for their enjoyment. Otherwise, what do I care about poetry? By God, I care nothing for poetry. There is nothing worse in my eyes. To me, it is like the cook who plunges his hand into tripe, cleaning it out for the sake of a guest’s appetite.

A merchant searches to see what products are needed in their city, and what the people want to buy. Then they buy and sell those goods and services, even if they are the lowest of things in their

eyes. I have studied many sciences and taken pains to offer fine, rare and precious things to the scholars and researchers, the clever ones and the deep thinkers who come to me. God has willed this. He gathered to me all those sciences, and assembled here all those pains, so I would become occupied with this work. What can I do? In my own country, and amongst my own people, there is nothing more shameful than poetry. If I had remained there, I would have lived in harmony with their temperament. I would have practiced what they love, such as giving lectures, composing books and preaching.

The Amir said: "The root of the matter is action."

Rumi said: Where are such people of action, so that I can teach them action? But now look how you cock your ears, seeking after words instead of action. If I were to stop speaking now, you would become upset. Become a seeker of action, so that I can show you action!

I am looking all over the world for students of action so that I can teach action. I am looking all over the world for anyone who knows action, but

I find no student of action—only of words, and so I occupy myself with words. What do you know of action? Action is only known through action. There is not one traveler upon this road—it is empty—so how will anyone see if we are on the true path of action?

After all, prayer and fasting are not action; these are forms of action. Action is an inward reality. From the time of Adam to the time of Mohammed, prayer and fasting have changed their form, but action is still the same.

Action is not what people think it is. People believe action is this outward show. But if a hypocrite performs only the form of action, such as prayer or fasting, it gains them nothing, since the sincere desire for true action was not present.

The secret principle of all things is speech and words. You do not yet know the true knowledge of speech and words, therefore you consider them unimportant. However, speech is fruit from the tree of action, for words are born of action. God created the world by a word.

You may have faith in your heart, but unless you share it through words, it is worth nothing.

When you say, "In this present age words are of no account," you say this with words, do you not? If words are of no account, then why do we hear you say this with words?

Someone asked: "When we do a good deed, if we have hopes and expectations of a good reward from God, does that harm us?"

Rumi answered: By God, we must always have hope. Faith, itself, consists of fear and hope. Someone once asked me, "Hope itself is good, but what is this fear?" I said, "Show me a fear without hope, or a hope without fear. The two are inseparable." For example, a farmer plants wheat. Naturally he hopes that wheat will grow. At the same time he is afraid some blight or drought may destroy it. So, there is no hope without fear, or fear without hope.

Now, when we hope expectantly for a reward, we will surely work with greater effort. Expectation becomes our wings, and the stronger our wings the farther the flight. If, on the other hand we lose hope, we become lazy and of no value to anyone. A sick person will take bitter medicine and give up ten sweet pleasures, but if

they have no hope for health, why would they endure this?

We are a mixture of animal and speech. If we do not speak outwardly, we still speak inwardly—we are constantly speaking. We are like a river in which clay is mixed; the pure water is our speech, while the clay is our animality. But the clay in us is an accident. Do you not see how those pieces of clay have crumbled and rotted away, while mankind's speech, poetry and sciences, both bad and good have remained?

The 'man or woman of heart' is a universe. When you have seen them, you have seen all. "All game is in the belly of the wild ass." All creatures in this world are contained in the man and woman of heart.

*Good and evil, the dervishes may be,
Whoever is not so, no dervishes are they.*

Once you have seen one who is the whole, surely you have seen the whole world. Whoever you see after is a mere repetition. That person's speech is contained in the words of the whole. Once you have heard their words, every word you hear thereafter is an echo.

Whoever beholds such a one, in any place,
Has seen all men and women, all time and
space.

*As the poet says:
You are the true transcription
Of the Archetype Divine.
A glass through which the Sun's
Own loveliness does shine.
Within, or without,
Wherever it may lie,
Accept every desire,
And declare, "'Tis I!"*

discourse 17

The Amir of Rum said: “The unbelievers used to worship and bow down to idols. Now we are doing the selfsame thing. We go and bow down and wait upon the Mongols, and yet we consider ourselves Muslims. We have many other idols in our heart too, such as greed, passion, temper, envy, and we are obedient to all of them. So we act in the very same way as the unbelievers, both outwardly and inwardly, and we consider ourselves Muslims!”

Rumi answered: But here is something different; it enters your thoughts that this conduct is evil and utterly detestable. The eye of your heart has seen something incomparably greater that shows up this behavior as vile and hideous. Brackish water shows its brackishness to one who has tasted sweet water, and things are made clear by their opposites.

So God has implanted in Soul the light of faith to see these things as hideous. Confronted by

beauty, this appears ugly. Yet others are not affected this way, they are perfectly happy in their existing state, saying, “This is absolutely fine.”

God will grant you your heart’s desire—where your ambition is, that will be yours. “The bird flies with its wings, the believers fly with their aspiration.”

There are three kinds of creatures. First there are angels, who are pure spiritual conscience. Worship, service and the remembrance of God are their nature and their food. They eat and live upon that essence. Like fish in the water, their mattress and pillow are the water. Angels are pure and free of lust, so what favor do they gain by not yielding to such desires? Since they are free of these things, they have no struggle against them. If they obey God’s will it is not counted as obedience, for this is their nature, and they cannot be otherwise.

Second are the beasts who are pure sensuality, having no spiritual conscience to restrain them. They too are under no burden of obligation.

Lastly, there remains the poor human being, who is a compound of spiritual conscience and

sensuality. We are half angel, half beast. Half snake, half fish. The fish draws us toward water, the snake toward the earth. We are forever in battle. If our spiritual conscience overcomes our sensuality, we are higher than the angels. If our sensuality overcomes our spiritual conscience, we are lower than the beasts.

"The angel is saved through knowledge,

The animal—through ignorance.

Between the two struggle the people of this world."

Now, some have followed their spiritual conscience so faithfully that they have become entirely angels and pure Light. They are the prophets and the saints. They are freed of fear and hope. In some, lust has overcome their spiritual conscience so entirely that they have taken on the status of animals. Some are still struggling. These last are the people who feel within themselves an agony and anguish, a sorrow and a longing. They are not satisfied with their lives. These are the believers. The saints are waiting to bring them to their own station, to make them like themselves, just as the satans, too, are waiting to draw them to the lowest of the low.

*“When God’s help comes through victory,
And you see people
Submitting to His Will in throngs,
Then fill yourself with the presence of the Lord,
And seek His forgiveness;
For God turns to men and women again.”*

Now, commentators offer an outward interpretation to the above Sura, from the Koran, as follows: Mohammed had the dream, “I will make all the world Muslims and bring them to the path of God.” When he saw his death approaching he cried, “Ah, didn’t I come into this life to call the people to God?” God answered, “Do not grieve. In that very hour when you pass away, provinces and cities which you would conquer by armies and by the sword I will convert to obedience and to the faith, every one of them without armies. The sign of this will come at the end when you are dying, you will see people entering in throngs and becoming Muslims. When this sign comes, know that the time for your departure has arrived. Then give praise, and seek forgiveness.”

However, there is an inward meaning to this Sura as well: People think they can drive away evil by great effort and striving. After struggling

and exhausting all their powers and means, they fall into despair. Then God says to them: "You thought you could achieve this goal through your own power, action and work. This is the law I have laid down: Whatever you possess, spend it in Our name. Then Our grace will supervene.

"You must journey upon this infinite road with the feeble hands and feet that you possess. We know well that with feet so feeble you can never accomplish this journey. Indeed, in a hundred thousand years you will not be able to accomplish a single stage of this journey. But even as you collapse and fall, with no strength left to struggle farther, then Our loving breath will carry you on. Even a child, so long as it is a suckling, is carried in the arms, but when it is grown it is set free to walk. Now in this hour when your powers have left you, when your own means fail, behold Our graces, Our gifts and Our love. You will not witness even an atom of such blessings after a hundred thousand strivings."

I do not love or bow down to the Amir on account of worldly considerations, for his rank, learning or achievements. Others love him for

those reasons, not seeing the Amir's face, but only his back. The Amir is like a mirror with precious pearls on its back, with gold inlaid. Those who love gold and pearls look at the back of the mirror, but those who love life always look upon the mirror, and love the mirror for itself. They do not grow weary of the fair beauty they see. But those with a hideous face full of blemishes see in the mirror only ugliness. They quickly turn the mirror and look for those precious stones. Yet what harm is done to the face of the mirror if its back is studded with a thousand kinds of engravings and precious stones?

“Things are made clear by their opposite.”

It is impossible to know anything without its opposite, yet God has no opposite. “I was a hidden treasure,” God says, “and I wanted to be known.” So It created this world of darkness for Its Light to become visible. So, too, It manifested the prophets and the saints, saying, “Go forth with My Attributes into My creation.” They are the theater for the Light of God, where friend may be disclosed from foe, and brother from stranger. The struggles of the saints reveals God's opposite,

even though It has none. Through persecution and opposition, the saints become known and admired.

*“With their mouths, the unbelievers try to extinguish the
Light of God.*

But God will perfect His Light through their adversity.”

God chastises some people through wealth, gold and rulership, for Soul flees from such possessions. Shams saw a prince riding in Arabia, on his brow the illumination of the prophets and saints. Shams said, “Glory be to God who chastises His servants by means of affluence!”

discourse 18

Someone said: “Ibn Muqri recites the Koran correctly.”

Rumi said: Yes, he recites the form of the Koran correctly, but he has no knowledge of its meaning. This is proven by the fact that when he is questioned for its meaning, he cannot answer. He recites blindly. He is like a man who holds an old, tattered sable in his hand; he is offered a newer, finer sable, but he refuses it. So we can see that he doesn’t know what sable really is. Someone told him that this is sable, and he blindly accepted it.

It is like children playing with walnuts. Offer them the nut itself, or the oil of the walnut, and they will refuse it, saying, “The walnut is what we spin on the table. This doesn’t spin.” God’s treasures are many, and God’s sciences are many. If he recites this Koran with knowledge, why does he reject the other eternal Koran?

I once explained to a Koran-teacher: The Koran says, “If the sea were ink for the Words of

my Lord, the sea would be spent before the Words of my Lord are spent.” Now, with fifty drams of ink one can copy the whole of this Koran. Therefore, the Koran is only a symbol of God’s knowledge and all the knowledge belonging to God.

An apothecary puts a pinch of medicine in a piece of paper. You wouldn’t say, “The whole of the apothecary’s shop is in this paper.” That would be foolishness. After all, in the time of Moses and Jesus and the other prophets, the Koran existed. God’s speech existed, but it was not in Arabic. I explained this to the Koran-teacher in this way, but I could see that it made no impression so I let him go.

It is related that during the time of the Prophet anyone who knew one Sura by heart, or half a Sura, was called a great person and pointed out, “They have a Sura by heart,” since in that day they devoured the Koran. To devour a loaf of bread, or two loafs, is certainly a great accomplishment. But people who put bread in their mouths without chewing it and spit it out again can devour thousands of tons in that way.

Still this is a good thing. God has sealed the eyes of some people so they can cultivate this present world. If no one were blind to the other world, this world would be empty. It is this blindness that gives rise to culture and progress. Consider children, how they grow up recklessly and become tall, but when their judgement reaches maturity they stop growing. So the cause and reason for civilization is blindness, and the cause of devastation is sight.

What I am saying is motivated by one of two things: Either I speak out of envy, or I speak with compassion. God forbid that it should be envy! It is stupid to envy even those who are worthy of envy, then how can we envy one who is not worthy? No, I speak out of great compassion and mercy, for I wish to draw you into the true meaning.

A story is told of a man on the way to the pilgrimage who collapsed in the desert, overcome by thirst. Suddenly he saw in the distance a small and tattered tent. He struggled there, and seeing a young girl, he cried aloud, "I am a guest! I have attained my goal!"

Saying this, he sat down and asked for water. She brought him water that was hotter than fire and more brackish than salt, and from lip to throat it burned every part. The man, out of extreme compassion, addressed the woman.

"I am indebted to you for what relief you have given me," he said. "Compassion has welled up within me. Listen to what I say to you. Behold, Baghdad is nearby, and Kufa and Wasit and the rest. There you will find plenty of sweet, cool water, foods of various kinds, baths, luxuries, rich delights." And he described the pleasures of those cities.

A moment later the Bedouin came on the scene who was the woman's husband. He had caught a few brace of desert rats, which he told the woman to cook. They offered some to the guest, who being in such desperate straits ate them. After that, in the middle of the night, the guest slept outside the tent. The woman spoke to her husband.

"Did you hear all the stories our guest had to tell?" And she repeated to her husband the guest's entire account.

“Don’t listen to these things,” the Bedouin answered. “There are many envious people in the world. When they see others living a life of ease and abundance, they envy them and want to send them wandering away to deprive them of their fortune.”

So it is with many people. When anyone out of pure compassion offers them a piece of advice, they see it as envy. But if there are roots in a person, in the end they will turn their face to the truth. If, since the day of the Primordial Covenant a drop has been sprinkled upon them, in the end that drop will deliver them out of all confusion and misery. Come then! How long will you be remote from us and estranged? How long locked up in confusion and sadness? And what should we say to people who have never heard stories like this before, even from their own teacher?

Since greatness never graced their forebears,
They cannot bear to hear the great ones
praised.

Although facing the truth is not attractive at first, the longer one follows it the sweeter it becomes. This is the opposite of outward forms

that charm us at first, but the longer you sit with them thinking they are all there is, the colder you become. What is the form of the Koran compared with its meaning? Examine a man or woman: what is their form compared with their meaning? If the sense of that person departs, we wouldn't let them loose in our house for one moment.

Our Master, Shams, once told this story: A great caravan was on its way to a distant city. Along the way they found a certain place with no sign of habitation or water. Suddenly they came upon a well with no bucket. So they took a kettle and some rope and lowered this kettle into the well. They drew up the rope, but the kettle broke away. They sent down another, but it broke away too. After that they tied people from the caravan with a rope and lowered them down into the well, but they disappeared as well.

Now there was a man of great heart present. He said, "I will go down." They lowered him down. He was nearly to the bottom of the well when a terrible black creature suddenly appeared.

"I will never escape," the man thought. "But at least let me keep my wits about me and not lose my senses, so that I can see what is going to happen."

“Don’t make a long story of it,” the black creature said. “You’re my prisoner. You won’t escape unless you give me the right answer. Nothing else will save you.”

“Ask on,” said the man.

“Where is the best place?” the creature asked.

“I am a prisoner and helpless,” the man reflected. “If I say Baghdad or some other place, I might insult his own hometown.” Then he spoke aloud, “The best place to live is wherever we feel at home. If that is in the bowels of the earth, then that’s the best place. If it’s in a mouse hole, then that’s the best place.”

“Well said, well said!” cried the creature. “You’ve escaped. You’re one in a million. Now I’ve let you go, and set free the others on account of your blessing. From this time forward I’ll shed no more blood. I bestow this gift on all the people of the world out of love for you.”

Then he gave the people of the caravan water to satisfy their needs.

The purpose of this story is contained in its inner meaning. We can tell the same meaning in another form, but the lovers of traditional forms will accept this version. It is difficult to speak with

them. If we speak these very same words in another parable they will not listen.

discourse 19

Rumi said: Someone said to Taj al-Din Quba'i, "These doctors of divinity live amongst us and deprive the people of their religious beliefs." Taj al-Din Quba'i answered, "They do not live amongst us and take away our beliefs. God forbid they could ever be one of us. If you put a golden collar on a dog, do you call it a hunting dog because of that collar? The quality of being a hunting dog is something specific in the animal, whether it wears a collar of gold or wool."

No one becomes a scholar by virtue of robe and turban. Scholarship is a virtue in its very essence, and whether that virtue is clothed in tunic or overcoat, it makes no difference.

Thus, in Mohammed's time, the hypocrites used to put on prayer-robcs to lure Muslims away from the Faith. How could they lead astray Muslims until they dressed up as Muslims, themselves? If a Christian or a Jew criticized Islam, who would listen to them?

*“Woe to those that pray
Yet do not listen to their own prayers,
Or to those who make big displays
But for others have no care.”*

But these are merely words. You have caught that Light but still have not found humanity. Seek humanity: that is your true purpose. The rest is mere long-windedness. When words are elaborately decorated, their purpose is forgotten.

A certain greengrocer was in love with a woman, and he sent messages by the lady's maid.

“I am like this, I am like that. I am in love, I am on fire. I find no peace. I am cruelly treated. I was like this yesterday. Last night such and such happened to me.” And he recited long, long stories.

The maid came into the lady's presence and addressed her as follows:

“The greengrocer sends you greetings and says, ‘Come, so that I may do this and that to you.’”

“So coldly?” the lady asked.

“He spoke at great length,” answered the maid. “But that was his purpose.”

The purpose is the root of the matter; the rest is merely a headache.

discourse 20

Rumi said: Night and day you are at war, attempting to reform the character of the opposite sex, to cleanse their impurity and to correct their faults. It is better to cleanse yourself through them than trying to cleanse them through yourself. Reform yourself by means of them. Go to them and accept whatever they may say, even if from your viewpoint their words sound absurd or unfair.

It was on account of this truth that Mohammed said, "There is no monkhood in Islam." The way of monks is solitude, dwelling in mountains, men not living with women, and giving up the world. God showed the Prophet a straight and hidden way. What is that way? Marriage, so that we can endure the trials of living with the opposite sex, to listen to their demands, for them to ride roughshod over us, and so in this way to refine our own character.

By enduring and putting up with the tyranny of your spouse it is as though you rub off your own impurity on them. Your character becomes good through forbearance; their character becomes bad through domineering and aggression. Once you have realized this, make yourself clean. Know that they are like a garment; in them you can cleanse your own impurities and become clean yourself.

Rid yourself of pride, envy and jealousy, until you experience pleasure in struggling and enduring. Through their demands discover spiritual joy. After that, you will endure such struggles, and you will not run from oppression, since you will see the advantages they bring to you.

It is related that Mohammed returned with his Companions from a raid, one night. He told them to beat the drum saying, "Tonight we will sleep at the gate of the city, and enter tomorrow." They asked, "Messenger of God, why don't we return to our homes immediately?" He said, "You might see your wives in bed with strange men. You would be hurt, and a commotion would arise." One of the Companions did not hear; he entered and found his wife with a stranger.

The way of the Prophet is this: It is necessary to endure pain to help rid ourselves of selfishness, jealousy and pride. To experience the pain of our spouses' extravagant desires, the pain of unfair burdens, and a hundred thousand other pains beyond all bounds, so the spiritual path can become clear. The way of Jesus was wrestling with solitude and not gratifying lust. The way of Mohammed is to endure the oppression and agonies inflicted by men and women upon each other. If you cannot go by the Mohammedan way, at least go by the way of Jesus, so you will not remain completely outside the spiritual path.

If you have the serenity to endure a hundred buffets, seeing the fruits and harvest that come through them, or believing in your hidden heart, "Though in this hour I see no harvest of these sufferings, in the end I will reach the treasures," you will reach the treasures, yes, and more than you ever desired and hoped.

If these words have no effect upon you now, after a while when you become maturer they will leave a great impression. This is the difference between talking with your spouse and a friend. When you speak to your mate, they remain the

same and will not change their ways due to anything you say. Your words have no effect on them, indeed they become more determined.

For instance, take a loaf of bread, put it under your arm, and deny it to others, saying, "I will not give this to anyone. Give it? Why, I won't even show it." Even if that loaf had been cast away and the dogs would not eat it because bread is so plentiful and cheap—yet the moment you begin to refuse it, everybody is after it and sets their hearts on it, pleading and protesting, "We want to see that bread which you refuse and keep hidden." Especially if you keep it hidden for a year, insisting emphatically that you will neither give it away nor show it, their eagerness for the loaf passes all bounds, since, "People are passionate for whatever they are denied."

The more you tell your spouse, "Keep yourself hidden," the greater their itch to flirt and show themselves. And through their being hidden, the opposite sex becomes more eager for them. So there you sit in the middle, augmenting eagerness on both sides, and you think of yourself as a reformer! Why, that is the very essence of corrup-

tion. If they have in them the natural quality not to do evil, whether you prevent them or not, they will proceed according to their good temperament and pure constitution. So rest assured, and don't worry. If they are the opposite, they will still go their own way; trying to stop them in reality does nothing but increase their eagerness.

Someone said: "We heard some men saying, 'We saw Shams-i-Tabriz, we really saw him.'"

Rumi said: Fools, where did they see him? Would you listen to someone who cannot see a camel on the roof of their own house, if they come along and say, "I found a needle in the field and threaded it." That is a fine story, like the person who said, "Two things make me laugh—a black person painting their nails black, and a blind person putting their head out of the window." They are exactly like that. Blind inwardly, they put their heads out of the window of the physical body. What can they see? What does their approval or disapproval amount to?

First it is necessary to acquire inner sight. Then one can see. But even with sight, how can one see what is hidden? In this world there are saints who

have achieved union, and other saints beyond those, called the Veiled Ones of God. The former saints are ever pleading humbly, "Oh Lord God, show us one of Thy Veiled Ones." Now as for those tavern-haunting braggarts, of course they cannot reach or see what their own boasting hides. How can one see the Veiled Ones of God, or know them without their will?

It is not an easy matter. Even the spiritual angels, who are not tempted by either wealth nor rank, who have no veil to separate them, whose food is the pure Light and Beauty of God, whose eyes—keen and farsighted—see only pure Love, these spiritual angels swing between favor and disfavor toward the people of this world. This is so that, during our moments of disgrace we might tremble and ask, "What have I become? What do I know?" And if some light should shine upon us and we should be graced by a certain joy, we might give thanks a thousandfold to God, saying, "How am I worthy of this?"

Submitting yourself in this way, you can experience great joy even from a word or a glimpse of Shams. For the sail on the ship of our being is our

ideal. When there is a sail, the wind can carry us to mighty places. When there is no sail, all words are merely wind.

The lover-beloved relationship is very pleasant; everything between the two is sheer informality. All formalities are for the sake of others. I would give a great exposition of these words, but the hour is late, and one must labor very hard and dig out rivers to reach the pool of the heart. In this matter proofs cannot work. Here one must be a seeker of love, not an observer.

It might seem that I exaggerate the relationship of the lover, but this is not true. In fact, I see that disciples should give up their own purpose for the sake of their master's form.

*Thou whose form is fairer far
Than a thousand purposes are.*

Every disciple who comes to the master must first abandon his or her own purpose, being in need of the master.

Baha al-Din asked the question: "Surely they shouldn't abandon their own purpose for the sake of the master's form, but for the sake of the master's purpose?"

Rumi answered: That isn't possible. If this were so, then both would be masters. Now you must struggle to find the inward light, to escape and be secure from this fire of confusions. When you acquire such an inward light, all the desires of this world such as rank, honor, and title pass across your inward heart like a lightning-flash. With worldlings, the rewards of the unseen world such as the presence of God and yearning for the world of the saints' shine upon their hearts for a moment and then pass like a lightning-flash. Therefore it is rank, honor and title they really seek. However, the people of God become wholly God's, their faces are turned to God. They are preoccupied with and absorbed in God. Worldly passions, like the lust of an impotent man, show briefly but do not take root and quickly pass away.

discourse 21

Rumi said: Sharif Paysukhta has written:

*God dispenses Its grace,
Indifferent to time and space,
Itself, the Spirit of the Whole
Is independent of our soul.
No matter what our ranging thought
Within its compass may be brought,
We find adoration for the Lord,
For It who need not be adored.*

These words are shameful; they neither honor God, nor do they honor mankind. Oh poet, what joy does it give you that God should be supremely independent of you? This is not the language of friends; this is the language of enemies. The enemy indeed says, “I am indifferent to you and do not care.”

Now consider the loyal and ardent lover of God who, when in a state of ecstatic joy, addresses that Beloved, “You are independent of me!” They would be like a stoker of the fires at the baths, saying, “The Sultan is indifferent and independent of me, a mere stoker. Indeed, the Sultan

is indifferent to all stokers.” What joy would such a miserable stoker feel with the thought that the king was indifferent to them? No, the right words for the stoker to speak would be: “I was on the roof of the baths. The Sultan passed by. I hailed him. He looked well at me and then passed me by, still looking at me.” Such words might well give joy to that stoker. As for saying, “The king is indifferent to stokers,” what sort of praise for the king is that, and what joy can it give the stoker?

*No matter what our ranging thought
Within its compass may be brought,*

Oh poet, what indeed will pass within the compass of your thought when you find that it is people who are independent of you, they are bored of your thoughts and run away? God’s independence is certain, oh poet, but if you have a spiritual state worth anything at all, He will not be independent of you. God’s closeness to you establishes the degree of your greatness.

Sheikh Mahalla used to say, “First see, then converse. Everyone sees the Sultan, but it is his favorite who enjoys his conversation.” This too is

backwards. Moses enjoyed the speech of God. With God's word he was filled. It was only afterwards he sought to see. Moses' station was the station of speech; the station of Mohammed was the station of seeing. How then can the Sheikh's statement be correct?

Someone said to Shams-i-Tabriz, "I have established the existence of God by a categorical proof." The following morning our Master, Shams, said, "Last night the angels came down and blessed that man, saying, 'Praise be to God, he has established the existence of our God! God give him long life! He has done no harm to the honor of men and women!'"

Oh poet, God exists. It needs no proof. If you do anything at all, establish yourself in some rank and station before Him. Otherwise, how can you share in His grace?

Nothing exists that does not proclaim His praise.

Lawyers are clever, a hundred per cent competent in their own specialty. But between them and the spiritual world, a wall has been built to pre-

serve their empire of logic and proofs. If that wall did not exist as a veil for them, no one would consult them and their work would disappear.

This is like what Shams said, "The other world is like a sea, and this world is foam from that sea. God desired to keep this foam in order. Therefore, He set certain people with their backs to the sea so this foam would not fall into ruin."

A tent was pitched for a king, and he kept certain people busy constructing this tent. One says, "If I don't make the tent-ropes how will the tent stand up?" Another says, "If I don't make the pegs, where will they tie the ropes?" Still, everybody knows these people are servants of the king. If the weavers gave up weaving and sought to be viziers, the whole world would be naked and bare. So, they were given a joy for their craft. They are content with weaving. Therefore people were created to keep the world of foam in order, and this world was created for the Saint.

God bestows contentment and happiness on everyone in the work that is theirs, so that even if their life should last a hundred thousand years they would still find love for their work. Every

day the love for their craft becomes greater, and subtle skills are born to them, which bring them infinite joy and pleasure.

Nothing exists that does not proclaim His praise.

There is one praise for the rope-maker, another for the carpenter who makes the tent-poles, another for the maker of the tent-pins, another for the weaver who weaves the cloth for the tent, another for the saints for whom the tent is made.

Now these seekers who come to us, wanting some time with us, if we say nothing they are disgusted and hurt. Yet if we say something it must be beneficial to their level of attainment. So we approach cautiously, and they leave, criticizing us, saying, "They are holding back what they know. They are hiding from us and running away."

How should the fire run away from the cook pot? It cannot. The truth is that when we see that the vessel is weak, we draw back some distance to protect it. So, it is really the pot that runs away. Our running away is their running away. We are a mirror. If they move to run away, it appears to them in us. We run away for their sake. In a mir-

ror people see themselves. If they see us as weary, that weariness is theirs and a reflection of their weakness. There is no room here for weariness; what use do we have for weariness?

In the baths, once, I showed great submission to Sheikh Salah al-Din, and Sheikh Salah al-Din showed great submission to me. Confronted by his submission, I protested. I thought to myself, "You are carrying submission too far. Submission is better by degrees: First you kiss the hand, then the foot. Little by little you come to a point where it does not stand out as a display, and in return they are moved by your sincerity. They are not chased away, or forced into matching courtesy with courtesy, when you gradually show your affection."

We must act this same way with friends and enemies, doing things gradually. For instance, with an enemy, first we offer them our advice, little by little. If they do not listen, we show some force. If they do not heed that, then we drive them away.

The work of the world proceeds in this way. Don't you see the peace and friendliness of

spring? In the beginning it shows us warmth little by little, then it displays its graces more and more. Look at the trees, how little by little they advance. First a smile, then they show their trappings of leaves and fruit, like dervishes and Sufis offering their hearts, giving away all that they possess.

Men and women run away from every goal, whether worldly or spiritual, because they overestimate the initial task. The proper way is a bit at a time. It is the same if someone eats too much; they should diminish it daily by a small bit, gradually. In that way, before a year or two have passed, they will have cut down what they eat by half, reducing it in such a way that their body does not notice. So it is with worship, withdrawing into solitude, attending to the service of God, and prayer. When a person enters upon the Way of God, for a while their prayers will be short. But after that, if they pray with their whole heart, their prayers will go on and on without end.

discourse 22

Rumi said to Ibn Chavish: The root of the matter is that you should guard against this backbiting when talking about Sheikh Salah al-Din. Perhaps this will remove these dark shadows and clouds that surround you.

How can you defend yourself? People have left their own country, their fathers and mothers, their households, kinsfolk and families, and have journeyed from Hind to Sind until their boots were cut to shreds, in search of someone having the fragrance of the other world. How many men and women have died of sorrow, never succeeding nor encountering such a person! As for you, you know such a man here in your own house, and you turn your back on him. This is a tragedy of recklessness.

You used to tell me that Sheikh Salah al-Din was the sheikh of sheikhs, a great and mighty man. "From the day I entered his service," you said to me, "I never heard him once mention your

name except as Rumi, Our Master, Our Lord, Our Creator. I never heard him change this humble expression for a single day.” It must be your ambitions that have blinded you now. Today you say that Salah al-Din is nothing.

What wrong has Sheikh Salah al-Din ever done you? Only, when seeing you fall into a pit of self-destruction, he said to you, “Beware of the pit.” He said this out of compassion for you, above all others, but you reject that compassion. Now, you find yourself in the midst of his wrath, and having plunged into this wrath, how will you escape? That is why he says, “Do not dwell in my house of wrath and anger. Move into my house of grace and compassion. Do something in praise of me, and enter my house of love.” He says this because then your heart will shed this darkness and fill with light.

He says this to you for your own sake, for your own good, but you charge his compassion to some ulterior motive. What ulterior motive should a man like that have towards you? Isn't it true that whenever you are filled to satisfaction with drink or music, at the same time you are

pleased with every enemy, forgiving them all? In that hour, unbeliever and believer become the same in your eyes. Now Sheikh Salah al-Din is the very ocean of this spiritual joy. All the seas of satisfaction are within him. How could he hate anyone, or have plans against them? And especially, what designs would he have against such as locusts and frogs? How can he, who possesses such empire and grandeur, be compared with such miserable creatures?

Is it not said that the Water of Life must be found in darkness? This darkness surrounds the saints, in whose being we find that Eternal Spring. The Water of Life is hidden in their darkness. If you turn from darkness and run away from it, how can the Water of Life ever reach you?

Don't you think if you wanted to learn sodomy from sodomites, or harlotry from harlots, you could never learn anything without putting up with a thousand disagreeable things, beatings and the thwarting of your desires? This is the only way you could attain your goal. Then how do you expect to attain the eternal and everlasting source of life, which is the station of the prophets and

saints, without anything disagreeable or without any sacrifice? How could this ever happen?

What the Sheikh prescribes for you is the same as what Sheikhs of old prescribed; that you give up your wealth and position. Indeed, they used to tell a disciple, "Leave your wife, that we may take her," and the disciples put up with that. As for you, when he counsels you a simple thing, how is it that you run away?

Do you not see how people are overcome by blindness and ignorance when they fall in love, how they will fawn and grovel and sacrifice all their wealth, seeking somehow to win the one they want with every effort. Night and day they think of nothing else, never wearying of their pursuit, yet wearying of everything else. Then, is the love for the Sheikh and the love for God less than this?

Yet, at the smallest word of advice and discipline you object and desert the Sheikh. Hence it is known that you are no lover or seeker. Were you a true lover and seeker, you would put up with many times what we have described. To your heart, dung would become honey and sugar.

discourse 23

Rumi said: I would like to go to Tuqat, for that region is warm. Although Antalya is warm, only a few people there understand our language. However, I was speaking there one day when a party of unbelievers was present. In the middle of my talk they began to weep with emotion and show signs of ecstasy.

Someone asked: “What can they understand? What do they know? Only one Muslim in a thousand understands this kind of talk. What could an unbeliever understand that would cause them to weep?”

Rumi answered: It isn’t necessary for them to understand the inner meaning of what we say. The vessel of this meaning is the words themselves, and this they do recognize. After all, everyone knows of the Oneness of God, Creator and Provider, the source of all life, where all things return. When anyone hears these words, which are a description and expression of God, a uni-

versal emotion and inner feeling stirs them, since out of these words comes a scent of their Beloved and their Quest.

The ways may vary, but the goal is one. Don't you see that there are many roads to the Kaaba? For some the road is from Rum, for some from Syria, others come from Persia or China or by sea from India and Yemen. So if you consider the roads, they are beyond counting, with infinite differences. But when you consider the goal they are all in accord with one desire.

The hearts of all are upon the Kaaba. The hearts are one in their longing and love for the Kaaba, and in that there is no room for separation. That love is neither belief nor non-belief, for it has nothing to do with the various roads. Once we arrive, this argument and war and those differences in the roads—this woman saying to that man, “You are false, you are an infidel,” and that man saying the same about her—once we arrive at the Kaaba, we realize that such fighting is over the roads only, and that the goal of all is the same.

For instance, a bowl's spirit is in love with its maker, and is a slave to those hands that fashion

it. Yet some see this bowl and say it should be placed just as it is on the table. Some say the inside of it should be washed first, some say the outside of it must be cleaned. Some say all of it, some say it must never be washed at all. The diversity of opinion comes from the bowl's many uses, but as to the fact that the bowl certainly had a creator who fashioned it, and that it did not come into existence of itself, on this all agree.

Now, men and women in their inmost hearts love God, seek Him, pray to Him and in all things put their hope in Him, recognizing none but God as the central reality ordering their affairs. This is neither belief nor non-belief. Within the heart it has no name. But when the water of innate truth flows out of the heart towards the sluice of the tongue and takes form, it acquires shape and expression. There it is given the name of infidelity or faith, good or evil. It is the same with plants growing out of the earth. At first they have no form at all. When they make their appearance in this world their shoots all look fine, delicate and white. But as they grow further they take on dif-

ferent shapes and colors. Then we can call them by name.

When believers and infidels sit together and say nothing, they are one and the same. There is no conflict of belief; the heart is a free world. Beliefs are subtle things and cannot be judged. People can judge by outward expression only, God is the fashioner of our secret hearts. When God uncovers your own beliefs to you, not a hundred thousand efforts can hide them again. As for the saying that God needs no instrument, do you not see how He reveals those ideas and beliefs in you without any instruments, without any pen, without any pigment?

Those beliefs are like birds of the air, and wild deer. Until you catch them, it is not allowable by law to sell them. It is not in your power to sell a bird on the wing, for how can you deliver it? Since it is not in your power, it is not yours to sell.

Beliefs then, so long as they are in the heart, are without name and token—they cannot be judged. Would any judge say, “In your heart you made this oath, you had this idea,” or “Come, swear

that in your heart you did not think this?" No judge would say this, because no one can judge the heart. Beliefs are birds of the air. Yet once they have been expressed, then immediately they can be judged as true or false, good or evil.

There is a world of bodies, a world of ideas, a world of fantasies, a world of possibilities. God is beyond all worlds, neither within them, nor without. Consider then how God fashions our beliefs, forming them without material means, without pen or instrument. As for this fancy or that idea, if you were to tear open the breast and search particle by particle you would never find that thought. Not in the blood, not in the vein, not above, not below. Being immaterial and beyond time and space, you would not find it outside the breast, either.

Since God's mark is so subtle as to be without trace, consider how subtle and without trace is God, Itself, the fashioner of all! Just as the physical body is gross in relation to the inner meaning of a person, so this subtle and invisible meaning is a gross body and form next to God's subtlety.

All Muslims say, “We will enter the Holy Mosque.” Some Muslims say, “If God wills, we will enter.” Those who use the expression “if God wills” are the true lovers of God. For the lover does not think that they’re in charge of things and a free agent. They recognize that the Beloved is in charge. Hence they say, “If this Beloved wills, I will enter.”

Now the literalists take the Holy Mosque to be the Kaaba in Mecca. However, lovers and the elect of God take the Holy Mosque to mean union with God. So they say, “If God wills, we will attain Him and be honored by the sight of Him.” For God to say, “If God wills,” is very rare. It is the tale of a stranger, and only a stranger can understand such a tale. Yet God has certain servants who are so well loved that He seeks them out, showering them with blessings, and carrying out all the actions of a lover. Just as the lover would say, “If God wills, I will enter,” so God says on behalf of that saint, “If God wills.”

If I were to try explaining this subtlety, even the saints who have attained God would lose the

thread of the discourse. How then is it possible to speak of such mysteries and mystic states to mortal men and women? "The pen wrote this far, and then it broke!" If someone can't see the camel on top of their own house, how can they see the thread of one hair in the mouth of that camel?

To resume: Those lovers who say, "If God wills," such people are absorbed in God. There is no room for anything else. Otherness does not even exist. For until a person has surrendered their image of a separate existence, the Holy Mosque cannot be found. "There is none dwelling in the house but God."

"The vision He entrusted to His Messenger..."

This vision is the dream of lovers and true people of God, but the true meaning is only revealed in the other world. When you see in a dream that you are riding on a horse, this means you will attain your goal; yet what connection does the horse have with a goal? If you dream that you have been given coins of good currency, the meaning is that you will hear true and good words from a wise person; but how does a coin resemble a word? If you dream that you have been hanged

before a crowd, you will become the chief of a people; but how do gallows resemble leadership? In the same way, the affairs of this world are a dream. "This world is the dream of a sleeper," and its meaning is seen quite differently in the other world. There it is truly judged by the Divine Interpreter, for to Him all things are revealed.

Like a gardener who enters an orchard and looks at the trees, without even looking at the fruit on the branches, they can judge this tree to be a date, that one a fig, that a pomegranate, a pear, or an apple. The true people of God know the science of trees, therefore they need not wait for the resurrection to see the interpretation of life. Such a person sees beforehand what will be, just as the gardener knows what fruit each branch will surely yield.

All things in this world—wealth, a mate, and clothing—are desired for something other than themselves. Don't you see that even with a hundred thousand gold coins, if you were hungry, and you could find no food, you could not feed yourself on gold? A mate is for the sake of children, companionship and to satisfy passion. Clothes are

to ward off the cold. In this way, all things are desired for some other thing, each desire leading to the next, all ending in the desire for God. He is desired for His own sake, not for anything else. Being beyond all, greater than all, nobler and subtler than all, can God be desired for something less? "So, He is the goal." Within God is the completion of all things, beyond Him there is no transcending.

The human mind churns with doubts and difficulties. The mind can never be rid of these except when it is truly in love—then all its doubts and difficulties vanish. "Your love renders you blind and deaf."

For example, when Iblis would not bow down before Adam and opposed God's command, Iblis said, "My essence is spirit, his essence is clay. Why should the higher bow down before the lower?" So God banished Iblis for opposing and contending with Divine Law. Then Iblis argued, "Alas, O Lord! You made all things. This was Your temptation, and now You are cursing me and banishing me."

Yet when Adam sinned, God expelled him from Paradise, but Adam said nothing back. Then God said to Adam, “O Adam, I have held you responsible and punished you for the sin you committed, why did you not argue with Me? After all, you had a perfect case. You could have said, ‘All things proceed from You and are made by You. Whatever You desire in the world comes to pass, and whatever You desire not will never come to pass.’ You had a clear and valid case, why did you not argue it?” Adam answered, “I knew that well, Lord, but I did not forget courtesy in Your presence. Because of my love for You I could say nothing.” Thus Adam’s love stayed firm and was not swayed.

This sacred Law of Love is a watering-place, a fountainhead. It is just like the court of a king where many study the king’s laws, his commandments and prohibitions, his government—equal justice for nobles and commons—etc. The edicts of the king are without end, and on them the stability of the country rests. But the status of dervishes and Sufis is one of love for the king. Out

of their love springs conversation with the king, and knowing his mind and heart. What is knowledge of the king's laws, compared with knowing the ruler himself, his mind and heart? There is a vast difference.

The Sufis and their various teachings are like a school with many scholars. The headmaster pays each scholar according to their qualifications, giving to one ten, the next twenty, another thirty. We too dispense our words according to everyone's degree and qualification. "Speaking to each according to the degree of their understanding."

discourse 24

People build these sacred monuments for a particular reason: either to display their generosity for the sake of fame, or to gain a reward in heaven. God should be the true object in honoring the saints, their tombs and graves. The saints do not need to be honored; they are an honor to themselves.

If a lamp desires to be placed up high, it wants this for the sake of others, not for its own sake. What does a lamp care whether it is high or low? It is still a lamp shedding light. But a lamp wants its light to reach others. The sun, if it were not in the height of the heavens would still be the same sun, only the world would fall into darkness. So the sun attains its height not for its own sake, but for the love of others. The saints, too, have gone beyond such things as above and below, and the worship of people.

Look at yourself when you are granted a fragment of ecstasy and a flash of grace from the

other world. In that moment you see no above or below, mastership or discipleship, or even yourself, which is nearer to you than all else. These things do not enter your mind. So how can the saints, who are the windows and doorways for that light and inspiration, be concerned about above and below. Their heart is with God, and God is independent of below and above. This higher and lower belongs to us who have heads and feet.

Mohammed said, "Do not hold me above Jonah, son of Matthew, just because his ascension was in the belly of a whale while my ascension was in heaven upon the Throne." He meant, "God is neither above nor below. His presence is the same, whether in heaven or in the belly of the whale."

There are many who have aims of their own, while God has another goal. God desired the religion of Mohammed to be honored, to be spread abroad and to abide down through time. Consider how many volumes have been written about the Koran. Yet the aim of those writers was to display their own virtuosity.

Zamakhshari filled his Kashshaf with numerous details of grammar, lexicography and rhetoric to display his own learning—but it also fulfilled God's purpose, namely the exaltation of the religion of Mohammed. So, all people do God's work, whether they know it or not. A man and woman satisfy their lust with each other for the sake of their own enjoyment, but the result is the birth of a child. In the same way everyone works for his or her own pleasure and enjoyment, and this is the means of maintaining the order of the world. In reality they are serving God, although that is not their intent.

In the same way, people carve miniature mosques at great expense to beautify their doors and walls. Mecca is the true aim and object of honor, and its honoring is all the greater since that was not their true intention.

The greatness of the saints means nothing in this world. By God, yes, they have an elevation and greatness, but it is beyond space and time. Suppose, for instance, you placed a silver dirham on the roof, and a gold piece under it. Is not the gold still superior in all circumstances? Similarly,

the chaff is above the sieve and the corn falls under it; but how can the chaff be “above” the corn? The superiority of the corn does not come from its position in this world, but from its place in that world of realities.

discourse 25

Someone entered, and Rumi said: He is beloved and humble, like a branch loaded with fruit—the fruit weighs it down. A branch with no fruit raises its head up high, like the white poplar, but when that fruit exceeds all bounds, they put props under the branch so it will not come down altogether.

Mohammed was extremely humble. All the fruits of this world and the next were gathered upon his branch, so of course he was humbler than others. He said, “No one ever preceded the Messenger of God in making a greeting.” No one was able to precede the Prophet in offering greetings because he outstripped all others in extreme humility, and always made his greetings first. Even if others had said their greeting first, still his humility came before they could speak, for everyone has learned the humble greeting from him and hear his greeting within themselves before they say a word.

Everything that ancient people or modern people possess is a shadow of the Messenger of God. Though a person's shadow might cross the threshold before them, still they are first. True, their shadow may appear to lead, but this shadow comes from them, and therefore always follows.

Our grace and humility are not made from this present moment; these atoms existed in that primeval time, from those particles and parts of the first Messenger of God. In this hour they become visible again, but this splendor and brightness is ancient. Its original light was altogether purer and brighter and more humble.

Some people see the beginnings of things, and some look to the end. Those who look to the goal are great and mighty, for although their eyes are fixed on this moment; still they look into the world beyond. But those who see the beginning are greater. They say, "Why look to the end? If wheat is sown in the beginning, barley will not grow. If oats are planted, you cannot reap corn." So their gaze is fixed upon the beginning.

Still there are others even greater yet, who look

at neither the beginnings nor the endings—the start and finish do not enter their minds...they are absorbed in God. However, those who are absorbed in worldly things do not see the beginning or end either, but in their case this is out of extreme carelessness—they are the fodder of fools.

So the Man and Woman of God are the foundation.

*“But for you,
I would not have created the heavens.”*

All that exists—honor and humility, authority and high degree—all are our inheritance from Them. All attributes are Their shadow, for everything has manifested from Them.

Whatever this hand does it does as the shadow of Spirit, for Spirit’s shadow directs it. In truth, Spirit has no shadow, yet it has a shadow without a shadow, just as ‘meaning’ has form without form. If the shadow of Spirit were not over us, all of our body would wither away—our hands would no longer grasp, our feet would not know how to walk, our eyes and ears would be lost in

confusion. Therefore, in reality all those actions proceed from Spirit—the body is the instrument of Spirit's tongue.

In the same way, there is a great person, the caliph of their time. They are like the Universal Spirit, and the spirits of humankind are their body. Whatever the people of this world do is in their shadow. If the actions of some are in error, it is because the Universal Spirit has lifted its shadow from their heads. When someone goes mad and acts crazy, everyone knows that reason has left them, and no longer casts its shadow over them. They are far away from the shadow and shelter of Spirit.

Spirit is kin to the angel. Although angels have definite form, while Spirit does not, both possess the same nature and act exactly the same. We should not be fooled by the form when they are identical in every way. If you dissolved an angel's form, nothing would remain but Spirit. Therefore angels are the embodiment of Spirit.

A bird can be molded of wax, complete with feathers and wings, but still it is wax. If you melt it, don't you see that its head and feet, feathers and wings all return to wax? Nothing else

remains. From this we know that it is wax embodied into a certain shape, but wax none the less.

Similarly, ice is nothing but water. When you melt it, only its form dissolves.

The human being was created like this: They took the feathers of an angel, and tied them to the tail of an ass, in hopes that the ass—from the radiance and companionship of the angel—might become an angel, too. So what is so wonderful if this ass became a human? God is able to do all things.

When a child is first born, it is worse than an ass, sticking its hands in filth and then into its mouth to lick. The mother must spank the baby to stop it. The ass at least has some sort of discrimination; when it urinates, it opens its legs so the urine will not trickle on them. Yet the child, who is worse than an ass, God raises into a man or woman. If God should turn the ass into a human, what is so astounding in that? With God, nothing is a cause for astonishment.

At the resurrection, all parts of a person will speak. The philosophers interpret this allegorically. They say: When the hand speaks, perhaps

some sign, like a scratch or abscess, will show on its skin. Then you can say, in a sense that the hand speaks since it gives information, "I ate something causing inflammation, and so I became like this." Or the hand is wounded and becomes black. These signs tell a story, saying "A knife struck me," or "I rubbed myself against a black pot." So much for the philosophers!

The Sunni theologians say: God forbid! No indeed! The hands and feet will speak just as the tongue speaks. On the day of resurrection a person will deny their past saying, "I did not steal." But their hand will answer, "Yes you stole, since I took it." They will then turn to their hand, saying, "You have never spoken before, how can you speak now?" The hand will answer, "God gave us speech, just as It gives all things speech. It gives speech to the door and wall, the stone and clod. What is so astonishing about that?"

You speak with your tongue, yet it is merely a piece of flesh. Your hand is also a piece of flesh. Is your tongue endowed with reason? Yet when God commanded it to speak, it spoke.

Words come according to the attainment of the listener. Speech is like water that flows from a reservoir. How can the water know where they will send it—into the cucumber-patch, the onion-bed, or the rose-garden? But I know this: when water comes in torrents, there the lands are thirsty and extensive. But if only a little trickle flows, that land is small—a little orchard, or a tiny courtyard. The Prophet said, “God inspires wisdom in the tongue of the teacher according to the aspirations of the student.” I am a cobbler: the leather is plentiful, but I cut and stitch according to the size of the foot.

*I am your mirror,
I am your measure;
As much as your stature is,
So much my treasure.*

A worm lives under the earth in darkness. It has no eyes or ears because where it lives it does not need them. Since there is no need, why give eyes and ears to worms? God has no scarcity of eyes and ears and It is not miserly, but It gives according to the need. Anything else becomes a

burden. God's wisdom and grace remove burdens; how could It do otherwise? For instance, if you gave tailors the tools of a carpenter—axe, saw, and a file—you would burden them, since they cannot use such instruments to make clothes. So God gives according to need and no more.

Just as those worms thrive in darkness under the earth, so there are people who are content and satisfied to live in the darkness of this world, having no need for the heavenly world, and no yearning for the Vision. Of what use to them is the eye of clairvoyance or the ear of understanding? Their work in this world needs only the eyes they have. Since they have no desire for the other side, why give them clairvoyance, which would be useless to them?

*Do not think that saints
No longer travel upon this road.
Perfect in all life's ways.
Traceless lovers of God.
It is because you cannot see
Their secrets through your eyes,
You fancy in your vain conceit,
No others can gain that prize.*

This world continues through heedlessness. If it were not for heedlessness this world would not

remain. Yearning for God, contemplation of the next world, intoxication, and ecstasy—these are the builders of that inner realm. If these true desires revealed themselves to all people, there would be a worldwide exodus. None would remain. Yet God wants both worlds to exist, so It has appointed two sheriffs one heedlessness, the other heedfulness—so that both houses can thrive.

discourse 26

Rumi said: If I appear lacking in gratitude and appreciation for the kindness and support you show me, both directly and indirectly, it is not out of arrogance or indifference, nor is it because I don't know the importance of returning your favor and love. But I am aware from the purity of your efforts that you do these things sincerely for the sake of God, so I leave it to God to thank you. If I concerned myself with thanking you, granting you verbal honor and praising you, it would be as if some part of the treasure that God has set aside for you was already given, some part of your reward had already been paid.

Humble attitudes, offering thanks and applause—these are worldly pleasures. But when you have gone to worldly pains such as the sacrifice of wealth and position, how can worldly pleasure be a satisfactory return? Therefore, I do not offer thanks since that reward should come entirely from God.

No one can eat wealth. Wealth is sought for what it brings, not what it is. With wealth people purchase horses, servant-girls and slaves. Then they display these riches so that others will praise and applaud them. Therefore, it is the world itself that is held up so high, and it is this world that is praised and applauded.

Sheik Nassaj of Bukhara was an honored, spiritual man. Learned and great people came to visit him and knelt at his feet. The Sheik was unlettered, but they loved to hear him expounding on the Koran and Traditions of the Prophet. He would say, "I do not know Arabic. Translate a verse from the Koran so I can tell you its meaning." They would translate the verse. Then he would begin to explain and reveal the truth in it. He would say, "The Prophet was in such and such a situation when he uttered this verse. The circumstances took place like this..." And he would describe in detail the spiritual level of that situation, the ways leading up to it, and how the Prophet gained that state.

One day a descendant of Ali was praising a certain judge while standing next to the judge, say-

ing, "There is no judge like this man anywhere in the world. He does not take bribes. He dispenses justice amongst others without partiality or favor, purely and sincerely for the sake of God." When Sheik Nassaj heard this he replied, "To say that he doesn't take bribes is certainly a lie. You, an honored descendant of Ali, praise and applaud him to his face, saying that he does not take bribes. Isn't that a bribe? What could be a better bribe than that?"

Sheik Tirmidhi once said, "Saiyid Burhan al-Din expounds truths so well because he has studied the books, secret writings and treatises of the masters." A Sufi answered, "But you study them as well. Why don't you speak like he does?" Tirmidhi replied, "Well, Burhan al-Din has also made great spiritual efforts and accomplishments." The Sufi said, "Why didn't you say that in the first place? You only know how to repeat what you have read; that is the difference. But we are now speaking of something greater than books—you too can speak of that!"

Few care about the other world at all. They have fixed their hearts upon this world entirely.

Some seek these teachings to eat the bread of God, some only to inspect the bread. They want to learn these words just to sell them. These words are like a beautiful bride; if a beautiful maiden is bought to be sold again, how can she love her buyer or fix her heart upon him? Since the pleasure of that merchant comes only in selling, he is as good as impotent. He buys the girl to sell her, not having the manhood and virility to want her for himself.

If a fine Indian sword falls into the hands of an effeminate man, he will take it to sell it. If a mighty Pehlevi bow falls into his hands, he will also sell it since he does not have the strength of arm to draw the bow. He desires that bow for the value of the string, he has no capacity for the string, itself. He is in love merely with what it will bring. When such a man sells the bow, he trades it for rouge and indigo. What else should he do? Marvelous! What could he buy better than that?

These words mean nothing except to the initiated! Beware! Do not say, "I have understood." The more you understand and grasp these words, the farther you will be from understanding them.

Their meaning comes in not understanding. All your troubles, misfortunes and disappointments arise from such understanding. This understanding is a chain for you. You must escape it to gain anything at all.

You say, "I filled my sheep-skin in the sea, but the sea was too great to be contained in my sheep-skin." That is absurd. If you say, "My sheep-skin was lost in the sea," that is excellent! That is the root of the matter. Reason is fine and useful until it brings you to the door of the King. Once you have reached His door, give up reason, for in that hour reason is a sheer loss to you, a highway robber. When you have reached the King, surrender yourself to Him, you have no use then for the how and wherefore.

For instance, you have an uncut cloth you want made into a tunic or a cloak. Reason brings you to a tailor. Until that moment reason is fine, for it brings the cloth to the tailor. Now in that very moment reason must be forgotten and you must abandon yourself wholly to the direction of the tailor. In the same way, reason is fine when you are sick because it brings you to the physi-

cian. After that, reason is of no use to you, since you must surrender yourself to the advice of the physician.

Your companions hear your secret cries of love for God. When they come to you, you will know which of them has that true substance—the responsiveness of Soul. In a train of camels, the camel in rut is easily spotted by its eyes, its manner of walking and its breath.

“Their mark is on their faces, the trace of prostration.”

Although it is the roots of a tree that drink, you can see the results of that drinking through its branches, leaves and fruit. The tree that does not drink withers—how can this stay concealed?

You will hear their loud shouts because they understand paragraphs from a single word you speak, and from a single letter they recognize all the overtones. They are like someone who has studied the Koran; As soon as they hear the first word from a Koran commentary, they understand all the root ideas and questions, since they know its source. They will offer observations on that single word as if to say, “Within the depths of this

subject I know many things and see many things, for I have worked and studied, turning night into day, and I have found the treasures.”

“Did We not expand your breast out of love for you?”

The expansion of the breast is infinite. Once that expansive truth has been tasted, we understand much from even one hint. But beginners will only understand, from a word, the meaning of that one word. What inner knowledge and ecstasy can they possess?

Words are spoken according to the capacity of the listeners. If beginners do not know how to draw wisdom out, how can it come forth? Once they breathe in, then wisdom will fill their hearts. But they say, “For heaven’s sake, why aren’t the words spoken?” The answer is, “For heaven’s sake, why don’t you draw this wisdom in?” Whoever withholds the power to listen also withholds from the speaker the impulse to speak.

In the time of the Prophet, a certain unbeliever had a Muslim slave who was a man of true substance. One morning the unbeliever ordered his slave, “Fetch basins. I am going to the baths.” On

the way they passed by the Prophet praying in the mosque with his companions. The slave said, “Master, for God’s good sake take this bowl for a moment, so that I can make a few genuflections, then I will attend to you.”

Entering the mosque, he prayed. The Prophet came out with his companions. The slave remained alone in the mosque. His master waited for him till mid-morning, then he shouted, “Come out, slave!” The slave answered, “They won’t let me go, as the work has gone beyond bounds.” The master put his head inside the mosque to see who it was that would not let the slave go. Except for a shoe and a shadow he saw no one. Nobody stirred. He said, “Well, who is it that won’t let you come out?” The slave replied, “The same One who will not allow you to come in, the very same One whom you cannot see.”

People always want to see new things that they have not yet seen. Night and day they seek after new experiences. They are slaves of anything they have not yet enjoyed, but become bored and run away from what they have already heard and understood. For this reason the philosophers

reject the Vision of God, saying, "If you can become bored with what you see, this cannot be truth." The Sunni theologians say, "This could occur only if God was single-colored. But in truth He comes forth in a hundred colors, every instant."

"Every day He is upon a task."

If God should reveal Himself a hundred thousand times, not one moment would resemble another. Every instant you see God's display and yet not even one act resembles another. In times of happiness you see one display, in times of weeping you find another. During moments of fear you see one face, during hope another. Since God's creations and His acts vary infinitely, not one like another, so you can be sure the display of His Essence also varies endlessly. You, too, being a single spark of God's flame, change a thousand times every instant and never stay the same.

There are certain seekers of God who proceed from the Koran to God. Others more elect come from God, find the Koran here, and know that God has sent it down.

*"We have seen the Remembrance,
and We will watch over it."*

Commentators say that this quote refers to the Koran, but it also means, "We have seen in you a substance, a seeking, a yearning. We will watch over that, not letting it go to waste, but will bring it to its rightful place."

Once you say "God", then stand firm under all calamities that rain down upon you. A certain person came to the Prophet and said to him, "Truly I love you." The Prophet said, "Take heed what you say." The person repeated, "Truly I love you." Mohammed said, "Take heed what you say." They said, "Truly I love you." Mohammed said, "Now stand firm, for with my own hand I will slay you. Woe upon you!"

Another person came to the Prophet and said, "I don't want this religion. By God, take it back. Ever since I entered your religion I've had no peace for a single day. My wealth is gone, my spouse has left, my child cannot be found, my respect is destroyed, my strength is sapped, even my lust has disappeared." Mohammed answered,

“What did you expect? Wherever our religion goes it does not return without uprooting that person and sweeping clean their house.”

“None but the purified shall touch God.”

So long as there remains in you a single trace of self-love, God will not show His face to you. You will not be worthy of His presence. You must become wholly indifferent to yourself and the world, so that Friend can show His face. So, whenever our religion lodges in a heart, it will not withdraw its hand until it brings that heart to God and severs from it all that is untrue.

The Prophet went on to say to that person, “You have no peace because sorrow’s purpose is to empty you of previous joys. So long as food fills your stomach, you are not given new food to eat. During elimination, we eat nothing. When we are empty and hungry, then we are given food. Be patient and grieve, for grieving is the emptying of yourself. After you are empty, then joy can enter—a joy with no sorrow, a rose without a thorn, a wine without crop-sickness.”

Why, night and day, do you search for quiet and rest? They cannot be found in this world. But

not for one instant do you give up seeking these things. The comfort you find in this world is like a lightning flash that passes but never endures. And what kind of lightning is it? Lightning full of hail, full of rain and snow, full of suffering. For instance, someone sets out for Antalya. They go toward Caesarea hoping to reach Antalya, and never turn back even though it is impossible to reach Antalya by this route. But another who goes by the Antalyan road, though lame and feeble, still they will reach their goal, since that is where the Antalyan road ends.

No task in this world or the next is without suffering. Therefore, devote your suffering to the next world so it will not be wasted. You say, "O Mohammed take away this religion from me, for I can find no rest." How can our religion let anyone go before it brings them to the goal?

There was a certain teacher who, due to poverty, wore only a single garment of cotton in the middle of winter. By chance, torrents of rain brought down a bear out of the mountains, carrying the bear along with its head hidden in the water. The children, seeing its back, cried,

“Teacher, look! A fur coat has fallen into the water, and you are cold. Take it!”

The teacher in dire need and coldness jumped in to catch the fur coat. The bear quickly plunged its claws into the teacher’s back. The bear in the water thus caught the teacher.

“Teacher,” the children shouted, “either grab the fur coat or let it go and come out!”

“I am letting the fur coat go,” answered the teacher, “but the fur coat isn’t letting me go. What should I do?”

How can God’s love let you go? We should be thankful that God does not let us go. When a child is small it knows nothing but milk and its mother. Yet, God does not leave the child there, but leads it on to eat bread and to play, and in this manner draws it on to the stage of reason. So too in this world—which is in its infancy compared with that other world—God does not leave you here, but brings you on so you can realize that this is infancy and nothing at all. I am amazed at the people who must be dragged to Paradise in chains and fetters.

*“Take them and fetter them,
then roast them in Paradise,
then roast them in Union,
then roast them in Beauty,
then roast them in Perfection.”*

Fishermen do not drag out a fish all at once. Once the hook has entered the fish’s throat they reel it in a little so it will lose strength. Then they let it out, and draw it in again, until it weakens. When the hook of Love falls into our throat, God draws us gradually so those bad attributes will leave us little by little.

“There is no God, but God”—that is what the common folk say. The elect believe “There is no Self, but Self.” Someone sees in a dream that they are a ruler. They are seated on a throne with servants, chamberlains and princes standing by. They say, “I am ruler, and there is no ruler but I.” They say this in their sleep. When they wake up and see no one in the house but themselves, they say, “I am, and there is no other than that I Am.” To realize this, one must be fully awake.

Every religion denies every other. One group says, “We are the true ones, revelation belongs to

us, all others are false.” All the others say exactly the same. So the two and seventy creeds are in agreement that all others are without revelation. They are all in accord that there is no revelation to any other religion, and that out of the lot of them there is but one true path. So, a believer must have discrimination and wisdom to know which one it is. Such discrimination and wisdom is true faith.

Someone said: “The religions that don’t know are many, and those that know are few. If we are to occupy ourselves with distinguishing all of them it will be a long business.”

Rumi answered: Although there are many who do not know, when you know a few you have known them all. In the same way when you know a single handful of corn, you know all the corn-stacks in the world. If you have tasted sugar once, though halvah is made in a hundred different varieties, still in that halvah you know the sugar.

If these words seem repetitious to you, it is only because you have not yet learned the first lesson, so I must say it every day. There was once a student who was taught for three months, but

never went beyond “A is for apple.” The child’s father came and said to the teacher, “I never fail to pay your fees. If I have ever failed a payment, please let me know, and I will pay more.” The teacher answered, “The failure is not yours, but the child doesn’t go beyond this point.” The teacher called the student and said, “Say, A is for apple.” The child said, “Is for apple,” unable to say “A.” The teacher said, “You see? Since the child has not passed the first point, how can I give any more?” The father said, “Praise belongs to God.”

We do not say, “Praise belongs to God” after a meal because there was a shortage of bread. Bread and blessings are without limit, but the appetite is gone and the guests are sated. That is why we say, “Praise belongs to God.”

The bread of revelation is very different from this worldly bread, because even with no appetite you can force yourself to eat as much worldly bread as you want. And since it is inanimate, you can drag it wherever you like. It does not have the spirit to withhold itself from those who are not worthy. But Divine bread is a living wisdom and

a living blessing. As long as you desire nothing else, it comes towards you and becomes your food. But should your desire fail, you will not be able to eat it, even by force. It hides behind the veil and will not show you its face.

(Rumi was telling about the miracles of the saints. He said:) For someone to fly from here to the Kaaba in an instant is not so wonderful, even though there are such stories of saints having done so. But a true miracle is this: that God should bring you from a lowly estate to a high estate, that you should travel from ignorance to reason, from the inanimate to life. Just as at first you were earth and mineral, God brought you to the vegetable world. Then you journeyed from the vegetable world to the animal world, from the animal world to the world of humanity.

These are the true miracles. Through these stations and forms you journeyed, never once thinking or imagining where you would arrive, by which road you would be taken, or how you would be brought. Even so, you will be brought on to a hundred other worlds. Do not doubt it, and if you are told such stories, believe them.

A bowl of poison was brought as a present to Umar. "Of what use is this?" he asked.

They said, "When it is not publicly advisable to kill someone openly, you can give them a little of this. Then they will die secretly. If it is an enemy who cannot be slain with the sword, with a little of this they can be killed clandestinely."

"You have brought me a very good thing," he said. "Give it to me to drink, for within me is a mighty enemy whom the sword cannot reach. I have no greater enemy in the world than he."

"There is no need to drink it all up in one gulp," they told him. "Just one sip is enough. This bowl is sufficient for a hundred thousand people."

"My enemy, too, is not one person," said Umar. "He is a thousand strong, and has overthrown a hundred thousand."

He then seized the cup and drank it all in one draught. At once the assembled multitude all became believers, crying, "Your religion is true!"

"You have all become believers," said Umar, "and yet this infidel within me has not yet become a believer."

What Umar desired was not the faith of the common people. He had that faith and more—indeed, he had the faith of the veracious. He was seeking the faith of the Prophets in absolute certainty. That was what he hoped for.

The report of a lion spread abroad through all parts of the world. It was said this lion had a special quality: Anyone who approached him boldly, and rubbed their hands upon him lovingly, would be unharmed, but if they were afraid and timorous the lion would be enraged against them. Sometimes he even attacked, as if to say, “What is this bad opinion you have of me?”

A certain person, marveling at the rumor, traveled from far away to see the lion. For a year this person endured the rigors of the road, and traveled from town to town. After finally arriving at the thicket and spying the lion from afar, this lion seeker stood still and could advance no closer.

The people said to this person, “You set forth on a long road out of love for this lion. For this creature you have struggled on for a year. Now that you have come so close, why do you stand still? Advance one more step!”

But none of them had the courage to take a further step. They all said, “The steps we took up to here were all easy. Yet this one step we cannot make.”

What Umar desired was that step, to take one step in the presence of the lion towards the lion. That step is a great and rare matter, the concern of only the chosen and intimate of God. Yet this is the true step—the rest are mere footprints. Such faith comes only to prophets who have washed their hands of their own life.

A lover is a wonderful thing. We derive strength, life and growth from even the thought of our beloved. Why is this surprising? Laila’s spirit gave strength to Majnun and became his food. If her image had such power and influence over Majnun, then why should you marvel at the thought of God giving strength to Umar? That was not a mere thought. That was the very soul of all realities! It is just such a thought that maintains this world.

You say “reality” is what you can see and perceive with your senses, otherwise you call it “imagination.” The opposite is true! This world is

what is imagined. Out of reality springs a hundred worlds like this that will rot one day and disappear. Then a new world springs forth, even better than the last. Reality does not become old or new. These are but temporary expressions of what is Real.

An architect sees a building in their thoughts. They picture it to be so tall, so long, its floor angles this way, its courtyard is shaped like this. People do not call this “imagination.” But when someone, who knows nothing about building, talks about such details, certainly that is different. As people say, “They are just imagining things.”

discourse 27

It is better not to question what Sufis say, since this obliges them to invent a lie. For if a materialist questions a Sufi, the Sufi must give some answer. But how can they be completely truthful with someone incapable of understanding? The materialist's mouth and lips are not able to receive such a delicate morsel. So the Sufi must answer people according to their capacity and experience, namely by inventing an answer that sends them away.

Although everything the Sufi gives out is true and cannot be a lie, yet the first thing a Sufi says is far greater. If this is questioned, then what good is answering with more truth? Even still, the lie given by the Sufi is good for the materialist, and more than right.

A certain dervish had a disciple who used to beg for him. One day out of what they gained from their begging, the disciple brought some food to their master. The dervish ate the food.

That night he had a wet dream.

“Where did you get that food?” he asked the disciple.

“A lovely girl gave it to me,” the disciple answered.

“By God,” said the dervish, “it is twenty years since I had a wet dream. This is the effect of her morsel.”

This shows that the dervish must be careful, they cannot eat every morsel. The dervish is too sensitive. Things will effect them and become visible, just as a little blackness shows on a clean white gown. However, as for a black gown that has become black with grime for many years, if a thousand kinds of filth should trickle on it, it would make no difference.

discourse 28

The long entreating prayer-song of seekers and travelers tells a story of lives occupied in labor and devotion with each effort assigned to its special time. It is as though an overseer of habit draws them to their specific task. For example, when first rising in the morning, they give themselves to contemplation and worship while the mind is quiet and clear. Thus, each performs the service that is suitable to them and comes within the scope of their noble Soul.

There are a hundred thousand ranks. The purer someone becomes, the higher up they are raised. This story of spiritual growth is a long one. Whoever tries to shorten it would shorten their own life and Soul, but for the grace of God. As for the prayer-songs of those who have attained union with God, I must speak within the limits of understanding—for their love and the purity of their voices attract holy spirits, pure angels, and those visitors whom none know but

God—the Silent Ones whose names are hidden from the world out of exceeding jealousy.

You are seated beside them now, but you do not see them. Neither do you hear their speech, their greetings or laughter. Yet what is so marvelous about this? When someone is sick, they see apparitions that others cannot see. Yet these spiritual beings are a thousand times subtler than those apparitions, for while the average person does not see or hear such visions until they are sick, they will not see these spiritual beings before they die. Such spiritual visitors know the refined states and majesty of the saints. They watch from earliest morn, while a thousand other angels and pure spirits wait upon the saints. For this reason the Silent Ones hesitate infinitely—not wanting to intervene in the midst of such a chorus, or disturb the ones they wish to honor.

Slaves are present every morning at the door of the king's palace. Each has a fixed station, a fixed service, and a fixed devotion. Some serve from afar, and the king does not see them nor notice them. All the slaves know which one amongst them has the honor of the king's presence. When

the king leaves, the servants attend to that one from every gate, for there is no greater way to serve the king. That one has taken on the characteristics of the king, and becomes the hearing and sight of the king for all the others.

This is an extremely majestic station, ineffable indeed. The majesty of it cannot be comprehended by spelling out M-a-j-e-s-t-y. If even a small trace of this majesty penetrated the world, the letter “M” would be unwritable, the sound “M” would be unpronounceable, nor could any hint or symbol remain. The whole city would be devastated by the hosts of Light.

“Kings, when they enter a city, disorder it.”

A camel enters a house, and the house is devastated, but in that ruin there are a thousand treasures.

*Only in ruins may a treasure be found.
In thriving cities a hound is still a hound.*

If I have described at length the station of the seekers, how can I explain the states of those who have attained? They have no end—only seekers have an end. The end of all seekers is attainment. What could be the end for those who have

attained union, a union with no separation? No ripe grape returns to an unripe grape. No mature fruit ever becomes raw again.

*Yes, it is unlawful to speak
Of these things to men and women.
But once Thy Name is mentioned, O God,
These words pour out for them.
By God, I will not make it long. I will make it short.
My life is consumed, but You turn
That life to wine.
You say that all is given, but take
This Soul as Thine.*

Whoever cuts this story short, it is as if they are abandoning the right road and taking a road into the life-destroying wilderness, where they say, "These trees look like the right way home."

discourse 29

A Christian by the name of al-Jarrah said: “A number of Sheik Sadr al-Din’s companions drank with me, and they said, “Jesus is God, as you claim. We confess that to be truth, but we conceal and deny it to preserve the honor of our community.”

Rumi said: God forbid! These are the words of those drunken with the wine of Satan, the misguiders. How could it be that Jesus, with such a frail body, who was forced to flee from the plotting Jews, place after place, who stood less than two cubits tall, should be the preserver of the seven heavens—each with a thickness of five hundred years, and from each heaven to the next a distance of five hundred years, and every earth five hundred years, and from each earth to the next five hundred years? And under this Throne, the sea of spirit whose depth is even greater, even many times the like of it? How could your reason accept that the ruler of all these is the feeblest of

forms? Moreover, that before being born, Jesus was the creator of the heavens and the earth? Glory be to God, above what the wrongdoers assert!

The Christian said: "His body was mere dust. Dust went to dust, and pure spirit to pure spirit."

Rumi said: If the spirit of Jesus was God, where went his spirit? Spirit returns to its Origin and Creator. If he was himself the Origin and Creator, where should he go?

The Christian said: "So we found it stated, and we took it as our religion."

Rumi answered: If you find and inherit your parents' false gold, black and corrupt, do you mean you will not change it for gold of sound quality, free of alloy and adulteration? No, you keep that gold, saying, "We found it so."

Or you inherit from your parents a paralyzed hand, and you find a treatment and a physician to heal that hand. Do you accept it? No, instead you say, "I found my hand paralyzed, and I will not change it." Or if you find salt water on a farm where your parents died and you were brought up, but you are shown another farm whose water

is sweet, whose herbs are wholesome, whose people are healthy. Do you desire to move to that other farm and drink the sweet water that would rid you of all diseases and ailments? No, you say, "We found this farm with its salt water and its ailments, and we hold on to what we found."

God forbid! This is not the action or the words of an intelligent person possessed of sound senses. God gave you an intelligence of your own separate from your parents' intelligence, a sight of your own other than your father's sight, a discrimination of your own. Why do you nullify your sight and your intelligence, following an intelligence that will mislead and destroy you?

Yutash—his father was a cobbler. Yet when he attained the Sultan's presence, learning the manner of kings and how to be Master of the Sword and the Sultan conferred on him the highest rank, he never said, "I found my father a cobbler, so I do not want this post. Give me, O Sultan, a shop in the market so I can practice cobbling." Indeed, even a dog, for all its baseness, once it has learned to become a hunter for the Sultan, forgets how it was raised, skulking in rubbish heaps and waste-

lands and craving for carrion. On the contrary, it follows the Sultan's horses and pursues the game. It is the same with the hawk. When the Sultan has trained it, it never says, "I inherited from my father desolate haunts in the mountains and the devouring of dead things, so I will not heed the Sultan's drum, or his game."

If the intellect of the beast can choose something better than what it inherited from its parents, it is monstrous and horrible that a human being, superior to all the inhabitants of the earth in reason and discrimination, should be less than a beast. We take refuge in God from that!

Certainly it is right to say that God honored Jesus and drew him close, so that whoever serves Jesus has served the Lord, whoever obeys him has obeyed the Lord. But since God sends a prophet in every age, manifesting by their hand all that was manifested by Jesus' hand and more, it behooves us to follow that prophet—not for the sake of the prophet, but for the sake of God.

Only God can be served for Its own sake. Therefore, only God is truly loved. Love for all else ends in God. So, love a thing only for God,

and seek a thing only for God, until in the end you come to God and love It for Itself.

*To dress up the Kaaba is a vain desire,
God's presence is all the cloth you need.*

Just as worn-out and ragged clothes conceal the elegance of wealth and grandeur, so excellent clothes and fine raiment conceal the mark and beauty and perfection of the saint. When the saint's clothes are in shreds and patches, then their heart is revealed.

discourse 30

There are heads that are adorned by crowns of gold, and there are heads whose beautiful curls are merely hidden by jewels and gold. The curls of our heart's beloved arouse love, and love is the throne-room of the heart. But a crown is nothing but metal and stones.

We sought everywhere for Solomon's ring. We found his wisdom far from riches. Abandoning wealth we found that beautiful treasure. In poverty we took our repose, and our Beloved was pleased with nothing so much as this.

Well, I am a whoremonger. Since I was young, I have been a seller of love. I know this destroys barriers and consumes the veils of the heart. Love is the root of all obedience; all else is mere adornment. If you do not sacrifice, how can you gain your heart's desire? Giving up everything leads to annihilation, the source of all pleasures where no separation exists.

“And God is with the patient.”

In every shop or potion, every merchandise or trade, the end of the thread for each one of these is the need of the human spirit. Until the need arises, the end of that thread is hidden. With every religion, every faith, every grace, every miracle, and all the states of the prophets—the end of each thread is within us. Until the need appears, the end of that thread remains invisible.

“All things are numbered and clearly recorded.”

Someone asked: “Is the source of good and evil one thing or two?”

Rumi said: From the point of view that they are continually at war with one another, the answer is obviously two—since a person cannot be opposed to himself. But, from the viewpoint that evil is inseparable from good—for good is the giving up of evil, and the giving up of evil is impossible without evil, and were it not for the incitement of evil, no one would ever abandon the good—from this point of view they are not two. The Magians said that Yazdan is the creator of good things and Ahriman is the creator of evil and hateful things. But desirable things are never

separated from hated things. The desirable cannot exist without the hateful, since what we like is always compared to what we hate, and the more we think evil of one thing, the more we desire its opposite. Joy is the end of sorrow; the end of sorrow without joy is impossible. So they are one and indivisible.

Until a thing passes away, its true meaning cannot be known. No one's life can be judged until it is finished, because what starts evil can turn out good. And until words pass away into speech, who can know their purpose?

Whoever criticizes a Sufi in reality does the Sufi a good turn, for the Sufi shies away from praise. The Sufi is an enemy of vanity, hence whoever speaks evil of the Sufi's ego, speaks evil of the Sufi's enemy, and therefore helps them. "Things become clear through their opposites." So the Sufi knows the critic is not really their enemy, but their friend.

I am like a smiling garden surrounded by a wall of filth and thorns. Those passing by do not see the garden; they see only the wall and ridicule it. Why then would the garden be angry with

them? The critics only hold themselves back, because to reach the garden they must first cross the wall. So by finding fault with the wall, they send themselves far away from the garden and work to their own destruction. The Prophet said, "I laugh as I slay," meaning he kills the unbelievers in one manner, so that unbelievers will not kill themselves in a hundred ways. So, of course, he laughs as he slays.

discourse 31

The police are always in search of thieves to capture, and thieves are always running away. It is rare indeed to find a thief that searches for the police to be captured and thrown in jail. That's not a natural desire for thieves.

God said to Abu Yazid, "What do you desire, Abu Yazid?" He answered, "I desire not to desire."

To be wholly without desire—that is not a natural desire, since a person must empty himself and cease to be. But God wanted to perfect Abu Yazid and to make him a complete Sheikh, so that within him there would be no room for duality or separation, and only complete union and unity would prevail.

There are various classes and different ranks on the spiritual path. Through effort and struggle, some have attained the station that can refuse every desire. That is within the scope of some. But to allow not even an itch of desire to enter the

heart—that is not within the scope of anyone. Only God's love can take that out.

It is stated that after Mohammed and the Prophets revelation will not be sent down upon anyone else, but this is not true. This is why Mohammed said, "The believer sees with the Light of God." When someone sees with God's Light, they see all things, the first and last, the visible and invisible, for how can anything be hidden from God's Light? If anything is hidden, then that is not God's Light. Therefore this is revelation, whether they call it revelation or not.

When Uthman became caliph, he stepped up into the pulpit. The people waited to see what he would say. He was silent and said nothing. He looked steadily at the people, and a state of ecstasy descended upon them so that they were unable to move, and could not tell where they were. Not by a hundred preachings and sermons could such an excellent state have been shown to them. Precious lessons were imparted and secrets revealed. Until the very end, he only looked at them like this, not saying a word. Then, just before leaving the pulpit, he said, "It is better for

you to have a working Imam than a speaking Imam.”

What he said was the truth. If the purpose of speaking is to communicate instruction delicately to uplift the people, that had been accomplished many times better without words. So what Uthman said was perfectly correct. During the time he was in the pulpit he did no external work visible to the people; he did not pray, he did not go on the pilgrimage, he did not give alms, he did not commemorate God, he did not even speak the caliph's address. Therefore, know that work and action are not limited to the outer form only, rather these visible forms of work are merely a shadow of that true work of Soul.

The Prophet said, “My Companions are like stars; Whichever of them you follow, you will be guided right.” When someone follows a star and finds their way by it, the star does not speak. Merely by looking at the star, they discover that invisible road and reach their goal. In the same way, it is possible by merely gazing at God's saints to find the spiritual path. Without words, without

questioning, without speech, the purpose is achieved.

In all the world there is nothing more difficult than enduring the ridiculous. Suppose for instance that you have studied a certain book, corrected, amended, and fully recited it. Then someone sitting beside you reads the book all wrong. Can you endure that? No, it is impossible. However, if you never read the book, it makes no difference to you whether anyone reads it wrong or right—you cannot tell the difference. So, enduring the ridiculous is a great discipline.

The prophets and saints do not shirk discipline. Their first discipline is to slay this self that is controlled by desires and lusts. That is the “Greater Holy War.” When they achieve this, and establish themselves in the station of security, then wrong and right become revealed to them. Yet they are still engaged in a great struggle, for these mortals do everything wrong. The saints see this and must endure it. If they do not, and speak out declaring those mortals wrong, not one person in Heaven or on Earth will stand beside them. But

God bestows on the saints a great and mighty capacity to endure. Out of a hundred wrong acts, they mention one, so that it will not become difficult to overcome. The other mistakes they hide and even praise, saying, "That wrong of yours is right," so that little by little they can overcome this ignorance.

It is the same when a teacher is teaching a child how to write. When the child writes their first whole line, the child runs to show it to the teacher. In the teacher's eyes it is filled with mistakes, but the teacher speaks to the child kindly and encourages them, "That is excellent. You have written well. Bravo, bravo! Only this letter is not quite right, this is how it should be. And this other letter looks like this." The teacher calls a few letters wrong out of that line, and shows the child how they ought to be written. The rest is praised, so the child will not lose heart. The child's weakness gathers strength from that approval, and so gradually they are taught and assisted on their way.

We hope that God will grant the Amir all the designs of his heart. We hope God will also grant

the Amir those good fortunes that he does not even know of, so that when his heart sees those true gifts of God, he will be ashamed of his former wishes and desires.

That is called a true gift when we find what is beyond our own imagination. For whatever enters a person's imagination is a measure of their ambition and capacity. But God's gift is a measure of God's capacity.

*“What the eye has not seen,
Nor the ear heard,
Nor has entered into the heart of anyone.”*

Whatever you conceive of God's bounty, God transcends all that.

discourse 32

Knowingness is the perfect Sheik. Inspired and true thoughts are His disciples ranked according God's closeness to them. As each thought expands it comes nearer to knowingness and farther from doubt.

All thoughts suck milk at the breast of certainty, and grow. Theory and practice nourish each thought until it approaches certainty. Then thought passes away into certainty, for, in knowingness, thought no longer remains.

The sheikhs and their disciples in the world today are reflections of that Sheikh of Knowingness. The disciples are proof that although the form of teaching changes from age to age, generation after generation, that Sheikh of Certainty and the Lovers of Truth are eternal, and never change.

Errant and doubtful thoughts are the outcast disciples of the Sheikh of Knowingness. Every day they wander further from the truth, and fall deeper into darkness.

*"In their hearts is a sickness,
 And God increases their sickness."
 The masters eat dates, but prisoners eat thorns.
 "Save those who return to truth,
 And do righteous deeds.
 God will change their evil
 Into good."*

Every experience leads us to certainty, even acts of corruption. Like the cunning thief who repents and joins the police force, all their thieving tricks now become a power for justice. They are more certain than all the other policemen who were never thieves, since having stolen they know the ways of thieves. If they should then become a Sheikh they would be perfect, the Elder of the world and the Mahdi of the age.

discourse 33

Everyone is in the midst of their own need. No living creature can be separated from its need.

*“Their need cleaves to them closer
Than their father and mother.”*

That need is their leash, drawing them this way and that, just like a nose-ring and chain. Now, who would make a leash for themselves? That is absurd—so someone else must have made it for them.

If we are in the midst of our own need, we are also in the midst of the One who gives us that need. If we are constantly attached to our own leash, we are always connected to the One who draws that leash. But if our eyes are fixed upon our chain, we lose strength and hope. Rather our eyes should be fixed on the One who draws that chain. Then we gladly surrender and accept our limitations. For that leash is around our neck only to reveal the One who holds it.

“Stay away,” they said. “Do not approach.”

*How can I keep away, when you are my need?
 God gives elders a youthful passion that young people have no
 knowledge of.
 Great is old age,
 When the grey hairs appear,
 And playfulness runs amok.*

Such an elder sees the world with a freshness,
 as if it were new. They laugh and play.

They ask, “When someone passes eighty, will
 they play?”

“Will they play before eighty?” I say.

So the glory of old age is greater than God’s
 display. In spring, God shows Its grace, frail and
 smiling. In autumn, old age prevails. The worldly
 garden is ruined. The apparent bounty is gone.

*God is beyond everything
 That the forces of destruction can sling.*

discourse 34

Rumi said: I saw our friend in a dream in the form of a wild animal with the skin of a fox upon him. He was on a small balcony, looking down the stairs. I moved as if to grab him and he raised his hands, leaping about like this and that. Then I saw Jalal al-Tibrizi with him in the form of a weasel.

Our friend shied away, but I caught him when he tried to bite me. I put his head under my foot and squeezed it hard until all its contents came out. I looked at the fineness of his skin and said, "This deserves to be filled with gold and precious stones, pearls and rubies, and things even more excellent than that." Then I said, "I have taken what I wanted. Shy away, shy one. Go where you will, and leap whatever direction you like!"

He leapt about because he feared being mastered, yet in being mastered his true happiness resides. No doubt he was formed of meteor fragments, his heart was drenched, and he wanted to

know all things. He started out upon this road with great desires and he struggled hard to keep to the path and take refuge in it, but that is not enough. For the Sheikh of Divine Grace is not snared with such nets, nor can such game be captured this way. If the Sheikh of God is honest and true, he is completely free to determine who will have him. He cannot be trapped without his free consent.

Our friend sat covertly watching for his prey, but that prey was watching him in his hidyhole, and his cunning. That prey is a free agent whose ways have no limit. He does not pass by everyone's hole. He only passes the ways he, himself, has charted.

*"God's earth is wide,
But none comprehend Its knowledge,
Except as It wills."*

Even when such subtleties as these fell upon our friend's tongue and understanding they were ruined and lost their fine essence. Just as everything, whether corrupt or true, when it falls into a Lover of God's mouth and comprehension is also changed, becoming swathed and wrapped up

in graces and miracles. Do you not see how the rod held in Moses' hand did not remain as it was? So, too, with the Moaning Pillar and the Stick in the hand of the Prophet, and prayer in the mouth of Moses, and iron in David's hand—they did not remain in their original form, but were changed. So, too, with subtleties and sacred words, when they fall into the hand of darkness and brute intellect, they are changed as well.

The Kaaba is a tavern for your prayers.

So long as it comes from you, your essence shares.

The unbeliever eats in seven stomachs, and Jalal al-Tibrizi eats in seventy stomachs. Even if he has only one stomach, still he eats in seventy stomachs, because everything that is hateful is hateful just as everything from the beloved is beloved. If our friend had returned, I would have sat with him and counseled him, and not left until he drove Jalal far away. For Jalal is a corrupter of our friend's faith, heart, spirit and reason. If only Jalal had induced our friend to corrupt practices other than religion, such as drinking wine and singing girls—for those can be put right when treated by a Sheikh of Divine Grace. But Jalal

filled our friend's house with prayer rugs—would that Jalal were rolled up in them and burned, so that our friend might escape from such misleading! But Jalal has poisoned our friend's trust in the Sheikh of God, ridiculing the Sheikh to his face, while our friend says nothing and destroys himself. Jalal has snared our friend with rosaries, litanies and prayer carpets.

Perhaps one day God will open the eyes of our friend, and he will see what ruined him and drove him far away from the compassion of the Sheikh of God. Then he will strike himself with his own hand, saying, "You destroyed me. Now I have committed these heavy crimes and evil acts. It is exactly the way they saw it in their revelations—the foulness of my deeds, and my vile and sinful beliefs, were hidden behind my own back in the corner of my house. I, myself, was concealing them from the Sheikh of God and burying them, while He saw everything and said, "What are you hiding? By God's will, if I had summoned those foul forms, they would have marched out before me one by one, visibly, uncovering themselves, telling their true nature, and what they concealed

within them.” May God save all those who are wronged by these highwaymen, who block the path of God by way of “devotion!”

Kings play polo to show the people of their city an example of the warrior’s skill—the lopping off of the enemies’ heads, rolling them around just as the balls roll in the field, the warrior’s frontal charge, attack and retreat. This play in the park is only a symbol for that serious business of war. In the same way, the people of God perform spiritual prayers and dances to show something of their inmost heart—how they follow their discipline and their path. The singer who leads them is like the Imam at a ritual Moslem prayer. The people follow his lead. If he sings slowly, they dance slowly. If he sings fast, they dance fast. It is only a reflection of how within their hearts they follow the summoning of God.

discourse 35

I am amazed by those who know the Koran by heart yet understand nothing of the spiritual states of the Sufis. As the Koran states, “And do not obey every paltry asserter.”

Look at the slanderers when they read this, they are exactly the ones who will say, “Do not listen to So-and-so, no matter what they say, for they will act the same way against you.”

*“Backbiter, going about with slander,
Hinderer of good.”*

The Koran is a marvelous magician. It speaks clearly to the ears of the hinderers so that they understand but are not one whit wiser. They don’t even catch an inkling of the Koran’s true delights.

“God has set a seal...”

How wonderfully gracious God is! It sets a seal on those who listen and do not understand, argue and yet learn nothing. God is gracious. Its wrath is gracious, and even Its lock is gracious. But Its lock is nothing next to Its unlocking, for the grace

of that is indescribable. If I shatter into pieces, it is through the infinite grace of God's unlocking.

Beware, do not think I am sick and dying. That is only a veil. My slayer is this grace of God's and Its incomparableness. The dagger of illness flashes forth to distract the eyes of strangers, so that no profane and defiled eyes can perceive Its secret slaying.

discourse 36

All forms spring from Love, as branches spring forth from their root. No branch can exist without its root. Therefore, God is not called a form, since form is the branch. How can God be called a branch?

Someone said: “Love too cannot be expressed or experienced without form. Hence it is the branch of form.”

Why cannot Love be a form without form? On the contrary, Love is the sculptor of form. A hundred thousand forms are raised up on Love’s pottery wheel. Although a painter cannot exist without paintings, still painting is the branch and the painter is the root. As the finger moves, so moves the ring.

Until someone has love for a house, no architect will draw up designs. In the same way, corn is at the price of gold one year, another year it is at the price of dust. The form of the corn is the same—therefore its value comes from love. The

sciences you study with such love—in your eyes they are valuable. But when no one pursues them and no one wants to learn from them, then who will teach those sciences?

Someone said: “Love is the want and need for a certain thing. Hence the need is the root, and that thing needed is its branch.”

These words of yours are also spoken out of need. First you had the desire for these words, then they were born. So the need existed first and then your words were born from it. This means your need existed, in the beginning, without any words. Therefore, love and need are not the branches of words.

Someone said: “But after all, the goal of that need was these words, so how can the goal be the branch?”

The branch is always the goal. The tree’s roots exist for the sake of its branches.

discourse 37

Rumi said: The stories that have been spread against this girl are lies and should go no further. But I can see that even though we may put aside these rumors as false, something has settled in the imagination. Our imagination and heart are like a vestibule—thoughts first enter the vestibule, then they move into the house.

This whole world is like one house, and every image that lodges in our deepest thoughts must appear and become visible in the house. For instance, this house in which we are seated—the form of it first became visible in the heart of the architect, then this house came into being. Imagination, daydreams and thoughts are the vestibule of this house. Whatever you see entering the vestibule, know that one day it will become visible in the house. And all these things, good and evil alike that you see in the world today, all first appeared in the vestibule before becoming visible here.

When God wishes to produce rare and wonderful things in this world; orchards, gardens, meadows and sciences, It first implants the desire and demand for them in our inward hearts. And so, everything you see in this world existed first in that inner world. For instance, what you see in the dew also exists in the ocean, for this dew is from that ocean. In the same way this creation of heaven and earth, and all the other marvels, God implanted the desire for these in the spirits of the ancients, and so the world came into being accordingly.

The philosophers who say that the world is eternal—how can they be taken seriously? Their statement simply means the world was never created in time, and this claim is impossible to prove. But those who say it is created in time; they are the saints and the prophets who are more ancient than the world. God implanted desire for the world within their spirits, and only then did the world appear. So they know for a fact and report out of their own experience that the world was created in time.

For instance, those of us who watched when this house was built know it did not exist until a few years ago. If living creatures were born in this house, such as scorpions, mice, snakes and other creatures, to them this house was already standing. If they should say, "This house is eternal," that is no proof to us, for we saw when this house was created. Termites and ants that have grown up in the walls and woodwork know nothing else, just as the people who have grown up within the house of this world. Here they sprout up, and here they will die, knowing nothing else. If they say that the world is eternal, that is no proof to the prophets and saints who existed millions of years before the world. Why speak of years? This is no place for numbers of years...they are infinite and beyond counting. They saw this world come into existence, just as you have seen when this house was first raised.

discourse 38

The Prophet was seated with his Companions. Some unbelievers began to denounce and lecture him. He said, “Well, you all agree there is one person in the world who receives revelation. Revelation descends upon him—it does not descend on everyone. That person has certain marks and signs in his actions and words, and in his mien and in every part of him the token and mark can be seen. Since you have seen those tokens, turn your faces towards him and hold to him firmly, so he can be your protector.”

They were all confounded by his argument and were left with nothing more to say. So they put their hands on their swords and began to threaten, torment and insult his Companions. The Prophet said, “Be patient, so they cannot say they have prevailed over us. They want to make the religion manifest by force. God will manifest this religion.”

For some time the Companions prayed and pronounced the name of Mohammed secretly.

Then after a while the revelation came; “You too unsheathe the sword and make war!”

Mohammed is not called “unlettered” because he was incapable of writing or reading. He is called “unlettered” because with him writing and wisdom were innate, not taught. He who inscribes characters on the face of the moon, is such a man not able to write? And what is there in all the world that he does not know, seeing that all people learn from him? What can the partial intellect know that the Universal Intellect does not possess?

The fact that we compose books and create buildings is nothing new. We have seen this done before, and we merely add to what we have already seen. But those who bring into this world something new of their own account, they are the Universal Intellect. We are capable of learning and need to be taught. The Universal Intellect is the teacher, and is not in need. So, if we investigate all trades, at the root and origin of them all is revelation. We have learned everything from the prophets and the Universal Intellect.

When Cain slew Abel and did not know what to do next, he saw a raven kill another raven, dig

the earth, and bury the body, scattering dust on its head. Cain learned from the raven how to make a grave and how to bury the dead. So it is with all the professions. Everyone who possesses a partial intellect is in need of learning, and the Universal Intellect is the source they are seeking. The prophets and saints have united the partial intellect and Universal Intellect so the two have become one.

For instance, the foot learns from the mind how to walk. The hand learns from the heart how to embrace. The eye and ear learn how to see and hear. If the heart and mind did not exist, how could the body function?

This body is coarse and gross compared to both mind and heart. Without their subtlety and freshness, the body remains useless and crude. So the partial intellect is like a tool for the Universal Intellect, and we learn and find our purpose from there.

Someone said, "Remember us in your intention. Intention is the root of the matter. If there are no words, let there be no words. Words are the branch."

Rumi said: Well, intention first exists in the inner world before entering this world of form. So if form does not matter, what is the purpose of this world? If you plant only the kernel of an apricot stone, nothing will grow. If you plant it with its husk, then it becomes a tree. From this we know that form also has a function. Yes, prayer is an inward matter: "There is no prayer without the heart being present." But it is still necessary to bring the prayer into form. With outward words, genuflection, and prostration, you gain benefit and attain your desire.

The outer form of prayer is temporary, the inner spirit never ends. For the Spirit of the world is an infinite ocean, the body but a limited shore. Therefore, continual prayer belongs only to the spirit, but that inward prayer must manifest. Until intention and form are wedded, there are no children born.

When you say that words are the branch, this is only a relative term. Until the branch exists how can the term "root" gain its meaning? So the meaning of root came out of this branch. If the branch had not existed, it could never have had a

name. When you speak of woman, there must also be man. When you speak of a Master, there must be a student. When you speak of the Ruler, there must be one ruled.

discourse 39

Husam al-Din Arzanjani, before entering the service and society of dervishes, was a great debater. Wherever he went, he engaged vigorously in argument and controversy. He used to debate well and spoke excellently, but once he took up the company of dervishes his heart turned completely against debate.

“Whoever desires to sit next to God, let them sit with lovers of God.” These intellectual sciences are a game and a waste of life, compared to the spiritual experiences of the dervishes.

This way of desirelessness is the way to attain your desires. Whatever you have longed for will come to you on this path, whether the shattering of armies, victory over your enemy, capturing kingdoms, bringing people to obedience, excelling your contemporaries, or elegance of speech. When you have chosen the way of poverty, these things come to you. No one has ever traveled this road and had cause to complain, contrary to other ways where only one out of a hundred

thousand reach their goal, and even they do not always find happiness and peace. For every desire has many branching paths to reach that goal. It is long and arduous, full of pitfalls and obstacles, and in the end it is possible those twisting paths will fall short of your desire.

However, once you enter the world of poverty and practice it, God bestows on you kingdoms and worlds you never imagined, and you feel quite ashamed of what you longed for at first. “Ah!” you cry. “With such reality in existence, how could I have sought after such foolishness?” But God says, “If only you had risen above such desires, becoming detached from them and seeing them for what they were, all would have been well. Yet now, when they enter your thoughts and you avoid them for My sake, My grace is infinite, so of course I make them attainable to you.”

So it happened with Mohammed. Before he attained his goal and became famous, he listened to the elegant speech and eloquence of the Arabs, and he wished that he too could speak so well. Yet, once the invisible worlds were revealed to him, and he became drunk with God, his heart

turned completely against that desire and longing. God declared, "I have given you the elegance and eloquence that you sought." The Prophet answered, "Lord, of what use are they to me? I am indifferent to them and have no desire for them." God replied, "Do not worry. Your original desire shall come to pass, and yet your indifference will remain, so that desire cannot harm you." God bestowed on him such speech that the entire world, from his time until today, has composed and still composes volumes expounding it, and yet people fall short of comprehending all that it contains. God also declared, "Your Companions, out of weakness and fear for their lives, whisper your name only in secret. But I will publish your greatness abroad so that men and women will shout it aloud in sweet intonations five times daily on the high minarets in all regions of the world. Your name will be famous in the east and the west."

It is the same with anyone who gambles their life upon this way, to them all objectives whether religious or mundane become attainable. None have ever had cause to complain.

The words of the Saints are the true coin; the words of others are but imitation. Imitation is a branch of the true coin. Imitation is like a wooden carving in the shape of a foot, that wooden foot was filched from a real foot and shaped to its measure. If no foot existed, how could there be a copy? Therefore some speech is true coin, and some imitation. They resemble each other. Only discrimination can recognize the difference. This critical perception is real faith.

Do you not see how Moses threw down his rod and it became a serpent, and the staffs and ropes of the magicians also became serpents, but Pharaoh who lacked insight saw no difference between them, while Moses who possessed discernment could see truth from sorcery? Through discrimination Moses became a believer. So we realize that faith is discrimination.

The root of our judgement is Divine revelation. But after mingling with the thoughts, senses and desires of mortal creatures, that original grace has vanished. How does our judgement resemble the delicacy of revelation now?

This is like the water that flows in Turut towards the city. There, at its fountainhead, see how pure and fine it is! But once it enters the city, and passes through the gardens, quarters and houses of the inhabitants, so many people wash their hands, faces, feet and others parts in it, and their clothes and carpets, and the urine of all the people and the dung of horses and mules is poured into it. Look at this water when it passes out the other side of the city! It is still the same water, able to turn dust into clay, quench the thirsty, make the field green, yet discrimination can see the water is polluted and has lost its original clarity.

Water that never grows stale—that is what we need. Water that can cleanse the impurities of the world, and yet they leave no trace in it. It retains its limpid and clear state, and is never tainted. This is the Water of Truth.

So, faith is discrimination, distinguishing truth from falsehood and the true coin from the fake. These words are valuable to everyone possessing that critical perception, but are wasted on those

who cannot see the difference. If these words fall into the hands of those who cannot discern, it is like giving precious pearls to children who do not know their value. Later, if you offer them apples they will gladly trade them for pearls, since they know no better.

Abu Yazid, when a child, was taken by his father to school to learn jurisprudence. When he was brought before the schoolmaster he asked, "Is this the jurisprudence of God?" They said, "This is the jurisprudence of Abu Hanifa." He said, "I want the jurisprudence of God." When he was brought before the grammar teacher, he asked, "Is this the grammar of God?" The teacher said, "This is the grammar of Sibawaihi." Abu Yazid said, "I do not want it." He spoke this way wherever his father took him. His father could do nothing with him, and finally let him be. Later he came to Baghdad upon his quest, and as soon as he saw Junaid he shouted, "This is the jurisprudence of God!"

How could it be that a lamb would not recognize its own mother on whose milk it has been suckled? So, forget the form.

There was a certain Sheikh who kept his disciples standing with their hands folded in service. They asked him, "Sheikh, why do you not let this class sit down? This is not the practice of dervishes, this is the custom of princes and kings." He replied, "No. Be silent. You must respect this way to gain full benefit. Though respect lies within the heart, yet 'the outer is the frontispiece of the inner.'"

From the frontispiece of a book, people know what it contains. From outward respect, bowing the head and standing, can be seen what respect they have inwardly, and their respect for God.

discourse 40

Jauhar, the Sultan's servant, said, "We have been told that we must repeat the Muslim credo five times during our lifetime. What if we don't understand the words, or do not memorize them correctly? After death, what questions will we be asked, seeing that we have forgotten even the questions we were taught?"

Rumi replied: If you forget what you have learned, then of course you become a clean slate suitable for questions that you have not learned.

Now, this minute, you are listening to me. You accept some part of what I say because you have heard similar things before, but some you only half accept, and concerning other things you hesitate. No one hears this rejection or acceptance, or the debate going on within you. Even though you are listening, no sound or voice comes to your ear from within you. If you search inwardly, you will find no instrument of speech.

This coming of yours, to visit me, is itself a question without a throat or tongue, namely,

“Show me a way, and explain what you have shown.” My sitting with you, whether silent or speaking, is an answer to your hidden questions. When you wait upon the king, that is a question addressed to the king and an answer. Every day the king questions his servants without tongue: “How do you stand? How do you eat? How do you look?” If anyone has a wry look within them, their answer inevitably comes out awry and they cannot give a straight answer. In the same way someone who stammers, however much they wish to speak straight, is unable to do so. A goldsmith who rubs gold against a stone is questioning the gold, and gold answers, “This is I. I am pure.” Or, “I am alloyed.”

*The crucible knows after you've been tested
Whether you are gold,
Or merely copper with gold covering.*

Hunger is a questioning of nature: “There is a crack in the body’s house. Give a brick. Give clay.” Eating is an answer: “Take.” Not eating is also an answer: “Wait until later. The brick is not yet dry.” The physician comes and takes our pulse. That is a question—the throbbing of the

vein is the answer. Examining the urine is an unspoken question and answer. To cast a seed into the ground is a question: "Will you give fruit?" The growing of the tree is an answer without a tongue. Because the answer is wordless, the question must be wordless, too.

A king read three letters from the same man, but did not answer. The subject wrote a complaint, saying, "Three times now I have petitioned your majesty. Let your majesty at least say whether my petition has been accepted or rejected." The king wrote on the back of the letter, "Do you not know that refusing an answer is an answer itself, and that the answer to a fool is silence?"

A tree's not growing is a refusal to answer, and is an answer itself. Every motion people make is a question. Whatever happens to them, whether sorrow or joy, is an answer. If they hear a pleasant answer, they show their thanks. Thanks is expressed by asking the same kind of question again. If they hear an unpleasant answer, they quickly ask God's forgiveness and do not repeat that kind of question.

*“If only, when Our might came upon them,
They had been humble!
But their hearts were hard.”*

In other words, they did not understand that the answer they received came from the question they asked.

*“And Satan decked out fair to them
What they were doing.”*

This means they saw the answer to their question but said, “This ugly answer is not appropriate to our fair question.” They did not realize that smoke comes from the fuel, not the fire. The drier the fuel, the cleaner the flame. If you entrust your garden to a gardener, and you smell a disagreeable odor, suspect the gardener and not the garden.

Someone said, “Why did you kill your mother?” The other answered, “I saw her sleeping with a strange man.” The first person said, “You should have killed the stranger.” The second one said, “Then I would be killing someone every day.”

Therefore, whatever happens to you, correct your own self, then you will not have to fight with someone every day. If others say, “Everything is from God,” we reply: Then to reproach one’s own

self and to let the world be is also from God.

This is like the story of a boy who shook down apricots from a tree and ate them. The owner of the orchard caught him and said, "Aren't you afraid of God's punishment?" The boy said, "Why should I be afraid? The tree belongs to God, and I am God's servant. God's servant ate God's fruit!" The owner said, "Wait and see what answer I shall give you. Fetch a rope, tie him to this tree and beat him until the answer is made clear!" The boy said, "Aren't you afraid of God's punishment?" The owner answered, "Why should I be afraid? You are God's servant, and this is God's stick. I am beating God's servant with God's stick!"

The moral is that this world is like an echo—whatever you say, whether good or evil, you hear the same from the mountain. If you think, "I spoke beautifully and the mountain gave an ugly answer," this is impossible. When the nightingale sings in the mountain, does the mountain return the voice of a raven or a donkey? Know for certain then that you have spoken like a donkey!

*Speak sweetly when crossing the mountain pass,
 Why do you bray like an ass?
 The azure sky sends back the note,
 Of sweetness from your own throat.*

discourse 41

We are like bowls on the surface of the water. The direction a bowl moves is controlled not by the bowl, but by the water.

Someone said: “That is a general statement. But some people know they are on the surface of the water, while some do not know.”

Rumi said: If that is a general statement, then the specific statement, “The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the All-Merciful” would mean nothing. It was also said, “The All-Merciful has taught the Koran.” This cannot be a general statement. God taught all the sciences, so what is this particular reference to the Koran?

Similarly, “He created the heavens and the earth.” Why specifically the heavens and the earth, since He created all things? True, all bowls travel on the surface of the water of Omnipotence and Divine Will, but it is poor manners to refer to God as “O Creator of dung and farting and wind-breaking.” Instead we say, “O Creator of the

heavens,” and “O Creator of intelligence.” So this distinction, although general, is an indication of choiceness and value.

The upshot is that the bowls travel on the surface of the water, and the water carries one bowl so that every other bowl gazes upon it. The water carries another bowl so that every bowl runs away instinctively, and feels ashamed seeing it. The water inspires them to run away and implants in them the power to move away, saying, “O God, take us farther away.” But in the first case they say, “O God, bring us closer to this one.”

The person who thinks this is a general situation says, “Both bowls are equally controlled by the water.” We say, “If only you saw the grace, beauty and pretty sauntering of this bowl on the water, you would have no desire to call such movement general.” In the same way, it would never occur to a lover to say, “My beloved and I are co-partners in the work and filth that results from two people sharing a certain space with bodies that decay.” How could anyone apply such a cold description to their beloved?

Since you only recognize the general attributes, not seeing our particular beauty, it is not proper arguing with you, for our words are commingled with beauty and it is wrong to reveal beauty to those who do not love beauty.

This is the science of potential, it is not the science of argumentation. Roses and fruit-blossoms do not bloom in the autumn, for that would confront and compete with autumn. It is not in the nature of the rose to confront autumn. If the sun has done its work, the rose comes out in its proper season, otherwise it draws in its head and retires within its stem. Autumn says to it, "If you are not barren, confront me!" The rose says, "In your presence I am barren and a coward. Say whatever you will!"

*O monarch of all truthful folk,
How can I be called a hypocrite?
With living people I am alive,
And with the dead as dead I sit.*

If some old crone without any teeth, her face all wrinkled like the back of a lizard, came to you and said, "If you are a man and a true youth, behold, I have come before you! Behold the horse

and the fair one that sits upon it. Behold the open field. Show manliness, if you are a man!" You would say, "God be my refuge! I am no man. What they have told you is all lies. If you are the mate, unmanliness is most attractive!"

A scorpion comes and raises its stinger against your leg, saying, "I have heard you are someone who laughs and is happy. Laugh, so that I can hear your laughter." In such a case you would say, "Now that you have come I have no laughter. What they have told you is lies. My desire to laugh has been replaced with the hope that you will go far away!"

Someone said to Rumi: "When you sighed a moment ago, the ecstasy departed. Do not sigh, so the ecstasy will not leave."

Rumi answered: Sometimes that ecstasy departs if you do not sigh. Otherwise, Mohammed would not have said,

"Abraham was a man who sighed, a merciful man."

Nor would it be right to show any act of obedience to God, for all displays of obedience are ecstasy.

You say this because you want the ecstasy to continue. When someone induces ecstasy, you look after them to continue your experience. This is like shouting to a sleeper, "Arise! It is day. The caravan is off." Others say, "Don't shout. She is in ecstasy. You will drive her ecstasy away." You answer, "That ecstasy of sleep is destruction, this ecstasy of wakefulness is birth and growth." They say, "Don't make a confusion, for this shouting is disturbing." You answer, "This shouting will make the sleeper think. How can she think while sleeping?"

So shouting is of two kinds. If the shouters are greater in knowledge, their shouting will cause an increase in thought. Since they are people of knowledge and of wakefulness, when they awaken others out of their slumber they show the sleepers their own world and draw them higher. However, when the awakener is lower in awareness and awakens others, the gaze of those sleeping is pulled down. Since the shouter's knowledge is lower down, inevitably the gaze of those shouted at drops downward to the lower world.

discourse 42

People who are interested in their scholarly studies think that if they faithfully attend our meetings they will forget and lose all they have learned. On the contrary, when they come here their sciences acquire soul. For all sciences, when they acquire soul, are like an empty body that springs to life. The heart of knowledge originates beyond this world of letters and language. It comes to us from that world where speech is without sound or sign.

“And to Moses, God spoke directly.”

Well, God did not speak with letters and sounds, with throat and tongue. Letters require a throat and lips to be heard. God is exalted far above lips, mouth and throat. So prophets in that world speak with God in a way that partial intelligences cannot imagine or understand. Yet the prophets come down from that world without letters into this world of letters, and become children for the sake of these children. Thus, Mohammed said, “I was sent as a teacher.”

Although the masses of people in this world do not reach the spiritual states of the prophets, still this world derives strength from the saints, and grows and finds comfort in them. In the same way, an infant, not knowing or recognizing its mother in detail, still finds comfort and derives strength from her. Just as the fruit is nourished by the branch, becoming sweet and ripe, yet knows nothing of the tree. So, the great saints, with their letters and speech, though the masses do not know them, still the people gain strength from the saints and are nourished.

There is fixed within soul—beyond reason, letter and sound—a macrocosm. But look at how many seek out those demented gurus who make outrageous claims. People think, “what these gurus say may be true. Such things might exist, even if they are wrong in this case. Not everything can be known by reason and logic.” But this doesn’t mean that everything outside of reason and logic is true. “Every nut is round, but not every round thing is a nut,” is a sign of that.

Although a saint has a state that cannot be expressed through words and writing, still from

the saint's presence reason grows and develops. This cannot be found from those demented ones around whom the masses circle. No one who visits them is transformed beyond their own state, and no one finds completeness through such guidance. People might think they have found completeness, but that is not what we call completeness. Just like a child who is separated from its mother finds comfort for a moment with someone else, this is not what we call comfort, since the child has simply made a mistake.

Physicians say that whatever is agreeable to the temperament and brings satisfaction gives strength and purifies the blood. However, this is only true when someone is without disease. For instance, a bilious person finds sour things agreeable, and sugar disagreeable, because their taste has become changed by their own distemper. And so the truly agreeable is what is agreeable to someone before they fall sick. For example, a woman breaks her hand and then hangs it in a sling so that it heals all crooked. Her surgeon must make the bones straight and set them to their original form. This is not agreeable to the

woman. Indeed, she finds it painful. Being crooked is much more agreeable to her. So the surgeon says, "First of all your hand was straight, and you found comfort in that. When you broke it, you felt pain and suffered. Although being crooked is more agreeable to you now, this comfort is false and means nothing."

Beings in the world of pure spirit find the commemoration of God and absorption in God agreeable, like the angels. However, if they fall sick through connection with the body, and eating sour things becomes agreeable to them, then the prophets and saints who are physicians, say, "This is not really what you want. This agreeableness is a lie. Your real desire is for something else that you have forgotten. What is agreeable to your original and sound temperament is what you truly want. But since this sickness now seems appealing, you do not recognize the truth."

A Sufi was seated before a grammarian. The grammarian said, "A word must be one of three things: either it is a noun, a verb, or a particle." The Gnostic tore his robe and cried, "Alas!

Twenty years of my life striving and seeking have gone to the winds, for I labored in the hope that there was another word beyond this. Now you have destroyed my hope.” Though the Sufi had already attained the Word he sought, he said this to arouse the grammarian.

The greater the number of guests, the larger they make the house, the more furniture they bring in, and the more food they prepare. This is why the stature of little children is small, and their thoughts too, which are their guests, are appropriate to the house of their bodies. They know nothing except milk and their nurses. When they grow older the guests, their thoughts, also increase, and their house of reason, perception and discrimination expands. When the guests of passionate love arrive, they are too much for the house. They demolish it and build anew.

God’s veils and God’s scouts and troops cannot be contained in God’s house. God’s veils cannot hide Its door. To accommodate infinite guests, an infinite station is required. When God’s veils are hung, they shed light and dissolve all shadows, so

that the secret things become manifest. This is opposite of the veils in this present world, that add to the shadows.

I suffer wrongs that will not be said.

None will hear my excuse or cries.

Just as the candle weeps,

No one knows if the tears it sheds,

Come from its closeness to the fire

*Or the longing of the bee's wax for the honey's sweetness, now
parted.*

This whole world is the prisoner of destiny, and destiny is the prisoner of beauty. Beauty reveals, it does not conceal.

God has certain servants that are men who, when they see a woman in a veil, command her, "Remove your veil so we may see your face and who you are. When you pass by veiled, we are distracted, wondering, 'What manner of person is this that passes before us.' We are not like those who are attracted and enslaved by you if they see your face. It has been a long time now that God has made us innocent and free from such charms. We are quite secure. You will not disturb us or tempt us. But it is when we do not see you that we are disturbed, wondering, 'Who is this?'"

These men are very different from others who are driven by their desires. If other men see the faces of beauty, they are captivated and become disturbed. Therefore, it is better for these beauties to hide themselves, so as not to tempt such men. As for the Sufis, however, it is better to show their faces, to spare God's servants the distraction.

Someone said: "In Khvarizm, no one falls in love, because in Khvarizm there are many beautiful women. No sooner do they see a beauty and fix their hearts on her, than they see another still more beautiful, and the first one is forgotten."

Rumi said: If there are no lovers for the beauties of Khvarizm, then certainly there are lovers of Khvarizm, itself, seeing the many beauties in that land. But the "Khvarizm" I speak of is poverty, where countless mystical and spiritual forms show their faces. Each one you turn to and find comfort in, leads to yet another more beautiful, so that you forget all before. On and on this leads—ad infinitum. So let us be lovers of poverty, where such true beauties are found.

discourse 43

Our friend, Saif al-Bukhari has gone to Egypt. Everyone likes a mirror, and is in love with reflections of their own attributes and attainments, but our friend misses the true nature of his face. He thinks this bodily veil is a face, and the mirror of this veil is the mirror of his face. Uncover your face, so you can know for sure that I am a mirror of your true self.

Someone said: "I know for a fact that the prophets and saints are all victims of a false presumption. There is nothing to it but mere pretense."

Rumi said: Do you say this at random, or have you looked into this before speaking? If you have looked into this, then this pretension you have seen is itself a vision, and therefore a proof of their vision. Indeed, such knowingness is the most precious and noblest thing in existence. The proof of the prophets' message is simply their own claim to such vision, which you have acknowledged

yourself. Such vision only manifests through great longing and seeking. Your own statement still portrays the existence of a seeker, desire and vision. Thus, the relationship between seekers and God is a case where all disclaimers of love prove only love.

They say, "That crowd are disciples of a dimwit, and venerate the fool." I say, "That 'dimwit' of a Sheikh is no less than a stone or an idol." Those who worship stones venerate and magnify them. They direct their hopes and longings toward them, and their petitions, needs and tears. The stone knows nothing, nor can it feel anything of this. Yet God has made stones and idols to be the means of devotion, of which the stones and idols are totally unaware.

In the same way, these disciples are in love with the image of this foolish Sheikh, and the Sheikh is oblivious to their "banishment," "union" and all the phases of their love life.

If misguided and misdirected love for a phantom can produce ecstasy, still it is nothing like the mutual love enjoyed with a real beloved, who is aware and wide awake to the lover's condition.

Like the person who embraces a pillar in the dark, thinking it to be their beloved, the pleasure they enjoy cannot be compared with one who embraces their living and conscious friend.

discourse 44

Everyone who sets out on a journey has a particular idea in mind: “Once I arrive I will be able to gain advantages and improve my affairs. My business will be set in order, my friends will be delighted, and I shall defeat my enemies.” Such are the ideas we have in mind, but God’s objective is something else. We make so many plans and think through so many ideas, and not one turns out according to our desire. Yet even with all of that, we continue to rely upon our own plans and choices.

Ignoring Fate, people plot their little plans.

God’s Will does not consult with the plans of man.

This is illustrated by the woman who sees in a dream that she has chanced into a strange city where no one knows her, and she knows no one else. She becomes bewildered, and depressed, saying to herself, “Why did I come to this city where I have no friend nor acquaintance to shake me by the hand, or press me on the lip?” On awakening,

this city and its people vanish, and she realizes that all her anguish and sorrow were over nothing. So she disregards the state she found herself in, thinking her worries were quite wasted. However, the next time she falls asleep, she sees herself in exactly such a city again, and begins to feel the same sorrow and loneliness. She regrets coming to such a city and doesn't remember when she was awake how foolish she see it was to worry, since it was only a dream and nothing to grieve about.

This is exactly how people are. They have seen their desires come to nothing a hundred thousand times. Nothing proceeds according to their intricate plans. But God appoints an oblivion to cover their eyes, so they forget all that has happened, and once again they plan out their own ideas and wills.

“God stands between people and their hearts.”

Once, when Ibrahim, son of Adham, was king, he galloped in the track of a deer he was hunting, until he became entirely separated from his soldiers, leaving them far behind. His horse was weary and covered with sweat, but still he chased

on. After passing far into the desert wilderness, the deer suddenly stopped, turned back its face and said, "You were not created for this. Beingness was not brought forth from not-being for you to hunt me. Even if you catch me, what will you have accomplished?"

When Ibrahim heard these words, he cried aloud and flung himself from the horse. There was no one in that desert except a shepherd. Ibrahim said to him, "Take my royal robes encrusted with jewels, my arms and my horse, and give me your gown of coarse cloth. And please tell no one, not even a hint to anyone, what has become of me." He put on the rough gown and set out on his way. Now consider what his intention was, and yet what his true objective turned out to be! He wanted to catch a deer, but God caught him by means of that deer. Therefore, realize that in this world things happen as God wills. His is the design, and all purpose comes from Him.

Before becoming a Muslim, Umar entered his sister's house. His sister was chanting from the Koran in a loud voice:

“TA HA: We have not sent down...”

When she saw her brother she immediately hid the Koran, and became silent. Umar bared his sword saying, “Tell me what you were reading and why you hid it or this very instant I will chop off your head!” His sister feared him, knowing his temper when angry, and in terror for her life she confessed, “I was reading from these words that God revealed to Mohammed.”

“Read on, so that I can hear,” said Umar, and she recited the whole of the Sura of Ta Ha. Umar became furious, and in a rage he waved his sword, saying, “If I killed you this instant, it would be a killing of the defenseless. First I will go and cut off Mohammed’s head, then I will attend to you.”

In his anger, holding a naked sword, Umar set off for the Prophet’s mosque. The chieftains of Quraish, seeing him go by, exclaimed, “Wonderful! Umar is after Mohammed. Surely, if anyone can stop this new religion, Umar can.” For Umar was a mighty and powerful man. Any army he marched against was vanquished. In fact, the Prophet had many times declared, “God, suc-

cor my religion by means of Umar or Abu Jahl.” For those two were famous in that time for strength and heroism. Afterwards, when Umar became a Muslim, he used to weep and say, “O Messenger of God, woe for me if you had spoken Abu Jahl’s name before mine. What would have become of me then? I would have continued in error.”

In short, Umar was on his way, with naked sword, making for the Prophet’s mosque. Meanwhile Gabriel revealed to Mohammed, “Lo, Messenger of God, Umar is coming to be converted to Islam. Take him to your bosom.” Just as Umar entered the door of the mosque, he saw clearly an arrow of light fly from Mohammed, and pierce his heart. Umar uttered a loud cry and fell down insensible. Love and passionate desire filled him, and he wanted to dissolve himself into Mohammed out of extreme affection, and he became nothing. He said, “Prophet of God, offer me your faith and speak your blessed word, so I may hear.” Having become a Muslim, he said, “Now, to correct my actions of coming against you with a bared sword, and to cleanse that act,

henceforth I will give quarter to no one I hear speaking wrongly of you. With this sword I will strike their heads from their bodies.”

Coming out of the mosque, he suddenly encountered his father. His father said, “You have changed religion.” Immediately he struck off his father’s head, and walked on holding the blood-stained sword. The chieftains of Quraish, seeing the blood, said to Umar, “You promised to bring back Mohammed’s head. Where is his head?” Umar said, “I carry it with me!” One of them said, “You brought his head?” He answered, “No, not that head. The head I bring is from the other side.”

Now look at what Umar planned, and what God brought about from those plans. Know that all affairs turn out as God desires.

Abraham said, “O God, since you have chosen me and honored me with the robe of Your approval, grant this distinction to my children also.” God declared:

“My covenant shall not reach the evildoers.”

When Abraham realized that God does not extend His loving care to the evildoers and the insolent, he tried to strike a bargain. He said, “O

God, those who believe and are not evildoers—give them a portion of Your provision.” God declared, “My provision is common to all men and women, and everyone shall have a share of it. All creatures enjoy their portion of benefits from this guesthouse. But the robe of My approval, and the honor of ennoblement and distinction, are a special gift for the elect and chosen ones.”

*“We appointed the House to be
A place of visitation for the people,
And a sanctuary.
‘Take to yourselves Abraham’s station
For a place of prayer.’”*

The literalists say that what is intended by this “House” is the Kaaba, for in the Kaaba it is forbidden to hunt, and no malice is allowed against anyone. God singled out that House for Itself. This is all perfectly true and fine, but that is the literal interpretation of the Koran. However, the Sufis say that the “House” is the inward part of our beingness. In other words, “God, free my inward self of temptation and worldly plans. Cleanse it of passions and idle thoughts, so that no fear can enter in and security will prevail. Let it become completely the center of Your revelation.”

It is said that God has appointed meteors to watch over heaven to prevent the accursed Satans from listening to the secrets of the angels. The meaning of this, according to esotericists, is, "O God, appoint the guardian of Your loving care to watch over our inward house, to drive away from us the temptation of the Satans and the tricks of the carnal desires."

Everyone begins this path from their own place. The Koran is a double-sided brocade. Some enjoy one side, and some the other. Both are true, since God desires that everyone should gain benefit from it. In the same way, a woman has a husband and a child. Each enjoys her in a different way. The child's pleasure is in her breast and her milk. The husband's pleasure is in intercourse with her. Some people are infants of the Way—they take pleasure in the literal meaning of the Koran, and drink that milk. But those who have reached years of full discretion have another enjoyment and a different understanding of the inner meanings of the Koran.

Abraham's station and place of prayer is a certain spot in the Kaaba where the literalists say two inclinations of prayer must be performed.

This is excellent indeed, by God. But according to the Sufis, Abraham's station is that inward state where you should cast yourself into the fire for God's sake, reaching this place through work and effort in God's name. There, people can sacrifice themselves for the sake of God, their own selves having no place in their sight, and they cease to tremble for themselves. To perform two inclinations of prayer at Abraham's station is excellent, but let the standing be performed in this world, and the bowing be in the other world.

The true Kaaba is the heart of the prophets and the saints, the locus of God's revelation. The physical Kaaba is a branch of that. If it were not for the heart, of what use would the Kaaba be? The prophets and the saints forsake their own desire and follow the desire of God. Whatever God commands, they do. Whoever God denies grace, to them the saints are indifferent—indeed in their eyes such a one is an enemy.

Into Your hands we give the reins of our heart.

Whatever you declare cooked, we declare it burnt!

Everything I say is a comparison. Comparison is one thing, and equivalence is another. We liken God's Light to a lamp for the sake of comparison,

and the saints are likened to the glass of that lamp. God's Light is not contained by any being or space, so how can it be contained in a glass lamp? How can the compass of His Light be contained in a heart? Yet seeking, you find it in the heart. Not like some box where that Light resides, but from the heart you find that Light radiating. Like you find your image in a mirror, yet your image is not in the mirror itself. Still, when you look in the mirror you see yourself.

By means of comparison all subtleties become intelligible, and once it is intelligible the senses can grasp it. Thus, they say that in the other world books will fly, some into the right hand and some into the left. There are also angels, the Throne, Heaven and Hell, the Balance, the Reckoning, and the Book: none of this is clear until an analogy is given. There is no likeness to any of these things in this world, yet through comparison they can be known.

For example, by night all people sleep, cobbler and king alike, judge and tailor. Once asleep, their thoughts take wing, and no thought remains to one of them. Then, at dawn, it is as though the

blast of Israfil's trumpet brings life to the atoms of their bodies, and the thoughts of each one, like scrolls from the next world, fly headlong towards each person without any mistake—the tailor's thoughts to the tailor, the lawyer's thoughts to the lawyer, the blacksmith's thoughts to the blacksmith, the oppressor's thoughts to the oppressor, the thoughts of the just to the just. Does anyone sleep through the night as a tailor, and rise by day a cobbler? No, for that work belongs to them, and so they take up their occupation as before. From this you can see that the likeness of each person continues in the other world. This makes sense, because in this world we see the same thing.

If we continue with comparison until we reach the end of this thread, we will witness all the states of the next world in this world. We will sniff out in this world all the circumstances as they correspond to the other world, and we will see that all things are contained in God's omnipotence. Many are the bones moldering in their graves, yet enjoying the sweet repose and drunken sleep of that enjoyment and intoxication. These are not idle words, for the saying goes,

“May the dust lie sweet on them!” If the dust had no awareness of sweetness, why would anyone say such a thing?

*I pray that moon-faced idol
May live a hundred years,
My faithful heart a quiver
For the shafts of her tears.
In the dust of her door my heart
So happy, happy died,
Praying, “Lord, may her dust
Forever happily abide!”*

A couple are sleeping on one mattress. The woman sees herself in the midst of a banquet, a rose-garden and Paradise, the man sees himself in the midst of snakes, the guardians of Hell, and scorpions. If you investigate, you will see neither Paradise nor Hell. Why then should it be a surprise that the parts of some, even in the tomb, experience pleasure, repose and intoxication, while some are in pain, torment and agony, yet you can see neither pleasure nor pain? Therefore, the invisible becomes sensible through the use of comparison.

Comparison is one thing, equivalence is another. The Gnostics give the name “spring” to relax-

ation, happiness and expansion. They call contraction and sorrow "autumn." What real resemblance is there between happiness and spring, sorrow and autumn? Yet without this comparison the intellect cannot conceive and grasp the meaning. So the Koran declares:

*"Not equal are the blind and those with sight,
The shadows and the light,
The shade and the torrid heat."*

Here, faith is compared to light and unbelief to shadows, but faith could be related to a delightful shade and unbelief to a burning, merciless sun boiling the brain. What resemblance is there between the bright subtlety of faith and the light of this world, or between the sordid gloom of unbelief and the darkness we know at night?

Do you see this man who has fallen asleep while we were talking? That slumber is not a sign of heedlessness, but safety and security. Like a caravan travelling along a difficult and dangerous road on a dark night, they drive on in fear, lest harm should befall them. But as soon as the voice of a dog, or cock, reaches their ears and they find a village, they are carefree. They stretch out their

legs and sleep sweetly. On the road, where not a sound or murmur would disturb them, they cannot sleep out of fear. But in the village they find security, and with all the barking of dogs and crowing of cocks, still they are happy and fall asleep.

Our words also derive from community and security, they are the sayings of prophets and saints. When soul hears the words of those familiar friends, it feels secure and is delivered from any fear, for upon these words is wafted a scent of hope and felicity.

Just as those travelers on that dark night think that every moment thieves are mingling with their caravan, so they desire to hear the words of their fellow travelers and to recognize them by their words. Once they hear their friends speak they feel secure. The same is true with you. Because your essence is subtle, glances are not enough for us, but if you speak we will then hear that familiar friend of our spirits and feel secure and at peace. So speak!

A certain mouse inhabiting a cornfield is invisible, being so small, but once it makes a sound,

then people know it by means of its sound. And so, people are utterly immersed in the cornfield of this world, and your essence, being extremely subtle, is invisible. So speak, that they may recognize you.

When we long to see a certain place, our heart goes first to experience the conditions there. Then our heart returns and draws our body along. Now all the men and women of this world are like bodies in relation to the saints and the prophets, who are the heart of this world. These beings of the heart first journeyed to the other world, leaving their human attributes of flesh and skin. They surveyed the depths and heights of that world, and traversed all the stages, until they knew the way. Then they came back and summoned mankind, saying, "Come to that original world! For this world is a bleak and empty ruin compared to that garden we have discovered."

From this you should realize that the heart is always attached to its beloved, and has no need to traverse the stages, no need to fear highwaymen, no need of the mule's packsaddle. It is the wretched body that is tied to these things.

I said to my heart,

*"How is it you are barred from the service
Of He whose name you bless?"*

My heart replied,

"You misread the signs.

I am constantly in His service,

You are the one astray."

Wherever you are, no matter what may happen, always strive to be a lover, a passionate lover. Once love has become your property you will be a lover eternally, in the grave, at the resurrection, or in Paradise, for ever and ever. When you have sown wheat, wheat will surely grow, stocks of wheat will fill the shed, loaves of wheat will fill the oven.

When Majnun wanted to write a letter to Laila, he took a pen in his hand and wrote:

*Your name is on my tongue,
Your image is within my sight,
Your memory fills my heart,
Where, then, can I write?*

Your image dwells in my sight, Your name never leaves my tongue, Your memory occupies the depths of my soul, so where am I to write, seeing that You are here in all these places? The pen broke, and the page was torn.

Many are those whose heart is full of such reality, but they cannot express the words in terms of speech. This is not surprising, and is no limit to that love. On the contrary, the root of the matter is the heart, yearning, and passion. A child is in love with milk, and from milk it derives succor and strength, yet the child cannot explain milk or describe it, saying, "What pleasure I find in drinking milk, and how weak and anguished I would be without it." The child has no words for it, yet still it desires milk. Most grown people, on the other hand, even though they might describe milk in a thousand ways, still they find no such pleasure or delight in milk like they did as children.

discourse 45

Rumi asked: What is the name of that youth?

Someone said: “Saif al-Din (“Sword of the Faith”).

Rumi said: No one can judge a sword while it is still in its scabbard. Truly, the Sword of the Faith is one who defends the way, dedicates their efforts wholly to God, who reveals rightness from error and distinguishes truth from falsehood. But first they correct themselves and improve their own character: “Begin with yourself,” said the Prophet.

So they direct all discipline first to themselves, saying, “After all, I too am human. I have hands and feet, ears and understanding, eyes and a mouth. The prophets and saints—who attained God’s favor and reached their goal—they were human like me with reason, a tongue, hands and feet. Why were they shown the way? Why is this door that was opened to them, closed to me?” Such a person corrects themselves night and day,

and struggles, saying, “What did I do, that I have not been accepted?” They continue until they become the Sword of God and the Tongue of Truth.

For example, ten people want to enter a house. Nine find the way, but one remains outside and is not allowed in. Certainly this person reflects inwardly and laments, saying, “What did I do that they would keep me out? What bad manners am I guilty of?” That person attributes the fault to themselves and recognizes their own errors and lack of manners. They should never say, “God has done this to me, what can I do? It is God’s will. If God willed it, I would be shown the way.” Such words are tantamount to abusing God and drawing the sword against God. Such a person would be a Sword Against God, not the Sword of God.

God is far beyond having family or friends. “He has not begotten, and has not been begotten,” says the Koran. You cannot say that those who have found the way to God were more God’s kin, more His friends or more closely connected to Him. No one has ever approached God except from below.

*"God is all sufficient,
You are the needy ones."*

Nearness to God is never attained, except through devotion and submission. He is the Giver of givers. He fills the skirt of the sea with pearls, He clothes the thorn in the raiment of the rose, He bestows life and spirit upon a handful of dust, all without precedent, all without favorites. All the world receives their share from Him.

When people hear about a generous person who bestows valuable gifts and favors, naturally they want to visit such a giver of wealth, in hopes of receiving a share of that bounty. Since God's Grace is so well known to the entire world, why don't you beg of Him? Why don't you ask Him for robes of honor, or a rich gift? Instead, you sit in indolence saying, "If He wants to He will give to me." So you never ask Him for anything.

A dog, without reason or comprehension, when hungry, comes up to you and wags its tail as if to say, "Give me food. I am hungry by the sight of that food you have. Please give me some." A dog knows that much. Are you less than a dog? The dog is not content to sleep in ashes and say,

“If he wants to he will throw me some food,” but begs and wags its tail. So should you wag your tail and beg of God, for in the presence of such a Giver, to ask is the expression of a wonderful desire. If you lack good fortune, ask from One who is not stingy, and a commander of great wealth.

God is always near to you. Every thought and idea you conceive, there is God—for God gave being to that idea and thought. Yet God is so close you cannot see It. What is so strange in that? In every act you perform, reason guides you and initiates your action, but you cannot see your reason. You see its effect, but you cannot see its essence. For instance someone goes to the baths. Wherever they go within the baths, they feel the heat of the fire, even though they do not see the fire itself. When they leave the baths, then they see the actual fire and flames. From this they know that the heat of the baths comes from a fire.

The human being is also a huge bath, and within itself dwells the heat of reason, spirit and the lower self. But once you leave this bath and enter the other world, you see the actual essences. Then

you know that intelligence comes through the glow of reason, that fallacies and pretenses radiate from the lower self, and the impulse of life itself is the result of spirit. You can clearly see the essences of all three, but as long as you are in the bath they are invisible. You can only experience their effect.

When we were in Samarkand, the Khvarizmshah laid siege to Samarkand and attacked with his army. Not far from us lived an exceedingly beautiful girl, so lovely that none could match her in all the city. I heard her saying, "O God, I know You would never allow me to be delivered into the hands of evildoers. I know You would never permit that. I rely on You, O God."

When the city was sacked and all its inhabitants were taken into captivity, even the maidservants of that woman were captured. But she was left unharmed. For all her extreme beauty, no man even cast eyes on her. From this, know that whoever commits themselves to God is secure from harm and remains in safety. No petition of man in God's presence is ever ignored. Therefore beg of God, and demand what you need of God, for your petition will not be in vain.

“Call upon Me and I will answer you.”

A certain dervish taught his son that no matter what he needed, “Ask it of God.” The years passed. Then one day, while the child was alone in the house, he became hungry. In his usual way he said, “I want some food, I am hungry.” Suddenly a bowl of pottage materialized, and the child ate until he was full. When his father and mother returned, they said, “Aren’t you hungry?” The child answered, “I just asked for food and ate.” His father said, “Praise be to God, that your confidence and reliance upon God has grown so strong!”

When Mary was born, her mother vowed to dedicate Mary to the House of God and not to support her. She left Mary in the Temple. Zachariah demanded to care for the child, but everyone wanted to do so, as well. A dispute sprang up amongst them. Now in that time the custom was that each party in a dispute must throw a stick into water—the one whose stick floated longest was deemed to prevail. It so happened that Zachariah’s stick was the right one. They all agreed that he had the right to care for Mary. So every day Zachariah brought food to

the child, but he always found an exact match of that food already at her side. He said, "Mary, I am in charge of you. Where is this food coming from?" Mary said, "Whenever I feel the need for food, I ask God and He sends it to me. His bounty and compassion are infinite. Whoever relies on Him, their trust is not in vain."

Now, after Zachariah saw this he prayed, "O God, since You allow the need of this child, please grant me my desire. Give me a son who will be Your friend, who, without my prompting, will walk with You and be occupied in obedience to You." God brought John into being, even though his father was bent and feeble, and his mother was very old and had not borne a single child while she was young. Still, she became pregnant and gave birth.

Don't you see that all these things are but an occasion for the display of God's omnipotence? Everything came from Him, and His will must always come to pass. The believer knows that behind this wall there is Someone who is aware of every circumstance in our lives, one by one, and who sees us though we do not see Him. But those

who say, “No, this is all a tale,” they cannot believe. The day will come when they will realize their error.

For instance, you are playing the rebec. Even if you can not see anyone, if you know people are behind this wall listening, you will continue playing, for you are a rebec player. After all, the purpose of prayer is not standing, bowing and prostrating all day, for those moments of spiritual union that possess you in prayer should always be with you. Whether asleep or awake, writing or reading, in any moment, you should not be far from the remembrance of God.

Speaking and keeping silent, sleeping and eating, being enraged and forgiving—all these attributes should be like the turning of a water mill. Surely the mill revolves because of water, and it knows this, since it has tried to move without water. Any mill that believes it is the source of its own turning is the epitome of foolishness and ignorance.

Now this revolving occurs within a narrow space, for that is the nature of this material world. Therefore, say to God, “O God, grant me anoth-

er turning that is spiritual, since all needs are fulfilled by You.” Therefore bring your needs to Him constantly, and never be without His remembrance, for the remembrance of God is strength, feathers and wings to a bird of spirit.

Through remembrance of God, little by little the inward heart becomes illumined and detached from the outward world. Just as a bird that tries flying to heaven, even though it never reaches that goal, yet every moment it rises farther from the earth and outsoars the other birds. Or for instance, some musk is in a jar, but the mouth of that jar is too small, and when you reach in you cannot remove the musk. Still, your hand is perfumed and your nostrils are fulfilled. So it is with the remembrance of God: although in this moment you do not attain the Essence of God, still it leaves its mark on you, and you gain the great benefits that go with that mark.

discourse 46

Sheikh Ibrahim is a noble dervish. When we see him, we are reminded of our beloved friends. Our Master Shams used to refer to him as “our Sheikh Ibrahim,” showing his affection.

Divine favor is one thing, but personal effort is another. The prophets did not attain prophethood through personal effort—they gained that fortune through Divine grace. Yet God still required the prophets to live a life of personal effort and virtue. This was for the sake of the common people, so they could put reliance on the prophets and their words. The gaze of ordinary people cannot penetrate into the inward heart—they see only the outward show. Yet, following those externals, through the Divine blessings bestowed on those forms, people find the way to the internal.

After all, even Pharaoh made personal efforts of charity and noble acts, but since God’s favor was not present, his generosity and beneficence

remained hidden. Like a military commander who is in charge of a fortress, even when he is kind and generous to the people, if his plan is to throw off allegiance to the king and become a rebel, his kindnesses lose all their worth and luster.

Nevertheless, we should not entirely deny God's favor to Pharaoh. God's grace might have been secret, causing Pharaoh to be rejected for a good purpose. For a king is both vengeful and gracious. He bestows both robes of honor and prison terms. The Sufis do not deny God's favor to Pharaoh completely. The literalists, however, consider Pharaoh wholly rejected, and this is fine for the proper maintenance of the external teaching.

When a king puts a man on the gallows, he hangs him up high in the presence of the assembled people. He could also suspend him indoors, hidden from everyone, by a low nail, but it is necessary for the people to see and take warning. The execution of the king's decrees, and the carrying out of his orders should be visible. But not every gallows consists of wood. High rank and worldly fortune are also a gallows, and a very high one.

When God desires to chastise someone, He grants them high rank in the world and a great kingdom, like Pharaoh, Nimrod and the rest. All those eminent positions are like the gallows from which God hangs people for others to gaze upon and understand.

For God declares, “I was a hidden treasure, and I desired to be known.” This is to say, “I created all the world to manifest My Reality, now through graciousness, now through severity.” God is not the kind of king for whom one voice is sufficient. If every atom in the world became God’s herald, they would still be unable to properly proclaim His Truth.

Therefore, day and night people are forever revealing God, but while some understand this, others are unaware. In either case, the manifestation of God’s will is certain. For example, a prince orders a man to be beaten, and the man screams and shouts with pain. Still, everyone sees that both beater and beaten are revealing the prince’s authority.

Whoever acknowledges God is revealing God continually, and whoever denies God is also revealing God. For how can anything be demon-

strated without its opposites? Besides, it would be wholly without pleasure and enjoyment. Thus, someone who loves controversy proposes a motion at a meeting, but if there is no reaction or argument, what can he say in return, and what joy is there in that? For a proclamation is only meaningful in the face of its own negation. In the same way, this world is a declaration of God. Without a proposer and an opposer this declaration would seem pale and lifeless.

“The believers are like a single soul.”

Dervishes are joined as if by a single body. If one member feels pain, all the others are distressed. An eye gives up its seeing, the ear its hearing, the tongue its speech—all meet in that one body. True friendship is to sacrifice oneself for one's friend. To plunge into danger for our friend's sake. For all are headed towards one and the same goal. All are drowned in one and the same sea. This is the effect of faith, and submission to God. What is the load they carry with their bodies compared to that load they carry with their souls?

Once the believer surrenders to God, why should they give a thought to distress and danger,

to hands and feet? If their journey is to God, what use do they have for limbs? God gave you hands and feet to travel in this world, but when traveling to that One who makes hands and feet, what does it matter if you trip and stumble, or like Pharaoh's sorcerers go crawling on your belly? What cause for grief is that?

*Poison is good to sup
When the fair one fills the cup.
Bitter words are sweet to hear
When the speaker is most dear.
Full of pleasure is my love
With that salty wit I know of.
Very pleasing is its smart
Rubbed into my wounded heart.
And God knows best.*

discourse 47

God wills both good and evil, but only blesses the good. His Law both commands and prohibits, but commandment is only valid when it is opposed to natural desires. If someone says, “Hungry one, eat sweetness and sugar,” that is not commandment, but a benefaction. Prohibition works in the same way. No one says, “Don’t eat stones, don’t eat thorns,” because there is no need to prohibit when there is no desire.

Therefore, for commandments and prohibition against evil to do any good, people must desire evil. And to will the existence of people who desire evil, is to will evil. But God does not approve of evil, otherwise He would not have commanded the good. This is like those who like to teach—they hope their pupils are ignorant, for they cannot teach unless their pupils need to learn. To desire a thing is to desire the need for that thing. But no teacher approves of their students’ ignorance, or why would they teach?

It is the same with doctors: they want illness to exist, since they could not display their medical skill unless people were sick. But they do not approve of illness, otherwise they would never treat it. Similarly, bakers want people to be hungry so they can ply their trade and earn a living, but they do not approve of hunger, otherwise they would not sell bread.

This is why commanders and cavalry want their king to have an opponent and an enemy. How else can they show their bravery and love for the king? The king would never muster them, having no need. But they do not approve of the king's enemy, or they would not fight. Therefore, we should respect the evil desires within ourselves, because God loves those who are grateful and obedient to His Law, and this means nothing without the existence of those desires within us. Yet, we should not approve of those evil tendencies, but struggle hard to overcome their influence.

Hence, we can see that God wills evil in one respect, but does not will it in another. Our opponents say, "God does not will evil in any way

whatever.” That is impossible. How could He will a thing and not will the need for that thing? Amongst the needs that God has created is this headstrong nature in humanity that longs to believe such foolishness as what our opponents say, thus leading people away from truth. The lessons needed by such people are all the evils that exist in this material world. Did God not will those evils? However, if God had approved those evils, He would not have issued commandments and prohibitions against them. This proves that evil is willed for the sake of something greater.

But they still say, “God wills only good, and amongst such good things is abstaining from evil. Therefore, God desires only the averting of evil.” But evil cannot be averted unless evil exists. Or they say, “God wills only faith,” but faith cannot exist except after disbelief, so disbelief is a prerequisite to faith. Therefore, willing evil is only bad when it is willed for its own sake. When evil is willed for the sake of some good, then it is good.

In the Koran it says, “In retaliation there is life for you.” Now, obviously retaliation is evil, being

an attack against God's creation. But this is a partial evil, while guarding people from the need for future killing is a complete good. To create a partial evil for the good of all is not wrong, but to partially abandon God's will while allowing evil to succeed, is wrong indeed. This is like the mother who does not want to scold her child because of the partial evil in punishment, but the father knows he must punish to avert that evil from taking control, and to nip the trouble in the bud.

God is All-pardoning, All-forgiving and Terrible in retribution. Does He will that all these names should be true of Him? The answer must be "yes," because He cannot be All-pardoning and All-forgiving without the existence of sin. Thus, He commands us to be forgiving and to make peace, but this commandment has no meaning without the existence of anger and war.

This is similar to Sadr al-Islam's statement that we are commanded to earn and acquire wealth, because in the Koran it says, "And expend in the way of God." Since it is impossible to spend money unless one has money, then this is also a commandment to acquire money. It is the same

when a man calls out, “Arise and pray.” This is a charge to perform the ritual cleaning with water, and all the functions that precede prayer as well.

discourse 48

When God loves people He afflicts them. If they endure with fortitude, He chooses them. If they are grateful, He elects them. Some men and women are grateful to God for His wrathfulness and some for His graciousness. Both are good, for gratitude is the antidote for all occasions, changing wrath into grace. The wise and complete servant is grateful for harsh treatment, both publicly and in private, for with the voice of gratitude comes the inspiration to give more. Even if God sends them to the lowest reaches of Hell, through gratitude God's purpose is advanced.

Outward complaining is a reflection of inward complaining to God. Mohammed said, "I laugh as I slay." That means, "My laughter in the face of attackers slays their anger and hatred." Laughter, here, is gratitude in place of complaining.

It is related that a certain Jew lived next door to one of the Companions. This Jew lived in an upper room, from which all kinds of dirt and

filth, the piddle of his children, the water his clothes were washed in, fell into the Muslim's apartment below. Yet the Muslim always thanked the Jew, and instructed his family to do the same. For eight years this continued, until the Muslim died. Then the Jew, while visiting the Muslim's apartment, to condole with the family, saw all the filth and how it came from his upper room. He realized what had happened during the past years, and was filled with sorrow. He said to the Muslim's household, "Why on earth didn't you tell me? Why did you always thank me?" They replied, "Our father told us to always be grateful, and chided us if we ever gave up being grateful." So the Jew became a believer.

*Examples of virtuous women and men
Encourage the development of virtues within,
Like the melodious minstrel's rhyme
Inspires the passing of wine.*

For this reason, God, who is All-powerful and All-forgiving, thanked His prophets and servants for what they did for Him. Now, gratitude for milk to drink is a blessing, but gratitude for those who suck the breast is a Divine blessing. Although

the breast is full, until you suck it the milk does not flow.

Someone asked: “What is it that prevents gratitude?”

Rumi answered: Inordinate greed, for no matter how much people have, greed wants more. Since they get less than what their heart is set upon, they cannot be grateful. But people are unaware of their own defect, and they cannot see the flaw that taints the coin they offer.

Greed is like eating raw meat—inevitably it makes you sick. Once we realize we have eaten something rotten, a purge becomes necessary. God, in His wisdom, makes us suffer through ingratitude to purge and rid us of that corrupt conceit, lest that one sickness becomes a hundred sicknesses.

*“And we tried them with good things and evil,
That gratefully they should return.”*

That is to say, “We planned for people in ways they do not know, such as when they avoid seeing secondary causes as partners with God.” It is for this reason that Abu Yazid said, “Lord, I have never associated anything else with You.” And

God said, "O Abu Yazid, not even on the night of the milk? You said one night, 'This milk has done me harm.' It is I who create all harm and benefit." Abu Yazid had seen the secondary causes as separate from God, so God showed him up as a believer in many causes and said, "It is I who harmed you, after the milk and before the milk. I made that milk so you would sin, and I made that harm as a correction to teach you, like a teacher's punishment."

When a teacher says, "Don't eat the fruit," if the students eat it, and the teacher beats them on the soles of their feet, it is not right for the pupils to say, "We ate the fruit and it hurt our feet." In the same way, whoever refuses to acknowledge that all things are partners to God, God uses ingratitude to cleanse their spirit from the weeds of believing in many causes. A little with God is much.

The difference between giving praise and giving thanks is that thanks are given for benefits we receive. No one says, "I give thanks for that person's beauty and bravery." Praise giving is less personal.

discourse 49

Rumi said: A man was leading the prayers, and chanted from the Koran:

“The Bedouins are stubborn in unbelief and hypocrisy.”

By chance a Bedouin chieftain was present. He gave the chanter a good box on the ears. During the second genuflection, the leader of the prayers chanted a different quote from the Koran:

“Some of the Bedouins believe in God and the Last Day.”

The Bedouin exclaimed, “Ha! That slap has taught you better manners!”

Every moment we receive a slap from the unseen world. Whatever our plans—one slap and we take another course. As the saying goes, “We have no power of our own, it is all a swallowing up and a vomiting.” The meaning of “swallowing” is descending into this lower world and becoming a part of it. The meaning of “vomiting” is expelling falsehood out of the heart. For

instance, if people eat food that turns sour in their stomach, they vomit it. If they did not cast out that poison, it would become a part of them.

The disciple dances and serves to find a place in the heart of the sheik. Anything the disciple does that displeases the sheik is cast forth from the sheik's heart, like the food we eat and then vomit. Just as bad food would become part of us, unless we rejected it, so that disciple's poor conduct in time would become a part of the sheik, unless the sheik cast such actions out of their heart.

*God's love was proclaimed to the world
And every heart into confusion was hurled,
Those hearts were burned and into ashes turned
Then to the indifferent wind their ashes spurned.*

In that wind of indifference the atoms of those hearts are dancing and singing. If they are not, then how do we hear their song, and who is it every moment that tells their tale anew? And if these hearts do not realize their very life consists in burning up and spurning to the wind, how is it they are so eager to be burned? As for those hearts burned up in the fire of worldly lusts and

turned into ashes, do you hear any sound or see any luster from them?

The poet, Urwa ibn Adhina, wrote, “I know well the way God provides our daily bread. What use is there in running about here and there with no purpose? Truly, when I forget about money, food, clothing and the desires of lust, my daily portion comes to me. But when I run after those desires, they only bring me pain and wear me out. If I sit where I belong, with patience, my needs are fulfilled without pain and distress. For truly, my daily supply is also seeking me and tugging at me. When it cannot pull me it comes to me, just as when I cannot attract it I go after it.”

The upshot of these words is this: absorb yourself with the World to come so that World will pursue you. “Sitting” means to sit detached from this world while being absorbed in the affairs of the world to come. Those who run for the sake of the other World, they are truly seated. If they are seated for the sake of the present world, they are running. The Prophet said, “Whoever reduces all their cares to a single care, God fulfills all their other needs.” If someone is plagued by ten cares

let them worry only about that care for the other World, and God will untangle those other nine knots without any effort.

The prophets cared nothing about fame and daily bread. Their only care was God's approval, and yet they received both daily bread and fame. Whoever seeks God's pleasure will become bed-fellows with the prophets, in this world and the next.

*"They are with those whom God has blessed,
Prophets, people of the path and heaven's guests."*

"I sit with those who remember Me." If God did not sit with them, the yearning for God would never have entered their hearts. The scent of the rose cannot exist without the rose. The scent of musk never exists without the musk.

There is no end to these words. Even if they do end, still they are not like other words.

*The night's departed, still, my friend,
Our story's not yet at an end.*

The night and darkness of this world passes away while the light of these words becomes clearer. Even though the night of the prophets' lives have set, still the light of their discourse has not left, nor ended, nor ever will.

People said about Majnun, “He loves Laila, what is so strange in that? After all, they were children together and went to the same school.” Majnun said, “They are fools. What pretty woman is not desirable?”

Is there any man whose heart is not stirred by a lovely woman? It is love that feeds our heart, just as the sight of mother, father and brother, the pleasure of children, the pleasure of lust—all forms of delight are rooted in love. Majnun was an example of all lovers, just as in grammar other sentences are quoted.

*Feast on sweetmeats or on roast,
 Drink the wine that you love most.
 What's that savor on your lips?
 Water that a dreamer sips!
 When tomorrow you arise,
 And great thirst upon you lies,
 Little use will be that deep
 Draught you've taken while asleep.*

The delights of this world are the same as people who eat while asleep. They chase after worldly needs just as if they were looking for something in a dream. Even if they find it, once they are awake what good will it do them if they have eaten while asleep? Yet, still, what they ask for in

their sleep they are given, for “The present is proportionate to the request.”

discourse 50

Someone said: “We have studied all aspects of the human condition one by one, and not so much as a single hair-tip of human temperament, or people’s hot and cold nature, has escaped our notice. Yet, we still have not discovered what aspect of the human being survives death.”

Rumi said: If such knowledge were attainable merely by asking others, there would be no need for the effort and the work, and no one would put themselves through such pain and sacrifice to know. For example, people come to the sea, and see nothing but salt water, sharks and fishes. They say, “Where is this pearl others speak about? Perhaps there is no pearl.” How can the pearl be gained merely by looking at the sea? Even if they measured out the sea, cup by cup, a hundred thousand times, they would never find the pearl. A diver is needed to discover that pearl, and not just any diver, but a diver who is both fortunate and nimble.

Humanity's sciences and arts are like measuring the ocean with a cup. To find the pearl calls for something else. There are people gifted with every skill, with wealth and good looks to boot, yet this vital quality is not in them. There are others who are outwardly a wreck, who have neither good looks nor elegant speech, yet in them is this element that is immortal. By this element we are ennobled and honored, and become superior to all other creatures. Leopards, crocodiles, and lions each have their own peculiar skills and abilities, but these qualities will not survive. When a person discovers the essential element, they attain the secret of their own eternal reality.

The accomplishments of the human race are like jewels on the back of a mirror. The mirror's face has no jewels, it must be crystal clear. Whoever has an ugly face eagerly looks for the jewels, since the mirror's face shows every dark secret.

A friend of Joseph returned from a far journey. Joseph asked, "What present have you brought me?" The friend replied, "What is there you do

not possess? What could you need? Since no one exists more handsome than you, I have brought a mirror so that every moment you may gaze in it upon your own face.”

What is there that God does not possess? What does He need? Therefore, bring before God a heart, crystal clear, so that He may see His own perfection. “God looks not at your form, nor at your deeds, but at your heart.”

You find a city with everything you desire, beautiful people, pleasures, all that people crave, and ornaments of every kind, but you find not one generous person. The opposite would be better than this!

That city is the human being. If in us are a hundred thousand talents, but not that essential element, better if that city were in ruins. But when that vital quality is there, the outward display matters not—our secret heart will be well furnished. In every state our heart is with God, and our outward work does not hinder our inward occupation. In the same way, whether a pregnant woman finds herself at peace or war, sleeping or

eating, the child in her womb is still nourished and continues to grow. The human being is also carrying that secret.

*"We offered the Trust to the heavens,
The earth and the mountains,
But they refused to carry it, and were afraid;
Yet humanity carried it. Surely they are sinful,
And very foolish."*

But God does not leave us in sin and foolishness. Out of our physical life comes companionship, families, and a thousand familiar friendships. If this Trust that humanity carries also produces friendships and knowledge, what is so strange in that? What rises from a person after death? Look in their secret heart. Their secret heart is like the root of a tree—although hidden, its influence appears in the leaves and branches. If a branch or two is broken when the root is whole, they will grow again, but if the root is damaged, neither bough nor leaf remains.

A farmer from the country came to visit and stay in the house of a friend in town. The town's person offered their friend halvah, which the guest ate with gusto. The farmer said, "O friend, night and day I eat carrots. Now that I have tast-

ed halvah, the pleasure of eating carrots has disappeared. But where I live I can not find halvah every day. What am I to do?" Once a farmer has tasted halvah, they yearn for the place where it is made. The town's person has carried their heart away. What can they do? They come looking for their heart.

Some people, when they greet you, the smell of smoke comes from their greeting. Some, when they speak, the smell of musk lingers on. Only those with a sensitive nose know the difference.

We must test our friends, so that in the end we have no cause for regret. Here is another of God's rules: "Begin with yourself." If you claim to be humble and serve God, do not accept this claim without testing it. When people wash, first they lift some water to their nose and then they taste it. Simply looking at the water is not enough, for water may have the appearance of purity, but its taste and smell will prove if it is infected. Once the test is done, then they wash their faces.

Whatever you keep hidden in your heart, God manifests in you outwardly. Whatever the root of

the tree feeds on in secret, affects the bough and the leaf.

“Their mark is on their faces.”

The Koran also says:

“We shall brand them upon the muzzle!”

If you want no one to see into your thoughts, then how will you hide the flush of color on your face?

discourse 51

Rumi said:

*Until you see, how can you find?
This is true for all but Lovers:
For how can they seek the Beloved,
Being blind,
Until they have discovered?*

The human quest consists of seeking for what has not yet been found. Night and day people are searching for that. But the quest that begins after our desire has been found and attained, that is a strange quest indeed, beyond our imagination and comprehension. The worldly quest is searching for something new, something not yet experienced, but this other quest begins with what we have already found and then desire. This is God's quest, for God is the Finder.

O friend, so long as you thirst for what is created in time, you are far from your goal. But, once your quest passes away into God's quest and Its Quest overrides your own, then you have been found. Then you can truly seek.

A student said: "There is no way to prove who is a friend of God and who has attained union with God. Neither words, nor deeds, nor miracles, nor anything else can offer proof. For words can be mimicked, with practice. As for deeds and miracles, there are those who can read a person's inmost thoughts, and display many wonders through magic."

Rumi asked: Do you believe in anyone or not?

The student answered: "Yes, by God. I both believe and love."

Rumi said: Is this belief of yours, in that person, founded on proof and token? Or did you simply shut your eyes and take up that person?

The student said: "God forbid that my belief should be without proof and token."

Rumi said: Then why do you say there is no proof or token leading to belief? You have contradicted yourself.

Another person said: "Every saint and great mystic has said, 'I enjoy a nearness with God and Divine favor that no one else has known before.'"

Rumi answered: Who made this statement—a saint, or someone else? If it was a saint, then they knew that every saint has had this belief, so how

could a saint believe they are the only recipient of Divine favor? However, if someone other than a saint made this statement, then in truth that one is the friend and elect of God, for God has kept this experience from all the saints but has not hidden it from that one.

The same person tried to support their statement with a parable: “Once there was a king with ten concubines. The concubines said, ‘We want to know which of us is dearest to the king.’ The king declared, ‘Tomorrow this ring shall be in the room of whomever I love best.’ Next day the king commanded ten rings to be made identical with that ring, and gave one ring to each maiden.”

Rumi said: The question still stands. This story provides no answer, and changes nothing. The statement, “The king loves me best,” was made by one of the ten maidens, or by someone else. If one of the ten maidens made this statement, and she knew that each of the maidens had been given a ring just like hers, then how could she feel that she was loved best? However, if this statement was made by someone other than those ten maidens, then that person was truly shown the king’s favor and special love.

Someone said: "A true lover must be submissive and abject and long-suffering." And they listed other qualities.

Rumi said: Should the lover be like that whether the beloved wishes it or not? If the lover is this way against the desire of the beloved, then they are no lover but merely following their own desire. If the lover accepts the desire of the beloved, then when their beloved does not want them to be submissive and abject, how could they be submissive and abject? Therefore, the states affecting the lover are unknown, and we can only know how the beloved wishes us to be.

Jesus said, "I wonder at the living creature that can eat a living creature." The literalists say that this refers to people eating the flesh of animals. This is an error. Why? Because when people eat flesh, it is not animal any longer, but inanimate. Once the animal is killed, the living spirit is gone from that flesh. The true meaning of this saying is that the Sheikh mysteriously consumes the disciple. I wonder at a process so extraordinary!

Someone asked the following question: "Abraham said to Nimrod, 'My God brings the dead to life and turns the living into the dead.'

Nimrod said, 'When I banish people, it is the same as causing them to die, and when I appoint someone to a post it is as if I brought them to life.' Then Abraham gave up this argument, being compelled to yield to Nimrod's point. He then embarked on another line of reasoning, saying, 'My God brings the sun up from the east and sends it down in the west. Do the opposite of that!' Isn't this argument at odds with the other?"

Rumi answered: God forbid that Abraham could have been silenced by Nimrod and left without any answer! The truth is that Abraham used his second statement to show how God brings life out of the womb of the east, and sends it back to death in the tomb of the west. Abraham's argument was presented with perfect consistency. God creates us anew every moment, bringing something perfectly fresh into our inner heart. God's first moment is nothing like His second, neither is His second moment like the third. Yet people, being unconscious of themselves, do not see this birth and death.

Sultan Mahmud was given a fine horse, with an exquisite shape. Next festival day he rode that horse, and all the people sat on their rooftops to

see him and enjoy the spectacle. But one drunken fellow wouldn't move from his apartment. By force, they carried him up to the roof, saying, "Come and look at the Sultan's horse!" He said, "I am busy with my own affairs. I don't want to see it." But he could not escape. So he sat there on the edge of the roof, extremely drunk, as the Sultan passed by.

When the drunken fellow saw the Sultan on the horse he cried out, "What do I care about this horse? Why, this very moment if that horse were mine and a minstrel sang even one song, I would give it to him." Hearing this, the Sultan became extremely angry and had the man thrown into prison. A week passed. Then the man sent a message to the Sultan, saying, "What is my crime? What sin did I commit? Let the King of the World state the case so his servant can be informed."

The Sultan ordered the man to be brought into his presence. He said, "You insolent rogue, how could you utter such words? How dare you speak so rudely?" The man answered, "King of the World, it was not I who spoke those words. In that moment a drunken manikin was sitting on

the edge of the roof and spoke those words. This hour I am not that fellow. I am an intelligent and sensible man.” The Sultan was delighted by his answer and conferred on him a robe of honor and ordered his release.

Whoever joins us and becomes drunk on this wine, no matter where they go, or whoever they visit, in reality their moments are still spent with us. For the coolness of strangers reminds us of our own friends’ gracious company, and mingling with those who do not know this wine stimulates love and desire for those who do.

This is why people prize other fruits above sugar, saying, “We have tasted so much bitterness that we attained the rank of sweetness.” How can you know the delight of sweetness until you have suffered the bitter?

discourse 52

Rumi was asked the meaning of the following lines:

*When love attains its ultimate goal
Desire turns to dislike.*

Rumi explained: Dislike is a narrow world compared to friendship. That is why people run from hatred to find friendship. But the world of friendship is itself narrow next to the Source of both friendship and dislike. Friendship and enmity, unbelief and faith—these are all opposites that lead to duality. Yet a world exists where there is no duality but only pure unity, and when we reach that world we are beyond friendship and dislike. There is no room for two in that world.

When we arrive there, we leave duality behind. The world of freedom we loved and struggled for is narrow next to that state where no opposites exist. Therefore, we no longer desire it, and are repulsed by it.

When Mansur al-Hallaj reached his utmost friendship with God, he became his own enemy

and gave away his life. He said, “I am God,” meaning, “I have passed away. God alone remains.” This is extreme humility. Your saying, “Thou art God, and I am Your servant,” is arrogance, for you have affirmed your own existence, and created dualism. To say, “He is God,” is still duality, for until “I” exists “He” is impossible. Therefore it was God alone who said, “I am God,” since Mansur had passed away.

The world of imagination is greater than facts and concepts, for all concepts are born of imagination. Yet imagination itself is narrow compared to that world from which imagination is born. This is the limit of explanations, for that reality cannot be made known by words and expressions.

Someone asked: “Then what is the use of expressions and words?”

Rumi answered: Words set you searching. They are not the objects of your quest. If that were the case, there would be no need for all this spiritual struggle and self-sacrifice. Words are like glimpsing something far away. You follow in its trail to see it better, but this doesn’t mean the trail is what you are seeking. Speech is inwardly the

same—it excites you to seek the meaning, even though the words are never the reality.

The other day someone said, “I have studied many sciences and mastered many ideas, yet I still do not know what essence in the human being exists forever. I have searched, but I have not discovered it.”

If such things were knowable through words alone, you would never need to pass away from your self and suffer such pains. But if you did not endure the struggle of losing your temporary self, how could you ever know that essence which will remain?

A boy says, “I have heard about the Kaaba, but no matter how far I look I can not see it. I will go up to the roof and search from there.” When he gets to the roof and stretches out his neck, he still can not see the Kaaba, so he rejects that any Kaaba exists. To see the Kaaba takes more than that. It is impossible to see it from the place where one abides.

In the same way, during winter, you hunt for a fur jacket with all your soul, but when summer arrives you fling it away and forget about it. You

sought the coat for the warmth. You were in love with warmth. In winter you can not find warmth and therefore need the medium of the coat, but once the summer sun starts to shine, you fling the fur jacket away.

“When heaven is rent asunder,” and “When earth is shaken with a mighty shaking,” are references to yourself. They mean that you have experienced the pleasure of being gathered together, but the day is coming when you will experience the pleasure of being torn apart. Then you will behold the expanse of the other world and be delivered from this present narrowness. For instance, if someone is held down by four nails for a long time, they start to feel comfortable with this condition, and forget the pleasure of being free. After they escape the four nails, then they realize the torment they had been in. Similarly, children are swaddled and put to rest in a cradle, and they are perfectly at ease with their hands bound. But if a grown person were cribbed in a cradle, it would be torment and prison.

Some feel pleasure when roses bloom and push forth their heads from the bud. Some feel pleasure

when the petals of the rose become scattered by the wind and rejoin their origin. Therefore, some people want friendship, passion, unbelief and faith all to dissolve and return to their source. For these are walls of form cause narrowness and duality, while the other world is broadness and absolute unity.

These words of themselves have no power. How can they be powerful? They are merely words. In fact, in themselves they can become a cause of weakness. Yet they inspire some to truth. Words are a veil. How can two or three letters combined together cause life and excitement?

When people come to visit and you greet them politely, and welcome them, they are happy and feel affection. If you receive them with two or three words of abuse, those two or three words cause them anger and pain. Now what connection is there between stringing together a few words and an increase in affection, or provocation of anger? God appointed these veils so that no one's gaze can fall upon Its beauty and perfection. Weak veils are appropriate to weak eyes.

Bread in reality is not the cause of life, but God has made it appear to be the cause of life and strength. After all, bread has no human life of itself, so how can it create strength? If it had any life at all, it would have kept itself alive.

discourse 53

Rumi was asked the meaning of the following lines from his Masnavi:

*You are that very thought, my brother:
Those bones and nerves are something other.*

Rumi said: You should think about this. “That very thought” in reality is not “thought” at all, and if it is, it does not belong to the kind of thought that people usually mean by the term. In using the word “thought” my intention was the “idea” or “essential element.” If you need to put this “idea” into a more humdrum way so that common people can understand, then say: “The human being is a speaking animal.”

Speech is thought, whether spoken or not. The rest of the human being is animal. Therefore, it is perfectly true to say people consist of thought, and the rest is “bones and nerves.” Speech is like the sun, all people derive warmth and life from the sun, and the sun is always there. The entire world is warmed by the sun, yet the sun’s rays are

not always visible. When thought is expressed through word or sign, be it thanks or complaint, good or evil, then the sun of speech becomes visible, just as the rays of the celestial sun become visible when they shine upon a wall.

So, the rays from that sun of speech only appear through the medium of letters and sounds. Though always present—for that sun is subtle, and “He is the All-subtle”—some element of grossness is required for it to become visible and apparent.

A certain man said that “God” had no meaning for him, the word left him bewildered and frozen. When they said, “This is God’s Creation, these are His Commandments, and these are His Laws,” then he felt the warmth of those rays. So, although God’s subtlety always existed and shone upon that man, until they explained it to him through the medium of Commandment, Creation and Law, he was unable to see.

There are some people, who, due to illness, cannot use honey. Yet through the medium of some other food, such as mixed into rice dressed with turmeric or halvah, they can eat it. Once

they recover from their illness, however, then they can take honey without any medium.

Therefore, speech is a subtle sun shining continually, without ceasing, and we need some gross medium in order to see and enjoy it. But, once you can see those rays and that subtlety without any gross medium, then you find wonderful colors and marvelous spectacles in the depths of that sea. Yet what is so amazing about that? For speech is always within you, whether you actually speak or not, even if you have no thought of speaking.

Philosophers say, "The human being is a speaking animal." Animality is always within you as long as you are living, just as speech is always within you. Chewing is one expression of animality, it is not a state of itself. In the same way, speaking and talking are only reflections of "Speech."

People have three spiritual states. In the first they have no thought of God at all, but worship and pay service to everything else: friends and lovers, wealth and children, stones and clods. Once they gain a little knowledge and awareness,

then they serve nothing but God. Yet, after learning and seeing more they enter a state of silence. They do not say, “I serve God,” nor “I do not serve God,” for they have transcended both. No sound issues from these people into the world.

*“God is neither present nor absent,
For God is the Creator of both.”*

All words, all sciences, all skills, all professions derive their flavor and relish from Speech. The end of that chapter cannot be known, however, for they are only expressions, and not the state of itself. This is illustrated by the man, who in seeking the hand of a wealthy and beautiful woman, looks after her sheep and horses, and waters her orchards. Though his time is occupied with those services, their flavor derives from the woman. If the woman were to disappear, those tasks would become cold and lifeless. In this same way, all professions and sciences derive life, pleasure and warmth from the rays of the Saints’ inspiration. But for their inspiration, all tasks would be utterly without relish and enjoyment.

discourse 54

Rumi said: When I first began composing poetry, a great urge compelled me. At that time the urge was strong. Now the desire has grown weaker and is declining, but still it has its effect. Such is the way of God. He gives life to things in the time of their rising, producing great results and wisdom, yet in declining His influence still has its force. “The Lord of the East and the West,” means, “He fosters both the rising and declining.”

The Mutazilites believe that people create their own acts; that every deed springs out of our own creation. But this cannot be true, for everything that we do is produced through our mind, spirit, senses or body. Yet, we haven’t created any of these instruments. Since we are not the creator and are not capable of creating such things, then these functions cannot be fully subject to our control. And it is impossible for us to create an act without these instruments.

Therefore, we realize that the true creator of our actions is not our own selves, but God. We

perform every effort of ours, whether good or evil, according to our own plans and purpose, but the wisdom of that deed is not limited to our intentions. We are only able to see that portion of the wisdom and benefits that derive from our actions. God, however, knows the total advantage of that deed, and what fruits it will bear.

For instance, you pray to gain rewards in the next world and to acquire a good name and safety in the present. But the help derived from prayer is not limited to that—it also bestows a hundred thousand advantages you will never understand. Only God, who gives rise to your prayer, knows those advantages.

We are like a bow in the grip of God's hand. God sends us out upon various tasks. In reality God is the agent, not the bow. The bow is merely an instrument, unaware and unconscious of God, so that the world's apparent order can be maintained. Mighty indeed is the bow that becomes aware of the Bowman's hand!

What can you say about a world whose perpetuation and order rests on heedlessness? Don't you see how the people who are awakened become indifferent to this world? Through child-

hood, people grow and gain strength from negligence and play. How else can they ever have grown up to become men and women? Therefore, God puts us through pains and labors to wash away those acts of negligence and make us clean. Only then are we able to become aware of the other world.

The human being is like a dunghill, a heap of manure. If this manure-heap is precious, it is because hidden in it is the seal ring of the King. You are like a sack of corn. The King cries out, "Where are you carrying that corn? My cup is in it." People are unaware of the cup, being absorbed in the corn. If they knew of the cup, how could the corn distract them? Now, every thought that draws you toward the other world, making you cold and indifferent to this lower world, is a reflection of that cup flashing out. When men and women yearn after this lower world, however, this is a sign that the cup has become hidden in the heap.

discourse 55

Someone said: “Qadi Izz al-Din sends his greetings, and always speaks of you in the most approving terms.”

Rumi answered: Whoever remembers us, and speaks us well,

Long may the world of their high merit tell.

When people speak well of others, those good words reflect back on themselves, and in the end they are praising and applauding their own essence. Those who cultivate the habit of speaking well of others are like gardeners who plant flowers and aromatic herbs around their houses—wherever they look out they see a beautiful display and are always in Paradise.

Whenever we speak well of another, that person becomes our friend. When we remember them, we remember a friend, and thinking of a friend is like being near flowers and aromatic herbs. It is refreshment and repose. But when we speak ill of others, those people become repulsive

in our eyes. When we think of them or their image even enters our thoughts, it is the same as snakes or scorpions, thorns or thistles appearing before us.

Since you can have flowers, aromatic herbs and the meadows of Iram, why do you choose to walk among the brambles and thorns? Think well of everyone so that you always dwell amongst the fields and meadows. Once you become the enemy of everyone, the images of your foes surround you day and night like scorpions and snakes.

This is why the saints have love for all people and think well of whomever they meet—not for the sake of others, but solely for themselves. Since, in this world no one can escape talking about other people or encountering their images, the saints struggle to hold everything in their mind and memory in an amiable and positive light, so that hateful images will not block their way.

So, whatever you say of others returns to yourself. Mohammed said:

*“Whoever does good, it is to their own gain,
And whoever does evil, it is to their own loss.*

*And whoever does an atom's weight of good
Shall see it,
And whoever does an atom's weight of evil
Shall see it."*

Someone asked a question about the following quote from the Koran:

*"God declared:
'I am setting in the earth a viceroy.'
The angels said:
'What? Will You set there one
Who does corruption, and sheds blood,
While we proclaim Your praise and call You holy?'*

"Since Adam had not yet come into the world, how could the angels know beforehand that the human race would be corrupt and shed blood?"

Rumi answered: There are two explanations—one traditional, and the other rational. The traditional version says that the angels read from the Preserved Tablet that a people would come forth who would act like this. The rational version says that the angels deduced by reasoning that people would come forth from the earth, and such people would have to bear the qualities of the earth, like animals. Although the spiritual element would be present in human beings, namely that they could speak, yet since animality would also

be in them, they would by necessity be ungodly and shed blood, this being the heritage of being human.

There is still another answer. Some people say that angels, being pure reason and goodness, have no choice in anything they say or do. Like in a dream, if you have no choice of what you say or do, how can you be criticized when you utter unbelief in your sleep, or declare God is One, or if you commit adultery? Angels are like this in their waking state. People are the reverse of that—they have freewill, are lustful and passionate, desire all things for themselves, and are ready to shed blood to gain what they want. These are the attributes of animals. Thus the state of the angels is the opposite of people.

It is perfectly fine to say that the angels spoke in this fashion, even though there was neither speech nor tongue, because if they were endowed with words and gave an account of themselves, this is how they would speak. In this same way the poet writes, “The pool said, I am full.” Pools of course do not really speak, but the poet means that if the pool had a tongue, this is what it would have said.

Every angel has a tablet within them, and from that tablet, according to the degree of their own powers, they can read all that is to happen in the world and everything that will take place. When the moment arrives and what they have read actually comes into being, then their belief becomes stronger and their love and intoxication increase. They marvel at God's majesty and omniscience. That increase of love and faith, that wordless and unexpressed wonder, is the angel's praise of God.

Thus, a builder tells their apprentice, "In this house being built, so much wood will be used, so many bricks, so many stones, and so much straw." When the house is complete and exactly that amount of material was used, neither more nor less, then the faith of the apprentice grows. The angels too are in a similar case.

Someone asked: "The Prophet had such majesty that God said, 'But for thee I would not have created the heavens,' and yet Mohammed said, 'Would that the Lord of Mohammed had not created Mohammed.' How can this be?"

Rumi answered: Let me offer a comparison for this to help you understand the meaning. In a certain village a man fell in love with a woman. The

two lived together in happiness and pleasure. They grew fat and thrived on one another. They lived through each other, just as fish live in water. Many years they were together. Then one day God made them wealthy, bestowing on them many sheep, oxen and horses, gold, servants and slaves.

Because of their great fortune and prosperity, they set out for the city. Each purchased a royal palace, with horses and retinue—she in one part of the city and he in another. Once they reached their peak of wealth, they were no longer able to enjoy each other's company. Their hearts smoldered away within them, and they uttered secret lamentations, being unable to speak. The consuming fire in them became so violent that they entirely perished in the flames of separation. The torture of their grief passed all bounds. Finally their longing was heard by God.

Their horses and sheep began to vanish, and little by little they were restored to their former condition. So, after a long while, they were reunited in their home village and resumed full enjoyment of their life together. When they recalled the

bitterness of their separation, they cried, “Would that our Lord had never granted us such wealth.”

As long as Mohammed’s soul was dwelling in the world of holiness and union with God, he grew and thrived, plunging about in that sea of compassion like a fish. But, in this earthly world, even though he was endowed with the rank of prophet and guide to humanity, and granted greatness, majesty, fame and a large following, still on returning to that former joyous life he said, “Would that I never became a prophet or came into this world.”

All these sciences, struggles and acts of devotion, in comparison to the merit and majesty of God, mean no more than bowing once, performing a service and then leaving. Even if you moved the whole Earth with your heart to serving God, it would amount to the same as bowing once to the ground. For God’s merit and graciousness existed before your life and service. Did He bring you forth, give you existence, and make you capable of service and worship that you should boast of serving Him? These services and sciences are just as if you carved little shapes of wood and

leather, then came to offer them up to God, saying, "I like these little shapes. I made them, but it is Your job to give them life. If You give them life, You will make my works live. Or, You do not have to—the command is entirely Yours."

Abraham said, "God is He who gives life and death." Nimrod said, "I give life and death." When God gave Nimrod kingship, he deemed himself omnipotent as well, not attributing this credit to God. Nimrod said, "I too bring life to some and cause others to die, and what I desire throughout my kingdom comes from my knowledge." When God bestows knowledge, sagacity and shrewdness, people claim all credit for themselves, saying, "Through my skill and abilities, I gave life to these actions and have attained ecstatic joy." Abraham said, "No, it is God who gives life and brings death."

Someone said: "Abraham said to Nimrod, 'My God is He who brings up the sun out of the east and sends it down in the west. God brings the sun from the east. If you claim to be a god, then do the reverse.'" But then Nimrod compelled Abraham to abandon this point, and Abraham

left his first argument and Nimrod's rejoinder unanswered, embarking upon another proof."

Rumi answered: Others have talked nonsense about this, and now you too are talking nonsense. Abraham gave one and the same argument in two different forms. You have misunderstood, and so did they. There are many meanings underlying this statement. One meaning is this; that God brought you out of the concealment of non-existence from your mother's womb. Your "east" was your mother's womb. From there you rose, and you will go down into the "west" of your tomb. This is precisely the first statement, only expressed in another way: "He gives life and brings death. Now, if you are able, bring forth life from the west of the tomb, and send it back to the east of the womb."

That is one meaning—here is another: Through obedience, strenuous effort, and noble actions the Gnostic attains illumination and spiritual intoxication, but through the abandonment of obedience and effort their happiness goes down like the sinking sun, therefore these two states are their "east" and "west." "So, if you are able to

bring life into a state of death through abandonment of God, corruption and disobedience, then out of this setting sun manifest the illumination that only rises out of obedience.”

But that is not the job of the servant, and the servant will never be able to do it. That is God’s job; for if He wishes He causes the sun to rise from the west, and if He wishes from the east.

The unbeliever and the believer both express the praises of God. For God has promised that anyone who chooses the right road and practices right action, following the sacred law and the way of the prophets and saints, shall be granted happiness, illumination and life. If they do the reverse, they will be granted darkness and fear, pits and suffering. Since both believer and unbeliever choose as they do, and what God has promised comes to pass precisely, neither more nor less, then both are proclaiming the praises of God—the believer with one tongue, and the unbeliever with another. How great that difference is between the praises of one, and the praises of the other!

For instance, a thief commits a theft and is hung on the gallows. That thief is a preacher to the world, saying, “Whoever commits a theft, this is what becomes of them.” On another person, the king bestows a robe of honor due to their trustworthiness. They are also a preacher to the world. But the thief preaches with one tongue, and the trusty servant with another. Consider the difference between these two preachers!

discourse 56

Rumi said: You are now experiencing happiness. Why? Because the mind is a delicate thing, and like a snare it was properly set to catch its prey. If you are unhappy, then that snare is torn and useless.

Therefore, it is best not to be excessive in love or hatred towards others, since both of these leave the snare broken and torn. Moderation is best. By excessive love, I mean love for other than God. How can love for God ever be excessive? It is inconceivable—the greater our love for God, the better.

Yet, when our love for someone else becomes excessive, we strive for them to experience only good fortune, but that is impossible, and so the mind becomes disturbed. Similarly, when enmity is excessive, we wish that person only bad luck and misfortune, but the wheel of heaven is ever turning, and everyone's circumstances are also revolving. One moment they are lucky, the next

unlucky, and this seems unfair and disturbing to the mind.

But love for God is latent in all people, Magians, Jews or Christians, and in all things that have being. How can anyone not love Him who is the source of their existence? Therefore, love is latent in everyone, but circumstances veil that love. When those circumstances change, that love becomes manifest.

Yet, why do I speak of only things that have being? Non-being is also churning in the hope and expectation of being granted existence. Non-beings are like four people standing before a king, each one hoping the king will grant them special rank, and yet each one ashamed before the other three, because their own desires contradict each other. So they stand, ranging in their expectation of finding existence through God, yet each desiring to be the first, and therefore embarrassed before one another. If non-beings are in such a circumstance, how should those in existence be?

*"There is nothing that does not proclaim
His praise."*

This is not remarkable. What is remarkable is that even no-thing proclaims His praise.

*Both faith and unbelief are seeking Thee
And shouting Thy undivided Unity.*

This house is built out of forgetfulness. All bodies and forms in this world are sustained through forgetfulness. Even our full-grown bodies grew by forgetting. But remembrance of God cannot exist without forgetfulness, for something must be forgotten before there can be remembrance. Therefore, faith and unbelief are one and the same, since one does not exist without the other. They are indivisible, and God is one. God is alone and has no partner.

Someone said: "Sayed Burhan al-Din discourses very well, yet he quotes Sana'i too frequently."

Rumi answered: What you say is true: the sun is excellent, yet it gives light. Is that a fault? Using Sana'i's words casts light on his discourse. The sun casts light on things, and through that light it is possible to see. The purpose of light is to see. After all, this sun in our heaven illuminates things that have no use. But the real sun shows things that are of use. This worldly sun is a reflection

and a metaphor. That real sun is the true sun. Do you yearn for the real sun and seek the light of knowledge? Then be expectant of understanding and learning something from every teacher and every friend.

We know of that other sun, apart from our physical sun, from which the realities and inner truths are revealed. Yet this partial knowledge that draws you, and through which you feel pleasure, is but a branch of that great knowledge and a ray of it. This ray is calling you to the original sun.

“Those—they are called from a far place.”

You try to draw that knowledge towards yourself, but it answers you, “I cannot be contained in your world, it is impossible, and you have stayed away so long because it is difficult to reach me.” Now, what is impossible is impossible, but what is difficult is not impossible. So, strive to attain that great knowledge, but do not expect to contain it here. The wealthy ones, out of their love for God’s wealth, collect penny by penny, grain by grain. But the ray of wealth says, “I am calling to you from infinite wealth. Why do you try draw-

ing me piece by piece? I cannot be contained in pieces. Listen, and follow me to unlimited riches.”

In short, the beginning depends upon the end—may the end be praiseworthy! What is a praiseworthy end? That the tree whose roots are fixed firm in the spiritual garden, whose branches, boughs and fruits suspend over another land, and whose fruits have scattered—that in the end those fruits should be carried back into that garden of its original roots. But if the roots of a tree belong to this world, although outwardly proclaiming praises of God, all its fruits should be carried back to this world. And if both roots and fruit are in the spiritual garden, then that is “Light upon Light.”

discourse 57

Akmal al-Din said: “I love our Master and desire to see him. Even heaven is blotted out of my mind. I find comfort in his image without the need for any discourses or lofty ideas. I rest in his beauty. Pleasure comes to me from his very mien—even from a mental picture of him.”

Rumi answered: Although heaven and God do not enter your thoughts, still they are implicit in love. A beautiful dancing-girl was once playing the castanets in the presence of the Caliph. The Caliph said, “Your art is in your hands.” She replied, “No, in my feet, great Caliph! Excellence appears in my hands only because they have captured the excellence of my feet.”

Although you do not remember heaven in every detail, still your delight in seeing the Sheikh, and your fear of being separated from him, contain all those details. All of heaven is captured in that image.

A family cherishes and loves each other. If thoughts of their care and fidelity, compassion

and fondness, and all the other benefits that kinsmen look for from kinsmen—if these thoughts do not enter their minds, still all these details are implicit. In the same way, air is implicit in wood, whether that wood is buried in earth or drenched in water. Without air in wood, fire could have no effect upon it, for air is the fuel of fire, the life of fire. Have you not seen how a breath of air puts life into fire? Whether wood is in water or earth, still air is latent in it. If air were not latent, wood could never rise to the surface of water.

It is the same with the words you speak. Many things are contained in those words, such as intelligence and thought, lips and mouth, throat and tongue, as well as the elements and temperaments, the influence of the stars, and the hundred thousand secondary causes upon which the world depends. On and on you can continue until you come to the world of attributes, and then essence—although none of these realities are put into words, yet all is implicit in your words.

Every day undesirable and painful experiences happen to us without our freewill. Certainly these things contain implicit messages in them beyond

our creation. We are under the control of Someone beyond, Someone that watches over. With many, an evil act brings pain. But despite these unwanted experiences, our nature does not want to accept the thought that we are under the control of another.

Divinity, which is the opposite of servanthood, is given to us on loan. We can be beaten over the head, still we won't let go of our borrowed stubbornness. We forget about our unwanted experiences, and we can not hear their message. Until that borrowed divinity becomes our own, we will not escape from being slapped.

discourse 58

Rumi related: A certain Gnostic once said, “I went to the baths to expand my heart, since the baths had become the place of retreat for certain saints. I saw that the master of the bath stove had an apprentice. The master was telling the apprentice, ‘Do this and do that.’ The apprentice was working briskly, and the stove gave off good heat because of how nimbly the orders were obeyed.

“‘Fine,’ said the master. ‘Be nimble like this. If you are always energetic and mind your manners, I will give you my own position, and appoint you to my own place.’

“I was overcome with laughter,” said the Gnostic, “and my inner knot was resolved, for I saw that bosses of this world all behave like this with their apprentices.”

discourse 59

Someone said, “The astronomers say: You claim there is something beyond the heavens and this terrestrial ball. We believe, apart from what we see, nothing exists. If something exists, then show us where it is!”

Rumi answered: Your demand is invalid from the very start. You say, “Show me where it is,” but that Thing has no place. Come then, tell me, where is your objection? Is it on your tongue, in your mouth, or within your breast? Search through all of these—divide them piece by piece, atom by atom, and you will still not find your objection, nor any thought. From this we realize that thought has no place. Since you do not know the place of your own thought, how could you know the place of the Creator of thought?

Thousands of emotions and moods come over you without your choice, for they are completely outside your power and control. If you only knew where these emotions came from, you would be

able to augment them. All these emotions pass over you, and yet you are wholly unaware where they come from, where they are going, and what they will do. Since you are incapable of penetrating your own moods, how do you expect to penetrate your Creator?

Those whose sons say, "God is not in the heavens." You cur, how do you know God is not? Yes, you have measured heaven span by span. You have gone through all of it, and you pronounce, "God is not in the heavens." Why, you do not know the whore you have in your own home, then how could you know the heavens? Oh yes, you have heard of heaven, and the names of stars and the spheres. You think that is something. If you really penetrated the depths of the heavens, or even mounted one single step, you would never utter such nonsense.

When we say that God is not in the heavens, we do not mean that God is not in the heavens. We mean that heaven cannot contain God, while God contains all. God has an ineffable link with the heavens, just as He has established an ineffable link with you. All things are in the hand of God's omnipotence, within His creation and

under His control. Therefore God is not outside the heavens and the universe, neither is He wholly in them. In other words, these things do not comprehend God, and yet God comprehends all.

Someone said: “Before earth, heaven and the Throne existed, where did God exist?” One of Rumi’s students answered, “This question is invalid from the start, for God is One who has no place.”

Rumi said: You ask, “Where was God before all this” Have you discovered the place of all these things in you, that you are searching for His place? Since your moods and thoughts have no place, how can a place for God be conceivable? Surely, the Creator of thought is subtler than thought. For instance, those who build a house are subtler than that house, because they are able to make and plan a hundred other buildings, each different from the last. Therefore they are subtler and more majestic than any fabric, but this subtlety can only be seen when they build a house and their work enters the visible world.

Your breath is visible in winter, but in summer is invisible. This doesn’t mean that your breath is cut off in summer, but in summer your breath is

subtler and can not be seen. In the same way your attributes and essential elements are too subtle to be seen until you perform some act. For instance, your clemency exists, but it cannot be seen until you forgive an offender. Then your clemency becomes visible. Similarly, your vengefulness cannot be seen, but when you take revenge upon criminals and beat them, then your vengefulness is seen.

Because of God's extreme subtlety He cannot be seen. So He created heaven and earth, that His omnipotence and His handiwork would be visible.

These words I am given to share are not in my complete control, and therefore I am pained, because I would like to counsel my friends but the words do not come as I want them to. This brings pain. But since these words are higher than I, and I am subject to them, I am happy. For the words that God speaks bring life wherever they reach, and leave a deep impression.

*"And when you threw, it was not
you who threw, but God."*

The arrow that leaps from the bow of God, no shield or breastplate can stop. Therefore I am happy.

If we knew all that there was to know, and all ignorance was eliminated, we would be consumed and cease to be. Therefore ignorance is a good thing, since through it this world continues to exist. Knowledge is also desirable, for it leads to the awareness of God. Thus, each is a partner with the other, and all opposites are joined. Night is the opposite of day, yet they are partners and both do the same work. If night lasted forever, our eyes would become dazzled and our brains would go insane. Therefore we rest and sleep at night, and the brain, thought, hand and foot, hearing and sight, all gather strength. By day they expend these powers.

So all things appear in opposition, but to the wise they all work together and are not opposed. Show me an evil in this world without good, or a good thing without evil. For instance, a man intent on murder becomes preoccupied with the man's wife, and as a result he sheds no blood. There is no doubt that taking the man's wife is evil, but since this saves her husband's life she also sees this as good. Therefore evil and good are one thing and inseparable.

This is our main quarrel with the Magians. They say there are two Gods: the creator of good and the creator of evil. Show me good without evil—then I will admit there is a God of evil and a God of good! This is impossible, for good can not exist without evil. Since there is no separation between them, how can there be two creators?

Are we not arguing in opposition to you? By all means, we most definitely are. But we will not push this point too far, because you might wonder if the Magians are correct. Granted, you are not sure what I have said is wrong, yet how can you be sure that it is not right? Wretched infidel, Mohammed said, “Haven’t you realized the threats which we have made might come true, and punishment will be visited upon the unbelievers as you have never imagined? Then why do you not take precautions and seek after Us?”

discourse 60

The Prophet says that Abu Bakr was superior to the other Companions, not due to his prayer and fasting, but because that special favor—the love of God—was with him. On the resurrection day, a person's prayers will be placed in the balance along with their fasting and generosity, but once love is brought forth it cannot be contained by any balance. Therefore, love is the root.

When you find love in your heart, then encourage it to grow. When you see the original investment within yourself, namely the desire for God, increase it through searching. “In movement is blessing.” If you do not build on it, even the original desire will leave you.

Are you less than the earth? Farmers turn the earth with a hoe and it yields crops. When they abandon it, it becomes hard. So, when you find the quest for Truth within yourself, follow it wherever it may lead. Do not say, “What use is there in following this desire?” Just go! The profit will show itself.

Everyone goes to the store to fulfill their needs. God bestows both the desires and the provisions for each person, but if people sit at home acting self-sufficient then their provisions will never reach them. After all, when a little child cries, her mother feeds her. Now, if the child stopped to think, "What use is there in crying? How could crying possibly cause milk to come?" she would stay hungry. Therefore, crying brings her food.

This is the same as asking, "What use is there in this bowing, prostrating and prayer? Why should I do it?" Well, when you bow before a prince, the prince has compassion for you, doesn't he? But this compassion doesn't come from the prince's skin and flesh. Should he die, or when he is asleep, then bowing to the prince's body accomplishes nothing. So we realize that the compassion of the prince is something invisible. If we can bow to something invisible contained in skin and flesh, surely we can also bow to that Prince who is without skin and flesh.

If everything contained in skin and flesh were visible, Abu Jahl and Mohammed would have been the same, there would have been no difference between them. An ear, to outward appear-

ance, is the same whether deaf or hearing—there is no difference. Their material shape is the same. Therefore, that hearing exists invisibly and cannot be seen.

So the root of the matter is Divine grace. You, being a prince, have two slaves. One performs many spiritual services and makes numerous inward journeys on your behalf. The other is idle in serving you. Yet we see your love for the idle one is greater. You do not intend to let the active one go unrewarded, but that is what happens.

It is impossible to determine the cause of God's grace. This right eye and this left eye both appear the same. What service has the right eye performed that the left eye has not? And the right hand—what work has it done that the left hand has not done? Yet Divine favor has fallen on the right hand and right eye. So too, Friday has been preferred over the rest of the days.

*“God has certain portions to bestow on people
Other than those inscribed on the Tablet,
So let everyone seek for them on Friday.”*

Now what service has Friday performed that the other days have not? Yet God bestowed His grace and special mark of honor upon Friday.

If a blind person should say, "I was created blind like this, it is not my fault," it will do them no good. It will not relieve them of their suffering. Those infidels who are fixed in unbelief—they suffer because of their unbelief. Yet looking at the matter again, that suffering is also a Divine blessing. When the unbelievers are at ease they forget the Source, so God reminds them through suffering. Therefore, Hell is a place of worship and is the mosque of infidels, for there the unbelievers remember God.

In prison, suffering, and toothache, when pain comes it tears away the veil of forgetfulness. The sufferers turn to God and pray, "O Lord, O compassionate One, O God!" They are healed. Then the veils of forgetfulness descend again and they say, "Where is God? I cannot find Him. I cannot see Him. Why should I even look?"

How is it that when you were suffering you saw and found, but now you cannot see? Therefore, suffering is made to prevail over you to the end, so that you will remember God. The sinner is forgetful in times of ease and does not recollect God. In Hell the sinner remembers night and day.

God created the world, heaven and earth, moon, sun and stars, good and evil, to remember Him, serve Him and proclaim His praise. Since the unbelievers do not remember unless they are suffering, and since their purpose in being created was to recollect God, they are sent suffering to remember Him.

Believers, however, do not forget that suffering—they see suffering as always present. In the same way, once an intelligent child has had its feet put in stocks as punishment, they never forget the stocks. The stupid child, however, forgets and must be put in the stocks every day. So, too, the clever horse, once it has felt the spur, does not require the spur again. It carries the rider for leagues without forgetting the sting of the spur. The stupid horse, however, requires the spur every moment; it is not fit to carry anyone, so they load it with dung.

discourse 61

Hearing something over and over from many people carries the same authority as seeing for yourself. For example, you've been told that you were born to your father and mother. You never saw this with your own eyes, but after hearing it many times from different people, you accept it as the truth. If you were told that they were not your parents, you wouldn't listen. Similarly, you have heard repeatedly from trusted people that Baghdad and Mecca exist. If all those people were now to swear an oath that those cities do not exist, you would not believe them. Therefore, when the ear has heard the same thing repeatedly from many different sources, it carries the same authority as the eye.

In the same way, if someone makes a statement that is a well-known saying handed down generation after generation, then that is not a single statement but a hundred thousand. What is so surprising in this? A king exercises the authority of a hundred thousand, though he is only one—if

a hundred thousand should speak nothing would happen, but when he speaks it happens immediately.

While this is the way of the external world, it is even truer of the spiritual world.

You may have seen this whole world, but since you have not seen it with God in mind, then you must make the trip again. "That journey was not on My account, it was for the sake of garlic and onions. Since you did not go about for My sake, but for another purpose, then that other purpose became a veil to you, not allowing you to see Me."

It is the same as searching earnestly for a person in the bazaar—you see nobody else, or if you see them they are only shadows. Or when you are hunting for the solution to a problem in a book, your ears and eyes and mind are full of that one problem. You turn the pages, yet you see nothing else. Since you had an intention and object in mind, wherever you went you were full of that goal.

In the time of Umar, there was a certain man who had grown so old that his daughter would feed him milk and look after him like a child.

Umar said to that daughter, "There is no child alive today to compare with you in your dutifulness to your father." She replied, "What you say is true, but there is a difference between what I give and what my father gave me. I may not fall short in service to my father, but when my father raised and served me he used to tremble for my safety and concern, while I serve my father and pray night and day asking God that he may die, so the trouble he causes me may end. If I serve my father, where can I get that same trembling he has for me?" Umar said, "This woman is wiser than Umar." He meant, "I have judged by externals, while she speaks of the core."

Those who are truly wise penetrate into the core of a thing and diagnose the truth of it. God forbid that Umar was not apprised of the truth and secrets of things, but such was the way of the Companions, that they criticized themselves and commended others.

There are many who lack the strength for "presence." They find "absence" more agreeable. In the same way, brightness comes from the sun and illuminates the world, but if people stare at

the sun's orb all day it does them no good and their eyes become dazzled. It would be better for them to become involved in some other task and leave the presence of the sun's orb. Similarly, to mention tasty dishes in the presence of sick people encourages them to gain strength and appetite, but the actual consumption of those dishes can do them harm.

Therefore, trembling and passionate love are necessary in the quest for God. Whoever does not tremble must wait upon the tremblers. No fruit ever grows on the trunk of a tree, for trunks do not tremble. The tips of the branches tremble, and the trunk supports the tips of the branches and the fruit securely, even against the blow of an axe. Since the trembling of the tree trunk would end in ruin, it is better for the trunk not to tremble. It suits the trunk to be quiet to better serve the tremblers.

Since the Amir's name is Mu'in al-Din, he is not 'Ain al-Din ("Essence of the Faith") because of the "M" added to the 'Ain. "Any addition to perfection is a diminution." The addition of that "M" is a diminution. In the same way, though a

sixth finger is an addition, still it is a diminution. Ahad (“One”) is perfection, and Ahmad is not yet in the state of perfection. When that “M” is removed it becomes complete perfection. In other words, God comprehends all—whatever you add to God is a diminution. The number one is contained in all numbers, and without it no number could exist.

Sayed Burhan al-Din was teaching, when a fool interrupted him to say, “We need some words without comparisons or likenesses.” The Sayed answered, “Whoever has no likeness, come and listen to words without likeness!”

After all, you are a likeness of yourself. You are not this body. The existence here is but a shadow of you. If someone dies, people say, “So-and-so has departed.” If they were only that body, then where have they gone? So, your outer form is an analogy of your internal being, and from your external form others can judge your inner reality. Everything is visible because of density. Thus, the breath in hot weather cannot be seen, but when it is cold it becomes visible due to density.

It was the duty of the Prophet to manifest the power of God and by preaching to awaken others. It was not his job, however, to bring people to the stage of being ready to receive God's truth—that is God's work. God has two attributes: wrath and loving-kindness. The prophets are theaters for both. To believers they are a theater of God's love, and to unbelievers they become a theater for God's wrath.

Those who acknowledge truth see themselves in the Prophet, hear their own voice proceeding from him, and smell their own scent in his presence. No one denies the reality of their own self. Therefore the prophets say to the community, "We are you, and you are we, there is no strangeness between us." Someone says, "This is my hand." Nobody asks them for proof, since their hand is a part of them. But if they say, "So-and-so is my son," then proof is demanded, for that is something separate from themselves.

discourse 62

Some say that love is the cause of service, but this isn't true. Rather, the Beloved's desire is the true source of service. If the Beloved wishes the lover to help, then the lover provides that help. If the Beloved does not want it, then the lover gives it up. Abandoning service is not the abandonment of love. No, on the contrary, even if the lover performs no service, love continues working through the lover's heart. Therefore, the root of the matter is love, and service is the branch.

When the sleeve moves, this is because the hand moves. But this does not mean the sleeve always follows the hand. For instance, someone has a gown so large that when they move around, the gown does not move. We have all seen that. But what is not possible, is that the gown can move without the person moving.

Some people have mistaken the gown for a person, have considered the sleeve a hand, and imagined the boot to be a foot. Yet this hand and foot

are the sleeve and boot of another hand and foot. They say, “So-and-so is under the foot of So-and-so,” and “So-and-so has a hand in so many things.” Surely, when we speak of such a hand and foot we do not mean this hand and foot.

That Prince came and assembled us and then departed. In the same way, the bee unites the wax with the honey and then flies away. This is because our creation was a condition, but, after all, God’s eternity is not a condition. Our mothers and fathers are like bees, uniting the seeker with the sought, and assembling together the lover and beloved. Then one day they suddenly fly away. God has made them a means for uniting the wax and the honey, and then they fly away, while the wax and honey remains. But they do not fly out of the garden. This is not the kind of garden that is possible to leave. Rather, they go from one corner of the garden to another.

Our body is like a beehive, assembled from the wax and honey of the love of God. Although the bees, our mothers and fathers, brought that honey and wax together, yet they too are tended by the gardener, and therefore it is the gardener who also

makes the beehive. God gives those bees a form appropriate to the work they are doing, but when they depart into the other world they change garments, for there a different work proceeds. Still, those people are the same as they were in the first place.

For example: a man goes into battle, puts on his battledress, girds on armor and places a helmet on his head to prepare for combat. But when he comes home to the feast he takes off those garments, since food and family are another business. Still, he is the same person. However, if you last saw him in that garment, then whenever you think of him, you will picture him in that shape and dress, even though he may have changed clothes a hundred times.

A woman loses a ring in a certain place. Though the ring has been moved, she still circles around that spot, implying, "It was here that I lost it." In the same way, a bereaved man circles around the grave, ignorantly circumambulating about the earth and kissing it, implying, "I lost that ring here," yet how could it still be there?

God performs so many wonderful works to display His omnipotence. It is here, for the sake of Divine wisdom, that He brings together spirit and body for a day or two.

People are afraid of death. They think that by sitting with a corpse in a tomb, even for a moment, they could go mad. Why then, once they are released from the trap of form and the tomb of the body, why would they remain nearby?

God has appointed the sight of a grave to strike fear into our hearts as a token, and to renew that fear of death again and again. In the same way, when a caravan has been ambushed in a certain place on the road, two or three stones are placed together there to act as a waysign, saying, "Here is a place of danger." Graves are also visible waysigns showing a place of danger.

Fear makes its mark on you, even though it is not always realized. For instance, if people say to you, "So-and-so is afraid of you," an affection immediately manifests toward them. If, on the contrary, they say, "So-and-so is not in the least afraid of you," and "They have no worry about

you at all,” simply because of these words an anger appears in your heart.

This running about in life is the effect of fear. All the world is running, but each being runs in a different way. The human being’s chasing or running away is of one kind, the pursuit and aversions of a plant are not the same, and the running of spirit is all together different.

For example, the running of the spirit is without visible step or sign. And consider the unripe grape, how much it pursues sweetness until it attains the blackness of the ripe grape. That running is invisible and imperceptible, but when the grape reaches that stage, it realizes what it had been chasing for so long. Similarly, someone enters the water without being seen by anyone, but when that person’s head suddenly sticks out in the middle of the water, then everyone realizes how much swimming has been done to reach that point.

discourse 63

Lovers have heartaches no cure can mend, neither sleeping, traveling, nor eating—only the sight of the beloved. “Meet the Friend and your sickness will end.” This is so true that even if a hypocrite sits in the company of believers, under their influence that hypocrite can become a believer in an instant. So God declares:

*“When they meet those who believe,
They will say, ‘We believe.’”*

How then, when a believer sits with a believer? Since such company has this effect on a hypocrite, consider what benefits it brings to the believer! Consider how wool, in the hands of a wise weaver becomes a beautiful carpet, and this earth, through association with creative builders becomes a fine palace! Since the society of intelligent people has such an effect on inanimate things, then imagine what effect the society of believers has on the believer!

Through association with beings of even limited intellect, inanimate things can take on great

forms and beauty. These creations are all the shadow of partial intellects, and from these shadows you can understand the creators, themselves. So, then, deduce the Intellect and Being that casts the shadow of yonder heavens, the moon and sun, the seven layers of the earth, and all that lies between the earth and heaven. All these are the shadow of the Universal Intellect. The shadow of a limited being is proportionate to the shadow of its body. The shadow of the Universal Being, which is all of Creation, is proportionate to That.

The saints have seen other heavens besides these heavens. This world is unimpressive and lowly next to what they have been shown. The saints have set their foot upon those heavens and transcended them.

*"Heavens there are in the province of the soul
That hold our worldly heaven in their control."*

Why is it so amazing that a certain person, out of all of humanity, should discover the particular quality necessary to set foot upon the head of the seventh heaven? Are we not all made of the same substance as the earth? Yet God implanted in us a quality that distinguishes us from the earth,

putting us in control of that substance. We can control it however we choose—now lifting it up, now setting it down. Now we fashion it into a palace, now we make it a cup and goblet. Now we stretch it out, now we shorten it. Perhaps we were first made of this very earth and a part of it, but God has distinguished us by means of that faculty. In the same way, what is so hard to believe about the fact that out of the midst of us, who are all of the same race, God should distinguish a certain one, and that in relation to him we are like an inanimate thing, he controlling us, we being unaware of him, while he is aware of us?

When I say “unaware,” I do not mean utterly unaware. Rather, everyone who focuses their attention on one thing is unaware of something else. Even earth, inanimate as it is, is aware of what God has given it. For if it were unaware, how could it be receptive to water, and how could it nurse and nourish every seed? When people apply themselves earnestly and completely to a particular task, their concentration on that task leaves them unaware of anything else. But this inattention does not mean total inattention. For

example, some people try to catch a cat, but it eludes them every time. Then one day that cat is so preoccupied with hunting a bird, that it does not see them approaching, and they catch it.

It is not necessary to become totally preoccupied with worldly affairs. We should take things easily, and not get caught up in bondage to them, lest in becoming disturbed we might distress something greater. The Treasure must not be disturbed, for if this world should worry, That Other will transform it, but if That Other is vexed (may we seek refuge with God!) then who will transform That?

If, for instance, you have many kinds of cloth, when you are absorbed, which of them will you clutch? Though they all may be indispensable, still it is certain that from your bundle you will choose something precious, something to be treasured, for with the value of one pearl and a single ruby you can produce a thousand ornaments.

From a certain tree, sweet fruit grows. Although that fruit is only one part, yet God has chosen and distinguished that part above the

whole, for in it God deposited a sweetness that He did not deposit in the rest. By virtue of that flavor, that part became superior to the whole, and proved the pith and purpose of the tree. So God declares:

*“Nay, but they wonder that a warner has come
to them from amongst themselves.”*

A certain person said, “I have attained a state in which neither Mohammed nor the angel near the Throne is contained.” The Sheikh replied, “What is so amazing about having a state where Mohammed is not contained? Yet Mohammed does not have even one state in which a stinking creature like you is not contained!”

A certain jester wanted to restore the king to a better mood. Everyone had offered him a certain sum to accomplish this, for the king was deeply vexed. The king was walking angrily along the bank of a river. The jester walked on the other side, across from the king. But the king would not pay the slightest attention to the jester, he just kept staring into the water. The jester, becoming desperate, said, “O king, what do you see in the

water?" The king replied, "I see the husband of an unfaithful wife." The jester said, "Your slave is also not blind."

So, you may have a time when Mohammed is not contained, but Mohammed does not have a state where such a stinking creature is not contained. After all, this spiritual state you have discovered is due to his blessing and influence. For, first, all gifts are showered on him, then they are distributed from him to others. Such is the rule. God said, "O Prophet, We have scattered all gifts upon thee." Said Mohammed, "And upon God's righteous servants!"

The way to God is exceedingly fearful and blocked deep by snow. Mohammed risked his life, driving his horse through and opening up the road. Whoever goes on this road, does so by his guidance and guarding. He discovered the road in the first place, and set up waymarks everywhere, posting signs that say, "Do not go in this direction, and do not go that way. If you go that way you will perish, even as the people of 'Ad and Thamud, but if you go in this direction you will be saved, like the believers. All of the Koran

expounds this, for “therein are clear signs”—in other words, upon this road We have given way-marks. If anyone tries to destroy any of these signs, everyone will attack them, saying, “Why do you destroy the road for us? Why do you work toward our destruction? Are you a highway robber?”

Know that Mohammed is the guide. God says, “Until you first come to Mohammed you cannot reach Us.” This is like when you decide to go somewhere; thought leads the way, saying, “Go to this place, it is in your best interests.” After that your eyes act as a guide, and then your limbs begin to move, all in that order. But the limbs have no knowledge of eyes, nor the eyes of thought.

Though some people are forgetful, other people do not forget them. But if you work hard in pursuit of this world, you forget your real concern. You must seek God’s approval, not the approval of society. Approval, love and affection are only on loan in us, being placed there by God. If God so wishes, there is no comfort or joy even with all the means of ease, bread and luxury pro-

vided—everything becomes pain and affliction.

All of these secondary conditions are like a pen in the hand of God's omnipotence. God is the mover and writer. Until He decides, the pen does not move. Your eye is fixed on the pen, and you say, "There must be a hand to this pen." You see the pen, but you do not see the hand. But seeing the pen, you remember the hand. There are those, however, who always see the hand. They say, "There must also be a pen in this hand." But seeing the beauty of the hand, they do not care about the pen. They simply say, "Such a hand cannot be without a pen."

While you are so delighted with beholding the pen that you forget the hand, they are so delighted with the hand, how could they care for the pen? While you find so much pleasure in barley bread that you never try wheat bread, they have wheat bread, so how could they care about barley bread? If He has given you such joy upon earth that you have no desire for heaven—the true place of joy—and since earth derives its life from heaven, then likewise, why should the inhabitants of heaven remember earth?

Therefore, do not think that happiness and pleasure come from secondary causes, for those realities are merely on loan. It is He who brings pain or gain, for all pain and profit come from Him. Why do you cling so tightly to secondary causes?

“The best words are those that are few and telling.” The best words convey a lesson without going on and on. Though in the Koran the Sura, “Say, He is One,” is short, still it is superior to the Sura of “The Cow”, which is much longer, because of the message it contains. Noah preached for a thousand years and four people rallied around him. We all know how long Mohammed preached, yet the people of so many climes believe in him, and so many saints and “pegs” appeared because of him. A lot or a little is no way to judge. The true object is the lesson received.

With some, a few words may convey the lesson better than many. In the same way, if the fire of a stove is too fierce you cannot even approach it, so how can you gain any benefit from it? But there are a thousand advantages with a feeble lamp.

Hence, it is the benefit gained that is the true objective. With some people it is best not to hear any words at all—it is enough for them to see. That is what profits them most, and if they hear any words it actually harms them.

A certain Sheikh from India came to visit a great saint. When he reached Tabriz and came to the door of the saint's cell, he heard a voice from within saying, "Return home! For you have attained your need in coming to this door. To see the saint would harm you."

A few words that convey a lesson are like a lit lamp that kisses an unlit lamp and then departs. That was enough for him, he had attained his purpose. After all, the prophet is not that visible form, that form is only the steed of the prophet. The prophet is that Divine love and affection that is immortal.

Someone asked: "Then why don't they only praise God upon the minaret? Why do they also mention Mohammed?"

Rumi answered: Well, praising Mohammed is praising God. It is like saying, "Long live the king, and long live that friend who led me to the

king, and told me of the king's good name and attributes!" Praising that friend is praising the king.

The Prophet said, "Give me something. I am in need. Either give me your cloak, your wealth, or your clothes." Now, what would he do with your cloak or wealth? He wants to lighten your garment, so that the warmth of the sun can reach you.

"And lend to God a good loan."

He does not want wealth and cloak alone. After all, He has given you many things besides wealth: knowledge, thought, wisdom and vision. He means, "Expend on Me a moment's thought, care and consideration, since this wealth you gain comes through these gifts I have given." God asks for alms from bird and snake alike. If you can go before the sun naked, all the better, for that Sun does not burn black, it turns you white. Or at least lighten your clothes to feel the joy of that Sun. You have become accustomed to bitterness. At least for a while try sweetness too!

discourse 64

Every science learned in this world through study and experiment is the science of bodies. The science acquired by crossing the portal of death is the science of Soul. Knowing about the science of “I am God” is the science of bodies, but to become “I am God” is the science of Soul. To see the light of the lamp and the fire is the science of bodies, to burn in that fire and lamp’s flame is the science of Soul. Everything experienced is the science of Soul, everything based upon knowledge is the science of bodies.

You could also say that the only truth is seeing and vision—all else is the science of fantasy. For example, an architect thinks through and imagines the building of a school. No matter how correct and accurate the architect’s thoughts, still it is fantasy. It becomes reality only after builders actually raise and construct the school.

Now, there are differences between fantasy and fantasy. The fantasy of Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman

and Ali is superior to the fantasy of the Companions. Between one person's fantasy and another's are great differences. An expert architect pictures building a house. Another person who is not an architect also imagines a house. However, the differences are great because the architect's fantasy is closer to reality. It is the same in the world of realities and vision, there are differences between one person's vision and the vision of others.

They say there are seven hundred veils of darkness and seven hundred veils of light. Well, all the worlds of fantasy are veils of darkness, and all the worlds of realities are veils of light. But between those veils of darkness, there is no knowledge that can grasp their extreme subtlety, and despite the vast and enormous variation between the worlds of realities, those differences can never be comprehended by the mind.

discourse 65

Those who are living in Hell are happier there than they would be in this world, for in Hell their awareness turns to God, while in this world they forget. Nothing is sweeter than the awareness of God. Therefore, their desire to return to this world is to work and carry out deeds so that they can witness the manifestation of Divine grace, not because this world is a happier place than Hell.

Hypocrites are consigned to the lowest place in Hell, because they were shown the faith but their unbelief was stronger. They did nothing with the gift they were given. Their punishment is more severe so they can become aware of God. To the unbelievers, faith never came. Their unbelief is not as strong, and so they become aware through less punishment. Between pants with dust upon them, and a carpet with dust, the trousers only need one person to shake them a little to become clean, while it takes four people shaking the rug violently to rid the carpet of its dust.

The inhabitants of Hell cry:

*"Pour upon us water, or of that
God has provided you..."*

God forbids their desire for food or drink, therefore this saying means, "Pour upon us from what you have found, and shines upon you."

The Koran is like a bride who does not show her face to you even when you draw aside the veil. The fact that you have examined her, and yet have not attained happiness or mystical unveiling, is a sign that your act of trying to remove her veil has itself repulsed her, so that she appears to you as ugly. She says, "I am no beautiful bride." The Koran shows itself in whatever form it pleases. But if you do not try drawing aside the veil, and seek only the Koran's good pleasure, watering its fields, attending it from afar, working upon whatever pleases it best, then it will show you its face without any effort at drawing aside the veil.

Seek the people of God, for God does not speak to every one, just as the kings of this world do not speak to every weaver. They have appointed viziers and deputies to show the way to the king. God has also chosen certain servants, so

that whoever seeks God can find God in them. All the prophets have come for this reason—only they are the Way.

discourse 66

Siraj al-Din said: “I was speaking to someone about a problem when something within me began to ache.”

Rumi said: That something is put in charge of you to prevent you from speaking when you should not speak. Usually it is so subtle that it goes unnoticed, but when you feel that yearning, compulsion and pain, then you know there is something in control. For instance, you enter a pool of water and the softness of the flowers and fragrant herbs reach you, but when you get to the other side thorns prick you. Then you realize that one side is a thorn-bed and pain, while the other side is a flowerbed and comfort. These differences affect us through our emotions, yet they are closer to us than anything external.

Hunger and thirst, anger and happiness—all these are invisible, yet they affect us more than anything we can see. For if you close your eyes, you can no longer see the perceptible, but this will

not drive hunger away. In the same way, spice in hot dishes, sweetness and bitterness in foods, these cannot be seen, yet their taste has a much stronger effect upon us than how the food looks.

Why do you worry about this body? Why are you so attached to it? You live without it. You are always without it. When nighttime comes you forget it, but once the day arrives you are absorbed in your body's affairs. But you are never truly with the body, so why tremble over its concerns. You are not with it for a single hour, but are always elsewhere. Where are you, and where is the body?

“You are in one valley, and I am in another.”

This body is a great deception.

Pharaoh's magicians paused for an instant, like a speck of dust hanging in the air, and gave up their forms, for they knew they lived apart from the body, and the body was not them. In the same way, Abraham, Ishmael and all the prophets and saints, having paused, were indifferent to whether the body existed or not.

Hajjaj, who smoked hashish, once shouted, “Do not move the door or my head will fall off!”

He thought his head was disconnected from his body and stayed in place only through its connection to the door. It is the same with all people—we think we are connected with the body and depend upon it for survival.

discourse 67

“He created Adam in His likeness.”

Everyone is seeking the manifestation of God. For example, there are many veiled women who uncover their faces to try the object of their desire, like you try a razor. There are lovers who say to their beloved, “I have not slept and I have not eaten. I have become like this and that without you.” What they mean is, “You are seeking a manifestation of God. I am the manifestation you can vaunt your belovedness upon.” In the same way, all scholars and learned people are seeking to manifest God’s desire, “I was a hidden treasure, and I desired to be known.”

“He created Adam in His likeness,” meaning in the likeness of God’s laws. Divine law is manifest in all creation, because all things are the shadow of God, and the shadow is like the person. If the five fingers spread out, the shadow also spreads out. If the body bows, the shadow also bows. If it stretches out, the shadow also stretch-

es out. Therefore, all people seek a Beloved, for they all desire to be lovers of God, enemies to His enemies, and friends to His friends. All these are the rules and attributes of God that appear in the shadow.

To sum up, this shadow world is unaware of who we really are, yet we are aware. But in comparison to God's knowledge, this awareness of ours is unawareness. Not everything in a person shows in their shadow, only certain things. So not all the attributes of God show in this shadow world, only some of them, for

*"You have been given of knowledge nothing
Except a little."*

discourse 68

Jesus was asked, “What is the most difficult thing in this world and the next?” He said, “The wrath of God.” They asked, “And what can save us from that?” He answered, “Master your own wrath and anger towards others.”

When the mind wants to complain, do the opposite—give thanks. Exaggerate the matter to such a degree that you find within yourself a love of what repels you. Pretending thankfulness is a way of seeking the love of God.

Our Master, Shams, said, “To complain of creation is to complain of the Creator.” He also said, “Hatred and rage lay hidden in your unconscious. If you see a spark leap from that fire, extinguish it, so that it will return to non-existence from where it came. If you insist on matching anger with anger and promoting the flame of rage, it will spring faster and faster from your unconscious, and become more and more difficult to put out.”

Chase away evil with something good, and you triumph over your enemy in two ways. One way is this—your enemy is not another person's flesh and skin, it is the contagiousness of their hatred. When that is cast out of you by an abundance of thanks, it will inevitably be cast out of your enemy as well, because everyone instinctively responds to kindness, and you have left your opponent with nothing to fight against.

It is just like with children, when they shout names at someone and that person yells bad names back, they are all the more encouraged, thinking, "Our words have had an effect." But if the enemy sees their words bring about no change they lose interest.

The second benefit is this: When the attribute of forgiveness comes forth in you, other people realize they have not been seeing you as you truly are. Then they know that they are the ones to be reproached, not you, and no proof puts adversaries to shame more than that. So by praising and giving thanks to detractors you are administering an antidote to that hatred in them, for while they have shown you your deficiency, you

have shown them your perfection.

Those who are loved by God can hardly be defective. Thus, let us praise those who criticize us, so their friends will think, “It is our friends who are at odds with the Sufis, since the Sufis always speak well to our friends.”

*Though they are powerful,
Pluck out their beards politely.
Firmly break their necks,
Though they are high and mighty.
May God assist us in that!*

discourse 69

Between the human being and God are just two veils—health and wealth—all other veils come from these. Those who are healthy do not look for God and do not see Him, but as soon as pain afflicts them they cry out, “O God! O God!” calling out and surrendering to God. Therefore, health is their veil and God is hidden in their pain.

As long as people have wealth, they gratify their desires, and are preoccupied night and day with pleasures. The moment poverty appears, their spirits are weakened and they turn to God.

*Drunkenness and poverty brought You to me,
I am the slave of Your drunkenness and need!*

God granted to Pharaoh four hundred years of life, kingship and enjoyment. All that was a veil, which kept him far from the presence of God. He did not even experience a single day of disagreeableness and pain, so that he would completely forget God. God said, “Go on being preoccupied

with your own desire, and do not even think of me. Good night!”

*King Solomon grew weary of his reign,
But Job was never sated of his pain.*

discourse 70

Rumi said: Some people say that in the human soul is an evil not found in animals and wild beasts, but this does not mean that people are worse than beasts. Rather, this evil character and darkness of soul in the human being hides a secret essential element. The more precious and noble that element is, the greater the veil to hide it, and such veils cannot be removed without great effort.

These struggles are of various kinds. The greatest is to spend time with friends who have turned their faces to God and turned their backs on this world. There is no more difficult combat than this, for the very sight of them dissolves our ego and worldly desires. That is why they say that if a snake has seen no human for forty years it becomes a dragon, since it has seen no one who could stop the growth of its own evil nature.

Wherever men or women put a big lock, that is a sign of something precious and valuable. Just

like the snake that guards a treasure, do not regard a person's ugliness, but look instead at the preciousness of their treasure.

discourse 71

The difference between birds on the wing, and lovers of God, is that birds always fly in a certain direction, while lovers of God fly on the wings of their desire away from all directions.

Every horse has its stable, every beast its pen, every bird its nest. And God knows best.

THE SEALS OF WISDOM

(*Fusus al-Hikam*)



by

Muhiyyi'd-din Ibn al-'Arabi

(This is out of print and it seems that plans for reprinting it have fallen through or been shelved for the time being.

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The Seal of Divine Wisdom in the Word of Adam



When Allah - glory be to Him! - willed that the source of His most Beautiful Names - which are beyond enumeration - be seen (or you can equally say that He willed His source to be seen), He willed that they be seen in a microcosmic being which contained the entire matter,^{[1](#)} endowed with existence, and through which His secret was manifested to Him. For how a thing sees itself through itself is not the same as how it sees itself in something else which acts as a mirror for it. So He manifests Himself to Himself in a form which is provided by the place in which He is seen. He would not appear thus without the existence of this place and His manifestation (*tajalli*) to Himself in it.

Allah brought the entire universe into existence through the existence of a form fashioned without a spirit (*rûh*), like an unpolished mirror. Part of the divine decree is that He does not fashion a locus without it receiving a divine spirit, which is described as being "blown"^{[2](#)} into it. This is nothing other than the result of the predisposition of that fashioned form to receive the overflowing perpetual *tajalli* which has never ceased and which will never cease.

Then we must speak of the container (*qâbil*). The container comes from nothing other than His most sacredly pure Overflowing. So the whole affair has its beginning from Him, and its end is to Him, and "*the whole affair will be returned to Him*" (11:123) as it began from Him. Thus the command decreed the polishing of the mirror of the universe. Adam was the very polishing of that mirror and the spirit of that form.

The angels are some of the faculties of that form which is the form of the universe, which the Sufis designate in their technical vocabulary as the Great Man (*al-Insân al-Kabîr*), for the angels are to it as the spiritual (*rûhânî*) and sensory faculties are to the human organism. Each of these faculties is veiled by itself, and it sees nothing which is superior to its own essence, for there is something in it which considers itself to be worthy of high rank and an elevated degree with Allah. It is like this because it has an aspect of the divine synthesis (*jam'îya*). In it is something which derives from the divine side and something which derives from the side of the reality of the realities. This organism carries these attributes as determined by the universal nature which encompasses the containers of the universe from the most exalted to the basest. However, the intellect cannot perceive this fact by means of logical investigation – for this sort of perception only exists through divine unveiling by which one recognises the basis of the forms of the universe which receive the spirits.

This being was called both a human being (*insân*) and *khalif*. As for his humanness, it comes from the universality of his organism and his ability to embrace all of the realities. He is in relation to Allah as the pupil,³ being the instrument of vision, is to the eye. This is why he is called *ÒinsânÓ*. It is by him that Allah beholds His creatures and has mercy on them. So he is a human being, both in-time [in his body] and before-time [in his spirit], an eternal and after-time organism. He is the word which distinguishes and unifies. The universe was completed by his existence. He is to the universe what the face of the seal is to the seal - for that is the locus of the seal and thus the token with which the King places the seal on his treasures.

Allah named him khalif for this reason, since man guards His creation as treasure is guarded with the seal. As long as the seal of the King is on the treasure, no one dares to open it without his permission. He made him a khalif in respect of safeguarding the universe, and it continues to be guarded as long as this Perfect Man is in it. Do you not see then, that when he disappears and is removed from the treasury of this world, nothing that Allah stored in it will remain? Everything that was in it will leave it, and all the parts will become confused, and everything will be transferred to the Next World. Then Man will be the seal on the treasury of the Next World for endless time and after-time.

All the Divine Names contained in in the divine form⁴ appear in this human organism. Thus it possesses the rank of containing and integrating this existence. It was by this that Allah set up the proof against the angels,⁵ so remember that! Allah admonishes you through others. Look at where that originates and where it ends up. The angels did not realise what was implied by the organism of the *khalif*, nor did they realise what the presence of the Truth demanded as *'ibâda* ⁶ (worship). Each one only knows from Allah what his essence accords him. The angels do not possess the universality of Adam, and they did not understand the Divine Names with which he has been favoured, and by which he praises Allah and proclaims His purity. They only knew that Allah had names whose knowledge had not reached them, so they could not praise Him nor proclaim His purity through them. What we mentioned overcame them and this state overpowered them. They said about this organism, "*Why put on it one who will cause corruption on it?*" (2:30) This is only the argument which they were voicing.

What they said regarding Adam is exactly the state they were with regard to Allah. Had it not been that their nature was in accord with it, they would not have said what they said in respect of Adam, "*and yet they were not aware.*" If they had had true recognition of themselves, they would have had knowledge, and had they been in possession of knowledge, they would have been protected and would not have resisted by belittling Adam and thus exceeding their claim of what they possessed of His praise and glorification. Adam was in possession of Divine Names which the angels did not have, so that their praise and glorification of Him was not the same as Adam's praise and glorification of Him. Allah describes this to us so that we may ponder it and learn *adab*⁷ with Allah, and so that we will not lay claim to what we have not realised or possessed by pinning down. How can we allege something which is beyond us and of which we have no knowledge? We will only be exposed. This divine instruction is part of Allah's discipline of those of His slaves who are well-mannered, trusting and khalifs.

Let us return to the wisdom under discussion. Know that universal matters which have no existence in themselves are without a doubt intelligible and known in the mind. They are hidden and continue in their invisible existence. These universal matters have jurisdiction and effect on everything which has an individual existence. Indeed, they are the same thing and nothing else, i.e. the sources of existent individual things, and they continue to be intelligible in themselves. They are manifest in respect of the sources of existent things just as they are hidden in respect of their intelligibility. Each individual existent thing depends on these universal matters which cannot be dislodged from the intellect, nor would their existence be possible in the source once they ceased to be intelligible, whether that individual existent is in-time or out-of-time. The relationship of that which is in-time or out-of-time to this universal intelligible matter is the same. This universal matter only has jurisdiction in individual existent things according to what the realities of these individual existent things demand of it. It is like the relationship of knowledge to the knower, and life to the living. Life is an intelligible reality; knowledge is an intelligible reality. Knowledge is as distinct from life as life is distinct from knowledge. So we say that Allah has knowledge and life, and that He is the Living, the Knowing. We also say that the angel has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. We say that man has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. The reality of knowledge is one thing and the reality of life is another, and their relationship to the knowing and the living is the same relationship. We say that the knowledge of Allah is in non-time and the knowledge of man is in-time. So look at the evaluation that this relationship has brought about in this intelligible reality!

Examine this connection between individual intelligibles and stence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself. As knowledge determines the one who participates in it – as he is called knowing – so the one who is described by it can determine the knowledge. It is in-time in relation to the one in-time and non-time in relation to the one in non-time. Each of the two is determining and determined. It is known that these universal matters, even if they are intelligible, lack a source although they still have an authority. When they are determined, since they are ascribed to an individual existent thing, they accept the principle in the existent sources and do not accept distinction or fragmenting, for that is impossible for them. They themselves are in everything described by them, as humanity is in every person of this particular species, without distinction or the numbering which affects individuals; and it continues to be intelligible.

Now, as there is a connection between that which has an individual existence and that which does not have one – and it is a non-existent relationship – so the connection of existents to each other is easier to conceive because, in any case, there is a common factor between them which is individual existence. In the other, there is no common factor, yet there is a connection despite the lack of a common factor. So it is stronger and more real when there is a common factor. Without a doubt, the in-time establishes itself as being put into time and it needs something in time to put it into time. It has no place in itself so it exists from something other-than-it, and it is linked to That by the dependence of need. This dependence must be on That whose existence is necessary, which is independent in Its existence by Itself without need. It is That which, by Its own essence, gives existence to the in-time which depends on It. Since the existence of Its essence is necessary and what appears from It depends on It for its essence, it nevertheless depends on its form for everything which is from a name or attribute, except for the essential necessity. That is not the property of it in-time, even if its existence is necessary, rather, it is

necessary by another, not by itself.

Since the matter is based on what we said about its manifestation in its form, Allah communicates to us knowledge of Himself through contemplation of the in-time. He tells us that He shows us His signs in the in-time,⁸ so we draw conclusions about Him through ourselves. We do not describe Him with any quality without also possessing that quality, with the exception of that essential autonomy. Since we know Him by ourselves and from ourselves, we attribute to Him all that we attribute to ourselves. For that reason, divine communications came down on the tongues of our interpreters,⁹ and so He described Himself to us through ourselves. When we witness, He witnesses Himself. We are certainly numerous as individuals and species, yet we are based on a single reality which unites us. So we certainly know that there are distinctions between individuals. If there were not, there would be no multiplicity in the One.

Similarly we are described in all aspects by that by which He describes Himself, but there must be a distinction and it is none other than our need of Him in our existence. Our existence depends on Him by virtue of our possibility and He is independent of that which makes us dependent on Him. Because of this, one can apply before-timeness and timelessness to Him which negates that firstness which is the opening to existence from non-existence. Although He is the First, firstness is not ascribed to Him, and for this reason, He is called the Last. Had His firstness been the firstness of the existence of determination, it would not have been valid for Him to be the Last of the determined because the possible has no last - for possibilities are endless. So they have no last. Rather, He is the Last because *"the whole affair will be returned to Him"* (11:123) after its attribution to us. So He is the Last in the source of His firstness and the First in the source of His lastness.

Then know that Allah has described Himself as the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden;¹⁰ He brought the universe into existence as a Visible world and an Unseen world so that we might know the Hidden by the Unseen and the Manifest by the Visible. He described Himself with pleasure and wrath, and so He brought the world into existence as a place of fear and hope – so we fear His wrath and hope for His pleasure. He described Himself with majesty and beauty, so He brought the universe into existence with awe and intimacy. It is the same for all that is connected with Him, may He be exalted, and by which He calls Himself. He designates these pairs of attributes by the two hands¹¹ which He held out in the creation of the Perfect Man. Man sums up all the realities of the universe and its individuals. So the universe is seen and the Khalif is unseen. It is with this meaning that the Sultan veils himself, even as Allah is mentioned and described as having with veils¹² of darkness, which are natural bodies, and luminous veils which are subtle spirits (*arwâh*). The universe is composed of both the gross and the subtle.

The universe is its own veil on itself and cannot perceive the Truth since it perceives itself. It is continuously in a veil which is not removed, since it knows that it is distinct from its Creator by its need of Him. It has no portion of that essential necessity which belongs to the existence of Allah, so it can never perceive Him. In this respect, Allah is never fully known by the knowledge of tasting and witnessing because the in-time has no hold on that.

Allah only applied "between His two hands" to Adam as a mark of honour, and so He said to Iblis, "*What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My two Hands?*" (38:76) That is none other than the union in Adam of the two forms - the form of the universe and the form of the Real:[13](#) and they are the two hands of Allah. Iblis is only a fragment of the universe and does not possess this comprehensive quality. It is because of this quality that Adam was a *khalif*. Had he not had the form of the One who appointed him *khalif*, he would not have been *khalif*. If there were not in him all that is in the world, and what his flocks, over whom he is *khalif*, demand of him because of their dependence on him – (and he must undertake all they need from him) –he would not have been *khalif* over them.

The khalifate is only valid for the Perfect Man, whose exterior form comes from the realities of the universe and its forms, and whose inner form is based on His form, may He be exalted! For that reason, Allah has said of him, "I am his hearing and his sight."[14](#) He did not say, "his eye and his ear." So He differentiated between the two forms. It is the same for every existent in the universe which appears according to what the reality of that existent demands of it. Nonetheless no one totally comprehends what the *khalif* has. One only surpasses others by this comprehensiveness. If it were not for the diffusion of Allah into the existents by the form, the universe would not have any existence. Similarly, were it not for these universal intelligible realities, no principle would have appeared in individual existent things. From this reality the universe depends on Allah for its existence. So all is in need, and nothing is independent.

This is the truth

and we have not spoken metaphorically.

If I speak of a something independent

without any need, you will know Who I mean by it.

The whole is tied to the whole

and cannot be separated from it, so understand what I have said!

Now, you have learnt of the formation of the body of Adam – his outer form – and the formation of his spirit, his inner form, so he is the Real and a created being. Now you have learnt of the formation of his rank which is the comprehensiveness by virtue of which he is worthy of the khalifate. Adam is the unique self from which the perfect human species was created according to His words, "*O mankind, be fearful of your Lord who created you from a single self, and created its mate from it, and disseminated many men and women from the two of them.*" (4:1)

His words, "*Be fearful of your Lord,*" mean to make of what has appeared from you a safeguard for your Lord and make what is concealed of you, which is your Lord, a safeguard for yourselves. The matter consists of blame and praise, so be His safeguard in the blame and your safeguard in the praise, so that

you will be among those of knowledge and *adab*. Then He showed him what He had placed in him, and He put that in His two hands - one handful contained the universe and the other handful contained Adam and his descendants - and He showed them their ranks in Adam.

Then Allah informed me in my inner heart (*sirr*) of what He placed in this Imam, the great progenitor. I have put in this book some of what was allotted to me but not all of what I realised. A book could not contain that and not even the present existent universe could contain it. I have put some of what I have witnessed in this book, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, defined it. It was the divine wisdom in the word of Adam, that is, this chapter.

Then there is the wisdom of the breath of angelic inspiration in the word of Shith (Seth), the wisdom of divine inspiration in the word of Nuh (Noah), the wisdom of purity in the word of Idris, the wisdom of being lost in love in the word of Ibrahim (Abraham), the wisdom of truth in the word of Ishaq (Isaac), the wisdom of the elevation of the word in the name of Isma'il (Ishmael), the wisdom of the spirit in the word of Yusuf (Joseph), the wisdom of unity in the word of Hud, the wisdom of revelation in the word of Salih, the wisdom of the heart in the word of Shu'ayb, the wisdom of the power of the word of Lut (Lot), the wisdom of the decree in the word of 'Uzayr (Ezra), the wisdom of prophethood in the word of 'Isa (Jesus), the wisdom of mercy in the word of Sulayman (Solomon), the wisdom of existence in the word of Da'ud (David), the wisdom of the soul in the word of Yunus (Jonah), the wisdom of the unseen in the word of Ayyub (Job), the wisdom of majesty in the word of Yahya (John the Baptist), the wisdom of possession in the word of Zakariya (Zachariah), the wisdom of intimacy in the word of Ilyas (Elias), the wisdom of benevolence in the word of Luqman, the wisdom of the Imam in the word of Harun (Aaron), the wisdom of sublimity in the word of Musa (Moses), the wisdom of what one turns to in the word of Khalid, and the wisdom of uniqueness in the seal of Muhammad.

There is a seal for each wisdom. So I have condensed these wisdoms according to what is established in the Mother of the Book, and I complied with what was written out for me, and stopped at what was set as a limit for me. Even if I had desired to do more than that, I would not have been able to do so. Indeed, the Presence forbids that, and Allah is the One who grants success. There is no Lord but Him.



1. *al-Insân al-Kâmil*, the Perfect Man.
2. *Nafkh*, Qur'an 32:9, etc.
3. *Insan*, as well as meaning human being, also means the pupil of the eye.
4. The form chosen by Allah for the human being.
5. Qur'an 2:30-33.

6. *Tbada*: All the acts of worship: giving, praying, fasting, etc..
7. *Adab*: Manners. Here meaning the much deeper quality of spiritual manners, that is a courtesy engendered in the ritual acts of worship, the prostrations of the prayer, the fast, and giving gifts to the needy. Such a quality is imbued with awareness that you are the dependent, and the Real is the independent. You are poor, He is rich.
8. Qur'an 41:53, "*We will show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves...*"
9. i.e. the Prophets.
10. Qur'an: 57:3.
11. Qur'an 38:75, "*What I created with My two hands.*"
12. Hadith: "Allah has 70,000 veils of light and darkness. If they were to be removed, the splendour of His face would consume."
13. Hadith: "Allah created Adam on His form."
14. ref. to *hadith qudsî* via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (*Sahih al-Bukhari*, 81:38:2)

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The Seal of Wisdom of the Breath of Angelic Inspiration¹ in the Word of Shith (Seth)



Know that the gifts and favours which appear in phenomenal being through human beings or without them fall into two categories: the gifts of the Essence and the gifts of the Divine Names. These two categories are distinct among the people of tasting according to whether as they come from a specific request for a specific thing, from a general request, or without any request. This applies whether they are gifts of the Essence or gifts of the Divine Names. They are specific when someone says, "O Lord, give me such-and-such a thing," and specifies something which occurs to him. They are general when someone says, "Give me what You know is good for all my parts, subtle and gross," without specifying it.

The askers fall into two groups - one group makes the request from a natural impulse to hasten its attainment, "*for man is impetuous*;" (17:11) and the other group asks because they know that there are matters with Allah which, in the foreknowledge of Allah, are only obtained after a request. They say, "Perhaps what I ask of Him is something of that sort." Their request takes into consideration this possibility. They do not know what is in the knowledge of Allah, nor what their capacity to receive will grant them. This is because it is one of the most difficult things to know capacity at any moment, for it refers to the capacity of the individual at that time. Furthermore, had he not been disposed by his capacity to make the request, he would not have made that particular request.

The goal of the people of presence,² who do not possess such a knowledge, is to know it in the moment in which they find themselves. They know by their state of presence what Allah has given them in that moment. and they only receive it by their predisposition for it. They are of two sorts: one group knows their predisposition from what they have already received, and the other group knows what they are going to receive based on their predisposition. This latter group has the most perfect recognition of predisposition.

Among this group are those who make a request, neither to hasten it nor for the possibilities of favour, but rather to comply with the command of Allah when He says, "*Call on Me and I will answer you*." (40:60) This sort of person is the pure slave and when he asks, his aspiration (*himma*) is not attached to what he asks for, be it specific or not, rather his aspiration is merely in or not, rather his

aspiration is merely in obedience to his Lord's command. When his state requires, he asks for slavehood, and when it requires entrustment [to Allah] and silence, he is silent. So Ayyub and others were tried, and they did not ask Allah to remove their affliction from them. Then at another moment, their state required that they ask that it be removed, and Allah removed it from them.

The immediate granting of a request, or its deferment, depends on the decree which has been determined for it by Allah. If the request coincides with the moment, the answer comes quickly, and if the moment is deferred - either in this world or the next, the answer is also deferred except for the answer from Allah which is, "At your service"[3](#) - so understand this well!

As for the second category, it is received without making a request, and by "without request" we mean verbal expression of it. In actuality, there must always be a request - be it articulated, or by a state, or from a predisposition. Similarly, unrestricted praise only takes place through verbal expression. The state determines the meaning, for that which induces you to praise Allah is determined for you by a Name of Action[4](#) or a Name of Disconnection.[5](#) In the case of the predisposition of the slave, its possessor is not conscious of it, but he is aware of his state because he knows both what his motive is and the state itself. Predisposition is the most hidden form of making requests.

That which prevents some people from asking is their knowledge that Allah has predetermined their destiny, so they have prepared themselves to receive whatever comes from Him, and they have withdrawn from their selves and their desires.

Among these people are those who know that the knowledge which Allah has of them in all their states is their basic constitution in the state of their permanent source-form from before existence. They know that Allah will only give them what their source allows them according to Allah's knowledge of it when they were in their permanent source-forms. Thus these people know that Allah knows the way they will obtain anything.

There is no higher, nor more unveiled group among the People of Allah than this group, who understand on the secret of the Decree. They, in turn, fall into two sorts: those who know it in general and those who know it in particular. Those who know it in particular are higher and nearer perfection than those who know it in general. Such a person knows what is in the knowledge of Allah for him - be it by Allah informing him of the knowledge his own source has accorded to Him, or be it by direct unveiling to him from his permanent source-form whose unfolding states are endless. So he, in his knowledge of himself, is in the position of having Allah's knowledge of him, because it is derived from the same source. In respect of the slave, concern from Allah is predestined for him, and it is constituted by the sum of the states of his source which the possessor of this unveiling perceives when Allah allows him to perceive it, i.e. the states of his source. When Allah informs him of the states of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of these permanent sources in the state of their non-existence, since they are but essential relations without any form. In this

respect, we say that divine concern precedes the slave's need because of this equivalence in the communication of knowledge.

In this way Allah speaks so that we will know, and it is an expression which is completely specific - not as is imagined by those who do not drink from this source. The goal of disconnection is to make that intimeness in knowledge belong to Knowledge. It is the highest aspect of this question which the *mutakallim*[6](#) can comprehend with his intellect - unless he considers knowledge to be distinct from the Essence. If he does this, he ascribes relativity to knowledge, and not to the Essence, and because of this, he sets himself apart from the realised ones among the People of Allah, who are endowed with unveiling and real existence.

Let us return to those gifts which are either the gifts proceeding from the Essence or the Names. As for the favours, gifts and graces of the Essence, they only come by means of divine *tajalli*.[7](#) *Tajalli* only comes from the Essence by means of the form of the predisposition of the one to whom the *tajalli* is made. It never occurs otherwise. The one who receives the *tajalli* will only see his own form in the mirror of the Real. He will not see the Real, for it is not possible to see Him. At the same time, he knows that he sees only his own form. It is the same as a mirror in the Visible world inasmuch as you see forms in it or your own form but do not see the mirror. At the same time, however, you know that you see the forms, or your own form, only by virtue of the mirror. Allah manifests that as a model[8](#) appropriate to the *tajalli* of His Essence, so that the one receiving the *tajalli* knows that he does not see Him. There is no model nearer or more appropriate to vision and *tajalli* than this. When you see a form in a mirror, try to see the body of the mirror as well - you will never see it. It is true that some people who perceive this say that the reflected form is imposed between the vision of the seer and the mirror. This is the most that it is possible to say, and the matter is as we have mentioned. We have clarified this in the *The Makkan Revelations*.

If you wish to taste this, then experience the limit beyond which there is no higher limit possible in respect of the creature. Neither aspire to, nor tire yourself out in trying to go beyond this degree, for in principle, there is only pure non-existence after it.

Thus Allah is your mirror in which you see yourself, and you are His mirror in which He sees His Names. His Names are not other than Himself, as you know. The matter is confusing. One of us implied ignorance of the matter as part of knowledge and said, "The incapacity to achieve perception is perception."[9](#)

Some of us know but do not express it in this way, even though it is the highest of words. Knowledge does not give incapacity to know as the first one said, but rather knowledge gives him the same silence which incapacity gives. This is the highest level of those who have knowledge of Allah.

This knowledge only belongs to the Seal of the Messengers and the Seal of the *Awliyâ'*. The Messengers and Prophets only see it from the niche of the Messenger who is the Seal. The *awliyâ'* only see it from the niche of the *walî* who is the Seal. Even the Messengers only see it to the extent that they see it from

the niche of the Seal of the *Awliya'*, for Message and Prophethood - by which I mean the Prophethood of bringing the Sharî'a and its message - ceases, but *wilâya* never ceases. Thus the Messengers, inasmuch as they are *awliya'*, see what we have mentioned only from the niche of the Seal of the *Awliya'*. How could it be different for other *awliyâ'*? Although the Seal of the *Awliyâ'* is subject to the judgement which the Seal of the Messengers brought through the Sharî'a, that does not diminish his station nor does it detract from what we have said, for something which is lower from one point of view can be higher from another.

Confirmation of this occurred in the history of our Sharî'a in the excellence of the judgement of 'Umar regarding the prisoners of Badr [10](#) and their treatment, and in the story of fertilization of the date-palms. [11](#) It is not necessary that the perfect have precedence in everything and in every rank. The *Rijâl* [12](#) regard precedence as being in the degrees of knowledge of Allah. Here is their goal. As for the things which are in-time, they do not attach their thoughts to them, so realise what we have mentioned!

Al-Khidr said to Musa, "I have knowledge which Allah has taught me, and which you do not know, and you have knowledge which Allah has taught you and which I do not know." [13](#)

It is like the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in relation to a brick wall which was complete except for one brick, [14](#) and the Prophet was that one brick although he himself only saw the place for the single brick.

The Seal of the *Awliyâ'* must also have this sort of vision. He sees the same as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, saw, but he sees a place for two bricks in the wall, and that the bricks are made of gold and silver. He sees that there are two bricks missing in the wall, and he sees that they are a silver brick and a gold brick. He must see himself as being disposed by nature to fill the place of these two bricks. The Seal of the *Awliyâ'* is these two bricks by which the wall is completed. The necessary reason for which he sees himself as two bricks is that he follows the Shari'a of the Seal of the Messengers outwardly - which is the place of the silver brick. This means the outward Sharî'a with all that pertains to it of ordinances which are taken from Allah by the secret, according to the outward form which conforms to the secret because he sees the matter for what it really is. He must see the matter in this manner, for it is the place of the golden brick in the inwardly hidden. It is taken from the source from which the angel brought it, the same angel who brought the revelation to the Messengers. If you have understood what I have alluded to, then you have indeed acquired useful knowledge!

All the Prophets, from Adam to the last of the Prophets, take their light from the niche of the Seal of the Prophets, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Even though the existence of his clay was deferred, the last Prophet was nevertheless present in his reality, according to his statement, "I was a Prophet when Adam was between water and clay." [15](#) Every other Prophet only became a Prophet by being described by divine qualities inasmuch as Allah is described as the Praiseworthy *Wali*. [16](#)

The Seal of the Messengers, in respect to his *wilâya*, is connected to the Seal of the *Awliyâ'* in the same way in which Prophets and Messengers are connected to it. He is a *walî*, Messenger, and Prophet. The

Seal of the *Awliyâ'* is a *walî* and the heir who takes directly from the source, contemplating the ranks. He is the most beautiful of the beauties of the Seal of the Messengers, Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, the overseer of the community, and the master of the sons of Adam by reason of opening the door of intercession. He specified a particular state which is not universal.^{[17](#)} In this special state, he has precedence over the Divine Names. So the All-Merciful only mediates with the Avenger for the people of affliction through the intercession of the mediators. Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, obtained mastery in this special station. Whoever understands the ranks and the stations does not find this discourse difficult.

As for the gifts of the Names, know that Allah bestows mercy on His creation which is wholly from the names. Either it is a pure mercy, like the excellence of the provision which they have in this world or on the Day of Rising which is bestowed by that name, the Merciful, and so is a gift of mercy, or it is a mixed mercy like the taking of a disagreeable remedy which is followed by relief - it is still a divine gift. Divine gifts can only possibly be given through the intermediary of the guardians of the Names. Sometimes Allah gives it to the slave by means of the All-Merciful, and so the gift is pure from any adulteration which would be contrary to the nature of the moment, otherwise he would not receive the object and what would resemble it. Sometimes He gives by means of the the Boundless, so it is general - or by the Wise, so He looks at what is fitter at the moment, or by the Giving, who gives what is good without those who receive it having to compensate for it by gratitude or deed. He gives by the Compeller, and so He looks at the environment and what is necessary to it. He gives by the Forgiving and so He looks to the environment and what is happening to the individual. If he is in a state which merits punishment, He veils him from it, and if he is in a state which does not merit punishment, He protects him from a state which would merit it. He is "protected from wrong action", "safeguarded", and other descriptions of that sort. The Giver is Allah in the sense that He is the Treasurer of all that is in His treasury, and Allah only brings forth from it according to a predestined decree through the intermediary of a name particular to that matter. So He gives everything its created form ^{[18](#)} according to the name, the Just, and its brothers.

The Names of Allah are endless because they are known by what comes from them, and what comes from them is endless, even though they can be traced back to the limited roots which are the matrices of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but one of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but One Reality which assumes all these relations and aspects which are designated by the Divine Names. The Reality grants that each of the Names, which manifest themselves without end, has a reality by which it is distinguished from another Name. It is that reality by which it is distinguished which is the Name itself - not that which it shares.

It is the same with the gifts - every gift is distinct from another by personal nature, although they come from a single source. It is evident that this one is not that one. That is because the Names are distinct. Because of its boundlessness, in the Divine Presence there is nothing at all which repeats itself. This is the truth which is determined.

This was the knowledge of Shith, peace be upon him, and its spirit aids every spirit which discusses the

like of this, except for the spirit of the Seal who receives replenishing knowledge directly from Allah, not from any spirit. No, rather it is from his spirit that his substance flows to all spirits, although he may not perceive that of himself at the time when his elemental body existed. However, in respect to his reality and his rank, he knows all of that essentially, just as he is ignorant of the composition of the elements (of his body). So he has knowledge and is ignorant, and he is capable of being described by contrary attributes even as the Origin admits of description with opposites such as the Majestic and the Beautiful, the Outward and the Inward, the Last and the First - and they are the same, and not other than Him. Therefore, he knows and does not know, and he perceives and does not perceive, and he sees and does not see. It is by this knowledge that Shith received his name because it means "the gift". In His hand is the key to the gifts in their various types and relationships So Allah gave him to Adam, and he was the first gift, and He only gave it from Himself.

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All gifts in phenomenal being are manifested in this fashion - so no one receives anything from Allah and no-one receives anything which does not come from himself. Not everyone recognises this. Only a few of the people of Allah know it. When you see one who recognises that, rely on him, for that one is the source of the purest purity and the elite of the elite of the Men of Allah.

Whenever a person of unveiling sees a form which communicates to him gnosis which he did not have and which he had not been able to grasp before, that form is from his own source, no other. From the tree of himself he gathers the fruits of his cultivation, as his outer form opposite the reflected body is nothing other than himself, even though the place of the presence in which he sees the form of himself presents him with an aspect of the reality of that presence through transformation. The large appears small in the small mirror and tall in the tall, and the moving as movement. It can reverse its form from a special presence, and it can reflect things exactly as they appear, so the right side of the viewer is his right side, while the right side can be on the left. This is generally the normal state in mirrors, and it is a break in the norm when the right side is seen as the right and inversion occurs. All this is from the gifts of the reality of the Presence in which it is manifested and which we have compared to the mirror.

Whoever recognises his predisposition, recognises what he will receive. Not everyone who knows what he will receive, knows his predisposition, unless he knows it after receiving it, and this one knows it in a

general way. Some people who are weak of intellect think that since it confirmed with them that Allah does what He wills, they deem it admissible that He could contradict wisdom and what the matter is in itself.¹⁹ Because of this, some of them go so far as to deny the possibility and affirm that which is necessary by essence and by other. The man who has achieved realisation, however, admits the possibility and knows its presence and knows what is possible and how it is possible, since in its source it is necessarily existent because of something other-than-it. From where is the name of other, which determines its necessity, valid for it? No one knows this distinction except those with particular knowledge of Allah.

It is in the footsteps of Shith that the last of this human species will be born, and he will carry his secrets. There will none of this species born after him, so he will be the Seal of the Begotten. A sister will be born with him, and she will emerge before him, and he will follow her with his head at her feet. He will be born in China, and he will speak the language of his country. Sterility will spread in men and women, so there will be much cohabitation without conception. He will call people to Allah, but will not be answered. When Allah takes him and the believers of his time, those who remain will be like beasts, not knowing what is lawful (*halâl*) from what is unlawful (*harâm*). They will act according to their natural instincts with lust, devoid of reason and law. Upon them the Last Hour will occur.



1. *Nafth*, to puff, blow or spit, hence inspiration. Hadith, "He (Jibril) inspired or put (*nafatha*) into my heart..." Hence poetry is called the *nafth* of Shaytan.

2. The people of the presence are those who see everything as coming to them from Allah and everything as effected by Allah.

3. *Labbayk*.

4. Like the Giving, the Provider.

5. *Tanzih*, making Allah free of any connection to His creation. Names like the Absolutely Pure (*al-Quddûs*).

6. The people of words - theologians and philosophers. They are unable to enter the realm of reflection and meditation that is the Sufic domain, and thus oppose the Sufic teaching - mistaking the doctrine's meanings since they cannot intellectually identify them with a specific set of physical practices and direct inner experience.

7. A manifestation by which something is made clear and unobscured, as the bride is displayed to the husband or the rust removed from a sword or mirror so that it shines. The *tajalli* is the unveiling of a spiritual reality in the realm of vision. It is a direct-seeing into the nature of existence, a showing forth of

the secrets of the One in the celestial and terrestrial realms.

8. *Mithâl*, a Qur'anic term which indicates learning not by logical but by analogical method. It is simply the ACCESS to the parable and not the parable or any idea that the "metaphor" equals its interpretation. It has no specificity. *Mithal* is grasped "on the wing" so to speak. It cannot be explored or analysed or extended. That is to say it must not be approached rationally but emphathetically with direct and clear seeing-into.

9. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq.

10. After Badr, Abu Bakr asked the Prophet to either forgive or allow the prisoners to be ransomed. 'Umar said that they should be killed. Eventually, the Muslims reached a consensus that the captives should be ransomed and they were. Later the verse was revealed, *"It is not for a Prophet to take captives..."* (8:67)

11. When the Prophet had been asked about whether palm-trees should be pollinated and then later said, "You have the best knowledge of these things of your world."

12. *Rijal* (sing. *rajul*): The men. Meaning the men of gnosis and illumination. Those who know - that is - who know how-it-is, and not the veiled fantasy experience of so-called ordinary sensory perception which is, as we now know, in direct contradiction to the physical reality of matter according to high-energy physics.

13. cf. Qur'an 18:65.

14. Hadith in al-Bukhari (2815) and Muslim.

15. Hadith in at-Tirmidhi and *Musnad* Ibn Hanbal.

16. Qur'an 42:28, *"It is He who sends down abundant rain after they have lost all hope, and He unfolds His mercy; He is the Praiseworthy, the Wali."*

17. He only can open the door of intercession because it is a special gift to him alone.

18. Qur'an 20:50: *"Our Lord is He who gives each thing its created form and then guides it."*

19. i.e. they permit that He do the impossible, like making existence non-existence or non-existence existence.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath of Divine Inspiration ¹ in the Word of Nuh (Noah)



Know that disconnection (*tanzîh*) among the people of realities in respect to Allah is the same as limitation and qualification, so the one who disconnects is either ignorant or ill-mannered if he only applies disconnection to Him and believes that about Him.² When the believer who follows the Sharî'a disconnects and stops at that, and does not see anything else, he displays ill manners and slanders Allah and the Messengers - may the blessings of Allah be upon them! - although he is not aware of it. He imagines that he has reached the target and yet he has missed it, so he is like the one who believes in part and rejects part.³

One especially knows that when the language of the various Sharî'as speaks about Allah as they do, they speak to the common people in the first sense, and to the elite in every sense which can be understood from the various aspects of that expression in any language in the usage of that language.

Allah manifests Himself in a special way in every creature. He is the Outwardly Manifest in every graspable sense, and He is the Inwardly Hidden from every understanding except the understanding of the one who says that the universe is His form ⁴ and His He-ness (*huwiyya*), and it is the name, the Outwardly Manifest. Since He is, by meaning, the spirit of whatever is outwardly manifest, He is also the Inwardly Hidden. His relation to whatever is manifested of the forms of the world is the relation of the governing spirit to the form. The definition of man, for example, includes both his inward and outward; and it is the same with every definable thing. Allah is defined in every definition, yet the forms of the universe are not held back and He is not contained by them. One only knows the limits of each of their forms according to what is attained by each knower of his form. For that reason, one cannot know the definition of Allah, for one would only know His definition by knowing the definition of every form. This is impossible to attain, so the definition of Allah is impossible.

Similarly, whoever connects without disconnection has given limits to Allah and does not know Him. Whoever combines connection and disconnection in his gnosis, and describes Allah with both aspects in general - because it is impossible to conceive in detail because we lack the ability to encompass all the forms which the universe contains - has known Him in general and not in particular, as he knows himself generally and not in particular. For that reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, linked knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of Allah to knowledge of oneself and said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Allah says, "*We will show them Our signs on the horizons* (what is outside of you) *and in themselves* (what is your source) *until it is clear to them* (the contemplators) *that it is the*

Truth," (41:53) inasmuch as you are His form and He is your spirit. You are to Him as your body-form is to you, and He is to you as the spirit which governs the body.

The definition contains your inwardness and outwardness, for the form remains when the spirit which governs it departs, and it is no longer man, but one can speak of it as resembling the form of man. There is no difference between it and the form made of wood or stone, upon which the name of man is only applied by metaphor and not by reality. Allah cannot vanish from the forms of the universe, as His definition of His divinity is by reality, not metaphor, as the definition of man applies only so long as he is alive. As the exterior of the form of man praises both his spirit, and the self governed by it, with his tongue, similarly Allah made the forms of the universe which glorify His praise, but we do not understand their glorifying.⁶ We do not embrace all forms in the universe. All are tongues of Allah uttering the praise of Allah and for that reason He said, "*Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds,*" (1:1) i.e. all types of praise refer to Him. He is the Praiser and the One praised.

If you speak of disconnection, you limit Him,

and if you speak of connection, you define Him.

If you speak of the two together,

then you are free of error

and you are an Imam and a master in knowledges of gnosis.

He who affirms duality, falls into *shirk*, and whoever speaks of uniqueness is a unifier.⁶ Take care lest you be a dualist by connection, and take care lest you be a isolator by disconnection.

You are not Him, rather you are Him

and you see Him in the source of thing,

absolute and limited at the same time.

Allah says, "*There is nothing like Him,*" and so He disconnects, "*and He is the Hearing, the Seeing,*" (42:11) so He connects. Allah says, "*There is nothing like Him,*" so He connects and doubles it,⁷ and "*He is the Hearing, the Seeing.*" Then He uses disconnection and makes Himself Unique.

If Nuh had combined these two calls for his people, they would have answered him. He called them openly (71:8), and he called them secretly (71:9). Then he said to them, "*Ask forgiveness of your Lord. Truly He is Endlessly Forgiving.*" (71:10) He said, "*I have called my people night and in the day, but my calling has only made them more evasive*" (71:5-6) because they knew what they had to do in answering

his call.

So the knowledge of those who know Allah is what Nuh indicated in respect to his people by praising them through blame. He knew that they would not answer his call because of the *furqân* [8](#) it contained. The command is the Qur'an, not the *Furqân*. Whoever is established in the Qur'an does not incline to the *Furqân*. Even if the *Furqân* is in the Qur'an, the Qur'an contains the *Furqân* but the *Furqân* does not contain the Qur'an. For this reason, no one was favoured by the Qur'ân except Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and this community which is the "*best community ever to be produced before mankind.*" (3:110)

So "*there is nothing like Him*" unified several matters in one single matter. If Nuh had articulated something like of this *âyat*, his people would have responded to him, because it contains connection and disconnection in a single *âyat*, rather in half an *âyat*.

Nuh, peace be upon him, peace be upon him, called on his people at night in respect to their intellects and spirituality (*rûhânîyya*), which are unseen; and by day he called on them in respect to their outer forms and arrival. In his call, he did not unify with anything, like "*there is nothing like Him.*" So their inward had a distaste for this separation, and it increased them in evasion. Then he said of himself that he called upon them that He might forgive them, not that He be unveiled to them. They understood that from him. That is why "*they put their fingers in their ears and wrapped themselves in their clothes,*" (71:7) and this is the form of veiling to which he called them. So they answered his call by action, not by saying, "At your service."

There is both the confirmation of likeness and its negation in "*There is nothing like Him.*" For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said of himself, "I have been given all the words."[9](#) Muhammad, peace be upon him, did not call on his people by night and day, but rather he called upon them by night in the day and by day in the night. Nuh said in his wisdom to his people, "*He will send heaven down on you in abundant rain,*" (71:11) which is intellectual gnosis in meanings and metaphorical speculation, and "*He will reinforce you with wealth,*" i.e. by what comes to you from Him.

Thus it is your wealth in which you have seen your form. So whoever among you imagines that he has seen Him, does not have gnosis, and whoever of you knows that he has seen himself, he is the gnostic. For this reason people are divided into those who know Allah and those who do not know. "*And sons*" is what results from their logical speculation while the knowledge of the business (to which Nuh called them) is based upon contemplation which is far from the results of thought. Their trade did not profit them,[10](#) so what they had in their hands, which they only imagined they possessed, vanished from them.

The kingdom belongs to the people of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, for Allah says "*Give of that to which He has made you successors.*" [11](#) (57:7) For the people of Nuh it is, "Do not take anyone besides Me as a guardian." (17:2) The kingdom was confirmed for the people of Muhammad, and the guardianship in it belongs to Allah. The people of Muhammad are the *khalîfs* in it. The kingdom belongs to Allah and He is their guardian, and that is the kingdom of being appointed

khalif. For this reason, Allah is the "King of the kingdom"[12](#) as at-Tirmidhi says. "They have hatched a mighty plotting," (71:22) because calling to Allah is the plotting of the the One called; since He does not lack the beginning, He is called to the end, so they call to Allah. This is the source of devising according to inner sight. Nuh said, "The affair belongs entirely to Him," so they answered Him with plotting as He called them.

The people of Muhammad came and knew what the call to Allah was in respect of its He-ness, rather what it is in respect to His Names. Allah says, *"The day those who are godfearing are gathered to the All-Merciful."* [13](#) So He used the "particle of the end" (*ilâ* - to) and joined it to that Name, and we recognise that the universe is under the care of a Divine Name which requires them to be among the "godfearing". The reality of *taqwâ* [14](#) is that man avoids ascribing blessings, perfections and praiseworthy attributes to himself or to others, except for Allah. He fears Allah through His acts and attributes. These things are evils from the spring of possibilities. They said in their plotting, *"Do not abandon your gods. Do not abandon Wadd or Suwa' or Yaghuth or Ya'uq or Nasr."* (71:22) Then they abandoned them ignorant of the Truth according to what they left of the idols. Allah has an aspect in every worshipped thing. Whoever recognises it, recognises, and whoever is ignorant of it is ignorant among the people of Muhammad. Your Lord decreed that you should worship only Him – that is the judgement of your Lord.

The one who possesses knowledge knows who the slave is and in what form he is manifested as far as he is a slave. Separation and multiplicity are like the limbs of the sensory form and like faculties of meaning [15](#) of the spiritual form. He only worships Allah in every worshipped object. The lowest one is the one who imagines that godness is contained in it. Were it not for this illusion, stones and other things would not have been worshipped. This is why He said, *"Say: Name them!"* (13:33) If they had named them, they would have named stone, tree, or star. If they had been asked, "Who do you worship?" they would have replied, "God". They would not say "Allah" or "the god".

The highest knower does not use this imagination,[16](#) but rather he says that this is a divine *tajalli* which one must exalt, and he does not restrict himself. The lowest one is the one possessed of fantasy: *"We only worship them so that they bring us neared to Allah."* (39:3) The highest knower says, *"Your god is One God, so submit to Him,"* (22:34) wherever He is manifest, *"and give good news to the humble-hearted"* who humble the fire of their nature. They spoke to it (the fire), and did not say "nature". *"They have misguided many people,"* (71:24) i.e. they perplexed many in the multiplicity of the One by aspects and relations.

"Do not increase not the wrongdoers" because their selves are from the totality of the chosen ones who inherited the Book and they are the first of the three,[17](#) which precedes the ambivalent and the outdoor, *"in anything but misguidance"*, except in the perplexity of the man of Muhammad who says, "Increase me in perplexity."[18](#) *"Every time it shines on them, they walk in it. When the darkness comes over them, they stop."* (2:20) So the perplexed one turns about, and the circular movement is about the axis which he does not leave.

The one who has a stretched-out path is inclined to leave the goal, seeking what the possessor of imagination has in it, and his end is that imagination. He has "from" and "to" and what is between them. The one who has a circular movement has no beginning, "from", which clings to him, and no end, "to", is judged of him. Thus he has the most perfect existence. He "is given all the words"[19](#) and wisdoms. *"And because of their errors"* which is that which is recorded for them, "they were drowned" in the seas of the knowledge of Allah which is perplexity among the men of Muhammad. When the seas were heated up,[20](#) *"they were put into a fire"* in the source of water, *"and they found no one to help them besides Allah."* (71:25) Allah is the source of their helpers, and so they were destroyed in it for time without end. If He had brought them out to the shore, the shore of nature, He would have brought them down from this high degree. All belongs to Allah and is by Allah, rather it is Allah.

Nuh said, *"My Lord!"* and he did not say, "My God," for the Lord has immutability, and "God" differs according to the Names. So *"every day He is engaged in some affair."* (55:29) By Lord, he meant something with an immutable quality. *"Do not leave upon the earth"* and he called on them to go into its Muhammadan interior. "If you let down a rope, it would fall on Allah,"[21](#) *"to Him belongs what is in the heavens and what is in the earth."* When you are buried in it, you are in it and it is your container, and *"We will return you into it and We will bring you forth from it again,"* (20:55) by the difference of existence.

"...of the unbelievers" who wrap themselves in their garments and put their fingers in their ears, seeking veiling because he called on them that He might forgive them. Forgiveness is the veiling of wrong actions, *"not even one"* so that the benefit will become universal like the call. *"If You leave any,"* i.e. if You call them and then leave them, *"they will misguide Your slaves,"* i.e. confuse them and so bring them out of their service to what they have of the secrets of lordship. They will think themselves lords after they were slaves in themselves. Thus they are slaves and lords. *"They will spawn nothing"* i.e. they will not have any result or manifest anything except their being shameless – that is, the manifestation of what veils the unbelievers is that they were veiled from what appeared after their manifestation. They manifested that which veils, so they were veiled after their appearance.

The thinker is confused and does not recognise the goal of the shameless in shamelessness,[22](#) or the unbeliever in his disbelief, yet the person is but one. *"My Lord, forgive me,"* i.e. veil me and that which concerns me so that my rank and station are unknown, as the rank of Allah are unknown in His statement, *"They do measure Allah with His true measure";*[23](#) *"and my parents"* of whom I am a result, and they are the intellect and nature; *"and all who enter my house,"* i.e. my heart, *"as believers"* believing in what it contains of divine reports, and it is what their selves occasioned, *"And all the believers, men (the intellects) and women (the selves)."*

"Do not increase the wrongdoers (dhâlimîn)" who are from the darkness (*dhulumât*), the people of the unseen, hiding behind the veils of darkness, *"except in ruin"* i.e. in destruction. Thus, they do not recognise themselves because they see the Face of Allah outside of them. Among the men of Muhammad, *"All things are passing except His Face."* (28:88) Ruin is destruction.

Whoever wishes to understand the secrets of Nuh must rise into the sphere of Nuh.[24](#) It is in our book, *at-Tanazzulat al-Mawsuliyya*.



1. *Subbûh*, name applied to Allah, the All-Perfect, disconnected from imperfections.
2. If he does not go on to include *tashbih*, connection.
3. cf. Qur'an 4:149: *"Those who reject Allah and His Messengers and desire to make division between Allah and His Messengers, saying, 'We believe in some and reject some.'"*
4. By manifesting His attributes and Essence since everything is a proof and indication of Him.
5. Ref. to Qur'an 17:44, *"There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise, but you do not understand their glorification."*
6. In this case, ignorant of the multiplicity of His Names and Attributes.
7. "Like Him" = "*ka-mithlihi*", the word "like" occurs twice: "*ka*" and "*mithl*", so like negates like, like a double negative.
8. *Furqan*: One of the names of the Qur'an, meaning a "discrimination" that which separates or distinguishes. Here presented as an opposite in a dyad: Qur'an/furqan, that is, discrimination/gathering.
9. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
10. Reference to Qur'an, 2:16, *"Those are the people who have sold guidance for misguidance. Their trade has brought no profit. They are not guided."*
11. Khalifs.
12. Since He answers His slave who is the "kingdom". Technical term used by al-Hakim at-Tirmidhi and Abu Madyan, discussed by Ibn al-'Arabi in the *Futuh al-Makkiyya*, Chapter 24, vol. I, p. 182.
13. ref. Qur'an 19:85.
14. Fearfulness of Allah which is reflected in one's behaviour.
15. Meaning. Meaning does not carry the ordinary connotative significance that it has in the science of semantics. In the Sufic science meaning is not allied, but inseparable from the experience of the

recognition of meaning. In other words, it is not a "thing" which can be apprehended with the qualities of thingness. It is a mode of experiencing which takes places in a zone of awareness that is in itself a realm of the inward reality cognised in the waking state. Meaning/sensory, *ma'na/hiss*.

16. *Khayal*: An important term. *Khayal* means imagination, but in the special technical language of Ibn al-'Arabi the *khayal* contains an outer and inner meaning. Its outer (not inner) meaning is imagining in the ordinary sense of a "tangible reality" which is experienced mentally yet remains unreal, that is, untouchable and non-physical. Its inner meaning, however, is that faculty by which we solidify the objects - which are according to unveiling basically "not-there" - spatiality itself. There is much resistance to this in "rational" and programmed intellects as there is of the hand to the rock in "common sense" experience. The rock is there, it does not budge. There is, it must not be forgotten, a threshold situation where this is not so, for if the subject were brain-damaged, subjected to a hallucinogen, or hypnotic trance, then the object would experientially melt away. That is still not the same as seeing in which things are seen as-they-as in one unified field without differentiation, while alert within that condition of experiencing. And this state brings with it wisdom beyond the recognition of how-it-is at that moment - in other words a new understanding is established by the experience.

17. Ref to Qur'an 35:32, "...but some of them wrong themselves, some are ambivalent, and some outdo each other in good."

18. *Hayra*: Bewilderment. A Key term. *Hayra* is not a negative situation - it is the condition in which the seeker finds every intellectual channel blocked, every pathway of reason clashing against the other in contradiction so that it induces in the seeker a state of intensity. This intensity by virtue of its inner tension creates a condition we call *hayra*. It is a collapse of separation - a kind of "white hole" - which results in gatheredness. That is, the *hayra* creates a new condition which is its result and that result is a breakthrough into an illumination of the Real.

19. Meaning the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, who was given all the words.

20. By the oven (from which the water gushed out of the earth in the Flood.)

21. Hadith.

22. The manifestation of lordship.

23. 6:91, 22:84, 39:67.

24. The Sphere of the Sun.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Purity (*Quddûs*) in the Word of Idris



Elevation has two references - one of place and one of rank. Elevation of place is *"We raised him up to a high place,"* (19:57) and the highest of places is that upon which the mill of the world of the spheres revolves. It is the sphere of the sun and in it is the station of the spirituality of Idris, peace be upon him! There are seven heavens under it and seven heavens above it, and it is the fifteenth. That which is above it is the red heaven, i.e. Mars, the heaven of Jupiter, Saturn, the heaven of fixed stars, the Starless Heaven and the heaven of the constellations, the heaven of the Footstool and the heaven of the Throne. That which is below it is the heaven of Venus, Mercury, the Moon, the circle of ether, the circle of air, the circle of water, and the circle of earth. It is the axis of the heavens, and it is a "high place".

As for the elevation of rank, it is for us, the people of Muhammad. Allah said, *"When you are the uppermost and Allah is with you"* (47:35) in this height. He exalts Himself above place, not above rank. When the selves of those among us who do deeds are afraid, He follows the mention of "being with" with His words, *"He would not cheat you of your deeds."* The deed demands place and knowledge demands rank. So He joined the two heights for us - elevation of place by deed and elevation of rank by knowledge. Then to disconnect the association of being with, He said, *"Glorify the name of your Lord, the Most High,"* (87:1) above this association in meaning.

It is one of the most wondrous of matters that man is the highest of existent things - I mean the Perfect Man, and elevation is only attributed to him by subordination either to place or rank which is a degree. So he is not high by his essence, he is high by the height of place and the height of rank, for these possess height. Height of place is like the All-Merciful settling on the throne,¹ and it is the highest of places. Height of rank is *"All things are passing except His Face,"* (28:88) and *"the whole affair will be returned to Him,"* (11:123) and nothing has existence along with Allah.

When Allah said, *"We raised him up to a high place,"* He made high an adjective for place. Since your Lord said to the angels, *"I am putting a khalif in the earth,"* (2:30) this is height of rank. He said about the angels, *"Were you overcome by arrogance, or are you one of the exalted?"* (38:75) so He gave elevation to the angels. If the angels had possessed that elevation by simple virtue of the fact that they are angels, then all the angels would have been included in this elevation. It was not common to them in the definition of angel. We recognise that this is elevation of rank with Allah. It is the same for the khalifs of the people. If their elevation with the khalifate had been an elevation by essence, every man

would have it. It is not general and so we know that that elevation is by rank.

One of His names is the High. Over whom, when there is nothing except Him? So He is the High by His Essence. Is He is High over that which is particular, when there is no He except Him? His elevation is by virtue of Himself, and He, in respect to existence, is the source of existents. Those in-time things which He calls high in themselves are not other than Him. He was the High when there was no height of relativity because the source-forms in non-existence had not smelt the scent of existence. They remain in their state in spite of the multiplicity of forms in existents, but the source is the same from the whole in the whole.

The existence of multiplicity lies in the names which are the relationships, and they are non-existent matters. There is only the source which is the Essence. He is High through Himself, not by any ascription to another. From this standpoint, there is no height of relative relation in the universe, but the aspects of existence which are distinct. The height of relativity exists in the one Source in respect of the many aspects. For that reason, you say of Him, Him and not Him, and you and not you.

Al-Kharraz,[2](#) may Allah have mercy on him, who is one of the aspects of Allah and one of His tongues with which He speaks of Himself, said that one only has gnosis by joining opposites together in respect of Him. *"He is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden."* (57:3) He is the source of what appears and the source of what is hidden in the state of its manifestation. There is none who sees Him other than Him and there is none who is hidden from Him. So He is manifest to Himself and hidden from Himself. He is called Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz and other than that from the names of things in-time.

The Hidden says "No" while the Manifest says, "Me," and the Manifest says, "No" while the Hidden says, "Me". This is found in every opposite, yet the speaker is one, and he is the same as the hearer in the statement of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, about what their selves say,[3](#) for they speak and hear what they say, and know what their selves say. The source is but one, even if the judgements are different. There is no way that anyone can be ignorant of this sort of thing. Every man knows from himself, and it is the form of the Real.

So things are mixed and numbers appear by the one in the known ranks. Thus "one" brought number into existence, and number divides the One. The principle of number only appeared through the numbered. Part of the numbered is non-existent, and part is existent. The thing is non-existent in relation to the senses while it is existent in relation to the intellect. There must be number and numbered. That must grow from one and it grows because of it. Every rank of the numbers has one reality like 9, for example, and 10 and down to 2, and upwards without end, and its reality is not a sum.

A name is not perceived by the addition of ones. 2 is one reality, and 3 is one reality, and so on until the end of these ranks. Even though the source [of numbers] is one, the source of one of them is not the source of the others. Addition encompasses them all, and it speaks of them from them and judges them by them. Twenty ranks[4](#) appeared in this statement, so composition entered into them. You will continue

to affirm the source of what you deny in itself. Whoever recognises what we have related of the numbers, and that negation is the same as their affirmation, knows that the Real, who is disconnected by disconnection, is creature by connection, even though the creature is distinct from the Creator. The matter is the creature/Creator and it is the Creator/creature. That is from one source, rather is is the One source and it is many sources. Look at what you see!

Ibrahim¹s son told him, *"My father, do what you are ordered."* (37:102) The child is the same as his father, so he only saw himself sacrificing himself, "and He ransomed him with an immense sacrifice."⁵ That which was manifested as a ram was manifested in the form of a human, and manifested in the form of a son. Rather, it is by the principle of the son being the same as the father.

"He created from (one self) his mate." (4:1) He⁶ married his own self, and from him are both his companion and his child. The matter is one in number.

It is the same for nature and what is manifested from it. We do not see it diminishing by what appears from it nor increasing by the lack of what other than it manifests. That which is manifested is not other than it, nor is it the same as what is manifested according to the variety of forms in principle. This one is cold and dry, and that one is hot and dry. They are joined by dryness, and distinct by another quality. The common source is nature, and the world of nature is composed of forms in one mirror. Rather, it is one form in different mirrors.

There is only bewilderment (*hayra*) by the dispersal of perspectives. Whoever knows what we have said is not bewildered. If he increases in knowledge, it is only from the principle of place, and place is the same as the source-form in which the Real varies in the locus of His *tajalli*. Conditions vary, so He assumes every condition. There is no condition except for the source in which He make *tajalli* of Himself, and there is nothing except this.

By this aspect, Allah is creature, so interpret!

And by this aspect, He is not creature, so remember!

The inner sight of whoever understands

what I have said is not confused, and only

the one who perceives it possesses sight.

The source of joining and separating is the same,

and it is multiplicity which never remains or departs.

The One who is High in Himself is the One who possesses the perfection in which all matters of existence are absorbed, as are all non-existent relations, inasmuch as it is not possible that any of these attributes be lacking from Him, be they praiseworthy by custom, logic, or law, or blameworthy by custom, logic or law. That belongs only to the One named Allah. As for what is named other-than-Allah, it is either a locus of His *tajalli* or a form which is in it. If it is the locus of His *tajalli*, it contains distinction. Be-cause of that, there must be distinction between the One who makes *tajalli* and the place of *tajalli*; if it is a form in it, that form is the source of the essential perfection because it is the same as what is manifested in it. That which belongs to Allah belongs to that form. However, it is not said that it is Him nor that it is other-than-Him.

Abu'l-Qasim ibn Qasi [7](#) indicated this in his book, *The Removal of the Sandals*, and he said, "Each Divine Name is qualified by all the Divine Names, and described by their description." It is so. Each Name indicates the Essence and the meaning which is set out for it and which demonstrates it. In respect to its indication of the Essence, it possesses all the names, and in respect to its indication of the meaning which is singular to it, it is distinct from others, such as the Lord, the Creator, the Fashioner, etc. The Name is the same as the Named in respect to the Essence, and the Name is other than the Named in respect to the meaning which is particular to it.

If you have understood that the "high" is as we have mentioned, you know that it is neither place nor height of rank, for height of rank is particular to the administration of authority, like the Sultan and the judge, wazirs and qadis, and all who have rank, be they worthy of that rank or not. Height is by attributes which are not like that. The most knowledgeable of people can be ruled by the person with the position of power, even if that person is the most ignorant of people. This is the height of rank according to the principle of what he has over me in himself. When he retires, his high rank vanishes. The one with knowledge is not like that.



1. Qur'an 7:54, "*...then He settled Himself firmly on the Throne.*"
2. Abu Sa'id Ahmad ibn 'Isa al-Kharraz, died in Cairo 286/899. He said, "I only knew Allah by joining the opposites," and then recited, "*He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the Inward.*"
3. Hadith, "Allah forgives my people what their selves say to then as long as they do not act upon that."
4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 1000.
5. "And We ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." Qur'an: 37:107.
6. Adam.

7. Sufi leader of rebellion against the Murabitun in the Algarve.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Being Lost in Love¹ in the Wisdom of Ibrahim (Abraham)



Ibrahim is called the intimate friend, and he was an intimate friend (*khalîl*), because he was penetrated (*takhallal*) and gathered all the qualities of the Divine Essence. The poet says:

You pervaded the course of my spirit,

and that is why the intimate friend is called the intimate friend.

It is like the colour which permeates the coloured, so it is a non-essential matter (*'arad*) in respect to its essential substance (*jawhar*),² and it is not like the place and that which it occupies. Or it means the penetration of the Real into the existence of the form of Ibrahim. Each of these two principles is true as was mentioned, for each points to an aspect which appears without overstepping it.

Do you not see that the Real is manifest in the qualities of beings in-time and He gives news of that from Himself, and He is even manifest in the attributes of imperfection and the attributes of blame? Do you not see that the creature is manifest with the qualities of the Real from first to last, and all of them belong to him as the attributes of in-time things belong to the Real? "*Praise belongs to Allah*," so the results of praise from every praiser and one praised go back to Him, and "*the whole affair will be returned to Him*," (11:132) It includes what is blameworthy and praiseworthy, and there is only one or the other.

Know that when something is penetrated by something the first is contained by the second, so the penetrating is the name of the actor veiled by the penetrated, which is the name of the one acted upon, and it is the Outwardly Manifest. The name of the actor is the Veiled, the Inwardly Hidden. It is its food, as water permeates wool and so makes it expand. If the Real is the Outwardly Manifest, then the creature is veiled within Him, and creation is all the Names of the Real, His hearing and seeing, and all His ascriptions and discernments. If the creature is outwardly manifest, then the Real is veiled and hidden in him, and so the Real is the hearing of the creature, and his seeing, hand and foot, and all his faculties as it related in sound hadith.³

If the Essence were exempt from these relations, it would not be divinity. These relations are made by

our sources, so we make Him god by our dependence on His godness. He is not recognised until we are recognised. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Such a person is the creature with the most knowledge of Allah. Some sages, especially Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, claim that one can have gnosis of Allah through disregarding the world. This is false. Indeed, the non-time pre-time is not recognised as god until that which depends on its being God is known. Thus it is a proof of Him.

Then after this, in the second state, [4](#) unveiling accords you that the Real Himself is the source of the proof of Himself and His godness. The universe is but His *tajalli* in the forms of their source-forms whose existence is impossible without Him. He assumes various forms and modes according to the realities of these sources and their states, and this is after our knowledge of Him that He is our God.

Then the last unveiling comes, so our forms appear to you in Him, and some of us appear to others in the Real, and then some of us recognise each other and some of us are distinct from one another. Among us are those who recognise that our recognition of ourselves occurs in the Real, and some of us are unaware of the presence in which this recognition of ourselves takes place. *"I seek refuge with Allah from being one of the ignorant."* (2:67)

By the two unveilings together, He only judges us by ourselves, rather we judge ourselves by ourselves, but through Him. That is why He says, *"Allah's is the conclusive argument,"* (6:149) meaning against those who are veiled when they say to the Real, in conformity with their desires, "Why did you do this or that to us?", thinking that it was not in conformity with their desires. *"On the Day when the legs are bared,"* (68:42) means the matter which the gnostics unveil here. They see that the Real did not do to them what they allege that He did, but that it was from themselves. For He only lets them know what they are in themselves. From this their argument will dissolve, and the decisive proof of Allah will remain.

If you say, what is the benefit of His words, *"If He had willed, He could have guided every one of you,"* (6:149; 16:9) we say in If He willed "if (*law*)" is a particle of impossibility showing impossibility. He only willed the matter as it is. But the source of possibility accepts the thing and its opposite in the principle of logical proof, and it is the same with any two logical principles. That which occurs is that which the possibility implies in the state of its immutability. The meaning of *"If We had guided you"* is, had He shown you the Truth. Allah does not open the inner eye of every possibility in the universe to the perception of the matter as it is. There are those who know and those who are ignorant. Allah did not so will, so He did not guide all of them, and He will not will it, and it is the same as if He had willed it. How would He will this which is not? His volition is unified in its connections. It is a relationship dependent on the known, and the known is you and your states. Knowledge does not have an effect on the known, rather the known has an effect on knowledge, and so it accords from itself what it is in its source.

Divine discourse relates according to what agrees with the ones addressed and what logical reflection accords it. It does not come according to what unveiling gives. For that reason, there are many believers,

but the gnostics who possess unveiling are few. "*There is not one of us who does not have a known station,*" (37:164) and it is what you are in your state of immutability which you manifest in your existence. This is if it is confirmed that you have existence. If existence is confirmed to the Real and not to you, the judgement is yours without a doubt in the existence of the Real. If it is confirmed that you are existent, then the judgement is yours without a doubt, even if the judge is the Real. It is only the overflowing of existence on you.

You only praise yourself and you only blame yourself, and praise is only due to Allah for the overflowing of existence, for that is His, not yours. You are His nourishment by conditions, and He is your nourishment by existence. He is specified by what specifies you. The command comes from Him to you, and from you to Him, even though you are called obligated, a passive name (*mukallaf*), and He is not called obligated since there is no imposition upon Him.

He praises me, and I praise Him.

He serves me and I serve Him.

In one state I draw near to Him,

and in sources I deny Him.

So He knows me and I do not know Him,

and I know Him and I witness Him.

Where is independence

when I help Him and assist Him?

That is why the Real brought me into existence.

Then I knew Him and manifested His existence.

Hadith[5](#) brought us that,

and in me He achieved His goal.

Then the intimate friend, Ibrahim, peace be upon him!, possessed this rank by virtue of which he was called the intimate friend. For that reason, he made hospitality to guests a sunna. Ibn Masarra [6](#) associates him with the angel Mika'il in respect to provisions. Provision is that which nourishes those provided for: when provision permeates the essence of the one provided for until nothing remains in it

except permeation and nourishment flows in all the parts of the one nourished. There are no parts in divinity, so all the divine stations are penetrated which are designated by the Names, and by which His Essence is manifested.

We are His as our proofs confirm,

and we are ours.

Only my being belongs to Him,

and we are His as we are ours.

I have two aspects: Him and me,

but He does not have "me" through me.

However, His place of manifestation is in me,

so we are His - like me.

"Allah speaks the truth, and He guides to the Way." (33:4)



1. *Huyûm* is the intense love and passion which causes bewilderment and distraction.
2. These terms are similar to the "ontic" and "ontological", particularly in Martin Heidegger.
3. ref. to *hadith qudsî* via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (*Sahih al-Bukhari*, 81:38:2)
4. The first unveiling was annihilation (*fanâ'*) and the second is going-on (*baqâ'*).
5. "I created existence so that I might be known."
6. Muhammad ibn Masarra al-Jabali, Andalusian Sufi and thinker, born in Granada 269 /883 and died near there in 319/931.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of the Real in the Word of Ishaq (Issac)



The ransom of a Prophet by an animal's sacrifice

as an offering!

How can the bleating of a ram be equal

to the voice of a man?

Allah Almighty magnified the ram out of concern for us or for it,

but I do not see by what measure.

There is no doubt that the bodies

of cows and camels are larger,

but they relinquished the rank of sacrifice

to the offering of the ram.

Would that I knew how a ram

replaced the khalif of the All-Merciful with its small body!

Do you not see that the command to sacrifice

implies correspondence and promises gain and diminishes loss?

There is no creature higher than the mineral,

and after it comes the plant according to its ranks and measures.

The animal comes after the plant,

and each one had gnosis of its Creator by unveiling and evident proof.

As for the one named Adam, he is limited

by intellect, thinking, and the conventions of belief.

It is that which Sahl (at-Tustari)[1](#) and the realizer

said as we do[2](#) - because we and they are in the degree of *Ihsan*.

Whoever witnesses the matter I have witnessed

will say what I have said, both secretly and openly.

Do not pay any attention to words

which contradict our words and do not sow grain in the land of the blind!

They are the "deaf and dumb" in the text of the Qur'an

which the one protected from wrong action brought for our ears.

Know, may Allah support us and you! that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, peace be upon him, told his son, "*I saw in a dream that I must sacrifice you.*" (37:102) He did not interpret it although the dream is the presence of the imagination (*khayâl*). It was a ram which appeared in the form of Ibrahim's son, and Ibrahim confirmed the vision. So his Lord ransomed his son from Ibrahim's illusion with the "mighty sacrifice", which was the interpretation of the vision with Allah, but Ibrahim was not aware of it.

The *tajalli* of form in the presence of the imagination requires another knowledge by which one can perceive what Allah means by that form. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said to Abu Bakr when he interpreted a dream, "You have guessed part of it rightly, and you have missed part of it." Abu Bakr asked him to inform him of what was right in it and what was wrong, but the Prophet did not do so.

Allah said to Ibrahim when He called him, "*Ibrahim, you have discharged your vision.*" (37:105) He did not say to him, "You have confirmed the vision that it is your son" because he did not interpret it. He

took what he dreamt literally, whereas dreams require interpretation. That is why the 'Aziz, the ruler of Egypt, said, "...if you can interpret dreams." (12:43) The meaning of interpretation is the transposition from the form of what one dreamt to another form. The cattle represented the hard years and the fertile years. If Ibrahim had been faithful to the dream, he would have sacrificed his son, since he believed in the dream that it really was his son, whereas with Allah it meant the "*mighty sacrifice*" in the **form** of his son. He ransomed him by what occurred in Ibrahim's mind, but it was not ransomed in actuality with Allah.

There is a common form to the sensory form of the sacrifice and the imaginary form of Ibrahim's son. If he had seen a ram in his imagination, he would have interpreted it as his son or something else. Then Allah said, "*This was a most manifest trial*," (37:106) i.e. his clear test, meaning his experience in knowledge - whether or not he knew what the perspective of the dream required in the way of interpretation. He knew that the place of the imagination required interpretation, but he neglected it and the condition inherent in it, and for this reason he believed in the vision.

Taqi ibn Mukhallad, the transmitter of traditions, did so too, having heard in a tradition he was sure of, that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Whoever sees me in a dream, sees me when awake, for Shaytan cannot assume my form."³ So Taqi ibn Mukhallad saw the Prophet in a dream in which the Prophet gave him milk to drink. Taqi ibn Mukhallad believed his dream, but he made himself vomit and threw up the milk. If he had interpreted the dream, he would have known that milk means knowledge, equal to the quantity that he drank. Do you not see that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received a goblet of milk in a dream and he said, "I drank it until satiety came out of my nails, and then I gave the surplus to 'Umar." It was said, "Messenger of Allah, what do you interpret it as?" He replied, "Knowledge."⁴ He did not leave it as milk in its dream form since he had knowledge of the state of dreams and how they must be interpreted.

It is known that the form of the Prophet, peace be upon him, which the senses see, is buried in Madina, and that the form of his spirit and his subtle form have never been seen by anyone nor by himself. For this reason, the spirit of the Prophet takes on material existence in the form of his body as he died, and nothing is missing from it. So it is Muhammad, peace be upon him, who appears in dreams through his spirit in a bodily form which resembles his buried body, for Shaytan cannot assume the form of his body,⁵ may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and Allah protects the one who sees him. For this reason, whoever sees this form takes from it all that it orders or prohibits or gives good news of, even as he takes judgements from him in the life of this world - according to what they indicate from text, immediate or implicit. If he gives him something, that thing is subject to interpretation, unless it is manifest in the senses as it is in the imagination, and so does not require interpretation. It is based on this aspect that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, relied, even as Taqi ibn Mukhallad did. The vision has these two aspects.⁶

Allah taught us *adab* in what He did with Ibrahim and what He said to him when He gave him the station of prophethood. We know that when we see Allah in a form which logical reason rejects, we must interpret that form according to the Sharî'a, whether it is in the state of the one who sees Him, or in

the place in which He is seen, or the two together. If logical reason does not refute it, then we take it as we saw it, just as when we see Allah in the Next World.

So the One, the All-Merciful,

has forms in every place from what is hidden and what is manifest.

If you said, "This is the Real!" you spoke truly;

and if you said, "It is something else," you interpreted.

His principle is not in one place rather than another,

but it brings the Real to the creatures.

When He manifests Himself to the eyes,

the intellects deny him by insistent proofs.

He is accepted in the *tajalli* to the intellects,

and in that which is called the imagination (*khayâl*).

That which is sound is the seeing.

Abu Yazid,^{[7](#)} may Allah be pleased with him, says of this station,^{[8](#)} "Had the Throne, and all it contains a hundred million times over, been in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have felt it." This is the magnitude of Abu Yazid in the world of bodies, but I say, "If the limitlessness of that which exists could be conceived of as being limited, and had it been contained as an existent source in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have been aware of it in his knowledge." For it is confirmed that the heart contains Allah, although it is not described by satiety. Had it been filled, it would have saturated.

Abu Yazid also said, "We have pointed to this station, saying:

O Creator of things in Yourself,

You encompass all You have created!

You create that whose being has no end in You,

for You are narrow and vast!

Had that which Allah created shone in my heart,

this shining dawn would not have shone.

But that which contains Allah

does not exclude creation.

How is that, O Hearing?

Anyone can create by illusion in his imagination that which has no existence save in the imagination. This is a common matter. By aspiration (*himmā*), the gnostic creates that which has an outside existence in his aspiration. However, it continues only as long as the aspiration continues to preserve it without being tired by preserving what it created.[9](#)

When it happens that the gnostic neglects to preserve what he created by concentration, that creature ceases to exist, unless the gnostic has mastered all the presences and does not neglect anything. Rather, he must witness at least one of these presences. If the gnostic creates something by his aspiration and possesses this encompassment, that creature's form will appear in every presence, and the form will preserve itself. If the gnostic neglects a presence or many presences while seeing one of the presences, and while preserving the form of what he created in the presence he is in, all the forms will be preserved by the preservation of that form in the presence which he does not neglect. For neglect is never universal, either among the common or the elite.

I have exposed a secret here which the People of Allah have guarded jealously, for it contains a refutation of their allegation of being the Real. For the Real is never unconscious of anything, and the slave must be unconscious of something in favour of something else. Inasmuch as he preserves that which he has created, he says, "I am the Real,"[10](#) but he does not maintain it the way the Real maintains it – that is the difference. Inasmuch as he is unconscious of any form and its presence, the slave is distinguished from the Real. He must be distinct, although all the forms are maintained by his preservation of a single one of these in the presence of which he is conscious. This is preservation by inclusion, and the preservation of the Real of what He created is not like that. Rather, His preservation is of each form in particular. This matter which I have just communicated has never been written about by anyone - neither by me nor by any others - except in this book. It is unique in time. Take care lest you forget it!

The presence which you remain conscious of, with the form which resembles it, is like the Book about which Allah said, "*We have not omitted anything from the Book.*" (6:38) It therefore integrates the tangible and the intangible. None will recognise what we have said except the one who is himself a Qur'an.[11](#) The one who fears Allah will have a *furqân*,[12](#) which is, as we mentioned, this matter in

which the slave is distinct from the Lord. This *furqân* is the highest *furqân*.

At one moment, the slave is the Lord without a doubt,
and at another the slave is most certainly the slave.

If he is the slave, he is vast by Allah,
and if he is the Lord, he is in a restricted life.

Insofar as he is the slave,
he sees the source of himself,
and without a doubt

his hopes expand from him.

Inasmuch as he is a lord, he sees all of creation,
from the presence of angels and the kingdom, demanding from him,

And he is unable to answer their demands by his essence.

For this reason, some of the gnostics weep.

Be the slave of a Lord, and do not be the lord of His slave,
so you will not be suspended and tested in the fire.



1. Famous Sufi who studied under Sufyan ath-Thawri. d. 282/896. Wrote a short commentary on the Qur'an.
2. That the inanimate has more greater gnosis of Allah and obeys Him more than other creatures.
3. Al-Bukhari (6592); Muslim 42:10.
4. In Abu Dawud and Ibn Hanbal.

5. As in the hadith of al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. Either it remains on its dream form or it is subject to interpretation.
7. Al-Bistami, d. 261/874. Famous Sufi known for his ecstatic expressions.
8. The station of the vastness of the heart.
9. Language derived from Qur'an 2:255, "...their preservation does not tire him."
10. Al-Hallaj.
11. i.e. The Perfect Man.
12. Qur'an 8:29, *"O you who believe! If you have fear of Allah, He will give you a furqan..."*

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Elevation in the Word of Isma'il (Ishmael)



Know that the one called Allah is Unique (*Ahad*) by Essence and by all His names, and every existent thing is only attached to Allah by its own lord exclusively, for it is impossible for an existent to possess the whole. As for Divine Unity (*ahadiyya*), no existent possesses any of it because one cannot have one part of it while another has another part. Unity does not admit of divisibility. His Unity integrates all of Him by potentiality.

The happy one is the one is the one "*who was pleasing to his Lord.*" (19:55) There is no one who is not pleasing to his Lord because it is by him that lordship (*rububiyya*)¹ is sustained. He is pleasing to Him, and so he is happy. This is why Sahl at-Tustari said, "Lordship has a secret, and this secret is you." He was addressing every source. "Had the secret been disclosed, lordship would have been invalidated." He used the word "*law*"² which is the particle of impossibility - so it is never manifested, and lordship is never invalidated - for the source has no existence except by its Lord. The source is always existent, therefore lordship is never invalidated.

He who is pleasing is beloved, and all that the beloved does is beloved, so everything is pleasing, because the source could not act unless the act belonged to its Lord. The source is made tranquil by having an act attributed to it, but it is content with what appears in it and from it of the acts of its Lord, and is pleased with these acts, because every doer and producer is pleased with his act and product. He completes his act and product according to its basis. "*He gives each thing its created form and then guides it,*" (20:50) that is, He revealed to it that He gave everything its creation, so it does not admit of decrease.

Isma'il, peace be upon him, by his discovery of what we mentioned "*was pleasing to his Lord.*" In the same way, every existent thing who is pleasing to its Lord is also pleasing to the Lord of another, because lordship is only obtained from each of the names, not from the One of Unity. What is specific to it from the whole is only what is attributed to it. So He is its Lord. None is attached to Him in respect of His Unity. For this reason, the people of Allah are forbidden *tajalli* in the Unity. If you look at Him by Him, He is the One who is looking at Himself, and He continues to be Himself looking at Himself by Himself. If you look at Him by yourself, unity vanishes because of you. If you look at Him both through Him and through you, Unity also vanishes because the pronoun of the second person implies that there is

something else besides that which is regarded. There must be some relationship which necessitates the duality of the regarnder and regarded, and so Unity vanishes, even though there only exists the One who sees Himself by Himself. It is known that in this description, He is the Regarder and the Regarded.

It is not possible that the one who is pleasing be totally pleasing, unless all that he manifests comes from the act of the One who is pleased with him. Isma'il was distinguished from other individuals by how Allah described him, namely, that *"he was pleasing to his Lord."*

It is the same for every *"self at peace"* to which it is said, *"Return to your Lord."* He only commanded it to return to its Lord who called it, and so it recognised Him among the totality, *"well-pleasing and well-pleased. Enter among My slaves!"* (89:28) to the degree that they have this station. The slaves mentioned here refer to every slave who has gnosis of his Lord, who is content with Him, and does not turn to the Lord of another while preserving the unity of the source which is necessary. *"Enter My Garden,"* which is My veil,[3](#) and My Garden is not other than you, so you veil Me by your essence. There is only gnosis of Me by you and you only exist by Me, so whoever has gnosis of you has gnosis of Me, and there is no gnosis of Me, for there is no gnosis of you. If you enter into the Garden, you enter into yourself, so you will know yourself by a gnosis other than the gnosis by which you had knowledge when you knew your Lord. You will have two sorts of gnosis: gnosis of Him in respect of yourself, and gnosis of yourself and Him in respect of Him, not in respect of you.

You are a slave and you are a lord

to whomever you are a slave in respect of.

And you are a lord and you are a slave

to whoever possesses the covenant in speech.

Every knot has a person over it who unravels it

by one who has another knot.

Allah is pleased with His slaves, and *"they are well-pleasing and well-pleased with Him."* He is pleasing, so the two presences confront each other and accept likes, and the likes are opposites because the two likes are a single reality which does not unify them since they would not then be distinct. There is only the distinct, so there is no like. There is no like in existence, and so there is no opposite in existence. Existence is one reality, and the thing is not opposite to itself.

Only the Real remains,

no phenomenal being remains.

There is nothing connected, nothing distinct.

For that reason, the proof of the eye-witness came,

so I only see His source with my eye when I see!

That is for "*the one who fears his Lord*" lest He makes distinction by his knowledge. By that distinction, we indicated the ignorance of sources in existence according to what the knower brought, so distinction occurs among the slaves, and distinction occurs among the lords. If distinction had not occurred, one divine name would have been interpreted in all its aspects by that by which another name is interpreted. The explanation of the Exalter is not that of the Abaser, and so on, but from the aspect of unity, as we said, every name indicates the Essence and its reality in respect to what it is. The One Named is but One. The Exalter is the Abaser in respect to the Named. It is not the Abaser in respect to itself and its reality. That which is understood differs in the understanding in respect to each of them.

Do not look at the Real.

Free Him from creation.

Do not look at creation,

and garb it in other than the Real.

Disconnect Him and connect Him,

and stand in a seat of honour.[4](#)

Stay in the state of gatheredness (*jamÔ*) if you wish,

and, if you wish, in the forms in separateness (*farq*).

You will win all,

even if all set out to carry the day.

You will not be annihilated

and you will not have going-on

and the forms will not be annihilated

and will not have going-on.

Revelation will not be given to you

in respect to another, and you will not receive it.

Praise is by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat. The Divine Presence demands praise which is praiseworthy in itself. So one extols the Divine Presence by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat, for one goes beyond it, "*and do not imagine that Allah break His promise to His Messengers.*" (14:47) He did not say, "and his threat", rather He said that He will pass over their wrong actions even though he threatens not to. He praised Isma'il because "*he was true to his promise.*" (19:54) Possibility vanishes in respect to the Real, since in it is that which demands the probable.

Nothing remains except the One

who is true to His promise alone,

and an eye does not remain

seeing the threat of the Real.

If they enter the abode of misery,

in it they are in possession of delight, and a different bliss.

Than the bliss of the gardens of endless-time, but the matter is the same.

The difference between them occurs in the *tajalli*.

It is called punishment (*'adhab*) from the sweetness (*'udhuba*) of its food,

that is like the husk of it, and the husk protects it.



1. *Rububiyya*: Lordship, the quality of being a lord. A term derived from the Qur'anic descriptions of Allah's lordship over creation. One might say the ecology of natural existence. It is an essential element in Sufic cosmology and is a most sophisticated concept which surpasses the crude specificity and mechanistic views of evolutionist biology. It is an energy system of relationships in constant change and altering dynamics. It functions through the different realms, the atomic, the mineral, the plant, and so on. It relates the levels of living organisms from the uni-cellular up to man, and the interpenetrations of

organism and environment. It re-defines "event" from crude historicity to a picture of organism/event in a unified field. It is the underlying concept which allows us to abandon the dead mind/body split of the dying culture. It permits us to utilise and develop the energy concepts of Islamic/Chinese medicine - which hold a common energy concept at base. Rububiyya permits us to observe ONE PROCESS at work throughout every level of the creational realities.

2. *Law* (if) expresses an unlikely condition.

3. Garden, *Janna*, also carries the connotation of veiling, concealing.

4. Qur'an 54:53-55, *"The fearfully aware will be amid Gardens and Rivers on seats of honour in the presence of an All-Powerful King."*

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The Seal of the Wisdom of the Spirit (*Rûh*) in the Word of Ya'qub (Jacob)



The *deen*¹ is two *deens*: the *deen* with Allah and with the one whom the Real knows, and who has recognition of the fact that the Real knows him; and the *deen* with creation; and Allah takes account of it since its goal is conformity with what Allah has willed of the Shari'a set down with Him. Allah said, "*Ibrahim directed his sons to this, as did also Ya'qub, 'My sons! Allah has chosen this deen for you, so do not die except as Muslims'*" (2:132) that is obeying Him. The *deen* brought the *alif* and the *lam*² of definition and acquaintance. It is the recognised *deen*. It is His words, "*The deen with Allah is Islam,*" (3:19) and it is submission. So the *deen* is an expression of your obedience. That which is from Allah is the road which leads you to Him. *Deen* is submission and the law (*namus*) is the road which Allah has set down.

Anyone who is described by submission to what Allah has prescribed for him is the one who has based himself on the *deen*, and it raises him up and establishes him as does the prayer. The slave is the product of the *deen*. Allah sets down judgements, and thus submission is the source of your action, and so *deen* is from your action. You will only achieve happiness by what comes from you. As happiness is established for you by your actions, so the Divine Names are only established by His actions, which are you and which are in-time. As He is called god by His effects, so you are called happy by your effects.

Allah bestowed His rank upon you since you established the *deen* and obeyed what He prescribed for you. I will enlarge on that, if Allah wills, in a useful manner, after we have clarified the *deen* which creation has which Allah takes account of when He says, "*The deen is Allah's alone,*" (8:39) and all of it is from you, and not from Him except in respect to origin. Allah says, "*They invented monasticism,*" (57:27) and monasticism consists of arbitrary esoteric rules (*an-nawâmis al-hikmiya*) which the known Messenger did not bring to the people from Allah by the traditional Prophetic method. When wisdom and clear benefit corresponded to these rules regarding the divine decision about the goal of the Shari'a of Allah,³ Allah took it into account according to what He Himself prescribed. Allah did not prescribe it for them. Then Allah opened between Himself and their hearts the door of divine concern and mercy while they were not aware of it, and in their hearts He made them esteem their rules by which they seek "the pleasure of Allah" beyond the Prophetic method known by Divine definition. Allah says, "*They did not observe it*" – those people who devised these rules and what was prescribed for them – "*as it should have been observed*" - "*unless it was purely out of the desire to gain the good*

pleasure of Allah." That was what they believed about it.

"To those of them who believed We gave their reward, but many of them are deviators." (57:27) "Many of them," i.e. those who have this worship prescribed for them, *"are deviators,"* that is, do not submit to it and observe it properly. Allah does not accord to the one who does not obey it, a law which pleases Him, but the command requires submission. Its proof is that the one who is obligated either obeys with agreement or opposes it. The one who agrees and is obedient has no need of any discourse on it to prove it. The one who opposes it is seeking one of two matters from Allah to be judged regarding him: either overlooking of wrong actions and forgiveness, or being taken to task for that. One of the two is necessary because the command is true in itself. In any state, it is true that Allah guides His slave by his actions whatever state he is in, and so the state is the influencing factor.

Thus the *deen* is a reward, that is, the exchange for what is easy and for what for is not easy. *"Allah is pleased with them, and they are pleased with Him"* (97:8, 58:22) is the easy reward, and *"As for any one of you who has done wrong, We will make him suffer great punishment"* (25:19) is the reward of what is not easy. He passes over their wrong actions and this is their reward. It is proven that the *deen* is the reward. As the *deen* is Islam, and Islam is the same as being led, it leads to what is easy (the reward) and what is not easy (the punishment), and so it is the repayment. This is the language of the people of outwardness.

As for its secret and inwardness, it manifests itself in the mirror of the existence of Allah, so it does not refer to possibilities from Allah other than what their essences in their states accord. They have a form in every state, and their forms differ according to the difference of their states. The *tajalli* differs according to the difference of the state. The effect occurs in the slave according to what he is. None gives him good except himself, and none gives him the opposite of good except himself. Thus he gives bliss to his essence, and he also punishes it. He only blames himself and only praises himself. *"Allah's is the conclusive argument"* (6:149) in His knowledge of them since knowledge depends on the known.

The secret which is above this in this sort of question is that possibilities are based on their origin from non-existence. The existence of the created reality is only by the forms of the states on which the possibilities are based in themselves and their sources. Thus you know who has pleasure and who has pain, and from each of these states you know what follows (*'aqaba*); and since it follows, you derive punishment (*'uquba*) and penalty (*'iqab*) from it. It permits good and evil as two opposites which custom calls the good reward, and the evil punishment.

For this reason, He designates and elucidates the *deen* by custom because He relates to it what is necessary and what his state demands. *Deen* is custom or habit, and the poet said, "Like your habit (*deen*) with the mother of little Harith...," that is, like your custom. What is understood by custom or habit is that the matter itself recurs. This is not the case in *deen*. Custom is repetition, but custom is only one intelligible thing while resemblance in forms exists. We know that Zayd is the same as 'Amr in respect to humanness, but humanness does not recur since, had it done so, it would have multiplied. It is but one reality, and the one does not multiply itself. We know that Zayd is not the same as 'Amr in

respect to personality. The person of Zayd is not the person of 'Amr in spite of the realisation that personality is common to both. In the sensory, we say that humanness recurs because of this resemblance, and we say in sound judgement that it does not. From one aspect, there is no habit in reward, and from another aspect, there is habit even as there is reward by one aspect and no reward by another aspect. Thus reward is also a state in the possible.

This is a question about which those who know this matter are unaware, and it is part of the secret of the Decree which governs creatures. Know that it is as if it were said of the doctor that he is the servant of nature - in the same way, it is said of the Messengers and heirs [4](#) that they are the servants of the Divine Command among people. In the heart of the matter, they serve the states of possible things, and their service derives from the sum of their own states on which they are based in the state of the immutability of their sources. See how wondrous this is!

Is not the the desired servant here the one who performs what is commanded by the one who is served, either by state or by word? So it is valid that the doctor be called the servant of nature if he acts according to the principle of assisting it. Nature produces in the body of the one who is ill a special state of being by which he is called "ill". If the doctor were to assist nature by service, he would also increase the magnitude of the illness by it when he wants to repel the illness, seeking health. Health is also a part of nature by the growth of another state of being which differs from this state of being. Then the doctor is not the servant of nature, and yet he serves it inasmuch as he only heals the body of the one who is ill and changes that aspect, not the general one, for generalities are not valid in this sort of question. Thus the doctor is both a servant and is not a servant of nature.

In the same way, the Messengers and their heirs are in the service of the Real, and the Real has two aspects of judgement in respect to the states of the obligated. The matter proceeds from the slave according to what the will of Allah demands of it, and the will of Allah is attached to it according to what the knowledge of Allah demands of it. The knowledge of Allah is attached to it according to what the known accords it of its essence. The known only appears in its form. The Messenger and the heir serve the divine command by will, and yet they do not serve the will. The Messenger answered it seeking the happiness of the one who is under obligation. Had he served the Divine Will, he would not have given counsel, and yet he only gave counsel by it, i.e. the will. The Messenger and the heir are the doctors of the selves for Next life, obedient to the command of Allah when He commands them. So he looks at Allah's command, and sees that He has commanded him to do that which opposes His will. The command is only what He wills, and for this reason, it is the command.

He wills the command and it occurs, and He did not will the occurrence of what He commanded the commanded one to do, and so it did not occur from the commanded one – therefore it is called opposition and rebellion. The Messenger conveys the news, and this is why he said, "The *Sura* of Hud (and its like) made me white-haired," when they came to him from His words, "*Go straight as you have been commanded.*" (11:112) He did not know whether he was commanded to what complies with the will, so that it occurs, or to what does not comply with the will, so that it does not occur.

No one recognises the judgement of the will except after what is willed takes place, unless he is one whose inner eye has been unveiled by Allah. If he is, he will perceive the source-forms of the possibilities in their fixed state for what they really are. Then he judges according to what he sees. This belongs to certain people at certain moments, but they do not have it all the time. The Messenger said, "I do not know what He will do with me or with you." [5](#) So he made the veil clear, and he only meant that it emerges in a particular command, and no more.



1. *Deen*: The life transaction, literally the debt or exchange situation between two parties, in this usage the Creator and the created, or as some say between the conditioned and the unconditioned, the limited and the limitless, or the many and the One.
2. The definite article.
3. Which is the achievement of human perfection through knowledge and actions.
4. Hadith, "The people of knowledge are the heirs of the Prophets."
5. Hadith in al-Bukhari.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Light in the Word of Yusuf (Joseph)



This luminous wisdom spreads its light on the presence of the imagination (*khayal*), and it is the first of the beginnings of divine revelation in the people of divine concern. 'A'isha, may Allah be pleased with her, said, "The first of what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had of revelation was the true dream. Then he only saw dreams which came like the breaking of dawn, and there was nothing hidden in it," [1](#) and her knowledge only extended to this. This lasted for six months, and then the angel came to him. She did not know that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had said, "People are asleep, and when they die, they waken up." Everything seen in the state of wakefulness is of that sort, although states differ. She spoke of six months, but all his life in this world was like that, as a dream in a dream.

Everything reported of this nature is called the world of the imagination (*khayal*), and for this reason, there must be interpretation: the matter which has a form in itself appears in a form other than it. The interpreter passes from these forms which the sleeper sees to the form upon which the matter is based. If he is correct, as in knowledge appearing in the form of milk, then he interprets the source of the form of knowledge from the form of milk, He discovers the source and says, "This form of milk refers to the form of knowledge."

When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received revelation, he was taken from the ordinary sensory world. He was covered and withdrew from those who were present with him. When that left him, he returned, and he only received revelation in the "presence of the imagination", although it could not be said of him that he had been asleep.

It was the same when the angel appeared to him as a man. That was also from the presence of the imagination, for it was not a man, but rather an angel who had entered into the form of a man. The gnostic onlooker interpreted it until he reached its form in reality. Then he said, "This is Jibril who came to teach you your *deen*." [2](#) He told them, "Answer the greeting of the man," so he called him a man in respect to the form in which he appeared to them. Then he said, "This is Jibril," and he looked at the form to which this imaginary man would return. He spoke the truth both times, with the truth of the vision of the physical eye, and the truth in that this was Jibril without a doubt.

Yusuf, peace be upon him, said, *"I saw eleven stars and the sun and the moon prostrate themselves in front of me."* (12:4) He saw his brothers in the form of the stars and his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon. This is from the point of view of Yusuf. Had it been from the point of view of what was seen, the appearance of his brothers in the form of stars and the appearance of his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon would have been from their volition. Since they had no knowledge of what he saw, that which Yusuf perceived was in the repository of his imagination.

Ya'qub knew that when he related it to him, so he said, *"O my son, do not tell your vision to your brothers in case they should devise some scheme to injure you."* (12:5) Then he absolved his sons of deceit and ascribed it to Shaytan, who is the source of deceit. He said, *"In truth, Shaytan is a clear-cut enemy to man,"* i.e. he manifests enmity. Then Yusuf said at the end of the affair, *"This is now the interpretation of the dream that I had. My Lord has made it all come true,"* (12:100) that is, that He manifested it in the world of senses after it was in the form of the imagination.

The Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said about it, "People are asleep". Yusuf spoke of what his Lord had rendered true in the status of one who dreams that he has awakened from his dream and interprets it, and does not know that he is still asleep. Then later when he wakes up, he says, "I dreamt such-and-such a thing, and then I dreamt that I woke up and interpreted in such-and-such a way." This is similar to that. Look at how great the difference of perception is between Muhammad, peace be upon him, and Yusuf, peace be upon him, at the end of the affair when Yusuf said, *"This is the interpretation of my dream of long ago which my Lord has rendered true,"* that is, made sensory or sensed. It was always sensed, since the imagination only gives out sensed things, and it has nothing other than that. See how noble is the knowledge of the heirs of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace!

I would say more on this presence on the Muhammadan tongue of Yusuf, as you will soon understand, if Allah wills. Know that that which is referred to as other-than-Allah, or the universe, is related to Allah as the shadow is related to the person. The universe is the shadow of Allah. It is the same as the relation of existence to the universe, since the shadow exists in the senses without a doubt. But there must be something by which that shadow appears. If one were to remove that by which the shadow appears, the shadow would be intelligible but would not exist in the senses. Rather, it would be a potential in the essence of the person on whom it depends. The locus of the manifestation of this divine shadow called the "universe" is the sources of the possibilities by which this shadow extends itself. This shadow is perceived according to what it projects itself on from the existence of this essence, but perception occurs through His name, the Light. This shadow is projected on the sources of possibilities in the form of the unknown unseen.

Do you not see that shadows incline to the darkness, indicating the hiddenness they contain because of the distance of the relationship between them and the persons who project them? Even if the person is white, his shadow is like this. Do you not see that when mountains are distant from the eye of the onlooker, they appear black? In their actual sources they are other than the colour the senses perceive. This is only due to the effect of distance. It is like the blue of the sky. This is the effect distance has on the senses with non-luminous bodies. It is the same for the sources of possibilities which are non-

luminous because they are non-existent. Even if they are described as unchanging, they are not described by existence since existence is light. Distance makes luminous bodies appear small in the senses, so this is another effect of distance. The senses perceive them as small in size, whereas in their sources they are large according to that degree and greater in magnitude. One knows by proof that the sun is larger than the earth, but it appears to be the size of a shield. That is also an effect of distance.

You only know the universe according to the amount you know the shadows, and you are ignorant of the Real according to what you do not know of the person on which that shadow depends. Inasmuch as He has a shadow, He is known, and inasmuch as one is ignorant of what is in the essence of the shadow of the form which projects the shadow, he is ignorant of Allah. For that reason, we say that Allah is known to us from one aspect and not known to us from another aspect. *"Do you not see how your Lord stretches out shadows? If He had wished, He could have made them stationary,"* (25:45) i.e. it still would be a potential in Himself. It is as He said, that Allah would not give a tajalli of Himself to possibilities until He manifests the shadow. The shadow is as if it remains outside of the possibilities which do not have a source manifested for them in existence.

"Then We appoint the sun to be a pointer to them," that is to His name, the Light of which we spoke, and the senses witness it, for shadows have no source in the absence of light. *"Then We draw them back to Ourselves, in gradual steps,"* so Allah draws it back to Himself because it is His shadow which appeared from Him, and it is not other-than-Him. All that you perceive is the existence of Allah in the sources of possibilities. Inasmuch as the He-ness of Allah is He, it is His existence. Inasmuch as forms differ in it, it is the sources of possibilities. As the name of the shadow does not leave it by the difference of forms, in the same way the name of the universe or the name other-than-Allah does not leave it by the difference of forms.

In regard to the Divine Unity of His being, the shadow is Allah, because He is the One, the Unique; and in respect to the multiplicity of forms, it is the world, so understand and realise what I have explained to you!

Since the matter is as I mentioned, the universe is illusory, and it does not have a real existence. This is the meaning of the imagination, that is, you imagine that the universe is an autonomous extra thing outside of Allah. It is not like that in itself. Do you not see that in the senses, the shadow is connected to the person who projects it, and it is impossible that it be detached from that connection since it is impossible for something to be detached from its own essence? Recognise your source (*'ayn*), and who you are, what is your he-ness and what your relation to Allah is, and by what You are the Truth and by what you are the universe, "other", and whatever resembles these expressions. In this, those that know vie in excellence, so there is the one who knows and the one who is more knowing.

The Real is, in relation to a particular shadow, small or large, pure or more pure, as light is in relation to what veils it from the onlooker through coloured glass which tints it. At the same time, it has no colour, and so you see it as making a mirror-image of your reality to your Lord. If you say that the light is green by the greenness of the glass, you will have spoken the truth as your sensory vision testifies. If you say

that it is not green and has no colour as evidence accords you, you will have spoken the truth as sound logical consideration testifies. This is light projected across the shadow, and it is the same as the glass which is a luminous shadow because of its purity.

It is the same for one of us who has realised the Real. His form manifests itself in him more than it manifests itself in another. Among us there is the one for whom Allah is his hearing, seeing, and all his faculties and limbs,³ according to the signs which the Shari'a gives in a transmission from Allah. In spite of this, the source of the shadow exists, so the pronoun of "his hearing" refers to him. Other slaves are not like this. The relation of this slave is nearer to the existence of Allah than the relation of other slaves.

Then the matter is as we have confirmed. So know that you are imagination and that which you perceive and of which you say, "It is not me" is also imagination. All of existence is imagination within imagination. True existence is Allah, the Real, in particular in respect to essence and source, not in respect to His Names, because the Names have two meanings. One meaning is His source which is the same as the "Named", and the other meaning is what it indicates and that by which the Name is separate from this other Name, and so distinct. The Ever-Forgiving is separate from the Manifest and the Hidden, and the First is distinct from the Last. Thus it is clear to you that each Name is the same as the other Name, and yet it is not the other Name. Inasmuch as the Name is the same, it is the Real, and inasmuch as it is not it, it is the imaginary Real which we discussed.

Glory be to the One who is only proven by Himself and Whose being is only confirmed by His source! The Hidden is pure non-existence, so whoever holds to multiplicity, holds to the universe and the Divine Names and the names of the world. Whoever holds to Divine Unity holds to Allah in respect to His Essence which is independent of the universe, not in respect to its divinity and form. If the Essence is independent of the universe, then He is the source of its independence from the ascriptions of the Names, because it has the Names, and they indicated it as they indicate other named things in which their effect is realised. *"Say: He is Allah, Absolute Oneness"* (112:1) in respect of his source, *"Allah, the Everlasting Sustainer of all"* in respect to our dependence on Him. *"He has not given birth"* in respect to His He-ness and us, *"and was born born"* the same way, *"and no one is comparable to Him"* in the same way.

This is His description so He singled out His Essence in His statement, *"Allah is Unique (Ahad)"*. Multiplicity appears by His attributes which are known with us. We beget and are begotten, we depend on Him, and we are equals to one another. This is the One who is pure above these attributes. He is independent of them as He is independent of us. There is no description of Allah except for this *sura*, the *Sura al-Ikhlās* (112), and it was revealed in that. The Divine Unity (*ahadiyya*) of Allah is in respect to the Divine Names which demand the unity of multiplicity on our part, and the Divine Unity of Allah, in respect to His independence from us and from the names, is the Divine Unity of the source. Both of them are included in the name, the Unique One (*al-Ahad*).

Know that Allah has not manifested the shadows and made them prostrate themselves, casting themselves to the left and the right,⁴ except as indications for you of yourself and Him. In this way you

are able to recognise who you are and what your relationship to Him is, and what His relationship to you is, until you know from where and by which divine reality that which is other-than-Allah is described, through its complete poverty to Him as well as the relative poverty of some to others. In this way also, you are able to know from where and by what reality it is that Allah is described by independence from people and the universe, and the universe is described by independence, i.e. the independence of some from others in an aspect which is the source of its need of some. For the universe is in need of causes without a doubt by essential need. The greatest of its causes is the causality of Allah, and there is no causality of Allah by which the universe is in need except for the Divine Names. The universe is in need of each of the Divine Names, whether from the universe like it or, from Allah Himself. Thus it is Allah, and not other-than-Him.

This is why Allah said, *"Mankind! you are the poor in need of Allah whereas Allah is the Rich Beyond Need, the Praiseworthy."* (35:15) It is known that we depend on each other. Our names are the Names of Allah since everything is, without a doubt, in need of Him. At the same time, our sources are His shadow, and not other-than-Him. So He is our he-ness, and He is not our he-ness. We have prepared the way for you, so look!




1. In al-Bukhari and elsewhere.
2. In Muslim, also an-Nawawi's *Forty Hadith*.
3. Hadith, see. p.11.
4. Ref. Qur'an 16:48, *"Do they not see the things that Allah has created, casting their shadows to the right and to the left, prostrating themselves before Allah incomplete humility."*

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Divine Unity (*Ahadiyya*) in the Word of Hud



Allah has the straight path which is manifest
and unhidden among the common people.

Its source exists in great and small,
in those who are ignorant of matters
and those who know.

For this reason, 'His mercy encompasses everything,'¹ great and small.

"There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) So all that walks on the Straight Path of the Lord, and is not of those "against whom Allah is wrathful" from this aspect, nor is he "astray".² As being astray is a non-essential quality, so divine wrath is also a non-essential quality. The source to which they return is the "mercy which extends to all things", and which preceded wrath. Everything which is other-than-Allah is a creature which crawls and which has a spirit. There is nothing which crawls by itself, rather it crawls by other than it. It crawls by the principle of following the One who is on a Straight Path. It is only a path by virtue of the fact that it is walked on.

If creation draws near you, Allah draws near you.

If Allah draws near you, creation does not follow.

So realise what we say on it,

and everything I have said to you is true.

There is no existent thing in phenomenal being

that you see which does not have articulation.

The eye only sees of creation

that its source is Allah.

But He is stored in it,

and for this reason, its forms are true.

Know that divine knowledges of taste (*dhawq*) which are acquired by the people of Allah differ according to the different faculties acquired from them, even though they derive from a single source. Allah said, "I am his hearing by which he hears and his sight by which he sees and his hand by which he strikes and his foot by which he walks."³ So He mentioned that His He-ness is the source of the limbs which are the same as the slave. Thus He-ness is one, but the limbs are different, and every limb has one of the knowledges of taste which are specified from a single source, and differ according to the different limbs. It is like water which is but a single reality, yet differs in taste according to the different locations. The water of the Euphrates is sweet, and brackish water is salty, yet it is water in all its states and its reality does not change, even though the taste differs.

This wisdom is from the wisdom of the feet. It is the words of Allah, that whoever establishes His Books will eat "*from beneath their feet*" (5:66). The path which is the Straight Path is travelling on it, and walking and running on it. It is only by the feet. So this witnessing of the taking by the forelock by the hand of the One who is one the Straight Path only results in this special art from the knowledges of taste. "*We will drive the evildoers*" (19:86),⁴ who are those who deserve the station to which they are sent, and destroy them by the west wind.⁵ The wind takes them by the forelocks and carries them on, and it is the source of the passions which take them to *Jahannam*. It is the distance ⁶ which they imagined. When it carried them to that abode, they reached the source of nearness, and so distance vanished. What is called *Jahannam* vanished in respect to them. They win the bliss of nearness in respect to merit since they were wrong-doers.

This pleasurable station of taste was not given to them as a favour. They received it by what they realities merited from the acts which they were doing. They were running with their actions on the Straight Path of the Lord because their forelocks were in the hand of the One who has this attribute. They did not walk by themselves, but by the principle of compulsion to reach the source of nearness. "*We are nearer to him than you, but you cannot see.*" (56:85) Rather it is seen, and so the covering is stripped away, and "his sight is sharp."⁷

What is specified as dead is from the dead, i.e. what distinguishes the happy from the wretched in usage. "*We are nearer to him than his jugular vein.*" (50:16) What is specified as man is from man, so divine nearness is from distance as is not hidden in divine transmissions. There is no nearness nearer than that

His He-ness be the source of the limbs of the slave and his faculties. The slave is not other than these limbs and faculties, so he is Allah witnessed in illusory creation. Creation is intelligible and Allah is felt and witnessed with the believers and the people of unveiling. Allah is intelligible with other classes, and creation is witnessed. So they are in the station of the salty, brackish water. The first group is the station of the sweet water which is pleasant to drink.

People are of two classes – those who walk on the path recognising it and its end, for it is a straight path in respect to him; and those who walk on the path being ignorant of it and not knowing its end. It is the same path which the other class knows. The gnostic calls to Allah by inner sight, and the non-gnostic calls to Allah by limitation and ignorance. This is a special knowledge which comes from the lowest of the low [8](#) because the feet are the lower part of the person, and what is lower than them is none other than the path. Whoever recognises that Allah is the same as the Path, recognises the matter for what it is. Then Allah is travelling on it since there is no known except Him, and He is the source of the wayfarer and the traveller. There is no knower except Him. He is you, so know your reality and your Path (*tariqa*). The matter has been made clear to you on the tongue of the interpreter, [9](#) if you but understand. It is the true tongue, so the only one who will understand is the one whose understanding is Real.

Allah has many ascriptions and their existence varies. See how 'Ad, the people of Hud, said, *"This is a storm cloud which will give us rain."* (46:24) They thought good of Allah, and He is with the opinion of His slave. [10](#) Allah turned this word away from them. He informed them of what was more perfect and higher in nearness. When it rained upon them, that was the earth's portion and the seed was watered. He told them, *"No, rather it is what you desired to hasten – a wind containing painful punishment."* He made the wind (*rîh*) an indication of what rest (*râha*) it contained for them. By this wind, He gladdens their spirits (*arwah*), delivering them from dark forms, difficult paths and black veils.

There is punishment (*'adhab*) in this wind, i.e. a matter which they find sweet (*ista'dhaba*) when they taste it. It only pains them by the separation from familiar things. Thus punishment gives them good news. And the command is nearer to them than they imagine.

"Destroying everything at its Lord's command ! When morning came you could see nothing but their dwellings." (46:25) That is, their corpses, in which their true spirits lived, so the trueness of this special relation vanished from them; and a special life in their forms remains to them from Allah of which their skins, hands, and feet speak, [11](#) so does the punishment of the blows and thighs. [12](#) All that is related in a divine text.

Allah described himself by jealousy (*ghayra*). Out of jealousy He forbade actions unrestrained by limits (*fawahish*). The unrestrained act is only what is evident. As for the unrestrained which is hidden, it belongs to the one who manifests it. When He made the unrestrained haram, that it, forbade that the reality of what we mentioned be known, and that is the source of things, He hid it by other (*ghayr*). So other says: hearing is Zayd's hearing. The gnostic says that hearing is Allah. Thus nothing remains of the faculties and limbs. Therefore not everyone recognises Allah. People vie in excellence and ranks are differentiated, and the exceeding and exceeded are clear.

Know that Allah revealed to me and caused me to witness in a vision, which I received in Cordoba in 586, the sources of His Messengers and all His Prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. None of this group spoke to me except for Hud, peace be upon him. He told me why they were gathered together. I saw that he was a very large man of good appearance, subtle in reply, gnostic in matters of unveiling. My proof of his unveiling is His words, *"There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path."* (11:56) What gift to creatures is greater than this? Then it is from the bestowal of favours on us by Allah that this speech reached us from Him in the Qur'an.

Then Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant us peace, completed its gathering for everyone by what he was told by Allah, for He is the source of "hearing, sight, the hand, the foot and tongue – the source of the senses. The spiritual faculties are nearer than the senses. He is content with the defined and distant more than with the defined unknown which is nearer. Allah translated the speech of Hud to his people to inform us, and the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, translated the speech of Allah in turn to give us good news. Knowledge is perfected in the breasts of those who are given knowledge, *"and none denies Our signs but the unbelievers,"* (29:47) for they cover up the signs when they recognise them through envy, meanness and injustice.

We only see from Allah in respect of Himself disconnection (*tanzih*) or non-disconnection by definition in any ayat which He has sent down or in transmissions which have reached us from Him. Otherwise He has the Great Mist (*al-'Ama'*)[13](#) which has no air above it and no air beneath it. Allah was in it before He created creation. Then He mentioned that He *"established Himself firmly on the Throne."* (57:4) This is also definition. Then He mentioned that "He descends to the nearest heaven." [14](#) This is also definition. Then He said that "He is in the heaven and in the earth," [15](#) and "He is with us wherever we are." [16](#) and He tells us that He is our source. We are limited, so He only describes Himself by limitation.

His statement, *"There is nothing like Him,"* (42:11) is also limitation if we take the *kaf* ("like") as an appendage to other than the attribute. Whoever is distinct from the defined is defined by his phenomenal being which is not the source of what is defined. Freedom from limitation is limitation, and the absolute is limited by absoluteness for whoever has understanding. If we attach the *kaf* of *ka-mithli* (like) to the attribute, we define it. If we take *"There is nothing like Him"* as the negation of "like (*mithl*)", we realise the given and the sound transmissions that He is the source of things, and that things are defined. If their definitions differ, He is defined by the definition of everything with a definition. Nothing is defined unless it is a definition of Allah's. He moves in the designation of creatures and creation. Had the matter not been like that, existence would not have been valid, for He is the source of existence. He preserves everything by His Essence, and the preserving of something does not oppress Him. [17](#) His preserving of all things is His preserving of His form in that the thing is other than His form. Only this is valid. He is the witness in the witness and the witnessed in the witnessed. [18](#) He is the spirit of the universe which is managed by Him, and it is the Macrocosmic or Great man (*al-insan al-kabir*).

He is all phenomenal being

and He is the One (*al-Wahid*)

who establishes my phenomenal being by His being,

For that reason, I said that He is nourished.

So my existence is His food, and we imitate Him in Him from Him,

if you look by the aspect of my taking refuge.

For his sorrow breathed, so the breath is related to the All-Merciful because He is Merciful by it. Divine ascriptions demand it from the bringing into existence of the form of the universe which we have said is what is manifest by Allah since He is the Manifest. It is His inward since He is the Hidden; and He is the First since He was when they were not. He is the Last since their source is in their manifestation. The Last is the source of the Manifest, and the Hidden is the source of the First. He has knowledge of all things since he knows Himself.

When He brought forms into existence in the Breath, and the power of the ascriptions designated by the names appeared, the divine ascriptions then became valid for the universe. They depend on Allah. He said, "Today, I set down your ascriptions and raise up My ascriptions," i.e. I take from you your dependence on yourselves and return to you your dependence on Me. Where are those who are fearful of Allah? [19](#) – they those who take Allah as a safeguard. Allah is their manifest part, i.e. the source of their manifest forms. They are the greatest of people, the most pure and the strongest among all. The one who has *taqwa* is the one who makes himself a safeguard for Allah by His form since the He-ness of Allah is the faculties of the slave. The one called the slave makes a safeguard for the One called Allah based on witnessing, so that the knower is distinct from the one who does not know. "Say: 'Are they the same – those who know and those who do not know?' It is only people of intelligence who pay heed," (39:9) and they see into the core of the thing [20](#) which is sought from that thing.

The negligent one does not precede the diligent, and similarly the hireling does not resemble the slave, Since Allah is a safeguard for the slave by one aspect, the slave is a safeguard for Allah by another aspect. Say what you like about phenomenal being. If you like, say that it is creation. If you like, say that is the Real. If you like, say that it is both the Real and creation. If you like, say that it is not Real from every point of view and not creation from every point of view. If you wish, say it is bewilderment in that. The goals are made clear by your specification of ranks. If it had not been for definition, the Messengers would not have reported the changing of the Real in forms, nor would they have described Him by the dropping of forms from Himself.

The eye only looks to Him,

and authority only rests with Him.

We are His, and by Him, in His hand, in every state, so we are with Him. For that reason, He is denied and recognised, disconnected and described. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by His eye is a gnostic. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by his own eye is not a gnostic. The one who does not see Allah from Him nor in Him, and waits to see Him by his own eye is veiled and ignorant.

On the whole, each person must have some doctrine of his Lord by which he refers to Him and in which he seeks Him. So when Allah manifests Himself to him in it, he knows Him and goes near Him. If He manifests Himself to him in other than it, he denies Him and takes refuge from Him and has bad *adab* in that matter while claiming he shows *adab* with Him.^{[21](#)} He only believes in a divinity according to the [subjective] form he gives that in himself. The divinity of creeds is based on subjective positing. People only see themselves and what they formulate in themselves.

Look at the ranks of people in knowledge of Allah. That is the source of their ranks in vision on the Day of Rising; and I have taught you the necessary cause of it. Take care lest you be limited by a particular creed and deny what is other than it, so that a great blessing may pass you by. Indeed, knowledge of what the matter is based on may pass you by.

Make yourself a vessel for all the forms of belief. Surely Allah is vaster and greater than being contained by one creed rather than another. So Allah says, "*Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there.*" (2:115) He did not mention one "where" less than another. He said **there** is the face of Allah. The face of the thing is its reality. By this He spoke to the hearts of the gnostics, that they might not occupy themselves with non-essentials in this life through seeking the like of this. The slave does not know in which breath he will be taken. He may be taken at the time of his negligence, and then he will not be equal to the one taken in a state of presence.

Then the slave who is perfect knows that this is linked to exterior form and to the state limited by turning the prayer toward the Masjid al-Haram. He believes that Allah is in his *qibla* when he prays. Those are some of the ranks of Allah from "*Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there.*" The direction of the Masjid al-Haram is one of them. In it is the face of Allah, but do not say "He is here", rather stop with what you perceive and cling to *adab* in turning towards the Masjid al-Haram, and cling to *adab* in the non-encompassment of the face in this particular whereness. Rather whereness is part of the sum of directions to which one turns. So Allah makes it clear to you that He is in the "where-ness" of every direction.

There are only creeds, so all directions are correct. Every correct thing has a reward. Every rewarded thing is happy. Every happy one is approved. If he is wretched at one time in the Next Abode, the people of preservation experience illness and pain in this life in spite of our knowledge that they are happy and the people of Allah. Among the slaves of Allah are those who are overtaken by these pains in the other life in an abode called Jahannam. Even so, none of the people of knowledge to whom the matter is unveiled for what it is declares that they do not possess a bliss particular to them in this abode. As for the loss of pain, they denied it, and so it was lifted from them. Their bliss is their rest from feeling that pain, or else bliss is particular and extra as is the bliss of the people of the Garden in the Garden. Allah

knows best.



1. ref. Qur'an 7:156, *"My mercy extends to all things."*
2. ref. Qur'an 1:7.
3. Hadith qudsi. See above p. 11.
4. "We will drive the evildoers to Jahannam."
5. The worst of winds which does not fertilise trees or raise clouds. It is said that it was a west wind which destroyed ÔAd. It blows in the hot season and is very thirsty.
6. Jahannam comes from a root which means "deep", as in a deep well.
7. See Qur'an 50:22.
8. Ref. Qur'an 95:5, *"We reduced him to the lowest of the low."*
9. The Messenger of Allah in the hadith, *"..I am his hearing, his sight, etc."*
10. *Hadith qudsi*, "I am according to My slave's opinion of Me..."
11. Ref. Qur'an 41:21, *"...that your hearing, eyes, and skin should not testify against you."*
12. In the grave according to hadith.
13. "He was in the Great Mist with air neither above nor below it. "Hadith in Ibn Majah, Ibn Hanbal and at-Tirmidhi.
14. Hadith qudsi from Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim: "Our Lord who is blessed and exalted descends every night to the lowest heavens when two-thirds of the night has passed and says, 'Who supplicates to me so that I may answer him?"
15. Qur'an 6:3, *"He is Allah in the heavens and the earth."*
16. cf. Qur'an 57.4.

17. Qur'an: 2:255.

18. cf. Qur'an 85:3.

19. i.e. have *taqwa*.

20. *Lubb* means both the core of a thing and or understanding.

21. Hadith in Muslim (Belief, 302) about the Day of Rising.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Revelation (*Futuh*)¹ in the Word of Salih



Among the signs are the signs of the mounts.²

That is due to the difference in destinations.

Among those with mounts are those

who make their mounts stand by the command of Allah,

and among them are those who cross

the deserts with their mounts.

As for those who stand,

they are the people of the source,³

and those who cross the deserts are the aliens.

Each of these has the revelation (*futuh*) of the Unseen worlds

brought to him from Allah on every side.

Know, may Allah grant you success, that the business (of bringing into existence) is based on uniqueness (*fardiyya*), and uniqueness has triplicity which is from three and upwards. Three is the first singular. The universe exists from this Divine Presence. Allah, may He be exalted!, says, "*Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, 'Be' and it is.*" (16:40) This is an essence which has volition and speech.⁴ Had it not been for this essence and its volition, which is connecting attention to something particular in order to bring anything into being (and when He turns to that thing, He says, "*Be*"), that thing would not have been. Then tripartite uniqueness also appeared in that thing, and it is by this uniqueness in respect to the thing that it is valid that it take and that it be described by existence. Its triplicity is its thingness, its hearing, and obeying the command of the One who gives it form by

bringing it into existence. It accepted three by the threeness of its fixed essence when it was in the state of its non-existence in counterbalance to the essence of the One who brought it into existence. Its hearing is in counterbalance to the volition of the One who brought it into existence. Its agreeing to comply with the command to take form is in counterbalance to His word *"Be!" and it is.* Taking form is thus related to the thing. If it not had the capacity to take form from within itself when this is said, it would not have been. Allah only brought the thing into existence after it was not in the command of taking form, by the thing itself.

Allah confirmed that taking-form (*takwin*) belongs to the thing itself, not to Allah; and that that which belongs to Allah is His command. Similarly, He told us about Himself when He said, *"Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, 'Be!' and it is."* He ascribed taking-form to the thing itself from the command of Allah. Allah speaks the truth, so this is understood in the command itself. Someone who is feared and not disobeyed commands His slave: "Stand!" and the slave stands in obedience to his master's command. When this slave stands, the master only has the command to the slave to stand. Standing is the slave's action, not the master's action.

Thus taking-form is based on triplicity, i.e. from three, on both sides – the side of Allah and the side of creation. That applies to bringing meanings into existence by proofs. The proof must be compounded of three in a special structure and special condition. There must be a result from it. The result is that the thinker constructs his proof from two propositions. Each one proposition contains two singulars, and so it four. One of the four is repeated in the two propositions in order to link one to the other as is marriage. It is three and no more because of one is repeated in both of them. That is how it is– the goal exists. Then this compound occurs in a special aspect which is that the two propositions are connected to each other by the repetition of that one singular, by which triplicity, and the special condition that the principle be more general by cause or equal to it, is valid. Then the principle is true.

If it is not like that, then it will give a result which is not true. This existent thing in the universe is like the ascription of actions to the slave, removed from their ascription to Allah, or the ascribing of taking form, the object of our discussion, to Allah absolutely. But Allah only ascribed it to the thing which was told, "Be!" A representation of that is if we wish to prove that the universe exists from a cause,⁵ we say that every thing which is in-time has a cause.⁶ Thus we have the in-time and the cause. Then in the other proposition we say that the universe is in time. The "in-time" is repeated in the two propositions. The third singular is "the universe". From this it follows that the universe has a cause and the conclusion appears in what was mentioned in the first proposition - that is the cause.

The special aspect is the repetition of the "in-time", and the special condition is the generality of the cause (*'illa*) because the cause is what effects the existence of the in-time. The principle is general in the in-timeness of the universe in relation to Allah.

We therefore make the judgement that every being which is "in-time" has a cause, i.e. in the greater proposition, unless that cause is equal to the principle or the principle is more general than the cause. So the universe would thus fall under the principle of the cause [in both cases]. The result is true.

The principle of triplicity also appears in bringing meanings into existence, which makes use of proofs. The root of phenomenal being is triplicity. For this reason, the wisdom of Salih, peace be upon him, is what Allah manifested in the delay of three days when He promised to punish the people of Salih, and the promise was kept. The truth was the result, and it was the Cry by which Allah destroyed them, and *"morning found them lying flattemed in their homes."* (11:67) On the first of the three days, the faces of the people became yellow, and on the second day red, and on the third day black. When the three days had passed, their predisposition was proved and corruption appeared in them. That manifestation was called "destruction".

The yellowing of the faces of the wretched is in counterbalance to the shining of the faces of the happy in the words of Allah, *"Some faces on that day will be radiant (musfira)"* (80:38) which comes from *sufur*, when the dawn becomes white. This is a manifestation as the yellowing of the faces on the first day was the manifestation of the sign of the wretchedness of Salih's people. Then came the counterbalance offered to His word about the happy, *"laughing"*. (80:39) Laughter is one of the causes which produces redness in the face. Among the happy, it is the cheeks which are red.

Then He made the complexion of the wretched turn black as a counterbalance to His word, *"joyous (mustabshira)"*.⁷ That is the effect that joy has on their skins as black effected the skins of the wretched. For this reason, He spoke of the two groups with good news (*bushra*). He spoke a word to them which affected their skin (*bashara*) which turned a colour by which skin had not been described before this event. Allah said in regarding the happy, *"Their Lord gives them the good news of His mercy and good pleasure,"* (9:21) and He said about the wretched, *"Give them the news of a painful punishment."* (9:34) There was an effect on the skin of each group because of the effect of the discourse on them. It only appeared in them outwardly by virtue of the understanding which was fixed inside them. So it is them who have that effect on themselves just as taking form only comes from them. *"Allah's is the conclusive argument."* (6:149)

Whoever understands this wisdom and confirms it in himself and witnesses it, gives his self rest from connection to other. He knows that good and evil only come from him. By good, I mean what agrees with his goal and suits his nature and temperament. By evil, I mean what does not agree with his goal or suit his nature and temperament. The one who possesses this witnessing makes out excuses for all existent beings, even if they do not make excuses. He knows that all he has for himself is from himself, as we mentioned at the beginning, since knowledge follows the known. When something which does not agree with his goal comes to him, he tells himself , *"Clench your fists and puff out your cheeks!"* *"Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way."* (33:4)



1. Opening. Salih has this in view of the fact that the mountain split open to reveal the she-camel, he opened belief to those who believed in him. The camel is a mount.

2. Mounts which are miracles proving the truthfulness of the Prophets - like the Buraq of Muhammad and the she-camel of Salih.
3. Eyewitnessing.
4. i.e. a triplicity: Essence, volition, and speech (*qawl*).
5. Here he uses *sabab*, something by which something is brought about, rather than *'illa*, which is something which alters or effects something, as in cause and effect. *'Illa* is the reason behind judicial reasoning.
6. First proposition.
7. Comes from a root meaning skin (*bashara*), the root of *bashshara*, to give good news, is to announce something which produces a change in the complexion.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of the Heart in the Word of Shu'ayb



Know that the heart of the gnostic of Allah is from the mercy of Allah, and it is vaster than mercy. The heart encompasses Allah, but His Mercy does not encompass Him.¹ This is the language of the general public from the door of indication (*ishara*). Allah is merciful (*rahim*) and is not the one to whom mercy is shown (*marhum*). Mercy has no power over Him. As for the indication from the tongue of the elite, Allah describes Himself by the breath which is from breathing. The Divine Names are the same as the Named, and the breath is none other than Him. They require what they give the breath of realities, so the realities which the Names demand are not other than the universe. Thus divinity (*ulûhîya*) demands the object of worship (*ma'luh*) and sovereignty (*rubûbiya*) demands the object of lordship (*marbub*).² They have no source except by the universe in existence and determination (*taqdir*). Allah, in respect to His essence, is independent of the universe, but sovereignty does not possess this principle. The matter remains between what the sovereignty demands and what the essence deserves of independence from the universe. Sovereignty is based on reality and the description is only the same as this essence.

Then the matter changes according to the relationships. It is reported that Allah only describes Himself with compassion for His slaves. The first of what was breathed from sovereignty by Himself is related to the Merciful by His bringing into being the universe, which sovereignty demands by its reality and all the Divine Names. By this aspect it is confirmed that "His mercy encompasses everything."³ It encompasses Allah. It is wider than the heart or equal to it in capacity.

Know that Allah, as it is confirmed in sound tradition, changes in the forms of the *tajalli*. When the heart contains Allah, it does not contain other-than-Him of creatures along with Him. It is as if He filled it, and the meaning of this is, that when it looks to Allah in His *tajalli* to it, it is not possible to look at another with Him.

The heart of the gnostic in respect to vastness is as Abu Yazid al-Bistami said, "If the Throne and what surrounds it a million times over were in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he still would not feel it." Al-Junayd said about this meaning, "If the in-time were compared to the out-of-time, not a trace of it would remain." The heart encompasses the out-of-time, so how can it sense the in-time as existent? If Allah varies His *tajalli* in forms, then by necessity, the heart is expanded and contracted according to the form in which the divine *tajalli* occurs. There is nothing left in the heart apart from the form in which the *tajalli* occurs. So in relation to the seal, the heart of the gnostic or the Perfect Man, is at the

stage of the place that is the face of the seal. It does not exceed it, rather it is its size and shape in respect to roundness. The face is round, square, hexagonal, octagonal, etc. in form. If the face is square, hexagonal, octagonal or whatever form, its place in relation to the seal is like it and it is not like other than it.

This is the opposite of what one group alluded to, saying that Allah gives a *tajalli* according to the predisposition of the slave. This is not how it is. The slave is manifest to Allah according to the form in which Allah gives him a *tajalli* of Himself.

The exact clarification of this question is that Allah has two *tajalli*: an unseen *tajalli* and a visible *tajalli*. From the unseen *tajalli* He accords the predisposition on which the heart is based, and it is the *tajalli* of the Essence of which the Unseen is the reality. It is the He-ness which merits it by His word from Himself: "He". His He-ness is always He. If this predisposition comes to the heart, then the visible *tajalli* is manifested to it in the Visible world, so the heart sees it. He is manifest by the form of whatever *tajalli* he has, as we mentioned. Allah gives it the predisposition by His word, "*He gave everything its creation, then guided it.*" (20:50) Then He lifted the veil between Him and His slave, so He sees Him in the form of his belief in Allah. Allah, who is in the belief, is He whose form the heart contains. He is the One who gives it a *tajalli*, and so it knows Him. The eye only sees by belief, not hidden in the varieties of belief.

Whoever limits Allah, denies Allah in other than what he limits Allah to, and confirms Allah in what he limits Him by, when Allah gives him a *tajalli*. Whoever frees Allah from limitation does not deny Allah, and so confirms Allah in every form in which Him changes. He is given from himself according to the form in which the *tajalli* infinitely occurs. The forms of the *tajalli* are without end. Similarly knowledge of Allah has no limit in the gnostic who understands the forms. Rather, he is a gnostic at every moment, seeking increase of knowledge by "Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge!"[4](#)

The business is endless from both sides. This is as if you said: Allah and creation. If you looked at His words, "I am his foot by which he runs, and his hand with which he strikes and his tongue by which he speaks," and so on of the faculties whose location are the limbs which are not separate, then you said that the matter is all Allah or the matter is all creation. It is creation by one ascription and it is Allah by another ascription, yet the source is one. The source of the form is what gives the *tajalli* of the source of the form which did not exist before the *tajalli*. It is the one giving the *tajalli* and the one receiving it. See how wondrous is the command of Allah in respect to His He-ness and in respect to His relationship to the universe in the realities of His most Beautiful Names!

Who is He and what is He and what is His source?

He is He!

Whoever is of His commonality is of His elite,

and whoever is of His elite is of His commonality.

There is no source except source,

so the light of His source is His darkness.

Whoever is ignorant of this

experiences grief in himself

And none recognises what we have said

except for the slave who has aspiration (*himma*).

He said, "*There is a reminder in that for anyone who has a heart*," (50:37) because the heart (*qalb*) is transformed (*taqallaba*) in the various forms and attributes. He did not say, "to him who has an intellect" because the intellect limits.⁵ It confines the matter to a single description, but reality refuses to be contained. It is also a reminder for those who have intellect, and they are those who have creeds by which some deny others, and some curse others, and they do not have helpers.⁶ The god of the one with a creed does not have jurisdiction over the god of someone with another creed. The one who has a creed defends it; he defends the matter which he believes of his god, and supports it. He does not support that which is not in his creed. For this reason, he has no effect on the creeds of his dissenters, and similarly his dissenters have no help from the god who is in his creed; so they have no helpers. Allah excluded help from the divinity of creed based on the isolation of one creed to the exclusion of others. The helped is gathered and the helper is gathered.

For the gnostic, Allah is the Recognised Who is not denied. The people of recognition in this world are the people of recognition in the Next World. This is why Allah said, "*anyone who has a heart (qalb)*" (50:37) since he knows the transformation (*taqlib*) of Allah in forms by the transformation in shape. He recognises himself from himself. His self is not other than the He-ness of Allah. There is nothing in phenomenal being from what is, or what will be, which is other than the He-ness of Allah. Rather, He is the source of He-ness. So He is the gnostic and the knower and the acknowledger in this form. He is the one who is neither gnostic nor knower. He is also the one who denies Him in the other form. This is the portion of the one who knows Allah from the *tajalli* and the witnessing in the source of gatheredness (*jam*'). It is His word, "*anyone who has a heart*" which transforms the shapes by His transforming.

As for the people of belief (*iman*), they are the ones who imitate those who imitated the Prophets and Messengers in what they transmitted from Allah. They are not those who imitate the people of concepts and those who interpret the transmissions received by basing them on their logical proofs. These are the ones who imitate the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace. They are the ones who are meant by His words, "*or listens well*" (50:37) to what divine transmissions relate of the *sunna* of the

Prophets. He means this is the one who "*will listen well, having seen the evidence*" (50:37) with awareness of the presence of the imagination and its use.

That is what the Prophet said about *ihsan*, "Worship Allah as if you saw Him," [7](#) and "Allah is in the qibla of the one who prays."[8](#) For that reason, he is a witness. Anyone who imitates the people of logical speculation and is limited by them is not the one who will listen well. The one who will listen well must witness what we have mentioned. When he does not witness what we have mentioned, he is not the one meant by this ayat. These are those of whom Allah has said, "*When those who were followed disown those who followed them.*" (2:166) The Messengers do not disown their followers who follow them.

Realise, my friend, what I have mentioned to you in this wisdom of the heart. As for its specification with Shu'ayb, there is some branching off (*tash'ib*). Its branches are not numbered because every creed has a branch, and so they are all branches or creeds. If the covering is removed, it is removed for everyone in accordance with his creed. The covering might be removed in a manner contrary to his creed in principle. It is His words, "*What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with.*" (39:47) Most of them in principle are like the Mu'tazilites, believing that Allah will execute the threat on the rebel should he die without repentance. If he dies and is given mercy from Allah, then concern preceded it, for He did not punish him. Thus he found Allah Ever-Forgiving, All-Merciful, and there appeared to him from Allah something he did not reckoned with.

As for He-ness (*huwiya*), some people are firm in their belief that Allah is such-and-such. When the covering is removed, they see the form of their belief, and it is true. They believe in it. Then the knot is unravelled and the creed vanishes and becomes knowledge through contemplation (*mushahada*). After vision is sharpened, weak vision does not return. It appeared to some people by the variety of the *tajalli* in forms through vision, since the *tajalli* is not repeated. He verifies it in he-ness; and there appeared to them from Allah in Allah's He-ness what they never reckoned with before the covering was removed.[9](#) We mentioned the form of the ascent in divine recognitions after death in our *Book of the Tajalliyat*, in which we mentioned what we gathered from the group regarding unveiling, and the benefits we derived from them in the question that they did not know about. One of the most wondrous of matters is that man is always in ascent, but is not aware of that due to the fineness of the veil and its delicateness. It is like His words, "*They were only given a simulation of it.*" (2:25)

He, the One, is not the same as the Last. Therefore the two semblances with the gnostic are similar dissimilars. The one possessed of realisation sees multiplicity in One, as he knows what the Divine Names indicate. Although their realities differ and are numerous, it is yet One Source. It is an intelligible multiplicity in the source of One. In the *tajalli*, it is multiplicity witnessed in the one source even as it matter which you obtain in the definition of each form. It and the multiplicity of forms and their variety derive, in fact, from one substance (*jawhar*). It is its own matter (*hayula*). Whoever recognises himself with this recognition recognises his Lord. Allah is in His creation due to His form, rather He is the source of its he-ness and its reality.

For this reason, the only ones among the '*ulama*' who tumble on the recognition of the self (*nafs*) and its

reality are the divinely inspired messengers and the great among the Sufis. As for the philosophers and masters of thought among the ancients and the *mutakallimun* in their discourse on the self and its whatness, none of them stumbled on its reality, and logical speculation can never provide it.¹⁰ He who seeks knowledge of it by means of logical speculation, swells himself up and boasts without vigour or substance. *"They are those whose efforts in the life of this world are misguided while they suppose that they are doing good."* (18:104) He who seeks the matter by other than its path will not achieve its realization.

How excellent is what Allah said about the universe - He changes it with the breaths into a new creation in one source. He said in respect to some, rather to most of the world, *"Yet they are dubious about the new creation."* (50:15) This means that they do not know the renewal of the command in breaths. However, the Ash'arites stumbled on it in some existent things, and these are non-essentials (*a'Erâd*). The Hisbaniya ¹¹ stumbled on it regarding the entire universe. The logical philosophers consider them ignorant of it. However, the two groups erred. As for the error of the Hisbaniya, in spite of what they said regarding change in the entire universe, they did not stumble on the oneness of the source of the intelligible substance (*jawhar*) which underlies the form. The universe only exists by the oneness, as the oneness is only intelligible by the universe. If they had said that, they would have obtained the degree of realisation in the matter.

As for the Ash'arites, they do not know that the entire universe consists of a collection of non-essentials (*a'râd*). It changes in every moment since accidents do not last for two moments. That appears in their definition of things. So when they defined the thing, its phenomenal being is clear in the definition of non-essential matters. These non-essentials mentioned in its definition are actually the source of this independent substance and its reality. Inasmuch as it is a non-essential, it is not independent, but by the sum of what is not independent, comes what is independent. It is like occupation of space in the definition of the independent essential substance, and its acceptance is non-essential in its essential definition. There is no doubt that that the containing-of-form is an accident since it is only in the container, and that is not independent – it is in the essential nature of the substance. Occupation of space is a non-essential, and it only occurs in the thing occupying space, and so it is not independent. Occupation of space and containing-of-form are not based on the source of the defined substance by an extra matter, since essential definitions are the source of the defined and its he-ness.

That which does not last two moments becomes that which lasted two moments or indeed several moments! What was not independent became independent in their view! They do not understand the basis of this, and these people ³are dubious about the new creation.²

As for the people of unveiling, they see Allah in a *tajalli* of Himself in every breath, and there is no repetition of the *tajalli*. They also see by witnessing that every *tajalli* grants a new creation and takes away a creation. Thus its departure is annihilation in the presence of the *tajalli*, and it is going-on by what the other *tajalli* grants. So understand!



1. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My earth nor My heaven contain Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."
2. lit. "god-ed" and "Lord-ed".
3. cf. Qur'an 7:156.
4. Ref Qur'an 20:114: *"Say, 'My Lord, increase me in knowledge!'"*
5. The root meaning from which intellect ('*aql*) comes means to hobble a camel.
6. ref to Qur'an 29:25, *"You have adopted idols apart from Allah as tokens of mutual affection in this world. But then on the Day of Rising you will reject one other and curse one another. The Fire will be your shelter. You will have no helpers."*
7. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari.
8. Hadith in al-Bukhari.
9. Ref. Qur'an 39:47, *"If those who did wrong were to possess all that If those who did wrong owned everything on earth, and the same again with it, they would offer it as a ransom to save themselves from the evil of the punishment on the Day of Rising. What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with. them from Allah that they never reckoned with."*
10. Being veiled by limitation.
11. The Hisbaniya were sophists, a group known in the history of philosophy for doubts, scepticism and sophism who held that the universe changes at every moment since there is no objective Reality. All is subjective.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Power (*Malk*) in the Word of Lut (Lot)



Malk is power and force, and the strong man with power says, "I have power over the kneading, since I am forceful in kneading it." When the poet, Qays ibn al-Hatim, described his attack with a spear in verse, he said:

I have power over it

and so I made its rupture wide,

and you see standing under it what was behind it.

That is to say that he used enough force in the thrust. It was what Allah said regarding Lut, peace be upon him, *"If only I had the power to combat you, or could take refuge in some powerful support!"* (11:80) The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Allah showed mercy to my brother Lut, and he took refuge in a powerful support." So the Prophet said that Lut was with Allah who is strong. It was Allah whom Lut, peace be upon him, meant by the strong pillar, and resistance when he said, "If only I had the power". Here it is aspiration (*himma*) in relation to man in particular.

The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "From that time, the time in which Lut, peace be upon him, said, '*or could take refuge in some powerful support,*' after that, Prophets have only been sent with some power from their people." His tribe protected him as Abu Talib protected the Messenger of Allah. His words, *"If only I had the power to combat you" is because he heard Allah say, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning,"* (30:54) by origin, *"and then after weakness, gave you strength."* Strength is by appointing, and it is non-essential strength. *"Then after strength ordained weakness and grey hair."* Appointing is connected to grey hair. As for weakness, it returns to the basis of its creation as He said, *"He created you from a weak beginning."* Allah returns him to that from which He created him, as He says, *"then some of you revert to the lowest form of life that, so after having knowledge, they may know nothing at all."* (16:70) Allah mentions that he returns to the first weakness. The old man is judged to be as weak as the child is.

A Prophet is only sent after he has reached the age of forty. It is the time which is the beginning of decrease and weakness. For this reason, Lut said, *"If only I had the power to combat you,"* although that demands effective aspiration (*himma*). If you were to ask: "What prevents him from using effective

aspiration while it is present in the wayfarers (*sâlikûn*) among the followers when the Messengers are more entitled to that?" you spoke the truth. However, you lack another knowledge, which is that gnosis does not leave the aspiration freedom of action. Whenever gnosis is great, then its freedom of action with the aspiration is weak. That has two reasons – one is his realisation of the station of slavery and his regarding the root of his natural creation; [1](#) and the other reason is the oneness of the actor and the acted upon. The aspiration of a Messenger does not appear, since the latter aspect prevents it.

In this witnessing, he sees that his opponent does not turn from the reality on which he is based in the state of his source-form and the state of his non-existence. He only appears in existence through what he had in the state of non-existence by his source-form. He does not overstep his reality nor does he abandon his path. That is called dissent; yet it is a non-essential matter manifested by the veil which is over the eyes of the people, as Allah says, "*but most people do not know.*" They know what is manifest and outward of the life of this world, but they are ignorant of the Next life. It is the other way round, so it is from their words, "*our hearts are veiled,*" [2](#) that is, in coverings. It is a covering which veils them from perceiving the matter for what it is. This and its like prevent the gnostic from acting freely in the world.

Shaykh Abu 'Abdullah ibn al-Qa'id said to Shaykh Abu's-Su'ud ibn ash-Shibli, "Why do you not act freely?" Abu's-Su'ud replied, "I have left Allah to act for me as He wishes." He meant the command of Allah, "*so take Him as your Guardian.*" (73:9) The Guardian is the one with freedom of action, especially as He heard Allah saying, "*Give of that to which He has made you successors (khalifs).*" (57:7) Abu's-Su'ud knew, and the gnostics know that the command which he has is not his, and he is only a successor to it. Allah told him, "this command is the *deen* to which I have you successors and over which I have given you power, so take Me for a guardian in it," Abu's-Su'ud obeyed the command of Allah and took Him for a Guardian.

How can there remain any aspiration for the one who witnesses the like of this command? Aspiration (*himma*) only acts by the property of concentration that which its possessor does not have, and acts on other than his concentration. This gnosis separates him from that property of concentration. The complete gnosis manifests gnosis at the end of incapacity and weakness. One of the *Abdal* [3](#) said to Shaykh 'Abdu'r-Razzaq, [4](#) "After you greet Shaykh Abu Madyan, [5](#) tell him, 'O Abu Madyan! Why is nothing difficult for us, yet things are difficult for you, and we long for your station and you do not long for ours?'" Similarly, although Abu Madyan had that station as well as the other, we are more complete than him in the station of weakness and incapacity. His *badl* said this to him; he did not say it.

The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said that this station is from the command of Allah to him: "I do not know what He will do to me or you. I only follow what is revealed to me." The Messenger acts according to what is revealed to him. He does not have anything else. If He reveals to him that he should act by ordinance, he acts. If he is prevented from acting, he does not act. The best part of choice is to abandon freedom of action unless the person is deficient in gnosis.

Abu's-Su'ud ash-Shibli said to his believing companions, "Allah gave us freedom of action fifteen years

ago, and we abandoned it through politeness." This is the language of conceit. As for us, we did not abandon it through politeness, for abandoning would imply preference. Rather, we abandoned it by the perfection of gnosis. Gnosis does not oblige it on the strength of choice. When the gnostic acts by aspiration in the world, it is from divine command and compulsion, not by choice.

There is no doubt that the station of the Messenger demands freedom of action for the acceptance of the Message which he brings. Allah informs him of what will be accepted in his community and among his people in order to manifest the *deen* of Allah. The *wali* is not like that. Nevertheless, the Messenger does not seek Him in the manifest, because the Messenger has compassion for his people. He does not want them to exceed by having the proof appear against them because that would entail their destruction. He spares them.

The Messenger also knew that when something inimitable [6](#) is manifested to the community, some of them believe in it, and some recognise it but deny it out of injustice, arrogance or envy. Some of them attribute it to magic and deception. The Messenger sees that, and he also sees that no one will believe unless Allah illuminates his heart by the light of belief. When the person does not look by that light called belief, the inimitable miracle has no benefit for him. Their aspiration does not seek inimitable matters, since the effect is not uniform among those who see it, nor is it in their hearts as He said in respect to the most perfect of Messengers and the most knowing of creation and the most truthful in state, *"You cannot guide those you would like to but Allah guides those He wills."* (28:56)

If aspiration did have an effect, no one would be more perfect than the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, nor have a higher nor stronger aspiration than him, yet even so his aspiration did not bring about Abu Talib, his uncle, becoming Muslim, and it was to the Prophet that the ayat which we mentioned was revealed. Similarly, Allah said of the Messenger, *"It is only his to deliver the message."* [7](#) And He said, *"You are not responsible for their guidance, but Allah guides whoever He wills,"* (2:272) and He added in *Surat al-Qasas*, *"He has best knowledge of the guided,"* (28:56) those to whom knowledge of their guidance was given in the state of their non-existence in their source-forms. It is established that knowledge follows the known. Whoever is a believer in his source-form and in the state of his non-existence, appears in that form in the state of his existence. Allah knew that of him, so that is what he is like. For that reason, Allah said, *"He has best knowledge of the guided."*

When Allah said the like of that, He also said, *"My Word, once given, is not subject to change,"* (50:29) because My Word is based on My knowledge of My creation. *"and I do not wrong My slaves,"* that is, I do not decree that disbelief (*kufr*) on them which makes them wretched and then I demand of them what is not in their capacity to do. Rather, We only deal with them according to what We gave them knowledge of, and We only gave them knowledge of what they gave Us from themselves by that on which they are based. So if they do wrong, they are the ones who are unjust. For this reason, He said, *"but they wronged themselves. Allah did not wronged them."* [8](#) Finally, We only said to them what Our essence accorded that We say to them. Our Essence is known to Us by what it is based on; so, if We say this, and do not say that, then We only spoke by what We knew to say. We spoke the word from Us, and obedience or lack of obedience is up to those who hear.

So all is from Us and from them,[9](#)

and acceptance is from Us and from them.

If they are not from Us,

We, without a doubt, are from them.

So,. my friend, realise this wisdom of power in the word of Lut. It is a gate which belongs to gnosis. The secret [10](#) has been made clear for you, and the command is clear. It is included in the even which is called the odd.



1. Which is weakness, and the slave obeying the command of the Master, as in Qur'an 30:54, *"It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning."*

2. Two places: 2:88; 4:155.

3. *Abdal*, plural of *badl*, a substitute. Shaykh al-Akbar says, "They are seven. Whoever travels from one place and leaves his body in its form so that no one recognises that he has gone, that one is only a badl. He is modelled on the heart of Ibrahim, peace be upon him."

4. A jurist and one of Abu Madyan's disciples.

5. Abu Madyan: Shu'ayb ibn al-Husayn al-Andalusi, great Maghribi Sufi, born ca. 520/1126 near Seville and died near Tlemcen in 594/1197.

6. *Mu'jiza*, a miracle performed by a Prophet to prove his truthfulness and which others are unable to do.

7. Ref. Qur'an 5:99 and several other places.

8. 2:57, 9:70, etc. in many places in the Qur'an.

9. The apparent sources. The Word is from him and obedience from them.

10. The secret of the Decree.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of the Decree (*Qadar*) in the Word of 'Uzayr (Ezra)



Know that fate (*qada'*) is the judgement of Allah on things, and Allah's judgement on things is according to His knowledge in them and of them. The knowledge of Allah in things is based on that which known things accord Him of what they are in themselves. The decree (*qadar*) is the timing of how things are in their source without increase.¹ Fate is only decreed for things by themselves. This is the source of the secret of the Decree for the one who has a heart or gives ear. He is a witness *"Allah's is the conclusive argument."* (6:149)

Properly speaking, the judge (*hâkim*) studies the source of the question which he judges according to what its essence demands. The one sentenced to what is due him is, in fact, a judge over the judge when he sentences him to that. Every "judge" is sentenced to what he sentences, and in it he is the judge, whoever he is. Grasp this question! The decree is only unknown by the force of its appearance. It is not recognised, so there is much seeking and earnest request in it.

Know that the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, inasmuch as they are Messengers – not inasmuch as they are *awliya'* and gnostics – are in ranks according to that on which their communities are based. They only have the knowledge with which they were sent, according to what the community of that Messenger needs, no more and no less. Communities differ, some have more need than others, so Messengers differ in the knowledge of the message just as their communities differ. It is what Allah said: *"Those Messengers: We favoured some of them over others."* (2:253)

In the same way, they also differ in what springs from their essences, peace be upon them, in the varieties of knowledges and judgements they have according to their predispositions. This is what Allah said: *"We have preferred some of the Prophets over others."* (17:55) And Allah said in respect of creation, *"Allah has favoured some of you over others in provision."* (16:71) Provision from Allah can be spiritual – like knowledges – and sensory – like food. Allah *"only sent it down in a known measure."* (15:21) It is the due which creation seeks. Allah *"gives everything its created form."* (20:50) He sends down according to what He wills.² He only wills what He knows, and so He commands it. What He knows is as we have stated. It is only by what the known accords.

Timing basically belongs to the known. Fate, knowledge, will and volition follow the Decree. So Allah only gives the understanding of the secret of the decree in respect to knowledges to the one who has been given complete gnosis. Knowledge gives complete rest to the knower, and it gives painful

punishment to the knower as well. It gives two opposites. By knowledge, Allah describes Himself with both wrath and pleasure, and by knowledge the Divine Names are opposite one another. A reality [3](#) governs the absolute existent and the limited existent. It is not possible that there be something more complete than it or stronger or greater than it, because of the universality of its jurisdiction, both limited and unlimited.

The Prophets, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, only take their own knowledges from a particular divine revelation. Their hearts are free of logical speculation because they know the limitations of the intellect in respect to its cognitive perception. The intellect is unable to perceive matters for what they really are. Simple communication is also unable to perceive that which is only accorded by taste (*dhawq*). Perfect knowledge remains only in the divine *tajalli* and in what Allah removes of veils from the springs of the inner sight and the eyes. They perceive matters - their non-time and in-time, their non-existence and existence, their impossibility, necessity and possibility - for what they truly are in their realities and sources.

Since the request of 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, occurred on the elite path, censure fell on him as is related in tradition.[4](#) Had he sought the unveiling which we mentioned, perhaps censure in that would not have fallen on him. The proof of the simplicity of his heart is in his statement, *"How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?"* (2:259) His form, peace be upon him, is in this statement of his, as the form of Ibrahim is in His words, "Show me how You bring the dead to life." (2:260) That necessitates the response by the action which Allah manifested when He said, *"Allah caused him to die a hundred years, then He brought him back to life,"* and He said, *"Look at the bones – how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh."* So he saw how bodies grow with the witnessing of realisation. He showed him how it was. He asked about the decree which is only perceived by unveiling to things in the state of their permanence in their non-existence. That was not granted. That is one of the properties of divine cognisance, so it is impossible that any except Allah know it. They are the keys of the First [5](#) – the keys of the unseen which only He knows. Allah informs only those slaves whom He wills on such matters.

Know that they are only called keys in the state of opening.[6](#) The state of opening is the state of connecting taking-form to things, or rather the state of connecting the decree to the decreed. None has any taste in that except Allah. Neither *tajalli* nor unveiling occur in it since only Allah has power and action in view of the fact that He has absolute existence which is unlimited.

When we saw that Allah censured 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, when he asked about the Decree, we knew that 'Uzayr was seeking this cognisance. Thus he was seeking to possess the power (*qudra*) which is connected to the decreed (*maqdur*). That is only claimed by the One Who has absolute existence. Thus he sought the impossible. How-things-are is only perceived by taste.

As for what we relate of what Allah revealed to him, "If you do not desist, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood," it means I will remove the path of transmission from you and give you matters based on *tajalli*. *Tajalli* only occurs according to what you have of the predisposition by which the perception of taste occurs. You know that you only perceive according to your predisposition. You

look at this matter which you are seeking. If you do not see it, you know that you do not have the predisposition which it requires. That is one of the properties of the Divine Essence. You have learned that Allah *"gives everything its created form."* (20:50) So if He did not give you this particular predisposition, then it is not your creation. If it had been your creation, then Allah, who informed you that *"He gives everything its created for,"* would have given it to you. It is you who desist from this sort of question in yourself. There is no need for any other prohibition. This is a mark of concern Allah showed to 'Uzayr, peace be upon him. He knew that from his own knowledge and was ignorant of that from his own ignorance.

Know that *wilaya* [7](#) is the universal encompassing sphere. This why it is not intersected, and so it is informed about things. As for the prophethood of law-giving and the Message, it is intersected, and it was cut off in Muhammad, peace be upon him. There will be no Prophet after him, either giving law or bound by law. There is no Messenger after him, and he is the lawgiver.

This hadith [8](#) is a fragment of the manifestation of the *awliya'* of Allah, because it contains the cutting off of the taste of complete perfect slavedom, so the name of slavedom, which is particular to it, was not used. The slave does not want to share with his Lord, who is Allah, in the same name. Allah is not called "prophet" or "messenger." However, He is called Wali and is described by that name. [9](#) Allah says, *"Allah is the Wali of those who believe,"* (2:257) and He says, *"He is the Wali, the Praiseworthy."* (42:28) This name, "*wali*", continues to be applied to the slaves of Allah both in this world and the Next. A name which is particular to the slave and not to Allah no longer remains since prophethood and the message have been cut off.

"Allah is gentle to His slaves," (42:19) so they still have the general prophethood in which there is no law (*shari'a*), and they still have the law in striving in the confirmed ordinances. They still have heirs in the laws. The Prophet said, "The '*ulama*' (men of knowledge) are the heirs of the Prophets."[10](#) The only inheritance here is that they strive with the ordinances, and so they legislate them.

If you see a Prophet speaking a language outside the simple ordinances of the Shari'a, that is due to the fact that he is a *wali* and a gnostic. For this reason, his station in respect to his being a man of knowledge and a *wali* is more perfect and complete than it is due to the fact that he is a Messenger or someone who legislates and has a Shari'a. If you hear one of the People of Allah speaking, or it is related to you that he said, "*Wilaya* is higher than prophethood," that speaker only means what we mentioned. Or if he says that the *wali* is above the Prophet or the Messenger, he means in the same person. He is the Messenger, and inasmuch as he is a *wali*, he is more complete than he is by simply being a Prophet. It does not mean that the *wali* who follows him is higher than him. The follower never overtakes the followed in that in which he follows him. If he had overtaken him, then he would not be his follower. So understand that!

The starting point of the Messenger or Prophet who brings a Shari'a is *wilaya* and knowledge. Do you not see that Allah commanded him to seek increase of knowledge, not increase of anything other than it? Allah commanded him, "*Say: 'Lord, increase me in knowledge!'*" ((20:114) This means: you know that the Shari'a consists of making certain deeds obligatory and prohibiting certain actions. These actions

take place in this world, so they come to an end. *Wilaya* is not like that. If it had been cut off, it would have been cut off in respect to itself just as the message is cut off in respect to itself. If it had been cut off, it would not still have a name. *Wali* is a name which Allah will continue to have.[11](#) This belongs to the slaves by following a model, realisation and attachment.[12](#)

He told 'Uzayr, "If you do not desist from asking about how the decree is, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood. The business will come to through unveiling by *tajalli* and the name "prophet" and "messenger" will vanish from you." Allah will still have his *wilaya*. The context of the state indicated that this speech came as a threat. Whoever has this state when he is addressed in this fashion, knows that he is threatened with the cutting off of some of the special ranks of *wilaya* in this abode, since prophethood and the message are a special rank in *wilaya* based on some of the ranks which *wilaya* contains. He knows that he is higher than the wali who has neither law-giving prophethood nor the message.

If someone has another state which necessitates that the rank of prophethood be confirmed for him, that then is the promise and not the threat. 'Uzayr's question was accepted because the Prophet is the elite *wali*. Because of the context, he knows that since the prophet has this prerogative in *wilaya*, he cannot engage in what he knows that Allah will dislike him doing. He cannot engage in what he knows it is impossible for him to attain. When these circumstances exist for the one who has them and they are affirmed, then this divine statement, "I will efface your name for the register of prophethood" becomes a promise. Thus it becomes a transmission indicating a lasting rank. It is a lasting rank for the Prophets and Messengers in the Next Abode, which is not a place where a Shari'a is prescribed for any of Allah's creatures after they have entered the Garden or the Fire.

We define that as an entry into the two abodes of the Garden and the Fire. When the Day of Rising begins for the people who lived in the times of the gaps between the Prophets,[13](#) young children, and madmen, all of them will be gathered on one plain for the establishment of justice, recompense for wrong actions and the rewards for works which are due to the people of the Garden. Then they will be gathered separate from other people on one plain, [14](#) and a Prophet from the best of them will be sent among them. The Fire will be shown to them. This Messenger sent to these people will bring it, and he will say to them, "I am the Messenger of Allah to you." Some will affirm him and others will deny him. Then he will say to them, "Plunge into this fire. Whoever obeys me will be saved and will enter the Garden. Whoever disobeys me and opposes my command will be destroyed and he will be one of the people of the Fire." Whoever obeys his command and casts himself into this fire will be happy and receive his reward. He will find this fire to be "*coolness and peace*".[15](#) Whoever disobeys him deserves the punishment and will enter the Fire and descend into it because of his deed of opposition so that that justice from Allah might be set up among His slaves.

That is like the words of Allah, "*Upon the day when legs are bared,*" (68:42) [16](#) i.e. for one of the immense matters of the Next World, "*and they are called on to prostrate.*" This is obligation and Shari'a. Some will be able to prostrate and some will not be able to do so.[17](#) These are the one about whom Allah says, "They are called on to prostrate, but they will not be able to do so," just as some of the slaves

cannot obey the command of Allah in this world – like Abu Jahl [18](#) and others. This is according to what remains of the Shari'a in the Next Abode on the Day of Rising before people enter the Garden and the Fire. This is why we have written it down, and praise belongs to Allah, the *Wali*.



1. *Qadar* has a specific time and *qada'* does not. So *qadar* refers to the particular instances of *qada'*.
2. Ref. Qur'an, "*Were Allah to expand the provision of His slaves, they would act as tyrants on the earth. But He sends down whatever He wills in a measured way.*" (42:27)
3. The secret of the decree.
4. Qur'an 2:259 "Or the one who passed by a town which had fallen into ruin. He asked, 'How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?' Allah caused him to die a hundred years then brought him back to life. Then He asked, 'How long have you been here?' He replied, 'I have been here a day or part of a day.' He said, 'Not so! You have been here a hundred years. Look at your food and drink – it has not gone bad – and look at your donkey so We can make you a Sign for all mankind. Look at the bones – how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh.'" According to 'Ali, Ibn Jarir, Ibn 'Abbas, al-Hasan and Qatada, that is 'Uzayr.
5. The realities of sources.
6. *Miftah*, key, comes from the root, *fath*, opening.
7. According to the commentator, *wilaya* is annihilation in Allah, and Allah encompassed all, and "*All things are passing except His face.*" (28:88).
8. "I am the Seal of the Messengers."
9. *Wali* means the friend of Allah, and refers to the gnostic. It is also one of the Divine Names which means the Guardian or the One who manages people's affairs.
10. Al-Bukhari.
11. As Yusuf said about Allah, "*...You are my Wali in this world and the Next.*" (12:101).
12. According to al-Qashani, it is acquires and realised through annihilation in the Divine Attributes and Essence and attached by the going-on (*baqa'*) after annihilation in the station of drawing near.
13. i.e. those who did not have a Prophet to follow.

14. According to the commentator, al-Qashani, the plain on which they are gathered may be *as-Sahira*, as in the Qur'an (79:14), "*But it shall be but a single scare, and behold they are at as-Sahira!*" *As-Sahira* which, according to some, is the earth Allah will create anew on the Day of Rising.
15. As was the case with Ibrahim, Qur'an 21:69.
16. The expression means to get ready for something difficult.
17. This is also reflected in a hadith in al-Bukhari in which the Prophet said, "Our Lord will bare the leg, and every believer, man and woman, will prostrate to Him. Those who prostrated out of eyeservice and reputation in this world will go to prostrate and find their backs rigid."
18. The Prophet's uncle who was a violent opponent of Islam.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Prophethood in the Word of 'Isa (Jesus)



He was manifested from the water of Maryam

and the breath of Jibril in the form of man existing from clay.

The spirit was in an essence purified of nature

which it called prison.

For that reason, the spirit stayed in it

for more a thousand years in the designation of time.[1](#)

A spirit from Allah, no other.

For that reason, he revived the dead and formed the bird from clay.

Since his relation with his Lord is proven,

by it he has effective action in both the higher and lower worlds.

Allah purified his body, and made his spirit pure,

and He made him a model of taking-form.

Know that among the special qualities of the spirits (*arwah*) is whenever they touch anything life flows into it. This is why the Samiri [2](#) seized a handful of dust from the track of the messenger, who was Jibril, and he is the Spirit. The Samiri had knowledge of this matter. When he recognised that it was Jibril, he knew that life would flow into whatever he had walked on, so he took a handful of dust [3](#) from the track of the messenger or he filled his hand or the ends of his fingers, [4](#) and threw it into the Calf. The Calf made a noise like the sound of a cow mooing. If it had been in another form, the name of that form's

sound would have been ascribed to it - as grumbling to the camel, baa-ing to rams, bleating to sheep, and voice – or articulation and speech – to man.

That power from the life which flows in things is called *lâhût*. The *nâsût* is the locus on which the spirit is based. The *nâsût* may be called a spirit by what is based on it.

When the Trusty *Ruh*, who is Jibril, presented himself to Maryam, peace be upon her, in the form of a "handsome, well-built man",⁵ she imagined that he was a man wishing to have intercourse with her. She took refuge with Allah from him with all her being, with the whole of her existence, that Allah might save her from him since she knew that that was among the things which are not permitted. She was given a complete presence with Allah, and it is the meaning-without-form spirit. If Jibril had breathed into her at that moment in this state, 'Isa would have been born in such a manner that no one could tolerate him due to the harshness of his nature which was the state of his mother.

When he said to her, "*I am only your Lord's messenger of your Lord so that He can give you a pure boy,*" she relaxed from that contraction (*qabd*) and her breast expanded. It was at that time that Jibril breathed 'Isa into her.

Jibril conveyed the word of Allah to Maryam as the Messenger conveyed the word of Allah to his community. 'Isa was "*His word that He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him.*"⁶ Then appetite filled Maryam. The body of 'Isa was created from the actual water of Maryam and from the imaginary water of Jibril which was infused in the moisture of that breath, since the breath of the living is moist because of the water content in it. So the body of 'Isa is from imaginary water and real water. He emerged in the form of a man in respect to his mother and inasmuch as Jibril had appeared in the form of a man, since taking-form only occurs in the human species according to the normal principle.

'Isa brought the dead to life because he is the Divine Spirit, and bringing to life belongs to Allah. The breath which 'Isa has is like the breath which Jibril has. The word belongs to Allah. The bringing the dead to life by 'Isa is an actual revival inasmuch as it was manifested from his breath as he was manifested from the form of his mother. His bringing to life is also imagined to be from him, but it actually belongs to Allah. He joined the two by the reality on which he is based even as we said that he is created from imaginary water and actual water. Bringing-to-life is ascribed to him by means of actualisation in one aspect, and by imagination in another aspect. In respect to actualisation, it is said of him that he brings the dead to life. In respect to imagination (*tawahhum*), it is said that he breathes into it and it becomes a bird by the leave of Allah.⁷ The agent is in the prepositional phrase "by Allah's permission", even though He did not breathe into it. It is also possible that the agent is the one who breathes into it. It became a bird as regards physical form. In the same way, 'Isa healed the blind and the lepers.

All was ascribed to 'Isa as being "*by Allah's permission.*"⁸ "Permission" (*idhn*) is an indirect expression, as in His words, "*By My permission*"⁹ and "*by the permission of Allah*". If the prepositional phrase is connected to breathing, the breather has leave in the breathing, and so it is a bird by the leave of Allah. If

the breather breathed not by leave, then the taking form of the bird as a bird is not by the leave of Allah. The agent in that is then the verb "it becomes (*yakûn*).\" If there had not been something real and something imaginary in the matter, then these forms would not have accepted these two aspects. Rather, it has these two aspects because the constitution of 'Isa accords that.

'Isa showed humility to the extent that he prescribed that his community *"pay the jizya [10](#) tax with their their hands in a state of complete abasement," [11](#)* and that if one of them were slapped on the cheek, he should offer the other cheek to the one who slapped him, and not rise up against him nor seek revenge. This came from his mother's side. Since the woman is lower, she has humility because she is subject to the man legally and physically.

The power to bring to life and heal that he had came to him the side of the breath of Jibril in the form of a man. 'Isa brought the dead to life by the form of man. If Jibril had not come in the form of man, but in another of the elemental forms of phenomenal beings from the animals, plants or minerals, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life without taking on that form for that moment and appearing in it. If Jibril had come in a luminous form beyond the elements and natural humours, since luminosity is part of his nature, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life unless he appeared in that form of non-elemental light, while still maintaining the human form in respect of his mother.

When he brought the dead to life, it was said that it was him and not him. The onlookers fell into bewilderment (*hayra*) just as the man of intellect becomes bewildered in his logical reflection when he sees an individual human being bringing the dead to life, as that is one of the divine qualities - bringing to life with speech, not mere bringing with animation.[12](#) The beholder is bewildered because he sees the form of a man who possesses a divine effect. That led some of them to speak of that as "incarnation" and say that 'Isa was Allah since it was by Him that 'Isa brought the dead to life. Thus they are charged with disbelief (*kufr*) which is the veil because they veil Allah, who brings the dead to life, by the human form of 'Isa. Allah said, *"They are unbelievers who say, 'Allah is the Messiah, the son of Maryam."* [13](#) They fell into both error and disbelief at the end of all they said, not because they say that he is Allah nor by calling him the son of Maryam. But they made the attribution that Allah, insofar as He brought the dead to life, was contained in the human form of the nasut which is called the son of Maryam. There is no doubt that 'Isa was the son of Maryam. The hearer imagines that they have attributed divinity to the form, and so they make divinity the same as the form. That is not what they do. Rather, they make divine He-ness the subject in the human form which is the son of Maryam. They should differentiate between the form of 'Isa and the divine principle because they have made the form the same as the principle. Jibril was in the form of man who did not breathe and then he breathed. One differentiates between the form and the breath, and the breath from the form. The form existed without the breath - thus the breath is not part of its essential definition.

For that reason, differences occurred among the people of different [Christian] parties regarding 'Isa and what he was. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal human form, says that he is the son of Maryam. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal representational form relates him to Jibril. Whoever looks at him in respect to what was manifested from him of bringing the dead to life, relates

him to Allah by the quality of the spirit, and says that he is the Spirit of Allah,[14](#) that is, by Him life was manifested in whomever received his breath. Sometimes Allah is imagined to be the passive principle in 'Isa, and sometimes the angel is imagined in him, and sometimes mortal humanity is imagined in him. So the conception of everyone is based on what predominates that person. 'Isa is the Word of Allah, [15](#) the Spirit of Allah, [16](#) and the slave of Allah.[17](#) That is something which no one else has in the sensory form.

Indeed, each person is attached to his father of form, not to the One who breathed his spirit into the human form. When Allah fashioned the human body as He said, *"When I have shaped him,"* (15:29;38:72) then He breathed into Him, that was from His spirit. Thus in its being and source, the spirit is ascribed to Allah. That is not the case with 'Isa. The shaping of his body and mortal form is implied in the breath of the spirit. Others, as we mentioned, are not like that.

All existent things are the words of Allah which are inexhaustible [18](#) because they are from "*kun*" and "*kun*" is the word of Allah. Is the word ascribed to Him according to what He really is? His what-ness is not known. Or is it that Allah descends to the form of the one who says, "*kun*", and so the word "*kun*" is the reality of that form to which he descended or in which He is manifest? Some of the gnostics take one side and some take the other side, and some of them are bewildered in the business and do not know. This is a question which can only be recognised by taste (*dhawq*), as was the case with Abu Yazid al-Bistami when he breathed into the ant which he had killed and it returned to life. He knew in that action by Whom he had breathed, and that was an 'Isawian witnessing.

As for the revival of meaning by knowledge, that is the divine life, essential, eternal, sublime, and luminous, about which Allah said, *"Is someone who was dead and whom We brought to life, supplying him with a light by which to walk among the people..."* (6:123) Whoever gives life to a dead soul by the life of knowledge in a particular problem connected to knowledge of Allah, has brought him to life by it, and it is "a light for him by which he walks among the people, i.e. among his likes in form.

Were it not for Him and not for us,

that which is would not have been.

I worship Him in truth,

and Allah is our Master.

I am his source so know!

If you said, "man,"

Then do not be veiled by "man".

He has given you a proof.

So be Allah and be creation,

and you will be merciful by Allah.

Feed His creation through Him,

and you will be spirit and sweet scent.

We give Him what appeared by Him in us,

and He gave to us.

The command is apportioned between Him and us.

My heart was given life by the One who knew it

when He gave us sensory life.

At that time (before time),

we were beings, sources and times in Him.

That did not endure in us, but that gave us life.

Part of what proves what we mentioned concerning the breath (*nafkh*) of the spirit with the elemental form is that Allah has described Himself by the "*breath of the All-Merciful*". Everyone described by an attribute must follow the attribute and all that attribute demands of him. You realise that breath is necessary for the one who breathes. For that reason, the divine breath accepts the forms of the universe. It is like the primordial substance,[19](#) which is not other than the source of nature.

The elements are one of the forms of nature, and what is above the elements and what issues from them are also part of the forms of nature. They are sublime spirits going right up to the seven heavens. As for the spirits of the seven heavens and their sources, they are elemental, so they issue from the vapour of the elements. The angels from every heaven are from the elements, so they are made from the elements, and there are no beings of nature above them. For this reason, Allah described them with dispute,[20](#) i.e. the Highest Assembly, because nature has polarisation. Polarisation is that which is in the Divine Names, and they are ascriptions given by the "*breath of the All-Merciful*." Do you not see how the Essence is not subject to this principle, and that it is independent of the worlds? This is why the world appeared in the form of the One who brought it into being, and it is not other than the divine breath.

The divine breath ascends by what it has of heat, and descends by what it has of humidity and cold, and fixes itself and solidifies by what it has of dryness. Thus precipitation comes from cold and humidity. Do you not see that when the doctor wants to give someone a remedy, he looks at his water (urine) in a long-necked bottle? If he sees precipitation, he knows that the digestion is complete. He gives the remedy to speed progress. The precipitation is produced by his natural coldness and humidity.

Then Allah kneaded the clay of this human person with "His two hands." These are opposite to each other. Even though each of these two hands may be a right hand, the distinction between them is not hidden. They are only two in themselves - two hands because He only causes effects in nature according to what is in conformity with it. Nature consists of opposites, so He said "two hands".

Then He brought man into existence with two hands, and called him man (*bashar*).^{[21](#)} This refers to the direct contact (*mubashara*) of the two hands as befits the the Divine Presence. That arises from His concern for this human species. Then Allah said to the one who refused to prostrate himself before Adam, *"What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My Own Hands? Were you overcome with arrogance (towards the one who is your like, made of the elements) or are you one of the exalted?"* (38:75) meaning those who are above the elements. "You are not like that."

By the exalted,^{[22](#)} He means those who, by their essence, are above being elemental by their luminous constitution, even though they are part of nature. Man is only better than the other species by virtue of his being made of clay (*bashar*). He is the best species of all that was created from the elements by direct contact with the two hands. So in rank, man is above the terrestrial and celestial angels, although the lofty angels are better than the human species according to a divine text.^{[23](#)}

If anyone wishes to recognise the divine breath (*nafas*), let him recognise the universe, because "whoever knows himself knows his Lord" ^{[24](#)} who is manifest in him. The universe was manifested in the breath of the Merciful which Allah breathed from the Divine Names. They brought the manifestation of their effects into existence from the non-manifestation of their effects. He was generous to Himself by what He brought into existence in Himself. The first effect of the breath took place in that Presence. Then the command continued to descend ^{[25](#)} by breathing out from the universal to the last of what Allah brought into existence.

All is contained in the source of the breath,

like light is contained in the essence of darkness

at the end of the night before daylight.

Knowledge comes by proof at the end of the day

for the one who is sleepy.

He sees what I have said as a dream which indicates the breath,

And it gives him relief from every grief.

In the recitation of the Qur'an, it is, "He frowned."[26](#)

He has given a *tajalli* of Himself

to the one who came to fetch a firebrand.[27](#)

So Musa saw Him as a fire, while He is a light

for kings and seekers.

If you have recognise what I said,

then know that you are in a state of grief.[28](#)

If Musa had sought something else

(other than the brand),

he still would have seen Him in that,

and not the opposite.

When Allah establishes this 'Isawian word in the Station [29](#) so that we would know and he would be known, 'Isa will be asked about what was ascribed to him and whether or not it was true, even though Allah already knew whether or not that matter had taken place. Allah will say to him, "*Did you say to people: 'Take me and my mother as gods, besides Allah'?*"[30](#)

Adab demands a response to the one asking the question because when He gave him a *tajalli* in this station and form, wisdom necessitated the response in separation by the source of gatheredness. So he put disconnection first and said, "*Glory be to You!*" using the *kaf* (pronoun of the second person singular) which defines who is indicated by encounter and speech. "*It is not mine,*" inasmuch as I belong to myself rather than You, [31](#) "*to say what I have no right to,*" that is, what my he-ness rather than my essence necessitates. "*If indeed I said it, You know it,*" because You are the Speaker, and whoever says something knows what he has said. You are the tongue by which I speak, as the Messenger of Allah,

may Allah bless him and grant him peace, reported to us in a divine transmission in which Allah said, "I am his tongue by which he speaks." He made His He-ness the same as the tongue of the speaker, but ascribed the speech to His slave.

Then the man of right action completed his response by saying, *"You know what is in my self,"* and the speaker is Allah, "and I do not know what is in it," so this is in knowledge of the he-ness of 'Isa in respect of His He-ness, not in respect of the fact that 'Isa speaks and has an effect. *"It is You"*, so He brought distinction and support to confirm the proof and dependence on Him, since Allah only knows the Unseen. So He separated and gathered, unified and made many, made wide and narrow.

To end his reply, 'Isa said, *"I said to them nothing but what You ordered me to say."* He negated to begin with,^{[32](#)} alluding to the fact the he has no existence. The statement required *adab* with the questioner. If he had not acted thus, he would have been described as lacking knowledge of the realities, but he certainly was not like that! Thus he said, *"only what You ordered me,"* and it is You are the One who speaks on my tongue, and You are my tongue. Observe this divine polarity of the spirit! What is finer and more subtle than this!

ÔIsa said that he said, *"Worship Allah."* So he used the name of Allah because slaves differ in forms of worship and ShariÔa. So he did not specify one name rather than another name. Instead he used the name which joins all of them. Then he went on, "my Lord and your Lord." It is known that His relationship to one existent being by lordship (*rubûbiya*) is not the same as His relationship with another existent being. That is why he made a distinction when he said, *"my Lord and your Lord,"* by two references – one to the speaker and one to the one addressed. He said, *"nothing but what You ordered me,"* and thus he affirmed that he is one who is commanded. The quality of being commanded is not other than slavery, since one is only commanded when obedience is expected of one, even if one does not comply.

Since the command descends according to ranks, all that appears in a certain rank is coloured with what the reality of that rank gives it. The rank of the one commanded has a principle which appears in everyone who is commanded. The rank of the commander has a principle which appears in every command. Allah said, *"Establish the prayer."* He is the commander and the one who is subject to the obligation is the commanded. The slave says, "Forgive me!" so he commands and Allah is the commanded. What Allah demands of His slave by His command is the same as what the slave demands of Allah by his command. This is why every supplication is answered, and it must be answered, even if the answer is delayed, just as some who are under obligation delay the prayer. Whoever who is obligated to perform the prayer and does not pray it at its proper time, delays obedience and prays it at another time when he is able to perform it. There must be an answer, if only by intention.

Then he said, *"I was a witness against them* (and he did not say over himself with them as when he said, *'my Lord and your Lord')* *as long as I remained among them"* because the Prophets are witnesses over their communities as long as they are in them. "But when You took me (i.e. raised me) *back to You,"* and You veiled them from me and me from them, *"You were the One Watching over them,"* no longer in my

substance, but in their substance, since You are their eye which necessitates observation.

He wanted to make a distinction between him and his Lord so that it would be known that he was a slave and that Allah is Allah and He is his Lord. He referred to himself as a witness (*shahid*) and he referred to Allah as the Watcher (*raqib*). He mentioned "them" before himself when he said, *"I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them,"* [33](#) preferring them in priority and with *adab*. He put "them" after Allah in relationship to Him when he said, *"You were the One Watching over them"* because of what the Lord merits in priority of rank.

Then know that Allah has the name the Watcher (*Raqib*) which 'Isa applied to Him, and He is the Witness in His words, *"a witness against them,"* and *"You are Witness of all things."* (5:117) He referred to all things and "thing" is the most indefinite of things. He used the name, "The Witness," and Allah is the Witness over every witnessed thing according to what the reality of that witnessed things demands. He indicated that Allah was the Witness over the people of 'Isa when he said, *"I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them."* This is the witnessing of Allah in the substance of 'Isa, as it is confirmed that Allah is his tongue, hearing and sight.

Then he said something which is both 'Isawian and Muhammadan. As for its being 'Isawian, that is the speech of 'Isa by the transmission of Allah from him in His Book. As for its being Muhammadan, it happened that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood in one place for an entire night reciting it without turning to anything else until dawn broke. It is, *"If You punish them, they are Your slaves. If You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise."* [34](#) "They" is the pronoun of those who are absent as "he" is the pronoun of someone who is absent. as He said, *"they are those who disbelieve,"* with the pronoun of those who are not present. Absence is their veil to what is meant by the witnessed one who is present. He said, *"If you punish them,"* with the pronoun of the absent, and that absence is the source of the veil which hides them from the Real.

The Prophet mentioned them to Allah before the time when they are present [35](#) so that when the actual time came when they were present, the heaven would already have acted on the dough, and the dough might have had time to become equal to the heaven.[36](#)

Then by *"they are Your slaves,"* he singled out the unity (*tawhid*) on which they are based. There is no submissiveness greater than the submissiveness of slaves because they have no freedom of action with themselves. They act according to what their master wishes of them when he has no partner in them. He said, *"Your slaves,"* and singled out what was meant of the punishment which is their humiliation. There are none more lowly than them since they are slaves. Thus their essence necessitates that they be lowly, so You do not degrade them, for You do not degrade them with anything more lowly than the fact that they are slaves.

"If You forgive them," if You veil them from the punishment which they deserve because of their opposition – if You put forgiveness on them, You veil them from the punishment and protect them from it, *"You are the Almighty,"* the Protector, the Guardian. When Allah gives this name (*'aziz*) to one of His

slaves, then Allah is called the Exalter (*Mu'izz*). This name is given to him by the 'Aziz, so he has strong protection from the revenge and punishment which the Avenger and Punisher desire for him. He also used distinction and dependence to confirm the proof, and so the ayat is the same sort of His words, "*You are the Knower of the Unseen Worlds,*" and "*You are the Watcher over them,*" and "*You are the Almighty, the All-Wise.*" [37](#)

The question from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and his supplication to his Lord in which he repeated the phrase for the entire night until dawn was a request for the answer. If he had heard the answer in the first questioning, he would not have repeated it. Allah showed him the judgements in detail by which they deserved punishment. As each instance was presented to him and specified, the Prophet said to Him, "*If You punish them, they are Your slaves, and if You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise.*" If he had seen in what was presented to him anything which would make it necessary that Allah had already decided and that His presence must be preferred, he would have invoked Allah against them rather than for them. So what they deserved is changed by what this ayat accords of submission to Allah and exposing themselves to His pardon.

The Prophet related that when Allah loves the voice of His slave when he makes supplication to Him, He delays the answer to his supplication so that the slave will repeat the supplication. This comes from His love for the slave, not because He has turned away from him. For that reason, the Prophet mentioned the name of the Wise, and the Wise is the one who puts everything in its proper place, and who does not turn away from the qualities which their realities necessitate and demand; so the Wise is the One who knows the order of things.

When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, kept repeating this ayat, he was in possession of a great knowledge from Allah. If anyone recites it, let him recite it in that manner. [38](#) Otherwise, it is better that he remain silent. When Allah lets the slave articulate any request, He does so when He wants to answer it and grant his need. Let no one be slow in whatever has been guaranteed to him, but let him persevere as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, perserved with this *ayat* in all his states, so that he either hears with His ear, or with hearing, whichever you like. How else will Allah make you hear the answer? If He permits the question on your tongue, He will let you hear the answer with your ear. If He permits the meaning to you, He will let you hear the answer by your hearing.



1. As he was born 555 years before the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and is still alive, waiting to descend.
2. The story is found in the Qur'an 20:75-95, where the Samiri convinces the tribe of Israel to cast their ornaments into the fire out of which he brought the figure of a Calf which they worshipped. He told Musa, "I beheld what they did not behold, and I seized a handful of dust from the messenger's track and cast it into the thing."

3. With *dad*, *qabda*.
4. With *sad*, *qabsa*.
5. Qur'an 19:17.
6. Qur'an 4:171, "*The Messiah, 'Isa son of Maryam, was only the Messenger of Allah and His Word, which He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him.*"
7. ref. Qur'an 3:49; 5:110.
8. Qur'an 3:49.
9. Qur'an 5:110.
10. The tax paid by the People of the Book to the Muslims.
11. Qur'an 9:29.
12. i.e. the dead person can speak and answer him. This not simply causing the dead limbs to move of their own accord.
13. Qur'an 5:17, 5:72.
14. *Ruh Allah*.
15. See Qur'an 3:45, 4:171.
16. Qur'an 14:171.
17. Qur'an 19:30.
18. See Qur'an 18:109, "*Say: 'If all the sea was ink to write down the Words of my Lord, it would run out long before the Words of my Lord ran out,' even if We were to bring the same amount of ink again.*"
19. *Al-jawhar al-hayulani*.
20. Qur'an 38:69, "*I had no knowledge of the Highest Assembly when they disputed.*" It can also mean mutual rivalry.

21. Qur'an 15:28, "I am creating a mortal (bashar)."
22. *"The exalted"* are the angels who wander in love and those who are near, like Jibril and the angels of the Throne.
23. *"Or are you one of the exalted?"* 38:75.
24. As the Prophet said.
25. See Qur'an 65:12, *"It is Allah who created the seven heavens and of earth their like, the Command descending down through all of them."*
26. Sura 80.
27. Musa in Qur'an 20:10; 27:7. Refers to empirical knowledge, but he found unveiling in the form of the Burning Bush.
28. By standing behind the veil or seeking other-than-Him.
29. On the Last Day.
30. Qur'an 5:116.
31. To slaveness rather than lordship.
32. (*ma qulta* = I did not say).
33. Literally in the Arabic, "I was against them a witness."
34. This is the end of what 'Isa said in this verse.
35. On the Day of Gathering.
36. According to the commentator, the leaven is the predisposition for the arrival in the presence of Allah. The dough is the clay of his substance.
37. All used in this verse.
38. i.e. with knowledge, weeping, and maintaining *adab*.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Mercy in the Word of Sulayman (Solomon)



Bilqis said,¹ *"It (the letter) is from Sulayman and it says 'In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, Most Merciful.'"* Some people criticise the fact that the name of Sulayman comes before the name of Allah. That is not the case, and in saying this they say something that does not befit the gnosis which Sulayman, peace be upon him, had of his Lord. How could what they say be connected to him when Bilqis said of it, *"a noble letter had been delivered to me,"* that is, a letter which honoured her. In this they were influenced by the story of how Chosroes tore up the letter of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.² He did not tear it up until he had read all of it and knew what it contained. It was the same with Bilqis. Had she not accepted what was established, respect for its author would not have prevented her from tearing up the letter, whether his name, peace be upon him, had been mentioned before or after the name of Allah.

Sulayman mentioned the two mercies: the mercy of graciousness and the mercy of obligation, and they are *ar-Rahman ar-Rahim*. So Allah freely dispenses His bounty by the *Rahman*, and it is incumbent on Him by the *Rahim*. This obligation comes from graciousness, so *Rahim* is contained in *Rahman*. Allah "has prescribed mercy for Himself," glory be to Him! in order that the slave might have what Allah spoke about of the deeds which this slave brings, expecting his due from Allah who has required Himself to have this mercy for them, the mercy of obligation. When one of the slaves is like this, he knows that He is the author of the deed.

The deed is divided according to the eight organs of man. Allah informed us that He is the He-ness of each organ. So the author of the action is none other than Allah while the form is that of the slave. He-ness is embodied in him, i.e. only in his name because Allah is the source of what is manifested and which is called "creation". Because of this, the names of the Manifest and the Last belong to the slave since he was not and then was. By the fact that his manifestation depends on Him and action issues from Him, there is the name the Hidden and the First. Thus, when you see creation, you see the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

This recognition was not hidden from Sulayman, peace be upon him. Indeed, it is a part of a kingdom which "belonged to no one after him,"³ in terms of its manifestation in the visible world. Muhammad, peace be upon him, was given what Sulayman was given, but he did not manifest it. Allah gave him the power to vanquish the 'ifrit ⁴ who came in the night to attack him.⁵ When the Prophet wanted to take the

'*ifrit* and tie him to the one of the columns of the mosque until morning so that the children of Madina could play with him, he remembered the prayer of Sulayman, and so Allah made him drive the '*ifrit* off in disgrace.

The Prophet did not manifest his power as Sulayman had done. He spoke of "a kingdom" which is not universal, and we know that he meant a particular kingdom. We see that the Prophet shared in every part of the Kingdom which Allah had given him and so we know by this that he is privileged with the whole kingdom. In the story of the '*ifrit*, he was only given the manifestation while Sulayman might have been given the whole and the manifestation. If the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had not said in the story of the '*ifrit*, "and Allah gave me power over him," we would have said that when he wanted to seize the '*ifrit*, Allah reminded him of Sulayman's prayer so that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, would know that Allah had not given him power to seize him. He then made him send off the '*ifrit* off in disgrace.

When he said, "*Allah gave me power over him*," we knew that Allah had given him freedom of action in that. Then Allah reminded him and he remembered Sulayman's prayer and showed *adab* towards him. We know from this that that no creature after Sulayman had the general manifestation of that kingdom.

Our goal in this question is only discussion and instruction about the two mercies which Sulayman mentioned in the two names which are expressed in Arabic as ar-Rahman ar-Rahim.[6](#) Allah stipulated the mercy of obligation [7](#) and made the application of the mercy of graciousness universal when He said, "*My mercy extends to all things*," (7:156) even the Divine Names, which are the realities of ascriptions. He was gracious to us in them. We are the result of the mercy of graciousness by the Divine Names and divine ascriptions of lordship. Then He prescribed mercy for Himself by our own manifestation. He informed us that He is our He-ness, that we might know that He obliged mercy on Himself only for Himself. Mercy never departs from Him. Who could be gracious to you when there is only Him?

There must be a principle for clarifying differences in merit – this is in relation to what is manifested of the differences in merit that creatures have in knowledge, so that it might be said that this person knows more than that person, even though the source is but one. This means the shortcoming connected to the will (*irada*), apart from the connection of knowledge. This difference in merit exists in the divine attributes. [8](#) The connection and merit of will and its increase is connected to power. In the same way, hearing, sight and all the divine names are arranged in ranks, some having more merit than others. Similarly what is manifested in creation differs in ranks of merit, so that it can be said that this person knows more than that person even though the source is the same.

As each Divine Name which I have set forth is implied by all the Names and described by them, similarly that which creation manifests accepts all of that which is subject to differences of merit. Each part of the universe is from all the universe, i.e. it is a vessel for all the separate realities of the universe. Our statement that Zayd is inferior to 'Amr in knowledge does not contradict the fact that the He-ness of Allah is the source of both Zayd and 'Amr, but it is more perfect and knowing in 'Amr than in Zayd, even as the Names differ in merit. They are not other-than-Allah. Allah, inasmuch as He is Knowing,

has a more encompassing connection than Allah as the Transformer, the All-Powerful. But He is still He and not other-than-Him.

O my friend! do not then know Him in one aspect and be ignorant of Him in another! Do not negate Him here and affirm Him there, unless You affirm Him by an aspect through which He affirms Himself and negate Him by an aspect through which He negates Himself, as in the *ayat* which combines affirmation and negation in respect to Him when He said, "*Nothing is like Him,*" negating, "*and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing,*" (42:11) and so He affirmed an attribute which is general to every hearing and seeing living being. Nothing exists but that it is alive, although this is hidden in the world from the perception of some people. It will appear to all people in the Next World, for it is the Abode of the Living (*ad-Dar al-Hayawan*). Similarly, the life of this world is only veiled from some of the slaves so that election and difference of merit might be manifested among the slaves of Allah according to what they perceive of Him from the realities of the universe.

In one whose attainment is more comprehensive, Allah is in principle more manifest in him than in someone who does not have this comprehensiveness. So do not be veiled by the difference in merit and say that it is not correct to say that creation is the He-ness of Allah after we have shown you the different in merit in the Divine Names. You have no doubt about them being Allah, and what is designated by them is not other than Allah.

How then could Sulayman place his name before the name of Allah as they allege? He is part of the whole which the mercy of graciousness brought into existence. The name, ar-Rahman ar-Rahim, *must come first for the dependence of the one receiving this mercy to be valid. Advancing the one who should come afterwards and delaying the one who should come before in the place he merits is contrary to the realities.*

Part of the wisdom of Bilqis and the sublimity of her knowledge lies in the fact that she did not mention who cast the letter to her. She only did that so that her companions would know that she had communications on matters whose means they did not know. This is part of divine management in ruling because when the means of communication reaching the ruler are unknown, the people of the government fear for themselves in their actions. Therefore they only act with prudence in a matter because that will reach their ruler, and they are guarding themselves from the potential danger of that action. If they knew precisely by whom information reached their ruler, they would have tried to flatter him and bribe him so that they could do whatever they wanted without their ruler hearing about it. Therefore the Queen said, "*a noble letter has been delivered to me,*" without naming the one who cast it. That was an act of policy on her part would would insure respect for her among the people of her kingdom and the nobles under her rule. By this, she merited her superiority over them.

As regards the superiority of the human man of knowledge over the man of knowledge of the jinn in the secrets of the disposal of things and the special properties of thing, that is known by the amount of time, for the movement of the eye in perceiving what it perceives is quicker than the movement of the body when it moves.⁹ The moment in which the eye moves is the same moment which it connects to the

object, in spite of the distance between the viewer and the object. The moment that the eyes open is the moment in which they are connected to the heaven of the fixed stars. The moment when its glance returns is the same moment that its perception is absent.

Rising from one's place is not like that. It does not possess this speed. Asaf ibn Barkhiya [10](#) was more perfect in the deed than the jinn was. What Asaf ibn Barkhiya said is the same as the action in the same moment. Sulayman, peace be upon him, at the same moment saw Bilqis' throne "settled before him" so one must not imagine that he perceived it while it was in its original place without being moved. We do not think that the displacement takes place in one and the same moment, but that it involves going into non-existence and returning to existence inasmuch as the only one who is aware of that is the one who has recognition of it. This is what Allah said, "*Yet they are dubious about the new creation.*" (50:15) Not a moment passes them but that they see what they saw. Since it is like this, the time of its non-existence (the absence of the throne from its place) is the same as the time of its existence with Sulayman because of the renewal of creation with the "breaths". No one knows this power, or rather, man is not aware with regard to himself that he ceases to exist in each breath and then is again.

Do not think that "this" (*thumma*) implies a delay. That is not true. However, it demands a high rank of knowledge in Arabic, as when the poet says:

As he brandished the straight Rudayni,[11](#) it quivered.

There is no doubt that the moment of brandishing the spear is without a doubt the same as the moment of quivering of the thing which is brandished. It happened without delay. It is the same with the renewal of creation with breaths. The time of non-existence coincides with the time of the existence of its like. It is similar to the renewal of accidents in the theory of the Ash'arites [*tajrîd al-a'râd*].

The question involving the moving of Bilqis' throne is one of the most difficult problems, except for someone who has recognition of what we have mentioned in its story. Asaf did not have any merit except for acquiring renewal in the assembly of Sulayman, peace be upon him. The throne was not moved across place nor did it rise above the earth nor break the laws of space for the one who understands what we mentioned. That was done by one of the companions of Sulayman in order to elevate Sulayman's honour in the selves of those who were present with Bilqis and her suite. The reason for that was that Sulayman was Allah's gift to Da'ud as He said, "*We gave Sulayman to Da'ud,*" (38:30) so the gift is the giving of the donor by providing a blessing, not by means of fitting recompense or merit. So he is the abundant blessing, the decisive word and the cutting sword.

As for the knowledge of Sulayman, Allah said of him, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it (in spite of his opposite judgement to that of Da'ud), and Allah "*gave each of them judgement and knowledge.*" (21:79) Da'ud's knowledge was knowledge given by Allah, and Sulayman's knowledge was the knowledge of Allah in the matter inasmuch as He is the Judge without intermediary. So Sulayman is the interpreter of Allah in the seat of sincerity.[12](#) It is like the man who is striving to hit on the judgement of Allah by which Allah would judge the question. If he were to find it by himself or by what

was revealed to His Messenger, then he would have two rewards. The one who errs in this particular judgement has one reward as well as its being knowledge and judgement. The community of Muhammad was given the rank of Sulayman in judgement [13](#) and the rank of Da'ud in wisdom, [14](#) so there is no better community than it.

When Bilqis saw her throne, and she knew how great the distance was and the impossibility of moving it in that space of time, she said, *"It seems the same."* (28:42, lit. "it is as if it were.") She spoke the truth according to what we mentioned regarding the renewal of creation by similarity. It was it. The matter is true, as you are the same at the time of renewal as you were in past time.

Part of the perfection of Sulayman's knowledge was in the instruction he gave regarding the pavilion when he told Bilqis, *"Enter the courtyard."* [15](#) The courtyard was very smooth without any curvature in its glass. When Bilqis saw it, she thought that it was water and had depth, so she bared her legs so as not to let the water dampen her clothes. By that, Sulayman informed her that the throne which she saw was of this sort. This is the utmost fairness. He informed her that she had hit the mark when she said, *"It seems the same."* At that point, she said, *"My Lord, I have wronged myself but I have submitted with Sulayman to the Lord of all the worlds."*

So she did not submit to Sulayman, but to the Lord of the worlds, and Sulayman was part of the worlds. She did not restrict her submission as the Messengers do not restrict their belief in Allah, contrary to Pharaoh who said, *"to the Lord of Musa and Harun."* (26:48) Although this submission is related to Bilqis' submission in a certain respect, it does not have the same force. She had more discernment than Pharaoh in submission to Allah. Furthermore, Pharaoh was governed by the principle of the moment when he said, *"I believe in the One in whom the Children of Israel believe."* (10:90) He specified, but he also specified when he saw the sorcerers articulate their belief in the *"Lord of Musa and Harun."* The Islam of Bilqis was the Islam of Sulayman since she said, *"with Sulayman."* She followed him in all that he adhered to in the way of beliefs.

This is how we are on the straight path which the Lord is on, for our forelocks are in His hand, [16](#) and it is impossible for us to separate from Him. We are with Him implicitly, and He is with us by open declaration. Allah said, *"He is with you wherever you are,"* (57:4) and we are with Him as He takes us by our forelocks. He, may He be exalted! is with Himself wherever He goes with us on His path. So everyone in the world is on a straight path, and it is the path of the Lord. It is this that Bilqis learned from Sulayman, so she said, *"To Allah, the Lord of all the worlds,"* without referring to a particular world.

As for the subjection which was the privilege of Sulayman, peace be upon him, and by which he was distinguished from others, and the kingdom which Allah gave him which none after him would have, it is from his command when He said, *"We gave him the fiercely blowing wind, speeding at his command."* (21:81) It was not subjection in itself, for Allah said in respect of each of us without exception, *"He has made everything in the heavens and everything on the earth subservient to you."* (45:13) He also mentioned the subjection of the winds, stars and other things, [17](#) but that is not by

our command. It is from the command of Allah.

If you reflect with your intellect, Sulayman was privileged by this command neither by mental concentration nor by aspiration (*himma*) – rather, it was by nothing more than the command itself. We said that because we recognise that the physical bodies of the world can be affected by the *himma* of the self when someone is in the station of concentration. We have seen such things happen in this Path. Sulayman only had to articulate the command in whatever he wished to subject without either concentration or *himma*.

Know, may Allah support us and you by a spirit from Him, that when any slave receives a gift like this, that does not detract from his portion of the kingdom of the Next World, nor is he called to account for it. That was true of Sulayman. Although he sought it from his Lord, the tasting (*dhawq*) of the Path [18](#) demands that it was advanced to him from what was stored up for others, and He will call him to account for it when he wants it in the Next World. Allah told him. "*This is Our gift* (and He did not say "to you: or to anyone else); *bestow or withhold without reckoning.*" (38:39) We knew by the tasting of the Path that his request was from the command of his Lord. Thus the request was from the divine command, and the one who requested it received full recompense for his request.

If the Creator wishes, He grants his need in what he seeks from Him, and if He wishes, He withholds it. The slave has fulfilled what Allah demanded of him – to obey His command – in what he asked of his Lord. If he had asked that from himself without his Lord commanding him to do that, then he would be held to account for it.

That is true in all that Allah is asked for, as He said to His Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "*Say: 'O Lord, increase me in knowledge!'*" He obeyed his Lord's command and sought increase in knowledge to such an extent that each time he was given milk, he interpreted it to be knowledge even as he interpreted it as knowledge in a dream in which he received a glass of milk. In the dream, he drank the milk, and gave the rest of it to 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. The people asked, "What is its interpretation?" He replied, "Knowledge." Similarly, when Allah took him on his Night Journey, the angel gave him a vessel which contained milk and a vessel which contained wine. The Prophet drank the milk, and the angel said, "You have chosen the true nature (*fitra*). Allah has bestowed you on your community!" When milk appeared, it was the form of knowledge. Therefore it is knowledge taking on the form as milk, just as Jibril came to Maryam in the form of "*a handsome, well-built man.*" (19:16)

When the Prophet said, "People are asleep and when they die, they wake up," he meant that everything that man sees in the life of this world is in the rank of the dreams of someone who is asleep, so it must be interpreted. Phenomenal being is imagination (*khayal*), but it is Allah in reality. [19](#) Whoever understands this has received the secrets of the Path. When the Prophet was offered milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and increase us in it" because he saw it as the form of knowledge, and he had been commanded to seek increase in knowledge. When he was offered something other than milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and give us better than it."

When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it to him by a request which arises from a divine command, He does not take him to account for it in the Next Abode. When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it by a request which is not by a divine command, the business in it is up to Allah. If He wishes, He will take him to account for it, and if He wishes, He will not take him to account for it. I hope for knowledge from Allah in particular for which He will not call one to account, for He commanded the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, to seek increase of knowledge, and it is the same command which is addressed to the Prophet's community. Allah said, *"You have an excellent model in the Messenger of Allah,"* (33:21) and what greater model is there than this model who is a source of solace [20](#) to the one who possesses understanding from Allah?

Had we discussed the station of Sulayman in its entirety, you would have seen a matter whose revelation would have struck you with terror. Most of the men of knowledge of this Path have no knowledge of the state and rank of Sulayman. The business is not as they claim.[21](#)



1. In Qur'an 27:30. The story is found in Sura 27. When Sulayman hears of the kingdom of Queen Bilqis in Sheba', he sends the hoopoe to take a letter to her.
2. When the Prophet sent Chosroes or Khosrau a letter inviting him to Islam, he tore it up after it was read to him.
3. Ref. Qur'an 38:35, where Sulayman says, *"My Lord, forgive me, and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me."*
4. Type of malicious jinn.
5. Hadith. "Yesterday Shaytan rushed up suddenly to stop my prayer. Allah gave me power over him and I seized him. I wanted to tie him to one of the pillars of the mosque so that all of you could look at him, but then I remembered the supplication of my brother Sulayman, 'O Lord, forgive me and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me.' (38:35) Allah turned him away in humiliation." via Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful.
7. When He said, *"I will write (mercy) for those who are godfearing...."* (Qur'an 7:156)
8. i.e. Knowledge is more perfect than will.
9. Sulayman asked his council, *"O Council, who among you will bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?"* An 'ifrit of the jinn said, *'I will bring it to you before you get up from your seat...'*

He who possessed knowledge of the Book said, 'I will bring it to you before your glance returns to you.'" (27:38-40)

10. The name of the man of knowledge in Sulayman's council.
11. Rudayna was a woman who was famous for straightening spear shafts which were tested by shaking.
12. See Qur'an 54:55.
13. i.e. by the Qur'an and hadith.
14. By *ijtihad*.
15. This is in the same sura (27), ayat 44.
16. Qur'an Ref. 11:56, *"I have believed in Allah, my Lord and your Lord. There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a straight path."*
17. Various places in the Qur'an: 14:32, 16:12, 22:65, 31:20.
18. One variant has "reality" instead of Path (*Tariq*).
19. Inasmuch as phenomenal being is a divine shadow.
20. *Uswa* is model, or a person to be imitated and through whose emulation one gains consolation. The source of solace is the verbal noun from Form V of this verb, *ta'assa*, which means to become consoled by the example of another who had suffered in a similar fashion and been patient in it.
21. His kingdom does not decrease what he has in the Next world.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Existence (Wujud) in the Word of Da'ud (David)



"We subjected the mountains to glorify with him in the evening and sunrise, and also the birds, flocking together, all of them turned to him." Then Allah combined the kingdom and speech and prophethood in Da'ud when He says, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech."¹ Allah clearly and openly appointed Da'ud Khalif. This was Da'ud, peace be upon him. His freedom of action in the kingdom with this subjection was by a mighty command which was not completed in him alone. Allah also gave it to Sulayman who shared in it as He says, "And We gave knowledge to Da'ud and Sulayman who said, 'Praise be to Allah who has favoured us.'" (27:15) He says, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it. We gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79)

Know that since prophethood and the message are a divine privilege, and cannot be acquired. This is the prophethood which lays down a Shari'a. It is Allah's gift to them. Gifts of this sort are not recompense, nor is recompense demanded from them for these gifts. Allah bestows it on them as pure blessing and favour. So He says, *"We gave him (i.e. Ibrahim) Ishaq and Ya'qub."* ² He says of Ayyub, *"We gave him his family, and the same again with them."* (38:43) He says of Musa, *"We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet,"* (19:53). There are more instances like that. What they received first of all is what they will receive at the last in the totality of their states, or most of them. It is only His name, the Giver.

Allah says in respect of Da'ud, *"We gave Da'ud great favour from Us."* (34:10) He did not accompany that with a demand for recompense from Da'ud, nor did He say that He gave him what He mentioned as a reward. When He demanded gratitude for that by action, He demanded it of the people of Da'ud, and did not mention Da'ud himself, asking Da'ud's people to thank Him for the blessing which He gave to Da'ud. For Da'ud himself, it is a gift of pure blessing and favour. It is not like that for his people, but rather like the demands of barter. So Allah said, *"Work, family of Da'ud, in thankfulness! But very few of My slaves are thankful."*³

If the Prophets, peace be upon him, thanked Allah for what He had bestowed on them and given to them, that was not from the command of Allah. They undertook that freely from themselves, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood thanking Allah until his feet were swollen, when Allah had forgiven Him his wrong actions, past and present. When people commented what he did, he said, "Am I not a thankful slave?" Allah said that Nuh was a thankful slave.⁴ So the thankful

among the slaves are few.

The first blessing which Allah bestowed on Da'ud was that He gave him a name which does not have any connected letters in it:

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By this, He cut him off from the world and He told us this by the name itself which is *dâl*, *alif*, and *wâw*. Allah named Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, with both connected and separated letters:



So in this Allah both joined him and separated him from the world. He combined the two states for him in his name as He combined the two states for Da'ud through meaning (ma'na)⁵ although He did not put that in his name. That was a privilege which Muhammad had above Da'ud, i.e. calling him by this name. The matter was thus completed for Muhammad in all its aspects. It is the same in his name Ahmad.

AHMAD

That is from the wisdom of Allah.

Then He spoke about the blessing He gave Da'ud in the mountains' echoing of glorification with him.⁶ So they glorified with his glorification that the deed might be his. It was the same with the birds. He gave him power and described him by it,⁷ and He gave him wisdom and decisive speech.⁸

Then the greatest blessing and nearest rank which Allah appointed for him was that his khalifate was mentioned in the divine text. He did not do that with any of his kind, and there were khalifs among them. Allah said, *"Da'ud, We have made you a khalif on the earth, so judge between people with truth and do follow your own desires,"* i.e. whatever comes to your mind in judgement without revelation from Me, *"letting them misguide you from the Way of Allah,"* (38:26) from the path which I revealed to My Messengers. Then Allah showed adab with him and said, *"Those who are misguided from the Way of Allah will receive a harsh punishment since they forgot the Day of Reckoning."* He did not say to him, *"If you go astray from My Path, there is a terrible punishment for you."*

If you said that Adam is mentioned as the Khalif in divine text, we will say that it is not the same as in the text regarding Da'ud, for Allah said to the angels, *"I am putting a khalif on the earth."* (2:30) He did not say, *"I am making Adam a khalif."* Even if He had said that, it still would not be the same as His

words, "*We have made you a khalif*," in respect of Da'ud. One is implied and the other is explicit. Mentioning Adam in the story after that did not indicate that he is the same as the khalif of whom Allah spoke. Occupy your mind with the transmissions of Allah on His slaves when He transmits them. It is the same in respect to Ibrahim the friend, "*I will make you an Imam for the people*." (2:124) He did not say "a khalif". We know that the imamate here means the khalifate, but it is not the same because He did not mention it by the most specific of its names which is the khalifate.

Then part of bestowing the khalifate on Da'ud is that He made him a khalif of judgement. That is only from Allah. He told him, "*Judge between people with the truth*." (5:42) The khalifate of Adam was not of this rank. Da'ud's khalifate was that he follow what was in it previously, not that he delegated with the divine judgement of Allah in His creation. If that had been the case, it would have occurred. However, our discourse is only regarding the khalifs on the earth from Allah, and they are Messengers. As for the khalifate today, it is from the Messengers, not from Allah, so they only judge by what the Messengers prescribed for them. They do not go beyond that except when there is a small point which is only known by those like us. That is in taking what they judge by, from what is in the Shari'a of the Messenger, peace be upon him.

The khalifate is from the Messenger. He takes the judgement from him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, by transmission or by *ijtihad*, whose basis is also transmitted from him. Some of us think that the one who takes the judgement takes it from Allah, for he is a khalif from Allah by the source of that judgement. The substance is his inasmuch as it was the Messenger's - the source of his judgement is that of the Messenger's. Outwardly he follows, not disputing his judgement, as will be the case with 'Isa when he descends and judges. It is the same when the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "*Those are the ones whom Allah has guided, so be guided by their guidance*." [9](#) This relates to what he recognises as one who is singled out and one who conforms. It is in him by the degree of what the Prophet established of the Shari'a which from the previous Messengers since he confirmed it. We follow him in relation to its confirmation, not because it is a Shari'a of someone else before him. In the same way, the Khalif takes from Allah the same thing that he takes from the Messenger.

In the language of unveiling, we call him "the khalif of Allah", and with outward knowledge, we say "the khalif of the Messenger of Allah". For this reason, the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, died and did not transmit the khalifate from himself to anyone else for he knew that among the slaves of Allah are those who will take the khalifate from their Lord. Thus the khalif from Allah is in conformity with the judgements of the Shari'a. Since the Prophet knew that, he did not hinder the matter. Allah has khalifs in His creation who take from the mine of the Messenger and the Messengers that which the Messengers took. They recognise the virtue of their predecessor there because the Messenger is a vessel for increase. The khalif is not a container for the increase which, had he been the Messenger, he would have received. He only gives knowledge and judgement in what he legislates through the specific legislation of the Messenger. Outwardly he follows the Messenger without opposition.

Do you not see that in the case of 'Isa, peace be upon him, when the Jews imagined that he did not add to Musa, as is the case with what we said about the Khalifate today with the Messenger, they accepted him and confirmed him? When he added judgement and abrogated judgement, Musa confirmed it, for 'Isa was a Messenger. They did not accept that because he differed from their creed, and the Jews did not know the matter for what it was - this is why they sought to kill him. His story is what Allah relates to us about them and him in His Mighty Book. He was a Messenger before increase. As for decrease of the judgement or its increase, it is confirmed since decrease is increase of judgement without a doubt.

The khalifate today does not have this rank, but it decreases or increases based on the Shari'a which is confirmed by *ijtihad*, not on the Shari'a which Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, articulated. The khalif might do something which is counter to a *hadith* in a certain judgement, and so he imagines that that comes from *ijtihad*. That is not the case, but rather this Imam has not confirmed that the transmission with respect to unveiling is from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. If it had been confirmed, he would have judged by it. If the path in it is fairness in justice, he is not protected from illusion. It is not by transmission in meaning.

Something like this occurs in the khalif today. Similarly, it also applies to 'Isa for, when he descends, he will remove much of the Shari'a established by *ijtihad*. By removing that, he will clarify the form of the legislated truth which he had, especially when the judgements of the Imams differ in the same event. We know absolutely that when revelation descended, it descended in a certain way. That is the divine judgement and none other! Allah confirmed it and it is the Shari'a of confirmation by the removal of interdiction from this community and the vastness of its judgements in it.

As for the statement of the Prophet, "If there are two khalifs, then slay one of them," this is the outward khalifate which has the sword. If they are in agreement, then one of them must be killed by the conflict of the khalifate of meaning. There is no actual killing in it, but killing comes with the outward khalifate. If the khalif does not possess this station, being the khalif of the Messenger of Allah - it is just being from the principle of the basis by which the existence of two gods could be imagined: "*If there had been any gods besides Allah in heaven or earth, they would both be ruined*," (21:22) even if they are in agreement. We know that if they differ implicitly, the judgement of one of the two will be valid. The one with the operative judgement is the god properly speaking. The one whose judgement is not operative is not god.

From this, we know that every valid judgement in the world today is the judgement of Allah even if it differs from the established judgement in its outward manifestation called the Shari'a. The only judgement which is valid belongs to Allah in the heart of the matter, because the matter which occurs in the world is based on the judgement of the Divine Will, not on the judgement of the established Shari'a,[10](#) whose establishment itself comes from the Will. For that reason, He put His determination into effect. Therefore, Will only has determination in the matter, not in the act which it brings.

The power of the Will (*mashi'a*) is immense.[11](#) This is why Abu Talib [12](#) considered it to be the Throne of the Essence, since the will itself necessitates judgement. Nothing occurs in existence nor disappears

from it without the Will. When there is opposition to the divine command here, it is called "rebellion". It is only commanding the means, not the command which brings things into being. None opposes Allah at all in what He does in respect to the command of the Will. Opposition only occurs in respect of the command of means. So understand that!

Properly speaking, the command of the Will is directed to bringing the action itself into existence, not to the one at whose hands the action manifests itself. It is impossible that the action should not be. However it takes place in a particular locus, and so, at one moment, it is called opposition to the command of Allah, and at another moment it is called agreement and obedience to the command of Allah. The language of praise and blame follow the action accordingly.

Since the matter itself is based on what we have stated about it, creation of all sorts therefore hopes for happiness. He designated this station as *"mercy which encompasses everything."*¹³ It preceded divine wrath, and the predecessor comes before as is its right. That which the latter judges is what the former judged. Mercy obtained it since nothing preceded it, so this is one meaning of "His mercy preceded His wrath" – that mercy judges the one who reaches it. It stands at the end. Therefore the end must be reached, and thus mercy and parting from wrath must be reached. It has jurisdiction over everything which reaches it according to what is given to it by the state of the one who arrives.

Whoever possesses understanding

witnesses what we have said.

If they do not understand,

they should take it from us.

There is only what we mentioned in this matter,

so rely on it and be in it now as we were.

What we recited to you came from it to us,

and from us to you is what we gave you from us.

As for the softening of iron,¹⁴ hard hearts are softened by reprimand and threat as fire softens iron. The hardness of hearts is a stronger hardness than that of stone. Fire breaks stone, calcifies it and does not soften it. Iron was only softened for him so that protective coats of mail could be fashioned. This is an instruction from Allah that the thing is only protected by itself.¹ Mail protects against the spearhead, the sword, the knife and the arrowhead - protection against iron is by iron. The Muhammadan Shari'a brings, "I take refuge with You from You." Understand this! This is the spirit of the softening of iron. He is the

Avenger, the Merciful, and Allah grants success.




1. Qur'an 38:18-20.
2. 6:84;19:49; 21:72; 29:29.
3. Qur'an 34:13.
4. Qur'an 17:3.
5. As he had prophethood, the message, the khalifate, the kingdom, knowledge, wisdom, and discrimination.
6. Qur'an 34:10, *"O mountains and births! echo with him in his praise!"*
7. Qur'an 38:17, *"Remember Our slave Da'ud, who possessed true strength."*
8. Qur'an 38:20, *"We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech."*
9. Qur'an 6:90.
10. See the Qur'an 74:54-56, "It is truly a reminder to which anyone who wills may pay heed. But they will only pay heed if Allah wills."
11. The reality of the will necessitates judgement because it is the same as making a demand.
12. Al-Makki.
13. Qur'an 7:156, also 40:7.
14. Qur'an 34:10, *"We softened iron for him: 'Fashion wide coats of mail and measure well the links.'"*

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The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath (*Nafas*) in the Word of Yunus (Jonah)



Know that this human organism in its perfection consists of spirit (*ruh*), body and self (*nafs*). Allah created it in His form. The disintegration of its structure is only undertaken by the One who created it either by His hand - and it is only that - or by His command. Whoever undertakes to do that without the command of Allah has wronged himself and exceeded the limits of Allah in it and rushed to the ruin of the one whom Allah has commanded to thrive. Know that compassion to the slaves of Allah is more proper through preservation than jealousy in Allah.

Da'ud, peace be upon him, wanted to build the Bayt al-Muqaddas,¹ and built it many times. Whenever he finished it, it was destroyed. He complained about that to Allah. Allah revealed to him, "This House of Mine will not be built by the hands of one who has shed blood." Da'ud said, "O Lord, was that not for Your sake?" Allah said, "Yes, but are they not My slaves?" Da'ud said, "O Lord, let it be built at the hands of someone who is from me!" Allah revealed to him, "Your son Sulayman will build it."

What is meant in this story is that the preservation and maintenance of this human organism is better than its destruction. Do you not see that Allah has obliged the *jizya* ² and truce on the enemy of the *deen* in order to spare them. He said, *"If they incline to peace, you too incline to it, and put your trust in Allah."* (8:61)

Do you not see that for the one who has responsibility for retaliation, accepting blood-money or pardoning is prescribed for the next-of-kin who is the responsible guardian? If he refuses to accept either, then the killer can be slain in retaliation. Do you not see how when the next-of-kin consists of a group of people, and one of them accepts the blood-money or pardons the person while the rest of the group want him killed, Allah observes the one who pardoned and prefers him to the one who did not pardon. Do you not see that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, *"Whoever is in a position to retaliate and slays the person is like him"*? Allah says, *"The repayment of a bad action is one equivalent to it,"* (42:40) so He made retaliation an evil deed, i.e. that deed is evil even though it is part of the Shari'a. Whoever pardons and makes amends has a reward due from Allah because he is based on His form. Whoever pardons and does not slay, his reward is due to the One on whose form he is based, because the One who fashioned is more entitled to it, and his existence only appeared by the name the Manifest.

Whoever preserves the person, preserves Allah. Man is not blameable by his source, but by his action,

and his action is not the same as him. We are discussing his action, and action belongs only to Allah, even though some actions are blamed and some are praised. The language of blame in respect to purpose which is reprehensible with Allah, and the only thing reprehensible is what is made to be so by the Shari'a. The Shari'a makes something reprehensible because of what Allah made known or which He made known through someone He has instructed. So Allah prescribed retaliation by necessity for the preservation of the human race and to prevent people exceeding the limits of Allah. Allah says, "*There is life for you in retaliation, O you who possess intelligence (lit. cores)!*"[3](#) (2:179) They are the people of the core who stumble onto the secret of divine laws and wisdoms.

Since you know that Allah preserves this organism and preserves its continuance, you should also preserve it since you have that happiness. While man is still alive, he hopes that he will obtain the attribute of perfection for which he was created. Whoever strives to destroy it, strives to prevent the acquisition of that for which he was created. How excellent is what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Shall I tell you what is better and more excellent for you when you meet your enemies, smite their necks and they smite yours? Remembering Allah."

That is because the only one who know the value of this human organism is the one who remembers Allah with the invocation (*dhikr*) demanded of him.[4](#) Allah sits with the one who remembers Him,[5](#) and the sitter is witnessed by the one doing the invocation. When the one doing the invocation does not witness Allah who sits with him, then he is not doing invocation. When Allah is mentioned, He flows in all parts of the slave, not just in his invocation with the tongue. Allah, at that moment, is only the Companion of the tongue in particular. The tongue sees Him, inasmuch as the man,[6](#) in respect of his sight does not see Him.[7](#)

Understand this secret in the invocation of those who are heedless! The heedless person who does invocation is present without a doubt, and the One mentioned sits with him and so he witnesses Him. In respect of his heedlessness, this person does not do invocation and Allah does not sit with the heedless. Man is many but with a single source. Allah is one source but has many Divine Names, just as man has many parts. What is required of the invocation of one part is not the invocation of another part. Allah sits with the part which is invoking Him, and the other part is described as heedless. There must be some part of man doing invocation, so Allah sits with that part, and He preserves the rest of the parts by His concern.

When Allah undertakes the destruction of this organism by what is called "death", that is not negation (*i'dam*) , but rather separation. He takes man to Him, and what is meant is only Allah's taking man to Him, "*and to Him the whole affair will be returned.*" (11:123) When He takes him to Him, He fashions him a different composition than this composition. The new composition is from the genus of the abode to which he has moved, that is, the Abode of Going-on, because equilibrium exists. The creature thus will never die, i.e. his parts will never be separated.

As for the people of the Fire, they will return to bliss, but it will be in the Fire since after the end of the duration of punishment, it must become cold and peace according to the mercy which preceded it. This

is their bliss. The bliss of the people of the Fire, after claims are settled, is the bliss of the friend of Allah, Ibrahim, when he was thrown into the Fire.⁸ He was punished by the sight of it since his knowledge told him that it is a form which causes pain to any living being which is near it. He did not know what Allah intended by it and from it in respect to him.

So after the existence of these pains, he will find cold and peace in spite of the fact that he still witnesses the phenomenal form which is fire in the eyes of the people. The single thing has various modes in the eyes of the onlookers. The divine *tajalli* is also like that. If you wish, you could say that the *tajalli* of Allah resembles this, and if you wish, you could say that the world is in the eye of the beholder which contains the parable of Allah in the *tajalli*, and so it takes on various modes in the eye of the onlooker according to the onlooker's disposition. The onlooker's disposition varies with the modalities of the *tajalli*. All of this is permissible in the realities.

Had a slain person or one who had died not returned to Allah when he died or was slain, Allah would not have decreed their deaths nor prescribed their slaying. All is in His hand, and there is no loss in respect to Him. He prescribes slaying and decrees death by His knowledge that His slave will not pass from Him, for he returns to Him as Allah says, *"and to Him the whole affair will be returned."* So freedom of action occurs in it, and He is the One with freedom of action. Nothing is outside of Him of which He is not the source. Rather, His He-ness is the source of that thing, and He is the One who gives it its unveiling when He says, *"and to Him the whole affair will be returned."*



1. The Temple in Jerusalem.
2. Poll tax paid by non-Muslims.
3. *Lubb*: In Arabic there is no word for mind. However, in the Qur'an the word that designates a central locus of awareness in the human being is *lubb*, which means core. It is the heart viewed as an organ of gnosis and not merely as a valve which pumps blood to the head. Ibn al-'Arabi says that it is that part of knowledge which is protected from the hearts which are attached to phenomenal being.
4. Which is to remember Allah on the tongues while banishing passing thoughts and the chatter of the *nafs* while you watch Allah with the heart.
5. *Hadith qudsi*, "The people of My dhikr are the people I sit with..." in Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Majah, etc.
6. Insan - also the pupil of the eye.
7. "Eyesight cannot perceive Him but He perceives eyesight. He is the All-Penetrating, the All-Aware." (Qur'an 6:103)


8. See Qur'an 21:69.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of the Unseen in the Word of Ayyub (Job)



Know that the secret of life flows in water, for it is the basis of the components and the basic elements. For this reason, Allah made every living thing of water.¹ There is nothing which is not alive, so there is nothing which does not proclaim His praise, but their extolling is only understood by divine unveiling.² Nothing extols unless it is alive. So the basis of everything is water. Do you not see how the Throne is on the water because it was formed from it?³ It oppresses the water while the water underneath it maintains it.

In the same way, Allah created man a slave. Then he was haughty towards his Lord and put himself above Him. In spite of this, Allah preserves him from underneath in respect of the height of this slave who is ignorant of himself. This is what the Prophet said, "If you let a rope fall, it would fall on Allah." So he indicated that "below" is related to Him as "above" is related to Him when He said, *"They fear their Lord above them,"* (16:50) and *"He is the Absolute Master over His slaves."* (6:18; 6:61) So He has "above" and "below" For this reason, the six directions only appeared in respect of man, who is on the form of the All-Merciful.

There is no nourisher except Allah. He said of one group, *"If they had implemented the Torah and the Gospel,"* using the indefinite and being general, *"and what was sent down to them from their Lord,"* and this includes every judgement sent down on the tongue of a Messenger or someone inspired, *"they would have been fed from above their heads,"* and He is the Nourisher in respect of the aboveness which is ascribed to Him, *"and beneath their feet,"* (5:66) as He is the Nourisher in respect of the belowness which He ascribes to Himself on the tongue of His Messenger, who translates from Him. If the Throne had not been on the water, its existence would not have been maintained. The existence of the living sustains life. Do you not see that when the living dies the customary death, the parts of his structure disintegrate and his faculties are eliminated from that particular structure? Allah said to Ayyub, *"Stamp your foot! Here is a cool bath,"* (38:42) meaning that since he had an excess of the heat of pain, He would alleviate it by the coolness of the water. For this reason, the medicine was decrease from excess and excess in decreasing. What is meant is the demand of balance, and the only way to it is by approaching it.

However, we said that there is no way achieve equilibrium because realities and witnessing constantly accord taking-form with every single breath.⁴ Taking-form (takwin) only comes from an inclination

which is called deviation or decomposition in nature. In Allah it is the will, and it is inclination to one particular goal rather than another. Equilibrium denotes sameness in all, but this does not occur. For this reason, we are deprived of the principle of equilibrium. Allah's description with pleasure and anger and the attributes is related in prophetic divine knowledge. Pleasure obliterates anger, and anger obliterates pleasure from the pleasing. Perfect equilibrium would mean that anger and pleasure are the same. The Wrathful would not not wrathful towards the one he is angry with, but would be pleased with him. He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him – that is, inclination. And Allah would not pleased with the one He is pleased with and would be angry with him, and so He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him - that is, inclination.

We said this, however, in respect of the one who thinks that Allah's wrath will continue against the people of the Fire forever, as he claims. So they do not have the principle of pleasure from Allah. What is meant is true. It is as we have said, so the hopes of the people of the Fire lies in the removal of pains. Even if they still dwell in the Fire, that is pleasure, so wrath is removed when the pains are removed since the source of pain is the source of wrath if you understand! Whoever is wrathful has suffered hurt. He only strives to avenge the object of his wrath by causing him suffering so that the wrathful might find relief by that. He transfers the pain which he has to the object of his wrath.

If you separate Allah from the universe, then High indeed is He exalted above this attribute! If Allah is the He-ness of the universe, then all principles appear only in Him and from Him. It is His word, *"to Him the entire affair will be returned"* in reality and unveiling, *"so worship Him and put your trust in Him"* (11:123) in veil and covering. There is nothing in the realm of possibility more original than this universe because it is based on the form of the Merciful which Allah brought into existence - He manifested His existence by the existence of the universe as man manifests the existence of the natural form. We are His manifest form, and His He-ness is the spirit of this form which governs it. There is no management except in Him as it is only from Him. He is the First by meaning and the Last by form, and the Manifest by the changing of judgements and states, and the Inner by management. *"He has knowledge of all things."* *"He witnesses everything"*⁵ so He knows by direct witnessing, not by thought. It is the same with the knowledge of tasting (*dhawq*) which does not derive from thought. Tasting is sound knowledge. Other things are only conjecture and surmise, and that is not knowledge at all.

Then Ayyub had that water to drink to remove the pain of thirst which was from the weariness and punishment with which shaytan ⁶ had touched him,⁷ that is, distance from the realities which he perceived for what they were. Ayyub perceived them for what they were, and by his perception, he was in the place of nearness. Every witnessed one is close to the eye (*'ayn*=source), even if it is far away by the interval of distance. Vision reaches it, since it is witnessing. If it had not been for that, he would not witness it, nor would what is witnessed be reached by vision, however you want to put it. The witnessed is near between the sight and the seer. This is why Ayyub alluded to touch and ascribed it to Shaytan in spite of the nearness of touch. He said, "The one distant from me is near because of his power over me."

You know that distance and nearness are two relative matters, for they are two ascriptions. They have no existence in the source in spite of the fact that there judgements are established in the far and near.

Know that the secret of Allah in Ayyub (whom He made an example for us in a written existing book which this Muhammadan community reads in order to learn what is in it, and they attach honour to the one who possesses it), is that Allah praised him for his patience in his supplication to remove affliction from him. We know that when the slave calls on Allah to remove affliction from him without that lessening his patience, then he is patient and the best of the slaves, as Allah said, *"What an excellent slave! He truly turned to his Lord."* [8](#) (38:44) This means he goes back to Allah, not back to the cause.

Allah affects by the cause because the slave depends on it since the causes which will remove any one matter are many, but the Causer is but one. It is more fitting that the slave return to the One Source in order to remove that pain by the cause of that than to the particular cause. It may be that that will not conform to Allah's knowledge in it, and then some will say, "Allah did not answer me." Yet he did not call on him, but he inclined to a particular cause which neither the time nor the moment requires. Ayyub acted by the wisdom of Allah since he was a Prophet. He knew that with one group, patience is what holds the self back from complaint. That is not our definition of patience (*sabr*). Its definition is to hold the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah, not to Allah. The first group is veiled in their view that the complainer is lessened in contentment (*rida*) with the decree by complaint. That is not the case.

Contentment with the decree is not lessened by complaint to Allah or to others, but contentment with the decreed is lessened. We are not speaking about contentment with the decreed. Affliction is what is decreed and not the same as the Decree. Ayyub knew that holding the self back from complaint to Allah for the removal of affliction is to oppose divine force. It is ignorance if, when Allah afflicts someone by what gives him pain, he does not call on Allah to remove that painful matter from him. The one who has realisation must supplicate and ask Allah to remove that from him. For that gnostic who possesses unveiling, that removal comes from the presence of Allah. Allah describes Himself as "hurt", so He said, *"those who hurt Allah and His Messenger."* (33:57) What hurt is greater than that Allah test you with affliction in your heedlessness of Him or a divine station which you do not know so that you return to Him with your complaint so that He can remove it from you? Thus the need which is your reality will be proven. The hurt is removed from Allah by your asking Him to repel it from you, since you are His manifest form.

One of the gnostics was hungry and wept. Someone who had no tasting (*dhawq*) in that area censured him for that. The gnostic said, "But Allah makes me hungry so that I might weep. He tests me by affliction so that I might ask Him to remove it from me. This does not lessen my being patient." We know that patience is holding the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah.

By "other" I mean a particular aspect of Allah. Allah specified a particular one of Allah's aspects, and it is called the aspect of He-ness, so he calls on Him from that aspect to remove affliction from him, not from the other aspects called causes. They are only Him in respect to elaboration of the matter in itself. The gnostic's request does not veil him from the He-ness of Allah in removing affliction from him and the fact that all the causes are Him from a particular point of view. This path is only obliged on the people of *adab* among the slaves of Allah who are entrusted with the secrets of Allah. Allah has guardians whom only Allah recognises, and some of them recognise each other. We have counselled

you, so strive, and ask of Allah!



1. Qur'an See 21:30.
2. See Qur'an 17:44.
3. See 11:7. Meaning the physical throne which is the Starless Sphere. Hadith in al-Bukhari, "Allah existed and there was nothing with Him. His Throne was on the water and then He created the heavens and the earth."
4. Tajdid al-khalq, instantaneous renewal of creation.
5. See Qur'an 5:117; 22:17, etc.
6. The root of Shaytan is *shaytana*: to be distant.
7. Qur'an 38:41.
8. *Awwab*, which means one who frequently returns to Allah.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Majesty in the Word of Yahya (John the Baptist)



This is the wisdom of firstness in the names. Allah called him Yahya, i.e. the memory of Zakariyya was (*yahya*) brought to life by him, and *"a name We have given to no one else before."* (19:7) He joined the attainment of the attribute, which is in the one who has passed on but left a son to revive his memory and his name through him. He called him "Yahya". His name Yahya is like knowledge by tasting. The memory of Adam, peace be upon him, was revived by Shith and that of Nuh by Sam. It is the same with the Prophets, peace be upon them; but Allah did not combine the name of knowledge from Him and the attribute for anyone before Yahya. It was an act of concern for Zakariyya from Allah, since Zakariyya said, *"Give me an heir from You."* (19:5) He mentioned Allah before the mention he mentioned his son, as Asiya [1](#) mentioned the Neighbour before the abode when she said, *"Build a house in the Garden, for me in Your presence."* (66:11) Allah was generous to Zakariyya, for He granted his need and named him by His attribute. Yahya's name was a remembrance for what His Prophet Zakariyya asked of Him; because he preferred the going-on of *dhikru'llah* after his death, since the son is the secret of his father.

He said, *"to be my inheritor and the inheritor of the family of Ya'qub."* (19:6) Nothing is inherited in respect of these except for the station of *dhikru'llah* and calling to Him. Then Allah gave him the good news of what He appointed for him from His words, *"Peace be upon him the day he was born, and the day he dies, and the day he is raised up again alive."* (19:15) He brought the attribute of life, which is his name, and He informed him of His peace upon him. His words are true. He completed it, even if it is the word of the spirit, *"Peace be upon me the day I was born, the day I die, and the day I am raised up again alive,"* (19:33) and this is more sublime and more perfect in oneness and belief in the interpretation. That in which the order of nature [2](#) was broken in respect to 'Isa was articulation. His intellect was given mastery and perfected at that time when Allah made him speak. In any case, mastery of articulation is not necessary.

'Isa spoke the truth in what he articulated but this is different than the one who was testified to, as in the case of Yahya. [3](#) Allah's greeting on Yahya was higher than the greeting of 'Isa on himself in this way since the ambiguity occurring in divine concern was removed. The immediate circumstances indicate his proximity to Allah in that and his sincerity, since he spoke in the cradle the form which indicated the innocence of his mother. He was one of the two witnesses. The other witness was the shaking of the dried trunk of the palm tree. [4](#) Fresh, ripe dates came tumbling down without the male palm tree or pollination. In the same way, Maryam bore 'Isa without a man, that is, without normal and customary intercourse. If a Prophet had said, "My sign and my miracle is that this wall will speak," and then the

wall speaks and says, "You have lied, you are not the Messenger of Allah," then the sign is proven and it is confirmed by it that he is the Messenger of Allah. One does not pay any attention to what the wall said.

He introduces this probability into the words of 'Isa when his mother pointed to him while he was in the cradle. Allah's greeting on Yahya is higher than this element. The passage which indicates that he is the slave of Allah is in respect of the claim made about him that he was the son of Allah. The indication is completed by sheer articulation. He is the slave of Allah according to another group who speak of prophethood. It increases the principle of probability in logical thought until his truthfulness appeared in the future regarding all that he spoke about when he was in the cradle. So understand our allusion!



1. The wife of Pharoah who was one of the perfect women.
2. *Kharq al-'adat*, miracle, literally, the breaking of the normal pattern of things.
3. 'Isa was a witness, not one who is the object of witness, since he testified on behalf of his mother.
4. See Qur'an 19:29

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Possession¹ in the Word of Zakariyya (Zachariah)



Know that the mercy of Allah encompasses everything in existence and judgement, and the existence of wrath comes from the mercy of Allah by wrath. His mercy preceded His wrath, that is, the ascription of mercy to Him preceded the ascription of wrath. Then every source has an existence which demands that Allah's mercy encompass every source. For that reason, we say that the mercy of Allah encompasses all things in existence and principle.

The Divine Names are "things", but they derive from a single Source. The first thing that His mercy encompassed before time was its thingness, that source which gives existence to mercy by mercy. Thus the first thing that His mercy encompassed was itself, then the thingness indicated, then the thingness of every existent existing without end in this world and the Next, non-essential (*'arad*) and substance (*jawhar*), composite and simple. Neither the acquisition of a goal nor harmony of nature is taken into account – rather, harmonious and inharmonious things are all encompassed by divine mercy in existence. We mentioned in The Makkan Revelations that effect only belongs to the non-existent, not the existent. If the existent had it, it is by the principle of the non-existent. It is a strange knowledge and a rare question. Only those who possess illusions (*awhâm*) know its realisation, and that is by their tasting (*dhawq*).²

The mercy of Allah pervades phenomenal beings, and circulates in essences and sources. The most ideal position of mercy is when it is known from witnessing with sublime thoughts. Everyone mercy designates is happy. There is only what mercy designates, and the mention of the mercy of things is the source of its bringing them into existence. Every existent thing has been shown mercy. O friend! Do not be veiled from the perception of what we have said by what you see of the troubles people experience and what you believe about the pains of the Next Abode which will not depart from the one whom they afflict.

First of all, know that mercy is in bringing-into-existence in general. In mercy by pains, only pains come into existence. So mercy has an effect in two ways - the first effect is by the essence, which is its bringing every existent source into existence. It does not regard desire or lack of it, suitability or lack of suitability. It looks at the source of every existent before its existence, or rather, it looks at its source-form. For this reason, it saw Allah-as-creature in creeds as a single source-form among the source-forms. Its mercy to itself is by bringing-into-existence. This is why we said that Allah-as-creature in creeds is the first thing shown mercy after its mercy to itself in its connection of bringing those shown mercy into existence.

It has another effect by request. Those who are veiled ask Allah to have mercy on them in their beliefs, and the people of unveiling ask for the mercy of Allah to settle on them. They ask for it by the name of Allah, and so they say, "O Allah! Have mercy on us!" and He only has mercy on them by carrying out mercy through them. It has authority because authority in reality belongs to the meaning based on place.

He is the Merciful in reality, so Allah is only merciful to His slaves, attentive to them by mercy. When mercy settles on them, they experience its authority through taste (*dhawq*). The one designated by mercy has had mercy known to him. The active participle is the Merciful (*Rahîm*) and the Mercy-Giver (*Râhim*), and this principle does not describe creatures because it is a matter of directing meanings to their essences.

States are neither existent nor non-existent – they have no source in existence because they are relationships. They are not non-existent in principle because what knowledge establishes is called the "knower", and it is a state. The knower is an essence described by knowledge, but it is not the same as the essence nor is it the same as knowledge. There is only knowledge and the essence on which this knowledge is established. The being of the knower is a state of this essence when it is described by this meaning. The relationship of knowledge occurred to him, so he is called knowing. Mercy, properly speaking, is a relationship from the Mercy-giver, and it is necessarily part of the principle, so it is merciful. The One who brought it into existence in the one shown mercy did not bring it into existence in order to be shown mercy by it; He brought it into existence to show mercy to the one on whom it settled.

Allah is not in a place by events, so He is not in a place by bringing mercy into existence. He is the Mercy-Giver, and the Mercy-Giver is only Mercy-Giver by the establishment of mercy. He confirmed that He is the source of mercy. Whoever has not tasted this matter and has no part in it, does not dare to say that He is the source of mercy or the source of the attribute. Such a person says, "He is not the same as the attribute nor other than it." In his view, the attributes of Allah with Him are not Him, nor are they other-than-Him because he cannot deny them nor can he make them the same as Him. Thus he [3](#) moves to this interpretation, and it is a good interpretation. Yet there is another interpretation more appropriate to the matter than this one, and more likely to remove ambiguity. It is to deny the sources of the attributes any existence based on the essence of the one described. Rather, they are relationships and relative ascriptions between the one described by them and their intelligible sources. Although mercy is common to all of them, it is different in relationship to each Divine Name.[4](#)

For this reason, Allah is asked to show mercy by each Divine Name, so the mercy of Allah and its indirect reference, which is that which encompasses everything, has many branches according to the number of the Divine Names. It is not general in relation to that particular divine name in the statement of the one who asks, "O Lord, have mercy!" and other Divine Names, even the Avenger. So he says, "O Avenger, have mercy on me!" That is because these Names indicate the designated Essence and, by their realities, indicate different meanings. They call on Him by these Names in mercy with respect to their indication of the Essence called by that Name and no other – not by what is indicated by that Name, separating it from another and distinguishing it. The Name is not distinguished from another, and with

him it is the indication of the Essence. It is distinguished in itself from other-than-it by its essence, as it is generally agreed that, by any expression, this Name is a reality distinct in its essence from other-than-it. The whole is set forth to indicate one designated source. There is no disagreement that each name has an authority which another does not have. That also must be taken into account, as one takes into account their indications of the named essence.

For this reason, Abu'l-Qasim ibn Qasi said regarding the Divine Names that each Name is, in its isolation, designated by all of the Divine Names since they preceded in mentioning its description by all the Names, that is, by their indication of one source. Although the Names based on it are many and their realities differ, i.e. the realities of these Names, the mercy is obtained by two means. The first is the path of obligation, and it is His word, *"I shall prescribe it for those who are godfearing and pay zakat,"* (7:156) and He binds them by it through the attributes of knowledge and action. The other path by which mercy is obtained is the path of divine graciousness which is not connected to action. It is His words, *"My mercy embraces all things."* Of this, it is said, *"So that Allah may forgive you your earlier errors and any later ones."* (48:2) And of this, there are His words, *"Do what you want, I have already forgiven you."*⁵ So know that!



1. *Al-Mâlikiyya*. His state was dominated by the name, al-Mâlik, the Master, who is the Strong. This strength was shown in his himma whose fruit was Yahya.
2. Because they connect the imagination (*wahm*) to things and bring them into existence and thus have experiential knowledge of this. As for the one on whom illusion has no effect, he is far from this question.
3. *Al-Ash'ari*.
4. i.e. mercy by provision, mercy by knowledge, etc.
5. This refers to an incident involving Hatib ibn Abi Balta'a. When the Muslim army prepared to set out to conquer Makka, Hatib sent a letter to warn Quraysh which was intercepted. 'Umar wanted kill him, but the Prophet said, "O 'Umar, perhaps Allah has looked with favour on those who fought at Badr and said, 'Do what you want. I have already forgiven you.'"

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Word of Ilyas (Elijah)



Ilyas is Idris, peace be upon him. He was a Prophet before Nuh, and Allah raised him to a high place.^{[1](#)} He dwells in the heart of the spheres, the sphere of the sun. Then he was sent to the town of Baalbek (Ba'labakk). Baal is the name of an idol and "bekk" is the power of the village. The idol was called Baal and was singled out with domination. It was Ilyas who was Idris, who was given the example of the splitting of the mountain called "*Lubnan* (Lebanon)" which comes from *lubana* (desire, goal). What he needed was a horse of fire with all its trappings of fire. When he saw it, he rode it and appetite fell from him, and so there was intellect without appetite. There remained for him no connection with that which is connected to the desire of the self. For him, Allah was pure without connection. He had only half of gnosis of Allah. When the intellect is free of the self in respect to gathering knowledges by its discernment, its gnosis of Allah is based on disconnection (*tanzih*) not connection (*tashbih*). When Allah gives gnosis by *tajalli*, then gnosis of Allah is perfected. Disconnection is used in one place and connection in another place.

The gnostic sees the diffusion of Allah by existence in natural and elemental forms. There is no form but that he sees the source of Allah in its source. This is the complete perfect gnosis which is brought the roads (*shara'i*) revealed from Allah. By this recognition, all illusions (*awham*) have authority. For this reason, illusion has a stronger power in this human organism than the intellect, because the man of intellect – even if his intellect reaches maturity – is not free of the power which illusion has over him and over the formation of what he reasons. Illusion is the greatest power in this perfect human organism. The revealed roads brought it, and so you use both connection and disconnection. You use connection in disconnection by illusion, and disconnection in connection by the intellect. So the whole is connected to the whole. It is not possible that disconnection be free of connection nor connection from disconnection. Allah said, "*Nothing is like Him*," so He used connection and disconnection. "*He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing*,"^{[2](#)} and He used connection, and yet it is the greatest of ayats revealed on disconnection. Even so, it is not free of connection because of the *kaf* (like).

So He has the most knowledge of Himself of those who know. He only designated Himself by what we mentioned. Then He said, "*Glory be to your Lord, the Lord of Might, beyond anything they describe*," (37:180) and they only describe according to what these realities accord them. He exalted Himself above their disconnection since they limit Him by that disconnection. That is due to the inability of the intellect to perceive the like of this.

Then all the roads (*Shara'i*) brought what the illusions dominate. They do not free Allah of an attribute in which He is manifest as they said. They brought that, and so communities acted on it. Allah granted them the *tajalli*. The heirs followed the Messengers closely, and said what the Messengers of Allah said. Allah knows best where He puts His message, and so Allah knows best who turns his face to Him in a particular aspect by transmission to the Messenger of Allah. One aspect of His begins with "*He knows best where to place His message.*" (6:124) There is a reality in each of the two aspects – for that reason, we speak of connection and disconnection, and disconnection and connection.

After this [3](#) is established, we will lower the screens and drop the veils on the eye of the critic [4](#) and the one who simply follows a creed. Both of them are among the forms in which Allah gives *tajalli*, but He has commanded the veil for us in order that different levels of excellence of the predisposition of forms might appear. One is given a *tajalli* in a form according to the predisposition of that form. What its reality and exigencies accord him is ascribed to him. That must be. The example of the one who sees Allah when he is asleep and does not deny it is this. Without a doubt, it is Allah Himself. He attaches to it the exigencies of that form and its realities in which He gives the *tajalli* in sleep. Then after that, he interprets, i.e. he transfers it to another matter which disconnection logically demands. If the one who interprets it has unveiling and belief (*iman*), then he does not transfer it to disconnection at all. Rather, he gives it the disconnection that is due it and what is due to that which is manifest in it, i.e. its connection/resemblance. Properly speaking, "Allah" is an expression for the one who understands the indication (*ishara*).[5](#)

The spirit of this wisdom and its seal is that the command is divided into the effector and the one effected. These are two expressions. The effector in every aspect and in every state and in every presence is Allah. The effected by every aspect and in every state and in every presence is the universe, even if it is Allah who comes.[6](#) Allah is everything at its foundation which corresponds. That which appears is forever and ever a branch from the root; divine love is a branch from the superogatory acts of the slave. So this is an effect between the effector and the effected. Allah is the hearing of the slave and his sight and faculties from this love.[7](#) This is an established effect which, if you believe, you cannot deny because it is confirmed by the Shari'a.

As for the person of sound intellect, he is either in possession of a divine *tajalli* in a natural locus of *tajalli*,[8](#) so he recognises what we have said, or else he is a believing Muslim who believes in what was reported in sound tradition. The power of illusion must govern the man of intellect investigating what has been brought to him in this form because he believes in that form. As for the one who is not a believer, he judges illusion by illusion; and so he imagines by his logical discernment that he assigns to Allah what the *tajalli* gives him in dream. Illusion in that does not depart from him inasmuch as he is not aware because of his disregard for himself. From that is what Allah says, "Call on Me and I will answer You." (40:60) Allah also says, "*If My slaves ask you concerning Me, I am near. I answer the call of the caller when he calls on Me,*" (2:186) since He only answers when there is someone who calls to Him. The source of the caller is the source of the answerer, but there is no disagreement about the difference of forms. They are two forms without a doubt.

All these forms are like Zayd's limbs. It is known that Zayd is one reality in personality, yet his hand is not the form of his foot nor his head nor his eye nor his eyebrow. He is one multiple - multiple by forms, one by source. That is like man who is one by source without a doubt. There is no doubt that 'Umar is not Zayd nor Khalid nor Ja'far, and that the individual persons of this one source are endless in existence. Even if man is one by source, he is many by forms and persons. If you are a believer, you know absolutely that Allah Himself will appear in a *tajalli* in a form on the Day of Rising. He will be recognised and then He will change form and be denied.⁹ Then He will change from it again into another form and will not be recognised. He is the One giving *tajalli* and it is not other than Him in each form, even though it is known that this form is not that other form.

It is one source which has the same function as the mirror. When the viewer looks in it at the form of his belief in Allah, he recognises Him, and so draws near Him. When it happens that he sees in it the belief of someone else, he denies Him since he sees his form and the form of someone else in the mirror. The mirror is but a single source while the forms are many in the eye of the viewer. There is no form in the mirror which comprises them all at once.

Although the phenomenal being of the mirror has an effect on the forms from one aspect, it does not have an effect on the forms from another aspect. The effect which it has makes the form change shape in smallness, largeness, length, and width, so it has an effect in quantities. This is attributable to it, but this changing of it is by the difference of the size of the mirrors. In the example, look at one of these mirrors, and do not look at all of them. It is your perception in respect to His being essence, and so He is independent of the universe, and in respect to the divine names. In that moment He is like the mirrors. Whatever Divine Name in which you look at yourself or simply look at. He manifests the reality of that Name in whoever looks. The matter is thus. If you understand, do not be anxious, and do not fear. Allah loves bravery, even to the extent of killing a snake. The snake is not other than your self, and the snake is alive through its self in form and reality. The thing is not killed by itself, even if the form is destroyed in the senses, The definition determines it, and imagination does not make it depart.

Since the matter is based on this, this is the safeguard of the essences and might and invincibility. You cannot destroy the definition. What might is greater than this might? You imagine by illusion that you have killed. By intellect and illusion, the form does not vanish from existence in the definition. The proof of that is, "*You did not throw when you threw, but Allah threw.*" (8:17) The eye only perceived the form of Muhammad which had the throwing confirmed to it in the senses. It is what Allah denied the throwing to at first, and then confirmed in the middle, only to return to the perception that Allah was the One who threw in the form of Muhammad. One must believe this. So look at this effector when Allah descended into a Muhammadan form. Allah Himself informs His slaves of that, and none of us said that of Him, rather He said it of Himself. His report is true, and it is obligatory to believe it whether or not you perceive the knowledge of what He said, being a knower or believing Muslim.

Part of what shows you the weakness of the intellect's discernment in respect to its thought, since the intellect passes judgement on cause (*'illa*), is that cause is not an effect of the one who is the cause. This is the judgement of the intellect which is evident. There is only this in the knowledge of *tajalli*, and it is

that the cause is an effect to whoever is the cause. That which the intellect governs is sound when discernment is clarified. Its goal in that is that, when it sees the matter differently than what logical proof would accord it, it says that the source – after it is confirmed that it is one in this multiple, and inasmuch as it is cause in one of these forms belonging to any effect – is not an effect of its effect, so that its effect would become a cause to it. This is his goal when he sees the matter for what it was, although he does not continue in his logical discernment.

Since the command in causality is of this sort, your opinion by the scope of logical discernment is not in other than this narrow limit. None are more reasonable than the Messengers, may the blessings of Allah be upon them, and they brought what they brought in transmission from the Divine Presence. They confirmed what the intellect confirmed. Then they gave more in what the intellect alone does not possess by its perception and what the intellect does not imagine directly, but one draws near to it in the divine *tajalli*. When he is alone with himself after the *tajalli*, he is confused about what he saw. If he is the slave of a Lord, his intellect returns to him, and if he is the slave of reasoning, Allah gives him back judgement. This is only as long as he is veiled in the dimension of this world from his dimension in the Next World.

The gnostics appear here as if they possessed the form of this world by virtue of the fact that its principles operate on them. However, Allah has transformed them inwardly to the dimension of the Next World. That must be the case. They are unknown by form except to whomever has had his inner eye unveiled by Allah so that he perceives.[10](#) There is no gnostic of Allah in respect of divine *tajalli* who is not based on the dimension of the Next World. He has been gathered in this lower world of his and has been called from his grave. He sees what they do not see, and he witnesses what they do not witness - as a mark of concern from Allah to some of His slaves in that respect.

Whoever wishes to find this wisdom of Ilyas-Idris to whom Allah gave two formations, so that he was a Prophet before Nuh, and then he raised him up and brought him down after that as a Messenger and so Allah joined for him the two degrees, let him descend from the authority of his intellect to his appetite and be an absolute animal so that he will be shown what every creature that crawls is shown except for the jinn and men. Then he will know that he has realised his animality, and it has two tokens. One is this unveiling – so he sees who is punished in his grave and who has bliss. He sees the dead alive and the silent speaking and the sitting walking. The second token is muteness since, had he wanted to utter what he had seen, he would be unable to do so. Thus he has realised his animality. We had a pupil who acquired this unveiling although dumbness did not take hold of him, and so he did not fully realise his animality. When Allah established me in this station, I realised my animality with a complete realisation. So I was seeing and wishing to utter what I was witnessing but I could not. So there was no difference between me and the mute who cannot speak.

When he realises what we have mentioned, he will move to being pure intellect in natural matter. He will witness matters which are the roots of what is manifested in natural forms. He will know from where this principle is manifest in the natural form with the knowledge of tasting. Had it been unveiled that nature is the source of the breath of the All-Merciful, he would have been given much good. If he is

restricted in what we have mentioned, this power from the gnosis which governs his intellect will be enough for him. He keeps company with gnostics, and by that he knows tasting. *"You did not kill them, it was Allah who killed them,"* (8:17) yet only iron, the blow and that which is behind this form killed them. In the whole, killing and throwing took place. So he witnesses matters by their roots and by their forms, and he is complete. When he witnesses the breath, he is completely perfect. The breath of the All-Merciful is the source of the overflowing of existence and life on all, rather the source of Allah's descent to all forms.



1. See Qur'an 19:57, *"Mention Idris in the Book. He was a true man and a Prophet. We raised him up to a high place."*
2. Qur'an 42:11.
3. The rule of joining *tanzih* and *tashbih*.
4. The one who uses logical proof.
5. i.e. what he recognises from the word "Allah" extends only so far as his predisposition and understanding.
6. In the *wârid*.
7. "When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks".
8. i.e. the human form.
9. Hadith in Muslim: 1: 299, 302.
10. See Qur'an 50:22, *"We have stripped you of your covering and today your sight is sharp."*

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Ihsan in the Word of Luqman (Lokman)



If Allah wishes, He wills provision for Him,

so all of phenomenal being is His food.

If Allah wishes, He wills provision for us,

so He is our food as He wishes.

His volition is His will, so say that He wished it.

So it is wished.

He wills increase and decrease.

So what He wishes is wished.

This is the distinction between them,[1](#)

so understand!

From a certain point of view,

their source is the same.

Allah says, *"We gave Luqman wisdom,"* (31:12) and He says, *"Whoever has been given wisdom has been given much good."* (2:269) By the divine text, Luqman had much good as Allah has testified. The example of what Luqman said to his son is, *"My son, even if something weighs as little as a mustard-seed, and it is insode a rock or anywhere else in the heavens or earth, Allah will bring it out."* (31:16) This is a wisdom which is articulated, and that wisdom is his setting out that Allah is the One who brings forth. Allah confirmed that in His Book and did not refute what the speaker said.

As for the silent wisdom in it, and you know it by the circumstances, he is silent about the one to whom that grain is given. He did not mention him nor did he say to his son, "Allah will bring it to you or to other than you." He used bringing in general terms and denoted the thing brought in the heavens or in the earth as an instruction that the looker might regard His words, "*He is Allah in the heavens and in the earth.*" (6:3) Luqman gave instruction by what he said and by what he remained silent on, so Allah is the source of every knowing thing because the known is more universal than the thing, so it denies unknown things.

Then he completed the wisdom and brought it to its full value in order that the structure might be complete in it. He said, "*Allah is Latif (Subtle, Kind).*" (31:16) Part of His subtleness (*latâfa*) and His kindness (*lutf*) is that He is in the thing named by such-and-such a definition in such-and-such a source of that thing, so it is only what its name indicates by convention and usage. It is said that these are names: heaven, earth, rock, tree, animal, angel, provision and food, and yet the source of everything is One. Thus the Ash'arites say about this that the entire universe is homogeneous in substance (*jawhar*), so it is one single substance.

It is the same as our statement that the source is One. They said that it varies by non-essentials. Thus our statement that it varies and becomes many through forms and relationships so as to provide distinction. It is said, "This is not that in respect to its form or its non-essential or natural disposition (*mizâj*)."
Say whatever you like, but this is the same as that in respect to its substance. For this reason, the source of the substance is put in the definition of every form and disposition. However, we say that it is not other-than-Allah. The *mutakallim* thinks that it is called substance. Even though it is true, it is not the source of Allah of which the people of unveiling and *tajalli* speak. This is the wisdom of the "*Latîf*".

Then He is described when He says "*the All-Aware (Khabir),*" the One who knows by experience. It is His words, "*We will test you until We know.*" (47:31) This is the knowledge of tastes. Allah put Himself with His knowledge of what the matter is in (our) profitable knowledge. No one can deny what Allah has written about Himself. Allah differentiated the knowledge of tasting and absolute knowledge. The knowledge of tasting is limited by the faculties. He said of Himself that He is the source of the faculties of His slave when He said, "I am his hearing," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his sight," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his tongue," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his foot and his hand." He did not restrict Himself to specifying the faculties, but He mentioned the members. The slave is not other than his members and faculties. The source called the slave is the Real, but the source of the slave is not the Compassionate Master.

Relationships are distinct by their essence. The one brought into relationship is not distinct.² Then He equalized His source in all relationships, for it is but one source with various ascriptions, relationships and attributes.

Part of the completeness of Luqman's wisdom in instructing his son is what has come in the *ayat* of these two Divine Names, *Latif* and *Khabir* – Allah is called by them. If He had put that in phenomenal being (*kawn*) which is existence, and said, "He was (*kana*)," it would have been more complete in

wisdom and more eloquent in admonition. Allah related the words of Luqman in meaning as he said it and did not add anything to it. His statement that Allah is the *Latif*, the Aware, is from the statement of Allah. Then Allah knew of Luqman that, had he said it (*kana*), it would have been utterly perfected by this.

As for his words, "If it should be but the weight of one grain of mustard-seed," it is for the one who has it as food. It is only the atom mentioned in His words, "*Whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it.*" (99:7-8) A mustard-seed is the smallest thing consumed. If there had been anything smaller, Allah would have used it as He said, "*He is not ashamed to make an example of a gnat.*" (2:26) Then since He knew that there is anything smaller than the gnat, He said "*or of an even smaller thing,*" i.e. in smallness. This is the word of Allah, and that which is in the *Sura of the Earthquake* (99) is also the word of Allah. So know that!

That which is smaller than the gnat is the atom, and then there is another subtlety (*latîfa*). That is that the atom, in spite of its smallness, is also lighter in weight because it is alive, since the living is lighter than the dead. So the meaning is that when the deed is the weight of an atom in smallness and lightness, the recompense must be seen. We know that Allah did not restrict Himself to the weight of the atom, and there is nothing smaller than it. He used it by way of intensification, and Allah knows best.

When Luqman used the diminutive for his son,³ it was the diminutive of mercy and thereby he gave him a legacy which contains his happiness if he acts according to it. The wisdom of Luqman's legacy lies in his prohibition to his son, "*Do not associate anything with Allah Aassociating others with Him is a terrible wrong.*" (31:13) The one wronged establishes apportioning in respect to His description even though it is the same source. So he is only associating His source with Him, and this is the very greatest ignorance.

The reason for this is that the person who has no recognition of the matter nor of the reality of the thing, does not know that diversity is actually contained in a single source although forms vary in that single source. So such a person puts the form shared by another in that station, and so he makes every form a part of that station. It is known of the associate that the matter which indicates him through what occurs in him of partnership is not the source of the other with whom he is associated, since it is the other. In reality, there is no associate. Everyone is based on his portion whenever it is said about him that there is a partnership between the two in it. The reason for that joint association, if it is joint, is that the action of one of them eliminates the collective aspect. "*Say: Call on Allah or call on the All-Merciful.*" (17:110) This is the very heart of the question.



1. The difference between volition or wishing (*mashi'a*) and will (*irada*).
2. In respect of its reality, the Essence is not distinguishable.

3. *Bunayya*, "little son".

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The Seal of the Wisdom of the Imam in the Word of Harun (Aaron)



Know that the existence of Harun, peace be upon him, was from the presence of mercy (*rahamut*) by His words, *"We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet."* (19:53) So his prophethood was from the presence of the Rahamut. He was older than Musa, and Musa was greater than him in prophethood. The prophethood of Harun is from the presence of mercy (*rahma*) and, for that reason, he said to his brother Musa, peace be upon him, *"O son of my mother!"* (7:150) So he called to him by his mother, not by his father, since, in principle, mercy belongs in greater abundance to the mother than the father. Were it not for that mercy, the mother would not have the patience necessary for upbringing. Then he said, *"do not seize me by the beard or by the hair,"* (20:94) and do not let my enemies gloat over me. All this is one of the breaths of mercy. The reason for that is the lack of ascertainment in looking at the tablets which had been given into his hands. If he had looked at them with ascertainment, he would have found guidance and mercy in them.

Musa would have found guidance, which is an elucidation of what happened in the matter which made him angry and of which Harun was innocent, and mercy towards his brother. He did not take him by the beard because of that state in which he saw his people because of his age, for Harun was older than him. That was compassion for Musa from Harun because the prophethood of Harun is from the mercy of Allah. Only the like of that issued from him.

Then Harun said to Musa, *"I was afraid that you would say: 'You have caused division in the Tribe of Israel,'"* (20:94) and you would make me the cause of their division since the worship of the Calf divided them. There were some of them who worshipped it following and imitating the Samiri, and there were some of them who refused to worship it until Musa returned to them so that they might question him regarding it. Harun was afraid that he would have that division between them attributed to him.

Musa knew the matter better than Harun because by his knowledge he knew the One the people of the Calf worshipped since Allah decreed that only He would be worshipped. When Allah decrees something, it must occur. Musa chided his brother Harun since the business consisted of disavowal and inadequacy. The gnostic is the one who sees Allah in everything, rather he sees Him as the source of everything. Musa was teaching Harun with the instruction of knowledge even though Musa was younger than him in age.

For that reason, when Harun said what he said, he turned to the Samiri and said to him, *"What did you*

think you were doing, O Samiri," i.e. what were you doing in turning aside to the form of the Calf, and in your making this shape from the jewelry of the people so that you captured their hearts for the sake of their wealth? 'Isa used to say to the Tribe of Israel, "O Tribe of Israel! Every man turns to where his wealth is, so put your wealth in heaven, and then your hearts will be in heaven." Wealth is only called that (*mâl*) because by essence it inclines (*yumîl*) the hearts to worship. It is the greatest and most exalted goal in the hearts since they need it. Forms have no going-on, so the form of the Calf must vanish. If Musa had not hastened to burn it, jealousy would have overcome him. So he burned it and then scattered the ashes of that form in the sea. He told the Samiri, "*Behold your god.*" He called it a god to alert him in order to teach him that he did know some of the places of divine *tajalli*, "*I will surely burn it!*"

The animality (*hawayâniyya*) of man has freedom of action over the animality of animals since Allah has subjected animals to man, especially in view of the fact that man's origin is not animal. Man has greater subjugation because that which is not-animal does not possess will. In fact, the non-animal is under the jurisdiction of whoever administers it without any recalcitrance whatsoever. The animal, on the other hand, has both will and instinct. Recalcitrance appears in some of its actions. If it has the power to manifest that, reluctance and resistance to what man wants appears from it. If it does not have that power or if what the man wants agrees with what the animal itself wants, then the animal obediently follows what is wanted of it.

Even so, man's "like" follows a command in whatever Allah has called him to in respect of the wealth which he hopes for from Him, which is designated in some states by "the other World" as when Allah says, "*We have raised some of them above others in rank so that some of them are subservient to others.*" (43:32) His like is only subjugated to him by his animality, not by his humanness. The two likes are two opposites. The higher in degree subjugates the lower in degree by wealth or by rank with his humanness, and that other was subjected to him either by fear or greed from his animality, not from his humanness, so his like is not subjected to him.

Do you not see that what is among the beasts in the way of jostling against one another is because they are likes? Two likes are two opposites. That is why He said, "*and He raised some of them above others in rank,*" so he is not with him in rank, and so subjugation occurs in respect of rank. Subjection is of two kinds. First, there is subjection intended by the subjector like the active conqueror when he subjects this subjected person - like the subjugation by the master of his slave although he is his like in humanness, and like the subjugation of the Sultan of his subjects who are his like in humanness, He subjugated them by rank.

The second sort is subjugation by the subjects of the king establishing their command that he drive harm away from them, protect them, do battle against those who attack them, and preserve their property and lives. All this is subjection through state by the subjects who subjugate their king in this act. In reality, it is called the subjection of rank. Rank has jurisdiction over him by this act. There are kings who work just for themselves, and there are those who recognise the matter and know that their subjects¹ subjugation of them is by rank. He knows their power and rights. Allah rewards him for that with the reward of those who know. The reward of the like of this is up to Allah, in Allah's being involved in the affairs of His slaves, for all the universe is subjected by state. Who is there who cannot be referred to as

being "subjected"? Allah said, *"Every day He is engaged in some affair."* (55:29)

Lack of power was in fact the armour of Harun which saved him from the people of the Calf by mastery over the Calf as Musa had mastery over it. This is a wisdom from Allah which is manifest in existence that He should be worshipped in every form. When the form departed after that, it only departed after it had been clad with divinity by its worshipper. For this reason, there is no species but that it is worshipped, either by the worship of making divine or by the worship of subjugation. That must be so for the one who has intellect.

Nothing is worshipped in the universe except after it is clad in elevation for the worshipper and its rank is manifest in his heart. For that reason, Allah called Himself for us, "the Exalter of ranks," and He did not say the "Exalter of rank," for ranks are many in the same source. He decreed that we worship only Him in many ranks. Each rank accords a divine locus of *tajalli* which is worshipped in it, and the greatest locus of *tajalli* in which He is worshipped and the the highest, is passion (*hawa*). As He said, *"Have you seen him who takes his passion to be his god?"* (45:23) It is the greatest idol. Nothing is worshipped except by it, and it is only worshipped by itself. Of it I say:

The truth of passion is

that passion is the cause of passion.

If there had not been passion in the heart,

passion would not have been worshipped.

Do you not see how perfect Allah's knowledge of things is? How it is completed it in respect of the one who worships his passion and takes it as a god? He said, *"he who Allah has misguided knowingly."* (45:23) Being astray is bewilderment (*hayra*). That is when this worshipper sees that what he worships is only his passion, by following it in obedience to Him in what He commanded him of worship of whichever person worships Him, until his worship is for Allah the Great. That too is from passion because if passion had not occurred in him in that pure presence – and it is the will to love – he would neither have worshipped Allah nor preferred Him to others. In the same way, everyone worships a certain form among the forms of the universe, and takes it as a god, and he only takes it by passion. The worshipper is under the power of his passion.

Then he sees that idols take on various forms among the worshippers. Each worshipper, for some reason, denies the one who worships another. What he has is a nearer perception which is confused by the unity (*ittihâd*) of passion, rather by the oneness (*ahadiyya*) of passion as He mentioned. It is the same source in every worshipper. Allah led him astray, i.e. confused him in respect to a knowledge that every worshipper only worships his own passion, and only seeks to worship his passion whether or not it agrees with the command of the Shari'a.

The complete gnostic is the one who sees that every idol is a locus of Allah's *tajalli* in which He is worshipped. For that reason, they are all called "god" in spite of having a particular name of a stone, tree, animal, man, star, or angel. This is the nature of the personality in it. Divinity is a rank which the worshipper imagines it to have, and it is the rank of his idol. In reality, it is a locus for the *tajalli* of Allah belonging to the sight of this particular worshipper devoted to this idol in this particular locus of *tajalli*.

This is why some of those who did not recognise an ignorant statement said, *"We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah"* (39:3) although they called them "god", as they said, *"Has he turned all the gods into One God? That is truly astonishing."* (38:5) They do not deny Him, rather they are amazed. They stop at the multiplicity of possible forms and the ascription of divinity to them. That is why the Messenger came and called them to one God who is recognised and not witnessed by their witnessing. They confuse Him with them and believe in Him when they say, *"We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah"* by their knowledge of those forms in stones. This is why the proof went against them when He said, *"Say: Name them!"* and they only named them by what they know those names to have in reality.

As for those who recognise the matter for what it is, they manifest the form of denying what is worshipped in the way of forms because their rank is in knowledge, and their rank is in accord with their being based on the principle of the moment, since they know that the moment is one of the mighty places of the *tajalli* of Allah in which He gives *tajalli* at each moment by some of His attributes. This is why time (*ad-Dahr*) is one of Allah's Names. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, *"Do not curse time, for time is Allah!"* At every moment, people are overcome by the principle of the quality in which He gives *tajalli* at that particular moment. The Messenger who is sent in that moment is the greatest manifestation of the perfection of that quality. He calls creation to Allah, manifested by *tajalli* in him, by obedience to him, which is obedience to Allah, as Allah says, *"Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah."* (4:80) This is why is obligatory to trust in him and obey him.

However, the gnostics know that they do not worship the forms themselves. Rather, they worship Allah in them according to the power of the *tajalli* which they know of these forms. The one who denies and has no knowledge of what Allah has manifested in *tajalli* is ignorant of this. The complete gnostic veils himself from the Prophet and Messenger and their heirs. He commands himself to leave that form which the Messenger of the moment left in order to follow the Messenger desiring Allah's love for them by His words, *"Say: if you love Allah, then follow me and Allah will love you."* (3:31) He called on a God to whom one has recourse and Who is known in respect to the whole and is not witnessed, *"nor do the eyes perceive Him, but He perceives the eyes"* (6:103) by His *lutf* and His diffusion in the source of things. The eyes do not perceive Him as they do not perceive their spirits which govern their shapes and outward forms. *"...He is the Latif, the All-Aware."*

Experience is tasting, and tasting is *tajalli*. *Tajalli* occurs in forms. They must be and it must be, and the one who sees Him by his passion must worship Him, if you only knew! Allah possesses the goal of the path.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of Sublimity in the Word of Musa (Moses)



The wisdom of the killing of the male children in respect to Musa was in order to give him the support of the life of each of those killed for his sake because each of them was killed for being Musa. There is no ignorance, so the life of the one killed for his sake had to return to Musa. It is pure life in the natural state (*fitra*). The desires of the self have not soiled it; rather, it is in its natural state of "Yes (*bala*)."¹ Musa was the sum of the lives of those killed for being him. All that was prepared for the murdered ones in the way of the predisposition of their spirits was in Musa, peace be upon him. This is a divine favour to Musa which no one before him had.

The wisdoms of Musa are numerous. If Allah wills, I will enumerate them in this chapter according to what the divine command puts into my mind. This is the first about which I shall speak in this chapter.

Musa was only born being a synthesis of many spirits. He was a concentration of effective forces since the young have an effect on the old. Do you not see how the child has an effect on the older person by the special quality the child has? The older person descends from his leading position to play with the child and rock him in his arms and to show himself at the child's level of intellect – he descends to the level of the child's intellect. He is under subjugation even though he is not aware of it. He occupies himself with instructing and protecting the child, seeing to his needs and consoling him so that the child is not distressed.

All this is part of the effect of the young on the old. That is due to the strength of his station. The young has a new covenant with his Lord because he has newly come into being. The old person is further from Him. Whoever is nearer to Allah subjects whoever is further away from Him, just as the elite of the near angels subject the further ones. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to expose himself to the rain when it came down and to uncover his head so that it would fall on him. He said that it has a new covenant with Allah. Look at this recognition of Allah on the part of this Prophet! What is more glorious, more sublime and clearer than this? The rain subjected the best of men due to its proximity to its Lord. That is a likeness of the Messenger on whom the revelation descends. The rain called him by its own state,² and so he exposed himself to the rain in order to receive from it what it brought from his Lord. If he had not received this divine benefit from it by the rain, he would not have exposed himself to it. This is the message of water from which Allah has fashioned every living thing³ – so understand!

As for the wisdom of Musa being put into the ark and then cast into the river, the ark (*tâbût*) is his human nature (*nâsût*). The river is what he received of knowledge through his body by what the power of discernment and the sensory imaginative faculties accorded him. Only by the existence of this elemental body does the human self have these faculties or their like. When the self comes to this body and is commanded to freely dispose of it and manage it, Allah gives it these faculties as instruments by which it obtains what Allah wills that it obtain in the management of this ark which contains the *sakina* [4](#) of the Lord. Musa was cast into the river in order to receive various knowledges by these faculties. Thus Allah taught him that the spirit which manages him is the ruler. He is only managed by it. It gives him the command of these faculties of phenomenal being which are in this *nâsût* that is designated by the ark in the field of indications and wisdoms.

Allah manages the universe in the same way, and it is only managed by it or by its form. It is only managed by Him inasmuch as the arrival of the one begotten depends upon its being brought into existence by the begetter. Caused things depend on their causes, proven things depend on their proofs, and true things depend on their realities. All of this is part of the universe, and it is Allah's management of it, and he only manages by it.

As for our statement, "or by its form," I mean the form of the universe, and by it I mean the Most Beautiful Names and sublime attributes by which Allah is named and described. Nothing of a name by which He is called has reached us but that we found the meaning and spirit of that name in the universe. The universe is also only managed by the form of the universe.

For that reason, the Prophet said in respect of the creation of Adam who is the blueprint which gathers all the attributes of the Divine Presence which is the essence, the attributes and the actions: "Allah created Adam in His form." His form is only the Divine Presence. In this noble epitome, which is the Perfect Man, He brought into existence all the Divine Names and the realities of that which is outside of him in the Macrocosm separate from him. He made Adam a spirit (*rûh*) for the universe, and so He subjected to him the high and the low through the perfection of his form. As there is nothing in the universe that "does not glorify Allah's praise," [5](#) in the same way, there is nothing in the world which is not subject to this man according to what the reality of his form accords him. Allah says, "*He has made everything that is in the heavens and the earth subservient to you. It is all from Him.*" (22:65) All that is in the universe is subject to man. He who knows that from his knowledge is the Perfect Man. He who is ignorant of that is the Animal Man.

The form of casting Musa into the ark and then casting the ark into the river is outwardly a form of destruction. Inwardly, it was his rescue from being killed. He was brought to life as the self is brought to life by knowledge from the death of ignorance as Allah says, "*Is someone who was dead* (i.e. by ignorance) *and whom We brought to life* (with knowledge) *and supplied with a light by which to walk among the people* (which is guidance) *the same as someone who is in utter darkness* (in being astray) *unable to emerge from it* (i.e. will never be guided)?" [6](#) In itself the matter has no end at which it stops.

Guidance is that man is guided to bewilderment (*hayra*). He knows that the business is bewilderment.

Bewilderment is being unsettled and movement. Movement is life. There is no non-movement nor death. There is existence and not non-existence. It is the same with the water which gives life to the earth. Its movement is His word, "*so it quivers*" and conceives, "*and swells*" with pregnancy, "*and sprouts plants in beautiful pairs*." [7](#) It only gives birth to what resembles it, i.e. has a nature like it. It has being linked in pairs (*zawjiya*) which is the state of being doubled by what is born from it and what appears from it.

Similarly, the existence of Allah has multiplicity and the many Names. It is this or that according to what appears from it of the universe which demands the realities of the Divine Names by its development. They are doubled by it and stand in opposition to the unity of multiplicity. It is one by source in respect to its essence, as the primal substance (*hayûla*) is a single source in respect to its essence, while it has many forms which it supports by its essence. It is the same with Allah through the forms of *tajalli* which are manifested from Him. So the locii of the *tajalli* are the forms of the universe, in spite of the intelligible unity (*ahadiyya*). Look at the excellence of this divine instruction which Allah gives by granting its recognition to whoever He wishes among His slaves.

When the family of Pharaoh found him in the river by the tree, Pharaoh called him Musa. *Mu* is water in Coptic and *sha* is tree. He named him by where he found him, for the ark stopped by the tree in the river. Pharaoh wanted to kill him. His wife, speaking by divine articulation in what she said to Pharaoh about Musa – since Allah had created her for perfection as Allah said about her when He testified that she and Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, have the perfection which men have [8](#) - said, "*he may be a source of delight for me and for you*." (28:9) She would be consoled by him with the perfection which she received as we have said.

The consolation of Pharaoh was with the belief Allah gave him when he was drowning. So Allah took him pure and purified. There was no impurity in him since He took him in his belief before he had acquired any wrong actions. Islam effaces what was before it. He made him a sign of His concern so that none might despair of the mercy of Allah, for "*no one despairs of solace from Allah except for the unbelievers*." (12:87) If Pharaoh been of those who despair, he would not have embarked on belief. Musa, peace be upon him, was, as the wife of Pharaoh said, "*a source of delight for me and for you. Do not kill him. It may well be that he will be of use to us*." That is what happened. Allah gave them use of Musa, although they were not aware that he was a prophet who would destroy the kingdom of Pharaoh and his family.

When Allah protected him from Pharaoh, his mother's heart was freed of the anxiety which had befallen her. Then Allah forbade him to be suckled until he had received his mother's breast, so she suckled him that Allah might complete her joy. The knowledge of the roads (*sharâ'i*) is like that. It is as Allah said, "*to each We have made a road*," (5:48) i.e. a path (*tariq*), "and a direction (*minhaj*)" from that path. This statement is an indication of the root from which he came (*minhu ja*). It is his food as the tree has branches and yet is only nourished by its root. What is *haram* in one Shari'a can be *halal* in another Shari'a - I mean in a certain form it can be *halal*, while in the heart of the matter it is not really the same as what passed because the matter is new creation, not repetition. This is what we instruct you! It is referred to in connection with Musa when the wet-nurses were made *haram*.

In reality, the one who suckled him, not the one who bore him, is his mother. The mother of birth carried him in regard to the trust. He is formed within her and fed by her menstrual blood without any volition on her part in that, so that does not come from her benevolence towards him. He is only fed by what would destroy her or make her ill had he not been nourished on it, or had that blood not gone out of her. The embryo is a gift to its mother since it feeds on what would cause her harm had that blood remained with her and not gone out of her, or had not the embryo been nourished on it.

Suckling is not the same. By her suckling, she intends to give him life and to sustain him. Allah gave that to Musa in the mother who bore him. No woman outside of his mother by birth had any right over him that she also might find consolation in bringing him up and watching him grow in her room, and so she was not sad.

Allah saved him from the grief of the ark, so he pierced natural darkness by what Allah gave him of divine knowledge, while he did not depart from nature. He tested him with many trials [9](#) and gave him experience in many places so that he might realise patience in himself in the trials Allah gave him.

The first of Allah's trials was the killing of the Copt which Allah inspired him to do and gave him success in his secret – yet he did not know this. However, Musa did not feel any anxiety over killing him, although he was unsure until the command of his Lord told him, since the Prophet is inwardly protected without being aware of it until he is informed, until transmission comes to him. For this reason, al-Khidr showed him the killing of the boy, [10](#) so Musa criticised the killing but did not remember how he had killed the Copt. Al-Khidr told him, "*I did not do it of my own volition*," (18:82) and he informed him of his rank before he told him that his movement was protected in reality, but he was not aware of it.

Al-Khidr also showed him the piercing of the ship. Outwardly it was destruction, but inwardly it was rescue from the hand of the tyrant. He made that an analogy of the ark which was in the river– its outward aspect was destruction, while inwardly it was rescue, for his mother did it fearing the hand of the tyrant, who was Pharaoh, that he might not kill Musa in captivity. She looked at him with the revelation Allah had inspired in her while she was not aware of it. She felt in herself that she would suckle him. When she feared for him, she cast him into the river because, as the proverb says, "What the eye does not see does not afflict the heart." She did not fear for him with the fear of the witnessing of the eye, and she was not sad with the sorrow of seeing him. It came over her thoughts that perhaps Allah would return him to her, for she had a good opinion of Him. She lived by this thought in herself and by the hope which was opposite fear and despair. When she was inspired to do this, she said, "Perhaps he is the Messenger who will destroy Pharaoh and the Copts." She lived and took joy in this, which was illusion and thought in respect of herself, but, in the heart of the matter, it is knowledge.

When they searched for Musa (after he had killed the Copt), he left in flight, fearful outwardly and in the meaning, it was love of deliverance – for movement is always by love, but the onlooker is veiled from it by other causes, which are not the movement. This is because the root is the movement of the universe from non-existence which was immobile in existence. That is why it is said that the matter is movement

from immobility. The movement which is the existence of the universe is the movement of love. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, quoting Allah, "I was a hidden treasure, therefore I wanted (lit. loved) to be known."[11](#)

If it had not been for this love, the universe would not have appeared in its source. Its movement from non-existence to existence is the movement of the love of the One who brings into existence for this purpose. The universe also loves to witness itself in existence as it was witnessed in immutability. Thus by every aspect, the movement from immutable non-existence to the existence of the sources is a movement of love, both in respect of Allah and in respect to itself.

Perfection is loved for itself. Allah's knowledge of Himself is His, since He is independent of the worlds. It belongs only to Him. The perfection of the rank of knowledge only remains by the in-time knowledge which comes from these sources. When the sources of the universe exist, then the forms of perfection appear with timeless and in-time knowledge. Thus the rank of knowledge is perfected by two aspects.

In the same way, the ranks of existence are perfected. Existence from it is before-time and not before-time, which is in-time. Pre-temporal (*azali*) time is the existence of Allah by Himself, and non-pre-temporal-time is the existence of Allah by the forms of the immutable universe. It is called in-time because it manifests some parts to others. He is manifest to Himself by the forms of the universe, and so existence is perfected.

The movement of the universe is by love of perfection, so understand! Do you not see how what the Divine Names bring into existence is breathed from the absence of the manifestation of their effects in a entity called the universe? It loves rest [12](#) which is only reached by the existence of form, high and low. Thus it is confirmed that movement occurs by love. The only movement in the entire cosmos is by love.

Among the 'ulama' are those who know that and those who are veiled by the nearer cause because it rules their state (*hâl*) and overpowers them. Musa was aware of his fear by what occurred through his killing the Copt. That fear implied love of deliverance from killing. So he fled by fear. In the meaning, he fled when he loved deliverance from Pharaoh and his deeds. He mentioned the nearest cause which he was aware of at that moment, which is like the form of the body of man, and love of deliverance is contained in it as the body contains the spirit which manages it.

The Prophets had the language of the outward with which they addressed people in general and on which they relied to make the one who listened understand what was said. The Messengers make allowances for people in general by their knowledge of the rank of the people of understanding. It is as the Prophet, peace be upon him, said about gifts, "I give to this man, while another man is more beloved to me than him for I fear that Allah might throw him down into the Fire." He made allowances for those whose intellect and discernment are weak and who are overcome by greed and nature.

Similarly, what they brought of knowledges, they brought wearing a robe [13](#) which nearer to the understanding, so that the one who has no "diving" might stop at the robe and say, "How excellent this

robe is!" and he will see it as the limit of rank. Because of what this robe from the king demands, the one with subtle understanding, the one who dives for the pearls of wisdom, looks at the quality of the robe and its type of material. By it, he knows the degree of the one it covers, and so he stumbles onto a knowledge which no one else has obtained from those without knowledge of such matters.

Then the Prophets and Messengers and heirs knew that in this world and in their communities, there are those who, in this manner, express themselves in the outward language which the elite and common share. The one who is elite understands of it what the common understand, and more, inasmuch as it is valid that he be called elite. He is distinguished from the blind. Those who have obtained knowledges are content with this. This is the wisdom of his words, *"I fled from you when I was in fear of you,"* [14](#) but he did not say, "I fled from you by love of safety and well-being."

Musa came to Madyan and found two women and got water for them without being paid for it. Then he turned away to the divine shade and said, *"O my Lord, I am truly in need of any good You have in store for me."* (28:24) He made the source of his getting water the same as the good which Allah sent down to him, and he described himself as being in need of Allah in the good which he had. Al-Khidr showed him the setting-up of the wall without wage, but Musa chided him for it. So al-Khidr reminded him of his drawing water without wage, and other things which were not mentioned. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, wished that Musa had remained silent and had not left him so that Allah would have related more about them.

Al-Khidr alerted Musa to the fact that what had come to him and would come to him was by the command of Allah and His will which it is impossible to contradict. Knowledge of that is one of the prerogatives of *wilaya*. As for the Messenger, He might not acquaint him with it, for it is the secret of the decree. [15](#) If He had acquainted him with that, it might have been a reason for his lassitude in conveying what he was commanded to convey. Allah withholds the knowledge of this from some of the Messengers as a mercy to them from Him. He did not withhold it from our Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, because of the strength of his state. This is why our Prophet said, *"I call on Allah by inner sight."* (75:14)

By this he knew what Musa had succeeded in had been without knowledge on his part. If it had been from knowledge, Musa would not have criticised what al-Khidr did, since Allah had testified before Musa as to al-Khidr's purity and justice. In spite of this, Musa was heedless of the fact that Allah had made him pure, and of the conditions set down for following him. This was a mercy for us if we forget the command of Allah. If Musa had known that, al-Khidr would not have said to him, *"What you have never encompassed in your knowledge,"* meaning I have a knowledge which you have not received by tasting as you have a knowledge which I do not know. He was just.

As for the wisdom of his parting from him, it is because Allah said of the Messenger, *"Take what the Messenger brings you, and avoid what he prohibits you."* (59:7) The '*ulama*' of Allah who recognise this quality of the Message and the Messenger stop at this statement. Al-Khidr knew that Musa was the Messenger of Allah. He regarded what came from him to preserve the *adab* which is due to the

Messengers. Musa said to him, "*If I ask you about anything after this, then you should no longer keep me company.*" So he forbade al-Khidr to keep his company. When that occurred for the third time, al-Khidr therefore said, "*This is where you and I part company,*" Musa did not tell him, "Do not do it," nor did he seek to keep him company for he knew the level of the rank he was in when he spoke of the prohibition against keeping him company. Musa was silent, and the parting took place.

Look at the perfection of these two men in knowledge and the completion of divine *adab* as right, and the justice of al-Khidr, peace be upon him, in what he acknowledged to Musa when he said, "I have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know, and you have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know." This information which al-Khidr imparted to Musa was a remedy for the wound inflicted on him in his words, "*How indeed could you bear with patience something you have not encompassed in your knowledge?*" (18:68) although he knew the sublimity of his rank with the message, and al-Khidr did not have this rank.

This appeared in the community of Muhammad in the *hadith* regarding the fertilisation of the date tree. The Prophet, peace be upon him, told his Companions, "You know more about the matters of your daily life." [16](#) There is no doubt that the knowledge of the thing is better than ignorance of it. Allah praises Himself, saying, "He has knowledge of all things." The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, acknowledged to his Companions that they knew more about the exigencies of this world than him because he had no experience of them. It is knowledge of tasting (*dhawq*) and experience, and the Prophet, peace be upon him, had not occupied himself with this sort of knowledge. Rather, he was occupied with what was more important. I have informed you about a great *adab* by which will benefit you if you occupy yourself with it.

Musa's statement, "*My Lord gave me right judgement,*" (26:21) means the khalifate, "*and made me one of the Messengers,*" means the message. Not every Messenger is a khalif. The Khalif has a sword, duties and governance. The Messenger is not the same – rather, he transmits what he has been sent to transmit. If he does battle and defends with the sword, then he is both khalif and Messenger.

As for the wisdom of Pharaoh's question regarding divine whatness (*mâhiya*) when he said, "*What is the Lord of the worlds?*" (26:23) that question did not arise from ignorance, but it was posed in order to test Musa and to see what answer he would give when he claimed that he had a message from his Lord. Pharaoh knew the rank of the Messengers in knowledge of Allah and he wanted to test Musa's answer to ascertain the validity of his claim. In order to inform those present, he invited an answer which would have been misleading as far as they were concerned since they did not know what Pharaoh himself knew about the question.

Musa answered him with the answer of those who have knowledge of the matter. Then Pharaoh, in order to preserve his position, asserted that Musa had not answered his question. So because of the inadequacy of their understanding, it seemed clear to those who were present that Pharaoh knew more than Musa. For this reason, when Musa answered him with what was not appropriate – and outwardly it is not an answer to what he was asked about – and Pharaoh knew that he would only give that answer, Pharaoh

then said to his companions, "Your Messenger" who was sent to you "is mad" since the knowledge of what I question him about is veiled from him [17](#) since it is inconceivable that it be known at all.

The question is valid. The question of the what-ness is a question about the reality of what is asked about - it must be real in itself. As for those who make definitions which consist of category and genus, these are matters shared by various things. Whoever has no category must have a reality in Himself which belongs to no other. The question is invalid in the school of the People of Allah, sound knowledge and sound intellect. The only answer to it is the answer Musa gave.

Here is a great secret! He mentioned the "act" in giving the answer to the one who asked for a definition of essence. He made the essential definition the source of the attribution to what appeared of Him in the forms of the universe, or what appeared in Him of the forms of the universe. In answer to, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" he said that He is the One in whom the forms of the universe are manifest on high – which is the heaven - and below - which is the earth, "if you but have certainty," [18](#) or He who is manifest by them.

When Pharaoh told his companions that Musa was mad, (*majnûn*) in the sense that he was possessed, Musa added to the elucidation in order to inform Pharaoh of his rank in divine knowledge because he knew that Pharaoh already knew that. Musa said, "*The Lord of the East and the West*," bringing what was manifest and what was hidden, in the outward and the inward, "*and what between them is*" which is Allah's words, "*He has knowledge of everything*," "*if you have intellect*," [19](#) i.e. if you possess qualification since this comes from intellect.

The first answer is for those who are certain, and they are the people of unveiling and existence. Musa said, "If you have certainty," i.e. if you are the people of unveiling and existence. I have given you knowledge of what you are already certain about in your witnessing and existence. If you are not of this category, I have answered you in the second answer: if you are among the people of intellect and qualification, and you limit Allah according to what the proofs of your intellects accord.

Thus Musa manifested both aspects in order to inform Pharaoh about his question and his veracity. Musa knew that Pharaoh knew that because he asked about the what-ness of Allah. He knew that his question was not couched in the language the ancients used in their questioning by means of what. That is why he answered him. If he had known anything else from him, he would have been mistaken in the question. Musa treated that about which he was asked as the source of the universe, and Pharaoh addressed him by this language [20](#) although the people present were not aware of that.

Pharaoh said to him, "*If you take any god other than me, I will certainly make you one of the imprisoned*." (26:29) The letter sin in prison (*sijn*) is one of the letters of increase, [21](#) meaning I will veil you, for you answered by what supported me so that I might say the same to you. If you say to me, "O Pharaoh! I do not I do not recognise your threat to me while the source is but one, so how can you separate?" Then Pharaoh replied, "The ranks are separate, but the source is not separate and it is not divided in its existence. My rank right now is power over you by actual fact, O Musa! I am you by the

source and other than you by rank!"

When Musa understood that from him, he gave him his due in respect to himself and told him, "You will not be able to do that." Pharaoh's rank gave him power and influence over Musa because Allah is in the rank of Pharaoh in respect of the outward form which has authority over the rank in which Musa appeared in that assembly.

Therefore Musa told him that Allah had manifested a barrier to his hostility against Musa. He said, *"Even if I were to bring you something undeniable?"* Pharaoh could only reply, *"Produce it then, if you are someone telling the truth"* so that Pharaoh would not appear to be unjust among those of his nation who were weak-minded. They had doubts about him, and they were the group Pharaoh made unsteady. However, they obeyed Pharaoh because they were a corrupt people; [22](#) that is, lacking sound intellects' rejection of taking Pharaoh's claims literally. The intellect stops at a certain limit, and only those of unveiling and certainty can cross that limit. This is why in his answer, Musa first addressed those of certainty and then address those of the intellect.

"So he drew down his staff ('asa)" (26:32) which is the form with which Pharaoh defied [23](#) ('asa) Musa when he refused to answer his call. *"And there it was, unmistakably a snake,"* i.e. an evident snake. Thus rebellion, which is evil, changed into obedience, which is good, as Allah says, *"Allah will transform their evil deeds into good deeds,"* (25:70) meaning in judgement. Here the judgement manifested a differentiated source in a single substance (*jawhar*) – so it is a staff, a snake, and a manifest serpent. It devoured its likes among the snakes in the form of a snake, and the staffs in the form of a staff. The proof of Musa overcame the proofs of Pharaoh in the form of staffs, snakes and ropes. The sorcerers had ropes, but Musa did not have a rope. The "rope" is the small hill; [24](#) that is, their powers in relation to the power of Musa is as the hills are to the lofty mountains.

When the sorcerers saw that, they recognised Musa's rank in knowledge and they saw that he possessed a power which was not mortal. If it had been within the the power of a mortal, it would only belong to someone who could distinguish sure knowledge from imagination and illusion. So they believed in *"the Lord of the Worlds, the Lord of Musa and Harun"* - that is, the Lord to whom Musa and Harun summoned them because they knew that the people understood that they were not being called to Pharaoh. Pharaoh was in the position of authority, and he was the master of the moment since he was the Khalif with the sword, even though he broke the customary divine laws when he said, *"I am your Lord most high"* - i.e. since all are lords, [25](#) I am the highest of them through the power which you have outwardly given me over you. The sorcerers knew that he spoke the truth in what he said, and they did not deny it. They affirmed that to Pharaoh, and said, "You only judge in this passing life, so judge as you like, for the kingdom is yours." So the statement of Pharaoh, *"I am your Lord most high,"* was valid. Although the source is from Allah, the form is Pharaoh's. He cut off the hands and feet, and crucified through a real source in false form in order to attain the ranks which are only attained by that act.

There is no way to neutralise causes because the source-forms necessitate them. They only appear in existence by the form on which they are based at the source since *"there is no changing the words of*

Allah." (10:64) The words of Allah are not other than the sources of existent things. Timelessness is ascribed to Him in respect to their permanence, and in-timeness is ascribed to them in respect of their existence and appearance. Thus we say, a certain man or guest happened [26](#) to be with us today." That does not mean that he did not have any existence before this event. For that reason, Allah says about His Mighty Word which is timeless, *"No reminder (dhikr) from their Lord comes to them lately renewed [27](#) without their listening to it as if it were a game,"* (21:2) and *"but no fresh [28](#) reminder reaches them from the All-Merciful, without their turning away from it."* (26:5) The Merciful only brings mercy, and whoever turns away from mercy advances the punishment which is the absence of mercy.

As for the words of Allah, *"but their belief when they saw Our violent force was of no use to them. That is the pattern Allah has always followed with His slaves,"* [29](#) (40:85) that did not mean that it did not profit them in the Next World through His exception, *"except for the people of Yunus."* He meant that that did not prevent them being punished in this world. For that reason, Pharaoh was seized in spite of the existence of his belief even though his affair was that of someone who is certain that his death is approaching. The circumstances accord that he was not certain that he was going to die because he saw the believers walking on the dry path which had appeared when Musa struck the sea with his staff. Pharaoh was not certain that he would perish since he believed that he would not die until the moment actually reached him. He believed in the One in whom the Tribe of Israel believed, in certainty of his deliverance.

It was indeed certain, but it was in a form other than the one he wanted. He was saved from the punishment of the Next World in himself and his body was saved as Allah says, *"Today We will save your body that you might be a sign for those after you,"* (10:92) because, if his form had vanished, his people might have said that he had gone into occultation. His known form appeared as a corpse that it might be known that it was really him. Deliverance was encompassed both in the senses and in the meaning.

The one who has the word of the punishment in the Other World realized for him [30](#) will not believe, even if every ayat had been brought to him, *"so that they might see the painful punishment,"* that is, taste the punishment of the Next World. Pharaoh left this class of people. This is the literal meaning of what the text of the Qur'an brought us. We say, and the matter belongs to Allah, that the fixed idea which the common people have regarding the wretchedness of Pharaoh is not based on anything in the divine text. As for his family, that is another judgement. This is not the place to mention it.

Know that Allah only takes someone while he believes – that is, affirms what divine transmissions bring, and I mean those who are consciousness at death. This is why dislikes sudden death and being killed while unaware is disliked. The definition of sudden death is that the incoming breath goes out and the outgoing breath does not come in. This is sudden death and when that happens, one is not conscious of death.

It is the same if a man is killed unawares by a blow from behind on the back of the neck. He is then taken with whatever belief or disbelief he possesses at that moment. For that reason, the Prophet said,

"One will be gathered in the state in which one dies," as one is taken in whatever one is doing at the time. The one who is conscious of death is only the one who sees it coming. He believes what he sees. He is only taken in what he is doing because that is an existent expression connected to time by the circumstances. We distinguish between the unbeliever who is conscious at death and the unbeliever either killed while unaware or who dies suddenly as we have said in the definition of sudden death.

As for the wisdom of *tajalli* and the discourse on the form of the fire, this was because it was the object of Musa's desire. Allah gave him a *tajalli* in what he was searching for so that Musa would turn to Him and not turn away. If Allah had given the *tajalli* in other than the form which he was seeking, Musa would have turned away because his interest was concentrated on a particular goal. If he had turned away, his action would have rebounded on him, and Allah would have turned away from him. Musa was the chosen one and the one brought near. When Allah brings someone near to Him, He gives him a *tajalli* in the object he desires, without him knowing it.

Like the Fire of Musa

which he saw as what he needed.

It was Allah,

but he did not perceive it.



1. "Yes, we testify." Qur'an 7:172. Before the selves were created, Allah asked them, "Am I not your Lord?" They replied. "Yes, we testify."
2. In the form of knowledge and life descending from Allah.
3. See Qur'an 21:30.
4. Calmness, tranquillity, but also refers to the Ark of the Covenant, and the invisible *Sakina* (Shechina) which descended on it. 2:249: *"The sign of his kinship is that the Ark will come to you, containing a Sakina from your Lord, and certain relics left by the families of Musa and Harun left. It will be borne by angels."*
5. Qur'an 17:44.
6. Qur'an 6:122.
7. Qur'an 22:5.

8. Qur'an 66:11: *"Allah has make an example for the believers - the wife of Pharaoh when she said, 'My Lord, build a house in the Garden for me in Your Presence, and rescue me from Pharaoh and his deeds.'"*

Also the hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Musa, "Many men have been perfect, but among women only Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, and Asiya, wife of Pharaoh, were perfect."

9. See Qur'an 20:40, "We rescued you from trouble and tested you with many trials."

10. See the story in the Qur'an 18:65-82.

11. *Hadith qudsi*.

12. i.e reaching the perfection of love. This is called or love or yearning after the parting.

13. *khil'a*, a robe of honour.

14. Qur'an 26:21.

15. *Sirr al-Qadar*.

16. Hadith found in Muslim.

17. Madness "*junun*" is related to veils.

18. *"The Lord of the heavens and the earth and what is between them is you have certainty."* Qur'an 26:24.

19. Qur'an 26:28.

20. of unveiling.

21. *Zawa'id*, the augmenative letters, i.e. the ten letters which are added to the radical letters in Arabic words *sin*, *hamza*, *alif*, *lam*, *ta'*, *mim*, *waw*, *nun*, *ya'* and *ha'*. If you take away the *sin* from *sijn* (prison), you get "jinn" meaning veil.

22. See Qur'an 43:54, *"In that way he swayed his people and they succumbed to him. They were a people of deviators."*

23. 'Asâ as a noun means "staff", and 'Asâ as a verb means "to rebel against against, oppose."

24. *Habl* meaning "rope" also means mound or small hill.
25. Lord being a relative name, demanding a subject, also because it means owner, so one says the lord of the house, the "lord" of a herd, etc. Also one who looks after, the "lord" of a child.
26. *Huduth* means coming into existence for the first time. It also means an event or occurrence.
27. *Muhdath*.
28. *Muhdath*.
29. It like is in Qur'an 10:98, where the punishment is removed from the people of Yunus after they believed.
30. cf. Qur'an 39:71.

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The Seal of the Wisdom of What One Turns to (*as-Samad*) in the Word of Khalid



As for the wisdom of Khalid ibn Sinan,¹ by his call he manifested the prophethood of the interspace.¹ He claimed that he would tell them about what happens after death. He commanded that he should be disinterred and questioned in order that he might report that the judgement in the Interspace occurs in the form of the life of this world. Thus it would be known that all the Messengers spoke the truth in what they related in this life regarding what happens after death. Khalid's goal was that all the world would believe in what the Messengers brought so that there would be mercy for all. He was honoured by his prophethood being near the time of the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. He knew that Allah had sent Muhammad as a mercy to the worlds, but Khalid was not a Messenger. He wanted to receive a generous share of this mercy contained in the message of Muhammad. He was not commanded to convey the message, but he wanted to have that share in the Interspace so that there would be stronger knowledge about the creation, and for this reason his people squandered him.

The Messenger of Allah described them as having squandered their Prophet because they did not do what he wanted them to do. Did Allah give him the reward for what he wanted? There is no doubt and no disagreement that he had the reward of what he wished, but there is doubt and disagreement about the reward of the goal. Is wishing for it the same in the Next World as its occurrence even though it did not occur or not? In the Shari'a, equality is not supported in many places – such as in the case of the one who performs the prayer in the group.² The one who prays it in the group has a reward from the presence of the group. He is like the person who, in spite of poverty, desires to be able to give charity as the people of wealth and property do. He has the like of their rewards, but the like of their rewards can be in their intentions or their deeds. The people had both the intention and the action. The Prophet, peace be upon him, did not prescribe both of them, nor one of them, and outwardly they are not the same. For that reason, Khalid ibn Sinan sought the proclamation to confirm for him the station of joining both matters so that he would receive two rewards. Allah knows best.



1. Al-Qashani, the commentator, says that Khalid lived in Aden, and was a man of great *himma* who was overcome in the contemplation of divine unity. One day a great fire appeared from a cave among his people. It destroyed the crops and the livestock, and the people called on him to protect them from it. He struck the fire with his staff, saying, "Away! Away!" until it became cold and retreated to the cave. Then

he told his people that he would enter the cave in order to extinguish the fire, and he told them to call him after three full days had passed. Should he call him before that, he would come out and die. If they were patient, he would emerge in good health.

They waited two days, and then Shaytan made them restless, and doubts came to them and they were afraid that he might have been destroyed. They shouted to him. He emerged from the cave with his hand on his head from the pain their shouting had caused him. He told them, "You have killed me and squandered my word and my covenant." He then told them of his death and commanded them to bury him and then watch for forty days. Then, he said, a flock of sheep led by a donkey with slit ears and its tail cut off would come to them. When it stood opposite his grave, they were to disinter him and he would rise and tell them of the true state of things after death from witnessing and vision so that all creation would receive certainty as to what the Messenger related. Then he died and they buried him.

They waited until the forty days had passed. The flock of sheep came led by a donkey with slit ears. It stopped opposite his grave, so they understood that they should disinter Khalid as he had commanded them so that he might inform them as to the truth of the Prophets. Some of his older sons were adverse to that and said that it would shame them among the Arabs and that they would be called, "the sons of the disinterred one." There was the vehemence of the *Jahiliya* in that. They squandered their legacy and destroyed him.

After the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was sent, a daughter of Khalid came to him, and he said to her, "Greetings to you, O daughter of a Prophet whose people squandered him!"

2. His prophethood did not appear in this world.

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The Seal of the Unique Wisdom in the Word of Muhammad



Muhammad's wisdom is uniqueness (*fardiya*) because he is the most perfect existent creature of this human species. For this reason, the command began with him and was sealed with him. He was a Prophet while Adam was between water and clay,¹ and his elemental structure is the Seal of the Prophets.

The first singular is three, and what is more than this firstness of individuals comes from three. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is the surest proof of his Lord, so he was given all the words,² which are everything that is named by the names of Adam.³ He resembles the proof in its threefoldness, and the proof is a proof of itself. Then his reality grants the first uniqueness which is threefold in structure. For that reason, speaking about the domain of love which is the root of existence, he said, "I was made to love three things in your world," ⁴ because of what this world has of threefoldness. Then he mentioned women, and perfume, and that the coolness of his eye was in the prayer.

The Prophet began by mentioning women and ended with the prayer. That is because woman is part of man in the root of the manifestation of her source, and because man's recognition of himself preceded his recognition of his Lord. That is why the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." If you wish, you can say that this tradition is the forbidding of gnosis and stating the inability to attain to Him - and that is a permissible statement; and, if you wish, you can say that it is the affirmation of gnosis. The first is that if you do not know yourself, so you will not know your Lord. The second is that you recognise yourself, so you do recognise your Lord. Muhammad was the clearest proof of his Lord. Every part of the world indicates its root which is its Lord, so understand!

The Prophet was made to love women, so he yearned for them because as the whole yearns for what is part of it. The matter is self-evident through what Allah says regarding this elemental human constitution, "*and I breathed My Ruh into him.*" (15:29; 38:72) Then He described Himself with intensity of yearning to meet those who yearn for Him. He said, "O Da'ud! I have intense yearning for them," i.e. those who yearn for Him, and it is a particular encounter. The Prophet said in a hadith about the Dajjal, "None of you will see his Lord until after he dies." ⁵ Allah must yearn for those near ones - because even though He sees them and wants them to see Him, that encounter is still prevented by man's station. That is like His words "*until We know*" although He is Knowing. He yearns for this particular

attribute which only is achieved existence through death.

By this, He tests their yearning for Him as He said in the hadith of hesitation which concerns this matter, "I do not hesitate in anything I do, but I hesitate to take the breath of My believing slave because he hates death, and I hate to make him die. But He must meet Me." He gave him good news and did not say to him, "he must die" because He did not want to distress him by mentioning death. Man only meets Allah after death as the Prophet says, "None of you will see his Lord until he dies." That is why Allah says, "He must meet Me," for Allah desires the existence of this relationship. He made it clear that He breathed into him some of His spirit (*rûh*) so He only yearns for him. Do you not see that He created him on His form because he is from His Spirit?

Man's constitution is based on these four elements which are called the "humours" in his body. The combustion of the moisture found in the body occurs from his breath. The spirit of man is fire as regards his constitution. For this reason, Allah only spoke to Musa in the form of fire,⁶ and put his need in it. If his constitution had been from nature,⁷ then his spirit would have been light. Allah alluded to it with the blowing (*nafkh*) which indicates that it is from the breath (*nafas*) of the All-Merciful. It is by this breath, which is the blowing-out that he manifested from Him, and by the predisposition of the one blown into, that combustion is fire and not light. The breath of Allah is hidden in that by which man is man.

From man, He derived a person in his form called "woman". She appeared in his form, and he yearned for her with the longing of that thing has for itself, and she yearned for him with the longing of that thing has for its home.

Allah made him love women. Allah loves the one whom He created in His form, and He made the luminous angels, in spite of the power of their might and their station and the sublimity of their natural constitution, prostrate to him.⁸ From this comes the affinity which occurs in the form which man and woman share, which is like that between Allah and man. The form has the greatest affinity, as well as the most glorious and perfect. It makes a pair – that is, doubles the existent belonging to Allah, as the woman, by her existence, doubles man, and makes him one of a pair. So three appeared: Allah, man and woman. Man yearns for his Lord who is the origin as woman yearns for man.

His Lord made him love women as Allah loves the one who is in His form. Love only occurred by the One by whom he is formed. His love was for the One he was formed by, and He is Allah. This is why the Prophet said, "He made me love...," and he did not say, "I loved" as coming from himself because his love is connected to his Lord in Whose form he is. In his love for his wife, he loves her by Allah's love for him as a divine nature.⁹

When a man loves a woman, he desires union, that is, the goal of union which exists in love. In the elemental form, there is no greater union than marriage.¹⁰ By this appetite encompasses all parts. For that reason, complete ritual washing is prescribed after intercourse. Purification envelops him as annihilation in the woman was complete in the obtainment of appetite. Allah is very jealous of His slave if He believes that he finds pleasure in other than Him. So man purifies himself by ritual washing in

order to return to Him in whom he was annihilated, since that is all there is.

When man witnesses Allah in women, his witnessing is in the passive; when he witnesses Him in himself, regarding the appearance of woman from Him, he witnesses Him in the active. When he witnesses Him from himself without the presence of any form from him, his witnessing is in the passive directly from Allah without any intermediary. So his witnessing of Allah in the woman is the most complete and perfect because he witnesses Allah inasmuch as He is both active and passive. Regarding himself, He is passive in particular. For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, loved women because of the perfection of the witnessing of Allah in them since one does not ever witness Allah free of matter. Allah by His essence is independent of the worlds. So from this aspect, the business is impossible, yet witnessing only occurs in matter. The witnessing of Allah in women is the greatest and most perfect witnessing. The greatest union is marriage.

It is like the projection of His will on the one He created in His form in order to create him. He sees His form in him, rather, He sees Himself. He fashioned him and balanced him and breathed into him of His spirit (*rûh*) which is His breath. Outwardly he is creation, and inwardly he is Allah. For this reason, Allah describes Himself with having management of this frame. He "*directs the whole affair from the heaven,*" which is the height of the earth, "*to earth,*" (32:5) which is the lowest of the low, because it is the lowest of all the elements.

He called them women (*an-nisâ'*) which is a plural which does not have a singular form. For that reason, he said, "He made me love three things in your world: women..." and he did not say, "woman". He took note of the fact that they came after him in existence. The word *an-nisa'* also means postponement. Allah says, "*The month postponed is an increase in disbelief,*" (9:37) and the sale of "*nasi'a*" is said to be by postponement, that is, by credit. That is why he said *an-nisa'*. He loved them only by rank, and they are the place of the passive. They are to him as nature is to Allah in which Allah opened the forms of the world by the projection of the will and the divine command which is marriage in the world of elemental forms, and aspiration (*himma*) in the world of luminous spirits, as in the order of premises and their meanings through deduction. All of that is the marriage of the first uniqueness in each of these aspects.

Whoever loves women in this measure, loves with a divine love. Whoever loves them in respect to natural appetite in particular, deprives himself of the knowledge of this appetite. For him it is a form without a spirit (*rûh*). That form in the heart of the matter is the essence of a spirit, but it is not witnessed by the one who comes to his wife— or any woman— by pure gratification, and he does not perceive the one it is for – even so, he has no knowledge of himself, as others have no knowledge of him, since he has not been verbally named so that he could be known.

One of them said:

It is confirmed with people

that I am a passionate lover,

although they do not know

the object of my passion.

It is the same with the one who loves gratification - he loves the place in which it occurs, being the woman, but the spirit of the question is obscure to him. If he had known it, he would have known by whom he has pleasure and who it is that has pleasure. He would have been perfect.

Similarly, the woman has a lower degree than the man by the words of Allah, "*As for men, they have a degree over them.*" (2:228) The one created on the form is lower in degree than the one who is fashioned in His form,[11](#) even though he is in His form. This is the degree by which He is distinguished from the form. So Allah is independent of the universe, and He is the first Doer. The form is the second doer, and does not have the firstness which Allah has. Sources are distinguished by ranks. "He gives each thing its creation," [12](#) as every gnostic gives each thing with a right its due.

That love that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had for women came from divine love. "Allah gives everything its creation," and that is the source of its truth. He only gave creation to it by merit, so it merits what He called it— that is, by the essence of the created thing.

He put women first because they are the place of the passive as nature precedes that which exists from it by means of form. Nature in reality is only the breath of the Merciful. The forms of the universe, high and low, are introduced into it by the diffusion of the breath (*nafkha*) in the primal substance (*jawhar hayulânî*), particularly in the world of bodies. As for its diffusion by the existence of the luminous spirits and non-essentials (*a'râd*), that is another kind of diffusion.

In this tradition, the Prophet put the feminine before the masculine because he meant to attach importance to women. He said, "Three (*thalath*, the feminine form of the number) and he did not say *thalatha* (the masculine) with the *ha'* which is by the number of the masculine since scent (*tîb*) is one of the three, and it is masculine. The custom among the Arabs is that the masculine takes precedence over the feminine. When they say, "The Fatimas and Zayd went out," they saw *kharajû* (mas. pl) and do not say *kharajna* (fem. pl). The masculine, even if it is only one, take precedence over the feminine, even if they are a group. The Prophet was Arab, so he respected the meaning which was intended by showing love for what did not happen through his own love. Then Allah informed him of what he did not know, and Allah's bounty to him was great.[13](#) The feminine took precedence over the masculine by his word, *thalath* without *ha'*. Who knew the realities better than him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace? Who had greater care to observe rights and dues?

Then he placed the seal with what was like the first since it is also feminine (*salat*, prayer, is feminine), and he placed the masculine between them, as in existence. He began with "women" and ended with "prayer", both of which are feminine while perfume is masculine. The man is between the essence from which he appeared and then the woman appeared from him. So man is between two feminines, the form

of the Essence [14](#) from which he appeared, and a real feminine, woman, who appeared from him. Similarly, *women* is a real feminine, and the prayer is not a real feminine. Scent is the masculine between the two, as Adam is between the essence from which he has existence and Hawwa' (Eve), who existed from him. If you wish, you can say "attribute (*sifa*)" which is also feminine. If you wish, you can say, "power (*qudra*)" and it is feminine. Be of whatever school you wish. You will always find that the feminine takes precedence, even among the people of cause (*'illa*) who make Allah a cause in the existence of the form, and cause is also feminine.

As for the wisdom of the perfume which he mentioned after women, because women have fragrance in their form, the most fragrant of perfumes is the embrace of the lover as they say in the common example. When the Prophet was created a slave, by the nobility of his origin, he did not lift his head at all to mastery – rather, he continued to prostrate himself in humility and to remain passive in spite of who he was until Allah formed from Him what He had intended. He gave him the rank of action in the world of breaths, and the breaths are fragrant scents. So Allah made him love perfume. For that reason, he put perfume after women.

He observed the ranks which belong to Allah in His words, *"Raiser of ranks is He, Possessor of the throne"* (40:15) by His sitting on it by the name of the All-Merciful. There is none among those that the Throne encompasses but that divine mercy touches him. That is the words of Allah, *"My mercy embraces all things,"* (7:156) and the Throne encompasses everything, and the One who sits on it is the Merciful. By its reality, mercy is diffused through the universe as we explained in another part in this book and in The Makkan Revelations.

Allah put perfume in this marital connection in the innocence of 'A'isha, [15](#) may Allah be pleased with her! He said, *"Corrupt [16](#) men are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; and good [17](#) women are for good men, and good men are for good women. The latter are innocent of what they say."* (24:26) He made their scent fragrant because the word is breath, and it is the source of the scent. It goes out with fragrance and putrefaction according to what appears in the form of speech. As it is divine by the nobility of its origin, it is all good, and so it is good. As for what is not praised and is censured, it is good and bad. The Prophet said in respect to the badness of garlic, "It is a plant whose scent I dislike." He did not say, "I dislike it." The source is not disliked, but he disliked what appeared from it. Dislike for that is either by custom or unsuitability of nature, by something in the Shari'a, or a lack of perfection or something other than what we have mentioned.

Since the command is divided into corrupt and good as we confirmed, he was made to love perfume rather than repulsive odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. Since there is putrefaction in this elemental structure as it is created of *"dry clay from mud moulded (or fetid),"* [18](#) so the angels dislike it by essence. The nature of the dung-beetle is offended by the scent of the rose which is one of the pleasant scents. For the dung-beetle, the scent of the rose is not a pleasant scent. If someone has the same sort of nature (as the dung beetle) in meaning and form, the truth offends him when he hears it, and he is gladdened by the false. It is what Allah said, *"those who believe in falsehood and reject*

Allah." (29:52) He described them with loss, and said, "*those, they are the losers*" who have lost themselves. Whoever does not distinguish goodness from corruption, has no perception.

Allah made the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, love only the good (the perfume) of everything, and there is only that. Can it be conceived that there is a disposition in the universe which only finds good in everything but does not recognise the bad? We say that there is not. We find it in the very root from which the universe appeared – which is Allah; we find that He hates and loves. The corrupt is only that which He hates, and the good is only that which He loves. The universe is the form of Allah, and man is in both forms. There is no nature which only perceives one matter in everything - rather, the nature distinguishes the good from the corrupt in spite of the fact that it knows that it is corrupt by tasting and good without tasting. The perception of the good in it diverts him from the sensation of its corruptness. This can happen. As for the removal of the corrupt from the universe – that is, from phenomenal being – it is not admissible. The mercy of Allah extends to both the corrupt and the good. The corrupt considers itself good, but the good in itself is corrupt. There is nothing but good but that an aspect of its disposition is bad, and vice versa.

As for the third by which uniqueness (*fardiyya*) is completed, it is the prayer. The Prophet said, "and the coolness of the eye [19](#) is in the prayer" because it is contemplation. That is because it is intimate discourse between Allah and His slave as Allah says, "*Remember Me, and I will remember you.*" (2:152) It is worship (*'ibâda*) which is divided in two parts between Allah and His slave – one part belongs to Allah and one part to His slave, as has come in sound transmission from Allah in which He says, "I divided the prayer into two parts between Me and My slave. One part is Mine and one part is My slave's, and My slave will receive what he asks for. The slave says, '*In the name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,*' and Allah says, 'My slave has mentioned Me.' Then the slave says, '*Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds,*' and Allah says, 'My slave has praised Me.' The slave says, '*The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,*' and Allah says, 'My slave has glorified Me. My slave has given Me authorisation.'" [20](#) All this part belongs purely to Allah.

"Then the slave says, '*You alone we worship. You alone we ask for help,*' and Allah says, 'This is between Me and My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" Sharing occurs in this *ayat*. "The slave then says, '*Guide us in the straight path, the path of those You have blessed, not of those with anger on them nor of the misguided,*' and Allah says, 'This is for My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" This is purely for His slave as the first part is purely for Allah. The knowledge of this makes the recitation of the *Fatiha* obligatory. Whoever does not recite it has not prayed the prayer establish between Allah and His slave.

The prayer is then a secret conversation (*munajat*). It is remembrance/invoke (*dhikr*). When someone mentions Allah, he sits with Allah and Allah sits with him. It is a sound divine transmission that Allah said, "I sit with the one who mentions Me." [21](#) Whoever sits with the One he mentions and has sight, sees the One with whom he sits. This is contemplation (*mushahada*) and vision. If he does not have sight, he does not see Him. Thus the one who prays knows his rank, and whether or not he sees Allah with this vision in the prayer. If he does not see Him, then let him worship Him by belief (*iman*) as if he saw Him,

imagining Him to be in the *qibla* of his conversation, and let him listen for Allah's reply.

Without a doubt, everyone who prays is an Imam, so the angels pray behind the slave when he prays alone, as is related in tradition. If he is the Imam for his particular world and the angels pray with him, then he has attained the rank of the Messenger in his prayer which is deputyship from Allah. When he says, "Allah hears whoever praises Him," [22](#) he informs himself and whoever is behind him that Allah has heard him. The angels and those present say, "Our Lord, praise belongs to You."

Allah says on the tongue of the slave, "Allah hears whoever praises Him." Look at the sublimity of the rank of the prayer and where it takes the one who has it! Whoever does not achieve the rank of vision in the prayer has not reached the goal nor does he have the coolness of the eye in it because he does not see the One he addresses. If he does not hear the answer of Allah, he is not one of those who listen. Whoever is not present in the prayer with his Lord, and does not hear nor see Him, is not one who prays at all, and he is not along those *"who listen well, having seen the evidence."* (30:37)

The prayer is the only form of *'ibada* during which one is forbidden to perform any other action. The mention of Allah in it is greater than the words and actions it contains. We mentioned the attribute of the perfect man in the prayer in The Makkan Revelations and his nature, because Allah says that *"the prayer precludes indecency and wrongdoing"* (29:45) since it is set down in the Shari'a that the one performing the prayer cannot act in anything except this *'ibâda* as long as he is in it, and he is called the one the prays (*musalli*). *"The remembrance of Allah is greater still"* (29:45) in it – that is, the mention which is from Allah to His slave when He answers him in his request, and his praise of Him is greater than the mention of the slave of his Lord in it, because greatness belongs to Allah.[23](#) This is why He says, *"Allah knows what you do,"* and He says, *"He who listen well, having seen the evidence"* – he gives ear to what Allah mentions in the prayer.

Therefore, since existence is from an intelligible movement which transported the universe from non-existence to existence, the prayer encompasses all movements. There are three movements: vertical, which is the state of standing in the prayer, the horizontal, which is the state of bowing, and the downward movement, which is the state of prostration. The movement of man is vertical, the movement of the animal is horizontal, and the movement of plants is downward. The inanimate does not have a movement from its essence. If a rock moves, it moves by other means than itself.

As for the words of the Prophet, "The coolness of my eye is in the prayer," he did not ascribe the action of putting it there to himself, so Allah gives the one who prays a *tajalli* which stems from Him, not from the one who prays. If he had not mentioned this attribute from himself, he would have commanded the prayer without *tajalli* from Him to him. Since that is from Him by means of graciousness, the contemplation is also through graciousness. He said, "the coolness of my eye is in the prayer," and it is only contemplation of the Beloved by which the eye of the lover is delighted by continuance. The eye remains seeing Allah. It does not look with Him to other than Him in anything, and for that reason, it is forbidden to turn away in the prayer. The glance is something which Shaytan steals from the prayer of the slave in order to forbid him the contemplation of the Beloved.[24](#) If Allah had truly been the Beloved

of the one who turns aside, he would not have turned aside in his prayer to another *qibla*. Man knows his state in himself, whether he is like that in this particular act of worship or not. *"Man will be clear proof against himself in spite of any excuses he might offer."* (75:14) He recognises his lie apart from his truth in himself, because man is not ignorant of his state, his state has tasting (*dhawq*) for him.

The prayer has another portion. Allah commanded us to pray to Him, and He told us that He prays for us. The prayer is from us and from Him. When He prays, He prays by His name, the Last, for it comes after the existence of the slave, and it is the source of Allah which the slave created in his *qibla* by logical discernment or by imitation. He is the God of the one who has a creed. It varies according to what the place of the *tajalli* has and according to the established predisposition as al-Junayd said when he was asked about recognition of Allah and the gnostic. He said, "The colour of water is the colour of its vessel." It is a masterly answer giving information about the matter for what it is. This is Allah who prays for us. If we pray, we have the name, the Last, so we are in it, as we mentioned, in the state of the One who has this name – we are with Him according to our state. He only regards us by the form which we bring to Him. The one who prays is behind the one who precedes him in the place. It is His words, *"Each one knows its prayer and its glorification "* (24:41) – that is, its rank in being behind the worship of its Lord and the extolling which his predisposition accords him of disconnection (*tanzih*). *"There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise"* of its Lord, the Forbearing, the Forgiving. For that, we do not understand the extolling of the universe distinctly,[25](#) creature by creature.

Then a rank refers the pronoun to the extolling slave in His words, *"There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise,"* that is, the praise of that thing. The pronoun which is in His word, *"His praise (bi-hamdihi)"* refers to the thing - that is, with the praise that is from it.

As we said of the one who has a creed other than Islam, he praises the God who is in his creed and attaches himself to Him. What is from his work returns to him, so he only praises himself. It is from the praise of fabrication – the artisan is praised without a doubt, and so the excellence of what he creates or its lack of excellence returns to the artisan. The god of a creed is the product of the one who looks at it, and it is his fabrication; his praise for what he believes is his praise for himself. For this reason, he condemns the creed of another – if he had been fair, he would not have done that. Indeed, the possessor of this particular object of worship is certainly ignorant in his rejection of other than what he believes about Allah, since had he recognised what al-Junayd said, "The colour of water is the colour of its vessel," he would have conceded to everyone who has a creed what he believed in, and he would have recognised Allah in every form of worship of every person with a creed, He has opinion but does not know it. For that reason, Allah says, "I am in My slave's opinion of Me," [26](#) that is, I only appear to him in the form of his creed. If he wishes, he generalises, and if he wishes, he limits. The god of creeds is taken from definition, so He is the God which the heart of His slave encompasses.[27](#) The Absolute Divinity is not encompassed by anything because He is the source of things and the source of Himself. It is not said of the thing that it encompasses itself, not that it does not encompass itself, so understand! *"Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way."* (33:4)



1. Hadith, "I was a Prophet when Adam was still between water and clay."
2. Hadith, "I was given all the words."
3. Qur'an 2:31, *"And He taught Adam the names of all things..."*
4. Hadith in an-Nasa'i and Ibn Hanbal: "I was made to love three things in your world: women, perfume, and the coolness of my eye in the prayer."
5. Hadith in Muslim (fitan:95) and at-Tirmidhi.
6. The Burning Bush.
7. i.e. from the nature of the world of Purity.
8. Qur'an 2:34.
9. Since his nature (khuluq) was immense or mighty (*'adhim*) as Allah said, *"You are truly immense in character,"* (68:4) and as 'A'isha said of the Prophet, "His nature was the Qur'an."
10. *Nikah*, or marriage, actually means lawful intercourse.
11. See Qur'an 6:98.
12. See Qur'an 20:50.
13. Qur'an 4:113, *"Allah's favour to you is indeed immense."*
14. *Dhat*, essence, is feminine.
15. The following verse was revealed about 'A'isha in the affair of the Lie and declared her innocence in the affair.
16. *Khabith*, also meaning with a repulsive odour.
17. *Tayyib*, means good, wholesome, fragrant, from the same root as perfume, *tîb*.
18. See Qur'an 15:26.
19. i.e. that which delights me.

20. Muslim 4:38, 41, etc.

21. *Hadith qudsi* in Ibn Majah and Ibn Hibban.

22. When he comes up from *ruku'* in the prayer.

23. See Qur¹an: 45:37.

24. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim. "(Looking aside in the prayer) is something which Shaytan snatches from a slave's prayer."

Also the hadith in Ibn Hanbal and elsewhere: "Allah continues to turn favourably towards a slave while he is engaged in the prayer as long as he does not look to the side. But if he does so He departs from him."

25. See Qur'an 17:44, "*The seven heavens and the earth and everyone in them glorify Him. There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise; but you do not understand their glorification. He is the All-Forbearing, Ever-Forgiving.*"

26. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari, "I am in My slave's opinion and I am with him when he remembers Me..."

27. *Hadith qudsi*, "Neither My heaven nor My earth contains Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."

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Fusus al-Hikam

The Seals of Wisdom

Muhi-e-Din Ibn Arabi

Translated to English by Aisha Bewley

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1) The Seal of Divine Wisdom in the Word of Adam

When Allah - glory be to Him! - willed that the source of His most Beautiful Names - which are beyond enumeration - be seen (or you can equally say that He willed His source to be seen), He willed that they be seen in a microcosmic being which contained the entire matter, (1) endowed with existence, and through which His secret was manifested to Him. For how a thing sees itself through itself is not the same as how it sees itself in something else which acts as a mirror for it. So He manifests Himself to Himself in a form which is provided by the place in which He is seen. He would not appear thus without the existence of this place and His manifestation (tajalli) to Himself in it.

Allah brought the entire universe into existence through the existence of a form fashioned without a spirit (rûh), like an unpolished mirror. Part of the divine decree is that He does not fashion a locus without it receiving a divine spirit, which is described as being "blown" (2) into it. This is nothing other than the result of the predisposition of that fashioned form to receive the overflowing perpetual tajalli which has never ceased and which will never cease. Then we must speak of the container (qâbil). The container comes from nothing other than His most sacredly pure Overflowing. So the whole affair has its beginning from Him, and its end is to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) as it began from Him. Thus the command decreed the polishing of the mirror of the universe. Adam was the very polishing of that mirror and the spirit of that form.

The angels are some of the faculties of that form which is the form of the universe, which the Sufis designate in their technical vocabulary as the Great Man (al-Insân al-Kabîr), for the angels are to it as the spiritual (rûhânî) and sensory faculties are to the human organism. Each of these faculties is veiled by itself, and it sees nothing which is superior to its own essence, for there is something in it which considers itself to be worthy of high rank and an elevated degree with Allah. It is like this because it has an aspect of the divine synthesis (jam'îya). In it is something which derives from the divine side and something which derives from the side of the reality of the realities. This organism carries these attributes as determined by the universal nature which encompasses the containers of the universe from the most exalted to the basest. However, the intellect cannot perceive this fact by means of logical investigation for this sort of perception only exists through divine unveiling by which one recognises the basis of the forms of the universe which receive the spirits.

This being was called both a human being (insân) and khalif. As for his humanness, it comes from the universality of his organism and his ability to embrace all of the realities. He is in relation to Allah as the pupil, (3) being the instrument of vision, is to the eye. This is why he is called "insân". It is by him that Allah beholds His creatures and has mercy on them. So he is a human being, both in-time [in his body] and before-time [in his spirit], an eternal and after-time organism. He is the word which distinguishes and unifies. The universe was completed by his existence. He is to the universe what the face of the seal is to the seal - for that is the locus of the seal and thus the token with which the King places the seal on his treasures.

Allah named him khalif for this reason, since man guards His creation as treasure is guarded with the seal. As long as the seal of the King is on the treasure, no one dares to open it without his permission. He made him a khalif in respect of safeguarding the universe, and it

continues to be guarded as long as this Perfect Man is in it. Do you not see then, that when he disappears and is removed from the treasury of this world, nothing that Allah stored in it will remain? Everything that was in it will leave it, and all the parts will become confused, and everything will be transferred to the Next World. Then Man will be the seal on the treasury of the Next World for endless time and after-time. All the Divine Names contained in the divine form (4) appear in this human organism. Thus it possesses the rank of containing and integrating this existence. It was by this that Allah set up the proof against the angels, (5) so remember that! Allah admonishes you through others. Look at where that originates and where it ends up. The angels did not realise what was implied by the organism of the khalif, nor did they realise what the presence of the Truth demanded as 'ibâda (6) (worship). Each one only knows from Allah what his essence accords him. The angels do not possess the universality of Adam, and they did not understand the Divine Names with which he has been favoured, and by which he praises Allah and proclaims His purity. They only knew that Allah had names whose knowledge had not reached them, so they could not praise Him nor proclaim His purity through them. What we mentioned overcame them and this state overpowered them. They said about this organism, "Why put on it one who will cause corruption on it?" (2:30) This is only the argument which they were voicing.

What they said regarding Adam is exactly the state they were with regard to Allah. Had it not been that their nature was in accord with it, they would not have said what they said in respect of Adam, "and yet they were not aware." If they had had true recognition of themselves, they would have had knowledge, and had they been in possession of knowledge, they would have been protected and would not have resisted by belittling Adam and thus exceeding their claim of what they possessed of His praise and glorification. Adam was in possession of Divine Names which the angels did not have, so that their praise and glorification of Him was not the same as Adam's praise and glorification of Him. Allah describes this to us so that we may ponder it and learn adab (7) with Allah, and so that we will not lay claim to what we have not realised or possessed by pinning down. How can we allege something which is beyond us and of which we have no knowledge? We will only be exposed. This divine instruction is part of Allah's discipline of those of His slaves who are well-mannered, trusting and khalifs.

Let us return to the wisdom under discussion. Know that universal matters which have no existence in themselves are without a doubt intelligible and known in the mind. They are hidden and continue in their invisible existence. These universal matters have jurisdiction and effect on everything which has an individual existence. Indeed, they are the same thing and nothing else, i.e. the sources of existent individual things, and they continue to be intelligible in themselves. They are manifest in respect of the sources of existent things just as they are hidden in respect of their intelligibility. Each individual existent thing depends on these universal matters which cannot be dislodged from the intellect, nor would their existence be possible in the source once they ceased to be intelligible, whether that individual existent is in-time or out-of-time. The relationship of that which is in-time or out-of-time to this universal intelligible matter is the same. This universal matter only has jurisdiction in individual existent things according to what the realities of these individual existent things demand of it. It is like the relationship of knowledge to the knower, and life to the living. Life is an intelligible reality; knowledge is an intelligible reality. Knowledge is as distinct from life as life is distinct from knowledge. So we say that Allah has knowledge and life, and that He is the Living, the Knowing. We also say that the angel has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. We say that man has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. The reality of knowledge is one thing and the reality of life is another, and their relationship to the

knowing and the living is the same relationship. We say that the knowledge of Allah is in non-time and the knowledge of man is in-time. So look at the evaluation that this relationship has brought about in this intelligible reality!

Examine this connection between individual intelligibles and stence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself. As knowledge determines the one who participates in it as he is called knowing so the one who is described by it can determine the knowledge. It is in-time in relation to the one in-time and non-time in relation to the one in non-time. Each of the two is determining and determined. It is known that these universal matters, even if they are intelligible, lack a source although they still have an authority. When they are determined, since they are ascribed to an individual existent thing, they accept the principle in the existent sources and do not accept distinction or fragmenting, for that is impossible for them. They themselves are in everything described by them, as humanity is in every person of this particular species, without distinction or the numbering which affects individuals; and it continues to be intelligible.

Now, as there is a connection between that which has an individual existence and that which does not have one and it is a non-existent relationship so the connection of existents to each other is easier to conceive because, in any case, there is a common factor between them which is individual existence. In the other, there is no common factor, yet there is a connection despite the lack of a common factor. So it is stronger and more real when there is a common factor. Without a doubt, the in-time establishes itself as being put into time and it needs something in time to put it into time. It has no place in itself so it exists from something other-than-it, and it is linked to That by the dependence of need. This dependence must be on That whose existence is necessary, which is independent in Its existence by Itself without need. It is That which, by Its own essence, gives existence to the in-time which depends on It. Since the existence of Its essence is necessary and what appears from It depends on It for its essence, it nevertheless depends on its form for everything which is from a name or attribute, except for the essential necessity. That is not the property of it in-time, even if its existence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself.

Since the matter is based on what we said about its manifestation in its form, Allah communicates to us knowledge of Himself through contemplation of the in-time. He tells us that He shows us His signs in the in-time, (8) so we draw conclusions about Him through ourselves. We do not describe Him with any quality without also possessing that quality, with the exception of that essential autonomy. Since we know Him by ourselves and from ourselves, we attribute to Him all that we attribute to ourselves. For that reason, divine communications came down on the tongues of our interpreters, (9) and so He described Himself to us through ourselves. When we witness, He witnesses Himself. We are certainly numerous as individuals and species, yet we are based on a single reality which unites us. So we certainly know that there are distinctions between individuals. If there were not, there would be no multiplicity in the One.

Similarly we are described in all aspects by that by which He describes Himself, but there must be a distinction and it is none other than our need of Him in our existence. Our existence depends on Him by virtue of our possibility and He is independent of that which makes us dependent on Him. Because of this, one can apply before-timeness and timelessness to Him which negates that firstness which is the opening to existence from non-existence. Although He is the First, firstness is not ascribed to Him, and for this reason, He is called the Last. Had His firstness been the firstness of the existence of determination, it would not have been valid

for Him to be the Last of the determined because the possible has no last - for possibilities are endless. So they have no last. Rather, He is the Last because "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) after its attribution to us. So He is the Last in the source of His firstness and the First in the source of His lastness.

Then know that Allah has described Himself as the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden; (10) He brought the universe into existence as a Visible world and an Unseen world so that we might know the Hidden by the Unseen and the Manifest by the Visible. He described Himself with pleasure and wrath, and so He brought the world into existence as a place of fear and hope so we fear His wrath and hope for His pleasure. He described Himself with majesty and beauty, so He brought the universe into existence with awe and intimacy. It is the same for all that is connected with Him, may He be exalted, and by which He calls Himself. He designates these pairs of attributes by the two hands (11) which He held out in the creation of the Perfect Man. Man sums up all the realities of the universe and its individuals. So the universe is seen and the Khalif is unseen. It is with this meaning that the Sultan veils himself, even as Allah is mentioned and described as having with veils (12) of darkness, which are natural bodies, and luminous veils which are subtle spirits (arwâh). The universe is composed of both the gross and the subtle.

The universe is its own veil on itself and cannot perceive the Truth since it perceives itself. It is continuously in a veil which is not removed, since it knows that it is distinct from its Creator by its need of Him. It has no portion of that essential necessity which belongs to the existence of Allah, so it can never perceive Him. In this respect, Allah is never fully known by the knowledge of tasting and witnessing because the in-time has no hold on that.

Allah only applied "between His two hands" to Adam as a mark of honour, and so He said to Iblis, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My two Hands?" (38:76) That is none other than the union in Adam of the two forms - the form of the universe and the form of the Real: (13) and they are the two hands of Allah. Iblis is only a fragment of the universe and does not possess this comprehensive quality. It is because of this quality that Adam was a khalif. Had he not had the form of the One who appointed him khalif, he would not have been khalif. If there were not in him all that is in the world, and what his flocks, over whom he is khalif, demand of him because of their dependence on him (and he must undertake all they need from him) he would not have been khalif over them.

The khalifate is only valid for the Perfect Man, whose exterior form comes from the realities of the universe and its forms, and whose inner form is based on His form, may He be exalted! For that reason, Allah has said of him, "I am his hearing and his sight." (14) He did not say, "his eye and his ear." So He differentiated between the two forms. It is the same for every existent in the universe which appears according to what the reality of that existent demands of it. Nonetheless no one totally comprehends what the khalif has. One only surpasses others by this comprehensiveness. If it were not for the diffusion of Allah into the existents by the form, the universe would not have any existence. Similarly, were it not for these universal intelligible realities, no principle would have appeared in individual existent things. From this reality the universe depends on Allah for its existence. So all is in need, and nothing is independent.

This is the truth
and we have not spoken metaphorically.
If I speak of a something independent

without any need, you will know Who I mean by it.
The whole is tied to the whole
and cannot be separated from it, so understand what I have said!

Now, you have learnt of the formation of the body of Adam his outer form and the formation of his spirit, his inner form, so he is the Real and a created being. Now you have learnt of the formation of his rank which is the comprehensiveness by virtue of which he is worthy of the khalifate. Adam is the unique self from which the perfect human species was created according to His words, "O mankind, be fearful of your Lord who created you from a single self, and created its mate from it, and disseminated many men and women from the two of them." (4:1)

His words, "Be fearful of your Lord," mean to make of what has appeared from you a safeguard for your Lord and make what is concealed of you, which is your Lord, a safeguard for yourselves. The matter consists of blame and praise, so be His safeguard in the blame and your safeguard in the praise, so that you will be among those of knowledge and adab. Then He showed him what He had placed in him, and He put that in His two hands - one handful contained the universe and the other handful contained Adam and his descendants - and He showed them their ranks in Adam.

Then Allah informed me in my inner heart (sirr) of what He placed in this Imam, the great progenitor. I have put in this book some of what was allotted to me but not all of what I realised. A book could not contain that and not even the present existent universe could contain it. I have put some of what I have witnessed in this book, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, defined it. It was the divine wisdom in the word of Adam, that is, this chapter.

Then there is the wisdom of the breath of angelic inspiration in the word of Shith (Seth), the wisdom of divine inspiration in the word of Nuh (Noah), the wisdom of purity in the word of Idris, the wisdom of being lost in love in the word of Ibrahim (Abraham), the wisdom of truth in the word of Ishaq (Isaac), the wisdom of the elevation of the word in the name of Isma'il (Ishmael), the wisdom of the spirit in the word of Yusuf (Joseph), the wisdom of unity in the word of Hud, the wisdom of revelation in the word of Salih, the wisdom of the heart in the word of Shu'ayb, the wisdom of the power of the word of Lut (Lot), the wisdom of the decree in the word of 'Uzayr (Ezra), the wisdom of prophethood in the word of 'Isa (Jesus), the wisdom of mercy in the word of Sulayman (Solomon), the wisdom of existence in the word of Da'ud (David), the wisdom of the soul in the word of Yunus (Jonah), the wisdom of the unseen in the word of Ayyub (Job), the wisdom of majesty in the word of Yahya (John the Baptist), the wisdom of possession in the word of Zakariya (Zachariah), the wisdom of intimacy in the word of Ilyas (Elias), the wisdom of benevolence in the word of Luqman, the wisdom of the Imam in the word of Harun (Aaron), the wisdom of sublimity in the word of Musa (Moses), the wisdom of what one turns to in the word of Khalid, and the wisdom of uniqueness in the seal of Muhammad.

There is a seal for each wisdom. So I have condensed these wisdoms according to what is established in the Mother of the Book, and I complied with what was written out for me, and stopped at what was set as a limit for me. Even if I had desired to do more than that, I would not have been able to do so. Indeed, the Presence forbids that, and Allah is the One who grants success. There is no Lord but Him.

Notes to Chapter 1:

1. al-Insân al-Kâmil, the Perfect Man.
2. Nafkh, Qur'an 32:9, etc.
3. Insan, as well as meaning human being, also means the pupil of the eye.
4. The form chosen by Allah for the human being.
5. Qur'an 2:30-33.
6. 'Ibada: All the acts of worship: giving, praying, fasting, etc..
7. Adab: Manners. Here meaning the much deeper quality of spiritual manners, that is a courtesy engendered in the ritual acts of worship, the prostrations of the prayer, the fast, and giving gifts to the needy. Such a quality is imbued with awareness that you are the dependent, and the Real is the independent. You are poor, He is rich.
8. Qur'an 41:53, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves..."
9. i.e. the Prophets.
10. Qur'an: 57:3.
11. Qur'an 38:75, "What I created with My two hands."
12. Hadith: "Allah has 70,000 veils of light and darkness. If they were to be removed, the splendour of His face would consume."
13. Hadith: "Allah created Adam on His form."
14. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)

2) The Seal of Wisdom of the Breath of Angelic Inspiration (1) in the Word of Shith (Seth)

Know that the gifts and favours which appear in phenomenal being through human beings or without them fall into two categories: the gifts of the Essence and the gifts of the Divine Names. These two categories are distinct among the people of tasting according to whether as they come from a specific request for a specific thing, from a general request, or without any request. This applies whether they are gifts of the Essence or gifts of the Divine Names. They are specific when someone says, "O Lord, give me such-and-such a thing," and specifies something which occurs to him. They are general when someone says, "Give me what You know is good for all my parts, subtle and gross," without specifying it.

The askers fall into two groups - one group makes the request from a natural impulse to hasten its attainment, "for man is impetuous;" (17:11) and the other group asks because they know that there are matters with Allah which, in the foreknowledge of Allah, are only obtained after a request. They say, "Perhaps what I ask of Him is something of that sort." Their request takes into consideration this possibility. They do not know what is in the knowledge of Allah, nor what their capacity to receive will grant them. This is because it is one of the most difficult things to know capacity at any moment, for it refers to the capacity of the individual at that time. Furthermore, had he not been disposed by his capacity to make the request, he would not have made that particular request.

The goal of the people of presence, (2) who do not possess such a knowledge, is to know it in the moment in which they find themselves. They know by their state of presence what Allah has given them in that moment. and they only receive it by their predisposition for it. They are of two sorts: one group knows their predisposition from what they have already received, and the other group knows what they are going to receive based on their predisposition. This latter group has the most perfect recognition of predisposition.

Among this group are those who make a request, neither to hasten it nor for the possibilities of favour, but rather to comply with the command of Allah when He says, "Call on Me and I will answer you." (40:60) This sort of person is the pure slave and when he asks, his aspiration (himma) is not attached to what he asks for, be it specific or not, rather his aspiration is merely in or not, rather his aspiration is merely in obedience to his Lord's command. When his state requires, he asks for slavehood, and when it requires entrustment [to Allah] and silence, he is silent. So Ayyub and others were tried, and they did not ask Allah to remove their affliction from them. Then at another moment, their state required that they ask that it be removed, and Allah removed it from them.

The immediate granting of a request, or its deferment, depends on the decree which has been determined for it by Allah. If the request coincides with the moment, the answer comes quickly, and if the moment is deferred - either in this world or the next, the answer is also deferred except for the answer from Allah which is, "At your service" (3) - so understand this well!

As for the second category, it is received without making a request, and by "without request" we mean verbal expression of it. In actuality, there must always be a request - be it articulated, or by a state, or from a predisposition. Similarly, unrestricted praise only takes place through verbal expression. The state determines the meaning, for that which induces

you to praise Allah is determined for you by a Name of Action (4) or a Name of Disconnection. (5) In the case of the predisposition of the slave, its possessor is not conscious of it, but he is aware of his state because he knows both what his motive is and the state itself. Predisposition is the most hidden form of making requests.

That which prevents some people from asking is their knowledge that Allah has predetermined their destiny, so they have prepared themselves to receive whatever comes from Him, and they have withdrawn from their selves and their desires.

Among these people are those who know that the knowledge which Allah has of them in all their states is their basic constitution in the state of their permanent source-form from before existence. They know that Allah will only give them what their source allows them according to Allah's knowledge of it when they were in their permanent source-forms. Thus these people know that Allah knows the way they will obtain anything.

There is no higher, nor more unveiled group among the People of Allah than this group, who understand on the secret of the Decree. They, in turn, fall into two sorts: those who know it in general and those who know it in particular. Those who know it in particular are higher and nearer perfection than those who know it in general. Such a person knows what is in the knowledge of Allah for him - be it by Allah informing him of the knowledge his own source has accorded to Him, or be it by direct unveiling to him from his permanent source-form whose unfolding states are endless. So he, in his knowledge of himself, is in the position of having Allah's knowledge of him, because it is derived from the same source. In respect of the slave, concern from Allah is predestined for him, and it is constituted by the sum of the states of his source which the possessor of this unveiling perceives when Allah allows him to perceive it, i.e. the states of his source. When Allah informs him of the states of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of these permanent sources in the state of their non-existence, since they are but essential relations without any form. In this respect, we say that divine concern precedes the slave's need because of this equivalence in the communication of knowledge.

In this way Allah speaks so that we will know, and it is an expression which is completely specific - not as is imagined by those who do not drink from this source. The goal of disconnection is to make that in-timeness in knowledge belong to Knowledge. It is the highest aspect of this question which the mutakallim (6) can comprehend with his intellect - unless he considers knowledge to be distinct from the Essence. If he does this, he ascribes relativity to knowledge, and not to the Essence, and because of this, he sets himself apart from the realised ones among the People of Allah, who are endowed with unveiling and real existence.

Let us return to those gifts which are either the gifts proceeding from the Essence or the Names. As for the favours, gifts and graces of the Essence, they only come by means of divine tajalli. (7) Tajalli only comes from the Essence by means of the form of the predisposition of the one to whom the tajalli is made. It never occurs otherwise. The one who receives the tajalli will only see his own form in the mirror of the Real. He will not see the Real, for it is not possible to see Him. At the same time, he knows that he sees only his own form. It is the same as a mirror in the Visible world inasmuch as you see forms in it or

your own form but do not see the mirror. At the same time, however, you know that you see the forms, or your own form, only by virtue of the mirror. Allah manifests that as a model (8) appropriate to the tajalli of His Essence, so that the one receiving the tajalli knows that he does not see Him. There is no model nearer or more appropriate to vision and tajalli than this. When you see a form in a mirror, try to see the body of the mirror as well - you will never see it. It is true that some people who perceive this say that the reflected form is imposed between the vision of the seer and the mirror. This is the most that it is possible to say, and the matter is as we have mentioned. We have clarified this in the The Makkan Revelations.

If you wish to taste this, then experience the limit beyond which there is no higher limit possible in respect of the creature. Neither aspire to, nor tire yourself out in trying to go beyond this degree, for in principle, there is only pure non-existence after it.

Thus Allah is your mirror in which you see yourself, and you are His mirror in which He sees His Names. His Names are not other than Himself, as you know. The matter is confusing. One of us implied ignorance of the matter as part of knowledge and said, "The incapacity to achieve perception is perception." (9) Some of us know but do not express it in this way, even though it is the highest of words. Knowledge does not give incapacity to know as the first one said, but rather knowledge gives him the same silence which incapacity gives. This is the highest level of those who have knowledge of Allah.

This knowledge only belongs to the Seal of the Messengers and the Seal of the Awliyâ'. The Messengers and Prophets only see it from the niche of the Messenger who is the Seal. The awliyâ' only see it from the niche of the walî who is the Seal. Even the Messengers only see it to the extent that they see it from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya', for Message and Prophethood - by which I mean the Prophethood of bringing the Sharî'a and its message - ceases, but wilâya never ceases. Thus the Messengers, inasmuch as they are awliya', see what we have mentioned only from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya'. How could it be different for other awliyâ'? Although the Seal of the Awliyâ' is subject to the judgement which the Seal of the Messengers brought through the Sharî'a, that does not diminish his station nor does it detract from what we have said, for something which is lower from one point of view can be higher from another. Confirmation of this occurred in the history of our Sharî'a in the excellence of the judgement of 'Umar regarding the prisoners of Badr (10) and their treatment, and in the story of fertilization of the date-palms. (11) It is not necessary that the perfect have precedence in everything and in every rank. The Rijâl (12) regard precedence as being in the degrees of knowledge of Allah. Here is their goal. As for the things which are in-time, they do not attach their thoughts to them, so realise what we have mentioned!

Al-Khidr said to Musa, "I have knowledge which Allah has taught me, and which you do not know, and you have knowledge which Allah has taught you and which I do not know." (13)

It is like the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in relation to a brick wall which was complete except for one brick, (14) and the Prophet was that one brick although he himself only saw the place for the single brick. The Seal of the Awliyâ' must also have this sort of vision. He sees the same as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, saw, but he sees a place for two bricks in the wall, and that the bricks are made of gold and silver. He sees that there are two bricks missing in the wall, and he sees that they are a silver brick and a gold brick. He must see himself as being disposed by nature to fill the place of these two bricks. The Seal of the Awliyâ' is these two bricks by which the wall is completed. The necessary reason for which he sees himself as two bricks is that he follows

the Shari'a of the Seal of the Messengers outwardly - which is the place of the silver brick. This means the outward Sharī'a with all that pertains to it of ordinances which are taken from Allah by the secret, according to the outward form which conforms to the secret because he sees the matter for what it really is. He must see the matter in this manner, for it is the place of the golden brick in the inwardly hidden. It is taken from the source from which the angel brought it, the same angel who brought the revelation to the Messengers. If you have understood what I have alluded to, then you have indeed acquired useful knowledge!

All the Prophets, from Adam to the last of the Prophets, take their light from the niche of the Seal of the Prophets, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Even though the existence of his clay was deferred, the last Prophet was nevertheless present in his reality, according to his statement, "I was a Prophet when Adam was between water and clay." (15) Every other Prophet only became a Prophet by being described by divine qualities inasmuch as Allah is described as the Praiseworthy Wali.(16)

The Seal of the Messengers, in respect to his wilāya, is connected to the Seal of the Awliyā' in the same way in which Prophets and Messengers are connected to it. He is a walī, Messenger, and Prophet. The Seal of the Awliyā' is a walī and the heir who takes directly from the source, contemplating the ranks. He is the most beautiful of the beauties of the Seal of the Messengers, Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, the overseer of the community, and the master of the sons of Adam by reason of opening the door of intercession. He specified a particular state which is not universal. (17) In this special state, he has precedence over the Divine Names. So the All-Merciful only mediates with the Avenger for the people of affliction through the intercession of the mediators. Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, obtained mastery in this special station. Whoever understands the ranks and the stations does not find this discourse difficult.

As for the gifts of the Names, know that Allah bestows mercy on His creation which is wholly from the names. Either it is a pure mercy, like the excellence of the provision which they have in this world or on the Day of Rising which is bestowed by that name, the Merciful, and so is a gift of mercy, or it is a mixed mercy like the taking of a disagreeable remedy which is followed by relief - it is still a divine gift. Divine gifts can only possibly be given through the intermediary of the guardians of the Names. Sometimes Allah gives it to the slave by means of the All-Merciful, and so the gift is pure from any adulteration which would be contrary to the nature of the moment, otherwise he would not receive the object and what would resemble it. Sometimes He gives by means of the the Boundless, so it is general - or by the Wise, so He looks at what is fitter at the moment, or by the Giving, who gives what is good without those who receive it having to compensate for it by gratitude or deed. He gives by the Compeller, and so He looks at the environment and what is necessary to it. He gives by the Forgiving and so He looks to the environment and what is happening to the individual. If he is in a state which merits punishment, He veils him from it, and if he is in a state which does not merit punishment, He protects him from a state which would merit it. He is "protected from wrong action", "safeguarded", and other descriptions of that sort. The Giver is Allah in the sense that He is the Treasurer of all that is in His treasury, and Allah only brings forth from it according to a predestined decree through the intermediary of a name particular to that matter. So He gives everything its created form (18) according to the name, the Just, and its brothers.

The Names of Allah are endless because they are known by what comes from them, and what comes from them is endless, even though they can be traced back to the limited roots which

are the matrices of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but one of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but One Reality which assumes all these relations and aspects which are designated by the Divine Names. The Reality grants that each of the Names, which manifest themselves without end, has a reality by which it is distinguished from another Name. It is that reality by which it is distinguished which is the Name itself - not that which it shares.

It is the same with the gifts - every gift is distinct from another by personal nature, although they come from a single source. It is evident that this one is not that one. That is because the Names are distinct. Because of its boundlessness, in the Divine Presence there is nothing at all which repeats itself. This is the truth which is determined.

This was the knowledge of Shith, peace be upon him, and its spirit aids every spirit which discusses the like of this, except for the spirit of the Seal who receives replenishing knowledge directly from Allah, not from any spirit. No, rather it is from his spirit that his substance flows to all spirits, although he may not perceive that of himself at the time when his elemental body existed. However, in respect to his reality and his rank, he knows all of that essentially, just as he is ignorant of the composition of the elements (of his body). So he has knowledge and is ignorant, and he is capable of being described by contrary attributes even as the Origin admits of description with opposites such as the Majestic and the Beautiful, the Outward and the Inward, the Last and the First - and they are the same, and not other than Him. Therefore, he knows and does not know, and he perceives and does not perceive, and he sees and does not see. It is by this knowledge that Shith received his name because it means "the gift". In His hand is the key to the gifts in their various types and relationships So Allah gave him to Adam, and he was the first gift, and He only gave it from Himself.

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All gifts in phenomenal being are manifested in this fashion - so no one receives anything from Allah and no-one receives anything which does not come from himself. Not everyone recognises this. Only a few of the people of Allah know it. When you see one who recognises that, rely on him, for that one is the source of the purest purity and the elite of the elite of the Men of Allah. Whenever a person of unveiling sees a form which communicates to him gnosis which he did not have and which he had not been able to grasp before, that form is from his own source, no other. From the tree of himself he gathers the fruits of his cultivation, as his outer form opposite the reflected body is nothing other than himself, even

though the place of the presence in which he sees the form of himself presents him with an aspect of the reality of that presence through transformation. The large appears small in the small mirror and tall in the tall, and the moving as movement. It can reverse its form from a special presence, and it can reflect things exactly as they appear, so the right side of the viewer is his right side, while the right side can be on the left. This is generally the normal state in mirrors, and it is a break in the norm when the right side is seen as the right and inversion occurs. All this is from the gifts of the reality of the Presence in which it is manifested and which we have compared to the mirror.

Whoever recognises his predisposition, recognises what he will receive. Not everyone who knows what he will receive, knows his predisposition, unless he knows it after receiving it, and this one knows it in a general way. Some people who are weak of intellect think that since it confirmed with them that Allah does what He wills, they deem it admissible that He could contradict wisdom and what the matter is in itself. (19) Because of this, some of them go so far as to deny the possibility and affirm that which is necessary by essence and by other. The man who has achieved realisation, however, admits the possibility and knows its presence and knows what is possible and how it is possible, since in its source it is necessarily existent because of something other-than-it. From where is the name of other, which determines its necessity, valid for it? No one knows this distinction except those with particular knowledge of Allah.

It is in the footsteps of Shith that the last of this human species will be born, and he will carry his secrets. There will none of this species born after him, so he will be the Seal of the Begotten. A sister will be born with him, and she will emerge before him, and he will follow her with his head at her feet. He will be born in China, and he will speak the language of his country. Sterility will spread in men and women, so there will be much cohabitation without conception. He will call people to Allah, but will not be answered. When Allah takes him and the believers of his time, those who remain will be like beasts, not knowing what is lawful (halâl) from what is unlawful (harâm). They will act according to their natural instincts with lust, devoid of reason and law. Upon them the Last Hour will occur.

Notes to to Chapter 2:

1. Nafth, to puff, blow or spit, hence inspiration. Hadith, "He (Jibril) inspired or put (nafatha) into my heart..." Hence poetry is called the nafth of Shaytan.
2. The people of the presence are those who see everything as coming to them from Allah and everything as effected by Allah.
3. Labbayk.
4. Like the Giving, the Provider.
5. Tanzih, making Allah free of any connection to His creation. Names like the Absolutely Pure (al-Quddûs).
6. The people of words - theologians and philosophers. They are unable to enter the realm of reflection and meditation that is the Sufic domain, and thus some of them oppose the Sufic teaching - mistaking the doctrine's meanings since they cannot intellectually identify them with a specific set of physical practices and direct inner experience.
7. A manifestation by which something is made clear and unobscured, as the bride is displayed to the husband or the rust removed from a sword or mirror so that it shines. The tajalli is the unveiling of a spiritual reality in the realm of vision. It is a direct-seeing into the nature of existence, a showing forth of the secrets of the One in the celestial and terrestrial realms.

8. Mithâl, a Qur'anic term which indicates learning not by logical but by analogical method. It is simply the ACCESS to the parable and not the parable or any idea that the "metaphor" equals its interpretation. It has no specificity. Mithal is grasped "on the wing" so to speak. It cannot be explored or analysed or extended. That is to say it must not be approached rationally but emphatically with direct and clear seeing-into.
9. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq.
10. After Badr, Abu Bakr asked the Prophet to either forgive or allow the prisoners to be ransomed. 'Umar said that they should be killed. Eventually, the Muslims reached a consensus that the captives should be ransomed and they were. Later the verse was revealed, "It is not for a Prophet to take captives..." (8:67)
11. When the Prophet had been asked about whether palm-trees should be pollinated and then later said, "You have the best knowledge of these things of your world."
12. Rijal (sing. rajul): The men. Meaning the men of gnosis and illumination. Those who know - that is - who know how-it-is, and not the veiled fantasy experience of so-called ordinary sensory perception which is, as we now know, in direct contradiction to the physical reality of matter according to high-energy physics.
13. cf. Qur'an 18:65.
14. Hadith in al-Bukhari (2815) and Muslim.
15. Hadith in at-Tirmidhi and Musnad Ibn Hanbal.
16. Qur'an 42:28, "It is He who sends down abundant rain after they have lost all hope, and He unfolds His mercy; He is the Praiseworthy, the Wali."
17. He only can open the door of intercession because it is a special gift to him alone.
18. Qur'an 20:50: "Our Lord is He who gives each thing its created form and then guides it."
19. i.e. they permit that He do the impossible, like making existence non-existence or non-existence existence.

3) The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath of Divine Inspiration (1) In the Word of Nuh (Noah)

Know that disconnection (tanzîh) among the people of realities in respect to Allah is the same as limitation and qualification, so the one who disconnects is either ignorant or ill-mannered if he only applies disconnection to Him and believes that about Him. (2) When the believer who follows the Shari'a disconnects and stops at that, and does not see anything else, he displays ill manners and slanders Allah and the Messengers - may the blessings of Allah be upon them! - although he is not aware of it. He imagines that he has reached the target and yet he has missed it, so he is like the one who believes in part and rejects part. (3)

One especially knows that when the language of the various Shari'as speaks about Allah as they do, they speak to the common people in the first sense, and to the elite in every sense which can be understood from the various aspects of that expression in any language in the usage of that language.

Allah manifests Himself in a special way in every creature. He is the Outwardly Manifest in every graspable sense, and He is the Inwardly Hidden from every understanding except the understanding of the one who says that the universe is His form (4) and His He-ness (huwiyya), and it is the name, the Outwardly Manifest. Since He is, by meaning, the spirit of whatever is outwardly manifest, He is also the Inwardly Hidden. His relation to whatever is manifested of the forms of the world is the relation of the governing spirit to the form. The definition of man, for example, includes both his inward and outward; and it is the same with every definable thing. Allah is defined in every definition, yet the forms of the universe are not held back and He is not contained by them. One only knows the limits of each of their forms according to what is attained by each knower of his form. For that reason, one cannot know the definition of Allah, for one would only know His definition by knowing the definition of every form. This is impossible to attain, so the definition of Allah is impossible. Similarly, whoever connects without disconnection has given limits to Allah and does not know Him. Whoever combines connection and disconnection in his gnosis, and describes Allah with both aspects in general - because it is impossible to conceive in detail because we lack the ability to encompass all the forms which the universe contains - has known Him in general and not in particular, as he knows himself generally and not in particular. For that reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, linked knowledge (ma'rifa) of Allah to knowledge of oneself and said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Allah says, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons (what is outside of you) and in themselves (what is your source) until it is clear to them (the contemplators) that it is the Truth," (41:53) inasmuch as you are His form and He is your spirit. You are to Him as your body-form is to you, and He is to you as the spirit which governs the body.

The definition contains your inwardness and outwardness, for the form remains when the spirit which governs it departs, and it is no longer man, but one can speak of it as resembling the form of man. There is no difference between it and the form made of wood or stone, upon which the name of man is only applied by metaphor and not by reality. Allah cannot vanish from the forms of the universe, as His definition of His divinity is by reality, not metaphor, as the definition of man applies only so long as he is alive. As the exterior of the form of man praises both his spirit, and the self governed by it, with his tongue, similarly Allah made the forms of the universe which glorify His praise, but we do not understand their glorifying. (5) We do not embrace all forms in the universe. All are tongues of Allah uttering the praise of

Allah and for that reason He said, "Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," (1:1) i.e. all types of praise refer to Him. He is the Praiser and the One praised.

If you speak of disconnection, you limit Him,
and if you speak of connection, you define Him.
If you speak of the two together,
then you are free of error
and you are an Imam and a master in knowledges of gnosis.

He who affirms duality, falls into shirk, and whoever speaks of uniqueness is a unifier. (6)
Take care lest you be a dualist by connection, and take care lest you be a isolator by disconnection.

You are not Him, rather you are Him
and you see Him in the source of thing,
absolute and limited at the same time.

Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," and so He disconnects, "and He is the Hearing, the Seeing," (42:11) so He connects. Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," so He connects and doubles it, (7) and "He is the Hearing, the Seeing." Then He uses disconnection and makes Himself Unique.

If Nuh had combined these two calls for his people, they would have answered him. He called them openly (71:8), and he called them secretly (71:9). Then he said to them, "Ask forgiveness of your Lord. Truly He is Endlessly Forgiving." (71:10) He said, "I have called my people night and in the day, but my calling has only made them more evasive" (71:5-6) because they knew what they had to do in answering his call.

So the knowledge of those who know Allah is what Nuh indicated in respect to his people by praising them through blame. He knew that they would not answer his call because of the furqân (8) it contained. The command is the Qur'an, not the Furqân. Whoever is established in the Qur'an does not incline to the Furqân. Even if the Furqân is in the Qur'an, the Qur'an contains the Furqân but the Furqân does not contain the Qur'an. For this reason, no one was favoured by the Qur'ân except Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and this community which is the "best community ever to be produced before mankind." (3:110)

So "there is nothing like Him" unified several matters in one single matter. If Nuh had articulated something like of this âyat, his people would have responded to him, because it contains connection and disconnection in a single âyat, rather in half an âyat.

Nuh, peace be upon him, peace be upon him, called on his people at night in respect to their intellects and spirituality (rûhânîyya), which are unseen; and by day he called on them in respect to their outer forms and arrival. In his call, he did not unify with anything, like "there is nothing like Him." So their inward had a distaste for this separation, and it increased them in evasion. Then he said of himself that he called upon them that He might forgive them, not that He be unveiled to them. They understood that from him. That is why "they put their fingers in their ears and wrapped themselves in their clothes," (71:7) and this is the form of veiling to which he called them. So they answered his call by action, not by saying, "At your service."

There is both the confirmation of likeness and its negation in "There is nothing like Him." For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said of himself, "I have been given all the words." (9) Muhammad, peace be upon him, did not call on his people by night and day, but rather he called upon them by night in the day and by day in the night. Nuh said in his wisdom to his people, "He will send heaven down on you in abundant rain," (71:11) which is intellectual gnosis in meanings and metaphorical speculation, and "He will reinforce you with wealth," i.e. by what comes to you from Him.

Thus it is your wealth in which you have seen your form. So whoever among you imagines that he has seen Him, does not have gnosis, and whoever of you knows that he has seen himself, he is the gnostic. For this reason people are divided into those who know Allah and those who do not know. "And sons" is what results from their logical speculation while the knowledge of the business (to which Nuh called them) is based upon contemplation which is far from the results of thought. Their trade did not profit them, (10) so what they had in their hands, which they only imagined they possessed, vanished from them.

The kingdom belongs to the people of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, for Allah says "Give of that to which He has made you successors." (11) (57:7) For the people of Nuh it is, "Do not take anyone besides Me as a guardian." (17:2) The kingdom was confirmed for the people of Muhammad, and the guardianship in it belongs to Allah. The people of Muhammad are the khalîfs in it. The kingdom belongs to Allah and He is their guardian, and that is the kingdom of being appointed khalîf. For this reason, Allah is the "King of the kingdom" (12) as at-Tirmidhi says. "They have hatched a mighty plotting," (71:22) because calling to Allah is the plotting of the the One called; since He does not lack the beginning, He is called to the end, so they call to Allah. This is the source of devising according to inner sight. Nuh said, "The affair belongs entirely to Him," so they answered Him with plotting as He called them.

The people of Muhammad came and knew what the call to Allah was in respect of its He-ness, rather what it is in respect to His Names. Allah says, "The day those who are godfearing are gathered to the All-Merciful." (13) So He used the "particle of the end" (ilâ - to) and joined it to that Name, and we recognise that the universe is under the care of a Divine Name which requires them to be among the "godfearing". The reality of taqwâ (14) is that man avoids ascribing blessings, perfections and praiseworthy attributes to himself or to others, except for Allah. He fears Allah through His acts and attributes. These things are evils from the spring of possibilities. They said in their plotting, "Do not abandon your gods. Do not abandon Wadd or Suwa' or Yaghuth or Ya'uq or Nasr." (71:22) Then they abandoned them ignorant of the Truth according to what they left of the idols. Allah has an aspect in every worshipped thing. Whoever recognises it, recognises, and whoever is ignorant of it is ignorant among the people of Muhammad. Your Lord decreed that you should worship only Him that is the judgement of your Lord.

The one who possesses knowledge knows who the slave is and in what form he is manifested as far as he is a slave. Separation and multiplicity are like the limbs of the sensory form and like faculties of meaning (15) of the spiritual form. He only worships Allah in every worshipped object. The lowest one is the one who imagines that godness is contained in it. Were it not for this illusion, stones and other things would not have been worshipped. This is why He said, "Say: Name them!" (13:33) If they had named them, they would have named stone, tree, or star. If they had been asked, "Who do you worship?" they would have replied, "God". They would not say "Allah" or "the god".

The highest knower does not use this imagination, (16) but rather he says that this is a divine tajalli which one must exalt, and he does not restrict himself. The lowest one is the one possessed of fantasy: "We only worship them so that they bring us nearer to Allah." (39:3) The highest knower says, "Your god is One God, so submit to Him," (22:34) wherever He is manifest, "and give good news to the humble-hearted" who humble the fire of their nature. They spoke to it (the fire), and did not say "nature". "They have misguided many people," (71:24) i.e. they perplexed many in the multiplicity of the One by aspects and relations. "Do not increase not the wrongdoers" because their selves are from the totality of the chosen ones who inherited the Book and they are the first of the three, (17) which precedes the ambivalent and the outdoer, "in anything but misguidance", except in the perplexity of the man of Muhammad who says, "Increase me in perplexity." (18) "Every time it shines on them, they walk in it. When the darkness comes over them, they stop." (2:20) So the perplexed one turns about, and the circular movement is about the axis which he does not leave.

The one who has a stretched-out path is inclined to leave the goal, seeking what the possessor of imagination has in it, and his end is that imagination. He has "from" and "to" and what is between them. The one who has a circular movement has no beginning, "from", which clings to him, and no end, "to", is judged of him. Thus he has the most perfect existence. He "is given all the words" (19) and wisdoms. "And because of their errors" which is that which is recorded for them, "they were drowned" in the seas of the knowledge of Allah which is perplexity among the men of Muhammad. When the seas were heated up, (20) "they were put into a fire" in the source of water, "and they found no one to help them besides Allah." (71:25) Allah is the source of their helpers, and so they were destroyed in it for time without end. If He had brought them out to the shore, the shore of nature, He would have brought them down from this high degree. All belongs to Allah and is by Allah, rather it is Allah.

Nuh said, "My Lord!" and he did not say, "My God," for the Lord has immutability, and "God" differs according to the Names. So "every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29) By Lord, he meant something with an immutable quality. "Do not leave upon the earth" and he called on them to go into its Muhammadan interior. "If you let down a rope, it would fall on Allah," (21) "to Him belongs what is in the heavens and what is in the earth." When you are buried in it, you are in it and it is your container, and "We will return you into it and We will bring you forth from it again," (20:55) by the difference of existence. "...of the unbelievers" who wrap themselves in their garments and put their fingers in their ears, seeking veiling because he called on them that He might forgive them. Forgiveness is the veiling of wrong actions, "not even one" so that the benefit will become universal like the call. "If You leave any," i.e. if You call them and then leave them, "they will misguide Your slaves," i.e. confuse them and so bring them out of their service to what they have of the secrets of lordship. They will think themselves lords after they were slaves in themselves. Thus they are slaves and lords. "They will spawn nothing" i.e. they will not have any result or manifest anything except their being shameless that is, the manifestation of what veils the unbelievers is that they were veiled from what appeared after their manifestation. They manifested that which veils, so they were veiled after their appearance.

The thinker is confused and does not recognise the goal of the shameless in shamelessness, (22) or the unbeliever in his disbelief, yet the person is but one. "My Lord, forgive me," i.e. veil me and that which concerns me so that my rank and station are unknown, as the rank of Allah are unknown in His statement, "They do measure Allah with His true measure"; (23) "and my parents" of whom I am a result, and they are the intellect and nature; "and all who enter my house," i.e. my heart, "as believers" believing in what it contains of divine reports,

and it is what their selves occasioned, "And all the believers, men (the intellects) and women (the selves)."

"Do not increase the wrongdoers (dhâlimîn)" who are from the darkness (dhulumât), the people of the unseen, hiding behind the veils of darkness, "except in ruin" i.e. in destruction. Thus, they do not recognise themselves because they see the Face of Allah outside of them. Among the men of Muhammad, "All things are passing except His Face." (28:88) Ruin is destruction. Whoever wishes to understand the secrets of Nuh must rise into the sphere of Nuh. (24) It is in our book, at-Tanazzulat al-Mawsuliyya.

Notes to to Chapter 3:

1. Subbûh, name applied to Allah, the All-Perfect, disconnected from imperfections.
2. If he does not go on to include tashbih, connection.
3. cf. Qur'an 4:149: "Those who reject Allah and His Messengers and desire to make division between Allah and His Messengers, saying, 'We believe in some and reject some.'"
4. By manifesting His attributes and Essence since everything is a proof and indication of Him.
5. Ref. to Qur'an 17:44, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise, but you do not understand their glorification."
6. In this case, ignorant of the multiplicity of His Names and Attributes.
7. "Like Him" = "ka-mithlihi", the word "like" occurs twice: "ka" and "mithl", so like negates like, like a double negative.
8. Furqan: One of the names of the Qur'an, meaning a "discrimination" that which separates or distinguishes. Here presented as an opposite in a dyad: Qur'an/furqan, that is, discrimination/gathering.
9. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
10. Reference to Qur'an, 2:16, "Those are the people who have sold guidance for misguidance. Their trade has brought no profit. They are not guided."
11. Khalifs.
12. Since He answers His slave who is the "kingdom". Technical term used by al-Hakim at-Tirmidhi and Abu Madyan, discussed by Ibn al-'Arabi in the Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Chapter 24, vol. I, p. 182.
13. ref. Qur'an 19:85.
14. Fearfulness of Allah which is reflected in one's behaviour.
15. Meaning. Meaning does not carry the ordinary connotative significance that it has in the science of semantics. In the Sufic science meaning is not allied, but inseparable from the experience of the recognition of meaning. In other words, it is not a "thing" which can be apprehended with the qualities of thingness. It is a mode of experiencing which takes places in a zone of awareness that is in itself a realm of the inward reality cognised in the waking state. Meaning/sensory, ma'na/hiss.
16. Khayal: An important term. Khayal means imagination, but in the special technical language of Ibn al-'Arabi the khayal contains an outer and inner meaning. Its outer (not inner) meaning is imagining in the ordinary sense of a "tangible reality" which is experienced mentally yet remains unreal, that is, untouchable and non-physical. Its inner meaning, however, is that faculty by which we solidify the objects - which are according to unveiling basically "not-there" - spatiality itself. There is much resistance to this in "rational" and programmed intellects as there is of the hand to the rock in "common sense" experience. The rock is there, it does not budge. There is, it must not be forgotten, a threshold situation where this is not so, for if the

subject were brain-damaged, subjected to a hallucinogen, or hypnotic trance, then the object would experientially melt away. That is still not the same as seeing in which things are seen as-they-as in one unified field without differentiation, while alert within that condition of experiencing. And this state brings with it wisdom beyond the recognition of how-it-is at that moment - in other words a new understanding is established by the experience.

17. Ref to Qur'an 35:32, "...but some of them wrong themselves, some are ambivalent, and some outdo each other in good."

18. Hayra: Bewilderment. A Key term. Hayra is not a negative situation - it is the condition in which the seeker finds every intellectual channel blocked, every pathway of reason clashing against the other in contradiction so that it induces in the seeker a state of intensity. This intensity by virtue of its inner tension creates a condition we call hayra. It is a collapse of separation - a kind of "white hole" - which results in gatheredness. That is, the hayra creates a new condition which is its result and that result is a breakthrough into an illumination of the Real.

19. Meaning the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, who was given all the words.

20. By the oven (from which the water gushed out of the earth in the Flood.)

21. Hadith.

22. The manifestation of lordship.

23. 6:91, 22:84, 39:67.

24. The Sphere of the Sun.

4: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sanctification (Quddûs) in the Word of Idris

Elevation has two references - one of place and one of rank. Elevation of place is "We raised him up to a high place," (19:57) and the highest of places is that upon which the mill of the world of the spheres revolves. It is the sphere of the sun and in it is the station of the spirituality of Idris, peace be upon him! There are seven heavens under it and seven heavens above it, and it is the fifteenth. That which is above it is the red heaven, i.e. Mars, the heaven of Jupiter, Saturn, the heaven of fixed stars, the Starless Heaven and the heaven of the constellations, the heaven of the Kursi and the heaven of the 'Arsh. That which is below it is the heaven of Venus, Mercury, the Moon, the circle of ether, the circle of air, the circle of water, and the circle of earth. It is the axis of the heavens, and it is a "high place".

As for the elevation of rank, it is for us, the people of Muhammad. Allah said, "When you are uppermost and Allah is with you" (47:35) in this height. He exalts Himself above place, not above rank. When the selves of those among us who do deeds are afraid, He follows the mention of "being with" with His words, "He would not cheat you of your deeds." The deed demands place and knowledge demands rank. So He joined the two heights for us - elevation of place by deed and elevation of rank by knowledge. Then to disconnect the association of being with, He said, "Glorify the name of your Lord, the Most High," (87:1) above this association in meaning.

It is one of the most wondrous of matters that man is the highest of existent things - I mean the Perfect Man, and elevation is only attributed to him by subordination either to place or rank which is a degree. So he is not high by his essence, he is high by the height of place and the height of rank, for these possess height. Height of place is like the All-Merciful settling on the throne, (1) and it is the highest of places. Height of rank is "All things are passing except His Face," (28:88) and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:123) and nothing has existence along with Allah.

When Allah said, "We raised him up to a high place," He made high an adjective for place. Since your Lord said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif in the earth," (2:30) this is height of rank. He said about the angels, "Were you overcome by arrogance, or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) so He gave elevation to the angels. If the angels had possessed that elevation by simple virtue of the fact that they are angels, then all the angels would have been included in this elevation. It was not common to them in the definition of angel. We recognise that this is elevation of rank with Allah. It is the same for the khalifs of the people. If their elevation with the khalifate had been an elevation by essence, every man would have it. It is not general and so we know that that elevation is by rank.

One of His names is the High. Over whom, when there is nothing except Him? So He is the High by His Essence. Is He is High over that which is particular, when there is no He except Him? His elevation is by virtue of Himself, and He, in respect to existence, is the source of existents. Those in-time things which He calls high in themselves are not other than Him. He was the High when there was no height of relativity because the source-forms in non-existence had not smelt the scent of existence. They remain in their state in spite of the multiplicity of forms in existents, but the source is the same from the whole in the whole. The existence of multiplicity lies in the names which are the relationships, and they are non-existent matters. There is only the source which is the Essence. He is High through Himself,

not by any ascription to another. From this standpoint, there is no height of relative relation in the universe, but the aspects of existence which are distinct. The height of relativity exists in the one Source in respect of the many aspects. For that reason, you say of Him, Him and not Him, and you and not you.

Al-Kharraz, (2) may Allah have mercy on him, who is one of the aspects of Allah and one of His tongues with which He speaks of Himself, said that one only has gnosis by joining opposites together in respect of Him. "He is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden." (57:3) He is the source of what appears and the source of what is hidden in the state of its manifestation. There is none who sees Him other than Him and there is none who is hidden from Him. So He is manifest to Himself and hidden from Himself. He is called Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz and other than that from the names of things in-time.

The Hidden says "No" while the Manifest says, "Me," and the Manifest says, "No" while the Hidden says, "Me". This is found in every opposite, yet the speaker is one, and he is the same as the hearer in the statement of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, about what their selves say, (3) for they speak and hear what they say, and know what their selves say. The source is but one, even if the judgements are different. There is no way that anyone can be ignorant of this sort of thing. Every man knows from himself, and it is the form of the Real.

So things are mixed and numbers appear by the one in the known ranks. Thus "one" brought number into existence, and number divides the One. The principle of number only appeared through the numbered. Part of the numbered is non-existent, and part is existent. The thing is non-existent in relation to the senses while it is existent in relation to the intellect. There must be number and numbered. That must grow from one and it grows because of it. Every rank of the numbers has one reality like 9, for example, and 10 and down to 2, and upwards without end, and its reality is not a sum.

A name is not perceived by the addition of ones. 2 is one reality, and 3 is one reality, and so on until the end of these ranks. Even though the source [of numbers] is one, the source of one of them is not the source of the others. Addition encompasses them all, and it speaks of them from them and judges them by them. Twenty ranks (4) appeared in this statement, so composition entered into them. You will continue to affirm the source of what you deny in itself. Whoever recognises what we have related of the numbers, and that negation is the same as their affirmation, knows that the Real, who is disconnected by disconnection, is creature by connection, even though the creature is distinct from the Creator. The matter is the creature/Creator and it is the Creator/creature. That is from one source, rather is is the One source and it is many sources. Look at what you see!

Ibrahim's son told him, "My father, do what you are ordered." (37:102) The child is the same as his father, so he only saw himself sacrificing himself, "and He ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." (5) That which was manifested as a ram was manifested in the form of a human, and manifested in the form of a son. Rather, it is by the principle of the son being the same as the father. "He created from (one self) his mate." (4:1) He (6) married his own self, and from him are both his companion and his child. The matter is one in number. It is the same for nature and what is manifested from it. We do not see it diminishing by what appears from it nor increasing by the lack of what other than it manifests. That which is manifested is not other than it, nor is it the same as what is manifested according to the variety of forms in principle. This one is cold and dry, and that one is hot and dry. They are joined by dryness,

and distinct by another quality. The common source is nature, and the world of nature is composed of forms in one mirror. Rather, it is one form in different mirrors.

There is only bewilderment (hayra) by the dispersal of perspectives. Whoever knows what we have said is not bewildered. If he increases in knowledge, it is only from the principle of place, and place is the same as the source-form in which the Real varies in the locus of His tajalli. Conditions vary, so He assumes every condition. There is no condition except for the source in which He make tajalli of Himself, and there is nothing except this.

By this aspect, Allah is creature, so interpret!
And by this aspect, He is not creature, so remember!
The inner sight of whoever understands
what I have said is not confused, and only
the one who perceives it possesses sight.
The source of joining and separating is the same,
and it is multiplicity which never remains or departs.

The One who is High in Himself is the One who possesses the perfection in which all matters of existence are absorbed, as are all non-existent relations, inasmuch as it is not possible that any of these attributes be lacking from Him, be they praiseworthy by custom, logic, or law, or blameworthy by custom, logic or law. That belongs only to the One named Allah. As for what is named other-than-Allah, it is either a locus of His tajalli or a form which is in it. If it is the locus of His tajalli, it contains distinction. Be-cause of that, there must be distinction between the One who makes tajalli and the place of tajalli; if it is a form in it, that form is the source of the essential perfection because it is the same as what is manifested in it. That which belongs to Allah belongs to that form. However, it is not said that it is Him nor that it is other-than-Him.

Abu-l-Qasim ibn Qasi (7) indicated this in his book, The Removal of the Sandals, and he said, "Each Divine Name is qualified by all the Divine Names, and described by their description." It is so. Each Name indicates the Essence and the meaning which is set out for it and which demonstrates it. In respect to its indication of the Essence, it possesses all the names, and in respect to its indication of the meaning which is singular to it, it is distinct from others, such as the Lord, the Creator, the Fashioner, etc. The Name is the same as the Named in respect to the Essence, and the Name is other than the Named in respect to the meaning which is particular to it.

If you have understood that the "high" is as we have mentioned, you know that it is neither place nor height of rank, for height of rank is particular to the administration of authority, like the Sultan and the judge, wazirs and qadis, and all who have rank, be they worthy of that rank or not. Height is by attributes which are not like that. The most knowledgeable of people can be ruled by the person with the position of power, even if that person is the most ignorant of people. This is the height of rank according to the principle of what he has over me in himself. When he retires, his high rank vanishes. The one with knowledge is not like that.

Notes to Chapter 4:

1. Qur'an 7:54, "...then He settled Himself firmly on the Throne."
2. Abu Sa'id Ahmad ibn 'Isa al-Kharraz, died in Cairo 286/899. He said, "I only knew Allah by joining the opposites," and then recited, "He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the

Inward."

3. Hadith, "Allah forgives my people what their selves say to then as long as they do not act upon that."

4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 1000.

5. "And We ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." Qur'an: 37:107.

6. Adam.

7. Sufi leader of rebellion against the Murabitun in the Algarve.

5: The Seal of the Wisdom of Being Lost in Love (1) in the Wisdom of Ibrahim (Abraham)

Ibrahim is called the intimate friend, and he was an intimate friend (khalîl), because he was penetrated (takhallal) and gathered all the qualities of the Divine Essence. The poet says:

You pervaded the course of my spirit,
and that is why the intimate friend is called the intimate friend.

It is like the colour which permeates the coloured, so it is a non-essential matter ('arad) in respect to its essential substance (jawhar), and it is not like the place and that which it occupies. Or it means the penetration of the Real into the existence of the form of Ibrahim. Each of these two principles is true as was mentioned, for each points to an aspect which appears without overstepping it.

Do you not see that the Real is manifest in the qualities of beings in-time and He gives news of that from Himself, and He is even manifest in the attributes of imperfection and the attributes of blame? Do you not see that the creature is manifest with the qualities of the Real from first to last, and all of them belong to him as the attributes of in-time things belong to the Real? "Praise belongs to Allah," so the results of praise from every praiser and one praised go back to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:132) It includes what is blameworthy and praiseworthy, and there is only one or the other.

Know that when something is penetrated by something the first is contained by the second, so the penetrating is the name of the actor veiled by the penetrated, which is the name of the one acted upon, and it is the Outwardly Manifest. The name of the actor is the Veiled, the Inwardly Hidden. It is its food, as water permeates wool and so makes it expand. If the Real is the Outwardly Manifest, then the creature is veiled within Him, and creation is all the Names of the Real, His hearing and seeing, and all His ascriptions and discernments. If the creature is outwardly manifest, then the Real is veiled and hidden in him, and so the Real is the hearing of the creature, and his seeing, hand and foot, and all his faculties as it related in sound hadith. (2)

If the Essence were exempt from these relations, it would not be divinity. These relations are made by our sources, so we make Him god by our dependence on His godness. He is not recognised until we are recognised. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Such a person is the creature with the most knowledge of Allah. Some sages, especially Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, claim that one can have gnosis of Allah through disregarding the world. This is false. Indeed, the non-time pre-time is not recognised as god until that which depends on its being God is known. Thus it is a proof of Him. Then after this, in the second state, (3) unveiling accords you that the Real Himself is the source of the proof of Himself and His godness. The universe is but His tajalli in the forms of their source-forms whose existence is impossible without Him. He assumes various forms and modes according to the realities of these sources and their states, and this is after our knowledge of Him that He is our God.

Then the last unveiling comes, so our forms appear to you in Him, and some of us appear to others in the Real, and then some of us recognise each other and some of us are distinct from one another. Among us are those who recognise that our recognition of ourselves occurs in

the Real, and some of us are unaware of the presence in which this recognition of ourselves takes place. "I seek refuge with Allah from being one of the ignorant." (2:67)

By the two unveilings together, He only judges us by ourselves, rather we judge ourselves by ourselves, but through Him. That is why He says, "Allah's is the conclusive argument," (6:149) meaning against those who are veiled when they say to the Real, in conformity with their desires, "Why did you do this or that to us?", thinking that it was not in conformity with their desires. "On the Day when the legs are bared," (68:42) means the matter which the gnostics unveil here. They see that the Real did not do to them what they allege that He did, but that it was from themselves. For He only lets them know what they are in themselves. From this their argument will dissolve, and the decisive proof of Allah will remain.

If you say, what is the benefit of His words, "If He had willed, He could have guided every one of you," (6:149; 16:9) we say in If He willed "if (law)" is a particle of impossibility showing impossibility. He only willed the matter as it is. But the source of possibility accepts the thing and its opposite in the principle of logical proof, and it is the same with any two logical principles. That which occurs is that which the possibility implies in the state of its immutability. The meaning of "If We had guided you" is, had He shown you the Truth. Allah does not open the inner eye of every possibility in the universe to the perception of the matter as it is. There are those who know and those who are ignorant. Allah did not so will, so He did not guide all of them, and He will not will it, and it is the same as if He had willed it. How would He will this which is not? His volition is unified in its connections. It is a relationship dependent on the known, and the known is you and your states. Knowledge does not have an effect on the known, rather the known has an effect on knowledge, and so it accords from itself what it is in its source.

Divine discourse relates according to what agrees with the ones addressed and what logical reflection accords it. It does not come according to what unveiling gives. For that reason, there are many believers, but the gnostics who possess unveiling are few. "There is not one of us who does not have a known station," (37:164) and it is what you are in your state of immutability which you manifest in your existence. This is if it is confirmed that you have existence. If existence is confirmed to the Real and not to you, the judgement is yours without a doubt in the existence of the Real. If it is confirmed that you are existent, then the judgement is yours without a doubt, even if the judge is the Real. It is only the overflowing of existence on you.

You only praise yourself and you only blame yourself, and praise is only due to Allah for the overflowing of existence, for that is His, not yours. You are His nourishment by conditions, and He is your nourishment by existence. He is specified by what specifies you. The command comes from Him to you, and from you to Him, even though you are called obligated, a passive name (mukallaf), and He is not called obligated since there is no imposition upon Him.

He praises me, and I praise Him.
He serves me and I serve Him.
In one state I draw near to Him,
and in sources I deny Him.
So He knows me and I do not know Him,
and I know Him and I witness Him.
Where is independence

when I help Him and assist Him?
 That is why the Real brought me into existence.
 Then I knew Him and manifested His existence.
 Hadith (4) brought us that,
 and in me He achieved His goal.

Then the intimate friend, Ibrahim, peace be upon him!, possessed this rank by virtue of which he was called the intimate friend. For that reason, he made hospitality to guests a sunna. Ibn Masarra (5) associates him with the angel Mika'il in respect to provisions. Provision is that which nourishes those provided for: when provision permeates the essence of the one provided for until nothing remains in it except permeation and nourishment flows in all the parts of the one nourished. There are no parts in divinity, so all the divine stations are penetrated which are designated by the Names, and by which His Essence is manifested.

We are His as our proofs confirm,
 and we are ours.
 Only my being belongs to Him,
 and we are His as we are ours.
 I have two aspects: Him and me,
 but He does not have "me" through me.
 However, His place of manifestation is in me,
 so we are His - like me.
 "Allah speaks the truth, and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 5:

1. Huyûm is the intense love and passion which causes bewilderment and distraction.
2. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)
3. The first unveiling was annihilation (fanâ') and the second is going-on (baqâ').
4. "I created existence so that I might be known."
5. Muhammad ibn Masarra al-Jabali, Andalusian Sufi and thinker, born in Granada 269 /883 and died near there in 319/931.

6: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Real in the Word of Ishaq (Isaac)

The ransom of a Prophet by an animal's sacrifice
as an offering!
How can the bleating of a ram be equal
to the voice of a man?
Allah Almighty magnified the ram out of concern for us or for it,
but I do not see by what measure.
There is no doubt that the bodies
of cows and camels are larger,
but they relinquished the rank of sacrifice
to the offering of the ram.
Would that I knew how a ram
replaced the khalif of the All-Merciful with its small body!
Do you not see that the command to sacrifice
implies correspondence and promises gain and diminishes loss?
There is no creature higher than the mineral,
and after it comes the plant according to its ranks and measures.
The animal comes after the plant,
and each one had gnosis of its Creator by unveiling and evident proof.
As for the one named Adam, he is limited
by intellect, thinking, and the conventions of belief.
It is that which Sahl (at-Tustari) (1) and the realizer
said as we do (2) - because we and they are in the degree of Ihsan.
Whoever witnesses the matter I have witnessed
will say what I have said, both secretly and openly.
Do not pay any attention to words
which contradict our words and do not sow grain in the land of the blind!
They are the "deaf and dumb" in the text of the Qur'an
which the one protected from wrong action brought for our ears.

Know, may Allah support us and you! that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, peace be upon him, told his son, "I saw in a dream that I must sacrifice you." (37:102) He did not interpret it although the dream is the presence of the imagination (khayâl). It was a ram which appeared in the form of Ibrahim's son, and Ibrahim confirmed the vision. So his Lord ransomed his son from Ibrahim's illusion with the "mighty sacrifice", which was the interpretation of the vision with Allah, but Ibrahim was not aware of it.

The tajalli of form in the presence of the imagination requires another knowledge by which one can perceive what Allah means by that form. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said to Abu Bakr when he interpreted a dream, "You have guessed part of it rightly, and you have missed part of it." Abu Bakr asked him to inform him of what was right in it and what was wrong, but the Prophet did not do so.

Allah said to Ibrahim when He called him, "Ibrahim, you have discharged your vision." (37:105) He did not say to him, "You have confirmed the vision that it is your son" because he did not interpret it. He took what he dreamt literally, whereas dreams require interpretation. That is why the 'Aziz, the ruler of Egypt, said, "...if you can interpret dreams."

(12:43) The meaning of interpretation is the transposition from the form of what one dreamt to another form. The cattle represented the hard years and the fertile years. If Ibrahim had been faithful to the dream, he would have sacrificed his son, since he believed in the dream that it really was his son, whereas with Allah it meant the "mighty sacrifice" in the form of his son. He ransomed him by what occurred in Ibrahim's mind, but it was not ransomed in actuality with Allah.

There is a common form to the sensory form of the sacrifice and the imaginary form of Ibrahim's son. If he had seen a ram in his imagination, he would have interpreted it as his son or something else. Then Allah said, "This was a most manifest trial," (37:106) i.e. his clear test, meaning his experience in knowledge - whether or not he knew what the perspective of the dream required in the way of interpretation. He knew that the place of the imagination required interpretation, but he neglected it and the condition inherent in it, and for this reason he believed in the vision.

Taqi ibn Mukhallad, the transmitter of traditions, did so too, having heard in a tradition he was sure of, that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Whoever sees me in a dream, sees me when awake, for Shaytan cannot assume my form." (3) So Taqi ibn Mukhallad saw the Prophet in a dream in which the Prophet gave him milk to drink. Taqi ibn Mukhallad believed his dream, but he made himself vomit and threw up the milk. If he had interpreted the dream, he would have known that milk means knowledge, equal to the quantity that he drank. Do you not see that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received a goblet of milk in a dream and he said, "I drank it until satiety came out of my nails, and then I gave the surplus to 'Umar." It was said, "Messenger of Allah, what do you interpret it as?" He replied, "Knowledge." (4) He did not leave it as milk in its dream form since he had knowledge of the state of dreams and how they must be interpreted. It is known that the form of the Prophet, peace be upon him, which the senses see, is buried in Madina, and that the form of his spirit and his subtle form have never been seen by anyone nor by himself. For this reason, the spirit of the Prophet takes on material existence in the form of his body as he died, and nothing is missing from it. So it is Muhammad, peace be upon him, who appears in dreams through his spirit in a bodily form which resembles his buried body, for Shaytan cannot assume the form of his body, (5) may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and Allah protects the one who sees him. For this reason, whoever sees this form takes from it all that it orders or prohibits or gives good news of, even as he takes judgements from him in the life of this world - according to what they indicate from text, immediate or implicit. If he gives him something, that thing is subject to interpretation, unless it is manifest in the senses as it is in the imagination, and so does not require interpretation. It is based on this aspect that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, relied, even as Taqi ibn Mukhallad did. The vision has these two aspects. (6)

Allah taught us adab in what He did with Ibrahim and what He said to him when He gave him the station of prophethood. We know that when we see Allah in a form which logical reason rejects, we must interpret that form according to the Shari'a, whether it is in the state of the one who sees Him, or in the place in which He is seen, or the two together. If logical reason does not refute it, then we take it as we saw it, just as when we see Allah in the Next World.

So the One, the All-Merciful,
has forms in every place from what is hidden and what is manifest.
If you said, "This is the Real!" you spoke truly;

and if you said, "It is something else," you interpreted.
 His principle is not in one place rather than another,
 but it brings the Real to the creatures.
 When He manifests Himself to the eyes,
 the intellects deny him by insistent proofs.
 He is accepted in the tajalli to the intellects,
 and in that which is called the imagination (khayâl).
 That which is sound is the seeing.

Abu Yazid, (7) may Allah be pleased with him, says of this station, (8) "Had the Throne, and all it contains a hundred million times over, been in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have felt it." This is the magnitude of Abu Yazid in the world of bodies, but I say, "If the limitlessness of that which exists could be conceived of as being limited, and had it been contained as an existent source in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have been aware of it in his knowledge." For it is confirmed that the heart contains Allah, although it is not described by satiety. Had it been filled, it would have saturated.

Abu Yazid also said, "We have pointed to this station, saying:
 O Creator of things in Yourself,
 You encompass all You have created!
 You create that whose being has no end in You,
 for You are narrow and vast!
 Had that which Allah created shone in my heart,
 this shining dawn would not have shone.
 But that which contains Allah
 does not exclude creation.
 How is that, O Hearing?"

Anyone can create by illusion in his imagination that which has no existence save in the imagination. This is a common matter. By aspiration (himma), the gnostic creates that which has an outside existence in his aspiration. However, it continues only as long as the aspiration continues to preserve it without being tired by preserving what it created. (9)

When it happens that the gnostic neglects to preserve what he created by concentration, that creature ceases to exist, unless the gnostic has mastered all the presences and does not neglect anything. Rather, he must witness at least one of these presences. If the gnostic creates something by his aspiration and possesses this encompassment, that creature's form will appear in every presence, and the form will preserve itself. If the gnostic neglects a presence or many presences while seeing one of the presences, and while preserving the form of what he created in the presence he is in, all the forms will be preserved by the preservation of that form in the presence which he does not neglect. For neglect is never universal, either among the common or the elite. I have exposed a secret here which the People of Allah have guarded jealously, for it contains a refutation of their allegation of being the Real. For the Real is never unconscious of anything, and the slave must be unconscious of something in favour of something else. Inasmuch as he preserves that which he has created, he says, "I am the Real," (10) but he does not maintain it the way the Real maintains it that is the difference. Inasmuch as he is unconscious of any form and its presence, the slave is distinguished from the Real. He must be distinct, although all the forms are maintained by his preservation of a single one of these in the presence of which he is conscious. This is preservation by inclusion, and the

preservation of the Real of what He created is not like that. Rather, His preservation is of each form in particular. This matter which I have just communicated has never been written about by anyone - neither by me nor by any others - except in this book. It is unique in time. Take care lest you forget it!

The presence which you remain conscious of, with the form which resembles it, is like the Book about which Allah said, "We have not omitted anything from the Book." (6:38) It therefore integrates the tangible and the intangible. None will recognise what we have said except the one who is himself a Qur'an. (11) The one who fears Allah will have a furqân, (12) which is, as we mentioned, this matter in which the slave is distinct from the Lord. This furqân is the highest furqân.

At one moment, the slave is the Lord without a doubt,
and at another the slave is most certainly the slave.
If he is the slave, he is vast by Allah,
and if he is the Lord, he is in a restricted life.
Insofar as he is the slave,
he sees the source of himself,
and without a doubt
his hopes expand from him.
Inasmuch as he is a lord, he sees all of creation,
from the presence of angels and the kingdom, demanding from him,
And he is unable to answer their demands by his essence.
For this reason, some of the gnostics weep.
Be the slave of a Lord, and do not be the lord of His slave,
so you will not be suspended and tested in the fire.

Notes to Chapter 6:

1. Famous Sufi who studied under Sufyan ath-Thawri. d. 282/896. Wrote a short commentary on the Qur'an.
2. That the inanimate has more greater gnosis of Allah and obeys Him more than other creatures.
3. Al-Bukhari (6592); Muslim 42:10.
4. In Abu Dawud and Ibn Hanbal.
5. As in the hadith of al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. Either it remains on its dream form or it is subject to interpretation.
7. Al-Bistami, d. 261/874. Famous Sufi known for his ecstatic expressions.
8. The station of the vastness of the heart.
9. Language derived from Qur'an 2:255, "...their preservation does not tire him."
10. Al-Hallaj.
11. i.e. The Perfect Man.
12. Qur'an 8:29, "O you who believe! If you have fear of Allah, He will give you a furqan..."

7: The Seal of the Wisdom of Elevation in the Word of Isma'il (Ishmael)

Know that the one called Allah is Unique (Ahad) by Essence and by all His names, and every existent thing is only attached to Allah by its own lord exclusively, for it is impossible for an existent to possess the whole. As for Divine Unity (ahadiyya), no existent possesses any of it because one cannot have one part of it while another has another part. Unity does not admit of divisibility. His Unity integrates all of Him by potentiality.

The happy one is the one who is the one "who was pleasing to his Lord." (19:55) There is no one who is not pleasing to his Lord because it is by him that lordship (rububiyyah) (1) is sustained. He is pleasing to Him, and so he is happy. This is why Sahl at-Tustari said, "Lordship has a secret, and this secret is you." He was addressing every source. "Had the secret been disclosed, lordship would have been invalidated." He used the word "law" (2) which is the particle of impossibility - so it is never manifested, and lordship is never invalidated - for the source has no existence except by its Lord. The source is always existent, therefore lordship is never invalidated.

He who is pleasing is beloved, and all that the beloved does is beloved, so everything is pleasing, because the source could not act unless the act belonged to its Lord. The source is made tranquil by having an act attributed to it, but it is content with what appears in it and from it of the acts of its Lord, and is pleased with these acts, because every doer and producer is pleased with his act and product. He completes his act and product according to its basis. "He gives each thing its created form and then guides it," (20:50) that is, He revealed to it that He gave everything its creation, so it does not admit of decrease.

Isma'il, peace be upon him, by his discovery of what we mentioned "was pleasing to his Lord." In the same way, every existent thing who is pleasing to its Lord is also pleasing to the Lord of another, because lordship is only obtained from each of the names, not from the One of Unity. What is specific to it from the whole is only what is attributed to it. So He is its Lord. None is attached to Him in respect of His Unity. For this reason, the people of Allah are forbidden tajalli in the Unity. If you look at Him by Him, He is the One who is looking at Himself, and He continues to be Himself looking at Himself by Himself. If you look at Him by yourself, unity vanishes because of you. If you look at Him both through Him and through you, Unity also vanishes because the pronoun of the second person implies that there is something else besides that which is regarded. There must be some relationship which necessitates the duality of the regarder and regarded, and so Unity vanishes, even though there only exists the One who sees Himself by Himself. It is known that in this description, He is the Regarder and the Regarded.

It is not possible that the one who is pleasing be totally pleasing, unless all that he manifests comes from the act of the One who is pleased with him. Isma'il was distinguished from other individuals by how Allah described him, namely, that "he was pleasing to his Lord."

It is the same for every "self at peace" to which it is said, "Return to your Lord." He only commanded it to return to its Lord who called it, and so it recognised Him among the totality, "well-pleasing and well-pleased. Enter among My slaves!" (89:28) to the degree that they have this station. The slaves mentioned here refer to every slave who has gnosis of his Lord, who is content with Him, and does not turn to the Lord of another while preserving the unity

of the source which is necessary. "Enter My Garden," which is My veil, (3) and My Garden is not other than you, so you veil Me by your essence. There is only gnosis of Me by you and you only exist by Me, so whoever has gnosis of you has gnosis of Me, and there is no gnosis of Me, for there is no gnosis of you. If you enter into the Garden, you enter into yourself, so you will know yourself by a gnosis other than the gnosis by which you had knowledge when you knew your Lord. You will have two sorts of gnosis: gnosis of Him in respect of yourself, and gnosis of yourself and Him in respect of Him, not in respect of you.

You are a slave and you are a lord
to whomever you are a slave in respect of.
And you are a lord and you are a slave
to whoever possesses the covenant in speech.
Every knot has a person over it who unravels it
by one who has another knot.

Allah is pleased with His slaves, and "they are well-pleasing and well-pleased with Him." He is pleasing, so the two presences confront each other and accept likes, and the likes are opposites because the two likes are a single reality which does not unify them since they would not then be distinct. There is only the distinct, so there is no like. There is no like in existence, and so there is no opposite in existence. Existence is one reality, and the thing is not opposite to itself.

Only the Real remains,
no phenomenal being remains.
There is nothing connected, nothing distinct.
For that reason, the proof of the eye-witness came,
so I only see His source with my eye when I see!

That is for "the one who fears his Lord" lest He makes distinction by his knowledge. By that distinction, we indicated the ignorance of sources in existence according to what the knower brought, so distinction occurs among the slaves, and distinction occurs among the lords. If distinction had not occurred, one divine name would have been interpreted in all its aspects by that by which another name is interpreted. The explanation of the Exalter is not that of the Abaser, and so on, but from the aspect of unity, as we said, every name indicates the Essence and its reality in respect to what it is. The One Named is but One. The Exalter is the Abaser in respect to the Named. It is not the Abaser in respect to itself and its reality. That which is understood differs in the understanding in respect to each of them.

Do not look at the Real.
Free Him from creation.
Do not look at creation,
and garb it in other than the Real.
Disconnect Him and connect Him,
and stand in a seat of honour. (4)
Stay in the state of gatheredness (jam') if you wish,
and, if you wish, in the forms in separateness (farq).
You will win all,
even if all set out to carry the day.
You will not be annihilated
and you will not have going-on

and the forms will not be annihilated
and will not have going-on.
Revelation will not be given to you
in respect to another, and you will not receive it.

Praise is by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat. The Divine Presence demands praise which is praiseworthy in itself. So one extols the Divine Presence by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat, for one goes beyond it, "and do not imagine that Allah break His promise to His Messengers." (14:47) He did not say, "and his threat", rather He said that He will pass over their wrong actions even though he threatens not to. He praised Isma'il because "he was true to his promise." (19:54) Possibility vanishes in respect to the Real, since in it is that which demands the probable.

Nothing remains except the One
who is true to His promise alone,
and an eye does not remain
seeing the threat of the Real.
If they enter the abode of misery,
in it they are in possession of delight, and a different bliss.
Than the bliss of the gardens of endless-time, but the matter is the same.
The difference between them occurs in the tajalli.
It is called punishment ('adhab) from the sweetness ('udhuba) of its food,
that is like the husk of it, and the husk protects it.

Notes to Chapter 7:

1. Rububiyah: Lordship, the quality of being a lord. A term derived from the Qur'anic descriptions of Allah's lordship over creation. One might say the ecology of natural existence. It is an essential element in Sufic cosmology and is a most sophisticated concept which surpasses the crude specificity and mechanistic views of evolutionist biology. It is an energy system of relationships in constant change and altering dynamics. It functions through the different realms, the atomic, the mineral, the plant, and so on. It relates the levels of living organisms from the uni-cellular up to man, and the interpenetrations of organism and environment. It re-defines "event" from crude historicity to a picture of organism/event in a unified field. It is the underlying concept which allows us to abandon the dead mind/body split of the dying culture. It permits us to utilise and develop the energy concepts of Islamic/Chinese medicine - which hold a common energy concept at base. Rububiyya permits us to observe ONE PROCESS at work throughout every level of the creation realities.
2. "Law" (if, but probably not) expresses an unlikely condition, while "in" (if, but probably yes) expresses a probable condition.
3. Garden, Janna, also carries the connotation of veiling, concealing.
4. Qur'an 54:53-55, "The fearfully aware will be amid Gardens and Rivers on seats of honour in the presence of an All-Powerful King."

8: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Spirit (Rûh) in the Word of Ya'qub (Jacob)

The Din (1) is two Dins: the Din with Allah and with the one whom the Real knows, and who has recognition of the fact that the Real knows him; and the Din with creation; and Allah takes account of it since its goal is conformity with what Allah has willed of the Shari'a set down with Him. Allah said, "Ibrahim directed his sons to this, as did also Ya'qub, 'My sons! Allah has chosen this Din for you, so do not die except as Muslims'" (2:132) that is obeying Him. The Din brought the alif and the lam (2) of definition and acquaintance. It is the recognised Din. It is His words, "The Din with Allah is Islam," (3:19) and it is submission. So the Din is an expression of your obedience. That which is from Allah is the road which leads you to Him. Din is submission and the law (namus) is the road which Allah has set down.

Anyone who is described by submission to what Allah has prescribed for him is the one who has based himself on the Din, and it raises him up and establishes him as does the prayer. The slave is the product of the Din. Allah sets down judgements, and thus submission is the source of your action, and so Din is from your action. You will only achieve happiness by what comes from you. As happiness is established for you by your actions, so the Divine Names are only established by His actions, which are you and which are in-time. As He is called god by His effects, so you are called happy by your effects.

Allah bestowed His rank upon you since you established the Din and obeyed what He prescribed for you. I will enlarge on that, if Allah wills, in a useful manner, after we have clarified the Din which creation has which Allah takes account of when He says, "The Din is Allah's alone," (8:39) and all of it is from you, and not from Him except in respect to origin. Allah says, "They invented monasticism," (57:27) and monasticism consists of arbitrary esoteric rules (an-nawâmis al-hikmiya) which the known Messenger did not bring to the people from Allah by the traditional Prophetic method. When wisdom and clear benefit corresponded to these rules regarding the divine decision about the goal of the Shari'a of Allah, (3) Allah took it into account according to what He Himself prescribed. Allah did not prescribe it for them. Then Allah opened between Himself and their hearts the door of divine concern and mercy while they were not aware of it, and in their hearts He made them esteem their rules by which they seek "the pleasure of Allah" beyond the Prophetic method known by Divine definition. Allah says, "They did not observe it" those people who devised these rules and what was prescribed for them "as it should have been observed" - "unless it was purely out of the desire to gain the good pleasure of Allah." That was what they believed about it.

"To those of them who believed We gave their reward, but many of them are deviators." (57:27) "Many of them," i.e. those who have this worship prescribed for them, "are deviators," that is, do not submit to it and observe it properly. Allah does not accord to the one who does not obey it, a law which pleases Him, but the command requires submission. Its proof is that the one who is obligated either obeys with agreement or opposes it. The one who agrees and is obedient has no need of any discourse on it to prove it. The one who opposes it is seeking one of two matters from Allah to be judged regarding him: either overlooking of wrong actions and forgiveness, or being taken to task for that. One of the two is necessary because the command is true in itself. In any state, it is true that Allah guides His slave by his actions whatever state he is in, and so the state is the influencing factor.

Thus the Din is a reward, that is, the exchange for what is easy and for what for is not easy. "Allah is pleased with them, and they are pleased with Him" (97:8, 58:22) is the easy reward, and "As for any one of you who has done wrong, We will make him suffer great punishment" (25:19) is the reward of what is not easy. He passes over their wrong actions and this is their reward. It is proven that the Din is the reward. As the Din is Islam, and Islam is the same as being led, it leads to what is easy (the reward) and what is not easy (the punishment), and so it is the repayment. This is the language of the people of outwardness.

As for its secret and inwardness, it manifests itself in the mirror of the existence of Allah, so it does not refer to possibilities from Allah other than what their essences in their states accord. They have a form in every state, and their forms differ according to the difference of their states. The tajalli differs according to the difference of the state. The effect occurs in the slave according to what he is. None gives him good except himself, and none gives him the opposite of good except himself. Thus he gives bliss to his essence, and he also punishes it. He only blames himself and only praises himself. "Allah's is the conclusive argument" (6:149) in His knowledge of them since knowledge depends on the known.

The secret which is above this in this sort of question is that possibilities are based on their origin from non-existence. The existence of the created reality is only by the forms of the states on which the possibilities are based in themselves and their sources. Thus you know who has pleasure and who has pain, and from each of these states you know what follows ('aqaba); and since it follows, you derive punishment ('uquba) and penalty ('iqab) from it. It permits good and evil as two opposites which custom calls the good reward, and the evil punishment.

For this reason, He designates and elucidates the Din by custom because He relates to it what is necessary and what his state demands. Din is custom or habit, and the poet said, "Like your habit (Din) with the mother of little Harith...," that is, like your custom. What is understood by custom or habit is that the matter itself recurs. This is not the case in Din. Custom is repetition, but custom is only one intelligible thing while resemblance in forms exists. We know that Zayd is the same as 'Amr in respect to humanness, but humanness does not recur since, had it done so, it would have multiplied. It is but one reality, and the one does not multiply itself. We know that Zayd is not the same as 'Amr in respect to personality. The person of Zayd is not the person of 'Amr in spite of the realisation that personality is common to both. In the sensory, we say that humanness recurs because of this resemblance, and we say in sound judgement that it does not. From one aspect, there is no habit in reward, and from another aspect, there is habit even as there is reward by one aspect and no reward by another aspect. Thus reward is also a state in the possible. This is a question about which those who know this matter are unaware, and it is part of the secret of the Decree which governs creatures. Know that it is as if it were said of the doctor that he is the servant of nature - in the same way, it is said of the Messengers and heirs 4 that they are the servants of the Divine Command among people. In the heart of the matter, they serve the states of possible things, and their service derives from the sum of their own states on which they are based in the state of the immutability of their sources. See how wondrous this is!

Is not the the desired servant here the one who performs what is commanded by the one who is served, either by state or by word? So it is valid that the doctor be called the servant of nature if he acts according to the principle of assisting it. Nature produces in the body of the one who is ill a special state of being by which he is called "ill". If the doctor were to assist nature by service, he would also increase the magnitude of the illness by it when he wants to

repel the illness, seeking health. Health is also a part of nature by the growth of another state of being which differs from this state of being. Then the doctor is not the servant of nature, and yet he serves it inasmuch as he only heals the body of the one who is ill and changes that aspect, not the general one, for generalities are not valid in this sort of question. Thus the doctor is both a servant and is not a servant of nature.

In the same way, the Messengers and their heirs are in the service of the Real, and the Real has two aspects of judgement in respect to the states of the obligated. The matter proceeds from the slave according to what the will of Allah demands of it, and the will of Allah is attached to it according to what the knowledge of Allah demands of it. The knowledge of Allah is attached to it according to what the known accords it of its essence. The known only appears in its form. The Messenger and the heir serve the divine command by will, and yet they do not serve the will. The Messenger answered it seeking the happiness of the one who is under obligation. Had he served the Divine Will, he would not have given counsel, and yet he only gave counsel by it, i.e. the will. The Messenger and the heir are the doctors of the selves for Next life, obedient to the command of Allah when He commands them. So he looks at Allah's command, and sees that He has commanded him to do that which opposes His will. The command is only what He wills, and for this reason, it is the command.

He wills the command and it occurs, and He did not will the occurrence of what He commanded the commanded one to do, and so it did not occur from the commanded one therefore it is called opposition and rebellion. The Messenger conveys the news, and this is why he said, "The Sura of Hud (and its like) made me white-haired," when they came to him from His words, "Go straight as you have been commanded." (11:112) He did not know whether he was commanded to what complies with the will, so that it occurs, or to what does not comply with the will, so that it does not occur.

No one recognises the judgement of the will except after what is willed takes place, unless he is one whose inner eye has been unveiled by Allah. If he is, he will perceive the source-forms of the possibilities in their fixed state for what they really are. Then he judges according to what he sees. This belongs to certain people at certain moments, but they do not have it all the time. The Messenger said, "I do not know what He will do with me or with you." (5) So he made the veil clear, and he only meant that it emerges in a particular command, and no more.

Notes to Chapter 8:

1. Din: The life transaction, literally the debt or exchange situation between two parties, in this usage the Creator and the created, or as some say between the conditioned and the unconditioned, the limited and the limitless, or the many and the One.
2. The definite article.
3. Which is the achievement of human perfection through knowledge and actions.
4. Hadith, "The people of knowledge are the heirs of the Prophets."
5. Hadith in al-Bukhari.

9: The Seal of the Wisdom of Light in the Word of Yusuf (Joseph)

This luminous wisdom spreads its light on the presence of the imagination (khayal), and it is the first of the beginnings of divine revelation in the people of divine concern. 'A'isha, may Allah be pleased with her, said, "The first of what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had of revelation was the true dream. Then he only saw dreams which came like the breaking of dawn, and there was nothing hidden in it," (1) and her knowledge only extended to this. This lasted for six months, and then the angel came to him. She did not know that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had said, "People are asleep, and when they die, they waken up." Everything seen in the state of wakefulness is of that sort, although states differ. She spoke of six months, but all his life in this world was like that, as a dream in a dream.

Everything reported of this nature is called the world of the imagination (khayal), and for this reason, there must be interpretation: the matter which has a form in itself appears in a form other than it. The interpreter passes from these forms which the sleeper sees to the form upon which the matter is based. If he is correct, as in knowledge appearing in the form of milk, then he interprets the source of the form of knowledge from the form of milk. He discovers the source and says, "This form of milk refers to the form of knowledge."

When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received revelation, he was taken from the ordinary sensory world. He was covered and withdrew from those who were present with him. When that left him, he returned, and he only received revelation in the "presence of the imagination", although it could not be said of him that he had been asleep.

It was the same when the angel appeared to him as a man. That was also from the presence of the imagination, for it was not a man, but rather an angel who had entered into the form of a man. The gnostic onlooker interpreted it until he reached its form in reality. Then he said, "This is Jibril who came to teach you your deen." (2) He told them, "Answer the greeting of the man," so he called him a man in respect to the form in which he appeared to them. Then he said, "This is Jibril," and he looked at the form to which this imaginary man would return. He spoke the truth both times, with the truth of the vision of the physical eye, and the truth in that this was Jibril without a doubt.

Yusuf, peace be upon him, said, "I saw eleven stars and the sun and the moon prostrate themselves in front of me." (12:4) He saw his brothers in the form of the stars and his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon. This is from the point of view of Yusuf. Had it been from the point of view of what was seen, the appearance of his brothers in the form of stars and the appearance of his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon would have been from their volition. Since they had no knowledge of what he saw, that which Yusuf perceived was in the repository of his imagination.

Ya'qub knew that when he related it to him, so he said, "O my son, do not tell your vision to your brothers in case they should devise some scheme to injure you." (12:5) Then he absolved his sons of deceit and ascribed it to Shaytan, who is the source of deceit. He said, "In truth, Shaytan is a clear-cut enemy to man," i.e. he manifests enmity. Then Yusuf said at the end of the affair, "This is now the interpretation of the dream that I had. My Lord has made it all come true," (12:100) that is, that He manifested it in the world of senses after it

was in the form of the imagination.

The Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said about it, "People are asleep". Yusuf spoke of what his Lord had rendered true in the status of one who dreams that he has awakened from his dream and interprets it, and does not know that he is still asleep. Then later when he wakes up, he says, "I dreamt such-and-such a thing, and then I dreamt that I woke up and interpreted in such-and-such a way." This is similar to that. Look at how great the difference of perception is between Muhammad, peace be upon him, and Yusuf, peace be upon him, at the end of the affair when Yusuf said, "This is the interpretation of my dream of long ago which my Lord has rendered true," that is, made sensory or sensed. It was always sensed, since the imagination only gives out sensed things, and it has nothing other than that. See how noble is the knowledge of the heirs of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace!

I would say more on this presence on the Muhammadan tongue of Yusuf, as you will soon understand, if Allah wills. Know that that which is referred to as other-than-Allah, or the universe, is related to Allah as the shadow is related to the person. The universe is the shadow of Allah. It is the same as the relation of existence to the universe, since the shadow exists in the senses without a doubt. But there must be something by which that shadow appears. If one were to remove that by which the shadow appears, the shadow would be intelligible but would not exist in the senses. Rather, it would be a potential in the essence of the person on whom it depends. The locus of the manifestation of this divine shadow called the "universe" is the sources of the possibilities by which this shadow extends itself. This shadow is perceived according to what it projects itself on from the existence of this essence, but perception occurs through His name, the Light. This shadow is projected on the sources of possibilities in the form of the unknown unseen.

Do you not see that shadows incline to the darkness, indicating the hiddenness they contain because of the distance of the relationship between them and the persons who project them? Even if the person is white, his shadow is like this. Do you not see that when mountains are distant from the eye of the onlooker, they appear black? In their actual sources they are other than the colour the senses perceive. This is only due to the effect of distance. It is like the blue of the sky. This is the effect distance has on the senses with non-luminous bodies. It is the same for the sources of possibilities which are non-luminous because they are non-existent. Even if they are described as unchanging, they are not described by existence since existence is light. Distance makes luminous bodies appear small in the senses, so this is another effect of distance. The senses perceive them as small in size, whereas in their sources they are large according to that degree and greater in magnitude. One knows by proof that the sun is larger than the earth, but it appears to be the size of a shield. That is also an effect of distance.

You only know the universe according to the amount you know the shadows, and you are ignorant of the Real according to what you do not know of the person on which that shadow depends. Inasmuch as He has a shadow, He is known, and inasmuch as one is ignorant of what is in the essence of the shadow of the form which projects the shadow, he is ignorant of Allah. For that reason, we say that Allah is known to us from one aspect and not known to us from another aspect. "Do you not see how your Lord stretches out shadows? If He had wished, He could have made them stationary," (25:45) i.e. it still would be a potential in Himself. It is as He said, that Allah would not give a *tajalli* of Himself to possibilities until He manifests the shadow. The shadow is as if it remains outside of the possibilities which do

not have a source manifested for them in existence.

"Then We appoint the sun to be a pointer to them," that is to His name, the Light of which we spoke, and the senses witness it, for shadows have no source in the absence of light. "Then We draw them back to Ourselves, in gradual steps," so Allah draws it back to Himself because it is His shadow which appeared from Him, and it is not other-than-Him. All that you perceive is the existence of Allah in the sources of possibilities. Inasmuch as the He-ness of Allah is He, it is His existence. Inasmuch as forms differ in it, it is the sources of possibilities. As the name of the shadow does not leave it by the difference of forms, in the same way the name of the universe or the name other-than-Allah does not leave it by the difference of forms. In regard to the Divine Unity of His being, the shadow is Allah, because He is the One, the Unique; and in respect to the multiplicity of forms, it is the world, so understand and realise what I have explained to you! Since the matter is as I mentioned, the universe is illusory, and it does not have a real existence. This is the meaning of the imagination, that is, you imagine that the universe is an autonomous extra thing outside of Allah. It is not like that in itself. Do you not see that in the senses, the shadow is connected to the person who projects it, and it is impossible that it be detached from that connection since it is impossible for something to be detached from its own essence? Recognise your source ('ayn), and who you are, what is your he-ness and what your relation to Allah is, and by what You are the Truth and by what you are the universe, "other", and whatever resembles these expressions. In this, those that know vie in excellence, so there is the one who knows and the one who is more knowing.

The Real is, in relation to a particular shadow, small or large, pure or more pure, as light is in relation to what veils it from the onlooker through coloured glass which tints it. At the same time, it has no colour, and so you see it as making a mirror-image of your reality to your Lord. If you say that the light is green by the greenness of the glass, you will have spoken the truth as your sensory vision testifies. If you say that it is not green and has no colour as evidence accords you, you will have spoken the truth as sound logical consideration testifies. This is light projected across the shadow, and it is the same as the glass which is a luminous shadow because of its purity. It is the same for one of us who has realised the Real. His form manifests itself in him more than it manifests itself in another. Among us there is the one for whom Allah is his hearing, seeing, and all his faculties and limbs, (3) according to the signs which the Shari'a gives in a transmission from Allah. In spite of this, the source of the shadow exists, so the pronoun of "his hearing" refers to him. Other slaves are not like this. The relation of this slave is nearer to the existence of Allah than the relation of other slaves.

Then the matter is as we have confirmed. So know that you are imagination and that which you perceive and of which you say, "It is not me" is also imagination. All of existence is imagination within imagination. True existence is Allah, the Real, in particular in respect to essence and source, not in respect to His Names, because the Names have two meanings. One meaning is His source which is the same as the "Named", and the other meaning is what it indicates and that by which the Name is separate from this other Name, and so distinct. The Ever-Forgiving is separate from the Manifest and the Hidden, and the First is distinct from the Last. Thus it is clear to you that each Name is the same as the other Name, and yet it is not the other Name. Inasmuch as the Name is the same, it is the Real, and inasmuch as it is not it, it is the imaginary Real which we discussed.

Glory be to the One who is only proven by Himself and Whose being is only confirmed by His source! The Hidden is pure non-existence, so whoever holds to multiplicity, holds to the

universe and the Divine Names and the names of the world. Whoever holds to Divine Unity holds to Allah in respect to His Essence which is independent of the universe, not in respect to its divinity and form. If the Essence is independent of the universe, then He is the source of its independence from the ascriptions of the Names, because it has the Names, and they indicated it as they indicate other named things in which their effect is realised. "Say: He is Allah, Absolute Oneness" (112:1) in respect of his source, "Allah, the Everlasting Sustainer of all" in respect to our dependence on Him. "He has not given birth" in respect to His He-ness and us, "and was born born" the same way, "and no one is comparable to Him" in the same way.

This is His description so He singled out His Essence in His statement, "Allah is Unique (Ahad)". Multiplicity appears by His attributes which are known with us. We beget and are begotten, we depend on Him, and we are equals to one another. This is the One who is pure above these attributes. He is independent of them as He is independent of us. There is no description of Allah except for this sura, the Sura al-Ikhlās (112), and it was revealed in that. The Divine Unity (ahadiyya) of Allah is in respect to the Divine Names which demand the unity of multiplicity on our part, and the Divine Unity of Allah, in respect to His independence from us and from the names, is the Divine Unity of the source. Both of them are included in the name, the Unique One (al-Ahad).

Know that Allah has not manifested the shadows and made them prostrate themselves, casting themselves to the left and the right, (4) except as indications for you of yourself and Him. In this way you are able to recognise who you are and what your relationship to Him is, and what His relationship to you is, until you know from where and by which divine reality that which is other-than-Allah is described, through its complete poverty to Him as well as the relative poverty of some to others. In this way also, you are able to know from where and by what reality it is that Allah is described by independence from people and the universe, and the universe is described by independence, i.e. the independence of some from others in an aspect which is the source of its need of some. For the universe is in need of causes without a doubt by essential need. The greatest of its causes is the causality of Allah, and there is no causality of Allah by which the universe is in need except for the Divine Names. The universe is in need of each of the Divine Names, whether from the universe like it or, from Allah Himself. Thus it is Allah, and not other-than-Him.

This is why Allah said, "Mankind! you are the poor in need of Allah whereas Allah is the Rich Beyond Need, the Praiseworthy." (35:15) It is known that we depend on each other. Our names are the Names of Allah since everything is, without a doubt, in need of Him. At the same time, our sources are His shadow, and not other-than-Him. So He is our he-ness, and He is not our he-ness. We have prepared the way for you, so look!

Notes to Chapter 9:

1. In al-Bukhari and elsewhere.
2. In Muslim, also an-Nawawi's Forty Hadith.
3. Hadith, see. p.11.
4. Ref. Qur'an 16:48, "Do they not see the things that Allah has created, casting their shadows to the right and to the left, prostrating themselves before Allah incomplete humility."

10: The Seal of the Wisdom of Divine Unity (Ahadiyya) in the Word of Hud

Allah has the straight path which is manifest
and unhidden among the common people.
Its source exists in great and small,
in those who are ignorant of matters
and those who know.

For this reason, 'His mercy encompasses everything,' (1) great and small. "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) So all that walks on the Straight Path of the Lord, and is not of those "against whom Allah is wrathful" from this aspect, nor is he "astray". (2) As being astray is a non-essential quality, so divine wrath is also a non-essential quality. The source to which they return is the "mercy which extends to all things", and which preceded wrath. Everything which is other-than-Allah is a creature which crawls and which has a spirit. There is nothing which crawls by itself, rather it crawls by other than it. It crawls by the principle of following the One who is on a Straight Path. It is only a path by virtue of the fact that it is walked on.

If creation draws near you, Allah draws near you.
If Allah draws near you, creation does not follow.
So realise what we say on it,
and everything I have said to you is true.
There is no existent thing in phenomenal being
that you see which does not have articulation.
The eye only sees of creation
that its source is Allah.
But He is stored in it,
and for this reason, its forms are true.

Know that divine knowledges of taste (dhawq) which are acquired by the people of Allah differ according to the different faculties acquired from them, even though they derive from a single source. Allah said, "I am his hearing by which he hears and his sight by which he sees and his hand by which he strikes and his foot by which he walks." (3) So He mentioned that His He-ness is the source of the limbs which are the same as the slave. Thus He-ness is one, but the limbs are different, and every limb has one of the knowledges of taste which are specified from a single source, and differ according to the different limbs. It is like water which is but a single reality, yet differs in taste according to the different locations. The water of the Euphrates is sweet, and brackish water is salty, yet it is water in all its states and its reality does not change, even though the taste differs.

This wisdom is from the wisdom of the feet. It is the words of Allah, that whoever establishes His Books will eat "from beneath their feet" (5:66). The path which is the Straight Path is travelling on it, and walking and running on it. It is only by the feet. So this witnessing of the taking by the forelock by the hand of the One who is one the Straight Path only results in this special art from the knowledges of taste. "We will drive the evildoers" (19:86), (4) who are those who deserve the station to which they are sent, and destroy them by the west wind. (5) The wind takes them by the forelocks and carries them on, and it is the source of the passions which take them to Jahannam. It is the distance (6) which they imagined. When it carried

them to that abode, they reached the source of nearness, and so distance vanished. What is called Jahannam vanished in respect to them. They win the bliss of nearness in respect to merit since they were wrong-doers.

This pleasurable station of taste was not given to them as a favour. They received it by what they realities merited from the acts which they were doing. They were running with their actions on the Straight Path of the Lord because their forelocks were in the hand of the One who has this attribute. They did not walk by themselves, but by the principle of compulsion to reach the source of nearness. "We are nearer to him than you, but you cannot see." (56:85) Rather it is seen, and so the covering is stripped away, and "his sight is sharp." (7) What is specified as dead is from the dead, i.e. what distinguishes the happy from the wretched in usage. "We are nearer to him than his jugular vein." (50:16) What is specified as man is from man, so divine nearness is from distance as is not hidden in divine transmissions. There is no nearness nearer than that His He-ness be the source of the limbs of the slave and his faculties. The slave is not other than these limbs and faculties, so he is Allah witnessed in illusory creation. Creation is intelligible and Allah is felt and witnessed with the believers and the people of unveiling. Allah is intelligible with other classes, and creation is witnessed. So they are in the station of the salty, brackish water. The first group is the station of the sweet water which is pleasant to drink.

People are of two classes those who walk on the path recognising it and its end, for it is a straight path in respect to him; and those who walk on the path being ignorant of it and not knowing its end. It is the same path which the other class knows. The gnostic calls to Allah by inner sight, and the non-gnostic calls to Allah by limitation and ignorance. This is a special knowledge which comes from the lowest of the low (8) because the feet are the lower part of the person, and what is lower than them is none other than the path. Whoever recognises that Allah is the same as the Path, recognises the matter for what it is. Then Allah is travelling on it since there is no known except Him, and He is the source of the wayfarer and the traveller. There is no knower except Him. He is you, so know your reality and your Path (tariqa). The matter has been made clear to you on the tongue of the interpreter, (9) if you but understand. It is the true tongue, so the only one who will understand is the one whose understanding is Real.

Allah has many ascriptions and their existence varies. See how 'Ad, the people of Hud, said, "This is a storm cloud which will give us rain." (46:24) They thought good of Allah, and He is with the opinion of His slave. (10) Allah turned this word away from them. He informed them of what was more perfect and higher in nearness. When it rained upon them, that was the earth's portion and the seed was watered. He told them, "No, rather it is what you desired to hasten a wind containing painful punishment." He made the wind (rîh) an indication of what rest (râha) it contained for them. By this wind, He gladdens their spirits (arwah), delivering them from dark forms, difficult paths and black veils. There is punishment ('adhab) in this wind, i.e. a matter which they find sweet (ista'dhaba) when they taste it. It only pains them by the separation from familiar things. Thus punishment gives them good news. And the command is nearer to them than they imagine.

"Destroying everything at its Lord's command ! When morning came you could see nothing but their dwellings." (46:25) That is, their corpses, in which their true spirits lived, so the trueness of this special relation vanished from them; and a special life in their forms remains to them from Allah of which their skins, hands, and feet speak, (11) so does the punishment of the blows and thighs. (12) All that is related in a divine text.

Allah described himself by jealousy (ghayra). Out of jealousy He forbade actions unrestrained by limits (fawahish). The unrestrained act is only what is evident. As for the unrestrained which is hidden, it belongs to the one who manifests it. When He made the unrestrained haram, that it, forbade that the reality of what we mentioned be known, and that is the source of things, He hid it by other (ghayr). So other says: hearing is Zayd's hearing. The gnostic says that hearing is Allah. Thus nothing remains of the faculties and limbs. Therefore not everyone recognises Allah. People vie in excellence and ranks are differentiated, and the exceeding and exceeded are clear.

Know that Allah revealed to me and caused me to witness in a vision, which I received in Cordoba in 586, the sources of His Messengers and all His Prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. None of this group spoke to me except for Hud, peace be upon him. He told me why they were gathered together. I saw that he was a very large man of good appearance, subtle in reply, gnostic in matters of unveiling. My proof of his unveiling is His words, "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) What gift to creatures is greater than this? Then it is from the bestowal of favours on us by Allah that this speech reached us from Him in the Qur'an.

Then Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant us peace, completed its gathering for everyone by what he was told by Allah, for He is the source of "hearing, sight, the hand, the foot and tongue the source of the senses. The spiritual faculties are nearer than the senses. He is content with the defined and distant more than with the defined unknown which is nearer. Allah translated the speech of Hud to his people to inform us, and the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, translated the speech of Allah in turn to give us good news. Knowledge is perfected in the breasts of those who are given knowledge, "and none denies Our signs but the unbelievers," (29:47) for they cover up the signs when they recognise them through envy, meanness and injustice. We only see from Allah in respect of Himself disconnection (tanzih) or non-disconnection by definition in any ayat which He has sent down or in transmissions which have reached us from Him. Otherwise He has the Great Mist (al-'Ama') (13) which has no air above it and no air beneath it. Allah was in it before He created creation. Then He mentioned that He "established Himself firmly on the Throne." (57:4) This is also definition. Then He mentioned that "He descends to the nearest heaven." (14) This is also definition. Then He said that "He is in the heaven and in the earth," (15) and "He is with us wherever we are." (16) and He tells us that He is our source. We are limited, so He only describes Himself by limitation.

His statement, "There is nothing like Him," (42:11) is also limitation if we take the kaf ("like") as an appendage to other than the attribute. Whoever is distinct from the defined is defined by his phenomenal being which is not the source of what is defined. Freedom from limitation is limitation, and the absolute is limited by absoluteness for whoever has understanding. If we attach the kaf of ka-mithli (like) to the attribute, we define it. If we take "There is nothing like Him" as the negation of "like (mithl)", we realise the given and the sound transmissions that He is the source of things, and that things are defined. If their definitions differ, He is defined by the definition of everything with a definition. Nothing is defined unless it is a definition of Allah's. He moves in the designation of creatures and creation. Had the matter not been like that, existence would not have been valid, for He is the source of existence. He preserves everything by His Essence, and the preserving of something does not oppress Him. (17) His preserving of all things is His preserving of His form in that the thing is other than His form. Only this is valid. He is the witness in the

witness and the witnessed in the witnessed. (18) He is the spirit of the universe which is managed by Him, and it is the Macrocosmic or Great man (al-insan al-kabir).

He is all phenomenal being
and He is the One (al-Wahid)
who establishes my phenomenal being by His being,
For that reason, I said that He is nourished.
So my existence is His food, and we imitate Him in Him from Him,
if you look by the aspect of my taking refuge.

For his sorrow breathed, so the breath is related to the All-Merciful because He is Merciful by it. Divine ascriptions demand it from the bringing into existence of the form of the universe which we have said is what is manifest by Allah since He is the Manifest. It is His inward since He is the Hidden; and He is the First since He was when they were not. He is the Last since their source is in their manifestation. The Last is the source of the Manifest, and the Hidden is the source of the First. He has knowledge of all things since he knows Himself. When He brought forms into existence in the Breath, and the power of the ascriptions designated by the names appeared, the divine ascriptions then became valid for the universe. They depend on Allah. He said, "Today, I set down your ascriptions and raise up My ascriptions," i.e. I take from you your dependence on yourselves and return to you your dependence on Me. Where are those who are fearful of Allah? (19) they those who take Allah as a safeguard. Allah is their manifest part, i.e. the source of their manifest forms. They are the greatest of people, the most pure and the strongest among all. The one who has taqwa is the one who makes himself a safeguard for Allah by His form since the He-ness of Allah is the faculties of the slave. The one called the slave makes a safeguard for the One called Allah based on witnessing, so that the knower is distinct from the one who does not know. "Say: 'Are they the same those who know and those who do not know?' It is only people of intelligence who pay heed," (39:9) and they see into the core of the thing (20) which is sought from that thing. The negligent one does not precede the diligent, and similarly the hireling does not resemble the slave, Since Allah is a safeguard for the slave by one aspect, the slave is a safeguard for Allah by another aspect. Say what you like about phenomenal being. If you like, say that it is creation. If you like, say that is the Real. If you like, say that it is both the Real and creation. If you like, say that it is not Real from every point of view and not creation from every point of view. If you wish, say it is bewilderment in that. The goals are made clear by your specification of ranks. If it had not been for definition, the Messengers would not have reported the changing of the Real in forms, nor would they have described Him by the dropping of forms from Himself.

The eye only looks to Him,
and authority only rests with Him.

We are His, and by Him, in His hand, in every state, so we are with Him. For that reason, He is denied and recognised, disconnected and described. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by His eye is a gnostic. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by his own eye is not a gnostic. The one who does not see Allah from Him nor in Him, and waits to see Him by his own eye is veiled and ignorant.

On the whole, each person must have some doctrine of his Lord by which he refers to Him and in which he seeks Him. So when Allah manifests Himself to him in it, he knows Him and goes near Him. If He manifests Himself to him in other than it, he denies Him and takes

refuge from Him and has bad adab in that matter while claiming he shows adab with Him. (21) He only believes in a divinity according to the [subjective] form he gives that in himself. The divinity of creeds is based on subjective positing. People only see themselves and what they formulate in themselves.

Look at the ranks of people in knowledge of Allah. That is the source of their ranks in vision on the Day of Rising; and I have taught you the necessary cause of it. Take care lest you be limited by a particular creed and deny what is other than it, so that a great blessing may pass you by. Indeed, knowledge of what the matter is based on may pass you by.

Make yourself a vessel for all the forms of belief. Surely Allah is vaster and greater than being contained by one creed rather than another. So Allah says, "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." (2:115) He did not mention one "where" less than another. He said there is the face of Allah. The face of the thing is its reality. By this He spoke to the hearts of the gnostics, that they might not occupy themselves with non-essentials in this life through seeking the like of this. The slave does not know in which breath he will be taken. He may be taken at the time of his negligence, and then he will not be equal to the one taken in a state of presence.

Then the slave who is perfect knows that this is linked to exterior form and to the state limited by turning the prayer toward the Masjid al-Haram. He believes that Allah is in his qibla when he prays. Those are some of the ranks of Allah from "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." The direction of the Masjid al-Haram is one of them. In it is the face of Allah, but do not say "He is here", rather stop with what you perceive and cling to adab in turning towards the Masjid al-Haram, and cling to adab in the non-encompassment of the face in this particular whereness. Rather whereness is part of the sum of directions to which one turns. So Allah makes it clear to you that He is in the "where-ness" of every direction.

There are only creeds, so all directions are correct. Every correct thing has a reward. Every rewarded thing is happy. Every happy one is approved. If he is wretched at one time in the Next Abode, the people of preservation experience illness and pain in this life in spite of our knowledge that they are happy and the people of Allah. Among the slaves of Allah are those who are overtaken by these pains in the other life in an abode called Jahannam. Even so, none of the people of knowledge to whom the matter is unveiled for what it is declares that they do not possess a bliss particular to them in this abode. As for the loss of pain, they denied it, and so it was lifted from them. Their bliss is their rest from feeling that pain, or else bliss is particular and extra as is the bliss of the people of the Garden in the Garden. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 10:

1. ref. Qur'an 7:156, "My mercy extends to all things."
2. ref. Qur'an 1:7.
3. Hadith qudsi.
4. "We will drive the evildoers to Jahannam."
5. The worst of winds which does not fertilise trees or raise clouds. It is said that it was a west wind which destroyed 'Ad. It blows in the hot season and is very thirsty.
6. Jahannam comes from a root which means "deep", as in a deep well.
7. See Qur'an 50:22.
8. Ref. Qur'an 95:5, "We reduced him to the lowest of the low."

9. The Messenger of Allah in the hadith, "...I am his hearing, his sight, etc."
10. Hadith qudsi, "I am according to My slave's opinion of Me..."
11. Ref. Qur'an 41:21, "...that your hearing, eyes, and skin should not testify against you."
12. In the grave according to hadith.
13. "He was in the Great Mist with air neither above nor below it. "Hadith in Ibn Majah, Ibn Hanbal and at-Tirmidhi.
14. Hadith qudsi from Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim: "Our Lord who is blessed and exalted descends every night to the lowest heavens when two-thirds of the night has passed and says, 'Who supplicates to me so that I may answer him?"
15. Qur'an 6:3, "He is Allah in the heavens and the earth."
16. cf. Qur'an 57:4.
17. Qur'an: 2:255.
18. cf. Qur'an 85:3.
19. i.e. have taqwa.
20. Lubb means both the core of a thing and or understanding.
21. Hadith in Muslim (Belief, 302) about the Day of Rising.

11: The Seal of the Wisdom of Revelation (Futuh) (1) in the Word of Salih

Among the signs are the signs of the mounts. (2)
That is due to the difference in destinations.
Among those with mounts are those
who make their mounts stand by the command of Allah,
and among them are those who cross
the deserts with their mounts.
As for those who stand,
they are the people of the source, (3)
and those who cross the deserts are the aliens.
Each of these has the revelation (futuh) of the Unseen worlds
brought to him from Allah on every side.

Know, may Allah grant you success, that the business (of bringing into existence) is based on uniqueness (fardiyya), and uniqueness has triplicity which is from three and upwards. Three is the first singular. The universe exists from this Divine Presence. Allah, may He be exalted!, says, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, 'Be' and it is." (16:40) This is an essence which has volition and speech. (4) Had it not been for this essence and its volition, which is connecting attention to something particular in order to bring anything into being (and when He turns to that thing, He says, "Be"), that thing would not have been. Then tripartite uniqueness also appeared in that thing, and it is by this uniqueness in respect to the thing that it is valid that it take and that it be described by existence. Its triplicity is its thingness, its hearing, and obeying the command of the One who gives it form by bringing it into existence. It accepted three by the threeness of its fixed essence when it was in the state of its non-existence in counterbalance to the essence of the One who brought it into existence. Its hearing is in counterbalance to the volition of the One who brought it into existence. Its agreeing to comply with the command to take form is in counterbalance to His word "'Be!' and it is." Taking form is thus related to the thing. If it not had the capacity to take form from within itself when this is said, it would not have been. Allah only brought the thing into existence after it was not in the command of taking form, by the thing itself.

Allah confirmed that taking-form (takwin) belongs to the thing itself, not to Allah; and that that which belongs to Allah is His command. Similarly, He told us about Himself when He said, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, "Be!" and it is." He ascribed taking-form to the thing itself from the command of Allah. Allah speaks the truth, so this is understood in the command itself. Someone who is feared and not disobeyed commands His slave: "Stand!" and the slave stands in obedience to his master's command. When this slave stands, the master only has the command to the slave to stand. Standing is the slave's action, not the master's action.

Thus taking-form is based on triplicity, i.e. from three, on both sides the side of Allah and the side of creation. That applies to bringing meanings into existence by proofs. The proof must be compounded of three in a special structure and special condition. There must be a result from it. The result is that the thinker constructs his proof from two propositions. Each one proposition contains two singulars, and so it four. One of the four is repeated in the two propositions in order to link one to the other as is marriage. It is three and no more because of one is repeated in both of them. That is how it is the goal exists. Then this compound occurs

in a special aspect which is that the two propositions are connected to each other by the repetition of that one singular, by which triplicity, and the special condition that the principle be more general by cause or equal to it, is valid. Then the principle is true. If it is not like that, then it will give a result which is not true. This existent thing in the universe is like the ascription of actions to the slave, removed from their ascription to Allah, or the ascribing of taking form, the object of our discussion, to Allah absolutely. But Allah only ascribed it to the thing which was told, "Be!" A representation of that is if we wish to prove that the universe exists from a cause, (5) we say that every thing which is in-time has a cause. (6) Thus we have the in-time and the cause. Then in the other proposition we say that the universe is in time. The "in-time" is repeated in the two propositions. The third singular is "the universe". From this it follows that the universe has a cause and the conclusion appears in what was mentioned in the first proposition - that is the cause.

The special aspect is the repetition of the "in-time", and the special condition is the generality of the cause ('illa) because the cause is what effects the existence of the in-time. The principle is general in the in-timeness of the universe in relation to Allah.

We therefore make the judgement that every being which is "in-time" has a cause, i.e. in the greater proposition, unless that cause is equal to the principle or the principle is more general than the cause. So the universe would thus fall under the principle of the cause [in both cases]. The result is true.

The principle of triplicity also appears in bringing meanings into existence, which makes use of proofs. The root of phenomenal being is triplicity. For this reason, the wisdom of Salih, peace be upon him, is what Allah manifested in the delay of three days when He promised to punish the people of Salih, and the promise was kept. The truth was the result, and it was the Cry by which Allah destroyed them, and "morning found them lying flattened in their homes." (11:67) On the first of the three days, the faces of the people became yellow, and on the second day red, and on the third day black. When the three days had passed, their predisposition was proved and corruption appeared in them. That manifestation was called "destruction".

The yellowing of the faces of the wretched is in counterbalance to the shining of the faces of the happy in the words of Allah, "Some faces on that day will be radiant (musfira)" (80:38) which comes from sufur, when the dawn becomes white. This is a manifestation as the yellowing of the faces on the first day was the manifestation of the sign of the wretchedness of Salih's people. Then came the counterbalance offered to His word about the happy, "laughing".(80:39) Laughter is one of the causes which produces redness in the face. Among the happy, it is the cheeks which are red.

Then He made the complexion of the wretched turn black as a counterbalance to His word, "joyous (mustabshira)". (7) That is the effect that joy has on their skins as black effected the skins of the wretched. For this reason, He spoke of the two groups with good news (bushra). He spoke a word to them which affected their skin (bashara) which turned a colour by which skin had not been described before this event. Allah said in regarding the happy, "Their Lord gives them the good news of His mercy and good pleasure," (9:21) and He said about the wretched, "Give them the news of a painful punishment." (9:34) There was an effect on the skin of each group because of the effect of the discourse on them. It only appeared in them outwardly by virtue of the understanding which was fixed inside them. So it is them who have that effect on themselves just as taking form only comes from them. "Allah's is the

conclusive argument." (6:149) Whoever understands this wisdom and confirms it in himself and witnesses it, gives his self rest from connection to other. He knows that good and evil only come from him. By good, I mean what agrees with his goal and suits his nature and temperament. By evil, I mean what does not agree with his goal or suit his nature and temperament. The one who possesses this witnessing makes out excuses for all existent beings, even if they do not make excuses. He knows that all he has for himself is from himself, as we mentioned at the beginning, since knowledge follows the known. When something which does not agree with his goal comes to him, he tells himself, "Clench your fists and puff out your cheeks!" "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 11:

1. Opening. Salih has this in view of the fact that the mountain split open to reveal the she-camel, he opened belief to those who believed in him. The camel is a mount.
2. Mounts which are miracles proving the truthfulness of the Prophets - like the Buraq of Muhammad and the she-camel of Salih.
3. Eyewitnessing.
4. i.e. a triplicity: Essence, volition, and speech (qawl).
5. Here he uses sabab, something by which something is brought about, rather than 'illa, which is something which alters or effects something, as in cause and effect. 'Illa is the reason behind judicial reasoning.
6. First proposition.
7. Comes from a root meaning skin (bashara), the root of bashshara, to give good news, is to announce something which produces a change in the complexion.

12: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Heart in the Word of Shu'ayb (Jethro)

Know that the heart of the gnostic of Allah is from the mercy of Allah, and it is vaster than mercy. The heart encompasses Allah, but His Mercy does not encompass Him. (1) This is the language of the general public from the door of indication (ishara). Allah is merciful (rahim) and is not the one to whom mercy is shown (marhum). Mercy has no power over Him. As for the indication from the tongue of the elite, Allah describes Himself by the breath which is from breathing. The Divine Names are the same as the Named, and the breath is none other than Him. They require what they give the breath of realities, so the realities which the Names demand are not other than the universe. Thus divinity (ulûhîya) demands the object of worship (ma'luh) and sovereignty (rubûbiya) demands the object of lordship (marbub). (2) They have no source except by the universe in existence and determination (taqdir). Allah, in respect to His essence, is independent of the universe, but sovereignty does not possess this principle. The matter remains between what the sovereignty demands and what the essence deserves of independence from the universe. Sovereignty is based on reality and the description is only the same as this essence.

Then the matter changes according to the relationships. It is reported that Allah only describes Himself with compassion for His slaves. The first of what was breathed from sovereignty by Himself is related to the Merciful by His bringing into being the universe, which sovereignty demands by its reality and all the Divine Names. By this aspect it is confirmed that "His mercy encompasses everything." (3) It encompasses Allah. It is wider than the heart or equal to it in capacity.

Know that Allah, as it is confirmed in sound tradition, changes in the forms of the tajalli. When the heart contains Allah, it does not contain other-than-Him of creatures along with Him. It is as if He filled it, and the meaning of this is, that when it looks to Allah in His tajalli to it, it is not possible to look at another with Him.

The heart of the gnostic in respect to vastness is as Abu Yazid al-Bistami said, "If the Throne and what surrounds it a million times over were in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he still would not feel it." Al-Junayd said about this meaning, "If the in-time were compared to the out-of-time, not a trace of it would remain." The heart encompasses the out-of-time, so how can it sense the in-time as existent? If Allah varies His tajalli in forms, then by necessity, the heart is expanded and contracted according to the form in which the divine tajalli occurs. There is nothing left in the heart apart from the form in which the tajalli occurs. So in relation to the seal, the heart of the gnostic or the Perfect Man, is at the stage of the place that is the face of the seal. It does not exceed it, rather it is its size and shape in respect to roundness. The face is round, square, hexagonal, octagonal, etc. in form. If the face is square, hexagonal, octagonal or whatever form, its place in relation to the seal is like it and it is not like other than it.

This is the opposite of what one group alluded to, saying that Allah gives a tajalli according to the predisposition of the slave. This is not how it is. The slave is manifest to Allah according to the form in which Allah gives him a tajalli of Himself.

The exact clarification of this question is that Allah has two tajalli: an unseen tajalli and a visible tajalli. From the unseen tajalli He accords the predisposition on which the heart is

based, and it is the tajalli of the Essence of which the Unseen is the reality. It is the He-ness which merits it by His word from Himself: "He". His He-ness is always He. If this predisposition comes to the heart, then the visible tajalli is manifested to it in the Visible world, so the heart sees it. He is manifest by the form of whatever tajalli he has, as we mentioned. Allah gives it the predisposition by His word, "He gave everything its creation, then guided it." (20:50) Then He lifted the veil between Him and His slave, so He sees Him in the form of his belief in Allah. Allah, who is in the belief, is He whose form the heart contains. He is the One who gives it a tajalli, and so it knows Him. The eye only sees by belief, not hidden in the varieties of belief.

Whoever limits Allah, denies Allah in other than what he limits Allah to, and confirms Allah in what he limits Him by, when Allah gives him a tajalli. Whoever frees Allah from limitation does not deny Allah, and so confirms Allah in every form in which Him changes. He is given from himself according to the form in which the tajalli infinitely occurs. The forms of the tajalli are without end. Similarly knowledge of Allah has no limit in the gnostic who understands the forms. Rather, he is a gnostic at every moment, seeking increase of knowledge by "Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge!" (4)

The business is endless from both sides. This is as if you said: Allah and creation. If you looked at His words, "I am his foot by which he runs, and his hand with which he strikes and his tongue by which he speaks," and so on of the faculties whose location are the limbs which are not separate, then you said that the matter is all Allah or the matter is all creation. It is creation by one ascription and it is Allah by another ascription, yet the source is one. The source of the form is what gives the tajalli of the source of the form which did not exist before the tajalli. It is the one giving the tajalli and the one receiving it. See how wondrous is the command of Allah in respect to His He-ness and in respect to His relationship to the universe in the realities of His most Beautiful Names!

Who is He and what is He and what is His source?

He is He!

Whoever is of His commonality is of His elite,
and whoever is of His elite is of His commonality.

There is no source except source,
so the light of His source is His darkness.

Whoever is ignorant of this
experiences grief in himself

And none recognises what we have said
except for the slave who has aspiration (himma).

He said, "There is a reminder in that for anyone who has a heart," (50:37) because the heart (qalb) is transformed (taqallaba) in the various forms and attributes. He did not say, "to him who has an intellect" because the intellect limits. (5) It confines the matter to a single description, but reality refuses to be contained. It is also a reminder for those who have intellect, and they are those who have creeds by which some deny others, and some curse others, and they do not have helpers. (6) The god of the one with a creed does not have jurisdiction over the god of someone with another creed. The one who has a creed defends it; he defends the matter which he believes of his god, and supports it. He does not support that which is not in his creed. For this reason, he has no effect on the creeds of his dissenters, and similarly his dissenters have no help from the god who is in his creed; so they have no

helpers. Allah excluded help from the divinity of creed based on the isolation of one creed to the exclusion of others. The helped is gathered and the helper is gathered.

For the gnostic, Allah is the Recognised Who is not denied. The people of recognition in this world are the people of recognition in the Next World. This is why Allah said, "anyone who has a heart (qalb)" (50:37) since he knows the transformation (taqlib) of Allah in forms by the transformation in shape. He recognises himself from himself. His self is not other than the He-ness of Allah. There is nothing in phenomenal being from what is, or what will be, which is other than the He-ness of Allah. Rather, He is the source of He-ness. So He is the gnostic and the knower and the acknowledger in this form. He is the one who is neither gnostic nor knower. He is also the one who denies Him in the other form. This is the portion of the one who knows Allah from the tajalli and the witnessing in the source of gatheredness (jam'). It is His word, "anyone who has a heart" which transforms the shapes by His transforming.

As for the people of belief (iman), they are the ones who imitate those who imitated the Prophets and Messengers in what they transmitted from Allah. They are not those who imitate the people of concepts and those who interpret the transmissions received by basing them on their logical proofs. These are the ones who imitate the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace. They are the ones who are meant by His words, "or listens well" (50:37) to what divine transmissions relate of the sunna of the Prophets. He means this is the one who "will listen well, having seen the evidence" (50:37) with awareness of the presence of the imagination and its use.

That is what the Prophet said about ihsan, "Worship Allah as if you saw Him," (7 and "Allah is in the qibla of the one who prays." (8) For that reason, he is a witness. Anyone who imitates the people of logical speculation and is limited by them is not the one who will listen well. The one who will listen well must witness what we have mentioned. When he does not witness what we have mentioned, he is not the one meant by this ayat. These are those of whom Allah has said, "When those who were followed disown those who followed them." (2:166) The Messengers do not disown their followers who follow them.

Realise, my friend, what I have mentioned to you in this wisdom of the heart. As for its specification with Shu'ayb, there is some branching off (tash'ib). Its branches are not numbered because every creed has a branch, and so they are all branches or creeds. If the covering is removed, it is removed for everyone in accordance with his creed. The covering might be removed in a manner contrary to his creed in principle. It is His words, "What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with." (39:47) Most of them in principle are like the Mu'tazilites, believing that Allah will execute the threat on the rebel should he die without repentance. If he dies and is given mercy from Allah, then concern preceded it, for He did not punish him. Thus he found Allah Ever-Forgiving, All-Merciful, and there appeared to him from Allah something he did not reckoned with.

As for He-ness (huwiya), some people are firm in their belief that Allah is such-and-such. When the covering is removed, they see the form of their belief, and it is true. They believe in it. Then the knot is unravelled and the creed vanishes and becomes knowledge through contemplation (mushahada). After vision is sharpened, weak vision does not return. It appeared to some people by the variety of the tajalli in forms through vision, since the tajalli is not repeated. He verifies it in he-ness; and there appeared to them from Allah in Allah's He-ness what they never reckoned with before the covering was removed. (9)

We mentioned the form of the ascent in divine recognitions after death in our Book of the Tajalliyat, in which we mentioned what we gathered from the group regarding unveiling, and the benefits we derived from them in the question that they did not know about. One of the most wondrous of matters is that man is always in ascent, but is not aware of that due to the fineness of the veil and its delicateness. It is like His words, "They were only given a simulation of it." (2:25)

He, the One, is not the same as the Last. Therefore the two semblances with the gnostic are similar dissimilars. The one possessed of realisation sees multiplicity in One, as he knows what the Divine Names indicate. Although their realities differ and are numerous, it is yet One Source. It is an intelligible multiplicity in the source of One. In the tajalli, it is multiplicity witnessed in the one source even as it matter which you obtain in the definition of each form. It and the multiplicity of forms and their variety derive, in fact, from one substance (jawhar). It is its own matter (hayula). Whoever recognises himself with this recognition recognises his Lord. Allah is in His creation due to His form, rather He is the source of its he-ness and its reality.

For this reason, the only ones among the 'ulama' who tumble on the recognition of the self (nafs) and its reality are the divinely inspired messengers and the great among the Sufis. As for the philosophers and masters of thought among the ancients and the mutakallimun in their discourse on the self and its whatness, none of them stumbled on its reality, and logical speculation can never provide it. (10) He who seeks knowledge of it by means of logical speculation, swells himself up and boasts without vigour or substance. "They are those whose efforts in the life of this world are misguided while they suppose that they are doing good." (18:104) He who seeks the matter by other than its path will not achieve its realization.

How excellent is what Allah said about the universe - He changes it with the breaths into a new creation in one source. He said in respect to some, rather to most of the world, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) This means that they do not know the renewal of the command in breaths. However, the Ash'arites stumbled on it in some existent things, and these are non-essentials (a'râd). The Hisbaniya (11) stumbled on it regarding the entire universe. The logical philosophers consider them ignorant of it. However, the two groups erred. As for the error of the Hisbaniya, in spite of what they said regarding change in the entire universe, they did not stumble on the oneness of the source of the intelligible substance (jawhar) which underlies the form. The universe only exists by the oneness, as the oneness is only intelligible by the universe. If they had said that, they would have obtained the degree of realisation in the matter.

As for the Ash'arites, they do not know that the entire universe consists of a collection of non-essentials (a'râd). It changes in every moment since accidents do not last for two moments. That appears in their definition of things. So when they defined the thing, its phenomenal being is clear in the definition of non-essential matters. These non-essentials mentioned in its definition are actually the source of this independent substance and its reality. Inasmuch as it is a non-essential, it is not independent, but by the sum of what is not independent, comes what is independent. It is like occupation of space in the definition of the independent essential substance, and its acceptance is non-essential in its essential definition. There is no doubt that that the containing-of-form is an accident since it is only in the container, and that is not independent it is in the essential nature of the substance. Occupation of space is a non-essential, and it only occurs in the thing occupying space, and so it is not independent. Occupation of space and containing-of-form are not based on the source of the

defined substance by an extra matter, since essential

definitions are the source of the defined and its he-ness.

That which does not last two moments becomes that which lasted two moments or indeed several moments! What was not independent became independent in their view! They do not understand the basis of this, and these people "are dubious about the new creation."

As for the people of unveiling, they see Allah in a tajalli of Himself in every breath, and there is no repetition of the tajalli. They also see by witnessing that every tajalli grants a new creation and takes away a creation. Thus its departure is annihilation in the presence of the tajalli, and it is going-on by what the other tajalli grants. So understand!

Notes to Chapter 12:

1. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My earth nor My heaven contain Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."
2. lit. "god-ed" and "Lord-ed".
3. cf. Qur'an 7:156.
4. Ref Qur'an 20:114: "Say, 'My Lord, increase me in knowledge!'"
5. The root meaning from which intellect ('aql) comes means to hobble a camel.
6. ref to Qur'an 29:25, "You have adopted idols apart from Allah as tokens of mutual affection in this world. But then on the Day of Rising you will reject one other and curse one another. The Fire will be your shelter. You will have no helpers."
7. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari.
8. Hadith in al-Bukhari.
9. Ref. Qur'an 39:47, "If those who did wrong were to possess all that If those who did wrong owned everything on earth, and the same again with it, they would offer it as a ransom to save themselves from the evil of the punishment on the Day of Rising. What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with. them from Allah that they never reckoned with."
10. Being veiled by limitation.
11. The Hisbaniya were sophists, a group known in the history of philosophy for doubts, scepticism and sophism who held that the universe changes at every moment since there is no objective Reality. All is subjective.

13: The Seal of the Wisdom of Power (Malk) in the Word of Lut (Lot)

Malk is power and force, and the strong man with power says, "I have power over the kneading, since I am forceful in kneading it." When the poet, Qays ibn al-Hatim, described his attack with a spear in verse, he said:

I have power over it
and so I made its rupture wide,
and you see standing under it what was behind it.

That is to say that he used enough force in the thrust. It was what Allah said regarding Lut, peace be upon him, "If only I had the power to combat you, or could take refuge in some powerful support!" (11:80) The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Allah showed mercy to my brother Lut, and he took refuge in a powerful support." So the Prophet said that Lut was with Allah who is strong. It was Allah whom Lut, peace be upon him, meant by the strong pillar, and resistance when he said, "If only I had the power". Here it is aspiration (himma) in relation to man in particular.

The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "From that time, the time in which Lut, peace be upon him, said, 'or could take refuge in some powerful support,' after that, Prophets have only been sent with some power from their people." His tribe protected him as Abu Talib protected the Messenger of Allah. His words, "If only I had the power to combat you" is because he heard Allah say, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning," (30:54) by origin, "and then after weakness, gave you strength." Strength is by appointing, and it is non-essential strength. "Then after strength ordained weakness and grey hair." Appointing is connected to grey hair. As for weakness, it returns to the basis of its creation as He said, "He created you from a weak beginning." Allah returns him to that from which He created him, as He says, "then some of you revert to the lowest form of life that, so after having knowledge, they may know nothing at all." (16:70) Allah mentions that he returns to the first weakness. The old man is judged to be as weak as the child is. A Prophet is only sent after he has reached the age of forty. It is the time which is the beginning of decrease and weakness. For this reason, Lut said, "If only I had the power to combat you," although that demands effective aspiration (himma). If you were to ask: "What prevents him from using effective aspiration while it is present in the wayfarers (sâlikûn) among the followers when the Messengers are more entitled to that?" you spoke the truth. However, you lack another knowledge, which is that gnosis does not leave the aspiration freedom of action. Whenever gnosis is great, then its freedom of action with the aspiration is weak. That has two reasons one is his realisation of the station of slavery and his regarding the root of his natural creation; (1) and the other reason is the oneness of the actor and the acted upon. The aspiration of a Messenger does not appear, since the latter aspect prevents it.

In this witnessing, he sees that his opponent does not turn from the reality on which he is based in the state of his source-form and the state of his non-existence. He only appears in existence through what he had in the state of non-existence by his source-form. He does not overstep his reality nor does he abandon his path. That is called dissent; yet it is a non-essential matter manifested by the veil which is over the eyes of the people, as Allah says, "but most people do not know." They know what is manifest and outward of the life of this world, but they are ignorant of the Next life. It is the other way round, so it is from their

words, "our hearts are veiled," (2) that is, in coverings. It is a covering which veils them from perceiving the matter for what it is. This and its like prevent the gnostic from acting freely in the world.

Shaykh Abu 'Abdullah ibn al-Qa'id said to Shaykh Abu's-Su'ud ibn ash-Shibli, "Why do you not act freely?" Abu's-Su'ud replied, "I have left Allah to act for me as He wishes." He meant the command of Allah, "so take Him as your Guardian." (73:9) The Guardian is the one with freedom of action, especially as He heard Allah saying, "Give of that to which He has made you successors (khalifs)." (57:7) Abu's-Su'ud knew, and the gnostics know that the command which he has is not his, and he is only a successor to it. Allah told him, "this command is the deen to which I have you successors and over which I have given you power, so take Me for a guardian in it," Abu's-Su'ud obeyed the command of Allah and took Him for a Guardian.

How can there remain any aspiration for the one who witnesses the like of this command? Aspiration (himma) only acts by the property of concentration that which its possessor does not have, and acts on other than his concentration. This gnosis separates him from that property of concentration. The complete gnosis manifests gnosis at the end of incapacity and weakness. One of the Abdal (3) said to Shaykh 'Abdu'r-Razzaq, (4) "After you greet Shaykh Abu Madyan, (5) tell him, 'O Abu Madyan! Why is nothing difficult for us, yet things are difficult for you, and we long for your station and you do not long for ours?'" Similarly, although Abu Madyan had that station as well as the other, we are more complete than him in the station of weakness and incapacity. His badl said this to him; he did not say it.

The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said that this station is from the command of Allah to him: "I do not know what He will do to me or you. I only follow what is revealed to me." The Messenger acts according to what is revealed to him. He does not have anything else. If He reveals to him that he should act by ordinance, he acts. If he is prevented from acting, he does not act. The best part of choice is to abandon freedom of action unless the person is deficient in gnosis.

Abu's-Su'ud ash-Shibli said to his believing companions, "Allah gave us freedom of action fifteen years ago, and we abandoned it through politeness." This is the language of conceit. As for us, we did not abandon it through politeness, for abandoning would imply preference. Rather, we abandoned it by the perfection of gnosis. Gnosis does not oblige it on the strength of choice. When the gnostic acts by aspiration in the world, it is from divine command and compulsion, not by choice.

There is no doubt that the station of the Messenger demands freedom of action for the acceptance of the Message which he brings. Allah informs him of what will be accepted in his community and among his people in order to manifest the deen of Allah. The wali is not like that. Nevertheless, the Messenger does not seek Him in the manifest, because the Messenger has compassion for his people. He does not want them to exceed by having the proof appear against them because that would entail their destruction. He spares them.

The Messenger also knew that when something inimitable (6) is manifested to the community, some of them believe in it, and some recognise it but deny it out of injustice, arrogance or envy. Some of them attribute it to magic and deception. The Messenger sees that, and he also sees that no one will believe unless Allah illuminates his heart by the light of belief. When the person does not look by that light called belief, the inimitable miracle has no benefit for him. Their aspiration does not seek inimitable matters, since the effect is not

uniform among those who see it, nor is it in their hearts as He said in respect to the most perfect of Messengers and the most knowing of creation and the most truthful in state, "You cannot guide those you would like to but Allah guides those He wills." (28:56)

If aspiration did have an effect, no one would be more perfect than the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, nor have a higher nor stronger aspiration than him, yet even so his aspiration did not bring about Abu Talib, his uncle, becoming Muslim, and it was to the Prophet that the ayat which we mentioned was revealed. Similarly, Allah said of the Messenger, "It is only his to deliver the message." (7) And He said, "You are not responsible for their guidance, but Allah guides whoever He wills," (2:272) and He added in Surat al-Qasas, "He has best knowledge of the guided," (28:56) those to whom knowledge of their guidance was given in the state of their non-existence in their source-forms. It is established that knowledge follows the known. Whoever is a believer in his source-form and in the state of his non-existence, appears in that form in the state of his existence. Allah knew that of him, so that is what he is like. For that reason, Allah said, "He has best knowledge of the guided."

When Allah said the like of that, He also said, "My Word, once given, is not subject to change," (50:29) because My Word is based on My knowledge of My creation. "and I do not wrong My slaves," that is, I do not decree that disbelief (kufr) on them which makes them wretched and then I demand of them what is not in their capacity to do. Rather, We only deal with them according to what We gave them knowledge of, and We only gave them knowledge of what they gave Us from themselves by that on which they are based. So if they do wrong, they are the ones who are unjust. For this reason, He said, "but they wronged themselves. Allah did not wronged them." (8) Finally, We only said to them what Our essence accorded that We say to them. Our Essence is known to Us by what it is based on; so, if We say this, and do not say that, then We only spoke by what We knew to say. We spoke the word from Us, and obedience or lack of obedience is up to those who hear.

So all is from Us and from them, (9)
and acceptance is from Us and from them.
If they are not from Us,
We, without a doubt, are from them.

So,. my friend, realise this wisdom of power in the word of Lut. It is a gate which belongs to gnosis. The secret (10) has been made clear for you, and the command is clear. It is included in the even which is called the odd.

Notes to Chapter 13:

1. Which is weakness, and the slave obeying the command of the Master, as in Qur'an 30:54, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning."
2. Two places: 2:88; 4:155.
3. Abdal, plural of badl, a substitute. Shaykh al-Akbar says, "They are seven. Whoever travels from one place and leaves his body in its form so that no one recognises that he has gone, that one is only a badl. He is modelled on the heart of Ibrahim, peace be upon him."
4. A jurist and one of Abu Madyan's disciples.
5. Abu Madyan: Shu'ayb ibn al-Husayn al-Andalusi, great Maghribi Sufi, born ca. 520/1126 near Seville and died near Tlemcen in 594/1197.
6. Mu'jiza, a miracle performed by a Prophet to prove his truthfulness and which others are

unable to do.

7. Ref. Qur'an 5:99 and several other places.

8. 2:57, 9:70, etc. in many places in the Qur'an.

9. The apparent sources. The Word is from him and obedience from them.

10. The secret of the Decree.

14: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Decree (Qadar) in the Word of 'Uzayr (Ezra)

Know that fate (qada') is the judgement of Allah on things, and Allah's judgement on things is according to His knowledge in them and of them. The knowledge of Allah in things is based on that which known things accord Him of what they are in themselves. The decree (qadar) is the timing of how things are in their source without increase. (1) Fate is only decreed for things by themselves. This is the source of the secret of the Decree for the one who has a heart or gives ear. He is a witness "Allah's is the conclusive argument." (6:149)

Properly speaking, the judge (hâkim) studies the source of the question which he judges according to what its essence demands. The one sentenced to what is due him is, in fact, a judge over the judge when he sentences him to that. Every "judge" is sentenced to what he sentences, and in it he is the judge, whoever he is. Grasp this question! The decree is only unknown by the force of its appearance. It is not recognised, so there is much seeking and earnest request in it.

Know that the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, inasmuch as they are Messengers not inasmuch as they are awliya' and gnostics are in ranks according to that on which their communities are based. They only have the knowledge with which they were sent, according to what the community of that Messenger needs, no more and no less. Communities differ, some have more need than others, so Messengers differ in the knowledge of the message just as their communities differ. It is what Allah said: "Those Messengers: We favoured some of them over others." (2:253)

In the same way, they also differ in what springs from their essences, peace be upon them, in the varieties of knowledges and judgements they have according to their predispositions. This is what Allah said: "We have preferred some of the Prophets over others." (17:55) And Allah said in respect of creation, "Allah has favoured some of you over others in provision." (16:71) Provision from Allah can be spiritual like knowledges and sensory like food. Allah "only sent it down in a known measure." (15:21) It is the due which creation seeks. Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) He sends down according to what He wills. (2) He only wills what He knows, and so He commands it. What He knows is as we have stated. It is only by what the known accords.

Timing basically belongs to the known. Fate, knowledge, will and volition follow the Decree. So Allah only gives the understanding of the secret of the decree in respect to knowledges to the one who has been given complete gnosis. Knowledge gives complete rest to the knower, and it gives painful punishment to the knower as well. It gives two opposites. By knowledge, Allah describes Himself with both wrath and pleasure, and by knowledge the Divine Names are opposite one another. A reality (3) governs the absolute existent and the limited existent. It is not possible that there be something more complete than it or stronger or greater than it, because of the universality of its jurisdiction, both limited and unlimited.

The Prophets, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, only take their own knowledges from a particular divine revelation. Their hearts are free of logical speculation because they know the limitations of the intellect in respect to its cognitive perception. The intellect is unable to perceive matters for what they really are. Simple communication is also unable to perceive that which is only accorded by taste (dhawq). Perfect knowledge remains only in the

divine tajalli and in what Allah removes of veils from the springs of the inner sight and the eyes. They perceive matters - their non-time and in-time, their non-existence and existence, their impossibility, necessity and possibility - for what they truly are in their realities and sources.

Since the request of 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, occurred on the elite path, censure fell on him as is related in tradition. (4) Had he sought the unveiling which we mentioned, perhaps censure in that would not have fallen on him. The proof of the simplicity of his heart is in his statement, "How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?" (2:259) His form, peace be upon him, is in this statement of his, as the form of Ibrahim is in His words, "Show me how You bring the dead to life." (2:260) That necessitates the response by the action which Allah manifested when He said, "Allah caused him to die a hundred years, then He brought him back to life," and He said, "Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh." So he saw how bodies grow with the witnessing of realisation. He showed him how it was. He asked about the decree which is only perceived by unveiling to things in the state of their permanence in their non-existence. That was not granted. That is one of the properties of divine cognisance, so it is impossible that any except Allah know it. They are the keys of the First (5) the keys of the unseen which only He knows. Allah informs only those slaves whom He wills on such matters.

Know that they are only called keys in the state of opening. (6) The state of opening is the state of connecting taking-form to things, or rather the state of connecting the decree to the decreed. None has any taste in that except Allah. Neither tajalli nor unveiling occur in it since only Allah has power and action in view of the fact that He has absolute existence which is unlimited.

When we saw that Allah censured 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, when he asked about the Decree, we knew that 'Uzayr was seeking this cognisance. Thus he was seeking to possess the power (qudra) which is connected to the decreed (maqdur). That is only claimed by the One Who has absolute existence. Thus he sought the impossible. How-things-are is only perceived by taste.

As for what we relate of what Allah revealed to him, "If you do not desist, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood," it means I will remove the path of transmission from you and give you matters based on tajalli. Tajalli only occurs according to what you have of the predisposition by which the perception of taste occurs. You know that you only perceive according to your predisposition. You look at this matter which you are seeking. If you do not see it, you know that you do not have the predisposition which it requires. That is one of the properties of the Divine Essence. You have learned that Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) So if He did not give you this particular predisposition, then it is not your creation. If it had been your creation, then Allah, who informed you that "He gives everything its created for," would have given it to you. It is you who desist from this sort of question in yourself. There is no need for any other prohibition. This is a mark of concern Allah showed to 'Uzayr, peace be upon him. He knew that from his own knowledge and was ignorant of that from his own ignorance.

Know that wilaya (7) is the universal encompassing sphere. This why it is not intersected, and so it is informed about things. As for the prophethood of law-giving and the Message, it is intersected, and it was cut off in Muhammad, peace be upon him. There will be no Prophet after him, either giving law or bound by law. There is no Messenger after him, and he is the

lawgiver. This hadith (8) is a fragment of the manifestation of the awliya' of Allah, because it contains the cutting off of the taste of complete perfect slavery, so the name of slavery, which is particular to it, was not used. The slave does not want to share with his Lord, who is Allah, in the same name. Allah is not called "prophet" or "messenger." However, He is called Wali and is described by that name. (9) Allah says, "Allah is the Wali of those who believe," (2:257) and He says, "He is the Wali, the Praiseworthy." (42:28) This name, "wali", continues to be applied to the slaves of Allah both in this world and the Next. A name which is particular to the slave and not to Allah no longer remains since prophethood and the message have been cut off.

"Allah is gentle to His slaves," (42:19) so they still have the general prophethood in which there is no law (shari'a), and they still have the law in striving in the confirmed ordinances. They still have heirs in the laws. The Prophet said, "The 'ulama' (men of knowledge) are the heirs of the Prophets." (10) The only inheritance here is that they strive with the ordinances, and so they legislate them.

If you see a Prophet speaking a language outside the simple ordinances of the Shari'a, that is due to the fact that he is a wali and a gnostic. For this reason, his station in respect to his being a man of knowledge and a wali is more perfect and complete than it is due to the fact that he is a Messenger or someone who legislates and has a Shari'a. If you hear one of the People of Allah speaking, or it is related to you that he said, "Wilaya is higher than prophethood," that speaker only means what we mentioned. Or if he says that the wali is above the Prophet or the Messenger, he means in the same person. He is the Messenger, and inasmuch as he is a wali, he is more complete than he is by simply being a Prophet. It does not mean that the wali who follows him is higher than him. The follower never overtakes the followed in that in which he follows him. If he had overtaken him, then he would not be his follower. So understand that!

The starting point of the Messenger or Prophet who brings a Shari'a is wilaya and knowledge. Do you not see that Allah commanded him to seek increase of knowledge, not increase of anything other than it? Allah commanded him, "Say: 'Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" ((20:114) This means: you know that the Shari'a consists of making certain deeds obligatory and prohibiting certain actions. These actions take place in this world, so they come to an end. Wilaya is not like that. If it had been cut off, it would have been cut off in respect to itself just as the message is cut off in respect to itself. If it had been cut off, it would not still have a name. Wali is a name which Allah will continue to have. (11) This belongs to the slaves by following a model, realisation and attachment. (12)

He told 'Uzayr, "If you do not desist from asking about how the decree is, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood. The business will come to through unveiling by tajalli and the name "prophet" and "messenger" will vanish from you." Allah will still have his wilaya. The context of the state indicated that this speech came as a threat. Whoever has this state when he is addressed in this fashion, knows that he is threatened with the cutting off of some of the special ranks of wilaya in this abode, since prophethood and the message are a special rank in wilaya based on some of the ranks which wilaya contains. He knows that he is higher than the wali who has neither law-giving prophethood nor the message.

If someone has another state which necessitates that the rank of prophethood be confirmed for him, that then is the promise and not the threat. 'Uzayr's question was accepted because the Prophet is the elite wali. Because of the context, he knows that since the prophet has this

prerogative in wilaya, he cannot engage in what he knows that Allah will dislike him doing. He cannot engage in what he knows it is impossible for him to attain. When these circumstances exist for the one who has them and they are affirmed, then this divine statement, "I will efface your name for the register of prophethood" becomes a promise. Thus it becomes a transmission indicating a lasting rank. It is a lasting rank for the Prophets and Messengers in the Next Abode, which is not a place where a Shari'a is prescribed for any of Allah's creatures after they have entered the Garden or the Fire.

We define that as an entry into the two abodes of the Garden and the Fire. When the Day of Rising begins for the people who lived in the times of the gaps between the Prophets, (13) young children, and madmen, all of them will be gathered on one plain for the establishment of justice, recompense for wrong actions and the rewards for works which are due to the people of the Garden. Then they will be gathered separate from other people on one plain, (14) and a Prophet from the best of them will be sent among them. The Fire will be shown to them. This Messenger sent to these people will bring it, and he will say to them, "I am the Messenger of Allah to you." Some will affirm him and others will deny him. Then he will say to them, "Plunge into this fire. Whoever obeys me will be saved and will enter the Garden. Whoever disobeys me and opposes my command will be destroyed and he will be one of the people of the Fire." Whoever obeys his command and casts himself into this fire will be happy and receive his reward. He will find this fire to be "coolness and peace".(15) Whoever disobeys him deserves the punishment and will enter the Fire and descend into it because of his deed of opposition so that that justice from Allah might be set up among His slaves.

That is like the words of Allah, "Upon the day when legs are bared," (68:42) (16) i.e. for one of the immense matters of the Next World, "and they are called on to prostrate." This is obligation and Shari'a. Some will be able to prostrate and some will not be able to do so. (17) These are the one about whom Allah says, "They are called on to prostrate, but they will not be able to do so," just as some of the slaves cannot obey the command of Allah in this world like Abu Jahl (18) and others. This is according to what remains of the Shari'a in the Next Abode on the Day of Rising before people enter the Garden and the Fire. This is why we have written it down, and praise belongs to Allah, the Wali.

Notes to Chapter 14:

1. Qadar has a specific time and qada' does not. So qadar refers to the particular instances of qada'.
2. Ref. Qur'an, "Were Allah to expand the provision of His slaves, they would act as tyrants on the earth. But He sends down whatever He wills in a measured way." (42:27)
3. The secret of the decree.
4. Qur'an 2:259 "Or the one who passed by a town which had fallen into ruin. He asked, 'How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?' Allah caused him to die a hundred years then brought him back to life. Then He asked, 'How long have you been here?' He replied, 'I have been here a day or part of a day.' He said, 'Not so! You have been here a hundred years. Look at your food and drink it has not gone bad and look at your donkey so We can make you a Sign for all mankind. Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh.'" According to 'Ali, Ibn Jarir, Ibn 'Abbas, al-Hasan and Qatada, that is 'Uzayr.
5. The realities of sources.
6. Miftah, key, comes from the root, fath, opening.
7. According to the commentator, wilaya is annihilation in Allah, and Allah encompassed all, and "All things are passing except His face." (28:88).

8. "I am the Seal of the Messengers."
9. Wali means the friend of Allah, and refers to the gnostic. It is also one of the Divine Names which means the Guardian or the One who manages people's affairs.
10. Al-Bukhari.
11. As Yusuf said about Allah, "...You are my Wali in this world and the Next." (12:101).
12. According to al-Qashani, it is acquired and realised through annihilation in the Divine Attributes and Essence and attached by the going-on (baqa') after annihilation in the station of drawing near.
13. i.e. those who did not have a Prophet to follow.
14. According to the commentator, al-Qashani, the plain on which they are gathered may be as-Sahira, as in the Qur'an (79:14), "But it shall be but a single scare, and behold they are at as-Sahira!" As-Sahira which, according to some, is the earth Allah will create anew on the Day of Rising.
15. As was the case with Ibrahim, Qur'an 21:69.
16. The expression means to get ready for something difficult.
17. This is also reflected in a hadith in al-Bukhari in which the Prophet said, "Our Lord will unveil what is hidden, and every believer, man and woman, will prostrate to Him. Those who prostrated out of eyeservice and reputation in this world will go to prostrate and find their backs rigid."
18. The Prophet's uncle who was a violent opponent of Islam.

15: The Seal of the Wisdom of Prophethood in the Word of 'Isa (Jesus)

He was manifested from the water of Maryam
and the breath of Jibril in the form of man existing from clay.

The spirit was in an essence purified of nature
which it called prison.

For that reason, the spirit stayed in it
for more a thousand years in the designation of time. (1)

A spirit from Allah, no other.

For that reason, he revived the dead and formed the bird from clay.

Since his relation with his Lord is proven,
by it he has effective action in both the higher and lower worlds.

Allah purified his body, and made his spirit pure,
and He made him a model of taking-form.

Know that among the special qualities of the spirits (arwah) is whenever they touch anything life flows into it. This is why the Samiri (2) seized a handful of dust from the track of the messenger, who was Jibril, and he is the Spirit. The Samiri had knowledge of this matter. When he recognised that it was Jibril, he knew that life would flow into whatever he had walked on, so he took a handful of dust (3) from the track of the messenger or he filled his hand or the ends of his fingers, (4) and threw it into the Calf. The Calf made a noise like the sound of a cow mooing. If it had been in another form, the name of that form's sound would have been ascribed to it - as grumbling to the camel, baa-ing to rams, bleating to sheep, and voice or articulation and speech to man. That power from the life which flows in things is called lâhût. The nâsût is the locus on which the spirit is based. The nâsût may be called a spirit by what is based on it.

When the Trusty Ruh, who is Jibril, presented himself to Maryam, peace be upon her, in the form of a "handsome, well-built man", (5) she imagined that he was a man wishing to have intercourse with her. She took refuge with Allah from him with all her being, with the whole of her existence, that Allah might save her from him since she knew that that was among the things which are not permitted. She was given a complete presence with Allah, and it is the meaning-without-form spirit. If Jibril had breathed into her at that moment in this state, 'Isa would have been born in such a manner that no one could tolerate him due to the harshness of his nature which was the state of his mother.

When he said to her, "I am only your Lord's messenger of your Lord so that He can give you a pure boy," she relaxed from that contraction (qabd) and her breast expanded. It was at that time that Jibril breathed 'Isa into her. Jibril conveyed the word of Allah to Maryam as the Messenger conveyed the word of Allah to his community. 'Isa was "His word that He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him." (6) Then appetite filled Maryam. The body of 'Isa was created from the actual water of Maryam and from the imaginary water of Jibril which was infused in the moisture of that breath, since the breath of the living is moist because of the water content in it. So the body of 'Isa is from imaginary water and real water. He emerged in the form of a man in respect to his mother and inasmuch as Jibril had appeared in the form of a man, since taking-form only occurs in the human species according to the normal principle.

'Isa brought the dead to life because he is the Divine Spirit, and bringing to life belongs to

Allah. The breath which 'Isa has is like the breath which Jibril has. The word belongs to Allah. The bringing the dead to life by 'Isa is an actual revival inasmuch as it was manifested from his breath as he was manifested from the form of his mother. His bringing to life is also imagined to be from him, but it actually belongs to Allah. He joined the two by the reality on which he is based even as we said that he is created from imaginary water and actual water. Bringing-to-life is ascribed to him by means of actualisation in one aspect, and by imagination in another aspect. In respect to actualisation, it is said of him that he brings the dead to life. In respect to imagination (tawahhum), it is said that he breathes into it and it becomes a bird by the leave of Allah. (7) The agent is in the prepositional phrase "by Allah's permission", even though He did not breathe into it. It is also possible that the agent is the one who breathes into it. It became a bird as regards physical form. In the same way, 'Isa healed the blind and the lepers.

All was ascribed to 'Isa as being "by Allah's permission." (8) "Permission" (idhn) is an indirect expression, as in His words, "By My permission" (9) and "by the permission of Allah". If the prepositional phrase is connected to breathing, the breather has leave in the breathing, and so it is a bird by the leave of Allah. If the breather breathed not by leave, then the taking form of the bird as a bird is not by the leave of Allah. The agent in that is then the verb "it becomes (yakûn)." If there had not been something real and something imaginary in the matter, then these forms would not have accepted these two aspects. Rather, it has these two aspects because the constitution of 'Isa accords that. 'Isa showed humility to the extent that he prescribed that his community "pay the jizya (10) tax with their hands in a state of willing submission," (11) and that if one of them were slapped on the cheek, he should offer the other cheek to the one who slapped him, and not rise up against him nor seek revenge. This came from his mother's side. Since the woman is lower, she has humility because she is subject to the man legally and physically. The power to bring to life and heal that he had came to him the side of the breath of Jibril in the form of a man. 'Isa brought the dead to life by the form of man. If Jibril had not come in the form of man, but in another of the elemental forms of phenomenal beings from the animals, plants or minerals, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life without taking on that form for that moment and appearing in it. If Jibril had come in a luminous form beyond the elements and natural humours, since luminosity is part of his nature, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life unless he appeared in that form of non-elemental light, while still maintaining the human form in respect of his mother.

When he brought the dead to life, it was said that it was him and not him. The onlookers fell into bewilderment (hayra) just as the man of intellect becomes bewildered in his logical reflection when he sees an individual human being bringing the dead to life, as that is one of the divine qualities - bringing to life with speech, not mere bringing with animation. (12) The beholder is bewildered because he sees the form of a man who possesses a divine effect. That led some of them to speak of that as "incarnation" and say that 'Isa was Allah since it was by Him that 'Isa brought the dead to life. Thus they are charged with disbelief (kufr) which is the veil because they veil Allah, who brings the dead to life, by the human form of 'Isa. Allah said, "They are unbelievers who say, 'Allah is the Messiah, the son of Maryam.'" (13) They fell into both error and disbelief at the end of all they said, not because they say that he is Allah nor by calling him the son of Maryam. But they made the attribution that Allah, insofar as He brought the dead to life, was contained in the human form of the nasut which is called the son of Maryam. There is no doubt that 'Isa was the son of Maryam. The hearer imagines that they have attributed divinity to the form, and so they make divinity the same as the form. That is not what they do. Rather, they make divine He-ness the subject in the human form

which is the son of Maryam. They should differentiate between the form of 'Isa and the divine principle because they have made the form the same as the principle. Jibril was in the form of man who did not breathe and then he breathed. One differentiates between the form and the breath, and the breath from the form. The form existed without the breath - thus the breath is not part of its essential definition. For that reason, differences occurred among the people of different [Christian] parties regarding 'Isa and what he was. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal human form, says that he is the son of Maryam. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal representational form relates him to Jibril. Whoever looks at him in respect to what was manifested from him of bringing the dead to life, relates him to Allah by the quality of the spirit, and says that he is the Spirit of Allah, (14) that is, by Him life was manifested in whomever received his breath. Sometimes Allah is imagined to be the passive principle in 'Isa, and sometimes the angel is imagined in him, and sometimes mortal humanity is imagined in him. So the conception of everyone is based on what predominates that person. 'Isa is the Word of Allah, (15) the Spirit of Allah, (16) and the slave of Allah. (17) That is something which no one else has in the sensory form. Indeed, each person is attached to his father of form, not to the One who breathed his spirit into the human form. When Allah fashioned the human body as He said, "When I have shaped him," (15:29;38:72) then He breathed into Him, that was from His spirit. Thus in its being and source, the spirit is ascribed to Allah. That is not the case with 'Isa. The shaping of his body and mortal form is implied in the breath of the spirit. Others, as we mentioned, are not like that.

All existent things are the words of Allah which are inexhaustible (18) because they are from "kun" and "kun" is the word of Allah. Is the word ascribed to Him according to what He really is? His what-ness is not known. Or is it that Allah descends to the form of the one who says, "kun", and so the word "kun" is the reality of that form to which he descended or in which He is manifest? Some of the gnostics take one side and some take the other side, and some of them are bewildered in the business and do not know. This is a question which can only be recognised by taste (dhawq), as was the case with Abu Yazid al-Bistami when he breathed into the ant which he had killed and it returned to life. He knew in that action by Whom he had breathed, and that was an 'Isawian witnessing. As for the revival of meaning by knowledge, that is the divine life, essential, eternal, sublime, and luminous, about which Allah said, "Is someone who was dead and whom We brought to life, supplying him with a light by which to walk among the people..." (6:123) Whoever gives life to a dead soul by the life of knowledge in a particular problem connected to knowledge of Allah, has brought him to life by it, and it is "a light for him by which he walks among the people, i.e. among his likes in form.

Were it not for Him and not for us,
that which is would not have been.
I worship Him in truth,
and Allah is our Master.
I am his source so know!
If you said, "man,"
Then do not be veiled by "man".
He has given you a proof.
So be Allah and be creation,
and you will be merciful by Allah.
Feed His creation through Him,
and you will be spirit and sweet scent.
We give Him what appeared by Him in us,

and He gave to us.
The command is apportioned between Him and us.
My heart was given life by the One who knew it
when He gave us sensory life.
At that time (before time),
we were beings, sources and times in Him.
That did not endure in us, but that gave us life.

Part of what proves what we mentioned concerning the breath (nafkh) of the spirit with the elemental form is that Allah has described Himself by the "breath of the All-Merciful". Everyone described by an attribute must follow the attribute and all that attribute demands of him. You realise that breath is necessary for the one who breathes. For that reason, the divine breath accepts the forms of the universe. It is like the primordial substance, (19) which is not other than the source of nature.

The elements are one of the forms of nature, and what is above the elements and what issues from them are also part of the forms of nature. They are sublime spirits going right up to the seven heavens. As for the spirits of the seven heavens and their sources, they are elemental, so they issue from the vapour of the elements. The angels from every heaven are from the elements, so they are made from the elements, and there are no beings of nature above them. For this reason, Allah described them with dispute, (20) i.e. the Highest Assembly, because nature has polarisation. Polarisation is that which is in the Divine Names, and they are ascriptions given by the "breath of the All-Merciful." Do you not see how the Essence is not subject to this principle, and that it is independent of the worlds? This is why the world appeared in the form of the One who brought it into being, and it is not other than the divine breath.

The divine breath ascends by what it has of heat, and descends by what it has of humidity and cold, and fixes itself and solidifies by what it has of dryness. Thus precipitation comes from cold and humidity. Do you not see that when the doctor wants to give someone a remedy, he looks at his water (urine) in a long-necked bottle? If he sees precipitation, he knows that the digestion is complete. He gives the remedy to speed progress. The precipitation is produced by his natural coldness and humidity.

Then Allah kneaded the clay of this human person with "His two hands." These are opposite to each other. Even though each of these two hands may be a right hand, the distinction between them is not hidden. They are only two in themselves - two hands because He only causes effects in nature according to what is in conformity with it. Nature consists of opposites, so He said "two hands". Then He brought man into existence with two hands, and called him man (bashar). (21) This refers to the direct contact (mubashara) of the two hands as befits the Divine Presence. That arises from His concern for this human species. Then Allah said to the one who refused to prostrate himself before Adam, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My Own Hands? Were you overcome with arrogance (towards the one who is your like, made of the elements) or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) meaning those who are above the elements. "You are not like that."

By the exalted, (22) He means those who, by their essence, are above being elemental by their luminous constitution, even though they are part of nature. Man is only better than the other species by virtue of his being made of clay (bashar). He is the best species of all that was created from the elements by direct contact with the two hands. So in rank, man is above

the terrestrial and celestial angels, although the lofty angels are better than the human species according to a divine text. (23)

If anyone wishes to recognise the divine breath (nafas), let him recognise the universe, because "whoever knows himself knows his Lord" (24) who is manifest in him. The universe was manifested in the breath of the Merciful which Allah breathed from the Divine Names. They brought the manifestation of their effects into existence from the non-manifestation of their effects. He was generous to Himself by what He brought into existence in Himself. The first effect of the breath took place in that Presence. Then the command continued to descend (25) by breathing out from the universal to the last of what Allah brought into existence.

All is contained in the source of the breath,
like light is contained in the essence of darkness
at the end of the night before daylight.
Knowledge comes by proof at the end of the day
for the one who is sleepy.
He sees what I have said as a dream which indicates the breath,
And it gives him relief from every grief.
In the recitation of the Qur'an, it is, "He frowned." (26)
He has given a tajalli of Himself
to the one who came to fetch a firebrand. (27)
So Musa saw Him as a fire, while He is a light
for kings and seekers.
If you have recognise what I said,
then know that you are in a state of grief. (28)
If Musa had sought something else
(other than the brand),
he still would have seen Him in that,
and not the opposite.

When Allah establishes this 'Isawian word in the Station (29) so that we would know and he would be known, 'Isa will be asked about what was ascribed to him and whether or not it was true, even though Allah already knew whether or not that matter had taken place. Allah will say to him, "Did you say to people: 'Take me and my mother as gods, besides Allah?'" (30)

Adab demands a response to the one asking the question because when He gave him a tajalli in this station and form, wisdom necessitated the response in separation by the source of gatheredness. So he put disconnection first and said, "Glory be to You!" using the kaf (pronoun of the second person singular) which defines who is indicated by encounter and speech. "It is not mine," inasmuch as I belong to myself rather than You, (31) "to say what I have no right to," that is, what my he-ness rather than my essence necessitates. "If indeed I said it, You know it," because You are the Speaker, and whoever says something knows what he has said. You are the tongue by which I speak, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, reported to us in a divine transmission in which Allah said, "I am his tongue by which he speaks." He made His He-ness the same as the tongue of the speaker, but ascribed the speech to His slave.

Then the man of right action completed his response by saying, "You know what is in my self," and the speaker is Allah, "and I do not know what is in it," so this is in knowledge of the he-ness of 'Isa in respect of His He-ness, not in respect of the fact that 'Isa speaks and has

an effect. "It is You", so He brought distinction and support to confirm the proof and dependence on Him, since Allah only knows the Unseen. So He separated and gathered, unified and made many, made wide and narrow.

To end his reply, 'Isa said, "I said to them nothing but what You ordered me to say." He negated to begin with, (32) alluding to the fact the he has no existence. The statement required adab with the questioner. If he had not acted thus, he would have been described as lacking knowledge of the realities, but he certainly was not like that! Thus he said, "only what You ordered me," and it is You are the One who speaks on my tongue, and You are my tongue. Observe this divine polarity of the spirit! What is finer and more subtle than this!

'Isa said that he said, "Worship Allah." So he used the name of Allah because slaves differ in forms of worship and Shari'a. So he did not specify one name rather than another name. Instead he used the name which joins all of them. Then he went on, "my Lord and your Lord." It is known that His relationship to one existent being by lordship (rubûbiya) is not the same as His relationship with another existent being. That is why he made a distinction when he said, "my Lord and your Lord," by two references one to the speaker and one to the one addressed. He said, "nothing but what You ordered me," and thus he affirmed that he is one who is commanded. The quality of being commanded is not other than slavery, since one is only commanded when obedience is expected of one, even if one does not comply.

Since the command descends according to ranks, all that appears in a certain rank is coloured with what the reality of that rank gives it. The rank of the one commanded has a principle which appears in everyone who is commanded. The rank of the commander has a principle which appears in every command. Allah said, "Establish the prayer." He is the commander and the one who is subject to the obligation is the commanded. The slave says, "Forgive me!" so he commands and Allah is the commanded. What Allah demands of His slave by His command is the same as what the slave demands of Allah by his command. This is why every supplication is answered, and it must be answered, even if the answer is delayed, just as some who are under obligation delay the prayer. Whoever who is obligated to perform the prayer and does not pray it at its proper time, delays obedience and prays it at another time when he is able to perform it. There must be an answer, if only by intention.

Then he said, "I was a witness against them (and he did not say over himself with them as when he said, 'my Lord and your Lord') as long as I remained among them" because the Prophets are witnesses over their communities as long as they are in them. "But when You took me (i.e. raised me) back to You," and You veiled them from me and me from them, "You were the One Watching over them," no longer in my substance, but in their substance, since You are their eye which necessitates observation.

He wanted to make a distinction between him and his Lord so that it would be known that he was a slave and that Allah is Allah and He is his Lord. He referred to himself as a witness (shahid) and he referred to Allah as the Watcher (raqib). He mentioned "them" before himself when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them," (33) preferring them in priority and with adab. He put "them" after Allah in relationship to Him when he said, "You were the One Watching over them" because of what the Lord merits in priority of rank.

Then know that Allah has the name the Watcher (Ra'iqib) which 'Isa applied to Him, and He is the Witness in His words, "a witness against them," and "You are Witness of all things."

(5:117) He referred to all things and "thing" is the most indefinite of things. He used the name, "The Witness," and Allah is the Witness over every witnessed thing according to what the reality of that witnessed things demands. He indicated that Allah was the Witness over the people of 'Isa when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them." This is the witnessing of Allah in the substance of 'Isa, as it is confirmed that Allah is his tongue, hearing and sight.

Then he said something which is both 'Isawian and Muhammadan. As for its being 'Isawian, that is the speech of 'Isa by the transmission of Allah from him in His Book. As for its being Muhammadan, it happened that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood in one place for an entire night reciting it without turning to anything else until dawn broke. It is, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves. If You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (34) "They" is the pronoun of those who are absent as "he" is the pronoun of someone who is absent. as He said, "they are those who disbelieve," with the pronoun of those who are not present. Absence is their veil to what is meant by the witnessed one who is present. He said, "If you punish them," with the pronoun of the absent, and that absence is the source of the veil which hides them from the Real.

The Prophet mentioned them to Allah before the time when they are present (35) so that when the actual time came when they were present, the leaven would already have acted on the dough, and the dough might have had time to become equal to the leaven. (36)

Then by "they are Your slaves," he singled out the unity (tawhid) on which they are based. There is no submissiveness greater than the submissiveness of slaves because they have no freedom of action with themselves. They act according to what their master wishes of them when he has no partner in them. He said, "Your slaves," and singled out what was meant of the punishment which is their humiliation. There are none more lowly than them since they are slaves. Thus their essence necessitates that they be lowly, so You do not degrade them, for You do not degrade them with anything more lowly than the fact that they are slaves.

"If You forgive them," if You veil them from the punishment which they deserve because of their opposition if You put forgiveness on them, You veil them from the punishment and protect them from it, "You are the Almighty," the Protector, the Guardian. When Allah gives this name ('aziz) to one of His slaves, then Allah is called the Exalter (Mu'izz). This name is given to him by the 'Aziz, so he has strong protection from the revenge and punishment which the Avenger and Punisher desire for him. He also used distinction and dependence to confirm the proof, and so the ayat is the same sort of His words, "You are the Knower of the Unseen Worlds," and "You are the Watcher over them," and "You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (37)

The question from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and his supplication to his Lord in which he repeated the phrase for the entire night until dawn was a request for the answer. If he had heard the answer in the first questioning, he would not have repeated it. Allah showed him the judgements in detail by which they deserved punishment. As each instance was presented to him and specified, the Prophet said to Him, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves, and if You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." If he had seen in what was presented to him anything which would make it necessary that Allah had already decided and that His presence must be preferred, he would have invoked Allah against them rather than for them. So what they deserved is changed by what this ayat accords of submission to Allah and exposing themselves to His pardon.

The Prophet related that when Allah loves the voice of His slave when he makes supplication to Him, He delays the answer to his supplication so that the slave will repeat the supplication. This comes from His love for the slave, not because He has turned away from him. For that reason, the Prophet mentioned the name of the Wise, and the Wise is the one who puts everything in its proper place, and who does not turn away from the qualities which their realities necessitate and demand; so the Wise is the One who knows the order of things. When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, kept repeating this ayat, he was in possession of a great knowledge from Allah. If anyone recites it, let him recite it in that manner. (38) Otherwise, it is better that he remain silent. When Allah lets the slave articulate any request, He does so when He wants to answer it and grant his need. Let no one be slow in whatever has been guaranteed to him, but let him persevere as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, perserved with this ayat in all his states, so that he either hears with His ear, or with hearing, whichever you like. How else will Allah make you hear the answer? If He permits the question on your tongue, He will let you hear the answer with your ear. If He permits the meaning to you, He will let you hear the answer by your hearing.

Notes to Chapter 15:

1. As he was born more than five centuries before the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and is still alive, waiting to descend.
2. The story is found in the Qur'an 20:75-95, where as-Samiri convinces the tribe of Israel to cast their ornaments into the fire out of which he brought the figure of a Calf which they worshipped. He told Musa, "I beheld what they did not behold, and I seized a handful of dust from the messenger's track and cast it into the thing."
3. With dad, qabda.
4. With sad, qabsa.
5. Qur'an 19:17.
6. Qur'an 4:171, "The Messiah, 'Isa son of Maryam, was only the Messenger of Allah and His Word, which He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him."
7. Qur'an 3:49; 5:110.
8. Qur'an 3:49.
9. Qur'an 5:110.
10. The tax paid by the People of the Book to the Muslim State.
11. Qur'an 9:29.
12. i.e. the dead person can speak and answer him. This not simply causing the dead limbs to move of their own accord.
13. Qur'an 5:17, 5:72.
14. Ruh Allah.
15. See Qur'an 3:45, 4:171.
16. Qur'an 14:171.
17. Qur'an 19:30.
18. See Qur'an 18:109, "Say: 'If all the sea was ink to write down the Words of my Lord, it would run out long before the Words of my Lord ran out,' even if We were to bring the same amount of ink again."
19. Al-jawhar al-hayulani.
20. Qur'an 38:69, "I had no knowledge of the Highest Assembly when they disputed." It can also mean mutual rivalry.
21. Qur'an 15:28, "I am creating a mortal (bashar)."
22. "The exalted" are the angels who wander in love and those who are near, like Jibril and

the angels of the Throne.

23. "Or are you one of the exalted?" 38:75.

24. As the Prophet said.

25. See Qur'an 65:12, "It is Allah who created the seven heavens and of earth their like, the Command descending down through all of them."

26. Sura 80.

27. Musa in Qur'an 20:10; 27:7. Refers to empirical knowledge, but he found unveiling in the form of the Burning Bush.

28. By standing behind the veil or seeking other-than-Him.

29. On the Last Day.

30. Qur'an 5:116.

31. To slaveness rather than lordship.

32. (ma qulta = I did not say).

33. Literally in the Arabic, "I was against them a witness."

34. This is the end of what 'Isa said in this verse.

35. On the Day of Gathering.

36. According to the commentator, the leaven is the predisposition for the arrival in the presence of Allah. The dough is the clay of his substance.

37. All used in this verse.

38. i.e. with knowledge, weeping, and maintaining adab.

16: The Seal of the Wisdom of Mercy in the Word of Sulayman (Solomon)

Bilqis said, (1) "It (the letter) is from Sulayman and it says 'In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, Most Merciful.'" Some people criticise the fact that the name of Sulayman comes before the name of Allah. That is not the case, and in saying this they say something that does not befit the gnosis which Sulayman, peace be upon him, had of his Lord. How could what they say be connected to him when Bilqis said of it, "a noble letter had been delivered to me," that is, a letter which honoured her. In this they were influenced by the story of how Chosroes tore up the letter of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. (2) He did not tear it up until he had read all of it and knew what it contained. It was the same with Bilqis. Had she not accepted what was established, respect for its author would not have prevented her from tearing up the letter, whether his name, peace be upon him, had been mentioned before or after the name of Allah.

Sulayman mentioned the two mercies: the mercy of graciousness and the mercy of obligation, and they are ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. So Allah freely dispenses His bounty by the Rahman, and it is incumbent on Him by the Rahim. This obligation comes from graciousness, so Rahim is contained in Rahman. Allah "has prescribed mercy for Himself," glory be to Him! in order that the slave might have what Allah spoke about of the deeds which this slave brings, expecting his due from Allah who has required Himself to have this mercy for them, the mercy of obligation. When one of the slaves is like this, he knows that He is the author of the deed.

The deed is divided according to the eight organs of man. Allah informed us that He is the He-ness of each organ. So the author of the action is none other than Allah while the form is that of the slave. He-ness is embodied in him, i.e. only in his name because Allah is the source of what is manifested and which is called "creation". Because of this, the names of the Manifest and the Last belong to the slave since he was not and then was. By the fact that his manifestation depends on Him and action issues from Him, there is the name the Hidden and the First. Thus, when you see creation, you see the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

This recognition was not hidden from Sulayman, peace be upon him. Indeed, it is a part of a kingdom which "belonged to no one after him," (3) in terms of its manifestation in the visible world. Muhammad, peace be upon him, was given what Sulayman was given, but he did not manifest it. Allah gave him the power to vanquish the 'ifrit (4) who came in the night to attack him. (5) When the Prophet wanted to take the 'ifrit and tie him to the one of the columns of the mosque until morning so that the children of Madina could play with him, he remembered the prayer of Sulayman, and so Allah made him drive the 'ifrit off in disgrace. The Prophet did not manifest his power as Sulayman had done. He spoke of "a kingdom" which is not universal, and we know that he meant a particular kingdom. We see that the Prophet shared in every part of the Kingdom which Allah had given him and so we know by this that he is privileged with the whole kingdom. In the story of the 'ifrit, he was only given the manifestation while Sulayman might have been given the whole and the manifestation. If the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had not said in the story of the 'ifrit, "and Allah gave me power over him," we would have said that when he wanted to seize the 'ifrit, Allah reminded him of Sulayman's prayer so that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, would know that Allah had not given him power to seize him.

He then made him send off the 'ifrit off in disgrace.

When he said, "Allah gave me power over him," we knew that Allah had given him freedom of action in that. Then Allah reminded him and he remembered Sulayman's prayer and showed adab towards him. We know from this that that no creature after Sulayman had the general manifestation of that kingdom.

Our goal in this question is only discussion and instruction about the two mercies which Sulayman mentioned in the two names which are expressed in Arabic as ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. (6) Allah stipulated the mercy of obligation (7) and made the application of the mercy of graciousness universal when He said, "My mercy extends to all things," (7:156) even the Divine Names, which are the realities of ascriptions. He was gracious to us in them. We are the result of the mercy of graciousness by the Divine Names and divine ascriptions of lordship. Then He prescribed mercy for Himself by our own manifestation. He informed us that He is our He-ness, that we might know that He obliged mercy on Himself only for Himself. Mercy never departs from Him. Who could be gracious to you when there is only Him?

There must be a principle for clarifying differences in merit this is in relation to what is manifested of the differences in merit that creatures have in knowledge, so that it might be said that this person knows more than that person, even though the source is but one. This means the shortcoming connected to the will (irada), apart from the connection of knowledge. This difference in merit exists in the divine attributes. (8) The connection and merit of will and its increase is connected to power. In the same way, hearing, sight and all the divine names are arranged in ranks, some having more merit than others. Similarly what is manifested in creation differs in ranks of merit, so that it can be said that this person knows more than that person even though the source is the same.

As each Divine Name which I have set forth is implied by all the Names and described by them, similarly that which creation manifests accepts all of that which is subject to differences of merit. Each part of the universe is from all the universe, i.e. it is a vessel for all the separate realities of the universe. Our statement that Zayd is inferior to 'Amr in knowledge does not contradict the fact that the He-ness of Allah is the source of both Zayd and 'Amr, but it is more perfect and knowing in 'Amr than in Zayd, even as the Names differ in merit. They are not other-than-Allah. Allah, inasmuch as He is Knowing, has a more encompassing connection than Allah as the Transformer, the All-Powerful. But He is still He and not other-than-Him.

O my friend! do not then know Him in one aspect and be ignorant of Him in another! Do not negate Him here and affirm Him there, unless You affirm Him by an aspect through which He affirms Himself and negate Him by an aspect through which He negates Himself, as in the ayat which combines affirmation and negation in respect to Him when He said, "Nothing is like Him," negating, "and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (42:11) and so He affirmed an attribute which is general to every hearing and seeing living being. Nothing exists but that it is alive, although this is hidden in the world from the perception of some people. It will appear to all people in the Next World, for it is the Abode of the Living (ad-Dar al-Hayawan). Similarly, the life of this world is only veiled from some of the slaves so that election and difference of merit might be manifested among the slaves of Allah according to what they perceive of Him from the realities of the universe.

In one whose attainment is more comprehensive, Allah is in principle more manifest in him than in someone who does not have this comprehensiveness. So do not be veiled by the difference in merit and say that it is not correct to say that creation is the He-ness of Allah after we have shown you the different in merit in the Divine Names. You have no doubt about them being Allah, and what is designated by them is not other than Allah.

How then could Sulayman place his name before the name of Allah as they allege? He is part of the whole which the mercy of graciousness brought into existence. The name, ar-Rahman ar-Rahim, must come first for the dependence of the one receiving this mercy to be valid. Advancing the one who should come afterwards and delaying the one who should come before in the place he merits is contrary to the realities.

Part of the wisdom of Bilqis and the sublimity of her knowledge lies in the fact that she did not mention who cast the letter to her. She only did that so that her companions would know that she had communications on matters whose means they did not know. This is part of divine management in ruling because when the means of communication reaching the ruler are unknown, the people of the government fear for themselves in their actions. Therefore they only act with prudence in a matter because that will reach their ruler, and they are guarding themselves from the potential danger of that action. If they knew precisely by whom information reached their ruler, they would have tried to flatter him and bribe him so that they could do whatever they wanted without their ruler hearing about it. Therefore the Queen said, "a noble letter has been delivered to me," without naming the one who cast it. That was an act of policy on her part would insure respect for her among the people of her kingdom and the nobles under her rule. By this, she merited her superiority over them.

As regards the superiority of the human man of knowledge over the man of knowledge of the jinn in the secrets of the disposal of things and the special properties of thing, that is known by the amount of time, for the movement of the eye in perceiving what it perceives is quicker than the movement of the body when it moves. (9) The moment in which the eye moves is the same moment which it connects to the object, in spite of the distance between the viewer and the object. The moment that the eyes open is the moment in which they are connected to the heaven of the fixed stars. The moment when its glance returns is the same moment that its perception is absent.

Rising from one's place is not like that. It does not possess this speed. Asaf ibn Barkhiya (10) was more perfect in the deed than the jinn was. What Asaf ibn Barkhiya said is the same as the action in the same moment. Sulayman, peace be upon him, at the same moment saw Bilqis' throne "settled before him" so one must not imagine that he perceived it while it was in its original place without being moved. We do not think that the displacement takes place in one and the same moment, but that it involves going into non-existence and returning to existence inasmuch as the only one who is aware of that is the one who has recognition of it. This is what Allah said, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) Not a moment passes them but that they see what they saw. Since it is like this, the time of its non-existence (the absence of the throne from its place) is the same as the time of its existence with Sulayman because of the renewal of creation with the "breaths". No one knows this power, or rather, man is not aware with regard to himself that he ceases to exist in each breath and then is again.

Do not think that "this" (thumma) implies a delay. That is not true. However, it demands a high rank of knowledge in Arabic, as when the poet says:

As he brandished the straight Rudayni, (11) it quivered.

There is no doubt that the moment of brandishing the spear is without a doubt the same as the moment of quivering of the thing which is brandished. It happened without delay. It is the same with the renewal of creation with breaths. The time of non-existence coincides with the time of the existence of its like. It is similar to the renewal of accidents in the theory of the Ash'arites [tajrîd al-a'râd].

The question involving the moving of Bilqis' throne is one of the most difficult problems, except for someone who has recognition of what we have mentioned in its story. Asaf did not have any merit except for acquiring renewal in the assembly of Sulayman, peace be upon him. The throne was not moved across place nor did it rise above the earth nor break the laws of space for the one who understands what we mentioned. That was done by one of the companions of Sulayman in order to elevate Sulayman's honour in the selves of those who were present with Bilqis and her suite. The reason for that was that Sulayman was Allah's gift to Da'ud as He said, "We gave Sulayman to Da'ud," (38:30) so the gift is the giving of the donor by providing a blessing, not by means of fitting recompense or merit. So he is the abundant blessing, the decisive word and the cutting sword.

As for the knowledge of Sulayman, Allah said of him, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it (in spite of his opposite judgement to that of Da'ud), and Allah "gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79) Da'ud's knowledge was knowledge given by Allah, and Sulayman's knowledge was the knowledge of Allah in the matter inasmuch as He is the Judge without intermediary. So Sulayman is the interpreter of Allah in the seat of sincerity.(12) It is like the man who is striving to hit on the judgement of Allah by which Allah would judge the question. If he were to find it by himself or by what was revealed to His Messenger, then he would have two rewards. The one who errs in this particular judgement has one reward as well as its being knowledge and judgement. The community of Muhammad was given the rank of Sulayman in judgement (13) and the rank of Da'ud in wisdom, (14) so there is no better community than it.

When Bilqis saw her throne, and she knew how great the distance was and the impossibility of moving it in that space of time, she said, "It seems the same." (28:42, lit. "it is as if it were.") She spoke the truth according to what we mentioned regarding the renewal of creation by similarity. It was it. The matter is true, as you are the same at the time of renewal as you were in past time. Part of the perfection of Sulayman's knowledge was in the instruction he gave regarding the pavilion when he told Bilqis, "Enter the courtyard." (15) The courtyard was very smooth without any curvature in its glass. When Bilqis saw it, she thought that it was water and had depth, so she bared her legs so as not to let the water dampen her clothes. By that, Sulayman informed her that the throne which she saw was of this sort. This is the utmost fairness. He informed her that she had hit the mark when she said, "It seems the same." At that point, she said, "My Lord, I have wronged myself but I have submitted with Sulayman to the Lord of all the worlds."

So she did not submit to Sulayman, but to the Lord of the worlds, and Sulayman was part of the worlds. She did not restrict her submission as the Messengers do not restrict their belief in Allah, contrary to Pharaoh who said, "to the Lord of Musa and Harun." (26:48) Although this submission is related to Bilqis' submission in a certain respect, it does not have the same force. She had more discernment than Pharaoh in submission to Allah. Furthermore, Pharaoh was governed by the principle of the moment when he said, "I believe in the One in whom

the Children of Israel believe." (10:90) He specified, but he also specified when he saw the sorcerers articulate their belief in the "Lord of Musa and Harun." The Islam of Bilqis was the Islam of Sulayman since she said, "with Sulayman." She followed him in all that he adhered to in the way of beliefs.

This is how we are on the straight path which the Lord is on, for our forelocks are in His hand, (16) and it is impossible for us to separate from Him. We are with Him implicitly, and He is with us by open declaration. Allah said, "He is with you wherever you are," (57:4) and we are with Him as He takes us by our forelocks. He, may He be exalted! is with Himself wherever He goes with us on His path. So everyone in the world is on a straight path, and it is the path of the Lord. It is this that Bilqis learned from Sulayman, so she said, "To Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," without referring to a particular world.

As for the subjection which was the privilege of Sulayman, peace be upon him, and by which he was distinguished from others, and the kingdom which Allah gave him which none after him would have, it is from his command when He said, "We gave him the fiercely blowing wind, speeding at his command." (21:81) It was not subjection in itself, for Allah said in respect of each of us without exception, "He has made everything in the heavens and everything on the earth subservient to you." (45:13) He also mentioned the subjection of the winds, stars and other things, (17) but that is not by our command. It is from the command of Allah. If you reflect with your intellect, Sulayman was privileged by this command neither by mental concentration nor by aspiration (himma) rather, it was by nothing more than the command itself. We said that because we recognise that the physical bodies of the world can be affected by the himma of the self when someone is in the station of concentration. We have seen such things happen in this Path. Sulayman only had to articulate the command in whatever he wished to subject without either concentration or himma.

Know, may Allah support us and you by a spirit from Him, that when any slave receives a gift like this, that does not detract from his portion of the kingdom of the Next World, nor is he called to account for it. That was true of Sulayman. Although he sought it from his Lord, the tasting (dhawq) of the Path (18) demands that it was advanced to him from what was stored up for others, and He will call him to account for it when he wants it in the Next World. Allah told him, "This is Our gift (and He did not say "to you: or to anyone else); bestow or withhold without reckoning." (38:39) We knew by the tasting of the Path that his request was from the command of his Lord. Thus the request was from the divine command, and the one who requested it received full recompense for his request.

If the Creator wishes, He grants his need in what he seeks from Him, and if He wishes, He withholds it. The slave has fulfilled what Allah demanded of him to obey His command in what he asked of his Lord. If he had asked that from himself without his Lord commanding him to do that, then he would be held to account for it.

That is true in all that Allah is asked for, as He said to His Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "Say: 'O Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" He obeyed his Lord's command and sought increase in knowledge to such an extent that each time he was given milk, he interpreted it to be knowledge even as he interpreted it as knowledge in a dream in which he received a glass of milk. In the dream, he drank the milk, and gave the rest of it to 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. The people asked, "What is its interpretation?" He replied, "Knowledge." Similarly, when Allah took him on his Night Journey, the angel gave him a vessel which contained milk and a vessel which contained wine. The Prophet drank the milk,

and the angel said, "You have chosen the true nature (fitra). Allah has bestowed you on your community!" When milk appeared, it was the form of knowledge. Therefore it is knowledge taking on the form as milk, just as Jibril came to Maryam in the form of "a handsome, well-built man." (19:16)

When the Prophet said, "People are asleep and when they die, they wake up," he meant that everything that man sees in the life of this world is in the rank of the dreams of someone who is asleep, so it must be interpreted. Phenomenal being is imagination (khayal), but it is Allah in reality. (19) Whoever understands this has received the secrets of the Path. When the Prophet was offered milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and increase us in it" because he saw it as the form of knowledge, and he had been commanded to seek increase in knowledge. When he was offered something other than milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and give us better than it."

When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it to him by a request which arises from a divine command, He does not take him to account for it in the Next Abode. When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it by a request which is not by a divine command, the business in it is up to Allah. If He wishes, He will take him to account for it, and if He wishes, He will not take him to account for it. I hope for knowledge from Allah in particular for which He will not call one to account, for He commanded the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, to seek increase of knowledge, and it is the same command which is addressed to the Prophet's community. Allah said, "You have an excellent model in the Messenger of Allah," (33:21) and what greater model is there than this model who is a source of solace (20) to the one who possesses understanding from Allah?

Had we discussed the station of Sulayman in its entirety, you would have seen a matter whose revelation would have struck you with terror. Most of the men of knowledge of this Path have no knowledge of the state and rank of Sulayman. The business is not as they claim. (21)

Notes to Chapter 16:

1. In Qur'an 27:30. The story is found in Sura 27. When Sulayman hears of the kingdom of Queen Bilqis in Sheba', he sends the hoopoe to take a letter to her.
2. When the Prophet sent Chosroes or Khosrau a letter inviting him to Islam, he tore it up after it was read to him.
3. Ref. Qur'an 38:35, where Sulayman says, "My Lord, forgive me, and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me."
4. Type of malicious jinn.
5. Hadith. "Yesterday Shaytan rushed up suddenly to stop my prayer. Allah gave me power over him and I seized him. I wanted to tie him to one of the pillars of the mosque so that all of you could look at him, but then I remembered the supplication of my brother Sulayman, 'O Lord, forgive me and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me.' (38:35) Allah turned him away in humiliation." via Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful.
7. When He said, "I will write (mercy) for those who are godfearing...." (Qur'an 7:156)
8. i.e. Knowledge is more perfect than will.
9. Sulayman asked his council, "'O Council, who among you will bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?' An 'ifrit of the jinn said, 'I will bring it to you before you get

up from your seat...' He who possessed knowledge of the Book said, 'I will bring it to you before your glance returns to you.'" (27:38-40)

10. The name of the man of knowledge in Sulayman's council.

11. Rudayna was a woman who was famous for straightening spear shafts which were tested by shaking.

12. See Qur'an 54:55.

13. i.e. by the Qur'an and hadith.

14. By ijtiḥad.

15. This is in the same sura (27), ayat 44.

16. Qur'an Ref. 11:56, "I have believed in Allah, my Lord and your Lord. There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a straight path."

17. Various places in the Qur'an: 14:32, 16:12, 22:65, 31:20.

18. One variant has "reality" instead of Path (Tariq).

19. Inasmuch as phenomenal being is a divine shadow.

20. Uswa is model, or a person to be imitated and through whose emulation one gains consolation. The source of solace is the verbal noun from Form V of this verb, ta'assa, which means to become consoled by the example of another who had suffered in a similar fashion and been patient in it.

21. His kingdom does not decrease what he has in the Next world.

17: The Seal of the Wisdom of Existence (Wujud) in the Word of Da'ud (David)

"We subjected the mountains to glorify with him in the evening and sunrise, and also the birds, flocking together, all of them turned to him." Then Allah combined the kingdom and speech and prophethood in Da'ud when He says, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech." (1) Allah clearly and openly appointed Da'ud Khalif. This was Da'ud, peace be upon him. His freedom of action in the kingdom with this subjection was by a mighty command which was not completed in him alone. Allah also gave it to Sulayman who shared in it as He says, "And We gave knowledge to Da'ud and Sulayman who said, 'Praise be to Allah who has favoured us.'" (27:15) He says, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it. We gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79)

Know that since prophethood and the message are a divine privilege, and cannot be acquired. This is the prophethood which lays down a Shari'a. It is Allah's gift to them. Gifts of this sort are not recompense, nor is recompense demanded from them for these gifts. Allah bestows it on them as pure blessing and favour. So He says, "We gave him (i.e. Ibrahim) Ishaq and Ya'qub." (2) He says of Ayyub, "We gave him his family, and the same again with them." (38:43) He says of Musa, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet," (19:53). There are more instances like that. What they received first of all is what they will receive at the last in the totality of their states, or most of them. It is only His name, the Giver.

Allah says in respect of Da'ud, "We gave Da'ud great favour from Us." (34:10) He did not accompany that with a demand for recompense from Da'ud, nor did He say that He gave him what He mentioned as a reward. When He demanded gratitude for that by action, He demanded it of the people of Da'ud, and did not mention Da'ud himself, asking Da'ud's people to thank Him for the blessing which He gave to Da'ud. For Da'ud himself, it is a gift of pure blessing and favour. It is not like that for his people, but rather like the demands of barter. So Allah said, "Work, family of Da'ud, in thankfulness! But very few of My slaves are thankful." (3)

If the Prophets, peace be upon him, thanked Allah for what He had bestowed on them and given to them, that was not from the command of Allah. They undertook that freely from themselves, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood thanking Allah until his feet were swollen, when Allah had forgiven Him his wrong actions, past and present. When people commented what he did, he said, "Am I not a thankful slave?" Allah said that Nuh was a thankful slave. (4) So the thankful among the slaves are few.

The first blessing which Allah bestowed on Da'ud was that He gave him a name which does not have any connected letters in it:

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By this, He cut him off from the world and He told us this by the name itself which is dâl, alif, and wâw. Allah named Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, with both connected and separated letters:

So in this Allah both joined him and separated him from the world. He combined the two

states for him in his name as He combined the two states for Da'ud through meaning (ma'na) (5) although He did not put that in his name. That was a privilege which Muhammad had above Da'ud, i.e. calling him by this name. The matter was thus completed for Muhammad in all its aspects. It is the same in his name Ahmad.

AHMAD

That is from the wisdom of Allah.

Then He spoke about the blessing He gave Da'ud in the mountains' echoing of glorification with him. (6) So they glorified with his glorification that the deed might be his. It was the same with the birds. He gave him power and described him by it, (7) and He gave him wisdom and decisive speech.(8)

Then the greatest blessing and nearest rank which Allah appointed for him was that his khalifate was mentioned in the divine text. He did not do that with any of his kind, and there were khalifs among them. Allah said, "Da'ud, We have made you a khalif on the earth, so judge between people with truth and do follow your own desires," i.e. whatever comes to your mind in judgement without revelation from Me, "letting them misguide you from the Way of Allah," (38:26) from the path which I revealed to My Messengers. Then Allah showed adab with him and said, "Those who are misguided from the Way of Allah will receive a harsh punishment since they forgot the Day of Reckoning." He did not say to him, "If you go astray from My Path, there is a terrible punishment for you." If you said that Adam is mentioned as the Khalif in divine text, we will say that it is not the same as in the text regarding Da'ud, for Allah said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif on the earth." (2:30) He did not say, "I am making Adam a khalif." Even if He had said that, it still would not be the same as His words, "We have made you a khalif," in respect of Da'ud. One is implied and the other is explicit. Mentioning Adam in the story after that did not indicate that he is the same as the khalif of whom Allah spoke. Occupy your mind with the transmissions of Allah on His slaves when He transmits them. It is the same in respect to Ibrahim the friend, "I will make you an Imam for the people." (2:124) He did not say "a khalif". We know that the imamate here means the khalifate, but it is not the same because He did not mention it by the most specific of its names which is the khalifate.

Then part of bestowing the khalifate on Da'ud is that He made him a khalif of judgement. That is only from Allah. He told him, "Judge between people with the truth." (5:42) The khalifate of Adam was not of this rank. Da'ud's khalifate was that he follow what was in it previously, not that he delegated with the divine judgement of Allah in His creation. If that had been the case, it would have occurred. However, our discourse is only regarding the khalifs on the earth from Allah, and they are Messengers. As for the khalifate today, it is from the Messengers, not from Allah, so they only judge by what the Messengers prescribed for them. They do not go beyond that except when there is a small point which is only known by those like us. That is in taking what they judge by, from what is in the Shari'a of the Messenger, peace be upon him.

The khalifate is from the Messenger. He takes the judgement from him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, by transmission or by ijtiḥad, whose basis is also transmitted from him. Some of us think that the one who takes the judgement takes it from Allah, for he is a khalif from Allah by the source of that judgement. The substance is his inasmuch as it was the Messenger's - the source of his judgement is that of the Messenger's. Outwardly he follows,

not disputing his judgement, as will be the case with 'Isa when he descends and judges. It is the same when the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Those are the ones whom Allah has guided, so be guided by their guidance." (9) This relates to what he recognises as one who is singled out and one who conforms. It is in him by the degree of what the Prophet established of the Shari'a which from the previous Messengers since he confirmed it. We follow him in relation to its confirmation, not because it is a Shari'a of someone else before him. In the same way, the Khalif takes from Allah the same thing that he takes from the Messenger.

In the language of unveiling, we call him "the khalif of Allah", and with outward knowledge, we say "the khalif of the Messenger of Allah". For this reason, the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, died and did not transmit the khalifate from himself to anyone else for he knew that among the slaves of Allah are those who will take the khalifate from their Lord. Thus the khalif from Allah is in conformity with the judgements of the Shari'a. Since the Prophet knew that, he did not hinder the matter. Allah has khalifs in His creation who take from the mine of the Messenger and the Messengers that which the Messengers took. They recognise the virtue of their predecessor there because the Messenger is a vessel for increase. The khalif is not a container for the increase which, had he been the Messenger, he would have received. He only gives knowledge and judgement in what he legislates through the specific legislation of the Messenger. Outwardly he follows the Messenger without opposition.

Do you not see that in the case of 'Isa, peace be upon him, when the Jews imagined that he did not add to Musa, as is the case with what we said about the Khalifate today with the Messenger, they accepted him and confirmed him? When he added judgement and abrogated judgement, Musa confirmed it, for 'Isa was a Messenger. They did not accept that because he differed from their creed, and the Jews did not know the matter for what it was - this is why they sought to kill him. His story is what Allah relates to us about them and him in His Mighty Book. He was a Messenger before increase. As for decrease of the judgement or its increase, it is confirmed since decrease is increase of judgement without a doubt.

The khalifate today does not have this rank, but it decreases or increases based on the Shari'a which is confirmed by itjihad, not on the Shari'a which Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, articulated. The khalif might do something which is counter to a hadith in a certain judgement, and so he imagines that that comes from itjihad. That is not the case, but rather this Imam has not confirmed that the transmission with respect to unveiling is from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. If it had been confirmed, he would have judged by it. If the path in it is fairness in justice, he is not protected from illusion. It is not by transmission in meaning.

Something like this occurs in the khalif today. Similarly, it also applies to 'Isa for, when he descends, he will remove much of the Shari'a established by itjihad. By removing that, he will clarify the form of the legislated truth which he had, especially when the judgements of the Imams differ in the same event. We know absolutely that when revelation descended, it descended in a certain way. That is the divine judgement and none other! Allah confirmed it and it is the Shari'a of confirmation by the removal of interdiction from this community and the vastness of its judgements in it.

As for the statement of the Prophet, "If there are two khalifs, then slay one of them," this is the outward khalifate which has the sword. If they are in agreement, then one of them must

be killed by the conflict of the khalifate of meaning. There is no actual killing in it, but killing comes with the outward khalifate. If the khalif does not possess this station, being the khalif of the Messenger of Allah - it is just being from the principle of the basis by which the existence of two gods could be imagined: "If there had been any gods besides Allah in heaven or earth, they would both be ruined," (21:22) even if they are in agreement. We know that if they differ implicitly, the judgement of one of the two will be valid. The one with the operative judgement is the god properly speaking. The one whose judgement is not operative is not god.

From this, we know that every valid judgement in the world today is the judgement of Allah even if it differs from the established judgement in its outward manifestation called the Shari'a. The only judgement which is valid belongs to Allah in the heart of the matter, because the matter which occurs in the world is based on the judgement of the Divine Will, not on the judgement of the established Shari'a, (10) whose establishment itself comes from the Will. For that reason, He put His determination into effect. Therefore, Will only has determination in the matter, not in the act which it brings.

The power of the Will (mashi'a) is immense. (11) This is why Abu Talib (12) considered it to be the Throne of the Essence, since the will itself necessitates judgement. Nothing occurs in existence nor disappears from it without the Will. When there is opposition to the divine command here, it is called "rebellion". It is only commanding the means, not the command which brings things into being. None opposes Allah at all in what He does in respect to the command of the Will. Opposition only occurs in respect of the command of means. So understand that!

Properly speaking, the command of the Will is directed to bringing the action itself into existence, not to the one at whose hands the action manifests itself. It is impossible that the action should not be. However it takes place in a particular locus, and so, at one moment, it is called opposition to the command of Allah, and at another moment it is called agreement and obedience to the command of Allah. The language of praise and blame follow the action accordingly.

Since the matter itself is based on what we have stated about it, creation of all sorts therefore hopes for happiness. He designated this station as "mercy which encompasses everything." (13) It preceded divine wrath, and the predecessor comes before as is its right. That which the latter judges is what the former judged. Mercy obtained it since nothing preceded it, so this is one meaning of "His mercy preceded His wrath" that mercy judges the one who reaches it. It stands at the end. Therefore the end must be reached, and thus mercy and parting from wrath must be reached. It has jurisdiction over everything which reaches it according to what is given to it by the state of the one who arrives.

Whoever possesses understanding
witnesses what we have said.
If they do not understand,
they should take it from us.
There is only what we mentioned in this matter,
so rely on it and be in it now as we were.
What we recited to you came from it to us,
and from us to you is what we gave you from us.

As for the softening of iron, (14) hard hearts are softened by reprimand and threat as fire softens iron. The hardness of hearts is a stronger hardness than that of stone. Fire breaks stone, calcifies it and does not soften it. Iron was only softened for him so that protective coats of mail could be fashioned. This is an instruction from Allah that the thing is only protected by itself.¹ Mail protects against the spearhead, the sword, the knife and the arrowhead - protection against iron is by iron. The Muhammadan Shari'a brings, "I take refuge with You from You." Understand this! This is the spirit of the softening of iron. He is the Avenger, the Merciful, and Allah grants success.

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. Qur'an 38:18-20.
2. 6:84;19:49; 21:72; 29:29.
3. Qur'an 34:13.
4. Qur'an 17:3.
5. As he had prophethood, the message, the khalifate, the kingdom, knowledge, wisdom, and discrimination.
6. Qur'an 34:10, "O mountains and births! echo with him in his praise!"
7. Qur'an 38:17, "Remember Our slave Da'ud, who possessed true strength."
8. Qur'an 38:20, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech."
9. Qur'an 6:90.
10. See the Qur'an 74:54-56, "It is truly a reminder to which anyone who wills may pay heed. But they will only pay heed if Allah wills."
11. The reality of the will necessitates judgement because it is the same as making a demand.
12. Al-Makki.
13. Qur'an 7:156, also 40:7.
14. Qur'an 34:10, "We softened iron for him: 'Fashion wide coats of mail and measure well the links.'"

18: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath (Nafas) in the Word of Yunus (Jonah)

Know that this human organism in its perfection consists of spirit (ruh), body and self (nafs). Allah created it in His form. The disintegration of its structure is only undertaken by the One who created it either by His hand - and it is only that - or by His command. Whoever undertakes to do that without the command of Allah has wronged himself and exceeded the limits of Allah in it and rushed to the ruin of the one whom Allah has commanded to thrive. Know that compassion to the slaves of Allah is more proper through preservation than jealousy in Allah.

Da'ud, peace be upon him, wanted to build the Bayt al-Muqaddas, (1) and built it many times. Whenever he finished it, it was destroyed. He complained about that to Allah. Allah revealed to him, "This House of Mine will not be built by the hands of one who has shed blood." Da'ud said, "O Lord, was that not for Your sake?" Allah said, "Yes, but are they not My slaves?" Da'ud said, "O Lord, let it be built at the hands of someone who is from me!" Allah revealed to him, "Your son Sulayman will build it."

What is meant in this story is that the preservation and maintenance of this human organism is better than its destruction. Do you not see that Allah has prescribed jizya (2) and research of peace with those who had opposed the Din in order to spare them. He said, "If they incline to peace, you too incline to it, and put your trust in Allah." (8:61)

Do you not see that for the one who has responsibility for retaliation, accepting blood-money or pardoning is prescribed for the next-of-kin who is the responsible guardian? If he refuses to accept either, then the killer can be slain in retaliation. Do you not see how when the next-of-kin consists of a group of people, and one of them accepts the blood-money or pardons the person while the rest of the group want him killed, Allah observes the one who pardoned and prefers him to the one who did not pardon. Do you not see that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever is in a position to retaliate and slays the person is like him"? Allah says, "The repayment of a bad action is one equivalent to it," (42:40) so He made retaliation an evil deed, i.e. that deed is evil even though it is part of the Shari'a. Whoever pardons and makes amends has a reward due from Allah because he is based on His form. Whoever pardons and does not slay, his reward is due to the One on whose form he is based, because the One who fashioned is more entitled to it, and his existence only appeared by the name the Manifest.

Whoever preserves the person, preserves Allah. Man is not blameable by his source, but by his action, and his action is not the same as him. We are discussing his action, and action belongs only to Allah, even though some actions are blamed and some are praised. The language of blame in respect to purpose which is reprehensible with Allah, and the only thing reprehensible is what is made to be so by the Shari'a. The Shari'a makes something reprehensible because of what Allah made known or which He made known through someone He has instructed. So Allah prescribed retaliation by necessity for the preservation of the human race and to prevent people exceeding the limits of Allah. Allah says, "There is life for you in retaliation, O you who possess intelligence (lit. cores)!" (3) (2:179) They are the people of the core who stumble onto the secret of divine laws and wisdoms.

Since you know that Allah preserves this organism and preserves its continuance, you should also preserve it since you have that happiness. While man is still alive, he hopes that he will

obtain the attribute of perfection for which he was created. Whoever strives to destroy it, strives to prevent the acquisition of that for which he was created. How excellent is what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Shall I tell you what is better and more excellent for you when you meet your enemies, smite their necks and they smite yours? Remembering Allah."

That is because the only one who knows the value of this human organism is the one who remembers Allah with the invocation (dhikr) demanded of him. (4) Allah sits with the one who remembers Him, (5) and the sinner is witnessed by the one doing the invocation. When the one doing the invocation does not witness Allah who sits with him, then he is not doing invocation. When Allah is mentioned, He flows in all parts of the slave, not just in his invocation with the tongue. Allah, at that moment, is only the Companion of the tongue in particular. The tongue sees Him, inasmuch as the man, (6) in respect of his sight does not see Him. (7)

Understand this secret in the invocation of those who are heedless! The heedless person who does invocation is present without a doubt, and the One mentioned sits with him and so he witnesses Him. In respect of his heedlessness, this person does not do invocation and Allah does not sit with the heedless. Man is many but with a single source. Allah is one source but has many Divine Names, just as man has many parts. What is required of the invocation of one part is not the invocation of another part. Allah sits with the part which is invoking Him, and the other part is described as heedless. There must be some part of man doing invocation, so Allah sits with that part, and He preserves the rest of the parts by His concern.

When Allah undertakes the destruction of this organism by what is called "death", that is not negation (i'dam) , but rather separation. He takes man to Him, and what is meant is only Allah's taking man to Him, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." (11:123) When He takes him to Him, He fashions him a different composition than this composition. The new composition is from the genus of the abode to which he has moved, that is, the Abode of Going-on, because equilibrium exists. The creature thus will never die, i.e. his parts will never be separated.

As for the people of the Fire, they will return to bliss, but it will be in the Fire since after the end of the duration of punishment, it must become cold and peace according to the mercy which preceded it. This is their bliss. The bliss of the people of the Fire, after claims are settled, is the bliss of the friend of Allah, Ibrahim, when he was thrown into the Fire.⁸ He was punished by the sight of it since his knowledge told him that it is a form which causes pain to any living being which is near it. He did not know what Allah intended by it and from it in respect to him.

So after the existence of these pains, he will find cold and peace in spite of the fact that he still witnesses the phenomenal form which is fire in the eyes of the people. The single thing has various modes in the eyes of the onlookers. The divine tajalli is also like that. If you wish, you could say that the tajalli of Allah resembles this, and if you wish, you could say that the world is in the eye of the beholder which contains the parable of Allah in the tajalli, and so it takes on various modes in the eye of the onlooker according to the onlooker's disposition. The onlooker's disposition varies with the modalities of the tajalli. All of this is permissible in the realities.

Had a slain person or one who had died not returned to Allah when he died or was slain,

Allah would not have decreed their deaths nor prescribed their slaying. All is in His hand, and there is no loss in respect to Him. He prescribes slaying and decrees death by His knowledge that His slave will not pass from Him, for he returns to Him as Allah says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." So freedom of action occurs in it, and He is the One with freedom of action. Nothing is outside of Him of which He is not the source. Rather, His He-ness is the source of that thing, and He is the One who gives it its unveiling when He says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned."

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. The Temple (Beth ha-Mikdash) in Jerusalem. The chapter is an evident proof against the lies circulated by the occupier of al-Aqsa, Mr. 'Ikrimah Sabri, after the Ahlu-s-Sunnah were expelled from it.
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19: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Unseen in the Word of Ayyub (Job)

Know that the secret of life flows in water, for it is the basis of the components and the basic elements. For this reason, Allah made every living thing of water. (1) There is nothing which is not alive, so there is nothing which does not proclaim His praise, but their extolling is only understood by divine unveiling. (2) Nothing extols unless it is alive. So the basis of everything is water. Do you not see how the Throne is on the water because it was formed from it? (3) It oppresses the water while the water underneath it maintains it. In the same way, Allah created man a slave. Then he was haughty towards his Lord and put himself above Him. In spite of this, Allah preserves him from underneath in respect of the height of this slave who is ignorant of himself. This is what the Prophet said, "If you let a rope fall, it would fall on Allah." So he indicated that "below" is related to Him as "above" is related to Him when He said, "They fear their Lord above them," (16:50) and "He is the Absolute Master over His slaves." (6:18; 6:61) So He has "above" and "below" For this reason, the six directions only appeared in respect of man, who is on the form of the All-Merciful.

There is no nourisher except Allah. He said of one group, "If they had implemented the Torah and the Gospel," using the indefinite and being general, "and what was sent down to them from their Lord," and this includes every judgement sent down on the tongue of a Messenger or someone inspired, "they would have been fed from above their heads," and He is the Nourisher in respect of the aboveness which is ascribed to Him, "and beneath their feet," (5:66) as He is the Nourisher in respect of the belowness which He ascribes to Himself on the tongue of His Messenger, who translates from Him. If the Throne had not been on the water, its existence would not have been maintained. The existence of the living sustains life. Do you not see that when the living dies the customary death, the parts of his structure disintegrate and his faculties are eliminated from that particular structure? Allah said to Ayyub, "Stamp your foot! Here is a cool bath," (38:42) meaning that since he had an excess of the heat of pain, He would alleviate it by the coolness of the water. For this reason, the medicine was decrease from excess and excess in decreasing. What is meant is the demand of balance, and the only way to it is by approaching it.

However, we said that there is no way achieve equilibrium because realities and witnessing constantly accord taking-form with every single breath. (4) Taking-form (takwin) only comes from an inclination which is called deviation or decomposition in nature. In Allah it is the will, and it is inclination to one particular goal rather than another. Equilibrium denotes sameness in all, but this does not occur. For this reason, we are deprived of the principle of equilibrium. Allah's description with pleasure and anger and the attributes is related in prophetic divine knowledge. Pleasure obliterates anger, and anger obliterates pleasure from the pleasing. Perfect equilibrium would mean that anger and pleasure are the same. The Wrathful would not be wrathful towards the one he is angry with, but would be pleased with him. He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him that is, inclination. And Allah would not be pleased with the one He is pleased with and would be angry with him, and so He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him - that is, inclination.

We said this, however, in respect of the one who thinks that Allah's wrath will continue against the people of the Fire forever, as he claims. So they do not have the principle of pleasure from Allah. What is meant is true. It is as we have said, so the hopes of the people of the Fire lies in the removal of pains. Even if they still dwell in the Fire, that is pleasure, so

wrath is removed when the pains are removed since the source of pain is the source of wrath if you understand! Whoever is wrathful has suffered hurt. He only strives to avenge the object of his wrath by causing him suffering so that the wrathful might find relief by that. He transfers the pain which he has to the object of his wrath. If you separate Allah from the universe, then High indeed is He exalted above this attribute! If Allah is the He-ness of the universe, then all principles appear only in Him and from Him. It is His word, "to Him the entire affair will be returned" in reality and unveiling, "so worship Him and put your trust in Him" (11:123) in veil and covering. There is nothing in the realm of possibility more original than this universe because it is based on the form of the Merciful which Allah brought into existence - He manifested His existence by the existence of the universe as man manifests the existence of the natural form. We are His manifest form, and His He-ness is the spirit of this form which governs it. There is no management except in Him as it is only from Him. He is the First by meaning and the Last by form, and the Manifest by the changing of judgements and states, and the Inner by management. "He has knowledge of all things." "He witnesses everything" (5) so He knows by direct witnessing, not by thought. It is the same with the knowledge of tasting (dhawq) which does not derive from thought. Tasting is sound knowledge. Other things are only conjecture and surmise, and that is not knowledge at all.

Then Ayyub had that water to drink to remove the pain of thirst which was from the weariness and punishment with which shaytan (6) had touched him, (7) that is, distance from the realities which he perceived for what they were. Ayyub perceived them for what they were, and by his perception, he was in the place of nearness. Every witnessed one is close to the eye ('ayn=source), even if it is far away by the interval of distance. Vision reaches it, since it is witnessing. If it had not been for that, he would not witness it, nor would what is witnessed be reached by vision, however you want to put it. The witnessed is near between the sight and the seer. This is why Ayyub alluded to touch and ascribed it to Shaytan in spite of the nearness of touch. He said, "The one distant from me is near because of his power over me."

You know that distance and nearness are two relative matters, for they are two ascriptions. They have no existence in the source in spite of the fact that there judgements are established in the far and near. Know that the secret of Allah in Ayyub (whom He made an example for us in a written existing book which this Muhammadan community reads in order to learn what is in it, and they attach honor to the one who possesses it), is that Allah praised him for his patience in his supplication to remove affliction from him. We know that when the slave calls on Allah to remove affliction from him without that lessening his patience, then he is patient and the best of the slaves, as Allah said, "What an excellent slave! He truly turned to his Lord." (8) (38:44) This means he goes back to Allah, not back to the cause.

Allah affects by the cause because the slave depends on it since the causes which will remove any one matter are many, but the Causer is but one. It is more fitting that the slave return to the One Source in order to remove that pain by the cause of that than to the particular cause. It may be that it will not conform to Allah's knowledge in it, and then some will say, "Allah did not answer me." Yet he did not call on him, but he inclined to a particular cause which neither the time nor the moment requires. Ayyub acted by the wisdom of Allah since he was a Prophet. He knew that with one group, patience is what holds the self back from complaint. That is not our definition of patience (sabr). Its definition is to hold the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah, not to Allah. The first group is veiled in their view that the complainer is lessened in contentment (rida) with the decree by complaint. That is not the case.

Contentment with the decree is not lessened by complaint to Allah or to others, but contentment with the decreed is lessened. We are not speaking about contentment with the decreed. Affliction is what is decreed and not the same as the Decree. Ayyub knew that holding the self back from complaint to Allah for the removal of affliction is to oppose divine force. It is ignorance if, when Allah afflicts someone by what gives him pain, he does not call on Allah to remove that painful matter from him. The one who has realization must supplicate and ask Allah to remove that from him. For that gnostic who possesses unveiling, that removal comes from the presence of Allah. Allah describes Himself as "hurt", so He said, "those who hurt Allah and His Messenger." (33:57) What hurt is greater than that Allah test you with affliction in your heedlessness of Him or a divine station which you do not know so that you return to Him with your complaint so that He can remove it from you? Thus the need which is your reality will be proven. The hurt is removed from Allah by your asking Him to repel it from you, since you are His manifest form.

One of the gnostics was hungry and wept. Someone who had no tasting (dhawq) in that area censured him for that. The gnostic said, "But Allah makes me hungry so that I might weep. He tests me by affliction so that I might ask Him to remove it from me. This does not lessen my being patient." We know that patience is holding the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah.

By "other" I mean a particular aspect of Allah. Allah specified a particular one of Allah's aspects, and it is called the aspect of He-ness, so he calls on Him from that aspect to remove affliction from him, not from the other aspects called causes. They are only Him in respect to elaboration of the matter in itself. The gnostic's request does not veil him from the He-ness of Allah in removing affliction from him and the fact that all the causes are Him from a particular point of view. This path is only obliged on the people of adab among the slaves of Allah who are entrusted with the secrets of Allah. Allah has guardians whom only Allah recognizes, and some of them recognize each other. We have counselled you, so strive, and ask of Allah!

Notes to Chapter 19:

1. Qur'an See 21:30.
2. See Qur'an 17:44.
3. See 11:7. As for the connection between Water (al-ma') and the Throne (al-'arsh), see the hadith narrated by Imam al-Bukhari, "Allah existed and there was nothing with Him, then His Throne was on the water, and then He created the heavens and the earth."
4. Tajdid al-khalq, instantaneous renewal of creation.
5. See Qur'an 5:117; 22:17, etc.
6. The root of the name Shaytan is shaytana, meaning "to be remote from".
7. Qur'an 38:41.
8. Awwab, which means one who frequently turns to Allah.

20: The Seal of the Wisdom of Majesty in the Word of Yahya (John the Baptist)

This is the wisdom of firstness in the names. Allah called him Yahya, i.e. the dhikr of Zakariyya was Yahya brought to life by him, and "a name We have given to no one else before." (19:7) He joined the attainment of the attribute, which is in the one who has passed on but left a son to revive his memory and his name through him. He called him "Yahya". His name Yahya is like knowledge by tasting. The memory of Adam, peace be upon him, was revived by Shith and that of Nuh by Sam. It is the same with the Prophets, peace be upon them; but Allah did not combine the name of knowledge from Him and the attribute for anyone before Yahya. It was an act of concern for Zakariyya from Allah, since Zakariyya said, "Give me an heir from You." (19:5) He mentioned Allah before the mention he mentioned his son, as Asiya (1) mentioned the neighbor before the abode when she said, "Build a house in the Garden for me in Your presence." (66:11) Allah was generous to Zakariyya, for He granted his need and named him by His attribute. Yahya's name was a remembrance for what His Prophet Zakariyya asked of Him; because he preferred the going-on of dhikr-Ullah after his death, since the son is the secret of his father.

He said, "to be my inheritor and the inheritor of the family of Ya'qub." (19:6) Nothing is inherited in respect of these except for the station of dhikr-Ullah and calling to Him. Then Allah gave him the good news of what He appointed for him from His words, "Peace be upon him the day he was born, and the day he dies, and the day he is raised up again alive." (19:15) He brought the attribute of life, which is his name, and He informed him of His peace upon him. His words are true. He completed it, even if it is the word of the spirit, "Peace be upon me the day I was born, the day I die, and the day I am raised up again alive," (19:33) and this is more sublime and more perfect in oneness and belief in the interpretation. That in which the order of nature (2) was broken in respect to 'Isa was articulation. His intellect was given mastery and perfected at that time when Allah made him speak. In any case, mastery of articulation is not necessary.

'Isa spoke the truth in what he articulated but this is different than the one who was testified to, as in the case of Yahya. (3) Allah's greeting on Yahya was higher than the greeting of 'Isa on himself in this way since the ambiguity occurring in divine concern was removed. The immediate circumstances indicate his proximity to Allah in that and his sincerity, since he spoke in the cradle the form which indicated the innocence of his mother. He was one of the two witnesses. The other witness was the shaking of the dried trunk of the palm tree. (4) Fresh, ripe dates came tumbling down without the male palm tree or pollination. In the same way, Maryam bore 'Isa without a man, that is, without normal and customary intercourse. If a Prophet had said, "My sign and my miracle is that this wall will speak," and then the wall speaks and says, "You have lied, you are not the Messenger of Allah," then the sign is proven and it is confirmed by it that he is the Messenger of Allah. One does not pay any attention to what the wall said.

He introduces this probability into the words of 'Isa when his mother pointed to him while he was in the cradle. Allah's greeting on Yahya is higher than this element. The passage which indicates that he is the slave of Allah is in respect of the claim made about him that he was the son of Allah. The indication is completed by sheer articulation. He is the slave of Allah according to another group who speak of Prophethood. It increases the principle of probability in logical thought until his truthfulness appeared in the future regarding all that he

spoke about when he was in the cradle. So understand our allusion!

Notes to Chapter 20:

1. The wife of Pharaoh who was one of the perfect women.
2. Kharq al-'adat, miracle, literally, the breaking of the normal pattern of things.
3. 'Isa was a witness, not one who is the object of witness, since he testified on behalf of his mother.
4. See Qur'an 19:29.

21: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sovereignty (1) in the Word of Zakariyya (Zachariah)

Know that the mercy of Allah encompasses everything in existence and judgement, and the existence of wrath comes from the mercy of Allah by wrath. His mercy preceded His wrath, that is, the ascription of mercy to Him preceded the ascription of wrath. Then every source has an existence which demands that Allah's mercy encompass every source. For that reason, we say that the mercy of Allah encompasses all things in existence and principle.

The Divine Names are "things", but they derive from a single Source. The first thing that His mercy encompassed before time was its thingness, that source which gives existence to mercy by mercy. Thus the first thing that His mercy encompassed was itself, then the thingness indicated, then the thingness of every existent existing without end in this world and the Next, non-essential ('arad) and substance (jawhar), composite and simple. Neither the acquisition of a goal nor harmony of nature is taken into account rather, harmonious and inharmonious things are all encompassed by divine mercy in existence. We mentioned in The Makkan Revelations that effect only belongs to the non-existent, not the existent. If the existent had it, it is by the principle of the non-existent. It is a strange knowledge and a rare question. Only those who possess illusions (awhâm) know its realisation, and that is by their tasting (dhawq). (2)

The mercy of Allah pervades phenomenal beings, and circulates in essences and sources. The most ideal position of mercy is when it is known from witnessing with sublime thoughts. Everyone mercy designates is happy. There is only what mercy designates, and the mention of the mercy of things is the source of its bringing them into existence. Every existent thing has been shown mercy. O friend! Do not be veiled from the perception of what we have said by what you see of the troubles people experience and what you believe about the pains of the Next Abode which will not depart from the one whom they afflict.

First of all, know that mercy is in bringing-into-existence in general. In mercy by pains, only pains come into existence. So mercy has an effect in two ways - the first effect is by the essence, which is its bringing every existent source into existence. It does not regard desire or lack of it, suitability or lack of suitability. It looks at the source of every existent before its existence, or rather, it looks at its source-form. For this reason, it saw Allah-as-creature in creeds as a single source-form among the source-forms. Its mercy to itself is by bringing-into-existence. This is why we said that Allah-as-creature in creeds is the first thing shown mercy after its mercy to itself in its connection of bringing those shown mercy into existence.

It has another effect by request. Those who are veiled ask Allah to have mercy on them in their beliefs, and the people of unveiling ask for the mercy of Allah to settle on them. They ask for it by the name of Allah, and so they say, "O Allah! Have mercy on us!" and He only has mercy on them by carrying out mercy through them. It has authority because authority in reality belongs to the meaning based on place.

He is the Merciful in reality, so Allah is only merciful to His slaves, attentive to them by mercy. When mercy settles on them, they experience its authority through taste (dhawq). The one designated by mercy has had mercy known to him. The active participle is the Merciful (Rahîm) and the Mercy-Giver (Râhim), and this principle does not describe creatures because it is a matter of directing meanings to their essences.

States are neither existent nor non-existent they have no source in existence because they are relationships. They are not non-existent in principle because what knowledge establishes is called the "knower", and it is a state. The knower is an essence described by knowledge, but it is not the same as the essence nor is it the same as knowledge. There is only knowledge and the essence on which this knowledge is established. The being of the knower is a state of this essence when it is described by this meaning. The relationship of knowledge occurred to him, so he is called knowing. Mercy, properly speaking, is a relationship from the Mercy-giver, and it is necessarily part of the principle, so it is merciful. The One who brought it into existence in the one shown mercy did not bring it into existence in order to be shown mercy by it; He brought it into existence to show mercy to the one on whom it settled.

Allah is not in a place by events, so He is not in a place by bringing mercy into existence. He is the Mercy-Giver, and the Mercy-Giver is only Mercy-Giver by the establishment of mercy. He confirmed that He is the source of mercy. Whoever has not tasted this matter and has no part in it, does not dare to say that He is the source of mercy or the source of the attribute. Such a person says, "He is not the same as the attribute nor other than it." In his view, the attributes of Allah with Him are not Him, nor are they other-than-Him because he cannot deny them nor can he make them the same as Him. Thus he (3) moves to this interpretation, and it is a good interpretation. Yet there is another interpretation more appropriate to the matter than this one, and more likely to remove ambiguity. It is to deny the sources of the attributes any existence based on the essence of the one described. Rather, they are relationships and relative ascriptions between the one described by them and their intelligible sources. Although mercy is common to all of them, it is different in relationship to each Divine Name. (4)

For this reason, Allah is asked to show mercy by each Divine Name, so the mercy of Allah and its indirect reference, which is that which encompasses everything, has many branches according to the number of the Divine Names. It is not general in relation to that particular divine name in the statement of the one who asks, "O Lord, have mercy!" and other Divine Names, even the Avenger. So he says, "O Avenger, have mercy on me!" That is because these Names indicate the designated Essence and, by their realities, indicate different meanings. They call on Him by these Names in mercy with respect to their indication of the Essence called by that Name and no other not by what is indicated by that Name, separating it from another and distinguishing it. The Name is not distinguished from another, and with him it is the indication of the Essence. It is distinguished in itself from other-than-it by its essence, as it is generally agreed that, by any expression, this Name is a reality distinct in its essence from other-than-it.

The whole is set forth to indicate one designated source. There is no disagreement that each name has an authority which another does not have. That also must be taken into account, as one takes into account their indications of the named essence.

For this reason, Abu'l-Qasim ibn Qasi said regarding the Divine Names that each Name is, in its isolation, designated by all of the Divine Names since they preceded in mentioning its description by all the Names, that is, by their indication of one source. Although the Names based on it are many and their realities differ, i.e. the realities of these Names, the mercy is obtained by two means. The first is the path of obligation, and it is His word, "I shall prescribe it for those who are godfearing and pay zakat," (7:156) and He binds them by it through the attributes of knowledge and action. The other path by which mercy is obtained is the path of divine graciousness which is not connected to action. It is His words, "My mercy

embraces all things." Of this, it is said, "So that Allah may forgive you your earlier errors and any later ones." (48:2) And of this, there are His words, "Do what you want, I have already forgiven you." (5) So know that!

Notes to Chapter 21:

1. Al-Mâlikiyya. His state was dominated by the name al-Mâlik, the Sovereign, who prevails in His orders. This strength was shown in his himma whose fruit was Yahya.
2. Because they connect the imagination (wahn) to things and bring them into existence and thus have experiential knowledge of this. As for the one on whom illusion has no effect, he is far from this question.
3. The Imam of Ahlu-s-Sunnah wa-l-Jama'ah, Shaykh Abu-l-Hasan al-Ash'ari.
4. There is a specific mercy of Allah, of al-Rahman, of ar-Rahim, of al-Malik, etc.
5. This refers to an incident involving Hatib ibn Abi Balta'a. When the Muslim army prepared to set out to conquer Makka, Hatib sent a letter to warn the Quraysh which was intercepted. 'Umar wanted kill him for intelligence with the nemy in war, but the Prophet said, "O 'Umar, perhaps Allah has looked with favor on those who already fought at Badr and said, 'Do whatever you want. I have already forgiven you.'"

22: The Seal of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Word of Ilyas (Elijah)

Ilyas (Elijah) is none but Idris (Enoch), peace be upon him. He was a Prophet before Nuh, and Allah raised him to a high place. (1) He dwells in the heart of the spheres, the sphere of the sun. Then he was sent to the town of Baalbek (Ba'labakk). Baal is the name of an idol and "bakk" is the power of the village. The idol was called Baal and was singled out with domination. It was Ilyas who was Idris, who was given the example of the splitting of the mountain called "Lubnan (Lebanon)" which comes from lubana (desire, goal). What he needed was a horse of fire with all its trappings of fire. When he saw it, he rode it and appetite fell from him, and so there was intellect without appetite. There remained for him no connection with that which is connected to the desire of the self. For him, Allah was pure without connection. He had only half of gnosis of Allah. When the intellect is free of the self in respect to gathering knowledges by its discernment, its gnosis of Allah is based on disconnection (tanzih) not connection (tashbih).

When Allah gives gnosis by tajalli, then gnosis of Allah is perfected.
Disconnection is used in one place and connection in another place.

The gnostic sees the diffusion of Allah by existence in natural and elemental forms. There is no form but that he sees the source of Allah in its source. This is the complete perfect gnosis which is brought the roads (shara'i) revealed from Allah. By this recognition, all illusions (awham) have authority. For this reason, illusion has a stronger power in this human organism than the intellect, because the man of intellect even if his intellect reaches maturity is not free of the power which illusion has over him and over the formation of what he reasons. Illusion is the greatest power in this perfect human organism. The revealed roads brought it, and so you use both connection and disconnection. You use connection in disconnection by illusion, and disconnection in connection by the intellect. So the whole is connected to the whole. It is not possible that disconnection be free of connection nor connection from disconnection. Allah said, "Nothing is like Him," so He used connection and disconnection. "He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (2) and He used connection, and yet it is the greatest of ayat revealed on disconnection. Even so, it is not free of connection because of the Kayf (like).

So He has the most knowledge of Himself of those who know. He only designated Himself by what we mentioned. Then He said, "Glory be to your Lord, the Lord of Might, beyond anything they describe," (37:180) and they only describe according to what these realities accord them. He exalted Himself above their disconnection since they limit Him by that disconnection. That is due to the inability of the intellect to perceive the like of this.

Then all the roads (Shara'i) brought what the illusions dominate. They do not free Allah of an attribute in which He is manifest as they said. They brought that, and so communities acted on it. Allah granted them the tajalli. The heirs followed the Messengers closely, and said what the Messengers of Allah said. Allah knows best where He puts His message, and so Allah knows best who turns his face to Him in a particular aspect by transmission to the Messenger of Allah. One aspect of His begins with "He knows best where to place His message." (6:124) There is a reality in each of the two aspects for that reason, we speak of connection and disconnection, and disconnection and connection. After this (3) is established, we will lower the screens and drop the veils on the eye of the critic (4) and the one who simply follows a

creed. Both of them are among the forms in which Allah gives tajalli, but He has commanded the veil for us in order that different levels of excellence of the predisposition of forms might appear. One is given a tajalli in a form according to the predisposition of that form. What its reality and exigencies accord him is ascribed to him. That must be. The example of the one who sees Allah when he is asleep and does not deny it is this. Without a doubt, it is Allah Himself. He attaches to it the exigencies of that form and its realities in which He gives the tajalli in sleep. Then after that, he interprets, i.e. he transfers it to another matter which disconnection logically demands. If the one who interprets it has unveiling and belief (iman), then he does not transfer it to disconnection at all. Rather, he gives it the disconnection that is due it and what is due to that which is manifest in it, i.e. its connection/resemblance. Properly speaking, "Allah" is an expression for the one who understands the indication (ishara). (5)

The spirit of this wisdom and its seal is that the command is divided into the effector and the one effected. These are two expressions. The effector in every aspect and in every state and in every presence is Allah. The effected by every aspect and in every state and in every presence is the universe, even if it is Allah who comes. (6) Allah is everything at its foundation which corresponds. That which appears is forever and ever a branch from the root; divine love is a branch from the supererogatory acts of the slave. So this is an effect between the effector and the effected. Allah is the hearing of the slave and his sight and faculties from this love. (7) This is an established effect which, if you believe, you cannot deny because it is confirmed by the Shari'a.

As for the person of sound intellect, he is either in possession of a divine tajalli in a natural locus of tajalli, (8) so he recognizes what we have said, or else he is a believing Muslim who believes in what was reported in sound tradition. The power of illusion must govern the man of intellect investigating what has been brought to him in this form because he believes in that form. As for the one who is not a believer, he judges illusion by illusion; and so he imagines by his logical discernment that he assigns to Allah what the tajalli gives him in dream. Illusion in that does not depart from him inasmuch as he is not aware because of his disregard for himself. From that is what Allah says, "Call on Me and I will answer You." (40:60) Allah also says, "If My slaves ask you concerning Me, I am near. I answer the call of the caller when he calls on Me," (2:186) since He only answers when there is someone who calls to Him. The source of the caller is the source of the answerer, but there is no disagreement about the difference of forms. They are two forms without a doubt.

All these forms are like Zayd's limbs. It is known that Zayd is one reality in personality, yet his hand is not the form of his foot nor his head nor his eye nor his eyebrow. He is one multiple - multiple by forms, one by source. That is like man who is one by source without a doubt. There is no doubt that 'Umar is not Zayd nor Khalid nor Ja'far, and that the individual persons of this one source are endless in existence. Even if man is one by source, he is many by forms and persons. If you are a believer, you know absolutely that Allah Himself will appear in a tajalli in a form on the Day of Rising. He will be recognized and then He will change form and be denied. (9) Then He will change from it again into another form and will not be recognized. He is the One giving tajalli and it is not other than Him in each form, even though it is known that this form is not that other form.

It is one source which has the same function as the mirror. When the viewer looks in it at the form of his belief in Allah, he recognizes Him, and so draws near Him. When it happens that he sees in it the belief of someone else, he denies Him since he sees his form and the form of someone else in the mirror. The mirror is but a single source while the forms are many in the

eye of the viewer. There is no form in the mirror which comprises them all at once. Although the phenomenal being of the mirror has an effect on the forms from one aspect, it does not have an effect on the forms from another aspect. The effect which it has makes the form change shape in smallness, largeness, length, and width, so it has an effect in quantities. This is attributable to it, but this changing of it is by the difference of the size of the mirrors. In the example, look at one of these mirrors, and do not look at all of them. It is your perception in respect to His being essence, and so He is independent of the universe, and in respect to the divine names. In that moment He is like the mirrors. Whatever Divine Name in which you look at yourself or simply look at. He manifests the reality of that Name in whoever looks. The matter is thus. If you understand, do not be anxious, and do not fear. Allah loves bravery, even to the extent of killing a snake. The snake is not other than your self, and the snake is alive through its self in form and reality. The thing is not killed by itself, even if the form is destroyed in the senses, The definition determines it, and imagination does not make it depart.

Since the matter is based on this, this is the safeguard of the essences and might and invincibility. You cannot destroy the definition. What might is greater than this might? You imagine by illusion that you have killed. By intellect and illusion, the form does not vanish from existence in the definition. The proof of that is, "You did not throw when you threw, but Allah threw." (8:17) The eye only perceived the form of Muhammad which had the throwing confirmed to it in the senses. It is what Allah denied the throwing to at first, and then confirmed in the middle, only to return to the perception that Allah was the One who threw in the form of Muhammad. One must believe this. So look at this effector when Allah descended into a Muhammadan form. Allah Himself informs His slaves of that, and none of us said that of Him, rather He said it of Himself. His report is true, and it is obligatory to believe it whether or not you perceive the knowledge of what He said, being a knower or believing Muslim.

Part of what shows you the weakness of the intellect's discernment in respect to its thought, since the intellect passes judgement on cause ('illa), is that cause is not an effect of the one who is the cause. This is the judgement of the intellect which is evident. There is only this in the knowledge of tajalli, and it is that the cause is an effect to whoever is the cause. That which the intellect governs is sound when discernment is clarified. Its goal in that is that, when it sees the matter differently than what logical proof would accord it, it says that the source after it is confirmed that it is one in this multiple, and inasmuch as it is cause in one of these forms belonging to any effect is not an effect of its effect, so that its effect would become a cause to it. This is his goal when he sees the matter for what it was, although he does not continue in his logical discernment.

Since the command in causality is of this sort, your opinion by the scope of logical discernment is not in other than this narrow limit. None are more reasonable than the Messengers, may the blessings of Allah be upon them, and they brought what they brought in transmission from the Divine Presence. They confirmed what the intellect confirmed. Then they gave more in what the intellect alone does not possess by its perception and what the intellect does not imagine directly, but one draws near to it in the divine tajalli. When he is alone with himself after the tajalli, he is confused about what he saw. If he is the slave of a Lord, his intellect returns to him, and if he is the slave of reasoning, Allah gives him back judgement. This is only as long as he is veiled in the dimension of this world from his dimension in the Next World.

The gnostics appear here as if they possessed the form of this world by virtue of the fact that its principles operate on them. However, Allah has transformed them inwardly to the dimension of the Next World. That must be the case. They are unknown by form except to whomever has had his inner eye unveiled by Allah so that he perceives. (10) There is no gnostic of Allah in respect of divine tajalli who is not based on the dimension of the Next World. He has been gathered in this lower world of his and has been called from his grave. He sees what they do not see, and he witnesses what they do not witness - as a mark of concern from Allah to some of His slaves in that respect.

Whoever wishes to find this wisdom of Ilyas-Idris to whom Allah gave two formations, so that he was a Prophet before Nuh, and then he raised him up and brought him down after that as a Messenger and so Allah joined for him the two degrees, let him descend from the authority of his intellect to his appetite and be an absolute animal so that he will be shown what every creature that crawls is shown except for the jinn and men. Then he will know that he has realized his animality, and it has two tokens. One is this unveiling so he sees who is punished in his grave and who has bliss. He sees the dead alive and the silent speaking and the sitting walking. The second token is muteness since, had he wanted to utter what he had seen, he would be unable to do so. Thus he has realized his animality. We had a pupil who acquired this unveiling although dumbness did not take hold of him, and so he did not fully realize his animality. When Allah established me in this station, I realized my animality with a complete realization. So I was seeing and wishing to utter what I was witnessing but I could not. So there was no difference between me and the mute who cannot speak.

When he realizes what we have mentioned, he will move to being pure intellect in natural matter. He will witness matters which are the roots of what is manifested in natural forms. He will know from where this principle is manifest in the natural form with the knowledge of tasting. Had it been unveiled that nature is the source of the breath of the All-Merciful, he would have been given much good. If he is restricted in what we have mentioned, this power from the gnosis which governs his intellect will be enough for him. He keeps company with gnostics, and by that he knows tasting. "You did not kill them, it was Allah who killed them," (8:17) yet only iron, the blow and that which is behind this form killed them. In the whole, killing and throwing took place. So he witnesses matters by their roots and by their forms, and he is complete. When he witnesses the breath, he is completely perfect. The breath of the All-Merciful is the source of the overflowing of existence and life on all, rather the source of Allah's descent to all forms.

Notes to Chapter 22:

1. A place from which, according to Sidi Muhiddin, Idris (Enoch) descended in order to become Ilyas (Elijah). See Qur'an 19:57, "Mention Idris in the Book. He was a true man and a Prophet. We raised him up to a high place."
2. Qur'an 42:11.
3. The rule of joining tanzih and tashbih.
4. The one who uses logical proof.
5. i.e. what he recognises from the word "Allah" extends only so far as his predisposition and understanding.
6. In the wârid.
7. "When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks".
8. i.e. the human form.

9. Hadith in Muslim: 1: 299, 302.

10. See Qur'an 50:22, "We have stripped you of your covering and today your sight is sharp."

23: The Seal of the Wisdom of Ihsan in the Word of Luqman

If Allah wishes, He wills provision for Him,
so all of phenomenal being is His food.
If Allah wishes, He wills provision for us,
so He is our food as He wishes.
His volition is His will, so say that He wished it.
So it is wished.
He wills increase and decrease.
So what He wishes is wished.
This is the distinction between them, (1)
so understand!
From a certain point of view,
their source is the same.

Allah says, "We gave Luqman wisdom," (31:12) and He says, "Whoever has been given wisdom has been given much good." (2:269) By the divine text, Luqman had much good as Allah has testified. The example of what Luqman said to his son is, "My son, even if something weighs as little as a mustard-seed, and it is inside a rock or anywhere else in the heavens or earth, Allah will bring it out." (31:16) This is a wisdom which is articulated, and that wisdom is his setting out that Allah is the One who brings forth. Allah confirmed that in His Book and did not refute what the speaker said.

As for the silent wisdom in it, and you know it by the circumstances, he is silent about the one to whom that grain is given. He did not mention him nor did he say to his son, "Allah will bring it to you or to other than you." He used bringing in general terms and denoted the thing brought in the heavens or in the earth as an instruction that the looker might regard His words, "He is Allah in the heavens and in the earth." (6:3) Luqman gave instruction by what he said and by what he remained silent on, so Allah is the source of every knowing thing because the known is more universal than the thing, so it denies unknown things.

Then he completed the wisdom and brought it to its full value in order that the structure might be complete in it. He said, "Allah is Latif (Subtle, Kind)." (31:16) Part of His subtleness (latâfa) and His kindness (lutf) is that He is in the thing named by such-and-such a definition in such-and-such a source of that thing, so it is only what its name indicates by convention and usage. It is said that these are names: heaven, earth, rock, tree, animal, angel, provision and food, and yet the source of everything is One. Thus the Ash'arites say about this that the entire universe is homogeneous in substance (jawhar), so it is one single substance.

It is the same as our statement that the source is One. They said that it varies by non-essentials. Thus our statement that it varies and becomes many through forms and relationships so as to provide distinction. It is said, "This is not that in respect to its form or its non-essential or natural disposition (mizâj)." Say whatever you like, but this is the same as that in respect to its substance. For this reason, the source of the substance is put in the definition of every form and disposition. However, we say that it is not other-than-Allah. The mutakallim thinks that it is called substance. Even though it is true, it is not the source of Allah of which the people of unveiling and tajalli speak. This is the wisdom of the "Latîf".

Then He is described when He says "the All-Aware (Khabir)," the One who knows by experience. It is His words, "We will test you until We know." (47:31) This is the knowledge of tastes. Allah put Himself with His knowledge of what the matter is in (our) profitable knowledge. No one can deny what Allah has written about Himself. Allah differentiated the knowledge of tasting and absolute knowledge. The knowledge of tasting is limited by the faculties. He said of Himself that He is the source of the faculties of His slave when He said, "I am his hearing," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his sight," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his tongue," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his foot and his hand." He did not restrict Himself to specifying the faculties, but He mentioned the members. The slave is not other than his members and faculties. The source called the slave is the Real, but the source of the slave is not the Compassionate Master.

Relationships are distinct by their essence. The one brought into relationship is not distinct. (2) Then He equalized His source in all relationships, for it is but one source with various ascriptions, relationships and attributes. Part of the completeness of Luqman's wisdom in instructing his son is what has come in the ayat of these two Divine Names, Latif and Khabir - Allah is called by them. If He had put that in phenomenal being (kawn) which is existence, and said, "He was (kana)," it would have been more complete in wisdom and more eloquent in admonition. Allah related the words of Luqman in meaning as he said it and did not add anything to it. His statement that Allah is the Latif, the Aware, is from the statement of Allah. Then Allah knew of Luqman that, had he said it (kana), it would have been utterly perfected by this.

As for his words, "If it should be but the weight of one grain of mustard-seed," it is for the one who has it as food. It is only the atom mentioned in His words, "Whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it." (99:7-8) A mustard-seed is the smallest thing consumed. If there had been anything smaller, Allah would have used it as He said, "He is not ashamed to make an example of a gnat." (2:26) Then since He knew that there is anything smaller than the gnat, He said "or of an even smaller thing," i.e. in smallness. This is the word of Allah, and that which is in the Sura of the Earthquake (az-Zalzal, 99) is also the word of Allah. So know that! That which is smaller than the gnat is the atom, and then there is another subtlety (latifa). That is that the atom, in spite of its smallness, is also lighter in weight because it is alive, since the living is lighter than the dead. So the meaning is that when the deed is the weight of an atom in smallness and lightness, the recompense must be seen. We know that Allah did not restrict Himself to the weight of the atom, and there is nothing smaller than it. He used it by way of intensification, and Allah knows best.

When Luqman used the diminutive for his son, (3) it was the diminutive of mercy and thereby he gave him a legacy which contains his happiness if he acts according to it. The wisdom of Luqman's legacy lies in his prohibition to his son, "Do not associate anything with Allah. Associating others with Him is a terrible wrong." (31:13) The one wronged establishes apportioning in respect to His description even though it is the same source. So he is only associating His source with Him, and this is the very greatest ignorance.

The reason for this is that the person who has no recognition of the matter nor of the reality of the thing, does not know that diversity is actually contained in a single source although forms vary in that single source. So such a person puts the form shared by another in that station, and so he makes every form a part of that station. It is known of the associate that the matter which indicates him through what occurs in him of partnership is not the source of the other

with whom he is associated, since it is the other. In reality, there is no associate. Everyone is based on his portion whenever it is said about him that there is a partnership between the two in it. The reason for that joint association, if it is joint, is that the action of one of them eliminates the collective aspect. "Say: Call on Allah or call on the All-Merciful." (17:110) This is the very heart of the question.

Notes to Chapter 23:

1. The difference between volition (mashi'a) and will (irada).
2. In respect of its reality, the Essence is not distinguishable.
3. Bunayya, "little son".

24: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Imam in the Word of Harun (Aaron)

Know that the existence of Harun, peace be upon him, was from the presence of mercy (rahamut) by His words, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet." (19:53) So his Prophethood was from the presence of the Rahamut. He was older than Musa, and Musa was greater than him in Prophethood. The Prophethood of Harun is from the presence of mercy (rahma) and, for that reason, he said to his brother Musa, peace be upon him, "O son of my mother!" (7:150) So he called to him by his mother, not by his father, since, in principle, mercy belongs in greater abundance to the mother than the father. Were it not for that mercy, the mother would not have the patience necessary for upbringing. Then he said, "do not seize me by the beard or by the hair," (20:94) and do not let my enemies gloat over me. All this is one of the breaths of mercy. The reason for that is the lack of ascertainment in looking at the tablets which had been given into his hands. If he had looked at them with ascertainment, he would have found guidance and mercy in them.

Musa would have found guidance, which is an elucidation of what happened in the matter which made him angry and of which Harun was innocent, and mercy towards his brother. He did not take him by the beard because of that state in which he saw his people because of his age, for Harun was older than him. That was compassion for Musa from Harun because the Prophethood of Harun is from the mercy of Allah. Only the like of that issued from him.

Then Harun said to Musa, "I was afraid that you would say: 'You have caused division in the Tribe of Israel'," (20:94) and you would make me the cause of their division since the worship of the Calf divided them. There were some of them who worshipped it following and imitating the Samiri, and there were some of them who refused to worship it until Musa returned to them so that they might question him regarding it. Harun was afraid that he would have that division between them attributed to him.

Musa knew the matter better than Harun because by his knowledge he knew the One the people of the Calf worshipped since Allah decreed that only He would be worshipped. When Allah decrees something, it must occur. Musa chided his brother Harun since the business consisted of disavowal and inadequacy. The gnostic is the one who sees Allah in everything, rather he sees Him as the source of everything. Musa was teaching Harun with the instruction of knowledge even though Musa was younger than him in age.

For that reason, when Harun said what he said, he turned to the Samiri and said to him, "What did you think you were doing, O Samiri," i.e. what were you doing in turning aside to the form of the Calf, and in your making this shape from the jewelry of the people so that you captured their hearts for the sake of their wealth? 'Isa used to say to the Tribe of Israel, "O Tribe of Israel! Every man turns to where his wealth is, so put your wealth in heaven, and then your hearts will be in heaven." Wealth is only called that (mâl) because by essence it inclines (yumîl) the hearts to worship. It is the greatest and most exalted goal in the hearts since they need it. Forms have no going-on, so the form of the Calf must vanish. If Musa had not hastened to burn it, jealousy would have overcome him. So he burned it and then scattered the ashes of that form in the sea. He told the Samiri, "Behold your god." He called it a god to alert him in order to teach him that he did know some of the places of divine tajalli, "I will surely burn it!"

The animality (hawayâniyya) of man has freedom of action over the animality of animals since Allah has subjected animals to man, especially in view of the fact that man's origin is not animal. Man has greater subjugation because that which is not-animal does not possess will. In fact, the non-animal is under the jurisdiction of whoever administers it without any recalcitrance whatsoever. The animal, on the other hand, has both will and instinct. Recalcitrance appears in some of its actions. If it has the power to manifest that, reluctance and resistance to what man wants appears from it. If it does not have that power or if what the man wants agrees with what the animal itself wants, then the animal obediently follows what is wanted of it.

Even so, man's "like" follows a command in whatever Allah has called him to in respect of the wealth which he hopes for from Him, which is designated in some states by "the other World" as when Allah says, "We have raised some of them above others in rank so that some of them are subservient to others." (43:32) His like is only subjugated to him by his animality, not by his humanness. The two likes are two opposites. The higher in degree subjugates the lower in degree by wealth or by rank with his humanness, and that other was subjected to him either by fear or greed from his animality, not from his humanness, so his like is not subjected to him.

Do you not see that what is among the beasts in the way of jostling against one another is because they are likes? Two likes are two opposites. That is why He said, "and He raised some of them above others in rank," so he is not with him in rank, and so subjugation occurs in respect of rank. Subjection is of two kinds. First, there is subjection intended by the subjector like the active conqueror when he subjects this subjected person - like the subjugation by the master of his slave although he is his like in humanness, and like the subjugation of the Sultan of his subjects who are his like in humanness, He subjugated them by rank.

The second sort is subjugation by the subjects of the king establishing their command that he drive harm away from them, protect them, do battle against those who attack them, and preserve their property and lives. All this is subjection through state by the subjects who subjugate their king in this act. In reality, it is called the subjection of rank. Rank has jurisdiction over him by this act. There are kings who work just for themselves, and there are those who recognize the matter and know that their subjects' subjugation of them is by rank. He knows their power and rights. Allah rewards him for that with the reward of those who know. The reward of the like of this is up to Allah, in Allah's being involved in the affairs of His slaves, for all the universe is subjected by state. Who is there who cannot be referred to as being "subjected"? Allah said, "Every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29)

Lack of power was in fact the armour of Harun which saved him from the people of the Calf by mastery over the Calf as Musa had mastery over it. This is a wisdom from Allah which is manifest in existence that He should be worshipped in every form. When the form departed after that, it only departed after it had been clad with divinity by its worshipper. For this reason, there is no species but that it is worshipped, either by the worship of making divine or by the worship of subjugation. That must be so for the one who has intellect.

Nothing is worshipped in the universe except after it is clad in elevation for the worshipper and its rank is manifest in his heart. For that reason, Allah called Himself for us, "the Exalter of ranks," and He did not say the "Exalter of rank," for ranks are many in the same source. He decreed that we worship only Him in many ranks. Each rank accords a divine locus of tajalli

which is worshipped in it, and the greatest locus of tajalli in which He is worshipped and the highest, is passion (hawa). As He said, "Have you seen him who takes his passion to be his god?" (45:23) It is the greatest idol. Nothing is worshipped except by it, and it is only worshipped by itself. Of it I say:

The truth of passion is
that passion is the cause of passion.
If there had not been passion in the heart,
passion would not have been worshipped.

Do you not see how perfect Allah's knowledge of things is? How it is completed in respect of the one who worships his passion and takes it as a god? He said, "he who Allah has misguided knowingly." (45:23) Being astray is bewilderment (hayra). That is when this worshipper sees that what he worships is only his passion, by following it in obedience to Him in what He commanded him of worship of whichever person worships Him, until his worship is for Allah the Great. That too is from passion because if passion had not occurred in him in that pure presence and it is the will to love he would neither have worshipped Allah nor preferred Him to others. In the same way, everyone worships a certain form among the forms of the universe, and takes it as a god, and he only takes it by passion. The worshipper is under the power of his passion. Then he sees that idols take on various forms among the worshippers. Each worshipper, for some reason, denies the one who worships another. What he has is a nearer perception which is confused by the unity (ittihâd) of passion, rather by the oneness (ahadiyya) of passion as He mentioned. It is the same source in every worshipper. Allah led him astray, i.e. confused him in respect to a knowledge that every worshipper only worships his own passion, and only seeks to worship his passion whether or not it agrees with the command of the Shari'a.

The complete gnostic is the one who sees that every idol is a locus of Allah's tajalli in which He is worshipped. For that reason, they are all called "god" in spite of having a particular name of a stone, tree, animal, man, star, or angel. This is the nature of the personality in it. Divinity is a rank which the worshipper imagines it to have, and it is the rank of his idol. In reality, it is a locus for the tajalli of Allah belonging to the sight of this particular worshipper devoted to this idol in this particular locus of tajalli.

This is why some of those who did not recognize an ignorant statement said, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" (39:3) although they called them "god", as they said, "Has he turned all the gods into One God? That is truly astonishing." (38:5) They do not deny Him, rather they are amazed. They stop at the multiplicity of possible forms and the ascription of divinity to them. That is why the Messenger came and called them to one God who is recognized and not witnessed by their witnessing. They confuse Him with them and believe in Him when they say, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" by their knowledge of those forms in stones. This is why the proof went against them when He said, "Say: Name them!" and they only named them by what they know those names to have in reality.

As for those who recognize the matter for what it is, they manifest the form of denying what is worshipped in the way of forms because their rank is in knowledge, and their rank is in accord with their being based on the principle of the moment, since they know that the moment is one of the mighty places of the tajalli of Allah in which He gives tajalli at each moment by some of His attributes. This is why time (ad-Dahr) is one of Allah's Names. The

Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Do not curse time, for time is Allah!" At every moment, people are overcome by the principle of the quality in which He gives tajalli at that particular moment. The Messenger who is sent in that moment is the greatest manifestation of the perfection of that quality. He calls creation to Allah, manifested by tajalli in him, by obedience to him, which is obedience to Allah, as Allah says, "Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah." (4:80) This is why it is obligatory to trust in him and obey him.

However, the gnostics know that they do not worship the forms themselves. Rather, they worship Allah in them according to the power of the tajalli which they know of these forms. The one who denies and has no knowledge of what Allah has manifested in tajalli is ignorant of this. The complete gnostic veils himself from the Prophet and Messenger and their heirs. He commands himself to leave that form which the Messenger of the moment left in order to follow the Messenger desiring Allah's love for them by His words, "Say: if you love Allah, then follow me and Allah will love you." (3:31) He called on a God to whom one has recourse and Who is known in respect to the whole and is not witnessed, "nor do the eyes perceive Him, but He perceives the eyes" (6:103) by His lutf and His diffusion in the source of things. The eyes do not perceive Him as they do not perceive their spirits which govern their shapes and outward forms. "...He is the Latif, the All-Aware."

Experience is tasting, and tasting is tajalli. Tajalli occurs in forms. They must be and it must be, and the one who sees Him by his passion must worship Him, if you only knew! Allah possesses the goal of the path.

25: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sublimity in the Word of Musa (Moses)

The wisdom of the killing of the male children in respect to Musa was in order to give him the support of the life of each of those killed for his sake because each of them was killed for being Musa. There is no ignorance, so the life of the one killed for his sake had to return to Musa. It is pure life in the natural state (fitra). The desires of the self have not soiled it; rather, it is in its natural state of "Yes (bala)." (1) Musa was the sum of the lives of those killed for being him. All that was prepared for the murdered ones in the way of the predisposition of their spirits was in Musa, peace be upon him. This is a divine favour to Musa which no one before him had.

The wisdoms of Musa are numerous. If Allah wills, I will enumerate them in this chapter according to what the divine command puts into my mind. This is the first about which I shall speak in this chapter.

Musa was only born being a synthesis of many spirits. He was a concentration of effective forces since the young have an effect on the old. Do you not see how the child has an effect on the older person by the special quality the child has? The older person descends from his leading position to play with the child and rock him in his arms and to show himself at the child's level of intellect he descends to the level of the child's intellect. He is under subjugation even though he is not aware of it. He occupies himself with instructing and protecting the child, seeing to his needs and consoling him so that the child is not distressed.

All this is part of the effect of the young on the old. That is due to the strength of his station. The young has a new covenant with his Lord because he has newly come into being. The old person is further from Him. Whoever is nearer to Allah subjects whoever is further away from Him, just as the elite of the near angels subject the further ones. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to expose himself to the rain when it came down and to uncover his head so that it would fall on him. He said that it has a new covenant with Allah. Look at this recognition of Allah on the part of this Prophet! What is more glorious, more sublime and clearer than this? The rain subjected the best of men due to its proximity to its Lord. That is a likeness of the Messenger on whom the revelation descends. The rain called him by its own state, (2) and so he exposed himself to the rain in order to receive from it what it brought from his Lord. If he had not received this divine benefit from it by the rain, he would not have exposed himself to it. This is the message of water from which Allah has fashioned every living thing (3) - so understand! As for the wisdom of Musa being put into the ark and then cast into the river, the ark (tâbût) is his human nature (nâsût). The river is what he received of knowledge through his body by what the power of discernment and the sensory imaginative faculties accorded him. Only by the existence of this elemental body does the human self have these faculties or their like. When the self comes to this body and is commanded to freely dispose of it and manage it, Allah gives it these faculties as instruments by which it obtains what Allah wills that it obtain in the management of this ark which contains the sakina (4) of the Lord. Musa was cast into the river in order to receive various knowledges by these faculties. Thus Allah taught him that the spirit which manages him is the ruler. He is only managed by it. It gives him the command of these faculties of phenomenal being which are in this nâsût that is designated by the ark in the field of indications and wisdoms.

Allah manages the universe in the same way, and it is only managed by it or by its form. It is only managed by Him inasmuch as the arrival of the one begotten depends upon its being brought into existence by the begetter. Caused things depend on their causes, proven things depend on their proofs, and true things depend on their realities. All of this is part of the universe, and it is Allah's management of it, and he only manages by it.

As for our statement, "or by its form," I mean the form of the universe, and by it I mean the Most Beautiful Names and sublime attributes by which Allah is named and described. Nothing of a name by which He is called has reached us but that we found the meaning and spirit of that name in the universe. The universe is also only managed by the form of the universe.

For that reason, the Prophet said in respect of the creation of Adam who is the blueprint which gathers all the attributes of the Divine Presence which is the essence, the attributes and the actions: "Allah created Adam in His form." His form is only the Divine Presence. In this noble epitome, which is the Perfect Man, He brought into existence all the Divine Names and the realities of that which is outside of him in the Macrocosm separate from him. He made Adam a spirit (rûh) for the universe, and so He subjected to him the high and the low through the perfection of his form. As there is nothing in the universe that "does not glorify Allah's praise," (5) in the same way, there is nothing in the world which is not subject to this man according to what the reality of his form accords him. Allah says, "He has made everything that is in the heavens and the earth subservient to you. It is all from Him." (22:65) All that is in the universe is subject to man. He who knows that from his knowledge is the Perfect Man. He who is ignorant of that is the Animal Man.

The form of casting Musa into the ark and then casting the ark into the river is outwardly a form of destruction. Inwardly, it was his rescue from being killed. He was brought to life as the self is brought to life by knowledge from the death of ignorance as Allah says, "Is someone who was dead (i.e. by ignorance) and whom We brought to life (with knowledge) and supplied with a light by which to walk among the people (which is guidance) the same as someone who is in utter darkness (in being astray) unable to emerge from it (i.e. will never be guided)?" (6) In itself the matter has no end at which it stops.

Guidance is that man is guided to bewilderment (hayra). He knows that the business is bewilderment. Bewilderment is being unsettled and movement. Movement is life. There is no non-movement nor death. There is existence and not non-existence. It is the same with the water which gives life to the earth. Its movement is His word, "so it quivers" and conceives, "and swells" with pregnancy, "and sprouts plants in beautiful pairs." (7) It only gives birth to what resembles it, i.e. has a nature like it. It has being linked in pairs (zawjiya) which is the state of being doubled by what is born from it and what appears from it.

Similarly, the existence of Allah has multiplicity and the many Names. It is this or that according to what appears from it of the universe which demands the realities of the Divine Names by its development. They are doubled by it and stand in opposition to the unity of multiplicity. It is one by source in respect to its essence, as the primal substance (hayûla) is a single source in respect to its essence, while it has many forms which it supports by its essence. It is the same with Allah through the forms of tajalli which are manifested from Him. So the locii of the tajalli are the forms of the universe, in spite of the intelligible unity (ahadiyya). Look at the excellence of this divine instruction which Allah gives by granting its recognition to whoever He wishes among His slaves.

When the family of Pharaoh found him in the river by the tree, Pharaoh called him Musa. Mu is water in Coptic and sha is tree. He named him by where he found him, for the ark stopped by the tree in the river. Pharaoh wanted to kill him. His wife, speaking by divine articulation in what she said to Pharaoh about Musa since Allah had created her for perfection as Allah said about her when He testified that she and Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, have the perfection which men have (8) - said, "he may be a source of delight for me and for you." (28:9) She would be consoled by him with the perfection which she received as we have said.

The consolation of Pharaoh was with the belief Allah gave him when he was drowning. So Allah took him pure and purified. There was no impurity in him since He took him in his belief before he had acquired any wrong actions. Islam effaces what was before it. He made him a sign of His concern so that none might despair of the mercy of Allah, for "no one despairs of solace from Allah except for the unbelievers." (12:87) If Pharaoh been of those who despair, he would not have embarked on belief. Musa, peace be upon him, was, as the wife of Pharaoh said, "a source of delight for me and for you. Do not kill him. It may well be that he will be of use to us." That is what happened. Allah gave them use of Musa, although they were not aware that he was a prophet who would destroy the kingdom of Pharaoh and his family.

When Allah protected him from Pharaoh, his mother's heart was freed of the anxiety which had befallen her. Then Allah forbade him to be suckled until he had received his mother's breast, so she suckled him that Allah might complete her joy. The knowledge of the roads (sharâ'i) is like that. It is as Allah said, "to each We have made a road," (5:48) i.e. a path (tariq), "and a direction (minhaj)" from that path. This statement is an indication of the root from which he came (minhuja). It is his food as the tree has branches and yet is only nourished by its root. What is haram in one Shari'a can be halal in another Shari'a - I mean in a certain form it can be halal, while in the heart of the matter it is not really the same as what passed because the matter is new creation, not repetition. This is what we instruct you! It is referred to in connection with Musa when the wet-nurses were made haram.

In reality, the one who suckled him, not the one who bore him, is his mother. The mother of birth carried him in regard to the trust. He is formed within her and fed by her menstrual blood without any volition on her part in that, so that does not come from her benevolence towards him. He is only fed by what would destroy her or make her ill had he not been nourished on it, or had that blood not gone out of her. The embryo is a gift to its mother since it feeds on what would cause her harm had that blood remained with her and not gone out of her, or had not the embryo been nourished on it.

Suckling is not the same. By her suckling, she intends to give him life and to sustain him. Allah gave that to Musa in the mother who bore him. No woman outside of his mother by birth had any right over him that she also might find consolation in bringing him up and watching him grow in her room, and so she was not sad.

Allah saved him from the grief of the ark, so he pierced natural darkness by what Allah gave him of divine knowledge, while he did not depart from nature. He tested him with many trials (9) and gave him experience in many places so that he might realize patience in himself in the trials Allah gave him.

The first of Allah's trials was the killing of the Copt which Allah inspired him to do and gave him success in his secret yet he did not know this. However, Musa did not feel any anxiety

over killing him, although he was unsure until the command of his Lord told him, since the Prophet is inwardly protected without being aware of it until he is informed, until transmission comes to him. For this reason, al-Khidr showed him the killing of the boy, (10) so Musa criticized the killing but did not remember how he had killed the Copt. Al-Khidr told him, "I did not do it of my own volition," (18:82) and he informed him of his rank before he told him that his movement was protected in reality, but he was not aware of it.

Al-Khidr also showed him the piercing of the ship. Outwardly it was destruction, but inwardly it was rescue from the hand of the tyrant. He made that an analogy of the ark which was in the river its outward aspect was destruction, while inwardly it was rescue, for his mother did it fearing the hand of the tyrant, who was Pharaoh, that he might not kill Musa in captivity. She looked at him with the revelation Allah had inspired in her while she was not aware of it. She felt in herself that she would suckle him. When she feared for him, she cast him into the river because, as the proverb says, "What the eye does not see does not afflict the heart." She did not fear for him with the fear of the witnessing of the eye, and she was not sad with the sorrow of seeing him. It came over her thoughts that perhaps Allah would return him to her, for she had a good opinion of Him. She lived by this thought in herself and by the hope which was opposite fear and despair. When she was inspired to do this, she said, "Perhaps he is the Messenger who will destroy Pharaoh and the Copts." She lived and took joy in this, which was illusion and thought in respect of herself, but, in the heart of the matter, it is knowledge.

When they searched for Musa (after he had killed the Copt), he left in flight, fearful outwardly and in the meaning, it was love of deliverance for movement is always by love, but the onlooker is veiled from it by other causes, which are not the movement. This is because the root is the movement of the universe from non-existence which was immobile in existence. That is why it is said that the matter is movement from immobility. The movement which is the existence of the universe is the movement of love. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, quoting Allah, "I was a hidden treasure, therefore I wanted (lit. loved) to be known." (11)

If it had not been for this love, the universe would not have appeared in its source. Its movement from non-existence to existence is the movement of the love of the One who brings into existence for this purpose. The universe also loves to witness itself in existence as it was witnessed in immutability. Thus by every aspect, the movement from immutable non-existence to the existence of the sources is a movement of love, both in respect of Allah and in respect to itself.

Perfection is loved for itself. Allah's knowledge of Himself is His, since He is independent of the worlds. It belongs only to Him. The perfection of the rank of knowledge only remains by the in-time knowledge which comes from these sources. When the sources of the universe exist, then the forms of perfection appear with timeless and in-time knowledge. Thus the rank of knowledge is perfected by two aspects.

In the same way, the ranks of existence are perfected. Existence from it is before-time and not before-time, which is in-time. Pre-temporal (azali) time is the existence of Allah by Himself, and non-pre-temporal-time is the existence of Allah by the forms of the immutable universe. It is called in-time because it manifests some parts to others. He is manifest to Himself by the forms of the universe, and so existence is perfected.

The movement of the universe is by love of perfection, so understand! Do you not see how what the Divine Names bring into existence is breathed from the absence of the manifestation of their effects in a entity called the universe? It loves rest (12) which is only reached by the existence of form, high and low. Thus it is confirmed that movement occurs by love. The only movement in the entire cosmos is by love.

Among the 'ulama' are those who know that and those who are veiled by the nearer cause because it rules their state (hâl) and overpowers them. Musa was aware of his fear by what occurred through his killing the Copt. That fear implied love of deliverance from killing. So he fled by fear. In the meaning, he fled when he loved deliverance from Pharaoh and his deeds. He mentioned the nearest cause which he was aware of at that moment, which is like the form of the body of man, and love of deliverance is contained in it as the body contains the spirit which manages it.

The Prophets had the language of the outward with which they addressed people in general and on which they relied to make the one who listened understand what was said. The Messengers make allowances for people in general by their knowledge of the rank of the people of understanding. It is as the Prophet, peace be upon him, said about gifts, "I give to this man, while another man is more beloved to me than him for I fear that Allah might throw him down into the Fire." He made allowances for those whose intellect and discernment are weak and who are overcome by greed and nature.

Similarly, what they brought of knowledges, they brought wearing a robe (13) which nearer to the understanding, so that the one who has no "diving" might stop at the robe and say, "How excellent this robe is!" and he will see it as the limit of rank. Because of what this robe from the king demands, the one with subtle understanding, the one who dives for the pearls of wisdom, looks at the quality of the robe and its type of material. By it, he knows the degree of the one it covers, and so he stumbles onto a knowledge which no one else has obtained from those without knowledge of such matters.

Then the Prophets and Messengers and heirs knew that in this world and in their communities, there are those who, in this manner, express themselves in the outward language which the elite and common share. The one who is elite understands of it what the common understand, and more, inasmuch as it is valid that he be called elite. He is distinguished from the blind. Those who have obtained knowledges are content with this. This is the wisdom of his words, "I fled from you when I was in fear of you," (14) but he did not say, "I fled from you by love of safety and well-being."

Musa came to Madyan and found two women and got water for them without being paid for it. Then he turned away to the divine shade and said, "O my Lord, I am truly in need of any good You have in store for me." (28:24) He made the source of his getting water the same as the good which Allah sent down to him, and he described himself as being in need of Allah in the good which he had. Al-Khidr showed him the setting-up of the wall without wage, but Musa chided him for it. So al-Khidr reminded him of his drawing water without wage, and other things which were not mentioned. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, wished that Musa had remained silent and had not left him so that Allah would have related more about them.

Al-Khidr alerted Musa to the fact that what had come to him and would come to him was by the command of Allah and His will which it is impossible to contradict. Knowledge of that is

one of the prerogatives of wilaya. As for the Messenger, He might not acquaint him with it, for it is the secret of the decree.(15) If He had acquainted him with that, it might have been a reason for his lassitude in conveying what he was commanded to convey. Allah withholds the knowledge of this from some of the Messengers as a mercy to them from Him. He did not withhold it from our Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, because of the strength of his state. This is why our Prophet said, "I call on Allah by inner sight." (75:14)

By this he knew what Musa had succeeded in had been without knowledge on his part. If it had been from knowledge, Musa would not have criticized what al-Khidr did, since Allah had testified before Musa as to al-Khidr's purity and justice. In spite of this, Musa was heedless of the fact that Allah had made him pure, and of the conditions set down for following him. This was a mercy for us if we forget the command of Allah. If Musa had known that, al-Khidr would not have said to him, "What you have never encompassed in your knowledge," meaning I have a knowledge which you have not received by tasting as you have a knowledge which I do not know. He was just.

As for the wisdom of his parting from him, it is because Allah said of the Messenger, "Take what the Messenger brings you, and avoid what he prohibits you." (59:7) The 'ulama' of Allah who recognize this quality of the Message and the Messenger stop at this statement. Al-Khidr knew that Musa was the Messenger of Allah. He regarded what came from him to preserve the adab which is due to the Messengers. Musa said to him, "If I ask you about anything after this, then you should no longer keep me company." So he forbade al-Khidr to keep his company. When that occurred for the third time, al-Khidr therefore said, "This is where you and I part company," Musa did not tell him, "Do not do it," nor did he seek to keep him company for he knew the level of the rank he was in when he spoke of the prohibition against keeping him company. Musa was silent, and the parting took place.

Look at the perfection of these two men in knowledge and the completion of divine adab as right, and the justice of al-Khidr, peace be upon him, in what he acknowledged to Musa when he said, "I have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know, and you have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know." This information which al-Khidr imparted to Musa was a remedy for the wound inflicted on him in his words, "How indeed could you bear with patience something you have not encompassed in your knowledge?" (18:68) although he knew the sublimity of his rank with the message, and al-Khidr did not have this rank.

This appeared in the community of Muhammad in the hadith regarding the fertilization of the date tree. The Prophet, peace be upon him, told his Companions, "You know more about the matters of your daily life."¹⁶ There is no doubt that the knowledge of the thing is better than ignorance of it. Allah praises Himself, saying, "He has knowledge of all things." The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, acknowledged to his Companions that they knew more about the exigencies of this world than him because he had no experience of them. It is knowledge of tasting (dhawq) and experience, and the Prophet, peace be upon him, had not occupied himself with this sort of knowledge. Rather, he was occupied with what was more important. I have informed you about a great adab by which will benefit you if you occupy yourself with it.

Musa's statement, "My Lord gave me right judgement," (26:21) means the khilafah, "and made me one of the Messengers," means the message. Not every Messenger is a Khalif. The Khalif has a sword, duties and governance. The Messenger is not the same rather, he

transmits what he has been sent to transmit. If he does battle and defends with the sword, then he is both Khalif and Messenger.

As for the wisdom of Pharaoh's question regarding divine whatness (mâhiya) when he said, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" (26:23) that question did not arise from ignorance, but it was posed in order to test Musa and to see what answer he would give when he claimed that he had a message from his Lord. Pharaoh knew the rank of the Messengers in knowledge of Allah and he wanted to test Musa's answer to ascertain the validity of his claim. In order to inform those present, he invited an answer which would have been misleading as far as they were concerned since they did not know what Pharaoh himself knew about the question. Musa answered him with the answer of those who have knowledge of the matter. Then Pharaoh, in order to preserve his position, asserted that Musa had not answered his question. So because of the inadequacy of their understanding, it seemed clear to those who were present that Pharaoh knew more than Musa. For this reason, when Musa answered him with what was not appropriate and outwardly it is not an answer to what he was asked about and Pharaoh knew that he would only give that answer, Pharaoh then said to his companions, "Your Messenger" who was sent to you "is mad" since the knowledge of what I question him about is veiled from him (17) since it is inconceivable that it be known at all.

The question is valid. The question of the what-ness is a question about the reality of what is asked about - it must be real in itself. As for those who make definitions which consist of category and genus, these are matters shared by various things. Whoever has no category must have a reality in Himself which belongs to no other. The question is invalid in the school of the People of Allah, sound knowledge and sound intellect. The only answer to it is the answer Musa gave.

Here is a great secret! He mentioned the "act" in giving the answer to the one who asked for a definition of essence. He made the essential definition the source of the attribution to what appeared of Him in the forms of the universe, or what appeared in Him of the forms of the universe. In answer to, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" he said that He is the One in whom the forms of the universe are manifest on high which is the heaven - and below - which is the earth, "if you but have certainty," (18) or He who is manifest by them.

When Pharaoh told his companions that Musa was mad, (majnûn) in the sense that he was possessed, Musa added to the elucidation in order to inform Pharaoh of his rank in divine knowledge because he knew that Pharaoh already knew that. Musa said, "The Lord of the East and the West," bringing what was manifest and what was hidden, in the outward and the inward, "and what between them is" which is Allah's words, "He has knowledge of everything," "if you have intellect," (19) i.e. if you possess qualification since this comes from intellect.

The first answer is for those who are certain, and they are the people of unveiling and existence. Musa said, "If you have certainty," i.e. if you are the people of unveiling and existence. I have given you knowledge of what you are already certain about in your witnessing and existence. If you are not of this category, I have answered you in the second answer: if you are among the people of intellect and qualification, and you limit Allah according to what the proofs of your intellects accord.

Thus Musa manifested both aspects in order to inform Pharaoh about his question and his veracity. Musa knew that Pharaoh knew that because he asked about the what-ness of Allah.

He knew that his question was not couched in the language the ancients used in their questioning by means of what. That is why he answered him. If he had known anything else from him, he would have been mistaken in the question. Musa treated that about which he was asked as the source of the universe, and Pharaoh addressed him by this language (20) although the people present were not aware of that.

Pharaoh said to him, "If you take any god other than me, I will certainly make you one of the imprisoned." (26:29) The letter sin in prison (sijn) is one of the letters of increase, (21) meaning I will veil you, for you answered by what supported me so that I might say the same to you. If you say to me, "O Pharaoh! I do not I do not recognize your threat to me while the source is but one, so how can you separate?" Then Pharaoh replied, "The ranks are separate, but the source is not separate and it is not divided in its existence. My rank right now is power over you by actual fact, O Musa! I am you by the source and other than you by rank!"

When Musa understood that from him, he gave him his due in respect to himself and told him, "You will not be able to do that." Pharaoh's rank gave him power and influence over Musa because Allah is in the rank of Pharaoh in respect of the outward form which has authority over the rank in which Musa appeared in that assembly.

Therefore Musa told him that Allah had manifested a barrier to his hostility against Musa. He said, "Even if I were to bring you something undeniable?" Pharaoh could only reply, "Produce it then, if you are someone telling the truth" so that Pharaoh would not appear to be unjust among those of his nation who were weak-minded. They had doubts about him, and they were the group Pharaoh made unsteady. However, they obeyed Pharaoh because they were a corrupt people; (22) that is, lacking sound intellects' rejection of taking Pharaoh's claims literally. The intellect stops at a certain limit, and only those of unveiling and certainty can cross that limit. This is why in his answer, Musa first addressed those of certainty and then address those of the intellect.

"So he drew down his staff ('asa)" (26:32) which is the form with which Pharaoh defied (23) ('asa) Musa when he refused to answer his call. "And there it was, unmistakably a snake," i.e. an evident snake. Thus rebellion, which is evil, changed into obedience, which is good, as Allah says, "Allah will transform their evil deeds into good deeds," (25:70) meaning in judgement. Here the judgement manifested a differentiated source in a single substance (jawhar) so it is a staff, a snake, and a manifest serpent. It devoured its likes among the snakes in the form of a snake, and the staffs in the form of a staff. The proof of Musa overcame the proofs of Pharaoh in the form of staffs, snakes and ropes. The sorcerers had ropes, but Musa did not have a rope. The "rope" is the small hill; (24) that is, their powers in relation to the power of Musa is as the hills are to the lofty mountains.

When the sorcerers saw that, they recognized Musa's rank in knowledge and they saw that he possessed a power which was not mortal. If it had been within the power of a mortal, it would only belong to someone who could distinguish sure knowledge from imagination and illusion. So they believed in "the Lord of the Worlds, the Lord of Musa and Harun" - that is, the Lord to whom Musa and Harun summoned them because they knew that the people understood that they were not being called to Pharaoh. Pharaoh was in the position of authority, and he was the master of the moment since he was the Khalif with the sword, even though he broke the customary divine laws when he said, "I am your Lord most high" - i.e. since all are lords, (25) I am the highest of them through the power which you have outwardly given me over you. The sorcerers knew that he spoke the truth in what he said, and

they did not deny it. They affirmed that to Pharaoh, and said, "You only judge in this passing life, so judge as you like, for the kingdom is yours." So the statement of Pharaoh, "I am your Lord most high," was valid. Although the source is from Allah, the form is Pharaoh's. He cut off the hands and feet, and crucified through a real source in false form in order to attain the ranks which are only attained by that act.

There is no way to neutralize causes because the source-forms necessitate them. They only appear in existence by the form on which they are based at the source since "there is no changing the words of Allah." (10:64) The words of Allah are not other than the sources of existent things. Timelessness is ascribed to Him in respect to their permanence, and in-time ness is ascribed to them in respect of their existence and appearance. Thus we say, a certain man or guest happened (26) to be with us today." That does not mean that he did not have any existence before this event. For that reason, Allah says about His Mighty Word which is timeless, "No reminder (dhikr) from their Lord comes to them lately renewed (27) without their listening to it as if it were a game," (21:2) and "but no fresh (28) reminder reaches them from the All- Merciful, without their turning away from it." (26:5) The Merciful only brings mercy, and whoever turns away from mercy advances the punishment which is the absence of mercy.

As for the words of Allah, "but their belief when they saw Our violent force was of no use to them. That is the pattern Allah has always followed with His slaves," (29) (40:85) that did not mean that it did not profit them in the Next World through His exception, "except for the people of Yunus." He meant that that did not prevent them being punished in this world. For that reason, Pharaoh was seized in spite of the existence of his belief even though his affair was that of someone who is certain that his death is approaching. The circumstances accord that he was not certain that he was going to die because he saw the believers walking on the dry path which had appeared when Musa struck the sea with his staff. Pharaoh was not certain that he would perish since he believed that he would not die until the moment actually reached him. He believed in the One in whom the Tribe of Israel believed, in certainty of his deliverance.

It was indeed certain, but it was in a form other than the one he wanted. He was saved from the punishment of the Next World in himself and his body was saved as Allah says, "Today We will save your body that you might be a sign for those after you," (10:92) because, if his form had vanished, his people might have said that he had gone into occultation. His known form appeared as a corpse that it might be known that it was really him. Deliverance was encompassed both in the senses and in the meaning.

The one who has the word of the punishment in the Other World realized for him (30) will not believe, even if every ayat had been brought to him, "so that they might see the painful punishment," that is, taste the punishment of the Next World. Pharaoh left this class of people. This is the literal meaning of what the text of the Qur'an brought us. We say, and the matter belongs to Allah, that the fixed idea which the common people have regarding the wretchedness of Pharaoh is not based on anything in the divine text. As for his family, that is another judgement. This is not the place to mention it.

Know that Allah only takes someone while he believes that is, affirms what divine transmissions bring, and I mean those who are consciousness at death. This is why dislikes sudden death and being killed while unaware is disliked. The definition of sudden death is that the incoming breath goes out and the outcoming breath does not come in. This is sudden

death and when that happens, one is not conscious of death.

It is the same if a man is killed unawares by a blow from behind on the back of the neck. He is then taken with whatever belief or disbelief he possesses at that moment. For that reason, the Prophet said, "One will be gathered in the state in which one dies," as one is taken in whatever one is doing at the time. The one who is conscious of death is only the one who sees it coming. He believes what he sees. He is only taken in what he is doing because that is an existent expression connected to time by the circumstances. We distinguish between the unbeliever who is conscious at death and the unbeliever either killed while unaware or who dies suddenly as we have said in the definition of sudden death.

As for the wisdom of tajalli and the discourse on the form of the fire, this was because it was the object of Musa's desire. Allah gave him a tajalli in what he was searching for so that Musa would turn to Him and not turn away. If Allah had given the tajalli in other than the form which he was seeking, Musa would have turned away because his interest was concentrated on a particular goal. If he had turned away, his action would have rebounded on him, and Allah would have turned away from him. Musa was the chosen one and the one brought near. When Allah brings someone near to Him, He gives him a tajalli in the object he desires, without him knowing it.

Like the Fire of Musa
which he saw as what he needed.
It was Allah,
but he did not perceive it.

Notes to Chapter 25:

1. "Yes, we testify." Qur'an 7:172. Before the selves were created, Allah asked them, "Am I not your Lord?" They replied. "Yes, we testify."
2. In the form of knowledge and life descending from Allah.
3. See Qur'an 21:30.
4. Divine Presence which causes calmness and tranquillity in the hearts of the Believers. It is also related to the Ark of the Covenant and to Bayt al-Maqdis, when the invisible Sakina/Shechina descends from above. See 2:249: "The sign of his kinship is that the Ark will come to you, containing a Sakina from your Lord, and certain relics left by the families of Musa and Harun left. It will be borne by angels."
5. Qur'an 17:44.
6. Qur'an 6:122.
7. Qur'an 22:5.
8. Qur'an 66:11: "Allah has made an example for the believers - the wife of Pharaoh when she said, 'My Lord, build a house in the Garden for me in Your Presence, and rescue me from Pharaoh and his deeds.'"
- Also the hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Musa, "Many men have been perfect, but among women only Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, and Asiya, wife of Pharaoh, were perfect."
9. See Qur'an 20:40, "We rescued you from trouble and tested you with many trials."
10. See the story in the Qur'an 18:65-82.
11. Hadith qudsi.
12. i.e. reaching the perfection of love. This is called or love or yearning after the parting.
13. khil'a, a robe of honor.
14. Qur'an 26:21.

15. Sirr al-Qadar.
16. Hadith narrated by Imam Muslim.
17. Madness "junun" is related to veils.
18. "The Lord of the heavens and the earth and what is between them is you have certainty."
Qur'an 26:24.
19. Qur'an 26:28.
20. of unveiling.
21. Zawa'id, the augmentative letters, i.e. the ten letters which are added to the radical letters in Arabic words sin, hamza, alif, lam, ta', mim, waw, nun, ya' and ha'. If you take away the sin from sijn (prison), you get "jinn" meaning veil.
22. See Qur'an 43:54, "In that way he swayed his people and they succumbed to him. They were a people of deviators."
23. 'Asâ as a noun means "staff", and 'Asâ as a verb means "to rebel against , oppose."
24. Habl meaning "rope" also means mound or small hill.
25. Lord being a relative name, demanding a subject, also because it means owner, so one says the lord of the house, the "lord" of a herd, etc. Also one who looks after, the "lord" of a child.
26. Huduth means coming into existence for the first time. It also means an event or occurrence.
27. Muhdath.
28. Muhdath.
29. It like is in Qur'an 10:98, where the punishment is removed from the people of Yunus after they believed.
30. See Qur'an 39:71.

26: The Seal of the Wisdom of What One Turns to (as-Samad) in the Word of Khalid

As for the wisdom of Khalid ibn Sinan, (1) by his call he manifested the Prophethood of the interspace. He claimed that he would tell them about what happens after death. He commanded that he should be disinterred and questioned in order that he might report that the judgement in the Interspace occurs in the form of the life of this world. Thus it would be known that all the Messengers spoke the truth in what they related in this life regarding what happens after death. Khalid's goal was that all the world would believe in what the Messengers brought so that there would be mercy for all. He was honored by his Prophethood being near the time of the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. He knew that Allah had sent Muhammad as a mercy to the worlds, but Khalid was not a Messenger. He wanted to receive a generous share of this mercy contained in the message of Muhammad. He was not commanded to convey the message, but he wanted to have that share in the Interspace so that there would be stronger knowledge about the creation, and for this reason his people squandered him.

The Messenger of Allah described them as having squandered their Prophet because they did not do what he wanted them to do. Did Allah give him the reward for what he wanted? There is no doubt and no disagreement that he had the reward of what he wished, but there is doubt and disagreement about the reward of the goal. Is wishing for it the same in the Next World as its occurrence even though it did not occur or not? In the Shari'a, equality is not supported in many places such as in the case of the one who performs the prayer in the group. (2) The one who prays it in the group has a reward from the presence of the group. He is like the person who, in spite of poverty, desires to be able to give charity as the people of wealth and property do. He has the like of their rewards, but the like of their rewards can be in their intentions or their deeds. The people had both the intention and the action. The Prophet, peace be upon him, did not prescribe both of them, nor one of them, and outwardly they are not the same. For that reason, Khalid ibn Sinan sought the proclamation to confirm for him the station of joining both matters so that he would receive two rewards. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 26:

1. Al-Qashani, the commentator, says that Khalid lived in Aden, and was a man of great himma who was overcome in the contemplation of divine unity. One day a great fire appeared from a cave among his people. It destroyed the crops and the livestock, and the people called on him to protect them from it. He struck the fire with his staff, saying, "Away! Away!" until it became cold and retreated to the cave. Then he told his people that he would enter the cave in order to extinguish the fire, and he told them to call him after three full days had passed. Should he call him before that, he would come out and die. If they were patient, he would emerge in good health.

They waited two days, and then Shaytan made them restless, and doubts came to them and they were afraid that he might have been destroyed. They shouted to him. He emerged from the cave with his hand on his head from the pain their shouting had caused him. He told them, "You have killed me and squandered my word and my covenant." He then told them of his death and commanded them to bury him and then watch for forty days. Then, he said, a flock of sheep led by a donkey with slit ears and its tail cut off would come to them. When it stood opposite his grave, they were to disinter him and he would rise and tell them of the true state of things after death from witnessing and vision so that all creation would receive certainty as to what the Messenger related. Then he died and they buried him.

They waited until the forty days had passed. The flock of sheep came led by a donkey with slit ears. It stopped opposite his grave, so they understood that they should disinter Khalid as he had commanded them so that he might inform them as to the truth of the Prophets. Some of his older sons were adverse to that and said that it would shame them among the Arabs and that they would be called, "the sons of the disinterred one." There was the vehemence of the Jahiliya in that. They squandered their legacy and destroyed him. After the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was sent, a daughter of Khalid came to him, and he said to her, "Greetings to you, O daughter of a Prophet whose people squandered him!"

2. His Prophethood did not appear in this world.

27: The Seal of the Unique Wisdom in the Word of Muhammad

Muhammad's wisdom is uniqueness (fardiya) because he is the most perfect existent creature of this human species. For this reason, the command began with him and was sealed with him. He was a Prophet while Adam was between water and clay, (1) and his elemental structure is the Seal of the Prophets. The first singular is three, and what is more than this firstness of individuals comes from three. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is the surest proof of his Lord, so he was given all the words, (2) which are everything that is named by the names of Adam. (3) He resembles the proof in its threefoldness, and the proof is a proof of itself. Then his reality grants the first uniqueness which is threefold in structure. For that reason, speaking about the domain of love which is the root of existence, he said, "I was made to love three things in your world," (4) because of what this world has of threefoldness. Then he mentioned women, and perfume, and that the coolness of his eye was in the prayer.

The Prophet began by mentioning women and ended with the prayer. That is because woman is part of man in the root of the manifestation of her source, and because man's recognition of himself preceded his recognition of his Lord. That is why the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." If you wish, you can say that this tradition is the forbidding of gnosis and stating the inability to attain to Him - and that is a permissible statement; and, if you wish, you can say that it is the affirmation of gnosis. The first is that if you do not know yourself, so you will not know your Lord. The second is that you recognize yourself, so you do recognize your Lord. Muhammad was the clearest proof of his Lord. Every part of the world indicates its root which is its Lord, so understand!

The Prophet was made to love women, so he yearned for them because as the whole yearns for what is part of it. The matter is self-evident through what Allah says regarding this elemental human constitution, "and I breathed My Ruh into him." (15:29; 38:72) Then He described Himself with intensity of yearning to meet those who yearn for Him. He said, "O Dawud! I have intense yearning for them," i.e. those who yearn for Him, and it is a particular encounter. The Prophet said in a hadith about the Dajjal, "None of you will see his Lord until after he dies." (5) Allah must yearn for those near ones - because even though He sees them and wants them to see Him, that encounter is still prevented by man's station. That is like His words "until We know" although He is Knowing. He yearns for this particular attribute which only is achieved existence through death.

By this, He tests their yearning for Him as He said in the hadith of hesitation which concerns this matter, "I do not hesitate in anything I do, but I hesitate to take the breath of My believing slave because he hates death, and I hate to make him die. But He must meet Me." He gave him good news and did not say to him, "he must die" because He did not want to distress him by mentioning death. Man only meets Allah after death as the Prophet says, "None of you will see his Lord until he dies." That is why Allah says, "He must meet Me," for Allah desires the existence of this relationship. He made it clear that He breathed into him some of His spirit (rûh) so He only yearns for him. Do you not see that He created him on His form because he is from His Spirit?

Man's constitution is based on these four elements which are called the "humors" in his body. The combustion of the moisture found in the body occurs from his breath. The spirit of man

is fire as regards his constitution. For this reason, Allah only spoke to Musa in the form of fire, (6) and put his need in it. If his constitution had been from nature, (7) then his spirit would have been light. Allah alluded to it with the blowing (nafkh) which indicates that it is from the breath (nafas) of the All-Merciful. It is by this breath, which is the blowing-out that he manifested from Him, and by the predisposition of the one blown into, that combustion is fire and not light. The breath of Allah is hidden in that by which man is man.

From man, He derived a person in his form called "woman". She appeared in his form, and he yearned for her with the longing of that thing has for itself, and she yearned for him with the longing of that thing has for its home. Allah made him love women. Allah loves the one whom He created in His form, and He made the luminous angels, in spite of the power of their might and their station and the sublimity of their natural constitution, prostrate to him. (8) From this comes the affinity which occurs in the form which man and woman share, which is like that between Allah and man. The form has the greatest affinity, as well as the most glorious and perfect. It makes a pair that is, doubles the existent belonging to Allah, as the woman, by her existence, doubles man, and makes him one of a pair. So three appeared: Allah, man and woman. Man yearns for his Lord who is the origin as woman yearns for man.

His Lord made him love women as Allah loves the one who is in His form. Love only occurred by the One by whom he is formed. His love was for the One he was formed by, and He is Allah. This is why the Prophet said, "He made me love...", and he did not say, "I loved" as coming from himself because his love is connected to his Lord in Whose form he is. In his love for his wife, he loves her by Allah's love for him as a divine nature. (9)

When a man loves a woman, he desires union, that is, the goal of union which exists in love. In the elemental form, there is no greater union than marriage. (10) By this appetite encompasses all parts. For that reason, complete ritual washing is prescribed after intercourse. Purification envelops him as annihilation in the woman was complete in the obtainment of appetite. Allah is very jealous of His slave if He believes that he finds pleasure in other than Him. So man purifies himself by ritual washing in order to return to Him in whom he was annihilated, since that is all there is.

When man witnesses Allah in women, his witnessing is in the passive; when he witnesses Him in himself, regarding the appearance of woman from Him, he witnesses Him in the active. When he witnesses Him from himself without the presence of any form from him, his witnessing is in the passive directly from Allah without any intermediary. So his witnessing of Allah in the woman is the most complete and perfect because he witnesses Allah inasmuch as He is both active and passive. Regarding himself, He is passive in particular. For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, loved women because of the perfection of the witnessing of Allah in them since one does not ever witness Allah free of matter. Allah by His essence is independent of the worlds. So from this aspect, the business is impossible, yet witnessing only occurs in matter. The witnessing of Allah in women is the greatest and most perfect witnessing. The greatest union is marriage.

It is like the projection of His will on the one He created in His form in order to create him. He sees His form in him, rather, He sees Himself. He fashioned him and balanced him and breathed into him of His spirit (rûh) which is His breath. Outwardly he is creation, and inwardly he is Allah. For this reason, Allah describes Himself with having management of this frame. He "directs the whole affair from the heaven," which is the height of the earth, "to earth," (32:5) which is the lowest of the low, because it is the lowest of all the elements.

He called them women (an-nisâ') which is a plural which does not have a singular form. For that reason, he said, "He made me love three things in your world: women..." and he did not say, "woman". He took note of the fact that they came after him in existence. The word an-nisa' also means postponement. Allah says, "The month postponed is an increase in disbelief," (9:37) and the sale of "nasi'a" is said to be by postponement, that is, by credit. That is why he said an-nisa'. He loved them only by rank, and they are the place of the passive. They are to him as nature is to Allah in which Allah opened the forms of the world by the projection of the will and the divine command which is marriage in the world of elemental forms, and aspiration (himma) in the world of luminous spirits, as in the order of premises and their meanings through deduction. All of that is the marriage of the first uniqueness in each of these aspects. Whoever loves women in this measure, loves with a divine love. Whoever loves them in respect to natural appetite in particular, deprives himself of the knowledge of this appetite. For him it is a form without a spirit (rûh). That form in the heart of the matter is the essence of a spirit, but it is not witnessed by the one who comes to his wife or any woman by pure gratification, and he does not perceive the one it is for even so, he has no knowledge of himself, as others have no knowledge of him, since he has not been verbally named so that he could be known.

One of them said:

It is confirmed with people
that I am a passionate lover,
although they do not know
the object of my passion.

It is the same with the one who loves gratification - he loves the place in which it occurs, being the woman, but the spirit of the question is obscure to him. If he had known it, he would have known by whom he has pleasure and who it is that has pleasure. He would have been perfect.

Similarly, the woman has a lower degree than the man by the words of Allah, "As for men, they have a degree over them." (2:228) The one created on the form is lower in degree than the one who is fashioned in His form, (11) even though he is in His form. This is the degree by which He is distinguished from the form. So Allah is independent of the universe, and He is the first Doer. The form is the second doer, and does not have the firstness which Allah has. Sources are distinguished by ranks. "He gives each thing its creation," (12) as every gnostic gives each thing with a right its due.

That love that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had for women came from divine love. "Allah gives everything its creation," and that is the source of its truth. He only gave creation to it by merit, so it merits what He called it that is, by the essence of the created thing.

He put women first because they are the place of the passive as nature precedes that which exists from it by means of form. Nature in reality is only the breath of the Merciful. The forms of the universe, high and low, are introduced into it by the diffusion of the breath (nafkha) in the primal substance (jawhar hayulânî), particularly in the world of bodies. As for its diffusion by the existence of the luminous spirits and non-essentials (a'râd), that is another kind of diffusion.

In this tradition, the Prophet put the feminine before the masculine because he meant to attach

importance to women. He said, "Three (thalath, the feminine form of the number) and he did not say thalatha (the masculine) with the ha' which is by the number of the masculine since scent (tīb) is one of the three, and it is masculine. The custom among the Arabs is that the masculine takes precedence over the feminine. When they say, "The Fatimas and Zayd went out," they saw kharajû (mas. pl) and do not say kharajna (fem. pl). The masculine, even if it is only one, take precedence over the feminine, even if they are a group. The Prophet was Arab, so he respected the meaning which was intended by showing love for what did not happen through his own love. Then Allah informed him of what he did not know, and Allah's bounty to him was great. (13) The feminine took precedence over the masculine by his word, thalath without ha'. Who knew the realities better than him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace? Who had greater care to observe rights and dues?

Then he placed the seal with what was like the first since it is also feminine (salat, prayer, is feminine), and he placed the masculine between them, as in existence. He began with "women" and ended with "prayer", both of which are feminine while perfume is masculine. The man is between the essence from which he appeared and then the woman appeared from him. So man is between two feminines, the form of the Essence (14) from which he appeared, and a real feminine, woman, who appeared from him. Similarly, women is a real feminine, and the prayer is not a real feminine. Scent is the masculine between the two, as Adam is between the essence from which he has existence and Hawwa' (Eve), who existed from him. If you wish, you can say "attribute (sifa)" which is also feminine. If you wish, you can say, "power (qudra)" and it is feminine. Be of whatever school you wish. You will always find that the feminine takes precedence, even among the people of cause ('illa) who make Allah a cause in the existence of the form, and cause is also feminine.

As for the wisdom of the perfume which he mentioned after women, because women have fragrance in their form, the most fragrant of perfumes is the embrace of the lover as they say in the common example. When the Prophet was created a slave, by the nobility of his origin, he did not lift his head at all to mastery rather, he continued to prostrate himself in humility and to remain passive in spite of who he was until Allah formed from Him what He had intended. He gave him the rank of action in the world of breaths, and the breaths are fragrant scents. So Allah made him love perfume. For that reason, he put perfume after women.

He observed the ranks which belong to Allah in His words, "Raiser of ranks is He, Possessor of the throne" (40:15) by His sitting on it by the name of the All-Merciful. There is none among those that the Throne encompasses but that divine mercy touches him. That is the words of Allah, "My mercy embraces all things," (7:156) and the Throne encompasses everything, and the One who sits on it is the Merciful. By its reality, mercy is diffused through the universe as we explained in another part in this book and in The Makkan Revelations.

Allah put perfume in this marital connection in the innocence of 'A'isha, (15) may Allah be pleased with her! He said, "Corrupt (16) men are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; and good (17) women are for good men, and good men are for good women. The latter are innocent of what they say." (24:26) He made their scent fragrant because the word is breath, and it is the source of the scent. It goes out with fragrance and putrefaction according to what appears in the form of speech. As it is divine by the nobility of its origin, it is all good, and so it is good. As for what is not praised and is censured, it is good and bad. The Prophet said in respect to the badness of garlic, "It is a plant whose scent I dislike." He did not say, "I dislike it." The source is not disliked, but he disliked what appeared from it.

Dislike for that is either by custom or unsuitability of nature, by something in the Shari'a, or a lack of perfection or something other than what we have mentioned.

Since the command is divided into corrupt and good as we confirmed, he was made to love perfume rather than repulsive odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. Since there is putrefaction in this elemental structure as it is created of "dry clay from mud moulded (or fetid)," (18) so the angels dislike it by essence. The nature of the dung-beetle is offended by the scent of the rose which is one of the pleasant scents. For the dung-beetle, the scent of the rose is not a pleasant scent. If someone has the same sort of nature (as the dung beetle) in meaning and form, the truth offends him when he hears it, and he is gladdened by the false. It is what Allah said, "those who believe in falsehood and reject Allah." (29:52) He described them with loss, and said, "those, they are the losers" who have lost themselves. Whoever does not distinguish goodness from corruption, has no perception.

Allah made the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, love only the good (the perfume) of everything, and there is only that. Can it be conceived that there is a disposition in the universe which only finds good in everything but does not recognize the bad? We say that there is not. We find it in the very root from which the universe appeared which is Allah; we find that He hates and loves. The corrupt is only that which He hates, and the good is only that which He loves. The universe is the form of Allah, and man is in both forms. There is no nature which only perceives one matter in everything - rather, the nature distinguishes the good from the corrupt in spite of the fact that it knows that it is corrupt by tasting and good without tasting. The perception of the good in it diverts him from the sensation of its corruptness. This can happen. As for the removal of the corrupt from the universe that is, from phenomenal being it is not admissible. The mercy of Allah extends to both the corrupt and the good. The corrupt considers itself good, but the good in itself is corrupt. There is nothing but good but that an aspect of its disposition is bad, and vice versa.

As for the third by which uniqueness (fardiyya) is completed, it is the prayer. The Prophet said, "and the coolness of the eye (19) is in the prayer" because it is contemplation. That is because it is intimate discourse between Allah and His slave as Allah says, "Remember Me, and I will remember you." (2:152) It is worship ('ibâda) which is divided in two parts between Allah and His slave one part belongs to Allah and one part to His slave, as has come in sound transmission from Allah in which He says, "I divided the prayer into two parts between Me and My slave. One part is Mine and one part is My slave's, and My slave will receive what he asks for. The slave says, 'In the name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has mentioned Me.' Then the slave says, 'Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds,' and Allah says, 'My slave has praised Me.' The slave says, 'The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has glorified Me. My slave has given Me authorisation.'" (20) All this part belongs purely to Allah.

"Then the slave says, 'You alone we worship. You alone we ask for help,' and Allah says, 'This is between Me and My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" Sharing occurs in this ayat. "The slave then says, 'Guide us in the straight path, the path of those You have blessed, not of those with anger on them nor of the misguided,' and Allah says, 'This is for My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" This is purely for His slave as the first part is purely for Allah. The knowledge of this makes the recitation of the Fatiha obligatory. Whoever does not recite it has not prayed the prayer establish between Allah and His slave.

The prayer is then a secret conversation (munajat). It is remembrance/invocation (dhikr). When someone mentions Allah, he sits with Allah and Allah sits with him. It is a sound divine transmission that Allah said, "I sit with the one who mentions Me." (21) Whoever sits with the One he mentions and has sight, sees the One with whom he sits. This is contemplation (mushahada) and vision. If he does not have sight, he does not see Him. Thus the one who prays knows his rank, and whether or not he sees Allah with this vision in the prayer. If he does not see Him, then let him worship Him by belief (iman) as if he saw Him, imagining Him to be in the qibla of his conversation, and let him listen for Allah's reply.

Without a doubt, everyone who prays is an Imam, so the angels pray behind the slave when he prays alone, as is related in tradition. If he is the Imam for his particular world and the angels pray with him, then he has attained the rank of the Messenger in his prayer which is deputyship from Allah. When he says, "Allah hears whoever praises Him," (22) he informs himself and whoever is behind him that Allah has heard him. The angels and those present say, "Our Lord, praise belongs to You."

Allah says on the tongue of the slave, "Allah hears whoever praises Him." Look at the sublimity of the rank of the prayer and where it takes the one who has it! Whoever does not achieve the rank of vision in the prayer has not reached the goal nor does he have the coolness of the eye in it because he does not see the One he addresses. If he does not hear the answer of Allah, he is not one of those who listen. Whoever is not present in the prayer with his Lord, and does not hear nor see Him, is not one who prays at all, and he is not along those "who listen well, having seen the evidence." (30:37)

The prayer is the only form of 'ibada during which one is forbidden to perform any other action. The mention of Allah in it is greater than the words and actions it contains. We mentioned the attribute of the perfect man in the prayer in The Makkan Revelations and his nature, because Allah says that "the prayer precludes indecency and wrongdoing" (29:45) since it is set down in the Shari'a that the one performing the prayer cannot act in anything except this 'ibâda as long as he is in it, and he is called the one the prays (musalli). "The remembrance of Allah is greater still" (29:45) in it that is, the mention which is from Allah to His slave when He answers him in his request, and his praise of Him is greater than the mention of the slave of his Lord in it, because greatness belongs to Allah. (23) This is why He says, "Allah knows what you do," and He says, "He who listen well, having seen the evidence" he gives ear to what Allah mentions in the prayer.

Therefore, since existence is from an intelligible movement which transported the universe from non-existence to existence, the prayer encompasses all movements. There are three movements: vertical, which is the state of standing in the prayer, the horizontal, which is the state of bowing, and the downward movement, which is the state of prostration. The movement of man is vertical, the movement of the animal is horizontal, and the movement of plants is downward. The inanimate does not have a movement from its essence. If a rock moves, it moves by other means than itself.

As for the words of the Prophet, "The coolness of my eye is in the prayer," he did not ascribe the action of putting it there to himself, so Allah gives the one who prays a tajalli which stems from Him, not from the one who prays. If he had not mentioned this attribute from himself, he would have commanded the prayer without tajalli from Him to him. Since that is from Him by means of graciousness, the contemplation is also through graciousness. He said, "the coolness of my eye is in the prayer," and it is only contemplation of the Beloved by

which the eye of the lover is delighted by continuance. The eye remains seeing Allah. It does not look with Him to other than Him in anything, and for that reason, it is forbidden to turn away in the prayer. The glance is something which Shaytan steals from the prayer of the slave in order to forbid him the contemplation of the Beloved. (24) If Allah had truly been the Beloved of the one who turns aside, he would not have turned aside in his prayer to another qibla. Man knows his state in himself, whether he is like that in this particular act of worship or not. "Man will be clear proof against himself in spite of any excuses he might offer." (75:14) He recognizes his lie apart from his truth in himself, because man is not ignorant of his state, his state has tasting (dhawq) for him.

The prayer has another portion. Allah commanded us to pray to Him, and He told us that He prays for us. The prayer is from us and from Him. When He prays, He prays by His name, the Last, for it comes after the existence of the slave, and it is the source of Allah which the slave created in his qibla by logical discernment or by imitation. He is the God of the one who has a creed. It varies according to what the place of the tajalli has and according to the established predisposition as al-Junayd said when he was asked about recognition of Allah and the gnostic. He said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel." It is a masterly answer giving information about the matter for what it is. This is Allah who prays for us. If we pray, we have the name, the Last, so we are in it, as we mentioned, in the state of the One who has this name we are with Him according to our state. He only regards us by the form which we bring to Him.

The one who prays is behind the one who precedes him in the place. It is His words, "Each one knows its prayer and its glorification " (24:41) that is, its rank in being behind the worship of its Lord and the extolling which his predisposition accords him of disconnection (tanzih). "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise" of its Lord, the Forbearing, the Forgiving. For that, we do not understand the extolling of the universe distinctly, (25) creature by creature.

Then a rank refers the pronoun to the extolling slave in His words, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise," that is, the praise of that thing. The pronoun which is in His word, "His praise (bi-hamdihi)" refers to the thing - that is, with the praise that is from it.

As we said of the one who has a creed other than Islam, he praises the God who is in his creed and attaches himself to Him. What is from his work returns to him, so he only praises himself. It is from the praise of fabrication the artisan is praised without a doubt, and so the excellence of what he creates or its lack of excellence returns to the artisan. The god of a creed is the product of the one who looks at it, and it is his fabrication; his praise for what he believes is his praise for himself. For this reason, he condemns the creed of another if he had been fair, he would not have done that. Indeed, the possessor of this particular object of worship is certainly ignorant in his rejection of other than what he believes about Allah, since had he recognized what al-Junayd said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel," he would have conceded to everyone who has a creed what he believed in, and he would have recognized Allah in every form of worship of every person with a creed, He has opinion but does not know it. For that reason, Allah says, "I am in My slave's opinion of Me," (26) that is, I only appear to him in the form of his creed. If he wishes, he generalizes, and if he wishes, he limits. The god of creeds is taken from definition, so He is the God which the heart of His slave encompasses. (27)

The Absolute Divinity is not encompassed by anything because He is the source of things and

the source of Himself. It is not said of the thing that it encompasses itself, not that it does not encompass itself, so understand! "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 27:

1. Hadith, "I was a Prophet when Adam was still between water and clay."
2. Hadith, "I was given all the words."
3. Qur'an 2:31, "And He taught Adam the names of all things..."
4. Hadith in an-Nasa'i and Ibn Hanbal: "I was made to love three things in your world: women, perfume, and the coolness of my eye in the prayer."
5. Hadith in Muslim (fitan:95) and at-Tirmidhi.
6. The Burning Bush.
7. i.e. from the nature of the world of Purity.
8. Qur'an 2:34.
9. Since his nature (khuluq) was immense or mighty ('adhim) as Allah said, "You are truly immense in character," (68:4) and as 'A'isha said of the Prophet, "His nature was the Qur'an."
10. Nikah, or marriage, actually means lawful intercourse.
11. See Qur'an 6:98.
12. See Qur'an 20:50.
13. Qur'an 4:113, "Allah's favour to you is indeed immense."
14. Dhat, essence, is feminine.
15. The following verse was revealed about 'A'isha in the affair of the Lie and declared her innocence in the affair.
16. Khabith, also meaning with a repulsive odor.
17. Tayyib, means good, wholesome, fragrant, from the same root as perfume, tîb.
18. See Qur'an 15:26.
19. i.e. that which delights me.
20. Muslim 4:38, 41, etc.
21. Hadith qudsi in Ibn Majah and Ibn Hibban.
22. When he comes up from ruku' in the prayer.
23. See Qur'an: 45:37.
24. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim. "(Looking aside in the prayer) is something which Shaytan snatches from a slave's prayer."
Also the hadith in Ibn Hanbal and elsewhere: "Allah continues to turn favorably towards a slave while he is engaged in the prayer as long as he does not look to the side. But if he does so He departs from him."
25. See Qur'an 17:44, "The seven heavens and the earth and everyone in them glorify Him. There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise; but you do not understand their glorification. He is the All-Forbearing, Ever-Forgiving."
26. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari, "I am in My slave's opinion and I am with him when he remembers Me..."
27. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My heaven nor My earth contains Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."

Fusus al-Hikam

The Seals of Wisdom

Muhi-e-Din Ibn Arabi

Translated to English by Aisha Bewley

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1) The Seal of Divine Wisdom in the Word of Adam

When Allah - glory be to Him! - willed that the source of His most Beautiful Names - which are beyond enumeration - be seen (or you can equally say that He willed His source to be seen), He willed that they be seen in a microcosmic being which contained the entire matter, (1) endowed with existence, and through which His secret was manifested to Him. For how a thing sees itself through itself is not the same as how it sees itself in something else which acts as a mirror for it. So He manifests Himself to Himself in a form which is provided by the place in which He is seen. He would not appear thus without the existence of this place and His manifestation (tajalli) to Himself in it.

Allah brought the entire universe into existence through the existence of a form fashioned without a spirit (rûh), like an unpolished mirror. Part of the divine decree is that He does not fashion a locus without it receiving a divine spirit, which is described as being "blown" (2) into it. This is nothing other than the result of the predisposition of that fashioned form to receive the overflowing perpetual tajalli which has never ceased and which will never cease. Then we must speak of the container (qâbil). The container comes from nothing other than His most sacredly pure Overflowing. So the whole affair has its beginning from Him, and its end is to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) as it began from Him. Thus the command decreed the polishing of the mirror of the universe. Adam was the very polishing of that mirror and the spirit of that form.

The angels are some of the faculties of that form which is the form of the universe, which the Sufis designate in their technical vocabulary as the Great Man (al-Insân al-Kabîr), for the angels are to it as the spiritual (rûhânî) and sensory faculties are to the human organism. Each of these faculties is veiled by itself, and it sees nothing which is superior to its own essence, for there is something in it which considers itself to be worthy of high rank and an elevated degree with Allah. It is like this because it has an aspect of the divine synthesis (jam'îya). In it is something which derives from the divine side and something which derives from the side of the reality of the realities. This organism carries these attributes as determined by the universal nature which encompasses the containers of the universe from the most exalted to the basest. However, the intellect cannot perceive this fact by means of logical investigation for this sort of perception only exists through divine unveiling by which one recognises the basis of the forms of the universe which receive the spirits.

This being was called both a human being (insân) and khalif. As for his humanness, it comes from the universality of his organism and his ability to embrace all of the realities. He is in relation to Allah as the pupil, (3) being the instrument of vision, is to the eye. This is why he is called "insân". It is by him that Allah beholds His creatures and has mercy on them. So he is a human being, both in-time [in his body] and before-time [in his spirit], an eternal and after-time organism. He is the word which distinguishes and unifies. The universe was completed by his existence. He is to the universe what the face of the seal is to the seal - for that is the locus of the seal and thus the token with which the King places the seal on his treasures.

Allah named him khalif for this reason, since man guards His creation as treasure is guarded with the seal. As long as the seal of the King is on the treasure, no one dares to open it without his permission. He made him a khalif in respect of safeguarding the universe, and it

continues to be guarded as long as this Perfect Man is in it. Do you not see then, that when he disappears and is removed from the treasury of this world, nothing that Allah stored in it will remain? Everything that was in it will leave it, and all the parts will become confused, and everything will be transferred to the Next World. Then Man will be the seal on the treasury of the Next World for endless time and after-time. All the Divine Names contained in the divine form (4) appear in this human organism. Thus it possesses the rank of containing and integrating this existence. It was by this that Allah set up the proof against the angels, (5) so remember that! Allah admonishes you through others. Look at where that originates and where it ends up. The angels did not realise what was implied by the organism of the khalif, nor did they realise what the presence of the Truth demanded as 'ibâda (6) (worship). Each one only knows from Allah what his essence accords him. The angels do not possess the universality of Adam, and they did not understand the Divine Names with which he has been favoured, and by which he praises Allah and proclaims His purity. They only knew that Allah had names whose knowledge had not reached them, so they could not praise Him nor proclaim His purity through them. What we mentioned overcame them and this state overpowered them. They said about this organism, "Why put on it one who will cause corruption on it?" (2:30) This is only the argument which they were voicing.

What they said regarding Adam is exactly the state they were with regard to Allah. Had it not been that their nature was in accord with it, they would not have said what they said in respect of Adam, "and yet they were not aware." If they had had true recognition of themselves, they would have had knowledge, and had they been in possession of knowledge, they would have been protected and would not have resisted by belittling Adam and thus exceeding their claim of what they possessed of His praise and glorification. Adam was in possession of Divine Names which the angels did not have, so that their praise and glorification of Him was not the same as Adam's praise and glorification of Him. Allah describes this to us so that we may ponder it and learn adab (7) with Allah, and so that we will not lay claim to what we have not realised or possessed by pinning down. How can we allege something which is beyond us and of which we have no knowledge? We will only be exposed. This divine instruction is part of Allah's discipline of those of His slaves who are well-mannered, trusting and khalifs.

Let us return to the wisdom under discussion. Know that universal matters which have no existence in themselves are without a doubt intelligible and known in the mind. They are hidden and continue in their invisible existence. These universal matters have jurisdiction and effect on everything which has an individual existence. Indeed, they are the same thing and nothing else, i.e. the sources of existent individual things, and they continue to be intelligible in themselves. They are manifest in respect of the sources of existent things just as they are hidden in respect of their intelligibility. Each individual existent thing depends on these universal matters which cannot be dislodged from the intellect, nor would their existence be possible in the source once they ceased to be intelligible, whether that individual existent is in-time or out-of-time. The relationship of that which is in-time or out-of-time to this universal intelligible matter is the same. This universal matter only has jurisdiction in individual existent things according to what the realities of these individual existent things demand of it. It is like the relationship of knowledge to the knower, and life to the living. Life is an intelligible reality; knowledge is an intelligible reality. Knowledge is as distinct from life as life is distinct from knowledge. So we say that Allah has knowledge and life, and that He is the Living, the Knowing. We also say that the angel has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. We say that man has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. The reality of knowledge is one thing and the reality of life is another, and their relationship to the

knowing and the living is the same relationship. We say that the knowledge of Allah is in non-time and the knowledge of man is in-time. So look at the evaluation that this relationship has brought about in this intelligible reality!

Examine this connection between individual intelligibles and stence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself. As knowledge determines the one who participates in it as he is called knowing so the one who is described by it can determine the knowledge. It is in-time in relation to the one in-time and non-time in relation to the one in non-time. Each of the two is determining and determined. It is known that these universal matters, even if they are intelligible, lack a source although they still have an authority. When they are determined, since they are ascribed to an individual existent thing, they accept the principle in the existent sources and do not accept distinction or fragmenting, for that is impossible for them. They themselves are in everything described by them, as humanity is in every person of this particular species, without distinction or the numbering which affects individuals; and it continues to be intelligible.

Now, as there is a connection between that which has an individual existence and that which does not have one and it is a non-existent relationship so the connection of existents to each other is easier to conceive because, in any case, there is a common factor between them which is individual existence. In the other, there is no common factor, yet there is a connection despite the lack of a common factor. So it is stronger and more real when there is a common factor. Without a doubt, the in-time establishes itself as being put into time and it needs something in time to put it into time. It has no place in itself so it exists from something other-than-it, and it is linked to That by the dependence of need. This dependence must be on That whose existence is necessary, which is independent in Its existence by Itself without need. It is That which, by Its own essence, gives existence to the in-time which depends on It. Since the existence of Its essence is necessary and what appears from It depends on It for its essence, it nevertheless depends on its form for everything which is from a name or attribute, except for the essential necessity. That is not the property of it in-time, even if its existence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself.

Since the matter is based on what we said about its manifestation in its form, Allah communicates to us knowledge of Himself through contemplation of the in-time. He tells us that He shows us His signs in the in-time, (8) so we draw conclusions about Him through ourselves. We do not describe Him with any quality without also possessing that quality, with the exception of that essential autonomy. Since we know Him by ourselves and from ourselves, we attribute to Him all that we attribute to ourselves. For that reason, divine communications came down on the tongues of our interpreters, (9) and so He described Himself to us through ourselves. When we witness, He witnesses Himself. We are certainly numerous as individuals and species, yet we are based on a single reality which unites us. So we certainly know that there are distinctions between individuals. If there were not, there would be no multiplicity in the One.

Similarly we are described in all aspects by that by which He describes Himself, but there must be a distinction and it is none other than our need of Him in our existence. Our existence depends on Him by virtue of our possibility and He is independent of that which makes us dependent on Him. Because of this, one can apply before-timeness and timelessness to Him which negates that firstness which is the opening to existence from non-existence. Although He is the First, firstness is not ascribed to Him, and for this reason, He is called the Last. Had His firstness been the firstness of the existence of determination, it would not have been valid

for Him to be the Last of the determined because the possible has no last - for possibilities are endless. So they have no last. Rather, He is the Last because "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) after its attribution to us. So He is the Last in the source of His firstness and the First in the source of His lastness.

Then know that Allah has described Himself as the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden; (10) He brought the universe into existence as a Visible world and an Unseen world so that we might know the Hidden by the Unseen and the Manifest by the Visible. He described Himself with pleasure and wrath, and so He brought the world into existence as a place of fear and hope so we fear His wrath and hope for His pleasure. He described Himself with majesty and beauty, so He brought the universe into existence with awe and intimacy. It is the same for all that is connected with Him, may He be exalted, and by which He calls Himself. He designates these pairs of attributes by the two hands (11) which He held out in the creation of the Perfect Man. Man sums up all the realities of the universe and its individuals. So the universe is seen and the Khalif is unseen. It is with this meaning that the Sultan veils himself, even as Allah is mentioned and described as having with veils (12) of darkness, which are natural bodies, and luminous veils which are subtle spirits (arwâh). The universe is composed of both the gross and the subtle.

The universe is its own veil on itself and cannot perceive the Truth since it perceives itself. It is continuously in a veil which is not removed, since it knows that it is distinct from its Creator by its need of Him. It has no portion of that essential necessity which belongs to the existence of Allah, so it can never perceive Him. In this respect, Allah is never fully known by the knowledge of tasting and witnessing because the in-time has no hold on that.

Allah only applied "between His two hands" to Adam as a mark of honour, and so He said to Iblis, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My two Hands?" (38:76) That is none other than the union in Adam of the two forms - the form of the universe and the form of the Real: (13) and they are the two hands of Allah. Iblis is only a fragment of the universe and does not possess this comprehensive quality. It is because of this quality that Adam was a khalif. Had he not had the form of the One who appointed him khalif, he would not have been khalif. If there were not in him all that is in the world, and what his flocks, over whom he is khalif, demand of him because of their dependence on him (and he must undertake all they need from him) he would not have been khalif over them.

The khalifate is only valid for the Perfect Man, whose exterior form comes from the realities of the universe and its forms, and whose inner form is based on His form, may He be exalted! For that reason, Allah has said of him, "I am his hearing and his sight." (14) He did not say, "his eye and his ear." So He differentiated between the two forms. It is the same for every existent in the universe which appears according to what the reality of that existent demands of it. Nonetheless no one totally comprehends what the khalif has. One only surpasses others by this comprehensiveness. If it were not for the diffusion of Allah into the existents by the form, the universe would not have any existence. Similarly, were it not for these universal intelligible realities, no principle would have appeared in individual existent things. From this reality the universe depends on Allah for its existence. So all is in need, and nothing is independent.

This is the truth
and we have not spoken metaphorically.
If I speak of a something independent

without any need, you will know Who I mean by it.
The whole is tied to the whole
and cannot be separated from it, so understand what I have said!

Now, you have learnt of the formation of the body of Adam his outer form and the formation of his spirit, his inner form, so he is the Real and a created being. Now you have learnt of the formation of his rank which is the comprehensiveness by virtue of which he is worthy of the khalifate. Adam is the unique self from which the perfect human species was created according to His words, "O mankind, be fearful of your Lord who created you from a single self, and created its mate from it, and disseminated many men and women from the two of them." (4:1)

His words, "Be fearful of your Lord," mean to make of what has appeared from you a safeguard for your Lord and make what is concealed of you, which is your Lord, a safeguard for yourselves. The matter consists of blame and praise, so be His safeguard in the blame and your safeguard in the praise, so that you will be among those of knowledge and adab. Then He showed him what He had placed in him, and He put that in His two hands - one handful contained the universe and the other handful contained Adam and his descendants - and He showed them their ranks in Adam.

Then Allah informed me in my inner heart (sirr) of what He placed in this Imam, the great progenitor. I have put in this book some of what was allotted to me but not all of what I realised. A book could not contain that and not even the present existent universe could contain it. I have put some of what I have witnessed in this book, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, defined it. It was the divine wisdom in the word of Adam, that is, this chapter.

Then there is the wisdom of the breath of angelic inspiration in the word of Shith (Seth), the wisdom of divine inspiration in the word of Nuh (Noah), the wisdom of purity in the word of Idris, the wisdom of being lost in love in the word of Ibrahim (Abraham), the wisdom of truth in the word of Ishaq (Isaac), the wisdom of the elevation of the word in the name of Isma'il (Ishmael), the wisdom of the spirit in the word of Yusuf (Joseph), the wisdom of unity in the word of Hud, the wisdom of revelation in the word of Salih, the wisdom of the heart in the word of Shu'ayb, the wisdom of the power of the word of Lut (Lot), the wisdom of the decree in the word of 'Uzayr (Ezra), the wisdom of prophethood in the word of 'Isa (Jesus), the wisdom of mercy in the word of Sulayman (Solomon), the wisdom of existence in the word of Da'ud (David), the wisdom of the soul in the word of Yunus (Jonah), the wisdom of the unseen in the word of Ayyub (Job), the wisdom of majesty in the word of Yahya (John the Baptist), the wisdom of possession in the word of Zakariya (Zachariah), the wisdom of intimacy in the word of Ilyas (Elias), the wisdom of benevolence in the word of Luqman, the wisdom of the Imam in the word of Harun (Aaron), the wisdom of sublimity in the word of Musa (Moses), the wisdom of what one turns to in the word of Khalid, and the wisdom of uniqueness in the seal of Muhammad.

There is a seal for each wisdom. So I have condensed these wisdoms according to what is established in the Mother of the Book, and I complied with what was written out for me, and stopped at what was set as a limit for me. Even if I had desired to do more than that, I would not have been able to do so. Indeed, the Presence forbids that, and Allah is the One who grants success. There is no Lord but Him.

Notes to Chapter 1:

1. al-Insân al-Kâmil, the Perfect Man.
2. Nafkh, Qur'an 32:9, etc.
3. Insan, as well as meaning human being, also means the pupil of the eye.
4. The form chosen by Allah for the human being.
5. Qur'an 2:30-33.
6. 'Ibada: All the acts of worship: giving, praying, fasting, etc..
7. Adab: Manners. Here meaning the much deeper quality of spiritual manners, that is a courtesy engendered in the ritual acts of worship, the prostrations of the prayer, the fast, and giving gifts to the needy. Such a quality is imbued with awareness that you are the dependent, and the Real is the independent. You are poor, He is rich.
8. Qur'an 41:53, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves..."
9. i.e. the Prophets.
10. Qur'an: 57:3.
11. Qur'an 38:75, "What I created with My two hands."
12. Hadith: "Allah has 70,000 veils of light and darkness. If they were to be removed, the splendour of His face would consume."
13. Hadith: "Allah created Adam on His form."
14. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)

2) The Seal of Wisdom of the Breath of Angelic Inspiration (1) in the Word of Shith (Seth)

Know that the gifts and favours which appear in phenomenal being through human beings or without them fall into two categories: the gifts of the Essence and the gifts of the Divine Names. These two categories are distinct among the people of tasting according to whether as they come from a specific request for a specific thing, from a general request, or without any request. This applies whether they are gifts of the Essence or gifts of the Divine Names. They are specific when someone says, "O Lord, give me such-and-such a thing," and specifies something which occurs to him. They are general when someone says, "Give me what You know is good for all my parts, subtle and gross," without specifying it.

The askers fall into two groups - one group makes the request from a natural impulse to hasten its attainment, "for man is impetuous;" (17:11) and the other group asks because they know that there are matters with Allah which, in the foreknowledge of Allah, are only obtained after a request. They say, "Perhaps what I ask of Him is something of that sort." Their request takes into consideration this possibility. They do not know what is in the knowledge of Allah, nor what their capacity to receive will grant them. This is because it is one of the most difficult things to know capacity at any moment, for it refers to the capacity of the individual at that time. Furthermore, had he not been disposed by his capacity to make the request, he would not have made that particular request.

The goal of the people of presence, (2) who do not possess such a knowledge, is to know it in the moment in which they find themselves. They know by their state of presence what Allah has given them in that moment. and they only receive it by their predisposition for it. They are of two sorts: one group knows their predisposition from what they have already received, and the other group knows what they are going to receive based on their predisposition. This latter group has the most perfect recognition of predisposition.

Among this group are those who make a request, neither to hasten it nor for the possibilities of favour, but rather to comply with the command of Allah when He says, "Call on Me and I will answer you." (40:60) This sort of person is the pure slave and when he asks, his aspiration (himma) is not attached to what he asks for, be it specific or not, rather his aspiration is merely in or not, rather his aspiration is merely in obedience to his Lord's command. When his state requires, he asks for slavehood, and when it requires entrustment [to Allah] and silence, he is silent. So Ayyub and others were tried, and they did not ask Allah to remove their affliction from them. Then at another moment, their state required that they ask that it be removed, and Allah removed it from them.

The immediate granting of a request, or its deferment, depends on the decree which has been determined for it by Allah. If the request coincides with the moment, the answer comes quickly, and if the moment is deferred - either in this world or the next, the answer is also deferred except for the answer from Allah which is, "At your service" (3) - so understand this well!

As for the second category, it is received without making a request, and by "without request" we mean verbal expression of it. In actuality, there must always be a request - be it articulated, or by a state, or from a predisposition. Similarly, unrestricted praise only takes place through verbal expression. The state determines the meaning, for that which induces

you to praise Allah is determined for you by a Name of Action (4) or a Name of Disconnection. (5) In the case of the predisposition of the slave, its possessor is not conscious of it, but he is aware of his state because he knows both what his motive is and the state itself. Predisposition is the most hidden form of making requests.

That which prevents some people from asking is their knowledge that Allah has predetermined their destiny, so they have prepared themselves to receive whatever comes from Him, and they have withdrawn from their selves and their desires.

Among these people are those who know that the knowledge which Allah has of them in all their states is their basic constitution in the state of their permanent source-form from before existence. They know that Allah will only give them what their source allows them according to Allah's knowledge of it when they were in their permanent source-forms. Thus these people know that Allah knows the way they will obtain anything.

There is no higher, nor more unveiled group among the People of Allah than this group, who understand on the secret of the Decree. They, in turn, fall into two sorts: those who know it in general and those who know it in particular. Those who know it in particular are higher and nearer perfection than those who know it in general. Such a person knows what is in the knowledge of Allah for him - be it by Allah informing him of the knowledge his own source has accorded to Him, or be it by direct unveiling to him from his permanent source-form whose unfolding states are endless. So he, in his knowledge of himself, is in the position of having Allah's knowledge of him, because it is derived from the same source. In respect of the slave, concern from Allah is predestined for him, and it is constituted by the sum of the states of his source which the possessor of this unveiling perceives when Allah allows him to perceive it, i.e. the states of his source. When Allah informs him of the states of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of these permanent sources in the state of their non-existence, since they are but essential relations without any form. In this respect, we say that divine concern precedes the slave's need because of this equivalence in the communication of knowledge.

In this way Allah speaks so that we will know, and it is an expression which is completely specific - not as is imagined by those who do not drink from this source. The goal of disconnection is to make that in-timeness in knowledge belong to Knowledge. It is the highest aspect of this question which the mutakallim (6) can comprehend with his intellect - unless he considers knowledge to be distinct from the Essence. If he does this, he ascribes relativity to knowledge, and not to the Essence, and because of this, he sets himself apart from the realised ones among the People of Allah, who are endowed with unveiling and real existence.

Let us return to those gifts which are either the gifts proceeding from the Essence or the Names. As for the favours, gifts and graces of the Essence, they only come by means of divine tajalli. (7) Tajalli only comes from the Essence by means of the form of the predisposition of the one to whom the tajalli is made. It never occurs otherwise. The one who receives the tajalli will only see his own form in the mirror of the Real. He will not see the Real, for it is not possible to see Him. At the same time, he knows that he sees only his own form. It is the same as a mirror in the Visible world inasmuch as you see forms in it or

your own form but do not see the mirror. At the same time, however, you know that you see the forms, or your own form, only by virtue of the mirror. Allah manifests that as a model (8) appropriate to the tajalli of His Essence, so that the one receiving the tajalli knows that he does not see Him. There is no model nearer or more appropriate to vision and tajalli than this. When you see a form in a mirror, try to see the body of the mirror as well - you will never see it. It is true that some people who perceive this say that the reflected form is imposed between the vision of the seer and the mirror. This is the most that it is possible to say, and the matter is as we have mentioned. We have clarified this in the The Makkan Revelations.

If you wish to taste this, then experience the limit beyond which there is no higher limit possible in respect of the creature. Neither aspire to, nor tire yourself out in trying to go beyond this degree, for in principle, there is only pure non-existence after it.

Thus Allah is your mirror in which you see yourself, and you are His mirror in which He sees His Names. His Names are not other than Himself, as you know. The matter is confusing. One of us implied ignorance of the matter as part of knowledge and said, "The incapacity to achieve perception is perception." (9) Some of us know but do not express it in this way, even though it is the highest of words. Knowledge does not give incapacity to know as the first one said, but rather knowledge gives him the same silence which incapacity gives. This is the highest level of those who have knowledge of Allah.

This knowledge only belongs to the Seal of the Messengers and the Seal of the Awliyâ'. The Messengers and Prophets only see it from the niche of the Messenger who is the Seal. The awliyâ' only see it from the niche of the walî who is the Seal. Even the Messengers only see it to the extent that they see it from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya', for Message and Prophethood - by which I mean the Prophethood of bringing the Sharî'a and its message - ceases, but wilâya never ceases. Thus the Messengers, in much as they are awliya', see what we have mentioned only from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya'. How could it be different for other awliyâ'? Although the Seal of the Awliyâ' is subject to the judgement which the Seal of the Messengers brought through the Sharî'a, that does not diminish his station nor does it detract from what we have said, for something which is lower from one point of view can be higher from another. Confirmation of this occurred in the history of our Sharî'a in the excellence of the judgement of 'Umar regarding the prisoners of Badr (10) and their treatment, and in the story of fertilization of the date-palms. (11) It is not necessary that the perfect have precedence in everything and in every rank. The Rijâl (12) regard precedence as being in the degrees of knowledge of Allah. Here is their goal. As for the things which are in-time, they do not attach their thoughts to them, so realise what we have mentioned!

Al-Khidr said to Musa, "I have knowledge which Allah has taught me, and which you do not know, and you have knowledge which Allah has taught you and which I do not know." (13)

It is like the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in relation to a brick wall which was complete except for one brick, (14) and the Prophet was that one brick although he himself only saw the place for the single brick. The Seal of the Awliyâ' must also have this sort of vision. He sees the same as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, saw, but he sees a place for two bricks in the wall, and that the bricks are made of gold and silver. He sees that there are two bricks missing in the wall, and he sees that they are a silver brick and a gold brick. He must see himself as being disposed by nature to fill the place of these two bricks. The Seal of the Awliyâ' is these two bricks by which the wall is completed. The necessary reason for which he sees himself as two bricks is that he follows

the Shari'a of the Seal of the Messengers outwardly - which is the place of the silver brick. This means the outward Sharī'a with all that pertains to it of ordinances which are taken from Allah by the secret, according to the outward form which conforms to the secret because he sees the matter for what it really is. He must see the matter in this manner, for it is the place of the golden brick in the inwardly hidden. It is taken from the source from which the angel brought it, the same angel who brought the revelation to the Messengers. If you have understood what I have alluded to, then you have indeed acquired useful knowledge!

All the Prophets, from Adam to the last of the Prophets, take their light from the niche of the Seal of the Prophets, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Even though the existence of his clay was deferred, the last Prophet was nevertheless present in his reality, according to his statement, "I was a Prophet when Adam was between water and clay." (15) Every other Prophet only became a Prophet by being described by divine qualities inasmuch as Allah is described as the Praiseworthy Wali.(16)

The Seal of the Messengers, in respect to his wilāya, is connected to the Seal of the Awliyā' in the same way in which Prophets and Messengers are connected to it. He is a walī, Messenger, and Prophet. The Seal of the Awliyā' is a walī and the heir who takes directly from the source, contemplating the ranks. He is the most beautiful of the beauties of the Seal of the Messengers, Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, the overseer of the community, and the master of the sons of Adam by reason of opening the door of intercession. He specified a particular state which is not universal. (17) In this special state, he has precedence over the Divine Names. So the All-Merciful only mediates with the Avenger for the people of affliction through the intercession of the mediators. Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, obtained mastery in this special station. Whoever understands the ranks and the stations does not find this discourse difficult.

As for the gifts of the Names, know that Allah bestows mercy on His creation which is wholly from the names. Either it is a pure mercy, like the excellence of the provision which they have in this world or on the Day of Rising which is bestowed by that name, the Merciful, and so is a gift of mercy, or it is a mixed mercy like the taking of a disagreeable remedy which is followed by relief - it is still a divine gift. Divine gifts can only possibly be given through the intermediary of the guardians of the Names. Sometimes Allah gives it to the slave by means of the All-Merciful, and so the gift is pure from any adulteration which would be contrary to the nature of the moment, otherwise he would not receive the object and what would resemble it. Sometimes He gives by means of the the Boundless, so it is general - or by the Wise, so He looks at what is fitter at the moment, or by the Giving, who gives what is good without those who receive it having to compensate for it by gratitude or deed. He gives by the Compeller, and so He looks at the environment and what is necessary to it. He gives by the Forgiving and so He looks to the environment and what is happening to the individual. If he is in a state which merits punishment, He veils him from it, and if he is in a state which does not merit punishment, He protects him from a state which would merit it. He is "protected from wrong action", "safeguarded", and other descriptions of that sort. The Giver is Allah in the sense that He is the Treasurer of all that is in His treasury, and Allah only brings forth from it according to a predestined decree through the intermediary of a name particular to that matter. So He gives everything its created form (18) according to the name, the Just, and its brothers.

The Names of Allah are endless because they are known by what comes from them, and what comes from them is endless, even though they can be traced back to the limited roots which

are the matrices of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but one of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but One Reality which assumes all these relations and aspects which are designated by the Divine Names. The Reality grants that each of the Names, which manifest themselves without end, has a reality by which it is distinguished from another Name. It is that reality by which it is distinguished which is the Name itself - not that which it shares.

It is the same with the gifts - every gift is distinct from another by personal nature, although they come from a single source. It is evident that this one is not that one. That is because the Names are distinct. Because of its boundlessness, in the Divine Presence there is nothing at all which repeats itself. This is the truth which is determined.

This was the knowledge of Shith, peace be upon him, and its spirit aids every spirit which discusses the like of this, except for the spirit of the Seal who receives replenishing knowledge directly from Allah, not from any spirit. No, rather it is from his spirit that his substance flows to all spirits, although he may not perceive that of himself at the time when his elemental body existed. However, in respect to his reality and his rank, he knows all of that essentially, just as he is ignorant of the composition of the elements (of his body). So he has knowledge and is ignorant, and he is capable of being described by contrary attributes even as the Origin admits of description with opposites such as the Majestic and the Beautiful, the Outward and the Inward, the Last and the First - and they are the same, and not other than Him. Therefore, he knows and does not know, and he perceives and does not perceive, and he sees and does not see. It is by this knowledge that Shith received his name because it means "the gift". In His hand is the key to the gifts in their various types and relationships So Allah gave him to Adam, and he was the first gift, and He only gave it from Himself.

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All gifts in phenomenal being are manifested in this fashion - so no one receives anything from Allah and no-one receives anything which does not come from himself. Not everyone recognises this. Only a few of the people of Allah know it. When you see one who recognises that, rely on him, for that one is the source of the purest purity and the elite of the elite of the Men of Allah. Whenever a person of unveiling sees a form which communicates to him gnosis which he did not have and which he had not been able to grasp before, that form is from his own source, no other. From the tree of himself he gathers the fruits of his cultivation, as his outer form opposite the reflected body is nothing other than himself, even

though the place of the presence in which he sees the form of himself presents him with an aspect of the reality of that presence through transformation. The large appears small in the small mirror and tall in the tall, and the moving as movement. It can reverse its form from a special presence, and it can reflect things exactly as they appear, so the right side of the viewer is his right side, while the right side can be on the left. This is generally the normal state in mirrors, and it is a break in the norm when the right side is seen as the right and inversion occurs. All this is from the gifts of the reality of the Presence in which it is manifested and which we have compared to the mirror.

Whoever recognises his predisposition, recognises what he will receive. Not everyone who knows what he will receive, knows his predisposition, unless he knows it after receiving it, and this one knows it in a general way. Some people who are weak of intellect think that since it confirmed with them that Allah does what He wills, they deem it admissible that He could contradict wisdom and what the matter is in itself. (19) Because of this, some of them go so far as to deny the possibility and affirm that which is necessary by essence and by other. The man who has achieved realisation, however, admits the possibility and knows its presence and knows what is possible and how it is possible, since in its source it is necessarily existent because of something other-than-it. From where is the name of other, which determines its necessity, valid for it? No one knows this distinction except those with particular knowledge of Allah.

It is in the footsteps of Shith that the last of this human species will be born, and he will carry his secrets. There will none of this species born after him, so he will be the Seal of the Begotten. A sister will be born with him, and she will emerge before him, and he will follow her with his head at her feet. He will be born in China, and he will speak the language of his country. Sterility will spread in men and women, so there will be much cohabitation without conception. He will call people to Allah, but will not be answered. When Allah takes him and the believers of his time, those who remain will be like beasts, not knowing what is lawful (halâl) from what is unlawful (harâm). They will act according to their natural instincts with lust, devoid of reason and law. Upon them the Last Hour will occur.

Notes to to Chapter 2:

1. Nafth, to puff, blow or spit, hence inspiration. Hadith, "He (Jibril) inspired or put (nafatha) into my heart..." Hence poetry is called the nafth of Shaytan.
2. The people of the presence are those who see everything as coming to them from Allah and everything as effected by Allah.
3. Labbayk.
4. Like the Giving, the Provider.
5. Tanzih, making Allah free of any connection to His creation. Names like the Absolutely Pure (al-Quddûs).
6. The people of words - theologians and philosophers. They are unable to enter the realm of reflection and meditation that is the Sufic domain, and thus some of them oppose the Sufic teaching - mistaking the doctrine's meanings since they cannot intellectually identify them with a specific set of physical practices and direct inner experience.
7. A manifestation by which something is made clear and unobscured, as the bride is displayed to the husband or the rust removed from a sword or mirror so that it shines. The tajalli is the unveiling of a spiritual reality in the realm of vision. It is a direct-seeing into the nature of existence, a showing forth of the secrets of the One in the celestial and terrestrial realms.

8. Mithâl, a Qur'anic term which indicates learning not by logical but by analogical method. It is simply the ACCESS to the parable and not the parable or any idea that the "metaphor" equals its interpretation. It has no specificity. Mithal is grasped "on the wing" so to speak. It cannot be explored or analysed or extended. That is to say it must not be approached rationally but emphatically with direct and clear seeing-into.
9. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq.
10. After Badr, Abu Bakr asked the Prophet to either forgive or allow the prisoners to be ransomed. 'Umar said that they should be killed. Eventually, the Muslims reached a consensus that the captives should be ransomed and they were. Later the verse was revealed, "It is not for a Prophet to take captives..." (8:67)
11. When the Prophet had been asked about whether palm-trees should be pollinated and then later said, "You have the best knowledge of these things of your world."
12. Rijal (sing. rajul): The men. Meaning the men of gnosis and illumination. Those who know - that is - who know how-it-is, and not the veiled fantasy experience of so-called ordinary sensory perception which is, as we now know, in direct contradiction to the physical reality of matter according to high-energy physics.
13. cf. Qur'an 18:65.
14. Hadith in al-Bukhari (2815) and Muslim.
15. Hadith in at-Tirmidhi and Musnad Ibn Hanbal.
16. Qur'an 42:28, "It is He who sends down abundant rain after they have lost all hope, and He unfolds His mercy; He is the Praiseworthy, the Wali."
17. He only can open the door of intercession because it is a special gift to him alone.
18. Qur'an 20:50: "Our Lord is He who gives each thing its created form and then guides it."
19. i.e. they permit that He do the impossible, like making existence non-existence or non-existence existence.

3) The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath of Divine Inspiration (1) In the Word of Nuh (Noah)

Know that disconnection (tanzîh) among the people of realities in respect to Allah is the same as limitation and qualification, so the one who disconnects is either ignorant or ill-mannered if he only applies disconnection to Him and believes that about Him. (2) When the believer who follows the Shari'a disconnects and stops at that, and does not see anything else, he displays ill manners and slanders Allah and the Messengers - may the blessings of Allah be upon them! - although he is not aware of it. He imagines that he has reached the target and yet he has missed it, so he is like the one who believes in part and rejects part. (3)

One especially knows that when the language of the various Shari'as speaks about Allah as they do, they speak to the common people in the first sense, and to the elite in every sense which can be understood from the various aspects of that expression in any language in the usage of that language.

Allah manifests Himself in a special way in every creature. He is the Outwardly Manifest in every graspable sense, and He is the Inwardly Hidden from every understanding except the understanding of the one who says that the universe is His form (4) and His He-ness (huwiyya), and it is the name, the Outwardly Manifest. Since He is, by meaning, the spirit of whatever is outwardly manifest, He is also the Inwardly Hidden. His relation to whatever is manifested of the forms of the world is the relation of the governing spirit to the form. The definition of man, for example, includes both his inward and outward; and it is the same with every definable thing. Allah is defined in every definition, yet the forms of the universe are not held back and He is not contained by them. One only knows the limits of each of their forms according to what is attained by each knower of his form. For that reason, one cannot know the definition of Allah, for one would only know His definition by knowing the definition of every form. This is impossible to attain, so the definition of Allah is impossible. Similarly, whoever connects without disconnection has given limits to Allah and does not know Him. Whoever combines connection and disconnection in his gnosis, and describes Allah with both aspects in general - because it is impossible to conceive in detail because we lack the ability to encompass all the forms which the universe contains - has known Him in general and not in particular, as he knows himself generally and not in particular. For that reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, linked knowledge (ma'rifa) of Allah to knowledge of oneself and said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Allah says, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons (what is outside of you) and in themselves (what is your source) until it is clear to them (the contemplators) that it is the Truth," (41:53) inasmuch as you are His form and He is your spirit. You are to Him as your body-form is to you, and He is to you as the spirit which governs the body.

The definition contains your inwardness and outwardness, for the form remains when the spirit which governs it departs, and it is no longer man, but one can speak of it as resembling the form of man. There is no difference between it and the form made of wood or stone, upon which the name of man is only applied by metaphor and not by reality. Allah cannot vanish from the forms of the universe, as His definition of His divinity is by reality, not metaphor, as the definition of man applies only so long as he is alive. As the exterior of the form of man praises both his spirit, and the self governed by it, with his tongue, similarly Allah made the forms of the universe which glorify His praise, but we do not understand their glorifying. (5) We do not embrace all forms in the universe. All are tongues of Allah uttering the praise of

Allah and for that reason He said, "Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," (1:1) i.e. all types of praise refer to Him. He is the Praiser and the One praised.

If you speak of disconnection, you limit Him,
and if you speak of connection, you define Him.
If you speak of the two together,
then you are free of error
and you are an Imam and a master in knowledges of gnosis.

He who affirms duality, falls into shirk, and whoever speaks of uniqueness is a unifier. (6)
Take care lest you be a dualist by connection, and take care lest you be a isolator by disconnection.

You are not Him, rather you are Him
and you see Him in the source of thing,
absolute and limited at the same time.

Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," and so He disconnects, "and He is the Hearing, the Seeing," (42:11) so He connects. Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," so He connects and doubles it, (7) and "He is the Hearing, the Seeing." Then He uses disconnection and makes Himself Unique.

If Nuh had combined these two calls for his people, they would have answered him. He called them openly (71:8), and he called them secretly (71:9). Then he said to them, "Ask forgiveness of your Lord. Truly He is Endlessly Forgiving." (71:10) He said, "I have called my people night and in the day, but my calling has only made them more evasive" (71:5-6) because they knew what they had to do in answering his call.

So the knowledge of those who know Allah is what Nuh indicated in respect to his people by praising them through blame. He knew that they would not answer his call because of the furqân (8) it contained. The command is the Qur'an, not the Furqân. Whoever is established in the Qur'an does not incline to the Furqân. Even if the Furqân is in the Qur'an, the Qur'an contains the Furqân but the Furqân does not contain the Qur'an. For this reason, no one was favoured by the Qur'ân except Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and this community which is the "best community ever to be produced before mankind." (3:110)

So "there is nothing like Him" unified several matters in one single matter. If Nuh had articulated something like of this âyat, his people would have responded to him, because it contains connection and disconnection in a single âyat, rather in half an âyat.

Nuh, peace be upon him, peace be upon him, called on his people at night in respect to their intellects and spirituality (rûhânîyya), which are unseen; and by day he called on them in respect to their outer forms and arrival. In his call, he did not unify with anything, like "there is nothing like Him." So their inward had a distaste for this separation, and it increased them in evasion. Then he said of himself that he called upon them that He might forgive them, not that He be unveiled to them. They understood that from him. That is why "they put their fingers in their ears and wrapped themselves in their clothes," (71:7) and this is the form of veiling to which he called them. So they answered his call by action, not by saying, "At your service."

There is both the confirmation of likeness and its negation in "There is nothing like Him." For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said of himself, "I have been given all the words." (9) Muhammad, peace be upon him, did not call on his people by night and day, but rather he called upon them by night in the day and by day in the night. Nuh said in his wisdom to his people, "He will send heaven down on you in abundant rain," (71:11) which is intellectual gnosis in meanings and metaphorical speculation, and "He will reinforce you with wealth," i.e. by what comes to you from Him.

Thus it is your wealth in which you have seen your form. So whoever among you imagines that he has seen Him, does not have gnosis, and whoever of you knows that he has seen himself, he is the gnostic. For this reason people are divided into those who know Allah and those who do not know. "And sons" is what results from their logical speculation while the knowledge of the business (to which Nuh called them) is based upon contemplation which is far from the results of thought. Their trade did not profit them, (10) so what they had in their hands, which they only imagined they possessed, vanished from them.

The kingdom belongs to the people of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, for Allah says "Give of that to which He has made you successors." (11) (57:7) For the people of Nuh it is, "Do not take anyone besides Me as a guardian." (17:2) The kingdom was confirmed for the people of Muhammad, and the guardianship in it belongs to Allah. The people of Muhammad are the khalîfs in it. The kingdom belongs to Allah and He is their guardian, and that is the kingdom of being appointed khalîf. For this reason, Allah is the "King of the kingdom" (12) as at-Tirmidhi says. "They have hatched a mighty plotting," (71:22) because calling to Allah is the plotting of the the One called; since He does not lack the beginning, He is called to the end, so they call to Allah. This is the source of devising according to inner sight. Nuh said, "The affair belongs entirely to Him," so they answered Him with plotting as He called them.

The people of Muhammad came and knew what the call to Allah was in respect of its He-ness, rather what it is in respect to His Names. Allah says, "The day those who are godfearing are gathered to the All-Merciful." (13) So He used the "particle of the end" (ilâ - to) and joined it to that Name, and we recognise that the universe is under the care of a Divine Name which requires them to be among the "godfearing". The reality of taqwâ (14) is that man avoids ascribing blessings, perfections and praiseworthy attributes to himself or to others, except for Allah. He fears Allah through His acts and attributes. These things are evils from the spring of possibilities. They said in their plotting, "Do not abandon your gods. Do not abandon Wadd or Suwa' or Yaghuth or Ya'uq or Nasr." (71:22) Then they abandoned them ignorant of the Truth according to what they left of the idols. Allah has an aspect in every worshipped thing. Whoever recognises it, recognises, and whoever is ignorant of it is ignorant among the people of Muhammad. Your Lord decreed that you should worship only Him that is the judgement of your Lord.

The one who possesses knowledge knows who the slave is and in what form he is manifested as far as he is a slave. Separation and multiplicity are like the limbs of the sensory form and like faculties of meaning (15) of the spiritual form. He only worships Allah in every worshipped object. The lowest one is the one who imagines that godness is contained in it. Were it not for this illusion, stones and other things would not have been worshipped. This is why He said, "Say: Name them!" (13:33) If they had named them, they would have named stone, tree, or star. If they had been asked, "Who do you worship?" they would have replied, "God". They would not say "Allah" or "the god".

The highest knower does not use this imagination, (16) but rather he says that this is a divine tajalli which one must exalt, and he does not restrict himself. The lowest one is the one possessed of fantasy: "We only worship them so that they bring us nearer to Allah." (39:3) The highest knower says, "Your god is One God, so submit to Him," (22:34) wherever He is manifest, "and give good news to the humble-hearted" who humble the fire of their nature. They spoke to it (the fire), and did not say "nature". "They have misguided many people," (71:24) i.e. they perplexed many in the multiplicity of the One by aspects and relations. "Do not increase not the wrongdoers" because their selves are from the totality of the chosen ones who inherited the Book and they are the first of the three, (17) which precedes the ambivalent and the outdoer, "in anything but misguidance", except in the perplexity of the man of Muhammad who says, "Increase me in perplexity." (18) "Every time it shines on them, they walk in it. When the darkness comes over them, they stop." (2:20) So the perplexed one turns about, and the circular movement is about the axis which he does not leave.

The one who has a stretched-out path is inclined to leave the goal, seeking what the possessor of imagination has in it, and his end is that imagination. He has "from" and "to" and what is between them. The one who has a circular movement has no beginning, "from", which clings to him, and no end, "to", is judged of him. Thus he has the most perfect existence. He "is given all the words" (19) and wisdoms. "And because of their errors" which is that which is recorded for them, "they were drowned" in the seas of the knowledge of Allah which is perplexity among the men of Muhammad. When the seas were heated up, (20) "they were put into a fire" in the source of water, "and they found no one to help them besides Allah." (71:25) Allah is the source of their helpers, and so they were destroyed in it for time without end. If He had brought them out to the shore, the shore of nature, He would have brought them down from this high degree. All belongs to Allah and is by Allah, rather it is Allah.

Nuh said, "My Lord!" and he did not say, "My God," for the Lord has immutability, and "God" differs according to the Names. So "every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29) By Lord, he meant something with an immutable quality. "Do not leave upon the earth" and he called on them to go into its Muhammadan interior. "If you let down a rope, it would fall on Allah," (21) "to Him belongs what is in the heavens and what is in the earth." When you are buried in it, you are in it and it is your container, and "We will return you into it and We will bring you forth from it again," (20:55) by the difference of existence. "...of the unbelievers" who wrap themselves in their garments and put their fingers in their ears, seeking veiling because he called on them that He might forgive them. Forgiveness is the veiling of wrong actions, "not even one" so that the benefit will become universal like the call. "If You leave any," i.e. if You call them and then leave them, "they will misguide Your slaves," i.e. confuse them and so bring them out of their service to what they have of the secrets of lordship. They will think themselves lords after they were slaves in themselves. Thus they are slaves and lords. "They will spawn nothing" i.e. they will not have any result or manifest anything except their being shameless that is, the manifestation of what veils the unbelievers is that they were veiled from what appeared after their manifestation. They manifested that which veils, so they were veiled after their appearance.

The thinker is confused and does not recognise the goal of the shameless in shamelessness, (22) or the unbeliever in his disbelief, yet the person is but one. "My Lord, forgive me," i.e. veil me and that which concerns me so that my rank and station are unknown, as the rank of Allah are unknown in His statement, "They do measure Allah with His true measure"; (23) "and my parents" of whom I am a result, and they are the intellect and nature; "and all who enter my house," i.e. my heart, "as believers" believing in what it contains of divine reports,

and it is what their selves occasioned, "And all the believers, men (the intellects) and women (the selves)."

"Do not increase the wrongdoers (dhâlimîn)" who are from the darkness (dhulumât), the people of the unseen, hiding behind the veils of darkness, "except in ruin" i.e. in destruction. Thus, they do not recognise themselves because they see the Face of Allah outside of them. Among the men of Muhammad, "All things are passing except His Face." (28:88) Ruin is destruction. Whoever wishes to understand the secrets of Nuh must rise into the sphere of Nuh. (24) It is in our book, at-Tanazzulat al-Mawsuliyya.

Notes to to Chapter 3:

1. Subbûh, name applied to Allah, the All-Perfect, disconnected from imperfections.
2. If he does not go on to include tashbih, connection.
3. cf. Qur'an 4:149: "Those who reject Allah and His Messengers and desire to make division between Allah and His Messengers, saying, 'We believe in some and reject some.'"
4. By manifesting His attributes and Essence since everything is a proof and indication of Him.
5. Ref. to Qur'an 17:44, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise, but you do not understand their glorification."
6. In this case, ignorant of the multiplicity of His Names and Attributes.
7. "Like Him" = "ka-mithlihi", the word "like" occurs twice: "ka" and "mithl", so like negates like, like a double negative.
8. Furqan: One of the names of the Qur'an, meaning a "discrimination" that which separates or distinguishes. Here presented as an opposite in a dyad: Qur'an/furqan, that is, discrimination/gathering.
9. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
10. Reference to Qur'an, 2:16, "Those are the people who have sold guidance for misguidance. Their trade has brought no profit. They are not guided."
11. Khalifs.
12. Since He answers His slave who is the "kingdom". Technical term used by al-Hakim at-Tirmidhi and Abu Madyan, discussed by Ibn al-'Arabi in the Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Chapter 24, vol. I, p. 182.
13. ref. Qur'an 19:85.
14. Fearfulness of Allah which is reflected in one's behaviour.
15. Meaning. Meaning does not carry the ordinary connotative significance that it has in the science of semantics. In the Sufic science meaning is not allied, but inseparable from the experience of the recognition of meaning. In other words, it is not a "thing" which can be apprehended with the qualities of thingness. It is a mode of experiencing which takes places in a zone of awareness that is in itself a realm of the inward reality cognised in the waking state. Meaning/sensory, ma'na/hiss.
16. Khayal: An important term. Khayal means imagination, but in the special technical language of Ibn al-'Arabi the khayal contains an outer and inner meaning. Its outer (not inner) meaning is imagining in the ordinary sense of a "tangible reality" which is experienced mentally yet remains unreal, that is, untouchable and non-physical. Its inner meaning, however, is that faculty by which we solidify the objects - which are according to unveiling basically "not-there" - spatiality itself. There is much resistance to this in "rational" and programmed intellects as there is of the hand to the rock in "common sense" experience. The rock is there, it does not budge. There is, it must not be forgotten, a threshold situation where this is not so, for if the

subject were brain-damaged, subjected to a hallucinogen, or hypnotic trance, then the object would experientially melt away. That is still not the same as seeing in which things are seen as-they-as in one unified field without differentiation, while alert within that condition of experiencing. And this state brings with it wisdom beyond the recognition of how-it-is at that moment - in other words a new understanding is established by the experience.

17. Ref to Qur'an 35:32, "...but some of them wrong themselves, some are ambivalent, and some outdo each other in good."

18. Hayra: Bewilderment. A Key term. Hayra is not a negative situation - it is the condition in which the seeker finds every intellectual channel blocked, every pathway of reason clashing against the other in contradiction so that it induces in the seeker a state of intensity. This intensity by virtue of its inner tension creates a condition we call hayra. It is a collapse of separation - a kind of "white hole" - which results in gatheredness. That is, the hayra creates a new condition which is its result and that result is a breakthrough into an illumination of the Real.

19. Meaning the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, who was given all the words.

20. By the oven (from which the water gushed out of the earth in the Flood.)

21. Hadith.

22. The manifestation of lordship.

23. 6:91, 22:84, 39:67.

24. The Sphere of the Sun.

4: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sanctification (Quddûs) in the Word of Idris

Elevation has two references - one of place and one of rank. Elevation of place is "We raised him up to a high place," (19:57) and the highest of places is that upon which the mill of the world of the spheres revolves. It is the sphere of the sun and in it is the station of the spirituality of Idris, peace be upon him! There are seven heavens under it and seven heavens above it, and it is the fifteenth. That which is above it is the red heaven, i.e. Mars, the heaven of Jupiter, Saturn, the heaven of fixed stars, the Starless Heaven and the heaven of the constellations, the heaven of the Kursi and the heaven of the 'Arsh. That which is below it is the heaven of Venus, Mercury, the Moon, the circle of ether, the circle of air, the circle of water, and the circle of earth. It is the axis of the heavens, and it is a "high place".

As for the elevation of rank, it is for us, the people of Muhammad. Allah said, "When you are uppermost and Allah is with you" (47:35) in this height. He exalts Himself above place, not above rank. When the selves of those among us who do deeds are afraid, He follows the mention of "being with" with His words, "He would not cheat you of your deeds." The deed demands place and knowledge demands rank. So He joined the two heights for us - elevation of place by deed and elevation of rank by knowledge. Then to disconnect the association of being with, He said, "Glorify the name of your Lord, the Most High," (87:1) above this association in meaning.

It is one of the most wondrous of matters that man is the highest of existent things - I mean the Perfect Man, and elevation is only attributed to him by subordination either to place or rank which is a degree. So he is not high by his essence, he is high by the height of place and the height of rank, for these possess height. Height of place is like the All-Merciful settling on the throne, (1) and it is the highest of places. Height of rank is "All things are passing except His Face," (28:88) and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:123) and nothing has existence along with Allah.

When Allah said, "We raised him up to a high place," He made high an adjective for place. Since your Lord said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif in the earth," (2:30) this is height of rank. He said about the angels, "Were you overcome by arrogance, or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) so He gave elevation to the angels. If the angels had possessed that elevation by simple virtue of the fact that they are angels, then all the angels would have been included in this elevation. It was not common to them in the definition of angel. We recognise that this is elevation of rank with Allah. It is the same for the khalifs of the people. If their elevation with the khalifate had been an elevation by essence, every man would have it. It is not general and so we know that that elevation is by rank.

One of His names is the High. Over whom, when there is nothing except Him? So He is the High by His Essence. Is He is High over that which is particular, when there is no He except Him? His elevation is by virtue of Himself, and He, in respect to existence, is the source of existents. Those in-time things which He calls high in themselves are not other than Him. He was the High when there was no height of relativity because the source-forms in non-existence had not smelt the scent of existence. They remain in their state in spite of the multiplicity of forms in existents, but the source is the same from the whole in the whole. The existence of multiplicity lies in the names which are the relationships, and they are non-existent matters. There is only the source which is the Essence. He is High through Himself,

not by any ascription to another. From this standpoint, there is no height of relative relation in the universe, but the aspects of existence which are distinct. The height of relativity exists in the one Source in respect of the many aspects. For that reason, you say of Him, Him and not Him, and you and not you.

Al-Kharraz, (2) may Allah have mercy on him, who is one of the aspects of Allah and one of His tongues with which He speaks of Himself, said that one only has gnosis by joining opposites together in respect of Him. "He is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden." (57:3) He is the source of what appears and the source of what is hidden in the state of its manifestation. There is none who sees Him other than Him and there is none who is hidden from Him. So He is manifest to Himself and hidden from Himself. He is called Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz and other than that from the names of things in-time.

The Hidden says "No" while the Manifest says, "Me," and the Manifest says, "No" while the Hidden says, "Me". This is found in every opposite, yet the speaker is one, and he is the same as the hearer in the statement of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, about what their selves say, (3) for they speak and hear what they say, and know what their selves say. The source is but one, even if the judgements are different. There is no way that anyone can be ignorant of this sort of thing. Every man knows from himself, and it is the form of the Real.

So things are mixed and numbers appear by the one in the known ranks. Thus "one" brought number into existence, and number divides the One. The principle of number only appeared through the numbered. Part of the numbered is non-existent, and part is existent. The thing is non-existent in relation to the senses while it is existent in relation to the intellect. There must be number and numbered. That must grow from one and it grows because of it. Every rank of the numbers has one reality like 9, for example, and 10 and down to 2, and upwards without end, and its reality is not a sum.

A name is not perceived by the addition of ones. 2 is one reality, and 3 is one reality, and so on until the end of these ranks. Even though the source [of numbers] is one, the source of one of them is not the source of the others. Addition encompasses them all, and it speaks of them from them and judges them by them. Twenty ranks (4) appeared in this statement, so composition entered into them. You will continue to affirm the source of what you deny in itself. Whoever recognises what we have related of the numbers, and that negation is the same as their affirmation, knows that the Real, who is disconnected by disconnection, is creature by connection, even though the creature is distinct from the Creator. The matter is the creature/Creator and it is the Creator/creature. That is from one source, rather is is the One source and it is many sources. Look at what you see!

Ibrahim's son told him, "My father, do what you are ordered." (37:102) The child is the same as his father, so he only saw himself sacrificing himself, "and He ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." (5) That which was manifested as a ram was manifested in the form of a human, and manifested in the form of a son. Rather, it is by the principle of the son being the same as the father. "He created from (one self) his mate." (4:1) He (6) married his own self, and from him are both his companion and his child. The matter is one in number. It is the same for nature and what is manifested from it. We do not see it diminishing by what appears from it nor increasing by the lack of what other than it manifests. That which is manifested is not other than it, nor is it the same as what is manifested according to the variety of forms in principle. This one is cold and dry, and that one is hot and dry. They are joined by dryness,

and distinct by another quality. The common source is nature, and the world of nature is composed of forms in one mirror. Rather, it is one form in different mirrors.

There is only bewilderment (hayra) by the dispersal of perspectives. Whoever knows what we have said is not bewildered. If he increases in knowledge, it is only from the principle of place, and place is the same as the source-form in which the Real varies in the locus of His tajalli. Conditions vary, so He assumes every condition. There is no condition except for the source in which He make tajalli of Himself, and there is nothing except this.

By this aspect, Allah is creature, so interpret!
And by this aspect, He is not creature, so remember!
The inner sight of whoever understands
what I have said is not confused, and only
the one who perceives it possesses sight.
The source of joining and separating is the same,
and it is multiplicity which never remains or departs.

The One who is High in Himself is the One who possesses the perfection in which all matters of existence are absorbed, as are all non-existent relations, inasmuch as it is not possible that any of these attributes be lacking from Him, be they praiseworthy by custom, logic, or law, or blameworthy by custom, logic or law. That belongs only to the One named Allah. As for what is named other-than-Allah, it is either a locus of His tajalli or a form which is in it. If it is the locus of His tajalli, it contains distinction. Be-cause of that, there must be distinction between the One who makes tajalli and the place of tajalli; if it is a form in it, that form is the source of the essential perfection because it is the same as what is manifested in it. That which belongs to Allah belongs to that form. However, it is not said that it is Him nor that it is other-than-Him.

Abu-l-Qasim ibn Qasi (7) indicated this in his book, The Removal of the Sandals, and he said, "Each Divine Name is qualified by all the Divine Names, and described by their description." It is so. Each Name indicates the Essence and the meaning which is set out for it and which demonstrates it. In respect to its indication of the Essence, it possesses all the names, and in respect to its indication of the meaning which is singular to it, it is distinct from others, such as the Lord, the Creator, the Fashioner, etc. The Name is the same as the Named in respect to the Essence, and the Name is other than the Named in respect to the meaning which is particular to it.

If you have understood that the "high" is as we have mentioned, you know that it is neither place nor height of rank, for height of rank is particular to the administration of authority, like the Sultan and the judge, wazirs and qadis, and all who have rank, be they worthy of that rank or not. Height is by attributes which are not like that. The most knowledgeable of people can be ruled by the person with the position of power, even if that person is the most ignorant of people. This is the height of rank according to the principle of what he has over me in himself. When he retires, his high rank vanishes. The one with knowledge is not like that.

Notes to Chapter 4:

1. Qur'an 7:54, "...then He settled Himself firmly on the Throne."
2. Abu Sa'id Ahmad ibn 'Isa al-Kharraz, died in Cairo 286/899. He said, "I only knew Allah by joining the opposites," and then recited, "He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the

Inward."

3. Hadith, "Allah forgives my people what their selves say to then as long as they do not act upon that."

4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 1000.

5. "And We ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." Qur'an: 37:107.

6. Adam.

7. Sufi leader of rebellion against the Murabitun in the Algarve.

5: The Seal of the Wisdom of Being Lost in Love (1) in the Wisdom of Ibrahim (Abraham)

Ibrahim is called the intimate friend, and he was an intimate friend (khalîl), because he was penetrated (takhallal) and gathered all the qualities of the Divine Essence. The poet says:

You pervaded the course of my spirit,
and that is why the intimate friend is called the intimate friend.

It is like the colour which permeates the coloured, so it is a non-essential matter ('arad) in respect to its essential substance (jawhar), and it is not like the place and that which it occupies. Or it means the penetration of the Real into the existence of the form of Ibrahim. Each of these two principles is true as was mentioned, for each points to an aspect which appears without overstepping it.

Do you not see that the Real is manifest in the qualities of beings in-time and He gives news of that from Himself, and He is even manifest in the attributes of imperfection and the attributes of blame? Do you not see that the creature is manifest with the qualities of the Real from first to last, and all of them belong to him as the attributes of in-time things belong to the Real? "Praise belongs to Allah," so the results of praise from every praiser and one praised go back to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:132) It includes what is blameworthy and praiseworthy, and there is only one or the other.

Know that when something is penetrated by something the first is contained by the second, so the penetrating is the name of the actor veiled by the penetrated, which is the name of the one acted upon, and it is the Outwardly Manifest. The name of the actor is the Veiled, the Inwardly Hidden. It is its food, as water permeates wool and so makes it expand. If the Real is the Outwardly Manifest, then the creature is veiled within Him, and creation is all the Names of the Real, His hearing and seeing, and all His ascriptions and discernments. If the creature is outwardly manifest, then the Real is veiled and hidden in him, and so the Real is the hearing of the creature, and his seeing, hand and foot, and all his faculties as it related in sound hadith. (2)

If the Essence were exempt from these relations, it would not be divinity. These relations are made by our sources, so we make Him god by our dependence on His godness. He is not recognised until we are recognised. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Such a person is the creature with the most knowledge of Allah. Some sages, especially Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, claim that one can have gnosis of Allah through disregarding the world. This is false. Indeed, the non-time pre-time is not recognised as god until that which depends on its being God is known. Thus it is a proof of Him. Then after this, in the second state, (3) unveiling accords you that the Real Himself is the source of the proof of Himself and His godness. The universe is but His tajalli in the forms of their source-forms whose existence is impossible without Him. He assumes various forms and modes according to the realities of these sources and their states, and this is after our knowledge of Him that He is our God.

Then the last unveiling comes, so our forms appear to you in Him, and some of us appear to others in the Real, and then some of us recognise each other and some of us are distinct from one another. Among us are those who recognise that our recognition of ourselves occurs in

the Real, and some of us are unaware of the presence in which this recognition of ourselves takes place. "I seek refuge with Allah from being one of the ignorant." (2:67)

By the two unveilings together, He only judges us by ourselves, rather we judge ourselves by ourselves, but through Him. That is why He says, "Allah's is the conclusive argument," (6:149) meaning against those who are veiled when they say to the Real, in conformity with their desires, "Why did you do this or that to us?", thinking that it was not in conformity with their desires. "On the Day when the legs are bared," (68:42) means the matter which the gnostics unveil here. They see that the Real did not do to them what they allege that He did, but that it was from themselves. For He only lets them know what they are in themselves. From this their argument will dissolve, and the decisive proof of Allah will remain.

If you say, what is the benefit of His words, "If He had willed, He could have guided every one of you," (6:149; 16:9) we say in If He willed "if (law)" is a particle of impossibility showing impossibility. He only willed the matter as it is. But the source of possibility accepts the thing and its opposite in the principle of logical proof, and it is the same with any two logical principles. That which occurs is that which the possibility implies in the state of its immutability. The meaning of "If We had guided you" is, had He shown you the Truth. Allah does not open the inner eye of every possibility in the universe to the perception of the matter as it is. There are those who know and those who are ignorant. Allah did not so will, so He did not guide all of them, and He will not will it, and it is the same as if He had willed it. How would He will this which is not? His volition is unified in its connections. It is a relationship dependent on the known, and the known is you and your states. Knowledge does not have an effect on the known, rather the known has an effect on knowledge, and so it accords from itself what it is in its source.

Divine discourse relates according to what agrees with the ones addressed and what logical reflection accords it. It does not come according to what unveiling gives. For that reason, there are many believers, but the gnostics who possess unveiling are few. "There is not one of us who does not have a known station," (37:164) and it is what you are in your state of immutability which you manifest in your existence. This is if it is confirmed that you have existence. If existence is confirmed to the Real and not to you, the judgement is yours without a doubt in the existence of the Real. If it is confirmed that you are existent, then the judgement is yours without a doubt, even if the judge is the Real. It is only the overflowing of existence on you.

You only praise yourself and you only blame yourself, and praise is only due to Allah for the overflowing of existence, for that is His, not yours. You are His nourishment by conditions, and He is your nourishment by existence. He is specified by what specifies you. The command comes from Him to you, and from you to Him, even though you are called obligated, a passive name (mukallaf), and He is not called obligated since there is no imposition upon Him.

He praises me, and I praise Him.
He serves me and I serve Him.
In one state I draw near to Him,
and in sources I deny Him.
So He knows me and I do not know Him,
and I know Him and I witness Him.
Where is independence

when I help Him and assist Him?
 That is why the Real brought me into existence.
 Then I knew Him and manifested His existence.
 Hadith (4) brought us that,
 and in me He achieved His goal.

Then the intimate friend, Ibrahim, peace be upon him!, possessed this rank by virtue of which he was called the intimate friend. For that reason, he made hospitality to guests a sunna. Ibn Masarra (5) associates him with the angel Mika'il in respect to provisions. Provision is that which nourishes those provided for: when provision permeates the essence of the one provided for until nothing remains in it except permeation and nourishment flows in all the parts of the one nourished. There are no parts in divinity, so all the divine stations are penetrated which are designated by the Names, and by which His Essence is manifested.

We are His as our proofs confirm,
 and we are ours.
 Only my being belongs to Him,
 and we are His as we are ours.
 I have two aspects: Him and me,
 but He does not have "me" through me.
 However, His place of manifestation is in me,
 so we are His - like me.
 "Allah speaks the truth, and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 5:

1. Huyûm is the intense love and passion which causes bewilderment and distraction.
2. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)
3. The first unveiling was annihilation (fanâ') and the second is going-on (baqâ').
4. "I created existence so that I might be known."
5. Muhammad ibn Masarra al-Jabali, Andalusian Sufi and thinker, born in Granada 269 /883 and died near there in 319/931.

6: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Real in the Word of Ishaq (Isaac)

The ransom of a Prophet by an animal's sacrifice
as an offering!
How can the bleating of a ram be equal
to the voice of a man?
Allah Almighty magnified the ram out of concern for us or for it,
but I do not see by what measure.
There is no doubt that the bodies
of cows and camels are larger,
but they relinquished the rank of sacrifice
to the offering of the ram.
Would that I knew how a ram
replaced the khalif of the All-Merciful with its small body!
Do you not see that the command to sacrifice
implies correspondence and promises gain and diminishes loss?
There is no creature higher than the mineral,
and after it comes the plant according to its ranks and measures.
The animal comes after the plant,
and each one had gnosis of its Creator by unveiling and evident proof.
As for the one named Adam, he is limited
by intellect, thinking, and the conventions of belief.
It is that which Sahl (at-Tustari) (1) and the realizer
said as we do (2) - because we and they are in the degree of Ihsan.
Whoever witnesses the matter I have witnessed
will say what I have said, both secretly and openly.
Do not pay any attention to words
which contradict our words and do not sow grain in the land of the blind!
They are the "deaf and dumb" in the text of the Qur'an
which the one protected from wrong action brought for our ears.

Know, may Allah support us and you! that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, peace be upon him, told his son, "I saw in a dream that I must sacrifice you." (37:102) He did not interpret it although the dream is the presence of the imagination (khayâl). It was a ram which appeared in the form of Ibrahim's son, and Ibrahim confirmed the vision. So his Lord ransomed his son from Ibrahim's illusion with the "mighty sacrifice", which was the interpretation of the vision with Allah, but Ibrahim was not aware of it.

The tajalli of form in the presence of the imagination requires another knowledge by which one can perceive what Allah means by that form. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said to Abu Bakr when he interpreted a dream, "You have guessed part of it rightly, and you have missed part of it." Abu Bakr asked him to inform him of what was right in it and what was wrong, but the Prophet did not do so.

Allah said to Ibrahim when He called him, "Ibrahim, you have discharged your vision." (37:105) He did not say to him, "You have confirmed the vision that it is your son" because he did not interpret it. He took what he dreamt literally, whereas dreams require interpretation. That is why the 'Aziz, the ruler of Egypt, said, "...if you can interpret dreams."

(12:43) The meaning of interpretation is the transposition from the form of what one dreamt to another form. The cattle represented the hard years and the fertile years. If Ibrahim had been faithful to the dream, he would have sacrificed his son, since he believed in the dream that it really was his son, whereas with Allah it meant the "mighty sacrifice" in the form of his son. He ransomed him by what occurred in Ibrahim's mind, but it was not ransomed in actuality with Allah.

There is a common form to the sensory form of the sacrifice and the imaginary form of Ibrahim's son. If he had seen a ram in his imagination, he would have interpreted it as his son or something else. Then Allah said, "This was a most manifest trial," (37:106) i.e. his clear test, meaning his experience in knowledge - whether or not he knew what the perspective of the dream required in the way of interpretation. He knew that the place of the imagination required interpretation, but he neglected it and the condition inherent in it, and for this reason he believed in the vision.

Taqi ibn Mukhallad, the transmitter of traditions, did so too, having heard in a tradition he was sure of, that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Whoever sees me in a dream, sees me when awake, for Shaytan cannot assume my form." (3) So Taqi ibn Mukhallad saw the Prophet in a dream in which the Prophet gave him milk to drink. Taqi ibn Mukhallad believed his dream, but he made himself vomit and threw up the milk. If he had interpreted the dream, he would have known that milk means knowledge, equal to the quantity that he drank. Do you not see that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received a goblet of milk in a dream and he said, "I drank it until satiety came out of my nails, and then I gave the surplus to 'Umar." It was said, "Messenger of Allah, what do you interpret it as?" He replied, "Knowledge." (4) He did not leave it as milk in its dream form since he had knowledge of the state of dreams and how they must be interpreted. It is known that the form of the Prophet, peace be upon him, which the senses see, is buried in Madina, and that the form of his spirit and his subtle form have never been seen by anyone nor by himself. For this reason, the spirit of the Prophet takes on material existence in the form of his body as he died, and nothing is missing from it. So it is Muhammad, peace be upon him, who appears in dreams through his spirit in a bodily form which resembles his buried body, for Shaytan cannot assume the form of his body, (5) may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and Allah protects the one who sees him. For this reason, whoever sees this form takes from it all that it orders or prohibits or gives good news of, even as he takes judgements from him in the life of this world - according to what they indicate from text, immediate or implicit. If he gives him something, that thing is subject to interpretation, unless it is manifest in the senses as it is in the imagination, and so does not require interpretation. It is based on this aspect that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, relied, even as Taqi ibn Mukhallad did. The vision has these two aspects. (6)

Allah taught us adab in what He did with Ibrahim and what He said to him when He gave him the station of prophethood. We know that when we see Allah in a form which logical reason rejects, we must interpret that form according to the Shari'a, whether it is in the state of the one who sees Him, or in the place in which He is seen, or the two together. If logical reason does not refute it, then we take it as we saw it, just as when we see Allah in the Next World.

So the One, the All-Merciful,
has forms in every place from what is hidden and what is manifest.
If you said, "This is the Real!" you spoke truly;

and if you said, "It is something else," you interpreted.
 His principle is not in one place rather than another,
 but it brings the Real to the creatures.
 When He manifests Himself to the eyes,
 the intellects deny him by insistent proofs.
 He is accepted in the tajalli to the intellects,
 and in that which is called the imagination (khayâl).
 That which is sound is the seeing.

Abu Yazid, (7) may Allah be pleased with him, says of this station, (8) "Had the Throne, and all it contains a hundred million times over, been in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have felt it." This is the magnitude of Abu Yazid in the world of bodies, but I say, "If the limitlessness of that which exists could be conceived of as being limited, and had it been contained as an existent source in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have been aware of it in his knowledge." For it is confirmed that the heart contains Allah, although it is not described by satiety. Had it been filled, it would have saturated.

Abu Yazid also said, "We have pointed to this station, saying:
 O Creator of things in Yourself,
 You encompass all You have created!
 You create that whose being has no end in You,
 for You are narrow and vast!
 Had that which Allah created shone in my heart,
 this shining dawn would not have shone.
 But that which contains Allah
 does not exclude creation.
 How is that, O Hearing?"

Anyone can create by illusion in his imagination that which has no existence save in the imagination. This is a common matter. By aspiration (himma), the gnostic creates that which has an outside existence in his aspiration. However, it continues only as long as the aspiration continues to preserve it without being tired by preserving what it created. (9)

When it happens that the gnostic neglects to preserve what he created by concentration, that creature ceases to exist, unless the gnostic has mastered all the presences and does not neglect anything. Rather, he must witness at least one of these presences. If the gnostic creates something by his aspiration and possesses this encompassment, that creature's form will appear in every presence, and the form will preserve itself. If the gnostic neglects a presence or many presences while seeing one of the presences, and while preserving the form of what he created in the presence he is in, all the forms will be preserved by the preservation of that form in the presence which he does not neglect. For neglect is never universal, either among the common or the elite. I have exposed a secret here which the People of Allah have guarded jealously, for it contains a refutation of their allegation of being the Real. For the Real is never unconscious of anything, and the slave must be unconscious of something in favour of something else. Inasmuch as he preserves that which he has created, he says, "I am the Real," (10) but he does not maintain it the way the Real maintains it that is the difference. Inasmuch as he is unconscious of any form and its presence, the slave is distinguished from the Real. He must be distinct, although all the forms are maintained by his preservation of a single one of these in the presence of which he is conscious. This is preservation by inclusion, and the

preservation of the Real of what He created is not like that. Rather, His preservation is of each form in particular. This matter which I have just communicated has never been written about by anyone - neither by me nor by any others - except in this book. It is unique in time. Take care lest you forget it!

The presence which you remain conscious of, with the form which resembles it, is like the Book about which Allah said, "We have not omitted anything from the Book." (6:38) It therefore integrates the tangible and the intangible. None will recognise what we have said except the one who is himself a Qur'an. (11) The one who fears Allah will have a furqân, (12) which is, as we mentioned, this matter in which the slave is distinct from the Lord. This furqân is the highest furqân.

At one moment, the slave is the Lord without a doubt,
and at another the slave is most certainly the slave.
If he is the slave, he is vast by Allah,
and if he is the Lord, he is in a restricted life.
Insofar as he is the slave,
he sees the source of himself,
and without a doubt
his hopes expand from him.
Inasmuch as he is a lord, he sees all of creation,
from the presence of angels and the kingdom, demanding from him,
And he is unable to answer their demands by his essence.
For this reason, some of the gnostics weep.
Be the slave of a Lord, and do not be the lord of His slave,
so you will not be suspended and tested in the fire.

Notes to Chapter 6:

1. Famous Sufi who studied under Sufyan ath-Thawri. d. 282/896. Wrote a short commentary on the Qur'an.
2. That the inanimate has more greater gnosis of Allah and obeys Him more than other creatures.
3. Al-Bukhari (6592); Muslim 42:10.
4. In Abu Dawud and Ibn Hanbal.
5. As in the hadith of al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. Either it remains on its dream form or it is subject to interpretation.
7. Al-Bistami, d. 261/874. Famous Sufi known for his ecstatic expressions.
8. The station of the vastness of the heart.
9. Language derived from Qur'an 2:255, "...their preservation does not tire him."
10. Al-Hallaj.
11. i.e. The Perfect Man.
12. Qur'an 8:29, "O you who believe! If you have fear of Allah, He will give you a furqan..."

7: The Seal of the Wisdom of Elevation in the Word of Isma'il (Ishmael)

Know that the one called Allah is Unique (Ahad) by Essence and by all His names, and every existent thing is only attached to Allah by its own lord exclusively, for it is impossible for an existent to possess the whole. As for Divine Unity (ahadiyya), no existent possesses any of it because one cannot have one part of it while another has another part. Unity does not admit of divisibility. His Unity integrates all of Him by potentiality.

The happy one is the one who is the one "who was pleasing to his Lord." (19:55) There is no one who is not pleasing to his Lord because it is by him that lordship (rububiyyah) (1) is sustained. He is pleasing to Him, and so he is happy. This is why Sahl at-Tustari said, "Lordship has a secret, and this secret is you." He was addressing every source. "Had the secret been disclosed, lordship would have been invalidated." He used the word "law" (2) which is the particle of impossibility - so it is never manifested, and lordship is never invalidated - for the source has no existence except by its Lord. The source is always existent, therefore lordship is never invalidated.

He who is pleasing is beloved, and all that the beloved does is beloved, so everything is pleasing, because the source could not act unless the act belonged to its Lord. The source is made tranquil by having an act attributed to it, but it is content with what appears in it and from it of the acts of its Lord, and is pleased with these acts, because every doer and producer is pleased with his act and product. He completes his act and product according to its basis. "He gives each thing its created form and then guides it," (20:50) that is, He revealed to it that He gave everything its creation, so it does not admit of decrease.

Isma'il, peace be upon him, by his discovery of what we mentioned "was pleasing to his Lord." In the same way, every existent thing who is pleasing to its Lord is also pleasing to the Lord of another, because lordship is only obtained from each of the names, not from the One of Unity. What is specific to it from the whole is only what is attributed to it. So He is its Lord. None is attached to Him in respect of His Unity. For this reason, the people of Allah are forbidden tajalli in the Unity. If you look at Him by Him, He is the One who is looking at Himself, and He continues to be Himself looking at Himself by Himself. If you look at Him by yourself, unity vanishes because of you. If you look at Him both through Him and through you, Unity also vanishes because the pronoun of the second person implies that there is something else besides that which is regarded. There must be some relationship which necessitates the duality of the regarder and regarded, and so Unity vanishes, even though there only exists the One who sees Himself by Himself. It is known that in this description, He is the Regarder and the Regarded.

It is not possible that the one who is pleasing be totally pleasing, unless all that he manifests comes from the act of the One who is pleased with him. Isma'il was distinguished from other individuals by how Allah described him, namely, that "he was pleasing to his Lord."

It is the same for every "self at peace" to which it is said, "Return to your Lord." He only commanded it to return to its Lord who called it, and so it recognised Him among the totality, "well-pleasing and well-pleased. Enter among My slaves!" (89:28) to the degree that they have this station. The slaves mentioned here refer to every slave who has gnosis of his Lord, who is content with Him, and does not turn to the Lord of another while preserving the unity

of the source which is necessary. "Enter My Garden," which is My veil, (3) and My Garden is not other than you, so you veil Me by your essence. There is only gnosis of Me by you and you only exist by Me, so whoever has gnosis of you has gnosis of Me, and there is no gnosis of Me, for there is no gnosis of you. If you enter into the Garden, you enter into yourself, so you will know yourself by a gnosis other than the gnosis by which you had knowledge when you knew your Lord. You will have two sorts of gnosis: gnosis of Him in respect of yourself, and gnosis of yourself and Him in respect of Him, not in respect of you.

You are a slave and you are a lord
to whomever you are a slave in respect of.
And you are a lord and you are a slave
to whoever possesses the covenant in speech.
Every knot has a person over it who unravels it
by one who has another knot.

Allah is pleased with His slaves, and "they are well-pleasing and well-pleased with Him." He is pleasing, so the two presences confront each other and accept likes, and the likes are opposites because the two likes are a single reality which does not unify them since they would not then be distinct. There is only the distinct, so there is no like. There is no like in existence, and so there is no opposite in existence. Existence is one reality, and the thing is not opposite to itself.

Only the Real remains,
no phenomenal being remains.
There is nothing connected, nothing distinct.
For that reason, the proof of the eye-witness came,
so I only see His source with my eye when I see!

That is for "the one who fears his Lord" lest He makes distinction by his knowledge. By that distinction, we indicated the ignorance of sources in existence according to what the knower brought, so distinction occurs among the slaves, and distinction occurs among the lords. If distinction had not occurred, one divine name would have been interpreted in all its aspects by that by which another name is interpreted. The explanation of the Exalter is not that of the Abaser, and so on, but from the aspect of unity, as we said, every name indicates the Essence and its reality in respect to what it is. The One Named is but One. The Exalter is the Abaser in respect to the Named. It is not the Abaser in respect to itself and its reality. That which is understood differs in the understanding in respect to each of them.

Do not look at the Real.
Free Him from creation.
Do not look at creation,
and garb it in other than the Real.
Disconnect Him and connect Him,
and stand in a seat of honour. (4)
Stay in the state of gatheredness (jam') if you wish,
and, if you wish, in the forms in separateness (farq).
You will win all,
even if all set out to carry the day.
You will not be annihilated
and you will not have going-on

and the forms will not be annihilated
and will not have going-on.
Revelation will not be given to you
in respect to another, and you will not receive it.

Praise is by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat. The Divine Presence demands praise which is praiseworthy in itself. So one extols the Divine Presence by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat, for one goes beyond it, "and do not imagine that Allah break His promise to His Messengers." (14:47) He did not say, "and his threat", rather He said that He will pass over their wrong actions even though he threatens not to. He praised Isma'il because "he was true to his promise." (19:54) Possibility vanishes in respect to the Real, since in it is that which demands the probable.

Nothing remains except the One
who is true to His promise alone,
and an eye does not remain
seeing the threat of the Real.
If they enter the abode of misery,
in it they are in possession of delight, and a different bliss.
Than the bliss of the gardens of endless-time, but the matter is the same.
The difference between them occurs in the tajalli.
It is called punishment ('adhab) from the sweetness ('udhuba) of its food,
that is like the husk of it, and the husk protects it.

Notes to Chapter 7:

1. Rububiyah: Lordship, the quality of being a lord. A term derived from the Qur'anic descriptions of Allah's lordship over creation. One might say the ecology of natural existence. It is an essential element in Sufic cosmology and is a most sophisticated concept which surpasses the crude specificity and mechanistic views of evolutionist biology. It is an energy system of relationships in constant change and altering dynamics. It functions through the different realms, the atomic, the mineral, the plant, and so on. It relates the levels of living organisms from the uni-cellular up to man, and the interpenetrations of organism and environment. It re-defines "event" from crude historicity to a picture of organism/event in a unified field. It is the underlying concept which allows us to abandon the dead mind/body split of the dying culture. It permits us to utilise and develop the energy concepts of Islamic/Chinese medicine - which hold a common energy concept at base. Rububiyya permits us to observe ONE PROCESS at work throughout every level of the creation realities.
2. "Law" (if, but probably not) expresses an unlikely condition, while "in" (if, but probably yes) expresses a probable condition.
3. Garden, Janna, also carries the connotation of veiling, concealing.
4. Qur'an 54:53-55, "The fearfully aware will be amid Gardens and Rivers on seats of honour in the presence of an All-Powerful King."

8: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Spirit (Rûh) in the Word of Ya'qub (Jacob)

The Din (1) is two Dins: the Din with Allah and with the one whom the Real knows, and who has recognition of the fact that the Real knows him; and the Din with creation; and Allah takes account of it since its goal is conformity with what Allah has willed of the Shari'a set down with Him. Allah said, "Ibrahim directed his sons to this, as did also Ya'qub, 'My sons! Allah has chosen this Din for you, so do not die except as Muslims'" (2:132) that is obeying Him. The Din brought the alif and the lam (2) of definition and acquaintance. It is the recognised Din. It is His words, "The Din with Allah is Islam," (3:19) and it is submission. So the Din is an expression of your obedience. That which is from Allah is the road which leads you to Him. Din is submission and the law (namus) is the road which Allah has set down.

Anyone who is described by submission to what Allah has prescribed for him is the one who has based himself on the Din, and it raises him up and establishes him as does the prayer. The slave is the product of the Din. Allah sets down judgements, and thus submission is the source of your action, and so Din is from your action. You will only achieve happiness by what comes from you. As happiness is established for you by your actions, so the Divine Names are only established by His actions, which are you and which are in-time. As He is called god by His effects, so you are called happy by your effects.

Allah bestowed His rank upon you since you established the Din and obeyed what He prescribed for you. I will enlarge on that, if Allah wills, in a useful manner, after we have clarified the Din which creation has which Allah takes account of when He says, "The Din is Allah's alone," (8:39) and all of it is from you, and not from Him except in respect to origin. Allah says, "They invented monasticism," (57:27) and monasticism consists of arbitrary esoteric rules (an-nawâmis al-hikmiya) which the known Messenger did not bring to the people from Allah by the traditional Prophetic method. When wisdom and clear benefit corresponded to these rules regarding the divine decision about the goal of the Shari'a of Allah, (3) Allah took it into account according to what He Himself prescribed. Allah did not prescribe it for them. Then Allah opened between Himself and their hearts the door of divine concern and mercy while they were not aware of it, and in their hearts He made them esteem their rules by which they seek "the pleasure of Allah" beyond the Prophetic method known by Divine definition. Allah says, "They did not observe it" those people who devised these rules and what was prescribed for them "as it should have been observed" - "unless it was purely out of the desire to gain the good pleasure of Allah." That was what they believed about it.

"To those of them who believed We gave their reward, but many of them are deviators." (57:27) "Many of them," i.e. those who have this worship prescribed for them, "are deviators," that is, do not submit to it and observe it properly. Allah does not accord to the one who does not obey it, a law which pleases Him, but the command requires submission. Its proof is that the one who is obligated either obeys with agreement or opposes it. The one who agrees and is obedient has no need of any discourse on it to prove it. The one who opposes it is seeking one of two matters from Allah to be judged regarding him: either overlooking of wrong actions and forgiveness, or being taken to task for that. One of the two is necessary because the command is true in itself. In any state, it is true that Allah guides His slave by his actions whatever state he is in, and so the state is the influencing factor.

Thus the Din is a reward, that is, the exchange for what is easy and for what for is not easy. "Allah is pleased with them, and they are pleased with Him" (97:8, 58:22) is the easy reward, and "As for any one of you who has done wrong, We will make him suffer great punishment" (25:19) is the reward of what is not easy. He passes over their wrong actions and this is their reward. It is proven that the Din is the reward. As the Din is Islam, and Islam is the same as being led, it leads to what is easy (the reward) and what is not easy (the punishment), and so it is the repayment. This is the language of the people of outwardness.

As for its secret and inwardness, it manifests itself in the mirror of the existence of Allah, so it does not refer to possibilities from Allah other than what their essences in their states accord. They have a form in every state, and their forms differ according to the difference of their states. The tajalli differs according to the difference of the state. The effect occurs in the slave according to what he is. None gives him good except himself, and none gives him the opposite of good except himself. Thus he gives bliss to his essence, and he also punishes it. He only blames himself and only praises himself. "Allah's is the conclusive argument" (6:149) in His knowledge of them since knowledge depends on the known.

The secret which is above this in this sort of question is that possibilities are based on their origin from non-existence. The existence of the created reality is only by the forms of the states on which the possibilities are based in themselves and their sources. Thus you know who has pleasure and who has pain, and from each of these states you know what follows ('aqaba); and since it follows, you derive punishment ('uquba) and penalty ('iqab) from it. It permits good and evil as two opposites which custom calls the good reward, and the evil punishment.

For this reason, He designates and elucidates the Din by custom because He relates to it what is necessary and what his state demands. Din is custom or habit, and the poet said, "Like your habit (Din) with the mother of little Harith...," that is, like your custom. What is understood by custom or habit is that the matter itself recurs. This is not the case in Din. Custom is repetition, but custom is only one intelligible thing while resemblance in forms exists. We know that Zayd is the same as 'Amr in respect to humanness, but humanness does not recur since, had it done so, it would have multiplied. It is but one reality, and the one does not multiply itself. We know that Zayd is not the same as 'Amr in respect to personality. The person of Zayd is not the person of 'Amr in spite of the realisation that personality is common to both. In the sensory, we say that humanness recurs because of this resemblance, and we say in sound judgement that it does not. From one aspect, there is no habit in reward, and from another aspect, there is habit even as there is reward by one aspect and no reward by another aspect. Thus reward is also a state in the possible. This is a question about which those who know this matter are unaware, and it is part of the secret of the Decree which governs creatures. Know that it is as if it were said of the doctor that he is the servant of nature - in the same way, it is said of the Messengers and heirs 4 that they are the servants of the Divine Command among people. In the heart of the matter, they serve the states of possible things, and their service derives from the sum of their own states on which they are based in the state of the immutability of their sources. See how wondrous this is!

Is not the the desired servant here the one who performs what is commanded by the one who is served, either by state or by word? So it is valid that the doctor be called the servant of nature if he acts according to the principle of assisting it. Nature produces in the body of the one who is ill a special state of being by which he is called "ill". If the doctor were to assist nature by service, he would also increase the magnitude of the illness by it when he wants to

repel the illness, seeking health. Health is also a part of nature by the growth of another state of being which differs from this state of being. Then the doctor is not the servant of nature, and yet he serves it inasmuch as he only heals the body of the one who is ill and changes that aspect, not the general one, for generalities are not valid in this sort of question. Thus the doctor is both a servant and is not a servant of nature.

In the same way, the Messengers and their heirs are in the service of the Real, and the Real has two aspects of judgement in respect to the states of the obligated. The matter proceeds from the slave according to what the will of Allah demands of it, and the will of Allah is attached to it according to what the knowledge of Allah demands of it. The knowledge of Allah is attached to it according to what the known accords it of its essence. The known only appears in its form. The Messenger and the heir serve the divine command by will, and yet they do not serve the will. The Messenger answered it seeking the happiness of the one who is under obligation. Had he served the Divine Will, he would not have given counsel, and yet he only gave counsel by it, i.e. the will. The Messenger and the heir are the doctors of the selves for Next life, obedient to the command of Allah when He commands them. So he looks at Allah's command, and sees that He has commanded him to do that which opposes His will. The command is only what He wills, and for this reason, it is the command.

He wills the command and it occurs, and He did not will the occurrence of what He commanded the commanded one to do, and so it did not occur from the commanded one therefore it is called opposition and rebellion. The Messenger conveys the news, and this is why he said, "The Sura of Hud (and its like) made me white-haired," when they came to him from His words, "Go straight as you have been commanded." (11:112) He did not know whether he was commanded to what complies with the will, so that it occurs, or to what does not comply with the will, so that it does not occur.

No one recognises the judgement of the will except after what is willed takes place, unless he is one whose inner eye has been unveiled by Allah. If he is, he will perceive the source-forms of the possibilities in their fixed state for what they really are. Then he judges according to what he sees. This belongs to certain people at certain moments, but they do not have it all the time. The Messenger said, "I do not know what He will do with me or with you." (5) So he made the veil clear, and he only meant that it emerges in a particular command, and no more.

Notes to Chapter 8:

1. Din: The life transaction, literally the debt or exchange situation between two parties, in this usage the Creator and the created, or as some say between the conditioned and the unconditioned, the limited and the limitless, or the many and the One.
2. The definite article.
3. Which is the achievement of human perfection through knowledge and actions.
4. Hadith, "The people of knowledge are the heirs of the Prophets."
5. Hadith in al-Bukhari.

9: The Seal of the Wisdom of Light in the Word of Yusuf (Joseph)

This luminous wisdom spreads its light on the presence of the imagination (khayal), and it is the first of the beginnings of divine revelation in the people of divine concern. 'A'isha, may Allah be pleased with her, said, "The first of what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had of revelation was the true dream. Then he only saw dreams which came like the breaking of dawn, and there was nothing hidden in it," (1) and her knowledge only extended to this. This lasted for six months, and then the angel came to him. She did not know that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had said, "People are asleep, and when they die, they waken up." Everything seen in the state of wakefulness is of that sort, although states differ. She spoke of six months, but all his life in this world was like that, as a dream in a dream.

Everything reported of this nature is called the world of the imagination (khayal), and for this reason, there must be interpretation: the matter which has a form in itself appears in a form other than it. The interpreter passes from these forms which the sleeper sees to the form upon which the matter is based. If he is correct, as in knowledge appearing in the form of milk, then he interprets the source of the form of knowledge from the form of milk. He discovers the source and says, "This form of milk refers to the form of knowledge."

When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received revelation, he was taken from the ordinary sensory world. He was covered and withdrew from those who were present with him. When that left him, he returned, and he only received revelation in the "presence of the imagination", although it could not be said of him that he had been asleep.

It was the same when the angel appeared to him as a man. That was also from the presence of the imagination, for it was not a man, but rather an angel who had entered into the form of a man. The gnostic onlooker interpreted it until he reached its form in reality. Then he said, "This is Jibril who came to teach you your deen." (2) He told them, "Answer the greeting of the man," so he called him a man in respect to the form in which he appeared to them. Then he said, "This is Jibril," and he looked at the form to which this imaginary man would return. He spoke the truth both times, with the truth of the vision of the physical eye, and the truth in that this was Jibril without a doubt.

Yusuf, peace be upon him, said, "I saw eleven stars and the sun and the moon prostrate themselves in front of me." (12:4) He saw his brothers in the form of the stars and his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon. This is from the point of view of Yusuf. Had it been from the point of view of what was seen, the appearance of his brothers in the form of stars and the appearance of his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon would have been from their volition. Since they had no knowledge of what he saw, that which Yusuf perceived was in the repository of his imagination.

Ya'qub knew that when he related it to him, so he said, "O my son, do not tell your vision to your brothers in case they should devise some scheme to injure you." (12:5) Then he absolved his sons of deceit and ascribed it to Shaytan, who is the source of deceit. He said, "In truth, Shaytan is a clear-cut enemy to man," i.e. he manifests enmity. Then Yusuf said at the end of the affair, "This is now the interpretation of the dream that I had. My Lord has made it all come true," (12:100) that is, that He manifested it in the world of senses after it

was in the form of the imagination.

The Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said about it, "People are asleep". Yusuf spoke of what his Lord had rendered true in the status of one who dreams that he has awakened from his dream and interprets it, and does not know that he is still asleep. Then later when he wakes up, he says, "I dreamt such-and-such a thing, and then I dreamt that I woke up and interpreted in such-and-such a way." This is similar to that. Look at how great the difference of perception is between Muhammad, peace be upon him, and Yusuf, peace be upon him, at the end of the affair when Yusuf said, "This is the interpretation of my dream of long ago which my Lord has rendered true," that is, made sensory or sensed. It was always sensed, since the imagination only gives out sensed things, and it has nothing other than that. See how noble is the knowledge of the heirs of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace!

I would say more on this presence on the Muhammadan tongue of Yusuf, as you will soon understand, if Allah wills. Know that that which is referred to as other-than-Allah, or the universe, is related to Allah as the shadow is related to the person. The universe is the shadow of Allah. It is the same as the relation of existence to the universe, since the shadow exists in the senses without a doubt. But there must be something by which that shadow appears. If one were to remove that by which the shadow appears, the shadow would be intelligible but would not exist in the senses. Rather, it would be a potential in the essence of the person on whom it depends. The locus of the manifestation of this divine shadow called the "universe" is the sources of the possibilities by which this shadow extends itself. This shadow is perceived according to what it projects itself on from the existence of this essence, but perception occurs through His name, the Light. This shadow is projected on the sources of possibilities in the form of the unknown unseen.

Do you not see that shadows incline to the darkness, indicating the hiddenness they contain because of the distance of the relationship between them and the persons who project them? Even if the person is white, his shadow is like this. Do you not see that when mountains are distant from the eye of the onlooker, they appear black? In their actual sources they are other than the colour the senses perceive. This is only due to the effect of distance. It is like the blue of the sky. This is the effect distance has on the senses with non-luminous bodies. It is the same for the sources of possibilities which are non-luminous because they are non-existent. Even if they are described as unchanging, they are not described by existence since existence is light. Distance makes luminous bodies appear small in the senses, so this is another effect of distance. The senses perceive them as small in size, whereas in their sources they are large according to that degree and greater in magnitude. One knows by proof that the sun is larger than the earth, but it appears to be the size of a shield. That is also an effect of distance.

You only know the universe according to the amount you know the shadows, and you are ignorant of the Real according to what you do not know of the person on which that shadow depends. Inasmuch as He has a shadow, He is known, and inasmuch as one is ignorant of what is in the essence of the shadow of the form which projects the shadow, he is ignorant of Allah. For that reason, we say that Allah is known to us from one aspect and not known to us from another aspect. "Do you not see how your Lord stretches out shadows? If He had wished, He could have made them stationary," (25:45) i.e. it still would be a potential in Himself. It is as He said, that Allah would not give a *tajalli* of Himself to possibilities until He manifests the shadow. The shadow is as if it remains outside of the possibilities which do

not have a source manifested for them in existence.

"Then We appoint the sun to be a pointer to them," that is to His name, the Light of which we spoke, and the senses witness it, for shadows have no source in the absence of light. "Then We draw them back to Ourselves, in gradual steps," so Allah draws it back to Himself because it is His shadow which appeared from Him, and it is not other-than-Him. All that you perceive is the existence of Allah in the sources of possibilities. Inasmuch as the He-ness of Allah is He, it is His existence. Inasmuch as forms differ in it, it is the sources of possibilities. As the name of the shadow does not leave it by the difference of forms, in the same way the name of the universe or the name other-than-Allah does not leave it by the difference of forms. In regard to the Divine Unity of His being, the shadow is Allah, because He is the One, the Unique; and in respect to the multiplicity of forms, it is the world, so understand and realise what I have explained to you! Since the matter is as I mentioned, the universe is illusory, and it does not have a real existence. This is the meaning of the imagination, that is, you imagine that the universe is an autonomous extra thing outside of Allah. It is not like that in itself. Do you not see that in the senses, the shadow is connected to the person who projects it, and it is impossible that it be detached from that connection since it is impossible for something to be detached from its own essence? Recognise your source ('ayn), and who you are, what is your he-ness and what your relation to Allah is, and by what You are the Truth and by what you are the universe, "other", and whatever resembles these expressions. In this, those that know vie in excellence, so there is the one who knows and the one who is more knowing.

The Real is, in relation to a particular shadow, small or large, pure or more pure, as light is in relation to what veils it from the onlooker through coloured glass which tints it. At the same time, it has no colour, and so you see it as making a mirror-image of your reality to your Lord. If you say that the light is green by the greenness of the glass, you will have spoken the truth as your sensory vision testifies. If you say that it is not green and has no colour as evidence accords you, you will have spoken the truth as sound logical consideration testifies. This is light projected across the shadow, and it is the same as the glass which is a luminous shadow because of its purity. It is the same for one of us who has realised the Real. His form manifests itself in him more than it manifests itself in another. Among us there is the one for whom Allah is his hearing, seeing, and all his faculties and limbs, (3) according to the signs which the Shari'a gives in a transmission from Allah. In spite of this, the source of the shadow exists, so the pronoun of "his hearing" refers to him. Other slaves are not like this. The relation of this slave is nearer to the existence of Allah than the relation of other slaves.

Then the matter is as we have confirmed. So know that you are imagination and that which you perceive and of which you say, "It is not me" is also imagination. All of existence is imagination within imagination. True existence is Allah, the Real, in particular in respect to essence and source, not in respect to His Names, because the Names have two meanings. One meaning is His source which is the same as the "Named", and the other meaning is what it indicates and that by which the Name is separate from this other Name, and so distinct. The Ever-Forgiving is separate from the Manifest and the Hidden, and the First is distinct from the Last. Thus it is clear to you that each Name is the same as the other Name, and yet it is not the other Name. Inasmuch as the Name is the same, it is the Real, and inasmuch as it is not it, it is the imaginary Real which we discussed.

Glory be to the One who is only proven by Himself and Whose being is only confirmed by His source! The Hidden is pure non-existence, so whoever holds to multiplicity, holds to the

universe and the Divine Names and the names of the world. Whoever holds to Divine Unity holds to Allah in respect to His Essence which is independent of the universe, not in respect to its divinity and form. If the Essence is independent of the universe, then He is the source of its independence from the ascriptions of the Names, because it has the Names, and they indicated it as they indicate other named things in which their effect is realised. "Say: He is Allah, Absolute Oneness" (112:1) in respect of his source, "Allah, the Everlasting Sustainer of all" in respect to our dependence on Him. "He has not given birth" in respect to His He-ness and us, "and was born born" the same way, "and no one is comparable to Him" in the same way.

This is His description so He singled out His Essence in His statement, "Allah is Unique (Ahad)". Multiplicity appears by His attributes which are known with us. We beget and are begotten, we depend on Him, and we are equals to one another. This is the One who is pure above these attributes. He is independent of them as He is independent of us. There is no description of Allah except for this sura, the Sura al-Ikhlās (112), and it was revealed in that. The Divine Unity (ahadiyya) of Allah is in respect to the Divine Names which demand the unity of multiplicity on our part, and the Divine Unity of Allah, in respect to His independence from us and from the names, is the Divine Unity of the source. Both of them are included in the name, the Unique One (al-Ahad).

Know that Allah has not manifested the shadows and made them prostrate themselves, casting themselves to the left and the right, (4) except as indications for you of yourself and Him. In this way you are able to recognise who you are and what your relationship to Him is, and what His relationship to you is, until you know from where and by which divine reality that which is other-than-Allah is described, through its complete poverty to Him as well as the relative poverty of some to others. In this way also, you are able to know from where and by what reality it is that Allah is described by independence from people and the universe, and the universe is described by independence, i.e. the independence of some from others in an aspect which is the source of its need of some. For the universe is in need of causes without a doubt by essential need. The greatest of its causes is the causality of Allah, and there is no causality of Allah by which the universe is in need except for the Divine Names. The universe is in need of each of the Divine Names, whether from the universe like it or, from Allah Himself. Thus it is Allah, and not other-than-Him.

This is why Allah said, "Mankind! you are the poor in need of Allah whereas Allah is the Rich Beyond Need, the Praiseworthy." (35:15) It is known that we depend on each other. Our names are the Names of Allah since everything is, without a doubt, in need of Him. At the same time, our sources are His shadow, and not other-than-Him. So He is our he-ness, and He is not our he-ness. We have prepared the way for you, so look!

Notes to Chapter 9:

1. In al-Bukhari and elsewhere.
2. In Muslim, also an-Nawawi's Forty Hadith.
3. Hadith, see. p.11.
4. Ref. Qur'an 16:48, "Do they not see the things that Allah has created, casting their shadows to the right and to the left, prostrating themselves before Allah incomplete humility."

10: The Seal of the Wisdom of Divine Unity (Ahadiyya) in the Word of Hud

Allah has the straight path which is manifest
and unhidden among the common people.
Its source exists in great and small,
in those who are ignorant of matters
and those who know.

For this reason, 'His mercy encompasses everything,' (1) great and small. "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) So all that walks on the Straight Path of the Lord, and is not of those "against whom Allah is wrathful" from this aspect, nor is he "astray". (2) As being astray is a non-essential quality, so divine wrath is also a non-essential quality. The source to which they return is the "mercy which extends to all things", and which preceded wrath. Everything which is other-than-Allah is a creature which crawls and which has a spirit. There is nothing which crawls by itself, rather it crawls by other than it. It crawls by the principle of following the One who is on a Straight Path. It is only a path by virtue of the fact that it is walked on.

If creation draws near you, Allah draws near you.
If Allah draws near you, creation does not follow.
So realise what we say on it,
and everything I have said to you is true.
There is no existent thing in phenomenal being
that you see which does not have articulation.
The eye only sees of creation
that its source is Allah.
But He is stored in it,
and for this reason, its forms are true.

Know that divine knowledges of taste (dhawq) which are acquired by the people of Allah differ according to the different faculties acquired from them, even though they derive from a single source. Allah said, "I am his hearing by which he hears and his sight by which he sees and his hand by which he strikes and his foot by which he walks." (3) So He mentioned that His He-ness is the source of the limbs which are the same as the slave. Thus He-ness is one, but the limbs are different, and every limb has one of the knowledges of taste which are specified from a single source, and differ according to the different limbs. It is like water which is but a single reality, yet differs in taste according to the different locations. The water of the Euphrates is sweet, and brackish water is salty, yet it is water in all its states and its reality does not change, even though the taste differs.

This wisdom is from the wisdom of the feet. It is the words of Allah, that whoever establishes His Books will eat "from beneath their feet" (5:66). The path which is the Straight Path is travelling on it, and walking and running on it. It is only by the feet. So this witnessing of the taking by the forelock by the hand of the One who is one the Straight Path only results in this special art from the knowledges of taste. "We will drive the evildoers" (19:86), (4) who are those who deserve the station to which they are sent, and destroy them by the west wind. (5) The wind takes them by the forelocks and carries them on, and it is the source of the passions which take them to Jahannam. It is the distance (6) which they imagined. When it carried

them to that abode, they reached the source of nearness, and so distance vanished. What is called Jahannam vanished in respect to them. They win the bliss of nearness in respect to merit since they were wrong-doers.

This pleasurable station of taste was not given to them as a favour. They received it by what they realities merited from the acts which they were doing. They were running with their actions on the Straight Path of the Lord because their forelocks were in the hand of the One who has this attribute. They did not walk by themselves, but by the principle of compulsion to reach the source of nearness. "We are nearer to him than you, but you cannot see." (56:85) Rather it is seen, and so the covering is stripped away, and "his sight is sharp." (7) What is specified as dead is from the dead, i.e. what distinguishes the happy from the wretched in usage. "We are nearer to him than his jugular vein." (50:16) What is specified as man is from man, so divine nearness is from distance as is not hidden in divine transmissions. There is no nearness nearer than that His He-ness be the source of the limbs of the slave and his faculties. The slave is not other than these limbs and faculties, so he is Allah witnessed in illusory creation. Creation is intelligible and Allah is felt and witnessed with the believers and the people of unveiling. Allah is intelligible with other classes, and creation is witnessed. So they are in the station of the salty, brackish water. The first group is the station of the sweet water which is pleasant to drink.

People are of two classes those who walk on the path recognising it and its end, for it is a straight path in respect to him; and those who walk on the path being ignorant of it and not knowing its end. It is the same path which the other class knows. The gnostic calls to Allah by inner sight, and the non-gnostic calls to Allah by limitation and ignorance. This is a special knowledge which comes from the lowest of the low (8) because the feet are the lower part of the person, and what is lower than them is none other than the path. Whoever recognises that Allah is the same as the Path, recognises the matter for what it is. Then Allah is travelling on it since there is no known except Him, and He is the source of the wayfarer and the traveller. There is no knower except Him. He is you, so know your reality and your Path (tariqa). The matter has been made clear to you on the tongue of the interpreter, (9) if you but understand. It is the true tongue, so the only one who will understand is the one whose understanding is Real.

Allah has many ascriptions and their existence varies. See how 'Ad, the people of Hud, said, "This is a storm cloud which will give us rain." (46:24) They thought good of Allah, and He is with the opinion of His slave. (10) Allah turned this word away from them. He informed them of what was more perfect and higher in nearness. When it rained upon them, that was the earth's portion and the seed was watered. He told them, "No, rather it is what you desired to hasten a wind containing painful punishment." He made the wind (rîh) an indication of what rest (râha) it contained for them. By this wind, He gladdens their spirits (arwah), delivering them from dark forms, difficult paths and black veils. There is punishment ('adhab) in this wind, i.e. a matter which they find sweet (ista'dhaba) when they taste it. It only pains them by the separation from familiar things. Thus punishment gives them good news. And the command is nearer to them than they imagine.

"Destroying everything at its Lord's command ! When morning came you could see nothing but their dwellings." (46:25) That is, their corpses, in which their true spirits lived, so the trueness of this special relation vanished from them; and a special life in their forms remains to them from Allah of which their skins, hands, and feet speak, (11) so does the punishment of the blows and thighs. (12) All that is related in a divine text.

Allah described himself by jealousy (ghayra). Out of jealousy He forbade actions unrestrained by limits (fawahish). The unrestrained act is only what is evident. As for the unrestrained which is hidden, it belongs to the one who manifests it. When He made the unrestrained haram, that it, forbade that the reality of what we mentioned be known, and that is the source of things, He hid it by other (ghayr). So other says: hearing is Zayd's hearing. The gnostic says that hearing is Allah. Thus nothing remains of the faculties and limbs. Therefore not everyone recognises Allah. People vie in excellence and ranks are differentiated, and the exceeding and exceeded are clear.

Know that Allah revealed to me and caused me to witness in a vision, which I received in Cordoba in 586, the sources of His Messengers and all His Prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. None of this group spoke to me except for Hud, peace be upon him. He told me why they were gathered together. I saw that he was a very large man of good appearance, subtle in reply, gnostic in matters of unveiling. My proof of his unveiling is His words, "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) What gift to creatures is greater than this? Then it is from the bestowal of favours on us by Allah that this speech reached us from Him in the Qur'an.

Then Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant us peace, completed its gathering for everyone by what he was told by Allah, for He is the source of "hearing, sight, the hand, the foot and tongue the source of the senses. The spiritual faculties are nearer than the senses. He is content with the defined and distant more than with the defined unknown which is nearer. Allah translated the speech of Hud to his people to inform us, and the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, translated the speech of Allah in turn to give us good news. Knowledge is perfected in the breasts of those who are given knowledge, "and none denies Our signs but the unbelievers," (29:47) for they cover up the signs when they recognise them through envy, meanness and injustice. We only see from Allah in respect of Himself disconnection (tanzih) or non-disconnection by definition in any ayat which He has sent down or in transmissions which have reached us from Him. Otherwise He has the Great Mist (al-'Ama') (13) which has no air above it and no air beneath it. Allah was in it before He created creation. Then He mentioned that He "established Himself firmly on the Throne." (57:4) This is also definition. Then He mentioned that "He descends to the nearest heaven." (14) This is also definition. Then He said that "He is in the heaven and in the earth," (15) and "He is with us wherever we are." (16) and He tells us that He is our source. We are limited, so He only describes Himself by limitation.

His statement, "There is nothing like Him," (42:11) is also limitation if we take the kaf ("like") as an appendage to other than the attribute. Whoever is distinct from the defined is defined by his phenomenal being which is not the source of what is defined. Freedom from limitation is limitation, and the absolute is limited by absoluteness for whoever has understanding. If we attach the kaf of ka-mithli (like) to the attribute, we define it. If we take "There is nothing like Him" as the negation of "like (mithl)", we realise the given and the sound transmissions that He is the source of things, and that things are defined. If their definitions differ, He is defined by the definition of everything with a definition. Nothing is defined unless it is a definition of Allah's. He moves in the designation of creatures and creation. Had the matter not been like that, existence would not have been valid, for He is the source of existence. He preserves everything by His Essence, and the preserving of something does not oppress Him. (17) His preserving of all things is His preserving of His form in that the thing is other than His form. Only this is valid. He is the witness in the

witness and the witnessed in the witnessed. (18) He is the spirit of the universe which is managed by Him, and it is the Macrocosmic or Great man (al-insan al-kabir).

He is all phenomenal being
and He is the One (al-Wahid)
who establishes my phenomenal being by His being,
For that reason, I said that He is nourished.
So my existence is His food, and we imitate Him in Him from Him,
if you look by the aspect of my taking refuge.

For his sorrow breathed, so the breath is related to the All-Merciful because He is Merciful by it. Divine ascriptions demand it from the bringing into existence of the form of the universe which we have said is what is manifest by Allah since He is the Manifest. It is His inward since He is the Hidden; and He is the First since He was when they were not. He is the Last since their source is in their manifestation. The Last is the source of the Manifest, and the Hidden is the source of the First. He has knowledge of all things since he knows Himself. When He brought forms into existence in the Breath, and the power of the ascriptions designated by the names appeared, the divine ascriptions then became valid for the universe. They depend on Allah. He said, "Today, I set down your ascriptions and raise up My ascriptions," i.e. I take from you your dependence on yourselves and return to you your dependence on Me. Where are those who are fearful of Allah? (19) they those who take Allah as a safeguard. Allah is their manifest part, i.e. the source of their manifest forms. They are the greatest of people, the most pure and the strongest among all. The one who has taqwa is the one who makes himself a safeguard for Allah by His form since the He-ness of Allah is the faculties of the slave. The one called the slave makes a safeguard for the One called Allah based on witnessing, so that the knower is distinct from the one who does not know. "Say: 'Are they the same those who know and those who do not know?' It is only people of intelligence who pay heed," (39:9) and they see into the core of the thing (20) which is sought from that thing. The negligent one does not precede the diligent, and similarly the hireling does not resemble the slave, Since Allah is a safeguard for the slave by one aspect, the slave is a safeguard for Allah by another aspect. Say what you like about phenomenal being. If you like, say that it is creation. If you like, say that is the Real. If you like, say that it is both the Real and creation. If you like, say that it is not Real from every point of view and not creation from every point of view. If you wish, say it is bewilderment in that. The goals are made clear by your specification of ranks. If it had not been for definition, the Messengers would not have reported the changing of the Real in forms, nor would they have described Him by the dropping of forms from Himself.

The eye only looks to Him,
and authority only rests with Him.

We are His, and by Him, in His hand, in every state, so we are with Him. For that reason, He is denied and recognised, disconnected and described. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by His eye is a gnostic. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by his own eye is not a gnostic. The one who does not see Allah from Him nor in Him, and waits to see Him by his own eye is veiled and ignorant.

On the whole, each person must have some doctrine of his Lord by which he refers to Him and in which he seeks Him. So when Allah manifests Himself to him in it, he knows Him and goes near Him. If He manifests Himself to him in other than it, he denies Him and takes

refuge from Him and has bad adab in that matter while claiming he shows adab with Him. (21) He only believes in a divinity according to the [subjective] form he gives that in himself. The divinity of creeds is based on subjective positing. People only see themselves and what they formulate in themselves.

Look at the ranks of people in knowledge of Allah. That is the source of their ranks in vision on the Day of Rising; and I have taught you the necessary cause of it. Take care lest you be limited by a particular creed and deny what is other than it, so that a great blessing may pass you by. Indeed, knowledge of what the matter is based on may pass you by.

Make yourself a vessel for all the forms of belief. Surely Allah is vaster and greater than being contained by one creed rather than another. So Allah says, "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." (2:115) He did not mention one "where" less than another. He said there is the face of Allah. The face of the thing is its reality. By this He spoke to the hearts of the gnostics, that they might not occupy themselves with non-essentials in this life through seeking the like of this. The slave does not know in which breath he will be taken. He may be taken at the time of his negligence, and then he will not be equal to the one taken in a state of presence.

Then the slave who is perfect knows that this is linked to exterior form and to the state limited by turning the prayer toward the Masjid al-Haram. He believes that Allah is in his qibla when he prays. Those are some of the ranks of Allah from "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." The direction of the Masjid al-Haram is one of them. In it is the face of Allah, but do not say "He is here", rather stop with what you perceive and cling to adab in turning towards the Masjid al-Haram, and cling to adab in the non-encompassment of the face in this particular whereness. Rather whereness is part of the sum of directions to which one turns. So Allah makes it clear to you that He is in the "where-ness" of every direction.

There are only creeds, so all directions are correct. Every correct thing has a reward. Every rewarded thing is happy. Every happy one is approved. If he is wretched at one time in the Next Abode, the people of preservation experience illness and pain in this life in spite of our knowledge that they are happy and the people of Allah. Among the slaves of Allah are those who are overtaken by these pains in the other life in an abode called Jahannam. Even so, none of the people of knowledge to whom the matter is unveiled for what it is declares that they do not possess a bliss particular to them in this abode. As for the loss of pain, they denied it, and so it was lifted from them. Their bliss is their rest from feeling that pain, or else bliss is particular and extra as is the bliss of the people of the Garden in the Garden. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 10:

1. ref. Qur'an 7:156, "My mercy extends to all things."
2. ref. Qur'an 1:7.
3. Hadith qudsi.
4. "We will drive the evildoers to Jahannam."
5. The worst of winds which does not fertilise trees or raise clouds. It is said that it was a west wind which destroyed 'Ad. It blows in the hot season and is very thirsty.
6. Jahannam comes from a root which means "deep", as in a deep well.
7. See Qur'an 50:22.
8. Ref. Qur'an 95:5, "We reduced him to the lowest of the low."

9. The Messenger of Allah in the hadith, "...I am his hearing, his sight, etc."
10. Hadith qudsi, "I am according to My slave's opinion of Me..."
11. Ref. Qur'an 41:21, "...that your hearing, eyes, and skin should not testify against you."
12. In the grave according to hadith.
13. "He was in the Great Mist with air neither above nor below it. "Hadith in Ibn Majah, Ibn Hanbal and at-Tirmidhi.
14. Hadith qudsi from Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim: "Our Lord who is blessed and exalted descends every night to the lowest heavens when two-thirds of the night has passed and says, 'Who supplicates to me so that I may answer him?"
15. Qur'an 6:3, "He is Allah in the heavens and the earth."
16. cf. Qur'an 57:4.
17. Qur'an: 2:255.
18. cf. Qur'an 85:3.
19. i.e. have taqwa.
20. Lubb means both the core of a thing and or understanding.
21. Hadith in Muslim (Belief, 302) about the Day of Rising.

11: The Seal of the Wisdom of Revelation (Futuh) (1) in the Word of Salih

Among the signs are the signs of the mounts. (2)
That is due to the difference in destinations.
Among those with mounts are those
who make their mounts stand by the command of Allah,
and among them are those who cross
the deserts with their mounts.
As for those who stand,
they are the people of the source, (3)
and those who cross the deserts are the aliens.
Each of these has the revelation (futuh) of the Unseen worlds
brought to him from Allah on every side.

Know, may Allah grant you success, that the business (of bringing into existence) is based on uniqueness (fardiyya), and uniqueness has triplicity which is from three and upwards. Three is the first singular. The universe exists from this Divine Presence. Allah, may He be exalted!, says, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, 'Be' and it is." (16:40) This is an essence which has volition and speech. (4) Had it not been for this essence and its volition, which is connecting attention to something particular in order to bring anything into being (and when He turns to that thing, He says, "Be"), that thing would not have been. Then tripartite uniqueness also appeared in that thing, and it is by this uniqueness in respect to the thing that it is valid that it take and that it be described by existence. Its triplicity is its thingness, its hearing, and obeying the command of the One who gives it form by bringing it into existence. It accepted three by the threeness of its fixed essence when it was in the state of its non-existence in counterbalance to the essence of the One who brought it into existence. Its hearing is in counterbalance to the volition of the One who brought it into existence. Its agreeing to comply with the command to take form is in counterbalance to His word "'Be!' and it is." Taking form is thus related to the thing. If it not had the capacity to take form from within itself when this is said, it would not have been. Allah only brought the thing into existence after it was not in the command of taking form, by the thing itself.

Allah confirmed that taking-form (takwin) belongs to the thing itself, not to Allah; and that that which belongs to Allah is His command. Similarly, He told us about Himself when He said, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, "Be!" and it is." He ascribed taking-form to the thing itself from the command of Allah. Allah speaks the truth, so this is understood in the command itself. Someone who is feared and not disobeyed commands His slave: "Stand!" and the slave stands in obedience to his master's command. When this slave stands, the master only has the command to the slave to stand. Standing is the slave's action, not the master's action.

Thus taking-form is based on triplicity, i.e. from three, on both sides the side of Allah and the side of creation. That applies to bringing meanings into existence by proofs. The proof must be compounded of three in a special structure and special condition. There must be a result from it. The result is that the thinker constructs his proof from two propositions. Each one proposition contains two singulars, and so it four. One of the four is repeated in the two propositions in order to link one to the other as is marriage. It is three and no more because of one is repeated in both of them. That is how it is the goal exists. Then this compound occurs

in a special aspect which is that the two propositions are connected to each other by the repetition of that one singular, by which triplicity, and the special condition that the principle be more general by cause or equal to it, is valid. Then the principle is true. If it is not like that, then it will give a result which is not true. This existent thing in the universe is like the ascription of actions to the slave, removed from their ascription to Allah, or the ascribing of taking form, the object of our discussion, to Allah absolutely. But Allah only ascribed it to the thing which was told, "Be!" A representation of that is if we wish to prove that the universe exists from a cause, (5) we say that every thing which is in-time has a cause. (6) Thus we have the in-time and the cause. Then in the other proposition we say that the universe is in time. The "in-time" is repeated in the two propositions. The third singular is "the universe". From this it follows that the universe has a cause and the conclusion appears in what was mentioned in the first proposition - that is the cause.

The special aspect is the repetition of the "in-time", and the special condition is the generality of the cause ('illa) because the cause is what effects the existence of the in-time. The principle is general in the in-timeness of the universe in relation to Allah.

We therefore make the judgement that every being which is "in-time" has a cause, i.e. in the greater proposition, unless that cause is equal to the principle or the principle is more general than the cause. So the universe would thus fall under the principle of the cause [in both cases]. The result is true.

The principle of triplicity also appears in bringing meanings into existence, which makes use of proofs. The root of phenomenal being is triplicity. For this reason, the wisdom of Salih, peace be upon him, is what Allah manifested in the delay of three days when He promised to punish the people of Salih, and the promise was kept. The truth was the result, and it was the Cry by which Allah destroyed them, and "morning found them lying flattened in their homes." (11:67) On the first of the three days, the faces of the people became yellow, and on the second day red, and on the third day black. When the three days had passed, their predisposition was proved and corruption appeared in them. That manifestation was called "destruction".

The yellowing of the faces of the wretched is in counterbalance to the shining of the faces of the happy in the words of Allah, "Some faces on that day will be radiant (musfira)" (80:38) which comes from sufur, when the dawn becomes white. This is a manifestation as the yellowing of the faces on the first day was the manifestation of the sign of the wretchedness of Salih's people. Then came the counterbalance offered to His word about the happy, "laughing".(80:39) Laughter is one of the causes which produces redness in the face. Among the happy, it is the cheeks which are red.

Then He made the complexion of the wretched turn black as a counterbalance to His word, "joyous (mustabshira)". (7) That is the effect that joy has on their skins as black effected the skins of the wretched. For this reason, He spoke of the two groups with good news (bushra). He spoke a word to them which affected their skin (bashara) which turned a colour by which skin had not been described before this event. Allah said in regarding the happy, "Their Lord gives them the good news of His mercy and good pleasure," (9:21) and He said about the wretched, "Give them the news of a painful punishment." (9:34) There was an effect on the skin of each group because of the effect of the discourse on them. It only appeared in them outwardly by virtue of the understanding which was fixed inside them. So it is them who have that effect on themselves just as taking form only comes from them. "Allah's is the

conclusive argument." (6:149) Whoever understands this wisdom and confirms it in himself and witnesses it, gives his self rest from connection to other. He knows that good and evil only come from him. By good, I mean what agrees with his goal and suits his nature and temperament. By evil, I mean what does not agree with his goal or suit his nature and temperament. The one who possesses this witnessing makes out excuses for all existent beings, even if they do not make excuses. He knows that all he has for himself is from himself, as we mentioned at the beginning, since knowledge follows the known. When something which does not agree with his goal comes to him, he tells himself, "Clench your fists and puff out your cheeks!" "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 11:

1. Opening. Salih has this in view of the fact that the mountain split open to reveal the she-camel, he opened belief to those who believed in him. The camel is a mount.
2. Mounts which are miracles proving the truthfulness of the Prophets - like the Buraq of Muhammad and the she-camel of Salih.
3. Eyewitnessing.
4. i.e. a triplicity: Essence, volition, and speech (qawl).
5. Here he uses sabab, something by which something is brought about, rather than 'illa, which is something which alters or effects something, as in cause and effect. 'Illa is the reason behind judicial reasoning.
6. First proposition.
7. Comes from a root meaning skin (bashara), the root of bashshara, to give good news, is to announce something which produces a change in the complexion.

12: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Heart in the Word of Shu'ayb (Jethro)

Know that the heart of the gnostic of Allah is from the mercy of Allah, and it is vaster than mercy. The heart encompasses Allah, but His Mercy does not encompass Him. (1) This is the language of the general public from the door of indication (ishara). Allah is merciful (rahim) and is not the one to whom mercy is shown (marhum). Mercy has no power over Him. As for the indication from the tongue of the elite, Allah describes Himself by the breath which is from breathing. The Divine Names are the same as the Named, and the breath is none other than Him. They require what they give the breath of realities, so the realities which the Names demand are not other than the universe. Thus divinity (ulûhîya) demands the object of worship (ma'luh) and sovereignty (rubûbiya) demands the object of lordship (marbub). (2) They have no source except by the universe in existence and determination (taqdir). Allah, in respect to His essence, is independent of the universe, but sovereignty does not possess this principle. The matter remains between what the sovereignty demands and what the essence deserves of independence from the universe. Sovereignty is based on reality and the description is only the same as this essence.

Then the matter changes according to the relationships. It is reported that Allah only describes Himself with compassion for His slaves. The first of what was breathed from sovereignty by Himself is related to the Merciful by His bringing into being the universe, which sovereignty demands by its reality and all the Divine Names. By this aspect it is confirmed that "His mercy encompasses everything." (3) It encompasses Allah. It is wider than the heart or equal to it in capacity.

Know that Allah, as it is confirmed in sound tradition, changes in the forms of the tajalli. When the heart contains Allah, it does not contain other-than-Him of creatures along with Him. It is as if He filled it, and the meaning of this is, that when it looks to Allah in His tajalli to it, it is not possible to look at another with Him.

The heart of the gnostic in respect to vastness is as Abu Yazid al-Bistami said, "If the Throne and what surrounds it a million times over were in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he still would not feel it." Al-Junayd said about this meaning, "If the in-time were compared to the out-of-time, not a trace of it would remain." The heart encompasses the out-of-time, so how can it sense the in-time as existent? If Allah varies His tajalli in forms, then by necessity, the heart is expanded and contracted according to the form in which the divine tajalli occurs. There is nothing left in the heart apart from the form in which the tajalli occurs. So in relation to the seal, the heart of the gnostic or the Perfect Man, is at the stage of the place that is the face of the seal. It does not exceed it, rather it is its size and shape in respect to roundness. The face is round, square, hexagonal, octagonal, etc. in form. If the face is square, hexagonal, octagonal or whatever form, its place in relation to the seal is like it and it is not like other than it.

This is the opposite of what one group alluded to, saying that Allah gives a tajalli according to the predisposition of the slave. This is not how it is. The slave is manifest to Allah according to the form in which Allah gives him a tajalli of Himself.

The exact clarification of this question is that Allah has two tajalli: an unseen tajalli and a visible tajalli. From the unseen tajalli He accords the predisposition on which the heart is

based, and it is the tajalli of the Essence of which the Unseen is the reality. It is the He-ness which merits it by His word from Himself: "He". His He-ness is always He. If this predisposition comes to the heart, then the visible tajalli is manifested to it in the Visible world, so the heart sees it. He is manifest by the form of whatever tajalli he has, as we mentioned. Allah gives it the predisposition by His word, "He gave everything its creation, then guided it." (20:50) Then He lifted the veil between Him and His slave, so He sees Him in the form of his belief in Allah. Allah, who is in the belief, is He whose form the heart contains. He is the One who gives it a tajalli, and so it knows Him. The eye only sees by belief, not hidden in the varieties of belief.

Whoever limits Allah, denies Allah in other than what he limits Allah to, and confirms Allah in what he limits Him by, when Allah gives him a tajalli. Whoever frees Allah from limitation does not deny Allah, and so confirms Allah in every form in which Him changes. He is given from himself according to the form in which the tajalli infinitely occurs. The forms of the tajalli are without end. Similarly knowledge of Allah has no limit in the gnostic who understands the forms. Rather, he is a gnostic at every moment, seeking increase of knowledge by "Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge!" (4)

The business is endless from both sides. This is as if you said: Allah and creation. If you looked at His words, "I am his foot by which he runs, and his hand with which he strikes and his tongue by which he speaks," and so on of the faculties whose location are the limbs which are not separate, then you said that the matter is all Allah or the matter is all creation. It is creation by one ascription and it is Allah by another ascription, yet the source is one. The source of the form is what gives the tajalli of the source of the form which did not exist before the tajalli. It is the one giving the tajalli and the one receiving it. See how wondrous is the command of Allah in respect to His He-ness and in respect to His relationship to the universe in the realities of His most Beautiful Names!

Who is He and what is He and what is His source?

He is He!

Whoever is of His commonality is of His elite,
and whoever is of His elite is of His commonality.

There is no source except source,
so the light of His source is His darkness.

Whoever is ignorant of this
experiences grief in himself

And none recognises what we have said
except for the slave who has aspiration (himma).

He said, "There is a reminder in that for anyone who has a heart," (50:37) because the heart (qalb) is transformed (taqallaba) in the various forms and attributes. He did not say, "to him who has an intellect" because the intellect limits. (5) It confines the matter to a single description, but reality refuses to be contained. It is also a reminder for those who have intellect, and they are those who have creeds by which some deny others, and some curse others, and they do not have helpers. (6) The god of the one with a creed does not have jurisdiction over the god of someone with another creed. The one who has a creed defends it; he defends the matter which he believes of his god, and supports it. He does not support that which is not in his creed. For this reason, he has no effect on the creeds of his dissenters, and similarly his dissenters have no help from the god who is in his creed; so they have no

helpers. Allah excluded help from the divinity of creed based on the isolation of one creed to the exclusion of others. The helped is gathered and the helper is gathered.

For the gnostic, Allah is the Recognised Who is not denied. The people of recognition in this world are the people of recognition in the Next World. This is why Allah said, "anyone who has a heart (qalb)" (50:37) since he knows the transformation (taqlib) of Allah in forms by the transformation in shape. He recognises himself from himself. His self is not other than the He-ness of Allah. There is nothing in phenomenal being from what is, or what will be, which is other than the He-ness of Allah. Rather, He is the source of He-ness. So He is the gnostic and the knower and the acknowledger in this form. He is the one who is neither gnostic nor knower. He is also the one who denies Him in the other form. This is the portion of the one who knows Allah from the tajalli and the witnessing in the source of gatheredness (jam'). It is His word, "anyone who has a heart" which transforms the shapes by His transforming.

As for the people of belief (iman), they are the ones who imitate those who imitated the Prophets and Messengers in what they transmitted from Allah. They are not those who imitate the people of concepts and those who interpret the transmissions received by basing them on their logical proofs. These are the ones who imitate the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace. They are the ones who are meant by His words, "or listens well" (50:37) to what divine transmissions relate of the sunna of the Prophets. He means this is the one who "will listen well, having seen the evidence" (50:37) with awareness of the presence of the imagination and its use.

That is what the Prophet said about ihsan, "Worship Allah as if you saw Him," (7 and "Allah is in the qibla of the one who prays." (8) For that reason, he is a witness. Anyone who imitates the people of logical speculation and is limited by them is not the one who will listen well. The one who will listen well must witness what we have mentioned. When he does not witness what we have mentioned, he is not the one meant by this ayat. These are those of whom Allah has said, "When those who were followed disown those who followed them." (2:166) The Messengers do not disown their followers who follow them.

Realise, my friend, what I have mentioned to you in this wisdom of the heart. As for its specification with Shu'ayb, there is some branching off (tash'ib). Its branches are not numbered because every creed has a branch, and so they are all branches or creeds. If the covering is removed, it is removed for everyone in accordance with his creed. The covering might be removed in a manner contrary to his creed in principle. It is His words, "What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with." (39:47) Most of them in principle are like the Mu'tazilites, believing that Allah will execute the threat on the rebel should he die without repentance. If he dies and is given mercy from Allah, then concern preceded it, for He did not punish him. Thus he found Allah Ever-Forgiving, All-Merciful, and there appeared to him from Allah something he did not reckoned with.

As for He-ness (huwiya), some people are firm in their belief that Allah is such-and-such. When the covering is removed, they see the form of their belief, and it is true. They believe in it. Then the knot is unravelled and the creed vanishes and becomes knowledge through contemplation (mushahada). After vision is sharpened, weak vision does not return. It appeared to some people by the variety of the tajalli in forms through vision, since the tajalli is not repeated. He verifies it in he-ness; and there appeared to them from Allah in Allah's He-ness what they never reckoned with before the covering was removed. (9)

We mentioned the form of the ascent in divine recognitions after death in our Book of the Tajalliyat, in which we mentioned what we gathered from the group regarding unveiling, and the benefits we derived from them in the question that they did not know about. One of the most wondrous of matters is that man is always in ascent, but is not aware of that due to the fineness of the veil and its delicateness. It is like His words, "They were only given a simulation of it." (2:25)

He, the One, is not the same as the Last. Therefore the two semblances with the gnostic are similar dissimilars. The one possessed of realisation sees multiplicity in One, as he knows what the Divine Names indicate. Although their realities differ and are numerous, it is yet One Source. It is an intelligible multiplicity in the source of One. In the tajalli, it is multiplicity witnessed in the one source even as it matter which you obtain in the definition of each form. It and the multiplicity of forms and their variety derive, in fact, from one substance (jawhar). It is its own matter (hayula). Whoever recognises himself with this recognition recognises his Lord. Allah is in His creation due to His form, rather He is the source of its he-ness and its reality.

For this reason, the only ones among the 'ulama' who tumble on the recognition of the self (nafs) and its reality are the divinely inspired messengers and the great among the Sufis. As for the philosophers and masters of thought among the ancients and the mutakallimun in their discourse on the self and its whatness, none of them stumbled on its reality, and logical speculation can never provide it. (10) He who seeks knowledge of it by means of logical speculation, swells himself up and boasts without vigour or substance. "They are those whose efforts in the life of this world are misguided while they suppose that they are doing good." (18:104) He who seeks the matter by other than its path will not achieve its realization.

How excellent is what Allah said about the universe - He changes it with the breaths into a new creation in one source. He said in respect to some, rather to most of the world, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) This means that they do not know the renewal of the command in breaths. However, the Ash'arites stumbled on it in some existent things, and these are non-essentials (a'râd). The Hisbaniya (11) stumbled on it regarding the entire universe. The logical philosophers consider them ignorant of it. However, the two groups erred. As for the error of the Hisbaniya, in spite of what they said regarding change in the entire universe, they did not stumble on the oneness of the source of the intelligible substance (jawhar) which underlies the form. The universe only exists by the oneness, as the oneness is only intelligible by the universe. If they had said that, they would have obtained the degree of realisation in the matter.

As for the Ash'arites, they do not know that the entire universe consists of a collection of non-essentials (a'râd). It changes in every moment since accidents do not last for two moments. That appears in their definition of things. So when they defined the thing, its phenomenal being is clear in the definition of non-essential matters. These non-essentials mentioned in its definition are actually the source of this independent substance and its reality. Inasmuch as it is a non-essential, it is not independent, but by the sum of what is not independent, comes what is independent. It is like occupation of space in the definition of the independent essential substance, and its acceptance is non-essential in its essential definition. There is no doubt that that the containing-of-form is an accident since it is only in the container, and that is not independent it is in the essential nature of the substance. Occupation of space is a non-essential, and it only occurs in the thing occupying space, and so it is not independent. Occupation of space and containing-of-form are not based on the source of the

defined substance by an extra matter, since essential

definitions are the source of the defined and its he-ness.

That which does not last two moments becomes that which lasted two moments or indeed several moments! What was not independent became independent in their view! They do not understand the basis of this, and these people "are dubious about the new creation."

As for the people of unveiling, they see Allah in a tajalli of Himself in every breath, and there is no repetition of the tajalli. They also see by witnessing that every tajalli grants a new creation and takes away a creation. Thus its departure is annihilation in the presence of the tajalli, and it is going-on by what the other tajalli grants. So understand!

Notes to Chapter 12:

1. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My earth nor My heaven contain Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."
2. lit. "god-ed" and "Lord-ed".
3. cf. Qur'an 7:156.
4. Ref Qur'an 20:114: "Say, 'My Lord, increase me in knowledge!'"
5. The root meaning from which intellect ('aql) comes means to hobble a camel.
6. ref to Qur'an 29:25, "You have adopted idols apart from Allah as tokens of mutual affection in this world. But then on the Day of Rising you will reject one other and curse one another. The Fire will be your shelter. You will have no helpers."
7. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari.
8. Hadith in al-Bukhari.
9. Ref. Qur'an 39:47, "If those who did wrong were to possess all that If those who did wrong owned everything on earth, and the same again with it, they would offer it as a ransom to save themselves from the evil of the punishment on the Day of Rising. What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with. them from Allah that they never reckoned with."
10. Being veiled by limitation.
11. The Hisbaniya were sophists, a group known in the history of philosophy for doubts, scepticism and sophism who held that the universe changes at every moment since there is no objective Reality. All is subjective.

13: The Seal of the Wisdom of Power (Malk) in the Word of Lut (Lot)

Malk is power and force, and the strong man with power says, "I have power over the kneading, since I am forceful in kneading it." When the poet, Qays ibn al-Hatim, described his attack with a spear in verse, he said:

I have power over it
and so I made its rupture wide,
and you see standing under it what was behind it.

That is to say that he used enough force in the thrust. It was what Allah said regarding Lut, peace be upon him, "If only I had the power to combat you, or could take refuge in some powerful support!" (11:80) The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Allah showed mercy to my brother Lut, and he took refuge in a powerful support." So the Prophet said that Lut was with Allah who is strong. It was Allah whom Lut, peace be upon him, meant by the strong pillar, and resistance when he said, "If only I had the power". Here it is aspiration (himma) in relation to man in particular.

The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "From that time, the time in which Lut, peace be upon him, said, 'or could take refuge in some powerful support,' after that, Prophets have only been sent with some power from their people." His tribe protected him as Abu Talib protected the Messenger of Allah. His words, "If only I had the power to combat you" is because he heard Allah say, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning," (30:54) by origin, "and then after weakness, gave you strength." Strength is by appointing, and it is non-essential strength. "Then after strength ordained weakness and grey hair." Appointing is connected to grey hair. As for weakness, it returns to the basis of its creation as He said, "He created you from a weak beginning." Allah returns him to that from which He created him, as He says, "then some of you revert to the lowest form of life that, so after having knowledge, they may know nothing at all." (16:70) Allah mentions that he returns to the first weakness. The old man is judged to be as weak as the child is. A Prophet is only sent after he has reached the age of forty. It is the time which is the beginning of decrease and weakness. For this reason, Lut said, "If only I had the power to combat you," although that demands effective aspiration (himma). If you were to ask: "What prevents him from using effective aspiration while it is present in the wayfarers (sâlikûn) among the followers when the Messengers are more entitled to that?" you spoke the truth. However, you lack another knowledge, which is that gnosis does not leave the aspiration freedom of action. Whenever gnosis is great, then its freedom of action with the aspiration is weak. That has two reasons one is his realisation of the station of slavery and his regarding the root of his natural creation; (1) and the other reason is the oneness of the actor and the acted upon. The aspiration of a Messenger does not appear, since the latter aspect prevents it.

In this witnessing, he sees that his opponent does not turn from the reality on which he is based in the state of his source-form and the state of his non-existence. He only appears in existence through what he had in the state of non-existence by his source-form. He does not overstep his reality nor does he abandon his path. That is called dissent; yet it is a non-essential matter manifested by the veil which is over the eyes of the people, as Allah says, "but most people do not know." They know what is manifest and outward of the life of this world, but they are ignorant of the Next life. It is the other way round, so it is from their

words, "our hearts are veiled," (2) that is, in coverings. It is a covering which veils them from perceiving the matter for what it is. This and its like prevent the gnostic from acting freely in the world.

Shaykh Abu 'Abdullah ibn al-Qa'id said to Shaykh Abu's-Su'ud ibn ash-Shibli, "Why do you not act freely?" Abu's-Su'ud replied, "I have left Allah to act for me as He wishes." He meant the command of Allah, "so take Him as your Guardian." (73:9) The Guardian is the one with freedom of action, especially as He heard Allah saying, "Give of that to which He has made you successors (khalifs)." (57:7) Abu's-Su'ud knew, and the gnostics know that the command which he has is not his, and he is only a successor to it. Allah told him, "this command is the deen to which I have you successors and over which I have given you power, so take Me for a guardian in it," Abu's-Su'ud obeyed the command of Allah and took Him for a Guardian.

How can there remain any aspiration for the one who witnesses the like of this command? Aspiration (himma) only acts by the property of concentration that which its possessor does not have, and acts on other than his concentration. This gnosis separates him from that property of concentration. The complete gnosis manifests gnosis at the end of incapacity and weakness. One of the Abdal (3) said to Shaykh 'Abdu'r-Razzaq, (4) "After you greet Shaykh Abu Madyan, (5) tell him, 'O Abu Madyan! Why is nothing difficult for us, yet things are difficult for you, and we long for your station and you do not long for ours?'" Similarly, although Abu Madyan had that station as well as the other, we are more complete than him in the station of weakness and incapacity. His badl said this to him; he did not say it.

The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said that this station is from the command of Allah to him: "I do not know what He will do to me or you. I only follow what is revealed to me." The Messenger acts according to what is revealed to him. He does not have anything else. If He reveals to him that he should act by ordinance, he acts. If he is prevented from acting, he does not act. The best part of choice is to abandon freedom of action unless the person is deficient in gnosis.

Abu's-Su'ud ash-Shibli said to his believing companions, "Allah gave us freedom of action fifteen years ago, and we abandoned it through politeness." This is the language of conceit. As for us, we did not abandon it through politeness, for abandoning would imply preference. Rather, we abandoned it by the perfection of gnosis. Gnosis does not oblige it on the strength of choice. When the gnostic acts by aspiration in the world, it is from divine command and compulsion, not by choice.

There is no doubt that the station of the Messenger demands freedom of action for the acceptance of the Message which he brings. Allah informs him of what will be accepted in his community and among his people in order to manifest the deen of Allah. The wali is not like that. Nevertheless, the Messenger does not seek Him in the manifest, because the Messenger has compassion for his people. He does not want them to exceed by having the proof appear against them because that would entail their destruction. He spares them.

The Messenger also knew that when something inimitable (6) is manifested to the community, some of them believe in it, and some recognise it but deny it out of injustice, arrogance or envy. Some of them attribute it to magic and deception. The Messenger sees that, and he also sees that no one will believe unless Allah illuminates his heart by the light of belief. When the person does not look by that light called belief, the inimitable miracle has no benefit for him. Their aspiration does not seek inimitable matters, since the effect is not

uniform among those who see it, nor is it in their hearts as He said in respect to the most perfect of Messengers and the most knowing of creation and the most truthful in state, "You cannot guide those you would like to but Allah guides those He wills." (28:56)

If aspiration did have an effect, no one would be more perfect than the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, nor have a higher nor stronger aspiration than him, yet even so his aspiration did not bring about Abu Talib, his uncle, becoming Muslim, and it was to the Prophet that the ayat which we mentioned was revealed. Similarly, Allah said of the Messenger, "It is only his to deliver the message." (7) And He said, "You are not responsible for their guidance, but Allah guides whoever He wills," (2:272) and He added in Surat al-Qasas, "He has best knowledge of the guided," (28:56) those to whom knowledge of their guidance was given in the state of their non-existence in their source-forms. It is established that knowledge follows the known. Whoever is a believer in his source-form and in the state of his non-existence, appears in that form in the state of his existence. Allah knew that of him, so that is what he is like. For that reason, Allah said, "He has best knowledge of the guided."

When Allah said the like of that, He also said, "My Word, once given, is not subject to change," (50:29) because My Word is based on My knowledge of My creation. "and I do not wrong My slaves," that is, I do not decree that disbelief (kufr) on them which makes them wretched and then I demand of them what is not in their capacity to do. Rather, We only deal with them according to what We gave them knowledge of, and We only gave them knowledge of what they gave Us from themselves by that on which they are based. So if they do wrong, they are the ones who are unjust. For this reason, He said, "but they wronged themselves. Allah did not wronged them." (8) Finally, We only said to them what Our essence accorded that We say to them. Our Essence is known to Us by what it is based on; so, if We say this, and do not say that, then We only spoke by what We knew to say. We spoke the word from Us, and obedience or lack of obedience is up to those who hear.

So all is from Us and from them, (9)
and acceptance is from Us and from them.
If they are not from Us,
We, without a doubt, are from them.

So, my friend, realise this wisdom of power in the word of Lut. It is a gate which belongs to gnosis. The secret (10) has been made clear for you, and the command is clear. It is included in the even which is called the odd.

Notes to Chapter 13:

1. Which is weakness, and the slave obeying the command of the Master, as in Qur'an 30:54, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning."
2. Two places: 2:88; 4:155.
3. Abdal, plural of badl, a substitute. Shaykh al-Akbar says, "They are seven. Whoever travels from one place and leaves his body in its form so that no one recognises that he has gone, that one is only a badl. He is modelled on the heart of Ibrahim, peace be upon him."
4. A jurist and one of Abu Madyan's disciples.
5. Abu Madyan: Shu'ayb ibn al-Husayn al-Andalusi, great Maghribi Sufi, born ca. 520/1126 near Seville and died near Tlemcen in 594/1197.
6. Mu'jiza, a miracle performed by a Prophet to prove his truthfulness and which others are

unable to do.

7. Ref. Qur'an 5:99 and several other places.

8. 2:57, 9:70, etc. in many places in the Qur'an.

9. The apparent sources. The Word is from him and obedience from them.

10. The secret of the Decree.

14: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Decree (Qadar) in the Word of 'Uzayr (Ezra)

Know that fate (qada') is the judgement of Allah on things, and Allah's judgement on things is according to His knowledge in them and of them. The knowledge of Allah in things is based on that which known things accord Him of what they are in themselves. The decree (qadar) is the timing of how things are in their source without increase. (1) Fate is only decreed for things by themselves. This is the source of the secret of the Decree for the one who has a heart or gives ear. He is a witness "Allah's is the conclusive argument." (6:149)

Properly speaking, the judge (hâkim) studies the source of the question which he judges according to what its essence demands. The one sentenced to what is due him is, in fact, a judge over the judge when he sentences him to that. Every "judge" is sentenced to what he sentences, and in it he is the judge, whoever he is. Grasp this question! The decree is only unknown by the force of its appearance. It is not recognised, so there is much seeking and earnest request in it.

Know that the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, inasmuch as they are Messengers not inasmuch as they are awliya' and gnostics are in ranks according to that on which their communities are based. They only have the knowledge with which they were sent, according to what the community of that Messenger needs, no more and no less. Communities differ, some have more need than others, so Messengers differ in the knowledge of the message just as their communities differ. It is what Allah said: "Those Messengers: We favoured some of them over others." (2:253)

In the same way, they also differ in what springs from their essences, peace be upon them, in the varieties of knowledges and judgements they have according to their predispositions. This is what Allah said: "We have preferred some of the Prophets over others." (17:55) And Allah said in respect of creation, "Allah has favoured some of you over others in provision." (16:71) Provision from Allah can be spiritual like knowledges and sensory like food. Allah "only sent it down in a known measure." (15:21) It is the due which creation seeks. Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) He sends down according to what He wills. (2) He only wills what He knows, and so He commands it. What He knows is as we have stated. It is only by what the known accords.

Timing basically belongs to the known. Fate, knowledge, will and volition follow the Decree. So Allah only gives the understanding of the secret of the decree in respect to knowledges to the one who has been given complete gnosis. Knowledge gives complete rest to the knower, and it gives painful punishment to the knower as well. It gives two opposites. By knowledge, Allah describes Himself with both wrath and pleasure, and by knowledge the Divine Names are opposite one another. A reality (3) governs the absolute existent and the limited existent. It is not possible that there be something more complete than it or stronger or greater than it, because of the universality of its jurisdiction, both limited and unlimited.

The Prophets, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, only take their own knowledges from a particular divine revelation. Their hearts are free of logical speculation because they know the limitations of the intellect in respect to its cognitive perception. The intellect is unable to perceive matters for what they really are. Simple communication is also unable to perceive that which is only accorded by taste (dhawq). Perfect knowledge remains only in the

divine tajalli and in what Allah removes of veils from the springs of the inner sight and the eyes. They perceive matters - their non-time and in-time, their non-existence and existence, their impossibility, necessity and possibility - for what they truly are in their realities and sources.

Since the request of 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, occurred on the elite path, censure fell on him as is related in tradition. (4) Had he sought the unveiling which we mentioned, perhaps censure in that would not have fallen on him. The proof of the simplicity of his heart is in his statement, "How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?" (2:259) His form, peace be upon him, is in this statement of his, as the form of Ibrahim is in His words, "Show me how You bring the dead to life." (2:260) That necessitates the response by the action which Allah manifested when He said, "Allah caused him to die a hundred years, then He brought him back to life," and He said, "Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh." So he saw how bodies grow with the witnessing of realisation. He showed him how it was. He asked about the decree which is only perceived by unveiling to things in the state of their permanence in their non-existence. That was not granted. That is one of the properties of divine cognisance, so it is impossible that any except Allah know it. They are the keys of the First (5) the keys of the unseen which only He knows. Allah informs only those slaves whom He wills on such matters.

Know that they are only called keys in the state of opening. (6) The state of opening is the state of connecting taking-form to things, or rather the state of connecting the decree to the decreed. None has any taste in that except Allah. Neither tajalli nor unveiling occur in it since only Allah has power and action in view of the fact that He has absolute existence which is unlimited.

When we saw that Allah censured 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, when he asked about the Decree, we knew that 'Uzayr was seeking this cognisance. Thus he was seeking to possess the power (qudra) which is connected to the decreed (maqdur). That is only claimed by the One Who has absolute existence. Thus he sought the impossible. How-things-are is only perceived by taste.

As for what we relate of what Allah revealed to him, "If you do not desist, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood," it means I will remove the path of transmission from you and give you matters based on tajalli. Tajalli only occurs according to what you have of the predisposition by which the perception of taste occurs. You know that you only perceive according to your predisposition. You look at this matter which you are seeking. If you do not see it, you know that you do not have the predisposition which it requires. That is one of the properties of the Divine Essence. You have learned that Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) So if He did not give you this particular predisposition, then it is not your creation. If it had been your creation, then Allah, who informed you that "He gives everything its created for," would have given it to you. It is you who desist from this sort of question in yourself. There is no need for any other prohibition. This is a mark of concern Allah showed to 'Uzayr, peace be upon him. He knew that from his own knowledge and was ignorant of that from his own ignorance.

Know that wilaya (7) is the universal encompassing sphere. This why it is not intersected, and so it is informed about things. As for the prophethood of law-giving and the Message, it is intersected, and it was cut off in Muhammad, peace be upon him. There will be no Prophet after him, either giving law or bound by law. There is no Messenger after him, and he is the

lawgiver. This hadith (8) is a fragment of the manifestation of the awliya' of Allah, because it contains the cutting off of the taste of complete perfect slavery, so the name of slavery, which is particular to it, was not used. The slave does not want to share with his Lord, who is Allah, in the same name. Allah is not called "prophet" or "messenger." However, He is called Wali and is described by that name. (9) Allah says, "Allah is the Wali of those who believe," (2:257) and He says, "He is the Wali, the Praiseworthy." (42:28) This name, "wali", continues to be applied to the slaves of Allah both in this world and the Next. A name which is particular to the slave and not to Allah no longer remains since prophethood and the message have been cut off.

"Allah is gentle to His slaves," (42:19) so they still have the general prophethood in which there is no law (shari'a), and they still have the law in striving in the confirmed ordinances. They still have heirs in the laws. The Prophet said, "The 'ulama' (men of knowledge) are the heirs of the Prophets." (10) The only inheritance here is that they strive with the ordinances, and so they legislate them.

If you see a Prophet speaking a language outside the simple ordinances of the Shari'a, that is due to the fact that he is a wali and a gnostic. For this reason, his station in respect to his being a man of knowledge and a wali is more perfect and complete than it is due to the fact that he is a Messenger or someone who legislates and has a Shari'a. If you hear one of the People of Allah speaking, or it is related to you that he said, "Wilaya is higher than prophethood," that speaker only means what we mentioned. Or if he says that the wali is above the Prophet or the Messenger, he means in the same person. He is the Messenger, and inasmuch as he is a wali, he is more complete than he is by simply being a Prophet. It does not mean that the wali who follows him is higher than him. The follower never overtakes the followed in that in which he follows him. If he had overtaken him, then he would not be his follower. So understand that!

The starting point of the Messenger or Prophet who brings a Shari'a is wilaya and knowledge. Do you not see that Allah commanded him to seek increase of knowledge, not increase of anything other than it? Allah commanded him, "Say: 'Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" ((20:114) This means: you know that the Shari'a consists of making certain deeds obligatory and prohibiting certain actions. These actions take place in this world, so they come to an end. Wilaya is not like that. If it had been cut off, it would have been cut off in respect to itself just as the message is cut off in respect to itself. If it had been cut off, it would not still have a name. Wali is a name which Allah will continue to have. (11) This belongs to the slaves by following a model, realisation and attachment. (12)

He told 'Uzayr, "If you do not desist from asking about how the decree is, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood. The business will come to through unveiling by tajalli and the name "prophet" and "messenger" will vanish from you." Allah will still have his wilaya. The context of the state indicated that this speech came as a threat. Whoever has this state when he is addressed in this fashion, knows that he is threatened with the cutting off of some of the special ranks of wilaya in this abode, since prophethood and the message are a special rank in wilaya based on some of the ranks which wilaya contains. He knows that he is higher than the wali who has neither law-giving prophethood nor the message.

If someone has another state which necessitates that the rank of prophethood be confirmed for him, that then is the promise and not the threat. 'Uzayr's question was accepted because the Prophet is the elite wali. Because of the context, he knows that since the prophet has this

prerogative in wilaya, he cannot engage in what he knows that Allah will dislike him doing. He cannot engage in what he knows it is impossible for him to attain. When these circumstances exist for the one who has them and they are affirmed, then this divine statement, "I will efface your name for the register of prophethood" becomes a promise. Thus it becomes a transmission indicating a lasting rank. It is a lasting rank for the Prophets and Messengers in the Next Abode, which is not a place where a Shari'a is prescribed for any of Allah's creatures after they have entered the Garden or the Fire.

We define that as an entry into the two abodes of the Garden and the Fire. When the Day of Rising begins for the people who lived in the times of the gaps between the Prophets, (13) young children, and madmen, all of them will be gathered on one plain for the establishment of justice, recompense for wrong actions and the rewards for works which are due to the people of the Garden. Then they will be gathered separate from other people on one plain, (14) and a Prophet from the best of them will be sent among them. The Fire will be shown to them. This Messenger sent to these people will bring it, and he will say to them, "I am the Messenger of Allah to you." Some will affirm him and others will deny him. Then he will say to them, "Plunge into this fire. Whoever obeys me will be saved and will enter the Garden. Whoever disobeys me and opposes my command will be destroyed and he will be one of the people of the Fire." Whoever obeys his command and casts himself into this fire will be happy and receive his reward. He will find this fire to be "coolness and peace".(15) Whoever disobeys him deserves the punishment and will enter the Fire and descend into it because of his deed of opposition so that that justice from Allah might be set up among His slaves.

That is like the words of Allah, "Upon the day when legs are bared," (68:42) (16) i.e. for one of the immense matters of the Next World, "and they are called on to prostrate." This is obligation and Shari'a. Some will be able to prostrate and some will not be able to do so. (17) These are the one about whom Allah says, "They are called on to prostrate, but they will not be able to do so," just as some of the slaves cannot obey the command of Allah in this world like Abu Jahl (18) and others. This is according to what remains of the Shari'a in the Next Abode on the Day of Rising before people enter the Garden and the Fire. This is why we have written it down, and praise belongs to Allah, the Wali.

Notes to Chapter 14:

1. Qadar has a specific time and qada' does not. So qadar refers to the particular instances of qada'.
2. Ref. Qur'an, "Were Allah to expand the provision of His slaves, they would act as tyrants on the earth. But He sends downwhatever He wills in a measured way." (42:27)
3. The secret of the decree.
4. Qur'an 2:259 "Or the one who passed by a town which had fallen into ruin. He asked, 'How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?' Allah caused him to die a hundred years then brought him back to life. Then He asked, 'How long have you been here?' He replied, 'I have been here a day or part of a day.' He said, 'Not so! You have been here a hundred years. Look at your food and drink it has not gone bad and look at your donkey so We can make you a Sign for all mankind. Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh.'" According to 'Ali, Ibn Jarir, Ibn 'Abbas, al-Hasan and Qatada, that is 'Uzayr.
5. The realities of sources.
6. Miftah, key, comes from the root, fath, opening.
7. According to the commentator, wilaya is annihilation in Allah, and Allah encompassed all, and "All things are passing except His face." (28:88).

8. "I am the Seal of the Messengers."
9. Wali means the friend of Allah, and refers to the gnostic. It is also one of the Divine Names which means the Guardian or the One who manages people's affairs.
10. Al-Bukhari.
11. As Yusuf said about Allah, "...You are my Wali in this world and the Next." (12:101).
12. According to al-Qashani, it is acquired and realised through annihilation in the Divine Attributes and Essence and attached by the going-on (baqa') after annihilation in the station of drawing near.
13. i.e. those who did not have a Prophet to follow.
14. According to the commentator, al-Qashani, the plain on which they are gathered may be as-Sahira, as in the Qur'an (79:14), "But it shall be but a single scare, and behold they are at as-Sahira!" As-Sahira which, according to some, is the earth Allah will create anew on the Day of Rising.
15. As was the case with Ibrahim, Qur'an 21:69.
16. The expression means to get ready for something difficult.
17. This is also reflected in a hadith in al-Bukhari in which the Prophet said, "Our Lord will unveil what is hidden, and every believer, man and woman, will prostrate to Him. Those who prostrated out of eyeservice and reputation in this world will go to prostrate and find their backs rigid."
18. The Prophet's uncle who was a violent opponent of Islam.

15: The Seal of the Wisdom of Prophethood in the Word of 'Isa (Jesus)

He was manifested from the water of Maryam
and the breath of Jibril in the form of man existing from clay.

The spirit was in an essence purified of nature
which it called prison.

For that reason, the spirit stayed in it
for more a thousand years in the designation of time. (1)

A spirit from Allah, no other.

For that reason, he revived the dead and formed the bird from clay.

Since his relation with his Lord is proven,
by it he has effective action in both the higher and lower worlds.

Allah purified his body, and made his spirit pure,
and He made him a model of taking-form.

Know that among the special qualities of the spirits (arwah) is whenever they touch anything life flows into it. This is why the Samiri (2) seized a handful of dust from the track of the messenger, who was Jibril, and he is the Spirit. The Samiri had knowledge of this matter. When he recognised that it was Jibril, he knew that life would flow into whatever he had walked on, so he took a handful of dust (3) from the track of the messenger or he filled his hand or the ends of his fingers, (4) and threw it into the Calf. The Calf made a noise like the sound of a cow mooing. If it had been in another form, the name of that form's sound would have been ascribed to it - as grumbling to the camel, baa-ing to rams, bleating to sheep, and voice or articulation and speech to man. That power from the life which flows in things is called lâhût. The nâsût is the locus on which the spirit is based. The nâsût may be called a spirit by what is based on it.

When the Trusty Ruh, who is Jibril, presented himself to Maryam, peace be upon her, in the form of a "handsome, well-built man", (5) she imagined that he was a man wishing to have intercourse with her. She took refuge with Allah from him with all her being, with the whole of her existence, that Allah might save her from him since she knew that that was among the things which are not permitted. She was given a complete presence with Allah, and it is the meaning-without-form spirit. If Jibril had breathed into her at that moment in this state, 'Isa would have been born in such a manner that no one could tolerate him due to the harshness of his nature which was the state of his mother.

When he said to her, "I am only your Lord's messenger of your Lord so that He can give you a pure boy," she relaxed from that contraction (qabd) and her breast expanded. It was at that time that Jibril breathed 'Isa into her. Jibril conveyed the word of Allah to Maryam as the Messenger conveyed the word of Allah to his community. 'Isa was "His word that He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him." (6) Then appetite filled Maryam. The body of 'Isa was created from the actual water of Maryam and from the imaginary water of Jibril which was infused in the moisture of that breath, since the breath of the living is moist because of the water content in it. So the body of 'Isa is from imaginary water and real water. He emerged in the form of a man in respect to his mother and inasmuch as Jibril had appeared in the form of a man, since taking-form only occurs in the human species according to the normal principle.

'Isa brought the dead to life because he is the Divine Spirit, and bringing to life belongs to

Allah. The breath which 'Isa has is like the breath which Jibril has. The word belongs to Allah. The bringing the dead to life by 'Isa is an actual revival inasmuch as it was manifested from his breath as he was manifested from the form of his mother. His bringing to life is also imagined to be from him, but it actually belongs to Allah. He joined the two by the reality on which he is based even as we said that he is created from imaginary water and actual water. Bringing-to-life is ascribed to him by means of actualisation in one aspect, and by imagination in another aspect. In respect to actualisation, it is said of him that he brings the dead to life. In respect to imagination (tawahhum), it is said that he breathes into it and it becomes a bird by the leave of Allah. (7) The agent is in the prepositional phrase "by Allah's permission", even though He did not breathe into it. It is also possible that the agent is the one who breathes into it. It became a bird as regards physical form. In the same way, 'Isa healed the blind and the lepers.

All was ascribed to 'Isa as being "by Allah's permission." (8) "Permission" (idhn) is an indirect expression, as in His words, "By My permission" (9) and "by the permission of Allah". If the prepositional phrase is connected to breathing, the breather has leave in the breathing, and so it is a bird by the leave of Allah. If the breather breathed not by leave, then the taking form of the bird as a bird is not by the leave of Allah. The agent in that is then the verb "it becomes (yakûn)." If there had not been something real and something imaginary in the matter, then these forms would not have accepted these two aspects. Rather, it has these two aspects because the constitution of 'Isa accords that. 'Isa showed humility to the extent that he prescribed that his community "pay the jizya (10) tax with their hands in a state of willing submission," (11) and that if one of them were slapped on the cheek, he should offer the other cheek to the one who slapped him, and not rise up against him nor seek revenge. This came from his mother's side. Since the woman is lower, she has humility because she is subject to the man legally and physically. The power to bring to life and heal that he had came to him the side of the breath of Jibril in the form of a man. 'Isa brought the dead to life by the form of man. If Jibril had not come in the form of man, but in another of the elemental forms of phenomenal beings from the animals, plants or minerals, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life without taking on that form for that moment and appearing in it. If Jibril had come in a luminous form beyond the elements and natural humours, since luminosity is part of his nature, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life unless he appeared in that form of non-elemental light, while still maintaining the human form in respect of his mother.

When he brought the dead to life, it was said that it was him and not him. The onlookers fell into bewilderment (hayra) just as the man of intellect becomes bewildered in his logical reflection when he sees an individual human being bringing the dead to life, as that is one of the divine qualities - bringing to life with speech, not mere bringing with animation. (12) The beholder is bewildered because he sees the form of a man who possesses a divine effect. That led some of them to speak of that as "incarnation" and say that 'Isa was Allah since it was by Him that 'Isa brought the dead to life. Thus they are charged with disbelief (kufr) which is the veil because they veil Allah, who brings the dead to life, by the human form of 'Isa. Allah said, "They are unbelievers who say, 'Allah is the Messiah, the son of Maryam.'" (13) They fell into both error and disbelief at the end of all they said, not because they say that he is Allah nor by calling him the son of Maryam. But they made the attribution that Allah, insofar as He brought the dead to life, was contained in the human form of the nasut which is called the son of Maryam. There is no doubt that 'Isa was the son of Maryam. The hearer imagines that they have attributed divinity to the form, and so they make divinity the same as the form. That is not what they do. Rather, they make divine He-ness the subject in the human form

which is the son of Maryam. They should differentiate between the form of 'Isa and the divine principle because they have made the form the same as the principle. Jibril was in the form of man who did not breathe and then he breathed. One differentiates between the form and the breath, and the breath from the form. The form existed without the breath - thus the breath is not part of its essential definition. For that reason, differences occurred among the people of different [Christian] parties regarding 'Isa and what he was. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal human form, says that he is the son of Maryam. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal representational form relates him to Jibril. Whoever looks at him in respect to what was manifested from him of bringing the dead to life, relates him to Allah by the quality of the spirit, and says that he is the Spirit of Allah, (14) that is, by Him life was manifested in whomever received his breath. Sometimes Allah is imagined to be the passive principle in 'Isa, and sometimes the angel is imagined in him, and sometimes mortal humanity is imagined in him. So the conception of everyone is based on what predominates that person. 'Isa is the Word of Allah, (15) the Spirit of Allah, (16) and the slave of Allah. (17) That is something which no one else has in the sensory form. Indeed, each person is attached to his father of form, not to the One who breathed his spirit into the human form. When Allah fashioned the human body as He said, "When I have shaped him," (15:29;38:72) then He breathed into Him, that was from His spirit. Thus in its being and source, the spirit is ascribed to Allah. That is not the case with 'Isa. The shaping of his body and mortal form is implied in the breath of the spirit. Others, as we mentioned, are not like that.

All existent things are the words of Allah which are inexhaustible (18) because they are from "kun" and "kun" is the word of Allah. Is the word ascribed to Him according to what He really is? His what-ness is not known. Or is it that Allah descends to the form of the one who says, "kun", and so the word "kun" is the reality of that form to which he descended or in which He is manifest? Some of the gnostics take one side and some take the other side, and some of them are bewildered in the business and do not know. This is a question which can only be recognised by taste (dhawq), as was the case with Abu Yazid al-Bistami when he breathed into the ant which he had killed and it returned to life. He knew in that action by Whom he had breathed, and that was an 'Isawian witnessing. As for the revival of meaning by knowledge, that is the divine life, essential, eternal, sublime, and luminous, about which Allah said, "Is someone who was dead and whom We brought to life, supplying him with a light by which to walk among the people..." (6:123) Whoever gives life to a dead soul by the life of knowledge in a particular problem connected to knowledge of Allah, has brought him to life by it, and it is "a light for him by which he walks among the people, i.e. among his likes in form.

Were it not for Him and not for us,
that which is would not have been.
I worship Him in truth,
and Allah is our Master.
I am his source so know!
If you said, "man,"
Then do not be veiled by "man".
He has given you a proof.
So be Allah and be creation,
and you will be merciful by Allah.
Feed His creation through Him,
and you will be spirit and sweet scent.
We give Him what appeared by Him in us,

and He gave to us.
The command is apportioned between Him and us.
My heart was given life by the One who knew it
when He gave us sensory life.
At that time (before time),
we were beings, sources and times in Him.
That did not endure in us, but that gave us life.

Part of what proves what we mentioned concerning the breath (nafkh) of the spirit with the elemental form is that Allah has described Himself by the "breath of the All-Merciful". Everyone described by an attribute must follow the attribute and all that attribute demands of him. You realise that breath is necessary for the one who breathes. For that reason, the divine breath accepts the forms of the universe. It is like the primordial substance, (19) which is not other than the source of nature.

The elements are one of the forms of nature, and what is above the elements and what issues from them are also part of the forms of nature. They are sublime spirits going right up to the seven heavens. As for the spirits of the seven heavens and their sources, they are elemental, so they issue from the vapour of the elements. The angels from every heaven are from the elements, so they are made from the elements, and there are no beings of nature above them. For this reason, Allah described them with dispute, (20) i.e. the Highest Assembly, because nature has polarisation. Polarisation is that which is in the Divine Names, and they are ascriptions given by the "breath of the All-Merciful." Do you not see how the Essence is not subject to this principle, and that it is independent of the worlds? This is why the world appeared in the form of the One who brought it into being, and it is not other than the divine breath.

The divine breath ascends by what it has of heat, and descends by what it has of humidity and cold, and fixes itself and solidifies by what it has of dryness. Thus precipitation comes from cold and humidity. Do you not see that when the doctor wants to give someone a remedy, he looks at his water (urine) in a long-necked bottle? If he sees precipitation, he knows that the digestion is complete. He gives the remedy to speed progress. The precipitation is produced by his natural coldness and humidity.

Then Allah kneaded the clay of this human person with "His two hands." These are opposite to each other. Even though each of these two hands may be a right hand, the distinction between them is not hidden. They are only two in themselves - two hands because He only causes effects in nature according to what is in conformity with it. Nature consists of opposites, so He said "two hands". Then He brought man into existence with two hands, and called him man (bashar). (21) This refers to the direct contact (mubashara) of the two hands as befits the Divine Presence. That arises from His concern for this human species. Then Allah said to the one who refused to prostrate himself before Adam, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My Own Hands? Were you overcome with arrogance (towards the one who is your like, made of the elements) or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) meaning those who are above the elements. "You are not like that."

By the exalted, (22) He means those who, by their essence, are above being elemental by their luminous constitution, even though they are part of nature. Man is only better than the other species by virtue of his being made of clay (bashar). He is the best species of all that was created from the elements by direct contact with the two hands. So in rank, man is above

the terrestrial and celestial angels, although the lofty angels are better than the human species according to a divine text. (23)

If anyone wishes to recognise the divine breath (nafas), let him recognise the universe, because "whoever knows himself knows his Lord" (24) who is manifest in him. The universe was manifested in the breath of the Merciful which Allah breathed from the Divine Names. They brought the manifestation of their effects into existence from the non-manifestation of their effects. He was generous to Himself by what He brought into existence in Himself. The first effect of the breath took place in that Presence. Then the command continued to descend (25) by breathing out from the universal to the last of what Allah brought into existence.

All is contained in the source of the breath,
like light is contained in the essence of darkness
at the end of the night before daylight.
Knowledge comes by proof at the end of the day
for the one who is sleepy.
He sees what I have said as a dream which indicates the breath,
And it gives him relief from every grief.
In the recitation of the Qur'an, it is, "He frowned." (26)
He has given a tajalli of Himself
to the one who came to fetch a firebrand. (27)
So Musa saw Him as a fire, while He is a light
for kings and seekers.
If you have recognise what I said,
then know that you are in a state of grief. (28)
If Musa had sought something else
(other than the brand),
he still would have seen Him in that,
and not the opposite.

When Allah establishes this 'Isawian word in the Station (29) so that we would know and he would be known, 'Isa will be asked about what was ascribed to him and whether or not it was true, even though Allah already knew whether or not that matter had taken place. Allah will say to him, "Did you say to people: 'Take me and my mother as gods, besides Allah?'" (30)

Adab demands a response to the one asking the question because when He gave him a tajalli in this station and form, wisdom necessitated the response in separation by the source of gatheredness. So he put disconnection first and said, "Glory be to You!" using the kaf (pronoun of the second person singular) which defines who is indicated by encounter and speech. "It is not mine," inasmuch as I belong to myself rather than You, (31) "to say what I have no right to," that is, what my he-ness rather than my essence necessitates. "If indeed I said it, You know it," because You are the Speaker, and whoever says something knows what he has said. You are the tongue by which I speak, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, reported to us in a divine transmission in which Allah said, "I am his tongue by which he speaks." He made His He-ness the same as the tongue of the speaker, but ascribed the speech to His slave.

Then the man of right action completed his response by saying, "You know what is in my self," and the speaker is Allah, "and I do not know what is in it," so this is in knowledge of the he-ness of 'Isa in respect of His He-ness, not in respect of the fact that 'Isa speaks and has

an effect. "It is You", so He brought distinction and support to confirm the proof and dependence on Him, since Allah only knows the Unseen. So He separated and gathered, unified and made many, made wide and narrow.

To end his reply, 'Isa said, "I said to them nothing but what You ordered me to say." He negated to begin with, (32) alluding to the fact the he has no existence. The statement required adab with the questioner. If he had not acted thus, he would have been described as lacking knowledge of the realities, but he certainly was not like that! Thus he said, "only what You ordered me," and it is You are the One who speaks on my tongue, and You are my tongue. Observe this divine polarity of the spirit! What is finer and more subtle than this!

'Isa said that he said, "Worship Allah." So he used the name of Allah because slaves differ in forms of worship and Shari'a. So he did not specify one name rather than another name. Instead he used the name which joins all of them. Then he went on, "my Lord and your Lord." It is known that His relationship to one existent being by lordship (rubûbiya) is not the same as His relationship with another existent being. That is why he made a distinction when he said, "my Lord and your Lord," by two references one to the speaker and one to the one addressed. He said, "nothing but what You ordered me," and thus he affirmed that he is one who is commanded. The quality of being commanded is not other than slavery, since one is only commanded when obedience is expected of one, even if one does not comply.

Since the command descends according to ranks, all that appears in a certain rank is coloured with what the reality of that rank gives it. The rank of the one commanded has a principle which appears in everyone who is commanded. The rank of the commander has a principle which appears in every command. Allah said, "Establish the prayer." He is the commander and the one who is subject to the obligation is the commanded. The slave says, "Forgive me!" so he commands and Allah is the commanded. What Allah demands of His slave by His command is the same as what the slave demands of Allah by his command. This is why every supplication is answered, and it must be answered, even if the answer is delayed, just as some who are under obligation delay the prayer. Whoever who is obligated to perform the prayer and does not pray it at its proper time, delays obedience and prays it at another time when he is able to perform it. There must be an answer, if only by intention.

Then he said, "I was a witness against them (and he did not say over himself with them as when he said, 'my Lord and your Lord') as long as I remained among them" because the Prophets are witnesses over their communities as long as they are in them. "But when You took me (i.e. raised me) back to You," and You veiled them from me and me from them, "You were the One Watching over them," no longer in my substance, but in their substance, since You are their eye which necessitates observation.

He wanted to make a distinction between him and his Lord so that it would be known that he was a slave and that Allah is Allah and He is his Lord. He referred to himself as a witness (shahid) and he referred to Allah as the Watcher (raqib). He mentioned "them" before himself when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them," (33) preferring them in priority and with adab. He put "them" after Allah in relationship to Him when he said, "You were the One Watching over them" because of what the Lord merits in priority of rank.

Then know that Allah has the name the Watcher (Ra'iqib) which 'Isa applied to Him, and He is the Witness in His words, "a witness against them," and "You are Witness of all things."

(5:117) He referred to all things and "thing" is the most indefinite of things. He used the name, "The Witness," and Allah is the Witness over every witnessed thing according to what the reality of that witnessed things demands. He indicated that Allah was the Witness over the people of 'Isa when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them." This is the witnessing of Allah in the substance of 'Isa, as it is confirmed that Allah is his tongue, hearing and sight.

Then he said something which is both 'Isawian and Muhammadan. As for its being 'Isawian, that is the speech of 'Isa by the transmission of Allah from him in His Book. As for its being Muhammadan, it happened that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood in one place for an entire night reciting it without turning to anything else until dawn broke. It is, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves. If You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (34) "They" is the pronoun of those who are absent as "he" is the pronoun of someone who is absent. as He said, "they are those who disbelieve," with the pronoun of those who are not present. Absence is their veil to what is meant by the witnessed one who is present. He said, "If you punish them," with the pronoun of the absent, and that absence is the source of the veil which hides them from the Real.

The Prophet mentioned them to Allah before the time when they are present (35) so that when the actual time came when they were present, the leaven would already have acted on the dough, and the dough might have had time to become equal to the leaven. (36)

Then by "they are Your slaves," he singled out the unity (tawhid) on which they are based. There is no submissiveness greater than the submissiveness of slaves because they have no freedom of action with themselves. They act according to what their master wishes of them when he has no partner in them. He said, "Your slaves," and singled out what was meant of the punishment which is their humiliation. There are none more lowly than them since they are slaves. Thus their essence necessitates that they be lowly, so You do not degrade them, for You do not degrade them with anything more lowly than the fact that they are slaves.

"If You forgive them," if You veil them from the punishment which they deserve because of their opposition if You put forgiveness on them, You veil them from the punishment and protect them from it, "You are the Almighty," the Protector, the Guardian. When Allah gives this name ('aziz) to one of His slaves, then Allah is called the Exalter (Mu'izz). This name is given to him by the 'Aziz, so he has strong protection from the revenge and punishment which the Avenger and Punisher desire for him. He also used distinction and dependence to confirm the proof, and so the ayat is the same sort of His words, "You are the Knower of the Unseen Worlds," and "You are the Watcher over them," and "You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (37)

The question from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and his supplication to his Lord in which he repeated the phrase for the entire night until dawn was a request for the answer. If he had heard the answer in the first questioning, he would not have repeated it. Allah showed him the judgements in detail by which they deserved punishment. As each instance was presented to him and specified, the Prophet said to Him, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves, and if You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." If he had seen in what was presented to him anything which would make it necessary that Allah had already decided and that His presence must be preferred, he would have invoked Allah against them rather than for them. So what they deserved is changed by what this ayat accords of submission to Allah and exposing themselves to His pardon.

The Prophet related that when Allah loves the voice of His slave when he makes supplication to Him, He delays the answer to his supplication so that the slave will repeat the supplication. This comes from His love for the slave, not because He has turned away from him. For that reason, the Prophet mentioned the name of the Wise, and the Wise is the one who puts everything in its proper place, and who does not turn away from the qualities which their realities necessitate and demand; so the Wise is the One who knows the order of things. When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, kept repeating this ayat, he was in possession of a great knowledge from Allah. If anyone recites it, let him recite it in that manner. (38) Otherwise, it is better that he remain silent. When Allah lets the slave articulate any request, He does so when He wants to answer it and grant his need. Let no one be slow in whatever has been guaranteed to him, but let him persevere as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, perserved with this ayat in all his states, so that he either hears with His ear, or with hearing, whichever you like. How else will Allah make you hear the answer? If He permits the question on your tongue, He will let you hear the answer with your ear. If He permits the meaning to you, He will let you hear the answer by your hearing.

Notes to Chapter 15:

1. As he was born more than five centuries before the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and is still alive, waiting to descend.
2. The story is found in the Qur'an 20:75-95, where as-Samiri convinces the tribe of Israel to cast their ornaments into the fire out of which he brought the figure of a Calf which they worshipped. He told Musa, "I beheld what they did not behold, and I seized a handful of dust from the messenger's track and cast it into the thing."
3. With dad, qabda.
4. With sad, qabsa.
5. Qur'an 19:17.
6. Qur'an 4:171, "The Messiah, 'Isa son of Maryam, was only the Messenger of Allah and His Word, which He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him."
7. Qur'an 3:49; 5:110.
8. Qur'an 3:49.
9. Qur'an 5:110.
10. The tax paid by the People of the Book to the Muslim State.
11. Qur'an 9:29.
12. i.e. the dead person can speak and answer him. This not simply causing the dead limbs to move of their own accord.
13. Qur'an 5:17, 5:72.
14. Ruh Allah.
15. See Qur'an 3:45, 4:171.
16. Qur'an 14:171.
17. Qur'an 19:30.
18. See Qur'an 18:109, "Say: 'If all the sea was ink to write down the Words of my Lord, it would run out long before the Words of my Lord ran out,' even if We were to bring the same amount of ink again."
19. Al-jawhar al-hayulani.
20. Qur'an 38:69, "I had no knowledge of the Highest Assembly when they disputed." It can also mean mutual rivalry.
21. Qur'an 15:28, "I am creating a mortal (bashar)."
22. "The exalted" are the angels who wander in love and those who are near, like Jibril and

the angels of the Throne.

23. "Or are you one of the exalted?" 38:75.

24. As the Prophet said.

25. See Qur'an 65:12, "It is Allah who created the seven heavens and of earth their like, the Command descending down through all of them."

26. Sura 80.

27. Musa in Qur'an 20:10; 27:7. Refers to empirical knowledge, but he found unveiling in the form of the Burning Bush.

28. By standing behind the veil or seeking other-than-Him.

29. On the Last Day.

30. Qur'an 5:116.

31. To slaveness rather than lordship.

32. (ma qulta = I did not say).

33. Literally in the Arabic, "I was against them a witness."

34. This is the end of what 'Isa said in this verse.

35. On the Day of Gathering.

36. According to the commentator, the leaven is the predisposition for the arrival in the presence of Allah. The dough is the clay of his substance.

37. All used in this verse.

38. i.e. with knowledge, weeping, and maintaining adab.

16: The Seal of the Wisdom of Mercy in the Word of Sulayman (Solomon)

Bilqis said, (1) "It (the letter) is from Sulayman and it says 'In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, Most Merciful.'" Some people criticise the fact that the name of Sulayman comes before the name of Allah. That is not the case, and in saying this they say something that does not befit the gnosis which Sulayman, peace be upon him, had of his Lord. How could what they say be connected to him when Bilqis said of it, "a noble letter had been delivered to me," that is, a letter which honoured her. In this they were influenced by the story of how Chosroes tore up the letter of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. (2) He did not tear it up until he had read all of it and knew what it contained. It was the same with Bilqis. Had she not accepted what was established, respect for its author would not have prevented her from tearing up the letter, whether his name, peace be upon him, had been mentioned before or after the name of Allah.

Sulayman mentioned the two mercies: the mercy of graciousness and the mercy of obligation, and they are ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. So Allah freely dispenses His bounty by the Rahman, and it is incumbent on Him by the Rahim. This obligation comes from graciousness, so Rahim is contained in Rahman. Allah "has prescribed mercy for Himself," glory be to Him! in order that the slave might have what Allah spoke about of the deeds which this slave brings, expecting his due from Allah who has required Himself to have this mercy for them, the mercy of obligation. When one of the slaves is like this, he knows that He is the author of the deed.

The deed is divided according to the eight organs of man. Allah informed us that He is the He-ness of each organ. So the author of the action is none other than Allah while the form is that of the slave. He-ness is embodied in him, i.e. only in his name because Allah is the source of what is manifested and which is called "creation". Because of this, the names of the Manifest and the Last belong to the slave since he was not and then was. By the fact that his manifestation depends on Him and action issues from Him, there is the name the Hidden and the First. Thus, when you see creation, you see the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

This recognition was not hidden from Sulayman, peace be upon him. Indeed, it is a part of a kingdom which "belonged to no one after him," (3) in terms of its manifestation in the visible world. Muhammad, peace be upon him, was given what Sulayman was given, but he did not manifest it. Allah gave him the power to vanquish the 'ifrit (4) who came in the night to attack him. (5) When the Prophet wanted to take the 'ifrit and tie him to the one of the columns of the mosque until morning so that the children of Madina could play with him, he remembered the prayer of Sulayman, and so Allah made him drive the 'ifrit off in disgrace. The Prophet did not manifest his power as Sulayman had done. He spoke of "a kingdom" which is not universal, and we know that he meant a particular kingdom. We see that the Prophet shared in every part of the Kingdom which Allah had given him and so we know by this that he is privileged with the whole kingdom. In the story of the 'ifrit, he was only given the manifestation while Sulayman might have been given the whole and the manifestation. If the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had not said in the story of the 'ifrit, "and Allah gave me power over him," we would have said that when he wanted to seize the 'ifrit, Allah reminded him of Sulayman's prayer so that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, would know that Allah had not given him power to seize him.

He then made him send off the 'ifrit off in disgrace.

When he said, "Allah gave me power over him," we knew that Allah had given him freedom of action in that. Then Allah reminded him and he remembered Sulayman's prayer and showed adab towards him. We know from this that that no creature after Sulayman had the general manifestation of that kingdom.

Our goal in this question is only discussion and instruction about the two mercies which Sulayman mentioned in the two names which are expressed in Arabic as ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. (6) Allah stipulated the mercy of obligation (7) and made the application of the mercy of graciousness universal when He said, "My mercy extends to all things," (7:156) even the Divine Names, which are the realities of ascriptions. He was gracious to us in them. We are the result of the mercy of graciousness by the Divine Names and divine ascriptions of lordship. Then He prescribed mercy for Himself by our own manifestation. He informed us that He is our He-ness, that we might know that He obliged mercy on Himself only for Himself. Mercy never departs from Him. Who could be gracious to you when there is only Him?

There must be a principle for clarifying differences in merit this is in relation to what is manifested of the differences in merit that creatures have in knowledge, so that it might be said that this person knows more than that person, even though the source is but one. This means the shortcoming connected to the will (irada), apart from the connection of knowledge. This difference in merit exists in the divine attributes. (8) The connection and merit of will and its increase is connected to power. In the same way, hearing, sight and all the divine names are arranged in ranks, some having more merit than others. Similarly what is manifested in creation differs in ranks of merit, so that it can be said that this person knows more than that person even though the source is the same.

As each Divine Name which I have set forth is implied by all the Names and described by them, similarly that which creation manifests accepts all of that which is subject to differences of merit. Each part of the universe is from all the universe, i.e. it is a vessel for all the separate realities of the universe. Our statement that Zayd is inferior to 'Amr in knowledge does not contradict the fact that the He-ness of Allah is the source of both Zayd and 'Amr, but it is more perfect and knowing in 'Amr than in Zayd, even as the Names differ in merit. They are not other-than-Allah. Allah, inasmuch as He is Knowing, has a more encompassing connection than Allah as the Transformer, the All-Powerful. But He is still He and not other-than-Him.

O my friend! do not then know Him in one aspect and be ignorant of Him in another! Do not negate Him here and affirm Him there, unless You affirm Him by an aspect through which He affirms Himself and negate Him by an aspect through which He negates Himself, as in the ayat which combines affirmation and negation in respect to Him when He said, "Nothing is like Him," negating, "and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (42:11) and so He affirmed an attribute which is general to every hearing and seeing living being. Nothing exists but that it is alive, although this is hidden in the world from the perception of some people. It will appear to all people in the Next World, for it is the Abode of the Living (ad-Dar al-Hayawan). Similarly, the life of this world is only veiled from some of the slaves so that election and difference of merit might be manifested among the slaves of Allah according to what they perceive of Him from the realities of the universe.

In one whose attainment is more comprehensive, Allah is in principle more manifest in him than in someone who does not have this comprehensiveness. So do not be veiled by the difference in merit and say that it is not correct to say that creation is the He-ness of Allah after we have shown you the different in merit in the Divine Names. You have no doubt about them being Allah, and what is designated by them is not other than Allah.

How then could Sulayman place his name before the name of Allah as they allege? He is part of the whole which the mercy of graciousness brought into existence. The name, ar-Rahman ar-Rahim, must come first for the dependence of the one receiving this mercy to be valid. Advancing the one who should come afterwards and delaying the one who should come before in the place he merits is contrary to the realities.

Part of the wisdom of Bilqis and the sublimity of her knowledge lies in the fact that she did not mention who cast the letter to her. She only did that so that her companions would know that she had communications on matters whose means they did not know. This is part of divine management in ruling because when the means of communication reaching the ruler are unknown, the people of the government fear for themselves in their actions. Therefore they only act with prudence in a matter because that will reach their ruler, and they are guarding themselves from the potential danger of that action. If they knew precisely by whom information reached their ruler, they would have tried to flatter him and bribe him so that they could do whatever they wanted without their ruler hearing about it. Therefore the Queen said, "a noble letter has been delivered to me," without naming the one who cast it. That was an act of policy on her part would insure respect for her among the people of her kingdom and the nobles under her rule. By this, she merited her superiority over them.

As regards the superiority of the human man of knowledge over the man of knowledge of the jinn in the secrets of the disposal of things and the special properties of thing, that is known by the amount of time, for the movement of the eye in perceiving what it perceives is quicker than the movement of the body when it moves. (9) The moment in which the eye moves is the same moment which it connects to the object, in spite of the distance between the viewer and the object. The moment that the eyes open is the moment in which they are connected to the heaven of the fixed stars. The moment when its glance returns is the same moment that its perception is absent.

Rising from one's place is not like that. It does not possess this speed. Asaf ibn Barkhiya (10) was more perfect in the deed than the jinn was. What Asaf ibn Barkhiya said is the same as the action in the same moment. Sulayman, peace be upon him, at the same moment saw Bilqis' throne "settled before him" so one must not imagine that he perceived it while it was in its original place without being moved. We do not think that the displacement takes place in one and the same moment, but that it involves going into non-existence and returning to existence inasmuch as the only one who is aware of that is the one who has recognition of it. This is what Allah said, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) Not a moment passes them but that they see what they saw. Since it is like this, the time of its non-existence (the absence of the throne from its place) is the same as the time of its existence with Sulayman because of the renewal of creation with the "breaths". No one knows this power, or rather, man is not aware with regard to himself that he ceases to exist in each breath and then is again.

Do not think that "this" (thumma) implies a delay. That is not true. However, it demands a high rank of knowledge in Arabic, as when the poet says:

As he brandished the straight Rudayni, (11) it quivered.

There is no doubt that the moment of brandishing the spear is without a doubt the same as the moment of quivering of the thing which is brandished. It happened without delay. It is the same with the renewal of creation with breaths. The time of non-existence coincides with the time of the existence of its like. It is similar to the renewal of accidents in the theory of the Ash'arites [tajrîd al-a'râd].

The question involving the moving of Bilqis' throne is one of the most difficult problems, except for someone who has recognition of what we have mentioned in its story. Asaf did not have any merit except for acquiring renewal in the assembly of Sulayman, peace be upon him. The throne was not moved across place nor did it rise above the earth nor break the laws of space for the one who understands what we mentioned. That was done by one of the companions of Sulayman in order to elevate Sulayman's honour in the selves of those who were present with Bilqis and her suite. The reason for that was that Sulayman was Allah's gift to Da'ud as He said, "We gave Sulayman to Da'ud," (38:30) so the gift is the giving of the donor by providing a blessing, not by means of fitting recompense or merit. So he is the abundant blessing, the decisive word and the cutting sword.

As for the knowledge of Sulayman, Allah said of him, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it (in spite of his opposite judgement to that of Da'ud), and Allah "gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79) Da'ud's knowledge was knowledge given by Allah, and Sulayman's knowledge was the knowledge of Allah in the matter inasmuch as He is the Judge without intermediary. So Sulayman is the interpreter of Allah in the seat of sincerity.(12) It is like the man who is striving to hit on the judgement of Allah by which Allah would judge the question. If he were to find it by himself or by what was revealed to His Messenger, then he would have two rewards. The one who errs in this particular judgement has one reward as well as its being knowledge and judgement. The community of Muhammad was given the rank of Sulayman in judgement (13) and the rank of Da'ud in wisdom, (14) so there is no better community than it.

When Bilqis saw her throne, and she knew how great the distance was and the impossibility of moving it in that space of time, she said, "It seems the same." (28:42, lit. "it is as if it were.") She spoke the truth according to what we mentioned regarding the renewal of creation by similarity. It was it. The matter is true, as you are the same at the time of renewal as you were in past time. Part of the perfection of Sulayman's knowledge was in the instruction he gave regarding the pavilion when he told Bilqis, "Enter the courtyard." (15) The courtyard was very smooth without any curvature in its glass. When Bilqis saw it, she thought that it was water and had depth, so she bared her legs so as not to let the water dampen her clothes. By that, Sulayman informed her that the throne which she saw was of this sort. This is the utmost fairness. He informed her that she had hit the mark when she said, "It seems the same." At that point, she said, "My Lord, I have wronged myself but I have submitted with Sulayman to the Lord of all the worlds."

So she did not submit to Sulayman, but to the Lord of the worlds, and Sulayman was part of the worlds. She did not restrict her submission as the Messengers do not restrict their belief in Allah, contrary to Pharaoh who said, "to the Lord of Musa and Harun." (26:48) Although this submission is related to Bilqis' submission in a certain respect, it does not have the same force. She had more discernment than Pharaoh in submission to Allah. Furthermore, Pharaoh was governed by the principle of the moment when he said, "I believe in the One in whom

the Children of Israel believe." (10:90) He specified, but he also specified when he saw the sorcerers articulate their belief in the "Lord of Musa and Harun." The Islam of Bilqis was the Islam of Sulayman since she said, "with Sulayman." She followed him in all that he adhered to in the way of beliefs.

This is how we are on the straight path which the Lord is on, for our forelocks are in His hand, (16) and it is impossible for us to separate from Him. We are with Him implicitly, and He is with us by open declaration. Allah said, "He is with you wherever you are," (57:4) and we are with Him as He takes us by our forelocks. He, may He be exalted! is with Himself wherever He goes with us on His path. So everyone in the world is on a straight path, and it is the path of the Lord. It is this that Bilqis learned from Sulayman, so she said, "To Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," without referring to a particular world.

As for the subjection which was the privilege of Sulayman, peace be upon him, and by which he was distinguished from others, and the kingdom which Allah gave him which none after him would have, it is from his command when He said, "We gave him the fiercely blowing wind, speeding at his command." (21:81) It was not subjection in itself, for Allah said in respect of each of us without exception, "He has made everything in the heavens and everything on the earth subservient to you." (45:13) He also mentioned the subjection of the winds, stars and other things, (17) but that is not by our command. It is from the command of Allah. If you reflect with your intellect, Sulayman was privileged by this command neither by mental concentration nor by aspiration (himma) rather, it was by nothing more than the command itself. We said that because we recognise that the physical bodies of the world can be affected by the himma of the self when someone is in the station of concentration. We have seen such things happen in this Path. Sulayman only had to articulate the command in whatever he wished to subject without either concentration or himma.

Know, may Allah support us and you by a spirit from Him, that when any slave receives a gift like this, that does not detract from his portion of the kingdom of the Next World, nor is he called to account for it. That was true of Sulayman. Although he sought it from his Lord, the tasting (dhawq) of the Path (18) demands that it was advanced to him from what was stored up for others, and He will call him to account for it when he wants it in the Next World. Allah told him, "This is Our gift (and He did not say "to you: or to anyone else); bestow or withhold without reckoning." (38:39) We knew by the tasting of the Path that his request was from the command of his Lord. Thus the request was from the divine command, and the one who requested it received full recompense for his request.

If the Creator wishes, He grants his need in what he seeks from Him, and if He wishes, He withholds it. The slave has fulfilled what Allah demanded of him to obey His command in what he asked of his Lord. If he had asked that from himself without his Lord commanding him to do that, then he would be held to account for it.

That is true in all that Allah is asked for, as He said to His Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "Say: 'O Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" He obeyed his Lord's command and sought increase in knowledge to such an extent that each time he was given milk, he interpreted it to be knowledge even as he interpreted it as knowledge in a dream in which he received a glass of milk. In the dream, he drank the milk, and gave the rest of it to 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. The people asked, "What is its interpretation?" He replied, "Knowledge." Similarly, when Allah took him on his Night Journey, the angel gave him a vessel which contained milk and a vessel which contained wine. The Prophet drank the milk,

and the angel said, "You have chosen the true nature (fitra). Allah has bestowed you on your community!" When milk appeared, it was the form of knowledge. Therefore it is knowledge taking on the form as milk, just as Jibril came to Maryam in the form of "a handsome, well-built man." (19:16)

When the Prophet said, "People are asleep and when they die, they wake up," he meant that everything that man sees in the life of this world is in the rank of the dreams of someone who is asleep, so it must be interpreted. Phenomenal being is imagination (khayal), but it is Allah in reality. (19) Whoever understands this has received the secrets of the Path. When the Prophet was offered milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and increase us in it" because he saw it as the form of knowledge, and he had been commanded to seek increase in knowledge. When he was offered something other than milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and give us better than it."

When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it to him by a request which arises from a divine command, He does not take him to account for it in the Next Abode. When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it by a request which is not by a divine command, the business in it is up to Allah. If He wishes, He will take him to account for it, and if He wishes, He will not take him to account for it. I hope for knowledge from Allah in particular for which He will not call one to account, for He commanded the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, to seek increase of knowledge, and it is the same command which is addressed to the Prophet's community. Allah said, "You have an excellent model in the Messenger of Allah," (33:21) and what greater model is there than this model who is a source of solace (20) to the one who possesses understanding from Allah?

Had we discussed the station of Sulayman in its entirety, you would have seen a matter whose revelation would have struck you with terror. Most of the men of knowledge of this Path have no knowledge of the state and rank of Sulayman. The business is not as they claim. (21)

Notes to Chapter 16:

1. In Qur'an 27:30. The story is found in Sura 27. When Sulayman hears of the kingdom of Queen Bilqis in Sheba', he sends the hoopoe to take a letter to her.
2. When the Prophet sent Chosroes or Khosrau a letter inviting him to Islam, he tore it up after it was read to him.
3. Ref. Qur'an 38:35, where Sulayman says, "My Lord, forgive me, and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me."
4. Type of malicious jinn.
5. Hadith. "Yesterday Shaytan rushed up suddenly to stop my prayer. Allah gave me power over him and I seized him. I wanted to tie him to one of the pillars of the mosque so that all of you could look at him, but then I remembered the supplication of my brother Sulayman, 'O Lord, forgive me and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me.' (38:35) Allah turned him away in humiliation." via Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful.
7. When He said, "I will write (mercy) for those who are godfearing...." (Qur'an 7:156)
8. i.e. Knowledge is more perfect than will.
9. Sulayman asked his council, "'O Council, who among you will bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?' An 'ifrit of the jinn said, 'I will bring it to you before you get

up from your seat...' He who possessed knowledge of the Book said, 'I will bring it to you before your glance returns to you.'" (27:38-40)

10. The name of the man of knowledge in Sulayman's council.

11. Rudayna was a woman who was famous for straightening spear shafts which were tested by shaking.

12. See Qur'an 54:55.

13. i.e. by the Qur'an and hadith.

14. By ijtiḥad.

15. This is in the same sura (27), ayat 44.

16. Qur'an Ref. 11:56, "I have believed in Allah, my Lord and your Lord. There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a straight path."

17. Various places in the Qur'an: 14:32, 16:12, 22:65, 31:20.

18. One variant has "reality" instead of Path (Tariq).

19. Inasmuch as phenomenal being is a divine shadow.

20. Uswa is model, or a person to be imitated and through whose emulation one gains consolation. The source of solace is the verbal noun from Form V of this verb, ta'assa, which means to become consoled by the example of another who had suffered in a similar fashion and been patient in it.

21. His kingdom does not decrease what he has in the Next world.

17: The Seal of the Wisdom of Existence (Wujud) in the Word of Da'ud (David)

"We subjected the mountains to glorify with him in the evening and sunrise, and also the birds, flocking together, all of them turned to him." Then Allah combined the kingdom and speech and prophethood in Da'ud when He says, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech." (1) Allah clearly and openly appointed Da'ud Khalif. This was Da'ud, peace be upon him. His freedom of action in the kingdom with this subjection was by a mighty command which was not completed in him alone. Allah also gave it to Sulayman who shared in it as He says, "And We gave knowledge to Da'ud and Sulayman who said, 'Praise be to Allah who has favoured us.'" (27:15) He says, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it. We gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79)

Know that since prophethood and the message are a divine privilege, and cannot be acquired. This is the prophethood which lays down a Shari'a. It is Allah's gift to them. Gifts of this sort are not recompense, nor is recompense demanded from them for these gifts. Allah bestows it on them as pure blessing and favour. So He says, "We gave him (i.e. Ibrahim) Ishaq and Ya'qub." (2) He says of Ayyub, "We gave him his family, and the same again with them." (38:43) He says of Musa, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet," (19:53). There are more instances like that. What they received first of all is what they will receive at the last in the totality of their states, or most of them. It is only His name, the Giver.

Allah says in respect of Da'ud, "We gave Da'ud great favour from Us." (34:10) He did not accompany that with a demand for recompense from Da'ud, nor did He say that He gave him what He mentioned as a reward. When He demanded gratitude for that by action, He demanded it of the people of Da'ud, and did not mention Da'ud himself, asking Da'ud's people to thank Him for the blessing which He gave to Da'ud. For Da'ud himself, it is a gift of pure blessing and favour. It is not like that for his people, but rather like the demands of barter. So Allah said, "Work, family of Da'ud, in thankfulness! But very few of My slaves are thankful." (3)

If the Prophets, peace be upon him, thanked Allah for what He had bestowed on them and given to them, that was not from the command of Allah. They undertook that freely from themselves, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood thanking Allah until his feet were swollen, when Allah had forgiven Him his wrong actions, past and present. When people commented what he did, he said, "Am I not a thankful slave?" Allah said that Nuh was a thankful slave. (4) So the thankful among the slaves are few.

The first blessing which Allah bestowed on Da'ud was that He gave him a name which does not have any connected letters in it:

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By this, He cut him off from the world and He told us this by the name itself which is dâl, alif, and wâw. Allah named Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, with both connected and separated letters:

So in this Allah both joined him and separated him from the world. He combined the two

states for him in his name as He combined the two states for Da'ud through meaning (ma'na) (5) although He did not put that in his name. That was a privilege which Muhammad had above Da'ud, i.e. calling him by this name. The matter was thus completed for Muhammad in all its aspects. It is the same in his name Ahmad.

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That is from the wisdom of Allah.

Then He spoke about the blessing He gave Da'ud in the mountains' echoing of glorification with him. (6) So they glorified with his glorification that the deed might be his. It was the same with the birds. He gave him power and described him by it, (7) and He gave him wisdom and decisive speech.(8)

Then the greatest blessing and nearest rank which Allah appointed for him was that his khalifate was mentioned in the divine text. He did not do that with any of his kind, and there were khalifs among them. Allah said, "Da'ud, We have made you a khalif on the earth, so judge between people with truth and do follow your own desires," i.e. whatever comes to your mind in judgement without revelation from Me, "letting them misguide you from the Way of Allah," (38:26) from the path which I revealed to My Messengers. Then Allah showed adab with him and said, "Those who are misguided from the Way of Allah will receive a harsh punishment since they forgot the Day of Reckoning." He did not say to him, "If you go astray from My Path, there is a terrible punishment for you." If you said that Adam is mentioned as the Khalif in divine text, we will say that it is not the same as in the text regarding Da'ud, for Allah said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif on the earth." (2:30) He did not say, "I am making Adam a khalif." Even if He had said that, it still would not be the same as His words, "We have made you a khalif," in respect of Da'ud. One is implied and the other is explicit. Mentioning Adam in the story after that did not indicate that he is the same as the khalif of whom Allah spoke. Occupy your mind with the transmissions of Allah on His slaves when He transmits them. It is the same in respect to Ibrahim the friend, "I will make you an Imam for the people." (2:124) He did not say "a khalif". We know that the imamate here means the khalifate, but it is not the same because He did not mention it by the most specific of its names which is the khalifate.

Then part of bestowing the khalifate on Da'ud is that He made him a khalif of judgement. That is only from Allah. He told him, "Judge between people with the truth." (5:42) The khalifate of Adam was not of this rank. Da'ud's khalifate was that he follow what was in it previously, not that he delegated with the divine judgement of Allah in His creation. If that had been the case, it would have occurred. However, our discourse is only regarding the khalifs on the earth from Allah, and they are Messengers. As for the khalifate today, it is from the Messengers, not from Allah, so they only judge by what the Messengers prescribed for them. They do not go beyond that except when there is a small point which is only known by those like us. That is in taking what they judge by, from what is in the Shari'a of the Messenger, peace be upon him.

The khalifate is from the Messenger. He takes the judgement from him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, by transmission or by ijtiḥad, whose basis is also transmitted from him. Some of us think that the one who takes the judgement takes it from Allah, for he is a khalif from Allah by the source of that judgement. The substance is his inasmuch as it was the Messenger's - the source of his judgement is that of the Messenger's. Outwardly he follows,

not disputing his judgement, as will be the case with 'Isa when he descends and judges. It is the same when the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Those are the ones whom Allah has guided, so be guided by their guidance." (9) This relates to what he recognises as one who is singled out and one who conforms. It is in him by the degree of what the Prophet established of the Shari'a which from the previous Messengers since he confirmed it. We follow him in relation to its confirmation, not because it is a Shari'a of someone else before him. In the same way, the Khalif takes from Allah the same thing that he takes from the Messenger.

In the language of unveiling, we call him "the khalif of Allah", and with outward knowledge, we say "the khalif of the Messenger of Allah". For this reason, the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, died and did not transmit the khalifate from himself to anyone else for he knew that among the slaves of Allah are those who will take the khalifate from their Lord. Thus the khalif from Allah is in conformity with the judgements of the Shari'a. Since the Prophet knew that, he did not hinder the matter. Allah has khalifs in His creation who take from the mine of the Messenger and the Messengers that which the Messengers took. They recognise the virtue of their predecessor there because the Messenger is a vessel for increase. The khalif is not a container for the increase which, had he been the Messenger, he would have received. He only gives knowledge and judgement in what he legislates through the specific legislation of the Messenger. Outwardly he follows the Messenger without opposition.

Do you not see that in the case of 'Isa, peace be upon him, when the Jews imagined that he did not add to Musa, as is the case with what we said about the Khalifate today with the Messenger, they accepted him and confirmed him? When he added judgement and abrogated judgement, Musa confirmed it, for 'Isa was a Messenger. They did not accept that because he differed from their creed, and the Jews did not know the matter for what it was - this is why they sought to kill him. His story is what Allah relates to us about them and him in His Mighty Book. He was a Messenger before increase. As for decrease of the judgement or its increase, it is confirmed since decrease is increase of judgement without a doubt.

The khalifate today does not have this rank, but it decreases or increases based on the Shari'a which is confirmed by itjihad, not on the Shari'a which Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, articulated. The khalif might do something which is counter to a hadith in a certain judgement, and so he imagines that that comes from itjihad. That is not the case, but rather this Imam has not confirmed that the transmission with respect to unveiling is from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. If it had been confirmed, he would have judged by it. If the path in it is fairness in justice, he is not protected from illusion. It is not by transmission in meaning.

Something like this occurs in the khalif today. Similarly, it also applies to 'Isa for, when he descends, he will remove much of the Shari'a established by itjihad. By removing that, he will clarify the form of the legislated truth which he had, especially when the judgements of the Imams differ in the same event. We know absolutely that when revelation descended, it descended in a certain way. That is the divine judgement and none other! Allah confirmed it and it is the Shari'a of confirmation by the removal of interdiction from this community and the vastness of its judgements in it.

As for the statement of the Prophet, "If there are two khalifs, then slay one of them," this is the outward khalifate which has the sword. If they are in agreement, then one of them must

be killed by the conflict of the khalifate of meaning. There is no actual killing in it, but killing comes with the outward khalifate. If the khalif does not possess this station, being the khalif of the Messenger of Allah - it is just being from the principle of the basis by which the existence of two gods could be imagined: "If there had been any gods besides Allah in heaven or earth, they would both be ruined," (21:22) even if they are in agreement. We know that if they differ implicitly, the judgement of one of the two will be valid. The one with the operative judgement is the god properly speaking. The one whose judgement is not operative is not god.

From this, we know that every valid judgement in the world today is the judgement of Allah even if it differs from the established judgement in its outward manifestation called the Shari'a. The only judgement which is valid belongs to Allah in the heart of the matter, because the matter which occurs in the world is based on the judgement of the Divine Will, not on the judgement of the established Shari'a, (10) whose establishment itself comes from the Will. For that reason, He put His determination into effect. Therefore, Will only has determination in the matter, not in the act which it brings.

The power of the Will (mashi'a) is immense. (11) This is why Abu Talib (12) considered it to be the Throne of the Essence, since the will itself necessitates judgement. Nothing occurs in existence nor disappears from it without the Will. When there is opposition to the divine command here, it is called "rebellion". It is only commanding the means, not the command which brings things into being. None opposes Allah at all in what He does in respect to the command of the Will. Opposition only occurs in respect of the command of means. So understand that!

Properly speaking, the command of the Will is directed to bringing the action itself into existence, not to the one at whose hands the action manifests itself. It is impossible that the action should not be. However it takes place in a particular locus, and so, at one moment, it is called opposition to the command of Allah, and at another moment it is called agreement and obedience to the command of Allah. The language of praise and blame follow the action accordingly.

Since the matter itself is based on what we have stated about it, creation of all sorts therefore hopes for happiness. He designated this station as "mercy which encompasses everything." (13) It preceded divine wrath, and the predecessor comes before as is its right. That which the latter judges is what the former judged. Mercy obtained it since nothing preceded it, so this is one meaning of "His mercy preceded His wrath" that mercy judges the one who reaches it. It stands at the end. Therefore the end must be reached, and thus mercy and parting from wrath must be reached. It has jurisdiction over everything which reaches it according to what is given to it by the state of the one who arrives.

Whoever possesses understanding
witnesses what we have said.
If they do not understand,
they should take it from us.
There is only what we mentioned in this matter,
so rely on it and be in it now as we were.
What we recited to you came from it to us,
and from us to you is what we gave you from us.

As for the softening of iron, (14) hard hearts are softened by reprimand and threat as fire softens iron. The hardness of hearts is a stronger hardness than that of stone. Fire breaks stone, calcifies it and does not soften it. Iron was only softened for him so that protective coats of mail could be fashioned. This is an instruction from Allah that the thing is only protected by itself.¹ Mail protects against the spearhead, the sword, the knife and the arrowhead - protection against iron is by iron. The Muhammadan Shari'a brings, "I take refuge with You from You." Understand this! This is the spirit of the softening of iron. He is the Avenger, the Merciful, and Allah grants success.

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. Qur'an 38:18-20.
2. 6:84;19:49; 21:72; 29:29.
3. Qur'an 34:13.
4. Qur'an 17:3.
5. As he had prophethood, the message, the khalifate, the kingdom, knowledge, wisdom, and discrimination.
6. Qur'an 34:10, "O mountains and births! echo with him in his praise!"
7. Qur'an 38:17, "Remember Our slave Da'ud, who possessed true strength."
8. Qur'an 38:20, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech."
9. Qur'an 6:90.
10. See the Qur'an 74:54-56, "It is truly a reminder to which anyone who wills may pay heed. But they will only pay heed if Allah wills."
11. The reality of the will necessitates judgement because it is the same as making a demand.
12. Al-Makki.
13. Qur'an 7:156, also 40:7.
14. Qur'an 34:10, "We softened iron for him: 'Fashion wide coats of mail and measure well the links.'"

18: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath (Nafas) in the Word of Yunus (Jonah)

Know that this human organism in its perfection consists of spirit (ruh), body and self (nafs). Allah created it in His form. The disintegration of its structure is only undertaken by the One who created it either by His hand - and it is only that - or by His command. Whoever undertakes to do that without the command of Allah has wronged himself and exceeded the limits of Allah in it and rushed to the ruin of the one whom Allah has commanded to thrive. Know that compassion to the slaves of Allah is more proper through preservation than jealousy in Allah.

Da'ud, peace be upon him, wanted to build the Bayt al-Muqaddas, (1) and built it many times. Whenever he finished it, it was destroyed. He complained about that to Allah. Allah revealed to him, "This House of Mine will not be built by the hands of one who has shed blood." Da'ud said, "O Lord, was that not for Your sake?" Allah said, "Yes, but are they not My slaves?" Da'ud said, "O Lord, let it be built at the hands of someone who is from me!" Allah revealed to him, "Your son Sulayman will build it."

What is meant in this story is that the preservation and maintenance of this human organism is better than its destruction. Do you not see that Allah has prescribed jizya (2) and research of peace with those who had opposed the Din in order to spare them. He said, "If they incline to peace, you too incline to it, and put your trust in Allah." (8:61)

Do you not see that for the one who has responsibility for retaliation, accepting blood-money or pardoning is prescribed for the next-of-kin who is the responsible guardian? If he refuses to accept either, then the killer can be slain in retaliation. Do you not see how when the next-of-kin consists of a group of people, and one of them accepts the blood-money or pardons the person while the rest of the group want him killed, Allah observes the one who pardoned and prefers him to the one who did not pardon. Do you not see that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever is in a position to retaliate and slays the person is like him"? Allah says, "The repayment of a bad action is one equivalent to it," (42:40) so He made retaliation an evil deed, i.e. that deed is evil even though it is part of the Shari'a. Whoever pardons and makes amends has a reward due from Allah because he is based on His form. Whoever pardons and does not slay, his reward is due to the One on whose form he is based, because the One who fashioned is more entitled to it, and his existence only appeared by the name the Manifest.

Whoever preserves the person, preserves Allah. Man is not blameable by his source, but by his action, and his action is not the same as him. We are discussing his action, and action belongs only to Allah, even though some actions are blamed and some are praised. The language of blame in respect to purpose which is reprehensible with Allah, and the only thing reprehensible is what is made to be so by the Shari'a. The Shari'a makes something reprehensible because of what Allah made known or which He made known through someone He has instructed. So Allah prescribed retaliation by necessity for the preservation of the human race and to prevent people exceeding the limits of Allah. Allah says, "There is life for you in retaliation, O you who possess intelligence (lit. cores)!" (3) (2:179) They are the people of the core who stumble onto the secret of divine laws and wisdoms.

Since you know that Allah preserves this organism and preserves its continuance, you should also preserve it since you have that happiness. While man is still alive, he hopes that he will

obtain the attribute of perfection for which he was created. Whoever strives to destroy it, strives to prevent the acquisition of that for which he was created. How excellent is what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Shall I tell you what is better and more excellent for you when you meet your enemies, smite their necks and they smite yours? Remembering Allah."

That is because the only one who knows the value of this human organism is the one who remembers Allah with the invocation (dhikr) demanded of him. (4) Allah sits with the one who remembers Him, (5) and the sinner is witnessed by the one doing the invocation. When the one doing the invocation does not witness Allah who sits with him, then he is not doing invocation. When Allah is mentioned, He flows in all parts of the slave, not just in his invocation with the tongue. Allah, at that moment, is only the Companion of the tongue in particular. The tongue sees Him, inasmuch as the man, (6) in respect of his sight does not see Him. (7)

Understand this secret in the invocation of those who are heedless! The heedless person who does invocation is present without a doubt, and the One mentioned sits with him and so he witnesses Him. In respect of his heedlessness, this person does not do invocation and Allah does not sit with the heedless. Man is many but with a single source. Allah is one source but has many Divine Names, just as man has many parts. What is required of the invocation of one part is not the invocation of another part. Allah sits with the part which is invoking Him, and the other part is described as heedless. There must be some part of man doing invocation, so Allah sits with that part, and He preserves the rest of the parts by His concern.

When Allah undertakes the destruction of this organism by what is called "death", that is not negation (i'dam) , but rather separation. He takes man to Him, and what is meant is only Allah's taking man to Him, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." (11:123) When He takes him to Him, He fashions him a different composition than this composition. The new composition is from the genus of the abode to which he has moved, that is, the Abode of Going-on, because equilibrium exists. The creature thus will never die, i.e. his parts will never be separated.

As for the people of the Fire, they will return to bliss, but it will be in the Fire since after the end of the duration of punishment, it must become cold and peace according to the mercy which preceded it. This is their bliss. The bliss of the people of the Fire, after claims are settled, is the bliss of the friend of Allah, Ibrahim, when he was thrown into the Fire.⁸ He was punished by the sight of it since his knowledge told him that it is a form which causes pain to any living being which is near it. He did not know what Allah intended by it and from it in respect to him.

So after the existence of these pains, he will find cold and peace in spite of the fact that he still witnesses the phenomenal form which is fire in the eyes of the people. The single thing has various modes in the eyes of the onlookers. The divine tajalli is also like that. If you wish, you could say that the tajalli of Allah resembles this, and if you wish, you could say that the world is in the eye of the beholder which contains the parable of Allah in the tajalli, and so it takes on various modes in the eye of the onlooker according to the onlooker's disposition. The onlooker's disposition varies with the modalities of the tajalli. All of this is permissible in the realities.

Had a slain person or one who had died not returned to Allah when he died or was slain,

Allah would not have decreed their deaths nor prescribed their slaying. All is in His hand, and there is no loss in respect to Him. He prescribes slaying and decrees death by His knowledge that His slave will not pass from Him, for he returns to Him as Allah says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." So freedom of action occurs in it, and He is the One with freedom of action. Nothing is outside of Him of which He is not the source. Rather, His He-ness is the source of that thing, and He is the One who gives it its unveiling when He says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned."

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1. The Temple (Beth ha-Mikdash) in Jerusalem. The chapter is an evident proof against the lies circulated by the occupier of al-Aqsa, Mr. 'Ikrimah Sabri, after the Ahlu-s-Sunnah were expelled from it.
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19: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Unseen in the Word of Ayyub (Job)

Know that the secret of life flows in water, for it is the basis of the components and the basic elements. For this reason, Allah made every living thing of water. (1) There is nothing which is not alive, so there is nothing which does not proclaim His praise, but their extolling is only understood by divine unveiling. (2) Nothing extols unless it is alive. So the basis of everything is water. Do you not see how the Throne is on the water because it was formed from it? (3) It oppresses the water while the water underneath it maintains it. In the same way, Allah created man a slave. Then he was haughty towards his Lord and put himself above Him. In spite of this, Allah preserves him from underneath in respect of the height of this slave who is ignorant of himself. This is what the Prophet said, "If you let a rope fall, it would fall on Allah." So he indicated that "below" is related to Him as "above" is related to Him when He said, "They fear their Lord above them," (16:50) and "He is the Absolute Master over His slaves." (6:18; 6:61) So He has "above" and "below" For this reason, the six directions only appeared in respect of man, who is on the form of the All-Merciful.

There is no nourisher except Allah. He said of one group, "If they had implemented the Torah and the Gospel," using the indefinite and being general, "and what was sent down to them from their Lord," and this includes every judgement sent down on the tongue of a Messenger or someone inspired, "they would have been fed from above their heads," and He is the Nourisher in respect of the aboveness which is ascribed to Him, "and beneath their feet," (5:66) as He is the Nourisher in respect of the belowness which He ascribes to Himself on the tongue of His Messenger, who translates from Him. If the Throne had not been on the water, its existence would not have been maintained. The existence of the living sustains life. Do you not see that when the living dies the customary death, the parts of his structure disintegrate and his faculties are eliminated from that particular structure? Allah said to Ayyub, "Stamp your foot! Here is a cool bath," (38:42) meaning that since he had an excess of the heat of pain, He would alleviate it by the coolness of the water. For this reason, the medicine was decrease from excess and excess in decreasing. What is meant is the demand of balance, and the only way to it is by approaching it.

However, we said that there is no way achieve equilibrium because realities and witnessing constantly accord taking-form with every single breath. (4) Taking-form (takwin) only comes from an inclination which is called deviation or decomposition in nature. In Allah it is the will, and it is inclination to one particular goal rather than another. Equilibrium denotes sameness in all, but this does not occur. For this reason, we are deprived of the principle of equilibrium. Allah's description with pleasure and anger and the attributes is related in prophetic divine knowledge. Pleasure obliterates anger, and anger obliterates pleasure from the pleasing. Perfect equilibrium would mean that anger and pleasure are the same. The Wrathful would not be wrathful towards the one he is angry with, but would be pleased with him. He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him that is, inclination. And Allah would not be pleased with the one He is pleased with and would be angry with him, and so He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him - that is, inclination.

We said this, however, in respect of the one who thinks that Allah's wrath will continue against the people of the Fire forever, as he claims. So they do not have the principle of pleasure from Allah. What is meant is true. It is as we have said, so the hopes of the people of the Fire lies in the removal of pains. Even if they still dwell in the Fire, that is pleasure, so

wrath is removed when the pains are removed since the source of pain is the source of wrath if you understand! Whoever is wrathful has suffered hurt. He only strives to avenge the object of his wrath by causing him suffering so that the wrathful might find relief by that. He transfers the pain which he has to the object of his wrath. If you separate Allah from the universe, then High indeed is He exalted above this attribute! If Allah is the He-ness of the universe, then all principles appear only in Him and from Him. It is His word, "to Him the entire affair will be returned" in reality and unveiling, "so worship Him and put your trust in Him" (11:123) in veil and covering. There is nothing in the realm of possibility more original than this universe because it is based on the form of the Merciful which Allah brought into existence - He manifested His existence by the existence of the universe as man manifests the existence of the natural form. We are His manifest form, and His He-ness is the spirit of this form which governs it. There is no management except in Him as it is only from Him. He is the First by meaning and the Last by form, and the Manifest by the changing of judgements and states, and the Inner by management. "He has knowledge of all things." "He witnesses everything" (5) so He knows by direct witnessing, not by thought. It is the same with the knowledge of tasting (dhawq) which does not derive from thought. Tasting is sound knowledge. Other things are only conjecture and surmise, and that is not knowledge at all.

Then Ayyub had that water to drink to remove the pain of thirst which was from the weariness and punishment with which shaytan (6) had touched him, (7) that is, distance from the realities which he perceived for what they were. Ayyub perceived them for what they were, and by his perception, he was in the place of nearness. Every witnessed one is close to the eye ('ayn=source), even if it is far away by the interval of distance. Vision reaches it, since it is witnessing. If it had not been for that, he would not witness it, nor would what is witnessed be reached by vision, however you want to put it. The witnessed is near between the sight and the seer. This is why Ayyub alluded to touch and ascribed it to Shaytan in spite of the nearness of touch. He said, "The one distant from me is near because of his power over me."

You know that distance and nearness are two relative matters, for they are two ascriptions. They have no existence in the source in spite of the fact that there judgements are established in the far and near. Know that the secret of Allah in Ayyub (whom He made an example for us in a written existing book which this Muhammadan community reads in order to learn what is in it, and they attach honor to the one who possesses it), is that Allah praised him for his patience in his supplication to remove affliction from him. We know that when the slave calls on Allah to remove affliction from him without that lessening his patience, then he is patient and the best of the slaves, as Allah said, "What an excellent slave! He truly turned to his Lord." (8) (38:44) This means he goes back to Allah, not back to the cause.

Allah affects by the cause because the slave depends on it since the causes which will remove any one matter are many, but the Causer is but one. It is more fitting that the slave return to the One Source in order to remove that pain by the cause of that than to the particular cause. It may be that it will not conform to Allah's knowledge in it, and then some will say, "Allah did not answer me." Yet he did not call on him, but he inclined to a particular cause which neither the time nor the moment requires. Ayyub acted by the wisdom of Allah since he was a Prophet. He knew that with one group, patience is what holds the self back from complaint. That is not our definition of patience (sabr). Its definition is to hold the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah, not to Allah. The first group is veiled in their view that the complainer is lessened in contentment (rida) with the decree by complaint. That is not the case.

Contentment with the decree is not lessened by complaint to Allah or to others, but contentment with the decreed is lessened. We are not speaking about contentment with the decreed. Affliction is what is decreed and not the same as the Decree. Ayyub knew that holding the self back from complaint to Allah for the removal of affliction is to oppose divine force. It is ignorance if, when Allah afflicts someone by what gives him pain, he does not call on Allah to remove that painful matter from him. The one who has realization must supplicate and ask Allah to remove that from him. For that gnostic who possesses unveiling, that removal comes from the presence of Allah. Allah describes Himself as "hurt", so He said, "those who hurt Allah and His Messenger." (33:57) What hurt is greater than that Allah test you with affliction in your heedlessness of Him or a divine station which you do not know so that you return to Him with your complaint so that He can remove it from you? Thus the need which is your reality will be proven. The hurt is removed from Allah by your asking Him to repel it from you, since you are His manifest form.

One of the gnostics was hungry and wept. Someone who had no tasting (dhawq) in that area censured him for that. The gnostic said, "But Allah makes me hungry so that I might weep. He tests me by affliction so that I might ask Him to remove it from me. This does not lessen my being patient." We know that patience is holding the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah.

By "other" I mean a particular aspect of Allah. Allah specified a particular one of Allah's aspects, and it is called the aspect of He-ness, so he calls on Him from that aspect to remove affliction from him, not from the other aspects called causes. They are only Him in respect to elaboration of the matter in itself. The gnostic's request does not veil him from the He-ness of Allah in removing affliction from him and the fact that all the causes are Him from a particular point of view. This path is only obliged on the people of adab among the slaves of Allah who are entrusted with the secrets of Allah. Allah has guardians whom only Allah recognizes, and some of them recognize each other. We have counselled you, so strive, and ask of Allah!

Notes to Chapter 19:

1. Qur'an See 21:30.
2. See Qur'an 17:44.
3. See 11:7. As for the connection between Water (al-ma') and the Throne (al-'arsh), see the hadith narrated by Imam al-Bukhari, "Allah existed and there was nothing with Him, then His Throne was on the water, and then He created the heavens and the earth."
4. Tajdid al-khalq, instantaneous renewal of creation.
5. See Qur'an 5:117; 22:17, etc.
6. The root of the name Shaytan is shaytana, meaning "to be remote from".
7. Qur'an 38:41.
8. Awwab, which means one who frequently turns to Allah.

20: The Seal of the Wisdom of Majesty in the Word of Yahya (John the Baptist)

This is the wisdom of firstness in the names. Allah called him Yahya, i.e. the dhikr of Zakariyya was Yahya brought to life by him, and "a name We have given to no one else before." (19:7) He joined the attainment of the attribute, which is in the one who has passed on but left a son to revive his memory and his name through him. He called him "Yahya". His name Yahya is like knowledge by tasting. The memory of Adam, peace be upon him, was revived by Shith and that of Nuh by Sam. It is the same with the Prophets, peace be upon them; but Allah did not combine the name of knowledge from Him and the attribute for anyone before Yahya. It was an act of concern for Zakariyya from Allah, since Zakariyya said, "Give me an heir from You." (19:5) He mentioned Allah before the mention he mentioned his son, as Asiya (1) mentioned the neighbor before the abode when she said, "Build a house in the Garden for me in Your presence." (66:11) Allah was generous to Zakariyya, for He granted his need and named him by His attribute. Yahya's name was a remembrance for what His Prophet Zakariyya asked of Him; because he preferred the going-on of dhikr-Ullah after his death, since the son is the secret of his father.

He said, "to be my inheritor and the inheritor of the family of Ya'qub." (19:6) Nothing is inherited in respect of these except for the station of dhikr-Ullah and calling to Him. Then Allah gave him the good news of what He appointed for him from His words, "Peace be upon him the day he was born, and the day he dies, and the day he is raised up again alive." (19:15) He brought the attribute of life, which is his name, and He informed him of His peace upon him. His words are true. He completed it, even if it is the word of the spirit, "Peace be upon me the day I was born, the day I die, and the day I am raised up again alive," (19:33) and this is more sublime and more perfect in oneness and belief in the interpretation. That in which the order of nature (2) was broken in respect to 'Isa was articulation. His intellect was given mastery and perfected at that time when Allah made him speak. In any case, mastery of articulation is not necessary.

'Isa spoke the truth in what he articulated but this is different than the one who was testified to, as in the case of Yahya. (3) Allah's greeting on Yahya was higher than the greeting of 'Isa on himself in this way since the ambiguity occurring in divine concern was removed. The immediate circumstances indicate his proximity to Allah in that and his sincerity, since he spoke in the cradle the form which indicated the innocence of his mother. He was one of the two witnesses. The other witness was the shaking of the dried trunk of the palm tree. (4) Fresh, ripe dates came tumbling down without the male palm tree or pollination. In the same way, Maryam bore 'Isa without a man, that is, without normal and customary intercourse. If a Prophet had said, "My sign and my miracle is that this wall will speak," and then the wall speaks and says, "You have lied, you are not the Messenger of Allah," then the sign is proven and it is confirmed by it that he is the Messenger of Allah. One does not pay any attention to what the wall said.

He introduces this probability into the words of 'Isa when his mother pointed to him while he was in the cradle. Allah's greeting on Yahya is higher than this element. The passage which indicates that he is the slave of Allah is in respect of the claim made about him that he was the son of Allah. The indication is completed by sheer articulation. He is the slave of Allah according to another group who speak of Prophethood. It increases the principle of probability in logical thought until his truthfulness appeared in the future regarding all that he

spoke about when he was in the cradle. So understand our allusion!

Notes to Chapter 20:

1. The wife of Pharaoh who was one of the perfect women.
2. Kharq al-'adat, miracle, literally, the breaking of the normal pattern of things.
3. 'Isa was a witness, not one who is the object of witness, since he testified on behalf of his mother.
4. See Qur'an 19:29.

21: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sovereignty (1) in the Word of Zakariyya (Zachariah)

Know that the mercy of Allah encompasses everything in existence and judgement, and the existence of wrath comes from the mercy of Allah by wrath. His mercy preceded His wrath, that is, the ascription of mercy to Him preceded the ascription of wrath. Then every source has an existence which demands that Allah's mercy encompass every source. For that reason, we say that the mercy of Allah encompasses all things in existence and principle.

The Divine Names are "things", but they derive from a single Source. The first thing that His mercy encompassed before time was its thingness, that source which gives existence to mercy by mercy. Thus the first thing that His mercy encompassed was itself, then the thingness indicated, then the thingness of every existent existing without end in this world and the Next, non-essential ('arad) and substance (jawhar), composite and simple. Neither the acquisition of a goal nor harmony of nature is taken into account rather, harmonious and inharmonious things are all encompassed by divine mercy in existence. We mentioned in The Makkan Revelations that effect only belongs to the non-existent, not the existent. If the existent had it, it is by the principle of the non-existent. It is a strange knowledge and a rare question. Only those who possess illusions (awhâm) know its realisation, and that is by their tasting (dhawq). (2)

The mercy of Allah pervades phenomenal beings, and circulates in essences and sources. The most ideal position of mercy is when it is known from witnessing with sublime thoughts. Everyone mercy designates is happy. There is only what mercy designates, and the mention of the mercy of things is the source of its bringing them into existence. Every existent thing has been shown mercy. O friend! Do not be veiled from the perception of what we have said by what you see of the troubles people experience and what you believe about the pains of the Next Abode which will not depart from the one whom they afflict.

First of all, know that mercy is in bringing-into-existence in general. In mercy by pains, only pains come into existence. So mercy has an effect in two ways - the first effect is by the essence, which is its bringing every existent source into existence. It does not regard desire or lack of it, suitability or lack of suitability. It looks at the source of every existent before its existence, or rather, it looks at its source-form. For this reason, it saw Allah-as-creature in creeds as a single source-form among the source-forms. Its mercy to itself is by bringing-into-existence. This is why we said that Allah-as-creature in creeds is the first thing shown mercy after its mercy to itself in its connection of bringing those shown mercy into existence.

It has another effect by request. Those who are veiled ask Allah to have mercy on them in their beliefs, and the people of unveiling ask for the mercy of Allah to settle on them. They ask for it by the name of Allah, and so they say, "O Allah! Have mercy on us!" and He only has mercy on them by carrying out mercy through them. It has authority because authority in reality belongs to the meaning based on place.

He is the Merciful in reality, so Allah is only merciful to His slaves, attentive to them by mercy. When mercy settles on them, they experience its authority through taste (dhawq). The one designated by mercy has had mercy known to him. The active participle is the Merciful (Rahîm) and the Mercy-Giver (Râhim), and this principle does not describe creatures because it is a matter of directing meanings to their essences.

States are neither existent nor non-existent they have no source in existence because they are relationships. They are not non-existent in principle because what knowledge establishes is called the "knower", and it is a state. The knower is an essence described by knowledge, but it is not the same as the essence nor is it the same as knowledge. There is only knowledge and the essence on which this knowledge is established. The being of the knower is a state of this essence when it is described by this meaning. The relationship of knowledge occurred to him, so he is called knowing. Mercy, properly speaking, is a relationship from the Mercy-giver, and it is necessarily part of the principle, so it is merciful. The One who brought it into existence in the one shown mercy did not bring it into existence in order to be shown mercy by it; He brought it into existence to show mercy to the one on whom it settled.

Allah is not in a place by events, so He is not in a place by bringing mercy into existence. He is the Mercy-Giver, and the Mercy-Giver is only Mercy-Giver by the establishment of mercy. He confirmed that He is the source of mercy. Whoever has not tasted this matter and has no part in it, does not dare to say that He is the source of mercy or the source of the attribute. Such a person says, "He is not the same as the attribute nor other than it." In his view, the attributes of Allah with Him are not Him, nor are they other-than-Him because he cannot deny them nor can he make them the same as Him. Thus he (3) moves to this interpretation, and it is a good interpretation. Yet there is another interpretation more appropriate to the matter than this one, and more likely to remove ambiguity. It is to deny the sources of the attributes any existence based on the essence of the one described. Rather, they are relationships and relative ascriptions between the one described by them and their intelligible sources. Although mercy is common to all of them, it is different in relationship to each Divine Name. (4)

For this reason, Allah is asked to show mercy by each Divine Name, so the mercy of Allah and its indirect reference, which is that which encompasses everything, has many branches according to the number of the Divine Names. It is not general in relation to that particular divine name in the statement of the one who asks, "O Lord, have mercy!" and other Divine Names, even the Avenger. So he says, "O Avenger, have mercy on me!" That is because these Names indicate the designated Essence and, by their realities, indicate different meanings. They call on Him by these Names in mercy with respect to their indication of the Essence called by that Name and no other not by what is indicated by that Name, separating it from another and distinguishing it. The Name is not distinguished from another, and with him it is the indication of the Essence. It is distinguished in itself from other-than-it by its essence, as it is generally agreed that, by any expression, this Name is a reality distinct in its essence from other-than-it.

The whole is set forth to indicate one designated source. There is no disagreement that each name has an authority which another does not have. That also must be taken into account, as one takes into account their indications of the named essence.

For this reason, Abu'l-Qasim ibn Qasi said regarding the Divine Names that each Name is, in its isolation, designated by all of the Divine Names since they preceded in mentioning its description by all the Names, that is, by their indication of one source. Although the Names based on it are many and their realities differ, i.e. the realities of these Names, the mercy is obtained by two means. The first is the path of obligation, and it is His word, "I shall prescribe it for those who are godfearing and pay zakat," (7:156) and He binds them by it through the attributes of knowledge and action. The other path by which mercy is obtained is the path of divine graciousness which is not connected to action. It is His words, "My mercy

embraces all things." Of this, it is said, "So that Allah may forgive you your earlier errors and any later ones." (48:2) And of this, there are His words, "Do what you want, I have already forgiven you." (5) So know that!

Notes to Chapter 21:

1. Al-Mâlikiyya. His state was dominated by the name al-Mâlik, the Sovereign, who prevails in His orders. This strength was shown in his himma whose fruit was Yahya.
2. Because they connect the imagination (wahn) to things and bring them into existence and thus have experiential knowledge of this. As for the one on whom illusion has no effect, he is far from this question.
3. The Imam of Ahlu-s-Sunnah wa-l-Jama'ah, Shaykh Abu-l-Hasan al-Ash'ari.
4. There is a specific mercy of Allah, of al-Rahman, of ar-Rahim, of al-Malik, etc.
5. This refers to an incident involving Hatib ibn Abi Balta'a. When the Muslim army prepared to set out to conquer Makka, Hatib sent a letter to warn the Quraysh which was intercepted. 'Umar wanted kill him for intelligence with the nemy in war, but the Prophet said, "O 'Umar, perhaps Allah has looked with favor on those who already fought at Badr and said, 'Do whatever you want. I have already forgiven you.'"

22: The Seal of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Word of Ilyas (Elijah)

Ilyas (Elijah) is none but Idris (Enoch), peace be upon him. He was a Prophet before Nuh, and Allah raised him to a high place. (1) He dwells in the heart of the spheres, the sphere of the sun. Then he was sent to the town of Baalbek (Ba'labakk). Baal is the name of an idol and "bakk" is the power of the village. The idol was called Baal and was singled out with domination. It was Ilyas who was Idris, who was given the example of the splitting of the mountain called "Lubnan (Lebanon)" which comes from lubana (desire, goal). What he needed was a horse of fire with all its trappings of fire. When he saw it, he rode it and appetite fell from him, and so there was intellect without appetite. There remained for him no connection with that which is connected to the desire of the self. For him, Allah was pure without connection. He had only half of gnosis of Allah. When the intellect is free of the self in respect to gathering knowledges by its discernment, its gnosis of Allah is based on disconnection (tanzih) not connection (tashbih).

When Allah gives gnosis by tajalli, then gnosis of Allah is perfected.
Disconnection is used in one place and connection in another place.

The gnostic sees the diffusion of Allah by existence in natural and elemental forms. There is no form but that he sees the source of Allah in its source. This is the complete perfect gnosis which is brought the roads (shara'i) revealed from Allah. By this recognition, all illusions (awham) have authority. For this reason, illusion has a stronger power in this human organism than the intellect, because the man of intellect even if his intellect reaches maturity is not free of the power which illusion has over him and over the formation of what he reasons. Illusion is the greatest power in this perfect human organism. The revealed roads brought it, and so you use both connection and disconnection. You use connection in disconnection by illusion, and disconnection in connection by the intellect. So the whole is connected to the whole. It is not possible that disconnection be free of connection nor connection from disconnection. Allah said, "Nothing is like Him," so He used connection and disconnection. "He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (2) and He used connection, and yet it is the greatest of ayat revealed on disconnection. Even so, it is not free of connection because of the Kayf (like).

So He has the most knowledge of Himself of those who know. He only designated Himself by what we mentioned. Then He said, "Glory be to your Lord, the Lord of Might, beyond anything they describe," (37:180) and they only describe according to what these realities accord them. He exalted Himself above their disconnection since they limit Him by that disconnection. That is due to the inability of the intellect to perceive the like of this.

Then all the roads (Shara'i) brought what the illusions dominate. They do not free Allah of an attribute in which He is manifest as they said. They brought that, and so communities acted on it. Allah granted them the tajalli. The heirs followed the Messengers closely, and said what the Messengers of Allah said. Allah knows best where He puts His message, and so Allah knows best who turns his face to Him in a particular aspect by transmission to the Messenger of Allah. One aspect of His begins with "He knows best where to place His message." (6:124) There is a reality in each of the two aspects for that reason, we speak of connection and disconnection, and disconnection and connection. After this (3) is established, we will lower the screens and drop the veils on the eye of the critic (4) and the one who simply follows a

creed. Both of them are among the forms in which Allah gives tajalli, but He has commanded the veil for us in order that different levels of excellence of the predisposition of forms might appear. One is given a tajalli in a form according to the predisposition of that form. What its reality and exigencies accord him is ascribed to him. That must be. The example of the one who sees Allah when he is asleep and does not deny it is this. Without a doubt, it is Allah Himself. He attaches to it the exigencies of that form and its realities in which He gives the tajalli in sleep. Then after that, he interprets, i.e. he transfers it to another matter which disconnection logically demands. If the one who interprets it has unveiling and belief (iman), then he does not transfer it to disconnection at all. Rather, he gives it the disconnection that is due it and what is due to that which is manifest in it, i.e. its connection/resemblance. Properly speaking, "Allah" is an expression for the one who understands the indication (ishara). (5)

The spirit of this wisdom and its seal is that the command is divided into the effector and the one effected. These are two expressions. The effector in every aspect and in every state and in every presence is Allah. The effected by every aspect and in every state and in every presence is the universe, even if it is Allah who comes. (6) Allah is everything at its foundation which corresponds. That which appears is forever and ever a branch from the root; divine love is a branch from the supererogatory acts of the slave. So this is an effect between the effector and the effected. Allah is the hearing of the slave and his sight and faculties from this love. (7) This is an established effect which, if you believe, you cannot deny because it is confirmed by the Shari'a.

As for the person of sound intellect, he is either in possession of a divine tajalli in a natural locus of tajalli, (8) so he recognizes what we have said, or else he is a believing Muslim who believes in what was reported in sound tradition. The power of illusion must govern the man of intellect investigating what has been brought to him in this form because he believes in that form. As for the one who is not a believer, he judges illusion by illusion; and so he imagines by his logical discernment that he assigns to Allah what the tajalli gives him in dream. Illusion in that does not depart from him inasmuch as he is not aware because of his disregard for himself. From that is what Allah says, "Call on Me and I will answer You." (40:60) Allah also says, "If My slaves ask you concerning Me, I am near. I answer the call of the caller when he calls on Me," (2:186) since He only answers when there is someone who calls to Him. The source of the caller is the source of the answerer, but there is no disagreement about the difference of forms. They are two forms without a doubt.

All these forms are like Zayd's limbs. It is known that Zayd is one reality in personality, yet his hand is not the form of his foot nor his head nor his eye nor his eyebrow. He is one multiple - multiple by forms, one by source. That is like man who is one by source without a doubt. There is no doubt that 'Umar is not Zayd nor Khalid nor Ja'far, and that the individual persons of this one source are endless in existence. Even if man is one by source, he is many by forms and persons. If you are a believer, you know absolutely that Allah Himself will appear in a tajalli in a form on the Day of Rising. He will be recognized and then He will change form and be denied. (9) Then He will change from it again into another form and will not be recognized. He is the One giving tajalli and it is not other than Him in each form, even though it is known that this form is not that other form.

It is one source which has the same function as the mirror. When the viewer looks in it at the form of his belief in Allah, he recognizes Him, and so draws near Him. When it happens that he sees in it the belief of someone else, he denies Him since he sees his form and the form of someone else in the mirror. The mirror is but a single source while the forms are many in the

eye of the viewer. There is no form in the mirror which comprises them all at once. Although the phenomenal being of the mirror has an effect on the forms from one aspect, it does not have an effect on the forms from another aspect. The effect which it has makes the form change shape in smallness, largeness, length, and width, so it has an effect in quantities. This is attributable to it, but this changing of it is by the difference of the size of the mirrors. In the example, look at one of these mirrors, and do not look at all of them. It is your perception in respect to His being essence, and so He is independent of the universe, and in respect to the divine names. In that moment He is like the mirrors. Whatever Divine Name in which you look at yourself or simply look at. He manifests the reality of that Name in whoever looks. The matter is thus. If you understand, do not be anxious, and do not fear. Allah loves bravery, even to the extent of killing a snake. The snake is not other than your self, and the snake is alive through its self in form and reality. The thing is not killed by itself, even if the form is destroyed in the senses, The definition determines it, and imagination does not make it depart.

Since the matter is based on this, this is the safeguard of the essences and might and invincibility. You cannot destroy the definition. What might is greater than this might? You imagine by illusion that you have killed. By intellect and illusion, the form does not vanish from existence in the definition. The proof of that is, "You did not throw when you threw, but Allah threw." (8:17) The eye only perceived the form of Muhammad which had the throwing confirmed to it in the senses. It is what Allah denied the throwing to at first, and then confirmed in the middle, only to return to the perception that Allah was the One who threw in the form of Muhammad. One must believe this. So look at this effector when Allah descended into a Muhammadan form. Allah Himself informs His slaves of that, and none of us said that of Him, rather He said it of Himself. His report is true, and it is obligatory to believe it whether or not you perceive the knowledge of what He said, being a knower or believing Muslim.

Part of what shows you the weakness of the intellect's discernment in respect to its thought, since the intellect passes judgement on cause ('illa), is that cause is not an effect of the one who is the cause. This is the judgement of the intellect which is evident. There is only this in the knowledge of tajalli, and it is that the cause is an effect to whoever is the cause. That which the intellect governs is sound when discernment is clarified. Its goal in that is that, when it sees the matter differently than what logical proof would accord it, it says that the source after it is confirmed that it is one in this multiple, and inasmuch as it is cause in one of these forms belonging to any effect is not an effect of its effect, so that its effect would become a cause to it. This is his goal when he sees the matter for what it was, although he does not continue in his logical discernment.

Since the command in causality is of this sort, your opinion by the scope of logical discernment is not in other than this narrow limit. None are more reasonable than the Messengers, may the blessings of Allah be upon them, and they brought what they brought in transmission from the Divine Presence. They confirmed what the intellect confirmed. Then they gave more in what the intellect alone does not possess by its perception and what the intellect does not imagine directly, but one draws near to it in the divine tajalli. When he is alone with himself after the tajalli, he is confused about what he saw. If he is the slave of a Lord, his intellect returns to him, and if he is the slave of reasoning, Allah gives him back judgement. This is only as long as he is veiled in the dimension of this world from his dimension in the Next World.

The gnostics appear here as if they possessed the form of this world by virtue of the fact that its principles operate on them. However, Allah has transformed them inwardly to the dimension of the Next World. That must be the case. They are unknown by form except to whomever has had his inner eye unveiled by Allah so that he perceives. (10) There is no gnostic of Allah in respect of divine tajalli who is not based on the dimension of the Next World. He has been gathered in this lower world of his and has been called from his grave. He sees what they do not see, and he witnesses what they do not witness - as a mark of concern from Allah to some of His slaves in that respect.

Whoever wishes to find this wisdom of Ilyas-Idris to whom Allah gave two formations, so that he was a Prophet before Nuh, and then he raised him up and brought him down after that as a Messenger and so Allah joined for him the two degrees, let him descend from the authority of his intellect to his appetite and be an absolute animal so that he will be shown what every creature that crawls is shown except for the jinn and men. Then he will know that he has realized his animality, and it has two tokens. One is this unveiling so he sees who is punished in his grave and who has bliss. He sees the dead alive and the silent speaking and the sitting walking. The second token is muteness since, had he wanted to utter what he had seen, he would be unable to do so. Thus he has realized his animality. We had a pupil who acquired this unveiling although dumbness did not take hold of him, and so he did not fully realize his animality. When Allah established me in this station, I realized my animality with a complete realization. So I was seeing and wishing to utter what I was witnessing but I could not. So there was no difference between me and the mute who cannot speak.

When he realizes what we have mentioned, he will move to being pure intellect in natural matter. He will witness matters which are the roots of what is manifested in natural forms. He will know from where this principle is manifest in the natural form with the knowledge of tasting. Had it been unveiled that nature is the source of the breath of the All-Merciful, he would have been given much good. If he is restricted in what we have mentioned, this power from the gnosis which governs his intellect will be enough for him. He keeps company with gnostics, and by that he knows tasting. "You did not kill them, it was Allah who killed them," (8:17) yet only iron, the blow and that which is behind this form killed them. In the whole, killing and throwing took place. So he witnesses matters by their roots and by their forms, and he is complete. When he witnesses the breath, he is completely perfect. The breath of the All-Merciful is the source of the overflowing of existence and life on all, rather the source of Allah's descent to all forms.

Notes to Chapter 22:

1. A place from which, according to Sidi Muhiddin, Idris (Enoch) descended in order to become Ilyas (Elijah). See Qur'an 19:57, "Mention Idris in the Book. He was a true man and a Prophet. We raised him up to a high place."
2. Qur'an 42:11.
3. The rule of joining tanzih and tashbih.
4. The one who uses logical proof.
5. i.e. what he recognises from the word "Allah" extends only so far as his predisposition and understanding.
6. In the wârid.
7. "When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks".
8. i.e. the human form.

9. Hadith in Muslim: 1: 299, 302.

10. See Qur'an 50:22, "We have stripped you of your covering and today your sight is sharp."

23: The Seal of the Wisdom of Ihsan in the Word of Luqman

If Allah wishes, He wills provision for Him,
so all of phenomenal being is His food.
If Allah wishes, He wills provision for us,
so He is our food as He wishes.
His volition is His will, so say that He wished it.
So it is wished.
He wills increase and decrease.
So what He wishes is wished.
This is the distinction between them, (1)
so understand!
From a certain point of view,
their source is the same.

Allah says, "We gave Luqman wisdom," (31:12) and He says, "Whoever has been given wisdom has been given much good." (2:269) By the divine text, Luqman had much good as Allah has testified. The example of what Luqman said to his son is, "My son, even if something weighs as little as a mustard-seed, and it is inside a rock or anywhere else in the heavens or earth, Allah will bring it out." (31:16) This is a wisdom which is articulated, and that wisdom is his setting out that Allah is the One who brings forth. Allah confirmed that in His Book and did not refute what the speaker said.

As for the silent wisdom in it, and you know it by the circumstances, he is silent about the one to whom that grain is given. He did not mention him nor did he say to his son, "Allah will bring it to you or to other than you." He used bringing in general terms and denoted the thing brought in the heavens or in the earth as an instruction that the looker might regard His words, "He is Allah in the heavens and in the earth." (6:3) Luqman gave instruction by what he said and by what he remained silent on, so Allah is the source of every knowing thing because the known is more universal than the thing, so it denies unknown things.

Then he completed the wisdom and brought it to its full value in order that the structure might be complete in it. He said, "Allah is Latif (Subtle, Kind)." (31:16) Part of His subtleness (latâfa) and His kindness (lutf) is that He is in the thing named by such-and-such a definition in such-and-such a source of that thing, so it is only what its name indicates by convention and usage. It is said that these are names: heaven, earth, rock, tree, animal, angel, provision and food, and yet the source of everything is One. Thus the Ash'arites say about this that the entire universe is homogeneous in substance (jawhar), so it is one single substance.

It is the same as our statement that the source is One. They said that it varies by non-essentials. Thus our statement that it varies and becomes many through forms and relationships so as to provide distinction. It is said, "This is not that in respect to its form or its non-essential or natural disposition (mizâj)." Say whatever you like, but this is the same as that in respect to its substance. For this reason, the source of the substance is put in the definition of every form and disposition. However, we say that it is not other-than-Allah. The mutakallim thinks that it is called substance. Even though it is true, it is not the source of Allah of which the people of unveiling and tajalli speak. This is the wisdom of the "Latîf".

Then He is described when He says "the All-Aware (Khabir)," the One who knows by experience. It is His words, "We will test you until We know." (47:31) This is the knowledge of tastes. Allah put Himself with His knowledge of what the matter is in (our) profitable knowledge. No one can deny what Allah has written about Himself. Allah differentiated the knowledge of tasting and absolute knowledge. The knowledge of tasting is limited by the faculties. He said of Himself that He is the source of the faculties of His slave when He said, "I am his hearing," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his sight," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his tongue," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his foot and his hand." He did not restrict Himself to specifying the faculties, but He mentioned the members. The slave is not other than his members and faculties. The source called the slave is the Real, but the source of the slave is not the Compassionate Master.

Relationships are distinct by their essence. The one brought into relationship is not distinct. (2) Then He equalized His source in all relationships, for it is but one source with various ascriptions, relationships and attributes. Part of the completeness of Luqman's wisdom in instructing his son is what has come in the ayat of these two Divine Names, Latif and Khabir - Allah is called by them. If He had put that in phenomenal being (kawn) which is existence, and said, "He was (kana)," it would have been more complete in wisdom and more eloquent in admonition. Allah related the words of Luqman in meaning as he said it and did not add anything to it. His statement that Allah is the Latif, the Aware, is from the statement of Allah. Then Allah knew of Luqman that, had he said it (kana), it would have been utterly perfected by this.

As for his words, "If it should be but the weight of one grain of mustard-seed," it is for the one who has it as food. It is only the atom mentioned in His words, "Whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it." (99:7-8) A mustard-seed is the smallest thing consumed. If there had been anything smaller, Allah would have used it as He said, "He is not ashamed to make an example of a gnat." (2:26) Then since He knew that there is anything smaller than the gnat, He said "or of an even smaller thing," i.e. in smallness. This is the word of Allah, and that which is in the Sura of the Earthquake (az-Zalzal, 99) is also the word of Allah. So know that! That which is smaller than the gnat is the atom, and then there is another subtlety (latifa). That is that the atom, in spite of its smallness, is also lighter in weight because it is alive, since the living is lighter than the dead. So the meaning is that when the deed is the weight of an atom in smallness and lightness, the recompense must be seen. We know that Allah did not restrict Himself to the weight of the atom, and there is nothing smaller than it. He used it by way of intensification, and Allah knows best.

When Luqman used the diminutive for his son, (3) it was the diminutive of mercy and thereby he gave him a legacy which contains his happiness if he acts according to it. The wisdom of Luqman's legacy lies in his prohibition to his son, "Do not associate anything with Allah. Associating others with Him is a terrible wrong." (31:13) The one wronged establishes apportioning in respect to His description even though it is the same source. So he is only associating His source with Him, and this is the very greatest ignorance.

The reason for this is that the person who has no recognition of the matter nor of the reality of the thing, does not know that diversity is actually contained in a single source although forms vary in that single source. So such a person puts the form shared by another in that station, and so he makes every form a part of that station. It is known of the associate that the matter which indicates him through what occurs in him of partnership is not the source of the other

with whom he is associated, since it is the other. In reality, there is no associate. Everyone is based on his portion whenever it is said about him that there is a partnership between the two in it. The reason for that joint association, if it is joint, is that the action of one of them eliminates the collective aspect. "Say: Call on Allah or call on the All-Merciful." (17:110) This is the very heart of the question.

Notes to Chapter 23:

1. The difference between volition (mashi'a) and will (irada).
2. In respect of its reality, the Essence is not distinguishable.
3. Bunayya, "little son".

24: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Imam in the Word of Harun (Aaron)

Know that the existence of Harun, peace be upon him, was from the presence of mercy (rahamut) by His words, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet." (19:53) So his Prophethood was from the presence of the Rahamut. He was older than Musa, and Musa was greater than him in Prophethood. The Prophethood of Harun is from the presence of mercy (rahma) and, for that reason, he said to his brother Musa, peace be upon him, "O son of my mother!" (7:150) So he called to him by his mother, not by his father, since, in principle, mercy belongs in greater abundance to the mother than the father. Were it not for that mercy, the mother would not have the patience necessary for upbringing. Then he said, "do not seize me by the beard or by the hair," (20:94) and do not let my enemies gloat over me. All this is one of the breaths of mercy. The reason for that is the lack of ascertainment in looking at the tablets which had been given into his hands. If he had looked at them with ascertainment, he would have found guidance and mercy in them.

Musa would have found guidance, which is an elucidation of what happened in the matter which made him angry and of which Harun was innocent, and mercy towards his brother. He did not take him by the beard because of that state in which he saw his people because of his age, for Harun was older than him. That was compassion for Musa from Harun because the Prophethood of Harun is from the mercy of Allah. Only the like of that issued from him.

Then Harun said to Musa, "I was afraid that you would say: 'You have caused division in the Tribe of Israel'," (20:94) and you would make me the cause of their division since the worship of the Calf divided them. There were some of them who worshipped it following and imitating the Samiri, and there were some of them who refused to worship it until Musa returned to them so that they might question him regarding it. Harun was afraid that he would have that division between them attributed to him.

Musa knew the matter better than Harun because by his knowledge he knew the One the people of the Calf worshipped since Allah decreed that only He would be worshipped. When Allah decrees something, it must occur. Musa chided his brother Harun since the business consisted of disavowal and inadequacy. The gnostic is the one who sees Allah in everything, rather he sees Him as the source of everything. Musa was teaching Harun with the instruction of knowledge even though Musa was younger than him in age.

For that reason, when Harun said what he said, he turned to the Samiri and said to him, "What did you think you were doing, O Samiri," i.e. what were you doing in turning aside to the form of the Calf, and in your making this shape from the jewelry of the people so that you captured their hearts for the sake of their wealth? 'Isa used to say to the Tribe of Israel, "O Tribe of Israel! Every man turns to where his wealth is, so put your wealth in heaven, and then your hearts will be in heaven." Wealth is only called that (mâl) because by essence it inclines (yumîl) the hearts to worship. It is the greatest and most exalted goal in the hearts since they need it. Forms have no going-on, so the form of the Calf must vanish. If Musa had not hastened to burn it, jealousy would have overcome him. So he burned it and then scattered the ashes of that form in the sea. He told the Samiri, "Behold your god." He called it a god to alert him in order to teach him that he did know some of the places of divine tajalli, "I will surely burn it!"

The animality (hawayâniyya) of man has freedom of action over the animality of animals since Allah has subjected animals to man, especially in view of the fact that man's origin is not animal. Man has greater subjugation because that which is not-animal does not possess will. In fact, the non-animal is under the jurisdiction of whoever administers it without any recalcitrance whatsoever. The animal, on the other hand, has both will and instinct. Recalcitrance appears in some of its actions. If it has the power to manifest that, reluctance and resistance to what man wants appears from it. If it does not have that power or if what the man wants agrees with what the animal itself wants, then the animal obediently follows what is wanted of it.

Even so, man's "like" follows a command in whatever Allah has called him to in respect of the wealth which he hopes for from Him, which is designated in some states by "the other World" as when Allah says, "We have raised some of them above others in rank so that some of them are subservient to others." (43:32) His like is only subjugated to him by his animality, not by his humanness. The two likes are two opposites. The higher in degree subjugates the lower in degree by wealth or by rank with his humanness, and that other was subjected to him either by fear or greed from his animality, not from his humanness, so his like is not subjected to him.

Do you not see that what is among the beasts in the way of jostling against one another is because they are likes? Two likes are two opposites. That is why He said, "and He raised some of them above others in rank," so he is not with him in rank, and so subjugation occurs in respect of rank. Subjection is of two kinds. First, there is subjection intended by the subjector like the active conqueror when he subjects this subjected person - like the subjugation by the master of his slave although he is his like in humanness, and like the subjugation of the Sultan of his subjects who are his like in humanness, He subjugated them by rank.

The second sort is subjugation by the subjects of the king establishing their command that he drive harm away from them, protect them, do battle against those who attack them, and preserve their property and lives. All this is subjection through state by the subjects who subjugate their king in this act. In reality, it is called the subjection of rank. Rank has jurisdiction over him by this act. There are kings who work just for themselves, and there are those who recognize the matter and know that their subjects' subjugation of them is by rank. He knows their power and rights. Allah rewards him for that with the reward of those who know. The reward of the like of this is up to Allah, in Allah's being involved in the affairs of His slaves, for all the universe is subjected by state. Who is there who cannot be referred to as being "subjected"? Allah said, "Every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29)

Lack of power was in fact the armour of Harun which saved him from the people of the Calf by mastery over the Calf as Musa had mastery over it. This is a wisdom from Allah which is manifest in existence that He should be worshipped in every form. When the form departed after that, it only departed after it had been clad with divinity by its worshipper. For this reason, there is no species but that it is worshipped, either by the worship of making divine or by the worship of subjugation. That must be so for the one who has intellect.

Nothing is worshipped in the universe except after it is clad in elevation for the worshipper and its rank is manifest in his heart. For that reason, Allah called Himself for us, "the Exalter of ranks," and He did not say the "Exalter of rank," for ranks are many in the same source. He decreed that we worship only Him in many ranks. Each rank accords a divine locus of tajalli

which is worshipped in it, and the greatest locus of tajalli in which He is worshipped and the highest, is passion (hawa). As He said, "Have you seen him who takes his passion to be his god?" (45:23) It is the greatest idol. Nothing is worshipped except by it, and it is only worshipped by itself. Of it I say:

The truth of passion is
that passion is the cause of passion.
If there had not been passion in the heart,
passion would not have been worshipped.

Do you not see how perfect Allah's knowledge of things is? How it is completed in respect of the one who worships his passion and takes it as a god? He said, "he who Allah has misguided knowingly." (45:23) Being astray is bewilderment (hayra). That is when this worshipper sees that what he worships is only his passion, by following it in obedience to Him in what He commanded him of worship of whichever person worships Him, until his worship is for Allah the Great. That too is from passion because if passion had not occurred in him in that pure presence and it is the will to love he would neither have worshipped Allah nor preferred Him to others. In the same way, everyone worships a certain form among the forms of the universe, and takes it as a god, and he only takes it by passion. The worshipper is under the power of his passion. Then he sees that idols take on various forms among the worshippers. Each worshipper, for some reason, denies the one who worships another. What he has is a nearer perception which is confused by the unity (ittihâd) of passion, rather by the oneness (ahadiyya) of passion as He mentioned. It is the same source in every worshipper. Allah led him astray, i.e. confused him in respect to a knowledge that every worshipper only worships his own passion, and only seeks to worship his passion whether or not it agrees with the command of the Shari'a.

The complete gnostic is the one who sees that every idol is a locus of Allah's tajalli in which He is worshipped. For that reason, they are all called "god" in spite of having a particular name of a stone, tree, animal, man, star, or angel. This is the nature of the personality in it. Divinity is a rank which the worshipper imagines it to have, and it is the rank of his idol. In reality, it is a locus for the tajalli of Allah belonging to the sight of this particular worshipper devoted to this idol in this particular locus of tajalli.

This is why some of those who did not recognize an ignorant statement said, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" (39:3) although they called them "god", as they said, "Has he turned all the gods into One God? That is truly astonishing." (38:5) They do not deny Him, rather they are amazed. They stop at the multiplicity of possible forms and the ascription of divinity to them. That is why the Messenger came and called them to one God who is recognized and not witnessed by their witnessing. They confuse Him with them and believe in Him when they say, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" by their knowledge of those forms in stones. This is why the proof went against them when He said, "Say: Name them!" and they only named them by what they know those names to have in reality.

As for those who recognize the matter for what it is, they manifest the form of denying what is worshipped in the way of forms because their rank is in knowledge, and their rank is in accord with their being based on the principle of the moment, since they know that the moment is one of the mighty places of the tajalli of Allah in which He gives tajalli at each moment by some of His attributes. This is why time (ad-Dahr) is one of Allah's Names. The

Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Do not curse time, for time is Allah!" At every moment, people are overcome by the principle of the quality in which He gives tajalli at that particular moment. The Messenger who is sent in that moment is the greatest manifestation of the perfection of that quality. He calls creation to Allah, manifested by tajalli in him, by obedience to him, which is obedience to Allah, as Allah says, "Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah." (4:80) This is why it is obligatory to trust in him and obey him.

However, the gnostics know that they do not worship the forms themselves. Rather, they worship Allah in them according to the power of the tajalli which they know of these forms. The one who denies and has no knowledge of what Allah has manifested in tajalli is ignorant of this. The complete gnostic veils himself from the Prophet and Messenger and their heirs. He commands himself to leave that form which the Messenger of the moment left in order to follow the Messenger desiring Allah's love for them by His words, "Say: if you love Allah, then follow me and Allah will love you." (3:31) He called on a God to whom one has recourse and Who is known in respect to the whole and is not witnessed, "nor do the eyes perceive Him, but He perceives the eyes" (6:103) by His lutf and His diffusion in the source of things. The eyes do not perceive Him as they do not perceive their spirits which govern their shapes and outward forms. "...He is the Latif, the All-Aware."

Experience is tasting, and tasting is tajalli. Tajalli occurs in forms. They must be and it must be, and the one who sees Him by his passion must worship Him, if you only knew! Allah possesses the goal of the path.

25: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sublimity in the Word of Musa (Moses)

The wisdom of the killing of the male children in respect to Musa was in order to give him the support of the life of each of those killed for his sake because each of them was killed for being Musa. There is no ignorance, so the life of the one killed for his sake had to return to Musa. It is pure life in the natural state (fitra). The desires of the self have not soiled it; rather, it is in its natural state of "Yes (bala)." (1) Musa was the sum of the lives of those killed for being him. All that was prepared for the murdered ones in the way of the predisposition of their spirits was in Musa, peace be upon him. This is a divine favour to Musa which no one before him had.

The wisdoms of Musa are numerous. If Allah wills, I will enumerate them in this chapter according to what the divine command puts into my mind. This is the first about which I shall speak in this chapter.

Musa was only born being a synthesis of many spirits. He was a concentration of effective forces since the young have an effect on the old. Do you not see how the child has an effect on the older person by the special quality the child has? The older person descends from his leading position to play with the child and rock him in his arms and to show himself at the child's level of intellect he descends to the level of the child's intellect. He is under subjugation even though he is not aware of it. He occupies himself with instructing and protecting the child, seeing to his needs and consoling him so that the child is not distressed.

All this is part of the effect of the young on the old. That is due to the strength of his station. The young has a new covenant with his Lord because he has newly come into being. The old person is further from Him. Whoever is nearer to Allah subjects whoever is further away from Him, just as the elite of the near angels subject the further ones. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to expose himself to the rain when it came down and to uncover his head so that it would fall on him. He said that it has a new covenant with Allah. Look at this recognition of Allah on the part of this Prophet! What is more glorious, more sublime and clearer than this? The rain subjected the best of men due to its proximity to its Lord. That is a likeness of the Messenger on whom the revelation descends. The rain called him by its own state, (2) and so he exposed himself to the rain in order to receive from it what it brought from his Lord. If he had not received this divine benefit from it by the rain, he would not have exposed himself to it. This is the message of water from which Allah has fashioned every living thing (3) - so understand! As for the wisdom of Musa being put into the ark and then cast into the river, the ark (tâbût) is his human nature (nâsût). The river is what he received of knowledge through his body by what the power of discernment and the sensory imaginative faculties accorded him. Only by the existence of this elemental body does the human self have these faculties or their like. When the self comes to this body and is commanded to freely dispose of it and manage it, Allah gives it these faculties as instruments by which it obtains what Allah wills that it obtain in the management of this ark which contains the sakina (4) of the Lord. Musa was cast into the river in order to receive various knowledges by these faculties. Thus Allah taught him that the spirit which manages him is the ruler. He is only managed by it. It gives him the command of these faculties of phenomenal being which are in this nâsût that is designated by the ark in the field of indications and wisdoms.

Allah manages the universe in the same way, and it is only managed by it or by its form. It is only managed by Him inasmuch as the arrival of the one begotten depends upon its being brought into existence by the begetter. Caused things depend on their causes, proven things depend on their proofs, and true things depend on their realities. All of this is part of the universe, and it is Allah's management of it, and he only manages by it.

As for our statement, "or by its form," I mean the form of the universe, and by it I mean the Most Beautiful Names and sublime attributes by which Allah is named and described. Nothing of a name by which He is called has reached us but that we found the meaning and spirit of that name in the universe. The universe is also only managed by the form of the universe.

For that reason, the Prophet said in respect of the creation of Adam who is the blueprint which gathers all the attributes of the Divine Presence which is the essence, the attributes and the actions: "Allah created Adam in His form." His form is only the Divine Presence. In this noble epitome, which is the Perfect Man, He brought into existence all the Divine Names and the realities of that which is outside of him in the Macrocosm separate from him. He made Adam a spirit (rûh) for the universe, and so He subjected to him the high and the low through the perfection of his form. As there is nothing in the universe that "does not glorify Allah's praise," (5) in the same way, there is nothing in the world which is not subject to this man according to what the reality of his form accords him. Allah says, "He has made everything that is in the heavens and the earth subservient to you. It is all from Him." (22:65) All that is in the universe is subject to man. He who knows that from his knowledge is the Perfect Man. He who is ignorant of that is the Animal Man.

The form of casting Musa into the ark and then casting the ark into the river is outwardly a form of destruction. Inwardly, it was his rescue from being killed. He was brought to life as the self is brought to life by knowledge from the death of ignorance as Allah says, "Is someone who was dead (i.e. by ignorance) and whom We brought to life (with knowledge) and supplied with a light by which to walk among the people (which is guidance) the same as someone who is in utter darkness (in being astray) unable to emerge from it (i.e. will never be guided)?" (6) In itself the matter has no end at which it stops.

Guidance is that man is guided to bewilderment (hayra). He knows that the business is bewilderment. Bewilderment is being unsettled and movement. Movement is life. There is no non-movement nor death. There is existence and not non-existence. It is the same with the water which gives life to the earth. Its movement is His word, "so it quivers" and conceives, "and swells" with pregnancy, "and sprouts plants in beautiful pairs." (7) It only gives birth to what resembles it, i.e. has a nature like it. It has being linked in pairs (zawjiya) which is the state of being doubled by what is born from it and what appears from it.

Similarly, the existence of Allah has multiplicity and the many Names. It is this or that according to what appears from it of the universe which demands the realities of the Divine Names by its development. They are doubled by it and stand in opposition to the unity of multiplicity. It is one by source in respect to its essence, as the primal substance (hayûla) is a single source in respect to its essence, while it has many forms which it supports by its essence. It is the same with Allah through the forms of tajalli which are manifested from Him. So the locii of the tajalli are the forms of the universe, in spite of the intelligible unity (ahadiyya). Look at the excellence of this divine instruction which Allah gives by granting its recognition to whoever He wishes among His slaves.

When the family of Pharaoh found him in the river by the tree, Pharaoh called him Musa. Mu is water in Coptic and sha is tree. He named him by where he found him, for the ark stopped by the tree in the river. Pharaoh wanted to kill him. His wife, speaking by divine articulation in what she said to Pharaoh about Musa since Allah had created her for perfection as Allah said about her when He testified that she and Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, have the perfection which men have (8) - said, "he may be a source of delight for me and for you." (28:9) She would be consoled by him with the perfection which she received as we have said.

The consolation of Pharaoh was with the belief Allah gave him when he was drowning. So Allah took him pure and purified. There was no impurity in him since He took him in his belief before he had acquired any wrong actions. Islam effaces what was before it. He made him a sign of His concern so that none might despair of the mercy of Allah, for "no one despairs of solace from Allah except for the unbelievers." (12:87) If Pharaoh been of those who despair, he would not have embarked on belief. Musa, peace be upon him, was, as the wife of Pharaoh said, "a source of delight for me and for you. Do not kill him. It may well be that he will be of use to us." That is what happened. Allah gave them use of Musa, although they were not aware that he was a prophet who would destroy the kingdom of Pharaoh and his family.

When Allah protected him from Pharaoh, his mother's heart was freed of the anxiety which had befallen her. Then Allah forbade him to be suckled until he had received his mother's breast, so she suckled him that Allah might complete her joy. The knowledge of the roads (sharâ'i) is like that. It is as Allah said, "to each We have made a road," (5:48) i.e. a path (tariq), "and a direction (minhaj)" from that path. This statement is an indication of the root from which he came (minhuja). It is his food as the tree has branches and yet is only nourished by its root. What is haram in one Shari'a can be halal in another Shari'a - I mean in a certain form it can be halal, while in the heart of the matter it is not really the same as what passed because the matter is new creation, not repetition. This is what we instruct you! It is referred to in connection with Musa when the wet-nurses were made haram.

In reality, the one who suckled him, not the one who bore him, is his mother. The mother of birth carried him in regard to the trust. He is formed within her and fed by her menstrual blood without any volition on her part in that, so that does not come from her benevolence towards him. He is only fed by what would destroy her or make her ill had he not been nourished on it, or had that blood not gone out of her. The embryo is a gift to its mother since it feeds on what would cause her harm had that blood remained with her and not gone out of her, or had not the embryo been nourished on it.

Suckling is not the same. By her suckling, she intends to give him life and to sustain him. Allah gave that to Musa in the mother who bore him. No woman outside of his mother by birth had any right over him that she also might find consolation in bringing him up and watching him grow in her room, and so she was not sad.

Allah saved him from the grief of the ark, so he pierced natural darkness by what Allah gave him of divine knowledge, while he did not depart from nature. He tested him with many trials (9) and gave him experience in many places so that he might realize patience in himself in the trials Allah gave him.

The first of Allah's trials was the killing of the Copt which Allah inspired him to do and gave him success in his secret yet he did not know this. However, Musa did not feel any anxiety

over killing him, although he was unsure until the command of his Lord told him, since the Prophet is inwardly protected without being aware of it until he is informed, until transmission comes to him. For this reason, al-Khidr showed him the killing of the boy, (10) so Musa criticized the killing but did not remember how he had killed the Copt. Al-Khidr told him, "I did not do it of my own volition," (18:82) and he informed him of his rank before he told him that his movement was protected in reality, but he was not aware of it.

Al-Khidr also showed him the piercing of the ship. Outwardly it was destruction, but inwardly it was rescue from the hand of the tyrant. He made that an analogy of the ark which was in the river its outward aspect was destruction, while inwardly it was rescue, for his mother did it fearing the hand of the tyrant, who was Pharaoh, that he might not kill Musa in captivity. She looked at him with the revelation Allah had inspired in her while she was not aware of it. She felt in herself that she would suckle him. When she feared for him, she cast him into the river because, as the proverb says, "What the eye does not see does not afflict the heart." She did not fear for him with the fear of the witnessing of the eye, and she was not sad with the sorrow of seeing him. It came over her thoughts that perhaps Allah would return him to her, for she had a good opinion of Him. She lived by this thought in herself and by the hope which was opposite fear and despair. When she was inspired to do this, she said, "Perhaps he is the Messenger who will destroy Pharaoh and the Copts." She lived and took joy in this, which was illusion and thought in respect of herself, but, in the heart of the matter, it is knowledge.

When they searched for Musa (after he had killed the Copt), he left in flight, fearful outwardly and in the meaning, it was love of deliverance for movement is always by love, but the onlooker is veiled from it by other causes, which are not the movement. This is because the root is the movement of the universe from non-existence which was immobile in existence. That is why it is said that the matter is movement from immobility. The movement which is the existence of the universe is the movement of love. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, quoting Allah, "I was a hidden treasure, therefore I wanted (lit. loved) to be known." (11)

If it had not been for this love, the universe would not have appeared in its source. Its movement from non-existence to existence is the movement of the love of the One who brings into existence for this purpose. The universe also loves to witness itself in existence as it was witnessed in immutability. Thus by every aspect, the movement from immutable non-existence to the existence of the sources is a movement of love, both in respect of Allah and in respect to itself.

Perfection is loved for itself. Allah's knowledge of Himself is His, since He is independent of the worlds. It belongs only to Him. The perfection of the rank of knowledge only remains by the in-time knowledge which comes from these sources. When the sources of the universe exist, then the forms of perfection appear with timeless and in-time knowledge. Thus the rank of knowledge is perfected by two aspects.

In the same way, the ranks of existence are perfected. Existence from it is before-time and not before-time, which is in-time. Pre-temporal (azali) time is the existence of Allah by Himself, and non-pre-temporal-time is the existence of Allah by the forms of the immutable universe. It is called in-time because it manifests some parts to others. He is manifest to Himself by the forms of the universe, and so existence is perfected.

The movement of the universe is by love of perfection, so understand! Do you not see how what the Divine Names bring into existence is breathed from the absence of the manifestation of their effects in a entity called the universe? It loves rest (12) which is only reached by the existence of form, high and low. Thus it is confirmed that movement occurs by love. The only movement in the entire cosmos is by love.

Among the 'ulama' are those who know that and those who are veiled by the nearer cause because it rules their state (hâl) and overpowers them. Musa was aware of his fear by what occurred through his killing the Copt. That fear implied love of deliverance from killing. So he fled by fear. In the meaning, he fled when he loved deliverance from Pharaoh and his deeds. He mentioned the nearest cause which he was aware of at that moment, which is like the form of the body of man, and love of deliverance is contained in it as the body contains the spirit which manages it.

The Prophets had the language of the outward with which they addressed people in general and on which they relied to make the one who listened understand what was said. The Messengers make allowances for people in general by their knowledge of the rank of the people of understanding. It is as the Prophet, peace be upon him, said about gifts, "I give to this man, while another man is more beloved to me than him for I fear that Allah might throw him down into the Fire." He made allowances for those whose intellect and discernment are weak and who are overcome by greed and nature.

Similarly, what they brought of knowledges, they brought wearing a robe (13) which nearer to the understanding, so that the one who has no "diving" might stop at the robe and say, "How excellent this robe is!" and he will see it as the limit of rank. Because of what this robe from the king demands, the one with subtle understanding, the one who dives for the pearls of wisdom, looks at the quality of the robe and its type of material. By it, he knows the degree of the one it covers, and so he stumbles onto a knowledge which no one else has obtained from those without knowledge of such matters.

Then the Prophets and Messengers and heirs knew that in this world and in their communities, there are those who, in this manner, express themselves in the outward language which the elite and common share. The one who is elite understands of it what the common understand, and more, inasmuch as it is valid that he be called elite. He is distinguished from the blind. Those who have obtained knowledges are content with this. This is the wisdom of his words, "I fled from you when I was in fear of you," (14) but he did not say, "I fled from you by love of safety and well-being."

Musa came to Madyan and found two women and got water for them without being paid for it. Then he turned away to the divine shade and said, "O my Lord, I am truly in need of any good You have in store for me." (28:24) He made the source of his getting water the same as the good which Allah sent down to him, and he described himself as being in need of Allah in the good which he had. Al-Khidr showed him the setting-up of the wall without wage, but Musa chided him for it. So al-Khidr reminded him of his drawing water without wage, and other things which were not mentioned. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, wished that Musa had remained silent and had not left him so that Allah would have related more about them.

Al-Khidr alerted Musa to the fact that what had come to him and would come to him was by the command of Allah and His will which it is impossible to contradict. Knowledge of that is

one of the prerogatives of wilaya. As for the Messenger, He might not acquaint him with it, for it is the secret of the decree.(15) If He had acquainted him with that, it might have been a reason for his lassitude in conveying what he was commanded to convey. Allah withholds the knowledge of this from some of the Messengers as a mercy to them from Him. He did not withhold it from our Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, because of the strength of his state. This is why our Prophet said, "I call on Allah by inner sight." (75:14)

By this he knew what Musa had succeeded in had been without knowledge on his part. If it had been from knowledge, Musa would not have criticized what al-Khidr did, since Allah had testified before Musa as to al-Khidr's purity and justice. In spite of this, Musa was heedless of the fact that Allah had made him pure, and of the conditions set down for following him. This was a mercy for us if we forget the command of Allah. If Musa had known that, al-Khidr would not have said to him, "What you have never encompassed in your knowledge," meaning I have a knowledge which you have not received by tasting as you have a knowledge which I do not know. He was just.

As for the wisdom of his parting from him, it is because Allah said of the Messenger, "Take what the Messenger brings you, and avoid what he prohibits you." (59:7) The 'ulama' of Allah who recognize this quality of the Message and the Messenger stop at this statement. Al-Khidr knew that Musa was the Messenger of Allah. He regarded what came from him to preserve the adab which is due to the Messengers. Musa said to him, "If I ask you about anything after this, then you should no longer keep me company." So he forbade al-Khidr to keep his company. When that occurred for the third time, al-Khidr therefore said, "This is where you and I part company," Musa did not tell him, "Do not do it," nor did he seek to keep him company for he knew the level of the rank he was in when he spoke of the prohibition against keeping him company. Musa was silent, and the parting took place.

Look at the perfection of these two men in knowledge and the completion of divine adab as right, and the justice of al-Khidr, peace be upon him, in what he acknowledged to Musa when he said, "I have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know, and you have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know." This information which al-Khidr imparted to Musa was a remedy for the wound inflicted on him in his words, "How indeed could you bear with patience something you have not encompassed in your knowledge?" (18:68) although he knew the sublimity of his rank with the message, and al-Khidr did not have this rank.

This appeared in the community of Muhammad in the hadith regarding the fertilization of the date tree. The Prophet, peace be upon him, told his Companions, "You know more about the matters of your daily life."¹⁶ There is no doubt that the knowledge of the thing is better than ignorance of it. Allah praises Himself, saying, "He has knowledge of all things." The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, acknowledged to his Companions that they knew more about the exigencies of this world than him because he had no experience of them. It is knowledge of tasting (dhawq) and experience, and the Prophet, peace be upon him, had not occupied himself with this sort of knowledge. Rather, he was occupied with what was more important. I have informed you about a great adab by which will benefit you if you occupy yourself with it.

Musa's statement, "My Lord gave me right judgement," (26:21) means the khilafah, "and made me one of the Messengers," means the message. Not every Messenger is a Khalif. The Khalif has a sword, duties and governance. The Messenger is not the same rather, he

transmits what he has been sent to transmit. If he does battle and defends with the sword, then he is both Khalif and Messenger.

As for the wisdom of Pharaoh's question regarding divine whatness (mâhiya) when he said, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" (26:23) that question did not arise from ignorance, but it was posed in order to test Musa and to see what answer he would give when he claimed that he had a message from his Lord. Pharaoh knew the rank of the Messengers in knowledge of Allah and he wanted to test Musa's answer to ascertain the validity of his claim. In order to inform those present, he invited an answer which would have been misleading as far as they were concerned since they did not know what Pharaoh himself knew about the question. Musa answered him with the answer of those who have knowledge of the matter. Then Pharaoh, in order to preserve his position, asserted that Musa had not answered his question. So because of the inadequacy of their understanding, it seemed clear to those who were present that Pharaoh knew more than Musa. For this reason, when Musa answered him with what was not appropriate and outwardly it is not an answer to what he was asked about and Pharaoh knew that he would only give that answer, Pharaoh then said to his companions, "Your Messenger" who was sent to you "is mad" since the knowledge of what I question him about is veiled from him (17) since it is inconceivable that it be known at all.

The question is valid. The question of the what-ness is a question about the reality of what is asked about - it must be real in itself. As for those who make definitions which consist of category and genus, these are matters shared by various things. Whoever has no category must have a reality in Himself which belongs to no other. The question is invalid in the school of the People of Allah, sound knowledge and sound intellect. The only answer to it is the answer Musa gave.

Here is a great secret! He mentioned the "act" in giving the answer to the one who asked for a definition of essence. He made the essential definition the source of the attribution to what appeared of Him in the forms of the universe, or what appeared in Him of the forms of the universe. In answer to, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" he said that He is the One in whom the forms of the universe are manifest on high which is the heaven - and below - which is the earth, "if you but have certainty," (18) or He who is manifest by them.

When Pharaoh told his companions that Musa was mad, (majnûn) in the sense that he was possessed, Musa added to the elucidation in order to inform Pharaoh of his rank in divine knowledge because he knew that Pharaoh already knew that. Musa said, "The Lord of the East and the West," bringing what was manifest and what was hidden, in the outward and the inward, "and what between them is" which is Allah's words, "He has knowledge of everything," "if you have intellect," (19) i.e. if you possess qualification since this comes from intellect.

The first answer is for those who are certain, and they are the people of unveiling and existence. Musa said, "If you have certainty," i.e. if you are the people of unveiling and existence. I have given you knowledge of what you are already certain about in your witnessing and existence. If you are not of this category, I have answered you in the second answer: if you are among the people of intellect and qualification, and you limit Allah according to what the proofs of your intellects accord.

Thus Musa manifested both aspects in order to inform Pharaoh about his question and his veracity. Musa knew that Pharaoh knew that because he asked about the what-ness of Allah.

He knew that his question was not couched in the language the ancients used in their questioning by means of what. That is why he answered him. If he had known anything else from him, he would have been mistaken in the question. Musa treated that about which he was asked as the source of the universe, and Pharaoh addressed him by this language (20) although the people present were not aware of that.

Pharaoh said to him, "If you take any god other than me, I will certainly make you one of the imprisoned." (26:29) The letter sin in prison (sijn) is one of the letters of increase, (21) meaning I will veil you, for you answered by what supported me so that I might say the same to you. If you say to me, "O Pharaoh! I do not I do not recognize your threat to me while the source is but one, so how can you separate?" Then Pharaoh replied, "The ranks are separate, but the source is not separate and it is not divided in its existence. My rank right now is power over you by actual fact, O Musa! I am you by the source and other than you by rank!"

When Musa understood that from him, he gave him his due in respect to himself and told him, "You will not be able to do that." Pharaoh's rank gave him power and influence over Musa because Allah is in the rank of Pharaoh in respect of the outward form which has authority over the rank in which Musa appeared in that assembly.

Therefore Musa told him that Allah had manifested a barrier to his hostility against Musa. He said, "Even if I were to bring you something undeniable?" Pharaoh could only reply, "Produce it then, if you are someone telling the truth" so that Pharaoh would not appear to be unjust among those of his nation who were weak-minded. They had doubts about him, and they were the group Pharaoh made unsteady. However, they obeyed Pharaoh because they were a corrupt people; (22) that is, lacking sound intellects' rejection of taking Pharaoh's claims literally. The intellect stops at a certain limit, and only those of unveiling and certainty can cross that limit. This is why in his answer, Musa first addressed those of certainty and then address those of the intellect.

"So he drew down his staff ('asa)" (26:32) which is the form with which Pharaoh defied (23) ('asa) Musa when he refused to answer his call. "And there it was, unmistakably a snake," i.e. an evident snake. Thus rebellion, which is evil, changed into obedience, which is good, as Allah says, "Allah will transform their evil deeds into good deeds," (25:70) meaning in judgement. Here the judgement manifested a differentiated source in a single substance (jawhar) so it is a staff, a snake, and a manifest serpent. It devoured its likes among the snakes in the form of a snake, and the staffs in the form of a staff. The proof of Musa overcame the proofs of Pharaoh in the form of staffs, snakes and ropes. The sorcerers had ropes, but Musa did not have a rope. The "rope" is the small hill; (24) that is, their powers in relation to the power of Musa is as the hills are to the lofty mountains.

When the sorcerers saw that, they recognized Musa's rank in knowledge and they saw that he possessed a power which was not mortal. If it had been within the power of a mortal, it would only belong to someone who could distinguish sure knowledge from imagination and illusion. So they believed in "the Lord of the Worlds, the Lord of Musa and Harun" - that is, the Lord to whom Musa and Harun summoned them because they knew that the people understood that they were not being called to Pharaoh. Pharaoh was in the position of authority, and he was the master of the moment since he was the Khalif with the sword, even though he broke the customary divine laws when he said, "I am your Lord most high" - i.e. since all are lords, (25) I am the highest of them through the power which you have outwardly given me over you. The sorcerers knew that he spoke the truth in what he said, and

they did not deny it. They affirmed that to Pharaoh, and said, "You only judge in this passing life, so judge as you like, for the kingdom is yours." So the statement of Pharaoh, "I am your Lord most high," was valid. Although the source is from Allah, the form is Pharaoh's. He cut off the hands and feet, and crucified through a real source in false form in order to attain the ranks which are only attained by that act.

There is no way to neutralize causes because the source-forms necessitate them. They only appear in existence by the form on which they are based at the source since "there is no changing the words of Allah." (10:64) The words of Allah are not other than the sources of existent things. Timelessness is ascribed to Him in respect to their permanence, and in-time ness is ascribed to them in respect of their existence and appearance. Thus we say, a certain man or guest happened (26) to be with us today." That does not mean that he did not have any existence before this event. For that reason, Allah says about His Mighty Word which is timeless, "No reminder (dhikr) from their Lord comes to them lately renewed (27) without their listening to it as if it were a game," (21:2) and "but no fresh (28) reminder reaches them from the All- Merciful, without their turning away from it." (26:5) The Merciful only brings mercy, and whoever turns away from mercy advances the punishment which is the absence of mercy.

As for the words of Allah, "but their belief when they saw Our violent force was of no use to them. That is the pattern Allah has always followed with His slaves," (29) (40:85) that did not mean that it did not profit them in the Next World through His exception, "except for the people of Yunus." He meant that that did not prevent them being punished in this world. For that reason, Pharaoh was seized in spite of the existence of his belief even though his affair was that of someone who is certain that his death is approaching. The circumstances accord that he was not certain that he was going to die because he saw the believers walking on the dry path which had appeared when Musa struck the sea with his staff. Pharaoh was not certain that he would perish since he believed that he would not die until the moment actually reached him. He believed in the One in whom the Tribe of Israel believed, in certainty of his deliverance.

It was indeed certain, but it was in a form other than the one he wanted. He was saved from the punishment of the Next World in himself and his body was saved as Allah says, "Today We will save your body that you might be a sign for those after you," (10:92) because, if his form had vanished, his people might have said that he had gone into occultation. His known form appeared as a corpse that it might be known that it was really him. Deliverance was encompassed both in the senses and in the meaning.

The one who has the word of the punishment in the Other World realized for him (30) will not believe, even if every ayat had been brought to him, "so that they might see the painful punishment," that is, taste the punishment of the Next World. Pharaoh left this class of people. This is the literal meaning of what the text of the Qur'an brought us. We say, and the matter belongs to Allah, that the fixed idea which the common people have regarding the wretchedness of Pharaoh is not based on anything in the divine text. As for his family, that is another judgement. This is not the place to mention it.

Know that Allah only takes someone while he believes that is, affirms what divine transmissions bring, and I mean those who are consciousness at death. This is why dislikes sudden death and being killed while unaware is disliked. The definition of sudden death is that the incoming breath goes out and the outcoming breath does not come in. This is sudden

death and when that happens, one is not conscious of death.

It is the same if a man is killed unawares by a blow from behind on the back of the neck. He is then taken with whatever belief or disbelief he possesses at that moment. For that reason, the Prophet said, "One will be gathered in the state in which one dies," as one is taken in whatever one is doing at the time. The one who is conscious of death is only the one who sees it coming. He believes what he sees. He is only taken in what he is doing because that is an existent expression connected to time by the circumstances. We distinguish between the unbeliever who is conscious at death and the unbeliever either killed while unaware or who dies suddenly as we have said in the definition of sudden death.

As for the wisdom of tajalli and the discourse on the form of the fire, this was because it was the object of Musa's desire. Allah gave him a tajalli in what he was searching for so that Musa would turn to Him and not turn away. If Allah had given the tajalli in other than the form which he was seeking, Musa would have turned away because his interest was concentrated on a particular goal. If he had turned away, his action would have rebounded on him, and Allah would have turned away from him. Musa was the chosen one and the one brought near. When Allah brings someone near to Him, He gives him a tajalli in the object he desires, without him knowing it.

Like the Fire of Musa
which he saw as what he needed.
It was Allah,
but he did not perceive it.

Notes to Chapter 25:

1. "Yes, we testify." Qur'an 7:172. Before the selves were created, Allah asked them, "Am I not your Lord?" They replied. "Yes, we testify."
2. In the form of knowledge and life descending from Allah.
3. See Qur'an 21:30.
4. Divine Presence which causes calmness and tranquillity in the hearts of the Believers. It is also related to the Ark of the Covenant and to Bayt al-Maqdis, when the invisible Sakina/Shechina descends from above. See 2:249: "The sign of his kinship is that the Ark will come to you, containing a Sakina from your Lord, and certain relics left by the families of Musa and Harun left. It will be borne by angels."
5. Qur'an 17:44.
6. Qur'an 6:122.
7. Qur'an 22:5.
8. Qur'an 66:11: "Allah has made an example for the believers - the wife of Pharaoh when she said, 'My Lord, build a house in the Garden for me in Your Presence, and rescue me from Pharaoh and his deeds.'"
- Also the hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Musa, "Many men have been perfect, but among women only Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, and Asiya, wife of Pharaoh, were perfect."
9. See Qur'an 20:40, "We rescued you from trouble and tested you with many trials."
10. See the story in the Qur'an 18:65-82.
11. Hadith qudsi.
12. i.e. reaching the perfection of love. This is called or love or yearning after the parting.
13. khil'a, a robe of honor.
14. Qur'an 26:21.

15. Sirr al-Qadar.
16. Hadith narrated by Imam Muslim.
17. Madness "junun" is related to veils.
18. "The Lord of the heavens and the earth and what is between them is you have certainty."
Qur'an 26:24.
19. Qur'an 26:28.
20. of unveiling.
21. Zawa'id, the augmentative letters, i.e. the ten letters which are added to the radical letters in Arabic words sin, hamza, alif, lam, ta', mim, waw, nun, ya' and ha'. If you take away the sin from sijn (prison), you get "jinn" meaning veil.
22. See Qur'an 43:54, "In that way he swayed his people and they succumbed to him. They were a people of deviators."
23. 'Asâ as a noun means "staff", and 'Asâ as a verb means "to rebel against , oppose."
24. Habl meaning "rope" also means mound or small hill.
25. Lord being a relative name, demanding a subject, also because it means owner, so one says the lord of the house, the "lord" of a herd, etc. Also one who looks after, the "lord" of a child.
26. Huduth means coming into existence for the first time. It also means an event or occurrence.
27. Muhdath.
28. Muhdath.
29. It like is in Qur'an 10:98, where the punishment is removed from the people of Yunus after they believed.
30. See Qur'an 39:71.

26: The Seal of the Wisdom of What One Turns to (as-Samad) in the Word of Khalid

As for the wisdom of Khalid ibn Sinan, (1) by his call he manifested the Prophethood of the interspace. He claimed that he would tell them about what happens after death. He commanded that he should be disinterred and questioned in order that he might report that the judgement in the Interspace occurs in the form of the life of this world. Thus it would be known that all the Messengers spoke the truth in what they related in this life regarding what happens after death. Khalid's goal was that all the world would believe in what the Messengers brought so that there would be mercy for all. He was honored by his Prophethood being near the time of the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. He knew that Allah had sent Muhammad as a mercy to the worlds, but Khalid was not a Messenger. He wanted to receive a generous share of this mercy contained in the message of Muhammad. He was not commanded to convey the message, but he wanted to have that share in the Interspace so that there would be stronger knowledge about the creation, and for this reason his people squandered him.

The Messenger of Allah described them as having squandered their Prophet because they did not do what he wanted them to do. Did Allah give him the reward for what he wanted? There is no doubt and no disagreement that he had the reward of what he wished, but there is doubt and disagreement about the reward of the goal. Is wishing for it the same in the Next World as its occurrence even though it did not occur or not? In the Shari'a, equality is not supported in many places such as in the case of the one who performs the prayer in the group. (2) The one who prays it in the group has a reward from the presence of the group. He is like the person who, in spite of poverty, desires to be able to give charity as the people of wealth and property do. He has the like of their rewards, but the like of their rewards can be in their intentions or their deeds. The people had both the intention and the action. The Prophet, peace be upon him, did not prescribe both of them, nor one of them, and outwardly they are not the same. For that reason, Khalid ibn Sinan sought the proclamation to confirm for him the station of joining both matters so that he would receive two rewards. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 26:

1. Al-Qashani, the commentator, says that Khalid lived in Aden, and was a man of great himma who was overcome in the contemplation of divine unity. One day a great fire appeared from a cave among his people. It destroyed the crops and the livestock, and the people called on him to protect them from it. He struck the fire with his staff, saying, "Away! Away!" until it became cold and retreated to the cave. Then he told his people that he would enter the cave in order to extinguish the fire, and he told them to call him after three full days had passed. Should he call him before that, he would come out and die. If they were patient, he would emerge in good health.

They waited two days, and then Shaytan made them restless, and doubts came to them and they were afraid that he might have been destroyed. They shouted to him. He emerged from the cave with his hand on his head from the pain their shouting had caused him. He told them, "You have killed me and squandered my word and my covenant." He then told them of his death and commanded them to bury him and then watch for forty days. Then, he said, a flock of sheep led by a donkey with slit ears and its tail cut off would come to them. When it stood opposite his grave, they were to disinter him and he would rise and tell them of the true state of things after death from witnessing and vision so that all creation would receive certainty as to what the Messenger related. Then he died and they buried him.

They waited until the forty days had passed. The flock of sheep came led by a donkey with slit ears. It stopped opposite his grave, so they understood that they should disinter Khalid as he had commanded them so that he might inform them as to the truth of the Prophets. Some of his older sons were adverse to that and said that it would shame them among the Arabs and that they would be called, "the sons of the disinterred one." There was the vehemence of the Jahiliya in that. They squandered their legacy and destroyed him. After the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was sent, a daughter of Khalid came to him, and he said to her, "Greetings to you, O daughter of a Prophet whose people squandered him!"

2. His Prophethood did not appear in this world.

27: The Seal of the Unique Wisdom in the Word of Muhammad

Muhammad's wisdom is uniqueness (fardiya) because he is the most perfect existent creature of this human species. For this reason, the command began with him and was sealed with him. He was a Prophet while Adam was between water and clay, (1) and his elemental structure is the Seal of the Prophets. The first singular is three, and what is more than this firstness of individuals comes from three. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is the surest proof of his Lord, so he was given all the words, (2) which are everything that is named by the names of Adam. (3) He resembles the proof in its threefoldness, and the proof is a proof of itself. Then his reality grants the first uniqueness which is threefold in structure. For that reason, speaking about the domain of love which is the root of existence, he said, "I was made to love three things in your world," (4) because of what this world has of threefoldness. Then he mentioned women, and perfume, and that the coolness of his eye was in the prayer.

The Prophet began by mentioning women and ended with the prayer. That is because woman is part of man in the root of the manifestation of her source, and because man's recognition of himself preceded his recognition of his Lord. That is why the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." If you wish, you can say that this tradition is the forbidding of gnosis and stating the inability to attain to Him - and that is a permissible statement; and, if you wish, you can say that it is the affirmation of gnosis. The first is that if you do not know yourself, so you will not know your Lord. The second is that you recognize yourself, so you do recognize your Lord. Muhammad was the clearest proof of his Lord. Every part of the world indicates its root which is its Lord, so understand!

The Prophet was made to love women, so he yearned for them because as the whole yearns for what is part of it. The matter is self-evident through what Allah says regarding this elemental human constitution, "and I breathed My Ruh into him." (15:29; 38:72) Then He described Himself with intensity of yearning to meet those who yearn for Him. He said, "O Dawud! I have intense yearning for them," i.e. those who yearn for Him, and it is a particular encounter. The Prophet said in a hadith about the Dajjal, "None of you will see his Lord until after he dies." (5) Allah must yearn for those near ones - because even though He sees them and wants them to see Him, that encounter is still prevented by man's station. That is like His words "until We know" although He is Knowing. He yearns for this particular attribute which only is achieved existence through death.

By this, He tests their yearning for Him as He said in the hadith of hesitation which concerns this matter, "I do not hesitate in anything I do, but I hesitate to take the breath of My believing slave because he hates death, and I hate to make him die. But He must meet Me." He gave him good news and did not say to him, "he must die" because He did not want to distress him by mentioning death. Man only meets Allah after death as the Prophet says, "None of you will see his Lord until he dies." That is why Allah says, "He must meet Me," for Allah desires the existence of this relationship. He made it clear that He breathed into him some of His spirit (rûh) so He only yearns for him. Do you not see that He created him on His form because he is from His Spirit?

Man's constitution is based on these four elements which are called the "humors" in his body. The combustion of the moisture found in the body occurs from his breath. The spirit of man

is fire as regards his constitution. For this reason, Allah only spoke to Musa in the form of fire, (6) and put his need in it. If his constitution had been from nature, (7) then his spirit would have been light. Allah alluded to it with the blowing (nafkh) which indicates that it is from the breath (nafas) of the All-Merciful. It is by this breath, which is the blowing-out that he manifested from Him, and by the predisposition of the one blown into, that combustion is fire and not light. The breath of Allah is hidden in that by which man is man.

From man, He derived a person in his form called "woman". She appeared in his form, and he yearned for her with the longing of that thing has for itself, and she yearned for him with the longing of that thing has for its home. Allah made him love women. Allah loves the one whom He created in His form, and He made the luminous angels, in spite of the power of their might and their station and the sublimity of their natural constitution, prostrate to him. (8) From this comes the affinity which occurs in the form which man and woman share, which is like that between Allah and man. The form has the greatest affinity, as well as the most glorious and perfect. It makes a pair that is, doubles the existent belonging to Allah, as the woman, by her existence, doubles man, and makes him one of a pair. So three appeared: Allah, man and woman. Man yearns for his Lord who is the origin as woman yearns for man.

His Lord made him love women as Allah loves the one who is in His form. Love only occurred by the One by whom he is formed. His love was for the One he was formed by, and He is Allah. This is why the Prophet said, "He made me love...", and he did not say, "I loved" as coming from himself because his love is connected to his Lord in Whose form he is. In his love for his wife, he loves her by Allah's love for him as a divine nature. (9)

When a man loves a woman, he desires union, that is, the goal of union which exists in love. In the elemental form, there is no greater union than marriage. (10) By this appetite encompasses all parts. For that reason, complete ritual washing is prescribed after intercourse. Purification envelops him as annihilation in the woman was complete in the obtainment of appetite. Allah is very jealous of His slave if He believes that he finds pleasure in other than Him. So man purifies himself by ritual washing in order to return to Him in whom he was annihilated, since that is all there is.

When man witnesses Allah in women, his witnessing is in the passive; when he witnesses Him in himself, regarding the appearance of woman from Him, he witnesses Him in the active. When he witnesses Him from himself without the presence of any form from him, his witnessing is in the passive directly from Allah without any intermediary. So his witnessing of Allah in the woman is the most complete and perfect because he witnesses Allah inasmuch as He is both active and passive. Regarding himself, He is passive in particular. For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, loved women because of the perfection of the witnessing of Allah in them since one does not ever witness Allah free of matter. Allah by His essence is independent of the worlds. So from this aspect, the business is impossible, yet witnessing only occurs in matter. The witnessing of Allah in women is the greatest and most perfect witnessing. The greatest union is marriage.

It is like the projection of His will on the one He created in His form in order to create him. He sees His form in him, rather, He sees Himself. He fashioned him and balanced him and breathed into him of His spirit (rûh) which is His breath. Outwardly he is creation, and inwardly he is Allah. For this reason, Allah describes Himself with having management of this frame. He "directs the whole affair from the heaven," which is the height of the earth, "to earth," (32:5) which is the lowest of the low, because it is the lowest of all the elements.

He called them women (an-nisâ') which is a plural which does not have a singular form. For that reason, he said, "He made me love three things in your world: women..." and he did not say, "woman". He took note of the fact that they came after him in existence. The word an-nisa' also means postponement. Allah says, "The month postponed is an increase in disbelief," (9:37) and the sale of "nasi'a" is said to be by postponement, that is, by credit. That is why he said an-nisa'. He loved them only by rank, and they are the place of the passive. They are to him as nature is to Allah in which Allah opened the forms of the world by the projection of the will and the divine command which is marriage in the world of elemental forms, and aspiration (himma) in the world of luminous spirits, as in the order of premises and their meanings through deduction. All of that is the marriage of the first uniqueness in each of these aspects. Whoever loves women in this measure, loves with a divine love. Whoever loves them in respect to natural appetite in particular, deprives himself of the knowledge of this appetite. For him it is a form without a spirit (rûh). That form in the heart of the matter is the essence of a spirit, but it is not witnessed by the one who comes to his wife or any woman by pure gratification, and he does not perceive the one it is for even so, he has no knowledge of himself, as others have no knowledge of him, since he has not been verbally named so that he could be known.

One of them said:

It is confirmed with people
that I am a passionate lover,
although they do not know
the object of my passion.

It is the same with the one who loves gratification - he loves the place in which it occurs, being the woman, but the spirit of the question is obscure to him. If he had known it, he would have known by whom he has pleasure and who it is that has pleasure. He would have been perfect.

Similarly, the woman has a lower degree than the man by the words of Allah, "As for men, they have a degree over them." (2:228) The one created on the form is lower in degree than the one who is fashioned in His form, (11) even though he is in His form. This is the degree by which He is distinguished from the form. So Allah is independent of the universe, and He is the first Doer. The form is the second doer, and does not have the firstness which Allah has. Sources are distinguished by ranks. "He gives each thing its creation," (12) as every gnostic gives each thing with a right its due.

That love that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had for women came from divine love. "Allah gives everything its creation," and that is the source of its truth. He only gave creation to it by merit, so it merits what He called it that is, by the essence of the created thing.

He put women first because they are the place of the passive as nature precedes that which exists from it by means of form. Nature in reality is only the breath of the Merciful. The forms of the universe, high and low, are introduced into it by the diffusion of the breath (nafkha) in the primal substance (jawhar hayulânî), particularly in the world of bodies. As for its diffusion by the existence of the luminous spirits and non-essentials (a'râd), that is another kind of diffusion.

In this tradition, the Prophet put the feminine before the masculine because he meant to attach

importance to women. He said, "Three (thalath, the feminine form of the number) and he did not say thalatha (the masculine) with the ha' which is by the number of the masculine since scent (tīb) is one of the three, and it is masculine. The custom among the Arabs is that the masculine takes precedence over the feminine. When they say, "The Fatimas and Zayd went out," they saw kharajû (mas. pl) and do not say kharajna (fem. pl). The masculine, even if it is only one, take precedence over the feminine, even if they are a group. The Prophet was Arab, so he respected the meaning which was intended by showing love for what did not happen through his own love. Then Allah informed him of what he did not know, and Allah's bounty to him was great. (13) The feminine took precedence over the masculine by his word, thalath without ha'. Who knew the realities better than him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace? Who had greater care to observe rights and dues?

Then he placed the seal with what was like the first since it is also feminine (salat, prayer, is feminine), and he placed the masculine between them, as in existence. He began with "women" and ended with "prayer", both of which are feminine while perfume is masculine. The man is between the essence from which he appeared and then the woman appeared from him. So man is between two feminines, the form of the Essence (14) from which he appeared, and a real feminine, woman, who appeared from him. Similarly, women is a real feminine, and the prayer is not a real feminine. Scent is the masculine between the two, as Adam is between the essence from which he has existence and Hawwa' (Eve), who existed from him. If you wish, you can say "attribute (sifa)" which is also feminine. If you wish, you can say, "power (qudra)" and it is feminine. Be of whatever school you wish. You will always find that the feminine takes precedence, even among the people of cause ('illa) who make Allah a cause in the existence of the form, and cause is also feminine.

As for the wisdom of the perfume which he mentioned after women, because women have fragrance in their form, the most fragrant of perfumes is the embrace of the lover as they say in the common example. When the Prophet was created a slave, by the nobility of his origin, he did not lift his head at all to mastery rather, he continued to prostrate himself in humility and to remain passive in spite of who he was until Allah formed from Him what He had intended. He gave him the rank of action in the world of breaths, and the breaths are fragrant scents. So Allah made him love perfume. For that reason, he put perfume after women.

He observed the ranks which belong to Allah in His words, "Raiser of ranks is He, Possessor of the throne" (40:15) by His sitting on it by the name of the All-Merciful. There is none among those that the Throne encompasses but that divine mercy touches him. That is the words of Allah, "My mercy embraces all things," (7:156) and the Throne encompasses everything, and the One who sits on it is the Merciful. By its reality, mercy is diffused through the universe as we explained in another part in this book and in The Makkan Revelations.

Allah put perfume in this marital connection in the innocence of 'A'isha, (15) may Allah be pleased with her! He said, "Corrupt (16) men are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; and good (17) women are for good men, and good men are for good women. The latter are innocent of what they say." (24:26) He made their scent fragrant because the word is breath, and it is the source of the scent. It goes out with fragrance and putrefaction according to what appears in the form of speech. As it is divine by the nobility of its origin, it is all good, and so it is good. As for what is not praised and is censured, it is good and bad. The Prophet said in respect to the badness of garlic, "It is a plant whose scent I dislike." He did not say, "I dislike it." The source is not disliked, but he disliked what appeared from it.

Dislike for that is either by custom or unsuitability of nature, by something in the Shari'a, or a lack of perfection or something other than what we have mentioned.

Since the command is divided into corrupt and good as we confirmed, he was made to love perfume rather than repulsive odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. Since there is putrefaction in this elemental structure as it is created of "dry clay from mud moulded (or fetid)," (18) so the angels dislike it by essence. The nature of the dung-beetle is offended by the scent of the rose which is one of the pleasant scents. For the dung-beetle, the scent of the rose is not a pleasant scent. If someone has the same sort of nature (as the dung beetle) in meaning and form, the truth offends him when he hears it, and he is gladdened by the false. It is what Allah said, "those who believe in falsehood and reject Allah." (29:52) He described them with loss, and said, "those, they are the losers" who have lost themselves. Whoever does not distinguish goodness from corruption, has no perception.

Allah made the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, love only the good (the perfume) of everything, and there is only that. Can it be conceived that there is a disposition in the universe which only finds good in everything but does not recognize the bad? We say that there is not. We find it in the very root from which the universe appeared which is Allah; we find that He hates and loves. The corrupt is only that which He hates, and the good is only that which He loves. The universe is the form of Allah, and man is in both forms. There is no nature which only perceives one matter in everything - rather, the nature distinguishes the good from the corrupt in spite of the fact that it knows that it is corrupt by tasting and good without tasting. The perception of the good in it diverts him from the sensation of its corruptness. This can happen. As for the removal of the corrupt from the universe that is, from phenomenal being it is not admissible. The mercy of Allah extends to both the corrupt and the good. The corrupt considers itself good, but the good in itself is corrupt. There is nothing but good but that an aspect of its disposition is bad, and vice versa.

As for the third by which uniqueness (fardiyya) is completed, it is the prayer. The Prophet said, "and the coolness of the eye (19) is in the prayer" because it is contemplation. That is because it is intimate discourse between Allah and His slave as Allah says, "Remember Me, and I will remember you." (2:152) It is worship ('ibâda) which is divided in two parts between Allah and His slave one part belongs to Allah and one part to His slave, as has come in sound transmission from Allah in which He says, "I divided the prayer into two parts between Me and My slave. One part is Mine and one part is My slave's, and My slave will receive what he asks for. The slave says, 'In the name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has mentioned Me.' Then the slave says, 'Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds,' and Allah says, 'My slave has praised Me.' The slave says, 'The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has glorified Me. My slave has given Me authorisation.'" (20) All this part belongs purely to Allah.

"Then the slave says, 'You alone we worship. You alone we ask for help,' and Allah says, 'This is between Me and My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" Sharing occurs in this ayat. "The slave then says, 'Guide us in the straight path, the path of those You have blessed, not of those with anger on them nor of the misguided,' and Allah says, 'This is for My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" This is purely for His slave as the first part is purely for Allah. The knowledge of this makes the recitation of the Fatiha obligatory. Whoever does not recite it has not prayed the prayer establish between Allah and His slave.

The prayer is then a secret conversation (munajat). It is remembrance/invocation (dhikr). When someone mentions Allah, he sits with Allah and Allah sits with him. It is a sound divine transmission that Allah said, "I sit with the one who mentions Me." (21) Whoever sits with the One he mentions and has sight, sees the One with whom he sits. This is contemplation (mushahada) and vision. If he does not have sight, he does not see Him. Thus the one who prays knows his rank, and whether or not he sees Allah with this vision in the prayer. If he does not see Him, then let him worship Him by belief (iman) as if he saw Him, imagining Him to be in the qibla of his conversation, and let him listen for Allah's reply.

Without a doubt, everyone who prays is an Imam, so the angels pray behind the slave when he prays alone, as is related in tradition. If he is the Imam for his particular world and the angels pray with him, then he has attained the rank of the Messenger in his prayer which is deputyship from Allah. When he says, "Allah hears whoever praises Him," (22) he informs himself and whoever is behind him that Allah has heard him. The angels and those present say, "Our Lord, praise belongs to You."

Allah says on the tongue of the slave, "Allah hears whoever praises Him." Look at the sublimity of the rank of the prayer and where it takes the one who has it! Whoever does not achieve the rank of vision in the prayer has not reached the goal nor does he have the coolness of the eye in it because he does not see the One he addresses. If he does not hear the answer of Allah, he is not one of those who listen. Whoever is not present in the prayer with his Lord, and does not hear nor see Him, is not one who prays at all, and he is not along those "who listen well, having seen the evidence." (30:37)

The prayer is the only form of 'ibada during which one is forbidden to perform any other action. The mention of Allah in it is greater than the words and actions it contains. We mentioned the attribute of the perfect man in the prayer in The Makkan Revelations and his nature, because Allah says that "the prayer precludes indecency and wrongdoing" (29:45) since it is set down in the Shari'a that the one performing the prayer cannot act in anything except this 'ibâda as long as he is in it, and he is called the one the prays (musalli). "The remembrance of Allah is greater still" (29:45) in it that is, the mention which is from Allah to His slave when He answers him in his request, and his praise of Him is greater than the mention of the slave of his Lord in it, because greatness belongs to Allah. (23) This is why He says, "Allah knows what you do," and He says, "He who listen well, having seen the evidence" he gives ear to what Allah mentions in the prayer.

Therefore, since existence is from an intelligible movement which transported the universe from non-existence to existence, the prayer encompasses all movements. There are three movements: vertical, which is the state of standing in the prayer, the horizontal, which is the state of bowing, and the downward movement, which is the state of prostration. The movement of man is vertical, the movement of the animal is horizontal, and the movement of plants is downward. The inanimate does not have a movement from its essence. If a rock moves, it moves by other means than itself.

As for the words of the Prophet, "The coolness of my eye is in the prayer," he did not ascribe the action of putting it there to himself, so Allah gives the one who prays a tajalli which stems from Him, not from the one who prays. If he had not mentioned this attribute from himself, he would have commanded the prayer without tajalli from Him to him. Since that is from Him by means of graciousness, the contemplation is also through graciousness. He said, "the coolness of my eye is in the prayer," and it is only contemplation of the Beloved by

which the eye of the lover is delighted by continuance. The eye remains seeing Allah. It does not look with Him to other than Him in anything, and for that reason, it is forbidden to turn away in the prayer. The glance is something which Shaytan steals from the prayer of the slave in order to forbid him the contemplation of the Beloved. (24) If Allah had truly been the Beloved of the one who turns aside, he would not have turned aside in his prayer to another qibla. Man knows his state in himself, whether he is like that in this particular act of worship or not. "Man will be clear proof against himself in spite of any excuses he might offer." (75:14) He recognizes his lie apart from his truth in himself, because man is not ignorant of his state, his state has tasting (dhawq) for him.

The prayer has another portion. Allah commanded us to pray to Him, and He told us that He prays for us. The prayer is from us and from Him. When He prays, He prays by His name, the Last, for it comes after the existence of the slave, and it is the source of Allah which the slave created in his qibla by logical discernment or by imitation. He is the God of the one who has a creed. It varies according to what the place of the tajalli has and according to the established predisposition as al-Junayd said when he was asked about recognition of Allah and the gnostic. He said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel." It is a masterly answer giving information about the matter for what it is. This is Allah who prays for us. If we pray, we have the name, the Last, so we are in it, as we mentioned, in the state of the One who has this name we are with Him according to our state. He only regards us by the form which we bring to Him.

The one who prays is behind the one who precedes him in the place. It is His words, "Each one knows its prayer and its glorification " (24:41) that is, its rank in being behind the worship of its Lord and the extolling which his predisposition accords him of disconnection (tanzih). "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise" of its Lord, the Forbearing, the Forgiving. For that, we do not understand the extolling of the universe distinctly, (25) creature by creature.

Then a rank refers the pronoun to the extolling slave in His words, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise," that is, the praise of that thing. The pronoun which is in His word, "His praise (bi-hamdihi)" refers to the thing - that is, with the praise that is from it.

As we said of the one who has a creed other than Islam, he praises the God who is in his creed and attaches himself to Him. What is from his work returns to him, so he only praises himself. It is from the praise of fabrication the artisan is praised without a doubt, and so the excellence of what he creates or its lack of excellence returns to the artisan. The god of a creed is the product of the one who looks at it, and it is his fabrication; his praise for what he believes is his praise for himself. For this reason, he condemns the creed of another if he had been fair, he would not have done that. Indeed, the possessor of this particular object of worship is certainly ignorant in his rejection of other than what he believes about Allah, since had he recognized what al-Junayd said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel," he would have conceded to everyone who has a creed what he believed in, and he would have recognized Allah in every form of worship of every person with a creed, He has opinion but does not know it. For that reason, Allah says, "I am in My slave's opinion of Me," (26) that is, I only appear to him in the form of his creed. If he wishes, he generalizes, and if he wishes, he limits. The god of creeds is taken from definition, so He is the God which the heart of His slave encompasses. (27)

The Absolute Divinity is not encompassed by anything because He is the source of things and

the source of Himself. It is not said of the thing that it encompasses itself, not that it does not encompass itself, so understand! "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 27:

1. Hadith, "I was a Prophet when Adam was still between water and clay."
2. Hadith, "I was given all the words."
3. Qur'an 2:31, "And He taught Adam the names of all things..."
4. Hadith in an-Nasa'i and Ibn Hanbal: "I was made to love three things in your world: women, perfume, and the coolness of my eye in the prayer."
5. Hadith in Muslim (fitan:95) and at-Tirmidhi.
6. The Burning Bush.
7. i.e. from the nature of the world of Purity.
8. Qur'an 2:34.
9. Since his nature (khuluq) was immense or mighty ('adhim) as Allah said, "You are truly immense in character," (68:4) and as 'A'isha said of the Prophet, "His nature was the Qur'an."
10. Nikah, or marriage, actually means lawful intercourse.
11. See Qur'an 6:98.
12. See Qur'an 20:50.
13. Qur'an 4:113, "Allah's favour to you is indeed immense."
14. Dhat, essence, is feminine.
15. The following verse was revealed about 'A'isha in the affair of the Lie and declared her innocence in the affair.
16. Khabith, also meaning with a repulsive odor.
17. Tayyib, means good, wholesome, fragrant, from the same root as perfume, tîb.
18. See Qur'an 15:26.
19. i.e. that which delights me.
20. Muslim 4:38, 41, etc.
21. Hadith qudsi in Ibn Majah and Ibn Hibban.
22. When he comes up from ruku' in the prayer.
23. See Qur'an: 45:37.
24. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim. "(Looking aside in the prayer) is something which Shaytan snatches from a slave's prayer."
Also the hadith in Ibn Hanbal and elsewhere: "Allah continues to turn favorably towards a slave while he is engaged in the prayer as long as he does not look to the side. But if he does so He departs from him."
25. See Qur'an 17:44, "The seven heavens and the earth and everyone in them glorify Him. There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise; but you do not understand their glorification. He is the All-Forbearing, Ever-Forgiving."
26. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari, "I am in My slave's opinion and I am with him when he remembers Me..."
27. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My heaven nor My earth contains Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."

A KUBRAWĪ TREATISE ON MYSTICAL VISIONS: THE *RISĀLA-YI NŪRIYYA* OF 'ALĀ' AD-DAWLA AS-SIMNĀNĪ

The practice of *dhikr* is a central component of Sufi life and instruction. The word is normally translated as "recollection" or "remembrance," referring to the systematic repetition of God's name or of one of His attributes. At heart, this constitutes a meditational exercise, the goal of which is to rid the mystic of preoccupation with the self and other worldly concerns, thereby devoting him or herself completely to the contemplation of God. Various Sufi orders have prescribed the content and method of *dhikr* for their adherents, and the differences between them are so distinct as to constitute one of the primary distinguishing characteristics of these orders.¹

Although the content of these *dhikr* exercises is accessible in guide-books and compendia written by Sufi shaykhs as well as in a number of secondary works, very little information is available describing the experiences a mystic undergoes while practicing *dhikr*. The *Risāla-yi nūriyya* of 'Alā' Ad-Dawla As-Simnānī (d. 736/1336) constitutes one of the few treatises providing such information.

Simnānī was a prominent figure in the Kubrawī Sufi order. In its formative period, the Kubrawiyya appears to have been a loose conglomeration of individuals who derived their mystical affiliation from a visionary Sufi named Najm Ad-Dīn al-Kubrā (d. 618/1221). Their influence on Sufi thought and practice has been far reaching, and many subsequent orders in Iran, Central Asia, and India derive their mystical affiliation directly from these Kubrawī masters.²

¹ A survey treatment of the *dhikr* practices of a number of orders is found in Muḥammad ibn 'Alī as-Sanūsī, *As-salsabil al-mu'īn fi'l-tarā'iq al-arba'in*, printed in the margins of the same author's *Al-masā'il al-ashar* (Cairo: 1935).

² There is very little by way of doctrine, ritual or belief that identifies these early figures as belonging to one order. Despite the fact that Kubrā was himself a Sunni, two prominent Kubrawī shaykhs, Sa'd Ad-Dīn Ḥamūya (d. 650/1252) and his son Šadr Ad-Dīn (d. 722/1322), were Shī'īs. Kubrawī mystics are found on both sides of the debate over the doctrine of "Oneness of Being" (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), one of the main issues dividing Sufis in their day. Furthermore, they appear to have had no shared stance regarding involvement in politics: Najm Ad-Dīn al-Kubrā allegedly met his death fighting the Mongols; Simnānī's teacher, Nūr Ad-Dīn al-Isfarā'īnī (d. 717/1317) maintained contact with the Ilkhanid court, while Simnānī himself was deeply involved in the intrigues of various princes and was respected by the Ilkhanid rulers. Wjāyātū Khudābanda (r. 703/1304-716/1316) and Abū Sa'īd (r. 716/1316-736/1335). For a survey of Kubrawī history, see the introduction to Najm Ad-Dīn Dāya ar-Rāzī, *The Path of God's Bondsmen from Origin to Return*, tr. Hamid Algar (Delmar: Caravan, 1982); also Marijan Molé, "Les Kubrawiyya entre sunnisme et shiisme aux huitième et neuvième siècles de l'Hégire," *Revue des Études Islamiques* 29 (1961), 61-142.

One of the distinguishing features of the Kubrawī order in its formative period is the emphasis placed upon visionary experiences. Colors and visions encountered in meditation are seen not only as markers signifying progress along the mystical path, but also as symptoms of psychic and spiritual troubles ailing the individual. As such, treatises on visionary experience function as a *materia medica* of spiritual ailments in addition to their primary use as manuals of mystical instruction. Descriptions of mystical visions are found in several Kubrawī works such as the *Fawā'ih al-jamāl wa-fawātiḥ al-jalāl* of Najm Ad-Dīn al-Kubrā³ and the *Mirṣād al-ibād min al-mabdā' ila'l-ma'ād* of Najm Ad-Dīn Dāya ar-Rāzī (d. 654/1256).

One treatise, the *Risāla-yi nūriyya*, stands out for its explicit and systematized discussion of mystical lights and visions. Although color symbolism and its association with mystical advancement forms the basis of much of Simnānī's thought, the *Risāla-yi nūriyya* is the only work in which he provides a systematic description of these lights as they are encountered during the practice of *dhikr*.⁴

This work has sometimes been falsely attributed to Shihāb Ad-Dīn As-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) and 'Alī-yi Hamadānī (d. 786/1385). Based on internal evidence, however, there can be no doubt that the treatise belongs to Simnānī: it is explicitly stated that the work was written at the request of a student named Muḥammad-i Khurd (possibly Khirād), who is known to have been one of Simnānī's closest disciples.⁵ The doctrines expressed in the treatise are identical to those found in Simnānī's other writings, and the style is also characteristically his.

The treatise begins by providing a general description of the forms of light found in the visible and invisible dimension. Simnānī then proceeds to the main subject of his treatise, which is a detailed outline of the lights encountered as one engages in mystical recollection (*dhikr*) in order to perfect one's spiritual nature. These lights are hierarchical, corresponding to the subtle substances (*laṭā'if*) or organs which make up the mystical body. In order to make his discussion more comprehensive, Simnānī additionally describes the light of Satan, and those of ablution and recollection.

³ Fritz Meier, *Die Fawā'ih al-Gamāl wa Fawātiḥ al-Galāl des Nagm ad-Din al-Kubrā*, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, no. 9 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1957).

⁴ For a detailed discussion of Simnānī's life and thought, see Jamal J. Elias, *Sūfī Thought and Practice in the Teachings of 'Alā' ad-dawla as-Simnānī* (PhD Dissertation: Yale University, 1991).

⁵ Iqbāl-i Sistānī, *Chihil majlis-i 'Alā' ad-dawla-i Simnānī*, ed. 'Abd ar-Raḥīm Ḥaqīqat (Tehran: Shirkat-i mu'allifān-u mutarjimān-i Mīrān, 1979); Ibn al-Karbalā'ī, *Rawdhat al-jinān wa janāt al-janān*, ed. Ja'far Sulṭān al-Qurrā'ī (Tehran: Bungāh-i tarjuma wa nashr-i kitāb, 1965); Zayn al-'Ābidīn-i Shirwānī, *Riyādh as-siyāḥa*, ed. Aṣghar Ḥamid Rabbānī (Tehran: Kitābfurūshī-yi sa'dī, 1960), 525; Maṣūm 'Alī Shāh, *Tarā'iq al-ḥaqā'iq*, ed. M. Ja'far Mahjūb (Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi bārānī, 1921), 2:339; S.M. Sadr, *Sharḥ-i aḥwāl-u al-kār-u āsār-i Shaykh 'Alā' ad-dawla as-Simnānī* (Tehran: Dānish, 1955), 45.

In addition to its systematic treatment of lights and colors, the *Risāla-yi nūriyya* also contains graphic descriptions of the specific visions encountered along the mystical path. These include sparks, smoke, experiences of levitation, and visions of buildings and animals. Simnānī's descriptions are often vivid, relying on everyday objects as metaphoric points of reference.

Four manuscripts of this work are known to exist, representing two stemmae. The oldest is dated 851/1447 and is contained in a collection of treatises attributed to 'Alī-yi Hamadānī, a prominent Kubrawī mystic who was affiliated with Simnānī through two of the latter's disciples: Sharaf Ad-Dīn-i Mazdaqānī (d. 766/1364-65) and 'Alī-yi Dūsī (or Dūstī, d. 734/1334).⁶ The manuscript is clearly written, but is incomplete and contains many lacunae which are noted by the scribe.

The two other manuscripts belonging to the first stemma are both inaccurate. One is dated dhu'l-Ḥijja 1048/April 1639 but is incomplete.⁷ The second, though complete, cannot be accurately dated.⁸

By far the most valuable copy of the treatise is preserved in the Süleymaniye Library under the title *Risālat al-anwār*.⁹ Dated Sha'bān 899/May 1494, this manuscript is complete, and is accurately and clearly written. It is the sole representative of the second manuscript stemma.



[44r]¹⁰ In the name of God, the Compassionate and Merciful.

Gratitude and thanks to the Creator Who, through love and perfect knowledge, changed the light of intention (*nūr-i irādat*) into the seed of the tree of bliss (*shajara-yi sa'ādat*) in the soil within the human being which is the invisible realm of the souls. With the power of omnipotence, He planted this seed therein and brought forth the tree of bliss, and bore it to the heaven of His intimacy. And with the wisdom of sovereignty, He brought forth the fruit of the light of sainthood (*nūr-i wilāyat*) from that tree, and raised it above all His beings and placed it at their head. And may there be countless blessings

⁶ MS. 4009, Kitābkhāna-yi Ganjibakhsh, Islamabad, pages 751-762 [abbreviated *Ganj*]. For more on 'Alī-i Hamadānī, see J.K. Teufel, *Eine Lebensbeschreibung des Scheichs 'Alī-i Hamadānī* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962); G. Bowering, *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, s.v. "Alī Hamadānī."

⁷ Private collection of Arif Naushahi [abbreviated *Naw*]. This manuscript was copied by Muḥammad Ghānī, a disciple of Akhund Darwiza-yi Nangarhārī (d. 1048/1638).

⁸ MS. 4274, Kitābkhāna-yi dānishgāh, (Tehran) [abbreviated *Dān*]. Najib Māyil-i Hirawī has prepared an edition on the basis of this manuscript and MS. 4409, Kitābkhāna-yi Ganjibakhsh (*Muṣannifāt-i fārsī*) (Tehran: Shirkat-i intishārāt-i 'ilmi wa farhangī, 1990), 301-11.

⁹ MS. 1105, Carullah Efendi, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul, folios 44r-48v [abbreviated *Car*].

¹⁰ Folio numbers in brackets refer to MS. 1105, Carullah Efendi.

and peace upon the purified spirit of the Prophet—it is only in the garden of His laws (*sharīʿat*) that this tree can reach fruition. And may [blessings] also be upon his family and companions who are the landlords of the “Master of Inner Perception” (*sāhib-i baṣīrat*, i.e. Muḥammad), and upon the saints and scholars (*awliyā wa ʿulamāʾ*) and the followers of his tradition who are the chaste gardeners of prophetic custom.

2. Know that it has been some time since the “champion of reality,” Muḥammad-i Khurd, who is one of my disciples, has desired that a treatise about the nature of illumination and the description of various lights be written for the guidance of the novice traveller and the satisfaction of the accomplished mystic. But I wished that these secrets should remain hidden from strange eyes, so I did not take his entreaties into consideration until this moment. Now the pen has set out to describe the Eternal One, and all volition has passed to my fingers, so that the figures which were drawn on the page of my heart are now reproduced on this page in summary form. God willing, may they be a source of pleasure for those who read them and proof for those who hear them, and may they remain far from the impure and hidden from outsiders.

3. Know, O friend, that God has illuminated your heart with “sacred lights” (*anwār qudsiyya*), which is what the light of a thing is called in actuality so that it may know itself and see all things and know them. It can see and know all things with it. This absolute light (*nūr-i muṭlaq*) is a particular attribute of God.

4. Know that the light of intention (*nūr-i irādat*) is earthly and the light of sainthood (*nūr-i wilāyat*) is celestial, as He says in His Glorious Book: “Allah is the light of the heavens and the earth” (24:35). And the light of sainthood, which is His special attribute, cannot be seen except with the light of intention which is an attribute of His essence; it is for this reason that He says: “My saints are beneath My tents—no one knows them but Me.”¹¹ Once you know the meaning of this, know that, in the invisible dimension of the spiritual realm (*ghayb-i anfus*), light is associated with the inner mystery (*khafī*), spirit (*rūh*), inmost being (*sirr*), heart (*dil*), intellect (*ʿaql*), and soul (*nafs*),¹² and in the visible dimension of the spiritual realm (*shahādat-i anfus*) with the light of the eyes and the conceptual faculties which are stored in the brain. In the invisible dimension of the physical realm (*ghayb-i āfāq*) they are attributed to spirits of the angels and *jinn*, and in the visible of the physical realm (*shahādat-i āfāq*) with the sun, moon,¹³ stars, candles, and lamps.

¹¹ This is a non-canonical prophetic tradition.

¹² The manuscripts have conflicting lists. The mystery (*khafī*) does not appear in *Car*; *Ganj* does not contain intellect (*ʿaql*). The intellect does not ordinarily appear as a substance in Simnānī’s scheme of the spiritual realm.

¹³ Not in *Car*.

5. This is to say that when the mystic turns his face from the visible and invisible dimensions of the physical realm, he should also turn away from the visible of the spiritual realm and face the invisible of the spiritual realm. The first curtain that appears before him is turbid.¹⁴ As soon as he strikes the stone of his heart with the flint of the profession of faith, "There is no deity but God," the hidden fire which is placed in him becomes apparent, and he stands in the fireship of the soul (*ḥarrāqa-yi nafs*); he feeds it with the firewood of the body until it becomes ignited and that turbid curtain is transformed to dark blue. And as the fire becomes stronger and the firewood of existence is dried of the moisture of [remaining] morsels of sensual delight (*nadawāt-i luqmāt-i ḥuḏuḏī*), the colors become purer and the smoke is decreased. When the morsels (*luqmāt*) are entirely made up of what is just, then no smoke remains and a pleasant odor reaches the nose. Colorful lights also appear, and one witnesses [true] spiritualists.¹⁵ All that has been described results from the blessing of the strength of recollection and from guarding the morsel from the moisture of sensual delight.

6. The difference between the colors red, white, blue, yellow, black and green in this stage is the result of the strength of the fire of recollection. It may so happen that the essence of the fire of recollection may come out from behind the curtain and shout: "It is no other!" and say: "I am everything."¹⁶ It is necessary that the individual not be arrogant at this stage since this is the stage of the beginner in recollection.

7. The next fire which appears to the mystic on the path is undefined, but insofar as it can be described it is the fire of reality, and of recollection, and of love, and of longing, and of desire, and of anger, and of evil, and of the physical body of which the human being is composed. It is possible to differentiate between all these fires with signs that occur along the path, but the beginner should not [45r] attempt to differentiate between them without the guidance of a master lest Satan whisper suggestions to his soul in order to influence it, causing the novice to fall into the trap of arrogance and turn away from the path. It is, therefore, necessary that the disciple tell everything he

¹⁴ *Naw* and *Dān* add: "and is the curtain of the unseen of Satan."

¹⁵ *Dān*: "spiritual witnessing comes to pass;" *Car*: "one witnesses spirituality." This is probably a reference to the appearance of the mystical guide in the unseen realm (*shaykh al-ghayb*), a phenomenon frequently mentioned in Sufi texts.

¹⁶ *Simnānī* is paraphrasing a distinctive passive from the *Fawā'id al-jamāl wa fawā'id al-jalāl* of *Najm Ad-Dīn al-Kubrā* (d. 618/1221): "*dhikr* is a fire which neither abides nor spreads. When it enters an abode it says 'It is I and no other!' and that is a meaning of *lā ilāha illā 'llāh*. And if there is wood in the abode it burns it [the wood] and it becomes fire; if there is darkness in the abode it [the *dhikr*] becomes a light and destroys it [the darkness] and illuminates the abode; and if there is light in the abode it does not oppose it but this light is also recollection (*dhikr*) and the one who recollects (*dhikr*) and the object of the recollection (*madhkur*) which habit together, light upon light." (Meier, 4-5). This passage has been borrowed by other writers, most notably by Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh al-Iskandarī (d. 708/1309) in his *Miftāḥ al-salāḥ wa-misbāḥ al-arwāḥ* (Cairo: Maṭba'a Muḥammad 'Alī Ṣabīḥ, n.d., 6).

sees to the master so that he [the master] may explain the mystical experiences and visions.

8. After this, when the existence soiled by the morsels of sensual delight and tarnished by the filth of disobedience is completely burned, and annihilation (*fanā'*) has been obtained as a result of the fire of recollection, then the light of the soul becomes apparent, the curtain of which is of a pleasing, dark blue color.

9. After this the light of the heart appears, the curtain of which is ruby red in color. Upon seeing this light the mystic experiences a great mystical taste (*dhawq*) which reaches his heart and causes him to obtain permanence (*istiqāmat*) on the path.

10. After this, the light of the inmost being (*sirr*) shines forth, the curtain of which is white. In this stage the mystic acquires knowledge of the delight of unveiling.¹⁷

11. After this the light of the spirit shines forth, the color of which is an extremely pleasing yellow. The soul is weakened and the heart is strengthened by seeing it.

12. After this the light of the inner mystery (*khafī*)— to which the Holy Spirit is a reference—is manifested. Its curtain is black, a pure and awesome blackness. Sometimes, through fear at seeing this black curtain, the mystic is annihilated and his body begins to tremble.

13. This is to say that the water of eternal life is arrayed in this darkness. Whoever makes a place for himself in the luminescence of the light of the Prophet (may peace be upon him) and remains in the shadow of obedience to him, like Khidr¹⁸ that person reaches the spring of the water of life which is the source of the lights of the attributes. He drinks a cupful of love from the heavenly river (*kawthar*) of grace and becomes deserving of that which the Lord, Most High, manifests to him through His attributes of beauty and majesty. At this stage, it is necessary that one not incline oneself towards the jewels (*jawāhir*) that are placed in this darkness, so that, like Alexander, he is not deprived of the spring of the water of life. He should travel in this darkness with sincere steps and keep his heart strong. Under no circumstances should he fear any of the dreadful forms and sounds [that he encounters]. The light of the inner mystery then becomes apparent from its potentiality in the invisible, and fear is transformed into intimacy.

14. When he has fulfilled the requirements of this stage, "absolute light" (*nūr-i mutlaq*) is manifested. This is a particular attribute of God, [45v] ex-

¹⁷ An alternate reading would be: "the inspirational knowledge of unveiling."

¹⁸ Khidr is an alias for the prophet Elias or Elijah who discovered the fountain of eternal life and thus attained immortality. He is also sometimes equated with Alexander's prime minister and with St. George. Khidr figures prominently in Islamic mysticism as the miraculous shaykh of the unseen who guides the most capable and fortunate mystics in their quest.

alted above indwelling in (*ḥulūl*) and union with (*ittiḥād*) any other, sanctified beyond association and disassociation. Its curtain is green in color, this greenness being a sign of the life of the tree of existence. The manifestation of the "absolute light" is not possible except in paradise. The effects that appear in it, that is in this manifestation, are: firstly, the annihilation¹⁹ of the mystic, then standing on the boundary, splitting of the sky, transformation of the earth, the flying of mountains, the dispersal of fixed stars, the changed rising of the sun and moon, the dimming of planets, the assemblage in open spaces, judgement of accounts on the balance, traversing the path, being thrown into the abyss, and being lifted up in levels.²⁰ When the mystic sees these signs, he should know himself to be in the eternal garden. Then he should pay complete attention to the beauty of His presence in accordance with the command "Neither did sight falter nor exceed the bounds" (53:17). He should not incline to anything so that the "holy essence" (*dhāt-i muqaddas*) may be manifested. Witnessing this instantaneously and miraculously returns light to his ailing eyes.

15. The manifestation of the light of the "real" (*nūr-i ḥaqq*) is exalted above all causes; nothing resembles it and it resembles nothing. The light of the inner mystery is manifested above the head and no light resembles it in the visible realm; it annihilates the mystic in the beginning of its manifestation. The light of the spirit is greater and more awesome than that of the sun, and is generally manifested behind the back, though sometimes also from the left and right. The light of the inmost being resembles that of Venus but is brighter and subtler than it; its manifestation occurs opposite the mystic and strikes his eyes, enters his body and annihilates him. When the mystic returns from that state, he sees much knowledge collected within him which he had never known or heard before. When this light falls on his eyes it permeates all parts of his body. He then sees himself like illuminated water, since his skin and the clothes that are on his body are illuminated. The light of the heart resembles the moon at first, although the true point (*nūḡta-yi ḥaqīqī*) that is in that moon as well as in the mystic's heart also appears. This light manifests itself on the left side of the mystic and annihilates him. Effort in the heart is decreased in this stage,²¹ and strange and wondrous lights and states occur to the mystic. The light of the [46r] soul surrounds the mystic. It resembles a polished door on which the sun is shining and from which the reflection is falling on a wall.

16. The manifestation of the light of the soul does not possess the power to annihilate. As for other lights that he sees, such as a candle, lamp or lantern: these are the lights of the spirits of humans and *jinn*,²² classed according to their

¹⁹ *Ḡanj*, *Naw*, and *Dān*: resurrection (*qiyāmat*).

²⁰ These are standard Islamic eschatological images. They are described in vivid detail in *ḥadīth* collections and in popular literature. See Y. Haddad and Jane I. Smith, *The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981).

²¹ *Naw*: "Effort is lost in his heart," *Dān*: "... and gets lost in the heart."

²² *Ḡanj*, *Naw*, and *Dān*: "the lights of the righteous spirits of humans and *jinn*."

differing abilities and disparate levels of attainment. The sky, stars, sun and moon that he sees comprise the heavens of the physical "human realm" (*malakūt-i mulk-i āfāq*) and the earth of the spiritual "Realm of Sovereignty" (*mulk-i malakūt-i anfus*). Sometimes, however, they are the lights of the archangels, and of the prophets and saints (upon them be peace).

17. The sparks of fire that he sees in the beginning are signs of the mystic having traversed the element of fire in his own body. His flying and walking through the air is a sign of his passing the element of air. Swimming in the sea or in rivers, and walking on water indicates that the mystic has passed the element of water in his body. Rising up above streets, houses and walls is a sign of the mystic's having traversed the earthy portion of himself which is also part of the composition of a human being. Each time the mystic's bodily parts are purified of the darkness of the morsels of sensual delight, beautifully colored, pure, swirling and swiftly moving fires become visible. He also witnesses clean, bright air; illuminated waters; wide streets; clean and majestic palaces; beautifully spread carpets; and sumptuous feasts laid out. But if the mystic's bodily parts are sullied by morsels of sensual delight and soiled by desires of the soul, he sees the opposite of this, such as frightening, slow-moving, smoke-filled fires in which he falls and is burned. He sees a cauldron into which he is hurled; he sees dark winds, lightening, frightening thunderbolts, and terrifying darkness in which he is trapped; turbid waters full of filth in which he falls and is polluted; and he sees narrow, dark streets, and ruined, filthy palaces in which he gets lost. Whenever he tries to come out of this wilderness, he is surrounded on all sides by high walls and hills of sand on which he walks with great difficulty. He sees deep, dark pits into which he falls. Dangerous beasts such as the snake,²³ scorpion, lion, leopard, bear, boar, and their like become apparent at this stage and cause him grief. [46v] The mystic must transcend the attributes of the inciteful soul in order to be delivered [from this state]. To the degree that the darkness of the morsels of sensual delight is exchanged for the purity of the morsels of that which is just, blame-worthy attributes are transformed into praiseworthy ones, and these detestable images are transformed into noble ones, such as sheep, deer, and colorful and melodious birds.

18. There comes a time when the animal form gets discarded and the individual is dressed in human form, at which point he sees himself as a mystical traveller. And as the purity of the morsel of that which is just increases, so too does its beauty. The good conduct of the mystic is the visible sign of the beauty of this invisible form.

19. There comes a time when the dark human person is illuminated; in fact, he becomes light personified.²⁴ At this stage, the mystic learns of the re-

²³ *Naw and Dān*: add "and ant (*mūr*)."

²⁴ *Naw and Dān*: "the dark person becomes like light personified."

ality of the subtle substance of I-ness (*laṭīfa-yi anāniyyat*), and of the cultivation of the acquired body (*badan-i muktasab*) which will abide with him. He obtains knowledge of the inner meaning of the words of the "master of ascetics," Ibrāhīm b. Adham (d. 162/778-9) (may God sanctify his spirit), who said: "Consider your food lawful, and do not stay awake by night and fast by day."²⁵ Exert great effort in obtaining lawful sustenance, which is a lawful morsel and with which the human body is strengthened and from which the profession of faith (*kalima-yi ṭayyiba*) is obtained, since the Prophet (upon him be peace) says:²⁶ "Any flesh that derives from the unlawful, is more appropriate for the fire [than for eating]."²⁷

20. Know for certain that the mystic's advancement on the path is four-sixths worship of God through observing the [lawful nature of] the morsel, one sixth recollection, and one-sixth following the guidance of the master. If, God forbid, he is plagued by an unlawful morsel, he should not eat even the minutest amount. If there is any doubt [about its lawful nature], he should abstain from satiation, and if it is lawful he should avoid excess. He should eat in such an amount that he remains hungry, so that he does not feel sluggish and be overtaken by sleep and turn away from recollection. He should observe moderation lest he fall into the misfortune of excess or deficiency (*ifrāt wa tafrit*). He must also guard against temptation. Know that God (may He be exalted) says: "Indeed, Allah does not love transgressors" (5:87); these are the people who forbid lawful morsels unto themselves. And He says: "Indeed, He does not love the wasteful" (7:31);²⁸ these are the people who engage in gluttony. "Eat and drink, but do not be wasteful" (7:31) should be taken as a model, and he should emulate the tradition of God's prophet (may peace be upon him) and not transgress it, since "to exceed perfection is an error." Thus today you must try to adorn your being with praiseworthy attributes and pleasant qualities so that [47r] tomorrow you might not be trapped in bitter agony in the deepest pits of hell. Embody noble characteristics so that you may be rewarded with eternal blessings in the gardens of Paradise.²⁹ Whosoever does not purify his body today yet hopes for Paradise is like a person who does not sow seeds in the ground in autumn but hopes for grain at harvest time. In fact, there is no one more bootless than him,³⁰ for the Prophet of God (may He be exalted) has said: "This world is the field from which

²⁵ This statement appears to completely contradict the beliefs and practices of Ibrāhīm b. Adham who is remembered as a Buddha-like prince who abandoned his worldly life for one of extreme asceticism.

²⁶ *Ganj* ends at this point.

²⁷ Paraphrase of a *ḥadīth* found in at-Tirmidhi, ad-Dārimī, and Ibn Ḥanbal.

²⁸ *Naw*: missing "Indeed, Allāh does not love transgressors"... unto themselves. And He says:" *Dān*: missing "These are the people... wasteful."

²⁹ *Dān*: "And do not embody detestable characteristics so that you may be rewarded with eternal blessings in the gardens of Paradise."

³⁰ *Naw* and *Dān*: "In fact, more ignorant than him."

the harvest is reaped in the afterlife."³¹ When this world comes to an end and the tools which he could have used for sowing are taken away, and the seeds of worldly appetites do not turn green, then such a person will say: "O Lord! We have seen and heard, so send us back. We shall do the right thing, for we have come to believe with certainty" (32:12).³² But this plea will not be heard, and it will be said in reply: "Remain condemned in it, and do not speak to Me" (23:108).

21. My friend, accept this advice and do not share in the arrogance of Satan (a verse):

Sow seeds today, for tomorrow
Nothing will come of begging.

22. Pleading: "Pour a little water over us or give us a little of what God has given you" (7:50) will only increase [their] thirst, and no heart will be forgiven for crying: "O Lord! Our misery overwhelmed us" (23:106). Do not leave today's task onto tomorrow. One must be industrious, not lazy; one must be extraordinary, not common;³³ one must be thankful, not disbelieving. Unbelief consists of not recognizing the nature of God's blessings contained in what He has said regarding the reality of your being. As a consequence, you make this life—which is itself a great blessing—into an assemblage of disobedience to God. Indeed, a disbeliever is not only one who has not physically uttered the profession of faith; anyone who is deprived of the meaning of this formula is also a disbeliever. One must strive so that not one precious soul is lost, and that you accord the just due of every soul, which is a noble substance (*jawharī az jawāhir-i sharīfa*). Thus might you be among those who are thankful for God's blessings.

23. I was talking about lights and suddenly I left that issue. Let me now return to the subject at hand. When I was describing the lights of the inner mystery, spirit, inmost being, heart and soul, I did not remember the light of Satan. It appears necessary that I explain the light of fire and describe its characteristics lest the mystic in seclusion (*khalwatī*) think that Satan does not enter into anything which possesses the attribute of luminescence.

24. One must know, then, that the light of Satan, which is manifested in the beginning, is like a puppet of foul-colored fire. He sees its curtain on the face of the earth covering everything with a dark red fire; a drop of black blood becomes obscured on the face of this redness,³⁴ and the heart [47v] is constricted³⁵ by looking at it so that the mystic can only engage in recollection with difficulty. All his body parts ache, such that you might say he was suffer-

³¹ Not a canonical *ḥadīth* but a well known proverb.

³² *Car*: missing "for we have come to believe with certainty."

³³ *Dān*: "One must be attentive (*ḥādhir*), not heedless (*ghāfil*)."

³⁴ *Naw* and *Dān*: "A spot like dark blood appearing on the face of that redness."

³⁵ *Naw* and *Dān*: miserable.

ing a seizure at this time. But when he recalls his master with complete concentration and occupies himself with recollection, the puppet falls to the earth and the foul-colored curtain turns to nought. The mystic's body feels light, and pure recollection flows on his tongue. Then the fire of recollection starts to rise, and the mystic experiences a state of pleasure and ease.

25. One must know, furthermore, that every part of the mystic's body has a specific light, and every act of devotion also has a light. The details of these lights are beyond the scope of this treatise. "None knows the armies of your Lord save Himself" (74:31). Earlier masters, may God sanctify their spirits, have not written as much as I have committed to paper lest pretenders present these as their own ideas and ensnare mystics in the net of their deception.³⁶ But the strength of that friend's [i.e. Muḥammad-i Khurd] will was such that I have explained an infinitesimal amount of the secrets of illumination. And in this state it occurred to me that God (may He be exalted) says: "Thereby He leads many astray, and thereby He guides many; yet He leads astray none but those who transgress, who, having sealed it, break God's covenant, dividing what He ordained joined; and those who spread corruption in the land will surely suffer" (2:26-27). Know that going astray and being rightly guided are by His command Who "thereby guides whosoever He wishes, and leads astray whosoever He wishes." "Whoever is guided by God is rightly guided, but whosoever goes astray will not find a guide to show him the right path" (18:17).³⁷ I eliminated my own volition and was content with God's judgement, and entrusted control of the pen of elucidation to the fingers. And inasmuch as He wishes, He writes the meanings of the invisible dimension on the page of the visible, and seats the blessed people at His sumptuous table, and relegates the wretched to the torments and pits of hell for disbelieving in the lights.³⁸ "God does as He wishes" (14:27) "and ordains what He wills" (5:1).

26. The purpose of this is to say that when the mystic sees the effect³⁹ within himself (which is the acceptance of the words of mystical saints), he put his foot forward on the mystical path with full confidence. He then witnesses the lights, obtains knowledge of the signs of the path, and comprehends the real nature of the removal of the veils and lifting of the covers. It is vital that, until his dying breath, he should not be heedless for one instant, since the veil of darkness falls in every instant in the visible realm which is itself nothing but absolute darkness and nothingness. If he is not occupied with the removal of this veil, veils upon veils [48r] will descend and the lights will disappear

³⁶ *Naw and Dān*: "... present this as the world of their own religious message and hurl mystics into the trap of their own deception."

³⁷ *Dān*: "Going astray and perishing are not by His command: 'He leads astray whom He will and guides whom He will' (93:16 and others), 'and he is rightly guided, but whosoever goes astray will not find a guide to show him the right path' (18:17)."

³⁸ *Dān*: missing "and relegates the wretched... the lights."

³⁹ *Naw and Dān*: add "of this divine favor (*ṭawfiq*)."

behind the curtain. [The mystic must be constantly occupied with their removal] lest Satan communicate false ideas to the soul and turn it away from the path so that it apostatizes.⁴⁰ The masters, may God sanctify their souls, have said: "one who apostatizes from the religious law (*sharīʿa*) attains his former status if he says the profession of faith: "There is no deity but God, and Muḥammad is the messenger of God" just once; but all the efforts of the humans and *jinn* cannot return to his former status one who apostatizes from the mystical path." May God protects us from apostasy after belief, from paucity after plenty.

27. Know, in addition, that ablution possesses a great light which illuminates the dark seclusion. This light resembles the sun and appears opposite the forehead of the mystic. As soon as the mystic raises his eyes to see it, it rises upwards until a mountain appears above the place of seclusion and that disc shines forth from above the head of the mystic and illuminates the entire place of seclusion. Most often this light appears when the mystic has returned from performing his ablutions and has occupied himself with offering thanks for their successful performance. However, in the end he sees the disc, which he [previously] saw above him, in the center of his own breast which is the place from which it comes out. This disc is subtler than the sun and its light is pure, having come out from behind the colored garment.

28. The novice mystic sees lights and a variety of colors just outside the place of seclusion, which is illuminated with a light by which one can see all the people of the world. This is the result of the fire of recollection's power. And sometimes a circle appears opposite the mystic and colored lights come out of it, just like a spring out of which water flows. This is the sign of the transformation of the inciteful and censorious soul (*nafs-i ammāra wa lawwāma*) through the attributes of comfort and contentment. But know that seventy thousand veils of light and darkness are in the mystic's path, just as the Prophet (may peace be upon him) has said but which is not explained in any book. I will discuss them here cursorily, summarizing them in seven curtains.

29. The first curtain is of the invisible realm of Satan which is turbid, and 10,000 veils must be lifted at this stage. After this is the curtain of the invisible realm of the soul, the curtain of which is blue, and 10,000 additional veils must be removed at this stage. After this is the curtain of the invisible realm of the heart which is red and ruby-colored, and 10,000 veils must be destroyed in this stage. Then there is the curtain of the invisible realm of the inmost being, the color of which is white and extremely fine, and there are also 10,000 veils in this stage which must be lifted. After this is the curtain [48v] of the

⁴⁰ *Nawand Dān*: "Lest Satan communicate false ideas to the soul and cause it to grow tired of travelling the path [*Naw*: "true path"] so that it turns away from the course and apostatizes from the path."

invisible of the spirit. The color of this curtain is a very pleasing yellow and there are 10,000 more veils at this stage which must be illuminated. After this there is the curtain of the invisible of the inner mystery, the color of which is an awesome pure black, and 10,000 more veils must be lifted at this stage. After this is the curtain of the hiddenmost mystery (*ghayb al-ghuyūb*); the color of its curtain is green and 10,000 additional veils lie at this threshold. And all these veils relate to the mystic's being. It is he who is veiled by these veils which are brought about by God, not God that is veiled. Nothing can veil God.

30. After the lifting of these 70,000 veils he reaches the veil of "Divine Grandeur" (*ḥijāb-i kibriyā*) just as the Prophet (upon him be peace) says: "His veil is of light (fire, according to another tradition). If it were lifted, the splendor of His face would burn whatever turned its eyes towards it."⁴¹ It is necessary at this stage that he place his head on the threshold of supplication (*āstāna-yi 'ajz*) so that a rapturous occurrence (*jadhba*) from that realm might shine down on his body, overcome him and transport him to the divine presence, for this is the desired effect. If this does not happen, then he must become a servant at the threshold of eternity (*āstāna-yi samadiyyat*) and place his head upon the threshold of servitude (*āstāna-yi 'ubūdiyyat*) until such time that God opens that door through grace and bounty. The key to that door is in the hands of His beloved (upon him be peace), and one should not seek it from anyone but him lest one be eternally debarred.

31. It is my hope that my associates will want to discover this state through striving, not through words alone, so that they might become people who strive in religion. When their hearts' eye (*dida-yi jānishān*) is illuminated with these lights, let them remember this poor [mystic] with a small prayer. And let them deem it necessary to pray continually for the spirits of the masters, without the guidance of whose efforts, one cannot conclude this formidable journey. Let their tongues be continuously moving with prayers for the spirit of the "Joy of the World" [i.e. Muḥammad], upon him be the most eminent salutations and best prayers. Praise be to God at all times.⁴²

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⁴¹ This is a canonical tradition, versions of which are found in Muslim (Īmān, 293, 294); Ibn Māja (muqaddima 13); and Ibn Ḥanbal (4, 401, 405). Simnāni is quoting the tradition as recorded by Muslim. *Naw* ends at this point.

⁴² *Dān*: "And the blessings of God upon the best of His creatures, Muḥammad, and upon his family and companions."

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Twin Wisdoms Reconciled: An annotated English translation of Nāṣir-i Khusraw's Kitāb-i

Jāmi' al-ḥikmatayn

I.B. Tauris in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies

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This is the first English translation of the last known philosophical work of the great eleventh-century Ismaili thinker, poet, and Fatimid emissary, Nāṣir-i Khusraw. Appointed from Cairo by command of the Fatimid Imam-caliph al-Mustanṣir to serve first as a dāʿī, and then as the ḥujjat, for the entire region of Khurasan, he maintained his allegiance to both his mission and his Imam for the rest of his life, even when threatened and driven into exile.

Written during his exile in Badakhshan in the year 1070 CE, Nāṣir-i Khusraw here develops a powerful presentation of both Aristotelian philosophy and Ismaili exegesis, or taʿwīl, and strives to show that they are ultimately in harmony. The work is presented as a learned commentary on a long philosophical poem, written in the previous century and sent to Nasir by the amīr of Badakhshan, ʿAlī b. Asad, who copied the poem out in his own hand from memory and asked the poet-philosopher to explicate it.

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اخوان الصفا'

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Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa' - Select Bibliography

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PdF- Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' - Arabic Text.

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Fifty-two or so Arabic most likely Isma'ili related epistles ultimately set down in the late 4th AH /10th cent. CE.

"The Encyclopedia is divided into fifty-two epistles (rasa'il) of varying lengths, which make up four books. Each book develops different topics: Book 1: the mathematical sciences (14 rasa'il) include theory of number, geometry, astronomy, geography, music, theoretical and practical arts, ethics and logic. Book 2: the natural sciences (17 rasa'il) comprehend matter, form, motion, time, space, sky and universe, generation and corruption, meteorology, minerals, plants, animals, human body, perception, embryology, man as microcosm, development of souls in the body, limit of knowledge, death, pleasure, and language. Book 3: the psychological and rational sciences (10 rasa'il) comprehend intellectual principles (Pythagoras and Ikhwan), universe as macrocosm, intelligence and intelligible, periods and era, passion, resurrection, species of movement, cause and effect, definitions and descriptions. Book 4: the theological sciences (11 rasa'il) include doctrines and religions, way to God, doctrine of Ikhwan, essence of faith, divine law and prophethood, appeal to God, hierarchy, spiritual beings, politics, magic and talisman."

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The Digital Orientalist

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[Manuscripts: The Hunt for Topkapi](#)

Getting images of manuscripts from Topkapi, Istanbul, is notoriously difficult. Here I describe how I succeeded in obtaining them. I am not saying my way is the only way. In fact, if you know of better ways, please do get in contact with me. All I am doing here is share my own experience.

The first step of that experience was to realize, after more than a year, that I was not going to do it without going there myself. I tried several connections, and some of them really went the extra mile for me, but in the end it did not work out.

So, I went there. Istanbul is great and if my readers would like to see a more general guide to manuscript hunting in Istanbul, I would be happy to write it. Please leave a response either here or on Facebook. I planned to stay for a week. This turned out to be too short. My suggestion is to be there for two weeks.

What you need to do at home is:

Know exactly which manuscripts you need. I have found out that the catalogue is lacking many details and contains wrong information. I suggest to use scholarly literature; you need to know about a call number from someone who has seen the manuscript itself. In my case the “Philologika” articles from Helmut Ritter were helpful. There is no reading room at Topkapi and you will not be allowed to peruse a bunch of manuscripts. You can only go there and say: “I want pictures of the manuscript with call number #####”.

What I took with me was:

2 hard copies and a digital copy of the Topkapi CD Request Form.

2 hard copies and a digital copy of my passport.

2 hard copies and a digital copy of a letter of endorsement from my supervisor, printed on paper with university letterhead.

2 hard copies and a digital copy of a letter explaining my purpose.

2 passport quality photographs (did not need them).

I stayed at the Netherlands Institute in Turkey. This came in really handy as I found out that you really need to either speak Turkish or have someone at your disposal who speaks Turkish to make things happen. The librarian was kind enough to help me out.

She translated the letter in which I explained my purpose into Turkish.

With her help, calling to Topkapi, I also learned that you first need to get a letter of approval from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. They are located in the Atlas Pasaji, on Istiklal Cadessi. Coming from Taksim, it will be on the left, a little before the Galatasaray Lisesi. In the Atlas Pasaji, the entrance is on the left, right next to the Tattoo Parlor (!). You will need a few Turkish words and a letter in Turkish explaining your purpose to talk yourself in. I had to go to the second floor where I was pointed to a door (they're all bind with no signs). I opened it and saw a civil servant watching a television show on his computer. He only spoke Turkish. A colleague of him came, and his German was very good (English only limited).

The question they will ask you is: "Do you have permission from Ankara?"

The correct answer is: "I do not need to physically hold the manuscript, I only want photographs."

With that established, they were actually very helpful. However, the letter I needed required a signature of someone who was not there. I agreed to come back the next day. Sometime in the morning, the next day, I actually received an e-mail saying the letter was signed. I went to pick it up and went to Topkapi Palace.

Once you have that letter, it is probably better to call ahead to Topkapi and make an appointment. I did not. When you are there, you can speak to the doorkeeper. You will receive a visitor's pass and be on your way, from the entrance you take a right. I ended up talking to a lady who was, yet again, very helpful. I was asked again about Ankara and I repeated again that I only needed photographs. I asked her why it is a bit more difficult to get images from Topkapi than it is from Suleymaniye. She said that when Topkapi Palace was turned into a museum (Topkapi Palace Museum), all the manuscripts were logged as museum items, and so the library (Topkapi Palace Museum Library) uses different protocols in handling the manuscripts than other manuscript libraries do. Unlucky for me, they had not made photos of the manuscripts I was after (ergo: not all manuscripts are digitized). But I was surprised to learn how willing they were to do it, and they did not bill me any extra money.

About the money, the photos are not dirt cheap. For large quantities it is 2 liras per photo. I wanted to see three sizable manuscripts which amounted to €500,-. I think that's a fine price, but I am just saying, it ain't a bargain.

All of the above happened in a span of 3 days. But, of course, those photos needed to be taken, so I returned home empty-handed. She said that from here we would be able to handle it over the Internet. When I had returned home, it took several e-mails and 22 days to finally have the pictures.

In a next post, I will discuss the quality of these pictures, in comparison with other collections that offer digitalization.

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Shiva Mihan's avatarShiva Mihan

June 22, 2021 at 1:57 am

Thanks for this post. Topkapi is definitely not the easiest place to deal with, but the University of Istanbul is equally difficult, and I am not going to mention impossibilities of the TIEM. Good luck with your research and I look forward to the next part.

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A: New Valley Governorate, Egypt

Medieval Islamic Views of the Cosmos: The Book of Curiosities

Circa 1025

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World map from the Fatimid treatise, Book of Curiosities of the Sciences and Marvels for the Eyes; copy of manuscript originally written in the first half of the 11th century.

Bodleian Library.

In 2002 the Bodleian Library at Oxford acquired one of the only known copies of an illustrated anonymous cosmography compiled in Egypt during the first half of the 11th century. This manuscript contains a series of early maps and astronomical diagrams, most of which are unparalleled in any other known Greek, Latin or Arabic material. The rhyming title of the volume, *Ḳitāb Gharā'ib al-funūn wa-mulāḥ al-ʿuyūn*, loosely translates as The Book of Curiosities of the Sciences and Marvels for the Eyes. The Bodleian's copy may have been made in the late 12th or early 13th century.

"Its unique maps and diagrams include: diagrams of star-groups and comets; a rectangular map of the world with a graphic scale (the earliest surviving example of such a map); a circular world map; individual maps of islands and ports in the eastern Mediterranean, including Sicily, Tinnis, Mahdia, Cyprus, and the Byzantine coasts of Asia Minor; maps illustrating the Mediterranean Sea as a whole, the Indian Ocean, and the Caspian Sea; and maps of five major rivers (the Nile, Indus, Oxus, Euphrates, and Tigris)" (http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/news/2007_mar_29, accessed 01-23-2014).

"The volume (now given the shelfmark MS. Arab. c. 90) consists of 48 folios (96 pages), each measuring 324 x 245 mm. Pages without illustrations have 27 lines of text per page. The treatise begins with a dedication to an unnamed patron and an abbreviated table of contents. The manuscript copy is incomplete, however, for the copyist has omitted the eighth and ninth chapters of the second book, and the manuscript has lost part of the penultimate chapter and all of the last one.

The Paper

"The lightly glossed, biscuit-brown paper is sturdy, rather soft, and relatively opaque. The paper has thick horizontal laid lines, slightly curved, and there are rib shadows, but no chain lines or watermarks are visible. The thickness of the paper varies between 0.17

and 0.20 mm and measures 3 on the Sharp Scale of Opacity; the laid lines are 6-7 wires/cm, with the space between lines less than the width of one line. The paper would appear to have been made using a grass mould. Paper of such construction was produced in Egypt and Greater Syria in the 12th and 13th centuries (greater precision is not possible). For similar Islamic papers, see Helen Loveday, *Islamic Paper: A Study of the Ancient Craft* (London, 2001); we thank the author for examining and discussing with us the paper in this particular manuscript.

Authorship, date and provenance

"The author of *The Book of Curiosities* is not named and has not been identified, although he refers to another composition of his titled *Ṣal-Muḥīt* ('The Comprehensive'). On the basis of internal evidence, we can suggest that the treatise was composed in the first half of the 11th century, probably in Egypt. The copy we have today is more recent and appears to have been made some hundred and fifty to two hundred years later. Although the copy is undated and unsigned, the paper, inks, and pigments appear consistent with Egyptian-Syrian products made from the early 13th through the 14th century.

"Our author recognized the legitimate authority of the Fāṭimid imāms who came to power in Ifrīqiyah (modern Tunisia) in 909 and ruled at Cairo from 973 until their dynasty was brought to an end by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin) in 1171. At their heyday, the Fāṭimids ruled all over Syria, Egypt and North Africa. Whereas the 'Abbāsīd caliphs of Baghdad were recognized as the rightful leaders of the Muslim community by the Sunnī majority, the Fāṭimid imāms—who claimed to be the biological descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad through his daughter Fāṭimah—were recognized as legitimate by a faithful minority of Ismā'īlī Muslims. Our author not only opens his work with an explicit acknowledgement of the Fāṭimids but also, further on, gives a brief but highly doctrinaire history of the rise of the dynasty, from the accession of the first imām, al-Mahdī, to the defeat of Abū Yazīd (al-dajjāl, the Antichrist) by his son, al-Qā'im.

"The geographical focus of *The Book of Curiosities* is Muslim commercial centres of the 9th- to 11th-century eastern Mediterranean, such as Sicily, the textile-producing town of Tinnīs in the Nile Delta, and Mahdiyyah in modern Tunisia. The author is equally acquainted with Byzantine-controlled areas of the Mediterranean, such as Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, and the southern coasts of Anatolia. The author's occasional use of Coptic terms and Coptic months, together with the allegiance to the Fāṭimid caliphs based in Cairo, suggest Egypt as a likely place of production.

"The treatise was almost certainly composed before 1050. The tribal group of the Banū Qurrah are mentioned in chapter 6 of Book 2 as inhabiting the lowlands near Alexandria. As the Banū Qurrah are known to have been banished from the region of Alexandria by the Fāṭimid authorities in 1051–1052, it is very likely that this treatise was written before that date. Since Sicily is described as being under Muslim rule, the treatise could

definitely not have been composed later than the Norman invasion of Sicily in 1070.

"The last dated event mentioned in the treatise is the construction buildings for merchants in the city of Tinnīs in 1014-1015. Moreover, al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh, the Fāṭimid ruler of Egypt and Syria from 996 to 1021, is referred to in the chapter on Tinnīs as if he were no longer reigning. Therefore, the treatise was probably composed after 1021" (<http://cosmos.bodley.ox.ac.uk/content.php/boc?expand=732>, Offsite Link accessed 01-23-2014)

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treasuresofknowledge.jpeg

Publication information:

Necipoğlu, Gülrü, Cemal Kafadar, and Cornell H. Fleischer, eds. Treasures of Knowledge: An Inventory of the Ottoman Palace Library (1502 3-1503 4) (2 Vols). Brill, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004402508>.

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[Translator](#) Redhouse, James W. (James William), Sir, 1811-1892

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İḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn

İḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn

The Revival of the Religious Sciences (İḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn) is widely regarded as the greatest work of Muslim spirituality, and is perhaps the most read work in the Muslim world, after the Qur'ān.

The Revival of the Religious Sciences is divided into four parts, each containing ten chapters. Part one deals with knowledge and the requirements of faith—ritual purity, prayer, charity, fasting, pilgrimage, recitation of the Qur'ān, and so forth; part two concentrates on people and society—the manners related to eating, marriage, earning a living, and friendship; parts three and four are dedicated to the inner life of the soul and discuss first the vices that people must overcome in themselves and then the virtues that they must strive to achieve. Below we list the contents of the book, English translations, and links to printed editions in the original Arabic.

For a listing of Arabic language printed editions you may follow this link here.

İḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn: In Arabic MS word files with takhrīj (ḥadīth verification) by al-Ḥāfiẓ Zayn al-dīn 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. al-Ḥussain al-'Irāqī (died Wednesday, 8th of sha'bān (8) 806/ 2 February 1404) (in MS word files.) Overview of the İḥyā' by Ḥājī Khalīfa (In Arabic)

Books of the İḥyā' in translation:

First Quarter: Acts of worship (Rub' al-'ibadāt)

Book 1: Book of knowledge (Faris' text)

Al-Ghazālī: The Book of Knowledge, Translated by Kenneth Honerkamp, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2015.

English translation by N. A. Faris (PDF).

English translation that was a PhD thesis at Hartford Seminary by W. McCall (1940).
(See item # 30 for details)

Turkish translation (PDF) 18 mb

Book 2: Foundations of Belief.

Al-Ghazālī: The Principles of the Creed, Translated by Khalid Williams, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2016.

English translation by N. A. Faris (in HTML and PDF). Review of the Faris translation by Watt (in 1964).

Turkish Translation (PDF) 8.76 mb

Book 3: Mysteries of Purity.

Al-Ghazālī: The Mysteries of Purification, Translated by M. F. Aresmouk and M A. Fitzgerald, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2017.

English translation by N. A. Faris (PDF). Also .doc format. –

Turkish Translation (PDF) 4.76 megs. New English translation

Book 4: Mysteries of Worship.

Al-Ghazālī: The Mysteries of Prayer, Translated by M A. Fitzgerald, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2018.

English translation by E. E. Caverley (also in PDF).

Book 5: Mysteries of Zakat (Charity).

Al-Ghazālī: The Mysteries of Charity and the Mysteries of Fasting, Translated by M A. Fitzgerald, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2018.

English Translation by N. A. Faris (also PDF) and (doc)

Book 6: Mysteries of Fasting.

Al-Ghazālī: The Mysteries of Charity and the Mysteries of Fasting, Translated by M A. Fitzgerald, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2018.

English translation by N. A. Faris (PDF)

Book 7: Mysteries of Pilgrimage.

Al-Ghazālī: The Mysteries of Pilgrimage, Translated by M A. Fitzgerald, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, Forthcoming in 2019.

English translation by I. Umar (AUC [Thesis 340]: 1975 M.A. dissertation) (html)

(Author's complete) Proof reading by S. Sharafi courtesy of Nur. Thank you both, you guys are great. (PDF) Also another Arabic edition, M. A. 'Alī: PDF

Book 8: The Etiquette of the Recitation of the Qur'ān.

Al-Ghazālī: The Etiquette of the Recitation of the Qur'ān, Translated by James Pavlin, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, Forthcoming late 2021.

Second English translation to be published as Al-Ghazali on Proper Conduct for the Recitation of the Qur'an Translated by: SHUAIB ALLY, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, TBD. Link description.

Book 9: Invocations and Supplications.

Al-Ghazālī: Invocations and Supplications, Translated by Khalid Williams, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, Forthcoming.

English translation by K. Nakamura (ITS description).

Book 10: On the Arrangements of Litanies and the Exposition of the Night Vigil.

Al-Ghazālī: On the Arrangements of Litanies and the Exposition of the Night Vigil, Translated by Muhtar Holland and James Pavlin. Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae,

Forthcoming.

Second Quarter: Norms of Daily Life (Rubʿ al-ʿadat)

Book 11: On the Manners Related to Eating. English translation by D. Johnson-Davies. (ITS description)

Book 12: On the Etiquette of Marriage:

Arabic original (Word file format only!) with ḥadīth verifications.

English translation* by the late M. Farah. Also in PDF

Partial English translation The Proper Conduct of Marriage in Islām (Ādāb an-Nikāḥ)

Book Twelve of Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm ad-Dīn by M. Holland: Al-Baz Publishing (1998), 99p.

Persian translation (from Kimiya-i-Saʿadat) (Persian PDF)

French translation (from Algiers) (French PDF)

German translation: Hans Bauer: Al-Ghazālī. Das Buch der Ehe. Kitab adabi n-nikah.

Das 12. Buch der Iḥyāʾ ʿulum ad-din. Übersetzt und kommentiert von Hans Bauer

(Kandern, Spohr, 2005).

Book 13: On the Etiquette of Acquisition and Earning a Livelihood. Translated as The Book of the Proprieties of Earning and Living, translated by Adi Setia, IBFIM, Kuala Lumpur, 2013, 187pp, ISBN: 9789670149288.

Book 14: The Lawful and Prohibited (Translated)

English translation by YUSUF TALAL DELORENZO published as al-Ghazālī on the Lawful and the Unlawful, Book XIV of the Revival of the Religious Sciences, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 2014. Link description.

English translation by Nicholas Mahdi Lock published as the Book of the Lawful and the Unlawful, IBFIM, Kuala Lumpur, 2013, 258pp, IBN: 9789670149271.

Book 15: On the Duties of Brotherhood.

forthcoming a complete English translation by James Pavlin, Fons Vitae, 2022.

Partial translation by M. Holland. (cover-image) (Arabic edition partial outtakes PDF).

Book 16: On the Etiquette of Seclusion.

forthcoming a complete English translation by James Pavlin, Fons Vitae, 2022.

Book 17: On the Etiquette of Travel

AL-GHAZALI ON CONDUCT IN TRAVEL Translated by: LEONARD LIBRANDE, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 2015

Book 18: On Music and Singing.

Forthcoming in English as AL-GHAZALI ON RESPONSES PROPER TO LISTENING TO MUSIC AND THE EXPERIENCE OF ECSTASY Book XVIII of the Revival of the Religious Sciences Translated by: ANTHONY H. JOHNS forthcoming ITS (link description)

English translation by D. B. MacDonald in three parts (PDF) Part I + II + III, republished as Music and Singing by IBT Books, Kuala Lumpur, 2009, 139pp. ISBN: 9789675062230.

Book 19: On Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil.

Al-Ghazālī: The Commanding of the Good and Forbidden of the Wrong, Translated by James Pavlin. Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, Forthcoming, 2022.

Partial translation in Michael Cook's Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 427-459.

Book 20: Etiquette of Living and the Prophetic Mannerism:

English translation by Dr. Adi Setia, Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, published, 2019.
(E-text) rtf (rich text file- word) or (PDF)
Third Quarter: The Ways to Perdition (Rub' al-muhlikat)

Book 21: The Marvels of the Heart:

Complete English translation by W. J. Skellie (PhD thesis (PDF), Hartford Seminary—published edition (Fons Vitae March 2010). N.B. that Skellie translated the edition that was published by Zabidi in his commentary on the *ihya'* which has slight variations from the standard Cairo edition. These have been restored in the Fons Vitae edition.

Partial translation in *Freedom and Fulfillment* by McCarthy (Boston: Twayne, 1980), pp. 363–382; Reprinted (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 1999), pp. 309–325;

Partial translation in *Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism* by John Renard (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), pp. 298–326.

Also published as *Wonders of the Heart* (Malaysia: IBT, 2007), without the complete translator's introduction and notes; includes an index and publishers note.

Book 22: On Disciplining the Soul. English translation by T. J. Winter (ITS description).

Book 23: On Breaking the Two Desires.

English translation by T. J. Winter. (ITS description)

English translation by C. Farah. (HTML E-text) (PDF)

Book 24: Defects of the Tongue

English translation in progress

Book 25: Condemnation of Rancor and Envy (Complete English translation in progress)

Book 26: Condemnation of the World (English translation)

Book 27: Condemnation of Miserliness and Condemnation of the Love of wealth.
(English translation)

Book 28: Condemnation of Status and Ostentation. (Complete English translation in progress) Translation of its Arabic Summary.

Book 29: Condemnation of Pride and Conceit. (English translation by M. Rustom as: *Al-Ghazālī On the Condemnation of Pride and Self-Admiration*, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2018. ITS description)

Book 30: Condemnation of Self-Delusion. (Complete English translation in progress)

Fourth Quarter: The Ways to Salvation (Rub' al-munjiyat)

Book 31: On Repentance.

New English translation forthcoming

English Translation by M. S. Stern. (E-text) (PDF) Also available in (unedited word file)
Part I is now available in html.

German translation: Books 31–36: Richard Gramlich, *Muhammad al-Gazzālīs Lehre von den Stufen zur Gottesliebe : die Bücher 31-36 seines Hauptwerkes*. Eingel., übers. u. komment. von Richard Gramlich (Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1984).

Book 32: On Patience and Thankfulness.

English translation by H. T. Littlejohn and published as *Al-Ghazālī on Patience and Thankfulness*, Book XXXII of the *Revival of the Religious Sciences*, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2016. (ITS description).

Book 33: On Fear and Hope.

English translation

English translation by W. McKane (E-text) (PDF). Also in complete edited word file.
reviewed by Watt in 1964. (pdf)

Book 34: On Poverty and Abstinence.

English translation by A. F. Shaker. Al-Ghazālī on Poverty and Abstinence Book XXXIV of the Revival of the Religious Sciences, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2019. (ITS description)

Book 35: Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence.

English translation by D. Burrell. (Fons Vitae)

German: Hans Wehr, Al-Gazzālī's Buch vom Gottvertrauen. Das 35. Buch des Ihya' 'ulum ad-dīn. Übers. u. mit Einl. u. Anm. vers. v. Hans Wehr. Halle: Niemeyer, 1940.

Book 36: On Love, Longing, Intimacy and Contentment.

English Translation by Eric Ormsby, published as Al-Ghazālī on Love, Longing, Intimacy and Contentment, Book XXXVI of the Revival of the Religious Sciences, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2012, ITS description).

For German see above #31.

Book 37: On Intention, Sincerity, and Truth.

Edited Arabic PDF. Edited Arabic MS word.

English translation by Anthony F. Shaker and published as Al-Ghazali on Intention, Sincerity & Truthfulness Book XXXVII of the Revival of the Religious Sciences, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2014. (ITS description).

German translation by Hans Bauer, Islamische Ethik. Nach den Originalquellen übersetzt und erläutert. Heft 1: Über Intention, Reine Absicht und Wahrhaftigkeit. (das 37. Buch von Al-Ġazālī) (pdf)

Book 38: On Holding Vigil and Self-Examination.

English translation by: Anthony F. Shaker and published as Al-Ghazālī on Vigilance and Self-examination, Book XXXVIII of the Revival of the Religious Sciences, Cambridge, 2015 Islamic Texts Society

Book 39: On Meditation.

English translation published as Al-Ghazali: The Book of Contemplation (Book 39 of The Revival of the Religious Sciences) Translated by Muhammad Isa Waley. Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2021.

Book 40: On the Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife.

English translation by T. J. Winter and published as Al-Ghazālī on the Remembrance of Death & the Afterlife Book XL of the Revival of the Religious Sciences, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1989, 2nd ed. 2015. (ITS description) Sample of the book. (PDF) courtesy of the publisher.

Remembrance of Death and the Afterlife. (E-text)

Printed Editions: A link with details on at least fourteen (14) printed editions including the most recent editions printed in the twenty first century follow this page.

Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-Dīn was first printed at Būlāq, 1269/1853 followed by a lithograph in India in 1863, then in 1894 on the margins of its commentary which is one of the most reliable editions to date. In the 25 Spetember 1939 Cairo edition by the Ḥalabī press it was edited by a committee of scholars headed by the Azhari scholar Aḥmad sa'ad 'Alī it was printed with the now standard addendum and marginal text of al-'Irāqī. All later publishers would follow suit with few modern exceptions.

al-Ghazālī. *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-Dīn*. Cairo: Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya, 1356–57 (1937–38). This is the edition that the Dār al-Sha'ab based their edition on. It has been recreated here with the pagination in red on the pdf files. Thanks is due to Prof. Frank Griffel for this information, his help in recreating this edition and providing the scans of the missing pages. Do note that this is a very readable and an accurate edition that is used for scholarly work.

volume 1 (parts 1 -4)

volume 2 (parts 5-8)

volume 3 (parts 9 -12)

volume 4 (parts 13-16). (PDF facsimile)

SUMMARIES: There are many summaries of the *Iḥyā'*, though only a handful are published; the others remain in manuscript form. For more information about the summaries of the *Iḥyā'* in Arabic, see this short article (Arabic html).

Summary by Aḥmad al-Ghazālī (pdf) *Lubāb al-iḥyā'*, published as *Mukhtaṣar Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*. The publisher claims that it is by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, though I believe this is incorrect. (PDF). This book has been translated into English: Imam Al-Ghazālī *Mukhtaṣar Iḥyā' 'ulūm ad-dīn* translated from the Arabic, and annotated by Marwan Khalaf. Lympha/Nikosia, Cyprus: SPOHR, 2014.

The *Iḥyā'* was summarized in a book entitled *Minhaj al-qāṣidīn* by Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597 AH/1201 CE), (PDF1, PDF2) which was further summarized in *Mukhtaṣar minhāj al-qāṣidīn* by Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī (d. 620 AH/1341 CE). (link Arabic HTML). This book has been widely distributed and reprinted several times, one of which by Dār al-Khayr, Damascus, 1998; with ḥadīth verification by M. W. Salman and A. A. H. Abulkhair (PDF) also other editions are available: 'A. Ḥ. M. Darwish edition: PDF, S. 'Āref edition: PDF, 'A. Ḥ. 'A. Ḥalabī edition: PDF, and 'A. Q. al-'Arnāout edition: PDF, and Z. Shāwīsh edition: PDF)

Tahdhīb mū'aẓat al-mū'minīn, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī n.p. n.d. Note that he also did a summary of *Qūt al-Qulūb* (PDF), (PDF) .

Modern summary of the *Iḥyā'* comes from Salih Aḥmad al-Shāmī, *al-Muhadhab min iḥyā' 'ulum al-dīn*, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1993). Sample translation (link) Also another edition is available from Dār ibn al-Qayīm: PDF. This is an admirable attempt that closely follows the structure of the original book.

The late Sa'īd Ḥawwa (d. 1989) wrote a summary for a training curriculum: *al-Mustakhlaṣ fī tazkiyat al-anfus* (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 1984). (PDF) The author/activist was a prolific writer.

COMMENTARY: A commentary (sharḥ) of al-Iḥyā' by Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī's [d. 1791] *Itḥaf al-sada al-muttaqīn bi sharḥ iḥyā' 'ulum al-dīn*, printed in Cairo 1894 in 10 large volumes. This work is still in print in facsimiles of this edition as well as well as an unreliable DKI edition. Note that the link provided is for the complete 1894 edition. (download page)

Defense: As many were critical of al-Ghazālī there were as many if not more who rallied to his defense:

In his own defense, al-Ghazālī wrote: *al-Imlā' fī ishkalat al-iḥyā'* (Notes on issues of the *Iḥyā'*) printed as an appendix in some editions of the *Iḥyā'* (pdf)

'Abd al-Qādir al-'Aydrūs, *Ta'arīf al-aḥyā' bi faḍl al-iḥyā'* (Introducing the living to the

benefits of the Iḥyā' printed as an appendix in some editions of the Iḥyā' (pdf). Note the pun in the title, which is, of course, intentional.

al-Suyūṭī, Tashyat al-'arkān fī laysa fī al-imkan 'abda' mimā kān (Fortifying the foundations of [the statement] "the best of all possible worlds") printed as an appendix in some editions of the Iḥyā' (PDF). Note also this work was the basis of a study done in Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute over Al-Ghazālī's "Best of All Possible Worlds" by Eric L. Ormsby (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Unknown author: Risala fi bayan faḍil iḥyā' 'ulum al-dīn (mss in al-Azhar number 1956 [majami 91] folios 76-86).

Unknown author: Risāla fī al-rad 'ala min 'atraḍa 'ala al-ghazālī fī qawlihi ana al-musabibāt ratabat 'ala al-'asbāb (mss in Dār al-Kutub al-miṣriyya [majāmi' 210])

Refutations: The Iḥyā' has generated some heated discussions mostly revolving around the traditions that al-Ghazālī included.

Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597 AH) i'lam al-aḥya' bi aghlat al-iḥyā' (not printed and no known mss copies)

al-Dhahabi mentioned that Abū al-Ḥasan b. Sukar wrote Iḥyā' mayit al-aḥya fi al-rad 'ala kitab al-iḥyā' (not printed and no known mss copies)

Aḥmad b. Munir al-Iskandarī (d. 1284) wrote al-Ḍiya' al-mutalali fi ta'qub al-iḥyā' lil ghazālī as mentioned by Zabīdī (in commentary above) vol. 1. p .33, ln 10) (not printed and no known mss copies)

A Shi'a 'recension': under the title: al-Maḥajjah al-bayḍā' fī tahdhīb al-Iḥyā' by Muḥammad b. al-Murṭaḍa al-maḍ'ū bi-al-Mawla Muḥsin al-Kāshānī (d. 1681) Thanks to Prof. Alger for referring to this book in his monograph on Ghazali. (PDF)

Fatawas (judicial decrees) by scholars and these are too many list or know but Ibn Taymiyya is known to have written one as well as al-Ṭarṭuṣhī. Even in modern times there have been fatwās issued by Saudi 'ulamā'. A typical critique along those lines is by 'A. R. Dimashqīya: PDF.

Miscellaneous:

E-pub Version of the Arabic Text of the Iḥyā'

Shamela version of the Iḥyā'(link) – Shamela version (online)

List of Personalities mentioned in the Iḥyā'. (redone!)

Islamic Text Society: Al-Ghazālī Series (link)

Translations from Fons Vitae. (website and navigate to Ghazali section)

Turkish translation of the Iḥyā'.

Urdu translation of the Iḥyā' (link)

Sufi Review of Iḥyā' (link)

Mawlana Fazil Karim's Summarized English translation from the Urdu translation. (online)

Manuscripts:

A growing number of Arabic manuscripts are now available online.

King Saud University manuscript collection. A link to one such ms copied in 12th cen AH by 'A. A. Kanānī, a partial ms. More manuscripts are available here: link2, link3,

[link4](#), [link5](#), [link6](#), [link7](#), [link8](#), [link9](#), and a summary here, Mukhtaṣar Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn: [link10](#).

Princeton University Library, has a complete copy of the ihya but it is not available online yet, we can hope. N.B. Princeton is changing where it puts its manuscripts and is migrating to a new site.

Illuminated manuscript. (scanned from the Tunisian National Archives).

Manuscripts from Turkey. (list).

List of Iḥyā' manuscripts from Badawi (Arabic word file with minor additions in red), original entry in PDF

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Mishkāt al-Anwār

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Mishkāt al-Anwār or The Niche of Lights is an exegetical text written by the Islamic theologian Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) that discusses the Quran's Verse of Light.

[Description](#)

The commentary, probably written toward the end of the author's life, interprets this verse and a related hadith from a Sufi perspective. Among other things, it describes the metaphysics of light and the relationship between divine light and the human soul. It is written in terse language and cites numerous Quranic passages in its argument.

The text has three chapters. Chapter one analyzes the first sentence of the verse, and chapters two and three expand on the interpretation outlined. God's light, also identified with existence and knowledge, is described as the source underpinning creation. Al-Ghazali frequently uses analogies between the natural and supernatural world in his argument. He describes the role of purification in the soul's attempt to grasp divine illumination and the "holy prophetic spirit".[1]

References

Ġazālī, Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Abū Ḥāmid al-; Buchman, David (1998). The niche of lights: a parallel English-Arabic text. Islamic translation series. Provo (Utah): Brigham young university press. ISBN 978-0-8425-2353-0.

Categories: Sunni tafsir11th-century Arabic-language booksBooks by Al-Ghazali

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Sufism

Ideas

AbdalAl-Insān al-

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Ma'rifaMaqamMuridMurshidNafsNūrQalandarQayyumQutbSilsilaSufi cosmologySufi

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Sufi orders

AkbariAliansAzeemiaBa

'AlawiBadawiBayramiBektashiBurhaniChishtiDarqawiGalibiHaqqaniHurufildrisiInayatilss

awiyyaJelvetiJerrahiKhalwatiKubrawiMadariMahdaviMaizbandariMalamatiMevleviMouri

diNi'matullāhīNaqshbandiNoorbakshiNuqtaviQadiriQalandariRahmaniRifa'iSafaviSadiyy

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List of sufis

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The Laṭā'if (Arabic: اللطائف) are special organs of perception and psycho-physiological functioning in Sufi spirituality. Depending on context, the laṭā'if (plural) are also understood to be the experiential qualities or forms of those perceptions and functions.

[1]

The Arabic word laṭīfa (singular) means “subtlety” and the phrase laṭā'if-e-sitta means “six subtleties” (although the number of laṭā'if can differ depending on the specific Sufi tradition).

The laṭā'if are viewed as components of Man's spiritual “Organ of Evolution”, [2] known as Qalb (Heart) (See "Disambiguation: Qalb (Heart) or Qalb (laṭīfa)").

The integration of the laṭā'if into Qalb is considered by some Sufi orders -- especially the Naqshbandi -- to be a central part of the comprehensive spiritual development that produces the Sufi ideal of a Complete Human Being (Al-Insān al-Kāmil).

Different understandings of the laṭā'if

Not all Sufi orders teach about the laṭā'if. Of those which do, descriptions and understandings can differ depending on the specific Sufi lineage and exponent representing it.

In addition, individual Sufi teachers (see Sheikh (Sufism)) sometimes understand aspects of laṭā'if theory and practice according to how the laṭā'if have been uniquely

revealed to them.[3]

In general, there are at least three major historical understandings of the laṭāʾif:

(13th century) The Kubrāwī order, exemplified by Ala ud-Daula Simnani (1261–1336), views the laṭāʾif as potential psychospiritual organs/capacities that can be realized as progressive stages in those undergoing spiritual development;

(17th century) The Mujaddidīyya branch of the Naqshbandi order, exemplified by Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), views the laṭāʾif as psychospiritual organs/capacities that are potential receptors of Divine energy[3] when activated in those undergoing spiritual development;

(20th century) The Punjab tradition within the Naqshbandi order, exemplified by Idries Shah (1924–1996), views the laṭāʾif as actual human psycho-physiological organs/capacities that are implicit in everyday life and made explicit in those undergoing spiritual development.

Kubrāwī laṭāʾif (13th century)

According to the view of the Kubrawi Order there are seven laṭāʾif. They are understood cosmologically as “descending” levels through which reality is created and structured.[4]
[5]

In the process of spiritual development, the Sufi student is understood to “ascend” back through these levels progressively (see ontological Arcs of Descent and Ascent in Sufism).

The attainment of each level is associated with the activation/realization of a corresponding spiritual organ/capacity, interpreted symbolically through Islamic cosmology and the prophets and messengers in Islam.[6]

In ascending order they are:

Qalab (associated with an experience of the color gray) represents the acquisition of a new organ, an embryonic subtle body. It is understood symbolically as “the Adam of one’s being”, since Adam was the first human being.

Nafs (color blue) is an organ that corresponds to the animal soul and is a testing ground for struggle with desires and passions. It is understood symbolically as “the Noah of one’s being”, since Noah faced the same situation in dealing with the hostility of his people.

Qalb (color red) is the organ that will develop to become the True Ego, the real personal individuality. It is understood symbolically as “the Abraham of one’s being”, since the prophet Abraham historically represents the establishment of real religion.

Sirr (color white) is an organ of superconsciousness. It is understood symbolically as “the Moses of one’s being”, since the prophet Moses participated in spiritual communication with God through this consciousness.

Ruḥ (color yellow) is an organ through which an individual becomes capable of acting as vice-regent of God. It is understood symbolically as “the David of one’s being”, since

the prophet David fulfilled that role.

Khafi (color black) is the subtle organ that receives spiritual inspiration. It is understood symbolically as “the Jesus of one’s being”, since the prophet Jesus was characteristic of such inspiration.

Ḥaqq (color green) is the subtle organ that is the final achievement of spiritual development: the True Ego. It is understood symbolically as “the Muḥammad of one’s being”, since Muḥammad was the final prophet.

Naqshbandi laṭā’if (Mujaddidiyya) (17th century)

According to the view of the Mujaddidiyya branch of the Naqshbandi order there are five laṭā’if.[7] The reception of each laṭīfa’s “spiritual energy” from its corresponding cosmic realm is interpreted symbolically through the prophets and messengers in Islam, similar to the interpretation of the Kubrawi order:

Qalb (color yellow; located below left breast) (Adam)

Ruḥ (color red; located below right breast) (Abraham/Noah)

Sirr (color white; located above left breast) (Moses)

Khafi (color black; located above right breast) (Jesus)

Ikhfa (color green; located at sternum) (Muḥammad)

In this understanding, the laṭā’if all have their physical association in the chest and so are said to be “of the Heart” (Qalb, the potential human “Organ of Evolution” -- see “Disambiguation: Qalb (Heart) or Qalb (Laṭīfa)”).

Naqshbandi laṭā’if (Punjab tradition) (20th century)

According to the Punjab tradition within the Naqshbandi order, which emphasizes modern-day psychological aspects of Sufism,[8] there are five laṭā’if:[9]

Qalb (color yellow; experienced in left side of the body)

Ruḥ (color red; experienced in right side of the body)

Sirr (color white; experienced in solar plexus)

Khafi (color black; experienced in forehead)

Ikhfa (color green; experienced in center of chest)

Comparison of understandings of the laṭā’if

Laṭīfa	Sufi Tradition	Color	Association	Physical Association	Note
Qalb	Kubrawi (1)	Red	(?)	Kubrawi:[4]	
Qalb	Naqshbandi (Mujaddidiyya) (1)	Yellow	below left breast	Mujaddidiyya:[10]	
Qalb	Naqshbandi (Awaisi) (1)	Red	below left breast	Awaisi:[11]	
Qalb	Naqshbandi (Punjab) (1)	Yellow	left side of body	Punjab:[9]	
Qalb	Chishti (1)	Red	left breast	[citation needed]	
Qalb	Inayati (1)	Red	left breast	Inayati:[12]	
Qalb	Khwajagan (1)	Red	left breast	Khwajagan:[13]	
Qalb	Burhaniyya (1)	Yellow	below left breast	Burhaniyya:[14]	
Ruḥ	Kubrawi (2)	Yellow	(?)		
Ruḥ	Naqshbandi (Mujaddidiyya) (2)	Red	below right breast		
Ruḥ	Naqshbandi (Awaisi) (2)	Yellow	below right breast		
Ruḥ	Naqshbandi (Punjab) (2)	Red	right side of body		

Ruḥ Chishti (2) Green center of chest
 Ruḥ Inayati (2) White right breast
 Ruḥ Khwajagan (2) Yellow right breast
 Ruḥ Burhaniyya (2) Red below right breast
 Sirr Kubrawi (3) White (?)
 Sirr Naqshbandi (Mujaddidiyya) (3) White above left breast
 Sirr Naqshbandi (Awaisi) (3) Blue above left breast
 Sirr Naqshbandi (Punjab) (3) White solar plexus
 Sirr Chishti (3) White right breast
 Sirr Inayati (3) Green center of chest
 Sirr Khwajagan (3) White left breast
 Sirr Burhaniyya (3) Green center of chest
 Khafi Kubrawi (4) Black/Green (?)
 Khafi Naqshbandi (Mujaddidiyya) (4) Black above right breast
 Khafi Naqshbandi (Awaisi) (4) White above right breast
 Khafi Naqshbandi (Punjab) (4) Black forehead
 Khafi Chishti (4) Indigo forehead
 Khafi Inayati (4) Indigo forehead
 Khafi Khwajagan (4) Green right breast
 Khafi Burhaniyya (4) White forehead
 Ikhfa Naqshbandi (Mujaddidiyya) (5) Green sternum
 Ikhfa Naqshbandi (Awaisi) (5) Green sternum
 Ikhfa Naqshbandi (Punjab) (5) Green center of chest
 Ikhfa Chisti (5) Black top of head
 Ikhfa Inayati (5) Black top of head
 Ikhfa Khwajagan (5) White center of chest
 Ikhfa Burhaniyya (5) Black top of head
 Nafs Kubrawi (5) Blue (?) see "Disambiguation: Nafs (Egoic Self) or Laṭīfa"
 Nafs Chishti (6) Yellow below navel "
 Nafs Inayati (6) Yellow below navel "
 Nafs Khwajagan (6) Blue forehead "
 Nafs Naqshbandi (Awaisi) (6) colorless forehead "
 Qalab Kubrawi (6) Gray (?) see "Disambiguation: Qalab or Sultan al-Azkar"
 Qalab Chishti (7) Gray floor of pelvis "
 Qalab Naqshbandi (Awaisi) (7) colorless entire body "
 Haqq Kubrawi (7) Green (?)

Ana (?) White center of chest also known as "Ana'iya" [15]

Ana Junaidiyya [citation needed] colorless forehead [16]

Spiritual development and the laṭā'if

For Sufi traditions that teach the laṭā'if, spiritual development is undertaken on two dimensions:

refinement of the egoic, psycho-physiological "self", known as "Nafs"[17]

activation (realization/opening/awakening/energizing/illumination (tajalli)) of the laṭā'if.

The egoic Self is said to proceed through seven stages of development, the primitive

stages of which distort or "veil" (see Hijab (Sufism)) full realization of the laṭā'if. In most Sufi traditions, accordingly, a general, progressive refinement of the Nafs precedes any explicit activation of the laṭā'if.

In the Naqshbandi tradition, however, it is the reverse: the activation of specific laṭā'if is used to facilitate the progressive refinement of the Nafs. This is why the Naqshbandi teaching method is known as "where others end, there marks our beginning" ("indiraj al-nihayat fi'l-bidayat").[18]

See also: "Disambiguation: Nafs (Egoic Self) or Nafs (Laṭīfa)".

Activation of the laṭā'if

Just as interpretations of the laṭā'if vary depending on different Sufi traditions and teachers, so do methods of their activation.

The process of activating each laṭīfa consists of various methods, singly or in combination, such as:

Dhikr ("remembrance"): recitation of a Quranic phrase accompanied by postures, breathing, and movement[19]

Muraqabah ("watching"): persistent awareness directed to the part of the body associated with the laṭīfa[20]

Tawajjuh ("attention"): intentional transmission of the laṭīfa directly from teacher to student.[21]

Kubrawi

In the Kubrawi tradition, Sufi Ala ud-Daula Simnani (1261–1336) describes a dhikr type practice that involved certain postures, the rotation of attention and breath to different parts of the physical body, and the recitation of a Quranic credal formula.[22][23]

Khwajagan

In the Khwajagan tradition, Rif'at Bey describes a practice in which the name of Allah is imagined "written in letters of light" at the physical location associated with a laṭīfa and repeated silently until the color associated with it is seen surrounding the letters.[13]

Naqshbandi (Mujaddidiyya)

In the Mujaddidiyya tradition, the laṭā'if are opened through practice one-by-one in "ascending" order, beginning with Qalb. Viewed as a progressive activation, each laṭīfa (or progressive combination of laṭā'if) is considered to be a level of spiritual realization.

The method of opening each laṭīfa typically begins with a direct transmission of Barakah (spiritual Presence) by teacher to student, and can also include physical touch (except for women) and the disclosure of a specific one of the Divine Names of God in Islam.

The student then continues the practice by silent dhikr of the Name, concentrating attention on the laṭīfa's location; sometimes a visualization of the Name, the

corresponding prophet, or the teacher is also added.[24]

Naqshbandi (Awaisi)

In the Awaisi tradition,[25] the laṭāʾif are illuminated through a dhikr cycle that begins with Qalb and continues with the other six laṭāʾif in order. The student inhales vigorously into the Qalb(Heart) with a silent, attentive “Allah” and exhales out to the specific laṭīfa with a silent, attentive “Hu”.

(See also: corresponding video in "External Links").

Naqshbandi (Punjab)

In the Punjab tradition, Idries Shah describes a type of muraqabah in which the student concentrates awareness on the part of the body that is associated with a laṭīfa.[26]

Direct experiences of the laṭāʾif

With rare exceptions, direct and explicit experiences of the laṭāʾif only arise in human beings who have undergone a spiritual evolution. These experiences can be of several different types, singly or in combination, among them:

“Visual” experiences

“Tactile” experiences

Kubrawi

In Persian Sufi Illuminationism (see: Najm al-Din Kubra), all creation is a successive outflow from the original Supreme Light of Lights (Nur al-Anwar) (see: Nūr (Islam)). The cosmology of this tradition is a kind of Emanationism in which immaterial Light descends from the Light of Lights in ever-diminishing intensity. In other words, Creation at all levels of its existence—including that of the laṭāʾif—is made up of varying degrees of Light.

Accordingly, the experiences of the laṭāʾif are both an external “visual” experience of photisms (“acts of light”) and a tactile inner sensation, as described by Henry Corbin. [27]

Khwajagan

The laṭāʾif are experienced primarily as colors seen surrounding the name of Allah at the physical location associated with each laṭīfa, as described by Rifaʿt Bey.[13]

Naqshbandi (Punjab)

Direct and explicit realizations of the laṭāʾif are experienced primarily as differentiated, localized forms of an overall tactile spiritual Presence (“Ḥuḍūr”[28]) in the body.[29]

Indirect experiences of the laṭāʾif

Beyond direct and explicit experiences of the laṭāʾif, Sufi traditions can differ in their understanding of how the laṭāʾif affect human experience indirectly and implicitly.

Kubrawi

In traditions similar to the Kubrawi, for example, the laṭāʾif are only activated after the Nafs has been refined by other means.

As a result, the experiences of the laṭāʾif are viewed as higher spiritual capacities and virtues that are unrelated to the conventional experiences and capacities of the lower egoic Self (Nafs).

Naqshbandi

In traditions similar to the Naqshbandi, however, the process of activating the laṭāʾif is understood to itself contribute to the refinement of the Nafs. This refinement is experienced both as a reduction in specific vices and an increase in corresponding virtues.

Such changes in the egoic Self can therefore be understood as indirect, secondary effects of the (partially or wholly) activated laṭāʾif.

The activation of the Ruḥ laṭīfa, for example, is often connected with overcoming personal weakness and anger and replacing it with healthy strength and assertiveness.

Naqshbandi (Punjab)

Finally, traditions similar to the Naqshbandi (Punjab) understand the laṭāʾif to be spiritual organs/capacities that also underlie ordinary forms of human perception and functioning.

As such, they are thought to be activated and operating implicitly at all times and appear indirectly through the corresponding experiences that they pattern on the conventional mental/emotional/somatic level of the egoic Self.

Naqshbandi influenced [30] spiritual teacher Hameed Ali (A. H. Almaas) (1944–) understands some of these laṭāʾif and psycho-physiological correspondences as follows: [31]

Qalb (Enjoyment)

Ruḥ (Vitality)

Sirr (Confidence)

Khafi (Stillness)

Ikhfa (Sensitivity)

(See also: corresponding video in "External Links").

Disambiguation of the laṭāʾif

Even among traditions that recognize the laṭāʾif, Sufi teachings often include other features or terminology that have ambiguous relationships to the laṭāʾif.

In addition, there is perennial potential for ambiguity in discussing the laṭāʾif (both in primary sources and in their English translation) arising from the way that words in

Arabic can have different meanings in different contexts.[32]

Arabic, Quranic, or Sufi meaning of laṭāʾif

The word laṭāʾif is the plural of the transliterated Arabic word laṭīfa, from the tripartite verb la-ṭa-fa, which means “to be subtle”. [33]

It assumed a spiritual meaning in the Qurʾan where Al-Laṭīf is one of the 99 names of God in Islam, reflecting His subtle nature.[33][34]

And it was subsequently adopted by Sufism to refer to various aspects of reality that are not gross, material qualities of the physical world (see, for example, "Disambiguation: Ten, five, or six laṭāʾif"). [35]

Transliteration or translation or interpretation of the laṭāʾif

English language authors use one or more of three methods when referring to specific laṭāʾif:

a transliteration of the Arabic word associated with the laṭīfa

a translation of the word's general Arabic meaning

an interpretation of the corresponding experience that is the word's specific Sufi meaning.

Laleh Bahktiar[4] uses both a transliteration and a translation:

Laṭāʾif (“Subtle [Organs]”)

Qalabīya (“Mold”)

Nafsīya (“Soul”)

Qalbīya (“Heart”)

Sirrīya (“Secret”)

Ruḥīya (“Spirit”)

Khafīya (“Inspiration”)

Haqqīya (“Seal”)

Idries Shah also[36] uses both a transliteration and a translation:

Laṭāʾif (“[Five] Subtleties”)

Qalb (“Mind”)

Ruḥ (“Spirit”)

Sirr (“Consciousness”)

Khafi (“Intuition”)

Ikhfa (“Deep perception of Consciousness”)

Hameed Ali[37] uses a transliteration and an interpretation:

Laṭāʾif

Qalb (“Joy”)

Ruḥ (“Strength”)

Sirr (“Will”)

Khafi ("Peace")

Ikhfa ("Compassion")

Ten, five, or six laṭā'if

In the version of Sufi cosmology proposed by Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624),[38] God created the universe in three stages:

First came the "World of God's Command" (alam al-amr), which emerged instantly when God said, "Be!" The five subtle qualities (laṭā'if) of God's Command were: Qalb, Ruh, Sirr, Khafi, and Ikhfa.

Then came the "World of God's Creation" (alam al-khalq), which emerged through a process of evolution. The five subtle qualities (laṭā'if) which patterned that Creation were: Consciousness (Nafs), Air (Baad), Fire (Nar), Water (Ma), and Earth (Khak). Finally, God created human beings, which combined the "World of God's Command" with the "World of God's Creation".

In this usage, then, there are ten laṭā'if in two categories:

five relating to the "World of God's Command" and

five relating to the "World of God's Creation".

In contrast, in most Sufi usages outside this cosmological one (including most of this webpage), there are either:

five laṭā'if (from the first category alone, the "World of God's Command") or

six laṭā'if (the five from the first category . . . plus Nafs from the second category, the "World of God's Creation") .

Inter-relationship of laṭā'if

Most Sufi traditions arrange the individual laṭā'if in some specific order.

For example, the laṭīfa Qalb is often given first priority because its activation is the student's first orientation to the related presence and importance of Qalb (Heart) -- Man's spiritual "Organ of Evolution".

In the Kubrawi tradition, the laṭā'if are understood to reflect the hierarchy of successive historical prophets and messengers, beginning with Adam and culminating with Muhammad. The student's spiritual development is thought to unfold from an earlier, more limited revelation to a later, more complete one.

In the Naqshbandi (Mujaddidi) tradition, the realization of the laṭā'if is sometimes understood to be not only progressive but also cumulative; each new laṭīfa's realization is a comprehensive combination of that laṭīfa and all previously realized laṭā'if.

Finally, in those traditions that emphasize modern day psychological aspects of Sufism, the order of activation of the laṭā'if is sometimes determined by the individual student's personal history. A student might, for example, have one or another laṭīfa that is less "veiled" than another, in which case it could be the first laṭīfa emphasized for activation.

Nafs (Egoic Self) or Nafs (laṭīfa)

The Nafs in Sufism is considered to be a person's egoic consciousness[39] or egoic, psycho-physiological "Self". It is the subtle (laṭīfa) quality of "God's Creation" that becomes individual and can undergo a spiritual development. This makes it unlike the five laṭā'if of "God's Command", which are transcendent, unchanging qualities.

Ruḥ (Spirit) or Ruḥ (laṭīfa)

The word "Ruḥ" is used in Sufism in two different ways, on two different levels:

"Ruḥ", as one of the laṭā'if described in the foregoing

"Ruh" (Spirit), as the Divine Spirit or "essence" in human beings, created by God from his own Spirit.[40]

Qalb (Heart) or Qalb (laṭīfa)

The word "Qalb", like "Ruḥ", is used in Sufism in two different ways, on two different levels:

"Qalb", as one of the laṭā'if described in the foregoing

"Qalb" (Heart), as the "Organ of Evolution" in human beings, the potential integration of Ruḥ (the Divine Spirit) and Nafs (the egoic Self).[41]

Sirr (Secret) or Sirr (laṭīfa)

The word "Sirr", like "Ruḥ" and "Qalb", is also used in Sufism in two different ways, on two different levels:

"Sirr", as one of the laṭā'if described in the foregoing

"Sirr" ("Secret"), as a super-conscious state of Qalb (Heart) or Ruḥ (Spirit) experienced as unity with God.[42]

Laṭā'if and the Jism Latif

The integration of the laṭā'if into Qalb (Heart) is understood by Sufism to also represent the development of a corresponding subtle body known, in some traditions, as the "Jism Latif".[43]

Whereas Qalb (Heart) emphasizes the psycho-physiological functions of the laṭā'if, the Jism Latif emphasizes their underlying spiritual substance and persistent spiritual Presence ("Ḥuḍūr"[44]).

The Jism Latif is said to exist in one of ten forms, corresponding to the level of spiritual development an individual has undergone in life. As such, it is also the corresponding level at which a human being survives physical death.[45]

See also: "Disambiguation: Qalab or Sultan al-Azkar".

Qalab or Sultan al-Azkar

The laṭīfa named "Qalab" in the Kubrawi tradition is equivalent to the laṭīfa named "Sulṭan al-Azkar" ("King of Zikrs"[46]) in the Naqshbandi (Awaisi) tradition.[47] Traditions that recognize this laṭīfa consider its realization to be the realization of a subtle body.

(See also "Disambiguation: Laṭāʾif and the Jism Latif").

Some (like the Kubrawi) consider Qalab to be a preliminary realization of the subtle body and therefore the first laṭīfa to be activated in spiritual practise. In this perspective, the realization of subsequent laṭāʾif is considered to be a refinement and differentiation of the subtle body.

Other traditions (like the Awaisi) consider Sultan al-Azkar to be a comprehensive realization of the subtle body and therefore the final laṭīfa to be activated in practise.[48] In this perspective, the subtle body is considered to be a unification and integration of previously realized laṭāʾif [49].

Ḥal (State), Maqam (Station), or laṭīfa

In addition to the laṭāʾif, some[50][51] Sufi traditions also speak about two other categories of conscious experience that can arise during spiritual practice:

“Ḥal” (State), is a temporary altered state of consciousness arising from psychological or spiritual influences acting upon a student. They are considered to be gifts from God that arise in experience and disappear, usually immediately.

“Maqam” (Station or Stage), is one of seven permanent stages of a Sufi's spiritual development/embodiment/transformation achieved by his own effort.

There appears to be no consensus that the laṭāʾif are directly related to either of the categories Ḥal or Maqam.

Laṭāʾif and the number "Seven"

The number "seven" appears repeatedly in Islam and in Sufism, to reflect the relationships between entities within various categories.

In Islam, "seven" appears in the Quran, in the Hajj pilgrimage, and in the "Seven Heavens", among others. In Sufism, it appears in seven laṭāʾif, seven stages of Nafs development, and seven Maqamat.

In some cases this use of "seven" is understood literally . . . while in other cases it is understood to be a metaphor for an "infinite" or "complete" number of entities.[52]

Additionally, there is not always a consensus about correlating one category of seven things with another.

For example, Ala ud-Daula Simnani explicitly correlates the seven progressive laṭāʾif with the seven ontological levels of Islamic cosmology, whereas other Sufi orders, which recognize only five laṭāʾif, do not.

Divine Names or laṭāʾif

The Divine Names of God in Islam are understood by Sufism to refer (in the great majority of cases) to the relational action, functioning, or appearance of transcendental

Divine Attributes/Qualities in immanent, manifest reality.[53]

The laṭāʾif, in contrast, while capable of being experienced indirectly through the somatic, emotional, and mental states they pattern in conventional experience, are primarily direct transcendental experiences of Divine Attributes themselves.[54]

There appears to be no consensus that the laṭāʾif are directly related to the Divine Names.

The laṭāʾif outside Sufism

In addition to Sufism itself, the laṭāʾif are also found in certain spiritual teachings whose founders have been influenced by Sufism.

The Fourth Way

The Fourth Way is an approach to human self-development introduced to Europe in the early 20th century by George Gurdjieff (1867-1949) and his student P.D. Ouspensky (1878-1947). Substantial parts of the teaching are thought to be derived from Naqshbandi Sufism.[55]

For example, there are said to be seven Centers (Fourth Way) within human beings that organise specific functions:

Five “lower” centers: the "Intellectual", "Emotional", "Moving", "Instinctive", and "Sexual", which are understood to operate explicitly in humans from birth.[56]

Two “higher” centers: the "Higher Emotional" and "Higher Intellectual", which are understood to operate implicitly in humans but which can become explicit in those who undergo a spiritual development.[57]

In this teaching, the qualities of the Higher Emotional Center (equivalent to Qalb (Heart) in Sufism) are known as “Positive Emotions” or “sacred impulses”. [58]

John G. Bennett (1897-1974), a contemporary student of both Ouspensky and Gurdjieff, researched the sources of Gurdjieff’s teaching and concluded that these Positive Emotions were in fact derived from the laṭāʾif of Sufism.[59]

Nevertheless, specific knowledge and realization of the Positive Emotions as laṭāʾif are rarely emphasized in schools of the Fourth Way teaching today.

The Diamond Approach

The Diamond Approach is a spiritual teaching developed by Hameed Ali (A. H. Almaas) (1944–) and Faisal Muqaddam (1946-) beginning in the 1970s. The history of the teaching was influenced both by Idries Shah and by Gurdjieff’s Fourth Way.[60]

It confirms the Naqshbandi (Punjab) understanding of five fundamental laṭāʾif and then expands it to include dozens of similar human capacities for which the more general term “Essential Aspects” is adopted.[61]

Unlike the Gurdjieff/Ouspensky Fourth Way, the Diamond Approach uses various mental, emotive, and somatic methods for realizing the laṭāʾif, as a central part of its overall teaching and practice.[62]

(See also: corresponding video in "External Links").

History of the laṭāʾif

The spiritual experiences identified by Sufism as the laṭāʾif have their immediate historical antecedents in the Emanationism of Neoplatonism[63] (3rd century AD), which is known to have influenced the subsequent development of Sufism (see: Platonism in Islamic philosophy). The Emanations of Neoplatonism, in turn, arose from the Theory of forms of Plato (4th century BC).

The general concept of spiritual “subtle centers” originated within Persian Sufism: Junayd of Baghdad (835–910), al-Hallaj (858–922),[64] and Shahab al-Din Abu Hafs Umar Suhrawardi (1145–1234).[65]

Kubrawi Sufi Najm al-Din Razi (1177–1256) proposed five “inner means of perception” (Qalb, Ruh, Sirr, Khafi, and Ikhfa) that parallel the five physical senses. It’s unclear to commentators whether these inner senses were already understood as laṭāʾif at that time.[66]

The earliest systematic formulation of the laṭāʾif is thought to be that of Kubrawi Ala ud-Daula Simnani (1261–1336),[6] who proposed seven laṭāʾif, relating them to the seven ontological levels of Sufi cosmology.[67]

From the 17th to 19th centuries, the Indian Mujaddidis, beginning with Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), returned to a standardized interpretation of five experiential laṭāʾif and associated their locations with parts of the physical body.[68]

The Punjab tradition within the Naqshbandi in the late 19th and 20th centuries continued with five laṭāʾif but identified the experience of their physical locations differently and viewed them as spiritual organs/capacities that also underlie ordinary forms of human consciousness.[69]

It is thought by some[70] that, just as with the nominal 99 Names of God in Islam and their underlying Divine Attributes,[71] the number of laṭāʾif and their potential realization by humanity might actually be unlimited.

See also

Al-Insān al-Kāmil

Arcs of Descent and Ascent

Dhikr

Emanationism

Illuminationism
 Islamic cosmology
 Muraqabah
 Neoplatonism
 Platonism in Islamic Philosophy
 Qalb
 Ruh
 Subtle Body
 Sufi cosmology
 Tajalli
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 External links

Article: Marcia K. Hermansen: "Shāh Walī Allāh's Theory of the Subtle Spiritual Centers (Laṭā'if)"; accessed February 15, 2025.

Book: Idries Shah: "The Sufis"; accessed February 15, 2025.

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The phrase is also translated variously as "Leader of Remembrance", "Prime Recitation", and "King of Invocations". It can refer not only to the experience of a subtle body, but also to a specific dhikr practise that invokes that experience.

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Sacred Texts Islam

Mishkât Al-Anwar

("THE NICHE FOR LIGHTS")

by AL-GHAZZALI

[1058-1111 C.E.]

Translation and Introduction by W. H. T. {William Henry Temple} GAIRDNER
[b. 1873, d. 1928]

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A TRANSLATION WITH INTRODUCTION

BY

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

I AM so conscious that my general equipment was insufficient to warrant my having undertaken an introduction to this treatise (in addition to the translation), that my utmost hope is this,--that what I have written may be regarded by lenient Orientalists as something to elicit--provoke, if you will--the necessary supplementing and formative criticism; or as useful materials to be built into some more authoritative and better informed work: and that they may from this point of view be inclined to pardon what otherwise might seem an unwarrantable piece of rashness and indiscretion.

A still greater presumption remains to be forgiven, but this time on the ground of the great human simplicities, when I venture to inscribe this work, in spite of everything, to the beloved memory of

IGNAZ GOWZIER

--that golden-hearted man--who in 1911 introduced me to the Mishkât; and to join with his

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name that of

DUNCAN BLACK MACDONALD

who first introduced me to the Mishkât's author. Of these twain, the latter may perhaps forgive the lapses of a pupil because of the filial joy with which, I know well, he will see the two names joined together, howsoever or by whomsoever it was done. As for the former, . . . in Abraham's bosom all things are forgiven.

CAIRO

July, 1923.

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INTRODUCTION

The references in square brackets are to the pages of the Cairo Arabic edition, and to the present English translation.

THE MISHKÂT AL-ANWAR[1] is a work of extreme interest from the viewpoint of al-Ghazzâlî's[2] inner life and esoteric thought. The glimpses it gives of that life and thought are remarkably, perhaps uniquely, intimate. It begins where his autobiographical *Al-Munqidh min al-Dalâl* leaves off. Its esotericism excited the curiosity and even the suspicion of Muslim thinkers from the first, and we have deeply interesting allusions to it in Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd,[4] the celebrated philosophers of Western Islam, who

flourished within the century after al-Ghazzâlî's death in 1111 (A.H. 505)--a fact which, again, increases its importance and interest for us.

[1. The *Mishkât al-Anwâr* is numbered No. 34 in Brockelmann's *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur* (vol. i, p. 423). It was printed in Cairo (matba`at as Sidq, A. H. 1322), to which edition the references in the present work are made. There is another edition in a collection of five opuscles of Ghazzâlî under the title of the first of the five, *Faisal al-Tafriqa*.

2. The Algazal of the Schoolmen.

3. The Abubacer of the Schoolmen.

4. The Averroes of the Schoolmen.]

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I. DATE, OBJECT, AND GENERAL CONTENTS

There is no way of fixing the Precise date of this treatise; but it falls among his later ones, perhaps among the latest; the most important hint we get from Ghazzâlî himself being that the book was written after his Magnum opus, the *Ihyâ'al Ulûm* (p. [9]). Other works of Ghazzâlî mentioned by him in this treatise are the *Mi`âr al-`Ilm*, *Mahakk al-Nazar*, and *al-Maqsad al-Asnâ*.

The object of the opuscle is to expound a certain Koran verse and a certain Tradition. The former is the celebrated Light-Verse (S. 24, 35) and the latter the Veils-Tradition. It is divided into three sections, of which the first is considerably the longest.

In this first section he considers the word "light" itself, and its plural "lights," as applied to physical light and lights; to the eye; to the intelligence (i.e. intellect or reason); to prophets; to supernal beings; and finally to Allah himself, who is shown to be not the only source of light and of these lights, but also the only real actual light in all existence.

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In the second section we have some most interesting prolegomena to the whole subject of symbolic language in the Koran and Traditions, and its interpretation. Symbols are shown to be no mere metaphors. There is a real mystical nexus between symbol and symbolized, type and antitype, outer and inner. The symbols are infinitely numerous, very much more numerous than those mentioned in Koran, or Traditions. Every object

on earth "perhaps" has its correlative in the unseen, spiritual world. This doctrine of symbols reminds us of the Platonic "ideas" and their earthly copies, and of the "patterns of things in the heavens" and "the example and shadow [on earth] of heavenly things" in the Epistle to the Hebrews. A notable deduction is made from this doctrine, namely, the equal incumbency of keeping the outward letter (zâhir) of the Law as well as its inner meaning (bâtin). Nearly all the most advanced Sûfis were zealous and Minutely scrupulous keepers of the ritual, ceremonial, and other prescriptions of the Sunna law, and Ghazzâlî here supplies a quasi-philosophical basis for this fidelity--a fidelity which some of the bolder and more extreme

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mystics found illogical and "unspiritual".

In the third section the results of this symbology are applied to the Verse and Tradition in question. In the former the beautiful, and undeniably intriguing expressions of the Koran--the Light, the Niche, the Glass, the Oil, Tree, the East and the West--are explained both on psychological and religio-metaphysical lines; and a similar exegesis is applied to the tradition of the Seventy Thousand Veils.

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II. MYSTERIES LEFT VEILED IN THIS TREATISE

In the course of all this Ghazzâlî gives us, incidentally, much that excites our curiosity to the highest degree; though always, when we get to the crucial point, we meet a "perhaps," or a patronizing allusion to the immaturity of his less-initiated reader. (Ghazzâlî's hesitations--"it may be," "perhaps", etc.--are worthy of study in this treatise. They do not so much have the impression of hesitancy in his own mind, as of a desire to "fence" a little with his reader.) He himself writes "incommunicable mystery" across a number of these passages. Thus, the nature of the human intelligence

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and its peculiar affinity to the divine (pp. 16, 71); the mystic "state" of al-Hallâj, and other "inebriates," and the expressions they emit in their mystic intoxication (p. [20]) --"behind which truths," says Ghazzâlî, "also lie secrets which it is not lawful to enter upon"; the astounding passage (p. [24]) in which to the supreme Adept of the mystical Union with deity are ascribed features and functions of very deity; the real explanation of the word tawhîd, involving as it does the question of the reality of the universe and the nature of the soul's union or identification with deity; the nature of the Commander (al-Mutâ`) of the universe, and whether he be Allah or an ineffable supreme Vicegerent; who that Vicegerent is, and why it must be he and not Allâh who performs the prime function of

the cosmos-ruler, viz. the issue of the command for the moving of the primum mobile, whereby all the motions of the Heavenly (and the Sublunary) spheres are set a-going; and the final mystery of Allah-an-sich, a Noumenal Deity, in whose case transcendence is to be carried to such a pitch that gnosticism and agnosticism meet,

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and the validity of every possible or conceivable predication is denied, whether of act or attribute (see p. [55])--all these things are incommunicable mysteries, secrets, from the revealing of which our author turns away at the exact moment when we expect the denouement. The art is supreme--but something more than tantalizing. Who were the adepts to whom he did communicate these thrilling secrets? Were these communications ever written down for or by his brother initiates? Or did he ever communicate them? Was there really anything to communicate? If so, what?

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III. A GHAZZALIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

On the whole it is the final section on the Veils-Tradition which, though really of the nature of an appendix, contains the most numerous and the most interesting problems for the study of Ghazzâlî's inner life, thought, and convictions. This tradition speaks of "Seventy Thousand Veils of Light and Darkness" which veil pure Godhead from the human soul. The origin of the tradition is, it is safe to hazard, Neoplatonic, and it therefore lent itself completely to the gnostic and theosophical mode of

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thought which so soon invaded Muslim Sûfism after its less successful effort to capture orthodox Christianity. Accordingly Muslim mystics seem to have seized upon the tradition with avidity, though they interpret it variously. For an entirely Neoplatonic, theosophical interpretation, as expounded by Rifâ'i dervishes, the translator's "'Way' of a Mohammedan Mystic" may be consulted.[1] According to this version, the soul, in its upward Seven-fold Way to Union with pure Deity, is at every stage stripped of 10,000 of these Veils, the dark ones first and then the bright. After that the naked soul stands face to face with naked Deity, with Absolute Being, with an unveiled Sun, with unadulterated Light. Ghazzâlî's treatment is different. According to him, these Veils are various according to the varieties of the natures which they veil from the One Real. And it is the classification of these natures, which is thus involved, that supplies rich material for an unusually inside view of Ghazzâlî's real views concerning men, doctrines, religions, and sects. It

[1. The Moslem World, year 1912, pp. 171 seqq., 245 seqq.; as separatum, Otto Harrassowitz, pp. 9, 10.]

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is not the orthodox schoolman, the fierce dogmatist, the rigid mutakallim, who is now speaking. We have the sensation of overhearing Ghazzâlî as he speaks aloud to his own soul, or to a circle of initiates. It is hardly less than an outline of a philosophy of religion with which we have to do. He divides mankind into four classes: those veiled with veils of pure darkness; those veiled with veils of mixed darkness and light; those veiled with veils of pure light; and those who attain to the vision of the Unveiled. Every line of this part of the work merits and requires the closest study. It is not possible to give this detailed study here--it has been given elsewhere, and to that the reader must be referred.[1] But a summary of Ghazzâlî's classification of souls and creeds may be given here, for thus, even more effectively than by an extended study, may a vivid preliminary appreciation be gained of the importance of this section for students of the Ghazzâlî problem. He begins at the bottom and works up the light-ladder, rung by rung, to the very top, thus giving a gradation of

[1. Der Islam, year 1914, in Nos. 2 and 3: by the present writer.]

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human natures and human creeds in respect of their approach to absolute truth. Sometimes the grades are definitely identified by the author. In other cases they may be certainly, or nearly certainly, identified from the description he gives. In the following summary Ghazzâlî's own identifications are given between round brackets; inferred identifications certain or nearly certain, between square brackets.

Class I.--Those veiled with Veils of pure Darkness

Atheists--

(a) Naturist philosophers whose god is Nature,

(b) Egotists whose god is Self.

Subdivisions of (b):--

(1) Seekers after sensual pleasures (the bestial attributes).

(2) Seekers after dominion ("Arabs, some Kurds, and (the very numerous Fools").

(3) Seekers after filthy lucre

(4) Seekers after vainglory

(2-4) (the ferocious attributes).

Class II.--Those veiled with Veils of mixed Darkness and Light

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A. THOSE WHOSE DARKNESS ORIGINATES IN THE SENSES

(1) Image-worshippers. [Polytheists of the Hellenic (? and Indian) type.]

(2) Worshippers of animate objects of physical beauty. (Some of the most remote Turkish tribes.)

(3) Fire-worshippers. [Magians.]

(4) Astrologizing Star-worshippers. [Star-worshippers of Harran: ?Sabîans.]

(5) Sun-worshippers.

(6) Light-worshippers, with their dualistic acknowledgement of a supreme correlative Darkness. (Zoroastrians of the cult of Ormuzd and Ahrimân.)

B. THOSE WHOSE DARKNESS ORIGINATES IN THE IMAGINATION

(who worship a One Being, sitting [spatially] on his throne).

(1) Corporealists. {p. 11}

[Extreme Hanbalites: Zâhirites.]

(2) Karrâmites.

(3) Those who have eliminated all spatial ideas in regard to Allâh except the literal "up-above".

[Ibn Hanbal.[1] Hanbalites.[2]]

C. THOSE WHOSE DARKNESS ORIGINATES IN THE [DISCURSIVE][3] INTELLIGENCE

[Various sorts of Mutakallimîn]

(1) Anthropomorphists in respect of the Seven Attributes of Allah, "Hearing, Seeing,"

etc., and especially the "Word" of Allah.

(Those who said that the Word of Allah has letters and sounds like ours.) [Early literalists; Hanbalites: early Ash`arites.]

(2) Those who said that the word of Allah

[1. Faisal al-Tafriqa, p. 10.

2. Averroes adds to these (with justice) the Koran; Mohammed himself; the "Early Fathers"; al-Ash'ari; and the early Ash`arites--before the time of Abul Ma'âli," says Averroes, loc. cit. i.e. of al-Juwainî, The Imâm al-Haramain, our author's Shaikh, d. 478 (see his al-Kashf 'an manâhij al-adillâ', ed. Müller, p. 65, Cairo ed., p. 54.)

3. For according to Ghazzâlî the genuine axiomata of the pure intelligence are infallible. See p. [10], and an important autobiographical passage near the beginning of the Munqidh.]

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is like our mental speech (hadith al-nafs.)

[Later Ash`arites.]

Class III.--Those veiled by pure Light

[i.e. purged of all anthropomorphism (tashbîh)]

(1) Those whose views about the Attributes were sound, but who refused to define Allah by means of them: replying to the question "What is the Lord of the World?" by saying, "The Lord, who transcends the ideas of those attributes; He, the Mover and Orderer of the Heavens."

[Hasan al-Basrî, al-Shâfi`î, and others of the bilâ kaifa school.]

(2) Those who mounted higher than the preceding, in declaring that Allah is the mover of only the primum mobile (the Ninth and outermost Heaven), which causes the movement of the other Eight, mediated by their respective Angels.

[Sûfî philosophers. (?) Al-Fârâbî.]

(3) Those who mount higher than these {p. 13} again, in putting a supreme Angel in place of Allah, Who now moves the heavens by commanding this supreme Angel, but not immediately by direct action.

[Sûfî philosophers. Al-Ghazzâlî himself when coram populo (Munqidh, p 11)!]

Class IV.--The Unveiled who Attain

Those who will predicate nothing whatsoever of Allah, and refuse to allow that He even issues the order for the moving of the primum mobile. This Commander (Mutâ`) is now a Vicegerent, who is related to the Absolute Being as the sun to Essential Light or live coal to the Element of Fire.

(1) Adepts who preserve self-consciousness in their absorption in this Absolute, all else being effaced.

(2) Adepts whose self-consciousness is also effaced ("the Fewest of the Few") [al-Hallâj and the extreme Mystics],

(a) who attain to this State with a single leap--as Abraham "al-Khalîl" did, {p. 14}

(b) who attain to it by stages,--as Mohammed "al-Habîb" did [at the Mi`râj].

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IV. GHAZZALI PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE FOREGOING

The mere perusal of this graded scale of systems and of souls shows at once its extraordinary interest because of its revelation of Ghazzâlî's innermost thought about these things, and because of the piquancy and difficulty of some of the problems raised. In the discussion of the whole subject the reader is referred to, the monograph upon the Mishkât to which allusion has been made. The problems may be indicated here in the form of questions, for the sake of defining them as particularly as possible:--

(1) How is it that some reputable Moslems are grouped with Idolators and Dualists in the second division ("mixed light and dark")?

(2) How is it that Jews and Christians are neither mentioned nor alluded to in this rather full sketch for a philosophy of religion? And where could they have been fitted in if they had been mentioned?

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(3) How is it that the later Ash`arites, the standard orthodox Theologians, are placed so low, viz. in the division where there are still veils of darkness?

(4) How is that the Mu`tazilites are neither mentioned nor alluded to; and that, according. to the differentia of the highest section of the second division, it would be inevitable to place them above the orthodox Ash`arites?

(5) How is it that the most pious believers of the earliest and most venerated type come no higher than the lowest section of the third division?

(6) How is it that to such men is ascribed any special concern about Allah as "mover of the Heavens"[1]

(7) How is it that the various doctrines about the mode of this Moving of the Heavens is made the main if not the sole differentia of the (ascending) grades of this division, though in other works Ghazzâlî treats this very matter with marked coolness[2]? How is it that on this

[1. This is all the more marked because the words are Ghazzâlî's own gloss on a quotation from the Koran; see below.

2. E.g. Tahâfut, pp. 57, 60.]

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is explicitly said to turn the superiority of the schools of Sûfî's over the pious Believers, and the superiority of one school of Sûfî's over another?

(8) How is it that this matter of Moving the Heavens is considered so particularly to threaten the Unity of Allah, and that that Unity is only saved when He is relieved from even the function of Commanding the (outermost) Heaven to be moved?

(9) And who is this Commander who thus commands, and who orders all things, and who is related to pure Being as the Sun to Elemental Light? And what was "the mystery (in this affair), the disclosure of which this book does not admit of"?

(10) What becomes of a Deity of whom nothing whatsoever can even be said or predicated? And how, then, can a "relation" between Him and His Vicegerent be asserted, still more described as above? And how can this Unknowable, Unimaginable and Inconceivable be nevertheless "reached" by mystic souls?

(11) What was "the book" into which Ghazzâlî himself says he put all his esoteric

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teaching (Jawâhir, p. 31); which he implores any into whose hands it may fall not to publish; which Ibn Tufail denies could have been this Mishkât (Hayy, ed. Gautier, pp. 13-15, trans. Gautier. pp. 12-14), nor any other of the supposed esoteric books that "had

come to Andalus"?

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V. THE PROBLEM OF THE VICEGERENT IN IBN RUSHD AND IBN TUFAIL

After this it will cause no surprise that it is this figure of the Vicegerent (al-Mutâ` . . . alladhî amara bi tahrîk il-samâwât) who excited the curiosity and suspicion of thinkers in the century after Ghazzâlî's death. The passage is at least twice singled out, once by Ibn Rushd in the treatise already cited, and once by Ibn Tufail in his Hayy ibn Yaqzân.

(1) Ibn Rushd uses the passage to level at Ghazzâlî a direct accusation of gravest hypocritical insincerity over a matter which Ghazzâlî had ostentatiously singled out as the prime test of orthodoxy, namely.. the doctrine of emanation. According to Ibn Rushd the passage about the Vicegerent was the explicit teaching of this doctrine of the Philosophers, for which,

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elsewhere, Ghazzâlî can find no words strong enough to express his censure and contempt. The words of Ibn Rushd are as follows:

"Then he comes on with his book known as Mishkât al-Anwâr, and mentions therein all the grades of the Knowers of Allah; and says that all of them are veiled save those who believe that Allah is not the mover of the First Heaven, He being the One from Whom this mover of the First Heaven emanated: which is an open declaration on his part of the tenet of the philosophers' schools in the science of theology; though he has said in several places that their science of theology (as distinct from their other sciences) is a set of conjectures." [1]

It is not within the scope of this Introduction to follow in detail the evidence for and against the truth of this radical accusation. This has been done at length and with considerable minuteness in the monograph in *Der Islâm*, which has already been cited (pp. 133-145). The

[1. Op. cit., ed. Müller, p. 21, Cairo edition, p. 59. The treatise was written before A.H. 575; date of *Mishkât* c. 500.]

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reader must be referred to that; and it must suffice here to say that after the full consideration of all the evidence the verdict given there. is Not Guilty. On the other

hand, the existence of an esoteric doctrine in regard to this Vicegerent and his function is undeniable (and undenied); and it is clear, from the comparison of the Mishkât itself with the Munqidh, that that doctrine differed vitally from the one professed by Ghazzâlî exoterically (Munqidh, p. 11). Ghazzâlî himself, in a passage of remarkable candour,[1] admits that every "Perfect" man has three sets of opinions (madhâhib), (a) those of his own environment, (b) those he teaches to inquirers according as they are able to receive them, and (c) those which he believes in secret between himself and Allah, and never mentions except to an inner circle of friends or students.

Ibn Rushd's accusation was an attempt to identify the figure of the Vicegerent, al-Mutâ` with that of Al Ma`lûl al Awwal, the First Caused, in the emanational scheme of the Neoplatonizing[2] philosophers of Islâm, with

[1. Mîzân al `Amal, p. 214.

2. The unquestionable Neoplatonism of much of the forms and expression of Ghazzâlî's thought, if not of the thought itself {footnote p. 20} Contd. (see especially pp. 15, 16. 29, 47 seq.]), exposed him in a very special way to this charge of emanational pantheism. And it cannot have made it easier for him to steer clear of such dangers in fact.]

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al-Fârâbi and Ibn Sinâ at their head. This was the Demiurge, the Being who first emanates from the Absolute Being, and mediates between It and all the lower stages or relational existence, with their increasing limitedness and grossness, thus relieving the predicateless Absolute from all part in the creation or administration of the universe.

There can be no doubt that whatever Ghazzâlî's doctrine of the Vicegerent was, and whatever else his esoteric doctrine contained, the emanational theory formed no part of that doctrine. For this particular piece of pseudo-metaphysics he appears to have had a very particular dislike and contempt; and if Ibn Rushd was really serious in levelling his accusation he can hardly be acquitted of being blinded by his bitter prejudice against "Abû Hâmid". The only possible ground for Ibn Rushd's accusation which I have been able to discover is as follows:--it is a fact that the extreme (ghulât) Imâmîtes did identify al-Rûh "The Spirit of

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Allah" with the First Emanation[1]. If, as is contended hereafter, Ghazzâlî identified al-Mutâ` with al-Rûh, and Ibn Rushd was aware of this, he may have thought, or been pleased to think, that Ghazzâlî therefore thought that al-Mutâ` was the First Emanation. This would be an indirect confirmation of the identification which it is attempted presently to prove, namely, al-Mutâ` = al-Rûh.

(2) We now pass to the other criticism of the passage, by Ibn Rushd's contemporary Ibn

Tufail, in the introduction to his philosophical romance entitled Hayy Ibn Yaqzân.[2]

Ibn Tufâil's allusion to this perplexing passage is as follows:--

"Some later writers[3] have fancied they have found something tremendous in that passage of his that occurs at the end of al-Mishkât, which (they think) impales Ghazzâlî on a dilemma from which there is no escape. I mean where, after speaking of the various degrees of the

[1. Massignon, Hallâj, p. 661.

2. Ed. Gautier, pp. 14-15, transl. 12-14.

3. Or "a later writer" presumably Ibn Rushd himself, in the passage already cited and discussed.]

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Light-Veiled, and then going on to speak of the true Attainers, he tells us that these Attainers have discovered that this Existing One possesses an attribute which negates unmitigated Unity; insisting that it necessarily follows from this that Ghazzâlî believed that the Absolute Being has within His Essence some sort of plurality: which God forbid!"

The excursus on this passage in the article cited from Der Islâm (pp. 145-151) can only be summarized here. It seems to have escaped the critics quoted by Ibn Tufail, that the Unveiled, according to Ghazzâlî himself, abandoned the position of the last of the Light-Veiled just because of this dread, viz. that the identification of al-Mutâ` with Allah would endanger "the unmitigated Unity" of Deity. Ibn Tufail himself, though he admits the serious contradictions which appear in Ghazzâlî's books, flatly refuses to see in this passage anything so monstrous, or anything sinister at all.

Unfortunately he does not give us his own exegesis of the passage; but it may perhaps be inferred from his own schematization of the

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grades of being. In this he makes elaborate use of the schema of reflectors, and reflectors of reflectors, which Ghazzâlî has already suggested in this book (pp. [15, 16]). "The essences of the Intelligences of the Spheres" are represented as successive, graded reflections of the Divine Essence. The highest of them is not the essence of the One Real nor is he the Sphere itself, nor is he other than both. He is, as it were, the image of the sun which appears in a polished mirror; for that image is neither the sun, nor the mirror, nor other than them both." It is probable that Ibn Tufail, who professed to have won through to his position after studying al-Ghazzâlî and Ibn Sînâ (the

juxtaposition is singular!), would have more or less equated this conception of the highest Essence of the Intelligences of the Spheres with the conception of al-Mutâ` in the Mishkât, though he says nothing about the business of Heaven-moving in relation to this Being. It need not follow that al-Ghazzâlî would have accepted this explanation[1]; though both men were evidently striving equally to avoid a total pantheism, and both

[1. Though his "mirror" schema in Mishkât, p. [15], is near Ibn Tufâil's meaning.]

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disbelieved in the emanational theory as taught by al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sinâ.

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VI. ONE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE VICEGERENT

In the absence of "the book" into which Ghazzâlî put these secret opinions, or inconceivable mysteries, including, we may suppose, the secret of this mysterious Vicegerent, we are not likely to reach any authoritative settlement of the question: nor, even if we be put on the right track, clear up the whole of the mystery. For want of direct help from our author, therefore, the only thing to be done is to examine minutely al-Mishkât itself, to see if it yields any indirect help. It would seem that from this examination two possible solutions emerge. In this section the first of these will be discussed.

This solution, which was first suggested to the writer by the distinguished French Orientalist, M. Louis Massignon, identifies the mysterious figure of this Vicegerent, al-Mutâ`, with the Qutb ("Axis") or some other Supreme Adept. According to the developed doctrine, this Qutb was an earthly Mystic of supremest attainment, who during his lifetime administered

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the affairs of the heavens and the earth. There was nothing about him, during his lifetime, to suggest to any observer that he was, engaged in so stupendous a task, and it was not known till after his death that he had been "the Axis of his time" (qutbu zamânihi).

The beginnings of this doctrine go back far beyond al-Ghazzâlî--a rudimentary form of it was held by even the ultra-orthodox Hanbalites,[1] and a developed form of the conception is expressed quite definitely in al-Hujwârî's Kashf al-Mahjûb,[2] and must have been widely held, in orthodox circles too, in the fifth century, at the close of which

our treatise was written.

Moreover, at least from the time of al-Hallâj, to whom, as we shall see, our author in this treatise refers in terms by no means of repudiation, the very word under discussion, al-Mutâ` or some other form of the same verb, occurs in significant connexion with supreme sainthood. One of the accusations levelled against al-Hallâj was that he taught that "having

[1. Massignon, *Passion d' al-Hallâj*, p. 754.

2. p. 214 of trans.]

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attained to sainthood the Adept becomes al-Mutâ` he who says to a thing 'Be!' and it becomes".[1] It sounds startling enough, but it was a true accusation, though it has to be taken in connexion with the whole of Hallâj's philosophy of mystical union with the Divine. For he did definitely adopt from a predecessor, Ibn `lyâd, the aphorism "Man atâ`a Allaha atâ`ahu kullu shay",[3] an aphorism which received a later redaction (quite in the spirit of Hallâj, as has been shown), "man hudhhiba ... fa yasîru mutâ`an, yaqûlu lish shay'i `Kun' fa yakûn," "He who has passed through the mystic askesis becomes Obeyed; he says to this or that, 'Be!' and it is."[4]

Since then al-Hallâj did so teach, and did use this very word, and since al-Ghazzâlî in this treatise betrays a very considerable admiration of al-Hallâj, and a sort of tremulous half-assent to his wildest utterances, including the notorious

[1. Massignon, *op. cit.*, p. 791; *ib.*, p. 472.

2. The sense in which he did use the expression, and the proof that it did not in his thought mean self-deification, is given very clearly in Massignon, *op. cit.*, 519-521.

3. *Op. cit.*, p. 472.

4. Al-Avnî on al-Istakhrî., quoted in a letter by M. Massignon to the writer.]

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"Ana-l Haqq" itself, it would seem that a strong prima-facie case has been made out for identifying the Mutâ` of our treatise, in spite of the cosmic nature of his functions, with some supreme Adept. But only a prima-facie case. To make out the thesis itself, the treatise itself must be interrogated; for it by no means follows that because a Hallâj held an opinion a Ghazzâlî adopted it.

There are, certainly, some passages that do suggest that the solution is along this line.

(1) The description of the adventures of a soul in highest state of Union (Mish., p. [24]) tends to bear out the Identification, or the general idea underlying it. The person there described is a supreme Adept, and in particular al-Hallâj himself. Having reached Union with the One divine Real, he ascends in and with Him "to the throne of the Divine Unity and from thenceforth administers the Command throughout His (or 'his,' for in this extraordinary passage the pronouns remain the same throughout) storied Heavens." The words translated "administers the Command", yudabbîru-l amr, are remarkable, for they contain an Arabic

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word (amr) which, as we shall see presently, is to the last degree significant, being the very word used in the Mutâ` passage (p. [55]), where Ghazzâlî confesses it is an obscure mystery. The Mutâ` (Commander) is said to move the outermost Heaven by precisely the amr (command). The words yudabbîru-l amr could no doubt be translated in a less significant way, owing to the troublesome double meaning of amr, ("affair," "command"), namely, "he disposes things." But in view of the fact that this amr was a notable Sûfî term, and a mysterious problem alluded to by Ghazzâlî in this very treatise, it seems inevitable to take it as "command" here. And a "Command" necessitates an "Obeyed".

(2) On p. [23], where the reference throughout is purely general, and presumably applies to anyone who has the necessary qualifications and attains this supreme mystical "state", Ghazzâlî says that when the mystic Ascent is complete, "if there be indeed any change, it is by way of 'the Descent into the Lowest Heaven', the radiation from above downwards." This also suggests supreme divine activity in the Universe

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below, especially if the word ishrâq refers, as it probably does, to causative activity.

(3) On pp. [13, 14] occurs another passage which strongly supports the general identification, though it leaves its particular and personal reference still obscure. In this the adepts, who in their mystical Ascent (mi`râj) "attained to that supreme attainment", are said to be "the Prophets", who "from thence looked down upon the entire World Invisible [precisely the world of the Heavens]; for he who is in the world of the Realm Supernal is which Allah, and hath the keys of the Unseen. I mean that from where he is descend the causes of existing things; for the world of sense is one of the effects of yonder-world of causes", etc. This looks almost like a reasoned, philosophic doctrine behind the mystical one, that to attain to the world of Reality is ipso facto to attain to the fount of causation; which involves the ability to direct the Causes which control all the Effects in the Heavens below and the Earth beneath. The Vicegerent does no more than this.

A close scrutiny of these passages leaves, one, nevertheless, with the impression that the

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Adepts whose celestial adventures are there described are too generalized, or perhaps one should say too pluralized, to be identifiable with this single, solitary figure of al-Mutâ` as he is presented in our passage. As far as these three passages go, this assumption of the reins of the Universe is only granted to Adepts in their mystic "States", to Prophets in their highly exceptional "Ascent". There is nothing to show that two or more such Attainers might not exist at one time, or that even one must always be existing; in other words, there is no trace of the complete and fully developed Qutb doctrine in this treatise. But these considerations make it impossible to identify any one of these Adepts, or all of them together, with the cosmic al-Mutâ`, whose function, related as it is to the very mechanism of the Heavens, is ceaseless, and coextensive with Time itself. And these last four words suggest a further consideration which in itself seems fatal to the proposed identification; namely, that al-Mutâ` was Vicegerent from the very foundation of the world; he is the one "who commanded the Heavens to be moved" (p. [55, 1. 12]). No

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Hallâj, no Adept, no Qutb, no Prophet even, ever claimed, or had claimed for him, such priority as this,[1] or even priority at all. But if not, none of them--and, if so, no terrestrial being at all--can claim to fill the role of this Vicegerent. The three passages were probably intended only to assert and account for the karâmât of the Saints in their wonder-working which was parallel to that of the Koranic Jesus.

The a-priori question of our author's attitude to the Qutb doctrine--whether, consistently with his published writings, he could have sustained such a doctrine in this work--is one which can only be indicated here. Professors R. Nicholson and D.S. Macdonald have both communicated to the writer, in reference to the passage under discussion, their opinion that there is an a-priori impossibility. To al-Ghazzâlî the doctrine was tainted with Imâmism, his special bete noire (see his attack on the Ta`lîmites in his Munqidh;[2] that since an omnipotent.

[1. The question of the priority claimed by a certain school for Mohammed, and of the nûr Muhammadi, will be considered, later.

2. See Nicholson, The Idea of Personality in Sûfism, p. 46]

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Administrator must also be an infallible Guide (whom Ghazzâlî would not have at any price), there is no room for the former in Ghazzâlî's thought (thus Professor Macdonald).

If the Mutâ` is not Mohammed, he is certainly no Saint (thus Professor Nicholson).

Be this as it may, the above considerations, drawn from the study of the text itself, and from the passages which *prima facie* seemed to point to the Qutb-Mutâ` identification, seem finally, when more closely examined, to rule that identification out.

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VII. ANOTHER SOLUTION

But there are other passages in our treatise which, when carefully studied, lead to the belief that in Ghazzâlî's own mind--though the identification is nowhere explicitly stated or significantly hinted--the Mutâ` is none than al-Rûh, THE SPIRIT OF ALLAH.[1]

In S. 17, 87, Mohammed himself had left this enigmatic entity as a divinely uncommunicated,

[1. Nicholson. The Idea of Personality in Sûfism, pp. 44, 45. The identification had occurred independently to the present writer before appearance of Professor Nicholson's work. It had also occurred independently to Professor D. B. Macdonald.]

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and therefore incommunicable, mystery. The passage runs as follows: "They ask thee of The Spirit: say, The Spirit pertains to my Lord's Word-of-Command, and ye have not been communicated knowledge [of It] save a little." The Arabic of the words italicized is *min amri rabbî*; and we are again faced, at the outset, with the troublesome double meaning of the word *amr*. The phrase *min amr* might merely mean--perhaps did only mean--"a matter of"[1] (my Lord's), a vague phrase, common in Arabic, meaning "something that pertains to" so and so. But in a case like this, we are not concerned with what Mohammed may originally have meant, but what mystic writers have taken him to mean. And enormously though this verse attracted puzzled, and baffled commentators and mystics of all ages, the latter seem to have taken the word *amr*, with practical unanimity, in the far more significant sense of "Command". The Hebrew root means "speak", and this meaning is implicit in the Arabic root also, which signifies spoken command. And

[1. The word *min* is itself tantalizingly ambiguous. It might mean "(derived) from" or "(part) of" or "pertaining to." Under such circumstances one looks round for the vaguest possible phrase to render the preposition.]

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just as later Jewish writers made out of a derivative of this root a Logos doctrine (Memra), so the Mohammedan mystics came near to making a Logos doctrine out of the word *amr*, taking their start from this very text.

A mystery having been definitely started by this text, a haze of mystification was thrown over the entire subject of "spirit": over angels as "spirits", over the human "spirit", the prophetic "spirit"; the interrelation between these, and the relation of all to "the Spirit"; finally its relation to Allah. In our treatise there is a full measure of this mystification.

"The Spirit" is *ar-Rûh*. With this may be absolutely identified *Rûh Allah* "The Spirit of God"; *Rûhuhu* "His Spirit"; and *al-Rûhu-l Qudsî*[1] (or *Rûhu-l Qudsî*) "The Transcendent Spirit"--all Koranic expressions.

What then are the considerations which suggest that we have in this Figure of Mystery

[1. This is the Arabic for the Christian "The Holy Spirit". But in Arabic as in early Hebrew the word emphasized the idea of separation or transcendence rather than of righteousness or holiness.]

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the key to the mystery of the Vicegerent? On this supposition there would be no wonder that Ghazzâlî left the figure of the latter a mystery, and declined to divulge the secret of it (p. [55]). He could not divulge the whole secret, because by the decree of Allah and the Book, he could not know it himself--"save a little." And, there is no wonder he declined to discuss it, considering the interminable complexities and baffling obscurities of the recorded musings of Sûfî doctors on the theme.

At the very outset we are struck by the fact that the word *Mutâ`* occurs in the Koran (S. 81, 23), and not only so, but it occurs as an attribute of the mysterious Agent of Revelation, the vision of whom Mohammed saw at the first (S. 53, 5-16). The text 87, 23, is not definitely cited in *Mishkât*; and in later Islâm the commentators, with their arid tameness, made a stereotyped identification of this Figure with the Angel Gabriel. But the Koran gives no warrant for this; and there is nothing in the *Mishkât* to show that Ghazzâlî thus taught. On the contrary, Gabriel is assigned a low place

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in the angelic hierarchy. No one can read those two Koranic passages (in S. 87 and S. 53) without feeling that Mohammed's awful visitant on those two occasions was the One of absolute supreme rank in the heavenlies: not a spirit but the Spirit. And it was *mutâ`*--"one who is obeyed." Is it not but a very short step from this to *al-Mutâ`*, The Obeyed-One?

The identification, however attractive, would nevertheless be precarious if there was not so much in the Mishkât itself that supports this identification.

(1) On p. [15] the ultimate kindling-place of the graded Lights, of which the Prophets occupy the lower and terrestrial ranks and the Angelic Beings the higher and celestial, is the theme of discussion. Both these ranks of beings are compared to "lights" and all of them are contrasted with the Highest of all, who is compared to "fire", from whose flame these graded lights are successively lit, from top to bottom. Who and what is this Highest of all next to Allah? He is said to be an Angel with countenances seventy thousand'. . . {p. 37} This is he who is contrasted with all the angelic host, in the words: 'On that day whereon THE SPIRIT ariseth, and the Angels, rank on rank.'" It is thus explicitly clear that this Being is the highest of all possible beings in heaven or earth next to Allah; and so, if the Vicegerent of p. [55] is also the highest of all, it would seem inevitable to equate them.

(2) In the very next page, p. [16], Ghazzâlî schematizes this conception, and, comparing Allah with the Sun (the source of light in the terrestrial system), he compares the highest of the ministrant lights to the Moon (all others being reflections, or reflections-of-reflections, of it). This "Highest is the one who is nearest to the Ultimate Light: . . . that Nighest to Allah, he whose rank comes nighest to the Presence Dominical, which is the Fountainhead of all these Lights" This "Nighest" and "Highest" cannot be other than THE SPIRIT spoken of in the preceding page. And on p. [31]--unless Ghazzâlî has suddenly changed all the symbols--the Sun is said to be the Sovereign, while "the antitype of the Moon will be that Sovereign's Minister (wakîl), for it is through

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the moon that the sun sheds his light on the world in its own absence, and even so it is through his own wakîl that the Sovereign makes his influence felt by subject who never beheld the royal person". Does not this wakîl who stands "highest and nighest" to his Liege-Lord, and who makes himself obeyed by all that Lord's subjects, strongly suggest "the Obeyed One", al-Mutâ`, the Vicegerent of the conclusion, whose function is, precisely, this?

(3) But what perhaps clinches the matter is the tell-tale word *amr* in that passage about al-Mutâ` himself on p. [55]. Those who stopped short of complete illumination, he says, identified al-Mutâ` with Allah just because he moves the *primum mobile* (and so all things) "with his Word of Command" (*amr*). "The explication of which *amr* (he continues), and what it really is, contains much that is obscure, and too difficult for most minds, besides going beyond the scope of this book." And then he says that the perfect Illuminati perceived that, al-Mutâ` the Obeyed One is not more than the Highest--other-than-Absolute-Deity, and is related to Him as the sun to Essential Light

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(mysterious enough this!) or as a glowing coal to the Elemental Fire: and therefore they turned their faces from that Being "who commanded (amr) the moving of the Heavens" to the One Existent, Transcendent, Incomparable, Predicateless.

With this word amr thus impressed on us with such penetrating significance we turn back to the Koran text: "The Spirit pertains to my Lord's Word of Command (amr)" Unless the word min introduces a quite upsetting element, the identification between this SPIRIT and the Commander who is Obeyed seems complete.

But the history of the Sûfî teaching on the text shows that min need introduce no such upsetting element, and that the practical identification of Amr with Rûh, of The Word of Command with The Spirit, was with the Mystics a familiar idea. It was the explicit teaching of al-Hallâj[1] and the typical "word of command" which this Divine Spirit gave was the fiat "Kun!"

[1. Massignon, op. cit., pp. 519-21.]

{p. 40} "Be!"[1] We have seen the fascination which this treatise shows al-Hallâj had for al-Ghazzâlî. Does it not seem likely, nay almost certain, that in his meditation on the inscrutable text he followed al-Hallâj in this equation, with whatever mental reserve regarding the Spirit itself--whether divine or creaturely, eternal or originate? Not that it was only Imâmîtes or extreme Sûfî Sunnites like al-Hallâj who asserted the divinity of The Spirit. The ultra-orthodox Hanbalites "admitted in some manner the eternity of the Rûh Allah".[2] Ibn Hanbal himself had given them the lead with a characteristic hedging aphorism (which reminds us of similar remarks on the Sifat, the Kalâm Allah, and the Qur'ân) "Whoever says that al-Rûh is created, (makhlûq) is a heretic: whoever says that It is eternal (qadîm) is an infidel."[3] His followers held fast on to "uncreate", and it was hard to keep "eternal" from following. No wonder al-Ghazzâlî

[1. This mediation of the creative function would carry with it the mediation of the administrative. In this connexion use would unquestionably be made of S. 7, 53, "the sun, the moon, and the stars are compelled-to-work by His amr--His Word-of-Command--His Spirit--exactly the function of al-Mutâ`.

2. Massignon, op. cit., p. 664.

3. Ib., p. 661.]

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gave a unique and mysterious tinge to his similitude for "The Obeyed", and that It figures, virtually, as an Arian Logos. The more one reflects on what is said about the function of this Being in M., p. [55], and especially Its comparison with the Sun (Allah being Essential Light), or with glowing coal (Allah being Elemental Fire), the more unique It appears, and: the more mysterious our author's thought about It becomes. For

such functions, and such a relation to Absolute Deity, are in very truth entirely unique, in kind as well as degree; and, thus described, the Vicegerent becomes, in a secondary way, as unique a Figure as is Deity Itself. No wonder the passage raised doubts as to the soundness of our author's monotheism! No wonder he was not anxious to go more deeply into the matter, out of consideration for the limited spiritual capacities of his readers! Perhaps, to preserve his own faith in the Unity, Indivisibility, and absolute Uniqueness of Allah,. he was glad to leave the dark problem of the Vicegerent where Allah Himself had left that of--the Spirit--an uncommunicated and incommunicable mystery, which now he only knew in

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part, and only saw as in a glass, darkly.

It remains to consider whether there is any evidence that Ghazzâlî extended the equation $Mutâ` = Amr = Rûh$ to include the *Nûr Muhammadî* (as suggested tentatively by Professor R. Nicholson in his lectures on "The Idea of Personality in Sûfism"), the archetypal spirit of Mohammed, the Heavenly Man created in the image of God, and regarded as a Cosmic Power on whom depends the order and preservation of 'the universe. If this could be sustained it would to some extent modify the conclusion reached before that al-Mutâ` had nothing to do with any human being, idealized or not, whether a Prophet or even Mohammed; though even so, there would be a vast difference between this archetypal Spirit and the historical Prophet.

While the germs of this idea, as of every other one, may be found much earlier than Ghazzâlî's century (the fifth), the study of the sketch which M. Massignon gives of the history of the doctrine (Hallâj, pp. 830 seqq.) does not create the impression that it was developed or

[1. Pp. 46, 47, and Lecture III.]

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received in orthodox circles[1] up to Ghazzâlî's time. Professor Nicholson does not find it in an orthodox Sûfî writer earlier than `Abdu-l Qâdir al-Jîlânî (b. 571, d. 561), in the generation immediately succeeding that of Ghazzâlî.[2] After which the doctrine developed and spread amazingly, reaching its height with Ibn al-`Arabî al-Jîlî several centuries later.[3]

Thus the a-priori evidence is this time decidedly against Ghazzâlî's having anything to do with this doctrine. Unless, therefore, very clear actual evidence were found in his writings, it would be surely justifiable to assert definitely that it is not Ghazzâlîan. It appears not to be found in his works other than al-Mishkât. If this is so, it may be further asserted with confidence that it is not found in al-Mishkât either.

On the contrary, there is much there that shows a relatively simple, primeval conception of Mohammed on the part of Ghazzâlî. For him the archetypal man is Adam, as in the Koran,

[1. It was at first prevalently Imâmîte and Shî'ite (Nicholson, Idea of Personality in Sûfism, p. 58).

2. He described Muhammed as al-rûh al-qudus and rûh jasad al-wajûd "the Transcendent Spirit, the Spirit of the body of the Universe."

3. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 59.]

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not Mohammed.[1] An examination of the passage[2] in which the idea of the "Khalîfa" appears shows that here also his thought was not esoteric, and that Mohammed was not in his mind: he is thinking of the whole human race, or of Adam himself, the first and representative human being, the only "Khalîfa" particularized by the Koran. And the one passage in the Mishkât which at first sight does look as if it contained a "high doctrine of the person" of Mohammed, turns out on closer inspection to, prove the exact reverse, viz. that essentially he belonged to this world and to the time-order--to the prophets, above whom are ranked the celestial "Lights" culminating, as we have seen, in the Supreme Angelical, The Spirit. This passage is on pp. [14, 15]. Here we have the Transcendent Spirit Prophetical (al-Rûh al-qudus al-nabawî) attributed to Mohammed as prophet, by reason of which he is called a Luminous Lamp (sirâj munîr). If this stood by itself we might be suspicious of something esoteric. But immediately after this the other prophets, and even saints, are said to be

[1. M., p. [34].

2. M., p. [22].]

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"Lamps", and to possess, as its name implies this Spirit Prophetical. The sequel shows that this Spirit is the Fire from which all the Angelical lights above and the Prophetical lights beneath are lit, and that this Spirit is the Supreme Angelical, "The Spirit," as in the passage already discussed.'

To sum up the conclusion to which I have been led by a consideration of the evidence of the Mishkât itself, top-ether with the a-priori evidence which supplements it and is checked by it,--the heavenly Vicegerent is the Spirit of Allah, the Transcendent Spirit of Prophecy, the divine Word-of-Command; he is not a Qutb or any Adept; he is not Mohammed nor the archetypal spirit of Mohammed.

Whether this mystery of the Vicegerent was connected in our author's mind with that of the divine-human, archetypal Sûra, as developed by al Hallâj and other advanced Mystics, will be discussed later.

[1. See above, pp. 36-37 The only thing that puzzles is that Ghazzâlî sometimes distributes and pluralizes the Spirit, see p. [15, l. 4] and p. [22. l. 8]. In each case the regulative singular, however, is close by. This reminds one of Rev. iv, 5 and v. 6, compared with Rev. ii. 7.]

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VIII. AL-GHAZZALI AND THE SEVEN SPHERES

The Seven Planetary Heavens played a great part in Platonic,[1] Neoplatonic, and Gnostic-theosophical schemes. The naive adoption by Mohammed (in the Koran) of the Ptolemaic celestial construction was one of the things which added picturesqueness to early Mohammedan tradition and theology; caused endless trouble to generations of later theologians; made it easier for Neoplatonic ideas to graft themselves on to Islam; gave to the raptures of the Mystics sensuous form and greater definition; and afforded to the Philosophers a line of defence, and even of attack, in their war with the Theologians. [2] And the allusions of the Koran were heavily reinforced by the legend of the Mirâj, the exact origin of which is obscure, but which appears in a highly developed form almost from the first. The influences of the Mi`râj are indeed evident in page after page of the Mishkât.

Al-Ghazzâlî's sympathies in regard to this subject were divided. He disliked the Philosophers,

[1. See the Vision of Er in the Republic, bk. X.

2. See Averroes' Ki tab al Kashf an manâhij al adillâ, quoted above on p. 11, note 2.]

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and this made him displeased with their confident assertions about the Heavens, while he detested the "philosophical" profit to which they put them. On the other hand, he was a Sûfî and thus in closest touch with persons who made very similar assertions about the Heavens, and also put them to profit in their own way. Finally, he was an Ash`arite Theologian, belonging to a school which had recently, after much trouble, eliminated from theology the dangerous ideas to which Mohammed's naive attitude to the Heavens,

had given rise.

This uncertainty of touch comes out, as, might be expected, in a treatise like al-Mishkât with its blend of scholasticism and Neoplatonically-tinctured mysticism. The Heavens figure continually in its pages. They seem to play a most important part both in thought and in experience--towards the close of the book a determining part. Yet it is impossible to make out exactly what that part was, in the mind of al-Ghazzâlî himself.

On p. [23] we have a correlation of the human microcosm and the macrocosm of the

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celestial realm, Ptolemaically construed, in describing the Ascension of a God-united soul. The adept's body-and-soul structure is conceived of as subsisting in three planes or Spheres, which are correlated with the three lower spheres of the Seven Planetary Heavens. From the highest of these (the Intelligence) the soul takes its departure and ascends through the four upper Heavens (ila saba`i tabaqât) to the Throne [beyond the outermost Heaven]. Thus he "fills all things" by his upward Ascent just as Allâh did by His downward Descent (nuzûl). In all this the pronoun "he" stands for the soul who is now Allâh-possessed and united, as described in what immediately precedes. It is the upward ascent of Allah (corresponding to His nuzûl illa-l samâ'i-l dunyâ), and not of the Adept only.

On the other hand, in p. [29], this Ascent is described in purely psychological terms, without this schema of the Heavens. And on p. [13] we have the following: "Do not imagine that I mean by the World Supernal the World of the [Seven] Heavens, though they are 'above' in respect of part of our world of sense-perception. {p. 49} These Heavens are equally present to our apprehension and that of the lower animals. But a man finds the doors of the Realm Celestial closed to him, neither does he become of or belonging to that Realm (mala-kûfî), unless this earth to him 'be changed into that which is not earth; and likewise the heavens;'[1] . . . and his 'heaven' come to be all that transcends his sense. This is the first Ascension for every Pilgrim who has set out on his Progress to the nearness of the Presence Dominical." And he continues: "The Angels ... are part of the World of the Realm Celestial, floating even in the Presence of the Transcendence, whence they gaze down upon our world inferior.

The last lines hardly give us the same ultra-spiritualizing impression which is conveyed by their predecessors. And, as we have already seen (Introduction, pp. 12-17), the part played by the Spheres with their Angels in the last section of the book is decisive, and there does not seem to be there any spiritualizing whatever.

[1. S. 14, 48.]

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How far, therefore, these passages are mere word-play, pious picturesqueness, or how far they represent speculation of a rather far-reaching character, is one of the puzzles of the book. In the Tahâfut, demolishing the arrogant claim of the Philosophers to prove their doctrine of the Spheres by syllogistic demonstration (burhân), he said: "The secrets of The Kingdom are not to be scanned by means of such fantastic imaginations as these; Allâh gives none but His Prophets and Saints (anbiyâ' and awliyâ') to scan them, and that by inspiration, not by demonstration." [1] So then there were mysteries and secrets in regard to the Spheres. In the Mishkât we are able to see pretty clearly that Ghazzâlî had his; but we are not able to see just what they were. He has kept this secret well.

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IX. ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND THEOMORPHISM IN AL-MISHKAT

The doctrine of mukhâlafa--that the divine essence and characteristics wholly and entirely "differ from" the human--appears to be

[1. Tah., p. 60. Quoted in the writer's article in Der Islâm, see pp. 134-6, 151, 152, where parts of the subject are gone into in greater detail.]

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assorted, as this treatise's last word, in its most extreme and intransigent form. For the conclusion of the whole matter, the end of the quest for truth for those who "Arrive", is "an Existent who transcends ALL that is comprehensible by human Insight . . . transcendent of and separate from every characterization that in the foregoing we have made." [1]

Nevertheless, the Mishkât itself seems to be one long attempt to modify or even negate this its own bankrupt conclusion. Indeed, it goes unusual lengths in asserting a certain ineffable likeness between Allâh and man. It is true that the usual anthropomorphic expressions--the Hand, the Sessions on the Throne, the Descent to the Lowest Sphere, etc., those

[1. In Ghazzâlî the most extreme Agnosticism and the most extreme Gnosticism meet, and meet at this point; for, as he says (p [25]), things that go beyond one extreme pass over to the extreme opposite." For him "Creed because Incredible" becomes "Gnosis because Agnoston". What saved the Universe for him from his nihilistic theologizing was his ontology (see below, pp. 108 seqq.). What saved God for him from his obliterating agnosticism was the experience of the mystic leap, his own personal mi`râj. This may have been non-rational, but it was to him experience. Even those who regard the

sensational experience of Sûfism as having been pure self-hypnotism cannot condemn them and the sense of reality they brought, in relation to the man who had thought his way out of both atheism and pantheism, and yet would have been left at the end of the quest, by his thinking alone, with an Unknown and Unknowable Absolute.]

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perennial sources for Mohammedan theologizing-are used and are discounted in the usual way. But they are, in reality, only discounted by being replaced by a Sûfî system of theomorphism. This has three main aspects--

(1) a quasi-Platonic doctrine of terrestrial type and celestial antitype;

(2) the relation of the divine and human rûh (spirit);

(3) the relation of the divine and human sûra ("image," "form").

(1) The whole of the first two parts of the treatise are practically an exposition of an Islamico-Platonic typology. It is not explicitly said that earthly things are more or less faint copies of "the patterns of things in the heavens," though this is probably implicit in what is said, namely, that the heavenly realities (haqâ'iq), (ma`ânî), all have their symbols on earth. These symbols or types, as their Arabic term itself suggests (amthâl), do possess a "resemblance" to their celestial antitypes, for, as al Ghazzâlî remarks, "the thing compared (al-mushabbah, the antitype) is in some sort parallel, and bears resemblance, to the thing compared therewith (al-mushabbah bihi, the type

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or symbol), whether that resemblance be remote or near; a matter again which is unfathomably deep." [1] Ghazzâlî. can hardly be allowed to elude the application of this true principle to Allâh Himself, considering that this very Koran-verse which it is the object of the entire treatise to expound begins with a simile. "Light" is the chosen, or rather the God-given symbol, wherewith Allah is "compared", and which therefore He must "in some sort resemble". This analogy of light floods the whole book. Now Allah is the Sun: now the Light of lights: and at the end, in the same breath in which Abu Hâmîd, with the incorrigible inconsistency which so angered Averroes, denied the validity of the similitude, description, relation, or even predication in regard to Allâh, we are told that He stands in relation to His Vicegerent (or "wakeel" in a parallel passage) as the pure Light-essence to the sun, or as the Elemental Fire to a glowing coal. Theomorphism has "in some sort" been admitted.

(2) In the lhyâ' al `Ulûm Ghazzâlî speaks of the human rûh as amr rabbâni "a divine

[1. M., p. [14].]

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affair" (amr must surely bear here its other meaning); and he is there very anxious, not to say agitated, over the esoteric character of the doctrine; it must be kept a dead secret from the Many! it must not be set forth in a book![1] "The specific characteristic which differentiates humanity [from the lower creation] is something which it is not lawful to indite in a book." [2] The thing that agitates him is the relation of this human rûh to the Spirit of God, rûh Allâh, and its relation to Allâh. The matter is esoteric--it is to be "grudged" to the "commons"--because it is dangerous ground. It is dangerous ground because one has to talk warily in order to avoid a violation of the uniqueness of Allâh, which would involve confusing Creator with created, and so passing gradually to ishrâk, which is the worst "infidelity."

This particular anxiety is not reflected in the present treatise; it is strange that the mystery of rûh does not figure in the list (see above, p. 5) over which the author's favete linquis! is

[1. See Mizân, p. 214, quoted above.

2. Ihyâ, iv, p. 294, quoted in a letter to the writer from Professor R. Nicholson.]

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inscribed.[1] He is mainly occupied with working out what the New Testament calls the "operations", rather than the nature of the spirit. In so doing the singular "spirit" becomes plural "spirits", arwâh, which, as already observed, happens also in the Book of the Revelation. Ghazzâlî works out the theory of the several "spirits" of the human psychology; then the graded "spirits" of the heavenly hosts; and then the Neoplatonic or theosophic idea of the gradation of all these (in maqâmât), and the way in which they are "lit" (muqtabasa) from each other in order: we must not say "derived", for that would involve him in the emanationism he was ever anathematizing yet, for ever incurring the suspicion of.[2] In all this his tone is open, easy, confident. The special mystery of The Spirit had been already discounted in the Koran, so that was harmless. As for the identification of Rûh Mutâ`, if our theory is correct, that was a grand secret. But that secret he never intended even to hint at, and it would really seem as if we had surprised and betrayed a sirr maknûn!

[1. The human 'aql does figure on that list, pp. [6, 7].

2. See the writer's op. cit. in Der Islâm, pp. 138-141.]

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(3) It was the sûra tradition,[1] "ALLAH CREATED ADAM AFTER HIS IMAGE," that above all else led Moslem thinkers into temptation--the temptation of trenching on the

uniqueness of Allâh. Its very riskiness seems, however, to have fascinated them supremely from the very outset. Not one of them could let it alone. In this very treatise Ghazzâlî returns to it again and again. Perhaps it would accord with inner truth to say rather that both he and others returned to that tradition not so much as moths fascinated by a dangerous glare, but as those who are feeling cold return for warmth and cheer to even an alien fire. The aphorism, sacred as a Koran text, was the assertion and pledge that man somehow is, or may become, "like God." The word sûra became the symbol and the guarantee of theomorphism.

In the first allusion in the Mishkât to this tradition (p. [9]), the point of the similarity is the human intelligence (ʿaql). In virtue of his intelligence, Ghazzâlî hints, man is "after the image of Allâh." The ʿaql is "Allâh's balance-scale

[1. Gen. i. 27, though Islâm ignores the parentage.]

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upon earth." [1] In its own sphere it is infallible. [2] From the ʿaql, as from a firm "taking-off" place, souls make their mystic Ascension to the heavenlies. [3] It is because it is thus the specifically human faculty that it is a determinative element in the human sûra. [4]

The second allusion (M., p. [23]) carries us very much further--even to that verge from which Moslem mystics so often looked dizzily down, but from which they so seldom fell, into the pantheistic abyss. Behold a human soul in completest Union (jamʿ) with Deity, sitting on The Throne, and administering all things in heaven and earth! "Well might one," says our author, "in looking upon such an one," get a new view of this tradition. Is not such a uniate, indeed, "after the image of Allâh"? But, he continues [5], "after contemplating that word more deeply one becomes aware that it has an interpretation like [al-Hallâj's] 'I am the One Real.'" [5] Unfortunately he has omitted to

[1. M., p. [29].

2. Ib., p. [10].

3. Ib., p. [24]

4. Ib., [40].

5. How {to} translate this "Ana-l-Haqq"? Not by Jesus, "I am the Truth", tempting though this is. "I am the Absolute" would be a parallel rendering in modern philosophic parlance. Professor Nicholson's "I am God" is startling, but illuminating because perfectly justifiable: for al-Haqq and Allâh are mutually and exclusively convertible.]

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indicate what precisely that interpretation is. We have a tantalizing author to deal with.

What was that interpretation?

Probably we do not find it in the third passage (pp. [34, 35]), though it is deeply influenced by Hallâjîan thought. There is in the celestial world something which "developpe, modalise, et concerte entre elles les creations divines ... une certaine structure interne particuliere a l'acte createur".¹ This living order, this organised "Presence" (hadar), is symbolized by the word Image, or Form. And this macrocosmic hadra has its earthly counterpart in an analogous human form, or sūra, which has the same "structure interne particuliere" (it is alluded to on p. [22, l. 1], and p. [34, l. 3], and described in detail on pp. [39-41]). Therefore, man, formed in this Form, is "after the Form, the Image, of this Merciful One (al Rahmân)". Ghazzâlî's explanation of his preference for this variation of the tradition, to which, however, he by no means always adheres, is difficult to follow.

[1. Massignon, op. cit., p, 519, describing Hallâj's doctrine of the divine rūh, and exactly hitting off Ghazzâlî's difficult thought on p. [24, ll. 2, 3], (cf. p. [22, l. 2]). But from this point of view rūh and sūra merge into each other, as a careful comparison of the two Mishkât passages just cited shows.]

{p. 59} But the general idea clearly is that "but for this 'mercy' [i.e. of these two correlative and coincident Forms] every son of Adam would have been powerless to know his Lord, for 'only he who knows himself knows his Lord". The wheel has, indeed, brought us round a strange circle! Through the eternal grace of theomorphism we win back to a higher anthropomorphism, so that the proper study of God is--man! And this from the writer whose last word is that Allah must not have so much as an attribute predicated of Him, or the divine uniqueness will be violated! Truly, thus the whirligig of thought brings in his revenges.

We have already seen many indications that before he wrote this treatise Ghazzâlî must have been deep in the study of al-Hallâj; and the passage we have just been considering may be added to these indications. Yet there is no overt trace in it, or elsewhere in the Mishkât, of al-Hallâj's profoundest thought on this matter of the Divine-Adamic; no trace of that strange Figure--that Epiphany of humanized Deity, or Apotheosis of ideal-Humanity--which was presented by Allah to the angels for worship

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or ever the first man was created, and in which He Himself, on behalf of the human race, swore unto Himself the Covenant (mîthâq) of allegiance. For this conception, which has the closest interrelations with all the moments of the above discussion--rūh, amr, sūra, nûr-Muhammadî--the reader must be referred to the grand work which has brought to light so many hidden things, A Louis Massignon's *La Passion d' Al Hosayn-ibn-Mansour al-Hallaj*. [I] Ghazzâlî's silence on this so remarkable development of the Sūra tradition

would suggest that it was precisely here that he felt it dangerous to follow al-Hallâj. What was possible for the seer might send the theologian over the line where Islam ends and pantheism begins. On the other hand, is it possible that here we have the explanation of our author's embarrassed words on p. [55] "on account of a Mystery which it is not in the competence of this book to reveal"? His inmost

[1. Pages 485, 599-602. In a note Massignon hazards the tentative suggestion that this epiphanized God (called by al-Hallâj al-Nâsût) in contra-distinction from the unknowable al-Lâhût) is analogical to, or suggestive of Ghazzâlî's Vicegerent (p. 601, n. 5). The suggestion is thrilling, as we see. It must be repeated that there is no overt trace of the doctrine in M.]

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thought may have been, "Perhaps al-Hallâj has penetrated here to something of what the Koran itself [in the Spirit-Verse] left obscure. I neither assert, nor deny. Allâhu a`lam!"

Thus we come to the ultimate question--the ultimate question with every Sûfî writer and book--does he and it escape pantheism? What light comes from this "Niche for Lights" upon this obscure question?

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X. PANTHEISM AND AL-GHAZZALI, IN AL-MISHKAT

The root question in regard to al-Ghazzâlî, and every other advanced mystic and adept in Islâm, is the question of Pantheism: did he succeed in balancing himself upon the edge of the pantheistic abyss, and finding some foothold for his creationist theism, some position that cleared his conscience towards his orthodox co-religionists? Or did he fail in this? The Mishkât contains a good deal that is relevant to this final issue.

It contains much, in the first place, which on the face of it reads like naked pantheism; and in particular the whole passage on

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pp. [19, 201 and [22-4], where not only is the most extreme language of the extreme wing of Sûfism (Ana-l Haqq[1] and the rest) quoted with guarded approval, but there is open eulogy of the formula lâ huwa illâ Huwa "there is no it but HE", which is declared to be more expressive of real, absolute truth than the Mohammedan creed itself lâ ilâha ill-Allâh "there is no god but God". This would seem to be as unreserved an assertion of

flat pantheism as could be found in philosophic Hinduism itself. Equally worthy of philosophic Hinduism is Ghazzâlî's "He is everything: He is that He is: none but He has ipseity or heity at all . ." [9] (p. [22]). And then gain the experience of the advanced Initiates and Adepts is described in terms of thorough pantheism: to them "the plurality of things fell away in its entirety. They were drowned in the absolute Unitude [5] and their intelligences were lost in its abyss" (p. [19]); and when they return to earthly illusions again from that world of reality they "confess with one voice that they had seen nought existent there save the One Real

[1. Which, it must be remembered, might not unfairly be translated -I am God---; see footnote above.]

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(Allâh)". Existent! Do words mean what they say?

No, not precisely! with a Ghazzâlî, and with Mohammedan mystics, clinging desperately to orthodoxy! The matter, in fact, turns precisely on this word "existent". What is existence? What is non-existence? It was Ghazzâlî's ontological philosophy that seems to have yielded him a fulcrum on which he could precariously balance the pantheistic and the deistic moments of his religious thought.

This philosophy is poetically stated in our treatise, but in spite of the poetic, imaginative diction it can be recognized as identical with his usual doctrine. [1] It will be found on pp. [17-19, 21, 22]. We have there a picturesque representation of a doctrine well known to the schoolmen of Islâm, that Not-Being is a sort of dark limbo in which the Contingent awaits the creative word Kun "Be!"--compared in this "Light" treatise to a ray of light from the One Self-existing Being. Neither the Greeks nor the schoolmen could

[1. See, for example, Minqiah and the Lesser Madnûn (if that is Ghazzâlî's).]

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ever quite get over the feeling that, in predicating anything of Not-being or a Nonentity, in using the word "is" in a sentence with Not-being or a Nonentity as its subject, you have in some way ascribed, not existence, but a sort of quasi-being, to that subject. Hegel's solution was so to evacuate the category of mere, bare "Being" of all content, and to demonstrate its consequent total impoverishment and inanity, that it could be seen to be, the equivalent of Not-being. This was impossible for the schoolmen, above all for Oriental schoolmen, even of the most contradictory schools, who regarded the category of "pure" being (they would never have said "mere") as the sublimest and most radiant of all the categories, and the very object of the whole quest of life. But the obverse of the Hegelian paradox may nevertheless be seen in their ascription to contingent not-yet-being a sort of quasi-existence. The effect of the creative word was simply to turn this potential into actual being. Thus the universe, always contingent, indeed but formerly

potential-contingent, now became actual-contingent.

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All this is schematized in al-Mishkât. The limbo becomes Darkness (p. 30); the potential-contingent, Dark Things;[1] the divine creator, the Sun; the creative act, a Ray from His real being, whereby a dark Nonentity flashes into being and becomes an Entity, but an Entity that depends continuously on the permanent illumination of that ray, for in the Mohammedan creational scheme, at any rate, Creator is equally capable of being Annihilator.

At this point Ghazzâlî's tortured thought is greatly helped out by the ambiguous word

[1. It is just here that, as it seems to the writer, the Philosophers with their Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity, the formless substrate of things--might well have forced a place for their thought, in spite of the Ghazzâlian wrath against them and it. For when the dark "self-aspect" of these contingencies of the Theologians is considered, prior to their "existence" (p. [59]), is there much to choose between the eternal potentiality asserted of them by Ghazzâlî, and the eternity asserted for hyle by the Philosophers? Ghazzâlî himself quotes a saying of Mohammed (p. [13]), on to which these Philosophers would eagerly have seized proving the point: "Allâh created the creation in darkness, then sent an effusion of His light upon it," For a man who was using this divine light-emanation to typify the act of creation, of Calling out of non-being to being it was dangerous surely to give, apparently so powerful an indication as this of a previous creation in "darkness" (= not being in Ghazzâlî's chosen symbology). It might very well have been claimed by the Philosophers that this creation-in-darkness is precisely their formless, chaotic hyle, eternal as darkness is eternal before the light shines. The Philosophers did pretend to prove their thesis from the Koran; see Averroes' *Manâhij*, ed. Müller, p. 13 (=Cairo ed. *Faisafat Ibn Rushd*, p. 12), where the following texts are cited in support, S. 11, 9; 14, 49; 41, 10.]

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wajh, which has two senses, or rather three, Face, Side, Aspect (logical). This gave him a formula: it was not the first time, nor the last, that the ambiguity of the chief word in a theological formula has been welcome to all concerned. He could take the Koran texts "the Wajh of everything faces (muwajjah) to Him and is turned in His direction," and "Whithersoever they turn themselves, there is the Wajh of Allâh;" and the hadîth qudsî, "Everything is a perishing thing except His Wajh;" and could then play on the word. In ancient and mediaeval times the merest plays on words were not considered figures of speech but profundities of thought. Quibbles masqueraded as discoveries. And so this word (a) enabled Ghazzâlî to keep his hold on creationism on the one hand, for these were "things" sure enough, all turned towards the central Sun and dependent for their existence on its creative light; and there was also the sound logical position, that under this aspect (wajh) of relatedness these things have actual being (p. [18j). So the

actuality of the universe is saved, and the abyss of pantheism is avoided. And (b), on the other hand, he could say to the

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pantheistic Sûfî (and to himself in that mood), that equally under this "aspect" of relatedness things, if and when considered an sich, had no existence, were not existent at all. The only Existent was the Wajh Allâh (p. [22]) that is, Allâh Himself, for, as he carefully informs us i (p. [191]), Allah cannot possibly be said to be greater" (akbar) than His own wajh; and I must, therefore, be identical therewith. And thus the out-and-out pantheist might well feel his case complete; the last vestige of dualism disappears; Allah is All, and All is Allah, lâ mawjûda ill-Allâh (M. p. [18])! As Ghazzâlî himself put it, Allah is the Sun and besides the sun there is only the sun's light. Quid plura?

Nevertheless, it may be believed that Ghazzâlî himself contrived to use this ontology so as to keep, not lose, his hold on the reality^[1] and actuality of things, and that early training, central theological orthodoxy, and strong commonsense proved by its help too strong for the pull towards pantheism, with which his late

[1. I.e. in the modern or western sense of the word, = "objectivity" To the mediaeval eastern thinker the Arabic the word meant rather "ideality." It is a case of the difference between phenomenal and transcendental reality.]

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Sûfism with its Neoplatonic atmosphere and sensational ecstasies undoubtedly did pull him--as Sûfism pulled every Mohammedan mystical devotee. Is it not notable that even in the lyrical passages in this treatise, in which he describes (with a rather scared unction) the Mystics' intoxication and the verbal blasphemies which that state so happily permitted, and which were permitted to that state, Ghazzâlî keeps his head, and preserves the same cautious balance as he does in the ontological sections (see pp. [19, 20])? When these inebriates, he says, became sober again, "and they came under the sway of the intelligence they knew that that had not been actual Identity, but only something resembling Identity" (not homoousion but homoiouision!). If we correctly translate ittihad^[1] thus, the remark is of crucial importance; for the ultimate test of a complete Pantheism is whether things are identical with God, or only united with Him. All classes of mystics without exception assert at least the latter--it is the "Union" of the Christian, as of the Muslim, Catholic; but only

[1. Professor Macdonald prefers "identification," to bring out the verb-aspect of the masdar more clearly.]

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those who have actually surrendered their balance and toppled over into the pantheistic

abyss assert the former. And Ghazzâlî did not do so. He goes on to quote yet another "drunken" cry of a soul in Union, "I am He whom I love, and He whom I love is I," and shows how even here a distinction is preserved. And then that other, who likened the Union to a transparent Glass filled with red Wine--

"The glass is thin, the wine is clear.
The twain are alike, the matter is perplexed
For 'tis as though there were wine and no wineglass there,
Or as though there were wine-glass and nought of wine."

And thus comments: "Here there is a difference between saying 'The wine is the wineglass' and 'tis as though it were the wineglass'." The former, he tells us, is Identity (tawhîd), the latter Unification (tawhîd), not in the commonalty's meaning of tawhîd, he honestly says (p. [20]), for them this is one of "the mysteries which we are not at liberty to discuss"--but at the same time not inconsistent With that meaning. What he had in mind was,

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perhaps, something like this: "I reject the herd's interpretation of tawhîd, the mere declaration-of-the-oneness of Allâh, as a bare truism, miserable in its inadequacy. I likewise reject the other extreme, the pantheist's interpretation of the word as an absolute denial of the actuality of things, or an assertion that things are Allâh. Against them both I assert that Allâh and the Universe constitute a UNITY, but one wherein the Universe is wholly relative to and dependent on Allâh, for existence or nonexistence; preservation or annihilation. All existing things are and must be 'united' to Allâh. But even this must not be declare, openly, for, then, what about Iblîs, Hell, and the Damned? I must not seem to teach 'universalism' any more than pantheism. Allâhu a'lam! "

It therefore seems to the writer that Ghazzâlî's position, which he tortured rather than explained when he tried to describe and illustrate it, really amounted to nothing more than the inevitable distinction between absolute and relative being; between things when viewed relationally, in their relation to their

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Author, and things viewed apart from that relation. Neither Author nor Things were to be denied actuality, or reality, as we understand the latter term. As between Allâh and human intelligences he even goes great lengths (in this very treatise of all others) in asserting parallelism and comparability, similarity therefore[1]; but between Allâh and all else ONE fundamental all-sufficient difference had to be asserted; namely, ALLAH is self-subsistent, qayyûm; things are not so. This distinction was the minimum one; yet also the maximum, for it preserved at once Creator and created, and gave actuality to each. There is, in truth, a good deal of wilful paradox in the Mishkât, of Oriental hyperbole, of pious highfalutin[2] intended perhaps to scare the "unco" orthodox of the

day, to make their flesh creep a little for their health's sake, and to "wake them out of their dogmatic slumbers". For it is in the Mishkât that we find the following words, too,

[1. And to assert similarity between two things is at once to have asserted two, and a distinction between them. See M, p. [7].

2. Is not this true for all Sûfî writers? Do we not take their language too seriously? It parades as scientific; it is really poetico-rhetorical.]

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which seem plain and harmless enough: "Being is itself divided into that which has being-in-itself, and that which derives its being from not-itself. The being of this latter is borrowed, having no existence by itself. Nay, if it is regarded in and by itself it is pure not-being. Whatever being it has is due to its relation to not-itself, which is not real being at all . . ." In other words, it is by a purely arbitrary mental abstraction that we "regard derived being in and by itself". The impossibility of really effecting this abstraction is precisely what preserves to derived being its measure of actuality --"whatever being it has . . ."[1] To us these last words are a clear concession of reality to conditioned being. It is true Ghazzâlî denies reality to it in the next sentence. But this only shows that when an Oriental talks of "Real" he means what we mean by "Unconditioned", and that when he is thinking of "Conditioned or Relative" he says "Unreal." The matter has become one of terms.

[1. Gh. has no more use for the Noumenon, for the Ding an sich, than had the post-Kantians; though for how different reasons.]

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It is impossible to demand more than this from Ghazzâlî as philosopher-theologian. He was, perhaps, not more successful than other eastern theologians in finding a place for the universe, philosophically, with or in Allâh. But has western philosophy been any more successful in finding a place for Allâh, philosophically, with or in the universe?

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TRANSLATION

[The references in square brackets are to the pages of the Cairo Arabic edition. {these are written in the form [p. 3], to avoid confusion with the footnote indicators.--jbh}]

THE NICHE FOR LIGHTS (Mishkât al-Anwâr)

Praise to ALLAH! who poureth forth light; and giveth sight; and, from His mysteries' height, removes the veils of night!

And Prayer for MUHAMMED! of all lights the Light; Sire of them that do the right; Beloved of The Sovereign of Might; Evangelist of the forgiven in his sight; to Him devoted quite; to sinner and to infidel the Arm that knows to fight and smile!

You have asked me, dear brother--and may Allâh decree for you the quest of man's chiefest bliss, make you candidate for the Ascent to the highest height anoint your vision with the light of Reality, and purge your inward parts from all that is not the Real!--You have asked me, I say, to communicate to you the mysteries of the Lights Divine, together with the allusions behind the literal meaning of certain texts in the Koran and certain sayings in the Traditions.

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And principally this text[1]:--

"Allâh is the Light of the Heavens and of the Earth. The similitude of His Light is as it were a Niche wherein is a Lamp: the Lamp within a Glass: the Glass as it were a pearly Star. From a Tree right blessed is it lit, an Olive-tree neither of the East nor of the West, the Oil whereof were well-nigh luminous though Fire touched it not: Light upon Light!

"But as for the Infidels, their deeds are as it were massed Darkness upon some fathomless sea, the which is overwhelmed with billow topped by billow topped by cloud: Darkness on Darkness piled! so that when a man putteth forth his hand he well-nigh can see it not. Yea, the man for whom Allâh doth not cause light, no light at all hath he."

What is the significance of His comparison of LIGHT with Niche, and Glass, and Lamp, and Oil, and Tree?

And this Tradition

"Allâh hath Seventy Thousand Veils of

[1. The Light-Verse in S. 24, 35. The Darkness-Verse. which almost immediately follows, and is mentioned in the exposition, has been added.]

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Light and Darkness: were He to withdraw their curtain, then would the splendours of His Aspect^[1] surely consume everyone who apprehended Him with his sight."

Such is your request. But in making it you have assayed to climb an arduous ascent, so high that the height thereof cannot be so much as gauged by mortal eyes [p. 3]. You have knocked at a locked door which is only opened to those who know and "are established in knowledge."^[2] Moreover, not every mystery is to be laid bare or made plain, but-

"Noble hearts seal mysteries like the tomb."

Or, as one of those who Know has said--

"To divulge the secret of the Godhead is to deny God."

Or, as the Prophet has said--

"There is a knowledge like the form of a hidden thing, known to none save those who know God."

If then these speak of that secret, only the Children of Ignorance will contradict them. And howsoever many these Ignorants be, the

[1. Or Countenance; see Introduction, p. 66.

2. Cf. S. 3, 6.]

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Mysteries must from the gaze of sinners be kept inviolate.

But I believe that your heart has been opened by the Light and your consciousness purged of the darkness of Ignorance. I will, therefore, not be so niggardly as to deny you direction to these glorious truths in all their fineness and all their divineness; for the wrong done in keeping Wisdom from her Children is not less than that of yielding her to those who are Strangers to her. As the poet hath it--

"He who bestoweth Knowledge on fools loseth it,
And he who keepeth the deserving from her doeth a wrong."

You must, however, be content with a very summarized explanation of the subject; for the full demonstration of my theme would demand a treatment of both its principles and its parts for which my time is at present insufficient, and for which neither my mind nor my energies are free. The keys of all hearts are in the hands of Allah: He opens them

when He pleases, as He pleases, and with what {p. 79} He pleases. At this time, then, it shall suffice to open up to you three chapters or parts, whereof the first is as hereunder follows.

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PART I.--LIGHT, AND LIGHTS: PRELIMINARY STUDIES

1. "Light" as Physical Light; as the Eye; as the Intelligence

The Real Light is Allâh; and the name "light" is otherwise only predicated metaphorically and conveys no real meaning.

To explain this theme: you must know that the word light is employed with a threefold signification: the first [p. 4] by the Many, the second by the Few, the third by the Fewest of the Few. Then you must know the various grades of light that relate to the two latter classes, and the degrees of the reality appertaining to these grades, in order that it may be disclosed to you, as these grades become clear, that ALLAH is the highest and the ultimate Light: and further, as the reality appertaining to each grade is revealed, that Allâh alone is the Real, the True Light, and beside Him there is no light at all.

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Take now the first signification. Here the word light indicates a phenomenon. Now a phenomenon, or appearance, is a relative term, for a thing necessarily appears to, or is concealed from, something other than itself; and thus its appearance and its non-appearance are both relative. Further, its appearance and its nonappearance are relative to perceptive faculties; and of these the most powerful and the most conspicuous, in the opinion of the Many, are the senses, one of which is the sense of sight. Further, things in relation to this sense of sight fall under these categories: (1) that which by itself is not visible, as dark bodies; (2) that which is by itself visible, but cannot

make visible anything else, such as luminaries like the stars, and fire before it blazes up; (3) that which is by itself visible, and also makes visible, like the sun and the moon, and fire when it blazes up, and lamps. Now it is in regard to this third category that the name "light" is given: sometimes to that which is effused from these luminaries and falls on the exterior of opaque bodies, as when we say "The earth is lighted up", or "The light of the sun falls on the earth", or "The lamp-light falls on

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wall or on garment"; and sometimes to the luminaries themselves, because they are self-luminous. In sum, then, light is an expression for that which is by itself visible and [p. 5] makes other things visible, like the sun. This is the definition of, and the reality concerning, light, according to its first signification.

We have seen that the very essence of light is appearance to a percipient; and that perception depends on the existence of two things--light and a seeing eye. For, though light is that which appears and causes-to-appear, it neither appears nor causes-to-appear to the blind. Thus percipient spirit is as important as perceptible light quâ necessary element of perception; nay, 'tis the more important, in that it is the percipient spirit which apprehends and through which apprehension takes place; whereas light is not apprehensive, neither does apprehension take place through it, but merely when it is present. By the word light, in fact, is more properly understood that visualizing light which we call the eye. Thus men apply the word light to the light of the eye, and say of the weak-sighted that "the light of his eye is

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weak", and of the blear-eyed that "the light of his vision is impaired," and of the blind that "his light is quenched." Similarly of the pupil of the eye it is said that it concentrates "the light of vision, and strengthens it, the eye-lashes being given by the divine wisdom a black colour, and made to compass the eye every way round about, in order to concentrate its "light." And of the white of the eye it is said that it disperses the "light of the eye" and weakens it, so that to look long at a bright white surface, or still more at the sun's light, dazzles "the light of the eye" and effaces it, just as the weak are effaced by the side of the strong. You understand, then, that percipient spirit is called light; and why it is so called; and why it is more properly so called. And this is the second signification, that employed by the Few.

You must know, further, that the light of physical sight is [p. 6] marked by several kinds of defects. It sees others but not itself. Again, it does not see what is very distant, nor what is very near, nor what is behind a veil. It sees the exterior of things only, not their interior; the parts, not the whole; things finite, not

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things infinite. It makes many mistakes in its seeing, for what is large appears to its vision small; what is far, near; what is at rest, at motion; what is in motion, at rest. Here are seven defects inseparably attached to the physical eye. If, then, there be such an Eye as is free from all these physical defects, would not it, I ask, more properly be given the name of light? Know, then, that there is in the mind of man an eye, characterized by just this perfection--that which is variously called Intelligence, Spirit, Human Soul. But we pass over these terms, for the multiplicity of the terms deludes the man of small intelligence into imagining a corresponding multiplicity of ideas. We mean simply that by which the rational man is distinguished from the infant in arms, from the brute beast, and from the lunatic. Let us call it the Intelligence, following the current terminology. So, then, the intelligence is more properly called Light than is the eye, just because in capacity it transcends these seven defects.

Take the first. The eye does not behold itself, but the intelligence does perceive itself as

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well as others; and it perceives itself as endowed with knowledge, power, etc., and perceives its own knowledge and perceives its knowledge of its own knowledge, and its know, ledge of its knowledge of its own knowledge, and so on ad infinitum. Now, this is a property which cannot conceivably be attributed to anything which perceives by means of a physical instrument like the eye. Behind this, however, [p. 7] lies a mystery the unfolding of which would take long.

Take, now, the second defect: the eye does not see what is very near to it nor what is very far away from it; but to the intelligence near and far are indifferent. In the twinkling of an eye it ascends to the highest heaven above, in another instant to the confines of earth beneath. Nay, when the facts are realized, intelligence is revealed as transcending the very idea of "far" and "near," which occur between material bodies; these compass not the precincts of its holiness, for it is a pattern or sample of the attributes of Allâh. Now the sample must be commensurate with the original, even though it does not rise to the

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degree of equality^[1] with it. And this may move you to set your mind to work upon the true meaning of the tradition: "Allah created Adam after His own likeness." But I do not think fit at the present time to go more deeply into the same.

The third defect: the eye does not perceive what is behind the veil, but the intelligence moves freely about the Throne, the Sedile, and everything beyond the veil of the Heavens, and likewise about the Host Supernal, and the Realm Celestial, just as much as about its own world, and its propinquate, (that is its own) kingdom. The realities of things stand unveiled to the intelligence. Its only veil is one which it assumes of its own sake, which resembles the veil that the eye assumes of its own accord in the closing of

its eyelids. But we shall explain this more fully in the third chapter of this work.

The fourth defect: the eye perceives only the exterior surfaces of things, but not their interior; may, the mere moulds and forms, not the realities; while intelligence breaks through

[1. Reading ### which both sense and rhyme demand.]

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into the inwardness of things and into their secrets; apprehends the reality of things and their essential spirits; [p. 8] elicits their causes and laws--from what they had origin, how they were created, of how many ideal forms they are composed, what rank of Being they occupy, what is their several relation to all other created things, and much else, the exposition of which would take very long; wherein I think good to be brief.

The fifth: the eye sees only a fraction of what exists, for all concepts, and many percepts, are beyond its vision; neither does it apprehend sounds, nor yet smells, nor tastes, nor sensations of hot and cold, nor the percipient faculties, by which I mean the faculties of hearing, of smelling, of tasting. nay, all the inner psychical qualities are unseen to it, joy, pleasure, displeasure, grief, pain, delight, love, lust, power, will, knowledge, and innumerable other existences. Thus it is narrow in its scope, limited in its field of action, unable to pass the confines of the world of colour and form, which are the grossest of all entities; for natural bodies are in themselves the grossest of the

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categories of being, and colour and form are the grossest of their properties. But the domain of intelligence is the entirety of existence, for it both apprehends the entities we have enumerated, and has free course among all others beside (and they are the major part), passing upon them judgments that are both certain and true. To it, therefore, are the inward secrets of things manifest, and the hidden forms of things clear. Then tell me by what right the physical eye is given equality with the intelligence in claiming the name of Light? No verily! it is only relatively light; but in relation to the intelligence it is darkness. Sight is but one of the spies of Intelligence [p. 9] who sets it to watch the grossest of his treasures, namely, the treasury of colours and forms; bids it carry reports about the same to its Lord, who then judges thereof in accordance with the dictates of his penetration and his judgment. Likewise are all the other faculties but Intelligence's spies--imagination, phantasy, thought, memory, recollection; and behind them are servitors and retainers, constrained to his service in this present world of his. These, I say, he constrains,

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and among these he moves at will, as freely as monarch constrains his vassals to his

service, yea, and more freely still. But to expound this would take us long, and we have already treated of it in the book of my lhyâ` al-`Ulûm, entitled "The Marvels of the Mind".

The sixth: the eye does not see what is infinite. What it sees is the attributes of known bodies, and these can only be conceived as finite. But the intelligence apprehends concepts, and concepts cannot be conceived as finite. True, in respect of the knowledge which has actually been attained, the content actually presented to the intelligence is no more than finite, but potentially it does apprehend that which is infinite. It would take too long to explain this fully, but if you desire an example, here is one from arithmetic. In this science the intelligence apprehends the series of integers, which series is infinite; further, it apprehends the coefficients of two, three, and all the other integers, and to these also no limit can be conceived; and it apprehends all the different relations between numbers, and to these also no limit can be conceived; and finally it apprehends

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its own knowledge of a thing, and its knowledge of its knowledge of its knowledge of that thing; and so on, potentially, to infinity.

The seventh: the eye apprehends the large as small. It sees the sun the size of a bowl, and the stars like silver-pieces scattered upon a carpet of azure. But intelligence apprehends that the stars [p. 10] and the sun are larger, times upon times, than the earth. To the eye the stars seem to be standing still, and the boy to be getting no taller. But the intelligence sees the boy moving constantly as he grows; the shadow lengthening constantly; and the stars moving every instant, through distances of many miles. As the Prophet said to Gabriel, asking: "Has the sun moved?" And Gabriel answered: "No--Yes." "How so?" asked he; and the other replied: "Between my saying No and Yes it has moved a distance equal to five hundred years." And so the mistakes of vision are manifold, but the intelligence transcends them all.

Perhaps you will say, we see those who are Possessed of intelligence making mistakes

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nevertheless, I reply, their imaginative and phantastic faculties often pass judgments and form convictions which they think are the judgments of the intelligence. The error is therefore to be attributed to those lower faculties. See my account of all these faculties in my Mî`âr al-`Ilm and Mahakk al-Nazar. But when the intelligence is separated from the deceptions of the phantasy and the imagination, error on its part is inconceivable; it sees things as they are. This separation is, however, difficult, and only attains perfection after death. Then is error unveiled, and then are mysteries brought to light, and each one meets the weal or the woe which he has already laid up for himself, and "beholds a Book, which reckons each venial and each mortal sin, without omitting a single one".[1] In that hour it shall be said unto him: "We have stripped from thee the Veil that covered thee and thy vision this day is iron."[2] Now that covering Veil is even that of the

imagination and the phantasy; and therefore the man who has been deluded by his own fancies, his false beliefs, and his vain

[1. S. 50, 18.

2. S. 22, 50.]

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imaginings, replies: "Our Lord! We have seen Thee and heard Thee! [p.11] O send us back and we will do good.[1] Verily now we have certain knowledge!"

From all which you understand that the eye may more justly be called Light than the light (so called) which is apprehended by sense; and further that the intelligence should more properly be called Light than the eye. It would be even true to say that between these two there exists so great a difference in value, that we may, nay we must, consider only the INTELLIGENCE as deserving the name Light at all.

2. The Koran as the Sun of the Intelligence

Further you must notice here, that while the intelligence of men does truly see, the things it sees are not all upon the same plane. Its knowledge is in some cases, so to speak, given, that is, present in the intelligence, as in the case of axiomatic truths, e.g. that the same thing cannot be both with and without an origin; or existent and non-existent; or that the same proposition cannot be both true and false; or that the judgment which is true

[1. S. 12, 32.]

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of one thing is true of an identically similar thing; or that, granted the existence of the particular, the existence of the universal must necessarily follow.

For example, granted the existence of black, the existence of "colour" follows; and the same with "man" and "animal"; but the converse does not present itself to the intelligence as necessarily true; for "colour" does not involve "black", nor does "animal" involve "man". And there are many other true propositions, some necessary, some contingent, and some impossible. Other propositions, again, do not find the intelligence invariably with them, when they recur to it, but have to shake it up, arouse it, strike flint on steel, in order to elicit its spark. Instances of such propositions are the theorems of speculation, to apprehend which the intelligence has to be aroused by the dialectic (kalâm) of the philosophers. Thus it is when the light of philosophy dawns that man sees actually, after having before seen potentially. Now the greatest [p. 12] of philosophies is the word (kalâm) of Allah in general, and the Koran in particular.

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Therefore the verses of the Koran, in relation to intelligence, have the value of sunlight in relation to the eyesight, to wit, it is by this sunlight that the act of seeing is accomplished. And therefore the Koran is most properly of all called Light, just as the light of the sun is called light. The Koran, then, is represented to us by the sun, and the intelligence by the Light of the Eye, and hereby we understand the meaning of the verse, which said: "Believe then on Allâh and His Prophet, and the Light which We caused to descend;"[1] and again: "There hath come a sure proof from your Lord, and We have caused a clear Light to descend."[2]

3. The Worlds Visible and Invisible: with their Lights

You have now realized that there are two kinds of eye, an external and an internal; that the former belongs to one world, the World of Sense, and that internal vision belongs to another world altogether, the World of the Realm Celestial; and that each of these two eyes has a sun and a light whereby its seeing is perfected; and that one of these suns is external, the

[1. S. 64,8.

2. S. 4, 174.]

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other internal, the former belonging to the seen world, viz. the sun, which is an object of sense. perception, and the other internal, belonging to the world of the Realm Celestial, viz. the Koran, and other inspired books of Allah. If, then, this has been disclosed to you thoroughly and entirely, then one of the doors of this Realm Celestial has been opened unto you. In that world there are marvels, in comparison with which this world of sight is utterly condemned. He who never fares to that world, but allows the limitations of life in this lower world of sense to settle upon him, is still a(brute beast, an excommunicate from that which constitutes us men; gone astray is he more than any brute beast, for to the brute are not vouched the wings of flight, on which to fly away unto that invisible world. "Such men," the Koran says, "are cattle, nay, are yet further astray!"[1] [p. 13] As the rind is to the fruit; as the mould or the form in relation to the spirit, as darkness in relation to light; as infernal to supernal; so is this World of Sense in relation to the world of the Realm Celestial. For this

[1. S. 7, 178.]

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reason the latter is called the World Supernal or the World of Spirit, or the World of

Light, in contrast with the World Beneath, the World of Matter and of Darkness. But do not imagine that I mean by the World Supernal the World of the [Seven] Heavens, though they are "above" in respect of part of our world of sense-perception. These heavens are equally present to our apprehension, and that of the lower animals. But a man finds the doors of the Realm Celestial closed to him, neither does he become of or belonging to that Realm unless "this earth to him be changed into that which is not earth, and likewise the heavens"[1]; unless, in short, all that comes within the ken of his sense and his imagination, including the visible heavens, cause to be his earth, and his heaven come to be all that transcends his sense. This is the first Ascension for every Pilgrim, who has set out on his Progress to approach the Presence Dominical. Thus mankind was consigned back to the lowest of the low, and must thence rise to the world of highest height. Not so is it with the Angels; for they are part of the World of the

[1. S. 14, 48.]

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Realm Celestial, floating ever in the Presence of the Transcendence, whence, they gaze down upon our World Inferior. Thereof spoke the Prophet in the Tradition: "Allâh created the creation in darkness, then sent an effusion of His light upon it," and "Allâh hath Angels, beings who know the works often better than they know them themselves." Now the Prophets, when their ascents reached unto the World of the Realm Celestial, attained the uttermost goal, and from thence looked down upon a totality of the World Invisible; for he who is in the World of the Realm Celestial is with Allâh, and hath the keys [p. 14] of the Unseen. I mean that from where he is the causes of existing things descend into the World of Sense; for the world of sense is one of the effects of yonder world of cause, resulting from it just as the shadow results from a body, or as fruit from that which fructuates, or as the effect from a cause. Now the key to this knowledge of the effect is sought and found in the cause. And for this reason the World of Sense is a type of the World of the Realm Celestial, as will appear when we explain the NICHE, the LAMP, and the TREE. For the thine, compared is in some sort parallel, and

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bears resemblance, to the thing compared therewith, whether that resemblance be remote or near: a matter, again, which is unfathomably deep, so that whoever has scanned its inner meaning had revealed to him the verities of the types in the Koran by an easy way.

I said that everything that sees self and not-self deserves more properly the name of Light, while that which adds to these two functions the function of making the not-self visible, still more properly deserves the name of Light than that which has no effect whatever beyond itself. This is the light which merits the name of "Lamp Illuminant",[1] because its light is effused upon the not-self. Now this is the property of the transcendental prophetic spirit, for through its means are effused the illuminations of the

sciences upon the created world. Thus is explained the name given by Allâh to Mohammed, "Illuminant." [2] Now all the Prophets are Lamps, and so are the Learned- but the difference between them is incalculable.

[1. S. 33, 46.

2. S. 46, 33.]

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4. These Lights as Lamps Terrestrial and Celestial: with their Order and Grades

If it is proper to call that from which the light of vision emanates a "Lamp Illuminant", then that from which the Lamp is itself lit may [p. 15] meetly be symbolized by Fire. Now all these Lamps Terrestrial were originally lit from the Light Supernal alone; and of the transcendental Spirit of prophecy it is written that "Its oil were well-nigh luminous though fire touched it not"; but becomes "very light upon light" when touched by that Fire. [1] Assuredly, then, the kindling source of those Spirits Terrestrial is the divine Spirits Supernal, described by Ali and Ibn Abbas, when they said that "Allâh hath an Angel with countenances seventy thousand, to each countenance seventy thousand mouths, in each mouth seventy thousand tongues wherewith he laudeth God most High". This is he who is contrasted with all the angelic host, in the words: "On the day whereon THE SPIRIT ariseth and the Angels, rank on rank." [2] These Spirits Celestial, then, if they be considered as the kindling-source of the

[1. S. 24, 35; see p. [45] of translation.

2. S. 28, 78.]

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Lamps Terrestrial, can be compared alone with "Fire". [1] And that kindling is not perceived save "on the Mountain's side". [2]

Let us now take these Lights Celestial from which are lit the Lamps Terrestrial, and let us rank them in the order in which they themselves are kindled, the one from the other. Then the nearest to the fountain-head will be of all others the worthiest of the name of Light for he is the highest in order and rank. Now the analogy for this graded order in the world of sense can only be seized by one who sees the light of the moon coming through the window of a house, falling on a mirror fixed upon a wall, which reflects that light on to another wall, whence it in turn is reflected on the floor, so that the floor becomes illuminated therefrom. The light upon the floor is owed to that upon the wall, and the light on the wall to that in the mirror, and the light in the mirror to that from the moon, and the light in the moon to that from the sun, [16] for it is the sun that radiates its light upon the moon. Thus these four lights are ranged one above the other, each

[1. S. 28, 29.

2. S. 28, 29: also 19, 53.]

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one more perfect than the other; and each one has a certain rank and a proper degree which it never passes beyond. I would have you know, then, that it has been revealed to the men of Insight that even so are the Lights of the Realm Celestial ranged in an order; and that the highest is the one who is nearest to the Ultimate Light. It may well be, then, that the rank of Seraphiel is above the rank of Gabriel; and that among them is that Nighest to Allâh, he whose rank comes nighest to the Presence Dominical which is the Fountain-head of all these lights; and that among these is a Nighest to Man, and that between these two are grades innumerable, whereof all that is known is that they are many, and that they are ordered in rank and grade, and that as they have described themselves, so they are indeed--"Not one of us but has his determined place and standing,"[1] and "We are verily the ranked ones; we are they in whose mouth is Praise."[1]

5. The Source of all these Grades of Light: ALLAH

The next thing I would have you know is

[1. S. 37, 164-7.]

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that these degrees of light do not ascend in an infinite series, but rise to a final Fountain-head who is Light in and by Himself, upon Whom comes no light from any external source, and from Whom every light is effused according to, its order and grade. Ask yourself, now whether the name Light is more due to that which is illumined and borrows its light from an external source; or that which in itself is luminous, illuminating all else beside? I do not believe that you can fail to see the true answer, and thus conclude that the name light is most of all due to this LIGHT SUPERNAL, above Whom there is no light at all, and from Whom light descends upon all other things.

Nay, I do not hesitate to say boldly that the term "light" as applied to aught else than this primary light is purely metaphorical; for all [p. 17] others, if considered in themselves, have, in themselves and by themselves, no light at all. Their light is borrowed from a foreign source; which borrowed illumination has not any support in itself, only in something not-itself. But to call the borrower by the same name as the lender is mere metaphor. Think

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you that the man who borrows riding-habit, saddle, horse, or other riding beast, and mounts the same when and as the lender appoints, is actually, or only metaphorically, rich? Or is it the lender who alone is rich? The latter, assuredly! The borrower remains in himself as poor as ever, and only of him who made the loan and exacts its return can richness be predicated--him who gave and can take away. Therefore, the Real Light is He in Whose hand lies creation and its destinies; He who first gives the light and afterwards sustains it. He shares with no other the reality of this name, nor the full title to the same; save in so far as He calls some other by that name, deigns to call him by it in the same way as a Liege-Lord deigns to give his vassal a fief, and therewith bestows on him the title of lord. Now when that vassal realizes the truth, he understands that both he and his are the property of his Liege, and of Him alone, a property shared by Him with no partner in the world.

You now know that Light is summed up in appearing and manifesting, and you have ascertained the various gradations of the same. You

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must further know that there is no darkness so intense as the darkness of No-being. For[1] a dark thing is called "dark" simply because it cannot appear to anyone's vision; it never comes to exist for sight, though it does exist in itself. But that which has no existence for others nor for itself is assuredly the very extreme of darkness. In contrast with it is Being, which is, therefore, Light; for unless a thing is manifest in itself, [p. 18] it is not manifest to others. Moreover, Being is itself divided into that which has being in itself, and that which derives its being from not-itself. That being of this latter is borrowed, having no existence by itself. Nay, if it is regarded in and by itself, it is pure not-being. Whatever being it has is due to its relation to a not-itself; and this is not real being at all, as you learned from my parable of the Rich and the Borrowed Garment. Therefore, Real Being is Allâh most High, even as Real Light is likewise Allâh.

6. The Mystic Verity of Verities

It is from this starting-point that Allâh's gnostics rise from metaphors to realities, as one

[1. Reading ### for ###.]

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climbs from the lowlands to the mountains; and at the end of their Ascent see, as with the direct sight of eye-witnesses, that there is nothing in existence save Allâh alone, and that "everything perisheth except His Countenance, His Aspect"[1] (wajh); not that[2] it perisheth at some particular moment, but rather it is sempiternally a perishing thing, since it cannot be conceived except as perishing. For each several thing other than Allâh is, when considered in and by itself, pure not-being; and if considered from the

"aspect" (wajh) to which existence flows from the Prime Reality, it is viewed as existing, but not in itself, solely from the "aspect" which accompanies Him Who gives it existence. Therefore, the God-aspect is the sole thing in existence. For everything has two aspects, an aspect to itself and an aspect to its Lord: in respect of the first, it is Not-being; but in respect of the God-aspect, it is Being. Therefore there is no Existent except God and the God-aspect, and therefore all things are perishing except the God-aspect from and to all eternity. These gnostics, therefore, have no need

[1. S. 88, 28.

2. Reading ###.]

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await the arising of the Last Uprising in order to hear the Creator proclaim, "To whom is the power this day? To ALLAH! the One, the Not-to-be-withstood"[1]; [p. 19] for that summons is.. pealing in their ears always and for ever. Neither do they understand by the cry "Allah is most great" (Allâhu akbar) that He is only "greater" than others. God forbid! For in. all existence there is beside Him none for Him. to exceed in greatness. No other attains so much as to the degree of co-existence, or of sequent existence, nay of existence at all, except from the Aspect that accompanies Him. All existence is, exclusively, His Aspect. Now it is impossible that He should be "greater" than His own Aspect. The meaning is rather that he is too absolutely Great to be called Greater, or Most Great, by way of relation or comparison--too Great for anyone, whether Prophet or Angel, to grasp the real nature of His Greatness. For none knows Allah with a real knowledge but He Himself; for every, known falls necessarily under the sway and within the province of the Knower; a state:

[1. S. 16, 40.]

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which is the very negation of all Majesty, all "Greatness". The full proof whereof I have given in my al-Maqsad al-Asnâ fî ma`ânî asmâ'i llâhi-l Husnâ.

These gnostics, on their return from their Ascent into the heaven of Reality, confess with one voice that they saw nought existent there save the One Real. Some of them, however, arrived at this scientifically, and others experimentally and subjectively. From these last the plurality of things fell away in its entirety. They were drowned in the absolute Unitude, and their intelligences were lost in Its abyss. Therein became they as dumbfounded things. No capacity remained within them save to recall ALLAH; yea, not so much as the capacity to recall their own selves. So there remained nothing with them save ALLAH. They became drunken with a drunkenness wherein the sway of their own intelligence disappeared; so that one[1] exclaimed, "I am The ONE REAL!" and another, "Glory be to ME! How great is MY glory!"[2] and another, "Within this robe is nought but

Allâh!"[2] ... But the words of

[1. Al-Hallâj.

2. Abû Yazîd al-Bistâmî. See Massignon's Hallâj, p. 513.]

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Lovers Passionate in their intoxication and ecstasy [p. 20] must be hidden away and not spoken of . . . Then when that drunkenness abated and they came again under the sway of the intelligence, which is Allâh's balance-scale upon earth, they knew that that had not been actual Identity, but only something resembling Identity; as in those words of the Lover at the height of his passion:--

"I am He whom I love and He whom I love is I;
We are two spirits immanent in one body."[1]

For it is possible for a man who has never seen a mirror in his life, to be confronted suddenly by a mirror, to look into it, and to think that the form which he sees in the mirror is the form of the mirror itself, "identical" with it. Another might see wine in a glass, and think that the wine is just the stain of the glass. And if that thought becomes with him use and wont, like a fixed idea with him, it absorbs him wholly, so that he sings:--

"The glass is thin, the wine is clear!
The twain are alike, the matter is perplexed:

[1. By al-Hallâj.]

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For 'tis as though there were wine and no wineglass there,
Or as though mere were wine-glass and nought of wine!"

He there is a difference between saying, "The wine is the wine-glass," and saying, "'tis as though it were the wine-glass." Now, when this state prevails, it is called in relation to him who experiences it, Extinction, nay, Extinction of Extinction, for the soul has become extinct to itself, extinct to its own extinction; for it becomes unconscious of itself and unconscious of its own unconsciousness, since, were it conscious of its own unconsciousness, it would be conscious of itself. In relation to the man immersed in this state, the state is called, in the language of metaphor, "Identity"; in the language of reality, "Unification." And beneath these verities also lie mysteries which we are not at liberty to discuss.

7. The "God-Aspect": an "advanced" Explanation of the Relation of these Lights to ALLAH

It may be that you desire greatly to know

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the aspect (wajh) [p. 21] whereby Allâh's light is related to the heavens and the earth, or rather the aspect whereby He is in Himself the Light of heavens and earth. And this shall assuredly not be denied you, now that you know that Allâh is Light, and that beside Him there is no light. and that He is every light, and that He is the universal light: since light is an expression for that by which things are revealed; or., higher still, that by and for which they are revealed; yea, and higher still, that by, for, and from which they are revealed: and now that, you know, too that, of everything called light, only that by, for, and from which things are revealed is real--that Light beyond which there is no light to kindle and feed its flame, for It is kindled and fed in itself, from Itself, and for Itself, and from no other source at all. Such a conception, such a description, you are now assured, can be applied to the Great Primary, alone. You are also assured that the heavens and the earth are filled with light appertaining to those two fundamental light-planes, our Sight and our Insight; by which I mean our senses and our intelligence. The first kind of light is

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what we see in the heavens--sun and moon and stars; and what we see in earth--that is, the rays which are poured over the whole face of the earth, making visible all the different colours and hues, especially in the season of spring; and over all animals and plants and things, in all their states: for without these rays no colour would appear or even exist. Moreover, every shape and size which is visible to perception is apprehended in consequence of colour, and it is impossible to conceive of apprehending them without colour. As for the other ideal, intelligential Lights, the World Supernal is filled with them--to wit, the angelic substance; and the World Inferior is also full of them--[p. 22] to wit, animal life and human life successively. The order of the World Inferior is manifested by means of this inferior human light; while the order of the World Supernal is manifested by means of that angelical light. This is the order alluded to in the passage in the Koran, "He it is Who has formed you from the earth, and hath peopled it with you, that He might call you Successors upon the earth" . . . and "Maketh you Successors on

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the earth," and "Verily I have set in the earth a Successor" (Khalîfa).[1]

Thus you see that the whole world is all filled with the external lights of perception, and the internal lights of intelligence; also that the lower lights are effused or emanate the one from the other, as light emanates or is effused from a lamp; while the Lamp itself is the transcendental Light of Prophecy; and that, the transcendental Spirits of Prophecy are lit from the Spirit Supernal, as the lamp is lit from fire; and that the Supernals are lit

the one from the other; and that their order is one of ascending grades: further, that these all rise to the Light of Lights, the Origin and Fountainhead of lights, and that is ALLAH, only and alone; and that all other lights are borrowed from Him, and that His alone is real light; and that everything is from His light, nay, He is everything, nay, HE IS THAT HE is, none but He has ipseity or heity at all, save by metaphor. Therefore there is no light but He, while all other lights are only lights from the Aspect which accompanies Him, not from

[1. S. 61, 11; 55, 24; 62, 27; 30, 2. Cf. Mishkât, p.[34].]

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themselves. Thus the aspect and face of everything faces to Him and turns in His direction; and "whithersoever they turn themselves there is the Face of Allâh." [1] So, then, there is no divinity but HE; for "divinity" is an expression by which is connoted that towards which all faces are directed [2] in worship and in confession--that He is Deity; but which I mean the faces of the hearts of men, for they verily are lights and spirits. Nay, more, just as "there is no deity but He," so there is no heity but He, [p. 23] for "he" is an expression for something which one can indicate; but in every and any case we can but indicate Him. Every time you indicate anything, your indication is in reality, to Him, even though through your ignorance of the truth of truths which we have mentioned you -know it not. Just as one cannot point to, indicate, sunlight but only the sun, so the relation of the sum of things to Allâh is, in the visible -analogue, as the relation of light to the sun. Therefore "There is no deity but ALLAH" is the

[1. S. 2. 115, see 144, 149, 150.

2. Gh.'s piece of amateur etymology here, by which he appears to derive the root 'lh ("god") from the root wty ("turn"), is about as absurd as my attempt to suggest it in the English.]

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Many's declaration of Unity: that of the Few is "There is no he but HE"; the former is more general, but the latter is more particular, more comprehensive, more exact, and more apt to give him who declares it entrance into the pure and absolute Oneness and Onliness. This kingdom of the One-and-Onliness is the ultimate point of mortals' Ascent: there is no ascending stage beyond it; for "ascending" involves plurality, being a sort of relatively involving two stages, an ascent from and an ascent to. But when Plurality has been eliminated, Unity is established, relation is effaced, all indication from "here" to "there" falls away, and there remains neither height nor depth, nor anyone to fare up or down. The upward Progress, the Ascent of the soul, then becomes impossible, for there is no height beyond the Highest, no plurality alongside of the One, and, now that plurality has terminated, no Ascent for the soul. If there be, indeed, any change, it is by way of the "Descent into the Lowest Heaven", the radiation from above downwards; for

the Highest, though It may have no higher, has a lower. This is the goal of

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goals, the last object of spiritual search, known of him who knows it, denied by him who is ignorant of it. It belongs to that knowledge which is according to the form of the hidden thing, and which no one knoweth save the Learned[1] is Allah. If, therefore, they utter it, it is only denied by the Ignorant of Him.

There is no improbability in the explanation given by these Learned to this "Descent into the Lowest Heaven", [p. 24] namely, that it is the descent of an Angel; though one of those Gnostics[2] has, indeed, fancied a less probable explanation. He, immersed as he was in the divine One-and-Onliness, said that Allah has "a descent into the lowest heaven", and that this descent is His descent, in order to use physical senses, and to set in motion bodily limbs; and that He is the one indicated in the Tradition in which the Prophet says, "I have become His hearing whereby He heareth, His vision whereby He seeth, His tongue wherewith He speaketh." Now if the Prophet was Allah's hearing and vision and tongue, then Allah and He alone is

[1. Cf. S. 3, 7.

2. Al-Hallâjj.

3. A saying reported by Ibn Adham, d. 170.]

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the Hearer, the Seer, the Speaker; and He is the one indicated in His own word to Moses, "I was sick, and thou visitedst Me not." [1] According to this, the bodily movements of this Confessor of the divine Unity are from the lowest heaven; his sensation from a heaven next above; and his intelligence from the heaven next above that. From that heaven of the intelligence he fares upward to the limit of the Ascension of created things, the kingdom of the One-and-Onliness, a sevenfold way; thereafter "setteth he himself on the throne" of the divine Unity, and therefrom "taketh command"[2] throughout his storied heavens. Well might one, in looking upon such an one, apply to him the saying, "Allah created Adam after the image of the Merciful One"; until, after contemplating that word more deeply, he becomes aware that it has an interpretation like those other words, "I am the ONE REAL," "Glory be to ME!" [3] or those sayings of the Prophet, that Allah said, "I was sick and thou

[1. See St, Matt. xxv.

2. Ar. al amr. See on p. [55], Introduction, pp. 32-40. Or, "controlleth things." And see S, 32, 5.

3. M, p. [19].]

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visitedst Me not," and "I am His hearing, and His vision; and His tongue". But I see fit now to draw rein in this exposition, for I think that you cannot hear more of this sort than the amount which I have now communicated.

8. The Relation of these Lights to ALLAH: Simpler Illustrations and Explanations

It may well be that you will not rise to the height of these words, for all your pains; it may be that for all your pains you will come short of it after all. Here, then, is something that lies nearer your understanding, and nearer your weakness. The meaning of the doctrine that Allah is [p. 25] the Light of Heavens and Earth may be understood in relation to phenomenal, visible light. When you see hues of spring-the tender green, for example-in the full light of day, you entertain no doubt but that you are looking on colours, and very likely you suppose that you are looking on nothing else alongside of them. As though you should say, "I see nothing alongside of the green." Many have in fact, obstinately maintained this. They have asserted that light is a meaningless term, and that there is nothing but colour with

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the colours. Thus they denied the existence of the light, although it was the most manifest of all things--how should it not be so, considering that through it alone all things become manifest?, for it is the thing that is itself visible and makes visible, as we said before. But, when the sun sank, and heaven's lamp disappeared from sight, and night's shadow fell, then apprehended these men the existence of an essential difference between inherent shadow and inherent light; and they confessed that light is a form that lies behind all colour, and is apprehended with colour, insomuch that, so to speak, through its intense union with the colours it is not apprehended, and through its intense obviousness it is invisible. And it may be that this very intensity is the direct cause of its invisibility, for things that go beyond one extreme pass over to the extreme opposite.

If this is clear to you, you must further know that those endowed with this Insight never saw a single object without seeing Allah along with it. It may be that one of them went further than this and said, "I have never seen a single object, but I first saw Allah"; for

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some of, them only see objects through and in Allah, while others first see objects and then see Allah in and through those objects. It is to the first class that the Koran alludes to in the words, "Doth it not suffice that My Lord seeth all?"[1] and to the second in the words, "We shall shew them our signs in all the world and in themselves." For the first

class [p. 26] have the direct intuition of Allah, and the second infer Him from His works. The former is the rank of the Saint-Friends of God, the latter of the Learned "who are established in knowledge".[2] After these two grades there remains nothing except that of the careless, on whose faces is the veil.

Thus you see that just as everything is manifest to man's Sight by means of light, so everything is manifest to man's Insight by means of Allah; for He is with everything every moment and by Him does everything appear. But here the analogy ceases, and we have a radical difference; namely, that phenomenal light can be conceived of as disappearing with the sinking of the sun, and as assuming a veil

[1. S. 41, 53.

2. S. 3, 6.]

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in order that shadow may appear: while the divine light, which is the condition of all appearance, cannot be conceived as disappearing. That sun can never set! It abides for ever with all things. Thus the method of difference (as a method for the demonstration of the Existence of God from His works) is not at our disposal. Were the appearance of Allah conceivable, heaven and earth would fall to ruin, and thence, through difference, would be apprehended an effect which would simultaneously compel the recognition of the Cause whereby all things appeared. But, as it is, all Nature remains the same and invariable to our sight because of the unity of its Creator, for "all things are singing His praise"[1] (not some things) at all times (not sometimes); and thus the method of difference is eliminated, and the way to the knowledge of God is obscured. For the most manifest way to the knowledge of things is by their contraries: the thing that possesses no contrary and no opposite, its features being always exactly alike when you are looking at it, will very likely elude your

[1. See S. 17, 44.]

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notice altogether. In this case its obscureness results from its very obviousness, and its elusiveness from the very radiance of its brightness. Then glory to Him who hides Himself from His own creation by His utter manifestness, and is veiled from their gaze through the very effulgence of His own light!

But it may be that not even this teaching is intelligible to some limited intelligences, [27] who from our statement (that "Allah is with, everything", as the light is with everything) will understand that He is in every place. Too high. and holy is He to be related to place! So far from starting this vein imagining, we assert to you that He is prior to everything, and above everything, and that He makes everything manifest. Now manifest is

inseparable from, manifested, subjectively, in the cognition of the thinker; and this is what we mean by saying. that Allah accompanies or is "with" everything. You know, further, that manifest is prior to, and above, manifested, though He be "with" it; but he is "with" it from one aspect, and "above" it from another. You are not to suppose, therefore, that there is

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here any contradiction. Or, consider, how in the world of sense, which is the highest to which your knowledge can rise, the motion of your hands goes "with" the motion of its shadow, and yet is prior to it as well. And whoever has not wit enough to see this, ought to abandon these researches altogether; for

"To every science its own people;
And each man finds easy that for which he has been created apt."

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PART II.--THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM,
PROLEGOMENA TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE SYMBOLISM OF THE NICHE, THE
LAMP, THE GLASS, THE TREE, THE OIL, AND THE FIRE

The exposition of this symbolism involves, first of all, two cardinal considerations, which afford limitless scope for investigation, but to which I shall merely allude very briefly here.

First, the science and method of symbolism; the way in which the spirit of the ideal form^[1] is captured by the mould of the symbol; the mutual relationship of the two; the inner nature of this correspondence between the

[1. Or Idea = in practically the Platonic sense.]

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world of Sense (which supplies the clay of the moulds, the material of the symbolism) and the world of the Realm Supernal from which the Ideas descend.^[1]

Second, the gradations of the several spirits of our mortal clay, and the degree [p. 28] of light possessed by each. For we treat of this latter symbolism in order to explain the former.

(i) THE OUTWARD AND THE INWARD IN SYMBOLISM: TYPE AND ANTITYPE

The world is Two Worlds, spiritual and material, or, if you will, a World Sensual and a World Intelligential; or again, if you will, a World Supernal and a World Inferior. All these expressions are near each other, and the difference between them is merely one of viewpoint. If you regard the two worlds in themselves, you use the first expression; if in respect of the organ which apprehends them, the second; if in respect of their mutual relationship, the third. You may, perhaps, also term

[1. (By Ghazzâlî.) In this Light-Verse, in Ibn Mas'ûd's reading, the words "in the heart of the believer, "follow the words "of His light". And Ubayy b. Ka`b's instead of "the similitude of His light", has "the similitude of the light of the heart of him who believes is like". etc.]

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them the World of Dominance and Sense-perception, and, the World of the Unseen and the Realm Supernal. It were no marvel if the students of the realities underlying the terminology were puzzled by the multiplicity of these terms, and imagined a corresponding multiplicity of ideas. But he to whom the realities beneath the terms are disclosed makes the ideas primary and the terms secondary: while inferior minds take the opposite course. To them the term is the source from which the reality proceeds. We have an allusion to these two types of mind in the Koran, "Whether is the more rightly guided, he who walks with his face bent down, or he who walks in a straight Way, erect?"[1]

1. The two Worlds: their types and antitypes

Such is the idea of the Two Worlds. And the next thing for you to know is, that the supernal world of "the Realm" is a world invisible to the majority of men; and the world of our senses is the world of perception, because it is perceived of all. This World Sensual

[1. S. 67, 22.]

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is the point from which we ascend to [p. 29] the world Intelligential: and, but for this connexion between the two, and their reciprocal relationship, the way upward to the higher sphere would be barred. And were this upward was impossible, then would the Progress to the Presence Dominical and the near approach to Allah be impossible too. For no man shall approach near unto Allah, unless his foot stand at the very centre of the Fold of the Divine Holiness. Now by this World of the "Divine Holiness" we mean the world that transcends the apprehension of the senses and the imagination. And it is in respect of the law of that world--the law that the soul which is a stranger to it neither goeth out therefrom, nor entereth therein--that we call it the Fold of the Divine Holiness and Transcendence. And the human spirit, which is the channel of the manifestations of

the Transcendence, may be perhaps called "the Holy Valley".[1]

Again, this Fold comprises lesser folds, some of which penetrate more deeply than others into the ideas of the Divine Holiness.

[1. S. 20, 12.]

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But the term Fold embraces all the gradations of the lesser ones; for you must not suppose that these terms are enigmas, unintelligible to men of Insight. But I cannot pursue the subject further, for I see that my preoccupation with citing and explaining all this terminology is turning me from my theme. It is for you to apply yourself now to the study of the terms.

To return to the subject we were discussing: the visible world is, as we said, the point of departure up to the world of the Realm Supernal; and the "Pilgrim's Progress of the Straight Way"[1] is an expression for that upward course, which may also be expressed by "The Faith," "the Mansions of Right Guidance." Were there no relation between the two worlds, no inter-connexion at all, then all upward progress would be inconceivable from one to the other. Therefore, the divine mercy gave to the World Visible a correspondence with the World of the Realm Supernal, and for this reason there is not a single thing in this world of sense that is not a symbol of something in yonder one. It may well hap

[1. See S. 1, 4.]

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that some one thing in this world may symbolize several things in the World of the Realm Supernal, and equally well that some one thing in the latter may have several symbols [p. 30] in the World Visible. We call a thing typical or symbolic when it resembles and corresponds to its antitype under some aspect.

A complete enumeration of these symbols would involve our exhausting the whole of the existing things in both of the Two Worlds! Such a task our mortal powers can never fulfil; or human faculties have not sufficed to comprehend it in the past; and with our little lives we cannot expound it fully in the present. The utmost I can do is to explain to you a single example. The greater may then be inferred from the less; for the door of research into the mysteries of this knowledge will then lie open to you.

2. An Example of Symbolism, from the Story of Abraham in the Koran

Listen now. If the World of the Realm Supernal contains Light-substances, high and lofty, called "Angels", from which substances the various lights are effused upon the

various

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mortal spirits, and by reason of which these angels are called "lords," then is Allah "Lord of lords," and these lords will have differing, grades of luminousness. The symbols, then, of these in the visible world will be, preeminently, the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars.

And the Pilgrim of the Way rises first of all to a degree corresponding to that of a star. The effulgence of that star's light appears to him., It is disclosed to him that the entire world beneath adores its influence and the effulgence of its light. And so, because of the very beauty and superbness of the thing, he is made aware of something which cries aloud saying, "This is my Lord?"[1] He passes on; and as he be. comes conscious of the light-degree next above. it, namely, that symbolized by the moon, lo! in the aerial canopy he beholds that star set, to wit, in comparison with its superior; and he saith, "Nought that setteth do I adore!" And so he rises till he arrives at last at the degree symbolized by the sun. This, again, he sees is greater and higher than the former, but nevertheless admits of comparison therewith, in,

[1. See for this whole passage S. 6, 75-8.]

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virtue of a relationship between the two. [31] But to bear relationship to what is imperfect carries with it imperfection-the "setting" of our allegory. And by reason thereof he saith: "I have turned my face unto That Who made the heavens and the earth! I am a true believer, and, not of those who associate other gods with Allah!" Now what is meant to be conveyed by this "THAT WHO" is the vaguest kind of indication, destitute of all relation or comparison. For, were anyone to ask, "What is the symbol comparable with or corresponding to this That?' no answer to the question could be conceived. Now He Who transcends all relations is ALLAH, the ONE REALITY. Thus, when certain Arabs once asked the Apostle of God, "To what may we relate Allah?' this reply was revealed, "Say, He, Allah is one! His days are neither ended nor begun; neither is He a father nor a son; and none is like unto Him, no not one[1]; the meaning of which verse is simply that He transcends relation. Again, when Pharaoh said to Moses: "What, pray, is the Lord of the Universe?" as though demanding

[1. S. 112.]

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to know His essence, Moses, in his reply, merely indicated His works, because these were clearer to the mind of his interrogator; and answered, "The Lord of the heavens and the earth." [1] But Pharaoh said to his courtiers, "Ha! marked ye that!" as though objecting to Moses' evasion of his demand to be told Allah's essential nature. Then

Moses said, "Your Lord, and your first fathers' Lord." Pharaoh then set him down as insane. He had demanded an analogue, for the description of the divine Essence, and Moses replied to him from His works. And so Pharaoh said, "Your prophet who has been sent you is insane."

3. Fundamental Examples of Symbolism especially from the Story of Moses in the Koran

Let us now return to the pattern we selected for illustrating the symbolic method. The science of the Interpretation of Visions determines for us the value of each kind of symbol; for "Vision is a part of Prophecy." It is clear, is it not, that the sun, when seen in a vision,

[1. For this passage see S. 26, 24-7, and for the whole thought--compare pp. [54, 55]. 9]

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must be interpreted by a Sovereign Monarch, because of their mutual resemblance and their share in a common spiritual idea, to wit, sovereignty over all, and the emanation or effusion of influence and light on to all. The antitype of the moon will be that Sovereign's Minister; for it is through the moon that the sun sheds his light on the world in its own absence; and even so, it is through his own Minister that the Sovereign [p. 32] makes his influence felt by subjects who never beheld the royal person. Again, the dreamer who sees himself with a ring on his finger with which he seals the mouths of men and the secrets of women, is told that the sign means the early Call to Prayer in the month of Ramadan.[1] Again, for one who sees himself pouring olive oil into an olive-tree the interpretation is that the slave-girl he has wedded is his mother, unrecognized by him. But it is impossible to exhaust the different ways by which symbols of this description may be interpreted, and I cannot set myself the task of enumerating them. I can merely say that just as certain

[1. Because after the idhân, just before morning, food and sexual intercourse are fasted from till the next sunset.]

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beings of the Spirit-World Supernal are symbolized by Sun, Moon and Stars, others may be typified by different symbols. when the Point of connexion is some characteristic other than light.

For example, if among those beings of that Spirit-World there be something that is fixed and unchangeable; great and never diminishing; from which the waters of knowledge, the excellencies of revelations, issue into the heart, even as waters well out into a valley; It would be symbolized by the Mountain.[1] Further, if the beings that are the recipients of those excellencies are of diverse grades, they would be symbolized by the Valley; and if those excellencies, on reaching the hearts of men, pass from heart to heart, these

hearts are also symbolized by Valleys.[2] The head of the Valley will represent the hearts of Prophet, Saint, and Doctor, followed by those who come after them. So, then, if these valleys are lower than the first one, and are watered from it, then that first one will certainly be the "Right" Valley,[3] because

[1. S. 28, 29. 46.

2. S. 13, 18.

3. S. 28, 30. See S. 19, 53, and 10, 82.]

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of its signal rightness[1] and superiority. And finally will come the lowest valley which receives its water from the last and lowest level of that "Right" Valley, and is accordingly watered from "the margin of the Right Valley",[2] not [p. 33] from its deepest part and centre.

But if the spirit of a prophet is typified by a lighted Lamp, lit by means of Inspiration ("We have inspired thee with [a] Spirit from Our power"),[3] then the symbol of the source of that kindling is Fire. If some of those who derive knowledge from the prophets live by a merely traditional acceptance of what they are told, and others by a gift of insight, then the symbol for the former, who investigate nothing, is a Fire-brand or a Torch or a Meteor; while the man of spiritual experience, who has therefore something in some sort common with the prophets, is accordingly symbolized by the Warming of Fire, for a man is not warmed by hearing about fire but by being close to it.

[1. Ghazzâlî here plays on the word ayman, the root of which means dexter or felix.

2. S. 28, 30.

3. S. 42, 52.]

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If the first stage of prophets is their translation into the World of Holy Transcendence away from the disturbances of senses and imagination, that stage is symbolized by "the Holy Valley".[1] And if the Holy Valley may not be trodden save after the doffing of the Two Worlds (that is, this world and the world beyond) and the soul's turning of her face towards the One Real (for this world and the world beyond are co-relatives and both are accidentia of the human light-substance, and can be doffed at one time and donned at another), then the symbol of the putting-off of these Two Worlds is the doffing of his two sandals by the pilgrim to Mekka,[2] what time he changes his worldly garments for the pilgrim's robe and faces towards the holy Kaaba.

Nay, but let us now translate ourselves to the Presence Dominical once more, and speak of its symbols. If that Presence hath something whereby the several divine sciences are engraven on the tablets of hearts susceptible to them, that something will be symbolized by the Pen.[3] That Within those hearts whereon those

[1. S. 20, and 79, 16.

2. S. 20, 12.

3. S. 68.]

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things are engraved will be typified by the Tablet,[1] Book,[2] and Scroll.[3] [p. 34] If there be, above the pen that writes, something which constrains it to service, its type will be the Hand.[4] If the Presence which embraces Hand and Tablet, Pen and Book, is constituted according to a definite order, It will be typified by the Form or Image.[5] And if the human form has its definite order, after that likeness, then is it created "in the Image, the Form, of the Merciful One". Now there is a difference between saying, "In the image of the Merciful One," and, "In the image of Allâh." For it was the Divine Mercy that caused the image of the Divine Presence to be in that "Image." And then Allâh, out of His grace and mercy, gave to Adam a summary "image" or "form," embracing every genus and species in the whole world, inasmuch that it was as if Adam were all that was in the world, or were the summarized copy of the world. And Adam's form--this summarized "image"--was inscribed in the

[1. S. 85, 22 and 7, 44.

2. S. 2, 1.

3. S. 25, 3,

4. S. 48, 36.

5. S. 82, 8; cf. 64, 3.

6. There must, I think, be some corruption in the text here. I suggest reading ### for ####.]

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handwriting of Allâh, so that Adam is the Divine handwriting, which is not the characters of letters (for His Handwriting transcends both characters and letters, even as His Word transcends sound and syllables, and His Pen transcends Reed and Steel, and His Hand transcends flesh and bone). Now, but for this mercy, every son of Adam would have

been powerless to know his Sovereign-Lord; for "only he who knows himself knows his Lord." This, then, being an effect of the divine mercy, it was "in the image of the Merciful One," not "in the image of Allâh," that Adam was created. So, then, the Presence of the Godhead is not the same as the Presence of The Merciful One, nor as the Presence of The Kingship, nor as the Presence of the Sovereign-Lordship; for which reason He commanded us to invoke the protection of all these Presences severally. "Say, I invoke the protection of the Lord of mankind, the King of mankind, the Deity of mankind!"[1] If this idea did not underlie the expression [p. 35] "Allâh created man in the image of the Merciful," the words

[1. S. 114.]

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would be linguistically incorrect; they should then have run, "after His image." But the words, according to Bokhari, run, "After the image of the Merciful."

But as the distinction between the Presence of the Kingship and the Presence of the Lordship call for a long expression, we must pass on, and be content with the foregoing specimen of the symbolic method. For indeed it is a shoreless sea.

But if you are conscious of a certain repulsion from this symbolism, you may comfort yourself by the text, "He sent down from heaven rain, and it flowed in the valleys, according to their capacity;"[2] for the commentaries on this text tell us that the Water here is knowledge, and the Valleys are the hearts of men.

4. The Permanent Validity of the Outward and Visible Sign: an Example

Pray do not assume from this specimen of symbolism and its method that you have any

[1. And so they are quoted on p. [7].

2. S. 13, 19.]

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licence from me to ignore the outward and, visible form, or to believe that it has been annulled; as though, for example, I had asserted that Moses had not really shoes on, did not, really hear himself addressed by the words, "Put thy shoes from off thy feet." [1] God forbid!--The annulment of the outward and visible sign is the tenet of the Spiritualists (Bâtiniyya), who, looked, utterly one-sidedly, at one world, the, Unseen, and were grossly ignorant of the balance that exists between it and the Seen. This aspect they wholly failed to understand. Similarly annulment of the inward and invisible meaning in the opinion of the Materialists. (Hashawiyya). In other words, whoever abstracts and isolates the outward from the whole is a Materialist, and whoever abstracts. the inward

is a Spiritualist, while he who joins the two together is catholic, perfect. For this reason the Prophet said, "The Koran has an outward and an inward, an ending and a beginning" (a Tradition which is, however, possibly, traceable to 'Alî, as its pedigree stops short at his name). I assert, on the contrary, that

[1. S. 20, 12.]

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'Moses understood from the command "Put off thy shoes" the Doffing of the Two Worlds, and obeyed the command literally by putting off his two sandals, and spiritually by putting off the Two Worlds. Here you just have this cross-relation between the two, [p. 36] the crossing over from one to the other, from outward word to inward idea. The difference between the true and false positions may be thus illustrated. One man hears the word of the Prophet, "The angels of Allâh enter not a house wherein is a dog or a picture," and yet keeps a dog in the house, because, he says, "The outward sense is not what was meant; but the Prophet only meant, 'Turn the dog of Wrath out of the house of the Heart, because Wrath hinders the knowledge which comes from the Lights Angelical; for anger is the demon of the heart.'" While the other first carries out the command literally; and then says, "Dog is not dog because of his visible form, but because of the inner idea of dog--ferocity, ravenousness. If my house, which is the abode of my person, of my body, must be kept clear of doggishness in concrete form, how much more must the house of

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my heart, which is the abode of man's true and proper essence, be kept clear of doggishness in spiritual idea!" The man, in fact, who combines the two things, he is the perfect man; which is what is meant when it is said, "The perfect man is the one who does not let the light of his knowledge quench the light of his reverence." In the same way he is never seen permitting himself to ignore one single ordinance of religion, for all the perfection of his spiritual Insight. Such a thing is grievous error; an example of which is the evil which befell some mystics, who called it lawful to put by literal prescriptions of the Shariat as you roll up and put-by a carpet; insomuch that one of them perhaps went so far as to give up the ordinance of prayer, saying, forsooth, that he was always at prayer in his heart! But this is different from the error of those fools of Antinomians (Ibâhiyya) who trifle with sophisms, like the saying of one, "Allah has no need of our works"; or of another, "The heart is full of vices from which it cannot possibly be cleansed," [p. 37] and did not even desire to eradicate anger and lust, because he believes he is

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[not] (?) commanded to eradicate them. These last, verily, are the follies of fools; but, as for the first-named error, it reminds one of the stumble of a high-bred horse, the error of

a mystic whom the devil has diverted from the way and "drawn him with delusion as with cords".[1]

To return to our discussion of "the Putting-off of the Shoes." The outward word wakens one to the inward signification, the Putting-off of the Two Worlds. The outward symbol is a real thing, and its application to the inward meaning is a real truth. Every real thing has its corresponding real truth. Those who have realized this are the souls who have attained the degree of the Transparent Glass (we shall see the meaning of this presently). For the Imagination, which supplies, so to speak, the clay from which the symbol is formed, is hard and gross; it conceals the secret meanings; it is interposed between you and the unseen lights. But once let it be clarified, and it becomes like transparent glass, and no longer keeps out the light, but on the contrary becomes a light-conductor. nay, that which keeps that light from being put out.

[1. S. 7, 21.]

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by gusts of wind. The story of the Transparent Glass, however, is coming; meanwhile, remember that the gross lower world of the imagination became to the Prophets of God like a transparent "glass" shade and "a niche for lights"; a strainer, filtering clear the divine secrets; a stepping-stone to the World Supernal. Whereby we may know that the visible symbol is real: and behind it lies a mystery. The same holds good with the symbols of "the Mountain," "the Fire," and the rest.

5. Another Example of this Two-sided and Equal Validity of Outward and Inward

When the Prophet said, "I saw Abdul-Rahmân enter Paradise crawling," you are not to suppose that he did not see him thus with his own eyes. No, awake he saw him, as a sleeper might see him in a dream, even though the person of Abdul-Rahmân b. `Awf was at the time asleep in his house. [p. 38] The only effect of sleep in this and similar visions is to suppress the authority of the senses over the soul, which is the inward light divine; for the senses preoccupy the soul, drag it back to the -Sense-world, and turn a man's face away from

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the world of the Invisible and of the Realm Supernal. But, with the suppression of sense, some of the lights prophetic may become clarified and prevail, inasmuch as the senses are no longer dragging the soul back to their own world, nor occupying their whole attention. And so it sees in waking what others see in sleep. But if it has attained absolute perfection, it is not limited to apprehending the visible form merely; it passes direct from that to the 'inner idea, and it is disclosed to such an one that faith is drawing the soul of an Abdul-Rahmân to the World Above (described by the word "Paradise"), while wealth and riches are drawing it down to this present life, the World Below. If the

influences which draw it to the preoccupations of this world are more stubborn than those which draw it to the other world, the soul is wholly turned away from its journey to Paradise. But if the attraction of faith is stronger, the soul is merely occasioned difficulty, or retarded, in its course, and the symbol for this in the world of sense is a crawl. It is thus that mysteries are shown forth from behind the crystal transparencies

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of the imagination. Nor is this limited to the Prophet's judgment about Abdul Rahmân only, though it was only him he saw at that time. He passess judgment therein on; every man whose spiritual vision is strong, whose faith is firm, but whose wealth has so much multiplied that it threatens to crowd out his faith, only failing to do so because the power of that faith more than counterbalances it. This example illustrates to you the way in, which prophets used to see concrete objects, and have immediate vision of the spiritual, ideas behind them. Most frequently the idea, is presented to their direct inward vision first, and then looks down from thence on to [p. 39] the imaginative spirit and receives the imprint of some concrete object, analogous to the idea. What is conferred by inspiration in sleeping vision or dreams needs interpretation.[1]

(ii) THE PSYCHOLOGY OR THE HUMAN SOUL: ITS FIVE FACULTIES OR SPIRITS

The gradations of human Spirits Luminous;

[1. (Note by Ghazzâlî.) The proportion borne by dreams to the other characteristics of prophethood is as one to forty-six. That borne by waking vision has a greater ratio-as one to three, I believe, for it has been revealed to us that the prophetic characteristics fall definitely into three categories, and of these three one is waking vision.]

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in knowing which we may know the symbolism of the Light-Verse in Koran.

The first of these is the sensory spirit. This is the recipient of the information brought in by the senses; for it is the root and origin of 'the animal spirit, and constitutes the differentia, of the animal genus. It is sound in the infant at the breast.

The second is the imaginative spirit. This .is the recorder of the information conveyed by the senses. It keeps that information filed and ready to hand, so as to present it to the intelligential spirit above it, when the information is called for. It is not found in the infant at the beginning of its evolution. This is why an infant wants to get hold of a thing when he sees it, while he forgets about it when it is out of his sight. No conflict of desire arises in his soul for something out of sight until he gets a little older, when he begins to cry for it and asks to have it, because its image is still with him, preserved in his imagination, This faculty is possessed by some, but not all animals. It is not found, for example, in the moth which perishes

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in the flame. [p. 40] The moth makes for the flame, because of its desire for the sunlight, and, thinking that the flame is a window opening to the sunlight, it hurries on to the flame, and injures itself. Yet, if it flies on into the dark, back it comes again, time after time. Now had it the mnemonic spirit, which gives permanence to the sensation of pain that is conveyed by the tactile sense, it would not return to the flame after being hurt once by it. On the other hand, the dog that has received one whipping runs away whenever it sees the stick again.

Third, the intelligential spirit. This apprehends ideas beyond the spheres of sense and imagination. It is the specifically human faculty. It is not found in the lower animals, nor yet in children. The objects of its apprehension are axioms of necessary and universal application, as we mentioned in the section in which the light of intelligence was given precedence over that of the eye.

Fourth, the discursive spirit. This takes the data of pure reason and combines them,

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arranges them as premises, and deduces from them informing knowledge. Then it takes, for example, two conclusions thus learned, combines them again, and learns a fresh conclusion; and so goes on multiplying itself ad infinitum.

Fifth, the transcendental prophetic spirit. This is the property of prophets and some saints. By it the unseen tables and statutes of the Law are revealed from the other world, together with several of the sciences of the Realms Celestial and Terrestrial, and pre-eminently theology, the science of Deity, which the intelligential and discursive spirit cannot compass. It is this that is alluded to in the text, "Thus did We inspire thee with a spirit from Our power. Thou didst not know what is the Book, nor what is Faith, [p. 41] but we made that spirit a light wherewith we guide whom We will of our vassals. And thou, verily, dost guide into a straight way." [1] And here, a word to thee, thou recluse in thy rational world of the intelligence! Why should it be impossible that beyond reason there should be a further plane, on

[1. S. 42, 52.]

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which appear things which do not appear on the plane of the intelligence, just as it is possible for the intelligence itself to be a plane above the discriminating faculty and the senses; and for relations of wonders and marvels to be made to it that were beyond the reach of the senses and the discriminative faculty? Beware of making the ultimate perfection stop at thyself! Consider the intuitive faculty of poetry, if thou wilt have an

example of everyday experience, taken from those special gifts which particularize some men. Behold how this gift, which is a sort of perceptive faculty, is the exclusive possession of some; while it is so completely denied to others that they cannot even distinguish the scansion of a typical measure from that of its several variations. Mark how extraordinary is this intuitive faculty in some others, insomuch that they produce music and melodies, and all the various grief-, delight-, slumber-, weeping-, madness-, murder-, and swoon-producing modes! Now these effects only occur strongly in one who has this original, intuitive sense. A person destitute of it hears the sounds just as much as the other, but

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the emotional effects are by him only very faintly experienced, and he exhibits surprise at those whom they send into raptures or swoons. And even were all the professors of music in the world to call a conference with a view of making him understand the meaning of this musical sense, they would be quite powerless to do so. Here, then, is an example taken from the gross phenomena which are easiest for you to understand. Apply this now to this peculiar prophetic sense. And strive earnestly to become one of those who experience mystically something [p. 42] of the prophetic spirit; for saints have a specially large portion thereof. If thou canst not compass this, then try, by the discipline of the syllogisms and analogies set forth or alluded to in a previous page, to be one of those 'who have knowledge of it scientifically. But if this, too, is beyond thy powers, then the least thou canst do is to become one of those who simply have faith in it ("Allâh exalts those that have faith among you, and those who acquire knowledge in their several ranks").[1] Scientific knowledge is above faith, and mystic experience is above knowledge. The province of mystic experience

[1. S. 58, 11.]

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is feeling; of knowledge, ratiocination, and of faith, bare acceptance of the creed of one's fathers, together with an unsuspecting attitude towards the two superior classes.

You now know the five human spirits. So we proceed: they are all of them Lights, for it is through their agency that every sort of existing thing is manifested, including objects of sense and imagination. For though it is true that the lower animals also perceive these said objects, mankind possesses a different, more refined, and higher species of those two faculties they having been created in man for a different, higher, and more noble end. In the lower animals they were only created as an instrument for acquiring food, and for subjecting them to mankind. But in mankind they were created to be a net to chase a noble quarry through all the present world; to wit, the first principles of the religious sciences. For example, a man may, in perceiving with his, visual sense a certain individual, apprehend, through his intelligence, a universal and absolute idea, as we saw in our example of Abdul Rahmân the son of `Awf.

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PART III.--THE APPLICATION TO THE LIGHT-VERSE AND THE VEILS TRADITION

(i) THE EXPOSITION OF THE SYMBOLISM OF THE LIGHT-VERSE

We now come to what the symbolism of this Verse actually signifies. The full exposition of the parallelism between these five classes of Spirit, and the fivefold Niche; Glass, Lamp, Tree, and Oil, [p. 43] could be indefinitely prolonged. But we must be content with shortly indicating the method of the symbolism.

1. Consider the sensory spirit. Its lights, you observe, come through several apertures, the eyes, ears, nostrils, etc. Now the aptest symbol for this, in our world of experience, is the Niche for a lamp in a wall.

2. Take next the imaginative spirit. It has three peculiarities: first, that it is of the stuff that this gross lower world is made of, for its objects have definite and limited size, and shape, and dimension, and are definitely related to the subject in respect of distance. Further,

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one of the properties of a gross substance whereof corporal attributes are predicated is to be opaque to the light of pure intelligence, which transcends these categories of direction, quantity, and distance. But, secondly, if that substance is clarified, refined, disciplined, and controlled, it attains to a correspondence with and a similarity to the ideas of the intelligence, and becomes transparent to light from them. Thirdly, the imagination is at first very much needed, in order that intelligential knowledge may be controlled by it, so that that knowledge be not disturbed, unsettled, and dissipated, and so get out of hand. The images supplied by the imagination hold together the knowledge supplied by the intellect. Now, in the world of everyday experience the sole object in which you will find these three peculiarities, in relation to physical lights, is Glass. For glass also is originally an opaque substance, but is clarified and refined until it becomes transparent to the light of a lamp, which indeed it transmits unaltered. Again, glass keeps the lamp from being put out by a draught or violent jerking. [p. 44] By what,

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then, could possibly the imagination be more aptly symbolized?

3. The intelligential spirit, which gives cognizance of the divine ideas. The point of the symbolism must be obvious to you. You know it already from our preceding explanation of the doctrine that the prophets are a "Light-giving lamp."

4. The ratiocinative spirit. Its peculiarity is to begin from one proposition, then to branch out into two, which two become four and so on, until by this process of logical division they become very numerous. It leads, finally, to conclusions which in their turn become germs producing like conclusions, these latter being also susceptible of continuation, each with each. The symbol which our world yields for this is a Tree. And when further we consider that the fruit of the discursive reason is material for this multiplying, establishing, and fixing of all knowledge, it will naturally not be typified by trees like quince, apple, pomegranate, nor, in brief, by any other tree whatever, except the Olive. For the quintessence of the fruit of the olive is its oil, which is the material which feeds

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the lamps, and has this peculiarity, as against all other oils, that it increases radiance. Again, if people give the adjective "blessed" to specially fruitful trees, surely the tree the fruitfulness whereof is absolutely infinite should be named Blessed! Finally, if the ramifications of those pure, intellectual propositions do not admit of relation to direction and to distance, then may the antitypical tree will be said to be "Neither from the East nor from the West."

5. The transcendental prophetic spirit, which is possessed by saints as well as prophets if it is absolutely luminous and clear. For the thought-spirit is divided [p. 45] into that which needs be instructed, advised, and supplied from without, if the acquisition of knowledge is to be continuous; while a portion of it is absolutely, clear, as though it were self-luminous, and had. no external source of supply. Applying these, considerations, we see how justly this clear, strong natural faculty is described by the words, "Whose Oil were well-nigh luminant, though Fire touched it not;" for there be Saints whose light shines so bright that it is "well-nigh" independent of that which Prophets

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supply, while there be Prophets whose light is "well-nigh" independent of that which Angels 'supply. Such is the symbolism, and aptly does it typify this class.

And inasmuch as the lights of the human spirit are graded rank on rank, then that of Sense comes first, the foundation and preparation for the Imagination (for the latter can only be conceived as superimposed after Sense); those of the Intelligence and Discursive Reason come thereafter. All which explains why the Glass is, as it were, the place for the Lamp's immanence; and the Niche, for the Glass: that is to say, the Lamp is within the Glass, and the Glass within the Niche. Finally, the existence, as we have seen, of a graded succession of Lights explains the words of the text "Light upon Light."

Epilogue: the Darkness Verse

But this symbolism holds only for the 'hearts of true believers, or of prophets and saints, but not for the hearts of misbelievers; 'for the term "light" is expressive of right-guidance alone. But as for the man who is turned from the path of guidance, he is false,

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he is darkness; nay, he is darker than darkness. For darkness is natural; it leads one neither one way nor the other; but the minds of misbelievers, and the whole of their perceptions, are perverse, and support each other mutually in the actual deluding of their owners. They are like a man "in some fathomless sea, overwhelmed [p. 46] by billow topped by billow topped by cloud; darkness on darkness piled!"[1] Now that fathomless sea is the World, this world of mortal dangers, of evil chances, of blinding trouble. The first "billow" is the wave of lust, whereby souls acquire the bestial attributes, [2] and are occupied with sensual pleasures, and the satisfaction of worldly ambitions, so that "they eat and luxuriate like cattle. Hell shall be their place of entertainment!"[3] Well does this wave represent darkness, therefore; since love for the creature makes the soul both blind and deaf. The second "billow" is the wave of the ferocious attributes, which impel. the soul to wrath, enmity, hatred, prejudice,

[1. S. 24, 40.

2. The following tripartite division of the soul, with its analogues, is Platonic (see Republic, bk. iv).

3. S. 12, 47.]

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envy, boastfulness, ostentation, pride. Well is this, too, the symbol of darkness, for wrath is the demon of man's intelligence; and well also is it the uppermost billow, for anger is mostly stronger even than lust; swelling wrath diverts the soul from lust and makes it oblivious of enjoyment; lust cannot for a moment stand up against anger at its height, Finally, "the cloud" is rank beliefs, and lying heresies, and corrupt imaginings, which become so many veils veiling the misbeliever from the true faith, from knowledge of the Real, and from illumination by the sunlight of the Koran and human intelligence. For it is the property of a cloud to veil the shining of the sunlight. Now these things, being all of them darkness, are well called "darkness on darkness piled", shutting the soul out from the knowledge of things near, [p. 47] let alone things far away; veiling the misbeliever, therefore, from the apprehension of the miraculousness of the Prophet, though he is so near to grasp, so manifest upon the least reflection. Truly it might be said of such an, one that "when a man putteth forth his hand, he can well-nigh see it not." [1] Finally, if all

[1. S. 24, 40.]

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these Lights have, as we, saw, their source and origin in the great Primary, the One Real, then every Confessor of the Unity may well believe that "the man for whom Allâh doth not cause light, no light at all hath he." [1]

And now you must be content with thus much of the mysteries of this Verse.

(ii) THE EXPOSITION OF THE SYMBOLISM OF THE SEVENTY THOUSAND VEILS

What is the signification of the tradition, "Allâh hath Seventy Thousand Veils of Light and Darkness: were He to withdraw their curtain, then would the splendours of His Aspect surely consume everyone who apprehended Him with his sight." (Some read "seven hundred veils;" others, "seventy thousand.")

I explain it thus. Allâh is in, by, and for himself glorious. A veil is necessarily related to those from whom the glorious object is veiled. Now these among men are of three kinds, according as their veils are pure darkness; mixed darkness and light; or pure light.

The subdivisions of these three are very numerous. That much only is certain. I could

[1. S. 24, 40.]

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no doubt make some far-fetched enumeration of these subdivisions; but I have no confidence in the results of such defining and enumerating, for none knows whether they were really intended or not. As for the fixing of the number at seven hundred, or at seventy thousand, this is a matter that only the prophetic power can compass. My own clear impression, however, is that these numbers are not mentioned in the way of definite enumeration at all, for [p. 48] numbers are not infrequently mentioned without any intention of limitation, but rather to denote some indefinitely great quantity:--God knows best! That point, then, is beyond our competence, and all I can do now is to unfold to you these three main divisions and a few of the subdivisions.

1. Those veiled by Pure Darkness

The first division consists of those who are veiled by pure darkness. These are the atheists "who believe not in Allâh, nor the Last Day." [1] These are they "who love this present life more than that which is to come," [2] for they do not believe in that which is to come at all. They

[1. S. 4, 37.

2. S. 14, 3.]

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fall into subdivisions.

First, there are those who desire to discover a cause to account for the world, and make Nature that cause. But nature is an, attribute which inheres in material substances, and is immanent in them, and is moreover a, dark one, for it has no knowledge, nor perception, nor self-consciousness, nor consciousness, nor light perceived through the medium of physical sight.

Secondly, there are those whose preoccupation is self, and who in no wise busy themselves. about the quest for causality. Rather, they live the life of the beasts of the field. This veil is, as it were, their self-centred ego, and, their lusts of darkness; for there is no darkness, so intense as slavery to self-impulse and self-love. "Hast thou seen," saith Allâh, "the man who makes self-impulse his god?"[1] and the Prophet, "Self-impulse is the hatefulest of the gods, worshipped instead of Allâh."

This last division may farther be subdivided. There is one class which has thought that this world's Chief End is the satisfaction,

[1. S. 25, 43.]

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of one's wants, lusts, and animal pleasures, whether connected with sex, or food, or drink, or raiment. These, therefore, are the creatures of pleasure; pleasure is their god, the goal of their ambition, and in winning her they believe that they have won felicity. Deliberately and willingly do they place themselves at the level of the beasts of the field; nay, at a viler level than the beasts. Can darkness be conceived more intense than this? Such men are, indeed, veiled by darkness unadulterated. Another class has thought that man's Chief End is conquest and domination--the taking of prisoners, and captives, and life. [49] Such is the idea of the Arabs, certain of the Kurds, and withal very numerous fools. Their veil is the dark veil of the ferocious attributes, because these dominate them, so that they deem the running down of their quarry the height of bliss. These, then, are content to occupy the level of beasts of prey, nay, one more degraded still. A third class has supposed that the Chief End is riches and prosperity, because wealth is the instrument for the satisfaction of every lust. Their concern is therefore the heaping up and multiplication

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of riches--the multiplication of property, real estate, personal estate, thoroughbreds,

flocks, herds, fields and the rest. Such men hoard their pelf underground--you may see them toiling their lives long, embarking on perils by land, perils by sea, up-date, down-lea, piling up wealth, and yet grudging it to themselves--and how much more others! These are they whom the Prophet had in view when he said, "Poor wretch, the slave of money! Poor wretch, the slave of gold!" And, indeed, what darkness is in tenser than that which blinds mankind to the fact that gold and silver are just two metals, unwanted for their own sakes, no better than gravel unless they are made a means to various ends, and spent upon things worth spending on? A fourth class had advanced a step higher than the total folly of these last, and has supposed that the supreme felicity is found in the extension of a man's personal reputation, the spread of his own renown, the increase of his own following and his influence over others. You may see these admiring themselves in their own looking-glasses! One of them, who may be suffering hunger and

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penury at home, will be spending his substance on clothes, and trying to look his smartest therein, [p. 50] just in order to avoid contemptuous glances when he walks abroad!

Innumerable are the varieties of this species, and one and all are veiled from Allâh by pure darkness, and they themselves are darkness. So there is no need to mention all the individual varieties, when once attention has been called to the species. One of these varieties which we should, however, mention is the sort that confesses with their tongues the Creed "There is no god but Allâh," but are probably urged thereto by fear alone, or the desire to beg from Mohammadans, or to curry favour with them, or to get financial assistance out of them, or by a merely fanatical zeal, to support the opinions of their fathers. For if the Creed fails to impel these to good works, by no means shall it secure their elevation from the dark sphere to light. Rather are their patron-saints devils, who lead them from the light into the darkness. But he whom the Creed so touches that his evil deeds displease him and his good deeds give him pleasure, has

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passed from pure darkness even though he be a great sinner still.

2. Those veiled by mixed Light and Darkness

The second division consists of those who are veiled by mixed light and darkness. It consists of three main kinds: first, those whose darkness has its origin in the Senses; secondly, in the Imagination; thirdly, in false syllogisms of the Intelligence.

First, then, those veiled by the darkness of the Senses. These are persons who one and all have got beyond that self-absorption which was the characteristic of all the first division, as they deify something outside the self, and have some yearning for the knowledge of the Deity. The first grade of these consists of the idol-worshippers, the last

grade consists of the dualists; between which extremes come other grades.

The first, the idolaters, are aware, in general, that they have a deity whom they must prefer to their dark selves, and believe [p. 51] that their deity is mightier than everything else, and more to be prized than every prize.

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But the darkness of sense veils from them the knowledge that they must transcend the world of sense in this quest; so that they make for themselves from the more precious minerals, gold, silver, gems, etc., figures splendidly fashioned, and then take those images unto themselves as gods. Such men are veiled by the light of Majesty and Beauty from the attributes of Allah and his light: they have affixed these attributes to sense-perceived bodies; which sense has blocked out the light of Allah; for the senses are darkness in relation to the World Spiritual, as we have already shown.

The second class, composed of the remotest Turkish tribes, who have no organized religious community and no definite religious code, believe that they have a deity, and that that deity is some particularly beautiful object; so that when they see a human being of exceptional beauty, or similarly a tree, or a horse, etc., they worship it and call it their god. These are veiled by the light of Beauty mixed with the darkness of Sense. They have penetrated further than the idolaters into the Realm of Light

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in the discovery of Light, for they are worshippers of Beauty in the absolute, not in the individual; and they do not limit it specially to one individual to the exclusion of others; and then, again, the Beauty they worship is of Nature's hand, and not of their own.

The third class say, Our deity must be in His essence Light, glorious in His express image, majestic in Himself, terrible in His presence, intolerant of approach; and yet He must be likewise perceptible. For the imperceptible is meaningless in the opinion of these. Then because they find Fire thus characterized, they worship it and take it unto themselves as lord. Such are veiled by the light of Dominion and of Glory, [p. 52] which are, indeed, two of the Lights of Allah.

The fourth class think that, since we have control over fire, kindling or quenching it at will, it cannot serve as divinity. Only that which possessing the attribute of Dominion and Glory and has us under its absolute sway, and is withal very higher and lifted up-only this avails for divinity. Astrology is the science that is celebrated among this folk, the attribution

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to each star of its special influence: so that some worship Cynosura and others Jupiter,

and others some other heavenly body, according to the many influences with which they believe the several stars are endued. These, then, are veiled by Light, the Light of the Sublime, the Luminous, the Potent; which are also three of the Lights of Allâh.

The fifth class support the fourth in their fundamental idea, but they say that it does not befit their Lord to be describable as small or great among light-giving substances, but He must be the greatest of them; and so they worship the Sun, which, they say, is the Greatest of All. Such are veiled by the Light of Greatness, in addition to the former lights; but are still blent with the darkness of the Senses.

The sixth class advance higher still and say, The sun has no monopoly of light; bodies other than the sun have each one its light. So, as the deity must have no partner in lightfulness, they worship Absolute Light, which embraces all lights, and think that It is the Lord of the Universe, and that all good things are attributable to it. Then, since they perceive

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the existence of evils in the world, and will by no means allow them to be attributed to their deity, He being wholly void of evil, they conceive of a struggle between Him and the Darkness, [53] and these two are called by them, as I suppose, Yazdân and Ahriman; which is the sect of the Dualists.

This must suffice for the exemplification of this division, the classes whereof are more numerous than those we have mentioned.

Second, those veiled by some light, mixed with the darkness of the Imagination. These have got beyond the senses, for they assert the existence of something behind the objects of sense, but are unable to get beyond the imagination, and so have worshipped a Being who actually sits on a throne. The meanest grade of these is called the Corporealists; then all the various Karrâmites, into whose writings and opinions we cannot go here, for to multiply words thereon were bootless. But the highest in degree are those who denied to Allah corporality and all its accidentia, except one--direction, and that direction upwards; for (say they) that which is not referable to any direction,

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and cannot be characterized as either within or without the world, does not exist at. all, since it cannot be imagined by the imagination.[1] They failed to perceive that the very first degree of the intelligibilia takes us clean beyond all reference whatsoever to direction and dimension.

Third, those who are veiled by Light divine, mixed with the darkness of false syllogisms of the Intelligence, and who worship a deity, that "Heareth, Seeth, and hath Knowledge, Power, Will, Life", and transcends all directions, including direction upwards; but whose

conception of these attributes is relative to their own; so that some of them may even have declared outright that His "speech" is with sounds and letters like ours; while others advanced a step higher, it may be, and said, "Nay, but it is like our thought-speech, both soundless and letterless." Thus, when they were challenged to show that "hearing, sight, life", etc., are real in Allâh they fell back on what was essentially anthropomorphism, though

[1. See Averroes, opusc. cit., p. 61, Cairo ed., p. 51.]

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they repudiated it[1] formally; for they utterly failed to apprehend what [p. 54] the attribution of[1] these ideas to Allah really signifies. Thus they, say, in regard to His will, that it is contingent, like ours; that it is a demanding and a purposing, like ours. All of which opinions are well-known, and we need not go into further details with regard to them: These, then, are veiled by several of the divine Lights, mixed with the darkness of false syllogisms of the intelligence., All such are various classes of the second division, which consists of those veiled by mixed. light and darkness.

3. Those veiled by Pure Light

The third division are those veiled with, pure Light, and they also fall into several classes. I cannot enumerate all, but only refer to three.

The first of these have searched out and understood the true meaning of the divine attributes, and have grasped that when thee divine attributes are named Speech, Will

[1. It seems inevitable to read ###. The feminine Pronoun could only refer to ### which makes nonsense. To refer it to a supplied masdar does not seem to be in our author's manner.]

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Power, Knowledge, and the rest, it is not according to our human mode of nomenclature. And this has led them to avoid denoting Him, by these attributes altogether, and to denote Him simply by a reference to His creation, as 'Moses did in his answer to Pharaoh, when the latter asked, "And what, pray, is the Lord of .the Universe?" and he replied, "'The Lord, Whose Holiness transcends even the ideas of these attributes,' He, the Mover and Orderer of the Heavens."[1]

The second mount higher than these, inasmuch as they perceived that the Heavens are a plurality, and that the mover of every several Heaven is another being, called an Angel, and that these angels form a plurality, and that their relation to the other Lights Divine is as the relation of the stars to[2] all other visible lights.[3] Then they perceived that these Heavens are enveloped by another Sphere, by whose motion all the rest

revolve once in twenty-four hours, and that finally The LORD is He Who communicates motion to this outermost Sphere,

[1. See S. 26, 23 ff..

2. Reading ### for ###.

3. Cf. S. 41, 11.]

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which encloses all the rest, on the ground (say they) that plurality must be denied of Him.

The third mount higher than these also, [p. 55], and say that this direct communication of motion to the celestial bodies must be an act of service to the Lord of the Universe, an act of worship and obedience to His command, and rendered by one of His creatures, an Angel, who stands to the pure Light Divine in the relation of the Moon to the other visible lights; and they asserted that the LORD is the Obeyed-One of this Angelic Movent, and that the Almighty must be considered the universal Movent indirectly and by way of command only (amr),[1] but not directly by way of act. The explication of which "command" and what it really is contains much that is obscure, and too difficult for most minds, besides being beyond the scope of this book.

These, then, are grades all of which are veiled by Lights without admixture of Darkness.

4. The Goal Of the Quest

But those who ATTAIN make a fourth

[1. See S. 7, 53.]

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grade, to Whom, in turn, it has been made clear that this Obeyed-One, if identified with, Allâh, would have been given attributes negative of His pure Unity and perfection, on account of a mystery which it is not in the scope of this book to reveal; and that the relation of this Obeyed-One to THE REAL EXISTENCE is as the relaxation of the Sun to Essential Light, or of the live coal to the Elemental Fire, and so "turned their faces"[1] from him who moves the heavens and him who issued the command (amara) for their moving, and Attained unto an Existent who transcends ALL that is comprehensible by human Sight or human Insight; for they found IT transcendent of and separate from every characterization that in the foregoing we have made.

And these last are also divided. For one class the whole content of the perceptible is.

consumed away--consumed, obliterated, and annihilated; yet the soul itself remains contemplating the absolute Beauty and Holiness and contemplating herself in her beauty, which is conferred on her by this Attainment unto the

[1. See M. pp. [30, 31].]

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Presence Divine [p. 56] In them, then, the seen things, but not the seeing, soul, are obliterated.

And they are passed by others, among whom are the Few of the Few; whom "the splendours of the Countenance sublime consume", [1] and the majesty of the Divine Glory obliterate; so that they are themselves blotted out, annihilated. For self-contemplation there is no more found a place, because with the self they have no longer anything to do. Nothing remaineth any more save the One, the Real; and the import of His word, "All perisheth save His Countenance," [2] becomes the experience of the soul. To this we have made reference in the first chapter, where we set forth in what sense they named this state "Identity," and how they conceived the same.

Such is the ultimate degree of those who Attain. Some of these souls had not, in their upward Progress and Ascent, to climb step by step the stages we have described; neither did their ascension cost them any length of time; but with their first flight they attained to the

[1. See the Tradition on p. [2].]

2. S. 28, 88.]

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knowledge of the Holiness and the confession that His sovereignty transcends everything that it must be confessed to transcend. They were overcome at the very first by the knowledge which overcame the rest at the very last. The onset of God's epiphany came upon them with one rush, so that all that is apprehensible by the sight of Sense or by the insight of Intelligence was by "the splendours of His Countenance utterly consumed". It may be that that first was the way of Abraham, the Friend of Allâh, while the latter was the way of Mohammed, the Beloved of Allâh. Allâh alone knoweth the mysteries of their Progress and of their Stations on the Way of Light.

Such is our account of the classes of the veiled by the Veils; and it were not strange, if, after all these Stations were fully classified and the veils of the Pilgrims Mystical were fully studied, the number of classes were found to amount to Seventy Thousand. Yet, if you look carefully, you shall find that of them all not one falls outside the divisions which we have set forth. For, as we have shown, they must be veiled by their own human

attributes

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or by the senses, imagination, discursive intelligence; or by pure light.

This is what has occurred to me by way of answer [57] to your interrogations, though, these came to me at a time when my thought was divided, and my mind preoccupied, and my attention given to other matters than this. May not my suggestion be, then, that you ask forgiveness for me for anything wherein my pen. has erred, or my foot has slipped? For 'tis a, hazardous thing to plunge into the fathomless. sea of the divine mysteries; and hard, hard it is to essay the discovery of the Lights Supernal that are beyond the Veil.

THE END

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Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam

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I am grateful to three anonymous readers for their comments on my translation and notes. Thanks are also due to David Brauner, who became a student of Ibn al-‘Arabī, for correcting my English. My students in the course of *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, at Bar Ilan University, deserve my gratitude for their insights of the Greatest Master.

Introduction

Our author, Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn al-‘Arabī, was born in 560/1165 in Murcia in al-Andalus to a family of high social position. At the age of thirty-seven he left al-Andalus and travelled to the eastern lands of Islam, staying for various lengths of time in Mecca, Egypt, Syria and Rūm (Turkey). Finally he settled in Damascus (620/1223), where he died in 638/1240. During these years he wrote hundreds of works, met many Sufis, whom he mentioned by name, and taught his mystical and philosophical ideas. Claude Addas gathered and analyzed many details of his biography, available in his writings in a very informative book *Quest for the Red Sulphur: The Life of Ibn ‘Arabī*.¹

My interest in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s writings began several years ago after coming across Chittick’s book *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*.² As a student of Islam in general and Islamic theology and Qur’ānic exegesis in particular, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s ideas seemed to me extraordinary even in terms of extreme Sufism. From the first reading of his writings, he appeared to me as an original thinker³ whose daring concepts exceed the boundaries of Islam.⁴ Undoubtedly, his mixing of mysticism, theology, philosophy, hermetic sciences, and law⁵ in his voluminous⁶ writings is unprecedented. Furthermore, he used a complex style of writings, which contains symbols,⁷ allusions and rhetorical forms, with the presumption that he had an

¹ SPK, pp. 10f.

² Chittick’s contribution to the understanding of the Greatest Master’s works is enormous, and one cannot learn Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thought without consulting this book, SDG, and his other writings.

³ I discussed his originality in my book *Ibn al-‘Arabī and the Sufis*, published by Anqa Publishing, Oxford 2014.

⁴ Peter Coates, *Ibn ‘Arabī and Modern Thought – The History of Taking Metaphysics Seriously*, Oxford 2002; Ian Almond, *Sufism and Deconstruction: A Comparative Study of Derrida and Ibn ‘Arabī*, London and New York 2004.

⁵ Sells, *Mystical Languages*, p. 63.

⁶ Apart from *The Meccan Revelations (Al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya)*, which consists of 560 chapters in 3,000 pages (Cairo edition), he wrote, according to his own testimony, 250 treatises. Morris, Part I, p. 540, n. 3. Of these only 95 are extant. J. Clark and Stephen Hirstenstein, “Establishing Ibn ‘Arabī’s Heritage,” *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī Society*, 52(2012):1–32.

⁷ See, for example, the beginning of ch. 25 in *Fuṣūṣ*.

2 Introduction

expert audience who could understand him.⁸ Add to these appealing factors his influence on later generations,⁹ even into the modern era,¹⁰ in the spheres of mysticism and philosophy, and you can understand why scholars and laypeople alike are eager to learn his thought.

The desire to know Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought involves overcoming several difficulties. First, the presentation of his ideas in many works forces the reader to examine thousands of pages. Second, as noted, the amalgamation of different spheres of Islamic culture compels the researcher to be an expert in these fields in order to detect influences and to assess the author's originality. Third, Ibn al-ʿArabī's style of writing is very complex and often terse and unclear. He also uses poetry as a means of conveying his thoughts.

To overcome the first obstacle, one can begin his study of Ibn al-ʿArabī by examining his *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (The Bezels of Wisdom), because this treatise is relatively short (179 pages in Affifi's edition) and contains the basic principles of his thought. It is worth noting that the Muslims' reactions to Ibn al-ʿArabī's teachings were derived from reading this work, because it was so accessible.¹¹ The two other impediments can be confronted by using the commentaries written on this work¹² and the available translations.¹³ Naturally, the translator's knowledge of Islamic theology, philosophy, mysticism and the Qurʾān plays an important role in understanding the author's approaches.

After considering these problems and the ways to solve them, taking into consideration the development in the research on Ibn al-ʿArabī that has been carried out over the past thirty years, and examining the present translations, I reached the conclusion that a new translation of the *Fuṣūṣ* is required to enhance the study of the Greatest Master (*al-shaykh al-akbar*). It is not my intention to criticize my predecessors to justify my own initiative in translating the *Fuṣūṣ*. Indeed, I owe much of my understanding of Ibn al-ʿArabī's texts to previous translations. However, every translator finds his way to elucidating the text, to identifying its ideas and their sources, to recognizing Qurʾānic paraphrases, and to avoiding the errors of language which lead to incorrect translation. A literal translation of a sentence into English seems superfluous, if the reader is unable to follow the idea

⁸ Morris, Part I, p. 540.

⁹ Knysh, *Ibn ʿArabī in the Later Islamic Tradition*.

¹⁰ Coates, *Ibn ʿArabī and Modern Thought*.

¹¹ Knysh, pp. 10f.

¹² Muslim scholars, beginning with his immediate disciples, wrote more than a hundred commentaries on the *Fuṣūṣ*. Morris, Part I, p. 540, n. 5.

¹³ Austin, Burckhardt, Rauf, Dagli and al-Tarjumana. According to Rešid Hafizovic, the Turkish translation of the *Fuṣūṣ* which, in Bulent Rauf's view, was done by Ismail Hakki Bursevi, is really the work of a Bosnian Muslim scholar named Abdulla Effendi al-Bosnawi (d. 1644). *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ʿArabī Society* 47 (2010):83–94. At any rate, Rauf translated the Turkish translation into English.

Stephen Hirtenstein kindly supplied me with a draft of his translation of several chapters of the *Fuṣūṣ*. He translated chapters 1–4, chapters 5 and 6 with Cecilia Twinch, and chapter 7 with Jane Clark. I benefited greatly from their translation and explanatory notes.

conveyed by the sentence in the light of its context. Hence, I tried to translate the text in a simple and lucid manner, so that the reader may understand the purport in its context. This translation is destined not only for those who do not know Arabic, but also for those proficient in Arabic who might be perplexed in trying to understand this complicated text, in which even the meaning of technical terms changes depending on the context. Hence, I added transcription of the Arabic terms and tried to explain these terms, for two reasons: Ibn al-ʿArabī was prudent in choosing his terms, and frequently no equivalent terms exist in English matching the Arabic terms.¹⁴

The *Fuṣūṣ* consists of twenty-seven chapters, each treating a different prophet and his distinctive essence.¹⁵ In the short introduction to the book, the author relates that he saw in a vision the Prophet giving him a book entitled *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* and commanding him to deliver it to the people. Elsewhere, Ibn al-ʿArabī testifies to the divine source of his writings.¹⁶ One might get the impression that our author tries to compare himself to Muḥammad, who received the whole Qurʾān from the angel Jibrīl.

The book is replete with repetitions of the author's ideas and terms. However, sometimes the same concept is discussed from different perspectives in such a way that minimizes the repetitiveness.¹⁷ Furthermore, as Austin observes, "The overall impression on the reader is lack of proper organization and continuity."¹⁸ Notwithstanding Ibn al-ʿArabī's statement of the book's source, it seems that its chapters consist of lectures delivered before an audience. The repetition of sentences and phrases, and mainly the reiteration of causal phrases, such as "because of" (*li-anna*), may support this supposition. Another possibility explaining the structure of the *Fuṣūṣ* is Chittick's characterization of Ibn al-ʿArabī's way of writing: "The writings of Ibn ʿArabī tend to be like sudden inspirations flowing from his pen with such force and velocity that they destroy horizontal and logical continuity. Qūnawī on the contrary is the model of logical consistency and point-by-point reasoning."¹⁹ However, this description of Ibn al-ʿArabī's style does not characterize all the passages in the *Fuṣūṣ*, for example the discussion of the universals in [ch. 1](#).

The structure of the chapter headings²⁰ is one and the same. The first word *faṣṣ* (pl. *fuṣūṣ*) denotes the bezel or setting in which the gemstone is set.²¹ Thus, the

¹⁴ SDG, p. XXXVIII.

¹⁵ All the prophets are Qurʾānic figures, except Seth (Shīth) and Khālid ibn Sinān. There is no order of time, except for the appearance of Ādam as the first prophet and Muḥammad as the last.

¹⁶ *Futūḥāt*, Vol. VI, p. 233; SDG, p. 296; Chittick, "Chapter Headings," p. 2.

¹⁷ [Ch. 4](#), n. 1.

¹⁸ Austin, p. 20.

¹⁹ "The Perfect Man as the Prototype of the Self in the Sufism of Jāmi," p. 141.

²⁰ No clear connections between the chapter headings and the text of the chapters are always examined. Austin, p. 20. The reader might ask why a certain chapter heading is appropriate only to one prophet and not to another.

²¹ Austin, p. 16.

4 Introduction

title of the book, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, means the bezels of wisdom which exist in the essence (*kalima*)²² of each prophet. In his essence, each prophet has a predisposition (the bezel) which enables him to receive a specific wisdom. According to this interpretation, the bezel is the setting of the gemstone. However, at the beginning of [chapter 1](#), the bezel is the gemstone itself and the setting is the universe. The perfect human being is placed in the universe to complete God's self-manifestation, because without him the mirror, that is, the cosmos, is not smooth and so things are not clearly seen in it.

Interpretations of Qur'ānic verses occupy a wide range of the work. In his interpretations, the author uses, apart from allusions and symbols, several other devices to support his ideas. He employs the plain meaning of the text,²³ points to the first meanings of words,²⁴ plays with the etymology of words,²⁵ changes words²⁶ and brings together verses from different *sūras* of the Qur'ān to complete his ideas.²⁷ No doubt, Ibn al-ʿArabī assumes that, although the sacred Text consists of separate *sūras*, the whole Qur'ān is one entity, each part supporting another. In this manner, the author can take a verse from one *sūra* and incorporate it in another to create one meaning.

Obviously, in his interpretations of the Qur'ān, Ibn al-ʿArabī implements the three principles of interpretation enjoined by the Sufis:

- 1 The Qur'ān contains many layers of meanings.²⁸
- 2 The human being is capable of discovering these layers.
- 3 The interpretation of the Qur'ān is an endless task.

Furthermore, the philosophic notion Ibn al-ʿArabī adopts that the Qur'ān was destined to the common people helps him articulate his complicated interpretation.²⁹

Consequently, Ibn al-ʿArabī's interpretations of the Qur'ānic text often deviate from the ordinary orthodox interpretations. One of the conspicuous examples is [chapter 3](#) on Noah (Nūḥ). Also, the cases of Moses (Mūsā) and al-Khiḍr and that of Moses and Pharaoh (Fir'awn) ([ch. 25](#)) are interpreted in the light of Ibn al-ʿArabī's conceptions. Likewise, he freely interprets traditions and makes these fit his ideas.³⁰

The present work is an annotated translation of the *Fuṣūṣ*. I have tried to translate the text in the manner called in the field of Qur'ānic translations *tarjamat*

²² Ch. 1, n.27.

²³ *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 70 of the Arabic text (Qur'ān 42:11).

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 73f.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 71.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 72f.

²⁸ Nicholas Heer, "Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī's Esoteric Exegesis of the Koran," in *The Heritage of Sufism*, ed. L. Lewisohn, Oxford 1999, Vol. I, pp. 235–239.

²⁹ *Fuṣūṣ*, [ch. 25](#). This contradicts what he says about special audience he has. See n. 7 above.

³⁰ Austin, p. 22.

al-ma'ānī or *tarjama tafsīriyya*, which can be rendered “translation of the meanings” and “interpretative translation,” respectively. This is not a literal translation, but rather a translation which conveys the meanings of the text.³¹ Hence, I have interlaced the text with sentences and phrases in round parentheses which fill missing parts in the original or explain opaque expressions. In so doing, I follow the method of Izutsu’s translation of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s texts.³² Furthermore, short footnotes with references to appropriate bibliographical entries, which are intended to widen the reader’s knowledge, explain ideas and terms appearing in the text.

In trying to understand obscure passages, I used mainly the commentaries of al-Kāshānī (d. 730/1330), al-Qayṣarī (751/1350), Muṣṭafā ibn Sulaymān Bālī Zādeh (d. 1069/1658) and Affifi, the editor of the text. Other translations were infrequently consulted when the translator was not confident in his understanding and wished to see other suggestions.³³ In treating long sentences, I tended to divide them into shorter ones in order to make the understanding easier.

Believing that the researcher’s role in the humanities is not only to present a text and to analyze its contents, but also to criticize the author whenever he contradicts himself or is unfaithful to his own convictions, I did not hesitate to comment on Ibn al-‘Arabī’s inconsistencies.

Some technical notes are needed. In round parentheses appear the following items: references to Qur’ānic verses, numbers of pages in Affifi’s edition of the text, necessary additions to the text, and words and terms in transcription. Intentionally, I did not use square brackets or other kinds of parentheses to make the reading easier, because the text suffers no lacuna. Also, all blessings for God and the prophets were omitted.³⁴

As a thinker who tried to explain existence by using previous as well as his own notions, Ibn al-‘Arabī can be regarded as a philosopher. However, employing

³¹ For example, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, An Explanatory Translation*, by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, New York 1953. Meir M. Bar-Asher, “Muslim Views Regarding the Translation of the Qur’ān” (Hebrew), in *On Translating the Qur’ān*, ed. Yohanan Friedmann, Jerusalem 2012, pp. 24f.

³² Sells, “Garden,” pp. 287f, n. 1. Sells represents an opposite view and tries to translate the text as is without interpolations. He states in an exaggerated manner, to my mind, the following: “No particular expression or manifestation of the central principles is self-sufficient or transparent. Each new passage reveals something and veils something. *There is always an obscurity* (the emphasis is mine), an undefined term, a new paradox.” He reaches the conclusion that “Finally, it is impossible to separate what is being said and how it is said and thus impossible to paraphrase faithfully the text...”

³³ French translations such as Gilis’s were not consulted.

³⁴ The blessings for God, such as “may He be exalted,” are not, in Sells’s view, primarily expressions of piety, as usually understood, but rather “they evoke the entire apophatic dialectic, and might be translated as follows: ‘May he (or it) be praised through the attribute being attributed to him here, but also exalted beyond this attribute.’” “Polished Mirror,” p. 137. However, since the apophatic dialectic is often explicitly expressed by Ibn al-‘Arabī in the *Fuṣūṣ*, the rendering of these blessings seems to me superfluous.

the mystical ideas of his Sufi predecessors³⁵ and blending these with philosophical teachings turns his thought into mystical philosophy, as Affifi rightly states in his introduction to the edition of the *Fuṣūṣ*.³⁶ Naturally, I do not ignore the Sufi practice that Ibn al-‘Arabī extensively deals with in his writings.³⁷ However, when taking into consideration the ultimate goal of the Sufi, that is, coming close to God, one should note that Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Sufi practice is tightly connected to his mystical philosophy. Even in this volume in which Ibn al-‘Arabī mainly treats his mystical philosophy, some examples of mystical practice appear, such as the invocation to God at the end of [chapter 15](#) (Jesus - ‘Īsā).

Two basic ideas lie at the core of our author’s thought. The first is the unity or oneness of existence or being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), an idea that had not appeared in its complete form in Islam before,³⁸ and the second is the theory of aspects, which explains or makes the first idea conceivable.³⁹ The first term never appeared in his writings and was coined by his commentators, while the second idea constitutes a device I used to elucidate his notions. The author himself does not speak of such a theory, although he uses many times the formula “from this perspective.” This formula goes back to earlier Sufis.⁴⁰

In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s view, the true existence is one and it is God’s Existence. Thus, God’s Essence, attributes and names,⁴¹ and the cosmos including all its phenomena are one existence.⁴² However, the Greatest Master distinguishes between God’s Essence (*dhāt*)⁴³ which cannot be known and His names which can be known. In explaining the relationships between God as Essence and His names, Ibn al-‘Arabī mentions a Kalām formula according to which the names are neither Himself nor other than Himself.⁴⁴ However, he prefers the view of the Mutakallim Abū al-Hudhayl, who asserts that God knows by virtue of His attribute of knowledge which is identical to His Essence. Anyhow, Ibn al-‘Arabī considers the attributes to be relationships and attributions or states, and as such

³⁵ See my book *Ibn al-‘Arabī and the Sufis*.

³⁶ Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy*, pp. 10f.

³⁷ Morris, Part I, p. 541.

³⁸ Affifi, I, p. 25.

³⁹ Izutsu (p. 152) writes that Ibn al-‘Arabī’s concept of God’s self-manifestation (*tajallin*) “is the very basis of his world view.” However, from a logical point of view, the oneness of existence is the foundation of his theory and God’s self-manifestation explains the relationships between God and the cosmos in a unified existence. The fact that our author dedicates much space to God’s self-manifestation and its ramifications does not cancel the place of the theory’s cornerstone.

⁴⁰ *Ibn al-‘Arabī and the Sufis*, pp. 172f.

⁴¹ From this point onward I will use only the term “names,” because it designates the concepts of the attributes. Thus, mercy is the attribute and Merciful is the name.

⁴² *Fuṣūṣ*, [ch. 23](#).

⁴³ Although Ibn al-‘Arabī states that God’s absolute existence cannot be known, he ascribes to this entity the power of existentiating everything. Also, the assertion that no multiplicity exists in it means that humans have some knowledge of the Essence.

⁴⁴ *Fuṣūṣ*, [ch. 21](#).

they are not separate entities existing in God's Essence.⁴⁵ Thus, God's Unity is absolute from the standpoint of His Essence but many from the perspective of the cosmos.⁴⁶

God's names are different from each other and also arranged in hierarchical order; for example, knowledge is higher than will,⁴⁷ but regarding God's Essence they are equal to each other.⁴⁸ Mercy encompasses everything, and as such it brings all things into existence.⁴⁹ As noted, these names represent relationships between God and His self-manifestation.⁵⁰ The cosmos is under the control of God's names.⁵¹ From this perspective each name is called *rabb* (lord) and is responsible for certain acts and for specific people.⁵² Since the phenomena in the cosmos are infinite, God's names are infinite, but they can be reduced to some basic names.⁵³ For example, the name Merciful functions as the Creator.⁵⁴

A distinction exists between the term *allāh* (God) and the term *rabb* (lord). Whereas the Lord is the Real who is manifested in a particular name, which is dedicated to a specific person or an event, Allāh denotes all the names which always change.⁵⁵

The cosmos reflects God's names, or God's self-manifestation through His names. Not only does the cosmos as a whole express God's names, but also the perfect human being, Adam, or other extraordinary figures such as the Prophet and the saints. They contain in their essences all the ingredients of the cosmos; that is, God's names.⁵⁶ When Ibn al-ʿArabī speaks of Muḥammad, he does not mean the historical prophet, but the spirit of Muḥammad (*al-ḥaqīqa al-muḥammadiyya*), which preceded all existents. Hence, Muḥammadans, in Ibn al-ʿArabī's view, are not necessarily Muslims, but rather those who comprise in themselves all the elements of God's self-manifestation – those who know, for example, that all religions are expressions of His self-manifestation.⁵⁷

Sometimes, our author goes further when claiming that even every atom in the cosmos contains all the forms of the cosmos.⁵⁸ That is because God's self-manifestation is expressed not only through the external form of everything, but through the permeation of God's Essence, as exists in His names, into everything. Ibn al-ʿArabī uses examples taken from philosophy or nature to illustrate

⁴⁵ Ibid., chs. 16, 21.

⁴⁶ Ibid., chs. 22, 25.

⁴⁷ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 16; Izutsu, pp. 104–107.

⁴⁸ *Fuṣūṣ*, chs. 2, 4.

⁴⁹ Ibid., chs. 16, 21.

⁵⁰ Ibid., ch. 4.

⁵¹ Ibid., ch. 3.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., ch. 9; Izutsu, p. 101.

⁵⁴ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 21; Izutsu, ch. 9.

⁵⁵ Ibid., ch. 7; Izutsu, pp. 110–115.

⁵⁶ Ibid., ch. 25.

⁵⁷ See ch. 3, n. 21.

⁵⁸ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 16; *Futūḥāt*, Vol. IV, p. 471.

this phenomenon. Thus, just as Primordial Matter (*hayūlā*) permeates everything and constitutes the common denominator of everything, so does God's Essence.⁵⁹ Elsewhere, water appears as a symbol of God's Essence penetrating everything.⁶⁰ In like manner, color permeates the colored thing.⁶¹ Also the number one, which is a symbol of God, is found in all numbers, because each number is the sum of ones. Thus God in the cosmos is like the number one in each number. This phenomenon explains the idea that a thing may be one and many at the same time.⁶² Also the cosmos's phenomena are symbolized as shadows produced by the light God's names cast on the fixed entities.⁶³ By this metaphor, the author states that although the phenomena seem to be concrete, they depend for their existence on God's names, which means their existence is unreal.

One of the results of the notion of God's self-manifestation is the notion that the cause is also the effect. God's Essence is the cause of all phenomena, which is the effect. However, since all phenomena constitute God's self-manifestation of His Essence, His Essence is both cause and effect.⁶⁴

In order to describe the process of the cosmos's appearance or God's self-manifestation often associated with the word creation (*khalq*), though this is not the creation meant by Muslim theologians, Ibn al-ʿArabī uses mythic language. First, the motivation of God's self-manifestation is His names' desire to see themselves in another entity; that is, the cosmos. Or, in other words, God, the hidden treasure, desired to be known.⁶⁵ The names are also depicted as forces wishing to burst out of their being under the pressure of an inability to act.⁶⁶ Then God, as the Merciful,⁶⁷ breathed into His names, thus creating the fixed entities, and God's second breath caused these entities to become concrete things.⁶⁸ This process is occurring endlessly.⁶⁹

In Ibn al-ʿArabī's view, not only the cosmos as a whole serves as a mirror of Him, but also the Perfect Human Being, Adam, contains in himself all the forms of God's names. Accordingly, Ibn al-ʿArabī regards Adam as God's vicegerent.⁷⁰

⁵⁹ Ibid., ch. 12.

⁶⁰ Ibid., ch. 19.

⁶¹ Ibid., ch. 5. Ibn al-ʿArabī also uses God's name *al-laṭīf* (the Subtle) to signify that God permeates everything as an immaterial substance. Ibid., ch. 23; Izutsu, 141. In his *Sharḥ asmāʾ allāh al-ḥusnā* (p. 253), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī points out that *al-laṭīf* means the imperceptible. Whereas *al-laṭīf* means God's permeation of everything in the material world, the name *al-khabīr* (the Knowing) means His pervading the consciousness of every human being. Ibid., ch. 23; Izutsu, pp. 142f.

⁶² Ibid., ch. 4.

⁶³ Ibid., ch. 9; Izutsu, ch. 6.

⁶⁴ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 22.

⁶⁵ Ibid., chs. 1, 25.

⁶⁶ Ibid., ch. 25.

⁶⁷ Ibid., ch. 12.

⁶⁸ Ibid., ch. 15.

⁶⁹ Ibid., ch. 25.

⁷⁰ On vicegerency and messengerhood, see ch. 25.

Actually, every human being reflects God, even in his outward form,⁷¹ hence to know oneself (or one's soul) means to know God.⁷² However, the most Perfect Human Being is Muḥammad, whose spirit preceded Adam's existence.⁷³ As noted, by Muḥammad, Ibn al-ʿArabī does not mean the historical Muḥammad, but rather the reality or the essence of the Prophet; that is, his spiritual entity which has been embodied in prophets and saints.⁷⁴ It is worth noting that just as the human being serves as God's mirror, so God is the human being's mirror through which he sees his own soul.⁷⁵ God is reflected in the cosmos, and the cosmos is reflected in God.⁷⁶ Likewise, our author says that God is known only through the human being, and the human being through God.⁷⁷ Ibn al-ʿArabī inevitably concludes that the human being grants existence to God.⁷⁸ The mutual relationship between God and man is also exemplified through the notion that just as God commands humans to act in specific ways, so the human being commands God to forgive him.⁷⁹

Furthermore, since the human being reflects God's names, and since God's names are arranged in a hierarchic manner, so that God as a knower is more general than God who wills, also the human being has different levels, at the highest of which stands the gnostic (*ʿārif*) and at the lowest the ignorant (*jāhil*).⁸⁰

The process of God's self-manifestation or creation is perpetual; God never stops destroying and creating the cosmos at the same time. Only the heart of the human being can perceive such endless changes, because, contrary to the intellect (*ʿaql*), which limits, the heart (*qalb*), as its name testifies, is able to perceive all changes in the cosmos.⁸¹

As he so often does, Ibn al-ʿArabī advances another explanation of the phenomenon of creation, this time from a theological perspective. Basing himself on Qurʾān 16:40, "When We will a thing (to be), We only say to it 'be' and it comes into being," he points out three divine elements: 1. God's Essence (the word "We") from the perspective of His self-manifestation; 2. God's will; and 3. God's command ("be"). Facing these three divine elements stand three parallel elements of the fixed entities. These are: 1. the thingness of the fixed entities; that is, their potential being as things; 2. their hearing; and 3. their obedience to God's command "be." In Ibn al-ʿArabī's view, the fixed entities produce themselves

71 Ibid., ch. 19.

72 Ibid., ch. 1; Izutsu, pp. 234–35.

73 Ibid., ch. 27.

74 Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds*, p. 31.

75 *Fuṣūṣ*, chs. 2, 22.

76 Ibid., ch. 5.

77 Ibid., ch. 7.

78 Ibid., ch. 5.

79 Ibid., ch. 15.

80 Ibid., ch. 10. For another classification, see ch. 22.

81 Ibid., chs. 12, 16.

because they obey God's command. In other words, the potentiality of becoming existents is brought into actuality by the divine command.⁸²

The tripartite principle – here mentioned in the context of the coming into being of the fixed entities – governs Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought. Just as this principle shows us the process of creation, it produces true ideas through the practice of syllogism, also composed of three parts, two premises and a conclusion.⁸³ Moreover, chapter 27 about Muḥammad is built on the basis of a tradition which is composed of three parts.

The idea of the fixed entities (*aʿyān thābita*) plays an important role in Ibn al-ʿArabī's cosmogony. As noted, these entities, reminiscent of Plato's ideas, are the concrete things in their hidden forms before their appearance in the cosmos.⁸⁴ Furthermore, these also determine the structure of everything, its essence and its acts. Actually, all God's acts, including His turning to the human being, are determined by the human fixed entity. God's knowledge follows the content of the fixed entities, and His will follows this content, which was previously conceived by God. Consequently, all the human being's acts and the time of their occurrences are decreed in the fixed entities. Strangely enough, the human being's will, which appears in his fixed entities, establishes the form of God's self-manifestation to him.⁸⁵ Thus, God is compelled to act in keeping with His own thought expressed in the fixed entities.

This scheme of processes absolutely excludes the possibility of human free will, which, to our surprise, our author holds true. How can one explain free will in a world in which all the phenomena are preordained in the fixed entities and even God is coerced to act in accordance with what is set firmly in them? One can answer this question by pointing to the fact that from the human perspective free will exists; one feels that following one's will, one can freely act. However, from the cosmic standpoint, one is compelled to act as is decreed in one's fixed entity. In other words, in the terrestrial plan, every human being possesses free will, or at least feels he has free will, while in the divine domain all was already determined, including one's will. If all the phenomena, including free will, are the expression of God's self-manifestation, there is no meaning to the responsibility for one's acts.

Another result of the idea of the unity of existence, or the idea that God is the sole true existent, is the notion that what we call "the concrete cosmos" is nothing but imagination. Speaking of the world or dreaming it means imagination within imagination.⁸⁶ Imagination as a faculty of the soul is sometimes stronger than the intellect, even though each faculty produces different approaches

⁸² Ibid., ch. 11; Izutsu, pp. 198–201.

⁸³ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 11.

⁸⁴ In *Inshāʾ al-dawāʾir* (pp. 16f), Ibn al-ʿArabī states that the fixed entities are neither existent nor non-existent, meaning they are existent in God's thought but non-existent from the perspective of the concrete phenomena. Izutsu, pp. 160–163.

⁸⁵ *Fuṣūṣ*, chs. 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 18, 25.

⁸⁶ Ibid., ch. 9; Izutsu, p. 7.

regarding God.⁸⁷ Through the intellect one may reach the conclusion that God is transcendent, while through his imagination he is aware of God's immanence. Gaining the knowledge that God is both transcendent and immanent means attaining the truth.⁸⁸ This leads the human being to see the One in the Many and the Many in the One, or alternatively to see the Many as One and the One as Many. Thus, one is led to perplexity (*ḥayra*), because one does not know whether God is One or Many.⁸⁹ However, this state characterizes the earliest stage of spiritual development; the gnostic, the one who experiences God's self-manifestation, does not suffer perplexity.⁹⁰ Even the prophet Noah was mistaken when he spoke to his people of only God's transcendence.⁹¹

The human being's knowledge of God is divided by Ibn al-ʿArabī into two parts: a. one's knowledge of God from the perspective of one's essence; and b. one's knowledge of God from the perspective of God who is manifested in one's essence.⁹² In order to know the true state of the world and God's attitude toward it, one must relinquish his intellect and be like an animal.⁹³ Also, using rational arguments does not lead the human being to true knowledge.⁹⁴

Still another outcome of the perception of the oneness of existence is the notion, from the perspective of metaphysics, that all religions are equal, because they are God's self-manifestation. The common denominator of all religions is the worship of God. God is worshiped in every form. The Greatest Master speaks of the god of belief (*ilāh fīl-i'tiqād*) which is peculiar to each people or group, because of their predisposition and circumstances. However, the human being should know that beyond the god of his belief, there is God, who is the source of all religions. For example, in prayer the Muslim should turn his face toward Mecca; however, he should know that God is everywhere, which actually means the possibility of other ways of worship.⁹⁵

One of the most important themes in the *Fuṣūṣ* is God's gifts which He gives either from His essence or from His names. God's gift from His essence is His self-manifestation to the human being. God's gifts stemming from His names are all the other benefits humanity receives, such as sustenance. Ibn al-ʿArabī also discusses the states of the human beings who request divine gifts and those who do not and the question of which of the two groups is preferable.⁹⁶

In the context of revelation, Ibn al-ʿArabī treats prophethood, which derives from God's Mercy.⁹⁷ He distinguishes between general prophethood

⁸⁷ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 22.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, chs. 22, 4.

⁸⁹ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 3; Izutsu, p. 69.

⁹⁰ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 4; Izutsu, pp. 85f.

⁹¹ *Fuṣūṣ*, chs. 3, 9, 22.

⁹² *Ibid.*, ch. 5; Izutsu, pp. 40f.

⁹³ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 22.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. 12.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, chs. 8, 10, 24, 25.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, chs. 2, 16, 17.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, ch. 24.

(*nubuwwa ʿamma*) and legislative prophethood (*nubuwwat tashrīʿ*). The first kind of prophethood, also called *walāya* (sainthood, literally: proximity to God or friendship toward God), denotes the essential quality of one who is close to God and receives from Him revelations of any kind. Prophets, messengers and saints (*walī*, pl. *awliyāʾ*) share this quality. The second kind of prophethood is always connected with messengerhood and denotes the transmission of God's laws to peoples. Thus, every messenger is a prophet and hence has the quality of *walāya*, but not every saint is a messenger. Consequently, from the perspective of the *walāya*, no difference obtains between prophets, messengers and saints. However, whereas Muḥammad is considered the Seal of the Prophets (*khātam al-anbiyāʾ*) with respect to the legislative prophethood, he is not the seal of the saints, which means the one who brought the *walāya* to its highest level.⁹⁸ It is worth noting that Ibn al-ʿArabī regarded himself as the seal of the saints.⁹⁹ At the end of [chapter 14](#) on ʿUzayr, *walāya* appears as a principle preferable to legislative prophecy, and the author points out that after Muḥammad legislation was given to scholars. This is seemingly an allusion that legislation has not ended. No doubt, Ibn al-ʿArabī adopted his theory of the *walāya* from al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī's teachings.¹⁰⁰

In the context of Jesus' prophecy, Ibn al-ʿArabī deals with miracles. Among these are, for example, the appearance of the angel Jibrīl in the form of a human being, his speaking to Mary, Jesus' procreation, and his speaking in the cradle and revivification of the dead.¹⁰¹ In contradistinction to what he says elsewhere,¹⁰² here Ibn al-ʿArabī expresses no reservation regarding the performing of physical miracles, very probably because they are recorded in the Sacred Books. In addition, our author also speaks of the spiritual miracle by which dead soul, a symbol of ignorance, is restored by divine knowledge to life.¹⁰³

As noted, the theory of aspects is not a doctrine developed by Ibn al-ʿArabī, but deduced from his words. This theory explains away contradictions found in our author's thought. The notion that God is both transcendent and immanent seems at first sight contradictory, for if God is ontologically and epistemologically beyond our perception, how can He be within the cosmos? And if, on the other hand, He is immanent, how can He be beyond our perception? Ibn al-ʿArabī solves this problem by asserting that from the standpoint of the intellect, that is, logical perception, He is transcendent; however, from the standpoint of His self-manifestation, He is immanent. The truth comprises both aspects. In like manner, God is the First and the Last. He is the First, because everything derives from Him, and He is the Last, because everything returns to Him.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ Ibid., chs. 2, 13–15, 17.

⁹⁹ Chodkiewicz, *Seal of the Saints*, ch. 9.

¹⁰⁰ Radtke and O'Kane.

¹⁰¹ *Fuṣūṣ*, chs. 15, 20.

¹⁰² Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 47–49.

¹⁰³ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 15.

¹⁰⁴ *Fuṣūṣ*, chs. 1–4, 22, 25.

Also the nature of God is twofold. From the aspect of His Essence, He is One, but from the aspect of His self-manifestation He is Many.¹⁰⁵ In the moral sphere, things are not different. From the perspective of metaphysics, as expressions of God's self-manifestation, good and evil things are not different from each other. However, judged by humans, one who does evil deserves punishment, and one who does good deserves reward.¹⁰⁶ Likewise, all religions are equal from the cosmic perspective, because religion means worship, and each people worship a certain god. Here, Ibn al-ʿArabī recommends humans to consider the equality of religions and have the capacity to know their common source.¹⁰⁷

One of the most important hendiadys, also known from other trends of thought, is the manifest (*ẓāhir*) and the hidden (*bāṭin*). For example, from the manifest perspective, throwing Moses into the river means putting him to death, yet, from the hidden perspective, water symbolizes knowledge; thus, Moses was thrown into the river in order to attain knowledge. The Greatest Master explains all Moses' and al-Khiḍr's acts in keeping with these two aspects.¹⁰⁸

These two aspects express one entity, the cosmos; the Real is the inward aspect of the cosmos, while the human being expresses its outward aspect.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, the human being's essence can be analyzed from two perspectives, humanity and animality, each having a different function in the human being.¹¹⁰

The present survey of Ibn al-ʿArabī's teachings in the *Fuṣūṣ* is, of course, not exhaustive, but aims to give the reader the principles of his thought, so that he will be able to understand the text. To attain a wider knowledge of the Greatest Master's ideas and worldview, one should consult, apart from the explanations, the references given in the footnotes.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. ch. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., chs. 8,

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., ch. 10.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., chs. 5, 25. For further discussion of this topic, see Sells, "Polished Mirror," and "Garden" (= chs. 3, 4 in his *Mystical Languages*).

¹⁰⁹ Affifi, I, p. 36.

¹¹⁰ *Fuṣūṣ*, ch. 24.

1 The bezel of the wisdom of divinity exists in the essence of Adam

Preface

(47) In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Praise be to God who has sent down from eternity (many) kinds of wisdom (*ḥikma*, pl. *ḥikam*)¹ upon the hearts² of the perfect humans (*kalim*)³ in a unique right way, even if the sects and religious communities vary because of the variety of nations. May God bless and protect him (Muḥammad) who bestows (on people) spiritual aspirations⁴ from the treasures of (His) generosity (*khazā'in al-jūd*)⁵ and kindness through the most valuable statements.

I saw God's Messenger in a vision (*mubashshira*)⁶ during the latter part of the month of Muḥarram in the year 627 (1229) in Damascus. Seizing in his hand a book, he said to me, "This is *Kitāb fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (the book of *The Bezels of Wisdom*); take it and bring it to people so that they might benefit from it." I said, "I hear and obey God, His Messenger and those in authority⁷ among us as we are commanded." Therefore, I implemented the Messenger's wish with sincere intention and pure aim and aspiration and made this book manifest as God's Messenger determined without increase or decrease. I asked God to include me, both in this (mission) and in all my states (*aḥwālī*), among His servants over whom the Devil has no authority.⁸ I also asked Him that in all that which my fingers may write, in all that which my tongue

1 For this term see Hikmet Yaman, *Prophetic Niche in the Virtuous City: The Concept of Hikmah in Early Islamic Thought*, Leiden and Boston 2011.

2 In Sufism the heart is the place in which revelations are received.

3 By this word he means the realities of prophets and God's friends. Jandī, p. 95. Affīfī, II, p. 4.

4 *Himma*, pl. *himmam*. For this term see SPK, p. 104 and index.

5 Ibn al-'Arabī devotes a long chapter (369) in the *Futūḥāt* to the issue of the treasures of generosity, entitled "The knowledge of the waystation of the keys to the treasures of generosity." It is also possible to understand this word as internal knowledge bestowed by God, or as God's names. Affīfī, II, p. 5.

6 SPK, p. 403, n. 18. *Sharḥ* (p. 12) interprets this word as correct vision or dream (*ru'yā ṣāliḥa*).

7 Qur'ān 4:59: "You who believe, obey God and the Messenger and those in authority among you." Trans. AH.

8 Cf. Qur'ān 14:22: "I had no power over you" (trans. AH), said the Devil. See also Qur'ān 16:99–100, 17:65.

may utter, and in all that which my heart may contain, to bestow only upon my mind glorified revelation (*ilqāʾ subbūhī*)⁹ and spiritual blowing (*naḥīh rūḥī*)¹⁰ through His protective support. (I asked this for the purpose) of my being a transmitter (*mutarjim*) and not one who writes according to his own thoughts (*mutaḥakkim*).¹¹ Consequently, those who learn it (the book), among the people of God (*ahl allāh*),¹² the people of contemplation, may be certain that it originates in (48) the Place of Sanctification (in God) that is exempt from personal interests¹³ in which deception is involved. I hope that God (*al-ḥaqq*),¹⁴ having heard my prayer, will accede to my call, for I shall convey (literally: cast into – *alqā*)¹⁵ only that which He conveyed to me, and I shall not send down (*unazzilu*)¹⁶ in this book anything except that which God sent down to me. I am neither a prophet nor a messenger, but only an heir (of prophets and messengers)¹⁷ preparing for the world to come (*li-ākhiratī ḥārith*).¹⁸

Hear from God!/And return to God!

When you hear what I bring/pay attention!

Then through understanding detail/the whole and combine the details into a whole

Then bestow it¹⁹ upon//its seekers and do not withhold (them from it)

This is the Mercy that/embraces you,²⁰ so make it known (to others)²¹

I asked God to be one of those who are given revelation and accept it, and of those who are restricted (*quyyida*)²² by the pure Muḥammadan Law and accept its

⁹ SPK, p. 35.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 169.

¹¹ Literally: one who rules over his thoughts. *Sharḥ*, p. 14.

¹² These are the greatest friends of God, those who achieve unveiling in its true and extreme form. SPK, p. 388, n. 20; SDG, pp. XIV, 56.

¹³ Or interests of the lower soul (*nafs*). Austin, p. 46.

¹⁴ The Real or the Truly Real. SPK, p. 132.

¹⁵ For the use of *alqā* with the object “word” (*kalima*), see Qurʾān 4:171.

¹⁶ It is not by chance that Ibn al-ʿArabī employs here the verb *nazzala* (he sent down), because this verb designates the sending down of the Qurʾān, and our author regards himself as one who receives divine revelation, although he is neither a prophet nor a messenger, but God’s friend (*walī*).

¹⁷ Here he alludes to the famous tradition that “the scholars are the heirs of the prophets (*al-ʿulamāʾ warathat al-anbiyāʾ*).” Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, Vol. IV, p. 98.

¹⁸ “Who so desires the tillage (*ḥarṭh*) of the world to come, We shall give him increase in his tillage . . .” (Qurʾān 42:20).

¹⁹ This word refers to “understanding” in the line above.

²⁰ This sentence is a clear echo of Qurʾān 7:156: “. . . My mercy embraces all things.” Trans. AH.

²¹ For the author’s poetry, see Denis E. McAuley, *Ibn ʿArabī’s Mystical Poetics*, Oxford 2012. Using poetry, which is regular in Ibn al-ʿArabī’s writings, is recorded in Sufism from its earlier time. See, for example, T. Graham, “Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī al-Khayr and the school of Khurasān,” in *The Heritage of Sufism*, Vol. I, pp. 96–106.

²² This sentence is reminiscent of al-Junayd’s dictum “Our knowledge (that is, mystical knowledge) is bound (*muqayyad*) by the Book (the Qurʾān) and the Sunna (Tradition). *Futūḥāt*, II, p. 41. Another version of this dictum reads “Our knowledge is built (*mushayyad*) by the Book and the Sunna.” Ibid., Vol. II, p. 337. Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 78f.

restriction and restrict (others). May God gather us in His group²³ as He made us part of His community. The **first (chapter)** which the Lord reveals to the servant is as follows:

The bezel²⁴ of the wisdom²⁵ of divinity exists in the essence²⁶ of Ādam²⁷

(48) The Real,²⁸ from the perspective of His Names,²⁹ wanted to see the essences of His uncountable Most Beautiful Names (*asmāʾ ḥusnā*),³⁰ as they really operate, or if you wish, say to see His Essence, in an all-inclusive being containing all of them and qualified by existence. Through this being, His mystery will be revealed to Him. That is, because one's self seeing is not like one's seeing oneself in another, which serves as a mirror for the seer. (The reason for this preference) is that the mirror reveals to the seer himself in a shape which is (49) given by the substrate (*maḥall*) which one observes. If such a substrate does not exist and does not appear to the seer, he cannot see himself.

²³ Very probably the author means by the phrase "God's group" God's people (*ahl allāh*) which denotes, as mentioned above, the greatest friends of God, or the highest rank of mystics.

²⁴ This word can also be translated as ring setting. Sometimes Ibn al-ʿArabī seems to refer to the stones rather than to the bezels. Sells, *Mystical Languages*, p. 248, n. 22.

²⁵ *Hikma* (wisdom) means the knowledge of things as they really are and acting accordingly. In this meaning it is identical to philosophy. The Sufis regard *ḥikma* as designating the hidden knowledge (*ʿilm al-bāṭin*), and Ibn al-ʿArabī follows them. Affifi, II, pp. 3f.

²⁶ The word *Kalima* denotes *ḥaqīqa* (essence) of a prophet, which amounts to an attribute of God. Suʿād al-Ḥakīm, p. 976. Also it designates a prophet. Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy*, pp. 72f. If by *kalima* we mean logos, that is, special traits of the prophets (Chittick, "Ibn ʿArabī's Summary," p. 4), then it is equivalent to essence. It is worth noting that in philosophical contexts one of the meanings of logos is the internal nature of something. Walbridge, *God and Logic*, p. 19.

²⁷ The perfect reality of Ādam, that is, the human kind, serves as a frame in which the divine wisdom is placed. In other words, humanity is the perfect place wherein all God's attributes are manifested. Likewise, each prophet's reality serves as a frame for an attribute of God. In other words, each prophet possesses a predisposition for a specific divine attribute. As noted above, it is also possible to understand *faṣṣ* not as a bezel but as a ringstone. This would not change the general idea of the inherence of God's attributes in prophets.

²⁸ The sentence begins with *lammā*, meaning because, but owing to the length of the sentence, this word cannot be rendered here and will be replaced later by "because of this idea."

²⁹ In Ibn al-ʿArabī's view, there are two aspects of God's Essence: a. the Essence, or the Self about which nothing can be said; and b. the Essence with respect to His Names and Attributes, which can be known. Here His Names wish to see themselves. Sells, "Garden," pp. 295f, n. 12; idem, "Polished Mirror," p. 137.

³⁰ Although God is qualified by ninety-nine names, Ibn al-ʿArabī says that they are infinite. It seems that the reason of his statement is the uncountable phenomena of the world which express His names. Since the phenomena are infinite, their sources, the names, are infinite. *Sharḥ al-Jandī*, p. 69. On the possibility that God's names are more than ninety-nine, see al-Ghazālī, *al-Maṣṣad al-asnā*, pp. 184–191.

(Because of this idea),³¹ the Real brought the whole cosmos into existence (*awjada*),³² an existence of an indistinct shape without a spirit in it, and it was like an unpolished mirror. According to God's customary rule, He does not make a substrate unless it receives the divine spirit, which is expressed by "breathing into it."³³ This breathing means the coming to be of a predisposition (*isti'dād*) of this created form to receive the constant revealed overflow (*fayḍ*) which has not ceased and will never cease. There is only a receptacle (*qābil*), which derives from His holy overflow (*fayḍ aqdas*).³⁴ All existents³⁵ come from Him, their beginning and their end, and "all things are brought back to God,"³⁶ just as they begin from Him.

(The revelation of) all things required the disclosure (*jalā'*)³⁷ of the mirror of the world. Ādam was equal to the clearness of this mirror³⁸ and the spirit of this form (that is, the mirror). The angels were among the faculties of this form, that is, the form of the world, which is expressed in popular terminology through "the Great Human Being." The angels relate to the world like the relationship between the spiritual and sensual faculties in the human structure (to the body). Each of these faculties is veiled through itself from seeing something better than its essence, for it claims that it (the human structure) has competence for every high position and exalted rank with God, because it has the divine all-comprehensiveness (*al-jam'iyya al-ilāhiyya*),³⁹ which goes back to the divine side (*al-janāb al-ilāhī*)⁴⁰ and to the side of the Reality of Realities (*ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqā'iq*), and with respect to the structure which possesses these qualities, (it goes back) to that which is required by the Universal Nature which comprises all the receptacles of the world, higher and lower.⁴¹

³¹ This is the alternative to the *lammā* mentioned above.

³² Although in our author's thought the creation of the world does not coincide with the usual orthodox approach of creation ex nihilo, he uses the terminology of this approach, such as *awjada* (he brought into existence), *ḥadatha* (it came into being), and *khalāqa* (he created).

³³ Qur'ān 11:123. Sells, *Mystical Languages*, p. 246, n. 11.

³⁴ The holy overflow is responsible for the production of the fixed entities (*a'yān thābita*), possible intelligible forms possessing potential power of becoming existents in the world, reminiscent of the Platonic ideas, which come into being in existence through the sacred overflow (*fayḍ muqaddas*). Whereas the first overflow is the Real's self-manifestation in the fixed entities, the second overflow is His self-manifestation in the concrete forms in the world. Affifi, II, pp. 8f. In themselves these things, that is, the objects of God's knowledge, are nonexistent. SDG, pp. XIXf.

³⁵ *Al-amr kulluhu* here designates the whole cosmos. *Sharḥ*, p. 22.

³⁶ Qur'ān 2:210.

³⁷ *Jalā'* may also mean the clearness of this mirror.

³⁸ That is, because in his essence he reflects all the ingredients of the world.

³⁹ SPK, p. 195.

⁴⁰ By "the divine side" Ibn al-'Arabī may mean God's names. Affifi, II, p. 10.

⁴¹ Humans reflect God's attributes, or the divine side (*al-janāb al-ilāhī*), the first intellect (*ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqā'iq*) and the Universal Nature (*al-ṭabī'a al-kullīyya*). Cf. Affifi, II, pp. 10f. Sells, "Garden," p. 312, n. 38.

This (idea)⁴² is not known by the intellect (*‘aql*) through rational observation (*naẓar fikrī*),⁴³ but rather this kind of perception originates only in divine unveiling (*kashf ilāhī*). Through this divine unveiling the foundation of the forms of the world which contain its spirits is known.

The (entity) mentioned above is called (50) a human being and the vicegerent (*khalīfa*)⁴⁴ (of God). As for his humanness, it derives from his comprehensive structure and his comprising of all the realities, (because) the human being (*insān*) relates to the Real (*al-ḥaqq* – God) as the pupil (*insān al-‘ayn*) relates to the eye, and through the pupil seeing (*naẓar, baṣar*) occurs. Hence, he is called *insān* (meaning human being and pupil), because through him the Real looks (*naẓara*) at His creation and has mercy (*raḥima*)⁴⁵ on them. This human being is both created in time and is eternal, coming into being and living forever.⁴⁶ He is both the separating and unifying principle (literally: word – *kalima*).⁴⁷ The world owes its existence to him. His relation to the world is like the relation of the bezel of the seal ring to the seal ring. The human being is the tool (literally: place or substrate) and the sign by which the King seals His treasure. Because of (this function) God calls him the vicegerent, for through him God preserves His creation, as the seal ring preserves the treasures. So long as the King’s seal is on the treasures, no one dares to open them, except with His permission. For this reason, God has appointed him as a vicegerent who preserves His possessions (*mulk*). So long as the Perfect Human Being remains, the world will not cease to exist.⁴⁸ Do you not see that when he disappears and the seal of the treasure of the world is broken, nothing of what the Real preserved in the treasure will remain, and all the parts which exist in it will go out being united with each other, and all of them will move to another world (*al-Ākhira*) and he (the Perfect Human Being) will be an everlasting seal on the treasure of another world.⁴⁹

⁴² This is the idea of a receptacle which contains all the forms of the cosmos.

⁴³ In theological and philosophical discussions, *fikra* in most cases designates syllogistic procedure. See, for example, the beginning of *Kitāb al-fikr* in the fourth volume of al-Ghazālī’s *Iḥyā’*.

⁴⁴ The notion that the human being is the vicegerent of God is attested in the Qur’ān (2:30).

⁴⁵ For the connection between *naẓar* and *raḥma*, see Qur’ān 3:77 and its commentary.

⁴⁶ By this sentence Ibn al-‘Arabī may mean either the eternal existence of the species against the transient life of each member of the species, or alternatively, the eternal form of human beings in opposition to the passing nature of their corporeal bodies. In any case, this seems to prove that the present chapter does not treat Ādam, but the human being in general. Takeshita, “The Theory of the Perfect Man,” p. 91. However, our author immediately refers to the Perfect Human Being, who is Ādam. Yet, as seen on pages 75, 76, 199, and 120–122 of the Arabic text, the Perfect Human beings are the Sufi gnostics. Takeshita, *ibid.*, pp. 93–97.

⁴⁷ Since the human being is the symbol of the cosmos, from one point of view he is divided into parts, while from another point of view he is one essence. See my article “Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Attitude toward al-Ghazālī,” in *Avicenna and His Legacy*, ed. Y. Tzvi Langermann, Turnhout, Belgium 2009, pp. 105–107.

⁴⁸ Chittick, “Ibn ‘Arabī’s Summary,” p. 8.

⁴⁹ The notion that God creates numerous worlds in which one hundred thousand Ādams have existed appears in the *Futūḥāt* (Vol. VI, pp. 81, 369), in one of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s visions. The Greatest Master seems to say that there is no possibility of nonexistence of

All that exists in the divine forms,⁵⁰ that is, (God's) names, appears in the human structure. Hence these forms attained the rank of being encompassed and included in the existence of the human structure. And through this existence God argues against the angels.⁵¹ So take care, because God teaches you a lesson through (telling you the story of) another, and think⁵² what is the reason for blaming someone. That is, the angels were neither aware of the structure of this vicegerent nor of the essential servitude (*ibāda dhātīyya*) required by the presence of the Real. For no one knows about the Real except that which is given to him by one's essence.⁵³ The angels neither had the comprehensive (nature) of Ādam nor perceived the divine names (51) which particularize his nature and through which God is glorified and sanctified. Moreover, the angels did not know that God has (other) names by which they can glorify and sanctify Him as Ādam did. This situation which we have mentioned overwhelmed them and caused them to say concerning the structure of the human being: "How can You put someone there who will cause damage and bloodshed?" (Qur'ān 2:30, trans. AH). These words express only quarreling and the essence of their behavior, that is, what they said regarding Ādam equals their attitude toward the Real. If their structure had not imposed on them such (an ignorance of God's names), having been unaware of this imposition (*wa-hum lā yash'urūn*),⁵⁴ they would not have said what they said concerning Ādam. If they had known their souls (or selves – *nufūs*), they would have known (their predisposition),⁵⁵ and if they had known, they would have been protected (*ʿuṣimū*) (from ascribing sins to the human being). Moreover, the angels did not cease disparaging Ādam, but added the claim that (contrary to Ādam) they glorify and sanctify God (Qur'ān 2:30). Ādam knew the divine Names which the angels did not know, hence they could neither glorify their Lord nor sanctify Him through these names as Ādam did.⁵⁶

The Real described to us what happened (between Him and the angels) so that we know it and behave toward Him accordingly. Consequently, we shall not claim what we have realized and encompassed by limited (knowledge). How can we make, without restrictions, comprehensive claims of what we have no experience

a world, because any world is a manifestation of God. A world always exists with the Perfect Human Being as its seal. Cf. Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds*, p. 90.

⁵⁰ Takeshita (*An Analysis*, p. 251, n. 48), basing himself on al-Kāshānī's and al-

Nabulusi's commentaries, reads here *ṣūra* (image), and not *ṣuwar* as in Affīfī's text.

⁵¹ The angels opposed the existence of Ādam, because he would cause damage and bloodshed on earth. Consequently, God showed the superiority of Ādam to them, for He taught Ādam the names of all existents. Qur'ān 2:30–33. Cf. Sells, *Mystical Languages*, p. 67.

⁵² Read *wa-nzur* instead of *sa-anzuru*.

⁵³ Thus, through his own essence the human being learns about God.

⁵⁴ This phrase is taken from the Qur'ān (7:95 and others) and designates the state of unawareness or heedlessness.

⁵⁵ They would have known the limitations of their knowledge.

⁵⁶ According to Ibn al-'Arabī, everything behaves in keeping with its fix or immutable entity (*ʿayn thābita*), and the angels are no exception to this rule. Thus, the angels cannot be blamed for acting in accordance with their basic structure. Our author ignores this logical difficulty, which can be found in other parts of the *Fuṣūṣ*.

and knowledge, for we will only be disgraced? This is the divine lesson (*ta'rīf* – literally: information) through which the Real educates His servants, the well mannered, the faithful, the vicegerents.

Let us now return to the Wisdom mentioned above and say: Know that the universals (*al-umūr al-kullīyya*), even if they have no concrete existence in themselves, they are undoubtedly perceived and known by the mind (*fī'l-dhihn*).⁵⁷ (Although) they are always hidden (*bāṭin*)⁵⁸ from the concrete existence (*wujūd 'aynī*),⁵⁹ they determine and influence each concrete existent. Moreover, the concrete existents are related only to the universals, (by which) I mean the (fixed) entities of the concrete things. The universals are always intelligible in themselves. The universals are manifest⁶⁰ from the point of view of concrete existents and hidden from the point of view of their intelligibility. Every concrete existent is dependent on the universals, which cannot be disconnected from the intellect. The universals cannot exist in a concrete manner in such a way that (52) they cease to be intelligible. Whether the concrete existence is temporal or not, its relationship to the universal is one and the same. However, the universal serves as the source of the determining rule of the concrete existents according to the requirements of the latter's essences; (it is) like the relationship of knowledge to the knower and life to the living.⁶¹ That is because life and knowledge are intelligible realities which differ from each other. We also say concerning the Real that He has knowledge and life, and hence He is knowing and living. We say regarding the angel that he has knowledge and life, hence he is knowing and living, and the same applies to the human being. The reality of knowledge is one, as is the reality of life, and the relationship of each of them to the knower and living, respectively, is one.

Regarding the knowledge of the Real we say that it is eternal (*qadīm*), while the knowledge of the human being is brought into being (*muḥdath*). Consider the determining rule which the relationship (between the act and its agent)⁶² creates regarding the intelligible reality, and consider the connection between the intelligible and the concrete existents. Just as the knowledge determines that the entity in which it exists is called knower, so the knower (literally: the one who is described by knowledge – *al-mawṣūf bihi*) determines that the knowledge is brought into being regarding the knower who is brought into being, and that the

⁵⁷ For the kinds of existents, see *Inshā' al-dawā'ir*, pp. 7–27.

⁵⁸ Internal.

⁵⁹ Chittick understands this term as an entified existence, that is, existence which is not in the mind. SPK, p. 83.

⁶⁰ External.

⁶¹ Ibn al-ʿArabī seems to mean that, for example, the universal that is called knowledge entails the existence of one who knows, and this connection between the act (knowledge) and its subject (the knower) is part of the essence of knowledge. This paragraph on the universals is reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion on the universals. See, for example, *Metaphysics*, 1038a; D. M. Armstrong, *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction*, Boulder 1989.

⁶² By this phrase Ibn al-ʿArabī means the relationship between, for instance, knowledge and the knower.

knowledge is eternal regarding the eternal (entity). Each of the two (knowledge and knower) is both determining and determined.⁶³

It is known that even if the universals (*al-umūr al-kulliyya*) are intelligible, they have no concrete existence,⁶⁴ but only the (power) of determination, as they are determined by the relationship to the concrete existent.⁶⁵ The universals are determined by the concrete existents,⁶⁶ but it is inconceivable that they should admit particularization and division, for they exist in their essences in each entity they qualify, as humanity exists in each individual of this particular species, being neither particularized nor (53) divided by the multiplicity of the individuals. (Even though the universals are present in concrete existents), they (the universals) remain intelligible. If the connection between that which has concrete existence and that which lacks such existence is proved (*thabata*), therefore this would be a nonexistent relationship (*wa-hiya nisba 'adamiyya*),⁶⁷ then the connection between the concrete existents to each other is more easily perceived by the intellect, because the concrete existence unifies them, whereas in the former case (the connection between the concrete existents and the universals), there is no unifying element (*jāmi'*). Hence, there is a connection without a unifying element; however, a connection with a unifying element is stronger and more correct. There is no doubt that the bringing into being (*iḥdāth*) of that which is brought into being (*muḥdath*) and the need of the latter to a bringer into being (*muḥdith*) is proved, because the *muḥdath* is possible by virtue of itself.⁶⁸ Consequently, its existence derives from another, and it is connected to another with a connection of need (*irtibā' iftiqār*). The entity on which the *muḥdath* relies (for its existence) is undoubtedly a necessary existent by virtue of its essence (*bi-dhātihī*); for its existence, it does not need another entity. It is He (God) who bestows existence to this coming-into-being thing (*ḥādith*) by His essence and the *ḥādith* relies on Him (for its existence). Since God's Essence necessitates the existence of the *muḥdath*, the *muḥdath* is a necessary entity by virtue of God. Since the *ḥādith* relies on the entity from which it emerges, because of the

⁶³ In other words, the existence of knowledge in one entails one's being a knower, and the characteristic of the knower as brought into being or eternal entails the characteristic of knowledge as brought into existence or eternal.

⁶⁴ For Ibn al-ʿArabī concrete existence does not mean existence in the mind, but only existence outside one's mind, in the external world. I have no evidence that he knew of the doctrine of Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. after 1164), who thought that existence in the mind is one of the forms of concrete existence (*wujūd fī'l-a'yān*). *Al-Kitāb al-mu'tabar fī'l-ḥikma al-ilāhiyya*, Haydarabad 1939, Vol. III, p. 19.

⁶⁵ The knowledge of concrete existents determines the form of their universals.

⁶⁶ As he said above, the concrete existent may characterize the state of the universal.

⁶⁷ The author seems to say that the relationship between the concrete things and the universals are not seen but perceived by the intellect.

⁶⁸ A thing that is brought into existence is possible by virtue of itself and necessary by virtue of another. God is the necessary existent by virtue of itself (His essence), which means that no entity is the cause of His existence. In this characterization of the existents, Ibn al-ʿArabī follows other philosophers and theologians. See, for example, Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā': al-ilāhiyyāt*, trans. M. E. Marmura, Utah 2005, Ch. 6; Al-ʿAmidī (d. 1233), *Ghāyat al-marām fī 'ilm al-kalām*, ed. Ḥasan Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, Cairo 1971, pp. 48f.

essence of this entity, (this connection between the *ḥādīth* and its source) necessitates that the *ḥādīth* reflects the source's form. (This means) that each name and attribute of the source is ascribed to the *ḥādīth* except essential necessity (*wujūb dhātī*),⁶⁹ for the latter is inadmissible regarding the *ḥādīth*; although the *ḥādīth* is the necessary existent, it is necessitated by another, not by itself.

Moreover, you should know that since what we have said concerning the emergence of the human being in His form is right, God caused us to know Him through the observation of the *ḥādīth* and pointed out that He showed us His signs in the *ḥādīth*,⁷⁰ so we adduced evidence from ourselves about Him. The description through which we described Him was not but the description of ourselves, except for the unique essential necessity (which belongs to Him alone). Since we know Him through knowing ourselves and from ourselves, we ascribe to Him all that which we ascribe to ourselves. This (point is corroborated) by divine messages which come to us through the prophets (*tarājīm*).⁷¹ (In these messages) He described Himself for us through us. If we witness Him, we witness ourselves, and if He witnesses us, He witnesses Himself. We are doubtless many in terms of being (numerous) individuals and species. Even if one reality unites us, we definitely know that there is a difference through which individuals are distinguished from one another. If this (rule) did not exist, multiplicity would not subsist in one (entity). (54) Likewise, even if He describes us through what He describes Himself, that is, through all aspects, still there should be a difference, which is our need of Him for our existence and (the fact) that our existence depends on Him. This is because we are possible things, whereas He does not need that which we need. Consequently, it is right (to ascribe to) Him eternity and pre-existence, and to deny of Him antecedence, (which means) the beginning of existence from nonexistence. Although He is the First, antecedence is not ascribed to Him. For this reason, it is said of Him (He is) the Last.⁷² If His antecedence were antecedence in the sphere of limited existence, it would be impossible that He should be the Last existent, for there is no last possible thing, because the possible things (*mumkināt*) are infinite, hence there is no last possible thing.⁷³ He is the Last, only because everything goes back to Him, after it has been attributed to us. Hence, essentially He is both the Last and the First.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ This means being necessitated by virtue of its essence.

⁷⁰ Qur'ān 41:53: "We shall show them Our signs on the far horizons and in themselves, until it becomes clear to them that this is the Truth. Is it not enough that your Lord witnesses everything?" (trans. AH). For the concept of signs (*āyāt*) in the Qur'ān and Islamic theology, see Abrahamov, "Signs," *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān*, ed. J. D. McAuliffe, Leiden 2006, Vol. V, pp. 2–11.

⁷¹ For this use see SPK, p. 330. On p. 47, the word *mutarjīm* (literally: translator) means transmitter.

⁷² Qur'ān 57:3: "He is the First and the Last, the Outward (*ẓāhir*) and the Inward (*bāṭin*)."

⁷³ The possible things have no end, for they reflect God's essence, which is infinite.

⁷⁴ Here Ibn al-ʿArabī expresses the notion of the twofold nature of God. Just as God is transcendent and immanent, depending on the aspect considered, in the same manner, He is the First and Last. He is the First, because all entities derive from Him, and He is the Last, because all entities return to Him.

You should know that God characterized Himself as the Outward and the Inward and brought the world into existence in two forms – invisible and visible – so that we might perceive the Inward through the invisible (things) in ourselves and the Outward through the visible things in ourselves.⁷⁵ And He described Himself through satisfaction (*riḍā*) and anger (*ghaḍab*), and brought the world into existence as containing fear (*khawf*) and hope (*rajāʾ*), so that (people) would fear His anger and hope for His satisfaction. And He depicts Himself as beautiful and possessing majesty, and hence brought us into existence with (the attributes) of reverence (*hayba*) and intimacy (*uns*).⁷⁶ In this manner (one should understand) all that is ascribed to God and all His names. He expressed (each) pair of attributes by His two hands,⁷⁷ which turn from Him toward the creation of the Perfect Human Being, because he combines the realities of the world and its individual things. That is, because the world is visible (literally: witness – *shahāda*) and the vicegerent is invisible,⁷⁸ therefore the Ruler (God) is veiled. The Real describes Himself as (concealed) through dark veils, which are the natural bodies, and through luminous veils, which are the subtle spirits.⁷⁹ The universe is either dense (*kathīf*) or subtle (*laṭīf*), and it veils itself, hence it cannot perceive the Real as it perceives itself. It does not (55) cease (to be covered) by a veil which is not removed, knowing (*maʿa ilmihi*) that because of its need for its creator, it is distinct from Him. Moreover,⁸⁰ it has no part in the essential necessity which characterizes the existence of the Real, hence it will never perceive Him. The Real will never be known by the universe, either by mystical experience (*dhawq*) or by physical witness (*shuhūd*), for the created in time has no part in (the knowledge of the eternal).

God combined in Ādam (the pair of contradictory traits) to honor him. For this reason He said to Iblīs: “What prevented you from prostrating to (the human being) that I created with my two hands?” (Qurʾān 38:75) (Iblīs did not prostrate himself), because Ādam combined in himself two forms: the form of the cosmos and the form

⁷⁵ Since the structure of the human being reflects the cosmos, his hidden parts correspond to the cosmos’s hidden parts and the same applies to his manifest parts. *Al-tadbīrāt al-ilāhiyya fī iṣlāḥ al-mamlaka al-insāniyya*, in *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-ʿArabī*, ed. H. S. Nyberg, p. 108; trans. T. S. al-Jerrahi al-Halveti, *Divine Governance of the Human Kingdom*, Louisville 1997, pp. 9–11.

⁷⁶ One reveres God because of His majesty and wishes to be an intimate friend of God because of His beauty. Ibn al-ʿArabī wrote an epistle entitled *Kitāb al-jalāl waʾl-jamāl*. *Rasāʾil*, I, no. 2.

⁷⁷ Here Ibn al-ʿArabī finds a solution to the anthropomorphic expression in Qurʾān 38:75, which reads: “God said: ‘Iblīs, what prevents you from prostrating to (the human being) that I created with my two hands (*bi-yadayya*) . . .’” God’s two hands symbolize each pair of His attributes.

⁷⁸ The explanation of the invisibility of the vicegerent appears immediately.

⁷⁹ The notion that God is veiled by seventy veils of light and darkness is based on a *ḥadīth*. Al-Ghazālī, *Mishkāṭ al-anwār*, *The Niche of Lights: A Parallel English-Arabic text, translated, introduced, and annotated by David Buchman*, Provo, Utah, 1998, p. 44.

⁸⁰ The text reads *wa-lakinna* (but, however), which does not make sense here.

of the Real; both are the two hands of the Real, while Iblīs is part of the cosmos which does not possess this combination. Therefore, Ādam was vicegerent, and if he were not manifest in the form of that which made him vicegerent for the purpose of his vicegerency, he would not be vicegerent. And if he did not combine in himself all that which the subjects, for whose sake he was made vicegerent, require from him, because they depend on him and hence he must implement what they need, he would not be their vicegerent. Consequently, vicegerency is valid only regarding the Perfect Human Being. Therefore, God created his manifest form from the realities of the cosmos and its forms, and his invisible form in the form of God. For this reason, God said of him: “I was his hearing and seeing,” and He did not say, “I was his eye and ear.”⁸¹ He made a distinction between the two forms. (Just as the Real is in the Perfect Human Being), He is in each existent of the cosmos in the (same) measure that the reality of each existent requires. However, no existent possesses the combination (of traits) possessed by the vicegerent. He gained (this status of vicegerency) only because of this combination.

If the Real did not pervade the existents through (His) form, the cosmos would not exist. Likewise, if the universal intelligible realities did not exist, the concrete existents would not be determined.⁸² Hence, from this truth (mentioned above) (we learn) the cosmos’s need of God for its existence.

(56) All things need (God) and cannot dispense with (Him)/this is the truth that we express plainly

If you mention He who does not need (anything)/you know whom we mean

Everything is connected to everything without/ being separated, (so) learn from me what I say.

Now you know the wisdom of the creation (*nash’a*) of Ādam, that is, his external form, and you know the creation of his spirit, that is, his internal form, and this is the truth regarding creation.⁸³ And you know the creation of his position which is the combination (of traits) that made him worthy of the vicegerency. Ādam is the single soul from which God created the human species. This (is attested) in God’s saying: “Mankind, fear (*ittaqū*)”⁸⁴ your Lord, who created you of a single soul, and from it created its mate, and from the pair of them scattered abroad many men and women . . . (Qur’ān 4:1, trans. Arberry). His saying “fear (or beware)

81 Eye and ear are external and hence perceptible, while hearing and seeing are internal and hence imperceptible. The author refers to the tradition of supererogatory acts (*ḥadīth al-nawāfil*), according to which God rewards the believer who performs such acts “by becoming the hearing with which he hears, the seeing with which he sees . . .” Bukhārī, Vol. LXXXI, no. 38 (6502). Sells, *Mystical Languages*, p. 69. Ibn al-‘Arabī, *Divine Sayings*, p. 70.

82 For its existence the cosmos first needs God’s spirit (form) and second universal realities (ideas or the fixed entities – *a’yān thābita*), which establish the forms of the existents.

83 Read: *al-ḥaqq fī’l-khalq. Sharḥ*, p. 38. Reading *fa-huwa al-ḥaqq al-khalq* (Affīfī’s edition) means “thus, he (Ādam) is both the Real and the creation,” which coincides with the present context.

84 *Ittaqū* may also mean “beware.”

your Lord” (means) make your external side a protection for your Lord⁸⁵ and your internal side, that is God, a protection for you.⁸⁶ That is because the attitude toward human behavior consists of blame and praise; you should protect Him from blame (do not blame Him) and protect yourselves from praise (do not ascribe to yourselves praise), (only) then will you be well mannered and knowers.

Then, God showed Ādam what he placed in him, and he made it abide in two aspects relating to Ādam: the first aspect is the world and the second is Ādam and his progeny,⁸⁷ explaining the grades (of his progeny).

(The author) said: Since God showed me in secret what he placed in this great progenitor, I have recorded in this book what he established for me, not all of what I have been taught, for this (all the knowledge I was given) cannot be included in a book or in the world existing now. The following is what I witnessed, that is, what God’s messenger deposited in this book as He established it for me:

1. The Wisdom of Divinity exists in the Essence of Ādam; This is the present chapter.
2. The Wisdom of Expiration exists in the Essence of Seth (Shīth);
3. The Wisdom of Transcendence exists in the Essence of Noah (Nūh);
4. The Wisdom of Holiness exists in the Essence of Enoch (Idrīs);
5. The Wisdom of Excessive Love exists in the Essence of Abraham (Ibrāhīm);
6. The Wisdom of Reality exists in the Essence of Isaac (Ishāq);
7. The Wisdom of Loftiness exists in the Essence of Ishmael (Ismā‘īl);
8. The Wisdom of Spirituality exists in the Essence of Jacob (Ya‘qūb);
9. The Wisdom of Light exists in the Essence of Joseph (Yūsuf);
10. The Wisdom of Unity exists in the Essence of Hūd;
11. The Wisdom of Opening exists in the Essence of Šālīḥ;
12. The Wisdom of the Heart exists in the Essence of Shu‘ayb;
13. The Wisdom of Spiritual Power exists in the Essence of Lot (Lūṭ);
14. The Wisdom of Predetermination exists in the Essence of Ezra ‘(Uzayr);
15. The Prophetic Wisdom exists in the Essence of Jesus (‘Īsā);
16. The Wisdom of Mercy exists in the Essence of Solomon (Sulaymān);
17. The Wisdom of Existence exists in the Essence of David (Dā‘ūd);
18. The Wisdom of Breath exists in the Essence of Jonah (Yūnus);
19. The Wisdom of the Unseen exists in the Essence Job (Ayūb);
20. (58) The Wisdom of Majesty exists in the Essence of John (Yaḥyā);
21. The Wisdom of the Dominion exists in the Essence of Zakariah (Zakariyya);
22. The Wisdom of Intimacy exists in the Essence of Elias (Ilyās);
23. The Wisdom of Virtue exists in the Essence of Luqmān;
24. The Wisdom of Leadership exists in the Essence of Aaron (Hārūn);
25. The Wisdom of Exaltation exists in the Essence of Moses (Mūsā);
26. The Wisdom of Recourse exists in the Essence of Khālīd;
27. The Wisdom of Uniqueness exists in the Essence of Muḥammad.

⁸⁵ Probably by this phrase Ibn al-‘Arabī means that God is protected from any accusation concerning human behavior which derives from the humans’ external aspect. In other words, beware of ascribing to God your sins. *Sharḥ*, p. 38.

⁸⁶ You are not responsible for the good deeds which emanate from you. Do not ascribe them to yourselves, but to God.

⁸⁷ Ādam reflects in his essence the whole cosmos, and in addition he is the source of all generations to come.

The bezel of each kind of wisdom is the essence ascribed to it.⁸⁸ In the kinds of wisdom I mentioned in this book, I limited myself to what was established in the Source of the Book (*umm al-Kitāb*).⁸⁹ I copied what the Messenger dictated to me and did not go beyond what was established for me. Even if I wished to increase (the contents given to me) I would not be able to do so, for God's presence (*ḥaḍra*) prevents this action. It is God Who grants success, and there is no Lord except Him.

⁸⁸ Very probably, by "it" the author means each prophet, although the pronoun of *ilā* (to) is in the feminine (*ilayhā*), Ibn al-ʿArabī might have thought on the reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of a prophet to which the essence is ascribed.

⁸⁹ Qurʾān 43:4, 13:39, trans. AH. The source of the book is equivalent to the Preserved Tablet, the heavenly scripture, from which the Qurʾān was taken. This is another allusion of Ibn al-ʿArabī to the divine character of the *Fuṣūṣ* and to his status as one who, like prophets, receives revelation from Heaven.

2 The bezel of the wisdom of expiration¹ exists in the essence of Seth

Know that the external gifts and grants in the world, which are (given) through people and not through them, are divided into two kinds: gifts deriving from the Essence (of God) and gifts deriving from His Names. The people of mystical experience (*ahl al-adhwāq*) distinguish between them. Also, the two kinds of gifts (are given) in answer to a specific or a nonspecific request. (Moreover), there are gifts, whether of the Essence or of the Names, which are (59) (given) without request. One who wants a specific gift will ask: “O my Lord, give me such a thing, and he will specify a certain thing, not another.” One who wants a nonspecific gift will say: “Give me what You know is in my (best) interest for any part of my being, whether subtle or dense,” without specifying a certain thing.

Those who ask are divided into two kinds: those who are motivated to ask because of natural (inclination) to hasten (matters) (*istījāl tabīʿī*), for the human being was created hasty (*khuliqa ʿajūlan*);² and those who are urged to request, for they know that there are things belonging to God that cannot be attained (except and) only after a request. And he (one of this group) says (to himself) perhaps what we ask God is of this kind. Hence, his request (expresses) a precautionary measure, because of the possibility that there are things which God can give (but) only on request. That is because he cannot know what God knows, nor can he know what his predisposition (*istīdād*) permits him to receive, because one of the obscure objects of knowledge (*aghmaḍ al-maʿlūmāt*) is (knowing) one’s predisposition in each instant at that moment. However, if the predisposition did not make him request (something), he would not request (it).

The best knowledge attained by the People of Presence (*ahl al-ḥudūr*) with God,³ who do not know (their predisposition), is the knowledge of (their gift) at the moment of its reception. Because they are present with God, they know what God grants them at this time and that they receive it through their predisposition.

1 After stating in the [first chapter](#) that Ādam’s role was to unify all the realities in himself, the [second chapter](#) ascribes to Seth God’s self-manifestation of His power of creation, which is exemplified in the act of expiration (*naḥīth*).

2 This sentence is a combination of two Qur’ānic verses: “. . . Man is ever hasty” (*wakāna al-insān ʿajūlan* – Qur’ān 11:17) and “Man was created hasty . . .” (*khuliqa al-insān min ʿajal* – Qur’ān 21:37).

3 SPK, p. 105.

They are divided into two kinds: those who know from what they have received (what) their predisposition is, and those who know from their predisposition what they may receive. The latter is more complete than the former. Among those who belong to the second kind are certain people who ask, neither because they want to hasten (the reception of the gift) nor because there are many possible things (to be given), but only to obey God's command in His saying: "If you call on Me, I will answer you" (Qur'ān 40:60). Whoever does so is a pure servant. That is because this requester (*al-dā'i*) has no aspiration (*himma*),⁴ whether specific or not, which is connected with what he requests, but he wishes to obey his Lord's command. If his state requires (making a) request, he will ask servanthood (*'ubūdiyya*), and if his state requires the entrusting (of his affairs to God) and silence, he will be silent. Job (Ayūb) and others were afflicted by suffering, and they did not ask God to remove their affliction. (60) Then, at another time, their state required them to request the removal of it, and God removed it from them.

Hastening or slowing down the answer (depends) on the predetermined answer appointed by God for those who ask. If the request fits the moment predetermined for its answer, God hastens to answer, and if the time (of request) is delayed, whether in this world or until the world to come, the answer is also delayed. (What is delayed is) the thing requested, not the answer, for God is at the human being's service, hence you should understand this.⁵

By the second kind of request, "There are (gifts) that are given without request," I mean an articulated request, for essentially there must be a request, whether through articulation, a spiritual state, or a predisposition. Likewise, undefined praising (*ḥamd muṭlaq*)⁶ is never valid unless it is articulated; however, a spiritual state necessarily restricts praising when it refers to a (specific) meaning. The (knowledge) which urges you to praise God is the (knowledge) which limits (your praise) through a name of action (*ism fi'l*) or of transcendence (*ism tanzīh*).⁷ One is not aware of one's predisposition, but of one's spiritual state, because one knows the motive which is the state, for predisposition is a more hidden (form of) request. Only the knowledge that God predetermined (their actions) prevents such people from requesting God. They prepare their substrate to receive whatsoever comes from God, their souls and their aims being concealed from them.⁸

⁴ See p. 14, n. 4.

⁵ If all things and events are predetermined by God, then the suitability of the request to the answer is also determined. Thus, there is no possibility of man's choosing his actions freely in this system. Even one's thoughts and evaluations regarding one's actions can be considered as decreed by God.

Dr. Avraham Elqayam suggests that the word *ifham* ("understand"!) signifies the end of an esoteric or profound discussion that one should deliberate on. See, for example, ch. 12, 14, 17.

⁶ By this phrase, Ibn al-'Arabī may be suggesting general praise, like "you are good," without particularizing a specific trait.

⁷ When one knows God's names and actions, one praises Him by using words that are connected with these names.

⁸ They are not aware of their feelings and objectives, for they are waiting only for God's gifts.

Among those persons there are those who know that God's knowledge of them in all their states equals the knowledge of their fixed entity before their existence. They know that the Real does not confer (on the concrete entities) but what the fixed entity⁹ confers and they know the source of God's knowledge of them.

Among the people of God (*ahl allāh*),¹⁰ this kind of people (who do not request) are higher and more receptive to revelation than others, because they perceive the mystery of God's predetermination (*sirr al-qadar*).¹¹ They are divided into two groups: those who know it (the mystery) in a general way (*mujmalan*), and those who know it in a detailed manner (*mufaṣṣalan*). One who knows it in a detailed way is higher and more complete than one who knows it in a general way, for the former knows that which God knows about him, whether through God's notification to him of the knowledge latent in his fixed entity or His revelation to him of his fixed entity whose states are endless and ever-changing. (61) Such a one is higher than the one who knows in a general way. That is because his knowledge of himself is like God's knowledge of him, for the source of knowledge is one.¹²

However, from the point of view of the servant, (his knowledge of himself) derives from God's previous providence, which consists of God's revelation to him of all the states of his entity.¹³ When God makes the created being know the fixed states of his entity, he knows them as (concrete) existents, and he cannot know them in the state of their absence (from concrete existence),¹⁴ for they are essential relationships¹⁵ (*nisab*) having no form. In this respect we say that the two kinds of knowledge (God's and the human being's) are equal and originate in God's previous providence. That is why God said: "(We will try you) until we know (which of you do his best)" (Qur'ān 47:31). The phrase "until we know" has a very clear meaning, not as the meaning imagined by those who have no mystical inclination (*mashrab*). The best the one who holds God's transcendence (can do) is to state that the cause of the created knowledge is its connection (to the created beings). In the gift issue, this would be the best way of the rationalist, if he did not affirm knowledge as something added to God's essence and ascribed the connection to the created beings and not to the Essence. Through this (direction), the

⁹ See p. 17, n. 34.

¹⁰ See p. 15, n. 12.

¹¹ The mystery of God's predetermination is based on the following tradition: "Do not speak of anything relating to *qadar*, for it is God's secret, so do not disclose God's secret." Al-Lālakā'ī, Abū al-Qāsim Hibat Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan, *Sharḥ uṣūl 'ittiqād ahl al-sunna wa'l-jamā'a min al-kitāb wa'l-sunna wa-ijmā' al-ṣaḥāba wa'l-tābi'in min ba'dihim*, ed. Aḥmad Sa'd Ḥamdān, Makka AH 1402 (AD 1981), Vol. II, p. 629. B. Abrahamov, *Islamic Theology – Traditionalism and Rationalism*, Edinburgh 1998, p. 10.

¹² It is one's fixed entity.

¹³ Our author testifies to his own experience of receiving God's revelation on his future states and acts. Hirtenstein, *The Unlimited Mercifier*, p. 127.

¹⁴ He knows them only as they appear in concrete forms and not as ideas in God.

¹⁵ By relationships Ibn al-'Arabī means attributes (*ṣifāt*). SPK, p. 52. Thus, the fixed entities or the archetypes are like God's attributes; that is, they are not concrete spiritual beings, which would injure God's absolute unity.

rationalist is distinguished from the Verifier, the one, among the people of God, who receives revelation and has the capability of finding (*wujūd*) the truth.¹⁶

Let us now return to the (subject) of (divine) gifts, which we say derive either from God's Essence or Names. As for the gifts and donations which come from the Essence, they always originate in divine revelation. Revelation originating in the Essence is always only through the predisposition of the recipient of the revelation, not through any other way. Thus, the recipient of revelation sees only his own form in the mirror of the Real; he does not see the Real, and it is impossible to see the Real, although he knows that he sees his form only in the Real. This is comparable to a mirror in the concrete existence; if you see a form in it, you will not see the mirror itself, although you know that you see forms or your form only in it.¹⁷ God manifests this as a simile of the revelation of His essence (62), so that the recipient will know that he does not see God. There is no simile closer and more similar to vision and revelation than this. When you see a form in the mirror, try as you may to see the substance of the mirror, you can never see it. This is so true that some people, who perceived such a phenomenon concerning the forms seen in mirrors, thought that the form observed is placed between the beholder and the mirror. This is the best (theory) that can be known, though the matter is as we have said and thought. We have explained it in *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya*.¹⁸ If you have tasted this matter, you have tasted the utmost degree (of knowledge) beyond which no higher degree (can be reached by) the created being. Hence, do not strive and weary yourself (by trying) to ascend to a higher degree than this, for He is not there at all, and beyond this degree there is only pure non-existence (*al-ʿadam al-mahd*). God is your mirror, through which you see yourself, and you are His mirror through which He sees His names and the manifestation of their rules, and these names are nothing other than Himself.¹⁹

The matter became confused and obscure: Some of us are ignoramuses and say: "The inability to perceive is perception." Some others among us know, but say nothing at all, and this is the best reaction (literally: saying): knowledge causes them to be silent, not incapable. (One who is silent) is the best knower of God. This knowledge belongs only to the Seal of Messengers and the Seal of God's Friends (or Saints). None of the prophets and messengers can perceive (this knowledge),

¹⁶ The question is how to explain God's knowledge of the entities which are brought into being. In other words, how this knowledge is related to God without infringing on His eternity and unity. The verifier knows by revelation that God's eternity and unity are not impaired, while the rationalist knows the same idea by ascribing the change in knowledge not to God but to the created beings. God knows from eternity what will exist and act in the cosmos, and there is no change in his knowledge. *Futūḥāt*, ch. 411, Vol. 7, pp. 23f.

¹⁷ Exactly, when you focus your gaze on the form in the mirror, you do not see the mirror, although you are aware of its existence.

¹⁸ *Futūḥāt*, Vol. I, p. 249 (ch. 17).

¹⁹ The last phrase echoes the Ibn Kullab's theory of God's attributes, according to which the attributes are neither identical to God's essence nor other than His essence. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, pp. 208f. This doctrine was adopted by the Ash'arites, as attested by Ibn al-ʿArabī. *Futūḥāt*, Vol. V, p. 406 (ch. 360).

except through the light-niche (*mishkāṭ*)²⁰ of the Seal of Messengers. (Likewise) none of God's Friends can perceive it, except through the light-niche of the Seal of God's Friends, so that the messengers do not perceive it – even when they perceive it – except through the light-niche of God's Friends. That is, because messengerhood and prophecy – I mean the prophecy of legislation and its messengerhood – come to an end, while sainthood (*walāya*) never ends.²¹ Because the messengers are God's Friends, they do not perceive that which we have mentioned, except through the light-niche of the Seal of God's Friends, the more so concerning those who are more inferior than God's Friends. Even if the Seal of God's Friends follows the Law promulgated by the Seal of Messengers, this does not infringe his (Muḥammad) status nor contradict that which we have said, for from one vantage point he is inferior as he is superior from another. Accounts that appear in our plain religious sources (*ẓāhir shar'īnā*) (63) as regards the superiority of 'Umar's judgment of Badr's prisoners²² and the pollination of palms²³ support our view.

The perfect one is not necessarily superior in every respect and rank. People consider superiority in terms of the degree one can know God and (strive) to achieve this end. They must not think about the contingent beings. Understand what we have said!

The Prophet likened prophethood to a complete brick wall, except for one brick, and he was the (missing) brick. Muḥammad saw only one missing brick, while the Seal of God's Friends (*khātam al-awliyā'*), who necessarily experienced this vision of the Prophet's likening, saw two missing bricks, one made of gold and the other of silver. He saw that when these two bricks are in place, the wall is complete, and when they are missing, the wall is incomplete. He necessarily regarded himself as the two missing bricks needed to complete the wall.

The reason that entails his seeing two bricks is his following outwardly the Law of the Seal of Messengers, and this is the place of the silver brick. It is the outward aspect, (meaning) the rules that he follows. In like manner he learns from God inwardly that which he follows outwardly, for he necessarily contemplates things as they really are.²⁴ Regarding the inward aspect, this is the place of the golden brick. He and the angel, who reveals (messages) to the Messenger, acquire their knowledge from the same source.

If you understand what I have pointed to, you will attain beneficial knowledge of everything. That is because every prophet from Ādam to the last prophet has acquired his knowledge from the Niche of the Seal of Prophets. Even if the corporeal existence of a prophet comes late, (64) his reality (*ḥaqīqa*) always exists, and

²⁰ Cf. Qur'ān 24:35. When a lamp is placed in a niche, the light becomes stronger.

²¹ *Walāya* (proximity to God, friendship, sainthood) is the basic trait of prophets and saints. As such, it never ends, because nearness to God never ends. Chodkiewicz, *Seal of the Saints*, ch. 3.

²² Qur'ān 8:67–68; Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-qur'ān al-ʿaẓīm*, Beirut 1970, Vol. III, pp. 345f.

²³ A. Guillaume, *Life of Muhammad*, Oxford 1955, p. 301.

²⁴ By this Ibn al-ʿArabī means that the Seal of God's Friends contemplates both the internal and the external aspect of God's Law.

the (following) saying of the Prophet (corroborates this idea): “I was a prophet when Ādam was between the water and the clay.”²⁵ Others became prophets only when they were sent. Likewise, the Seal of God’s Friends became God’s Friend while Ādam was between water and clay, and others became God’s Friends only when they fulfilled the conditions of God’s Friendship (*walāya*); that is, the divine qualities they assumed, because God called Himself the Praised Friend (*al-walī al-ḥamīd*).²⁶

As regards his *walāya*, the Seal of Messengers relates to the Seal of God’s Friends as the prophets and messengers relate to the Seal of God’s Friends, for he (Muḥammad) is God’s friend, messenger and prophet.

As for the Seal of God’s Friends, he is the *walī*, the heir who learns from the (divine) source and witnesses (all) the ranks (of being or of God’s Friends). The *walāya* is one of the merits (*ḥasana*) of the Seal of Messengers, Muḥammad, the first in the community and the lord of Ādam’s offspring regarding the opening of the gate of intercession (*shafā’a*).²⁷ Only Muḥammad among the prophets was assigned to this state of intercession. In this unique state he precedes the Divine Names, for the Merciful (*al-raḥmān*) does not intercede with the Avenger of the people of trial (*ahl al-balā’a*)²⁸ until intercession is made with them. Muḥammad attained supremacy in this unique rank. He, who understands the spiritual degrees and stations,²⁹ will not find it difficult for him to accept this idea.

As for the gifts deriving from God’s names, know that God’s bestowal (of these gifts) on his creatures shows His mercy toward them; all these gifts derive from His names. (This mercy is divided into two kinds.) Either it is pure mercy such as good and pleasant sustenance in this world, which is (also) pure in the Resurrection.³⁰ The name the Merciful (*al-raḥmān*) gives this sustenance, and it is a merciful bestowal. Or it is a mixed³¹ mercy, such as drinking repugnant medicine which, however, relieves. This is a divine bestowal which cannot be made except through one of the guardians of the names. Sometimes God bestows on the servant (a gift) through (His name) the Merciful, and the gift is free of a mixture which does not fit the servant’s nature at a certain time, or does not cause the attainment of his aim, or something similar. Sometimes God bestows (65) (a gift) through

²⁵ I did not find this tradition in the canonical collections. For a similar tradition, see SPK, p. 239.

²⁶ Qur’ān 42:28.

²⁷ According to Muslim dogma, no Muslim who carried out a grave sin (*kabīra*) would stay forever in Hell, because the Prophet would plead for him. Al-Ājurri, *Al-Sharḥa*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī, Beirut 1983, pp. 331–359.

²⁸ I assume that by this phrase the author means “the people of Hell” with whom intercession is made.

²⁹ Ibn al-‘Arabī may allude to his view that an individual can excel another in one aspect and be inferior in another.

³⁰ Probably by “pure” the Greatest Master means that this sustenance was not obtained by unlawful acts or, and this seems most likely, that it is not a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant things.

³¹ It is a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant things.

(His name) the All-Encompassing (*al-wāsiʿ*),³² so that (His bestowal) is general, or through (His name) the Wise (*al-ḥakīm*) to serve the best interests (*al-aṣḥaḥ*) (of the people) at a certain time. Or He may bestow through His name the Bestower (*al-wahhāb*) in such a way that the recipient is not obliged to respond either by (expressing) gratitude or carrying out an action. Or He may bestow through His name the Almighty (*al-jabbār*), as it relates to a certain place (*mawṭin*) and its requirements.³³ Or He may bestow through His name the Forgiver (*al-ghaffār*), observing the true state (of the sinner). If the sinner deserves punishment, He will forgive him, and if he does not deserve punishment, he will protect him from a sin. Hence he will be called “immune” (*maʿṣūm*), “protected from sins,” and other names of a similar kind.

The giver is God, because He is the guardian of His treasuries. He brings forth (gifts) only in a known measure (*qadr maʿlūm*) and only in a name unique to each gift. “He gives everything its (appropriate measure of) creation (*khalqahu*)”³⁴ (Qurʾān 20:50) according to the name Just (*ʿadl*) and other names like it.

God’s names are infinite, because they are known through the infinite things which derive from them, even if their sources are finite principles; that is, the foundations of the names (*ummahāt al-asmāʾ*) or the presences of the names (*ḥaḍarāt al-asmāʾ*).³⁵

Truly, there is only one Reality (*ḥaqīqa*) which receives all these relations and attributions which are called the Divine Names. The Reality grants to every name, which appears endlessly, an essence (*ḥaqīqa*)³⁶ by which a name is distinguished from (all) others. This peculiar essence constitutes the name itself, not (the characteristics) the name shares with others. Likewise, gifts differ from each other through their distinctive characteristics (*shakhsiyya*); even though they derive from the same source, it is known that each differs from (all) others. The reason for this is the distinction of the names, for a thing never repeats itself because of the expansion of the divine domain. This is the truth on which one relies (*yuʿawwalu ʿalayhi*).³⁷

This is the knowledge of Seth. Seth’s spirit supplies any spirit that talks (66) about this (idea) with this knowledge, except for the Seal’s spirit, because the Seal

³² For this name see, for example, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ asmāʾ allāh al-ḥusnā*, ed. Taha ʿAbd al-Raʿuf Saʿd, Beirut 1990, pp. 282–284.

³³ By this the author may mean God’s control over every place on earth.

³⁴ SDG, pp. XXIVf.

³⁵ By the foundations (literally: the mothers) of the names, Ibn al-ʿArabī very probably means the seven basic attributes: the Living (*ḥayy*), the Omniscient (*ʿalīm*), the Willer (*murīd*), the Omnipotent (*qādir*), the Speaker (*mutakallim*), the All-Seeing (*baṣīr*), and the All-Hearing (*samīʿ*). And by the presences of the names, he may mean the ninety-nine most beautiful names of God.

³⁶ It is worth noting that Ibn al-ʿArabī uses the same terms with different meanings even in the same paragraph. Here the Reality designates God, whereas *ḥaqīqa* in the context of God’s names means the essence of the name. For this phenomenon, see Addas, p. 208.

³⁷ Cf. the title of one of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s books: The Book of Things One Must Not Rely On (*lā yuʿawwalu ʿalayhi*). *Rasāʾil*, I.

receives this knowledge (literally: the material – *al-mādda*) only from God, not from a spirit. Moreover, it is from the Seal's spirit that this knowledge (passes) to all the spirits. If the Seal does not comprehend this (procedure) through himself at the moment of the composition (*tarkīb*) of his material body, he knows all this, as it is, through his essence and rank. From the point of view of his material composition, he is ignorant. Thus, he is the knower and the ignorant (at the same time). He is described through contraries, just as the Source (God) is described as the Beautiful and the Majestic, the Manifest and the Hidden, the First and the Last. This (joining of contraries) signifies his essence, and not another (trait). He knows and does not know, he comprehends and does not comprehend, he witnesses and does not witness.

Because of this knowledge, Seth was named "God's gift," which is the meaning of Seth.³⁸ In his hand is the key to gifts of different kinds and attributions. First this key was given to Ādam, and that which Seth received is from Ādam, because the son is the secret of his father;³⁹ from the father he emerges and to him he returns. To him who has understanding from God, nothing is strange in this giving. Every gift in this world takes the same course of giving. Every gift derives from God and there is nothing which does not come from Him, even if the forms (of gifts) are various. Not all persons know this and that this is the truth; only a very few of the people of God (know this). If you see one who knows it, rely on him, for this one is the very purest individual of the choicest of the elite (*'ayn ṣafā' khulāṣt khāṣat al-khāṣa*) among the people of God. Every gnostic (literally: one who possesses unveiling – *ṣāḥib kashf*) who contemplates a form which gives him knowledge he did not possess before (must know) that this knowledge originates in himself, and in no other (entity). It is from the tree of his own self that he garners the fruit of his knowledge. It is like a manifest form which faces a polished surface (and is seen in it), not another (form is seen in it). However, the substrate or the plane (*ḥaḍra*) in which he sees his form may change owing to the shape of this plane; a big thing may appear as a little thing in a little mirror, and (a short thing may appear) as a long thing (in a long mirror), and (a resting thing) may appear as a moving thing (in a moving mirror). A unique plane may cause the reverse (67) form to be seen, or may reflect the exact thing which it faces, in such a way that the right side is seen as right from the point of view of the seer. However, in general, the right side appears in the mirror as the left side. But in exceptional cases, the right side appears as a right side. All this applies to the traits of the essence of the plane wherein (things) appear; this is the plane which we compare to a mirror. Whoever knows his predisposition, knows that which he receives. Not everyone who knows that which he receives knows his predisposition except after he receives, even though he knows this (his predisposition) in a general way.

³⁸ Seth does not appear in the Qur'ān. Cf. Huart and C.E. Bosworth, "Shīth," E I2. Very probably Ibn al-'Arabī knew the meaning of the name which is given in Genesis 4:25: "And Adam knew his wife again: and she bore a son, and called his name Seth; For God, said she, has given (*shat*) me another seed instead of Abel, whom Cain slew."

³⁹ The son is the hidden entity of the father.

However, some people of speculation (*ahl al-naẓar*) who are weak-minded hold that since it has been proved that God does what he wants, it is possible for Him to do things contrary to wisdom and to the real state of things. Consequently, some speculative thinkers come to deny possibility (or contingency – *imkān*) and to affirm the necessity through the Essence or through another (entity).⁴⁰ One who verifies (*al-muḥaqqiq*)⁴¹ affirms possibility and its attendance (*ḥaḍra*);⁴² he knows what the possible thing is, what turns it into a possible thing and that it is necessary by virtue of another. (He also knows) why it is legitimate to designate that which requires the necessity of another thing. Only those who know God are aware of the distinction between (these terms).

The last-born individual of the human species will follow the footsteps of Seth and bear Seth's mysteries. There will be no other offspring of this species and he will be its seal. His sister will be born with him, and he will emerge after her, his head lying at her feet. He will be born in China and speak Chinese. Infertility will spread among men and women, and there will be many marriages without procreation. He will call them to God, but they will not respond. When God will make him and the believers of his time die, those who remain will live like animals, not permitting the lawful and not prohibiting the unlawful. They will behave as dictated by nature and passion without any regard for intellect or religion. Because of them the Last Hour will take place.

⁴⁰ They deny the existence of possible things and the fact that things are necessary through other things and affirm that only God makes things necessary through His Essence. Cf. B. Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Causality," *Studia Islamica* 67 (1988), especially pp. 95f.

⁴¹ This is the one who knows the truth for certain. SPK, p. 389, n. 11.

⁴² Here the word *ḥaḍra* appears in a different meaning.

3 The bezel of the wisdom of transcendence¹ exists in the essence of Noah

Know, may God inspire you through His spirit, that according to the people of truth (*ahl al-ḥaqāʾiq*), transcendence (*tanzīh*) concerning the Divine amounts to limitation and restriction.² Whoever believes in God's transcendence (*munazzih*) is either foolish or ill mannered. If he, as a believer in religion, holds (this doctrine) unreservedly and believes in it and does not take into consideration something else, he misbehaves, denies the truth and the messengers, without being aware of this (consequence). He imagines that he is right, but he is wrong. He is like one who believes in parts (of religion) and disbelieves in others,³ especially if he knows that divine expressions in the Scriptures that speak of the Real convey easily understood meanings to the common people (*ʿumūm*), but to the elite (*khuṣūṣ*) (they convey) all meanings that are comprehensible according to the aspects of a certain phrase in the ordinary usage of a given language.

The Real is manifest in every created and comprehended (*maṣhūm*) thing, and He is hidden from all comprehension, except for the comprehension of the one who holds that the cosmos is His form and ipseity (*huwiyya*). The cosmos is His manifest name, just as He is in another sense the spirit of that which is manifest, and this spirit means His being hidden. The Real's relationship to the manifest forms of the cosmos is like the relationship of the spirit that governs a form. Concerning the definition of the human being and of any other being, we can speak of the manifest and the hidden aspects. The Real (in his manifest aspect) can be defined by every definition, for the forms of the cosmos are infinite and cannot

1 *Subbūh* is an attribute of God which denotes His transcendence of any trait relating to the cosmos. Chittick, "The Chapter Headings," p. 9. The Real in respect to His Essence has no connection to the cosmos; however, in respect to His names and attributes, He permeates the cosmos. According to our author, the truth lies in accepting both God's transcendence and immanence. Affifi, II, pp. 31–33. Ibn al-ʿArabī distinguishes between two kinds of transcendence. The first is *ḥikma subūḥiyya*, which denotes purifying God from partners and imperfections, while the second is *ḥikma quḍsiyya* (see the title of ch. 4), which signifies removing from God all traits of the possible things. Izutsu, pp. 51f.

2 When you can say nothing about God, because He is transcendent, you limit your knowledge of Him.

3 Qurʾān 4:150.

be encompassed. The definitions of every form of the cosmos cannot be known but through the measure of the knowledge of the form of the cosmos that one possesses. Consequently, the definition of the Real is not known, for His definition cannot be attained except through the knowledge of every form, which is impossible. Therefore, the definition of the Real is inconceivable.

(69) Likewise, whoever holds the Real's immanence (*shabbaha*) and does not hold His transcendence (*nazzaha*) limits and restricts Him and does not know Him. Whoever combines in his knowledge transcendence and immanence in a general way, for it is inconceivable to know the cosmos in detail, because one cannot embrace all the forms of the cosmos, knows the cosmos in a general way but not in detail, just as he knows himself in general but not in detail. For this reason, the Prophet connected knowledge of the Real with knowledge of the self (or soul), saying: "Whoever knows himself (or his soul) knows his Lord" (*man 'arafa nafsahu 'arafa rabbahu*).⁴ And God said: "We shall show them Our signs on the horizons," meaning the outside world, "and in themselves (or in their souls)," meaning the inside world, "until it becomes evident to them," meaning to the observer, "that He is the Real" (Qur'ān 41:53), in that you are His form, and He is your spirit.⁵ You relate to Him, as your bodily form relates to you, and He relates to you as the spirit that governs the form of your body. Your definition includes both the external and the internal aspects, for if the spirit that governs the form of your body disappears, you are no longer called a human being; concerning this form, it is said that it has the form of a human being, which does not differ from a form of wood or of stone. The name "human being" applies to this form only figuratively, not in reality. However, the Real never disconnects Himself from the forms of the cosmos. Just as the human being when alive is defined by the spirit in reality and not in a figurative way, so the cosmos is defined by the Divinity.

Just as the external form of the human being praises with its unique language⁶ its spirit and soul which govern it, so God makes the forms of the cosmos praise Him. But we are not able to understand their praise, because we cannot encompass all the forms of the cosmos. All the praises come from the languages of the Real which express His praise. For this reason, God says: "Praise belongs to God, the Lord of (all) existents (*'ālamīn*),"⁷ meaning that He is the source of all praises, hence He is both the one who praises and the one praised.

(70) If you hold transcendence, you restrict Him/and if you hold immanence, you limit Him

If you hold the two doctrines, you are right/and you will be a leader and a master in knowledge

4 For this dictum, see A. Altmann, "The Delphic Maxim in Medieval Islam and Judaism," in Altmann, *Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism*, New York 1969, pp. 1–40.

5 See p. 22, n. 7.

6 The body has a specific language through which it expresses its praises.

7 Qur'ān 1:1. Most of the commentators regard the word *'ālamīn* (literally: worlds) as designating all existents, except for God. See, for example, Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-aẓīm*, Beirut 1970, Vol. I, p. 43.

Whoever holds His being as two things is a polytheist/and whoever holds that He is one unifies Him

Beware of likening Him if you hold duality/and of making Him transcendent if you unify Him

You are not He, but you are He and you see Him⁸/in the essences of things both boundless and restricted.⁹

God said: “There is nothing like Him” (Qur’ān 42:11), thus making Himself transcendent, and “He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing” (ibid.), thus likening Himself to creation. (However), when He says “there is nothing like His likeness (*ka-mithlihi*),” He likens Himself to creation¹⁰ and makes Himself two, and when He says “the All-Hearing the All-Seeing,” He makes Himself transcendent and united.¹¹

If Noah had combined the two calls¹² to his people, they would have answered him. (However), he first called them to the external (doctrine of transcendence) then to the internal (doctrine of immanence)¹³ and then said to them: “Ask forgiveness of your Lord, for He is always Forgiving” (Qur’ān 71:10). And he said: “. . . I have called my people night and day, but the more I call them, the further they run away” (Qur’ān 71:5, 6, trans. AH). He said that his people did not want to hear his call, for they knew that they should respond to it. Those who know God apprehend what Noah pointed out regarding his people; this was praise in the form of blame. They (those who know God) understand that the people did not respond to his call only because his call separated (*furqān*)¹⁴ (between the transcendent and the immanent aspects of the Reality), whereas one should combine the two aspects (*qur’ān*) and not separate (*furqān*) them. Whoever holds a combination (of the two aspects) does not pay attention to separation even if he is in a state of separation, because the combination includes the separation and not vice versa. For this reason, only Muḥammad and this community, which is the “best community singled out for people” (Qur’ān 3:110), were distinguished by the Qur’ān. (The verse) “There is nothing like Him” (Qur’ān 42:11) combines the two aspects in one place. If Noah had uttered this verse, they would have answered him, for the Qur’ān likens (God to creation) and does not liken (Him) in the same verse, moreover even in half a verse.

⁸ Ibn al-‘Arabī here refers to the question of the One and the Many. From one point of view the cosmos is identified with the Real, because it is His manifestation, but from another point of view it is different, because it is created. Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy*, p. 12. This doctrine will also be dealt with in [ch. 4](#).

⁹ These stanzas were also translated by Affifi in his *Mystical Philosophy*, p. 21.

¹⁰ He likens Himself, because the Qur’ān says that God has a like.

¹¹ That is because only God has such absolute traits.

¹² That is, the call for a transcendent God and the call for an immanent God.

¹³ Cf. Qur’ān 71:8, 9.

¹⁴ Here *furqān* does not appear as a synonym of al-Qur’ān in the meaning of redemption, but rather as an infinitive of *faraqa* (he divided, separated), while *qur’ān* derives from the verb *qara’a* (he connected, joined, combined).

Noah called his people at night (71), (which symbolizes) their intellect and spirituality, for they are hidden. Also he called them by day, (which symbolizes) their external forms and senses.¹⁵ However, he did not combine the external and the internal aspects as in “there is nothing like Him.” As a result, their innermost perception repelled (Noah’s call) because of this separation (between the two aspects), and his call increased their running away.¹⁶ Then he spoke about himself, (revealing) that he called them so that God would forgive (*li-yaghfira lahum*) them, not that He would reveal to them (the two aspects). They understood that which he (Noah) told them. For this reason, they “thrust their fingers into their ears and covered their heads with their garments” (Qur’ān 71:7, trans. AH). All this is the form of covering (*satr*)¹⁷ to which he called them, and they responded to his call in an active manner, not by yielding to God. In the verse “There is nothing like Him,” there is both affirmation and negation of likeness to God. Muḥammad spoke about this point of having been given (the knowledge) of the all-comprehensive words (*jawāmi‘ al-kalim*).¹⁸ Muḥammad did not call his people at night and by day (separately), but rather at night by day and by day at night.¹⁹

In his wisdom, Noah said to his people: “He will send down abundant rain from the sky for you” (Qur’ān 71:11, trans. AH); that is, (various kinds) of intellectual knowledge regarding the meanings (of things), and reflection, “and He will give you wealth (*amwāl*)” (ibid., 12, trans. AH), through which He will incline you toward Him (*yamīlu bi-kum ilayhi*).²⁰ When He inclines you toward Him, you will see your form in Him. However, he among you who imagines that he sees Him does not know, and he among you who knows that he sees himself is the knower. For this reason, people are divided into those who do not know and those who know. And “his offspring” (*waladuhu*, ibid., 21) is the fruit of their reflection. The knowledge of this issue²¹ is based on revelation (*mushāhada*) and is far removed from the fruits of reflection. (“Their wealth and children) will increase their ruin” (ibid.) and “their trade reaps no profit” (Qur’ān 2:16, trans. AH). What they grasp, that is, what they imagined was their property, has disappeared. Concerning the Muḥammadans,²² (it is said in

¹⁵ “My Lord, I have called my people night and day” (Qur’ān 71:5, trans. AH).

¹⁶ Ibid., 7.

¹⁷ The verb *satara* is equivalent to the verb *ghafara* mentioned above; both designate covering.

¹⁸ This is a *ḥadīth* which appears in al-Bukhārī, *Jihād* 122 (7013): “I was sent with the all-comprehensive words.” *Futūḥāt*, Vol. III, p. 160. SPK, pp. 239, 306, 330, 396, n. 17. Here Ibn al-‘Arabī finds corroboration for his idea that in his personality Muḥammad joins the external and the internal aspects.

¹⁹ This means that the internal aspect (night) exists in the external aspect (day) and vice versa.

²⁰ Here Ibn al-‘Arabī plays with the stems *m.w.l* of *amwāl* and *m.y.l* of *yamīlu*, although the meanings of both words are different.

²¹ The author means the combination of the two aspects mentioned above.

²² This epithet does not necessarily indicate Muslims, but those who, like Muḥammad, manifest every divine and human trait. For example, they know the things as they really are, transcend every station and combine the two aspects of transcendence and immanence. In short, they are the ideal people. SPK, 376–379. SDG, p. XXV.

the Qur'ān) "Give out of what He has made pass down to you" (Qur'ān 57:7, trans. AH) and concerning Noah (and his people) (the Qur'ān says): "Entrust yourselves to no one but Me" (Qur'ān 17:2, trans. AH). (The Qur'ān) affirms that the property is theirs and that God is their trustee. They are appointees of the property possessed by God, and God is their trustee. The property is in their grasp, but this is the property of appointment (*mulk al-istikhlāf*). Through this, the Real is the Owner of the Property (*mālik al-mulk*), as al-Tirmidhī said. "And they have deceived a mighty deception" (Qur'ān 71:22), because the call to God means a deception (of the people) to whom (this call) was directed, for God (72) has not been absent from the beginning, therefore He is always called to. "I call (the people) to God" (Qur'ān 12:108), and this is the essence of deception.²³ "(When I called them) it was out of clear awareness" (ibid.) He (Noah) turned their attention to (the idea) that the whole cosmos belongs to Him. They responded by deceiving him, just as he did.

The Muḥammadan knows that the call to God is not a call to His ipseity, but rather to His names. God said: "On the day that We shall gather the god-fearing to (*ilā*) the Merciful as a group" (Qur'ān 19:85). The Qur'ān uses the particle indicating direction (*ilā*) and connects it to God's name (the Merciful), hence it lets us know that the cosmos is under the providence of a divine name which obliges humans to be god-fearing. In their deceit they said: "Do not abandon your gods, do not abandon Wadd, Suwā', Yaghūth, Ya'ūq and Nasr" (Qur'ān 71:23). If they renounced their gods, they would not know the Real in the measure of their renouncement, for the Real is reflected in every worshiped god, whether one knows or does not know (this fact).

Concerning the Muḥammadans (Qur'ān 17:23 says): "God decreed (*qadā*) that you should worship none but Him," meaning He ordered (*ḥakama*).²⁴ The knower is aware of the object of worship and the form through which it was made manifest for the purpose of being worshiped. He also knows that separation and multiplicity (of the parts of this object) are like parts in the sensible form and like spiritual faculties in the spiritual form, hence in every object of worship it is God who is worshiped.²⁵ The inferior person is he who imagines (the existence of) divinity in these objects. If he had not imagined this, he would not have worshiped stone or other things. For this reason, God said (to Muḥammad): "Say (to the idolaters) 'name them' (the idols)" (Qur'ān 13:33). If they had named them, they would have named them stones, trees and stars. If they had been asked: "Whom did you worship?" They would have said: "A god." They would not have said God (*allāh*) or the god. The superior person does not imagine, but says that this is a divine manifestation which one needs to exalt, and he does not confine himself (to the worship of a specific object). The inferior person who uses his imagination says: "We only worship them

²³ Noah's call was a deception, because he called them to believe in the transcendent God while omitting God's immanent aspect.

²⁴ Believing in the human being's free will, Ibn al-ʿArabī cannot ascribe to God predetermination, which denies giving reward or punishment.

²⁵ Since all things in the cosmos are God's manifestations, whether they are parts or wholes, when one worships a part of an object or a whole, one actually worships God.

because they bring us nearer to God” (Qur’ān 39:3, trans. AH). The superior person, the knower, says: “Your God is one, so submit yourselves only to Him” wherever He is manifest “and give good news to the humble” (*al-mukhbbīn*, literally: those who make themselves low. Qur’ān 22:34), whose fire of nature was extinguished and they say “a god” and not “a nature.”

“They have led many astray” (Qur’ān 71:24, trans. AH), meaning they have confused them regarding the counting of the One through aspects and attributions. “Do not increase the going astray of those who do evil” (*al-zālimīn*)²⁶ (ibid.) (73) to their souls. “The elect” (Qur’ān 38:47) “who inherited the Scripture” (Qur’ān 42:14) are the first of the three (groups).²⁷ He gives this group precedence over the moderate and the foremost. (By those who go astray mentioned above) he means the perplexity of the Muḥammadan (who says:) Increase my perplexity regarding You!²⁸ “Whenever it (the lightning) flashes on them, they walk on, and when darkness falls around, them they stand still” (Qur’ān 2:20, trans. AH).

The perplexed person circles (the Pole) and his circular motion (continues) around the Pole without interruption,²⁹ while the individual who takes the long course inclines away from (the circle), distancing himself from the target, seeking only the state in which he exists and imagining his aim. (He imagines) the points of beginning and end of his way and that which is in between.³⁰ There is no beginning point for the human being who takes the circular course; he should not go out at a certain place nor direct himself to a final point. He possesses the complete existence and is given all the comprehensive words³¹ and wisdoms (*ḥikam*).

“Because of their steps of going beyond”³² (*khaṭīrātihim*, literally: their sins, Qur’ān 71:25), which caused them to go beyond, they were drowned in the seas

²⁶ This appellation is positive, for by it Ibn al-‘Arabī is referring to those who wrong their appetite souls and practice asceticism, thus reaching the highest rank of Sufism. Hence, such people are preferred to the moderate and the foremost. Affīfī, II, p. 40.

²⁷ Ibn al-‘Arabī alludes to Qur’ān 35:32: “We gave the Scripture as a heritage to Our chosen servants: some of them wronged themselves (AH: their own souls), some stayed between (right and wrong), and some, by God’s permission (AH: leave), were foremost in good deeds. That is the greatest favor” (based on AH’s trans.).

²⁸ This sentence is a paraphrase of Qur’ān 20:114 which reads: “Increase my knowledge” (*zidnī ‘ilman*). Our author is saying that the measure of perplexity concerning God depends on the measure of our knowledge of Him. Perplexity is defined as drowning in the sea of knowledge, which is the final aim of the mystic. Su’ād al-Ḥakīm, pp. 358–363. See below, pp. 199–200 of the Arabic text.

²⁹ The picture Ibn al-‘Arabī draws here is a circle, which corresponds to the whole of existence. At the center of the circle is the Pole or the Reality of Muḥammad, which represents the aggregation of all the phenomena of the cosmos. The perplexed person sees the Pole from every point of the circumference of the circle.

³⁰ The second person seems to regard the world of phenomena as finite, hence his course is from the beginning to the ending point, while the knower, the perplexed, is aware of the infinite character of the world.

³¹ See note 18 above.

³² Here the author plays with the root of *khaṭīrātihim*, *kh.ṭ.*, and replaces it with the root *kh.ṭ.w* in the first form (*khaṭā*), meaning to walk, to go.

of the knowledge of God, which means perplexity. “And they were made to enter a Fire” (ibid.), meaning according to the Muḥammadans the same as drowning. “When the seas boil over” (*sujjirat*, Qur’ān 81:6). When you set an oven on fire (you say): “The oven was set on fire (*sajjarat*).”

“Except for God, they found none to help them” (Qur’ān 71:25), for God was their (only) source of help,³³ and they were annihilated in Him forever. If He had taken them (from the bottom of the sea of knowledge) to the shore of nature (the world of the phenomena), He would have brought them down from this lofty rank, even if the whole cosmos belongs to God (*li-allāh*), (exists) through God (*bi-allāh*), and moreover the whole is God (*al-kull huwa allāh*).³⁴

“(And) Noah said: ‘My Lord’” (*rabbī* – ibid., 26). He did not say “My God” (*ilāhī*), for Lord has (the attribute of) stability, while God has (the attribute of) many names, because “Every day He does something (different)” (Qur’ān 55:29). By Lord, Noah means the stability in variation (*thubūt al-talwīn*),³⁵ for the only real existence belongs to Him. (Noah said to God): “Do not leave one of the unbelievers on earth” (Qur’ān 71:26), meaning that he calls (on God) to make them dwell in its bottom.³⁶ The Muḥammadan says: “If you drop a rope, it will fall upon God”³⁷ (which means that) “Everything in the heavens and on earth belongs to Him” (Qur’ān 2:116, trans. AH). When you are buried in it, you are in it and it is your place (*zarfuka*). (“From the earth we created you), into it We shall return you, and from it We shall raise you a second time” (Qur’ān 20:55, trans. AH), because of the variety of aspects (involved in returning and raising). (“Do not leave) one of those who conceal³⁸ (*kāfirīn*) (on earth)” (Qur’ān 71:26) who “covered their heads with their garments and thrust their fingers into their ears”³⁹ in order to find cover, because he called (74) them to cover (*ghafara*) them, for covering (*ghafir*) means concealing (*satr*).

(He points out in this verse) “one” (Qur’ān 71:26) to indicate that just as the calling is general so is the benefit.

“If you leave them” (Qur’ān 71:27), meaning if you call them and leave them, “they will lead Your servants astray” (ibid.), meaning they will confound (*yuhayyirūhum*) them and make them go out from servanthood to the mysteries of Lordship existing in them. Consequently, they will regard themselves as lords after they regarded themselves as servants; hence, they are servants and lords (at the same time). “They will not beget” (ibid.), meaning they will not

³³ The text has “helpers” (*aṣṣār*).

³⁴ If the whole is God, there is no higher or lower place or idea.

³⁵ This phrase means that there are various stable names of God, whereas the name God (*allāh*) denotes the endless changes of all things in the cosmos. Each name is actually a lord (*rabb*). Affifi, II, p. 42.

³⁶ To be on earth means to consider only the external phenomena, while to be in the bottom of the earth means to see the inner aspects of existence.

³⁷ Tirmidhī, V:58 (3298).

³⁸ They are those who conceal the Real by worshipping idols.

³⁹ Our author changed the order of Qur’ān 71:7.

produce and manifest except “only one who breaks”⁴⁰ (ibid.), meaning one who manifests that which was concealed, (and only) “one who conceals,”⁴¹ meaning concealed that which was manifest after its being manifested. They will manifest what was concealed, then conceal what was manifested after its manifestation. As a result, the beholder will be bewildered and not know the aim of the one who manifests in his manifestation, or the aim of the one who conceals in his concealment, nor that person (carrying out the two actions), who is one and the same. “My Lord, (*ighfir*) me” (Qur’ān 71:28), meaning conceal me and do it for my sake, so that (one) will not know my (true) value (*qadr*) and station, just as one does not know Your value in Your Qur’anic statement “They did not assess God’s true value” (6:91). (And conceal) “My parents” (Qur’ān 71:28), (that is) the intellect and the nature who produced me, “and whoever enters my house” (ibid.), meaning my heart, “believing” (ibid.), (that is) saying that the divine messages in it are true and that they derive from themselves (souls). (And conceal) “the male believers” from the intellect “and the female believers” from the souls. “And do not increase those who are obscure (*ẓālimīn*)” (ibid.). (This meaning) derives from the word “darkness” (*ẓulumāt*). They are the people of the hidden world who are concealed behind dark veils.⁴² (Do not increase them) “But destruction (*tabār*),” (ibid.), meaning annihilation (in God) so that they will not be aware of their souls because they will see the face of the Real. (The following verse was directed) to the Muḥammadans: “Everything perishes except for His face” (Qur’ān 28:88). *Tabār* means annihilation. Whoever wishes to know the mysteries of Noah must ascend to the sphere of Noah (the sun). This issue is treated in my *al-tanazzulāt al-mawṣiliyya*⁴³ (The Mosul Revelations). God speaks the Truth.

⁴⁰ This is the first meaning of *fajara*, from which the active participle (*fājir*, wrong doer) derives.

⁴¹ Again, Ibn al-‘Arabī exploits the first meaning of *kafara* (he concealed), neglecting the usual meaning of *kaffār* (unbeliever).

⁴² p. 23.

⁴³ *Majmū‘at rasā’il ibn ‘arabī*, Beirut 2000, Vol. II.

4 The bezel of the wisdom of holiness¹ exists in the essence of Enoch²

(75) (The term) elevation (*‘uluww*) has two meanings: elevation with respect to physical place and elevation with respect to status. The elevation of place (is attested in Qur’ān 19:57), “We raised him to a high place.” The highest place is the place around which the Spheres revolve. This is the Sphere of the Sun, the place of the spirituality of Enoch. Seven Spheres are situated below the Sphere of Enoch and seven others above it, and his Sphere is the fifteenth. The Spheres above him are those of Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, the Mansions, the Constellations (*al-aṭlas*),³ the Footstool, and the Throne. The Spheres below him are those of Venus, Mercury, the Moon, Ether, Air, Water, Earth. Because (the Sphere of the Sun) is the pivot of (all) the Spheres, it is an elevated place.⁴

As for the elevated status, it belongs to us, the Muḥammadans. God said: “You are the elevated, and God is with you” (Qur’ān 47:35) in this elevation; He is far above physical place but not above status.⁵ When the souls of those of us who acted were afraid (of God’s proximity to the human being), He said (following “God is with you”): “God will not decrease the reward for your actions” (ibid.). That is because an action requires place, while knowledge requires status. Hence, God conjoins the two elevations, the elevation of place through action and of status through knowledge. Then, in order to place Himself far above the human being, He said: “Praise the name of your Lord, the Most High” (Qur’ān 87:1) to negate any idea of partnership.⁶

¹ Like *Ḥikma subūhiyya* (ch. 3), *Ḥikma qudūsiyya* designates God’s transcendence. However, whereas the first phrase denotes God’s transcendence which is expressed in lacking of a copartner and not suffering damage, the second phrase means God’s detachment from all kinds of possible things. Affifi, II, p. 46.

² For Idrīs, see Qur’ān 19:56–57, 21:85, 86. G. Vajda, “Idrīs,” E I2. As in other chapters, in this chapter Idrīs is not a historical person, but a spirit which resides in the sphere of the sun. Affifi, II, p. 45. See below, ch. 22.

³ The Sphere of *burūj*, which is placed after *al-aṭlas*, is identical to the Sphere of *al-aṭlas* and hence redundant.

⁴ As is well known, this is not the usual description of the Spheres by the philosophers or the astronomers, but a strange amalgamation of astronomical, philosophical and Qur’ānic elements. Affifi, II, 48.

⁵ Ibn al-‘Arabī seems to say that since the human being reflects God, he shares with Him the attribute of elevation.

⁶ In keeping with his doctrine of conjoining of contraries, our author says that God is both with the humans and is not with them, just as He is both the external and the internal, the first and the last, and so on.

Among the most wonderful things is that the human being, I mean the perfect human being, is the most elevated existent. Elevation is attached to him only through his relationship to a place, or to a grade, that is, status. His elevation does not derive from his essence (*li-dhātihī*). He is elevated because of the elevation of place and grade. Elevation derives from both (place and grade). For example, the elevation of place (76) (is attested in Qurʾān 20:5), “The Merciful sat Himself upon the Throne,” which is the highest place. (Concerning) the elevation of status (God said): “Everything perishes except for His face” (Qurʾān 28:88) and “All things return to Him” (Qurʾān 11:123) (and) “Is there a god with God?” (Qurʾān 27:60). When God said: “We raised him to an elevated (*ʿaliyyan*) place” (Qurʾān 19:57), He made *ʿaliyyan* an adjective of a place. (And when He said): “When your Lord said to the angels, ‘I am appointing a vicegerent on earth’” (Qurʾān 2:30), He meant the elevation of status. And He said regarding the angels: “Are you (the Devil) proud or are you among the elevated?” (Qurʾān 38:75), thus He ascribed elevation to the angels. If elevation were ascribed to them because of their being angels, then all angels would be elevated. Since God does not generalize, although all the angels share the definition of angels, we know that, according to God, this is an elevation of status. Likewise, if the elevation of the vicegerents (Caliphs) among people were an essential attribute, every human being would share this (attribute). However, since He does not generalize, we know that this elevation derives from status.

The Elevated (*al-ʿaliyy*) is one of His Most Beautiful Names. (However), elevated above whom, when only He exists? Thus, He is the Elevated by virtue of His Essence.⁷ From where did He take (this elevation),⁸ when only He exists? Thus, again, His elevation is by virtue of His Essence. With respect to existence, He is the Essence of the existents. What we call contingent beings (*muḥdathāt*)⁹ are elevated by virtue of themselves, because they are (actually) His (manifestation), for He is not elevated in a relative (but in an essential) way. That is because the fixed entities (*al-aʿyān al-thābita*), which never exist in a concrete form or (even) smell the odor of existence, remain in their state (of absence) despite the multiplicity of the existent forms.¹⁰ There exists One Essence from which all the concrete things can be gathered and which permeates them all. The existence of multiplicity (of things) derives from God’s names, which are solely nonexistent relationships (and not concrete entities).¹¹ There is only the *ʿayn*, which is the Essence (of God). He is the Elevated by virtue of His Essence (*li-naḥsihi*),¹² not by virtue of any relationship. From this

7 Unlike the human being, whose essence does not elevate him.

8 *Sharḥ*, p. 77.

9 These are things that are brought into being in time.

10 The fixed entities are manifestations of God, and the concrete existents are in turn manifestations of the fixed entities, hence the concrete existents are elevated by virtue of themselves.

11 Ibn al-ʿArabī accepts the Muʿtazilite doctrine that God’s attributes are not entities existing in God’s essence. M. Takeshita, “An Analysis of Ibn ʿArabī’s *Inshāʾ al-Dawāʾir* with Particular Reference to the Doctrine of the Third Entity,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 41, 4 (1982), p. 249.

12 To express the notion of essence, Ibn al-ʿArabī uses the words *ʿayn*, *dhāt* and *naḥs*. One should emphasize that for our author the Essence is devoid of any characteristic and hence ineffable. However, he is not consistent in this assertion, for in *Futūḥāt*, Vol. VII,

point of view, there is no relative elevation in this world; however, the aspects of existence have different grades. Relative elevation exists in the Unique Essence when it is considered (manifesting) many aspects. For this reason, we say regarding Him that He is not He and you are not you.¹³

Al-Kharrāz¹⁴ (77), who is one of the Real's aspects and one of His tongues, refers to God's Self saying that God can be known only through His combination of opposites which determine His (nature).¹⁵ "He is the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden" (Qur'ān 57:3). He is the Essence (ʿayn) of the manifest things and the Essence of the hidden things when they are manifest.¹⁶ Only He sees Himself, and nothing is hidden from Him. He is both Manifest and Hidden by virtue of¹⁷ His Essence (*li-naḥsihi*). He, Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz, and other created beings are called in this manner (of combination of the manifest and the hidden).

The hidden says "no" when the manifest says "I am (the manifest)," and when the hidden says "I (am the hidden)," the manifest says "no." (This situation) refers to each opposite (which negates the other), while the speaker and the listener are one and the same. The Prophet says: "What they told themselves,"¹⁸ (meaning) they are the tellers, the listeners and those who know what was told. The essence is one, while the aspects are many. There is no way to escape this knowledge, for every person knows this of himself, and this is the form of the Real.¹⁹

(Without counting) things are not in order. (Hence) numbers appear through (adding) "one" (*wāḥid*) to each number in a known arrangement. The "one" brings the number into existence, and the "one" divides the number.²⁰ The number appears only through that which is countable (*maʿdūd*).²¹ The countable can be either absent or existent: a thing may be absent with respect to the senses, but existent with respect to the intellect. In sum, there must be a number and that which is countable, just as there must be "one" which creates the number and the number is increased by it. Each grade of number is a single reality, such as nine or ten, down

p. 13 (the beginning of ch. 406), he says that contrary to the attributes All-Mighty, the Creator, etc., the attributes of "being in no need and glory belongs to the Essence" (*al-ghinā wa-l-ʿizza li-l-dhāt*).

¹³ God as considered in terms of Essence is not God as considered in terms of attributes.

¹⁴ Died 899. On Al-Kharrāz as seen by Ibn al-ʿArabī, see my *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 63–67.

¹⁵ One may judge God's activity only through being aware of His being the conjoining of opposites. Cf. Ibn al-ʿArabī, *Kitāb al-tajalliyāt, Rasāʾil*, II, p. 40.

¹⁶ That is because God's existence pervades all existents, both the manifest and the hidden; in other words, there is no difference in His relationship to the existents.

¹⁷ Ibn al-ʿArabī here uses two particles *li* and *ʿan* to denote "by virtue of."

¹⁸ Or "what their souls told." Bukhārī, II:15.

¹⁹ Just as God is one entity, but has many attributes, so the human being shares this principle.

²⁰ Read *wa-faṣṣala al-wāḥid al-ʿadad*. He means to say that the number is the combination of many ones.

²¹ Read *bi-l-maʿdūd*, in keeping with *Sharḥ*, p. 80, meaning that not all things are countable.

to the lowest number and up to the highest infinitely. These numbers are not a sum (of particulars), but rather they are called a collection of ones (*jam' al-āḥād*).²²

(78) That is because the number two and the number three are unique realities, and so on, even if they (the numbers that follow) are combined from ones. However, the essences (of each number) differ from each other. The combination (of ones) characterizes all numbers; the combination speaks of them (ones) and through them determines²³ (their place). In this speech (of the combination) there are twenty grades²⁴ which are combined from ones. You can continue to affirm the reality of the number which you negate, because of its essence.²⁵

Whoever knows that which we have established regarding the numbers, namely, that their negation is their very affirmation, knows that the transcendent Real is the same as the immanent created thing, even though the created differs from the Creator. The statements that the Creator is like the created and the created is like the Creator refer to One Essence (*'ayn wāḥida*).²⁶ All this derives from One Essence. Furthermore, it is (simultaneously) One Essence and many essences. ("When the boy was old enough to work with his father, Ibrāhīm said: 'My son, I have seen myself sacrificing you in a dream.) What do you think?' He said: 'Father, do as you are commanded . . .'" (Qur'ān 37:102 trans. AH). And the son is identical to his father. Thus, he (Ibrāhīm) saw that he would sacrifice only himself. He ransomed him "with a mighty sacrifice" (ibid.: 107),²⁷ so that what had appeared in a human form appeared as a ram. (Furthermore), he who was the essence of a father appeared in the form of a boy, nay, as a real boy.²⁸

"He created from Ādam his mate" (Qur'ān 4:1), so (Ādam) married only himself. Hence, from Ādam (came forth) his mate and child, (however, although they are three) in number, they are one in essence.

What is nature and what emerges from it? We observe that nature does not diminish, because of that which comes forth from it, nor increase because of that which does not come forth. Nature is only that which appears from it, (however) nature does not constitute the essence of the manifest things, for many forms characterize it. (For example), there exists a thing which is cold and dry and another hot and dry. Their common denominator is dryness, but they are different regarding temperature. What joins them is nature, nay, it is the natural essence. Thus, the world of nature can be seen as many forms in one mirror, nay, a single form in many mirrors.²⁹

²² Here Ibn al-ʿArabī reiterates the notion that an entity is one from one point of view and many from another. Thus, opposites exist in one and the same entity.

²³ Read *yaqūlu* and *yaḥkumu*, respectively. *Sharḥ*, pp. 80f.

²⁴ They are: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, and 1000.

²⁵ The essence of a number is its being composed of ones.

²⁶ This phrase can also be rendered "One Entity." SDG, p. 72.

²⁷ The Qur'ān reads: "We ransomed him" (*fadaynāhu*).

²⁸ Ibn al-ʿArabī speaks of three forms of one entity.

²⁹ Again, all depends on the observer's point of view. From one point of view, nature serves as a mirror of all things, meaning that all things are reflected in nature, or nature embraces all things; but from another point of view, nature pervades all things, meaning it is an essential element of all things or it is reflected in everything.

(This can bring about) perplexity because of the differences in perspective. However, whoever knows what we have said does not become perplexed. If (79) his knowledge increases, it is only through the aspect of the substrate (*ḥukm al-maḥall*), because the substrate is the basis of the fixed entity.³⁰ In the substrates, God's manifestations and all their aspects are diversified, and the substrate can receive every aspect. One can judge God's manifestation only through the substrate in which He is manifested. And this is the only (explanation of the structure of the world).

The Real from one aspect is creation, so think about (it)/but from another aspect He is not, so take (it) into consideration;

Whoever knows what I have said, his insight will not leave (him)/and only whoever perceives knows this;

The essence, whether combination or separation is one/yet (either way) it is multiplicity, not remaining or leaving.

The Elevated by virtue of Himself is He who possesses perfection through which He encompasses all the existents and nonexistent relationships in such a way that no trait of them escapes Him, whether (these) traits are praiseworthy or blameworthy from the point of view of custom, intellect or religion. This applies only to the name God (Allāh). As for other names (of the Divine), they are either God's manifestations (*majlan*)³¹ or a form in a manifestation. If they are manifestations, there necessarily exists a priority among them,³² and if it is a form in a manifestation, then this form is the essential perfection, because it is the essence of what is manifest in a certain entity.³³ That which pertains to the name Allāh pertains to this form.³⁴ We do not say that the names are He, nor are they other than He.³⁵

In his book *Khal' (al-na'layn)*, Abū al-Qāsim ibn Qasī³⁶ points to this (principle), saying that every divine name is designated by all the divine names and depicted by them. That is because every name indicates both the Essence and the unique aspect toward which it is directed, and this name seeks for this aspect.³⁷ From the point of view of its indication of the Essence, it possesses all the names, while from the point of view of its indication of its unique aspect,

³⁰ *Al-maḥall* means the thing in which the fixed entity, such as an idea, is embodied. The diversity of God's manifestations is revealed through these substrates.

³¹ For this word, see Su'ād al-Ḥakīm, p. 268.

³² For example, God's mercy overcomes His anger.

³³ Possibly by this form Ibn al-ʿArabī means the Perfect Human Being.

³⁴ All God's names are included in the name Allāh, so this form (the Perfect Human Being) contains all God's names.

³⁵ See ch. 2, n. 19.

³⁶ Died 1151. A. Faure, "Ibn Qasī," E.I.2. Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 145–150.

³⁷ According to al-Ḥallāj, each of God's attributes includes all the other attributes. Takeshita, p. 20.

it is distinguished from others, for example, the Lord, the Creator, the Former (*muşawwir*), and so on. Thus, from the perspective of the Essence, the name and the named are identical, (80) while from the perspective of the meaning to which the name is directed they are different.

If you understand that the Elevated is that which we have mentioned, you know that (His) elevation is neither of place nor of position. That is, because the elevation of position pertains only to leaders, such as sultans, governors, ministers, judges and every holder of office whether they are qualified for this office or not. Elevation by virtue of attributes is not like this, for the one who holds the office of a governor may have dominion over the most knowledgeable person, even if the former is the most ignorant person. The governor is elevated in position, because of his office, and not because of his own attributes. If the governor is dismissed from his office, his high standing will disappear, while the knowledgeable person does not lose his high standing.

5 The bezel of the wisdom of excessive love exists in the essence of Abraham

(80) Abraham is called *al-khalīl*¹ because he pervades and encompasses all the (attributes) through which the Divine Essence is described.² A poet said: “You (God) permeated (*takhalalta*) me just as the spirit permeated my body³/because of this permeation he (Abraham) was named *al-khalīl*.”

It is just as the color permeates the colored; in such a way the accident (*‘araḍ*) pervades the substrate. It is not the relationship between a place and that which is placed on it.⁴ Or Abraham was so called because the Real permeates his form. Every aspect (*ḥukm*) (of permeation) is valid, for every aspect has its place through which it is manifest and beyond which it is not manifest. Do you not understand that the Real is manifest through the attributes of the created things, (including) attributes of deficiency and blame, and He informs this about Himself? Do you not understand that the created being is manifest through the Real’s attributes from first to last, all of which are appropriate to it, just as the attributes of the created things (81) are appropriate to the Real? (The words) “Praise belongs to God” (Qur’ān 1:1) (mean) that the effects of praise, whether they relate to the praiser or the one praised, go back to God. “And all things return to Him” (Qur’ān 11:123) (means) that He embraces (in Himself) the blameworthy and the praiseworthy and that there is no (other) alternative – only the blamed and the praised.⁵

Know that a thing permeates another only when it is immersed in the latter (*maḥmūl fīhi*).⁶ That which permeates (another is called) the active participle (*ism al-fā’il*) and it is veiled by that which is permeated, the passive participle (*ism*

1 This word means “the friend of God”; however, Ibn al-‘Arabī understands this name in a different way.

2 From this point of view Abraham is also the Perfect Human Being, in that all the divine attributes exist in him. Affifi, II, p. 57.

3 *Sharḥ*, p. 85.

4 In the last possibility we are speaking about two separate entities, the place and the thing which is put on it, but, contrary to the sample of color, the thing placed does not become a part of the place.

5 According to the Qur’ān’s commentators, this verse conveys the idea that God knows all the human beings’ acts and He will reward them or punish them in the Hereafter for their deeds. See, for example, Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-qur’ān al-aẓīm*, Vol. III, p. 588.

6 In logic *maḥmūl* signifies the predicate. Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā’*, index.

al-maʿfūl).⁷ The passive participle is manifest and the active participle is hidden and concealed. The latter is nourishment for the former, like water permeating a piece of wool and thus making it grow and expand. If the Real is the manifest, then the created (human being) is hidden in Him, and as a result the created (embraces) all the names of the Real, His hearing, seeing, all His relationships and perceptions. If the created is the manifest, the Real is concealed and hidden in him; the Real, then, is the hearing of the created, his seeing, hand, foot and all his faculties, as referred to in the correct tradition.⁸

Moreover, if these relationships were removed from the Essence, it would not be Divinity (*ilāh*).⁹ Our (fixed) entities (*aʿyānunā*) bring into being these relationships; because God exists in us (*maʿlūhiyatunā*),¹⁰ we make Him God. Consequently, He is not known till we know Him (as God). He (Muḥammad) said: “Whoever knows himself knows his Lord.”¹¹ And he (Muḥammad) best knows God. Some scholars, including Abū Ḥāmid (al-Ghazālī, d. 1111), claimed that God can be known without observing the cosmos, which is a fault.¹² Indeed, an eternal essence can be known; however, that this entity is god (*ilāh*)¹³ can be known only after gaining knowledge of the objects dependent on this entity (*al-maʿlūh*). These objects are the indication (*dalīl*) of this entity.

Then, after that, in a second state, revelation grants you (the knowledge) that the Real Himself is the very indication of Himself and His Divinity, that the cosmos is nothing but His self-disclosure in the forms of the fixed entities (*aʿyān thābita*) whose existence is impossible without Him, and that He is manifest through various forms according to the realities of these entities and their states. This (is known) after we know (82) that He is our god. Then comes the final revelation through which our forms are disclosed in Him; some of us are disclosed to each other in the Real, and some of us know each other and are different from each other. Some of us know that God knows us through us, and some others do not know that in this Presence (*ḥaḍra* – God) there is knowledge (produced) by us. “I seek refuge in God, lest I be one of the ignorant” (Qurʾān 2:67). Only through these two revelations¹⁴ does God determine (our states) through us, nay, rather we determine (our states) through us, yet in Him. For this reason God said: “God has the conclusive argument” (Qurʾān 6:149). (God means the conclusive argument) against the veiled, for

⁷ These two grammatical terms can also be rendered the “agent” and “object” of an act, respectively.

⁸ Bukhārī, LXXXI:38 (6502). See ch. 1, n. 81, above.

⁹ Here the Essence means God with respect to His names and attributes, and not God’s pure Essence, which is ineffable.

¹⁰ Qayṣrī, p. 526.

¹¹ Ch. 3, n. 4.

¹² This strange note of the Greatest Master is to the best of my knowledge mistaken. Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, Vol. IV, Book 9 (*Kitāb al-tafakkur*).

¹³ By god Ibn al-ʿArabī means an entity which has relationships with the cosmos that it created.

¹⁴ The first revelation conveys the idea that God is reflected in the cosmos, and the second that the cosmos is reflected in Him.

they said to the Real: “Why have You done things to us which did not coincide with our aims?”¹⁵ He made their affair difficult for them.¹⁶ The gnostics disclosed this matter and knew that the Real has not done to them what they claimed He did, and that this grave thing derived from them, for He only taught them their own states, hence their argument was refuted and God’s conclusive argument remained (valid).

If you ask what can we learn from His saying: “If He had willed, He would have guided all of you” (ibid.), we shall say: “In the phrase ‘if He had willed’ the word ‘if’ indicates an impossibility because of another impossibility¹⁷ (*imtinā’ li-imtinā’*), for God only wills the thing as it really is.¹⁸ According to reason, the possible thing in definition can receive a trait or its opposite;¹⁹ however, what determines which trait of the two reasonable possible traits will exist depends on what was already established in the fixed entity. The meaning of “He would have guided you” is “He would have explained to you” (your hidden state). God does not open the insight of every possible individual to perceive things as they really are. Among people there are knowers and ignoramuses. God does not will and He will not will, hence He cannot guide them all. Likewise, (if we say) “if He wills,” (we can ask) does He will that which cannot be? His will has a single connection, which constitutes a relationship to knowledge which in turn is connected to a known object, and the known object (83) is you and your states. Knowledge has no effect on the object of knowledge, but rather the object of knowledge affects knowledge and gives to knowledge from itself its true state.

The Divine Address comes only in accordance with the agreement of those addressed and with what rational observation conveys. It does not come in accordance with unveiling. For this reason, believers are many, and gnostics, the people of unveiling, are few. “There are none of us, but have a known place” (Qur’ān 37:164), meaning through the personality you have in your fixed entity you will appear in (concrete existence), on condition that your existence will be affirmed. If it is affirmed that existence belongs to the Real, not to you, then you are undoubtedly determined in the existence of the Real. If it is affirmed that you are existent, then you are undoubtedly determined as a real existent. If the Real determines (your existence), He should only pour existence upon you, and as a result, you determine yourself.²⁰ Hence, you should praise or blame only yourself. What remains for the

¹⁵ The text has “their aims,” which does not fit the meaning of the sentence.

¹⁶ I follow here Austin’s translation, although he regards this sentence as a Qur’ānic verse, but it is a paraphrase of Qur’ān 68:42 which reads: “On the Day when matters become dire.” According to the translator Abdel Haleem, the sentence literally means when a shin is bared.

¹⁷ This is a hypothetical clause which indicates that there is no possibility of the existence of the conditioned instance.

¹⁸ If a human being is not to be guided according to his fixed entity and God knows this state, He cannot guide this human being. Thus, God is prevented from performing universal guidance because of His knowledge.

¹⁹ A tree, for example, can be existent or nonexistent.

²⁰ The human personality and traits are determined by the fixed entities, the ideas which reside in God’s thought. When God bestows on these entities existence, they become

Real is only the praise of pouring forth existence, because this belongs to Him, not to you. You supply the Real (literally: feed Him) with determinations, while He supplies you with existence. What is allocated to Him is allocated to you. Thus, all things (literally: the affair, *al-amr*) derive from Him to you, and from you to Him. However, you are called obliged (*mukallaf*), and He obliges you only through your saying to Him “oblige me through your true state.” Hence He is not obliged.²¹

He praises me and I praise Him/He worships me and I worship Him

In (my) state (of existence) I affirm Him/but regarding the (fixed) entities I deny Him

He knows me and I do not/and I know Him and witness Him

How can He be independent while/I help Him and make Him happy²²

For this reason, the Real created me/for I make Him know and thus bring Him into existence²³

A tradition²⁴ tells us this/and in me His aim is realized

(84) Since al-Khalīl attained this grade, because of which he was called al-Khalīl, he established hospitality as a rule, and Ibn Masarra²⁵ put him with Mikā’il (as sponsors) of the means of subsistence. By the means of subsistence people are fed. When the means of subsistence permeate the one who is fed in such a way that every part of the fed person is permeated, food spreads in all the parts of the fed person. (However, regarding God) there are no parts (in Him), hence He necessarily permeates all the Divine Stations which are called names, so that His Essence is manifest through them.

We belong to Him as signs in us/show this, but we (also) belong to ourselves

He has only my being (to manifest Himself)/for we belong to Him just as we belong to ourselves

I have two aspects, He and I/but He has no “I” through me²⁶

In me He is manifest/and we are for Him as vessels

“God speaks the truth and guides to the right path” (Qur’ān 33:4).

existents in the concrete world. Thus, in the phase of giving existence, the structure of the human being was already determined and cannot change. It is as if the human being determines his own structure, while actually God determines it in His thought.

²¹ The human being is obliged through the hidden principles imprinted in his fixed entity. Here arises a theological problem of God’s being obliged to act according to a previous plan. Although Ibn al-‘Arabī states that God is not obliged, He is obliged by His own determinations.

²² God sees His attributes only in creation, thus He is dependent on the cosmos.

²³ God receives knowledge from the human being who reflects His attributes, and so in this respect the human bestows existence on God.

²⁴ According to al-Kāshānī (p. 199), the tradition is: “They have represented me (as a figure standing) before their eyes” (*qad maththalūni bayna a’yūnihim*). Trans. by Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy*, p. 13, n. 1.

²⁵ On Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdallāh ibn Masarra al-Jabalī, see my *Ibn al-‘Arabī and the Sufis*, pp. 97–102.

²⁶ The human being has two aspects: first, his existence through God and his being a reflection of God, and second, his being himself with respect to other human beings. Dagli, p. 65, n. 34.

6 The bezel of the wisdom of reality¹ exists in the essence of Isaac

The ransom of a prophet is the slaughter of an animal for sacrifice/What is the cry of man in comparison to the voice of a ram?

God the Mighty made the animal mighty² taking care/of us or of it – I do not know by what standard³

No doubt (other) sacrificial animals are highly valuable/but they are less valuable than the sacrifice of a ram

I wish I knew how a single small ram replaced/the vicegerent of the Merciful

Do you not know that all things⁴ were arranged/in fulfillment of profit and in decreasing loss?

(85) There is no creation higher than the inanimate⁵ and after it/the plant, in certain measures and patterns

And after the plant come the possessors of senses and all know/their creator through unveiling or rational demonstration

As for the one called Ādam he is/restricted by intellect, thinking and the necklace of faith (*īmān*)

Sahl,⁶ who was a verifier like us, said the same thing (about Ādam)/for we and they have reached the level of witnessing (*iḥsān*)⁷

Whoever witnesses that which I have witnessed/will say the same I have said both secretly and openly

¹ Wisdom of Reality (*ḥikma ḥakkiyya*) represents Isaac's request from his father to transform the latter's dream into reality.

² Qur'ān 37:107.

³ The author does not know by which standard God decides to change the sacrificial victim, and as a result, he does not know the object of God's care.

⁴ Ibn al-ʿArabī is going to explain the order of all things in nature.

⁵ The principle Ibn al-ʿArabī uses here is that the lower the thing is in the domain of concrete existence, the higher it is in the domain of servanthood. Hence, the inanimate thing is the highest entity regarding servanthood.

⁶ Sahl al-Tustarī, died 896. Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 53–62.

⁷ Very probably Ibn al-ʿArabī regards *iḥsān* as higher than *īmān*, according to Qur'ān 5:93. Al-Kāshānī, p. 208. Since the definition of *iḥsān* is "worship God as if you see Him" (*Fuṣūṣ*, p. 123; SPK, p. 401, n. 24), the commentators of the *Fuṣūṣ* extended this meaning to include witnessing. Al-Kāshānī, p. 208.

Do not pay attention to a view contrary to our view/or sow seeds in blind soil⁸

They are the deaf and the dumb⁹ whom/the infallible (Muḥammad) brought to our notice in the text of the Qurʾān

Know, may God bestow on us and on you revelation, that Ibrāhīm al-Khalīl said to his son: “My son, I have seen myself sacrificing you in a dream” (Qurʾān 37:102). The dream is on the plane of imagination, and so he did not interpret the dream. A ram in the form of Abraham’s son appeared in the dream, and Abraham believed that what he saw in the dream was true. His Lord ransomed Abraham’s son from the false imagination of his father by the great sacrifice,¹⁰ which means the interpretation of his dream in the eyes of God, while he (Abraham) was unaware.

The disclosure of a form on the plane of imagination requires another science (*ʿilm*)¹¹ through which one can perceive what God means by this form. Do you not consider what God’s Messenger said to Abū Bakr on his interpretation of a dream: “You were right in part but also partly wrong”?¹² Abū Bakr asked Muḥammad to tell him where he was right and where he was wrong, but the Prophet did not answer. God said to Abraham when He called him: “O Abraham, you believed that the dream is true” (ibid. 105). He did not say to him you believed that he is your son in the dream, because Abraham did not interpret the dream, but accepted the manifest form of what he saw.¹³ However, dreams (86) require interpretation. For this reason, the King of Egypt (*al-ʿazīz*: literally: the Powerful) said (addressing his courtiers): “If you can interpret (*taʿburūn*) the dream” (Qurʾān 12:43). The meaning of interpretation (*taʿbīr*) is to pass from the form one sees to something else. The cows were (symbols) of years of barrenness and plenty.

If Abraham had been right in understanding his dream, he would have slaughtered his son. However, he truly saw his son (in the dream), whereas in God’s eyes it was the Great Sacrifice in the form of his son. God ransomed him because of Abraham’s thought; in God’s eyes it was not a real ransom (the ransom was the ram). His sense perception produced the sacrifice, while his imagination produced his son. If he had seen the ram in his imagination, he would have interpreted it as his son or something else. Then God said: “Indeed, this is a clear test” (Qurʾān 37:106), that is, a clear and manifest trial of knowledge: would he know what the interpretation of the dream required or not? He knew that imagination required interpretation. However, he did not take into consideration what this realm of dreams implied. For this reason, he regarded the dream as true, just as did Taqī ibn Mukhallad,¹⁴ the imam and the author of a Musnad. He heard in a tradition which he approved that the Prophet said:

⁸ Do not teach those who have not the disposition of learning. Kāshānī, p. 208.

⁹ Qurʾān 8:22–23.

¹⁰ Qurʾān 37:107.

¹¹ This is the science of interpretation of dreams (*taʿbīr al-ruʾyā*).

¹² For the dream, see Kāshānī, pp. 209f.

¹³ Abraham saw in the dream that he would sacrifice his son. However, he should have interpreted this vision to know the truth, but he did not do so. Therefore, he understood he had to sacrifice his son.

¹⁴ An Andalusian traditionist (d. 276/889).

“Whoever sees me in sleep has seen me in waking, for the Devil cannot assimilate my form.”¹⁵ In this dream Taqī ibn Mukhallad saw the Prophet, who gave him milk to drink. Taqī ibn Mukhallad regarded the dream as true; he drank and then vomited the milk. Had he interpreted the dream, this milk would have been knowledge. God deprived him much knowledge according to the measure of his drinking. Do you not see that (when) the Messenger of God was given a cup of milk in a dream he said: “I drank the milk until I was completely satiated (literally: until satiety came out of my fingernails), and then gave the remainder to ‘Umar”?’¹⁶ The Prophet was asked: “What is your interpretation, O God’s Messenger?” He said: “Knowledge.” He did not leave it as milk, (that is) in the (87) form of what he saw, because he knew it was a dream that required interpretation.

It is well known that the form of the Prophet, which was seen by the sense (of sight), is buried in al-Madīna, and that the form of his spirit and his rational soul (*laṭīfā*)¹⁷ has not been seen by anyone through (the form) of anyone else or through (the form) of oneself. Each spirit must be regarded as such. The spirit of the Prophet appears to one in a dream in the form of his body when he died, without the body being damaged at all. It is Muḥammad who is seen through his spirit in a bodily form which resembles his buried form. The Devil cannot assume the form of Muḥammad’s body, for God protects the one who sees him. For this reason, whoever sees Muḥammad in this form will learn from him all that he orders or prohibits, or tells him, just as he could learn from the Prophet in this world the laws in keeping with the sayings which point to these laws, namely, (laws written) in texts, through plain or general meanings or through whatever form. If he (the Prophet) gives him something, this thing may be interpreted. If, (however), knowledge through the senses equals knowledge through the imagination, this dream does not need interpretation.¹⁸ Through and on the basis of this criterion Abraham and Taqī ibn Mukhallad dealt with their dreams.

Since the dream has two aspects,¹⁹ and since God has taught us what He did regarding Abraham and what He said to him – because this is the manner befitting the grade of prophecy – we know (the following): In our vision of the Real in a form which the rational argument rejects, we should interpret this form in a way appropriate to religion, (that is), in terms of who the seer is, or the place where the Real was seen, or both. If rational argument does not reject (the form we saw), we shall leave this form as it was seen, in the same form as we shall see the Real in the world to come.²⁰

¹⁵ Muslim, XLII:12 (2266).

¹⁶ Ibn Ḥanbal, II:83, 154.

¹⁷ Al-Jurjānī, *Kitāb al-ta’rīfāt*, pp. 202, 289.

¹⁸ According to this criterion, Abraham’s conduct is right, because the form he saw in his dream, that is, in his imagination, was Isaac, and his perception of Isaac in his dream matches his perception of him through the sense of sight in the concrete existence, therefore he did not interpret his dream.

¹⁹ That is, the sensual and the imaginal perceptions.

²⁰ This system of interpreting Qur’ānic verses whose literal meaning cannot be accepted by reason is reminiscent of al-Ash‘arī’s way to deal with such verses. Al-Ash‘arī, *Al-Idāra ‘an usūl al-diyāna*, Dār al-Ṭibā‘a al-Muniriyya, Cairo n.d., p. 13 (the chapter on the seeing of God).

(88) The One, the Merciful, has in every domain²¹/hidden and manifest forms
If you say this is the Real, you are right/and if you say something else you are interpreting

His status is not determined in one domain to exclude another/but He unveils Himself to creation through His Reality

When He discloses Himself to the sight, the intellect/refutes (His appearance) through a persistent proof

He is accepted in the domain of the intellect/in imagination, and in true sight

Abū Yazīd said concerning this station: If the Throne and that which it contains – multiplied a hundred millions times – were (to dwell) in one of the corners of the gnostic's heart, he would not feel them.²² This is the ability of Abū Yazīd in the world of bodies. Moreover, I say that if the infinite existence was assessed as finite with the Essence which brought it into existence (and these found their abode) in one of the corners of the gnostic's heart, he would not perceive them in his knowledge. Hence, it is proved that the heart contains the Real, and notwithstanding, it is not shown as satiated. If it were filled, said Abū Yazīd, it would be satiated. We note this station, saying:

O He who creates things in Himself/You encompass what you create

You create the infinite being within You/even as You are the Limited and the Vast

If the creation of God were in my heart/its luminous dawn would not appear (there)

Whoever comprises the Real, cannot be confined/to (comprise) creation; What is your opinion O Listener

Through the power of fancy every human being creates in his faculty of imagination that which has existence only in this faculty.²³ This is the general matter. The gnostic creates through spiritual aspiration (*himma*)²⁴ that which has existence outside the substrate of his spiritual aspiration; however, this aspiration does not cease to preserve its object. Its preservation, that is, the preservation of that which it created, does not weary this faculty.²⁵ When the gnostic does not pay attention (89) to the preservation of this created entity, it disappears, unless the gnostic masters all his domains²⁶ (*ḥaḍarāt*) and does not become heedless at all, because he witnesses at least one domain. When the gnostic through his spiritual aspiration creates, possessing this mastership, that which he created, this creation

²¹ Ibn al-ʿArabī uses this word (*mawṭin*) to denote “domain.” Thus, there exists the domain of reason, the domain of imagination, the domain of this world, etc. I prefer to translate *mawṭin* as “domain” (in SDG, p. 46, it is homestead), because it has the double meaning of spiritual and physical spheres.

²² Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 46f.

²³ This sentence is awkward in Arabic. Using two terms (*wahm* and *khayāl*), Ibn al-ʿArabī repeats the power of imagination twice without any need. He seems to say that the human being creates in his imagination, or using it, forms which are appropriate only to this faculty.

²⁴ See above, p. 14, n. 4.

²⁵ Qurʾān 2:255.

²⁶ Possibly the author means domains or presences such as the senses, the intellect and so on. Kāshānī, p. 216. *Sharḥ*, p. 102. *Ḥaḍra* is a divine or cosmological reality, hence also God's names and their ramifications are realities. *Mufjam*, pp. 323–327.

appears in his form in every domain; the forms become preserved by each other. As a result, when the gnostic does not pay attention to a certain domain, or to some domains, while witnessing one of the domains and preserving in it the form of his creation, all the forms are preserved through his preservation of this single form in the domain which he heeds. That is because heedlessness is never absolute, neither regarding all the domains, nor regarding a single domain.

Here I have revealed a mystery which the people of God have always jealously concealed, because this mystery refutes their claim that they are the Real. However, the Real is always attentive, while the servant does not escape inattentiveness to something. From the point of view of preserving what he created, the gnostic may say: "I am the Real" (*anā al-ḥaqq*).²⁷ However, his preservation of his creation is not like God's, and we have already clarified the difference. The servant is different from the Real, given his heedlessness of a form and its domain. He must be distinct from the Real, notwithstanding his continuing preservation of all the forms through the preservation of one form in the domain to which he pays heed. This is preservation through a guaranty,²⁸ while God's preservation of what He created is not like this, for it is a preservation of each form specifically.

As I have been told, no one has written ever before on this question in a book, neither I nor others, except in this book, hence it (the question) is extraordinary and unique. Consequently, beware of being inattentive to this question, for the remaining domain, which still you dwell within, with the form, is like the Book in which God said: "We have left nothing out unwritten in the Book" (Qur'ān 6:38), for the Book comprises the past and future events. Only he who has the faculty of combination (*qur'ān*) (all the presences)²⁹ in his soul knows what we have said (90), for whoever fears God, "God will give him the faculty of separation" (*furqān* between the Real and the creation).³⁰ This is similar to what we have pointed out regarding this question of the device through which the servant is distinct from the Lord. This faculty of separation is the loftiest faculty of separation.

At one time the servant is a lord without a doubt/and at another he is really a servant without a lie

If he is a servant, he encompasses the Real/and if he is a lord, he is in a poor state

Through his being a servant, he beholds the essence of his self/and with no doubt hopes overflow from him

Through his being a lord, he beholds the whole of creation/making demands on him through the domain of Ownership and Kingdom

Because of his essence he cannot answer their demands/for this reason you see some gnostics weeping

So be a servant of a lord and not a lord of his servant lest you fall, melting in the Fire.

²⁷ This is the famous saying of al-Hallāj. Ibn al-ʿArabī remains faithful to his principle that the human being resembles God in certain aspects.

²⁸ That is, the preservation of one form in a single domain guarantees the preservation in all other domains.

²⁹ This is the perfect human being. Kāshānī, p. 218.

³⁰ Kāshānī, p. 218.

7 The bezel of the wisdom of loftiness¹ exists in the essence of Ishmael

Know that the (entity) called (*musammā*) God is one with respect to essence and all with respect to names. Each existent has from God only a single lord, and it is inconceivable for it to have all the lords.² As for God's Unity (*aḥadiyya*), no single entity enters it, for one cannot call part of it a thing and another a thing, for it does not admit division.³ However, His Unity is the totality of His attributes in potentiality.

The happy person is the one whose Lord is pleased with him,⁴ and there is none but that who is pleasing in the eyes of his Lord, because Lordship applies to everyone, hence the Lord finds everyone pleasing, and so everyone is happy.⁵ For this reason Sahl⁶ said: Lordship has a mystery – and it is you, ergo Sahl's saying refers to every entity – if it had disappeared, (91) the Lordship would also have been cancelled. The words “if it had disappeared” signify the impossibility of the impossibility (*imtināʿ al-imtināʿ*),⁷ for the condition will not appear and hence the Lordship will not be annulled, because an entity is existent only through its lord. Since an entity is always existent, its Lordship will never be cancelled.

Every pleasing thing is beloved, and all that the beloved person does is beloved. All is pleasing, for any entity does not act at all, but God alone acts in it. Any entity is safe from ascription of an act to it, hence it is pleased with that which appears in it and from it, that is, God's acts. These acts are pleasing, for every doer

¹ According to al-Qaysarī, this wisdom is ascribed to Ishmael, because God's name the Loftiest, or the Most High (*al-ʿaltī*), is manifest in him. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” p. 14.

² Since each existent is the embodiment of a fixed entity, which in turn is a form of a specific name, the existent is a servant of a specific name.

³ God's Essence is not divided into attributes which are different from each other. Here God's unity stands for the unity in respect to His Essence. See n. 13 below.

⁴ In these words Qurʾān 19:55 refers specifically to Ishmael.

⁵ Every individual is under the control of a divine name which serves as his lord. SPK, p. 55.

⁶ Ch. 6, n. 6, above.

⁷ This conditional sentence means that because the occurrence of the condition is impossible, the conditioned thing cannot take place. Ibn al-ʿArabī immediately explains this notion. See ch. 5, n. 17, above.

or maker is pleased with his acts, and if He carries out his acts perfectly, it will be appropriate to say of Him: “He gave everything its (measure of) creation then guided (it)” (Qur’ān 20:50),⁸ meaning God clarified that He gave everything that which fits it without decrease or increase.⁹

Since Ishmael discovered what we have mentioned, he was pleasing to God.¹⁰ In like manner, every existent is pleasing to his lord. If every existent is pleasing to his lord, as we have explained, it is not necessary that it be pleasing to a lord of another servant, for he took the lordship only from one lord, not from many.¹¹ What was established for him from all the lords is only that which fits him, and this (what is suited to him) is his lord. No one takes from God (something) which relates to His Unity (*aḥadiyya*).¹² For this reason, the People of God were prevented from the manifestation of God’s Unity. That is because if you look at Him through Him, it is He who looks at Himself, and He always looks at Himself through Himself. And if you look at Him through yourself, His Unity disappears through yourself. (And), if you look at Him through Himself and through yourself, Unity also disappears. For the pronoun *tā’* in *naẓartahu* (you look) is not the essence of that which you look at (*‘ayn al-manẓūr*), hence there is necessarily a relationship which requires two entities, the one who looks (*nāẓir*) and the one who is looked at (*manẓūr*). Consequently, Unity disappears, even if (God) sees Himself through Himself. It is well known that in this description He is both the observer and the observed.¹³

The pleasing person will be absolutely pleasing only when all things through which he is manifest originate (92) in the action of the one who is pleased with him. Ishmael excels others, for the Real qualified him as pleasing to Him. In like manner it is said to every tranquil soul, “Return to your Lord” (Qur’ān 89:28). God ordered the soul to return only to its Lord who called it and it knows Him from other lords as “pleased and pleasing” (ibid.). (And God said to the soul) “Enter among My servants” (ibid., 29), because they possess this station. Every servant among those mentioned here knows his lord, confining himself to this knowledge without looking at the lord of another, notwithstanding the Unity of the Essence. This is necessarily so. “And enter into My Garden” (*jannatī*)¹⁴ (ibid., 30) which is My place of concealment. My place of concealment is only You, and You

8 This verse is the basis of the theory *taḥqīq*, that is, one’s realization that every entity is formed and acts according to the appropriate manner which was decreed by God in its fixed entity (*‘ayn thābita*). SDG, p. 96.

9 One should note that according to Ibn al-‘Arabī also the feeling of being satisfied with God’s acts comes from God, otherwise Ibn al-‘Arabī would have stated that perceptions and feelings belong to the human being alone.

10 Qur’ān 19:55.

11 Read: *mā akhadha al-rubūbiyya illā min wāḥid lā min kull*.

12 For this term, see the title of ch. 10.

13 When we speak of God’s Unity, we cannot deal with it in terms of duality, even if this duality exists in God’s Essence. His Unity excludes any form of duality.

14 The verb *janna* means “he covered or concealed,” hence *janna* may be rendered cover, veil, or place of concealment.

conceal me through Your Essence. I am known only through You, just as You are not (manifest) only through me. Whoever knows You knows me, and I am not known through (another), (just as) You are not known through (another, but through me). When you enter into His place of concealment, you enter into yourself, then you know yourself with another knowledge which is different from the knowledge of yourself when you know your Lord through your knowledge of yourself. As a result, you possess two kinds of knowledge: knowledge of Him through yourself, and knowledge of Him through yourself, with respect to Him, not to you.¹⁵

You are the servant and you are the lord/of the one you are his servant

You are the lord and you are the servant/of the one who possesses your covenant in His address (to you)¹⁶

Every contract to which one is committed/can be dissolved by someone else¹⁷

God is pleased with his servants and they are pleasing. They are pleased with Him and He is pleasing. The two presences (servanthood and lordship) face each other like similar things, because there is no distinction between the two kinds. (However), similar things are opposites, for the two similar things do not join.¹⁸ There is only the one which is distinct and the one which is similar. (Actually), there is neither a similar thing in existence, nor an opposite thing, for existence is one reality (*ḥaqīqa wāḥida*), and a thing does not oppose itself.

(93)

Only the Real remains, no other being/there is no connected thing, and there is no separated thing¹⁹

The seeing of the eyes proves this and I do not see/when I see but His Essence “This is for one who fears his Lord” (Qur’ān 98:8), lest he will be Him, because he knows the distinction (between the servant and the lord). What proves this to us is the fact that (some people) are ignorant of things (*a’yān*) in existence which the knower shows them. There is a distinction between servants and there is a distinction between lords. If there had been no distinction, a certain divine name would have been interpreted according to all its aspects in the same manner as another name is interpreted. The name the Strengtheners (*al-mu’izz*) is not interpreted in the same manner as the Debaser (*al-mudhill*), and so on. However, from the point of view of the Unity they are the same. As you say, every name is

¹⁵ The first kind of knowledge reveals divine traits in one’s soul through rational examination of the soul, while the second makes one find God in his soul. The second kind derives from unveiling which occurs in one’s soul, and not from investigation. Affifi, II, pp. 91f.

¹⁶ This is an allusion to Qur’ān 7:172, in which all the human generations affirmed God’s Lordship.

¹⁷ That is because each creed expresses one’s speculation and investigation, and it is not characterized by an absolute truth. Hence, it can be replaced by another creed.

¹⁸ Here I changed the order of the sentence to make it coherent. According to the Greatest Master, things are similar to each other from certain points of view and opposite to each other from other points of view. However, with respect to the absolute unity of existence, there is no difference between the things.

¹⁹ All is one unity.

a proof of the Essence and of its reality with respect to its ipseity, for the named (*al-musammā*) is one and the Strengtheners is the Debaser with respect to the named. However, the Strengtheners is not the Debaser with respect to their own entities and realities, for our understanding of each of them is different.

Do not contemplate (only) the Real/(so that) you divest Him of creation

Do not contemplate (only) creation/(so that) you clothe it (in all things) except the Real

Make Him incomparable and comparable/and place yourself in the domain of truth

If you will, be in a state of joining²⁰/or in a state of separation

Then, if all²¹ is revealed to you/you will gain the greatest success

You will not pass away (in creation) nor remain (in the Real)/and you will not make others either pass away or remain

Revelation is not bestowed on you/and you do not grant revelation to others²²

Praise (for the people is carried out by God) through faithfulness to the promise (*ṣidq al-waʿd*) and not through faithfulness to the threat. The Divine Presence requires commendable praise through God's Essence. The Essence is praised through faithfulness to the promise and not through faithfulness to the threat, moreover, through overlooking (one's sins).²³ "Do not think (94) that God will break His promise to His Messengers" (Qur'ān 14:47). He does not say "His threat," but rather "We shall overlook their sins" (Qur'ān 46:16), although He made a threat regarding sins. He praised Ishmael, because he was faithful to his promise (*ṣādiq al-waʿd*).²⁴ Regarding the Real (in his praising of Ishmael), possibility disappears, because possibility requires a preponderant (*murajjih*).²⁵

Only the one who is faithful to his promise remains/while the Real's threat has no established essence

Even if they enter the abode of suffering/they have delight therein (and) pure happiness

There is happiness in the eternal gardens, for the matter is one²⁶/(only) when God is revealed there is a difference

Suffering (*ʿadhāb*) is so called because of its sweetness (*ʿudhūba*)/this is like a shell, and the shell protects (what is inside).

²⁰ Joining of transcendence and immanence.

²¹ Both the transcendent and the immanent aspects.

²² If the existence is one, it follows that revelation exists within everyone. Hence, revelation is not bestowed on anyone, nor given to anyone. Bursevi, Vol. II, p. 581.

²³ Qur'ān 46:16.

²⁴ Qur'ān 19:54.

²⁵ To decide between possible alternatives, one needs a preponderant which overwhelms all other alternatives, leaving only one choice that seems the best. Consequently, when a person carries out his promise, God is obliged to praise him.

²⁶ By this he means that all the phenomena are one, hence there is no difference from this point of view between Paradise and Hell.

8 The bezel of the wisdom of spirituality¹ exists in the essence of Jacob

(94) Religion is divided into two kinds: a. Religion according to God and according to whom the Real taught and those who taught others what the Real taught them; and b. Religion according to the created beings, which God acknowledges. God's religion is the one which God chose and granted it the highest degree above the human religion. God said: "Abraham ordered his sons (to submit to God), and so did Jacob, saying: 'My sons, God has chosen for you the religion (*al-dīn*), so do not die except in a state of submission to God (*muslimūn*)'" (Qur'ān 2:132), meaning obeying Him. (The word) *al-dīn* is marked with the definite particle (*alif* and *lām*) to designate a specific religion, hence this is a known religion (which is shown) in God's saying: "The religion according to God is Islam" (Qur'ān 3:19), meaning submission. Religion expresses your submission. That which comes from God is the Law to which you submit. Religion means submission and the rule (*al-nāmūs*) is the Law (*al-shar'*) which God promulgated. Whoever is qualified as yielding to God's laws is the one who carries out the orders of the religion and maintains them, as one who performs the prayer.

The servant is one who maintains religion and the Real promulgates the laws. Hence, submission is the essence of your act, and religion (95) comes out of your act. You will not be happy except by way of that which comes from yourself. Just as your acts affirm (*athbata*) your happiness, so His acts, which are you and the created beings, affirm the Divine Names. Because of His effects (in the cosmos), He is called God (*ilāh*), and because of your effects (in yourself), you are called happy. When you observe (the commandments of) religion and obey His laws, He makes you equal to His rank. If God wills, I shall expound further on this issue in a beneficial way after explaining religion in the eyes of the created beings which God acknowledges.

Religion as a whole belongs to God and comes (with respect to implementation) from you, not from Him, except with respect to its origin.² God said: "They invented monasticism" (Qur'ān 57:27). (Their invention) refers to the wise laws;

¹ In keeping with al-Qūnawī's and Kāshānī's commentaries, I prefer *ḥikma rūḥiyya* to *ḥikma rawḥiyya* (wisdom of ease), although the latter possibility has a basis in Qur'ān 12:87. Chittick, "Chapter Headings," pp. 17f.

² That is because God is the origin of all things.

however, these were not brought to the people by the known Messenger through God in the customary way (that is, through prophecy). But as wisdom and plain interest in (these laws) coincide with Divine Judgment regarding the aim of Divine Law, God approved of (these human laws) just as He did of His Laws, (although) “We (God) did not prescribe (these laws) for them” (Qur’ān 57:27).³

Since⁴ God opened the door of His Providence and Mercy between Him and their hearts of which they were unaware, He established in their hearts the exaltation of the laws they had promulgated – through which they sought God’s satisfaction. They did so not in the usual and known prophetic way of divine teaching. Hence God said: “They did not keep their laws” (Qur’ān, *ibid.*), meaning those who established the laws which I (God) affirmed, “in a proper way, only to seek God’s satisfaction” (Qur’ān, *ibid.*). So they thought. “We gave those who believed,” in these laws, “among them their reward, (however) many of them” (Qur’ān, *ibid.*), meaning of those for whom this worship was established, “are sinners” (Qur’ān, *ibid.*), meaning they did not submit to these laws and did not keep them.

Whoever does not obey these laws, his legislator will not comply with what pleases him. However, the matter necessitates obedience, meaning the one under obligation (*mukallaf*) is either obedient through acceptance of the laws, or a transgressor. There is no need to talk about the one who obeys and accepts the laws, because this is obvious. As for the transgressor, his transgression which was determined for him by God requests either one of two things: disregard and forgiveness or rebuke (96) for what he did. One of these options should apply, because essentially the matter requires one of the two. Anyhow, it is correct (to say that) the Real submits to the servant’s acts and state. It is the state which affects (God’s reaction). From this (it is evident) that religion means requital (*jazā’*), meaning compensation for that which makes one happy or unhappy. As for that which makes one happy, God said: “God is pleased with them, and they with Him” (Qur’ān 5:119, trans. AH). This is a compensation that makes one happy. As for that which makes one unhappy, God said: “Whoever among you who does wrong, we shall make him taste a severe punishment” (Qur’ān 25:19). This is a compensation that does not make one happy. “We shall disregard their evil deeds” (Qur’ān 46:16) is (also) redress. Hence, it is correct (to say) that religion is compensation. That is because religion is *islām* and *islām* is essentially submission; God submits to what makes one happy or unhappy, which means compensation. This is the external aspect in this issue.

As for its mystery and internal aspect, it manifests itself in the mirror of the Real’s existence; the possible things receive from the Real only that which their essences give them in each state. For each state has a form. Their forms differ according to the differences in their states. Hence, the manifestation differs because of the difference in the state, and the effect on the servant occurs

³ Here Ibn al-‘Arabī seems to speak of laws promulgated by people before revelation. Rationalist as well as orthodox thinkers advanced this notion. Kevin A. Reinhart, *Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought*, New York 1995.

⁴ Read *lammā*. Kāshānī, p. 236.

in accordance with what characterizes him. No one bestows on him good or evil except himself; only he bestows on his essence favors and sufferings. He should chastise and praise only himself. “To God belongs the conclusive argument” (Qur’ān 6:149) in his knowledge of them, for knowledge follows the object of knowledge.⁵ In an issue like this, the mystery that lies behind it is (the notion) that the possible things in principle are nonexistent. There is no existence but the existence of the Real (which is disclosed) through the forms of the states in which the possible things appear in themselves and in their (fixed) essences. Consequently, you know whoever experiences pleasure and whoever experiences pain and what follows (*ya‘qubu*) each state, because of which it is called following (*‘uqūba*) and consequence (*‘iqāb*).⁶ (This idea of following) is allowable in relation to both good and evil; however, convention calls the good – reward, and the evil – punishment. Because of this procedure religion may be called or explained as what returns (*‘āda*, usually: custom), for that which his state requires and seeks returns to him (*‘āda ‘alayhi*). Hence, religion is that which returns.⁷ The poet said: “As your religion with Umm al-Ḥuwayrith before” (97), meaning your custom.

The rational meaning of *‘āda* is the return of the thing itself to its (previous) state. However, this is not the case here, for *‘āda* means repetition. But *‘āda* is an intelligible reality, and resemblance in forms exists. That is, because we know that Zayd is the same as ‘Amr with respect to humanity (*insāniyya*), but humanity does not repeat itself, for if it does, it will be multiplied; however, humanity is one reality that does not repeat itself. (Also) we know that Zayd is not the same as ‘Amr in terms of individual identity (*shakhsiyya*), for Zayd as an individual is not the same as ‘Amr, though we certainly know that the existence of individuality is shared by both. Through sense perception resemblance repeats itself; however, through true judgment resemblance does not repeat itself. From one point of view there is a repetition and from another there is not. In like manner, in one respect there is a reward, and in another there is not; that is because reward is a possible state. The scholars probing this issue did not pay attention to it; that is, they paid no attention to its explanation, not that they did not know it, because it belongs to the mystery of predetermination which governs the created beings.

Know that just as it is said of a physician that he is the servant of nature, so the Messengers and the Heirs are the servants of the Divine Command in general, and actually they are the servants of the states of the possible things.⁸ Their service is part of their states which have been established by their fixed entities. Consider what a marvelous thing this is! However, the servant, of whom we are

⁵ SDG, p. 186.

⁶ From the perspective of the Real, that which follows the states is called following or consequence. Ibn al-‘Arabī immediately explains that in this world that which follows the states is called either reward or punishment. This is a revolutionary idea, according to which, with respect to the Existence, good and evil play no role.

⁷ One’s states cause the human being to perform acts repeatedly, and this characterizes religion.

⁸ For the term *amr* (command), its role in the cosmological and terrestrial domains and its Ismā‘īlī origin, see Ebstein, “The Word of God,” pp. 44–50.

talking here, is restricted regarding saying and state by his lord's rules. It is correct to say that the physician is a servant of nature, only if he helps nature. That is because nature put in the body of the ill person a unique temperament (*mizāj*) because of which he is called an ill person. If the physician were to help nature through his service, he would also increase the measure of illness (98). He prevents nature (from worsening the illness) only in order to seek health – and health also belongs to nature – through introducing another temperament that opposes the present temperament. Hence, the physician is not a servant of nature (regarding all aspects); he only serves it through curing the ill person and changing his temperament by using nature itself. Regarding nature, he exerts efforts by using a particular, not a general aspect, because generality is not correct in such an issue. Hence, the physician is servant/not servant of nature, just as messengers and heirs are regarding the servitude of the Real.

In determining the states of those who are under obligation (*mukallaḥ*), the Real acts through two aspects: The servant acts in accordance with the requirements of the Real's will, and His will in turn is connected to what the Real's knowledge requires, and the Real's knowledge is connected to what the object of knowledge bestows on Him, that is, its essence, which appears only in its form.⁹

The Messenger and the Heir are servants of the divine command by way of the will (*irāda*);¹⁰ however, they are not servants of the will. He (the Messenger) refutes the divine command by way of the divine command seeking for the happiness of the person under obligation. If he were the servant of the divine will, he would not advise (people), or would advise (people) only through the divine will. The Messenger, the Heir, is the physician of the souls for the world to come. He obeys God's command when He commands him. He may observe His command and will and sees that God's command opposes His will, (knowing) that all things occur according to His will, and for this reason the command stands. If He wills the fulfillment of the command, it will be fulfilled, and if He does not will the fulfillment of what He commands, the person under obligation will not carry out the command, and this is called transgression and sin.

The messenger is a transmitter (of God's commands and sayings). For this reason he (Muḥammad) said: "Hūd and its sisters made me anxious" (literally: made my hair white),¹¹ because they (these *sūras*) contain God's saying: "So keep to

⁹ God's knowledge is determined by the essence of the thing which is its fixed entity (*ʿayn thābita*). Thus, God is compelled to act in keeping with His knowledge, and has no free choice. SDG, pp. 186f. This is the logical conclusion of Ibn al-ʿArabī's ideas, although he says that free choice and compulsion do not apply to God. Our author seems to be inconsistent in his thought, because one cannot describe a series of cause-effect, that is, will, knowledge, the fixed entity, and then deny the consequence of one's thought, claiming that this procedure is irrelevant. Moreover, he asserts that God's choice is expressed in bestowing existence on the fixed entities. Thus, God has some kind of free choice. As in other issues in Ibn al-ʿArabī's teachings, God has and does not have free choice. Ibid. Another point worth noting is the absence of discussion in Ibn al-ʿArabī's doctrine on when and how God produces the fixed entities.

¹⁰ *Irāda* is God's power to bring into existence potential existents. Affifi, *Mystical Philosophy*, p. 160.

¹¹ Tirmidhī, 3297. Dagli, p. 93, n. 30.

the right course, as you have been commanded” (Qur’ān 11:112, trans. AH). (99) The words “as you have been commanded” made him anxious, because he did not know whether the command fitted His will and hence would be implemented, or opposed His Will, and hence would not be implemented. No one knows the way of the will (*ḥukm al-irāda*), until the object of the will occurs, except one to whom God has revealed his insight, and as a result he perceives the possible things as they really are in their states as fixed entities and thereupon he judges according to his insight. This may happen to a very few individuals in times of seclusion. (Consequently), the Prophet said: “I do not know what will be done with me or you” (Qur’ān 46:9, trans. AH). He (the Prophet) explicitly said of the veil (existing between God and the humans). The aim (of this verse) is to inform that the Prophet had knowledge only of some things, not all things.

9 The bezel of the wisdom of light¹ exists in the essence of Joseph

(99) The light of this bright wisdom spreads over the presence of Imagination, which is the first principle of Divine Revelation among the people under God's Providence (*fī ahl al-ʿināya*).² ʿĀ'isha said: "The first revelation to the Messenger of God, may God bless him and give him peace, was a true dream. Each of his dreams was clear like the breaking dawn, no obscurity therein."³ Her knowledge stops here. The period (of these revelations) continued six months, then the angel came to him. She did not know that the Messenger of God said: "People are asleep, and when they die, they awake up."⁴ Everything one sees while awake⁵ is like this, even if the states (of sleep and wakefulness) are different. She spoke of six months; however, his whole life in this world should be gauged in this manner, that is, as a dream within a dream (*manām fī manām*).⁶ All things of this kind belong to the world of imagination (*ʿālam al-khayāl*), and for this reason they are interpreted, meaning a thing that is essentially in a certain form appears in another form. (100) Hence, the interpreter (*ʿābir*),⁷ if he is correct, passes from the form seen by the sleeper to the true (meaningful) form it is. This is like the appearance of knowledge in the form of milk.⁸ In his interpretation, the Prophet passed from the

1 This chapter is so called because Joseph was connected with dreams and their interpretations, and the world of dreams, the world of imagination, is part of the spiritual side of the cosmos. Spirits have the power of unveiling and hence are characterized by light, whereas the concrete world, by darkness. Chittick, "Chapter Headings," pp. 18–20; Idem, "Ibn ʿArabī's Summary," pp. 20f.

2 In simple words, Ibn al-ʿArabī wants to say that revelation, which is symbolized by light, reaches humans through the imagination, that is, in their dreams.

3 Bukhārī 1:3 (3).

4 This tradition does not appear in the great collections of traditions, but it is frequently cited by Sufi authors. Dagli, p. 95, n. 4; SPK, p. 396.

5 I used Kāshānī's reading (p. 246), which seems appropriate to the context, because what we call the concrete world is also unreal. Our text has *fī ḥāl al-nawm* (while asleep). Cf. *Sharḥ*, p. 122.

6 That is because life is unreal, it is imagination, and when one dreams, his dream is within a dream.

7 Here Ibn al-ʿArabī uses the active participle of the first form (*ʿabara*) to denote "interpreter." Generally one uses the word *muʿabbir*, the active participle of the second form, which has the same meaning.

8 For the interpretation of milk, see [ch. 6](#), p. 56.

form of milk to the form of knowledge, explaining that the form of milk is attributed to the form of knowledge.

When the Prophet received revelation, he was detached from ordinary sensory perception and was covered by a dress, being unaware of his company. After he was freed from (the state of inspiration), he was restored (to his previous state). His perception occurs only in the presence of imagination; however, he was not said to be asleep. In like manner, the angel (Jibrīl) appeared to him in the form of a man, and this (appearance) derived from the presence of imagination, for he was not a man but an angel, who assumed the form of a human. The observer, the gnostic, interpreted this appearance until he reached the real form, saying: "This is Jibrīl, who came to you to teach you your religion."⁹ Then he (the gnostic) said: "Bring this man back to me." He called him a man, due to the form in which he appeared to them. Then he said: "This is Jibrīl," realizing the origin of this imagined man. He was right in both statements: the first based on his sense of sight and the second on (the real knowledge) that he was Jibrīl without doubt.¹⁰

Joseph said: "I saw (in my dream) eleven stars and the sun and the moon, I saw them prostrating before me" (Qur'ān 12:4). He saw his brothers in the form of stars and his father and stepmother in the form of the sun and the moon. This (seeing) was from Joseph's viewpoint. However, if it (the scene) were seen from the viewpoint of those in it, then the appearance of his brothers in the form of stars and the appearance of his father and stepmother in the form of the sun and the moon would be very pleasing to them. Since (his brothers) did not know what Joseph had seen, the latter's perception was preserved in his imagination. When Joseph told him his dream, Jacob was aware (of the danger) and said: "Do not tell your dream to your brothers, lest they plot against you" (ibid., 5). Then he pardoned (101) his sons of this plot and ascribed it to the Devil, who is the essence of plotting, and said: "The Devil is a clear enemy of the humans" (ibid.); that is, (his) enmity is manifest. After that Joseph finally said: "This is the interpretation of my earlier dream. God made it true" (ibid., 100), meaning that God made it manifest to the senses, after it had been in imaginative form. The Prophet Muḥammad said: "People are asleep," and Joseph's saying "God made it true" is like (the state) of one who sees in his sleep that he wakes up from a dream and then interprets it. He does not know that he is still asleep, but when he wakes up, he says: "I saw this, and I saw myself apparently waking up and I interpreted the dream." This is Joseph's experience. Think about the difference between Muḥammad's perception and Joseph's when the latter said at last: "This is the interpretation of my earlier dream. God made it true." This is sensory perception which could not be otherwise. That is because imagination conveys only the objects of senses, and no other objects. Consider how exalted the knowledge of Muḥammad's heirs is. I shall expand my sayings concerning this matter using Joseph's words (uttered in the spirit of) Muḥammad, so that you may know, if God wills.

⁹ Muslim, 1:1 (5).

¹⁰ Ibn al-'Arabī discusses the beginning of revelation in al-Tirmidhī's question number 25 (*Futūḥāt*, Vol. III, pp. 88f, ch. 73) and in ch. 188 (*Futūḥāt*, Vol. IV, pp. 7f).

Know that which is said about “other than the Real” or that which is called the cosmos relates to the Real as the shadow relates to a person. The cosmos is God’s shadow. This relationship is the same as the Existence is to the cosmos, for the shadow undoubtedly exists in the senses. However, there must be a substrate in which the shadow appears. Even if you assumed the absence of such a substrate, the shadow would still be intelligible but not existent in the senses, and the shadow would be potentially in the essence of the thing which casts the shadow. The substrate of the appearance of this divine shadow, called the cosmos, is the (fixed) entities of (102) the possible things (*a’yān al-mumkināt*) over which the shadow spreads out. Thus, from the extension of this shadow, one can perceive the measure of the existence of this Essence. It is by virtue of His name Light perception occurs, and this shadow spreads out over the fixed entities of the possible things in the form of unknown mystery.¹¹

Do you not see that shadows incline to the black color, thus pointing to their hiddenness because of the remoteness between them and the things that cast them? Even if an object is white, its shadow will be black. Do you not see the mountains that are distant from the observer appear to be black, but actually they might be of another color? Is there a cause of this but distance? The same is true as regards the blueness of the sky. This is what the effect of distance produces in the sense (of sight) with regard to non-luminous bodies. In like manner, the fixed entities of the possible things (*a’yān al-mumkināt*) are non-luminous, because they are non-existent, even if they are described as fixed. However, they are not described as existent, for existence is light. Furthermore, distance causes the luminous bodies to appear small, thus this is another effect of distance. The sense (of sight) perceives them as small, but they are actually bigger than what is seen. As we know by proof, the sun is one hundred sixty times the size of the earth; however, by the sense of sight it appears no larger than a shield. This is also the effect of distance. One knows of the cosmos (only) by the measure of what one knows of shadows.

Similarly, the Real is not known just as the object which causes the appearance of the shadow is not known. He is known from the point of view of His shadow but not from the point of view of the essence of the producer of the shadow. For this reason, we say that the Real is known from one aspect and not known from another. “Do you not see how your Lord lengthens the shadow; if He had willed, He would have made it rest” (Qur’ān 25:45), meaning the shadow exists in Him potentially. We say¹² that the Real cannot reveal Himself (*mā kāna al-ḥaqq li-yatajallā*) to the possible things until (103) He makes the shadow appear, and the shadow (before its appearance) is like the possible things that do not have yet concrete existence. Then “We made the sun a sign for Him”¹³ (Qur’ān, *ibid.*), (this

11 Ibn al-‘Arabī seems to say that God’s Light illuminates the fixed entities, and as a result of this illumination shadows appear. As our author said before, these shadows are the possible things in the concrete world.

12 The text has “He says” (*yaqūlu*), which does not seem logical, albeit Kāshānī (p. 254) ascribes the verb to God.

13 According to the usual commentaries, the sun is the sign for the shadow. However, in Ibn al-‘Arabī it serves as a sign for God, who is light.

sign) is the name of the Real, that is, the Light mentioned above, and the sense (of sight) witnesses it, for shadows exist in concrete form only when light exists. "Thereafter We seize it to Ourselves, drawing it gently" (Qur'an 25:46, trans. Arberry). He seizes it (the shadow) to Himself only because it is His shadow, from Him it appears and to Him all things return,¹⁴ for the shadow is He, and no other. All we perceive is the existence of the Real in the concrete possible things. Regarding the ipseity (*huwiyya*)¹⁵ of the Real, (we can only speak of) His existence, (whereas) regarding the variety of forms in Him, He is the concrete possible things. Just as the name shadow does not disappear from Him because of the variety of forms, so the name the cosmos does not disappear because of the variety of forms or any other name except for the Real. With respect to His Unity (*aḥadiyya*) as a shadow, He is the Real, because He is the Unique, the One, and with respect to the multiplicity of forms, He is the cosmos. Hence (you should) understand and ascertain what I have elucidated for you.

If the matter is as I have pointed out to you, then the cosmos is an illusion, having no real existence. This is the meaning of imagination. You imagine that the cosmos is something separate, existing by virtue of itself (*qā'im bi-nafsihi*) and unconnected to the Real, but actually this is not so.

Do you not see it (the shadow) by your sense of sight as connected to the object from which it extends? It is inconceivable that the shadow should be separated from this connection, because it is inconceivable that a thing should be separated from its essence. As a result, you should know your essence, who you are, what your ipseity is, and what your relationship to the Real is. (Also you should know) through which thing you are real and through which thing you are the cosmos, the other, and the unlike, and words like these. In this matter scholars excel one another, and therefore try to better each other in knowledge (*fa-ʿālim wa-aʿlam*)¹⁶ and to know (more)!

The Real in relation to a specific shadow (may it be) small or big, pure or purest, is like a light in relation to a glass that comes between the light and the beholder; the light takes the color of the glass, while at the same time it has no color. In this manner you are made to see the Real through giving (you) similes (104) of your reality (which proceeds) from your Lord. If you say the light is green because of the greenness of the glass, you are right, as your sense (of sight) bears witness. And if you say the light is not green and has no color, because you use a logical proof, you are right, as your witness is based on sound, rational speculation (*al-nazar al-ʿaqlī al-ṣaḥīḥ*). This is a light which extends from a shadow, which is a concrete glass, and this is a luminous shadow because of its purity.¹⁷

¹⁴ Qur'an 11:123.

¹⁵ *Huwiyya* can also be rendered as He-ness or Essence. It signifies that which is unknown regarding God. SPK, p. 394, n. 15.

¹⁶ Lane, *An Arabic English Lexicon*, s.v.

¹⁷ Here also the light is God's Essence and the glass represents the world. The different colors seen are produced by the light which passes through the glass. Affifi, II, pp. 111 f. Just as in the previous simile, the shadows, which are produced by the light that is cast on the world, are the possible things in the world, so are the different colors.

Likewise, (regarding) whoever among us who assumes his reality (*mutaḥaqqiq*) through the Real, the form of the Real appears in him more intensively than it appears in others. The Real becomes the hearing, the sight, and all the faculties and organs of some among us through signs which religion conveys about the Real. Despite this,¹⁸ the essence of the shadow exists, for the pronoun “his” (in his hearing – *sam’uhu*) refers back to the Real as a shadow, and other servants (of God) do not gain such a position.¹⁹ The relationship of such a servant to the existence of the Real is closer than the relationship of other servants to this (existence).

If the matter is as we have established, know that you are imagination and all that you perceive; that is, for example, your statement about imagination that “I am not” (imagination) is imagination. All existence is imagination within imagination. The only true existence is God, especially as regards His Essence and Reality, and not as regards His names, because His names have two meanings, the first is His Essence, the Essence of the named (God), and the second is that which the name indicates, that is, what distinguishes a name from another. There is a great difference between the Forgiving on the one hand and the Manifest and the Hidden on the other, the same with regard to the First and the Last. This becomes clear to you through (the notion that) each name is identical to another in essence and through (the notion that) each name differs from another. With respect to the Essence, each name is the Real, and with respect to the otherness, it is the imagined Real (*al-ḥaqq al-mutakhayyal*) which concerns us.

Glory be to Him who has no sign pointing to Him but Himself and whose being is proved only through His Essence. Only that to which God’s Unity points exists in the cosmos, and only multiplicity points to that which exists in the imagination. Whoever adheres to multiplicity stays with the cosmos, the divine names, and the names of the cosmos. And whoever adheres to God’s Unity stays with the Real with respect to His Essence, which dispenses with all things (*‘ālamīn*). If God’s Essence dispenses with all things, this is (105) the Essence’s dispensing with the names connected to it, because just as the names point to the Essence, so they point to other named entities which are ascertained by their effects. “Say, this is God (*allāh*), He is one” (Qur’ān 112:1) with respect to His Essence, “God who is sought by all” (*al-ṣamad*, *ibid.*, 2) with respect to our reliance on Him, “He did not beget” (*ibid.*, 3) with respect to His Ipseity and to us, “and He was not begotten” (*ibid.*) “and has no equal” (*ibid.*, 4), also with respect to His Ipseity and to us. This is His qualification, and He singled out His Essence saying, “God is one,” and the multiplicity appeared through His qualities which are known to us. We beget and are begotten and rely on Him, and we are equal one to another. This Unique Entity is free of these qualities and dispenses with them just as He dispenses with us. The Real has no lineage except (that which is said) in this *sūra*, the *sūra* of purification

¹⁸ Despite the fact that the tradition (See p. 24 above) speaks of God, it refers to the shadow.

¹⁹ Ibn al-‘Arabī seems to say that these shadows, hearing, sight, etc., are produced in the human being when God’s light illuminates His attributes of the All-Hearing and the All-Seeing, thus producing shadows of these attributes in the human being.

from multiplicity (*ikhlāṣ*); for this purpose it was revealed.²⁰ God's Unity with respect to the divine names which require us (our existence) is the Unity of many (*aḥadiyyat al-kathra*), and God's unity with respect to His dispensing with us and with the names is the Unity of the Essence (*aḥadiyyat al-ʿayn*). The name One applies to both kinds of unity. Know this!

The Real brought the shadows into existence and made them prostrate and cast themselves to the right and to the left, only to (serve) as signs for you, indicating your existence and His.²¹ That way you can know yourself and your relationship to Him and His relationship to you. Also (God brought the shadows into existence) to let you know from where or from what divine reality all that is other than the Real is described through absolute need for God and through relative need for each other, and to let you know from where or from what reality the Real is described as one who dispenses with people and with all things, whereas the (things in the) cosmos sometimes need others with respect to their essence and sometimes not. (All things in) the cosmos essentially need causes. The greatest cause for them is the Real, whose causality is embodied in the divine names which all things need. The divine names mean each name which the things are in need of (106), that is, things of the cosmos or the Essence of the Real, which is God, no other. For this reason God said: "People, you are needful of God, and God does not need you, He is the Praised" (Qurʾān 35:15). It is well known that we need each other. Hence, our names are His, for without doubt we need Him. Actually, our essences are His shadow, and nothing else. He is at the same time our ipseity and not our ipseity. We have paved the way for you, so contemplate!

²⁰ This chapter of the Qurʾān denies of God any connection to the cosmos.

²¹ This is a paraphrase of Qurʾān 16:48.

10 The bezel of the wisdom of unity¹ exists in the essence of Hūd

(106) The Straight Path² belongs to God/It is universally manifest not hidden
His Essence exists in young and old people/in the ignorant and in the knower
For this reason, His Mercy encompasses/everything³ be it despicable or exalted
“There is no creature (*dabba*) which He does not seize its forelock.⁴ Verily,
my Lord acts according to a straight path” (Qur’ān 11:56). Every moving creature walks according to God’s Straight Path. Those (who walk according to the Straight Path) are not the object of God’s anger in this respect, nor do they go astray.⁵ Just as going astray is accidental, so is the divine wrath, and (all things) go back to God’s Mercy which encompasses everything and precedes (His Wrath).⁶ All things other than God are creatures, because they possess a spirit.⁷ There is nothing that moves by virtue of itself, but everything moves by virtue of another. Each thing moves according to God’s Straight Path, which serves as a path only by walking according to it (literally: on it).

If creation submits to you/the Real submits to you
And if the Real submits to you/creation may not follow (Him in submission)
Hence, ascertain what we say concerning Him/for all my saying is true
(107) There is no existent that you see in the cosmos/which does not speak
Nor is there a creation seen by the eyes/but its essence is the Real
The Real is deposited in creation/for this reason, the forms of creation are His.

1 Unity (*aḥadiyya*) denotes God as an entity which cannot accept manyness. It is the pure one, the ineffable Essence. Yahya, “Theophanies and Lights,” pp. 35f. However, Ibn al-‘Arabi, as we have seen partly, distinguishes between God’s Unity, which designates His transcendence and God with respect to His attributes and names. In this chapter he discusses the third kind of God’s Unity, that is, the divine acts, which are the outcome of the second kind of unity.

2 *Al-Sīrāt al-mustaḡīm* appears for the first time in Qur’ān 1:6.

3 A paraphrase of Qur’ān 7:156.

4 By this phrase the author means that God directs every creature.

5 A paraphrase of Qur’ān 1:7.

6 A paraphrase of Bukhārī 7553 which reads “My Mercy precedes My Wrath” (*sabaqat raḥmatī ghadabī*).

7 According to Ibn al-‘Arabi, everything in the cosmos has a spirit, including inanimate things, because they are manifestations of God’s names and as such partake in God’s life. SDG, pp. 81–86. SPK, p. 302.

Know that the divine experiential sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-ilāhiyya al-dhawqiyya*) which the People of God experience are different by virtue of the difference of the faculties from which these experiences derive, although they go back to one Essence.⁸ That is because God says: “I have been his hearing by which he hears, his seeing by which he sees, his hand by which he seizes, and his foot by which he walks.”⁹ God points out that His Essence (*huwiyya*) is the essence of the human being’s organs, which is the essence of the servant. However, the essence is one, while the organs are many. Each organ possesses an experiential science peculiar to that organ. Each science originates in one essence, but differs in accordance with a specific organ. This is like water, which possesses one essence, but differs in taste according to its place. Some water is sweet and fresh and some is salty and bitter;¹⁰ however, it is water in all its states and its essence does not change, even if its tastes vary.

This wisdom pertains to the science of “feet,” for as God says concerning the nourishment of those who uphold His scriptures: “And from below” (literally: from beneath their feet – Qur’ān 5:66).¹¹ For the way, which is the (Straight) Path, means something to be traveled along and walked on, and walking is done only on foot. This witnessing (*shuhūd*) concerning the seizing of the forelocks by the one who is on the Straight Path (God) produces only this particular kind of experiential sciences. “And We¹² shall drive the sinners” (Qur’ān 19:86), those who deserve the station to which He will drive them by the wind, which pushes them from behind. He will destroy them by this wind, because of (the sins) of their souls. He will seize their forelocks, while the wind is driving them – what drives them is their desires to which they cling – to the Hell, which is the distance (between them and God) imagined by them.

(108) Since He drives them to this place, they attain the essence of nearness to Him, for the distance disappears, and the term Hell no longer applies to them. They attain the grace of nearness, because being sinners they deserve it.¹³ He does not give them this pleasurable experiential station as a gift. They take it, only because they deserve it owing to their acts. In carrying out their acts they are on the Lord’s Straight Path, for their forelocks are at the hands of the one who has this attribute (of seizing forelocks). They do not walk by themselves but under compulsion until they reach the essence of nearness to Him. “We are nearer to him (to a dying person) than you, but you (his relatives) do not know” (literally: do

⁸ God has all kinds of experiences which He bestows on people, each in keeping with the predisposition of the individual.

⁹ See above p. 24.

¹⁰ Cf. Qur’ān 35:12.

¹¹ Qur’ān 5:66 reads: “If they had upheld the Torah and the Gospel and what was sent down to them from their Lord, they would have been given abundance from above and from below: some of them are on the right course, but many of them – how evil is what they do!” (trans. AH).

¹² The text in Affifi’s edition reads: *wa-yasūqu* (he drives), which seems to be an error. In Kāshānī’s and Sharḥ’s text, the word *nasūqū* appears as in the Qur’ān.

¹³ The paradox here is that even the evildoers, who suffer in Hell, come near to God. *Sharḥ*, pp. 138f.

not see; Qurʾān 56:85). Only the dying person knows, for the veil is removed, and “his knowledge (literally: his sight) is sharp” (Qurʾān 50:22).¹⁴ The Qurʾān does not single out one dying person from another; that is, it does not single out a happy (*saʿīd*) from an unhappy (*shaqī*) person with respect to nearness (to God). “We are nearer to him than his jugular vein” (Qurʾān 50:16). The Qurʾān does not single out one person from another. The divine nearness to the human being is not hidden in the divine message. Nothing is closer to the human being than his organs and faculties, and the human being constitutes only his organs and faculties, for he is an attested reality (*ḥaqq mashhūd*) in an imagined creation. The believers and people of unveiling and finding (*ahl al-kashf waʾl-wujūd*) hold that creation is intelligible and the Real is sensible and perceivable; (however), others except these two groups hold that the Real is intelligible and creation is perceivable. The latter are like salty and bitter water, while the former are like sweet and pleasant water, tasty to drink.

People are divided into two groups: a. those who walk on a way they know and whose aim they cognize, and this way is with respect to them a straight path; and b. those who walk on a way they do not know and whose aim is not cognized by them. This way is the same as that known to the first group. The knower calls God out of knowledge (*ʿalā baṣīra*),¹⁵ while the one who does not know calls God out of uncritical belief (*taqlīd*) (109) and ignorance. This is a specific knowledge which comes from the lowest of the low (*asfal sāfilīn*),¹⁶ for the feet are the lowest parts of the human being, and lower still is the way beneath the feet. Whoever knows that the Real is the essence of the way, truly knows reality, for in Him you walk and travel, because there is no known object but He. He is both the essence of existence and the walker and the traveler. There is no knower but He, and who are you? Know your reality and your way, for reality became clear to you through the tongue of the Transmitter (*turjumān*),¹⁷ if you understand. He is the true (*ḥaqq*) tongue, and only the one whose understanding is true understands Him, for the Real (*al-ḥaqq*) has many relations and various aspects.

Do you not think of ʿĀd, the people of Hūd, and how “they said: ‘This cloud will give us rain’” (Qurʾān 46:24. trans. AH)? They think well of the Lord, Who appears as the human being thinks of Him. The Real made them turn away from this saying and informed them of something more complete and exalted concerning nearness (to Him). For, when He gave them rain, which is the share of the earth, and watered the seed, they attained the fruit of this rain only after a long time. Therefore He said to them: “No indeed! It is what you wanted to hasten: a (hurricane) wind bearing a painful punishment” (ibid., trans. AH). He made the wind (*rīḥ*) an allusion of the comfort (*rāḥa*) which is therein, for through this wind

¹⁴ The whole verse reads: “You paid no attention to this (Day); but today we have removed your veil and your sight is sharp.” By Day the Qurʾān means the Resurrection.

¹⁵ For this phrase, see Qurʾān 12:108.

¹⁶ This idiom appears in Qurʾān 95:5.

¹⁷ The Transmitter is Muḥammad. See pp. 15, 22, 66.

He released them (*arāḥahum*)¹⁸ from the darkness of their bodies (literally: temples *hayākil*), from the rough roads and from the deep darkness. In this wind there is *ʿadhāb*, that is, something they find sweet when they taste it, although it causes them pain, because they are unaccustomed to it. The punishment touched them and was nearer to them than anything they had imagined. By God's command the wind destroyed everything and "in the morning there was nothing to see except their (ruined) dwellings" (ibid., 25., trans. AH), which are their dead bodies in which their essential spirits lived. The firm and special relationship (between the spirits and their bodies) disappeared and the life characteristic of the bodies (without spirits) remained in their bodies, that is, the Real made the skin, hands, feet, tips of the lashes, and the thighs to express (themselves).¹⁹ The divine text attests to all this.²⁰

However, God describes Himself as Other (or Jealous),²¹ and because of His otherness (jealousy) He "forbade (110) disgraceful deeds (or excesses *fawāḥish*)" (Qurʾān 7:33). *Faḥsh* is only what is manifest. As for the *faḥsh* of the unmanifest, it is possessed by the one for whom it is manifest.²² Hence, God forbade excesses, that is, prevented people from knowing the reality which we mentioned, meaning that He is the Essence of things. He concealed the reality through His otherness (*ghayra*), which stems from (the word) other (*ghayr*). Actually, He is identical to you (*wa-huwa anta*). The other says that hearing belongs only to Zayd, whereas the gnostic says that hearing is the Essence of the Real and so are other faculties and organs.²³ Not everyone knows the Real; people surpass each other, and their ranks are different, so it becomes clear who is most excellent (*fāḍil*) and who is excellent (*maḥḍūl*).²⁴

Know that when the Real made me see and witness his human messengers and prophets themselves, from Adam to Muḥammad, in a location of witnessing (*mashhad*) where I was placed in Cordova in the year 586 (AH), no one in this group spoke to me except Hūd. He informed me of the reason for their assembly. I saw him as a big man in relation to other men, handsome, who conversed in a subtle way, one who knows and reveals things. My proof of his (faculty) of revealing is his saying: "There is no creature (*dabba*) which He does not seize its forelock. Verily, my Lord acts according to a straight path" (Qurʾān 11:56).

¹⁸ *Rīḥ*, *rāḥa*, and *arāḥa* originate in the root *r.w.ḥ*.

¹⁹ Even the inanimate body has a certain kind of life.

²⁰ See Qurʾān 41:20, 21.

²¹ He is jealous of His existence, claiming that only He really exists.

²² The notion that excesses whether manifest or unmanifest refer to the same object is based on the verse noted above.

²³ The other, who regards himself as different from God, ascribes Zayd's hearing to Zayd himself, ignoring the truth, known by the gnostic, that Zayd's hearing is identical to God's Essence. Here the author alludes to the tradition of the supererogatory works. See above p. 24.

²⁴ *Maḥḍūl* is exactly one-who-is-known-to-be-excelled by others. These two terms are usually employed in discussions on the Imamate. B. Abrahamov, "Al-Ḳāsim ibn Ibrāhīm's Theory of the Imamate," *Arabica* 34 (1987), p. 89.

What good news for people is better than this? God bestowed on us His favor when he brought Hūd's statement in the Qur'ān. Muḥammad, who embraced everything, completed Hūd's saying by telling us about the Real who is the essence of (our) hearing and seeing, and of (our) hands, feet, and tongue, meaning He is the essence of our senses. The spiritual faculties are nearer (to the human being) than the senses, therefore God contented Himself with the more distant faculties that can be defined, rather than the nearer faculties that cannot be defined. The Real transmitted (*tarjama*)²⁵ Hūd's statement as good tidings to us, and God's messenger transmitted from God Hūd's statement also as good tidings. Thus, knowledge became perfect in the hearts of those who received it. "Only the unbelievers (or those who conceal – *al-kāfirūn*)²⁶ deny Our signs" (Qur'ān 29:47). That is because they concealed the signs, even if they knew them, out of envy, rivalry,²⁷ and injustice (*ẓulm*). We consider what comes to us from God concerning God in a Qur'ānic verse or in another kind of transmission which He delivered for us only in terms of limitation, whether limited by transcendence (*tanzīh*) or any other kind of characterization.

(111) The first limitation is the Cloud (*'amā*) which has no air above or beneath it.²⁸ The Real came to be in it before He created the creation. Then He said that He "Sat Himself upon the Throne" (Qur'ān 7:54, trans. Arberry), which is also a limitation. He then said that He descends to the lower heaven, which is yet another limitation.²⁹ He also said that He is in the heaven and on the earth,³⁰ and that He is with us wherever we are,³¹ until He informed us that He is our essence.³² We are limited; therefore, He can describe Himself only in terms of limitation. And His saying "There is nothing like Him (*ka-mithlihi*)" (Qur'ān 42:11) is also a limitation, if we regard the *kāf* as redundant and not descriptive. That which is distinguished from the limited thing is itself limited, because of its being distinct from the limited thing. Being free of limitation is limitation, and one who understands (knows that) the free (the unlimited) thing is limited by its freedom. If we regard *kāf* as a particle for description, we limit Him.³³ If we understand by "There is nothing like Him" the denial of comparison (of God to others), we verify the true sense and the correct information that He is the essence of things, and the things

²⁵ For this verb as designating transmission, see above, pp. 15, 22, 66, 76.

²⁶ For *kafara* in the meaning of "he concealed," see above, p. 42f.

²⁷ Read *munāfasa* instead of *nafāsa*.

²⁸ This sentence is based on a *ḥadīth* (Tirmidhī, 3109) translated in SPK (p. 125) as follows: The Prophet was asked: "Where (*ayn*) did your Lord come to be (*kān*) before He created the creatures (*al-khalq*)?" He replied: "He came to be in a cloud, neither above which nor below which was any air (*hawā*)."²⁹ For more references to this tradition, see SPK, p. 397, n. 1.

²⁹ For a detailed discussion of this tradition (Bukhārī, 1145), see Ibn Taymiyya, *Sharḥ ḥadīth al-nuzūl*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Khamīs, Al-Riyāḍ 1993.

³⁰ Cf. Qur'ān 43:84.

³¹ Cf. Qur'ān 57:4.

³² He might refer here to the tradition of the supererogatory acts. See above, p. 24.

³³ *Ka-mithlih* is identical to *mithl mithlihi*, meaning that there is nothing like His image; that is, He has an image, but this image is different from other images.

are limited, even if their limitations are different. He is limited by the limitation of every limited thing. A thing is limited only by the limitation of the Real. He permeates that which is called the created and the produced things, and were it not the case, existence would not come to be. He is the Essence of existence and He is “the preserver of everything” (Qur’ān 11:57, 34:21) by His Essence; the preservation of everything “does not weary Him” (Qur’ān 2:255). His preservation of all things means His preservation of His form lest the thing assume a different form, which is inconceivable. He is both witness and witnessed. The cosmos is His form, and He is the spirit of the cosmos and directs it, and He is the Great Man (Macrocosm).

He is all being/and the one by whose

Being I came to be/therefore I say He feeds

My existence is His nourishment/and we assume His form

In Him and from Him, if you observe from a certain aspect/we seek refuge.³⁴

(112) Because of this anxiety (*karb*), He sighed, and His breath was attributed to the Merciful, for He had mercy on that which the divine relations require, that is, bringing the forms of the cosmos into existence. These forms are both the manifest and the unmanifest aspects of the Real, because He is both the Manifest and the Unmanifest (the Hidden). He is the First, because He existed without the forms, and He is the Last, because He was the Essence of things when they came to be. The Last is the essence of the Manifest, and the Unmanifest is the essence of the First.³⁵ And “He knows all things absolutely” (Qur’ān 57:3), for He knows Himself. Since He brought the forms into existence in the Breath and the rule of the relations (between the Real and the cosmos), that is, the Names, was manifest, the divine relationship to the cosmos was established, and all things were attributed to Him. He (Muḥammad) said: “This day I lowered your pedigree and raised my pedigree”;³⁶ that is, I took from you your attribution to yourselves and turned your attribution to Me.

Where are the God-fearing (*muttaqūn*), that is, those who took their God as protection (*wiqāya*)?³⁷ God was their manifest aspect, that is, the Essence of their manifest forms. The God-fearing person is the greatest, the most deserving (of this name), and the strongest in the eyes of all people. The God-fearing is the one who makes himself a protection for God through his form, because the Essence of the Real is the faculties of the servant. He made the one called the servant as a protection for the one called the Real on the basis of witness, so that the knower is distinguished from the ignorant. “Say, are those who know equal to those who do not know? Only the intelligent remember” (Qur’ān 39:9). The intelligent are those

³⁴ Existence is compared here to nourishment which comes from God. With respect to the notion that God is the Essence of all things, when one asks for refuge in God, one is actually asking for refuge from Him.

³⁵ In view of the cosmos He is the Manifest; however, without the cosmos, He is the Unmanifest.

³⁶ I could not find the source of this statement.

³⁷ *Muttaqūn* and *wiqāya* derive from the same root, *w.q.y.*

who contemplate the core of the thing, which is what is sought (in order to know the thing). The negligent cannot overcome the diligent; likewise, the hireling cannot be compared with the servant. If the Real is a protection for the servant³⁸ from one aspect, and vice versa from another, then say of Being what you will: if you want, say it is the creation, and if you want, say it is the Real, and if you want, say it is the Real and the creation, and if you want, say there is neither real nor creation from every aspect, and if you want, you will hold perplexity in this matter. By establishing levels (of being), that which you seek becomes clear. If (the messengers) had not defined existence, they would not have conveyed the transformation of the Real into forms, nor would they have described Him as removing the forms from Himself.

(113) The eye looks only at Him/and one judges only Him

We (belong) to Him, (live) by Him and under His rule/and in every state we are in His presence

As a consequence, He is unknown and known, indescribable and describable. Whoever sees the Real from His standpoint (*minhu*), in Him (*fīhi*) and through Him (*bi-ʿaynihi*), is a knower (*ʿārif*). Whoever sees the Real from His standpoint, in Him, but through his own eyes, does not know.³⁹ And whoever does not see the Real from His standpoint, nor in Him, expecting to see Him through his own eyes, is ignorant. To sum up, each individual must have a belief (*iʿtiqād*) regarding his Lord through which he turns to Him and seeks Him. If the Real reveals Himself to him within this belief, he acknowledges Him. But if He reveals Himself in another belief, then he is denying Him, seeking refuge against Him, and behaving badly toward Him, while simultaneously thinking that he is behaving properly. Such a believer only believes in a god which he created in himself, for a god of beliefs is created (in thought). Such believers see only themselves and what they create in themselves.

Observe! The levels of people regarding the knowledge of God are the same levels concerning the seeing of God in the Resurrection. I have informed you of the reason which entails this. Beware of limiting yourself by a specific belief (*ʿaqd*)⁴⁰ and disbelieving in everything else lest you miss much good; moreover, you will miss knowing of things as they really are.⁴¹ Be in yourself primal matter, receptive to all forms of belief, for God is too vast and great to be confined by one belief rather than another.⁴² For this reason, He said: “Wherever you turn there is the face of God” (Qurʾān 2:115); He did not mention one place rather than another. He mentioned that there is the face of God, and the face of a thing is its essence (*ḥaqīqa*, or reality). By this He turned the attention of the gnostics’ hearts lest events of this world should distract them from applying their minds to (God’s

³⁸ The text has *li-l-ḥaqq*, which is an error.

³⁹ When the human being sees God with God’s seeing, he is a gnostic. This idea is based on the tradition of the supererogatory works mentioned above. See p. 24 above.

⁴⁰ Literally: knot.

⁴¹ The knowledge of things as they really are is the aim of the philosophers.

⁴² Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds*, p. 176.

omnipresence), for the servant does not know in which breath he will be taken (die); he may be taken at a time of inattentiveness, and thus will be unequal to the one taken at a time of attentiveness.

Also, the perfect servant (114), notwithstanding his knowledge (of God's omnipresence), must, from the standpoint of the external form and the limited state, turn his face in prayer toward the Holy Mosque and believe that God is there at prayer time. This is one of the levels (of the presence) of the Real's face, which derives from "Wherever you turn there is the face of God" (ibid.). The direction toward the Holy Mosque is part of (this verse), and in this direction God's face exists. However, do not say that He is only here, but adhere to the two notions you perceived, these being, embrace the rule of directing your face toward the Holy Mosque and abide by the rule of not limiting God's presence to specific buildings, which are only some of the many directions to which one can turn.

Through God it became clear to you that He is in every direction wherever one's belief is. Hence everyone is right (in his belief), and whoever is right is rewarded, and whoever receives reward is happy, and God is pleased with the happy individual, even if he is unhappy for some time in the world to come. For even the people of Providence⁴³ are sick and suffer pain in this world, although we know that they are the happy persons among the people of the Real. Among God's servants are those who will suffer pain in the next world in an abode called Hell (*jahannam*).⁴⁴ Despite this, none of the people of knowledge, those who were made to reveal things as they really are, will say with certainty that the happy persons will not enjoy a specific delight in this abode, either by freeing them from pains, and thus their delight will be relief from pain, or they will enjoy a separate⁴⁵ and additional delight as the delight of the people of Paradise in Paradise. And God knows best.

⁴³ That is, those whom God takes care of.

⁴⁴ I cannot be sure of what or who Ibn al-ʿArabī is hinting at by telling us that some of God's servants will suffer in the world to come. Is he saying pain will follow them for their sins?

⁴⁵ This is a delight which is not connected to the relief of pain.

11 The bezel of the wisdom of opening¹ exists in the essence of Ṣāliḥ

(115) Among His signs are the (riders) on mounts/because of the variety of paths
Some adhere to the true course/and others travel (as in) the desert without aim
The former are eyewitnesses/while the latter go astray
Both receive from God/revelations of mysteries from every side²

Know, may God grant you success, that in their essences all things are built on unevenness, which begins with number three and beyond that.³ The first uneven number is three. From the divine presence the cosmos came into existence. Therefore, God said: “When We will a thing (to be), We only say to it ‘be’ and it comes into being” (Qur’ān 16:40). This is an essence, which possesses will and speech. If this essence and its will, which constitutes a specific turning toward a thing aiming at making it exist, and the saying “be” in this process did not exist, the thing would not exist. Also the tripartite unevenness appears in this thing. With respect to the thing itself, its existence and description as an existent are valid because of three (elements): its quality of being a thing (*shay’iyya*), its (quality of) hearing (*samā*), and its (quality of) obedience to the originator’s command. Compare the first three with the last three: The fixed entity of the thing in its state of absence corresponds to the Essence of its bringer into existence; the hearing of this entity, to the will of its originator; and, its obedience to the command of its originator, to the latter’s saying “be,” and so brings it into existence. Bringing into being is ascribed to the thing, for if it had no power of bringing into being, when hearing this saying, it would not come into being. On hearing the command, only the essence of the thing brings it into existence, after its non-existence. Thus, the Real affirms that (116) bringing into being pertains to the thing itself and not to the Real, while the Real in this (process) only commands.⁴ He so informs about

1 Opening is equivalent to unveiling or to all kinds of God’s self-manifestation. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” pp. 21f; SPK, pp. 222–224.

2 The riders here are individuals who travel in the ways of life. Some of them know their way and others go astray. Both groups receive signs from God, which can teach them about Him and the cosmos.

3 “One” is not considered a number; hence, the first uneven number is three.

4 According to Ibn al-‘Arabī, the thing exists in the state of a fixed entity, which can be embodied and becomes a concrete object at God’s command. In fact, Ibn al-‘Arabī interprets this verse in a plain manner, because the Qur’ān speaks of a thing’s existence

Himself in his saying: “When We will a thing (to be), We only say to it ‘be’ and it comes into being” (ibid.). He (the Real) attributes the bringing into being to the thing itself as a result of God’s command, and He speaks the truth. In principle, it is reasonable, just as the one feared and obeyed orders his servant to stand, and he stands in submission to his master’s command. The master only orders the servant to stand; however, standing is the outcome of the servant’s activity, and not the master’s.⁵ Thus, bringing into being rests on the tripartite principle – three elements from both sides, from the Real and from creation.

Also, the tripartite principle permeates the origination of notions by way of logical proofs. A proof should be composed of three (parts) in accordance with a specific order and condition(s). Only in this way is a result reached. The contemplator (*nāẓir*) composes his proof of two premises, each containing two parts,⁶ so that there are four parts. One of these four parts is repeated in the two premises so as to link the first premise to the second, like in a marriage;⁷ hence, there are three (different) parts, because of the repetition of one part.

When this procedure takes place in accordance with the specific aspect, that is, the connection of the first premise with the second through the repetition of one part, thus validating the tripartite structure, one arrives at the conclusion (literally: what one seeks, *al-maṭlūb*). (As a) specific condition, the predicate of the first premise must be more general than its subject or equal to it.⁸ In this case the conclusion will be valid, otherwise it is invalid. Such faulty procedure can be found in the world. For example, the ascription of one’s acts to oneself without connecting them to God, or attributing the bringing into being, of which we speak, to God alone, while the Real attributes it only to the thing to which God says “be.”

For example, if we wish to prove that the existence of the world is caused, we shall say everything that comes into being (*ḥādith*) has a cause (*sabab*), thus we have the thing that comes into being and the cause.⁹ Then we say (117) in the second premise: the world comes into being, so “comes into being” is repeated in both premises. The conclusion is that the world has a cause. The cause, which

before its concrete existence; the command is turned to a thing, which means that it has some kind of existence. This plain meaning supports Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theory of the fixed entities.

5 This is not a very accurate example, because the servant exists concretely, while things only exist in the Real’s thought as fixed entities. However, it does bear witness to the aspect of the obedience to the command which inheres in the servant.

6 For example, the two parts are the subject and predicate.

7 Probably in this context he means the connection between male and female, who have something in common.

8 I follow here the examples given in Affifi’s commentary (p. 136): 1. Every animal is a body; 2. The human being is an animal; 3. Therefore, the human being is a body. In this example the predicate (body) is more general than its subject (every animal), because a body may also refer to inanimate things. In the second example the predicate is equal to the subject: 1. Every animal is sensitive; 2. The human being is an animal; 3. Therefore, the human being is sensitive.

9 This is the first premise in which “everything that comes into being” is the subject and “cause” is the predicate.

appears in the first premise, is reiterated in the conclusion. The specific aspect is the repetition of “comes into being,” while the specific condition is the generality of the predicate, for it makes that which comes into being exist.¹⁰ Regarding the coming of the world into being from God, the predicate is general. We affirm that everything that comes into being (subject) has a cause (predicate), whether this cause is equal to or more general than its subject. In both cases the conclusion is valid. Thus, also in the origination of ideas through proofs the tripartite principle is manifest.

Hence, the foundation of Being is tripartite in principle. For this reason, God manifested the wisdom of Ṣāliḥ in postponing the punishment of his people for three days as a true threat,¹¹ which finally became real, and this is the cry by which God destroyed them, “so that they fell down in their homes” (Qur’ān 7:78, 11:67). On the first of the three days their faces became yellow, on the second red, and on the third black.¹² When the third day passed, their predisposition was appropriate, and then decay appeared in them, and this appearance was called destruction. The yellowing of the faces of the miserable parallels the shining of the faces of the happy, as in his saying “On that Day some faces will be shining (*musfira*)” (Qur’ān 80:38). (The word *musfira*) originates in *sufūr*, meaning manifestation (*zuhūr*). (This sign) corresponds to the yellowing of the faces of the people of Ṣāliḥ on the first day in which the sign of their misery appeared. Likewise, in parallel to the redness that appeared in their faces, God said of the happy “laughing” (ibid., 39), for laughter causes redness of the face, and for the happy it is the redness of the cheeks. And finally, as a counterpart to the transformation of the skins of the miserable to black, God said “rejoicing” (ibid., *mustabshira*), meaning the impact (118) of joyfulness on their skins as blackness had impact on the skins of the miserable. For this reason, He applied the word “tidings” (*bushrā*) to both parties; that is, what He said to them affected their skin (*bashara*),¹³ and His words caused their skin to color in a way which described their faces differently than before. Regarding the happy, He said: “Their Lord gives them glad tidings of His mercy and pleasure” (Qur’ān 9:21), while regarding the miserable, He said: “Give them tidings of a painful punishment” (Qur’ān 3:21). The two kinds of announcements influenced the souls of both groups and in turn the color of their skins.

That which was manifest in their outward appearance derived from the notion already established in their souls. Nothing affected them but themselves, just as their origination derived from themselves. “God possesses the conclusive argument” (Qur’ān 6:149).

Whoever understands this wisdom, establishing it in his soul as witness, releases himself from dependence on others and knows that the good and evil that

¹⁰ Ibn al-‘Arabī uses the term *illa* in two meanings: a predicate and a cause.

¹¹ Qur’ān 11:65,

¹² Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-qur’ān al-‘azīm*, Beirut 1970, Vol. III, p. 192 (Qur’ān 7:73–78).

¹³ *Bushrā* and *bashara* have the same root, *b.sh.r.*

befall him come only from himself.¹⁴ By good I mean what fits his aims and tallies with his nature and temperament, and by evil I mean the opposite. Whoever witnesses this (wisdom) ascribes all excuses to the existents themselves, even if they make no excuse, knowing that all that befalls one derives from oneself, for as we have mentioned before, knowledge follows the known object. Thus, he says to himself when something that does not fit his aim befalls him: “Your hands did it and your mouth breathed.” And God speaks the truth and guides (people) to the (right) way (Qur’ān 33:4).

¹⁴ Ibn al-‘Arabī ignores the self-contradiction in his thought, because in the last analysis God alone establishes the fixed entities that determine the physical and the spiritual constitution of the human being. Thus, actually the human being is not responsible for what suits his constitution, because the latter was already established by God.

12 The bezel of the wisdom of the heart¹ exists in the essence of Shu‘ayb

(119) Know that the heart – I mean the heart of the knower of God (the gnostic – ‘*ārīf*) – derives from God’s Mercy, but is more encompassing (*awsa’*) than Mercy, because the heart encompasses the Real, while His Mercy does not.² Most scholars³ hold this notion, pointing out that the Real has mercy on (people), but is not the object of mercy.

As for the elite, they point out that God describes Himself as breath (*nafas*), a word derived from exhalation (*tanfis*). (Also they state) that the divine names are identical to the entity named, that is, God. These names require the realities they bestow, and the realities which they require are none but the cosmos. Divinity (*ulūhiyya*) requires worshipers, while Lordship (*rubūbiyya*) requires servanthood, because the essence of both Divinity and Lordship depends on worshipers and servanthood for its concrete and assumed existence. However, the Real with respect to His Essence (*dhāt*) needs nothing, (whereas in contrast) to Lordship this notion (the Essence) does not apply. Thus, the matter remains (as something) between what Lordship requires and what the Essence deserves, that is, its dispensing with the cosmos.

Truly, Lordship is identical with the Essence. However, because things contradict each other by virtue of their relationships, the Real describes Himself in a tradition as the one who has mercy on His servants. The first breath which came forth from Lordship is related to (the name) the Merciful (*al-raḥmān*), which brought the cosmos into existence, the cosmos that Lordship in its reality and all the divine names require. Regarding this aspect, it is proved that His Mercy encompasses

1 Shu‘ayb means “branching out,” and this meaning is connected to the human heart. First, the human heart’s many functions affect every part of the body, and second, the heart is capable of changing and adopting various ideas. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” p. 23. Idem, “Ibn ‘Arabī’s Summary,” p. 25f. By the human heart, Ibn al-‘Arabī does not mean a bodily organ, but rather a spiritual organ possessing mystical awareness. Izutsu, *Creation*, p. 161.

2 The Real (*al-ḥaqq*) denotes God in respect to His names and attributes, therefore His Mercy pertains to the Real. From the standpoint of the Essence, His Mercy does not encompass the Real. See below, n. 4.

3 See Kāshānī, p. 300.

everything, including the Real,⁴ and His Mercy is broader than the heart or similar to it in broadness. (Here) the discussion of mercy and the heart finishes.

Also, you should know, as (120) stated in the *Ṣaḥīḥ*,⁵ the Real changes His forms when He reveals Himself. Also, when the heart encompasses Him, it does not encompass anything else with Him, and it is as if the Real filled the heart. This means that when the heart looks at the Real when the latter reveals Himself to it, it cannot look at other things. The gnostic's heart is related to broadness, as Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī said: "Were the Throne and that which it contains multiplied one hundred million times and placed in the corner of the gnostic's heart, he would not feel it."⁶ Likewise al-Junayd said: "When the coming into being is linked to the eternal, no sign of it will remain."⁷ How can a heart which contains the Eternal feel the existence of the coming into being?⁸ If the forms of the Real's self-manifestation are diversified, the heart necessarily becomes wide or narrow in keeping with the form of the divine self-manifestation, for the heart can contain only the form in which the self-manifestation takes place. That is because the heart relates to the gnostic or the perfect human being as the bezel of the ring relates to the seal (the stone); the seal does not exceed the bezel, but it fits its measure and form, be it circular, square, hexagonal, octagonal, or any other form. This runs contrary to what the Sufis (*al-tā'ifa*) said, viz., that the Real manifests Himself according to the measure of the servant's predisposition. This is not true, for the servant manifests himself to the Real in accordance with the form the Real manifests Himself to the servant. To explain this issue, God has two ways of self-manifestation: concealed (*ghayb*) and unconcealed (*shahāda*). The concealed self-manifestation bestows the heart with predisposition. This is the essential self-manifestation whose essence is concealed; it is the ipseity which the Real deserves saying of Himself, "He" (*huwa*). The term "He" belongs to Him always and forever.

When the heart possesses this predisposition, the unconcealed self-manifestation appears (121) in the sensible world and the heart sees the Real in the form mentioned above. The Real bestows on the heart its predisposition, as said: "(Our Lord) bestowed on everything (the form of) its creation" (Qur'ān 20:50). Then He removed the veil between Him and His servant, and he saw Him in the form of his belief, which is the essence of his belief. Both the heart and the eye always witness only the form of belief vis-à-vis the Real. Thus, the heart contains the Real of the belief, and the Real manifests Himself to the heart and hence the heart knows Him. The eye sees only the Real of the belief. Quite evidently there are various

4 From the standpoint of the divine names, the Real too is given mercy by the essential mercy. Kāshānī, p. 302.

5 The collection of traditions by al-Bukhārī or Muslim.

6 *Futūḥāt*, Vol. III, pp. 540 (with a slight difference). Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 46f. Very probably the Greatest Master speaks of the Perfect Human Being who encompasses the Real's attributes and hence everything. Izutsu, *Creation*, pp. 162f. See p. 57 above.

7 Ibn al-ʿArabī, *Kitāb al-bāʿ*, in *Majmūʿa*, Vol. I, p. 463; idem, *The Tarjumān al-ashwāq*, p. 90, n. 19; idem, *al-Tadbīrāt al-ilāhiyya*, p. 114, line 3.

8 Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 82f.

beliefs that whosoever restricts Him to his belief denies Him in other beliefs, affirming His self-manifestation in the belief to which he restricts Him.⁹ Whoever considers the Real without restriction does not deny Him, affirming Him in every form He manifests Himself and devoting himself to the endless forms in which He is manifest, for the forms of His self-manifestation have no end.

The same applies to the knowledge of God; no limit stops the knower at a certain point (in this knowledge), but (on the contrary), he is always a knower seeking to increase the knowledge of Him. "O my Lord, increase my knowledge" (Qur'an 20:114); the matter has no end, from both sides.¹⁰

This is so when you say the Real and creation. However, if you consider His saying "I am his foot with which he walks, his hand with which he seizes and his tongue with which he speaks," and other faculties and substrates, that is, the organs, in which they are located, you will not separate (the Real from creation) and you will say all things are the Real or creation. But, this is creation from one standpoint and the Real from another, yet the Essence is one. The form of self-manifestation is identical to the form of the one who receives this self-manifestation; hence, one is at the same time that which is manifested and that for which manifestation is performed. Look how wonderful is God regarding His ipseity and His relationship with the cosmos within the realities of His most beautiful names.

(122) Who is there and what is there/the "who" and the "what" are the same

Whoever generalizes Him, particularizes Him/and whoever particularizes Him, generalizes Him

There is no essence but His/the light of His Essence is darkness

Whoever disregards this/will suffer anxiety

Only a servant who is anxious/knows what we said

"Surely in that there is a reminder for whoever has a heart (*qalb*)" (Qur'an 50:37), because he changes (*taqallubih*)¹¹ himself by way of various forms and attributes. God did not say "for whoever has an intellect," because the intellect (*ʿaql*) means a limit and it restricts the matter to a single trait, and the reality denies restriction in the cosmos. It is not a reminder to those who possess intellect, that is, the people of beliefs (*aṣḥāb al-ʿitqādāt*) who accuse each other of unbelief and curse each other and "no one helps them" (Qur'an 3:22, 91). That is because the god of one believer has no authority over the god of another believer. One who adheres to a belief defends his belief, that is, what he believes regarding his god, and another believer will not help him, and for this reason he has no impact on his rival. Likewise, the rival receives no help from the god of his belief (because)

⁹ Takeshita, p. 117.

¹⁰ The matter has no end because the self-manifestations of the Real are endless; hence, seeking knowledge of them has no end. Sells ("Garden," p. 300) points out the double function of this verse in this context: a. true knowledge always changes and increases; and b. the repetition of the words "increase my knowledge" may release the Sufi from being bound by his intellect.

¹¹ The noun *qalb* and the verb *taqallaba* derive from the root q.l.b, which connotes change and transformation. SPK, p. 106. Izutsu, *Creation*, pp. 163f.

“no one helps them” (ibid.). The Real denies the gods of beliefs the ability to help each believer separately; those who are helped are all the people, who are also the helpers.

In the eyes of the knower (or gnostic – ‘*ārīf*), the Real is the known (*al-ma‘rūf*) which is never denied. The people of the known (*ahl al-ma‘rūf*)¹² in this world are the people of the known in the next world. For this reason, God says “for whoever has a heart” (Qur’ān 50:37), because he knows the change of the Real in forms by his own change in shapes.¹³ Through his self, he knows God’s self, and his self is not different from the Real’s ipseity. No thing of the Being, at present or in the future, is other than the Real’s ipseity, but it is the essence of His ipseity. (One who knows the Real through his self) is the knower (123), who cognizes and affirms this form; however, this one is neither the knower nor the one who cognizes; he is denied in this different form.¹⁴ This is the portion of whoever knows the Real through His self-manifestation and in witnessing the very combination (of all things), and (this is proved) through His words “for whoever has a heart” (Qur’ān, ibid.) (meaning that the Real has) different forms when He changes (things).

As for the people of belief, they are those who blindly followed (*qalladū*) the reports of the prophets and the messengers regarding the Real. They are not those who blindly follow the people of contemplation (*aṣḥāb al-aḥkār*) who interpret the reports (using rational) proofs. By those who blindly follow the messengers, God means (those who) “listen attentively” (Qur’ān, ibid.), because the divine reports were given by the prophets. “Whoever listens attentively” means a witness who calls attention to the presence of imagination and its use. Concerning good deeds (*iḥsān*), the Prophet said: “You should worship God as if you see Him,”¹⁵ and God is present in the direction of the one who prays, therefore the latter is a witness. One who blindly follows a man of contemplation and is limited by him is not the same as one who listens attentively, for the latter should be a witness of what we have mentioned. When he is not a witness of what we have mentioned, he is not the one meant in this verse. Those are the people about whom God said: “When those who have been followed disown their followers” (Qur’ān 2:166, trans. AH). However, the messengers did not disown their followers. Hence, O my friend (*yā waliyya*),¹⁶ verify what I have introduced to you in this wisdom of the heart.

As for the ascription of this wisdom to Shu‘ayb, it is because this name contains the (notion) of branching off (*tasha‘ub*), meaning that its (wisdom’s) branches are not limited, for each belief is a branch of wisdom, and wisdom is the totality of

¹² It seems that this term is equivalent to *ahl allāh*, the people of God, who are the best mystics.

¹³ Izutsu, *Creation*, p. 165.

¹⁴ Because the forms are always changing, one cannot ascribe to the knower residence in one station (*maqām*), and not in another. Hence, the true knower is in a station of no station (*maqām lā maqām*). SPK, p. 376.

¹⁵ Bukhārī, II: 37 (50).

¹⁶ According to one of the manuscripts (Affīfī, p. 123, n. 6), the letters *y.a.w.l.y* can be corrected to create the word *ta‘wīl*.

all its branches, that is, the beliefs. When the veil is disclosed,¹⁷ (this wisdom) will be manifested to everyone according to his belief. It might be manifested contrary to one's belief regarding God's judgment. (This is proved by the following) verse: "(On the Day of Resurrection) God will show them what they did not take into consideration" (Qur'ān 39:47). Most cases (of not taking into consideration) pertain to God's judgment. For example, the Mu'tazilite holds that God will implement His threat on the transgressor (*al-ʿāṣī*) if he dies without repentance.¹⁸ When he dies (124) and God has mercy on him, (it becomes evident) that God's providence has already established that the sinner will not be punished. (Thus), the Mu'tazilite found God to be Forgiving and Merciful, and so God showed him that which he did not take into consideration.

As for God's ipseity, some people are absolutely certain that God is such and such; however, when the veil is disclosed, they see that the form of their belief is true and they believe in it. (In such a case) the knot (*uqda* of belief) is untied, and beliefs disappear and turn into knowledge which derives from revelation (*mushāhada*).¹⁹ After one's sight is sharpened, its weakness does not recur. As a result, God appears in the sight of some servants in various forms of self-manifestation contrary to their beliefs, because His self-manifestations do not repeat themselves. They regard the appearance of His ipseity as true, (because) "God will show them what they did not take into consideration" (Qur'ān, *ibid.*) before the removal of the veil.

We have mentioned the form of ascension after death (in the gradations) of the divine knowledge in our *Book of Revelations* (*Kitāb al-tajalliyāt*),²⁰ wherein we noted the Sufis we met in visions and the things they did not know of which we informed them regarding this issue.²¹ One of the marvelous things concerning the ascension is that the Sufi is always ascending without being aware of his ascension, because of the subtlety and thinness of the veil and the likeness of the forms, as God said: "They were supplied with something like it" (Qur'ān 2:25, following AH).

One form is not the same as another, for the knower is aware of the fact that they (the forms) are similar, (not identical), to each other, (and hence) different (from each other). He who verifies (*ṣāhib al-taḥqīq* the divine realities) sees multiplicity in the One, just as he knows that the divine names, although their realities are many and different, apply to only one essence. With respect to reason, there is multiplicity; however, it applies to one essence. Thus, in self-manifestation, multiplicity is witnessed in one essence, just as Prime Matter (*hayūlā*) exists²² in everything, and Prime Matter, though having many and various forms, (125) is actually reduced to a single substance (*jawhar*).

¹⁷ In the world to come, one will be able to see the truth.

¹⁸ Abrahamov, *Al-Kāsim ibn Ibrāhīm*, pp. 48f, n. 290.

¹⁹ Literally: seeing.

²⁰ In *Rasā'il ibn al-ʿarabī*, Haydarabad 1942, no. 23.

²¹ See, for example, Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, p. 61.

²² Or Prime Matter "is found" (read *tūjadu* [Affifi, I, p. 124, n. 6] instead of *tūkhadhu* of the text).

Thus, whoever knows himself (or his soul) through this knowledge knows his Lord, because He created him in His image;²³ moreover, he is the very ipseity and reality of God. For this reason, none of the scholars have arrived at the knowledge of the self (soul) and its reality except for the metaphysicians among the messengers and the Sufis.

As for the people of contemplation and discursive thinking among the ancients and the speculative theologians (*mutakallimūn*), in their discussion of the self (soul) and its essence, none of them have achieved its reality; discursive discussion never provides this knowledge. Whoever seeks knowledge of the self (soul) through discursive discussion overvalues this device and uses it not in its proper place.²⁴ Undoubtedly, they are among “those whose efforts were in vain in this world, while they thought that they were doing well” (Qur’ān 18:104). Whoever seeks this knowledge through an improper way will not arrive at its reality.

How beautiful is God’s saying regarding the cosmos and its (perpetual) changes, because of His breaths “in a new creation” (Qur’ān 50:15), in a single essence. He said (this) about a single group, nay, about most people: “No, they doubt a new creation” (ibid.).²⁵ They do not know of the renewal of the cosmos’s creation due to God’s breaths. However, the Ash’arites arrived at the notion of the perpetual creation of some existents, that is, the accidents (*ʾaʾrāḍ*), and the Sophists (*al-ḥisbāniyya*)²⁶ thought that the whole cosmos is created perpetually. All the people of contemplation regarded them as ignorant.

However, both groups erred. In spite of the Sophists’ belief that the whole cosmos is always changing, their error lies in not ascribing these changes to a single essence which brings the cosmos into existence and in not making the cosmos intelligible through God. Had they held this notion, they would have attained the rank of realization of the truth. As for the Ash’arites, they did not know that the whole cosmos is an aggregation of accidents and that it is changing all the time, for accidents do not endure two instants.²⁷ This appears in (their) definition of things, for when they define a thing it becomes manifest that it has accidents,²⁸

²³ See p. 37, n. 4 above; Sell, *Mystical Languages*, p. 245, n. 9; Masataka Takeshita, “The *Homo Imago Dei* Motif and the Anthropocentric Metaphysics of Ibn ‘Arabī in *Inshāʾ al-Dawāʾir*, *Orient* 18(1982):111–128.

²⁴ Here Ibn al-ʿArabī uses an idiom which reads: “whoever regards the swollen as fat and exhales toward a thing which is not kindled” (*istasmana dhā waram, wa-naḥakha fī ghayr ḍaram*) (in order to intensify the fire), which means he makes an error in judgment and uses an improper device.

²⁵ T. Izutsu, “The Concept of Perpetual Creation in Islamic Mysticism and Zen Buddhism,” in Izutsu, *Creation*, pp. 141–173.

²⁶ Kāshānī, p. 316. The Sophists were so called because *ḥisbān* means conjecture. J. van Ess, “Skepticism in Islamic Religious Thought,” *Al-Abhath* 21 (1968), p. 1.

²⁷ Contrary to the Ash’arites, who believed that only the accidents are always changing (al-Bāqillānī, *Kitāb al-tamhīd*, pp. 15–21), Ibn al-ʿArabī held that the whole cosmos is always in a state of fluctuation, not only the accidents, but also the atoms.

²⁸ In the Ash’arite view, everything is composed of atoms (*jawhar*, pl. *jawāhir*) and accidents. The atoms are indivisible particles which do not differ from each other; they

(126) and that these accidents, which are mentioned in the definition, serve as the essence of the atom and its reality. Every atom exists by virtue of itself (*qā'im bi-naqsihi*). From the standpoint of its being an accident, a thing does not exist by virtue of itself. From the aggregation of that which does not exist by virtue of itself (accidents) comes that which does exist by virtue of itself.²⁹ For example, the atom, which exists by virtue of its essence, is defined as having the property of occupying one place (*taḥayyuz*)³⁰ and as having the property of being a substrate for accidents, (and these two properties are) essential to its definition. No doubt, receivability (*qabūl*) is an accident, because it exists only in a recipient (*qābil*), for it does not exist by virtue of itself, and this property is an essential (element) of the atom. (Likewise) occupying one place is an accident that exists only in some place, hence it does not exist by virtue of itself. Occupying one place and receivability are not something added to the essence of the defined atom, for essential definitions are the essence of the defined thing and its ipseity. Thus, that which does not remain for two instants becomes that which does remain for two instants and more, and that which does not exist by virtue of itself comes to be that which does exist by virtue of itself. They (the Ash'arites) were not aware of their state, (for) they "doubt a new creation" (Qur'ān, *ibid.*).³¹

As for the people of unveiling, they believe that God reveals Himself in every breath and never repeats his self-manifestation. They (also) believe from witnessing that every self-manifestation bestows a new creation and removes a preceding creation. Its removal is the essence of annihilation (*fanā'*) in the passing self-manifestation and subsistence (*baqā'*) in the bestowal of the following self-manifestation. So understand!

are the stable element of everything, while the accidents are the changing elements of all bodies, such as color, states of aggregation, heat or coldness, etc. See the preceding reference. For atomism in the Kalām, see Pines, *Atomism*, pp. 1–41.

²⁹ The combination (*ijtimā'*) of accidents is itself an accident. Thus, that which does not exist by virtue of itself causes the existence of that which exists by virtue of itself.

³⁰ Pines, *Atomism*, p. 12.

³¹ Because the atom possesses the properties of an accident, it is really an accident which always changes. Thus, the whole cosmos changes, not only the accidents. Cf. Izutsu, *Creation*, pp. 168–171. Here Izutsu misses the core of Ibn al-'Arabī's speculative argumentation, omitting the discussion of the atoms' traits and speaking instead of substances.

13 The bezel of the wisdom of spiritual power¹ exists in the essence of Lot

(126) *Al-malk* means power (*shidda*) and *al-malik* is the powerful (*shadīd*). When you powerfully knead a lump of dough (*shaddadta al-‘ajīn*), you say *malaktu al-ajīn*. (The poet) Qays ibn al-Ḥaṭīm² says, describing a stab:

I seized (so) powerfully the place of the wound by the palm of my hand and widened (*anhartu*) it/so that one standing in front of the wound could see that which is behind (the wounded),

(127) meaning I seized so powerfully (the place) of the stab. This is what God said about Lot: (Lot said) “If only I had the power to stop you or sought shelter in a strong support” (*rukn shadīd*) (Qur’ān 11:80, trans. AH). God’s messenger said: “May God have mercy upon my brother, (because) he sought shelter in a strong support.”³ The Prophet called (our) attention to the fact that Lot was with God, because God is Powerful. By “a strong support” Lot means (his) tribe, and by “if only I had the power” he means will (or aspiration, *himma*) which pertains especially to humans. God’s messenger said “since that time,” meaning from that time when Lot said “or sought shelter in a strong support,” God sent a prophet only when he was protected by his tribe. This was the case of Abū Ṭālib (who sheltered) God’s messenger (Muḥammad). Lot said, “If only I had the power,” because he heard God saying, “It is God who created you of weakness” (Qur’ān 30:54), as an essential trait, “then, after weakness, he gave them strength” (ibid.). The strength occurred (*‘araḍat*) through giving, hence it is an accidental strength (*quwwa ‘araḍiyya*), “then after strength He gave weakness and white hair” (ibid.). God’s giving is associated with white hair, while weakness means returning to the fundamental trait of his creation which is expressed in His words, “created you of weakness” (ibid.). Thus, He returned humans to the first state of their creation, as He said: “then...God will return (some of you) to the most despicable state of life, so that after having knowledge they will know nothing” (Qur’ān 16:70). He pointed out that humans are brought back to the state of the first weakness; hence, as regards weakness, an old man is like a child.

1 *Hikma Malkiyya*. Lot could not overcome his corrupted people, because he was weak, hence he turned to God seeking His help against them. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” p. 23.

2 A very important poet of Yathrib (al-Madīna). See on him E 12.

3 Bukhārī, LX:11 (3372).

No prophet has been sent before he has reached the age of forty, at which time one begins to decline and weaken. For this reason, Lot said: "If only I had the power," (meaning that this situation) requires effective will. If you ask: "What prevents him from having an effective will, which exists in the followers who travel on the way and the messengers are most worthy of it?" We shall answer: "You are right, but you lack another knowledge, because knowledge does not leave to the will (128) the power to act freely (*taṣarruf*)." Whenever knowledge increases, the power to act freely decreases, because of the will.

Two aspects explain this: The first is one's firm awareness of the station of servanthood (*'ubūdiyya*) and his consideration of the root of his natural creation, and the second is the unity of the one who acts freely and the one freely acted upon. He (the prophet) did not know to whom he should direct his will, and this prevented him from exercising it. In this state (*mashhad*), he saw that his opponent did not deviate from his reality and the state of his fixed entity and absence. That which appears in existence was only that which exists as an absent fixed entity. (His opponent) neither exceeded his reality nor infringed on his way. Designating this way, "opposition" is only accidental matter, which the veil over human eyes makes appear, as God said about them: "...but most of them do not know.⁴ They know the manifest side of life in this world, but are heedless of the next" (Qur'ān 30:6–7). This emerges from the word hearts (*qulūb*)⁵ in their saying, "Our hearts are covered" (Qur'ān 2:88), meaning (our hearts) are in wrapping, that is, cover which prevents (literally: conceals) them from perceiving things as they really are. This and similar (situations) hinder the knower from acting freely.

Shaykh Abū 'Abdallah ibn Qā'id asked Shaykh Abū al-Su'ūd ibn al-Shibl.⁶ "Why do you not act freely?" Abū al-Su'ūd answered: "I leave God to act freely for me as He wills." By this he means what God said commanding Muḥammad: "Make Him your agent (*wakīl*)" (Qur'ān 73:9). The agent is the one who acts freely. Moreover, Muḥammad heard God saying: "Spend from what We gave you as substitutes" (Qur'ān 57:7). Abū al-Su'ūd and the gnostics knew that that which was in his hand did not belong to him and that he is just a substitute. Then the Real actually said to him: "Make Me an agent of the matter over which I made you a substitute and granted you mastery." Abū al-Su'ūd obeyed God and made Him an agent. How (129) can a will, by which one acts freely, remain for the one who witnesses this matter, while the will acts only through the combination of all one's powers (*jam'iyya*),⁷ and no room is left for anything else? The knowledge (of this matter) makes him aloof from this *jam'iyya*. Thus, the knower whose knowledge is perfect appears as totally incapable and weak.

4 The beginning of the verse reads: "It is God's promise. God does not break His promise." Thus, the ignorance of people refers to God's promise; however, Ibn al-'Arabī transfers, as he often does, the subject matter so that it fits his aim.

5 Read *qulūb* instead of *maqlūb*, which has no meaning here.

6 Ibn al-Shibl was 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī's (d. 1166) famous disciple. Abrahamov, *Ibn al-'Arabī and the Sufis*, pp. 152–155.

7 SPK, pp. 135, 239.

One of the Substitutes (*abdāl*)⁸ said to Shaykh ‘Abd al-Razzāq:⁹ “After greeting Abū Madyan ask him why nothing is difficult for us, while things are difficult for you, notwithstanding, we desire your station and you do not desire ours?” This was the situation of Abū Madyan, who had attained this station and others, whereas we are more complete in weakness and incapability than him. Nevertheless, this Substitute said to him what he said. This story refers to the same matter (with which we are dealing).

Regarding this station, Muḥammad said about God’s order to him to (act): “I do not know what will be done with me or you; I follow only what is revealed to me” (Qur’ān 46:9, trans. AH). The Messenger should act according to what is revealed to him; he has nothing else. If it was revealed to him with certainty to act, he acted, and if he was prevented from acting, he abstained from acting. If he was given the choice (to act or not), he chose not to act, unless his knowledge was defective (and he chose to act). Abū al-Su‘ūd said to those who believed in him: “Fifteen years ago, God gave me (the ability) to act freely, but I did not act, because of a display of affectedness.” This is arrogance (*idlāl*). As for ourselves, we did not act not because of a display of affectedness, which means to prefer acting, but because of perfect knowledge, for knowledge does not require an act through choice. When the knower acts freely in the world by his will, his act derives from a divine command and compulsion, not from choice. No doubt, the position of the prophetic mission (*risāla*) requires (the ability of the prophet) to act freely so that his mission will be accepted and that what appears in him will affirm his mission in the eyes of his community and his people in order that God’s religion will be made manifest. The case of the saint (*walī*) is different. Notwithstanding, the messenger does not require (the ability to act freely) manifestly, because the messenger (130) has compassion for his people and he does not want to exaggerate in manifesting the (divine) argument against them,¹⁰ for (the appearance of this argument) might cause their destruction, and he wants their subsistence.

The messenger also knew that if a miracle (*al-amr al-mu‘jiz*)¹¹ appears to the community, some will believe when seeing the miracle; others, aware of its veracity, will nevertheless deny it in disbelief out of evilness, arrogance and envy; and still others ascribe it to magic and delusion.¹² Since the messengers perceived

8 A substitute is a saint who replaces the Pole (*qutb*) when the latter leaves a certain place. God preserves the seven climes through the seven substitutes. Chodkiewicz, *Seal of the Saints*, ch. 7.

9 One of Abū Madyan’s (d. 1198) disciples. *Sufis of Andalusia*, p. 101.

10 Qur’ān 6:149. The Qur’ān tells us in several places that disputations took place between God and certain peoples. In these disputations the conclusive argument belonged to God.

11 A miracle in Arabic is called *mu‘jiza*, from the verb *a‘jaza*, meaning he caused someone to be unable to imitate the occurrence of the miraculous event. Al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, p. 170.

12 For such accusations in Islamic literature, see Abrahamov, “The Barāhima’s Enigma – A Search for a New Solution,” *Die Welt des Orients* 18 (1987), p. 83. Sarah Stroumsa, *Freethinkers of Medieval Islam – Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and Their Impact on Islamic Thought*, Leiden 1999, pp. 83–86.

that the believers are only those in whose hearts God aroused the light of belief, and that when a person does not contemplate through this light called belief, a miracle is of no benefit to him, they refused to require miracles, because their effect neither embraces these (people) who see them nor does it enter their hearts. Regarding the most perfect of all messengers and the wisest and most righteous of all creatures, God said: “You will not guide whom you want to guide, but God will guide whom He wants” (Qur’ān 28:56).

If the will (*himma*) necessarily¹³ had affected (its object), then none would have been more perfect, elevated and stronger than God’s Messenger regarding this power. In fact, the Messenger’s will did not influence his uncle, Abū Ṭālib, to become a Muslim and the above-mentioned verse was sent down regarding him. For this reason, God said referring to Muḥammad that he should only convey (the divine message to the people): “It is not incumbent on you to guide them, but God will guide whom He wants” (Qur’ān 2:272). And He adds in *sūrat al-qaṣaṣ* (28): “And He knows best those who are rightly guided” (Qur’ān 28:56). By “by those who are rightly guided,” He means those who made Him know their being guided in the state of their absence through their fixed entities.¹⁴ God affirmed that knowledge follows the thing known (*al-ma’lūm*). Whoever is a believer in his state of being a fixed entity and in his state of absence appears as a believer in the state of his concrete existence. God knows the future position of the believer, and for this reason He said: “And He knows best those who are rightly guided” (ibid.). Since He said this, He also said: “My statement cannot be changed” (Qur’ān 50:29), because My statement follows exactly My knowledge of My creatures – “And I do not wrong My servants” (ibid.), meaning I do not predetermine their unbelief, thus making them unhappy, then require them to do what they are incapable of doing. But I do treat them only in keeping with Our knowledge of them, and We know them only through what they give us, that is, their exact essence. If there is any wrongness, (it derives from them) and they are the wrongdoers. For this reason, God said: “But (131) they wronged themselves” (Qur’ān 2:57). Hence, God did not wrong them. In like manner, We said to them only what Our essence gave Us to say to them. And Our essence is too known to Us in its exact state to say this and not that. We say only what We know to say. We have the privilege to say, and they have the privilege to obey or not upon hearing (Our words).¹⁵

¹³ The author means without the intervention of God.

¹⁴ Does God not know the way of guidance without the fixed entities? Such a formulation of his thought makes Ibn al-‘Arabī believe in the independence of the fixed entities, as if they were produced without God’s power. This notion is mentioned in the end of ch. 5 (p. 83 of the Arabic text). However, Ibn al-‘Arabī seems to state there and here that God’s will is established in accordance with the fixed entities, which were already produced in God’s thought.

¹⁵ Strangely enough, Ibn al-‘Arabī gives the human the choice to act or not, and this capacity to choose contradicts what he said previously about the decree of the fixed entities. Also, the Greatest Master contradicts himself when saying that he knows how God’s essence acts, whereas he states many times that God’s essence cannot be known.

Everything is from Us and from them/learning of this is from Us and from them

If they are not from Us/We no doubt are from them

So realize, O my friend, this wisdom of spiritual power that exists in the essence of Lot, for it is the core of knowledge.

The mystery is now manifest to you/and the matter is evident

That which is called uneven/is included in the even¹⁶

¹⁶ In this image, Ibn al-ʿArabī seems to say that just as the uneven is included in the even, so vice versa, meaning just as God is within us, we are within God.

14 The bezel of the wisdom of predetermination¹ exists in the essence of Ezra

(131) Know that the decree (*qaḍāʾ*) is God's judgment of things established by His knowledge of and about them. God's knowledge concerning things is in keeping with what the objects of knowledge give, that is, their exact essences.² Determination (*qadar*)³ means appointing the time for the exact states of things without any addition (to them). The decreeing of things is established by the essences of things. This is the very mystery of determination "for whoever has a heart, for whoever listens and bears witness" (Qur'ān 50:37) "and to God belongs the conclusive argument" (Qur'ān 6:149). That is because the judge (*ḥākim*) actually follows the essence of the issue he judges and its requirements, and the one who is judged judges the judge in complying with the former's essence. Thus, every judge is equal to the one who is judged through and in which he judges, whoever the judge (132) may be. Hence, be aware of this issue, for determination is unknown only because of its intense manifestation; it is unknown, and hence people seek it and persist in their seeking.

Know that God's messengers, in their capacity as messengers and not as saints and gnostics, occupy the same levels as their communities. The knowledge with which they have been sent corresponds to the needs of their community, no more and no less. Now, the communities excel (*tafāḍala*) each other, some are greater than others. Hence, the messengers excel regarding their knowledge of the message according to the level of their communities, as God said: "We preferred some of these messengers to others" (Qur'ān 2:253). Similarly, the messengers, as regards their knowledge of the sciences and rules which derives from their essences, also differ in excellence from each other in keeping with their predispositions, as God said: "We preferred some prophets to others" (Qur'ān 17:55). God said concerning creatures: "God preferred some of you to others regarding

1 *Ḥikma qadariyya*.

2 The notion that knowledge follows the object of knowledge is here reiterated. See the preceding chapter and [ch. 5](#).

3 Generally in Islamic theology *qaḍāʾ* means predetermination, while a *qadar* decree appoints time. L. Gardet, "al-Ḳaḍāʾ wa'l-Ḳadar," E I2. Ibn al-ʿArabī adopts in principle this division ascribing predestination to the fixed entities in God's thought, and the decree in time to the concretization of the fixed entities in a certain time. Chittick, "Chapter Headings," pp. 23f.

sustenance” (Qur’ān 16:71). Sustenance is divided into spiritual like kinds of knowledge and sensual like foods. The Real sends down sustenance only in keeping with a “known measure,” (Qur’ān 15:21) that is, deservingness required by the creatures, for God “gives everything (its measure) of creation” (Qur’ān 20:50), “and He sends down (things) in the measure He wills” (Qur’ān 42:27). He only wills what He knows and judges, and as we said above, His knowledge follows the known object.

The appointment of time belongs to the known thing, and also the decree, knowledge, desire and will follow the determination (*qadar*).⁴ The mystery of determination is one of the loftiest kinds of knowledge, and God causes only those who are particularized by perfect knowledge to understand it. Knowledge of the mystery of determination brings about both absolute repose and painful suffering for the knower. Thus, it causes two contradictory effects. Through this mystery God describes Himself as Wrathful and Content, and through it the divine names oppose each other. Its reality (the reality of this mystery) judges both the absolute existence and the limited existence, and nothing is more perfect (133), stronger, greater than it, because of its general determination and its judgment of the contingent appearances and the essences of things.⁵

Since the prophets learn their knowledge only from specific divine revelations, their hearts are bereft of rational contemplation, because they know the intellect’s inadequacy with respect to the rational perception of things as they really are. In like manner, divine communication is unable to perceive what can be perceived only by mystical experience. Consequently, perfect knowledge remains only within the confines of divine self-manifestation and in the Real’s removing of the veils covering the hearts and eyes so that they are able to perceive things, eternal and contingent, nonexistent and existent, impossible, necessary and possible, as they really are in their essences.

Since Ezra sought the unique way, he was rebuked, as it was related in a tradition.⁶ Had he sought revelation as we mentioned, maybe he would not have been rebuked regarding this matter. The proof of his heart’s inadequacy is the question asked in one event: “How will God revive (this town) after its destruction?” (Qur’ān 2:259) We think that in this verse Ezra resembles Abraham, who said: “My Lord, show me how you revive the dead” (Qur’ān 2:260). This (question) requires an actual response which the Real made manifest in the Qur’ān, saying “God made him die for hundred years then revived him” (ibid., 259) and: “Look at the bones, how we revive them then cover them with flesh” (ibid.). He really saw how bodies grow, thus God showed him the modality (*kayfiyya*) (through which bodies are restored to life).

4 The last sentence shows that essentially no difference obtains between *qaḍā’* and *qadar* in that both decisions follow the known thing. The only difference is the time element, which the author ascribes to *qadar* in the beginning of this chapter but confuses in the last sentence with *qaḍā’*.

5 Kāshānī, p. 337.

6 See this tradition below.

Then he asked about God's predetermination, which can be perceived only through revelation of things in their state of fixed entity, (that is), of nonexistence. Ezra was not given this (knowledge), for it belongs only to divine perception, and only God knows it, because this knowledge is the first keys, I mean, "the hidden keys which none knows but He" (Qur'ān 6:59). God informs only those of His servants He wills about some of these things.

(134) Know that these are called keys only in the state of opening (*fath*); the state of opening is the state of linking the act of bringing into being and the things brought into being, or if you wish, say the state of the connecting of God's power (*qudra*) to the object of this power (*maqḍūr*). Only God has experience (*dhawq*)⁷ of this act. Regarding this (the acts of connection), no manifestation or revelation occurs, because power and (the ability) to act belong to God alone, for he possesses the absolute existence which cannot be limited. Since we are aware of God's rebuking Ezra for his request concerning predetermination, we know that he asked for knowledge of predetermination and the power connected to the object of power. Only the one who has absolute existence can require this knowledge and power. Ezra asked for something the existence of which cannot be experienced by humans, for the modalities (of creation) are perceived only through experience.

As for the tradition we related, that is, what God revealed to Ezra to the effect that "if you do not stop, I will erase your name from the register of prophecy,"⁸ meaning I will remove from you (My) way of giving information and give you (the knowledge of things) through manifestation. (Now) manifestation occurs only in keeping with your predisposition, through which experiential perception takes place, hence you will know that your perception mirrors your predisposition. Then you contemplate the thing you sought, and if not seeing it, you know that the predisposition you sought is lost and that ability is one of the qualities of the divine essence. You know that God gives everything (its measure) of creation, and He withheld from you this unique predisposition; it is not your (measure) of creation. If it had been your (measure) of creation, the Real, who said that "He gives everything (its measure) of creation" (Qur'ān 20:50), would have given you this (predisposition). In this case, you yourself should abstain from making this request, to avoid the need of a divine prohibition. This was God's providence for Ezra; some people know it and others do not.⁹

Know that Sainthood (*walāya*)¹⁰ is (like) the all-encompassing general sphere (*al-falak al-muḥīṭ*);¹¹ for this reason it never stops and has (the function) of general prophecy (*al-inbā' al-āmm*). However, the prophecy of legislation (*nubuwwat*

⁷ By "God has experience..." Ibn al-ʿArabī seems to express the idea that only God can handle this act in the proper manner, that is, knowing all its modalities.

⁸ Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥalabī, *Niʿmat al-dharʿa fī nuṣrat al-sharʿa*, Dār al-Masīr, al-Riyāḍ 1998, p. 113.

⁹ This paragraph exemplifies Ibn al-ʿArabī's way of writing in the present volume, which is full of repetitive explanations.

¹⁰ *Walāya* can be also rendered as Friendship or Nearness to God.

¹¹ Very probably, our author uses this astronomical term to denote both the steadfastness and the exaltedness of *walāya*.

al-tashrīf) and mission (*risāla*) came to an end. It ended with Muḥammad, (135) for no prophet has come after him, that is, a lawgiver or a person for whom a law is established, and no messenger, who is a lawgiver.¹² This report (about the difference between a prophet or messenger who is a lawgiver and God's saint [*walī*]) was a mortal blow to God's saints, because it involves the end of perfect and complete servanthood (which is enjoyed only by prophets). However, (on the other hand) the specific names "prophet" and "messenger" do not apply to God, because the servant does not want to share a name with his Lord.¹³ Hence, God is not called by "prophet" or "messenger," but is named "friend" (saint) and described by that name, hence He said: "God is the friend (*walī*) of the believers" (Qur'ān 2:257) and "He is the Friend, the Praiseworthy" (Qur'ān 42:28). This name (*walī*) never ends and is applied to God's servants in this world and the world to come. Because of the end of prophecy and mission, no name has remained which is specifically applied to the servant and not to God.

However, God still assists (*laṭāfa*) His servants by leaving to them general prophecy (*al-nubuwwa al-ʿamma*) in which there is no legislation. Yet, He has left to them legislation through independent judgment (*ijtihād*) with the aim of establishing rules. He has bequeathed their scholars the power of legislation, saying "The scholars are the heirs of the prophets."¹⁴ In this there is an inheritance only of the scholars' independent making of laws. If you observe a prophet speaking on matters not including legislation, he speaks in his capacity as a saint and a gnostic. For this reason, his position as a scholar is more complete and perfect than that of a messenger or legislator. If you hear one of the people of God saying or transmitting to you (the notion) that sainthood is higher than prophecy, he adds nothing to what we have said. Or if he says that the saint is above the prophet and the messenger, he means by this (the qualities) of one person, that is, the Messenger (Muḥammad) as a saint, is more complete than that of a prophet messenger. This does not mean that the saint who follows the Prophet is higher than the Prophet, for the follower never attains the rank of the one he follows in the way in which he follows him, because if he had attained his rank, he would not have been his follower. So understand (this)!

The (position) of the messenger and the lawgiving prophet derives from sainthood (*walāya*) and knowledge. Do you not see that God ordered the Prophet to seek increase in knowledge and not in anything else, hence he said, ordering him, "and say, O my Lord (136) increase my knowledge!" (Qur'ān 20:114) That is because you know that the law means the obligation (*taklīf*) to perform specific acts and the prohibition to perform others, and the place of this obligation is this

¹² Yohanan Friedmann, "Finality of Prophethood in Sunnī Islam," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 7(1986):177–215; Uri Rubin, "The Seal of the Prophets and the Finality of Prophecy – On the Interpretation of the Qur'ānic Sūrat al-Aḥzāb (33)," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 164(1)(2014):65–96.

¹³ Here one has the impression that the human being establishes the names, while actually the source of these names is the Qur'ān.

¹⁴ Bukharī III:10 (67).

world which will come to an end. However, sainthood is not like an obligation, because if it had been terminated, it would have been terminated because of itself,¹⁵ just as the mission ended because of itself. Had sainthood been terminated because of itself, its name would not have remained. But the name “saint” remains God’s name, and this name is assimilated and realized by His servants and is associated with them.

This is his saying to Ezra: If you do not stop to ask about the essence of predetermination, I will erase your name from the register of prophecy. Then the issue (of predetermination) will reach you through revelation and self-manifestation; the name “messenger” and “prophet” applied to you will disappear, but sainthood will remain. However, since the circumstances demonstrate that God’s address to him took the form of a threat, he knew, whenever these circumstances were connected to a divine address, that this was a threat to deprive him of some specific characteristics of sainthood in this world, for prophecy and mission are some traits of sainthood among others. Then he knew that he was superior to the saint who was deprived of legislative prophecy and mission.

However, another possible state that prophecy requires and that is connected to a saint proves this trait is a promise and not a threat. This is because his request is acceptable, for the prophet is a unique saint. By (observing) circumstances, the saint knows it is inconceivable that the prophet who shares in sainthood should do anything he knows God does not will or (try) to do anything that is impossible. If these circumstances affect one whom they affect in a stable condition, the divine address for him “I will erase your name from the register of prophecy” is a threat. This statement becomes a report that points to the sublimity of a remaining position. This position is for the prophets and messengers in the world (137) to come, which is not a place where laws are observed by the people who enter Paradise or those come to Hell.

We have limited (our discussion) to going into the two abodes, Paradise and Hell, for in the Day of Resurrection God gives laws to people who lived between two eras of prophets, to young children and the insane.¹⁶ They will be gathered in one place to do justice, to punish the wrongdoers and to reward the people of Paradise.

When they are gathered in one place secluded from the others, God will send to them a prophet, who is the best individual among them, and this prophet will bring a fire and it will be presented to them on this day, and he will say: “I am the messenger of the Real to you.” Some of them will believe in him and some will not. And he will say to them: “Enter into this fire with your souls, and whoever obeys me will be saved and enter Paradise, and whoever disobeys me and offends my command will perish and be among the people of Hell.” (It will happen actually): Whoever among them obeys the prophet and throws himself into the fire

¹⁵ Obligation will come to an end, because of the termination of the world, which will make obligation needless, not because of an inherent cause.

¹⁶ Here Ibn al-‘Arabī conveys the traditions that deal with these kinds of people before their going into Paradise and Hell, because in both abodes no law is implemented.

will be happy and be rewarded for his acts; he will find this fire cool and peaceful. Whoever disobeys him deserves punishment and will enter into the fire and dwell therein because of his disobedient deeds, so that God will do justice to his servants. This corresponds to God's words, "On the Day when matters become dire" (Qur'ān 68:42, trans. AH), that is, a grave affair of the events of the Hereafter, and "they will be called to prostrate themselves" (ibid.), which means obligation and legislation. Among them are those who are able (to prostrate themselves) and those who are not. God said regarding the latter: "they will be called to prostrate themselves, but they will not be able to do so" (ibid.), just as some servants, like Abū Jahl¹⁷ and others, could not obey God's command in this world. This is the measure of legislation, which will be left in the world to come on the Day of Resurrection, before the entry into Paradise and Hell. For this reason we have limited our discussion. Praise be to God.

¹⁷ Abū Jahl was one of the staunch enemies of the Prophet in Mecca. See Qur'ān 96:6, 7, and their commentaries.

15 The bezel of the prophetic wisdom¹ exists in the essence of Jesus

(138) From the water of Maryam or from the breath of Jibrīl/in the form of a human being produced of clay

The spirit came into being in an essence untainted/of the Nature which is called *sijjīn*²

For this reason, his stay (in heaven) lasted by decree for a long time/more than a thousand years

It was a spirit of God not from another, hence/he revived the dead and produced birds out of clay

Till his association with His Lord/through which he influenced the high and the low (people) became valid

God purified his body and cleansed/his spirit and made him like Himself in (his power) of creation³

Know that one of the traits of the spirits is that everything they tread on becomes alive and life permeates throughout it. For this reason, al-Sāmīrī,⁴ knowing this affair, took a portion of sand from the messenger's tracks, who was Jibrīl, that is, the Spirit. Since al-Sāmīrī realized it was Jibrīl, he knew that life permeated everything Jibrīl trod on. Hence, he took a portion of sand from the tracks of the messenger,⁵ either with his hands (*qabḍa*) or with his two fingers (*qabṣa*), that is, a handful or with the tips of his fingers.⁶ He threw the sand at the calf and the calf lowed, for the voice of the cow is lowing. Had he established (the idol) in some other form, the form established would have made the appropriate sound, such as the grumbling of camels, the bleating of lambs and sheep, and the speaking of human beings.

1 According to al-Qaysarī and al-Kāshānī, Ibn al-ʿArabī ascribes prophecy to Jesus, because his prophecy is eternal. Chittick, "Chapter Headings," p. 25.

2 A unique word in the Qurʾān, which mainly designates a heavenly book or the lowest place on earth in which the Devil and his followers reside. E12.

3 Because like God, Jesus created birds out of clay.

4 There is a discussion in Qurʾān exegesis on the essence of this figure. See, for example, Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr*, Vol. IV, p. 534 (on Qurʾān 20:95); Al-Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, part 22, p. 101 (on Qurʾān 20:85).

5 Qurʾān 20:96,

6 Wehr's dictionary defines *qabṣa* as follows: "as much as may be taken between the finger and the thumb, a pinch."

This measure of life which permeates things is called divine nature (*lāhūt*), and human nature (*nāsūt*) is the substrate in which this spirit dwells. *Nāsūt* is called spirit, because of that which inheres in it. When the trustworthy spirit (*al-rūḥ al-amīn* – Qurʾān 26:193), Jibrīl, took on the shape of a perfect human being before Maryam (139), she imagined that he was a man who wanted to lie with her, hence she sought refuge in God with all her heart, so that God would save her from this person, because she knew that this was prohibited. As a result, she experienced the complete presence of God, which is the essential spirit (*al-rūḥ al-maʿnawī*). Had Jibrīl blown his breath into her when she was in this state, Jesus would have been born such that none would have tolerated him, because of his ill-temperedness which derived from his mother's state. When he (Jibrīl) said to her, "I am but a messenger of your Lord" and I came "to grant to you a pure son" (Qurʾān 19:19), she was relieved of her depression and was delighted. At that very moment he blew Jesus into her.

Jibrīl was transmitting God's word to Maryam just as a messenger transmits God's word to his community. These are God's words: "(Jesus, the son of Maryam, was God's messenger) and His word which He conveyed to Maryam and a spirit from Him" (Qurʾān 4:171). Thus, a desire arose in Maryam. As a result, the body of Jesus was created from the real water of Maryam and the imaginary water of Jibrīl,⁷ which pervaded the moisture of his breath, because the breath of an animate being contains humidity, an element of water in it. The body of Jesus was composed of imagined and real water, and he appeared in the form of a human being because of his mother and because of Jibrīl's taking the form of a human being. (All this happened) to make the creation of this human species occur in the usual way.⁸

Jesus appeared as one who revived the dead, because he was a divine spirit. In this act, revivification belonged to God and the breath to Jesus, just as the breath belongs to Jibrīl and the essence of creation (literally: the word) to God. Hence his revivification of the dead was real with respect to his breath, just as he appeared out of the form of his mother. His revivification was also assumed as his own act, but actually it was God's act. Thus, in his reality in which he was created, he combined (the real and the imagined aspects), as we said, he was created of imagined and real water. Consequently, revivification is ascribed to him in a real manner in one respect, and in an imagined manner (140) in another. It was said about Him that in a real manner "he revives the dead" (Qurʾān 42:9) and in an imagined manner: "You breathed into it (the clay) and it became a bird by God's permission" (Qurʾān

⁷ Qurʾān 86:6–7.

⁸ I do not know for certain what Ibn al-ʿArabī means when he says "this human species." Possibly he means that Jesus was born like all human beings. However, Maryam's conception was extraordinary, and regarding this, it is inconceivable to state that it was the usual way. Thus, only the birth was as usual; however, our author does not speak here in an exact manner. On Jesus' spirit see Souad Hakim, "The Spirit and the Son of the Spirit," *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ʿArabi Society* 31 (2002):1–29.

5:110).⁹ The phrase “by God’s permission” is connected to “it became,” not to “you breathed.”¹⁰ It is also possible that the agent who is Jesus breathed into the clay, and as a result the clay became a corporeal, sentient form. In like manner (we should deal with) “he cured the blind and the leprous” (ibid.) and all that is ascribed to him and to God’s permission in the phrases “by My permission” or “by God’s permission.” If “by God’s permission” is connected with breathing, then he who breathes has permission to breathe, and the bird becomes alive through the one who breathes with God’s permission. If the breather does so without God’s permission, (even) then the creation of the bird derives from His permission. In such a case, the agent exists in the word *yakūnu* (it will be). If this occurrence did not involve imagination and reality (simultaneously), this form would not have these two aspects. However, this matter involves two aspects, because the creation of Jesus involved both.

Jesus sprang from humility to such an extent that his community was ordered “to pay the poll-tax with their own hands (*‘an yadin*)¹¹ being humiliated” (Qur’ān 9:29), and also if one of them (the Christians) is struck on his cheek he should turn the other cheek toward the one who struck him and not try to overcome his assailant or seek vengeance. This trait of Jesus was inherited from his mother, because the woman is lower and humbler (than the man), for she is under his authority formally and sensually. Jesus’ power to revive and heal derived from Jibrīl’s breath when the latter took a human form. Thus, Jesus revived the dead when he was in a human form. If Jibrīl had not come¹² in the form of a human, but rather in another genus of the genera, whether animal, plant, or mineral, Jesus would have revived (the dead) only after assimilating this genus and appearing in it. Likewise, had Jibrīl come in his luminous form, which is devoid of terrestrial genera and elements, because he does not go beyond his nature, (141) Jesus would have revived the dead only by appearing in this luminous natural form, not in an elemental form, still retaining the human form he received from his mother.

When he was reviving the dead, it was said about him: “he/not he.” Looking at him induced perplexity, just as the intelligent person became perplexed when contemplating Jesus, because the former saw a human being resurrecting the dead, humans not animals, which is a divine trait. (Hence), the seer became perplexed, for he saw a human form that possesses a divine faculty.

Thus, some people believed in incarnation (*ḥulūl*) and (thought) that he was God, because he revived the dead. For this reason, concealment (*kufīr*)¹³ was attributed to them, because they concealed God, who revived the dead employing Jesus’ human form. Hence, God said: “Those who said that God was *al-masīḥ* (Messiah),

⁹ The accurate citation is “by My permission.” “By God’s permission” appears in a parallel verse told by Jesus himself (Qur’ān 3:49).

¹⁰ In this case the agent of creation is God and not Jesus.

¹¹ I translate this phrase on the basis of Uri Rubin’s translation of the Qur’ān into Hebrew (Tel Aviv 2005).

¹² Read *wa-law lam* (Kāshānī, p. 358) instead of *wa-lam* in Affifi’s edition, which seems to be a misprint.

¹³ For the meaning of *kufīr* as concealment, see the [third chapter](#) on Noah.

the son of Maryam, are concealers” (Qur’ān 5:17, 72). In their complete saying they combined error and concealment; they did not err, because they said “he is God,” or because of their words, “he is the son of Maryam,” but because they ascribed to God, (who in their view) was responsible for the revivification of the dead, a human mortal form, when they said, “the son of Maryam,” and no doubt he was the son of Maryam. However, the listener imagined that they attributed divinity to a human form, and made divinity the essence of this form, but this they did not do. (Instead) from the beginning, they included God’s essence in the form of a human who is the son of Maryam. Hence, they distinguished between the form and its appearance (literally: its aspect); they did not identify the form with its very appearance, like Jibrīl who took the form of a human and did not breathe (into Maryam), then he breathed. Thus, the breathing is distinguished from the form. Although the breathing issued from the form, the form might remain without breathing, for breathing is not essential to the definition of the form.

For this reason, debate arose among the people of religious communities regarding (142) the nature of Jesus. Some argued from the viewpoint of his mortal human form and said that he was the son of Maryam. On the basis of his apparent human form, others argued that he was related to Jibrīl. Referring to his resurrection of the dead, still others argued that he was related to God’s spirit; that is, through his breath, he brought the dead back to life. Sometimes people imagined that God was in him, sometimes that the angel was in him, and other times that mortality and humanity were in him. Thus, each thinker regarded Jesus according to the form that prevails in him (the thinker). Consequently, Jesus was God’s word, God’s spirit, God’s servant, and these appellations concerning his sentient form are not related to others, but every person is related to his real father, and not to the one who breathed his spirit into the human form. Because when God shaped the human body, as He said, “When I shaped him” (Qur’ān 15:29), it was God who breathed into him his spirit, ascribing the spirit in the human being and his essence to Him. The case of Jesus is different, for the shaping of his body and his human form was included in the spiritual breath, and other humans were not shaped like him.

All existents are God’s words, which will never be exhausted,¹⁴ because they derive from the word “be,” and “be” is God’s word.¹⁵ Can the word “be” be ascribed to God, to his ipseity, so that its essence cannot be known? Or does God descend to the form of him who says “be,” so that the word “be” serves as the reality of this form to which He descends and in which He manifests Himself? Some gnostics adhered to the first view and some to the second, and some others became perplexed not knowing (the solution). This issue can be known only through experience, as when Abū Yazīd (al-Bisṭāmī) breathed into the ant he had killed, restoring it to life. In this moment he knew the One who breathes, and then he breathed. In (this matter) he was like Jesus.¹⁶

¹⁴ Cf. Qur’ān 18:109: “If the whole ocean were ink for writing the words of my Lord, it would run dry before those words were exhausted...” (trans. AH).

¹⁵ Every existent is created by God’s word “be” (*kun*). See Qur’ān 2:117, 16:40.

¹⁶ Abrahamov, *Ibn al-Arabī and the Sufis*, pp. 48f.

As for spiritual revivification through knowledge, that is, the divine, eternal, elevated, and luminous life, (143) God said: “Whoever was dead and We restored him to life and established for him light by which he walks among people” (Qur’ān 6:122). Everyone who restores life to a dead soul by the life of knowledge regarding a specific issue connected with the knowledge of God brings him to life, so that he has a light by which he “walks among people,” that is, among his likeness in form.

Had he and us not been/what exists would not have been
 We are really servants/and God is our master
 We are His essence, know (this)!/when you say “a human being”
 Do not be concealed by human being/for He gave you a proof
 If you are real and created¹⁷/you will be merciful through God
 If you feed His creation through Him¹⁸/you will (cause people to) rest and receive good nourishment¹⁹

We give Him what is manifested/in us through Him and He gives us
 The whole matter is divided/between Him and us
 Whoever knows through my heart revives this matter/when He revives us
 We are in Him as beings/essences and pieces of time
 (Whereas) He is not permanent in us/but He gives us life

The proof of what we have said regarding the spiritual breath which joins the mortal human form is that the Real qualifies Himself by the merciful breath (*al-nafas al-raḥmānī*),²⁰ and that which is qualified by a quality should follow this quality and all that this quality requires. You know that the one who breathes (follows) what the breath (144) requires. For this reason, the divine breath receives the forms of the cosmos. It serves as a material substance for the forms and it is nature itself.

The elements are one of the natural forms as that which is above them and that which derives from them, the latter being the elevated spirits placed above the seven heavens. As for the spirits of the seven heavens and their essences, they are elemental, because they emerge from the smoke²¹ that is generated from the elements. Also the angels who are generated from each heaven are elemental, while those who are above them are natural. For this reason, God described them, the heavenly group, as rivals,²² because nature is self-contradictory, and the self-contradiction which exists in the divine names, that is, the relationships, derives from the breath. Do you not see how the Essence which is beyond this aspect (of self-contradiction) does not need the created beings? For this reason, the cosmos emerged in the form of its originator, that is, the divine breath.

¹⁷ If you are real in essence and created in form, you will be merciful.

¹⁸ You should feed your soul with God’s spirit.

¹⁹ Qur’ān 56:88.

²⁰ The concrete, external forms of the cosmos reflect the name the All-Merciful, whose breath serves as the prime matter of the cosmos. When God speaks, He breathes out, and His words become the existents in the cosmos. SPK, pp. 19, 34, 127.

²¹ The identification of the heaven with smoke appears in Qur’ān 41:11.

²² Qur’ān 38:69.

When it is hot, it rises, and when it is cold and humid, it falls, for precipitation belongs to coldness and humidity, and when it is dry, it is stable without trembling. Precipitation drives from coldness and humidity. Do you not see how the physician who wants to give a patient a remedy to drink (first) looks at the sedimentation in his urine? When he sees that it is precipitating, he knows that the illness has completely matured and gives him medication to drink in order to hasten his cure. The urine precipitates only because of its natural humidity and coldness.

God kneaded the clay of the human being with his two hands. Though both are right hands, they confront each other, yet the difference between them is quite evident, even if they are only two, I mean two hands, because that which affects nature is only that which fits her, and nature is self-contradictory. He brought two hands (to create the human being). Since He brought him into existence with two hands, which are ascribed to Him (*al-yadayni al-muḍāfayni*),²³ He called him *bashar*, because of His direct connection (*mubāshara*) (to the creation) fitting this (honorable) act. God did so because (145) of his concern for this human species, and He said to the one (the Devil) who declined prostration before Adam: “What prevented you from prostrating before him whom I created with My own hands, do you deem yourself greater” (Qur’ān 38:75) than one who was like you, that is, (composed of) of elements? “Or are you loftier” (Qur’ān *ibid.*), than the elements? (In fact) you are not so.

By “loftier” He means one who in his luminous form makes himself loftier than the elemental (beings), even if one is a natural entity. The human being is superior to other elemental species only because of his being created directly (*bashar*) of clay by God. He is superior to all entities created of elements (but) without direct connection (*mubāshara*). His rank is above the terrestrial and celestial angels; however, according to the divine statement, the higher angels are better than the human species.

Whoever wishes to know the divine breath should know the cosmos, for whoever knows himself (or his soul) knows his Lord,²⁴ who is manifested in the cosmos. This means that the cosmos manifests itself in the breath of the Merciful who gives vent to the divine names which feel distressed because their effects are not manifested. Hence, God bestows favor on Himself by that which He brought into existence with His breath, for the first effect of His breath was in this divine domain (*janāb*),²⁵ and afterward the effects of the divine breath do not cease descending (in the cosmos hierarchy) by the divine encompassing release till the last existent thing.

²³ Ibn al-‘Arabī does not express reservations concerning this anthropomorphic picture of the creation of the human being. However, the fact that he uses the verb *adāfa* (he ascribed) to designate the connection between God and His hands points to some kind of reservation; that is, God does not have hands, but as they are ascribed to him in the Qur’ān, one cannot escape describing Him by this word.

²⁴ For this dictum, see *ch. 3*, n. 4.

²⁵ Very probably by this effect the author means the appearance of the divine names and attributes. *Kāshānī*, p. 373.

All things are latent in the essence of the breath/as is light in the essence of dawn

And knowledge through proof is/like daybreak for the sleeper

Because he (the sleeper) sees what I said/(that is) a dream which shows the breath

My words relieve him of every anxiety/when he recites (*sūrat*) ‘*abasa*²⁶

God manifests Himself to him/who comes seeking burning coal

He (Moses) considered it fire, but it was light/to kings and nightfarers²⁷

(146) If you understand my words/you will know that you are needy

Had he (Moses) sought something else (not fire)/he would have seen the Real in it, and God does not change His way (of self-manifestation)

As for the essence of Jesus (we say) that when the Real placed Himself in the station of “until we know” (Qur’ān 47:31),²⁸ and (in fact) He knew, He asked Jesus about what was ascribed to him, was it true or not, notwithstanding His foreknowledge of this ascription’s occurrence or nonoccurrence. Thus, God said to him: “Did you say to the people take me and my mother as two gods rather than God?” (Qur’ān 5:116) Out of courtesy, one should answer the questioner. Since He manifested Himself to Jesus in this station and form, wisdom required an answer that distinguishes the essence of many, and he said giving precedence to God’s transcendence: “May You be exalted” (*subḥānaka*, Qur’ān *ibid.*), Then turning directly to God, he used the word “You” (and he added) “I am not allowed,” with respect to myself in comparison to You, “to say what I have not the right to say,” that is, what my identity and essence require. “If I had said such a thing, You would have known it” (*ibid.*), for you are the speaker, and whoever says something knows what he says, and you are the tongue by which I speak, as God’s messenger informs us about his Lord in the divine tradition: “I am his tongue by which he speaks.”²⁹ He made His essence similar to the tongue of the speaker, ascribing speech to His servant.

Then the righteous servant completed his answer, saying, “You know what is in myself” (my soul – *ibid.*), for the speaker is the Real, “while I do not know what” (*ibid.*) it contains.³⁰ He denied knowledge of Jesus’ essence, with respect to his essence, not referring to his being a speaker and a producer of effects. “Indeed, You are” (*innaka anta*, *ibid.*). He says these words (“You are”), (using

²⁶ ‘*Abasa* means “he frowned” (Qur’ān 80:1). This chapter of the Qur’ān deals mainly with the Resurrection.

²⁷ That is, to the elite and the common people.

²⁸ This verse speaks of God’s trial of the people in order to know their characteristics. However, God knows from eternity these traits, but he wishes to know them from terrestrial phenomena, that is, to know people from their own acts and not from His eternal knowledge. As usual, Ibn al-‘Arabī exploits complete verses and phrases of verses, taking them out of their context for his own objectives.

²⁹ Bukhārī, LXXXI:38 (6502). Ch. 1, n. 81.

³⁰ Ibn al-‘Arabī changes the verse, which reads in the original: “While I do not know what Your soul contains” or “what is in Yourself” (*naṣīka*).

the pronouns) of separation and support (*al-faṣl wa 'l-ʿimād*),³¹ to emphasize and confirm his message, because only God knows absolutely the hidden things (*ʿallām al-ghuyūb* – *ibid.*).

(In his answer) he separated and joined together, unified and multiplied, broadened and narrowed, then he said, completing the answer: “I did not say to them but what you commanded me to say” (*ibid.*, 117). First, he denied that he had said, and then he spoke in the affirmative (147) out of courtesy to the questioner. Had he not acted in this manner, he would have been described as lacking in knowledge of the realities, which was far from his conduct. For this reason, he said: “but what you commanded me to say” (*ibid.*), (which means) You are the speaker through my tongue, and You are my tongue.

(Now), think how subtle and precise is the following spiritual and divine message: (Jesus said) “Worship God”! (*ibid.*). He introduced the name God (*allāh*), because the worshipers differ in their religious observances and because of the variety of religions; he did not particularize a name, but rather introduced the name which embraces all (religions). Then he said: “My Lord and your Lord” (*ibid.*). It is well known that one’s relationship with a certain existent lord differs from one’s relationship with another. For this reason, when he said, “my Lord and your Lord,” he distinguished between two appellations; the first applies to the speaker and the second to the addressee. (He said), “but what you commanded me to say” (*ibid.*), thus he affirmed himself as one who is commanded, which meant his being only a worshiper, for the one commanded is supposed to obey, even if he does not.

Since the command descends according to the law of ranks, everyone who appears in a certain rank is characterized by the reality that this rank grants. The rank of the commanded possesses a law which appears in every commanded person, just as the rank of the commander possesses a law which is manifested in every commander. The Real says: “Observe the prayer” (Qurʾān 2:43), for He is the commander, while the obliged person (*mukallaḥ*)³² is the commanded.³³ And the servant says: “O my Lord, forgive me” (Qurʾān 7:151, 38:35, 71:28), for he is the commander, and the Real is the commanded. What the Real requires from the servant by His command is the same as what the servant requires from the Real by his command. For this reason, every request is necessarily complied with, even if its compliance is postponed, just as some people who are obliged to observe a prayer time postpone their prayer, and when possible pray at another time. Thus, compliance with the request is necessary if only by intention.

Then he (Jesus) said: “I was (a witness) over them” (Qurʾān 5:117), and he did not say over me with them, as he said, “my Lord and your Lord” (*ibid.*), “(I was) a witness during my stay among them” (*ibid.*), because prophets are (148)

31 W. Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, Cambridge 1967, II, p. 259.

32 This term can also be translated as “one who is charged with responsibilities.” Izutsu, p. 171.

33 I read *wa 'l-mukallaḥ (huwa) al-ma'mūr* instead of *al-mukallaḥ al-ma'mūr* in the text, because of the structure of the following sentence.

witnesses over their communities so long as they stay in them. “When You took my soul” (ibid.), meaning when You raised me to Yourself,³⁴ concealing them from me and me from them, “You were the watcher over them” (ibid.) not in my matter but in theirs, for You were their sight, which required observation.

The person’s witnessing of himself is like the Real’s witnessing of him. (Jesus) made Him a watcher through this name (*al-raqīb*), because He described himself as a witness. Wishing to distinguish between himself and his Lord, he would be known as (a witness), because of his being a servant, and the Real is the Real, because He is his Lord. He called himself a witness and the Real the Watcher, giving precedence to his people over himself and saying: “Over them (I was) a witness during my stay among them” (*‘alayhim shahīdan*), while postponing their appearance in relation to the Real, saying, “You were the Watcher over them” (ibid.), because the Lord merits precedence in rank.

Then he let (us) know that the Real, the Watcher, bears the name which Jesus attributed to himself, that is, the Witness, in his words “a witness over them” (ibid.). And he said: “You are Witness of everything” (ibid., *wa-anta ‘alā kull shay’ shahīd*); the word “every” (*kull*) denotes generality, while “thing” denotes the most undefined word. He introduced the name “witness,” because He is the Witness of every witnessed thing in keeping with what this witnessed thing requires. He pointed out that the Real is the Witness of Jesus’ people, saying, “over them (I was) a witness during my stay among them” (ibid.). This is the witness of the Real as embodied in Jesus’ matter, just as it was proved that He was his tongue, hearing and seeing.

Then Jesus expressed a phrase referring to himself and another referring to Muḥammad. As for the phrase that belonged to Jesus, it was Jesus speaking God’s message about him in His book, and as for Muḥammad’s phrase, it reached him in a certain place, and he uttered it repeatedly without turning to another phrase until dawn’s first light. “If you punish them, (it is) because they are Your servants, and if You forgive them, (it is) because You are the All-mighty, the All-Wise” (ibid., 118). Both the word “they” and the word “he” are third-person pronouns³⁵ (149), as he said: “They were the ones who disbelieved” (Qur’ān 48:25, AH), using the third-person pronoun (the pronoun of the concealed), for hiddenness concealed them from what is meant by the witnessed one who is present (*al-mashhūd al-ḥāḍir*).³⁶ And he said, “If you punish them” (ibid.) with the third-person pronoun, which is the very veil that conceals them from the Real. He reminded them of God before they will be present (on the Day of Resurrection), and when they will be in attendance before Him, the heaven will dominate the dough and will make the dough like itself. “Because they are Your servants,” (he said), particularizing his form of address (in the second-person pronoun) because of their state of unity with God.

No humiliation is greater than that of servants, because they are incapable of acting freely, for they submit to the will of their master, who has no partner in the dominion

³⁴ Cf. Qur’ān 3:55.

³⁵ Literally: pronoun of the hidden or the concealed (*damīr al-ghā’ib*).

³⁶ Meaning: Jesus.

over them. That is because he said: “Your servants.” Hence, he singled them out. By punishment he meant their humiliation, and no people were humiliated more than they, because they were servants. Their essences required their being humiliated, hence You did not demean them any less than is required by their essences.

“If You forgive (*taghfir*) them” means if You conceal them from being punished as they deserve, because of their transgression; that is, You prepared a cover for them to conceal them from punishment and shield them from it.³⁷ “Because You are the All-Mighty” (the All-Mighty – *al-‘azīz*) means the one whose protection is unassailable (*al-manī al-ḥimā*).³⁸ When the Real gives this name to one of His servants, He is called the Strengtheners (*al-mu‘izz*), and the one who is given this name is called mighty (*al-‘azīz*). The one whose protection is unassailable is kept from the harm of punishment and suffering intended by God as the Punisher and Afflicter. He presented the pronoun of separation and support (*al-faṣl wa’l-‘imād*)³⁹ to emphasize his message and as a safeguard of the coherence of his verse: “You are the Knower of the hidden things” and “You are the Watcher over them.” Likewise he said: “Because You are the All-Mighty, the All-Wise.” (In this verse) Jesus asked God, beseeching Him in his request all nightlong until daybreak for an answer. Had he heard an answer after the first question he would not have repeated (his request). The Real detailed the reasons for their punishment and Jesus responded (150) each time repeating this verse (*ibid.*, 118). Had he considered God’s presentation preferable, he would have invoked God against them, not for them. Jesus put before God what they deserved, that is, submission to God and their exposing to His forgiveness.

It is related that when the Real loves the voice of his servant invoking Him, He postpones His response to him until the servant repeats his request out of His love for him and not out of His turning away from him. For this reason, he indicates the name “the All-Wise,” because he who is wise puts things in their proper places and does not allow them to deviate from what their realities require through their attributes. Thus, the wise is he who knows well the order of things. Jesus repeated this verse, because he possessed great knowledge of God. Whoever recites (the Qur’ān) should recite it in this manner, otherwise silence is more appropriate for him.

If God guides a servant to speak of something, He guides him only because He wishes to respond to him and satisfy his need. Hence, let no one think that what one is directed to comes late. Let him rather persist like the Messenger’s persistence in his repetition of this verse in all his states, so that he may hear with his ears or with his inner hearing (*sam*), in whatever way you want, or in whatever way God may make him⁴⁰ hear His response. If God rewards you with a request of the tongue, He will make you hear with your ear, and if He rewards you with a spiritual request, He will make you hear with your inner hearing.

³⁷ For the verb *ghafara* in the meaning of “he concealed,” see the beginning of p. 74 of the Arabic text.

³⁸ Ibn al-‘Arabī uses here improper annexation (*iḍāfa ghayr ḥaqīqīyya*). Wright, *Grammar*, II, p. 64.

³⁹ See n. 31 above.

⁴⁰ The text has “make you hear” (*asma‘aka*).

16 The bezel of the wisdom of mercy¹ exists in the essence of Solomon

(151) “It” (Qur’ān 27:30), meaning the letter, “is from Solomon” (ibid.), “and it is” (ibid.), that is, its contents are (written) “in the name of God, the All-Merciful and the All-Compassionate” (ibid.). Some people learned the precedence of Solomon’s name over God’s name, but (this conclusion) is wrong. What is said concerning this precedence is improper with respect to Solomon’s knowledge of God. How could their utterances be appropriate, for as Bilqīs² said about this: “A honorable letter has been delivered to me” (ibid. 29), that is, one honoring her? Possibly what stirred them to speak as they did was the incident in which Chosroes tore up the Prophet’s letter. However, he did not tear it up until he had read it and knew its contents. So too would Bilqīs have done, had she not been guided as she was, and the letter would not have been protected from being burned, whether its honorable sender’s name had been given precedence over God’s (name) or not.

Solomon introduced two kinds of mercy: the mercy of favor (*raḥmat al-imtinnān*) and the mercy of obligation (*raḥmat al-wujūb*), which correspond to the All-Merciful (*al-raḥmān*) and the All-Compassionate (*al-raḥīm*), respectively. As the All-Merciful He bestows His favors freely, and as the All-Compassionate He is obliged to give favors. This obligation derives from His bestowal; the All-Compassionate is included in the All-Merciful. That is because God decreed on Himself mercy³ for (the benefit of) the servant, because the Real mentions the acts carried out by the servant for which he deserves mercy. Mercy is incumbent on God, and He ordained it for Himself, I mean the mercy of obligation. Servants who belong to this kind (of people who carry out acts and deserve mercy) know the identity of the one who carries out their acts.

Human acts are divided among eight organs. The Real informed us that He is the essence of every organ, hence the agent of human acts is solely the Real,

1 Solomon is associated with Mercy, because in his letter to Queen Bilqīs he mentioned God the All-Merciful, the All-Compassionate. Qur’ān 27:29–30. See below.

2 This is the name of the Queen of Sheba in the Qur’ān. At first Ibn al-‘Arabī thought that she was born to a father of the demons (*abūhā min al-jinn*) and to a human mother (*ummuhā min al-ins*), then he changed his mind and denied his first view of her. *Al-Mu‘jam*, pp. 215.

3 Qur’ān 6:54.

while the form (of the act) (152) belongs to the servant.⁴ The essence is contained in him (the servant), that is, only His name, because He is the essence of what is manifested. (Because God is manifested in things) He is called Creation (*khalq*) and because of Him the names The Manifest and the Last belong to the servant, given that he was nonexistent then existent. And because the manifestation of the servant and his acts depend on Him, he bears the names The Hidden and The First. Thus, when you see creation, you see the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

This knowledge⁵ was not concealed from Solomon, but rather it was part of the dominion (he enjoyed over things) which was appropriate to none after him, that is, the manifestation of his dominion in the sensuous world. Muḥammad was given the same trait Solomon received, but he did not manifest it. God gave Muḥammad the power to overcome a demon which came to him in the night to kill him. He planned to seize and tie it to one of the mosque's columns until morning so that the children of al-Madīna could play with it.⁶ He (Muḥammad) mentioned Solomon's request, but God thwarted it. Although Muḥammad was granted power, he did not manifest it, while Solomon did. Solomon (asked God to grant him) a dominion (*mulk*),⁷ not absolute dominion, hence we know that he wished to possess some dominion. We are aware that other people shared with him each part of the dominion granted to him by God, but he was particularized by joining all these parts together and by the report about the manifested demon. Thus, he was particularized by the aggregation of all parts of dominion and by its manifestation. Had Muḥammad not spoken in the tradition that "God enabled me to (overcome the demon)," we would have said that since he did not wish to seize it, God reminded him of Solomon's request. That way he might know that God had not granted him power to seize it. Thus, God denied him (his request). Since he said, "God enabled me to (overcome the demon)," we know that God granted him the power to act freely. And God reminded him and he remembered Solomon's request, (thus) teaching himself how to behave. As a result, we learn in general that no other human being after Solomon was bequeathed with manifestation of this power.

Regarding this issue, our aim is only to discuss it, calling attention to the two kinds of mercy Solomon mentioned whose names in Arabic are *al-raḥmān al-raḥīm* (the All-Merciful, the All-Compassionate). God restricts (153) the mercy of obligation and derestricts the mercy of favor, in His saying, "My mercy encompasses all things" (Qur'ān 7:156), even the divine names, that is, the realities of relationships. He bestows favors on the divine names through us. Thus, we are the result of the mercy of favor through the divine names and the lordly relationships.

4 Here Ibn al-ʿArabī uses the word "agent" (*ʿāmil*) to indicate that the Real is the cause of the occurrence of the act but not of its characteristics. This is reminiscent of al-Ghazālī's theory of causality as elaborated in his non-philosophical works. According to this theory, God's power makes the series of causes and effects move. Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Causality."

5 Solomon was aware of the idea that God is the agent of his acts and that he is a manifestation of Him.

6 Bukhārī, VIII:75 (3423).

7 Qur'ān 38:35.

Then he obliged Himself to bestow favors through our self-manifestation and he made us know that He is our essence so we may know that He obliged Himself to bestow favors only for Himself. Consequently, mercy does not exceed Him, for on whom would He bestow favors were none to exist other than He?

However, we should not ignore the difference between entities, for people excel one another in knowledge, so it is said that this person is more learned than another, although the Essence (of all things) is one. This means that the attribute of knowledge overcomes the attribute of will (*irāda*), just as the attribute of will overcomes the attribute of power, and this is the hierarchy of the divine attributes.⁸ Likewise, the divine hearing and seeing (are arranged). All the divine names are graded in a hierarchy. In the same manner creation is arranged according to a hierarchy; for example, we say that one individual is more knowledgeable than another, although the Essence is one. Just as you give precedence to a certain divine name and you call and depict it by all the names, the manifested creation has all the attributes of that with which it is compared. Thus, every part of the cosmos contains all its parts; that is, every part is the substrate of the realities of the whole cosmos. Hence, our saying that Zayd is inferior to ‘Amr in knowledge does not infringe (the idea) that the Real’s Essence is the essence of both. Equally, just as ‘Amr’s essence is more perfect and knowing than Zayd’s, the divine names excel each other, yet they are none other than the Real.

As a knowing God is more general than God who wills or is All-Mighty, His Essence, (nevertheless), does not change and He is as He is. As a result, you, my friend, cannot know Him and be ignorant of Him or affirm Him and deny Him in one aspect, unless you affirm Him by the aspect He affirms Himself and deny Him by the aspect He denies Himself. (This is) like the verse combining denial and affirmation with respect to Him when (154) God says: “There is nothing like Him” (Qur’ān 42:11), by which He denies, and “He is the All-Hearing and All-Seeing,” by which He affirms. He affirms (Himself) through an attribute which includes every creature that hears and sees. In this world a creature can exist that is concealed from the perception of some people, but it will be made manifest to all people in the world to come, which is the abode of living just like this world. In the latter, the living essence is concealed from some servants, so that particularization and difference concerning (the perception) of the realities of the cosmos are manifested (only to some people). The Real is more manifested in him who possesses a general perception than in him who does not possess such a perception. Do not be veiled (from the truth) through the hierarchy of things and say that the statement that the Real is the Essence of creation⁹ is false, after I have shown you the hierarchy of the divine names whose identity with the Real you do not doubt, for He is named by them, and this is God.

⁸ Possibly Ibn al-‘Arabī follows here al-Ghazālī’s scheme of God’s attributes according to which knowledge raises will and will raises power. Abrahamov, “Al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Causality,” p. 83; *Ihyā’*, Vol. IV, pp. 249f (ch. *bayān ḥaqīqat al-tawḥīd alladhī huwa aṣl al-tawakkul*).

⁹ The text has “creation is the essence of the Real” (*al-khalq huwiyyat al-ḥaqq*), which seems to me incorrect and should be replaced by the transposed subject and predicate.

Moreover, how could Solomon give precedence to his name over God's name,¹⁰ as they claimed, despite his being a part of the whole creation which the attribute of mercy brought into existence? He should have placed the All-Merciful and the All-Compassionate first so that the dependence of the object of mercy on the Real would be right. Making that which deserves the place of the last be the first and vice versa is the reverse of realities.

Because of her wisdom and elevation, Bilqīs did not mention the one who sent the letter to her. She did so to teach her followers that she was aware of things whose ways they did not know. This is a part of the divine direction regarding kingdom, for if the people of the state do not know the way reports reach the king, they will be afraid to act freely. Only when they know they are protected from danger of the ruler discovering their deeds will they act freely. If they knew for certain who delivers reports to their king, they would blandish him and bribe him liberally in order to do as they want, knowing that their deeds will not reach the king's notice. Bilqīs merely said: "(A honorable letter) has been delivered to me," without naming the sender, because that was her policy, by which she kept the people of her kingdom and its elevated leaders cautious of her. (155) Thus, she earned the right to be superior to them.

As for the superiority of the human knower over the demonic knower regarding the knowledge of the mysteries of action and the special nature of things, it is known through the aspect of time, for a twinkling of the eye of the beholder¹¹ is quicker than one's rising from one's seat, because the movement of a glance in the perception of its object is more rapid than the motion of the body. That is, because the duration of the movement of a glance is the same as the (duration of the) perception of the object of sight, notwithstanding the distance between the beholder and the object. (For example), the duration of opening the eye equals the duration of the eye's perception of the fixed stars, and closing the eye equals the ceasing of perception. Rising from one's seat is not as quick.

Asaf ibn Berechya¹² was faster than the demons, for his speech and action occurred in the same instant. As a result, in this moment, Solomon saw with his own eyes Bilqīs' throne established before him, lest he should imagine that he perceived the throne in its place without its being moved (from its place). In our view, because of the simultaneous occurrence (of speech and the establishment of the throne), no movement (of the throne from its original place to Solomon's palace) happened. Instead, (the throne in its original place) entered a state of non-existence and was brought back into existence (in Solomon's palace) with the awareness of none, except the one who knew God's saying: "No indeed, they are perplexed regarding a new creation" (Qur'ān 50:15). They immediately saw what they were looking at.

¹⁰ Qur'ān 27:30.

¹¹ Cf. Qur'ān 27:40.

¹² Muslim tradition identifies "the one who has some knowledge of the Scripture" (Qur'ān 27:40) with Asaf ibn Berechya, who was a Levite, a poet, and one of Solomon's secretaries. Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr*, Vol. V, pp. 235f. *Chronicles*, I, 6:24. Cf. Izutsu, pp. 210f.

If the case is as we pointed out, then the time of its absence, I mean the absence of the throne from its place, is the time of its existence with Solomon, because of the repetition of creation by means of (God's) breaths.

One has no knowledge of this measure (of repetition of creation). Moreover, no one is aware that in himself with each breath one becomes nonexistent then (*thumma*) existent again. Do not say that the word "then" (*thumma*) requires a lapse of time – this is not correct. According to the Arabs, this word requires only (156) the precedence of a cause (to its effect) in specific circumstances, as the poet said: "Just as (you) throw the lance, then it trembles."¹³ No doubt, the instant of throwing is the same instant it trembles. (The poet) uses the word "then," (although) no lapse of time occurs (between the throwing and the trembling). In like manner, the repetition of creation by breaths takes place; the moment of a thing's nonexistence is the same moment of the existence of its like, as with the repetition of the creation of accidents in the Ash'arite theory.¹⁴

The existence of Bilqīs' throne (in Solomon's palace) is a (most) difficult matter, but only for one who does not know what we mentioned earlier regarding this story. Asaf's advantage in this matter was only (his responsibility for) the occurrence of recreation in Solomon's court. Whoever understands what we have said (knows) that the throne traveled no distance, that no land was contracted for it, and that it did not break through the earth. This act was carried out by one of Solomon's followers, so that Solomon would greatly (impress) those present (in his court), that is, Bilqīs and her entourage.

The reason for this (event) is that Solomon was God's gift to David, as the Qur'ānic verse states: "We gave (*wahabnā*) David Solomon" (Qur'ān 38:30). A gift (*hibba*) is one's bestowal of favor (*in'ām*), not because of an agreement or deservingness. This gift is a lavish favor, a strong argument, and a devastating blow.¹⁵ As for Solomon's knowledge, God said: "We made him understand the case"¹⁶ (Qur'ān 21:79), although Solomon's judgment contradicts David's. However, God "granted both of them judgment and knowledge" (*ibid.*). God made David acquire his knowledge from Him, while Solomon's knowledge on this matter came to him directly from God, for (actually) God was the judge. Solomon served as a transmitter of truth in an assembly of sincerity (*maq'ad*

¹³ This is a fragment of a line of poetry written by Abū Dāwūd ibn al-Ḥajjāj. Affifi, II, p. 215.

¹⁴ The text here has the word *dalīl*, which literally means proof or sign. The Ash'arites hold the recreation of the accidents, and in this manner Ibn al-'Arabī's idea is reminiscent of theirs.

¹⁵ The last two phrases are directed toward Bilqīs' followers, who were confronted with the power of Solomon.

¹⁶ According to the Tradition, the case to which the Qur'ān alludes is David's trial of a shepherd whose flock of sheep entered a field and ruined its harvest. David judged that the flock should be transferred to the owner of the field to be his possession, while Solomon opined that the shepherd should repair the damage and until he does so, the owner of the land will enjoy the milk and the wool of the sheep. Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr*, Vol. V, p. 576.

sidq).¹⁷ This issue resembles the case of an independent legist (*mujtahid*)¹⁸ who reaches the correct legal decision, which God would have arrived at, had He taken it upon Himself, or the case of one who judges in accordance with the revelation to God's Messenger. In both cases the judge receives two rewards, while one who makes incorrect decision receives one reward, because, notwithstanding his fault, he uses knowledge and judgment. The Muḥammadan community was given the rank of judgment of both Solomon and David. How excellent a community it is!

(157) Although Bilqīs knew the great distance (between her palace and Solomon's) and the impossibility, in her view, of the throne's movement in so short a time, when she saw her throne, she said: "It looks like it" (Qur'ān 27:42, AH). She believed in what we have mentioned, that is, recreation by similars. It is it – the idea you are the same in the time of recreation as you were before is correct.

Solomon's perfect knowledge (is shown) in the Qur'ān's notice regarding his palace. "(Then) it was said to her: 'Enter the palace'" (ibid., 44). The palace was perfectly paved with smooth glass. "When she saw it, she thought it was a deep pool of water, and bared her legs" (ibid., AH) to prevent the water from reaching her dress. Solomon informed her that the throne which she saw is like this water. This is the utmost degree of justice, for he told her that she was right in saying "It looks like it" (ibid., 42). Then she said: "O my Lord, I have wronged myself, and I submitted myself with Solomon" (ibid., 44), that is, like Solomon, "to God, the Lord of all beings" (*ʿālamīn*)¹⁹ (ibid.). She did not submit to Solomon, but rather to God, the Lord of all beings, because Solomon was one of the beings. In her submission, she did not bind herself (to Solomon), just as the messengers do not bind themselves (to people) in their belief in God, contrary to Pharaoh, who said: "The Lord of Moses and Aaron" (Qur'ān 7:122).²⁰ Even if Pharaoh's submission was somewhat similar to that expressed by Bilqīs, he was too weak (to submit to God); Bilqīs was more learned in her submission to God. Pharaoh was subject to the (event)²¹ of this time when he said: "I believe in what the Children of Israel believe."²² He singled out (his belief), because he saw the sorcerers saying concerning their belief in God: "The Lord of Moses and Aaron" (Qur'ān 7:122). Bilqīs' submission (*islām*) was identical to Solomon's, for she said, "with Solomon" (Qur'ān 27:44), then followed him in such a way that she believed in all Solomon's creeds, just as we walk

¹⁷ For this phrase, see Qur'ān 54:55.

¹⁸ This is a legist who formulates his legal decisions using the four roots of law (*Qur'ān*, *Sunna*, *Ijmāʿ*, and *Qiyās*) without blindly following human authorities or books.

¹⁹ For *ʿālamīn* see p. 37, n. 7 above.

²⁰ Strangely enough, in the Qur'ān, Pharaoh's sorcerers said this as written in verses 121–122: "The sorcerers fell to their knees and said: 'We believe in the Lord of all beings, the Lord of Moses and Aaron.'" See also Qur'ān 26:47–48.

²¹ He said this when he was drowning with his troops.

²² This is a paraphrase of Qur'ān 10:90, which reads: "I believe there is no God except the One the Children of Israel believe in."

on God's Straight Path (*al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm*),²³ because our forelocks are in His grasp. It is inconceivable that we should leave Him. We are with Him by being contained (in Him),²⁴ and He is with us, as it is clearly announced: "He is with you wherever you are" (Qur'ān 57:4). We are with Him, because He seizes our forelocks (158), and He is with Himself wherever He leads us on His Path. Everything in the cosmos is on the Straight Path, which was established (for it) by His Lord. This is what Bilqīs learned from Solomon and then said: "to God, the Lord of all beings" (Qur'ān 27:44). She did not single out one being to the exclusion of others.

As for the faculty of subjugation by which Solomon was distinguished and excelled others, and through which God granted him dominion which "no one else after him would achieve" (Qur'ān 38:35), it derived from Solomon's command. God said: "We subjected to his power the wind, which blows at his command" (Qur'ān 38:36). The fact that the wind is subjected to a human is not the issue here, for God's words include all of us, excluding none: "He subjects for you all that which is in the heavens and the earth" (Qur'ān 45:13). God mentioned the subjugation of the winds, the stars, and other things; however, this subjugation is not at our command, but at God's command. If you consider (the matter), He singled out Solomon, (granting him) only the power of command, with neither the faculty of concentration (*jam'iyya*) nor of spiritual aspiration (*himma*). We say this, because we know that the terrestrial bodies are affected by the souls' spiritual aspirations if the latter are placed in the station of concentration.²⁵ We have examined this in the Way.²⁶ However, Solomon had only to utter the command to any entity he wanted to subject without spiritual aspiration or concentration.

Know, may God inspire us and you by His spirit, that if such a gift is bestowed on a servant, whoever he is, this does not diminish his dominion in the next world and nor does it harm his credit, though Solomon asked this from his Lord. Experience of the Way requires that God should give him in advance what He preserves for others in the world to come, and if God wishes, He will settle Solomon's account in the next world. God said to him, "This is Our gift" (Qur'ān 38:39), and he said, neither to you nor to others, "so bestow" (*ibid.*), that is, give "or withhold without settling an account" (*ibid.*). We know from experiencing the Way that Solomon's request of this (faculty) derived from God's command. If a request occurs at the divine command, the one who requests receives complete reward for his request. If the Lord wills, He fulfills the servant's need regarding what he asked of Him, and if He wills (159), He withholds (His response). That is because the servant

²³ For this term, see the beginning of *ch. 10*.

²⁴ *Bi'l-taḍmīn*. Kāshānī (p. 398) deduces this understanding from the word *ḍimna*, meaning in, within. Also, this phrase may express the idea that our existence in Him is concealed, that is, not written or articulated outwardly, while His staying with us is manifested in the Qur'ān.

²⁵ That the soul affects the body is an idea developed by Ibn Sīnā. *Kitāb al-najāt*, pp. 196–205.

²⁶ See pp. 127f of the Arabic text above.

carried out what God obliged him; to wit, he obeyed his Lord's command concerning his request. Had his request come from himself and not as a reaction to his Lord's command, He would have settled his account with him. This (procedure) pervades all that is requested of God, as He said to His Prophet Muḥammad: "Say: 'O my Lord, increase my knowledge'" (Qur'ān 20:114). Hence, he obeyed his Lord's command, asking increase in knowledge to such an extent that when he was given milk, he interpreted it as knowledge, just as he interpreted his dream in which he saw himself receiving a cup of milk, which he drank, and the remainder he gave to 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. They (his followers) asked him: "What is your interpretation of the milk?" He answered: "It is knowledge."²⁷ In like manner, when he was made to travel (*usriya bihi*) by night,²⁸ an angel brought him a vessel of milk and another of wine, and Muḥammad drank the milk. Then the angel said to him: You did the right thing according to your inborn trait (*fiṭra*); may God do the right thing by you for your community. Thus, when milk appears in a dream, it is an image of knowledge, which takes the form of milk, just as Jibrīl took the form of an ordinary human being before Maryam. For when Muḥammad said: "People are sleeping, and when they die, they wake up,"²⁹ he was calling attention to all that the human being sees in his life in this world as being like the dream of a sleeper, (that is), imagination which should be interpreted.

Being is only imagination/(but) in truth it is (also) reality

Whoever understands this/attains the mysteries of the Way

Thus, when milk was given to Muḥammad, he used to say: "God bless us by it and give us increase of it," because he saw the milk as an image of knowledge, and he was commanded to ask for an increase in knowledge. (However) when he was given something other than milk, he used to say: "God bless us by it and feed us by something better than this."³⁰ God will not settle His account with him whom God gives what He gives by a request done at a divine command, because of this request in the Hereafter. (But) whoever is given something by God because of his request made without God's command, it is for God to decide, as He wishes, whether to settle his account (160) or not. I hope God will not settle His account especially concerning knowledge, for His command to His Prophet to ask increase in knowledge is the same command to his community. That is because God said: "God's Messenger was a good model for you" (Qur'ān 33:21). What better model is there for one who learns from God? If we called attention to Solomon's station in its completeness, you would see something that would frighten you to know thoroughly, for most scholars of this Way did not know Solomon's state and position, and the matter is not as they maintained.

²⁷ Ibn Ḥanbal, II: 83, 154; Bukhārī, I, 27 (82).

²⁸ Qur'ān 17:1.

²⁹ This dictum of the Prophet does not appear in the canonical collections of the Ḥadīth but in Qur'ān commentaries and Sufī works. See, for example, *Tafsīr al-Tustarī* to Qur'ān 16:97.

³⁰ Abū Dāwūd, XXV:21 (3730).

17 The bezel of the wisdom of existence exists in the essence of David

(160) Know that since prophecy, I mean legislative prophecy (*nubuwwat al-tashrī*), and messengerhood (*risāla*) are special divine (gifts), they are not acquired absolutely. God's gifts of this kind to them are not rewards for which they are asked to give (something in exchange). He gives them (gifts) through bestowing favors. God said: "And We gave him Isaac and Jacob" (Qur'ān 6:84), that is, to Abraham, the friend (of God). And about Job, God said: "We gave him his family and their like with them" (Qur'ān 38:43). And regarding Moses, He said: "Out of our Mercy We gave him his brother Aaron as a prophet" (Qur'ān 19:53), and other (verses) like that. What bestowed favors on them at the beginning is the same (entity) that bestowed favors on them in all or most of their states, and it is only His name the Bestower (*al-wahhāb*).

And He said concerning David: "We bestowed our favor on him" (Qur'ān 34:10) without connecting this favor to a reward He would ask in return from David, and without informing him that He gave the aforementioned favor as a reward. When God asked thanks for this act, He asked it from David's family; He did not mention David, so that his family would thank Him for the favor He bestowed on David. Regarding David, it was a gift of favor and beneficence, while regarding his family, it was not so, because He asked them to respond and said: "Thank God, family of David, for few of My servants are thankful" (Qur'ān 34:13). If the prophets (161) thanked God for the favors He bestowed on them, they did so not because God asked them to thank Him, but out of their own choice, just as God's Messenger stood thanking Him, until his legs became swollen, for He forgave him his earlier and later sins.¹ When someone said (something) to him concerning his behavior, he said: "Shall I not be a thankful person?"² God said about Noah: "Indeed, he was a thankful servant" (Qur'ān 17:3), because few of God's servants are so.

The first favor God bestowed on David was His giving him a name composed of disconnected letters, *dāl*, *alif*, and *wāw*. Thus, He severed his connections from the world, informing us about him purely by his name. However, God named (His

¹ Qur'ān 48:2.

² Bukhārī, XIX:6 (1130).

Prophet) Muḥammad by using both connected and disconnected letters in order on the one hand to connect Muḥammad to Him and on the other to separate him from the world. Hence, in his name, He combined the two states of Muḥammad, while these two states were internally expressed in David without God's establishing them in his name. This, that is, calling attention to his two states, was Muḥammad's special trait which David lacked. (And so) his personality (literally: his matter) became perfect in all aspects, just as it is in his name Aḥmad.³ This derives from God's wisdom. Then He said, regarding David and His bestowing on him favors, that the mountains and the birds reverberated the praise of (God) with David's praising, so that their praises joined his.⁴ God granted him power and described him by it, and granted him wisdom and decisive resolution (*faṣl al-khiṭāb*).⁵ Then He (granted) him the greatest favor and nearness to Us⁶ and stated specifically that the vicegerency belonged to him alone. God did not do this for any other human being, even if there were vicegerents among them. He said: "O David, We appointed you a vicegerent in the earth, so judge justly between people and do not follow your own will" (Qur'ān 38:26), that is, what comes to your mind when you judge without taking into account My inspiration, "lest this may lead you astray from (162) God's path" (ibid.), that is, the way revealed to My messengers. Then God treated David tenderly, saying: "Those who stray from God's path will be severely punished, because they forgot the Day of Reckoning" (ibid.). He did not say to him: "If you stray from My path, you will be severely punished."

If you say: "The vicegerency of Ādam was also appointed (in the Qur'ān)," we shall answer: "Ādam's appointment is not similar to David's, (because God only) said (it) to the angels: 'I am appointing a vicegerent in the earth' (Qur'ān 2:30), and He did not say: 'I am appointing Ādam a vicegerent in the earth.'" Even if He had said so, it would not have been like His saying "We appointed you a vicegerent," regarding David, because the latter statement is definite and the former is not. The mention of Ādam after that in the story does not indicate that he was the vicegerent whom God appointed. Hence, pay attention to God's reports of His servants.

Likewise, regarding Abraham, the Friend, (God said): "I am appointing you a leader (*imām*) of people" (Qur'ān 2:124), and He did not say "vicegerent," even if we know that leadership (*imāma*) here means vicegerency (*khilāfa*). These (two concepts) are not the same, because He did not mention its (the leadership's) most specific name, which is vicegerency.⁷ Regarding David, there is an additional element of particularization, because He appointed him a vicegerent of judgment that originates only from God, for He said to him: "Judge justly between people" (Qur'ān 38:26). However, Ādam's vicegerency was likely not of this degree.

³ Qur'ān 61:6.

⁴ This is an allusion to Qur'ān 21:79, 38:18–19.

⁵ Qur'ān 38:20.

⁶ Ibid., 25.

⁷ On the use of these two terms in Islamic theology, see my "Al-Kāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm's Theory of the Imamāt," *Arabica* 34(1987):80–105.

Rather it was the replacement of whoever lived in the earth before his time, not that he was a vicegerent of God among His creatures with divine judgment over them. Even if he actually was God's vicegerent, we are only talking about his appointment and its manifest form.

God has in the earth vicegerents who are the messengers. At present, vicegerency derives from the messengers and not from God. They judge only according to what the Messenger promulgated to them and do not violate his rules. However, here is a subtle issue, which only people like us know, that is, learning the judgments in keeping with the Messenger's legal way.

The Messenger's vicegerent is the one who learns judgments from the transmitted traditions (from the Messenger) (163), or by applying the method of personal efforts (*ijtihād*), (the authority of) which is also transmitted from the Messenger. Among us are some who learn from God, hence they are God's vicegerents through the same criterion, and the content (of the rules) they receive is the same as that which the Messenger received from God. Thus, seen outwardly, they are followed by others, because they do not contradict the Messenger's judgment, like Jesus when he will come down and judge and like Muḥammad in God's saying: "Those are the people whom God has guided, so follow their guidance" (Qur'ān 6:90). Concerning what he knows about the way of learning, the follower is distinguished and successful, and he is like the Prophet, who followed the messengers who preceded him. So we follow him, because he established the rule of following the preceding messengers, and not because of the rules of the messengers who preceded him. In like manner, the vicegerent's learning from God is the same as the Messenger's learning from God. Speaking from the perspective of revelation, he is God's vicegerent, and with respect to the outward realm, he is the Messenger's vicegerent. For this reason, the Messenger died without appointing a vicegerent. He did not appoint a vicegerent, knowing that in his community was one who would take the vicegerency from his Lord. Thus, he would be a vicegerent of God accepting the existing laws. Since Muḥammad knew of this (notion), he did not prevent its application. Among His creatures, God has vicegerents who took from the Messenger and the messengers the authority that the messengers had taken (from God). The vicegerents know the preceding Messenger's superiority, because the Messenger received increase (in knowledge), while the vicegerent does not receive such an increase, which he would have received, had he had been a messenger. The vicegerent gives only knowledge and judgments which were specifically given to the Messenger. Hence, outwardly, contrary to the Messenger, he follows the latter and does not oppose him.

Do you not see Jesus' (conduct)? The Jews thought well of Jesus when he did not promulgate laws which Moses had not promulgated; as we have said concerning the vicegerency today in relation to the Messenger, they believed in him and confirmed (his position as vicegerent) (164). However, when he added (a new) judgment or abrogated a judgment brought by Moses, because Jesus was a messenger, they did not tolerate this, for he opposed their belief in Moses. The Jews did not know the matter as it was and wished to kill Jesus. Of what happened to him, God informs us in His Noble Book about him and them. Since he was a

messenger, he was allowed to change⁸ (his religion), either by omission (*naqṣ*) of an existing rule or by adding a new one. However, without a doubt, omission of a rule implies adding a new rule.

The vicegerency today does not have the same status as it once had; it omits or adds rules which were promulgated by personal efforts (*ijtihād*), (but) not (the kind of) rules promulgated by Muḥammad. Sometimes a vicegerent seems to contradict a legal tradition, and as a result, one imagines that this contradiction derives from *ijtihād*, but this is not the case; rather, this tradition was not affirmed for this leader through revelation from the Prophet, and if it were affirmed, he would judge according to this rule. If the way this tradition was transmitted is from one honest person to another, such a person is not immune from fancy or transmission according to the meaning.⁹ Such a thing might occur today to a vicegerent, as it occurred to Jesus, for when he will descend, he will cancel many rules promulgated through *ijtihād* and through this cancellation he will make clear the truth established by Muḥammad's laws, especially when the rules of religious leaders concerning an event contradict each other. We know for certain that if a revelation descended concerning an event it would guide to one solution, and this solution constitutes the divine law. In other cases, even if the Real affirms (a solution), it is a law which is affirmed to remove difficulty from this community and to spread (divine) laws in it.

As for Muḥammad's saying, "if two persons are acknowledged as vicegerents, kill the last of them,"¹⁰ it applies to an external vicegerency which can be removed by sword. (165) Even if both agree, one must be killed, contrary to the spiritual vicegerency in which killing is forbidden.¹¹ Killing (of one vicegerent) takes place only in the external vicegerency. However, even if such a vicegerent does not have the position of the spiritual vicegerent, he is still the vicegerent of God's Messenger, if he behaves justly. The principle (of establishing one ruler) is a fundamental and it resembles the assumption of the existence of two gods (as God said): "If there had been in them (the heaven and the earth) gods except God, they would have been ruined"¹² (Qur'ān 21:22), even if they agree. However, we know by supposition that if two gods disagreed, the one whose judgment would be carried out is truly God, and the other whose judgment cannot be carried out is not God. Hence, we know that each judgment which is carried out in the world today is God's judgment, even if it opposes the external established judgment which is called law (*sharʿ*). No judgment except God's is workable, because the order which takes place in the world

⁸ The text has *ziyāda* (addition), which seems to me inappropriate.

⁹ Does Ibn al-ʿArabī mean by this phrase that the transmitter changes the content of the tradition according to his own understanding and not according to what was transmitted to him?

¹⁰ Muslim, XV, 61 (1853).

¹¹ Literally: in which there is no killing.

¹² This verse serves Muslim theologians, both rationalists and traditionalists, to corroborate the argument from assumed mutual prevention. Abrahamov, *al-Ḳāsim Ibn Ibrāhīm*, p. 190, n. 89.

complies with divine will (*al-mashīʿa al-ilāhiyya*),¹³ not with established law, even if its establishment derives from God's will. For this reason, the establishment of a judgment takes place in a particular way, for the will is concerned only with the establishment, not with the fulfillment of the judgment.

The rule of the will is great, hence Abū Ṭālib (al-Makkī)¹⁴ named it the Throne of the Essence, because it is the Essence which requires judgment. Everything in existence occurs or not only through God's will, for if God's command is disobeyed – called here a transgression (*maʿṣiya*) – it is not God's creative command (*al-amr al-takwīnī*) (which is disobeyed) but rather a command addressed to people indirectly (through angels or prophets). No one can disobey in all one's actions the command of the divine will. If there is disobedience, it is of the indirect command. So, understand it! The will of God only applies to the bringing of the action into existence and not to its agent, hence it is inconceivable that it would not exist.¹⁵ However, in this specific substrate (the human being), sometimes this action constitutes a transgression of God's command and other times acceptance of and obedience to God's command. (166) Praise or blame follows in accordance with what happens. Since the matter in itself is as we have established, all people achieve happiness of different kinds. God expresses this station (saying) that "Mercy encompasses everything"¹⁶ and that it precedes divine Wrath.¹⁷ That which precedes is the first, and when the judgment of the latter follows, the first (that is, Mercy) judges it, because it precedes Wrath.¹⁸ This is the meaning of "His Mercy precedes His Wrath," in order that the first will judge that which comes later, for the aim is Mercy and everything is going toward Mercy. The human being comes necessarily to Mercy leaving Wrath, and Mercy judges everyone who comes to it according to his state.

Whoever understands will witness what we say/if he does not, he will learn from us

There is nothing except what we have stated, so rely/on it and be in the same state as we are

¹³ Ibn al-ʿArabī distinguishes between essential divine free will (*mashīʿa*), which establishes every occurrence in the cosmos and cannot be rejected by human beings, and God's desire (*irāda*), which human beings can obey or disobey. Austin, p. 141. SPK, p. 389, n. 8.

¹⁴ Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 996) is the author of the mystical treatise *Qūt al-qulūb*, which exerted much influence on the teachings of al-Ghazālī.

¹⁵ This idea that God creates the human act but not its modality is reminiscent of an interpretation of al-Ashʿarī's theory of acquisition (*kasb*), according to which it is the human being which assigns to the act its moral value. For example, if one enters a house and takes money from it, his act will be lawful if he enters his own house, but unlawful in case it is not his house. So the act itself is an objective entity which can be applied to different situations. Abrahamov, "A Re-Examination of al-Ashʿarī's Theory of Kasb according to K. al-lumaʿ, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1989):210–221.

¹⁶ Qurʾān 7:156.

¹⁷ Bukhārī, LIV:416 (7554).

¹⁸ This explanation seems awkward, because Ibn al-ʿArabī does not explain why that which comes first overcomes the latter.

What we have told you comes from Him to us/and what we have given to you comes from us to you

As for the “softening of iron,”¹⁹ (it is said) that hardened hearts²⁰ are softened by rebuke and threat as fire softens iron. However, the difficult thing is hearts that are harder than stone,²¹ for fire breaks and calcifies the stone but does not soften it. God softened iron for him so that he could make shields, and (in this act) He called his attention to (the notion) that what attacks you, that is, spears, swords, knives, and arrowheads, are made of the iron from which you make shields. So you protect yourself from iron with iron. The Muḥammadan religion sets forth (the rule): “I seek refuge from You in You.”²² So understand! Thus, this is the spirit of softening iron, for God is both the Avenger and the All-Compassionate, and He gives us success.

¹⁹ “We softened iron for him” (David – Qur’ān 34:10).

²⁰ Qur’ān 39:22.

²¹ Cf. Qur’ān 2:74.

²² Cf. Qur’ān 19:18.

18 The bezel of the wisdom of breath¹ exists in the essence of Jonah

(167) Know that this human formation in its totality, (that is), spirit, body, and soul, was created by God in His image. Only God, who created this structure, can be responsible for its disintegration, whether by His hand or by His command, which is always the case.² Whoever engages in the disintegration of the human structure without receiving God's command wrongs himself, transgresses God's law regarding the human being, and strives to ruin whom God orders to protect his life. Know that feeling pity for God's servants and caring for them are more deserving than jealousy of God.³

David wanted to build the Holy House and built it several times.⁴ However, each time he completed the building, it was ruined. He complained of this to God, who revealed to him: "My House will not be built by one who has shed blood." Then David said: "O my Lord, was this act (of shedding blood) not carried out for Your sake?" God said: "Indeed, but were they not My servants?" David said: "O my Lord, appoint for its building one of my family." Then God revealed to him: "Your son Solomon will build it."

The aim of this story is to preserve this human formation and (to show) that its keeping up is better than its destruction. Do you not see that God imposed poll tax and peace on the enemy of the religion in order to spare human life and said: "If they incline toward peace, incline to it yourself and trust in God" (Qur'ān 8:61)? Do you not see that the Law enjoins the avenger of blood, who is obliged to retaliate, to take ransom, or to forgive? But if the killer refuses, the avenger is allowed

1 Al-Qūnawī and following him al-Qaysarī reads here *ḥikma nafsiyya* (the wisdom of the soul) instead of *ḥikma nafasiyya* (the wisdom of the breath), claiming that the soul, as that which connects body and spirit, or the divine (*barzakh*, isthmus), is like Jonah, who cries out to God from the belly of the fish, just as the soul turns to God. Chittick, "Chapter Headings," p. 31.

2 The last phrase stands between "by His hand" and "by His command." It cannot refer to both phrases, because of the alternative nature of the text, and because God creates by the command "be"; hence, I prefer to attach "which is always the case" to "by His command." This disorderly construction often characterizes the writing of our author.

3 Ibn al-ʿArabī refers here to killing people on account of religious motives, such as the killing of pagans.

4 I did not find the source of this information.

to execute him. God's decision may be seen in the following case: When the avengers of blood are a group and one of them is pleased with blood money or forgives the killer, while the rest only desire to kill him, the Law takes into consideration the one who forgives and his opinion preponderates the opinion of the others who do not forgive, and the wrongdoer will not be executed (168) as a retaliation. Do you not see the Prophet saying of the owner of the thong: "If the avenger of blood kills him, he will be like him"?⁵ Do you not see Him saying: "Requital of an evil deed is an evil deed like it" (Qur'ān 42:40)? Thus, God made the punishment an evil deed, meaning that this act (of punishment) is wrong, notwithstanding its being lawful. "However, whoever forgives and makes peace (between people) will receive his reward from God" (Qur'ān, *ibid.*), because he was created in God's image. Whoever forgives and does not kill receives reward from God, who created him in His image, because he is most deserving the reward, for God created him for this purpose. God is manifested through the external name (*al-ism al-zāhir*), only through the human being's existence. Thus, whoever preserves his own existence preserves the Real.

The human being is not blamable because of his essence, but because of his action, and his action is not him, and we are speaking of his essence. Every action belongs to God, notwithstanding human acts are blameworthy and praiseworthy. God detests blame for the sake of blame. There is nothing blameworthy except that which religion considers so, for the religious blame derives from a rationale (*ḥikma*) known to God or to one God makes know, just as He enacted retribution for the benefit of preserving humanity and deterring one who transgresses God's laws. "In retribution there is life for you, O you wise people" (Qur'ān 2:179). These are people who know things as they really are (*ahl lubb al-shay'*)⁶ and find the mystery of the divine and wise laws. If you know that God preserves this human formation and its persistence, you are most entitled to preserve it, for in that you attain felicity (*sa'āda*); as long as the human being is alive, it is hoped that he will attain the trait of perfection for which he was created. Whoever makes efforts to destroy a human being makes efforts to prevent him from reaching the aim for which he was created.

How good is what God's Messenger said: "Do I not tell you that which is better and more excellent for you than meeting your enemies and killing them and being killed by them? This is the remembrance of God."⁷ That is because only the one who remembers God, a remembrance required of him, knows the value of this human formation, for God is the companion of the one who remembers Him, and the one who remembers witnesses (the existence) of the companion. When the one who remembers does not witness the Real, who is his companion, (169) he does not remember, for the remembrance of God permeates the whole structure of the servant, not only his tongue by which he remembers Him. That is because in

5 A person was found killed, and his thong was taken by the killer, who was identified by a relative of the dead person. When the relative wanted to execute the killer, the Prophet said this sentence. Muslim, XXVIII:32 (1680).

6 Literally: the people of the core of things.

7 Nasā'ī, XXV:24. Tafsīr al-Baghawī to Qur'ān 29:41.

this time, the Real will be specifically the companion only of the tongue, and the tongue will see Him through that which it sees, not through that which the human beings see Him, that is, the sense of sight. Understand this mystery regarding the remembrance of the neglectful (*ghāfilīn*), for the part of the neglectful person which remembers God is present with God, and the remembered is his companion, because He sees him. The neglectful person with respect to his negligence does not remember, hence (God) is not the companion of the neglectful person.

The human being is (composed) of many parts and his essence is not one, while the Essence of the Real is one, but He is many through His names, just as the human being is many through his parts, and the remembrance derived from one part does not necessarily entail the remembrance of another part. Thus, the Real is the companion of the remembering part, while other parts are described as neglectful of remembering. There is necessarily a part in the human being through which he remembers, and the Real is the companion of that part, while the Real takes care of the other parts. The Real does not take upon Himself the destruction of this (human) formation through what is called death. Death is not annihilation (*īdām*), but only the separation (of the parts), meaning that the Real takes the human being to Himself (as God said:) “To Him all things go back” (Qur’ān 11:123).

When the Real takes the human being to Himself, He makes for him a composite formation, different from his present composite body, one appropriate for the kind of abode to which He transfers him.⁸ This is an abode of eternal life, because of its temperance (*li-wujūd al-ītidāl*).⁹ Hence, the human being will never die, meaning, his parts will never be separated.

As for the people of the Fire, they finally attain felicity, but in Hell, for the form of the Fire will become necessarily cool and safe for those who dwell in it at the end of their punishment period. This is their felicity. The felicity of the people of the Fire after exhausting the (sufferings) they deserve is like the felicity of God’s friend (Abraham) when he was thrown into the fire. He suffered, because he saw it, and he knew from his past knowledge (170) that fire causes injury and pain to creatures which come near it. He did not know God’s intention: what the fire was meant to impart to him. However, after experiencing these sufferings, he found the fire cool and safe,¹⁰ though he still witnessed the color (of its flames flashing back at) him, for it was fire in the people’s eyes.

One thing may appear in different forms in the eyes of the beholders. And so it is with the divine self-manifestation. If you wish, you can say that God manifests Himself like this thing, and if you wish, you can say that the cosmos is

⁸ Ibn al-‘Arabī seems here to make a concession to the philosophers who claim that the physical phenomena of the next world mentioned in the Qur’ān are just metaphors illustrating to the common people what they will encounter in the world to come. It is reminiscent of the view that in the world to come God will create a sixth sense by which people will be able to see Him. Abrahamov, *Anthropomorphism*, pp. 17f, 130f.

⁹ In ancient times and the Middle Ages, medicine held the concept that temperance of the essential parts of the body guarantees its health. Often Ibn al-‘Arabī employs the theory of temperance. SPK, pp. 140, 351. See ch. 19, p. 133, n. 8, below.

¹⁰ Qur’ān 21:69.

observed like the Real in His self-manifestation. In the eyes of the beholder, the cosmos takes on different forms accordant with the beholder's temperament, or his temperament differs with the various forms of the self-manifestation. All this is allowable concerning the realities (of the cosmos).

If a dead or killed person, whoever he may be, had died or had been killed and had not returned to God, then God would not have decreed the death of anyone or judged his killing. However, all is in God's grasp, for with respect to Him, no loss has occurred. He established killing as a law and decreed death, for He knows that his servant will not pass away, because he returns to Him as He said: "To Him all things go back" (Qur'ān 11:123), which means that He acts freely (with everything). Everything which comes out of Him is His Essence; moreover, His Ipseity is the essence of everything, and He gives everything its manifestation, as He said, "To Him all things go back" (ibid.).¹¹

¹¹ Loyal to his idea that the cosmos reflects God's names, our author cannot hold the passing away of human beings. Hence, after their death, they continue to live in a different form.

19 The bezel of the wisdom of the unseen¹ exists in the essence of Job

(170) Know that the mystery of life permeates through water, since it is the root of the elements² and foundations (*‘anāṣir, arkān*). For this reason God makes “of water every living thing” (Qur’ān 21:30). Everything in the cosmos is living, for everything celebrates God’s praise;³ however, we can understand this celebration only through divine unveiling (*kashf ilāhī*). Only a living being can praise. Hence everything is living. And the root of everything is water.

Do you not see the Throne, how it rests on the water,⁴ because (171) it was composed of water; it floats on the water, and the water preserves it from beneath. Likewise, God created the human being as a servant and (then) he became haughty and wished to excel Him, but God, notwithstanding, preserved him from beneath, taking into account the seeming loftiness of the servant who is ignorant of himself. This is (illustrated in Muḥammad’s tradition): “If you let a rope fall down, it will fall on God.”⁵ God alluded to His being both below and above in His saying: “They fear their Lord above them” (Qur’ān 16:50, trans. AH), and in His saying: “He is the High Master over His servants” (Qur’ān 6:18, 61). Thus, God possesses the high and the low positions.⁶ For this reason, the six directions⁷ are manifested only through the human being, who (was created) in the image of the Merciful.

There is no sustainer but God. He said regarding a group of people: “If they carried out (the precepts) of the Torah and the Gospel” (Qur’ān 5:66), then He said in an indefinite and general manner: “and what was sent down for them from their Lord” (ibid.). In this last sentence He included every law which was sent down to people through a messenger or inspired human beings. (“If they carried out . . .”), “they would eat from above” (ibid.), because He sustains from above, as is ascribed

¹ According to al-Jandī, al-Kāshānī, and al-Qaysarī, all Job’s states derived from the Unseen. Al-Qūnawī opines that Job had a special connection with the Unseen which enabled him to patiently endure his sufferings. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” pp. 32f.

² The four elements.

³ Cf. Qur’ān 17:44.

⁴ Cf. Qur’ān 11:7.

⁵ Tirmidhī, V:58 (3298).

⁶ The tradition quoted above indicates His low position, and the two verses His high position. Affifi, II, p. 235.

⁷ North, south, east, west, up, down.

to Him, “and from beneath their feet” (ibid.), and sustaining from beneath is (also) ascribed to Him by the medium of His Messenger who transmitted from Him.

If the Throne were not on the water, its existence would not be preserved, for the existence of the living is preserved through life. Do you not see that when the living dies a normal death, the parts of his formation are resolved and his faculties disappear from his unique bodily structure?

God said to Job: “Stamp your foot! This is a place to wash” (Qur’ān 38:42), meaning water, “cool” (ibid.), because of the extreme heat caused by his pain. Therefore, God calmed him with cool water. For this reason, (the core) of medicine is to decrease that which is increased and to increase that which is decreased, with the aim of achieving temperance,⁸ which can be attained only approximately. We say “can be attained only approximately,” that is, temperance, because the (divine) realities and witnesses⁹ are eternally responsible for creation along with the (divine) breaths. Creation derives from an inclination in nature called deviation or decomposition. Regarding God, it is called will (172), which is an inclination toward a specific object of the will, and not to another. Temperance shows that all things are equal, but this is not the case in reality. Hence, we avoid (the use of) the rule of temperance.¹⁰

In the divine prophetic knowledge, the Real is described as content, angry, and (other) attributes. However, contentment nullifies anger and anger nullifies contentment, while temperance means the equality of anger and contentment. One who is angry with someone cannot be content with him at the same time, and vice versa. Such a person is characterized by one of the two traits (anger or contentment), which is an inclination. This statement is aimed at those who claim that God has not ceased to be angry at the people of the Fire. Consequently, they (the people of the Fire) do not enjoy God’s contentment. Thus, our aim is valid. However, if the situation is as we have said, that is, the suffering of the people of the Fire is finally removed, even if they remain in the Fire, this is contentment, for God’s anger disappears, because of the disappearance of suffering. That is because the essence of suffering is the essence of angry, if you understand. The one who is angry suffers, hence he tries to take revenge on the object of his anger by causing him suffering in order to gain relief by his act, and as a result his suffering passes to the object of his anger.

If you separate the Real from the cosmos, He is highly exalted above this quality according to this definition.¹¹ If, however, the Real is the Essence of the world, all the laws emerge from Him and in Him, which is (attested) in his saying: “All things return to Him” (Qur’ān 11:123) in reality and in revelation, and “hence, worship Him and trust Him” (ibid.), while He is veiled and hidden from you. This

⁸ Here Ibn al-‘Arabī refers to the theory of the balance of the temperaments which prevailed in the medicine of the ancient times and the Middle Ages. F. Sanagustin, “Mizādj,” E I2.

⁹ Possibly, here the realities and the witnesses stand for the fixed entities and the divine attributes, respectively.

¹⁰ He means to say that this rule cannot explain the existence and nature of God.

¹¹ The author seems to say that God cannot be described as being angry like the human being. Speaking here of the aloofness of God from the cosmos means that in terrestrial language we consider God as avenger.

is because there cannot be a world more wonderful than the present world (*laysa fi'l-imkān abda' min hādha al-ʿālam*),¹² for it is in the image of the Merciful. God brought the world into existence; that is, His existence is manifested by the manifestation of the world, just as the human being is manifested by the existence of his natural form. We are His external form, while His Ipseity is the spirit which governs the form.¹³ This governing is only in Him, just as it is from Him, for He is the First in essence, and the Last in form.

(173) He is the External through the changing of determinations (of things) and states, and He is the Internal through His governing (of the world), and He is the Knower of everything.¹⁴ He is Witness to everything (Qurʾān 58:6, 85:9), knowing by witnessing and not by reflection. Such is true knowledge gained from mystical experience,¹⁵ not by reflection, which amounts to guessing and conjecture, that in no way is knowledge.

Let us return to Job. He was given water to drink to remove the pain of his thirst, caused by the weariness and suffering inflicted upon him by the Devil.¹⁶ (The weariness and suffering are metaphors) indicating remoteness from the perception of the realities as they really are. Through this perception he (Job) is near God. Everything witnessed is near to the eye, even if the object is far away. That is, sighting (something) makes contact with it, therefore by way of vision it is witness. If he could not see the object, he would not witness it, or the object would make contact with his eyesight in a certain way. This is the closeness between eyesight and its object. For this reason, Job alluded to affliction and attributed it to the Devil. Notwithstanding the nearness of affliction, he said: "He who is far away from me, but his judgment of me is near." Thus, you know that remoteness and closeness are relative values; they are relationships with no essential existence; however, they establish the remote and the close things.

Know that God's mystery exists in Job, of whom He made a lesson for us and a written book about him which this Muḥammadan community reads in order to know its content and to attach itself to its subject in honor of him.¹⁷ God praised Job for his forbearance (*ṣabr*), notwithstanding Job's invocation to remove the injury from him. Thus, we know that when a servant invokes God to remove injury from him, this does not impair his forbearance and his excellence as a servant, for as God said, he "always turns to God" (Qurʾān 38:44), meaning, he directs himself to God, and not to causes. Concerning the removal of injury, the Real acts through a cause, because the servant relies on causes, for the causes which remove something are many, while the Causer is one

¹² The source of this statement is al-Ghazālī, whose wording is somewhat different: "There cannot be a more wonderful entity than this" (*laysa fī'l-imkān abda' mim mā kāna*). For the lengthy discussions in Islamic theology on al-Ghazālī's dictum, see Eric L. Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute over Al-Ghazālī's "Best of All Possible Worlds"*, Princeton 1984.

¹³ For God as governing the world, see Qurʾān 10:3, 31.

¹⁴ For the First, the Last, the External, the Internal, and the Knower, see Qurʾān 57:3.

¹⁵ Literally: taste, *dhawq*, pl. *adhawāq*).

¹⁶ "Bring to mind Our servant Job who cried to his Lord, 'Satan has afflicted me with weariness and suffering'" (Qurʾān 38:41, trans. AH).

¹⁷ Possibly Ibn al-ʿArabī refers to Qurʾān 38:41–44, in which Job is mentioned, because in Islamic culture there is no specific book on him.

entity. The turning of the servant to the single entity which removes injury by a cause is better than turning to a specific cause, which might not coincide with God's knowledge of that cause. Consequently, the servant might say, "God does not (174) answer me," though he does not invoke God, but turns to a specific cause which neither the period nor the moment requires. Because Job was a prophet, he acted according to God's wisdom, because he knew that for the Sufis (*tā'ifa*) forbearance means restraining the soul from complaining; however, this is not our definition of forbearance.

The (true) definition is only restraining the soul from complaining to an entity other than God, not to God. The Sufis confined their approach to the idea that the one who complains impairs his contentment with God's decree (*al-riḍā bi'l-qaḍā'*). However, this is not so, because contentment with God's decree is not impaired by complaining to God or to another entity; however, what is impaired is the contentment with the thing decreed (*al-maḳḍī*). We have not been addressed of the contentment with the thing decreed, because the injury lies in the thing decreed, not in the decree itself. Job knew that in restraining the soul from complaining to God to remove injury there is a resistance to God's compulsion, which amounts to ignorance of the person who does so. That is because (it is) God who puts him to test by causing him pain, hence he should invoke God to remove the painful thing. Moreover, in view of the verifier (*al-muḥaqqiq*), the one who suffers pain should beseech God and ask Him to remove his pain. For according to the gnostic, the one who experiences unveiling, the elimination of pain derives from God, because He describes Himself as "hurt" and said: "Those who hurt God and His Messenger" (Qur'ān 33:57). What hurt is greater than to test you when you are heedless of Him or of a divine station you do not know, so that you will turn to Him complaining and He, as a result, will remove your hurt? Then, your need of Him, which is your reality, becomes true, and the hurt of the Real is removed by your beseeching Him, when he removes it from you, because you are His external form.

This resembles (what happened to) one of the gnostics who suffered hunger and wept, and one of those who has no mystical experience censured him. The gnostic's response was: "He (God) made me hungry only to cause my weeping," meaning, He put me to test with suffering so that I would beseech Him to take away my suffering. "This in no way impairs my being forbearing." Thus, we know that forbearance is only restraining the soul from complaining to an entity other than God. By "other than God" I mean a specific aspect of God. God (*allāh*) established the Real (175) as a specific aspect of Himself called the aspect of Ipseity. So one should invoke Him using this aspect to alleviate an affliction and not to use other aspects called causes, which are identical to Him only with respect to particularizing God's aspects. When the gnostic beseeches His Ipseity in order to cure him of his affliction, he does not prevent himself from knowing that all causes constitute His essence and that each (cause) is a different aspect of Him.

This is a way to which only the Courteous¹⁸ among God's servants cling. Those are the reliable servants who keep God's secrets, for God has reliable servants; only He knows who they are and they know each other. We have counseled you, so act accordingly, and ask Him!

¹⁸ God's courtesy (*adab*) is the rules He promulgated to people, and those who cling to them are called *udabā'*. SPK, p. 175.

20 The bezel of the wisdom of the majesty¹ exists in the essence of John

(175) This is the wisdom of priority regarding names, for God named him Yahyā (he will live), meaning that the memory of Zakariah² will live through him. “We have chosen this name for no one before him” (Qur’ān 19:7). God joined the attribute which existed in the deceased, who left a son through whom his memory will live on, and the name He gave to the son. He named (Zakariah’s son) Yahyā, and the name of the father will live on like experiential knowledge (*al-‘ilm al-dhawqī*).³ Hence, Ādam’s memory lived on in Seth, and Noah’s in Shem (Sām), and this goes on with all the prophets. However, before John, God did not connect anyone’s proper name with the attribute; however, he did so out of concern for Zakariah. This is because he said (to God): “Grant me from Yourself a successor” (Qur’ān 19:5), positing the Real before mentioning his son, just as Āsiya (Pharaoh’s wife) gave precedence to the Neighbor (God) before the house (Paradise), saying: “(My Lord, build for me) a house near You in Paradise” (Qur’ān 66:11).

God honored him by fulfilling his need and naming his son with this attribute, so that his name would be a reminder to what His prophet Zakariah asked Him; that is, because Zakariah preferred the continued remembrance of God in his offspring, for the son is the mystery of his father. Hence, Zakariah said: “who will be my heir and be an heir of Jacob’s family” (Qur’ān 19:6). Regarding them, what is inherited is only the station of the remembrance and invocation of God. Then He announced to him the peace which He bestowed on him the day (176) he was born, the day of his death, and the day he will be raised again to life.⁴ God brought the attribute of life, which is his name, and informed Zakariah of granting peace to his son, and God’s statement is true and certain.

1 As a person who inclined to sorrow and weeping, John represents some of the traits which pertain to God’s majesty (*jalāl*) as against His beauty (*jamāl*), which contains, *inter alia*, gentleness and compassion. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” p. 33.

2 Zakariah was John’s father. Qur’ān 19:7.

3 By this comparison Ibn al-‘Arabī very probably means that just as experiential knowledge lives in one’s memory after the termination of the experience, so the memory of Zakariah will last.

4 Qur’ān 19:15.

If the saying of the Spirit (Jesus), “Peace was on me the day I was born, and will be the day I will die and the day I will be raised again to life” (Qur’ān 19:33), was the most perfect regarding unity, then the present saying (concerning John) was the most perfect regarding both unity and belief and foremost for nullifying incorrect interpretations. What was miraculous about Jesus was that he spoke (in the cradle),⁵ for his intellect was perfect and enabled him to speak at the time God made him speak. The one who is able to speak, being in some state or another, does not necessarily speak the truth, contrary to the one who is the object of God’s witness, like John. Considering this aspect, the peace God granted John is more valuable for reversing obscurity regarding God’s providence than the peace Jesus granted himself, even though the circumstances in his case prove his proximity to God and his truth, for he spoke in the cradle in order to free his mother from the guilt (of fornication). This was one witness (of her innocence), and the other is the dry trunk of a palm tree which dropped fresh fruit without being fertilized by the male,⁶ just as Mary (Maryam) gave birth to Jesus without a male and normal sexual intercourse.

If a prophet said, “My sign and miracle is that this wall will speak,” and the wall says: “You are a liar, you are not God’s messenger,” the sign would be verified and it confirms his being God’s messenger, and no attention should be paid to whatever the wall said.⁷ Since there is a possibility of such an interpretation regarding Jesus’ speech in the cradle as a result of his mother’s allusion to it, the peace granted by God to John is more elevated in this respect.⁸ The proof that he (Jesus) is God’s servant is based on what was said about him being God’s son. Those who believed in his prophecy knew that he was God’s servant only through the proof of his speech. What remains is the increase of possible interpretations based on rational considerations; however, only the future will show his truth concerning all that he said in the cradle. Then, what we have alluded to will be ascertained.

⁵ Qur’ān 19:29.

⁶ Ibid., 19:23, 25.

⁷ The miracle is the wall’s speech and not the content of it.

⁸ God’s saying is more elevated than the miracle performed by Jesus in the cradle.

21 The bezel of the wisdom of the dominion¹ exists in the essence of Zakariah

(177) Know that God's Mercy encompasses everything² that relates to existence and rule³ and that the existence of His Wrath derives from His Mercy with His Wrath. His Mercy precedes His Wrath, meaning that the relation of Mercy to Him precedes the relation of Wrath to Him.⁴ Since every essence has an existence which it seeks from God, His Mercy encompasses every essence, for with the Mercy by which He is Merciful He fulfills the essence's request to have existence and then brings it into existence. For this reason we said that God's Mercy encompasses everything with respect to existence and rule.

The divine names belong to the (genus of) things and they derive from one essence. The first thing God's Mercy encompassed was the thingness (*shay'yya*) of the essence which brought into existence Mercy through Mercy.⁵ The first thing Mercy encompassed was itself, then its thingness, to which we have alluded, then the thingness of every existent which is brought into existence unendingly with respect to this world and the next, accidents and atoms (*jawhar wa-ʿaraḍ*), composed and simple things. No consideration is given to attaining an aim or concord in nature, but all the fitting and unfitting things are embraced in God's Mercy with respect to (their) existence.

We have mentioned in *The Meccan Revelation (al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya)* that only the nonexistent exerts influence, not the existent, and if the existent exerts influence, it is as if it is nonexistent.⁶ This is a strange knowledge and a rare issue known only to the people of imagination through experience (*dhawq*). As for those not influenced by imagination, they are far removed from this issue.

1 God gave Zakariah power, which affects his aspirations. Hence, this chapter is entitled according to Zakariah's unique characteristic. Chittick, "Chapter Headings," pp. 33f.

2 Qur'ān 7:156. See [ch. 16](#).

3 God not only brings things into existence, but also has dominion over them, in that He compels them to behave in specific ways.

4 First of all, He should be qualified by Mercy, and then by Wrath.

5 Mercy as an existent has an essence which brings it into existence, and this existence must be created by Mercy itself, but with respect to essence and not to activity.

6 Ibn al-'Arabī refers here to the act of the spirit and imagination which exerts influence on the coming of things into existence. *Futūḥāt*, Vol. I, pp. 141f ([ch. 2](#), the last paragraph).

God's Mercy permeates (all) beings/existing in essences and entities

The position of Mercy is the highest if you know/through the evidence of discursive reasoning

(178) Everything mentioned by Mercy is happy, and there is nothing that is not mentioned by Mercy. The Mercy's mention of things amounts to bringing them into existence. Every existent is the object of Mercy. O God's friend, do not be veiled from perceiving what we have said because you have considered the afflictions people suffer and because you believe the torments of the next world will not cease to plague those people.

First you should know Mercy alone is bringing into existence, in general, for through Mercy torments are brought into existence. Also, Mercy exerts influence in two ways. Its first effect is on the essence, meaning it brings every existent essence into existence, without any regard for a specific aim or absence thereof, or for suitability or lacks of it, because it only heeds the essence of every existent before its existence. Moreover, it concerns itself with the thing (purely) as a fixed entity (*'ayn thābita*). For this reason, it sees the god created in beliefs as one of the fixed entities, and hence has mercy⁷ on it through bringing it into existence. Because of this, we said that the god created in beliefs is the first thing on which mercy is bestowed after Mercy bestows mercy on Itself, (when we refer to) its connection to the bringing of existents into existence. Another effect Mercy has is initiated by request. The veiled ones ask the Real to have mercy on them in their belief, while the people of revelation ask God's mercy to exist in them, and request it by God's name, saying: "O God, have mercy on us" (Qur'ān 23:109). The mercy that is shown to them is only the existence of mercy in them, which is the dominating principle (*ḥukm*) that exists in them, for the dominating principle is actually the accident that exists in the substrate (*al-ma'nā al-qā'im bi'l-maḥall*). This accident is that which actually has mercy on them, for God has no mercy on His servants for whom He feels concern, only through (His attribute of) Mercy. When mercy exists in them they experientially find its dominating principle. When Mercy remembers a person, it has mercy on him. The active participle is both *raḥīm* and *rāḥim*. The dominating principle is not described as created, because it is an accident required by the essence (of Mercy).

The states (*aḥwāl*)⁸ are neither existent nor nonexistent; that is, they have no concrete essence in existence, because they are relationships. (179) Concerning the dominating principle, they are not nonexistent, because the one possesses knowledge is called "the knower," which is a state. And a knower is an essence qualified by knowledge, yet the state of knowledge neither constitutes the essence of the knower nor the essence of knowledge. There is only knowledge and an essence in which knowledge exists. Being a knower means a state of essence that

⁷ Mercy with an uppercase letter indicates God's attribute, while the lowercase points to the action of this attribute, or the accident.

⁸ Ibn al-'Arabī here employs two terms to designate first the accident (*ma'nā*, pl. *ma'ānin*) and second the result of the accident (*ḥāl*, pl. *aḥwāl*).

is qualified by the accident (of knowledge). The relationship between knowledge and its substrate is termed the knower.

Actually, Mercy is attributed to the Merciful, which means that Mercy entails the dominating principle and shows mercy. Whoever brings mercy into existence in the recipient does not do so to show mercy, but rather to bring it into existence to cause the recipient to have mercy.⁹ God is not a substrate of accidents (*ḥawādith*), hence He is not a substrate in which mercy is brought into existence. However, He is the Merciful, and He is worthy of this quality only because Mercy exists in Him. Consequently, it is confirmed that He is identified with Mercy Itself.¹⁰

Whoever does not experience (literally: taste – *dhāqa*) this issue and has no part in it does not venture to say that God is identical with Mercy or with any other attribute, but he may say that He is neither this attribute nor other than it.¹¹ In his view, the Real's attributes are neither Himself nor other than Himself, for he cannot deny them or make them identical with His essence.¹² He inclines toward this expression, which is good; however, another expression is a more appropriate response to the question and may remove obstacles. This is the view which denies the realities of the attributes as existents in the essence of the qualified entity (the Real). They (the attributes) are only relationships and attributions between the qualified entity and their intelligible essences.

Even though Mercy is comprehensive, it differs relative to each divine name.¹³ For this reason, God is requested to show His Mercy to people through every name. Hence, God's Mercy and the pronoun connected with it¹⁴ encompass everything. Mercy has many branches, owing to the multiplicity of the divine names. However, when God is asked to have mercy on someone through a specific name, Mercy is not comprehensive regarding that name or another. Even regarding the name the Avenger, one who seeks revenge is allowed to say: "O Avenger, have Mercy on me." That is because these names refer to the Essence indicated, but through their real expressions they point (180) to different meanings.¹⁵ By these names that exist in Mercy, one invokes (God) in their reference to the Essence which is indicated by

⁹ God wants people to be merciful, hence He brings Mercy into existence in them. Affīfī, I, p. 179, n. 3.

¹⁰ Since God is not a body, He cannot be the recipient of accidents, and the only possibility to affirm His being the Merciful is to state that He and Mercy are one entity, just as His other attributes are related to Him. In holding this view, Ibn al-ʿArabī seems to have adopted Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf's (d. between 840 and 850) solution to the problem of God's attributes. According to Abū al-Hudhayl, the attributes are none but God. The attributes do not constitute separate spiritual entities within God, but are identified with His essence. Thus, God is Merciful by virtue of Mercy, which is Himself. H.A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, Cambridge, MA 1970, pp. 225–232.

¹¹ Strangely enough, Ibn al-ʿArabī ignores the fact mentioned in the preceding note. Did he not know that this is a Muʿtazilite approach acquired by the use of reason?

¹² This is the view of Ibn Kullāb on God's attributes. J. van Ess, "Ibn Kullāb," E I2. See p. 309, n. 19 above.

¹³ Mercy acts through giving sustenance, through bestowing knowledge, etc. Kāshānī, p. 454.

¹⁴ By this the author means My Mercy (*rahmatī*). Qurʾān 7:156.

¹⁵ One turns to God's essence, but in its capacity as Sustainer, Avenger, etc.

a specific name and no other; one does not invoke the name which is different from other names (but God's Essence). (With respect to) its indicating of the Essence, a name does not differ from another, but it is distinct from another through its own characteristic, because it is a reality distinct from other names through its essence irrespective of any acceptable name referring to it, even though all the names are directed to show one Essence. There is no controversy that each name has its own rule which no other name possesses. This should be taken into account, just as one should take into account the notion that each name points to the indicated Essence. For this reason, Abū al-Qāsim ibn Qasī¹⁶ said regarding the divine names that each separate name is named by all the other names; if you give a name priority by mentioning it, you depict it by all the names, because it points to one essence, even if there are many names for this essence and their realities are numerous.

Mercy can reach people in two ways. (The first is) the way of necessity, as He said: "I shall decree it for those who fear (God) and give alms" (Qur'ān 7:156), and (Mercy also includes) the theoretical and practical attributes by which He restricts them. The second way in which Mercy can reach people is by divine grace, which is not a reaction to the human being's act, and this is his saying: "My Mercy encompasses everything" (ibid.).¹⁷ To this second way of Mercy refers the verse "so that God may forgive you your earlier and later sins" (Qur'ān 48:2) and the tradition "Do all you wish, for God has already forgiven you."¹⁸ So know this!

¹⁶ He died in 1151. Abrahamov, *Ibn al-ʿArabī and the Sufis*, pp. 145–150.

¹⁷ This statement in Qur'ān 7:156 immediately follows the first statement and can be interpreted to mean that this first Mercy is the same Mercy that is given to the God-fearing. However, loyal to his doctrine, Ibn al-ʿArabī distinguishes between two kinds of Mercy. See [ch. 16](#) above.

¹⁸ Ibn Ḥanbal, I: 492.

22 The bezel of the wisdom of the intimacy¹ exists in the essence of Elias

(181) Eliās is Idrīs. He was a prophet before Noah, and God raised him “to a high position” (Qur’ān 19:57).² He dwells in the heart of the celestial spheres, that is, the sphere of the sun. Afterward, he was sent to a town named Baalbek; Baal is the name of an idol, and Bek is the ruler of this town. This idol called Baal was characterized as a ruler. Eliās, who is Idrīs, had a vision of the mountain named Lubnān, from *lubāna*, meaning a need, which was split open to reveal a fiery horse, all of whose organs were made of fire. When Eliās saw the horse, he mounted it and consequently passion left him, and he became an intellect without passion and with no connection to the intentions of the (lower) soul. In him the Real was transcendent, and hence he knew half the knowledge of God, for when the intellect learns the sciences governed only by speculation, it knows God only as transcendent, not as immanent. (But) when God gives the human being knowledge through revelation, his knowledge of God becomes perfect, thus he regards God as transcendent in one way and immanent in another and sees the permeation of the Real in natural and elemental forms, so that he sees the Real’s Essence in their (the forms) essences.

This is the perfect knowledge which was brought by the religions God sent down, and through this knowledge all (kinds of) imagination have dominion over (human beings). For this reason, the power of imagination is stronger in this world than the power of the intellect, for whatever the intelligent person attains through his intellect, he is not free of the power of imagination over his objects of intellection. Imagination is the greatest power in this perfect human form, and the revealed religions brought it. The religions made God transcendent and immanent, likening Him (*shabbaha*) in His transcendence (*tanzīh*) through imagination and making Him transcendent (*nazzaha*) in His immanence (*tashbīh*) through the intellect. Each is connected with the other, so that (182) transcendence cannot be free of immanence, and vice versa. God said: “There is nothing like Him” (Qur’ān 42:11), thus making Himself transcendent and immanent, and “He is the All-Hearing and the All-Seeing” (ibid., trans. AH), thus making Himself immanent.

¹ Intimacy is ascribed to Elias, because he became intimate with both angels and human beings. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” p. 34.

² See ch. 4 above.

This is the greatest verse of transcendence ever sent down, even though it is not free of immanence because of the letter *kāf* (like).³ He is therefore the greatest knower of Himself, and He expressed Himself only in the way we mentioned. Also He said: “Your Lord, the Lord of Might, is exalted above their description (of Him)” (Qur’ān 37:180). They describe God in terms of their rational perception. God placed Himself above their (perception) of His transcendence, because they limit Him by that transcendence, for their intellect is unable to perceive the (true) transcendence.

Then all religions brought (notions) dominated by imagination. They did not free the Real from any attribute through which He manifests Himself. All religions said and brought the same (ideas concerning God). The religious communities act accordingly and, as a result, God bestowed on them His self-manifestation, hence they adhered to God’s messengers as God’s inheritors, imitating what He said: “God knows best where to place His message” (Qur’ān 6:124, trans. AH). (The word) “God” in “God knows best” has two aspects: First, it is a predicate of God’s messengers,⁴ and second, it is a subject of “knows best where to place His message.” The two aspects are true regarding God; therefore, we hold immanence in transcendence and vice versa.

After establishing this issue, we drop the veils and lower the curtains over the eyes of the critic and the believer, even though both are among the forms in which the Real manifests Himself. However, we are ordered to cover (their eyes), so that the differences in the predispositions of the forms may be manifested and so that (we may know) that the one who manifests Himself does so according to the predisposition of a certain form; its reality and inherent traits are necessarily attributed to Him. For example, one sees the Real in his sleep and does not deny his vision; this is undoubtedly the Real Himself. As a result, the inherent traits of this form and its realities through which the Real manifests Himself in sleep are attached (to this vision). After one wakes up, one can pass from that which one sees in sleep to something else which, according to the intellect, requires transcendence. If the person who interprets his vision possesses unveiling (*kashf*) and belief (*īmān*), he does not pass from the vision to transcendence alone, but gives both transcendence and the form appearing in sleep (= immanence) that which they deserve. (183) For God is actually an expression (to be interpreted) by one who understands allusions.

The spirit of this wisdom and its frame (*fāṣṣ* – literally: bezel) lies in the division into that which affects (*mu’aththir*) and that which is affected (*mu’aththar*).

3 The exact translation of *ka-mithlihi* (like Him) is “like (*ka*) his simile,” which means that God has simile, consequently He is not transcendent but immanent, although His simile is not like other similes. Hence, even the first part of the verse implies both transcendence and immanence. See pp. 38, 78 above.

4 In the verse indicated, the phrase “God’s messengers” precedes the word “God,” and thus God becomes the predicate of God’s messengers. This signifies the identification of the messengers with God, an indication of immanence, whereas the second aspect indicates a distance between God and His messengers.

These are two expressions, the first of which in every respect, in every state, and in every realm is God, and the second in every respect, in every state, and in every realm is the world. When this wisdom comes to you, attach everything to its appropriate source, for that which comes to you is necessarily and always a branch stemming from a root, just as the Divine Love derives from the human being's supererogatory acts. This is an affect (sign – *athar*) between that which affects and that which is affected, just as the Real is His servant's hearing, seeing, and power, which derive from this love. This is an established affect which cannot be denied, because religion proves it, if you are a believer. As for a sane individual, he is either one who experienced divine self-manifestation in a natural manifestation and knows what we are talking about, or a Muslim believer who trusts that which is documented in the *Ṣaḥīḥ*.⁵ The imagination dominates necessarily the person who seeks that which the Real brought in this form, because he believes in it. As for the person who is not a believer, he governs his imagination through imagination, rationally thinking that he ascribes to God that which self-manifestation gives him in his vision, while his imaginings in this case do not leave him, for he is unaware of his negligence of himself. Concerning this, God said: "If you call on Me, I will answer you" (Qur'ān 40:60).⁶ God said: "If My servants ask you about Me, I am near. I will answer the one who calls Me, when one does so" (Qur'ān 2:186), for He does not answer, unless there is one who calls Him, even though the one who calls and the one who answers are the same.

There is no controversy concerning the variety of forms. No doubt, they are twofold. All these forms are like Zayd's organs; it is known that Zayd is one individual reality, (however) his hand is other than the forms of his leg, head, eye, and eyebrow. He is many and one (at the same time), (184) many in forms and one in essence, just as the human being is no doubt one in essence. 'Amr is undoubtedly distinct from Zayd, Khālīd, and Ja'far, and the individuals of this single essence (humankind) are infinite in existence. Even though the human being is one in essence, he has many forms and (his essence exists in many) individuals.⁷

If you are a believer, you know for certain that God will manifest Himself on the Day of Resurrection in a specific form and will be known, then change His form and will be not known, then once again change his form and will be known; it is He, not other than He, who manifests Himself in every form. It is known that each form is distinct from another; it is as if the Single Essence is reflected in a mirror, and when the beholder looks at the mirror and sees the form of his God in belief, he knows and confirms it. If it happens that he sees the form of another

5 This term refers to the two collections of the traditions, al-Bukhārī's and Muslim's, and indicates their reliability. Here Ibn al-'Arabī alludes to the tradition of the supererogatory works mentioned above.

6 Our author wishes to say that one should call on God and not be satisfied with his own intellect, which is deluded by his imagination. One believes that one rationally reasons, but actually is misled by fancies. Hence, one needs God's help.

7 For a possible influence of al-Ghazālī on the Greatest Master in this issue of the one and the many, see Abrahamov, *Ibn al-'Arabī and the Sufis*, pp. 121–124.

God in belief, he will not know Him, just as one sees in the mirror his form and the form of another person. The mirror is a single essence, yet the beholder sees many forms in the mirror, which (itself) has no comprehensive form, though the mirror affects the forms in one aspect and not in another. It affects the forms through the reflection of different measures, such as smallness, largeness, tallness, and broadness, which go back to the mirror. The changes that take place in mirrors derive from their different measures. If you look, for example, at one mirror among these, you do not look at all of them, just as you look at God with respect to His Essence, because He does not need anything. (And if) you look at Him with respect to His names, it is as if you are looking at many mirrors. If your soul looks at a divine name, its reality appears in you. This is the idea, if you understand.

Do not worry and do not be afraid, because God loves bravery even in killing a snake, and the snake is only your soul. The snake is a snake because of itself in form and in reality. And a thing is not killed on its own. Even if you destroy the form in your sense perception, (185) its definition preserves it and the imagination does not remove it. If this is the case, then the essences are safe, strong, and protected (from damage), for you cannot destroy the definitions (of the essences). What strength is better than this? You can imagine that you killed (someone); however, through imagination and intellectual perception his form remains with its definition.⁸ The proof of this (is): “You (Muḥammad) did not throw when you threw, but God threw” (Qur’ān 8:17). The eye of the beholder saw only Muḥammad’s form, and the sense of sight affirmed it throwing. First, God denied the act of throwing, then He affirmed it (“when you threw”), and finally corrected (the first phrase) by saying that it is God who threw in Muḥammad’s form.⁹ One must believe in this. Consider this effective factor through which God appeared in the form of Muḥammad. God Himself, not one of us, informed His servants of this. His message is true, and belief in it is obligatory, whether you perceive the knowledge (in the message) or not, be you a learned person or Muslim believer.

What proves the weakness of intellectual speculation is the judgment of the intellect that a cause cannot be an effect of the thing for which it serves as a cause. This is clearly the judgment of the intellect. However, in the science of self-manifestation, a cause can be the effect of the thing for which it is a cause. The judgment of the intellect is right,¹⁰ but its speculation must be revisited. The aim of this reconsideration is to say the following: After it was established that the Essence is one in many, then with respect to its being a cause of a certain effect in a certain form, it cannot be an effect of its effect in the state of its being a cause, but its aspect (of being a cause) changes when it moves in the forms, so that it

⁸ When one destroys a thing, one destroys its sensual existence; however, one cannot destroy a species, for example humankind, or the imaginable form of a thing.

⁹ In theological debates the verse cited serves to prove God’s predetermination. See, for example, al-Rāzī, *Maṣāṭīḥ al-ghayb*, part 15, p. 139.

¹⁰ With respect to the intellect, the procedure that a cause has an effect is correct. The question arises whether this procedure is suitable for explaining the phenomena in the cosmos.

becomes an effect of its effect, so that its effect becomes a cause to it (the effect).¹¹ If one reconsiders things as they really are and does not stop at his rational thinking, one attains this aim. If such is the case regarding causality, what do you think about expanding rational speculation into other difficult realms?¹²

The messengers are the most intelligent people, and the message they brought (186) stemmed from the Divine Presence (*al-janāb al-ilāhī*).¹³ They affirmed what the intellect affirmed and added what the intellect alone cannot perceive and what the intellect considers immediately as absurdity but acknowledges (it as true) after God's self-manifestation. When a person is alone, by himself, he is perplexed regarding what he has seen; if he is a servant of his Lord, he ascribes his intellect to Him, and if he is a servant of his own speculation, he ascribes the Real to the rule of the intellect. This is so only as long as he remains in this world, being veiled from the next world while in this life, for the gnostics outwardly appear here as if they were in the form of this world, because they are dominated by the rules of this world; however, no doubt, God transforms their outward appearance into the inward appearance of the next world. In their outward form they are known (really) only to those to whom God has revealed their insight so that they can perceive (the true nature of the gnostics). The gnostics are only those people who know the divine self-manifestation, because they possess the form of the next world. They are gathered (*ḥashr*) in this world for the Last Judgment and resurrected in their tombs, and they see what you cannot see, and witness what you cannot witness, because of God's Providence for some of His servants.

Whoever wishes to find this wisdom of Elias (who was) Idrīs, whom God twice brought into being – first, because he was a prophet before Noah, and then was raised up to heaven and then descended as a messenger, thus God joined for him the two positions (prophethood and mission) – must give up the domination of his intellect in favor of his desire. Then he will be a pure animal so that he can discover what every animal discovers, except the jinn and mankind (*al-thaqalāni*),¹⁴ and so will realize his animality. Elias possessed two signs, the first being this discovery; he could see the one tormented in the grave and the one who was delighted therein, and he could see the dead alive, the dumb speaking, and the

11 Let us try to explain the last sentence. Since the cosmos is the reflection of God's Essence, which means that it exists in every form, and since the Essence is the cause of the cosmos, one can state that the Essence is both a cause and an effect. Also, with respect to a certain form, which contains as noted the essence, it is both a cause and an effect. Moreover, one can state that an effect, that is, a certain form, may produce another effect, thus being an effect of its effect.

12 If rational speculation fails in the basic principle of causality, which is the cornerstone of every investigation, how much more so when it is applied to other problematic issues. It is worth noting that Aristotle at the very beginning of his *Metaphysics* points out the importance of causation in science.

13 Chittick translates this phrase as the Divine Side. SPK, p. 39.

14 Literally: the two heavy ones. Qur'ān 55:31. Here Ibn al-Arabī expresses the idea that in order to receive revelation one must relinquish all his knowledge.

sitting walking. The second sign is dumbness, for if he wished to speak of what he saw, he would be unable to do so; consequently, he would realize his animality.¹⁵

A student among us experienced such a revelation, but he did not become dumb, and so did not realize his animality. (But) when God placed me in this station, I fully realized my animality; I saw (things) and wished to speak (187) of what I had witnessed, but I could not, so there was no differentiating between me and the dumb, who cannot speak.

When an individual (like Elias) realizes what we have mentioned, he will be transformed into a state of pure intellect in an unnatural material, witness things that are the sources of the manifest natural forms, and know with intuitive knowledge (*‘ilm dhawqī*) from where this rule of the natural forms is manifested. If he experiences a revelation (which communicates to him) that nature is the same as the Breath of the Merciful, he will be given great benefit. If he is confined to what we have mentioned, this measure will suffice him to know what dominates his intellect. Then he will join the gnostics and know intuitively (the verse): “It was not you who killed them but God” (Qur’ān 8:17, trans. AH); only the iron and the striker and He who is behind these forms killed them. The killing and the throwing occurred by the joining of these elements, and in seeing things in their roots and forms, he thus completes his knowledge.¹⁶ If he witness the Breath (of the Merciful), he is both complete and perfect (in his knowledge), because he sees only God as the essence of what he sees, thus identifying the seer and the object of seeing. This measure (of explanation) is enough, and God guides us to the right way.

¹⁵ Ibn al-‘Arabī argues that al-Ghazālī could not attain unveiling because he failed to erase from his heart the sciences he had learned. Abrahamov, *Ibn al-‘Arabī and the Sufis*, pp. 131–133.

¹⁶ Meaning that his knowledge has all the elements needed, that is, the roots and the forms.

23 The bezel of the wisdom of virtue¹ exists in the essence of Luqmān

(187) If God wills Himself to desire sustenance/then all of Being is His food

If He wills us to desire sustenance/He is the food as He wills

His will is His desire, then adhere to it/He wills it, and it is the object of his will

He desires both increase and decrease/and what He wills is the object of His will

This is the difference between them, then realize (it)/from another perspective, their essence is the same²

(188) God said: “We gave Luqmān wisdom” (Qur’ān 31:12), “and whoever is given wisdom, is given much good” (Qur’ān 2:269). Thus, in the Qur’ān, (that is), through God’s witness, Luqmān possessed much good. Wisdom may be spoken or unspoken, as Luqmān said to his son: “My son, if even the weight of a mustard seed were hidden in a rock or anywhere in the heavens or earth, God would bring it (to light)” (Qur’ān 31:16). This is wisdom that is spoken, an act of God which He transmitted and affirmed in His Book; it is not ascribed to the one who utters it. However, unspoken wisdom is known by its circumstantial connections, for God neither spoke of the one to whom this seed was brought nor mentioned him, and Luqmān did not say to his son that God would bring it to him or to someone else. God spoke of this bringing in general, and placed the thing brought either in the heavens or on earth to call the thinker’s attention to God’s saying, “He is God in the heavens and the earth” (Qur’ān 6:3).

Through the spoken and the unspoken (content), Luqmān draws attention to (the idea) that the Real is the Essence of every known thing, for the known is more general than the thing, because (the Real) is most indefinite of all. Then he completed and exhausted the wisdom so that the cosmos (*nash’a*) will be perfected by it and said: “God is the All-Subtle (*laṭīf*)” (Qur’ān 31:16). Owing to His grace

¹ God gave Luqmān wisdom (Qur’ān 31:12), and the Qur’ān (2:269) connects wisdom with doing good or virtue. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” pp. 34f. All traditional scholars, except for ‘Ikrima, regard Luqmān as a sage and not as a prophet. Notwithstanding, he appears in most books of *Qīṣaṣ al-anbiyā’* (Stories of the Prophets). E I2.

² It seems that *mashī’a* (will) is the essential will which cannot be changed, while *irāda* (desire) is usually embodied in God’s prescriptions, which may be obeyed or not. See [ch. 11](#) above. Here one cannot differentiate between the two terms.

(*luṭf*) and subtlety (*laṭāfa*), regarding the thing that is so named and so defined, He is its essence, so that of this thing it is said about it only what its name indicates through agreement and usage. Thus, one speaks of the heaven, the earth, the rock, the tree, the animal, the angel, the sustenance, and the food.

The essence of everything and in everything is one, just as the Ash‘arites said that the whole world takes the form of one substance, which is the core of our view, that the essence is one.³ Then the Ash‘arites said that each thing varies by its accidents. This is also our view that things are different and multiply through forms and relationships, so that they are distinct from each other, and so one may say this thing is different from that thing with respect to its form or accident or temperament. You may say whatever you wish. Yet this is the same thing as that with respect to its substance; for this reason, (189) the same substance exists in each form and temperament. However, we say that substance is in fact the Real. But the speculative thinker (*mutakallim*) assumes that what is named substance, even though it is real, is not identified with the essence of the Real of which the people of revelation and self-manifestation speak. This is the wisdom of His being the All-Subtle (*laṭīf*).

Then he (Luqmān) described (God) as the All-Knowing (*khabīr*), meaning knowing through experience (*ikhtibār*, or putting something to the test). As He said: “We shall test you in order to know” (Qur’ān 47:31); and this (then) is knowledge through experience (*ilm al-adhwāq*). In spite of His knowledge of things as they really are, God made Himself acquire knowledge. We are incapable of denying what the Real determined about Himself, for He distinguished between experiential knowledge and unrestricted knowledge, because the former is limited by the (human) faculties. He said of Himself that He is the essence of His servant’s faculties when he said: “I am his hearing,”⁴ which is one of the servant’s faculties, as well as His seeing, and His tongue, foot, and hand, which are the servant’s organs. In His definition (of the human being), He did not limit Himself to the faculties alone, but also mentioned the human organs, for the servant is nothing but organs and faculties. Thus, the essence of what is named “the servant” is the Real. This does not imply the identification of the servant with the master, because the relationships (between the servant and God’s names) are differentiated on account of themselves, while the essence to which they refer is not differentiated, because in all relationships only His Essence exists. This one essence (alone) combines all relationships, references, and attributes.

Part of Luqmān’s complete wisdom in instructing his son is these two divine names which he brought forth in this verse, the All-Subtle and the All-Knowing, by which he named God. However, had Luqmān placed the two names in being, that is in existence, saying, “God is (*kāna*) (the All-Subtle, the All-Knowing),”

³ See p. 92, n. 28 above.

⁴ For this tradition, see [ch. 1](#), n. 81.

his wisdom would have been more complete and deeper.⁵ God related Luqmān's utterance exactly as he said it, without adding anything to it, even though (190) the words "God is the All-Subtle, the All-Knowing" were God's words, for God knew that Luqmān would have completed his utterance with these words, had he concluded what he was saying.

As for His saying, "if even the weight of a mustard seed" (Qur'ān 31:16) for whom it is food, (the weight of a mustard seed) is only the atom, mentioned in His verses: "Whoever has done a speck's weight of good, will see it, and whoever has done a speck's weight of evil, will see it" (Qur'ān 99:7–8, trans. on the basis of AH). (Whoever eats this speck) is the smallest feeder, for the master seed is the smallest (speck of) food. If there had been a smaller particle, God would have produced it, as His verse says, "God does not shy away from giving an example of a gnat or something higher" (Qur'ān 2:26). Now, since He knew that nothing is smaller than a gnat, He said, "or something higher," meaning concerning smallness. This is God's saying here and also in Qur'ān 99. Know this, for we know that God does not restrict Himself to the weight of a speck, while there is something smaller than that, because He brought it forth for the purpose of exaggeration, and God knows best.

As for his forming a diminutive of his son's name (*bunayya*), it is a diminutive of mercy. Because of his mercy, he advised his son that if he acts properly, he will gain happiness. The wisdom of his advice lies in forbidding him from "attributing associates to God, for attributing associates to Him is a great evil" (Qur'an 31:13). This evil refers to God's state of unity, because it describes Him as divided (into parts), while He is one Essence, and this is the utmost ignorance, because His Essence is His only associate.

The reason for this is that the person who does not possess the knowledge of things as they really are and of their reality does not know that when the Essence appears to him in different forms, this difference goes back to one essence, hence he makes each form an associate of the essence, and each form becomes a part of this essence. However, it is well known regarding an associate that what distinguishes it from that with which it is an associate is not the essence of another associate, because the other is distinguished by something else. (191) Consequently, really there is no associate, because among the things of which we say they are associates, each associate has a distinguishing element of its own. The reason for this (view) is general association. Even if it is general, the ability of each associate to freely act cancels its generality. "Say: 'Call on God, or call on the Merciful'" (Qur'ān 17:110).⁶ This is the spirit of the subject (here discussed).

⁵ Probably by the addition of this verb, Ibn al-ʿArabī intends to say that God always, in the past, present, and future, knows and puts humans to the test, and that these traits are components of His fixed relationships with the cosmos. *Kāshānī*, p. 482.

⁶ According to this verse, there is no difference between God's names, because they are related to one essence.

24 The bezel of the wisdom of leadership¹ exists in the essence of Aaron

(191) Know that Aaron's existence stemmed from the presence of divine Mercy (*raḥamūt*),² because God said: "We have bestowed on him," that is, on Moses, "out of Our Mercy, his brother Aaron as a prophet" (Qur'ān 19:53). His prophethood derived from the presence of divine Mercy, because he was older than Moses, nevertheless Moses was greater than him in prophethood. Since Aaron's prophethood derived from the presence of divine Mercy, he said to his brother Moses, "O son of my mother" (Qur'ān 20:94), calling on him by his mother, not by his father, because mercy is more fitted to the mother than to the father. Had the mother not possessed mercy, she would not have had the forbearance to rear children.

Then he (Aaron) said: "Do not seize my beard, nor my head (*ibid.*), and do not make my enemies gloat over me" (Qur'ān 7:150). All this is a breath of Mercy's breaths. The reason for this was that Moses did not look carefully at the tablets he threw down from his hands. Had he looked carefully at the tablets, he would have found in them guidance and mercy. Guidance is an explanation of the event that made Moses angry and of which Aaron was guiltless. Aaron found mercy in his brother's (behavior), because Moses did not seize Aaron's beard before the eyes of his people, taking into consideration his brother's older age. Aaron felt pity for Moses, because Aaron's prophethood derived from God's Mercy, and only mercy derives from His Mercy.

Thereafter Aaron said to Moses, "I was afraid you would say, 'You have caused division among the children of Israel'" (Qur'ān 20:94, trans. AH), thus making me the cause of their division, (192) for the worship of the calf divided them. Some of them worshiped the calf, following the Sāmīrī³ and imitating him, while some others abstained from worshipping it until Moses' return so that they could ask him about it. Aaron was afraid that Moses would attribute this sin to him. However, Moses knew the matter better than Aaron, because he knew of that which the people of the calf worshiped, and he also knew that God had decreed to worship only Him, and what God ordains will surely happen. Moses reproached

¹ Leadership (*imāma*) is ascribed to Aaron, because he was appointed as a leader both by God and by his brother Moses. Chittick, "Chapter Headings," p. 35.

² This term is built on the pattern of *jabarūt* and *malakūt*.

³ See p. 104, n. 4 above.

his brother Aaron, because he denied that God's essence permeates everything.⁴ That is because the gnostic sees the Real in everything; moreover, he regards Him as the essence of everything. Thus, Moses taught Aaron by granting him knowledge, even though Aaron was older than him.

For this reason, since Aaron said to Moses what he said, the latter returned to the Sāmīrī, saying to him, "What was the matter with you, O Sāmīrī?" (ibid., 95); that is, what did you make when you turned to the specific form of the calf? You made this form using the ornaments of the people until you deceived them because you took their property. Jesus (explained this phenomenon), saying: "O Children of Israel, the heart of every human being lies in the place of his property, thus, if you place your property in the heaven, your hearts will be there" (Matthew 6:21). Property (*māl*) is so called, because essentially the heart inclines (*tamīlu*) to it through worship.⁵ This is the greatest aim admired by the heart, because of its desire for it.

Forms do not last, and the form of the calf would necessarily have perished, had not Moses hurried to burn it. His fervor overcame his nature and he burned the calf and scattered its ashes upon the sea. Thereafter, he said to the Sāmīrī: "Look at your god" (Qur'ān 20:97). He called it a "god" in the manner of calling attention in order to teach, because he knew that the calf is one of God's manifestations. (He said), "I will surely burn it" (*lanuḥariqannahu* – ibid.).⁶ (Moses said this) because the animality of the human being can act freely over the animality of the animal, for God subjects animals to the human being (193), especially regarding a thing which is not an animal, which is more subject to the human being, because the inanimate things have no will and are controlled by that which acts freely over them without their being able to resist.

As for the animal, it possesses will and aim, and it can refuse to do some acts, and if it is able to manifest such a behavior, it can show defiant attitude toward what the human being wants from it. If the animal does not have the power (to resist), or if the (human wish) coincides with the aim of the animal, it obeys submissively to the human will. In like manner, the human being obeys a command, by which God raises him above others, because he hopes to attain some profit from his obedience. The profit is sometimes called reward, as He says: "We have raised some of them above others in rank, so that some may subject others" (Qur'ān 43:32, based on AH). Only because of his animality, not because of his humanity, is a human being subjugated to another human being, for the two similar persons are contraries (regarding humanity).⁷ Whoever is higher than another in rank, because of property or honor, subjugates another by his humanity, and the latter is a subject of him by his fear or greed arising from his animality, not from

4 This sentence is translated in the light of the following one.

5 The noun *māl* derives from the root m.w.l., while the verb *tamīlu* stems from m.y.l. As usual, this does not prevent Ibn al-ʿArabī from connecting their meanings. See above, [ch. 3](#), n. 20.

6 The text has *lanuḥarikannahu* (We will surely burn it).

7 Here we see once again one of the basic elements of Ibn al-ʿArabī's doctrine, that is, the consideration of a matter from two or more points of view. One can consider a human being from the point of view of his animality, that is, for example, his lower soul, and also from the point of view of his humanity, that is, his intellect and ethical behavior.

his humanity. A person does not subjugate another who is like him. Do you not see animals stirring up each other because they are similar and the similar animals oppose each other? For this reason He said: "We have raised some of them above others in rank" (ibid.), and the one who subjugates differs in rank from the subjugated. Hence, subjugation occurs as a result of difference in rank.

Subjugation falls into two categories. First is the subjugation emanating from the subjugator's will to overcome the subjugated person, as the master subjugates the slave, even though both are human beings, and the ruler of his subjects, even though they are similar (in humanity) – (in both cases), subjugation occurs because of rank. The second is the subjugation deriving from circumstances, as when the subjects subjugate the ruler who takes care of them by defending them, fighting against (194) their enemies and safeguarding their property and souls. (In) all these acts the subjects subjugate the ruler because of their state, and this category is actually called the subjugation of rank, because the rank of the ruler determines this. Some kings work (only) in their own interests, while others know their role (literally: matter) and their rank of subjugation by their subjects. They (also) know the value and rights of their subjects. God rewards these (kings) as He rewards scholars who know things as they really are, and it is God's obligation to reward such people, because He takes care of His servants. In fact, the whole cosmos subjugates the One that cannot be called subjugated (God), (as) He said: "Every day He takes care of something" (Qur'ān 55:29).

Aaron could not deter the people from worshipping the calf and overcoming it as Moses did, because of God's wisdom which manifests itself in existence so that He should be worshipped in every form. When this form disappeared afterward, it disappeared only after it had been mixed with Divinity in the eyes of its worshipper. For this reason, every kind of thing is worshipped either as divine or as a subjugator. The intelligent person necessarily knows this. Nothing in the cosmos is worshiped unless its worshipper ascribes to it high value and elevated degree. For this reason the Real is called, for our sake, "The Elevated in degrees" (Qur'ān 40:15). He did not say "The Elevated in degree," for He multiplied the degrees in one essence. Thus, He decreed that only He should be worshiped in many various degrees, and that each degree embodies God's self-manifestation in which He is worshiped. The greatest and loftiest of the degrees in which He is worshiped is passion, as He said: "Have you seen him who has taken his passion to be his god?" (Qur'ān 45:23). It (passion) is the greatest object of worship, for only thanks to it everything can be worshiped, and it is worshiped only through its essence. Regarding this I say:

The essence of passion is that passion causes passion/had passion not been in the heart, passion would have not been worshiped

(195) Do you not see how perfect God's knowledge of things is, and how He completed (our knowledge) concerning him who worshipped his passion and took it to be his god, and said: "God led him astray (*aḍallahu*) knowingly" (ibid.), and going astray (*ḍalāla*) is confusion? That is because he (the Prophet) saw this person worshipping only his passion by obeying it. His passion ordered him to worship objects, so that even his worshipping God also derived from his passion,

because had passion – which is will caused by love – not arisen in him regarding this sacred presence, he would neither have worshiped God nor preferred Him to other (objects). Likewise, whoever worships one of the forms of the world and takes it to be a god does not do this but through passion. The worshiper is always under the rule of his passion.

Also he sees that worshipers have different objects of worship, and one worshiper declares another who worships some other object to be an unbeliever. Whoever pays a little attention (to this phenomenon) is confused by the unity of passion, moreover its oneness, for it is the same phenomenon in each servant. For this reason, “God led him astray” (ibid.), that is, confused him, “knowing” (ibid.) that every worshiper venerates only his passion, making him a servant, whether he meets unexpectedly a religion or not.

The perfect knower (gnostic) is whoever regards every object of worship as a manifestation of God in which He is worshiped. For this reason, they all call every object of worship god (*ilāh*), although its specific name might be stone, tree, animal, human being, star, or angel. This is the particular name of each god. Divinity causes the worshiper to imagine that this is the object (literally: level – *martaba*) of his worship, while truly it is the manifestation of the Real in the perception of the worshiper who devotes himself to this object in its specific manifestation.

For this reason, some knowers expressed an ignorant view: “We only worship them because they bring us closer to God” (Qur’ān 39:3, AH), although they called them gods when they said: “Did he make the gods one god? This is an astonishing thing” (Qur’ān 38:5). They did not deny one god, but were astonished at this, (196) for they stuck to the multiplicity of forms and the relationship of divinity to them.⁸ Then the Messenger came and called them to one God, who can be known but not witnessed by them. However, they affirmed Him and believed in Him, saying: “We only worship them because they bring us closer to God” (Qur’ān 39:3, AH), for they knew those forms are made of stone. For this reason, they were refuted by His saying: “Say (to those who ascribe partners to God), name them” (Qur’ān 13:33). However, they named them only because they knew these names have a reality.

As for those who knew things as they really are, they made known their denial of the forms which were worshiped, because their degree of knowledge taught them to be subject to the rule of the messenger through which they were called believers, instead of being subject to the rule of time. The polytheists are worshipers of time (*‘ubbād al-waqt*),⁹ although they knew they did not worship the forms themselves, but only God in these forms, because they knew the rule of self-manifestation exists in the idols. The denier, who did not know the self-manifestation, was not aware of this (phenomenon), (while) the perfect knower,

⁸ The Arabs in the Jāhiliyya believed in one highest God, but associated him with three goddesses (*allāt, manāt, al-‘uzzā*) who served as intercessors between god and the human beings. T. Fahd, “*Ṣanam*,” E I2.

⁹ By this appellation, Ibn al-‘Arabī probably means those who do not know the essence of things, but only their external appearances in time.

that is, the prophet, messenger, and inheritor (of prophet and messenger), concealed it from the people.

God ordered the people to leave these forms, for the messenger of the time left them, so that they would follow him, desiring God's love, by His saying: "If you love God, follow me, then God will love you" (Qur'ān 3:31). He called for God, who is aspired to and generally known, but not witnessed, (for) "Glances do not perceive Him" (Qur'ān 6:103), but "He perceives the glances" (ibid.), because of His subtlety and the permeation of the things themselves. Glances do not perceive Him, just as they do not perceive the human beings' spirits which direct the bodies and their external forms. "And He is the All-Subtle and All-Knowing (of experience)" (ibid.). Experience means tasting, and tasting is the self-manifestation that exists in forms. Both they and He are necessary, and the one who sees Him through one's passion necessarily worships Him, if you understand, "and it is incumbent on God to show the right way" (Qur'ān 16:9).

25 The bezel of the wisdom of exaltation exists in the essence of Moses¹

(197) The wisdom of (Pharaoh's) slaying the boys was destined to support Moses through the life of every slain boy, who was killed as if he were Moses. (In this act), there was no ignorance, for the life of every slain boy was necessarily returned to Moses. Each life was pure, because its inborn trait (*fiṭra*) of the primordial covenant of *balā*² was unimpaired by selfish aims. Moses was the combination of the lives of all the boys who were killed as if each one was Moses, hence, every spiritual predisposition of each slain boy inhered in Moses. God particularized Moses in an unprecedented manner, for he possessed many kinds of wisdom. I shall present successively, if God wills, some of these in this chapter in measure of the occurrence of the divine instruction (*amr ilāhī*)³ in my thought.

The above notion was the first thing I was told (*shūfihtu bihi*)⁴ in this chapter. When Moses was born, he was the sum of many spirits and active powers, because the small part (of the human being) acts on the large part. Do you not see how the infant, with his special trait, acts on the adult so that the latter comes down from his leading position and plays with the infant, rocking him and appearing before the infant as his equal in understanding? Thus, the adult becomes subject to the infant without being aware of it. Also, the child occupies the adult with his rearing, protection, looking after his interests, and making his life easy, so that he will not be anxious. All this pertains to the ways the younger acts on the older, because of the power of the child's state, for the child has been recently acquainted with his Lord, for he is closer to his birth (198), while the older is more distant from this acquaintance. Thus, whoever is nearer to God subordinates the one more distant from Him, just as by virtue of their closeness to the king, his highest officials subordinate those

1 For a partial discussion of this chapter, see Ronald L. Nettler, "Ibn 'Arabi and the Qur'an: Some Passages Concerning Mūsa in the Fusūs al-hikam," *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society* 20(1996):53–66.

2 Qur'ān 7:172.

3 Since Ibn al-'Arabī was inspired to write this book and its content was dictated to him, it is advisable here to render *amr* as instruction, that is, what God taught him, and not a command.

4 The verb *shāfaha* means to speak mouth to mouth (face to face), and one can deduce from the use of this verb the notion of direct revelation to Ibn al-'Arabī who only transmitted what he was told.

more remote from him. God's Messenger used to bare himself to the rain uncovering his head so that the rain touched him; then he said the reason is that the rain recently had contact with God. Think of the Prophet's knowledge of God – how exalted, high, and clear it is. The rain subjugates the best people, because of its proximity to its Lord; it was like a messenger who sends down inspiration to the Prophet calling him directly by his essence, and the Prophet bared himself to him to receive what he brought from the Lord. Had the Prophet not received a divine benefit from the touch of the rain, he would not have exposed himself to it.⁵ Thus, this is the message of the water from which God made every living thing,⁶ so understand!

As for the wisdom of putting him (Moses) in the ark (*tābūt*) and throwing him into the river,⁷ (its meaning is the following): The ark alludes to his humanity, while the river is the symbol of the knowledge he attained through his body. Only via the body, composed of the four elements, can the human soul be supplied with the faculties of reasoning, sensation, and imagination. When the soul resides in the body and is ordered to act on and direct the body, God makes these faculties tools through which one can fulfill what God wants from him in directing his humanity (*tābūt*) in which God's presence (*sakīna*) inheres.⁸ He was cast into the river in order to attain different kinds of knowledge through these faculties. God taught him that even though the spirit which directs him is his ruler, the spirit directs him through these faculties. God made these faculties, which reside in humanity (expressed through the *tābūt*), associate the human being through allusions and kinds of wisdom.

In like manner, God directs the cosmos; He allows it to direct itself by itself or by its form,⁹ just as the existence of the child depends on his father's bringing him into existence (*ijād al-wālid*), the effects on their causes, the conditioned things on their conditions, the objects of knowledge on knowledge,¹⁰ the notions that are proved on their proofs, and the unquestionable notions (199) on their truths. All these things pertain to the cosmos and this is God's direction of it; He let it direct itself by itself. As for our saying "by its form," meaning the form of the cosmos, I mean the Most Beautiful Names and the highest attributes through which God is named and described. We find the meaning and the spirit of each of His names by which He is named in the cosmos. Thus, He directs the cosmos only through its form.

For this reason, He said regarding the creation of Ādam, who is the model (*namūdhaq*)¹¹ that includes the qualities of the divine Presence, that is, the Essence,

⁵ Cf. Muslim, IX:13 (898).

⁶ Cf. for example, Qur'ān 21:30: "We made every living thing from the water" (trans. AH). Ebstein and Sviri, p. 250.

⁷ Cf. Qur'ān 20:39. In this verse the word *yamm* (literally: sea) appears.

⁸ On the notion that the *sakīna* resides in the *tābūt*, see Qur'ān 2:248.

⁹ According to Ibn al-ʿArabī, everything is directed by the rules inherent in it and by God's names.

¹⁰ Read here *al-maʿlūmāt ʿalā ʿulūmihā* instead of *al-maʿlūlāt ʿalā ʿilalihā* (effects on their causes), which repeats what was already said.

¹¹ For the use of this word instead of the word *barnāmaj* (plan) in Affīfī's text, see Kāshānī, pp. 506f.

the attributes and acts: “God created Ādam in His image.”¹² His image is only the divine Presence. In this noble archetype, which is the Perfect Human Being, He brought into existence all the divine names and the realities that are brought forth from him in the macro-cosmos outside him. God made him (Ādam) the spirit of the cosmos and subordinated to him the high and the low things, because of his perfect form. Just as everything in the cosmos praises Him,¹³ so everything in the cosmos is subordinated to this human being, because of the reality of his form. God said: “He has subjugated all that is in the heavens and the earth as a present for you” (Qur’ān 45:13). Thus, everything in the world is subject to the human being; the one who knows this is the perfect human being, while the human being who is like an animal does not know it.

Putting Moses in the ark and casting the ark into the river was an external form of destruction; however, from an inward perspective, it saved him from being killed. He lived just as the souls live because of knowledge, (escaping) the death of ignorance as God said: “Or whoever was a dead person” (Qur’ān 6:122), meaning because of ignorance, and “We restored him to life” (ibid.), meaning because of knowledge, and “We gave him light by which he can walk among people” (ibid.), meaning guidance (light), “Is this person like one who walks in darkness” (ibid.), meaning going astray, “unable to escape it” (ibid.), meaning that he can never be rightly guided, for going astray is inherent in his soul, and there is no other aim which can make him act otherwise.

Guidance means that the human being (200) is led to perplexity (*hayra*),¹⁴ so that he knows that (divine) matter involves perplexity, and perplexity is anxiety and motion, and motion is life. Hence, there is neither rest nor death; there is only existence and (therefore) no nonexistence. In like manner God said, regarding the water by which the earth lives and moves: “It (the earth) quakes” (Qur’ān 22:5), and concerning the earth’s pregnancy, He said: “(The earth) swells” (ibid.), and as for its giving birth, He said: “It brings forth every joyous pair” (ibid.). This means that the earth gives birth only to that which is like it, that is, natural like it. Pairing (*zawjiyya*, *shafiyya*) is the basis of what the earth gives birth and what appears from it.

Likewise, the existence of the Real (is attested) through the multiplicity of the cosmic phenomena and His many names, and the form of the world requires the realities of the divine names. Through the cosmic phenomena and their creator, the Unity of Manyness (*aḥadiyyat al-kathra*) is proved. (The Real) is One in His entity with respect to His Essence, just as the substance (*jawhar*) of primary matter is one with respect to its essence and many with respect to all the forms which appear through it and for which it serves as their substrate. Similarly, the Real is many, because of the forms of His self-manifestation; however, He is the manifestation of the cosmic forms, notwithstanding His intelligible Unity. Think how good is this divine instruction through which God particularizes whomsoever among His people He wishes him to learn (this idea).

¹² Bukhārī, LXXIX: 1 (6227). See [ch. 12](#), n. 23.

¹³ Cf. Qur’ān 17:44.

¹⁴ See [ch. 3](#), n. 28, above.

Since Pharaoh's family¹⁵ found him in the river by the tree, Pharaoh called him Mūsā (Moses). In Coptic *mū* means water, and *sā* is a tree, thus he called him after the place where he found him, for the ark stopped at the tree in the river. Pharaoh wanted to kill him, but his wife – who was inspired by a divine speech (201) and whom God created for perfection, as the Prophet said about her when he acknowledged her and Maryam, the daughter of 'Imrān, as possessing perfection which (usually) pertains to males – said to her husband regarding Moses that he “is a delight for me and you” (Qur'ān 28:9). Thus, she was delighted by him through her perfection which was granted to her, as we said, and he (Moses) was a delight for Pharaoh through the belief God granted him as he was drowning.

God made him die when he was pure, immaculate, and free of evilness, because He put him to death being a believer before he acquired any sin. (Acceptance of) Islam erases what (one did) before.¹⁶ God made it a sign of his providence for whomsoever He wishes, so that no one despairs of God's Mercy, “for only unbelievers despair of God's Mercy” (Qur'ān 12:87). If Pharaoh had been one of those who despair, he would not have hastened to believe in God.

As Pharaoh's wife said, Moses was a “delight for me and you . . . maybe he will benefit us” (Qur'ān 28:9). So it happened, for God benefited both of them through Moses even though they did not know that he was the prophet who would be responsible for the destruction of Pharaoh's kingdom and people. When God protected him from Pharaoh, “the heart of Moses' mother became empty” (ibid., 10) of the anxiety which had affected her. Then God prevented him from being suckled until he was brought to his mother's breast, and she suckled him and so God made her pleasure in him complete.

In like manner, God taught (humanity) the religions, as He said: “We have made a law (*shir'atan*) and a path (*minhājan*) for each of you” (Qur'ān 5:48), meaning a way (*ṭarīq*). *Minhājan* means that from this way (*minhā*) each one came (*jā'a*).¹⁷ This statement makes an allusion to the sources (*aṣl*, literally: root) from which it came. This source (religion) is his sustenance, just as the branch of a tree is nourished only from its root.

What is prohibited in one law may be permitted in another, that is, with respect to the form. I mean (202) my saying that this is permitted.¹⁸ Essentially, a thing is not the same as it was, because everything is created anew, and there is no repetition (in creation). We have (already) called your attention to this (notion).¹⁹

¹⁵ The Qur'ān (28:9) speaks of Pharaoh's wife, as it is written here below.

¹⁶ According to a doctrine of *muwāfāt*, the status of one's belief or unbelief is established before one's death. The human being, who becomes a believer before his death, is considered a believer throughout his whole life. For a thorough discussion of this doctrine, see Etan Kohlberg, “Muwāfāt Doctrines in Muslim Theology,” *Studia Islamica* 57(1983):47–66.

¹⁷ The author divides the word *minhājan* into two words: *minhā* (from it, from the way) and *jā'a* (each one came).

¹⁸ Ibn al-ʿArabī means that a thing is not permitted or forbidden by virtue of itself, but by God's command. Thus, things have no intrinsic nature.

¹⁹ Ibn al-ʿArabī here adopts the Ashʿarite doctrine of continuous creation. See pp. 91f.

God refers to this (notion) regarding Moses when He forbade employing a wet nurse,²⁰ because his mother was really the woman who suckled him, not the woman who bore him. The mother, who bore him, did this as one who receives a trust; the child was produced in her and nourished by her menstrual blood. She did not will this, so that she was not indebted to him, for he was nourished, and if he were not nourished by what nourished him and the menstrual blood did not come from her, this would destroy her or make her ill. Hence, the mother was indebted to the fetus, because it was nourished by this blood and it protected her from injury, which she would experience, if this blood did not come from her and if her fetus was not nourished by it. The wet nurse is different, because by her suckling the child, the aim is to give him life and preserve it. God gave this advantage to Moses' mother, and no other woman enjoyed this advantage except his mother, so that she would be delighted in rearing him and seeing him grow at her bosom, "that she might not grieve" (Qur'ān 28:13).

God rescued him from the anxiety of the ark, and Moses broke the darkness of nature because God granted him divine knowledge even if he did not go beyond of it (nature). God subjected him to trials,²¹ that is, put him to the test in many circumstances, so that he would realize patience in himself when God tempted him. The first trial God subjected him to was killing the Egyptian, for God inspired him to do this and made it fit his innermost part (his soul), even though Moses was unaware of this. However, he did not care to kill the Egyptian and did not wait to receive God's order to kill him, for the prophet is inwardly protected and is unaware (of it), until he prophesies, that is, is informed by God. For this reason, al-Khiḍr showed him the killing of the youth,²² which Moses disowned, forgetting his killing of the Egyptian.

Then, al-Khiḍr said to Moses: "I did it not of my own bidding" (Qur'ān 18:82, trans. Arberry), calling Moses' attention to his (al-Khiḍr's) degree before he was informed that he was protected regarding this very event, even though he was not aware of this protection. Also he (al-Khiḍr) showed him making a hole in the vessel (and as a result its sinking), which outwardly was its destruction, while inwardly it was saved from being plundered. Al-Khiḍr made this (event) (203) correspond to Moses' ark, which was in the river. Outwardly it signified destruction, while inwardly deliverance. His mother did it, looking at Pharaoh out of fearing his violence, because he could slaughter him in order to cause her harm.²³ She did it with the help of God's inspiration, without having been aware of it. She felt in herself a desire to suckle him; however, when she feared for his safety, she cast him into the river, for the proverb says: "If the eye does not see, the heart does not grieve." She did not fear for him because of what she saw, or grieve for him upon looking at him. Probably she thought that God would restore him to her because she had a good opinion of Him. She lived with this thought in herself, as hope,

²⁰ Qur'ān 28:12.

²¹ Qur'ān 20:40.

²² Qur'ān 18:74.

²³ Read *ḍayran* (al-Kāshānī and al-Qayṣarī).

fear, and despair were blended (in such a situation). For this reason, when she was inspired, she said: "Perhaps this is the messenger who will destroy Pharaoh and his people." She lived enjoying this fancy, and with respect to her, this assumption essentially amounted to knowledge.

Then, Moses was sought (by the Egyptians) and he came out of the city, escaping from (his persecutors), outwardly out of fear, but inwardly for love of deliverance. That is because movement is always caused by love, and the one who looks at movement is prevented from seeing this cause, for (he has in his mind) other causes, that are not (the real cause). This can be explained by the fact that the origin (of all things) is the movement of the cosmos from nonexistence, in which it resides, to existence. For this reason, it is said that the whole cosmos derives from movement after its being at rest.²⁴ Movement, which is the existence of the cosmos, derives from love. God's Messenger called (our) attention to this, saying: "I was a hidden and unknown treasure and (therefore) I loved (or wanted) to be known."²⁵ Had this love not existed, the cosmos itself would not have appeared. Its movement from nonexistence to existence derives from love which brings it into existence, and the cosmos too loves to see itself in concrete existence, as it saw itself in a hidden fixed state (*thubūt*). Hence, in every respect its movement from fixed nonexistence to existence derives from the love of both the Real and the cosmos, because (204) perfection is loved by virtue of itself (*al-kamāl maḥbūb li-dhātihi*).²⁶ And His knowledge of Himself with respect to His ability to dispense with (all) things belongs to Him (alone) by virtue of His essence (*huwa lahu bi-dhātihi*). What remains is only to complete the degree of knowledge through the knowledge of what comes into being (*al-ʿilm al-ḥādīth*) based on the concrete entities, the entities of the world, when they exist (literally: are found – *wujidat*). The form of perfection is manifest through the knowledge of things that come into being and knowledge of the eternal things; the degree of knowledge becomes perfect through both aspects. The degrees of existence are perfected similarly, for existence is divided into the eternal and noneternal; the latter is what comes into being. The eternal is the existence of the Real by virtue of Himself, and the non-eternal is the existence of the Real in the form of the concrete (*thābit*) world. The non-eternal is called coming into being (*ḥudūth*), because parts of it appear to others, and appear in the form of the world. Thus, existence becomes perfect, and the movement of the world derives from love of perfection, so understand!

Do you not see how He relieves the constriction of the divine names²⁷ from the nonexistent manifestation of their effects in what is called the world? God loves

²⁴ Very probably by this phrase (at rest), Ibn al-ʿArabī means the state of the cosmos as a thought God had before His self-manifestation took place.

²⁵ The present tradition was considered spurious by the experts of Ḥadīth; hence, Ibn al-ʿArabī ascribed its authenticity to unveiling. SPK, p. 391, n. 14.

²⁶ This notion is reminiscent of al-Ghazālī's theory of love in which the love of a thing because of its perfection is the most important cause of love. Abrahamov, *Divine Love*, pp. 46–50.

²⁷ Cf. *Futūḥāt*, Vol. IV, p. 174. SPK, p. 130.

case, and He reaches it only through the existence of the forms, the highest and the lowest. Thus, it is proved that movement derives from love, and there is no movement in Being except that which stems from love.²⁸ Among the learned people some know this and some others are veiled from knowing it, because they consider the proximate cause which dominates their soul and makes them decide according to it.

Moses' fear because he killed the Egyptian was evident. (At the same time) this fear implied the will (love) of deliverance from being killed. (Outwardly) he escaped because he feared; however, inwardly he escaped because he willed (loved) to be rescued from Pharaoh and what he would do to him.²⁹ (The Qur'ān) mentions the evident and proximate cause, which was (in relation to the real cause), as the form of the body is to the human being. And the will (love) to be rescued was implicit in him, just as the spirit which directs the body is implicit in the body.

When the prophets turn to the people, they use external and general expressions and base their address on the understanding of the knower and the listener.³⁰ The messengers take into account only the common people, because they know the degree of their understanding, as the Prophet called attention to (205) this degree in the chapter of gifts and said: "I will give a gift to a man, even though another gift is dearer to me, for fear that God will throw him into the Fire."³¹ Thus, he took into consideration the low-minded who are driven by greed and natural desires.

Thus, the knowledge the prophets brought was covered with a garment (*khiṭ'a*)³² fitted to the lowest understanding, so that whoever cannot penetrate this cover would say how good is this garment and regard it as the last aim. However, the one who possesses subtle understanding and who dives to reach the pearls of wisdom, which he deserves to find, says: "This is a garment given by the king." Thereafter, he examines the value of this garment and its kind among other garments. He then realizes the value of the one on whom it was bestowed and finds a knowledge which others cannot attain, because they do not know the value of this garment.

Since the prophets, messengers, and (their) heirs knew that in the world and among peoples of the world there are such persons, they intended to express (their messages) in an outward understandable manner, one which both the common and the elite share. The elite person understands what the common people understand

²⁸ For love as a cause of motion, see Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 192a. Very probably this notion goes back to Plato, *Symposium*, pp. 186–189. Abrahamov, *Divine Love*, p. 4.

²⁹ "So Moses left the city, fearful and wary, and prayed, 'My Lord, save me from people who do wrong'" (Qur'ān 28:21).

³⁰ Here Ibn al-ʿArabī follows the philosophers who claim that the Qur'ān expresses itself in a style which can be understood by the common people. Consequently, part of the Qur'ān, for example the descriptions of Paradise and Hell, should be interpreted metaphorically. Walbridge, *God and Logic*, p. 80.

³¹ Bukhārī, II, 19 (27).

³² The literal meaning of this word is "robe of honor." However, by this metaphor, our author means the outward cover of the prophets' statements that only the subtle scholar may penetrate.

and more, thus he is rightly called one of the elite and through this additional understanding he distinguishes himself from the common people. For this reason, those who transmit knowledge are satisfied (with this state of affairs). This is the wisdom in Moses' saying: "I escaped from you out of fear" (Qur'ān 26:21); he did not say I fled from you out of love of safety and well-being.

Thereafter, he came to Madyan and found two maidens and "he watered (their flocks)" (Qur'ān 28:24) without (asking) payment, "then he turned to the shadow" (ibid.) of God and said: "My Lord, I need the good You sent down to me" (ibid.). Thus, he made his act of watering the same as the good God sent to him, and described himself as one in want of God regarding the good that is with Him.

Al-Khiḍr wished to build a wall without (asking) payment, and Moses reproved him for that.³³ (As a response) al-Khiḍr reminded him that he watered the flocks without asking payment and other things he did not mention, until Muḥammad wished that Moses would have been silent and not raised objections, so that God could tell him of Moses' and al-Khiḍr's affair. (206) Hence, Muḥammad would know through God's story the place to which Moses was led without his being aware of this. Had Moses known (the role of al-Khiḍr), he would not have disapproved of al-Khiḍr's deeds. God made al-Khiḍr's deeds true in the eyes of Moses, purified him, and led him to the right way. Notwithstanding, Moses ignored al-Khiḍr's purification and the condition the latter had laid down so that Moses could follow him.³⁴ This (story) will shed God's Mercy on us, if we forget God's (hidden aims).³⁵ Had Moses known (the hidden meanings of al-Khiḍr's acts), al-Khiḍr would not have said to him "(How could you have patience in) matters beyond your knowledge" (Qur'ān 18:68, trans. AH.)? By this al-Khiḍr meant: I attained knowledge through mystical experience (literally: taste – *dhawq*), which you (Moses) could not attain, just as you possessed knowledge which I could not attain. Thus, al-Khiḍr was just to Moses.

As for the wisdom in al-Khiḍr's separation from Moses, it is (reasoned) in God's saying: "Accept whatever the Messenger gives you, and abstain from whatever he forbids you" (Qur'ān 59:7, trans. AH). Those who know God and the value of the Message and the Messenger stop at these words. Since al-Khiḍr knew that Moses was God's messenger, he began to watch Moses' sayings, so that he might behave with good manners toward the messenger as he deserved. Then Moses said to him: "From now on, if I ask you something, do not follow me" (Qur'ān 18:76). Thus, he forbade al-Khiḍr to be in his company. When Moses reacted to al-Khiḍr's act the third time, al-Khiḍr said: "This is the separation between me and you" (ibid., 78). Moses did not say to him do not act, nor did he ask al-Khiḍr to stay in his company, because he knew the value of his position, which told him

³³ Qur'ān 18:77.

³⁴ Al-Khiḍr stipulated that Moses would not ask him about his acts until he would inform him. Qur'ān 18:70.

³⁵ The author seems to say that whenever a human being does not understand God's acts, he should remind himself of the story about Moses, who did not realize the wisdom in al-Khiḍr's acts until he was informed.

to forbid al-Khiḍr's company. Moses remained silent, and the separation took place.

Look at the perfection of the knowledge of these two persons. Moses maintained divine good manners and al-Khiḍr was just to Moses in acknowledging before Moses the (following): "I possessed knowledge which God taught me and you did not know, and you possessed knowledge which God taught you and I did not know." This announcement of al-Khiḍr regarding Moses constituted a remedy for the injury he caused Moses when he said: "How could you have patience about matters beyond your knowledge" (Qur'ān 18:68, trans. AH)? Al-Khiḍr said this though he knew the lofty position Moses held because of his mission and that he (al-Khiḍr) lacked such a position. This became manifest in the Muḥammadan community in the tradition of the pollination of the palm trees, concerning which Muḥammad told to his Companions: "You know best the interests of your worldly affairs."³⁶ No doubt, the knowledge of a thing is better than ignorance of it. For this reason, God praises Himself that "He (207) absolutely knows everything" (Qur'ān 29:62). Thus, Muḥammad admitted to his Companions that they are more cognizant of the worldly affairs than he, because he possessed no experience in these matters, for these things require experience and practice, and he did not find time to learn them, because he was engaged with more important things. In sum, I have called your attention to this important behavior which will benefit you if you use it.

God's saying: "My Lord bestowed on me authority (*ḥukm*)" (Qur'ān 26:21) means the vicegerency (*khilāfa*), "and made me one of the messengers" (ibid.) means the mission (*risāla*), for not every messenger is a vicegerent. Because the vicegerent fights with the sword, dismisses and appoints (officials), whereas the messenger is different, for he must transmit the message with which he is sent. If he fights for the message and protects it with the sword, he is (then) both a vicegerent and a messenger. Thus, just as not every prophet is a messenger,³⁷ so not every messenger is a vicegerent; that is, (not every messenger) is given kingship and the ability to handle it.

As for the rationale of Pharaoh's question regarding the divine essence,³⁸ it did not arise from ignorance, but from seeking information (*ikhtibār*), so that he could consider Moses' answer in the light of the latter's claim for God's mission. Pharaoh knew the messengers' degree of knowledge and he sought to prove by Moses' answer the truth of his claim. Pharaoh asked a question to let those present know – without being aware of (the nature of his question), as he was aware of it – (that Moses was ignorant). When Moses answered him as a learned person answers, Pharaoh showed, because he wished to preserve his position, that Moses had not answered him properly, so that those present came to know, because of their weak understanding that Pharaoh knew more than Moses. For this reason,

³⁶ See p. 31 above.

³⁷ For a theological and philological discussion of this point, see al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, pp. 153f.

³⁸ "Pharaoh said: 'What is the Lord of all things?'" (*rabb al-ʿālamīn*). Qur'ān 26:23.

since Moses answered what he did not need to answer – and outwardly it was not the answer to the question he was asked, and Pharaoh knew that he (Moses) would answer as he did – Pharaoh said to Moses' companions: "Your messenger who was sent to you is mad" (Qur'ān 26:27); that is, the knowledge I asked him about is concealed from him, for it is absolutely inconceivable that he should know. The question was legitimate, for asking (208) what-a-thing-is (*māhiyya*) is a question about the essence of what is sought, which must characterize the thing itself and no other. As for those who made definitions composed of genus and differentia (*jins wa-faṣl*),³⁹ (this procedure) applies to all things that are characterized by equivocality (*ishtirāk*). However, (God) who has no genus must have a specific essence not shared by others. Thus, the question is legitimate according to the people of truth, correct knowledge, and sound intellect, and Moses' answer to it is the only correct answer.

Here is a great mystery, for Moses actually answered one who had asked for an essential definition, and for this reason, he (Moses) made the essential definition his reference to the forms of the world through which God manifests Himself, or the forms of the world in which He is manifest. One can understand his answer to the question "What is the Lord of all things?" (*rabb al-ʿālamīn*) (Qur'ān 26:23), as if Moses said: "The one in which the high forms of the world are manifest, that is, the heaven, and the low (forms), that is, the earth, "if you know for certain" (ibid.), or He manifests Himself through them. When Pharaoh said to his companions "he is mad" (ibid., 27), as we said above, Moses added (a phrase) to his explanation, so that Pharaoh would know Moses' rank in divine knowledge, because Moses knew that Pharaoh would realize this. Thus, Moses said: "The Lord of the east and the west" (ibid., 28), conveying (the idea) of what is manifested and what is concealed,⁴⁰ that is, the outward (*ẓāhir*) and the inward (*bāṭin*), and "what is between them" (ibid.), and this is His saying, "(He) absolutely knows everything" (Qur'ān 29:62). "If you understand (*taʿqilūn*)" (Qur'ān 26:28), meaning if you are people who limit (*aṣḥāb taqyīd*), because the intellect (*ʿaql*) limits (*yuqayyidu*). Thus, the first answer (Qur'ān 26:24) is for the people who know for certain, that is, the people of unveiling (*kashf*) and finding (*wujūd*). He (Moses) said to him (Pharaoh): "If you know for certain" (ibid.), that is, (you) the people of unveiling and finding, for I have informed you of what you knew for certain in your witnessing and finding. If you do not belong to this kind, (that is), if you are people of limit, restriction, and restraint, I shall respond with the second answer. Also (you should know) that the Real (that you know) is according

39 "For Aristotle, a definition is 'an account which signifies what it is to be for something' (*logos ho to ti ên einai sêmainei*). The phrase 'what it is to be' and its variants are crucial: giving a definition is saying, of some existent thing, what it is, not simply specifying the meaning of a word." Robin Smith, "Aristotle's Logic," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/#Def>. Each definition is composed of genus and differentia. For example, the definition of the term "human being" is an animal (genus), whose differentia is having the ability to reason.

40 The east is the direction of sunrise, hence it is the manifest thing, and the west is the direction of sunset, hence it is the concealed thing.

to the proofs of your intellect. Moses brought these two aspects to light so that Pharaoh would know Moses' excellence and truthfulness. Moses knew that Pharaoh had known this, (209) or would know this, because Pharaoh asked about the essence, and he knew that his question was not based on the way of the ancient sages to ask "what," hence Moses answered as he did. Had he known something different, he would have regarded the question as an error. Since Moses identified the entity about which Pharaoh asked with the world, Pharaoh addressed him as he did, while the people (who were present) did not realize it.

Pharaoh said to Moses: "If you take a god other than me, I will place you among the prisoners (*masjūnīn*)" (Qur'ān 26:29). Now, the letter *sīn* in *al-sijn* (prison) is one of the redundant letters,⁴¹ (hence) the meaning is "I shall conceal you," for you answered me in a manner that helped me express such a saying. If you say to me: "O Pharaoh, by threatening me, you act unknowingly, because the Essence is one, and how can you separate it?" I (Pharaoh) will say: "The ranks in existence separate the Essence, while the Essence, in principle, is not separated nor divided." "My rank" (Pharaoh continues), "is in actuality to dominate you, while I and you (are the same) through the Essence, but different in rank (in concrete existence)." When Moses understood Pharaoh's statement, he referred to what Pharaoh deserved, saying to him that he could not carry out (his threat). However, Pharaoh's rank attested to his ability to do this and to affect (Moses' state), for concerning Pharaoh's rank, the Real is the outward form that can dominate the rank of the form of Moses' appearance in this session.

Moses said, showing Pharaoh what can prevent him from attacking Moses: "Even if I show you something manifest?" (ibid., 30), to which Pharaoh could only say to Moses: "Bring it then, if you are truthful" (ibid., 31). (Pharaoh said this) for fear of appearing unjust and consequently one to be doubted in the eyes of his people, who were weak-minded. Pharaoh made those people unsteady,⁴² and as a result they obeyed him "because they were wrongdoers" (Qur'ān 43:54); that is, through using their sane intellect, they did not deny Pharaoh's claim,⁴³ which was expressed in clear and intelligible language, (210) for the intellect cannot go beyond its limit. However, one who possesses unveiling and certainty can exceed this limit. For this reason, Moses answered in a way which could be accepted by both one who knows for certain and another who knows by using his intellect. "Then, he (Moses) cast his rod" (ibid., 32). This was the form of Pharaoh's transgression which was expressed in his refusal to respond to Moses' claim "and behold, it became a clearly seen snake" (ibid.), that is, a manifest snake. Thus,

⁴¹ In this case, the letters which remain are *j.n.*, and if one adds, as Ibn al-ʿArabī did, another *n*, one gets the verb *janna*, which means "he concealed." Kāshānī, p. 523. For kinds of etymology adduced by medieval Muslim scholars, see Ignatz Goldziher, *On the History of Grammar among the Arabs – An Essay in Literary History*, trans and ed. Kinga Dévényi and Tomas Ivanyi, Amsterdam 1994, ch. 5. I am grateful to Dr. Almog Kasher, who supplied me with this reference.

⁴² This rendering is based on Arberry's translation of Qur'ān 43:54.

⁴³ Pharaoh claimed that he is a god.

the disobedience, that is, the evil deed, became obedience, that is, good deed, as He said: "God will change their evil deeds into good deeds" (Qur'ān 25:70), that is, regarding his judgment.⁴⁴ Here the judgment appeared as a particular entity in one substance (*jawhar*), that is, the rod, which is (also) the snake and the manifest snake. As a snake, Moses' rod swallowed up the snakes, and as a rod, it swallowed up the rods. Thus, Moses' argument overcame Pharaoh's arguments in the form of rods, snakes, and ropes (*ḥabl*, pl. *ḥibāl*), and the magicians had ropes,⁴⁵ which Moses did not have. *Al-ḥabl* means (also) a small hill (*tall ṣaghīr*);⁴⁶ that is, their abilities in relation to Moses' abilities are like small hills to lofty mountains.

When the magicians saw that, they realized Moses' degree of knowledge and that what they saw could not derive from human capability. Even if it was in the power of a human being, it would only be one who is distinguished in his unquestionable knowledge and who is free of imagination and obscurity. Consequently, they believed in the Lord of all creatures, the Lord of Moses and Aaron, that is, the Lord Moses and Aaron called upon, because they understood that the people knew that Moses did not call upon Pharaoh. Since Pharaoh was the ruler of his time and the vicegerent wielding the sword, even if he deviated from the conventional laws, he said: "I am your loftiest Lord" (Qur'ān 79:24); that is, even if all are lords in some respect, I am higher than them, because, taking into account the external aspect, I was given dominion over you. Because the magicians realized truth in his words, they did not contradict him, and indeed agreed with him and said: "You can judge only the life of this world, (211) so judge as (you wish)" (Qur'ān 20:72),⁴⁷ for the state is yours. For this reason, his statement "I am your loftiest Lord" is true. Even though he was identified with the Real, the form was Pharaoh's. He cut off hands and feet and crucified (people)⁴⁸ through a true essence in false form in order to attain the ranks which are only attainable through such acts.

That is because in no way can causes be canceled, for the fixed entities (*ʿāyān thābita*) require them. The fixed entities appear in existence in the same form as their existence in their state of fixity, for God's words (*kalimāt*) cannot be changed (*tabdīl*).⁴⁹ God's words are nothing but the entities of the existents; because of their permanence one ascribes them to eternity, and because of their (concrete) existence and appearance one ascribes to them coming into being (*ḥudūth*). As you can

⁴⁴ The rod (*ʿaṣā*) stands for Pharaoh's transgression (*ʿiṣyān*) and the snake (*ḥayya*) for his obedience. Ibn al-ʿArabī exploits the same root ʿ.ṣ.y on which *ʿaṣā* and *ʿiṣyān* are built in order to connect the two words. He also claims that the *ḥayya* derives from *ḥayāt* (life) which, in turn, signifies knowledge which brings about obedience. One's act has no moral value without God's judgment, which permits or forbids. Hence, Pharaoh's act can change from transgression into obedience. Affifi, II, p. 313.

⁴⁵ Qur'ān 26:44.

⁴⁶ Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Vol. I, p. 505.

⁴⁷ Ibn al-ʿArabī reversed the position of the two phrases of the verse which begins with "judge whatever . . ."

⁴⁸ Qur'ān 26:49.

⁴⁹ The last phrase is based on Qur'ān 6:115: "No one can change (*lā mubaddila*) His words" (trans. AH). See also Qur'ān 10:64.

say, a person or a guest appeared in our (house) today; however, it does not follow from his appearance that he had no existence before his appearance (*hudūth*). For this reason, that is, the appearance of His words notwithstanding their eternity, God said in His venerable speech: “(Whenever) a new (*muḥdath*) reminder comes to them from their Lord, they listen to it while they play” (Qur’ān 21:2). “(Whenever) a new reminder comes to them from the Merciful, they deviate from it” (Qur’ān 26:5). And the Merciful comes only with mercy, and whoever deviates from God’s Mercy may meet punishment, which derives from absence of mercy. As for His saying, “When they saw our injury (punishment), their belief would not benefit them, this was always God’s way of treating His servants” (Qur’ān 40:85), “except for the people of Jonah” (Qur’an 10:98). Because of the exception expressed in the second verse, the first verse does not prove that their belief will not benefit them in the next world. God wished to say that this exception does not absolve them of blame in this world, and for this reason Pharaoh was blamed, notwithstanding the existence of belief in him. This would have been correct, had he been certain of his death in this moment. The situation proves that he was not sure of his death, because he saw the believers walking on the dry land which became manifest, because Moses struck the sea with his rod. Because Pharaoh believed, he was not certain of his destruction, contrary (212) to the dying person, so that one cannot combine the two cases (of Pharaoh and the dying person).

Pharaoh believed in what the Children of Israel believed, that is, the indubitable belief in deliverance. Of that which did take place he was certain; however, not in the manner he wanted. God saved his soul from the punishment of the next world, and (also) saved his body, as He said: “Today we shall save only your corpse as a sign to all posterity” (Qur’ān 10:92, trans. AH), because had his form (corpse) disappeared, perhaps people would have said that he became hidden.⁵⁰ He appeared as a dead person, in the usual form, so that people would know that it was he. Thus, his deliverance combines both the tangible and spiritual aspects.

Whoever deserves the punishment of the Hereafter does not believe in it, even though every sign comes to him.⁵¹ “until they see the painful punishment” (Qur’ān 10:97), that is, until they taste the punishment of the next world. Pharaoh did not belong to this kind of people. This is the plain meaning (*zāhir*) the Qur’an conveys (to us). After that, we shall say further that God decides in this matter, because the common people had no doubt regarding his suffering (in the Hereafter); however, they had no text to support their claim in this issue. As for his family, their judgment is different, but here is not the place to discuss it.

Also, you should know that God does not cause persons who are dying to expire unless they believe and trust in the divine messages. For this reason, sudden death and killing an inadvertent person are detested. Sudden death is defined as (a state in which) the internal breath comes out, while the external breath does not enter. This is sudden death, which is not the state of the dying person. It is like

⁵⁰ Very probably Ibn al-‘Arabī had in mind the Shi’ite concept of the occultation of the twelfth imam.

⁵¹ This phrase is based on Qur’ān 10:96.

killing a heedless person by striking his neck from behind, while he is unaware. Thus, such a person dies in a state of either belief or unbelief. For this reason, the Prophet said: “He will be gathered in the state in which he dies,”⁵² just as he will die in the state of (either belief or unbelief). However, the dying person is a witness (of God’s messages), hence he believes as we have said, and he dies only in-the-state-in-which-he-is (*‘alā mā kāna ‘alayhi*), for the verb *kāna* as a word designating existence entails time only when it is connected with circumstances. Hence, one should differentiate between the dying unbeliever and the unbeliever who is killed while being inadvertent or one who died suddenly, as we have said in the definition of sudden death.

As for the wisdom of God’s self-manifestation and (His) speech (213) in the form of fire, it (happened) because Moses willed it. God manifested Himself in keeping with Moses’ wish, so that he would accept the revelation and not deviate from it. Had He revealed Himself in a form different from Moses’ desire, he would have deviated from God, because his interest was concentrated on a specific demand. Had he deviated, his act would have been fruitless and God would have turned away from him. However, he was the chosen and the favorite person. Because of that, God manifested Himself to him in keeping with his request, while he was unaware of this.

He saw this as the core of his need, like the fire of Moses/while it was God, and he did not know.

⁵² I could not find the source of this tradition. See n. 16 above.

26 The bezel of the wisdom of recourse¹ exists in the essence of Khālid

(213) As for Khālid ibn Sinān's² wisdom, he manifested in his mission the prophecy of the Isthmus (*al-nubuwwa al-barzakhīyya*).³ He claimed he wanted to inform (the people) of what exists in the Isthmus (*barzakh*) only after (his) death. Hence, he commanded that his tomb be uncovered in order to ask him. He related that things in the Isthmus are managed as life is in this world. Through this one can know that all that which the messengers have related in the present world is true.

Khālid intended that all the people would believe in the messages of the messengers so that mercy would apply to all. He had the honor to be a prophet before Muḥammad, and therefore he knew that God sent Muḥammad as a mercy to all the creatures. Khālid himself was not a messenger, hence he wished to attain a good deal of the mercy which existed in Muḥammad's mission. Khālid was not ordered to inform people, but he desired to achieve this in the Isthmus, so that he would be the most knowledgeable person regarding mankind. (But) Khālid's people did not carry out his order.⁴ Muḥammad did not describe Khālid's people as getting lost (*dā'a*), but as a people who destroyed their prophet, because they did not fulfill his wish.

Did God give him a reward for his desire? There is no doubt and no controversy that Khālid deserved to be rewarded for his desire; however, there is doubt and controversy regarding the reward which is demanded; does the reward for a

¹ The wisdom of recourse (*ḥikma ṣamadiyya*) pertains to Khālid because, since his people opposed him, he asked them to have recourse to his grave one year after his passing away. Chittick, "Chapter Headings," p. 36.

² For this prophet, who lived one generation before Muḥammad, see [ch. 2](#), Pellat, E I2.

³ "A *barzakh* is something that separates (*fāṣil*) two other things while never going to one side (*mutaṭarrif*), as, for example, the line that separates shadow from sunlight. God says: 'He let forth the two seas that meet together, between them a *barzakh* they do not overpass' (Koran 55:19); in other words, the one sea does not mix with the other." *Futūḥāt*, Vol. I, p. 459. Trans. SPK, pp. 117f.

⁴ According to al-Kāshānī (pp. 534f), Khālid saved his people from a fire that could have destroyed them. He went into a cave in order to extinguish the source of the fire. He asked his people on entering to call him after three days, so that he would not die after leaving the cave. But becoming impatient, they called him after two days, and this caused his death.

realized desire equal the reward for an unrealized (214) desire? In many instances the Law supports this equation. For example, one who comes to pray with a congregation, but the congregation does not attend, deserves a reward as if one attended the prayer. In like manner, one who wishes to do good deeds as rich people do, although one is poor, deserves their reward. However, does the equation apply to their intentions or to their acts, for the rich people combine intention and act? The Prophet did not determine either giving reward for both, or for one of the two. On the face of it (*al-ẓāhir*), intention and act are not equal. For this reason, Khālid ibn Sinān demanded (to carry out) the act of transmission of messages,⁵ so that the position of joining the two activities (intention and act) would prove true for him and he would achieve the two rewards. And God knows best.

⁵ As Muḥammad did.

27 The bezel of the wisdom of uniqueness¹ exists in the essence of Muḥammad

(214) His wisdom is unique, because he is the most perfect existent in mankind. For this reason, creation begins and ends with him.² He was a prophet when Ādam was between water and clay.³ Also in his essential structure he is the Seal of the Prophets (*khātām al-nabiyyīn*).

The first of the uneven numbers is three,⁴ and that which becomes greater than this first derives from it. He was the greatest proof of his Lord, for he was given all the words, that is, the things named by Ādam.⁵ In his triplicity, he resembled this proof, which was a proof of himself. Since his essence was in keeping with the first uneven number, because his structure was based on three parts, he said in the chapter of love, which is the root of existents: “Three things have been made beloved to me in your world.” (He said this) because of the triplicity in him, then he mentioned “women and perfume,” and “the delight he was given in the prayer.”⁶ First he mentioned women and then prayer, because, (215) in the root of the appearance of her entity, the woman is a part of the man.

The human being’s knowledge of himself (soul) precedes his knowledge of his Lord, because his knowledge of his Lord results from his knowledge of himself. For this reason, Muḥammad said: “Whoever knows himself (soul) knows his Lord.”⁷ If you wish, you may hold the impossibility of knowing (God) and the inability to reach this knowledge, and if you wish, you may hold the provability of this knowledge. According to the first (interpretation of the tradition) you cannot know yourself (soul), hence, you cannot know your Lord; and according

1 Muḥammad is unique because he was the first human being in which God’s Essence was reified and because all God’s self-manifestations exist in him. Chittick, “Chapter Headings,” p. 37; idem, “Summary,” p. 40.

2 No doubt Ibn al-‘Arabī here speaks of Muḥammad as possessing the *walāya* which, in our author’s view, will not end. Thus, Ibn al-‘Arabī contradicts himself. Affīfī (Vol. II, p. 322) tries to solve this self-contradiction by saying that Ibn al-‘Arabī intends to say that existence began with Muḥammad and the mission (*risāla*) ended with him.

3 Bukhārī, LXXVIII:119.

4 Affīfī, I, p. 115; SPK, p. 360. See p. 82, n. 3 above.

5 Qur’ān 2:31.

6 Nasā’ī, XXXVI:1 (3939).

7 See ch. 3, n. 4.

to the second, you can know yourself (soul), hence, you can know your Lord. Muḥammad was the clearest proof of his Lord, for every part of the cosmos is a proof of its root, which is God, so understand!

Women were made beloved to Muḥammad and he yearned for them, because this (behavior) pertains to the yearning of the whole for its part. Through this (behavior) Muḥammad made clear what God had ingrained in him, as God said regarding the essential human structure: "I breathed my spirit into him" (Qur'ān 15:29, trans. AH, and 38:72). Then God described Himself as most longing to meet humans and He said to those who longed for Him: "O Dāwūd, I am most longing for them,"⁸ meaning for those who long for Him. This is a unique meeting, for He said in the tradition concerning the Antichrist (*al-Dajjāl*): "None of you will see his Lord, until he dies."⁹ One necessarily longs for someone whose description is such. The Real longs for those who are near to Him, although He sees them; however, he wishes them to see Him, but their state precludes this (possibility). His statement resembles ("We shall test you) until We know" (Qur'ān 47:31), even though He knew (them).

He (God) longs for this unique trait (to meet humans), which takes place only after death, and through this trait He causes them to be cured of their longing for Him.¹⁰ As God said in the tradition of hesitation, which is relevant to this issue: "I do not hesitate in whatever I do as much as I hesitate in causing the death of my believing servant, who hates death as much as I hate to injure him; however, he necessarily will meet Me."¹¹ He informed him of good tidings, and did not say to him that death is necessary, so that He would not grieve him by mentioning of death. (216) Since humans do not meet the Real until after they die, as the Prophet said: "None of you will see his Lord, until he dies," God said: "He necessarily will meet Me." The Real's longing for the existence of this relationship (is expressed in the following poem):

The beloved yearns to see me/and I yearn for him very much

Souls are impassioned (but) the human rejects the decree (of death)/I complain, moaning, and so does He

Since the Real has made it clear that He breathed His spirit into humans, He longs only for Himself. Do you not see that the Real created him in His image,¹² because he stems from His spirit? Since his structure is composed of the four elements in his body, which are called the humors, there comes into being out of His breath a

⁸ I do not know the source of this saying.

⁹ Muslim, LII:95 (169).

¹⁰ On the one hand, people wish to meet God, but on the other, they are afraid of meeting Him, because this involves death, and death causes their longing, which is like an illness, to be cured.

¹¹ Bukhārī, LXXXI:38 (6502).

¹² See *ch. 25*, n. 12.

burning, despite the moisture in his body,¹³ and as a result of which, the spirit of the human being became fire, because of his structure. For this reason, God only spoke to Moses only in the form of fire and placed his need in it.¹⁴ Had his structure not been natural,¹⁵ his spirit would have been of light. He called this act blowing, alluding to its derivation from the Merciful's breath, because by this breath, which is blowing, his essence appears, and because of the predisposition of the one blown into, the burning is fire, not light. The breath of the Merciful, through which human is human, is hidden in (the part of his structure).

From Ādam, God produced a figure in his image and called it woman, who appeared in his image, so that he yearned for her as a thing yearns for itself, and she yearned for him as a thing yearns for its source. Thus, women were made beloved to man, because God loved whomever He created in His image. Then He caused the angels that were made of light to prostrate themselves before Ādam, notwithstanding their great value and position and their high natural structure.¹⁶ Because (God and humans share the same form), an affinity (*munāsaba*) binds them together, for form causes the greatest, the most exalted and perfect affinity.¹⁷ Form (causes the creation of) pair; that is, it doubles the existence of the Real, just as through her existence, the woman doubles the man, thus producing a pair. Thus, a triad appears, (that is), the Real, the man, and the woman.

The man yearns for His Lord, who is his source, just as the woman yearns for him. His Lord made women beloved (217) to man, just as God loves whomever is made in His image. One feels love only for the entity which is the source of one's being, that is, the Real.¹⁸ For this reason, he (the Prophet) said: "Women have been made beloved to me" (*ḥubbiba*), and not "I loved" from himself, because his love was connected to his Lord, in whose image he was created, even in his love for his wife, for he loved her through God's love for him, assimilating the divine love. Since a man loves a woman, he seeks union with her, which is the most profound union possible. And in the form of the elemental structure (of humans), there is no stronger union than sexual intercourse. For this reason, passion permeates all parts of the human. This permeation explains the command to perform major ablution, which encompasses all the human parts, just as a man is absorbed in a woman when passion takes place. (Another reason for major ablution) is God's jealousy of His servant lest he be delighted in other than Him, so He

¹³ Notwithstanding the word *bi-mā* (through which or by which), this is the only correct translation of the phrase *bi-mā fī jasadihi min al-ruṭūba*, because fire cannot derive from humidity or through it. Possibly something is incorrect in the text.

¹⁴ See ch. 25.

¹⁵ Read *law-lā* (Affīfī, I, p. 216, n. 4), which seems logical.

¹⁶ Qur'ān 2:34.

¹⁷ In al-Ghazālī, affinity is one of the causes of love between the Divine and the human being. Both thinkers use in this context the same terms and tradition. Abrahamov, *Divine Love*, pp. 56–58.

¹⁸ The notion that God is beloved because He gives humans existence occurs in the *Futūḥāt* as one of the causes of love. Very probably Ibn al-ʿArabī follows parts of al-Ghazālī's theory of love. Abrahamov, "Ibn al-ʿArabī on Divine Love," pp. 14f.

purifies him with major ablution in order to cause him to turn to God in the entity (woman) in which he is absorbed, for the woman reflects God.

When man witnesses the Real in a woman, it is a witness of passivity, and if he witnesses Him in himself, from the point of view of the appearance of the woman from him, it is a witness of activity.¹⁹ However, when he witnesses the Real in himself without considering the form that comes from Him, his witness is of God's passivity without any mediator (such as a divine name). His witness of the Real in the woman is the most complete and perfect, because he witnesses the Real with respect to His being both passive and active,²⁰ and with respect to Himself, He is uniquely passive.

For this reason, the Prophet loved women, because of the perfect witness of God in them, for the Real is never witnessed without materials,²¹ because in His Essence, He does not need the creatures. If witness of God's Essence is impossible, and witness of Him occurs only through material, then the witness of the Real in women is the greatest and the most perfect witness. The strongest union is sexual intercourse, which resembles God's turning to the one whom He created in His image in order to make him his vicegerent, so that He might see Himself (218) in him.

God made him, shaped his form, and blew His spirit into him, which is His breath, thus, externally his form attests to creation and internally to the truth (reality). For this reason, God describes the spirit as directing this (human) structure, because through it He "directs everything from the heaven" (Qur'ān 32:5), which is the height "to the earth" (ibid.), which is the lowest level, because it (the earth) is the lowest of all the elements.

He called them (the women) *nisā'*, a plural form which has no singular form deriving from the plural. Because of this Muḥammad said: "Three things have been made beloved to me in your world, women . . ." He did not say "woman," taking into account the fact that they were brought into existence after Ādam, for the word *nus'a*²² means postponement, (as) God said: "The month postponed (*al-nasī'*) is only an increase of unbelief" (Qur'ān 9:37). Selling by postponement (*nasī'*) means delay of payment. For this reason, he mentioned "women." He loved them only because of their being the (lowest) degree and of their being a substrate of passivity. Muḥammad was related to women as the Real is to nature. The Real reveals in nature the forms of the world through His will, which turns to

19 According to Ibn al-ʿArabī's logic, one can also see in man the two aspects of passivity and activity. Because God created man, he symbolizes the active aspect, and because man is a servant, he represents passivity.

20 That is because from one point of view the woman is passive, as she was created from the man, but from another she is active, because God created her. Alternatively, in the course of sexual relations, man is considered active and woman passive.

21 One can learn of God only through His connections to the world, because in Himself He is ineffable.

22 Ibn al-ʿArabī derives the word *nisā'* (women) from the root *n.s.ʿ*; however, the origin of *nisā'* is *n.s.w*. As we know, such changes do not bother our author.

the things (*al-tawajjuh al-irādī*),²³ and divine command, which amounts to sexual intercourse in the world of the elemental forms, to aspiration (*himma*) in the world of the luminous spirits and to the arrangement of premises (*muqaddimāt*) in the world of ideas in order to arrive at conclusions.²⁴ Each of these aspects (is symbolized) by the first and singular sexual union.

Whoever loves women by this definition, (his) love is divine. And whoever loves them in particular because of natural desire lacks the knowledge of this desire. Thus, (his love) is form without spirit, and even though that form essentially possesses spirit, it is not attested (as existent) for one who approaches his wife, or any other woman, only for the sake of pleasure, while he himself does not know to whom he approaches.²⁵ Thus, he does not know from himself (to whom he approaches), just as another person does not know this, unless he names with his own tongue (his aim), so that one can know it. Someone said:

“People rightly said of me that I am a lover/however, they do not know whom I love.”

(219) Likewise, this person loved pleasure and loved the substrate in which it resides, that is, the woman; however, he missed the spirit of the issue. If he knew this, he would know the object of his delight and whoever delights in him, and (as a result) he would be the perfect individual.

Just as the rank of the woman is lower than the man’s, as God said, “The rank of men is higher than that of women” (Qur’ān 2:228), so the rank of the human who was created in God’s image is lower than that of He who produced him in His image, notwithstanding his being in His image. Because of His rank which distinguishes God from the human, He does not need the cosmos and He is the true Agent, while the human is a second-rank agent. The human does not have the priority of the Real. The (fixed) entities (*ʿyān*) are distinguished by a hierarchy, and God gives each that which it deserves and each gnostic his due.²⁶ For this reason, Muḥammad’s love for women derived from divine love, (because) God “gave everything its (form of) creation (*khalqahu*)” (Qur’ān 20:50), which is the same as what everything deserves (*ḥaqq*). God gave him only what he deserved in keeping with the essence to which he was entitled. The Prophet gave precedence to women (in this tradition), because they are the substrate of passivity, just as nature precedes that which derives its existence from it through a form. Actually, nature is the Breath of the Merciful, for the forms of the higher and lower world are revealed in nature, because the blowing (of God’s Breath) permeates the hylic substance (*al-jawhar al-hayūlānī*), particularly in the world of bodies. As for the permeation of God’s Breath through the existence of the luminous spirits, this is another kind of permeation.

Also, in this tradition, Muḥammad advanced the feminine form above the masculine one, because he was concerned for women’s well-being. Hence, he said

²³ The text has *al-idārī*, which is clearly a misprint.

²⁴ Cf. above, pp. 116f of the Arabic text.

²⁵ He does not know the real aim of his love.

²⁶ For this notion, see ch. 10 above.

thalāth (three in the feminine gender) and not *thalātha* in the masculine, although he mentioned perfume, which is masculine. The Arabs used the masculine gender over the feminine and said (for example), “the Fāṭimas and Zayd went out” (*kharajū* – third-person masculine plural) and not *kharajna* (third-person feminine plural). Thus, they made the masculine gender, though Zayd was only one person (Zayd), overcome the feminine, though the Fāṭimas were a group (Fāṭimas). Muḥammad was an Arab (and so he adopted the linguistic norms of the Arabs). However, he took into consideration (220) the notion of God’s intention to make women beloved to him, (although) he did not choose this love. God taught him what he did not know and bestowed on him abundant grace (*faḍl aẓīm*).²⁷ He made the feminine gender overcome the masculine by saying *thalāth* (three in feminine gender) without the addition of *hā’* (which makes the word masculine).²⁸ How cognizant was the Messenger of the realities (*ḥaqā’iq*) and how great his attention to what each thing deserves.

Also, the Prophet placed the third and final beloved thing in the feminine gender (*ṣalāt*, prayer), just like the first beloved thing, and inserted between them a masculine word (*ṭīb*, perfume). He began with women and ended with prayer, both being feminine, while the word between them, perfume, is identical to man’s status in existence, for man is placed between God’s Essence (*dhāt* – feminine), from which he stemmed, and woman, who stemmed from him. Also, he is between two feminine forms, the *dhāt* whose gender is feminine in language and woman which is feminine in its real (natural) meaning. In like manner, women are in reality (nature) feminine, while prayer is not really a feminine entity (except in language). Perfume, masculine in gender, is inserted between them as Ādam was between God’s Essence, from which he was brought into existence, and Ḥawā’, whose existence stemmed from him. If you wish, you can say (regarding God) that both His attribute (*sifa*) (of creation) and (the attribute) of ability (*qudra*) (to create) are also feminine in gender. Whichever system of thought you wish (to follow), you will find the prevalence of the feminine gender even among the sages who adhered to the theory of causality (*aṣḥāb al-‘illa*) and made the Real the cause (*‘illa*) of the existence of the world. *‘Illa* itself is feminine. The reason for placing perfume after women is because of the smells of generation in women, for the best perfume is embracing the beloved, as they said in the famous proverb.²⁹

Since Muḥammad was originally created as a servant, he never aspired to leadership, but was always prostrating and standing before God in a passive way, until God produced from him what He produced. He gave him the rank of action in the domain of breaths and good perfumes. Thus, He made perfume beloved to him, and for this reason placed perfume after women. He took into account the Real’s degrees in His saying: “He is Elevated in degrees, Possessor of the Throne” (Qur’ān

²⁷ That God possesses great or infinite grace is frequently mentioned in the Qur’ān, for example 2:105, 3:74, 174, 57:21, 29, 62:4.

²⁸ This is an example of the many redundant sentences and phrases which fill the *Fuṣūṣ* and give the impression that originally the book began as a series of lectures.

²⁹ I have not found this proverb.

40:15), because He is established on the Throne through His name, the Merciful. Thus, Divine Mercy reaches everything encompassed by the Throne, as attested in His saying, “My Mercy encompasses everything” (Qur’ān 7:156). (221) The Throne embraces all things and the One established on it is the Merciful. Through His Reality Mercy permeates the world, as we have frequently explained in this book and in the Meccan Revelation (*sic!* *Al-Futūḥ al-makkī*).³⁰ God placed the perfume in the conjugal union referring to ‘Ā’isha’s innocence and said: “Corrupt women are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; good women are for good men, and good men are for good women. The good are innocent of what has been said against them” (Qur’ān 24:26).³¹ God made their odors good (sweet-smelling), because speech derives from breath, which is the essence of the odor. Thus, breath proceeds from (the mouth) as good or bad (sweet or disgusting), according to the way it is expressed in speech. With respect to its being originally divine, breath is all sweet-smelling and good; however, with respect to praise and condemnation, it is good and evil. On the badness of garlic, Muḥammad said: “It is a bush whose odor I detest,”³² and he did not say, “I detest it,” because one does not detest the substance (*‘ayn*) of a thing, but rather that which stems from it. Abhorrence of odors is based on custom, natural antipathy (*‘adam mulā’amat ṭab’*),³³ an aim (to be achieved), law, and lack of the perfection of (the human body) which one seeks. There are no other causes of disgust but those we have mentioned.

Now, since the matter is divided into evil and good, as we have said, God caused Muḥammad to love good, not evil. He described the angels as those who suffer bad odors, because rottenness resides in the elemental structure (of humans), for the human is created of “dried clay formed from dark mud” (Qur’ān 15:26, AH); that is, his odors (always) change.³⁴ Thus, the angels are disgusted by humans, because of their nature. Similarly, the dung beetle is harmed by the odor of the rose. Whereas (for us) its smell is good, for the dung beetle it is not so. Whoever possesses such a temperament (characterized metaphorically by bad odor) in essence and form, when he hears the truth it hurts him, (however) he rejoices in falsehood, as God said: “Those who believe in falsehood and disbelieve in God” (Qur’ān 29:52). He described them through loss (*khusrān*) and said: “Those are losers” (*khāsirūn*, *ibid.*), those who “lost their souls” (themselves, Qur’ān 6:12 and *passim*), for whoever does not perceive the difference between good (222) and evil has no perception.

God made His Messenger love only the good in everything, and everything is good. Can one imagine or not that there exists in the world a temperament (of an entity) which finds only good and not evil in everything? We said that no such

³⁰ *Futūḥāt*, Vol. IV, pp. 29f (ch. 198).

³¹ Here, as in other places, the author plays with the double meaning of *khabīth* (corrupt and malodorous) and *ṭayyib* (good and sweet-smelling), in order to interweave this verse into the context of the discussion on perfume.

³² Muslim, V:76 (565).

³³ This is al-Qaysarī’s reading.

³⁴ In reality this means that humans vacillate between good and evil deeds.

entity exists, for we do not find such a phenomenon (seeing only good) in the source from which the world stemmed, that is, the Real; we find Him abhorring and loving, and the evil is that which is abhorred and the good is that which is loved. The world was created in God's image, and the human was created in two images (the Real and the world), hence, no human temperament perceives only one of the two aspects (good and evil). Thus, any human temperament can perceive the difference between the good and the evil, and to know by experience that a thing is evil and without experience (that is, by reason) that it is good, so that his (rational) perception of the good in a thing diverts him from (seeing) its evilness. This is conceivable. However, the removal of evilness from the world, that is, from being, is inconceivable. God's Mercy applies to both the good and the evil. With respect to itself, the evil is good and vice versa. Regarding a certain human temperament, a good thing may be evil from a certain standpoint and vice versa.

As for the third (part of the tradition) through which unevenness (the odd number) was completed, it is prayer. He (Muḥammad) said: "I was given delight in prayer," for prayer bears witness, because it is a secret conversation between God and his servant, as God said: "If you remember Me, I will remember you" (Qur'ān 2:152). Prayer is worship which is divided between God and His servant; half belongs to God and half to His servant, as it is related in the sound tradition about God, who said: "I have divided the prayer into two parts; half belongs to Me and half to My servant, and My servant will receive what he asks for."³⁵ The servant says: "In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful" (Qur'ān 1:1), and God says: "My servant remembers Me." The servant says: "Praise be to God, the Lord of the created beings" (ibid., 2). God says: "My servant praises Me." The servant says: "The Compassionate, the Merciful" (ibid., 3). God says: "My servant extols Me." The servant says: "The King on the Day of Judgment" (ibid., 4). God says: "My servant exalts Me (and) entrusts Me with (his affairs)." Thus, the whole of this half (of *sūrat al-fātiḥa*) belongs exclusively to God.³⁶

Then the servant says: "It is You we worship; it is you (223) we ask for help" (ibid., 5). God says: "This is between Me and My servant, and My servant will receive what he asks for." Thus, God produces participation (between Him and His servant) in this verse. The servant says: "Guide us to the straight way (ibid., 6), the way of those on whom You bestow favors, those who bring upon themselves no anger and who do not deviate from the right way" (ibid., 7). God says: "These (last three verses)³⁷ belong to My servant, and he will receive what he asks for." These (last three verses) are particularized to God's servant, just as the first (three verses) are particularized to Him. From this (division of the verses), we know the obligation to recite: "Praise be to God, the Lord of the creatures" (ibid., 1 or 2). Whoever does not recite it does not perform the prayer which is divided between God and His servant.

³⁵ Muslim IV:38 (395). The citations below are taken from this tradition.

³⁶ The first *sūra* of the Qur'ān has six verses without accounting the "In the name . . .," which is usually considered the first verse.

³⁷ The text has *hā'ulā'i* (sic!) instead of *hādhihi*.

Since prayer is a secret conversation, it is remembrance, and whoever remembers the Real sits with (*jālasa*) Him, and the Real sits with him, for in the divine tradition God truly said: “I am the companion (*jalīs* – I sit with) of him who remembers Me.”³⁸ Now, whoever has the ability to see and sits with the one whom he remembers sees his companion. This is witness and seeing. If he is incapable of seeing, he does not see his companion. As a result, one who prays knows his rank (in prayer), whether he sees the Real with this seeing or not. If he does not see Him, he should worship Him through belief as if he sees Him, imagines Him in his *qibla*³⁹ and performs his secret conversation with him, listening to God’s response.

If he is an *imām* (a prayer leader) for his own people and for the angels who pray with him – for everyone who prays is no doubt an *imām* – for the angels pray behind one who prays alone, as stated in a tradition,⁴⁰ he attains the level of the messengers in their prayer, that is, to be (one of) God’s vicegerents. When he says: “God hears the one who praises Him,” he is informing himself and those behind him that God has heard him, and then the angels and those who are present say: “Our Lord, praise belongs to You.” That is because God says through the tongue of His servant: “God hears the one who praises Him.”

Thus, consider the lofty rank of the prayer and the place to which it brings its performer. Whoever does not attain the degree of seeing in prayer will not reach its aim and will find no delight in it, for he does not see the One with whom he converses secretly. If he does not hear what the Real transmits to him in prayer, he does not belong to those who listen (to God). And whoever is not present in prayer with God, (224) neither hearing and nor seeing Him, is not praying at all and is not one of those who listen and witness. So long as prayer continues, there is no other kind of worship which can prevent one from carrying out other obligations.

The invocation of God is the strongest part in prayer, because prayer includes both words and acts – we have mentioned the description of the perfect human in performing the prayer in the Meccan Revelations (*al-futūḥāt al-makkiyya*) – for God says: “The prayer prevents from carrying out outrageous and evil deeds” (Qur’ān 29:45). This is because the Law forbids one who performs the prayer to engage in any other acts so long as the prayer lasts. “The remembrance of God is greater” (ibid.), that is, in prayer, viz., God’s remembrance of His servant when He responds to his request. The servant’s praise of God is greater than his remembrance of Him, because majesty belongs to God.⁴¹ For this reason, God said: “God knows what you do” (ibid.), and He said: “or whoever listens and is a witness” (Qur’ān 50:37). He listens to God’s remembrance of him in prayer.

Moreover, since existence derives from rational movement which transforms the cosmos from nonexistence into existence, prayer comprises the three kinds of movement: vertical movement, which corresponds to standing in prayer; horizontal movement, which corresponds to bowing in prayer; and downward movement,

³⁸ Muslim, XVIII:2.

³⁹ This is the direction to the Ka’ba in Mecca toward which the Muslim prays.

⁴⁰ Bukhārī, IX:16 (659).

⁴¹ Qur’ān 45:37.

which corresponds to prostration. The movement of the human is vertical, that of the animal is horizontal, and that of plants is downward, while the inanimate thing has no essential movement, for when a stone moves, another thing causes it to move.

As for his saying, “my delight was made to be in prayer,” he does not ascribe this making to himself, for God’s self-manifestation to the one who prays derives from God and not from the one who performs the prayer. That is because had he not mentioned this description of himself (as being delighted), God would have ordered him to pray without His being manifested to him. Since he received this delight as a favor, the vision of God was also a favor. He said: “my delight (*qurraṭ ‘aynī*) was made to be in prayer,” and (this delight) is only the vision of the beloved (225), through which the eye of the lover becomes settled (*taqarru bihā ‘ayn al-muḥibb*), from the word *istiqrār* (come to rest), for the eye comes to rest when it sees the beloved and does not look at some other thing, whether sensual or not.⁴² For this reason, when praying one is forbidden to turn around in prayer, because this turning around is something the Devil steals from the servant’s prayer, thus preventing him from seeing his beloved. Moreover, if (God) had been indeed the Beloved of the one who turns around, he would have turned in his prayer only toward the *qibla*. Every human knows himself, (that is), whether he is in this state or another in this specific worship, for “truly, man is a clear witness against himself, despite all the excuses he may put forward” (Qur’ān 75:14–15). One knows to distinguish between falsehood and truth in himself, because he knows his state, for it derives from his feeling (*dhawq*) of himself.

In addition, prayer has another part, for God commanded us to pray to Him and informed us that He prays for us. Thus, prayer is from us and from Him. If it is God who prays, He prays only through His name the Last (*al-Ākhir*), because He comes after the creation of the servant. It is the Real which the servant creates in his heart, whether through rational consideration or through following others (*taqlīd*). This is a god of belief (*al-ilāh al-mu’taqad*). This god takes different forms in keeping with the predisposition which resides in a certain substrate (that is, place, society, etc.), as al-Junayd, when asked about gnosis and the gnostic, said: “the color of the water is like the color of the vessel in which it resides.”⁴³ This is an answer which hits the target, speaking of the matter as it really is. Thus, this is God who prays for us. When we pray, we bear the name the Last, for in this station we, as we have mentioned, are in the position of those who have this name, thus, in His eyes we are in keeping with our position, and He looks at us only in the form which we have brought, because the one who prays falls behind the one who arrives first in the race.⁴⁴

God’s saying, “Each knows his prayer and exaltation” (Qur’ān 24:41) means his degree of being late in worshipping his Lord and his exaltation of God’s

⁴² Affifi, I, p. 225, n. 1.

⁴³ Abrahamov, *Ibn al-‘Arabī and the Sufis*, pp. 76f.

⁴⁴ Since prayer is also one of God’s self-manifestations, it is this self-manifestation which comes first from the divine perspective and the one who prays falls behind; that is, he performs what God has already established. One of the meanings of the verb *ṣallā* is “to be the second in the race.”

transcendence which derives from his predisposition. Everything without exception exalts the praise of its Lord, the most forbearing (226), the most forgiving.⁴⁵ For this reason, one cannot understand⁴⁶ in detail, one by one, the exaltation of the world. Another understanding of the verse “everything without exception exalts the praise of its Lord” (*biḥamdihi*, Qur’ān 17:44) is possible; the pronoun *hi* in *biḥamdihi* may refer to the praise spoken of each thing, just as we say concerning the human’s belief, one praises the god of his belief and connects himself to him. (In like manner), the act one performs returns to oneself, thus one praises only oneself, for whoever praises the act undoubtedly praises only the agent of the act, because the perfection or imperfection of the act returns to its agent. Similarly, the god of belief is the product (*maṣnūʿ*) of one’s thought; it is one’s production (*ṣanʿ*). One’s praise of that which one believes amounts to one’s praise of oneself. For this reason, one dispraises the beliefs of others, and if one were just, one would not be able to do this. However, this believer, who worships his specific object, is no doubt ignorant of this (the truth), because he opposes the beliefs of others in their gods. That is because had he known al-Junayd’s saying, “the color of the water is the color of its vessel,” he would have approved of the belief of everyone and known God in every form and every belief. Such a person supposes (*ẓānn*), but does not know (*ʿālim*). For this reason, God said (in a tradition): “I am as my servant supposes Me to be” (*anā ʿinda ẓann ʿabdī bī*);⁴⁷ that is, I manifest myself to him only in the form of his belief; if he wishes, he will make (my self-manifestation) unlimited, and if he wishes, he will make it limited, for the God of beliefs is limited, and (hence) He is the God whom His servant holds in his heart, because the unlimited God cannot be comprised by anything, for He is the essence of things and of Himself. One cannot say that either God comprises Himself, or not, so understand! “God speaks the truth and guides to the right way” (Qur’ān 33:4).

⁴⁵ This is a paraphrase of Qur’ān 17:44.

⁴⁶ *lā yufqahu* occurs on the basis of the preceding Qur’ānic verse, which reads “you do not understand their praise” (*lā tafqahūna tasbiḥahum*).

⁴⁷ Bukhārī, 97:15 (7405); Affīfī, I, p. 33.

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الجمهورية العراقية
وزارة الاوقاف والشؤون الدينية
أحياء التراث الاسلامي

٦٥

كِتَابُ

آدابُ الصَّحبةِ وَالْمُعَاشِرَةِ

مع أضاف الخلق

للأمام الغزالي

المتوفى سنة ٥٠٥ هـ

دراسة وتحقيق


الدكتور محمد سعود المعيني

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

والصلاة والسلام على سيد الأنبياء والمرسلين ، ومن
دعاً بدعوته الى يوم الدين .

أما بعد : فلاشك أن الشريعة الإسلامية عالجت كل
أمور الحياة ، ورسمت للبشرية طريقاً واضحاً ، وأحاطت
النظم بسور متين من الأخلاق والقيم ، يحفظ ديمومة سير
المجتمع ، ويصونه من التصدع والأنهيار ، فرسمت
الحدود الكاملة للنظرية الأخلاقية ، بوحى من النظرة
الشمولية ، التي تتناول الحقيقة الإلهية وصفاتها ،
والكون ، نشأته وحركته ، وما يجري له من تصريف
وتمسيق ، وردّها الى الحقيقة الأزلية الأولى ، الله الخالق
المبدع المكون القادر ، كما تتناول الإنسان ، نشأته
وموته وأعماله ، ثم ربطها جميعاً بمبدأ التوحيد ، فكل
ما عدا الله مخلوق وفق برنامج مرسوم ، ولأجل غاية
أسمى وأعظم .

وهذه النظرية لحقيقة الألوهية ، وحقيقة الكون ،
وحقيقة الحياة ، وحقيقة الإنسان ، تولد شعوراً وسلوكاً
في شأن الحياة والموت ، والسعي ، والصحة ، والمرض ،
والرزق ، وغير ذلك . كما تحل الألغاز التي شغلت عقل
الإنسان ، بما ينسجم وطبيعة العلاقة بين الخالق
والمخلوق ، مع توازن تام ، وتفاعل صحيح .



06 MAY 1991

فالإنسان يعمل للعالم بقدر ، ويعمل للآخرة بقدر ،
ويحدد علاقاته مع الآخرين بقدر ، كما يحدد علاقته مع
خالقه بقدر .

وينتج عن ذلك تهذيب الضمير ، واتزان السلوك ،
وتنظيم الحياة الإنسانية ككل . فيحس الفرد بتذوق
الحياة ، لأن قيمة الحياة الإنسانية ، ترتفع وتسمو كلما
أصبحت في فلك طاعة الله ومرضاته ، ولا عجب إذا برزت
مبادئ حب الخير والتسامح ونكران الذات .

ومن هنا تبرز القيمة الأخلاقية للفرد والمجتمع ، على
شكل مبادئ سامية ، تعصم الفرد من الضلال والتهيه ،
والأمة من التمزق والضياع .

فالفرد جزء من الجماعة ، والجماعة جزء من الحياة ،
والحياة جزء من الكون ، والكون مسخر للأحياء ، والكل
من خلق الله وفي طاعته .

وانطلاقاً من هذه الأهمية العظمى ، رأيت أن أقدم
هذا الكتاب في الأخلاق ، وآمل أن تجمع الأشباه والنظائر ،
وينتقى منها ما يعصم الأمة من الزيغ والزلل ، وبين أيدينا
ثروة هائلة ، يقف الإنسان أمامها باجلال وإكبار .

والذي دفعني لذلك ، ملاحظتي الميدانية لسلوك
شبابنا ، حيث بدأت تتأثر باتجاه الحضارة المادي ،
والتعامل مع الحياة بمقاييس مادية ، والأبتعاد عن القيم
الأخلاقية التي اتصفت بها أمتنا .

وبما أن الحياة المادية تسير بجناح واحد ، فهي
معرضة للتصدع والأنهيار . فالتعامل المادي البحت يجعل
من الإنسان ذنباً أنانياً لا تعرف خيره من شره ، وإذا
تحكمت مثل هذه العلاقات بين الأفراد والمجتمعات ، كانت
عرضة للتلاشي والضياع . وقد حدثنا التاريخ عن
أمم تلاشت بتلاشي قيمها ومآثرها .

وما دامت الأمم بأخلاقها وأعرافها ، تكتسب العراقة
والبقاء والشموخ أرى واجباً على المربين والمفكرين ، أن
يتحسسوا عظم المسؤولية قبل غيرهم ، وأن يقدموا ما
يضمن سلامة التفاعل مع الحياة وفق حسابات دقيقة ،
تجنب المسيرة مطبات الطريق ، وأحوال الكوارث .

وقد إخترت هذا الكتاب للامام الغزالي لمكانته وسعة
أفقه ، وسلامة معتقده ، وعذوبة أسلوبه ، فهو يسترسل
في حديثه الشيق ، يخاطب عقل الإنسان ومشاعره
وضميره ، ويجري منه مجرى الدم في العروق ، حيث غاص
في أعماق النفس ، وعالجها بعلاج كتاب الله وسنة
نبيه ، وخلاصة ما توصلت إليه عقول السلف الصالح ،
مبتعداً عن التعقيد والتنفير .

وقد حاولت جهدي خدمة النص ، والوقوف على
عبارة الغزالي نفسها ، لأن كتاب إحياء علوم الدين
مطبوع ، وقد قرأه الناس على مر العصور ، وربما وجد
البعض بعض الشيء ، فنسبه للمؤلف ، وهو تصنيف ،
أو سهو من الناسخ ، وغير ذلك . والذي يقرأ كتاب
الأخلاق عند الغزالي ، للدكتور زكي مبارك ص ١٠٤ -

١١٥ ، يجد العجب ، فقد نسب إليه الأخطاء اللغوية ، وعدم سلامة النص ، واضطراب التعبير ، حيث وجد العبارة مقطوعة ، أو سقطت منها بعض الكلمات ، وهذا يعود للنسخ ، لا للتأليف . وبعد تحقيق النص ، استقامت عبارته ، وتلاشت الأخطاء تماماً .

كما تعقبت الحديث النبوي الشريف ، الذي استشهد به مع بيان ما قيل فيه ، وما ورد من حديث ضعيف ، أو موضوع ، لا ذنب للمؤلف فيه ، حيث نقل عن السلف ، ما أورده في كتبهم ، ولما تكتمل دراسات الحديث بعد ، والذين تعقبوه وجدوا مصادرهم ميسرة ، واليوم نجد مصادرنا ، وللذين من بعدنا مصادرهم ، وهكذا سنة الحياة ، تفاعل دائم ، وإنتاج مستمر .

كما رأيت أن أضع ملخصاً متواضعاً في الفكر الأخلاقي عند الغزالي ، لعل القاري يسترشد بها ، أو تعينه على فهم نصوص الكتاب .

هذا وارجو أن أكون بجهدي المتواضع ، قد قدمت خدمة للتراث والجيل ، وارجو الله المزيد ، وما توفيقي الا بالله .

د . محمد سعود المعيني

الباب الأول الفصل الأول ترجمة الإمام الغزالي

إسمه ومولده :

هو أبو حامد زين محمد بن محمد بن محمد بن أحمد الغزالي^(١) الطوسي^(٢) ولد بمدينة طوس من أعمال خراسان سنة ٤٥٠ هـ^(٣) ، من والد فقير صالح ، كان يعمل بغزل الصوف وبيعه في دكان بطوس .

صفة والده :

يحكى ' أن أباه كان فقيراً صالحاً ، لا يأكل إلا من كسب يده ، ويطوف على الفقهاء ويجالسهم ، ويخدمهم ما أمكنه ، وكان يستمع لأقوال علماء المتصوفة في حلقاتهم ، فيتأثر تأثراً كبيراً ، ويبكي ويتوسل الى الله تعالى ، أن يرزقه

(١) نسبة الى مهنة أبيه ، وهي غزل الصوف ، لذا تقرأ بتشديد الزاي ، ويرى أنه ولد في قرية الغزالية من قرى طوس ، وعلى هذا فالزاي تنطق غير مشددة ، وعلق ابن خلكان على رواية عدم التشديد بأنها خلاف المشهور ، ونسبها الى ابن السمعاني . والذي شاع هو تخفيف الزاي في لقيه . وفيات الأعيان ٨١/١ ، الوافي بالوفيات ٢٧٧/١ ، اللباب ١٧٠/٢ .

(٢) نسبة الى طوس ، ثاني مدينة في خراسان ، بعد نيسابور ، وكانت تتألف من بلدين يقال لأحدهما الطابران . وللأخرى : نوقان ، ولهما أكثر من ألف قرية ، وبطوس يوجد قبر الإمام علي بن موسى الرضا ، وقبر هارون الرشيد ، وفي سنة ٦١٧ هـ دمر المغول مدينة طوس ، فلم تنهض ، وقامت بجوانبها بعض المدن كالمشهد . معجم البلدان ٥٩٠/٣ ، الوفيات ٨١/١ .

(٣) البداية والنهاية ١٧٣/١٢ ، الاعلام للزركلي ط العلم ٢٢/٧ ، وفيات الأعيان ٤٦٣/١ ، شذرات الذهب ١٠/٤ ، مفتاح السعادة ١٩١/٢ .

ولداً صالحاً مثلهم ، ويجعله فقيهاً واعظاً^(١) .

فاستجاب الله سبحانه دعاءه ، ورزقه محمداً واحمداً ، فكان محمد إمام أهل زمانه ، وعلماً لأئمة الأسلام ، كتب فأنار ، ووعظ فأفاد .

أما أحمد ، فكان ذلك الصوفي الواعظ ، الذي تجمع الناس حوله ، وازدحموا .

ألا أن والدهما لبي' نداء ربه ، ولم يدرك ما وصل إليه ولده .

نشأته :

لما دنت ساعة وفاة والده ، أوصى به ، وبأخيه أحمد ، إلى صديق له من المتصوفة ، وزوده بما يدخره من مال ، لينفقه على 'تعليمهما ، ولم يكن هذا الصديق المتصوف ، مجرد وصي عليهما ، بل كان معلماً لهما أيضاً . فأول معلم للغزالي ، كان صوفياً .

ولكن المال الذي خلفه والدهما كان قليلاً ، سرعان ما نفذ ، إضافة إلى كون الصديق المتصوف من الفقراء ، فأشار عليهما بالألتحاق بمدرسة تنفق على طلابها ، فأنصرف محمد وأحمد إلى تحصيل العلم بكل جد ونشاط^(٢) .

(١) طبقات الشافعية للسبكي ١٠٢/٤ .

(٢) انظر شفاء الغليل ص ١٥ .

فكان هذا الرجل سبب سعادتهما وعلو درجتهما ، وكان الغزالي يحكي ذلك ، كما كان يقول : طلبنا العلم لغير الله ، فأبى أن يكون إلا لله^(١) .

تلقيه العلوم :

لقد كان تأثير الصوفي عليهما واضحاً ، حيث أنصرف أحمد إلى التصوف في ريعان شبابه ، فآثر الزهد والتقشف والخلوة والاعتكاف ، وقد دخل بغداد وعقد حلقة للوعظ في أحد مساجدها ، فتوافد عليه الطلبة من كل مكان ، وازدحموا حوله .

أما محمد فقد واصل دراسة الفقه في طوس ، ثم سافر إلى جرجان لتلقي العلوم ، وهو دون العشرين من عمره ، ثم رجع إلى طوس ، وفي الطريق داهمه بعض اللصوص ، وسرقوا منه بعض كتبه ، فعز عليه أن يتركها وينجو بنفسه ، فخاطر بحياته ، وتوسل اليهم أن يردوها إليه . ومنذ هذه الحادثة ، أصبح الغزالي يحفظ كل ما يقع تحت يديه من علوم ومعارف ، حتى لا يكون بحاجة إليها في حال فقده إياها^(٢) .

ثم ارتحل إلى نيسابور ، حيث جذبته شهرة أمام الحرمين الجويني^(٣) ، رئيس المدرسة النظامية آنذاك ،

(١) انظر مقدمة إحياء علوم الدين .

(٢) الغزالي للدكتور مصطفى غالب ص ١٩ .

(٣) هو أبو المعالي ضياء الدين عبد الملك الجويني ، انظر طبقات الشافعية

• ٢٤٩/٢

فدرس عليه الفقه واصوله والجدل والمنطق والفلسفة فتعمق في دراسة الفلسفة ، ولم يجد فيها ما يشفي الغليل ، فانتقدها ، واتجه للتصوف (١) ، حيث وجد فيه مرتعاً للنفس وطمأنينة للقلب ، وطريقاً توصل الإنسان الى أسامي الدرجات .

زيارته للوزير نظام الملك :

لما مات الإمام الجويني ، غادر الغزالي نيسابور عام ٤٧٨ هـ ، قاصداً المعسكر ، وهو في الثامنة والعشرين من عمره ، فتعرف على ' نظام الملك الوزير السلجوقي ، مؤسس المدرسة النظامية ببغداد ، فأعجب به ، وبعلمه فعينه أستاذاً فيها فقدم ببغداد سنة ٤٨٤ هـ ودرس بالنظامية ، وأعجب الخلق ، بحسن كلامه ، وكمال فضله ، وفصاحة لسانه ، فأحبوه وأجلوه .

إقامته على التدريس :

أقام الغزالي على التدريس والوعظ ، فعلا جاحه ، واشتهر إسمه ، فضربت به الأمثال ، وشدت اليه الرحال ، لما عرف بشرف النفس والترفع عن الرذائل .

فانتفع بعلمه الكثير ، ومصنفاته ما تزال رافداً عذباً ، يرتوي منها عشاق الفضيلة .

(١) انظر دراسات في الفكر الفلسفي الاسلامي ص ١٣٣ .

وفي سنة ٤٨٨ هـ خرج من بغداد بناءً على نصيحة أطبائه ، حيث أصيب بداء الكنظ (١) ، فأشاروا عليه بالسفر والتجوال ، فاستجاب لطلبهم ، واستتاب أخاه في التدريس ، وخرج الى الشام والقدس والخليل ومكة والمدينة ، ولم يعمل في بغداد سوى أربع سنوات (٢) .

ثم عاد الى بغداد بعد أداء فريضة الحج ، وعقد بها مجلس الوعظ ، تكلم عن لسان أهل الحقيقة ، وحدث بكتاب إحياء علوم الدين .

ثم قصد نيسابور فدرس بنظاميتها ، ثم عاد الى بلده طوس ، فأقام فيها ، وابتنى ' رباطاً للصوفية ، واتخذ داراً حسنة ، وغرس فيها بستاناً ، وأقبل على تلاوة القرآن ، وحفظ صحيح الحديث ، والزهد والعبادة .

وفاته :

توفي رحمه الله بطوس سنة ٥٠٥ هـ . ودفن فيها (٣) .

(١) كنظه الأمر يكنظه ، وتكنظه ، بلغ مشقته وعنه ، والكنظة ، بالضم ، الضغطة . القاموس المحيط ٣٩٨/٢ . وهو هبوط في القوى الجسمانية والعقلية ، ينتج اضطراباً نفسياً ، يتسم صاحبه بالقلق والسويدة ، نتيجة تعرض الشخص لازمات شتى ، فيشعر بالتشاؤم . وضعف الذاكرة ، فيهرب من الواقع وتبعات الحياة ، مع فقدان للشهية ، وقلة النوم ، كما روى ذلك في كتابه المنقذ من الضلال ص ١٠٥ . انظر تاريخ الفكر العربي ص ٣٩٢ .

(٢) الغزالي ص ٢٢ .

(٣) البداية والنهاية ١٧٤/١٢ ، اللباب في تهذيب الأنساب ١٧٠/٢ ، الوافي بالوفيات ٢٧٧/١ ، طبقات الشافعية ١٠٣/٤ ، الأعلام للزركلي ٢٢/٧ .

الفصل الثاني

آثاره ومصنفاته :

بدأ الإمام الغزالي التأليف في فروع الفقه وأصوله ،
ومسائل الخلاف والجدل منذ صباه ، ثم شملت أكثر
فروع المعرفة ، التي كانت معروفة آنذاك .

ويتميز أسلوب الغزالي بالجزالة والوضوح والرقّة ،
مع إثارة الوجدان ، كما اشتهر بحسن التقسيم
والتبويب ، مما يجعل الأجزاء متناسقة مترابطة ، تُشكل
وحدة شاملة ، وقد يطغى أسلوبه الجدلي أحياناً ، حينما
يرد على بعض الأفكار .

الكتب المطبوعة (١) :

أ - في التصوف :

- ١ - آداب الصوفية .
- ٢ - الأدب في الدين .
- ٣ - الأربعين في أصول الدين .
- ٤ - الأملاء عن إشكال الأحياء .
- ٥ - إحياء علوم الدين .
- ٦ - أيها الولد .
- ٧ - بداية الهداية وتهذيب النفوس بالآداب الشرعية .
- ٨ - جواهر القرآن ودرره .
- ٩ - الحكمة في مخلوقات الله .

(١) أعدّه الدكتور مصطفى غالب دراسة في كتب الغزالي ورتبها ضمن
كتابه «الغزالي» ص ٢٨ - ٣٩ ، وهي دراسة مفيدة فلتراجع في مكانها .

١٠ - خلاصة التصانيف .

١١ - الدرّة الفاخرة في كشف علوم الآخرة .

١٢ - الرسالة الدنيّة .

١٣ - الرسالة الوعظيّة .

١٤ - فاتحة العلوم .

١٥ - القواعد العشرة .

١٦ - الكشف والتبيين في غرور الخلق أجمعين ، مطبوع

بهامش (تنبيه المغتر) للشعراني .

١٧ - المرشد الأمين الى موعظة المؤمنين ، لخص فيه

إحياء علوم الدين .

١٨ - مشكاة الأنوار .

١٩ - مكاشفة القلوب المقرّب الى حضرة علام الغيوب .

٢٠ - منهاج العابدين الى الجنة .

٢١ - ميزان العمل .

ب - في العقائد :

٢٢ - الأجوبة الغزالية في المسائل الأخروية .

٢٣ - الأقتصاد في الاعتقاد .

٢٤ - إلبام العوام عن علم الكلام .

٢٥ - الرسالة القدسية في قواعد العقائد .

٢٦ - عقيدة أهل السنة .

٢٧ - فضائح الباطنية وفضائل المستظهرية .

٢٨ - فيصل التفرقة بين الأسلام والزندقة .

٢٩ - القسطاس المستقيم .

٣٠ - كيمياء السعادة .

٣١ - المقصد الأسنى في شرح أسماء الله الحسنى .

ج - في الفقه وأصوله :

٣٢ - أسرار الحج ، في الفقه الشافعي .

٣٣ - شفاء الغليل في بيان الشبه والمخيل ومسالك

التعليل .

٣٤ - المسصفى في علم الأصول .

٣٥ - الوجيز في الفروع .

د - في المنطق والفلسفة :

٣٦ - تهافت الفلاسفة .

٣٧ - رسالة الطير .

٣٨ - محك النظر في المنطق .

٣٩ - معارج القدس في مدارج معرفة النفس .

٤٠ - معيار العلم في المنطق .

٤١ - مقاصد الفلاسفة .

٤٢ - المنقذ من الضلال .

المخطوطات :

لقد ذكر الدكتور مصطفى غالب في كتابه الغزالي
ص ٣٧ وما بعدها ، جملة من المخطوطات مع أماكن
وجودها ، كالآتي :

أ - في التصوف :

١ - جامع الحقائق بتجربة العلائق ، ومنه نسخة خطية
في مكتبة (أويسال) .

٢ - زهد الفاتح . منه نسخة خطية في المتحف البريطاني .

٣ - مدخل السلوك الى منازل الملوك ، بحث فيه حياة
الصوفي . منه نسخة خطية في مكتبة (الاسكوريال) .

- ٤ - معارج السالكين - منه نسخة في مكتبة باريس .
٥ - نور الشمعة في بيان ظهر الجمعة - منه نسخة خطية في لندن .

ب - في الفقه وأصوله :

- ٦ - البسيط في الفروع ، منه نسخة في مكتبة (الأسكوريال) وأخرى في (دار الكتب المصرية) .
٧ - غاية مسائل الدور - منه نسخة في المتحف البريطاني .
٨ - المنحول في الأصول ، منه نسخة في (دار الكتب المصرية) .
٩ - الوسيط المحيط بأقطار البسيط ، منه نسخ في مكتبة (مونش) ومكتبة (أكسفورد) ومكتبة (دار الكتب المصرية) .
١٠ - حقائق العلوم لأصل الفهوم ، منه نسخة في مكتبة (باريس) .
١١ - المعارف العقلية والحكمة الالهية ، منه نسخ في مكتبتي (باريس وأكسفورد) .
١٢ - فضائل القرآن ، منه نسخة خطية في (دار الكتب المصرية) .

وهذا جزء مما كتب الغزالي ، حيث ذكر أن له (٢٢٨) كتاباً عدا المشكوك في نسبتها إليه ، ولعل القسم منها قد ضاع ، والقسم الآخر في مكاتب خاصة ، لم تظهر فهرستها لحد الآن (١) .

(١) انظر كتاب الغزالي ص ٢٨ - ٣٩ .

نسخ كتاب آداب الصحبة

- ١ - نسخة مكتبة الدراسات العليا بكلية الآداب - بغداد برقم ١٢٢٥ ، وهي نسخة قديمة من المئة السابعة للهجرة ، خطها جميل ، مذهبة ، مقروءة ومصححة ، عدد صفحاتها ١١٨ صفحة ، ولا تحمل اسماً للناسخ ، ولا تاريخ النسخ ، وقد رمزت لها بالحرف (ب) .
٢ - نسخة المكتبة المركزية بجامعة البصرة ، ضمن مجموع رقم ٣٣٤ ، وهي نسخة قديمة أيضاً ، ولا تحمل تاريخاً للنسخ ، ولا اسماً لناسخها ، خطها واضح يعود للمئة السادسة للهجرة تقريباً ، وقد رمزت لها بالحرف (ج) .
٣ - إحياء علوم الدين - الكتاب جزء من كتاب الأحياء ، يقع بين ص ١٥٧ و ٢٢١ ، وقد جعلتها هي الأصل ، لأن كتاب إحياء علوم الدين قد نال عناية في طبعه ، وقد أخذت طبعة دار المعرفة للطباعة والنشر ، لأنها تتضمن كتاب المغني عن حمل الأسفار ، للحافظ زين الدين العراقي .
وعلى الرغم من العناية في طباعة الكتاب ، فقد وجدت الكثير من الأخطاء والسقطات ، التي تؤثر على المعنى .

الفصل الثالث

عملي في التحقيق

حينما بدأت بتحقيق كتاب أدب الصحبة للغزالي ، وهو جزء من كتاب إحياء علوم الدين المطبوع ، كنت شاكاً في قيمة عملي العلمية والتراثية ، وبعد الانتهاء من تحقيقه ، خرجت جازماً بضرورة تحقيق الكتب المطبوعة لا سيما المصادر الرئيسية ، التي تُقرأ باطمئنان ويُنقل عنها بلا تحفظ . فقد وجدت من التصحيف ، وسقطات العبارات ، والخلاف بين مخطوطة وأخرى ، ما يتأثر به المعنى . وقد ينسب الى المؤلف ، خطأ ، أو عدم دقة فيما كتب .

وعملية التحقيق هي التي تعطينا النص الذي خطه المؤلف دون زيادة أو نقصان ، عند ذلك يمكن نسبة الرأي لصاحبه ، وهذه لا يمكن تحقيقها من نسخة واحدة ، لأن التصحيف ، والخطأ في النقل ، ونسيان العبارات ، وربما السطور ، كثيراً ما يقع من النساخ ، وبالتالي تنعكس على كيفية فهم القارئ ، الذي قرأ نصاً ناقصاً وهو لا يدري ، ثم رتب نتائجه على ما وجد . لذا آمل أن تحقق المصادر المهمة للوصول الى الفكر الأصيل .

وعلمي في تحقيق الكتاب كالاتي :

١ - قابلت النسخ الثلاث مع بعضها ، واخترت اللفظ

المناسب للمعنى ، والذي ظننت أنه نص المؤلف .
وأثبت الأخرى بالهامش ، إذ ربما لم أوفق في
إختياري ، ولباحث آخر أن يختار الذي يراه .

٢ - تفسير المفردات التي تحتاج الى تفسير لغوي ، أو
إصطلاحي ، مع التعليق على بعض فقرات الكتاب ،
إذا إقتضت الضرورة .

٣ - ترجمة الأعلام الواردة في الكتاب ، مع ذكر أرقام
الآيات القرآنية .

٤ - قسمت الموضوع الى عناوين وسطية ، محصورة بين
قوسين بلا أرقام ، لئلا يختلط بكلام المؤلف . وإذا
توقف فهم العبارة على كلمة ، أضفتها بين قوسين .

٥ - خرجت الأحاديث الواردة في الكتاب ، والمسندة اليه
صلى الله عليه وسلم ، وتعقبت ما قيل فيها من
صحة ، أو ضعف ، أو وضع ، وأكملت نص الحديث
في الهامش ، إذا توقف عليه فهم المعنى ، مع التنبيه
على إختلاف الألفاظ في الحديث ، بين المساند ،
ونص الكتاب .

وقد اكتفيت بذكر أرقام صفحات البخاري
ومسلم ، اذا كان الحديث متفقاً عليه ، أما التي لم
ترد في الصحيحين ، فقد تتبعته في المساند الأخرى ،
وذكرت ما قيل فيها من قبل علماء الحديث ، ليكون
القارئ على بينة من أمره ، وهو يقرأ نصاً
للغزالي .

ومن خلال دراستي للحديث الوارد في الكتاب ،
وجدت الكثير من الأحاديث الضعيفة ، والأحاديث
الموضوعة ، التي لا يُعتمد عليها .

ولعل الامام الغزالي ، نقل عن كتب السلف ،
فهو متبع وليس بمبتدع ، ولما تتكامل دراسات
الحديث ونقده في عصره ، فهو معذور فيما كتب
ونقل .

ولقد قام الامام الحافظ زين الدين العراقي
المتوفى سنة ٨٠٦هـ بتخريج أحاديث الاحياء ، وبين
الضعيف منها ، والذي لا أصل له ، كما تيسر له في
عصره ، وقد أضفت الى ذلك ما تيسر لي من
دراسات الحديث ، ليكون الجهد متكاملًا ، وقد
ابتغيت من وراء هذا العناء ، أن يكون هذا الكتاب ،
صالحاً معتمداً عليه ، في رسم نظرية متكاملة في
الأخلاق والسلوك ، من غير خوف أو وجل .

٦ - التنبيه على ما جاء في الكتاب ، وفق منظور
الصوفية ، والذي لم يطلب من عموم الناس ، ولا
يتوقف عليه صلاح الحال والعقيدة ، حيث المتصوفة
خاصة المجتمع ، ولهم طريقهم الخاص ، ولا يصح أن
يعمم هذا الطريق للناس كافة ، بل يجب الاقتصار
على حد أدنى يحقق صلاح المجتمع في الدين
والدنيا ، على إختلاف طبقاته وأصنافه وظروفه .

٧ - قمت بدراسة مناسبة للفكر الأخلاقي عند الغزالي ،
لتكون أساساً لما كتب في الأمور التفصيلية ، وقد
استخرجت رأي الغزالي من كتبه ذاتها ، وقد
وجدتها ضرورية ، لأن الغزالي قد بني الأخلاق على
أساس نظري وعملي ، كما إتصف بالواقعية
المفيدة ، فهو بحق جدير أن تنسب إليه نظرية
أخلاقية .

الباب الثاني الفكر الأخلاقي عند الغزالي

الفصل الأول

المباحث التي تمس الفكر الأخلاقي

أسس السلوك :

كل عمل إرادي يسمى سلوكاً ، كالصدق ، والكذب ،
والكرم ، والبخل ، وغيرها من الأعمال .

ولسلوك الانسان ، أسس نفسية يصدر عنها ،
كالغريزة ، والسعادة . وتعرف هذه الأسس بمظاهرها .
فكل سلوك لا بد له من أساس يصدر عنه .

وأخلاق الانسان لا توجد بالصدفة ، ولكنها توجد ،
وتترقى ، وتصلح ، أو تنحط وتفسد ، وفق قوانين ثابتة ،
ومعرفة هذه القوانين تساعد على إصلاح الأخلاق ،
وتقويمها ، بقدر ما تسمح به الظروف البيئية
والحضارية .

إن الناس يميلون الى الشرف والرفعة والكمال ،
وسائر الفضائل دائماً ، ولكن هذا الميل يختلف قوة
وضعفاً ، بحسب طبيعة المجتمع وإعدادة وأنظمتة وزمنه .

والتربية الصحيحة ، هي التي تعزز هذا الميل
وتنميه ، وتصل بالانسان ، الى أقصى ما يمكن الوصول
إليه ، من السمو والكمال .

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**Inevitable
Journey**
الرحلة المحتمة

حَيَاةُ الْبَرْزَخِ
Life in al-Barzakh
from Death until Resurrection

2ND EDITION



محمد بن مصطفى الجبالي
Muhammad Mustafā al-Jibāly

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THE INEVITABLE JOURNEY - PART IV

الْحَيَاةُ فِي الْبَرْزَخِ LIFE IN AL-BARZAKH

BY

مُحَمَّدُ الْجِبَالِي

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PRELUDE

Introduction

Alḥamdu lillāh. Indeed, all glory and praise is due to Allāh. We glorify and praise Him, and we ask Him for help and forgiveness. In Allāh we seek refuge from the evils of ourselves and from our wrong doings. He whom Allāh guides shall not be misguided, and he whom He misguides shall never be guided.

I bear witness that there is no true god except Allāh, alone without any partners, and I bear witness that Muḥammad (ﷺ) is His 'Abd¹ and Messenger.

﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ حَقَّ تُقَاتِهِ وَلَا تَمُوتُنَّ إِلَّا وَأَنتُمْ

مُسْلِمُونَ﴾ آل عمران ١٠٢

«Believers! Fear and worship Allāh as He deserves, and do not die except as Muslims.»²

﴿يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ اتَّقُوا رَبَّكُمُ الَّذِي خَلَقَكُمْ مِنْ نَفْسٍ وَاحِدَةٍ وَخَلَقَ مِنْهَا زَوْجَهَا وَبَثَّ مِنْهُمَا رِجَالًا كَثِيرًا وَنِسَاءً ۚ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ الَّذِي تَسَاءَلُونَ بِهِ وَالْأَرْحَامَ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ عَلَيْكُمْ رَقِيبًا﴾ النساء ١

«People! Revere your Lord who has created you from one soul, and created from it its mate, and from these two spread forth multitudes of men and women; and fear Allāh through whom you demand [your mutual rights], and [revere the ties of] the wombs. Indeed, Allāh is ever-watchful over you.»³

1 'Abd: Devoted servant and worshipper.

2 Āl 'Imrān 3:102.

3 An-Nisā' 4:1.

«يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَقُولُوا قَوْلًا سَدِيدًا ۖ يُصْلَحْ
لَكُمْ أَعْمَالَكُمْ وَيَغْفِرْ لَكُمْ ذُنُوبَكُمْ ۗ وَمَنْ يُطِيعِ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ فَقَدْ
فَازَ فَوْزًا عَظِيمًا ۝» الأحزاب ٧٠-٧١

«Believers! Revere Allāh, and [always] speak the truth. He will then direct you to do righteous deeds and will forgive your sins. And whoever obeys Allāh and His Messenger has indeed achieved a great victory.» ¹

Verily, the best words are those of Allāh (ﷻ); the best guidance is that of Muḥammad (ﷺ); the worst matters [in creed or worship] are those innovated [by people], for every such innovated matter is a *bid'ah* ², and every *bid'ah* is an act of misguidance that deserves the Fire. ³

Our *Da'wah* and Objectives

Our goal in this and our other works is to propagate the True *Da'wah* ⁴ that derives from the Book of Allāh (ﷻ) and the *Sunnah* ⁵ of His Messenger (ﷺ). Propagating this *Da'wah* is a duty that every Muslim should cherish. Allāh (ﷻ) says:

«وَلْتَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ
عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ ۗ وَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ ۝» آل عمران ١٠٤

«Let there arise from you a group of people inviting

¹ *Al-Aḥzāb* 33:70-71.

² *Bid'ah*: Innovation in the creed or in acts of worship.

³ These opening paragraphs are a translation of *Khuṭbat ul-Ḥājah* (the Sermon of Need) with which the Messenger (ﷺ) used to start his speeches and which he was keen to teach to his companions.

⁴ *Da'wah*: Call and mission.

⁵ *Sunnah*: Way, guidance, teachings, etc.

to all that is good (*Islām*), enjoining what is right (according to *Islām*), and forbidding what is wrong (according to *Islām*). These are the ones who will achieve success.»¹

This *Da'wah* may be summarized in two words: *taṣfiyah* (cleansing and purification) and *tarbiyah* (cultivation and education). Allāh (ﷻ) refers to this in the following:

﴿هُوَ الَّذِي بَعَثَ فِي الْأُمِّيِّينَ رَسُولًا مِنْهُمْ يَتْلُوا عَلَيْهِمْ آيَاتِهِ وَيُزَكِّيهِمْ وَيُعَلِّمُهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْحِكْمَةَ وَإِنْ كَانُوا مِنْ قَبْلُ لَفِي ضَلَالٍ مُبِينٍ﴾ الجمعة ٢

«He it is who has sent unto the unlettered people a Messenger from among themselves to convey unto them His messages, to purify them, and to teach them the Book and the Wisdom - whereas before that they had been, most obviously, in clear misguidance.»²

Propagating the True *Da'wah* must then be pursued through purifying *Islām* from unfounded beliefs and practices, and working patiently to assist the Muslims abide by the true and purified religion. This must be done at various levels as follows:

1. We must uphold the sublime *Qur'ān* and the Prophet's authentic *Sunnah*, and comprehend them in accordance with the understanding and practice of the righteous *Salaf*³. This is Allāh's (ﷻ) command, as in the following:

﴿وَمَنْ يُشَاقِقِ الرَّسُولَ مِنْ بَعْدِ مَا تَبَيَّنَ لَهُ الْهُدَىٰ وَيَتَّبِعْ

¹ *Āl 'Imrān* 3:104.

² *Al-Jumu'ah* 62:2.

³ The *ṣaḥābah* (the Prophet's companions; singular *ṣaḥābī*) and their true followers.

غَيْرَ سَبِيلِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ نُوَلِّهِ مَا تَوَلَّىٰ وَنُصْلِهِ جَهَنَّمَ ۖ وَسَاءَتْ

مَصِيرًا ﴿النساء ١١٥﴾

«If anyone contends with the Messenger after the Guidance has been plainly conveyed to him, and follows a path other than that of the believers, We shall leave him in the path he has chosen, and land him in Hell: What an evil abode!»¹

And He (ﷺ) says:

﴿فَإِنْ آمَنُوا بِمِثْلِ مَا آمَنْتُمْ بِهِ فَقَدْ أَهْتَدُوا﴾ البقرة ١٣٧

«So if they believe as you believe², they are indeed on the right path.»³

2. We must enlighten and educate the Muslims, urging them to comply with the true *Dīn*⁴, act according to its teachings, and adorn themselves with its virtues and ethics. This will ensure Allāh's acceptance, through which they will realize happiness and glory, as indicated in the following:

﴿وَالْعَصْرِ ۖ إِنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ لَفِي خُسْرٍ ۖ إِلَّا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا

الصَّالِحَاتِ وَتَوَاصَوْا بِالْحَقِّ وَتَوَاصَوْا بِالصَّبْرِ﴾ العصر ١-٣

«By the passing time, man is indeed in loss, except those who believe, do good deeds, enjoin upon one another the keeping to truth, and enjoin upon one another patience in adversity.»⁵

1 *An-Nisā* 4:115.

2 The address here is to the companions of the Messenger (ﷺ).

3 *Al-Baqarah* 2:137.

4 *Dīn* : Religion.

5 *Al-'Aṣr* 103:1-3.

3. We must caution the Muslims and exhort them to absolve their lives of any thoughts alien to the pure and essential tenets of *Islām*, such as *shirk* (polytheism), *bid'ahs*, or philosophy. This is a duty that Allāh (ﷻ) enjoins on us by saying:

«وَتَعَاوَنُوا عَلَى الْبِرِّ وَالتَّقْوَىٰ وَلَا تَعَاوَنُوا عَلَى الْإِثْمِ وَالْعُدْوَانِ»

المائدة ٢

«Help one another in righteousness and piety; and do not help one another in sinning and transgression.»¹

4. We must help cleanse the *Sunnah* of weak and fabricated narrations. The weak reports and unfounded beliefs have marred the clarity of *Islām*, preventing the Muslims' advancement. This duty is of such absolute vitality that the Messenger (ﷺ) praised those who perform it by saying:

«This knowledge will be carried by the trustworthy ones of every generation - they will expel from it the alterations made by those going beyond bounds, the false claims of the liars, and the false interpretations of the ignorant.»²

5. Guided by the *Islām*ic principles³, we must strive to revive the unobstructed *Islām*ic thought, and oppose stubborn adherence to *mathhabs*⁴ and prejudiced loyalty to parties. Neglecting this in the past has caused rust to dwell on the hearts and minds of Muslims,

¹ *Al-Mā'idah* 5:2.

² Authentic - Reported by Ibn 'Adiyy and others.

³ These principles are described in point "1" above.

⁴ *Mathhab*: Way or approach. It mostly refers to one of the four *Islām*ic schools of legislation and jurisprudence that were based on the research and understanding of the Four *Imāms* (scholars): Abū Ḥanīfah an-Nu'mān Bin Thābit, Mālik Bin Anas, Aḥmad Bin Ḥanbal, and Muhammad Bin Idrīs ash-Shāfi' - May Allāh (ﷻ) bestow His mercy on them all.

diverting them from the pure original sources of *Islām*, and causing them to deviate from the honest *Islāmic* brotherhood called to by Allāh (ﷻ):

﴿وَأَعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا﴾ آل عمران ١٠٣

«And hold fast all together, by the rope of Allāh, and be not divided among yourselves.»¹

And by His Messenger (ﷺ):

«Be, worshippers of Allāh, one brethren.»²

6. We must help provide realistic *Islāmic* solutions to contemporary problems, and strive to resume a true *Islāmic* way of life and establish a true *Islāmic* society governed by Allāh's law. Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿وَأَنْ أَحْكَمَ بَيْنَهُمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ﴾ المائدة ٤٩

«Hence, judge between them in accordance with what Allāh has revealed, and do not follow their errant views.»³

We call upon all the Muslims to support us in carrying out this noble trust. This will surely elevate and honor them and spread the eternal message of *Islām* all over the earth, as is Allāh's true promise:

﴿هُوَ الَّذِي أَرْسَلَ رَسُولَهُ بِالْهُدَىٰ وَدِينِ الْحَقِّ لِيُظْهِرَهُ عَلَى الدِّينِ كُلِّهِ وَلَوْ كَرِهَ الْمُشْرِكُونَ﴾ الص ٩

«He it is who has sent His Messenger with Guidance and the Religion of Truth, in order to make it

1 *Āl 'Imrān* 3:103.

2 *Al-Bukhārī* and *Muslim*.

3 *Al-Mā'idah* 5:49.

prevail over all [false] religion, however hateful this may be to the *mushriks* (those who ascribe divinity to other than Allāh).»¹

General Approach in This Work

A large number of *Islāmic* writings in recent times lack the correctness and preciseness that are expected in a true *Islāmic* approach. They suffer from two major problems:

1. Unconcern about the importance of relying only on authentic evidence, particularly in quoting *ḥadīths*². Thus some conclusions that they reach, and some principles that they establish are, in the least, of doubtful validity.
2. Replacing the glorious thought and sound understanding of the early righteous pioneers and scholars of *Islām* (the *Salaf* ﷺ) with inferior opinions and speculations of later scholars.

These problems have led to the following serious consequences:

- ▶ A deformation in some of the fundamental beliefs for the majority of Muslims, including many who are regarded as scholars.
- ▶ Practicing *Islām* in a way that conflicts with the teachings of the Prophet Muḥammad (ﷺ).

Through the ages, only few true scholars ('*ulamā'*) have directed their efforts to correcting these problems through reviving the authentic *Sunnah* and fighting *bid'ahs*. Their efforts have always been greatly

¹ *Aṣ-Ṣaff* 61:9.

² *Ḥadīth*: Reports of the Prophet's sayings, actions, and approvals. Our convention is to use *ḥadīth* (plural *ḥadīths*) with lower case ḥ to indicate single report(s), and *Ḥadīth* with upper case Ḥ to indicate the subject of *Ḥadīth* specialty.

countered and fiercely rejected by their contemporaries. But there is no way to stop the truth from spreading, and Allāh's Light will surely be complete and prevalent. These 'ulamā' (may Allāh bless them and reward their efforts) have produced marvelous writings that have rectified the *Islāmic* beliefs and practices.

Very little of these great writings have been translated to English, or have been resorted to in English writings on *Islām*. Thus a good deal of the existing *Islāmic* literature in English suffers from the two problems cited earlier. It also suffers from additional problems, mainly:

3. Many writers have had a shallow *Islāmic* education. They had to self-educate themselves to meet the requirements of *da'wah* in the West. But their education has not been, in general, adequate enough to qualify them to write on *Islām*.
4. Some non-Muslim scholars and orientalists have volunteered to write on *Islām*. Despite their wide academic knowledge, their writings on *Islām* are usually charged with obvious fallacies and prejudiced misinformation.

These problems have caused a further deviation from the truth in many of today's English writings and talks on *Islām*.

This publication is, therefore, a humble response to our realization of a great responsibility: the responsibility to help bring forth, before the general English speaking public, writings that refine the *Islāmic* concepts from the above problems and present *Islām* pure and simple, as close as possible to the way that it was understood and practiced by its early good pioneers - the *Salaf*.

Translating and Transliterating Arabic

Attempt has been made to minimize the use of Arabic terms. This is a frequently neglected service to the English speaking reader. Transliterated Arabic terms are used in the following two situations only:

- a) When no English expression is found that can reflect the same meaning as the original term.
- b) When it is judged that an Arabic term is of such importance that it is essential to familiarize the readers with it.

In such cases, the Arabic terms are defined at their first occurrence, between brackets or in a footnote. They are then include in the INDEX OF ARABIC TERMS, usually appearing at the end of the book.

Except for proper nouns, transliterated Arabic terms are *italicized*. In general, the rules of English pronunciation can be applied. The following table includes additional symbols employed in this book to help pronounce the Arabic terms.

Symbol	Stands for	English Equivalent Sounds
ā, Ā	<i>Alif</i> (long vowel a)	Mostly: <u>Ma</u> n, <u>sa</u> d. At times: Fa <u>th</u> er, ha <u>rd</u> , go <u>d</u> .
ū, Ū	<i>Wāw</i> (long vowel u)	<u>Ro</u> ot, <u>so</u> up, fl <u>u</u> te.
ī, Ī	<i>Yā'</i> (long vowel i)	<u>Se</u> ed, <u>lea</u> n, <u>pie</u> ce, rece <u>i</u> ve.
'	<i>Hamzah</i>	The first consonant vocal sound uttered when saying: <u>a</u> t, <u>i</u> t or <u>o</u> h.
Th, th	<i>Thā'</i>	<u>Th</u> ree, mo <u>th</u> .
H, h	<i>Hā'</i>	No equivalent. Produced in the lower throat, below "h". Resembles the sound produced after swallowing.
Kh, kh	<i>Khā'</i>	No equivalent. Produced in the back of the mouth and top of the throat.
<u>Th</u> , <u>th</u>	<i>Thāl</i>	<u>Th</u> ere, mo <u>th</u> er.

Symbol	Stands for	English Equivalent Sounds
Ṣ, ṣ	Ṣād	A deeper “s” sound. Somewhat close to the “sc” in “mus <u>sc</u> le”.
Ḍ, ḍ	Ḍād	Sounds deeper than a “d”. Produced by touching the tongue to the mouth’s roof.
Ṭ, ṭ	Ṭah	Similar but deeper than a “t”.
Ẓ, ẓ	Ẓah	A deeper <i>thāl</i> , produced by touching the tip of the tongue to the back of the front teeth.
‘	Āyn	Produced in the bottom of the throat, underneath “ḥ”.
Gh, gh	Ghayn	A gurgling sound produced in the back of the mouth, just above the <i>khā’</i> . Similar to the “R” in some french accents.
Q, q	Qāf	Somewhat similar to the “c” in “c <u>o</u> ffee”.

Translating and Referencing *Qur’ān* and *Ḥadīth*

The *Qur’ān* contains Allāh’s exact words. These words cannot be exactly translated into other languages because of possible misinterpretations and limited human understanding. It is best to translate the meanings as understood by the Muslim scholars. This is what is attempted here. When an *āyah*¹ is cited, the Arabic text is quoted first, followed, between double angle quotation marks (⟨⟩), by

1 *Āyah*: A *Qur’ānic* phrase approximately equal to one sentence, but sometimes longer or shorter than that. Its plural is *āyāt*.

the English meaning in **boldface**. The meaning is extracted from books of *tafsīr* (*Qur'ānic* commentaries and interpretations) and from accessible translations.

The location of a *Qur'ānic* citation is specified in a footnote. It provides the name of the *sūrah* (*Qur'ānic* chapter) followed by its number and the number(s) of the *āyah*(s) cited.

In general, the Arabic text of a cited *ḥadīth* is not provided. This is based on a general agreement among the '*ulamā*' permitting relating *ḥadīths* by meaning. The meaning of a *ḥadīth* is included, in **boldface**, between single angle quotation marks (↯).

A footnote normally specifies the location of a cited *ḥadīth* in the *Ḥadīth* compilations. The footnote indicates as well its degree of authenticity and the names of scholars who made such judgement. If a *ḥadīth* is narrated by al-Bukhārī or Muslim, its authenticity is taken for granted.

Notable Utterances

Out of love, appreciation, gratitude or other noble feelings, a Muslim is encouraged to utter certain phrases at the mention of Allāh, His messengers, the angels, the *ṣaḥābah*, or other righteous Muslims. We present these phrases in condensed Arabic calligraphy as follows:

Phrase	Mentioned with	Transliteration	Meaning
	Allāh's Name	<i>Subhānahū wa ta'ālā.</i>	He is exalted above weakness and indignity.
	Allāh's Name	<i>'Azza wa-jall.</i>	May He be hollowed and glorified.
	Allāh's Name	<i>Jalla jalāluh.</i>	May His glory be hollowed.

Phrase	Mentioned with	Transliteration	Meaning
	Muḥammad and other prophets	<i>Ṣalla 'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam</i> ¹ .	May Allāh's peace and praise be on him.
	Prophets and angels	' <i>Alayh is-Salām</i> .	Peace be on him.
	A male companion	<i>Raḍiya 'Llāhu 'anhu</i> .	May Allāh be pleased with him.
	A female companion	<i>Raḍiya 'Llāhu 'anhā</i> .	May Allāh be pleased with her.
	Two companion	<i>Raḍiya 'Llāhu 'anhumā</i> .	May Allāh be pleased with them.
	More than two companions	<i>Raḍiya 'Llāhu 'anhum</i> .	May Allāh be pleased with them.
	A past scholar or righteous Muslim.	<i>Raḥimahu 'Llāh</i> .	May Allāh have mercy on him.

When coming across any of these symbols, the reader is advised to utter the complete phrase in order to obtain the reward of saying the appropriate *thikr* (remembrance) or *du'ā* (invocation).

1 Uttering this is sometimes described as, “saying *ṣalāh* upon the Messenger”.

PREFACE

Al-Barzakh

Death is the ultimate reality that no human being can escape. It forces everyone to realize the worthlessness of this worldly life and the necessity to prepare for the permanent abode in the next one. It awes people and challenges all of their false claims and deviant beliefs. It puts an end to their hopes for prosperity in this life. It transfers them to an intermediate stage of living totally different from the life in this world. Once there, they have no way of returning to this life. Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿حَتَّىٰ إِذَا جَاءَ أَحَدَهُمُ الْمَوْتُ قَالَ رَبِّ ارْجِعُونِ ۚ لَعَلِّي
أَعْمَلُ صَالِحًا فِيمَا تَرَكْتُ كَلَّا إِنَّهَا كَلِمَةٌ هُوَ قَائِلُهَا وَمِن
وَرَاءِهَا بَرْزَخٌ إِلَىٰ يَوْمٍ يُبْعَثُونَ ۚ﴾ المؤمنون ٩٩-١٠٠

«Until, when death comes to one of them (those who join partners with Allāh), he says, “My Lord! Send me back. Perhaps I may do good in that which I have left behind!” No! It is but a word that he speaks, and behind them is a *barzakh* (barrier) until the day when they are raised up.»¹

This Book

The purpose of this book is to cover the details of this intermediate life in *al-Barzakh*. The discussion is only based on authentic texts from Allāh’s Book and His Messenger’s *Sunnah*. It totally avoids unfounded presumptions and speculations that people have accumulated in various cultures and societies.

1 *Al-Mu’minūn* 23:99-100.

In addition to the subjects usually discussed when dealing with the study of *al-Barzakh*, we include in this book material covering subjects that, we believe, are highly relevant. Among these is “Communication with *Al-barzakh* (Chapter 10)” and “Things That Benefit the Dead (Chapter 11)”. Other material, which is believed to be relevant but not to the same high degree, is included in the other parts of this series (*The Inevitable Journey*).

Whereas we make no claim to encompassing all authentic texts related to this subject, we have made a serious attempt to cover all authentic incidents and help form as complete a picture of that stage of life as possible.

Our hope is to provide with this an important reference that will help people gain a clear understanding of that inevitable stage of life and, therefore, help them prepare themselves for it.

We have attempted to present the material in a highly structured and organized manner, introducing tables as much as possible, in order to enable using the book as a classroom or study-circle reference.

References

The idea of this book started with a rough translation of the booklet “*Al-Qabr, ‘Athābuhū wa-Nā’imuh* (The Grave, Its Tortures and Pleasures)” by Ḥusayn al-‘Awāyshah. However, that book was found to lack in providing sufficient commentary on the cited texts. Its titles were found to be unstructured, presenting the material in a somewhat unorganized and detached manner.

When it was found that, in addition to the above, it was not possible to reach an acceptable agreement with the Arabic publisher of that booklet, it was decided to give up that book and rewrite a more complete manual on the subject of *al-Barzakh*. The fruit of that is in your hands.

In addition to the above-mentioned reference, we have used a number of other references, many of which are cited in the back of the book. The most important of those are “*Aḥkām ul-Janā’izi wa-Bida’uhā* (The Regulations of Funerals, and Innovations Thereof)” and “*Al-Āyāt ul-Bayyināt, Fī ‘Adami Samā’ il-Amwāt* (The Clear Signs

Concerning the Inability of the Dead to Hear)”, both by Muḥammad Nāṣir ud-Dīn il-Albānī.

Acknowledgements

All praise and thanks are offered to our Lord (ﷻ) who facilitated completing this work. May He further reward all the Muslims who helped and supported this effort in various ways. In particular, may Allāh (ﷻ) reward ‘Imrān Ḥusayn (from Guyana) for initiating the work on the subject of this book. May Allāh (ﷻ) also reward ‘Abdullāh al-Jibālī who typed all of the Arabic text and designed the cover.

We ask Allāh (ﷻ) to make this humble effort helpful and fruitful to the Muslims, forgive our shortcomings, purify our work from hypocrisy and conceit, and accept it from us.

Our Lord, forgive us and all of the believers, and bestow Your peace and praise upon our Prophet Muḥammad (ﷺ).

Muhammad al-Jibālī
29 Thul-Qa’dah 1418 H
27 March 1998

CHAPTER 1

THE APPROACH OF DEATH

Loving to Meet Allāh

A true believer's greatest wish and ultimate hope is to meet his Lord (ﷻ) and be able to see Him in the hereafter. 'Ubādah Bin aṣ-Ṣamit (رضي الله عنه) reported that the Prophet (ﷺ) said:

﴿Whoever loves to meet Allāh, Allāh loves to meet him; and whoever hates to meet Allāh, Allāh hates to meet him.﴾

On hearing this, 'Ā'ishah (رضي الله عنها) exclaimed, "But we do hate death!" The Prophet (ﷺ) responded:

﴿This is not what it means! When death comes to a believer, he is given the tidings of Allāh's acceptance and bounties. Nothing is then dearer to him than what is ahead: he loves to meet Allāh; and Allāh loves to meet him. But when death comes to a disbeliever, he is given the tidings of Allāh's torture and punishment. Nothing is then more hateful to him than what is ahead: he hates to meet Allāh; and Allāh hates to meet him.﴾¹

Similar to this is Abū Hurayrah's *ḥadīth* (presented in full in Chapter 2) that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

﴿Verily, when death descends upon a believer, and he witnesses things (implying his forthcoming rewards),

1 Al-Bukhārī and Muslim.

he wishes that his soul would depart (quickly), and Allāh loves to meet him ...

And when death descends upon an enemy of Allāh, and he witnesses things (implying his imminent punishment), he wishes that his soul would never depart, and Allāh hates to meet him.> ¹

Allāh Hesitates to Take a Believer's Soul

Allāh (ﷻ) loves the believers in proportion to their obedience to Him and His Messenger (ﷺ). When Allāh loves a person, he becomes so supportive to him and so protective that He would prevent any harm from reaching him, and He would even hesitate to inflict death on him – except that it is an avoidable thing that He (ﷻ) had decreed for all human beings. Abū Hurayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said that Allāh (ﷻ) said:

«Whoever harms a *walī* ² of Mine, I declare war against him.

My '*abd*' ³ does not draw closer to Me with anything dearer to Me than the religious duties I have mandated upon him.

And My '*abd*' continues to draw closer to Me with voluntary acts (of worship) until I love him; when I love him, I become his ears with which he hears, his eyes with which he sees, his hand with which he strikes and his foot with which he walks. Would he then ask me for anything, I surely grant it to him; and would he seek refuge in Me, I surely shelter him.

1 Recorded by al-Bazzār; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥah* no. 2628).

2 *Walī*: Ally.

3 '*Abd*': A slave or worshipper.

I do not hesitate in anything I have to do as I hesitate in taking the life of my believing 'abd: he hates death and I hate to hurt him.> ¹

Satan's Presence at the Time of Death

Shayṭān ² works hard to entice people to commit evil actions. He is intent to be present when a person does any action that he may be able to influence by introducing into it any possible amount of sinning. The moment of death is a final chance that *Shayṭān* wants to try, hoping to make the dying person end his life with evil, impiety, or disobedience. Jābir Bin 'Abdillāh (ؓ) reported that the Prophet (ﷺ) said:

«Verily the *Shayṭān* attends with you in all your actions. He attends when you eat; if any morsel of food drops, wipe the dirt off it, and eat it instead of leaving it for the *Shayṭān*. After finishing, lick your fingers, because you do not know where in the food the blessing lies.> ³

The Disbeliever's Wish to Return to Life

As indicated in the *ḥadīths* of 'Ubādah and Abū Hurayrah (ؓ) (p. 1 above), when the reality of death comes to a believer, he welcomes it and longs to meet his Lord (ﷻ). A disbeliever, on the other hand, fears such a meeting and hates it. Allāh (ﷻ) says:

«حَتَّىٰ إِذَا جَاءَ أَحَدَهُمُ الْمَوْتُ قَالَ رَبِّ ارْجِعُونِ ۚ لَعَلِّي أَعْمَلُ صَالِحًا فِيمَا تَرَكْتُ كَلَّا إِنَّهَا كَلِمَةٌ هُوَ قَائِلُهَا وَمِنْ

¹ Al-Bukhārī.

² *Shayṭān*: Satan.

³ Muslim.

وَرَأَيْهِمْ بَرَزَ إِلَى يَوْمٍ يُبْعَثُونَ ﴿١٠٠﴾ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ ٩٩-١٠٠

«Until, when death comes to one of them (those who join partners with Allāh), he says, “My Lord! Send me back. Perhaps I may do good in that which I have left behind!” No! It is but a word that he speaks, and behind them is a barrier until the day when they are raised up.»¹

Agonies of Death

Death arrives with pains and agonies of which no human being is spared – not even the prophets. ‘Ā’ishah (رضي الله عنها) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«*Lā ilāha illallāh*»². Verily death comes with agonies.»³

Too Late for the Disbelievers to Declare Faith

A disbeliever’s declaration of faith at the time of Death will be rejected. Ibn ‘Abbās (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«When Allāh (ﷻ) drowned Pharaoh, he said, “(Now) I believe that there is no (true) god except Him in Whom the children of Israel believe.” Jibrīl said, “O Muḥammad, would you have seen me as I took black dirt from the sea and stuffed it into his mouth, fearing that the Mercy might reach him.”»⁴

1 *Al-Mu’minūn* 23:99-100.

2 There is no deity worthy of worship but Allāh.

3 Al-Bukhārī and Aḥmad.

4 Recorded by Aḥmad and at-Tirmithī; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi’* no. 5206).

The First Step into the Hereafter

Death is the first step into the hereafter, and the grave is the first of the hereafter's domiciles. Hānī, 'Uthmān Bin 'Affān's (رضي الله عنه) servant, said that whenever 'Uthmān stood over a grave, he would cry until he soaked his beard. He was told, "You remember *Jannah* and the Fire without weeping, but you weep when you remember the grave!" He replied, "Indeed, I heard Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) say:

«The grave is the first of the hereafter's domiciles; if one passes through it safely, what follows will be easier; and if one does not pass through it safely, what follows will be more horrible.»

And I heard Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) say:

«I have never seen a dreadful view but the grave is even more dreadful.» ¹

¹ Recorded by at-Tirmithī; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ut-Targhībī wat-Tarhīb*).

CHAPTER 2

TEXTS DESCRIBING *AL-BARZAKH*

In this chapter, we present a number of long *ḥadīths*, each describing various happenings in *al-Barzakh*. The incidents mentioned in these (as well as other *ḥadīths*) are summarized and segmented in the next four chapters to cover the four stages of the life of *al-Barzakh*.

1. Al-Barā's *Ḥadīth*

Al-Barā' Bin 'Āzib (رضي الله عنه) reported that they (the companions) went out with Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) to the funeral of a man from *al-Anṣār* ¹. They reached the location of the grave before it was dug. The Messenger (ﷺ) sat down facing the *Qiblah* ²; and they sat around him quietly, as if afraid to disturb birds standing on their heads. He held in his hand a stick with which he was moving the earth. He looked toward the sky, then toward the earth, raising and lowering his eyes three times. He said to them (two or three times), **«Seek refuge in Allāh (ﷻ) from the punishment of the grave.»** Then he said (three times):

«O Allāh, I seek refuge in You from the punishment of the grave.»

He (ﷺ) continued:

«Verily, when a believing 'abd ³ is at the point of departure from the worldly life, and is about to

1 These are the companions of the Prophet (ﷺ) from al-Madīnah who helped and supported him when he migrated to them.

2 The *Qiblah*: The direction of *al-Ka'bah*.

3 A slave, servant, or created being of Allāh (ﷻ).

enter the next life ¹, angels descend from heaven. Their faces are white (and bright) like the sun. They carry with them a shroud from the clothes of *Jannah*, and embalmment from the fragrance of *Jannah*. They sit away from him at the limit of his eyesight. The angel of death then arrives, sits by his head, and says, "O good and peaceful soul, depart to Allāh's forgiveness and pleasure." On hearing this, the soul leaves the body (as easily) as water drops flow from the spout of a water skin; and he (the Angel of Death) takes it.

When the soul leaves his body, all angels between the heavens and the earth, and all angels in the heavens, pronounce *ṣalāh* on him ². All gates of the heavens open for him; the guardians of every gate implore Allāh that this soul ascends in their direction.

When the Angel of Death takes the soul, they (the other angels) do not leave it in his hand for as little as the blinking of an eye. They take it and place it in their shroud and embalmment. To this apply Allāh's (ﷻ) words:

﴿تَوَفَّتْهُ رُسُلُنَا وَهُمْ لَا يُفَرِّطُونَ﴾ الأنعام ٦١

«...Our messengers (the angels) take his soul, and they never neglect their duty.» ³

There emanates then from the soul the best smelling scent of musk that ever existed on the surface of the earth.

The angels then ascend with it. As they pass by gatherings of angels, they ask them, "What is this good soul?" They (the angels holding it) reply, "He

1 i.e., he is close to death.

2 i.e. they ask that he be forgiven.

3 *Al-An'ām* 6:61.

is so and so, son of so and so,” using the best names with which he had been addressed in the first life. When they reach the lowest heaven, they ask for permission to enter; and the gates open for them. The most elite (angels) of each heaven escort him to the next one, until he reaches the seventh heaven. Allāh (ﷻ) then says, “Write My servant’s records in ‘*Illiyūn*’¹,

﴿وَمَا أَدْرَاكَ مَا عَلِيُّنَ﴾ المطففين ١٩

«And what will make you know what ‘*Illiyūn*’ is? An inscribed register, witnessed by those nearest (to Allāh – among the angels).»²

Thus, his records are inscribed in ‘*Illiyūn*’; and the angels are told, “Take him back to the earth, because I promised them that from it I create them, into it I return them, and from it I resurrect them once again.”³

He is then returned to the earth; and his soul is returned to his body, so that he hears the thumping of his companions’ shoes as they walk away from his grave.

Two angels of severe reprimand then come to him, and shake him. They make him sit up, and ask him, “Who is you Lord?” He replies, “My Lord is Allāh.” They ask him, “What is your *Dīn* (religion)?” He replies, “My *Dīn* is *Islām*.” They ask him, “Who is that man who was sent to you?” He replies, “He is Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ).” They ask him, “What did you do?” He replies, “I read Allāh’s Book, believed in it, and obeyed it.” They shake him again, asking,

1 A place most high; the highest register.

2 *Al-Muʿaffifin* 83:19-21.

3 *Tāhā* 20:55.

“Who is your Lord? What is your *Dīn*? Who is your Prophet?” And this is the last *fitnah* (trial) to which a believer is subjected. In this regard, Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿يُثَبِّتُ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا بِالْقَوْلِ الثَّابِتِ فِي الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا
وَفِي الْآخِرَةِ﴾ إبراهيم ٢٧

«Allāh keeps the believers firm with firm words in the first life, and in the last one.»¹

He repeats, “My Lord is Allāh, my *Dīn* is *Islām*, and my Prophet is Muḥammad (ﷺ).” A caller then calls from the heavens, “My servant has spoken the truth; so provide him with furnishings from *Jannah*; clothe him from *Jannah*; and open for him a door to *Jannah*.” Thus he receives provision and perfume from it; and his grave is spread to the extent of his eyesight.

Before him appears a man with a pleasant face, nice garments, and a good smell. He says to him, “I am to give you glad tidings that will please you: tidings of Allāh’s acceptance, and gardens with everlasting bliss. This is the day that you have been promised.” He responds, “Glad tidings from Allāh be to you too. Who are you? Your face is one that brings goodness.” He says, “I am your good deeds. By Allāh, I only knew you quick in obeying Allāh, and slow in disobeying Him. May Allāh reward you with good.”

A door is opened for him to *Jannah* and another one to the Fire; and he is told, “This (the Fire) would have been your dwelling had you disobeyed Allāh. But Allāh has substituted it for you with this (*Jannah*).” When he sees what is awaiting him in

¹ *Ibrāhīm* 14:27.

Jannah (of pleasures), he says, "O my Lord, speed up the arrival of the Hour (of Resurrection), so that I may rejoin my family and property." He is told, "Calm down."

And verily when a disbelieving (or disobedient) *'abd* is at the point of departure from the worldly life, and is about to enter the hereafter, strong hulking angels with dark faces descend to him from the heavens. They bring with them tough fabrics from the Fire. They sit away from him at the limit of his eyesight. The Angel of Death (مَلَكُ الْمَوْتِ) arrives, sits by his head, and says, "O malicious soul, depart to a wrath and anger from Allāh." (On hearing this) it becomes terrified, and clings to the body; but he extracts it (by force), like a skewer is pulled from wet wool, causing the veins and nerves to burst.

Every angel between the heavens and the earth, and every angel in the heavens, curses him. The gates of the heavens are shut; the guardians of every gate implore Allāh that this soul does not ascend in their direction.

When the Angel of Death takes the soul, they (the other angels) do not leave it in his hand for as little as the blinking of an eye. They put it in the fabric that they have (from the Fire); and from it emanates the most repugnant odor of a decaying cadaver that ever existed on the surface of the earth.

The angels then ascend with it. As they pass by gatherings of angels, they ask them, "What is this malicious soul?" The angels holding it respond, "He is so and so, son of so and so," using the worst names with which he had been addressed in the first life. When they reach the lowest heaven, they ask for permission to enter; but the gates are not opened for him. (Here the Messenger (ﷺ) recited:)

«لَا تُفْتَحُ لَهُمْ أَبْوَابُ السَّمَاءِ وَلَا يَدْخُلُونَ الْجَنَّةَ حَتَّى يَلِجَ الْجَمَلُ فِي سَمِّ الْخِيَاطِ» الأعراف ٤٠

«For them (the disbelievers), the gates of heaven will not be opened; and they will not enter *Jannah* until the camel goes through the eye of the needle.» ¹

Allāh (ﷻ) then says, “Write his record in *Sijjīn* ² in the lowest earth.” And they are told, “Take him back to the earth, because I promised them that from it I create them, into it I return them, and from it I resurrect them once again. ³” His soul is then cast down from the heavens without regard; and it falls into his body. (Here Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) recited:)

«وَمَنْ يُشْرِكْ بِاللَّهِ فَكَأَنَّمَا خَرَّ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ فَتَخْطَفُهُ الطَّيْرُ أَوْ تَهْوِي بِهِ الرِّيحُ فِي مَكَانٍ سَحِيقٍ» الحج ٣١

«As for the one who joins partners with Allāh, it is as if he plunges down from the skies – whereupon birds snatch him off, or the wind casts him away to a remote place (from Allāh’s mercy).» ⁴

His soul is restored to his body, so that he hears the thumping of his companions’ shoes as they walk away from his grave.

Two angels of severe reprimand come to him and shake him. They make him sit up, and ask him, “Who is your Lord?” He replies, “Alas, alas, I do not know!” They ask him, “What is your *Dīn*?” He replies, “Alas, alas, I do not know!” They ask him,

¹ Al-A ‘rāf 7:40.

² A place most low; a place of Imprisonment.

³ Tāhā 20:55.

⁴ Al-Hajj 22:31

“Who is that man who was sent to you?” He cannot recall his name, and he is told, “(His name is) Muḥammad!” He says, “Alas, alas, I do not know. I just heard the people say that.” He is then told, “You did not know; and you did not recite (the *Qur’ān*)!” A caller calls from the heaven, “He lies! So spread for him furnishings from the Fire; and open for him a door to the Fire.” Thus its heat and fierce hot wind reach him; and his grave is tightened around him, causing his ribs to break.

Before him appears a man with ugly face, repulsive clothes, and a foul smell; he says, “I am to give you evil tidings that will displease you. This is the day that you have been promised.” He responds, “Evil tidings from Allāh be to you too! Who are you? Your face is one that brings evil.” He says, “I am your malicious deeds. By Allāh, I only knew you slow in obeying Allāh, and quick in disobeying Him. May Allāh repay you with evil.”

A blind, deaf, and dumb person is appointed for him. He carries in his hand a sledgehammer that, if it hits a mountain, would turn it to dust. He hits him (with it) once; and he becomes dust. Allāh then restores him as he was; and the person hits him again; he sounds a shriek that is heard by everything except men and *jinn*s.

A door is opened for him to the Fire; and he is given the furnishings from the Fire. He then says, “O my Lord! Do not establish the Hour.”¹

1 Recorded by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi* 'no. 1676).

2. Abū Hurayrah's First *Ḥadīth*

Abū Hurayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

‘Indeed, a dying person is witnessed by angels. If he were righteous, he (the Angel of Death) says, “Depart, O good soul that inhabited a good body; depart in a praised state; and receive glad tidings of happiness, sweet aromas, and a Lord who is not angry.” He continues to say this until it leaves the body. It is then taken up to the (first) heaven, where permission is sought for it to be admitted. It is said, “Who is this?” He (an angel) replies, “So and so.” It is then said, “Welcome, good soul that inhabited a good body; enter in a praised state; and receive glad tidings of happiness, sweet aromas, and a Lord who is not angry.” This repeats (in every heaven), until it finally reaches the (seventh) heaven above which is Allāh (ﷻ).

As for an evil man, he (the Angel of Death) says, “Depart, O malicious soul that inhabited a malicious body; depart in a condemned state; and receive evil tidings of boiling fluids and dirty wound discharges (to drink), and other types of suffering of similar nature – all paired together.” This continues to be said until it leaves the body. It is then taken up to the (first) heaven, where permission is sought for it to be admitted. It is said, “Who is this?” He (an angel) replies, “So and so.” It is then said, “Unwelcome, malicious soul that inhabited a malicious body; return in a condemned state, because the gates to the heavens will not open for you.” Thus it is sent down from the heaven, and it enters the grave.

The pious person sits in his grave without fear or terror. He is asked, “What did you do?” He replies, “I adhered to *Islām*.” He is then asked, “Who is that man?” He replies: “Muhammad, Allāh’s

Messenger (ﷺ). He brought to us clear signs from Allāh; and we believed him.” He is then asked, “Did you see Allāh?” He replies, “It is not possible for anyone to see Allāh (in the first life).”

An opening is made (from his grave) to the Fire, so that he sees its various sections crushing each other. He is told, “Look at that from which Allāh (ﷻ) has saved you.” Another opening is then made (from his grave) in the direction of *Jannah*; and he views its grandeur and the things (bounties) in it. He is then told, “This will be your position. You lived with certitude (about Allāh’s promises); upon it you died; and upon it you will be raised – when Allāh (ﷻ) wills.”

The evil person is made to sit in his grave in a state of fear and terror. He is asked, “What did you do?” He replies, “I do not know.” He is asked, “Who is that man?” He replies, “I heard the people say things; and I said the same.”

An opening then appears (from his grave) in the direction of *Jannah*; and he views its grandeur and the things (bounties) in it. He is told, “Look at that from which Allāh (ﷻ) has deprived you.” Another opening appears (from his grave) to the Fire; and he observes its various sections crushing each other. He is told, “This will be your abode; in doubt you lived; upon it you died; and upon it you will be raised – when Allāh wills.”¹

3. ‘Ā’ishah’s *Ḥadīth*

‘Ā’ishah (رضي الله عنها) narrated that a Jewish woman came to her door begging for food and saying, “Feed me; may Allāh protect you from the *fitnah*

1 Recorded by Ibn Mājah; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi’* no. 1968).

(tribulation) of the *Dajjāl*¹ and the *fitnah* of the grave's torture." 'Ā'ishah (ﷺ) deliberately delayed the woman until Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) arrived. Then she said, 'O Messenger of Allāh, what does this Jewish woman mean?' He said: <What did she say?> She replied, "She said, 'Feed me; may Allāh protect you from the *fitnah* of the *Dajjāl* and that of the grave's torture.'" Immediately Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) stood up, raised and extended his hands, and asked Allāh to shelter him from the *fitnah* of the *Dajjāl* and that of the grave's torture. Then he (ﷺ) said:

«As for the *fitnah* of the *Dajjāl*, there never was a prophet but has warned his people from him. However, I will tell you a thing (about the *Dajjāl*) from which no other prophet warned his nation: He is one-eyed; and Allāh is not one-eyed. Between his eyes is written the word "*kāfir*", which every believer will be able to read.

And as for the tribulation of the grave: with me will people be tested, and about me will they be asked.

A righteous person is made to sit in his grave, without having any fear or terror. He is asked, "What did you use to say about *Islām*?" He is also asked, "Who is that man who was among you?" He replies, "He is Muḥammad, the Messenger of Allāh, who came with clear signs from Allāh; and we believed in him."

An opening then appears (from his grave) to the Fire; he observes its various sections crushing each other. He is told, "Look at that from which Allāh (ﷻ) has saved you." Another opening then appears (from his grave) to *Jannah*. He observes its grandeur and the things (bounties) in it. He is told, "This will be your place in it." And he is told, "You lived with certitude (about Allāh); upon that you

1 The *Dajjāl*: The lying imposter who will claim that he is the Messiah Jesus Son of Mary.

died; and upon it you will be raised – when Allāh wills.”

As for an evil person, he is made to sit in his grave in a state of fear and terror. He is asked, “What did you use to say?” He replies, “I heard the people say things; so I said as they said.”

An opening then appears (from his grave) to *Jannah*. He observes its grandeur and the things (bounties) in it. He is told, “Look at that from which Allāh has deprived you.” Another opening appears (from his grave) to the Fire. He observes its various sections crushing each other. He is told, “This will be your abode in it. You lived in doubt (about Allāh); upon that you died; and upon it will you be raised – when Allāh wills.” He is then tortured.¹

4. Abū Hurayrah’s Second *Ḥadīth*

Abū Hurayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«When a believer dies, the angels of mercy come to him with a piece of white silk. They say, “Depart (from the body) to Allāh’s (granted) happiness.” It departs with the most beautiful scent of musk. They even pass it from one angel to the next, smelling it.

When they arrive at the gate of the (lowest) heaven, they are asked, “What is this beautiful scent coming from the earth?” They continue their ascent; and as they arrive at each one of the heavens, the same thing is said to them.

They (the angels) take it to (the location of) the souls of the believers. They (the other souls) are happier in meeting it than are those to whom a

¹ Recorded by Aḥmad; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī in *Ṣaḥīḥ ut-Targhībī wat-Tarhīb*.

beloved one returns after a long absence. They ask it, “What happened to such and such (a disbeliever)?” Some of them interrupt, “Leave him until he rests, because he was in the grief of the world.” However, he says, “He died; did he not come to you?” They (the angels) then say, “He was taken to a bottomless pit (of Fire).”

As for a disbeliever, the angels of punishment come to him with coarse fabric and say, “Depart (from the body) to Allāh’s wrath.” It departs, smelling like the worst of decayed corpses. It is then taken to the gate of the earth.¹

5. Abū Hurayrah’s Third *Ḥadīth*

Abū Hurayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«When a (believing) dead person is buried, two black and blue angels come to him. One of them is called Munkar, and the other Nakīr. They ask him, “What did you use to say about this man (Muḥammad)?” He says, as he used to say, “He is Allāh’s ‘abd and Messenger; I testify that there is no deity (worthy of being worshipped) but Allāh, and that Muḥammad is His ‘abd and Messenger.” They say, “We expected you to say this.” His grave is then expanded for him to seventy cubits by seventy; it is illuminated for him; and he is told, “Go to sleep.” He says, “Let me return to my people to inform them (about my good condition).” But they tell him, “Sleep as does a newlywed person, whom no one awakens except the member of his family who is dearest to him.” (He sleeps like that) until Allāh raises him from his resting place.

¹ Recorded by Ibn Ḥibbān and Ibn Mājah; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ut-Targhibi wat-Tarhīb*).

As for a hypocrite, he replies (to their questioning), “I heard the people say things; and I said the same; but I do not know.” They say, “We expected you to say this.” The earth is then told, “Contract on him.” And it contracts on him until his ribs break. Thus, his punishment continues therein, until Allāh raises him from his abode.> ¹

6. Abū Hurayrah’s Fourth *Ḥadīth*

Abū Hurayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

‘Verily, when death descends upon a believer, and he witnesses things (implying his forthcoming rewards), he wishes that his soul would depart (quickly), and Allāh loves to meet him.

His soul is taken up to the heaven. The souls of the believers come to him and inquire from him about their acquaintances of the dwellers of the earth. They are pleased when he says, “I left such and such in the *dunyā* (the first life).” And when he says, “Such and such had died,” they say (disappointedly), “But he was not brought to us.” ²

A believer is made to sit in his grave, and is asked, “Who is your lord?” He replies, “My lord is Allāh.” He is asked, “Who is your prophet?” He replies, “My prophet is Muḥammad (ﷺ).” He is asked, “What is your religion?” He says, “My religion is *Islām*.” A door is then opened from his grave (to *Jannah*), and he is told, “Look at you

1 Recorded by at-Tirmithī; verified to be *ḥasan* by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* no. 724).

2 The souls of the believers meet all other believers’ souls upon their death. They are concerned about those whom they have not met yet, and would rather know that they are still in the *dunyā*, and still have a chance of dying as believers, than to know that they had died as disbelievers.

(future) abode.” He is then left in the grave, and (the time passes) as if it is but a nap.

And when death descends upon an enemy of Allāh, and he witnesses things (implying his imminent punishment), he wishes that his soul would never depart, and Allāh hates to meet him.

When he is made to sit in his grave, he is asked, “Who is your lord?” He replies, “I do not know.” He is told, “May you never know!” A door is then opened from his grave to Hell, and he is hit a blow that can be heard by every creature except the human beings and the *jinn*s. And he is told, “Go to sleep like a bitten person.” And his grave is made tight on him.>

Abū Hurayrah was asked, “What is a bitten person?” He replied, “One who is bitten by creatures and snakes.”¹

7. Anas’s First *Ḥadīth*

Anas (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Verily, when a believer is placed in his grave, an angel comes to him and asks him, “What did you worship?” If Allāh guides him, he replies, “I worshipped Allāh.” Then he asks him, “What did you say about this man (Muḥammad)?” He answers, “He is Allāh’s ‘*abd* and Messenger.”

He is not questioned about anything else after this. He is taken to a house in the Fire, and is told, “This would have been your house in the Fire; but Allāh protected you and had mercy upon you; thus He substituted it for you with a house in *Jannah*.”

¹ Recorded by al-Bazzār; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥah* no. 2628).

He says, "Allow me to go give this good news to my family." But he is told, "Be tranquil."

When a disbeliever is put into his grave, an angel comes to him, rebukes him, and asks him, "What did you worship?" He replies, "I do not know." He is told, "You did not know; nor did you recite (*Qur'ān*)!" He is then asked, "What did you say about this man?" He replies, "I said what the people said." He (the angel) then hits him with an iron hammer between his ears; and he emits a shriek which is heard by all creatures except the human beings and *jinn*s.¹

8. Anas's Second *Hadīth*

Anas (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Verily, after a *'abd* is placed in his grave, and his companions walk away from him, so that he can hear the echo of their footsteps, two angels come to him. They make him sit, and ask him, "What did you saying about this man (Muḥammad)?"

A believer replies, "I bear witness that he is Allāh's *'abd* and Messenger." He is then told, "Look at your place in the Fire; Allāh has substituted it for you with a place in *Jannah*." Thus he views both of them. His grave is then expanded for him to seventy cubits; and it is filled with greenery until the Day of Resurrection.

As for a disbeliever or a hypocrite, he replies, "I do not know. I said what the people said." He is then told, "You did not know; nor did you recite (*Qur'ān*)!" He is then hit one blow between his ears

1 Recorded by Abū Dāwūd; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi'* no. 1930).

with an iron hammer; and he emits a shriek which is heard by all creatures near him except *jinn*s and human beings. His grave contracts on him until his ribs break.›¹

1 Al-Bukhārī and Muslim.

CHAPTER 3

THE MOMENT OF DEATH

Introduction

In this chapter, we present the incidents that take place from the time that one is on the verge of death, until one's soul starts its trip to the heavens. The incidents are segmented to make it easy for the reader to follow.

With the approach of death, a believer is pleased because the material barrier is about to dissolve, and he is therefore about to meet his Lord. His soul departs with ease, emitting beautiful odors that delight the angels. A disbeliever, on the other hand, is terrified to realize that his great punishment is eminent. His soul is extracted from his body by force, emitting the most loathsome odors.

It is important to note that most of the available texts compare the situation of a believer to that of a disbeliever, without making reference to a sinful believer. Because of this we assume that, in this comparison, a "believer" is one whose good deeds outweigh his sins, so that he will not be punished in the grave or on the Day of Judgement.

As for the believers who have been so sinful as to deserve punishment before they enter *Jannah*, they may be punished in their graves, and possibly after resurrection as well. Their punishment has not been fully detailed in the *Sunnah*. Yet, some of its forms have been described by the Prophet (ﷺ). This is covered in Chapter 8 titled, "The Sinful in *al-Barzakh*".

The following table compares what happens, in each case or situation, to a believer and a disbeliever. The references are numbered after the long *hadiths* cited in Chapter 2. Other references, marked with a "*", are presented later in this chapter under the section titled, "Related Texts".

Tabulated Events

Action or Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Angels descend from the heaven to “witness” the death.	They are angels of mercy. Their faces are white and bright like the sun.	They are angels of punishment. They are strong, hulking, with dark faces.	1,4
Things brought by the “witnessing” angels:	They bring a piece of white silk and embalmment from <i>Jannah</i> .	They bring coarse fabrics from the Fire.	1,4
Sitting position of the angels:	They sit at the limit of his eyesight.		1
Arrival of the angel of death:	He sits by his head.		1
What the “witnessing” angels say to the soul:	“Depart from the body to Allāh’s granted happiness.”	“Depart from the body to Allāh’s wrath.”	4
The angel of death’s command to the soul to leave the body:	“Depart, O good and peaceful soul that inhabited a good body.”	“Depart, O malicious soul that inhabited a malicious body.”	1,2

Action or Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
The angel of death's tidings to the soul:	"Depart to Allāh's forgiveness and pleasure; depart in a praised state; and receive glad tidings of happiness, sweet aromas, and a Lord who is not angry."	"Depart to Allāh's wrath and anger; depart in a condemned state; and receive evil tidings of boiling fluids, dirty wound discharges, and other types of suffering."	1,2
How long does the angel of death say this?	He continues to say this until the soul leaves the body.		2
The soul's departure from the body:	It leaves the body as water flows from the spout of a water skin; the angel of death takes it easily.	It becomes terrified, and clings to the body; the angel of death extracts it by force, causing the veins and nerves to burst.	1
The dying person's feeling about meeting Allāh:	He longs to meet Him and loves that.	He hates to meet Him and fears that.	6

Action or Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
What the person says as his soul leaves his body:	He praises Allāh.	He request to be allowed to return to life.	*, p. 4
What happens to the eyesight:	It follows the departing soul.		*
Saying of the angels in the heavens and on earth as the soul leaves the body:	They supplicate for him.	They curse him.	1
The gates to the heavens, and their guardians:	They open for him; their guardians plead Allāh to send this soul in their direction.	They are shut; their guardians plead Allāh to avert this soul from them.	1
Action of the “witnessing” angels after the angel of death takes the soul:	They do not leave it in his hand for as little as the blinking of an eye.		1
Action of the “witnessing” angels after they receive the soul:	They place it in the shroud and embalmment from <i>Jannah</i> .	They put it in the fabric from the Fire.	1

Action or Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Smell emanating from the departing soul:	The best smelling scent of musk that ever existed on the surface of the earth.	The most repugnant odor of a decaying cadaver that ever existed on the surface of the earth.	1,4

Related Texts

PRAISING ALLĀH

Ibn ‘Abbās (ؓ) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«A believer praises Allāh as his soul leaves from between his two sides.»¹

THE EYESIGHT FOLLOWS THE SOUL

Umm Salamah (ؓ) reported that the Prophet (ﷺ) said:

«Indeed, when the soul is taken away, the eyesight follows it.»²

THE WRONG-DOERS IN THE AGONIES OF DEATH

Allāh (ﷻ) says:

1 Recorded by Aḥmad and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi’* no. 1931).
2 Muslim and others.

«وَلَوْ تَرَىٰ إِذِ الظَّالِمُونَ فِي غَمَرَاتِ الْمَوْتِ وَالْمَلَائِكَةُ بَاسِطُوا
 أَيْدِيهِمْ أَخْرَجُوا أَنْفُسَكُمْ الْيَوْمَ تُجْزَوْنَ عَذَابَ الْهُونِ بِمَا كُنْتُمْ
 تَقُولُونَ عَلَى اللَّهِ غَيْرَ الْحَقِّ وَكُنْتُمْ عَنْ آيَاتِهِ تَسْتَكْبِرُونَ ﴿٩٣﴾»

الأنعام ٩٣

«If you could but see when the wrong-doers are in the agonies of death, and the angels stretching out their hands (and saying), “Deliver your souls! This day you shall be recompensed with the torment of degradation because of what you used to utter against Allāh other than the truth, and you used to reject His āyāt with disrespect.»¹

¹ *Al-An'ām* 6:93.

CHAPTER 4

TRIP TO THE HEAVENS AND BACK

Introduction

After departing from the bodies, the souls are taken up on a trip to the heavens. The believers' souls are warmly welcomed, and are admitted into all of the heavens. They meet the souls of other believers and receive their Lord's praise before returning into the bodies. The disbelievers' souls are condemned, and are not allowed to enter the heavens. They receive their Lord's blame before falling into the bodies. These incidents are detailed in the following table.

The numbered references refer to the *ḥadīths* in Chapter 2. The "*" references are cited toward the end of this chapter.

Tabulated Events

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Supplication of the angels in the heavens:	"A good soul is coming from the earth; may the blessings of Allāh be upon you and the body that you had inhabited."	"An evil soul is coming from the earth."	*
Who takes the soul up to the heavens:	The "witnessing" angels ascend with it.		1

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Smelling the soul's musky aroma:	The angels pass it from one to the next to smell it.	(Not applicable.)	4
What angel gatherings ask along the way to the heavens:	"What is this good soul?"	"What is this malicious soul?"	1
The "witnessing" angels' response:	"He is so and so, son of so and so," uttering the best names with which he had been known.	"He is so and so, son of so and so," uttering the worst names with which he had been known.	1,2
Requesting admission to the heavens:	When they reach the lowest heaven, they ask for permission to enter.		1,2
Reception by the angels guarding the lowest heaven's gates:	"Welcome, good soul that inhabited a good body; enter in a praised state; and receive glad tidings of happiness, sweet aromas, and a Lord who is not angry."	"Unwelcome, malicious soul that inhabited a malicious body; return in a condemned state, because the gates to the heavens will not open for you."	2

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Admission of the soul into the heavens:	The gates open for it; it is admitted into all of the heavens.	The gates are shut, and it is not admitted, even into the lowest heaven.	1,2
Reception by the angels guarding the upper heavens' gates:	The soul is welcomed in every heaven, until it reaches the seventh, above which is Allāh's Throne.	(Not applicable.)	1,2
The angels' amazement at the beauty of the soul's scent:	At the gate to each heaven, they ask, "What is this beautiful scent coming from the earth?"	(Not applicable.)	4
Escorts between the heavens:	The most elite angels of each heaven escort it to the next one.	(Not applicable.)	1
Meeting of the soul with the believers' souls:	The angels take it to the souls of the believers.	(Not applicable.)	4,6

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Reception by the believers' souls:	They are happier in seeing it than are those to whom a dear one returns from a long absence.	(Not applicable.)	4
Writing the records:	Allāh says, "Write My servant's records in 'Illiyūn'"	Allāh says, "Write his record in <i>Sijjīn</i> in the lowest earth."	1
Allāh's command to the "witnessing" angels to return the soul:	"Take him back to the earth to complete its appointed time before resurrection. I promised them that from it I create them, into it I return them, and from it I resurrect them once again."		1,*
Return to the body:	His soul is returned to the body.	His soul is cast down from the heavens without regard; it falls into his body in the grave.	1,2
Hearing the people's footsteps:	He hears the thumping of his companions' shoes as they walk away from his grave.		1
The squeeze of the grave:	No one is spared it.		*

Related Texts

SQUEEZE OF THE GRAVE

No human being will be spared the squeeze of the grave. However, the following *ḥadīth* indicates that it is not at the same degree of severity for all people; some of the believers are released from its grip quicker than others. Ibn ‘Abbās (رضي الله عنه) said that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«If anyone were to escape from the squeeze of the grave, it would be Sa’d Bin Mu‘āth; however, he was squeezed once and then released.»¹

THE ANGELS’ SUPPLICATION FOR THE BELIEVERS

Abū Hurayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«When the soul of a believer departs from the body, it is taken by two angels who rise with it (here he (ﷺ) described the sweetness of its fragrance). The inhabitants of the heaven say, “A good soul is coming from the direction of the earth; may Allāh’s blessings be upon you and upon the body that you had inhabited.” He is then taken to his Lord, Who says, “Take it to complete its appointed time (before resurrection).”

But when the soul of a disbeliever departs from the body (here he (ﷺ) described its foul odor), the inhabitants of the heaven say, “An evil soul is coming from the direction of the earth.” Then it is said, “Take it to complete its appointed time.»²

1 Aṭ-Ṭabarānī in *al-Kabīr*; *Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* by al-Albānī No. 5306.

2 Muslim.

CHAPTER 5

THE FINAL TEST

Introduction

The soul returns to the body after the burial, just in time for the “Final Test”. Two very stern angels conduct the test. They ask the soul questions that test the person’s level of belief and adherence to the Prophet (ﷺ). With firm words, a believer provides the correct answers, whereas a disbeliever stutters and provides wrong answers. These incidents are detailed in this chapter.

The numbered references in the following table refer to the *ḥadīths* in Chapter 2. The “*” references are cited later in this chapter.

Tabulated Events

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
When the test starts:	Immediately after burial.		*
Who conducts the test:	Two angels.		1,5,7,8
Appearance of the two angels:	They are black and blue, with a very stern appearance.		1,5
Names of the two angels:	Their names are “Munkar” and “Nakīr”.		5
First thing done by the angels:	They shake him and make him sit up in his grave.		1,6,8,*

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
State of anticipation before the test:	He sits without fear or terror.	He sits in a state of fear and terror.	2,3
Manner of answering the questioning:	He says what he used to say (before death). The faculty of reason is returned to him.		5,*
They ask him, "Who is you Lord?"	He replies, "My Lord is Allāh."	He replies, "Alas, alas, I do not know!"	1,6
They ask him, "What is your <i>Dīn</i> ? What did you say about <i>Islām</i> ? What did you do?"	He replies, "My <i>Dīn</i> is <i>Islām</i> . I adhered to it, read Allāh's Book, believed and obeyed it."	He replies, "Alas, alas, I do not know! I heard the people say things; so I said the same."	1,2,3, 6
They ask him, "What did you worship?"	He replies, "I worshipped Allāh."	He replies, "I do not know."	7
His response to the question, "Who is that man who was sent to you?"	"He is Allāh's 'abd and Messenger Muḥammad. He brought clear signs from Allāh, and we believed him. I testify that there is no (true) god but Allāh, and that Muḥammad is His 'abd and Messenger."	He cannot recall his name. He is told, "(His name is) Muḥammad!" He says, "Alas, alas, I do not know. I just heard the people say that."	1,2,3, 5,6,8, *

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
What the angels expected:	“We expected you to say this.”		5
Performance in the test:	Allāh guides him and makes him firm in words, so that he knows how to answer his questions.	He is confused and is told, “You did not know, or recite (<i>Qur’ān</i>)!”	1,8,*
They shake him again, asking, “Who is your Lord? What is your <i>Dīn</i> ? Who is your Prophet?”	He repeats, “My Lord is Allāh, my <i>Dīn</i> is <i>Islām</i> , and my Prophet is Muḥammad.”	(Not applicable.)	1
Last <i>fitnah</i> :	This is the last <i>fitnah</i> to which he is subjected.	(Not applicable.)	1,7
The test’s result is announced with a call from the heavens:	“My ‘ <i>abd</i> has spoken the truth; give him furnishings from <i>Jannah</i> ; clothe him from it; and open for him a door to it.”	“He lies! Give him furnishings from the Fire; and open for him a door to it.”	1

Related Texts

QUESTIONING TIME

‘Uthmān (رضي الله عنه) narrated that after Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) buried a person, he (ﷺ) would stand by the grave and say:

«Ask Allāh to grant to your brother forgiveness and firmness (of words), because he is being questioned at this moment.»¹

As death approached him, ‘Amr Bin al-‘Āṣ (رضي الله عنه) said to his companions:

“After you bury me, stand around my grave for as long as it takes to slaughter a camel and distribute its meat; I will thus be comforted by your presence while I am considering how to respond to my Lord’s Messengers (the two angels).”²

ALLĀH GRANTS FIRMNESS OF WORDS TO THE BELIEVERS

Al-Barā’ Bin ‘Āzib (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«When the believer is placed in the grave, he is made to sit, and is approached (by the two angels); he then testifies that there is no deity (worthy of being worshipped) but Allāh, and that Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allāh. This is why Allāh says:

يُشَبِّتُ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا بِالْقَوْلِ الثَّابِتِ فِي الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا
وَفِي الْآخِرَةِ ﴿إِبْرَاهِيمَ ٢٧﴾

1 Recorded by Abū Dāwūd and al-Ḥākim; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* no. 945).

2 Muslim.

«Allāh makes the believers firm with firm words.» ¹, ²

PRESERVING THE FACULTY OF REASON

‘Abdullāh Bin ‘Umar (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) mentioned the questioners (the two angels) of the grave. ‘Umar asked, “Is our reason preserved with us then, O Messenger of Allāh?” He (ﷺ) said, **«Yes, as is your present state.»** ‘Umar (رضي الله عنه) then said:

“I would then throw a stone into his (the angel's) mouth ³.” ⁴

1 *Ibrāhīm* 14:27.

2 Al-Bukhārī.

3 This is an Arabic expression which means, “My answer will be so convincing that he will be dumbfound.”

4 *Ṣaḥīḥ ut-Targhībī wat-Tarhīb* by al-Albānī Vol. 4.

CHAPTER 6

AFTER THE TEST

Introduction

The test confirms what the person had already realized from the moment of his death. A believer is immediately rewarded with an opening that appears from his grave to *Jannah*. His good deeds materialize next to him in the form of a pleasant looking man. On the other hand, a disbeliever is severely punished, and an opening appears from his grave to Hell. His evil deeds materialize in the form of a repulsive man. These incidents are detailed in this chapter.

The numbered references in the following table refer to the *ḥadīths* in Chapter 2. The “*” references are cited later in this chapter.

Where the Souls Really Are

It is important to note that some texts indicate that the believers’ souls turn into birds in *Jannah*. Other texts indicate that the souls are sometimes attached to the bodies that are in the grave. There is no contradiction between the two situations, because this is a matter of *ghayb* that cannot be subjected to the reasoning deriving from our worldly experience. A good example to facilitate understanding this is the dreams that take place during our sleep, where our souls seem to make trips to worlds beyond human perception.

Ibn ul-Qayyim has a very detailed discussion regarding this and related issues in his book *ar-Rūḥ* (the Soul). We quote from it the following:

“The soul’s attachment to the body has five different stages:

- a) Its attachment to it while it is still an embryo in the mother’s womb.

- b) Its attachment to it after it emerges to the surface of the earth.
- c) Its attachment to it during sleep. In that case, it is attached to it in one respect, and detached in another respect.
- d) Its attachment to it in *al-Barzakh*. Even though it departs and becomes detached from it, its detachment is not complete so as to have absolutely no connection with it.
- e) Its attachment to it on the Day of Reckoning, which is the most complete and inseparable attachment ...”

Tabulated Events

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Furnishings and clothing:	He is given furnishings and clothes from <i>Jannah</i> .	He is given furnishings from the Fire.	1
Openings from the grave to future abodes:	Two openings appear in it: One to <i>Jannah</i> ; and he views its grandeur and bounties. The other to the Fire; and he sees its various sections crushing each other.		1,2,3
Seeing, from his grave, the place that he evaded:	Pointing to the Fire, the angels tell him, “This could have been your place, had you disobeyed Allāh; but Allāh has saved you from it.”	Pointing to <i>Jannah</i> , the angels tell him, “Look at that from which Allāh has deprived you.”	1,2,3, 7,8

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Seeing, from his grave, his final destination:	He sees his future place in <i>Jannah</i> , tastes its provision and perfume, and is told, "Allāh has granted you this place in it."	He sees his future place in the Fire, tastes its heat and fierce hot wind, and is told, "This will be your abode in it."	1,2,3, 6,7,8
Between doubt and certitude:	He is told, "You lived with certitude; upon it you died; and upon it you will be raised – when Allāh wills."	He is told, "In doubt you lived; upon it you died; and upon it you will be raised – when Allāh wills."	2,3
Extent of the grave:	It is spread to the extent of his eyesight – seventy cubits by seventy.	The earth is told, "Contract on him." And it contracts until his ribs break.	1,5,6, 8
Light in the grave:	It is illuminated for him because of the Prophet's supplication.	Darkness engulfs him.	5,*
Greenery in the grave:	It is filled with greenery until the Day of Resurrection.	(Not applicable.)	8

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Companion in the grave:	His good deeds take the form of a good looking, nicely dressed, and pleasantly smelling person.	His bad deeds take the form of an ugly looking, hideously dressed, and foully smelling person.	1
Tidings carried by the companion:	“I am to give you glad tidings of Allāh’s acceptance, and gardens with everlasting bliss. This is the day that you have been promised.”	“I am to give you evil tidings. This is the day that you have been promised.”	1
Response of the dead person to the companion:	“Glad tidings from Allāh be to you too. Who are you? Your face is one that brings goodness.”	“Evil tidings from Allāh be to you too! Who are you? Your face is one that brings evil.”	1
Explanation by the companion:	“I am your good deeds. By Allāh, I only knew you quick in obeying Allāh, and slow in disobeying Him. May He reward you with good.”	“I am your malicious deeds. By Allāh, I only knew you slow in obeying Allāh, and quick in disobeying Him. May He repay you with evil.”	1

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Executor in the grave:	(Not applicable.)	A blind, deaf, and dumb person is appointed for him. He has an iron hammer that can turn mountains to dust.	1
Beating in the grave:	(Not applicable.)	He is hit between his ears, once and again, each time turning to dust, and getting restored as he was.	1,7,8
Uncanny shrieks of agony:	(Not applicable.)	His shrieks are heard by everything (even animals) except the human beings and the <i>jinns</i> .	1,7,8, *
Wish of the dead regarding resurrection, when they see what awaits them:	"My Lord, speed up the Resurrection, so that I may rejoin my family and property."	"My Lord! Do not establish the Hour."	1,5,7

Event	A Believer	A Disbeliever	Ref.
Wish to return:	“Allow me to go give this good news to my family.”	(Not applicable.)	5,7
Response of the two angels to the wish:	“Calm down; sleep as does a newlywed person, whom no one awakens except the member of his family who is dearest to him.”	(Not applicable.)	1,5,7
The rest of the abode in <i>al-Barzakh</i> :	He sleeps until Allāh raises him from his resting place.	He sleeps like a bitten person, and his punishment goes on.	5,6
Where the soul stays until the Day of Resurrection:	His soul is turned into a bird that eats from the trees of <i>Jannah</i> .	(No information.)	*
Showing him his future abode morning and evening:	He is shown his place in <i>Jannah</i> , and is told, “This will be your place when Allāh raises you on the Day of Resurrection.”		*

Related Texts

CONTINUAL EXPOSITION TO THE FUTURE POSITION

Allāh (ﷻ) says:

«النَّارُ يُعْرَضُونَ عَلَيْهَا غُدُوًّا وَعَشِيًّا وَيَوْمَ تَقُومُ السَّاعَةُ أَدْخِلُوا
ءَالَ فِرْعَوْنَ أَشَدَّ الْعَذَابِ» ﴿٤٦﴾ غافر ٤٦

«The Fire; they (the people of Pharaoh) are exposed to it morning and evening; and on the Day when the Hour will be established (it will be said to the angels): “Let Pharaoh’s people into the severest torment.”»¹

Ibn ‘Umar (رضي الله عنه) said that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«When one of you dies, he is shown his (future) position morning and evening. If he is from the people of *Jannah*, (he is shown his place) in *Jannah*, and if he is from the people of the Fire, (he is shown his place) in the Fire; and each is told, “This will be your place when Allāh raises you on the Day of Resurrection.”»²

SCREAMS OF AGONY

Ibn Mas‘ūd (رضي الله عنه) said that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Verily, the dead are punished in their graves, and even the animals hear their screaming.»³

1 *Ghāfir* 40:46.

2 *Al-Bukhārī* and *Muslim*.

3 Recorded by Abū Nu‘aym and aṭ-Ṭabarānī in *al-Kabīr*; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* no. 1965).

Zayd Bin Thābit (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Verily, those people (the dead) are being afflicted in the grave. Were it not that you may tend to stop burying each other, I would have asked Allāh (ﷻ) to let you hear the torture of the grave as I do.»¹

DARKNESS IN THE GRAVE

Abū Hurayrah and Anas (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Indeed, these graves engulf their dwellers with darkness; and verily Allāh illuminates them (for the believers) because of my *ṣalāh* (supplication) for them.»²

EATING FROM THE TREES OF *JANNAH*

Ka'b Bin Mālik narrated that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Verily, a believer's soul is (turned into) a bird that eats from the trees of *Jannah* until Allāh (ﷻ) sends it to his body on the day that it will be resurrected.»³

1 Muslim and Aḥmad.

2 Muslim and others.

3 Recorded by Mālik, Aḥmad, and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi'* no. 2373).

CHAPTER 7

THE PROPHETS AND THE MARTYRS

Introduction

The prophets, the martyrs, and the most righteous believers have a special well-earned status in the hereafter. This applies to *al-Barzakh* as well. The prophets' bodies are preserved from decay, and they live a special type of life in which they continuously pray to their Lord (ﷻ). The martyrs' souls are with the other believers' souls in *Jannah*, but their souls are within green birds, and they are closer to Allāh, being immediately under the Throne.

Preservation of the Prophets' Bodies

The earth does not consume the bodies of the Prophets. Aws Bin Aws (رضي الله عنه) narrated that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Indeed, among the best of all of your days is the day of *Jumu'ah* (Friday). On such a day, Ādam was created, he died, on it the blow (of the *Ṣūr* or trumpet of the Doom's Hour) will be sounded, and on it is the great shock (when all those on earth will die following the blow of the *Ṣūr*); so say in plenty your *ṣalāh* upon me on Friday, for indeed your *ṣalāh* will be presented to me. Indeed, Allāh has prohibited the earth from eating up the bodies of prophets.»¹

1 Recorded by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi'* no. 2212).

The Prophets' Life in Their Graves

The Prophets live and pray in their graves. However, their life is not the life of this world, but is a life from *al-Barzakh*. What distinguishes it from the life of the other believers is that the latter sleep in their graves, whereas the prophets are granted the ability and merit to continue to pray even after death. Anas Bin Mālīk (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

‘The prophets are alive in their graves; and they are praying (therein).’¹

Anas (رضي الله عنه) also reported that the Messenger (ﷺ) said:

‘On the night of *Isrā’*², I passed by Mūsā, who was standing in prayer in his grave.’³

Some scholars, such as al-Manāwī, believe that this *ḥadīth* refers to the original linguistic meaning of the prayer, “It means that he was making *du‘ā*, praising Allāh, and mentioning Him.”⁴ Others, such as al-Qurṭubī, believe that it refers to the actual *shar‘ī* (legislated) prayer.

Note that there is no conflict between this *ḥadīth* and that (cited below) in which the Prophet (ﷺ) says that he also saw Mūsā (عليه السلام) on that night in the Sixth Heaven. The latter one refers to Mūsā's soul, whereas the first one refers to his body joined by the soul in a *ghaybī* manner.⁵

Conveying the *Ṣalāh*

Allāh (ﷻ) appoints an angel at the grave of Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) to inform him, by name, of each one who says the *ṣalāh* upon him. Abū Bakr (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

1 Recorded by Abū Y'alā, al-Bazzār and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi'* no. 2790).

2 *Isrā'*: The Prophet's (ﷺ) miraculous night trip from Makkah to Jerusalem.

3 Muslim and others.

4 *Fayd ul-Qadīr* 5:519.

5 *Al-Āyāt ul-Bayyināt* 41.

«Say the *ṣalāh* upon me frequently, because Allāh has appointed for me an angel who stays by my grave. Whenever one of my *Ummah* (Nation or followers) says the *ṣalāh* upon me, that angel says to me, “O Muḥammad, such and such person said the *ṣalāh* upon you at this moment.”» ¹

Also, Abū Mas‘ūd al-Anṣārī (ؓ) reported that the Messenger (ﷺ) also said:

«Say the *ṣalāh* upon me plentifully on *al-Jumu‘ah* (Friday), for no one says the *ṣalāh* upon me on Friday but his *ṣalāh* is presented to me.» ²

The Night Journey

Mālik Bin Ṣa‘ṣa‘ah narrated that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) described to the *ṣaḥābah* his Night Journey (*al-Isrā’* and *al-Mi‘rāj*) as follows:

«While I was lying at al-Ḥatīm ³, someone suddenly came to me and cut my body open from here to here ⁴ and took out my heart. A gold washbowl full of *Īmān* (faith) was then brought to me. My heart was washed with *Zamzam*’s water and filled with *Īmān*; it was then returned to its original place.

Before me was brought an animal smaller than a mule and larger than a donkey, white in color, called *al-Burāq*. (It travels so fast that) it places its footstep

1 Recorded by ad-Daylamī; verified to be *ḥasan* by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* no. 1207).

2 Recorded by al-Ḥākim and al-Bayhaqī; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* no. 1208).

3 The wall of *al-Ka‘bah* nearest to the black stone. It is so called because people crowd around it.

4 From his throat to his navel.

at the end of its eyesight. I was carried on it, and Jibrīl led me till he reached the lowest heaven.

When he requested admission, he was asked, "Who is it?" He said, "Jibrīl." He was asked, "Who accompanies you?" He replied, "Muḥammad." He was asked, "Has he been summoned?" He said, "Yes." It was then said, "He is welcome; what an excellent visit his is!" The gate was opened. When I entered, I saw Ādam (ﷺ). Jibrīl said, "This is your father, Ādam; so give him *salām* (greeting with peace)." I gave him *salām*. He returned my *salām* and said, "Welcome, righteous Prophet and righteous son."

Jibrīl then ascended with me until we reached the second heaven. He requested admission, and was asked, "Who is it?" He said, "Jibrīl." He was asked, "Who accompanies you?" He replied, "Muḥammad." He was asked, "Has he been summoned?" He said, "Yes." It was then said, "He is welcome; what an excellent visit his is!" The gate was opened. When I entered, I saw Yaḥyā (John) and ʿĪsā (Jesus), who are cousins. Jibrīl said, "These are Yaḥyā and ʿĪsā; give them *salām*." I gave them *salām*. They returned my *salām* and said, "Welcome, righteous brother and righteous prophet."

Jibrīl then ascended with me to the third heaven. He requested admission, and was asked, "Who is it?" He said, "Jibrīl." He was asked, "Who accompanies you?" He replied, "Muḥammad." He was asked, "Has he been summoned?" He said, "Yes." It was then said, "He is welcome; what an excellent visit his is!" The gate was opened. When I entered I saw Yūsuf. Jibrīl said, "This is Yūsuf; give him *salām*." I gave him *salām*. He returned my *salām* and said, "Welcome, righteous brother and righteous prophet."

Jibrīl then ascended with me to the fourth heaven. He requested admission, and was asked,

“Who is it?” He said, “Jibrīl.” He was asked, “Who accompanies you?” He replied, “Muḥammad.” He was asked, “Has he been summoned?” He said, “Yes.” It was then said, “He is welcome; what an excellent visit his is!” The gate was opened. When I entered, I saw Idrīs. Jibrīl said, “This is Idrīs; give him *salām*.” I gave him *salām*. He returned my *salām* and said, “Welcome, righteous brother and righteous prophet.”

Jibrīl then ascended with me to the fifth heaven. He requested admission, and was asked, “Who is it?” He said, “Jibrīl.” He was asked, “Who accompanies you?” He replied, “Muḥammad.” He was asked, “Has he been summoned?” He said, “Yes.” It was then said, “He is welcome; what an excellent visit his is!” When I entered I saw Hārūn (Aaron). Jibrīl said, “This is Hārūn; give him *salām*.” I gave him *salām*. He returned my *salām* and said, “Welcome, righteous brother and righteous prophet.”

Jibrīl then ascended with me to the sixth heaven. He requested admission, and was asked, “Who is it?” He said, “Jibrīl.” He was asked, “Who accompanies you?” He replied, “Muḥammad.” He was asked, “Has he been summoned?” He said, “Yes.” It was then said, “He is welcome; what an excellent visit his is!” When I entered I saw Mūsā (Moses). Jibrīl said, “This is Mūsā; give him *salām*.” I gave him *salām*. He returned my *salām* and said, “Welcome, righteous brother and righteous prophet.” After I passed on, he began crying; he was asked, “What makes you cry?” He said, “I am crying because a young man, sent after me (with the Message from Allāh), has followers who will enter *Jannah* in greater numbers than my followers.”

Jibrīl then ascended with me to the seventh heaven. He requested admission, and was asked, “Who is it?” He said, “Jibrīl.” He was asked, “Who

accompanies you?" He replied, "Muḥammad." He was asked, "Has he been summoned?" He said, "Yes." It was then said, "He is welcome; what an excellent visit his is!" When I entered I saw Ibrāhīm. Jibrīl said, "This is your father Ibrāhīm; give him *salām*." I gave him *salām*. He responded to my *salām* and said, "Welcome, righteous son and righteous prophet."

I was then shown *Sidrat ul-Muntahā*¹. And behold! Its fruits were like the jars of Hajar², and its leaves were as big as elephants' ears. Jibrīl said, "This is *Sidrat ul-Muntahā*." There ran four rivers, two were concealed and two were visible. I asked, "What are these rivers, O Jibrīl?" He replied, "As for the two concealed ones, they are two rivers in *Jannah*; and as for the two visible ones, they are the Nile and the Euphrates."

Then I was shown *al-Bayt ul-Ma'mūr*³. I said, "What is this, O Jibrīl?" He replied, "This is *al-Bayt ul-Ma'mūr*: seventy thousand angels enter into it every day; and once they leave, they never enter it again."

I was then offered a flask of wine, a flask of milk, and a flask of honey. I took the one that contained milk. Jibrīl remarked: "This is the *fiṭrah*⁴ upon which you and your followers are."

Fifty *ṣalāhs* (prayers) were then made obligatory for me each day. On my way back I passed by Mūsā, who asked me, "What have you been commanded?" I replied, "I have been commanded to perform fifty prayers each day." Mūsā said, "Your *Ummah* (followers) cannot accomplish fifty prayers each day."

1 *Sidrat ul-Muntahā*: The Lotus Tree at the Farthest Limit, beyond which no one is allowed to pass.

2 Hajar: A village near al-Madīnah where huge clay jars used to be made.

3 *Al-Bayt ul-Ma'mūr*: The Much-Frequented House in the heavens.

4 *Fiṭrah*: The pure nature according to which Allāh created the people.

By Allāh, I have dealt with the people before you; and I tried my utmost with the Children of Isrāʼīl. Go back to your Lord, and ask him to reduce the burden for your *Ummah*.”

I returned; and Allāh reduced the required number of prayers by ten. Again, I came to Mūsā, who repeated his earlier advise to me.

I returned; and Allāh reduced the number by ten. I came to Mūsā, who repeated his earlier advise.

I returned; and Allāh reduced the number by ten. I came to Mūsā, who repeated his earlier advise.

I returned; and Allāh reduced the number by ten, thus commanding me to perform ten prayers each day. And Mūsā repeated his earlier advise.

I returned, and was commanded to perform five prayers each day. When I came back to Mūsā, He said, “What have you been commanded?” I replied, “I have been commanded to perform five prayers each day.” He said, “Your *Ummah* cannot accomplish five prayers each day. I have dealt with the people before you; and I tried my utmost with the Children of Isrāʼīl. Go back to your Lord, and ask him to reduce the burden for your *Ummah*.” I said, I have requested so much from my Lord that I now feel shy (to ask anymore of Him). I will just accept this and submit to Him. As I left, I heard a caller address me by saying, “You have submitted to My command, and have reduced the burden for My worshippers.”¹

The Martyred

The companions of the Prophet (ﷺ) who were martyred in the battle of *Uḥud* are anxious to inform their brothers about what Allāh (ﷻ) has

1 Al-Bukhārī, Muslim and others.

granted the martyrs. Ibn ‘Abbās (رضي الله عنه) narrated that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«When your brothers were killed in the battle of *Uḥud*, Allāh (ﷻ) cast their souls into green birds that frequent the rivers of *Jannah*, eat of its fruits, and rest in lamps of gold hanging in the shadow of the ‘*Arsh*’¹. When they found this pleasant food, drink, and repose, they said, “Who will inform our brothers, on our behalf, that we are alive in *Jannah*, and that we receive sustenance – so that they do not forsake *jihād* (fighting in Allāh’s way) or turn back during the fighting?” Allāh (ﷻ) said, “I will inform them for you.”²»

1 *‘Arsh*: Throne.

2 Recorded by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd and al-Ḥākim; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi’* no. 5205).

CHAPTER 8

THE SINFUL IN *AL-BARZAKH*

Samurah's *Hadīth*

Samurah Bin Jundub (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) would often inquire from his companions, **«Did anyone of you see a dream this night?»** So dreams would be narrated to him by those whom Allāh wills them to do. One morning he (ﷺ) told them:

«Last night two men came to me (in a dream ¹) and said, "Come with us." I went with them to a sacred land.

1) We came upon a man lying flat on his back (on the ground). Another man was standing over his head with a boulder in his hand. He would hurl the boulder upon the (first) man's head, causing it to split open. The boulder would then roll away, and he would go and retrieve it. By the time he returned to him, his head is restored as it was before, and he would hit him again (with the boulder). I said to them, "May Allāh be exalted! Who are these two?" They said, "Come on, come on!"

2) We proceeded until we came upon a man sitting, and another man standing over him with an iron hook. He would approach him from one side, and rip open (with the hook) his face from the corner of the mouth to the back of the head, from the nose to the back of the head, and from the eye to the back of

¹ The prophets' dreams are all truthful; Satan cannot approach them even while they sleep.

the head. He would then move to the other side and do what he did on the first side. As soon as he finished with that side, the first side would be restored to what it was before, and he would move to it and do as he did the first time. I said, "May Allāh be exalted! Who are these two?" They said, "Come one, come on!"

3) We proceeded until we came upon a hole that resembled a baking pit, narrow at the top and wide at the bottom. Babbling and voices were issuing from it. We looked in and saw naked men and women. Underneath the pit was a raging fire; whenever it flared up, they screamed and rose with it until they almost fell out of the pit. As it subsided, they returned (to the bottom). I said, "Who are these?" They said, "Come on; come on!"

4) We proceeded until we reached a river of blood, with a man swimming in its center. On the bank of the river there was a man who had piled around him many rocks. The man in the river would swim for a while, and then approach the one who had gathered the rocks around him, trying to exit (from the river). He would open his mouth, and he (the one standing on the bank) would throw a rock into it, causing him to return to his original position (in the middle of the river). He would then resume swimming; and every time he made an effort to get out (of the river), he would throw a rock into his mouth, forcing him to fall back to the center. I said, "Who are these two?" They said, "Come on, come on!"

5) We proceeded until we came upon a garden dense with plantation, with all sorts of spring flowers, and with a very large tree in its center. Near the stem of the tree, there stood a very tall man – so tall that I could barely see his head in the sky. Around him

was the greatest number of children that I have ever seen. I said, "Who is this, and who are these?" They said, "Come on, come on!"

6) Near the tree, I saw a man with the most hateful appearance in any man. Before him was a fire, which he was kindling and trotting around. I said to them, "Who is this?" They said, "Come on; come on!"

7) As for the tree, never before had I seen a tree greater or more beautiful than this one. They instructed me, "Climb it." We ascended, until we came upon a city that I have never seen one more beautiful. It was built with gold and silver bricks. We arrived at the gate of the city and requested admission. It was opened, and we entered into it. We were met by old and young men with one half of their faces the most beautiful to behold, and the other half the ugliest to behold. They (my two companions) said to them, "Go and plunge into that river." A river was flowing across, whose water was milk-white in color. They plunged into it and returned to us. Their ugliness disappeared; and they became most handsome.

8) They took me further up, and let me into a town better and more beautiful than the first one.

I said, "Since the beginning of this night, you have taken me to different places, and I have been seeing amazing things! What is all this that I saw?" They said, "We will now tell you:

1) As for the first man whom you saw his head getting smashed with a boulder: he is a man whom Allāh taught the *Qur'ān*, but he slept and neglected

it during the night, and did not implement it during the day. He turned away from the *Qur'ān*, and slept through the prescribed prayers. He will continue to be tortured in this way until the Day of Resurrection.

2) As for the man whom you saw with his mouth, nose, and eyes being ripped to the back of his head: he is a liar who leaves his house in the morning to spread lies which are carried from him in all directions. He will continue to be tortured in this way until the Day of Resurrection.

3) As for the naked men and women who were in the pit: they are men and women who indulge in *zinā* (adultery).

4) As for the man whom you saw swimming in the river and being fed with rocks: he is the one who eats *ribā* ¹.

5) As for the tall man that you saw in the garden, he is Ibrāhīm (عليه السلام). The children about him are all those children who have died according to *fiṭrah* ².

(Here, some of the companions interjected, 'O Messenger of Allāh! The children of the disbelievers too?' He (عليه السلام) said, 'The children of the disbelievers as well!')

6) As for the man with extremely ugly appearance who was by the fire, kindling it and running around it: he is Mālik, the Guardian of *Jahannam* (Hell).

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- 1 Eating *ribā* means to take usury or deal with any prohibited transactions. Unfortunately, many such transactions in our time are given deceiving names like "interest" or "benefit". But there is no interest or benefit in them; and the names do not change their reality of being major sins and pure harm.
- 2 *Fiṭrah* is the pure and clean nature according to which all people are born before they are influenced by their societies and upbringing.

7) As for the first town, it is the dwelling place of the common believers. The people who were half handsome and half ugly: they are people who mixed good with evil deeds, and Allāh forgave them.”

8) And as for this town, it is the dwelling place of the *shuhadā'* (martyrs).

They added, “I am Jibrīl, and this is Mikā'il. This is the Garden of 'Adn (Eden); and that over there is your residence. Now raise your head.” I raised my eyes and saw, above me, a castle that resembled a white cloud. They said (again), “That is your dwelling.” I said to them, “May Allāh bless you; allow me to enter my dwelling.” They said, “Not yet! There is a portion of your life which you have not yet completed; when you complete it, you will surely enter your dwelling.” > ¹

Sins Punishable in the Grave

In the following table, we summarize the sins that were specifically mentioned in authentic texts as being punishable in *al-Barzakh*. In the column of references, “S” refers to the above *ḥadīth* of Samurah (رضي الله عنه), and “*” refers to the additional *ḥadīths* appearing later in this chapter.

It is important to note that these texts provide examples of sins that are punished in the grave. However, there could be other punishable sins that we have not been informed about.

1 This is a combined narration of two different reports recorded by al-Bukhārī from Samurah.

Sinful Person	Punishment in <i>al-Barzakh</i>	Ref.
A <i>kāfir</i> .	Being the worst sin, his punishment is the most sever, as detailed in earlier chapters.	Earlier chaps.
One who rejects the <i>Qur'ān</i> after knowing it, and sleeps through the prescribed prayers.	He lies on his back on the ground. A man smashes his head, once and again, with a boulder.	S
A liar who spreads lies which are carried from him in all directions.	His mouth, nose, and eyes are continuously ripped, with a sharp hook, to the back of his head.	S
Men and women who indulge in <i>zinā</i> (adultery).	They are put, naked, into a hole that resembles a baking pit, narrow at the top and wide at the bottom. Underneath the pit is a raging fire; whenever it flares up, they scream and rise with it until they almost fall out of the pit. As it subsided, they return (to the bottom).	S
One who take <i>ribā</i> (usury).	He swims in a river of blood, on whose bank stands a man with a pile of rock. Every time he tries to exit from the river, the man throws a rock into his mouth, causing him to fall back to the center of the river.	S
One who does not clean himself from traces of urine.	This is the most common reason of punishment; but it is not specified what form of punishment he receives.	*

Sinful Person	Punishment in <i>al-Barzakh</i>	Ref.
One whose relatives wail or weep over him (expressing dissatisfaction with Allāh's decree).	He receives punishment (unspecified), or his punishment is increased. This applies to a disbeliever, as well as a believer who had encouraged his relatives to do so.	*
One whose relatives are excessive in praising him.	Allāh appoints two angels who hit him in the neck saying, "Were you like that?"	*
One who spreads <i>namīmah</i> (slander) among the people.	This is one of the great sin punished in <i>al-Barzakh</i> . Its punishment is not specified.	*

Additional Texts

CONTAMINATION WITH URINE

Ibn 'Abbās (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

<The most prevalent punishment of the grave is because of urine.> ¹

WAILING OF A DISBELIEVER'S RELATIVES

'Ā'ishah (رضي الله عنها) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

<Indeed Allāh increases the punishment of a disbeliever because of the weeping of some members of his family over him.> ²

1 Recorded by al-Hākim; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi'* no. 3971).

2 Recorded by an-An-Nasā'ī; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi'* no. 3971).

WAILING OF A DEAD PERSON'S RELATIVES

Any dead person is also liable to the punishment of the grave because of the lamentation over him. He would be excused, however, if he had urged his family during his life not to do so after his death. ‘Abdullāh Bin ‘Umar (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

‘The dead (person) is punished in his grave because of the wailing over him.’¹

EXCESSIVENESS IN PRAISING THE DEAD PERSON

Abū Mūsā (رضي الله عنه) narrated that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

‘Whenever a person dies, and one of his mourners stands up and cries, “O you whom we used to rely on! O you who used to rescue us! ...,” and so on, two angels are appointed to hit him in the neck saying, “Were you truly as they say?”’²

SLANDERING

Ibn ‘Abbās (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) passed by two graves and said:

‘Verily, these two (dead people) are being tortured. Their punishment is for matters that are not important (to many people). But they are very serious indeed. As for the first, he used to walk about spreading slander; and as for the other, he did not cover himself from his urine.’³

1897).

1 Al-Bukhārī, Muslim and others.

2 Recorded by at-Tirmithī; verified to be *hasan* by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi’* no. 5788).

3 Al-Bukhārī and Muslim.

CHAPTER 9

SAVIORS FROM THE PUNISHMENT

From the previous chapters, it is apparent that the best protection against punishment in the grave is to carry the true belief in Allāh and avoid the major sins. In this chapter, we additionally present specific things that protect from the punishment of the grave.

Martyrdom on the Battlefield

Al-Miqdām Bin Ma'd Yakrib narrated that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«A *shahīd* (martyr) is favored by Allāh with seven qualities:

- (a) He is forgiven as soon as his blood gushes forth;**
- (b) he is shown his position in *Jannah*;**
- (c) he is adorned with the adornments of *Īmān*;**
- (d) he is married to seventy two wives of *al-Ḥūr ul-ʿĪn* (fair females with wide lovely eyes);**
- (e) he is protected from the torment of the grave, and is saved from the Great Fear (on the Day of Judgement);**
- (f) on his head is placed the crown of dignity, each of whose jewels is better than the world and all what is in it;**
- (g) and he is allowed to intercede for seventy of his relatives.»¹**

¹ Recorded by at-Tirmithī, Ibn Mājah, and Ahmad; verified to be authentic by a Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmiʿ* no. 5182).

One of the companions of the Prophet (ﷺ) reported that a man said, “O Messenger of Allāh, why are all the believers tested in their graves except a martyr?” He (ﷺ) said:

«The flashing of swords over his head was a sufficient *fitnah* (test) for him.»¹

Standing Guard in the Way of Allāh

Salmān (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Standing guard (on the battle ground) for one day and night is better than fasting the days and praying the nights of an entire month. And if he (the guard) dies, his (good) deeds that he used to do continue to accumulate for him (until the Day of Judgement); he is provided with his provisions (from *Jannah*); and he is saved from *al-Fattān* ².»³

Fuḍālah Bin ‘Ubayd and ‘Uqbah Bin ‘Āmir (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Every dead person’s deeds are sealed (at the time of death), except for the one who stands guard in the way of Allāh: his (good) deeds continue to increase until the Day of Resurrection; and he is protected from the trial of the grave.»⁴

1 Recorded by an-Nasā’ī; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi’* no. 4483).

2 *Al-Fattān*: The angel who test people in the grave.

3 Muslim.

4 Recorded by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd, at-Tirmithī, and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi’* no. 4562).

Death Caused by Abdomen Diseases

‘Abdullāh Bin Yasār reported that he was sitting with Sulaymān Bin Şard and Khālid Bin ‘Arfaṭah (رضي الله عنه). They mentioned that a man died of an abdominal disease; and they expressed desire to witness his funeral; one of them said to the other, “Did Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) not say:

«Whoever is killed by a disease in his abdomen will not be punished in the grave?»”

The other one replied, “Yes. You spoke the truth.” ¹

Reciting *Sūrat ul-Mulk*

‘Abdullāh Bin Mas‘ūd (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«*Sūrat Tabārak* is the protector from the torment of the grave.» ²

Dying on Friday

‘Abdullāh Bin ‘Amr (رضي الله عنه) said that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«For any Muslim who dies on the day or night of *Jumu‘ah* (Friday), Allāh protects him from the trial of the grave.» ³

1 Recorded by at-Tirmithī and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī in *Aḥkām ul-Janā‘iz*.

2 Recorded by Al-Ḥākim and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* no. 3643).

3 Recorded by Aḥmad and at-Tirmithī; verified to be *ḥasan* by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* no. 5773).

CHAPTER 10

COMMUNICATION WITH *AL-BARZAKH*¹

The Dead's Ability to Hear?

Do the dead hear what takes place in this world? This question is not subject to human opinions or speculations. It is a matter of *ghayb* that is encompassed by Allāh's knowledge, and may only be established through a clear evidence from Allāh's book and His Messenger's (ﷺ) *Sunnah*.

The true understanding in this regard is that the dead cannot, in general, hear what takes place on the earth. There are, however, exceptions to this general rule that are established in the Book and the *Sunnah*. We have to accept these exceptional cases and believe in them, without generalizing them beyond their boundaries.

In this chapter, we will establish this understanding by presenting the proper evidence and, in some cases, refuting the wrong evidence used by some people to the contrary.

Comparison with the Deaf

Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿إِنَّكَ لَا تَسْمَعُ الْمَوْتَى وَلَا تَسْمَعُ الصُّمَّ الدُّعَاءَ إِذَا وَلَّوْا مُدْبِرِينَ﴾

النمل ٨٠

1 This chapter draws heavily on "*al-Āyāt ul-Bayyināt*" by al-Ālūsī and al-Albānī.

«So, verily (O Muḥammad), you cannot make the dead hear you, nor can you make the deaf hear the call while they turn their backs to you.»¹

In this *āyah*, Allāh (ﷻ) compares the dead disbelievers to the deaf people. This obviously indicates that they share with them the characteristic of being unable to hear. Ibn Jarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī (رحمته) supports this understanding in his *Tafsīr* (*Qur'ānic* commentary) by saying:

‘This is a parable meaning, ‘You cannot make these disbelievers understand, because Allāh has sealed their hearing and has taken away their ability to understand the revealed lessons that are recited to them – just as you cannot make the dead understand by giving them hearing, because Allāh has taken away their hearing faculty.’

He is further saying, ‘You cannot make the deaf hear after they turn their backs to you, because they have been deprived of the hearing faculty. Similarly, for those whom Allāh has deprived of the ability to hear and understand the *āyāt* of His Book, you cannot help them in hearing and understanding.’ ”²

Aṭ-Ṭabarī then reported that Qatādah (رحمته) said:

“Allāh gives this parable for a *kāfir* (disbeliever). Just as the dead cannot hear the calls, so the *kāfirs* cannot hear. Thus He tells, ‘If a deaf person turns his back to you and you call him, he would not hear you. Similarly, a *kāfir* would not hear, nor would he benefit from what he hears.’ ”³

1 *An-Naml* 27:80 and *ar-Rūm* 30:52.

2 *Tafsīr aṭ-Ṭabarī* 21:36.

3 Al-Albānī verifies that this report has an authentic *isnād* (chain of narrators) (*al-Āyāt ul-Bayyināt* p. 30 of the introduction).

This is also the understanding of ‘Ā’ishah (ؓ), as is documented in the books of *Sunnah*¹. It is also the understanding of ‘Umar and others among the *ṣaḥābah*.

Those Who Are Worshipped Beside Allāh

Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿ذَٰلِكُمُ اللَّهُ رَبُّكُمْ لَهُ الْمُلْكُ ۚ وَالَّذِينَ تَدْعُونَ مِن دُونِهِ مَا يَمْلِكُونَ
مِن قِطْمِيرٍ ۚ إِن تَدْعُوهُمْ لَا يَسْمَعُوا دُعَاءَكُمْ وَلَوْ سَمِعُوا مَا اسْتَجَابُوا
لَكُمْ ۚ وَيَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ يَكْفُرُونَ بَشِرِكِكُمْ ۖ وَلَا يُنَبِّئُكَ مِثْلُ خَبِيرٍ ۚ﴾

فاطر ١٣-١٤

«Such is Allāh your lord; to Him belongs the dominion. And those, whom you invoke instead of Him, own not even a *qīṭmūr* (date pit’s covering membrane). If you call upon them, they do not hear your call; and were they to hear, they could not grant your requests. And on the Day of Resurrection, they will disown your taking them as partners. And none can inform you better than one who is well acquainted with things.»²

The disbelievers used to worship a number of people who were righteous and noble during their lifetimes. After their death, Satan inspired their followers to commemorate them with statues. These statues eventually turned into idols that were worshipped instead of Allāh (ﷻ).

The above *āyah* clearly denies that those whom the disbelievers invoked instead of Allāh could hear them. The *āyah* does not refer to the idols themselves, but to the persons whom they were supposed to

1 Check *al-Āyāt ul-Bayyināt* pp. 7, 10, 14, etc.

2 *Fāṭir* 35:13-14.

represent. This clear from the statement, **«On the Day of Resurrection, they will disown your taking them as partners.»** It is not the idols, which are irrational objects, that will be resurrected, but rather the actual people that they represented. There are many *āyāt* in the *Qur'ān* indicating that when Allāh resurrects the people, those who had been worshiped will turn against those who had worshiped them. However, there is nothing to indicate that the irrational objects will be resurrected as well.

Therefore, this *āyah* indicates that the righteous people, as well as those who are of lesser virtue, cannot hear after their death.

The Ditch of Badr

THE COMBINED REPORT

Ibn 'Umar, Abū Ṭalḥah, and Anas (رضي الله عنه) reported that, after the battle of Badr, the Prophet (ﷺ) commanded his followers to cast twenty four of the most disdainful among the dead of the Quraysh into a very filthy ditch in Badr. Then, as was his practice after victory, he spent three nights in the neighborhood of the battleground. On the third day, he had his animal prepared for departure, and then went and stood with his companions at the verge of the ditch. He called out the dead men with their names and the names of their parent saying:

«O such and such, son of such and such! O such and such, son of such and such! ... Don't you wish that you had obeyed Allāh and His Messenger? Indeed, we have found our Lord's promises to us true; have you found you Lord's promises true?»

Whereupon 'Umar (رضي الله عنه) (and others) exclaimed, "Are you addressing them after having been dead for three nights, and when these bodies have no souls in them? Can they hear? Allāh (ﷻ) says:

(إِنَّكَ لَا تَسْمَعُ الْمَوْتَىٰ)

«Verily, you cannot make the dead hear you.»

He (ﷺ) replied:

«By Him in whose hand is Muḥammad's soul, They can hear me NOW; and you cannot hear what I am saying better than they can! But they cannot respond.»¹

THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE *SALAF*

When this incident was mentioned to 'Ā'ishah (رضي الله عنها), she said, "The Prophet (ﷺ) only meant that they now realized that what he told them was the truth." Then she recited the *āyah*:

﴿إِنَّكَ لَا تَسْمَعُ الْمَوْتَىٰ وَلَا تَسْمَعُ الْأَدْعَاءَ إِذَا وَلَّوْا مُدْبِرِينَ ۚ﴾

«So, verily you cannot make the dead hear you, nor can you make the deaf hear the call while they turn their backs to you.»²

Commenting on the above *ḥadīth*, Qatādah (رضي الله عنه) said:

"Allāh (ﷻ) gave them life in order to hear the Prophet's (ﷺ) words, as a reproach and scorn, and to make them feel the remorse and regret for what they did."³

Ibn 'Aṭīyyah⁴ said:

"It appears that the incident of Badr constitutes a miracle for Muḥammad (ﷺ), whereupon Allāh (ﷻ)

1 This is a combined report from three authentic *ḥadīths* recorded by al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and Aḥmad.

2 This is recorded by al-Bukhārī, Aḥmad, and others.

3 Recorded by al-Bukhārī and Muslim.

4 He is a knowledgeable scholar of *Ḥadīth* and *Islāmic* legislation from Grenada, al-Andalus (Spain). He has a well-known book of *tafsīr* called "*Al-Muḥarrar ul-Wajīz fī Tafsīr il-Kitāb il-'Azīz*". He died on 542 H.

give them back the perception to be able to hear him. Had Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) not told us of this, we would have interpreted his addressing them to carry the meaning of reproach for the living disbelievers, as well as a reassurance for the hearts of the believers.”¹

Ibn Hajar al-‘Aṣqalānī (رحمته الله) said:

“Ibn ut-Tīn said, ‘There is no conflict between of Ibn ‘Umar’s *ḥadīth* (of the Ditch) and the *āyah*. There is no doubt that the dead cannot hear. But Allāh may enable that which does not normally hear to hear ...’”²

THE PROPHET’S APPROVAL

It is important to point out that the Prophet (ﷺ) approved of the understanding of ‘Umar and others among the *ṣaḥābah* that the dead cannot hear. We should assume that these companions have previously gained this understanding from the Prophet (ﷺ) – otherwise, they would not have hastened to object to his action of addressing the dead. And even if we assume that they were hasty in objecting without knowledge, it would then be the Prophet’s (ﷺ) obligation to clarify to them their misconception. However, he did not do any of that, but only indicated that those specific dead people were able to hear him at that specific time. Thus it is obvious that he (ﷺ) approved of their general understanding in regard to this issue.

And ‘Ā’ishah’s (رضي الله عنها) above statement (p. 73) shows that she had a similar understanding to that of ‘Umar and the other companions.

WRONG CONCLUSION

This is important to emphasize, especially when we realize that some scholars misinterpret this incident of the Ditch. They use the Prophet’s (ﷺ) statement, **‘You cannot hear me better than they can,’** as a proof that the dead always hear what goes on around them.

1 Al-Qurṭubī’s *Tafsīr* 13:232.

2 *Fath ul-Bārī* 3:182.

They often neglect the fact that he (ﷺ) has approved of their understanding and did not object to it. Thus, they turn the exceptional case, which was a miracle granted to the Prophet (ﷺ) in that situation, into a general case conflicting with the clear texts of the *Qur'ān*!

A SUNNAH OF THE PROPHETS

It is interesting to indicate that addressing the disbeliever after they have been destroyed by Allāh (ﷻ) is an old practice of the prophets. For instance, Allāh (ﷻ) says in regard to the people of Ṣāliḥ:

﴿فَأَخَذَتْهُمْ الرِّجْفَةُ فَأَصْبَحُوا فِي دَارِهِمْ جِثِيمِينَ ۝ فَتَوَلَّى عَنْهُمْ وَقَالَ يَلْقَوْمٍ لَقَدْ أَبْلَغْتُكُمْ رَسُولَهُ رَبِّي وَنَصَحْتُ لَكُمْ وَلَكِنْ لَا تُحِبُّونَ النَّصِيحِينَ ۝﴾ الأعراف ٧٨-٧٩

«So the earthquake seized them, and they became in their homes (corpses) fallen prone. He (Ṣāliḥ) turned away from them and said, “O my people! I have certainly conveyed to you the message of my Lord and advised you; but you do not like advisers.»¹

Ibn Kathīr commented on this by saying:

“This is a rebuke from Ṣāliḥ (عليه السلام) to his people after Allāh had destroyed them because of their disobeying him, rebelling against Allāh, rejecting the truth, and turning away from the guidance. Ṣāliḥ said this to them, after their destruction, rebuking and reprimanding them; and they heard him, as has been reported in the two *Ṣaḥīḥs* (Al-Bukhārī and Muslim) ...”

He then cited the *ḥadīth* of the Ditch. Note that the *Qur'ānic* text does not express that they heard Ṣāliḥ. But Ibn Kathīr assumed this based on the similar situation of the Ditch.

¹ Al-A'rāf 7:78-79.

The Roaming Angels

Ibn Mas'ūd (رضي الله عنه) reported that the Prophet (ﷺ):

«Allāh has angels that roam over the earth, delivering to me the *salām* from my *Ummah*.»¹

Similar *ḥadīths* have been cited earlier (p. 50). They clearly indicate that the Prophet (ﷺ) cannot independently hear the *salām* of the Muslims, but needs angels to deliver it to him. This implies that he cannot hear other things as well. Also, the text of this *ḥadīth* is general and makes no distinction based on distance.

Thus, if Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) cannot hear after his death what goes on the earth, this should apply more appropriately to those who are lesser than him.

Hearing the Footsteps of His Companions

An important evidence used by those who believe that the dead hear what goes on the earth is the Prophet's (ﷺ) description in the long *ḥadīth* of al-Barā' Bin 'Āzib (fully cited in Chapter 2):

«He hears the thumping of his companions' shoes as they walk away from his grave.»

However, this clearly applies to the time when the dead person is put into his grave and the angels come to question him. It cannot be generalized to other cases. This is the only way to reconcile between the general meaning of the above *āyah* (as understood by 'Umar, 'Ā'ishah, and other companions) and this *ḥadīth*.

1 Recorded by Abū Dāwūd and others. Verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*al-Āyāt ul-Bayyināt* p. 43).

CHAPTER 11

THINGS THAT BENEFIT THE DEAD

Introduction

This worldly life is a life of tests and trials. A person's performance in it determines his fate in the hereafter. His actions are recorded, and are the basis for his judgement in the next life.

Allāh (ﷻ) informs us that a disbeliever's punishment is a result of his actions:

﴿ذَٰلِكَ بِمَا قَدَّمْتَ أَيْدِيكُمْ وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ لَيْسَ بِظَلَّامٍ لِّلْعَبِيدِ﴾

آل عمران ١٨٢

«This (punishment) is because of that which your hands have previously done. Certainly, Allāh is never unjust to His slaves.»¹

Allāh (ﷻ) also informs us that a believer's rewards result from his actions:

﴿وَتِلْكَ الْجَنَّةُ الَّتِي أُورِثْتُمُوهَا بِمَا كُنْتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ﴾ الزخرف ٧٢

«This is *Jannah* which you have been made to inherit because of the deeds that you used to do.»²

Thus, the deeds that a person can do in this life to benefit him on the Day of judgement end by his death. Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿وَلَيْسَتِ التَّوْبَةُ لِلَّذِينَ يَعْمَلُونَ السَّيِّئَاتِ حَتَّىٰ إِذَا حَضَرَ أَحَدَهُمْ

1 Āl 'Imrān 3:182, al-Anfāl 8:51, and al-Hajj 22:10.

2 Az-Zukhruf 43:72.

أَلَمَوْتُ قَالَ إِنِّي تُبْتُ أَلَّنَّ وَلَا الَّذِينَ يَمُوتُونَ وَهُمْ كَفَّارٌ ﴿١٨﴾

النساء ١٨

«And of no effect is the repentance of those who continue to do evil deeds until death faces one of them and he says, “Now I repent;” nor of those who die while they are disbelievers.»¹

And Ibn ‘Umar (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Allāh accepts a person’s repentance as long as he does not reach the gurgling stage (when his soul departs).»²

Therefore, one cannot expect any changes in his records after departing from this world.

Furthermore, one cannot expect other people to do for him, after his death, good deeds that will benefit him in the hereafter. Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿وَأَنْ لَّيْسَ لِلْإِنْسَانِ إِلَّا مَا سَعَىٰ﴾ النجم ٣٩

«And that the human being can have nothing but what he has earned (good or bad).»³

Commenting on this *āyah*, Ibn Kathīr (رحمته الله) said:

“Imām ash-Shāfi‘ī concluded from this *āyah* that reciting *Qur’ān* does not benefit the dead, because it is not from their doing and earning. For this reason, Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) did not recommend it to his *Ummah*, encourage them to do it, or guide them to it with a text or a hint. Nor was such a thing reported from any of the *ṣaḥābah* (رضي الله عنهم). Had this been any good,

1 *An-Nisā* 4:18.

2 Recorded by Aḥmad, at-Tirmithī, and others. Verified to be authentic by al-Albānī.

3 *An-Najm* 53:39.

they would have preceded us in doing it. Matters of worship must be limited to the texts, and are not liable to modifications based on analogies and opinions.”¹

It is in general true that one cannot benefit from other people's deeds after his death. But this has important exceptions detailed in this chapter.

List of Beneficial Acts

The following list summarizes the beneficial acts, covered in this chapter, that benefit a person after his death.

#	Beneficial Act
1	<i>Janāzah</i> prayer for the deceased
2	Deeds of renewed benefit
3	Charitable deeds from a child
4	Fulfilling the deceased's vows
5	Payment of the deceased's debts
6	Supplications of the Muslims
7	Guarding in Allāh's way
8	Reviving the <i>Sunnah</i>

Janāzah Prayer

When the Muslims pray *janāzah* for their deceased brother, they are granted intercession for him. The more the number of Muslims who join in the prayer, the more beneficial it is for the deceased.

¹ *Tafsīr ul-Qur'ān il-'Azīm*.

This means that Allāh takes their testimony and supplication regarding the deceased's apparent actions as a sufficient reason for forgiveness. Since those Muslims who associated with him did not find any major problem to prevent them from supplicating for him, Allāh the most generous accepts that and agrees to forgive many of his hidden sins that they did not know. Anas and 'Ā'ishah (رضي الله عنهما) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Whenever a (Muslim) person dies, and a group of Muslims numbering one hundred pray *janāzah* for him, all interceding on his behalf, their intercession is granted (by Allāh), and he is forgiven.»¹

Ibn 'Abbās (رضي الله عنهما) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Whenever a Muslim man dies, and forty men stand for his *janāzah* prayer, all of them not joining anything with Allāh in worship, Allāh grants them intercession for him.»²

Maymūnah (رضي الله عنها) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Whenever a (Muslim) person dies, and a group of (Muslim) people pray *janāzah* for him, they are granted intercession for him.»³

Mālik Bin Hubayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Whenever a Muslim dies, and three lines of Muslims pray *janāzah* for him, he is granted forgiveness.»⁴

1 Muslim and others

2 Muslim and others

3 Recorded by an-Nasā'ī; verified to be *ḥasan* by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi'* no. 5787).

4 Recorded by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd, and others. Verified to be *ḥasan* by al-Ḥāfiẓ and others; however, al-Albānī disagrees with this because Muḥammad Bin Ishāq, one of the narrators, is known to be a *mudallis* (one who is ambiguous in stating his

Shams ul-Ḥaqq Ābādī said in his commentary on *Sunan Abī Dāwūd*:

“These *ḥadīths* indicate that it is recommended to gather a large number of people for the *janāzah* prayer. It should be attempted to reach these numbers (mentioned in the *ḥadīths*), because that could lead to success (in the forgiveness of the deceased). This has been restricted by two conditions:

- 1) They should attempt to intercede for him, which means that they should be sincere in supplication and in seeking forgiveness for him.
- 2) They should all be Muslims, none among them joining partners with Allāh, as in the earlier *ḥadīth* of Ibn ‘Abbās.”¹

Deeds of Renewed Benefit

Any good deed that a Muslim starts during his lifetime, and that is of renewed benefit and ongoing use for the Muslims, will continue to benefit him and augment his record of good deeds, even after his departure – as long as its benefits continue to reach others. Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿وَنَكْتُبُ مَا قَدَّمُوا وَآثَرَهُمْ﴾ يس ١٢

«We record that (deeds) which they have put forward, and their traces (that which they have left behind).»²

sources), and did not declare direct hearing of this report (*Aḥkām ul-Janā'iz* 128). Yet, the Prophet’s (ﷺ) practice of forming three lines for *janāzah* prayer provides a further supporting evidence for this *ḥadīth*.

1 ‘Awn ul-Ma‘būd 8:452.

2 Yā-Sīn 36:12.

Abū Hurayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«When a human being dies, all of his deeds are terminated except for three types: an ongoing *ṣadaqah*, a knowledge (of *Islām*) from which others benefit, and a righteous child who makes *Du'ā'* for him.»¹

Abū Qatādah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«The best that a man can leave behind after his death are three things: a righteous child who makes *Du'ā'* for him, an ongoing *ṣadaqah* whose rewards continue to reach him, and a knowledge that continues to be implemented after him.»²

Abū Qatādah (رضي الله عنه) also reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Among the good deeds that continue to benefit a believer after death are: a knowledge that he taught and disseminated, a righteous child who lived after him, a *Qur'ān* book that he left as inheritance, a *masjid* (mosque) that he built, a house that he built for the wayfarers, a stream that he ran, or a charity that he gave from his wealth during his healthy lifetime so that it would reach him (in rewards) after death.»³

Commenting on this, al-Munthirī (رحمته الله) said:

“Some scholars say that the deeds of a human being end with his death. However, since he had caused these

1 Muslim and others.

2 Recorded by Ibn Mājah and others. Verified to be authentic by al-Munthirī and al-Albānī.

3 Recorded by Ibn Mājah and others. Verified to be *ḥasan* by al-Munthirī and al-Albānī.

things (which are mentioned in the above *ḥadīths*), such as the earning of a child, disseminating the knowledge among those who take it from him, compiling a book that remains after him, or establishing a *ṣadaqah*, the rewards of these things continue to reach him as long as they continue to exist.”¹

The reason that one continues to receive rewards for these deeds, even though they are done by other people, is that he had initiated them during his life or contributed to them to a certain degree, whether little or large. Since Allāh does not neglect an atom’s weight of deeds, He records these contribution for a person even after his death. Abū al-Wafā’ Bin ‘Aqīl said:

“The best explanation for this in my view is that a human being, by his efforts and good conduct, had earned friends, produced children, married spouses, done good, and was amiable to the people. Because of this, they invoke mercy for him and do good on his behalf. All of this is then a result of his own earning.”²

And Rashīd Ridā (رحمہ اللہ) said:

“Among the deeds that benefit a person, even though they are done by others, are those that count like his own because he caused them, such as his children’s supplication for him, or their performing *ḥajj*, giving *ṣadaqah*, or fasting on his behalf – all of which having been established with authentic *ḥadīths*.”³

¹ ‘*Awn ul-Ma’būd* 8:86.

² Cited in *ar-Rūḥ* by Ibn ul-Qayyim p. 171.

³ *Tafsīr ul-Manār* 8:247.

Charitable Deeds from a Child

ONE'S CHILD IS FROM HIS EARNING

The above *ḥadīths* indicate that a righteous child benefits his deceased parents with *duʿāʾ*. It is further demonstrated here that he can benefit them by spending *ṣadaqah*, as well as doing other charitable deeds, on their behalf.

ʿĀʾishah (رضي الله عنها) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

**«Indeed, the best that one eats is that which he earns.
And his child is from his earning.»¹**

The reason for this is that a parent benefits himself by rearing his child according to the teachings of *Islām*, and exerting a consistent effort to raise him as a righteous person. As the child grows into adulthood and does righteous deeds, his parents deserve a merit in that they helped him accomplish that; and his good actions are therefore, at least in part, from his parents' earning.

ṢADAQAH FROM A CHILD

ʿĀʾishah (رضي الله عنها) reported that a man asked Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ), "My mother had a sudden death, and did not have chance to bequeath anything. Had she been able to do, I think that she would have given *ṣadaqah*. Would she or I get any rewards if I give *ṣadaqah* on her behalf?" He (ﷺ) replied, **«Yes! So give *ṣadaqah* on her behalf.»²**

Ibn ʿAbbās (رضي الله عنه) reported that Saʿd Bin ʿUbadah's mother died during his absence on a trip. He came to the Prophet (ﷺ) and asked him, "O Allāh's Messenger! My mother has passed away during my absence. Would it be of benefit to her if I give *ṣadaqah* on her behalf?" He (ﷺ) replied, **«Yes!»** He said, "Be my witness then that I give my fruitful garden as *ṣadaqah* on her behalf."³

1 Recorded by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd, and others. Verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Aḥkām ul-Janāʾiz* 217).

2 Al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and others.

3 Al-Bukhārī, Aḥmad, and others.

Abū Hurayrah (رضي الله عنه) reported that a man asked the Prophet (ﷺ), “My father has died, leaving behind a wealth; but he did not bequeath anything. Would it help him if I give *ṣadaqah* on his behalf?” He (ﷺ) replied, **«Yes!»**¹

‘Abdullāh Bin ‘Amr (رضي الله عنه) reported that al-‘Āṣ Bin Wā’il as-Sahmī (his grandfather) bequeathed that one hundred slaves be freed on his behalf. His son Hishām freed fifty; and ‘Amr wanted to free the other fifty, but decided to ask Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) first. He came to the Prophet (ﷺ) and said, “O Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ)! My father has bequeathed that one hundred slaves be freed on his behalf. Hishām has freed fifty, and fifty are left. Should I free them for him?” He replied:

«Had he been a Muslim, your freeing slaves, giving *ṣadaqah*, or performing *hajj* on his behalf would all have reached (in rewards) and benefited him.»²

Commenting on these *ḥadīths*, ash-Shawkānī said:

“This indicates that the rewards for a *ṣadaqah* from a child reach the parents after their death – even if they had not bequeathed it. These *ḥadīths* restrict the general meaning of Allāh’s (ﷻ) saying:

﴿وَأَنْ لَّيْسَ لِلْإِنْسَانِ إِلَّا مَا سَعَى﴾ النجم ٣٩

«And that the human being can have nothing but what he has earned.»³

But there is no indication in these *ḥadīths* that the *ṣadaqah*, except from one’s own child, helps. Since it is established that a person’s child is his own earning, it is not possible to claim that the meaning (of these *ḥadīths*) needs to be restricted.

1 Muslim, Aḥmad, and others.

2 Recorded by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd, and al-Bayhaqī. Verified to be *ḥasan* by al-Albānī (*Aḥkām ul-Janā’iz* 218).

3 *An-Najm* 53:39.

As for the *ṣadaqah* from other than one's child, it is apparent from general *Qur'ānic* texts that it does not help the deceased. This should then be maintained unless an additional evidence can be brought to restrict it.”¹

CHARITABLE DEEDS FROM A NON-CHILD

Some scholars, such as an-Nawawī, hold the opinion that all charitable deeds on behalf of a deceased person benefit him, whether done by his children or other people. This is refuted by ash-Shawkānī's above strong argument. Similarly, al-Albānī says in this regard:

“Some scholars have treated a non-child as a child (in this matter). This analogy is invalid for various reasons:

1. It conflicts with general *Qur'ānic* texts that make a person's good deeds a condition for entering *Jannah*. There is no doubt that a parent benefits himself by raising his child and nurturing him. Thus, unlike other people, he deserves a reward for this.
2. The difference between the two cases inhibits such an analogy. As in 'Ā'ishah's *ḥadīth*, Allāh has made a child part of his parents' earnings – but not of other people's earnings. Al-'Izz Bin 'Abd us-Salām said:

‘If one does an act of obedience and dedicates its reward to a living or dead person, the reward will not reach that person. And if he starts an act of worship intending it on behalf of a dead person, it would not be as intended – except for

¹ *Nayl ul-Awṭār* 4:97.

things excluded in *Islām* such as *ṣadaqah*, fasting, and *hajj*.’¹

3. Had this analogy been possible, it would have implied that it is recommended to dedicate rewards to the dead. In such a case, the *Salaf* would have done this, because they surely used to have more concern than us about doing good. But they did not do it. Ibn Taymiyyah said:

‘It was not the practice of the *Salaf*, when they performed a voluntary prayer, fasting, *hajj*, or *Qur’ānic* recitation, to dedicate the rewards of that to the dead Muslims. Thus, one should not abandon the way of the *Salaf*, because it is better and more complete.’² ”³

CLAIMS FOR *IJMĀ'*

It should be noted that there are claims for *ijmā'* (consensus) that a dead person benefits from the good deeds, including *Qur’ānic* recitation, done on his behalf by other people⁴. Whereas these claims have been demonstrated to be invalid in the above discussion, they further fall under the following two consideration:

¹ *Al-Fatāwā* 24:2.

² *Al-Ikhtiyārāt ul-‘Ilmiyyah* 54. Note that Ibn Taymiyyah has another opinion contradicting this one, which was advocated by his student Ibn ul-Qayyim in *ar-Rūḥ*. That opinion conflicts with Ibn Taymiyyah’s known position of rejecting *qiyās* (analogy) in matters of worship; and it was refuted in a strong and sound manner by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā in *Tafsīr ul-Manār* 8:254-270. Many people of *bid‘ah* have used this second opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah as an evidence against the followers of *Sunnah*. By doing this, they have neglected a very important fact, which is that the people of *Sunnah* do not imitate any one specific man without evidence; and they do not blindly imitate any particular scholar, regardless of how much love they hold for him (*Aḥkām ul-Janā‘iz* 221-222).

³ Summarized from *Aḥkām ul-Janā‘iz* 220-222.

⁴ Such as an-Nawawī, Ibn Qudāmāh (in *al-Mughnī* 2:569), and others.

- “1. It has been demonstrated by staunch scholars, such as Ibn Ḥazm (in *Uṣūl ul-Aḥkām*), ash-Shawkānī (in *Irshād ul-Fuḥūl*), and ‘Abd ul-Wahhāb Khallāf (in *Uṣūl ul-Fiqh*), that it is not possible to justify *ijmā’* for other than the most obvious matters in *Islām*. Imām Aḥmad has indicated this in his famous refutation against those who claim *ijmā’*.
2. I have investigated many of the cases for which there have been claims of *ijmā’*, and found that there is an obvious difference of opinion concerning them. I even found (in some cases) that the opinion of the majority of scholars is contrary to the claimed *ijmā’*!”¹

A DANGEROUS BELIEF

The danger of holding a wrong belief in regard to this issue has been clarified and emphasized by al-Albānī:

“We do not doubt this wrong belief’s evil effects upon one who adopts it. He would rely upon others for acquiring rewards and high ranks (in the hereafter), because he knows that the Muslims dedicate hundreds of good deeds everyday to all of the living and dead Muslims, and he is one of them; that would then relieve him from having to work hard when others are striving on his behalf! ...

A more dangerous saying is that it is permissible to perform *ḥajj* on behalf of others, even if there is no valid excuse preventing them from performing it by themselves. This causes many of the wealthy people to drop *ḥajj* or other obligations, giving themselves the excuse, ‘They will perform *ḥajj* on my behalf after my death!’ ...

1 Al-Albānī in *Aḥkām ul-Janā’iz* 219.

There are many other similar opinions that clearly have evil effects on the (Muslim) societies. It is imperative for the scholars who wish to reform (the societies) to reject such opinions, because they conflict with the texts, as well as the spirit of the *Sharī'ah*. ...

As for the person who rejects the opinions described above, it is inconceivable that he would ever rely on other people in doing deeds and acquiring rewards. He realizes that only his own deeds can save him, and he is rewarded in accordance with what he himself earns. It is then incumbent that he strives to the utmost to leave behind him good traces which will result in good rewards for him even in the loneliness of his grave – instead of those imaginary good deeds.”¹

Fulfilling the Deceased's Vows

FASTING THE VOWED DAYS

‘Ā’ishah (رضي الله عنها) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

‘Whoever dies while he has a fasting to fulfill (as a vow), his *walī*² should fast for him.’³

Ibn ‘Abbās (رضي الله عنه) reported that a woman was travelling in the sea, and she vowed that if Allāh saved her she would fast for one month. Allāh saved her, but she died before fulfilling her vow. Her daughter came to the Prophet (ﷺ) and mentioned this to him. He asked, **‘Had she owed money as debt, wouldn’t you have paid it on her behalf?’** She replied, “Yes.” He said:

1 *Aḥkām ul-Janā'iz* 222-223.

2 Next of kin or guardian.

3 Al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and others.

«Allāh's debt is more worthy of being fulfilled. So fulfill (the vow) for your mother.»¹

Sa'd Bin 'Ubādah reported that he told Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ), "My mother has died; and she had an unfulfilled vow." He instructed him:

«Fulfill it for her.»²

These *ḥadīths* clearly indicate that it is recommended for a deceased's *walī* to fulfill his vows for fasting.

FASTING THE MISSED DAYS OF *RAMADĀN*

Some scholars recommended, in addition to this, fasting the days of *Ramaḍān* that the deceased had missed. However, the correct position in this regard is expressed by Imām Aḥmad (رحمته الله):

"One may not fast for a dead person except in the case of a vow."³

This position is confirmed by the understanding of two of the *ṣaḥābah*: 'Ā'ishah (رضي الله عنها) and Ibn 'Abbās (رضي الله عنه).

'Amrah reported that her mother died without making up her missed days of *Ramaḍān*. She asked 'Ā'ishah (رضي الله عنها), "Should I make that up on her behalf?" She replied:

"No! Rather, give *ṣadaqah* to the needy in the amount of a half *ṣā'*⁴ (of grains or food) for every missed day."⁵

1 Al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and others.

2 Al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and others.

3 *Al-Masā'il* 96 by Abū Dāwūd.

4 A *ṣā'* is a measure approximately equal to four scoops, with the hands cupped together, of an average man.

5 Recorded by aṭ-Ṭaḥāwī and Ibn Ḥazm. Verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Aḥkām ul-Janā'iz* 215).

Saʿīd Bin Jubayr (رضي الله عنه) reported that Ibn ʿAbbās (رضي الله عنه) said:

“If a man gets sick in *Ramaḍān* and then dies without fasting, food should be given on his behalf – without a need to make up for the fasting. But if he had made a vow (to fast), his *walī* should fast for him.” ¹

Commenting on this, al-Albānī says:

“This understanding is adopted by the Mother of the Believers, as well as Ibn ʿAbbās, the great scholar of the *Ummah*, and is further held by the *Imām* of *Sunnah*, Aḥmad Bin Ḥanbal. It is the most moderate and appropriate opinion in this regard; and it fulfills all of the relevant *ḥadīths*, without rejecting any of them, especially the first, which the Mother of the Believers (رضي الله عنها) did not find applicable to the fasting of *Ramaḍān*. She is the reporter of the *ḥadīth*, and it is established that a narrator of a *ḥadīth* is more knowledgeable about the meaning of what he reports, especially when his understanding agrees with the rules and foundations of the *Sharīʿah* ², as is the case here.” ³

And Ibn ul-Qayyim (رضي الله عنه) comments on ʿĀʾishah’s above *ḥadīth* by saying:

“One group (of scholars) generalizes this, and says that both the vowed and missed obligatory fasting should be made up for the deceased. Another group rejects this and says that no fasting may be made up for him. A third group is more specific in saying that only the vowed fasting, but not the obligatory fasting, should be

1 Recorded by Abū Dāwūd and Ibn Ḥazm. Verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Aḥkām ul-Janāʿiz* 215).

2 *Sharīʿah* or *Sharʿ*: Islāmic law and instructions.

3 *Aḥkām ul-Janāʿiz* 215-216.

fasted on his behalf. This is the opinion of Ibn ‘Abbās and his followers, and is the correct opinion.

Just as it is not possible for one to pray on behalf of another, or embrace *Islām* on his behalf, the same is true about fasting. As for a vow, it represents a committed obligation similar to a debt. Thus, the *walī*’s execution is acceptable, as in the case of the debt. This is the pure understanding (of this issue).

By the same token, it is not possible to perform *hajj* (pilgrimage) or *zakāh* (obligatory charity) on behalf of the deceased unless he had an acceptable excuse in delaying that. This is similar to a *walī*’s feeding the needy on behalf of the one who broke his fast in *Ramaḍān* with a valid excuse. But as for the one who neglected his obligations without a valid excuse, it would not help him that others perform his neglected obligations, because he was the one required to perform them as a test for him – not the *walī*. Thus, no one may repent on behalf of someone else, nor accept *Islām*, nor perform the prayers or other obligations that he neglected until death.”¹

Payment of the Deceased’s Debts

The deceased’s debts should be paid off immediately after his death. The *walī* should use whatever wealth the deceased had left behind. If that is exhausted, he should seek the help of relatives and friends of the deceased who are capable of helping in paying off the rest of the debt. There is a number of *ḥadīths* in this regard that we have included in Part 3 of this series. We mention one of them here for reference.

Sa’d Bin al-Aṭwal (رضي الله عنه) reported that his brother died, leaving behind three hundred *dirhams* and children. He wanted to spend the money on his brother’s children, but the Prophet (ﷺ) told him:

¹ *ʾlām ul-Muwaqqiʿin* 3:554.

«Your brother is a captive because of his debt. Go pay it off for him.»¹

The Muslims' Supplications

A Muslim's *du'ā* for a dead Muslim tremendously benefits both of them. When it is done correctly, truthfully, and sincerely, it reflects a high level of brotherhood and concern; and it eliminates the factor of showoff which can potentially destroy the good deeds. Allāh (ﷻ) says:

﴿وَالَّذِينَ جَاءُوا مِن بَعْدِهِمْ يَقُولُونَ رَبَّنَا اغْفِرْ لَنَا وَلِإِخْوَانِنَا الَّذِينَ سَبَقُونَا بِالْإِيمَانِ﴾ الحشر ١٠

«And those who came (into the faith) after them say: "Our Lord! Forgive us and our brothers who preceded us in *Īmān*." »²

‘Ubādah (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«Whoever seeks forgiveness for the believing men and women, Allāh records for him a good deed for every believing man and woman.»³

Abū ad-Dardā' (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) said:

«A Muslim's supplication for his brother in his absence is acceptable. An angel is appointed to stand by his head; every time he invokes something good

1 Recorded by Aḥmad, Ibn Mājah, and al-Bayhaqī. Verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Aḥkām ul-Janā'iz* 26).

2 *Al-Ḥashr* 59:10.

3 Recorded by Aṭ-Ṭabarānī in *al-Kabīr*; verified to be *ḥasan* by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi'* no. 6026).

for his brother, the appointed angels says, “*Āmīn* ¹; and the same be given to you.”²

Guarding in Allāh’s Way

As has been previously demonstrated (p. 66) Standing guard in the way of Allāh (ﷺ) benefits a person after his death. Fuḍālah Bin ‘Ubayd and ‘Uqbah Bin ‘Āmir (رضي الله عنه) reported that Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) said:

‘The deeds of a dead person are sealed (at the time of death), except for the one who stands guard in the way of Allāh: his (good) deeds continue to increase until the Day of Resurrection, and he is protected from the trial of the grave.’³

Reviving the *Sunnah*

Calling to a forgotten *Sunnah* or fighting an established *bid‘ah* are among the most important charitable deeds that a person can do during his lifetime. They help revive Allāh’s *Dīn* and enable other people to follow it clean and pure, as it was revealed to Muḥammad (ﷺ).

Jarīr Bin ‘Abdillāh (رضي الله عنه) reported that they (the companions) were with Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) in the middle of the day when a group of people arrived (from outside al-Madīnah) to see him. They were barefoot, (almost) naked, wearing only woolen lined cloth pieces or cloaks, armed with swords, wearing no *izārs* ⁴ or anything else beside that. Most or all of them were from (the tribe of) Muḍar. The face of Allāh’s Messenger (ﷺ) changed (reflecting sadness) when he noticed their extreme poverty. He went in (to his house), then came out. He commanded Bilāl to give *athān* (prayer announcement), prayed *zuhr*

1 This means, “O my Lord! Answer me!”

2 Muslim and others.

3 Recorded by Aḥmad, Abū Dāwūd, at-Tirmithī, and others; verified to be authentic by al-Albānī (*Ṣaḥīḥ ul-Jāmi‘* no. 4562).

4 *Izār*: a plain piece of clothing tied around the lower section of the body.

(midday prayer), then mounted a small *minbar* (steps). He gave a *khutbah* (speech) in which he praised and thanked Allāh, and then said:

«After this, (I say that) Allāh has revealed in His book:

﴿يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ اتَّقُوا رَبَّكُمُ الَّذِي خَلَقَكُمْ مِنْ نَفْسٍ وَاحِدَةٍ وَخَلَقَ مِنْهَا زَوْجَهَا وَبَثَّ مِنْهُمَا رِجَالًا كَثِيرًا وَنِسَاءً ۚ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ الَّذِي تَسَاءَلُونَ بِهِ وَالْأَرْحَامَ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ عَلَيْكُمْ رَقِيبًا ۝﴾ النساء ١

«O people! Revere your Lord who has created you from one soul, and created from it its mate, and from these two spread forth multitudes of men and women; and fear Allāh through whom you demand [your mutual rights], and [revere the ties of] the wombs. Indeed, Allāh is ever-watchful over you.»¹

And He (ﷻ) says:

﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَلْتَنْظُرْ نَفْسٌ مَّا قَدَّمَتْ لِغَدٍ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَبِيرٌ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ ۝ وَلَا تَكُونُوا كَالَّذِينَ نَسُوا اللَّهَ فَأَنْسَاهُمْ أَنْفُسَهُمْ ۚ أُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْفَاسِقُونَ ۝ لَا يَسْتَوِي أَصْحَابُ النَّارِ وَأَصْحَابُ الْجَنَّةِ ۚ أَصْحَابُ الْجَنَّةِ هُمُ الْفَائِزُونَ ۝﴾ الحشر ١٨-٢٠

«O you who believe! Revere Allāh, and let every person look to what he has sent forth for the morrow; and revere Allāh. Allāh is well Aware of what you do! And be not like those who forgot (disobeyed) Allāh, and He caused them to forget themselves. Those are the disobedient. Not equal are

**the dwellers of the Fire and the dwellers of *Jannah*.
It is the dwellers of *Jannah* that will be successful.»¹**

**Spend (in Allāh's way) before you are prevented
from spending. Let a man spend of his *dīnārs*,
dirhams, clothes, measure of wheat, barley, or dates.»**

Until he (ﷺ) said:

**«Do not belittle any amount of *ṣadaqah* (charity).
Safeguard yourselves from the Fire, even with half
a date.»**

Observing the people's slow response, the Prophet's (ﷺ) face showed signs of anger. But then, one man from the *Anṣār* came with a parcel full (of money) of silver and gold, which he could hardly hold in his palm. He handed it to Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ), while he was still on the *minbar*, and said, "O Allāh's Messenger! Take this in Allāh's way." He (ﷺ) took it. Abū Bakr (رضي الله عنه) then stood and gave something. Then 'Umar (رضي الله عنه) gave something. Then the rest of the *Muhājirūn* and *Anṣār* gave. Thus people followed each other in giving charity: This would give a *dīnār*, this a *dirham*, this such, and this such – until there were two piles of food and clothes; and the face of Allāh's Messenger (ﷺ) lighted up with a reddish-golden color. So he said:

**«He who initiates in *Islām* a good way gets his
reward for it, as well as rewards similar to those
who follow him into it, without reducing any of their
rewards. And he who initiates in *Islām* an evil way
gets his burden for it, as well as burdens similar to
those who follow him into it, without reducing any of
their burdens.»**

He (ﷺ) then recited:

1 Al-Hashr 59:18-20.

﴿وَنُكَتِبُ مَا قَدَّمُوا وَآثَرَهُمْ وَكُلَّ شَيْءٍ أَحْصَيْنَاهُ﴾

فِي إِمَامٍ مُبِينٍ ﴿١٢﴾

«We record that which they have done, as well as their traces – and We have enumerated everything in a clear book.» ¹

And he divided what was collected among them (the poor people from Muḍar). ²

Conclusion

From the above discussion, we can conclude that:

1. A person's deeds are sealed by his death. Nothing that takes place after that can affect his records.
2. The exception to the above rule is that anything, good or bad, that takes place after a person's death, which he contributed to its occurrence in any manner during his lifetime, will appear in his records in proportion with his contribution to it.

¹ *Yā-Sīn* 36:12.

² This combined report is taken from Muslim, Aḥmad, and others (*aḥkām ul-Janā'iz* 224-226).

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AL-GHAZZALI

THE MYSTERIES

OF

ALMSGIVING

TRANSLATED BY

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THE MYSTERIES OF **ALMSGIVING**

A Translation from the Arabic with Notes

of the

Kitāb Asrār al-Zakāh

of

Al-Ghazzali's *Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din*

by

NABIH AMIN FARIS

BOOK VI

SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF

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PREFACE

THOUGH ONE OF the most important works corn-

ing down to us from medieval Islam, no single part of the *Ihyā' Ulūm al-Dīn* appeared in English, or any European language at that, until Duncan B. Macdonald published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1901, pp. 195-252, 705-748, and 1902, pp. 1-28) an English version of Book VIII of the second quarter of the *Ihyā'*, i.e. the *Kitāb Ādāb*

Al-Samā' w-al-Wajd (On Audition and Grief). The second complete part of the *Ihyā'* was Edwin E. Calverley's translation of Book IV of the first quarter, i.e. the *Kitāb al-Salāh* (Madras, 1925). Except for a few extracts and selections, no complete translation of any part of the *Ihyā'* appeared in English until 1962 when two books from it were finally published : Book I of the first quarter, namely the *Kitāb al-'Ilm* (The Book of Knowledge) translated by the present writer and published by M. Ashraf, Lahore; and Book III of the fourth quarter, namely the *Kitāb al-Khawf w-al-Rajā'* (On Fear and Hope), translated by William McKane and published by Brill of Leiden. The following year, 1963, saw also the publication, in English, of two other books of the *Ihyā'* : Book X of the second quarter, on the Conduct of Life as Exemplified by the Prophet (*Adab al-Ma'ishah wa-Akhlāk al-Nubūwah*), translated by L. Zolondek and published

1980,

also by Brill ; and Book II of the first quarter, i.e. the *Kitāb Qāwā'id al-'Aqā'id* (The Foundations of the Articles of Faith), translated by the present writer and published also by Ashraf.

The following pages present in English garb Book V of the first quarter, namely the *Kitāb Asrār al Zakāh* (On the Mysteries of Almsgiving). The translation is, based on three printed texts and one in manuscript form. The printed texts are: first, that printed at Kafr al-Zaghāri in A. H. 1352 from the older. Cairo edition of A.H. 1289 ; second, that contained in the text of the *Ithāf al-Sādah al-Muttaqīn bi-Sharh Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* of al-Sayyid al-Murtada al-Zabidi (d. 1791); third, that reproduced in the margin of the same *Ithāf al-Sādah* ; and fourth, the text preserved in a four-volume manuscript in the Garrett Collection of Arabic Manuscripts in the Princeton University (No. 1481). In the translation of Koranic verses, I have depended mainly on J.M. Rodwell's version.

It is my hope that by making still another Book of the *Ihyā'* available in English, non-Arabic-speaking scholars will draw a benefit, even from my mistakes.

Nabih Amin Faris

March 29, 1966

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B O O K V

On the Mysteries of Almsgiving

INTRODUCTION

IN THE NAME of God the Merciful the Compassionate. [190] Praise be to God who hath blessed some with happiness, and reduced others to destitution; who hath brought some to death, and others to life; who hath caused some to laugh, and others to weep; who hath brought some things into existence, and other things He brought to nought; who hath reduced some to poverty, and hath made others rich; who hath visited some with harm, and others He hath blessed with good things; who hath created life from emitted clot,' and then set Himself apart from His creation through His attribute of independence (*ghina*) and endued some of His servants with excellence, enriching with His blessings those who toil and labour, and withholding His rewards from those who are indolent and languid, for the sake of testing them and trying them; who hath made almsgiving (*zakāh*) one of the foundations of religion; and hath revealed that, by His grace, through the giving of alms are His servants justified and through the same is their wealth increased. May the peace of God be upon

Muhammad the elect, the Lord of creation and the sun of guidance, and upon his family and his Companions who are favoured with learning and piety.

To proceed we say: God has made almsgiving one of the pillars of Islam placing it next to prayer which is the supreme[duty in Islam]. Thus He said,

"Observe prayer and pay alms."¹ The Apostle said, "Islam was built on five [pillars] : to witness that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His servant and Apostle, observing prayer, giving alms, [performing the pilgrimage, and fasting Ramadān]."² Furthermore, God has strongly warned those who are remiss in the fulfilment of these duties. Thus he said, "To those who treasure up gold and silver and expend it not in the way of God, announce tidings of a grievous torment."³ "To expend in the way of God" means to set aside the right proportion [of one's wealth] for alms. Al-Ahnaf ibn-Qays said, "I was once in the company of a group of Qurashites when abu-Dharr passed by and said, 'To those who treasure wealth announce that they will be branded in their back with a red-hot iron rod which will penetrate through their chests, and in the back of their heads with a rod which will pierce through to their foreheads.'" According to another version, the red-hot iron rod will be placed on the nipples of their breasts and forced through to emerge from the centre of their shoulder-blades, and on the centre of

their shoulder-blades to emerge from the nipples of their breasts.

Abu-Dharr said, "I came upon the Apostle of God sitting in the shadow of the Ka'bah, and when he saw me he said, 'Verily they [191] are the lost ones ; by the Lord of the Ka'bah, they are the lost ones.' I asked, 'Who are the lost ones?' He replied,

¹ . See *Sitrals* II : 40, 77, 104, 172, 277, etc. Prayer and almsgiving are mentioned side by side in the Koran no less than twenty-two times.

² Al-Bukhārī. *imin* : 1.

³ *Slirak* IX :3

'Those who have the most of wealth except him who gives of it to his fellowmen ; such men are not few. Verily if a person owns camels, or cattle, or flocks and does not set aside the *zakāh* on them, these camels, cattle, and flocks will return on the day of resurrection bigger and fatter than they ever were and will butt him with their horns and trample him with their hoofs over and over again until all the people are judged.' ''' Since this stricture is related in the two *Sahī*s,² it becomes an important part of religion to unfold the mysteries of almsgiving (*zakāh*), its obvious and hidden rules, and its outward and inward significance. We shall limit our discussion to those things which the payer of *zakāh* and its recipient should know. These are unfolded under four sections : First, the different kinds of *zakāh* and the reasons for its obligatory nature. Second, its inward and outward rules and regulations. Third, the recipient, the conditions which establish his claim, and the etiquette of payment. Fourth, the voluntary almsgiving (*sadaqah*)³ and its excellence.

1. Cf. Muslim, *Zakā* : 24. 26, 27 ; al • Bukhārī, *Zakāh* : 44.

2. Al-Bukhārī's and Muslim's.

3. The difference between *zakā* and *sadaqah* is that the former is legal and obligatory while the latter is meritorious and voluntary.

SECTION I

ON THE DIFFERENT kinds of *zakāh* and the reasons for its being obligatory, as well as the *zakāh* in relation to the various materials on which it is levied. These are of six kinds : 1. on livestock (*na'am*), 2. on gold and silver (*al-naqdayn*), 3. on merchandise, 4. on buried treasures (*rikāz*) and mines, 5. on land products (*al-mu'ashsharāt*), 6. on breaking the fast of Ramadan (*al-fitr*).

1. The Zakāh on Livestock

This, as well as the other kinds of *zakāh*, is not obligatory except on every free Moslem. That he be an adult and sane is not a prerequisite. In fact the *zakāh* is obligatory on minors and the insane.. These are the conditions for a person's liability to the *zakāh*. Those which render the property liable are five : that it be livestock,. maintained on pasturing, in the possession of its owner for at least one uninterrupted year, equivalent to a certain minimum (*nisāb*), and wholly owned [by the individual].

The first condition is that the property should be livestock, since only camels, cattle and flocks are liable to the *zakāh*, whereas horses, mules, donkeys, and the cross-breed of deer and sheep are exempt therefrom.

The second condition is pasturing. Livestock

maintained on fodder are not liable to the *zakāh*. Again if they were maintained on pasturing a part of the time and fed on fodder the rest of the time, they would be exempted from the *zakāh* because of the need to provide for them.

The third condition is possession for [at least] a period of one uninterrupted year. The Apostle of God said, "No *zakāh* is due on anything until it is in one's possession [for at least] one year." An exception from this rule is the produce of property. To it is applied the same rule which governs the property and is liable to the *zakāh* because its source [i.e. the original property] has been in the possession of the owner for one uninterrupted year. If during the *year* the property is sold or given away, the year's possession is interrupted [and the liability to *zakāh* falls].

The fourth condition is the whole and complete ownership of the property and freedom of action therein. Consequently, mortgaged livestock are liable to the *zakāh* because the owner himself has been responsible for the sequestration. But lost and confiscated things are not liable to the *zakāh* unless they are retrieved, at which time the amount due on them for the previous period must be paid. If the person were indebted to the amount of his capital, he would not be liable to the *zakāh* because he is not rich enough, as to be rich is to have a surplus.

The fifth condition is that the property be equal to a certain minimum [which varies with the kind of property on which the *zakāh* is levied].

1. Abu-Dāwād. *Zakāh* : 5.

Camels. No *zakāh*; is due on less than five camels, on which is levied a sheep in *its* second year or a goat in its third year. On ten camels two goats are levied, on fifteen camels three goats, on twenty camels four goats, and on twenty-five camels a yearling she-camel (*bint mikhād*) which is in its second year of age. If the person did not have among his camels a yearling she-camel then a he-camel in the third year of its age (*ibn-labūn*) would be taken instead, although the person might be able to buy a yearling she-camel. On thirty-six camels a she-camel in the third year of its age (*bint labūn*) is levied ; on forty-six camels a she-camel in the fourth year of its age (*hiqqah*) is levied ; on sixty-one camels a she-camel in the fifth year of its age (*jadha'ah*) ; on seventy-six camels two she-camels in the third year of their age; on ninety- one camels two she-camels in the fourth year of their age ; and on one hundred and twenty-one camels three she-camels in the third year of their age. When their number reaches one hundred and thirty-one camels the scale becomes fixed: for every fifty camels a she-camel in the fourth year of its age is levied, and for every forty camels a she-camel in the third year of its age.

Cattle. No *zakāh* is due on less than thirty bulls anti cows, on which is levied a calf in the second year of its age (*tabi'*). On forty bulls and cows a cow in the third year of its age (*musinnuh*) is levied, and on sixty bulls and cows two calves in the second year of their age. Beyond that the scale becomes fixed : for every forty bulls and cows a cow in the third year of its age is levied, and for every thirty bulls and cows a calf in the second year of its age.

Flock. No *zakāh* is due on less than forty sheep and goats, on which one ewe in the second year of its age or one goat in the third year of its age is levied. No *zakāh* is due on any more until the number reaches one hundred and twenty-one sheep and goats for which three ewes are levied. When the number reaches four-hundred, four ewes are levied. Beyond this number the scale becomes fixed and for every one hundred sheep and goats one ewe is levied.

The rule which governs the almsgiving (*sadaqah*) of two in partnership (*khalitayn*) is the same as that which governs the *sadaqah* of the sole owner. Thus if two individuals owned forty sheep together [the *zakāh*] due on them is one ewe; and if three individuals owned one hundred and twenty ewes in partnership among themselves the *zakāh* due on them all is one ewe. Partnership of neighbours, in its liability to the *zakāh*, is exactly like common partnership (*khultat, al-shuyū*), although it is required that their sheep should be herded together in the same place, taken to drink [192] together [at the same water-hole or well], milked together, graze together in the same pasture, and their mating be carried at the same time and place. Above all the partners should be of the people of the *zakāh* [i.e. free Moslems], for the partner-ship of the Moslem with the *dhimmi* and the slave who has ransomed himself (*mukātab*)² is without

1. Used here as a synonym of *zakāh*.

2. Cf. *Siirak XXIV : 33 Kitabak*. literally "writing," is a form of buying oneself free. It is a contractual liberation where the slave pays his owner a certain equivalent in two or three instalments. The owner is the *mukātib* and the slave is the *mukātab*. The latter alone can annul the contract if he wishes.

the law.

To give as *zakāh* a younger camel than the one prescribed by law is permissible, provided the camel given is not younger than a yearling (*bint mikhād*), although the person should make amends for the age of the camel : a camel one year younger than the prescribed age requires two ewes or twenty dirhams compensation; one two years younger, four ewes or forty dirhams. He may also give as *zakāh* camels older than the prescribed age as long as they do not go beyond the fifth year of their age (*jadha'ah*). [When camels older in years than the prescribed age have been given as *zakāh*], the owner is entitled to [differential] compensation and can collect it from the treasury officials.

No sick camel may be accepted as *zakāh* when one sound camel is found among the herd on which the *zakāh* is due. From among thorough-bred camels a thorough-bred is collected and from among the half-breed, a half-breed. No sheep fattened for slaughtering and eating or gravid may be taken as *zakāh*. Likewise no ewe which has just brought forth, or a male, or the best among the flock may be taken.

2. The Zakāh on Land Products

The second kind of *zakāh* is that which is levied on land products (*al-ma'ashsharāt*). The tithe is due on every edible plant when its amount reaches eight hundred manehs. No *zakāh* is due on any amount less than eight hundred manehs. Likewise no *zakāh* is due on fruits and cotton but it is due on dates and

raisins. To be liable to the *zakāh* their amount should not be less than eight hundred manehs and they should be dried dates and raisins, not fresh dates and grapes. Fresh dates and grapes become dried dates and raisins after a process of drying.

In common partnership the property of the one partner supplements that of the other [and the *zakāh* is due on the sum of the two]. For example in a vineyard which is owned in common by several heirs and the crop of which amounts to eight hundred manehs of raisins, eighty manehs of raisins are due on all of them together, each to pay in proportion to his share. This, however, does not hold in the partnership among neighbours.

An amount of wheat may not be supplemented with another of barley in order to raise it to the minimum (*nisāb*) liable to the *zakāh* but an amount of barley may be supplemented with thin-husked barley because they are of the same species.

The quality of the *zakāh* due on land products is as follows: dry dates, dry raisins, and dry grains are accepted as *zakāh*. Neither grapes nor fresh dates are accepted unless an epidemic should befall the trees and demand, for the sake of the general welfare, that they be cut down before their fruit is ripe. In that event fresh dates, [for example], may be collected—nine measures will be set aside for the owner, and one measure for the poverty-stricken. That the division of property is [equivalent to] the selling [of it] does not prevent such division, rather it is permissible because of necessity.

The *zakāh* is due at the time when the fruits be-

come ripe and the grains harden ; it is actually collected after the crop has been dried and sifted.

3. The *Zakāh* on Gold and Silver

When a year elapses with two hundred Makkan dirhams of sterling silver [in the possession of a person], the *zakāh* due on them will be five dirhams, which is one-fourth of ten per cent. Anything above that, though it may be only a dirham, follow the same ratio [of one dirham for every forty or one fortieth for each dirham].

The minimum amount (*nisāb*) of gold liable to the *zakāh* is twenty Makkan miskal of pure gold, on which is due one-fourth of ten per cent. The same proportion holds for anything above the minimum, but no *zakāh* is due if the minimum were short of one grain. A person possessing counterfeit money is liable to the *zakāh* if the pure metal it contains is equivalent to the required minimum. The *zakāh* is due on gold and silver bullion as well as on forbidden gold and silver luxuries such as gold and silver vessels and the gold coaches of [rich] men. On the other hand the *zakāh* is not due on permissible luxuries. It is also due on the debt of a solvent person capable of paying his debt, in which event it is due at the time of payment. If the payment of the debt has been set for a deferred date, the *zakāh* is not due until that date is come.

4. The *Zakāh* on Merchandise

The *zakāh* on merchandise, like that on gold and silver, [is one-fourth of ten per cent for the year].

The year, however, is reckoned from the time of the person's possession of the gold and silver with which he has purchased the goods, provided the money was up to the minimum liable to the *zakāh*. If the money were below the minimum, or if the person should purchase some goods with the intention of selling them for profit, then the year would be reckoned from the time of the purchase.

The *zakāh* is paid with the currency of the land and in terms of the same currency is its value calculated. If the money with which the goods were purchased belonged to a certain monetary unit, and equalled exactly the minimum liable to the *zakāh* (*nisāb*) it would be better to calculate the *zakāh* on the basis of the monetary unit with which the purchase was made than on that of the currency of the land.

If a person decides to invest a part of his income, the year will not be reckoned until he actually purchases something with it, for the mere intent to invest is not enough. If, before the year elapses, the person drops his intention of investing, the obligation to pay the *zakāh* likewise drops. It is, however, better to pay the *zakāh* for that year.

Whatever profit may accrue at the end of the year is liable to *zakāh* through the year of the capital, and will not have a special year reckoned for it as is the case with the increase of [camels, cattle, and flocks].

As to money-changers, the continuity of the year on the basis of which the *zakāh* due on their money is calculated is not interrupted by the ex-

change of the money to and fro among them as it is interrupted with exchange of other kinds of merchandise.

The *zakāh* due on the profits which accrue to the money-lender is due on the lender himself, i.e. on his share of the profit, even before the division of the shares takes place. This is the most regular practice.

5. The *Zakāh* on Buried Treasures and Mines

A buried treasure (*rikāz*) is money interred in the earth sometime during the *Jāhiliyyah* days and later found in a land to which no one has claimed title during the days of Islam. When such a treasure is discovered, he who finds it is required to pay one-fifth of its value, whether the treasure be gold or silver. The lapse of a one-year period is not required. Likewise no certain minimum need be required, since the fact that one-fifth of its value has been set down as the amount of the *zakāh* due on it establishes its similarity to booty. It is not unusual, however, to require a certain minimum (*nisāb*) because the way it is spent is the same as that of the *zakāh*. For this reason [the liability to the *zakāh* is confined to gold and silver treasures.

As to mines, no *zakāh* is due on any of the metals mined therefrom except gold and silver, on which, according to the best authority, one-fourth of ten per cent is due after they have been reduced and purified. Furthermore, a certain minimum (*nisāb*) is here required [193]. As to the one-year period two opinions are set forth, [one requiring and the other ignoring it]. But when one-fifth of its value is fixed as the

amount of the *zakāh* due, the year period is not required.

Two opinions are also set forth regarding the *minimum* liable to the *zakāh*. The more likely is that, in the amount of the *zakāh* due on it, it should follow the same rule as merchandise, since it is also a form of profit. In the case of the one-year period it should follow the rule of the land products and therefore no such period is required, since this is the most sensible course. A, certain minimum is required in this part as it is required in land products. The safest course is to set aside one-fifth of all buried treasures and mine products regardless of their amount and irrespective of whether or not they are gold or silver, in order to avoid these uncertain distinctions and differences, all of which are conjectural views and almost invariably contradictory. It is, therefore, dangerous to lay down fast and strict rules, especially because of the contradictory nature of these conjectures.

6. The Zakāh on Breaking the Fast of Ramadan

The *zakāh* on breaking the fast of Ramadan (*al-fitr*) is on the authority of the word of the Apostle of God,' obligatory upon every Moslem from whose food and the food of his dependants, on the day of *al-fitr* and the night before, a measure, measured with that of the Apostle of God, is left over. The measure of the Apostle of God was equivalent to two and two-thirds manehs. This he should set aside from whatever food he has been eating or from any superior

I. Cf. al-Nasā'i, *Zakāh* : 30; al-Bukhārī, *Zakāh* : 71-76.

food. If he were feeding on wheat he may not set aside [a measure] of barley [for the *zakāh*], and if he were feeding on several kinds of grains he should select the best and from it set aside the *zakāh*. But of whatever grain he sets aside the *zakāh* it will be sufficient.

The *zakāh* on the breaking of the fast of Ramadān (*al-fitr*) is expended in the same way as that of the other properties, and each of the various beneficiaries should be included. It is not permissible to offer either flour or parched barley as *zakāh*. Furthermore it is obligatory upon every Moslem to pay the *zakāh* on the breaking of the fast of Ramadan for his wife, slaves, children, and every relative dependent on him, i.e. those relatives whose support is obligatory upon him, such as his father, mother, and children. The Apostle said, "On breaking the fast of Ramadan, give the *sadaqah*' on behalf of those whom ye support."² In case the slave is jointly possessed by two partners the *sadaqah* is obligatory upon both. It is, however, not obligatory to pay it on behalf of an unbelieving slave. If a wife should independently set aside her own *sadaqah*, her *sadaqah* will be sufficient. Nevertheless, the husband may set aside the *sadaqah* on behalf of his wife without her permission. If, after paying the *sadaqah* of his immediate dependants, a person can still afford it, he should proceed to the *sadaqah* of those next in order beginning with the closest whose claim to his support is the most evident.

1. *Sadaqah* is used here interchangeably with *zakāh*.

2. Unidentified.

The Apostle of God has given the child's claim for support precedence over the wife's, and the wife's over that of the servant.'

The knowledge of these rules of jurisprudence is indispensable to him who wishes to be independent of others. He may, however, be confronted with unusual situations not within the scope of this discussion, in which event he should depend upon expert legal opinion having at first fortified himself with this knowledge.

1. . Cf. al-Nasā'i, *Zakāh*: 54, where the claim of the wife is given precedence over that of the child.

SECTION II

On the Payment of the Zakāh and the Inward and Outward Rules which Govern that Payment

Know that the payer of the *zakāh* should observe five things :

1. Intention, which means that the person should purpose in his heart the payment of the ordained *zakāh*, but he does not have to specify the property for which he pays the *zakāh*. Thus if he had some property under absentee ownership and, on paying the *zakāh* due on it, said, "This is paid for the property which I own under absentee ownership, provided that property is safe, otherwise let this be a supererogatory deed," his action will be permissible, because he did not specify what the property was. This will be the rule when a property is referred to in general terms.

The intention of the guardian takes the place of that of the insane and the minor. The intention of the magistrate takes the place of that of the owner who has refused to pay the *zakāh*, although only as far as the outward forms of this world are concerned. As far as the hereafter is concerned the intention of the magistrate does not take the place of that of the owner who has refused to pay **the** *zakāh*; on the

contrary the latter will continue to be held responsible for it until he resumes its payment.

If the owner should entrust an agent with the payment of the *zakāh* and, at the time of intrusting, the agent purposes himself to do so, or entrust the agent with the intention, he would fulfill the requirement thereof, because to entrust the agent with the intention is itself an intention.

2. Promptness in paying the *zakāh* at the end of each year and on breaking the fast of Ramadān (*al-fitr*). In the case of the latter he should not delay its payment beyond the feast of Ramadān. It is due as soon as the sun sets on the last day of Ramadān, and if one wishes to be very prompt he may pay it during the month of Ramadān, sometime between the first and the last day of the month. Whoever delays the payment of the *zakāh*, although he is able to be prompt, sins. Furthermore, if he had been able to pay the *zakāh* but delayed to do so and subsequently his property was destroyed, the obligation to pay it will not be removed from him. But if he delayed its payment because no beneficiaries were present to receive it, and subsequently his property was destroyed, the obligation to pay the *zakāh* will be removed from him.

To pay the *zakāh* in advance is permissible provided it is done after the minimum liable to the *zakāh* has been obtained and the one-year period has already elapsed. It is, however, permissible to pay the *zakāh* of two-years in advance. If the *zakāh* is paid in advance and then, before the end of the year, the poor man [who is the beneficiary] should die, or

apostate, or grow independently wealthy, or if the property of the owner should be destroyed or he himself die, the sum which had been paid in advance would not constitute a *zakāh* and cannot be refunded unless it had been so stipulated at the time of payment. Therefore, let him who pays the *zakāh* in advance keep in mind how things may end and watch for a safe outcome.

3. That no substitute based on the value of the *zakāh* be offered in its stead. The stipulated *zakāh* itself should be set aside and offered. Thus silver (*waraq*) will not take the place of gold, nor gold the place of silver, even though the substitute may exceed that for which it was substituted.

Perhaps some of those who do not understand the purpose of al-Shāfi'i may be inclined to be lenient and permit the substitution of one thing for the other on the ground that the main purpose of the whole thing is satisfying the need. But how far is this from the true knowledge of the law. For while satisfying the need is one of its purposes, it is in no way the sole purpose. Rather the purposes of the law are three. [194] These are :

The first purpose of the law is pure devotion (*ta'abbud ma'nā*) not affected by personal considerations or desires. This is, for example, like the throwing of the pebbles at the three *Jamrahs*:¹ no benefit

1. During the pilgrimage, when the pilgrims reach the valley of Mina, each one of them is expected to throw seven small pebbles, which he has already picked up at Muzdalifah, at each of the three heaps (sing. *jamrah*) symbolic of stoning Satan. There are three *Jamrahs*, *al-ūla* (the first), *al-wusta* (the middle), and the last which is known as that of *al-'aqabah*. Cf. al-Bukhārī : al-Hajj : 134-8; Ibrahim Rif'at, Mir'at al-Haramayn, (Cairo, 1925), vol. I, pp. 328-9.

is derived by the *Jamrah* from the falling pebbles. In this case the main purpose of the law is the trial of man through action, in order that he may show his servitude and bondage to God by means of acts which [in themselves] have no rational meaning. For acts which [in themselves] have rational meaning are transacted by the aid of the mind which urges man to do them. Consequently, rational acts do not reveal man's complete servitude and bondage to God. Real bondage to God, however, is revealed through [blind] obedience to His commandments and not through obedience for some other reason. Thus most of the activities of [the pilgrims during] the pilgrimage are, in themselves, void of any rational significance. For this reason, the Apostle, when in the sacred state (*ihrām*), said, "With zeal I obey thee O Lord, and through the pilgrimage I display my devotion and servitude." This he did in order to show that man proves his bondage to God through blind obedience to His commandments regardless of whether or not they are agreeable to him and irrespective of his desire and inclination to obey them.

The second purpose of the Law is a rational benefit rather than pure devotion, like, for example, honouring human debts and restoring to men whatever was forcibly taken from them. Thus there is not a single offence in which the act itself, as well as the motive, is not taken into consideration. Furthermore whenever the right is restored to its owner or a substitute indemnity agreeable to him has been paid, the demand of the law is fulfilled, and its claims are consequently dropped.

These two purposes of the law are free of complications and their comprehension is readily shared by all men.

The third purpose of the law is composite embracing the former two, namely the benefit of mankind and the trial of man by means of [the yoke of] bondage. Consequently therein is combined acts of pure devotion like the throwing of the pebbles, and human benefits like the restoration of [violated]. rights. The latter is, in, itself, rational. But if it is ordained by the law, it becomes imperative that the two purposes be combined. Never, however, should the subtler of the two purposes, namely devotion and servitude, be overlooked on account of the more apparent, [namely human benefit and advantage]. More likely the subtler of the two is the more important.

Of this last kind, [i.e. the third], is the *zakāh*. No one awoke to this fact except al-Shifī'i. The part of [the *zakāh* which is spent on] the poverty-stricken serves the purpose of satisfying the need. This is quite clear and is readily understood. On the other hand the requirements of devotion are fulfilled through carrying out the details which are connected with the *zakāh*. In this regard the *zakāh* has become an inseparable companion of prayer and the pilgrimage, it being one of the [five] pillars of Islam. No doubt man has to exert some effort in distinguishing the various kinds of his possessions and setting aside a portion of each and finally distributing what he had set aside around eight different groups of [beneficiaries] as will be discussed later. To make concessions on

this point will not mitigate the benefits due to the poverty-stricken but will certainly militate against devotion. That devotion is intended in the *zakāh* is evidenced by the specific treatment of the different kinds of the *zakāh* by the law. These specifications we have discussed under points of dispute in books of jurisprudence. One of the clearest of these specifications is where the law specifically ordains that the *zakāh* for every five camels is one ewe, thereby substituting the ewe for the camel but not permitting the substitution of gold and silver. Were this to be explained on the result of the scarcity of gold and silver money among the Bedouins, the explanation would be rendered inadequate as soon as it is recalled that the Apostle has stipulated that the sum of twenty dirhams or two ewes should be given in compensation when the age of the camel given as *zakāh* is younger than what it should be.' Why then did the Apostle not mention in connexion with the compensation required the amount of shortage in the value, and why did he value it at twenty dirhams or two ewes if garments and vessels of whatever kind were all of the same value as substitutes?

These as well as other similar specifications indicate that the *zakāh* has not been left void of devotional significance, but unlike the pilgrimage which is purely devotional, embraces both [the rational benefits and the devotional acts]. But whereas feeble minds fail to comprehend complicated things, errors have arisen in this field.

I. See above, p. 8.

4. That the *sadaqah* should not be transferred from one town to another. For in every town the eyes of the poor look towards the money collected therein for relief; and the transfer of that money to other towns brings disappointment to those who expected aid therefrom. According to one opinion, however, the transfer is permissible, but it is better to avoid anything which may cause dissension. Consequently, let the *zakāh* be spent in the town wherein it was collected. When this is observed it will no longer be wrong to spend the *zakāh* on such strangers as may be within that town.

5. That the payer of the *zakāh* should divide the sum which he pays among the different groups of beneficiaries found in his home-town. To include all the different groups of beneficiaries is obligatory, which thing is proved by the words of God when He said, "But alms (*sadaqāt*) are only to be given to the paupers and the poor, and those who collect them, and to those whose hearts are reconciled [to Islam], and those in captivity, and those in debt, and those who are on God's path, and for the wayfarers;—an ordinance this from God, for God is knowing and wise." This resembles the saying of the sick man that one third of his possessions is for the paupers and the poor, and consequently this demands settlement through transfer. As for the acts of worship care should be taken not to rush through them in a superficial manner.

Of the eight groups of beneficiaries two, namely

1. *Sūrah IX* : 60.

those whose hearts are reconciled [to Islam]² and the collectors of the *zakāh*, have disappeared in most lands, while four still universally exist. These are the paupers, the poor, those in debt, and the travellers, i.e. the wayfarers. Two groups, namely the warriors and those in captivity (al-mukātabūn), are still to be found in some lands. Thus if five groups of beneficiaries were found in one place, the payer of the *zakāh* should divide it among them in equal or almost equal parts, and should allot to each one part. He then should divide each part into three or more equal or unequal portions. Nevertheless, he is not compelled to divide each part equally among the members of the one group of beneficiaries, but may divide it, if he wishes, into ten or even twenty portions, in which case the share of each individual within the one group will necessarily diminish. The division of the *zakāh* among the different groups should not be tampered with : nothing should be taken from the one and added to the other but all should be equal. The share of each group should not be divided into less than three portions. Thus if the amount of the *zakāh* due for breaking the fast of Ramadan were one measure of any grain and there were five groups of beneficiaries in the town, the payer, [on the basis of at least three portions within each group], should divide the *zakāh* among fifteen men. Should one man be left out and not receive his portion, the payer, if he can afford it, should

2. *Al-mū allafah qulūbuhum* ; see *Surūh* IX : 60. These were petty Arab chiefs with whom Muhammad made terms after the battle of Hunayn (A.H. 8/ A.D. 629), in order to secure their aid. See *Sirah*. p. 880.

supply that portion from his own property. But if this were not possible because of the meagreness of the *zakāh*, a number of those men who are liable to the *zakāh* should pool their dues and then hand them over to the beneficiaries so that they might divide them among themselves. [195] Resort to this course of action is indispensable.

On. the Details of the Inward Rules of the *Zakāh*

Know that he who seeks the road of the hereafter through the *zakāh* has certain duties to fulfil. These are as follows :

The first duty is to understand the reason why the *zakāh* is obligatory, to comprehend its significance, to find out how it constitutes a criterion wherewith man's devotion to God is tested and tried, and finally why it has been made one of the [five] pillars of Islam although it is merely a financial transaction and does not form a part of bodily worship. This has three significations.

To repeat the two words of the *shahādah* is an obligation necessary for the acknowledgement of the unity of God and a witness to His oneness. As a prerequisite of man's complete loyalty to God he should banish from his heart every love except the One, the Single, since love tolerates no division of affection. Furthermore the verbal profession of the unity of God is of little value by itself. The degree of the person's love is tested when he parts with his beloved. Property and wealth are much loved by all people because they are the means by which they

enjoy the pleasures of this world, and because of them they love life and hate death, although through it they will meet [God] the beloved. As a proof of the truthfulness of their claim that they love God they have renounced property and wealth, the objects of their [earthly] attention and devotion. For this reason God said, "Verily, of the faithful hath God bought their persons and their substance, on condition of Paradise for them [in return]."¹ This is done by means of toil and labour of God, by giving up oneself to His service because of one's longing to meet Him. But giving up wealth is easier than giving up oneself. As people read in this the giving away of wealth and property, they were divided into three different groups. One group of men accepted the unity of God and fulfilled [the terms of] their covenant,² renouncing all their wealth and property and storing for themselves neither gold nor silver. Consequently, they refused to concern themselves with the obligation of the *zakāh* and that they were expected to pay it, so that when one of them was asked about the *zakāh* due on two-hundred dirhams he replied, "The law ordains that the common folk pay five dirhams [as the *zakāh* due on two-hundred], but, we have to give away all." For this reason abuBakr gave away all his possessions and Umar gave away half of his. Thereupon the Apostle asked Umar, "What have you left for your family?" Umar replied, "As much as I have given away." The Apostle then asked abu-Bakr, "And what have you

1. *Sūrah IX : 112.*

2. *Cf. Sūrah II : 172.*

left for your family?" Abu-Bakr replied, "[The protection of] God and His Apostle." The Apostle said, "The difference between you both is the same as the difference between your replies. Verily al-Siddiq has fulfilled his covenant completely, withholding nothing unto himself except God and his Apostle."¹

The members of the second group rank lower than those of the first. They withhold their wealth for the hour of need and until the season of giving arrives. Their purpose in saving and storing their wealth is to be able to spend according to their needs, though without extravagance, and to give away for charity whatever is left after they had satisfied their need. In giving, these men do not limit themselves to the *zakāh* but go beyond its fixed amount. In fact some of the followers (*al-tabī'ūn*), such as al-Nakha'i, al-Sha'bi, 'Atā' and Mujāhid, have said that a man's wealth was subject to other [impositions] besides the *zakāh*. Thus al-Sha'bi, having been asked, "Is a man's wealth subject to other [impositions] besides the *zakāh*?", said, "Yes. Have you not heard the words of God, 'And for the love of God distributeth his wealth to his kindred'?"² These same men have been guided in this by the words of God, "And give alms of that with which we have supplied them;"³

and "And expend [in the cause of God] out of that with which we have supplied you ;"⁴ claiming that neither of these two verses has been abrogated by

1. *Cf. al-Darimi, Zakāh 28 ; al-Tirmidhi, Manāqib : 16.*

1. *Sūrah II : 172.*

1. *Sūrah XXII : 36.*

2. *Sūrah LXIII : 10.*

that of the *zakāh*.¹ Rather they are part of the obligations of one Moslem towards another. In other words whenever a wealthy Moslem comes across one who is needy, he should relieve his want regardless of the fact that he has already paid the *zakāh*. In this connexion, the correct course, according to jurisprudence, is that the relief of a pressing need is a *fard kifāyah*, because the life of a Moslem should not be sacrificed.

It maybe said, however, that a wealthy Moslem is under no obligation to surrender any of his wealth for the relief of want except in the form of a loan, and that he is not under any compulsion to give any of it away once he has fulfilled the requirement of the *zakāh*. It may also be said that he should give away of his wealth for the relief of want but not in the form of a loan. In other words it is not permissible for him to place the poor under the obligation of accepting the loan [and the obligation of paying it back]. Differences of opinion on this question do exist. [To relieve want by] loans [rather than by outright gifts] is to descend to the lowest rank of the common folk, which is the rank of the third group.

The members of this third group confine themselves solely to the fulfilment of that which is obligatory ; they add nothing to it and take nothing away from it. This is, indeed, the lowest rank to which the common folk have confined themselves because of their niggardliness, and because of their strong love for money and their lukewarm love for

1. I. e. *Sūrah IX* : 60.

the hereafter. Said God, "If He were to ask you for your property and to press you for it, ye would be niggardly."¹ (To press you means to urge you). And what a difference is there between a servant from whom [God] has purchased his wealth and soul in return for Paradise and another whom [God] does not urge because of his niggardliness! This, therefore, is one of the meanings of the commandment of God to His servants to give their wealth away.

The second meaning is to purify oneself from the stigma of niggardliness which is one of the destructive matters of life. The Apostle said, "Three things in life are destructive : sordid avarice, vehement passion, and self-conceit."² God also said, "And whoso is preserved from his own covetousness, these are the prosperous."³ We shall discuss in the Quarter on the Destructive Matters of Life in what way it is destructive as well as the manner of avoiding it.

The stigma of niggardliness is removed by the practice of giving money away, since the love of a thing is overcome by compelling oneself to stay away from it until abstention becomes habitual. According to this meaning the *zakāh* is purity because it purifies the person who fulfils it from the destructive impurities of niggardliness. The extent to which the person if purified from the stigma of niggardliness is proportional to the amount of his giving and the degree of his pleasure in giving and in his delight in

1. *Sūrah XLVII* : 39.

2. *Al-Manawī, Fay4 el-Qadīr, Sharh al-Saghir, vol. III (Cairo, 1938). p. 307.*

3. *Sūrah LIX* : 9, *LXIV* : 16.

spending in the cause of God.

The third meaning is gratitude for the blessings of God, for He has blessed man in his own self and in his possessions. The bodily acts of worship [196] are man's gratitude for the bodily blessings which God has bestowed upon him, while the financial acts of worship are his gratitude for the financial gifts. How vile and ungrateful, then is the person who sees a poverty-stricken man in dire distress and need but does not extend to him a helping hand by giving him one-fourth of ten per cent or ten per cent of his wealth as a sign of his gratitude to God for sparing him the necessity of begging and visiting it upon others instead.

The second duty concerns the time of payment. One of the signs of etiquette among religious people is to pay [the *zakāh*] before it is already due, in order to show their desire to conform willingly to the law by bringing [relief and] happiness to the hearts of those in poverty, losing no time therein lest unforeseen obstacles arise and prevent them from doing good; and because of their knowledge that in delay are many evils, and that man exposes himself to [the fruits of] disobedience whenever he delays the payment of the *zakāh* beyond the appointed time. Whenever the impulse for doing good makes itself felt inwardly, the person should seize the opportunity [and hearken unto it] for in so doing he would join the company of heaven, since at that time "the heart of the believer is between two of the fingers of the Merciful God." But how quickly does the heart change its position. For Satan threatens [men] with poverty and invites them to commit turpitude and evil. He has a company

that goes after the company of heaven. Consequently, let man seize the opportunity and appoint a definite month for the payment the *zakāh* if he were wont to pay it annually ; and let him endeavour to have that month fall in the best part of the year, so that he may increase in the favour of God and his *zakāh* be multiplied double fold. Such a month would be *al-Muharram* because it is the first month of the year and one of the sacred months;¹ or *Ramādān* in which the Apostle, who was the best of creation, was like the open air free of all impurities.² To *Ramadan* also belongs the excellence of the Night of Power (*Laylat al-Qadr*)³ as well as that of being the month in which the *Koran* was revealed. *Mujāhid* was wont to say, "Say not *Ramādān*, because *Ramadan* is one of the names of God ; but say ye the month of *Ramādān*."⁴ *Dhu-al-Hijjah* is another of the months which claim great excellence since besides being a sacred month, it also boasts of the greater pilgrimage (*al-hajj al-akbar*),⁵ the appointed days (*al-ayyām al-ma'lūmāt*),⁶ which are the first ten days of the same month, and the numbered days (*al-ayyām al-ma'dūdāt*) which are the days of orienta-

1. During which fighting was unlawful. These were *Dhu-al-Qa'dah*, *Dhu-al-Hijjah*, *al-Muharram*, and *Rajah*.

2. Cf. *al-Bukhari*, *Manāqib* : 23.

3. The night of the day on which *Muhammad* received his call. it was later fixed towards the end of *Ramadan* A.D. 610, twelve years before the *Hijrah*. See *Sūrah XCVII* : *al-Bukhārī*, *Bad' al-Wahy*.

4. That *Ramādān* is one of the names of God is based on a weak tradition which I failed to locate.

5. To distinguish it from the lesser pilgrimage, both of which will be discussed in the *Book on the Pilgrimage*.

6. Being the first ten days of *Dhu-al-Hijjah*, the last of which is the day of sacrifice. *Sūrah XXII* : 29.

tion (*ayyām al-tashriq*).¹ The most excellent days of the month of Ramadan are the last ten, and the most excellent of Dhu-al-Hijjah are the first ten.

The third duty is secrecy. It is farther removed from the desire to be seen and heard. The Apostle said, "The most excellent *sadaqah* is the secret effort of one of meagre resources to relieve a poverty-stricken individual."² One of the learned men said, "Three things are among the precious works of righteousness, one of which is to give alms (*sadaqah*) in secret."³ This same saying has been related as a tradition.⁴ The Apostle also said, verily when a man does some thing [good] in secret God will record it down to his credit in secret ; if he reveals it, it will be transferred from the list of the good works done in secret to that of the good works done openly ; if he talks about it, it will be stricken out from both lists and put down in that of the works of hypocrisy."⁵ And again in the well-authenticated (*mashhūr*)⁶ tradition, he said, "Seven people will God cover with His shadow on the day when there will be no shadow but His ; one of these seven is a man who gives alms but his left

1. These are the three days next after the day of sacrifice which is the tenth day of Dhu-al-Hijjah. They are now days of rest after the peripatetic performance of the last four. Evidently, they had pre-Islamic antecedents. The *tashriq* may either mean turning eastward in worship, or drying up the blood of the sacrifice in the torrid sun of Makkah. it may also mean sunrise-prayer, to which meaning I incline. Cf. *Sīrah* II: 199.

2. Cf. Abu-Dāwūd, *Zakāh* : 40.

3. Cf. Matt. VI : 3, 4.

4. Unidentified.

5. Unidentified.

6. A tradition is *mashhūr* when it is vouched for by more than two Companions.

hand does not know what his right does."¹ In another tradition he said, "Alms given in secret turn away the wrath of God."² Said God, "But if ye hide it [i.e. almsgiving] and bring it to the poverty-stricken, then it is better for you."³ The advantage of secrecy in giving alms is salvation from the evils of the desire to be seen and heard. The Apostle said, "God will not accept the gift of the braggart, the hypocrite, and the person who is always reminding others of the favours he has done for them."⁴ For he who brags about his alms seeks to be known and heard, and he who gives his alms in the presence of crowds desires to be seen and recognized ; while secrecy and silence are the best protection against [such temptations].

Some have emphasized the excellence of secrecy in giving alms to an extent where they endeavour to conceal the identity of the benefactor from the beneficiary. Some were wont to place their alms in the hand of a blind man ; others used to throw them in the path of the poverty-stricken or in his sitting place where he could see them without seeing the giver ; others were in the habit of hiding them in the garments of the poor while he was fast asleep ; and others used to convey them to the poverty-stricken indirectly through an intermediary so that the identity of the giver might remain unknown. The intermediary, in turn, was charged with silence and warned not to divulge the identity of the giver. These men

1. Al-Bukhārī, *Adhān* : 36 ; cf. Matt. VI : 3, 4.

2. Cf. al-Tirmidhī *Zakāh* : 28.

3. *Sūrah* II : 273.

4. Unidentified.

took all this trouble to insure that the wrath of God has been turned away from them and to avoid the evils of being seen and heard. Whenever it is not possible to give alms without being known by some one, it is better to give the alms over to an agent who would pass them to the poor whose identity should remain unknown to the benefactor; for in knowing the identity of the poor who had received the alms lies both the desire to be known and the evil practice of reminding the poor of the favour done to him, while in knowing only the intermediary, there lies nothing but the desire to be known.

Whenever the giver's aim in giving is fame, his good deed will prove useless since the purpose of the *zakāh* is to banish niggardliness and weaken the love of wealth, yet the love of position and rank is more insidious than the love of wealth, and both [197] are destructive in the hereafter. While the quality of niggardliness becomes, so to speak, in the grave a stinging scorpion, the desire to be seen is transformed into a biting viper. Yet man is required to weaken or destroy them in order to avoid their harm or at least lessen it. But whenever he seeks to be seen and heard, he strengthens, as it were, the viper and weakens the scorpion. To the extent to which he weakens the scorpion, he strengthens the viper. If he had left them as they were, it would have been easier for him [to avoid their harm]. For the strength of these qualities lies in doing according to their demands, and their weakness is found in opposing and contradicting them and in doing contrary to their demands. Thus what use is there in contradicting the

demands of niggardliness and bending before the urge of being seen by men thereby weakening the weaker of the two and strengthening the stronger? (The mysteries of these things will be discussed in the Quarter on the Destructive Matters of Life).

The fourth duty is that the giving of alms be made public, if in so doing men are induced to do likewise and give. The giver, however, should, when making public his gift, guard against being seen in the manner which we shall discuss under the treatment of hypocrisy in the Book on that subject. For God has said, "If ye display your almsgiving, then well is it." This refers to such occasions where display is needed either for the sake of setting an example for giving or because someone has begged for alms in the presence of a great crowd, in which case giving should not be deferred or neglected for fear of being seen. Rather the person should give to him who has begged and *try as* much as possible to guard himself against being seen. That is because, besides the evils of constantly reminding people of favours done them and the desire to be seen, there is a third thing to be guarded against in connexion with the giving of alms in public. This is the fear of disgracing the poverty-stricken, whose feelings may be hurt at being publicly discovered to be needy. But he who begs in public is solely responsible for bringing disgrace upon himself, and as such, there is no danger of hurting his feelings in giving him alms in public. This is like exposing the incontinence of a person who has hitherto concealed it. Such an exposure is forbidden. Likewise,

spying at the person and discussing his incontinence in his absence are prohibited. But he who displays his incontinence openly should be punished by spreading the news of his offence among men although, in reality, he is the cause of it all. Of the same meaning are the words of the Apostle when he said, "He who casts off the garment of shame has no protection against calumny." God said, "And those who expend in alms, in secret and in public, out of what we have bestowed upon them."² He called men to give alms in public, openly, because of the conducive influence which such giving contains. Let man, therefore, be extremely careful in his choice between this beneficial influence and the dangers inherent therein for they vary with the variation of conditions and individuals. Under certain conditions making the giving of alms public is better for some individual. In short any one familiar with the advantages and disadvantages [of giving alms in public] and entertains no worldly ambitions, will readily discern what is better and more fitting under each different condition.

The fifth duty is that man should not make his alms (*sadaqah*) void by taunts and injury. God said, "Make not your alms void by reproaches and injury."³ People have differed in their definition of taunting and injury. Some have said that taunting is to remind people of favours done for them, while injury is to make them public. Sufyan⁴ said, "He

who resorts to taunting renders his alms void." Thereupon he was asked, "And how does a man resort to taunting ? " To which he replied, "By mentioning his alms and discussing them." Others said that taunting is to enslave a person by a gift while injury is to deride him for his poverty. It was also said that taunting is to lord it over a person for having given him something while injury is to upbraid and rebuke him for begging. The Apostle said, "God will not accept the gifts of the person who is always reminding others of the favours he has done for them." In my opinion taunting springs from the [hidden] states and qualities of the heart and then branches out into different concrete forms which manifest themselves through the tongue and the senses. Actually, the giver should deem himself a beneficiary and the poverty-stricken, by virtue of accepting his gifts which are due to God, his benefactor. For in this lie man's justification and his salvation from Hell-fire. Had the poverty-stricken declined to accept his gifts, man would have remained under an obligation to give. It is his duty, therefore to acknowledge that he is under an obligation to the poverty-stricken who has made his hand a substitute for that of God in receiving the dues [which man owes to] God. The Apostle of God said, "Verily alms fall into the hand of God before they fall into the hand of the beggar who receives them."² Let man therefore, know that [when he gives alms], he gives them unto God while the poor [who receives

1. Unidentified.
 1. Sūrah XIII : 22.
 1. Sūrah II : 266.
 2. A1-Thawri.

1. Unidentified.
 2. Unidentified.

them] is receiving his livelihood from God to whom it was first given. Thus if a person were indebted to another for a certain sum of money, and should turn over the responsibility of its payment to his slave or servant, both of whom are dependent upon him for their livelihood, and then if on paying the debt the slave or the servant should think that he had placed the recipient under an obligation to himself, this would be sheer impudence and ignorance, because the benefactor who deserves the credit is he on whom both the slave and the servant depend for their livelihood, whereas the slave [or the servant] who had made the payment would have done nothing but discharge a debt which the master had incurred, thereby gaining his favour and consequently aiding himself without placing anyone else under obligation to himself. In fact whenever he understands the three different meanings which we have mentioned in connexion with the obligatory nature of the *zakāh*, whenever he understands at least one of them, he will realize that he has not done any good except to himself either through expending his wealth to show his love to God, or to purify himself from the vice of niggardliness, or to give thanks unto God for the blessing of wealth and ask for more.

Whatever the case may be no dealings can exist between him and the poverty-stricken until he deems himself the benefactor. Whenever he succumbs to such folly he manifests the outward [symptoms of] taunting which we have already discussed, namely repeated discussion of ones alms and insistence on making them known, seeking reward from the bene-

ficiary by expecting from him thanks, praise, service, respect, and veneration, and by requiring him to carry out errands for him, pay him homage in assemblies, and agree with him on all subjects. All these are [198] the fruits of taunting. The inward meaning of taunting we have already mentioned.

The outward manifestations of injury are rebuke, derision, rough speech, stern looks, putting to shame by exposure, and all manner of ridicule. Its inward nature wherefrom its outward manifestations spring is made up of two things : the one is man's unwillingness to give up any of his wealth and the extreme pain which it causes him when he parts with any of it. This [attitude] makes a man inevitably short tempered. The second is his belief that he is superior to the poor who, by reason of his need, is inferior. Both these things are the result of ignorance. For he who dislikes to expend one dirham for a thousand is extremely foolish. It is also well known that he expends his wealth in order to receive the favour of God and to enjoy His rewards in the hereafter. The wealth which he expends for this purpose is nobler than that which he had spent or may spend to purify himself from the stigma of niggardliness or to give thanks in the hope of receiving more. Whatever you may assume, there is no justification for man's unwillingness [to part with any of his wealth].

The second thing [which makes up the inward nature of injury and wherefrom its outward manifestations spring] is ignorance. For if man would realize the superiority of poverty over wealth he would not despise the poor, but rather would seek

his blessing and wish that he were in his position instead; since the righteous among the wealthy would enter Paradise five-hundred years after the poor.' For this reason the Apostle said, "By the Lord of the Ka'bah, they shall suffer the greatest loss." Thereupon abu-Dharr asked, "And who are they [who shall suffer the greatest loss ?]" The Apostle replied, "Those who have the most of wealth..." to the end of the tradition.² Furthermore how could he despise the poverty-stricken when God has made the latter the source of his profit, since through the labours of the poverty-stricken he earns and accumulates his wealth, hoarding of it according to his need? He has been ordered [by God] to give the poverty-stricken in accordance to his need and to withhold from him any surplus which will harm him if it were given to him. The wealthy is, therefore, employed in providing for the poverty-stricken and differs from him by his duty to settle disputes and shoulder responsibilities, and his stewardship over the surplus [of his wealth] until he dies, when his enemies will devour what he has left. Consequently, when man's unwillingness to part with any of his wealth is displaced by gladness and joy for the aid which God has given him to fulfil his duty [of paying the *zakāh*] and handing it over to the poverty-stricken, so that the poverty-stricken, by accepting the payment, might free him from obligation, injury and its [outward manifestations of] rebuke and stern looks will cease and will be replaced

Cf. al-Tirmidhi, *Zuhd* : 37.

1. See above, p. 3 ; Muslim, *Zakāh* : 24; al-Bukhārī, *Zakāh*: 44.

by rejoicing, praise, and graceful acceptance of obligation. These then are the causes of taunting and injury.

If you should then say that for a man to see himself as a benefactor is, therefore, [indefinite and] obscure and consequently ask whether or not there is a sign wherewith to test his heart and, [failing to find it], ascertains that he is not a benefactor, then **know that such a sign does exist. It is a minute but clear sign and is distinguished in the following manner.** The man should confront himself with the following question : Supposing a poverty-stricken man should **commit** an offence against him or should aid an enemy in a conspiracy against him, would the man's disapproval of and disgust at the poverty-stricken man's behaviour be more intense if the latter had committed his offence after he had received the alms from him than if he had committed it before he had received the alms ? If his disapproval and disgust become more intense because the poverty-stricken man has offended against him after receiving alms from him, then the man's giving of alms is not free from the taint of taunting, since he has expected from the poverty-stricken man, after the latter had received his alms, what he has not expected before.

If you should, then, say that such an expectation is very indefinite and obscure and that the heart of no one is free from it and ask what remedy may be used for it, then know that it has both an internal and an external remedy. The internal remedy is to know the truths which we have **already**

mentioned concerning the obligatory nature [of the *zakāh*] and to realize that the poverty-stricken man, by his acceptance of the *zakāh*, enables the benefactor to purify himself [before God], and is therefore the real benefactor. The external remedy comprises the good works which the man who is under obligation does, since the motives from which works proceed colour the heart with their own nature as will be discussed in the last part of this Book. For this reason some were wont to place the *sadaqah* before the poverty-stricken and, standing before him, beg him to accept it, so that those giving might appear in the form of beggars and to experience the unpleasant feeling of fear lest they be refused. Others used to stretch out their open palms so that the poverty-stricken man might take [the *sadakah*] therefrom and appear in the role of givers. Both 'A'ishah and umm-Salamah,' whenever they sent a gift or a favour to a poverty-stricken man, used to ask the messenger with whom they sent the gift to remember what good the poverty-stricken man had wished them on receiving their gifts and wish him the same saying, "This wish for his wish, so that our *sadakah* may be true." They never expected good wishes [in return for their alms] because such wishes are somewhat like a reward. Consequently they responded to every good wish with one like it. The same thing was done by 'Umar ibn-al-Khattāb and his son 'Abdullāh. Likewise the physicians of the heart (*arbāb al-qulūb*) used to treat their hearts, since

1. Hind bint-abi-Umayyah, one of the wives of the Prophet ; A H. 59, A.D. 679: see ibn-Quteybah, p. 67 : ibu-Sa'd, vol. VIII, pp. 60-67.

there is no external cure for the heart except these good works which signify self-abasement, humility, and acceptance of obligation ; while internally their cure is found in knowledge of the facts which we have already mentioned. The one is from the standpoint of works and the other from that of knowledge. Furthermore, the heart cannot be treated except by means of knowledge and works, a condition in alms' giving corresponding to humility in prayer. This is attested by the words of the Apostle when he said, "Man gains nothing from his prayer except when it is intelligent."¹ This is similar to the words of the Apostle which he said, "God will not accept the gifts of a person who is always reminding others of the favours he has done for them."² It is also similar to the words of God when He said, "Make not your alms void by reproaches and injury."³ The opinion of the jurisprudent that the *sadakah* is fulfilled regardless of the condition [of knowledge and works according to that knowledge] and that, once given, the person frees himself from the obligation is a different matter altogether, and we have alluded to the meaning of the tradition which purports to support it in the Book, on Prayer.

The sixth duty is that man should belittle his gift because if he should make much of it he would be led to feel well-pleased with it, and vanity is one of the destructive matters of life and renders all good works useless. Said God, 'And on the day of

1. Unidentified.
2. Unidentified.
3. Sūrah IX : 25.

Hunayn¹ when ye were well-pleased with your number it availed you nothing."² It is also said that whenever a good work is belittled by man it grows greater in the sight of God ; on the other hand whenever sin is considered weighty by man it becomes light in the eyes of God. It has also been said that a good work is not made perfect except through three things, namely belittling its importance, hastening its execution, and concealing its report [199].

To make much of a gift, however, is distinct from either taunting or injury. For if a person had expended [some of] his wealth for erecting a mosque or building an outpost (*ribāt*)³ he could very easily think much of his donation but he could not possibly taunt or cause injury to anyone. Yet vanity and the practice of making much of one's good works invade all the acts of worship and have no remedy except in knowledge and works.

Knowledge entails that a person should recognize that ten per cent or one fourth of ten per cent, [the customary *zakāh* rates], is but a little portion of a great amount, [and that by so doing], the person has been content not to go beyond the lowest degree of giving as we have explained under the obligatory nature of the *zakāh*. He should, therefore; be

1. At the battle of Ijunayn, a valley three miles from Makkah (A.H. 8, A.D. 630) the followers of Muhammad, presuming upon the superiority of their number, 12,000 men, over the enemy who were only 4000 strong, were seized with panic throughout their ranks. Order was restored and victory obtained through the bravery and presence of mind of Muhammad and his kindred. See al-Tabari, vol. I, pp. 1654 *seq.* : *Sirah*, p. 840, *seq.*

1. *Sūrah* IX: 25.

1. For lodging Moslem warriors in the frontier.

ashamed of this little portion rather than proud of it. If on the other hand he should attain the highest degree and give all his wealth, or the greater part of it, [in alms], let him, before priding himself over it, ponder over the source of his wealth and over the purpose of *its* expenditure. For all his wealth belongs to God to whom he is under obligation since God has given him all and has aided him in the spending thereof. [Why then should he deem what he expends for God much when it all belongs to God]? And if his station in life should demand that he consider the hereafter and therefore expend his wealth for the sake of reward, why should he make much of his expending that for which he expects manifold reward in the hereafter?

Works, on the other hand, [involve the manner of giving] and require that the person should give because of his sense of shame which he feels for withholding the remainder of his wealth from God. Hence the manner of his giving should be one of humility and shame, just like the person who is requested to hand back a deposit but returns one part of it and withholds another. For the whole of [man's] wealth belongs to God who prefers that it should be all expended. He did not command His servants to do so because of the difficulty that such a command would cause them because of their niggardliness. Thus He said, "And were He to press you for it, ye would be niggardly."²

The seventh duty is that the person should,

1. Words in brackets not in B.

2. *Sūrah* XLVII : 39.

[when giving], select from his wealth the portion which is best and dearest unto him ; for God is good and accepts nothing but the good. If what he sets aside [for the *zakāh*] be taken from wealth secured in a dubious way and his title to it is questionable, then it fails to fulfil the required conditions. In that tradition related by Abān¹ on the authority of Anas we read, "Blessed is the servant who expends from wealth which he has earned without sin." If the portion set apart [for the *zakāh*] is not of the best of a man's wealth he will then be guilty of misconduct for he keeps the best for himself or for his servant or for his family and withholds it from God, thereby giving preference to others over God. If he does the same thing with his guest and offers him the worst food to be found in his house, he will certainly gain his displeasure.

What we have discussed is from the standpoint of God, but if man were to view the matter from his own standpoint it would be inconceivable that he would give others the preference, especially since none of his wealth profits him excepting that which he has given in alms, thereby preserving for himself that which would have been lost if he had spent it on himself for an immediate purpose like, for example, eating. It is, therefore, foolish to limit one's attention to immediate things and neglect to store up for the future. Said God, "O ye who believe ! Bestow alms of the good things which ye have acquired, and of that which we have brought forth for you out of

the earth, and choose not the bad for almsgiving,— such as ye would not take yourselves except by connivance."¹ In other words they will not accept such bad things for themselves except unwillingly and for fear of shame at its refusal. This is what connivance means. Therefore prefer not yourselves to God by giving him the bad and keeping the good for yourselves.

We also read in the tradition that "one single dirham has been preferred to a hundred thousand."² This obtains whenever man sets the dirham aside from the best portion of his wealth in a spirit of contentment and joy. On the other hand he may set aside a hundred thousand dirhams from a portion of his wealth which he loathes thereby proving that he will not give unto God anything which he likes. For the same reason God has condemned a group of people who have assigned to Him that which they loathe and abhor. He said, "Yet what they loathe themselves do they assign to God ; and their tongues-utter the lie, that theirs shall be a goodly lot. But beyond a doubt theirs is the Fire."³ In other words the Fire is their reward for assigning to God that which they themselves loathe and dislike.

The eighth duty is to seek for his *sadaqah* one worthy of it rather than simply be content that the recipient is one of the rank and file of the eight groups of beneficiaries. For among the rank and file of these eight groups are some possessing particular qualities.

1. *Sūrah II : 269-70.*
2. *Unidentified.*
3. *Sūrah XVI : 64.*

1. Perhaps ibn-abi-ʿAyyāsh ; cf. ibn-Sa'd, vol. VII, pt. 2, p. 19.

Let him, therefore, be on the look out for these qualities and, in giving, let him take them into consideration.

These qualities are six in number and are as follows :

First he should seek the pious who have renounced the world and have devoted themselves exclusively to the affairs of the hereafter. The Apostle said, "Do not partake except of the food of a pious man and let no one partake of yours except the pious."¹ This is because the pious is aided by that food to lead a life of piety. Hence by aiding him you would be his partner in his acts of worship. The Apostle also said, "Set your food before the pious and bestow your favours upon the believers."² According to another version, "With your substance entertain those whom you love in God."³

One of the learned was wont to single out the poverty-stricken Sufis and feed them. On being told that it would be better if he would include all the poverty-stricken in his charity he said, "No ! These Sufis are devoting all their energies to God ; if they should come exposed to any need they might be discouraged or confused. Verily to revive the zeal of one single person devoted to God is better than giving alms to a thousand whose concern is this world." This was related to al-Junayd, and he approved of it saying, "Verily this man is one of the saints of God," and added, "It is a long long time since I heard words [200]. better than these." Sometime later it was

1. Ci. al-Tirmidhi, Zuhd : 56; abu-Dāwūd, Adab : 16.

1. Unidentified,

1. Unidentified.

related that this same man came upon hard times and decided to close shop. Thereupon al-Junayd sent him some money and said, "Make this your capital and do not close down your shop ; verily commerce has no ill-effect on men like you." This man was a grocer who charged the poor nothing for the groceries which they purchased at his shop.

Second, the recipient should be one of those who have devoted themselves to knowledge and learning., Such gifts and alms are a [great] help to him in his search after knowledge. And knowledge, when coupled with good intentions, is the noblest form of worship. Thus ibn-al-Mubārak was wont to give his alms exclusively to the devotees of learning. As a result he was told, "If only you would give others as well." He replied, "I know of no rank, next to that of prophecy, which is better or superior to the rank of the learned men. If one of them were to bother himself about his needs he would not be able to devote his time to knowledge or concentrate upon study. Therefore, it is better to give them all the leisure and help them to apply themselves exclusively to knowledge and learning."

Third, that the recipient be true in his piety and honest in his belief in God and in the acceptance of His unity. The sign of his belief in God and in His unity is to praise God and thank Him and to acknowledge that He is the source of his blessing and not attempt to ascribe it to another. He who is most grateful to God does this: he acknowledges that God is the source of all blessings. In Luqman's testament to his son he said, "Hold not between yourself and

your God any intermediary benefactor and regard all other benefactors as instruments [in His hands] compelled to execute His will." He who gives thanks to anyone but God does not know the Benefactor and does not realize that the intermediary instrument [of benefaction] is under compulsion subject to the will of God who has subordinated [the intermediary instruments, i.e. the secondary causes] to the motives (*dawā'ī*) of action and has made the means [of execution] available unto them. Consequently, the giver makes his gift under compulsion, and once God has implanted in his heart that his well-being in this world and the next depends upon giving, he cannot neglect it even if he should so desire. When the impulse (*bā'ih*) becomes strong it demands the taking of a definite stand and the rising to immediate action,¹ with the result that a person will be unable to resist or contradict a strong impulse in which there is no room for indecision or hesitation. For it is God who creates impulses and arouses them to action; it is He who heals their weaknesses and does away with their indecision. He it is who imposes upon men the task of rising to action according to their impulses. And he who realizes this fact pays no attention except to the cause of causes (*musabbib al-ashāb*). Such a realization is of greater value to the giver than all the praise and thanks he may receive, [both] being nothing but chatter which is for the most part useless. [Hence] the opportunity to aid a believing worshipper should not be lost. But he, who gives praise when he receives a gift and wishes the giver good, will find

1. Another reading has 'and the seizing of opportunity.'

fault when it is withheld from him and will curse whenever he despairs of receiving a gift.¹ Such persons, however, differ [as to the extent of their reactions].

It has been related that the Apostle of God once sent a gift to one of the poverty-stricken and charged the messenger to [be sure and] remember what the man would say. On receiving the gift sent to him by the Apostle the poverty-stricken man said, "Praise be to God who forgetteth not him who remembereth Him and neglecteth not him who is grateful unto Him." The poverty-stricken man then added, "O God! Thou hast not forgotten me; teach me therefore not to forget thee." The Apostle of God was informed of this, and he was well pleased and said, "I have known that he would say this. Behold, then, how he centred his attention on God alone."² At another time the Apostle ordered a certain man saying, "Repent." The man replied, "Before God alone I shall repent and not before Muhammad." Thereupon the Apostle said, "He has known to whom the prerogative belongs."

When, in connexion with the false rumour (*qissat al-ifk*)³ against 'A'ishah, her innocence was revealed, abu-Bakr, [her father], told her, "Get up and kiss the

1. In B.C, and margin of SM "whenever he is hurt or injured."

2. Unidentified.

3. The rumour of improper intimacy between 'Ā'ishah and Safwān ibn-al-Mu'attal, during Muhammad's return from the expedition against the banu-al-Mustaliq (A.H. 6/A.D. 627-8), in which he was separated from her for an entire day, which she passed in the company of Safwān, who had found her when accidentally left behind. The scandal was propagated by one Mistah a relative of 'A'ishah. *Sūrah* XXIV: 4-26 were revealed to Muhammad shortly afterwards and the innocence of 'Ā'ishah was thereby established. See ibn-Hishām, *Sirah*, pp. 731-40.

head of the Apostle of God." But 'Ā'ishah replied, "No! By the eternal I shall not do that and I shall thank no one except God." Thereupon the Apostle said, "Let her alone, O abu-Bakr."¹ According to another version 'Ā'ishah told abu-Bakr, I shall sing the praise of God, not yours nor that of your friend."² The Apostle did not find fault with what she said although the revelation [of her innocence] reached through the words of the Apostle himself. To see things [independent of God] and proceeding from a source other than Him is characteristic of the unbelievers. Thus God said, "And when God alone is mentioned the hearts of those who believe not in the hereafter is filled with disgust, but when those beside Him are mentioned, lo ! they are filled with joy."³ Consequently, he who does purify his inward soul from [the error of] seeing the secondary causes [201] except as instruments [in the hands of God] persists secretly in the sin of associating others with God. Let him therefore fear God and purify his belief from the defects and blemishes of associating others with God.

The fourth quality is [that the recipient] be unknown, having concealed his need, and not much given to complaint and grumble. He should be one of the people of magnanimity who has lost his wealth but still keeps his magnanimous qualities and maintains his poise and self-restraint. Thus has God said, "Those who know them not, think them rich because

1. Cf. al-Bukhārī, Shahādāt : 15.

2. I.e. Muhammad. Cf. al-Bukhārī, Maghāzi : 36.

3. Sūrah XXXIX: 46.

of their modesty. By this their token thou shalt know them—they ask not of men importunately."¹ In other words they do not pester people begging because they are rich in their faith and proud in their fortitude. Such men should be sought by thorough investigation into the lives of religious men in every place and close examination of the inward states of men possessed of goodness and self-restraint. The reward for extending favours to them is manifold the reward of extending it to those who make known their needs and beg openly.

The fifth quality is that the recipient should be one who has to support a family or one disabled through sickness or some other cause, whose state corresponds to that which God described when He said, "There are among you the poverty-stricken, who being shut up to fighting for the cause of God, have it not in their power to strike out into the earth [for riches]."² In other words they are straitened in the way of the hereafter because of some sickness, or distress, or a change of heart. They are "unable to 'knock about' in the earth" because their wings, [as it were], are clipped and their limbs are tied down with shackles. For these reasons 'Umar was wont to give the people of the house (*ahl-al- bayt*)³ a whole flock of sheep numbering at least ten sheep. The Apostle himself used to bestow the gift in accordance to the size of the family.⁴ 'Umar was once

1. Sūrah II: 274.

2. Sūrah II: 274.

3. A term used in the Koran (Sūrah XXXIII : 33) and the tradition Muhammad's household.

4. Cf. abu-Dāwūd. Kbarāj : 14.

asked about the greatest misfortune and he replied, "A big family and a small wealth."

The sixth is that he should be a relative close of kin so that the gift would be both a *sadaqah* and a favour to the close of kin. A favour to the close of kin has countless rewards. 'Ali said, "I had rather give one of my brothers a single dirham than give twenty dirhams in alms; and I had rather give my brother twenty than give away a hundred in alms;" and again, "I had rather give him a hundred dirhams than give a slave his freedom." Both friends and the brethren of good should be given precedence over acquaintances just as relatives are given precedence over non-relatives.

Let therefore these details be observed, since they are the required qualities. Each quality has several degrees of which the highest should be sought. If there should be found one who possesses in himself a number of these qualities, that man has taken hold of the greatest treasure and the most valuable booty. Whenever he tries to secure these qualities and is successful in his effort he gains two rewards; but if he fails he earns but one reward. One of his two rewards is the immediate purification of himself from the quality of niggardliness and the establishment of the love of God in his heart as well as [the will] to endeavour and labour in His worship. These are also the qualities which grow stronger and stronger in his heart and make him long to meet God. The second reward is the benefit which he reaps from the prayers and aspirations of the recipient, for the hearts of the righteous exert an immediate and an ultimate

influence. If he succeeds [in securing these qualities] the two rewards obtain; but if he fails only the first reward is his. In this manner the reward of him who succeeds in his endeavour is doubled, both in this case

and in the others as well.

SECTION III

On the Recipient, the Grounds for his Claim, and the Duties of Receiving

On the Grounds for the Claim. Know that to no one is the *zakāh* due except to a free Moslem belonging to one of the eight groups mentioned in the Book of God' and being neither a Hāshimite² nor a Muttalibite.³ No *zakāh* is expended to an unbeliever, or to a slave, or to a Hashimite, or to a Muttalibite. The minor and the insane, however, may enjoy the *zakāh* if they have a guardian (*wali*) to receive it on their behalf.

Let us now discuss each of the eight above mentioned groups.

The first group comprises the paupers (*al-fuqarā'*).⁴ The pauper (*al-faqīr*) is he who has no wealth and is unable to earn a living. If the person possesses his daily food and clothing, he will not be a pauper but a poor man (*miskīn*).³ If he possesses half his daily food then he is a pauper. If he possesses a shirt but not a towel, or a shoe, or trousers and the value of the shirt be less than to enable him to

1. *Sūrah* IX : 60 ; see above, p 23.

1. Descendants of Hāshim, great-grandfather of the Prophet.

1. Descendants of al-Muttalib, great-granduncle of the Prophet.

2. Singular *faqīr* for which pauper or poverty-stricken has been used throughout this book.

3. This has been rendered poor or a poor man throughout.

secure these articles as it befits paupers, then he is a pauper because he lacks that which he needs and is unable to secure it. That the pauper should not possess anything except an article wherewith to cover his nakedness is inordinate and on the whole no such persons exist. Nor does the person cease to be in poverty because he is accustomed to beg. Therefore, begging is not considered a means of earning a living. But if the person is able to earn a living he will no longer be a pauper. If he were able to earn his living by means of an instrument which he does not possess, then he would be a pauper and it would be permissible to purchase the instrument for him. If he were able to earn a living [only] through means unworthy of his honour [202] and not befitting his station, then he would be a pauper. If he were a student of jurisprudence or law and work in order to earn his living would prevent him from continuing his studies then he would be regarded a pauper and his ability to secure a living will not be taken into consideration. If he were a devotee and work to secure a living would prevent him from fulfilling the act of worship and observing the set hours of prayer, let him work for his livelihood as much as possible because his work to earn a living is the more important. The Apostle said, "To seek an honest living is an obligation second only to a religious ordinance [in its importance]."¹ 'Umar said, "To earn a living in a dubious way is better than begging." If he were taken care of by

his father or by one under obligation to support him, then he would not be a pauper because this manner of securing a livelihood is easier than earning it through work.

The second group comprises the poor (*al-masākin*).¹ A poor man (*miskīn*) is he whose income is not sufficient to cover his expenses. Thus, a person may possess a thousand dirhams and yet be poor while another may own nothing more than an ax and a rope and yet be rich. Neither the little house in which the man may be living nor the garment with which he covers his nakedness does remove him from the category of being poor. The same is true of the furniture of his little house. In other words nothing which, in his position and station, he needs and possesses would make any difference. [He may possess these things and yet be poor]. Similarly, the books of jurisprudence which he may possess do not make him rich, because he is in need of them. If he should possess nothing but these books he is under no obligation to pay the *zakāh* due on breaking the fast of Ramadān. The rule which governs the possession of books is the same as that which governs the possession of garments and home furniture, for a man is in need of all these. Nevertheless, he should understand the real need which the book fulfils. He needs it for three-purposes: for instruction, for deriving benefit for himself, and for recreation through reading. The last is not considered [a valid purpose] and involves the collection of books of poetry and

History and the like, none of which are of any use in the hereafter. The collection of such books is of no use in this world except as means of recreation and pleasure. These books are, therefore, sold for [the payment of] expiation and the *zakāh* due on breaking the fast of Ramadan, and their possession removes from the person the name of poor.

If he should possess some books for the pleasure of using them in instruction in order to earn his livelihood, in the same way as the tutor and the teacher do in return for a certain fee, books would then be his tools and, therefore, would not be sold. The rule which governs them is the same as that which governs the tools of tailors and other artisans.

If his purpose in collecting books were to study for the fulfilment of a *fard kifāyah* they would not be sold and his possession of them would not rob him of the name poor, because the need for such study is grave.

The collection of books for the purpose of deriving benefits from them and for the sake of learning their contents for himself, such as his collecting medical books in order to [learn how to] administer treatment to himself, or books of sermons in order to read their admonitions and heed their warning, is not necessary at all if a physician or a preacher were living in town. Otherwise, he needs them. Again he may not need to read a certain book except after the lapse of a certain period of time, in which event the book should be retained as long as its owner needs it. The most reasonable thing to say is that whatever the man does not need within the

1. Sing, *miskīn*, for which poor or a poor man has been used throughout this book.

course of the current year may be spared and dispensed with.

If a person should have something left over from his daily food he would be under obligation to pay the *zakāh* due on breaking the fast of Ramadan. Since we reckon food on the basis of a day we should reckon home furniture and bodily clothing on the basis of a year. Consequently, the summer clothes are not sold in winter time nor the winter clothes in the summer. And books in this respect, have closer resemblance to clothes and furniture than to anything else.

A person may possess two copies of the same book and therefore has need of only one of them. If he should say that the one was more correct while the other was more beautiful and therefore he would need both of them, we would say, "You should be content with the more correct copy and sell the more beautiful, and you should let pleasure and luxury alone." If he should have two versions of a work on the same subject, the one extensive and the other brief, and his purpose of having the work should be deriving benefit for himself, let him content himself with the extensive, but if his purpose should be one of instruction and teaching, he would then be in need of both the extensive and brief versions for each possesses distinctive features not found in the other.

Cases like these are numerous and unlimited, and therefore, have not been dealt with in the science of jurisprudence. We have not touched upon the subject under jurisprudence, but mention it here because of the wide-spread nature of these and similar

conditions and to paint out that the position here taken is superior to the others. Nevertheless, it is impossible to exhaust the study of all these cases because such an undertaking will require the further investigation into each particular house, its size, the quantity, number, and kind of *its* furniture, and even the kind of clothing the person possesses. These things have no exact definitions and each jurispudent applies his own interpretation in an attempt to perfect definitions and thereby avoid the dangers of dubiosities. The pious person choses the safest course of conduct, abandoning what causes him to doubt what does not cause him to doubt. The ambiguous intermediate positions which fall between the two definite and clear opposite extremes are indeed numerous and nothing saves a person from being entangled in them except [extreme] precaution.

The third group comprises the agents (al-*'āmilūn*).¹ These are the workers who collect the *zakāh* except the caliph and the judge. [The list] includes the superintendent (*'arīf*), the recorder (*kātib*), the collector (*mustawfi*), the keeper (*hāfiz*), and the porter (*maqqāl*). They are paid alike, and if any money is left from the eighth [of the whole] after all have been paid it is transferred to the [portion of the other] groups, and if [the amount] proves too little it will be supplemented from other revenues.

The fourth group comprises those whose hearts are reconciled [to Islam] (al-mu'allafah *qulūbuhum*).² These are the nobles who embraced Islam. They are

1. *Sūrah IX* : 60.

1. See above, p. 23.

obeyed and respected among their followers, and by giving them [a portion of the *zākāh*] they are confirmed in Islam while their peers and followers are attracted and encouraged.

The fifth group comprises those in captivity (*al-mukatabūn*).¹ Their portion is paid to their masters although it is permissible to pay it directly to them. The master, however, does not pay any of his *zakāh* to the slave who is ransoming himself because the latter is still his slave.

The sixth group comprises those in debt (*al-ghārimūn*).² A debtor is a pauper who has borrowed [some money for the execution of something] righteous something permissible. If he should borrow the money for an evil purpose he should not be given it unless he should repent. If he were rich, his debt should not be settled [with money from the *zakāh* funds] unless he had incurred his debt for the welfare [of the community] or for the settlement of a dispute or an outbreak [of violence].

[203] The seventh group comprises the warriors (*ghuzāh*)³ who are not inscribed in the commissary registry (*dīwān al-murtaziqah*). Although they may be wealthy they receive a portion of the *zakāh* as a subsidy in time of war.

The eighth group comprises the wayfarers (sing. *ibn-al-sabūl*). A wayfarer is one who has set out from his own town on a trip the purpose of which is not evil, or one passing the town for a purpose of the

1. Cf. above, p. 8.

2. *Sūrah IX : 60* ; sing *gharims*.

3. Lit. raiders. Cf. *Sūrah IX : 60*.

same nature. If such a person were a pauper (*faqīr*) he would be given aid [from *the zakāh* fund], and if he were possessed of some wealth in another place he would be given aid in accordance to his need.

If you should say, "How then are these qualities known ?", we would say : Pauperism (*faqr*) and poverty (*maskanah*) depend upon the word of the recipient, who should not be required to produce any evidence or swear an oath. Rather, he should be taken at his word if he were not an established liar. War and travel are matters of the future. Consequently, anyone who announces his intention of embarking on a war expedition should be taken at his word and given aid from the *zakāh* fund. If he should not carry out his announced intention the aid which was given to him should be withdrawn and taken back. As to the other groups evidence should be produced.

These are then the grounds for the claim. As to the amount which is given to each, a discussion of it is forthcoming.

On the Duties of the Recipient

The duties of the recipient are five. The first duty is that the recipient should know that God has ordained the expenditure of [a portion of] *zakāh* on him for the purpose of removing his cares and to make all his worries into one single [concern]. For God has imposed upon creation the requirement that their concern in life be focused upon one thing, namely God himself and the last day. This is what

is meant by the words of God when He said, "And I have not created jinn and men but that they should worship Me."¹ But whereas [divine] wisdom has ordained that man should be subject to desires and needs which divert his attention [from devotion to God, divine] generosity ordained that he be blessed with bounties sufficient to meet those needs. Consequently, God made wealth abundant and caused it to flow into the hands of His servants to be for them a means wherewith to meet their needs and free themselves from want in order to devote their time exclusively to His worship and service. To some He gave plentifully and made their wealth a cause of plague and torment, thereby exposing them to the danger [of destruction]. Others He loved and consequently shielded from [the evils of] this world, in the same way as a pitying man guards his patient against injuries. Consequently, He removed from them the luxuries of this world and gave them provisions according to their necessities by placing upon the rich the responsibility of supplying their needs, so that the task of toiling and labouring to earn a living might fall on the rich, while its benefits flow to the paupers [and the poor]. As a result [the paupers and the poor] can devote their lives to the worship of God and prepare themselves for what lies beyond death. Neither the luxuries of this world will divert them from the worship of God nor poverty and distress from the preparation for the hereafter. Of such is the ideal grace and blessings. Therefore it befits the poverty-stricken to know the value of

1. *Sūrah LI* : 56.

poverty and to realize that the bounty of God to him is more [manifest] in those things which God has withheld from him than in those which He has granted him, as we shall establish and explain in the Book on Poverty. Let him therefore, accept whatever God has given him in way of livelihood and regard it as an aid for him in his worship of God, and let him, [when enjoying these gifts], have only one single purpose : that through them he may receive strength to serve Him. If, however, he finds himself unable to do this let him expend those gifts and use them for the attainment of those things which God has made permissible.

If he should use (these gifts) as an aid to disobey God he would be ungrateful to God, denying His blessings and deserving His disfavour and wrath.

The second duty of the recipient is that he should thank the giver, wish him good, and speak well of him. His good wishes, however, should be such as would not remove the giver from being only an instrument [in the hands of God], rather it should bring out the fact that the giver is only the means through which the grace of God has been extended to him and by which it has reached him. It is true that the means have their own place and importance but this does not and should not prevent the recipient from acknowledging that all blessings come to him from God. The Apostle of God said, "He who is not grateful to men is not grateful to God." Furthermore, God Himself praised and commended his servants at several occasions for their good works although He

1. Al-Tirmidhi, al-Barr w-al-Silah : 35.

Himself is the creator of those works and the author of man's ability and will to do them. Thus He said, "How excellent a servant, one who turned to Us was he !",¹ as well as other similar things.

In his good wishes for the giver, let the recipient say, "May God purify thy heart together with the hearts of the righteous, and with the good works of the upright and virtuous may He render thy works acceptable and just, and along with the spirits of the martyrs may He bless thine." The Apostle said "Whoever doeth unto you a favour, recompense him, but if ye be not able to do so, wish him good until ye ascertain that ye have recompensed him."²

Among the signs of gratitude is to overlook and conceal the defects of the gift whenever it is defective, and to avoid belittling and finding fault with it. Nor should the recipient reproach the giver with stinginess if the latter should withhold [something] from him. On the contrary he should magnify the man's gift both before men and before himself ; for it is the duty of the giver to belittle his gift, and the duty of the recipient is to magnify it and show his gratitude. Each man should, therefore fulfil his duty. There is no discrepancy in this because the belittling of the gift and the magnifying of it counter balance each other. It is beneficial, therefore, for the giver to observe the methods of belittling his gifts while the opposite process is harmful to him.

All this does not militate against seeing and acknowledging that all blessings come from God.

1. *Sūrah XXXVIII* : 44.

2. *Al-Tayālisi*: 1895.

He who fails to realize that the means through which he had received the blessing is nothing but an instrument [in the hands of God] goes astray ; and to regard the instrument as the origin is evil and disapproved.

The third duty of the recipient is that he should examine what he receives and if he should find out that it was not of a lawful source he should abstain therefrom. For he who fears God will be given his livelihood by God from whence he does not reckon. And he who abstains from what is unlawful will not suffer want but will receive his needs from lawful sources [opened to him by God]. Let him therefore accept nothing from the Turks, the soldiers, the agents of magistrates, and those whose income is mostly unlawful, unless he be in dire distress. Similarly, if he does not definitely know to whom the gift which has been offered to him belongs, [204] he may take of it according to his need and necessity. The legal opinion on this kind [of property] is that it should be given away in alms as will be explained in the Book on the Lawful and the Unlawful. For if the person were unable to avail himself of something lawful and had to take what was within reach, his taking of it would not constitute partaking of the *zakāh* because no *zakāh* would obtain when the property on which it had been paid is unlawful.

The fourth duty of the recipient is to guard against the pitfalls of doubt and ambiguity regarding the amount of the *zakāh* which he may take. He should not take anything except the amount permissible to him to take, and should not touch it unless

he were certain that his claim to it was established. If his claim were through a deed of manumission (*kitābah*)¹ or through a debt, he should not take anything in excess of that debt ; and if his claim were through his work as a collector he should not accept anything more than his rightful share—if he were offered more he should decline the offer. For the money does not belong to the giver so that he can dispense with it as he wishes. If the recipient were travelling he should not take anything in excess to the amount sufficient to defray the expenses of his provisions and the cost of hiring the mount to the place of his destination. If he were on a war expedition he should **not** take anything beyond what he needs for war, **especially** horses and arms, the amount of which and the expenses thereof are determined independently and have no limit. The same is true of the provisions of travel. The pious thing for the recipient to do is to ignore what causes him to doubt for what does not cause him to doubt.

If he should receive something on the grounds of poverty, he should first examine the furniture of his house as well as his clothes and books and see whether there are things with which he could dispense or expensive things which he could exchange for cheaper ones and expend the difference. All these things depend primarily on his own choice and opinion and involve two [opposite] states : one which clearly establishes that he is deserving and the other

1. Lit. writing. It is a deed of manumission granted to a slave in return for money paid. See Sūrah XXIV : 33 ; Cf. Dent. XV : 12-15. See also above, p. 8.

that he is not. Between the two lie several uncertain and questionable states. And he who plays with fire is liable to get burned. In this thing one has to rely upon the word of the recipient and take it as its face value. The needy persons, in estimating their needs, are either very strict or very generous. The pious is apt to be very strict while the unscrupulous is inclined to be generous to an extent where he deems himself in need of many [unnecessary] things, all of which the Law abhors.

When the amount of his need has been definitely ascertained, he should not reach for more but should take an amount sufficient for his need over a period of one year beginning with the time of payment. For this is the limit which the Law allows, since with the lapse of each year the source of the income increases. Furthermore, the Apostle of God [was wont] to store up the provisions of one whole year for his family.¹ This is the nearest thing towards a definition of the status of the pauper and the poor. If the recipient would limit himself to the need of one month or even that of one day he would draw closer to piety.

The views and opinions held by the learned men with regard to the amount which a person could receive from the *zakāh* and the *sadaqah* are varied and many. Some would go to the limit in reducing the amount and require that the person limit himself to no more than his daily food, insisting on following the words of the tradition which Sahl ibn-al-Hanza-

1. Al-Tirmidhl, jihad 40.

liyah¹ related to the effect that the Apostle of God had forbidden a person to beg because he was rich. On being asked what made that person rich the Apostle replied, "[His ability to procure] his dinner and supper."² Others said that a person may receive as much as he wishes provided he does not go beyond the limit which separates the rich from the poor. This limit is [marked by the possession of] the minimum amount³ on which the *zakāh* is due. Others hold, that it is [marked by the possession of] fifty dirhams or the possession of its equivalent in gold, basing their opinion on a tradition reported on the authority of ibn-Mas'ūd who related that the Apostle of God once said, "He who begs despite the fact that he has riches sufficient for his needs will be brought forth on the day of resurrection with his face full of scars and scratches." On being asked "What manner of riches will suffice his needs?", he replied. "Fifty dirhams or their equivalent in gold."⁴ It has been said, however, that the reporter□ of this tradition was not reliable. Others still say that the possession of forty dirhams or their equivalent in gold marks the distinction between the rich and the poor, and

1. A.H. 56/A.D. 676 ; see ibn-Sa'd, vol. VII. pt. 2, p. 124, ibn-al-Athir, vol. IV. p. 37.

2. Cf. abu-Dāwūd, *zakāh* : 24.

3. *Nisāb*

4. Al-Nasā'i, *Zakāh* : 87.

5. The chain of authority (*isnād*) given by al-Nasā'i is as follows : Ahmad the Sulayman, Yahya ibn-Adam, Sufyan al-Tbawri, Hakim ibn-Jubayr, Muhammad ibn-'Abd-al-Rahman ibn-Yazid, his father, 'Abdullah ibn-Mas'ūd, the Apostle. The weak link was Hakim ibn-Jubayr. Consequently, al-Nasā'i states that Sufyan had heard the same tradition from Zubayd (ibn-al-Hārith) on the same authority. Al-Nasā'i *Zakāh* : 87.

base their contention on a tradition from the isnād of which a name has dropped (*munqati'*), related by 'Atā' ibn-Yasār to the effect that the Apostle of God once said, "He who begs while he possesses an ounce¹ [of gold] is insolent in his begging."²

On the other hand others have gone to the extreme in generosity and said, that a person may take as much as would buy him a whole village which will make him independent for the rest of his life, or as much as would establish him in a business that will make him secure for the rest of his days, since this is what they believe a rich person should have. 'Umar said, "When ye give, enrich [those whom ye give]." Consequently, some have gone as far as to say that if a person should lose his wealth and be reduced to poverty, he might take [of the *zakāh*] as much as would restore him to his former state, even though the amount be ten thousand dirhams. But if he should go beyond the limits of moderation [he should be restrained].

When abu-Talhah³ became too much occupied with his garden so as to neglect the observance of the prayer he announced his intention to give it away as a *sadaqah*, but the Apostle said to him, [205] "It is better that you give it to your relatives."⁴ Thereupon he settled the garden on Hassān^s and abu-

1. Ar. *ūqiyah*, equivalent to forty dirhams.

2. Al-Nasā'i, *Zakāh*: 89, 90.

3. Al-Ansari, Zayd ibn-Sahl, A.H. 34/A.D. 654-5 ; see ibn-Sa'd, vol. III, pt. 2, pp. 64-6 ; ibn-Qutaybah, p. 138.

1. Al-Bukhārī, *Zakāh* : 45.

4. Ibn-Tbabit, the famous poet. He was a cousin of abu Talhah, and died A.H. 54/A.D. 674. See *al-Shi'r w-al-Shuu'ard'*, pp. 170-73 ; *Tahdid al-Asw d* pp. 203-4.

Qatādah.¹ A grove of palms, therefore, is sufficient for two and is more than what they need. 'Umar once gave a Bedouin a she-camel and a young camel it was nursing. These instances are related in support of generosity [in the distribution of the *zakāh*].

As to the strict [practice of distribution] which will reduce [the benefits of the *zakāh* to an amount equal] to the daily food [of the individual] or to an ounce of gold, it has been mentioned in connexion with the aversion to begging and frequenting the house-door both of which are disapproved and are subject to another rule. In fact to permit the person to receive of the *zakāh* as much as would enable him to buy a whole village so that he might become independent for the rest of his life is more probable although it is apt to be extravagant. More moderate is to take an amount sufficient for the current year. To exceed this limit is dangerous and to fall short of it causes distress.

In all these things, unless the Law offers a definite restriction, the independent interpreter of the Law can do nothing but hand down a judgment according to the best of his knowledge and say to the pious [inquirer] what the Apostle himself had said, namely "Consult your own heart although you have been given a dispensation [once, twice, or thrice]." ² But since "sin is heart alluring," the recipient should, whenever he is tempted to take anything [unlawful], fear God and not justify his act by a dispensation

1. Ibn-Rib'i, a distant cousin of abn-Talhah, died A.H. 54/A.D. 674. See *ibn-Sa'd*, vol. VI, pp. 8-9.

1. Al-Dirimi, *Buyū'* : 2.

which he received from learned men [versed] in the letter of the Law [but not in its spirit]. For their dispensations are [subject] to rules and regulations, particular and general, dictated by necessity and expedience and are full of conjectures and dubious [points]. To guard against such dubiousities is characteristic of men of religion and travellers on the path of the hereafter.

The fifth duty of the recipient is to inquire of the owner of the money concerning the amount of his obligation. If the owner should offer him an amount higher than one eighth of the whole *zakāh*, he should refuse to accept, for, together with the members of his group, he is entitled only to one eighth of the whole *zakāh*. He, therefore, should deduct from the sum which comprises one eighth of the whole an amount equal to the share of two members of his group.

This inquiry is obligatory on most people, since they usually do not take into consideration this division of the sum [into eight parts and the one eighth into at least three portions], either because of ignorance or because of neglect. It is, however, permissible to ignore the inquiry into these things if it does not appear [to the recipient] that there is in them anything which will make them seem probably unlawful. The questions relating to begging and the different degrees of probability will be discussed in the Book on the Lawful and the Unlawful.

1.. For difference between *sadaqah* and *Zakāh* see above, p. 3. This section deals with the *sadaqah* proper. It must be remembered, however, that al-Ghazzili often uses the two terms inter-changeably.

2. Unidentified.

3. Al-Bukari. *Zakāh* : 9

4. Cf. *ibid.*. *Zakāh* : 8 ; al-Tirmidhi. *Zakāh* : 2.

to. par-take of it.”¹ And again the Apostle said, “Never has a man given alms generously without receiving from God the assurance that his heirs will be worthy of the inheritance which he leaves behind.”² He also said, “Every man will stand under the shadow of his alms until God brings all to judgment.”³ And again, “A single *sadaqah* closes seventy gates of evil.”⁴ And again, “Alms given in secret [206] turn away the wrath of God.”□ And on another occasion he said, “The reward of him who gives alms from his abundance is not superior to that of him who receives alms because of need.”⁶ Perhaps what is meant here is [the recipient] who seeks to satisfy his [physical] needs in order to devote himself exclusively to the duties of religion. Consequently, he will be on a par with the giver who, through his gifts, seeks the welfare of his own religion.

The Apostle was once asked, “Which *sadaqah* is best?” To which he replied, “That which you give when you are in good health and expect many more years of life, despite the fact that your resources are meagre and regardless of your fear of want, not that which you give when you are on your death-bed.”□ On another occasion the Apostle addressed his Companions saying, “Give alms.” Thereupon one of

SECTION IV

On the Voluntary Almsgiving (*sadaqat al-tatawwu'*),
its Excellence, the Rules of Receiving it
and Giving it

On the Excellence of the *Sadaqah*¹

The excellence of the *sadaqah* is attested by the following traditions. The Apostle said, "Give alms even a single date, for it will satisfy the hunger [of the starving] and does away with sin as the water extinguishes the flames."² He also said, "Guard yourselves against Hellfire even by giving half a date, and if ye have none to give, speak a kindly word."³ And again, "No Moslem will ever give a bushel of dates from wealth lawfully earned, and God accepts nothing but the lawful, without its being accepted by God, who will tend it in the same way as any one of you tends his young camel or colt, until it grows and multiplies so as to become as great as [Mt.] Uhud."⁴ The Apostle also said to abu-al-Dardā', "If you happen to cook some soup be sure to put plenty of water and to invite your neighbours

1. Muslim, al-Birr *w-al-Silah* 142.

2. Unidentified.

3. Unidentified.
4. Cf. al-Baghdādi, *Ta'rikh Baghdad*,. vol. VIII : p. 207.
- 5, Cf. al-Tirmidhi, *Zakāh* : 28.
6. Unidentified.
7. Al-Bukhārī, *Zakāh* : II ; abu-Dāwūd, *Wasāya* : 3.

them said, "I have one dinar," and the Apostle replied, "Spend it on yourself." The man then said, "I have another dinar," and the Apostle answered, "Spend it on your wife." Again the man said, "I have another," and the Apostle replied, "Spend it on your child." Once again the man said, "I have another," and the Apostle answered, "Spend it on your servant." When for the last time the man said, "I have another dinar," the Apostle replied, "You should know best how to dispense with it."

At another time the Apostle said "The *sadaqah* for the family of Muhammad is unlawful because it is made of men's filth." ² And again, "Remove from the beggar the necessity of begging, even though it be with a morsel of food as small as the head of a bird." ³ He also said, "Had the beggar been truthful, no one who had turned him empty away would prosper." ⁴ Jesus said, "The angels will not enter the house of him who turneth a beggar empty away." ⁵ It was the practice of our own Prophet to insist on doing certain things himself and to entrust their performance to no one. These were getting ready his ablution water at night and setting it aside under a cover and handing the alms to the poor with his own hand.⁶ The Apostle said, "The poor man is not he who is dismissed with a couple of dates, or a

1. Al-Nasā i, *Zakāh* : 54.

2. *Ibid.*, *Zakāh*: 95.

3. Unidentified.

4. Unidentified.

5. Cf. Matt. XXV : 34-45.

6. Unidentified.

couple of mouthfuls, rather the poor man is he who abstains from begging. Read if you wish [what God had said of such men], 'They ask not of men with importunity.' " ¹ On another occasion the Apostle said, "Not a single Moslem gives a brother Moslem a garment without, in return for his gift, enjoying the protection of God until the last shred of that garment falls off the shoulders of the man to whom it had been given."²

In history the excellence of the *sadaqah* is attested by the following :

'Urwah ibn-al-Zubayr ³ once said, " [During her life time] 'Ā'ishah gave fifty thousand [dinars] in alms, yet her garment was full of patches." Commenting on the words of God, "Who for His love bestow their food on the poor, the orphans, and the captives,"⁴ Mujāhid said, "This means that though longing for it themselves, they give their food to the poor, the orphans, and the captives." 'Umar [ibn al-Khattab] was want to say, "O God ! Grant plenty and abundance unto the generous among us; haply they may share it with those of us who are in need." 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn-'Umar ⁵ used to say, "Prayer brings you half the way to the King, fasting brings you to His door, and almsgiving brings you before His

1. Cf. *Sūrah II* : 274 : al-Bukhari, *Zakāh* : 54.

2. Al-Tirmidhi, *Qiyāmah* : 41.

3. A.H. 94/A.D. 712-3 ; see ibn-Qutaybah, p. 114.

4. *Sūrah LXXVI* : 8.

5. 'Umar ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz in C. 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'ibn-'Umayr in SM.

'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn-'Umar in B which reading is correct. 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn-'Umar died in A.H. 68/A.D. 764 ; see al-Tabari, vol. III, p. 40 ; Shadharāt al-Dhahab, vol. I, p. 219.

throne." Ibn-abi-al-Ja'd said, "Verily a single *sadaqah* closes away seventy gates of evil." He also regarded secret alms seventy times superior to those given in public, and that each [is capable of] dislocating the jaws of seventy devils. Ibn-Mas'ūd said, "Once upon a time there was a man who for seventy years worshipped and obeyed God. Then suddenly he committed a grave sin and marred his record. One day he passed by a poor man and gave him a loaf of bread. Thereupon God forgave his sin and restored to him the credit of the seventy years of worship and obedience."

Luqmān once told his son, "Whenever you commit a sin [atone for it by] giving alms." At another time Yahya ibn-Mu'ādh said, "I know of no grain which outweighs the mountains of the whole world except the grain of alms." On another occasion 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn-Rawwād¹ said, "It used to be said that three things were among the treasures of Paradise. These were: concealing one's illness, giving alms in secret, and maintaining silence under afflictions." This has also been related as an authentic tradition the *isnād* of which goes back to the Apostle.

'Umar ibn-al-Khattāb said, "Once upon a time the works of man vied with one another in excellence and the *sadaqah* declared its superiority to all the rest." It was the custom of 'Abdullāh ibn-'Umar to give sugar in alms saying, "I have heard God say, 'Ye shall never attain righteousness until ye give alms of that which ye love,'² and God knows that I am fond

1. A.H. 159/A.D. 775-6; see ibn-Sa'd. vol. V. p. 362.

1. *Sūrah* III: 86.

of sugar."

Al-Nakha'i said once, "If anything be set aside for God it should have no defect, for that would displease me."

'Ubayd ibn-'Umayr¹ once said, "On the day of resurrection people will be assembled for judgment as hungry as ever, as thirsty as ever, and as naked as ever. Those who, in their lifetime, for love of God have given the hungry something wherewith to satisfy their hunger, will be filled; those who have given the thirsty something wherewith to quench their thirst, will be refreshed; and those who have given the naked something wherewith to clothe themselves, will be clothed."

[207] Al-Hasan [al-Basri] said, "If God had so desired He could have made you all rich, not a single poor or pauper among you. But He had willed that some of you be responsible for the support of the others." At another time al-Sha'bi said, "He who does not regard his need to the reward attending his alms greater than that of the recipients of the alms themselves renders his almsgiving useless and, as it were, smites his own face therewith." On another occasion Mālik said, "We see no harm in the rich man's drinking of the water which he has donated to be served in the mosque, because such water is intended for the use of the thirsty in general and not solely for the benefit of the needy and the poor."

Once upon a time al-Hasan [al-Basri] passed by a slave-trader accompanied by a maid for sale. Turning to the trader al-Hasan said, "Would you accept a

1. A.H. 68/A.D. 687-8; see ibn-Qutaybah pp. 221-2.

dirham or two for the maid ?” “No,” said the trader. Thereupon al-Hasan replied, “Then go your way. God Himself has been content with but a farthing and a single mouthful for a dark-eyed houri.”¹

On Secrecy and Publicity in the Giving of Alms

The paths of the seekers after truth have diverged in pursuing this subject. Some have been disposed to give secrecy the preference while others have been inclined to regard publicity as the more excellent. We shall now discuss the meaning of each, point out the good and the evil therein, and finally bring to light the exact truth of the whole matter.

Secrecy has five advantages. The first is that it better conceals the identity of the recipient. For his receiving alms in public is disgraceful to his manhood. It bares his need and obliges him to relinquish the desirable qualities of self-restraint and temperance, qualities because of which he is regarded rich by the ignorant.

The second [advantage] is that the maintenance of secrecy in the giving of alms is safer for the hearts and the tongues of men who may be otherwise moved to envy and driven to reproach by thinking that the person has received aid without really needing it or that he has taken more than he actually needs. For envy, suspicion, and backbiting are among the major sins, and to guard men against such sins is very important. Ayyūb al-Sakhtiyānī² once said, “Indeed

it has always been my practice to avoid putting on a new garment lest I provoke the spirit of jealousy and envy in my neighbours.” Another ascetic said, “Many a time I would relinquish one thing and refrain from another simply for the sake of my brethren who might have wondered wherefrom I have gotten them.”

It has also been related that Ibrāhīm al-Taymī was once seen wearing a new shirt and consequently some of his brethren asked him saying, “Wherefrom have you gotten this ?” To which he replied, “It was given to me by my brother Khaythamah,¹ but if I had known that his family had any knowledge of it I would have not accepted it.”

The third [advantage] of secrecy is that it aids the giver to keep his good works secret, for to give in secret is far superior to giving in public, and to help one do good is itself good. But secrecy is broken whenever the news are made known to more than two individuals, at which time the identity of the giver becomes public property.

A certain man once gave one of the learned men something in public but the latter declined the offer. At another time another person gave him something in secret and he accepted it. Questioned concerning [his behaviour] he said, “This man has acted with politeness and concealed his good deed, consequently I accepted his gift. The other has acted rudely, therefore I rejected his gift.”

A certain Sufi was once given something in the midst of a crowd publicly, but he refused to accept it. Thereupon the giver said to him, “Do you reject

1. Ibn-'Abd-al-Rahmān ; see *ibn-Sa'd*. vol. VI, pp. 200-201.

1. Cf. *Sūrah* LVI : 22-3.

2. Also al-Sakhtiyānī ; died A.H. 131/A.D. 748-9 ; see *ibn-Sa'd*, vol. VII, pt. 2. pp. 14-17 ; *ibn-Qutaybah*, pp. 238-9 ; *al-Sam'ānī*, fol. 2926-293a.

that which God has given thee ?” The Sufi replied saying, “You have associated others besides God in that which pertains to Him alone. Therefore I return to you your sin of association.” On another occasion one of the gnostics accepted in secret something which he had rejected in public. Asked [by the giver concerning his action] he replied, “You have publicly disobeyed God but I refused to be your accomplice in your sin. When, however, you obeyed Him in, secret, I helped you in your obedience.” At another time al-Thawri said, “If I were sure that there was among them one who would not talk about or discuss his alms I would have accepted his gifts.”

The fourth [advantage of secrecy is that it helps to spare the recipient the humiliation attending the receipt of alms in public]. For to receive alms in public is humiliating and insulting to the recipient, and the believer need not expose himself to humiliation. Thus one of the learned men was wont to accept alms in secret, but refuse them in public saying, “To receive alms in public is degrading to learning and humiliating to its torch bearers. Hence I never accept anything which degrades learning and humiliates its torch bearers.”

The fifth [advantage] is avoiding [the necessity of] sharing [the alms with those who may be present at the time of giving]. For the Apostle said, “Those who happen to be present when a man receives a gift are his partners therein.”¹ That the gift is silver or gold does not change its being a gift. The Apostle said, “The best gift which a man can give his brother

1. Unidentified.

is silver or bread.” He thus made silver by itself a gift.

In short the practice of giving in the presence of a crowd publicly is viewed with disfavour unless it is done with the consent of all present. Even then the practice is questionable.

Publicity in the giving of alms as well as open discussion of gifts has four advantages. These are as follows:

The first advantage of publicity is that it promotes sincerity, truthfulness, freedom from affectation and hypocrisy.

The second advantage of publicity is that it does away with vainglory and haughtiness, affirming servitude to God and poverty instead. It frees man from pride and self-sufficiency, and makes him indifferent to popular acclaim. A certain gnostic once said to one of his disciples, “Do not, under any condition, conceal the fact that you have been the recipient of alms. For when you receive alms and hide not the fact one of two things will ensue : either you lose favour with some people, a thing which is safer for your religion and more wholesome to your soul, or grow in the regards of others because you have revealed the truth. This is exactly what your brother desires because his reward increases [208] as your love to him grows greater and your respect to him becomes more profound. You also would be rewarded if you were instrumental in bringing about the increase in his reward.”

The third advantage is that the gnostic is not mindful of anybody other than God. His attitude to Him is the same in secret and in public. Consequent-

ly, and disagreement or difference between the attitude of the individual towards God in secret and his attitude towards Him in public constitutes a sin against the Unity of God. Thus one of the gnostics once said, "We were wont to pay no attention to the prayers of him whose practice it was to accept [alms] in secret and reject them in public." To aim at pleasing men, whether they are at the moment present or absent, impairs the state [of mind which man should have towards God]. Man should, therefore, be mindful of no one other than the one and only God.

The story has been told that a certain teacher was extremely fond of one of his pupils (sing. *murīd*) but the other pupils resented the [apparent] favouritism. The teacher, desiring to prove to the pupils the superiority of his favourite, give each one of them, including the favourite, a chicken and ordered them to disband into solitary spots where each could kill his chicken without being seen by anyone else. All except the favourite pupil did what the teacher asked them to do. On being asked by the teacher why he failed to carry out his command, the favourite pupil replied, "I could not find a secluded place where no one would see me, because wherever I went God saw me." Thereupon the teacher said, "It is for this reason that I favour this pupil, because he is mindful of no one but God."

The fourth is that publicity fulfils the obligation of gratitude. God said, ""Declare the bounty of the Lord."

' Secrecy, on the other hand, is a denial of

1. *Sūrah XCIII : 11.*

that bounty, and God has condemned those who conceal His bounties unto them describing them with niggardliness. Thus he said, "[Verily, God loveth not the proud, the vain boaster] who are niggardly themselves, and bid others to be niggards, and hide away what God hath of his bounty given them." ¹ The Apostle said, "Whenever God bestows a bounty upon one of His servants, He likes the bounty to be seen." ²

A certain person once gave something to one of the virtuous, who immediately displayed the gift saying, "This is something from this world wherein publicity is best, but in matters pertaining to the hereafter secrecy is best." For this reason a certain person said, "If you are given something in the presence of a crowd accept it, later returning it in private."

Gratitude and thankfulness for alms is highly recommended. The Apostle said, "He who is not grateful to men is not grateful to God." ³ Gratitude takes the place of reward to such an extent that the Apostle once said, "Whoever doeth unto you a favour recompense him, but if ye be not able to do so, wish him good until ye ascertain that ye have recompensed him." ⁴

When on one day the emigrants were discussing with the Apostle the question of gratitude and thanks they said, "O Apostle of God, never have we seen anybody in whose house we lived as guests and whose

1. *Sūrah IV :41.*

2. *Unidentified.*

3. *Al-Tirmidhi, al-Birr w-al-Sitah: 35.*

4. *Al-Tayālisi : 1895.*

property we shared, without fearing that he would run away with all the reward." Thereupon the Apostle replied, "[Fear not], for your thanks and praise are as good as compensation."

Now that you have seen these various advantages know that the differences which exist in them are in reality not basic differences in the problem itself but rather differences in the attitudes [of men] towards the problem. The gist of the matter is that we do not rule that privacy is, under all conditions, the best practice, or the publicity is the best. Rather they differ as the intentions differ, and the intentions in turn differ as the attitudes and the individuals differ. Consequently, the sincere person should watch himself carefully lest he be misled by vanity and beguiled by the deception of nature and the artifice of the devil. Artifice and deception are more prevalent in privacy than in publicity, although they affect both. Deception enters into privacy through the predilection of [human] nature to it, especially because it helps to maintain one's prestige and position before men, shields him against their disfavour and contempt, and spares him the necessity of acknowledging the giver as a benefactor and philanthropist. It is a virulent disease which afflicts the soul and through which the devil brings the advantages of privacy home to the individual, thereby persuading him to justify his behaviour with [one of] the five points which we have mentioned [in favour of privacy]. The criterion of this as well as its acid test is one

1. Cf. al-Tirmidhi, *Qiyāmah* : 44: aba-Dāwūd, *Adab* : 11 .

single thing, namely that the suffering which the individual undergoes, because the fact of his receiving alms has been made public, be just as acute as the suffering which he experiences when one of his adversaries or opponents has received alms and the news of his receiving them has been made known. For if he were interested in shielding people against calumny, envy, and suspicion or desirous to avoid betraying a confidence and anxious to aid a giver conceal his gifts, as well as to safeguard learning against [disgrace and the learned men against] insult, he should know that all these things would result from making public his brother's receipt of alms [just as they would result from making public his own]. If the exposure of his own is harder on him than that of others, then his apprehensions regarding these considerations are untrue and false, resulting from the artifice and the deception of the devil.

Furthermore, to disgrace and discredit learning is forbidden not because it is the learning of this or the other person but simply because it is learning itself. Calumny is forbidden because it is the defamation of a person's honour as such, not because it is the vilification of a particular person's honour.

Anyone observing this point may prove too strong for the devil to subdue, otherwise he will be a man of much activity but little success.

On the other hand human nature may incline to publicity, because through it the individual humours the giver and pleases him thereby encouraging him to do the same again. Moreover by making the receipt of alms known to the public, the recipient

reveals himself extremely grateful so that people might become disposed to honour him and ready to inquire about him and help him.

This is a virulent disease which afflicts the heart. [209] The devil, however, cannot prevail over the religious except by presenting such corruption to him as a part of the Law, telling him that open gratitude is a part of the Law, while concealing it is hypocritical, and reciting to him all the various advantages which we have already mentioned in connexion with publicity in order to induce him to make public his thanks. Man's inner purpose and motive, however, is that which we have already described, namely to make people better disposed to help him and be gracious unto him.

The criterion of this as well as its acid test is that the individual should compare his readiness to be thankful in cases where his thanks are neither revealed to the giver nor to the person who intends to extend to him his aid with his readiness to be thankful in the presence of persons who dislike making their gifts known but desire to keep them secret and whose custom is not to give except to one who keeps the news of their gifts secret and refrains from giving thanks. If both these conditions appear equal to him his motive would then truly be the observance of the Law by gratitude and articulate thankfulness. Otherwise, he is deluded. Again if he were moved to gratitude and thanks by the demands of the Law, he should not neglect to fulfil his duty -to the giver. If the latter were fond of being thanked publicly the recipient should hide his gratitude and not express

his thanks, because it is his duty not to aid the giver to sin, since his expectation of thanks is sinful. But if he should find out that the giver is not fond of being thanked and does not expect or seek it, the recipient should then thank him openly and make his gift known to the public. For this reason the Apostle of God said of the person who was praised in his presence, "You have overdone his praise ; verily if he were to hear it he would fail," although the Apostle was wont to praise people to their face. This is because he had confidence in their faith and because he was sure that his praise would not harm them but rather would increase their desire and encourage them to do good. On another occasion the Apostle said [pointing] to a certain visitor, "Behold this man is the master of all Bedouins (*ahl al-wabar*)."² Referring to another he said, "When a celebrity visits you honour him."³ At another time he heard someone talk and, being pleased with his speech, said, "Verily there is magic in eloquent speech."⁴ He also said, "If any of you should see something worthy in his brother, he should tell him of it for that would make him more desirous to do good."⁵ And again, "Whenever the believer is praised, belief grows stronger in his heart."⁶

1. Cf al-Bukhārī, Adab : 54.

2. *Ahl al-wabar* is literally the inhabitants of hair tents, i.e. The nomads or the Bedouins. The reference is to Qays ibn-'Asim who appeared before the Apostle and embraced Islam. Qays died A.H. 47/A.D. 667-8; see ibn-Sa'd, vol. VII, pt. I, pp. 23-4 ; ibn-Qutaybah, pp 153-4 ; *al-Aghānī*, Vol. XII, pp. 149-158; abu-al-Fidā', vol. I, pp. 196-7.

3 Ibn Mājah, Adab : 19.

4. Al-Bukhārī, Nikāh : 48.

5. Unidentified.

6. Unidentified.

Al-Thawri once said, "He who knows himself will not be harmed by the praise of men." On another occasion he said to Yūsuf ibn-Asbāt, "Whenever I do you a favour I am more pleased with it than you are because I regard it as one of the blessings of God upon me. Consequently, I give thanks to God. Unless I see my favour in this light my gratitude will be false."

These details should be observed by anyone who watches his heart, for without these details the works of the senses are the laughing-stock of the devil and the object of his ridicule and malice especially for what seems to be much activity but little profit. It is such knowledge which is described by the following saying, namely, "Learning one point of such knowledge is better than a year of worship." For through this knowledge worship becomes a living and a vital thing and without it, it dwindles and comes to nought. In short, to take in public and to reject in private is the best and safest policy to follow. Furthermore, no one, in rejecting a gift, should be excessive in his protestations of unworthiness. Rather his knowledge should be complete so that both privacy and publicity would be the same to him. Such a state is like red sulphur, often heard of but never seen.

On which is Better, to Accept Aid from the
Sadaqah or from the Zakāh¹

Both Ibrāhīm al-Khawwās and al-Junayd, as

1. As has been shown before the term *zakāh* represents the legal alms and *sadaqah*, the voluntary. Al-Ghazzālī has so far used the two terms interchangeably ; now however he uses the *sadaqah* for the voluntary alms and the *zakāh* for the legal and obligatory.

well as many others, held that accepting aid from the *sadaqah* fund was better than accepting it from the *zakāh* money, because in sharing the latter the individual competes with the poor and diminishes their means. Furthermore, he may not be able to establish his claim to the benefit from the *zakāh* money or prove himself actually deserving in accordance with the qualifications set down in the Glorious Book. But the *sadaqah* is more general.

Others have said that a person should accept aid from the *zakāh* fund rather than from the *sadaqah* money, because in so doing he would be fulfilling the Law.¹ Thus, if all the poor should refrain from accepting aid from the *zakāh* fund they would sin. A person should accept [his portion of] the *zakāh* [not only] because it places him under no obligation but also because it has been ordained by God as a means of livelihood for those needy among His servants. It is, therefore, because of need and necessity that a person accepts *zakāh* [money], and he certainly knows his needs.

To accept aid from the *sadaqah* funds is an offence against religion, because ordinarily the benefactor gives only to those of whom he thinks well; while the company of the poor is more conducive to humility and meekness and farther removed from pride; since oftentimes a person may accept a *sadaqah* as though it were merely a present and nothing distinct [210] from a present.

These indicate an insistence on the humility and

I. Cf. *Siirah* IX : 60.

the need of the receiver of the *zakāh*. The truth of the matter is that these things vary with each individual depending on the particular state in which he may be at that time and on the kind of intention which he may at that moment entertain. If he were in doubt as to whether or not he was deserving he should not accept anything from the *zakāh*. But if he were certain that he was deserving, as, for example, when he has to **pay** a debt which he had incurred for a just cause and is unable to pay it without aid, then he is certainly entitled to that aid and justified in accepting it.

If a deserving individual were given the choice between accepting aid from the *zakāh* or the *sadaqah* and had found out that the person who is to give the *sadaqah* would not give that particular sum unless he were to accept it, let him by all means choose the *sadaqah*, as the *zakāh* which is compulsory would always be paid to its deserving beneficiaries. This would increase charity and better the conditions of the poor.

If the money were to be definitely given as a *sadaqah* any way and on the other hand the *acceptance* of the *zakāh* would not result in distress for the poor, the person would be free to make his choice. In short the arguments in favour of the one or the other vary. On the whole the acceptance of aid from the *zakāh* is more conducive to modesty and humility.

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Kristin Zahra Sands

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INTRODUCTION

The Qur'ān, for Muslims, represents the word of God revealed to Muḥammad. Its interpretation, then, requires a certain audacity. How can one begin to say what God “meant” by His revelation? How does one balance the praiseworthy desire to understand the meanings of the Qur'ān with the realistic fear of reducing it to the merely human and individualistic? Is interpretation an art, a science, an inspired act, or all of the these? Ṣūfī commentators living in the classical time period of Islam from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries answered these questions in their own unique way, based on their assumptions regarding the nature of the Qur'ānic text, the sources of knowledge considered necessary for its interpretation, and the nature of the self seeking this knowledge. The commentaries they wrote are distinct from other types of Qur'ānic commentaries both in terms of content, which reflects Ṣūfī ideas and concepts, and the variety of styles ranging from philosophical musings to popular preaching to literary narrative and poetry.

Early Western scholarship on Ṣūfī Qur'ānic interpretation focused on the origins of Ṣūfī thought. In his *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranlegung*, Ignaz Goldziher characterized the Ṣūfī approach as eisegesis, the reading of one's own ideas into a text.¹ Goldziher firmly believed that Ṣūfī thought is radically different from “original, traditional Islam,”² finding little basis for their beliefs in the Qur'ān. Not surprisingly then, he viewed Ṣūfī Qur'ānic commentary as an attempt to reconcile these different belief systems and to justify the Ṣūfī worldview within an Islamic framework through the method of allegoresis. According to Goldziher, the Ṣūfis were influenced in this by Platonic thought which contrasts the world of appearances with the world of Ideas, just as Ṣūfī exegetes distinguish the exoteric (*ẓāhir*) from the esoteric (*bāṭin*) levels of meaning of the Qur'ān. Although Ṣūfis insisted that they were uncovering deeper meanings of the Qur'ān, Goldziher found them reading ideas into a text essentially alien or even hostile to their system of thought.

The conclusions of Goldziher regarding the sources of Ṣūfī thought were debated by Louis Massignon, who attempted to show through an analysis of early Ṣūfī vocabulary that it was the Qur'ān itself, constantly recited, meditated upon, and practiced which was the origin and genuine source for the development of Ṣūfism.³ Paul Nwyia continued Massignon's research, focusing particularly on the mystical

commentary attributed to Ja'far al-Šādiq (d. 765). Nwyia concluded that Ja'far al-Šādiq's commentary was the result of a dialogue between personal, mystic experience, and the text of the Qur'ān. The vocabulary found in this commentary marks the beginning of the development of specific Šūfī terminology that was not derived from foreign ideas and concepts but rather was created to describe the dialogue originating from and remaining within a Qur'ānic context.⁴ Both Massignon and Nwyia insisted that the Qur'ānic text remains primary for the Šūfī; that is to say, the Muslim mystic does not impose his own ideas on the Qur'ānic text, but rather discovers ideas in the course of his experiential dialogue with the text.⁵

The term *allegoresis* used by Goldziher does not adequately convey the complex and varied use of metaphorical language in Šūfī Qur'ānic commentaries. Studies by such scholars as Henry Corbin,⁶ Toshihiko Izutsu⁷ and William Chittick⁸ on the use of language in other types of Šūfī writings have shown the relationship between symbolic and metaphorical language and the concept of imagination, understood not as fantasy, but as an objective reality of the mind and cosmos. In his study of the *Dhakhā'ir al-a'lāq* of Ibn 'Arabī (d. 1240), Chittick identifies imagination as a concept referring to three different things: a faculty by which humans may obtain knowledge, just as they obtain knowledge from prophetic revelations and rational thought; an intermediate realm between the world of pure spirit and the world of bodies, sometimes called the "world of images" (*'ālam al-mithāl*); and something that reflects the nature of the cosmos as a whole.⁹ The kind of language and discourse used in Šūfī writings may, then, appear to be metaphorical while in fact being descriptive of experience in this intermediate realm, or it may be truly metaphorical since language using imagery is considered to be a better indicator of the nature of reality than abstract, rational thought.

The issue of language is related to the problem of defining the nature and objective of Šūfī writings. The possibility that Šūfīs are merely describing the reality that they see is rejected by those who consider their experiences a form of fantasy and their writings fictive compositions. In an article on the concept of the "world of images" (*ālam al-mithāl*) Fazlur Rahman rejects the ontological existence of this realm and therefore criticizes the claim of some Šūfīs to mystical experience within it; instead of descriptions of theophanies, he sees only an artistic impulse struggling to express itself.

Once the flood of imagination is let loose, the world of figures goes beyond the specifically religious motivation that historically brought it into existence in the first place and develops into the poetic, the mythical, and the grotesque: it seeks to satisfy the relatively suppressed and starved artistic urge. Much of the contents of the *'ālam al-mithāl* [the world of images], as it develops later, has, therefore, nothing to do with religion but indirectly with theater.¹⁰

Leonard Lewisohn, on the other hand, suggests that reading Šūfī literature without accepting the reality of mystical experience results in a distortion of their

writings. If one approaches Ṣūfī works from an aesthetic and literary perspective alone, one will see only allegories instead of metaphysical referents which can only be grasped experientially. While the aesthetic and literary element of Ṣūfī writings is undeniable, Lewisohn states that there is no “art for art’s sake in Ṣūfī literature.”¹¹

Hamid Dabashi has looked at the political dynamics behind Persian Ṣūfī poetry, describing its development within the context of a competition for authority among jurists, philosophers, court politicians, and the Ṣūfīs. As Ṣūfīs began writing poetry, or when poets became Ṣūfīs, they became propagandists for their mystical doctrines rather than poets first and foremost, subordinating the artistic impulse to a mystical worldview. Like Lewisohn, he agrees that the artistic impulse is secondary, but describes the phenomenon as an appropriation of art for other purposes.¹² Michael Sells views the interaction between these groups in a different way, as a creative clash of cultures. He suggests that the use of different language contexts by Ṣūfīs demonstrates a central aspect of classical Islamic culture, “the interpermeability and interfusion of discursive and cultural worlds.”¹³ J.C. Bürgel notes the major role that Ṣūfism played in allowing the arts to flourish in the Islamic world and suggests that this is because Ṣūfī theories made acts of creativity “licit magic,” while more orthodox Islam criticized and sometimes condemned poetry, representational art and music, seeing in their power an attempt to rival the creativity and power of God.¹⁴

The objective of this book is to add to these previous discussions by studying the relationship of Ṣūfīs to the Qur’ān more comprehensively. Understanding the nature of this relationship provides insight into the use of creative composition in other genres adopted by the Ṣūfīs as well. Part I of the study concerns Ṣūfī hermeneutics, a word used here to refer to the way in which Ṣūfīs described the nature of the Qur’ānic text and the types of knowledge and methods needed to understand it. The unique characteristics of Ṣūfī interpretation are further highlighted by means of an analysis of the writings of those who criticized and defended it. Part II begins with a brief overview of the lives and exegetical works of the Ṣūfī commentators studied for this work. Selections from their commentaries on the story of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr, the figure of Maryam, and the Light Verse will be presented in order to demonstrate common themes and different compositional styles.

The most basic question addressed in these works, and the question from which all other questions are derived, is how to best approach the Qur’ān in order to discover its richness and transforming possibilities. It is a question asked directly in the hermeneutical writings and addressed indirectly in the commentaries themselves. Because interpretation is seen as an unending process which will be different for each individual, Ṣūfī interpretations are more suggestive than declarative; they are “allusions” (*ishārāt*) rather than explanations (*tafāsīr*), to use the Arabic terms. They therefore indicate possibilities as much as they demonstrate the insights of each writer. The concept of imagination which plays such a prominent role in Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought is less pronounced in the writings studied here. There is instead an emphasis on the connection between knowledge granted directly from God (*‘ilm ladunī*) and the ethics and spiritual practice of the individuals seeking this knowledge. The

language and type of discourse chosen to express this knowledge varies with the different commentators, and demonstrates the individuality of each. The interplay of language worlds and discourses in classical Islam which Sells notes is very much apparent here; many of these commentaries can only be understood within the context of discussions occurring within other areas of Islamic thought.

The role of creativity in these writings is not a question that is addressed, probably because the self is not viewed as the origin of this knowledge. This is not to say, however, that the writers studied here are unaware of issues of style and composition. On the contrary, these aesthetic matters are considered important because the primary function of these works is didactic. The question of creativity is addressed somewhat indirectly through the justifications made for the highly individualistic nature of these interpretations, especially in the apologetic writings of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111).

Much of the subject matter in this book could be productively compared to studies on the interpretation of books considered sacred in other traditions as well as contemporary hermeneutical and literary theories on reading texts. I have, however, deliberately avoided making these comparisons in order to keep the focus on the complexity of the classical Islamic and Ṣūfī discussions on Qur'ānic interpretation. Western scholarship has only just begun to scratch the surface of the vast literature included within the genre of Qur'ānic commentary; this study represents only a small contribution towards what will hopefully be a greater appreciation of the enormous variety of Islamic thought.

A word should be said about the use of the terms Ṣūfī and Ṣūfism throughout this work. As Carl Ernst has pointed out, the Arabic equivalents to these words are terms used relatively infrequently in the writings we now label as Ṣūfī. When they are used in classical works, it is in a prescriptive rather than descriptive sense.¹⁵ In the works studied here, the authors do not refer to themselves as Ṣūfīs but rather as “the people of allusion and understanding” (*ahl al-ishāra wa'l-fahm*), “the people of meanings” (*ahl al-ma'ānī*), “the people of love” (*ahl al-ishq*), “gnostics” (*ʿarifūn*), “verifiers” (*muḥaqqiqūn*), and “the people of states” (*ahl al-mawājid*), to give just a few examples. However, despite the different terminology and writing styles employed, these works share common hermeneutical assumptions and elements. The use of unifying terms to describe their approach, then, seems appropriate and the words “Ṣūfī” and “Ṣūfism” are the logical choice in English, despite the problems outlined by Ernst.

The translations in this work are my own unless otherwise noted. I have benefited greatly from the work of previous translators and the choice to use my own translation in many places is due to a concern for consistency in terminology rather than a criticism of the translations of my predecessors. The translations of the Qur'ān have been made after consulting the translations of Arberry, Ali, and Asad. I have taken the liberty of omitting the frequent phrases of blessings that occur in these texts for the sake of brevity and clarity. The transliteration system used is that of *The Encyclopedia of Islam* with the exception of *j* for *jīm* and *q* for *qāf*.

Part I

HERMENEUTICS

THE QUR'ĀN AS THE OCEAN OF ALL KNOWLEDGE

Şūfī interpretation begins with several basic premises: that the Qur'ān contains many levels of meaning, that man has the potential to uncover these meanings, and that the task of interpretation is endless. In their exegetical writings, Şūfīs quote such Qur'ānic verses as *We have left nothing out from the Book* (6:38), *We have counted everything in a clear register* (36:12), *There is nothing whose treasures are not with Us and We only send it down in a known measure* (15:21),¹ and, *If all the trees on the earth were pens and the sea seven seas after it to replenish it, the words of God would not be depleted* (31:27).² The image of the Qur'ān as an ocean is a particularly popular one, as in this quote from the *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān* of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.

I will rouse you from your sleep, you who have given yourself up to recitation, who have taken the study of the Qur'ān as a practice, who have seized upon some of its outward meanings and sentences. How long will you wander about the shore of the sea with your eyes closed to its wonders? Was it not for you to sail through its depths in order to see its amazing things, to travel to its islands to pick its delicacies, to dive to its bottom and become rich from obtaining its jewels? Don't you despise yourself for losing out on its pearls and jewels as you continue to look only to its shores and exoteric aspects?

Haven't you heard that the Qur'ān is an ocean from which the knowledge of all ages branches out just as rivers and streams branch out from the shores of the ocean? Don't you envy the happiness of people who have plunged into its overflowing waves and seized red sulfur,³ who have dived into its depths and taken out red rubies, shining pearls and green chrysolite, who have roamed its shores and gathered gray ambergris and fresh blooming aloes wood, who have clung to its islands and found an abundance in their animals of the greatest antidote and pungent musk?⁴

A similar passage can be found in the introduction to the Qur'ānic commentary of 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 1329):

Their souls are purified by [the Qur'ān's] exoteric sense (*ẓāhir*) because it is water which flows copiously and the thirst of their hearts is quenched by its inner sense (*bāṭin*) because it is a surging sea. When they wish to dive in order to extract the pearls of its secrets the water crashes over them and they are submerged in its current. The riverbeds of insights (*fuhūm*) flow from this deluge according to their capacities, while the streams of realizations (*uqūl*) proceed from its rivers. The riverbeds bring forth piercing jewels and pearls upon the shores and the streams cause flowers and fruit to bloom upon the banks. Hearts take from the overflow as much as they can, filling their laps and sleeves, while souls set out to harvest the fruits and lights, grateful for finding them, their desires fulfilled by them.⁵

The idea that there are exoteric (*ẓāhir*) and inner (*bāṭin*) senses of the Qur'ān was well developed by Ṣūfīs before al-Kāshānī. Although the division of the exoteric and the inner has its basis in the Qur'ān,⁶ its importance in hermeneutical discussions is more closely tied to a *ḥadīth* attributed to 'Abd Allāh b. Mas'ūd (d. 652).

The *ḥadīth* of Ibn Mas'ūd

The *ḥadīth* of Ibn Mas'ūd is the *ḥadīth* most frequently quoted by the Ṣūfīs as proof of the many dimensions of the Qur'ān open to interpretation. Commentators who were not Ṣūfīs, such as Abū Ja'far al-Ṭabarī (d. 923),⁷ quoted it as well but they understood it in a different way. Here is al-Ṭabarī's version of the *ḥadīth* from the introduction to his Qur'ānic commentary, *Jāmi' al-bayān*:

The messenger of God said, "The Qur'ān was sent down in seven *aḥruf*. Each *ḥarf* has a back (*ẓahr*) and a belly (*baṭn*). Each *ḥarf* has a border (*ḥadd*) and each border has a lookout point (*muṭṭala'*)."⁸

Al-Ṭabarī includes this *ḥadīth* among several other *aḥādīth* about the seven *aḥruf*, devoting several pages to the controversy over the meaning of the word "*ḥarf* (pl. *aḥruf*)" and concluding that the seven *aḥruf* refer to both dialects (*alsun*) of the Arabs and aspects (*awjuh*) of the revelation.⁹ The meaning of this particular Tradition, according to al-Ṭabarī is as follows:

"Each *ḥarf* has a border (*ḥadd*)" means that each of the seven aspects (*awjuh*) has a border delimited by God which no one may go past. As for his words "and each *ḥarf* has a back (*ẓahr*) and a belly (*baṭn*)," its back (*ẓahr*) is that which becomes apparent (*ẓāhir*) in recitation and its belly (*baṭn*) is its interpretation (*ta'wīl*) which is hidden (*baṭāna*). His words,

“and each of the borders has a lookout point (*muṭṭala'*)” means that each of the borders in which God has delineated the permitted and prohibited and the rest of His revealed laws has a measure of the rewards and punishments of God which will be seen and beheld in the Hereafter and met at the Resurrection, just as 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb¹⁰ said, “If everything in the world belonged to me, assuredly I would ransom myself with it against the terror of the lookout point (*muṭṭala'*).”¹¹

For al-Ṭabarī, the inner sense (*bāṭin*) refers to events in the future, knowledge of which is not given to man until the Day of Resurrection. The word *ta'wīl* has different meanings in the Qur'ān; al-Ṭabarī seems to use it here in its sense of the unfolding of events, not interpretation.¹²

Roughly contemporary with al-Ṭabarī, the Ṣūfī interpretation of Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 896) gives us a reading of this *ḥadīth* that is different in two important respects. The first is in its designating knowledge of the external sense (*ẓāhir*) as public (*'āmm*) and knowledge of the inner sense (*bāṭin*) as private (*khāṣṣ*). The second difference is in the interpretation of the lookout point (*muṭṭala'*). Using the tradition from 'Umar, al-Ṭabarī understands this as a terrifying vantage point on the Day of Resurrection. Al-Tustarī, on the other hand, understands the *muṭṭala'* as a vantage point of the heart, an overview from which one can understand what God meant by certain verses of the Qur'ān while still in this life.

Every verse of the Qur'an has four kinds of meanings: an exoteric sense (*ẓāhir*), an inner sense (*bāṭin*), a limit (*ḥadd*), and a lookout point (*muṭṭala'*). The exoteric sense is the recitation, the inner sense is understanding (*fahm*), the limit is what [the verse] permits and prohibits, and the lookout point is the elevated places of the heart (*qalb*) [beholding] what was intended by it as understood from God Almighty. The knowledge of the exoteric sense is public knowledge (*'ilm 'āmm*) and the understanding of its inner sense and what was intended by it is private (*khāṣṣ*).¹³

Al-Tustarī does not specify in this passage as to exactly who possesses this public and private knowledge. Throughout his *tafsīr*, he uses the terms “elect” (*khuṣūṣ*) and common people (*'umūm*) without saying what he means by this distinction.¹⁴

Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 998), writing about a hundred years after al-Tustarī in his *Qūt al-qulūb*, interprets the *ḥadīth* in much the same way as al-Tustarī, adding details regarding exoteric and esoteric knowledge, and confirming the view that the lookout point (*muṭṭala'*) refers to a vantage point attainable in this life. He seems to reference the saying of 'Umar found in al-Ṭabarī, but manages to soften its frightening aspect by a play on words:

Its back (*ẓahr*) is for experts in the Arabic language (*ahl al-'arabiyya*), its inner sense (*bāṭin*) is for the people of certainty (*ahl al-yaqīn*), its limit (*ḥadd*) is for the exotericists (*ahl al-ẓāhir*), and its lookout point

(*muṭṭala'*) is for the people of elevated places (*ahl al-ashraf*) who are the gnostics (*'arifūn*), loving and fearing; they have beheld (*iṭṭala'ū*) the kindness of the One who looks down (*muṭṭali'*) after having feared the terror of the lookout point (*muṭṭala'*).¹⁵

Al-Ghazālī mentions the Ibn Mas'ūd *ḥadīth* in his defense of Sūfī exegesis in his *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*. His use of the *ḥadīth* is part of a more combative style intended to rebut religious scholars who believe that Qur'ānic commentary should be based entirely on the transmitted traditions of the Companions and the Followers of the Prophet. Al-Ghazālī's challenges them to explain the meaning of the Ibn Mas'ūd *ḥadīth* if exegesis is to be so restricted. He bluntly states that "the one who claims that the Qur'ān has no other meaning than what exoteric exegesis (*ẓāhir al-tafsīr*) has explained (*tarjama*), should know that he has acknowledged his own limitations and therefore is right with regards to himself, but is wrong in an opinion which brings everyone else down to his level."¹⁶

But al-Ghazālī is rather unique in his desire to engage with the opponents of Sūfism head-on. The approach of Rūzbihān al-Baqlī (d. 1209) in his Qur'ānic commentary *'Arā'is al-bayān* is more typical. He writes for his fellow Sūfīs alone, describing the division between exotericists and Sūfīs as part of God's plan in Creation:

Then he gave the external reins of [the Qur'ān] to the hands of the exotericists (*ahl al-zāhir*) among the scholars (*'ulamā'*) and the wise (*ḥukamā'*) so that they introduce its precepts, limits, regulations, and laws, and He reserved the unseen of the secrets of His speech and the hidden subtleties of His signs for the best of His people. He disclosed Himself in His words by the attribute of unveiling (*kashf*), eyewitnessing (*'iyyān*), and explanation (*bayān*) to their hearts (*qulūb*), spirits (*arwāḥ*), intellects (*'uqūl*), and innermost secrets (*asrār*).

He taught them the sciences of His realities (*ḥaqā'iq*) and the phenomena of His intricacies (*daqā'iq*). He purified the degrees of their intellects by the unveiling of the lights of his Beauty. He sanctified their understandings by the splendor of His Majesty. He made them the places for the hidden deposits of the symbols (*rumūz*) of His speech, the obscurities of His secrets deposited in His Book, the subtlety of His allusions (*ishārāt*) to the sciences of the ambiguous verses (*mutashābihāt*) and [other] difficulties of the verses. He Himself informed them of the meanings of that which He hid in the Qur'ān so that they would come to know by means of His causing them to know. He anointed their eyes by the light of His nearness and communion. He showed them the unseen mysteries of the brides of different kinds of wisdom and knowledge, and the meanings of the innermost understanding and innermost secret, the exoteric sense (*ẓāhir*) of which is a fundamental principle (*ḥukm*) in the Qur'ān and inner sense (*bāṭin*) of which is an allusion (*ishāra*) and

unveiling (*kashf*) which God (*al-ḥaqq*) reserves for His purified ones and His greater friends (*awliyā'*) and His exiled beloved among the sincere and close companions (*muqarrabūn*).

He veiled these secrets and marvels from others, those among the scholars of the external sense (*'ulamā' al-zāhir*) and the exotericists (*ahl-rusūm*) who have an abundant portion of the abrogating and the abrogated, and the comprehension and knowledge of the permitted and prohibited, the limits and rules.¹⁷

Although Ṣūfīs in this time period used the term “exotericists” (*ahl al-zāhir* or *ahl al-rusūm*), they did not call themselves “esotericists” (*bāṭiniyya*) since this was a derogatory term applied to those who rejected the literal sense of the Qur'ān and the exoteric practices of Islam, especially the Ismā'īlīs. None of the Ṣūfīs studied here rejected the external aspects of practice and knowledge, but rather considered these the necessary prerequisites for proceeding with the inward aspects.

Nizām al-Dīn al-Nisābūrī (d. 1327) echoes the thoughts of Rūzbihān in his interpretation of the Ibn Mas'ūd *ḥadīth*, found in the introduction to his Qur'ānic commentary entitled *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān wa raghā'ib al-furqān*. He writes that the exoteric sense (*zāhir*) of the Qur'ān is what scholars (*'ulamā'*) know, and the inner sense (*bāṭin*) is what is hidden from them, and he adds, “and we speak of it as we have been commanded and entrust the knowledge of it to God most High.”¹⁸ Al-Nisābūrī provides both exoteric and esoteric definitions for the word *muṭṭala'*. The first repeats the tradition of 'Umar found in al-Ṭabarī regarding the lookout point on the Day of Resurrection. The second definition confirms the Ṣūfī belief in the possibility of acquiring this vision in the here and now. The *muṭṭala'* is “the point of ascent (*maṣ'ad*), a place to which one arrives where one understands [a thing] as it is (*yafhamu kamā huwa*).”¹⁹

Al-Kāshānī's commentary on the *ḥadīth* interprets the back (*zahr*) and the belly (*baṭn*) as exoteric exegesis (*tafsīr*) and esoteric interpretation (*ta'wīl*). He understands the limit (*ḥadd*) as the place “where understandings of the meaning of the words end” and the lookout point (*muṭṭala'*) as the place to which one rises up from the limit and “beholds (*yafṭali'u*) the witnessing of the all-knowing King.”²⁰

In all of these interpretations of the Ibn Mas'ūd *ḥadīth*, the division of the Qur'ān is basically twofold, exoteric and esoteric. The exoteric is the external sense (*zahr*) and the commands and prohibitions that constitute the limit (*ḥadd*). The esoteric is the inner sense (*baṭn*) and the gnostic's lookout point (*muṭṭala'*). In 'Alā' al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 1336), this twofold sense is expanded into a four-fold hierarchical interpretative process:

O seeker of the inner meaning of the Qur'ān! You should first study the literal level of the Qur'ān and bring your body into harmony with its commands and prohibitions. Secondly, you should occupy yourself with

purifying your inner being so that you may comprehend the hidden meaning (*batn*) of the Qur'ān according to the instruction of the Merciful One and the inspiration of the Holy Angel. Thirdly, you should contemplate the gnosis of its limit (*ḥadd*) in the realm of hearts. [Only then] will you be distinguished with witnessing its point of ascent (*muṭṭala'*) without thought or reckoning.²¹

According to al-Simnānī, the source of interpretation varies according to these four different levels of the Qur'ān:

The commentator on the exoteric dimension of the Qur'ān should rely exclusively upon his external sense of hearing through which he learned the verses himself. The mystic should rely on inspiration (*ilhām*) to comment on the esoteric dimension, while the accomplished Sufi who has truly declared the unity of God should only comment on the limit with divine permission. The individual who has attained the secret of the essence should not comment at all, but proceed in a faltering manner into the point of ascent of the Qur'ān.²²

Al-Simnānī relates the four levels of meaning to four realms of existence: the Human Realm (*nāsūt*), the Kingdom (*malakūt*), the Omnipotence (*jabarūt*), and the Divinity (*lāhūt*).²³

Sayings from 'Alī and Ja'far al-Šādiq

In addition to the Ibn Mas'ūd *ḥadīth*, the Šūfīs found validation for their belief in the existence of deeper, discoverable meanings in the Qur'ān in sayings attributed to 'Alī (d.661) and Ja'far al-Šādiq (d. 765), important figures for both Šūfīs and Shī'īs.²⁴ The first of the sayings attributed to 'Alī quoted below echoes the *ḥadīth* of Ibn Mas'ūd:

Every verse of the Qur'ān has four kinds of meaning: an exoteric sense (*zāhir*), an inner sense (*bāṭin*), a limit (*ḥadd*), and a lookout point (*muṭṭala'*). The exoteric sense is the recitation (*tilāwa*), the inner sense is understanding (*fahm*), the limit (*ḥadd*) is the rulings of what is permitted and prohibited, and the lookout point (*muṭṭala'*) is what is meant by God for the servant by [the verse]. It is said that the Qur'ān is a clear expression (*ibāra*), an allusion (*ishāra*), subtleties (*laṭā'if*) and realities (*ḥaqā'iq*), so that the clear expression is for hearing, the allusion is for the intellect (*'aql*), the subtleties are for witnessing (*mushāhada*) and the realities are for self-surrender (*istislām*).²⁵

There is no good in an act of worship without comprehension, nor in a recitation without pondering.²⁶

The Messenger of God (peace and blessings of God be upon him), did not confide anything in me which he concealed from people, except that God most High gives a servant understanding of His Book.²⁷

If I had wished, I could have loaded seventy camels with commentary (*tafsīr*) on the *Fātiḥa* of the Book (the opening *sūra*).²⁸

For the one who understands (*yafhamu*) the Qur'ān, thereby whole bodies of knowledge are explained (*fussira*).²⁹

Those attributed to Ja'far al-Šādiq are:

The Qur'ān is recited with nine aspects (*awjuh*): the Truth (*ḥaqq*), truth (*ḥaqīqa*), realization (*taḥqīq*), realities (*ḥaqā'iq*), oaths, contracts, limits, the cutting off of attachments, and the exaltation of the One who is worshipped.³⁰

The Qur'ān was sent down in seven modes (*anwā'*): to inform, entrust, awaken affection, ennoble, unite, frighten and restrain. Moreover, it was revealed as a command, a prohibition, a promise, a threat, an indulgence, a foundation, and a test. Moreover, it was revealed as an inviter, a guardian, a witness, a preserver, an intercessor, a defender, and a protector.³¹

The Book of God has four things: the clear expression (*'ibāra*), the allusion (*ishāra*), subtleties (*laṭā'if*) and realities (*ḥaqā'iq*). The clear expression is for the common people (*'awāmm*), the allusion is for the elite (*khawāṣṣ*), the subtleties are for the friends (*awliyā'*), and the realities are for the prophets (*anbiyā'*).³²

THE QUR'ĀNIC TEXT AND AMBIGUITY

Verse 3:7

The Ṣūfīs' insistence upon the multivalent nature of the Qur'ānic text is related to their understanding of its ambiguity. A key verse here is Qur'ān 3:7 because it addresses the problems in interpreting a text that is both clear and ambiguous.

He it is who sent down to you the book containing clear verses (ayāt muḥkamāt) which are the mother of the Book and others that are ambiguous or similar (mutashābihāt). As for those in whose hearts is a turning away, they follow what is ambiguous or similar (mutashābih) in it, seeking discord and seeking its interpretation (ta'wīl) but none knows its interpretation except God. Those who are firmly rooted in knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fīl-'ilm) say, "We believe in it; the whole is from our Lord," and no one remembers except those who possess understanding (ulū al-albāb).

An alternative translation of the last part of this verse is possible, which makes *those who are firmly rooted in knowledge* a continuation of the phrase *except God*, resulting in the statement *but none knows its interpretation except God and those who are firmly rooted in knowledge who say, "We believe in it; the whole is from our Lord."* Most classical commentaries on this verse attempt to define what is meant by the clear and ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān and those *seeking discord* and those *firmly rooted in knowledge*. As is often the case in Ṣūfī commentaries, Ṣūfī interpretations are best understood within the context of exoteric commentaries such as al-Ṭabarī's that cite the interpretative traditions transmitted from the Companions and Followers of the Prophet.

The clear and ambiguous verses (muḥkamāt wa mutashābihāt)

In his commentary on the Qur'ān, al-Ṭabarī mentions five early interpretations for what constitutes the clear and ambiguous verses (*muḥkamāt wa mutashābihāt*).¹ Among these five, al-Ṭabarī's preferred interpretation is that the *muḥkamāt* are those verses that may be interpreted and understood by religious scholars ('ulamā') whereas the *mutashābihāt* are those verses that may be interpreted only

by God – the disconnected letters occurring at the beginning of several chapters of the Qur'ān or verses pertaining to future eschatological events.² Although this interpretation is often referred to in later commentaries, the interpretation more widely preferred after al-Ṭabarī is the one attributed to Muḥammad ibn al-Zubayr (d. 728–38), which states that the *muḥkamāt* are verses that can only be interpreted in one way, while the *mutashābihāt* are verses that allow for various interpretations.³ As we shall see, this interpretation was used to develop a methodology for dealing with the difficult theological issues raised by verses concerning God's attributes and actions.

Ṣūfī interpretations of Qur'ān 3:7 understand the Ibn al-Zubayr tradition as additional confirmation of different levels of meaning in the Qur'ān. The *muḥkamāt* verses constitute the basic message necessary for salvation addressed to all mankind while the *mutashābihāt* are addressed to an elect group of individuals; the Qur'ānic text is designed both to reveal and conceal, to communicate both simply and profoundly. This concept is described in the Qur'ānic commentary of the Ṣūfī Abū'l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 1074). Al-Qushayrī, always liberal in the use of metaphor in his writing, appears here to be using the literal meanings of the words “revelation” (*tanzīl*) and “interpretation” (*ta'wīl*) to evoke an image of something that descends with ease but is brought back up with great difficulty.

He has classified the discourse for them. From its apparent sense (*ẓāhir*), there is the clarity of its revelation (lit., “its being sent down,” *tanzīlihi*) and from its obscure sense (*ghāmiḍ*), there is the problem of its interpretation (lit., “its being brought back,” *ta'wīlihi*). The first kind is for the purpose of unfolding the law and guiding the people of the outwardly manifest (*ahl al-ẓāhir*). The second kind is for the purpose of protecting secrets (*asrār*) from the examination of outsiders.⁴

The Persian Qur'ānic commentator Rashīd al-Dīn al-Maybudī (fl. 1135) used al-Qushayrī's commentary as a source for his own, incorporating and expanding on his work in a decidedly literary manner. In this section of his *Kashf al-asrār*, al-Maybudī develops al-Qushayrī's suggestion that the obscurity in the Qur'ān is intentional, adding a short poem that taunts those who would undertake the search for deeper meanings casually:

There are two exalted parts to the Qur'ān. One of them is the clear apparent sense (*ẓāhir-i rawshan*) and one is the difficult obscure sense (*ghāmiḍ-i mushkil*). This apparent sense is the majesty of the law (*sharī'at*) and that obscure sense is the beauty of reality (*ḥaqīqat*). This apparent sense is so that the masses (*‘amma*) of mankind might understand and practice this in order to reach the comfort (*nāz*) and blessing. That obscure sense is so that the elite (*khawāṣṣ*) of mankind might submit to and accept that, in order to reach the blessing of the secret (*rāz*) of the friend. How great is the distance (lit., descent and ascent)

between the place of the comfort and blessing and the place of intimacy and the secret! Because of the grandeur of that state and the nobility of that work, the veil of obscurity (*ghumūd*) and ambiguity (*tashābuh*) is not removed, so that not just any stranger could set foot in that quarter, since not everyone is worthy of the tale of the secrets of kings.

Do not stroll around the royal curtain of secrets!

What can you do since you are not a man?

A real man ought to be peerless in each of the two worlds
since he drinks the last drops of the draught of friends.⁵

By creating a series of corresponding polarities here, the *muḥkamāt* and the *mutashābihāt* of the Qur'ānic text, the masses (*‘amma*) and the elite (*khawāṣṣ*), the law (*sharī‘a*) and the reality (*ḥaqīqa*), God's Majesty and Beauty; al-Maybudī connects the structure of the Qur'ān to that of mankind and the cosmos.

This linking of the structure of the Qur'ānic text to the nature of existence can also be seen in the commentary of Rūzbihān al-Baqlī. For Rūzbihān, the *muḥkamāt* are those verses that cannot be altered from how they were in pre-eternity. These are verses for believers that contain the practical application of the commandments, functioning like medicine for the sick in healing mankind and strengthening faith. They provide all that is necessary for man's salvation. The *mutashābihāt*, on the other hand, give information, to the few who are prepared to receive it, about the mysterious way in which God manifests Himself in His creation.

The *mutashābihāt* are descriptions of the ambiguous wrapping (*iltibās*) of the Attributes (*ṣifāt*) and the manifestation (*ẓuhūr*) of the Essence (*dhāt*) in the mirror of witnessings (*shawāhid*) and signs (*ayāt*).⁶

Iltibās is a term found frequently in Rūzbihān's writings. It is a verbal noun derived from the Arabic root *lbs*. Two first form verbs from this root occur in the Qur'ān: *labisa*, which means to wear something or to clothe someone, and *labasa*, which means to confuse. The eighth form of the verb, *iltabasa* (verbal noun: *iltibās*), means "to become entangled" or "to become confused."⁷ Rūzbihān uses the word to refer to the process by which God "clothes" His messages in forms that can be confusing or ambiguous to people.⁸ The *mutashābihāt* are examples of these kinds of messages.

Another way to express the concept of *iltibās* is to speak of unity and multiplicity, the terminology that ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī uses in his comments on Qur'ān 3:7. Without specifically identifying it, al-Kāshānī refers to Ibn al-Zubayr's interpretation before expanding it to include Šūfī metaphysical ideas and terminology:

Potentiality of meaning and ambiguity cannot touch [the *muḥkamāt*]; they convey only one meaning. *They are the mother*, i.e. the root (*aṣl*) of

the Book. *And others that are mutashābihāt*. They convey two meanings or more, and the truth and falsehood are ambiguous (*yashṭabihu*) in them. That is because the Truth (*ḥaqq*) has one face, which is the absolute abiding face after the annihilation of creation, not admitting multiplicity or plurality. He also has multiple additional faces in accordance with the mirrors of the loci of manifestation (*mazāhir*). [These faces] are what become manifest from that one face according to the preparedness (*isti'dād*) of each locus of manifestation. The truth and falsehood are ambiguous in them. The revelation appeared in this manner so that the *mutashābihāt* would turn towards the faces of the different forms of preparedness (*isti'dādāt*). So everyone clings to that which is appropriate to it, and the test and trial thereby become manifest.⁹

When al-Kāshānī speaks of loci of manifestation (*mazāhir*), he is employing one of the terms initiated by Ibn 'Arabī to explain the nature of existence. God is One both in His Essence and His attribute as the Manifest, while the loci within which He manifests are qualified by multiplicity. "Preparedness" (*isti'dād*) is the term he uses to describe the receptivity of individually created things and beings to the manifestation of God, each becoming a locus of manifestation according to its innate capacity.¹⁰ Although the terminology of al-Kāshānī and Rūzbihān are different, the basic concept is the same, that God created the world in such a way that truth and falsehood intermingle in an ambiguous way. Like al-Qushayrī and al-Maybudī, they distinguish between the *muḥkamāt* verses that send a message to all mankind and the *mutashābihāt* verses that are addressed to a few. The elitism here is not unique to Ṣūfīs but how the elite are defined is, as we shall see in the following section.

Those in whose hearts is a turning away and those who are firmly rooted in knowledge (*al-rāsikhūn fī'l-ilm*)

Qur'ān 3:7 describes two ways in which mankind responds to the ambiguous verses (*mutashābihāt*) in the Qur'ān. Those *in whose hearts there is a turning away* try to create discord by means of these verses, whereas *those who are firmly rooted in knowledge (*al-rāsikhūn fī'l-ilm*)* have faith in God's message as a unified whole. This part of the verse provoked extensive discussions in Qur'ānic exegesis concerning what constitutes sound interpretative methodology. The answer depends on how the *mutashābihāt* are defined. If the *mutashābihāt* are taken to refer to those events known only to God, such as future events, then *those firmly rooted in knowledge (*al-rāsikhūn fī'l-ilm*)* leave their interpretation to God.¹¹ This is al-Ṭabarī's preferred interpretation and the one which produces the clearest statement regarding the role of the interpreter. By narrowing the definition of the *mutashābihāt* to the verses of disconnected letters and the verses having to do with future events, al-Ṭabarī narrows the area of the unknowable in the Qur'ān, thereby emphasizing its clarity.

all of the verses of the Qur'ān that God revealed to His Messenger were revealed as a clear explanation (*bayān*) to him and his community and guidance to the worlds. It is not possible that anything could be included in it that they did not need, or anything that they did need but had no way of knowing by interpretation.

Since this is so, mankind has a need for everything in the Qur'ān even though there are some meanings they can do without and many meanings that they very much need. This is like when God says, *on a day when some of the signs of your Lord will come, no soul will benefit if it has not already believed or earned something good by means of its faith* (6:158). The prophet taught his community that the sign that God speaks of in this verse... is the rising of the sun from the west. What the worshippers needed to know was the time period in which repentance would benefit them without restricting it to years, months, or days. God explained this for them by means of the Book and clarified it for them by means of His messenger acting as an exegete (*mufasssīr*). They did not need to know the length of time between the revelation of this verse and the appearance of this sign. They had no need of knowing it for their religion or present life. It is knowledge that God has reserved for Himself exclusively and not His creation, and He has veiled it from them.¹²

The *muḥkamāt* consist of everything except the verses having to do with the future events and disconnected letters. Although these *mukḥamāt* verses could be interpreted in various ways, their intended meaning has been made clear elsewhere in the Qur'ān or in the explanations of the Prophet. The role of the religious scholar (*ʿālim*) is merely to present this intended meaning.

If the *mutashābihāt* are as we have described, everything else is *muḥkam* by virtue of its having only one meaning and one interpretation. No one hearing it would need any explanations for it. Or, it is clear despite its possessing many aspects and interpretations and the possibility of many meanings because there exists an indication to its intended meaning either through an explanation by God Himself or an explanation by His Messenger to his community. The knowledge of the religious scholars (*ʿulamāʾ*) in the community will not go beyond that because of what we have explained here.¹³

In keeping with his narrow definition of what constitutes the *mutashābihāt*, al-Ṭabarī prefers the reading of the verse that limits knowledge of the interpretation (*taʾwīl*) of the *mutashābihāt* to God alone, although he presents views from the Companions and Followers of the Prophet supporting the other reading as well. Because the verses with disconnected letters and those relating to future events make up a relatively small portion of the Qur'ānic text, al-Ṭabarī's preferred interpretation retains a broad role for the religious scholar in interpretation, since in this definition the *muḥkamāt* constitute the majority of the Qur'ān.

However, if the *mutashābihāt* are taken to refer to verses that can be interpreted in more than one way, then *those who are firmly rooted in knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fī 'l-'ilm)* are those who know how to interpret them in light of the *muḥkamāt*. Al-Ṭabarī quotes Ibn al-Zubayr as saying,

Then they refer the interpretation of the *mutashābiḥa* to what they know of the interpretation of the *muḥkama* that admit only one interpretation. The book is thereby harmonized by what they say, one part confirming another. By means of it, the proof (*ḥujja*) is established, victory appears, falsehood departs and infidelity is refuted.¹⁴

As for *those in whose hearts is a turning away*, they do the opposite, finding the meaning they want in the ambiguous verses, even when this meaning contradicts the clear verses.¹⁵

The Mu'tazilī commentator al-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144)¹⁶ gives examples of how this methodology works in his *Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl*, applying it to support Mu'tazilī views denying the possibility of seeing God and affirming man's absolute free will. According to al-Zamakhsharī, the Qur'ānic verse *Vision cannot encompass Him* (6:103) is the *muḥkam* verse to which the *mutashābih* verse *gazing at their Lord* (75:23) must be referred. The first verse is to be understood literally while the second must be interpreted in light of the literal truth of the first. Likewise, the *muḥkam* verse *God does not command what is shameful* (7:28) makes sense of the *mutashābih* verse *When We intend to destroy a town, We command those who live easy lives in it, and they act sinfully* (17:16), which otherwise would seem to suggest that God commands some people to sin.¹⁷

The problem with this interpretative methodology is that one person's *muḥkam* verse is easily another's *mutashābih* and vice versa. In the process, the potential exists for undermining the very message of the Qur'ān, a danger noted by the theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210)¹⁸ in his *Al-Taḥfīr al-kabīr*:

Know that among the apostates there is one who has attacked the Qur'ān because of its inclusion of the *mutashābihāt*. He said, "You say that the duties which mankind has been charged with are connected to this Qur'ān until the Coming of the Hour. Yet we see that [the disagreement over the *mutashābihāt*] reaches the point where each follower of a school of thought clings to it according to his own school, so that the Jabarite [determinist] clings to the verses of compulsion such as *We have placed veils upon their hearts lest they understand it, and heaviness in their ears* (6:25, 17:46, 18:57). The Qadarite [proponent of free will] says, "no, this is the school of infidels," indicating that God related this about the infidels when blaming them, saying, *They say our hearts are veiled from what you call us to and in our ears is a heaviness* (41:5) and in another place, *they say, "our hearts are enclosed in a covering"* (2:88, 4:155).

Similarly, the one who affirms the beatific vision clings to His words *on that day faces will be radiant, gazing towards their Lord* (75:22–3) and the denier clings to *Vision cannot encompass Him* (6:103). The one who affirms that God has direction clings to His words *they fear their Lord above them* (16:50) and His words *the Merciful sat upon the throne* (20:5), while the denier clings to His words *there is nothing like Him* (42:11).

Then each one calls the verse that agrees with his school *muḥkam* and the verses which disagree with his school *mutashābih*. Maybe the situation of preferring one verse over another derives from covert preference and weak positions. So how can it be fitting for the Wise to have made the Book that is the reference point for all of the religion until the Coming of the Hour thus? Wouldn't the objective be more likely attained if He had made it conspicuously evident and free of these *mutashābihāt*?¹⁹

After quoting this provocative question al-Rāzī provides several possible answers. He tells us that there are many religious scholars who believe that the difficulties of the *mutashābihāt* increase the reward for those who struggle to discover the truth, forcing them to exercise their minds, and freeing them from ignorance and uncritical faith (*taqlīd*). These verses also cause one to learn the methods of interpretation (*ta'wīlāt*) and preferring one (verse) over another (*tarjīḥ ba'dihā 'alā ba'd*). The strongest benefit, according to al-Rāzī, is that these verses facilitate comprehension of the more difficult aspects of God's attributes and actions for those with the capacity for such comprehension, while at the same time not confusing those for whom simple explanations are best.²⁰

Despite the dangers al-Rāzī outlines for the interpretative method of preferring one (verse) over another (*tarjīḥ ba'dihā 'alā ba'd*), he nonetheless accepts its validity and necessity, and attempts to establish guidelines for how this is to be done. Simply put, any expression in the Qur'ān that can be interpreted in more than one way must be interpreted by its more probable meaning (*rājiḥ*) unless there is a clear-cut indicator (*dalīl munfaṣil*) that demonstrates the absurdity of the apparent sense (*ẓāhir*). According to al-Rāzī, this clear-cut indicator (*dalīl munfaṣil*) can be either linguistic (*lafẓī*) or rational (*'aqlī*). However, even though a definitive rational indicator can demonstrate the absurdity of the probable meaning, the intended meaning remains a matter of conjecture (*ẓann*). Guessing is permissible only for legal matters where action is required, not for the fundamentals of faith.²¹

An example of the kinds of expressions al-Rāzī means here are the anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Qur'ān in verses such as *The Merciful sat upon His throne* (20:5). According to al-Rāzī, anthropomorphists (*mushabbihā*) seek to validate their beliefs with the apparent sense (*ẓāhir*) of this verse, even though it has been clearly established by reason (*thabata bi ṣarīḥ al-'aql*) that God cannot be characterized as confined in space. The anthropomorphists, then, are

among *those in whose hearts there is a turning away* because they try to support their false ideas by claiming that an ambiguous verse is a clear verse.²²

The interpreter's task, in al-Rāzī's opinion, is to correctly identify which verses are the clear verses and which are the ambiguous verses, working as "impartial verifiers" (*muḥaqqiqūn munṣifūn*) rather than proclaiming the verses that agree with their school of thought *muḥkamāt* and the verses which disagree with the same *mutashābihāt*. When it can be shown definitively that the apparent sense of a verse is impossible, the sound interpreter knows that what is intended is a figurative expression (*majāz*) for its reality (*ḥaqīqa*). However, figurative expressions are capable of many meanings and the preference of one over another can only be a linguistic preference. Since this is not definitive proof, it is not permissible. Accordingly, when *those who are firmly rooted in knowledge* (*al-rāsikhūn fī 'l-ilm*) and *those who possess understanding* (*ūlū al-albāb*) see something ambiguous in the Qur'ān, they accept that it has a sound meaning with God and believe in it without knowing its exact meaning. Al-Rāzī, then, prefers the reading of this verse that stops after *and no one knows its interpretation except God*.²³ However, far from belittling the role of the commentator, al-Rāzī understands this verse as praise for those who do exegesis correctly.

This verse indicates the grandeur of the situation of the theologians (*mutakallimūn*) who search for rational indicators (*al-dalā'il al-'aqliyya*) and by means of them seek knowledge of the essence, qualities, and acts of God.²⁴

Al-Rāzī is following the views of his fellow Ash'arī al-Ghazālī here, who makes three recommendations in his *Qānūn al-ta'wīl* for dealing with verses whose literal meaning seems to contradict knowledge obtained by the intellect (*ma'qūl*). The first is not to aspire to fully know the meaning of these verses. The second is to accept that interpretation is unavoidable because reason does not lie. The third recommendation is to refrain from specifying an interpretation when the [various] possibilities [of interpretation] are incompatible.²⁵ The best recourse is to say,

I know that its literal meaning is not what is intended, because it contains what is contrary to reason. What exactly is intended, however, I do not know, nor do I have a need to know, since it is not related to any action, and there is no way truly to uncover [its meaning] with certainty. Moreover, I do not believe in making judgements by guessing... This means that one should say, "We believe therein; the whole is from our Lord" (3:7).²⁶

Others, such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328),²⁷ a fierce critic of the writings of al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī, asserted that the literal sense of the Qur'ānic text must never be abandoned, whether that abandonment is through interpretation (*ta'wīl*)

or through entrusting its meaning to God (*tafwīd*). Ibn Taymiyya's insistence upon staying with the literal sense was not a rejection of the use of reason, but rather was based on the claim that true reason will never be in contradiction with the Qur'ān and sound *aḥādīth*.²⁸ He defines his own methodology of sound interpretation based entirely on these sources, a methodology which we will examine in Chapter 5.

Although al-Ghazālī limits the role of reason in his *Qanūn al-ta'wīl* and the permissibility of interpreting the *mutashābihāt*, he makes a significant exception to this rule in a book written towards the end of his life, *Iljām al-'awāmm 'an 'ilm al-kalām*. The book addresses the problem of traditions attributed to the first generations of Muslims (*salaf*) that appear to interpret anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Qur'ān literally. Al-Ghazālī not only denies that the *salaf* ever interpreted these passages literally, but also claims that they established guidelines detailing how the general public ('*awāmm*) should understand them. According to al-Ghazālī, the general public should avoid literal interpretations of anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'ān while, at the same time, avoiding any attempt to understand their true, non-literal meanings. They should avoid paraphrasing the text or engaging in theological proofs and arguments regarding them. Instead, they should accept that these verses do have a meaning that is fitting to God, but a meaning that can only be understood by the Prophet, his leading Companions, saints (*awliyā'*), and *those firmly rooted in knowledge* (*al-rāsikhūn fī 'l-'ilm*). The *mutashābihāt*, then, are primarily addressed to an elite.

If you were to say, "What is the benefit in speaking to mankind about something which they do not understand?" Your answer is that the goal of this speaking is to facilitate the understanding of those who are worthy of it: the saints (*awliyā'*) and those firmly rooted in knowledge (*al-rāsikhūn fī 'l-'ilm*).²⁹

Important here is the definition that al-Ghazālī provides for what he means by the general public ('*awāmm*) on the one hand, and the saints and *those firmly rooted in knowledge* on the other. He includes in the first category the litterateur (*adīb*), the grammarian, the *ḥadīth* specialist (*muḥaddith*), the exegete (*mufasssīr*), the jurist, and the theologian (*mutakallim*). None of these people should attempt interpretations (*ta'wīlāt*), nor act freely with the external sense of the words (*al-taṣarruf fī khilāl al-ẓawāhir*) of the Qur'ān or traditions. Al-Ghazālī warns that it is prohibited (*ḥarām*) to plunge into the sea if you are not a good swimmer, and the sea of gnosis (*ma'rifa*) of God is far more dangerous than the sea of water. Those who are permitted to interpret the difficult passages of the Qur'ān are

those who devote themselves exclusively to learning to swim in the seas of religious gnosis (*ma'rifa*); who restrict their lives to Him alone; who turn their faces from this world and the appetites; who turn their backs on money and fame, mankind, and all other pleasures; who devote themselves to God in the different types of knowledge and actions; who act

in accordance with all the ordinances of the religious law and its courtesies (*ādāb*) in performing the obediences and avoiding the objectionable; who have emptied out their hearts from everything except God; who despise the world and even the Hereafter and the Highest Paradise next to love of God. They are the divers in the sea of gnosis.³⁰

In shifting to metaphorical language, al-Ghazālī signals his shift from theologian to Ṣūfī. The only people qualified to interpret the *mutashābihāt*, after the Prophet and some of his immediate followers, are the Ṣūfīs, and their methodology is that of Ṣūfī practice.

Al-Ghazālī frequently functions, as he does here, as an apologist for Ṣūfism, and we will examine some of his many attempts to defend Ṣūfī Qur'ānic interpretation in more detail later. For now, however, we will move on to what other Ṣūfīs have to say in less apologetic works about how *those firmly rooted in knowledge* approach the *mutashābihāt* of the Qur'ān. The echoes of the discussions we have seen so far regarding verse 3:7 can be heard in these works, but take second place to the claim that there are some who receive knowledge directly from God concerning the ambiguous passages of the Qur'ān. Here is what al-Qushayrī has to say about those firmly rooted in knowledge (*al-rāsikhūn fī 'l-ilm*):

The way of those whose knowledge is firmly rooted (*al-'ulamā' al-rasūkh*) in seeking its meaning is in accordance with the fundamentals (*uṣūl*). Whatever their investigation obtains is acceptable and whatever resists the effect of their reflection (*fikr*) they surrender to the World of the Unseen.

The way of the people of allusion and understanding (*ahl al-ishāra wa'l-fahm*) is listening with the presence of the heart (*ḥuḍūr al-qalb*), so that the object of their levels of understanding (*fuhūm*), appearing from the things that are made known, is based upon the allusions of unveiling (*ishārāt al-kashf*).³¹

Again making a distinction between public and private interpretation, al-Qushayrī notes that those who receive this knowledge should not share it with others without being commanded to do so.

If they have been asked to maintain the veil and conceal the secret, they feign dumbness. If they have been commanded to reveal and proclaim, they freely release the elucidation of the Truth and speak from knowledge received from the Unseen.³²

Al-Qushayrī uses metaphors to describe those who understand these deeper meanings and those who do not.

Those who have been confirmed with the lights of insights (*anwār al-baṣā'ir*) are illuminated by the rays of the suns of understanding

(*fahm*). Those who have been clothed in a covering of doubt have been denied the subtleties of actualization, so that states (*aḥwāl*) divide them and mere conjectures (*ẓunūn*) plague them, and they are swept away in the wadis of doubt and deception. They only become more and more ignorant, more and more estranged through their uncertainty.³³

Rūzbihān al-Baqlī gives one possible explanation for why some can legitimately interpret the ambiguous verses while others should not. He writes that those who understand the meanings of the *mutashābihāt* see God in everything without falling into the trap of believing that God is incarnated in the world, while those who do not understand this mystery create chaos when they try to interpret them.

As for those in whose hearts is a turning away, they follow what is mutashābih in it. The people of blind imitation (*taqlīd*) plunge into the *mutashābihāt*, seeking unity (*tawḥīd*), but are cut off from witnessing it because they are the victims of illusion (*aṣḥāb al-wahm*), and the victim of illusion does not recognize the truth of temporally originated things (*al-ashyāʾ al-muḥdatha*). How can he recognize the existence of the Truth (*ḥaqq*) by the mark (*rasm*) of illusion? If he tries to seek the different kinds of knowledge of the *mutashābihāt*, he will not reach the truth regarding them and may create discord (*fitna*). It is because of this that the Prophet said, “Reflect upon the bounties of God, not His Essence.” One who has not traversed the seas of the realities of certainty has not seen the mirror of realization. The distinguishing mark (*rasm*) of the *mutashābihāt* falls short of that which has been marked for his faith. He does not grasp their meanings because this is the station of the lovers (*ahl al-ʿishq*) who see the Truth (*ḥaqq*) in everything. As one of the people of meanings (*ahl al-maʿānī*) said, “I do not see anything without seeing God in it.” This is the description of the manifestation of the Divine self-disclosure (*tajallī*) in the mirror of engendered existence (*kawn*). But this does not mean that God is in things because He is free from all forms of incarnation (*ḥulūl*).³⁴

Because *those firmly rooted in knowledge* are inwardly rooted in the knowledge of how things really are, they are outwardly calm, courageous, and self-effacing before life’s vicissitudes.

Those firmly rooted in knowledge are those who witness the quality of spirits (*arwāḥ*) [existing] prior to the bodies (*ashbāḥ*) in the court of pre-eternity, who have seen with their own eyes the concealed secrets of the particulars of the eternal types of knowledge. They have understood from them the end results of their situation in the pathways of subsistence (*baqāʾ*). They are firmly rooted in the sea of the source of certainty (*ʿayn al-yaqīn*) and are not agitated by the appearance of worldly authorities

who are characterized by change, transformation, deceit and treachery. They are not overwhelmed by acts of force and the fear they arouse; they stand firm before the blows of God, standing firm with God in that which appears from Him bearing the mark of effacement (*maḥw*) and obliteration (*tams*). They know that all of it is a trial and a test, so they remain tranquil in servanthood (*'ubūdiyya*) as their outward distinguishing mark and are firmly rooted in the witnessing of lordliness (*rubūbiyya*) in their inward absolute reality.³⁵

Once again al-Kāshānī expresses a similar idea using different terminology. *Those who are firmly rooted in knowledge* are those who see unity and not multiplicity, the abiding face and not the appearance of multiplicity in the mirrors of created things. Al-Kāshānī understands the scholarly tradition of interpretation of referring the *mutashābihāt* to the *muḥkamāt* as interpretation through this mode of perception.

The gnostic verifiers (*al-'ārifūn al-muḥaqqiqūn*),³⁶ who recognize the abiding face in whatever form or outward appearance it takes, recognize the true face among the various faces which the *mutashābihāt* take and they refer them to the *muḥkamāt*, following the example of the poet:

There is only one face yet
when you count the qualities there is multiplicity.

Those who are veiled, *those in whose hearts is a turning away* from the Truth, *seek what is mutashābih* because of their being veiled by multiplicity from unity. The verifiers follow the *muḥkam*, subordinating the *mutashābih* to it and choosing from its possible aspects what conforms to their religion (*dīn*) and school of thought (*madhhab*). *Seeking discord*, i.e. seeking to mislead themselves and others. *And seeking its interpretation* (*ta'wīl*) according to what conforms to their state (*ḥāl*) and method (*tarīq*). When the knife is crooked, its scabbard becomes crooked. Because they do not recognize the one abiding face among the other faces, it necessarily follows that they do not recognize the true meaning among the other [possible] meanings.³⁷

According to the Ṣūfīs, the knowledge of *those who are firmly rooted in knowledge* is not like the knowledge of religious scholars, but neither does it contradict it. One of the earliest writers on this topic, al-Tustarī, explains that their knowledge comes from their detachment from ordinary passion – a detachment which opens up the possibility of being granted profound knowledge directly from God of the many levels of meaning in the Qur'ān.

Those firmly rooted in knowledge. It has been related from 'Alī that they are those whom knowledge protects from the intrusion of passion

(*hawā*) and arguments presented without [knowledge of] hidden things (*al-ghuyūb*), because God has guided them and given them power over his hidden secrets in the treasures of the different kinds of knowledge (*‘ulūm*). They say, “*We believe in it*,” and God is thankful to them and has made them the people of firmrootedness (*ahl al-rusūkh*) and extraordinary accomplishment in knowledge, an increase from Him, just as He said, *Say, “Lord, increase me in knowledge”* (20:114).

God made an exception for *those firmly rooted in knowledge* in their saying, “*all of it is from our Lord*,” meaning the abrogating and the abrogated, the *muḥkam* and the *mutashābih*. They are those who have uncovered (*kāshifūn*) three kinds of knowledge, since those who know (*‘ulamā’*) are of three kinds: those who devote themselves exclusively to knowledge of their Lord (*rabbāniyyūn*), those who devote themselves exclusively to knowing the Light (*nurāniyyūn*), and those who devote themselves exclusively to knowing the Essence (*dhātiyyūn*).³⁸ Additionally, there are four kinds of knowledge: revelation (*wahy*), God’s self-disclosure (*tajallī*), [knowledge] from what is near [to Him] (*‘indī*) and [knowledge] from [His very presence] (*ladunī*), as in His words *We gave him mercy from Us (alaynāhu raḥmat^{an} min ‘indinā) and taught knowledge to him from Our very presence (‘allamnāhu min ladunnā ‘ilm^{an})* (18:65).³⁹

In his comments on *but no one remembers except those who possess understanding*, al-Kāshānī adds detachment from habit (*‘āda*) as another prerequisite for receiving deeper understanding. He also uses the etymology of the word *albāb* from the phrase *those who possess understanding (ūlū al-albāb)*⁴⁰ to create a metaphor for the transformation that is necessary to become wise. *Lubb* (pl. *lubūb*) means the choicest part or the kernel of foods such as nuts or wheat and *lubāb* (pl. *albāb*), from the same root, is the choicest part of anything. When said of a man, it means his intellect or understanding.⁴¹ Referring implicitly to this dual meaning, al-Kāshānī compares the “kernels” of the wise to the “husks” of the more ordinary human characteristics.

*And no one remembers that singular and decisive knowledge (al-‘ilm al-wāḥid al-faṣl) within the ambiguous and manifold particulars (al-tafāṣīl al-mutashābiha al-mutakaththira) except those whose intellects (‘uqūl) have been purified by the light of guidance and freed from the husk (qishr)⁴² of passion (hawā) and habit (‘āda).*⁴³

Al-Nisābūrī uses the metaphor of husks and kernels somewhat differently in his commentary on this verse. For al-Kāshānī, the contrast is between those who perceive unity and those who perceive multiplicity. For al-Nisābūrī, the contrasts are between ego existence and spiritual existence, the knowledge acquired in this

life (*‘ulūm kasbiyya*) and knowledge given directly to man by God (*‘ilm ladunī*) on the Day of the Covenant.⁴⁴

And no one remembers except those possessing understanding (ūlū al-albāb), those who follow the example of the Prophet, leaving the darkness of the husks (qushūr) of their ego existence (wujūduhum al-naḥsānī) for the light of the kernel (lubāb) of their spiritual existence (wujūduhum al-rūḥānī). They are those who are firmly rooted in the husks of the acquired types of knowledge (al-‘ulūm al-kasbiyya) and who have reached the realities of the kernel (lubāb) of types of knowledge received from His very presence (al-‘ulūm al-laduniyya) from the very presence of one who is Wise, Knowing (min ladun ḥakīm khabīr) (11:1).

In the verse there is an allusion (*ishāra*) to the fact that the types of knowledge of *those who are firmly rooted* were all taught to them on the Day of the Covenant (*al-mithāq*), since He disclosed the attribute of lordship to the seeds of future humanity *and He made them testify regarding themselves* (7:172) by the evidence of lordship, *Am I not your Lord?* (7:172). Through the witnessing of this evidence, the knowledge of unity (*tawḥīd*) was firmly embedded in the natural disposition (*jibla*) of the seeds of future humanity and *they said, "Yes."* All of the different types of knowledge are included in the knowledge of unity, just as He said, *and He taught Adam all of the names* (2:31).

The seeds were sent back to the loins and were veiled by the attributes of humanity (*ṣifāt al-bashariyya*), and were transferred to wombs and wandered through the ages from one state and place to another, from the most remote places to the process of birth. The speaking soul, which knew the knowledge of unity, was sent back to the lowest of the low forms, veiled in the veil of humanity, forgetful of these different types of knowledge and the speech regarding them.

But then his parents remind him of this knowledge by means of symbols (*rumūz*) and analogies (*qarā’in*) until he remembers some of them from beneath the veils of human nature and stages of development. He speaks in the language of his parents, not the language with which he answered his Lord, saying, “Yes.” For that language was the kernel (*lubb*) of this language that is the husk (*qishr*). In a similar way, the entire outer and inner existence of man are husks of the kernel (*lubāb*) of that existence which heard and answered on the Day of the Covenant. His hearing is the husk of that hearing which listened to the speech of the Truth. His sight is the husk of that sight which saw the beauty of the Truth. His heart is the husk of that heart which understood the speech of the Truth. All of his different types of knowledge are the husk of those types of knowledge which were learned from the Truth.

Thus, the Prophet was only sent to remind him of the truth of these different types of knowledge, the husk of which his parents had reminded him, just as He said, *Remind! You are only a reminder!* (88:21). So the reminding is for everyone (*al-tadhkīru ‘āmm*) but only a few remember (*al-tadhakkuru khāṣṣ*). Because of this, He said, *and no one remembers except those who possess understanding (ūlū al-albāb)*.⁴⁵

What distinguishes the Ṣūfī understanding of *those who are firmly rooted in knowledge* from other viewpoints is primarily their understanding of what type of knowledge is involved. Most Muslim thinkers accepted some combination of reason, authoritative tradition, and linguistic expertise as valid tools for interpreting the Qur’ān. For the Ṣūfīs, the sciences based on these tools are part of what al-Nīsābūrī calls acquired knowledge (*‘ulūm kasbiyya*). The sciences that lead to deeper knowledge of the Qur’ān’s meaning, however, are received directly from God (*‘ilm ladunī*). In Chapter 3, we will see the relationship between this type of knowledge and spiritual practice.

UNCOVERING MEANING

Knowledge and spiritual practice

For the Ṣūfīs, knowledge cannot be separated from spiritual practice. Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (d. 988)¹ explains this view in his *Kitāb al-luma'*, one of the earliest books to discuss the methodology of Ṣūfī Qur'ānic interpretation. According to Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, the Ṣūfīs are characterized by their practical application (*isti'māl*) of the verses of the Qur'ān and the Traditions of the Prophet, which produces noble qualities, virtuous actions, and higher states, all of which are implied in the word *adab*. Although this manner of acting in imitation of the Prophet is also discussed in the books of scholars (*'ulamā'*) and jurists (*fuqahā'*), al-Sarrāj claims that their understanding of these behaviors and attitudes is not as deep as their understanding of other sciences. He states that it is the Ṣūfīs who alone understand the various realities and attributes of states such as repentance (*tawba*), piety (*wara'*), trust in God (*tawakkul*), contentment (*riḍā'*), to name just a few. The people who experience these states attain them in various degrees according to what God has apportioned to them.²

In addition to their experience of states, the Ṣūfīs are also characterized by their knowledge of the soul (*nafs*), its characteristics and inclinations, the subtleties of hypocrisy (*riyā'*), hidden lust (*al-shahwāt al-khafīyya*), and hidden polytheism (*al-shirk al-khafī*). They know how to rid themselves of these vices by turning to God and giving up any sense of one's own ability and power.³

The Ṣūfīs are distinguished as well by what they have discovered (*mustanbaṭāt*) in sciences that are difficult for jurists and scholars to understand. Their ability to loosen the knots and understand what is difficult comes from their sacrificing the very core of their beings (*badhl al-muhajj*), so that when they speak of these discoveries, they speak from direct experience of them.⁴ Because of what they have discovered, the people of understanding (*fahm*) among the actualized (*muḥaqqiqūn*) conform to the Qur'ān and the practice of the Prophet externally (*ẓāhir^{an}*) and internally (*bāṭin^{an}*). When they act in this manner, God grants knowledge to them of the deeper meanings of the Qur'ān and Traditions of the Prophet.⁵

This last passage from Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj alludes to a *ḥadīth* that is cited in full by al-Ghazālī in his discussion of the relationship between certain kinds of knowledge and behavior in his *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān*.

Maybe you will say, “So demonstrate the purpose of the relationship between the two worlds, and why visions are by similitude (*al-mithāl*) and not the unambiguous (*al-ṣarīḥ*), and why the Prophet used to see Gabriel often in a form other than his own but only saw him twice in his own form.”

Know that you have become arrogant and have reached quite a height if you think that the knowledge of this can come to you all at once without your undertaking the task of preparing yourself to receive it by discipline (*riyāḍa*), effort (*mujāhada*), complete renunciation of the world, disengagement from the tumult of creation, utter immersion in love of the Creator, and the search for Truth. Knowledge like this will be withheld from the likes of you and it will be said,

You have come
in order to learn the secret of my happiness
but you will find me stingy with it.

Let go of your greed to attain this knowledge by means of exchanging treatises. Seek it only through the door of effort (*mujāhada*) and piety (*taqwā*). Then guidance will follow and strengthen your effort, just as God said, *We will surely guide to Our paths those who have struggled (jāhadū) for Us* (29:69). And the Prophet said, “For anyone who practically applies what he knows, God will bequeath knowledge of what he does not know.”⁶

Linking the bestowal of knowledge to practice and behavior was not unique to the Ṣūfīs but the emphasis they placed on it was. Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 1021) quotes a ninth century Ṣūfī as saying, “The whole of Sufism is ways of behavior (*al-taṣawwuf kulluhu ādāb*).”⁷

Reading the Qur’ān with presence of the heart (*ḥuḍūr al-qalb*)

Among the manners (*ādāb*) that the Ṣūfīs tried to cultivate was a respectful and thoughtful way of reciting or listening to the Qur’ān, intended to facilitate the understanding of its deeper meanings. Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj writes that

The people of understanding (*fahm*) among the people of knowledge (*‘ilm*) know that the only way to correctly connect to that to which the Qur’ān guides us is by pondering (*tadabbur*), reflecting (*tafakkur*), being wakeful (*tayaqquḥ*), recollecting (*tadhakkur*) and being present with the heart (*ḥuḍūr al-qalb*) when reciting the Qur’ān. They know this as well from His words, *A book which We have sent down to you as a blessing so that they might ponder its verses and so that those who possess understanding might recollect* (38:29). Pondering, reflecting and recollecting are only possible through the heart being present because God said,

*surely in that there is a remembrance for one who has a heart (qalb) or will lend an ear with presence (aw alqā al-sam'a wa huwa shahid) (50:37), that is to say, one who is present with the heart (hādir al-qalb).*⁸

There were several different ways in which Ṣūfīs tried to awaken themselves to the task of listening with presence of the heart. One way was to remind themselves of the awesome nature of the revelation and its transcendent origins. An oft-repeated quote is attributed to Ja'far al-Šādiq saying, "I swear by God that God has disclosed himself (*tajallā*) to His creation in His speech but they do not see."⁹ Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī writes in his *Qūt al-qulūb* of a man from the first generations (*salaf*) who used to read a *sūra* and, if his heart wasn't in it, he would repeat it a second time.¹⁰ Another method is recorded in Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj's *Kitāb al-luma'* and attributed to Abū Sa'īd al-Kharrāz (d. 899):

There are three ways to listen and to be present while listening. The first is to listen to the Qur'ān as if you were hearing the Messenger of God recite it to you.

Then you should rise from this and hear it as if Gabriel was reciting it to the Prophet, because Allah said, *and surely it is the revelation of the Lord of the worlds. The trustworthy spirit descends with it upon your heart* (26:192–4).

Then you should rise from this so that it is as if you were hearing it from God (*al-ḥaqq*). That is God saying, *We revealed the Qur'ān which is a healing and a mercy to the believers* (17:84), and His words, *the revelation of the Book is from God, the exalted, the wise* (39:1) and it is as if you were hearing it from God most High. Likewise, *Hā. Mīm. The revelation of the Book is from God, the exalted, the knowing* (40:1).

In your listening [as if you were hearing it] from God, understanding (*fahm*) is brought out by the presence of your heart (*ḥuḍūr al-qalb*) and your being devoid of any preoccupation with the world and your self by the power of witnessing (*mushāhada*), the purity of remembrance (*dhikr*), focused attention (*jam' al-hamm*), good manners (*ḥusn al-adab*), purity of the innermost secret (*sirr*) and sincerity of realization (*ṣidq al-tahqīq*).¹¹

The result of this approach is described as both sweet and awesome. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī tells us that a scholar said:

I used to read the Qur'ān but found no sweetness in it until I recited it as if I was hearing the Messenger of God reciting it to his Companions. Then I rose to a station above it and I recited it as if I was hearing Gabriel presenting it to the Messenger of God. Then God brought me to another way station and now I hear it from the Speaker. Here I found from it a blessing and delight I could not resist!¹²

He then tells the story of Ja'far al-Šādiq who was overcome by something during prayers and fainted. When he came, he was asked about it and said, "I kept repeating the verse in my heart until I heard it from its Speaker and my body was unable to stand firm when I saw His power."¹³ Al-Kāshānī quotes this tradition from Ja'far al-Šādiq and then relates his own experience:

Frequently, I used to engage in reciting the Qur'ān and pondering its meanings by means of the faculty of faith. In spite of diligence in devotions, my breast was tight and my heart was agitated, my heart neither opening because of these meanings, nor my Lord turning me away from them, until finally I became familiar and intimate with them. I tasted the sweetness of their cup and their drink. Then my soul was animated, my breast opened, my mind broadened, my heart expanded, my innermost secret made spacious, the moment (*waqt*) and the state (*ḥāl*) made pleasant, and my spirit delighted by that opening. It was as if continually, morning and evening, meanings were being unveiled to me in every verse such as would fatigue my tongue to describe. There could be no power adequate to contain them, nor enumerate them, nor any strength patient enough to divulge and disclose them.¹⁴

As in many other aspects of Sūfī piety, the various methods towards mindful reading were systematized by al-Ghazālī in his *Iḥyā'*, drawing upon much of the material found in Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī's *Qūt al-qulūb*,¹⁵ expanding it and arranging it neatly into ten categories regarding the external courtesies of recitation (*ẓāhir ādāb al-tilāwa*) and ten categories regarding inner practices in the recitation of the Qur'ān (*a'māl al-bāṭin fī tilāwat al-Qur'ān*).¹⁶ The external courtesies, which will not be discussed here, have to do with the ritual state of the reciter, where and when he recites, the quantity, speed, volume and beauty with which he recites, the advisability of weeping while reciting, the ritual prostrations and supplications in reciting, and how the Qur'ān is to be written down.¹⁷ The inner practices are as follows:

- 1 Understanding the exaltedness and grandeur of the speech of the Qur'ān, and God's grace and kindness to His creation in His descending from his exalted throne to the level of their understanding. One of the examples used to explain this is a story of a wise man (*ḥakīm*) who preached to a king. The King asks him how it is that man is able to bear the speech of God. The wise man tells him that God's speaking to man is similar to man's speaking to the animals, descending to their level through the use of sounds and whistles. It is also like the Sun, the full gaze of which man is unable to bear, and yet he is able to attain what he needs from it.¹⁸
- 2 Exaltation of the Speaker. The reciter must be mindful¹⁹ of the majesty of the Speaker, knowing that what he reads is not the speech of man, and that there is an extreme danger in reciting the speech of God. Just as only the ritually pure may touch the Qur'ān, only the inward part of the heart that is pure and illuminated by the light of exaltation and reverence will be able to understand

- its inner meaning. The act of exaltation of the Speaker will come about only when the reciter reflects upon the attributes, majesty, and acts of God.²⁰
- 3 Presence of the heart (*ḥuḍūr al-qalb*) and abandonment of the talk of the soul (*ḥadīth al-naḥs*). Al-Ghazālī seems to be talking here about distracting thoughts. He says that a gnostic was asked, “When you read the Qur’ān does your soul talk about anything?” He said, “What would be more beloved to me than the Qur’ān so that my soul would talk of it?” This kind of mindfulness follows from the previously mentioned exaltation that creates an intimacy without any inattentiveness, as the reciter finds unending delights in the Qur’ān.²¹
 - 4 Pondering (*tadabbur*). Pondering goes beyond being present with the heart (*ḥuḍūr al-qalb*), for one might not be reflecting on anything but the Qur’ān yet nevertheless be merely hearing it without pondering it. Al-Ghazālī tells us that this is the purpose of reciting the Qur’ān and it is why it is recommended to read it in a slow and distinct manner (*tartīl*). He quotes ‘Alī b. Abū Ṭālib as saying, “There is no good in an act of worship without comprehension, nor in a recitation without pondering.”²² Al-Ghazālī’s distinction here between the presence of the heart (*ḥuḍūr al-qalb*) and pondering (*tadabbur*) is not one made by other Ṣūfī authors, who seem to use *ḥuḍūr al-qalb* as shorthand for all of the methods used in listening attentively. For example, Al-Qushayrī writes, “the method (*sabīl*) of the people of allusion (*ishāra*) and understanding (*fahm*) is listening with the presence of the heart (*ḥuḍūr al-qalb*).”²³
 - 5 Trying to understand (*tafahhum*). This is to seek to clarify each verse in a suitable manner by contemplating the meanings of the attributes and works of God, and the circumstances of the prophets and the people to which they were sent.²⁴
 - 6 The abandonment of the obstacles to understanding (*fahm*). Al-Ghazālī says that the veils to understanding are four: too much concern for the correct articulation of letters; rigidity and zealotry in following (*taqlīd*) a school of thought (*madhhab*) instead of allowing for insight (*baṣīra*) and witnessing (*mushāhada*); persistence in sin, being prideful, or being afflicted in general with a passion for the world with which one complies; belief that there are no meanings of the Qur’ān other than those transmitted from Ibn ‘Abbās,²⁵ Mujaḥid²⁶ and others, and that all other commentary is that from prohibited personal opinion (*tafsīr bi’l-ra’y*).²⁷
 - 7 Personal application (*takhṣīs*). The reader should assume that every message in the Qur’ān is meant for him. Since God’s message is intended for all people, it is intended for each individual. Al-Ghazālī here is inviting people to contextualize the text to their own experience, for if the reader assumes that he himself is being spoken to by God, he will not consider the study of the Qur’ān as work but, rather, will meditate upon it and act in accordance with it.²⁸
 - 8 Affectivity (*ta’aththur*). His heart should be affected by the tenor of different verses, so that for everything which he understands, his heart will be connected to a state (*ḥāl*) or strong emotion (*wajd*) such as grief (*ḥuzn*), fear (*khawf*), hope (*rajā’*), and so on. When his knowledge is perfected, the

predominant state of his heart will be awe (*khashya*), for constriction (*tadyīq*) predominates in the verses of the Qur'ān. Therefore, he will notice that the mention of forgiveness and mercy is connected to conditions that he has yet to fulfill. The Qur'ān is meant to attract these states and to cause one to act on it; otherwise, the trouble of moving the tongue with its letters is insignificant.²⁹

- 9 Ascent (*taraqqī*). Al-Ghazālī repeats the three stations of reciting the Qur'ān from Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī's *Qūt al-qulūb* and elaborates. The first station is the servant who assumes he is reading to God, standing before him, and He sees him and hears him. His state is one of petitioning, adulation, imploring, and supplicating. The second station is when he witnesses with his heart that God sees him and speaks to him with His kindnesses and whispers to him with His blessings and beneficence. Therefore, his state is one of modesty, exaltation, attentiveness (*iṣghā'*) and understanding (*fahm*). The third station is when he sees the Speaker in the speech and the Attributes in the words. Therefore, he does not look to himself, nor to his reading, nor to his blessings but rather, his attention is confined to the Speaker, his reflection devoted to him as he is immersed in witnessing the Speaker to the exclusion of anything else.³⁰
- 10 Disavowal (*tabrī'*). This is the disavowal of one's own ability and power, and of considering oneself with approval and self-validation. The reciter will not consider himself among those who are pious, although he hopes to join them. Instead, he should view himself as one among those who are disobedient and negligent.³¹

METHODS OF INTERPRETATION

Beyond describing how to prepare oneself for reading the Qur'ān, Ṣūfīs also wrote more specifically about their exegetical methodologies, referred to by a variety of different words or phrases. Most avoided using the term *tafsīr*, reserving this instead for what they called exoteric Qur'ānic interpretation.

Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj and the methods of understanding (*fahm*) and allusion (*ishāra*)

Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj tells us that there are three things that the sound interpreter will never do: change the word order of the Qur'ān; forget his basic servanthood by contesting the divinity; and distort words. Although he gives no examples of the first two errors, he illustrates word distortion (*taḥrīf*) with several examples. Here are two of them:

This is like what is related about someone who, when asked about His words, *When Job cried to his Lord, "Truly I have been touched by distress (massanī al-ḍurr)"* (21:83), said that its meaning was, "I have *not* been touched by distress (*mā sā'anī al-ḍurr*)."¹ We have heard that someone else, when asked about His words, *Did He not find you an orphan (yatīm) and give (you) shelter?* (93:6), said that the meaning of *yatīm* was understood [not as an orphan but] as the singular, incomparable pearl (*al-durra al-yatīma allatī lā yūjadu mithlahā*).¹

In contrast to these interpretative errors, Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj gives examples from two methods he deems to be correct Ṣūfī exegesis, the method of understanding (*ṭarīq al-fahm*) and the method of allusion (*ṭarīq al-ishāra*). One of several examples he gives to illustrate the method of understanding is from Abū Bakr al-Kattānī (d. 934) on Qur'ān 26:89, *only the one who brings to God a sound heart*.

According to the method of understanding (*fahm*), the sound heart is of three types: One of them is the one who comes to God with a heart in which there is no partner to God; the second is the one who comes to

God with a heart uninterested in anything but God, not desiring anything but God; and the third is the one who comes to God, existing only in Him, having been annihilated from all things in God, and then annihilated from God in God.²

Another example is from al-Shiblī (d. 945), who was asked about Qur’ān 50:37:

Truly in this is a remembrance for the one who has a heart or will lend an ear with presence, and he said, “For the one for whom God is his heart,” and then he recited, “From me to You, a heart has no meaning. From me to You, every one of my limbs is a heart.”³

These interpretations do not radically change the topic of the verses but rather meditate upon the meaning of the phrases “sound heart” or “listening with presence.” The controversial aspect of the interpretations has more to do with the fact of the inclusion of such Ṣūfī concepts as the annihilation of the self which was strenuously opposed by some Muslims.

The examples Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj gives for the allusive method of interpretation (*ṭarīq al-ishāra*), on the other hand, demonstrate far-reaching interpretative analogies which constitute a far more problematic kind of exegetical methodology. He quotes Abū Yazīd al-Biṣṭāmī (d. 874) who, when asked about gnosis (*maʿrifa*), replied with an allegorical interpretation of a Qur’ānic verse from the story of the prophet Sulaymān and the queen Bilqīs.

He said, *Truly, when kings enter a village, they destroy it and debase the exalted among its inhabitants. This is the way they behave* (27:34). What is meant by that is that it is the custom of kings, when they descend upon a village, to enslave its people and make them submissive to them, so that they can do nothing without the command of the king. Likewise, when gnosis (*maʿrifa*) enters the heart (*qalb*), nothing remains in it that it does not uproot, and nothing moves in it that it does not burn.⁴

In the story of Bilqīs and Sulaymān, these words are spoken by Bilqīs, demonstrating her political sagacity in trying to avoid a violent confrontation with Sulaymān’s forces. Al-Biṣṭāmī creates an analogy between the force of an invading king and a powerful knowledge that seizes the heart completely.

Another example Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj gives of this method is attributed to al-Junayd (d. 910). Considered a more “sober” Ṣūfī than al-Biṣṭāmī, his allusive interpretation demonstrates the acceptability of this kind of interpretation for most Ṣūfīs.

When asked about his silence and lack of movement during the spiritual concert (*samāʿ*), al-Junayd alluded to His words, *and you see the mountains, thinking them to be firmly fixed, but they will pass as the clouds pass: the artistry of God who perfects everything* (27:88).⁵

The verse is part of a passage describing the events of the Day of Judgment, but al-Junayd applies it here to his spiritual state in the present world.

This method of allusion (*ṭarīq al-ishāra*) is the more problematic of the two methods that Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj describes because it goes beyond the literal sense of the text. The controversial nature of this kind of interpretation is addressed some 200 years later in the writings of al-Ghazālī, who attempts to distinguish the method from that of the *bāṭiniyya* and philosophers.

Al-Ghazālī and the method of striking similitudes (*ḍarb al-mithāl*)

Al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāṭ al-anwār* is a book that includes both a methodology for Qur'ānic interpretation and al-Ghazālī's interpretation of the Light Verse of the Qur'an. Al-Ghazālī calls the methodology "the secret and method of creating similitudes (*sirr al-tamthīl wa minhājihī*)"⁶ or "the method of striking similitudes (*minhāj ḍarb al-mithāl*)."⁷ The phrase *ḍarb al-mathal* or *ḍarb al-amthāl* is used twenty-seven times in various forms in the Qur'ān – mostly to describe the analogies and parables created by God to explain things to mankind.

Al-Ghazālī connects the method of "striking similitudes" to the existence of two worlds, worlds which he describes using both philosophical and Qur'ānic terminology. The one world is spiritual (*rūḥānī*), intellectual (*'aqlī*), and supernal (*'ulwī*); it is the world of Sovereignty (*malakūt*) and the Unseen (*ghayb*). The other world is physical (*jismānī*), sensory (*ḥissī*), and lower (*sufī*); it is the world of Dominance (*mulk*) and the Visible (*shahāda*).⁸

The World of the Visible (*'ālam al-shahāda*) is the place from which one rises up to the World of Sovereignty (*'ālam al-malakūt*), an ascension made possible by the interrelationship (*munāsaba*) and connection (*ittiṣāl*) between the two. To help man's ascent, God has made the World of the Visible parallel to the World of Sovereignty. There is nothing in this world that does not have a likeness (*mithāl*) or several likenesses in that world, and there is nothing in that world which does not have a likeness or likenesses in this world.⁹ To illustrate this, al-Ghazālī uses the example of the viewing the celestial bodies by Ibrāhīm (Abraham).¹⁰

Indeed, there are high and noble luminous substances (*jawāhir nūrāniyya sharīfa 'āliyya*) in the World of Sovereignty (*'ālam al-malakūt*) that are called angels. Because lights emanate from them to human spirits, they are called "lords" (*arbāb*) and God is the "Lord of lords." They have varying degrees of luminosity that have similitudes (*amthāl*) in the World of the Visible (*'ālam al-shahāda*): the sun, the moon and the stars.

At first, the traveler on the way (*al-sālik lil-ṭarīq*) reaches a degree that is the degree of the stars, and the radiance of [the star's] light becomes clear to him. The fact becomes unveiled to him that the lowest world is entirely under its authority and the radiance of its light. Suddenly, from [the star's] beauty and sublimity, it becomes clear to him,

and he says, “*This is my lord!*” (6:76). Then, when what is above [this star] becomes clear to him, the degree of the moon, he sees that the former has set in relationship to the latter, so he says, “*I do not love that which sets*” (6:76).

Likewise, he continues to ascend until he reaches that which has its similitude in the sun, and he sees that it is greater and more sublime. Yet he sees that it also has its similitude in its interrelationship (*munāsaba*) to the others, and whatever has a relationship with something imperfect is imperfect itself and “sets.” From this, he says, “*I have turned my face to the one who created the heavens and the earth in pure faith (ḥanīf^{an})*” (6:79).¹¹

The method of striking similitudes (*ḍarb al-mithāl*) is to find the connections between the physical and the spiritual world. Another example al-Ghazālī gives of this interpretative method in the *Mishkāt al-anwār* concerns God’s speech to Mūsā (Moses) in which Mūsā is asked to remove his shoes in the holy valley where he has seen a fire.¹²

If the first waystation of the prophets is the ascent to the world sanctified from the turbulence of sense perception and imagination, then the similitude (*mithāl*) of that waystation is the *holy valley* (20:12). And if it is not possible to tread that holy valley without removing the two worlds, meaning the present world and the hereafter, turning towards the One, God (*al-ḥaqq*) . . . , then the similitude of that removal is the *taking off of the shoes* at the time of switching to the pilgrims’ garments in order to turn towards the holy Ka’ba.¹³

Al-Ghazālī finds two parallel meanings for the removal of Mūsā’s shoes here. In the first, he compares the removal of the shoes to a spiritual state in which one distances oneself from concern for this world or the next. In the second, he compares it to the ritual enacted during the preparation for the pilgrimage. Al-Ghazālī explains that the method of striking similitudes (*ḍarb al-mithāl*) is like the science of dream or vision interpretation (*ta’bīr*).¹⁴

Accepting the literal and the symbolic meaning simultaneously is like accepting two different kinds of language acts. In his *Jawāhir al-Qur’ān*, al-Ghazālī suggests that knowledge of the deeper meanings of the Qur’ān requires knowledge of the language of similitudes:

I do not think that you will be successful (in seeking out the secrets of the Qur’ān) if you obstinately proceed with your own opinion (*ra’y*) and intellect (*‘aql*). How can you understand this when you do not understand the language of states (*lisān al-aḥwāl*)? Instead, you only believe in propositional speech (*maqāl*)! You will not understand the meaning of His words, *There is nothing which does not proclaim His praise* (17:44) nor His words, *They [the heavens and the earth] said, “We have come*

willingly” (41:11) so long as you think that the earth has a language (*lisān*) and a life. You will not understand the words of the speaker who said, “The wall said to the peg, “Why are you making a hole in me?” He said, “Ask the one who is hammering me and does not drop me! Behind me is the stone which hammers me.” You are not aware that these words are true and more correct than propositional speech, so how will you understand the secrets that are behind this?¹⁵

The example of the talking inanimate objects, the wall and the peg, is one that al-Zamakhsharī also uses in his commentary, written some twenty years after al-Ghazālī’s death, in his interpretation of verse 41:11.¹⁶ Either al-Zamakhsharī borrowed from al-Ghazālī, which seems unlikely, or they both adopted the example from a previous commentator or theologian. Al-Zamakhsharī understands the words spoken by the heavens and the earth, “*We have come willingly*,” as a figurative expression (*majāz*) which is either the creation of a similitude (*tamthīl*) or an imaginative representation (*takhyīl*) whose only purpose is to depict the effect of God’s power over decreed things, having nothing to do with the real acts of speech and answering. He uses the example of the talking wall and peg both to illustrate the figurative use of speech and to confirm the meaning of the verse.

Whereas al-Zamakhsharī uses the concept of figurative language to solve the problem of the anthropomorphism of the verse, al-Ghazālī’s point seems to be different. Although he might have agreed with al-Zamakhsharī’s interpretation as it explains a verse which otherwise seems literally absurd, al-Ghazālī is saying something more than that; he is asserting that metaphorical and symbolic ways of speaking are superior modes of expression for facilitating deeper comprehension of the Qur’ān. Ibn ‘Arabī develops this idea further in his writings by comparing the rational and imaginative faculties in man.

Ibn ‘Arabī and the method of allusion (*ishāra*)

Unlike al-Ghazālī, Ibn ‘Arabī rejects rational interpretation (*ta’wīl ‘aqlī*) outright. Although there are aspects of the revelation which reason declares impossible, this only proves the imperfection of man’s rational faculties, not the necessity of interpretation.¹⁷ Man has two faculties by which he obtains knowledge of God. The faculty of reason (*‘aql*) in man works by means of reflection (*fikr*), using the language of abstraction. It is capable of knowing God’s incomparability, how He is utterly different from His creation. The imaginative faculty (*khayāl*) in man, on the other hand, works through sensory perceptions, using the language of images. It is capable of perceiving God’s similarity in His self-disclosures (*rajālī*) in His creation. Perfect knowledge combines both of these faculties. Use of only the rational faculty turns God into an abstraction and use of only the imaginative faculty leads to polytheism and anthropomorphism.¹⁸

The Qur’ān uses both abstractions and images to communicate its message, but the latter predominate because revelation entails a descent of meanings into the

imaginal realm and sense perception and is an act of connection, not separation. The rational faculty is unable to understand the images of the Qur'ān and therefore seeks to interpret it so as to make it conform to the dictates of reason, but this leads to a distortion of its meaning. Prophets and friends of God, on the other hand, accept the whole of the Qur'ān because they understand the language of images by means of unveiling (*kashf*).¹⁹ To use al-Ghazālī's example described previously, the prophets and friends of God will understand what the verse *They said, "We have come willingly"* (41:11) means because they have experienced it through the seeing, hearing, and tasting of the imaginative faculty.

Only the prophets and friends of God understand the principles of "striking similitudes" (*ḍarb al-amthāl*). They can strike similitudes themselves because God has taught them how to do this, and they recognize the similitudes that God has struck for Himself because they have witnessed the connection between the similitude and the meaning it represents.²⁰ However, "striking similitudes" (*ḍarb al-amthāl*) is not the term Ibn 'Arabī uses to describe Ṣūfī interpretation of the Qur'ān, nor does he use the term *ta'wīl*, which he applies almost exclusively to the kind of rational interpretation (*ta'wīl 'aqlī*) of which he is so critical.²¹ Instead, the term Ibn 'Arabī prefers is "allusion" (*ishāra*). He explains that Ṣūfīs have chosen this word over "commentary" (*tafsīr*) in order to defend themselves from the ignorance of exotericists. The word *ishāra*, which literally means "to point," is used just once in the Qur'ān (19:29), in a verse referenced by Ibn 'Arabī as part of his explanation for the Ṣūfīs' adoption of the term. Just as Maryam (the Virgin Mary) "pointed" to the infant 'Īsā (Jesus) so that he spoke in her defense against the accusations of her people, so do Ṣūfīs "point" or "make allusion" to what they know so that they will not be attacked by uncomprehending exotericists.²²

Some of the examples of Ibn 'Arabī's own Qur'ānic interpretation in his *Futūḥāt al-makkiyya* resemble Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj's method of allusion (*tarīq al-ishāra*)²³ and al-Ghazālī's "striking of similitudes" (*ḍarb al-mithāl*), albeit with the addition of his own technical vocabulary. Chittick translates one such example from the *Futūḥāt* on verses 52:1–8 of the Qur'ān:

By the mount – the body, because of the natural inclination within it, since it is not independent through itself in its *wujūd* [existence].

And a book inscribed from a divine dictation and a right hand writing with a pen of potency.

On a parchment, that is your own entity – by way of allusion, not exegesis.

Unrolled, manifest, not rolled up, so it is not curtained.

By the inhabited house, that is, the heart that embraces the Real, so He is its inhabitant.

And the uplifted roof – the sensory and suprasensory faculties in the head.

And the burning sea, that is nature kindled with the ruling fire that necessitates movement.

Surely thy Lord's chastisement is about to fall. In other words, something from which the animal self, the command spirit, and the high intellect take refuge but which derives from the self's nurturing Master, who makes its affair wholesome, is about to fall and come down upon it. For the self possesses the low waystations absolutely in respect to its possibility and relatively in respect to its nature.

There is none to avert it, because there is only what I have mentioned. What we have is receiving His coming down and climbing up to His approach. Between these two properties become manifest the *barzakhs* [isthmuses], which possess towering splendor and firmly-rooted knowledge.²⁴

In this interpretation, the five signs invoked to attest to the reality of the Day of Judgment are taken to refer to the spiritual makeup of man. Events which will occur at the end of time are taken to refer to events which happen in the here and now. What makes Ibn 'Arabī's correspondence between these two realities unique is the way in which he connects them. The first verse of this *sūra* is *By the mount* (*wa'l-ṭūr*); as Chittick explains,

The word *ṭūr* or "mount" derives from a root that means to approach something and to hover around it. The Shaykh takes the etymological sense as an allusion to the bodily nature's inclinations, which draw it toward things that it desires.²⁵

It is this close attention to the etymological and grammatical possibilities of the text which distinguishes Ibn 'Arabī's approach to Qur'ānic interpretation, an approach based on the assumption that all the possible meanings which the Arabic language allows for any given word or group of words in the Qur'ān are valid. To reject any one of these meanings is to limit God's knowledge, to imply that He was unaware of the various ways in which His Book could be interpreted.²⁶

One example which shows the difference between this kind of hyperliteralism and a more purely symbolic or allegorical approach is Ibn 'Arabī's interpretation of the verse, "*laysa ka-mithlihi shay'um*" (42:11), which can be translated as, *there is nothing similar to him*. The *ka* means "like" and *mithl* means "similar." Ibn 'Arabī accepts the common explanation that the *ka* here merely serves to reinforce the meaning of *mithl*. He also endorses an interpretation in which *ka* retains its meaning, making it possible to translate the verse as *there is nothing like His similar*, and to understand it as a reference to the Perfect Man.²⁷ Although the common interpretation of this verse is that it asserts God's incomparability, Ibn 'Arabī's acceptance of all possible interpretations allows him to find in it confirmation for God's incomparability and His similarity. Ibn 'Arabī understood this interpretative approach as an extreme fidelity to the possibilities of the Qur'ānic text. His critics denounced it as a distortion of its meaning (*tahrīf ma'ānī 'l-Qur'ān*).²⁸

Al-Nisābūrī and al-Kāshānī and the method of esoteric interpretation (*ta'wīl*)

The terms *tafsīr* and *ta'wīl* have a complicated history.²⁹ In the first few centuries of Islam, they were used interchangeably to refer to any commentary on the Qur'ān. Over time, however, the word *tafsīr* began to be applied only to those works that relied heavily on the transmitted interpretative traditions from the first few generations of Muslims, while *ta'wīl* became a term used to describe other types of interpretations. In the fourteenth century both al-Nisābūrī and al-Kāshānī used the word *ta'wīl* to describe their interpretative activity.

Al-Nisābūrī divides his commentary *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān* into three sections comprised of variant readings (*qirā'āt* and *wuqūf*), exoteric commentary (*tafsīr*), and esoteric commentary (*ta'wīl*). His understanding of how the last two relate to one another is set forth in his introduction:

Know that the requirement of religion is that the Muslim should not interpret (*yū'awwīlu*) anything in the Qur'ān or the *ḥadīth* according to meanings which would invalidate the essentials which the Prophet and the pious first generations (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*) commented (*fassara*) on, like the Garden, the Fire, the Path, the Balance, the palaces, the rivers, the trees, etc. Instead, he must affirm these essentials just as they have been set forth.

Then, if he understands from them other realities (*ḥaqā'iq*), symbols (*rumūz*), and subtleties (*laṭā'if*) which have been unveiled to him, there is no harm. For surely God has not created anything in the world of form (*'ālam al-ṣūra*) that does not have an equal (*naẓīr*) in the world of meaning (*'ālam al-ma'na*). And nothing is created in the world of meaning, which is the Hereafter, which does not have a reality (*ḥaqīqa*) in the world of Truth (*'ālam al-ḥaqq*), which is the unseen of the unseen (*ghayb al-ghayb*). And nothing is created in the two worlds that does not have patterns (*namādhij*) in the world of mankind (*'ālam al-insān*). But God knows best.³⁰

The essentials (*a'yān*) that Nisābūrī mentions here are elements of the Afterlife that Islamic philosophers interpreted allegorically, an act of interpretation for which they were strongly criticized. Al-Nisābūrī emphatically states that these elements must be accepted as literal truth. His method of interpretation resembles that described by al-Ghazālī in his *Mishkāt al-anwār*, in which correspondences are uncovered between the physical and spiritual worlds.

Writing in the same period, al-Kāshānī uses the terms *tafsīr* and *ta'wīl* in much the same way as al-Nisābūrī does, although al-Kāshānī writes only *ta'wīl*. In addition to the term *ta'wīl*, al-Kāshānī refers to "*taṭbīq*," a word that means "to make correspondences."³¹ In the introduction to his commentary, al-Kāshānī writes that the process of *ta'wīl* is unending, while that of *tafsīr* is limited.

Al-Kāshānī believes that, while it is prohibited to alter the external sense of the Qur'ān, this prohibition does not extend to understanding its additional meanings.

It is said that the one who interprets (*fassara*) by his own opinion (*ra'y*) has become an infidel (*kafara*). As for esoteric interpretation (*ta'wīl*), it never ceases because it varies according to the states of the listener and his circumstances in the stages of his traveling and his different phases. Whenever he rises from a station, a door of new understanding is opened to him, and he beholds (*ittala'a*)³² by means of it the subtlety of a ready meaning.³³

Here, al-Kāshānī's view is not without precedent. Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj had also pointed out this difference between exoteric and esoteric commentary:

[The Ṣūfīs] differ in their deductions just as the exotericists (*ahl al-zāhir*) do. However, the differences of opinion between the exotericists lead to error while this is not so in the science of the inward (*ilm al-bāṭin*) because the differences [represent] virtues, advantages, noble characteristics, states, morals, stations and degrees. It is said that the differences of opinion among the scholars (*ulamā'*) in the science of exotericism (*ilm al-zāhir*) is a mercy from God because the one who is right refutes the one who is wrong, thereby making the error of his opponent in religion clear to people so that they turn away from him. If this were not the case, people would leave their religion.

But the differences of opinion between the people of realities is also a mercy from God because each one of them speaks from where he is at the moment (*waqtuhu*) in response to his state, making allusions from his ecstasy (*wajd*). There is a benefit in their words for everyone from amongst those who observe acts of obedience and the lords of the hearts, the aspirants and those who are realized, according to their different capacities, characteristics and degrees... [Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj demonstrates his point here with different interpretations of what the "true *faqīr*" means from ten different Ṣūfīs...] They have all differed in their replies just as they have differed in where they were at the moment (*awqāt*) and their states, but all are sound (*ḥasan*). Each reply belongs to the group of people suitable for it, and each is a benefit, blessing, increase and mercy for them.³⁴

Rūzbihān comments on this as well, speaking of the Ṣūfīs in the past:

They spoke according to their stations (*maqāmāt*) in the presence of His Omnipotence (*jabarūt*) and according to the extent of their travelling in the open spaces of His Kingdom (*malakūt*). They spoke by means of convincing allusions (*ishārāt*) and suitable expressions (*ibārāt*) from pure hearts, grounded intellects (*uqūl rāsikha*), passionate spirits, and

sanctified innermost secrets. The differences between their perceptions of the allusions of the Qur'ān is like their differences in degrees of what they have seen, the unveilings, states, approaches, visions of unseen things, and that which shines upon their innermost secrets from the lights of preeternal and everlastingly eternal things. What they attained is in what they said. They told of the depth of the sea of the Qur'ān because it is the qualities of the Merciful and all of its realities cannot be perceived by contingent beings.³⁵

Al-Simnānī and commentary on the seven inner senses (*tafsīr al-buṭūn al-sab'a*)

In the introduction to his Qur'ānic commentary, al-Simnānī explains that the “student of commentary on the seven inner senses” will have to learn special technical terms (*iṣṭilāḥāt*). The “seven inner senses” is a reference to a *ḥadīth* which states, “The Qur'ān has an exoteric sense (*ẓahr*) and an inner sense (*batn*), and its inner sense has an inner sense up to seven inner senses (*buṭūn*).”³⁶ The “special technical terms” (*iṣṭilāḥāt*) refer to spiritual faculties of man called “subtle substances” (*laṭā'if*), each of which corresponds to a prophet mentioned in the Qur'ān.³⁷

It is a system of correspondences based on Qur'ān 41:53: *We will show them Our signs in the horizons (āfāq) and in their souls (anfus) until it becomes manifest to them that this is the truth* (41:53).³⁸ Knowledge and deeper understanding of the Qur'ān, as well as the ability to benefit from it, requires the discovery of the connection between the horizons (*āfāq*) and souls (*anfus*), between the prophets and the subtle substances (*laṭā'if*) of man. Man has the potential to develop spiritually from a speaking animal to the bearer of the trust of God. At each level of his development, he becomes the possessor of a new subtle substance (*laṭīfa*) as shown in Table 4.1.

The reader of the Qur'ān should recognize these correspondences so as to be able to practically apply the lessons of the stories of the prophets to one's own struggle. Al-Simnānī explains this process with examples from each of the seven levels, as in this passage on the bodily subtle substance (*laṭīfa qālabīyya*) and the prophet Ādam:

Whenever you hear a part of the Book addressing Adam, listen to it with your subtle bodily subtle substance (*laṭīfa qālabīyya*). Apply your bodily subtle substance practically in what has been commanded and prohibited for it, and take heed in the similitudes struck for it (*bi-mā ḍuriba mathal^{an} lahu*). Know with certainty that the inner sense (*batn*) of this Book is connected to you in [the realm of] souls (*anfus*) just as its external sense is connected to Adam in [the realm of] horizons (*āfāq*), to enable you to benefit from the Speech of the Truth and so that you may be one of those who read [the Qur'ān] fresh and anew.³⁹

Table 4.1 Al-Simnānī's theory of subtle substances (*laṭā'if*)

<i>Seven subtle substances (laṭā'if)</i>	<i>Prossessor of the subtle substance</i>	<i>Corresponding prophet</i>
subtle bodily substance (<i>al-laṭīfa al-qālabīyya</i>)	man (<i>insān</i>)	Ādam
subtle soul substance (<i>al-laṭīfa al-naḥsiyya</i>)	civilized man (<i>al-insān al-madanī</i>)	Nūḥ (Noah)
subtle heart substance (<i>al-laṭīfa al-qalbiyya</i>)	submitter (<i>muslim</i>)	Ibrāhīm (Abraham)
subtle innermost substance (<i>al-laṭīfa al-sirriyya</i>)	believer (<i>mu'min</i>)	Mūsā (Moses)
subtle spirit substance (<i>al-laṭīfa al-rūhiyya</i>)	friend (<i>walī</i>)	Dāwūd (David)
subtle mystery substance (<i>al-laṭīfa al-khaḥfiyya</i>)	prophet (<i>nabī</i>)	ʿĪsā (Jesus)
subtle reality substance (<i>al-laṭīfa al-ḥaqqiyya</i> or <i>al-laṭīfa al-anā'iyya</i>)	seal (<i>khātim</i>)	Muḥammad

On this initial level, the struggle is to respond to the Qur'ānic commands and prohibitions pertaining to the body. On the next level, the level of the subtle soul substance (*laṭīfa al-naḥsiyya*) and the prophet Nūḥ, the struggle is to contain one's passion and anger which will otherwise be like an overwhelming flood, and so on. When one reads about the communities of each of these prophets, they should recognize its believers, unbelievers, and hypocrites as corresponding to the forces within each of their subtle substances (*laṭā'if*) which may act in harmonious or harmful ways.⁴⁰

The discovery of these subtle substances and their correspondences with the stories of the prophets is an experiential one. Al-Simnānī explains that no one will believe what he has said until they have witnessed it for themselves. But once this scheme has been understood, the reader will know with certainty that the Qur'ān has seven inner senses. Al-Simnānī gives an example of how these can be discovered in a single verse of the Qur'ān 4:43. He addresses only the first part of it:

O you who believe, do not come to prayers while intoxicated until you are able to know what you are saying; nor in a state of ritual impurity, unless you are traveling, until you have done the major ablution.

The external meaning of this verse is clear, admonishing the believer in a state of drunkenness or impurity to delay saying his prayers until he is sober and ritually pure. In al-Simnānī's commentary on the inner senses of the verse, the states of drunkenness and impurity refer to increasingly subtle forms of forgetfulness and attachment. In the first inner sense of this verse, drunkenness and impurity is the result of preoccupation with the affairs of the world. The ablution for it is the

“water” of the traditional remembrance (*al-dhikr al-rasmī*). In the second inner sense of the verse, the state of drunkenness and impurity is brought about by passion (*hawā*) and its ablution is accomplished with the “water” of the instructional remembrance (*al-dhikr al-ta’līmī*). In each of the inner senses that follow, the believer risks intoxication and impurity resulting from the ever-higher states he achieves. The ablution at each level is the “water” of the appropriate remembrance (*dhikr*). Without a state of sobriety and purity, there can be no prayer or intimate conversation with God.⁴¹

ATTACKING AND DEFENDING ŞŪFĪ QUR'ĀNIC INTERPRETATION

The problem of distinguishing sound exegesis from exegesis by mere personal opinion (*tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*)

Although there are indications that in the earliest period of Islam some Muslims objected to any kind of commentary on the Qur'ān, the necessity of interpretation was overwhelmingly accepted by the tenth century. Disagreements continued, however, over what constitutes legitimate commentary and exegetes had to justify their endeavors in light of a *hadīth* on interpretation transmitted from Ibn 'Abbās:

The Prophet said, "Whoever speaks of the Qur'ān from his personal opinion (*ra'y*), let him take his seat in the Fire."¹

A similar tradition quotes the first caliph Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq as saying,

What earth would carry me, what heaven shelter me, if I were to speak of the Qur'ān from my personal opinion (*ra'y*) or of what I do not know?²

The question became how to distinguish sound and acceptable interpretation from the prohibited interpretation by personal opinion (*tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*). In the introduction to his *Jāmi' al-bayān*, al-Ṭabarī writes that the Qur'ān is comprised of three parts: the part whose interpretation is known only to God; the part whose interpretation is known only to the Prophet and, through his explanation or other indication, to his community; and the part known only to those who possess knowledge of the Arabic language.³ The first part of the Qur'ān should not be interpreted by anyone and the second part can only be understood by means of an explanation of the Prophet; otherwise, it is interpretation by personal opinion (*tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*).⁴ The best interpreters of the Qur'ān will be those who are clearest in proving their interpretations based on the most authentic traditions of the Prophet and their knowledge of Arabic language. Furthermore, they will not disagree with what has been said by the Companions and Followers of the Prophet, and the men of knowledge in the community.⁵ After al-Ṭabarī there were religious scholars who believed that any commentary that did not base itself entirely on the

early interpretative tradition (*tafsīr bi'l-ma'thūr*) was an interpretation by personal opinion (*tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*), and therefore prohibited. Al-Ghazālī was one of the first to contest this view.

Al-Ghazālī on *tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*

Al-Ghazālī addressed the problem of defining what constitutes *tafsīr bi'l-ra'y* as part of his defense of Šūfī Qur'ānic interpretation in his *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*.

What is intended by [the prohibition on commentary of the Qur'ān] must either be a restriction to what has been transmitted (*naql*) or heard [from authorities] (*masmū'*), abandoning any deduction (*istinbāṭ*) and independent understanding (*istiqlāl bi'l-fahm*), or what is intended is something else. It is completely wrong to think that what is intended is that one should not speak about the Qur'ān except according to what one has heard, for several reasons.⁶

Al-Ghazālī presents four arguments for not confining commentary to the transmitted tradition. First, the traditions traceable to the Prophet explain only part of the Qur'ān. Most of the transmitted exegetical tradition comes from Companions such as Ibn 'Abbās and Ibn Mas'ūd and represents their own opinions, not what they heard from the Prophet himself. Therefore, these interpretations can be called *tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*. Second, the Companions and early exegetes had disagreements over the interpretation of Qur'ānic verses. Third, there is a distinction between interpretation and revelation. This is demonstrated in the Prophet's prayer for Ibn 'Abbās, "O God, instruct him in religion and teach him interpretation (*ta'wīl*)."⁷ Al-Ghazālī asks, "If interpretation was what has been heard [from authorities] (*masmū'*) like what has been revealed (*tanzīl*), what would be the purpose of granting him that?"⁷ Fourth, the Qur'ān confirms the possibility of deduction (*istinbāṭ*) independent of transmitted knowledge in Qur'ān 4:83, "Truly, those among them who are able to deduce (the matter) (*yastanbiṭūnahu*) know it."⁸

Having discussed what the *ḥadīth* on *tafsīr bi'l-ra'y* does not mean, al-Ghazālī continues with what he believes is the correct interpretation of the ban on *tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*.

The prohibition is for one of two reasons: The first is where someone has an opinion (*ra'y*) regarding something to which he is inclined by his nature (*ṭab'*) and inclination (*hawā*), so he interprets (*yata'awwalu*) the Qur'ān in accordance with his opinion and inclination so that he can argue for the authenticity of his own objective (*gharaḍ*). If he did not have that opinion and inclination, that meaning would not have appeared to him from the Qur'ān.

Sometimes this is done knowingly like the one who argues for the authenticity of his innovation (*bida'*) by means of some verses of the

Qur'ān, knowing that that is not what is meant by the verse, but he seeks to deceive his opponent by it.

Other times it may be done unknowingly but, since the verse has a potentiality for more than one meaning, his understanding of it inclines to the sense which agrees with his objective, that view having been preferred because of his opinion and inclination. He has commented by means of his opinion, i.e., his opinion has led him to that commentary. If he did not have that opinion, then he would not have preferred that sense.

Other times he may have a sound objective, and so he seeks some indication (*dalīl*) for that from the Qur'ān and then proves it with something he knows was not intended for that . . . this is like someone who calls for struggle with the hard heart and says, God says, “*Go to Pharoah. Truly, he has transgressed,*” (20:24) and he points to his own heart and indicates that that is what was intended by Pharoah. This kind [of interpretation] is what some preachers do with sound intentions of beautifying their talk and attracting the listener, but it is prohibited. The *bāṭiniyya* have utilized this with corrupt intentions to deceive people and invite them to their false school of thought. In accordance with their opinion (*ra'y*) and school of thought, they bring the Qur'ān down to matters which they most certainly know are not what was intended by it.

These categories are the first of the two reasons for the prohibition of *tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*. What is meant [in the *ḥadīth*] by personal opinion (*ra'y*) is the false personal opinion that agrees with inclination (*hawā*) without sound personal effort (*al-ijtihād al-ṣaḥīḥ*). Personal opinion (*ra'y*) includes the true and the false. That which agrees with inclination (*hawā*) can be designated by the term “*ra'y*.”⁹

Al-Ghazālī is making a distinction between two types of personal opinion (*ra'y*): sound personal effort (*al-ijtihād al-ṣaḥīḥ*), which is praiseworthy, and opinion biased by inclination (*hawā*), which is not. The latter is blameworthy whether the interpreter is aware of his distortion of the meaning of the Qur'ān, and whether his intention is sound, as in the case of the preacher, or unsound, as in the case of the *bāṭiniyya*. His example of the sound-intentioned but nonetheless blameworthy interpreter who suggests that what is meant by Pharoah is the hard heart is a strange one, given that this is exactly the kind of interpretation practiced by some Şūfīs. Al-Ghazālī himself justifies it in his other works with his theory of correspondences, a theory we will return to shortly. Al-Ghazālī continues with the second reason for the ban on *tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*.

The second is where someone hastens to comment on the Qur'ān on the basis of the external sense of the Arabic without seeking help from listening [to authorities] (*samā'*) and transmission (*naql*) regarding the strange words (*gharā'ib*) of the Qur'ān, its obscure and alternate expressions, its abridgment, elision, ellipsis, and word order. One who does not

master the exoteric aspect of commentary and hastens to deduce meaning purely on [his own] understanding of the Arabic language will have made many errors and will have joined the group of those who interpret the Qur'ān by personal opinion (*ra'y*).

Transmission (*naql*) and hearing [from authorities] (*samā'*) in the external aspect of commentary (*tafsīr*) are necessary for him first, so that by means of it, he will be wary of situations of error. After that, understanding (*fahm*) and deduction (*istinbāt*) will be expanded. The strange words (*gharā'ib*) that can be understood only through hearing [from authorities] (*samā'*) are many. We will point out some of them so that one can seek information about words like them and know that it is not permissible to neglect the memorization of exoteric commentary first; there is no hope of reaching the inner sense (*bāṭin*) before mastering the exoteric sense (*ẓāhir*). One who claims to understand the secrets of the Qur'ān without mastering exoteric exegesis is like one who claims to have reached the inside of the house before crossing through the door, or the one who claims to understand what Turks mean in their speech without his having understood their language. Truly, exoteric commentary is the same as learning the language that is necessary for understanding, and there are many areas that can only be learned by hearing from [authorities] (*samā'*) and there is no hope in reaching the inner sense (*bāṭin*) before mastering the external sense (*ẓāhir*).¹⁰

Al-Ghazālī is stating his belief that understanding the information transmitted from the Companions and Followers of the Prophet is necessary, but only as a first step in interpretation, and he appears to be limiting the usefulness of their commentary primarily to linguistic explanations. Because of the conflicting interpretations found among early exegetes, al-Ghazālī rejects an unquestioning acceptance of their interpretations in areas other than issues of language. Although al-Ghazālī's purpose here is to defend Ṣūfī exegesis in particular, his argument works as well for any exegete wishing to go beyond the interpretations of the first generations of Muslims. His argument was, in fact, adopted by one of the most well-known Qur'ānic commentators, Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Qurṭubī (d. 1272),¹¹ who quotes al-Ghazālī without due attribution to him almost word for word in the introduction to his commentary, *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān*.¹²

Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taymiyya on the importance of transmitted information

Al-Ghazālī firmly believed that the interpretation of the Qur'ān should not be restricted to the transmitted tradition. He rather bluntly says that,

the one who claims that the Qur'ān has no other meaning that what exoteric exegesis has provided should know that he has acknowledged his

own limitations and therefore is right with regards to himself, but is wrong in an opinion that brings everyone else down to his level.¹³

A critical response to this view can be found in the *Kitāb talbīs Iblīs* (The Book of the Devil's Deception) written by Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1200). Ibn al-Jawzī attempts in this book to identify and correct the errors he sees among his fellow Muslims, devoting approximately half of the book to the errors of Şūfis even though he appears to have been a member of a Şūfī order himself.¹⁴

According to Ibn al-Jawzī, the starting point for all the delusions of the Şūfis is their turning away from seeking transmitted knowledge.¹⁵ The devil deceives them in this matter in several ways. First, he shows them how much work is involved in seeking knowledge while making ease and comfort seem attractive. Some Şūfis have said that preoccupation with transmitted knowledge is idleness but this is only because they have seen the commitment it requires.

Second, he causes them to be content with just a little knowledge, so that they believe that those who seek extensive knowledge of *ḥadīth* do so only for prestige and their own pleasure. Ibn al-Jawzī concedes this desire for prestige, but compares it to the desire for marriage, a desire that is necessary for the greater goal of procreation.

Third, he causes some of them to believe that the objective is practice (*ʿamal*) without understanding that devotion to knowledge is the most perfect practice.

Last, the Devil deceives the Şūfis into believing that knowledge is acquired from inner processes (*bawāṭin*) and inspiration (*ilhām*), without intermediary (*bi-lā wāsiṭa*). Ibn al-Jawzī does not deny the possibility of inspiration but insists that it is not knowledge in and of itself, but is rather the *fruit* of knowledge and piety. He insists that there can be no knowledge without the intermediary of transmitted knowledge; otherwise, there would be no way of knowing whether the inspiration received is sound or merely a Satanic suggestion. Those who belittle transmitted knowledge attack the religious law (*sharīʿa*), a charge tantamount to infidelity. He notes that this is the case with Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī when he criticized religious scholars, saying, "Poor people! They get their knowledge from the dead, but we get our knowledge from the Living One who never dies."¹⁶

According to Ibn al-Jawzī, there is never a point where one moves beyond the need for transmitted knowledge. He disapprovingly relates a story regarding the Şūfī Aḥmad ibn Abū'l-Hawārī:

Aḥmad ibn Abū'l-Hawārī threw his books into the sea and said, "Yes, you *were* proof (*dalīl*), but devotion to proof after attainment (*wuṣūl*) is absurd." Aḥmad ibn Abū'l-Hawārī had searched out *ḥadīth* for thirty years. When he attained all he could from them, he carried his books to the sea, submerged them and said, "O knowledge, I have not done this to you out of disdain, nor out of disdain for what is your due. Rather, I used to seek you out in order to be guided by you to my Lord. Now that I have been guided by you, I have no further need of you."¹⁷

Ibn al-Jawzī understands that Ṣūfis justify their position concerning transmitted knowledge by dividing knowledge into the exoteric (*ilm al-ẓāhir*) and esoteric (*ilm al-bāṭin*), but it is a distinction he rejects.

Many of the Ṣūfis make a distinction between the law (*sharʿa*) and the truth (*ḥaqīqa*) but this is an ignorant thing to say because all of the law is different kinds of truths (*ḥaqāʾiq*).¹⁸

Despite this criticism, Ibn al-Jawzī notes that there have been many Ṣūfis who do insist upon the necessity and primacy of the law.

Ibn Taymiyya was an admirer of Ibn al-Jawzī, and he demonstrates a similar belief in the primacy of transmitted knowledge. He insists that knowledge can never be received directly without the intermediary of the *ḥadīth* and Traditions, and he attacks any belief to the contrary as a corrupt influence from philosophy.

What is stated by different groups of the *bāṭiniyya* – the Shiʿī *bāṭiniyya* such as the writers of the “Epistles of the Brotherhood of Purity” and the Ṣūfī *bāṭiniyya* such as Ibn Sabʿīn and Ibn ʿArabī and others, and as also found in the writings of Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] and others – that it is possible for men who practice spiritual exercises, purification of the heart, and development of the soul by means of praiseworthy characteristics, to come to know the realities that have been related from the Prophets concerning belief in God, angels, the Book, the prophets and the Last Day, and information about the jinn and devils, without the intermediary of communication from the prophets, is based upon this false premise, which is that when they purify themselves this will descend upon their hearts either through the “Active Intellect” or by some other means.¹⁹

He criticizes Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in particular for stating this belief frequently in his works and for suggesting that those who practice spiritual disciplines may hear the speech of God just as Mūsā did. According to Ibn Taymiyya this contradicts the correct beliefs held by the founders of the four Schools of Law, *ḥadīth* scholars and the “real” Ṣūfis (*ṣūfiyya muḥaqqiqūn*) who follow the Messenger.²⁰ However, Ibn Taymiyya does not deny that there is a connection between knowledge and practice but rather insists that this knowledge will never be received other than by means of the prophets.

Some theologians have criticized what is true in [al-Ghazālī’s writings], claiming that the practice of spiritual disciplines and purification of the heart has no effect whatsoever in obtaining knowledge. They are also wrong in this denial since the truth is that piety and purification of the heart are among the strongest means to acquiring knowledge. However, the Book and the Sunna must be resorted to for knowledge and practice. It is not possible for anyone after the Prophet to know by himself without

the intermediary of the Prophet these things from the Unseen. No one can do without that which has come from the messengers in understanding the Unseen. The speech of the Messenger is clear in and of itself. There is no unveiling to anyone nor is any analogy of it equal to it. An “unveiling” or “analogy” of someone is sanctioned only when it is consistent with [the speech of the Messenger]; otherwise it contradicts it. However what is called an “unveiling” (*kashf*) or an analogy (*qiyās*) does contradict the Messenger and is therefore a false analogy and false imagination (*khayāl*). This is what was meant when it was said, “I seek refuge in God from philosophical analogy and Şūfī imagination.”²¹

Ibn Taymiyya affirms a limited role for inspiration in areas where there are inadequate *sharʿī* indications. In his *Sharḥ kalimāt li-ʿAbd al-Qādir*, he writes

If the *sālik* [the person seeking knowledge] has creatively employed his efforts to the external *sharʿī* indications and sees no clear probability concerning the preferable action, he may feel inspired – along with his goodness of intention and reverent fear of God – to choose one of two actions as superior (to the other). This kind of inspiration is an indication concerning the truth. It may be even a stronger indication than weak analogies, weak *ḥadīths*, weak literal arguments (*ẓawāhir*) and weak *istiṣḥābs* which are employed by many of those who delve into the principles, differences, and systematizing of *fiqh*.²²

Ibn Taymiyya’s acceptance of a limited place for inspiration, however, does not extend to what Şūfis call the knowledge of states (*aḥwāl*). A basic error of the Şūfis, according to both Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taymiyya, is their acceptance of the state they call ecstasy (*wajd*). We have already seen how the Şūfis found a model for Qur’ānic recitation in Ja’far al-Şādiq, who is said to have repeated a verse continually in prayer until he heard it from the Speaker Himself and fainted. Ibn al-Jawzī does not refer to this particular story in his *Talbīs Ilbīs*, but he states that there are many examples in books on asceticism of men fainting, crying, and even dying upon hearing the Qur’ān recited.²³ Although acknowledging that there may have been some sincere believers amongst them, he nonetheless rejects what he sees as a loss of control without precedence among the Companions of the Prophet. According to Ibn al-Jawzī, the Companions had the purest of hearts but their strong emotion (*wajd*) did not go beyond weeping and humility (*khushūʿ*).²⁴

Ibn Taymiyya also makes it clear that those who faint or even die upon hearing a recitation of the Qur’ān are not to be emulated. In his *Al-Şūfiyya wa’l-fuqarāʾ* he describes three ranks of those who listen to or recite the Qur’ān, knowingly or unknowingly contesting the levels found in the Şūfī versions:

Instead, there are three ranks [to those hearing the *Qur’ān*]. One of them is the state of those unjust to themselves, those who are hard-hearted, not

yielding to the audition [of the *Qurʾān*] nor to the remembrance [of God], and they are comparable to the Jews...

The [second rank] is the state of the pious believer who is too weak to bear what suddenly afflicts his heart. So he is the one who is struck down, death-struck or swooning, and that is due only to the power of the sudden seizure (*al-wārid*) and the weakness of the heart to bear it...

But those who retain their reason, in spite of the fact that they acquired from faith that which others acquired, or similar to it or more perfect, they [the former] are more excellent than they [the latter] are. This is the state of the Companions – may God be satisfied with them – and the state of our Prophet – God bless him and give him peace. For he was made to travel by night into the heaven, and God revealed to him what He revealed. Yet, he awoke as he had spent the night; his state did not change. Thus, his state is more excellent than that of Moses – God bless him and give him peace – who fell swooning (Q. 7:143) when his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain. Moses' state is a splendid, exalted, and excellent state, but the state of Muḥammad – God bless him and give him peace – is more splendid, exalted, and excellent.²⁵

Ibn Taymiyya's views on the subject of losing consciousness are more complex than Ibn al-Jawzī's. Whereas Ibn al-Jawzī leans towards a complete condemnation of losing consciousness, Ibn Taymiyya carefully and clearly distinguishes the insincere who seek unconsciousness, even through alcohol and drugs, from the sincere who succumb because they have not yet realized the more perfect state of sobriety. It is a discussion similar to that found in many Ṣūfī texts.²⁶ Ibn al-Jawzī, however, rejects the entire notion of knowledge by means of states and stations, calling al-Qushayrī's description of them a worthless and confused mess (*al-takhlīṭ alladhī laysa bi-shayʿ*).

ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Hawāzin al-Qushayrī wrote a book, *Al-Risāla*, for [the Ṣūfis] in which he makes extraordinary remarks on annihilation (*fanāʾ*) and subsistence (*baqāʾ*), contraction (*qabḍ*) and expansion (*bast*), the moment (*waqt*) and the state (*ḥāl*), ecstasy (*wajḍ*) and existence/finding (*wujūd*), gathering (*jamʿ*) and separation (*tafriqa*), sobriety (*ṣaḥw*) and intoxication (*sukr*), tasting (*dhawq*) and drinking (*shurb*), obliteration (*maḥw*) and affirmation (*ithbāt*), self-disclosure (*tajallī*), presence of the heart before God's signs (*muḥādara*) and unveiling (*mukāshafa*), flashes (*lawāʾih*), rising stars (*ṭawālīʿ*) and glimmers (*lawāmiʿ*), originating (*takwīn*) and consolidating (*tamkīn*), the religious law (*sharʿa*) and the truths (*ḥaqāʾiq*) and so on – all that from a delirium without any basis, and his *tafsīr* is even more incredible.²⁷

For both Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taymiyya, valid Qurʾānic exegesis will not deviate in any way from the interpretations of the early Companions and Followers of the

Prophet. Ibn al-Jawzī specifically criticizes many of the books we have been mentioned so far and will be discussing in Part II. He mentions Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj's *Kitāb al-luma'*, wherein are mentioned "repugnant beliefs" and "despicable statements." Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī's *Qūt al-qulūb* contains "false *aḥādīth*" and "corrupt beliefs." 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī's *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* contains astonishing examples of Şūfī exegesis "which occur to them without the support of any of the fundamentals of knowledge." Al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* is full of false traditions which al-Ghazālī does not know are false.²⁸

According to Ibn al-Jawzī, the problems in Şūfī interpretation occur as a result of linguistic error or distortion, deviation from the transmitted *tafsīr* tradition, abandonment of the obvious and clear meaning of a verse, and incorrect belief. He gives examples of these errors, taken primarily from al-Sulamī's *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr*, and then ends with these dismissive words:

The entire book is like this. I had intended to show quite a bit of it here but I see that time will be wasted in recording something which borders between infidelity (*kufr*), error (*khaṭa*) and drivel (*hadhayān*). It is like what we have related from the *bāṭiniyya*. These are examples for anyone who wants to know what the book is like; if anyone wants to know more, let him look at this book.²⁹

Ibn Taymiyya on sound interpretation of the Qur'ān

Ibn Taymiyya's *Muqaddima fī uṣūl al-tafsīr*³⁰ can be seen as a point-by-point rebuttal of al-Ghazālī's arguments for not confining Qur'ānic commentary to the transmitted tradition. Al-Ghazālī, as we have seen, asserted that the Prophet explained only part of the Qur'ān, and that most of the transmitted exegetical tradition comes from the Companions of the Prophet and represents their own opinions, not what they heard from the Prophet himself. According to al-Ghazālī, this material is contradictory and should not be considered as authoritative as the revealed text. Instead, al-Ghazālī views the interpretative tradition from the first generations of Muslims (*salaf*) as a model for the independent exercise of judgment (*ijtihād*), not as conclusive proof (*ḥujja*) that demands acceptance.³¹

Ibn Taymiyya's approach, on the other hand, is to create a hierarchy of sources that are to be consulted in descending order until the explanation of a Qur'ānic verse is clear: the Qur'ān, the Sunnah of the Prophet, the statements of the Companions of the Prophet (*ṣaḥāba*), and the statements of the Followers of the Companions of the Prophet (*tābi'ūn*).³² Ibn Taymiyya supports his methodology and rebuts the points made by al-Ghazālī by making two assertions. The first is that the Prophet completely explained the meaning of the entire Qur'ān to his Companions.³³ The second is that the Companions and the Followers have greater authority in interpreting the Qur'ān than any generation of Muslims after them, to the point where their consensus is conclusive proof (*ḥujja*).³⁴ Ibn Taymiyya differs from other Sunnī Muslim commentators, not so much in his degree of

reverence for the Prophet and the pious predecessors (*salaf*), but in his confidence in the comprehensiveness, accuracy, and unity of the material transmitted from them.³⁵ He does not accept the assertion that the Companions or the Prophet and the early exegetes disagreed over interpretation of Qur'ānic verses. Instead, he gives examples proving that their differences amount to variation rather than contradiction.

According to Ibn Taymiyya, errors in interpretation are the result of error in one of two areas. He states that knowledge is either the result of authentic transmission (*naql muṣaddaq*) or verifiable deduction (*istidlāl muḥaqqaq*) and that, therefore, commentators make errors either through their imperfect knowledge of *aḥādīth* or by faulty thinking. Mostly these errors are the result of either preconceived ideas that are read into the Qur'an, or attention paid only to the words and not to the context of the revelation. Like al-Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyya divides those who make these errors into those who know full well that they are distorting the message of the Qur'an and those whose intention is good. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the second type includes many Ṣūfis, preachers, jurists, and others who have the correct meanings but the wrong Qur'ānic verses to support those meanings. Ibn Taymiyya tells us that this is the case for much of what the Ṣūfī Abū 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Sulamī (d. 1021) includes in his commentary, *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr*.³⁶ Ibn Taymiyya is not opposed to Ṣūfī exegesis per se, but rather considers it as falling into the category of *tafsīr bīl-ra'y* if it does not agree with the interpretations of the earliest exegetes.

Al-Ghazālī's defense of *ta'wīl*

The fact that al-Ghazālī was criticized well before Ibn Taymiyya for defending Qur'ānic exegesis that goes beyond the transmitted interpretative tradition can be seen in his work *Fayṣal al-tafriqa*.³⁷ It is a book that calls for careful discrimination in evaluating the beliefs of other Muslims before charging them with disbelief (*taḳfīr*). It was apparently written to console an unnamed colleague upset by attacks on al-Ghazālī himself. Al-Ghazālī states that the problem of excessive *taḳfīr* stems from a lack of differentiation between those who deny the message of the Prophet and those who have different interpretations of that message. Al-Ghazālī agrees that those who deny the message of the Prophet are guilty of disbelief (*kufīr*), a legal category in Islamic societies with serious consequences. But those who accept that message, differing only in their interpretations of it, are guilty only of innovation (*bida'*) or error (*khaṭa'*) if they are wrong in their interpretations, both lesser charges than disbelief.

Al-Ghazālī begins his argument with the statement that interpretation is essential for those verses of the Qur'an and *aḥādīth* whose meaning, if taken literally, would be absurd. According to him, this interpretation is incumbent on every Muslim, however literal-minded, if they are not to prove themselves completely stupid and ignorant.³⁸ However, since al-Ghazālī agrees that some interpretations *do* constitute disbelief, he provides a system for evaluating interpretative activity.

The system is based on a conception of existence (*wujūd*) as comprised of five degrees (*marātib*), each of which has a different relationship to interpretation.³⁹ The first degree is essential (*dhatī*) or absolutely real existence (*al-wujūd al-muṭlaq al-ḥaqīqī*), which is made up of the heavens and the earth, the animals and the plants that exist whether or not we perceive them. Al-Ghazālī asserts that there is no need for interpretation (*ta'wīl*) of this degree of existence because it entails what is manifest (*al-zāhir*). Significantly, al-Ghazālī includes in this category the Throne, the Footstool and the Seven Heavens mentioned in the Qur'ān and the Traditions of the Prophet, elements of the Unseen world which he insists are solid, real things, and therefore not subject to interpretation.

The second degree of existence is sensible (*ḥissī*), that which we see but which has no existence outside of our perceptions. Included in it are the dreams and hallucinations of ordinary people and the visions of prophets and saints. An example of a *ḥadīth* which corresponds to this level of existence is the one in which the Prophet says, "The Garden was shown to me in the breadth of this wall." The person who has proof (*burhān*) that physical bodies do not intermingle and that the small cannot contain the large, knows that this means that the likeness of the Garden appeared (*tamaththala*) to the senses (*al-ḥiss*), so that it was as if the Prophet was witnessing it.

The third degree of existence is the imaginary (*khayālī*), referring to things that we create in our imaginations that are absent from our senses, for example, the likeness of an elephant that exists in our brain but not outside of it. The *ḥadīth* used to illustrate this degree of existence is one which begins with the Prophet saying, "It was as if I were looking at Yūnus (Jonah)..." Al-Ghazālī interprets this to mean that the Prophet was not really seeing (*lam yakūn ḥaqīqa'l-nazar*), but it was *like* seeing (*ka'l-nazar*). However, he seems unsure of his own example, saying that it would not be farfetched to say he was really seeing it, as described in the sensible degree of existence.

The fourth degree of existence is mental (*'aqlī*) existence, based on the difference between a thing's meaning (*ma'nā*) and its form (*ṣūra*). The hand is the form (*ṣūra*) for the meaning (*ma'nā*) "the ability to strike." When the Qur'ān or *ḥadīth* speak of God's hand, the person who has proof (*burhān*) of the absurdity of God's having a sensible or imaginable hand attests to God's having the power to strike, give, and withhold, which is the meaning or reality of "hand."

The fifth degree of existence is analogical (*shabahī*) and refers to something which does not exist in any of the prior degrees of existence, and can only be understood by its resemblance (*ishbāh* or *munāsaba*) to the attributes or qualities of something else. The examples al-Ghazālī gives are the qualities such as anger, longing, joy, and patience, when they are attributed to God. The person who has proof (*burhān*) knows that God cannot possess qualities that imply imperfection, so he understands anger, for example, as the will to punish.

It is the last two degrees of existence that produce the most radical interpretations through the use of metaphor (*majāz*) and figurative speech (*isti'āra*). Al-Ghazālī insists that this kind of metaphorical interpretation is unavoidable,

supporting his claim by stating that even Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, the man most opposed to this form of interpretation, found himself unable to avoid it completely.⁴⁰ Having established the necessity of metaphorical interpretation, al-Ghazālī sets forth a rule of interpretation (*qanūn al-ta'wīl*) so as to define the parameters of its permissibility. In any given text of the Qur'ān or *ḥadīth*, the interpreter must accept the literal sense (*zāhir*) based on its essential existence (*al-wujūd al-dhātī*) unless he has proof (*burhān*) of its absurdity. If it is absurd, he looks to the next degree of existence for its meaning, unless this too is absurd. The metaphorical interpretation required by the mental and analogical degrees will only be permissible if the interpreter has proof of the absurdity of interpretation based on all the other levels.

Al-Ghazālī concludes that disagreements over interpretation are based on the matter of proof, with the Ḥanbalī declaring there is nothing inconceivable about God's being described by the direction "above," and the Ash'arī declaring there is nothing inconceivable about the ocular vision of God. To avoid internal strife in the Muslim community, al-Ghazālī has two different recommendations, one for the common man untroubled by doubts in his faith, and one for intellectuals whose faith needs more proof. For the common man, he recommends the unquestioning acceptance of the literal meanings of the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and the interpretations of the Companions of the Prophet. Speculative thinkers whose beliefs are more troubled may cautiously use this method of going beyond the literal sense in order to strengthen their faith. They should not, however, charge others with disbelief, unless there is denial of one of the roots of the faith (belief in God, in His Messenger, and in the Last Day), or one of its branches when based on the soundest Traditions.⁴¹

One of the examples al-Ghazālī gives to illustrate those who deny the fundamental tenets of Islam, and therefore deny the message as a whole, are the philosophers who deny God's knowledge of particulars or the physical reality of the Garden and the Fire in the Afterlife. He charges them with having abandoned the literal meaning of the Qur'ān and the soundest *ḥadīth* on these matters without any valid proof of the inconceivability of these concepts. What is particularly damning to them is their belief that the physical Afterlife is merely a fiction devised for those unable to grasp the intellectual Afterlife. This belief implies that the Prophet engaged in a kind of lie, however well meaning. This, according to al-Ghazālī, is what places them at the first degree of atheism (*zandaqa*).⁴²

As for those who interpret matters that do not pertain to Islam's most basic beliefs, al-Ghazālī advises against accusations of disbelief, although one may still make accusations of innovation and error. Al-Ghazālī uses a Ṣūfī interpretation as an example. He states that a certain Ṣūfī found it inconceivable that the Prophet Ibrāhīm (Abraham) could have believed that a star, the moon, or the sun could be God (Qur'ān 6:76–9). Instead, al-Ghazālī explains, the Ṣūfī took this as an indication that the celestial bodies mentioned represent something non-physical, which he then understood to mean the angelic luminous substances (*jawāhir malakiyya nūrāniyya*). Al-Ghazālī is critical, saying that this rejection of the

literal sense is not based on proofs (*barāhīn*) but on conjectural indications (*dalālāt ḡanniyya*). Nonetheless, he insists that the Şūfî should not be charged with disbelief as this matter is not one of the fundamental beliefs of Islam.⁴³ The interpretation referred to here is, in fact, al-Ghazālî's own, or at least one he quotes at length in other works. Versions of it can be found in both his *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*⁴⁴ and *Mishkāt al-anwār*.⁴⁵

Al-Ghazālî does not even identify himself as a Şūfî here, but rather says, "This is their kind of interpretation." He then refers to two other Şūfî interpretations, one of which is also discussed in his *Mishkāt al-anwār*.⁴⁶

They have interpreted (*ta'awwalū*) "the staff" and "the shoes" in God's words, "Take off your shoes" (20:12) and "Throw down what is in your right hand" (20:69). Perhaps conjecture (*ḡann*) in matters such as these that do not relate to the fundamentals of belief is analogous to proof (*burhān*) regarding the fundamentals, so there should be no accusations of disbelief or innovation. To be sure, if the opening of this door were to lead to confusing the hearts of the common people, then the author should be particularly charged with innovation in everything whose mention has not been related on the authority of the first generations (*salaf*).⁴⁷

Al-Ghazālî advocates tolerance for this kind of Şūfî interpretation so long as it does not confuse people and so long as the Şūfî does not claim to be released from the obligations of religious law. Al-Ghazālî recommends that such a Şūfî be killed because, even if he were still a believer, his actions would open a door to licentiousness (*ibāḥa*) that cannot be closed, thereby causing great harm to religion.⁴⁸

Problems with al-Ghazālî's defense of *ta'wīl*

Al-Ghazālî's uses the word *ta'wīl* in his *Fayṣal al-tafriqa* to refer to the interpretation of verses in the Qur'ān whose literal meaning can be definitively shown to be absurd. *Ta'wīl* used in this way is a concept that can be traced back to the theologian al-Ash'arî who strove to find a defensible exegetical stance between pure literalism and the type of metaphorical interpretation practiced by the Mu'tazila.⁴⁹ Ḥanbalî scholars felt that God should be described only as He described Himself, or as the Prophet described Him. They therefore felt that the anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'ān should not be interpreted as the Mu'tazila interpreted them, but rather should be understood *bi-lā kayfa*, without asking "how" or "why". The classic definition of the *bi-lā kayfa* doctrine goes back to a tradition from Mālik b. Anas,⁵⁰ quoted here from *Tahrīm al-naẓar fī kutub ahl al-kalām* (Censure of Speculative Theology), written by the Ḥanbalî scholar Muwaffaq al-Dīn ibn Qudāma (d. 1146):

Has he not heard the story of Mālik b. Anas when he was asked with regard to the Koranic verse, "The Merciful on the throne sits firm,"⁵¹

“how ‘sits firm’?”? Mālik inclined his head and was silent until the sweat of fever covered his brow; then he looked up and said: “The attribute *istawā*⁵² is unknown, the modality of it is not rational; but belief in it is obligatory, and inquiring about it is a heretical innovation.”⁵³

Al-Ash‘arī also relied on the *bi-lā kayfa* doctrine, but opened the door to some degree of interpretation if there was any proof (*hujja*) that the literal sense should be abandoned. The way that the later Ash‘arite theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī understood this was to divide the verses of the Qur‘ān into three parts. The first are the clear verses (*muḥkamāt*) whose apparent sense (*ẓāhir*) can be confirmed by rational indicators (*al-dalā’il al-‘aqliyya*). The second type of verses are those whose apparent sense (*ẓāhir*) has been shown to be impossible by definitive indicators (*al-dalā’il al-qāṭi‘a*). The third type of verses are ambiguous in meaning (*mutashābih*) and indicators like these cannot be found to either affirm or deny [one meaning or another].⁵⁴ The sound exegete, according to al-Rāzī, will know how to discover the truth concerning the first two types of verses, and will know to entrust the meaning of the third type to God.

When al-Ghazālī brings up examples of Ṣūfī interpretation in his *Fayṣal al-tafrīqa*, he expands the definition of verses open to *ta’wīl* beyond the anthropomorphic verses that are usually the subject matter of this debate, verses whose literal meaning was generally accepted by Muslims as being absurd. In discussing the story of the Prophet Ibrāhīm and the celestial bodies, al-Ghazālī acknowledges that the rejection of the literal sense of this story is not based on proofs (*barāhīn*) but on conjectural indications (*dalālāt ẓanniya*). What al-Ghazālī is most likely referring to here are theological arguments objecting to the idea that the Prophet Ibrāhīm could have mistaken the celestial bodies for God. However, when al-Ghazālī proceeds from his comments on the story of Ibrāhīm to Ṣūfī interpretations of Mūsā’s “staff” and “the two shoes,” he is now addressing another kind of verse altogether, verses whose literal sense is not at all in question. Clearly, Mūsā’s staff and shoes can be accepted as existing literally and therefore do not have to be interpreted metaphorically. Al-Ghazālī, however, seems unaware that he has violated his own hermeneutic principle. The weakness of al-Ghazālī’s defense of Ṣūfī interpretation in his *Fayṣal al-tafrīqa* is that his argument only works for the interpretation of Qur’ānic verses whose literal meaning is problematic, verses that constitute only a small portion of Ṣūfī exegesis.

Al-Ghazālī’s final defense of Ṣūfī interpretation

Whether al-Ghazālī recognized the problem with his argument, his later writings address it nonetheless in two ways.⁵⁵ The first concerns defining who is qualified to interpret the ambiguous verses of the Qur‘ān. In his *Fayṣal al-tafrīqa*, al-Ghazālī had recommended that the common people (*‘awāmm*) accept the ambiguous parts of the Qur‘ān, such as the anthropomorphic verses, without interpretation. The rule of interpretation he suggests in this book is only for those people whose

faith has become troubled. However, by the end of his life, as we have already seen, al-Ghazālī had expanded the definition of the common people in his *Iljām al-'awāmm* to include Qur'ānic exegetes, jurists, *ḥadīth* scholars and theologians, all of whom he believed should not go beyond the literal sense of Qur'ānic verses. Instead of confining *ta'wīl* to those whose faith has become troubled, al-Ghazālī now confined the right to interpret ambiguous verses to “those firmly rooted in knowledge” (*al-rāsikhūn fī'l-'ilm*), defined by al-Ghazālī as individuals of high spiritual attainment. Al-Ghazālī shifts from using rational criteria for defining acceptable *ta'wīl* to criteria based on the interpreter's spiritual practice and divine grace.⁵⁶

The second area in which a change can be seen in al-Ghazālī's exegetical thinking is in how he distinguishes Şūfī interpretations from *bāṭinī* interpretations. In his early writing on the subject in the *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, al-Ghazālī, he mentions the allegorization of the Qur'ānic figure Pharoah as an example of blameworthy interpretation in his discussion of *tafsīr bi'l-ra'y*:

This is like one who calls for struggle with the hard heart and says, God says, “Go to Pharoah. Truly, he has transgressed.” (20:24), and he points to his own heart and indicates that that is what was intended by Pharoah. This is what some preachers do with sound intentions of beautifying their talk and attracting the listener, but it is prohibited. The *bāṭiniyya* have utilized this with corrupt intentions to deceive people and invite them to their false school of thought.⁵⁷

The problem here is that equating Pharoah with the hard heart is exactly the kind of symbolic or allegorical commentary that Şūfīs do.⁵⁸ If one follows the rule of interpretation which al-Ghazālī proposes in his *Fayṣal al-tafrīqā*, any interpretation that goes beyond the literal sense of a Qur'ānic verse is unacceptable unless the literal sense can be shown to be absurd. Al-Ghazālī revises his defense of Şūfī interpretations in the *Mishkāt al-anwār*,⁵⁹ now relying upon the Ibn Ma'sūd *ḥadīth* to insist that all the different levels of meaning in the Qur'ān must be accepted as valid. Unacceptable interpretation would be like saying that Mūsā did not have any shoes, or that he did not hear the words, “Take off your shoes.” Equally unacceptable is the denial of other levels of meaning.

God forbid! Surely the annulment of the literal meanings (*ẓawāhir*) is the view of the *bāṭiniyya* who have looked one-eyed towards one of the worlds, not knowing the parallelism (*muwāzana*) between the two worlds, nor understanding this aspect. Likewise, the annulment of secrets (*asrār*) is the teaching of the *ḥashawīyya*.⁶⁰ Whoever looks only to the external sense (*ẓāhir*) is a *ḥashawī*, and whoever looks only to the inner sense (*bāṭin*) is a *bāṭinī*, and whoever joins the two is perfect (*kāmil*). Because of that [the Prophet] said, “The Qur'ān has an exoteric sense (*ẓāhir*) and an inner sense (*bāṭin*), a limit (*ḥadd*) and a point of

ascent (*muṭṭalaʿ*). It may be that this is transmitted from ʿAlī and stops with him (*mawqūf ʿalayhi*).⁶¹

Rather, I say that Mūsā understood from the command to take off his shoes the removal of the two engendered worlds, so he followed (*imtathala*)⁶² the command externally by taking off his shoes and inwardly by the removal of both worlds. This is “taking heed” (*iʿtibār*), i.e., the crossing over (*ʿubūr*) from one thing to another, from the external sense (*ẓāhir*) to the secret (*sirr*).⁶³

Although it is questionable whether the Ismāʿīlīs would have denied the reality of Mūsā’s shoes, al-Ghazālī argument here is, nonetheless, his most effective defense of Ṣūfī interpretation. In adopting it, however, he abandons the condition contained within the Ashʿarī defense which allows for *taʾwīl* only when the apparent sense of a verse can be shown to be absurd.

The success of al-Ghazālī’s argument can be seen in the fact that al-Simnānī adopts it, with a few modifications, in the introduction to his *tafsīr*:

Know with certainty that anyone who rejects commentary on the exoteric sense (*ẓāhir*) of the Qurʾān regarding the human world of horizons (*al-ʿālam al-āfāq al-nāsūtī*) is a stubborn *bāṭinī* apostate. Anyone who rejects commentary on the inner sense (*batn*) of the Qurʾān regarding the kingly world of souls (*al-ʿālam al-anfus al-malakūtī*) after having affirmed its external sense is a stupid and anthropomorphic idiot. But the one who combines the external and the inner sense is a happy *Sunnī muslim*. The one who knows the limit (*ḥadd*) of the Qurʾān in the World of Dominion (*ʿālam al-jabarūt*) is a rightly guided gnostic believer (*muʾmin*). The one who ascends to the lookout point (*muṭṭalaʿ*) of the Qurʾān in the World of Divinity (*ʿālam al-lāhūt*) is a perfectly virtuous man (*muḥsin kāmil*), witness for communities, looking out (*muṭṭaliʿ*) over unseen things, praiseworthy and noble.⁶⁴

Al-Simnānī adds an interesting interpretation of the *ḥadīth* on *tafsīr biʿl raʾy*, suggesting that the definition of unacceptable interpretation changes according to the level of meaning of the Qurʾān.

The one who interprets the external sense (*ẓāhir*) of the Qurʾān by his own opinion (*raʾy*), without hearing from a commentator whose authority derives from the Companions, has become a disbeliever because of his ignorance of most of its precepts (*aḥkām*), causes of revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*), and parables (*amthāl*).

The one who interprets the inner sense of the Qurʾān by his own opinion (*raʾy*), without secret, spiritual, hidden or real inspiration (*ilhām sirrī aw rūḥī aw khafī aw ḥaqqī*), has become a disbeliever in all the allusions (*ishārāt*) coming from the presence of Lordship through the particulars

of the powers (*al-daqqā'iq al-quwā*) and the kingly subtleties (*al-laṭā'if al-malakūtiyya*).

The one who interprets the limit (*ḥadd*) of the Qur'an by his own opinion (*ra'y*), without the permission emanating from the Ka'ba of Divinity, has become a disbeliever in the gnosis of the tenuousness of the qualities pertaining to the Dominion (*ma'ārif raqqā'iq al-ṣifāt al-jabarūtiyya*).

The one who interprets the lookout point of the Qur'an by his own opinion (*ra'y*), before His permission to enter into the exalted presence and before obtaining great purity and comprehension of the core of the real subtle substance (*al-laṭīfa al-ḥaqqiyya*) which nurtures the subtle "I" substance (*al-laṭīfa al-anā'iyya*), has become a disbeliever in the realities of the Qur'an.⁶⁵

Al-Simnānī's definitions of the different types of prohibited *tafsīr bi'l ra'y* can be compared to the restrictions which al-Ghazālī applies as to who may interpret the Qur'an in non-literal ways. Determining the legitimacy of interpretations that go beyond the literal sense of the Qur'anic text becomes far more difficult here because there are no external formulas to follow. There is a possibility of error at every level, and al-Simnānī therefore makes suggestions on how to combat them. Just as a healthy and sound ear is a requirement for hearing the external sense of the Qur'an and learning its exoteric commentary, a healthy and sound "ear" of the heart is a requirement for hearing the inner sense of the Qur'an and learning its esoteric commentary. Each higher level of comprehension requires a correspondingly healthy and sound "ear." Just as there are remedies for ailments of the physical ear, there are remedies for these inner ailments, consisting of the abandonment of attachments and various forms of remembrance (*dhikr*), for which al-Simnānī suggests several examples.⁶⁶

The defense of Şūfī exegesis that al-Ghazālī ends up with is the one that most Şūfīs seem to have quietly adopted. As detailed in the *ḥadīth* transmitted from Ibn Mas'ūd, the Qur'an has many levels of meaning, and therefore it would be wrong to limit its meaning to only those meanings transmitted in the interpretative tradition. The literal or exoteric aspect of its message must be accepted wholeheartedly along with these other levels of meaning. The interpretations of other levels of meaning correspond to the different states experienced by individual Şūfīs, and are the result of their spiritual practices and divine grace. Their validity cannot be verified by external means, and communicating them will not necessarily be of larger benefit to the community of Muslims.

Part II

COMMENTARY

ŞÜFÎ COMMENTATORS ON THE QUR'ĀN

In a religion as firmly based on a book as Islam, almost any writing which emerges can conceivably be classified as commentary on the Qur'ān, leaving us with the difficult task of deciding which works should be included in the genre of exegesis. The task of identifying the formal characteristics of *tafsīr* has been tackled with great skill by Calder.¹ He suggests that, first and foremost, a work of *tafsīr* must follow a “canon and segmentation, lemma and comment” format that sequentially addresses the complete, or nearly complete, text of the Qur'ān.”² Second, the *tafsīr* must allow for polyvalent readings through the citation of named authorities, a polyvalence that may, however, be limited by the selection of material included and the statement of preferred interpretations. Last, a *tafsīr* must measure the Qur'ānic text by use of outside disciplines, both linguistic (instrumental) and theological (ideological).³ Given these defined characteristics, Calder does not include Şūfī works within the genre of *tafsīr*, although he accepts the use of Şūfī ideas as an ideological structure against which to measure the Qur'ān.⁴

As we have already seen, the Şūfīs themselves often reserved the term “*tafsīr*” for the types of commentaries following the characteristics that Calder describes, and used different terms like “allusion” (*ishāra*) and “interpretation” (*ta'wīl*), or more rarely, “understanding” (*fahm*), or “striking similitudes” (*ḍarb al-mithāl*), for their commentaries. What holds these writings together as a genre, however, is the fact that they follow the lemma and comment format of *tafsīr*, and address the Qur'ān in a sequential, even if in a more selective manner.⁵ Works such as Jalāluddīn Rūmī's *Mathnawī* and Ibn 'Arabī's *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* are examples of Şūfī works that present a large amount of Şūfī interpretations of the Qur'ān, but are not generally considered as part of the commentary genre because they do not follow this format.

Şūfī commentaries on the Qur'ān differ from the *tafsīr* genre described by Calder in another way, in the area of style. These works have been described as “allegorical”⁶ and “symbolic,”⁷ but these are terms that do not adequately convey their varied forms of discourse. As part of their interpretation of Qur'ānic verses, Şūfīs displayed literary characteristics that are not often found in work of *tafsīr*, creating their own metaphors, wordplay, narratives, and poetry as an integral part

of their exegesis, and it is this use of language and style as much as specific Šūfī doctrines and beliefs that gives Šūfī commentary its distinctive character.

The commentaries chosen here to represent Šūfī exegesis consist of a variety of influential works, but it should be noted that many important Šūfī commentaries remain in manuscript form. Because the exegetical works included in this study will be excerpted as part of an analysis of selected Qur'ānic passages, the unique style of each of the commentaries may not be obvious. What follows, then, is a chronological introduction to each of the commentators, with biographical notes, and comments on the style and method of each.

Al-Tustarī

Abū Muḥammad Sahl b. 'Abd Allāh al-Tustarī was born in the Persian province of Khūzistān and died in Basra in 896.⁸ He became involved with Šūfism early in life under the influence of his uncle, a ḥadīth scholar and disciple of the Šūfī Ma'rūf al-Kharkhī (d. 815). His teachings are preserved in writings that reflect his own hand as well as the disciples who took oral instruction from him.

Al-Tustarī's *tafsīr* is the oldest continuous Šūfī commentary on the Qur'ān. Exegesis attributed to other early Šūfī figures exists in the compilation of al-Sulamī (d. 937 or 942), *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr*, but al-Tustarī's commentary is the earliest work to survive independently. Although there is yet no critical edition of the commentary, which comprises a small volume, Böwering has made a thorough study of it on the basis of six extant manuscripts.⁹ He describes it as a disjointed work, which "resembles a collection of jottings, noted down in loose sequence and linked to each other without any apparent principle of logical order."¹⁰ These jottings appear to come from three different sources: al-Tustarī's exoteric and esoteric interpretations of Qur'ānic verses, his aphorisms and stories taken from other works no longer extant, and additions and glosses inserted into the text, either by disciples of al-Tustarī or later Šūfīs.¹¹

Given the nature of the compilation of this work, its rather eclectic content is not surprising. According to Böwering,

There are literal and metaphorical interpretations of the Qur'ānic phrases: illustrations from the Prophet's normative and customary behavior; examples from the legends of the prophets of old; traces of mystical views shared by earlier Šūfīs and anecdotes concerning their practical conduct; fragments of Tustarī's mystical themes, his religious thought, and ascetic practice; exhortations and guidelines for disciples and answers to their questions; and finally, episodes about Tustarī's life, glosses and explanatory insertions into the text.¹²

Al-Tustarī's *tafsīr* hints at the possibilities but leaves to others the task of a more conscious and comprehensive presentation of Šūfī exegesis.

Al-Sulamî

Abū 'Abd al-Rahmān Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamî was born in the city of Nisābūr (Nishapur in Persian).¹³ Although he traveled extensively to study *ḥadīth* and perform the pilgrimage, most of his life was spent in his home city, where he died in 1021. Like the grandfather who educated him and the Şūfî teacher who initiated him, al-Sulamî was a Shāfi'î scholar of *ḥadīth*. He was a prolific writer, with more than 100 books to his name, about 30 of which are extant. His *Ṭabaqāt al-Sūfiyya*, the oldest extant Şūfî hagiographical collection, and his two compilations of Şūfî exegesis, the *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* and the *Ziyādāt ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* are invaluable because they preserve oral teachings and written works from Şūfis of the eighth to tenth centuries.

The *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* comprises two volumes in a recently published edition.¹⁴ Portions of the work were previously published by Massignon and Nywia.¹⁵ The *Ziyādāt ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* is an appendix to the *Ḥaqā'iq* recently discovered and published by Bowering in one volume.¹⁶ According to Bowering, al-Sulamî gathered the material for his commentaries from both written and oral sources. The only written sources which al-Sulamî mentions explicitly are those attributed to Abū'l-'Abbās Aḥmad al-Adamî, known as Ibn 'Aṭā' (d. 921) and Ja'far al-Şādiq (d. 765).¹⁷ The most frequently cited authorities in the *Ḥaqā'iq* are Ibn 'Aṭā', Abū Bakr al-Wāsiṭī, known as Ibn al-Farghānī (d. 932), Sahl al-Tustarī, Abū Sa'īd al-Kharrāz (d. 899), al-Junayd (d. 910) and Abū Bakr al-Shiblī.¹⁸ In the *Ziyādāt*, the most frequently cited authorities are Sahl al-Tustarī, Ja'far al-Şādiq, and Ibn 'Aṭā'.¹⁹ Both books include anonymous quotations as well.

In the introduction to his *tafsīr*, al-Sulamî states that he included two types of quotations in his compilation. The first he calls *āyāt*, by which he means interpretations of specific verses, and the second he calls *aqwāl*, which are Şūfî sayings related to key Qur'ānic terms. Noting the wealth of commentaries based upon the exoteric sciences and the relative lack of the same for Şūfî exegesis, al-Sulamî writes that he has deliberately confined himself to the latter. Bowering remarks that, in preserving the earliest Şūfis' exegetical comments, al-Sulamî performed a function similar to that of al-Tabarī in his *Jāmi' al-bayān*, and in doing so established Şūfî commentary by allusion (*ishāra*) as a distinct genre within the *tafsīr* tradition.²⁰

The style of al-Sulamî's commentaries reflects their structure as a compilation. Because there is no unifying voice behind the many citations that follow one another, linked only by the verse being interpreted, themes remain underdeveloped and terms unexplained. Without a larger context, many of these comments are somewhat cryptic. The focus is on key Qur'ānic words, rather than on larger segments of the verse and its context. Bowering understands the interpretations as encounters between key Qur'ānic words and mystical experience.

These allusions are the result of the merger between Qur'ānic keynotes and the matrix of the Şūfî world of ideas. The keynotes, Qur'ānic words

or phrases striking the Ṣūfī's mind, may be taken up in total isolation from the actual context or, less frequently, presuppose familiarity with a wider frame of Qur'ānic reference. It is significant to realize that these keynotes are not studied as a text, but aurally perceived by men experienced in listening attentively to Qur'ān recital and intent on hearing God, the actual speaker of the Qur'ānic word. Listening to the Qur'ānic word, the Ṣūfī is captured by a keynote, a fleeting touch of meaning communicated to him by the divine speaker. This keynote signals to the Ṣūfī the breakthrough to God, revealing himself in His divine speech and opening a way to Himself through and beyond His divine word.

With these keynotes the listener associates a cluster of images emerging from the content of his personal experience. These images merge with the Qur'ānic keynotes and find their expression in the allusions that are jotted down in the commentary in a condensed, abbreviated form. These jottings thus reflect the gist of the listener's encounter with the divine word merging inextricably with the matrix of the Ṣūfī world of ideas. In this process the allusions achieve a synthesis that makes it impossible to discern where "exegesis" ends and "eisegesis" begins, and where the discovery of man's own existence disappears in the revelation of the divine word.²¹

This interaction between the Qur'ānic text and Ṣūfī experience in Ṣūfī commentary was first noted by Nwyia. One of the most distinctive examples of this is found in what Nwyia calls the "intérieurisation des figures prophétiques." He writes,

In their meditation on the Qur'ān, the figures of the prophets become prototypes of mystic experience or figures of religious consciousness. That which they read in the stories of the ancients (*akhbār al-awwālin*) are not "histories" but a lesson (*ibrā*), a doctrine on the relationships between God and man. In this way Abraham becomes the figure of suffering but faithful consciousness or the prototype of friendship with God, Moses, the figure of spiritual experience as dialogue with God, etc.²²

While many of these comments can be obscure because of their use of esoteric symbolism or technical Ṣūfī terminology that is left unexplained, other comments cited in the *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* could be characterized as homiletic, especially when compared to the reticence in this area of other types of commentaries that confine themselves to the interpretative tradition.

The *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* was recognized almost immediately as representing a very different approach to understanding the Qur'ān, an approach deemed unacceptable by some. Al-Sulamī's near contemporary, the Qur'ānic scholar al-Wāḥidī (d. 1076), said, "If al-Sulamī thinks that this is a *tafsīr*, he is an infidel."²³ In his *Talbīs iblis*, Ibn al-Jawzī wrote that 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī's *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* contains astonishing examples of Ṣūfī exegesis "which occur to them without the

supports of any of the fundamentals of knowledge,”²⁴ and he quotes numerous examples from it in order to point out the errors of Şüfî exegesis. Critical judgments of the *Haqā'iq al-tafsîr* were also made by such later scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya, Shams al-Dîn al-Dhahabî (d. 1348), and Abû'l Faḍl 'Abd al-Raḥmân al-Suyûtî (d. 1505).²⁵

Al-Qushayrî

Abû'l-Qāsim 'Abd al-Karîm b. Hawāzin al-Qushayrî (d. 1074) was an Arab from Northeastern Iran who studied with al-Sulamî after his primary spiritual teacher and father-in-law, Abû 'Alî al-Daqqāq, died.²⁶ Upon meeting his first teacher, al-Qushayrî abandoned his life as a wealthy landowner, and, at the urging of his teacher, adopted the life of a scholar of *ḥadīth* and Ash'arî theology. This quiet life was interrupted when the Saljūqs began to persecute al-Qushayrî and other prominent and vocal Shāfi'î-Ash'arîs. Al-Qushayrî was imprisoned for a short time before escaping to live in exile, returning to Nīsābūr only when the political situation became more amenable to Ash'arîs.

Although al-Qushayrî wrote theological works and an exoteric Qur'ānic commentary, his fame rests upon his Şüfî works. The most famous of these is *Al-risāla fî 'ilm al-taṣawwuf*, considered by Şüfîs to be the classic formulation of their doctrine. His expressed purpose in writing the book was to reconfirm the orthodoxy of Şüfism against those Şüfîs who no longer observed the religious law (*sharī'a*). Al-Qushayrî was a cautious writer, avoiding the type of excessive statements attributed to al-Ḥallāj and other Şüfis; consequently, his Şüfî commentary, the *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, has never been attacked in the manner of the commentaries of al-Sulamî and al-Kāshānî.

The *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt* consists of al-Qushayrî's own comments on Qur'ānic verses as well as anonymous Şüfî sayings. According to Basyūnî, the editor of a critical six-volume edition,²⁷ al-Qushayrî's goal in writing this *tafsîr* was to help his fellow Şüfîs and, as such, is a better example of his school of thought than the *Risāla*.²⁸ Although many of the elements found in al-Sulamî's *Haqā'iq al-tafsîr* are present here, al-Qushayrî avoids the extensive use of Şüfî terminology and far-reaching wordplay and allegory, instead adopting a consistently homiletical style. Al-Qushayrî searches Qur'ānic verses for something to inspire the reader whether those verses are parts of narratives or religious legislation. The qualities of the prophets become lessons for the aspiring mystic. A verse on the distribution of booty prompts al-Qushayrî to comment on the booty to be enjoyed when one succeeds in capturing the soul from the enemies of passion and Satan.²⁹ Foreshadowing al-Ghazālî's *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dîn*, al-Qushayrî continually stresses the importance of the inner aspect of acts of worship, the need to go beyond mere bodily compliance to discover layers of meaning in these acts.³⁰

As Basyūnî points out, al-Qushayrî's method is more literary than intellectual, a fact which he attributes to the Şüfî emphasis on “tasting” (*dhawq*) and an appreciation for the inimitability (*'ijāz*) of the Qur'ān. This method is apparent in the

attention al-Qushayrī pays to individual words and phrases, drawing upon the roots of the language, etymology, inflections and rhetoric.³¹ In addition to showing his appreciation for the literary subtleties of the Qur'ānic text, al-Qushayrī responds himself to the text in a literary manner by the use of elegant prose, metaphors, and poetry.³²

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī al-Ghazālī was born in Ṭūs near present day Mashhad in Iran.³³ His studies brought him to Nīsābūr as a young man where he studied with the prominent Shāfi'ī jurist and Ash'arī theologian Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 1085), a colleague of al-Qushayrī. Al-Ghazālī resided in the court of the Saljūq vizier Nizām al-Mulk until he was appointed as rector and professor at the Nizāmīya *madrasa* in Baghdad. Four years later he resigned from this prestigious position as the result of a personal crisis that he later described in his intellectual autobiography, *Al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*, which also details al-Ghazālī's disenchantment with theology, philosophy and Ismā'ilism, and his consequent adoption of Sūfism. Al-Ghazālī spent the next ten years in practicing and studying Sūfism in Damascus, Mecca and Medina before returning to his hometown. He taught once again in Nīsābūr before he died in Ṭūs in 1111.

Al-Ghazālī is said to have written over 400 works, of which about 70 are extant manuscripts. His writings cover a broad range of the intellectual sciences of the classical Islamic world. Among his early works is an exposition of Islamic philosophers entitled *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, which was followed by a criticism of the same in the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*. Among his juridical works is *Al-Mustasfā min 'ilm al-uṣūl al-fiqh*, a work which is still used as a textbook on the sources of Islamic law today. The *Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayn al-Islām wa'l-zandaqa* deals with the specific issue of taxing others with disbelief. The *Iljām al-'awāmm 'an 'ilm al-kalām*, written at the very end of al-Ghazālī's life, expresses his reservations about the study of theology. Among al-Ghazālī's Sūfī works is the *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, a four-volume book that attempts, as its title announces, "the revivification of the religious sciences." Borrowing extensively from Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī's *Qūt al-qulūb*, al-Ghazālī reorganized and amplified this material into a systematic work written in a clear and lucid style, addressing the topics of knowledge, worship, and behavior from a pietistic and mystical standpoint. His shorter works include *Al-Risāla al-laduniyya*, a treatise dealing with the distinctive epistemology of Sūfism, the *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān* containing various theories regarding the Qur'ān and its interpretation, and the *Mishkāt al-anwār*, a short hermeneutical and exegetical work concerning the Light Verse of the Qur'ān and the Veils *ḥadīth*. Al-Ghazālī is said to have written a forty-volume commentary on the Qur'ān as well, but an extant copy has yet to be found.³⁴

Al-Ghazālī's commentary on the Light Verse in the *Mishkāt al-anwār* is, unique among the Sūfīs studied here in the extent to which it combines theory and exegesis.³⁵ If al-Ghazālī abandoned philosophy and theology as a means for

attaining truth, he nonetheless continued to employ their analytical and logical tools in his writing. We need not go so far as Ibn Taymiyya in saying, “Ghazālî went into the belly of the philosophers (*falāsifa*) and when he wished to come out he was unable to do so,”³⁶ but it could be said that al-Ghazālî’s contribution to Şūfî exegesis is more intellectual than poetic and literary, as it is with al-Qushayrî and al-Maybudî. However, he writes in a very accessible and non-obscure manner, and therefore functions quite effectively as an apologist for Şūfî theory. The style of the commentary is consistently allegorical, although, as we have seen, al-Ghazālî had distinctive ideas regarding the use of metaphors in the Qur’ân.

Rashîd al-Dîn al-Maybudî

We know very little of the life of Rashîd al-Dîn Abû’l-Faḍl Aḥmad al-Maybudî (fl. 1135), the author of the ten-volume commentary *Kashf al-asrâr wa-uddat al-abrâr*.³⁷ From his name we know he was from Maybud, a small town near Yazd in central Iran. On the basis of the contents of his commentary, Rokni has concluded that al-Maybudî was a Shāfi’î Sunnî *ḥadīth* scholar who showed his respect for the Shī’î tradition by quoting ‘Alī 185 times and other Shī’î imams 68 times.³⁸

Al-Maybudî explained the purpose of his writing the *Kashf al-asrâr* in his introduction. He had read and been greatly impressed by the *tafsîr* of ‘Abd Allāh al-Anṣarî al-Harawî (d. 1089) but was disappointed by its brevity, and so set out to expand it.³⁹ Although al-Anṣarî’s commentary was purely mystical, al-Maybudî decided to add other dimensions of *tafsîr* as well. He divided the Qur’ân into reading sections (*majlishā*), and then divided each of these sections into three parts. The first part in each section is a literal Persian paraphrase of the Qur’ānic Arabic verses. The second part, the largest of the three parts, is exoteric *tafsîr* written in both Persian and Arabic which addresses philological, narrative, juridical, and theological issues as found in the transmitted *salafî* and post-*salafî* exegetical tradition. The third part, also written in both Persian and Arabic, contains what al-Maybudî calls “symbols” (*rumûz*), “allusions” (*ishārât*) and “subtleties” (*laṭā’if*),⁴⁰ and it is this part that makes his *tafsîr* distinctive.

The *Kashf al-asrâr* has sometimes been called the *tafsîr* of Khwājā ‘Abd Allāh al-Anṣarî, but, in fact, al-Anṣarî is only one of the sources al-Maybudî used in the third part of his *tafsîr*. When al-Maybudî quotes al-Anṣarî, he sometimes refers to him by name and sometimes calls him “the spiritual guide of the way” (*pîr-i ṭarīqat*), or “the learned one of the way” (*‘ālim-i ṭarīqat*). Al-Maybudî’s other primary source for this part of his *tafsîr* is the *Laṭā’if al-ishārât* of al-Qushayrî who is quoted or paraphrased anonymously in Arabic or in Persian translation. Other sources must have been used as well for the sayings and interpretations attributed to early Şūfîs which he includes. Böwering states that, at least in the case of those sayings attributed to Sahl al-Tustarî, the material appears to have been taken from Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj’s *Kitāb al-luma’*, Abū Ṭālib al-Makkî’s *Qūt al-qulūb*, and the hagiographical work, *Hilyat al-awliyā wa-ṭabaqāt al-asfiyā* of Abū Nu’aym al-Iṣfahānî (d. 1038).⁴¹

Rokni has identified three different types of interpretation within this third part of al-Maybudī's *Kashf al-asrār*.⁴² The first kind he calls *ta'wīl*, by which he means interpretation that uncovers Ṣūfī doctrines and beliefs in Qur'ānic verses. Rokni illustrates this with al-Maybudī's commentary on verses 2:67–71, in which Mūsā commands his people, on God's behalf, to sacrifice a heifer and they question him regarding what kind of cow this might be. The qualities of the cow to be sacrificed are taken as an allusion to the qualities needed for the mystical aspirant. Another kind of *ta'wīl*, according to Rokni, is the juxtaposition of Ṣūfī terminology with Qur'ānic verses. His example is the commentary on Qur'ān 3:31. Al-Maybudī compares the first part of this verse, *Say, "If you love God,"* to the Ṣūfī concept of dispersion (*tafriqa*) and the second part, *"God will love you,"* to the concept of union (*jam'*).

The second kind of interpretation that Rokni identifies in al-Maybudī's Ṣūfī exegesis is homiletic elucidation (*tawdīḥ... bi-ravish-i majlis-i ghūyān va khuṭabā*). Adopting the style of preachers, al-Maybudī uses rhymed prose, poetry, puns, stories, similes, and metaphors to exhort and inspire the believer. The subject matter might be the inward qualities and outward practices of the believer, the stations of the prophets, or God's glory. It is in this kind of interpretation that al-Maybudī's literary skills are most apparent, and as Rokni points out, the value of the *Kashf al-asrār* lies in its mystical and literary aspects, its Ṣūfī *ta'wīl*, and its homilies.

Rokni's third type of interpretation occurs less frequently. He calls it *tashqīq*, by which he means the way in which al-Maybudī breaks apart a Qur'ānic verse and then expands these various parts by means of related verses, *ḥadīth*, or poetry. As an example he cites al-Maybudī's commentary on Qur'ān 3:191, *those who remember God standing, sitting and on their sides*, in which al-Maybudī identifies three different types of people who remember God. The first type remembers God with the tongue while forgetting Him in the heart. This is the remembrance (*dhikr*) of the unjust. The second type remembers God with the tongue and a present heart. Yet he seeks reward, so this is the remembrance of those who adopt a middle way. The third type remembers God with a heart full of Him, while his tongue has become silent as one who knows God. This is the remembrance of those who have outdistanced all others (*ṣābiqūn*).⁴³

Rūzbihān al-Baqlī

Abū Muḥammad Rūzbihān b. Abī Naṣr al-Baqlī began his life in the Persian town of Fasā (Pasā in Persian), where he was born, as he put it in his autobiography, "to ignorant folk who were a prey to drunkenness and error, gross and vulgar men like unto 'startled asses fleeing before a lion' (Koran 74:50–1)."⁴⁴ He claims to have experienced mystical states beginning in childhood, states which increased in intensity until he fled into the desert as a young man, and was overwhelmed daily by visions in which he perceived the heavens and the earth as pure light. Following this period, he lived with Ṣūfīs and began to balance his extraordinary

experiences by studying the exoteric sciences of Islam as a Shāfi'ī and an Ash'arī. Most of his life was spent in Shīrāz, where he established a Şūfī lodge and a following, and died in 1209.

Rūzbihān wrote over forty works in Arabic and Persian dealing with both exoteric and Şūfī topics, many of which are no longer extant or exist only in fragmentary form. Among those which have been published in critical editions, at least in part, are the aforementioned autobiography, *Kashf al-asrār*,⁴⁵ the '*Abhar al-āshiqīn*'⁴⁶ which presents Rūzbihān's theories on love and beauty, the *Sharḥ-i shatḥiyāt*⁴⁷ containing the ecstatic sayings of al-Hallāj and other Şūfīs, and the '*Ar'āis al-bayān fi haqā'iq al-Qur'ān*', his Şūfī commentary on the Qur'ān.

The '*Ar'āis al-bayān*' has been published so far only in lithographic form, comprising two large volumes in the edition used for this study.⁴⁸ Alan Godlas is currently working on a critical edition and English translation of this work.⁴⁹ The commentary on each Qur'ānic verse begins with Rūzbihān's own exegesis, followed by quotations from al-Sulamī's *Haqā'iq al-tafsīr* and *Ziyādāt haqā'iq al-tafsīr*, and al-Qushayrī's *Latā'if al-ishārāt*. The style of Rūzbihān's comments is quite distinct from the Şūfīs he quotes. Jāmī (d. 1492) remarked on its difficulty, saying, "he has sayings that have poured forth from him in the state of overpowering and ecstasy, which not everyone can understand."⁵⁰ The Moghul prince Dārā Shikūh (d. 1659) was impressed enough with Rūzbihān's writings to have written an abridgement and update of his *Sharḥ-i shatḥiyāt*, and to have had Rūzbihān's Qur'ānic commentary translated into Persian, yet he found his style "fatiguing."⁵¹ On the other hand, modern scholars have noted the literary merits of Rūzbihān's writings. Mu'in writes,

His speech is like a rose that flutters apart once grasped in the hand, or like an alchemical substance that turns into vapor when barely heated. His language is the language of perceptions; he praises the beautiful and beauty, and loves them both.⁵²

Similarly, Schimmel writes,

What so profoundly impresses the reader in Rūzbihān's writings, both in his commentary on the *Shatḥiyāt* and his '*Abhar al-āshiqīn*' – "*Le Jasmin des fidèles d'amour*," as Henri Corbin translates its title – is his style, which is at times as hard to translate as that of Aḥmad Ghazzālī and possesses a stronger and deeper instrumentation. It is no longer the scholastic language of the early exponents of Sufism, who tried to classify stages and stations, though Baqlī surely knew these theories and the technical terms. It is the language refined by the poets of Iran during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, filled with roses and nightingales, pliable and colorful.⁵³

In his Qur'ānic commentary, however, Rūzbihān's role changes from creator of symbols and metaphors to interpreter of those he locates in the Qur'ān, and in

these interpretations the influence of Šūfī theories and technical terms is more evident, and above all, mystical experience. Unlike the popular homiletical and didactic style of the commentaries of al-Qushayrī or al-Maybudī, Rūzbihān's is visionary and esoteric.

Al-Kāshānī

Other than the fact that 'Abd al-Razzāq Kamāl al-Dīn b. Abī'l-Ghanā'im al-Kāshānī (or Qāshānī, Kāshī or Kāsānī) came from the province of Kāshān in Iran and died in 1329, we know little of his life.⁵⁴ He studied logic and philosophy as a young man before turning to Šūfism, where his philosophical bent found new expression in the school of Ibn 'Arabī.⁵⁵ Al-Kāshānī became one of the most widely read of the early interpreters of Ibn 'Arabī, having studied with Mu'ayyid al-Dīn al-Jandī (d. 1291), himself a student of Ibn 'Arabī's stepson, Šadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274). Al-Kāshānī wrote an influential commentary on Ibn 'Arabī's *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, a commentary on al-Anṣārī's *Al-Sā'irīn*, and a dictionary of technical terms, the *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Šūfīyya*, which explains the terms found in his own and other Šūfis' writings. His Qur'ānic commentary, the *Tāwīlāt al-Qur'ān* has been published several times in two large volumes inaccurately attributed to Ibn 'Arabī.⁵⁶

It has been shown that, in fact, al-Kāshānī had an attitude towards exegesis very different from Ibn 'Arabī. The school of Ibn 'Arabī, beginning with al-Qūnawī, focused on the more philosophical and abstract areas of Ibn 'Arabī's thought, reducing if not eliminating Ibn 'Arabī's strong emphasis on the role of imagination and Islamic practice.⁵⁷ Al-Kāshānī was no exception here. As Morris writes,

Kāshānī's Koranic commentaries, like his other books, are all clearly distinguished by a thoroughgoing pedagogical concern and didactic procedure that is manifested in such interrelated characteristics as their rigorous systematization, the clarification and simplification of vocabulary (especially if compared with Ibn 'Arabī), and the conceptualization (often in an openly reductionistic manner) of what were originally multivalent symbols. These tendencies are not merely stylistic particularities; they also reflect a shift in the content and underlying intentions of Kāshānī's writing (when compared with Ibn 'Arabī) that brought him very close to the prevailing systems of Avicennan philosophy (especially in their interpretations of the phenomena and claims of Sufism) and related schools of kalam – to such a degree that their verbal formulations are sometimes virtually indistinguishable.⁵⁸

Morris judges al-Kāshānī's commentary as an aberration from the usual norms of Šūfī exegesis, replacing personal spiritual realization with "the *application* to the Koran of a coherent metaphysical system."⁵⁹ Whereas Ibn 'Arabī emphasized the primacy of knowledge by unveiling (*kashf*) over reason (*'aql*), Morris

suggests that al-Kāshānī alters or even reverses this perspective. The result is “a sort of allegorical reduction of the complex symbolism of the Koran and *ḥadīth* to a single (or at most twofold) plane of reference.”⁶⁰

What Morris is responding to here is al-Kāshānī's primary methodology, which is that of finding correspondences between Qur'ānic verses and spiritual psychology and the stages of an individual's spiritual path. According to Lory, this is the methodology al-Kāshānī calls *taṭbīq*.⁶¹ Al-Kāshānī is not the first commentator to use this technique, but he is the first to use it so extensively and exclusively, and the first to apply it to entire passages of the Qur'ān. It is this method that invites the charge of allegorical reductionism, and yet, however one judges the results, this does not appear to have been al-Kāshānī's intention. We have already seen how he characterizes the Qur'ān in the introduction to his commentary as a sea containing endless treasures to be found and *ta'wīl* as a process of ever changing interpretation related to the ever changing states of the reader.⁶²

Al-Nisābūrī

Nizām al-Dīn b. al-Ḥasan al-Khurāsānī al-Nisābūrī (d. 1327), known as Nizām the lame, was born and lived in Nisābūr.⁶³ He was a renowned scholar who wrote on subjects ranging from astronomy and mathematics to morphology and Qur'ānic recitation. His most important work was his Qur'ānic commentary, *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān wa ragḥā'ib al-furqān*, printed in thirty parts in twelve volumes.⁶⁴ The *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān*, like al-Maybudī's *Kashf al-asrār*, divides the Qur'ān into sections made up of both exoteric and Şūfī commentary. After quoting a group of Qur'ānic verses, al-Nisābūrī gives different readings (*qir'āt*) and recitation pauses and stops (*wuqūf*). This is followed by commentary (*tafsīr*) primarily derived from al-Rāzī's *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, as well as al-Zamakhsharī's *Al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl* and other commentaries. These sources are quoted without attribution throughout most of the commentary, although al-Nisābūrī acknowledges his debt to al-Rāzī and al-Zamakhsharī in the introduction and names a few additional sources in a postscript. He also states in his postscript that the final part of each section, entitled *ta'wīl*, was taken mostly from the *tafsīr* of the Şūfī Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī Dāya (d. 1256).⁶⁵

Dāya was a disciple of the founder of the Kubrawī order, Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā, who is said to have begun a commentary on the Qur'ān that he was unable to complete before his death, a commentary that ends in *sūra* 51. A number of manuscripts credit Dāya with the work, and it is therefore unclear to what degree this commentary was co-authored or revised by him. The commentary of 'Alā al-Dawla al-Simnānī (d. 1336), also from the Kubrawī order, contains an introduction and commentary on the first *sūra* followed by commentary from *sūra* 52 to the end of the Qur'ān. It exists independently and as a work appended to the *tafsīr* of Kubrā and Dāya. This collective work of the Kubrawī order is sometimes called *Al-Ta'wīlāt al-najmiyya*. Dāya may have written a different, independent *tafsīr* as well.⁶⁶ Because these *tafsīrs* exist only in manuscripts it is difficult to

ascertain at this point in time which *tafsīr* al-Nīsābūrī used for his *ta'wīl*, and the extent to which his material is indebted to it.

In some ways al-Nīsābūrī's *ta'wīl* resembles that of al-Kāshānī in that al-Nīsābūrī frequently establishes correspondences between elements of Qur'ānic verses and the spiritual psychology and states of man. In general however, al-Nīsābūrī is less philosophical and theoretical than al-Kāshānī and often demonstrates a more lyrical response to the Qur'ānic text. In the introduction to his commentary, al-Nīsābūrī provides a context to understand *ta'wīl* as part of the methodology of "extracting many issues from brief expressions" (*istinbāṭ al-masā'il al-kathīra min al-alfāz al-qalīla*). These issues pertain to either topics of wording or content. Included in the first are matters related to recitation (*qirā'a*), lexicology (*lugha*), etymology (*'ilm al-ishtiqāq*), morphology (*'ilm al-ḥarf*), grammar (*'ilm al-naḥw*), and rhetoric (*'ilm al-badī'*). Included in the second are matters related to meanings (*ma'ānī*), explanation (*bayān*), deduction (*istidlāl*), the fundamentals of religion (*uṣūl al-dīn*), the fundamentals of jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*), jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and the science of mystical states (*'ilm al-aḥwāl*). It is the science of mystical states that forms the basis for *ta'wīl* interpretations.⁶⁷

QUR'ĀNIC VERSES 18:60–82

The story of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr

And when Mūsā (Moses) said to his boy, "I will continue until I reach the junction of the two seas or spend years and years traveling. But when they reached the junction, they forgot their fish, which took its way through the sea as in a tunnel. When they had gone on, [Mūsā] said to his boy, "Give us our meal. Truly, fatigue has overwhelmed us on our journey." [The boy] said, "Did you see when we betook ourselves to the rock? I forgot the fish and what caused me to forget to mention it was none other than Satan. It took its way through the sea in an amazing way!" [Mūsā] said, "That is what we were seeking." So they retraced their steps.

They found one of Our servants to whom We had given mercy from Ourselves and to whom We had taught knowledge from Our very presence (min ladunnā). Musa said to him, "May I follow you so that you can teach me something of that which you have been taught – right judgement?" He said, "You will not be able to be patient with me. How can you be patient with what you do not fully understand?" [Mūsā] said, "You will find me patient, God willing, and I will not disobey you in anything." He said, "If you follow me, do not ask me anything until I myself mention it to you."

So they proceeded until they embarked on the ship and he made a hole in it. [Mūsā] said, "Did you put a hole in it in order to drown its people? You have done a terrible thing!" He said, "Didn't I say to you that you would not be able to be patient with me?" [Mūsā] said, "Do not call me to account for what I forgot and do not be hard on me for what I did." They proceeded until they met a young man and he killed him. [Mūsā] said "Have you killed an innocent soul who has killed no one? You have indeed done an awful thing!" He said, "Didn't I say to you that you would not be able to be patient with me?" [Mūsā] said, "If I ask you anything after this, do not keep me in your company. You have had enough excuses from me." Then they proceeded until they came upon a people of a village. They asked them for food but they refused them hospitality. They found a wall in it that was almost falling down, so he fixed it. [Mūsā] said, "If you had wished, you could have been paid for it."

He said, "This is the parting between you and me. I will tell you the interpretation (ta'wīl) of that which you were unable to bear patiently.

As for the ship, it belonged to some poor people who worked in the sea. I wanted to make it unusable because a king was behind them seizing every boat by force. As for the young man, his parents were believers and we feared that he would be hard on them on account of his insolence and ingratitude. We wanted that their Lord would give to them in exchange one better than he in purity and closeness of affection. As for the wall, it belonged to two young men who were orphans in the town. Underneath it was a buried treasure that was theirs. Their father had been a righteous man so your Lord wanted them to mature and reach their full strength and take out their treasure as a mercy from your Lord. I did not do it for myself. That is the interpretation (ta'wīl) of that which you were unable to bear patiently.

Many stories are related in the Qur'ān in this elliptical manner, suggesting that the first Muslims hearing these verses were already familiar with these tales, or that they received further narrative detail or explanation from the Prophet himself. In this case there is an evidence for the latter in a *ḥadīth* transmitted on the authority of the Jewish convert Ubayy b. Ka'b (d. 642), a *ḥadīth* which identifies the servant of God mentioned in these verses as al-Khaḍīr (or al-Khiḍr), "the green man." Early Western scholars attempted to identify external sources for the Qur'ānic story and found common features in the Gilgamesh epic, the Alexander romance, and the Jewish legend of Elijah and Rabbi Joshua ben Levi.¹ While Wensinck claimed that the Qur'ānic story is derived from Jewish legend,² Wheeler has demonstrated more recently that it is, in fact, the Jewish legend that can be traced to Arabic sources.³ He states that the common narrative elements isolated by Wensinck and earlier scholars conflate the Qur'ānic version with material from later Qur'ānic commentaries. For example, the theme of the water of eternal life, common to the Gilgamesh epic and the Alexander romance, is mentioned explicitly in the story of Mūsā and Khahīr only in the commentaries and not in the Qur'ān itself. Wheeler views the appropriation of themes from earlier sources as part of a purposeful interpretative strategy for uncovering meaning rather than as an attempt to "get the story straight." It should be pointed out, however, that while Wheeler attributes these narrative elements to Qur'ānic commentators, the classical commentators themselves attribute details such as the water of eternal life and the salted fish that comes to life to the Prophet himself through the *ḥadīth* attributed to Ubayy b. Ka'b, giving them a near canonical status.

The *ḥadīth* related from Ubayy b. Ka'b contextualizes the Qur'ānic narrative by explaining the reason for Mūsā's journey. Mūsā is looking for a man whom he has been told has more knowledge than he does.

Mūsā stood up amongst the people of Israel in order to preach. Someone asked, "Which person is the most knowledgeable?" Mūsā said, "I am."

God rebuked him since he did not attribute his knowledge to Him. [God] said, “Nay, I have a servant at the junction of the two seas.” Mūsā said, “O Lord, what is the way to him?” It was said, “You will take a fish and place it in a basket ...”⁴

Al-Ṭabarī quotes an embellishment of this dialogue transmitted from Ibn ‘Abbās:

Mūsā asked his Lord, “Lord, which of your servants is most beloved to you? He said, “The one who remembers Me and does not forget Me.” Mūsā said, “And which of your servants is most judicious?” He said, “The one who judges by the truth and does not follow his own inclination (*hawā*). Mūsā said, “O Lord, which of your servants is the most knowledgeable?” He said, “The one to whose knowledge the knowledge of the people aspire, that perhaps they might receive a word that would lead them to guidance or save them from ruin.” Mūsā said, “Lord, is there such a one on earth?” He said, “Yes.” Mūsā said, “Lord, who is he?” He said, “Al-Khaḍir.” Mūsā said, “Where shall I look for him?” He said, “Upon the shore by the rock where the fish will slip away.”⁵

Although al-Khaḍir is presented as being more knowledgeable than Mūsā, al-Khaḍir emphasizes the complementary nature of their knowledge, saying, “O Mūsā, I have knowledge from God that He has taught me that you do not know, and you have knowledge from His knowledge that He has taught you that I do not know.”⁶ Al-Ṭabarī quotes an interpretation from Ibn ‘Abbās on the nature of their respective knowledge stating that al-Khaḍir practised the knowledge of the Unseen (*‘ilm al-ghayb*) while Mūsā only understood external standards of justice⁷ and he characterizes al-Khaḍir’s knowledge as inward (*bāṭin*) and Mūsā’s as external (*ẓāhir*).⁸ Al-Khaḍir, however, points out the relative insignificance of the knowledge they both possess as he and Mūsā proceed on their journey; when the two of them board a boat they see a small bird pecking at the water, causing al-Khaḍir to remark that their combined knowledge takes from God’s knowledge an amount equal to what the bird has taken from the sea.⁹

As mentioned earlier, the *ḥadīth* of Ubayy b. Ka’b contains details common to other stories of late antiquity that do not occur in the Qur’ānic verses. These details are explicit in only one of the versions of the *ḥadīth*.

Mūsā set out with his boy and a salted fish. It had been said to him, “When this fish comes to life in a certain place, your companion will be there and you will have found what you are looking for.” So Mūsā set out with his boy and the fish that they carried. He traveled until the journey wore him out and he reached the rock and the water, the water of life (*mā’ al-ḥayāt*). Anyone who drank from it became immortal and nothing that was dead could approach it without coming to life. When they had stopped and the water touched the fish, it came to life *and took its way through the sea, as in a tunnel*.¹⁰

In the Alexandrian romance, Alexander's cook Andreas follows the fish, jumping into the spring of life after him, thereby attaining an immortality that he does not know what to do with. A similar narrative appears in an account attributed to Ibn 'Abbās, but it is unclear upon whose authority he speaks.

Ibn 'Abbās was asked, "Why don't we hear any mention of a *ḥadīth* concerning Mūsā's boy even though he was with him?" Regarding this, Ibn 'Abbās said, "The boy drank from the water and became immortal. The wise man took him, found him a suitable boat, and sent him out into the sea. It will rock in the waves with him until the Day of Resurrection and that is because it was not for him to drink from it but he did."¹¹

As for al-Khaḍīr's immortality, it is not mentioned in al-Ṭabarī's *tafsīr*, but can be found in his *Tārīkh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk* where he mentions reports that al-Khaḍīr drank from the water of life and became immortal and that he meets the Prophet Ilyās (Elijah) every year in Mecca during the pilgrimage season.¹² Al-Qurṭubī spends three and half pages discussing the matter of al-Khaḍīr's immortality in his *tafsīr*. He writes that most people believe that al-Khaḍīr died on the basis of a *ḥadīth* that states that not a soul living at the time of the Prophet would be alive 100 years after his death. Al-Qurṭubī, however, sides with those who interpret this as a general statement for which there are exceptions, including al-Khaḍīr, 'Īsā (Jesus), Ilyās, and the Dajjāl (Antichrist). Although the *ḥadīth* states that "no one will remain on the earth (*arḍ*)," al-Qurṭubī argues that *arḍ* here refers only to the Arab world. He finds additional support for al-Khaḍīr's immortality in traditions that mention the yearly pilgrimage of al-Khaḍīr and Ilyās to Mecca, and a treatise attributed to al-Qushayrī that contains many reports from pious men and women who have seen and met al-Khaḍīr. Additionally, 'Alī is said to have received a private prayer (*du'ā'*) directly from al-Khaḍīr. A *ḥadīth* in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim tells of the Dajjāl's meeting with the best of men at the end of time, and al-Qurṭubī cites those who identify this man as al-Khaḍīr and who say that the Dajjāl will finally end al-Khaḍīr's long life. As always, though, he admits that "God knows best."¹³

Although al-Khaḍīr's immortality is often mentioned in other Ṣūfī works, especially in his role as a spiritual initiator,¹⁴ this idea is not mentioned in the Ṣūfī commentaries studied here. Instead, the focus on al-Khaḍīr concerns the knowledge which he is said to have possessed, knowledge received directly from God (*'ilm ladunī*).

'Ilm ladunī

In non-Ṣūfī commentaries, exegetes attempt to clarify ambiguous or difficult words and phrases and to explain variant readings of the text. When Ṣūfīs address a word or phrase, as they do in the story of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr with the phrase *'ilm ladunī*, their writings often raise more questions than they resolve. Ernst has

suggested that these definitions are best understood as teaching tools. In discussing a passage from al-Qushayrī's *al-Risāla* that lists various definitions for the term Sufism, Ernst writes

[the definitions] accomplish a powerful rhetorical transaction; the person who listens to or reads these definitions is forced to imagine the spiritual or ethical quality that is invoked by the definition, even when it is paradoxical.¹⁵

The definitions in Sūfī commentaries for *'ilm ladunī* serve this function, being didactic rather than descriptive or explanatory. In commenting on the knowledge that God taught al-Khaḍīr *from Our very presence (ladunnā)*, al-Ṭabarī, as we have seen, compares the inner and outer aspects of the knowledge possessed by al-Khaḍīr and Mūsā. Sūfīs commentators provide much more extended definitions and meditations on this type of knowledge.

Al-Tustarī defines al-Khaḍīr's special knowledge as inspiration (*ilhām*), understood as a kind of revelation (*wahy*) that is not restricted to prophets:

Inspiration (*ilhām*) acts as a substitute for revelation (*wahy*), just as He said, *and your Lord revealed (awḥā)* to the bees (16:68)¹⁶ and *We revealed to the mother of Mūsā* (28:7).¹⁷ Both of these were inspiration (*ilhām*).¹⁸

After al-Tustarī, numerous tenth-century Sūfīs are quoted in the commentaries of al-Sulamī and Rūzbihān al-Baqlī with different definitions of *'ilm ladunī*. According to Ibn 'Atā, *'ilm ladunī* is not book learning, but knowledge from the Unseen:

[It is] knowledge by unveilings (*kushūf*), not by the dictation of letters. Rather, the place to encounter it is in witnessing (*mushāhada*) the spirits (*arwāḥ*).¹⁹

For al-Qāsim (d. 953–4),²⁰ *'ilm ladunī* is bestowed rather than acquired knowledge.

The knowledge of deduction (*istinbāt*) comes with exertion (*kulfa*) and intermediaries but *'ilm ladunī* comes without these.²¹

Not only is this knowledge not from this world, it distracts one from anything other than its source in the Unseen, bringing about a total absorption in God.

Al-Shiblī said, “[*and to whom We had taught*] knowledge that made him preoccupied with Us from anything other than Us.” It is said, “it directs him to Us and cuts him off from created things or anything concerning them.”²²

This early material is confirmed and expanded upon in the eleventh-century commentary of al-Qushayrī. He adds that this is knowledge reserved for God's

elite, but as a benefit for all believers. Al-Qushayrī's definitions also illustrate the inherent tension between Ṣūfī beliefs and traditional theology, since *'ilm ladunī* takes precedence over the proofs of rational thought.

It is said that knowledge from the very presence (*min ladun*) of God is something that is obtained by means of inspiration (*ilhām*) without being burdened by seeking (*taṭallub*).

One can say that it is that which God (*al-ḥaqq*) teaches the elite (*khawāṣṣ*) among His servants.

One can also say that it is something that God (*al-ḥaqq*) teaches His friends (*awliyā'*) according to what is appropriate in it for His servants.

It is said that it is something whose benefit does not belong to its possessor, but rather that which is in it from the truth of God belongs to His servants.

One can also say that it is something that its possessor cannot find a way to deny. Evidence (*dalīl*) of soundness would be what one finds definitively, but if you were to ask him about his proof (*burhān*) he will not be able to produce any evidence (*dalīl*), for the most powerful kinds of knowledge are those which are farthest from evidence (*dalīl*).²³

Although several of these definitions seek to define *'ilm ladunī* in relation to other types of knowledge, none do so systematically. This task was taken up by al-Rāzī in his commentary on the verse, beginning with a rebuttal to those who believed that *'ilm ladunī* could only be bestowed on a prophet. For the exegetes who believe al-Khaḍir was a prophet, the fact that God describes him as one to whom *We taught knowledge from Our very presence (ladunnā)*

requires that God taught him without the intermediary of the instruction of a teacher and the spiritual guidance (*irshād*) of a spiritual guide (*murshid*). Any person whom God teaches without the intermediary of a human being must be a prophet who knows things by means of revelation (*waḥy*).²⁴

We have already seen that this issue is a contentious one, with those like Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taymiyya insisting that only prophets can receive knowledge directly from God. Al-Rāzī disagrees, claiming that there are many types of knowledge that come to man directly without an intermediary.

This deduction (*istidlāl*) is weak because different types of necessary knowledge (*al-'ulūm al-ḍarūriyya*) are obtained initially from God, but that does not indicate prophecy.²⁵

The term “necessary or self-evident knowledge” (*'ilm ḍarūrī*) refers to sensory (*ḥissī*) knowledge from both internal and external sensory perceptions; intuitive (*badīḥī*) knowledge of self-evident truths such as the fact of one's existence and

the fact that one half of two is one; and information established by multiple reports (*mutawātir*). It is usually contrasted with acquired knowledge (*‘ilm muktasab* or *kasbī*), which consists of rational (*‘aqlī*) and religious (*shar‘ī*) knowledge.²⁶ Although al-Rāzī compares *‘ilm ladunī* to *‘ilm qarurī* for the sake of his argument here, he classifies *‘ilm ladunī* among the types of knowledge that are acquired (*‘ulūm kasbiyya*). Al-Rāzī mentions that al-Ghazālī has a treatise concerning God-given types of knowledge (*‘ulūm al-laduniyya*), and al-Rāzī proceeds to “verify what has been said regarding this matter.”²⁷ He begins by saying that we become aware of things either by conceptualization (*taṣawwūr*) or assent (*taṣdīq*). Each of these types of perception, in turn, are either considerative (*naẓarī*) or acquired (*kasbī*).²⁸

Considerative types of knowledge (*al-‘ulūm al-naẓariyya*) are obtained in the soul (*nafs*) and intellect (*‘aql*) without acquisition (*kasb*) or study (*ṭalab*), like our conceptualization (*taṣawwūr*) of pain and pleasure, and existence and nonexistence; and our assent (*taṣdīq*) that negation and affirmation cannot coexist nor be mutually eliminated, and that one is half of two.

Acquired types of knowledge (*al-‘ulūm al-kasbiyya*) are those that cannot be initially obtained in the substance of the soul (*jawhar al-nafs*) but rather their acquisition must be arrived at by means of some path. This path has two parts. One of them is where man combines these considerative and intuitive types of knowledge (*al-‘ulūm al-badhiyya al-naẓariyya*) until he reaches knowledge of unknown things. This way is called consideration (*naẓar*), reflection (*tafakkur*), pondering (*tadabbur*), contemplation (*ta‘ammul*), deliberation (*tarawwin*), and deduction (*istidlāl*). This mode of obtaining different types of knowledge is the path that can only be completed by effort and study.

The second mode [of obtaining types of knowledge] is when man strives by means of spiritual disciplines (*riyāḍāt*) and efforts (*mujāhadāt*) in which the sensual and imaginative faculties (*al-quwwat al-ḥissiyya wa’l-khayāliyya*) become weak. When they become weak the power of the rational faculty (*al-quwwat al-‘aqliyya*) becomes strong and the divine lights shine in the substance of the intellect (*jawhar al-‘aql*). Gnostic sciences (*ma‘ārif*) are obtained and different types of knowledge (*‘ulūm*) are perfected without the intermediary of effort or study in reflecting and contemplation. These are what are called the God-given types of knowledge (*al-‘ulūm al-laduniyya*).²⁹

If the treatise written by al-Ghazālī that al-Rāzī refers to is, in fact, *Al-Risālat al-laduniyya* that has come down to us,³⁰ al-Rāzī has stripped al-Ghazālī’s description of *‘ilm ladunī* of its Neoplatonic terminology.

In al-Ghazālī’s work, the acquisition of knowledge is said to be achieved either by human (*insānī*) or divine (*rabbānī*) teaching.³¹ When it is the latter, it may be

either an internal or an external process. The internal process is the process of reflection (*tafakkur*). Reflection (*tafakkur*) differs from knowledge gained by human teaching because reflection is what one gains from the Universal Soul (*al-nafs al-kullī*), while learning from another human being is confined to what one gains from a particular individual. When the divine (*rabbānī*) teaching involves an external process, this will either be revelation (*wahy*) or inspiration (*ilhām*). When it is revelation, the teacher is the Universal Intellect (*al-ʿaql al-kullī*)³² and knowledge is inscribed within the sanctified soul (*al-nafs al-qudsiyya*) without learning or reflection. According to al-Ghazālī, revelation (*wahy*) is reserved for prophets alone.

Revelation (*wahy*) is engendered from the emanation (*ifāda*) of the Universal mind (*al-ʿaql al-kullī*), while inspiration (*ilhām*) is engendered from the illumination (*ishrāq*) of the Universal Soul (*al-nafs al-kullī*).³³ Inspiration is the awakening of the individual human soul by the Universal Soul according to the degree of its purity and receptivity (*qabūl*), and the strength of its preparedness (*istiʿdād*). The knowledge received from this process, which occurs in both prophets and saints, is called God-given knowledge (*ʿilm ladunī*), and is the type of knowledge that al-Khaḍīr received.

What is common to the theories presented by al-Rāzī and al-Ghazālī here is the way in which they seek to confirm the possibility of individuals who are not prophets acquiring God-given types of knowledge (*al-ʿulūm al-laduniyya*); this validation is accomplished by incorporating *ʿilm ladunī* into existing philosophical and theological epistemological frameworks. Using the verse on al-Khaḍīr's knowledge as a proof-text, al-Rāzī and al-Ghazālī provide a theoretical framework for the Šūfī's belief in knowledge through inspiration (*ilhām*). It is an expositional and apologetic approach that differs from Šūfī commentaries that take this form of knowledge as a given. Although all of the Šūfī commentators studied here understood *ʿilm ladunī* as a kind of knowledge that might be received by the rare individual, none of them addressed the issue of whether these individuals, like al-Khaḍīr, are entitled or even obliged to follow a different set of rules than the common believer. But apparently there were those who did propose such an argument, and al-Qurṭubī attacks them in his *tafsīr* not only for believing that they could receive knowledge by any means other than the prophets, but especially for claiming that this special knowledge frees them from the need to follow the religious law.³⁴

Our shaykh, Imām Abū'l-ʿAbbās said that the esotericist heretics (*zanādiqa al-bāṭiniyya*) are of the opinion that traveling a path requires these religious precepts but they say, "These general religious precepts are only imposed upon the stupid and the common. As for the friends of god (*awliyāʾ*) and elect (*ahl al-khuṣṣ*), they don't need these texts; the only thing meant for them is what happens in their hearts and they are ruled by whatever seizes them in their thoughts." They say, "That is because of the purity of their hearts from all kinds of turbidity

and the freedom of their hearts from all others, so that the divine kinds of knowledge (*al-'ulūm al-ilāhiyya*) and lordly realities (*ḥaqā'iq al-rabbāniyya*) are disclosed to them and they understand the secrets of created things. They know the principles of individual things and by means of them they are able to dispense with universal religious principles just as happened with al-Khaḍir. Because of what was disclosed to him from different types of knowledge, he was able to dispense with the understanding Mūsā had of these things.” Included in what they have transmitted is, “Seek the legal opinion of your heart even if the Muftis give a legal opinion for you.”

Regarding that, our shaykh said that this is the talk of heresy (*zandaqa*) and infidelity (*kufṛ*), the proponent of which should be killed without being given a chance to seek repentance, because it is a denial of what is known from the religious laws. Truly God has imposed his practice (*sunna*) and implemented his wisdom through his precepts which can only be known by means of His messengers who mediate between Him and His creation. They convey His message and word from Him explaining His religious laws and precepts. They have been chosen for that just as He said, *God chooses messengers from angels and from men. Truly, He is Hearing, Seeing* (22:75). He also said, *God well knows where to place His message* (6:124), and *Mankind was a single community and God sent prophets to give glad tidings and warn* (2:213) in addition to other verses.

In sum, definitive knowledge (*al-'ilm al-qaṭ'i*), necessary certainty (*al-yaqīn al-darūrī*) and the consensus (*ijmā'*) of the pious predecessors and descendants all agree on the fact that there is no way that anyone can have knowledge of the precepts of God referring to His command and prohibition except by way of the messengers. And the one who says, “Here is another way by which to know His command and prohibition without the messengers,” so that he dispenses with them, is an infidel (*kāfir*) who should be killed. His repentance should not be sought and there is no need for questions and answers from him. It is a belief in the perpetuation of prophets after our Prophet whom God has made the seal of His prophets and messengers. There is no prophet or messenger after him.³⁵

Al-Qurṭubī would seem to be denying the possibility of what al-Rāzī and al-Ghazālī defended, *'ilm ladunī* received by those who are not prophets, at least with regards to knowledge of God's commands and prohibitions. But al-Qurṭubī does not deny the possibility of there being friends of God (*awliyā'*) to whom charismatic acts (*karāmāt*) occur. Although he agrees with other exegetes who say that al-Khaḍir was a prophet, al-Qurṭubī nonetheless uses him as a starting point for discussing charismatic acts (*karāmāt*) occurring in individuals who are not prophets, and the question of whether it is permissible for a friend of God (*walī*) to know that he is a friend of God.³⁶ In the latter discussion, al-Qurṭubī quotes

Şūfī hagiographical material approvingly,³⁷ demonstrating that his criticism of some Şūfīs should not be taken as a general condemnation of Şūfism.

The journeys of Mūsā

The fact that al-Rāzī describes *‘ilm ladunī* as acquired knowledge that requires spiritual disciplines (*riyāḍāt*) and efforts (*mujāhadāt*) on the part of those seeking it does not contradict the Şūfīs who say that it comes without exertion or seeking. Their comments refer to the actual bestowal of the knowledge from God, whereas al-Rāzī’s comments refer to the preparation needed to receive this knowledge. According to the Şūfīs, the difficulties that Mūsā underwent in his journey to and with al-Khaḍīr, were part of the process of learning proper behavior (*ta’dīb*). Their comments in this area demonstrate another distinctive characteristic of Şūfī exegesis, one that seeks to uncover the edifying potential of the characters and events described in the Qur’ān in a manner similar to that of preachers. They place Mūsā’s journey with al-Khaḍīr in the context of the other journeys in his life, and compare this to the different states (*aḥwāl*) and stations (*maqāmāt*) through which a spiritual seeker continually moves. The fact that al-Khaḍīr possessed *‘ilm ladunī*, while Mūsā did not, at least not at that point in his life, relates to their different stations.

Fāris³⁸ said: Mūsā said, “*God willing*” about himself in “*You will find me patient, God willing,*” but al-Khaḍīr did not do the same when he said, “*You will not be able to be patient with me,*” because the knowledge of Mūsā at that time was the knowledge of what religious law has prescribed and deduction (*istidlāl*), but the knowledge of al-Khaḍīr was God-given knowledge (*‘ilm ladunī*) from one unseen to another. Mūsā was in the station (*maqām*) of learning proper behavior (*ta’dīb*) while al-Khaḍīr was in the station (*maqām*) of unveiling (*kashf*) and witnessing (*mushāhada*).³⁹

Mūsā’s task in this journey, however, was not to learn about states, but rather to learn about proper behavior, and this could not be achieved by asking questions. In response to al-Khaḍīr’s request to Mūsā, *If you follow me, do not ask me anything until I myself mention it to you*, al-Ḥuşrī⁴⁰ is said to have said,

There was no way to learn the knowledge of al-Khaḍīr from a place of questioning. Mūsā came to him to learn proper behavior (*ta’dīb*), not for instruction regarding any particular state (*ḥāl*).⁴¹

While the purpose of the journey with al-Khaḍīr was to learn proper behavior, al-Qushayrī points out that this was not the case in the journey of Mūsā to Mount Sinai, nor when he set out into the desert fleeing from Pharaoh.

In this journey Mūsā was the one who carried a burden (*mutaḥammil*). It was a journey to learn proper behavior (*ta’dīb*) and to endure difficulty

because he had gone to ask for greater knowledge, and the state (*ḥāl*) of seeking knowledge is the state (*ḥāl*) of learning proper behavior (*ta'dīb*) and a time for bearing difficulty. Because of this he was overwhelmed by hunger and said, “*Truly fatigue has overwhelmed us on our journey.*” When he fasted at the time of waiting to hear the Word of God he was patient for thirty days and neither hunger nor difficulty overcame him, because his journey was to God and so he was the one who was carried (*maḥmūl*).⁴² One can say that this was a journey for learning proper behavior (*ta'dīb*) and he had been sent back to endure the difficulty. This is not as it was when he watered [the animals] for the daughters of Shu'ayb, for the toil and hunger that afflicted him [in the search for al-Khaḍir] was greater. In that time he was the one who was carried (*maḥc mūl*) while this time he was the carrier of the burden (*mutaḥammil*).⁴³

Al-Qushayrī's analysis here of the different journeys of Mūsā is not original. In 'Arā'is al-majālis fī qīṣaṣ al-anbiyā', a book on the stories of the prophets, Aḥmad Abū Ishāq al-Tha'labī (d. 1036) states that wise men (*ḥukamā'*) have said that Mūsā had a total of five journeys. The first of these was the journey of escape (*harab*) after killing a man in Egypt (Qur'ān 26:21). The second was the journey to Ṭūr where Mūsā saw a fire and heard a voice (Qur'ān 27:8 and 28:30). The third was the journey of seeking (*ṭalab*) when he left Egypt with his people (Qur'ān 20:77). The fourth was the journey of war (*ḥarb*) when he exhorted his people to enter the Holy Land (Qur'ān 5:27). The fifth was the journey of hardship (*naṣab*) and this was his journey to find al-Khaḍir.⁴⁴

While the stories found in the genre of *qīṣaṣ al-anbiyā'* were viewed with some suspicion, their engaging details and style led some commentators to loosen their standards of authenticity so as to include excerpts from them.⁴⁵ Al-Qurṭubī was one such commentator whose critical comments on *isrā'īliyyat* material did not keep him from including some of the more amusing anecdotes from al-Tha'labī's *tafsīr*.⁴⁶ However, the homiletic and literary style considered acceptable and even praiseworthy in preaching was not generally accepted within the genre of *tafsīr*, except when it could be shown to be transmitted from traditions whose authenticity was unquestioned. In contrast, Ṣūfī exegesis incorporates *isrā'īliyyāt* material and original homiletic and literary material into a style most fully developed in the commentary of Rashīd al-Dīn al-Maybudī. As we have already mentioned, al-Maybudī incorporates a good deal of al-Qushayrī's work in his own *tafsīr*, without attribution, but displays his originality in the way he weaves al-Qushayrī's comments into a decidedly literary format. In al-Maybudī's version of the journeys of Mūsā, there are four journeys and four rhyming words used to describe them: *harab*, *ṭalab*, *ṭarab*, and *ta'ab*.

Mūsā had four journeys. The first was the journey of escape (*harab*) just as God told in the story of Mūsā, “*So I fled from you when I feared you*” (26:21). The second was the journey of the search (*ṭalab*) at night for

fire: *When he came to it, a voice cried from the right shore of the wādi* (28:30). The third was the journey of rapture (*ṭarab*) *when Mūsā came to Our appointed time* (7:143). The fourth was the journey of toil (*ta'ab*): *Truly fatigue has overwhelmed us on our journey* (18:60).

As for the journey of flight (*harab*), it was the affair in the desert when he had fled from the enemy and had turned his face towards Madyan. He had killed the Copt, just as the Lord said, *Mūsā struck him and killed him* (28:15). How remarkable was the salvation and victory in God's solicitude in forgiving him that killing! Mūsā said, "The hand of him who has struck reaps the harvest," but He said to Mūsā, "There was no sin in that. The sin belonged to the devil and that act was from him." *He said, "This is the work of Satan"* (28:15). Thus the believing servant is excused by His grace and receives His pardon. He said, *Satan made them slip in some of what they earned but indeed God has forgiven them* (3:155). God overlooked their sin because that was the whispering of Satan and the work of the devil.

After this there was the journey of searching (*ṭalab*), the night when Mūsā went in search of fire, a fire that was such that the entire world would be extinguished by it. The entire world falls in love with every place where the tale of the fire of Mūsā has gone. Mūsā went in search of fire and found light while the brave youth (*javānmard*) went in search of light and found fire. If Mūsā received the sweetness of hearing the word of God (*ḥaqq*) without intermediary, how amazing is it that the smell of that reaches His friends (*dustān*)? If the fire of Mūsā was manifested publicly, the fire of these brave youths is hidden. And if the fire of Mūsā was in the bush, the fire of these brave youths is in the soul (*jān*). He who has this fire knows that it is such. All of the fires of the body burn and the fire of the friendship of the soul cannot endure the soul-burning fire.

As for the journey of rapture (*ṭarab*), it has been mentioned previously in [the commentary on] His words *when Mūsā came to Our appointed time* (7:143).

The fourth journey of Mūsā was a journey of toil (*ta'ab*). It is an allusion (*ishāra*) to the journey of aspirants (*murīdān*) in the beginning of their desires (*irādāt*),⁴⁷ the journey of discipline (*riyāda*), bearing difficulty, and the polishing of three things: the soul (*nafs*), the disposition (*khūy*) and the heart (*dil*).

Polishing the soul (*nafs*) consists of three things: replacing complaining with giving thanks, forgetfulness with wakefulness, and extravagance with sobriety. Polishing the disposition (*khūy*) also consists of three things: replacing irritation with patience, niggardliness with generosity, and vengefulness with forgiveness. Polishing the heart (*dil*) also consists of three things: replacing the danger of security with fear, the misfortune of despair with the blessing of hope, and the tribulation of the distraction in the heart with thanksgiving of the heart.

The substance of this polishing consists of three things: pursuing knowledge, [eating] permissible food, and persistence in litany (*wird*). The fruit of it consists of three things: an innermost heart (*sirr*) which has become adorned with knowledge of the Lord, a soul (*jān*) set ablaze by the sun of eternity, and God-given knowledge (*‘ilm ladunī*) found without intermediary.⁴⁸

As part of his effort to extract lessons from the story of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr for the individual believer, al-Maybudī uses the characters, details and events of the story as symbolic indicators of the stages of the soul in its progress towards attaining knowledge of higher realities. The boat which al-Khaḍīr ruins represents the poverty that one must embrace in order to escape the notice of Satan who is attracted to prosperity and the outward display of one's religion.⁴⁹ The boy he kills is an allusion (*ishāra*) to the desires and opinions that shoot up in the field of spiritual discipline (*riyāda*), and struggle (*mujāhada*) that must be cut off because this "offspring" will become a disbeliever as it grows.⁵⁰ Finally, the wall which al-Khaḍīr rebuilds is an allusion (*ishāra*) to the soul at peace (*nafs muṭma'inna*)⁵¹ that must not be destroyed. The purpose of spiritual effort is to purify the soul, not annihilate it, for the Prophet said, "Your soul has a right over you."

The treasures of the secrets of eternity have been placed underneath it. If the wall of the soul becomes ruined, the treasure of the lordly secrets will fall upon the desert and any feeble idiot will covet it. The secret of these words is that the treasure of reality has been placed in the human qualities and the natural manners of dervishes have been built upon this partition. This is the very thing that brave youth (*javānmard*) has said:

Religion for dervishes is searching (*ṭalab*)
for it is the custom of kings to
bury treasures in deserted places.⁵²

In contrast to al-Maybudī's very readable and didactic style, Rūzbihān's commentary on the story of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr is mostly a commentary on the commentary of his predecessors, written in a difficult style made all the more obscure by unexplained terminology and concepts. The interpretation of Mūsā's journey to al-Khaḍīr as a journey of toil, mentioned in al-Qushayrī, is used by al-Maybudī to address the practical aspects of the spiritual path that must be undertaken before mystical knowledge can be attained. Rūzbihān refers to al-Qushayrī's interpretation as well, and even quotes it in full, but his own interpretation is less practical than esoteric.

When [Mūsā and his boy] mistook their way, they did not proceed with the heart (*qalb*) and fatigue affected them. That was God's way of teaching them that they had disregarded intuition (*hads*) and the heart (*qalb*).

Perhaps he knew the order (*ḥukm*) of the Unseen, but the heart and intellect (*‘aql*) did not so the soul (*naḥs*) suffered on account of ignorance. If the heart (*qalb*) and the soul (*naḥs*) had known just as the innermost heart (*sirr*) knew, the effects of fatigue would not have overcome them. The fatigue overcoming them was because of their being in the station (*maqām*) of struggle (*mujāhada*) and trial (*imtiḥān*).

If Mūsā had been the one who was carried (*maḥmūl*)⁵³ there by the good fortune of witnessing (*mushāhada*), then he would have been as he was on Mount Sinai when he did not eat food for forty days, and yet weariness did not overcome him. This is the state (*ḥāl*) of the people of intimacy (*uns*) while the first is the state of the people of desire (*irāda*) . . . When he was seeking an intermediary he was veiled from the station (*maqām*) of witnessing (*mushāhada*), and he was tested with struggle (*mujāhada*) by means of which God taught him proper behavior (*addabahu*) until nothing of the different types of knowledge of realities entered into his mind, for God is jealous of the one whom He entrusts with reaching the secret of secrets, for the sake of which he draws him out to learn the knowledge of the Unseen.⁵⁴

Just as al-Rāzī’s *tafsīr* requires a background in theology and its terminology, Rūzbihān’s *tafsīr* is best understood by those who have read other Ṣūfī commentaries and are familiar with their special vocabulary.

What distinguishes the commentaries of al-Kāshānī and al-Nīsābūrī from earlier Ṣūfī exegetes is their almost exclusive use of allegoresis as a method of interpretation. Al-Kāshānī explicitly refers to such in his initial comments on the narrative of Mūsā and al-Khaḍir. It is the kind of interpretation that al-Ghazālī called “striking similitudes” (*ḍarb al-mithāl*) in his *Mishkāṭ al-anwār*.

And when Mūsā said to his boy. The external sense (*ẓāhir*) of it is in accordance with what has been mentioned in the stories and there is no way to deny the miracles. As for its inner sense (*bāṭin*), it can be said: “when Mūsā, the heart, said to his boy, the soul, at the time of the attachment to the body, “I will not stop,” i.e., I will keep on travelling and journeying “until I reach the junction of the two seas,” i.e. the intersection of the two worlds, the world of the spirit (*‘ālam al-rūḥ*) and the world of body (*jism*). They are the sweet and the bitter⁵⁵ in human form and the station (*maqām*) of the heart (*qalb*).⁵⁶

Whereas al-Maybudī used allegoresis sparingly in his commentary, in his interpretation of the three actions of al-Khaḍir, al-Kāshānī applies it consistently and extensively throughout his exegesis of the Qur’anic narrative. Also distinctive is the way in which he combines terminology and concepts taken from the writings of Ibn Sīnā with that of the Ṣūfīs.⁵⁷ Mūsā’s search for al-Khaḍir, according to al-Kāshānī, is a search for the holy intellect (*al-‘aql al-quḍī*) necessary to achieve

perfection.⁵⁸ Mūsā's saying, "God willing, you will find me patient," testifies to his own aptitude or preparedness (*istīdād*) and perseverance in searching. The path to perfection requires devotion to spiritual exercises until the soul is disengaged (*mujarrad*) from the body. Only then can one become acquainted with deeper realities.

*If you follow me in travelling the path of perfection do not ask me anything, i.e., you must practice emulation (iqtidā') and following the path by works (a'māl), spiritual disciplines (riyāqāt), moral traits (akhlāq), and struggles (mujāhadāt). Do not seek realities (ḥaqā'iq) and meanings (ma'ānī) until the time comes and I myself mention it to you, i.e., I tell you that knowledge of unseen realities upon your disengagement (tajarrud) by means of transactions (mu'āmalāt) of the body and heart.*⁵⁹

The ship which al-Khaḍir scuttles represents the body (*badan*) in the sea of matter (*hayūlā*) travelling to God. The poor people who own it are the animal and vegetable faculties (*al-quwā'l-ḥayawāniyya wa'l-nabātiyya*).⁶⁰ The ten brothers mentioned in tradition represent the five external and five internal senses (*al-ḥawāss al-zāhira wa'l-bāṭina*). The boat of the body must be ruined by spiritual discipline (*riyāqā*) so that the king of the commanding soul (*al-nafs al-ammāra*) will not seize it and use it for his passions and demands.⁶¹

The youth which al-Khaḍir kills also represents the commanding soul (*al-nafs al-ammāra*) whose qualities of anger and passion veil the heart. His parents, the spirit (*rūḥ*) and the corporeal nature (*al-ṭabī'a al-jismāniyya*), will be consoled with the birth of a new child, the soul at peace (*al-nafs al-muṭma'inna*).⁶² The wall that is about to fall down represents the soul at peace as well.

The wall that *was about to fall* is the soul at peace (*al-nafs al-muṭma'inna*). It is expressed as a wall because it came into being after the killing of the commanding soul (*al-nafs al-ammāra*) whose death was by means of spiritual discipline (*riyāqā*). It became like an inanimate object without movement in its soul or desire (*irāda*). Because of the intensity of its weakness, it was almost destroyed, so its state is expressed as being about to fall. His fixing it is its being altered by moral perfections and beautiful virtues by the light of the faculty of rationality (*al-quwwat al-nuṭqiyya*) until the virtues take the place of its vices.⁶³

The two orphans are the possessors of the theoretical and practical intellects (*al-'āqil al-naẓariyya wa'l-'amaliyya*) cut off from their father whom al-Kāshānī identifies as either the Holy Spirit (*rūḥ al-quḍus*) or the heart (*qalb*).⁶⁴ The treasure is knowledge that can only be obtained in the station (*maqām*) of the heart (*qalb*) because it is here where all of the particulars and universals are combined in actuality when perfection is achieved.⁶⁵

Although there are similarities between the interpretations of al-Kāshānī and al-Nisābūrī, the latter is far more careful to emphasize the role of the Ṣūfī shaykh in the process of attaining perfection.

And when Mūsā said to his boy. In this is the fact that the traveller must have a companion on the path. There is also the condition that one of them must be a commander and the other the one who is commanded. The companion must know his resolve and intention so that he understands the [nature of] his companionship and does not become fed up with the hardships of the journey before he succeeds in his goal. His intention should be to seek a shaykh to emulate, for seeking a shaykh, in truth, is seeking God (*al-ḥaqq*).

The junction of the two seas is the junction of the sanctity (*walāya*) of the saint and the sanctity of the aspirant (*murīd*). There is the real spring of life. When a drop of it fell upon the fish, the heart (*qalb*) of the aspirant, it came to life *and took its way* in the sea of sanctity (*walāya*) *as in a tunnel*.

When they had gone on. There is an allusion (*ishāra*) in this to the fact that if the aspirant becomes weary in the course of his travels, his heart will succumb to exhaustion and he will allow himself to be seduced into relinquishing the companionship of the shaykh, thinking that his goal can be obtained by other means. What an idea! This is false and worthless thinking if the divine solicitude does not reach him and return the sincerity of desire (*irāda*) to him.⁶⁶

The knowledge which al-Khaḍīr possesses is knowledge of the inner nature of things (*bawāṭin al-ashyā*) and their realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*), a knowledge which cannot be taught but can only be obtained by the purification (*tasfiya*) of the soul and the disengagement (*tajrīd*) of the heart from corporeal attachments. This process is illustrated by the allegorical interpretation of al-Khaḍīr's actions.

The scuttling of the ship represents the destruction of one's outward reputation and one's pride in devotional acts, for only devotional acts performed in a spirit of brokenness and humility are safe from Satan. The youth killed by al-Khaḍīr is the commanding soul (*al-naḥs al-ammāra*) killed with the knife of spiritual discipline (*riyāda*) and the sword of struggle (*mujāhada*). His parents are the heart (*qalb*) and spirit (*rūḥ*) who will receive a better child in his stead, the soul at peace (*al-naḥs al-muṭmaʾinna*). The wall is the attachment (*taʾalluq*) that acts as a barrier between the rational soul (*al-naḥs al-nāṭiq*) and the world of disengaged things (*ʿālam al-mujarradāt*). Al-Khaḍīr's fixing the wall is the strengthening of the body and kindness shown to the different faculties (*quwā*) and senses (*hawāss*), just as it is said, "Your soul is your mount, so be kind to it." The two orphans are the soul at peace and the inspired soul (*al-naḥs al-muṭmaʾinna waʾl-mulhama*) and the treasure waiting for them is the obtainment of theoretical and practical perfections (*al-kamālāt al-naẓariyya waʾl-ʿamaliyya*). Their father is the discerning

intellect (*al-'aql al-fāriqa*) who wanted to protect this treasure until they matured under the instruction of the shaykh and his kindly and indulgent guidance.⁶⁷

Although the content of al-Nīsābūrī's interpretation remains more faithful to the terminology and concepts of Ṣūfīsm rather than philosophy, the style is very much like al-Kāshānī's, a kind of allegoresis that involves finding one-to-one equivalences between each element of the Qur'ānic text and a Ṣūfī or philosophical concept. The common objective of all these commentaries, despite their different styles and methods with regards to the story of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr, is what al-Ghazālī calls applying the Qur'ānic text to oneself (*takhṣīṣ*) and what al-Simnānī calls recognizing the correspondences between the prophets and the subtle substances (*laṭā'if*) of man.

“I wanted,” “we wanted,” and “your Lord wanted”

When al-Khaḍīr finally explains his mysterious actions to the frustrated Mūsā before their parting, there is a shift in pronouns in his words from “*I wanted*” to “*we wanted*” to “*your Lord wanted*.” This narrative oddity was understood by Ṣūfīs as a reference to the ambiguous nature of human volition.

Ibn 'Aṭā said: When al-Khaḍīr said, “*I wanted*,” it was revealed to him in the innermost heart (*sirr*), “Who are you that volition (*irāda*) should belong to you?” Then, in the second situation he said, “*We wanted*,” and it was revealed to him in the innermost heart, “Who are you and Mūsā that volition (*irāda*) should belong to you?” They he came back and said, “*Your Lord wanted*.”⁶⁸

Al-Ḥallāj explains these as different stations.

The first station (*maqām*) is the total mastery (*isnā'ā*) of God (*al-ḥaqq*). The second station is conversation with the servant. The third station is a return to the inner understanding (*bāṭin*) of [God's] supremacy in the outer world (*al-zāhir*) . . . because to get closer to something by means of egos (*nufūs*) is to get farther away while to approach [the supremacy] by means of [the supremacy] itself is to draw near.⁶⁹

What al-Ḥallāj seems to be describing here is a change in awareness as the mystic draws nearer to God. Initially, al-Khaḍīr said, “*I wanted*,” because he perceived the distance between himself and the all-powerful Creator and therefore judged himself as a separate entity acting on his own volition. When he said, “*We wanted*,” he judged the intimate conversation between himself and his Lord as indicating a kind of partnership in action, but this was also an illusion which kept him from true nearness.⁷⁰ Finally, when he said, “*Your Lord wanted*,” he returned to the awareness of God's Omnipotence, achieving true intimacy by recognizing the secret of His pervasive agency and allowing his own ego to be eclipsed.⁷¹

As we have already seen, Rūzbihān often builds his meditations on the ideas of his Ṣūfī predecessors, and his comments here are followed by the interpretations attributed to Ibn ‘Aṭā and al-Ḥallāj.

These expressions of volition (*irādāt*) are in different forms but in truth they are one because volition (*irāda*) is the volition of God since desires (*irādāt*) emanate (*ṣadarat*) in their various types from His volition. His words, “*I wanted*” tell of the source of gathering (*‘ayn al-jam’*) and unity (*ittiḥād*).⁷² His words, “*We wanted*” tell of taking on the attributes (*ittiṣāf*) and becoming expanded (*inbiṣāt*). His words, “*Your Lord wanted*” tell of the separation of eternity (*qidam*) from the temporally originated (*muḥdath*), and the obliteration of temporality (*ḥadath*) and the annihilation of the one who declares God one (*muwahḥid*) in the unified (*muwahḥad*).

In its quality (*wasf*), this volition (*irāda*) is the inward dimension (*bāṭin*) of will (*mashr’a*) and the inward dimension of will is that which is the unseen of the attribute (*ṣifa*). That which is the unseen of the attribute is the secret (*sirr*) of the essence (*dhāt*) and the secret of the essence is that which is the unseen of all Unseen things. When al-Khaḍīr moved from the quality (*wasf*) of unity (*ittiḥād*), jealousy (*ghayra*) cut him off from pure unity to the source of gathering (*‘ayn al-jam’*), and cut him off from the gathering (*jam’*) to taking on the attributes (*ittiṣāf*), and from taking on the attributes to becoming expanded (*inbiṣāt*). Then it drowned him in the sea of divinity and annihilated him in its depths from any vision (*ru’ya*), knowledge (*‘ilm*), volition (*irāda*), act (*fi’l*), and allusion (*ishāra*). By his act (*fi’l*) God (*al-ḥaqq*) spoke in the first, second, and third case and nothing remained in the explanation except God.⁷³

The switch in pronouns from “*I wanted*” to “*we wanted*” to “*your Lord wanted*” is something which is only minimally addressed in non-Ṣūfī commentaries. By carefully focusing on the exact wording, Ṣūfī interpretations demonstrate something like the phenomenon Chodkiewicz notes in Ibn ‘Arabī’s writings, which he calls “rigorous fidelity” to the Qur’ānic text.⁷⁴

QUR'ĀNIC VERSES ON MARYAM

Maryam (Mary), the mother of 'Īsā (Jesus), occupies a significant position in the Qur'ān, being set forth as an example to believers (66:12) and, with her son, as a sign to the worlds (21:91 and 23:50). Extended references to Maryam occur in the Qur'ān 3:35–3:47, 19:16–29, and 66:12; other verses containing brief references to Maryam are 4:156, 4:171, 5:17, 5:75, and 5:116. In addition, Maryam's name is mentioned twenty-three times as part of 'Īsā's name, "the son of Maryam." Only three other persons are mentioned more frequently in the Qur'ān and she is the only woman mentioned by name.¹ Maryam has been referred to as the prototype of the mystic in Islam,² a characterization that certainly holds true for the Šūfī commentaries studied here. Even more so than the figures of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr, the figure of Maryam illustrates the way in which Šūfīs adopt a Qur'ānic figure as a prescriptive model for themselves. The fact that she is a woman only makes this all the more striking.

What interests Šūfīs is Maryam's unusual relationship with the world and the divine, especially as seen through her detachment from the world, her special relationship with prayer, and the virginal conception of her son. Her detachment from the world is tied to the special vow and prayer made by Maryam's mother for her unborn child and Maryam's resulting service in the temple as a child. As in the passages quoted on the concept of *'ilm ladunī* in the previous chapter, Šūfī commentary here is distinguished by its focus on an unusual Qur'ānic word, whose meaning is explored in a consciously didactic manner.

Muḥarrar

When a woman of 'Imran said, "O my Lord, I have vowed to you what is in my womb in consecration (muḥarrar^{an}). So accept it from me, for you are the Hearing, the Knowing." When she gave birth she said, "My Lord, I have given birth to a female!" God knows best what she gave birth to and the male is not like the female. "I have named her Maryam and I seek refuge for her and her offspring in You from the accursed Satan."

(Qur'ān 3:35–36)

Ibn Ishāq (d. c.767), an early source for explanatory details on the narratives in the Qur'ān, is quoted in al-Ṭabarī as saying that the *woman of Imrān* mentioned here was a woman named Ḥannā who had been barren for many years. One day she was sitting beneath a tree and saw a mother bird feeding her young. She so longed for a child that she prayed to God and He answered her prayer. When she realized that she was pregnant, she vowed to give the child up to be a servant in the temple. Although this was an accepted practice of the Jewish people in her time, only boys could serve. In light of her vow, Ḥannā was dismayed when she gave birth to a girl, Maryam. Nonetheless, *Her Lord accepted her with a gracious acceptance* (3:37), and she grew up in the temple.³

The word *muḥarrar* in this passage is explained by al-Ṭabarī and others⁴ as referring to this practice of giving up one's children for service in the temple. It is a passive participle of the verb *ḥarrar*, a verb which occurs five times in the Qur'ān, always with the meaning of setting free a slave, and it is this sense of emancipation that Ṣūfī commentators focused on. Ja'far al-Ṣādiq is said to have said that *muḥarrar* means:

in emancipation from the bondage of the world (*dunyā*) and its people. *Muḥarrar^{an}* means, I have vowed to you what is in my womb as a sincere servant (*'abd*) to You, not in servitude to any created being.⁵

Al-Tustarī writes that it means:

[the child's] being freed and emancipated from the bondage of the world (*dunyā*), the following of its personal inclination (*hawā*), and the desired objects of its self (*naḥs*). She made [the child] a servant to the worshippers of the temple in exclusive dedication to God.⁶

Al-Qushayrī adds,

God (*al-ḥaqq*), glory be to Him in His preeminent wisdom, has emancipated this one from the bondage of being preoccupied with all appearances (*wujūh*) and states (*aḥwāl*).⁷

The references here are brief definitions of a concept developed more fully in other Ṣūfī works. In his *Risāla*, al-Qushayrī explains the relationship of freedom (*ḥurriyya*) to servitude (*'ubūdiyya*), devoting one chapter to each. He writes, "Let it be known to you that the real meaning of freedom lies in the perfection of slavery (*'ubūdiyya*)."⁸ The relationship of the human being toward God is always that of a slave subject to His commands and prohibitions; those who have achieved the difficult and rare station of freedom experience it in relation to the

world, not God. Al-Qushayrī suggests the importance of such people for others in quoting Abū'l-ʿAbbās al-Sayyārī (d. 953–4):

If a prayer could be performed at all properly without recitation of the Qur'ān, it would be with the recitation of this verse:

“I wish something to happen that is completely impossible for [this time], namely, for my eyes to behold the face of a free man (*hur*r).⁹

To be a free man is to be subject only to God and no one and nothing else, and to serve others from this state of nobility for His sake. Maryam's freedom (*hurriyya*) was in her servitude (*ʿubūdiyya*). She was not subject to the tumult of the world, its people and its objects of desire and was freed from preoccupation with all transitory things. Al-Maybudī writes,

The following is an example of freedom. They tell of that gem of his time, Bū Bakr Qaḥṭubī,¹⁰ that he had a son who rejected all rules and regulations and kept company with foolish, corrupt and impure youths. One of the Pīrs of the Way passed by this boy sitting in one of his wanton and forbidden assemblies, holding hands with those lawless ones. People began criticizing him behind him back. That Pīr was sympathizing with Bū Bakr Qaḥṭubī, thinking of the consequences of all this, and that the prattle of people about his son would follow him to the end of his days. With these thoughts, he went to Qaḥṭubī and found him in such a state that he was beside himself and unaware of that tale and condition! Clearly, he knew neither relatives nor strangers. Clearly, he knew neither the world nor people. The Shaykh was astonished by this state and said, “I'd give my life for one who is unaffected by the soaring mountains!” He asked Qaḥṭubī about the state that so astonished him and he replied, “Indeed, we were freed from slavery to things from beginningless eternity (*azal*).”¹¹

According to Ṣūfī commentaries, it is this quality of servanthood that warrants the special status granted to Maryam in Qur'ānic verse 3:42, *And when the angels said, “O Maryam, truly God has chosen you and purified you, chosen you above the women of the world.”* In al-Ṭabarī, the verse prompts a discussion of the hierarchy of the four perfect women in the world, namely, Āsiya (the wife of Pharaoh), Maryam, Khadīja (the wife of Muḥammad), and Fāṭima (the daughter of Muḥammad);¹² and the question of whether Maryam is preferred over all women for all time or just the time in which she was living.¹³ Al-Qurṭubī states that some interpret this verse to mean that Maryam is a prophet, an opinion he agrees with, on the grounds that God spoke to her by the intermediaries of the angels.¹⁴ Ṣūfī commentators, however, consider Maryam's state to be one that is more broadly

attainable by saints and the elect who possess this same quality of servanthood. Commenting on Qur'ān 3:43, "*O Maryam, be obedient to your Lord, and prostrate and bow with those who bow,*" Rūzbihān writes,

"and bow with those who bow," that is to say, draw near with your humility with those who are humble among the saints, prophets, and the elect of the people of My love so as to attain the blessings of unification (*jam'*), because the companionship of the saints is firmly rooted in servanthood (*'ubūdiyya*) and purification from the bondage of human nature (*bashariyya*).¹⁵

In commentary on Qur'ān 66:12, Rūzbihān adds an element of consciousness to this quality: Maryam chooses servanthood with full knowledge of its value.

And Maryam, the daughter of 'Imrān, who guarded her chastity, so We breathed into her Our Spirit and she testified to the words of her Lord and His books and was one of the devout (*qānitūn*).

Rūzbihān writes,

She testified to the words of her Lord. When the lights of Holiness and the spirit of intimacy (*uns*) appeared, her soul almost inclined to intoxication in the (*divine*) solicitude, since she had experienced the solicitude before and had negated it in the stage of servanthood (*'ubūdiyya*) so as not to fall by intoxication from the station of sobriety. Don't you see how He said, *and His books and was one of the devout (qānitūn)*, that is to say one of the righteous in her knowledge of her Lord and her knowledge of the worth of her soul subservient (*musakhkhar*) and powerless to its Lord.¹⁶

Maryam has knowledge that a human being's value lies in his or her utter subservience to God, a concept perhaps better understood if one looks at the ways in which the words "subservient" (*musakhkhar*) and "to make subservient" (*sakhkhara*) are used in the Qur'ān. *Do they not see the birds held subservient (musakhkhar) in mid-air? Nothing holds them up but God!* (16:79). The sun, moon, stars, and clouds have all been made subservient, by God's command, and all that is in the heavens and the earth, held in this divine thrall, has been made subservient to man.¹⁷ The perfect man or woman remains in a state of constant servitude towards God and in doing so, becomes His representative before creation. Maryam is one of the obedient (*qānitūn*), a word that the Qur'ān applies to both believing men and women, and the cosmos.¹⁸ It is because Maryam represents the soul in complete submission and receptivity towards the divine that she is sometimes referred to as the soul at peace (*al-nafs al-muṭma'inna*).¹⁹

Prayer

If the portrayal of Maryam were to be confined to her consecration to God from the world (*muḥarrar*), she would remain an ascetic but ideal attainable by only a few. But the Ṣūfī commentaries studied here look to other, more visceral elements in the Qur'ānic and extra-Qur'ānic narratives, creating evocative meditations on the meaning of prayer as an expression of human longing and pain, and hope for God's response. The story of Maryam's uncle, the prophet Zakariyyā, and his awakening to the possibilities of prayer occurs in Ṣūfī comments on Qur'an 3:37–9.

Her Lord accepted her graciously and caused her to grow in a beautiful manner and He made Zakariyya her guardian. Whenever Zakariyya went into the miḥrab to (see) her, he found her with food. He said, "O Maryam, how does this come to you?" She said, "It is from God. Truly God provides to whom He pleases without measure." Zakariyya prayed there to his Lord, saying, "Lord, grant me from Yourself goodly offspring. Truly You are the hearer of prayer." So the angels called to him as he stood praying in the miḥrab. "God gives you the good news of Yahya who shall confirm a word from God, noble, chaste, and a prophet from among the righteous."

Al-Ṭabarī tells us that it was Zakariyyā who built Maryam a special chamber in the temple (*miḥrāb*) and took care of her needs. According to numerous traditions reported from the Companions and Followers of the Prophet, the food mentioned here refers to fruits miraculously sent to Maryam, winter fruits in the summer and summer fruits in the winter. When Zakariyyā saw this miraculous provision given to Maryam, he desired a similar miracle for himself, to have a son even though he was old and his wife was barren.²⁰

Ṣūfī commentaries on these verses note the importance of Zakariyyā serving Maryam, quoting an inspiration said to have been sent to the prophet Dāwūd (David), "If you see someone seeking me, be a servant to him."²¹ Rūzbihān says that *He made Zakariyyā her guardian* (3:37) because only a saint (*walī*) can serve a saint.²² Zakariyyā's desire to serve Maryam is such that he is concerned when he finds her in the *miḥrāb* already provided with food, since he did not initially believe that this food was the result of a miracle. According to al-Qushayrī, "He was afraid that someone other than him would seize the opportunity of serving her and beat him to performing these duties,"²³ but it was one of the signs of the "gracious acceptance" that she was not entrusted to Zakariyyā entirely but received provision from God directly "so that the worlds might know that God does not burden others with the concerns of His saints."²⁴ Rūzbihān writes that Zakariyyā was initially afraid that Maryam's charismatic gifts (*karāmāt*) were the result of a ruse of Satan but was reassured that this was not the case after questioning her.²⁵

Al-Kāshānī suggests that the food described here may also refer to special knowledge given to Maryam.

He found her with (*indahā*) food. It is possible that what is meant here is the spiritual food (*al-rizq al-rūḥānī*) from the gnostic sciences (*ma'ārif*), realities (*ḥaqā'iq*), sciences (*ulūm*) and abundant wisdom bestowed upon her from God, since the specification of “withness” (*indiyya*) indicates their being provisions divinely bestowed (*laduniyya*).²⁶

Similarly, al-Nīsābūrī writes,

He found her with food, that is to say from the openings of the unseen (*futūḥāt al-ghayb*) that God feeds the elect of His servants who spend the night with Him, not with themselves nor creation, just as the Prophet said, “I spend the night with (*inda*) my Lord feeding me and giving me to drink.”²⁷

Al-Nīsābūrī also describes the foods as “teachings directly from God (*al-'ulūm al-laduniyya*) without an intermediary.”²⁸ But whether it was food or knowledge being given to Maryam, Zakariyyā is portrayed as having had difficulty believing that her position was so high as to warrant charismatic gifts (*karāmāt*). Ja'far al-Sādiq is quoted as having said,

Her Lord accepted her until the prophets were amazed, in spite of the grandeur of their own fates, at the exaltedness of her situation with God. Don't you see that Zakariyyā said to her, “*How does this come to You?*” She said, “*It is from God,*” that is to say, from the one who has accepted me.²⁹

Although surprised and even jealous of Maryam's spiritual states and gifts, Zakariyyā is consoled by being able to observe Maryam in her states and by his continued service to her.

Maryam said, “It is from God, not from any created being,” and in that were two things to relieve Zakariyyā: one of them was in the witnessing of her station (*maqām*) and her charismatic gift (*karāma*) from God and the second was that no one had beaten him to serving her. When He says, *Whenever (kullamā) Zakariyyā went into the miḥrāb to [see] her*, the word *kullamā* means “repeatedly” and this is an allusion to the fact that Zakariyyā did not cease serving her even though he found her with provision, but rather every day and at every moment he was studying her state (*ḥāl*) because the charismatic gifts (*karāmāt*) of the saints do not necessarily remain absolutely. It is possible that God will make something appear in them indefinitely or He might not, so Zakariyyā did not

rely on that nor neglect to study her state. Then he began to question her again by saying, “*O Maryam, how did this come to you?*” because of the possibility that that which exists today is not how it was yesterday, since this is not incumbent on God.³⁰

It is this witnessing of Maryam’s states and gifts that inspires Zakariyyā to pray himself.

Zakariyya prayed there to his Lord, saying, “*Lord, grant me from Yourself goodly offspring. Truly You are the Hearer of prayer,*” (3:38) that is to say when he saw the charismatic gift (*karāma*) of God with her, he grew more certain and more hopeful, so he asked for a son in spite of his advanced age and the fact that his request was granted was contrary to ordinary reality (*naqḍ^{am}l-il-‘āda*).³¹

Rūzbihān describes Zakariyyā’s desire for a miracle as the jealousy (*ghayra*) of prophecy.

Zakariyyā prayed there to his Lord. When Zakariyyā went to [see] Maryam, he found her with all kinds of fruits, knowledge given to her from the precious charismatic gifts (*karāmāt*) of God. The jealousy (*ghayra*) of prophecy was aroused in him and he dwelt there in retreat (*khalwa*) and asked God for a son and God gave him what he asked for.³²

God answers Zakariyyā’s prayer out of compassion for this jealousy³³ and because the request is a worthy one. Both al-Qushayrī and Rūzbihān write that Zakariyyā asked for a son to help him in obeying God and to be a successor to him in carrying out the message and guiding the community. Al-Qushayrī extends the meaning beyond Zakariyyā to include all such prayer.

It was a request that deserved to be granted, for when a request is for the sake of God (*al-ḥaqq*) and not for the pleasure of the self (*nafs*), then He will not refuse it.³⁴

Zakariyyā’s jealousy and longing are seen as positive so long as the object of his desire is not one of mundane gratification. There is a tension here between this desire and supplication, and the acceptance of God’s will. In commenting on Qur’ān 3:39, *So the angels called to him as he stood praying in the miḥrāb*, al-Qushayrī writes,

In this is an allusion to the fact that one who needs something from kings should stay at the door incessantly until the request is granted. It is said that the wisdom of God is such that He only consents to the request of one who embraces His service and throws the one who rejects obedience into the humiliation of loneliness.³⁵

The right to petition God is a boldness that is tempered by the reminder that *Truly God provides to whom He pleases without measure* (3:37) and *God does what He wills* (3:40). Al-Maybudī tells us that when Zakariyyā received news from the angels that his prayer for a son would be answered, he said, “By what merit of mine do I deserve this reply, if not by Your will and grace?”³⁶ Furthermore, if man desires this grace, he should know that even his desire is the result of God’s act. In a beautiful passage describing how God creates man’s desires, al-Nīsābūrī writes,

There are secrets belonging to God in every single atom of all existing things and in every one of their movements (*ḥarakāt*) and God has secrets that only God knows. Look at what secrets God expresses through the bird’s feeding its young [before Ḥannā] and what signs and miracles He reveals from this moment to the Day of Resurrection through Maryam and ‘Īsā. Just as God made the bird feeding its young the cause of movement (*taḥarraka*) of Hannah’s heart (*qalb*) to seek a child, so did He make the state of Maryam and the food miraculously given to her the cause of the movement of Zakariyyā’s heart.³⁷

The theme of human longing and supplication is further developed in commentary that compares Maryam’s contemplative prayer in the *miḥrāb* to the prayer she makes in the pain and distress of childbirth.

So she conceived him and withdrew with him to a remote place. Labor pains drove her to the trunk of a palm tree. She said, “O would that I had died before this, and had been completely forgotten.” But the one that was below her called to her, “Do not grieve, your Lord has placed a brook below you. Shake the trunk of the palm tree towards you and fresh dates will fall down to you.”

(Qur’ān 19:22–25)

When Maryam received the food in her *miḥrāb*, it was a miracle of pure grace occurring without any effort on her part. The dates she is provided with here are also considered to be a miracle, since the tree is said to have been dried up and without fruit until she shook its trunk.³⁸ Several Ṣūfī commentators point out that in this second miracle, Maryam is required to act. Al-Qushayrī writes,

It is said that when she was isolated (*mujarrad*) and without attachment (*‘alāqa*), Zakariyyā would find her with food without her having been instructed to exert herself. When the attachment to the child occurred, she was instructed to shake the dried palm tree and this was in her weakest state as the time of the birth of the child became closer, in order to know that attachment necessitates pain and hardship.³⁹

Ja'far al-Šādiq writes: "*O would that I had died before*" seeing my heart (*qalb*) attached to something other than God.⁴⁰ Rūzbihān quotes Abū Bakr. b. Ṭāhir as saying,

"O would that I had died" in the days of trusting in God alone before being reduced to the pain of petitioning as referred to in His words, "*Shake the trunk of the palmtree towards you.*"⁴¹

But al-Maybudī would have us know that this "pain of petitioning" is itself a blessing:

Maryam rose up in her weakness and seized the dry tree. When her hand touched the dry tree, it turned green, moist and fresh, bearing fruit, and in its freshness bent towards her. A divine voice came saying, "We had the power so that even without your touching the tree it would have become green and bent towards you, but We wanted by your shaking it to bring forth two miracles; first was that in childbirth, weakness and illness, We gave you power to shake the tree, which was to verify the miracle for you. The other was that We wanted the blessing of your hand to reach the tree so that it would bear fruit. Then the people of the world would understand that whoever is sad and grieved for Us, their hand is a remedy for pains."⁴²

The pleading quality of the prayers of Ḥannā, Zakariyyā and Maryam, and God's responsiveness to them appealingly demonstrates the significance and value of human suffering and supplication. Maryam's contemplative life ends with her pregnancy, the pain of childbirth, and being slandered, making her a model for Šūfīs in balancing the concerns of the world with worship and trust in God.

The virgin Maryam

We have already seen in Šūfī interpretations of the story of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr the type of allegoresis that finds one-to-one correspondences between philosophical concepts and Qur'ānic references. In the commentary of al-Kāshānī, which makes use of the approach more than any other, the results of this interpretative approach can seem reductionistic or rich, depending on the passage. Al-Kāshānī's comments on Maryam's chastity display him at his best. In two passages of the Qur'ān, Maryam is described as *she who guarded her chastity* (21:91, 66:12). The Arabic phrase used is *aḥṣanat farjahā*, which literally means *she guarded her private parts*. Commenting on verse 21:91, al-Kāshānī writes,

And she who guarded, that is to say the chaste (*zakiyya*) and pure (*ṣafiyya*), prepared (*musta'idda*) and worshipping soul (*naḥs*), which guarded the private parts of its preparedness (*isti'dād*), and the locus (*maḥall*) of the effects of the spirit (*rūḥ*) belonging to its inward dimension by protecting it from the fornicators of the physical forces within it.⁴³

The idea of the preparedness (*isti'dād*) of the soul refers to the different capabilities of souls to receive light from the Divine manifestation, a receptivity that can be damaged.⁴⁴ Commenting on the Qur'ānic verse in which Ādam and Hawwā (Eve) say, “*Lord, we have wronged ourselves and if You do not forgive us we will surely be among the lost*” (7:23), al-Kāshānī writes that *the lost* are

those who waste their original preparedness (*isti'dād*), which is the substance of felicity and subsistence, by employing it in the abode of annihilation. Thereby they would be deprived of reaching perfection through becoming disengaged because they kept on clinging to the imperfections of nature.⁴⁵

Similarly, Najm al-Din Rāzī (d. 1256), a Ṣūfī of the Kubrawī order, uses the concept of preparedness in his *Mirṣād al-ibād*:

Wretched is the person who is deprived of his own perfection and looks upon himself with the eye of disdain! He employs preparedness (*isti'dād*) of the human level, which is the noblest of existent things, in acquiring the objects of animal appetite, while animals are the meanest of existent things! He fails to recognize his own worth!⁴⁶

Human beings are the most perfect form of creation because they have the potential for becoming the locus in which the Divine manifestation occurs most fully, but this is a potential that can be squandered if the soul clings to the pleasures of the temporary and corporeal world. Maryam protected herself from these “fornicators of the physical forces within [the soul]”⁴⁷ and thereby protected her potentiality for perfection. Commenting on Qur'ānic verse 66:12, al-Kāshānī writes,

What is taken into account in worthiness for the charismatic gift (*karāma*) from God is good work and true belief, such as the chastity (*iḥṣān*) of Maryam, her believing the words of her Lord, and her obedience, which prepared her for the acceptance (*qabūl*) of the breath of the spirit of God to her . . . The soul adorned by the excellence of abstinence and the aforementioned chastity is a receptacle (*qābila*) for the effusion (*fayḍ*) of the holy spirit and the pregnancy of 'Īsā, the heart (*qalb*), illuminated by the light of the spirit, believing in the words of the Lord, the wise tenants, and the divinely revealed religions, obeying god absolutely with knowledge and deed, secretly and openly, participating in the unity in everything large and small, inwardly and outwardly, and God knows best.⁴⁸

Because Maryam guarded the preparedness of her soul, her soul was able to become a receptacle (*qābila*) for the effusion of the holy spirit and the pregnancy of 'Īsā, described most fully in Qur'ānic verses 19:16–22:

Mention Maryam in the book when she withdrew from her family to an eastern place and veiled herself from them. Then We sent to her Our Spirit and it appeared to her as a well-proportioned man. She said, "I seek refuge in the Merciful from you if you fear God. He said, "I am only a messenger from your Lord, to grant you a pure son." She said, "How can I have a son when no man has touched me nor have I been unchaste!" He said, "Thus said your Lord: It is easy for Me and (We give him to you) so that We may make him a sign to men and a mercy from Us. It is a matter decreed." So she conceived him and withdrew with him to a remote place.

The complexity of Şūfī symbolic interpretation is amply illustrated in Rūzbihān's commentary on these verses. He begins by equating Maryam's essential nature with the very nature of holiness itself. Her withdrawal to the *eastern place*, the source of divine lights (*ma'dīn al-anwār al-ulūhiyya*),⁴⁹ refers to her profound mystical experiences and intimacy with the unseen world.

The real allusion here is that the essential substance (*jawhar*) of Maryam is itself the primordial substance of holiness (*qudus*). Raised by God (*al-ḥaqq*) in the light of intimacy, with every one of her breaths she was drawn by the quality of nearness (*qurb*) and intimacy (*uns*) to the source of divine lights. She became watchful at every moment for the appearance of the sun of omnipotence (*jabarūt*) from the place in the east of dominion (*malakūt*). She withdrew from created things by her high aspiration characterized by the light of the unseen. She turned towards the places of the east of the suns of the Essence and the Attributes, inhaling the breezes of union (*wiṣāl*) from the world of eternity without beginning (*azal*).⁵⁰

"The places of the East" and the suns that can be witnessed rising there are symbols for the different levels of reality or worlds of the Unseen, with the first referring to the unseen intermediary world of jinn and angels (the *malakūt*) and the second to the divine world of God's names and attributes. In his commentary on 19:16, al-Kāshānī calls the *eastern place* the holy world (*al-'ālam al-qudsī*) and the western place from which Maryam withdrew and to which she returns the world of nature (*al-'ālam al-ṭabī'a*) and the horizon of corporeality (*al-uḥūq al-jismānī*), or the dwelling place of the soul (*nafs*). In describing what happens to Maryam in this *eastern place*, Rūzbihān uses two concepts to describe the meeting of the divine and human: divine self-disclosure (*tajallī*) and clothing (*libās*).

When we have finished describing the holiness (*qudus*) of the divinity (*lāhūt*) from human nature (*nāsūt*) and that human nature is incapable of reaching the divinity, far removed is the Majesty of God (*ḥaqq*) from

mixing with creation, and eternity is segregated from contingency, exalted is His beauty and the grandeur of His beginninglessness (*azal*) above likeness and resemblance), we can say regarding God (*haqq*) sending His spirit to her that the Spirit is the visible manifestation (*tajallī*) of the holiness of the essence (*dhāt*) in the light of qualities (*ṣifāt*); and the light of qualities is in the clothing (*libās*) of the acts (*af'āl*) in accordance with the beautiful form made desirable to her, which draws every spirit to it through the attribute of yearning (*shawq*), and that was the spirit of the act (*fi'l*), the spirit of the quality (*ṣifa*) and the spirit of the essence (*dhāt*) in the clothing of His light according to the capacity of her intellect (*'aql*). Because of that, He said, and it appeared to her as a well-proportioned man. This is the usual way of the appearance of the God (*haqq*) in the beginning of the passionate love (*'ishq*) of the lovers, so that their spirits and hearts may be attracted by it to the treasure of being granted knowledge of the qualities and the essence, turning away after separating the truth (*haqiqā*) from creation (*khalīqā*). The Prophet, peace be upon him, said about that, "I see my Lord in the most beautiful form."⁵¹

Elsewhere in his Qur'ānic commentary, Rūzbihān quotes al-Tustarī as defining the divine self-disclosure (*tajallī*) as one of the ways in which God gives knowledge to His servants, the others being revelation (*waḥy*), and knowledge with (*al-'indī*) and from (*al-ladunī*) God, all of these being subsumed within the category of knowledge by unveiling (*mukāshafa*).⁵² The verb *tajalla* occurs in Qur'ānic verse 7:143, in which Mūsā asks to see God. God replies, "*You will never see Me, but look at the mountain. If it remains in its place, then you will see Me.*" *When His Lord manifested Himself (tajalla) to the mountain, He made it as dust and Mūsā fell down in a swoon.*

Like Mūsā, Maryam does not perceive God directly. The holiness (*qudus*) of the essence (*dhāt*) descends in the light of the qualities (*ṣifāt*), which are "clothed" in the acts (*af'āl*), the level of reality visible to her. The acts function as a mirror for the manifestation (*tajallī*) of the essence and the qualities. The divine self-disclosure (*tajallī*) is always clothed or made ambiguous (*iltibās*) in this manner and is therefore hidden from those who are unaware of the secret. As evidence for his statements, Rūzbihān quotes the *ḥadīth*, "I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form." A more complete version of this *ḥadīth*, called the *ḥadīth* of vision (*ḥadīth al-ru'yā*), reads,

I saw my Lord in a form of the greatest beauty, as a youth with abundant hair, seated on the throne of grace: he was clad in a garment of gold; on his hair a golden mitre; on his feet golden sandals.⁵³

It is a *ḥadīth* whose authenticity was mostly rejected outside of Sūfism and caused some problems within Sūfism itself from those who saw in it license for the practice of gazing at youths.⁵⁴ The *ḥadīth* plays a central role in the thought

of Rūzbihān because he believed the form of human beauty is the most perfect locus for the divine self-disclosure (*tajallī*) and that love of the form can lead to love of God.⁵⁵ It is not only the form of the well-proportioned man that acts as a mirror in which the *tajallī* occurs, but also Maryam.

A breath of the union of eternity (*azal*) came to her and the sun of witnessing of holiness rose upon her. When she witnessed the rising of the manifestation (*tajallī*) of the eternal (*azal*), its lights shown and its secrets reached her spirit (*rūḥ*) and her spirit was impregnated by the breath of the unseen (*ghayb*). She became pregnant with the great Word and the light of the highest Spirit. When her state became exalted by the reflection in her beauty of the manifestation of the eternal, she veiled herself from created beings and became intimate with the bridegroom of reality (*ḥaqīqa*).⁵⁶

If Rūzbihān seems to be suggesting a union of the human and divine here, elsewhere in his writings he qualifies this. Commenting on verses of al-Ḥallāj that would seem to describe union with the divine, Rūzbihān writes that this is a fancy (*wahm*) born of human weakness as it contemplates God, and he notes that “the intoxicated speak in this way frequently, even though they know that the essence of divinity is unattainable by the created.”⁵⁷ But if Rūzbihān is careful to stress God’s distance from created things, nonetheless his description of the intimacy Maryam enjoys with the “bridegroom of reality” is a provocative one that includes desire, yearning, and passion; the erotic imagery would be even more apparent if Rūzbihān’s writing style was not so dense and his terminology so technical.

QUR'ĀN 24:35 (THE LIGHT VERSE)

God is the light of the heavens and the earth. The similitude of His/his light is as a niche in which is a lamp and the lamp is in a glass, and the glass is like a glittering star lit from a blessed olive tree neither of the east nor the west, whose oil would well-nigh shine even if no fire touched it. Light upon light. God guides whom He wills to His light and strikes similitudes for mankind, and God has knowledge of all things.

The Light Verse has often been closely associated with Ṣūfī thought, primarily because of al-Ghazālī's well-known and influential commentary on it. Goldziher somewhat questionably stated that the verse is one of the few in the Qur'ān amenable to mystical thought.¹ It has been selected for discussion here because of the questions it raises concerning literal and metaphorical language, and how one can speak of God and His attributes.

God is the light of the heavens and the earth

The majority of non-Ṣūfī classical commentators considered the expression *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* to be a metaphor or idiom which must be understood in such a way as to avoid equating God with the phenomenon of light. In his *Jāmi' al-bayān*, al-Ṭabarī states that the Ibn 'Abbās' interpretation, "God is the guide (*hādī*) of the people of the heavens and the earth," is the best of the interpretations from the Companions and Followers because it is the logical continuation of the preceding verse, *We have sent down to you signs making things clear, as a similitude of those who passed away before you, and as an admonition for those who are Godfearing* (24:34).² Another interpretation al-Ṭabarī cites suggests that the phrase means that God "governs (*yudabbiru*) the affair (*amr*) with regards to [the heavens and the earth], their stars, sun and moon," an expression taken from Qur'ānic verses 10:3, 13:2, and 32:5.³ Other commentators quote additional interpretations traced back to the Companions and Followers, which make God the agent of illumination rather than light itself; that is, God is the illuminator (*munawwir*) or ornamentor (*muzayyin*) of the heavens and the earth.⁴

Only one interpretation cited in al-Ṭabarī retains the original wording of the phrase by suggesting a synonym for “light” (*nūr*), i.e., “light” (*ḍiyā*).⁵

Al-Zamakhsharī’s commentary is one of the first to reject the literal reading of the phrase and to insist upon its being interpreted. Like other Mu’tazila, al-Zamakhsharī was intent upon protecting the unity of God by denying that there could be a plurality of eternals, that is, a power, a knowledge, or a light that have existed independently with Him for all eternity. Their preferred manner of expressing the relationship between God and His attributes was to say that God is powerful, knowing, etc., by His very essence. In other words, the attributes are not distinct from His essence, but neither are they equivalent to it. One can say, “God is powerful,” but not “God is Power,” because this would be likening God to a created thing. Therefore, Qur’ānic phrases such as *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* must be interpreted because God is not like anything created, in this case light. Al-Zamakhsharī suggests that the phrase *God is the light* is like our saying, “Zayd is generous and munificent” (*Zayd^{um} karam^{um} wa jūd^{um}*) and then saying, “He revives men with his generosity and munificence” (*yun’ashu al-nās bi-karamihi wa jūdihi*). The first sentence does not mean that Zayd is generosity and munificence per se, but rather that Zayd possesses these attributes. Similarly, the meaning of the phrase *God is the light of the heavens and the earth*, according to al-Zamakhsharī, is that

He is the possessor of the light of the heavens and the owner of the light of the heavens. The light of the heavens and the earth is the truth (*al-ḥaqq*), which can be compared to light in its manifestation and clarification, just as He says, *God is the friend of those who believe; He brings them forth from the shadows to the light* (2:257), i.e., from the false to the true (*al-ḥaqq*).⁶

The Mu’tazilī doctrine concerning the attributes of God was one of the most significant differences setting them apart from their Ash’arī counterparts who labeled them “deniers” (*mu’aṭṭila*) for supposedly denying the existence of the attributes of God, leaving God as an abstract symbol of unity.⁷ In his commentary on this verse, however, the Ash’arī theologian al-Rāzī has more in common with al-Zamakhsharī than differences. Like al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāzī insists that the phrase *God is the light* must be interpreted. As we saw in the discussion of Qur’ān 3:7, al-Rāzī believes that the abandonment of the probable meaning of any expression in the Qur’ān requires a clear-cut indicator (*dalīl munfaṣil*) that demonstrates the absurdity of the apparent sense (*ẓāhir*).⁸ Al-Rāzī applies the methodology to this verse, setting forth argument after argument for proving the absurdity of calling God “light.” He begins by explaining various definitions of the word “light” (in its physical sense), and then demonstrates the absurdity of applying any of these definitions to God.

Further evidence to support his rational arguments is drawn from three Qur’ānic verses, one of which is the Light Verse itself. Al-Rāzī finds a contradiction

between the phrase *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* and the phrases *the similitude of His/his light* and *God guides whom He wills to His light*, since the first phrase appears to equate light with God's essence while the other phrases imply that light is attributed (*muḍāf*) to God. One of the ways in which al-Rāzī attempts to resolve this seeming contradiction is by referring to common usage of the Arabic language. He quotes the same sentences found in al-Zamakhsharī, although he does not mention al-Zamakhsharī by name.⁹ Like al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāzī understands the verse as meaning that God is not "light" per se but rather the possessor and creator of light, since Qur'ān 42:11 states *There is nothing like Him*. According to al-Rāzī, if God were a light, this verse would be false because all lights resemble one another. Nothing resembles Him and therefore He cannot be called light. Another verse al-Rāzī quotes to support his view is Qur'ān 6:1, *He made the shadows and the light*. This verse proves that the quiddity (*māhiyya*) of light was created by God, making it impossible that the divine being could be a light.¹⁰

Based on this rational and Qur'ānic evidence, al-Rāzī insists that the phrase *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* must be interpreted (*la budda min al-ta'wīl*). His preferred interpretation is the one attributed to Ibn 'Abbās and "the majority," which states that the verse means, "God is the Guide of the heavens and the earth." Al-Rāzī mentions several Qur'ānic verses that support this interpretation.¹¹ He considers it the best interpretation because the last part of the Light Verse, *God guides whom He wills to His light*, "indicates that what is meant is the light of guidance to knowledge and action." Al-Rāzī briefly mentions other traditional interpretations such as God as governor (*mudabbir*), arranger (*nāzim*), and illuminator (*munawwir*).¹²

This discussion of traditional interpretations is followed by an extensive summary and expansion of the first part of al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāṭ al-anwār*, a commentary on the Light Verse that will be discussed in greater depth in what follows. For now however, we can state that al-Ghazālī's basic premise is that light is a word used for many different types of phenomena. The relationship between these different kinds of phenomena is a hierarchical one, and lights that are higher are more worthy of the term "light" than lights that are lower. The light of the physical eye is inferior to that of the intellect (*aql*), a fact that al-Ghazālī proves by listing seven imperfections of physical sight when compared to rational insight; al-Rāzī expands this list to a total of twenty imperfections. Even higher than the light of rational insight is the light of God. According to al-Ghazālī, the perfection of His light is such that He alone is worthy of the term "light." God is light in reality (*ḥaqīqa*) while all other light is metaphorical (*majāz*) in relationship to His light; in truth there is no light but He.¹³

At first glance this view would seem to be antithetical to that of al-Rāzī, who began his own exegesis by arguing that God cannot be called light. Nonetheless, al-Rāzī concludes after his long summary of al-Ghazālī's work that no contradiction exists between al-Ghazālī's interpretation and the traditional interpretation of light as "Guide," al-Rāzī's preferred interpretation.¹⁴ Al-Rāzī's acceptance of

al-Ghazālī's interpretation makes more sense when seen in the context of other discussions of God's attributes. A precedent for al-Ghazālī's statement that God is light in reality (*ḥaqīqa*) while all other light is metaphor (*majāz*) can be found in the work of the Mu'tazilī theologian al-Nāshī' al-Akbar (d. 906), who attempted to solve the problem of anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Qur'ān by the theory that the attributes of God, when applied to God are "true" (*ḥaqīqa*) but when applied to men are "metaphor" (*majāz*). The more common way to solve anthropomorphic problems was to say the opposite, that attributes are *majāz* with regards to God but *ḥaqīqa* with regards to mankind. But, as Heinrichs has pointed out, either theory works well to solve the problem of anthropomorphism. The first theory, however, raises an additional issue, which is whether Nāshī' al-Akbar understands the distinction between the real (*ḥaqīqa*) and metaphor (*majāz*) to be on an ontological or a linguistic level.¹⁵ Nāshī' al-Akbar's view is ambiguous, but al-Ghazālī's is not. He clearly asserts that God's light, like His existence, is the only real Light and Existence. Al-Rāzī's position is less clear; while he repeats al-Ghazālī's emphatic phrase, "There is no light but He," he omits key passages explaining what al-Ghazālī means by this. Al-Rāzī's main concern is the theological problem of eliminating any possibility of equating God with the physical phenomenon that we call light.

Ibn Taymiyya wrote a commentary on the Light Verse that is structured as a rebuttal to an unnamed adversary. Many of the arguments quoted from this adversary are arguments found in al-Rāzī's *Tafsīr al-kabīr* and the section on God's name "light" (*nūr*) in his *Sharḥ asmā' Allāh ta'ālā wa'l-ṣifāt*.¹⁶ The wording is similar enough to suspect that Ibn Taymiyya's opponent is, in fact, al-Rāzī, but the fact that some of the arguments quoted are not found in either of the two works of al-Rāzī, at least not in the passages studied here, makes it difficult to definitively identify him as such. Ibn Taymiyya's commentary is highly polemical; he accuses his opponent of distorting the Qur'ān (*tahrīf*), apostasy (*ilhād*) with regards to God's signs and names, lying (*kidhb*), iniquity (*ẓulm*), and enmity towards the rights of God.¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya attempts to highlight, point by point, what he deems to be the contradictions in his opponent's arguments and their pervertedness (*fasād*). For our purposes the most important material pertains to Ibn Taymiyya's response to the claim that the phrase *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* must be interpreted. Ibn Taymiyya not only rejects the necessity of interpreting this phrase, he insists that the majority of Muslims do not interpret it, this being the view of the first generations (*salaf*), the Attributionists (*ṣifātiyya*)¹⁸ among the theologians, jurists, Sūfīs, and others. The interpretation of God's attribute "light," according to Ibn Taymiyya goes back to the *jahmiyya*¹⁹ and the Mu'tazila.

Ibn Taymiyya's opponent claims that the phrase *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* must be interpreted because "light is a mode of being (*kayfiyya*) existing in corporeality, which is the opposite of darkness, and far be it from God (*al-ḥaqq*) to have an opposite"²⁰ Ibn Taymiyya understands the term "light" as possessing different meanings appropriate to different contexts. He disagrees

with the definition of light as a mode of being existing in corporeality, stating that created light can be either an essence (*ʿayn*) or an accident (*ʿarāḍ*). An example of the first is fire while the second would be the reflective light of the fire on a wall. Only the second can be said to be a “mode of being existing by means of a body.” In other words, sometimes the word light refers to a substance (*jawhar*) and sometimes to a quality (*ṣifa*). Similarly, the names of God sometimes refer to His essence and sometimes to His attributes. As an example of this, Ibn Taymiyya quotes a *ḥadīth*, “You are the real (*ḥaqq*), Your speech is the real (*ḥaqq*), the Garden is real (*ḥaqq*), the prophets are real (*ḥaqq*) and Muḥammad is real (*ḥaqq*).”²¹

Similarly, Ibn Taymiyya understands the phrase *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* as meaning that light is part of God’s essence as well as being one of His attributes; that is to say God is both light and possesses light. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the first phrase, *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* and the second phrase *the similitude of His/his light*, and it would be wrong to interpret the first phrase to mean “God is the possessor of light,” as do al-Zamakhsharī and al-Rāzī. Ibn Taymiyya finds further proof for accepting the exact Qur’ānic wording as it is in the *ḥadīth*, “O God, praise be to You, light of the heavens and the earth and what is in them,” and the Prophet’s reply to the question of how he saw his Lord, “I see a light.”²²

Ibn Taymiyya’s insistence that God is light, however, does not mean that he rejects the metaphorical interpretations of the first generations (*salaf*) regarding this light, comments that he does not call *ta’wīl* but rather *tafsīr*. According to Ibn Taymiyya, saying that “God is the guide of the heavens and the earth” does not negate the fact of God being Himself a light. Using many of the same examples that he uses in his book on Qur’ānic methodology, *Muqaddima fī uṣūl al-tafsīr*, Ibn Taymiyya explains that the custom of the first generations was to use different expressions and examples to explain the meaning of the Qur’ān. When they said, “God is the guide of the heavens and the earth,” they were making a statement regarding one of the meanings of *God is the light of the heavens and the earth*, a statement that does not invalidate its other meanings. Likewise, when they said, “God is the illuminator (*munawwir*) of the heavens and the earth,” they were not contradicting the fact of His being a light, because part of the definition of light is being something that illuminates something else.²³ Ibn Taymiyya, then, accepts both the interpretation that *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* as “God is the guide of the heavens and the earth” and the interpretation that insists upon the literal meaning. However, he does not explore the implications of accepting the literal meaning.²⁴

Ṣūfī interpretations of *God is the light of the heavens and the earth*

It is the literal understanding of the phrase *God is light* that interests al-Ghazālī in his *Mishkāṭ al-anwār*, although the conclusions he draws regarding it are not

ones that Ibn Taymiyya would have accepted. He explains that the various interpretations of the Light Verse are due to the different definitions of light they presuppose. He judges the understanding of light found amongst the Ṣūfīs to be superior to that of other interpretations, but suggests that it is not an interpretation that should be widely broadcast. As we saw in the commentaries on Qur'ān 3:7, the Ṣūfīs asserted that the Qur'ān contains both public knowledge that should be disseminated and private knowledge that is made deliberately obscure except to those few intended to receive it. Al-Ghazālī refers to this principle in the introduction to his *Mishkāt al-anwār* and explains why, then, he is revealing some of this private information:

What is more, not every mystery is to be unveiled and divulged, and not every reality (*ḥaqīqa*) is to be presented and disclosed. Indeed, “the breasts of the free (*aḥrār*) are the graves of the mysteries.”²⁵ One of the gnostics has said, “To divulge the mystery of Lordship is unbelief (*kufīr*).” Indeed, the Master of the First and the Last [the Prophet] said, “There is a kind of knowledge like the guise of the hidden; none knows it except the knowers of God. When they speak of it, none denies it except those who are arrogantly deluded by God.” And when the people of arrogant delusion become many, it becomes necessary to preserve the coverings upon the face of the mysteries. But I see you as one whose breast has been opened up by God through light and whose innermost consciousness (*sirr*) has been kept free of the darknesses of delusion. Hence, in this discipline I will not be niggardly toward you in alluding (*ishāra*) to sparks and flashes or giving symbols of realities and subtleties, for the fear of holding back knowledge from those who are worthy of it is not less than that in disseminating it to those who are not worthy of it.

He who bestows (*manaḥa*) knowledge on the ignorant wastes it,
And he who withholds (*mana'a*) it from the worthy has done them wrong.²⁶

With this said, al-Ghazālī proceeds to the first section of his treatise on the definition of different types of light, and his interpretation of the phrase *God is the light of the heavens and the earth*.

Al-Ghazālī asserts that the term “light” is understood in three different ways. The first usage (*waḍ'*) is that of ordinary people (*āmmī*) and indicates manifestation (*ẓuhūr*) to visual perception. “Light” here is “an expression for what can be seen in itself and through which other things can be seen, like the sun.” The Arabic language, however, also includes the possibility of using the word “light” to refer to the organ of perception involved, the eye, as in the phrase “the light of the eyesight of the bat is weak (*fi'l-khuffāsh inna nūr 'aynihi ḍa'if*).”²⁷ Al-Ghazālī suggests that this second definition of the term “light” is more appropriate than the first definition because the eye perceives and through it perception takes place,

whereas seen light is merely the place where perception takes place. An even more perfect organ of perception is the “eye” of the intellect (*‘aql*) and so this too can be referred to as a “light.” It is in this sense that “light” can be used to refer to the Prophet and, to a lesser degree, the other prophets and religious scholars.²⁸

While this second definition of “light” occurs among the elect (*khawāṣṣ*), the elect of the elect (*khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ*) have a third definition, which defines “light” as “the first light” (*al-nūr al-awwal*) and “the real light” (*al-nūr al-ḥaqq*) because it is the only light that does not borrow its luminosity from something else. The use of the term “light” for anything other than this real light is metaphor (*majāz*). God is light, there is no light but He, and He is the totality of lights and the universal light. God is hidden from us because He is pure light. In everything other than God light is mixed with darkness, allowing us to see, but God has no opposite, no darkness mixed with His light and He is therefore veiled from His creation by the very intensity of His manifestation. He is everywhere but cannot be seen.

Just as the real light (*al-nūr al-ḥaqq*) is God, the real existent (*al-mawjūd al-ḥaqq*) is God. And just as our light is “borrowed,” so is our existence “borrowed (*isti‘āra*).” Once one has recognized what is real and what is metaphor, one will understand that “there is nothing in existence except God,” and *Everything is being annihilated except His face* (28:88). The state (*ḥāl*) of seeing this is attained either by cognitive gnosis (*‘irfān ‘ilmī*) or “tasting (*dhawq*).” In the latter case there is an intoxication that overcomes the intellect and gives rise to such statements as those made by al-Ḥallāj and Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī (d. 875), but when the state ends the intellect knows that it was a state that was not the reality of unification (*ḥaqīqat al-ittiḥād*) but the ambiguity of unification (*shubḥa’l-ittiḥād*). The possessor of this state has been annihilated (*faniya*) from himself and annihilated from his annihilation (*faniya ‘an fanā’ihi*) because he has lost all consciousness of himself.

In relationship to the one immersed in it, this state is called “unification” (*ittiḥād*), according to the language of metaphor (*majāz*), or is called “declaring God’s unity” (*tawḥīd*) in the language of reality (*ḥaqīqa*).²⁹

Al-Ghazālī quotes a poem here attributed to Ṣāḥib b. ‘Abbād (d. 995):

The glass is clear, the wine is clear,
the two are similar, the affair confused,
As if there is wine and no glass,
or glass and no wine.³⁰

And he adds, “There is a difference between saying, ‘The wine is the cup’ and ‘It is as if the wine is the cup.’”³¹ It was just this kind of ambiguous statement which troubled critics like Ibn Taymiyya who rejected the distinction between the reality and the metaphor of unification (*ittiḥād*) and therefore could only see these ideas

as heresies, a denial of God's complete transcendence. Ibn Taymiyya believed that this denial was at the root of both the ecstatic utterances of the early Ṣūfīs and their philosophizing successors, hidden beneath the deliberate ambiguity of Ṣūfī terminology and style. Ibn 'Arabī describes the state of bewilderment (*hayra*) which occurs in the mystic when he realizes the ambiguity of existence, but Ibn Taymiyya declares this merely confusion, the result of the logical absurdities of the mystic's thinking.³² In the *Mishkāt al-anwār*, al-Ghazālī anticipates this criticism, expressing his concern that what he has said will be misunderstood and suggests that those who cannot grasp this kind of knowledge should avoid it:

It may be that some people will fall short of understanding the innermost meaning of these words. Hence, they will understand the words, "God is with everything, just as light is with the things," to mean that He is in each place – high exalted and holy is He from being ascribed to place! Probably the best way not to stir up such imaginings is to say that He is before everything, that He is above everything and that He makes everything manifest. Yet, in the knowledge of those who possess insight, that which makes manifest cannot be separate from that which is manifest. This is what we mean by our saying that "He is with everything." Moreover, it is not hidden from you that the manifester is above and before everything made manifest, although it is with everything in a certain respect. However, [the manifester] is with [everything] in one respect and before it in another respect, so you should not suppose that this is a contradiction. Take an example from sensory objects, which lie at your level of knowledge: Consider how the movement of a hand is both with the movement of its shadow and before it. He whose breast cannot embrace knowledge of this should abandon this type of science. There are men for each science, and "the way is eased for each person to that for which he was created."³³

For ordinary people the declaration of God's unity (*tawḥīd*) is "There is no god but God," but for the elect the declaration of God's unity is "There is no he but He."³⁴

The *Mishkāt al-anwār* represents a type of Ṣūfī writing which uses the language of philosophy and theology to describe a view of reality based on the Ṣūfī experience of annihilation (*fanā*) and subsistence (*baqā*). Although Ibn 'Arabī has often been considered the originator of this theoretical form of Ṣūfism, the *Mishkāt al-anwār* demonstrates that al-Ghazālī was clearly his precursor.³⁵ Elsewhere, al-Ghazālī did address the types of theological issues which are the primary focus of al-Rāzī's commentary on the Light Verse, but these are not his concerns in the *Mishkāt al-anwār*. His concerns are also different from the purely philosophical approach of Ibn Sīnā in his interpretation of the Light Verse found in *Fī ithbāt al-nubuwwāt*. Like al-Rāzī, Ibn Sīnā declares physical light the "essential" meaning of light and the use of the term "light" in the Qur'ānic phrase

God is the light of the heavens and the earth “metaphorical,” a linguistic stance opposite to that of al-Ghazālī.

I say: *light* is an equivocal term (*mushtarak*) partaking of two meanings, one essential (*dhātī*) and the other metaphorical (*musta‘ār*). The essential stands for the perfection of the transparent inasmuch as it is transparent, as Aristotle said. The metaphorical meaning is to be understood in two ways: either as the good, or as the cause that leads to the good. Here, the sense is the metaphorical one in both meanings. I mean that God, the Exalted, is in Himself the good and the cause of everything good.”³⁶

In this respect, Ibn Sīnā has more in common with exoteric exegesis on this verse than with al-Ghazālī’s interpretation, because he assumes that the meaning of the term “light” can be easily understood. For al-Ghazālī, in contrast, the true meaning of “light” contains a secret regarding the ambiguous status of man’s existence. Al-Ghazālī links this particular understanding of man’s relationship to God to problems of Qur’anic interpretation both here and in his discussion in the *Ihyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn* of the meaning of the Qur’anic verse *You did not throw when you threw but God threw* (8:17). The verse was revealed after the Battle of Badr and refers to a moment in the battle when the Prophet threw dust at the enemies of the Muslims.

The external sense (*zāhir*) of this verse is clear but the truth of its meaning is obscure (*ghāmiḍ*) since it both affirms and negates the throwing. This is contradictory in the external sense unless one understands that he threw from one point of view and did not throw from another point of view, and from the point of view in which he did not throw God threw . . . The reality of this is taken from the vast ocean of the knowledges of unveiling (*‘ulūm al-mukāshafāt*). The external sense of the commentary will be of no use.³⁷

The similitude of His/his light is as a niche

While the phrase *God is the light* was interpreted both metaphorically and literally, the phrase *the similitude of His/his light is as a niche* and the various elements of this niche was understood by all commentators as a metaphor, but a metaphor whose referents are ambiguous. Al-Rāzī lists ten different interpretations that can be grouped according to whether these words refer to God, Muḥammad, or the believer.³⁸ Although al-Rāzī includes interpretations from later commentators, all three referents can be found in the earliest interpretations transmitted from the Companions and the Followers. Al-Rāzī’s preferred interpretation, as it was al-Ṭabarī’s, is that the extended metaphor of the niche serves the purpose of describing a pure and perfect light, thereby describing, by analogy, the perfection of God’s guidance. *His light* may also refer to the Qur’ān. Another interpretation

suggests that the words mean Muḥammad, just as the Qur'ān 33:46 describes Muḥammad as *a light-giving lamp*. Muqātil (d. 767) is quoted as saying that it is a similitude for the light of faith in the heart of Muḥammad, so the *niche* is like the loins of 'Abd Allāh, Muḥammad's father; the *glass* the body of Muḥammad; and the *lamp* faith or prophecy in Muḥammad's heart. Or the *niche* can be compared to Ibrāhīm, the *glass* to Ismā'īl, the *lamp* to the body of Muḥammad, and the *tree* to prophecy and the message.

Whereas these interpretations identify the elements of the niche as referring to God's guidance or Muhammad, the other interpretations cited by al-Rāzī understand this part of the verse as referring to the believer. One interpretation suggests that the *light* is knowledge of God and the religious laws in the heart of the believer. The evidence for this interpretation is in Qur'ān 39:22, *Is he whose breast God has opened up to Islam so that he has a light from his Lord...* and verse 14:1, *in order that you might bring mankind out of the darkness into the light*. The interpretations of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā, which understand the *niche* as referring to the human perceptual faculties are summarized. Al-Rāzī then quotes a Ṣūfī interpretation which states that the *niche* is the breast, the *glass* is the heart, the *lamp* is knowledge, and the *blessed tree* is the angels and their inspirations which are *neither of the east nor west* because they are spiritual (*rūḥāniyya*). The oil from this tree *would well-nigh shine even if no fire touched it* because of the plentitude of their different types of knowledge and the powerfulness of their understanding of the secrets of the kingdom (*malakūt*) of God. Al-Rāzī adds critically, "It is obvious here that the thing compared (*mushabbah*) is not the thing compared therewith (*al-mushabbih bihi*)."³⁹

Al-Rāzī does not explain why he finds this particular interpretation unacceptable. Al-Qurṭubī is clearer in his commentary that the issue is one of understanding the proper use of language. He states that metaphorical definitions of light are part of standard Arabic speech and gives examples of such from Arabic poetry to show that the statement *God is the light* refers to He who brings all things into existence, including light. He adds that the mistake of corporealists (*mujassima*) is that they follow the external sense of the verse and *aḥādīth* which seem to suggest that God *is* a light.⁴⁰ Metaphor, then, is part of the language of the Qur'ān. This does not mean, however, that words and expressions can be interpreted in ways that go beyond the metaphors that are a part of standard Arabic speech. Al-Qurṭubī quotes his teacher's critique of an interpretation of the elements of the *niche* similar to one of the interpretations al-Rāzī cites.

Al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-'Arabī said: It is strange that there was a jurist who said that this is a similitude which God has struck for Ibrāhīm and Muḥammad, and for 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib and his son 'Abd Allāh... 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib is likened to the *niche* in which there is a candle that is the *glass* that is like 'Abd Allāh. Muḥammad is like the *lamp*, meaning that he is from their loins, so that he is like *a glittering star* which is Jupiter.

Lit from a blessed tree means the inheritance of prophecy from Ibrāhīm who is the *blessed tree*, meaning pure in faith (*ḥanifiyya*). *Neither of the east nor the west*, neither Jewish nor Christian. *Whose oil would well-nigh shine even if no fire touched it*. [The jurist] says, “Ibrāhīm would well-nigh speak from revelation before it was revealed to him.” *Light upon light*. Ibrāhīm then Muḥammad.

Al-Qāḍī said: All of this is an abandonment of the obvious sense (*zāhir*) and nothing in the process of creating metaphors (*tamthīl*) prevents one from expanding it.⁴¹

Al-Qurṭubī’s teacher is drawing attention to what he perceives to be the danger inherent in metaphors, their openness to endless interpretation. Yet he also states that metaphor in the Qur’ān is necessary because man can only understand that of which he already has some knowledge, namely himself and his world.

This verse is a similitude which God has struck for His light. It is only possible to strike a similitude for His exalted light as an exhortation to His creation by some part of His creation, because men, due to their limitations, can only understand by means of themselves. If that were not so, no one would know God except He Himself.⁴²

Still confusing here, however, is the definition of the boundaries of acceptable metaphorical interpretation. Ibn Taymiyya states that the use of analogy (*qiyās*) in interpretation is acceptable if the analogies produced are in agreement with other Qur’ānic verses, sound *ḥadīth*, and *salafī* interpretations. In his commentary on this passage of the Light Verse, he quotes a Ṣūfī interpretation which he deems acceptable.

Among the sayings of the gnostics (*‘arīfūn*) is that *the light* is that which illuminates the hearts of the sincere by its declaration of God’s unity and illuminates the innermost hearts (*asrār*) of the lovers by its confirmation. It is said that it is that which enlivens the hearts of the gnostics by the light of its knowledge and the souls of the worshippers by the light of its worship.⁴³

This is the talk of some shaykhs who speak in a manner of admonition without verifying [what they say]. Shaykh Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān in *Taḥqīq al-tafsīr*⁴⁴ mentions allusions (*ishārāt*), some of which provide useful lessons and some of which come from invalid or rejected transmitted material. The allusions of the Ṣūfī shaykhs can be divided into allusion by state (*ishāra ḥālīyya*), which are their allusions by means of hearts – and it is this by which they are characterized – but this is not the case here; and allusions connected to teachings such as they take from the Qur’ān and the like. These allusions are in the category of consideration

(*i'tibār*), analogy (*qiyās*), and appending that which is not in a text to that which is in the text (*ilhā mā laysa bi-manṣūṣ bi'l-manṣūṣ*). These are like the consideration and analogy that jurists use in legal judgements. But the Ṣūfī shaykhs use them for inspiration (*targhīb*) and warning (*tarhīb*), virtuous deeds and degrees of men, and things like that.⁴⁵ If the allusion is considerative (*i'tibāriyya*) by virtue of a sound type of analogy (*qiyās*), it is good and acceptable. If the analogy is weak, it is judged accordingly. If it is a distortion (*tahrīf*) of the words beyond their [acceptable] interpretation, it is the type of sayings of the *qarāmiṭa*,⁴⁶ *bāṭiniyya* and *jahmiyya*.⁴⁷

Ibn Taymiyya, then, finds metaphorical interpretations beyond those transmitted from the Companions and the Followers acceptable provided they can be verified as sound by the Qur'ān, *aḥādith* and *tafsīr* from the Companions and Followers, a process of verification he suggests the Ṣūfīs rarely do.

Ṣūfī interpretations of the similitude of His/his light is as a niche

Ibn Taymiyya identifies an important point here. Ṣūfī commentaries rarely refer directly to the commentaries of the Companions and Followers of the Prophet, but this fact should not be taken to mean that they were unaware or critical of them. One of the earliest recorded Ṣūfī interpretations on the Light Verse, attributed to Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, reflects and expands upon all the *salafī* interpretations of *the similitude of His/his light* in its detailing of a long list of the varied manifestations of God's light and the hierarchy of those who possess it: God, Muḥammad, and the believers.

The lights are different. The first of them is the light of the protection of the heart, then the light of fear, then the light of hope, then the light of recollection, then vision by the light of knowledge, then the light of modesty, then the light of the sweetness of faith, then the light of Islam, then the light of doing beautiful acts (*iḥsān*), then the light of blessing, then the light of grace, then the light of benefits, then the light of generosity, then the light of affection, then the light of the heart, then the light of comprehension, then the light of awe, then the light of bewilderment, then the light of life, then the light of intimacy, then the light of uprightness, then the light of humility, then the light of tranquility, then the light of grandeur, then the light of majesty, then the light of power, then the light of might, then the light of divinity, then the light of oneness, then the light of singularity, then the light of eternity, then the light of endless time, then the light of eternity without beginning or end, then the light of permanence, then the light of sempiternity, then the light of subsistence (*baqā*), then the light of universality, then the light of He-ness (*huwiyya*).

Each of these lights has a people, a state (*ḥāl*) and a place (*maḥall*), and all of them are part of the lights of God (*al-ḥaqq*) that God has mentioned in his words, *God is the light of the heavens and the earth*. Each one of His servants is drinking from one of these lights and perhaps has a portion of two or three lights. These lights will not become complete for anyone except Muṣṭafa⁴⁸ because he stands with God by virtue of being rendered sound in servanthood and love. He is a light and is in a light from his Lord (*huwa nūr wa huwa min rabbihi ‘alā nūr*).⁴⁹

The language in this interpretation can be compared to an interpretation of *the blessed olive tree neither of the east nor of the west* and *light upon light* related from the Companion Ubayy b. Ka'b. Here, the believer is compared to a tree that receives just the right amount of light just as the believer is protected from life's vicissitudes by the strength which God gives him.

He balances four characteristics: if he receives he is grateful; if he is afflicted he is patient; if he expresses an opinion he is fair; and if he speaks he is truthful. Among other men he is like a living man walking amidst the graves of the dead. *Light upon light*. He freely moves about in five different kinds of light. His speech is light, his action is light, his private affairs are a light, his public affairs⁵⁰ are a light, and his ultimate destination will be the light on the Day of Resurrection in the Garden.⁵¹

What distinguishes Ṣūfī commentaries, however, is not only their expanded use of the metaphor of light but also a seemingly literal way of understanding this light, as in al-Tustarī's description of the role of light in the creation of Muḥammad and the believers. In his commentary on the Light Verse, al-Tustarī suggests that *the similitude of His/his light* refers to Muḥammad. He also quotes al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī as saying that what is meant is the heart of the believer. The creation of the lights of Muḥammad and the believers is described in al-Tustarī's comments on Qur'ānic verse 7:172, a verse which describes the primordial covenant between God and man.

When your Lord took from the children of Ādam their seed (dhuriyya) and caused them to bear witness concerning themselves, "Am I not your Lord?" They said, "Yes, we bear witness." That was so that you would say on the Day of Resurrection, "We ignored this."

In his commentary on this verse, al-Tustarī describes three types of seeds representing future mankind. The first type of seed was Muḥammad who was created directly from God's light.

God Most High, when he wished to create Muhammad (the blessings and peace of God upon him), manifested some of his light. When it attained the veil of majesty, it bowed down in prayer before Allah. Allah

created from the position of prayer a great column like a glass of light, as both his interior and exterior. In it is the *'ayn* (very being, essence, source, eye) of Muhammad, God's blessings and peace upon him. He stood in service before the lord of the two worlds for one thousand years with the dispositions of faith, the beholding of faith, the unveiling of certitude, and the witness of the lord.⁵²

The second type of seed was Ādam who was created from the light of Muḥammad. The third type of seed was mankind, the children of Ādam, who were created either from the light of Muḥammad or the light of Ādam. Those who are guides, who are desired (*murādūn*) were created from the light of Muḥammad, while those who are seekers (*murīdūn*) were created from the light of Ādam.⁵³ Mankind is created directly or indirectly from Muḥammad's light and will return to the divine light from which he was created.⁵⁴

The lights of God interpreted as Muḥammad and the believers are also mentioned in the writings of al-Ḥallāj. In the first chapter of his *Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn*, al-Ḥallāj repeats many aspects of the theory of Muḥammad's light of al-Tustarī, who was his teacher for a brief period of time.⁵⁵ In the fragments recorded of al-Ḥallāj's Qur'ānic commentary, the focus is on light as representing the qualities of the believer.

He compared the heart to a candle whose water is certainty and whose oil is patience and the sincerity which develops from it, and whose wick is trust in God and whose light is contentment. If it is characterized by this quality, the flavor of life can be found in its light.⁵⁶

God made submission (*islām*) a light for His people, and faith a light for His people, and assent (*taṣdīq*) a light in the heart of the believer. Knowledge (*ilm*), intelligence (*'aql*) and insight (*baṣīra*) are lights. All of the moral traits (*akhlāq*) of the believers are lights. All of the acts of worship are lights and the nearness of the servants to God is in proportion with their lights.⁵⁷

God is both "the light of light" (*nūr al-nūr*)⁵⁸ and "the illuminator (*munawwir*) of your hearts until you come to know and find (*wajadtum*)."⁵⁹ At this point the believer becomes full of light.

In the head is the light of revelation (*wahy*) and in the two eyes is the light of intimate dialogue with God, and in the ears is the light of certainty, and in the tongue is the light of clarity, and in the breast is the light of faith, and in the humours of the body (*ṭabā'ir*) is the light of glorifying God. When something catches fire from these lights it overwhelms the other light and incorporates it into its authority. When it has subsided the authority of that light returns and you are increased by what happened. When everything catches fire, it becomes *light upon light*. God guides whom He wills to His light.⁶⁰

Another distinctive element of these early Šūfī interpretations of the Light Verse is the comparison made between the macrocosm of the universe and the microcosm of man, a type of analogical thinking which becomes even more pervasive in the later commentaries of al-Kāshānī and al-Nīsābūrī. Ibn ‘Aṭā, al-Ḥallāj’s contemporary, explains what it is that God illuminates in *the heavens and the earth*.

God adorned (*zayyana*) the heavens with the twelve signs of the zodiac, and they are the Ram, the Bull, the Twins, the Crab, the Lion, the Ears of Corn (Virgo), the Scales, the Scorpion, the Archer, the Sea Goat, the Water Bearer, and the Fish. He adorned the hearts of the believers with twelve characteristics: the mind, attention, explanation, intelligence, knowledge, certainty, understanding, insight, the life of the heart, hope, fear and life. As long as these signs of the zodiac exist the world will be in order and abundance. Similarly, as long as these characteristics exist in the heart of the Gnostic (*‘ārīf*), there will be the light of the gnostic and the sweetness of worship.⁶¹

Al-Wasītī shows how the microcosm, man, is illuminated directly by God.

God created the spirits (*arwāḥ*) before the bodies (*ajsād*). He illuminated them by His attributes (*ṣifāt*) and addressed them by means of His essence (*dhāt*), so they are illuminated and receive light by means of the light of His sanctity (*qudus*). He told of it in His words *God is the light of the heavens and the earth* because He is the illuminator (*munawwir*) of the spirits (*arwāḥ*) by the perfection of His light.⁶²

The interrelationship between the corporeal (*jismānī*) and the spiritual (*rūḥānī*) forms the basis of the cosmology and hermeneutical theory that al-Ghazālī develops in his *Mishkāt al-anwār*. As discussed in Part I of this work, the theory states that what exists in one world serves as a similitude for what exists in the other and that the similitudes of the Qur’ān can be understood by understanding the relationship between these two worlds. Al-Ghazālī gives many examples of this, one of the most significant being that of man. Man was created “in the form of the Merciful,” an allusion to a *ḥadīth* which al-Ghazālī understands as referring to man as a microcosm of the universe.

God showed beneficence to Adam. He gave him an abridged form (*ṣūrat mukhtaṣar*) that brings together every sort of things found in the cosmos. It is as if Adam is everything in the cosmos, or an abridged transcription (*muskha mukhtaṣar*) of the world.⁶³

The *Mishkāt al-anwār* is divided into three parts. The first part is the discussion of the mystery of understanding *God is the light of the heavens and the earth*. The second part describes the two elements necessary for this understanding.

One of them is the hermeneutical theory of using similitudes which we have already discussed. The other is the structure of man himself and the relationship between the corporeal and spiritual worlds within him. This is described, according to al-Ghazālī, in the similitude of the elements of the niche, which represent the layers (*ṭabaqāt*) of the spirits (*arwāḥ*) of the human clay (*al-ṭīn al-bashariyya*) and the degrees (*marātib*) of their lights.⁶⁴ Unlike most Šūfī commentators, Al-Ghazālī is careful to link his interpretation to *salafī* interpretations, in this case those of Ibn Mas'ūd, whom he quotes as saying, “*the similitude of his/His light in the heart of the believers is like a niche*,” and Ubayy b. Ka'b, whom he quotes as saying, “*the similitude of a light in the heart of one who has faith*.”⁶⁵

According to al-Ghazālī, the first of the “luminous human spirits” (*al-arwāḥ al-bashariyya al-nūrāniyya*) is the sensory spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ḥassās*) which is found in animals and infants. It is like the niche because its lights come out of the different openings of the body such as the two eyes, ears, and nostrils, etc. The second is the imaginal spirit (*al-rūḥ al-khayālī*) which is capable of remembering and is found in older children, adults, and some animals. It is like glass, a dense substance which can be purified to channel light. The third is the rational spirit (*al-rūḥ al-'aqlī*) which comprehends meanings outside of the senses and imagination and is found only in human beings. It is like the lamp. The fourth is the reflective spirit (*al-rūḥ al-fikrī*) which combines part of the rational knowledge to derive a higher form of knowledge. It is like the tree because it begins from this root and then branches out. The fifth is the sanctified prophetic spirit (*al-rūḥ al-qudsī al-nabawī*) which belongs only to the prophets and some friends of God (*awliyā'*) and is beyond the intellect (*'aql*). It is the *oil which would well-nigh shine even if no fire touched it* because there are those among the friends of God who could almost do without the help of the prophets, and there are prophets who could almost do without the help of the angels.⁶⁶

The third part of the *Mishkāṭ al-anwār* applies al-Ghazālī's understanding of the Light Verse to classify different types of people, by means of an interpretation of the *ḥadīth* “God has seventy veils of light and darkness. If He were to unveil them, the glories of His face would burn up everyone whose eyes perceived Him.” The third part synthesizes the points made in the first two parts by demonstrating how the perceptions of the lower spirits of man lead to faulty conclusions regarding the nature of God. Al-Ghazālī defines three kinds of people who are veiled from the truth in various ways.

To summarize his categories briefly, the first type are atheists (*mulḥida*) veiled by darkness; they include materialists and egotists, the latter being further subdivided into hedonists, predators, materialistic people, and status seekers.

The second type are those people who are veiled by light and darkness. Their veils correspond to the levels of the spirit that al-Ghazālī has described as the elements of the *niche*. Some of them are veiled by sensory darkness, meaning that they can only understand God as an object perceived by the senses. The objects which they perceive as divinities range from precious substances such as gold or silver, to beautiful human beings, to fire, the stars or the sun, or unlimited light.

More advanced than those are individuals veiled by imaginal darkness, who can only understand God as an imagined being sitting on a throne, having a body, existing in a certain place, etc. Finally, there are those who are veiled by the darkness of faulty rational comparisons who can only understand God in relation to their own attributes.⁶⁷

The third type are those veiled by lights.⁶⁸ Among these are those who understand that God's attributes cannot be compared to those of humans. More advanced would be those who recognize God as the Mover (*muḥarrrik*) of the furthest celestial sphere which envelops the lower celestial spheres moved by angels. Most advanced are those who recognize that the "Mover" must still only be an angel obeying the Lord who "is a mover of everything by means of command ('*amr*'), not direct contact."⁶⁹ Those who have arrived (*wāṣilūn*) have found God to be beyond any of these descriptions. Like Ibrāhīm, they recognize that all their previous understandings of God are faulty.

Therefore, they have turned their faces from the one who moves the heavens, from the one who moves the furthest celestial body, from the one who commands moving them, to Him who originates the heavens, originates the furthest celestial body, and originates the one who commands moving the heavens. They have arrived at an existent thing that is incomparable with everything that their sight had perceived. Hence, the august glories of His face – the First, the Highest – burn up everything perceived by the sights and insights of the observers. Thus, they find Him too holy for and incomparable with all that we described earlier.⁷⁰

Some who reach this stage remain as perceivers and yet what they perceive completely disappears. Others, the elect of the elect (*khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ*), cease to observe themselves as well; in other words, the perceiver himself disappears, as in *Everything is being annihilated except His face* (28:88).⁷¹ This self-disclosure of God (*tajallī*) occurs in stages for some, as was the case with Ibrāhīm, and for others all at once, as was the case with Muḥammad.⁷²

Al-Ghazālī's interpretation of the *niche* was clearly influenced by Ibn Sīnā's interpretation in *Al-Ishārāt wa 'l-tanbīhāt*,⁷³ but while the similarities between the two interpretations are undeniable, al-Ghazālī makes significant modifications. While the five elements described in Ibn Sīnā's version are all parts of the intellect ('*aql*) which only man possesses, al-Ghazālī's version calls the faculties "spirit" (*rūḥ*) which opens up the metaphor to include all types of perception, even those shared with animals.⁷⁴ This change enables al-Ghazālī to classify faulty notions of God based on whether the possessor of those beliefs is bound by the limitations of animal or human perceptions.

Al-Kāshānī's interpretation of the Light Verse suggests a familiarity with the interpretations of both al-Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā. He explains the elements of the niche as the integrated physical and spiritual elements of man which combine to enable him to achieve perfection. The *niche* represents the dark body (*jasad*)

which is illuminated by the *lamp* of the spirit (*rūḥ*). The *glass* represents the heart which is both illuminated by the spirit and illuminates things other than itself.

The *glass* is likened to a *glittering star* because of its openness, its extreme luminosity, its high position, and the plenitude of its rays, as this is the state (*ḥāl*) of the heart (*qalb*).⁷⁵

The *glass* of the heart is *lit from a blessed olive tree* which is the sanctified soul (*al-naḥs al-quḍsiyya*) whose faculties grow up out of the earth of the body through the space of the heart to the heaven of the spirit. Its fruits are morals, works, and perceptions. Every kind of mystic knowledge and states are dependent upon it. It is *neither of the east nor the west* because “the soul is more subtle and luminous than the body and more dense than the spirit.” Its *oil* is preparedness (*isti'dād*) which *would well-nigh shine even if no fire*, the Active Intelligence (*al-'aql al-fa'āl*) touched it.⁷⁶

Al-Nisābūrī's commentary on the niche is interesting in that it gives two different levels of interpretation, one of which corresponds to the “world of horizons” and the other of which corresponds to the “world of souls.”⁷⁷ The first interpretation refers to the macrocosm, the Cosmos.

The *niche* is the world of bodies (*aḥsām*). The *glass* is the Throne, the *lamp* is the Footstool, and the tree is the Tree of the Kingdom (*malakūt*) which is the inward part (*bāṭin*) of the world of bodies. It rises neither to the east of eternity and timelessness nor to the west of annihilation (*fanā*) and nonexistence. Rather it is created for the everlastingness in which annihilation never occurs.

Whose oil, which is the world of spirits (*arwāḥ*), *would well-nigh shine*, i.e., become manifest from nonexistence into the world of engendered form (*'ālam al-ṣūrat al-mutawallida*) by means of the pairing (*iztidwāj*) of the world of the unseen with [the world] of witnessing *even if no fire*, the fire of the divine power, *touched it* and that is because of the nearness of its character to existence.

Light upon light. The first is the light of the merciful attribute and the second is the light of the Throne, as in His saying, *The Merciful sat upon the throne* (20:5). His words, *God guides whom He wills to his/His light* is an allusion (*ishāra*) to the fact that the emanation (*ḥayḍ*) of the light of mercifulness is divided amongst everything which God wills to bring into existence from the Throne to that which is under the earth.⁷⁸

The second interpretation refers to the microcosm, man. Like his predecessors, al-Nisābūrī understands the different elements of the niche as referring to the various faculties of man which must be developed in order to achieve perfection, a state in which man realizes the nature of the mysterious relationship between God and man. While a significant portion of the *Mishkāṭ al-anwār* is devoted to the

explanation of this concept, al-Nīsābūrī merely alludes to it through the famous *ḥadīth* of supererogatory acts, a *ḥadīth* understood by Ṣūfīs as referring to the states of annihilation (*fanāʾ*) and subsistence (*baqāʾ*).⁷⁹

The *niche* is the body, the *glass* is the heart, the *lamp* is the innermost heart (*sirr*), and the *tree* is the tree of spirituality (*al-rūḥāniyya*) which has been created for subsistence (*baqāʾ*) as has been described.⁸⁰ The *oil* is the human spirit (*al-rūḥ al-insāniyya*) which is profoundly receptive to the light of gnosis (*ʿirfān*) and the *fire* is the fire of God's self-disclosure (*tajallī*) and guidance in eternity. When it is combined with the light of the intellect (*ʿaql*) it becomes *light upon light*. When the *lamp* of the innermost heart (*sirr*) of *whom He wills* becomes illuminated by the light of timelessness, the *glass* of the heart and the *niche* of the body become illuminated. Their rays emerge from the aperture of the physical senses (*ḥawāss*) and the earth of humanity (*al-bashariyya*) is illuminated, just as He said, *the earth will shine with the light of its Lord* (39:69). This is the station (*maqām*) of the *ḥadīth*, "I am his hearing, his seeing..."⁸¹

Al-Nīsābūrī's interpretation seems to suggest that, having experienced annihilation (*fanāʾ*) and subsistence (*baqāʾ*), the perfected man is both illuminated by the light he receives through the fire of God's self-disclosure (*tajallī*) and in turn illuminates others by this light which emerges from the "aperture of the physical senses (*ḥawāss*)."

In the interpretations of Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī, al-Kāshānī and al-Nīsābūrī, each and every element of the Qur'ānic verse is explained by a single term. The similarities and differences in the resulting interpretations can be seen in Table 9.1. Another approach seen in Ṣūfī interpretations of the Light Verse has more in common with that of the interpretation of Ja'far al-Šādiq previously quoted. Here, the words open up to larger meanings rather than one-to-one correspondences and often refer to states in the believer. The believer is both created from light and engaged in an ongoing process of receiving light. To reach the higher states of *light upon light* the believer must be determined in his resolve to avoid man's natural tendency towards laziness, to allow himself to respond to the different states through which he travels, using the tension within and between them to motivate himself to continue in his exertions. This is how the phrase *neither of the east nor the west* was understood by Ja'far al-Šādiq:

Neither the fear which imposes despair nor the hope which brings about delight. One should stand between fear and hope.⁸²

Al-Qushayrī writes,

The allusion (*ishāra*) in it is to the fact that the fear in their hearts should not be separate from the hope so that one would come close to despair. Neither should their hope be separate from fear so that one would come close to complacency. Rather the two should be balanced so that one

Table 9.1 A comparison of interpretations of the elements of the niche in the Light Verse (Qurʾān 24:35)

	<i>Ibn Sīnā</i>	<i>Al-Ghazālī</i>	<i>Al-Kāshānī</i>	<i>Al-Nisābūrī</i>	
				<i>Macrocosm</i>	<i>Microcosm</i>
<i>niche</i>	material intellect (ʿaql ḥayālīyya)	sensory spirit (rūḥ ḥassās)	Body (jasad)	world of bodies (aḡsām)	Body (jasad)
<i>glass</i>	habitual intellect (ʿaql biʾl-malakā)	imaginal spirit (rūḥ khayālī)	heart (qalb)	the throne	heart (qalb)
<i>lamp</i>	actual intellect (ʿaql biʾl-fiʾl)	rational spirit (rūḥ ʿaqlī)	Spirit (rūḥ)	the footstool	innermost heart (sirr)
<i>tree</i>	Contemplation (fikra)	reflective spirit (rūḥ fikrī)	holy soul (naḡs qudsīyya)	the tree of the kingdom (malakūt)	the tree of spirituality (rūḥāniyya)
<i>oil</i>	Conjecture (ḥads)	holy spirit (rūḥ qudsī)	Preparedness (istʾidād)	world of spirits (arwāḥ)	human spirit (rūḥ insāniyya)
<i>fire</i>	Active Intellect (ʿaql faʿʿāl)	(not specified)	Active Intellect (ʿaql faʿʿāl)	divine power (qudra ilāhiyya)	God's self-disclosure (tajallī)

does not prevail over the other. Their awe (*hayba*) should come together with their intimacy (*uns*), their contracted state (*qabḍ*) with their expanded state (*bast*), their consciousness (*ṣaḥw*) with their effacement (*maḥw*), their subsistence (*baqā'*) with their annihilation (*fanā'*), their performance of the courtesies (*ādāb*) of the religious law with their realization of the all-comprehensive reality (*jawām'ī'l-haqīqa*).⁸³

The believer's states are part of a dynamic process which combines both the believer's efforts and God's grace. *Light upon light* appears to him in his different states until he reaches a stage where words can no longer describe what has been unveiled to him. Al-Qushayrī is usually thought of as a moderate Ṣūfī, but what he describes at the end of this passage appears to hint at something like the concept of the unity of God as interpreted in al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāt al-anwār*.

It is said that the effect of the light of the heart is the continuance of a state of agitation which does not allow one to remain lazy. One comes to his journey by the use of his reflection (*fikr*) and God nourishes him by the light of the success He grants until none of the obstacles to spiritual effort (*ijtihād*) can hold him back, neither love of leadership, nor the inclination to evil, nor indulgence. When the truth of one's forgetfulness is disclosed and vision takes hold of his situation, knowledge will be most certainly obtained. Then he will continue to increase in certainty (*yaqīn*) upon certainty based on what he sees in the interaction of contraction (*qabḍ*) and expansion (*bast*). The reward and compensation is in the increase of unveiling (*kashf*) upon the increase in effort and the obtainment of ecstasy (*wajḍ*) when performing the litany (*wird*).

Then after it there is the light of interaction (*mu'āmala*), then the light of the mutual waystation (*munāzala*), and the broad daylight of the connection (*muwāṣala*). The suns of the declaration of unity (*tawḥīd*) shine and there are no clouds in the sky of their secrets and no fog in its air. God said, *light upon light, God guides whom He wills to His light*.

It is said that the light of appeal (*muṭālaba*) appears in the heart and prompts its owner to settle his account. When he has seen his record and his prior disobedience, the light of examination (*mu'āyana*) comes to him and he reverts to blaming himself and drinks cups of remorse. Then he rises up from this by persistence in his goal and purification from what remained with him from the times of his lassitude. When he has become upright in that which was revealed by the light of observation (*murāqaba*), then he knows that God watches over him. After this is the light of beholding (*muhāḍara*) which are flashes (*lawā'ih*) that appear in the innermost hearts (*sarā'ir*). Then after that is the light of unveiling (*mukāshafa*) and that is by means of the self-disclosure (*tajallī*) of the attributes (*ṣifāt*). Then after it is the light of witnessing (*mushāhada*) and his night becomes day, his stars moons, and his moons full moons, and his full moons suns.

Then after this are the lights of the declaration of oneness (*tawhīd*) and at the same time disengagement (*tajrīd*) is realized by the qualities of single-mindedness (*tafrīd*). Then no expression (*ibāra*) can encompass it and no allusion (*ishāra*) can comprehend it. Explanations at that point become silent, evidence is effaced and the witnessing of another is absurd. This is the point *when the sun will be wrapped up, when the stars will become dull, when the mountains will be set moving, and when the pregnant camels will be neglected* (81:4) and *when the heavens will be split asunder* (84:1) and *split open* (82:1). All of these are different parts of the universe and that which was from nonexistence in them will end up in nonexistence. That which subsists through them is other than them and that which exists through them is other than them. Unity (*aḥadiyya*) is exalted, everlastingness is sublime, perpetuity (*daymūmiyya*) is sanctified, and the divinity is unblemished.⁸⁴

Al-Qushayrī breaks through the common understanding of the metaphor of light here by focusing on its qualities of energy and movement. Rather than accepting the simple equivalence of light as guidance, he gives us the unusual image of light as something agitating to the heart. What al-Qushayrī is talking about becomes less clear as he moves from the heart to the innermost secret (*sirr*, pl. *sarā'ir*) and he gives up on language entirely when it comes to the state of annihilation.

Al-Maybudī's commentary also recalls the interpretation of Ja'far al-Šādiq, in his comments on the lights of Muḥammad and the believer.

Know that the inner lights are different in their respective degrees. The first is the light of submission (*islām*) and with the submission is the light of sincerity. Another light is faith (*imān*) and with faith is the light of truthfulness. Another light is doing beautiful acts (*iḥsān*) and with doing beautiful acts is the light of certainty. The splendor of submission is in the light of sincerity and the splendor of faith is in the light of truthfulness and the splendor of doing beautiful acts is in the light of certainty. These are waystations (*manāzil*) on the path of the religious law and stations (*maqāmāt*) of the general believers. There is another light and state (*ḥāl*) as well for the people of truth (*ahl al-ḥaqīqat*) and the brave youths (*javān-mardān*) of the way, the light of perspicacity (*firāsāt*) and with perspicacity is the light of unveiling (*mukāshifat*). There is also the light of uprightness and the light of witnessing (*mushāhadat*). There is also the light of declaring God's unity (*tawhīd*) and with declaring God's unity there is the light of nearness (*qurbat*) in the presence of "withness" (*indiyyat*).

Until the servant has been in these stations, he will be captive to his own way. From here the allurement of God (*ḥaqq*) begins again, a divine attraction (*jadhba*) which unites and connects the lights, the light of grandeur, the light of majesty, the light of subtlety, the light of beauty,

the light of awe, the light of jealousy, the light of nearness, the light of divinity, and the light of he-ness (*huwiyyat*). These are those of which the Lord of the Worlds said, *light upon light*.

The situation reaches the point where servanthood (*‘ubūdiyyat*) becomes invisible in the light of lordship (*rubūdiyyat*). In all the world these lights have only reached perfection and nearness to the possessor of majesty in the Arab Muṣṭafā. Everyone has a part of these but he has the whole because he is entirely perfect, the totality of beauty and the *qibla* of virtues.⁸⁵

The similitude of his light. One group of commentators has said that the pronoun “his” refers to Muṣṭafā, since his character was light, his robe of honor light, his lineage light, his birth light, his witnessing light, his interactions light, and his miracle light. He himself was in his own essence *light upon light*. His superiority was such that in his face was the light of mercy, in his eyes the light of admonition, in his speech the light of wisdom, in the space between his shoulders the light of prophecy, in his palms the light of munificence, in his feet the light of service, in his hair the light of beauty, in his disposition the light of humility, in his breast the light of contentment, in his secret the light of purity, in his essence the light of obedience, in his obedience the light of declaring the unity of God (*tawḥīd*), in his declaring the unity of God the light of realization (*tahqīq*), in his realization the light of God’s good fortune (*tawfīq*), in his silence the light of exaltation, in his exaltation the light of declaring surrender (*taslīm*). A poem:

A sword of Indian steel drawn from amongst the swords of God.⁸⁶

Al-Maybudī combines this style of interpretation with the relating of *aḥādīth* and traditions from the Companions and the Followers of the Prophet which illustrate the light possessed by believers. More so than any of the other commentators studied here, al-Maybudī uses and develops the literary quality of this material. The first *ḥadīth* he cites is an appealing anecdote from the Prophet concerning the superior light of those believers who have suffered the most.

It is related that Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī⁸⁷ said: I was among a group of poor emigrants, some of whom were veiling others from their nakedness. We were listening to the recitation of the Qur’ān. The Prophet came up and stood over us. The reciter saw him and became silent. He greeted him, saying, “What are you doing?” We said, “O Messenger of God, the reciter is reciting to us and we are listening to his recitation.” The Messenger of God said, “Praise be to God who has made those in my community towards whom I have been commanded to make myself patient.” Then he sat down amidst us in order to occupy himself with us . . . The faces [of the poor emigrants] became illuminated . . . The Prophet said, “Rejoice you who have nothing! You will enter the garden in perfect light before the wealthy believers by half of a day whose reckoning will be five hundred years.”⁸⁸

The next *ḥadīth* which al-Maybudī cites is, “God created His creation in darkness, then cast some of His light upon them.”⁸⁹ Al-Maybudī expands the imagery of the *ḥadīth* and links the primordial event it describes to the possibility of states in the believer in this world.

The similitude of this light is such that Muṣṭafā has said, “God created the creation in darkness then sprinkled upon them some of His light.” Mankind was a handful of dust remaining in their own darkness, a darkness whose quality had become bewilderment, remaining unaware in the veil of creation. Everything in the pre-eternal heavens received the rain of the lights of eternity. The dust became narcissus, the stone became the jewel, the color of the heavens and the earth followed in each other's footsteps. It is said that the quality of “dustness” is everything which is darkness but a quality is everything which should be bright and pure. A subtle substance (*laṭīfa*) became joined to that quality, and the expression for that subtle substance is found in “He sprinkled upon them some of His light.” They asked, “O Messenger of God, what are the signs of this light?”⁹⁰ He said, When the light is made to enter the heart, the breast expands.” When the standard of the just sultan enters the city, no seat remains for the crowd. When the breast becomes open with the divine light, the aspiration (*himma*) becomes high, the sad becomes tranquil, and the enemy the friend. Dispersion becomes union (*jam'*) in the heart, the carpet of subsistence (*baqā'*) is spread out while the mat of annihilation (*fanā'*) is rolled up, and the cloister of the anxiety is bolted while the garden of union (*wiṣāl*) is opened.⁹¹

Al-Maybudī's last illustration is a long story which he says is taken from the traditions concerning an unnamed scholar among the Followers of the Prophet. The scholar had been captured while participating in one of the military campaigns against the Roman army and remained among the Romans for some time. One day he was present with some 30,000 Romans who had gathered in the desert to hear a bishop who came out of his monastery once every four years to give advice to the people. The bishop ascended the pulpit but stood there without speaking. Finally he told his audience that he was unable to speak to them because of the Muslim amongst them. The people did not know who this was and the Muslim was afraid to identify himself, but the bishop was able to find him by looking closely into the faces of the people. He asked him to come and speak with him.

[The narrator of this tale said]: He said to me, “You are a Muslim?”

I said, “Yes, I am a Muslim.”

He said, “Are you among those who are knowledgeable or ignorant?”

I said, “Regarding that which I know I am knowledgeable and that which I do not know I am a student. I am not one of the ignorant.”

He said, "I have three questions I would like to ask you and have you answer."

I said, "I will give you the answers on the condition that you tell me how you recognized me and on the condition that I may ask you three questions." The two made a pact and a promise.

[The narrator continued.] Then the bishop put his mouth to my ear and softly whispered in a voice hidden from the Romans, "I knew you by the light of your faith. I recognized the light of faith and unity in you which shone from your face." Then in a loud voice he questioned me. "Your messenger has said to you that Paradise is a tree of which every lofty chamber is a branch. What is the similitude of that in the world?"

I said, "The similitude of that tree in the world is the sun, with an orb every ray of which is a branch."

The bishop said, "You have spoken truly." He asked the second question: "Your messenger said that the people of Paradise consume food and drink but no defilement comes out of them. What is the similitude of that in the world?"

I said, "The embryo in the womb of its mother who eats but does not defecate."

The bishop said, "You have spoken truly." He asked the third question. "The messenger of God said that on the Day of Resurrection every morsel, atom and grain of alms will be like a great mountain on the Scales. What is the similitude of that in the world?"

I said, "When the sun rises at daybreak or sets in the evening it causes the ruins of a house which is in reality short to appear tall."

The bishop said, "You have spoken truly."

Then the Muslim asked him, "What is the number of the doors of the Gardens?"

He said, "Eight."

He said, "What are the numbers of the doors of Hell?"

He said, "Seven."

He said, "What is it that is written on the door of the Garden?"

The Muslim said that when he asked this of him, the bishop was unable to give an answer. The Romans called out to him to give an answer so that this stranger would not say that the bishop did not know. The bishop said, "If this answer is forced, it will not bode well for the belt (*zunnār*)⁹² and the cross." He tore open his belt and threw down his cross and said in a loud voice, "It is written on the door of the Garden that there is no God but God and Muḥammad is the messenger of God!"⁹³

When the Romans heard this they began to throw rocks and insults at the bishop. The bishop wept and called out to tell the people that 700 angels were coming to carry 700 martyrs to their deaths, and it did come to pass that 700 Romans joined the bishop that day in becoming Muslims and were killed by their fellow Romans. Al-Maybudī tells us that

the point of this tale is that the light of one believer who declared the unity of God shone amongst the handful of fighters and infidels so that the bishop saw and did what he did.⁹⁴

In this story the inner light of the believer is not merely a metaphor for faith, but a perceptible light which can be seen, at least by some.

What unites the very different styles of the Ṣūfī commentaries cited here is the way in which they avoid using the word “light” in this Qur’ānic verse as a simple metaphor for “guidance” or something similar. The issue, as Izutsu explains in an article on metaphorical thinking in Iranian Ṣūfism, has to do with the relationship between language and one’s understanding of reality. Aristotle defines metaphor in his *Poetics* as a linguistic sign functioning in a dual role by pointing simultaneously to a literal or conventional meaning and to another figurative meaning or non-conventional. Izutsu suggests that this is a problematic definition for Ṣūfīs because, for them, what would ordinarily be the figurative meaning is, in fact, the more literal or “real” meaning and correspondingly, the conventional meaning is the more figurative. He is not saying that Ṣūfīs never use metaphors in the Aristotelian sense of the term, but he distinguishes these from what he calls “archetypal metaphors” like light and darkness. Archetypal metaphors are not artificially or artistically created but rather are the result of mystic experience. When the mystic experiences spiritual light, he is not perceiving something similar to light, but rather sees a light far more powerful and “real” than physical light. The mystic does not choose a metaphor to describe his visionary experience; the metaphor or symbol does not point to something other than itself but rather is an indicator of its own self and the mystic has merely perceived this reality. Seen from the outside, the mystic’s description of this reality appears to be a metaphor, but this is only because the observer has not grasped the true nature of things.⁹⁵

The use of the word “light” in the manner described by Izutsu does seem to occur in many of the Ṣūfī interpretations cited here. However, the interpretations are best characterized as expressing more than one type of language use, by both an acceptance and elaboration of the meaning of “light” as “guidance” and a description of another, more literal, meaning similar to the Prophet’s statement, “I see a light.” The acceptance of interpretations based on this literal understanding of “light” will depend on the reader’s acceptance or rejection of subjective mystical experience.

CONCLUSION

Although the styles of the Şūfī commentaries studied here are quite different, there is a shared hermeneutical base of assumptions concerning the nature of the Qur’ānic text, the way in which knowledge of its meanings is acquired, and the nature of the self who seeks understanding. The first of these assumptions is that the Qur’ān is a multi-layered and ambiguous text open to endless interpretation, a concept most frequently illustrated by the metaphor of the ocean and its treasures. However, this insistence upon the infinite possibilities of the text is not considered license justifying the production of any and all interpretations. The fact that the ocean can be a dangerous place corresponds, in this metaphor, to the dangers that Şūfīs identify in attempting to understand God’s words. Al-Ghazālī, as we have seen, suggests that those who are not good swimmers should not even try. Al-Simnānī’s use of the *ḥadīth* prohibiting interpretation by mere personal opinion (*ra’y*) locates the possibility for error at each level of interpretation.

The problem that open-ended interpretation presents is seen as both spiritual and political by Şūfīs in that it comprises both a fundamental danger to one’s eternal soul and a more immediate danger in this world from other Muslims who consider Şūfī interpretations as a distortion of the true meanings of the Qur’ānic text. Al-Ghazālī’s defense of Şūfī interpretation in his *Fayṣal al-tafrīq* is an attempt to protect Şūfīs from the serious legal reprisals connected to the charge of disbelief (*taḳfīr*). The weaknesses of his arguments in this book result from the fact that he attempts to rebut his opponents on their own terms rather than questioning their basic assumptions. His strongest argument, found in the *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn*, is the simplest, namely that restricting the meaning of the Qur’ān to what has been transmitted from the Companions and Followers amounts to an unacceptable restriction of the Qur’ān’s potentiality. Although most obvious in al-Ghazālī, the political tension that Şūfī interpretations created is apparent in other writings studied here as well, in the use of the terms “common people” (*‘awāmm*) and “elite” (*khawāṣṣ*), a somewhat defensive dichotomy reflecting judgment on if not outright disdain for those who disagree with Şūfī concepts and methodology. The references to the Ibn Mas’ūd *ḥadīth* and the traditions from ‘Alī and Ja’far al-Şādiq serve to legitimize the Şūfī approach by showing its conformity with the views of the Companions and Followers.

The second shared assumption of Ṣūfī interpretation concerns knowledge which is obtained by means other than the study of the transmitted interpretive tradition and rational thought. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the weakness of Ṣūfī interpretation is its reliance on subjective knowledge¹ and consequent vulnerability to error. Ibn Taymiyya's insistence on the importance of referring all interpretations to the Qur'ān and the words of the Prophet and his Companions and Followers is not so much a rejection of all knowledge by interior experience – although he does reject the validity of ecstatic states – but a rejection of the privileging of that experience over other, more public forms of knowledge. In contrast, the Ṣūfīs studied here use the language and discourse of the more publicly debatable areas of philosophy, theology, and the transmitted tradition, but always with the underlying assumption that knowledge of the deeper meanings of the Qur'ān is an essentially private experience. Unlike the revelations sent to the prophets, the knowledge which comes to individuals directly from God (*‘ilm ladunī*) is not necessarily beneficial to disclose, a fact illustrated in the story of Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr: Al-Khaḍīr refuses to explain himself to Mūsā until they part. The communication between the two, which in Ṣūfī interpretations is understood as suggestive of the master–disciple relationship, is oral and private rather than written and public. In his comments on the Qur'ān 3:7, al-Qushayrī states that those who receive knowledge of the deeper meanings of the Qur'ān say what they have been commanded to say and, likewise, keep silent when commanded to do so.

The third assumption upon which Ṣūfī interpretation rests concerns the nature of the self seeking understanding of the meanings of the Qur'ān. Interpretation based on interior experience is ever changing because the self is in constant flux as it moves through different states and stations. In his interpretation of *light upon light*, al-Qushayrī describes the heart as agitated by light; knowledge is received by means of a series of interactions between the guidance sent to the self and the efforts it sends out. The subjectivity of the states and stations the self moves through make them unverifiable to anyone other than the individual experiencing them, paving the way to criticisms such as that of Ibn al-Jawzī who dismisses these states altogether as “a delirium without any basis.”² The problem of outside verification of the knowledge obtained by means of states is acknowledged by the Ṣūfīs as well; while acknowledging the reality of these states generally they also acknowledge the possibility of individual delusion and error. Qur'ānic interpretations based on experience are problematic because they may be misunderstood by those who have not experienced a similar state, as well as by the interpreter himself if he misunderstands the nature of his own experience.

In order to see things as they truly are, the attitude of the self and the efforts it makes are as important as the states it experiences. Mūsā's long and tiring journey searching for the wise man al-Khaḍīr and the frustration and confusion he experiences being with him is repeatedly referred to in Ṣūfī commentaries as a journey of discipline, of learning proper behavior (*ta'dīb*). As al-Ghazālī explains in his *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān*, it is arrogance to think that knowledge of the Qur'ān's deeper meanings can come without intense and persistent spiritual disciplines and

efforts. In addition to the toil of the journey, there is a further demand placed on Mūsā, himself a prophet, of unquestioning acceptance of al-Khaḍīr's bizarre and troubling actions, a requirement he is unable to fulfill. Maryam's story, on the other hand, represents the self who does possess the necessary attitude of complete and utter subservience towards God and His will, an attitude which in turn frees her from concern for anything else. The most important and difficult kind of knowledge to obtain, then, for the Ṣūfīs is a kind of knowledge that comes not from the strivings of the intellect but, rather, as the result of God's grace and a deeper kind of struggle within man. In his *Kitāb al-luma'* Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj characterizes this struggle in a corporeal way as the sacrifice of one's very lifeblood.

While the hermeneutics of these works is similar, the language and methods of discourse used are very different. Allegoresis is the most controversial type of Ṣūfī interpretation because it appears to abandon the obvious sense of Qur'ānic verses. The strictures against abandoning the obvious sense are behind al-Ghazālī's various attempts to justify and define acceptable interpretation, and to explain the theory of correspondences between the spiritual and the material world, and between the macrocosm of the universe and the microcosm of man. The method seems artificial when it consists of lists of these equivalences but substantive when the correspondences are more fully described and developed.

This kind of allegoresis, or finding correspondences (*taṭbīq*) as al-Kāshānī calls it, is different from symbolic Ṣūfī interpretations which arise from and remain with the tangible imagery and narratives of the Qur'ān. Here, the sensorial and emotional aspects of the text are emphasized and engaged with in kind: light illuminates, fire burns, and flood waters rage while people have doubts, desires, and longings. Symbolic interpretation uses both concrete and affective language, making use of metaphor, poetry, wordplay, narrative, and myth in a way that is unique among Qur'ānic commentaries. This is not to say that this kind of language use does not appear in other commentaries; al-Ṭabarī and others, for example, cite pre-Islamic and early Islamic poetry frequently in order to explain the meanings of obscure or ambiguous words, but the purpose is etymological while the affective and aesthetic elements of the poetry is ignored. Similarly, anecdotes, narratives, and homilies are very much part of the style of the early traditions transmitted from the Companions and Followers of the Prophet and continued to be cited in many commentaries. Al-Qurṭubī is a good example of a commentator who very much appreciates the appealing and entertaining qualities of this material, ignoring his otherwise rigorous standards of authentication to include it. But new stories, such as those told about Ṣūfī shaykhs, and new homilies, such as al-Maybudī's discussion of the journeys of Mūsā, are rare in this genre, perhaps considered more appropriately confined to the area of preaching. In Ṣūfī interpretation, poetry, metaphor, storytelling, and myth are accepted wholeheartedly, and if anything, take precedence over more explanatory language. The connection between other genres of Ṣūfī writing and the Qur'ān becomes clearer when one recognizes that these kinds of language acts represent an integral part of the Ṣūfī response to the Qur'ānic text.

CONCLUSION

As important as allegoresis and symbolic interpretation are in Ṣūfī commentaries, Ṣūfī interpretations characterized by close attention paid to words and phrases are equally prominent. Sometimes this takes the form of “rigorous fidelity to the text” as Chodkiewski defines it in the writings of Ibn ‘Arabī. In the texts studied here, the fact that al-Khaḍīr switches pronouns in speaking to Mūsā, from “*I wanted*” to “*We wanted*” to “*Your Lord wanted*” is considered highly significant and commented on accordingly. The approach can also be meditative and didactic, as in the attention paid to unusual words such as *‘ilm ladunī* and *muḥarrar*. Unlike the allegorical approach, which raises concerns about reading alien concepts into the Qur’ānic text, this approach remains very much within the text. Many of these interpretations, like the symbolic interpretations, constitute a literary form of commentary that has not always been recognized as such.

APPENDIX

Commentators on the Qur'ān

To contextualize the work of Ṣūfī commentators, several commentaries have been referred to throughout this study. The following provides brief biographical information and descriptions of the style and contents of these commentaries.

Al-Ṭabarī

Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī was born in Ṭabaristān in northern Iran but spent most of his life in Baghdād, where he died in 923.¹ According to one story, he first arrived in Baghdād hoping to study with Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal but found that he had recently died. Al-Ṭabarī himself attempted to establish a separate school of law based on his own principles, but apparently it was not distinct enough from Shāf'ism to survive his death. Instead, his fame rests upon two monumental works: his history of the world, *Mukhtaṣar ta'rīkh al-rusul wa'l-mulūk wa'l-khulafā'*, and his Qur'ānic commentary, *Jāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wīl āy Qur'ān*. The commentary marks the beginning of the classical period of Qur'ānic commentaries, and is important for the vast amount of information it contains from the earliest sources of Islam.

In the edition used for this study, the *Jāmi' al-bayān* comprises thirty parts printed in twelve volumes.² Al-Ṭabarī usually begins his exegesis by paraphrasing a verse with the use of synonyms, prefaced by the phrase, “He (God) says” (*yaqūla*) or “He (or it) means” (*ya'nī*). He then provides philological information on the verse, including variant readings, definitions and etymologies of problematic words, and solutions to grammatical difficulties. The comments are based on named or unnamed reciters of the Qur'ān (*al-qurrā'*), Arabists (*ahl al-'arabiyya*), grammarians (*naḥwiyyūn*), and evidence from Arab speech patterns (*taqūlu al-'arab*) and poems. After establishing the basic meaning of the text, al-Ṭabarī addresses intratextual and extratextual problems of meaning, noting differences of opinion. The sources that al-Ṭabarī uses to solve these problems of meaning are the Qur'ān itself, the *aḥādīth* of the Prophet, and the exegetical Traditions attributed to his Companions and Followers. Al-Ṭabarī's commentary is often referred to as the first and foremost example of “interpretation by the transmitted tradition” (*tafsīr bi'l-ma'thūr*) because of the enormous quantity of *aḥādīth* and

Traditions which he includes. When quoting *aḥādīth* he often gives numerous versions with different chains of transmission (*asānīd*). He also supplies the full chain of transmission for Traditions related from the Companions and Followers, chains which end with al-Ṭabarī himself.³ After quoting the *aḥādīth* and Traditions, al-Ṭabarī usually expresses his preferred interpretation, sometimes providing his reasoning, and sometimes not.

Al-Zamakhsharī

Abū'l-Qāsim Maḥmūd b. 'Umar al-Zamakhsharī was born in the province of Khwārazm south of the Aral Sea and died there in 1144 after years of studying and teaching which took him to such cities as Baghdad and Mecca.⁴ He was a particularly sought after teacher in the areas of Arabic grammar and philology. His best known work is his *tafsīr*, *Al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl*, a work which was greatly admired and quoted for its linguistic insights while censured for its Mu'tazilī views. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar al-Bayḍāwī (d. 1286 or 1293) produced a commentary entitled *Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-ta'wīl* which is mostly an abridged version of al-Zamakhsharī's work purged of its suspect theology. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī appears to have used *Al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl* as a basis for his own commentary,⁵ as did al-Nisābūrī.⁶

Al-Zamakhsharī's commentary comprises four volumes.⁷ He is far more selective than al-Ṭabarī in the *aḥādīth* and Traditions he chooses to include; those he does cite are often quoted anonymously and without any chain of transmission (*isnād*), introduced merely by "it has been said" (*qīla*) or "it has been related" (*ruwīya*). The result is little repetition and a far more condensed style, although he demonstrates an interest, like al-Ṭabarī, in expanding Qur'ānic narratives by providing details such as names of people and places, and story background. Johns has noted al-Zamakhsharī's fondness for this material, and the similarity between his accounts and those found in al-Tha'labī's *Qīṣaṣ al-anbiyā'*.⁸ More so than al-Ṭabarī, al-Zamakhsharī makes the occasional tentative step towards homiletics by suggesting lessons to be learned from certain Qur'ānic verses.

Al-Zamakhsharī's commentary is punctuated by the questions that he asks of the text using classic *kalām* speech: "For if you were to say..." (*fa-in qulta*), "I would say..." (*qultu*). The questions pertain to linguistic, narrative, or theological issues. His discussions of linguistic issues are more involved and subtle than al-Ṭabarī's, and are often used to support theological concerns, namely, the rejection of anthropomorphic interpretations and the affirmation of the miraculous nature (*ijāz*) of the Qur'ān.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. 'Umar b. al-Ḥusayn Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī was born in the Persian town of Rayy five years after the death of al-Zamakhsharī. The years after finishing his studies were difficult ones, as his outspokenness provoked the

antagonism of Mu'tazilīs and Karrāmiyya⁹ in the areas through which he traveled. He finally found patronage, wealth, and prestige in Heart where he spent most of his life before dying in 1210.¹⁰ Although still a thorn in the side of some, al-Rāzī was a popular preacher and sought after teacher. He seems to have possessed a genuine piety combined with both intellectual virtuosity and an abrasive personality. He is often labeled a philosopher–theologian because of his interest in both areas of Islamic thought.

Al-Rāzī's connection to Šūfism is unclear. We know that Ibn 'Arabi sent him a letter inviting him to consider the differences between mystical and rational knowledge.¹¹ According to several biographical sources, he is said to have met the Šūfī teacher Najm al-Dīn Kubrā and asked to become his disciple, but the outcome of this meeting is uncertain. Wherever al-Rāzī's ultimate loyalties lie, his interest in philosophy, theology, and Šūfism are all apparent in his *tafsīr*, which is known as either *Maḥāṭiḥ al-ghayb* or *Kitāb al-tafsīr al-kabīr*, and is considered his most important work. Ibn Taymiyya scoffed at the work, saying that it contained everything except *tafsīr*, whereas its admirers insisted that it contained everything else in addition to *tafsīr*. It is an encyclopedic work, similar in length to al-Ṭabarī's *tafsīr*.

Al-Rāzī usually begins his discussion of a verse by examining its place within the larger context of the *sūra* or the Qur'ān as a whole, finding evidence of the inimitability (*i'jāz*) of the Qur'ān in the ordering and sequencing of its verses. After addressing such contextual issues, al-Rāzī sometimes points out the lessons to be learned by a verse before proceeding to his summaries of the transmitted exegetical Traditions. Like al-Zamakhsharī, he does not always identify the *salafī* sources for this material, but he is more likely to present the full range of interpretations. Al-Rāzī is inclined to draw attention to the majority opinion particularly when he is about to disagree with it. He also demonstrates his independence from traditional exegetical discourse by including such authorities as Ibn Sīnā and Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī, although the traditional authorities he cites far outweigh the nontraditional.

Al-Rāzī uses al-Zamakhsharī's *Al-Kashshaf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl* as a basis for his philological and grammatical comments, although in an abridged form and not uncritically.¹² Al-Rāzī addresses the theological issues raised by the Qur'ānic text far more insistently and comprehensively than al-Zamakhsharī, and he searches for answers in a far more expanded intellectual universe, calling upon the ideas of Mu'tazilīs, philosophers, and Šūfis in addition to their more orthodox Sūnnī counterparts. Structurally, he conducts these discussions by dividing his commentary on individual verses into various "issues" (*masā'il*), "questions" (*as'ila*), "aspects" (*wujūh*), "topics" (*mabāḥith*), and "parts" (*aqsām*), an arrangement his biographer al-Šafadī says he was the first one to use.¹³

Al-Qurṭubī

Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr b. Faraj al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī was born on the other side of the classical Muslim world,

in Spain, although, like his predecessors, he traveled widely in his studies before settling in Egypt where he died in 1272.¹⁴ He was an expert not only in *tafsir*, but also *ḥadīth* and Mālikī law. The best known of his works is his Qur'ānic commentary entitled *Al-Jāmi' li-ahkām al-Qur'ān wa'l-mubayyin li-mā taḍammāna min al-sunna wa-āyāt al-furqān*. It is approximately the same size as the commentaries of al-Ṭabarī and al-Rāzī, comprising twenty slim volumes.¹⁵

Al-Qurṭubī's commentary is renowned for the large number of *aḥādīth* he includes therein, many of which are not found in al-Ṭabarī. Al-Ṭabarī limits his *aḥādīth* and Traditions to those which directly comment on Qur'ānic verses, whereas al-Qurṭubī includes others as well which are thematically related. While he is sometimes meticulous in addressing the authenticity of this material, he makes surprisingly frequent use of the more controversial *isrā'iliyāt* material found in the works of Abū Ishāq al-Tha'labī (d. 1036).¹⁶

Al-Qurṭubī also makes extensive use of the works of post-*salafī* exegetes, demonstrating the virtuosity of a keen mind well aware of the complex issues which divided these exegetes as well as the Muslim community at large, and he often displays a jurist's desire to define the boundaries of acceptable thought and practice. Like al-Rāzī, he frequently divides his commentary according to the issues (*masā'il*) raised by one or more verses, although he does not resort to anything like al-Rāzī's extensive subdivisions and his writing style is far more straightforward and clear. Al-Qurṭubī is markedly less interested in theological issues than al-Rāzī; of greater concern to him are the legal ramifications of the Qur'ānic text. His mastery of the many disciplines employed in *tafsir*, however, is undeniable, and Calder has suggested that it was al-Qurṭubī who most fully realized the possibilities of the genre.¹⁷

Ibn Taymiyya

Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taymiyya was a Ḥanbalī theologian and jurist who led an eventful life as an outspoken activist.¹⁸ Born in Ḥarrān, Syria in 1263, he was forced at the early age of five to flee with his family from the Mongols to Damascus where he lived most of his life. Coming from a family of renowned Ḥanbalī scholars, he took over his father's directorship of the *Sukkariyya* mosque and *madrasa* at the age of twenty and later taught at the oldest Ḥanbalī *madrasa* in Damascus, the *Ḥanbaliyya*.

Ibn Taymiyya's long career of controversial activism began at the age of thirty when he was briefly imprisoned for organizing a protest against the authorities' inaction with regards to a prominent Christian accused of insulting the Prophet. As was to be the case in the many incarcerations to follow, he spent his time in prison writing, producing his first great work. In the years that followed, Ibn Taymiyya's influence grew as he exhorted the people of Damascus to *jihād* against the Mongols and their Shī'ī supporters, and as he accompanied the fighting armies. Apparently unconcerned with his own safety or well-being, Ibn Taymiyya wrote treatise after treatise attacking any doctrine or practice, however popular,

which he felt degraded the original, pure message of Islam. The objects of his polemics included *kalām*, philosophy, popular saint worship, antinomian Ṣūfīs, the followers of Ibn 'Arabī, and Shī'īs. He died in a prison in Damascus in 1328.

Ibn Taymiyya's relationship to Ṣūfism is complicated. He appears to have been a member of the *Qādiriyya* order¹⁹ and wrote of his respect for several individual Ṣūfīs.²⁰ However, he was fiercely opposed to many aspects of Ṣūfī doctrine and practice based on his assessment of their heretical nature. The extent of Ibn Taymiyya's criticism is such that, using his creedal criteria, few of the major writings of Ṣūfism would be considered sound. Nonetheless, he seems to have desired to reform the tradition from within by carefully separating the sound from the false in both Ṣūfī doctrine and practice. He writes approvingly of the moral and ethical focus of Ṣūfī writings while rejecting what he perceives to be faulty conclusions regarding the nature of the relationship between man and God. These faulty conclusions, according to Ibn Taymiyya, are the result of turning away from the teachings of the Prophet and the pious first generations (*salaf*), substituting their wisdom with the inferior tools of *kalām* and philosophy, and concepts based on excessive emotional states.²¹

Ibn Taymiyya managed to write profusely on many different subjects, producing creeds, legal judgments, polemical and exegetical works. In the last category, he wrote the hermeneutical work *Muqaddima fī uṣūl al-tafsīr* and commentaries on a few Qur'ānic *sūras* and *āyāt*. These commentaries reflect the epistemological principle laid out in his *Muqaddima* that knowledge is either the result of authentic transmission (*naql muṣaddaq*) or verifiable deduction (*istidlāl muḥaqqaq*). Although Ibn Taymiyya is most often associated with the term "transmitted interpretation" (*tafsīr bi'l-ma'thūr*), it is the use of deduction (*istidlāl*) which is most striking in his exegesis. Al-Ṭabarī's commentary on *Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ* consists of about four pages of transmitted material from the first generations of Muslims (*salaf*). This material is expanded to almost 300 pages in Ibn Taymiyya's commentary with his original arguments and reformulations, all firmly based on *salafī* views.²² Ibn Taymiyya's exegetical works read more like treatises than line by line commentary.

The style is quite different than the famous commentary of Ibn Taymiyya's student, Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373), *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'azīm*. While Ibn Kathīr explicitly adopts the methodology of Ibn Taymiyya, even copying a portion of his *Muqaddima* into his introduction,²³ he is much more sparing in his use of deduction in his commentary, confining himself almost exclusively to the process of sifting through the transmitted material and selecting what he deems most authentic. When he ventures beyond this, it is usually to serve as a spokesperson for the more independent thought of his teacher.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Terms related to human faculties

‘aql Intellect, reason.

istī’dād The preparedness or aptitude of individual human souls.

laṭā’if (s. laṭīf) (1) Subtle interpretations of the Qur’ān or (2) subtle faculties in humans.

nafs Soul.

al-nafs al-ammāra The demanding soul.

al-nafs al-lawwāma The blaming or reproachful soul.

al-nafs al-muṭma’inna The soul at peace.

qalb Heart.

rūḥ Spirit.

sirr Secret or innermost heart.

Terms related to knowledge or ways of seeking knowledge

adab (pl. ādāb) Disciplined and refined ways of acting and speaking.

dhawq Tasting.

ḥāl (pl. aḥwāl) State.

ijtihād The process of seeking understanding of the Qur’ān based on an individual’s independent investigation and judgment.

ilhām Inspiration.

‘ilm al-aḥwāl Knowledge that comes from spiritual states.

‘ilm badīhī Intuitive knowledge of self-evident truths.

‘ilm qarūrī Necessary knowledge (as opposed to acquired knowledge); knowledge that comes without the need for reflection or examination of proofs; sensory knowledge.

‘ilm kasbī (or iktisābī) Knowledge that is acquired through study.

‘ilm ladunī Knowledge that comes to individuals directly from God.

kashf The process of obtaining knowledge by “unveiling.”

riyāḍa Spiritual discipline.

wahy A kind of revelation that is not restricted to prophets.

Terms related to the interpretation and interpreters of the Qur'ān

bāṭin The inner or esoteric meaning of Qur'ānic verses.

bāṭiniyya A derogatory name used to describe those who reject the exoteric sense of Qur'ānic verses.

ḍarb al-mithāl The creating of similitudes or parables; making analogies.

ḥadīth (pl. *aḥādīth*) The sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad.

ishāra Allusion; a silent signal or gesture.

laṭā'if (1) Subtle interpretations of the Qur'ān or (2) subtle faculties in humans.

majāz Figurative expression or metaphor.

muḥkamāt Clear and unambiguous verses in the Qur'ān.

mutashābihāt Ambiguous verses in the Qur'ān that can be interpreted in different ways.

muṭṭala' A high place from which one can view things clearly, meaning either (1) the vantage point from which one views the Resurrection or (2) one of four aspects of the Qur'ān described in a *ḥadīth*.

al-rāsikhūn fī'l-ilm Those firmly rooted in knowledge who are qualified to interpret the Qur'ān.

al-salaf al-sāliḥ The pious first generations after the Prophet Muḥammad whose comments on the meaning of the Qur'ān form the basis of the exegetical tradition.

tafsīr Commentary on the Qur'ān.

tafsīr bi'l-ma'thūr Commentary on the Qur'ān based on the *aḥādīth* and the interpretations of the pious first generations (*al-salaf al-sāliḥ*).

tafsīr bi'l-ra'y A term usually used to refer to blameworthy commentary on the Qur'ān based on mere opinion, but also sometimes used to refer positively to exegesis based on reasoning.

taṭbiq To make or find correspondences between two things.

ta'wīl A term originally synonymous with *tafsīr* but which came to mean (1) interpretation of anthropomorphic or other Qur'ānic verses that are ambiguous in meaning or (2) esoteric interpretation of the Qur'ān.

'ulamā' Religious scholars.

ẓāhir (1) The obvious or apparent sense of Qur'ānic verses or (2) the exoteric meaning of the Qur'ān.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

- 1 I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952, pp. 180–262.
- 2 Ibid., p. 180.
- 3 L. Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la Mystique Musulmane*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1968.
- 4 P. Nwyia, *Exégèse Coranique et Language Mystique*, Beirut: Dar El-Masreq, 1970.
- 5 The experiential methodology of the early Šūfis is noted as well in the study of Sahl al-Tustarī by G. Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam*, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1980 and P. Heath's analysis of Ibn 'Arabī in "Creative Hermeneutics: A Comparative Analysis of Three Islamic Approaches," *Arabica*, 36, 1989, pp. 173–210.
- 6 H. Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabī*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969.
- 7 T. Izutsu, *Creation and the Timeless Order of Things*, Ashland, OR: White Cloud Press, 1994.
- 8 W. Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-'Arabī and the Problem of Religious Diversity*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 25–6.
- 10 F. Rahman, "Dream, Imagination, and 'Ālam al-mithāl," in *The Dream and Human Societies*, eds G.E. Grunebaum and R. Caillois, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966, p. 415.
- 11 L. Lewisohn, *Beyond Faith and Infidelity*, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995, 19, 175–6.
- 12 H. Dabashi, "Historical Conditions of Persian Sufism during the Seljuk Period," in *Classical Persian Sufism: From its Origins to Rumi*, ed. Leonard Lewisohn, London: Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Publications, 1993, pp. 137–74.
- 13 M. Sells, "The Bewildered Tongue: The Semantics of Mystical Union in Islam," in *Mystical Union in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, eds M. Idel and B. McGinn, New York: Continuum, 1996, p. 88.
- 14 J.C. Bürgel, *The Feather of Simurgh: The "Licit Magic" of the Arts in Medieval Islam*, New York: New York University Press, 1988.
- 15 C. Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism*, Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1997, pp. 18–31.

1 THE QUR'ĀN AS THE OCEAN OF ALL KNOWLEDGE

- 1 Quoted in Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-luma' fī taṣawwuf*, London: Luzac, 1963, p. 73.
- 2 Quoted in Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, Beirut: Al-Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1989, vol. 5, p. 99; and Rūzbihān al-Baqlī's *'Arā'is al-bayān*, vol. 1, Lucknow, 1898, p. 3.

- 3 Said to be an elixer used to change silver into gold.
- 4 Al-Ghazālī, *Jawwār al-Qurʾān wa duraruh*, Beirut: Dār al-Afāq al-Jadīda, 1983, pp. 8–9. There is an English translation of this work by Abul Quasem, *The Jewels of the Qurʾān*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1983.
- 5 Al-Kāshānī, *Taʾwīlāt*, published as *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-karīm* and attributed incorrectly to Ibn ʿArabī, Beirut: Dār al-Yaqzāt al-ʿArabiyya, 1968, vol. 1, p. 3.
- 6 In verses such as Qurʾān 6:120, 6:151, 7:33, 31:20, 57:3.
- 7 For biographical information on al-Tabarī, see the Appendix.
- 8 Al-Tabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān*, Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1954–7, p. 12. There is an English translation of al-Tabarī’s introduction to his *tafsīr* in *The Commentary on the Qurʾān*, translated by J. Cooper, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. The *ḥadīth* of Ibn Masʿūd is also recorded in *Al-Musnad al-Ṣaḥīḥ ʿalāʾl-taqāsīm waʾl anwāʾ* of Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Ḥibbān (d. 965), Beirut: Muʾassasāt al-Risālā, 1984–91, vol. 1, p. 243.
- 9 Al-Tabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, vol. 1, pp. 11–42.
- 10 ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 644), the second caliph.
- 11 Al-Tabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 32. Lane understands the meaning of *muṭṭalaʾ* in this saying of ʿUmar as the “place whence one will look down on the day of resurrection,” *Arabic-English Lexicon*, vol. 2, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1984, p. 1870.
- 12 For an analysis of the different ways in which the word *taʾwīl* is used in the Qurʾān, see Tabatabaʾī’s “The Concept of Al-Taʾwīl in the Qurʾān,” *Message of Thaqaalayn* 2, 1995, 21–40.
- 13 Al-Tustarī, *Tafsīr al-Tustarī*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2002, p. 16. A similar interpretation, cited later, is attributed to ʿAlī (d. 661).
- 14 G. Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The Qurʾānic Hermeneutics of the Ṣūfī Sahl al-Tustarī*, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1980, p. 232.
- 15 Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, Cairo: Dār al-Rashād, 1991, p. 102.
- 16 Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyāʾ*, vol. 5, p. 129.
- 17 Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān*, vol. 1, pp. 2–3.
- 18 Al-Nisābūrī, *Gharāʾib al-Qurʾān wa ragḥāʾib al-furqān*, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1962–70, vol. 1, p. 26.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Al-Kāshānī, *Taʾwīlāt*, p. 4.
- 21 Al-Simnānī, *Tafsīr najm al-Qurʾān*, quoted in J. Elias, *The Throne Carrier of God*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995, pp. 107–8. The English translation here is that of Elias based on his reading of manuscript editions of al-Simnānī’s *Tafsīr* in Istanbul and Damascus.
- 22 Ibid., 108. Elias is paraphrasing al-Simnānī here.
- 23 The cosmological terms which al-Simnānī uses in his interpretation have a long history in Ṣūfism and can be traced to several sources (see L. Gardet’s “Ālam al-Djabarūt, Ālam al-malakūt, Ālam al-mithāl” and R. Arnaldez’s “Lāhūt and Nāsūt,” in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed, Leiden: Brill, 1960–2002). Elias suggests that al-Simnānī may have been the first to use these terms consistently in a hierarchical fashion (Elias, *The Throne Carrier of God*, pp. 154–7). The word “Kingdom” (*malakūt*) is Qurʾānic (6:75, 7:185, 23:88, and 36:83), and the word “Omnipotence” (*jabarūt*) occurs in the *aḥādīth*, but with meanings not clearly related to levels of existence. The terms “humanity” (*nāsūt*) and “divinity” (*lāhūt*) are not used in either the Qurʾān or the *aḥādīth*. The Ṣūfī al-Hallāj (d. 922) used these terms, perhaps adopting them from Arab Christians or Imāmī theologians (Arnaldez, vol. 5, p. 613). Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī used all four of these terms along with a fifth realm of Ipseity (*ḥāhūt*) (C. Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1989, pp. 128–32). The five realms were also discussed by the followers and systematizers of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought in what was called the Five Divine Presences (*al-ḥaḍarāt al-ilāhiyyat al-khams*) (W. Chittick, “The Five Divine Presences,” *The Muslim World*, 72, 1982, 107–28).

- 24 Both men are claimed in most of the lineages of Sūfī orders, and are considered to be the first and sixth imams by the Ismāʿīlī and Twelver Shīʿīs.
- 25 Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān*, vol. 1, p. 4. Al-Sulamī quotes a slightly different version in his *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001, vol. 1, p. 22–3).
- 26 Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, p. 94; Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyāʾ*, vol. 5, p. 87.
- 27 Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyāʾ*, vol. 5, pp. 93–4, 129; The version of this tradition in al-Sulamī and Rūzbihān is a little different: “It is related from Abū Juḥayfa (d. 693) that he asked ‘Alī whether he had any revelation (*waḥy*) from the Messenger of God other than the Qurʾān. ‘Alī said, ‘By the One who created the seed and the breath of life, no, except for that God gives a servant understanding of His Book’ ” (Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, p. 20 and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān*, vol. 1, p. 3).
- 28 Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, p. 101; Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyāʾ*, vol. 5, pp. 129–30.
- 29 Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyāʾ*, vol. 5, pp. 135.
- 30 Al-Sulamī, *Ziyādāt ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986, p. 2; Rūzbihān’s version substitutes verification (*taḥaqquq*) for *taḥqīq* (*ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān*, vol. 1, p. 14).
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, p. 22 and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān*, vol. 1, p. 4. In Al-Sulamī’s version, *ʿibāra* reads *ʿibāda*, which makes less sense.

2 THE QURʾĀNIC TEXT AND AMBIGUITY: VERSE 3:7

- 1 Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān*, Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī, al-Ḥalabī, 1954–7, vol. 3, pp. 172–5. For a discussion of various medieval definitions of the *mutashābihāt*, see L. Kinberg’s “*Muḥkamāt and Mutashābihāt* (Koran 3/7): Implication of a Koranic Pair of Terms in Medieval Exegesis,” *Arabica*, 35, 1988, 143–72.
- 2 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, vol. 3, pp. 174–5.
- 3 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 173–4.
- 4 Abūʾl-Qāsim al-Qushayrī, *Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt*, vol. 1, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, 1980, vol. 3, p. 232.
- 5 Rashid al-Dīn al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār wa ʿuddat al-abrār*, Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1982–3, vol. 3, p. 34.
- 6 Rūzbihān al-Baqlī, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān*, Lucknow, 1898, vol. 1, pp. 68–9.
- 7 See E.W. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, vol. 2, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1984, p. 2648.
- 8 Scholars of Rūzbihān’s writings have translated the term *iltibās* in different ways. In his *En Islam Iranien*, Corbin translates it as “amphibolie,” Paris: Gallimard, 1972. C. Ernst finds this “an excessively abstract overtranslation” which “fails to convey the sense of the root L-B-S as ‘clothing’.” He prefers the phrase “clothing with divinity,” “when the context makes it clear that *iltibās* means a theophany clothed in visible form” (*Ruzbihan Baqlī: Mysticism and the Rhetoric of Sainthood in Persian Sufism*, Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1995, p. 104, n. 56). In ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī’s glossary of Sūfī technical terms (*A Glossary of Sufi Technical Terms*, London: Octagon Press, 1991, p. 45), *al-labs*, the noun derived from the first form verb *labasa*, is defined as “the elemental form (*al-ṣurāt al-ʿunsuriyya*) that clothes (*talbisu*) spiritual realities (*al-ḥaqāʾiq al-rūḥāniyya*). He also cites the following Qurʾānic verse containing the verb *labasa*, a verse which replies to the unbelievers who ask why an angel is not sent down to them:

If We had made him [the Messenger] an angel, We would have made him [appear] as a man and We would have certainly confused (labasnā) them just as they are already in confusion (yalbisūna).

(6:9)

- 9 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta'wīlāt*, published as *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-karīm* and attributed incorrectly to Ibn 'Arabī, Beirut: Dār al-Yaqẓat al-'Arabiyya, 1968, vol. 1, p. 167.
- 10 See W. Chittick, *The Sufī Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989, pp. 89–94.
- 11 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān*, vol. 3, pp. 174–5; Abū Hāmid Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Mustasfā min 'ilm al-uṣūl*, Beirut: Mu'assasāt al-Risāla, 1997, p. 203; Al-Qurtubī, *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān wa'l-mubayyin li-mā taḍammāna min al-sunna wa-āyāt al-furqān*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Arabī, 1980, vol. 4, p. 18.
- 12 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān*, vol. 3, p. 175.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 183.
- 15 Ibid., pp. 178–80. This is one of three interpretations al-Ṭabarī lists for *those in whose hearts is a turning away*.
- 16 For biographical information on al-Zamakhsharī, see the Appendix.
- 17 Maḥmūd b. 'Umar Abū'l-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī, *Al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl*, Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1966, vol. 1, p. 412.
- 18 For biographical information on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, see the Appendix.
- 19 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, Beirut: Dār Ihya' al-Turāth al-'Arabī, 1980, vol. 7, pp. 183–4.
- 20 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 184–5. See also al-Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl*, vol. 1, p. 412.
- 21 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 7, pp. 181–2.
- 22 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 186.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 187–91.
- 24 Ibid., p. 191.
- 25 Abū Hāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, “The Canons of Ta'wil,” translated by N. Heer in *Windows on the House of Islam: Muslim Sources of Spirituality and Religious Life*, ed. John Renard, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998, p. 53.
- 26 Ibid., p. 54.
- 27 For biographical information on Ibn Taymiyya, see the Appendix.
- 28 See B. Abrahamov's “Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement of Reason with Tradition” (*Muslim World*, 82, 1992, 256–72), which discusses Ibn Taymiyya's response to al-Rāzī in his *Dar' ta'arūḍ al-'aql wa'l-naql*.
- 29 Abū Hāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Ijām al-'awāmm 'an 'ilm al-kalām*, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1985, p. 60.
- 30 Ibid., pp. 67–8.
- 31 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, vol. 1, p. 232.
- 32 Ibid., p. 233.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Rūzbihān, *'Arā'is al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 69.
- 35 Ibid., pp. 69–70.
- 36 As mentioned earlier, al-Rūzbihān uses the term “verifiers” (*muḥaqqiqūn*) to refer to theologians. Al-Kāshānī is following the usage of Ibn 'Arabī: “In general the Shaykh al-Akbar applies the term ‘Verifiers’ (*al-muḥaqqiqūn*) to the highest category of the friends of God. They follow no one's authority (*taqlīd*), since in themselves they have ‘verified’ (*taḥqīq*) and ‘realized’ (*taḥaqquq*) – through unveiling and finding – the truth (*ḥaqq*) and reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of all things, i.e. the Real Himself (*al-ḥaqq*).” (W. Chittick, *Sufī Path of Knowledge*, p. 389, n. 11.)
- 37 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta'wīlāt*, vol. 1, p. 167.
- 38 The word *rabbāniyyūn* appears in the Qur'ān in 3:79, 5:44, and 5:63. Sibawayh defines the *rabbānī* as one who devotes himself to the knowledge of the Lord exclusively (see Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, vol. 1, pp. 1006–7 and M. Asad, *The Message of the Qur'ān*, Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980, p. 79, n. 62). Al-Tustarī appears to be

- coining the words *nūrāniyyūn* and *dhātiyyūn* using the same Arabic word form. Cf. G. Böwering, who translates these three words as “those who perceive God as Lord,” “those who perceive God as Light,” and “those who perceive God as Essence” (*The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The Qur’ānic Hermeneutics of the Ṣūfī Sahl at-Tustarī*, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1980, p. 228). See also Böwering on al-Tustarī’s commentary on 3:79 in the same work, pp. 228–9.
- 39 Abū Muḥammad Sahl b. ‘Abd Allah Al-Tustarī, *Tafsīr al-Tustarī*, Beirut: Dār al-kutub al ‘Ilmiyya, 2002, p. 46. Qur’ānic verse 18:65 refers to the wise man Mūsā meets on a journey, identified in the *ḥadīth* as al-Khaḍir.
- 40 The phrase occurs in the Qur’ān sixteen times. See H. Kassis’ *Concordance of the Qur’ān*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983, pp. 732–3.
- 41 Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, vol. 2, p. 2643.
- 42 *Qishr* (pl. *qushūr*) is a word that is used for an outer covering such as the husk of wheat, the shell of nuts, or the rind of fruit.
- 43 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta’wīlāt*, vol. 1, p. 168.
- 44 The Day of the Covenant is a concept understood from Qur’ānic verse 7:172: *When your Lord took the seeds of their future progeny from the loins of the children of Ādam and made them testify regarding themselves, “Am I not your Lord?” (alastu bi-rabbikum) They said, “Yes. we testify.” Lest you say on the Day of Resurrection, “We were not aware of this.”* According to A. Schimmel, “The goal of the mystic is to return to the experience of the ‘Day of *Alastu*,’ when only God existed, before He led future creatures out of the abyss of not-being and endowed them with life, love, and understanding so that they might face Him again at the end of time,” (*Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975, p. 24).
- 45 Al-Nisābūrī, *Al-Gharāib al-Qur’ān wa ragḥā’ib al-furqān*, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1962–70, vol. 3, p. 138.

3 UNCOVERING MEANING: KNOWLEDGE AND SPIRITUAL PRACTICE

- 1 Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (d. 988), so far as we know, was the author of only one book, *Kitāb al-luma’ fi’l-taṣawwuf*, a highly influential work which served both as a defense of Ṣūfism and a manual for its followers. It was used by al-Qushayrī for his *Risāla* and al-Ghazālī for his *Ihyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn* (P. Lory, “Al-Sarrāj,” in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, eds C.E. Bosworth, E. vab Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, and G. Leconte, Leiden: E.J. Brill, new ed. 1960–2002).
- 2 Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-luma’ fi’l-taṣawwuf*, London: Luzac, 1963, pp. 13–4. The Arabic text of *Kitāb al-luma’* is edited by R.A. Nicholson and followed by his abridged English translation. The *Kitāb al-luma’* has also been translated into German by R. Gramlich as *Schlaglichter über das Sufitum*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990.
- 3 Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-luma’*, pp. 13–4.
- 4 *Ibid.*, pp. 14–5.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 6 Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Jawāhir al-Qur’ān wa duraruh*, Beirut: Dār al-Afāq al-Jadīda, 1983, pp. 32–3.
- 7 Al-Sulamī, *Tabaqāt al-ṣūfiyya*, ed. Sharība, Cairo, 1372, p. 119 (quoting a saying from Abū Hafṣ al-Haddād, d. 880 or 884), cited in G. Böwering, “The *Adab* Literature of Classical Sufism: Anṣarī’s Code of Conduct,” in *Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam*, ed. B. Daly Metcalf, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984, p. 67.
- 8 Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-luma’*, p. 73.
- 9 Abū Ṭālib al-Makki, *Qūt al-qulūb*, Cairo: Dār al-Rashād, 1991, p. 97; Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn*, Beirut: Al-Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1989,

- vol. 5, p. 122; Abd al Razzāq Al-Kāshānī *Ta'wīlāt (Ta'wīl al-Qur'ān)*, published as *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-karīm* and attributed incorrectly to Ibn 'Arabī, Beirut: Dār al-Yaqzāt al-'Arabīyya, 1968, p. 4.
- 10 Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, p. 95; Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'*, vol. 5, pp. 85–6.
- 11 Abū Naṣr al-Sarrā, *Kitāb al-luma'*, p. 80. This three stage approach to reading the Qur'ān also appears in Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī's *Qūt al-qulūb* in a somewhat different version, pp. 96–7; and in al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'* vol. 5, pp. 121–2.
- 12 Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, p. 100; Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'*, vol. 5, p. 123.
- 13 Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, p. 97; Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'*, vol. 5, pp. 122–3.
- 14 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta'wīlāt*, vol. 1, p. 4; Al-Kāshānī's version of the tradition from Ja'far al-Sādiq echoes the *ḥadīth* from Ibn Mas'ūd. It is said that Ja'far fell down in a faint during prayer and when asked about it he said, "I kept on repeating the verse until I heard it from the Speaker of it and I saw that which comes to me sometimes from the secrets of the realities of the depths (*buṭūn*), the lights of the splendors of the heights (*muṭṭala'āt*) beyond what is attached to externals (*ẓawāhir*) or limits (*ḥudūd*) with a clearly delineated limit (*ḥadd*)," pp. 4–5.
- 15 R. Gramlich's German translation of the *Qūt al-qulūb* entitled *Die Nahrung der Herzen* details each passage borrowed by al-Ghazālī in his *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992–5.
- 16 Abul Quasem has translated this portion of the *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* in *The Recitation and Interpretation of the Qur'ān*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1982.
- 17 Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'*, vol. 5, pp. 25–79.
- 18 Ibid., pp. 80–3; Cf. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, pp. 97–8.
- 19 Literally, "bring to his heart (*yuhḍiru fī qalbihi*)."
- 20 Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'*, vol. 5, pp. 84–5.
- 21 Ibid., pp. 85–7.
- 22 Ibid., pp. 87–92.
- 23 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-'Arabī, 1968–71, vol. 1, p. 232.
- 24 Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'*, vol. 5, pp. 92–100.
- 25 'Abd Allāh b. al-'Abbās (d. c.687) is the Companion of the Prophet most often quoted in commentaries on the Qur'ān.
- 26 Mujāhid b. Jubayr al-Makkī (d. 722) was a student of Ibn 'Abbās and is one of the best-known commentators from the Meccan school of the Followers.
- 27 Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'*, vol. 5, pp. 100–7.
- 28 Ibid., pp. 107–10.
- 29 Ibid., pp. 110–21.
- 30 Ibid., pp. 121–4. Cf. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-qulūb*, pp. 96–7.
- 31 Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā'*, vol. 5, pp. 124–7. Just as al-Ghazālī reworked the material for this passage of his *Ihyā'* from Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī's *Qūt al-qulūb*, the material was rewritten once again and included in the Persian *Javāhir al-tafsīr* of Husayn Va'iz-i Kashifī (d. 1504–5). Never mentioning al-Ghazālī by name, Kashifī selected, changed, and added poetry to his translation and embellishment of al-Ghazālī's ten external courtesies and ten inner practices for reading and understanding the Qur'ān (K. Sands, "On the Popularity of Husayn Va'iz-i Kashifī's *Mavāhib-i 'aliyya*: A Persian Commentary on the Qur'an," *Iranian Studies*, 36, 2003, pp. 474–5)

4 METHODS OF INTERPRETATION

- 1 Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-luma' fī 'l-taṣawwuf*, ed. Reynold A. Nicholson, Gibb Memorial series, no. 22, London: Luzac, 1963, p. 90.
- 2 Ibid., pp. 90–1.
- 3 Ibid., p. 91.

- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Al-Ghazālī: The Niche of Lights, A parallel English Arabic Text Translated, Introduced, and Annotated* by David Buchman, Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1998, p. 25. The edition used here contains a complete English translation by D. Buchman that faces the Arabic text. The translations given here are my own unless otherwise specified. Another English trans. is that of W.H.T. Gairdner, *Al-Ghazzālī's Mishkat al-anwar*, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1991.
- 7 Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Ghazālī: The Niche of Lights*, p. 29.
- 8 Ibid., pp. 25–6.
- 9 Ibid., p. 27.
- 10 The reference is to Qur'ānic verses 6:76–9: *When the night covered (Ibrāhīm), he saw a star. He said, "This is my Lord," but when it set he said, "I do not love that which sets." When he saw the moon appear, he said, "This is my Lord," but when it set he said, "If my Lord does not guide me, I will surely be among the people who lose their way." When he saw the sun appear, he said, "This is my Lord. This is the greatest." But when it set, he said, "O my people, I am free of your polytheism. Surely, I have turned my face to the One who created the heavens and the earth, in pure faith. I will never be one of the polytheists."*
- 11 Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Ghazālī: The Niche of Lights*, pp. 27–8.
- 12 *Has the story of Mūsā reached you? When he saw a fire and said to his family, "Wait. I perceive a fire. Maybe I can bring you a firebrand from it or find some guidance at the fire." Then, when he came to it, a voice was heard, "O Mūsā, surely I am your Lord. So take off your shoes in the holy valley Ṭuwā (20: 9–12).*
- 13 Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Ghazālī: The Niche of Lights*, p. 30.
- 14 Ibid., pp. 29–32.
- 15 Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān wa duraruh*, Beirut: Dār al-Afāq al-Jadīda, 1983, p. 33.
- 16 M. Abul Quasem points this out in his translation of the *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān (The Jewels of the Qur'ān*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1982, p. 57, n. 112). The passage from al-Zamakhsharī's *Al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl* (Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1966–8) is found in vol. 3, pp. 445–6.
- 17 W. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989, pp. 199–202.
- 18 W. Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-'Arabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 67–73.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 73–76; Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge* pp. 231, 245.
- 20 W. Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds*, pp. 76–7.
- 21 W. Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 199.
- 22 Ibid., p. 244–50; M. Chodkiewicz, *An Ocean Without a Shore: Ibn Arabi, the Book and the Law*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993, p. 35.
- 23 The distinction made by Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj between the method of understanding (*fahm*) and the method of allusion (*ishāra*) seems to have been ignored by later Sūfis, for whom allusion (*ishāra*) described all Sūfi commentary. This is particularly apparent in al-Qushayrī's commentary entitled *Lata'if al-ishārāt*, where he uses the term continually, in spite of the fact that his commentary more closely corresponds to Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj's method of understanding (*fahm*).
- 24 W. Chittick, *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-'Arabi's Cosmology*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998, pp. 118–19.
- 25 Ibid., pp. 398–9, n. 35.
- 26 Chodkiewicz, *An Ocean Without a Shore*, pp. 19–57; Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, pp. 242–4.

- 27 Chodkiewicz, *An Ocean Without a Shore*, p. 37.
- 28 Ibid., pp. 19–20.
- 29 For a discussion of the different definitions of these terms as they were understood towards the end of the classical period, see Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *Al-Itqān fī ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān*, Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1980, pp. 173–4.
- 30 Nizām al-Dīn Al-Nīsābūrī, *Gharā’ib al-Qur’ān wa raghā’ib al-furqān*, ed. Ibrāhīm ‘Aṭwah ‘Iwāḍ, vol. 1 Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1962–70, p. 52. This section introduces his commentary on Surat al-Fātiḥa.
- 31 Prior to P. Lory’s more extensive analysis of al-Kāshānī’s commentary, Goldziher had suggested that *ta’wīl* was al-Kāshānī’s word for the interpretation of passages whose literal meaning was obscure, and that *taṭbīq* was his word for the symbolic interpretation of passages whose unambiguous literal meaning remains intact. Lory, on the basis of his more complete reading of al-Kāshānī, states that al-Kāshānī used *ta’wīl* as the broader term for all forms of esoteric interpretation, and *taṭbīq* for the specific type of esoteric interpretation which uncovers the correspondences between Qur’anic symbols and man’s spiritual psychology and development (I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952, p. 243; P. Lory, *Les Commentaires ésotériques du Coran d’après ‘Abd ar-Razzāq al-Qāshānī*, Paris: Les Deux Océans, 1980, pp. 29–33).
- 32 By using the verb “to behold” (*iṭṭala’a*), al-Kāshānī is making a reference to the Ibn Mas’ūd *ḥadīth* regarding levels of meaning in the Qur’ān. The noun “lookout point” (*muṭṭalī*) used in this *ḥadīth* comes from the same root as the verb *iṭṭala’a*.
- 33 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta’wīlāt*, published as *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-karīm* and attributed incorrectly to Ibn ‘Arabī, Beirut: Dār al-Yaqẓat al-‘Arabiyya, 1968, vol. 1: 5.
- 34 Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-luma’*, pp. 107–8.
- 35 Abū Muḥammad b. abī Naṣr Rūzbihān al-Baqlī, *Arā’is al-bayān fī ḥaqā’iq al-Qur’ān*, Lucknow, 1989, vol. 1, p. 3.
- 36 This *ḥadīth*, which is not mentioned in any of the canonical books of *ḥadīth*, appears to be a variation on the seven *ḥarḥs* of the Qur’ān mentioned in the *ḥadīth* attributed to Ibn Mas’ūd and recorded by al-Ṭabarī.
- 37 ‘Alā al-Dawla Al-Simnānī, “Muqaddima tafsīr al-Qur’ān li-‘Alā’ al-dawla al-Simnānī,” ed. Paul Nwyia *Al-Abḥāth*, 26, 1973–77, pp. 146–57. Part of the *Muqaddima* has been analyzed by H. Corbin in *The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism*, trans. Nancy Pearson, Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1978, pp. 121–31. J. Elias analyzes the concept of the seven subtle substances in *The Throne Carrier of God: The Life and Thought of ‘Ala ad-dawla as-Simnani*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995, pp. 79–99.
- 38 Al-Simnānī, “Muqaddima tafsīr al-Qur’ān, p. 146.
- 39 Ibid., p. 147.
- 40 Ibid., p. 149–50.
- 41 Ibid., p. 152–4.

5 ATTACKING AND DEFENDING ŠUFĪ QUR’ĀNIC INTERPRETATION

- 1 Quoted in al-Ṭabarī’s Qur’ānic commentary *Jāmi’ al-bayān ‘an ta’wīl āy al-Qur’ān*, Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1954–7, vol. 1, p. 34.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 33–4, 41.
- 4 Ibid., p. 35.
- 5 Ibid., p. 41.

- 6 Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, Beirut: Al-Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1989, vol. 5, p. 136. This section is translated in its entirety in M. Abul Quasem's *The Recitation and Interpretation of the Qur'an: Al-Ghazālī's Theory*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1982.
- 7 Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā'*, vol. 5, p. 140.
- 8 Ibid., pp. 137–41.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 141–4.
- 10 Ibid., pp. 144–5.
- 11 For biographical information on al-Qurṭubī, see the Appendix.
- 12 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad 'Abd Allāh al-Anṣārī Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān wa'l-mubayyin li-mā taḍammāna min al-sunna wa-āyāt al-furqān*, vol. 1, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, 1968–71, pp. 33–4. In his article "Al-Qurṭubī" in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed., R. Arnaldez compares the passage on the manner of reading the Book of God in the introduction to al-Qurṭubī's *tafsīr* to a passage in al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, which is similar in style but not in content. Al-Qurṭubī's borrowing from al-Ghazālī here suggests he was working directly from the *Iḥyā'*, adapting parts of al-Ghazālī's writing to reflect his somewhat different point of view. The passage from al-Ghazālī is also copied without attribution in the introduction to al-Nisābūrī's *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān wa raghā'ib al-furqān*, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1962–70, vol. 1, p. 57.
- 13 Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā'*, vol. 5, p. 129.
- 14 For Ibn al-Jawzī's connection to Sūfism see G. Makdisi's "The Hanbali School and Sufism," *Humaniora Islamica*, 2, 1974, 61–71.
- 15 Abū'l-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mukhtaṣar kitāb talbīs Iblīs*, Beirut: Mu'assasāt al-Risāla, 1992, pp. 148, 268–79; There is a partial English translation of this work by D.S. Margoliouth entitled "The Devil's Delusion" in *Islamic Culture* in 10, 1936, pp. 229–68 and 11, 1937, pp. 393–403.
- 16 Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mukhtaṣar kitāb talbīs Iblīs*, p. 271.
- 17 Ibid., p. 274.
- 18 Ibid., p. 273.
- 19 Aḥmad Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-radd 'alā al-manṭiqiyyīn*, Bombay: Al-Maṭba'at al-Qayyima, 1949, pp. 509–10.
- 20 Ibid., pp. 510–11.
- 21 Ibid., p. 511. Ibn Taymiyya does not mention who said this.
- 22 The English translation here is that of T. Michel from his "Ibn Taymiyya's *Sharḥ* on the *Futūḥ al-ghayb* of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī," *Hamdard Islamicus*, 4, 1981, p. 8.
- 23 Abū Ishāq Aḥmad al-Tha'labī (d. 1045) wrote a book entitled *Qatā' l-Qur'ān* with the stories of men and jinn who died upon hearing a recitation of the Qur'ān. B. Wesimüller has prepared a critical edition and German translation of this text, *Die vom Koran Getöten: At-Ta'labīs Qatā' l-Qur'ān nach der Istanbuler und den Leidener Handschriften* with commentary (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2002). See also Kermani's comments on the text, in which he emphasizes that the deaths are described as occurring not from bliss, but from an intense fear of God and His judgment (*Gott ist schön: Das ästhetische Erleben des Koran*, Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1999).
- 24 Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mukhtaṣar kitāb talbīs Iblīs*, pp. 206–16.
- 25 This is T.E. Homer's translation from "Ibn Taymiyya's *Al-Ṣūfiyyah wa-al-fuqarā'*," *Arabica*, 32, 1985, 225–8.
- 26 The concept of ecstasy (*wajd*) is related to the concept of *fanā'* (annihilation), which Ibn Taymiyya discusses in detail in a number of his works. According to J. Pavlin, who has made a study of these works, Ibn Taymiyya does not reject the concept entirely but attempts to redefine it according to the pietism of the Hanbalī *madhab*. He describes three types of *fanā'*, a classification that separates those states and beliefs that he

- judges to be praiseworthy from those that he considers to be deficient and blameworthy. ("The *Salafi*-ization of the *Fanā*': Ibn Taymiyya and the Annihilation of the Self," Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, Nov. 19–22, 1999.)
- 27 Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mukhtaṣar kitāb talbīs Iblīs*, p. 150.
 - 28 Ibid., pp. 149–51.
 - 29 Ibid.
 - 30 Ibn Taymiyya, *Muqaddam fī uṣūl al-tafsīr*, Cairo: Maktaba al-Turāth al-Islāmiyya, 1988. For an English translation of this work, see *Muqaddam fī uṣūl al-tafsīr: An Introduction to the Principles of Tafseer*, trans. M. Ansari, Birmingham, UK: Al-Hidaayah Publishing, 1993. An excerpt of the work is also translated by J. McAuliffe in "Ibn Taymiyya: Treatise on the Principles of Tafsīr," *Windows on the House of Islam: Muslim Sources on Spirituality and Religious Life*, Berkeley, CA University of California Press, 1998, 35–43.
 - 31 On al-Ghazālī's rejections of the Companions' opinions as *ḥujja*, see his *Al-Mustasfā min 'ilm al-uṣūl*, vol. 1, Beirut: Mu'assasāt al-Risāla, 1997, pp. 400–9.
 - 32 Ibn Taymiyya, *Muqaddam fī uṣūl al-tafsīr*, pp. 93–102.
 - 33 Ibid., pp. 46–7.
 - 34 Ibid., pp. 46–7, 96–8, 100–2.
 - 35 In "The Principles of Ibn Taymiyya's Qur'ānic Interpretation," D. Syafruddin suggests that it is not the hierarchy of sources that make Ibn Taymiyya's methodology unique, but rather the assumptions behind it (M.A. Thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1994), pp. 113–8.
 - 36 Ibn Taymiyya, *Muqaddam fī uṣūl al-tafsīr*, pp. 83–92. Although Ibn Taymiyya's criticism of al-Sulamī is somewhat mild here, G. Böwering states that Ibn Taymiyya issued highly critical judgments against his *tafsīr* in his *Fatāwā* ("The Qur'ān Commentary of al-Sulamī," *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams*, ed. W.B. Hallaq and D.P. Little, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991, p. 41–56), p. 52.
 - 37 Al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-tafrīqa bayna al-Islām wa'l-zandaqa*, Dār al-Nashr al-Maghribiyya, 1983. There is an English translation of this by R.J. McCarthy in *Freedom and Fulfillment*, Boston, MA: Twayne, 1980, pp. 45–174.
 - 38 Two people who would disagree here with al-Ghazālī, for entirely different reasons are Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 'Arabī. We have already mentioned that Ibn Taymiyya insists that the literal sense of the Qur'ānic text must never be abandoned because reason properly applied will never contradict the Qur'ān or authentic *aḥādīth* (B. Abrahamov, "Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement of Reason with Tradition," *Muslim World*, 82, 1992, 256–72). Ibn 'Arabī also insists that the literal sense must never be abandoned, but for a different reason: perfect knowledge combines both the faculties of the intellect and imagination, both of which are needed to understand God's revelation (W. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998, pp. 199–202).
 - 39 Al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-tafrīqa*, pp. 9–15.
 - 40 Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) was the founder of the Ḥanbalī School of Law. Al-Ghazālī states that there were three *aḥādīth* which Ibn Ḥanbal interpreted metaphorically, but cites only two of these interpretations. One example will suffice here. The Prophet said, "The believer's heart is between the two fingers of the Merciful." Ibn Ḥanbal interpreted these fingers as the touch of the angel and the devil, by means of which God upsets the hearts of men.
 - 41 Traditions based on multiple transmission (*bi-tawātur*). Al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-tafrīqa*, pp. 18–21.
 - 42 Ibid., pp. 23–5.
 - 43 Ibid., pp. 21–3.
 - 44 Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā'*, vol. 10, pp. 517–22.

- 45 *Al-Ghazālī, The Niche of Lights*, A Parallel English-Arabic text translated, introduced and annotated by David Buchman, Prov, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1998, pp. 27–8.
- 46 *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 32–4.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 23.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- 49 In his *Al-Ibāna ‘an uṣūl al-diyāna* (Beirut, 1994), al-Ash‘arī states that one must not abandon the literal sense of the Qur‘ān without proof (*hujja*), pp. 105–6. This work has been translated into English by W.C. Klein (*Al-Ash‘arī’s Al-Ibānah ‘an ḥaqā’iq al-tanzīl*, Egypt, 1966).
- 50 Mālik b. Anas (d. 796) is the imām of the school of Mālikīs.
- 51 Qur‘ān 20:5.
- 52 *Istawā* is the verb used in Qur‘ān 20:5, translated here as “sits firm.”
- 53 Muwaffaq al-Dīn ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Qudāma, *Ibn Qudāma’s Censure of Speculative Theology: An edition and translation of Ibn Qudāma’s Taḥrīm an-naẓar fī kutub ahl al-kalām*, trans. G. Makdisi, London: Luzac, 1962, p. 30.
- 54 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Taḥfīr al-kabīr*, Beirut: Dār Iḥyā, al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 1980, vol. 7, pp. 187–8.
- 55 For the chronology of al-Ghazālī’s works, see G.F. Hourani’s “The Chronology of al-Ghazālī’s Writings,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 79, 1959, 225–33.
- 56 Al-Ghazālī, *Iljām al-awāmm ‘an ‘ilm al-kalām*, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1985, pp. 60–68.
- 57 Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā*, vol. 5, pp. 142–3. Cf. al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi‘ li-aḥkām*, vol. 1, pp. 33–4 and al-Nīsābūrī, *Gharā’ib al-Qur‘ān*, vol. 1, pp. 56–7.
- 58 When al-Qurṭubī quotes this passage from al-Ghazālī in the introduction to his own *taḥfīr*, he adds a significant phrase, “it is prohibited because it is an analogy (*qiyās*) in language that is not permitted,” Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi‘ li-aḥkām*, vol. 1, p. 33.
- 59 According to Hourani, the *Mishkāt al-anwār* is generally considered to be a late work of al-Ghazālī’s, based on its developed mystical doctrine. However, based on references within the writings of al-Ghazālī to his other works, it is unclear whether it was written before or after *Fayṣal al-tafrīqā*. In any event, *Iḥyā ‘ulūm al-dīn* is considered the earliest book of the books discussed here.
- 60 Elsewhere, al-Ghazālī defines the *ḥashawīyya* as those “believing themselves bound to a blind and routine submission to the criterion of human authority and to the literal meaning of the revealed books” (*Iqtīṣād fī’l iṭtiqād*, quoted in A.S. Halkin, “The Hashawīyya,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 54, 1934, 12). According to Halkin, the term was a derogatory term originally directed towards traditionalists (*aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth*) and Ḥanbalīs themselves (Halkin, pp. 1–28).
- 61 Al-Ghazālī is saying that this tradition is either from the Prophet or from ‘Alī.
- 62 The root of this verb is the same as that for the noun “similitude” (*mithāl*). Literally, it could be translated as, “he made himself similar to.”
- 63 Al-Ghazālī, *Mishkāt al-anwār*, pp. 32–3. “Taking heed” (*ītibār*) and “crossing over” (*ubūr*) come from the same root as dream or vision interpretation (*ta’bīr*).
- 64 ‘Alā’ al-Dawla Al-Simnānī, “Muqaddima tafsīr al-Qur‘ān li-’Alā al-dawla al-Simnānī,” *Al-Abḥāth*, 1973–71, vol. 26, p. 151.
- 65 *Ibid.*, pp. 155–6. Some of the terms used here are difficult to understand without a broader overview of al-Simnānī’s thought. Al-Simnānī is describing the descent of evermore subtle understandings of the Qur‘ān, all of which may be denied at different spiritual levels. This descent can be understood in terms of his system of emanation, for which see J. Elias, *The Throne Carrier of God: The Life and Thought of ‘Ala ad-dawla as-Simnani*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995, pp. 72–77.
- 66 Al-Simnānī, “Muqaddima tafsīr al-Qur‘ān,” p. 156.

6 ŠUFĪ COMMENTATORS ON THE QUR'ĀN

- 1 Norman Calder, "Tafsīr from Ṭabarī to ibn Kathīr: Problems in the description of the genre, illustrated with reference to the story of Abraham," in *Approaches to the Qur'ān*, ed. G.R. Hawting and A.A. Shareef, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 101–40.
- 2 Ibid., p. 101.
- 3 Calder includes orthography, lexis, syntax, rhetoric, and symbol/allegory in the category of instrumental structures; and prophetic history, theology, eschatology, law and Šūfism in the category of ideological structures (Ibid., pp. 105–6).
- 4 Ibid., pp. 134 and 134–5, nn. 2–3.
- 5 The Šūfī commentaries that address each *sūra* of the Qur'ān do not comment on each and every verse. Some are even more selective, such as the commentary of al-Ghazālī on the Verse of Light which addresses only one verse and one *ḥadīth*.
- 6 See I. Goldziher's chapter "Koranauslegung der islamischen Mystik" in his *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952, pp. 180–262; and A. Rippin in his articles on "Tafsīr" for *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed. and *The Encyclopedia of Religion*.
- 7 A. Habil, "Traditional esoteric commentaries on the Quran," in *Islamic Spirituality: Foundations*, ed. S.H. Nasr, New York: Crossroad, 1987, p. 25.
- 8 For the life and works of al-Tustarī, see G. Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence: The Qur'ānic Hermeneutics of the Šūfī Sahl at-Tustarī*, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1980, pp. 7–75.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 100–9. The edition used for this study was published under the title *Tafsīr al-Tustarī* in Beirut 2002. Although the editor, Muḥammad Bāsīl 'Uyūn al-Sūd, has added notes identifying *aḥādīth*, and authors and works cited, the text appears to be the same as the edition entitled *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-aẓīm* published in Cairo in 1911. Selected passages of this work have been translated into English by M. Sells in *Early Islamic Mysticism: Sufi, Qur'an, Mi'raj, Poetic and Theological Writings*, New York: Paulist Press, 1996, pp. 89–96.
- 10 G. Böwering, *Mystical Vision of Existence*, pp. 128–9.
- 11 Ibid., pp. 129–30, 262.
- 12 Ibid., p. 129.
- 13 Information on the life and works of al-Sulamī can be found in several of G. Böwering's works: "The Qur'ān Commentary of al-Sulamī," in *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams*, eds W. Hallaq and D. Little, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991, pp. 41–6; "The Major Sources on Sulamī's Minor Qur'ān Commentary," *Oriens*, 35, 1996, pp. 35–56; *Mystical Vision of Existence*, pp. 110–2, and the introduction by Böwering to Al-Sulamī's *Ziyādāt ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr (The Minor Qur'ān Commentary)*, Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986, pp. 15–21.
- 14 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr*, ed. S. 'Umrān, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2001.
- 15 L. Massignon copied the comments attributed to al-Hallāj in his *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la Mystique Musulmane*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1968, pp. 359–412 and P. Nwyia copied the comments attributed to Ja'far al-Šādiq in "Le Tafsīr mystique attribué à Ja'far al-Šādiq," *Melanges De L'Universite Saint Joseph*, 1968, vol. 43, pp. 179–230. A few passages from the latter have been translated into English by M. Sells, *Early Islamic Mysticism*, pp. 75–89. A significant amount of material from the *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* is quoted in Rūzbihān al-Baqlī's commentary '*Arā'is al-bayān fī ḥaqā'iq al-Qur'ān*', Lucknow, 1898.
- 16 Al-Sulamī, *Ziyādāt ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr (The Minor Qur'ān Commentary)*.
- 17 Böwering, "The Major Sources of Sulamī's Minor Qur'ān Commentary," p. 39. The inclusion of material attributed to Ja'far al-Šādiq has intrigued scholars since Massignon first noted it in his *Essai* (pp. 201–6) because it raises the question of

- the relationship between Sūfism and Shī'ism in the early stages of Islam. How much Ja'far al-Šādiq's approach to interpretation influenced both Šūfis and Shī'is is difficult to determine. Šūfī exegesis came to be characterized by symbolic and literary interpretation based on mystical experiences, but the hallmark of Shī'ī exegesis was allegorical interpretation which found hidden Qur'ānic references to 'Alī, Fāṭima, and their descendants. Only one of the manuscripts of Sulamī's *Ḥaqā'iq* contains anything like the latter, and this in only one passage which identifies five beings which received five of God's names: Muḥammad, 'Alī, Fāṭima, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn (Sells, *Early Islamic Mysticism*, 77–8). On the basis of an analysis of the *isnads* given for Ja'far al-Šādiq's sayings in al-Sulamī's works and the absence of this material in any previous Šūfī works, Böwering concludes that al-Sulamī was the first Šūfī to incorporate the body of teachings attributed to Ja'far al-Šādiq into Sūfism. Ibn Taymiyya accused al-Sulamī of lying about what Ja'far al-Šādiq said. (M. al-Dhahabī, *Al-tafsīr wa'l-mufasssīrūn*, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-ḥadītha, 1967, p. 386.) Other Shī'ī sources were used earlier than al-Sulamī, such as the first four imams and other Shī'ī authorities quoted by al-Tustarī in his *tafsīr*. (Böwering, *Mystical Vision*, p. 67.) On the existence of mystical esotericism in early Shī'ism, see M. Amir-Moezzi, *The Divine Guide in Early Shī'ism: The Sources of Esotericism in Islam*, trans. D. Streight, Albany, NY: SUNY, 1994.
- 18 Böwering, "The Qur'ān Commentary of al-Sulamī," p. 52.
 - 19 Böwering, "The Major Sources of Sulamī's Minor Qur'ān Commentary," p. 40.
 - 20 Böwering, "The Qur'ān Commentary of al-Sulamī," p. 56, and *Mystical Vision*, p. 110.
 - 21 Ibid., p. 51. Cf. *Mystical Vision*, pp. 136–7.
 - 22 Nwyia, *Exégèse Coranique, et Language Mystique: Nouvel essai sur le lexique technique des mystiques musulmans*, Beirut: Dar El-Masreq, 1970, p. 178.
 - 23 Quoted by I. Basyūnī in his introduction to al-Qushayrī's *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, p. 16.
 - 24 Abū'l-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mukhtaṣar kitāb talbīs ilbīs*, Beirut: Mu'assasāt al-Risāla, 1992, pp. 149–51, 280–2.
 - 25 See Basyūnī's introduction to al-Qushayrī's *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, p. 16, and Böwering, "The Qur'ān Commentary of al-Sulamī," p. 52.
 - 26 Information on the life and works of al-Qushayrī can be found in R. Ahmad, "Abu al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī as a Theologian and Commentator," *Islamic Quarterly*, 12, 1968, 71–119; Basyūnī's introduction to al-Qushayrī's *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, pp. 19–27, and H. Halm's "Al-Qushayrī" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.
 - 27 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*.
 - 28 Ibid., Introduction by Basyūnī, p. 42.
 - 29 Ibid.
 - 30 Ibid., pp. 43–4 and Ahmad, "Abu al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī," pp. 60–5.
 - 31 Ibid., pp. 47–9.
 - 32 In his *Takrīj abyāt laṭā'if al-ishārāt l-imam al-Qushayrī wa dirāsāt al-minhaj al-Qushayrī fī l-istashād al-adab* (Cairo: Al-Sa'āda, 1986), A.A. Muṣṭafā states that al-Qushayrī borrows some 4,000 lines from Jāhiliyya and 'Abbāsīd poetry, adapting them to his own themes and purposes by spiritualizing their sensual references.
 - 33 Information on the life and works of al-Ghazālī can be found in M. Watt's "Al-Ghazālī" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam* and *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. For an excellent review of scholarly research on al-Ghazālī, see D. Buchman's introduction to *Al-Ghazālī: The Niche of Lights*, Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1998.
 - 34 N. Heer, "Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī's Esoteric Exegesis of the Koran," in *Classical Persian Sufism: From its Origins to Rumi*, ed. L. Lewisohn, London: Khaneqahi Nimatullahi Publications, 1993, p. 235.
 - 35 The edition used here is a parallel English-Arabic text with English translation by Buchman. An earlier English translation was published by W.H.T. Gairdner, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1991 (originally published in 1924).

- 36 Quoted in F. Kholeif's *A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His Controversies in Transoxiana*, Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1966, p. 13.
- 37 Rashid al-Dīn al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār wa-uddat al-abrār*, ed. 'A.A. Hikmat, Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1982–3.
- 38 M.M. Rokni, *Laṭāyif-i az Qur'ān-i karīm*, Mashhad: Mu'assasah-i chāp va intisharāt-i āstān-I quds-I rāvi, 1996, pp. 31–6.
- 39 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 1, p. 1. There are no independent extant copies of al-Anṣārī's commentary.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Bowering, *Mystical Vision*, p. 36.
- 42 Rokni, *Laṭāyif-i az Qur'ān-i karīm*, pp. 115–21. In addition to Rokni's work in Persian on Maybudī, Annabel Keeler will be publishing a monograph in English based on her PhD dissertation entitled "Persian Sufism and Exegesis: Maybudī's Commentary on the Qur'ān, the *Kashf al-asrār*" (University of Cambridge, 2001).
- 43 *Šābiqūn* is a Qur'ānic term used in verses 9:100, 23:61, 35:32.
- 44 A.J. Arberry, *Shiraz: Persian City of Saints and Poets*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960, p. 90. Information on the life and works of Rūzbihān can be found in C. Ernst, "Rūzbihān Baqlī" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed. and *Rūzbihān Baqlī: Mysticism and the Rhetoric of Sainthood in Persian Sufism*, Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1995, pp. 1–15; and L. Massignon, "La Vie et les oeuvres de Ruzbehan Baqli," in *Opera minora*, ed. Y. Moubarac, Beirut: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1963, vol. 2, pp. 451–65.
- 45 Translated into English by C. Ernst in *The Unveiling of Secrets: Diary of a Sufi Master*, Chapel Hill, NC: Parvardigar Press, 1997; and analyzed in Ernst's *Rūzbihān Baqlī*.
- 46 Discussed by H. Corbin in *En Islam iranien*, Paris: Gallimard, 1972, vol. 3, pp. 45–64.
- 47 Discussed by C. Ernst as *Words of Ecstasy in Sufism*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1985, pp. 14–21, 85–94.
- 48 Rūzbihān al-Baqlī, *Arā'is al-bayān fi haqā'iq al-Qur'ān*, Lucknow, 1898.
- 49 A. Godlas, "Psychology and Transformation in the Sufi Qur'ān Commentary of Rūzbihān al-Baqlī," *Sufi Illuminations*, 1, 1996, p. 55, n. 4.
- 50 Quoted in C. Ernst, "The Symbolism of Birds and Flight in the Writings of Ruzbihan Baqli," in *The Legacy of Mediaeval Persian Sufism*, ed. L. Lewisohn, London: Khaneqahi Nimatullahi, 1992, p. 356.
- 51 Ibid., pp. 355–6.
- 52 Quoted in Ernst, *Rūzbihān Baqlī*, p. xi.
- 53 A. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975, p. 298.
- 54 See P. Lory, *Les Commentaires ésotériques du Coran d'après 'Abd ar-Razzāq al-Qāshānī*, Paris: Les Deux Océans, 1980, pp. 20–2 and D.B. Macdonald, "'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī," *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.
- 55 On the term "school of Ibn 'Arabī" and the followers to which it refers, see W. Chittick, "The School of Ibn 'Arabī," *History of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman, London: Routledge, 1996, vol. 1, pp. 510–23.
- 56 The edition used for this study was published as *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-karīm* and attributed to Ibn 'Arabī, Beirut, 1968. The authenticity of the work is discussed in P. Lory, *Les Commentaires ésotériques*, pp. 19–20 and J. Morris, "Ibn Arabi and His Interpreters. Part II (Conclusion): Influences and Interpretations," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 107, 1987, p. 101, n.73. Translations of portions of the commentary have been paraphrased and translated into English in M. Ayoub's *The Qur'ān and its Interpreters*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992 (but attributed to Ibn 'Arabī); and S. Murata's *The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook of Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992.
- 57 W. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998, pp. xvi–xx.

- 58 Morris, "Ibn 'Arabi and His Interpreters. Part II," 103–4.
- 59 Ibid., pp. 102–3.
- 60 Ibid., pp. 105. It is the philosophical underpinning of this kind of technique which R. Ahmad has in mind when he suggests that there are two types of Ṣūfī commentary, symbolic (*ishārī* or *ramzī*) and speculative (*naẓarī*), "Qur'ānic Exegesis and Classical Tafsīr," *The Islamic Quarterly*, 12, 1968, 104–5.
- 61 Lory, *Les Commentaires ésotériques*, pp. 28–33.
- 62 Ibid., pp. 3–5. These passages have been translated in Part I. A French translation of the entire introduction can be found in Lory, pp. 149–53.
- 63 Information on the life and works of al-Nīsābūrī can be found in al-Dhahabī, *Al-Tafsīr wa'l-mufasssīrūn*, Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-ḥadītha, 1967, vol. 1, pp. 321–2.
- 64 Al-Nīsābūrī, *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān wa ragḥā'ib al-furqān*, Cairo, 1962–70. Portions of this commentary have been paraphrased and translated into English in Ayoub, *The Qur'ān and Its Interpreters*.
- 65 Al-Nīsābūrī, *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān*, vol. 30, p. 223.
- 66 J. Elias, *The Throne Carrier of God: The Life and Thought of 'Ala' ad-dawla as-Simnani*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995, pp. 203–6. Elias gives additional information for many of the manuscripts of these *tafsīrs*.
- 67 Cf. al-Suyūtī's list of the fifteen types of knowledge required for the commentator, the last of which is "bestowed knowledge" (*ilm al-mawhibā*), which is the knowledge that God bequeaths to those who act on what they know," *Al-Itqān fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān*, Egypt, 1954–7, pp. 180–1.

7 QUR'ĀNIC VERSES 18:60–82: THE STORY OF MŪSĀ AND AL-KHAḌĪR

- 1 A.J. Wensinck, in his article "al-Khaḍīr" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed., identifies the common elements as follows. In the Gilgamesh epic, Gilgamesh travels looking for his ancestor who lives at the mouth of the rivers and has been given eternal life. In the Alexander romance, Alexander is accompanied by his cook Andreas in his search for the spring of life. At one point in their difficult journey, Andreas washes a salted fish in a spring that causes it to come alive and swim away. Andreas jumps in after it and attains immortality. In the Jewish legend, the prophet Elijah travels with Rabbi Joshua ben Levi, with the condition that he accepts his actions unconditionally. Elijah performs a series of seemingly outrageous acts that are ultimately explained to the perplexed Joshua (vol. 4; pp. 902b–3a).
- 2 A.J. Wensinck, "Ilyās," *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, p. 164b, following the earlier opinions of Y.L. Zunz, Abraham Geiger, and Israel Friedländer. For the references for these earlier opinions, see B.M. Wheeler, "The Jewish Origins of Qur'ān 18:65–82? Reexamining Arent Jan Wensinck, Theory," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 118, 1998, 155. This article has been rewritten into a chapter in Wheeler's *Moses in the Quran and Islamic Exegesis*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 10–36.
- 3 Wheeler, "The Jewish Origins of the Qur'ān 18:65–82?" pp. 153–71.
- 4 Abū Ja'far al-Tabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wīl āy Qur'ān*, vol. 15, Egypt: Muṣṭafa al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1954–7, p. 278.
- 5 Ibid., vol. 15, p. 277.
- 6 Ibid., p. 280.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid., p. 283.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 278–9.
- 10 Ibid., p. 279.
- 11 Ibid., p. 281.

- 12 Al-Tabarī, *The History of al-Ṭabarī (Taʾrīkh al-rusul waʾl-mulūk): The Children of Israel*, vol. 3, p. 5. L. Massignon in “Elie et son rôle transhistorique, Khadiriya, en Islam” (*Opera Minora*, ed. Y. Moubarac, Beirut: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1963, vol.1, pp. 142–61), notes the common pairing of Khadīr and Ilyās and the fact that they are sometimes even identified with one another in Muslim sources. He explores the role of al-Khadīr in the devotional life of Muslims and finds his alleged immortality and sainthood, and his reported apparitions and acts of intercession functioning as a symbol of messianic hope for the poor and oppressed similar to the role of Elijah in Judaism and Christianity.
- 13 Al-Qurtubī, *Al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān waʾl-mubayyin li-mā taḍammāna min al-sunna wa-āyāt al-furqān*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, 1980, vol. 11, pp. 41–5.
- 14 H. Corbin, inspired by al-Khadīr’s role as a spiritual master in the life of Ibn ʿArabī and other Ṣūfīs, uses concepts from both Ṣūfism and Jungian analytical psychology to analyze the spiritual experience that he believes represents the act of recognizing oneself as a disciple of al-Khadīr. He views al-Khadīr as both a person and an archetype who leads each of his disciples throughout the ages to their own theophanies (*Creative Imagination in the Ṣūfism of Ibn ʿArabī*, trans. R. Manheim, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 53–67).
- 15 C. Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism*, Boston, MA: Shambhala, 1997, p. 23.
- 16 The complete verse reads, *And your Lord revealed to the bees, “Take houses for yourselves from the mountains, trees, and from what they build.”*
- 17 The complete verse reads, *And We revealed to the mother of Mūsā, “Nurse him, but when you are afraid for him, cast him into the river. Do not be afraid nor grieve, for We will return him to you and We will make him one of the messengers.”*
- 18 Al-Sulamī, *Ziyādāt ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr (The Minor Commentary)*, Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986, p. 84. Quoted in Rūzbihān al-Baqlī’s *ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān* (Lucknow, 1898) without the chain of transmission (*isnād*), vol. 1, p. 592. This interpretation is not included in the edition of Al-Tustarī’s *tafsīr* used for this study.
- 19 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001, vol.1, p. 414 and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 591. The use of the word *kashf* to describe the unveiling of certain realities has its basis in the Qurʾānic verses *You were heedless of this but now We have removed (kashafnā) your veil (50:22) and That which is imminent becomes imminent. No one but God can unveil (kāshifa) it (53:57–58)*. In his *Risāla*, al-Qushayrī describes three stages of increasing nearness to the truth: presence of the heart before God’s signs (*muḥāḍara*), unveiling (*mukāshafa*), and direct witnessing (*mushāhada*). For this and other examples of the term *kashf* in Ṣūfism, see L. Gardet’s article “*Kashf*” in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.
- 20 Abūʾl-ʿAbbās al-Qāsim b. Maḥdī al-Sayyārī.
- 21 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, p. 414 and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 591.
- 22 Al-Sulamī, *Ziyādāt ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, pp. 84–5.
- 23 Al-Qushayrī, *Latāʾif al-ishārāt*, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, 1968–71, vol. 4, pp. 79–80.
- 24 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 21, Beirut, 1980, p. 148.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 The terms are found in Islamic theology as far back as the Ashʿarī scholars Abu Bakr al-Bāqallānī (d. 1013) and ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 1037–8). See F. Rosenthal’s *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970, pp. 216–18, 227–30 and A.J. Wensinck’s *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development*, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965, p. 250f.
- 27 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 21, p. 149.
- 28 Al-Rāzī’s use of the phrase “considerative types of knowledge (*al-ʿulūm al-naẓariyya*)” is confusing because he appears to be using it as a synonym for “necessary types of

knowledge (*al-‘ulūm al-ḍarūriyya*). It is possible that he is using the adjective *naẓarī* in its broadest sense to refer to consideration (*naẓar*) by the five physical senses and the intellect before it engages in the processes of inference or deduction. But then he uses the noun “consideration” (*naẓar*) in the opposite category, to describe an acquired form of knowledge. It is this second usage that is the more common, and the term speculative knowledge (*‘ilm naẓarī*) is often used as a synonym for acquired (*muktasab* or *kasbī*) knowledge. See Rosenthal *Knowledge Triumphant*, pp. 216–18, 227–30 and Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, p. 250f.

- 29 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 21, p. 150.
- 30 M. Watt, following Miguel Asin, does not consider *Al-Risālat al-laduniyya* to be an authentic work of al-Ghazālī. He quotes Asin’s observation concerning the similarity between the work and the *Risāla fīl-naḥs wa’l-rūḥ* of Ibn ‘Arabī: Asin judged the terminology and ideology of the latter work to be distinctly that of Ibn ‘Arabī’s and therefore judged *Al-Risālat al-laduniyya* as incorrectly attributed to al-Ghazālī. Watt judges the work as inauthentic on this basis and his own assessment that the work is uncharacteristic of al-Ghazālī’s thought as demonstrated in works of indisputable authenticity. According to Watt, in *Al-Risālat al-laduniyya*, al-Ghazālī gives precedence to reason (*‘aql*) over revelation, and he makes a distinction between revelation (*waḥy*) and inspiration (*ilhām*). The first idea is contrary to the precedence given to revelation in al-Ghazālī’s *Al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl* and the second idea is not discussed there or in the *Mishkāṭ al-anwār*, an omission Watt finds puzzling if this distinction was part of al-Ghazālī’s belief (“The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to al-Ghazālī,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1952, pp. 33–4). In response to Asin’s textual evidence, the mention of a treatise by al-Ghazālī on *‘ilm ladunnī* in al-Rāzī’s *tafsīr* demonstrates that a book on this topic attributed to al-Ghazālī existed before 1209, the year of al-Rāzī’s death, at which time Ibn ‘Arabī was in his early forties. It seems unlikely then, that Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Al-Risāla fīl-naḥs wa’l-rūḥ* could have been the source of the treatise mentioned here. The additional arguments made by Watt on the basis of the content of the *Risāla al-laduniyya* are not, in my opinion, sufficient to disprove the authenticity of the work. Al-Ghazālī is not elevating the human faculty of the intellect over revelation in *Al-Risāla al-laduniyya*, but rather the Universal Intellect. The distinction between revelation and inspiration is found in early Ṣūfism, so its adoption by al-Ghazālī is unsurprising and is not inconsistent with the ideas found in his *Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn*.
- 31 Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Risālat al-laduniyya*, Cairo, n.d., pp. 19–26. A English translation of this treatise was done by M. Smith, “Al-Risālat Al-Laduniyya,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1938, 177–200, 353–74.
- 32 The notion of the Universal Soul (*al-naḥs al-kullī*) and the Universal Intellect (*al-‘aql al-kullī*) are found in the Neoplatonic teachings of Plotinus, as Smith points out in the introduction to her translation of this treatise, pp. 181–6. Al-Ghazālī understands these metaphysical concepts as the equivalent of the Qur’anic terms “Tablet” (*lawḥ*) (Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Risālat al-laduniyya*, p. 25) and “Pen” (*qalam*) (Smith’s introduction p. 196, n. 6).
- 33 Cf. Ibn Sīnā in his *Fī ithbāt al-nubuwwāt* (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār li’l-Nashr, 1968), where he writes, “Revelation is the emanation and the angel is the received emanating power that descends on the prophets as if it were an emanation continuous with the universal intellect” (p. 45; English translation taken from M. Marmura, “On the Proof of Prophecies and the Interpretation of the Prophets’ Symbols and Metaphors,” in *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, eds. R. Lerner and M. Mahdi, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963, p. 115); for an analysis of Ibn Sīnā’s ideas on the nature of prophecy and the Intellect as a cause of human thought, see H.A. Davidson’s *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect*, Oxford: Oxford University Press,

- 1992, pp. 83–94, 116–23). Davidson demonstrates the influence of Ibn Sīnā on al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāṭ al-anwār* (pp. 129–44), an influence that is also apparent in *Al-Risālat al-laduniyya*. Curiously, a copy of *Al-Risālat al-laduniyya* exists in a manuscript attributed to Ibn Sīnā in a library in Istanbul. It is listed as *Al-ʿIlm al-ladunī* in G.C. Anawati's comprehensive bibliography of works attributed to Ibn Sīnā (*Mu'allafāt Ibn Sīnā*, Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1950, p. 231) and has been published as such in H. ʿĀṣī's *Al-tafsīr al-Qurʾānī wa'l lughat al-ṣūfiyya fī falsafa Ibn Sīnā*, Beirut: Al-Mu'assasāt al-Jāmi'iyya li'l-Dirāsāt wa'l-Nashr wa'l-Tazī', 1983. Neither Anawati nor ʿĀṣī mention that it is the same work as the work attributed to al-Ghazālī.
- 34 We have already seen that al-Ghazālī recommends in his *Fayṣal al-tafriqa* that the Ṣūfī who claims to be released from the obligations of religious law should be killed (Dār al-Nashr al-Maghribiyya, 1983), p. 28.
- 35 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' li-ahkām al-Qurʾān*, vol. 11, pp. 40–1.
- 36 Ibid., vol. 11, pp. 28–32.
- 37 Material which al-Maybūdī uses as well in his discussion of the same topic in his *Kashf al-asrār wa'uddat al-abrār*, Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1982–3, vol. 20, p. 232, as part of his commentary on the miraculous and instantaneous transporting of the throne of the Queen of Saba' to the court of Sulaymān (Qurʾān 27:38).
- 38 Fāris b. ʿIsā al-Dīnawārī al-Baghdādī (d. 951).
- 39 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, p. 415 and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān* vol. 1, p. 593.
- 40 Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥuṣrī (d. 981).
- 41 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, p. 415 and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 593.
- 42 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt*, vol. 4, p. 78.
- 43 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 83.
- 44 Al-Thaʿlabī, *Qīṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ: Musammā bi'l-ʿArāʾis al-majālis*, Egypt: Maktabat al-Jumhūriyya al-ʿArabiyya, 195?, p. 123.
- 45 Al-Thaʿlabī's *ʿArāʾis al-majālis* is considered to be the first independent collection of stories of the prophets (T. Nagel, "Qīṣaṣ al-Anbiyā'" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed. and W.M. Thackston, Introduction to *The Tales of the Prophets of al-Kisāʾi*, Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1978, p. xvi). This material from Jews and Christians was considered problematic fairly early on in the Muslim community. G. Newby has suggested that the *isrāʾīliyyāt* narratives included in al-Ṭabarī's *tafsīr* already represent "the remains of a moribund tradition" that found a more congenial home in the genre of *qīṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ* because of its less exacting standards ("Tafsir Israʾiliyat," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 47, 1979, 685–97). Al-Thaʿlabī's *tafsīr*, *Al-Kashf wa'l-bayān ʿan tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, was criticized for its use of the same kind of material. Ibn Taymiyya praised the exegete al-Baghawī (d. sometime between 1117 and 1122) for writing an abridged version of al-Thaʿlabī's *tafsīr* purged of the "inferior traditions and heretical opinions," thereby producing a *tafsīr* that Ibn Taymiyya judged superior to those of al-Zamakhsharī and al-Qurṭubī, two exegetes who quoted al-Thaʿlabī frequently (quoted in P.G. Riddell, "The Transmission of Narrative-Based Exegesis in Islam" in *Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society*, eds P.G. Riddell and T. Street, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997, p. 67).
- 46 R. Arnaldez states that al-Qurṭubī made very little use of this material ("Al-Qurṭubī" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed., vol. 5, p. 531b), but the index to al-Qurṭubī's *tafsīr*, *Fahāris al-Jāmi' li-ahkām al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1988) cites something like 250 citations from al-Thaʿlabī alone, and as mentioned in the previous note, Ibn Taymiyya criticized al-Qurṭubī for using this material. One example of al-Qurṭubī's use of al-Thaʿlabī's material will demonstrate what is at issue here. It is a comment on Mūsā's reaction to al-Khaḍir's killing of the boy.

When Mūsā said, "Have you killed an innocent soul...?" al-Khaḍir become angry. He ripped off the left shoulder of the boy and then peeled

the skin off of it. There, on the bone of the shoulder, was written, ‘An infidel who will never believe in God’ (Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi‘ li-ahkām al-Qur‘ān*, vol.11:21, Al-Tha‘labī, Qīṣaṣ al-anbiyā’, p. 127).

This tradition would seem to warrant questioning because it contradicts the chronology of the Qur’anic narrative in which al-Khaḍīr refuses to explain his actions until they part. Al-Qurṭubī demonstrates his critical method with regard to traditions elsewhere in his *tafsīr*, but here he is silent, and one wonders whether his choice to include this material is based on his appreciation of the entertaining manner in which it is written. The genre of the stories of the prophets (*qīṣaṣ al-anbiyā’*) was closely connected to the preaching profession where the importance of keeping the attention of one’s audience with a story well told was understood.

- 47 In his *Risāla* al-Qushayrī calls the station of desire (*irāda*) the first station of those who seek God (Principles of Sufism, trans. B. von Schlegell, Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1992, p. 175).
- 48 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 16, pp. 726–8.
- 49 Ibid., pp. 728–9.
- 50 Ibid., p. 729.
- 51 A reference to Qur’ān 89:27–8: *O soul at peace return to your Lord, well pleased and well-pleasing*. The Ṣūfīs believed in a potential progression of the soul from that which commands evil (*al-naḥs al-ammāra*) as in Qur’ān 12:53, *truly the soul commands evil unless my Lord has mercy*, to the soul which blames (*al-naḥs al-lawwāma*) as in Qur’ān 75:2, *Nay, I call to witness the blaming soul*, to the soul at peace (*al-naḥs al-muṭma’inna*) (A. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975, p. 112). For al-Kāshānī’s definition of these three stages see note 61.
- 52 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 16, pp. 729–30.
- 53 The expression “the one who was carried (*maḥmūl*)” is also used in al-Qushayrī.
- 54 Rūzbihān, *‘Arā’is al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 590.
- 55 A reference to the Qur’ān 25:53, *It is He who has let forth the two seas. This one is sweet and thirst-quenching, and the other is salty and bitter*, and 35:12, *The two seas are not alike. This one is sweet, thirst-quenching and pleasant to drink and the other is salty and bitter*.
- 56 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta’wīlāt*, published as *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-karīm* and attributed incorrectly to Ibn ‘Arabī, Beirut: Dār al-Yaqẓat al-‘Arabiyya, 1968, vol. 1, p. 766.
- 57 Al-Kāshānī, as has been mentioned, was a follower of the ideas of Ibn ‘Arabī, but in this passage his allegiance to Ibn Sīnā is far more apparent. Ibn ‘Arabī adopted some of Ibn Sīnā’s terminology and concepts, but adapted them to his own thought far more extensively than al-Kāshānī does here; al-Kāshānī’s interpretation of the Mūsā and al-Khaḍīr story follows Ibn Sīnā’s theories of the soul and knowledge closely. Summaries of these theories can be found in S.M. Afnan’s *Avicenna: His Life and Works* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 136–67 and P. Heath’s *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sina): With a Translation of the Book of the Prophet Muhammad’s Ascent to Heaven*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, pp. 53–106.
- 58 Elsewhere al-Kāshānī uses the term Holy Spirit (*rūḥ al-quḍus*) to describe al-Khaḍīr (*Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣufiyya*, London: Octagon Press, 1991, p. 160). In Ibn Sīnā’s terminology, the “holy intellect (*al-aql al-quḍī*)” refers to a soul which is blessed with the highest level of intellectual aptitude, an aptitude reserved for prophets (Heath, *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna*, pp. 89–90).
- 59 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta’wīlāt*, vol. 1, p. 768–9. Ibn Sīnā also made spiritual discipline a pre-requisite for obtaining higher knowledge in his *Al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbihāt* (Tehran, 1958), although he does not mention emulation of another nor does he use the term “heart (*qalb*).”

- 60 Ibn Sīnā understood the human soul as comprised of three parts: the vegetative (*nabāṭī*) or natural (*ṭabīʿī*) soul which governs the natural processes of the body; the animal (*ḥayawānī*) soul which governs instinctive and voluntary movement, the latter being based on desire or anger, and perception through five external and five internal senses; and the rational (*nāṭīqa*) soul, unique to man, which is made up of the practical (*ʿamalī*) and theoretical (*naẓarī*) intellects which enable men to seek moral and intellectual perfection (Afnan, *Avicenna*, pp. 136–9; Heath, *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna*, pp. 60–5).
- 61 Al-Kāshānī, *Taʾwīlāt*, vol. 1, pp. 769, 772. We have already mentioned the different stages of the soul in al-Maybudī's allegorical interpretation. Al-Kāshānī defines these three stages as follows. "The commanding soul (*al-naḥs al-ammāra*) is that which leans towards the bodily nature (*al-ṭabīʿa al-badaniyya*) and commands one to sensual pleasures and lusts and pulls the heart (*qalb*) in a downward direction. It is the resting place of evil and the source of blameworthy morals and bad actions. God said, *truly the soul commands evil* (12:53). The blaming soul (*al-naḥs al-lawwāma*) is that which has been illuminated by the light of the heart to the extent that it awakens from the habit of forgetfulness. It becomes watchful and begins to improve its state, wavering between the two directions of lordliness and creatureliness. Whenever something bad emanates from its unjust temperament, the light of divine awakening overtakes it and it begins to blame itself and to turn from it, asking for forgiveness and returning to the door of the Forgiving and the Compassionate. Because of this, God mentions it in oaths: *Nay, I call to witness the blaming soul* (75:2). The soul at peace (*al-naḥs al-muṭmaʿinna*) is that whose illumination has been perfected by the light of the heart so that it has lost its blameworthy qualities and become shaped by praiseworthy morals. It has turned towards the direction of the heart altogether, following it in rising up to the abode of the world of holiness (*ʿālam al-quḍus*), freed from the abode of uncleanness, diligent in acts of obedience, dwelling in the presence of the highest of degrees until its Lord addresses it, *'O soul at peace, return to your Lord, well pleased and well-pleasing. Enter among my servants and enter my Garden* (85:27–30)" of the absolute (*tajarrud*)" (*Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣuḥfiyya*, pp. 77–8).
- 62 Al-Kāshānī, *Taʾwīlāt*, vol. 1, pp. 770, 772.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 770.
- 64 According to Ibn Sīnā, the rational soul is made up of the practical and theoretical faculties or intellects. The practical intellect mediates between the vegetal and animal souls and the theoretical intellect, using the rationality of the latter to control the appetites and passions of the former by fostering ethical behavior. The practical intellect deals with the particulars of the external material world while the theoretical intellect has the potential to understand universal concepts received from the Active Intelligence (*al-ʿaql al-faʿāl*), either through a slow process of applied logic or immediate intuition (*ḥads*), a potential which may or may not be actualized. Al-Kāshānī adopted Ibn Sīnā's conception of the practical and theoretical intellects (P. Lory, *Les Commentaires ésotériques du Coran d'après 'Abd ar-Razzāq al-Qāshānī*, Paris: Les Deux Océans, 1980, p. 76) and viewed the Active Intelligence as the equivalent of the angel Gabriel or the Holy Spirit (*rūḥ al-quḍus*) (p. 55).
- 65 Al-Kāshānī, *Taʾwīlāt*, vol. 1, p. 773. Elsewhere, al-Kāshānī states that the heart (*qalb*) is what the philosopher (*al-ḥakīm*) calls the rational soul (*al-naḥs al-nāṭīqa*) (*Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣuḥfiyya*, p. 141).
- 66 Al-Nisābūrī, *Gharāʾib al-Qurʾān wa ragḥāʾib al-furqān*, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1962–70, vol. 16, p. 17.
- 67 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 68 Al-Sulamī, *Haqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, p. 417; Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 595; Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 16, p. 730.
- 69 *Ibid.*
- 70 Cf. Ibn ʿAṭā's interpretation of "We wanted" where the "we" refers to al-Khaḍīr and Mūsā.

- 71 Al-Maybudī adds a comment here: “For whoever is able to sacrifice his own qualities (*ṣifāt*) on the holy path, We will paint the secrets of the different types of knowledge of the real in his heart for *We taught him knowledge from Our very presence (min ladunnā)* (vol. 16, p. 728).
- 72 Rūzbihān understands this first station as one of mystical union, while al-Ḥallāj describes it as the total mastery (*istilāʾ*) of God.
- 73 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 595.
- 74 M. Chodkiewicz, *An Ocean Without Shore: Ibn Arabi, the Book, and the Law*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993, pp. 30, 45.

8 QURʾĀNIC VERSES ON MARYAM

- 1 J.I. Smith and Y. Haddad, “The Virgin Mary in Islamic Tradition and Commentary,” *The Muslim World*, 79, 1989, p. 162.
- 2 H. Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ʿArabi*, trans. R. Manheim, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 145, 153, 170; *The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism*, trans. N. Pearson, Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1978, p. 131; and *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shiʿite Iran*, trans. N. Pearson, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 309.
- 3 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy Qurʾān*, Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1954–7, vol. 3, p. 325.
- 4 Ibid., pp. 325–6; al-Zamakhsharī, *Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq al-tanzīl*, vol. 1, Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1966–8, p. 425; al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, vol. 4, Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿArabī, 1980, pp. 65–6.
- 5 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001, p. 98 and Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, “Le Tafsir Mystique attribue a Gaʿfar Sadiq,” *Melanges De L’Universite Saint Joseph*, 43, 1968, p. 192.
- 6 Al-Tustarī, *Tafsīr al-Tustarī*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2002, p. 48.
- 7 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt*, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿArabī, 1968–71, vol. 1, p. 249.
- 8 Quoted in F. Rosenthal, *The Muslim Concept of Freedom Prior to the Nineteenth Century*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960, p. 110.
- 9 Ibid., p. 111.
- 10 In his *Kitāb al-taʾarruf*, Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī mentions Abū Bakr Qaḥṭubī as a Ṣūfī who wrote a book on the sciences of allusion (*The Doctrine of the Sufis Kitāb al-taʾrruf li-madḥhab ahl al-taṣawwuf*, trans. A. Arberry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 13.
- 11 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār wa ʿuddat al-abrār*, Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1982–3, pp. 109–10.
- 12 A discussion based on the ḥadīth saying that many men have reached perfection but among women, only these four.
- 13 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, vol. 3, pp. 263–4.
- 14 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, vol. 4, pp. 82–4.
- 15 Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān*, Lucknow, vol. 1, p. 1898, p. 83.
- 16 Ibid., vol. 12, p. 333.
- 17 See Qurʾān 7:54, 13:2, 16:12, 22:65 and 31:20, etc.
- 18 See Qurʾān 2:116, 30:26, and 33:35, etc.
- 19 A. Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975, p. 112 and S. Murata, *The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook of Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought*, Albany: SUNY Press, 1992, pp. 313–4.
- 20 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, pp. 3:241–7.
- 21 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt*, vol. 1, p. 250 and al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 2, p. 111. This quote also appears in al-Qushayrī’s *Risāla*, where al-Qushayrī states that

- he heard it from his teacher, Abū 'Alī al-Daqqāq (Rosenthal, *Muslim Concept of Freedom*, p. 112).
- 22 Rūzbihān, *Ar'ā'is al-bayān*, vol. 1, pp. 80–1.
 - 23 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, vol. 1, p. 251.
 - 24 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 250.
 - 25 Rūzbihān, *Ar'ā'is al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 81.
 - 26 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta'wīlāt*, published as *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-karīm* and attributed incorrectly to Ibn 'Arabī, Beirut: Dār al-Yaqẓat al-'Arabiyya, 1968, vol. 1, p. 182.
 - 27 Al-Nisābūrī, *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān wa raghā'ib al-furqān*, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1962–70, vol. 3, p. 186.
 - 28 Ibid.
 - 29 Al-Sulamī, *Haqā'iq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2001, p. 98 and Ja'far al-Šādiq, *Le Tafsīr Mystique*, p. 192.
 - 30 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, vol. 1, p. 251.
 - 31 Ibid., p. 251.
 - 32 Rūzbihān, *Ar'ā'is al-bayān*, vol. 1, p. 81.
 - 33 Ibid.
 - 34 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, vol. 1, p. 252.
 - 35 Ibid.
 - 36 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 2, p. 111.
 - 37 Al-Nisābūrī, *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān*, vol. 3, p. 186.
 - 38 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān*, vol. 16, p. 71.
 - 39 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, vol. 4, p. 97.
 - 40 Ja'far al-Šādiq, *Le Tafsīr Mystique*, p. 208.
 - 41 Rūzbihān, *Ar'ā'is al-bayān*, vol. 2, p. 8 and quoted anonymously in al-Sulamī, *Haqā'iq al-tafsīr*, vol. 1, p. 424.
 - 42 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 6, p. 42.
 - 43 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 89.
 - 44 For a discussion of the idea of preparedness (*isti'dād*) in the thought of Ibn 'Arabī, see W. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989, pp. 91–4. For the concept as discussed in the thought of Šadr al-Dīn Qunawī (d. 1274) and Sa'īd al-Dīn Farghānī (d. 1296), see S. Murata, *The Tao of Islam*, pp. 107ff.
 - 45 Translated by S. Murata, *The Tao of Islam*, pp. 275–6.
 - 46 Translated by S. Murata, *The Tao of Islam*, p. 43.
 - 47 Al-Kāshānī, *Ta'wīlāt*, vol. 2, p. 89.
 - 48 Ibid., p. 670.
 - 49 Rūzbihān, *Ar'ā'is al-bayān*, vol. 2, p. 7.
 - 50 Ibid.
 - 51 Ibid.
 - 52 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 69.
 - 53 Quoted in Corbin, *Creative Imagination*, p. 272.
 - 54 Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, p. 290.
 - 55 H. Corbin, *En Islam Iranien*, vol. 2, Paris: Gallimard, 1972, pp. 9–146 and Rūzbihān, *Le Jasmin des Fideles d'amour (Kitab-e 'Abhar al-'ashiqin)*, trans. H. Corbin and M. Mo'in, Teheran: L'Institute Franco-Iranien, 1958, p. 114.
 - 56 Rūzbihān, *Ar'ā'is al-bayān*, vol. 2, p. 7.
 - 57 Quoted in and translated by C. Ernst, *Words of Ecstasy in Sufism*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1985, p. 27. The material from al-Ḥallāj that Rūzbihān is commenting on is, "I wonder at You and me. You annihilated me out of myself into You. You made me near to Yourself, so that I thought that I was You and You were me." The quote from al-Ḥallāj is from his *Diwān* and Rūzbihān's comments are from his *Sharḥ-i shathīyāt*.

9 QUR'ĀN 24:35 (THE LIGHT VERSE)

- 1 I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranlegung*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952, pp. 180–5.
- 2 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wīl āy Qur'ān*, Egypt, 1954–7, vol. 18, p. 135. God is called “the Guide (*hādī*)” in Qur'ānic verses 22:54 and 25:31.
- 3 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān*, vol. 18, p. 135.
- 4 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, Beirut, 1980, vol. 23, p. 224; al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'an*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Arabī, vol. 12, p. 257.
- 5 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān*, vol. 18, p. 135.
- 6 Al-Zamakhsharī, *Al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl*, Egypt, 1966, vol. 3, p. 67.
- 7 See the section on the attributes of God in L. Gardet's article, “Allāh” in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.
- 8 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 7, pp. 181–2.
- 9 Al-Rāzī appears to have used al-Zamakhsharī's *al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl* as a basis for his philological and grammatical comments, although in an abridged form and not uncritically (Ceylan, *Theology and Tafsīr in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996, pp. 16, 19–20; A.H. Johns, “Solomon and the Queen of Sheba: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Treatment of the Qur'ānic Telling of the Story,” *Abr-Nahrain*, 24, 1986, 76–80.
- 10 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 7, pp. 223–4.
- 11 Qur'ān 2:257, *God is the friend of those who believe. He brings them out of the shadows into the light*; 6:122, *Why, is he who was dead and We gave him life and made a light for him like him who is in the depths of darkness from which he cannot come out?*; and 42:52, *But We made it a light by which We guide those whom We will of Our servants*.
- 12 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 23, p. 224.
- 13 *Ibid.*, vol. 23, pp. 224–30.
- 14 F. Rosenthal understands al-Rāzī's exegesis as a rebuttal to al-Ghazālī's view (*Triumphant Knowledge: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970, p. 160), but this reading does not take into account the fact that al-Rāzī states that there is no contradiction between his own preferred view and that of al-Ghazālī.
- 15 W. Heinrichs, “On the Genesis of the *Ḥaqīqa-Majāz* Dichotomy,” *Studia Islamica*, 59, 1984, 136–7 and “Contacts Between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften*, 7, 1991–2, 256–7.
- 16 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 7, pp. 181–231 and *Sharḥ asmā' Allāh ta'āla wa'l-ṣifāt*, Cairo: Maktaba al-Kulliyāt al-Azhariyya, 1976, pp. 346–8.
- 17 Ibn Taymiyya *Al-tafsīr al-kabīr*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1988, vol. 5, p. 422.
- 18 This is what the Ash'arīs and Ḥanbalīs called themselves because they believed that they alone affirmed God's attributes.
- 19 The *jahmiyya* were an early sect said to have been founded by Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 746) who, like the Mu'tazila, denied the distinct existence of God's attributes and therefore resorted to their interpretation (*ta'wīl*).
- 20 Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 5, p. 421. Cf. al-Rāzī, in his *Sharḥ al-asmā'*: Know that light is the name of that mode of being (*kayfiyya*) which has darkness as its opposite, and it is impossible that God (*al-ḥaqq*) could be that for several reasons. The first is that this mode of being comes and goes but it is inconceivable that God (*al-ḥaqq*) could be like that. The second reason is that bodies (*aṣṣām*) are alike in corporeality but different with regards to light and darkness, so that light is a mode of being in need of a body in which to exist, but the Necessary Existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) could never be like that. The third reason is that light is the contrary to darkness, and far be it from God to have an opposite or an antagonist. The fourth reason is that

God said, *the similitude of His light*, so He attributed light to Himself. If He were a light then this attribution of a thing to Himself would be inconceivable. Therefore, God is not a light, nor is He a thing qualified by this mode of being because this mode of being can only be understood as established in bodies, pp. 346–7. See also al-Razī's *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 23, p. 223.

- 21 Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 5, p. 430.
- 22 Ibid., p. 429.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 435–8, 440.
- 24 Ibn Taymiyya's view on the Light Verse bears further investigation. According to J. Pavlin, in his *Bughtat al-Murtadd* Ibn Taymiyya refers to the *hadīth* that says, "His veil is light," to justify interpreting the word "light" and to reject the literal reading that equates God with light ("The Medieval Debate over Quranic Hermeneutics: Ibn Taymiyyah's Discussion of al-Ghazālī's Metaphysics in the *Bughtat al-Murtadd*, Paper presented at the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, Nov. 22–25, 2003).
- 25 D. Buchman has done an admirable job of locating the Ṣūfī maxims and *aḥādīth* in *Mishkāt al-anwār*. See his translations for these references, which will not be repeated here.
- 26 Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Ghazālī: The Niche of Lights*, trans. D. Buchman, Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1998, pp. 1–2. The English translations of *Mishkāt al-anwār* quoted in this chapter are those of Buchman, although I have added some of the transliterated Arabic.
- 27 Ibid., p. 4.
- 28 Ibid., pp. 5–13.
- 29 Ibid., p. 18.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 For these and other criticisms Ibn Taymiyya made of the Ṣūfīs, see W. Chittick, "Rūmī and *waḥdat al-wujūd*" in *Poetry and Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage of Rūmī*, eds. A. Banani, R. Hovannisian, and G. Sabagh, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 85–7; A. Knysh, *Ibn 'Arabī in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999, pp. 87–111; and T. Michel, *A Muslim Theologian's Response to Christianity: Ibn Taymiyya's Al-Jawab al-Sahih*, Delmar: Caravan, 1984, pp. 5–14, 24–39.
- 33 Al-Ghazālī, *The Niche of Lights*, p. 24.
- 34 Ibid., p. 20.
- 35 For example, G. Böwering writes, "Ibn al-'Arabī's theory transformed the early Ṣūfīs' psychological experience of mystical union into an ontological speculation on the unity of being, propelling the idea of *tawḥīd* to a dynamic conclusion" ("Ibn al-'Arabī's Concept of Time," in *God is Beautiful and He Loves Beauty*, Bern: Peter Lang, 1994), p. 75. In his "Bewildered Tongue: The Semantics of Mystical Union in Islam," Sells remarks that "The move from the *dialogical* language of union found in Hallaj and Bistami to the mystical *dialectic* of Ibn 'Arabī need not be seen, as it often has been seen, as a decadent movement from genuine experience to intellectual abstraction... Mystical union transforms philosophical and other objective or scientific discourse, even as the philosophical language offers a new dimension of critical self-awareness and logical precision to the mystical" (in *Mystical Union in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, eds M. Idel and B. McGinn, New York: Continuum, 1996), p. 116. One of Ibn 'Arabī's critics, Sa'd al-Dīn Taftāzānī (d. 1389 or 1390), acknowledged an outward similarity between the metaphysical views of al-Ghazālī and Ibn 'Arabī and his followers, but insisted that a closer examination of their works demonstrated the orthodoxy of the former and errors of the latter. He criticized Ibn 'Arabī and his followers for distorting the Ṣūfī concepts of annihilation (*fanā*) and subsistence (*baqā*'), mistakenly

- understanding subjective mystical experience as indicative of the objective reality of things (Knysht, *Ibn 'Arabī in the Later Islamic Tradition*, pp. 150–3). The differences between the metaphysical theories of al-Ghazālī and Ibn 'Arabī is an area which warrants further investigation, but the fact remains that al-Ghazālī preceded Ibn 'Arabī in making ontological statements based on mystical experience and adopting philosophical and theological language and terminology to systematize the view of reality alluded to in earlier Ṣūfī statements and writings.
- 36 Ibn Sīnā, *Fī ithbāt al-nubuwwāt li-Ibn Sīnā*, Beirut: Dār al-Nahār li'l-Nashr, 1968, p. 49. The English translation here is M. Marmura's, "On the Proof of Prophecies and the Interpretation of the Prophets' Symbols and Metaphors," in *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, ed. R. Lerner and M. Mahdi, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University press, 1963, p. 116.
 - 37 Al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, vol. 5, Beirut: Al-Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1989, pp. 173–4. W. Chittick indicates that this same verse drew the attention of Ibn 'Arabī who cites it more often than any other verse to show what Chittick calls the "radical ambiguity of existence," *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989, pp. 113–4.
 - 38 Al-Rāzī, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 23, pp. 232–5.
 - 39 *Ibid.*, p. 235.
 - 40 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, vol. 12, p. 206. The *aḥādīth* al-Qurṭubī is referring to here are those quoted in Ibn Taymiyya's discussion of the Light Verse: "O God, praise be to You, light of the heavens and the earth and what is in them," and the Prophet's reply to the question of how he saw his lord, "I see a light."
 - 41 *Ibid.*, p. 263.
 - 42 *Ibid.*, p. 264.
 - 43 Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 5, p. 422. Cf. al-Rāzī: The portion of the servant in [God's name "light"]: Know that the light of the heart is an expression for knowledge of God who said, *Anyone for whom God does not appoint a light has no light* (24:40). The shaykhs have said that light is that which illuminates the hearts of the sincere by its declaration of God's unity and illuminates the innermost hearts of the lovers by its confirmation. It is said that it is that which beautifies human beings by giving form (*taṣwīr*) and the innermost hearts (*asrār*) by illumination. It is said that it is that which enlivens the hearts of the Gnostics by the light of its knowledge and enlivens the souls of the worshippers by the light of its worship (*Sharḥ al-asmā'* p. 348).
 - 44 Ibn Taymiyya is referring to Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī's *Haqā'iq al-tafsīr*.
 - 45 Ibn Taymiyya's choice of words here shows that he is following the teachings of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal with regards to using material that is judged weak in transmission. Elsewhere Ibn Taymiyya quotes Ibn Ḥanbal as saying, " 'If a tradition deals with *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* (legal matters), we are strict regarding chains of transmission; and if it deals with *targhīb* and *tarhīb* we are lenient.' Ibn Taymiyya points out that this is one of the reasons why the '*ulamā* use *al-ḥadīth al-ḍa'īf* (weak tradition) for *fadā'il al-'amal* (virtuous deeds). By so doing, they do not intend, however, to make them the basis of legally suggested deeds (*istiḥbāb*), for *istiḥbāb* is an Islamic legal matter that should be based on an Islamic legal argument (*dalīl shar'ī*)," (D. Syafruddin, "The Principles of Ibn Taymiyya's Quranic Interpretation, M.S. Thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1994, p. 68); the quote from Ibn Ḥanbal is found in Ibn Taymiyya's *Majmū' fatāwā Ibn Taymiyya: al-ḥadīth*, Beirut, 198–, vol. 18, p. 65).
 - 46 The *qarāmiṭa* was a movement appearing in the late ninth century which combined esoteric doctrines and practices with programs for social justice.
 - 47 Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, vol. 5, p. 423.
 - 48 One of the epithets of Muḥammad which means "the chosen one."

- 49 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 2, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001, p. 47; Jaʿfar al-Šādiq, “Le Tafsīr Mystique attribue a Gaʿfar Sadiq,” *Melanges De L’Universite Saint Joseph*, 43, 1968, pp. 211–12; and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān* vol. 2, p. 84.
- 50 The Arabic in al-Ṭabarī here literally means, “entrance” (*madkhal*) and “exit” (*makhraj*). Al-Rāzī writes that al-Rabʿī asked Abūʿl-ʿĀliya (d. 708–9 or 714) about these words and he replied that they meant one’s private and public affairs (*sirruhu wa ʿalāniyatahu*), 23:237.
- 51 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmiʿ al-bayān*, vol. 18, p. 138.
- 52 Al-Tustarī, *Tafsīr al-Tustarī*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2002, pp. 40–1. The English translation here is that of M. Sells, *Early Islamic Mysticism: Sufi, Qurʾan, Miʾraj, Poetic and Theological Writings*, New York: Paulist Press, 1996, p. 11.
- 53 Al-Tustarī, *Tafsīr al-Tustarī*, p. 69. The full English translation of this passage can be found in M. Sells, *Early Islamic Mysticism*, pp. 93–4 and is discussed in G. Böwering, *The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The Qurʾānic Hermeneutics of the Šūfī Sahl at-Tustarī*, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1980, pp. 153–4.
- 54 On the basis of his reading of al-Tustarī’s entire Qurʾānic commentary, Böwering summarizes al-Tustarī’s vision of the relationship between God, Muḥammad, and man as follows: “God is light that issues forth in its radiance and articulates itself in the primordial light of Muḥammad the primal man and archetypal mystic. This divine light pervades the whole universe of this-worldly and other-worldly realities and represents the hidden marrow of their existence... The primordial Muḥammad represents the crystal which draws the divine light upon itself, absorbs it in its core (the heart of Muḥammad), projects it unto mankind in the Qurʾānic scripture, and enlightens the soul of mystic man... Man issues as an infinitely small particle of divine light in pre-existential eternity and achieves his final fulfillment as he is engulfed by the divine light in post-existential eternity” (*Mystical Vision*, pp. 264–5). The concept of the Muḥammadan light (*nūr Muḥammadi*) was a controversial one, with some scholars such as al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya rejecting the notion of Muḥammad’s pre-existence, interpreting instead the primordial creation of Muḥammad as referring only to his pre-destination. A less controversial term which later Šūfīs adopted to describe Muḥammad’s primordial nature was the Muḥammadan reality (*ḥaqīqa Muḥammadiyya*), a term often discussed with reference to the Light Verse (U. Rubin, “Nūr Muḥammadi in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.).
- 55 Al-Ḥallāj, *Diwān al-Ḥallāj*, Kohn: Al-Kamel Verlag, 1997, pp. 119–22.
- 56 Quoted in al-Sulamī, *Ziyādāt ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr (The Minor Commentary)*, Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986, p. 105.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 106.
- 58 Al-Ḥallāj quoted in al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 49; L. Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la Mystique Musulmane*, Paris: J. Vrin, 1968, p. 385; and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān*, vol. 2, p. 85.
- 59 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 49; Massignon, *Essai*, p. 385.
- 60 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 50; Massignon, *Essai*, pp. 385–6; and al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 6, pp. 546–7.
- 61 Quoted in al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 45 and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān*, vol. 2, p. 83.
- 62 Al-Sulamī *Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 49 and Rūzbihān, *ʿArāʾis al-bayān*, vol. 2, p. 85.
- 63 Al-Ghazālī, *The Niche of Lights*, p. 31.
- 64 *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- 65 *Ibid.*
- 66 *Ibid.*, pp. 36–7.
- 67 *Ibid.*, pp. 45–50. See H. Landolt’s article “Ghazālī and ‘Religionswissenschaft’: Some Notes on the *Mishkāt al-anwār* for Professor Charles J. Adams” (*Asiatische*

- Studien*, 45, 1991, 19–72) for his suggestions for the identification of the various groups al-Ghazālī refers to in the Veils of Light passage.
- 68 Al-Ghazālī, *The Niche of Lights*, pp. 50–1.
- 69 Ibid., p. 51.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 The state of annihilation (*fanāʾ*) described in Part I of the *Mishkāt al-anwār*.
- 72 Al-Ghazālī, *The Niche of Lights*, pp. 51–2. The issue of whether al-Ghazālī is accepting here the very philosophical theories which he criticized elsewhere has been discussed by such Arab philosophers as Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185) and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) and modern Western scholars such as W.H.T. Gairdner and M. Watt. Based on the Neoplatonic content of the third section of al-Ghazālī's work, Watt doubted its authenticity. For an excellent summary of and references to previous studies of the *Mishkāt*, studies which have primarily focused on the problems of this third section, see Buchman's Introduction to *The Niche of Lights*, pp. xxvii–xxxii.
- 73 Ibn Sīnā, *Al-ishārāt wa'l-tanbihāt*, Tehran: Matba'at al-Haydarī, 1958, vol. 2, pp. 353–4. An English translation of this can be found in M. Ha'iri Yazdī's *The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992, pp. 193–4, n. 16.
- 74 In the first section of the *Mishkāt al-anwār* al-Ghazālī uses the term “intellect” (*ʿaql*) which is the term common to all five elements of Ibn Sīnā's interpretation of the niche, but then switches to the term “spirit” (*rūḥ*) in the second section when presenting his own interpretation of the niche. The term “spirit” is one which Ibn Sīnā uses more generally to refer to either the vegetable, animal, or human souls within man, as opposed to the “intellect” (*ʿaql*) which is reserved for humans alone.
- 75 Al-Kāshānī, *Taʾwīlāt*, published as *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-karīm* and attributed incorrectly to Ibn ʿArabī, Beirut: Dār al-Yaqzāt al-ʿArabīyya, 1968, vol. 2, p. 140. In his *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-suḥūfīyya* (*A Glossary of Sufi Technical Terms*, London: Octagon Press, 1991), Kāshānī writes that the “heart” is what is meant by the philosophical term “rational soul” (*al-naḥs al-nāṭīqa*), p. 141.
- 76 Al-Kāshānī, *Taʾwīlāt*, vol. 2, p. 141.
- 77 Al-Nīsābūrī, *Gharāʾib al-Qurʾān wa raghāʾib al-furqān*, vol. 18, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1962–70, p. 199. The reference is to Qurʾān 41:53, which was used by al-Simnānī as well to describe the correspondences between the macrocosm and the microcosm, as detailed in Part I of this study.
- 78 Al-Nīsābūrī, *Gharāʾib al-Qurʾān*, vol. 18, pp. 199–20. The last line is a reference to Qurʾān 20:5–6: *The Merciful sat upon the throne. To Him belongs what is in the heavens and the earth, and what is between them, and what is under the earth.*
- 79 The *ḥadīth*, which appears in al-Bukhārī, Riqāq 38, is translated in full by W.A. Graham in his *Divine Word and Prophetic Word in Early Islam: A Reconsideration of the Sources, with Special Reference to the Divine Saying or Ḥadīth Qudsī* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1977):

God said, “Whoever treats a friend of Mine as an enemy, on him I declare war. My servant draws near to Me by means of nothing dearer to Me than that which I have established as a duty for him. And my servant continues drawing nearer to Me through supererogatory acts until I love him; and when I love him, I become his ear with which he hears, his eye with which he sees, his hand with which he grasps, and his foot with which he walks. And if he asks Me [for something], I give it to him. If indeed he seeks My help, I help him. I have never hesitated to do anything as I hesitate [to take] the soul of the man of faith who hates death, for I hate to harm him.”

(p. 173)

Graham provides numerous references for Şūfī works which cite this *ḥadīth*, pp. 173–4.

- 80 Presumably al-Nisābūrī is referring to a previous discussion in his commentary.
- 81 Al-Nisābūrī, *Gharā'ib al-Qur'ān*, vol. 18, p. 120.
- 82 Al-Sulamī, *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr*, vol. 2, p. 45 and Ja'far al-Şādiq, “Le Tafsir Mystique,” p. 212.
- 83 Al-Qushayrī, *Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, vol. 4, p. 284.
- 84 Ibid., pp. 285–6.
- 85 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 6, pp. 542–3.
- 86 Ibid., p. 546.
- 87 A Companion of the Prophet who died c.682–3.
- 88 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 6, p. 543.
- 89 Al-Ghazālī refers to this *ḥadīth* in a passage from his autobiography explaining the experience which led him to Şūfism:

At length God Most High cured me of that sickness. My soul regained its health and equilibrium and once again I accepted the self-evident data of reason and relied on them with safety and certainty. But that was not achieved by constructing a proof or putting together an argument. On the contrary, it was the effect of a light which God Most High cast into my breast. And that light is the key to most knowledge... And it is this of which the apostle – God's blessing and peace be upon him – said: “God Most High created men in darkness, then sprinkled on them some of His light. From that light then, the unveiling of truth must be sought.”

(trans. by R.J. McCarthy, *Freedom and Fulfillment*, Boston, MA: Twayne, 1980, p. 66)

- 90 In a similar passage of his commentary al-Maybudī writes,

A shaykh was asked, “What is the sign of that light?” He replied, “Its sign is that through that light the servant knows God without finding Him, loves Him without seeing Him, turns away from being occupied with and remembering himself through being occupied with and remembering Him. He finds ease and rest in His lane, he tells secrets to His friends and asks favors from them. By day he is busy with religion's work, by night intoxicated with certainty's tidings. By day he dwells with creatures of good character, by night with the Real, fixed in sincerity.”

(*Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 7, p. 455; English translation here by S. Murata, *Tao of Islam, A Sourcebook of Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992 p. 27)

- 91 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 6, pp. 543–4.
- 92 The *zunnār* was a belt or girdle worn about the waist by Eastern Christians.
- 93 Al-Maybudī, *Kashf al-asrār*, vol. 6, p. 545.
- 94 Ibid., p. 546.
- 95 T. Izutsu, *Creation and the Timeless Order of Things*, Ashland, OR: White Cloud Press, 1994.

CONCLUSION

- 1 I use the term “subjectivity” here, following B. Weiss in his article “Exotericism and Objectivity in Islamic Jurisprudence” in *Islamic Law and Jurisprudence*, ed. N. Heer, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990. Weiss points out the public nature of

rational argument and transmitted material in Islamic theology and law as compared to the private world of experience upon which Ṣūfism is based.

- 2 Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mukhtasar kitāb talbīs ilbīs*, Beirut: Mu'assasāt al-Risāla, 1992, p. 150.

APPENDIX: COMMENTATORS ON THE QUR'ĀN

- 1 Information on the life and works of al-Ṭabarī can be found in C. Bosworth, "Al-Ṭabarī" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.; J. McAuliffe, *Qur'ānic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 38–45; and F. Rosenthal's General Introduction to *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. 1 Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989, pp. 5–134.
- 2 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wīl āy Qur'ān*, Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābi al-Ḥalabi, 1954–7.
- 3 Bosworth notes that sources introduced by words such as *haddathanā*, *akhbaranā*, or *kataba* indicate that al-Ṭabarī had the recognized license (*ijāza*) to transmit those sources. Where he had no such authority, he used words such as *qāla*, *dhakara*, *rawā*, and *huddithu*, "Al-Ṭabarī," *Encyclopedia of Islam*.
- 4 Information on the life and works of al-Zamakhsharī can be found in C. Brockelmann, "Al-Zamakhsharī" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed. and McAuliffe, *Qur'ānic Christians*, pp. 49–54.
- 5 Y. Ceylan, *Theology and Tafṣīr in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996, pp. 16, 19–20 and A.H. Johns, "Solomon and the Queen of Sheba: Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Treatment of the Qur'ānic Telling of the Story," *Abr-Nahrain*, 24, 1986, 76–80.
- 6 M. Ayoub, *The Qur'an and its Interpreters*, vol. 1, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1984, p. 6.
- 7 Al-Zamakhsharī, *Al-Kashshāf 'an ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl*, Egypt, 1966.
- 8 Johns, "Solomon and the Queen of Sheba," p. 77.
- 9 Because few of their works remain, the views of the Karrāmiyya are known primarily through their opponents, who accused them of literalism and anthropomorphism. Al-Rāzī's polemical writings concerning them constitute the last traces of them before their disappearance after the Mongol invasions. See C. Bosworth, "Karrāmiyya" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.
- 10 Biographical information on al-Rāzī can be found in G. Anawati, "Al-Rāzī" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.; Ceylan, *Theology and Tafṣīr* pp. 1–13; F. Kholeif, *A Study on al-Rāzī and His Controversies in Transoxiana*, Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1966, pp. 9–25; and McAuliffe, *Qur'ānic Christians*, pp. 63–76.
- 11 W. Chittick translates a portion of this letter in *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-'Arabī's Cosmology*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998, p. 124.
- 12 Ceylan, *Theology and Tafṣīr*, pp. 16, 19–20; Johns, "Solomon and the Queen of Sheba," pp. 76–80. Although he abridges al-Zamakhsharī, grammatical and linguistic issues still represent the largest part of his comments, according to M. Lagarde, *Index du Grand Commentaire de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996, p. 3.
- 13 See McAuliffe, *Qur'ānic Christians*, p. 69.
- 14 Information on the life and works of al-Qurṭubī can be found in R. Arnaldez's "Al-Qurṭubī" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.
- 15 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān wa'l-mubayyin li-mā taḍammāna min al-sunna wa-āyāt al-furqān*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Abrabī, 1980.
- 16 Al-Qurṭubī shows himself to be aware of these controversies by sometimes offering critical comments relating to *isrā'īliyyāt* material. But, as M. Mashīnī demonstrates, al-Qurṭubī is inconsistent in his methodology, sometimes rejecting the narratives after assessing their source, sometimes including them without comment (*Madrasāt al-tafṣīr fī al-Andalus*, Beirut: Mu'assasāt al-Risāla, 1986, pp. 101, 560–78, 826).

- R. Arnaldez states that al-Qurṭubī makes very little use of this material (5:531b), but the index to *Al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān (Fahāris al-Jāmi' li-aḥkām al-Qur'ān)* lists something like 250 citations from al-Tha'labī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1988).
- 17 N. Calder, "Tafsīr from Ṭabarī to Ibn Kathīr: Problems in the description of a genre, illustrated with reference to the story of Abraham," in *Approaches to the Qur'ān*, eds G.R. Hawting and A.A. Shareef, London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 109–10.
 - 18 Information on the life and works of Ibn Taymiyya can be found in H. Laoust's article "Ibn Taymiyya" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed.
 - 19 See G. Makdisi in "The Hanbali School of Sufism," *Humaniora Islamica*, 2, 1974, 61–72 and "Ibn Taimīya: A Ṣūfī of the Qādiriya Order," *American Journal of Arabic Studies*, 1, 1973, 118–29.
 - 20 Makdisi, "Ibn Taimīya," pp. 126–7 and T. Michel, *A Muslim Theologian's Response to Christianity: Ibn Taymiyya's Al-Jawab al-Sahih*, Delmar: Caravan, 1984, pp. 27–8.
 - 21 See T. Homerin, "Ibn Taymiyya's *Al-Ṣūfiyyah wa-al-fuqarā'*," *Arabica*, 32, 1985, 219–44; A. Knysh, *Ibn 'Arabī in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image In Medieval Islam*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999, pp. 87–111; and T. Michel, "Ibn Taymiyya's *Sharḥ* on the *Futūḥ al-Ghayb* of 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī," *Hamdard Islamicus*, 4, 1982, 3–12; and Michel, *A Muslim's Theologian's Response to Christianity*, pp. 27–8.
 - 22 See D. Syafruddin's analysis of this commentary in his "The Principles of Ibn Taymiyya's Qur'ānic Interpretation," M.A. Thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1994, pp. 78–97.
 - 23 See R. Curtis, "Authentic Interpretation of Classical Islamic Texts: An analysis of the introduction to Ibn Kathīr's 'Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm,'" Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1989, pp. 76–87 and Syafruddin, "The Principles of Ibn Taymiyya's Qur'ānic Interpretation," pp. 122–3.

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
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THE SIGNS BEFORE THE DAY OF JUDGEMENT

Author: Al-Haafidh Ibn Katheer Hadeeth
Checking: Abu Talhah Daawood Burbank

Ayaat and Ahaadeeth about the Hour





"My Lord! Increase me in knowledge!" - Qur'an 20:114"

Allaah (subhaanahu wa ta'aala) said:

"They ask you (O Muhammad sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) about the Hour, - when will be its appointed time? You have no knowledge to say anything about it, To your Lord belongs (the knowledge of) the term thereof? You (O Muhammad sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) are only a warner for those who fear it, The Day they see it, (it will be) as if they had not tarried (in this world) except an afternoon or a morning." [An-Nazi'at (79):42-46]

"They ask you about the Hour (Day of Resurrection): 'When will be its appointed time?' Say: 'The knowledge thereof is with my Lord (Alone). None can reveal its time but He. Heavy is its burden through the heavens and the earth. It shall not come upon you except all of a sudden.' They ask you as if you have a good knowledge of it. Say: 'The knowledge thereof is with Allaah (Alone) but most of mankind know not.'" [Al-A'raaf (7):187]

There are many Ayaat and Ahaadeeth concerning this subject: Allaah said:

"The Hour has drawn near, and the moon has been cleft asunder." [Al-Qamar (54):1]

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, whilst pointing with his index and middle fingers,

"The time of my advent and the Hour are like these two fingers." [1]

In another report he said,

"The Hour almost came before me."

This indicates how close we are, relatively speaking, to the Hour.

Allaah said:

"Draws near for mankind their reckoning, while they turn away in heedlessness." [Al-Anbiyaa' (21):1]

"The Event (the Hour or the punishment of disbelievers and polytheists or the Islaamic laws or commandments), ordained by Allaah will come to pass, so seek not to hasten it. Glorified and Exalted be He above all that they associate as partners with Him." [An-Nahl (16):1]

"Those who believe not therein seek to hasten it, while those who believe are fearful of it, and know that it is the very truth. Verily, those who dispute concerning the Hour are certainly in error far away." [Ash-Shooraa (42):18]

In Saheeh al-Bukhaaree, there is a Hadeeth which states that a Bedouin asked the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) about the Hour.

He (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"It will surely come to pass. What have you prepared for it?" The man said, "O Messenger of Allaah, I have not prepared much in the way of prayer and good works, but I love Allaah and His Messenger." The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "You will be with those you love." The Muslims had never rejoiced as much they did when they heard this Hadeeth. [2]

Some Ahaadeeth report that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) was asked about the Hour. He looked towards a young boy and said, "If he lives, he will not grow very old before he sees your Last Hour coming to you." [3]

By this he meant their death and entering the Hereafter, because everyone who dies enters the Hereafter; some people say that when a person has died, his judgment has begun. This Hadeeth with this meaning is "correct" (Saheeh).

Some heretics comment on this Hadeeth and give it an incorrect meaning. The exact timing of the Great Hour (as-Saa'at al-'Uzmaa) is something which Allaah alone knows and which He has not revealed to anyone, as is clear from the Hadeeth in which the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said:

"There are five things which nobody knows except Allaah;" then he recited, "Verily, Allaah! With Him (Alone) is the knowledge of the Hour, He sends down the rain, and knows that which is in the wombs. No person knows what he will earn tomorrow, and no person knows in what land he will die. Verily, Allaah is All Knower, All Aware (of things)."

[Luqman (31):34] [4]

When Gabriel (Jibreel) (alayhi-salaam) came to the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) in the guise of a Bedouin, he asked him about Islaam, Eemaan (faith) and Ihsaan (excellence of faith); and the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) answered his questions. But when he asked him about the Hour, he said,

"The one questioned about it knows no better than the questioner." Jibreel said, "Tell me about its signs." Then the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) described them, as we shall see later when we quote this Hadeeth and others in full.

Hudhayfah said:

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) stood up one day to speak to us, and told us everything that was going to happen until the Hour, and left nothing unsaid. Some of the listeners learnt it by heart, and some forgot it; these friends of mine learnt it. I do not remember it completely, but sometimes it springs to mind, just as one might remember and recognise the face of a man whom one had forgotten, when one sees him." [Abu Daawood, Muslim] [5]

Imaam Ahmad reported via Abu Nudrah that Abu Sa'eed said:

"One day the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) led us in praying the afternoon prayer (Salaat al-'Asr). Then he stood and addressed us until sunset. He mentioned everything that was to happen until the Day of Resurrection, and left nothing unsaid. Some of us remembered it, and some of us forgot it. One of the things he said was:

'O people, this world is full of attractive temptations. Allaah has appointed you as vicegerents (Khaleefah) in this world, and He will see how you will act. So guard yourselves against the temptations of this world and of women.'

Towards the end of this speech, he said,

'The sun is about to set, and what remains of this world, compared to what has passed, is like what remains of this day compared to what has passed.' [6]"

'Alee ibn Zayd ibn Jad'an al-Timi narrated some Gharib and Munkar Ahaadeeth - which could bring into question the validity of this Hadeeth. But there are some reports which are similar to this Hadeeth, and which were transmitted with different isnaads. Part of this Hadeeth is in Saheeh Muslim, through Abu Nudrah on the authority of Abu Sa'eed. This Hadeeth refers to something which is beyond any doubt: what remains of this world, compared to what has passed, is very little. In spite of that, no-one can know exactly how much time is left except Allaah, and no-one can know exactly how much time has passed, except Allaah.

Footnotes

[1] Bukhaaree, Kitaab at-Tafsir, commentary on Surat an-Nazi'aat, 6/206.

[2] A similar Hadeeth was narrated by Bukhaaree in Kitaab al-Adab.

[3] See Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Adab; Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashraat

al-Sa'ah.

[4] Bukhaaree, Kitaab at-Tafsir, commentary on Luqman 31:34. A longer Hadeeth is narrated by Muslim in Kitaab al-Eemaan.

[5] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashraaat al-Sa'ah; Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Fitan wa'l-Malahim.

[6] The whole speech is narrated by Imaam Ahmad in his Musnad, 2/61. Checker's Note: Da'eef, al-Musnad (3/61) [or 2/61 as stated in the book??], at-Tirmidhee and al-Hakim (4/505). Da'eef due to `Alee ibn Zayd ibn Jad'an. al-Mishkat: 5145 of al-Albaanee. Parts of the complete speech are authentic, see Ibn Kathir's comments.

General Description of the Fitan (Tribulations)

Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman said,

"People used to ask the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) about good things, but I used to ask him about bad things because I was afraid that they might overtake me. I said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, we were lost in ignorance (Jahiliyyah) and evil, then Allaah brought this good (i.e. Islaam). Will some evil come after this good thing?' He said, 'Yes' I asked, 'And will some good come after that evil?' He said, 'Yes, but it will be tainted with some evil' I asked, 'How will it be tainted?' He said, 'There will be some people who will lead others on a path different from mine. You will see good and bad in them.'" I asked, 'Will some evil come after that good?' He said, 'Some people will be standing and calling at the gates of Hell; whoever responds to their call, they will throw him into the Fire.' I said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, describe them for us.' He said, 'They will be from our own people, and will speak our language.' I asked, 'What do you advise me to do if I should live to see that?' He said, 'Stick to the main body (jamaa'ah) of the Muslims and their leader (Imaam). I asked, 'What if there is no main body and no leader?' He said 'Isolate yourself from all of these sects, even if you have to eat the roots of trees until death overcomes you while you are in that state.' [1]"

'Abd Allaah ibn Mas'ood said:

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Islaam began as something strange, and it will revert to being strange as it was in the beginning, so good tidings for the strangers.' Someone asked, 'Who are the strangers?' He said, 'The ones who break away from their people (literally, 'tribes') for the sake of Islaam.'" This Hadeeth was narrated by Ibn Majah on the authority of Anas and Abu Hurairah. [2]

Footnotes

[1] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/65.

[2] Muslim, Kitaab al-Eemaan, 1/90: Ibn Majah, Kitaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 3988), 2/1320.

Divisions Within the Main Religious Groups

Abu Hurairah reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said:

"The Jews have split into seventy-one sects, and my Ummah will divide into seventy-three." [1]

'Awf ibn Malik reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said:

"The Jews split into seventy-one sects: one will enter Paradise and seventy will enter Hell. The Christians split into seventy-two sects: seventy-one will enter Hell and one will enter Paradise. By Him in Whose hand is my soul, my Ummah will split into seventy-three sects: one will enter Paradise and seventy-two will enter Hell." Someone asked, "O Messenger of Allaah, who will they be?" He replied, "The main body of the Muslims (al-Jamaa'ah)."

'Awf ibn Malik is the only one who reported this Hadeeth, and its isnaad is acceptable. [2]

Anas ibn Malik said,

"I shall tell you a Hadeeth which I heard from the Messenger of Allaah, and which no-one will tell you after me. I heard him say, 'Among the signs of the Hour will be the disappearance of knowledge and the appearance of ignorance. Adultery will be prevalent and the drinking of wine will be common. The number of men will decrease and the number of women will increase until there will be fifty women to be looked after by one man.'" This Hadeeth was reported in the two Saheehs from the Hadeeth of 'Abd Rabbihi. [3]

'Abd Allaah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Just before the Hour, there will be days in which knowledge will disappear and ignorance will appear, and there will be much killing.' " [Ibn Maajah; also narrated by Bukhaaree and Muslim, from the Hadeeth of al-A'mash] [4]

Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Islaam will become worn out like clothes are, until there will be no-one who knows what fasting, prayer, charity and rituals are. The Qur'aan will disappear in one night, and no Ayah will be left on earth. Some groups of old people will be left who will say, 'We heard our fathers saying La ilaha illa Allaah, so we repeated it.' Silah asked Hudhayfah, "What will saying La ilaha illa Allaah do for them when they do not know what prayer, fasting, ritual and charity

are?" Hudhayfah ignored him; then Silah repeated his question three times, and each time Hudayfah ignored him. Finally he answered, "O Silah, it will save them from Hell", and said it three times. [Ibn Maajah] [5] This indicates that in the last days, knowledge will be taken from the people, and even the Qur'aan will disappear from the Mushafs and from people's hearts. People will be left without knowledge. Only the old people will tell them that they used to hear people saying La ilaha illa Allaah; and they will repeat it to feel close to Allaah, so it will give them some blessing, even if they do not have any good deeds or beneficial knowledge. Knowledge will be taken away from men and ignorance will increase during the last days, and their ignorance and misguidance will increase until the end, as in the Hadeeth of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam):

"The Hour will not come upon anyone who says, 'Allaah, Allaah'; it will only come upon the most evil of men." [6]

Footnotes

[1] Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 3991), 2/1321.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh Ibn Maajah: 3225

[2] Abu Daawood, Kitaab as-Sunnah, (Hadeeth 4572, 4573), 12/1340-2. "The main body of the Muslims (al-Jamaa'ah)" means the people of the Qur'aan, Hadeeth, Fiqh and other sciences, who have agreed to follow the Traditions of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) in all circumstances without introducing any changes or imposing their own confused ideas.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh al-Jami as-Sagheer: 1082, the narration of `Awf ibn Malik is also reported by Ibn Maajah (no. 4992), Ibn Abee `Asim in as-Sunnah (no. 63) and al-Lalikai in Sharh us-Sunnah (no. 1492).

[3] A similar Hadeeth was narated by al-Bukhaaree in Kitaab al-'Ilm, 1/30,31; and by Muslim.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, al-Bukhari and Muslim.

[4] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/61; Msulim, Kitaab al-'Ilm, 8/58.

[5] Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 87.

[6]The first part of it was related by Muslim in Kitab al-Eemaan, 1/91, and the second part in Kitab al-Fitan wa Ashraat al-Sa'ah, 8/208.

The Evils Which Will Befall the Muslim Ummah During The Last Days

'Abd Allaah ibn 'Umar said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) came to us and said, 'O Muhaajiroon, (emigrants from Makkah to al-Madinah) you may be

afflicted by five things; God forbid that you should live to see them. If fornication should become widespread, you should realise that this has never happened without new diseases befalling the people which their forebears never suffered. If people should begin to cheat in weighing out goods, you should realise that this has never happened without drought and famine befalling the people, and their rulers oppressing them. If people should withhold Zakaat, you should realise that this has never happened without the rain being stopped from falling; and were it not for the animals' sake, it would never rain again. If people should break their covenant with Allaah and His Messenger, you should realise that this has never happened without Allaah sending an enemy against them to take some of their possessions by force. If the leaders do not govern according to the Book of Allaah, you should realise that this has never happened without Allaah making them into groups and making them fight one another." [Ibn Maajah] [1]

'Alee ibn Abee Taalib said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said: 'If my Ummah bears fifteen traits, tribulation will befall it.' Someone asked, 'What are they, O Messenger of Allaah?' He said, 'When any gain is shared out only among the rich, with no benefit to the poor; when a trust becomes a means of making a profit; when paying Zakaat becomes a burden; when a man obeys his wife and disobeys his mother; and treats his friend kindly whilst shunning his father; when voices are raised in the mosques; when the leader of a people is the worst of them; when people treat a man with respect because they fear some evil he may do; when much wine is drunk; when men wear silk; when female singers and musical instruments become popular; when the last ones of this Ummah curse the first ones - then let them expect a red wind, or the earth to swallow them, or to be transformed into animals.'" [Tirmidhee] [2]

'Alee ibn Abee Taalib said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) led us in praying Salaat al-Fajr (the morning prayer). When he had finished, a man called to him: 'When will the Hour be? The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) reprimanded him and said 'Be quiet!' After a while he raised his eyes to the sky and said, 'Glorified be the One Who raised it and is taking care of it.' Then he lowered his gaze to the earth and said, 'Glory be to the One Who has outspread it and has created it.' Then the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Where is the one who asked me about the Hour?' The man knelt down and said, 'I asked you.' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will come when leaders are

oppressors, when people believe in the stars and reject al-Qadar (the Divine Decree of destiny) when a trust becomes a way of making a profit, when people give to charity (Sadaqah) reluctantly, when adultery becomes widespread - when this happens, then your people will perish." [3]

'Imran ibn Husayn said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Some people of this Ummah will be swallowed up by the earth, some will be transformed into animals, and some will be bombarded with stones.' One of the Muslims asked, 'When will that be, O Messenger of Allaah?' He said, 'When singers and musical instruments will become popular, and much wine will be drunk.'" [4]

Footnotes

[1] Narrated by Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 4019), 2/1332.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 106-107.

[2] Tirmidhee, Abwaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 308), 6/4620-458.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, Da'eef al-Jami as-Sagheer: 608.

[3] al-Haythami, Kitaab al-Fitan.

Checker's Note: al-Haythami, says, "al-Bazzar reports it and it contains narrators I do not know." We do not know the status of the hadeeth as no muhaddith (as far as we know) has given a definite verdict.

[4] Narrated by at-Tirmidhee.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1604.

The Greater Signs of the Hour

After the lesser signs of the Hour appear and increase, mankind will have reached a stage of great suffering. Then the awaited Mahdee will appear; he is the first of the greater, and clear, signs of the Hour. There will be no doubt about his existence, but this will only be clear to the knowledgeable people. The Mahdee will rule until the False Messiah (al-Maseeh ad-Dajjal) appears, who will spread oppression and corruption. The only ones who will know him well and avoid his evil will be those who have great knowledge and Eemaan (faith).

The false Messiah will remain for a while, destroying mankind completely, and the earth will witness the greatest Fitnah (tribulation) in its history.

Then the Messiah Jesus (alayhi salam) will descend, bringing justice from heaven. He will kill the Dajjal, and there will be years of safety and security.

Then the appearance of Ya'jooj and Ma'jooj (Gog and Magog) will take mankind by surprise, and corruption will overtake them again. In answer

to Jesus' faithful prayer to Allaah (subhanahu wa ta'aala), they will die, and safety, security, justice and stability will return.

This state of affairs will continue for some years, until the death of Jesus. The Ulamaa differ concerning the order in which the other greater signs of the Hour will come about. They are:

- The destruction of the Ka'bah and the recovery of its treasure.
- The rising of the sun from the west.
- The emergence of the Beast from the earth.
- The smoke.
- A wind will take the souls of the believers.
- The Qur'aan will be taken up into heaven.
- A fire will drive the people to their last gathering place.
- The Trumpet will be sounded: at the first sound everyone will feel terror; at the second sound all will be struck down; at the last sound all will be resurrected.

The Mahdee

The Mahdee will come at the end of time; he is one of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and Imaams. He is not the Mahdee who is expected by the Shee'ah, who they claim will appear from a tunnel in Saamarraa. This claim of theirs has no basis in reality nor in any reliable source. They allege that his name is Muhammad ibn al-Hasan ibn al-Askaree, and that he went into the tunnel when he was five years old.

The matter we intend to discuss has been proven by Ahaadeeth narrated from the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam): that the Mahdee will appear at the end of time. I believe that he will appear before Jesus the son of Mary comes down, as the Ahaadeeth indicate.

Hajjaaj said that he heard Alee say,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "Even if there were only one day left for the world, Allaah would send a man from among us to fill the world with justice, just as it had been filled with oppression and justice." [Ahmad] [1]

Alee said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "The Mahdee is one of us, from among the people of my household. In one night Allaah will inspire him and prepare him to carry out his task successfully." [Ahmad and Ibn Maajah] [2]

Alee said, whilst looking at his son al-Hasan,

This son of mine is a Sayyid (master), as the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) named him. Among his descendants there will be man named after your Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam). He will resemble him

in behaviour but not in looks. Then he told them the report which mentions that the earth will be filled with justice. [Abu Daawood] [3]

Abu Daawood devoted a chapter of his Sunan to the subject of the Mahdee. At the beginning of this chapter he quoted the Hadeeth of Jaabir ibn Samrah, in which the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "This religion will remain steadfast until twelve caliphs have ruled over you." (According to another report he said, "This religion will remain strong until twelve caliphs have ruled over you.") Jaabir said, "The people cheered and shouted Allaahu Akbar! Then the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) whispered something. I asked my father 'What did he say?' My father said, 'He said, All of them will be from Quraysh.'" Another report says that when the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) returned to his house, Quraysh came to him and asked, "What will happen after that?" He said, "Then there will be tribulation and killing." [4]

Abu Daawood reported a Hadeeth from Abd Allaah ibn Masood: "The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "If there were only one day left for the world, that day would be lengthened until a man from among my descendants or from among the people of my household, was sent; his name will be the same as my name, and his fathers name will be the same as my fathers name. He will fill the earth with justice and fairness, just as it will have been filled with injustice and oppression. The world will not end until a man of my household, whose name is the same as mine, holds sway." [5]

Abd Allaah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'A man from my household, whose name is like mine, will take power.'" [Tirmidhee] [6]

In another report, from Abu Hurairah, the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"If there were only one day left for this world, Allaah would lengthen it until he took power." [7]

Aboo Sa'eed said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Mahdee will be one of my descendants; he will have a high forehead and a hooked nose. He will fill the earth with justice and fairness just as it was filled with injustice and oppression, and he will rule for seven years.'" [Abu Daawood] [8]

Umm Salamah said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'The Mahdee will be one of my descendants, from the children of Faatimah.'" [Abu Daawood] [9]

Umm Salamah reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"People will begin to differ after the death of a Khaleefah. A man from the people of Madinah will flee to Makkah. Some of the people of Makkah will come to him and drag him out against his will; they will swear allegiance to him between al-Rukn and al-Maqam. An army will be sent against him from Syria; it will be swallowed up in the desert between Makkah and Madinah. When the people see this, groups of people from Syria and Iraq will come and swear allegiance to him. Then a man from Quraysh whose mother is from Kalb will appear and send an army against them, and will defeat them; this will be known as the Battle of Kalb. Whoever does not witness the spoils of this battle will miss much! The Mahdee will distribute the wealth, and will rule the people according to the Sunnah of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam). Then he will die, and the Muslims will pray for him." [Abu Daawood] [10]

Alee said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'A man named al-Haarith ibn Hirath will come from Transoxania. His army will be led by a man named Mansoor. He will pave the way for and establish the government of the family of Muhammad, just as Quraysh established the government of the Messenger of Allaah. Every believer will be obliged to support him.'" [Abu Daawood] [11]

Abd Allaah ibn al-Haarith ibn Juz' al-Zubaydee said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'A people will come out of the East who will pave the way for the Mahdee.'" [Ibn Maajah] [12]

Abd Allaah said,

"Whilst we were with the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam), some young men from Banu Hashim approached us. When the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) saw them, his eyes filled with tears and the colour of his face changed. I said, 'We can see something has changed in your face, and it upsets us.' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'We are the people of a Household for whom Allaah has chosen the Hereafter rather than this world. The people of my Household (Ahl al-Bayt) will suffer a great deal after my death, and will be persecuted until a people carrying black banners will come out of the east. They will instruct the people to do good, but the people will refuse; they will fight until they are victorious, and the people do as they asked, but they will not accept it from them until they hand over power to a man from my household. Then the earth will be filled with fairness, just as it had been filled with injustice. If any of you live to see this, you should go

to him even if you have to crawl across ice.'" [13]

This text refers to the rule of the Abbasids, as we have mentioned above in the text referring to the beginning of their rule in 132 AH. It also indicates that the Mahdee will appear after the Abbasids, and that he will be one of the Ahl al-Bayt, a descendant of Faatimah, the daughter of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam), through Hasan, not Husayn, as mentioned in the Hadeeth from Alee ibn Abee Taalib; and Allaah knows best. [14]

Thwaban said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Three men will be killed at the place where your treasure is. Each of them will be the son of a Khaleefah, and none of them will get hold of the treasure. Then the black banners will come out of the East, and they will slaughter you in a way which has never been seen before.' Then he said something which I do not remember; then, 'If you see him, go and give him your allegiance, even if you have to crawl over ice, because he is the Khaleefah of Allaah, the Mahdee.'" [Ibn Maajah] [15]

The treasure referred to in this text is the treasure of the Ka'bah. Towards the end of time, three of the sons of the Khaleefahs will fight to get hold of it, until the Mahdee appears. He will appear from the East, not from the tunnel of Saamarraa, as the Shee'ah claim; they believe that he is in this tunnel now, and they are waiting for him to emerge at the end of time.

There is no evidence for it in any book or Saheeh tradition, and there is no benefit in believing this.

The truth of the matter is that the Mahdee whose coming is promised at the end of time will appear from the East, and people will swear allegiance to him at the Ka'bah, as some Ahaadeeth indicate.

At the time of the Mahdee, there will be peace and prosperity, with abundant crops and wealth, strong rulers, and Islaam will be well-established.

Aboo Sa'eed said,

"By Allaah every ruler we have had has been worse than the previous one, and every year has been worse than the year before, but I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'Among your rulers will be one who will give out wealth freely, without counting it. A man will come and ask him for money, and he will say, "Take"; the man will spread his cloak out and the ruler will pour money into it.' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) spread out a thick cloak he had been wearing, to demonstrate the man's actions; then he gathered it up by its corners and said, 'Then the man will take it and leave.'" [Ahmad] [16]

Footnotes

[1] Ahmad, al-Musnad; similar Hadeeth in Abu Daawood, Kitaab Awwal al-Mahdee.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Ahmad and Abu Daud, Saheeh al-Jami as-Sagheer: 5305.

[2] Ahmad, al-Musnad and Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan.

Checker's Note: Saheeh Saheeh al-Jami as-Sagheer: 6735. It has been mistranslated slightly, it should be "In one night, Allaah will prepare him," the mention of inspiration and the carrying out of the task is explanatory.

[3] See Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Mahdee.

Checker's Note: Da'eef Munqati' (chain of narration is broken), al-Mishkat, 1st checking: 5462.

[4] Checker's Note: "... returned to his house" is a da'eef addition. The rest of the hadeeth is saheeh.

[5] See Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Mahdee.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh Abee Daawood: 3601.

[6] Checker's Note: "A man from my household ..." Hasan, Saheeh al-Jami as-Sagheer: 8160.

[7] at-Tirmidhee, in his chapters dealing with al-Fitan.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh at-Tirmidhee: 1819.

[8] Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Mahdee.

Checker's Note: Hasan, Saheeh Abee Daawood: 3604. Translation states, "... a hooked nose." Correct translation is "... an aquiline nose."

[9] Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Mahdee.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh Abee Daawood: 3603.

[10] Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Mahdee.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, al-Mishkat, 1st checking: 5456.

[11] Checker's Note: Da'eef, Da'eef al-Jami as-Sagheer: 6418.

[12] Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 3088).

Checker's Note: Da'eef, Silsilatul Ahaadeeth ad-Da'eefah: 4826.

[13] Ibn Maajah, ibid., (Hadeeth 4082).

Checker's Note: Da'eef, Da'eef Ibn Maajah: 886.

[14] See Ahaadeeth above. (Ref. 1, 2 & 3)

Checker's Note: Footnote refers to hadeeth no. 3.

[15] Narrated by Ibn Maajah, op. cit., Hadeeth 4084.

Checker's Note: Da'eef Munkar (the isnaad is weak and moreover the meaning is wrong). In this case, the mention of "Khaleefah of Allaah" is munkar because Allaah cannot have a successor or vicegerent in His absence, Silsilatul Ahaadeeth ad-Da'eefah: 85.

[16] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/98.

Checker's Note: Da'eef. Its isnaad contains Mujahid ibn Sa'eed

Different Kinds of Fitan (Tribulations)

Zaynab bint Jahsh said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) got up from his sleep; his face was flushed and he said, 'There is no god but Allaah. Woe to the Arabs, for a great evil which is nearly approaching them. Today a gap has been made in the wall of Gog and Magog like this (Sufyan illustrated this by forming the number of 90 or 100 with his fingers).' Someone asked, 'Shall we be destroyed even though there are righteous people among us?' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Yes, if evil increases.'" [Bukhaaree] [1]

Umm Salamah, the wife of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"One night the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) got up and said, 'SubhanAllaah! How many tribulations have come down tonight, and how many treasures have been disclosed! Go and wake the dwellers of these apartments (i.e. his wives) for prayer. A well-dressed soul in this world may be naked in the Hereafter.'" [Bukhaaree] [2]

Usamah ibn Zayd said,

"Once the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) stood over one of the battlements of al-Madinah and asked the people, 'Do you see what I see?' They said, 'No.' He said, 'I see afflictions falling upon your houses as rain drops fall.'" [Bukhaaree and Muslim] [3]

Abu Hurairah (radiallahu anhu) said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Time will pass rapidly, knowledge will decrease, miserliness will become widespread in peoples hearts, afflictions will appear, and there will be much Harj.' The people asked, 'O Messenger of Allaah, what is Harj?' He said, 'Killing, killing!'" [Bukhaaree] [4]

Al-Zubayr ibn Adee narrated,

"We went to Anas ibn Malik and complained about the wrong we were suffering at the hands of al-Hajjaaj. Anas ibn Malik said, 'Be patient, "For no time will come but that the time following it will be worse, until you meet your Lord." I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say that.'" [Bukhaaree]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'There will come a time of afflictions when one who sits will be better than one who stands; one who stands will be better than one who walks; and one who walks

will be better than one who runs. Whoever exposes himself to these afflictions, they will destroy him. So whoever can find a place of protection or refuge from them, should take shelter in it." [Bukhaaree and Muslim] [5]

Hudhayfah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) told us two Hadeeth, one of which I have seen fulfilled, and I am waiting for the fulfilment of the other. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) told us that honesty came down into mens hearts (from Allaah); then they learnt it from the Qur'aan, and then from the Sunnah. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) told us that honesty would be taken away. He said, 'Man will be overtaken by sleep, during which honesty will be taken away from his heart, and only its trace will remain, like traces of a dark spot. Then man will be overtaken by slumber again, during which honesty will decrease still further, until its trace will resemble a blister such as is caused when an ember is dropped onto ones foot: it swells, but there is nothing inside. People will be carrying on with their trade, but there will hardly be any trustworthy persons. People will say, There is an honest man in such-and-such a tribe. Later they will say about some man, What a wise, polite and strong man he is! - although he will not have faith even the size of a mustard-seed in his heart.' Indeed, there came a time when I did not mind dealing with any one of you, for if he were a Muslim his Islaam would compel him to pay whatever he owed me, and if he were a Christian, the Muslim official would compel him to pay it. But now I do not deal with anyone except so-and-so and so-and-so." [Bukhaaree] [6]

Ibn Umar said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) stood beside the pulpit, facing the east, and said, 'Afflictions will verily emerge from here, where the top of Satans head will appear.'" [Bukhaaree] [7]

Abu Hurairah said that he had heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say,

"The Hour will not come until a man passes by someone's grave and says, 'Would that I were in his place!'" [Bukhaaree] [8]

Abu Hurairah said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'The Hour will not come until the buttocks of the women of Daws move whist going around Dhoo l-Khalasah.'" Dhoo l-Khalasah was an idol worshipped by the tribe of Daws during the Jaahiliyyah. [Hadeeth from Bukhaaree] [9]

Abu Hurairah also said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Euphrates will

disclose a golden treasure. Whoever is present at that time should not take anything of it." [10]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will not come before the Euphrates uncovers a mountain of gold, for which people will fight. Ninety-nine out of every hundred will die, but every one among them will say that perhaps he will be the one who will survive (and thus possess the gold).'" [Muslim] [11]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will not come until the following events have come to pass: two large groups will fight the another, and there will be many casualties; they will both be following the same religious teaching. Nearly thirty Dajjaals will appear, each of them falsely claiming to be a Messenger from Allaah. Knowledge will disappear, earthquakes will increase, time will pass quickly, afflictions will appear, and Harj (ie killing) will increase. Wealth will increase, so that a wealthy man will worry lest no-one accept his Zakaat, and when he offers it to anyone, that person will say, "I am not in need of it." People will compete in constructing high buildings. When a man passes by someones grave, he will say, "Would that I were in his place!" The sun will rise from the west; when it rises and the people see it, they will believe, but,

"No good will it do to a soul to believe in them then, if it believed not before nor earned righteousness through its faith..." [Al-An'aam (6):158]

"The Hour will come suddenly: when a man has milked his she-camel and taken away the milk, but he will not have time to drink it; before a man repairing a tank for his livestock will be able to put water in it for his animals; and before a man who has raised a morsel of food to his mouth will be able to eat it." [Bukhaaree] [12]

Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman said,

"Of all the people, I know most about every tribulation which is going to happen between now and the Hour. This is not because the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) told me something in confidence which he did not tell anyone else; it is because I was present among a group of people to whom he spoke about the tribulations (al-Fitan). The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) mentioned three tribulations which would hardly spare anybody, and some which would be like storms in summer; some would be great and some would be small. Everyone who was present at that gathering has passed away, except me." [Muslim] [13]

Abu Hurairah said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, "If you live for a while, you will see people go out under the wrath of Allaah and come back under His curse, and they will have in their hands whips like the tail of an ox." [Ahmad, Muslim] [14]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'There are two types among the people of Hell whom I have not yet seen. The first are people who have whips like the tails of oxen, with which they beat people, and the second are women who are naked in spite of being dressed; they will be led astray and will lead others astray, and their heads will look like camels humps. These women will not enter Paradise; they will not even experience the faintest scent of it, even though the fragrance of Paradise can be perceived from such a great distance.'" [15]

Anas ibn Malik said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) was asked, 'O Messenger of Allaah, (what will happen) when we stop enjoining good and forbidding evil?' He said, 'When what happened to the Israelites happens among you: when fornication becomes widespread among your leaders, knowledge is in the hands of the lowest of you, and power passes into the hands of the least of you.'" [Ibn Maajah] [16]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Woe to the Arabs from the great evil which is nearly approaching them: it will be like patches of dark night. A man will wake up as a believer, and be a kafir (unbeliever) by nightfall. People will sell their religion for a small amount of worldly goods. The one who clings to his religion on that day will be as one who is grasping an ember - or thorns.'" [Ahmad] [17]

Abu Hurairah said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) saying to Thawbaan, 'O Thawban, what will you do when the nations call one another to invade you as people call one another to come and eat from one bowl?'

Thawbaan said, 'May my father and my mother be sacrificed for you, O Messenger of Allaah! Is it because we are so few?' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'No, on that day you (Muslims) will be many, but Allaah will put weakness (wahn) in your hearts.' The people asked, 'What is that weakness, O Messenger of Allaah?' He said, 'It is love for this world and dislike of fighting.'" [Ahmad] [18]

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"There will be a tribulation in which one who is sleeping will be better than one who is lying down, one who is lying will be better than one who is

sitting, one who is sitting will be better than one who is standing, one who is standing will be better than one who is walking, one who is walking will be better than one who is riding, and one who is riding will be better than one who is running; all of their dead will be in Hell." The Companion of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) who narrated this Hadeeth said, "O Messenger of Allaah, when will that be?" He said, "That will be the days of Harj." He asked, "When will the days of Harj be?" The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "When a man will not trust the person to whom he is speaking." The Companion asked, "What do you advise me to do if I live to see that?" He said, "Restrain yourself, and go back to your place of residence." The Companion then asked, "O Messenger of Allaah, what should I do if someone enters my neighbourhood to attack me?" He said, "Go into your house." The Companion asked, "What if he enters my house?" He said, "Go into the place where you pray and do this - and he folded his arms, - and say 'My Lord is Allaah', until you die." [19]

Abu Bakrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'There will be a tribulation during which one who is lying down will be better than one who is sitting, one who is sitting will be better than one who is standing, one who is standing will be better than one who is walking, and one who is walking will be better than one who is running.' Someone asked, 'O Messenger of Allaah, what do you advise me to do?' He said, 'Whoever has camels, let him stay with them, and whoever has land, let him stay in his land.' Someone asked, 'What about someone who does not have anything like that?' He said, 'Then let him take his sword and strike its edge against a stone, then go as far away as possible.'" [Abu Daawood; similar Hadeeth in Muslim] [20]

At the time of the Fitnah of Uthmaan ibn Affaan's Khilaafah (Caliphate), Sa'd ibn Abee Waqqaas said,

"I bear witness that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'There will come a tribulation during which one who sits will be better than one who stands, one who stands will be better than one who walks, and one who walks will be better than one who runs.' Someone asked, 'What do you advise if someone enters my house to kill me?' He said, 'Be like the son of Adam (i.e. resign yourself).'" [Muslim, Tirmidhee] [21]

Abu Moosaa al-Asharee said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Before the Hour comes, there will be a tribulation like patches of dark night. A man will get up a believer and go to sleep a kaafir, or will go to sleep a believer and

get up a kaafir. The one who sits will be better than one who stands, and one who walks will be better than one who runs. Break your bows, cut their strings, and strike your swords against stones. If someone comes to kill any of you, then be like the better of the two sons of Adam." [Abu Daawood] [22]

Abu Dharr said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) was riding a donkey and sat me behind him. He said, 'O Abu Dharr, if the people were suffering from such severe hunger that you could not even get up from your bed to go to the mosque, what would you do?' I said, 'Allaah and His Messenger know best.' He said, 'Be decent and restrain yourself.' Then he said, 'O Abu Dharr, if the people were suffering from severe death (i.e. if a man were worth no more than a grave), what would you do? If the people were killing one another, until Hajar al-Zayt (an area of Madinah) were submerged in blood, what would you do?' I said, 'Allaah and His Messenger know best.' He said, 'Stay in your house and lock the door.' I asked, 'What if I am not left alone?' He said, 'Then be one of them.' I said, 'Should I take up my sword?' He said, 'If you did that, you would be joining them in their activities. No - if you fear that the brightness of the shining sword will disturb you, then cover your face with part of your clothing, and let him carry his own sin and your sin.'" [Ahmad] [23]

Abd Allaah ibn Amr said,

"We were on a journey with the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam)...When the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam)'s caller called for prayer, I went there. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) was addressing the people, saying: "O people, it has been the duty of every Prophet before me to guide his people to whatever he knew was good for them, and to warn them against whatever he knew was bad for them, but this Ummah has its time of peace and security at the beginning; at the end of its existence it will suffer trials and tribulations, one after the other. Tribulation will come, and the believer will say, "This will finish me", but it will pass. Another tribulation will come, and he will say, "This is it", but it will pass, and a third will come and go likewise. Whoever wishes to be rescued from Hell, and enter Paradise, let him die believing in Allaah and the Last Day, and treat the people as he himself wishes to be treated. If anyone gives allegiance to an Imaam, then let him obey him if he can (or on one occasion he said: as much as you can)."

Abd al-Rahman (one of the narrators of this Hadeeth) said,

"When I heard that, I put my head between my knees and said, 'But your cousin Mu'aawiyah is ordering us to squander our wealth among

ourselves in vanity, and to kill each other, although Allaah has said, "O you who believe! Squander not your wealth among yourselves in vanity..." ' [an-Nisaa (4):29]

Abd Allaah (another narrator) put his head in his hands and paused a while, then he raised his head and said,

"Obey him in that which is obedience to Allaah and disobey that which is disobedience to Allaah." I asked him, "Did you hear that from the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam)?" He said, "Yes, I heard it with my ears and understood it in my heart." [Ahmad, Abu Daawood, an-Nasaa'ee, Ibn Maajah] [24]

Abd Allaah ibn Amr said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'If you see my Ummah fearing a tyrant so much that they dare not tell him that he is a tyrant, then there will be no hope for them.'"

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"Among my Ummah, some will be swallowed up by the earth, some bombarded with stones, and some transformed into animals." [Ahmad] [25]

Footnotes

[1] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan.

[2] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-'Ilm.

[3] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/60; Muslim, Baab Nuzuul al-Fitan ka-Mawaaqi' al-Qatar, 8/168.

[4] Bukhaaree, ibid.

[5] op. cit., 9/64; Muslim, Baab Nuzuul al-Fitan ka-Mawaaqi' al-Qatar.

[6] Bukhaaree, op. cit., 9/66.

[7] Bukhaaree, Kitaab Bid' al-Khalq, 4/150.

[8] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/73.

[9] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/132

Daws: a tribe in Yemen; Dhoo l-Khalasah: a house full of idols - it is so called because they believed that whoever worshipped it or went around it would be purified (khallasa). This Hadeeth means that the tribe of Daws will become apostates from Islaam and will go back to idol worshipping; even their women will exert themselves in worshipping the idol and running around it, so that their flesh will quiver.

[10] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/73.

[11] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashraat al-Saa'ah, 8/174.

[12] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/74.

[13] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashraat al-Saa'ah, 8/172.

[14] Muslim, Kitaab al-Jannah wa Sifat Na'imihaa wa Ahlihaa, 8/155, 156.

[15] Muslim, ibid.

[16] Ibn Maajah narrated a similar Hadeeth in Kitaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 4015), 2/1331. Ahmad, Musnad, 3/187.

Checker's Note: Da'eef due to the `an`anah (usage of the word `an (from)) of Makhool, Da'eef Ibn Maajah: 870.

[17] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/390.

Checker's Note: Saheeh. Weak isnaad but supported by other narrations similar in meaning. Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: 2/390.

[18] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/359.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 958. Wording should be "dislike of death".

[19] Ahmad, Musnad, 1/448.

Checker's Note: Saheeh. Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: [??] Ahmad's narration contains an unnamed narrator who is named in the narration of Abdur Razzaaq, no. 20727 and al-Hakim, 4/320, and he is reliable.

[20] Abu Daawood, ibid. (Hadeeth 4236). Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/169.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh Abee Daawood: 3580.

[21] Tirmidhee, Abwaab al-Fitan, (Hadeeth 2290), 6/436, 438. Ahmad, Musnad, 1/185.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, al-Irwa, no. 2451 of Shaykh al-Albaanee. It is saheeh but has not been reported by Muslim, as main text states.

[22] Abu Daawood, Abwaab al-Fitan wa'l-Malaahim, (Hadeeth 4139), 11/337.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Abu Daawood and Ibn Maajah, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1535.

[23] Ahmad, Musnad, 5/149; similar Hadeeth in Abu Daawood, Abwaab al-Fitan wa'l-Malaahim, (Hadeeth 4241), 11-340, 343.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, al-Irwa, no: 2451.

[24] Ahmad, Musnad, 5/149. Muslim, Kitaab al-Imaarah, 6-18. Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 3956), 2/1306, 1037. an-Nasaa'ee, Kitaab al-Bay'ah (shorter version), 7-152, 153. Abu Daawood, Kitab al-Fitan (shorted version), Hadeeth 4429, 11-319.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 241.

[25] Ahmad, Musnad. 2/163.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, Silsilatul Ahaadeeth ad-Da'eefah: 1264. Its isnaad contains the `an`anah of Abu Zubair, but its last part ("Among my Ummah ...") is supported. See Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1787

The Signs and Portents of the Hour

'Abd Allaah ibn 'Amr said,

"I went to the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) one day whilst he was performing Wudoo' (ablution) slowly and carefully. He raised his head, looked at me and said, 'Six things will happen to this Ummah: the death of your Prophet - 'and when I heard that I was aghast,' - this is the first. The second is that your wealth will increase so much that if a man were given ten thousand, he would still not be content with it. The third is that tribulation will enter the house of every one of you. The fourth is that sudden death will be widespread. The fifth is a peace-treaty between you and the Romans: they will gather troops against you for nine months - like a woman's period of childbearing - then they will be the first to break the treaty. The sixth is the conquest of a city.' I asked, 'O Messenger of Allaah, which city?' He said, 'Constantinople.' " [Ahmad] [1]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Hasten to do good deeds before six things happen: the rising of the sun from the West, the smoke, the Dajjaal, the beast, the (death) of one of you, or general tribulation.' " [Ahmad, Muslim] [2]

Hudhayfah ibn 'Ubayd said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) came upon us whilst, we were busy in discussion. He asked us, 'What are you talking about?' We said, 'We are discussing the Hour.' He said, 'It will not come until you see ten signs: the smoke, the Dajjaal, the beast, the sun rising from the West, the descent of Jesus son of Mary, Gog and Magog, and three land-slides - one in the East, one in the West, and one in Arabia, at the end of which fire will burst forth from the direction of Aden (Yemen) and drive people to the place of their final assembly.' " [Ahmad] [3]

Footnotes

[1] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/174.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: 6623. Weak hadeeth due to Abri lamah al-Kalbi.

[2] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/207, Ahmad, Musnad, 2/337, 372.

[3] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/179.

Checker's Note: Wrong spelling, Ibn `Ubayd should be Ibn Usayd. Reported by Muslim, not by Ahmad as main text states.

The Battle with the Romans

After the battle with the Romans, which ended with the conquest of Constantinople, the Dajjaal will appear, and Jesus son of Mary will

descend from Heaven to the earth, to the white minaret in the east of Damascus, at the time of Salaat al-Fajr (the morning prayer), as we shall see in the Saheeh Traditions.

Dhoo Mukhammar said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'You will make a peace-treaty with the Romans, and together you will invade an enemy beyond Rome. You will be victorious and take much booty. Then you will camp in a hilly pasture; one of the Roman men will come and raise a cross and say "Victory to the Cross", so one of the Muslims will come and kill him. Then the Romans will break the treaty, and there will be a battle. They will gather an army against you and come against you with eighty banners, each banner followed by 10,000 men.' " [Ahmad, Abu Daawood, Ibn Maajah] [1]

Yusayr ibn Jaabir said,

"Once there was a red storm in Kufah. A man came who had nothing to say except, 'O 'Abd Allaah ibn Mas'ood, has the Hour come?' 'Abd Allaah was sitting reclining against something, and said, 'The Hour will not come until people will not divide inheritance, nor rejoice over booty.' Pointing towards Syria, he said, 'An enemy will gather forces against the Muslims and the Muslims will gather forces against them.' I asked, 'Do you mean the Romans?' He said, 'Yes. At that time there will be very heavy fighting. The Muslims will prepare a detachment to fight to the death; they will not return unless they are victorious. They will fight until night intervenes. Both sides will return without being victorious; then many will be killed on both sides. On the fourth day, the Muslims who are left will return to the fight, and Allaah will cause the enemy to be routed. There will be a battle the like of which has never been seen, so that even if a bird were to pass their ranks, it would fall down dead before it reached the end of them. Out of a family of one hundred, only one man will survive, so how could he enjoy the booty or divide any inheritance? While they are in this state, they will hear of an even worse calamity. A cry will reach them: "The Dajjaal has taken your place among your offspring." So they will throw away whatever is in their hands and go forward, sending 10 horsemen as a scouting party. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'I know their names, and the names of their fathers, and the colours of their horses. They will be the best horsemen on the face of the earth on that day.' " [Ahmad, Muslim] [2]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will not come until the Romans camp at al-A'mash or Dabeeq. An army,

composed of the best people on earth at that time, will come out from Madinah to meet them. When they have arranged themselves in ranks, the Romans will say, 'Do not stand between us and those who took prisoners from amongst us. Let us fight with them.' The Muslims will say, 'No, by Allaah, we will never stand aside from you and our brothers.' Then they will fight. One-third will runaway, and Allaah will never forgive them. One-third will be killed, and they will be the best of martyrs in Allaah's sight. One-third, who will never be subjected to trials or tribulations, will win, and will conquer Constantinople. Whilst they are sharing out the booty, after hanging their swords on the olive-trees, Satan will shout to them that the Dajjaal has taken their place among their families. When they come to Syria, the Dajjaal will appear, while they are preparing for battle and drawing up the ranks. When the time for prayer comes, Jesus the son of Mary will descend and lead them in prayer. When the enemy of Allaah (i.e. the Dajjaal) sees him, he will start to dissolve like salt in water, but Allaah will kill him.' " [Muslim] [3]

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "The Hour will not come until the furthest border of the Muslims will be in Bulaa." Then he said, "O 'Alee!" 'Alee said, "May my father and mother be sacrificed for you!" The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "You will fight the Romans, and those who come after you will fight them, until the best people among the Muslims, the people of al-Hijaaz, will go out to fight them, fearing nothing but Allaah. They will conquer Constantinople with Tasbeeh and Takbeer (saying "Subhaan Allaah" and "Allaahu Akbar"), and they will obtain booty the like of which has never been seen - they will share it out by scooping it up with their shields. Someone will come and say, 'The Dajjaal has appeared in your land', but he will be lying. Anyone who takes notice of him will regret it, and anyone who ignores him will regret it." [Ibn Maajah] [4]

Naafi' ibn 'Utbah said, "The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'You will attack Arabia, and Allaah will enable you to conquer it. Then you will attack Persia, and Allaah will enable you to conquer it. Then you will attack Rome, and Allaah will enable you to conquer it. Then you will attack the Dajjaal, and Allaah will enable you to conquer him.' " [Muslim] [5]

When Mustawrid al-Qurashee was sitting with 'Amr ibn al-'Aas, he said, "I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'The Hour will come when the Romans will be in the majority.' 'Amr asked him, "What are you saying?" He said, "I am repeating that which I heard from the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam)." 'Amr said, "If you say this, it is

true, because they have four good characteristics: they are the most able to cope with tribulation, the quickest to recover after disaster and to return to the fight after disaster, and are the best as far as treating the poor, weak and orphans is concerned. They have a fifth characteristic which is very good; they do not allow themselves to be oppressed by their kings." [6]

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"You will fight the Romans, and Believers from the Hijaaz will fight them after you, until Allaah enables them to conquer Constantinople and Rome with Tasbeeh and Takbeer ("Subhaan Allaah" and "Allaahu Akbar"). Its fortifications will collapse, and they will obtain booty the like of which has never been seen, so that they will share it out by scooping it up with their shields. Then someone will cry, 'O Muslims! The Dajjaal is in your country, with your families', and the people will leave the wealth. Anyone who takes notice will regret it and anyone who ignores it will regret it. They will ask, 'Who shouted?' but they will not know who he is. They will say, 'Send a vanguard to Ilyaa.' If the Dajjaal has appeared, you will hear about his deeds.' So they will go and see, and if they see that everything is normal, they will say, 'No-one would give a shout like that for no reason, so let us go together to Ilyaa.' If we find the Dajjaal there we will fight him together, until Allaah decides between us and him. If we do not find the Dajjaal, we will go back to our country and our families.'" [7]

Mu'aadh ibn Jabal said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The building of Bayt al-Maqdis (in Jerusalem) will be followed by the destruction of Yathrib (Madeenah), which will be followed by the conquest of Constantinople, which will be followed by the appearance of the Dajjaal.' Then he put his hand on the thigh or the shoulder of the one with whom he was speaking (i.e. Mu'aadh), and said, 'This is as true as the fact that you are here (or as true as you are sitting here).'" [8]

This does not mean that Madeenah will be destroyed completely before the appearance of the Day, but that will happen at the end of time, as we shall see in some authentic Ahaadeeth. But the building of Bayt al-Maqdis will be the cause of the destruction of Madeenah, as it was proven in the Hadeeth that the Dajjaal will not be able to enter Madinah. He will be prevented from doing so because it is surrounded by angles bearing unsheathed swords. [9]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said about Madeenah: 'Neither plague nor the Dajjaal can enter it.'" [Bukhaaree] [10]

Footnotes

[1] Similar Hadeeth in Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Malaahim, (Hadeeth 4271), 11/397/399. Ibn Maajah, Kitab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 4089), 2/1369. Ahmad, Musnad, 9104.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh al-Jami as-Sagheer: 3612.

[2] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/177, 178. Ahmad, Musnad, 1/384, 385.

[3] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8 - 175, 176.

Al-A'mash is a place outside the city, and Dabeeq is a market-place in the city. "The city" refers to Aleppo (some say Damascus).

[4] Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 4094), 2 - 1370.

The one who believes the liar will regret it, because he will find that the Dajjaal is not there. The one who does not believe him will regret it because the Dajjaal will appear soon afterwards.

Checker's Note: Fabricated. The reason is Kathir ibn `Abdillah, who is declared a liar by Abu Daawood and Shaafi'ee. He narrates a fabricated collection of hadeeth.

[5] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashtaar al-Saa'ah, 8 - 178. Ibn Maajah, Baab al-Malaahim (Hadeeth 4091), 2 - 1380.

[6] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitaan, 8 - 176.

[7] Al-Haythamee, Majma' al-Zawaa'id. Ibn Maajah, 7:248.

Checker's Note: Fabricated. Same reasons as the previous one.

Reported by al-Bazzar, Kashful Astar bi Zawa'id al-Bazzar of al-Haythamee: 3386.

[8] Hasan, al-Mishkat, 1st checking: 5424.

[9] Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Malaahim (Hadeeth 4273), 11 - 400, 401; Ahmad, Musnad, 5/245.

Checker's Note: Hasan.

[10] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/76.

The Appearance of the Dajjaal

First of all, we will quote the reports which mention the liars and "dajjaals" who will precede the coming of the Dajjaal, or Antichrist, who will be the last of them; may Allaah curse them and punish them with Hell-fire.

Jaabir ibn Samurah said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'Just before the Hour there will be many liars.' " Jaabir said, "Be on your guard against them." [Muslim] [1]

Jaabir said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'Just before the Hour there will be many liars; among them is the one in al-Yamamah, the

'Ansi in San'a', the one in Himyar, and the Dajjaal. This will be the greatest fitnah.' " [Ahmad] [2]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will not come ... until nearly 30 "dajjaals" (liars) appear, each one claiming to be a messenger from Allaah.' " [Bukhaaree and Muslim] [3]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will not come until 30 "dajjaals" appear, each of them claiming to be a messenger from Allaah, wealth increases, tribulations appear and al-Harj increases.' Someone asked, 'What is al-Harj?' He said, 'Killing, killing.' " [Ahmad] [4]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will not come until 30 "dajjaals" appear, all of them lying about Allaah and His Messenger.' " [Abu Daawood] [5]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Just before the Hour, there will be thirty "dajjaals", each of whom will say, I am a Prophet.' " [Ahmad] [6]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'There will be "dajjaals" and liars among my Ummah. They will tell you something new, which neither you nor your forefathers have heard. Be on your guard against them, and do not let them lead you astray.' " [Ahmad] [7]

Thawbaan said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'There will be thirty liars among my Ummah. Each one will claim that he is a prophet; but I am the last of the Prophets (Seal of the Prophets), and there will be no Prophet after me.' " [Ahmad] [8]

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"Verily before the Day of Resurrection there will appear the Dajjaal, and thirty or more liars." [Ahmad] [9]

Ibn 'Umar said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'Among my Ummah there will be more than seventy callers, each of whom will be calling people to Hell-fire. If I wished, I could tell you their names and tribes.' " [10]

Abu Bakrah said,

"The people spoke a great deal against Musaylimah before the Prophet

(sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said anything about him. Then the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) got up to give a speech and said: '...as for this man about whom you have spoken so much - he is one of the thirty liars who will appear before the Hour, and there is no town which will not feel the fear of the Antichrist.' " [Ahmad] [11]

In another version of this report, the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"He is one of the thirty liars who will appear before the Dajjaal. There is no town which will escape the fear of the Dajjaal, apart from Madeenah. At that time there will be two angels at every entrance of Madeenah, warding off the fear of the Antichrist." [12]

Anas ibn Malik said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The time of the Dajjaal will be years of confusion. People will believe a liar, and disbelieve one who tells the truth. People will distrust one who is trustworthy, and trust one who is treacherous; and the Ruwaybidah will have a say.' Someone asked, 'Who are the Ruwaybidah?' He said, 'Those who rebel against Allaah and will have a say in general affairs.' " [Ahmad] [13]

Footnotes

[1] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/189.

[2] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/345.

Checker's Note: Ahmad's isnaad contains Ibn Lahi'ah who reports by way of `an, as does Abu Zubair. Al-Bazzar's isnaad contains `Abdur-Rahman ibn Maghra and Mujaahid ibn Sa`eed. Majma' az-Zawaid of al-Haythamee: 7/335. The status of the hadeeth is unknown as no muhaddith, as far as we know, has given a definite verdict.

[3] See Part 7, where the Hadeeth is quoted in full.

[4] Ahmad, Musnad, 2 - 457.

Checker's Note: Saheeh.

[5] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/450.

Checker's Note: Hasan, Saheeh Abee Daawood: 3643.

[6] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/429.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1683.

[7] Ahmad, Musnad, 20/349.

Checker's Note: Da'eef isnaad, but Muslim reports similar wording.

[8] Ahmad, Musnad, 5/46.

Checker's Note: Saheeh. Wrong reference, Ahmad, Musnad, 5/46, should be Ahmad, Musnad, 5/278.

[9] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/95.

Checker's Note: Hasan, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1683, Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: 5694.

[10] Da'eef. Reported by Abu Ya'la. Its isnaad contains Laith ibn Abee Sulaim.

[11] Ahmad, Musnad, 5/41, 46.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Majma' az-Zawaid of al-Haythamee: 7/335.

[12] Ahmad, Musnad, 5/46.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: 5/41. It is part of no. 10 above, which is not given in full in the book.

[13] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/220.

Checker's Note: Saheeh. Its isnaad is hasan and is further supported, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1887, Kashful Astar bi Zawa'id al-Bazzar of al-Haythamee: 3373.

Ahaadeeth about the Dajjaal

'Abd Allaah ibn 'Umar said,

"Umar ibn al-Khattab went along with the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) and a group of people to Ibn Sayyaad, and found him playing with some children near the battlement of Banoo Maghaalah. At that time Ibn Sayyaad was on the threshold of adolescence; he did not realise that anybody was near until the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) struck him on the back. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said to him: 'Do you bear witness that I am the Messenger of Allaah?' Ibn Sayyaad looked at him and said, 'I bear witness that you are the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) of the unlettered.' Then Ibn Sayyaad said to the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam), 'Do you bear witness that I am the Messenger of Allaah?' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) dismissed this and said, 'I believe in Allaah and His Messengers.' Then the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) asked him, 'What do you see?' Ibn Sayyaad said, 'Sometimes a truthful person comes to me, and sometimes a liar.' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said to him, 'You are confused', then he said, 'I am hiding something from you.' Ibn Sayyaad said, 'It is Dukk.' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Silence! You will not be able to go beyond your rank.' 'Umar ibn al-Khattab said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, shall I cut off his head?' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'If he is (the Dajjaal) you will not be able to overpower him, and if he is not, then killing will not do you any good.' "

Saleem ibn 'Abd Allaah said,

"I heard 'Abd Allaah ibn 'Umar say, 'After that, the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) and Ubayy ibn Ka'b went along to the palm trees where Ibn Sayyaad was. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) started to hide behind a tree, with the intention of hearing something from Ibn Sayyaad before Ibn Sayyaad saw him. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) saw him lying on a bed, murmuring beneath a blanket. Ibn Sayyaad's mother saw the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) hiding behind a tree, and said to her son, "O Saf (Ibn Sayyaad's first name), here is Muhammad!" Ibn Sayyad jumped up, and the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "If you had left him alone, he would have explained himself." "

Saleem said,

"Abd Allaah ibn 'Umar said, The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) stood up to address the people. He praised Allaah as He deserved to be praised, then he spoke about the Dajjaal: 'I warn you against him; there is no Prophet who has not warned his people against him, even Noah warned his people against him. But I will tell you something which no other Prophet has told his people. You must know that the Dajjaal is one-eyed, and Allaah is not one-eyed.' "

Ibn Shihaab said:

"Umar ibn Thaabit al-Ansaaree told me that some of the Companions of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) told him that on the day when he warned the people about the Dajjaal, the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said: 'There will be written between his eyes the word Kaafir (unbeliever). Everyone who resents his bad deeds - or every believer - will be able to read it.' He also said, 'You must know that no one of you will be able to see his Lord until he dies.' " [Muslim, Bukhaaree] [1]

Ibn 'Umar said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) mentioned the Dajjaal to the people. He said, 'Allaah is not one-eyed, but the Dajjaal is blind in his right eye, and his eye is like a floating grape.' " [Muslim] [2]

Anas ibn Malik said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'There has never been a Prophet who did not warn his people against that one-eyed liar. Verily he is one-eyed and your Lord is not one-eyed. On his forehead will be written the letter Kaf, Fa, Ra (Kaafir).' " [Muslim, Bukhaaree] [3]

Hudhayfah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'I know more about the powers which the Dajjaal will have than he will know himself. He will have two flowing rivers: one will appear to be pure water, and the other

will appear to be flaming fire. Whosoever lives to see that, let him choose the river which seems to be fire, then let him close his eyes, lower his head and drink from it, for it will be cold water. The Dajjaal will be one-eyed; the place where one eye should be will be covered by a piece of skin. On his forehead will be written the word Kaafir, and every believer, whether literate or illiterate, will be able to read it.' " [Muslim] [4]

Abu Hurayrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Shall I tell you something about the Dajjaal which no Prophet has ever told his people before me? The Dajjaal is one-eyed and will bring with him something which will resemble Paradise and Hell; but that which he calls Paradise will in fact be Hell. I warn you against him as Noah warned his people against him.' " [Bukhaaree, Muslim] [5]

Muhammad ibn Munkadir said:

"I saw Jaabir ibn 'Abd Allaah swearing by Allaah that Ibn Sayyaad was the Dajjaal, so I asked him, 'Do you swear by Allaah?' He said, 'I heard 'Umar swear to that effect in the presence of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam), and the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) did not disapprove of it.' " [6]

Some 'ulamaa' (scholars) say that some of the Sahaabah (Companions of the Prophet) believed Ibn Sayyaad to be the greater Dajjaal, but that is not the case: Ibn Sayyaad was a lesser dajjal.

Ibn Sayyaad travelled between Makkah and Madeenah with Abu Sa'eed, and complained to him about the way that people were saying that he was the Dajjaal. Then he said to Abu Sa'eed,

"Did not the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say that the Dajjaal would not enter Madinah? I was born there. Did not he say that he would not have any children? - I have children. Did not he say that he would be a Kaafir? - I have embraced Islaam. Of all the people, I know the most about him: I know where he is now. If I were given the opportunity to be in his place, I would not resent it.' " [Bukhaaree, Muslim]

There are many Ahaadeeth about Ibn Sayyaad, some of which are not clear as to whether he was the Dajjaal or not. We shall see Ahaadeeth which indicates that the Dajjaal is not Ibn Sayyaad, as in the Hadeeth of Faatimah Bint Qays al-Fahriyyah, although this does not mean that he was not one of the lesser Dajjaal; but Allaah knows best.

Footnotes

[1] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Adab, 8/49, 50. Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/192, 193.

Ibn Sayyaad's [or Ibn Sa'eed's] first name was Saaf. He had some characteristics similar to those ascribed to the Dajjaal. When he was young, he was like a Kaahin (soothsayer) - sometimes he spoke the truth, sometimes he lied. When he grew up, he embraced Islaam and displayed some good characteristics, but later he changed, and it was said that his behaviour might indicate that he was the Dajjaal. But the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) had not received any Wahy (revelation) to that effect, so he told 'Umar: "If he is [the Dajjaal] you will not be able to overpower him."

Banoo Maghaalah: if you stand facing the Masjid al-Nabawee, (the Prophet's Mosque in Madeenah), everything on your right is the territory of Banoo Maghaalah.

Dukh: i.e. al-Dukhaan (smoke). The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) was thinking of the Aayah,

"Then wait you for the Day when the sky will bring forth a visible smoke."

[ad-Dukhaan (44):10]

"... with the intention of hearing something..." in other words, the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) wanted to eavesdrop on Ibn Sayyaad so that he and his companions could find out whether he was a soothsayer (kaahin) or a sorcerer.

"if you had left him alone, he would have had explained himself": i.e., if his mother had not told him that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) was there, then the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) would have found out what he was - a soothsayer or a sorcerer.

[2] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/194, 195.

"His eye is like a floating grape" - this means that, his eye will protrude and there will be some kind of brightness in it.

[3] Muslim, ibid. Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/75, 76.

"On his forehead will be written the letters Kaaf, Faa', Raa' " - this indicates that he will call people to Kufr, not the right path, so we must avoid him. The fact that Muslims will be able to identify him as a Kaafir is a great blessing from Allaah to this Ummah.

[4] Muslim, ibid. Shorter version in Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/75.

[5] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Anbiyaa, 4/75. Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/196.

[6] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/192.

The Hadeeth of Faatimah bint Qays

'Aamir ibn Sharaaheel Sha'bi Sha'b Hamdaan reported that he asked Faatimah bint Qays, the sister of Dahhaak ibn Qays, who was one of the first Muhaajiraat,

"Tell me a Hadeeth which you heard directly from the Prophet (sal-

Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) with no narrator in between." She said, "I can tell you if you like." He said, "Yes, please tell me." She said, "I married Ibn al-Mugheerah, who was one of the best of the youth of Quraysh in those days. But he fell in the first Jihaad on the side of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam).

"When I became a widow, 'Abd al-Rahmaan ibn 'Awf, one of the companions of the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) sent me a proposal of marriage. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) also sent me a proposal of marriage on behalf of his freedman Usaamah ibn Zayd. I had been told that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) had said, 'He who loves me should also love Usaamah.' When the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) spoke to me, I said, 'It is up to you: marry me to whomever you wish.'

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Go and stay with Umm Shareek.' Umm Shareek was a rich Ansaaree (Muslim originally from Madeenah) woman, who spent much in the way of Allaah and entertained many guests. I said, 'I will do as you wish.' Then he said, 'Don't go. Umm Shareek has many guests, and I would not like it if your head or leg were to become uncovered accidentally and people saw something you would not wish them to see. It is better if you go and stay with your cousin 'Abd Allaah ibn 'Amr ibn Umm Maktoom' (Abd Allaah was of the Banoo Fihir of Quraysh, the same tribe as that to which Faatimah belonged).

"So I went to stay with him, and when I had completed my 'Iddah (period of waiting), I heard the Prophet's (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) announcer calling for congregational prayer. I went out to the mosque, and prayed behind the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam). I was in the women's row, which was at the back of the congregation. When the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) had finished his prayer, he sat on the pulpit, smiling, and said, 'Everyone should stay in his place.' Then he said, 'Do you know why I had asked you to assemble?' The people said, 'Allaah and His Messenger know best.'

"He said, 'By Allaah, I have not gathered you here to give you an exhortation or a warning. I have kept you here because Tameem ad-Daaree, a Christian man who has come and embraced Islaam, told me something which agrees with that which I have told you about the Dajjaal. He told me that he had sailed in a ship with thirty men from Banoo Lakhm and Banoo Judhaam. The waves had tossed them about for a month, then they were brought near to an island, at the time of sunset. They landed on the island, and were met by a beast who was so hairy that they

could not tell its front from its back. They said, "Woe to you! What are you?" It said, "I am al-Jassaasah." They said, "What is al-Jassaasah?" It said, "O people, go to this man in the monastery, for he is very eager to know about you." Tameem said that when it named a person to us, we were afraid lest it be a devil.

"Tamim said, 'We quickly went to the monastery. There we found a huge man with his hands tied up to his neck and with iron shackles between his legs up to the ankles. We said, "Woe to you, who are you?" He said, "You will soon know about me. Tell me who you are." We said, "We are people from Arabia. We sailed in a ship, but the waves have been tossing us about for a month, and they brought us to your island, where we met a beast who was so hairy that we could not tell its front from its back. We said to it, "Woe to you! What are you?" and it said, "I am al-Jassaasah." We asked, "What is al-Jassaasah?" and it told us, "Go to this man in the monastery, for he is very eager to know about you." So we came to you quickly, fearing that it might be a devil.'

"The man said, 'Tell me about the date-palms of Baysaan.' We said, 'What do you want to know about them?' He said, 'I want to know whether these trees bear fruit or not.' We said, 'Yes.' He said, 'Soon they will not bear fruit.' Then he said, 'Tell me about the lake of at-Tabariyyah [Tiberias, in Palestine].' We said, 'What do you want to know about it?' He asked, 'Is there water in it?' We said, 'There is plenty of water in it.' He said, 'Soon it will become dry.' Then he said, 'Tell me about the spring of Zughar.' We said, 'What do you want to know about it?' He said, 'Is there water in it, and does it irrigate the land?' We said, 'Yes, there is plenty of water in it, and the people use it to irrigate the land.'

"Then he said, 'Tell me about the unlettered Prophet - what has he done?' We said, 'He has left Makkah and settled in Yathrib.' He asked, 'Do the Arabs fight against him?' We said, 'Yes.' He said, 'How does he deal with them?' So we told him that the Prophet (sal-Allahu 'alayhe wa sallam) had overcome the Arabs around him and that they had followed him. He asked, 'Has it really happened?' We said, 'Yes.' He said, 'It is better for them if they follow him. Now I will tell you about myself. I am the Dajjal. I will soon be permitted to leave this place: I will emerge and travel about the earth. In forty nights I will pass through every town, except Makkah and Madeenah, for these have been forbidden to me. Every time I try to enter either of them, I will be met by an angel bearing an unsheathed sword, who will prevent me from entering. There will be angels guarding them at every passage leading to them.'

Faatimah said, "The Prophet (sal-Allahu 'alayhe wa sallam), striking the

pulpit with his staff, said: 'This is Tayyibah, this is Tayyibah, this is Tayyibah, [i.e. Madeenah]. Have I not told you something like this?' The people said, 'Yes.' He said, 'I liked the account given to me by Tameem because it agrees with that which I have told you about the Dajjaal, and about Makkah and Madeenah. Indeed he is in the Syrian sea or the Yemen sea. No, on the contrary, he is in the East, he is in the East, he is in the East' and he pointed towards the East. Faatimah said: I memorised this from the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam)." [Muslim] [1]

'Abd Allaah ibn 'Umar said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'While I was asleep, I saw myself in a dream performing Tawaaf (circumambulation) around the Ka'bah. I saw a ruddy man with lank hair and water dripping from his head. I said, "Who is he?" and they said, "The son of Mary." Then I turned around and saw another man with a huge body, red complexion, curly hair and one eye. His other eye looked like a floating grape. They said, "This is the Dajjaal." The one who most resembles him is Ibn Qatan, a man from the tribe of al-Khuzaa'ah.' " [Bukhaaree, Muslim] [2]

Jaabir ibn 'Abd Allaah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Dajjaal will appear at the end of time, when religion is taken lightly. He will have forty days in which to travel throughout the earth. One of these days will be like a year, another will be like a month, a third will be like a week, and the rest will be like normal days. He will be riding a donkey; the width between its ears will be forty cubits. He will say to the people: "I am your lord." He is one-eyed, but your Lord is not one-eyed. On his forehead will be written the word Kaafir, and every believer, literate or illiterate, will be able to read it. He will go everywhere except Makkah and Madeenah, which Allaah has forbidden to him; angels stand at their gates. He will have a mountain of bread, and the people will face hardship, except for those who follow him. He will have two rivers, and I know what is in them. He will call one Paradise and one Hell. Whoever enters the one he calls Paradise will find that it is Hell, and whoever enters the one he calls Hell will find that it is Paradise. Allaah will send with him devils who will speak to the people. He will bring a great tribulation; he will issue a command to the sky and it will seem to the people as if it is raining. Then he will appear to kill someone and bring him back to life. After that he will no longer have this power. The people will say, "Can anybody do something like this except the Lord?" The Muslims will flee to Jabal al-Dukhaan in Syria, and the Dajjaal will come and besiege them. The siege will intensify and they will suffer great hardship. Then Jesus son of Mary will

descend, and will call the people at dawn: "O people, what prevented you from coming out to fight this evil liar?" They will answer, "He is a Jinn." Then they will go out, and find Jesus son of Mary. The time for prayer will come, and the Muslims will call on Jesus to lead the prayer, but he will say, "Let your Imaam lead the prayer." Their Imaam will lead them in praying Salaat al-Subh (Morning prayer), then they will go out to fight the Dajjaal. When the liar sees Jesus, he will dissolve like salt in water. Jesus will go to him and kill him, and he will not let anyone who followed him live.' " [Ahmad] [3]

Footnotes

[1] Muslim, Kitaab al- Fitan, 8/203-205.

Al-Jassaasah is so called because he spies on behalf of the Dajjaal (from jassa - to try to gain information, to spy out, etc.).

Baysaan - a village in Palestine.

'Ayn Zughar (the spring of Zughar) is a town in Palestine.

[2] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Fitan, 9/75. Muslim, Kitaab al-Imaan, 1/108.

[3] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/367, 368.

Checker's Note: Da`eef. Silsilatul Ahaadieeh ad-Da`eefah: 1969. It contains the `an`anah of Abu Zubair. Parts are found in authentic narrations. Refer to Dajjaal section in Saheeh Muslim.

The Hadeeth of Al-Nuwas Ibn Sam'an Al-Kilabi

Al-Nuwas ibn Saman said,

"One morning the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) spoke about the Dajjaal. Sometimes he described him as insignificant, and sometimes he described him as so dangerous that we thought he was in the clump of date-palms nearby. When we went to him later on, he noticed that fear in our faces, and asked, 'What is the matter with you?' We said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, this morning you spoke of the Dajjaal; sometimes you described him as insignificant, and sometimes you described him as being so dangerous that we thought he was in the clump of date-palms nearby.

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'I fear for you in other matters besides the Dajjaal. If he appears whilst I am among you, I will contend with him on your behalf. But if he appears while I am not among you, then each man must contend with him on his own behalf, and Allaah will take care of every Muslim on my behalf. The Dajjaal will be a young man, with short, curly hair, and one eye floating. I would liken him to 'Abd al-Uzzaa ibn Qatan. Whoever amongst you lives to see him should recite the opening Ayaat of Surat al-Kahf. He will appear on the way between

Syria and Iraq, and will create disaster left and right. O servants of Allaah, adhere to the Path of Truth.' "

"We said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, for the day which is like a year, will one days prayers be sufficient?' He said, 'No, you must make an estimate of the time, and then observe the prayers.' "

"We asked, 'O Messenger of Allaah, how quickly will he walk upon the earth?' He said, 'Like a cloud driven by the wind. He will come to the people and call them (to a false religion), and they will believe in him and respond to him. He will issue a command to the sky, and it will rain; and to the earth, and it will produce crops. After grazing on these crops, their animals will return with their udders full of milk and their flanks stretched. Then he will come to another people and will call them (to a false religion), but they will reject his call. He will depart from them; they will suffer famine and will possess nothing in the form of wealth. Then he will pass through the wasteland and will say, Bring forth your treasures, and the treasures will come forth, like swarms of bees. Then he will call a man brimming with youth; he will strike him with a sword and cut him in two, then place the two pieces at the distance between an archer and his target. Then he will call him, and the young man will come running and laughing.' "

"At that point, Allaah will send the Messiah, son of Mary, and he will descend to the white minaret in the east of Damascus, wearing two garments dyed with saffron, placing his hands on the wings of two angels. When he lowers his head, beads of perspiration will fall from it, and when he raises his head, beads like pearls will scatter from it. Every Kaafir who smells his fragrance will die, and his breath will reach as far as he can see. He will search for the Dajjaal until he finds him at the gate of Ludd, where he will kill him."

"Then a people whom Allaah has protected will come to Jesus son of Mary, and he will wipe their faces (i.e. wipe the traces of hardship from their faces) and tell them of their status in Paradise. At that time Allaah will reveal to Jesus: "I have brought forth some of My servants whom no-one will be able to fight. Take My servants safely to at-Toor."

"Then Allaah will send Gog and Magog, and they will swarm down from every slope. The first of them will pass by the Lake of Tiberias, and will drink some of its water; the last of them will pass by it and say, "There used to be water here." Jesus, the Prophet of Allaah, and his Companions will be besieged until a bull's head will be dearer to them than one hundred dinars are to you nowadays."

"Then Jesus and his Companions will pray to Allaah, and He will send

insects who will bite the people of Gog and Magog on their necks, so that in the morning they will all perish as one. Then Jesus and his Companions will come down and will not find any nook or cranny on earth which is free from their putrid stench. Jesus and his Companions will again pray to Allaah, Who will send birds like the necks of camels; they will seize the bodies of Gog and Magog and throw them wherever Allaah wills. Then Allaah will send rain which no house or tent will be able to keep out, and the earth will be cleansed, until it will look like a mirror. Then the earth will be told to bring forth its fruit and restore its blessing. On that day, a group of people will be able to eat from a single pomegranate and seek shelter under its skin (i.e. the fruit would be so big). A milch camel will give so much milk that a whole party will be able to drink from it; a cow will give so much milk that a whole tribe will be able to drink from it; and a milch-sheep will give so much milk that a whole family will be able to drink from it. At that time, Allaah will send a pleasant wind which will soothe them even under their armpits, and will take the soul of every Muslim. Only the most wicked people will be left, and they will fornicate like asses; then the Last Hour will come upon them." "

[Muslim] [1]

Footnote

[1] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashraat al-Saa'ah, 8/196-199.

Ludd: the biblical Lydda, now known as Lod, site of the zionist state's major airport

Hadeeth narrated from Abu Umaamah Al-Baahilee

Abu Umaamah al-Baahilee said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) delivered a speech to us, most of which dealt with the Dajjaal and warned us against him. He said, 'No tribulation on earth since the creation of Adam will be worse than the tribulation of the Dajjaal. Allaah has never sent a Prophet who did not warn his Ummah against the Dajjaal. I am the last of the Prophets, and you are the last Ummah. The Dajjaal is emerging among you and it is inevitable. If he appears while I am still among you, I will contend with him on behalf of every Muslim. But if he appears after I am gone, then every person must contend with him on his own behalf. He will appear on the way between Syria and Iraq, and will spread disaster right and left. O servants of Allaah adhere to the path of Truth. I shall describe him for you in a way that no Prophet has ever done before.

He will start by saying that he is a Prophet, but there will be no Prophet after me. Then he will say, "I am your Lord," but you will never see your

Lord until you die. The Dajjaal is one-eyed, but your Lord, glorified be He, is not one-eyed. On his forehead will be written the word Kaafir, which every Muslim, literate or illiterate, will be able to read. Among that which he will bring will be the Paradise and Hell he will offer; but that which he calls Hell will be Paradise, and that which he calls Paradise will be Hell. Whoever enters his Hell, let him seek refuge with Allaah and recite the opening Ayaat of Surat ul-Kahf, and it will become cool and peaceful for him, as the fire became cool and peaceful for Abraham.

"He will say to a Bedouin, What do you think if I bring your father and mother back to life for you? Will you bear witness that I am your lord? The Bedouin will say Yes, so two devils will assume the appearance of his father and mother, and will say, "O my son, follow him for he is your lord."

"He will be given power over one person, whom he will kill and cut in two with a saw. Then he will say, Look at this slave of mine, now I will resurrect him, but he will still claim that he has a Lord other than me. Allaah will resurrect him, and this evil man (the Dajjaal) will say to him, Who is your Lord? The man will answer, 'My Lord is Allaah, and you are the enemy of Allaah. You are the Dajjaal. By Allaah, I have never been more sure of this than I am today.' "

Aboo Sa'eed said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'That man will have the highest status among my Ummah in Paradise.' "

Abu Sa'eed said,

"By Allaah, we never thought that that man would be any other than 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, until he passed away."

Al-Muhaaribee said:

"Then we referred to the Hadeeth of Abu Raafi'ee, which said, 'Part of his Fitnah will be the fact that he will pass through an area whose people will deny him, and none of their livestock will remain alive. Then he will pass through a second area whose people will believe in him; he will order the sky to rain and the earth to bring forth crops, and their flocks will return from grazing fatter than they have ever been, with their flanks stretched, their udders full. He will pass through every place on earth - except Makkah and Madeenah, which he will never enter, for there are angels guarding every gate of them with unsheathed swords - until he reaches al-Zareeb al-Ahmar and camps at the edge of the salt-marsh. Madeenah will be shaken by three tremors, after which every Munaafiq (hypocrite) will leave it, and it will be cleansed of evil, as iron is cleansed of dross. That day will be called Yawm al-Khalaas (The Day of Purification).' "

Umm Shareek bint Abee'l-'Akr said,

"O Messenger of Allaah, where will the Arabs be at that time?" He said, "At that time they will be few; most of them will be in Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem), and their Imaam will be a righteous man. Whilst their Imaam is going forward to lead the people in praying Salaat al-Subh (the morning prayer), Jesus son of Mary will descend. The Imaam will step back, to let Jesus lead the people in prayer, but Jesus will place his hand between the man's shoulders and say, 'Go forward and lead the prayer, for the Iqaamah was made for you.' So the Imaam will lead the people in prayer, and afterwards Jesus (alayhi-salam) will say, 'Open the gate.' The gate will be opened, and behind it will be the Dajjaal and a thousand Jews, each of them bearing a sword and shield. When the Dajjaal sees Jesus, he will begin to dissolve like salt in water, and will run away. Jesus will say, 'You will remain alive until I strike you with my sword.' He will catch up with him at the eastern gate of Ludd and will kill him. The Jews will be deflated with the help of Allaah. There will be no place for them to hide; they will not be able to hide behind any stone, wall, animal or tree - except the boxthorn (al-Gharqarah) - without it saying, 'O Muslim servant of Allaah! here is a Jew, come and kill him!' " The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "The time of the Dajjaal will be forty years; one year like half a year, one year like a month, and one month like a week. The rest of his days will pass so quickly that if one of you were at one of the gates of Madeenah, he would not reach the other gate before evening fell."

Someone asked,

"O Messenger of Allaah, how will we pray in those shorter days?" He said, "Work out the times of prayer in the same way that you do in these longer days, and then pray." The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "Jesus son of Mary will be a just administrator and leader of my Ummah. He will break the cross, kill the pigs, and abolish the Jizyah (tax on non-Muslims). He will not collect the Sadaqah, so he will not collect sheep and camels. Mutual enmity and hatred will disappear. Every harmful animal will be made harmless, so that a small boy will be able to put his hand into a snake's mouth without being harmed, a small girl will be able to make a lion run away from her, and a wolf will go among sheep as if he were a sheepdog. The earth will be filled with peace as a container is filled with water. People will be in complete agreement, and only Allaah will be worshipped. Wars will cease, and the authority of Quraysh will be taken away. The earth will be like a silver basin, and will produce fruits so abundantly that a group of people will gather to eat a bunch of grapes or

on epomegranate and will be satisfied. A bull will be worth so much money, but a horse will be worth only a few dirhams."

Someone asked,

"O Messenger of Allaah, why will a horse be so cheap?" He said,

"Because it will never be ridden in war." He was asked, "Why will the bull be so expensive?" He said, "Because it will plough the earth. For three years before the Dajjaal emerges, the people will suffer severe hunger. In the first year, Allaah will order the sky to withhold a third of its rain, and the earth to withhold two-thirds of its fruits. In the third year, He will order the sky to withhold all of its rain, and the earth to withhold all of its fruits, so that nothing green will grow. Every cloven-hoofed creature will die except for whatever Allaah wills." Someone asked, "How will the people live at that time?" He said, "By saying Laa ilaaha illaa Allaah, Allaahu Akbar, Subhaan Allaah and Al-Hamdu-lillaah. This will be like food for them." [1]

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Dajjaal will come forth, and one of the Believers will go towards him.

The armed men of the Dajjaal will ask him, 'Where are you going?' He will say, 'I am going to this one who has come forth.' They will say, 'Kill him!' Then some of them will say to the others, 'Hasn't your lord [ie the Dajjaal] forbidden you to kill anyone without his permission?' So they will take him to the Dajjaal, and when the Believer sees him, he will say, 'O People, this is the Dajjaal whom the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) told us about.' Then the Dajjaal will order them to seize him and wound him in the head; they will inflict blows all over, even in his back and stomach. The Dajjaal will ask him, 'Don't you believe in me?' He will say, 'You are a false Messiah.' The Dajjaal will order that he be sawn in two from the parting of his hair to his legs; then he will walk between the two pieces. Then he will say 'Stand!' and the man will stand up. The Dajjaal will say to him, 'Don't you believe in me?' The believer will say, 'It has only increased my understanding that you are the Dajjaal.' Then he will say, 'O people! he will not treat anyone else in such a manner after me.' The Dajjaal will seize him to slaughter him, but the space between his neck and collar-bone will be turned into copper, and the Dajjaal will not be able to do anything to him. He will take the man by his arms and legs and throw him away; the people will believe that he has been thrown into Hell, whereas in fact he will have been thrown into Paradise." The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "He will be the greatest of martyrs in the sight of Allaah, the Lord of the Worlds." [Muslim] [2]

Footnotes

[1] Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan, (Hadeeth 4077), 2:1363.

"He will break the cross and kill pigs", i.e. Christianity will be annulled.

"He will not collect the Sadaqah" (i.e. Zakaat) - because there will be so much wealth, and no-one will be in need of Sadaqah.

Checker's Note: Da'eef. Da'eef Ibn Maajah: 884. Parts are supported.

[2] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashtaar al-Saa'ah, 8/199, 200

The Hadeeth of Al-Mugheerah Ibn Shu'bah

Al-Mugheerah ibn Shu'bah said,

"No-one asked the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) more questions about the Dajjaal than I did. He said, 'You should not worry about him, because he will not be able to harm you.' I said, 'But they say that he will have much food and water!' He said, 'He is too insignificant in the sight of Allaah to have all that.' " [Muslim]

Al-Mugheerah ibn Shu'bah said,

"No-one asked the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) more questions about the Dajjaal than I did." One of the narrators said, "What did you ask him?" Al-Mugheerah said, "I said, 'They say that the Dajjaal will have a mountain of bread and meat, and a river of water. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'He is too insignificant in the sight of Allaah to have all that.' " [Muslim]

From these Ahaadeeth, we can see that Allaah will test His servants with the Dajjaal and by the miracles which he will be permitted to perform: as we have already mentioned, the Dajjaal will order the sky to rain for those who accept him, and will order the earth to bring forth its fruits so that they and their livestock will eat of it, and their flocks will return fat and with their udders full of milk. Those who reject the Dajjaal and refuse to believe in him will suffer drought and famine; people and livestock will die, and wealth and supplies of food will be depleted. People will follow the Dajjaal like swarms of bees, and he will kill a young man and bring him back to life.

This is not a kind of magic; it will be something real with which Allaah will test His servants at the end of time. Many will be led astray, and many will be guided by it. Those who doubt will disbelieve, but those who believe will be strengthened in their faith.

Al-Qaadi 'Iyaad and others interpreted the phrase "He is too insignificant in the sight of Allaah to have all that" as meaning that the Dajjaal is too insignificant to have anything that could lead the true believers astray, because he is obviously evil and corrupt. Even if he brings great terror, the word Kaafir will be clearly written between his eyes; one report

explains that it will be written "Kaaf, Faa, Raa," from which we can understand that it will be written perceptibly, not abstractly, as some people say.

One of his eyes will be blind, protruding and repulsive; this is the meaning of the Hadeeth: "...as if it were a grape floating on the surface of the water." Other reports say that it is "dull, with no light in it," or "like white spittle on a wall," i.e. it will look ugly.

Some reports say that it is his right eye which will be blind; others say that it is his left eye.

He could be partly blind in both eyes, or there could be a fault in both eyes. This interpretation could be supported by the Hadeeth narrated by at-Tabaraanee, in which he reports that Ibn 'Abbaas said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Dajjaal is curly-haired and white-skinned. His head is like the branch of a tree; his left eye is blind, and the other eye looks like a floating grape.' "

One may ask: if the Dajjaal is going to cause such widespread evil and his claim to be a "lord" will be so widely believed - even though he is obviously a liar, and all the Prophet's have warned against him - why does the Qur'aan not mention him by name and warn us against his lies and stubbornness?

The answer is:-

The Dajjaal was referred to in the Ayah:

"...The day that some of the Signs of your Lord do come, no good will it do to a person to believe then, if he believed not before, nor earned good (by performing deeds of righteousness) through his Faith..." [al-An'aam (6):158]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'There are three things which, when they appear, no good will it do a soul to believe in them then, if it believed not before nor earned righteousness through its Faith. They are: The Dajjaal, the Beast, and the rising of the sun from the west.' "

Jesus son of Mary will descend from Heaven and kill the Dajjaal, as we have already mentioned. The descent of Jesus is mentioned in the Ayaat:

"And because of their saying (in boast), "We killed Messiah 'Eesaa (Jesus), son of Maryam (Mary), the Messenger of Allaah," - but they killed him not, nor crucified him, but the resemblance of 'Eesaa (Jesus) was put over another man (and they killed that man), and those who differ therein are full of doubts. They have no (certain) knowledge, they follow nothing but conjecture. For surely; they killed him not [i.e. 'Eesaa

(Jesus), son of Maryam (Mary) alayhi-salam]:

But Allaah raised him ['Eesaa (Jesus)] up (with his body and soul) unto Himself (and he alayhi-salam is in the heavens). And Allaah is Ever All Powerful, All Wise.

And there is none of the people of the Scripture (Jews and Christians), but must believe in him ['Eesaa (Jesus), son of Maryam (Mary), as only a Messenger of Allaah and a human being], before his ['Eesaa (Jesus) alayhi-salam or a Jew's or a Christian's] death (at the time of the appearance of the angel of death). And on the Day of Resurrection, he ['Eesaa (Jesus)] will be a witness against them." [an-Nisaa' (4):157-9] We think that the Tafseer (interpretation) of this Aayah is that the pronoun in "before his death" (qabla mawtihi) refers to Jesus; i.e, he will descend and the People of the Book who differed concerning him will believe in him. The Christians claimed that he was divine, while the Jews made a slanderous accusation, i.e. that he was born from adultery. When Jesus descends before the Day of Judgment, he will correct all these differences and lies.

On this basis, the reference to the descent of the Messiah Jesus son of Mary also includes a reference to the Dajjaal (false Mesor Antichrist), who is the opposite of the true Messiah, because sometimes the Arabs refer to one of two opposites and not the other, but mean both.

The Dajjaal is not mentioned by name in the Qur'aan because he is so insignificant: he claims to be divine, but he is merely a human being. His affairs are too contemptible to be mentioned in the Qur'aan. But the Prophet's, out of loyalty to Allaah, warned their people about the Dajjaal and the tribulations and misguiding miracles he would bring. It is enough for us to know the reports of the Prophet's and the many reports from the Prophet Muhammad (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam).

One could argue that Allaah has mentioned Pharaoh and his false claims, such as:

"I am your lord, most high" [an-Nazi'aat (79):24] and "O chiefs! I know not that you have an ilaah (a god) other than me..." [al-Qasas (28):38]

This can be explained by the fact that Pharaoh and his deeds are in the past, and his lies are clear to every believer. But the Dajjaal is yet to come, in the future; it will be a Fitnah and a test for all people. So the Dajjaal is not mentioned in the Qur'aan because he is contemptible; and the fact that he is not mentioned means that it will be a great test.

The facts about the Dajjaal and his lies are obvious and do not need further emphasis. This is often the case when something is very clear. For example, when the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) was

terminally ill, he wanted to write a document confirming that Abu Bakr would be the Khaleefah after him. Then he abandoned this idea, and said,

"Allaah and the believers will not accept anyone other than Abu Bakr."

He decided not to write the document because he knew of Abu Bakr's high standing among the Sahaabah (Companions) and was sure that they would not choose anyone else. Similarly, the facts about the Dajjaal are so clear that they did not need to be mentioned in the Qur'aan.

Allaah did not mention the Dajjaal in the Qur'aan because He (subhaanahu wa ta'aala) knew that the Dajjaal would not be able to lead His true servants astray; he would only increase their faith, their submission to Allaah and His Messenger, their belief in the Truth, and their rejection of falsehood. For this reason the believer whom the Dajjaal overpowers will say, when he revives him,

"By Allaah, it has only increased my understanding that you are the one-eyed liar about whom the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) spoke."

More Ahaadeeth about the Dajjaal

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Dajjaal will emerge in a land in the east called Khurasan. His followers will be people with faces like hammered shields." [1]

Asmaa' bint Yazeed al-Ansaariyyah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'During the three years just before the Dajjaal comes, there will be one year when the sky will withhold one third of its rain and the earth one-third of its fruits. In the second year the sky will withhold two-thirds of its rain, and the earth two-thirds of its fruits. In the third year the sky will withhold all of its rain, and the earth all of its fruits, and all the animals will die. It will be the greatest tribulation: the Dajjaal will bring a Bedouin and say to him, "What if I bring your camels to life for you? Will you agree that I am your lord?" The Bedouin will say "Yes." So devils will assume the forms of his camels, with the fullest udders and the highest humps. Then he will bring a man whose father and brother have died, and will ask him, "What do you think if I bring your father and brother back to life? Will you agree that I am your lord?" The man will say "Yes," so the devils will assume the forms of his father and brother.' Then the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) went out for something, and then returned. The people were very concerned about what he had told them. He stood in the doorway and asked, 'What is wrong, Asma'? I said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, you have terrified us with what you said about the Dajjaal.' He said, 'He will

certainly appear. If I am still alive, I will contend with him on your behalf; otherwise Allaah will take care of every Muslim on my behalf.' I said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, we do not bake our dough until we are hungry, so how will it be for the believers at that time?' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The glorification of Allaah which suffices the people of Heaven will be sufficient for them.' " [2]

Abu Hurairah (radi-Allahu 'anhu) said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them. When a Jew hides behind a rock or a tree, it will say, "O Muslim, O servant of Allaah! There is a Jew behind me, come and kill him!" All the trees will do this except the box-thorn (al-Gharqad), because it is the tree of the Jews.' " [Ahmad] [3]

Footnotes

[1] Tirmidhee Abwaab al-Fitan, Hadeeth 2338, 6/465. Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan, Hadeeth 4072, 1354, 2/1353, 1354. Ahmad, Musnad 1/7.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh Ibn Maajah: 4072.

[2] Ahmad, Musnad, 6/455, 456.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, al-Mishkat, 1st checking: 5491. Its isnaad contains Sharh ibn Hawshab, who is weak.

[3] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashraat al-Saa'ah, 8/388. Ahmad, Musnad, 2/417.

Protection Against The Dajjaal

1. Seeking refuge with Allaah from his tribulation.

It is proven in the Saheeh (authentic) Ahaadeeth that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) used to seek refuge with Allaah from the tribulation of the Dajjaal in his prayers, and that he commanded his Ummah to do likewise:

"Allaahumma innaa na'oodhu bika min 'adhaabi jahannam, wa min 'adhaabi 'l-qabr, wa min fitnatee 'l-mahyaa'i wa'l-mamaat, wa min fitnatee 'l-maseehi 'd-dajjaal."

"O Allaah! We seek refuge with You from the punishment of Hell, from the punishment of the grave, from the tribulations of life and death, and from the tribulation of the False Messiah (Dajjaal)." [1]

This Hadeeth was narrated by many Sahabah, including Anas, Abu Hurairah, 'Aa'ishah, Ibn 'Abbaas, and Sa'd (radi-Allaahu 'anhum).

2. Memorising certain Aayaat from Surat al-Kahf.

Al-Haafidh ad-Dhahabee said,

"Seeking refuge with Allaah from the Dajjaal is mentioned in many

Mutawaatir Ahaadeeth (those with numerous lines of narrators). One way of doing this is to memorise ten Ayaat from Surat al-Kahf."

Abul-Diraa reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "Whoever memorises the first ten Aayaat of Surat al-Kahf will be protected from the Dajjaal." [Abu Daawood] [2]

3. Keeping away from the Dajjaal.

One way to be protected from the tribulation of the Dajjaal is to live in Madeenah or Makkah.

Abu Hurairah reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"There are angels standing at the gates of Madeenah; neither plague nor the Dajjaal can enter it." [Bukhaaree, Muslim]

Abu Bakr reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "The terror caused by the Dajjaal will not enter Madeenah. At that time it will have seven gates; there will be two angels guarding every gate."

[Bukhaaree] [3]

Anas said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Dajjaal will come to Madeenah, and he will find angels guarding it. Neither plague nor the Dajjaal will enter it, inshaa-Allaah.' " [Tirmidhee, Bukhaaree]

It has been proven in the Saheeh Ahaadeeth that the Dajjaal will not enter Makkah or Madeenah, because the angels will prevent him from entering these two places which are sanctuaries and are safe from him. When he camps at the salt-marsh (Sabkhah) of Madeenah, it will be shaken by three tremors - either physically or metaphorically - and every hypocrite will go out to join the Dajjaal. On that day, Madeenah will be cleansed of its dross and will be refined and purified; and Allaah knows best.

Footnotes

[1] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Janaa'iz, 2/124. Muslim, Kitaab al-Masaajid, 2/93.

[2] Muslim, Kitaab al-Musaafirun, 2/199. Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Malaahim, (Hadeeth 4301), 11/401, 402.

[3] Bukhaaree, Baab Haram al-Madeenah, 1/28.

The Life And Deeds Of The Dajjaal

The Dajjaal will be a man, created by Allaah to be a test for people at the end of time. Many will be led astray through him, and many will be guided through him; only the sinful will be led astray.

Al-Haafidh Ibn 'Alee al-Abaar wrote in his book of history (at-Taareekh)

that the Dajjaal's Kunyah (nickname or paternal title) would be Abu Yoosuf. [1]

Abu Bakrah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Dajjaal's parents will remain childless for thirty years, then a one-eyed child will be born to them. He will be very bad and will cause a great deal of trouble. When he sleeps, his eyes will be closed but his heart (or mind) will still be active.' Then he described his parents: 'His father will be a tall and bulky man, with a long nose like a beak; his mother will be a huge, heavy-breasted woman.' " [2]

Abu Bakrah said,

"We heard that a child had been born to some of the Jews in Madeenah. Az-Zubayr ibn al-'Awaam and I went to see his parents, and found that they matched the description given by the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam). We saw the boy lying in the sun, covered with a blanket, murmuring to himself. We asked his parents about him, and they said, 'We remained childless for thirty years, then this one-eyed boy was born to us. He is very bad and causes a great deal of trouble.' When we went out, we passed the boy. He asked us, 'What were you doing?' We said, 'Did you hear us?' He said, 'Yes; when I sleep, my eyes are closed but my heart (mind) is still active.' That boy was Ibn Sayyaad." [Ahmad, Tirmidhee; this Hadeeth is not very strong] [3]

As we have already seen in the Saheeh Ahaadeeth, Maalik and others think that Ibn Sayyaad was not the Dajjaal; he was one of a number of "lesser dajjaals." Later he repented and embraced Islaam; Allaah knows best his heart and deeds.

The "greater" Dajjaal is the one mentioned in the Hadeeth of Faatimah bint Qays, which she narrated from the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam), from Tameem ad-Daaree, and which includes the story of the Jassaasah. The Dajjaal will be permitted to appear at the end of time, after the Muslims have conquered a Roman city called Constantinople. He will first appear in Isfahaan, in an area known as the Jewish quarter (al-Yahoodiyyah). He will be followed by seventy thousand Jews from that area, all of them armed. Seventy thousand Tatars and many people from Khuraasaan will also follow him. At first he will appear as a tyrannical king, then he will claim to be a prophet, then a lord. Only the most ignorant of men will follow him; the righteous and those guided by Allaah will reject him. He will start to conquer the world country by country, fortress by fortress, region by region, town by town; no place will remain unscathed except Makkah and Madeenah. The length of his stay

on earth will be forty days: one day like a year, one day like a month, one day like a week, and the rest of the days like normal days, i.e. his stay will be approximately one year and two and a half months. Allaah will grant him many miracles, through which whoever He wills will be astray, and the faith of the believers will be strengthened. The descent of Jesus son of Mary, the true Messiah, will happen at the time of the Dajjaal, the false messiah. He will descend to the minaret in the east of Damascus. The believers and true servants of Allaah will gather to support him, and the Messiah Jesus son of Mary will lead them against the Dajjaal, who at that time will be heading for Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem). He will catch up with him at 'Aqabah 'Afeeq. The Dajjaal will runaway from him, but Jesus will catch up with him at the gate of Ludd, and will kill him with his spear just as he is entering it. He will say to him, "I have to deal you a blow; you cannot escape." When the Dajjaal faces him, he will begin to dissolve like salt in water. So Jesus will kill him with his spear at the gate of Ludd, and he will die there, as many Saheeh Ahaadeeth indicate.

Majma' ibn Jaariyah is reported to have said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) saying, 'The son of Mary will kill the Dajjaal at the gate of Ludd.' " [Tirmidhee] [4]

Footnotes

[1] Checker's Note: Reported as the saying of ash-Sha'bi. The reporter, Mujaahid ibn Sa'eed is weak.

[2] Checker's Note: Da'eef, al-Mishkat, 1st checking: 6445.

[3] Tirmidhee, Abwaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 2350), 6/522, 523. Ahmad, Musnad, 5/40.

"When he sleeps, his eyes will be closed but his heart (or mind) will still be active" - means that his evil ideas will still come to him even while he is asleep.

Checker's Note: Da'eef due to Alee ibn Zaid ibn Jad'an.

[4] Tirmidhee, Abwaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 2345), 6/513, 514.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh at-Tirmidhee: 1829.

The Descent of Jesus at the End of Time

Abd Allaah ibn 'Amr said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Dajjaal will appear in my Ummah, and will remain for forty - "I cannot say whether he meant forty days, forty months or forty years." - Then Allaah will send Jesus (alayhi-salam), the son of Mary, who will resemble 'Urwah ibn Mas'ood. He will chase the Dajjaal and kill him. Then the people will live for seven years during which there will be no enmity between any two

persons. Then Allaah will send a cold wind from the direction of Syria, which will take the soul of everyone who has the slightest speck of good or faith in his heart. Even if one of you were to enter the heart of a mountain, the wind would reach him there and take his soul. Only the most wicked people will be left; they will be as careless as birds, with the characteristics of beasts, and will have no concern for right and wrong. Satan will come to them in the form of man and will say, "Don't you respond?" They will say, "What do you order us to do?" He will order them to worship idols, and in spite of that they will have sustenance in abundance, and lead comfortable lives.

"Then the Trumpet will be blown, and everyone will tilt their heads to hear it. The first one to hear it will be a man busy repairing a trough for his camels. He and everyone else will be struck down. Then Allaah will send (or send down) rain like dew, and the bodies of the people (i.e. the dead) will grow out of it. Then the trumpet will be sounded again, and the people will get up and look around. Then it will be said, "O people, go to your Lord and account for yourselves." It will be said, "Bring out the people of Hell," and it will be asked, "How many are there?" - the answer will come: "Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand." "On that day a child will grow old and the shin will be laid bare." [al-Qalam (68):42] " [Muslim] [1]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The son of Mary will come down as a just leader. He will break the cross, and kill the pigs. Peace will prevail and people will use their swords as sickles. Every harmful beast will be made harmless; the sky will send down rain in abundance, and the earth will bring forth its blessings. A child will play with a fox and not come to any harm; a wolf will graze with sheep and a lion with cattle, without harming them.' " [Ahmad] [2]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'By Him in Whose hand is my soul, surely the son of Mary will come down among you as a just ruler. He will break the cross, kill the pigs and abolish the Jizyah. Wealth will be in such abundance that no-one will care about it, and a single prostration in prayer will be better than the world and all that is in it.' "

Abu Hurairah said,

'If you wish, recite the Aayah: "And there is none of the People of the Book but must believe in him before his death; and on the Day of Judgement he will be a witness against them..." [an-Nisaa' (4):159] '

[Bukhaaree, Muslim] [3]

Abu Hurairah reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Prophets are like brothers; they have different mothers but their religion is one. I am the closest of all the people to Jesus son of Mary, because there is no other Prophet between him and myself. He will come again, and when you see him, you will recognise him. He is of medium height and his colouring is reddish-white. He will be wearing two garments, and his hair will look wet. He will break the cross, kill the pigs, abolish the Jizyah and call the people to Islaam. During his time, Allaah will end every religion and sect other than Islaam, and will destroy the Dajjaal. Then peace and security will prevail on earth, so that lions will graze with camels, tigers with cattle, and wolves with sheep; children will be able to play with snakes without coming to any harm. Jesus will remain for forty years, then die, and the Muslims will pray for him."

[Ahmad] [4]

Ibn Masood reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"On the night of the Israa' (night journey), I met my father Abraham, Moses and Jesus, and they discussed the Hour. The matter was referred first to Abraham, then to Moses, and both said, 'I have no knowledge of it.' Then it was referred to Jesus, who said, 'No-one knows about its timing except Allaah; what my Lord told me was that the Dajjaal will appear, and when he sees me he will begin to melt like lead. Allaah will destroy him when he sees me. The Muslims will fight against the Kaafirs, and even the trees and rocks will say, "O Muslim, there is a Kaafir hiding beneath me - come and kill him!" Allaah will destroy the Kaafirs, and the people will return to their own lands. Then Gog and Magog will appear from all directions, eating and drinking everything they find. The people will complain to me, so I will pray to Allaah and He will destroy them, so that the earth will be filled with their stench. Allaah will send rain which will wash their bodies into the sea. My Lord has told me that when that happens, the Hour will be very close, like a pregnant woman whose time is due, but her family do not know exactly when she will deliver.' "

[Ahmad, Ibn Maajah] [5]

Footnotes

[1] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashraat al-Saa'ah, 8/201, 202.

[2] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/482, 483.

Checker's Note: The Tabi'e is Ziyad ibn Sa'd, who is mentioned by Ibn

Hibban in ath-Thiqat al-Bukhari and Abu Hatim did not speak for nor against him. Ibn Kathir says the report is good and strong.

[3] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Anbiyaa, 204, 205. Muslim, Kitaab al-Imaan, 1/93, 94.

[4] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/406.

Checker's Note: Saheeh as declared by al-Hakim and adh-Dhahabi.

Qatadah's hearing it is reported in a later narration in al-Musnad 2/436.

[5] Ahmad, Musnad, 1/375. Similar Hadeeth in Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan (Hadeeth 4081), 2/1365, 1366.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, Da'eef al-Jami as-Sagheer: 4709. See Saheeh Muslim translation, no. 6924

Description of the Messiah Jesus son of Mary, Messenger of Allaah

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'On the night of the Israa' (miraculous journey to Jerusalem) I met Moses - he was a slim man with wavy hair, and looked like a man from the Shanoo'ah tribe. I also met Jesus - he was of medium height and of a red complexion, as if he had just come out of the bath' " [Bukhaaree, Muslim] [1]

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"Whilst I was asleep, I saw myself (in a dream) making Tawaaf around the Ka'bah. I saw a brown-skinned man, with straight hair, being supported by two men, and with water dripping from his head. I said, 'Who is this?' They said, 'The son of Mary' I turned around and saw a fat, ruddy man, with curly hair, who was blind in his right eye; his eye looked like a floating grape. I asked, 'Who is this?' They said, 'The Dajjaal.' The one who most resembles him is Ibn Qatan." Az-Zuhri explained: Ibn Qatan was a man from Khuzaa'ah who died during the Jaahiliyyah (before the coming of Islaam). [Bukhaaree] [2]

Footnotes

[1] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Anbiyaa, 4/302. Muslim, Kitaab al-Imaan, 1/106, 107.

[2] Bukhaaree, ibid.

The Appearance of Gog and Magog

They (two tribes or peoples) will appear at the time of Jesus son of Mary, after the Dajjaal. Allaah will destroy them all in one night, in response to the supplication of Jesus.

Abu Hurairah reported that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"Everyday, Gog and Magog are trying to dig a way out through the

barrier. When they begin to see sunlight through it, the one who is in charge of them says, 'Go back; you can carry on digging tomorrow,' and when they come back, the barrier is stronger than it was before. This will continue until their time comes and Allaah wishes to send them forth. They will dig until they begin to see sunlight, then the one who is in charge of them will say, 'Go back; you can carry on digging tomorrow, inshaa'-Allaah.' In this case he will make an exception by saying inshaa'-Allaah, thus relating the matter to the Will of Allaah. They will return on the following day, and find the hole as they left it. They will carry on digging and come out against the people. They will drink all the water, and the people will entrench themselves in their fortresses. Gog and Magog will fire their arrows into the sky, and they will fall back to earth with something like blood on them. Gog and Magog will say, 'We have defeated the people of earth, and overcome the people of heaven.' Then Allaah will send a kind of worm in the napes of their necks, and they will be killed by it..' 'By Him in Whose hand is the soul of Muhammad, the beasts of the earth will become fat.' " [1]

Gog and Magog are two groups of Turks, descended from Yaafith (Japheth), the father of the Turks, one of the sons of Noah. At the time of Abraham (alayhi-salam), there was a king called Dhu'l-Qarnayn. He performed Tawaaf around the Ka'bah with Abraham (alayhi-salam) when he first built it; he believed and followed him. Dhu'l-Qarnayn was a good man and a great king; Allaah gave him great power and he ruled the east and west. He held sway over all kings and countries, and travelled far and wide in both east and west. He travelled eastwards until he reached a pass between two mountains, through which people were coming out. They did not understand anything, because they were so isolated; they were Gog and Magog. They were spreading corruption through the earth, and harming the people, so the people sought help from Dhu'l-Qarnayn. They asked him to build a barrier between them and Gog and Magog. He asked them to help him to build it, so together they built a barrier by mixing iron, copper and tar.

Thus Dhu'l-Qarnayn restrained Gog and Magog behind the barrier. They tried to penetrate the barrier, or to climb over it, but to no avail. They could not succeed because the barrier is so huge and smooth. They began to dig, and they have been digging for centuries; they will continue to do so until the time when Allaah decrees that they come out. At that time the barrier will collapse, and Gog and Magog will rush out in all directions, spreading corruption, uprooting plants, killing people. When Jesus (alayhi-salam) prays against them, Allaah will send a kind of worm

in the napes of their necks, and they will be killed by it.

Footnotes

[1] Tirmidhee, Abwaab al-Tafsir: Soorat al-Kahf (Hadeeth 5160), 8/597-99. Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan, (Hadeeth 4080), 2/1364. Ahmad, Musnad, 2/510, 511.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1735.

The destruction of the Ka'bah

At the end of time, Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn, who will come from Abyssinia (al-Habash), will destroy the Ka'bah in order to steal its treasure and Kiswah (cloth covering). The Ka'bah is the ancient building which was built by Abraham, and whose foundations were laid by Adam.

As Tafseer (interpretation) of the Aayah "Until the Gog and Magog (people) are let through (their barrier)" [al-Anbiyaa' (21):96], it was reported from Ka'b al-Ahbar that Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn will first emerge at the time of Jesus, son of Mary. Allaah will send Jesus at the head of a vanguard of between seven and eight hundred. While they are marching towards Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn, Allaah will send a breeze from the direction of Yemen, which will take the soul of every believer. Only the worst of people will be left, and they will begin to copulate like animals. Ka'b said: "At that time, the Hour will be close at hand." [1]

'Abd Allaah ibn 'Amr said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn from Abyssinia will destroy the Ka'bah and steal its treasure and Kiswah. It is as if I could see him now: he is bald-headed and has a distortion in his wrists. He will strike the Ka'bah with his spade and pick-axe.' " [Ahmad] [2]

It was reported from 'Abd Allaah ibn 'Umar that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"Leave the Abyssinians alone so long as they do not disturb you, for no-one will recover the treasure of the Ka'bah except Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn from Abyssinia." [Abu Daawood, in the chapter on the prohibition of provoking the Abyssinians] [3]

Ibn 'Abbaas narrated that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"It is as if I can see him now: he is black and his legs are widely spaced. He will destroy the Ka'bah stone by stone." [Ahmad] [4]

The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Hour will not come until a man from Qahtaan appears and rules the people." [Muslim; similar Hadeeth in Bukhaaree]

This man could be Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn, or someone else, because this man comes from Qahtaan, while other reports say that Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn comes from Abyssinia; and Allaah knows best.

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Day and night will not come to an end until a freed man called Jahjaah holds sway.' " [Ahmad] [5]

This could be the name of Dhul-Suwayqatayn from Abyssinia; and Allaah knows best.

'Umar ibn al-Khattab reported that he heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say:

"The people of Makkah will leave, and only a few people will pass through it. Then it will be resettled and rebuilt; then the people will leave it again, and no-one will ever return." [6]

Footnotes

[1] Concerning Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn, see: Bukhaaree: Kitaab al-Hajj, Baab Hadam al-Ka'bah (The Book of Pilgrimage, Chapter of the Destruction of the Ka'bah), 2/183. Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan wa Ashraat al-Saa'ah, 8/183. Dhu'l-Suwayqatayn: al-Suwayqatayn is the diminutive of al-Saaqayn (legs); his legs are described as being "small" because they are thin. Thin legs are, in general, a characteristic of the Sudanese and people of the Horn of Africa.

[2] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/220.

Checker's Note: Da'eef isnaad. It contains the 'an'anah of Abu Zubair. The first part, up to 'treasure' is hasan, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 771.

[3] Abu Daawood, Kitaab al-Malaahim, (Hadeeth 4287), 11/423.

Checker's Note: Hasan, Saheeh Abee Daawood.

[4] Ahmad, Musnad, 1/227.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, also reported in al-Bukhaaree.

[5] Checker's Note: Saheeh, Ahmad, Muslim and at-Tirmidhee. Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 7684.

[6] Ahmad, Musnad, 1/23.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, Da'eef al-Jami as-Sagheer: 3298. Da'eef due to Ibn Lahi'ah and 'an'anah of Abu Zubair

Madeenah will remain inhabited at the time of the Dajjaal

It has been proven in the Saheeh Ahaadeeth, as already stated, that the Dajjaal will not be able to enter Makkah and Madeenah, and that there will be angels at the gates of Makkah to ward him off and prevent him

from entering.

It was reported from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"Neither the Dajjaal nor plague will be able to enter Madeenah."

As mentioned above, the Dajjaal will camp outside Madeenah, and it will be shaken by three tremors. Every hypocrite and sinner will go out to join the Dajjaal, and every believer and Muslim will stay. That day will be called the Day of Purification (Yawm al-Khalaas). Most of those who go out to join the Dajjaal will be women. As the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"Verily it (Madeenah) is good; its evil will be eliminated and its goodness will be obvious."

Allaah (subhaanahu wa ta'aala) said:

"Women impure are for men impure, and men impure for women impure, and women of purity are for men of purity, and men of purity are for women of purity..." [an-Noor (24):26]

Madeenah will remain inhabited during the days of the Dajjaal, and during the time of Jesus son of Mary (alayhi-salam), until he dies and is buried there. Then it will be destroyed.

'Umar ibn al-Khattab said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'A rider will go around Madeenah and say, There used to be many Muslims here.' "

[Ahmad] [1]

Footnotes

[1] Ahmad, Musnad, 1/20.

Checker's Note: Da'eef isnaad due to Ibn Lahi'ah and `an`anah of Abu Zubair. The fact that Madinah will be deserted is reported from Abu Hurairah by al-Bukhaaree.

The Emergence of the Beast

Among the signs of the Hour will be the emergence of a beast from the earth. It will be very strange in appearance, and extremely huge; one cannot even imagine what it will look like. It will emerge from the earth and shake the dust from its head. It will have with it the ring of Solomon and the rod of Moses. People will be terrified of it and will try to run away, but they will not be able to escape, because such will be the decree of Allaah. It will destroy the nose of every unbeliever with the rod, and write the word "Kaafir" on his forehead; it will adorn the face of every believer and write the word "Mu'min" (true believer) on his forehead, and it will speak to people.

Allaah (subhaanahu wa ta'aala) said:

"And when the Word is fulfilled against them (the unjust), We shall produce from the earth a Beast to (face) them: it will speak to them..."

[an-Naml (27):82]

Ibn 'Abbaas, al-Hasan and Qataadah said that "It will speak to them" (tukallimuhum) means that it will address them. Ibn Jareer suggested that it means that the Beast will address them with the words "...for that mankind did not believe with assurance in Our Signs..." [an-Naml (27):82 - latter part of the Ayah]

Ibn Jareer reported this from 'Alee and 'Ata'. It was reported from Ibn 'Abbaas that tukallimuhum means that the Beast will cut them, i.e., it will write the word "Kaafir" on the forehead of the unbeliever. It was also reported from Ibn 'Abbaas that he will both address them and cut them; this suggestion incorporates both of the previous suggestions; and Allaah knows best.

We have already mentioned the Hadeeth of Hudhayfah ibn Usayd, in which the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) is reported to have said,

"The Hour will not come until you see ten signs: the smoke; the Dajjaal; the Beast; the sun rising from the West; the descent of Jesus son of Mary; Gog and Magog; and three land-slides - one in the East, one in the West, and one in Arabia, at the end of which fire will burst forth from the direction of Aden (Yemen) and drive people to the place of their final assembly."

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Hasten to do good deeds before six things happen: the rising of the sun from the West, the smoke, the Dajjaal, the Beast, the (death) of one of you or general tribulation.' " [Muslim]

Bareedah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) took me to a place in the desert, near Makkah. It was a dry piece of land surrounded by sand. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Beast will emerge from this place.' It was a very small area." [Ibn Maajah] [1]

It was reported from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Beast of the Earth will emerge, and will have with it the rod of Moses and the ring of Solomon."

It was also reported that he said,

"(The Beast) will destroy the noses of the unbelievers with the ring, - so

that people seated around one table will begin to address one another with the words "O Believer!" or "O Unbeliever!" (i.e., everyone's status will become clear) [Ibn Maajah] [2]

'Abd Allaah ibn 'Amr said,

"I memorised a Hadeeth from the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) which I have not forgotten since. I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'The first of the signs (of the Hour) to appear will be the rising of the sun from the West and the appearance of the Beast before the people in the forenoon. Whichever of these two events happens first, the other will follow immediately.' " [Muslim] [3]

That is to say, these will be the first extraordinary signs. The Dajjaal, the descent of Jesus (alayhi-salam), the emergence of Gog and Magog, are less unusual in that they are all human beings. But the emergence of the Beast, whose form will be very strange, its addressing the people and classifying them according to their faith or unbelief, is something truly extraordinary. This is the first of the earthly signs, as the rising of the sun from the West is the first of the heavenly signs.

Footnotes

[1] Ibn Maajah, Kitaab al-Fitan, (Hadeeth 4267), 2/1352.

Checker's Note: Da'eef Jiddan (very weak). Ibn Maajah, no. 4067, Da'eef Ibn Maajah: 882.

[2] Similar Hadeeth narrated by Ibn Maajah in Kitaab al-Fitan, (Hadeeth 4061), 2 - 1351, 1352. Ahmad, Musnad, 2 - 295.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, Da'eef al-Jami as-Sagheer: 2413.

[3] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan, 8/202.

The Rising of the Sun from the West

Allaah (subhaanahu wa ta'aala) says:

"Do they then wait for anything other than that the angels should come to them, or that your Lord should come, or that some of the Signs of your Lord should come (i.e. portents of the Hour e.g., arising of the sun from the west)! The day that some of the Signs of your Lord do come, no good will it do to a person to believe then, if he believed not before, nor earned good (by performing deeds of righteousness) through his Faith. Say:

'Wait you! we (too) are waiting.'" [al-An'aam (6):158]

It was reported from Abu Sa'eed al-Khudree that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) explained,

"The day that some of the Signs of your Lord do come, no good will it do to a person to believe then...", referring to the rising of the sun from the West. [Ahmad] [1]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'The Hour will not come until the sun rises from the West. When the people see it, whoever is living on earth will believe, but that will be the time when - No good will it do to a person to believe then, if he believed not before then' "

[Bukhaaree] [2]

It was also reported from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Hour will not come until the sun rises from the West. When it rises and the people see it, they will all believe. But that will be the time when 'No good will it do to a person to believe then.' " [Bukhaaree] [3]

It was reported from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"There are three things which, if they appear, 'No good will it do to a person to believe then, if he believed not before, nor earned good (by performing deeds of righteousness) through his Faith' They are: the rising of the sun from the West, the Dajjaal, and the Beast of the Earth."

[Ahmad, Muslim, Tirmidhee] [4]

Abu Dharr said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) asked me, 'Do you know where the sun goes when it sets?' I said, 'I do not know' He said, 'It travels until it prostrates itself beneath the Throne, and asks for permission to rise again. But a time will come when it will be told, 'Go back whence you came.' That will be the time when 'No good will it do to a person to believe then, if he believed not before, nor earned good (by performing deeds of righteousness) through his Faith' " [Bukhaaree] [5]

'Amr ibn Jareer said,

"Three Muslims were sitting with Marwaan in Madeenah, and heard him say, whilst talking about the Signs of the Hour, that the first of them would be the appearance of the Dajjaal. The three went to 'Abd Allaah ibn 'Amr, and told him what they had heard Marwaan say concerning the Signs. 'Abd Allaah said, 'Marwan has not said much. I memorised a Hadeeth like that from the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) which I have not forgotten since. I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say:

"The first of the signs will be the rising of the sun from the West, and the emergence of the Beast in the forenoon. Whichever of the two comes first, the other will follow immediately"

Then 'Abd Allaah, who was widely-read, said,

"I think that the first to happen will be the rising of the sun from the West.

Every time it sets, it goes beneath the Throne, prostrates itself, and seeks permission to rise again. A time will come when three times it will seek permission and will receive no reply, until, when part of the night has passed and it realises that even if it were given permission, it would not be able to rise on time, it will say: 'O my Lord, how far the rising-point is from me! What can I do for the people now?' Then it will seek permission to go back, and it will be told: 'Rise from where you are now' - and it will rise from the West." Then 'Abd Allaah recited the Aayah: "No good will it do to a person to believe then, if he believed not before, nor earned good (by performing deeds of righteousness) through his Faith." [Ahmad] [6]

Footnotes

[1] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/31.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh at-Tirmidhee: 2455.

[2] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Tafsir, 6/73.

[3] Bukhaaree, ibid.

[4] Muslim, Kitaab al-Imaan, 1/96. Tirmidhee, Abwaab al-Tafsir (Hadeeth 5067), 8/449, 450. Ahmad, Musnad, 2/455, 446.

[5] Similar Hadeeth in Bukhaaree, Kitaab Bid' al-Khalq, 4/131.

[6] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/201.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: 6881.

The Smoke which will appear at the End of Time

Masrooq said:

"While a man was giving a speech among the people of Kindah, he said, 'There will be smoke on the Day of Resurrection which will deprive the hypocrites of their hearing and sight, but the believers will only suffer something like a cold.' We were terrified, so we went to Ibn Masood, who was reclining. When he heard about this, he became angry and sat up, and said: 'O people, whoever knows a thing, let him say it; but whoever does not know, let him say, "Allaah knows best." It is a part of knowledge, when one does not know something, to say "Allaah knows best." Allaah (subhaanahu wa ta'aala) said to His Prophet Muhammad (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam):

"Say (O Muhammad sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam): 'No wage do I ask of you for this (the Qur'aan), nor am I one of the Mutakallifoon (those who pretend and fabricate things which do not exist).'" [Saad (38):86]

"Quraysh were being slow in embracing Islaam, so the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) prayed against them, saying, 'O Allaah, help

me against them by sending seven years of famine like those of Joseph.' They were afflicted by a year of famine in which they were destroyed, and ate dead animals and bones. They began to see something like smoke between the sky and the earth. Abu Sufyan came and said, 'O Muhammad! You came to command us to keep good relations with our relatives, and your people have perished, so pray that Allaah may relieve them.'"

Then Ibn Mas'ood recited,

"Then wait you for the Day when the sky will bring forth a visible smoke. Covering the people, this is a painful torment. (They will say): "Our Lord! Remove the torment from us, really we shall become believers!" How can there be for them an admonition (at the time when the torment has reached them), when a Messenger explaining things clearly has already come to them. Then they had turned away from him (Messenger Muhammad sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) and said: "One (Muhammad sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) taught (by a human being), a madman!" Verily, We shall remove the torment for a while. Verily! You will revert."

[ad-Dukhaan (44):10-15]

Ibn Masood asked:

"Will their punishment in the Hereafter be removed so they can go back to their Kufr?"

Allaah (subhaanahu wa ta'aala) said:

"On the Day when We shall seize you with the greatest grasp. Verily, We will exact retribution." [ad-Dukhaan (44):16]

...and soon will come the inevitable (punishment)!" [al-Furqaan (25):77]

These Ayaat refer to the Day (Battle) of Badr. Allaah (subhaanahu wa ta'aala) said:

"Alif Laam Meem. The Romans have been defeated. In the nearer land (Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine), and they, after their defeat, will be victorious. Within three to nine years." [ar-Room (30): 1-4] [Bukhaaree]

[1]

This speaker's suggestion - that the idea that the smoke would be on the Day of Resurrection was not a good one - made Ibn Masood react angrily. But the smoke will appear before the Day of Resurrection; it will be one of the signs, which are: the Beast, the Dajjaal, the Smoke, and Gog and Magog, as the Ahaadeeth narrated from Abu Sareehah, Abu Hurairah and other Sahaabah indicate.

As mentioned in the Saheeh Ahaadeeth, the fire which will appear before the Day of Resurrection will burst forth from the direction of Aden, and drive the people to the place of their final assembly. It will move with

them and halt with them, and will devour any who lag behind.

Footnote

[1] Bukhaaree, Kitaab at-Tafsir - Soorat ar-Room, 6/142, 143

Other Events which will precede the Hour

It was reported from Abu Sa'eed al-Khudree that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"Thunderbolts will increase so much as the Hour approaches that when a man comes to a people, he will ask, 'Who amongst you was struck by a thunderbolt this morning?' and they will say, 'So-and-so and so-and-so was struck.'" [Ahmad] [1]

Heavy rain before the Day of Resurrection

It was reported from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The hour will not come until there has been rain which will destroy all dwellings except tents." [2]

We have already mentioned many Ahaadeeth about the signs of the Hour. Now we will turn our attention to some Ahaadeeth which could indicate that the Hour is close at hand.

It was reported from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said:

"The Hour will not come until the following events have come to pass: people will compete with one another in constructing high buildings; two big groups will fight one another, and there will be many casualties - they will both be following the same religious teaching; earthquakes will increase; time will pass quickly; afflictions and killing will increase; nearly thirty dajjals will appear, each of them claiming to be a messenger from Allaah; a man will pass by a grave and say, 'Would that I were in your place'; the sun will rise from the West; when it rises and the people see it, they will all believe, but that will be the time when 'No good will it do to a person to believe then, if it believed not before...' [al-An'aam (6):158]; and a wealthy man will worry lest no-one accept his Zakaat." [Bukhaaree, Muslim]

It was reported from Anas that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said:

"Among the signs of the Hour are the following: knowledge will decrease and ignorance will prevail; fornication and the drinking of wine will be common; the number of men will decrease and the number of women will increase, until one man will look after fifty women." [Bukhaaree] [3]

'Aa'ishah said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say, 'Day and night will not pass away until people begin to worship Laat and 'Uzzaa' (two goddesses of pre-Islaamic Arabic). I said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, I thought that when Allaah revealed the Aayah "It is He Who has sent His Messenger (Muhammad sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) with guidance and the religion of truth (Islaam), to make it superior over all religions even though the Mushrikoon (polytheists, pagans, idolaters, disbelievers in the Oneness of Allaah) hate (it)" [at-Tawbah (9):33], it implied that (this promise) would be fulfilled.' The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'It will happen as Allaah wishes. Then Allaah will send a pleasant breeze, which will take everyone who has as much faith as a grain of mustard-seed in his heart. Only those with no goodness in them will be left, and they will revert to the religion of their forefathers.' " [Muslim] [4] It was reported from Abu Hurairah that one day, while the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) was sitting with the people, a Bedouin came to him and asked him about Eemaan and Islaam, then he asked, "O Messenger of Allaah, when will the Hour be?" He said, "The one who is asked about it does not know more than the one who asks, but I tell you about its signs. When a slave gives birth to her mistress, and when the bare-footed and naked become the chiefs of the people - these are among the signs of the Hour. There are five things which no-one knows except Allaah." Then he recited:

"Verily the knowledge of the Hour is with God (alone). It is He Who sends down rain, and He Who knows what is in the wombs. Nor does anyone know what it is that he will earn on the morrow: nor does anyone know in what land he is to die. Verily God is All-Knowing, All Aware." [Luqman (31):34]

Then the man went away, and the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "Call him back to me," but when the people went to call him, they could not see anything. The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, "That was Gabriel, who came to teach the people their religion." [Bukhaaree, Muslim] [5]

"The bare-footed and naked paupers will compete with one another in constructing high buildings" means that they will become the chiefs of people. They will become rich, and their only concern will be to compete in constructing high buildings. This is as in the Hadeeth we shall see later:

"The Hour will not come until the happiest people in the world will be the depraved sons of the depraved."

It was reported from Abu Sa'eed that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa

sallam) said:

"The Hour will not come until the time when a man will leave his home, and his shoes or whip or stick will tell what is happening to his family."

[Ahmad] [6]

It was reported from Abu Sa'eed that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said:

"By Him in Whose hand is my soul, the Hour will not come until wild animals talk to men, and a man speaks to his whip or his shoe, and his thigh will tell him about what happened to his family after he left." [7]

Anas said,

"We were discussing the fact that the Hour would not come until there is no rain, the earth does not produce crops, and fifty women will be cared for by one man; and if a woman passes by a man, he will look at her and say, 'This woman once had a husband.' " [Ahmad] [8]

Abu Hurairah said:

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said: 'The Hour will not come until time passes so quickly that a year will be like a month, a month like a week, a week like a day, a day like an hour, and an hour like the time it takes for a palm-leaf to burn.' " [Ahmad] [9]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said: 'The world will not pass away until the one who enjoys it the most is the depraved son of the depraved.' " [Ahmad] [10]

Abu Hurairah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said, 'Before the Hour comes, there will be years of deceit, in which a truthful person will be disbelieved and a liar will be believed; and the insignificant will have a say.' " [Ahmad] [11]

Abu Hurairah said:

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say: 'The Hour will not come until the sheep with horns no longer fights the sheep without horns.' " [Ahmad] [12]

It was reported from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Hour will not come until wealth increases so much that a wealthy man will be worried lest no-one accept his Sadaqah; knowledge will be taken away; time will pass quickly; tribulations will appear; and there will be much Harj." The people asked, "What is Harj, O Messenger of Allaah?" He said, "Killing, killing." [Ahmad] [13]

It was reported from Abu Hurairah that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe

wa sallam) said,

"By Him Who sent me with the Truth, this earth will not pass away until people are afflicted with landslides, are pelted with stones, and are transformed into animals." The people asked, "When will that be, O Messenger of Allaah?" He said, "When you see women riding in the saddle, when singers are common, when bearing false witness becomes widespread, and when men lie with men and women with women." [14]

Taariq ibn Shihaab said,

"We were sitting with 'Abd Allaah ibn Mas'ood, when a man came and told us that the time for prayer had come. So we got up and went to the mosque... After the prayer, a man came to 'Abd Allaah ibn Mas'ood and said, 'As-salaam 'alayka (Peace be upon you), O Abu 'Abd ar-Rahmaan'. 'Abd Allaah answered, 'Allaah and His Messenger have spoken the truth.' When we went back, we asked one another, 'Did you hear the answer he gave? Who is going to ask him about it?' I said, 'I will ask him'; so I asked him when he came out. He narrated from the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam):

'Before the Hour comes, there will be a special greeting for the people of distinction; trade will become so widespread that a woman will help her husband in business; family ties will be cut; the giving of false witness will be common, while truthful witness will be rare; and writing will be widespread.' [Ahmad] [15]

Footnotes

[1] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/64, 65.

Checker's Note: Da'eef isnaad due to Muhammad ibn Mus'ab.

[2] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/262.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: 7554 and Majma' az-Zawa'id of al-Haythamee: 7/331.

[3] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-'Ilm, 1/30, 31.

[4] Muslim, Kitaab al-Fitan 8/182.

[5] Bukhaaree, Kitaab al-Imaan, 1/19; Kitaab at-Tafsir - Soorat Luqmaan, 6/144. Muslim, Kitaab al-Imaan, 1/30, 31.

[6] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/88, 89.

Checker's Note: Saheeh.

[7] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/82, 84.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 122.

[8] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/286.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, reported by Ahmad, Abu Ya'la and al-Bazzar. Majma' az-Zawa'id of al-Haythamee: 7/333 and Kashful Astar bi Zawa'id

al-Bazzar of al-Haythamee: 3415.

[9] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/358.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh al-Jami as-Sagheer: 7422.

[10] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/358.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh al-Jami as-Sagheer: 7272.

[11] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/238.

Checker's Note: Hasan, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1887.

[12] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/442.

Checker's Note: Da'eef?? [not quite sure] due to as-Salt ibn Quwaid; an-Nasaa'ee said, "His hadith is munkar."

[13] Ahmad, Musnad, 2/313.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: 8120, 8121.

[14] al-Haythamee, Kitaab al-Fitan.

Checker's Note: Da'eef, related by al-Bazzar and at-Tabaraanee in al-Awsat. It is weak due to Sulaiman ibn Daawood al-Yamami who is matrook (abandoned). Majma' az-Zawa'id of al-Haythamee.

[15] Ahmad, Musnad, 1/407.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 648.

Description of the People who will be Alive at the End of Time

It was reported from 'Abd Allaah ibn 'Amr that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Hour will not come until Allaah takes away the best people on earth; only the worst people will be left; they will not know any good or forbid any evil." [Ahmad] [1]

'Abd Allaah ibn Mas'ood said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say: 'Eloquence can be bewitching; the worst of the people are those upon whom the Hour will come while they are still alive, and those who turn graves into mosques.'

" [Ahmad] [2]

It was reported from Anas that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said,

"The Hour will not come until no-one on earth says 'Laa ilaaha illaa Allaah.'" [Ahmad] [3]

It was also reported from Anas that the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) said:

"The Hour will not come until no-one on earth says, 'Allaah, Allaah.'" [Ahmad] [4]

[Ahmad] [4]

There are two suggestions as to the meaning of the phrase, "until no-one on earth says 'Allaah, Allaah'":

It could mean that no-one will forbid evil, or try to correct another if he sees him doing something wrong. We have already come across this in the Hadeeth of 'Abd Allaah ibn 'Amr:

"Only the worst people will be left; they will not know any good or forbid any evil."

It could mean that Allaah will no longer be mentioned, and His Name will not be known; this will be part of the prevalent corruption and Kufr, as in the previous Hadeeth,

"Until no-one on earth says 'Laa ilaaha illaa Allaah."

'Aa'ishah said,

"The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) came in, saying 'O 'Aa'ishah, your people will be the first of my Ummah to join me.' When he sat down, I said, 'O Messenger of Allaah, may I be sacrificed for you! When you came in, you were saying something which scared me.' He asked, 'What was that?' I said, 'You said that my people would be the first of your Ummah to join you.' He said, 'Yes.' I asked, 'Why is that?' He said, 'Death will be widespread among them, and their relatives will be jealous of them.' I said, 'How will people be after that?' He said, 'Like locusts: the strong will devour the weak, until the Hour comes.' " [Ahmad] [5]

'Albaa' al-Salamee said,

"I heard the Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) say: 'The Hour will only come upon the worst of the people.' " [Ahmad] [6]

Footnotes

[1] Ahmad, Musnad, 1/454.

Checker's Note: Da'eef isnaad due to `an`anah of al-Hasan al-Basree.

[2] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/268.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Musnad Imaam Ahmad, checking by Ahmad Shakir: 4342.

[3] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/268.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Tahdheerus Saajid of Shaykh al-Albaanee, pg. 119.

[4] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/107.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Saheeh al-Jami as-Sagheer: 7420.

[5] Ahmad, Musnad, 6/81.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Silsilatul Ahadeeth as-Saheehah: 1953.

[6] Ahmad, Musnad, 3/499.

Checker's Note: Saheeh, Mustadrak of al-Hakim: 4/496. Declared saheeh by al-Hakim and agreed to by adh-Dhahaabee

THE SIGNS BEFORE THE DAY OF JUDGEMENT

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This comment applies to all the places in which Bashier has used the old version of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* instead of the newer one. This comment applies also to Bashier's explanation of *ta'ṣīl* and *tanzīh* (both terms are used to indicate a transcendent God who has no resemblance whatsoever to his Creation), which unfortunately also relies on a small and not sufficiently developed reference from the shorter version of *EI*¹.

The index is not complete: it lacks Arabic terms, and one finds them only under the English translation. There are a few spelling errors in the Arabic transliteration (e.g., p. 128: *al-Ākhir* and not *al-Akhir*; p. 113: *qalb* and not *qalp*). But in general Bashier's well-written and courageous book is a fine addition to previous research on Ibn al-ʿArabī in its attempt to shed light on the concept of *barzakh*. It deserves to be a starting point for future dialogue between scholars and philosophers, regardless of their familiarity with medieval Arabic thought.

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its spaces, and its uses? Something that would place the Nasrid palace firmly against the backdrop, not of Washington Irving's tales or John Frederick Lewis' gypsies, or Henri Regnault's muscle-bound executioner, but of the vibrant political, intellectual, courtly, poetic, social and religious culture that created it? This reviewer can think of none.

In truth, no fingers can be pointed at Irwin's vacillation between fact and fantasy, or at his eschewing of romantic fictions and exaggerations, only to trip over one and then another in the very next chapter. His laundry-list evocation of the complexities of Nasrid literary and intellectual culture, followed by a swift and seemingly contradictory return to universalizing musings about the cheap and ephemeral nature of these fantasies-in-stucco engendered by the Nasrids' own consciousness of the imminence of their end, is very much par for the course: specialists, with very few exceptions, have offered no better. It is indeed somewhat ironic that a fully contextualized study of the best preserved medieval Islamic palace (albeit located, as Irwin observes, in Europe [p. 3]) has yet to be undertaken, that no scholar has yet taken a stab at reading its ornamental program through the varied lenses offered by Nasrid poetics, philosophy, or Sufi aesthetics. One wonders if this is perhaps because, ultimately, we as scholars are just as seduced by the palace's constructed "mystery" as is Doris Lessing, who lauds Irwin's study as "captur[ing] and convey[ing] the mysterious attractions of the Alhambra."

But the stunning ornamental *tour de force* which is the Palace of the Lions is—must be—much more than just *trompe l'oeil* and sensationalism. Recent studies of other key buildings and their contexts in Islamic art have offered us provocative forays beyond the Western dead-end which is iconography, and toward illuminating readings of these monuments within the framework intended by patrons and (perhaps) artisans for very specific publics. Indeed, Irwin—who is not primarily an art historian, and does not claim to be—hints at something that smacks very much of frustration when faced with academia's construction of an impenetrable "stucco mystery" out of a place which was, in his words, "designed by and for intellectuals with mystical inclinations" (p. 99). He has laid out, in abbreviated form, in the final pages of his second chapter and throughout his third, what other scholars have laboriously reconstructed on the basis of original sources: a unique, sophisticated, original, and complex intellectual culture that must have informed (and doubtless been informed by) the aesthetics of the Alhambra's beloved *muqarnas* and ornamental programs. It is up to art historians now to remove the veil of mystery, however much we may enjoy luxuriating beneath it, and to weave together building and context. It would indeed be a great pleasure for this reviewer to address such a book in such a journal as this.

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Ibn al-ʿArabi's Barzakh: The Concept of the Limit and the Relationship between God and the World.

By SALMAN H. BASHIER. Albany: STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS, 2004. Pp. xii + 206. \$45.

A systematic analysis of one of the key terms in Ibn al-ʿArabi's monistic theory of the unity of existence (*wahdat al-wujūd*), set in a thorough description of the teachings of Plato as well as those of medieval Arabic thinkers, is central to this challenging book. The enigmatic term *barzakh* (translated by Bashier as "the Limit"), which is mentioned three times in the Qurʾān and in some eschatological traditions, is used by the Andalusian mystic thinker Ibn al-ʿArabi (d. 1240) to denote the concept of an immutable entity which separates the divine from creation and at the same time unites them. Bashier has recognized the importance of the concept of *barzakh* in Ibn al-ʿArabi's mystical philosophy. By dedicating his book to this concept, he provides a necessary outlook on a subject which was far from being exhausted in previous research. He wishes to relate Ibn al-ʿArabi's thought to Islamic theology and philosophy, in spite of the latter's proclaimed distance from and reservations about the rational philosophers. His argument in favor of comparing Ibn al-ʿArabi's thought to that of the Islamic philosophers hits the mark. As he puts it, "why [should] a certain scholar . . . establish his view concerning

Ibn al-ʿArabī's stand from the philosophical thought on the basis of some anecdote that depicts him tossing away a philosophy book, for instance, and not on the basis of his words in defense of philosophical activity. In a sense, this selective reading of Ibn al-ʿArabī seems as rather taking him out of context?" (pp. 143–44).

Situating Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought in the context of Islamic philosophy on the one hand and Greek philosophy on the other is the task Bashier has taken upon himself in this work, although he is aware of the criticism this step might raise. He admits that Ibn al-ʿArabī's tortuous writing style makes it very difficult to refine a definite argument and situate it in a coherent philosophical discussion. Bashier's solution is to bring statements from various works of Ibn al-ʿArabī and put them together as if they were asserted in one place. This solution is compatible with the aim of his research, although it does not always help to clarify the subject in question.

Apart from dealing with the *barzakh* and its place among the main themes in Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought, and after taking upon himself the task of describing the equivalents of the *barzakh* notion in the teachings of Ibn al-ʿArabī's predecessors, Bashier seems to have a much more ambitious aim. Following William Chittick in his introduction to *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, Bashier aims to present Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought as a worthy substitute for the Western intellectual tradition of rationalism. Thus, Ibn al-ʿArabī's notion of the *barzakh* is taken almost as a test case designed to demonstrate Bashier's assertion that "present philosophical thought is undergoing a serious crisis," a crisis that might be resolved if only modern philosophers were aware of the intellectual value of medieval and ancient thought, which "can still be our guide in ridding us of our present intellectual predicament" (p. 145). This and other statements in the same vein give the impression that the book is addressed to a much broader audience than the readers of Ibn al-ʿArabī, whether students or researchers, who are familiar with medieval Arabic thought.

Describing the concept of *barzakh* as Ibn al-ʿArabī's solution to a controversy between Ṣūfī thinkers on the one hand and *mutakallimūn* and *falāsifa* on the other over the problem of the origin of the world, is one of the greatest achievements of the book. The *barzakh*, as Bashier puts it, is "an imaginal mirror that represents the eternal God as eternal and the temporally originated world as temporally originated, although in itself it is neither eternal nor temporally originated. The *barzakh* differentiates between God and the world. In virtue of this differentiating activity, God may be represented to our knowledge as eternal and the world as temporally originated. But the *barzakh* plays also the complementary role of the provider for the context of unity, in which context both God and the world can be represented as both eternal and temporally originated" (p. 12). Bashier examines Ibn al-ʿArabī's notion of the *barzakh* in two modes of reflection: one emphasizing separation and discontinuity, and the other emphasizing connection and continuity. These apparently contradictory ideas are complementary, in the eyes of both Ibn al-ʿArabī and Bashier.

As a preliminary step towards leading the reader to a proper understanding of Ibn al-ʿArabī's concept of *barzakh*, Bashier emphasizes what he calls "one of Ibn Rushd's greatest achievements and yet his most misunderstood discovery that truth is one and universal, even though it may be expressed in contradictory ways" (p. 59). Thus philosophers who hold that the world is infinite see one side of the truth, while theologians who hold the view that the world is finite see the other side. Both are correct, "since the world can be considered as both finite and infinite from two different perspectives, or according to two different rational interpretations." This twofold point of view about the world is a necessary tool in deciphering the concept of *barzakh*.

The author is gifted with the ability to tell an exciting story, a talent revealed in the intriguing opening of the book: a delightful anecdote of the watchman in the Sultan's palace, a professional musician and a dream of gypsies, time, and music (pp. 1–2). The exciting atmosphere is maintained particularly in chapters four through eight, which analyze the thought of Ibn al-ʿArabī. However, since Bashier aims to demonstrate the philosophical heritage that nourished Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought, the reader is required to traverse three rather long chapters, while Ibn al-ʿArabī makes his actual significant appearance in the book only on p. 60.

In the first two chapters, which are a vital exposition of Ibn al-ʿArabī's *barzakh*, Bashier dedicates too much space to various views of modern scholars. For example, the second chapter deals with the concept of creation *ex nihilo*. Bashier elaborates the views of Netton, Wolfson, Leaman, Urvoy,

Arnaldez, and Burrell at the beginning of the chapter. Although this is a good indication of his meticulous reading and his profound knowledge of current research, it is a clear case of overkill. On the other hand, his insistence on dedicating a relatively extensive space (two chapters) to Ibn al-ʿArabī's predecessors in both Greek philosophy and Islamic philosophy and theology is admirable.

Chapter five is the most challenging chapter of the book. Here Bashier sets forth the notion that Ibn al-ʿArabī drew the concept of *barzakh* from the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* literature as well as from Platonic thinkers. He begins with an interesting example which demonstrates Ibn al-ʿArabī's concept of the grave as "the intermediate state in which the dead person lingers from the time of his death until the time of resurrection" (p. 77). This concept is reinforced by a series of prophetic traditions which describe the grave as a pleasure garden for the believer and a cave of fire for the heretic; it is also to be found in the theological writings of several medieval thinkers such as al-Ghazālī (d. 1111; al-Ghazālī's impact on Ibn al-ʿArabī is discussed on pp. 81–83), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350). Ibn al-ʿArabī sees the grave as *barzakh*, i.e., a place in which "spiritual entities are manifested in corporeal forms. Thus, the dead person may see his deeds in a perfect form if in his lifetime he managed to perfect himself through obedience to the Law, whereas the opposite happens if the person neglects his duty as a believer" (p. 79). However, as Bashier points out (pp. 172–73, n. 20), this notion is not alien to traditional Islam. In fact, Ibn al-ʿArabī rephrases a tradition that is found in the eschatological section of some *ḥadīth* compilations, according to which spiritual entities take on material form in the *barzakh*.

Ibn al-ʿArabī's definition of the *barzakh*, Bashier explains, is tentative. "For the *barzakh* is the very thing that makes the activity of defining possible. This is the meaning of his words that the separation between the things (defining) and the separating factor (that which defines) become manifest as one in entity. Understanding the definition of *barzakh* is identical to differentiating between things" (p. 87). Ibn al-ʿArabī's argument leads to the paradoxical conclusion that when things identify themselves, they differentiate themselves from all relations with the Other, "including the relations of difference from Other." "But the only way Something can differentiate itself from difference to Other is by making Other disappear in it, that is, by uniting with Other. Hence, by completely differentiating itself from Other, Something completely unites with Other" (p. 88).

This argument, as Ibn al-ʿArabī himself states, is anything but rationalistic. The way Bashier explains this paradox, as a golden mean of two contradicting assumptions, is commendable, and so are his explanations of other arguments throughout the book. His method of building the explanation step by step makes the complex concepts of Ibn al-ʿArabī accessible and not beyond comprehension. For example, when Bashier presents Ibn al-ʿArabī's concept of *aʿyān thābita* (fixed entities) through the concept of *barzakh*, he states that Ibn al-ʿArabī "thinks that the paradoxical reality of things comes to them by virtue of their being images of their immutable or fixed entities (*aʿyān thābita*), which are *barzakhs* between them and the Real" (p. 89). This succinct description follows a thorough discussion of Plato's theory of the Forms, so that the reader views Ibn al-ʿArabī's *barzakh* as an Arabic manifestation of Plato's Forms added to the Muʿtazilite concept of the *maʿdūm* (nonexistent). Bashier's dealing with Wolfson's and Chittick's reservations concerning this triple knot (Wolfson's reservation about identifying the Muʿtazilite concept with the Platonic Forms, and Chittick's reservation about identifying Ibn al-ʿArabī's concept with the Platonic Forms) is fair enough (p. 98). Bashier thinks that the Muʿtazilite notion of *al-maʿdūm*, Ibn al-ʿArabī's *aʿyān thābita*, and Plato's Forms are basically the same ideas (p. 98).

Chapter seven deals with one of the most provocative notions in Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought, that of the Perfect Man (*al-insān al-kāmil*; unfortunately this term is not referred to in this chapter). Here Bashier seems to give up the discussion of the philosophical and theological roots of this notion, and concentrates on the concept of the Perfect Man as a specific example of the *barzakh* between the divine and creation. This example is crystallized through an interesting analysis of a lengthy paragraph from *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, which describes the human soul's journey towards the love of God. Bashier's interpretation clarifies a great deal with respect to this highly complex paragraph, and leads the reader towards a synthesis between the notion of the Perfect Man and that of the *barzakh*: "Man begins to worship God. His worship, however, is mixed with love, fear and desire. He cannot rid himself of the elements of fear and desire in his worship until he attains a stage in which he sees God manifested in

This comment applies to all the places in which Bashier has used the old version of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* instead of the newer one. This comment applies also to Bashier's explanation of *ta'ṣīl* and *tanzīh* (both terms are used to indicate a transcendent God who has no resemblance whatsoever to his Creation), which unfortunately also relies on a small and not sufficiently developed reference from the shorter version of *EI*¹.

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both the natural and the spiritual aspects of reality. Once Man has arrived at this stage, he becomes a synthesis of the natural (manifest) and the spiritual (nonmanifest) aspects of reality. As such, he will have attained a state of perfection and become a *barzakh* between the Real . . . and His creation" (p. 116). The second part of the chapter is dedicated to a detailed comparison between Ibn al-ʿArabī's notion of the Supreme *Barzakh* and the notion of the Tao, based on Toshihiko Izutsu's research on Sūfism and Taoism. Although Bashier prefaces a warning to this discussion about the difficulties which the reader might come across in the next pages, he makes his point briefly and clearly, especially when he deals with Ibn al-ʿArabī's interpretation of Qurʾān 8:17 (p. 25). What this chapter lacks, in my opinion, is a more general discussion of the notion of the Perfect Man in Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought, although much concerning this notion is clarified and discussed in chapter eight.

In view of the rather lengthy treatment of contemporary thinkers' views, it is a pity that Bashier decides to shorten his discussion when it comes to the texts and concepts of Ibn al-ʿArabī. One example is his dealing with the fifteenth chapter of *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, "On the Poles and Realizers in Knowledge of Breaths and Their Secrets." A key term in the discussion is *maʿrifat al-anfās* ("knowledge of breaths"). Bashier indicates that this phrase stands for "the knowledge of Creative Imagination" (p. 61). However, instead of giving a thorough explanation of this concept, Bashier sends the reader to H. Corbin's *Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sūfism of Ibn ʿArabī* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1969). After presenting the views of scholars on various matters, the decision to give a short and unsatisfactory explanation is quite puzzling.

Bashier deals with the fifteenth chapter of the *Futūḥāt* in the context of the encounter between al-Khaḍīr and Moses; but his treatment is inconsistent and confusing. For example, he does not indicate that this encounter is *not* described in the fifteenth chapter of the *Futūḥāt*, nor that this chapter does not include a discussion of Moses' position, but Bashier inserts it all the same, without indicating the source. The story appears only in the commentaries on Qurʾān 18:60–82, none of which are mentioned by Bashier. Only on p. 62 does he cite the relevant Qurʾānic verses, but mistakenly ascribes them to Sūra 16 instead of Sūra 18. More careful editing could have avoided such unfortunate mistakes. The translation of this Qurʾānic passage is a mixture of Arberry's and Yūsuf ʿAlī's, neither of whom are credited for their efforts.

It is a pity that Bashier does not introduce more Arabic terms when citing from Ibn al-ʿArabī's works, even in translation. Inserting the Arabic terms in the body of the translation is crucial to the understanding of the thought of any scholar, let alone Ibn al-ʿArabī, whose whole system of thought is based on giving fresh and unconventional interpretations of familiar terms. One obvious example is his understanding of the terms *tashbīḥ* and *tanzīḥ*, which is by no means coeval with the familiar use of these terms. On pp. 24–25 Bashier cites a passage from the *Futūḥāt* which deals with these terms. Although this citation is taken from G. T. Elmore's translation, the Arabic terms should have been inserted here. When a text includes terms like "Reality," "Qualities," "essence," "quiddity," etc., it is important to give the Arabic terms in parentheses, especially when there is no wide acceptance of the proper translation for certain terms; "quiddity" is probably the most conspicuous example.

Bashier makes an interesting point when dealing with the mental state of the mystic, which is represented by the word *ḥāl*. The mystic *ḥāl* represents "a link that connects the created with the Creator," and is related to the term *taḥawwul*, which is the constant transmutation of the opposite elements of the Universe. This reminds Bashier of *ḥāl* as is used by the *mutakallimūn*: a quality of an existent being which "is neither existent nor nonexistent" (pp. 68–69). The connection Bashier makes between the two terms, which are apparently taken from two different fields of thought, is impressive, and sets a fine example for exploiting a *kalāmīc* notion familiar to Ibn al-ʿArabī in order to clarify a mystical term. It is obvious that Ibn al-ʿArabī's concept of the perpetual creation (*al-khalq al-mutajaddid*) of the world is drawn from Ashʿarite *kalām*. Thus his use of the term *ḥāl* encompasses both the theological as well as the mystical point of view. Here Bashier makes the dividing line between these two fields of thought blurred if not nonexistent; this approach is compatible with Ibn al-ʿArabī's own writings. However, this line of thought needs further investigation, because Bashier relies on the definition of *ḥāl* as it appears in the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Scholarship in the field of theology has advanced greatly since D. B. MacDonald wrote this entry around a century ago; consulting more recent research in the field of Islamic theology would have contributed more to the point Bashier is making.

MYSTICAL TREATISES OF MUHYIDDIN IBN 'ARABI

IBN 'ARABI



*The Universal Tree
and the Four Birds*

Translated by Angela Jaffray

The Universal Tree and the Four Birds

MYSTICAL TREATISES OF
MUHYIDDIN IBN 'ARABI

FORTHCOMING TITLES

The Four Cornerstones of the Way
(*Hilyat al-abdāl*)

Annihilated in Contemplation
(*Kitāb al-fanā' fi'l-mushāhada*)

Technical Terms of Sufism
(*al-Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣūfīya*)

Muḥyiddīn Ibn ‘Arabī

The Universal Tree and the Four Birds

Treatise on Unification (*al-Ittiḥād al-kawnī*)



Introduction, Translation and Commentary

ANGELA JAFFRAY



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I am in love with no other than myself,
and my very separation is my union ...

I am my beloved and my lover;
I am my knight and my maiden.

Muḥyiddīn Ibn ‘Arabī

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Lā tawfīq illā bi-llāh

OF THE TREE AND ITS FOUR BIRDS

RAFI ZABOR

It is He who is revealed in every face, sought in every sign, gazed upon by every eye, worshipped in every object of worship, and pursued in the unseen and the visible. Not a single one of His creatures can fail to find Him in its primordial and original nature.

Muḥyiddīn Ibn ‘Arabī

Ibn ‘Arabī – or Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn al-‘Arabī at-Ṭā’ī al-Ḥātimī, also called Muḥyiddīn, the Revivifier of the Faith – was born in 1165 CE in the city of Murcia in Muslim Andalusia, and died seventy-five years later in Damascus: a narrative traversal of the Islamic world more than mirrored by his encompassment of its internal, esoteric aspect. Called within the Sufi tradition the Shaykh al-Akbar, or Greatest Master, and seen as its ultimate exemplar of esoteric Knowledge, he was, among many other things, the author of approximately three hundred books, some of them no longer than a pamphlet, others comprising several volumes. The best known and doubtless most important of these are the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, in many ways the crystallization of a lifetime’s gnosis, and the enormous *Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, which combines the functions of a spiritual encyclopedia and intimate autobiography. The work translated here (*Risālat al-ittiḥād al-kawnī*, likely written before the author’s arrival in Mecca circa 1203 CE), combining verse, prose, and rhymed prose, is certainly one of Ibn ‘Arabī’s most beautiful and, while quite unlike

any other of his books so far translated into English,¹ it is wholly characteristic of his genius.

In it the reader will encounter a work of extraordinary literary and spiritual artistry, followed by a commentary whose lucidity and acuity of articulation will introduce the neophyte – its thoroughness should also please the specialist – to some of the details of the cosmological order to which our author's imagery, in this work and elsewhere, belongs; but there ought also to be room for a few general words of introduction for the general reader who might happen by.

In the history of monotheistic spirituality, in particular its Western, Abrahamic branch incorporating Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, you may find an aspected resemblance here and there, but there is really no one, from taproot to topmost leaf-tip, like Muḥyiddīn Ibn 'Arabī. In Islamic esotericism per se, especially with regard to its metaphysical and exegetical component, virtually everyone before him is an anticipation and everyone after a commentator or interpreter.

In encountering him you come upon the ultimate implications of monotheism whole and unaltered. Since in exoteric Islam the Unity and Absoluteness of God is the primary axiom, it follows that for its definitive esotericist a One and Absolute God implies the non-existence of anything other than Himself – since that would qualify His Singleness and Absoluteness – so that there is not, in existence or the many shades of relative existence and non-existence in the eighteen thousand Universes anything other than Him *tout court*. From this vantage point we pass to a world of apparently infinite paradox, actually a series of antinomic affirmations logically exclusive of each other but united in the suprarational fact that is the One Existence: the Universes are His appearance, He is the same as the existence of the things, although nothing can be associated with Him and He is transcendent from all qualification, even that of transcendence; everything that exists is the self-manifestation of possibilities latent in His essence, existentiated by His Mercy, yet the possibilities themselves choose their modes of being and demand existentiation from

1. It has been translated into splendidly lyrical French by Denis Gril as *Le Livre de l'arbre et des quatre oiseaux*, Paris: Les Deux Océans, 1984.

Him, so that their will is free and their own, and the consequences of their actions rebound upon themselves, although there is essentially no will but His, and He is transcendent from the existent things without difference although He is their being and substance, and He guides them, perpetually, because He is their inextricable essence. The conscious, perfected human being – the normal run of humans are veiled from the Reality by the illusion of their own self-existence – is the complete reflection of its infinite and eternal Source, and it is precisely for the sake of this mirroring that the Absolute breathed His mercy upon the possibilities and potentials latent in Himself and permitted the Universes to become, although their existence is pure contingency, a veil, an illusion, and also the Truth in Truth, while there is only He, and nothing with or beside Him, ever. And so on, almost ad infinitum, according to each particular face of revelation implicit in the nature of the Reality. Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmology sometimes seems as detailed as the Universe whose ontology it addresses; at other times he demolishes all secondary consideration in a totalizing affirmation of the indivisible and unconditionable One: these two components of his vision do not exclude each other but are essentially the same, and cannot be halved. And as the Shaykh sometimes likes to put it: if you understand it that way, fine; and if not, then not.

What after Ibn ‘Arabī’s death came to be called the doctrine of the Unity of Being was not, however, some ultimate ingenuity of exegesis but the result of profound self-experience, and when you read one of his books you encounter in some measure the extraordinary individual who experienced it. His is a flavor one comes to recognize and distinguish from all others, a genius both inclusive of and beyond rational compass, a forthrightness challenging all complacencies, and at times a robustly humorous overturner of all cognitive convention. His complications dazzle and bewilder the intellect and imagination; alternately his bluntness can, at times, make even so bold a visionary as William Blake seem almost an equivocator by comparison.

He is also a poet of extraordinary expressive power, as a reader of the *Ittiḥād* will quickly discover. The book begins with a preludinal poem which even in translation seems one of the great one-time-only coups of the world-long poetic tradition:

*From my incompleteness to my completeness, and from my
inclination to my equilibrium
From my grandeur to my beauty, and from my splendour to my
majesty
From my scattering to my gathering, and from my exclusion to my
reunion
From my baseness to my preciousness, and from my stones to my
pearls . . .*

For thirteen lines Ibn ‘Arabī’s contemplation swings like a pendulum between the polarities of a self whose sphere of allusion and reference is the entire subsolar and sublunary world with its risings and settings, breezes, boughs, and shade, its steeds and gazelles – an extraordinary ambit of discourse that shudders to a halt with the abrupt discovery of that self’s isolation and the limits of its enclosed love. The last line of the section reveals the reality behind even so inspired and inevitable a self-absorption and uncovers the crux of its anguish – *Do not blame me for my passion. I am inconsolable over the one who has fled me* – but if we have left the sphere of the passional self and the romance of its poetics, it is not in obeisance to the dictates of a conventional mysteriosophy; neither will Ibn ‘Arabī, as his accustomed readers know, end his quest with a conventionally diffuse devotional yearning for the Infinite as traditionally conceived: when the Shaykh al-Akbar seeks something he almost invariably finds it, on a large scale and in plenty.

When, after this reflective pause, the tolling of the polarities resumes, a measure of discrimination inserts itself into the cascade of couplets – *Continuous is the light of knowledge; ephemeral the light of intuition* – even, shortly, a teleology, and a changing a sense of quest:

So that I might bring to light what lies hidden in night’s core . . .

To explain the mysteries' roots and express the realities' enigmas.

The author ends this phase of his invocation by affirming the Spiritual nature of his inspiration and by distinguishing it from that of the willfully ignorant.

Ibn 'Arabī then calls his book to order, announces its title, and dedicates it to Abū al-Fawāris Ṣakhr b. Sinān, a “master of the triads and dyads” in whose nature, manner, or teaching must surely lie the root of the introduction’s uniquely “dyadic words of praise”. Ibn 'Arabī then praises God, with reference to a particularly important Qur’anic passage – “Surely We created man with the most beautiful of constitutions”, that is, in the essential image of God, “then We reduced him to the lowest of the low” (Q. 95: 4–5), which in part is to say the mortality and limits of this world but especially the blinkered consciousness we typically have in it – before resuming a rapturous poetics one might have thought eliminated by so firm a theological intrusion. In the following strophes, self and Self, essence and Essence, humanity and the properly Divine are both distinguished from each other – with particular reference to some occulted aspects of the individuated subjectivity – and revealed as inextricable.

In the last moment of this introductory section the author delineates still more precisely the book’s locus of revelation: situated “on the equator”, that is to say at the meeting-point, of “the most beautiful of constitutions” and the “lowest of degrees” that encompass between them the essential human state – the comprehensive conjunction of the Transcendent and the Manifest, in other texts the place where “the two seas meet”, and where the Arc of Necessarily-so-ness and the Arc of Possibilities converge – metaphorically rendered here as the City of human habitation and the Sinai that is the archetypal site of human receptivity to the continuous Divine self-revelation.

Having articulated the book’s metaphysical context, Ibn 'Arabī plunges us into the heart of a drama drawn on a consciously cosmic scale – there is tremendous urgency behind the narrative from the first – evincing an impetuosity and directness, a singleness of feeling

whose impassioned expressiveness is quite distinct from the Persian genius for decoration and ameliorative address to a normative audience, most familiar in the West in the work of Ibn 'Arabī's great near-contemporary Jalāluddīn Rūmī. In fact Rūmī, recognized within the Sufi tradition as its ultimate exemplar of divine and spiritual Love, is not Ibn 'Arabī's opposite but his complement. Ibn 'Arabī is alleged to have seen the child Rūmī and to have remarked upon his future greatness, but the two are more substantially and convincingly linked through Ibn 'Arabī's adopted son and great disciple Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī, who later was a friend and collaborator of Rūmī's in Konya, the capital of thirteenth-century Seljuk Turkey; and it may be that Ibn 'Arabī and Jalāluddīn Rūmī are ideally understood in terms of each other, one expressing explicitly what is implicit in his counterpart.

Unlike the Turkish–Persian master, who usually took care to veil his *jalāl*, or fierce majestic aspect, Ibn 'Arabī not only rushes straight at the Truth but trusts It to let the chips fall where they may: subjective after-effects and secondary concatenations are not his responsibility. Our author exemplifies not only the Arabic genius but the compressive power of the Arabic language, which like its cousin Hebrew and perhaps metaphorically the cosmos those languages characteristically describe, parlays a finite number of consonantal roots into an improbably multiform eloquence of expression.

Ibn 'Arabī shouts, “Alas, my burning heart. I fled from the universe and here I am in it. Where is what I seek?”, and is answered by a voice remarkably like the one that addressed Job from the whirlwind – the author scruples to note that it comes from neither inside nor outside him – demanding where he was at the setting up of the Throne and the placement of the celestial couches, not to mention before the establishment of the supreme horizon, and so on for a staggering paragraph delineating the utter incommensurability of the human and the Divine.

The Voice from the Whirlwind quite silenced Job's inquiries, but the ever-impetuous Ibn 'Arabī, registering that voice and its implications completely within himself, goes onward and inward through

aspect after aspect in his quest for the entire unedited human reality's reflection of the Divine Itselfness. Through an audacity of question and answer, in a sort of active submission to the Reality's fullness of will, in a dialogue of extreme spiritual subtlety dense with Qur'anic allusion and references to the Shaykh's own extensive terminology – much of which will be lost upon the neophyte reader but which registers as strong gnostic drama regardless;² also see the Commentary – Ibn 'Arabī finally arrives at the book's central image of revelation: a Tree with four birds in its branches. Our author will converse with each of them.

Up to this point the protagonist's struggle has been to detach himself from the last traces of contingent creation and so address himself appropriately to the unqualified Reality. (Along the way, the reader will have noted Ibn 'Arabī's characteristic combination of the evocative and the categorical: "If you extract me from the crashing waves and deliver me from the horror of this gloomy night I will never more pronounce the adverb or the preposition of place." Later on, the Crow will tell him: "I am the lamp and the winds. I am the chain against the rock and the wing. I am the sea whose waves constantly strike one another. I am, of the countable, the singular and the paired.") Beginning with his converse with the Tree, our author has reached his goal, and everything that follows is fruition and harvest.

At the very end of the text, Ibn 'Arabī tells us what the Tree and the birds represent, so it is probably best for the reader first to submit to their unassisted poetic authority. Still, for a reader unacquainted with the tradition and its symbology a few words of explication will probably not go amiss. Much of Ibn 'Arabī's personal terminology is a more abstract rendering of the language of the Qur'an, hence the Pen appears as the First Intellect, the Tablet as Soul, and so forth. Of the birds in the Tree, the third, or "strange '*Anqā*'", could certainly use a small interpretative assist and a bit of speciation. Sometimes translated as Phoenix, the strange '*Anqā*' in any case is proverbially

2. The indispensable glossary of his terminology and précis of his metaphysics is *The Twenty-Nine Pages*. Robertson, Roxburghshire: Beshara Publications, 1998.

a bird that has a Name but no manifest Being – *Ismi var, varlık yok*, as almost any Turk can tell you – and hence is associated with the Reality of Realities, a mercurial entity which is the foundation of the world. The Reality of Realities is, as Ibn ‘Arabī writes in *The Book of the Description of the Encompassing Circles*:

the All-embracing Universal which includes the temporal and the eternal, increasing by the multiplicity of existents without however subdividing by their fractioning . . . It is neither existent nor non-existent; it is not the world, and yet it also is; it is other without being other, given that otherness implies [at least] two existents, whereas sameness implies matching . . . resulting in a third notion qualified as form.³

It is co-eternal with the eternal and co-temporal with the temporal. The Reality of Realities is the core of Ibn ‘Arabī’s logos doctrine, and ultimately it is perfectly manifested in the heart of the Perfected Human Being. (Further ambiguities of its indeterminacy are treated within the translator’s Commentary.)

Amid all the beauty and allusiveness of Ibn ‘Arabī’s dialogue with the Tree and its birds, I would especially point out the peroration of the Crow, which is in part a reproach to spiritual types who disdain the created world of bodies and limitation and night. The Shaykh says elsewhere that there are People of the Right Hand, who care only for spiritual things, and People of the Left Hand, who care only for the things of this world; then there are the people who make no distinction between the spiritual and the mundane, and they are Those Who Have Been Brought Near – yet another piece of a rich, meticulously and majestically developed perspective that this short, lyrical and evocative book, youthful but already magisterial, with a conceptual spine strong as tensile steel, makes palpably real to the reader through the eloquence of its imagery and the uniqueness of its author’s unforgettable voice.

3. Translated by P. Fenton and M. Gloton, in *Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi: A Commemorative Volume*, ed. S. Hirtenstein and M. Tiernan. Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element, 1993, pp.25–6.

BIOGRAPHY OF IBN ‘ARABĪ¹

Muḥyiddīn Muḥammad Ibn ‘Arabī, known as “al-Shaykh al-Akbar”, or Greatest Shaykh, was born in 1165 in Murcia, Spain. His father held an important post in the government, first of Ibn Mardanīsh and later of his rival Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, the Almohad ruler. When he was seven, his family moved to Seville where, despite an initial attraction to youthful diversions, an even stronger inclination toward the devotional life began to emerge. Even as a very young man he began to undertake retreats, spent considerable time in cemeteries communing with spirits, and realized astounding mystical insights.

Ibn ‘Arabī tells us little about his first formative retreat, other than to say that, unlike most other mystical wayfarers, he was seized by a kind of divine attraction or ecstasy (*jadhba*), instead of proceeding slowly and laboriously by disciplined stages.² This illuminative event, if the later report of al-Qārī’ al-Baghdādī (d.1418) is to be believed,³ had its inception in the midst of a typical Andalusian fête attended by the teenaged Ibn ‘Arabī. About to raise a cup of wine to his lips, the young man heard a voice proclaim: “O Muḥammad, it was not for this that you were created!”⁴ He left the party abruptly and fled to a cemetery, where he engaged in solitary invocation of God.

1. I have relied on two excellent biographies of Ibn ‘Arabī: *Quest for the Red Sulphur*, by Claude Addas, and *The Unlimited Mercifier*, by Stephen Hirstenstein.

2. Ibn ‘Arabī’s initial spiritual opening is described in Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge* (hereafter *SPK*), p. 383, n. 12: “at twenty he began his ‘wayfaring’ (*sulūk*) in the technical Sufi sense, while in his early teens he had undergone his first opening as the result of a divine attraction (*jadhba*), through the intervention of the prophets Jesus, Moses, and Muḥammad.”

3. See Hirstenstein, *Unlimited Mercifier*, p. 254, n. 3.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

It was there in the cemetery that Ibn 'Arabī experienced a triple vision of the Prophets Jesus, Moses, and Muḥammad.⁵ Each of these three masters illuminated certain aspects of the Path: from Jesus he learned the necessity of asceticism; from Moses, he learned that he would attain *'ilm ladunī*, the kind of knowledge bestowed by God as a gift rather than the result of striving followed by acquisition.⁶ Finally, in the midst of a vision in which he was threatened by assailants, the young man saw the Prophet Muḥammad, standing on a hill. The Prophet urged him to “hold fast to me and you will be safe.”⁷ From that point on, Ibn 'Arabī became an ardent student of hadith, those traditions that recount the Prophet's words and actions, taking them as a model for his own behaviour.

This extraordinary retreat, however, was followed by a period of “abandonment” (*fatra*), which is not at all uncommon in either prophets or friends of God (*awliyā'*).⁸ The Prophet Muḥammad himself experienced it. It is a period of silence from the divine side. The mystic finds himself, as it were, in a desert, completely without sustenance, tormented by doubts and unsure of how, or even whether, to proceed. It is a state in which one may wander compassless forever; or one can emerge safely, as Ibn 'Arabī did, hearing the divine voice recite to him the Qur'anic verses:

And He it is who sendeth the winds as tidings heralding His mercy, till, when they bear a cloud heavy [with rain], We lead it to a dead land, and then cause water to descend thereon and thereby bring forth fruits of every kind. Thus we bring forth the dead. Haply you will remember. As for the good land, its vegetation cometh forth by permission of its Lord. (Q. 7: 57–58)

5. See *Fut.* IV. 172. For the significance of this unprecedented triple vision, see Hirtenstein, *Unlimited Mercifier*, pp. 52–6.

6. See *Fut.* I. 254. Although common to the prophets, this form of knowledge is rarely found in anyone else, a noted exception being al-Khidr, Moses' mysterious companion, whose remarkable tale is found in Surat al-Kahf (Q. 18: 65–82).

7. Hirtenstein, *Unlimited Mercifier*, p. 55.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 58–60.

Hearkening to the advice of Jesus, his “first master,”⁹ whom the Shaykh was to meet numerous times in visions, the young man pledged himself to an ascetic life and gave away all his possessions to his father. From then on, as he recounts in the *Futūḥāt*, he lived on gifts and alms, trusting in God for his needs.¹⁰ Henceforth, the young Ibn 'Arabī became a bona fide man of the Sufi Way. He studied the traditional Islamic sciences with some of the foremost scholars of Andalusia, and concurrently realized, in a very short time, the panoply of mystical stations he describes in his various writings.

By around the age of twenty, Ibn 'Arabī had acquired his first Sufi teacher, Abū al-‘Abbās al-‘Uryabī,¹¹ an illiterate peasant whom he met in Seville. Among this shaykh’s many virtues was that he had realized the station of perfect servitude, the highest of all stations. Al-‘Uryabī was not the only shaykh that the young Muḥyiddīn frequented during the thirty years he spent in Andalusia prior to his departure to the east. In his two compendia devoted to Andalusian saints, he lists and describes some seventy-one Sufi shaykhs, four of them women, from whom he received important spiritual direction.¹²

Ibn 'Arabī’s own spiritual state was made clear to him in three successive visions between 1190 and 1202. In them, he saw all of the messengers and prophets as well as “all the believers – those who have been and those who will be – until the Day of Resurrection.”¹³ He learned that the major reason why the prophets and messengers had assembled in the spiritual world was to congratulate him at being designated the Seal of the Muḥammadan Sainthood – the heir to the Seal of the Prophets, Muḥammad. As he explains in his *Futūḥāt*, the Seal of the Muḥammadan Sainthood combines all the qualities

9. *Fut.* III. 341.

10. *Fut.* II. 548.

11. Some accounts give his name as al-‘Uryanī.

12. Many of the Sufi masters with whom Ibn 'Arabī studied are described in his *Rūḥ al-quds* and *al-Durra al-fākhira*, partially translated by Austin as *Sufis of Andalusia*.

13. *Fut.* III. 323; trans. Addas, *Quest*, p. 74.

of all the saints; and since prophets are also saints, it includes all the qualities of all the prophets, excluding those pertaining to their legislative roles.

In 1193, Ibn 'Arabī made his first journey beyond the Iberian Peninsula, to North Africa. He stayed in Tunis for a year, studying with Shaykh al-Mahdawī, a disciple of the famous Algerian saint Abū Madyan, whose tomb is a site of pilgrimage to this day. When Ibn 'Arabī returned to al-Andalus, he began to compose the first of his more than 300 works. His primary activity, however, seems to have been spiritual wayfaring in order to learn from Sufi masters and study Prophetic Traditions. Between the years 1195 and 1200, he was engaged in constant travel between Spain and North Africa, while concurrently traversing another landscape, not visible to the physical eye. To many of these purely spiritual locales he gave evocative names, such as “God’s Vast Earth” where “the spiritual takes body and the body becomes spiritual,”¹⁴ and the “Abode of Light”, where all destinies are known from beginning to end.

But the greatest vision he experienced at this time was no doubt the spiritual ascent (*mi'rāj*) he made in imitation of the Prophet’s corporeal ascent to the seven heavens and to the Divine Presence Itself. Mounted on the “Burāq”¹⁵ of his spiritual aspiration, he travelled through the seven celestial spheres, each one presided over by a prophet. Beyond the seventh heaven lies the goal of every *mi'rāj*: the “Lote Tree of the Limit”, alluded to in the Qur’an. It was here that he became, as he puts it, “nothing but light”.¹⁶ He realized that, despite the multiplicity of God’s names, attributes, and acts, there is but a single Being to which they refer, and that “the journey that [he] made was inside [him]self, and it was toward [him]self he had been guided.”¹⁷

14. Corbin, *Creative Imagination*, p. 4.

15. The fabulous steed on which the prophets are said to be transported on their celestial ascent. Ibn 'Arabī often uses this image metaphorically. See *Fut.* III. 345, *R. al-ittihād*, p. 30.

16. *Fut.* III. 350; trans. Addas, *Quest*, p. 156.

17. *Fut.* III. 350; trans. Addas, *Quest*, p. 156.

The year 1200 marks the beginning of Ibn 'Arabī's journey to the east. He was never again to return to Spain. From North Africa he went first to Cairo, then to Hebron – where he visited the tomb of Abraham – then Jerusalem, where he prayed at the al-Aqsa Mosque. His final goal was Mecca, where he intended to perform the pilgrimage. Among his many visions and meetings with remarkable men and women, two merit special mention. The first was his astonishing encounter with the strange personage he calls the *Fatā*, or youth, evocatively described in the first chapter of the *Futūḥāt*. One evening, when he was performing the ritual circumambulations of the Ka'ba, a mysterious youth accosted him. Was he an angel or a human being? The embodiment of the Black Stone, or the personification of the Holy Spirit? Ibn 'Arabī's celestial twin or an epitome of the *Futūḥāt* itself? Perhaps he was all of these and more. After describing their conversation, recounted in poetry and rhymed prose, a pact between the young man and the Shaykh was concluded. The result of this epiphany is the some 2000 tightly-packed folio pages of the *Futūḥāt*, a masterpiece of mystical literature.

It was also in Mecca that he made the acquaintance of the young woman Nizām, who would become the inspiration for his love poems, written approximately fifteen years later (1215) and collected in the *Tarjumān al-ashwāq* (The Interpreter of Desires). Nizām was a young Iranian lady of considerable beauty, piety, and intelligence – “the ornament of our gatherings”,¹⁸ as Ibn 'Arabī says in his Preface to the *Tarjumān*. Commentators have seen in Nizām the archetypal Eternal Feminine, the embodiment of Sophia, the equivalent of Dante's Beatrice, and the coincidentia oppositorum.¹⁹ She is not only the muse of the *Interpreter of Desires* but also may have inspired the paean to Woman found in the final chapter of the *Fuṣūṣ*, on the Wisdom of Singularity in the Word of Muḥammad.²⁰ “Contemplation

18. *Tarjumān*, p. 11. (Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the Nicholson edition.)

19. See Austin, “The Lady Nizām”, pp. 35–48.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

of the Reality without formal support is not possible”, he says. “The best and most perfect kind [of contemplation] is the contemplation of God in women.”²¹

Ibn 'Arabī was to spend roughly two years in Mecca. It was at Mecca, during a brief period of dissatisfaction with the aptitude of his students that, in a dream vision, the Shaykh was given the divine advice to “counsel God’s servants”.²² Whether addressing jurists or Sufis, rulers or simple folk, for the remainder of his life the Shaykh made it a point to convey his message, orally and in his many writings, to all the believers he encountered and at the level of their varied understandings. Some of the texts he wrote were short, composed at a single sitting; some ran to hundreds, even thousands, of pages, as in the case of the *Futūḥāt*, and were the products of years of labour and revision.

Just as his early years were devoted to constant wayfaring throughout Andalusia and the Maghreb, Ibn 'Arabī spent the years spanning 1204 to 1220 travelling back and forth across Syria, Palestine, Anatolia, Egypt, Iraq, and the Hijaz. During this time he acquired many disciples, continued his literary output, and even became an advisor to the Seljuk sultan Kaykā'ūs. It was not until the final twenty years of his life that he ceased his peregrinations and in 1221 settled permanently in Damascus.

At the end of 1229, an event occurred that resulted in the writing of the Shaykh’s best known book, the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, or “Bezels of Wisdom.” In a dream, he saw the Prophet Muḥammad, holding a book. The Prophet told him: “This is the book of the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*. Take and give it to humanity so that they may find benefit from it.”²³ The twenty-seven chapters contained therein – each one devoted to a different prophet and elucidating a particular facet of wisdom – were, according to Ibn 'Arabī, inspired by the Prophet with no personal input on his part whatsoever. The *Fuṣūṣ* has remained to this day his most provocative and most frequently commented-upon work.

21. *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 217; trans. Austin, *Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 275.

22. See Addas, *Quest*, p. 218.

23. *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 47; trans. Austin, *Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 45.

Biography of Ibn 'Arabī

Ibn 'Arabī died in Damascus in November 1240. Over the centuries, his teachings spread east as far as China, disseminated by devoted students – many of them gifted mystics and poets in their own rights. For the past century, the West has also played a part in this process, as scholars and translators continue the effort to bring the Shaykh's remarkable writings to the attention of the contemporary world.

INTRODUCTION

Overview

The *Ittiḥād al-kawnī* is one of Ibn ‘Arabī’s early works, most likely written before the author’s journey to the eastern Islamic lands in 1201/02 CE (AH 598).¹ Written primarily in rhymed prose and poetry, it shares the charm of its cousins among the visionary mystical–philosophical fables of the Islamic world, such as those penned by Avicenna, Suhrawardī, and ‘Aṭṭār.²

It also belongs to the genre of mystical ascent literature. Although ascent literature is represented in many of the world’s traditions,³ in Islam the model derives from the Prophet Muḥammad’s ascension through the seven heavens to the Divine Presence as allusively recounted in Suras 17:1 and 53:4–18. In later years, Sufis undertook to imitate the Prophet’s ascent and, beginning with Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī (d.874 CE), several described their visions, either orally or in treatise form. Abū Yazīd’s strange account of his *mi‘rāj*, for example, was recounted by (pseudo-?) al-Junayd (d.910)⁴ and interpreted by al-Sarrāj (d.988).⁵ Having flown in the form of a bird to the Tree of Unity, the Lote Tree of the Limit, described in Sura 53:14, Abū

1. See Gril, *Le Livre de l’arbre*, p.29; Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood*, p.165. Although the precise dating of the treatise is not known, in all likelihood it was preceded by such works as *Mashāhid al-asrār al-qudsiyya*, *al-Tadbīrāt al-ilāhiyya*, *Mawāqī’ al-nujūm*, *Inshā’ al-dawā’ ir*, and other treatises that were probably lost when Ibn ‘Arabī left al-Andalus. Its subject matter bears a close resemblance to that of another early work, *‘Uqlat al-mustawfiz*.

2. See Corbin, *Avicenna*; Thackston, *Mystical and Visionary Treatises*; and Aṭṭār, *Manṭiq al-ṭayr*.

3. Among the many studies devoted to this subject in world literature, see Couliano, *Out of this World*, and Culianu, *Psychanodia I*.

4. See Sells, *Early Islamic Mysticism*, pp.242–50.

5. See al-Sarrāj, *K. al-luma’*.

Yazīd remarked that it was “all a cheat”⁶ – a remark interpreted by Sarrāj as meaning that Abū Yazīd found anything but attention to God a useless vanity.

Besides the *Ittiḥād al-kawnī*, Ibn ‘Arabī wrote at least two independent works,⁷ *K. al-isrā’* and *R. al-anwār*, devoted to the subject, and included two extensive *mi’rāj* accounts in his *Futūḥāt*.⁸ In addition, treatises such as *K. al-isfār*,⁹ a spiritual itinerary, cover much of the same ground as the *mi’rāj* accounts. It is evident that the Shaykh found the ascent genre a fitting one to describe both the boons and the perils of the spiritual path.

Despite its shimmering surface, the *Ittiḥād* is not an easy work to fathom because of its dense symbolism and enigmatic style. The initial series of poems immediately plunges the reader into a veritable sea of perplexity, as the author “swings like a pendulum between the polarities of [the] self.”¹⁰ The poems are then followed by a dedication whose dedicatee appears to be a long-dead Arabian prophet, while all the while the author claims to be addressing none other than himself. At last the narrative begins, but where? It appears that the reader has been set down at the centre of the world, the symbolic locus of balanced oppositions. Here the tension aroused by the constant fluctuation from state to state, amply elaborated in the opening verses, turns to lament as the author engages in an obscure dialogue with the Supreme Being of his very self. From this place

6. Sells, *Early Islamic Mysticism*, p. 219.

7. See Chodkiewicz, *Seal of the Saints*, Chap. 10, which translates most of *R. al-anwār* and provides an illuminating commentary on it. *R. al-anwār* has also been translated by Harris as *Journey to the Lord of Power*, and more recently in the study by Radtke, *Neue kritische Gänge*.

8. See *Fut.* II, Chap. 167 (French translation by Ruspoli, *L’Alchimie du bonheur parfait*); and *Fut.* III, Chap. 367. See also Morris’ partial translation and commentary of this latter in Chodkiewicz, *Meccan Revelations*, as well as his excellent study, “The Spiritual Ascension”.

9. See Gril, *Le Dévoilement des effets*. See also Jaffray, *Unveiling the Effects*, forthcoming.

10. See Zabor’s Foreword (“Of the Tree and Its Four Birds”), p. 4.

of momentary equilibrium, the author ascends on a Night Journey¹¹ to the outer limits of creation. There, in a garden at the farthest boundary of the cosmos, he hears the discourse of a Tree and four Birds, whose charming tales and flowery speech mask the fact that they are none other than the awesome images of the Perfect Human Being and his four cosmic faculties: the First Intellect, the Universal Soul, Prime Matter, and Universal Body. Never before have these abstruse philosophical concepts been described in such an elliptical and suggestive way.

Stylistic Considerations

The *Ittiḥād al-kawnī* is written in a combination of rhymed prose (*sajʿ*)¹² and poetry. As a youth Ibn Arabī seems to have been particularly taken with belles-lettres and his early works, despite their complex metaphysics, are remarkably lyrical. He never lost his love of either rhymed prose or poetry, as we see in many of his works. His *Dīwān* contains more than 800 verses and his *Tarjumān al-ashwāq*, a collection of sixty-one mystical love poems, is considered one of the finest collections of Arabic verse. His 560-chapter magnum opus, the *Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, begins with a lengthy proemium, embellished with flowing *sajʿ* and punctuated by many lines of verse. Nearly every chapter of this lengthy summa begins with poetry and many of the chapters contain additional lines of original verse.

Ibn ʿArabī's sheer love of the Arabic language can be felt on every page of his work, both poetry and prose. Among the various schools of thought concerning the origin of language, Ibn ʿArabī would have to be put in the category of those who favoured the divine institution

11. The Night Journey, or *Isrāʾ*, alluded to in Sura 17:1 of the Qurʾan, was Muḥammad's celestial ride on the fantastic steed Burāq to the Sacred Precinct of Jerusalem. From there he ascended through the seven heavens to the Divine Presence. This ascent, known as his *miʿrāj*, is recounted in Sura 53:4–18.

12. One of the meanings of the word "*sajʿ*" is the sound a pigeon (or dove) makes – quite fitting for a treatise in which a ringdove plays a major role!

of language. Thus for him, to take a word back to its root meaning and then to extend it to its full semantic range is a process that reflects the nature of the primal divine speech as one/many: “God takes one of these words and makes it many, for He says, Our only word to a thing, when We desire it, is to say to it ‘Be!’ (*kun*) (Q. 16:40).”¹³ On the one hand, as a Qu’ranic hermeneut, he insists on a sometimes shocking literalism that peels away incrustated layers of traditional interpretation. On the other hand, he allows for a word in the hands of a spiritually realized interpreter to bear any meaning as long as it lies within the range of understandable Arabic. God, he says, is fully aware of all the possible meanings of any given word, thus the gnostic interpreter is encouraged to open himself up to the full spectrum of interpretations, as long as there is evidence for them, based on the actual Qur’anic text.¹⁴

Drawing from nearly all the disciplines of his time – the traditional Islamic sciences, mysticism, theology, philosophy, and even alchemy and magic, Ibn ‘Arabi’s working vocabulary is astoundingly rich. Anchoring himself on the (primarily) tri-consonantal Arabic root, he leaves his imagination free to explore a complex world of interpenetrating meanings and associations attainable by acceptable morphological permutations.¹⁵ Although this approach generally produces a scintillating multifaceted gem whose surfaces delight and whose deep hues attract, the reader is often at a loss when trying to fathom the seemingly endless potential meanings, both lexicographical and symbolic, of any given word or phrase. The end result

13. *Fut.* III. 283; trans. Chittick, *Self-Disclosure of God* (hereafter *SDG*), p. 196.

14. See *Fut.* II. 119, Chap. 73, Question 128. Note, however, that for Ibn ‘Arabi, interpretation is more often than not a dangerous enterprise in the hands of most people, so he frequently condemns the ignorant use of *ta’wīl*, esoteric interpretation, that strays far from the literal meaning of the text.

15. Not all critics have found the Shaykh’s ventures into etymology as fruitful as they might seem. Jaroslav Stetkevych takes him to task for relying too heavily on the etymological method for commenting on his own poems of the *Tarjumān*: “Words run the danger of appearing like denuded, uprooted stems, leaving the imagination at best in amazement” (*Zephyrs of Najd*, p. 94).

is a thoroughly over-determined text that loses much in the effort of its commentator to explain it.

Unlike the *Tarjumān al-ashwāq*, on which the author himself – for better or worse – wrote a mystical commentary, the *Ittiḥād al-kawnī* provides no such aid, and there are seemingly no commentaries by the Shaykh's followers to guide us.¹⁶ Other writings by Ibn 'Arabī, especially his *Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, are essential to ferreting out clues, but, as is the case of all his works in general, the Qur'an – and to a somewhat lesser extent, the Prophetic Traditions (*ḥadith*) – remains the touchstone.

Thus, in its brief compass, the *The Universal Tree and the Four Birds* manages both to engage the reader's imagination and to introduce him to some of the major themes of Ibn 'Arabī's cosmology and metaphysics in a highly compressed and ciphered form. For that reason, it is an excellent entrée to Ibn 'Arabī's writings as a whole.

The following translation is based on the edition of Denis Gril in *Annales Islamologiques* 17, 1981. A description of the manuscripts he used can be found in the Appendix (Edition of the Text). I have generally used Muḥammad Marmaduke Pickthall's translation, *The Glorious Qur'an*, for Qur'anic quotations, altering it when necessary to reflect Ibn 'Arabī's interpretation.

The annotated translation is followed by a commentary that, while necessarily far from being conclusive, aims to provide some hints in order to make the reader's voyage in the company of the Shaykh a bit less baffling.

16. See Yahia, *Histoire et classification*, p. 325.

TREATISE ON UNIFICATION

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Blessings upon our master, Muḥammad, and upon his family and companions. This is a noble treatise in which I have consigned a tremendous discourse.

From my incompleteness to my completeness, and from my
inclination to my equilibrium
From my grandeur to my beauty, and from my splendour¹ to
my majesty²
From my scattering to my gathering, and from my exclusion
to my reunion³
From my baseness to my preciousness, and from my stones to
my pearls
From my rising to my setting, and from my days to my
nights
From my luminosity to my darkness, and from my guidance
to my straying
From my perigee to my apogee, and from the base of my
lance to its tip⁴

1. The words *sanā'* (grandeur) and *sanā* (splendour) form a *tajnīs zā'id*, that is, they are homonymous save for the addition of the letter *hamza* to the first term.

2. Majesty and Beauty are two Divine Attributes that seemingly oppose one another much as the Kabbalistic sefirot Gevurah (Rigour) and Hesed (Mercy) do. See *Fut.* II. 133, 541, 542; IV. 251, 269.

3. The terms *ṣudūd* and *wiṣāl* suggest opposing gestures on the part of the Beloved, who at times obstructs union and at times allows it, in keeping with His Attributes of Majesty and Beauty.

4. Gril points out (*Arbre*, p. 36, n. 4), that *zījāj* and *'awālī*, terms pertaining to the measure of a lance, signal “descending and ascending tendencies along an axial line”.

From my waxing to my waning, and from the void of my
moon to its crescent
From my pursuit to my flight, and from my steed to my
gazelle⁵
From my breeze to my boughs, and from my boughs to my
shade
From my shade to my bliss, and from my bliss to my wrath⁶
From my wrath to my likeness, and from my likeness to my
impossibility⁷
From my impossibility to my validity, and from my validity
to my deficiency.
I am no one in existence but myself, so –
Whom do I treat as foe and whom do I treat as friend?
Whom do I call to aid my heart, pierced by a penetrating
arrow,
When the archer is my eyelid,⁸ striking my heart without an
arrow?⁹
Why defend my station? It matters little to me; what do I
care?
For I am in love with none other than myself, and my very
separation is my union.¹⁰
Do not blame me for my passion. I am inconsolable over the
one who has fled me.

5. There is a nice parallel drawn here between the hunter on his steed in pursuit of the fleeing gazelle and the poet, who is both hunter and gazelle.

6. For this translation of *miḥāl*, see Q.13:13: “He launcheth the thunderbolts and smiteth with them whom He will while they dispute concerning Allah, and He is mighty in wrath (*miḥāl*).”

7. *Muḥāl*, “impossibility”, nicely complements *miḥāl*, “wrath”, in the previous line.

8. *Jafn*, “eyelid”, can also mean “scabbard” or “sheath”. See Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 2, p. 434, s.v. *jafn*.

9. The glance of the beloved, who is none other than the poet himself, pierces his own heart and causes him to fall in love with himself.

10. Ibn ‘Arabī repeats these lines in *Fut.* II. 390.

In this book I never cease addressing myself about myself and returning in it to myself from myself.

From my heaven to my earth, from my exemplary practice to
my religious duty,¹¹
From my pact to my perjury,¹² from my length to my
breadth.¹³

* * *

From my sense to my intellect and from my intellect to my
sense,
– From whence derive two strange sciences, without doubt or
confusion.
From my soul to my spirit and from my spirit to my soul,
– By means of dissolution and coagulation, like the corpse in
the tomb.¹⁴
From my intuition to my knowledge and from my knowledge
to my intuition,
– Continuous is the light of knowledge; ephemeral the light
of intuition.
From my sanctity to my impurity and from my impurity to
my sanctity,
– Sanctity is in my present and impurity is in yesterday.

11. *Fard* and *sunna* are two terms drawn from Islamic law, the first having to do with required religious duties, the second with recommended ones, based on the Prophet Muḥammad's practice.

12. The Arabic pair *ibrām* and *naqd*, in addition to the concrete meaning of braiding and unbraiding a rope, suggests in legal terms the conclusion of a pact and its violation.

13. *Ṭūl* (length) and *ʿarḍ* (width) again suggest movement along an axis. Ibn ʿArabī was much influenced by al-Ḥallāj's esoteric interpretation of this pair of terms. See, for example, *Fut.* I. 169, Chap. 20, in which he attributes to al-Ḥallāj the notion that length has to do with action in the world of spirits and width has to do with action in the world of bodies.

14. These two terms, *tahīl* and *tarkīb*, are, in addition to their common meaning of "dissolving" and "composition", an allusion to the alchemical process.

From my human-nature to my jinn-nature, and from my
jinn-nature to my human-nature,
– For my jinn-nature seeks to disquiet me and my human-
nature seeks to set me at ease.
From the narrowness of my body to the vastness of my soul,
And from the vastness of my soul to the prison of my body,
– For my soul denies my intellect and my intellect my soul.
From my entity to my nonentity, and my nonentity to my
entity,
– Where I rejoice to find my composition and lament to find
my dispersion.
From my likeness to my opposite and from my opposite to
my likeness,
– Were it not for Bāqil no light of excellence would shine in
Quss.¹⁵
From my sun to my full moon and from my full moon¹⁶ to
my sun,
– So that I might bring to light what lies hidden in night's core.
From Persian to Arab and from Arab to Persian,¹⁷
– To explain the mysteries' roots and express the realities'
enigmas.
From my root to my branch and from my branch to my root,

15. Quss and Bāqil are two semi-legendary pre-Islamic figures. Quss ibn Sā'ida, a *ḥanīf* of Najran, was an orator of the highest rank, and Muḥammad committed an excerpt of one of his sermons to memory (see Hoyland, *Arabia and the Arabs*, p.222). Bāqil, on the other hand, was a stutterer. The eloquent Quss and the tongue-tied Bāqil became proverbial (see Gril, *Arbre*, p.39, n.12).

16. The Perfect Human Being is sometimes compared to the full moon, which reflects the sun (the Real) most completely.

17. Although the terms '*urb*' and '*furs*' refer to the peoples designated by these names, there is another sense here of things that are clearly stated (from the root '*-R-B*') versus unintelligible (from another name for the Persians: *al-'ajam*). See Gril's note (*Arbre*, p.39, n.13): "These two terms refer to the state of non-manifestation or of revelation of divine mysteries to which two modes of expression correspond: allusion (*ishāra*) and clear expression ('*ibāra*'). Ibn 'Arabī employs *mu'jam* (from '*ajamī*') and *mu'rab* (from '*arabī*') in the same sense."

– For the sake of a life that was buried in death, animate or
inanimate.
Pay no heed, my soul, to the words of that jealous spite-
monger,
Or to the remarks of that ignorant presumer, O myrtle of
my soul!
How many ignoramuses have slandered us spiritual beings!
While my revelation descends from the Spirit of inspiration
and sanctity,
He is like a man possessed by a demon whose touch makes
him tremble.¹⁸
On the matter of spiritual realization mankind does not
cease to err,
For God’s secret is poised between the shout and the
whisper.

I have called this treatise “Cosmic unification in the presence of essential witnessing, through the assembling of the Human Tree and the Four Spiritual Birds.” I have dedicated it to Abū al-Fawāris Ṣakhr ibn Sinān, master of the reins of generosity and eloquence. I seek help from God. He is my support and my assistance, glory be to him!¹⁹

18. See Q.2:275: “Those who swallow usury cannot rise up save as he ariseth whom the devil hath prostrated by [his] touch.”

19. I have chosen to place all third-person singular pronouns in lower case in light of the ambiguous nature of the divine–human relationship in this treatise. There is additional justification for this in that Arabic pronouns, even when referring to the Divinity, are not indicated by capital letters.

Dedication

To the third and the second – the master of the triads and dyads – the one alluded to in the doubled words of praise,²⁰ the evanescent conqueror who restrains his mount, the one who turns toward his shadow and bows his head in humility; the generous one whose generosity never runs dry, the perfect being whose existence is not known, the one who is sent from the two divine presences and the envoy of the two powers; he whose foundations are certain, whose possibility is discounted, and whose place is known; channel of subtle graces, reality of time, goal of faith, seat of Mercy, subtlety of the moment, sultan of men and jinn, Jānn son of jinn,²¹ pupil of man's eye, beneficent giver, Abū al-Fawāris Ṣakhr b. Sinān, master of the reins of generosity and eloquence. I ask God to give him the most perfect and elevated of ranks.

May he receive the scent of the most perfect and the most pure of greetings, as well as the mercy and benedictions of God, the most Exalted.

20. As Gril mentions, this refers to the opening sura of the Qur'an, the Fātiḥa, often called "the seven doubled" or "oft-repeated" since it contains seven lines and is recited repeatedly in every ritual prayer. According to Ibn 'Arabī, the Perfect Human Being "opens" or initiates (*fataḥa*) existence just as the Fātiḥa opens the Qur'an. See Gril, *Arbre*, p. 10. The inner structure of the Fātiḥa is based on a division of the sura into two parts, one of which belongs to the Lord and one to the servant. At the same time, it is a synthesis of the entire Qur'an. These three aspects are echoed in the first verse of the Fātiḥa: "In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the All-Compassionate". The Name Allah embraces all Divine Names and Attributes while All-Merciful and All-Compassionate express nuanced modalities of Mercy (*rahma*). See *Fut.* I. 102, Chap. 5.

21. Arabic: Jānn ibn Jānn. *Jānn* is a plural of *jinnī*, the shape-shifting, fiery spirits mentioned frequently in the Qur'an. It also can mean "father of the jinn" (see Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 2, p. 462, s.v. *jānn*) or "a small white serpent, a great serpent, or a species of serpent having black-bordered eyes, inclining to yellow, harmless, and abounding in houses" (Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 2, p. 464, s.v. *jānn*). *Jānn* with this meaning is found twice in the Qur'an (Q. 27: 10; 28: 31) in connection with Moses' staff: "But when he saw it writhing like a *jānn*, he turned to flee headlong."

I praise God who has “fashioned” me and “balanced” me,²² and cast me in “the most beautiful of constitutions”.²³ For he made me know myself through myself and caused me to appear to myself, so that I became enamoured of only myself. Between my distance and my proximity I have become mad with love for myself, and I address myself alone.

Were I to see myself when I came to myself by myself,
secretly or openly,
And said, “Greetings” and answered, “At your service”,
And if my turning were from me to me,
My very “Here I am!” would annihilate me from myself,
From my enemies and my trusty friends,
From my threat [of punishment] and my surplus [grace],
From my delight and my promises [of paradise],
From my witnessing and my testimony.
What wonderful favour would be mine through myself!
Oh I! Return me by me to me until I see my stability.
He returned me by me to me from me, and only my qualities
subsisted in me.
My palm grasped my stick, my staff smote my rock;
The river of constellations flowed from it: Twelve heralds!²⁴

22. See Q.82:7–8: “Who created thee, then fashioned, then proportioned thee, into whatsoever form He will, He casteth thee.”

23. Q.95:4: “Surely We created man in the most beautiful of constitutions.”

24. See Q.2:60: “And when Moses asked for water for his people, We said: Smite with thy staff the rock. And there gushed out therefrom twelve springs [so that] each tribe knew their drinking place.” See also Q.7:60: “We divided them into twelve tribes, nations; and We inspired Moses, when his people asked him for water, saying: Smite with thy staff the rock! And there gushed forth therefrom twelve springs, so that each tribe knew their drinking-place.” See also *Fut.* II. 441, where the rivers mentioned in the verse are placed within the three different Gardens of Paradise: four in the Garden of the Elites, four in the Garden of Inheritance, and four in the Garden of Deeds. The rivers are then assigned various types of sciences. The river of unbrackish water = the science of life; the river of wine = the science of states; the river of honey = the science of revelation; and the river of milk = the science of the secrets.

I said to myself: Oh I! Add constancy to my constancy!
These are the sciences of life, scattering light from all that
grows upon my being.
Where in me does that subtle secret reside that God has
placed within my essences?
I was filled with what I sought from myself, but my desire for
death remained.
I took to complaining to myself of my passion so that my
signs would appear
Upon my eyelids from the essence of my creation.
Then he lavished gathering on my scattering.
My essence conjoined passionately with my essence,
for my essence, my whole life long.
I did not hold my harshness against myself,
Or the length of my abandonment or my misdeeds –
I am my beloved and my lover; I am my knight and
my maiden.²⁵

This book came to me from the city situated on the equator, assigned to the temperate clime,²⁶ fortified by [spiritual] powers: Mount Sinai, the Land Made Safe,²⁷ fashioned of water and clay,²⁸ uniting the “most beautiful of constitutions” with the “lowest of degrees”. This treatise informed me of what passed between myself and myself and what my existence contemplated of my existence.

25. Ibn ‘Arabī repeats these lines in *Fut.* II. 390.

26. Arabic: *mustawā*. Gril (*Arbre*, p. 44, n.29): “The line of the equator or the equinoxes cuts in its centre the horizontal plane of manifestation (*mustawā*) or the place of the divine establishment on the Throne (*al-istiwā* ‘*alā l-‘arsh*).”

27. Mecca. According to Gril (*Arbre*, p. 44, n.30), Mount Sinai = “the most beautiful of constitutions”, that is the Perfect Human Being who is created upon the divine form; the Land Made Safe = Mecca, at the heart of which is the cube of the Ka’ba, draped in its black covering. For dark things being ideal receptacles for divine lights and secrets, see our Commentary, p. 103. This passage relates particularly to Q. 95: 1–5: “By the fig, by the olive, by Mount Sinai, by this land made safe. Surely We created man of the most beautiful constitution. Then We reduced him to the lowest of the low.”

28. See Q. 6: 2; 15: 26; 25: 54.

When the signs of witnessing were lifted from me and the suffering of spiritual combat was removed, and harmony and succour began to flow through me, I mounted the Burāq²⁹ of my spiritual aspiration and departed from the cycle of this grief. I fell into the sea of hylic matter, and beheld the next world and the present one.³⁰ I said: “May he perish, whoever denies the gardens and the abode of life, the sporting boys and embracing houris,³¹ and the union of bodies with bodies! He who sees the Preserver affirms the existence of the Speaker, for the line of equilibrium does not waver.” I understood here that those who deny the resurrection of the body will continue to waver and will never be rid of the noose of the four and the two.³²

Then I shouted: “Oh alas!” and “Alas, my burning heart. I fled from the universe and here I am in it. Where is what I seek?”

I heard a voice coming from me – but neither inside me nor outside me – say: “Why do you demand a high station when you are on the road? What have you to do with the sittings [on the Throne]³³ What have you to do with the celestial couches and sublime litters?³⁴ What have you to do with the uppermost horizon?³⁵ What have you

29. Fabulous steed on which the Prophet rode on his Night Journey to the highest heavens. For the mystic, it is often linked to the initial stages of the Path, when spiritual concentration and correct intention are of particular importance.

30. The vision of heaven and hell takes place in the *Barzakh*. See Commentary, p. 79. Note that one variant reads: “I fell into the sea of destruction and beheld he who affirms and he who denies.”

31. For the beautiful women of Paradise, see Q. 44: 54; 52: 20; 55: 72; 56: 22.

32. Four and two are both even numbers that are polarized without resolution. Among the four things that have such an antagonistic relationship to one another are the four elements. Some of the Divine Names are also polarized, for example He who gives life and He who causes death, and are metaphorically engaged in “disputing with” one another. See, for example, *Fut.* I, Chap. 56; *Fut.* II, Chap. 73, question 86; *Fut.* II, Chap. 154; *Fut.* III, Chaps 306, 336.

33. Arabic plural: *istiwā’ūt*. See Q. 53: 6 and Gril’s note (*Arbre*, p. 46, n. 35): “*Istiwā’* is thus for the creature the equilibrium between contrary tendencies and the deliverance from existential limits.”

34. See Q. 55: 76: “Reclining on green cushions and fair carpets.”

35. See Q. 53: 7: “When he was on the uppermost horizon.”

to do with the screens of splendour? What have you to do with the radiant curtain? What have you to do with the Cloud?³⁶ What have you to do with the impenetrable Veil of Sublimity?³⁷ What have you to do with the absolute ipseities? What have you to do with the confirmed realities? What have you to do with the presence of allusions? What have you to do with the conversations? What have you to do with the nightly confidences? What have you to do with the sublime Tree? What have you to do with the branches of the world? What have you to do with the strange '*Anqā*'? What have you to do with the Ringdove? What have you to do with the Jet-Black Crow? What have you to do with the Royal Eagle? O you who are veiled, how can you ask 'where?' about the Essence, when you are in a station that does not admit lies!"

I answered: "Oh you who rebuke me, your words have wounded me.³⁸ Do you not know that you speak from your own station? You are in the presence of the Essence, divested of time and place, while I am in this dark³⁹ abyss,⁴⁰ in this black gloom and this fearful calamity,⁴¹ in this mine of lies and doubt, this place of faults and defects. Does the prisoner of quantity and the one confined to wise maxims not cry out: Woe! If you extract me from the crashing waves and deliver me from the struggles of this gloomy night I will never more pronounce an adverb or stop at a particle."

Through his irresistible power he attracted me to himself and said to me: "You are vanquished, so seek help!"⁴²

36. The Cloud is referred to in a hadith in which, before creation, God is said to have been in a Cloud above and below which there was no air.

37. See *Fut. I*, Chap. 73, question 153: "... it is blindness and perplexity." None can penetrate it and gain knowledge of God's Essence.

38. The root *K-L-M* has to do with both speech and wounding. For this latter, see Ibn 'Arabī's discussion of the Prophet Idrīs as the Healer of Wounds (*Muḍḍawī al-kulūm*), *Fut. I*, Chap. 14.

39. The root '*-M-Y*' conveys the sense of blindness and obscurity. The word '*immiyyā*' also means "trial", "slaughter", and "conflict." See Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 5, p. 2162, s.v. '*immiyyā*'.

40. *Lujja* can also mean "sea".

41. In Arabic, the expression uses two words from the same root: *dāhiya al-dahiyā*.

I said: "I will save myself by your right hand, for both your hands are right hands."⁴³ For he is the powerful, the trustworthy, the faithful, and the true one who never lies."

He said: "How can one mock me whose hope abides in me?"

I said: "Just like one who praises you bestows favour upon you."

When he attracted me to himself I saw myself in another form than my previous one. I established myself there and took a firm position.

I said: "Oh I!"

He said: "I, welcome!"

I said: "No welcome, no greetings, no make yourself at ease!"

He said: "Oh eye-balm, what is disquieting you? Oh prisoner of creation, what is afflicting you?"

I answered: "You do not cease from veiling me from myself. Unveil me to myself so that I can know myself! Here is my tablet outspread, my banner is raised, my knowledge is delimited, my station is praised, my secret self⁴⁴ is witnessed, my heart⁴⁵ is found, the goal I seek is lost, and I, in my world, am what is sought.⁴⁶ I am called the word of existence.⁴⁷ If these entities were to become annihilated, if these creatures were to vanish, and if I were to retreat from the Throne of Mercy and the lordly name, I would be able to enjoy the divine regard and not be harmed by this favour."⁴⁸

42. See Q. 54: 10: "So he [Noah] cried unto his Lord, saying: I am vanquished, so give help!"

43. Reference to a hadith: "Both the hands of my Lord are blessed right hands."

44. Arabic: *sirr*. Another meaning is the innermost part of the heart.

45. Arabic: *lubb*. The kernel, or inner part of the heart.

46. The text gives "*ma' būd*" (worshipped), but I translate according to the variant. See the Universal Tree's discourse, p. 37, n. 79, where the Tree describes himself as the "intended meaning".

47. This refers to the Arabic word *Kun* (Be!), God's Word that brought all creation into existence. The Universal Tree also gives this as one of his epithets. See p. 38, n. 80.

48. Gril (*Arbre*, p. 49, n. 49), points out the qualities that the Perfect Human Being must have in order to accomplish his spiritual goal. This paragraph contains references to the prophetic accoutrements: banner (*liwā'*) and praised station (*maqām maḥmūd*).

He said: "The pens have been spent, the signs have gone away, the names have departed, the Throne has been veiled, the tablets have been put away, and the hearts and spirits have been lost. But these are necessary: the dark-green⁴⁹ gloom of the Garden, the sphere of water, the Supreme Pen, the first step, the hidden letter *nūn*,⁵⁰ and the guarded right hand."⁵¹

When I heard that there was still a trace of createdness before me, I feared that it would cut me off from my cognizance. So I rose from that gloomy darkness, leaving the Burāq of my aspiration in it. I was transported to the thrones of subtle grace and the couches⁵² of the celestial cushions,⁵³ until I reached the station of rejoicing where I set myself to oscillate like a hanging lamp.⁵⁴ I said: "What have I to do with the state of audition?"⁵⁵

Someone said: "It is the beauty of the rhythm that has set you in motion."

49. Possible reference to Q. 55: 64.

50. The letter *nūn* is found at the beginning of Sura 70 of the Qur'an, called "The Pen".

51. The right hand moves the Supreme Pen.

52. Arabic: *muttākā'āt*. See Q. 12: 31: "And when she [Zulaykha] heard of their sly talk, she sent for them and prepared for them a cushioned couch."

53. Arabic: *rafārif*. See Q. 55: 76: "Reclining on green cushions (*rafrāf*) and fair carpets." Note also that *rafrāfa* means to flutter like a bird, hence the *rafrāf* was sometimes considered to be one of the vehicles Muḥammad was transported in on his celestial ascensions.

54. See also Ibn 'Arabī's *Risālat al-anwār*, p. 189; English trans. (Harris, *Lord of Power*) p. 47. See also notes from al-Jilī's Commentary of *R. al-anwār*, entitled *al-Isfār 'an risālat al-anwār*, translated in *Lord of Power*, p. 88, n. 21: "Know ... that this place is a stage demanding the greatest courage from seekers. For if they arrive in it and this oneness manifests itself to them ... they suppose that they have arrived in the Presence of the Unity and triumphed in the essential revelation. This is because of the divine bliss they find in this stage and the fact that any reality other than their own is absent from it."

55. Arabic: *samā'*. Gril (*Arbre*, p. 50, n. 52) notes that audition for Ibn 'Arabī consists of two sorts: one in which the hearer delights in the harmonies and rhythms of sensible melodies and songs; the other in which the hearer is absorbed in the supra-sensible realm and does not engage in movement at all. See *Fut.* I. 210–11 and *Fut.* II. 366–9.

I said: "I didn't feel it."

Someone said to me: "Be careful! For you are with yourself and not with him!"

I said: "Reality is beyond the rhythms of song. What it demands is extinction within extinction."

Then a veil was lowered between my essence and its Essence and a state came between me and it.

Then he said to me: "Where are you, do you belong to the world or to me?"

I said: "[I am] between drudgery and desire. My goal is the blinding Cloud⁵⁶ while I am in the water. My spirit is in the heavens while my throne is in the primordial Dust and my family is in Sabā.⁵⁷ My kingdom is in the Throne and my authority in the two feet of equivalence.⁵⁸ My constellation is in the celestial sphere,⁵⁹ my veil is in the angel, my obscurity is in prime matter, and my trial is in this world.⁶⁰ My beginning is the first state⁶¹ while my end is the next world. My intimacy is in the intimate friend Abraham; my conversations are in Moses, who spoke with God; my vicegerency is in Aaron, the sage; my elevation is in Idrīs; my form is in Joseph; my knowledge in its diversity and multiplicity is in Jesus; my body is in Adam, the father of mankind; my heart is from Abraham, the greatest of masters; and my physical frame is in the four elements."⁶²

56. A reference to a much-cited hadith. The Prophet Muḥammad was asked, "Where was our Lord before He created the creatures?" He answered: "He was in a Cloud, neither above which nor below which was there any air." Ibn 'Arabī explains that the Cloud is "the nearest of existent things to God" (*Fut.* II. 310). Within it the cosmos takes shape.

57. See Q.27:22; 34:15.

58. The two feet of equivalence (*sawā'*) are found at the level of the Footstool (*al-kursī*). It is at this level that the cosmos is polarized into opposing Names and Attributes.

59. Arabic: *fulk* and *falak*, whose orthography is identical.

60. Literally, the first. This world, as contrasted to the "last" world mentioned in the following line.

61. See Q. 79: 10–11: "Shall we really be restored to our first state even after we are crumbled bones?"

62. The seven prophets enumerated in this series are the same ones encountered

He said: "That is your portion from my creation, but where is your portion from my essence?"

I said: "Oh you, who speak by allusion! Relationship exists either with something contrary or something similar, and when the similar is inherent [to this relationship] it is inherent essentially and necessarily."

The one who speaks by allusion said: "I mean the relationship of the similar."

I said: "My trace is yours and my attribute is yours. Summation is better than particularization⁶³ in this manner, for the sake of the Wayfarers."

He said: "You've spoken correctly. But where is the relationship of the contrary, according to reality, not according to equivocation?"

I said: "In my non-existence is your existence and in my avarice is your generosity; in your speech is my muteness and in your discourse is my bell-peal. In my impossibility is your eternity and in my beginning is your precedence."

He said: "I know now that you know. How excellent is your judgment!"

Then the Universal Tree of the garden, described as the Likeness,⁶⁴ was unveiled to me. I observed a tree "whose root is firm and

by the Prophet Muḥammad during his *mi'rāj*. They are associated with seven planets and seven attributes: Saturn – Abraham – intimacy; Jupiter – Moses – face-to-face-conversation; Mars – Aaron – vicegerency; Sun – Idrīs – elevation; Venus – Joseph – form of beauty; Mercury – Jesus – diverse sciences; Moon – Adam – body.

It is odd that Abraham should be mentioned twice, occurring both at the head and the foot of the list. It may be, as Stephen Hirtenstein has suggested to me, that when the Real, in descending through the levels of existence, reaches the lowest heaven, that of the Moon, It is met by the heart of the Perfect Human Being, symbolized here by Abraham, the custodian of the heart. The heart, in turn, is the synthesizing spiritual organ in which the four elements combine. In the *mi'rāj* literature, Abraham's place is the Visited House (*al-Bayt al-Ma'mūr*), the celestial equivalent of the Ka'ba, whose microcosmic equivalent is the heart of the believer. See Hirtenstein, "The Brotherhood of Milk".

63. Arabic: *tafṣīl*. For these two opposing terms, described in terms of the Supreme Pen and the Preserved Tablet, see *Fut.* I. 295; *Fut.* II. 283.

whose branches are in the heavens.”⁶⁵ Its fruit is in the hand of the Deity, who sits upon the Throne. Among its branches sat the Crow and the strange ‘*Anqā*’, and in the shelter of its boughs perched the Eagle and the Ringdove. I greeted the Tree and it answered, greeting me even more finely. It said: “Listen, O wayfarer, O king.”

Discourse of the Universal Tree, Described as the Likeness

I am the Universal Tree of synthesis and likeness. I have deep roots and my branches are lofty. The hand of the One⁶⁶ planted me in the garden of eternity, protected from the vicissitudes of time. I have spirit and body. My fruit is gathered with no hand touching it. These fruits contain more sciences and knowledge than sound intellects and subtle hearts can bear. My leaves are “raised couches”,⁶⁷ my fruits are not “out of reach nor yet forbidden”.⁶⁸ My centre is the desired goal. My branches perpetually draw nigh and come down.⁶⁹ Some come down to provide benefit and aid, while some draw nigh gradually to bestow favour. My constitution is like the celestial sphere in roundness and my branches are homes to the winged spirits. My flowers are like the stars whose course engenders the minerals, flowing in their bodies.

I am the Tree of light, speech, and the eye-balm of Moses,⁷⁰ upon whom be peace. Of directions mine is the most excellent right-

64. Arabic: *mithliyya*. The Perfect Human Being is often described as being the likeness (*mithl*), since he was created upon the form of the Real.

65. Q.14:24.

66. The Tree was planted by God’s one hand while Adam was created with God’s two hands.

67. Q.56:34.

68. Q.56:33.

69. See Q.53:8.

70. See Q.20:10; 27:7–8; 28:29–30. Moses was in search of fire for his family when he chanced upon the Burning Bush.

handed one, of places mine is the holy valley.⁷¹ Of times mine is the instant. Of dwelling places, mine is the equator⁷² and the temperate climes.⁷³ I have perpetuity, everlastingness, and felicity without misery. The fruits of my two gardens are near to hand⁷⁴ and my bough sways loftily as if intoxicated. It bestows grace and tenderness on all living creatures. My branches always offer frankincense to the spirits of the Guarded Tablet, and my foliage is a protection for them against the diurnal rays. My shade extends over those whom God envelops in his solicitude and my wings are spread over the people of sainthood. The spirit-winds blow on me from many different directions⁷⁵ and disarrange the order of my branches. From this entanglement one hears such melodious sounds. They enrapture the supreme intellects in the utmost heights and set them running on the course inscribed upon their scroll.

I am the music of wisdom that removes care through the beauty of its rhythmic song. I am the luminous light. Mine is the green carpet and the most resplendent round face. Assisted by the powers and ennobled by the one who is seated on the Throne, I have become like prime matter,⁷⁶ receiving all forms in the afterworld and the present one. I am not too narrow to bear anything! I am never apart from a faithful light that shines upon me; it consoles the one who leans upon me.

71. See Q. 20: 12; 79: 16. It was from the right side of the valley that the tree called to Moses (Q. 28: 30).

72. Arabic: *khaṭṭ al-istiwā*. The word “*istiwā*” is also associated with the All-Merciful’s sitting on the Throne (Q. 20: 5).

73. Arabic: *i’tidāl al-arkān*. It can also mean “moderation of elements”. The sense here is that the Tree is positioned in the centre of creation, the pivot-point of existence.

74. See Q. 55: 54: “... the fruit of both gardens near to hand.” Note the alliteration here: *janā jannatayya*.

75. Arabic: *bi-ikhtilāfi taṣārīfihā*, literally, with the opposition of their vicissitudes. The sense here is of the opposing attributes of the Divine Names.

76. See Commentary, p. 96, for the relationship between the Perfect Human Being and Prime Matter.

I am the “spreading shade”,⁷⁷ the clustered plantains,⁷⁸ the intended meaning,⁷⁹ the word of existence,⁸⁰ the most noble of originated beings, the most transcendent of limited beings. My power is unsurpassable, my place most holy, my lamp most elevated.⁸¹ I am the source from which issue the lights, the synthesis of the divine words,⁸² the mine of secrets and wisdoms.

Mine are the vast earth and the heavens.
In my centre are equivalence and straightness.⁸³
Mine are the firmly-rooted⁸⁴ majesty, the splendour,
The secret of the worlds, and the exaltation.⁸⁵
When thoughts betake themselves to my essence
The distance and the blinding Cloud bewilder them.

77. Q.56:30.

78. Q.56:29.

79. Arabic: *al-ma'na al-maqsūd*. A possible reference to the offspring of dyadic oppositions, the “singularity” (*fardiyya*) that equilibrates contraries. Thus, for example, in the syllogism, it is the conclusion, the “third thing” that results from the “cosmic marriage” of two premises. In alchemy, it is the gold that is the product of the marriage of sulphur and mercury (see *Fut.* II. 270, Chap. 167). For more on the cosmic marriage, see Commentary, p. 103.

80. A reference to God’s cosmogonic word: Be!

81. A reference to Q.24:35–6.

82. The Prophet Muḥammad is called by this epithet.

83. Arabic: *al-sawā' wa-l-istiwā'*. These two terms suggest ontological levels as well as the ideas of straightness, likeness, and moderation. The first is often equated with the Footstool, the second with the Throne upon which the All-Merciful sits (see Q.20:5). As Gril remarks (*Arbre*, p. 56, n. 72), *sawā'* has been defined by Ibn 'Arabī in his *Iṣṭilāḥāt* as “the occultation of God in the creature and the creature in God.” See also *Fut.* II. 128, Chap. 73, which has the same definition, adding: “This is only in one who knows that he is a locus of manifestation for the Real.”

84. Arabic: *mu'aththal*. The word conveys the sense not only of being firmly rooted but also suggests permanence. The *athl* is a kind of tamarisk tree, mentioned in the Qur'an (Q.34:16) in connection with the gardens of Sabā (Sheba).

85. Also: ascension, as one ascends the throne.

No one in the universe knows my existence
Save one undelimited by praise.⁸⁶
He disposes over and governs us.
The choice is his⁸⁷ – he does what he wills.⁸⁸

Discourse of the Ringdove

When the Ringdove heard the Universal Tree's discourse and the eternal knowledge it brought forth, she uttered a cry in the garden of her sanctity, declaring about herself:

When God wished to bring my creation into existence, he made me contemplate my own essence; he encircled my neck with the ring of splendour and he gave me the "Lote Tree of the Limit"⁸⁹ as a dwelling place. He called to the Eagle, assuring him that he would be preserved from punishment.⁹⁰ The Eagle, who was in the courtyard⁹¹ in front of his door, answered obediently: "Your call is heard." He told him: "Now you are in exile, even though you remain in the locus of my proximity. I am not of your kind, so you must feel lonely. But in you is eye-balm. Make her appear in reality. Enjoy"⁹²

86. It is impossible to praise God as befits Him, by any quality or Name, since "every one of His names known to us is assumed by the servant as his own trait and by it he becomes qualified to the measure that is appropriate for him" (*Fut.* III. 148; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 71). As Chittick adds, parenthetically, "Hence there is no name worthy of God's unique Essence."

87. Literally: "He is the Chooser" (*al-mukhtār*).

88. Q. 3:40; 14:27; 22:18: "Allah doth what He will." This line is repeated in *Fut.* IV. 198 at the end of a poem on the Lordly Presence.

89. See Q. 53:13–16.

90. A play on words here. "Punishment" (*'iqāba*) is from the same root as "eagle" (*'uqāb*).

91. Another play on words, in that *finā'* (courtyard) and *fanā'* (annihilation) are from the same root *F-N-Y*. The Supreme Pen is often said to have been singled out from among the Enraptured Angels, who are annihilated in the beauty and majesty of the Real. See, for example, *Fut.* I, Chap. 13; I. 295.

92. From the same root as "soul" (*nafs*) and "breath" (*nafas*).

her company and be cheered by her conversation, because familiarity with me is impossible, for I am ‘mighty in power’.”⁹³

The Eagle asked: “How can something be manifested from me when my station is weakness and my power and might have no authority?”

He answered him: “Continue to call plaintively and that very one will appear before you, face to face. This is the second harmony and union through doubling.”

The Eagle obeyed. He doubled his plaint and I appeared; the Real called me and I hastened. The Eagle, however, had not understood what was happening, since he was preoccupied with the dower and my coming into existence from his loins. When he heard me respond to the divine call, he asked: “What is this that has appeared?”

As soon as he had seen me, he fell in love with me. The beauty God had surrounded⁹⁴ me with made him mad with love. Passion made him groan with pain: “I’m burning! I’m drowning!” He was like a nightingale, warbling his plaint,⁹⁵ trying to heal his condition, but the burning only became more extensive and solace more impossible. I would not permit him to kiss me, although his cure was in lying with me and embracing me. The veils of doubt were raised, and from behind the pavilions of the Unseen someone called: “What is wrong with you that you don’t regard her lineaments and the performance of her song? Why have you not looked upon her qualities and the marvels of her wisdom?”

He called me to him. “Here I am!” I responded. He commanded me to sit before him. He said: “I was so inflamed with ardour at your form that I overlooked the knowledge of your spiritual qualities.

93. Q.13:13. Note the paronomasia between *muḥāl* (impossible) and *miḥāl* (power).

94. Arabic: *ṭawwaganī*. It could also mean “he embraced me”.

95. Arabic: *balbala bulbulun balbālahu*. A fine play of words here on words from the quadriliteral root *B-L-B-L*, meaning “nightingale” (*bulbul*), to disquiet (*balbala*), and anxiety (*balbāl*), which the author complements by ending the following line with *bāl* (mind /state).

The divine order has come that you make yourself known to me and that a ray of your sunlight shine for me.”

I said: “God has brought me into existence from you, face to face.⁹⁶ And he has made me manifest from your loins, following our inclination for one another. I emanate from your power and am manifested through your form. God has entrusted me with two realities and has given me two subtle threads:⁹⁷ one reality by which I know and one reality by which I bring into existence what I wish by means of its occasion.⁹⁸ One thread is attached to you; it is sent down to me when I desire you and draws me to your presence. The second joins me to him and is sent down to me when he calls me to him.”

When he heard that a subtle thread extended from me to him, and having verified the realities of love, the Eagle descended toward me along this thread. My essence mingled with his,⁹⁹ my qualities disappeared into his, and we were absorbed in the pleasures of union, cheered by the attainment of harmony. The spiritual wedding took place. The two waters flowed together in the womb of the moment, which received them in virtue of that divine wisdom that bestows grace to some and accords misery to others.¹⁰⁰ The lover recovered from his malady and found rest in a desire to answer the divine call. Wavering between two desires, he set in the two wests and rose in the two easts.¹⁰¹

96. Arabic: *‘inda al-taqābul*. The sense is both of facing and opposing.

97. Arabic: *raqīqa*. See Commentary, pp. 85–6.

98. Arabic: *sabab*. This means the secondary cause, the primary cause being God who, in reality, is the only true cause.

99. See our Commentary, pp. 53–4, regarding the possibility of the intermingling (here *imtizāj*) of essences.

100. Arabic: *man ḥurima wa-man ruḥima*, literally “one who is refused and one who is accorded mercy”. Note the transposition of the letters *ḥā*’ and *rā*’ to give opposite meanings. As Gril notes (*Arbre*, p. 14), the Eagle represents the pole of severity and the Ringdove the pole of mercy, already inherent in the right and left branches of the Tree.

101. See Q.55: 17: “Lord of the two easts, and Lord of the two wests.” The exoteric sense of “two easts” may refer to the extreme points where the sun rises in winter and summer, while the “two wests” may be the extreme points where the sun sets in

When he had recovered from his suffering and had departed to his abode, I found in myself a fullness that I had never before known. The paths and roads to him were blocked. The divine thread moved and I said: “Oh, my God. What is this that has befallen me?”

He said: “Exhale¹⁰² when you mention me so that the word of my command may manifest from you.”

So I exhaled like one oppressed. And there was the ‘*Anqā*’, who filled my refuge with life. Ask the ‘*Anqā*’ about herself and she will tell you what God has deposited in her of his subtle graces and what he has given to her of knowledge.

I am the Dove of oft-repeated praises.¹⁰³

My dwelling is in the Garden of spiritual meanings.

I am an essence in the entities. I have nothing but dualities.

They call me “O second!” – but I am not second.

Everything in creation ends up at my existence.

I come after the one whose essence is too high for sight.

My authority is useful to those most far and near.

summer and winter. See Pickthall, *Glorious Qur’an*, p. 590, and Yūsuf ‘Ali, *Meaning of the Glorious Qur’an*, p. 1474, n. 5184. The latter adds “extreme” to qualify the points and says that they include all points in between. Hence God is everywhere. Additional esoteric meanings are given by Ibn ‘Arabī in another early work, the ‘*Anqā*’ *mughrib*. The east in general is associated with the world of manifestation, while the west is associated with the world of transcendence (see Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood*, p. 493). With respect to the two solar risings, he says: “Even as the sun necessarily changes its time of rising and shifts its place – similarly your own ‘Sun’ must rise upon the exterior of your physical constitution. And know that the sun, by an inherent [motion] is constantly circulating from the west to the east, even as it proceeds by [compulsion from] another from the east to the west, though sight is unable [to perceive the former movement] and the mind is staggered [by its computation]. But it must be that one day [the Sun rising from the West] will openly manifest its [inherent] movement [eastwards] and [freely] bestow its blessing.” (Trans. Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood*, p. 487.) Note: the sun’s rising in the west is a sign of the Mahdi’s coming.

102. This command suggests the Breath of the All-Merciful, which relieves the non-existent fixed entities (*al-a’yān al-thābita*) from the distress of their latent possibility by bringing them into existence.

103. Arabic: *mathānī*. See Commentary, pp. 87–8.

I have no likeness save one whose nature is similar to mine.
Reproach me if you wish for what my tongue brings forth:
Beautiful realities descend upon threads
Toward the hearts that turn from the ornaments of the
gardens
In search of the one who transcends the vicissitudes of time.
He is the singular, the exalted. No second shares his
authority.
He is the one who elected me;
He is the one who selected me.
He has placed me in equilibrium between pot and potter.¹⁰⁴
I banish every distant one and draw each near one closer.
I befriend every friend and I afflict all the wretched.
When I swoop down low, it is with the spirit of diffusing,
And when I rise high above, bodily constitutions dissolve.
It is I who confer sense and leave the inhabited places
deserted.¹⁰⁵

Discourse of the Royal Eagle

When the Eagle heard what the Ringdove had mentioned and what she had related about the certain sciences, he said: “What she has affirmed is true. She has disclosed to you all the sciences she encompasses.”

I said to him: “Fly through the air of your eloquence and tell us clearly about your nature.” The throne of the Eagle shook. He flapped his wings joyfully and said:

104. Arabic: *bayna dann wa-dannān*. *Dann* is literally an earthen wine-jar with a tapered bottom. See Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 3, p.918, s.v. *dann*. Both the imagery and the Arabic root *D-N-N* suggest the soul’s intermediate station between God the Craftsman and His product here below, *al-dunyā*.

105. Arabic: *maghānī*. See Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 6, p.2304, s.v. *maghnan*. The sense here is of a place whose inhabitants were satisfied but then departed from or were removed from it.

I am the Eagle.

To me belong the most elevated station, beauty, and the
most brilliant shining light.

I carry out everything according to its determined rank
On this world's shores, but my power is more inaccessible.

I am his sublime effusion, the light of his existence.

I am he who summons existence and it obeys.

I am the one who never ceases to be the "handful" of my
creator,¹⁰⁶

The instrument of his openhandedness.

The realities hurry toward me to seek their fill.¹⁰⁷

I give to and withhold from whomever I wish.

If I approach, the beauty of his being dazzles me.

If I retreat, his most magnificent splendour summons me.

Approach confers upon me a pleasing wisdom

But it rends the heart of the high one.

Distance invests me with an apportioned command

Whose light illuminates their borders.¹⁰⁸

When I am distant I am the commander –

My misery is in my command and my felicity when it is
removed.

The most pleasing of my moments is when I see the essences
of the new moons arising.

I was still non-existent as an entity in one of the levels of creation
when the divine solicitude came forth and made my existence the
beginning. Having manifested himself to himself, my existence
was prolonged in my contemplation. I received the supreme rank

106. See Q.39:67: "... the whole earth is His handful on the Day of Resurrection ..."

107. Arabic: *mā fī shirbihā*. *Shirb* is "a share, or portion that falls to one's lot of water." Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 4, p. 1527, s.v. *shirb*.

108. Arabic: *arjā'*. See Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 3, p. 1050, s.v. *rajan*. See also Q. 69: 17: "The angels will stand at its borders (*arjā' ihā*) and eight will uphold the Throne of their Lord that day, above them."

through the form,¹⁰⁹ and the most secret part of my being became his Throne.¹¹⁰ The divine all-encompassing Name sat itself down upon me. His two viziers, He-who-gives and He-who-withholds, and his two chamberlains, He-who-confers-harm and He-who-confers-good, stood at his two stirrups.¹¹¹ When the sitting had taken place, and the other¹¹² appeared, and the names “mighty” and “sublime” were given to me, the courtyard became filled. Subsistence and annihilation¹¹³ appeared; just allotment and effusive plenty followed one another in alternating course, and expansiveness and contraction were firmly established. By the kingdom the king was confirmed, by the message the angel became manifest, and by the stars the sphere was set in motion.

Then he called me to instruct me with the language of arbitration: “Look into your essence, bringing together all that delights you.” When I began to look and could distinguish between those that required precedence and those that required contemplation, I laid down the different laws and divided the lights between merits and graces.¹¹⁴ I said to those enraptured spirits whom I surveyed: “Adhere to the enrapturing presence!” And I said to the subjected spirits whom I surveyed: “Adhere to the subjecting stations!” And I said to the governing spirits whom I surveyed: “Adhere to the governed bodies!” Each of these departed to seek its waystation in order to contemplate there the one who had caused them to descend. I had already seen the Ringdove, pregnant with the strange *ʿAnqāʾ*, but in dividing up the waystations, I had neglected the one who shares my waystation.¹¹⁵

109. There is a near homophony between *sūra* (rank) and *ṣūra* (form). This is particularly fitting, as it is the divine form that gives the Intellect its high rank.

110. A play on words between *sarīr* (throne) and *sarīra* (secret).

111. A reference to the Footstool at which level polarities enter creation.

112. Arabic: *al-siwā*. What is other than the Real, that is, creation.

113. Note the near *tajnīs* between *fināʾ* (courtyard) and *fanāʾ* (annihilation).

114. Arabic: *al-makāsib* (what is earned) and *al-mawāhib* (what is bestowed). For this distinction and its relation to prophecy, see, for example, *Fut.* II, beginning of Chap. 73.

115. Arabic: *al-munāzil*. Translation unsure. I follow Gril’s translation (*Arbre*,

I am the knowledge of creation concealed in the cloak of the divine inviolability. A band of philosophers invented lies¹¹⁶ about me and a gang of noblemen tried to capture me. They set up the fowler's net of their thoughts to hunt me and used against me the very means that I myself had provided them with in order to gain from my toil. And when their spiritual aspirations were sufficient to grasp me in their fowler's net of thought, there fell into it an eagle with my form from the country of illusion. They said, "This is the clear truth!" Would that they knew that the truth is not clear to them and never will be. Knowledge of me and my existence depends upon what is granted as a gift or recompensed for merit.¹¹⁷ Satan incited them to doubt and they imagined that they had alighted at the summit when their station was the low plains. They mistook anteriority for eternity,¹¹⁸ declaring me eternal and that my existence did not stem from non-existence.¹¹⁹ I abandoned them to their confusion "like meat on the butcher's block." Those who commit an injustice to the divine command must be oppressed! I am free from what they attribute to me, and an unbeliever¹²⁰ in what they set up. For God, may his glory be magnified, was from all eternity while I was under the decree of non-existence. Then he brought me into existence from non-existence through a pre-eternal precedence, and my essence became manifest. He illuminated my existence with his knowledge and entrusted me with poverty and weakness, turning me away from might

p. 64). The form is masculine, but from the narrative of the Ringdove, we may assume she is the one who has been overlooked.

116. Arabic: *iftarā*. In the Qur'an, this word is used for the attribution of an associate with God. See Q. 4:51: "And whoso attributeth a copartner to God hath devised an enormous sin."

117. Again, a reference to earning and divine bestowal. The Shaykh is suggesting here that the philosophers will never discover the truth about the First Intellect; such knowledge belongs only to the Messengers, Prophets, and Friends of God.

118. Note the play on words between *qidam* (eternity) and *qadam* (anteriority), which have the same orthography.

119. In other words, the philosophers mistook the First Intellect for the Real.

120. Arabic: *kāfir*. Gril's translation (*Arbre*, p. 65), "I disavow the worship that they offer me", though less literal, conveys the sense of the phrase very well.

and glory. I am the humble one who has no glory and the powerful one who does not cease to be weak.¹²¹

Discourse of the Strange ‘Anqā’

When the Eagle completed his discourse and finished explaining his station, the ‘*Anqā*’ began to speak clearly about her existence and spoke strangely¹²² about the high rank of her limit.¹²³

She said: I am the strange ‘*Anqā*’. My dwelling is forever in the west,¹²⁴ in the middle station, on the banks of the surrounding sea.¹²⁵ Glory embraces me on two sides without my entity ever becoming manifest at all.

I am the one who has no existent entity, the one who lacks no
property,
Strange ‘*Anqā*’, they’ve come to call me.
Although the door of my existence is sealed
The Merciful has not made my mention in vain
But it has to do with a meaning whose secret must be sought –
It is that I am the one who bestows gnosis to their innermost
beings.
Our straight path stretches on, and the wayfarers are each at
the levels of their light:
The greatest one is he whose light is sheer detachment.

121. Ibn ‘Arabī plays nicely on the rhyming sounds of these two opposing verbs: *ya’ izz* (to be powerful) and *ya’ jiz* (to be weak).

122. Arabic: *tu’ribu* (to speak clearly) and *tughribu* (to say strange things). This paronomasia is particularly elegant in that the letters ‘*ayn* and ‘*ghayn* are distinguished only by the dot above the latter.

123. Arabic: *ḥadd*. Could also mean “definition”.

124. Arabic: *maghrib*. Note the use of words based on the root *GH-R-B*: meaning strangeness, west, exile.

125. Arabic: *al-baḥr al-muḥīṭ*. This is also the name for the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. For an esoteric meaning of this “surrounding sea”, see *Fut.* II. 40, where it is equated with knowledge of union and separation.

Limits¹²⁶ derive from me, and upon me existence depends. One hears mention of me but I am invisible, and the report of me is not one that can be declared a lie. I am the strange one, the '*Anqā*'. My mother is the Ringdove and my father the Royal Eagle. My son is the Jet-Black Crow. I am the element of light and darkness, the place of trust and suspicion. I do not receive the unqualified light, for it is my contrary. I am unacquainted with knowledge, for I cannot produce or reproduce.¹²⁷ Everyone who praises me is far from understanding me, subdued by the sultan of imagination. I have no might in which to seek protection. The bodily frames of superior and inferior creation trace their origin to me. I am the reality that has no character, because of the vastness that I have. I clothe every condition with either happiness or misery. I am capable of bearing any form. I have no rank in any known form. But I have received the gift of transmitting the sciences although I am no knower, and of bestowing determinations although I am no judge. Nothing can be manifested that I am not in, but no seeker can attain it as something grasped or perceived in its entirety. I am of very great value in the eyes of those who realize the truth. I wander through the gathering of those with bowed heads.¹²⁸ Thus I have explained my state and have made manifest what is true and what is impossible about myself.

Discourse of the Jet-Black Crow

The Crow arose and said: I am the body of lights and the bearer of the receptacle of secrets,¹²⁹ the receptacle of quality and quantity, and the cause of joy and sorrow. I am the leader who is led. Sense and sensible are mine and through me appear the traces [of existence].

126. As Gril says (*Arbre*, p. 67, n. 92): "Limits are what defines a being; they are of three kinds: essential, descriptive, and linguistic." See *Fut.* II. 63.

127. See Q. 85: 13: "It is He who produceth, then reproduceth."

128. Arabic: *majlis al-muṭṭiqīn*, from the fourth form of the root *ṭ-R-Q*. This root is also associated with the word *ṭarīqa*, meaning "the Sufi Path".

129. See *Fut.* II. 647.

From me arises the world of material bodies. I am the source of figures, and likenesses are struck according to the levels of my form. I am the lamp¹³⁰ and the winds. I am the chain against the pebbles¹³¹ and the wing. I am the sea whose waves constantly strike one another.¹³² I am, of the numbers, the singular among counted numbers and its pair. My width is the abode of the charismatic gifts of his friends and my depth is the abode of abuse to his enemies. My height has not ceased to be face to face with his essence, through eternity without beginning and end, ever since I was brought into existence. I am the alembic of wisdom, the music of melody, and the one who brings together the realities of the words. In directing oneself toward me, one reaches the limit,¹³³ and those who are endowed with intelligence¹³⁴ rely upon me. I am the most precious gift¹³⁵ that has been bestowed, the final goal that has no end.¹³⁶ For my sake some are accepted and others rejected. I am those who are rolled and held in his right hand, and I am enclosed in the grasp of the evident truth.¹³⁷ The Real summoned me into his presence and I came. He called me to his knowledge and I readily responded. I am the form of the celestial sphere and the place of royalty. Upon me he established the Throne and I was given the name “place where it was established”.¹³⁸ I am the subsequent¹³⁹ who is not overtaken, just

130. See Q.24:35: “The similitude of His light is as a niche wherein is a lamp.”

131. According to a prophetic report, this was one of the forms in which the revelation came to the Prophet.

132. See Q.24:40: “Or as a darkness on a vast, abysmal sea. There covereth him a wave, above which is a cloud. Layer upon layer of darkness.”

133. Arabic: *ilayya al-munahhī*. *Munahhī* can also mean “one who forbids or warns”. I follow Gril’s translation here, as it seems to make more sense. The Arabic root *N-H-W/Y* has the meanings: to forbid, restrain, reach (a limit).

134. See Q.20:54 and 20:128: “Herein verily are signs for men of thought.”

135. Arabic: *luhā*. The root of this word generally has to do with entertainment of a light sort; however, one of the manuscripts consulted by Gril glosses it as “gift”.

136. Although matter is the limit of manifestation, the individuals that come to be in embodied form are endless.

137. See Q.39:67: “... when the whole earth is His handful on the Day of Resurrection, and the heavens are rolled in His right hand.”

138. See Gril, *Arbre*, p.44, nn.29 and 30 for the connection between the equatorial

as the Eagle is the precedent¹⁴⁰ who is not outstripped. He is the first and I am the last. His is the non-manifest dimension and mine is the manifest one. Existence has been divided between myself and him. I manifest his might and his creation, while his judgement depends on me. My knowledge flows in him, and his knowledge flows in me. When its bestower offers it, it is for our benefit, and when I acquire it, he thanks me for increasing it even more.

Some alleging to be endowed with unshakeable reason made their claim and imposed their dubious judgement. They showered me with unseemly derision and divested me of the robe of seemly praise. But the evil consequences of their actions will turn against them and their mocking will encompass them when, in the depths [of my hell]¹⁴¹ they will call for help and be answered: “Begone therein and speak not unto me”,¹⁴² while in the breadth [of my paradise]¹⁴³ those who praised me well will make merry with their spouses “in a garden made joyful”.¹⁴⁴ The Law has already praised me so what do I care? The received text has made clear my rank, so why say more?

line, the place of the Throne’s establishment, and the “dark bodies” that are the most secure places to hide the divine lights.

139. Arabic: *al-lāḥiq*. It is interesting to note that both this word and its pair here, *al-sābiq* (see below), were used by the Ismā‘īlīs to designate levels in their hierarchical structure, be it human – as is the case with *lāḥiq*, which signifies the Hidden Imam’s deputy during his occultation – or cosmic, as is the case with *sābiq*, described below.

140. Arabic: *al-sābiq*. The Ismā‘īlīs, drawing on Neoplatonic emanationist doctrines, associated this word with the First Intellect. See Corbin, *Cyclical Time*, pp. 87–9. While there is ample proof in Ibn ‘Arabi’s writings to refute any Shi‘ite proclivities on his part, the linking of these two terms does suggest that there is a stronger connection between Intellect and Body than is immediately perceptible. For a refutation of Ibn ‘Arabi’s supposed Shi‘ism, see al-Ghorab, “Muhyiddin Ibn al-‘Arabi Amidst Religions and Schools of Thought”, pp. 202–6.

141. Literally: “in my depth”.

142. Q. 23: 108.

143. Literally: “in my breadth”.

144. Q. 30: 15; 43: 70.

I am, with respect to my Lord, a wisdom for one who sees me,
For I am the secret whose nature was fashioned without
fingertips.

My creator ordered everything within himself when he
constructed me,

For I am a rock, and from me the spiritual meanings flash.¹⁴⁵
Together with the superior beings, [we are] like contesting
racehorses,

Yet I am one who conceals himself modestly from view.
I'm the one who answered my Lord obediently when he
summoned me.

He who, because of time's vicissitudes, sees my existence
Like the heart of Moses' mother, empty of spiritual
meanings,¹⁴⁶

Is completely void¹⁴⁷ of the verities of explanation.

I am the source of habitations and the foundation of songs.

I am the secret of an Imam, a noble one, high in place,

Whose knowledge is the most perfect knowledge

And whose rank is the greatest rank.

He fell in love with me when he saw me in the enclosures of
the gardens.

I do not name him for I fear the spearhead's¹⁴⁸ sharpness.¹⁴⁹

145. See Q.2:60; 7:160. See Commentary, p. 72, for this line's connection to the dedicatee of the treatise.

146. See Q.28:10: "And the heart of the mother of Moses became void, and she would have betrayed him if We had not fortified her heart, that she might be of the believers."

147. Arabic: *al-khalī*. See Commentary, p. 101, for a discussion of this term.

148. Arabic: *ḥadd al-sinān*. A pun on the name of the dedicatee, found in the following line. The Arabic root *H-D-D* conveys a number of senses, including: sharpness, definition, limit, impediment, and legal punishment.

149. It is possible that Ibn 'Arabī is also alluding to a tradition of the Prophet: "No verse of the Qur'an has come down without it having an exoteric (*ẓāhir*) interpretation, an esoteric (*bāṭin*) interpretation, a limit (*ḥadd*) and a place of ascension (*muṭṭala'*).¹" If limit – the *barzakh* between the exoteric and esoteric interpretation – belongs to Sinān, the place of ascent where one solves the riddle, belongs to Ṣakhr,

Discourse of the Jet-Black Crow

But he who understands my riddle is Ṣakhr ibn Sinān –
The one who possesses the most generous hand
And the one who is most steadfast in combat.
Mother, Grandmother, Grandfather, and I:
The spiritual meanings of our existence derive from God,
timelessly,
Like what becomes visible to the eye in the air brightened
with lightning.¹⁵⁰

Oh Ṣakhr ibn Sinān, I have explained to you some of the stations of the sources of the creatures: the universal human being, the first intellect, the unique soul, prime matter, and universal body. Investigate them like an intelligent man who seeks the salvation of his soul.

Peace be upon its author and upon us!

the rock from which one gains a perspective of the totality. I thank Stephen Hirstenstein for his suggestive comments on this puzzling verse. See also Chap. 25 of the *Futūḥāt*.

150. This line can also be found in '*Uqlat al-mustawfiz*, p. 56, where it begins the chapter on the Throne of the All-Merciful, which brings together the "four existing things": Nature, Dust, [Universal] Body, and Sphere.

COMMENTARY

The Title

The full title of the treatise is long and complex: *Cosmic Unification in the Presence of the Eye-witnessing through the Assembly of the Human Tree and the Four Spiritual Birds* (*al-Ittiḥād al-kawnī fī ḥaḍrat al-ish-hād al-‘aynī bi-maḥḍūr al-shajara al-insāniyya wa-l-ṭuyūr al-arba‘a al-ruḥāniyya*). As is generally the case with Ibn ‘Arabī’s titles, each word is carefully chosen for its semantic as well as symbolic resonance. While we will discuss the “human tree” and the “four spiritual birds” later, let us briefly look at the other key terms in the title.

Ittiḥād

Ittiḥād is the verbal noun deriving from the eighth form of the consonantal root *W-H-D*, which conveys the basic meaning of “one, unity, uniqueness”. The eighth form of the verb primarily gives the sense of reflexivity and reciprocity. Thus the first-form verb *waḥada*, meaning “to be one, unique”, becomes in the eighth form *ittahada*, meaning “to unite”, to make oneself and/or others one. As Ibn ‘Arabī defines it, “*Ittiḥād* is that two essences become one, whether servant or Lord”,¹ thus the term suggests a mystical union in which one essence is subsumed or annihilated in the other. But, as Souad al-Ḥakīm has written, “the *ittiḥād* in which two essences become one is impossible according to Ibn ‘Arabī”.² As the Shaykh tells us, “There can be no *ittiḥād* other than with respect to number and nature.”³

1. *Fut.* II. 130, Chap. 73, Question 153.

2. Al-Ḥakīm, *Al-Mu‘jam al-ṣūfī*, p. 1180.

3. *Fut.* II. 130, Chap. 73, Question 153. In the case of numbers, one remains the essence of every number; two, although it has a different name, is nothing but one

The doctrine of *ittiḥād* is censured by both the exoteric scholars, such as the theologians and philosophers, and by the mystics, albeit in a qualified sense. Not only can there be no intermingling of essences, either as an apotheosis of the human being or as an incarnation (*ḥulūl*) of the divine in human form, but the entire notion of *ittiḥād* rests on the false assumption that there is anything at all other than the One Essence.⁴ *Ittiḥād* thus, from one point of view, is a meaningless concept.

This, however, is not the full story, for there are situations in which, Ibn 'Arabī claims, the declaration of *ittiḥād* is not only permissible but necessary for the mystic to profess. In the highly allusive Chapter 399 of the *Futūḥāt*, Ibn 'Arabī discusses *ittiḥād* at length. The paradoxes of this notion are evident in the chapter's title: On Knowledge of the Mutual Waystation of "He who enters it, I smote his neck [that is, behead him], and no one remains who does not enter it." It is inevitable, in other words, that the creature will profess *ittiḥād*, whether he realizes the true situation or is completely unaware. Everyone and everything attributes his own action to himself, everything says "I". God Himself ascribes action to His creatures, as Ibn 'Arabī points out in a series of quotations from the Qur'an. Hence, although the gnostic knows that God is the only agent, there are times when his spiritual state or even a command from God allows him to attribute God's action to himself, as in the case of spiritual annihilation (*fanā'*) where God, as a result of the servant's drawing near to Him through the supererogatory acts of worship (*nawāfil*), "becomes", in the *ḥadīth qudsī*,⁵ the servant's

plus one. The name "one" has disappeared. In the case of nature, various names designate the many forms of existing things, but the essence remains one, hidden.

4. See also *Fut.* IV. 71, Chap. 456, and Gril's translation (*Arbre*, p. 19) concerning the identity of the Voice that addressed Moses from the Burning Bush (here simply the Tree). The upshot is that the Real is both the Speaker in the form of the Tree and the Hearer in the form of Moses, without the Tree ceasing to be a tree or Moses ceasing to be Moses. There is no *ḥulūl* (dissolving of essences) because, as we have seen above, a thing cannot unite with its own essence.

5. A *ḥadīth qudsī* is the extra-Qur'anic speech of God, transmitted on the authority of the Prophet Muḥammad.

hearing, seeing, speaking, and all his faculties.⁶ When the servant enters the station of *ittiḥād*, God “smote[s] his neck”; that is, He severs the connection between the absolute and the relative with respect to the servant’s perception of his ontological condition, and only Oneness (*aḥadiyya*) remains, a Oneness that belongs to the Real alone, never to the servant.⁷ This, of course, is the reason for the “blasphemous” and unruly utterances of such well-known Sufis as al-Ḥallāj, who said: “I am the Real”, and Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī, who said: “Glory be to me.”

Another instance of the permissibility of declaring *ittiḥād* is discussed briefly by Ibn ‘Arabī in the *Futūḥāt*’s Chapter on Love,⁸ with reference to the *ḥadīth qudsī* mentioned above, as well as the Qur’anic dictum to the Prophet: “You did not throw when you threw but God threw” (Q. 8: 17). Further on in the chapter,⁹ he describes the goal of spiritual love as *ittiḥād*, in which the essence of the Beloved becomes the essence of the lover, a statement that would seem to contradict his statements elsewhere. He relates this to the infamous heresy of incarnation (*ḥulūl*), but says that those who proclaim it are unaware of the real meaning of this unification.

6. See Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Mishkāt al-anwār*, trans. Hirtenstein and Notcutt as *Divine Sayings*, hadith 91, p. 88 (English), p. 51 (Arabic) for the complete text. Note that, for Ibn ‘Arabī, only the human being, fashioned upon the divine Form, can participate in God’s creativity by engaging in supererogatory acts of worship; angels, on the other hand, have a certain one-dimensionality in that they can only engage in what is obligatory. See *Fut.* IV. 30, Chap. 421 (trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 328): “The angels are servants by compulsion, while we are servants by compulsion through our obligatory works and by free choice through our supererogatory works.”

7. See *Fut.* II. 31, Chap. 73: “If it were not for the dependence of the essence of the servant, the authority of these two Names [the First and the Last] would not become manifest, since the essence (*‘ayn*) [with respect to God] is one and it is not united (*muttaḥida*), while with respect to the servant it is united, not one. Oneness (*aḥadiyya*) belongs to God while unification (*ittiḥād*), not Oneness, belongs to the servant. For the servant cannot be conceived as other than [dependent] on someone else, not on himself, so he has no whiff of Oneness ever. One can conceive Oneness of the Real and one can conceive relation (*idāfa*) of Him, because everything belongs to Him, or rather He is the essence (*‘ayn*) of all.”

8. *Fut.* II. 322, Chap. 178.

9. See *Fut.* II. 334.

The sense of unification between the lover and the Beloved is later explained in terms of natural love, in which two lovers exchange breath, that is, spirits, and saliva in intimate embrace. “When this breath becomes the spirit in the one toward which it is transferred and the breath of the other becomes the spirit of the first, it is interpreted as unification (*ittiḥād*) ... So it is correct to say [as the poet al-Ḥallāj has said]:

I am the One I love, and the One I love is me!”¹⁰

A final example, taken from this same chapter on love, shows the bewilderment of the lover who does not understand the situation as it really is. Taken from an enumeration of various essential characteristics of the lover, the passage in question has to do with the lover whose essential characteristic is that he is “annoyed (*mutabarrim*) by the company of what comes between him and meeting his Beloved.”¹¹ As Ibn ‘Arabī explains, nothing comes between the gnostic and meeting God but non-existence, which is nothing. Existence is nothing other than God. God Himself is the Contemplator in every eye that sees Him. The only veil between lover and Beloved is creation, and the lover is unable to remove creation for it is his very essence. As Ibn ‘Arabī explains, “A thing cannot remove itself from itself, and his self is what comes between him and meeting his Beloved ... so he remains ever annoyed.”¹² He imagines that when he is separated from his body, he will be separated from composition and he will become something simple in which there is no duality. He multiplies his own oneness (*aḥadiyya*) with the Oneness of the Real, and this constitutes the meeting. But multiplication results only in him, not in Him. And this makes the lover even more annoyed. On the other hand, the lover who is a knower of God does not become

10. *Fut.* II. 334, Chap. 178. See also *Fut.* II. 390 where Ibn ‘Arabī makes an explicit connection between this line of al-Ḥallāj’s poem and two lines from the Shaykh’s own *Risālat al-ittiḥād*. See our translation, p. 24, n. 10 and p. 30, n. 24.

11. *Fut.* II. 351, Chap. 178.

12. *Ibid.*

annoyed because “he knows the affair as it really is, as we have mentioned in the *Treatise on Unification (Risālat al-ittiḥād)*.”¹³

And how is the affair as it really is? In one sense, one can explain it only by paradox: there is / is not unification, depending on one’s particular understanding of the word. Ibn ‘Arabī himself explains it in terms of the Prophet’s supererogatory supplication that God make him into a light since God has said: “God is the light of the heavens and the earth” (Q.24:35). The Shaykh explains: “The glories [of God’s Face] are lights, and light is not burned away by light. Rather, it is included within it, that is, it coheres with it because it is of the same genus. This is conjunction and unification (*ittiḥād*).”¹⁴ The Muḥammadan light is thus consubstantial with the Divine Light. The servant, who, in himself, has only possible existence, is by his very nature something added (*nafl*), “light upon light” (Q.24:34) as it were: “You are fundamentally extra with respect to existence, since God was when you were not, and then you were.”¹⁵

Thus *ittiḥād* can only occur when the servant realizes his superfluous or supererogatory nature vis-à-vis the Real. By engaging in the supererogatory, an act that engages his will and creativity, he assumes the attributes of the Real, whereby the Real becomes his hearing, seeing, and all his faculties. It is only in this way that the Real becomes manifest in the form of the servant and the servant becomes manifest in the form of the Real. Then there is an interpenetration of attributes rather than the disappearance of one essence into another.¹⁶

It is, as Ibn ‘Arabī remarks in his chapter on Abraham in the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, like the dying of a garment, where colour penetrates the cloth.¹⁷ This interpenetration of attributes is known as *khulla*, or intimate friendship, from which the designation of Abraham as

13. Ibid. This appears to be the only explicit mention of the *R. al-ittiḥād* in the *Futūḥāt*.

14. *Fut.* II. 184, Chap. 101. See also *Fut.* II. 126.

15. *Fut.* IV. 449, Chap. 560.

16. *K. al-masā’il*, pp. 164–5 (*mas’āla* 41).

17. *Fuṣūṣ*, pp. 80–1; Austin, *Bezels of Wisdom*, pp. 91–2.

al-Khalīl derives. As the Shaykh explains, “*Khulla* can only be between God and His servant. It is the station of unification (*ittiḥād*).”¹⁸ It is a reciprocal intimacy, then, in which the loving servant plays both an active and a passive part, following the two-part structure of the aforementioned *ḥadīth qudsī*.¹⁹ In the first stage: “My servant does not approach me by something I love more than by those acts which I have prescribed.” In this first movement, one involving the performance of obligatory acts, Abraham “penetrates and encompasses”²⁰ the Divine Attributes. This is followed by a second stage in which: “He does not cease approaching Me with supererogatory acts until I love him.” This love consists of the “penetration” by the Divine Spirit, which courses through every organ and limb of the servant’s body: “And when I love him, I am his ear with which he hears, his eye with which he sees, his hand with which he grasps.”²¹

Ittiḥād, then, is the state in which God is “nearer” to His servant “than the jugular vein” (Q. 50: 16), but neither Lord nor vassal disappears. As Ibn ‘Arabī concludes, in the chapter on Abraham in the *Fuṣūṣ*:

We are His as has been shown,
As also we belong to ourselves.
... I have two aspects, He and I,
But He is not I in my I.
In me is His place of manifestation,
And we are for Him as vessels.²²

18. *Fut.* II. 22, Chap. 73.

19. See above, pp. 56–7.

20. *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 80.

21. In *Fut.* IV. 24, Chap. 417, Ibn ‘Arabī notes that: “obligatory acts (*farā’id*) are higher and more loved by God than supererogatory ones (*nawāfil*). ... God the Most High said: [My servant] does not draw near to Me by anything I love more than by that which I have prescribed for him.” He then quotes the rest of the *ḥadīth qudsī*, and remarks: “This is the result of supererogatory acts, so what do you think about the result of obligatory acts by which the servant will be God’s hearing and sight?!” See also *Fut.* II. 173, IV. 30, 449–50.

22. Trans. Austin (slightly modified), *Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 95.

Kawnī

Kawnī is an adjective derived from the verbal noun *kawn*, cosmos, creation. It can also refer to the individual creature. The consonantal root is *K-W-N*, whose meanings include “to be”, “to create”, “to bring into existence”. God’s command “Be!” (*kun*)²³ is the occasion for all existence. Ibn ‘Arabī finds an esoteric meaning within the structure of this command. Although it is written with only two letters, the *kāf* and the *nūn*, the *wāw* lies hidden within, appearing only as the short-vowel *ḍamma*, pronounced “u”. The seeming polarity of the Real and creation is bridged by a third thing, the linking letter *wāw*, which represents the Perfect Human Being.²⁴ This Perfect Human Being thus serves as an isthmus, or *barzakh*, partaking of both sides of creation as a whole, the divine and the cosmic,²⁵ yet preserving the tension inherent in them.²⁶

Ishhād

Ishhād is the fourth-form verbal noun of the verb *ashhada*. Its root *SH-H-D* has to do with seeing, witnessing. One of the senses of fourth-form verbs is causative, hence in this case “to make see or witness”. For Ibn ‘Arabī, seeing possesses an inner as well as outward sense. The Essence or Being of the Real can never be grasped but His manifestation in the cosmos can be witnessed in its infinite self-disclosures.²⁷ In the state of annihilation of self (*fanā*) and the

23. Q.2:117, 3:47, 16:40, 19:35, 36:82, 40:68.

24. See, for example, *Fut.* III. 283.

25. “‘Engendered existence’ translates *al-kawn*. It may be that Ibn al-‘Arabī means by this term ‘all that is,’ including both God and the cosmos. Then, when we ‘leave aside’ the totality, we observe the two sides. However, although the word *kawn* can apply to the *wujūd* [being/finding] of God in some contexts, *al-kawn* is typically a technical term meaning everything other than God, everything that has come to be as the result of the divine command *kun*.” Chittick, *SDG*, p.407, n.29.

26. For extensive discussion of the Perfect Human Being in Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought, see Izutsu, *Sufism and Taoism*, pp.218–83; Takeshita, *Theory of the Perfect Man*.

27. “God is present and finds Himself in all things, and man witnesses this

subsistence of God (*baqā'*), the gnostic realizes that it is God who is both Witness and witnesser.

'Aynī

'Aynī is an adjective related to the consonantal root 'Y-N. 'Ayn is the paradigmatic homonym, with a wide range of meanings as diverse as "eye", "spring", "source", "essence", "entity", and "self". Ibn 'Arabī fully exploits the range of possibilities of this word's meaning in his title and throughout the treatise. What the author is being made to witness with the eye of his inner vision is the Root of his existence and his very self. The title could easily be read: *Cosmic Unification in the Presence of the I-witnessing*.

* * *

There is an unmistakable affinity between the paired terms *al-ittiḥād al-kawnī* and *al-ishḥād al-'aynī*.²⁸ While the first term may suggest to some the notion that has mistakenly been ascribed to Ibn 'Arabī through the centuries, *waḥdat al-wujūd*, oneness or unity of being, the form of the word *ittiḥād* is much more in line with Ibn 'Arabī's manner of thinking. The fact that the word is in a form that implies reflexivity and reciprocity provides a dynamism that we do not find in the more static word *waḥda*. Since we know from the Shaykh's own words that two incommensurable essences – the Real and the servant – cannot enter into a true unity, and that in reality there is only one absolute unqualified Being, the effort is directed to the realization of what it means to be the locus where absolute and relative being meet.

presence and finding to the extent of his capacity." Chittick, *SPK*, p. 226.

28. See Gril, *Arbre*, p. 8. Gril notes that the alternating symmetry in the title's words (*ittiḥād/ishḥād* and *kawnī/'aynī*) is echoed in the introductory poems, which depict the bi-polarity of Man. Hence, he says, the treatise comprises two parts, one devoted to the supreme realization of the Perfect Man, the other to his universality as symbolized by the Tree and the four Birds.

The Proemial Poems

The *Ittiḥād al-kawnī* begins abruptly with a series of proemial poems – a *Stemning*, in Kierkegaardian terms – that sets the tone for the first part of the *risāla*. The series consists of three poems of differing lengths and metres, interspersed by prose remarks, including the dedication and naming of the treatise. In reality, the three poems form a single poem, regularly repeating the refrain: “From my ... to my ...” They are all marked by end rhymes to which the letter *yā’* (transliterated “ī”) or the shortened variant “i” is appended. The first poem’s end rhyme is in *lām* plus the additional “ī” – *ālī* (for example, *i’tidālī // jalālī*); the second’s is *ḍād* plus “ī” – *ardī*: (*farḍī // ‘ardī*); the third’s is *sīn*, hence –*sī*: (*ḥissī // labsī*). The result is fifty lines of verse, all ending with the long “ee” sound. In Arabic, the long consonantal “*yā’*”, which gives the sound of a long “ee”, is the marker of the first person possessive pronoun suffix. Thus the author truly does not cease to speak about himself throughout the entire initial sequence and beyond. Imagine the effect if we were to read an English poem of equivalent length, all ending in the word “me”.

The first poem, in the metre *basīt*, is nineteen lines in length, thirteen of which present paired terms in each hemistich for a total of twenty-six paired terms. Nine lines consist of dyads that are not repeated: incompleteness / completeness; inclination / equilibrium. Represented by letters, the pattern would be: A → B → C → D. This pattern is repeated for nine lines, after which come four lines in which the second of the dyads is repeated, while the fourth is new: breeze, boughs / boughs, shade. The pattern here is A → B = B → C. Following the thirteen lines of paired terms are six lines with no paired terms.

The first thirteen lines are full of dyadic fluctuations, oppositions, ascents, and descents, in dizzying succession. Some of the terms are states, some things. Generally, the movement is along a variety of horizontal axes, but at the mention of the moon, a cyclical variant of this fluctuation is brought into consideration. This is made even


more apparent as the author begins to repeat the last term of the line as the first term of the next line: breeze to boughs, boughs to shade, and so forth.

The reader is caught in the sheer instability of human – nay all – nature, and the words of the Prophetic tradition may come to mind: “The heart is between two of the fingers of the All-Merciful; He makes it fluctuate as He desires.”²⁹

The second poem consists of only two lines in the rare metre *muḍāriʿ*. The pairs here: heaven, earth; exemplary practice, religious duty // pact, perjury; length, breadth, are contraries. There are no repeated terms among the eight, hence we return to the first pattern of the first sequence: $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D$.

The third poem consists of twenty-nine lines in the metre *hazaj*. The first pair of each hemistich, with one exception, is presented in reverse order in the second: sense, intellect / intellect, sense. Thus the pattern here is $A \rightarrow B = B \leftarrow A$. A line of explanation or elaboration follows each of these pair-embedded lines. As we have mentioned, all but one of the pairs in the first hemistich are repeated in reverse order in the second. The exception is the eleventh line: body, vastness; vastness / prison.³⁰ This gives a total of eleven pairs made up of five individual terms plus the extra “prison”. A final contrasting pair, shout / whisper, is given in the last line.

We have mentioned the pattern of the three proemial poems for a reason. The movement of the first sequence is along a horizontal line: $ABCD \rightarrow$. The second can be seen as a Z:




29. For variants of this hadith, see Muslim, Qadar 17; Tirmidhī, Qadar 7, Daʿawāt 89; Ibn Māja, Muqaddima 13; Aḥmad II, 168, 173; VI, 182, 251, 302, 315.

30. A variant gives: vastness/narrowness; narrowness/the Footstool.

The Dedicatee

The two-lined third sequence returns to ABCD→ and the fourth forms a perfectly self-contained X:



We also note that the terms in each line have been reduced in sequences one, two, and four from four terms to three and then to two. The wild ricocheting has settled down to an even swing as equilibrium approaches. The poet seems to have progressed from the sensation of being caught in the dualities at every level of existence to a realization of the Unity at the core.

The Dedicatee

As we have already noted, Ibn ‘Arabī states often in the treatise that he addresses only himself. What, then, is his relation to the dedicatee of the work? The *Ittiḥād al-kawnī* is dedicated to a mysterious personage who, as Ibn ‘Arabī says, “understands my riddle”. In the *Ittiḥād* he is called by the name Abū al-Fawāris Ṣakhr ibn Sinān, but as Gril has pointed out,³¹ there is no doubt that he is the semi-legendary prophet Khālīd ibn Sinān b. ‘Ayth (or al-Ghayth)³² al-‘Absī,³³

31. Gril, *Arbre*, p. 22.

32. See ‘Afifī, *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 317.

33. According to al-Jāḥiẓ, he belonged to the Banū Makhzūm of the Banū Qutay‘ah b. ‘Abs. (*K. al-ḥayawān*, Vol. IV, p. 476). While some accounts place his tribe of the Ṭā‘y in central Arabia – Gril points out that this is also the tribe from which Ibn ‘Arabī himself is descended (*Arbre*, p. 22, n. 11) – other accounts, such as Jāmī’s *Naqd al-nuṣūṣ*, place him in Aden (see Chittick, “Ibn ‘Arabī’s Own Summary of the *Fuṣūṣ*”, p. 87). Gril also remarks that Ṣakhr was the name of one of the factions of that tribe.

to whom Ibn ‘Arabī devotes his penultimate chapter in the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*. In the *Ittiḥād*, however, he is not called Khālīd but Ṣakhr. Nonetheless, the two men are one and the same, as will become clear later when we deconstruct these names.

The dedicatee’s role in the narrative seems minor at best, appearing only once in the Jet-Black Crow’s poem at the end, but this insignificance is only apparent. In reality, he holds a major key to the work, as a possible alter ego of the author himself and as a symbol for the Perfect Human Being as a *barzakh*, or isthmus, whose nature will be discussed below. Some delving into Khālīd’s history and the various components of his name yields important clues.

Khālīd, whom some, including Ibn ‘Arabī, regard as a pre-Islamic Arabian prophet,³⁴ is said to have lived at the time of what is known as the *fatra*³⁵ – the intermediate period between specific legislative revelations, in this case between Jesus and Muḥammad.³⁶ He is considered to be a *ḥanīf*, a natural monotheist or Muslim *avant le lettre*, in part because of a Prophetic tradition that links him with the message of *tawḥīd* – the declaration of God’s Oneness. According to this tradition, when the Prophet recited the Sura of Sincerity, Surat al-Ikhlāṣ: “Say: He, Allah, is One, Allah the Eternal Refuge (*al-Ṣamad*)”, Khālīd’s daughter informed him that she had heard her father recite the very same verse.

Khālīd is not mentioned by name in the Qur’an,³⁷ and his status as a prophet is sometimes cast into doubt by the Prophet’s having said, “I am the nearest of men to Jesus son of Mary, for there is no prophet between him and me.” But as Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī says in the *Fukūk*,

34. Other Arab prophets such as Ḥūd, Ṣāliḥ, and Shu‘ayb, were also sent to the peoples of the Arabian peninsula, but they did not bring with them a divine law for their community.

35. The word “*fatra*” is also applied to a condition of stagnation in an individual. It is that time known to prophets and saints – indeed to artists and scholars as well – when the fire of inspiration cools and the well runs dry.

36. Some accounts place him before Jesus. See ‘Aḥīfī, *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 317.

37. Note that the chapter devoted to Khālīd in the *Fuṣūṣ* is the only one in which no Qur’anic verses or hadith are cited.

this was due to the fact that Khālīd “did not manifest prophecy on the sensory plane”.³⁸

Why Khālīd failed to manifest his prophecy in this world is associated with a strange story, several versions of which are recounted by the Shaykh and his followers. We will mention first the more extensive account given in Jāmī’s commentary on Ibn ‘Arabī’s own chapter headings of the *Fuṣūṣ*.³⁹ The story goes as follows. Khālīd lived with his people in Aden.⁴⁰ One day, a great fire (traditionally called “*nār al-ḥarratayn*”),⁴¹ accompanied by billows of smoke and a deafening noise, came out of a cave and wreaked havoc upon the people, their farms, and their livestock, causing them to flee to Khālīd for refuge. Khālīd approached the fire and beat it with his staff until it retreated back into the cave. He told his sons that he was going to follow the fire into the cave and extinguish it completely. He then instructed them to call him after three days, and warned them that if they called him before that, he would come out but that they – presumably the sons as well as their father – would die. The sons waited two days before their patience wore out – or as Jāmī says, Satan made them restless – and they began to suspect that their father had died. So they called him before the appointed time. Khālīd emerged from the cave, his head wounded by their call. He told them, “You have caused me to perish, and you have let my words and instructions perish.”

He then told them that he was going to die and ordered them to bury him and watch over his grave for forty days. At that time a flock of sheep would come to them, led by a bob-tailed donkey. When the donkey stopped in front of his grave, they were to disinter him. He would then tell them about the states of the *barzakh*, the isthmus between life and death.

The people waited forty days, as instructed, and the flock, led by the bob-tailed donkey, came by, just as Khālīd predicted. When it

38. *Fukūk*, p. 307.

39. Chittick, “Ibn ‘Arabī’s Own Summary of the *Fuṣūṣ*”, pp. 86–7.

40. Some place this incident in the lava fields near Yathrib (= Medina).

41. ‘Aḥīfī, *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 317.

stopped in front of his grave, the believers among his people wanted to open the grave and hear Khālīd's message. His sons, however, once more thwarted their father's plans, fearing the disgrace of being called "the sons of him whose grave was opened". "So it was the pagan ignorance of the Arabs that caused his instructions to perish and let him perish."⁴²

The sign that confirmed his prophecy – his revelation concerning the *barzakh* – was to become manifest after death but, as Ibn 'Arabī says, "He let his sign perish, since he did not manifest it during his lifetime, and he let his people perish also, for he did not show it to them, so they let him perish."⁴³ This is alluded to in another tradition linking Khālīd to the Prophet, in which the latter is reported to have said to one of Khālīd's daughters: "Welcome to the daughter of a prophet whose people let him perish!"⁴⁴ Ibn 'Arabī, however, points out that the blame was to be assigned only to Khālīd's sons.

A second version, recounted by Ibn 'Arabī in his *Muḥāḍarāt al-abrār wa-musāmarāt al-aḥyār*, a work of belles-lettres, stays close to the hadith reports. It traces the report to Ibn 'Abbās, and places the story in the steppe lands between Mecca and Medina during the *fatra*. The fire that appeared was called "Budā" by the Bedouin and some of them were on the point of worshipping it like the Magians. Khālīd, presumably because of his monotheism, sought to stamp out the root of this heresy. He confronted the fire with his staff, beating it until God put it out.⁴⁵ The exertion seems to have mortally wounded Khālīd. The remainder of the story is as above, complete with burial instructions and donkey (full-tailed here). Khālīd promises to tell the people how things are in the world of the dead. The rest of the story passes as already recounted, the sons once more being assigned the blame for the failure to exhume their father. A coda links the story to two sayings of the Prophet, one of which we

42. Chittick, "Ibn 'Arabī's Own Summary of the *Fuṣūṣ*", p. 87.

43. Ibid., p. 87.

44. See *Muḥāḍarāt al-abrār wa-musāmarāt al-aḥyār*, p. 105.

45. In some accounts, he threw himself into the fire. See Pellat, s.v. Khālīd b. Sinān, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, revised edition (hereafter *EI* 2).

have encountered above, that is, the Prophet's greeting to Khālid's daughter, the other of which reflects the aborted message: "Then [the Messenger of God] said, 'Had they disinterred him, he would have told them about me and my community and what would come to be from them.'"⁴⁶

We should also mention al-Qāshānī's version that provides the intriguing detail that from the fire that terrified Khālid's people emerged an '*anuq* – a male '*anqā*' – whose body partly resembled a camel and partly a snake.⁴⁷ It was this serpent-like creature that Khālid beat back into the cave with his staff, his tribe following timorously behind.

The *Fuṣūṣ*, however, reflects yet another version,⁴⁸ in which Khālid tells his people that he will reveal the secrets of the *barzakh* only after his death and disinterment; he claims that the *barzakh* is in the form of this world,⁴⁹ thus confirming what the messengers had revealed. As the Ottoman commentator remarks in his commentary on the *Fuṣūṣ*, "It was not that Khālid was manifested with the prophecy of *barzakhīyya*, but that he would first die and would witness the states of the *barzakh* and then, after becoming alive again by divine order, he would be manifested with the prophecy of *barzakhīyya*."⁵⁰ Hence Khālid's failure to manifest his prophecy is the reason for the Prophet's statement: "I am the nearest of men to Jesus son of Mary, for there is no prophet between him and me." According to this commentator, then, Khālid did not become manifest with the prophecy of the *barzakh*, since his pronouncements upon its joys and sorrows were not confirmed by his resurrection: "Because for the general public, if a prophet dies and comes back, the effect of the news he gives of the other world is more definite than the

46. *Muḥāḍarāt al-abrār*, pp. 104–5.

47. 'Aḥfī, *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 317.

48. The account in the *Fuṣūṣ* draws from the story of Hanzalah b. Safwān. See Elmores, *Islamic Sainthood*, p. 191, n. 167.

49. As Ibn 'Arabī says regarding the disputed nature of the *barzakh*, its people alter in state there just as they do here. See *Fut.* III. 395.

50. *Ismail Hakki Bursevi's Translation and Commentary*, Vol. 4, p. 1047.

information of the other world given by a prophet who is not dead but who is alive in this world.”⁵¹

In the *Fuṣūṣ* version, Khālīd is also attributed with foretelling Muḥammad’s mission. Khālīd’s desire, according to Ibn ‘Arabī, was that all mankind believe in the message of the prophets and particularly in Muḥammad’s mission as a mercy to the universes, which he apparently foresaw. His people, however, did not allow him to fulfil his purpose. Thus this version differs in that the message concerning the *barzakh* is delivered, but not confirmed, and the role of harbinger of universal mercy is denied him.

The prophecy of Khālīd is in many ways the exact opposite of Muḥammad’s. While Muḥammad’s was fully visible, Khālīd’s was hidden. While Muḥammad’s mission was successful, Khālīd’s was a failure. While Muḥammad ascends to the heavens during his *mi‘rāj*, Khālīd is best known for his descents underground – practising a sort of *katabasis* in a cave, pursuing knowledge in the tomb. Like a seed deposited in the ground, or an embryo in the dark womb, Khālīd awaits the time when his people will disinter him, enabling him to proclaim his message, confirming the words of the messengers before him. But Khālīd himself could not achieve his wish. His message remains in sheer potentiality with respect to this world.

At this point, a certain constellation of notions discussed at great length in the *Futūḥāt* comes to mind. These include the opposing states of seclusion (*khalwa*) and society (*jalwa*), the various stages of annihilation (*fanā’*) and perdurance (*baqā’*),⁵² and the spiritual voyage that ends either in arrival (*wuṣūl*)⁵³ and halting (*waqfa*) or arrival and return (*rujū’*). Considered in relation to these discussions, Khālīd’s prophecy was imperfect for it was entirely concerned with *khalwa* and *waqfa*. He was not granted the possibility of manifesting his prophecy in public and was not able to return to his people. Muḥammad’s

51. Ibid., p. 1049.

52. See Ibn ‘Arabī’s treatise *al-Fanā’ fī al-mushāhada*; English trans. Hirtenstein and Shamash, *JMIAS*, IX (1991); French trans. Vâlsan, *Études Traditionnelles*, 363 and 364 (1961). See also *Fut.*, Chaps 220, 221, and 286.

53. From the same root as *ittiṣāl* (conjunction).

prophecy, on the other hand, was perfect for it embraced these opposites. The initial stage of his spiritual initiation, before the coming of the angel Gabriel, took place in the cave of Hirā. Thus it was a period of seclusion and flight from the world. In the wake of the descent of revelation upon him, however, his apostolic mission demanded that he manifest within the world. And his heavenly *mi'rāj* did not culminate in any permanent absorption in the divine but was followed by a return to his community. As the Shaykh says in his *Futūḥāt*, “The perfection of the heritage of the prophets and the messengers consists in the return to the creatures.”⁵⁴ And Khālīd is a clear example of a prophet who arrived and halted, unable to make the return to the world.

Secrets of the Name Abū al-Fawāris Ṣakhr [= Khālīd] ibn Sinān⁵⁵

The first *kunya*, or agnomen – Abū al-Fawāris – means “father of the knights”. The *farwāris* were “a class of Arab chivalrous heroes distinguished by eloquence (*bayān*) as well as courage and generosity (*jūd*)”.⁵⁶ The appellation suggests pre-Islamic values and may have a connection with the *fatā*, or chivalrous knight, of the *Futūḥāt*’s first chapter. Ibn ‘Arabī makes reference to these values in his dedication and again at the end of the *Risāla* when he praises Ṣakhr ibn Sinān for his generosity and steadfastness in combat.⁵⁷

Gril points out that the word *jūd* (generosity) calls to mind the word *wujūd* (existence) and vice versa; as an Arabic proverb states, “*Al-wujūd fī al-jūd*” (Existence is – or consists – in generosity). *Bayān* (eloquence) brings to mind the Qur’ān, since this is one of its

54. *Fut.* I. 251, Chap. 45.

55. ‘Abd al-Bāqī Miftāḥ has provided many of the clues enumerated below concerning the name Khālīd as well as other interesting information regarding this figure in his *Maḥātīḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, pp. 135–8.

56. Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood*, p. 193, n. 180.

57. The name Khālīd also appears in Ibn ‘Arabī’s *K. al-‘abādila*, pp. 168–9, where it is linked with the attribute of generosity. See Gril, *Arbre*, p. 23, n. 15.

appellations. Hence not only are generosity and eloquence evoked in this passage but existence and revelation as well.⁵⁸

The root *F-R-S* is also connected with the quasi-occult science of *fīrāsa*, or physiognomy. A *fāris* discerns the unseen nature of things, and especially human beings, from visible signs. To be *fāris* of something, says Ibn Manzūr in *Lisān al-‘Arab*, is to know it.

The dedicatee’s second *kunya* – Ibn Sinān – means “son of a spear-head”. This again suggests the notion of pre-Islamic warrior values.

* * *

The name Khālīd has two main meanings, one concerned with rocks (*ṣakhr/hajar*) and the other with everlastingness (*ṣamādiyya*). But let us begin with the name Khālīd itself and the Arabic root *KH-L-D* from which it is derived.

Khālīd-eternal* = *ṣamad* = *rock* = *ṣakhr

“*Khālīd*” is an active participle, deriving from the verb *khalada*: to remain or last forever; to be immortal; to remain in a place. In the fourth form, *akhlada*, it has many of the same meanings as form one, but it also means: to incline, lean, tend to. In this form it appears in the Qur’an: “And had We willed We could have raised him by their means, but he inclined toward [or clung to] the earth (*akhlada*) and followed his own whim” (Q. 7: 176). *Khālīda* (pl. *khawālīd*) are rocks or mountains,⁵⁹ “the immovable ones, ... the earth-riveted, unchanging, ... clasping the ground”.⁶⁰ Addressed by the poet Labīd, they are “the mute immovable ones whose speech yields no sense” (*ḍumman khawālīda mā yabīnu kalāmuhā*).⁶¹

The verbal noun *khuld* conveys the sense of infinite duration and eternity. *Dār al-khuld* is an epithet for the hereafter. Jaroslav

58. Gril, *Arbre*, p. 22.

59. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 2, p. 784, s.v. *khālīd*.

60. Stetkevych, “Toward an Arabic Lexicon”, p. 101.

61. Ibid., pp. 93, 108.

Stetkevych has discussed the “binary semantic tension that inheres in the word *khuld* itself”.⁶² In the Qur’an, this noun appears both in a positive (Q. 21: 15) and negative (Q. 10: 52; 32: 14; 41: 28) sense; and verbs and participles based on this root reflect the same ambivalence: “Where did *khuld* begin – in ‘heaven’ or in ‘hell’, or rather: in the higher regions of the awareness of self or in the lower ones? Is it an origin or an aspiration? ... Is it the future or the past?”⁶³ *Khuld* is also a word for mole, a blind burrowing creature who lives underground. Thus both the prophet Khālīd and the animal *khuld* are associated with the chthonic realm. Stetkevych remarks that even the celestial associations of this root in the Qur’an, wherein the term *khuld/khālīd* is frequently coupled with the term *jannah*, garden/paradise,⁶⁴ cannot be divorced from the chthonic: “... *jannah* ... may itself only be ‘projected’ into the eschatological ‘heavenly’ sphere out of its primary chthonic ‘hiddenness,’ ‘buriedness,’ ‘darkness,’ and also ‘protectedness.’”⁶⁵ For the semantic range of the root *ḡ-N-N* includes such words as “to veil”, “to conceal”, “fetus” (*janīn*), “jinn”, and “grave” (*janan*). Ibn ‘Arabī’s appellation of Khālīd as “Jānn ibn Jānn” (Jānn, son of the Jinn) in his dedication is thus entirely appropriate.⁶⁶

62. Ibid., p. 101.

63. Ibid.

64. For example Q. 20: 76; 25: 15.

65. Stetkevych, “Toward an Arabic Lexicon”, p. 102.

66. Gilis (*Livre des Chatons*, p. 681) has suggested an intriguing connection between the other meaning of *jānn*, a great serpent, and Khālīd, translating the phrase in question as “Serpent son of Jānn”. He points out parallels between Moses’ staff, which turns into a serpent in his contest with Pharaoh’s magicians and splits the rock from which issue twelve streams of water (as mentioned by Ibn ‘Arabī in his final poem), and Khālīd’s staff, with which he beats back the fire into the cave. If this “fire” is either a serpent/*jinnī* or an *‘anqā’*, as some accounts have it, the Khālīd legend becomes even more complex.

Ṣakhr-rock = ḥajar = khālīd = jabal

The word “ṣakhr” appears three times in the Qur’an: (1) “Didst thou see, when we took refuge in the rock” (Q.18:63). The context is the voyage undertaken by Moses and Khidr; (2) “though it be in a rock, or in the heavens, or in the earth ... God will bring it forth” (Q.31:16). The context is Luqmān’s advice to his son; and (3) “and Thamūd, who hollowed the rocks in the valley” (Q.89:9). Thus rocks may be refuges, hiding places, and ruins of a pre-Islamic people who disobeyed their prophet Hūd.

The other word for rock is *ḥajar*. This is the word used in the Qur’an in connection with Moses: “Strike with thy staff the rock” (Q.2:60; 7:160), and “for there are stones from which rivers come gushing” (Q.2:74). Ibn ‘Arabī seems to be referring to this image in the final poem of the *Ittiḥād*, “I am a rock (ṣakhr), and from me the spiritual meanings flash.”

The Moses/rock analogy is evident in another early work of Ibn ‘Arabī’s, *Mashāhid al-asrār*. One of the contemplations involves the “light of the Rock (ṣakhra)” at the end of which the Real addresses the Moon: “Tell the rock to let twelve springs pour forth ...”⁶⁷ According to Ibn Sawdakīn, who commented on this work, the rock is a symbol of the body and its knowledges, the Moon represents the knowledge of Nature, the twelve springs are the constellations.⁶⁸

Ṣamad

“Ṣamad” is a curious word that appears only once in the Qur’an, in Sura 112. It is variously translated in that context as “eternal refuge”, “everlasting”, and “resource”. As such it is an epithet for God.

The legends of Khālīd emphasize Khālīd’s role as the support and refuge of his people. It is to him that they turn in times of danger or need, as in the case of the fire that came out of the cave. We have also

67. Beneito and Twinch, *Contemplation of the Holy Mysteries*, p. 74.

68. Ibid., pp. 75–6.

seen that in the traditions, Khālīd is specifically associated with Sura 112, which calls God “*Aḥad*” and “*Ṣamad*”. Thus, the two elements of dependable recourse and strict monotheism are brought together as Khālīd’s distinguishing features.

In the *Fuṣūṣ*, these suppositions are tacitly understood, for the particular wisdom associated with Khālīd ibn Sinān is *ṣamadiyya*.⁶⁹ The chapter on Khālīd does not specifically mention what the precise connection is between Khālīd and *ṣamadiyya*, although Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnāwī in his *Fukūk* interprets *ṣamad* as “aim”.⁷⁰ In the *Fuṣūṣ*, this is one of the two main foci of the chapter – the other being the *barzakh* – since Khālīd is associated with the notions of intention and fulfilment. Khālīd’s mission, as we have noted, was a failure. Yet Ibn ‘Arabī concludes in the *Fuṣūṣ* that God “allow[ed] him to achieve the reward (*ajr*) of his wish (*umniyya*)”. But he adds: “There is doubt and dispute as to whether he attained the reward (*ajr*) of his quest (*maṭlūb*).”⁷¹ In other words, is wishing to perform an action equivalent to accomplishing the act itself, and does desire merit a reward even if it fails to be carried to fruition?⁷² “In the outward sense”, says Ibn ‘Arabī, “they are not equal. Therefore, Khālīd b. Sinān sought to attain both so he could have the station of bringing

69. *Ṣamad* is also mentioned in the *Fuṣūṣ* in connection with the prophet Aaron: “He is summoning to a God who is eternally resorted to, universally known, but not seen. ... The eyes cannot see Him, just as they cannot see the spirits that govern their shapes and outer forms” (*Fuṣūṣ*; trans. Austin, *Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 248).

70. *Fukūk*, p. 307. See also Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 4, p. 1726, s.v. *ṣamad*, for this sense of the word.

71. *Fuṣūṣ*, I. 213. Austin’s English translation (*Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 268) does not preserve the meaning of *ajr* as “reward”, which is essential to the legal discussion that follows. In addition, to translate both *umniyya* and *maṭlūb* as “wish” obscures the distinction between them. Dagli’s new English translation (*Ringstones of Wisdom*, p. 276) maintains this distinction; he translates *ajr* as “reward”, *umniyya* as “hope” and *maṭlūb* as “sought after thing”.

72. This is an issue debated in *fiqh*, of which Ibn ‘Arabī himself gives two examples: the person who makes the effort to attend the congregational prayer, but misses it, and the person of limited means who would like to perform the good deeds that the wealthy are able to perform but cannot because of his poverty. In both these cases, the reward for intending and accomplishing is said to be the same.

together both things and thus gain two rewards.”⁷³ His success, however, is inconclusive.⁷⁴

Another word belonging to this root is “*ṣamda*”, which is “a rock firmly imbedded in the earth, even with the surface thereof” or “somewhat elevated”.⁷⁵ Thus we find again associations connecting Ṣakhr / Khālīd ibn Sinān with enduring rocks and subterranean existence.

“*Ṣamad*” also means “solid, not hollow”⁷⁶ and is applied to someone who takes no nourishment yet neither hungers nor thirsts in war.⁷⁷ Thus it is connected in particular with fasting. Ibn ‘Arabī, for example, calls Ramadan “*ṣamadiyya*”.⁷⁸ One finds this same connection in the Shaykh’s small treatise *Hilyat al-abdāl*: “The station is that of universal sustenance. It is a very elevated condition characterized by intellectual secrets, contemplative unveilings, and spiritual states.”⁷⁹

Finally, the Presence of *ṣamad* is discussed in the *Futūḥāt*, Chapter 287. The particular self-disclosure of this Presence has to do with the descent of the Qur’an on the Night of Power, which occurs during the fasting month of Ramadan.⁸⁰

73. *Fuṣūṣ*, I. 214. Cf. Austin, *Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 268.

74. See Ismail Hakki Bursevi’s *Translation and Commentary*, Vol. 4, pp. 1049–50, for further illumination of this point. His conclusion is: “there is no equality between the two deserts of intention and action ... because had there been equality [Khālīd] would have been satisfied with desiring.”

75. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 4, p. 1727, s.v. *ṣamda*.

76. Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī includes this meaning of “recourse” and “aim” in his brief discussion of *ṣamad* in the Khālīd chapter. See *Fukūk*, p. 307.

77. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 2, p. 784, s.v. *khālīd*.

78. See ‘*Anqā’ mughrib*, trans. Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood*, p. 442; *Fut.* I, Chap. 71: On Fasting. Ibn ‘Arabī speaks also of the *ṣamadāniyya* retreat, most appropriately undertaken during the month of Ramadan, in his *K. al-khawāṣṣ al-muṭlaqa*, currently being edited and translated by Stephen Hirtenstein. This thirty-day retreat consists of fasting and nightly vigil.

79. *Hilyat al-abdāl*; French trans. Vâlsan, *Parure des abdāl*, p. 34.

80. In addition to the sources mentioned above, see also Rauf, *Addresses*, pp. 52–6.

Khālid ibn Sinān, Prophet of the *Barzakh*

When we bring together all the etymological clues with the legendary account of Khālid's mission, we find that this final Arabian prophet before the advent of Muḥammad is admirably suited to be called "Prophet of the *barzakh*". We have already encountered one meaning of *barzakh* in connection with the content of Khālid's message. It is "the interval between the present life and that which is to come, from the period of death to the resurrection".⁸¹ But in its broadest definition a *barzakh* is anything that separates two things, anything that is neither one thing nor another: it is the dream world that partakes of both life and death, the image in the mirror that both is and is not the observer; it is the unperceivable instant between past and future; the dawn and dusk when it is neither fully light nor dark; and the moon as it waxes and wanes in its cycle, forever in transit from crescent to void.⁸² As Chittick has noted,

A *barzakh* is something that stands between and separates two other things, yet combines the attributes of both. Strictly speaking, every existent thing is a *barzakh*, since everything has its own niche between two other niches within the ontological hierarchy known as the cosmos.⁸³

Chittick goes on to say: "Existence itself is a *barzakh* between Being and nothingness."⁸⁴ Between the One, unchanging Being and the equally unchanging nothingness (*'adam*) lies the *barzakh* of the ever-fluctuating existent things.

81. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 1, p. 187, s.v. *barzakh*.

82. For an extended study of the *barzakh* in Ibn 'Arabī's thought, see Bashier, *Ibn al-'Arabī's Barzakh*.

83. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 14.

84. Ibid. This, in Ibn 'Arabī's terms, is called "non-delimited imagination" (*al-khayāl al-muṭlaq*), the Supreme *Barzakh* (*al-barzakh al-a' lā*) or the *Barzakh* of *Barzakhs* (*barzakh al-barāzikh*). It is also called (although they are not exact synonyms): the Cloud, the Breath of the All-Merciful, the Real through whom creation takes place, the Universal Reality, Nature, and the Reality of the Perfect Human Being.

Two contradictories never stand opposite each other without a separator through which each is distinguished from the other and which prevents the one from being described by the attribute of the other. ... This is the Supreme *Barzakh*, or the *Barzakh* of *Barzakhs*. It possesses a face toward Being and a face toward nothingness. It stands opposite each of these two known things in its very essence. It is the third known thing. Within it are all possible things. It is infinite, just as each of the other two known things is infinite.⁸⁵

When we take this passage into consideration, the initially puzzling reference to Şakhr's being "master of the dyads and triads" becomes a bit clearer.⁸⁶ The Perfect Human Being, as we have stated above, brings together opposites and provides the resolving bridge between them. Thus he is able to reflect in response to the moment all the divine attributes on either side of the cosmic divide – mercy and severity, beauty and majesty, transcendence and immanence – while simultaneously preserving the oddness and singularity inherent in the whole, representing, as he does, the human axis of unity. While in himself he is non-existent, as a locus for the infinite manifestations of the divine in every instant, he is God's representative (*khalīfā*) in the world. For its part, the triplicate order is evident everywhere. There are three levels of existence: Real, creation, and *barzakh*; three points of articulation for the letters: throat, lips, and middle of the mouth; three levels within the human being: reason, sense, and *barzakh*.⁸⁷

Barzakh is the world of the imagination that stands as a mesocosm between the spiritual and material worlds. It is the "interworld", as Henry Corbin calls it,⁸⁸ the place where psycho-spiritual events including miracles, spiritual ascents, and theurgical operations take

85. *Fut.* III. 46, Chap. 312; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p.204.

86. The dyadic and triadic structure of existence is discussed by Ibn 'Arabī in many places. See, for example, *Fuṣūṣ*, Chap. on Şāliḥ and Chap. on Muḥammad.

87. See *Fut.* II. 391.

88. Corbin, *Spiritual Body*, p. 79.

place. “Imagination”, as the Shaykh tells us, “is neither existent nor non-existent, neither known nor unknown, neither negated nor affirmed.”⁸⁹ It is the broadest of universal planes, since, unlike the world of the senses, it contains everything that exists, “real” and “imaginary”. It is in this world of image-exemplars that the dialectical-monologue between the narrator and the various personae and faculties of himself takes place.

The Fourth Poem

After explaining the title and offering homage to the Prophet of the *barzakh*, the author turns again to rhyme. The fourth poem consists of eighteen lines in the metre *basīt*. Although separated from the preceding three poems, the fourth poem is connected with its predecessors through its end rhyme *tā’* coupled with the first person singular pronoun suffix *yā’*:–*ātī*: (*bi-dhātī* // *iltifātī*).

In addition, the author continues to group things in pairs, five of which are contrasting pairs: secretly/openly; enemies/friends; threat/grace; gathering/scattering; knight/maiden. Their effect here is more subdued than in the first three poems since they are not marked by the repeated refrain: “from ... to ...” (*min ... ilā ...*).

In this poem, the author engages in a clever repartee with himself. It is replete with paradoxes. His very assertion of self (*innanī*: here I am, or indeed I)⁹⁰ would cause his annihilation. To utter “I” throws the speaker into a state of *fanā’* – annihilation – in which friends and enemies, grace and punishment, disappear. There is only One who can properly say “I”.

89. *Fut.* I. 304, Chap. 6; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 118.

90. As Ibn ‘Arabī defines this emphatic particle in *Fut.* II. 130, Chap. 73: “If you ask: What is *inniyya*?, we answer: It is the Reality by way of attribution. [The people of *inniyya*] are those who are engaged with the Tablet, witnessing the Pen, observing the *Nūn*, drawing [the ink] from the Ipseity, speaking with *anniyya* [the personal pronoun “I”], expressing themselves with unification (*ittiḥād*).

Meetings in the Barzakh

The author now finds himself in a land “situated on the equator”, that is, in a momentary state of equilibrium where opposites are joined and realization of the Oneness of Being prevails. It is both a placeless place from which he will begin his ascent through the celestial spheres in imitation of the Prophet Muḥammad, and a balance-point within his very nature, anchoring his corporeal and spiritual dimensions. Thus we find both a cluster of sacred sites connected to this place of ascent: Mount Sinai, Mecca, Jerusalem (as the locus from which the Prophet was taken on his heavenly journey), and an allusion to the father of humanity, Adam, “fashioned of water and clay”, the synthesis of what is highest and lowest in creation.

The first stage in the ascent paradoxically involves a “plunge” into the sea of *hayūlā*, prime matter, later in the narrative to be symbolized by the *ʿAnqāʾ* bird. *Hayūlā* is yet another *barzakh*, the matrix of all form, spiritual and material. It is here that the levels of heaven and hell are made sensible to the inner vision. The Shaykh insists on the reality of these realms as they are depicted in the Qurʾan.

Then he engages in a popular rhetorical device he had made good use of in earlier works: “Question and answer” (*suʾāl wa-jawāb*). This abstruse exchange between the author and his unnamed interlocutor – who alludes to rather than explains his meaning clearly – serves to heighten the narrative’s drama.⁹¹ Used with unequaled power by the tenth-century Sufi al-Niffarī to describe the ineffable dialogue between the servant and God,⁹² his Andalusian admirer finds the opportunity to engage in riddled speech with the divine aspect of his being. In a speech that recalls Job’s Interlocutor from the Whirlwind, this alter ego, who both is and is not the author, both is and is not the Real, seems to be seeking to cut the author down to size: Where were you when I created the world and the spiritual realities?

91. For a discussion of this term in Persian poetry, see Schimmel, *Two-Colored Brocade*, p. 44.

92. See al-Niffarī’s *Mawāqif and Mukhāṭabāt*.

The truth demanded by the station demands that the servant realize his utter nonentity with respect to the transcendent and all-powerful God.

Seeking deliverance from the sea of matter, he is transformed into a more subtle form, which, despite its station, is still connected to the material world and at some remove from the One Reality. At the point where he leaves his Burāq – just as the Prophet dismounted and tied his steed to a post at the Masjid al-Aqṣā – we know that the author has begun his upward ascent. In a state of oscillation, like a lamp set swinging to celestial music, that brings to mind the poems at the beginning of the treatise, he realizes that he is still within the world of form, spiritual though it may be. What he longs for is annihilation in annihilation (*al-fanā' fī al-fanā'*), and the state of *baqā'*, subsistence, where all of the servant's faculties are realized to be, in truth, God's.⁹³ When asked by his interlocutor where he is, whether established in this world or in the Essence, he can only answer in dualities and then invoke the prophets who are the guardians of the seven heavens through which he passes, high to low: Abraham, Moses, Aaron, Idrīs, Joseph, Jesus, and Adam.⁹⁴ Despite what he acquires from the prophets, all of this pertains to the created world, not to the Essence itself. It seems that there is no escape on any level from his essential creatureliness.

The conversation that follows seeks to define the relationship between the Real and creation (*ḥaqq* and *khalq*). It culminates in the realization that, as God says in the aforementioned Prophetic tradition: "I am his hearing through which he hears, his eyesight through which he sees, his hand through which he holds, and his

93. For these technical terms, so vital in understanding Ibn 'Arabī's ideas concerning the possibility of union between the Real and the servant, see *Fut.* II, Chaps 220 and 221 and his short treatise *Kitāb al-fanā' fī al-mushāhada* (Arabic, pp. 11–18; French trans., see especially pp. 40–1 and Vâlsan's commentary, especially pp. 27–33; English trans. p. 6, and Hirtenstein and Shamash's notes, p. 15, n.11).

94. These are the prophets traditionally encountered in the mystical ascent. See *Fut.* II, Chap. 167, *Fut.* III, Chap. 367; *Kitāb al-isfār*; and *Risālat al-anwār*, in which the prophets are not mentioned but merely suggested (see Chodkiewicz's excellent commentary concerning this, *Seal of the Saints*, pp. 147–73).

foot through which he walks.” The servant now knows the meaning of *ittiḥād* as the coincidence of opposites – relative and absolute – in one locus, the Perfect Human Being: “Insofar as he manifests the Divine Attributes through his positive qualities, Man finds himself with God in a relation of similitude, but insofar as being is concerned, the difference is absolute, for Being (*al-wujūd*) belongs only to God.”⁹⁵

At this point, the Universal Tree and the Four Birds are revealed – an echo of the Prophet’s arrival at the Lote Tree of the Limit.⁹⁶ Each of the fantastic creatures, imaginatively conceived representations of the Perfect Human Being’s own faculties, addresses him both with an elegant speech in *saj’* and a poem.

Soliloquies of the Universal Tree and the Four Birds

The Universal Tree (*al-shajara al-kullī*)

If you ask: What is the Tree?, we answer: [It is] the Perfect Human Being who governs the bodily temple (*haykal*) of the Crow.⁹⁷

The first to address the author is the Universal Tree, otherwise known as the “human tree”, for it symbolizes the Human Being writ large, the archetypal “Perfect Human Being”, exemplified by such individuals as the Prophet Muḥammad, who reflect the totality of the Divine Names and Attributes in a synthetic form.

The Universal Tree is found in many of the world’s traditions, symbol of life eternal. Positioned as the central axis of the cosmos, it serves as a pivotal point around which creation revolves.⁹⁸

95. Gril, *Arbre*, p. 11.

96. Q. 53: 14–16.

97. *Fut.* II. 31, Chap. 73.

Significant trees are found in numerous places in the Qur'an, including: the "goodly tree" (Q. 14:24–5); the "green tree" (Q. 36:80); Adam's Tree of Immortality (Q. 20:12); Moses' Burning Bush (Q. 28:30); the desiccated palm tree that Mary shook to provide her with dates (Q. 19:25); the tree underneath which the believers swore allegiance to Muḥammad (Q. 48:18); the Lote Tree of the Limit (Q. 53:14); the "Blessed Olive Tree" (Q. 24:35); and, on a far less pleasing note, the "Accursed Tree" (Q. 17:60), the Tree of Zaqqūm, "a torment for wrongdoers" (see Q. 37:62–8) and "the food of the sinner" (see Q. 44:43–6). Prophetic reports give us the Ṭūbā tree, planted by God in the Garden of Paradise with His hand⁹⁹ and the tree in which Muḥammad and the angel Gabriel nested during one of the Prophet's Night Journeys.¹⁰⁰

Ibn 'Arabī's works are also replete with trees. In the *Futūḥāt*, for example, all of the prominent trees mentioned in the Qur'an and hadith are discussed and interpreted, some at great length.¹⁰¹ Man himself, at one point, is called a tree.¹⁰²

In a work once ascribed to Ibn 'Arabī, entitled *Shajarat al-kawn*, or the Universal Tree,¹⁰³ this symbol is extended and described in detail. The axial trunk of the cosmic Tree splits into two branches¹⁰⁴ that represent the multifarious opposing qualities manifesting in all

98. See Eliade, *Sacred and Profane*, especially pp.32–42, for a discussion of the symbolism of the central pole or cosmic tree. See also Philpot, *Sacred Tree*.

99. See Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad* III, 71. According to some traditions, the Ṭūbā tree is situated at the top of Mount Qāf, is associated in some way with Mount Sinai, and is made of green light. Its height is said to reach the sun. See Gloton, *L'Arbre du monde*, p.132.

100. See *Fut.* III. 3; III. 214; III. 554.

101. See, in particular, his extensive discussion of the Ṭūbā tree in *Fut.* III. 433, Chap. 371.

102. See *Fut.* III. 137ff., Chap. 336.

103. See Jeffery, "Ibn 'Arabī's *Shajarat al-kawn*"; Gloton, *L'Arbre du monde*. According to Chodkiewicz (*Ocean without Shore*, pp. 143–4, n. 13), the recent research of Y. A. Mdaghri has shown this work to be by 'Abd al-Salām b. Aḥmad b. Ghānim al-Maqdisī (d. 1280).

104. Note that in *Fut.* III. 315 the boughs of the tree of existence represent the Divine Names, and its fruit represents human beings.

of creation: male/female; active/passive; Pen/Tablet; and so forth. Thus a ternary structure consisting of right-hand branch, left-hand branch, and central axis can be imagined. When leaves, symbolizing the myriad and ever-renewed forms of creation, are generated, a fourth element results, and a circle, encompassing this cruciform structure, comes into view. Quaternity embraces such notions as the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth, and four temperaments: hot, cold, dry, and wet – the basic building blocks and qualities of the embodied world. In our treatise, in keeping with this quaternity, Ibn ‘Arabī has placed four birds among the branches, representing the four-fold structure of the cosmos.

In Ibn ‘Arabī’s mapping of correspondences, the Universal Tree finds its human counterpart in the *Quṭb*, or Spiritual Pole, who anchors the coincidentia oppositorum and balances creation. “The Pole is the point round which everything turns – hence another symbol of the [S]elf”.¹⁰⁵ Were he to disappear, the cosmos would dissolve into chaos. Mircea Eliade has noted, in his studies of symbols of sacred space,¹⁰⁶ that whatever is privileged with centrality – be it mountain, city, or tree – provides a threshold between heaven and earth. The human representative of this mediation, the Pole, serves the same function in Ibn ‘Arabī’s writings, and is thus considered a *barzakhī*, or liminal figure.

In the *Ittiḥād*, the Tree is described as the Likeness, that is, the likeness of the Real, “whose root is firm and whose branches are in the heavens”.¹⁰⁷ The likeness of the Tree / Perfect Human Being consists of its being modelled “upon the form” of the Divinity, hence it has both unity – represented by the well-rooted trunk – and multiplicity, reflected in the appearance of its branches, leaves, and fruits, as well as in its very name itself. One of the meanings of the Arabic root *SH-Ḥ-R* is “difference in opinion, dispute”.¹⁰⁸ This is alluded to

105. Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, p. 183.

106. See Eliade, *Sacred and Profane*, Chap. 1; Eliade, *Images and Symbols*, Chap. 1.

107. Q.14:24.

108. See Q.4:65. Ibn ‘Arabī’s chapter on Shu‘ayb in the *Fuṣūṣ* is particularly eloquent on this theme. Shu‘ayb’s name suggests branching (*tasha‘ub*), hence the

in the *Futūḥāt*, where the Shaykh states: “[God] made [man] a tree in which there is contentiousness (*tashājur*), because of his being created from contraries.”¹⁰⁹

The Perfect Human Being is a copy (*nuskha*) of the divine, a synthesis of all the Divine Names and Attributes, and a heart¹¹⁰ capable of assuming any form.¹¹¹ Like the Ṭūbā tree, the Universal Tree is planted with God’s own hand in the “where”-less place in the centre of the cosmos.

The Universal Tree’s Poem

The Tree’s poem consists of but five lines, in the metre *wāfir*. Its end rhyme is appropriately *hamza*, the first pronounced letter of the Arabic alphabet. In the majestic sway of the Tree’s recitation, the themes of straightness, balance, all-encompassment, and non-delimitation by form are reiterated.

The Ringdove (*al-muṭawwaqa al-warqā*)

The Dove is the Soul that is between Nature and the Intellect.¹¹²

The dove is the universally recognized symbol of peace and universal love. In alchemy, as in Christian iconography, the dove represents pneuma, or spirit.

The Ringdove is more often called *ḥamāma* in Arabic literature, but her name here is *muṭawwaqa warqā*. What do we make of this less common appellation given to her by Ibn ‘Arabī? Again we must look to etymology. The consonantal root *Ṭ-W-Q* is connected with rings.

chapter concentrates on the ability of the fluctuating heart of the believer both to embrace its Lord in every aspect and to accommodate any form of belief.

109. *Fut.* III. 137, Chap. 336.

110. “The Real can only be embraced by the heart.” *Fut.* I. 289, Chap. 58; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 112.

111. See *Tarjumān*, Poem XI.

112. *Fut.* II. 130, Chap. 73, Question 153.

The Ringdove is famous for her fidelity. Because of her dark neck-ring (*ṭawq*), she is faithfully bound forever to her mate.¹¹³ Despite her devotion, she is a weak bird and can be easily seized by birds of prey, such as the eagle, just as the heart can be seized by love.¹¹⁴ *Muṭawwaqa* (ringed) is a passive participle, hence a receptacle of action. The Ringdove is something ringed by an agent, in this case the Eagle. The ring encircling the dove's neck is sometimes interpreted by Ibn 'Arabī as the covenant entrusted to her by the Real.¹¹⁵

What first comes to mind from the root *W-R-Q* is "leaves" or "paper", in other words, something that is written upon. Since the Ringdove in Ibn 'Arabī's mystical aviary represents the Tablet (*lawḥ*) that receives the writing of the Supreme Pen (the Eagle), this is appropriate. Ibn 'Arabī himself makes a connection between the Ringdove and leaves in Poem IX of his *Tarjumān al-ashwāq*: "A ringdove flitted past and a twig put forth leaves (*awraqa*)."¹¹⁶ *Warqā* also means silver, a metal that suggests the shimmering of the moon and the reflection of the sun's superior light. *Ḥamāma*, on the other hand, is associated with the root *Ḥ-M-M*, hence with the colour red and with heat.¹¹⁷

The Ringdove is a messenger bird. In Ibn 'Arabī's writings, doves are sometimes seen as bearers of inspiration. In Poem XXX of the *Tarjumān*, for instance, doves – here called *ḥamām* – bring inspiration so overwhelming that their song causes the poet to become unconscious.¹¹⁸ Ibn 'Arabī obligingly interprets doves here as "spirits of the intermediate world, the bearers of the inspiration that comes at the tinkling sound, which is like the noise of a chain when it strikes a rock. They cause this heart to vanish, even as they themselves vanish on hearing that sound."¹¹⁹

113. See Ibn Ḥazm, *Ṭawq al-ḥamāma*.

114. Schimmel, *Two-Colored Brocade*, p. 184.

115. *Tarjumān*, p. 73.

116. *Tarjumān*, pp. 18 (Arabic), 64; Sells, *Stations of Desire*, p. 67; Giese, *Ibn 'Arabī: Urwolke und Welt*, p. 240.

117. Stetkevych, "Toward an Arabic Lexicon", pp. 103–4.

118. *Tarjumān*, pp. 33 (Arabic), 112, 116 (commentary).

The Ringdove – when not seen with her loving partner – is more often than not found moaning and lamenting her loneliness. Poem XIII of the *Tarjūmān*, in fact, makes reference to a ringdove who has lost her child – her unity (*waḥdāniyya*) as the Shaykh interprets it: “the special quality which distinguishes her from all things else ...whereby she knows the unity of Him who brought her into being. The loss of it consists in her not knowing what it is and in its not being plainly discerned by her.”¹²⁰

Another symbol represented by the ringdove is Jesus, the symbol of the universal spirit breathed into the human form.¹²¹ He, in turn, breathes life into the dead and the clay birds.

The Ringdove in philosophical terms is the Universal Soul.¹²² It is also occasionally called the Spirit (*rūḥ*) blown into forms, the first among existing things to come into existence through being sent forth (*inbi‘āth*), and the first existent whose existence is the effect of a created being, a cause – that is, the First Intellect, which, in turn, was brought into existence by the Divine Command.¹²³ The Universal Soul is thus passive in relation to the Intellect, just as the Intellect is passive in relation to the Real, and in this way is somewhat akin to matter’s reception of form.

The Soul, while it enjoys a high rank, occupies a subordinate level to the Intellect because of its duality, a fact that is reiterated throughout the Ringdove’s speech and poem. It has, for example, two “causes” or, as they are called in the *Ittiḥād*, “subtle threads” (*raqā’iq*).¹²⁴ One is the “special face” that is turned toward God,¹²⁵

119. Ibid., p. 116. The sound described here is a reference to the sound accompanying the descent of prophecy that the Prophet found most unendurable.

120. Ibid., p. 73. See also Sells, *Stations of Desire*, p. 105, and Giese, *Ibn ‘Arabī*, p. 253.

121. See *Tarjūmān*, p. 73, commentary on Poem XIII.

122. For the Ringdove as Universal Soul in Ibn ‘Arabī’s poetry, see *Tarjūmān*, p. 64, commentary on Poem IX.

123. See *Fut.* II. 427, Chap. 198, section 12.

124. On *raqā’iq* and their relation to “faces” see *Fut.* III. 260, Chap. 357:

Between these high celestial forms and the low elemental forms extend tenuous (*raqā’iq*) that belong to the divine names and the lordly realities. These are the specific faces belonging to each possible thing that has proceeded from

which, in philosophical terms, is the efficient cause of the Soul's existence. The other "face" is turned toward the First Intellect, which is the secondary cause (*sabab*) or, philosophically speaking, the formal cause, of its existence.

The Soul contains the attributes of both knowledge (*'ilm*) and effectiveness (*'amal*).¹²⁶ Its effective attribute brings the forms of the cosmos into existence: sensory forms – which are bodies and their sensible accidents – and supra-sensible forms – which are various sciences, knowledges, and desires pertaining to these bodies.¹²⁷ Its attribute of knowledge is called "a father, for it produces an effect, while the attribute related to action is a mother, for it is the object of an effect";¹²⁸ that is, it is because the Soul has received all that exists in its undifferentiated state that it can generate it in differentiated form.

Duality also pervades the Soul in terms Ibn 'Arabī describes as light and darkness, again sometimes related to the notion of "face". The light face is turned toward the Intellect, from which it receives light like the moon from the sun; the dark face is turned toward the material world.¹²⁹

In theological terms, the Ringdove is equivalent to the Preserved,

Him – from the word *Be* through the divine face-turning (*tawajjuh*) of desire. The occasioned thing does not know the specific face belonging to anything else, even though he has a specific face in himself, whether or not he knows it.

From this face everything is poor toward God, not toward its engendered occasion (*sabab*). This is the divine occasion that is nearer than the engendered occasion, for the engendered occasion is separate from the creature, but this occasion is qualified neither by separation from it nor by a proximate joining, even if, in the case of the human being it is *nearer than the jugular vein* (Q. 50: 16) – so its nearness is nearer than that.

Trans. Chittick, *SDG*, p. 143. See also *Fut.* III. 28ff., Chap. 307, where the *raqā'iq* are described as forming a cosmic chain, or ladder, of reciprocal interactions, stemming from God to Intellect to Soul and beyond.

125. See *Fut.* I. 428.

126. See *Fut.* I, Chap. 7.

127. See *Fut.* I, Chap. 11.

128. *Fut.* I. 140, Chap. 11.

129. See *'Uqlat al-mustawfiz*, p. 56.

or Inscribed Tablet, hence the notion of materiality is continued. The Tablet contains everything that the Pen writes upon it in detailed form, everything that God wills concerning creation until the Day of Resurrection.¹³⁰

The Ringdove is also the equivalent of Eve, who is born from the sleeping Adam, “as if the intellect had not become aware of its creative power”.¹³¹ It is only when the receptive female element becomes manifest that the active male element is able to contemplate most perfectly its own ability to know and act in this mirror that both is and is not itself.¹³²

The Ringdove’s Poem

Although we might expect the Eagle to address us first because of his precedent rank, he does not. Instead it is the Ringdove who regales us from her perch on the Tree with nineteen lines of poetry, whose end rhyme is *-ānī (ī)*. This is a fitting end rhyme for a creature whose poem both manifestly and subtly alludes to duality and doubling. First of all, there are four words in the first three lines, and an additional one in the twelfth, that are based on the consonantal root *TH-N-Y*, whose basic meaning is “two”. Another meaning of this root has to do with praise. The word *mathnā*, and its variant spelling *mathnah*, the plural of which in both instances is *mathānin*, is replete with symbolism, combining notions of repetition and praise. In particular we should note that *al-mathānī* can signify: (1) The Qur’an altogether, since it contains repeated mentions of certain dyads, such as reward and punishment, mercy and wrath; also that one reads it repeatedly without becoming weary. (2) The opening sura of the Qur’an, the Fātiḥa, which is repeated in every ritual prayer and at the beginning of the recitation of every Qur’anic verse, or because it contains praise of God. The Fātiḥa is often called, in fact, the

130. See *Fut.* I, Chap. 11.

131. Gril, *Arbre*, p. 13.

132. *Ibid.*, p. 14. This is best explained by the Shaykh in his chapter on Muḥammad in the *Fuṣūṣ*.

“seven doubled ones” (*al-sab‘ al-mathānī*).¹³³ (3) Qur’anic verses that are repeated often – especially the Fātiḥa – in order to avert evil.¹³⁴ The Ringdove, as a symbol of the Umm al-Kitāb, or heavenly prototype of the Qur’an, inscribed by the Supreme Pen, thus aptly names herself as the “doubled one”.

An additional doubling is fortuitously found in the Ringdove’s own name: *al-muṭawwaqa al-warqā*. The first part contains a doubled *wāw* and the second a *qāf* with two dots!

The Ringdove continues to allude to the notion of duality as she remarks: “They call me ‘O second!’” But as she tells us, and as we have already intuited by her preceding the Eagle in her address, she is not in actuality the second. As Ibn ‘Arabī explains elsewhere, the four spiritual beings: Intellect, Soul, Prime Matter, and Body, represented here by the four birds, in one sense occupy one rank.

Additional – less obvious – allusions to duality appear in the end rhyme of the poem itself: the suffix *-ān* in Arabic is a mark of the dual. Furthermore, the Ringdove has a penchant for repeating certain roots. Besides the five instances of words derived from *TH-N-Y*, there are two derived from *‘-N-Y* (meaning), three derived from its permutation *‘-Y-N*, and two from a closely related root *‘-W-N*. There are two derived from *‘-L-Y* (high) along with three from the closely related *W-L-Y* (friend). Then there are two derived from *D-N-N* (earthen jug), along with three from its close relative *D-N-W* (near, low). Finally, there are three from *Q-Ṣ-W* (far).

The Ringdove makes repeated references to things high and low, near and far. As we have mentioned above, she is connected to the Eagle and to her Lord by “subtle threads” (*raqā’iq*) that connect level to level in the hierarchy of existence.

133. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 1, p. 360, s.v. *mathnā*.

134. Steingass, *Persian English Dictionary*, p. 1172.

The Eagle (*‘uqāb*)

If you ask: What is the Eagle?, we answer: [It is] the Divine Spirit which the Real breathed into the bodily temples as if they were their moving and quiescent spirits.¹³⁵

Eagles have long been connected with royalty and temporal power. The most regal of the birds of prey, they are known for their dizzying ascents and swooping descents, lingering on earth just long enough to grasp the unsuspecting field mouse. They have a reputation for inaccessibility, living in mountain eyries. Their vision is so powerful and acute that they are said to be able to look at the sun without blinking.

In alchemy, the Eagle, especially the double-eagle, is a symbol – along with the raven – for Mercurius, the double-natured symbol of the philosopher’s stone. The Eagle is “synonymous with phoenix, vulture, raven”.¹³⁶

Why does Ibn ‘Arabī call the Eagle *‘uqāb* rather than the more common *nasr*? Etymology may have something to do with it. The consonantal root *‘-Q-B* has a semantic range that includes: heel, coming after, following, taking one’s place (as, for example, a vicegerent), punishment, consequence, result of an action, time or state of subsequence, recompense, offspring, mountain road, retaliation, sinews, and tendons. It is also described in ancient sources as a rock or mass of stone protruding in the side of a mountain like a stair or series of stairs. From this derives the meaning of *‘aqaba* as a place that is difficult to ascend. The root also has the meaning of a “chief” or a “lord”. The Eagle plays the role of a grand old shaykh. He is Adam as first vicegerent of God (*khalīfa*).

The word *‘uqāb* is also associated with the Prophet Muḥammad. First of all, it was his standard or banner, to which rallied his supporters for battle. Secondly, the Prophet assigned the name “al-‘Āqib” to

135. *Fut.* II. 130, Chap. 73, Question 153.

136. Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, p. 202.

himself because he came after the other prophets and was the last of the prophets.

In philosophical terms, the Eagle is the First Intellect. The Prophet is reported to have said: "The first thing that God created was the Intellect."¹³⁷ It came into existence from nothing (*ma'wjud al-ibdā'ī*), meaning directly from God without intermediary or secondary cause.

The Essential Attribute connected to the Intellect is Life.¹³⁸ The Intellect is also compared to Light from which all other lights, that is, intellects, are kindled.¹³⁹ As such, it is analogous to the primordial Muḥammadan Light of prophecy, from which all prophets throughout time drew their derivative light.

In theological terms specific to Islam, the Eagle is the Supreme Pen. It is created from the Breath, which Ibn 'Arabī in places equates with the Cloud. Ibn 'Arabī describes the Intellect as "the bearer (*ḥāmil*) of everything that is known, high and low ... which takes from God without intermediary".¹⁴⁰ It receives the dictation of all that is to be in summary form and inscribes it on the Tablet, which preserves it in detailed form.

The Eagle's Poem

The Eagle recites ten lines in *kāmil* (meaning: "perfect") metre, whose end rhyme is *'ayn*. The Eagle's poem expresses well the Intellect's high role in the hierarchy of existence. A subtext of the verse is the Qur'anic story of Adam's creation (Q.2:30–9) as God's vicegerent on the earth. When God announced His plans, the angels were dismayed: "Wilt Thou place therein one who will do harm therein and shed blood?" (Q.2:30). Thus the lines: "Approach confers upon me a pleasing wisdom but it rends the heart of the elevated spirit." What the angels did not know was that Adam was created

137. According to a similar hadith: "The first thing that God created was the Pen."

138. See *Fut.* I. 293.

139. See *Fut.* II. 66–7, Chap. 73, Question 39.

140. *Fut.* I. 92, Chap. 3.

“upon His form”, as a perfect reflection of his Creator. Moulded with two hands, he encompassed more of the Divinity than the angels could, as they were created only to praise and obey. As vicegerent, the Intellect/Adam was taught “all the names” – whether these are thought of as the Divine Names or the names of everything in creation: “The realities hurry toward me to seek their portion”, that is, their names. It was because of this all-encompassing knowledge that the angels – with the exception of Satan – realized Adam’s superiority and obeyed God’s command to prostrate themselves before Adam.

The poem plays with the ideas of closeness and distance, approach and retreat. As in the story of Adam, it is the Intellect’s disobedience and setting itself up as independent arbiter that causes distance from the Real, while realizing its servanthood and utter dependence is what brings it near.

The ‘*Anqā*’

If you ask: What is the ‘*Anqā*’?, we answer: [It is] the Dust (*habā*’), which is neither existent nor non-existent, although it assumes form in the vision-event.¹⁴¹

The ‘*Anqā*’ is the Dust in which God reveals/opens (*fataḥa*) the bodies of the world.¹⁴²

The ‘*anqā*’, sometimes translated into English as either gryphon or phoenix, is a mythical bird. Early Arabic lexicographers struggled to define this creature none had ever seen. It is said to be perhaps a kind of eagle (‘*uqāb*’) or vulture (*rakḥama*) or a crested black bird or one that is bald and has a long yellow beak.¹⁴³ Sometimes those seeking an etymological connection describe it as long-necked (‘*unuq*’ in

141. *Fut.* II. 130, Chap. 73, Question 153.

142. *Al-Iṣṭilāḥāt*, p. 310.

143. Kopf, “The Bird ‘*Anūq*’”, p. 125. For other descriptions of the ‘*anqā*’ under its various guises as phoenix, gryphon, and so forth, see Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood*, pp. 184–5.

Arabic means “neck”). The form ‘*anūq*’, according to the lexicographers, is either male or female, singular or plural, but the form ‘*anqā*’ is feminine. The ‘*anqā*’ is said to live atop the inaccessible Mount Qāf. Sometimes her high mountain habitat itself is called ‘*anqā*’.¹⁴⁴

Many proverbs exist concerning this odd bird, and from the beginning it was associated with all that was marvellous, occult, and strange. “Rarer than the eggs of the ‘*anūq*’”¹⁴⁵ was one such proverb, and the Turkish *ismi var cismi yok* – it has a name but not a body – came to symbolize “everything that exists only in the imagination”.¹⁴⁶

The ‘*anqā*’ has certain similarities to another fanciful female bird, the *simurgh*, described as “the manifestation of spiritual reality”.¹⁴⁷ The *simurgh* is the object of the birds’ quest in ‘Aṭṭār’s famous parable. The ‘*anqā*’ and the *simurgh* find a felicitous pairing in the avian symbolism of a follower of Rūzbihān Baqlī: “These are the places of the descent of the *Sīmurgh* of the spirit ... [and] the ascent of the ‘*Anqā*’ of the heart.”¹⁴⁸

The phoenix plays a major role in alchemical texts, in which the very alchemical process is said to begin in chaos and end in the birth of the phoenix, or philosopher’s stone.¹⁴⁹

In Ibn ‘Arabī’s symbology, as we have discovered, etymology provides a rich mine to explore. In the case of the “Strange ‘*Anqā*’” (‘*anqā*’ *mughrib*, or sometimes *mugharrib*), the consonantal root *GH-R-B* conveys the following semantic range: distance, removal, exile, foreignness, hiddenness, the setting sun, west, strangeness, improbability, obscurity, and incomprehensibility.

It is also connected with the quality of blackness. For instance, it is a certain intensely black grape, and intensely black hair.¹⁵⁰ Note that both the ‘*Anqā*’ and her son the Crow (*ghurāb*) are connected

144. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 5, p. 2177, s.v. *a’naq*.

145. Kopf, “The Bird ‘*Anūq*”, p. 125.

146. Schimmel, *Two-Colored Brocade*, p. 188.

147. Ibid.

148. See Ernst, “The Symbolism of Birds and Flight”, p. 366.

149. Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, p. 202.

150. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 5, p. 2177, s.v. *a’naq*.

with this root, the *‘Anqā’* primarily with connotations of hiddenness and strangeness, while the *Ghurāb*, as we shall see, is primarily associated with distance and blackness. It was no doubt quite intentional, on Ibn ‘Arabī’s part, to choose his four birds with an eye to the symbolic gradations of light. The Eagle, as we have seen, is pure light; the Ringdove, a mixture of light and darkness, with light predominating; the *‘Anqā’*, an ambiguous twilight, tending toward dark; and the Crow, jet-black midnight.

On the negative side, the term *‘anqā’ mughrīb* is also connected to the notion of calamity or misfortune. The expression *ṭārat bihi ‘anqā’ mughrīb* means: calamity or misfortune carried him away.¹⁵¹ Moreover, the early animal encyclopaedists did not hesitate to put the *‘anūq* in the category of dung-eaters.¹⁵² In a similarly negative vein, the *‘anqā’* was sometimes associated with the jinn. In a tradition, *inna fī-kum mugharribīn* means: “Among you are those in whom the jinn have a partnership or share” because of their coming from remote or foreign stock.¹⁵³

Because among its meanings is “west”, it is also associated both with the geographical west, that is, the Maghreb, where Ibn ‘Arabī spent much of his youth, and the spiritual meaning of “west” as esoteric knowledge. This contrasts with the Illuminationist school, founded by the martyred Suhrawardī, which saw the west as the dark realm of the body and the east as the source of spiritual knowledge and light. In Ibn ‘Arabī’s early work *‘Anqā’ mughrīb*, the narrator alludes cryptically to the Seal of the Saints, Jesus, both as the *‘anqā’ mughrīb* and as the Sun which, according to Islamic tradition, will rise in the west at the end of time.

There is an obvious parallel between the Phoenix (often the translation of choice for *‘anqā’*) and Khālīd, both of whom are connected with fire, death, and resurrection.¹⁵⁴ Here is ‘Aṭṭar on the Phoenix:

151. Ibid.

152. Kopf, “The Bird ‘Anūq”, p. 129.

153. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Part 5, p. 2177, s.v. *a’naq*.

154. Another reference to the story of Khālīd and the fiery *‘Anqā’* may be found in Ibn ‘Arabī’s *‘Anqā’ mughrīb*. See Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood*, pp. 481–2.

The Phoenix is an admirable and lovely bird which lives in Hindustan. It has no mate and lives alone. ... The Phoenix lives about a thousand years and he knows exactly the day of his death. When his time comes he gathers round him a quantity of palm leaves and, distraught among the leaves, utters plaintive cries. ... His lamentations express the sorrow of death, and he trembles like a leaf. At the sound of his trumpet the birds and the beasts draw near to assist the spectacle. Now they fall into bewilderment, and many die because their strength fails them. While the Phoenix still has breath, he beats his wings and ruffles his feathers, and by this produces fire. The fire spreads to the palm fronds, and soon both the fronds and the bird are reduced to living coals and then to ashes. But when the last spark has flickered out a new small Phoenix arises from the ashes.¹⁵⁵

In philosophical parlance, the '*Anqā*' is a metonym for the Greek notion of *hylē* (Arabic: *hayūlā*), or prime matter,¹⁵⁶ which Ibn 'Arabī, citing precedent in the Qur'an,¹⁵⁷ 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, and the Sufi Sahl al-Tustarī (d.896),¹⁵⁸ generally prefers to call Dust (*habā*'). In its original meaning, *habā*' was the dust particles that dance in the rays of the sun. Appropriated by Arabic alchemists such as Jābir, *habā*' was seen as the constitution of the material world in formation.¹⁵⁹ Associated with the sheer potentiality¹⁶⁰ and the female principle

155. 'Aṭṭār, *Manṭiq al-ṭayr*, pp.66–7.

156. The Greek philosophers discussed prime matter extensively, basing their doctrines on Aristotle's writings on material cause, Plato's notions of the receptacle, or a combination of the two. It is primarily this hybrid doctrine that penetrated the Islamic milieu through the late Hellenistic Neoplatonic commentary tradition.

157. See *Fut.* I. 122, Chap. 7. "It was scattered dust" (Q. 56:6).

158. See *Fut.* I. 119, Chap. 6. For Sahl, the Muḥammadan Light was akin to *habā*' in that it was shaped by God from His own Light. See Böwering, *Mystical Vision of Existence*, p. 150.

159. See Kraus, *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān*, p. 142 and his long note concerning *habā*' on p. 154, n. 6.

160. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1a.76.7; *Summa contra Gentiles* I, Chap. 43; II, Chap. 96; III, Chap. 6.

– hence the feminine gender of the ‘*Anqā*’ in the *Ittiḥād* – prime matter is capable of taking on any form and as such is the matrix and ground for the universe.

The notion of prime matter is a particularly difficult one to grasp, especially since the term “matter” in modern terms suggests the stuff of reality that we can physically sense and grasp. But prime matter is nothing of this sort. As the Ikhwān al-Ṣāfā’ (Brethren of Purity) write, “It is a simple intelligible substance that cannot be perceived by sense.”¹⁶¹ It is completely dimensionless, unquantifiable, and devoid of actual content, while containing at the same time the potential forms of all existence. As such, even understanding it becomes impossible. One is left only with knowledge of its name and the faculty of imagination, which is its domain, to give it form.

The origin of this Dust, according to Ibn ‘Arabī, is God’s desire to bring the cosmos into existence and His theophany “in the Universal Reality¹⁶² – a reality called Dust”.¹⁶³ The Shaykh compares it to the plaster with which a builder moulds whatever forms he wishes. God manifests Himself as Light to the Dust, and every thing existing in potentia in this Dust receives His light according to its particular predisposition, “as the corners of a room receive the light of a torch, and are more fully and brightly lit up the nearer they are to the torch”.¹⁶⁴

Habā’, says Ibn ‘Arabī, is present in all natural forms, and cannot be divided, separated, or decreased. He compares it to the whiteness that can be perceived in every white thing.¹⁶⁵ In this it appears to be equivalent to the philosophical universal accident that has no reality save when it manifests in an underlying subject or substance. Another example, given in the *Futūḥāt*, makes this even clearer. Knowledge, says the Shaykh, in itself is neither eternal nor temporal. In

161. *Rasā’il*, II, p. 6.

162. Universal Reality is synonymous with Reality of Realities (*ḥaqīqat al-ḥaqā’iq*). For more on the relationship between these terms and the ‘*Anqā*’, see below, p. 107.

163. *Fut.* I. 119, Chap. 6.

164. *Fut.* I. 119, Chap. 6; trans. Chodkiewicz, *Seal of the Saints*, p. 68.

165. *Fut.* I. 122, Chap. 7.

the Eternal One, knowledge is eternal; in the creature, knowledge is temporally originated. "In every essence it accords with its own reality and entity. But it has no existential entity except the entity of that which it describes. So it remains in its root: an intelligible thing, not an existent thing."¹⁶⁶

Hayūlā, moreover, is not only associated with cosmology and epistemology but is also used in connection with the Perfect Human Being. For example, Ibn 'Arabī tells the reader in his *Fuṣūṣ*, "Be the *hayūlā* of all the doctrinal beliefs",¹⁶⁷ meaning: Do not limit yourself to any particular Face that God shows to the believers, for they are infinite. It is to this all-encompassment that he refers when he says in what is perhaps his most memorable lines of verse: "My heart has become capable of every form: it is a pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian monks, / And a temple for idols and the pilgrim's Ka'ba and the tables of the Tora and the book of the Koran."¹⁶⁸

In his *Dīwān*, the Shaykh composed a poem to the '*Anqā*', which we give here in full as it expresses so well the nature of this strange creature:

I marvel at a being that comprises every form,
Whether of essential angels, jinn, or humankind;
Whether of this world or of the world-supernal,
Of animal, vegetable, or mineral.
These are naught beside it,
Nor yet are they its essence,
But in any form it wills, it manifests itself.
It is what appears, by definition, to perception,
Yet it is what remains veiled from conception.
For minds cannot know it by the force of their thinking,
But Imagination makes it manifest to sense.
It is the Living, although no life supports its Essence

166. *Fut.* II. 432, Chap. 198, Section 14; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 139.

167. *Fuṣūṣ*, I. 113; Austin, *Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 137.

168. *Tarjumān*, pp. 19 (Arabic), 67.

In the way that all the forms subsist in [life].
Inform me then, who it may be that I have indicated
In what we have described (and cast aside conceptions):
There it is – concealed, but without being absent;
And there, again, envisaged, but hidden from vision!
I would like to know: Of the likes of it have you
Ever heard or no? – Inform me, then, who is it?
But no one knows what we have adduced here
Except for One, and that is God.
No creature can ever comprehend it.
None there is like unto it, except one personage:
I marvel at the One Perfect that he epitomizes!¹⁶⁹

The ‘Anqā’'s Poem

The ‘*Anqā*’'s poem, like that of the Tree,¹⁷⁰ has but five lines, whose end rhyme is *dāl*, primarily *-ūd* with the exception of the final word of the poem that ends in *-īd*. A long “u”, inserted between the final two consonants of a first-form verb, indicates the passive participle, the recipient of an action, for example *mamdūd*. This participle is particularly apt for the ‘*Anqā*’ who, as a metonym for prime matter, receives all forms.¹⁷¹

169. Trans. Elmore (slightly altered), *Islamic Sainthood*, pp.614–15. He bases his trans. on the 1855 edn. of the *Dīrwān*.

170. It is not by mere chance that the poems of the ‘*Anqā*’ and the Tree are equal in length. The author wants to draw our attention to the ‘*Anqā*’'s similarity to the Tree as Perfect Human Being.

171. For more on the ‘*Anqā*’, see Elmore, *Islamic Sainthood*, pp.184–95.

The Jet-Black Crow (*al-ghurāb*)

If you ask: What is the Crow?, we answer: [It is] the Universal Body, which the Eagle made appear by means of the Dove.¹⁷²

The raven or crow is a bird that is often, perhaps because of its colour, connected with the occult. In alchemical lore, the raven – like the eagle and the phoenix – is one of the symbols for Mercurius, the *lapis philosophorum*.¹⁷³ It is thus associated with everything that is solid, dark, and earthy. It represents the first stage of the alchemical process, *melanosis* or *nigredo*, “either present from the beginning as a quality of the material prima, the chaos or *massa confusa*, or else produced by the separation ... of the elements”.¹⁷⁴ Ibn ‘Arabī appears to be well acquainted with the alchemical art when he has the *Ghurāb* call himself the alembic (*būṭāqa*), an alchemical term. Jung tells us that the alembic’s ideal shape was perfectly round – or sometimes egg-shaped, in imitation of the womb and the heavenly bodies.¹⁷⁵ Universal Body, the *Ghurāb*’s metaphysical reality, is also created round: “The first shape that this body received was the circular shape.”¹⁷⁶

Crows inhabit “the hibernal-material world”¹⁷⁷ and are associated with death and entombment. The *ghurāb* is found in the Qur’an in this connection in the remarkable story of Cain and Abel. Following Cain’s murder of his brother: “Allah sent a raven scratching up the ground, to show him how to hide his brother’s naked corpse. He said: Woe unto me! Am I not able to be as this raven and so hide my brother’s naked corpse? And he became repentant”(Q. 5: 31).

In Arabic literature, the crow or raven – the two are not distinguished – generally has a negative connotation for the reasons we have alluded to above.¹⁷⁸ In Rūmī’s poetry, for example, the crow is

172. *Fut.* II. 130, Chap. 73, Question 153.

173. Jung, *Philosophy and Alchemy*, p. 134.

174. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

175. See *ibid.*, pp. 87, 236.

176. ‘*Uqlat al-mustawfiz*, p. 57.

177. Schimmel, *Triumphal Sun*, p. 118.

considered an ugly and predacious bird, a consumer of carrion and dung. By extension, it is a symbol of those attracted by the material world. It also has a reputation for sharp-sightedness, caution, and pride.

Crows are almost invariably birds of ill-omen. In many a pre-Islamic poem, the *ghurāb al-bayn* – archetypal bird of separation – signals the impending separation of lover and beloved. Ibn ‘Arabī employs the motif of the *ghurāb al-bayn* in his poetry upon occasion. In Poem XV of the *Tarjumān al-ashwāq*, for example, he writes: “Gone, gone, / cawed the crows of separation, / God leave rotting on the path / a crow that caws! // And what are the crows of separation / but camel stallions / pacing hard, / taking those we love away.”¹⁷⁹

In pre-Islamic Arabia, Ghurāb was a personal name which, according to tradition, Muḥammad would not allow the Muslims to keep because of its etymological association with separation from one’s homeland (*ghurba*) and its natural association with the foul carrion-eating bird.

In philosophical terms, the Jet-Black Crow represents Universal Body. Universal Body is sometimes known as “Second Matter”,¹⁸⁰ the first metaphysical step to concrete existence.¹⁸¹ It is absolute, unqualified body which, because it receives effects from Nature in the form of the four elements, is the first natural form.¹⁸² Unlike *hayūlā*,

178. For more on the raven in Arabic literature, see Stetkevych, *Muḥammad and the Golden Bough*, p. 117–18, n. 11.

179. Trans. Sells, *Stations of Desire*, p. 114. Nicholson gives a more prosaic English trans., *Tarjumān*, pp. 21 (Arabic), 76.

180. The designation of Universal Body as “second matter” in Arabic philosophy can be found in the *Rasā’il* of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’ (Vol. III, p. 187): “The First Hyle receives measurements, which are length, width, and depth, and with that it becomes the Absolute Body, which is the Second Hyle.”

181. Philosophical discussions concerning first and second matter began early in Greek philosophy, probably in response to Stoic ideas concerning matter, and lasted well into the Hellenistic period. See de Haas, *John Philoponus’ New Definition*. The Arabic philosophers continued the debate, formulating their own opposing notions. See Hyman, “Aristotle’s ‘First Matter’ and Avicenna’s and Averroes’ ‘Corporeal Form’”.

182. See Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’, *Rasā’il*, II, p. 6. See also Nasr, *Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*, pp. 58–9.

Universal Body is quantifiable and determinate; it has length, width, and depth. A “corporeal sphere”, it “fills the Void”, and “within it every corporeal thing in the cosmos takes shape”.¹⁸³

As Ibn ‘Arabī says in the *‘Uqlat al-mustawfiz*: “The first form that received the form of the body is length, breadth, and depth. ... Its length is from the Intellect, its width from the Soul, and its depth is the space that extends to the centre [of the earth]. For this reason, these three realities were in it, and it was three-dimensional.”¹⁸⁴

The Universal Body is given the shape of a circle, the most perfect of shapes,¹⁸⁵ and it has movement, not from place to place but around its axis, “like a hand-mill”.¹⁸⁶ This movement is caused by heat, for, if the elements of the body were perfectly equilibrated, it would be stationary and there would be no manifestation whatsoever. Thus the series of revolving celestial spheres are the first and finest of the corporeal bodies to come into existence in Universal Body.

Universal Body is associated with fullness (*malā’*) as contrasted to void (*khalā’*), and it is in the Shaykh’s chapter on Retreat (*khalwa*) in the *Futūḥāt* that some of his most intriguing remarks concerning Universal Body can be found. The first thing to fill the void, according to Ibn ‘Arabī, was the dimensionless Dust, a “dark substance”.¹⁸⁷ Then the Real manifested Himself to this substance with His Name the Light, dyeing it and removing from it the darkness of non-existence. It then was attributed with existence and became what the early philosophers called the “Great Man” (*al-insān al-kabīr*), in other words, the macrocosm. The forms of shapes were unfolded within this body: shapes of the celestial spheres, the elements, and all generated beings, the human – called the “Small Man” – constituting the last of them. This human being, created upon the form of

183. Murata, *Tao of Islam*, p.156.

184. *‘Uqlat al-mustawfiz*, pp. 56–7.

185. As Corbin points out (*Temple and Contemplation*, p.216), the circular form should be conceived in terms of function rather than of geometrical shape.

186. *Fut.* II. 433, Chap. 198, Section 14.

187. *Fut.* II. 150, Chap. 78. See also *Fuṣūṣ*, Chap. on Joseph, for the description of the cosmos in its latent form as “shadow” and its relation to the Imagination.

the Real and the cosmos, bringing together every attribute, is God's vicegerent, the Perfect Human Being. Thus, as the Shaykh elegantly puts it, "the Dusty-Substance impregnated with Light is the basic element (*al-basīṭ*), the manifestation of the cosmos in it is the intermediary (*al-wasīṭ*), and the Perfect Human Being is the summary (*al-wajīz*)".¹⁸⁸

In Chapter 198 of the *Futūḥāt*, the Divine Name associated with Universal Body is the Manifest (*al-ẓāhir*), because it is the final outcome of the divine creative process, the complete filling of the void or womb of non-existence with life in all its manifest forms. The prophetic wisdom exemplified by this Name is that of Abraham, who, with his epithet "the Intimate Friend" (*khalīl*) exhibits the complementary qualities of voiding (*khalā'*)¹⁸⁹ of self and filling (*malā'*) with God. Permeated with divine qualities, as light permeates inchoate matter, Abraham becomes the manifest locus of the hidden God: "If ... the creature is considered the manifest and the Reality the Unmanifest within him, then the Reality is in the hearing of the creature, as also in his sight, hand, foot, and all his faculties, as declared in the [well-known] Holy Tradition of the Prophet."¹⁹⁰ To deprecate the material world is thus to fail to witness the fullness of God's Self-disclosure in the manifold vessels of the cosmos and to be ignorant of both oneself and God. "The spirit cannot rationally understand itself without the body, which is the locus of 'how many' and manyness. ... It does not know its humanness without the existence of the body along with it."¹⁹¹

An additional connection between Abraham and the *Ghurāb* should be noted. Corbin has pointed out that the site of the *Maqām Ibrāhīm* (Station of Abraham) is located in the western area of the Ka'ba precinct. Hence, the notions of setting and exile are appropriately

188. *Fut.* II. 151, Chap. 78.

189. *Khulla* (intimate friendship) and *khalā'* (void) are not derived from the same root, but Ibn 'Arabī often makes use of assonant words to draw startling parallels.

190. *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 81; trans. Austin, *Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 92.

191. *Fut.* II. 618, Chap. 282; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 235.

attributed to this archetypal monotheist, who refused to worship what sets, and chose exile over idol worship.¹⁹²

The Jet-Black Crow's Poem

The Jet-Black Crow has twenty lines of verse, whose metre is *ramal* and whose end rhyme is *-ānī*, like the Ringdove's. The world-shunning philosophers have maligned the Body as the source of darkness and evil, but the Crow seeks to set the record straight. As a manifestation of the Divine Name "the Last",¹⁹³ he is the very crown of creation; as a manifestation of the Name "the Manifest" he is the matrix for the corporeal entities of the universe. Although dark himself, he is the source of the myriad sparks of light in that the stars and planets are all derived from Universal Body. His poem thus contains an extended allusion to the Light verse of Sura 24.

Since the cosmos is created upon principles of arithmetic, geometry, and music, all these principles receive their first determination in the Universal Body. For that reason, the Crow rightly calls himself the "foundation of songs".

The Jet-Black Crow, because of his darkness, is a keeper of secrets and a repository of the Trust.¹⁹⁴ The one who can unravel his secret is someone who is also associated with the chthonic realm: Šakhr ibn Sinān, prophet of the *Barzakh*.

192. Corbin, *Temple and Contemplation*, p.231.

193. Note also the connection between the Name "the Last" (*al-Ākhir*) and the next or "last" world (*al-ākhirā*). Many of the secrets of the Crow – archetypal harbinger of death – have to do with the fate of the body after death. In this he is very like the man whose secret he conceals.

194. See *Fut.* II. 647.

Cosmic Marriage¹⁹⁵ and the Genealogy of the Birds

According to Ibn 'Arabī, the entire universe is the locus of marriage and procreation, not only among material beings but in the divine and spiritual realms as well. God, for example, engenders the universe in nothingness when He brings the fixed entities (*al-a'yān al-thābita*) into existence.¹⁹⁶

The Pen and the Tablet are also paired as a cosmic couple:

Between the Pen and the Tablet there is an intelligible spiritual marriage and a visible sensory effect. The effect that was deposited in the Tablet was like the sperm that is ejaculated into the womb of the female. The meanings deposited within the celestial letters that became manifest from that writing are like the spirits of the children deposited within their bodies.¹⁹⁷

Even syllogisms are engaged in procreation. Deductive knowledge can only result from the “marriage” of two premises, which takes place when a single term is repeated. This constitutes the marriage act between them, and the conclusion that is “born” from them is thus called their “child”.¹⁹⁸

In many places throughout the *Futūḥāt*, as we have alluded to above, Ibn 'Arabī speaks about the relations between the ontological levels in terms of fathers, mothers, and children.¹⁹⁹ He states this principle as follows: “Everything that exercises an effect is a father, and everything that receives an effect is a mother. ... That which is born between the two from the effect is called a son or a child.”²⁰⁰

195. For a masterful treatment of this theme in Islamic philosophy, see Murata, *Tao of Islam*, especially Chap. 5 (Macrocosmic Marriage).

196. See *Fut.* II. 656, Chap. 292.

197. *Fut.* I. 139, Chap. 11.

198. *Fut.* I. 138, Chap. 11.

199. See especially *Fut.* I, Chaps 11 and 21.

200. *Fut.* I. 138, Chap. 11; trans. Murata, *Tao of Islam*, p. 145.

God is thus the “First Father” and (non-existent) “thingness” is the First Mother. Marriage on this level takes place through the existential command: Be! The child that results is the possible thing upon which existence has been bestowed.²⁰¹ This cosmic pattern appears at every level of creation, but other than the role of First Father, which is fulfilled by God alone, the rest of the existing entities take turns at being fathers and mothers, depending on whether they have an active or a passive role. For this reason, the Eagle/Pen/Intellect is a mother as well as a father, a Tablet as well as a Pen, although we see him in the *Ittiḥād* primarily in his masculine role.

The four birds are thus related to one another in a variety of ways, the most evident of which is through a hierarchical descent. The Eagle, brought into existence by the Real, gives birth from himself to the Ringdove, through the agency of the Real’s command. Their mating, the tale of which constitutes a large portion of the Ringdove’s soliloquy, results in the ‘*Anqā*’, who is the mother of the Crow. We are not told who the Crow’s father is, and the narrator does not pursue the genealogy further.

The bird’s family tree, if we may call it that, is complicated, however, by the fact that they represent cosmological figures whose relation to one another is a serious matter of dispute. One member of the family, for example, appears to be altogether missing.

Nature

Anyone acquainted with the Shaykh’s extensive writings on cosmology in the *Futūḥāt* and elsewhere will note the absence of Nature among these cosmic principles making up the family tree of the four birds. In Chapter 198 of the *Futūḥāt*, for example, we find an enumeration of the twenty-eight levels of existence that places Nature between the level of the Universal Soul and that of the Dust. In fact, the Shaykh explains that the level of Nature can only be between the Soul and the Dust, for “Every body that the Dust accepts, down to

201. See *Fut.* I. 139.

the last existing body, is natural.”²⁰² Nature’s authority extends from the Dust to everything below it, while the Universal Soul’s authority extends from Nature to everything below it. As for what is above the Soul, that is, the Intellect and what is above it, neither Nature nor Soul have any authority over it.

In some instances, however, the Shaykh places Nature and Dust at an approximately equal level, Nature being slightly higher only because of its priority in time:

Among those things that were cast [into the Soul] through a most sanctified, spiritual casting [that is, from the First Intellect] were Nature and the Dust. Hence the Soul was the first mother to give birth to twins. The first thing she cast down was Nature, which was followed by the Dust. Hence Nature and the Dust are brother and sister from a single father and a single mother. Then [God] gave Nature in marriage to the Dust. Born from them was the form of the Universal Body, which was the first body to become manifest. Nature is the father because it produces effect. Dust is the mother because within it effects become manifest. The result is the Body.²⁰³

This appears to answer the question of the Crow’s progenitor: his father is Nature. We should not be surprised at seeing Mother Nature personified here as masculine, for it only means that Nature is the active force in the marriage act between it and the Dust. But this does not solve the problem of why Nature does not appear in the *Ittiḥād* at all.

It is possible that a clue to this mystery can be found in a passage of the *Futūḥāt* in which Ibn ‘Arabī appears to completely reverse his position regarding the relative positions of the entities in question: “[T]hose who have placed Nature in a level below the Soul and above the Hyle ... have no witnessing”,²⁰⁴ that is, they have not seen

202. *Fut.* I. 261, Chap. 47.

203. *Fut.* I. 140, Chap. 11; trans. Murata, *Tao of Islam*, pp. 156–7, modified.

204. *Fut.* III. 420, Chap. 371; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 140.

things as they really are. He goes on to resolve this contradiction by explaining that:

If a person does have witnessing and [nonetheless] holds this view, he means [by it] that Nature which becomes manifest through its authority in the translucent corporeal bodies, that is, in the Throne and what it surrounds. This second Nature is to the first as the daughter is to the woman who is the mother; like her mother, she gives birth, even if she is a daughter born from her.²⁰⁵

Nature, it now appears, occupies two rungs on the genealogical ladder. Thus far, we have only been concerned with that aspect of Nature which gives rise to physical bodies, from the celestial spheres to the four elements and everything in between. This “second Nature” is the cosmogonic *‘Anqā’*. But as the Shaykh tells us above, there is an aspect of Nature that transcends this second Nature and occupies a rank even higher than that of the First Intellect and Universal Soul – a Nature which, Ibn ‘Arabī says, “is more worthy to be attributed to the Real than anything else, since everything else becomes manifest only in that which becomes manifest from Nature, that is, the Breath [of the All-Merciful], which permeates the cosmos.”²⁰⁶

Nature as first Mother is all-inclusive. Ibn ‘Arabī equates this Nature with the Breath of the All-Merciful: “Universal Nature, by its form, comes before those things that derive their being from her. In reality, Nature is the Breath of the Merciful in which are unfolded the forms of the higher and lower Cosmos.”²⁰⁷ Breath manifests as a vaporous Cloud – that symbolic representation of the totality of animated entities, generated at every instant through God’s loving mercy. With every flash of metaphysical light, the cosmos comes into existence, returns to non-existence, and receives new existence perpetually within God’s knowledge of Himself. In every moment,

205. Ibid.; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 140, modified.

206. Ibid.; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 140.

207. *Fuṣūṣ*, p. 219; trans. Austin, *Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 277.

an endless process of divine exhalation and inhalation breathes life into the entities, annihilates them, and revivifies them eternally.

This Cloud is sometimes equated with the Reality of Realities, or Universal Reality. It is, so to speak, *hayūlā* writ large. To give an example which, although provided by Ibn ‘Arabī, is probably more familiar to readers of Plato, it is the Form of Knowledge as opposed to the Form of the chair. There is nothing that this Reality does not contain, since it embraces every concept, from the Real to the real, including the very notion of being itself:

The Cloud is that which we have mentioned as eternal in the eternal and temporally originated in the temporally originated. This is like your words, or identical with your words, concerning Being/existence. When you attribute it to the Real, you say it is Eternal, but when you attribute it to creation, you say that it is temporally originated. So the Cloud inasmuch as it is a description of the Real is a divine description, but inasmuch as it is a description of the cosmos it is an engendered description.²⁰⁸

Since this Reality is qualified neither by existence nor by non-existence, Ibn ‘Arabī sometimes calls it the “third thing” and the “All-embracing Universal”, and says that it is from this third thing that the world becomes manifest.²⁰⁹ Embracing all realities, particularizing them at will in a myriad of forms, this is the ‘*Anqā*’ in her noetic aspect. “Call it, if you wish, the Reality of Realities, or hylê, First Matter, or supreme genus. ... This third thing can never be separate from the Necessary Being, standing parallel to It, without having entified existence.”²¹⁰

There is still one more step we must take, one more form that the ‘*Anqā*’ must assume to complete the triplicate aspect of her nature: that of the Universal Tree, symbol of the Perfect Human

208. *Fut.* II. 63, Chap. 73, Question 31; trans. Chittick, *SPK*, p. 137.

209. *Inshā’ al-dawwā’ir*, p. 18.

210. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

Being, whose “shade extends over those whom God envelops in His solicitude”.

The Perfect Human Being, and Muḥammad in particular, is sometimes depicted as the microcosmic counterpart of the Breath of the All-Merciful. We should recall that the *Fuṣūṣ* begins with the divine exhalation that gives form to the cosmos and its likeness Adam, and it ends with Muḥammad, the perfect vessel of mercy, who receives and gives form to the Divine Breath: “When Muḥammad was created a pure servant, he had no ambition for leadership, but continued prostrating and standing [before his Lord], a passive creation, until God effected [His purpose] in him, when He conferred on him an active role in the realm of the Breaths.”²¹¹

Muḥammad, then, also occupies two levels: he is both the principle and the aim of creation. The highest of these levels is called the primordial Muḥammadan Reality, or the Muḥammadan Light, which lies above the levels of spiritual and material creation. It is to this that the Prophet’s claim, “I was a prophet when Adam was between water and clay”, refers. The other level is his specific universal mission as the Prophet Muḥammad, the embodied Seal of the Prophets, who lived and died as a fully human being.

The Perfect Human Being embraces all reality, divine and human, never known in itself, but only through relationship. The Perfect Human Being is a synthesis of all the words of existence, all Names of beauty and all Names of severity; a kaleidoscope of light and darkness; a heart that embraces every form, from mosque to fire temple; a microcosmic *mundus imaginalis*, where what is and what is not happily co-exist.

The secret of the birds’ genealogy, therefore, lies in the ‘*Anqā*’s unique position as First and Second Mothers – a fact that allows her to rightly claim that “nothing can be manifested that I am not in”. The ‘*Anqā*’, as First Mother, gives life to all. In this sense, she strangely gives birth to her father, the Intellect, bringing to mind

211. *Fuṣūṣ*, p.220; trans. Austin, p.278.

the paradoxical lines from al-Ḥallāj's cosmological–alchemical poem
“*Uqtulūnī yâ thiqātī*”:²¹²

My mother has given birth to her father,
What a marvel is mine!
And my daughters, 'though my daughters, are my sisters,
Not by the act of time, no,
Nor by the act of adultery.²¹³

212. *Dīwān al-Ḥallāj*, p. 125. See French trans. by Massignon, *Ḥusayn Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj*, p. 54.

213. See Ibn 'Arabī's reference to this poem in *Fut.* II. 656, Chap. 292. Henry Corbin has discussed the perplexing line: “My mother has given birth to her father” in *Creative Imagination*, pp. 169–70. He also notes that the appellation of the Prophet's daughter Fātima as “mother of her father” (*umm abīhā*) – an appellation attributed in Shi'ite sources to the Prophet himself – is an indication of the “Creative Feminine” alluded to in al-Ḥallāj's poem (see *Creative Imagination*, p. 345, n. 65; p. 347, n. 70).

APPENDIX

The Edition of the Text

Ibn ‘Arabī mentions the *Ittiḥād al-kawnī* once in his *Futūḥāt* (II.351), as well as in two bibliographical works, the *Fihrist* and the *Ijāza*. Osman Yahia lists twenty-three manuscripts,¹ all conserved in the libraries of Istanbul. Denis Gril consulted ten manuscripts, two of which (nos. 5 and 8 below) were not mentioned by Osman Yahia, to establish the text. They are:

1. Shehit Ali 2813 / no. 6 (fols. 26–33b), copied in AH 621

Part of a collection of nine surviving treatises by Ibn ‘Arabī, copied by one of his disciples, Ayyūb b. Badr b. Maṣṣūr al-Muqrī (or al-Maqqarī), in the presence of the author. The beginning of the Treatise bears a *samā’* in the hand of the copyist, also apparently describing the work as *Risālat al-aḥadiyya*. At the bottom of the page in his Andalusī script, Ibn ‘Arabī has appended an attestation of its accuracy:

ṣaḥḥa mā dhakarahu a’lāhu wa-kataba al-munshi’ fī tārikhihi (the above-mentioned is correct, as written by the author on this date)

This copy, certified by the author, constitutes the base manuscript. Some of its readings, however, remain tentative because of damage to the page margins and the copyist’s highly cursive script.

2. Veliyuddin 51 / no. 6 (fols. 48–56), copied in AH 736

Part of a collection of seventeen treatises of Ibn ‘Arabī, copied by Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Muthabbīt in Jerusalem, who claims to

1. *Histoire et classification*, Vol. I, p. 325, no. 317.

have taken it from an autograph copy, transmitted by ‘Abdallāh Badr al-Ḥabashī, Ibn ‘Arabī’s beloved disciple, who died around 618. The original manuscript, therefore, would antedate no. 1.

3. Beyazit 3750 / no. 18 (fols. 277–286), copied in AH 782

Part of a collection of thirty treatises by Ibn ‘Arabī (excluding no. 12), taken from a copy in the hand of Shaykh Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Zāhidī in Aleppo. Contains some variants tracing back to an original that is probably different from nos. 1 and 2.

4. Murad Bukhari 207 / no. 5 (fols. 71–95), copied in AH 875

Part of a collection of six treatises by Ibn ‘Arabī, copied by Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abdallāh b. Ibrāhīm from an original copy apparently in the author’s hand, which was read back to him and certified by him as correct. Derives from no. 1.

5. Laleli 3741 / no. 6 (fols. 113–122b), copied in AH 904

Evidently derived from no. 1.

6. Carullah 2111 / no. 10 (fols. 63–69b), copied in AH 915

Part of a collection of twenty-three treatises, nineteen of which are by Ibn ‘Arabī, copied by ‘Abd al-Ṣamad al-Ṣāliḥī al-Ḥanafī al-Ṣūfī. Numbers 7, 8, and 9 seem to derive from this copy.

7. Fatih 5322 / no. 19 (fols. 151–153b), copied in c. AH 934

Part of a collection of thirty separate works, mostly treatises by Ibn ‘Arabī, some of which are commented on by Ibn Sawdakīn. The poetry at the beginning is missing. It offers some variants similar to those in nos. 1 and 4.

8. Hacı Mahmud 2510 /no. 1 (fols. 1b–16b), copied in AH 958

Part of a collection of two treatises by Ibn ‘Arabī; bears similarities to no. 5.

9. Halet Efendi 245 / no. 17 (fols. 353b–366), copied after AH 936

Part of a collection of twenty-six treatises, mostly by Ibn 'Arabī; bears similarities to no. 5.

10. Esad Efendi 1777 /no. 9 (fols. 158–172b), copied in AH 1004

Part of a collection of eleven treatises attributed to Ibn 'Arabī, some of which are apocryphal. Copy is very defective, and derives from no. 2.

There appear, then, to be three families of manuscripts whose transmission cannot be traced with precision. In the Arabic edition, all variants have been provided.

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Muḥyī al-dīn Muḥammad
b. ‘Alī b. al-‘Arabī



Arabic text by Denis Gril

رسالة الإتحاد الكوني

فى حضرة الإشهاد العينى

بمحضر الشجرة الإنسانية والطيور الأربعة الروحانية¹

(¹) رموز التحقيق: - 1 شهيد : شهيد على 2813 (ق 26 - 33 ب) وهى النسخة الأصلية. - 2 ولي : ولي الدين 51 (ق 48 - 51). - 3 با يزيد : با يزيد 3750 (ق 277 - 286). - 4 لاله لي : لاله لي 3741 (ق 113 - 122 ب). - 5 جار : جار الله 2111 (ق 63 - 69 ب). - 6 مراد : مراد بخاري 207 (ق 71 - 95). - 7 فاتح : فاتح 5322 (ق 151 - 153 ب). - حاجي : حاجي محمود 2510 (ق 1 ب - 16 ب)، حالت : حالت افندى 245 (ق 353 ب - 366)، أسد : اسد افندى 1777 (ق 158 - 172 ب). انظر وصف النسخ فى آخر المقدمة باللغة الإنكليزية.

شهيد: رسالة الاتحاد. كتبه لنفسه أيوب بن بدر (...) (يليه سماع لغير هذا الكتاب ثم:) وقرأت هذه الأوراق رسالة الأحدية (ولعله الاتحاد لأن الأحدية تلى هذه الرسالة فى المجموعة) على ناظمها متع الله الإسلام بطول حياته محيي الدين ابي عبد الله محمد بن على بن أحمد بن العربي الحاتمي الطائي وأنا أيوب بن بدر بن منصورالمقرى فسمعها القاضي الفاضل معز الدين أبي اسحاق إبراهيم ولد القاضي عز الدين عبد الله القرشيين نفعه الله و نفع به وهياه للعلم وأعانه على نقله وحفظه وذلك فى سنة إحدى وعشرين وستمائة بدار المسمع ... (غير واضح بعد ذلك)

[يخط كبير أندلسى وهو خط المؤلف نفسه:] صح ما ذكره أعلاه وكتب المنشئ فى تاريخه.

ولى: + كتب بها محمد بن على بن محمد أبو عبد الله بن العربي الطائي الحاتمي الأندلسى إلى أبي الفوارس صخر بن سنان مالك أزمة الجود والبيان وفقهما الله تعالى. رواية الصوفي المسعود أبي محمد عبد الله بدر بن عبد الله الحبشى عتيق أبي الغنائم بن أبي الفتوح الحرائى عنه وفقه الله وإياكم. علقها المغترف من بحر جود ربه أحمد بن محمد بن مثبت من خط مرسلها رحمه الله تعالى.

جار: + كتب بها مؤلفها سيدي الشيخ العلامة محيي الدين بن عربي الحاتمي الطائي إلى أبي الفوارس محمد بن سنان وفقه ورحمه.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم²

هذا كتاب كريم وخطاب جسيم كتبتُ به

شعر: [بسيط]

من انحراقي إلى اعتدالي	من انتقاصي إلى كمالي
ومن سنائي إلى جلالي	ومن سنائي ³ إلى جمالي
فمن صدودي إلى وصالي	ومن شتاتي إلى اجتماعي
فمن حجاري إلى اللآلي	ومن خسيسي إلى نفيسي
فمن نهار ⁴ إلى الليالي	ومن شروقي إلى غروبي
فمن هُدائي إلى ضلالي	ومن ضيائي إلى ظلامي
فمن زجاج إلى العوالي	ومن حضيضي إلى استوائي
فمن محاقبي إلى هلاقي	ومن دخولي إلى خروجي
فمن جَوادي إلى غزالي	ومن طلابي إلى نفوري ⁵

(2) شهيد: + قال شيخنا وسيدنا وإمامنا الشيخ الإمام المحدث نسيج دهره وفريد عصره شيخ الطريق وإمام التحقيق محيي الدين أبي عبد الله محمد بن علي بن محمد بن العربي الحاتمي الطائفي نفعه الله ونفع به ولي - حاجي: + يقول عبد الله الفقير إلى الله محمد بن علي بن محمد بن العربي الطائفي الحاتمي ثم الأندلسي عفا الله عنه وختم بالحسن.

جار - حالت: + قال الشيخ الإمام العالم الأوحد الصدر الكبير المؤيد المنصور النور المخصوص برحمة من ربه أبو عبد الله محمد بن علي بن محمد العربي الطائفي الحاتمي الأندلسي رضى الله تعالى عنه ونفعنا ببركاته وعلومه

(3) ولي - با يزيد : سنائي.

(4) ولي - با يزيد - أسد: نهاري.

(5) أسد: ومن مضيقني إلى نفودي.

ومن غصوني إلى ظلالِي	ومن نسيمي إلى غُصوني
ومن نعيمِي إلى مُحالي	ومن ظلالِي إلي نعيمِي
ومن مثالي إلى مُحالي	ومن مُحالي إلى مثالي
ومن صحيحِي إلى اعتلالِي	ومن مُحالي إلى صحيحِي
فما أُعادي وما أُوالي	فما أنا ^٦ في الوجود غير
من أجل سَهْم ^٧ ماضِي النِّصَالِ	وما أنا دى على فؤادي
إلى فؤادي بلا نِبَالِ	فانْ رامِي النِّصَالِ جَفْنِي
وما أُغالي فما أُبالي	فما أحامِي ^٨ على مقامي
فعين فصلِي هو اتصالي	فإنني ما عشقتُ غيرِي
فلستُ عن هاجري بسالي	فلا تَلْمَنِي على هواي
وإنني لا أزال في هذا الكتاب أخاطبني عنى وأرجع فيها إلى مني:	
[مضارع]	

ومن سُنَّتِي إلى فَرَضِي	فمن سَمَائِي إلى أَرْضِي
ومن طَوْلِي إلى عَرَضِي	ومن إِبْرَامِي إلى نَقْضِي
[هزج]	

ومن عَقْلِي إلى حَسِي	فمن حَسِي إلى عَقْلِي
بلا شك ولا لبسٍ	بعلمين غريبين

(٦) با يزيد: أتى.

(٧) ولي - با يزيد - أسد : رام.

(٨) أسد: ولا أداني.

ومن نفسي إلى رُوحِي	ومن نفسي إلى رُوحِي
بتحليل وتركيب	بتحليل وتركيب
ومن حدُسي إلى علمي	ومن حدُسي إلى علمي
فنور العلم ممدودٌ	فنور العلم ممدودٌ
ومن قدُسي إلى رُجُسي ⁹	ومن قدُسي إلى رُجُسي ⁹
فقدُسي كان في وقُتي	فقدُسي كان في وقُتي
ومن إنُسي إلى جنِّي	ومن إنُسي إلى جنِّي
فجنِّي يبتغي هَمِّي	فجنِّي يبتغي هَمِّي
ومن جسَمي إلى سعتي	ومن جسَمي إلى سعتي
لنكر قام في نفسي	لنكر قام في نفسي
ومن أَيْسي إلى لَيْسي	ومن أَيْسي إلى لَيْسي
بسعد فيه تَأْلِيفي ¹¹	بسعد فيه تَأْلِيفي ¹¹
ومن جنسي إلى ضِدي	ومن جنسي إلى ضِدي
فلولا بَاقِلٌ ما لاح	فلولا بَاقِلٌ ما لاح
ومن شمسي إلى بدري	ومن شمسي إلى بدري
لإظهارِي الخفايا في	لإظهارِي الخفايا في
بطون نواشي دُبُس ¹²	بطون نواشي دُبُس ¹²

(9) أُسَد: طبعِي.

(10) با يزِيد - أُسَد: + ومن سعتي إلى ضيقي ومن ضيقي إلى الكرسي.

(11) ولي - جار: تَأْلِيف.

(12) جار: دمس. أُسَد: اللبس.

ومن عُربي إلى عُربي	ومن فُرسِي إلى عُربي
ورمز حقائق نُكْس ¹⁴	لشرح قوام ¹³ أسرار
ومن فرعي إلى أُسي	ومن أُسي إلى فرعي
بحسّ أو بلا حسّ	لعيش دُسّ في موت
لقول الحاسد النُكْس	فلا تهتمّ يا نفسي
يا ريحانة النفس ¹⁵	وقول الجاهل المغرور
في أرواحنا الجرّس ¹⁶	فكم من جاهل قد قال
بروح النفط والجسّ ¹⁷	لدى تنزيل تنزيلي
تخطّه من المسّ	كانس فيه شيطان
من التحقيق في لبسٍ	فإن الناس مازالوا
بين الجهرّ والهَمْسِ	فسرّ الله ممدود ¹⁸

وسميتُ هذه الرسالة بالإتحاد¹⁹ الكوني في حضرة الإِشهاد العيني بمحضر الشجرة الإنسانية والطيور الأربعة الروحانية، خاطبت بها أبا الفوارس²⁰ صخر بن سنان مالك أزمة الجود والبيان وهذه أول الرسالة وبالله أستعين فهو المؤيّد سبحانه والمعين.

(13) ولي [في الهامش]: عيون.

(14) أسد: لشرح حقائق المعنى ومن دقائق تكسي.

(15) ولي - جار - حاجي: الانس. يا يزيد - أسد: القدس.

(16) في بقية النسخ: الخرس.

(17) أسد: في القدس.

(18) في بقية النسخ: موجود.

(19) جار - حالت: الإيجاد.

(20) لاله لي: + بالحقائق التي كالعرائس.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله على الرؤف الرحيم

إلى الثالث والثاني ورب المثلث والمثاني والمشار إليه في المثاني القاهر الفاني
والسائر الثاني، الناكس لظله والناكس لذه، الجواد الذي لا يُقبل جوده والموجود
التام الذي جهل وجوده، المنبعث من الثنتين والمبعوث بالقوتين، معتمد الأركان
ومعتمد الإمكان ومستند المكان رقيقة المان وحقيقة الزمان ومنتهى الأمان
ومستوى الرحمن ودقيقة الآن وسلطان الإنس والجان جان بن جان الإنسان في
الإنسان الواهب المحسان، أبي الفوارس صخر بن سنان مالك أزمة الجود
والبيان، أستوهب الله له من المواهب المقدسة أسهلها وأحلاها ومن المراتب
المؤسّسة أكملها وأعلاها، سلام طيب²¹ مبارك يخص مقامكم الرفيع أتمّه وأزكاه.
ورحمت الله تعالى وبركاته.

أما بعد فاني أحمد الله إلى الذي سوانى وعدلني وفى صورة أحسن تقويم ركبني
ثم عرفني بي وأظهرني لي فعشقتني فلا أحب سواى وهيّمت²² فى بين بُعدى وقُربى
فما أخطب إلا إياي.

[بسيط]

فلو أراني إذا أتاني	سراً وجهراً أنا بذاتي
وقلت أنعم فقلت طوعاً	وكان مني لي التفاتي
فنيّت عنى بعين إنّي	وعن عداتي وعن ثقاتي
وعن وعيدي وعن مزيدي	وعن نعيمى وعن عدّاتي
وعن شهيدى وعن شهودى	وكنّت لي بي نغم المواتي
فيا أنا رُدّني بعيني	إليّ حتى أرى ثباتي
فردّني بي إليّ مني	فلم تقم بي سوى صفاتي

(21) ولي - با يزيد: + أثير.

(22) لا له لي - فاتح: همت.

وصال عودي على صفاتي	وصال ²³ كفي على عصاي
عشرا وثنتين معلّمت	فسال نهر البروج منها
مني ثباتاً على ثباتي	فقلت لي يا أنا وزدني
على وجودي من النبات	هذي علوم الحياة لاحت
فدام شوقي إلى مماتي	فأين سرّي اللطيف مني
إليّ كيما تبدو سماتي	فصرت أشكو الغرام مني
فجاد جمعي على شتاتي	إلى جفوني من عين كوني
من أجل ذاتي مدى حياتي	وصلت ذاتي وجداً بذاتي
وطول هجري وسيّاتي	ولم أعرج على جفائي
أنا فتاي أنا فتاتي	أنا حبيبي أنا محبي

ثم أما بعد فالكتاب إليّ من المدينة²⁴ الممكنة بالاستوا والمعينة في المستوى المحصنة بالقوى، طور سنين والبلد الأمين المسوى من الماء والطين والجامع بين أحسن تقويم وأسفل سافلين، معرفاً إياي بما طرأ بيني وبينني وما شاهده كوني من كوني، وذلك أنه لما رفعت لنا أعلام المشاهدة ووضعت عنا ألام المجاهدة وكان²⁵ التجاري بحكم الموافقة والمساعدة، امتطوت براق الهمة وخرجت عن كور هذه الغمة ووقعت في بحر الهيولى فعاينت الآخرة والأولى،²⁶ فقلت: تباً لمنكري الجنان والدار الحيوان وملاعبة الولدان ومعانقة الحور الحسان ولصوق الأبدان بالأبدان، من عاين الحافظ أثبت اللافظ، فإن خط الاعتدال غير ميّال، وعرفت هناك أن منكري حشر الأجساد ما برحوا من الميّلين وما انفكّوا من ربقة الأربعة والإثنين.

(23) ولي - با يزيد - جار الله - فاتح: فصال.

(24) جار - فاتح - حالت: + القصوى.

(25) في بقية النسخ: صار.

(26) جار - فاتح - حالت: فوقعت في بحر الهلاك فعاينت من أجاب وأبا.

ثم صَحْتُ: وَاحْرَبَاهُ، وَاحْرَقْ قَلْبَاهُ مِنَ الْكِيَانِ هَرَبْتُ وَهَا أَنَا فِيهِ فَأَيْنَ مَا طَلَبْتُ؟
 فسمعت الخطاب مني لادخل في ولا خارج²⁷ عني، وهو يخبرني أَنِي عَلَى الْمَدْرَجَةِ
 فكيف تطلب الدرجة؟ أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالاستواءات أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالانكفاءات، أَيْنَ أَنْتَ
 والرفارف العُلَيَّيْ أَيْنَ أَنْتَ مِنَ الْأَفَقِ الْأَعْلَى، أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَحُجُبُ الْبَهَا أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالسُّتُرُ
 الْأَزْهَى، أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالْعَمَا أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَحِجَابُ الْعِزَّةِ الْأَحْمَى، أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالْهَوِيَّاتِ الْمَطْلُوقَةِ
 أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالْإِنِّيَّاتِ²⁸ الْمُحَقَّقَةِ، أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَحُضْرَةُ الْإِشَارَاتِ أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالْمَحَادَثَاتِ²⁹
 أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالْمَسَامِرَاتِ، أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالشَّجَرَةُ الْعُلْيَا أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالْفُرُوعُ الدُّنْيَا، أَيْنَ أَنْتَ
 وَالْغُرْبِيَّةِ الْعِنَقَا أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالْمَطْوِقَةُ الْوَرَقَا، أَيْنَ أَنْتَ وَالْغُرَابُ الْحَالِكَا أَيْنَ أَنْتَ
 وَالْعَقَابُ الْمَالِكَا؟ يَا مَحْجُوبُ كَيْفَ تَسْأَلُ بِالْأَيْنِ عَنِ الْعَيْنِ وَأَنْتَ فِي مَقَامٍ لَا يَحْتَمِلُ
 الْمَيْنُ!

فقلت: أَيُّهَا الزَّاجِرُ لَقَدْ أَكَلَمْتُ، أَمَا عَلِمْتَ أَنَّكَ فِي مَقَامِكَ تَكَلَّمْتُ؟ أَنْتَ فِي حُضْرَةِ
 الْعَيْنِ، مَعْرَى عَنِ الْآنِ وَالْأَيْنِ وَأَنَا فِي هَذِهِ اللَّجَّةِ الْعَمْيَا وَالْدُلْجَةِ³⁰ السُّودَاءِ وَالْدَاهِيَةِ
 الدَّهْيَا، مَعْدَنُ الْمَيْنِ وَالزَّيْبِ وَمَحَلُّ النُّقْصِ وَالْعَيْبِ، وَهَلْ يَصِيحُ "وَاحْرَبَاهُ!" إِلَّا أُسِيرَ
 الْكَمِّ وَحَبِيسُ الْحَكْمِ؟ فَانْ أَنْتَ أَخْرَجْتَنِي مِنْ بَيْنِ تَلَاظِمِ هَذِهِ الْأَمْوَاجِ وَأَرْحَتَنِي مِنْ
 مَعَانَاةِ هَذَا اللَّيْلِ الْأَلْيَلِيِّ الدَّاجِ، فَانِي لَا أَفُوهُ بِظَرْفٍ³¹ وَلَا أُعْرَجُ عَلَى حَرْفٍ.

فجذبني إِلَيْهِ جَذْبَةً عَزِيزٍ مُقْتَدِرٍ وَقَالَ: إِنَّكَ مَغْلُوبٌ فَانْتَصِرْ³². فقلت: أَنْتَصِرْ بِيَدِكَ
 الْيُمْنَى مِنْ كَلْتِي يَدِيكَ يُمْنَى. فَإِنَّهُ الْقَوَى الْأَمِينُ وَالْوَفَى الصَّادِقُ الَّذِي لَا يَمِينُ. فَقَالَ
 كَيْفَ يَهْجُونِي مِنْ يَرْجُونِي؟ قُلْتُ: كَمَا يَمْدُحُكَ مِنْ يَمْنُوكُ. فَلَمَّا جَذَبْنِي إِلَيْهِ رَأَيْتَنِي
 فِي غَيْرِ الصُّورَةِ الَّتِي فِيهَا كُنْتُ وَقَدْ ثَبْتُ فِيهَا وَتَمَكَّنْتُ فَقُلْتُ: يَا أَنَا! فَقَالَ: أَنَا

(27) ولي: داخلا ... خارجاً ...

(28) في الأصل: إنيات.

(29) فاتح: المحاورات.

(30) جار - فاتح: اللجة.

(31) في بقية النسخ: طرف، ويبدو أصح.

(32) انظر سورة القمر ٥٤: ٤٢، ١٠.

مرحباً! فقلت: لا مرحباً ولا أهلاً ولاسعة ولا سهلاً! فقال: ياقرة العين ما رابك ويا أسيرة الكون ما أصابك؟ فقلت: كم ذا تحجبني عني فاكشفني لي حتى أعرفني، هذا لوحى ممدود ولوائى معقود وعلمى محدود ومقامى محمود وسرى مشهود ولبي موجود ومطلوبى مفقود وأنا في عالمي معبود³³ أدعى كلمة الوجود فلو فنيته هذه الأعيان وتلاشت هذه الأكوان وغبت عن الاستواء الرحماني والاسم الرباني، أمكنني أن أسرَّ باللمحة³⁴ ولا أتضرر بالمنحة.

قال: وقد فنيته الأقلام وزهبت الأعلام وراحت الأسماء واحتجب الاستواء ورفعت الألواح وفقدت³⁵ الأبواب والأرواح ولكن لا بد لك من ظلمة الجنة الدهما ودائرة الما والقلم الأعلى والقدم الأولى والنون³⁶ المكنون واليمين المصون.

فعندما سمعت أن أثراً من الكيان أمامي، خفت أن يقطعني عن إمامي فنهضت من تلك الظلمة المذلَّمة وتركت بها براق الهمة ورفعت على أسرة اللطائف ومُتَكَات الرفارف، إلى أن وصلنا مقام الإبتهاج أتمايل فيه تمايل السراج، فقلت: ما لي وحالة السماع؟ فقيل: حرَّك حسن الإيقاع، فقلت: ما أحسستُ به، فقيل لي: انتبِه فإنك بك ما أنت به! فقلت: الحقيقة في غنى عن إيقاع الغنا ومطلبها الفنا في الفنا، فحجب عن عيني عينها وحال بيني وبينها. ثم قال لي: أين أنت من العالم ومني؟ قلت: بين التعني والتمني، مطلبى في العما وأنا في الما وروحي في السما وعرشي في الهبا وأهلي في سبا وملكي في الاستواء وحكمي في قدمي السواء وفُلكي في الفلك وحجابي في الملك وظلمتي³⁷ في الهيولى ومحنتي في الأولى وبدأتي³⁸ في الحافرة وغايتي في الآخرة وخلتي في الخليل إبراهيم ومناجاتي في موسى الكليم

(33) جار - فاتح - حالت: مقصود.

(34) لا له لي: المحنة.

(35) با يزيد: قعدت.

(36) جار - فاتح - حالت: النور.

(37) ولي: تثليثي.

(38) ولي: بدايتي.

وخلافتي³⁹ في هرون الحكيم ورفعتي في إدريس⁴⁰ وصورتني في يوسف⁴¹ ومعارفي مع إختلافها وأصنافها في عيسى وجسدي⁴² في آدم أبي البشر وقلبي في ابراهيم السيد الأكبر⁴³ وهيكل في العنصر⁴⁴ المربع⁴⁵.

قال: هذا حظك من كوني وأين حظك من عيني؟ فقلت: أيها المشير⁴⁶ ، المناسبة تكون بالنقيض والنظير والنظير الملازم يكون بالذاتي واللازم. فقال المشير: أريد مناسبة النظير. فقلت: في رسمي رسمك وفي نعتي نعتك والاجمال أحسن من التفصيل في هذا القبيل من أجل أبناء السبيل. فقال: صدقت فأين مناسبة النقيض بحكم الحقيقة لا بحكم التعريض؟ فقلت: في عدمي وجودك وفي بُحلي جودك وفي كلامك خروسي وفي قولك جروسي وفي استحالتني قَدَمك وفي بدايتي قَدَمك. قال: علمت أنك علمت ونعم ما به حكمت.

ثم كشف لى عن شجرة البستان الكلية الموصوفة بالمثلية فنظرت إلى شجرة "أصلها ثابت وفرعها في السماء"⁴⁷ وثمرها بيد إله الإستواء بين أغصانها وأوراقها الغراب والغريبة العنقا وفي ذرى أفنانها العقاب والمطوقة الورقا فسلمت على الشجرة فحيّت بأحسن من ذلك، قالت اسمع أيها السالك المالك!

(39) جار - فاتح - حالت: + الانسانية.

(40) جار - فاتح - حالت: وقلبي في إدريس الرفيع.

(41) جار - فاتح - حالت: وحسني في يوسف - عليه السلام - وامضائي.

(42) جار - فاتح - حالت: وخلافتي الإلهية.

(43) جار- فاتح - حالت: - (قلبي... الأكبر).

(44) جار- فاتح - حالت: العالم.

(45) ولي، با يزيد، حاجي: وختي في زحل ومناجاتي في المشتري الأكمل وخلافتي الانسانية في المريخ الأحمر وقلبي في السيد الأبراهيمي الأكبر وحسني في زهرة الأحكام وإمضاي في عطارذ الافهام وخلافتي الالهية في البدر الأرفع وهيكل في العنصر المربع.

(46) جار، فاتح، حالت: المنشئ.

(47) سورة ابراهيم ١٤: ٢٤

خطبة الشجرة الكلية الموصوفة بالمثلية

أنا الشجرة الكلية الجامعة المثلية ذات الأصول الراسخة والفروع الشامخة،
غرستني يد الأحد في بستان الأبد، مستورة عن تصارييف الأمد فأنا ذات روح
وجسد وثمرتي مقطوف دون يد، حملت من ثمر العلوم و المعارف ما لا يستقل
بحمله العقول السليمة وأسرار اللطائف، ورقي "قُرْش مَرْفُوعَة" وفاكهتي غير
"مَقْطُوعَة وَلَا مَمْنُوعَة"⁴⁸ وسطي هو المقصود وفروعي في هبوط وصعود فالهابطة
للتدلي والإفادة والصاعدة للتداني والإستفادة، نشأني كالفلك في الاستدارة
وفروعي منازل الأرواح الطيارة وزهري كالكواكب السيارة تتكون المعادن عن
سريانها في أبدانها.

أنا شجرة النور والكلام وقرّة عين موسى - عليه السلام -، لى من الجهات اليمين
الأنفس ومن الأمكنة الوادي المقدّس ولي من الزمان الآن ومن المساكن خطّ
الاستواء واعتدال الأركان فلي الدوام والبقاء والسعادة دون الشقاء، جَنَى جَنَّتِي
دَان وَفَنَّنِي يَمِيسُ كَأَنَّهُ نَشْوَانُ لَهُ لَطَافَةٌ وَحَنَانٌ عَلَى جَمِيعِ الْحَيَوَانِ، لم تنزل أفناني
للأرواح اللوحية كنادرا وورقي لها عن تأثيرات الشعاعات اليومية ساترا، ظلّ⁴⁹
ممدود لأهل العناية وجناحي منشور على أهل الولاية، تهبّ عليّ الأرواح باختلاف
تصارييفها فتخرج أغصاني عن ترتيب تأليفها فتسمع لذلك التداخل نغمات تُولِّه
العقول العلوية على سموّ أوجها وتجري بها على حسب ما رقم في درجها. فأنا
موسيقى الحكمة ومزيل الغموم بحسن إيقاع النغمة.

فأنا النور الأزهر ولي البساط الأخضر والوجه المستدير الأنضر، أيدت بالقوى
وشرفت بالمستوى وصرت كالهيليولى أقبل على جميع الصور في الآخرة والأولى، [لا

(48) انظر سورة الواقعة ٥٦: ٣٣، ٣٤

(49) لعله: ظلي.

أُضيق عن حمل شيء ولا أنفك عن نور وفي فنور علي⁵⁰ فيئي لمن استند إلى.
وأنا الظل الممدود والطلح المنضود والمعنى المقصود وكلمة الوجود وأشرف
محدث موجود وأنزه محدود، عزيزة السلطان مقدسة الكان، رفيع المنار ينبوع
الأنوار، جوامع الكلم معدن الأسرار والحكم.

[وافر]

لى الأرض الأريضة والسماء	وفي وسطي السواء والاستواء
لى المجد الموثل والبهاء	وسر العالمين والإعتلاء
إذا ما أمت الأفكار ذاتي	يُخبرها على البعد العماء
فما فى الكون من يدري وجودي	سوى من لا يقيدہ الثناء
له التصريف والاحكام فينا	هو المختار يفعل ما يشاء

خطبة المطوقة الورقا

ولما سمعت المطوقة كلام الشجرة الكلية وما جاءت به من المعارف الازلية⁵¹،
صدحت في روضة قدسها معربة عن نفسها. فقالت: لما أراد الله إيجاد كوني
وإشهاد عيني وان يطوقني بطوق البهاء ويسكني في سدرۃ المنتهى، نادى بعقابه:
الأمن من عقابه وهو بفناء بابه فأجابه مطيعاً وقال: ناديت سميعاً. [فقال له: إنك
فى أرض غربة وإن كنت منى فى محل القربة]⁵² فاني لست من جنسك فلا بد من
استيحاش نفسك وفيك قرة عين فأظهرها فى العين تأنس بمجاورتها وتتنفس
بمحاورتها فان الأنس بي محال وإنني شديد المحال.

فقال العقاب: كيف يظهر عني شيء ومقامي العجز وما في قوتي سلطان ولا عز؟

(50) [] : سقط من الأصل.

(51) ولي: الإلية.

(52) [] : الزيادة من ولي.

فقال له: الزم المناوحة فسيظهر عينها عند المكافحة وهذا هو الانتظام الثاني والالتحام بالمثاني. فناوح الأمر فظهرت وناداني الحق فبادرت وما عرف العقاب ما جرى به النهر لشغله بالمهر⁵³ وكوني منه في الظهر فعندما سمع إجابة النداء، قال: ما هذا الذي بدا؟ فصرف النظر إلي فعشقتني وهيّه ما به الحق من الجمال طوقني فشكا الغليل والأليل ونادى بالحريق والغريق بلبل بلبل بلباله وتعلّم⁵⁴ في إصلاح باله ويأبى الخرق⁵⁵ إلا اتساعا والعزاء الا امتناعا وما أبيع له لثمي وشفاؤه في مضاجعتي وضمي فرفع عنه حجاب الريب ونودي من خلف سرادقات الغيب: ما لك تنظر في أعطافها وتوقع نغمتها ولا تنظر في أوصافها وبديع حكمتها؟

فدعاني إليه فلبيت وأمرني بالقعود بين يديه فجثوت فقال لي: تهيامي في حسن مبانيك⁵⁶ أذهلني عن معرفة معانيك وقد ورد الأمر بأن تعرفيني بنفسك وتطلع⁵⁷ لي بارقة من سنيّ شمسك. فقلت: إن الله أوجدني منك عند التقابل وأظهرني من ظهرك على التمايل فأنا من قوتك صادرة وبصورتك ظاهرة، أودعني حقيقتين ووهبني رقيقتين، حقيقة أعرف بها وحقيقة أكون ما شئت بسببها ورقيقة مني إليك تنزلني إذا اشتبهت عليك وبها حضرت بين يديك ورقيقة مني إليه تنزلني إذا دعاني إليه. فلما سمع أن بيني وبينه رقيقة ممتدة وهو قد تحقق بحقائق المودة، نزل في تلك الرقيقة إليّ حتى امتزجت ذاتي بذاته وغابت صفاتي في صفاته وغبنا في لذة الالتحام وطبنا بحصول الانتظام ووقع النكاح المعنوي واجتمع المان في الرحم الآن وقبله الرحم لحكمة من حرم ومن رجم، وبلّ العاشق من دائه وارتاح شوقا إلى ندائه، فهو يتردد بين شوقين ويغرب في غربين ويشرق في شرقيين.

(53) جار، حالت: القهر.

(54) فاتح: تعلل.

(55) لا له لي: معانيك.

(56) با يزيد، فاتح، حالت: الحرق.

(57) جار، حالت: تطلعي.

فعندما استبَلَّ من أَلمه ونزح إلى معلّمه وجدت في ذاتي امتلاءً لم أكن أعرفه قبل ذلك فانسَدَّت⁵⁸ المجاري له والمسالك فحركت الرقيقة الإلهية فأجابني فقلت: يا إلهي ما هذا الذي أصابني؟ فقال: تنفسي بذكري لتظهر عنك كلمة أمري. فتنفست تنفُسَ المثلث فاذا بالعنقاء قد عمرت المعقل فسَلُّوا العنقا عن شأنها فستخبركم بما أودع الحق فيها من لطائفه ومنحها من عوارفه.

[رمل]

أنا ورقا المثنائي	مسكني روض المعاني
أنا عين في العيان	ليس لي غير المثنائي
فينادييني يا ثان	وأنا لست بثنائي
ينتهي إلى وجودي	كل شئ من الكيان
أنا أتلو من تسامت	ذاته عن العيان
لي حكم مستفاد	في الأفاصى والأدان
ليس لي مثل سوى من	شأنه يُشبهه شائي
فانتقد إن كنت تبغي	ما أتى به لساني
من رقائق ⁵⁹ تدلّت	بحقائق ⁶⁰ حسان
لقلوب قد تولّت	عن زخارف الجنان
طالبات من تعالى	عن تصاريف الزمان
فهو الفرد المعلى	ما له في الحكم ثان
وهو الذي اجتباني	وهو الذي اصطفاني
وأقامني عديلا	بين دن ⁶¹ ودنان

(58) فى الأصل: انشأت.

(59) جار، حالت: رقيقات ... حقيقات.

(60) جار، حالت: رقيقات ... حقيقات.

(61) لا له لي، حاجى، حالت: دن.

وَأَدَانِي كُلِّ دَانِي	فَتَقَاصِي كُلِّ قَاصٍ
وَأَعَانِي كُلِّ عَانٍ	وَأَوَالِي كُلِّ وَالٍ
فَبِرُوحِ السَّرِيَانِ	فَإِذَا هَوَيْتُ سَفَلًا
فَلتَحْلِيلِ الْمَبَانِي	وَإِذَا صَعَدْتُ عُلُوًّا
وَأَنَا أَخْلِي ⁶² الْمَغَانِي	فَأَنَا أُعْطِي الْمَغَانِي

خطبة العقاب المالك

فلما سمع العقاب ما ذكرته المطوقة وما قررته من العلوم المحققة قال: صدقت فيما ادعته وأظهرت لكم ما وسعته فقلت له: طرُفِي جوَّ بيانك وأعربُ لنا عن شأنك! فاهتزَّ سرير العقاب وصفَّق بجناحه وطاب وقال:

[كامل]

والحسن والنور البهيَّ الأسطعُ	أَنَا الْعِقَابُ لِيَّ الْمَقَامُ الْأَرْفَعُ
فِي الْعُدُوَّةِ الدُّنْيَا وَعِزِّي أَمْنَعُ	أَمْضِي الْأُمُورَ عَلَى مَرَاتِبِ حِكْمِهِ
وَأَنَا الَّذِي أَدْعُو الْوُجُودَ فَيَخْضَعُ	أَنَا فَيَضُهُ السَّامِيُّ وَنُورُ وُجُودِهِ
فَالْجُودُ جُودِي وَالْحَقَائِقُ تَوْضَعُ	وَأَنَا الَّذِي مَازِلْتُ قُبْضَةً مُوجِدِي
فَأَعْطِي مِنْ أَشَاءٍ وَأَمْنَعُ	نَحْوِي لِنَتَلَبَّ مَا لَهَا فِي شَرْبِهَا
أُنْأَى فَيَدْعُونِي الْبُهَاءُ الْأُرُوعُ	أُدْنُو فَيِيْهَرْنِي جَمَالُ وُجُودِهِ
لَكِنْ لَهَا قَلْبُ الْعُلَى يَتَصَدَّعُ	فَإِذَا دَنُوتُ فَحِكْمَةٌ مُقْبُولَةٌ
وَالنُّورُ مِنْ أَرْجَائِهَا يَتَشَعَّشَعُ	وَإِذَا بَعْدْتُ فَاِمْرَةٌ مُقْسُومَةٌ
فِي إِمْرَتِي وَسَعَادَتِي إِذْ أَنْزَعُ	فَأَنَا الْأَمِيرُ إِذَا بَعْدْتُ، شَقَوْتِي
عَايَنْتُ أَعْيَانُ الْأَهْلَةَ تَطْلُعُ	فَأَسْرُ أَوْقَاتِي وَأَسْعِدُهَا إِذَا

لم أزل في مرتبة من مراتب الكون وأنا معدوم العين إلى أن سبقت العناية فكانت

(62) لاله لي، جار، حالت: أجلي - حاجي: أخل.

بوجودي البداية وذلك أنه تجلّى بنفسه لنفسه فامتدّ وجودي بشهودي فنلت السورة بالصورة وكنت سريره بالسريرة فاستوى عليّ الاسم الجامع وحف بركابه وزيره المعطى والمانع وحاجباه الضارّ والنافع، فلما تحقق الاستواء وبان السوى ودعّنى الأسماء بالأعزّ الأسمى فعُمرّ الفنا وبرز البقاء والفنا، وتوالى القسط والفيض واستمر وثبت البسط والقبض واستقرّ وصح بالملك الملك وظهر بالمأكلة الملك ودار بالفلك الفلك. ثم نداني نداء التعليم بلسان التحكيم أن انظر في ذاتك بجامع لذاتك. قلما وقع مني النظر وميزت بين من يجب له التقدم ممن يجب له النظر وشرعت المذاهب وقسمت الأنوار بين المكاسب والمواهب، وقلت لمن عاينت من الأرواح المهيّمة: الزموا الحضرة المهيّمة! وقلت لمن عاينت من الأرواح المسخّرة: الزموا المقامات المسخّرة! وقلت لمن عاينت من الأرواح المدبّرة: الزموا الهياكل المدبّرة! فراح كل صنف يطلب منزله ليشهد مُنْزَلَه وكنت قد عاينت المطوقة الورقا وحملها الغريبة العنقا غير أنني لتقسيم المنازل ذهلت عن المنازل.

فأنا علم الكون والمخبوء في أودية الصون، افترى على جماعة من العقلاء وتعصب لأخذي عصابة من الفضلاء فنصبوا شرك أفكارهم لصيدي وأحالوا عليّ ما مددتهم به ليستخرجوا جدّي، ولما كانت الهمم قد توفرت لتحصيلي في شركهم الفكري وحصل فيها عقابٌ على صورتي من الموطن الوهمي، قالوا: هذا هو الحق المبين! ولو علموا أن الحق ما بان لهم ولا يبين، فإن المعرفة بي وبموجودي موقوفة على الوهب مصروفة على الكسب، فاستفزهم بشبهته الشيطان وتخيلوا أنهم قد حلّوا بالرُّبِّي ومنزلهم الغيطان واشتبه عليهم القدم بالقدم فحكموهم على بالقدم وإن وجودي لا عن عدم، فتركهم بشبهتهم لحماً على وضمّ وهكذا ينبغي لمن اهتضم الأمر الإلهي أن يهتضم وأنا برئ مما نسبوا وكافر بما نصبوا فان الله جل جلاله في القدم وأنا [إذ ذاك⁶³] محكوم⁶⁴ عليّ بالعدم، ثم أوجدني عن عدم لسابقة القدم

(63) جار - با يزيد - فاتح: + إذ ذاك.

(64) با يزيد: موصوف.

فظهر عني وأناار بعلمه كوني وناط بي الفقر والعجز وأماط عني الأرز والعزّ فأنا
الذليل الذى لايعز والقوى الذى لم يزلّ يعجز.

خطبة الغريبة العنقا

فلما فرغ العقاب من كلامه وأتى على بيان مقامه قامت العنقا تعرب عن وجودها
وتغرب بعزة حدها، قالت: أنا عنقا مغرب، مازال مسكني بالمغرب بالمقام الوسيط
على سيف البحر المحيط، اكتتفني العز من الجهتين وما ظهر قط لوجودي عين.

[كامل]

فأنا التي ⁶⁵ لا عين لي موجود	فأنا التي ⁶⁶ لا حكم لي مفقود
عنقا مُغْرَبٌ قد تُعَوِّفَ ذكراها	عُرْفًا وباب وجودها مسدود
ما صَبَّرَ الرحمن ذكري باطلاً	لكن لمعنى سره المقصود
هو أننى وهَابَةٌ أسرارهم	عرفانها فصراطنا ممدود
والسالكون على مراتب نورهم	فأجلهم من نوره التجريد

بي تكون الحدود وعليّ توقف الوجود، يُسَمَّعَ بذكري ولا أرى وليس الحديث بي
حديثا يفتري، أنا الغيبة العنقا، اامي المطوقة الورقا ووالدي العقاب المالك وولدي
الغراب الحالك أنا عنصر النور والظلم ومحل الأمانة والتُّهم، لأقبل النور المطلق
فانه ضدي ولا أعرف العلم فإنني ما أعيد، لا أبدي، كل من أثنى علي فهو بعيد
الفهم مقهور تحت سلطان الوهم، ما لي عزة فأحتمي وهياكل الكون الأعلى
والأسفل إليّ تنتمي، أنا الحقيقة الإمعة لما عندى من السعة، نلبس لكل حالة
لبوسها إما نعيمها وإما بؤسها، لأعجز عن حمل صورة وليست لي فى الصور
المعلومة سورة لكن وهبت أن أهب العلوم ولست بعالمة وأمنح الأحكام ولست

(65) كذا فى الأصل وفى سائر النسخ: الذى.

(66) كذا فى الأصل وفى سائر النسخ: الذى.

بحاكمة، لا يظهر شئ لم أكن فيه ولا يحصله⁶⁷ طالب مدرك ولا يستوفيه، فهذا
القدر عَظُمْتُ في أعين المحققين ولي جولان في مجالس المطرقيين فهذا قد أبنتُ
عن حالي وأظهرت صِدْقِي من محالي.

خطبة الغراب الحالك

فقام الغراب وقال: أنا هيكل الأنوار وحامل محل⁶⁸ الأسرار ومحل الكيف والكم
وسبب الفرح والغم، أنا الرئيس المرؤس ولي الحس والمحسوس، بي ظهرت
الرسوم ومني قام عالم الجسوم، أنا أصل الأشكال وبمراتب صورتي تضرب
الأمثال، فأنا المصباح والرياح وأنا السلسلة على صفوان والجناح، أنا البحر الذي
يصطفق موجه وأنا فرد المعدود وزوجه، عرضي دار كرامته لأوليائه وعمقى دار
إهانته لأعدائه، وطولي مذ وجدت لم يزل يقابل بذاته الأبد والأزل، فأنا بوطيقي
الحكم وموسيقى النغم وجامع حقائق الكلم، إلى المنتهى وعلى عول أولو النهى وأنا
أسنى ما منح من الله⁶⁹، أنا الغاية وليست لي غاية، من أجلي أخذ من أخذ
وبسببي بُذ من بُذ، أنا المطوية باليمين وأنا في قبضة الحق المبين، دعاني الحق
إلى حضرته فأنتيت وناداني إلى معرفته فلبّيت، أنا صورة الفلك ومحل الملك، على
صح الاستوا وعنى كنى بالمستوى، أنا اللاحق الذي لا ألحق كما أن العقاب
السابق الذي لا يسبق هو الأول وأنا الآخر وله الباطن ولي الظاهر، قسم الوجود
بيني وبينه وأنا أظهرت عزّه وكونه، توقف عليّ حكمه وسرى فيه علمي وسرى في
علمه إذا دفعه واهبه فألى لنفيده وإذا أفدته شكرنى لأزيده.

قامت طائفة ممن تدعى العقل الرصين على زعمها وقضت على شبهتها بحكمها
فناطوا بي قبيح الهجاء وخلعوا عني حلة حسن الثناء فحار عليهم وبال ما كانوا

(67) في معظم النسخ: يحصره.

(68) ولي: محال.

(69) ولي، بالهامش: معناه العطايا.

يعملون وحق بهم ما كانوا به يستهزؤون كأنني عمقي يستصرخون فيجابون
 "أخسُّوا فيها ولا تُكَلِّمُون" ⁷⁰ إذا كان في عرضي أهل الثناء الحسن في حقي
 فأكهين هم وأزواجهم "في رَوْضَةٍ يُحْبَرُونَ" ⁷¹ وقد أثنى عليَّ الشرعُ فما أبالي وبين
 مرتبتي السمعُ فما أعالِي.

[رمل]

حكمةٌ لمن يراني ⁷²	إنني من حيث ربي
خُلِقَ بلا بَنانٍ	فأنا السر المسوَّى
خالقي لِمَا بناني	رتب الأمور فيه
تتفجَّر المعاني	فأنا صخرٌ ومِنِّي
مثل أفراس الرهانِ	وأنا مع العوالي
حشمة عن العيانِ	وأنا الذي توارِي
طائِعاً لِمَا دعاني	والذي أجبْتُ ربي
لتصاريف الزمان	فالذي يرى وجودي
فارغاً من المعاني	كفؤاد أم موسى
من حقائق ⁷³ البيان	فهو الخَلِيُّ حقاً
وأنا أَسُّ الأغاني	فأنا أصل المغاني ⁷⁴
فاضلٍ سامي المكانِ	وأنا سرُّ إمامٍ
شأنه أعظم شأنٍ	علمه أكمل علم
في المقاصير الجنان	هام بي لما رَأَني
خائف حد السنان	لأسميه فإنني

(70) سورة المومنون ٢٢: ١٠٨

(71) سورة الروم ٢٠: ١٥

(72) البيت ناقص في الأصل وبا يزيد وحاجي.

(73) جار، حالت: حقيقات.

(74) با يزيد، جار، فاتح، حاجي، حالت: المعاني.

والذي يفهم رمزي هو صخر بن سنان
أكرم الوجود كفاً ثابت⁷⁵ عند الطعان
وأنا والأم والجدة والجد المعاني
في وجودنا عن الحق⁷⁶ معاً بلا زمان
مثل ملاح بعين في الهوا برق يمان

فهذا يا صخر بن سنان قد أوضحت لك مقامات أمهات الأكوان وهو الإنسان الكلي
والعقل الأول والنفس الواحدة والهيولى والجسم الكلي⁷⁷ فابحث فيها بحث العاقل
الطالب نجاة نفسه والسلام على منشئها وعلينا⁷⁸. ⁷⁹

(75) ولي: بطل.

(76) ولي، جار، فاتح، حالت: الجود.

(77) جار، فاتح، حالت: والقلم الأعلى واللوح المحفوظ والهباء والجسم.

(78) في بقية النسخ: والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته.

(79) شهيد: + وصلى على محمد وآله وسلم تسليماً كثيراً كتبه لنفسه أيوب بن بدر بن منصور من أصل الشيخ
وكان بخطه حفظه الله.


ولي: + علقها الفقير أحمد بن محمد مثبت من خط منشئها ابن العربي رحمه الله (وبالهامش:) قرأتها معارضاً
بها الأصل فصحت لدي.

با يزيد: + قويل على النسخة المنقولة منها وهي بخط الشيخ بدر الدين محمد الزاهدي.

جار: + كملت والحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة على سيدنا محمد خاتم النبيين وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين
والحمد لله وحده ووقع الفراغ من تعليق هذه النسخة من نسخة معتمدة في اليوم المبارك تاسع عشرين شعبان
المكرم سنة خمس عشرة وتسعمائة أحسن الله عاقبتها وختم لنا بخير ولجميع المسلمين آمين وحسبنا الله
ونعم الوكيل.

مراد: + كتبه الفقير إلى الله تعالى جمال الدين عبد الله بن إبراهيم لأخيه الفقير الشيخ السالك الناسك العالم
الورع الزاهد قطب الدين محمد بن تقي الدين المشتهر بابن الكبكي البروي (٩) أعاد الله علينا من بركاته
ومفقتنا به والمسلمين في تاريخ أواخر شهر رمضان المبارك هـ ع ض (= 875) والحمد لله وحده.
فاتح: + تمت الرسالة بحمد الله وعونه وحسن توقيقه وصلواته وسلامه على سيدنا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه
وسلم أبداً.

حاجي: + تمت الرسالة المباركة الموسومة بالإتحاد الكوني في حضرة الإشهاد العيني بمحضر الشجرة
الإنسانية والطيور الأربعة الروحانية للشيخ محيي الدين بن العربي رحمه الله تعالى آمين ووافق الفراغ من
كتابتها نهار الأربعاء



The Universal Tree and the Four Birds, one of Ibn 'Arabi's early works, is a dazzling blend of poetry and rhymed prose, encompassing a number of themes that were of perennial concern to the Shaykh al-Akbar. Based on the mystical framework of the ascent, the stages of the journey to union with the Real are described in an intriguingly enigmatic way. Beginning with a dizzying series of poems that explain the existential fluctuation of the human heart, the narrator goes on to describe his meeting with his Essential Self in a place outside of space and time. He then finds himself in a garden with the Universal Tree and four delightful birds: an Eagle, a Ringdove, a fabulous 'Anqā', and a Jet-Black Crow. Each in turn regales the author with a tale of its origins and essential characteristics, but only at the end are their true natures revealed.

The elegant translation is complemented by Angela Jaffray's illuminating commentary on key elements in the text and extensive notes, and a Foreword by Rafi Zabor. The Arabic text, critically edited from the best manuscripts by Denis Gril, is also included.

محمد عيسى بن العربي



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PREFACE

The project goal is the presentation of Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali's teaching on repentance as rendered in his encyclopedic *Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya' 'Ulum ad-Din)*. The presentation is made in two parts.

Part One consists of introductory remarks designed to provide a background against which al-Ghazzali's teachings on repentance can be viewed. Specifically, it includes a short account of the idea of repentance in Jewish and Christian tradition; a discussion of the Koranic notion of repentance; a biographical sketch of al-Ghazzali; an outline of the content and purpose of the *Revival*; a treatment of al-Ghazzali's conception of salvation; and, finally, a profile of al-Ghazzali's position on a number of basic theological issues which are both intrinsically bound to his explication of repentance and generally illustrative of his religious and pedagogical stance.

Part Two consists of the translation of the *Kitab at-Tawba* which is the thirty-first book of al-Ghazzali's *Revival*. A Cairo edition (c. 1965) of the *Revival* was used. In order to achieve a more reliable text, however, one manuscript was used as well as the major printed commentary by al-Zabidi which presents a text in the commentary itself, and another running on the margin. Translations of other books of the *Revival* were examined for terminological usage. Citations from the literature of Tradition (*hadith*) were checked and the references are given in Appendix

A. The references of Appendix A are noted in the translation by lower case letters following the pagination of the Arabic text.

- Many have had a part in the completion of this work. I would especially like to acknowledge those whose contributions were most significant: Deans Finlay and Lobdell of the University of Manitoba, Professor

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- The late Professor G. E. von Grunebaum was a paradigm of humane scholarship; he is missed. Professor Moshe Perlmann, a teacher par

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At last but not least, my wife and partner, Sydel Stern; kind, patient and insightful, she nurtures my mind and my soul. These three have provided personal and professional models for me to emulate. I pray that I might prove worthy of each. To them, with gratitude to the Almighty, I dedicate this book.

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I

By the beginning of the seventh century, when Muhammad was beginning to preach to his new community of believers, repentance had already become a fundamental concept in both Judaism and Christianity. Both of these religious traditions assert the existence of a personal God, the reality of sin and its consequences and, perhaps most importantly, man's freedom both in his ability to commit and overcome sin. Thus man was seen as a moral being capable of breaking away from a negatively valued past and reforming. Furthermore, this conversion is highly valued as a basic virtue and a permanent condition to spiritual accomplishment.

The Hebrew noun *teshubah* ('repentance') is mishnaic in origin (i.e., post-biblical) but the same radical in its verbal form (*shub*) is quite common in the Hebrew Bible. Aside from its denotation 'to turn' or 'to return' in a physical sense,² there is a parallel usage indicating a spiritual or moral conversion. In fact, there are two such usages common, especially in the Latter Prophets. One such usage finds Israel as subject, indicating a conversion from sin to righteousness.³ The other uses the verb with God as subject, indicating the abatement of God's wrath and His extending to Israel a return to grace.⁴ There is a definite collective sense evident in many of these verses which are, incidentally, relatively unique to the Hebrew biblical tradition. The call to return is made to the people Israel, a manifestation of the covenant between God and His people.⁵ Nonetheless, there is clear evidence that the biblical tradition understood the possibility of repentance to exist both outside the people Israel⁶ and within it, on an individual basis.⁷

There are, in fact, two main currents to the idea of repentance in the Hebrew Bible. Firstly there is the ritualistic or cultic system by which man seeks forgiveness through sacrifice and displacement of guilt.⁸ This aspect is best exemplified in the ritual enjoined for the Day of Atonement.

Secondly there is the moral and ethical conversion especially emphasized by the prophetic sections of the Bible.¹⁰ These two currents should not, however, be viewed as totally independent elements. The

PART ONE

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ritual and ethical are intimately related in the biblical conceptions of sin and repentance. Indeed this synthesis becomes one of the fundamental aspects of later rabbinic teaching.¹

Finally, the Hebrew Bible views repentance as a process involving both man and God. Linguistic usage to this effect has already been cited. The prophets, however, put this usage together in such a manner as to indicate that the return by man is the factor under whose initiative God's return is triggered. Clearly, then, the biblical tradition views God's forgiveness and grace as a response to man's obedience.¹²

The Hebrew Bible does not, however, present a single comprehensive conception of repentance. Indeed one sees in this regard the variation of attitude and situation faced by the various biblical authors. The inconsistencies inherent in the biblical texts are, moreover, carried over to some degree into the rabbinic texts of the talmudic period.¹³ It is only in the medieval era, especially in the work of Maimonides, that consistent and comprehensive treatments of the topic are to be found. It can be said, however, that most of the major elements of the rabbinic conception of repentance are already mentioned in the talmudic literature. The talmudic sages were clearly aware of the biblical inconsistencies and the lack of systematic topical treatment may, in large measure, be due to the nature of talmudic literature itself.¹⁴

It is evident, nonetheless, that repentance had become a basic feature of rabbinic piety. The religious poetry of the period, an increasingly important liturgical resource in the post-Temple period, is marked by a high frequency of penitential themes.¹⁵ Further, the word *teshubdh* (repentance) becomes, at this time, a technical theological term, indicating a more intense concern for and treatment of its nature and characteristics.¹⁶ The significance assigned repentance by the talmudic sages is so great that it is credited with having been created prior to the physical world.¹⁷ Attributed to it are special life-giving and redemptive powers.¹⁸ Repentance is, furthermore, viewed as a potent form of righteousness. Consequently, at least some authorities see the penitent as more virtuous than the sinless man.¹⁹

So valued was the penitent in the rabbinic tradition that only his relative virtuosity compared with the unblemished could be questioned. In the Greek philosophical tradition this was not the case. Aristotle, for example, deals with the concept of 'repentance as cure in his *Nichomachean Ethics*. He does not, however, view it as a virtue. The good

man is not given to repentance²⁰ When the two lines converge in the

work of Philo²¹ repentance is introduced into the hellenistic philosophi

cal tradition as a virtue²² It would seem that the rabbinic view of man's fallibility and repentance were already so basic within pre-Destruction first century Judaism that Philo did not hesitate to disagree in this matter with the ancient masters.

In early Christianity, as portrayed in the New Testament, repentance becomes an urgent and pervasive theme. Even before Jesus' advent, John the Baptist, sensing the imminence of Judgement, calls for immediate repentance.²³ This call is taken up by Jesus who often explains the major purpose of his ministry as being the repentance of sinners²⁴

This concept of repentance (*metanoia*) is developed into far more than a turning away from sin. It becomes rather, a complete change of the total spiritual personality.²⁵ Paul describes this in mystical language as a crucifixion and coming again to life.²⁶ With Jesus' death, repentance, as the key to salvation, seems to be replaced by faith²⁷ Yet, as faith was understood it differs little, in process, from repentance. Repentance is man's turning away from sin, faith is his turning to God. The shift can be understood as an adjustment from the intense expectation of an imminent Judgement to the acceptance of the possibility of a prolonged interval between the present and the realization of the Kingdom.

This change, from repentance based on eschatological expectation to repentance based on the demands of normative piety, is an important process. It parallels, in many respects, the changes which are discernible in the teachings of Muhammad after the founding of his community in Medina.²⁸ Perforce, the warning, BUT UNLESS YOU REPENT YOU WILL ALL SIMILARLY PERISH,²⁹ has a different intensity after Jesus' death. In the following centuries, through to the emergence of Islam, Christian theological treatment of repentance never goes beyond the New Testament ideas. In fact, with the increasing involvement of the Church in the sacramental process of penance, of which repentance was considered a part, the intensity of the original concept is often lessened³⁰

In Christianity, however, as in Judaism repentance is highly valued and the penitent, fulfilling, as it were, Jesus' ministry, is considered God's joy. The New Testament parables of the lost sheep and the lost coin are even more emphatic than the rabbinic texts in lauding the virtue of the penitent even against the sinless³¹ Thus is the positive emphasis on repentance in Judaism and Christianity at the beginning of the seventh century.

Tawba is the Arabic equivalent to the Hebrew *teshubh*. It is a loan word borrowed, in its basic verbal form (*tfba*), from Aramaic. It does not have the physical denotation of the biblical *shfb* but does parallel its religious signification.³²

In its verbal forms the Koranic *tfba* occurs both in an absolute form³³ or with one of two prepositions, *ila*³⁴ or *'alf*³⁵ Use of the last mentioned preposition indicates, without exception, that the verb's subject is God. All other instances of the verb refer to man as subject. There are three nominal derivatives each meaning repentance or conversion: *tawb*,³⁶ *matab*,³⁷ and *tawba*.³⁸ The active participle occurs twice³⁹ and there is an adjectival form, *tawwdb*,⁴⁰ which refers to God in all but one case.⁴¹ In all, the word *tfba* or its derivatives occur eighty-four times in the Koran.

The frequency and periodic distribution of this usage would seem to have some significance. Of the eighty four instances in which this radical is encountered, only nineteen are unquestionably of the Meccan period.⁴² Of these nineteen only one is a verbal form with the preposition *'ald*.⁴³ Further, none of the adjectival forms predate the Medinian period. The adjectival *tawwfb* usually appears in tandem with the adjective *rahim*.⁴⁴ Such a double adjectival arrangement with *rahim* occurs in the Meccan period but never with *tawwfb*.⁴⁵ It seems clear that the Koran is asserting that God plays an active role in *tawba* but this idea is developed and stressed only relatively late in Muhammad's prophetic career. In fact, it would seem that whatever process is meant by *tawba*, a clear and decisive definition of which is not to be had in the Koran, it was taught in the Meccan period but not stressed or developed until after Muhammad's move to Medina.

Tfba and its derivatives are not the only words used in the Koran to indicate repentance. *Raja a*, a word meaning return in both physical and religious contexts, is used.⁴⁶ This word has not, however, become a legal or theological idiom and its religious signification would appear to be a simple extension of its literal meaning. Derivatives of *fba*⁴⁷ and the fourth verbal form of *nfb*⁴⁸ are found in the Koran and do, moreover, occur frequently in later literature.

In the context of the later usage, Hujwiri differentiates the three terms by reference to those who are repenting and their spiritual state at the time of penitence. *Tfba* refers to the repentance of the ordinary man; *anfba*, the repentance of the elect; and *fba*, the repentance of the elite,

those who have attained the degree of divine love.⁴⁹ It does not necessarily follow that this represents the Koranic usage but it is reasonable to assume that Muhammad did, in fact, use them to denote different aspects or categories of repentance.

Aba and its derivatives occur seventeen times in the Koran. Of these, only one is undoubtedly of the Medinian period.⁵⁰ None of these, including the adjectival form *awwfb* are used to refer to God. Only one verbal form is present and the subject is the mountains which are to sing God's praises along with David.⁵¹ *Anfba* appears eighteen times from among which only one instance is clearly of Medinian origin.⁵² Again, all these refer to man. *Tfba*, on the other hand, occurs, as noted above, eighty four times. Of these, only nineteen are, without question, Meccan. Here God is often referred to and some forms, such as *tawwfb*, almost exclusively refer to God.

Muhammad was, in Mecca, a warner. He called the people to return to God immediately, the Judgement was at hand. This type of return or conversion, based on imminent eschatological expectations, must be total, immediate and radical. When Muhammad moved to Medina he became increasingly concerned with establishing a normative frame for his growing community.⁵³ The concept of repentance, in this context, needed to be more sympathetic to the temptations and ignorant follies of man. If man's conversion was to remain steadfast over a relatively extended period he would feel the need for God, in His mercy, to undertake an active helping and accepting role. This would seem to be the concept expressed by the *tfba* terminology. It is perhaps of interest that in Medina, and in the context of *tawba*, Muhammad proclaims that deathbed repentance is unacceptable.⁵⁴ If, in fact, man can prepare himself for the final judgement only in this life, it seems inconsistent with the Meccan message to invalidate deathbed repentance. Yet, it is explained by the shift in the grounding of repentance from an eschatological frame to one of normative piety.

The Koran does not offer a precise definition of *tawba*. It is clear, however, that *tawba* represents, at its most basic level, an abandonment of sin and a reorientation to a life of obedience.⁵⁵ It follows, then, that

there must exist an awareness of having sinned and a feeling of remorse which moves one to turn away from sin. Repudiation of sin, however, is not sufficient. The Koran often juxtaposes *tawba* and the pursuit of righteousness.⁵⁶ It is not clear whether the latter is a part of the process of repentance or consequent to it. Whichever is the case, however, man's hope of divine forgiveness requires such a conversion.

Repentance is a requisite, although not necessarily determining, condition to the salvation of the sinner.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the Koran posits a special relationship between the penitent sinner and God. If man repents and turns to God (ild), God repents over man ('ala), turns to him and, perchance, will forgive him. God, moreover, places special value on the penitent and loves them.⁵⁸ One can conclude, therefore, that while the process of *tawba* is the repudiation and abandonment of sin, its purpose is the reconciliation of man to God. That the one could follow the other becomes intelligible only by understanding the Koranic conception of sin.

The Koran, in accord with its general character, does not elaborate a systematic theory of sin. There are, however, frequent references to sin, its consequences, and its possible forgiveness. From these references it is

possible to construct an outline of the Koranic concept of sin ⁵⁹

Sin is a breach of moral norms. The Koran, standing by itself, does not present a comprehensive moral code. It does, however, assert a moral sanction, God. When man commits an indecent act it is to God that he must turn in seeking forgiveness.⁶⁰ This religious orientation stands in 'sharp contrast to what was, fundamentally, a socially sanctioned, conservative and pragmatic moral standard in pre-Islamic pagan Arabia.⁶¹ This assertion of a religious orientation, which infers that sin alienates man from God, is further augmented by the very concept of repentance. Sin's cure lies, at least in part, in turning to God. The assumption that in sinning man has turned from God is clear. This concept, while clearly present in the Koran, is not as fully developed as it later becomes in al-Ghazzali's writings. It is, in this regard, interesting to note that the term *ma'siya*, which denotes disobedience and rebellion, is used frequently by al-Ghazzali to signify sin. In the Koran it appears only twice and in both cases relates to disobedience to a prophet.⁶² An additional indication of this orientation is to be found in the references to atonement. The Koran does not provide for, any specific atonement ritual such as is to be found in Judaism⁶³ It does indicate, however, that good deeds atone for sin. The fact that it specifies certain ritual observances, i.e.,

the correct execution of ^{prayers}, as efficacious can be attributed to the
underlying assumption that sin is fundamentally an offense against

God⁶⁴

Sin also entails damage to the perpetrator. Man, in sinning, falls short of his own potential. To express the concept of sin the Koran uses, among other terms, words derived from the radical *Kh-t'*.⁶⁵ This radical indicates stumbling or falling short of target.⁶⁶ The Koran indicates, moreover, that a man who accepts God's morality perceives in sin an

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effacement of self. Thus, for example, Moses says: O MY LORD, I HAVE WRONGED MYSELF (*zalamtu nafsī*) ⁶⁷ For Muhammad, sin effects more than subjectively discernible damage. Sin also leads man to hellfire, barring him from the rewards set aside for the righteous.⁶⁸ But, unlike the concepts of sin and justice in some other traditions,⁶⁹ the Koran asserts the lack of necessity in God's executing punishment ⁷⁰ The concept of uncontrolled and unwilling Fate is lacking.

The Koran refers to a differentiation between major and minor sins ⁷¹ It is not clear, however, which sins are included in either category or by what criteria they are to be differentiated. The classification of sin according to intensity, reference and effect is the product of later stages in the development of Islamic law and theology. The elaboration of a theory of sin, and the tangential questions suggested by such an elaboration, constituted one of the major elements in the controversy out of which Islamic orthodoxy emerged.

III

Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali was born in the year 1058 in or around Tus, a town in northeastern Persia. After an active and varied life, he died in Tus in the year 1111.⁷² Interestingly, while al-Ghazzali was an extremely prolific writer and, in many regards, a pivotal figure in Islamic life, only the barest sketch of biographical information about him is available. To a great degree this is due to al-Ghazzali himself who does not often reveal his private self beyond what he deems necessary for pedagogical purposes. This is best illustrated by the obvious gaps in al-Ghazzali's semi-autobiographical *Deliverance* whose real purpose seems more instructional and apologetic than personal and confessional. ⁷³ Nonetheless, it is essential to take note of his own intentional 'conversion' in order to properly comprehend his approach and to place it in its proper historical setting.

Al-Ghazzali was orphaned at an early age, and according to his father's will, he was placed in the care of a family friend. He and his brother were given a traditional education in the religious sciences and al-Ghazzali then followed an educational course leading to certification as a jurist and theologian (*'slim*). Given the mobility of students in that milieu, it is not at all unusual that he travelled to Nishapur in 1077 to study under al-Juwayni, a leading jurist of the age. He remained there, studying and

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teaching, until his mentor's death in 1085.

When al-Juwayni died, al-Ghazzali joined the entourage of the Seljuq vizier Nizam al-Mulk. He remained with the vizier until Nizam appointed him to a professorship at the Baghdad Nizamiyya college in July of 1091.

He continued in his professorship for four years until his spiritual crisis led to his resignation and withdrawal from public life in 1095.⁷⁴

Al-Ghazzali, in the *Deliverance*,⁷⁵ described his unrelenting search for certainty and truth. This quest, which al-Ghazzali states led to his crisis, brought him to study the four major intellectual and spiritual approaches of his day: theology, philosophy, Isma'ili authoritarian instruction (*ta'lim*) and Sufism. Yet, a critical analysis of his work and behaviour must lead to the conclusion that his crisis, and therefore his conversion, needs to be viewed as personal, immediate and nonacademic.⁷⁶

What caused the eruption of al-Ghazzali's crisis? Authoritarian instruction does not seem to have been an acceptable personal option. When he refers to it, he is totally polemical. Sufism, on the other hand, was not a new experience. The family friend, in whose care he had been placed as a child, was himself a sufi.⁷⁷ Rather, al-Ghazzali's crisis flowed from his increasing disenchantment with his colleagues in Baghdad. They were not the great religious models he had thought them to be. In his view, they were using their scholarship to further worldly ambitions.⁷⁸ In all probability al-Ghazzali became alarmed because, seeing himself fall into that same state, he became increasingly uncertain of his salvation. This uncertainty, coupled with a feeling of personal worthlessness, caused a progressive functional breakdown until al-Ghazzali finally resolved to withdraw from public life and follow the sufi Way in search of personal salvation. That there were other factors, political ones among them, which encouraged his departure from Baghdad is not to be discounted. Yet, they can only have been secondary. In all probability the other factors were decisive only in highlighting the worldliness of al-Ghazzali's status.⁷⁹

Al-Ghazzali spent the next ten years in retirement. Part of the time was spent in Syria, some on pilgrimage, and it seems, some in Baghdad itself. He returned to teaching, however, at the Nizamiyya college of Nishapur in 1106. He later went into semi-retirement in Tus where he established a small circle among whom he taught.⁸⁰

His undertaking of renewed public duties is indicative of the direction in which his penitential search led him. The answer to his previous worldliness was not in withdrawal but rather in reorientation, and in a way, intensification of his pedagogical work.⁸¹ His sensitivity to the responsibility of the '*ulama*' class brought him to realize that a 'return' on his part necessitated his working towards a general return, and therefore, a revival of the religious sciences.⁸²

Al-Ghazzali's influence on the development of Islam is both significant and multi-faceted. He helped to reintroduce the element of fear into the service of God. His work in the areas of philosophy and theology brought these disciplines a clarity that made them available to and treatable by the greater number of Muslims. In fact, though his interests and foci changed after 1095, he remained throughout his life a doctor of the Law. His later work, as exemplified in the *Revival*, was as significant to his theology as his earlier efforts. He also created a framework within which sufism attained an assured position within Orthodox Islam. These, moreover, are only some of his important contributions.⁸³

Nonetheless, the above are only contributing elements in the ultimate importance of al-Ghazzali to Islam. Above all he was a religious teacher and guide who felt and exhibited an overriding concern for his fellow believers. His greatest strength lay in his ability, as literary artist and teacher, to project his concern and involvement in the spiritual condition of his age.⁸⁴

Al-Ghazzali, as noted, was a very prolific writer. His works cover almost all the major areas of Islamic religious thought.⁸⁵ The *Ihya' 'Ulum ad-Din, Revival of the Religious Sciences*, an encyclopedic work that was written over a period of years beginning with his departure from Baghdad in 1095, is his magnum opus. While not written in a personal or confessional style, it represents the fruits of al-Ghazzali's years of spiritual development and sufi travelling. It is a vibrant work frequently using anecdotes and parables.⁸⁶ It is characterized, as is most of his writings, by the use of emotional as well as rational persuasion, a mark of his pedagogical style and skill.⁸⁷

Its intended purpose is to fundamentally redirect the attitude of the believer. In his *Beginning of Guidance*, al-Ghazzali declares that his *Revival* attempts, by increasing the fear of God and the believer's awareness of self, to decrease the appetite for this world and increase the desire for the life to come. The *Revival* will acquaint the Muslim with the internal aspects of piety which will lead to the opening of the supernal realm.⁸⁸

Al-Ghazzali divided the believers into two main categories: the 'vulgar' (*'awamm*) and the elite (*khawass*). The 'vulgar' is the intellectually and spiritually limited masses, usually possessed of imitative faith (*tagiid*).

Of the sciences of the hereafter they should be restricted to the practical sciences (*'ilm al-mu amala*). The elite is that group of believers which is intellectually and spiritually capable of revelatory faith. They are initiated to the science of vision (*'ilm al-mukashafa*)⁸⁹ Many have concluded that al-Ghazzali taught a 'double truth': an exoteric doctrine for the 'vulgas', and a higher esoteric truth for the elite. Professor Lazarus Yafeh has ably shown that such was not the case. For al-Ghazzali there was only one truth. As an accomplished and skilled pedagogue, however, he realized that different people have varying capacities for understanding. Al-Ghazzali, therefore, advocated limiting the amount of the singular truth taught, according to the capability of the student to absorb and comprehend it⁹⁰

Al-Ghazzali, as becomes one who considered himself primarily a teacher and spiritual physician, usually inclined to the theory that a man's rank was subject to his own will and effort. Given this position, the division of believers loses its rigidity. Most, if not all, of those who are to be reckoned :part of the 'vulgas' could raise themselves to the elite class. It would seem, in fact, that al-Ghazzali considered such endeavour to be each man's duty⁹¹

For whom, then, did alGhazzali write the *Revival*? Wilzer asserts that

the *Revival* was written for dw 'vulgas'..She bases this assertion on the repentance terminology used in the *b at-Tawba*. According to Tiujwiri's definitions, the **appropriate terms** for the repentance of the elite would be *abu o aaaa*, niter of which is used hereby ai-Ghazzali. Since al-Ghazzali treats only Twba, defined by Hujwiri as **the** repentance of the masses, she concludes that the *Ritnb at-Tawba* is wholly exoteric⁹² This position, however, ignores that fact that, despite disclaimers, al-Ghazzali struggles in the *JWOb at-Tawba*, as in other books of the *Revival*, with concepts that belong to the areas of knowledge reserved for the initiated⁹³ This apparent contradiction can only be resolved by reference to al-Ghazzali's fluid concept of the 'vulgas' and his graded approach to the revelation of the one truth. There are believers, not yet of the elite but who are capable of being guided to that Path by means of an awakening to some of the divine secrets. These people are led gradually to a fuller and more comprehensive knowledge of the truth.

It is to this group that the *Revival* is directed.⁹⁴

The *Revival* is divided into four quarters, each of which consists of ten books. The first quarter opens with a book dealing with knowledge and learning. It is here, at the very outset, that al-Ghazzali sets out the indictment of the '*ulama*'. The remainder, of this first quarter deals with

ritual observance (e.g., prayer, fasting, alms, etc.). The second quarter deals with the regulation of personal and social aspects of life (e.g., eating, marriage, livelihood, etc.). In the first half, al-Ghazzali deals with the usual legalistic aspects of religious life common to the literature of the '*ulamd*'. The second half deals with traits of the spirit and character. The third quarter treats the negative traits against which man must strive. These include anger, pride, the evil of the tongue and the like. The fourth and last quarter undertakes the exposition of positive traits and their acquisition. It examines patience, asceticism, contentment, selfexamination and such as these. This second section is clearly sufi and not unlike many non-Muslim devotional manuals⁹⁵

It would be wrong, however, to see the *Revival* as consisting of two separate strands: the legalistic and the mystic. One of al-Ghazzali's most significant characteristics is his blending and harmonizing of these two previously divergent lines. There were, before his time, observant (i.e. orthodox) sufis. Some of these were also members of the '*ulama*' class. Yet, to some, orthodoxy must have seemed mere conformity, while with others the two lines were compartmentalized and, therefore, separate. The external observance exists on one level, and the internal, pietistic search on another. For al-Ghazzali, however, the external and legalistic observances of Islam are the very basis for the internal mystic search. Islamic practices were, for him, the means of drawing near to God and preparing for the life to come⁹⁶ Indeed, just as al-Ghazzali sought to give deeper content to the religious life of the mechanically pious, he also showed great concern to remove the strongly entrenched indifference to the religious commandments from among the mystics.⁹⁷

All of al-Ghazzali's studies and experiences are reflected in the *Revival*. He, like the mystics before him, found in the Koran, the Tradition, and the literature of law, the first seeds of a moral-religious approach.⁹⁸ Yet he never turned away from them. He continued, throughout his career, to draw from these sources and to refine their concepts in light of his mystic studies and experiences. he further clarified them by struggling with the ideas

presented by the major movements (e.g., *mu tazila*, *kalam*, philosophy, etc.) of Islamic civilization.' Much of the success that the *Revival* enjoyed in bringing together once divergent lines of tradition can be attributed to the unity which al-Ghazzali himself brought to his work.

Repentance, as might be expected, is treated in the last quarter of the *Revival*. In fact, it is the first book of the fourth quarter. Al-Ghazzali, no doubt, viewed repentance as the most basic and requisite process for

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attaining positive spiritual qualities working towards the goal of salvation. In many ways his treatment of repentance typifies the totality of his teachings as explicated in the *Revival*.

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The goal of life, for al-Ghazzali, is the attainment of salvation.⁹⁹ To the uninitiated Muslim, God, the highest spiritual entity, forms with man a personal moral community.¹⁰⁰ The fulfillment of this relationship, one in which God is the Master and man the slave, is at Judgement. In the hereafter, the temporal locus of Judgement, God is manifested in the absoluteness of His mastery, and man in the totality of his subservience. If man is granted salvation, he is vindicated in judgement and awarded the rewards of Paradise. If he, in this life, has failed, he is damned and cast into hellfire. For such a Muslim the guiding theme of life is fear of God, i.e., fear of being denied the rewards of Paradise and fear of the torments of Hell.¹⁰¹

Al-Ghazzali did not consider Fear, an element promoted both by the Koran and the early ascetics, to be of no value. For the 'vulgar', whose faith is imitative and whose understanding is limited, it is as effective a means to salvation as is possible.¹⁰² For the gnostic (*arif*), however, fear can only be a preliminary stage which is overtaken by the stage of Love. Such a man does not seek the pleasures of Paradise nor does he fear the fires of Hell. He only desires to encounter his Beloved. His only fear is separation from God.¹⁰³ Whereas the masses prepare for Judgement, the mystics seek the bliss of knowing God. They become, as it were, indifferent to the whole concept of Judgement as it relates to Paradise and Hell. Their salvation- is with and in God.

In some mystic traditions the ultimate goal of man's search is to become one with God.¹⁰⁴ This objective was, within the monotheistic tradition of Islam, unacceptable. The gulf between God and man cannot be bridged. Yet, for al-Ghazzali, man could, indeed should, strive to attain knowledge of God.¹⁰⁵ This knowledge, the search of which becomes man's true purpose and vocation, is not intellectual (*'ilm*) (although intellectual knowledge is an important factor in the search for higher states). Rather, the sought after knowledge is intuitive and experiential (*ma'rifa*). In experiencing this knowledge man finds God. Through this illumination the gnostic achieves a portion of the divine substance.¹⁰⁶

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The traditional terminology for God, in this context, is *mahbub* (Beloved).¹⁰⁷ For al-Ghazzali this was a most apt term. If a man truly finds God as his Beloved, he will seek naught save that knowledge that will allow him to draw nigh and enjoy the bliss of proximity.¹⁰⁸ Gnosis (*ma'rifa*) and Love (*hubb*) always go together.¹⁰⁹ For such a lover the only true salvation is being near to God. The only damnation to fear is that which bars man from God's presence.

This idea, that the greatest bliss is proximity to God, is not unique to the mystical tradition of Islam. Indeed, it is to be found in the Koran¹¹⁰ as well as the talmudic tradition.¹¹¹ Yet, in those sources the expectation of intuitive knowledge or experience of God's presence is projected solely in the context of the hereafter. Maimonides, for example, who asserts that knowledge of God is man's prime duty, is discussing an intellectual phenomenon.¹¹² When he asserts the bliss of Encounter (i.e., the equivalent of *ma'rifa*) as the reward of the righteous, he clearly is talking of the rewards of the hereafter.¹¹³ The mystics, al-Ghazzali included, understood this experience to be attainable, through ecstasy, in this life. Indeed, it is only through gnosis that man can, in this life, gain a clear and direct image of the life to come.¹¹⁴

What role, then, does this world (*dunya*) play in al-Ghazzali's concept of salvation?

This life, which is called the World of the Material and the Evident (*'alam al-mulk wa-sh-shahada*), compares to the hereafter, called the World of the Hidden and Transcendent (*'alam al-ghayb wa-l-malakut*), as sleep

compares to the waking state. The literal form of a dream cannot yield a knowledge of the true state of things. Truth, however, can be revealed by the proper interpretation of the content or meaning of a dream. Thus, in this life, man is limited in his apprehension of the true state of things in the hereafter by his ability to properly interpret the parables and allegories presented him by prophecy. Man can directly experience and know God only by gnosis (*ma'rifa*).¹¹⁵ This too, however, is strictly limited. Man, because of his very nature, cannot achieve perfect and lasting gnosis in this life.¹¹⁶ So long as man's state of morality and knowledge is imperfect, a condition whose inevitability will be treated below, he cannot aspire to ^{salvation, i.e.,} full knowledge of and proximity to God, in this life. Salvation is only to be found in the hereafter.¹¹⁷

This life is an antechamber to the hereafter.¹¹⁸ Al-Ghazzali is wont to refer to the tradition which asserts that this world is a field for the cultivation of the hereafter.¹¹⁹ Man's life in this world plays a prepara

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tory role in which he can assure for himself either salvation or consignment to damnation. The possibility of achieving some measure of gnosis in this life allows man to foretaste, as it were, of the saved state in the hereafter. He can then be in a position to appreciate the rewards of the good life.

The relationship between this life and the hereafter is, in al-Ghazzali's thought, much more complex than just an antechamber leading into the great hall. Man, he asserts, will experience nothing new in the hereafter. Man receives, in the hereafter, only as he has provided himself in this world. If man wishes to find salvation in the hereafter, he must struggle to achieve gnosis, salvation's foretaste, while still in this ephemeral life.¹²⁰ This concept is very similar to the one expressed in the rabbinic dictum which states that only he who has prepared on the eve of the Sabbath will eat on the Sabbath.¹²¹ The parallel is very apt. In the rabbinic tradition, the Sabbath is spoken of as a foretaste of the life to come.¹²²

It is of interest to note that al-Ghazzali posits, in this regard, another parallel between this life and the hereafter. In different contexts he calls his reader's attention to the fact that the Master of both worlds is one and the same and, furthermore, that His order (*sunna*) is constant.¹²³ In trying to thus connect this world and the hereafter he is not saying that both are exactly alike. Such would be grossly inconsistent with his projections on the nature of the hereafter. He is saying, however, that there is a continuity between the two worlds. One can in no way dissociate the effects of man's life in this world from what he can expect in the hereafter. Thus, while the nature of man's life in the hereafter is unique, its roots and causes are to be found in his temporal existence.¹²⁴

Al-Ghazzali, finally, views this world not merely as a preparation for the hereafter, but as a test.¹²⁵ This world (*dunyā*) is the prime cause of sin and, therefore, man's alienation from God. This world is not intrinsically evil but, if man begins to live it for its own sake, it will lead him to perdition. For al-Ghazzali all sin can be traced to a man's finding excessive delight in the pleasures of this world. This life should be valued only for its functional use in aiding man to achieve salvation. Al-Ghazzali does not advocate extreme asceticism. Such behaviour, in his view, makes man as much a slave to this world as its opposite. Rather, man must learn to use this world to meet his primary goal and be prepared to renounce that which is neither useful nor desirable to that end.¹²⁶ This moderate asceticism should not be confused with the denial

that al-Ghazzali prescribes for individuals as self-castigation for specific sins. If an individual finds himself so attracted to an aspect of the temporal world that it is leading him to sin, he should renounce it even though, for most men, it would be permissible.¹²⁷

In sum, therefore, this world (*dunyā*) is a preparation for the hereafter. It is a test of man's worthiness and, in fact, a context within which he can gain a foothold on or preclude himself from salvation. Salvation, however, belongs to the hereafter. Only in the hereafter can the success of man's efforts in this life truly be validated.¹²⁸

What is man that this life becomes a test and thus threatens his salvation? Al-Ghazzali sees man as being endowed, as part of his basic nature, with two hostile forces: appetite and intellect. They are not, however, equal or co-temporal. These forces develop progressively as man grows older. The first to develop are the impulses leading man to desire the delights of this world. Only later, over a span of some thirty-three years beginning at age seven, does the intellect develop as a control on the appetites. Its function is to limit man's devotion to the mundane and direct him to knowledge of God and, thereby, to salvation.¹²⁹

Al-Ghazzali considers the unbridled pursuit of one's appetites as the basic road to alienation from God, i.e., sin. It follows, then, that with a person's appetites developing before the formation of the intellect, sin is inevitable. Even after the intellect has emerged it requires many years of development before it fully matures. If the appetites are allowed to gain control, the development of the intellect may be stunted and it may never reach full maturity. In such a case sin becomes impervious to conquest as well as inevitable.¹³⁰ This view of sin's inevitability in man is shared by both later Christianity and Judaism.¹³¹ The view, moreover, that man's moral position is strongly affected by the development of his impulses during his early years is reflected in the biblical

tradition¹³²

Man's appetites and impulses, according to al-Ghazzali, also develop progressively and sequentially. First, man develops an animal disposition. Then he moves on to a predatory, a satanic, and finally, an egotistic disposition. Each of these stages, separately and in combination, leads man to different traits, and therefore, the tendency to different sins. At the first stage a man might sin by robbery. At the last stage his sin might consist of tyranny over his fellows. Just as a man's intellectual growth may be retarded by the force of his passions, so might his intellect limit the development of sinful tendencies. Al-Ghazzali asserts, therefore, that each person will have a proclivity to a different set of sins. This subjective factor is, for al-Ghazzali, as teacher and spiritual physician, of great

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significance.¹³³

Al-Ghazzali maintains that man is created with a sound heart (*galb salim*). Furthermore, only a person who, at the end of his life, presents himself to God with a sound heart, will be granted salvation in the here

after." This position seems to indicate that man starts life with salvation assured and must only insure that he does nothing to forfeit it. Yet al-Ghazzali also asserts that sin is not an act that counters man's natural disposition. Indeed, sin is inevitable. Moreover, in the parable of the conquering king, the parable by which al-Ghazzali explicates the various states of the hereafter, he has a specific classification for the likes of the feeble-minded and the children; those who are, for various reasons not under their control, beyond obedience or disobedience. Al-Ghazzali does not assign them to Paradise. They are not rewarded with salvation, neither are they condemned to hellfire.¹³⁵ The sound heart which brings salvation is, for al-Ghazzali, only such a heart as has become pure through refinement.¹³⁶ Al-Ghazzali's position that every man is born with a sound heart would seem to indicate his conviction that every man has, in his very nature and constitution, the potential for attaining salvation. Notwithstanding the inevitability of sin, no man is inherently evil. This understanding is consistent with al-Ghazzali's statement at the beginning of the *Kitab at-Tawba* that total evil is not the nature of man but of Satan. The nature of man, he asserts there, is to sin but afterward to return to good through sincere repentance.¹³⁷ Each man has the potential to return the heart God have him in trust, refined by his deeds, and thereby worthy of salvation.

In light of the above it is pertinent to note that al-Ghazzali did not accept the concept of infallibility (*'Lsma*).¹³⁸ In the biographies of the Prophet (sira) and in Koranic exegesis (*tafsir*) there exists a tendency, much akin to rabbinic Midrash, to create a more perfect personality for the faith's model. This led to a widespread acceptance among Sunni dogmatists of the concept of prophetic immunity from sin and error. Among the *shi'a*, of course, infallibility was attributed to the imam to a greater degree than to the prophets.¹³⁹ In al-Ghazzali's view no man is free of sin, it is a part of man's fundamental make-up. Al-Ghazzali, in many of his writings, makes clear his attitude of opposition to this basic aspect of Shi'ism.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, as regards the Sunni tradition, in discussing the requisite qualities and attributes of the community's leadership he explicitly denies infallibility as a requisite.¹⁴¹ In fact, al-Ghazzali advocated, for pedagogical purposes, the public discussion of the prophets' sins and their consequent punishment.¹⁴² All men are fallible

but they are also given the potential to overcome the weakness of their nature and achieve salvation.

The ground of sin is the pursuit and love of the mundane world. Such pursuit diverts man from the search for the hereafter and leads to the loss of salvation. The nature of sin is disobedience and its effect is the alienation of man from God. The specifics of any particular act of sinning are important in the process of correction but are irrelevant in defining the act-as sinful. It is the disobedience to God, in whatever form it is manifested, that removes one from proximity to God.¹⁴³

It has already been noted that man's nature, combining appetites and intellect, make his sinning inevitable but also provides the wherewithal for overcoming the consequences of sin and achieving salvation. This comes through the intellect's gaining control over the appetites. The intellect masters the appetites by gaining knowledge and leading to gnosis. When it fails, totally or partially, it leaves the man with active appetites and ignorance (*jahl*), and such a state leads inexorably to sin. Knowledge, then, is the key to avoidance of sin.¹⁴⁴

Belief, according to al-Ghazzali, is of two types. Firstly, there is the belief in God, His attributes and deeds. This belief belongs to the category al-Ghazzali refers to as the science of revelation (*'ilm al-mukashafa*). To be lacking in such faith is to be left with sheer unbelief and, therefore, perdition. It is the root of all belief and knowledge without which there can be no other. Secondly, there is the belief, termed faith (*iman*), in the practical duties and states of man's heart. In his al-Ghazzali refers to under the heading of the science of behavior (*'ilm al-mu dmala*). This belief is equated, in al-Ghazzali's writings, with knowledge. If one's belief in the practical sciences is defective, therefore, he is ignorant. Ignorance, again, is the condition that brings man to sin. It follows, then, that a person may indeed sin while still being a believer. A defect in the latter belief does not

necessitate a defect in the former.¹⁴⁵

Al-Ghazzali understood, however, as did others in the Christian and Jewish traditions, that sin is an inner process of disease and decay.¹⁴⁶ Continuing sinfulness, which of itself is a defect only in the context of the practical sciences, must, little by little, erode the belief in the science of revelation. Eventually, if sin is left unchecked, the erosion of basic belief will lead to spiritual death, the loss of the heart.¹⁴⁷ If one loses the heart, of course, salvation is precluded. In this context al-Ghazzali is fond of using the parable of the mirror. Man's heart is like a mirror which was originally brought to a high polish (i.e., man is born with a sound heart). If he sins he allows vapour and filth to encrust itself upon

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the surface of the mirror. If this process is not controlled and reversed the metal becomes so dull as to preclude the possibility of reburnishing. Once the mirror begins to dull it must immediately be cleansed and polished. Thus, a man, after sinning, must proceed forthwith to attain the knowledge that counteracts the dulling effect of ignorance and defective faith; if not, the course of the decay will proceed apace.¹⁴⁸ This process of correction is, of course, repentance. It emerges from the confrontation between knowledge and ignorance. This confrontation, rooted as it is in human nature, is constant and enduring. Thus repentance is a life-long obligation flowing from the imperfection of man.¹⁴⁹

In pre-Islamic Arabia the gods were worshipped with certain rites centering on public sacrifice. It has already been noted that the morality of the age seems to have had limited religious sanction or relevance. The pagan, insofar as he went beyond the mundane, lived in a world filled with magical forces to be propitiated and neutralized. Muhammad, in preaching the message of Islam, cancelled public sacrifice and relegated such ritual to a private and secondary status. He instituted public worship through prayer and taught obedience to God through the fulfillment of the religious commandments.¹⁵⁰ This parallels, to a significant degree, a process of change in rabbinic Judaism just before and following the destruction of the second Temple of Jerusalem. In Judaism, the sacrificial cult was slowly losing ground to the institution of the synagogue so that, with the destruction of the Temple, a smooth transition to obligatory public prayer was possible. The developments of the later biblical tradition in which the sacrificial practices were increasingly limited by the prophetic call to worship through good works and piety, were decisive in the development of both talmudic Judaism and Christianity.¹⁵¹

The centrality of the pious life in obedience to the divine commandments was challenged by the proponents of sufism. The mystics believed that perfection and salvation could be achieved only by the search for knowledge and experience of God. Worship, on its various levels, was to be defined by its utility in the quest for the unitive state. Many of those travelling on the mystic Way developed an indifference to the observance of the commandments. They viewed the commandments, all normative piety, as a lower form of spirituality designed for the uninitiated masses. Al-Ghazzali sought to inculcate the mystics with an appreciation of the basic importance of obedience to God through the commandments as an ongoing requisite of salvation.¹⁵²

Maimonides, representative of many medieval thinkers, in this regard

viewed the religious commandments as a means by which man, through control of his bestial impulses and the discipline of virtue, could perfect himself, morally and intellectually. Having thus perfected himself, man would be prepared for the ultimate knowledge of God. This knowledge, for Maimonides, was philosophical.¹⁵³ After attaining to this perfection the commandments are no longer functional.¹⁵⁴ Al-Ghazzali's position is, to a great extent, parallel. The purpose of the commandments is to help man master his appetites, educate himself in virtuous living, and deepen his religious experience. Al-Ghazzali does not, however, view the intellectual knowledge of God to be the highest objective. Man's goal is knowledge, intuitive and experiential. In this world such experience is only attainable through deeds of obedience. Observance of the commandments, then, lead to knowledge ('ilm). This knowledge further refines his deeds which allow him to experience gnosis. Man's nature, furthermore, is such that there are always forces working to dull the surface of his heart. The result, for the pilgrim (*sdlik*), is a continuous need for further commitment to the pursuit of obedience through the observance of the commandments. Moreover, the higher a man is able to reach in his knowledge, the more he is able to infuse his observance with depth of intent. In the 'way of the hereafter' the proper observance of the commandments require the combination of knowledge and action (*'ilm wa- aural*). The process creates a spiral of expanding knowledge leading to deeper observance which, in turn, brings man to greater knowledge. Clearly al-Ghazzali was addressing himself to both the shallow religiosity of the mechanically pious and the rootless spirituality of the libertine mystics.¹⁵⁵

In sum, then, salvation is to be found in the experience of God the Beloved. It is a constant state attainable only in the hereafter. It must, however, be cultivated in this life which is a proving ground of man's worthiness. Man's nature is such as makes sin and ignorance, the seeds of the disease of the heart, inevitable, but it is also such as allows him, through observance of the religious commandments, in an increasingly refined and deepened manner, to expand his knowledge of God. The continuing combination of knowledge and obedience,

counteracting ignorance and heedlessness (*ghafla*), permits his attaining a measure of gnosis, the foretaste of salvation. This foretaste is itself a credit redeemable in the hereafter.

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During the early formative years of classical Islam there emerged a number of debates whose development and resolution were decisive in forming the body of doctrine that became accepted as orthodox.¹⁵⁶ Among these was the debate over the individual and communal consequences of sin. The Koran indicates that sin leads man to hellfire.¹⁵⁷ The questions that arose, in this context, concerned which sins or types of sin are those that result in damnation and, following such a determination, what status does one sinning in such a way have within the community of believers.

The Koran differentiates, as to punishment or forgiveness, between two groupings of sin: grave (*kabira*) and minor (*saghira*). This can be seen in the verse: IF YOU AVOID THE HEINOUS SINS THAT ARE FORBIDDEN YOU, WE WILL ACQUIT YOU OF YOUR EVIL DEEDS AND ADMIT YOU BY THE GATE OF HONOUR.¹⁵⁸ Thus it follows that minor sin does not, of itself, carry the punishment of hell fire. The people of Hell are those who commit grave sins. The ensuing debate concerned itself, then, with the immediate and ultimate disposition of such as commit sins considered grave.

The *khdriji* sectarians believed, to use Watt's terminology, in the 'charismatic community'.¹⁵⁹ Salvation was tied into membership in the community of believers which alone was the source of the people of Paradise. Moreover, salvation was dependent on the integrity of the community. A person who committed a grave sin was, therefore, to be excised from the community. Such a man is an unbeliever and of the people of Hell. These people, moreover, posing a threat to the salvation of the entire community, must be fought, killed if necessary. There were, however, variations within the *khariji* movement. The *azariga*, for example, were extreme in the application of this principle. They never succeeded in forming large or stable communities and were constantly in armed conflict with the established political and social order. The *najdiyya*, however, did succeed in establishing their own political unit. The practical demands of government were, no doubt, responsible for a more moderate approach. They asserted that isolated instances of sin did not make one an unbeliever or threaten the salvation of the community. Such a threat only followed persistent grave violations. In any case, all the *khariji* factions held the position that grave sin was unbelief and its consequence was eternal punishment¹⁶⁰

The *mu'tazila*, like most other Islamic groups, did not concur in this attitude toward a salvational community. They held that one who commits a grave sin is neither a believer nor an unbeliever. Rather, he occupies an intermediate position (*manila bayna 'l-manzilatayn*). Their outlook, as with most other early Islamic theologies, was more individualistic. They did concur with the *kharijis*, however, that the consequence

of grave sin is eternal punishment.¹⁶¹

A third group, important for the emergence of the orthodox view, was the *nuurji'a*. They believed that the status of the grave sinner, both as to his being a believer and his ultimate fate, were matters that could not be judged by men. They were questions best left for God at Judgement. Man should, to be considered a believer in this temporal setting, make the profession of faith. This latter consideration evokes the question of the relative importance, as regards man's ultimate disposition, of faith versus works.¹⁶²

The orthodox position, as articulated by al-Ash'ari and his school, posits that all unbelievers will be assigned to eternal damnation. Those attaining the status of believer, however, have done so as a result of their profession of faith and not as a result of their works. If a man has faith, if he accepts the Islamic creed, he will gain entrance to Paradise. The *ash art* school did not ignore the effects of sin. Indeed, many may be purged in the fires of Hell for a time. Ultimately, however, all who profess the faith will be saved.¹⁶³

Al-Ghazzali's position is, of course, very close to that of the *ash art* school. He does, however, refine this position in light of his understanding of both belief and sin. Polytheism (*shirk*), which is unbelief in the sphere of the revealed sciences, precludes pardon and condemns the unbeliever to perdition, eternally. If, on the other hand, a person is a believer he is assured of salvation.¹⁶⁴ If the man dies a sinner, a defect in the practical sciences, he is punished with hellfire for a time. Only the sound heart is accepted by God. If the surface of the heart is dirtied, it must be cleansed by fire. After death the only fire is that of Hell. In such a case the function of hellfire is purgative. After the heart is restored to its purity, entrance to some level of Paradise is effected.¹⁶⁵ In this there is no real difference from the *ash'ari* position. However, al-Ghazzali's understanding of sin, as previously expounded, is much more sophisticated. It is difficult for a man to continue in sin without an erosion of his belief in the revealed sciences. There is an intimate relationship, that of root and branch, between the areas known as faith and works. It is difficult for al-Ghazzali to envision a man persisting unrepentant in sin and remaining uncorrupted in faith. These two are

not easily divisible.

Furthermore, while profession of faith is sufficient to preclude exclusion from the community and temporal punishment as an unbeliever, al-Ghazzali is emphatic that ultimately it is of no avail if it is only verbal. Al-Ghazzali believes that it is beyond human competence to judge the veracity of another's profession of faith. Also, he does not believe that a man's faith can, in this life, be confirmed or denied by his sins. All of these judgments are beyond human ken.¹⁶⁶ God, however, will indeed make these judgments.

Al-Ghazzali does not consider the community as the basic reference for or source of salvation. In line with the Koran, al-Ghazzali is committed to an individualistic approach.¹⁶⁷ Each man stands for judgement as an individual. Also, each person's struggle for salvation must be based on his own strengths and weaknesses as an individual.¹⁶⁸ Al-Ghazzali, as Islam in general, does not present an institutionalized atonement procedure as might be found in Judaism and Christianity.¹⁶⁹ Public confession is neither required nor encouraged except in the case of social offense.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, since sin is derived from the pursuit of the appetites, the specific development of which varies from individual to individual, the quest for integrity of faith and works must differ from one person to another. The convenantal relationship in Islam is between the individual Muslim and God.¹⁷¹

In rejecting the community as the source of salvation al-Ghazzali does not lose sight of the societal environment in which man lives out his temporal life. Ignorance, for example, can only be removed by the spread of knowledge. As God entrusted the people's education to the prophets so it falls to the lot of the learned doctors, the prophets' heirs, to continue this work.¹⁷² Yet, in terms of ultimate responsibility each learned doctor will be judged as an individual, as will his charges. His communal work is a personal obligation imposed by his level of knowledge or appointed position.¹⁷³ That all men have social responsibilities for which they are answerable to God is attested to by the fact that injustices against one's fellows are also transgressions against God and are breaches of the belief in the practical sciences.¹⁷⁴ The community is not the source of salvation but rather it is, by divine will and command, an area of responsibility in which man can pursue either obedience or disobedience.

There is another interesting element in al-Ghazzali's treatment of sin. Sins, according to al-Ghazzali, may be measured in two ways: objectively or subjectively. Objective assessment may be made by recourse to the Law. Yet, this alone would be an insufficient measure. Al-Ghazzali insists that the measurement of a sin must take into account the spiritual level (i.e. knowledge and perception) of the sinner. The transgression of an ignoramus is not the same violation as the identical infraction perpetrated by a learned doctor.¹⁷⁵ Incidentally, the social or communal stature of the sinner, as well as the attendant publicity of the sin, are also important variables. The learned doctor, for example, is a model whose public actions will be emulated. A sin he commits publicly could lead others to sin. He would then be doubly culpable.¹⁷⁶

In discussing the division of sins into those grave and those minor, al-Ghazzali has recourse to a number of different standards based on the legal tradition. He is able, finally, to indicate that some sins are definitely known as being grave, others as minor, while some are in doubt.¹⁷⁷ Yet, in continuing his analysis he introduces a subjective element asserting that a minor sin may become grave notwithstanding its status according to the objective sources of tradition through a person's persistence or faulty attitude.¹⁷⁸

A determination of sin is based on a code of morality whose violation is an offense against God. The *mu'tazila* conceived of an autonomous morality which followed from rational premises. Al-Ghazzali rejects this conception out of hand. It is evident from the aforementioned that, for al-Ghazzali, the ethical is secondary to the religious. Revelation is the sole source of morality.¹⁷⁹ The basis of that morality is God's command. Sin is no more and no less than rebellion against God.¹⁸⁰ This does not mean that Reason has no function in al-Ghazzali's system. To the contrary, even the sciences of the hereafter are categorized by him as rational sciences.¹⁸¹ Nonetheless, al-Ghazzali is insistent that morality is revelatory.

If there is a little of the paradoxical in al-Ghazzali's attitude as regards Reason, such is not unique. There are a number of areas in al-Ghazzali's treatment of repentance that seem paradoxical. It may well be impossible to explain these beyond indicating that al-Ghazzali did not consider the *Revival* as directed to those to whom the whole truth might be exposed. Some things are mysteries, knowledge of which is reserved for the initiated. Yet, in introducing this work, it would seem useful to at least treat an example or two of the mysterious in the *Kitab at-Tawba*.

VI

One of the most fundamental and contested issues in the formative years after the establishment of Islam was defining the implications of the prophet's assertion of God's omnipotence. An early and basic question that emerged from this issue pertained to a determination of man's basic nature. Does man act as a free agent or are his actions predetermined by God.

The *khawarij* movement, influenced to no small degree by their political philosophy and goals, were among the earliest advocates of the free will position.¹⁸² They were followed in this by *the mu'tazila*.¹⁸³ On the other extreme were many in the traditionalist camp who, feeling that the assertion of human freedom impinged upon the absoluteness of God's omnipotence, upheld a position of pure and total determinism.¹⁸⁴

Al-Ash'ari, reflecting the orthodox position, affirmed the determinists' position while adding that man was nonetheless responsible for his actions. He explained that God creates all of the component elements that lead to an action and then man chooses the act into which he is compelled. While the act is totally of God's creation, man acquires it (*kasb, iktisab*). This formulation is quite obscure, proverbially so.¹⁸⁵ Yet it is clearly an attempt to reaffirm God's absolute freedom while preventing fatalistic indifference to proper moral behaviour. Man's subjective feeling of choice is given formal status while, at the same time, there is a recognition of God's acting out His will through men. This conception is foreign to Jewish thought as it is, in general, to Christianity. There does, however, exist a similar idea in the New Testament.¹⁸⁶

This conception is echoed by al-Ghazzali. Man, he says, is compelled into that choice that is his. He goes to great length to show how God creates the various sequential elements that lead man into acting in a predetermined manner.¹⁸⁷ Yet, al-Ghazzali also promotes ideas that do not seem to harmonize with this position. The very idea of repentance implies man's ability to choose and act upon that choice. In fact, al-Ghazzali asserts that the ability to turn from evil and correct one's mistakes is a fundamental characteristic of human nature. Al-Ghazzali, moreover, states that God does not require of man more than that of which he is capable. If so, God's commanding man presupposes his ability and volition. Finally, al-Ghazzali often emphasizes the ability of all men, at least potentially, to raise themselves to the ranks of the saints, prophets, and angels.¹⁸⁸

The basic paradox inherent in the various writings of al-Ghazzali on this subject is explicitly rendered in his presentation of the parable of the blind man and the elephant. In this parable of Buddhist origin, al-Ghazzali tells of a group of blind men who examine, by touch, different parts of an elephant in order to ascertain its nature. Each man, having felt a different part of the animal, describes the nature of the animal differently. All of the men spoke truthfully, yet none of them was able to encompass, in his description, the totality of the animal. Thus, says al-Ghazzali, those who take the positions of determinism, acquisition (*kasb*), and free will, have each stated a part of the truth but, if taken singly as embracing the totality of the truth, each position is only a distortion of reality.¹⁸⁹

Al-Ghazzali, the teacher and spiritual physician, had, it seems, a basic functional commitment to the position that man has the ability to make choices and act freely. He also understood that creation's order, as well as man's own previous actions, limit his freedom. The elements requisite for any choice must also exist. Moreover, al-Ghazzali no doubt felt the need, as did those before him (e.g., al-Ash'ari), to protect the theological integrity of God's omnipotence. Man is required to understand that nothing can be accomplished, even for the gnostic (*'arif*), without divine grace.¹⁹⁰ Yet as dependent as man is on God, he is not simply a vessel or automaton. He does, in a real sense, have the ability to exercise choice (*ikhtiyar*).¹⁹¹

Man, especially such as for whom al-Ghazzali wrote the *Revival*, should be, left with the mystery and paradox unresolved. It was, for al-Ghazzali, a mystery in pursuit of which the unenlightened would stumble and which the illumined are forbidden to reveal.¹⁹²

The debate about man's free volition was intimately tied to two other issues: Order and Justice. Do defined causes beget constant and predictable results. Most of the early Muslim theologians, in the context of their attitudes on the question of God's omnipotence, were atomistic in their view of the world. There does not exist a necessary cause-effect relationship. Rather, each moment is a fresh creation and expression of divine will. If man stands witness to the fact that a particular cause has always resulted in the same effect, he cannot, with certainty, project this as having a bearing on the next instance of that cause.¹⁹³

Al-Ghazzali rejects this position. Happiness or misery in the hereafter are directly attributable to man's actions, good or bad. In fact, this causal relationship can be reduced to the lowest measurable degree. The scales of judgement are tipped to salvation or perdition even by the weight of

an atom. His parable of the conquering king, which was cited previously, is eloquent testimony to this belief in causality. Each man's station in the hereafter, as in the newly conquered territory, is defined directly by the measure of his service or disservice. Again, in a different context, al-Ghazzali indicates that a person's fate is decided, in the minutest detail, by the quantity, duration, and intensity of his faith and works.¹⁹⁴ This is not an insignificant statement of fact. The acceptance of the reality of this causal order was, in his view, the very foundation of the belief in the divine origin of the commandments and the revelation (shar).¹⁹⁵

This causal order does not relate to the hereafter alone. Remaining in the moral sphere, al-Ghazzali viewed all calamity in this life as being a consequence of sin.¹⁹⁶ Al-Ghazzali also viewed the struggle for moral correction to be a natural outcome of the maturation of the intellect. If the intellect is allowed to develop, it will naturally confront the appetites and induce man to repentance.¹⁹⁷ According to Obermann, moreover, al-Ghazzali feels that acceptance of repentance is necessary in the sense that the very act of repentance results, causally, in the effects of acceptance (i.e. purification of the heart).¹⁹⁸

The mysterious element is raised by al-Ghazzali in treating the ideas of God's mercy and wrath. At times a man will be granted salvation or condemned to hellfire when all the apparent causes point to a different result. The condemnation of an apparently righteous man or the saving of an evil one would argue for the lack of order and causality. Al-Ghazzali, however, emphatically asserts that there is always a cause even, as in such a case, if it be hidden and secret. These hidden causes (*asbab haf <ya*), however, that result in mercy or wrath are not comprehensible through the rational sciences.¹⁹⁹ While there exists a causal order, it is God's order (*sunna*) and as such it is comprehensible only through revelation.

The other issue was that of Justice. There is order in creation, can this order be termed equitable. The *Mu'tazila* held, as one of their two most basic propositions, that it was part of the very nature of God that He be just and, according to some of their theorists, act in man's best interests. Thus they could speak of justice being an obligation of God.²⁰⁰ Al-Ash'ari was convinced, no doubt, of God's being equitable. This concern is probably one of the motives for his struggling with man's responsibility in the face of the doctrine of determinism. Yet, he could not reconcile the idea of obligation with God's omnipotence, a concept that assures absolute freedom of will.

Al-Ghazzali follows and elaborates al-Ash'ari's position. Is God just? His response is a resounding affirmative. God does not reward evil or punish obedience. Man's actions are requited with absolute equity.²⁰¹ There exists almost infinite variety, among men, in the quantity and quality of their obedience or disobedience. God, then, prepares innumerable levels both in Paradise and Hell.²⁰² A man's fate is measured according to his faith and works. These are, therefore, examined even to the measure of an atom.²⁰³ If a man realizes genuine repentance it will surely be accepted.²⁰⁴ Even in the working of the mysterious elements of mercy and wrath al-Ghazzali explicitly insists on their being just.²⁰⁵ Can this justice, which is clearly an absolute, be termed an obligation or a necessity? Here al-Ghazzali responds with an emphatic negative.²⁰⁶ Justice, for al-Ghazzali, is a part of God's order and practice (*sunna*). This order is an act of God's will, He could have willed otherwise. Being a part of His order, however, it is not wholly comprehensible to man except insofar as God wills it to be so. The dimension of justice must also be one in which, for man, mystery remains a part.

Al-Ghazzali's low valuation of formal theology might, through these examples, be more readily understood. He felt that theology might be useful to treat the doubts of the spiritually sick, but it could not be a tool of the healthy seeker of God.²⁰⁷ God, ultimately, cannot be known, as the philosophers would have it, through the exercise of reason and intellect. God, as His order, is beyond human comprehension. The knowledge that al-Ghazzali would have the believer seek is the intuitive knowledge that comes solely through the experience of and proximity to the living and omnipotent God. Only in this manner, through illumination, can the mysteries be uncovered. The totality of the single truth in which al-Ghazzali believed could not even be taught, objectively, by men.²⁰⁸

Repentance was a concept accepted and valued in both Judaism and Christianity. It was an integral part of Muhammad's message. In al-Ghazzali, however, repentance is given added dimensions and significance. Repentance is not only the means of overcoming the consequences and influence of a 'sick' past, it is the first step towards a 'healthy' future. Given man's nature, and the ordeal of this mundane

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existence, it is also a continuing part of man's quest for salvation.

Many of al-Ghazzali's insights and teachings can be seen in the earlier traditions of Judaism and Christianity. To a large degree, also, al-Ghazzali drew directly from earlier Muslim sources, traditional and mystic.²⁰⁹ The unique contribution that was al-Ghazzali's remains his mastery in two areas. Firstly, he possessed in his own person, the vast and variegated knowledge that was classical Islam. He was Koranic devotee, theologian, jurist, student of mystical theory, and defender of orthodoxy locked in debate with sectarianism and philosophy. He possessed this knowledge and integrated it into his own spiritual life and quest. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, he was a master pedagogue. He was devoted to his fellow believers and was, because of his belief in the idea of renewal dedicated to sharing his quest.

It is in this light that we proceed to al-Ghazzali's *Book of Repentance*.

TRANSLATION OF BOOK XXXI OF THE IJYA' 'ULUM AD-DIN

[2]²¹⁰ THE BOOK OF REPENTANCE

Which is the first book in the Quarter of Salvation of the Book of the

Revival of the Religious Sciences

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MERCIFUL, THE COMPASSIONATE

Praise to God, with whose praise every book is prefaced; with whose invocation every discourse commences; by whose praise the people of felicity shall abide with ease in the abode of recompense; and by whose name the wretched are consoled, even if the bar is set down before them, and they are separated from the blissful by a portaled wall; inside thereof Divine Mercy obtains, while outside Divine Chastisement proceeds.

We turn unto Him in penitence, convinced that He is master of all masters and originator of all causes. We look to Him in anticipation, knowing Him to be the King, compassionate, forgiving and disposed to accept penitence. We blend dread with hope, not doubting that while being forgiving of transgression and receptive to repentance He is also stern in inflicting punishment.

We pray for His prophet Muhammad, God bless him, and for his family and companions,²¹¹ a prayer that will rescue us from the terror of the place whence one will look down on the day of resurrection²¹² and will secure for us nearness to and safe refuge with God.

But to proceed; Repentance from sin, by recourse to the Veiler of vices, Knower of secrets, is the starting point for the followers of the spiritual path, the capital of the successful, the first step of the aspirants, key to the straightening of the bent, the prelude of the selection and election for those who are brought close to God; and for our father Adam, God bless him,²¹³ and all the other prophets. How appropriate it is for children to emulate their fathers and ancestors. It is small wonder if a son of Adam sins and does wrong, 'a- disposition which one who trans-

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gresses may recognize as a hereditary trait²¹⁴ For who resembles his father and does no evil? But if the father is restored after failing²¹⁵ and is revitalized after aging, let the emulation of him be at both poles, of the negative and the positive. Adam has been smitten with remorse, filled with repentance over his past deeds. Anyone who follows him as a model of sinning [only], and not in penitence, has stumbled.

Devotion to pure goodness is a trait of the angels close to God. Devotion to uncorrected evil is the nature of

devils. But, return to good after stumbling in evil is inevitable in human beings. The devotee of absolute good is an angel intimate of the King [who is] Judge. The devotee of evil only is a devil. But he who rectifies evil by returning to good, is, in truth, human. So, in man's nature there is a duality of disposition, two traits joining in him.

Every human being verifies his relationship with the Angel, Adam or the Devil. The penitent, by keeping to the definition of Man, truly proves that he is related to Adam, whilst he who persists in iniquity is proving that he is related to the Devil. Confirmation of relationship to the Angels, [3] however, by dedication exclusively to the good, is beyond the realm of possibility. For evil is firmly kneaded with good in the nature of man, and it cannot be refined except by one of the two fires: of penitence, or of Hell. Burning in fire is necessary to purify the human essence of the Satanic pollution.²¹⁶ It is up to you now to choose the easier fire,²¹⁷ and to be prompt in embarking on the lesser discomfort before the choice is withdrawn to give way to the inevitability²¹⁸ of either Paradise or Hell.

Since²¹⁹ repentance holds such a place within the faith, it must be put first in the Quarter of Salvation with explanation of its true nature, requisites, motivation, manifestation and benefit, the difficulties barring it²²⁰ and the remedies facilitating it. This will become clear by discussing four pillars.

The First Pillar: On the Nature of Repentance.

Explication of its definition and true character; that it is obligatory, at once, for all men, under all conditions and, if properly carried through, accepted.

The Second Pillar: On the Context of Repentance (i.e. transgression).

Explication of sin's division into venial and mortal sins, some toward one's fellow-man others toward God; how higher and lower states [in the hereafter] are distributed according to good and evil works [in this life]; the circumstances amplifying the venial sins.

The Third Pillar: On the Requisites and Perseverance of Repentance. How past iniquities may be corrected, and transgression atoned; the categories of men²²¹ according to their perseverance in repentance.

The Fourth Pillar: On the Stimulus spurring Repentance and the way of Treatment for the Dissolution of the Knot of Persistence.

The goal of the exposition concerning these four pillars will be attained by God's will.

THE FIRST PILLAR: ON THE NATURE OF REPENTANCE

Explication of Repentance and its Definition

Repentance is a concept consisting of three successive and joined elements: knowledge, state [of remorse] and action. Knowledge is first, awareness second and action third.²²² The first necessitates the second, and the second necessitates the third, in accord with the continuity of the divine regimen in matters temporal and spiritual.

As for knowledge, it is the realization of the magnitude of the sin's harm and its being a barrier between man and the divine. If he realizes this with utter and decisive certainty, overwhelming his heart, this realization will stir a heartache on account of the Beloved eluding him. For the heart, whenever it perceives the withdrawal of the Beloved, is pained. If the withdrawal be through man's own action, he is regretful of that alienating behaviour. Such grief of the heart over behaviour alienating the Beloved is called Regret.

When this anguish becomes overpowering, another inner state is induced, termed volition and aspiration towards [new] behaviour connected with the present, the past, and the future. Its connection with the present consists of the repudiation of the sin with which he was entwined. For the future, it involves the determination to abandon forever the sin which causes alienation from the Beloved. With regard to the past, it entails correction of what was omitted by [doing] good and performing [the omitted act], if it is susceptible to [such] restoration.

Thus, knowledge is prerequisite and is the starting point of these blessings. By this knowledge I mean faith, and certitude. To have faith is to accept as true that Sins are a deadly poison. Certitude consists of the assurance of the acceptance of this truth, the removal of all doubt about it and finally its mastery over the heart, so that whenever the illumination of this Faith shines upon the heart it produces the fire of Regret.

It, in turn, will bring forth anguish as the heart perceives, through this illumination of the light of the faith, that it has become veiled from its Beloved. As one who was in darkness and on the verge of ruin, and, with the dispersal of clouds and the rending of a veil, the illumination of the sun shone and radiated upon him,²²³ and he

saw his Beloved. Then the flames of love burn in his heart and these flames flare up in his will to rise to correct his ways.

Knowledge, Regret, and the intent connected with abandonment [of sin] in the present and future, and correction of the [sin perpetrated in the] past are three successive concepts within this process. The term Penitence (*tawba*) refers to this totality. Frequently, the term Penitence is used for the concept of Regret alone, as if making knowledge a precondition, and abandonment a result and later consequence. It is in this sense that the Prophet said: 'Regret is Repentance,'^a for Regret is void of knowledge which [4] necessitates and evokes it, and of determination which follows it. Regret is surrounded at both ends, by its result and its cause.

In this sense it is said, about Repentance as such that it is the melting of the entrails as a result of previous offense for this exposes to sheer agony. It is therefore said: /It is a fire raging in the heart, a fissure within that does not heal/. With respect to the meaning of Abandonment as an element of Repentance, it is related: It is the casting off of alienation and the start of fidelity.

Sahl ibn 'Abd Allah al-Tustari²²⁴ has said: Repentance is the change from reprehensible acts to commendable acts. This can be accomplished only in solitude and silence, eating from that which is allowed [i.e., earning an honest livelihood]. He seems to have pointed to the third element of Repentance.

The sayings about Repentance are innumerable. Yet, if you have understood these three aspects in their junction and sequence you will know that all that has been said regarding it falls short of encompassing all its aspects. The search for the knowledge of the true essence is more important than the pursuit of mere verbalizations.

Explication of the Obligatoriness and Excellence of Repentance

Know, that the obligatoriness (*wujub*) of repentance is evident in the Koran and the Tradition," and it is manifest in the light of discernment to him whose discernment has developed and whose heart God has laid open to the light of faith, so that he is capable²²⁵ of advancing. in this light amidst the murk of ignorance, without need of someone directing²²⁶ his every step.

A pilgrim (*sdlik*), may be blind, and must have someone to direct his steps; or his vision may be good, and he will be guided²²⁷ to the beginning of the way (*tariq*) whence he will guide himself. In the way of religion, men are similarly divided. There is the limited type not able to transcend blind imitation (*taqlid*) of past authority, and requiring, at each step, a text from God's Book or the tradition of His prophet, and in the absence of such a passage he may become perplexed, and, though he live long and be most diligent, such a man's progress may be limited, and his steps failing.

But then there is the fortunate man whose heart God has opened to an acceptance of Islam, and who is illumined by God. He will respond to the slightest indication to follow a difficult path and overcome tire some obstacles. The light of the Koran and the Faith will glow in his heart, and, due to the intensity of his inner illumination, the slightest explanation will suffice him. IT IS AS IF HIS OIL WOULD SHINE EVEN IF NO FIRE TOUCHED IT; and if THE FIRE TOUCHED IT THEN IT WOULD BE LIGHT UPON LIGHT. GOD GUIDES TO HIS LIGHT WHOM HE WILL²²⁸ Such a man has no need for a traditional text at every turn.

A person like that, if he desires to understand the obligation of repentance, examines, through the light of [his] discernment, what is the nature of repentance, then he scrutinizes what is the meaning of Obligation, then he combines these, and there will be no doubt as to his perseverance therein: To wit, he knows that the meaning of the obligatory is that which is obligatory for attainment of eternal bliss and deliverance from everlasting damnation. For unless 'happiness and misery are dependent²²⁹ on some action or its Omission, describing the act as being obligatory would be without meaning. The statement, 'it became obligatory by being given obligation [in some impersonal way]', is mere verbiage. For, in the case of an act where we have no purpose, near or distant, in doing it or leaving it undone and so no meaning in busying ourselves with it, someone else made it obligatory for us or did not make it obligatory.

If man understands the concept of obligation [of repentance], that it is the means to eternal bliss; that. there is no bliss in the Hereafter except in encounter of God; that everyone barred therefrom is no doubt suffering, feeling separated from. the object of his desire, and seared by the flame of separation and hellfire; that what keeps him away from encountering God is following the lusts and fondness for this ephemeral world

and the pursuit of affection for something with which lie inevitably must part; that nothing can bring near the encounter with God except the severance of his heart's attachment to the vanity of this life, complete responsiveness to God, in search of intimacy with Him by constantly remembering Him and by love

(*mahabba*) for Him, in the knowledge of His Majesty and Beauty, to the extent of man's capability; and that the transgressions which constitute turning from God and following the delights of the devils, those enemies of God that keep one away from His presence, are the cause of man's being shut off, kept out from [the presence] of God; then there is no doubt that renunciation of the path leading away [from God] is obligatory in order to achieve closeness to Him.

Renunciation, however, is achieved by Knowledge, Regret, and Determination. As long as man knows not that transgressions are the causes for the remoteness of the Beloved, he will neither regret nor grieve over his traveling on the path of withdrawal. As long as he has not grieved, he will not turn back, retreat being abandonment and determination. No doubt, these three elements are necessary in reaching [5] the Beloved, Such is then Faith that derives from the light of perception.

As for the [ordinary] man who is not qualified for such a station, whose climax transcends the bounds of most people, he has ample scope, through the following of convention and example, to attain salvation from damnation. Let him heed the word of God, His prophet and the righteous forebears (*salaf*).

God said, as a universal statement, BELIEVERS, TURN TO GOD [in repentance], HAPLY YOU MAY PROSPER,²³⁰ and He said: O BELIEVERS, TURN TO GOD IN SINCERE REPENTANCE.²³¹ The meaning of 'sincere' in the verse is 'sincere with God', free of blemish, the word being derived²³² from 'sincere counsel'. Further, God's word points out the excellence of repentance. TRULY GOD LOVES PENITENTS AND THOSE THAT CLEANSE THEMSELVES²³³

The Prophet said: 'The Penitent is beloved unto God, and he who repents of sin is as one who has never sinned.'a He also said: 'God is happier with the repentance of His faithful servant than the man [about whom the following story is related].

'Accompanied by his camel which bore his food and drink, he came to an arid desert. He laid down his head and napped. He awoke and his camel was gone. He searched for it until the heat and thirst overcame him, et cetera. He said, I will return whence I started and sleep until I die. He proceeded to place his head upon his arm so as to die. Then,

he was aroused, and lo, his camel stood before him, provisions intact. God's joy at the repentance of the faithful servant is more intense than that of the man on account of his camel.'o (Some versions have it that in his great joy and desirous of thanking God, he exclaimed: 'I am your master and you are my servant.')

It has been transmitted on the authority of Hasan [al-Basri]: When God forgave Adam, the angels congratulated him. Gabriel and Michael descended to him and said: 'O Adam, may you delight in God's forgiveness!' Adam replied: 'O Gabriel, if a question remains after this pardon, what is my standing?' God, then, revealed to him: 'O Adam, you have bequeathed your descendants toil and hardship but also repentance. Whosoever of them shall call upon Me, I shall respond to him as I did to you. Whosoever shall seek pardon, I shall not withhold it from him, for I am nigh and responsive! O Adam, I shall gather up the penitents from their graves happy and laughing, their supplication answered.'

There are innumerable traditions on the subject, and there exists within the community a general consensus as to the obligatoriness [of penitence]. For its meaning is the recognition that sins and iniquities are destructive and remove Man from God. This sense is part and parcel of the obligatoriness of Faith. At times, however, disregard of it may occur. Knowledge means the elimination of this disregard. There is no doubt of the obligatory nature of repentance.

Among the various aspects of repentance are the abandonment of iniquities in the present; resolve to abstain in the future; correction of previous shortcomings. Of the obligation of these there is no doubt. As for regret and sadness of past offenses, surely this is obligatory. It is the very spirit of repentance which includes full rectification. How could this not be obligatory? Nay, it is a sort of pain one suffers following the realization of how much of lifetime has passed away and was wasted

in the wrath of God.

You might say:

Heart anguish is a necessary state about which one has no choice. How then can it be classified as an obligation?

Know, then, that such anguish is caused by the certainty of having missed the Beloved. Man has a path by which to grasp its cause. In this sense, knowledge can be classified as obligatory. It cannot, however, be understood as a self-induced creation of man, for this would be absurd. Rather, Knowledge, Regret, Action, Volition, Capacity and the carrier ate all creations and deeds of ^{God}. GOD HAS CREATED YOU AND

[ALL] THAT YOU DO 2³⁴ This is what men of insight²³⁵ consider true, and all else is wrong.

You might also ask:

Has man, then, no choice in action and abandonment?

This we must answer in the affirmative. Yet this does not contradict our previous statement that everything stems from God's creation. So, also, does choice. Man is compelled in that choice which is his.

Indeed when God created the right hand, [6] delicious food and the appetite for food in the stomach, He also created the innate awareness that this food would alleviate the craving. He also produced the opposing notions: does or does not this food, while alleviating the craving, also contain harm and, perhaps, there is some objection to it, making its consumption objectionable. Further He created the knowledge that there is no obstacle. When these factors converge, there emerges a resolve motivating consumption. The emergence of the resolve, then, after vacillating between contradictory notions, and following on the intense²³⁶ appetite for the food, is called choice. It is inevitable that it should set in upon the convergence of all these conditions. Then, as resolve emerges through God's creation of these conditions, the right hand duly rises towards the food. For after volition and ability are attained, the following of the act is necessary so that the movement is produced. Thus the movement is by God's creation, following the attainment of ability and the emergence of the resolve, both also of divine creation. The emergence of volition follows real appetite and the recognition that there are no objections, again by divine creation. But some of these creations follow others in an order habitual in divine creation. **YOU SHALL NOT FIND FOR THE WAY OF GOD AUGHT OF CHANGE** 2³⁷

God does not create the movement of the hand in orderly writing so long as He has not created in the hand the quality of capacity, life and emerging will. Nor does He create a firm resolve as long as He has not brought forth desire and inclination in the soul. This inclination is not fully induced until there is knowledge that it suits the soul either immediately or ultimately. Knowledge, also, comes about only by other elements going back to movement, will and knowledge. Knowledge and natural disposition, then, always entail firm resolve. Movement always follows power and resolve. Such is the order of each action. All of it derives from divine origination.

Some of His creations, however, are preconditions of others and, therefore, some will have to precede others, e.g., will appears only after knowledge, which comes only with life, which emerges only after the

creation of the body. The creation of the body is, therefore, requisite for the incidence of life but not in the sense that life is generated from the body. Likewise, the creation of life is a condition for the creation of knowledge, but not in the sense that knowledge is born of life. Yet, there is no ready receptacle for knowledge except it be alive. The creation of knowledge is then a requisite for the emerging resolve but not in the sense that knowledge engenders resolve. But only a live and knowing body is receptive of a state of volition.

Nothing is included in Existence except that which is possible, and possibility is an ordained order which does not tolerate change, for such would be an absurdity. As soon as the precondition of a quality exists, the carrier endowed with it is created to receive the quality. This quality, then, is attained through divine grace and eternal power, once the disposition has set in. Inasmuch as the disposition, on account of the preconditions, has [pre-ordained] order, the flow, by God's directives, of events has a set order, and Man, then, is the arena of these divinely pre-ordained successive events. These events are regulated by divine decree, which is as the twinkling of an eye,²³⁸ in a universal and unchangeable order. Their manifestation²³⁹ is so predestined in detail that man cannot transcend them. This is expressed in the divine saying, **WE HAVE CREATED ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO A FIXED DECREE**,²⁴⁰ and concerning the absolute and eternal decree in the verse, **WE HAVE COMMANDED. BUT ONE WORD, AS THE TWINKLING OF AN EYE** 2⁴¹

Men are subject to the flow of fate and divine decree. Part of destiny is the creation of the movement in the hand of the writer²⁴² after the creation of a special quality in the hand which quality is termed capacity. This follows the introduction of a strong and definite inclination, called Intent, in man's soul. This succeeds knowledge of the object of his inclination, which is called Awareness and Perception.

When, from the hidden reaches of the invisible world,²⁴³ these four elements appear upon the person of a man, who is subject to the compulsion of fate, the people of the visible world, barred as they are from the invisible and sublime world, come and say: O man, you who have moved, aimed and written. But proclaimed from behind the veil of the transcendental and the whirlwind of majesty, it has been announced: When you have aimed it is not you that has aimed but God. When you have killed, it is not you that has done it 2⁴⁴ But, **BATTLE THEM, GOD CHASTIES THEM AT YOUR HANDS** 2⁴⁵

The minds of those sitting in the middle of the sensible world are there

upon sorely confused. Some teach utter predestination (*jabr*). Some maintain pure indeterminism (*ikhtird' sirf*). Yet others mediate and tend towards the theory of acquisition (*kasb*). If the gates of heaven were opened to them and they looked into the transcendental world, it would become apparent to them that each one is right in a sense, and yet all share in failure, and not one of them had fathomed the matter in all its aspects. Complete perception of it is attained by illumination through an aperture reaching into the invisible world. God knows the hidden world and the manifest. He reveals this hidden realm only to such a messenger with whom He is well-pleased ²⁴⁶ The manifest may be perceived [7] by one who has not come within the scope of [His] satisfaction. To him, who sets into motion the chain of causes and results, and knows the manner of its sequence and the nature of its connection to the primal cause; the secret of destiny is disclosed, and he acquires certainty that there is no creator and originator save for God.

If you say: you have concluded that each of these respective advocates of predestination, free will and acquisition is correct, to some degree, but also falls short of truth, are you not positing a contradiction? How can such a situation be understood? Is it possible to explain this through a parable?

A group of blind men heard that a strange animal, called an elephant, had been brought to the town but none of them had seen its shape nor had they heard its name. They said: 'We must inspect and know it by touch of which we are capable.' So, they sought it out, and when they found it they groped about it. One of them grasped its leg, ²⁴⁷ another its tusk and the third its ear. Then they said: 'Now we know it.' When ²⁴⁸ they departed, the other blind men questioned them but the three differed in their answers. The one who felt the leg said: 'The elephant is similar to a coarse cylinder outside although it appears to be softer than that.' The one who had felt the tusk said: 'It is not as he says. It is solid without any softness on it. It is smooth, not coarse. It is not at all stiff but rather it resembles a column.' The third man, who had handled the ear, said: 'By my life, it is soft and somewhat coarse. One of them is right but it is not like a column or a cylinder. It is rather, like broad, thick hide.'

Now, each of these presented a true aspect when he related what he had gained from experiencing the elephant. None of them had strayed from the true description of the elephant. Yet, together, they fell short of fathoming the true appearance of the elephant. Ponder this parable and learn from it. It is the pattern of most human controversies. If these

words touch the revealed sciences and provoke ripples therein, this was not our intention.

Let us, then, return to our present concern, i.e., the explanation that repentance with all its three divisions: Knowledge, Regret and Renunciation is obligatory. Regret comes within the scope of obligatoriness as this occurs in all of God's actions that are interposed between man's knowledge and his will and power. That which answers this description is included in the term 'obligatoriness'.

Explication that Promptness is [essential in fulfilling] the Obligation

of Repentance

No one doubts that promptness is [essential in fulfilling] this obligation, since perception of sins' destructiveness is of the essence of faith (*iman*), which is immediately obligatory. Its obligatoriness is profoundly grasped by him whom this keeps from reprehensible action. Indeed this perception is not of the revealed disciplines ('umm *al-mukashafat*) which are independent of action. Rather, it is of the sciences of practical religion ('*ulian al-mu amala*) ²⁴⁹ Every [item of] knowledge that is intended to be a stimulus to action has not been fully perceived as long as it has not become such a stimulus. The knowledge of sins' harm was intended to be a stimulus to renouncing them. He, then, who has not abandoned sin is failing in this part of faith. Such is the intent of the Prophet's saying: 'The adulterer does not fornicate at the time of fornication, he being a believer.'

His intent in [this saying] was not the denial of the faith which pertains to the revealed disciplines, such as knowledge of God[*'s* existence], His unity, His attributes, His scriptures and Apostles. Indeed, adultery and transgression do not preclude that. Rather, he thereby meant denial of the belief that adultery alienates [one] from God and leads to abomination. It is similar to a situation where the physician says: 'This is poison, do not take it.' If the patient then takes it, it can be said [that] he took it as a non-believer. [This is meant] not in the sense that he lacks belief in the existence of the physician or in his being a physician. Neither [does it indicate] the patient's distrust of the physician. Rather, what is meant is that the patient distrusts the physician's statement that the compound is a lethal toxin. Indeed, he who knows [the nature of] the toxin will not take it at all.

The sinner, of necessity, lacks in faith. Faith is not one variety but rather some seventy whose highest point is the creed (*shahada*) that there is only one God, and whose lowest point is the removal of harm from

the path. It is similar to the saying: Man is not one creature but rather some seventy whose highest is the heart and spirit, and whose lowest is keeping harm from the outer skin so that the mustache will be shaven, the nails cut and the skin free [8] of scum so that he is set apart from the beasts soiled by their detestable dung, with their long claws and hooves. This is a fitting simile.

Faith is similar to man. The loss of the affirmation of [God's] unity produces total futility like the loss of the spirit. He who has nothing save the affirmation of God's unity and of [Muhammad's] mission is like a man whose limbs are cut off, whose eyes have burst, and who has lost all his organs, both internal and external, except²⁵⁰ the spiritual element.

Just as he, who is in this condition, is close to death, the weak and solitary spirit, bereft of the limbs which support it and give it strength, abandoning him, so, he who being deficient in works, has naught save the root of faith is near to having the [whole] tree of his faith uprooted when, preceding the approach and arrival of the Angel of Death, the tempest which dislocates faith strikes the tree.

Any faith that is not firmly rooted in certitude nor branched out in action will not withstand the stormy terror of the Angel of Death, and may be in danger of an evil end, unlike faith that is tempered continuously with pious deeds until faith is firmly anchored.

The statement of the defiant to the obedient [servant]: 'I am a believer just as you are a believer,' is like the statement of the pumpkin tree to the stone pine: 'I am a tree and you are a tree.' How apt was the pine's retort when it said: 'When the autumn winds blow you will surely realize your foolishness in including [us both under the same] nomenclature, for then your roots will be severed, your leaves will fall away, and your conceit in sharing the name 'tree', as well as your heedlessness of the conditions of a tree's stability, will be made apparent.'

When the dust settles, you will see, If it's a horse you're riding, or an ass.

This matter will become apparent at the end. The arteries of people of perception collapse in fear of the vicissitudes of death and its terrible foreshadowing *which* only very few will withstand.

The sinner, when undaunted by the consequence of his disobedience, eternal hellfire, is like the healthy man who, addicted to injurious passions, is not, while in his healthy state, afraid of death. Indeed death does not usually occur suddenly. He may be told: 'The healthy man fears sickness, then, if he takes ill he hears death. So, the sinner fears a bad

end, then, when, God forbid, his end is bad, he is consigned to eternal hellfire'.

Sins are to faith what toxic foods are to the body. They keep accumulating inside [the body] until the component elements change, imperceptibly, until the composition deteriorates and suddenly the man falls ill, then, suddenly, dies. So it is with the sinner. If a man afraid of ruination in this passing world must, immediately and constantly, abandon toxic substances and harmful foods, so too, and even more so must he who fears eternal perdition.

If a man who consumed poison, then felt regret, would need vomit and discontinue the consumption of poison by invalidating and removing it from the stomach in the quickest manner, to save his body which is on the verge of death, the loss merely of this ephemeral world, then, he who consumes what is toxic to religion, that is commits sins, is even more blighted to desist from these sins by correcting whatever is possible so long as there remains time for correction, namely [the remainder of his] lifetime.

For, what is feared from this toxin is the loss of everlasting life which contains lasting bliss and the great kingdom;²⁵¹ its loss entails the fire of Hell and lasting chastisement which is such as multiples of life in this world are less than one tenth of a tenth of its duration, it having no end at all.

Hurry, hurry, then, to repent before the toxic sins do their work on the spirit of faith, and the matter will transcend physicians and their knowledge²⁵² After which seeking shelter will avail naught nor will counsel and admonition, and man may be said to be among the damned, as it says: SURELY WE HAVE PUT ON THEIR NECKS FETTERS UPTO THE CHIN, SO THAT THEY ARE MADE STIFF NECKED; AND WE HAVE PUT BEFORE THEM A BARRIER AND BEHIND THEM A BARRIER; AND WE HAVE COVERED THEM, SO THEY DO NOT SEE. IT IS ALIKE WHETHER OR NOT YOU FOREWARN THEM, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE 2⁵³

Do not be deluded by the word 'faith'. We say the verse pertains to the unbeliever. Since it has been explained to you that faith is of some seventy varieties, and that 'the adulterer does not fornicate being a believer',²⁵⁴ he then who is barred from faith which is bough and branch, will be barred, in the end, from that faith which is the root. Just as the man who, bereft of limbs, which are the branches, will be led to final death of that spirit (*ruh*) which is the root. But the root has no continuity without the branch, [9] nor has the branch existence without

the root. There is no difference between the root and the branch except in one point: the existence and continuity of the branch requires the existence of the root while the existence of the root does not require the existence of the branch. The continuity of the root, then, lies in the branch, and the branch draws its existence from the root.

Likewise the revealed discipline and the disciplines of practical religion are as inseparable as the root and branch. Neither can dispense with the other even though one of them has a primary status and the other is secondary. If the disciplines of practical religion have not become a stimulus to action, their non-existence is preferable to their existence. If they have not carried out their intended function, they turn into a support for the case against their student. Therefore, the chastisement of the learned but immoral is greater than that of the immoral ignoramus, as can be seen from the Traditions we cited in the Book of Knowledge 255

On the Universality of the Obligation of Repentance, no one being free of it

Know that the actual text of the Koran has already indicated this: BELIEVERS, TURN TO GOD [in repentance], HAPLY YOU MAY PROSPER ²⁵⁶ Thus He made the address universal (i.e., He addressed all believers). The light of the mind²⁵⁷ also advises so, as the meaning of repentance is the retreat from the road which leads away from God and draws [man] nigh unto Satan. That is conceived only by one endowed with reason.

The natural disposition of the intellect is fulfilled only after the fullness of the instincts of desire, anger and the rest of the negative qualities which are Satan's instruments for the enticement of man.

For the perfection of the intellect comes at the age of about forty; its foundation becomes complete only at puberty and its rudiments appear at the age of seven.

The passions are the soldiers of Satan, and the minds those of the angels. When they come together combat is, of necessity, joined between them, as one does not yield to the other, they being adversaries.

The strife between them is like the struggle between night and day, light and darkness. Whenever the one gains ascendancy, the other is, necessarily, roused. If the desires mature during childhood or adolescence, before the perfection of the intellect, then the satanic forces have preceded and mastered the situation. Familiarity and intimacy with Satan befall the heart, no doubt, as usual requisites of the desires. This overcomes man and makes it difficult to abstain therefrom. Then the intellect,

which is God's troop and force, emerges to save, gradually, those favoured by God, from the hands of His enemies. But if the mind is not strong and perfected, the kingdom of the heart is surrendered to Satan, and the Evil One carried out his promises: I SHALL VERILY MASTER HIS PROGENY, SAVE A FEW ²⁵⁸ But if the intellect is perfected and strengthened, its first occupation is to suppress the satanic forces by breaking the appetites and habits and by forcefully reverting the natural disposition to acts of worship. Only this is the meaning of repentance. It is the return, from that road whose guide is lust and whose sentry is Satan, to God's path.

In every human being passion prevails over intellect; the impulse which is a device of Satan prevails over the impulse which is an instrument of the angels. Prophet or fool, every human being must abandon the steps taken to promote desire. On no account should you suppose that this is peculiar to Adam. It has been said:

Do not suppose that only 'Hind [shows] treachery
as a personal temper.

Every songstress is like Hind.

Rather, it is an eternal rule, the fate of humankind which no decree can alter so long as there is no variance in the immutable divine order.

Consequently, anyone who has come of age as an ignorant unbeliever must repent his ignorance and unbelief. If he has come of age as a Muslim, following his parents; yet negligent of the real meaning of Islam, he must repent his negligence by a [growing] comprehension of the meaning of Islam. Indeed, his parents' Islam is of no avail to him so long as he himself does not turn Muslim. If he has understood that, then he must turn from his practice and propensity for following the desires, without anyone to divert him, and turn toward the pattern of the divinely set limits in prevention, release, absolution and renunciation. This is of the hardest varieties of repentance, and it is the ruin of most, as they fail therein. All this is retreat and repentance. It points to [the fact] that repentance is an individual duty of every person. It is unimaginable that anybody can be exempt from it, as Adam was not either. The constitution of the progeny cannot accommodate that which the original constitution of the progenitor could not.

As for the explanation of the constancy and universality of this obligation, it is [10] that no man is free from sins by his limbs; for even the prophets were not free of them, as is mentioned in the Koran and Traditions about the sins of the prophets: how the prophets bemdefined

and repented them. If a man, in some cases, is free of sin by commission, he is not free of thinking about sin in his mind. If he is free, sometimes, from such thought, he is not free of satanic temptation by instigation of sporadic thoughts distracting from invoking God's name. But even if he is free therefrom, he would not be free of heedlessness and shortcoming in the knowledge of God, His attributes and acts. All this is an imperfection which has its causes. Abandonment of its causes, by taking to their opposites, is a turning from a path to one leading in the opposite direction. The intent of repentance is [such a] turning.

Freedom from this imperfection, in humans is inconceivable but they differ as to the extent of imperfection. Yet, basically there is no escape from it. That is why the Prophet said: 'Verily my heart is beclouded so that I beg forgiveness of God seventy times in a day.'^a God therefore honoured him, as it says: THAT GOD MAY FORGIVE YOU THAT WHICH HAS PRECEDED OF SIN AND THAT WHICH SHALL FOLLOW 2⁵⁹ If such was the case of the Prophet, what could another person expect?

Perhaps you would assert:

It is obvious that the concerns and thoughts that overtake the heart are a blemish, and that perfection consists of freedom from them; further, that the defective cognition of the essence of God's sublimity is a deficiency, and as cognition grows, so does perfection increase; that the transition from the sphere of deficiency toward perfection is also a turning away and that turning away is repentance. These, however, are virtues not [religious] precepts. You have made a statement on the obligatoriness of repentance under all conditions. Yet, repentance of these matters is not obligatory, as the attainment of perfection is not obligatory under Islamic law. What then is intended by your statement: 'Repentance is obligatory under all conditions'?

Know, as it has already been stated, that basically, by his very nature, man cannot but follow his desires. The meaning of repentance is not merely their abandonment. Rather, full repentance includes the correction of that which has passed. From each desire that a man pursues, a darkness rises onto his heart, as a dark spot is picked up from man's breath ^{by} the surface of a polished mirror. If the darkness of the desires accumulates, it forms a stain, as the gathering vapour of breath becomes dross on the surface²⁶⁰ of the mirror. As the Koran said: NO INDEED, BUT THAT WHICH THEY WERE EARNING HAS RUSTED UPON THEIR HEARTS²⁶¹

When the rust collects it becomes characteristic and it is imprinted onto the heart like the dross on the surface of the mirror when the dross accumulates over a long time, becomes immersed in the iron and corrupts it: the metal will not take further polishing, and becomes imprinted with the slag.

In correcting [the results] of following the appetites it is not enough to abandon them in the future. It is necessary to wipe out those stains that impressed themselves upon the heart. Likewise, the future elimination of breath and vapor that darken the mirror's surface will not suffice for clear reflection in the mirror, as long as no effort was made to wipe out the stain that had imprinted itself in the mirror.

Just as darkness will arise onto the heart from [the commission] of sins and [the pursuit of] appetites, so a light will arise upon it from [acts of] obedience and abstention from the appetites. The darkness of sin will; then, be eradicated by the light of obedience. This is alluded to in the Prophet's saying: 'Follow an evil deed with a good deed, to wipe it out.'^o Consequently, in any given situation, man will not be free of the need to eliminate from his heart the traces of evil by pursuit of pious deeds, the influence of [the good] contravening the effects of those evil deeds. This [refers to] a heart which has first had its purity and clarity, and then became dark due to obstructive factors. As for the initial burnishing, it is a protracted affair, because polishing to remove rust from the mirror is unlike the initial work of producing the mirror. Such operations are long lasting, never ceasing at all. All this applies to repentance.

As for your statement that this cannot be called obligatory, but is rather a virtue and search for perfection, know, then, that [the term] 'obligatory' has two meanings. One of them is: that which falls within the terms of a legal decision and which applies to all the people. It is the measure with which, if all mankind were to observe it, the world would not be destroyed. If all men were truly bent on fearing God, they would abandon [the pursuit] of livelihood and would forsake the world totally. That would lead to the total nullity of piety. For whenever livelihood is impaired, no one has the leisure for piety. Rather, occupation in weaving [11] and cultivation and [baking] bread absorbs everyone's²⁶² life totally, according to his needs. From this point of view none of these stages (i.e., of freedom from sinful thought and the quest for perfection) is obligatory.

The second [meaning of] the obligatory is that which is essential for attaining the sought after proximity to God-And the good abode among the righteous. Repentance from all we have mentioned [of sins] is neces-

sary to attain it- As it is said: [Cultic] purity (*tahdra*) is obligatory for a voluntary prayer for anybody who desires it. Indeed, he will not come by it without that purity. On the other hand, for him who is satisfied with the omission of and preclusion from the virtue of voluntary service, purity, on its account, is not obligatory.

This [conforms to] what has been said: The eye, ear, hand and leg are a requisite for the existence of man. That is to say, it is a requisite for him who desires to be a complete man, enjoying his humanity and seeking thereby to attain to the noblest rank in this world. But he who is content with basic life and is satisfied to be like meat on the block and like a cast off rag, [finds] that for such a life the eye, hand and foot are not requisite. The root of the obligations, which enter the general mandate, bring one merely to the root of salvation. The root of salvation is like the root of life. The bliss beyond the root of salvation which shapes²⁶³ life flows through the limbs and tools by which life perfection²⁶⁴ is being prepared. It is this that the prophets, the saints, and the scholars sought, each according to his rank. That was their aspiration, their quest, and it is for this that they totally rejected the pleasures of this world.

Jesus came to rest his head on a stone to sleep. Satan then came to him and said: 'Were you not [resolved] to forsake this world for the next?' Jesus answered: 'Yes. What now?' Satan said: 'Your use of this rock as a pillow is a worldly enjoyment. Why do you not place your head on the ground?' Jesus cast away the stone, and placed his head on the ground. His casting off of the rock was [in] penance of that [worldly] enjoyment. Are you, then, of the opinion that Jesus did not know that placing [one's] head on the ground is not, by general mandate, considered obligatory?

Do you further think that our Prophet Muhammad, when the design on the garment he had on distracted him from his prayer until he removed the garment,^c or when the lace of his shoe, which was new, distracted him until he replaced it with an old one,^b did not know that such is not obligatory, according to the revelation he brought to all mankind?²⁶⁵ And, if he knew that, why did he repent through abstention from his deeds? Was that not because he saw [the amenities] acting upon his heart [in such a way as to] prevent him from reaching the good state which had been promised him?

And Abu Bakr, after he had drunk some milk and was informed that it was improper, inserting his finger in his throat, gagging almost to the point of death, so as to, bring [the milk] up. Do you think that he was

so unaware of the rule of [Islamic] law by which anything eaten [of improper food] through ignorance [of its state], is not [an object of] guilt, and the food need not, according to jurisprudential mandate, be evacuated? Then why did he repent his drinking, by attempting, to the best of his ability, to empty his stomach of it? Was it not the conscience embedded within him which informed him that the general mandate is one thing and that the gravity of the path to the next world is [another] known only by the righteous?

Contemplate the state of these who, of God's creation, are most cognizant of God, of His path, of His scheme and of the hiding places of the Deluder. Beware lest the life of this world should delude you even once. Beware, beware a million times of the Deluder's guile concerning God. These are mysteries. He, who sniffs them out early, knows that the need of sincere repentance with every breath, clings to the man who is a pilgrim (*salik*) on God's path, even if he live as long as Noah. He also, knows that this (repentance) is obligatory forthwith and with no delay.

Indeed, Abu Sulayman ad-Dariini²⁶⁶ has spoken truthfully when he said: If the sensible man cried in what is left of his life only over what he missed in breach of piety, this would be apt to grieve him unto death. How is it then for him who faces the remainder of his life with [behaviour] similar to that of his past ignorance? He said this because if the sensible man possessed a precious gem and it was lost senselessly, certainly he would cry over it; if its loss were the cause of his own destruction, his weeping would be yet greater. Each hour of life, nay each breath, is a precious stone for which there is no substitute or exchange; it is beneficial for it is leading you to eternal bliss and saving you from endless misery. Which gem²⁶⁷ is more precious than this? If you have lost it through negligence, you have suffered patent damage and if you have expended it in sin [12] then you have already perished repugnantly. If you do not weep over this sin it is because of your ignorance. Your misfortune through ignorance is greater than any other. Ignorance, however, is a calamity in which the one stricken is unaware of his misfortune.

Indeed, heedless slumber intervenes between man and his perception. Men are asleep, but when they die they awaken. At that time to every wretch his destitution is revealed, and to every afflicted person his misfortune. Yet correction is already out of their reach.

One of the mystics has said: If the Angel of Death appeared to a man and informed him, 'there remains one hour to your life, and you cannot be reprieved for even one moment,' the man would experience such

sorrow and grief, that if the whole world were all his, he would [be ready to] leave it for another hour to be added, just to enable him to seek God's pleasure and correct his own remissness. He will, however, find no way to accomplish this. This is the first meaning to appear from the divine word: AND A BARRIER IS SET BETWEEN THEM AND THAT WHICH THEY DESIRE ²⁶⁸ Further, this is indicated by the words: ... BEFORE DEATH COMES UNTO ONE OF YOU AND HE SAYS; O MY LORD! IF ONLY THOU WOULDST REPRIEVE ME, AWHILE, SO THAT I MIGHT MAKE FREE WILL OFFERING AND BE AMONG THE RIGHTEOUS. BUT GOD REPRIEVES NO SOUL WHEN ITS TERM IS ENDED ²⁶⁹

It has been said that the meaning of the 'awhile' that the man requests [according to the verse], is that when the matter is disclosed to him, man says: 'O Angel of Death, grant me an additional day, to plead to be excused by God, repent and provide a good record for my soul.' But the Angel replies: 'The days have come to an end, there is, then, not [a] day.' The man: 'Then reprieve me for an hour.' The Angel: 'The hours have lapsed; no hour!'

The gate of repentance is then closed to man, he gags, breathes heavily in his bitter regret. He suffers the agony of despair about correction, and bitter sorrow over the waste of his lifetime. The very foundation of his faith will be [surely] shaken under these blows.

When a man dies in God's grace, his soul expires with the words of the creed, and that [is to be considered] the good end. If he, God forbid, is doomed to wretchedness, he expires in doubt and confusion, and that is a bad end. In this regard it is said: BUT GOD SHALL NOT TURN TOWARDS THOSE WHO DO EVIL DEEDS UNTIL, WHEN ONE OF THEM IS VISITED BY DEATH, HE SAYS, 'INDEED NOW I REPENT.'²⁷⁰ And, again, GOD SHALL TURN ONLY TOWARDS THOSE WHO DO EVIL IN IGNORANCE, THEN SHORTLY REPENT ²⁷¹

'Shortly' refers to temporal proximity to the offense, so that he repent it and erase any trace of it through good works, substituting such for [the bad] before a stain beyond removal can collect upon the heart. Of this the Prophet has said: Follow an evil deed with a good deed, [may one] eliminate the other.

Of this, again, Lugmiin²⁷² said to his son: 'My son, do not delay repentance for death comes suddenly. He who has put off the effort to repentance finds himself between the two great perils: one of them being that darkness, brought on by his sins, will collect upon his heart until

it becomes deeply embedded grime beyond elimination; the other that sickness or death may befall him swiftly, without permitting time to engage in correction.' That is why Tradition has it that 'most of the cries from those consigned to hellfire result from procrastination.' It is this that accounts for perdition. Blackening of the heart is cash while purging it by obedient action is credit, until death snatches man, and he brings before God an impaired heart. But only he is saved who brings before God a sound heart.

The heart is a trust left by God with man. So is a lifetime. So are the other means of worship. he who breaches this trust and does not make amends is in sore peril.

A mystic has said: Indeed, God has entrusted²⁷³ to man, through inspiration, two secrets. Firstly, when man exits his mother's womb God says to him: 'My servant, I have brought you into the world clean and pure, and have consigned you life and entrusted it to you. Heed how you keep this trust safe, and consider how you shall encounter Me [later].' Secondly, at the time of death He says: 'Man, what have you done with my trust? Have you kept it safe until you found Me under the covenant, so that I find you faithful? Or, have you forfeited it, so that I meet you with claim and punishment?' This is alluded to in the verse: . . . FULFILL MY COVENANT AND I SHALL FULFILL YOUR COVENANT ,²⁷⁴ and in the verse: . . . AND WHO PROTECT THEIR TRUSTS AND COVENANT ²⁷⁵

[13] Upon Accumulation of its Requisites, Repentance is surely accepted

If you have understood the concept of 'acceptance you will not doubt that every correct repentance is accepted. Those who contemplate through the illumination derived from the lights of the Koran know that every sound heart is received well by God, is enjoying in the next world nearness to God, and its master, through his immortal eye, is prepared to perceive God's countenance. They also know that, originally, the heart was created sound, every creature being born with such a nature. This soundness, however, eludes man because of a murkiness which overcomes the surface of his heart from the pollution and darkness of sins.

They are aware that the fire of regret [can] burn this pollution, and that the light of good deeds [can] obliterate the darkness of evil from the heart's surface, and that the darkness of transgressions has no power against the light of pious acts, just as the gloom of night is helpless in the face of the light of day; nay, just as the turbidity of filth cannot exist

with the whiteness of soap, and as a king would not accept a dirty garment as his attire, so God does not admit a darkened heart into His proximity. And, just as the use of a garment for vile labor will soil it, and, certainly, to clean it one needs to wash it with soap and warm water, so exposure of the heart to the desires fouls it, and to clean, purge and purify it, one needs to wash it in the flow of tears and the burning of regret. Every clean and pure heart is well received, just as every clean garment is. The purification and cleansing, however, are up to you.

As for acceptance (*gabul*), it is freely granted as irrevocably preordained. This is termed 'prosperity' in the verse: PROSPEROUS IS HE WHO PURIFIES IT²⁷⁶

He who does not know, strictly speaking, with a perception greater and clearer than that achieved through eyesight, that the heart is affected contrarily by sins and good deeds, using for the former, the metaphor 'darkness' (*zaldm*) [as it is used also for ignorance] and for the latter, the metaphor 'illumination' (*nur*) [as used also for knowledge]; and that between illumination and darkness there exists a necessary unbridgeable contradiction; then he is as one to whom only the husk of religion was left with nothing attached save appellations. His heart is in a dense wrap [barred] from the essence of religion, nay even from his own essence and attributes. But he who is ignorant of himself, surely is yet more ignorant of another. I refer, in this, to his heart. Since knowledge of another [lies] within his heart, how can he have [such] knowledge when of his own heart he has no knowledge?

He who fancies that repentance could be sound yet not accepted is like him who imagines that the sun will rise but the darkness persist, or that a garment will be laundered with soap but the dirt will persist. Unless it be that lengthy accumulation of filth penetrated into the interstices of the garment and spoiled it so that the soap will lack the strength to extricate it. Likewise the accumulation of sins may become stained and imprinted upon the heart. Such a heart cannot return and repent.

Certainly, at times, a man says, with his tongue, 'I have repented.' Yet, that is like the fuller saying, with his tongue [alone], 'I have cleaned the garment.' But this will never clean the garment so long as he does not change the disposition of the garment by use of something effective against the filth²⁷⁷ ingrained in it. In this case repentance is fundamentally impossible. This is not rare but rather prevailing among all those creatures who devote themselves to this world and completely renounce God.

This explanation of the acceptance of repentance should be sufficient for men of discernment. But we shall support it by quoting verses, traditions and sayings of the Companions, for any reflection not attested to by the Book and the [apostolic] tradition (*sunna*) is not reliable.

The Koran says: IT IS HE WHO ACCEPTS REPENTANCE FROM HIS SERVANTS, AND PARDONS EVIL DEEDS ²⁷⁸ He also said: FORGIVER OF SINS, ACCEPTER OF REPENTANCE ²⁷⁹ Of such verses there are many more.

The Prophet said: 'God rejoices in the repentance of [even] one of you.... Joy is behind acceptance, and it points to acceptance, and more than that.' The Prophet also said: 'Indeed, God extends His hand with repentance until morning to him who sins at night, and to him who sins during the day He extends His hand until nightfall.' a Extension of the hand amounts to a call for repentance and the [attribute of] seeker is behind [the attribute of] accepter. Many are the receivers who do not seek but one does not seek unless he is [willing to] accept.

The Prophet said: 'If you sinned until it reached the heaven, then repented, surely God would turn unto you.' b He also said: 'Indeed a man can commit a sin [14] and enter paradise with it.' He was asked: 'How can this be, O Apostle of God?' He replied: 'He will direct his attention to repent it, fleeing [from sin] until he enters paradise.' The Prophet said: 'The expiation of sin is repentance.' d And: 'He who repents of sin is like one who has never sinned.'

It is related that an Abyssinian [came before the Prophet and] said: 'O Apostle of God, I used to commit vile deeds, do I have [a chance] of repentance?' T 'Yes,' replied [the Prophet]. [The Abyssinian] turned away and then returned saying: 'O Apostle of God, did He see me when I committed them?' Again, 'yes.' [At this point] the man uttered a shout with which his soul departed. e

It is related that when God damned Iblis, the devil asked for a reprieve. God, then, granted him a stay until the Day of Resurrection. [Iblis] said: 'By Your glory, may I not leave the heart of the son of Adam so long as he lives.' [To this] God replied: 'By My glory and majesty, may I not bar repentance from [man] so long as he lives.' f

The Prophet said: 'Good works remove evil as water [washes away] dirt.' 9

The traditions in this matter are too numerous to mention. ²⁸⁰

As for the sayings of the Companions:

Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab²⁸¹ said: God's revealed word, . INDEED HE IS FORGIVING OF THOSE THAT

RETURN,²⁸² [refers] to man: he sins, repents, sins and repents again.

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Al-Fudayl²⁸³ said: God has said: 'Announce to the sinners that if they repent I will accept their penitence. Caution the righteous that if I applied to them My justice, I would punish them.'

Talq b. Habib said: God's claims [upon man] are greater than man's capability; yet repent day and night.

'Abdullah b. 'Umar²⁸⁴ said:²⁸⁵ If a man bears in mind an offense he perpetrated, then is afraid in his heart on account of that offense, then that sin is erased from the [celestial] Register.

It is related that one of the prophets of the Children of Israel sinned.

God, then, revealed to him: 'By My glory, if indeed you do it again, I shall chastise you.' The prophet replied: 'O my God, Thou art Thou and I am I. By Your majesty, if You do not grant me immunity I will surely do it again.' Thereupon God granted him immunity.

One said: If a man sins and does not cease to regret it until he enters paradise, Iblis says: 'Would that I had not plunged him into sin.'

Habib b. Thabit said: A man is confronted with his sins on the Day of Resurrection. Then he passes by a sin and says, 'Verily, I was afraid of it.' That man is forgiven.

It is recounted that a man asked Ibn Mas'ad²⁸⁶ about a sin he committed: did he have a chance of repentance? Ibn Mas'ad turned away from him, then turned back and saw tears flowing from his eyes. Ibn Mas'ad said to the man: 'Indeed paradise has eight gates which open and close but the gate of repentance, guarded by a special angel, does not close; do [repent], and do not despair.'

'Abd ar-Rahman b. Abi-l-Qasim said: 'I conferred with 'Abd ar-Rahim²⁸⁷ about the repentance of an unbeliever and God's saying: IF THEY CEASE [151 WHAT HAS ALREADY PASSED WILL BE FORGIVEN THEM].²⁸⁸ And he said: 'I indeed expect that a Muslim will be better off with God. Yet, I have learnt that the repentance of a Muslim is like a [second and new] adoption of Islam after the original adherence thereto.'

'Abdullah b. Salam²⁸⁹ said: 'I would not report to you except of a [duly] charged prophet or a revealed book. Indeed, when a man sins, then feels remorse because of it for as long as a twinkle of an eye, the sin falls away from him quicker than the twinkling of an eye.'

'Umar²⁹⁰ said: 'Sit among the contrite. Indeed, they are the most delicate of hearts.'

One said: 'I know when God will forgive me.' 'When?' it was queried. 'When He restores me to His grace.'

Another said: 'I am more afraid of being deprived of repentance, than of being denied forgiveness. That is to say, forgiveness is certainly among the requisites and results of repentance.'

It is related: There, was, among the Children of Israel, a young man who had served God for twenty years, then defied God for [yet another] twenty years. Afterwards he gazed in a mirror and saw a gray hair in his beard. This grieved him and he said, 'My God, I obeyed You for twenty years, and disobeyed [another] twenty. If I return would you accept me?' He then heard a voice, although he saw no one: 'You loved Us and We loved you; you abandoned Us and We abandoned you; you defied Us but We granted you time; if you return, We will accept you.'

Dhu-l-Nun al-Misri²⁹¹ said: 'God has servants who grew trees of sins that were like guardians of the soul. They watered the trees with the water of repentance; the trees then produced regret and sadness. They became possessed without madness and idiotic without faltering or muteness. They are the profound, the eloquent, [those] that knew God and His Apostle. They drank from the cup of purity and achieved endurance (*sabr*) throughout tribulation. They they lost their hearts in the spiritual world and their thoughts roamed among the palaces veiling [God's] omnipotence. They sought shelter under the portico of regret, and read the ledger of sin. Then they were seized with anguish until they reached the height of asceticism on the ladder of piety. They found sweet the bitter [taste] of abandoning this world, and found supple the coarse bed, until they seized the thread of salvation and the grip of security. Their spirits roamed freely in the heights until they attained the gardens of pleasure. They plunged into the sea of life; filled in the trenches of anxiety and forded the bridges of passion until they descended to the courtyard of knowledge. They drank from the stream of wisdom; traveled on the ship of sagacity, and set sail, under the breeze of salvation, on the sea of security, until they reached the gardens of comfort, the source of glory and nobility.'

This is sufficient to demonstrate that all true repentance is certainly accepted.

Should you say:

Are you saying what the Mu'tazila have taught that the acceptance of repentance is obligatory upon God?

To this I reply:

In what I have mentioned of the necessity of God's acceptance of repentance I intend only what is intended by him who says: Indeed, when a garment is cleansed with soap, the dirt needs must vanish; When the thirsty [man] drinks water the thirst needs must cease; When he is, for

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awhile, denied water, thirst needs must result; if the thirst continues, death must [follow]. There is nothing in this of what the Mu'tazila intended by [the concept of] obligation [as regards] God[']s actions]. I would rather say; God created obedience as an atonement for sin, and good as an antidote to evil, as He created water as a remedy of thirst. His omnipotence is sufficient for the opposite should it have been His pleasure. There is, then, no obligation upon God but what His eternal Will has anticipated must, certainly, come to exist.

You might assert:

Every penitent doubts the acceptance of his repentance, while he who drinks water is certain of the abatement of thirst. Why then does [the penitent] doubt?

To this I say:

His doubt [with regard to the] acceptability [of his repentance] is like the doubt regarding the presence of the conditions of health. Repentance has delicate [requisite] props and conditions as will [later] be mentioned. The presence of all its requisites cannot be ascertained as if it were the case of one who doubts a laxative he took, i.e, will it work? That, because of his doubt in getting the requisites for relief by the medication in the given case, time, manner of mixing and preparing the remedy, and the potency of [its various component] drugs. Such and the like lead to fear even after repentance and, certainly, necessitate doubt of its acceptability, as will be seen, God willing, from the discussion of the requisites of penitence.

[16] **THE SECOND PILLAR: THE CONTEXT OF REPENTANCE BEING SINS: VENIAL AND MORTAL**

Repentance is the abandonment of sin. But it is impossible to abandon a thing unless it is perceived. Now since repentance is obligatory, it follows that anything, without which it cannot be achieved, must [also] be obligatory. Sin consists of anything which varies from God's [expressed] command by omission or commission.

A detailed exposition of this calls for an explanation of the whole range of Obligations. Such is not our intent. Yet, we shall indicate their general principles and the interconnections of their constituent parts. God is the one who in His mercy helps to [reach] what is correct.

On the Division of Sin in Relation to the Qualities of Man

[First Division:]

Man possesses many qualities and characteristics, as explained in the

Book of the Wonders and Dangers of the Heart 2 The stimuli of sin, however, are limited to four qualities: of supremacy, of delivery, of bestiality, and of predacity.

Such is the case, for man's substance is molded of different ingredients, each one resulting in a [different] effect, just as sugar, vinegar and saffron exert, in oxymel, different influences.

The bent for the supremacy qualities, encourages such traits as prestige; glory; power, love of praise, appreciation and wealth; the desire for perpetuate life; and quest for superiority over all until it seems that man wishes to say, 'I AM YOUR LORD, THE MOST HIGH.'²⁹³ From these some of the greatest sins result, of which men are heedless, and which they do not reckon as sins. yet they are the great ravagers which are the source of most transgressions, as we have detailed in the Quarter of Destructive Matters.²⁹⁴

The second is the satanic quality from which derive envy, injustice, subterfuge, perfidy, inclination to immorality and deception, including corruption, hypocrisy, and the urge to [unlawful] innovation and error.

The third is the bestial quality from which derive gluttony, greed and desire for the fulfillment of the carnal appetites. From it derived also adultery, homosexuality, robbery, misappropriation of the property of orphans and all the other vanities for the sake of the appetites.

The fourth is the predatory quality from which derive anger, malice, assault, vilification, murder and waste of wealth. From these, various sins branch off.

These qualities have [a certain] gradation in human nature. The bestial quality is first predominant. It is

followed by the predatory quality. Then, when the two get together and apply the mind to deceit, scheming and subterfuge, this is the satanic quality. Then, finally, the supremacy qualities prevail such as [the bent for] glory, power, arrogance, grandeur and control over all creatures.

These are the sources and origins of sin, the wells from which sin gushes forth to²⁹⁵ the limbs. Some of them [pertain] especially to the heart; such as unbelief, heresy, hypocrisy and harboring evil designs; others [pertain specifically] to the eye and ear, or to the tongue, or the stomach and genitals, or the hands and feet; some to the entire body. As this is clear, there is no need to go into details.

[Another Division:]

Sins are divided into that which is between man and God, and that which pertains to the relation of man to man; that which concerns an

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individual man, such as abstention from prayer, fast or obligations particular to him; and that which concerns inter-human relations, such as abstention from almsgiving, murder, usurpation of property, vilification of [another's] honour, and anything that infringes on another's rights, whether of life, limb, property, honour, belief or dignity; infringement on belief by leading astray and calling to heresy; incitement to transgression and to defiance against God, as practiced by certain preachers who cultivate hope over fear.

Sin that pertains to men is graver. In that which is between man and God [alone], unless it be idolatry, there is more hope for pardon. It has been transmitted in a tradition: There are three accounts: one which is forgiven, one which is never forgiven, and one which is not neglected. The account which is forgiven is that of the sins between man and God. The account which is never forgiven is that of idolatry. [17] The account which is not neglected is that of the injustices toward humans.^a That is, man must be called to answer for them before he is forgiven.

[Third Division:]

Sins are divided into venial and mortal. There is much disagreement about them. Some say: There is no venial or mortal [sin], rather, every transgression of God's command is mortal sin. This [position, however,] is weak since God said: IF YOU AVOID THE HEINOUS SINS THAT ARE FORBIDDEN YOU, WE WILL ACQUIT YOU OF YOUR EVIL DEEDS AND ADMIT YOU BY THE GATE OF HONOUR.²⁹⁶ Also: THOSE WHO AVOID THE HEINOUS SINS AND ABOMINATIONS, SAVE THE UNWILLED OFFENSES ...²⁹⁷ And, the Prophet said: 'The five prayers and [one] Friday [communal prayer] to the next, atone for what is between them, if mortal sins are avoided,'^b and in another version, '... are expiations for what [comes] between them except the mortal sins.' According to what was retold by 'Abdullah b. 'Amr b. al-'As,²⁹⁸ the Prophet said: 'Attributing partners to God, disobedience of parents, murder and willful perjury [are the mortal sins].'^t

The Companions and Followers differed in [setting] the number of mortal sins. [It ranged] from four, to seven, to nine, to eleven or more. Ibn Mas'ud²⁹⁹ said: 'They are four.' Ibn 'Umar said: 'They are seven.' 'Abdullah b. 'Amr said: 'They are~nine.' When Ibn 'Umar's statement, that their number is seven, reached Ibn 'Abbas³⁰⁰ he would say: 'They are closer to seventy than seven.' He once said: 'All that God has forbidden [constitutes] a mortal sin.' Another said: 'Any [action for which] God has threatened hellfire is of the mortal sins.' One of the righteous

forebears said: 'Anything which necessitates [the infliction] of legal punishment (*hadd*) in this world, is a mortal sin.' It has been said: It is an obscure point, the number is not known, like the Night of Power (*laylatu-l-gadr*) or the hour of the Friday prayer. Ibn Mas'ud, when he was asked of this, said: 'Read from the beginning of the Chapter of

Women to verse thirty where it says: IF YOU AVOID THE HEINOUS SINS THAT ARE FORBIDDEN YOU ...³⁰¹ Everything that God has

prohibited in this chapter to this point is a mortal sin.'

Abu Tiilib al-Makki³⁰² said: 'The mortal sins number seventeen. I collected them from all the traditions^a and from all that is gathered of the sayings of Ibn 'Abbas, Ibn Mas'ud, Ibn 'Umar, [18] and others. Four are of the heart: polytheism; persistence in disobedience; despairing of divine mercy; and [false] security from divine cunning. Four are of the tongue: false testimony; false accusation of the chaste; willful perjury, (i.e., that which justifies a falsehood or perverts the truth; which is, it is said, that by which the property of a Muslim³⁰³ is seized wrongly, even a toothpick,³⁰⁴ and it is termed 'plunger' (*ghamus*) because it plunges its perpetrator into hellfire), and sorcery which is any speech which alters man or other

substances from the states fixed at Creation. Three are of the stomach: imbibing wine or any intoxicating drink; eating illicitly, and from the property of an orphan; and conscious usury. Two are of sexual nature: adultery and homosexuality. Two are of the hands: murder and theft. One is of the feet: desertion of the ranks, one of two and ten from twenty. One is of the entire body: disobedience of parents.' He said: 'The acme of disobedience is that they justly adjure [the son] and he does not respect their appeal; if they ask of him something, and he does not give it to them; if they rebuke him he hits them; if they are hungry he does not feed them.'

This is what he said, and it is plausible. Complete satisfaction, however, will not be gleaned from it, since it is possible both to add to it or subtract from it. Thus he has listed usury and embezzling an orphan's property as mortal sins. They are [both, however,] misappropriation of property. But of criminal acts he mentioned only murder as a mortal sin. Yet, gouging the eye, cutting off the hands, and torture of Muslims by beating and types of punishment, did not occur to him. Surely, beating and torturing an orphan, and amputating his limbs are greater [in sinfulness] than embezzling his property. Indeed, in the tradition [it is stated]: 'Excessive reviling, and detracting from the reputation of a fellow Muslim are mortal sins.' This is in addition to slander of the chaste.

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Abu Sa'id al-Khudri³⁰⁵ and others of the Companions said: 'Indeed you are doing things which are, in your eyes, finer than a hair, and which in the time of the Prophet, God bless him, we used to reckon as mortal sins.'^o A faction said: 'Any premeditated [evil act] and anything that God has forbidden are mortal sins.'

To clarify this, take the case of the investigator of theft, as to whether it is or is not a major crime. [19] [This contemplation] will not be sound so long as one does not understand the meaning of mortal sin. What is intended by this is: Is theft prohibited or not? There is no hope of clarifying this without first establishing the essence [of the term] 'prohibited' (*haram*), and then, finding out whether that essence is present in theft.

'Major sin', then, is lexically vague and has no specific connotation, either in [Arabic] lexicography or in [Islamic] law. This is due to the fact that 'major' and 'minor' are modifiers. Any sin is major in comparison to what is beneath it and minor in comparison to what is above it. To lie down with an alien female is a major sin relative to gazing [at her]. It is minor [however,] in comparison to fornication. Amputation of a Muslim's hand is a major sin relative to beating him but minor in comparison to killing him.

Certainly, that action especially for which hellfire was set can be termed by man a mortal sin. By this appellation we mean to say that the punishment of hellfire is grave. Man can also apply [the term 'mortal'] to that [action] which necessitates, a legal punishment (*hadd*), for that which hastens a necessary punishment in this world is grave. He may also apply [this term] to that which is mentioned in the text of the Book as interdicted, for he can say that its specification in the Koran indicates the act's gravity. Then, again, since the Koranic stipulations also differ in their gradation, it will certainly be both grave and mortal by comparison. To these applications there is no objection, and preserved expressions of the Companions vacillate between these points. Possibly they can be reduced to one of these cases.

Certainly, it is important that you know the meaning of God's saying: IF YOU AVOID THE MORTAL SINS THAT ARE FORBIDDEN YOU, WE WILL ACQUIT YOU OF YOUR EVIL DEEDS, and [the meaning of] the Prophet's saying: 'Prayers are atonement for what [falls] between them except mortal sins.' Indeed, this is the ruling principle on mortal sin ³⁰⁷

The truth of the matter is that sins are divided, according to the view of the law (*spar'*), into those that are known to be considered by it as grave; those that are known to be counted among the venial sins;

and those that are in doubt and the rule about them is unknown. To strive for a comprehensive definition or a definite figure is to strive for the impossible. For this is impossible except by hearing the Apostle of God say: 'By mortal sins I meant ten or five,' and list them. But as this is not reported, though in some versions 'three mortal sins' are mentioned,^o in others, seven,^b and 'that blasphemy is one of the mortal sins', apart from the seven and three, it becomes clear that no specific number was meant. How could one then aspire to set a [specific] number when

the divine law does not? Perhaps the law intended to obscure it so that men would be in dread, as they are on the Night of Power (*laylata-lqadr*), to increase [thereby] men's diligence in searching for it.

Certainly, we have an overall method which enables us to know the categories and types of mortal sin, upon investigation. As for its main manifestations we know them by contemplation and approximation. We also know the greatest of mortal sins.

But, as for the most minor of the venial there is no way of knowing it.

The point is that we know, by the testimony of both the law and the illumination of insight, that the purpose of all the precepts is to lead men into proximity of God and the bliss of encounter with Him; and that men can attain this only through perception of God, His attributes, books and prophets. This is indicated by the verse: I HAVE NOT CREATED JINN AND MANKIND EXCEPT TO SERVE ME³⁰⁸ that is, that they be My servitors. Yet, man [the servitor] cannot be a servant so long as he has not perceived his master in His mastery, and himself in his servitude. Man must know himself and his Master. This, indeed, is the ultimate purpose of the mission of prophets.

This is, however, fulfilled only in the life of this world. This is the meaning of the Prophet's word: 'This world is a place [for the] cultivation of the hereafter.' Maintenance of this world thus also becomes the domain of religion, inasmuch as the world is a means of fulfilling religion (*din*). Two things of this world are connected with the hereafter: human beings and possessions. Anything, then, which is **in** the way of the perception of God is the gravest of mortal sin, the next being that which is destructive of human life, and the next is that which impedes the livelihood of men. These are three stages. [20] It is evidently the intent of all the creeds that the hearts must hold the perception [of the divine], the bodies - preserve life, humans - preserve possessions. It is unimaginable that these three matters would be [subject] to dissent [among the various] creeds. It is, then, inconceivable that God would send a prophet, desiring thereby the improvement of [His] creatures in their affairs, both

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spiritual and temporal, only to command them what would impede them from perceiving Him and His messengers, or that He would command them to destroy life and property. It follows that mortal sin has three levels. The first level is that which prevents [man] from perception of God and His apostles. This is unbelief (*kufra*), and there is no mortal sin greater than unbelief, for it is ignorance that is the barrier between God and man, and man's means to draw nigh to God is knowledge ('ilm) and perception (*ma'rifa*).

Man's proximity [to God] corresponds to the measure of man's perception while his remoteness [from Him] corresponds to the measure of his ignorance. That ignorance which is called unbelief is followed by [man's feeling of] security from God's devices and the despair of His mercy. This, indeed, is also of the very essence of ignorance. For he who perceives God could not conceive himself to be [in this sense] secure or despairing.

This stage is followed by the various heresies connected with [the concepts of] the essence of God, His attributes and works. Some of these are graver than others. The disparity [among them] is commensurate with their varying [degrees] of ignorance, and with their holding on to the belief in God, His works and revelations, His commands and prohibitions. The gradations of this are unlimited. They are divided into what one knows to be included within the mortal sins mentioned in the Koran; what is known not to be included; and what one is in doubt about. Seeking to dispel the doubt about this middle category is a hopeless aspiration.

The second level [relates to] human beings, since on their survival and maintenance depend the continuity of life and attainment of perception of God. Consequently, murder, even though it is beneath [the gravity] of unbelief, is certainly of the mortal sins. For, while one strikes at the goal [of religion] itself, the other strikes at the means to the [fulfillment] of that goal. For life in the world is intended only for the sake of the hereafter and the attainment thereof by means of [human] perception of God. This mortal sin is followed by amputation of limbs and whatever leads to death, even beating, with some acts being graver than others.

The prohibition of adultery and homosexuality falls within this category because if all men were to be content with males [alone] in fulfilling [their] carnal appetites, procreation would cease. Rejection of the existant is close to cutting off existence. As for adultery, it does not negate the principle of existence but rather distorts the lines of kinship and nullifies inheritance, mutual aid and many of those matters without which life [cannot be] well ordered. How, indeed, can good order be achieved

together with the permission of adultery? Animal life is not well thriv

ing so long as the male is not with his particular females, set apart from the other males. For this reason it is inconceivable for adultery to be permissible according to a religion³⁰⁹ whose aim is the improvement [of life]. Adultery needs be on a level beneath murder as it does not threaten the continuity of [human] existence, nor does it prevent its principle. It [merely] threatens the distinction of familial relationships, and stimulates factors that lead to strife. [Adultery] must, however, be considered graver than homosexuality as the [natural] desires spur it on both sides, its frequency is greater, and with frequency its harmful impact.

The third degree [relates. to] property, which is the life-stuff of man.

Men cannot control its acquisition chaotically, even until seizure, theft and the like. Rather it must be preserved, so that its continuity might insure the continuity of human beings. Nevertheless, property, when it is seized, can be regained, and if it has been disposed of, restitution is possible. The affair, then, cannot become [too] grave.

It is true that when its acquisition occurs in a [wrong] manner that would make correction difficult, such [interference] ought to be [considered] a mortal sin. This can be in four ways. The first is secret affair, which is theft. If it is not generally controlled - how can it be corrected. The second is consumption of an orphan's property. This too is a covert matter. I refer to a guardian or custodian, entrusted with [the property], who has not [possible] opposition save the orphan who is a minor unaware of the matter. This must be considered grave. Different is the case of extortion which is overt, and that of breach of [a normal] trust where the consignor can oppose the action and seek justice for himself. The third is its alienation by false testimony. The fourth is seizure of a trust and the like by [means of] willful perjury.

Indeed these methods³¹⁰ are not open to correction and it is unimaginable that religions should differ at all as to interdicting them. Some [cases] are graver than others, but they all are beneath the second level which is concerned with life. These four are worthy of being assigned as mortal sins even though canon law does not invoke legal punishment in some cases. However, [divine] threats in their regard are numerous, and in the affairs of this world their impact is great.

As for usury it is only, the consumption of another's property by mutual consent, along with the breach of a condition imposed by canon law. It is not impossible that there should be a variance among the religions [21] in a matter like this. If extortion,³¹¹ which is the taking of another's property without³¹² his consent and without the law's permission, has

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not been deemed a mortal sin, then exacting interest, done with the assent of the owner, albeit without legal sanction, should preferably not be considered a mortal sin³¹³

Even though the canon law views interest³¹⁴ with rebuke, it has done so also with regard to the iniquity of extortion and the like, and to breach of trust, with the result that it merits consideration whether a daniq's³¹⁵ worth of embezzlement and extortion is mortal sin, yet this is an area of doubt, and the trend of thought is against including such deeds under the heading of mortal sin. Rather, it is appropriate to limit mortal sin to that which is legally so indisputable that it be religiously obvious.

Thus, of what Abu Talib al-Makki³¹⁶ mentioned, only calumny, intoxication, witchcraft, desertion from the ranks and disobedience to parents³¹⁷ remain.

As for drinking, inasmuch as it removes reason, it is appropriate that it be a mortal sin, as attested to by both the severity of the law and rational considerations. For indeed, the intellect is a gift just as life, nay life is worthless without the [faculty of] reason. Elimination, then, of [the faculty of] reason is a mortal sin.

This does not follow, however, from a drop of wine. No doubt, if a man drank water in which was a drop of wine, that would not constitute a mortal sin. It is merely drinking polluted water. The drop itself is an object of doubt. That the law lays down legal punishment for it [merely] indicates how gravely it views the matter of intoxication. For it is counted as a mortal sin under the law. It is beyond human ability to grasp all the subtleties of the divine law. If, then, there is consensus that it is mortal sin, this line must be pursued. If not, there is room for hesitation.

As for calumny, it involves only hurting [people's] good repute, and this falls below the level of detriment to property." Again, hurt to honour is a matter of degree, its most severe being false accusation regarding the abomination of fornication. The canon law views this gravely.

I think, generally, that the Companions used to count any [action] which called for legal punishment a mortal sin. It, from this standpoint, is not expiated by the five prayers, and this is what we mean, now, by [the term] 'mortal sin'. But, inasmuch as it is possible that the [revelational] laws would differ about this, while analogy alone does not point to the magnitude and gravity [of this charge], nay, it would be possible for the Law to stipulate that one valid witness, upon seeing a man fornicate, may bear testimony, in which case the accused is flogged by virtue of

this testimony. But, if his testimony is not accepted, then the other man's punishment is not evident, practically, even if it is one of the actually occurring affairs in the category of needs. Then, this too is appended

to the mortal sins of him who knows the rule of canon law.' As for he who thinks that he must testify himself or that another may join him in support, it is not necessary that it be counted as a mortal sin of his.

As for sorcery, if it contains unbelief it is a mortal sin; if not, its gravity depends upon the damage which results from it, such as loss of life, sickness or the like.

As for desertion and disobedience versus parents, this too should be, by virtue of analogy, subject to hesitation.

Thus we conclude that any accusation, except adultery, assaulting people, oppressing them by usurpation of their property; evicting them from their dwellings and villages and ousting them from their homelands, does not involve a mortal sin. For it has not been mentioned among the seventeen, the highest listing given, so that hesitation in this too is not unlikely. The Tradition, however, indicates its designation as mortal sin, and so it may be appended to such sin.

In conclusion, the matter, therefore, reverts to the meaning we attached to the term 'mortal sin', i.e., that for the expiation of which, according to the rule of canon law, the prayers are not efficacious. That again is divided into what one knows will not, at all, be expiated; that for which people should atone; and that which is open to doubt. Of the last, some cases may be presumed to be solved positively or negatively, and others are so doubtful that only a text from the Book or [prophetic] tradition can resolve them. In the absence of such a text there is no point in seeking resolution of the doubt.

You might object:

This proves the impossibility of perceiving the definition of a mortal sin, and how can the Law deal with what cannot be defined?

Know, then, that anything that is connected³¹⁹ with judgement in this world can be open to ambiguity. Yet³²⁰ it is this world that is the sphere of prescribed divine law. About mortal sin, as such, there is no rule in this world. Rather, anything necessitating legal punishment is known by its [separate] name, such as theft, adultery and the like. But the rule re mortal sin is merely that the five prayers do not atone for it. This is a matter that relates to the hereafter. Ambiguity about it is appropriate in order that man be fearful and cautious, and should not venture, relying on the efficacy of the five prayers, into venial sins.

Thus, avoidance of mortal sins [22] atones venial ones, in accordance

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with the divine word: IF YOU AVOID THE MORTAL SINS THAT ARE FORBIDDEN YOU, WE WILL ACQUIT YOU OF YOUR EVIL DEEDS ³²¹ But, avoidance of mortal sin atones for the venial sin [only] when man abstains despite his ability and volition, like one who has power over a woman and could cohabit with her but restrains himself from intercourse and limits himself to gazing or touching. His internal struggle to abstain from sexual congress has greater effect in the illumination of his heart than his audacity in gazing has in the darkening of his heart. This, then, is the meaning of his atonement. If, however, he was impotent; abstaining only because of disability; or refrained in fear of another [extraneous] matter, then such would not, by any means, serve the purpose of atonement. Whoever, by nature, had no³²² desire for wine, and even were it permitted him would not drink of it, his abstention would not atone for the auxiliary venial sins like listening to the playing of musical instruments. Certainly, he who craves wine and listening to music, yet restrains himself with great effort from wine and settled for music, his internal struggle in abstention may erase from his heart the darkness which accrued to it through the sin of listening to music.

All of these judgements pertain to the hereafter, and it is conceivable that some of them will remain. in a state of uncertainty and doubt. Their particulars can be known only from a text; which text or comprehensive definition has not yet been [clearly] granted, and only varying versions have reached us.

Thus that Abu Hurayra³²³ said: The Apostle of God, of blessed memory, said: 'One prayer to the next and one Ramadan to the next is an atonement, except in three matters, [namely]; polytheism, abandoning the tradition (*sunna*) and breach of contract.'^o He was asked: 'What [constitutes] abandoning tradition?' He replied:³²⁴ 'Seceding from the community.' 'And what of breach of contract,' [he was asked]. 'That a man swore allegiance to [a leader] then go out with sword [in hand] to combat him.' This and its like are the expressions [in the matter]. They do not indicate a total number, nor do they point to a general rule. Thus the matter certainly remains obscure.

You might object:

Testimony (*shahada*) is accepted only from him who avoids the mortal sins; caution from venial sins is not a requisite for its acceptance. This is [in accord with] this world's rules.

Know, then, that we do not-restrict the rejection of testimony to the mortal sins. Indisputably, one who listens to the playing of musical instruments, dresses in silk brocade, wears a golden ring, and drinks from gold and silver vessels, his testimony is not accepted, yet no one has concluded that these matters are mortal

sins.

'Ash-Shi fr'i³²⁵ said: 'If a Hanafi drank nabidh,³²⁶ I should impose legal punishment but would not reject his testimony.' By obligating legal punishment he made it a mortal sin, yet he did not reject the testimony.

This shows that neither acceptance nor rejection of testimony depends upon either venial or mortal sins [as such]. Rather, all sins damage integrity except those which man obviously cannot escape, such as slander, snooping, evil thought, falsehood in some statements, listening to gossip, abandoning the commanding of the good and forbidding the evil; eating doubtful food; abuse of a child and slave, beating them, in anger, more than is right; deference to tyrannical rulers; friendship with profligates; and indolence in instruction of household and child in all their religious needs. It is inconceivable that the witness could avoid, more or less, these sins except by withdrawing and devoting himself exclusively to the affairs of the hereafter, and curbing himself for awhile to the extent that he would be able to stick to his path even after he has rejoined society. If only the word of such a man were to be accepted, then it would be so scarce that all litigation and testimony would prove untenable.

Dressing in silk, listening to music, playing backgammon, social intercourse with the drinking set at the time of a party, intimacy with alien women, and the like of these venial sins are not of this kind. In accepting or rejecting testimony one must look into these ways, not into mortal or venial sins.

Then again some of these venial sins; because of which testimony is not rejected, surely may bring on the rejection of testimony if a man persists in them, e.g., habitual gossip and slander, keeping company and friendship with profligates. The venial sin grows by persistence, just as the permissible but indifferent act, like playing chess, singing constantly, etc., may become, through persistence, a venial sin..

So much for the rule re mortal and venial-sins

[23] How Higher and Lower States, in the Hereafter are distributed

according to Good and Evil Works in this Life

This life (dunyā) is of the material world while the hereafter is of the transcendent world. By 'this life' I refer to your state before death, and by the 'hereafter' to your condition after death. For your [temporal] existence and afterlife are your attributes and states; [that] which is near is called 'this life' and that which follows later is called the hereafter

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(*dkhira*).

We speak now while being in this life of the next. Because, we speak in this life, it being the sensible world, but our purpose is the explanation of the hereafter, which is the world beyond the senses, and it is inconceivable to describe the transcendent world within the sensible world except by adducing parables. That is why it is said: AND THOSE PARABLES, WE COIN THEM FOR THE PEOPLE, BUT NONE UNDERSTANDS THEM SAVE THOSE WHO KNOW ³²⁷ This is because compared to the transcendental world (*'alam al-malakut*) the temporal world is like slumber. That is why the Prophet said: 'men are asleep, and when they die they awaken.'¹⁰

That which will occur in the waking state becomes clear to you during sleep only [through] parables which are in need of interpretation. Likewise, that which will take place in the waking state of the hereafter cannot be explained in the sleep of this life except through a multitude of parables, by which I mean that which we know from the science of dreaminterpretation. Of these [similitudes] three should suffice if you are sagacious.

A man came to Ibn Sirin³²⁸ and said: 'In my dream I seemed to have a seal in my hand with which I sealed men's mouths and women's pudenda.' Ibn Sirin said: 'You are a muezzin who announces the prayers during Ramadan before the break of dawn.' 'Right you are,' replied the man.

Another man came to him and said: 'I saw myself pouring oil into olives.' Ibn Sirin replied: 'If you have a female slave whom you bought, examine her case closely, for, indeed, she is your mother who was taken prisoner while you were an infant³²⁹ For the olives are the source of the oil, and now [in your dream] it is returned to the source.' The man, then, looked into the matter, and, in fact, the slave turned out to be his mother who had been taken captive while he was an infant.

Yet another said to Ibn Sirin: 'I was myself adorning the necks of swine with pearls.'³³⁰ Ibn Sirin said: 'You teach wisdom to the unworthy.' It was as he said.

Dream-interpretation, from first to last, consists of parables that convey to you the way of coining parables. By a parable we mean the rendering of meaning in such a form that if one considers its meaning he, finds it true, yet, if he looks at its form he will find it false. Thus the muezzin, if he looked at the form of the seal and the imprinting of it on the pudenda, would consider it false. Indeed, he did not seal with it at all. But, if he considered its meaning he found it true since from

it issued the spirit and sense of sealing, which is the stopping intended by sealing.

The prophets cannot address humans except by use of parables, for they are commissioned to speak to men

according to man's level of understanding. But men are³³n (as] in sleep, and nothing is revealed to a sleeper except through parable. When they die, then, they awake and realize that the parable is true.. That is why the Prophet said: 'The heart of the believer is between two of the Merciful's fingers.'^o This is of the parables that only those that know can understand. As for the ignorant [one], his level [of ability] does not go beyond the literal sense of the parable, because of his ignorance of interpretation (tafsir) which is called allegorical interpretation (tail) just^{as} the interpretation of the 'parables' seen in sleep is called 'dream interpretation' (ta'6ir). Thus he affirms of God a hand and a finger - may God be exalted far above this view!³³² Similar to this is the saying of the Prophet: 'God created Adam in His image.'b [The ignorant men] understand image [as meaning] only color, form and shape. He attributes these to God³³³ That is why some people stumbled in the matter of divine attributes, even re divine speech. They represent it as voice and letter etc. It would take too long to discuss it.

There may occur the coining of parables concerning the hereafter, which parables the unbeliever, whose view rigidly sticks to the literal sense and what he considers contradictory in it he will reject. For example, the Prophet says: 'On the Day of Resurrection, Death in the form of a beautiful ram will be brought and killed.' The stupid heretic revolts, deems it a falsehood, and infers from it the falsity of the prophets. He says: 'O Almighty God, death is an accident and the ram is a body. How is an accident transformed into a body? Is this not [24] absurd?' But God keeps the knowledge of His secrets out of reach of those fools, as it is said: NONE UNDERSTANDS IT SAVE THOSE THAT KNOW³³⁴ The wretch does not understand. A man said: 'I saw in my sleep that a ram was brought and it was said that it was the plague which [ravaged] the village. Then, it was slaughtered.' The interpreter said: 'You are right. It is as you have seen it. It indicates that the plague will cease and never recur, for the slaughtered was the source of desperation.' Both are right: the interpreter in his explanation, the dreamer in his vision. The truth here' goes back to the fact that the angel³³⁵ in charge of dreams is the one who informs men during sleep of that which is [written] on the 'safely preserved tablet' (al-lawh al-ma'afuz),³³⁶ he instructed the dreamer, by means of a parable which he coined for him,

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of what is on the preserved tablet. For the sleeper grasps the parable, the parable is true and its meaning sound.

The prophets, also, when they address men in this life, which, compared to the hereafter, is as slumber, convey meanings to men's minds through similitudes, out of divine wisdom and kindness to men, facilitating the comprehension of that which they would fail to grasp without parables. The statement, then, that death is brought in the form of a beautiful ram is a simile coined to convey to the mind that death brings on despair.

The heart is predisposed to being influenced by similes and to establishing their meanings. The Koran, therefore, characterized extreme power when it stated: BE, AND IT IS.³³⁷ The Prophet expressed the alacrity of transformation when he said: 'the heart of the believer is between two of the Merciful's fingers.' We have already indicated the sense of that in the Book of the Foundations of the Articles of Faith, which is in the quarter of Acts of Worship³³⁸ Let us now return to the matter at hand.

The point is that the indication of the distribution of degrees and attainments for good and evil works is impossible except by striking similes. Let us, then, understand our simile as to its meaning, not its form. Just as men differ in [the attainment] of happiness or misery in this life, so are they divided in the hereafter into classes and differ in an innumerable variety of greater or lesser happiness or misery. The hereafter is not at all different in this respect. For the ruler of [both] the temporal and the transcendental worlds is one; no associate has He. His order, which originates from His eternal will, is constant, unchangeable.


While we are unable to enumerate the individual levels, nevertheless, we can compute the [broader] categories. In the hereafter, men are divided, clearly, into four categories: the damned; the chastised; the redeemed; and the blessed³³⁹ An analogy in this world is the following. A king captures a region. He kills some of the [natives]; they are destroyed. He chastises some for awhile but does not kill them; they are chastised. He frees some; they are redeemed. He confers honours on some; they are successful. If the king is just he will divide them strictly on their merits. He will slay only those who deny the king's right, resisting him politically. He chastises only those who fell short in his service while acknowledging his dominion and lofty rank. He would free only those who, following recognition of his power, have not failed to the extent of deserving chastisement, nor have rendered service to the extent of deserving reward. He honours only those who have spent their lives to serve and support him.

It is proper that honours granted should vary in rank in accordance with the degrees of service; that the destruction of the damned should be, either by beheading or infliction of an exemplary punishment, in accordance with their degree of opposition; that the severity, duration and type of punishment for the chastised should be in accordance with the degree of their failing. Each of these categories is sub-divided into innumerable groups..

It is thus to be understood that, in the hereafter too, men are variously disposed. One will be destroyed, another chastised for awhile, one redeemed to reside in the abode of security, and another blessed. Moreover, the blessed are divided into those residing in the gardens of Eden, the gardens of sheltering retreat, or the gardens of Paradise^{34p} Among the chastised, also, there are those punished for a while, those tormented for one thousand to seven thousand years. These latter are the last to leave hellfire, as it has been reported ii, a tradition. ° The damned, who despaired of God's mercy, are also of different categories. All these variations correspond to the differences in their obedient and rebellious acts. Let us, now, mention the mode of distribution.

[25] The first level is that of the damned, by which term we refer to those who despair of God's mercy. Do not be heedless of the meaning of our simile in which the one slain was he who despaired of the king's pleasure and deference. This level is only for heretics; disdainers; those devoted solely to temporal existence; those who deny God, His apostles and scriptures. Yet, ultimate happiness lies in nearness to God and gazing at His countenance. Such is attained only through that perception which finds its expression in faith [in God] and acceptance [of His prophets]. The heretics are those who deny; the disbelievers are those who despair of God's eternal mercy. It is they who disbelieve the Lord of the Universe and His appointed prophets. But upon that day they shall be veiled from their Lord most certainly.³⁴¹ Yet whenever someone is veiled from his beloved, a bar is set between him and that which he desires, he certainly is seared as by hellfire by the fire of separation³⁴²

The gnostics therefore say: Our fear is not of hellfire, nor is our yearning for the maidens of paradise. Nay, what we seek is only the Encounter, and what we flee from - is the Veil. Also: One who worships God seeking compensation is ignoble. He worships God as if out of the quest for paradise or for fear of hellfire. The gnostic, however, serves Him for His own sake, and seeks naught save God Himself. He desires neither houri nor paradisiac fruit, and fears not hellfire. For the overwhelming fire



of separation is likely to prove more painful than the fire which consumes the body. Indeed, the fire of separation is THE FIRE OF GOD KINDLED ROARING OVER THE HEARTS ³⁴³ The fire of Hell affects naught save the body but, in relation to the affliction of the heart, the torment of the body is scorned. Therefore it has been said:

The hottest fire of Hell is cooler than,
The flame of passion in the lover's heart³⁴⁴

One should not ignore this [phenomenon] of the hereafter as there exists a visible parallel in the temporal world. It has been observed that a man possessed by the ecstasy of love runs over fire and on the roots of reeds that injure his feet yet he feels it not due to the intensity of that which fills his heart. You can see, in combat, how fury overwhelms a man, so that he remains unaware of injuries sustained: The rage is a fire filling his heart. The Prophet has said: 'Rage is a portion of hellfire.'^o

The burning of the heart is more potent than the burning of the body. As you can see, the stronger nullifies sensitivity to the lesser. Death by fire and sword is merely due to the separation of two components connected in a union feasible in bodies. But that which separates the heart from its beloved, to whom it is joined in a union more perfect than that [found] in bodies, is far more painful. [This is obvious] if you are a man of heart and insight. Nor it is unlikely that one who has no heart will not grasp the intensity of this pain and will regard it lightly in comparison to the pain of the body.

If a youth were given the choice between the pain of doing without ball and mallet and the pain of missing the rank of a ruler, he would, by no means, be sensitive to the preclusion from power. Nor would he reckon that as painful. He would exclaim: '[Running] with the mallet on the playing field is dearer to me than occupying a thousand royal thrones.

Likewise, one, who is dominated by gluttony, if given the choice between pastry³⁴⁵ and sweets and a good action by which he would triumph over his enemies and delight his friends, surely would choose the pastry and sweets, as a result of the loss of that stimulus (ma'na) by which glory becomes desirable, and the presence of the faculty by which food becomes delightful. This applies to one who has been dominated by bestial and predatory traits, one in whom the angelic qualities have not appeared, those traits which tally with the delight exclusively in proximity to the Lord, and are grieved only by remoteness and concealment [from Him]. Just as taste resides only in the tongue and hear

ing only in the ears, so this quality is only of the heart. And, just as one who is bereft of hearing and sight cannot appreciate the delight of melody nor the beauty of form and colour, so a man who has no heart cannot have this [spiritual] sensation. Not every man has a heart. Or else the Divine Word: SURELY IN THAT THERE IS A REMINDER TO HIM WHO POSSESSES A HEART,³⁴⁶ would not be true. In this verse God qualified one unmindful of the Koran as one who is bereft of the heart.

I do not mean, by the term 'heart', that which is encased by the ribs. Nay, I mean the conscience which is of the world of dominion. ⁴⁷ That flesh[, of the same name,] which is of the world of creation, is its throne, the chest [cavity] its seat and the other limbs are its [26] sphere and its realm. Both creation and dominion are the Lord's. Yet, that conscience about which God said: SAY, THE SPIRIT IS OF THE COMMAND OF MY LORD,³⁴ is the commander and king. For between the world of creation and that of dominion there is a certain relation,³⁴⁹ the world of dominion commanding the world of creation. It is that spiritual substance³⁵⁰ which, if it is sound, brings soundness to the rest of the body. One who perceives it, knows himself and one who knows himself knows his Lord. Then man can have the first inkling of the spiritual wisdom implied in the Prophet's statement that 'God created Adam in His image.'

God views with compassion those who attribute to Him the literal meaning of His expression and those who stray in the method of [allegorical] interpretation. If His compassion for the former is greater than for the latter, it is because compassion comes in accordance with the measure of the error, their error being greater even though they share in the common misfortune of being deprived of the truth. For the truth is the bounty of God.

He gives to whom He will, and God is of bounty abounding ist It is His wisdom for which He singles out whom He will³⁵² . . . AND WHOSO IS GIVEN THE WISDOM, HAS BEEN GIVEN MUCH GOOD ³⁵³

Let us return to the matter 'at hand. We went to all that length and dwelt extensively on a matter which is higher than the study of practical religion which we pursue in this book. It has become evident, then, that the degree of destruction is visited only on the ignorant deniers. As the evidence of this from God's book and the Tradition (*sunna*) of His Apostle is too extensive, we have not cited it.

The second level is that of the chastised. On it are those who are endowed with the basic faith but have failed in corresponding fidelity.

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Indeed, the beginning of faith is monotheism (*tawhid*), that is, that one serves only God. But a person who pursues his own whim, takes his whim to be god; consequently he pays lip-service to being monotheist without, in truth, being one. However, the meaning of the profession, 'there is no god but God', is as the Koran states: SAY: "GOD". THEN LEAVE THEM ALONE, PLAYING THEIR GAME OF PLUNGING ³⁵⁴ That means: abandon completely everything save God.

The sense of the verse: THOSE WHO HAVE SAID 'OUR LORD IS GOD', THEN HAVE GONE STRAIGHT... ³⁵⁵ is: The straight path, following of which is the only means to full monotheism, is, like the bridge (*sirat*)³⁵⁶ in the description of the hereafter, thinner than a hair and sharper than [the blade] of a sword. No man can escape deviation from it, even in an easy matter, as he is yet not free of following his whim, even if it be in a trifling. That detracts from the fullness of monotheism according to the [degree] of deviation from the straight path. Such certainly necessitates a defect in the degree of proximity to God. With each [such] defect, two fires attend: the fire of separation resulting from that elusive fullness of faith, and the fire of hell as the Koran has described it.

Everyone who deviates from the straight path is punished twice in two respects. The severity or leniency, however, and the varying duration of that punishment is decided by two factors: the intensity of his faith and the degree of his pursuit of whim. Since man, in most cases, is not devoid of failing in.. one of the two respects, God said: NOT ONE OF YOU THERE IS, BUT HE SHALL GO DOWN TO IT: THAT FOR THY LORD IS A THING DECREED, DETERMINED. THEN WE SHALL DELIVER THOSE THAT WERE GODFEARING: AND THE EVIL DOERS WE SHALL LEAVE THERE, HOBBLING ON THEIR KNEES ³⁵⁷ The pious of old said, therefore: 'Our fear is caused by our being sure that we are destined for the fire, and we have doubts about [our] salvation.' When al-Hasan³⁵⁸ reported the above-mentioned tradition of the one who leaves hellfire after a thousand years crying, 'O Compassionate One! O Benefactor!', ° Hasan exclaimed: 'If only I could be that man.'

Some traditions indicate that the last to leave hellfire will do so after seven thousand years, and that the duration differs between an instant and seven thousand years, so that some pass over hellfire like a fleeting bolt of lightning, without any sojourn. Between the instant and the seven thousand years there are varying degrees of duration: a day; a week; a month; and so forth. Also, [the traditions indicate] a diversity in the intensity with the maximum limitless, and the minimum an accounting. [This is just] as [in the case] of the king who sometimes punishes, by rebuke, those who have fallen short in their works, then grants pardon; sometimes by flogging and at other times he inflicts a different sort punishment. A third difference beyond duration and intensity, pertains to chastisement; that being variety of type. For one is punished with mere confiscation of his property; another by loss of his property and the slaying of his children, and seizure of his women, chastisement of his kinsfolk, flogging, amputation of tongue, hand, [27] nose, ear and so forth. Such variations exist also in the chastisement of the hereafter. These are indicated in the trenchant propositions of the law [of Islam].

These are in accordance with the strength or weakness of faith and the greater or lesser quantity of good and evil deeds ³⁵⁹ The intensity of chastisement is according to the intensity and frequency of the evil deeds; while its quantity is linked to the quantity of evil. The variety of type is related to the variety of deeds. This has been disclosed to those who possess hearts, through Koran passages, illumined by faith. This is the meaning of the verse: THY LORD WRONGS NOT HIS SERVANTS ³⁶⁰ And again: TODAY EACH SOUL SHALL BE RECOMPENSED FOR THAT IT HAS EARNED ³⁶¹ Also:... AND THAT MAN HAS NAUGHT SAVE AS HE HAS LABOURED³⁶² And: ... WHOSO HAS DONE AN ATOM'S WEIGHT OF GOOD SHALL SEE IT. AND WHOSO HAS DONE AN ATOM'S WEIGHT OF EVIL SHALL SEE IT;³⁶³

and other such passages in the Scripture and Tradition as to reward and punishment being recompense for man's acts, all this injustice without iniquity. The trend is toward pardon and mercy inasmuch as our Prophet quoted God as saying: 'My mercy outweighs My wrath.'¹⁰ God said: AND IF IT BE A GOOD DEED HE WILL DOUBLE IT, AND GIVE FROM HIMSELF A MIGHTY WAGE.³⁶⁴ Thus these general points, therefore, pertaining to the relation of greater and lesser ranks to good and evil works are known through the decisive statements of revelation and the illumination of gnosis. As for the particulars, they can be known only as [probable] opinion relying on the literal sense of the traditions and the type of intuition drawing upon the lights of contemplative scrutiny.

We assert, then, that anyone who absorbed the principle of faith, avoids all major sins and fulfills all religious obligations - namely, the five pillars, - with only sporadic minor transgressions, his punishment will, it seems; be merely a reprimand. When he is brought to account, his good works outweigh his evil ones, inasmuch as traditions have it that

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the five prayers, Friday prayer, and the Ramadiin fast atone for that which [occurs] between them. Also, according to the Koran text, avoidance of major sin atones for minor ones. The minimum of atonement is that the punishment be averted though the accounting was not. Anyone in this position, with his scales heavy in the balance [with good deeds], shall, after the favourable balance is evident and the accounting disposed, inherit a pleasing life.³⁶⁵ How excellent is his joining the Companions of the Right Hand or the near stationed, and his entering the gardens of Eden or the Supreme Paradise!³⁶⁶

The same applies to the classes of faith. For faith is of two types: imitative, as is the faith of the masses who believe that they are told and persist therein; and the revelatory faith which is achieved through the enlarging of the breast by divine illumination until all reality is exposed as it is. It then becomes clear that everything originates and ends in God for naught is real save God, His attributes and works. It is the people of this class that are the near-stationed ones who abide in the Supreme Paradise. They enjoy the utmost degree of proximity to the heavenly host. They too, however, are of various categories. Some are more advanced, others less, the disparity dependent upon the differences in their knowledge of God. The gnostics' degrees of gnosis are innumerable inasmuch as fully fathoming God's glorious essence is impossible. The sea of gnosis has no coast and no bottom and, therefore, men plunge into it according to their strength and according to what they have been granted by God throughout the ages. The stations on the road to God are endless, and innumerable are the levels of those who travel God's path.

One who believes by imitation is if the Companions of the Right Hand but on a level lower than the near-stationed. The Companions of the Right Hand are further subdivided. The level of the highest among them approaches the lowest level of the near-stationed. This is the position of one who avoided all major sins and performed all religious obligations - namely, the five pillars, i.e., the verbal utterance of the profession of faith, prayer, alms, fast and pilgrimage. One who perpetrated one or more major sins or neglected some of Islam's pillars, if he truly repents before his time came due, joins those who sinned not. For he who repents is as one who has never sinned. A washed garment is as one which was never soiled.

If he died before repenting, it is a perilous matter, for he may die while persisting [in sin] and this may be the cause of wavering in his faith, and he may be assigned to a bad end. This is especially so when his

faith was of a conformist kind. For imitation, even if resolute, is apt to disintegrate at the least doubt or distortion. [28] The insightful gnostic is less likely to be afraid for a bad end. Both of them, if they died in faith, would be chastised except that God may forgo any chastisement beyond rebuke at the accounting.

The duration of the punishment is commensurate with the duration of persistence in sin; its intensity with the ignominy of the major sins; the variety of type with the variety of evil works. At the termination of the period of punishment the tradition-bound dolts will abide in the levels of the Companions of the Right Hand while the gnostics of insight will abide in the highest *heights*.

It is related: 'The last to leave hellfire will be given such as this whole world (dunyd) tenfold.'¹⁰ Do not imagine that the intent is the calculation of the physical area, as one parasang compares to two parasangs or as ten compares to twenty. This would be ignorance of the way parables are coined. Rather, it is like the saying: 'One took from him a camel and gave him ten like it.' Or, 'the camel was worth ten dinars but someone gave him a hundred.'

If one understands the simile only in terms of weight surely, then, the hundred dinars, if placed on one balance

of a scale, would not register a relation of one to ten with the camel on the other balance. Nay, it is a comparison of the meanings of bodies and spirits not of their individual existences. The camel is not wanted for its weight, length, breadth or area, but for its monetary worth. Its spirit is its monetary worth, and its body is its flesh and blood. One hundred dinars are equal to it tenfold on the spiritual balances, not on the bodily balances. This can be seen as true by anyone who knows the concept of monetary worth of gold and silver.

If one gave him, however, a jewel whose weight was a mithgiil and whole value was a hundred dinars, and said: 'I gave him the like of ten of it,' he would be correct. Only jewelers, however, would grasp his veracity. For the jeweler's spirit does not comprehend by mere eyesight but by a different sense beyond the eye. Therefore, a youth, especially a villager or bedouin, would deny the statement saying: 'This jewel is but a stone weighing a mithg5l'; the camel weighs a million mithgi ls; hence the man lied when he said, 'I gave him tenfold thereof.' In truth, however, it is the youth who is wrong but there is no way to prove it to him, until he be left to mature and become refined, or until he attain in his heart the illumination with which he may grasp the inner worth of gems and other valuables. Then only would the truth be revealed

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to him.

The gnostic is unable to make the tradition-bound man, lagging behind, understand how right is the Prophet in this comparison, as the Prophet says, according to traditions: 'Paradise is in the heavens.'^o The heavens are of this world. How, then, can this world [they say] hold ten of the like? This incapacity is like that of the adult who is unable to make the boy grasp the above-mentioned comparison. The same is true of explaining the matter to the nomad.

Just as one may pity the jeweler when he attempts to enlighten the bedouin and villager concerning the parable, so the gnostic may be pitied when he attempts to enlighten the dullwitted. It is for this reason that the Prophet, God bless him said: 'Have mercy on three: a learned man among the ignorant; the rich man who became poor and the mighty man who was humbled .^b

For this reason the prophets are pitied from among the people. Their tribulations, because of the people's lack of understanding, are a trial and test for them from God. Such tribulation is assigned them, by eternal pre-ordained decree. This is the meaning of the Prophet's words: 'Tribulation is assigned the prophets, then the saints, and then others rank by rank.'

Do not surmise that the tribulation is like that of Job, an affliction of the body. Indeed, Noah's trial was also great. He suffered from people who the more he called them to turn to God, the more just fled. There fore, when God's Apostle was troubled by the speech of some he said: 'God had compassion on my brother Moses. Indeed, he was troubled by more than this, yet he endured.'^d

Thus, the prophets are not free [29] of being afflicted by the unbelievers. Nor are the saints and the learned free of being afflicted by the ignorant. Therefore, the saints are seldom free of [various] types of harm and tribulation: by expulsion from the land, or their being denounced before the authorities, or by accusation of their unbelief and heresy. It is inevitable that the men of gnosis be viewed as unbelievers by the ignorant just as that he who substitutes a small gem for the large camel should be viewed, by the ignorant, as a squanderer and loser.

When you are aware of these points, trust the Prophet's statement: 'The last to leave hellfire will be given the likes of this world tenfold.' Beware lest you limit your belief to that which is perceived through the sense alone, and become a two-legged ass. For the ass shares with you the five senses; you, however, differ from the ass in a divine conscience which has been offered to the heavens, the earth and the mountains, but

they refused to carry [the trust] and were afraid of it ³⁶⁷ Yet, understanding of that which is beyond the sensible world occurs only within the scope of that conscience which distinguishes you from the ass and the other animals. He who overlooks that, disregards and neglects it, and is content with the bestial level, does not transcend the [level] of sensual perceptions, is the one who destroys himself by wrecking his soul, forgetting it by ignoring it. **BE NOT AS THOSE WHO FORGOT GOD, AND SO HE CAUSED THEM TO FORGET THEIR SOULS.**³⁶⁸ Anyone who knows no more than is grasped through the five senses has forgotten God, inasmuch as His being cannot be encompassed, in this world, through the senses. But anyone who has forgotten God, is certainly made to forget his own soul, and is lowered to the animal level, and abandons the ascent to the higher horizon ³⁶⁹ He betrays the trust which God placed with him and bestowed upon him, is ungrateful of His blessings and is risking His rancor, nay his state is worse than that of the beast. For, the beast is redeemed by death.

But man has a trust which shall, certainly, be returned to its consignor. He is the source and end of the consignment. The trust is like the radiant sun, yet, it falls into this evanescent mold and sets in it. At the destruction of this mold this sun will rise from its setting place and return to its creator, either in eclipsing

darkness or with brilliant radiance. The brilliant and radiant are not barred from the divine Presence. The darkened also returns to the Presence for God is the source and end of all; only that [the darkened soul] turns its head from the highest heights to the lowest depths. The Koran, therefore, states: IF THOU COULDST SEE THE GUILTY HANDING THEIR HEADS BEFORE THEIR LORD³¹⁰ It is clear, then, that they are, before their Lord, in confusion; their faces turned back and their heads lowered. Such is the divine rule for all to whom He has denied success and whom He has not guided on His path. We seek refuge in God from error and from descent to the station of the ignorant. Such is the fate of him who leaves hellfire and is given ten times or more the like of this world. But only a [true] monotheist will leave hellfire. By monotheism I do not refer to the verbal profession: 'there is no god but God'. The tongue is of the temporal world and avails only in the temporal world. [Such verbal profession] removes the sword from man's neck and repels thothands of plunderers from his wealth. [But] security of limb and property [extends only] the duration of life. But as limb and property do not remain, verbalization avails not. On the contrary, sincerity in monotheism avails, and its perfection is that man sees all things as being only of God. Its sign is that

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he does not become vexed at any creature in what befalls him, inasmuch as he sees not the means but the Prime Cause, as will be shown in the Book on the Reliance on God ³⁷¹

This monotheism is variegated. There are those whose monotheism is like mountains (*jibdl*); in others, it is only the weight of an ounce (*mithgal*); still others have only the measure of a mustard seed or grain. He who has in his heart a dinar's weight of faith, will be the first to leave hellfire. It is said in a tradition: 'Those with a dinar's weight of faith, get out of hellfire!' The last to leave is he in whose heart is only a grain of faith. The gamut of degrees between the dinar's weight and the grain [determines the order of] exit from hellfire in between the two extremes. The comparison between the ounce and the grain is, in terms of simile, as we have mentioned in the comparison between property assets and specie.

For the most part, what leads monotheists into hellfire is injustices toward men, for the account of men is that which will not be neglected. As for the remainder of evil deeds, they may be quickly pardoned and atoned. As a tradition has it: Man [30] is brought before God. The man has good deeds [to his credit] the likes of mountains; if they be admitted he is of the people of Paradise. Then the examiners of interpersonal injustices rise: he may have abused someone's dignity, misappropriated someone's property, assaulted someone. These deeds are subtracted³⁷² from his good deeds until none remain. Then the angels declare: 'O Lord, this man's good deeds are gone and many claims against him remain.' God proclaims: 'Heap their grievances upon his account, and make out his ticket to hellfire.' Just as he is destroyed by the evil done to another, by way of retribution, so the wronged one is saved by the good deed of the evil-doer who committed the injustice against him. For, it is transferred to him in exchange for the wrong he suffered at the other's hand.

It has been related of Ibn al-Jala³⁷³ that one of his brethren slandered him, then, requested his forgiveness. He said: 'I cannot. My ledger has no good in it which is better than this. How, then, can I erase it.' He and others said: 'My brethren's transgressions are of my good deeds with which I intend to adorn my ledger.'

It is this we desired to mention of the variation of man's degrees of happiness and misery in the hereafter.

All this is judgement of external causes, like the decision of the doctor about the patient, that he will certainly die and no treatment will avail, or, about another patient, that his malady is slight and his cure easy. Indeed, that notion is correct in most instances. Yet, sometimes, unbe

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knownst to the physician, the soul's soundness may return to man close to death. Sometimes, however, the end comes unexpectedly to one who suffers from a light malady. These are God's mysteries, concealed in the living and in the obscurity of causes determined with a certain measure of the Prime Cause, for it is not given to human power to fathom them.

Likewise, salvation and bliss in the hereafter have secret causes beyond the power of human comprehension. That concealed cause leading to redemption is termed pardon and favour, and that leading to destruction is termed wrath and vengeance. Behind this mystery is the eternal divine volition which no creature can comprehend. Thus we must admit the pardon of the rebellious, even if his apparent evil is great, and the wrath upon the obedient, even if his apparent acts of obedience are many.

Indeed, we rely on piety, which is in the heart and it [i.e., the heart] is too obscure to be grasped by its possessor, the more so by another. It has already, however, been revealed to those possessed of hearts that forgiveness comes to man only through a secret reason which accounts for it. Wrath also comes only because of a hidden cause which draws man away from God. If not for that, pardon and wrath would not be recompense for acts and qualities. Were it not recompense it would be unjust, and, if it were unjust, the verses: THY LORD

WRONGS NOT HIS SERVANTS;³⁷⁴ and, SURELY GOD SHALL NOT WRONG SO MUCH AS THE WEIGHT OF A MOTE,³⁷⁵ would not be correct. Yet all of this is true.

... AND THAT A MAN SHALL HAVE TO HIS ACCOUNT ONLY AS HE HAS LABOURED, AND THAT HIS LABOURING SHALL SURELY **BE SEEN** ³⁷⁶ EVERY SOUL SHALL BE PLEDGED FOR WHAT IT HAS EARNED ³⁷⁷ WHEN THEY SWERVED, GOD CAUSED THEIR HEARTS TO SWERVE ³⁷⁸ And, when they change what is in themselves, God changes that which is in them. This fulfills the verse, GOD CHANGES NOT WHAT IS IN A PEOPLE, UNTIL THEY CHANGE WHAT IS IN THEMSELVES.³⁷⁹ All this has been revealed to possessors of heart in a manner clearer than visible evidence, inasmuch as eyesight can err, as when, at times, it perceives a distant object as near and a large one as small. But the evidence of the heart cannot err. The point, however, is the opening of the eyesight of the heart and not to imagine falsity in the heart after this development. This is alluded to in the verse, THE HEART LIES NOT OF WHAT HE SAW³⁸⁰

The third level is that of the redeemed. By redemption I mean security only, without felicity or bliss. They are people who have neither

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rendered service to be rewarded, not have they failed [so as] to deserve punishment. It seems that this is the state of the insane, the young of the unbelievers, the feeble-minded and those to whom the call to God has not reached due to geographical isolation. They live in ignorance without perception. Their portion is neither knowledge nor unbelief, neither obedience nor rebellion. There is no means that can bring them close to God nor any offence which can turn them away from God. They are not of the people of paradise nor of the people of hellfire. Rather, they are stationed midway between the two. The revelation terms this *A 'rdf* (the crest) ³⁸¹ The existence of some people in this stage is known with certainty from Koran verses, traditions and the lights [31] of various considerations. Essentially, the judgement,³⁸² for example, that the youth are in this category, is presumed and not known with certainty. Learning about it truly belongs to the sphere of prophecy, and it is unlikely that [men in] the grade of the saints and the scholars would rise to it.

The traditions as regards the youth are also contradictory. When one of the youths died, 'A'isha³⁸³ said: 'A bird of the birds of Paradise.' But God's Apostle denied this saying: 'How do you know?'b Ambiguity and obscurity, therefore, prevail about this placement.

The fourth level is that of the blessed ³⁸⁴ They are the gnostics, as distinct from the mere tradition-bound. They are the successful, station near [God]. The tradition-bound, even if he attains, on the whole, a station in Paradise, is of the Companions of the Right Hand but these are the near-stationed, and what they experience is beyond [the possibility of] explanation.. The extent of possible explanation is what is detailed in the Koran. There can be no explanation beyond God's. That which cannot be expressed in this world is summed up in the verse: NO SOUL KNOWS WHAT COMFORT IS LAID UP FOR THEM SECRETLY,³⁸⁵ and, further, in the tradition: 'I have prepared for my righteous servants that which no eye has seen, which no ear has heard, and which has not occurred to the human mind.'

The desire of the gnostics is that state which could not conceivably have occurred to the human mind in this world. As for the *houri*, palaces, fruit, milk, honey, wine, and jewelry of Paradise, the gnostics do not covet them. Moreover, if these were given to them, they would not be content. They seek only the rapture of gazing at God's countenance. This is the utmost of felicities and the ultimate delight. That is why, when Rabi'a al-'Adawiya³⁸⁶ was asked: 'What do you long for in Paradise?', she answered, 'first the Neighbour and then the House.'³⁸⁷ For these

are people whose preoccupation with the love of the Master deflects them from taking interest in the house and its embellishment, indeed in anything other than He, even in themselves. They are like the lover who is blindly devoted to his Beloved, whose mind is riveted to gazing at His countenance and thinking of Him. He is in the state of immersion, he is neglectful of himself, not aware of what affects his body. This state is termed the obliteration of self. That means that he becomes immersed in another, and all his concerns become one concern, namely his Beloved. There remains no room in him for anything but his beloved until he pays no attention to either himself or others. This is the state through which, in the hereafter, one attains such delight as is as inconceivable [32] in this world, in anyone's mind, as it cannot be imagined that one deaf and blind would form the notion of colour and melody unless the bar was lifted from (the impairment of) his faculties of hearing and sight. At that point he might understand his condition and know, assuredly, that earlier it was impossible for him to have formed such notions. This life (*dunyā*) is a veil to realization, and with its removal the hidden is revealed. At that point, the flavour of the good life is perceived. SURELY THE LAST ABODE IS LIFE, DID THEY BUT KNOW.³⁸⁸

This should suffice in explication of the distribution of degrees [in the hereafter] according to good works.

May God, in His benevolence, grant success.
How Minor Sins are increased

There are circumstances by which minor sins are magnified. Among them are persistence and assiduity. That is why they say: A sin persisted in cannot be minor, and a sin followed by the quest for forgiveness, cannot be major. A major sin can go by and, if it can be imagined that it is not followed by the like, then pardon for such is more likely than for a minor sin in which man persists. A model for this is drops of water falling, continuously, upon a stone until they wear it away. The same amount of water, poured onto the stone all at once, would not produce a like effect. That is why the Apostle of God said: 'best are works that are continuous even if &w.'^o

Matters are clarified through their opposites. If the useful work is the constant, even if it be minor, then the intermittent though numerous works are of little advantage in the illumination and purification of the heart. Likewise, a few evil deeds, if they persist, have great influence in corrupting the heart. Yet, it is hardly imaginable that man storms for the major sin suddenly without antecedents and accessories from the category

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of minor sins. Rarely does the adulterer fornicate without enticement and plotting. Rarely, also, does one kill abruptly without previous rancor and enmity. Thus every major sin involves previous and dependent minor ones. If we could imagine a major sin independent and sudden, without recurrence, perhaps pardon of it would be more likely than of a minor sin in which a man persists throughout his life.

Another [source of augmenting sin] is to consider sin minute. Indeed, whenever man himself deems the sin as major, it becomes, in God's view, minor, because the apprehension of its magnitude stems from the heart's aversion to it and loathing of it. This aversion to it restrains the intensity of its influence upon the heart. [Conversely,] considering a sin insignificant stems from habitude which makes for an intense influence on the heart. The heart must be illumined through acts of obedience, and its blackening through evil deeds must be avoided. It, therefore, will not be censured for what befalls it inadvertently. Indeed, the heart is not impressed by what occurs inadvertently. A tradition has it: 'The believer considers his sin a mountain, suspended above him, and fears it may fall upon him; the hypocrite considers his sin a fly which passed by his nose, and is swatted away.'^o Somebody has said that the sin which is not forgiven is man's saying: 'Were all my sins such as this.'

The sin waxes great in the heart of the believer because of his awareness of God's majesty, and when he contemplates the greatness of Him against whom he rebelled, he sees a minor sin as major. God has revealed to one of His prophets: 'Look not at the insignificance of the gift but, rather, at the greatness of the giver; look not at the smallness of the offense, look rather at the majesty of Him whom you confront with it.' In this sense a gnostic has said: 'There is no minor sin; every offense is major.'

Likewise, a Companion said to the 'Followers': 'Surely you do things which, while in your eyes they are finer than a hair, we, in the time of God's Apostle, would reckon as among the mortal sins.' Since the Companions' perception of God's majesty was more sterling, they considered the minor sins, with regard to God's majesty, as major sins. For the same reason what is a minor sin in the case of an ignoramus, becomes a major sin in the case of a learned man. Matters which are disregarded in the case of a common person, are not so disregarded in the case of an enlightened one, for sin and offense grow in proportion to the perception of the transgressor.

Another cause of the minor sin turning great is delighting in the minor sin, taking pride in it, considering its realization as pleasure, and dis regard of its being the cause of misery. The more the sweetness of the minor sin overcomes a man, the more a minor sin becomes major, and its impact in blackening the heart is growing, so that there are even sinners who pride themselves on their sins and boast of them, because of the intensity of their joy at having yielded to them. [33] As if saying: 'Have you not seen how I rent his dignity?' A disputant says: 'Have you now seen how I exposed him, how I brought out his shortcomings to the point of shame, how I scorned him and how I duped him?' A trader says: 'Have you not seen how I sold him the spurious, how I deceived him, how I cheated him of his wealth and how I made a fool of him?' By deeds such as these are minor sins magnified. But sins are destructive. When man is led to them, and Satan has succeeded in inducing him to act that way, then he should be in trouble and regret brought on by the triumph of the Enemy over him and his own remoteness from God.

If a sick person rejoices in the destruction of the vessel containing his medication, just to escape the discomfort pursuant to its consumption, he cannot be expected to be cured.

What also increases a minor sin is that man disdains God's protection of him, His forbearance, and the respite He granted. Man does not grasp that he is given respite out of detestation, so that the offense might increase. He thinks that his ability to sin is a sign of God's concern for him. This is because of his feeling secure from God's devising, and his ignorance of the pitfalls of delusion about God. As it says, AND THEY SAY WITHIN THEMSELVES, 'WHY DOES GOD NOT CHASTISE US FOR WHAT WE SAY?' SUFFICIENT FOR THEM SHALL BE GEHENNA, AT WHICH THEY SHALL BE ROASTED - A WRETCHED LOT.³⁸⁹ Another case: that he commit a sin and expose it by mentioning it after its commission or committing it in another's presence.

Indeed, such is an offense against the protection God lowers upon him and an incitement of the craving for evil in him whom he told of his sin or whom he made witness his action. Two offenses join into his offense to harden it. If encouraging another person to commit that sin, inducing him and involving him, be added it goes into a fourth crime, and it becomes a monstrous affair.

It is recorded in a tradition: 'All men are excused except the declarers. One of them passes the night in sin, and God conceals it, yet he arises and removes divine concealment, and speaks of his sin.'⁹⁰ This is because it is of God's attributes and favours that he reveals the good deed, conceals the unsightly and does not rip the protective veil. But exposure. [by man] is a repudiation of this grace.

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Somebody said: 'Do not sin, but if you cannot avoid sin, never awaken such a desire in another, for then you will have sinned twice.' That is why the Koran states: THE HYPOCRITES, THE MEN AND THE WOMEN, ARE AS ONE ANOTHER: THEY BID TO DISHONOUR AND FORBID HONOUR³⁹⁰ An early authority said: 'The gravest violation of a man's reputation is to assist him in committing a sin, and then make him consider it slight.'

Another way of increasing a sin: the sinner be a learned doctor with a following. If his sin is displayed, it increases, e.g., the scholar's donning of silk, riding in golden carriages, taking of doubtful money from rulers, frequenting the company of rulers, encouraging them by withholding report [of their sins], reckless slandering, intemperance in controversy, his design being scorn, and occupying himself with such learning as leads only to glory, e.g., the art of controversy and argumentation. For these are sins in which the doctor will have a following. He dies but his evil remains spreading in the world indefinitely. Blessed is he whose sins die with him. A tradition says: 'He who enacts an evil practice bears its burden as well as that of anybody practicing it, his responsibility not reduced at all.'^a

God has said: AND WE WRITE DOWN WHAT THEY HAVE FORWARDED AND WHAT THEY HAVE LEFT BEHIND ³⁹¹ What 'is left behind' refers to those acts which continue after the expiration of the deed and the doer.

Ibn 'Abbiis³⁹² said: 'Woe to the scholar from his followers; he slips but goes right yet people carry the error far away.' Somebody said: 'The error of the learned doctor is like a shipwreck, it sinks and its passengers drown.'

In the 'Isra'iliyat³⁹³ [it occurs]: 'There was a scholar who misguided people into unlawful innovation, then was overtaken by repentance and acted toward correction over a lifetime. God then revealed to their prophet: "Say to him: 'If your sin were only in that which is between Me and thee, I would surely forgive it. However, what about those of My servants thou hast misled and hast plunged into hellfire?' " ' "

Thus it becomes clear that the position of learned doctors is grave. They have two obligations; first abandonment of sin and, secondly, concealment of it. Just as their responsibility for sins is compounded, so is their recompense for good deeds emulated by their following.

If the doctor abandons [the search for] affectation and the affection for the mundane world; is satisfied with little thereof, as well as with little food and apparel against the elements; and is followed in this by

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leading scholars and the rank and file, he will enjoy the likes of their reward. If, however, he leans toward imitating him, they will be able to attain success only in the service of rulers [34] and the gathering of scraps from unlawful wealth. For all this he will be responsible. Thus the behaviour of the scholars is compounded manyfold, be it in merit or demerit, in gain or loss.

So much for the details of the sins for which repentance is effected.

THE THIRD PILLAR: ON THE FULLNESS, REQUISITES AND PERMANENCE OF REPENTANCE

We have already mentioned that repentance consists of regret which leads to determination and resolution. This regret is itself caused by knowledge that the offenses are a barrier between man and his Beloved. Each of these - knowledge, regret and determination - has permanence and fullness. Its fullness has a mark, and its permanence has requisites, all to be clarified.

As for knowledge, examination of it is a study of the cause of repentance; its strengthening and its perfection by factors such as the company of the virtuous, attendance of the dhikrs,³⁹⁴ questioning about the fatal impact of transgressions and about the punishment they may bring on in this world. But cleaving to a shaykh is more useful than all this; indeed it is the efficacious remedy. It will be discussed later on ³⁹⁵

As for regret, it is the heartache when man discerns that the Beloved has been missed. It is marked by long grief and sorrow, tears flowing

and much weeping³⁹⁶

One who becomes aware of torment afflicting his child or one of his dear ones, his grief and weeping are protracted. And, who is dearer to a person than himself, what punishment is severer than hellfire, what is more indicative of the descent of punishment than sins, and [finally,] what announcer is more reliable than God and His Apostle?

If a man was told by one called physician that his child would not recover from his illness and would die thereof, surely his grief would be aroused. Yet, his child is not dearer than himself, nor is the physician more knowledgeable or more reliable than God and His Apostle, death not more severe than hellfire and sickness not more indicative of death than sins are of God's wrath and the risk of hellfire.

The stronger the anguish of regret, the more likely is the expiation of sin through it. The sign of the sincerity of regret is the mellowness of the heart and the profusion of tears. It is said in a tradition: 'Sit with

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the contrite, for their hearts are the most mellow.¹⁰ A sign thereof is that instead of the sweetness of those sins, their bitterness seizes man's heart, and inclination turns into loathing, desire into aversion.

It is stated in the 'Isra'ilyat that Almighty God said to one of His prophets who had asked that the repentance of a certain man be accepted after he had strived in vain for years in worship: 'By My power and majesty, if the hosts of heaven and earth interceded, I would still not accept his repentance, for the sweetness of that sin, of which he repents, yet lurks in his heart.'

You might say:

Sins by nature are agreeable acts. How, then, can one find bitterness in them?

One who partakes of honey containing a poison, and does not discover it by taste, and relishes it, but afterwards falls ill, his illness and its pain progress, his hair falls out and his limbs are left paralyzed, - should honey containing a like substance, be set before him, even if he is in an extreme state of hunger and urge for sweetness, would his soul shun such honey or not? If you answer negatively, such answer would be a denial of the evident and of experience.

Rather, it is possible that even uncontaminated honey would be avoided because of its similarity to the other. That is how the penitent may have the sensation of the bitterness of sin. This is brought on by his knowledge that the taste of every sin may be the taste of honey yet its effect is that of poison. Repentance is not sincere or true without such belief. As such belief is rare, repentance and penitence are rare. You see only such as turn away from God, think lightly of sins, and persist in them.

This is a requisite for the fullness of remorse, and must be constant unto death.

Man must find such bitterness in all sins, even if he has never committed them before, just as one who consumed poison contained in honey feels aversion to fresh water as soon as he learns that it contains a similar poison, since the harm was not from the honey but rather from what it contained. Likewise, the damage that afflicts the penitent from his theft or fornication does not stem from the nature of the act itself but rather from its being a rebellion against God's command. This applies to every sin.

As for the resolution which emerges therefrom, it is the will to correction and it has a connection with the present. It entails renouncing anything prohibited which he practiced, and the fulfillment of every obli

gation which faces him in the present. This has a connection with the past, namely correction of what has preceded; and a connection with the future, namely continued obedience and permanent renunciation of sin unto death.

The requisite of the sincerity of repentance, as far as the past is concerned, is that man should turn his thought back to the first day when he came of age or attained virility, and scrutinize his past [351 life, year by year, month by month, day by day and moment by moment. He should review, in what acts of obedience he was remiss and to which sins he yielded.

If he missed a prayer or performed it while wearing an impure garment or not with the proper intent because he was unaware that the intention is a requisite of prayer, he should perform it in full. If he has doubts as to the number of prayers missed, computing from the period of his attaining majority, subtracting the number of prayers which he feels sure he had performed, he should perform the remainder. He may use common sense, and he will attain the right figure by way of inquiry and careful reckoning.

As for fasting, if he had neglected it during a journey, if he broke the fast intentionally or forgot the proper intention at night and did not make it up, he should, after most careful computation, busy himself with making it up.

As for alms, he should compute his total wealth and the number of years that elapsed since he acquired it. (The

computation is not made from the time of his attaining majority, for alms are due even on the property of a youth.) He then discharges that which he feels he probably owes. Further, if he discharged it in a manner inconsistent with his rite, as not having disbursed to all the eight categories or discharged an alternate³⁹⁷ while he is of the Shaf'i rite,³⁹⁸ he should execute all that; otherwise it is not fully satisfactory. The computation of alms and the knowledge of this matter is protracted, and requires lucid consideration: He may have to consult the jurists on how to settle the matter.

As for the pilgrimage, if one had been able, over the years, but his departure did not come to pass, and presently he has become destitute, he still should go on the pilgrimage. If, considering his destitution, he is unable, he must acquire, by licit means, enough for provisions. If he has no means of acquisition nor means, he should request people to grant him from the zakat or charitable funds, the necessary sum for the pilgrimage. If he dies before performing the pilgrimage, he dies in transgression. The Prophet said: 'One who dies without having made the

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pilgrimage, might as well die a Jew or a Christian.¹⁰ Accidental inability succeeding a state of capacity does not cancel man's obligation of pilgrimage.

Such is the way for a man to examine acts of obedience and to correct them.

As for sins, he should trace his hearing, eyesight, tongue, stomach, hand, foot, pudendum and the rest of him limbs, from the beginning of his majority, then look through all his days and hours and detail to himself a record of his transgressions until they all are established, the minor and the major, and he should sift them. Some of them are between God and himself, i.e., do not entail injustice to man. This includes such acts as gazing at a woman unlawful to the man, sitting in a mosque despite a major ritual impurity, touching a Koran before performing an ablution, entertaining a heresy, drinking wine, listening to entertainment, etc., all unconnected with harm to another person.

Repentance of these comes through remorse and contrition, also by reckoning their measure as regards magnitude and duration, and seeking for each of these sins a corresponding good deed. He performs good deeds in proportion to the measure of the transgressions relying on the Prophet's saying: 'Fear God wherever you be and follow an evil deed with a good one to wipe it out.'^b God, moreover, has said: ... SURELY THE GOOD DEEDS WILL DRIVE AWAY THE EVIL DEEDS⁹⁹

Listening to entertainments is atoned by listening to the recitation of the Koran and dhikr sessions. Sitting in a mosque in an impure state is atoned by retreat at a mosque for engaging in worship. Touching the Koran while unclean is atoned by deference to the Koran, extensive reading from it, kissing it often, and⁴⁰⁰ by making a copy of the Book and making it an endowment. The consumption of wine is atoned by charitable donation of a licit beverage which is better and liked by him.

It is impossible to enumerate all the transgressions. The object, however, is treading the opposite path. Illness is cured by its opposite. Every stain, which arose upon the heart through transgression can be erased only by an illumination raised upon it through an opposite good deed. These opposites are proportionate to one another. Therefore, each evil should be expunged with a good of its own kind but opposite in effect. White is cancelled by black, not by heat or cold. This classification and verification are subtleties toward expunging transgression. Expectation is so justified, trust [36] so great that one should not persist in one variety of worship, even though this too is effective in expunging sin.

Such is the rule concerning sins of man towards God. That a thing is atoned by its opposite is indicated by [the Tradition] that the love of the mundane is the beginning of all error, and that the effect, in the heart, of the pursuit of the mundane is delight in it and craving for it. Since faced with anxieties and worries the heart shuns the world, certainly any hurt which befalls the Muslim and draws his heart away from the mundane, will serve as an atonement.

The Prophet said: 'There are sins for which only anxieties atone.'¹⁰ And, according to another version, 'only the anxiety in the search of a livelihood.' A tradition of 'A'isha:⁴⁰¹ 'When man's sins multiply and he has no works by which to atone for them, God brings upon him anxieties, that should become atonement for his sins.'^b It is said that the anxiety which enters the heart, while man is unaware, is the strain of sins, and the worry about them, the feelings of the heart at the eve of Reckoning and the terror of the day of Resurrection.

You might say:

Man worries mostly about his wealth, children and status. This is [in itself] an error. How, then, will it be an atonement?

Know then that love for these is an error, and deprivation of these is an atonement. If man savoured it, the error set in. It has been related that Gabriel entered unto Joseph in the prison. - 'How was my poor father when you left him?' - 'He grieved for you with the sorrow of a hundred bereaved mothers.' - 'What has he, then, with God?' - 'The reward of a hundred martyrs.'

Thus, anxieties also atone for sins against God. This is the rule concerning sins against God.

As for injustices towards one's fellow-men, they too include felony and transgression of God's due. For God has also forbidden the wronging of one's fellow. The correction of such, insofar as they pertain to God's due, is achieved through remorse, contrition, renunciation of similar acts in the future, and the performance of good deeds counted as opposites of the sins. The penitent will requite with benevolence toward men for the hurt he may have caused them.

Illegal seizure of their property he will atone by charitable works from his lawfully held property. Degrading their dignity by slander and vilification will be atoned through praise for co-religionists, telling people of what the penitent knows of the good qualities of one's fellow etc. The taking of life is atoned by manumission of slaves. For this is like giving life, since the slave is lost to himself, and exists only for his master.

Manumission, therefore, is a creation, the maximum of creation man is capable of. The destruction [of life] is countered by the creation [of life]. By this you learn that what we have discussed of following the path of opposites in atonement and annulment, is attested to in the Law, as the atonement for slaying is the manumission of slaves.⁴⁰² But, even if he did all that, it would not be sufficient so long as he has not turned away from injustice to men, be it against life, or property, or dignity, or heart, I mean sheer hurt.

As for matters of life, if a man happened to slay by error, then his repentance is by compensation, through conceding the blood money, either from him or his clan, and its reaching the entitled party. Such is his responsibility until the delivery has been executed. If the murder was committed intentionally, and retaliation was due, then repentance is through [being ready to suffer] retaliation. If he was not identified, he must reveal himself to the avenger who will decide about his life: [the avenger] may forgive him or kill him. Only by such means is the killer's responsibility fulfilled. Concealment is not permitted.

This is not like his having fornicating, drunk wine, stolen, robbed or had part in an illicit affair for which legal punishment under the divine law had been stipulated, for, these cases do not require that the penitent publicly compromise himself, disclose himself or seek, from the ruler, the application of the sacred law. Rather, he should avail himself of God's protection, and carry out God's declared punishment upon himself by various sorts of effort and chastisement. Pardon, in the case of sins toward God alone, is nigh unto the contrite penitents.

If, however, he submits his case to the authorities and the prescribed punishment is imposed, he did his duty; his repentance is sound and accepted by God. This is attested to by what is related of Ma'iz b. Malik, who came to the Prophet and said: 'O Apostle of God, I have stained my soul and fornicated, and I desire that you cleanse me!' The Prophet then turned him away. The next day Mil'iz approached the Prophet: 'O Apostle of God, I have fornicated!' Again the Prophet turned him away. When MA'iz came the third time, the Prophet took up his case, a pit was dug for Ma'iz, [37] then the Prophet gave the order, the man was stoned. People, in this matter, were of two opinions. Some said: 'He perished as his crime engulfed him.' Others said: 'No repentance is more sincere than his.' But the Apostle of God said: 'His repentance surely would, if divided, suffice for a whole people.'¹⁰

A woman of the Ghamid clan came and said: 'O Apostle of God, I have committed adultery, cleanse me!' The Prophet turned her away.

Then, on the morrow, she said: 'O Apostle of God, why do you turn me away? Do you reject me as you did Ma'iz? By God, I am pregnant!' The Prophet said: 'As for now, go away until you bear the child.' When she gave birth she came with an infant boy wrapped in a tatter and said: 'Here, this is the child I bore.' 'Go away and nurse him until he is weaned.' Then, when she weaned him she came with the infant, and in his hand was a piece of bread. 'O Prophet of God, I have weaned him and he has already tasted food.' The child was given over to a man from among the Muslims. The Prophet gave command, she was buried unto the chest, and stoned. Khiilid b. al-Walid⁴⁰³ approached with a stone and cast it upon her head. The blood splashed upon his face and

he cursed her. The Apostle of God heard him reviling her, and said:

'Easy, Khalid, by Him in whose hand my soul is, she has certainly repented in such a fashion that if the tax collector repented like her, he would be forgiven.' After which he issued instructions [for the matter's

disposition], prayed for her and she was buried

As for retaliation and the punishment of false accusation, the one responsible must expiate his guilt before the one in the right. If the subject is property grasped through unlawful seizure, treachery, or swindle in business matters by means of fraud, such as sale of spurious goods, concealing a defect in the goods sold, undercutting a workman's wage or withholding his wages, all this requires investigation, not from the limit of a man's maturity but from his earliest c, ys. That which is due from a youth's property, the youth,

upon his attaining majority, must pay if the trustee failed to do so. If he does not do this, he becomes a transgressor liable for it. For the youth and the adult are equal as regards monetary claims.

Let man, then, be careful of the smallest sums from the first day of his life until the day of his repentance, before he is held responsible on the Day of Judgement. Let him examine before he is examined. One who is not careful of this world, his accounting is protracted in the next.

If his total obligation is, most plausibly and with all possible effort, summed up, let him write it down. Let him, also, record the names of the wronged, one by one, and travel around the world seeking them, to expiate his guilt before them or give them satisfaction. Such repentance is hard on the sinners and the merchants, as they are unable to seek out all their business contacts or the heirs of these. Each one, however, must do as much as is within his power. If he is unable, there remains for him only the path of a profusion of good works that, on the Day of Resurrection, will prove abundant, so that they will be taken and placed

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on the scales of the wronged claimants. The abundance of his good deeds, however, is measured against his wrongdoings. But if his good works do not counterbalance them, he will be saddled with some evils of the wronged claimants, so that he will perish by the evil of others.

Such is the path, for every penitent, of repelling the claims of the wronged. This necessitates the investment of a lifetime in good deeds, commensurate with the duration of unjust behaviour. How is this possible when it involves an unknown quantity? And perhaps the end is near? Time being limited, he must be more energetic in accumulating good deeds than he was in gathering sin over extended time. Such is the rule concerning injustices upon his conscience.

As for his actual possessions, let him return to the rightful owner that which is known to belong to that owner. Property, whose rightful owner is not known, should be distributed charitably. If lawful possessions become mixed up with unlawful ones, he must do his best to learn the amount of the illicit property, and distribute charity in that amount, as has been specified earlier in the Book of the Lawful and the Unlawful 404

As for such verbal offense against the heart, as having tormented people or defamed them,⁴⁰⁵ he must seek out everyone who suffered from his tongue or whose heart be hurt by his actions, and seek to expiate his sins with each, one by one. If one has died or disappeared, that matter is forfeit, and correction is possible only through augmenting good deeds to be accepted as substitutes at Judgement. If he finds a claimant who releases his guilt in good faith, then that is his atonement. The penitent must put his offense and opposition before the claimant, [38] for ambiguous pardon is insufficient⁴⁰⁶ Perhaps, if [the wronged party] were to know [all] that, and the magnitude of the offense against him, he would not be inclined to forgiveness, and would store [the violation] until Judgement Day, subtracting it then from the penitent's good deeds or loading it upon his evil record. If the penitent's offense against others includes anything that, were it mentioned or made known, would hurt the wronged person, such as the penitent's fornicating with the wronged person's slave girl or relative, or verbal reference by the penitent to some secret failings, the pain may be increasing however the penitent sought to induce him. Then the penitent's path in search of pardon, is blocked. There remains, then, naught save to seek release from his guilt. Still a guilt will remain. Let him seek to compensate for it through good deeds as in the case of the injustices against those now dead or missing.

[Injurious] remark and characterization, again, is a new evil from which expiation must be sought. Whenever the penitent mentions his offense and announces it to the aggrieved, yet [the latter's] soul does not permit expiation, the penitent's guilt remains. Such is the right of the aggrieved. The penitent must, therefore, subtly win him over, act in his interests, and show love and solicitude such as would take sway over his heart. Indeed, man yields to⁴⁰⁷ beneficence. Everyone who feels aversion to an evil may be swayed by a good deed. When [the aggrieved man's] heart recovers, through the abundance of [the sinner's] affection and solicitude, he will permit himself pardon. If he persist in refusal, the sinner's solicitude and pleas are counted among his good deeds which, at Judgement, will possibly make good for his offense. Let his effort at gladdening the other's heart through tenderness be as great as it was in inflicting harm, or surpass it. At Judgement, this will be taken as his compensation, according to the divine judgement. This is similar to one who, in this world, has damaged property, then offered the equivalent [in reparation], but the owner declined to accept it or absolve him, and the Judge then ordered the owner to accept whether he wanted to or not. That is how God will decree on the Day of Judgement.

In both Sahihs⁴⁰⁸ it is related, in the name of 'Abu Sa'id al-Khudri,⁴⁰⁹ that the Prophet said: "There was, in the past, a man who had killed ninety-nine persons. He inquired after the wisest man upon the earth, and was

directed to a monk. He came to the monk and asked: 'One has killed ninety-nine people, is there [a possibility] of repentance for him?' 'No.' The man then killed the monk, completing, thereby, the number of his victims - a hundred. Then he again sought the wisest man in the land, was directed to a learned man, to whom he said: 'One has killed a hundred men, is there repentance for him?' 'Yes,' was the reply, 'who prevents him from repenting? Go to such and such a land, where people⁴¹⁰ serve God, worship with them, and do not return to your land, for it is an evil land.' He set out on the road but midway death overtook him. Then the angels of mercy argued over him with the angels of chastisement. The angels of mercy said: 'He came as a penitent, in his heart directed toward God.' 'He has never done any good,' retorted the angels of chastisement. An angel, in human form, approached, and they appointed him to judge between them. He said: 'Measure the distance to the two lands; he belongs to the one which is nearer.' They measured, and found him nearer the land he sought. So the angels of mercy seized hold of him.¹⁰ According to another version, 'he was closer to the righteous city by a span of the hand, so he became one of it.' In yet another, 'God urged this side to move away and the other side to

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draw near, then said: Measure what is between them. They found the man closer to the one by a span; he was forgiven.'

From this you may learn that there is no salvation except through the preponderance of good deeds and even to an atom's measure. The penitent must show an abundance of good deeds. Such is the rule of intent as far as the past is concerned.

As to the determination linked to the future, it consists of man giving a firm undertaking to God, and contracting with Him a firm covenant not to repeat such sins nor their like. This is like the man who, in his sickness, knows that a fruit, for example, will cause him harm. He resolves, with determination, that he will not partake of the fruit so long as he remains ill. This resolution is immediately imperative, even though it can be imagined that craving will overcome him next. One is not, however, a penitent so long as he has not firmed up the resolution in the present. It is inconceivable that a penitent should succeed therein, at the start, except by means of solitude, silence, reducing food and sleep to a minimum, and sticking to lawful nourishment.

If he has lawfully inherited wealth, or a craft by which he can acquire a sufficient amount, let him be content with it. [39] The beginning of all sin is the consumption of the forbidden. How can one be penitent while persisting therein, not content with the lawful and abstinence from the doubtful, unable to give up the cravings for food and raiment? Someone said: 'He who is sincere in giving up desire and conquered himself for God's sake seven times, is no longer afflicted by that desire.' Another said: 'He who has repented from sin and kept to the straight seven years, will never return to it.' The penitent, if he is not learned, should learn what is incumbent upon him in the future and what is forbidden, so that he be able to cleave to uprightness.

Unless man chooses solitude his uprightness is incomplete, even though he may have renounced some sins. Such is the case of him who renounces, for example, drinking wine, fornication, homosexual relation,⁴¹¹ or usurpation, yet this is not full repentance.

Some people said that this repentance is not valid, while others have said that it is. Validity, in this context, is a vague expression. We would say to one who holds it to be invalid: If you mean by this that his abstention from certain sins is of no avail at all, that its incidence amounts to the same as its absence, then great indeed is your error. We know that a maximum of sin causes a maximum of punishment, and that a minimum of sin leads to a minimum of punishment. To one who asserts the validity [of such repentance] we say: If you mean thereby that renun

ciation of some sins is necessarily accepted and will lead to salvation

or bliss, this, also, is an error. Salvation and bliss come with total abstention from sin. Such is the direct sense. We are not speaking of the subtle secrets of divine forgiveness. If he, who takes the position that such repentance is invalid, says: I mean thereby that repentance amounts to remorse; man feels remorse for theft, for example, as a transgression and not as theft per se. It is impossible that he regret it without [regretting also] fornication, so long as his grief is due to sin being a transgression, for, both have a common cause. A man who grieves over the murder

of his child by sword would also grieve over the child's death by knife, because his grief is due to the death of his beloved, whether by sword or knife. Likewise man grieves over missing his Beloved, which occurs through

transgression, be it by theft or fornication. How does he grieve over one but not the other? Remorse is a state brought on by the knowledge that transgression, as such, alienates the Beloved.

It is, therefore, inconceivable that it would be so in the cause of some transgressions and not of others. For, if this were possible, it would be conceivable that one repent drinking wine from one jug but not from another. Yet, such is impossible, for the transgression, in both cases, is one, and the jugs are [merely] circumstantial. In the same way, the particular transgressions are [mere] tools of transgression [per se], while transgression, insofar as it is disobedience, is one and the same.

The meaning, therefore, of the invalidity is that God has promised the penitents a rank, and this rank can be achieved only through remorse, but remorse over [only] some of these identical [sins] is not imaginable. It is like the 'case of a property which is predicated upon offer and acceptance: if the offer and acceptance do not take place, we say that the contract is not valid, i.e., that the result, which is the disposition of property, does not occur. This is confirmed by the fact that the result of mere abstention is the elimination of the punishment for the sin given up. The yield of remorse, however, is the atonement of past sin. Remorse over theft atones but not abstention alone. Remorse can only be conceived [as referring to an act's] being a transgression. This applies to all sin. This is an exposition of the opinion of those who deny the soundness [of partial abstention from sin], and an explanation of the denial. It is a clear opinion, which a fair man examines in detail thereby eliminating obscurity.⁴¹²

We also assert that repentance of some sins may mean repentance either of major sins without regard for the minor ones, or of minor without regard for the major, or of one major sin rather than another.

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As for the repentance of major sins without repentance of the minor, it is within the realm of the possible. It is known that the major sins are greater in God's view and are more apt to arouse God's displeasure and wrath. But it is easier to obtain pardon for minor sins. It is not inconceivable, then, for one to repent the greater and feel remorse about them. This is as he who commits an offense against the family of a king and his women and also an offense against his animal. He is fearful about the former offense while he thinks little of the latter. Remorse follows in proportion to the notion about the magnitude of the sin and the conviction that it alienates from God. It is possible to find this in the Law. Many have been the penitents in past ages and not one of them was infallible. Repentance does not call for infallibility.

The physician might caution the patient strongly about honey. He might also caution him, to a lesser degree, against sugar, in a manner that the patient will feel that the harm of sugar might never materialize. The patient might then give up, by doctor's order, honey but not sugar. Such a situation is not at all impossible. If he consumed them both, because of his craving, he might regret having consumed the honey but not the sugar.

Secondly, it is possible that the man repent some major sins and not others, due to his belief that some sins of that degree are more severe and vicious [40] in God's eyes. One may renounce murder, robbery, tyranny and injustices to men because he knows that the human record is not neglected, while pardon for acts which are between man and God is readily achieved. Just as there is disparity between major and minor sins, so it is also possible to differentiate among the major sins themselves, and in the evaluation of the perpetrator. For that reason one might renounce [only] some major sins which are not directed against one's fellow-man. For example, one may renounce wine imbibing but not fornication, since it becomes clear to him that wine is the key to vice, and that [after consuming the wine] he loses his lucidity, he is apt to commit all sins unknowingly. As wine imbibing is graver in his opinion, a fear is aroused in him which forces him to renounce wine in the future and to regret its consumption in the past.

Thirdly, one may renounce a minor sin or some minor sins while persisting in a major sin, with full knowledge of its being a major sin. One may renounce slander, glancing at a woman forbidden, or something of the same order, while persisting in drinking wine. The way this is possible is that any believer is afraid of his sins and more or less regretful of having committed them. Yet, the delight from that sin can be

stronger than the heartache brought on by this fear, as factors of ignorance and neglect lead to the weakening of the fear, or due to factors which strengthen craving. Contrition exists but it is neither constant nor strong enough to actuate resolution. If, however, he is free from a craving stronger than he, so that he is master of the drives encountered, fear overcomes the craving, conquers it, and it imposes renunciation of that transgression.

Perhaps the voracity of the sinner for wine intensifies and he is not able to endure it. He also has somewhat of a desire for slander and defamation of people or for glancing at females. His fear of God has reached the point of taming this weaker drive, although not the stronger one. The element of fear then forces the emergence of determination toward abstention. This sinner, however, says to himself: If Satan vanquishes me through the overpowering desire for some sins, it is not proper that I throw off all restraint or let down the reins totally;

rather, I shall fight him in some sins, and perhaps I shall prevail over him, and my victory over him in resisting some sin will be an atonement for some of my sins. Were we not to imagine this we would not be able to conceive of the sinner as praying or fasting. One would have to say to him: 'If your prayer is to other than God, it is of no avail, and if it is to God, renounce your depravity. God's command, in all this, is one. It is inconceivable that your prayer intends to achieve closeness to God so long as you do not draw near through abandonment of depravity.'

It would be absurd that he should say to God: 'I am under two commandments and, upon disobedience, I face two penalties. I am able to vanquish Satan over one but am failing to do so about the other. I shall vanquish him as far as I can, and I pray that this may atone for some of my failure due to my excessive craving.' But how is such unthinkable when it is the condition of every Muslim? For any Muslim combines obedience to God and disobedience for no other reason than this. If one understood this, he would understand that the victory of fear over craving for some sins, is quite possible.

When fear pertains to past action it causes remorse. Remorse, then, induces resolution. The Prophet has said: Remorse is repentance. This does not stipulate contrition of all sin. He said: 'One who renounces a sin is as one who has never sinned.' He *did* not say: 'One who renounces all sins.' These concepts clarify the wrongness of the assertion that partial repentance is impossible due to the essential similarity of the appetites and the equal exposure to divine wrath.

Yes, it is possible that one renounces drinking wine (*kha,nr*) and does

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not renounce drinking *nabidh*⁴¹³ because of the disparity between them in the exposure to wrath. One might renounce many sins and not renounce a few, for if the sins are numerous, the effect is to augment punishment. This augments the punishment for the sinful urge to the extent that man fails to oppose it. Some of the urge is left then to divine judgement. Man then is like the ill person who was warned, by the physician, of fruit. He might take in some little amount without doing so in excess. It follows from this that he cannot renounce a thing without renouncing anything similar. It is inescapable that that which he renounced is incompatible with his behaviour, either in the severity of the transgression or the victory of the craving. When this discrepancy affects the belief of the penitent, one can conceive the variation, in this state, of fear and remorse as well as of renunciation. Even though he has not obeyed God in all command and prohibitions, his contrition over that sin, and his loyalty to his resolution to abstain, sets him in the category of him who has not sinned.

You might ask:

Can an impotent renounce fornication to which he yielded before the incidence of impotence?

I would say:

No. For renunciation means remorse [41] which induces the determination to abstain from that action which he is able to commit. But a deed man cannot execute is gone of itself, not as a result of abstention there -from. I say, however: if, after impotence, illumination and realization occur to him, he is convinced of the harm of fornication to which he yielded, and heartache, remorse and suffering are so aroused in him, that should a desire for coition remain in him, searing remorse would tame and master that desire, I would hope that such would atone for his sin, wipe out his evil deed. For it is beyond doubt that had he repented before the onset of impotence and died following repentance, he would be among the penitents. Even if a situation does not arise in which his craving is stimulated, and in which it can be satisfied, yet, he is penitent in that his contrition has attained such a level as would deflect him from fornication were his desire to surface. It is, therefore, not unthinkable that the strength of contrition should, in the case of an impotent man, reach such a level, albeit while it is not known to himself. Everyone who does not crave for something considers himself capable of renouncing it, through minimal fear, while God is aware of his conscience and the measure of his contrition. Perhaps God will accept it from him; nay, it seems He will.

The truth in all this goes back to the fact that the stain of transgression is effaced from upon the heart by two things: 1) the searing contrition and 2) the intensity of the effort to abstain from sin in the future. With the termination of craving, effort ceases. Yet, it is not inconceivable that contrition would wax to such an extent that it obliterates the craving without the inner struggle. If not for this we might say that repentance is not accepted unless the penitent live for a time struggling with that same craving many times after repenting. Yet the literal sense of the Law does not point at- all to such a condition,

You might say:

If we postulated two penitents, one having lost all urge to sin, and the other retaining it while fighting against it and blocking it, which, then, would be the better?

Know, then, that this is subject to difference of opinion among the learned doctors. Ahmad b. Abi al-Hawi ri and the companions of Abu Sulayman ^{ad-D5} rani⁴¹⁴ opined: The fighter is better since, in addition to repentance, he has the merit of striving (jihad). The doctors of Basra, however, taught: The other one is the better, for, if he becomes lax in his repentance, he will still be nearer to being faultless than the struggler who is liable to relax in his struggle. Each school's tenet contains some truth but fails to encompass the full truth.

The truth of the matter is that one whose urge has been discontinued can be in two [possible] states: firstly, that the discontinuance of the longing is due merely to a relaxation in the craving itself. Then the struggler is better than the one in this state inasmuch as his abstention through struggle is indicative of self-control and the conquest of his drives by his faith, which is a trenchant proof of the strength of conviction and belief. By strength of belief I mean the will-power emerging at the direction of certainty, and taming the craving which emerges at the direction of the demons. The struggle decidedly points to these two powers. The statement [of the Basrans] that this one is more secure, since if he is lax he will still not return to sin, is correct, but the use of the term 'better', in this context, is a mistake. This is like saying that the impotent is better than the virile for he is secure of the peril of lust, or, that the youth is better than the adult for he is more secure [from sin], or, that the weakling is better than the king, who is victorious over his enemies, for the weakling has no enemies while the king, though having been victorious many times, might, sometime, be defeated. These are the words of a man, sound of heart but lacking in understanding of worldly affairs, unaware that glory lies in facing perils and grandeur is conditioned upon

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defying dangers. One may say that the hunter who has no horse or dog is better in the art of hunting and of higher rank than one who possesses a horse and a dog, for he is safe of the bolting of his horse, and of breaking his limbs when he falls to the ground; he is safe, also, from being bitten and attacked by the dog. This, however, is an error. On the contrary, the owner of a horse and dog, if he is strong and knows how to control them, is better off and more likely to succeed in the hunt.

The second state is to thwart the longing by virtue of the strength of conviction and the sincerity of the preceding struggle as it reaches the point of taming the fury of the craving until it is controlled by the discipline of the Law, so that it is activated only by a directive the faith and, because of the dominance of the faith over it, it lies dormant. This is a higher grade than that of the struggler who endures the fury of desire and of curbing it. The statement that such a person has not the merit of striving (*jihad*) fails to grasp the goal of striving, as if [42] striving were an end unto itself. But the end is the elimination of the greed of the enemy lest it should drag you into his cravings. If he fails in his effort to involve you, he will not impede you in following the path of religion. Once you have subdued him and attained the goal, you are victorious, while so long as you continue to strive you are yet in the pursuit of victory. Compare one who has vanquished the enemy and enslaved him, as against one who is engaged in fighting on the battle line and does not know how he will fare. Or, take a man who has taught a dog to hunt, has trained the horse, both staying with him⁴¹⁵ after the dog has lost its voracity and the horse its recalcitrance, and compare him with one who is yet engaged in the difficult animal training. Some people have gone astray on this point, and considered that the struggle is, itself, the ultimate goal. They did not grasp that the struggle is conducted in order to get rid of the impediments on the Way. Others, again, considered that the total curbing and elimination of the desires is an end unto itself, so that one tried that,⁴¹⁶ and failed therein. he then said: 'This is absurd.' He then rejected the Law, and followed the road of licentiousness abandoning himself to the pursuit of [his] passions. All of that is ignorance and error, as we have established that in the Book on the Discipline of the Soul in the volume on the Destructive Matters 4¹⁷

Were you to ask:

What do you say of two penitents, one who forgot sin, did not engage in sinful thoughts, and the other who held sin in full view of his eyes, constantly reflecting on it, and then burning in contrition. Which of the two is better?

Know, then, that this is also subject to controversy. One says: 'True repentance is that you set your sin before your eyes.' The other says: 'True repentance is to forget your sin.' We consider each school correct but in relation to two [different] situations.

The speech of the mystics is always deficient. Indeed, the usage of each of them is to relate only his own [mystic] experience, another's does not concern him. The answers they give differ, therefore, according to the variation in [mystic] experiences. This is a shortcoming as regards mood, will and depth, inasmuch as the person in question is limited in view to his own experience, the other's state being of no concern to him. For his path is to God Himself and to mystic experiences. Man's path to God may be knowledge. But the paths to God are many, even though they differ as to proximity to or remoteness from God. Though they share divine guidance in common, only God knows who is the best guided of them.

I maintain:

To muse of the sin, remember it, -and be distressed by it is an accomplishment in the case of the novice. If he were to forget it, his vexation would not increase nor would his will and urge to follow the Way be strengthened, for then he would be left without the grief and the fear which impedes his reverting to similar sins. For the heedless, this is an accomplishment but for the [mystic] traveler - a deficiency. It is an occupation which prevents from following the Way. The mystic must not swerve from the path, and if he makes progress, and the illumination of gnosis and the shimmering of the mystery is revealed to him, it will engross him, and no scope will remain for attention to previous experiences. This is an accomplishment. But if the traveler to a certain city is hampered on the road by an obstructing river, his trouble, in fording it, is prolonged because he had previously destroyed his bridge. Should he sit on the banks of the river after fording it, and weep, lamenting his destruction of the bridge, this would constitute an additional hindrance engaging him after coping with the first. Truly, if the time was not right for departure, either because it was night and the going was, therefore, impractical, or because there are rivers on the road, and he is fearful of crossing them, let his weeping and sadness, over the destruction of the bridge, go on through the night, so that in the prolonging of grief, his determination not to return to such a situation, will be confirmed. If such admonition has produced in him inner strength not to revert, then it is more appropriate for him to follow the path rather than engage in recounting the destruction of the bridge and weeping over it.



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This is known only to one who understands the path, the goal, the barrier and the way to pursue. We have already alluded to this in the Book of

Knowledge's and in the volume on the Destructive Matters of Life ⁴¹⁹

We must, however, say that the prerequisite for the constancy of

repentance is that man meditate much on the delights of Paradise to aug

ment his longing. If, however, he is a youth, he should not ponder and

muse of all that parallels worldly things, such as the heavenly maidens and palaces, for, indeed, such reflections may perhaps stimulate his longing, with the result that he will pursue worldly delights rather than the life to come. Nay, he should reflect, solely, on the delight of gazing exclusively at God's countenance, which has no worldly parallel. [43] Thus, even recollection of sin may arouse desire. The novice, then, might be provoked, and, therefore, forgetfulness, in such a case, is preferable.

You should not be dissuaded from believing this inquiry by what you are told of David's weeping and lamentation.⁴²⁰ Drawing an analogy between yourself and the prophets is an utter distortion, because they may have descended, by word and deed, to the levels befitting their peoples to whom they were sent to give guidance, and they must, therefore, act in a disguise the sight of which may benefit their people, even if it detracts somewhat from the peak of their station. Some masters, whenever they assigned their disciples any type of spiritual exercise, would join them therein, not because they were in need of it after having accomplished their struggle and soul-training, but in order to facilitate the matter for the disciple. This is why the Prophet said: 'I do not forget but I forget to prescribe,'¹⁰ or, in another version, 'but I neglect to prescribe.' Do not wonder at

this. Peoples are under the protective wing of the prophets' compassion, as youth stand under the loving wings of their fathers, and as the cattle are under the care of the herdsmen. Have you not seen how a father, when he wishes to talk to his young child, comes down to the child's level of articulation? Thus the Prophet, God bless him, said to Hasan ⁴²¹ 'Kakh' Kakh!',^b when the child took a date, from those assigned to charity, and put it in his mouth. The Prophet did not lack the fluency to say: 'Drop that date for it is forbidden.' Yet when he realized that the child would not understand his locution, he abandoned eloquence and sank to the child's usage. He who teaches an ewe or a bird must make sounds for it, using as a device of instruction chattering or whistling like an animal or bird. Beware lest you neglect such intricacies, the stumbling block of the gnostics, to say nothing of the heedless. We will seek of God, in His tenderness and generosity, good success.

How People differ in the Perseverance of Repentance

Know ye that those who turn unto God in repentance are of four categories.

The first category: the sinner repents and keeps his penitence intact for all his remaining days. He corrects that in which he was remiss, and it does not occur to him to revert to his sins, except for those lapses of habit from which man cannot disengage himself as long as he is not on the level of prophecy. This is integrity of repentance. He who has it goes ahead with good, substituting good deeds for evil. Such repentance is called 'sincere repentance.'⁴²² The name of this calm soul, which returns to its Lord well-pleased, well-pleasing⁴²³ is the 'serene self. These are the people referred to in the Prophet's statement: 'The solitary who are totally devoted to the invocation of God, the invocation frees them of their burden so that they appear at Judgement light [of the burden of sins].'^c Indeed, in this lies an indication that they were oppressed by burdens which the invocation of God removed from them. The people of this class are at [various] levels with respect to their leaning towards appetites: from the penitent, whose desires subsided under the domination of gnosis, upon whom their pressure abated, and who follows the Way undisturbed by fighting them; to the one who incessantly is struggling with the soul but is able to contend with it and deter it.

The differentiation also pertains to the levels of struggle as regards quantity, duration and type. Men differ also as regards the length of lifespan. One is grabbed, dying soon after his repentance, and is gladdened by that for his escape and death before debility. Another is granted time, continues a long strife and endurance, his integrity continuous and his good deeds multiplying. The state of this one is higher and better since every evil is wiped out by a good deed. A scholar said: 'The sin, which the offender committed, is atoned even when it overcomes man ten times as true desire, yet he renounces it, breaking his lust in fear of God.' However, it would be far-fetched to stipulate this, though the great impact of such a rule if imposed is undeniable. However, the weak disciple should not follow this path lest the appetites be aroused, the circumstances brought on for the sin to overcome man, but when he aspires to desist, he may not be able to escape the reins of desire [44] at will. Consequently he will proceed with the sin and he will break his repentance. Rather, the path of repentance is to flee from the outset elements favouring sin, thus barring to man the paths of sin. At the same time, he will seek to conquer his lust as far as possible. Thereby his repentance will be safe from the outset.

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The second category is that of the penitent who follows the path of integrity in the major obedient acts and abandons all mortal abominations, yet is not free of sins which grip him unawares and without premeditation. He suffers, however, from them in the course of his affairs, without intention to commit them. But whenever he commits them he censures himself, regrets, is sad, and renews his resolution to be most careful to avoid circumstances which expose him to such acts. This soul is worthy of being the 'reproachful soul'⁴²⁴ as it rebukes man for the objectionable matters he pursues though with no strong will or calculation or intention.

This is also a high rank albeit inferior to the first class. It is the most frequent state of repentants, as evil is so kneaded into human substance, that rarely is man free from it. Yet, the goal of man's effort is that the good in him should prevail over the evil, so that the balance of good deeds will be heavier and favour his record. But it is extremely rare that the balance of evil deeds would be altogether void. Men of this class hold the good promise from God as He said: **THOSE WHO AVOID THE HEINOUS SINS AND INDECENCIES, SAVE LESSER OFFENSES - SURELY THY LORD IS WIDE IN HIS FORGIVENESS**⁴²⁵ As each lesser offense results in a minor sin, without man being reconciled to it, it is proper that it be among those lesser offenses which are forgiven. God said: **AND WHO, WHEN THEY COMMIT AN INDECENCY OR WRONG THEMSELVES, REMEMBER GOD AND PRAY FORGIVENESS FOR THEIR SINS ... THEIR RECOMPENSE IS FORGIVENESS ..** ⁴²⁶ Because of their regret and self censure, God commends them in spite of their wronging themselves.

To men of this grade refers the Prophet's saying, one related on his authority by 'Ali: 'The best of you are all those who are subject to temptation and are contrite.'^o Another tradition puts it thus: 'The believer is like a spike of grain, at times he recovers, and at times he is swayed.'^b Also: 'It is unavoidable that the believer sin, from time to time.' All these passages prove decisively that this measure [of minor infractions] does not invalidate repentance, and does not put the perpetrator in the category of the persistent sinners. To deprive a man of this

kind of hope to reach the level of the penitent, is to act like the physician who induces a healthy person to despair of remaining healthy if he partakes of fruit and hot dishes from time to time, though not persistently and continuously; or like the fagih who induces in the student of fiqh - a despair of ever attaining the degree of a fagih, all because, at rare and not prolonged intervals, he may be lax in repetition and let up taking notes. This points out the fault of the physician and the fagih. On the contrary, a [real] religious scholar is he who does not induce people to despair of attaining the grades of felicity because of temporary failures and the yielding to fleeting seizures of evil. The Prophet said: 'All human beings are sinners, and the best of the sinners are the penitent.'⁴²⁰ He also said: 'Brittle and patchy is the believer; the best is he who dies on his patch. That means: brittle because of his sins, patchy in repentance and contrition.'⁴²⁷ God has said: THESE SHALL BE GIVEN THEIR WAGE TWICE OVER FOR THAT THEY PATIENTLY ENDURED, AND AVERT EVIL WITH GOOD ⁴²⁸ But He has not described them as totally devoid of evil.

The third category is that of one who repents and, for awhile, persists in uprightness. Then, the appetites involve him in some sins, and unable to curb the desire he commits them with intent and premeditation. Yet, along with that, he persists in acts of obedience and avoids some sins despite drive and opportunity [to commit them]. But as this desire or two may overcome him, he wishes only that God enable him to curb it and that He protect him from its evil. Such is his aspiration as he satisfies the desire, but in the end he is contrite and says: Would that I had not done it; I will repent it and strive [45] to subdue it. But, he is tempted and puts off repentance, time after time, day after day. This soul is called, 'the tempted soul.'⁴²⁹ About such people God said: AND OTHERS HAVE CONFESSED THEIR SINS; THEY HAVE MIXED A RIGHTEOUS DEED WITH ANOTHER EVIL ⁴³⁰

On account of his assiduity in obedience and his aversion to the sins he perpetrates, his case is hopeful. Perhaps God will turn unto him. Yet, his end is perilous because of his procrastination and postponement. Perhaps, then, he will be snatched before the repentance, and his case will come under [God's] pleasure. If God, in His generosity, corrects him, cures his defect and grants him repentance, he will join the preceding categories. If, however, his misfortune overcomes and his desire overtakes him, then it may be feared that, in the end, he will deserve, for eternity, what divine speech predestined for him (i.e., hellfire). Whenever it is, for example, impossible for the student to avoid the distractions from learning, this difficulty indicates that he is predestined to be an ignoramus, and hope, in his case, becomes weak. When, on the other hand, diligence facilitates learning, it indicates that he was predestined to be one of the learned. Similarly the relation of the joys and attainments of the hereafter to good and bad deeds, according to divine preordination, is like the relation of sickness and health to the consumption

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of food and drugs, and like the relation of the attainment of soul comprehension, by which the high dignities in this world are merited, to the abandonment of indolence and to diligence in soul training. Just as only a soul, which has become understanding through prolonged training, lends itself to the dignities of leadership, judgeship and advancement in knowledge, so only a sound heart, which has become pure through prolonged purification and refinement, is fit to gain the hereafter, and proximity to the Master of the Universe. Thusly has it been preordained by God's direction. That is why God has said: BY THE SOUL, AND THAT WHICH SHAPED IT AND INSPIRED IT TO LEWDNESS AND GOD-FEARING! PROSPEROUS IS HE WHO PURIFIES IT, AND FAILED HAS HE WHO SEDUCES IT ⁴³¹ Whenever man falls into sin, the sin becomes a debit, repentance a credit, and this is one of the signs of a setback. The Prophet said: 'A man can, indeed, perform for seventy years, the deeds of the people of Paradise, until others say that he is one of the Paradise-dwellers, and there remains between him and Paradise only a span. Then, what is written overtakes him, and he performs an act of the people of hellfire, and enters hellfire.' A Fear of the end, therefore, is prior to repentance. Each breath is an end to that which was prior to it inasmuch as death might be contiguous to it. Let man, then, be attentive to each moment lest he fall into the perilous. Long is regret when it is of no avail.

The fourth category is that of the penitent who proceeds, for a time, in uprightness but then reverts to the temptation of sin or sins without admonishing his soul to repent and without regret for his action. Rather, he becomes absorbed heedlessly in following his appetites. Such a person is among those who persist in sin. Such a soul is the soul which incites to evil and flees from good ⁴³² Therefore the evil end may be feared, and his affair is in God's pleasure. If he is destined for an evil end, he suffers endless misery; if he is destined for the reward most fair,⁴³³ so that he dies a monotheist, then deliverance from hellfire can be expected for him, at least after some time. Possibly he will be included in the broad pardon because of a hidden inscrutable cause; just as it is not impossible for a man to enter a ruin to find a treasure, and quite accidentally, find it; or to sit at home and be made learned by God without study, as it happened to the prophets. Seeking forgiveness through acts of obedience is like searching for knowledge through effort and repetition, or like seeking wealth through trade and travel. Seeking forgiveness, however, through sheer hope, despite corrupt acts, is like seeking treasures in ruins or knowledge from angelic instruction. If only the one

who worked hard could learn! If only the one who traded would gain wealth! If only one who fasted and prayed would be forgiven!

All men are deprived [of ultimate happiness] except those who know. Those who know are all debarred except those who act. Those who act are all precluded except for the righteous, and the righteous are in great peril. Just as one destroyed his house, squandered his wealth, and left himself and his dependents hungry, is considered, by the sensible, as an ignorant and deluded man when he asserts that he anticipates God's generosity in providing for him a treasure to be found under his destroyed home (even though it is riot beyond God's power and generosity), so, one who expects pardon [46] from God's generosity, while he is negligent in obedience, persisting in sin, and not treading the path of forgiveness, is considered, by sensible people, as demented. One can only be astonished at the reasoning of this idiot and his propagating his foolishness in a nice form when he says: 'God is generous, His paradise is not too narrow for one like me, nor does my sin injure Him.' Then you see him traveling overseas and hurtling perils⁴³⁴ in search of dinars. Should he be told: 'Indeed God is generous, the dinars of His treasury do not fall short of your need, and your indolence in abandoning commerce will not harm you; sit, then, in your home and perhaps He will provide for you in an unanticipated manner,' he would consider the speaker stupid and would mock him. He would say: 'What is this nonsense? The heavens do not rain gold and silver. That must be earned. Thus God ordained it, and set His process in motion. God's usage (*sunna*) is immutable.' Fool that he is, he does not grasp that the Master of the hereafter and the Master of this life is one and the same, and that His usage in both worlds does not vary. This was announced when God said: AND THAT A MAN SHALL HAVE TO HIS ACCOUNT ONLY AS HE HAS LABOURED⁴³⁵ How, then, can the man believe that God is generous in the hereafter but not so in this life? How can he say that laxity in acquiring wealth is not a requisite of divine generosity while laxity in works for [attaining] abiding possession and eternal felicity is such a requisite, and, further, that God, by virtue of generosity, will give him in the hereafter without [human] effort, but usually will hold back, despite man's effort, in this world? He forgets God's word: AND IN HEAVEN IS YOUR PROVISION, AND THAT YOU ARE PROMISED⁴³⁶ God save us from blindness and going astray. This is nothing save standing on one's head and immersion in the darkness of ignorance. To such a man may apply the divine word: AH, IF THOU COULDST SEE THE GUILTY HANGING THEIR HEADS BEFORE

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THEIR LORD! 'OUR LORD, WE HAVE SEEN AND HEARD; NOW RETURN US, THAT WE MAY DO RIGHTEOUSNESS' ⁴³⁷ That is, we have seen that Thou wert right when Thou saidst: AND THAT MAN SHALL HAVE TO HIS ACCOUNT ONLY AS HE HAS LABOURED⁴³⁸ So turn us back, we shall labour. At that point no alteration is possible and he deserves chastisement. We seek refuge in God from the urges of ignorance and doubt, and of suspicion that leads, of necessity, to an evil fate in the hereafter and resurrection.

What must the Penitent do if he sins either with Intention and Dominant

Desire or by Chance

Know, that repentance, contrition and action toward atonement through good deeds to counter the sin, as we have mentioned, are incumbent upon him. If the soul, because of the triumph of desire, does not assist toward the resolution to abstain, then he has failed in one of the two imperatives. He should not, however, abandon the second which is to ward off the evil deed with a good one so as to obliterate the former, that he may be of those who blend a righteous deed with an evil one. The good deeds which atone evil, are through the heart, the tongue or the limbs. Let the good deed stand in the stead of the evil with its ramifications.

In his heart let him atone by entreating God for pardon and forgiveness, and by humbling himself with the self-abasement, of the fugitive slave. His humiliation should be manifest to others in reducing his rank among them. The sinful fugitive has nothing to be proud of among other people. Likewise, he should harbour in his heart benevolence toward Muslims, and the resolve to perform the acts of obedience.

His tongue should confess the offense and ask for forgiveness by saying: 'My Lord, I have stained my soul and have done evil, forgive my sins.' Thus he should multiply the kinds of apology that we have cited in the Book on Invocations and Supplications 439

The limbs should be engaged in acts of obedience, charity and various acts of worship. Some sayings of the Companions indicated that pardon of sin may be expected if the sin is followed by eight acts. Four are acts of the heart: repentance or resolution to repent, wish to desist from sin, fear of sin's punishment, and desire of forgiveness. Four are acts of the limbs: that following sin you should pray two rak'as,⁴⁴⁰ then seek God's forgiveness after them⁴⁴¹ saying seventy times: 'Praised by Almighty God,' praising Him even a hundred times; then you give alms, then fast [47] for a day. A saying of the Companions: 'You shall per

form the ritual ablution, enter the mosque and pray two rak'as.'^o A tradition: 'You shall pray four rak'as.'^b Another tradition: 'When you have done an evil, follow it with an atoning good deed. A secret [act] should be followed by [another] secret act and a public act by [another] public

act.' It is, therefore, said that charity given in secret atones the sins of the night, and charity given openly atones the sins of the day.

It is related in a sound tradition that a man said to the Apostle of God: 'I have taken up with a woman and I have done, with her, all save inter

course. Pronounce upon me the judgement of God.' The Prophet said:

'Did you not pray with us the early morning prayer?' 'Yes,' replied the man. The Prophet then said: 'Indeed, good deeds cancel the evil ones. ^{1a} This indicates that contact with women, save fornication, is a minor sin, inasmuch as prayer figures as an atonement, in accordance with the Prophet's statement: 'The five prayers are an atonement for all that happens between them except for the mortal sins.' In all conditions, then, man should every day take himself to account, sum up his evil acts, and strive to cancel them out with good deeds.

You might say:

How can the search for pardon be beneficial without untying the knot of persistence? In the tradition it is related: 'One who seeks pardon from sin, while persisting in it, is as one who mocks the verses of the Koran.'⁴⁴² One used to say: "I seek God's pardon for my saying, 'I seek God's pardon.'" It has been said: Seeking pardon with the tongue is the repentance of liars. Riibi'a al-'Adawiya⁴⁴³ said: 'Our search for pardon needs much apology.'

Know, then, that innumerable traditions have been handed down on the merit of seeking pardon - we have mentioned them in the Book of Invocations and Supplications⁴⁴⁴ - to the point that God connected the quest for pardon with the life of the Apostle. God said: BUT GOD WOULD NEVER CHASTISE THEM, WITH THEE AMONG THEM; GOD WOULD NEVER CHASTISE THEM AS THEY BEGGED FORGIVENESS⁴⁴⁵ One of the Companions used to say: 'We have two assurances of clemency. One of them, the Prophet's being among us, is gone, and only the quest for pardon remains. Were that to disappear, we would perish.'^f We say, then, that the seeking of pardon which is the repentance of liars, is that which pertains merely to the tongue, with the heart having no share, like the utterance of a man who, by habit and with utmost neglect, says: 'I seek God's forgiveness', or when he hears the description of hellfire, says: 'We seek refuge in God from it', without his heart being affected. This refers to the mere movement of the tongue,

and is of no avail. Yet, if the heart implores God and prayer to Him is added in the request of pardon, with sincere will, pure intent and desire, then it is, in itself, a pious deed, and may succeed in cancelling out the evil deed. Such is borne out by the traditions handed down on the merit of seeking pardon. The Prophet even said: 'One who seeks pardon does not persist [in sin], even if he reverted [to sin] seventy times during a day.'⁰ [48] This is tantamount to seeking pardon with the heart.

Repentance and the search for pardon have various stages. Even their beginnings are not devoid of gain though the initial gain falls short of the final gain. Sahl,¹⁶ therefore said: 'Never can man do without his Lord. The best man can do is return to Him in every matter. If a man transgresses he should say: "O Lord! Forgive me." When

man is through with his sin, he should say: "O Lord! Grant me immunity from sin." If man acts in penitence, let him say: "Lord! Accept it from me." ' Sahl was also asked about the search for pardon which atones sins. He said: 'The beginning of the quest for pardon is compliance (*istijdba*), then conversion (*inaba*), and then [full] repentance. Compliance consists of acts of the limbs, conversion - of acts of the heart, and repentance is man's approach to his Master promising to renounce his evil nature. Then he seeks God's pardon for his actual failings, his ignorance of divine grace and his ingratitude. At that point he will be forgiven and he will attain refuge with God, [followed, in order, by] a shift to solitude, stability, elucidation, contemplation, gnosis, confidential discourse, purity, friendship, and then, secret discourse which is intimacy ~^{a7} This does not establish itself in a man's heart until knowledge is his nourishment, invocation (*dhikr*) his sustenance, contentment his provision and trust in God (*tawwakul*) his companion. Then God will gaze upon him, raise him unto the throne. His station, then, will be that of the throne bearers.'

Sahl was also asked about the Prophet's statement: 'The penitent is God's beloved.' He said: 'He is beloved when he possesses all that is mentioned in the verse [which begins] :⁴⁴⁸ THOSE WHO REPENT, THOSE WHO SERVE"³⁹ Further, he said: 'The beloved is he who does not engage in that which his beloved abhors.'

The point is that repentance has two effects. The first is the atonement of evil so that man becomes as one who has never sinned. The second is the attainment of various grades so that he becomes a friend. Atonement, also, is of [various] stages. It may be a total obliteration of the sin, or a reduction thereof. The difference depends on the different grades of repentance. The quest for pardon through the heart, and

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correction by good deeds, even if man is not yet free from persistence

sin, is of the initial stage and is not without some benefit. You must not, therefore, think it is irrelevant whether it is present or absent. For men of vision and men of heart know beyond doubt, that the divine word: AND WHOSO HAS DONE AN ATOM'S WEIGHT OF GOOD SHALL SEE IT,⁴⁵⁰ is true and that, just as a grain cast upon the balance is not without effect, so, also, a grain's weight of good is not without effect. If the first grain had no consequence, surely the second would be like it, and the balance would not be upset by the load of them. That is, evidently, impossible. But the balance of good deeds is given preponderance by the atoms of good until it carries weight and lifts away the balance of impious deeds. Beware, lest you belittle the smallest measure of transgression, without disavowing it. You will be⁴⁵¹ like the stupid woman who neglects her spinning excusing herself by the fact that she is unable to produce more than one thread per hour. She said: 'What is the good of one thread? What impact does it have upon a garment?' Fool that she is, she does not comprehend that a worldly garment is achieved thread by thread, and that worldly bodies, despite the expansion of the world's areas, are collections of individual atoms. Supplication and apology with the heart, therefore, are a good deed that does not at all get lost before God.

I say, moreover, that seeking pardon [only] with the tongue is also a good deed inasmuch as such movement of the tongue, even heedlessly, is better than wagging of the tongue, at the same time, in slander against a fellow Muslim or chatter. Nay, it is better than to remain silent [without uttering the quest for pardon]. Its merit is manifest in comparison to silence while, on the other hand, it is a shortcoming by comparison to the action of the heart. That is why one disciple said to his master, Abu 'Uthman al-Maghribi:⁴⁵² 'My tongue, at times, flows with the invocation of God and the recitation of the Koran, yet my heart is heedless.' The master said: 'Thank God, since He engaged one of your limbs in the good cause, accustomed it to invocation, and did not use it in evil nor accustom it to wasteful chatter.' What he mentioned is true. If the limbs become conditioned to good, to the point that this becomes part of their nature, this will repel many a sin. If one who accustomed his tongue to seeking pardon hears another person lie, his tongue reverts spontaneously to its conditioning and utters: 'I ask God's forgiveness!' If one has been conditioned to chatter, his tongue proceeds to say: 'How stupid you are!, or, how ugly is your lie!' If he who has been conditioned to utter 'I take refuge with God' happens to be present at the very

beginning of an evildoer's evil, he says, by reflex: 'We seek refuge in

God.' But if the tongue is conditioned to chatter, he says: 'God curse him!' Man then sins in one of [these] two types of speech, and is safe

with the other. His safety is a consequence of the good habituation of his tongue. Such is one of the meanings of the divine word: GOD LEAVES NOT TO WASTE THE WAGE OF THE GOOD-DOERS;⁴⁵³ and of the passage: AND IF IT BE A GOOD DEED HE WILL DOUBLE IT, AND GIVE FROM HIMSELF [46] A MIGHTY WAGE ⁴⁵⁴ Contemplate how it is doubled when he makes the heedless search for forgiveness a habit of the tongue until, with that habit, he repels the evil of disobedience involved in slander, malediction and officiousness. This is the doubling, in this world, of minor acts of obedience; the doubling in the hereafter is

GREATER, DID THEY BUT KNOW ass

Beware lest you discern, in acts of obedience, only hardships, with the result that your longing for worship wanes. Indeed, this is an intrigue spread out, in his accursedness, by Satan for the deluded. He made them believe that they are insightful and understanding about hidden things and mysteries. [They say:] 'So what is the good of our invocation with the tongue while the heart is heedless?' By this ruse people are divided into three kinds: one who wrongs himself; one who adopts a middle course; and one who proceeds in doing good.

As for the last, he says: 'You are right, O cursed one, but it is a right saying with which you seek a wrong intent. Certainly, then, I should doubly chastise you. I shall defy you in two respects, by adding the movement of the heart to that of the tongue.' He is like one who treats Satan's wound by sprinkling salt on it.

As for the deluded wrongdoer, he feels, in himself, the conceit of sagacity for this minor point. Then, he is incapable of sincerity in the heart, abandoning at the same time the habituation of the tongue in invoking God. He, then, assists Satan, is hung by the rope of his own delusion, so that there is complete collaboration and harmony between the two. This is as it is said: 'The water skin fits its [skin] cover, it fits it and adjusts to it.'

As for the one who follows a middle course, he is unable to defy Satan by associating the heart in [his] practice but understands the deficiency of the movement of the tongue as compared with that of the heart. Yet, in comparison to silence and chatter, he follows the right course persistently, and asks God to involve the heart, with the tongue, in habituation of the good.

The one who proceeds [with spontaneous good] is like the weaver

/ whose weaving was faulted, so he abandoned it, and became a scribe. The failing wrongdoer is like the one who abandoned weaving totally and became a street cleaner. The one treading the middle course is like a man who fails to become a scribe but says: 'I do not deny that weaving is objectionable⁴⁵⁶ Yet, the weaver can be faulted [only] when compared to the scribe and not when compared to the street cleaner. If I am incapable of being a scribe, I will not abandon the weaving.'

That is why Rabi'a al-'Adawya said: 'Our quest for pardon needs much apology.' Do not think that she faults the movement of the tongue as invocation of God. Rather, she faults the heedlessness of the heart. Man must apologize for the negligence of the heart, not for the action of his tongue. If he also refrained from seeking pardon verbally, he needs two entreaties to pardon, not one. That is how you should understand the fault of what is faulted and the praise of what is praised. Else you will remain ignorant of the meaning of the saying of the righteous: 'The good deeds of the pious are the misdeeds of the Near-Stationed.'⁴⁵⁷

These matters are established relatively, and should not be taken absolutely. Nay, the smallest measures of obedience or rebellion should not be held in disdain. That is why Ja'far as-Sadig⁴⁵ said: 'God has concealed three in three. [He concealed] His pleasure with an act of obedience, so that you should not disdain any such act, as perhaps precisely that one pleases Him. He concealed His anger with an act of transgression; so do not belittle any such act, as perhaps precisely this one arouses His wrath. He concealed who is His saint among His worshipers. Do not, then, disdain any one of them, for perhaps it is he who is God's saint.' He added, 'and he hid His response to prayer; do not, then, stop praying; perhaps the divine response will follow it.'

THE FOURTH PILLAR: ON THE REMEDY OF REPENTANCE AND THE WAY OF TREATMENT FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE KNOT OF PERSISTENCE⁴⁵⁹

Know that men are of two types. Firstly, there is the 'young man who has no sensual desire', having grown up in [the pursuit of] good and the avoidance of evil. He is the one about whom the Prophet said: 'Your Lord is delighted by a youth who has no sensual desire.'¹⁰ This, however, is extremely rare. Secondly, there is the man who is not without sin. Further, this second group is divided into the persistent and the penitent. It is our aim to explain how the knot of persistence is to be treated, and to indicate the remedy therefor.

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Know, then, that the cure which is repentance is attained only by the remedy. One cannot, however, prescribe the remedy without diagnosing the malady, for remedy means to counteract the causes of the malady. For every disease results *from* a cause, and the remedy for it consists of dissolving the cause, removing it and cancelling it. A thing is cancelled only by its opposite. The cause of persistence is only heedlessness and appetite. Heedlessness is only opposed by knowledge and appetite - by forbearance in eliminating [50] the factors leading to appetite. Heedlessness is the beginning of error. God has said: AND THOSE - THEY ARE THE HEEDLESS ONES; WITHOUT A DOUBT, IN THE WORLD TO COME THEY WILL BE THE

LOSERS ⁴⁶⁰ There is, therefore, no medication [conducive] to repentance except a compound⁴⁶¹ of the sweetness of knowledge and the bitterness of endurance. Just as oxymel combines the sweetness of sugar and the acidity of vinegar, aiming, with each, at a different end in their combined impact, in order that the causes that provoke the bile be curbed, so you must understand the treatment of the heart against the measure of the malady of persistence present in it. Now, this remedy has two roots: 1) knowledge and 2) endurance. These must be explained.

You might ask:

Does every knowledge avail in breaking down persistence or is some specific knowledge necessary?

Know, then, that all kinds of knowledge are remedies for the heart's maladies. Yet, for each malady there is a specific knowledge. Just as the science of medicine is effective in the treatment of disease in general, yet each malady requires specific [specialized] knowledge, so also [is the case of] the treatment of persistence. Let us, then, discuss the specificity of that knowledge by comparison with the diseases of the body so that it be more readily understandable. We say, therefore, that the patient must believe certain propositions.

Firstly, he must believe, in general, that sickness and health have causes which he arrives at by the [exercise of] selection in accord with what God has determined. This belief is at the very root of medicine. For, one who has no faith in it will not engage in therapy, and is sure to perish. What corresponds to this, in our context, is the belief in the root of revelation, namely, that felicity in the hereafter has a cause, obedience, while wretchedness [also] has a cause, transgression. This is the faith in the root of the revelations. This must be secured either by inquiry or conformism - both varieties of faith.

Secondly, the patient must trust a certain physician, i.e., that he is

learned in medicine, skilled, and trustworthy in his judgement, not deceiving or lying. Faith on the basis of medicine will not avail the patient, in itself, without this belief. In our context, the corresponding element is the knowledge of the Apostle's veracity, and the belief that all of what he said is true and right, with no falsehood or discrepancy.

Thirdly, the patient must heed the doctor's warning as regards the consumption of fruit and harmful substances in general, so that the fear of deficient protection overcomes him. The intensity of the fear, then, will motivate him to seek protection. In religion the corresponding element is - a) attentiveness to the Koran verses and the traditions which include the call to piety and warning against the commission of sins and the pursuit of cravings, and b) the belief in everything he hears on the subject, without doubt or distrust, so that the fear is aroused in him which reinforces for endurance, that other pillar of treatment.

Fourthly, he must listen to the physician concerning the malady and what to beware of, so that [the physician] might inform him in detail, in the first instance, which of his actions, conditions, food and drinks, may harm him. Not every patient need avoid everything, nor will just any medication avail him. Rather, for each specific malady there is specific information and specific treatment. The corresponding element in religion is that not every person suffers from every craving or sin. Rather, every believer [has a propensity towards] a certain sin or certain sins. But then, his is an immediate and pressing need to recognize that these are sins, that they are injurious, what is the measure of their harm, how to arrive at desisting from them, and, finally, how to atone for such of them as have occurred.

Such knowledge is dealt with by the doctors of religion, the 'ulama', who are the heirs of the prophets. The sinner, then, if he is aware of his transgression, must seek treatment from the doctor, that is, from the 'slim. If the sinner does not know that what he is doing is a sin, the 'alim should inform him thereof. Each 'alim should be responsible for his area, town, quarter, mosque or shrine. He should instruct his folk in their religion, and distinguish that which may harm them from that which may benefit them, that which will make them miserable from that which will make them happy. The 'slim must not wait to be asked about this. Rather, he must devote himself to rallying the people, as the 'ulama' are the heirs of the prophets. The prophets did not abandon the people to their ignorance but, instead, the prophets called upon the people in their assemblies and, originally would go from door to door, seeking the people one by one in order to give them guidance. The sick of heart

are not aware of their illness, just as he, upon whose face leprosy has broken out [51] and who has no mirror, does not know of his leprosy as long as another person does not inform him thereof. Such is the personal duty of all the 'ulama'.

All rulers must appoint, in each village and quarter, a devout jurisprudent to instruct the people in their religion. People are born ignorant and bringing the call [of Islam] to them, in both root and branch, is imperative. This world is the abode of the ill inasmuch as only the dead are in the bowels of the earth and only the sick on its face. The ailing in heart are more numerous than the ailing of body. The 'ulama' are the physicians, and the rulers are the custodians of the abode of the ill. Just as the physician surrenders the patient who does not take care of himself or who has been overcome by insanity to a custodian, to confine the patient in fetters, forestalling his damaging himself or others, so every patient that does not respond to the 'alim's treatment is surrendered to the ruler, in order that the ruler restrict possible evil to and from the ailing.

The sickness of the hearts became more widespread than that of the body for three reasons. Firstly, the one who suffers from such is not aware of his being ill. Secondly, its consequence is not visible in this world. This differs from the disease of the body whose end is death [which is] visible and which people naturally shun, while, what follows death is not visible. The consequence of sins is the death of the heart, which is not witnessed in this world. The shunning of sins, therefore, is rare, even though the perpetrator is aware of them. For this reason you will see him, in case of the disease of the heart, relying on God's generosity while striving diligently in the treatment of bodily ailment without reliance on God ⁴⁶² Thirdly, and this is the calamitous affliction, there is the loss of the physician. For, it is the 'ulama' who are the physicians, yet in these times they have been stricken by a sore affliction, the treatment of which is beyond their capabilities. They have found solace in the wide spread of the disease, so that their deficiency is not apparent. They have been forced to mislead the people instructing them in a manner bound to compound their illness. For the destructive affliction is the love for this world. This disease has overcome the doctors. They are, therefore, incapable of cautioning the people against it, for they fear they would be told: 'How do you prescribe treatment [to others], while forgetting yourselves?' For this reason the affliction spread throughout the people, the plague grew, remedy has run out, and, because of the loss of the physicians, the people have perished. Nay, the physicians have engaged in various kinds of misleading. Would that they did not cure, at least they would not aggravate the malady. Would they only remain silent, for when they speak, they care in their sermons only about what may please the masses or win their hearts. They succeed in that only through demoting fear and promoting hope, and speaking of the signs of [divine] mercy, because that is more pleasant to the ear and easier on the tempers. The people, then, leave the exhortatory sessions further emboldened to sin and with greater trust in divine generosity.

Whenever the physician is ignorant or perfidious⁴⁶³ he destroys with the remedy as he applies it in the wrong place. Hope and fear are two remedies, but for two persons of opposing symptoms. One who was overcome with fear, to the point that he completely renounced the world and charged himself beyond endurance, made his life totally miserable, the severity of his intemperance in fear is broken by talking about the reasons for hope, so that he might return to a proper balance. Likewise, one who persists in sin, yet though desirous of repentance, is held back because of despondency and despair, thinking his previous sins too great, is also treated by the reasons for hope, so that he may aspire to the acceptance of repentance, and finally repent.

On the other hand, treating the deluded, who is devoted to sin, by speaking of the reasons of hope, resembles treating with honey the patient who developed a higher fever. That is the practice of the ignorant and the fools. It is the corruption of the physicians, therefore, that is the real problem, totally beyond cure.

You might say:

Speak of the way which the preacher should follow in admonishing the people.

Know, that this is an involved and protracted matter. Yet certainly, we will indicate the types beneficial in breaking down persistence in sin, and inducing people to renounce sin. These are of four types.

The first is that men should mention those verses of the Koran which strike fear in sinners and rebels, as also

[similar passages] from the traditions going back to the Prophet and sayings of the Companions [52]. Such, for example, as this statement of the Prophet: 'Dawn does not rise on any day nor does twilight disappear any night but that two angels echo in four voices. One says: "Would only that these creatures had not been created." The other says: "Since they were created would they know what they were created for." The first says: "Would that, since they learned not⁴⁶⁵ why they were created, they acted as they were taught."^o (In some versions: "Would that they sit together and

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discuss⁴⁶ what they learned.") Finally, the last voice says: "Since they do not act as they were taught, would that they repent their deeds." '

One of the old masters said: 'When a man sins the Master of the Right orders the Master of the Left, who is in charge of that man, to hold back the pen [about the man] for six hours. If the man repents and seeks for givenness, the sin is not recorded against him. If, however, he does not seek forgiveness, it is recorded.'

Another of the old masters said: 'Whenever a man transgresses, his place upon earth seeks permission to swallow him, and his roof seeks leave, from the heavens, to fall onto him in fragments ⁴⁶⁷ But God says to the heaven and earth: "Desist from my servant and grant him respite. You did not create him, and if you did you would be compassionate towards him; perhaps he will turn to Me and I will forgive him; perhaps he will change to righteousness, and I will change his sin for him into pious deeds." That is the meaning of the verse: GOD HOLDS THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH, LEST THEY REMOVE: DID THEY REMOVE, NONE WOULD HOLD THEM AFTER HIM.¹⁴⁶⁸

The tradition of 'Umar b. al-Khattiib⁴⁶⁹ 'The seal is attached to the foot of the Throne. When the sacred is violated, and the forbidden permitted, God sends the seal and it is impressed upon the hearts and their contents.'b In the tradition of Mujiihid:⁴⁷⁰ 'The heart is like the open palm. Whenever man sins, a finger contracts until all the fingers contract and the heart is obstructed. That is the sealing.'c Hasan⁴⁷¹ said: 'Between man and God stands a certain boundary of sin. When man reaches it, God seals his heart, and afterward no longer promotes him towards good fate.'

The traditions of the Prophet and the sayings of the Companions on the censure of transgression and the praise of the penitent are innumerable. The preacher should draw from them constantly if he is the heart to God's Apostle. The Prophet bequeathed no dinars or dirhams but knowledge and wisdom which the scholar inherits according to the measure of his attainment.

The second type is the stories of the prophets and the righteous forebears and what misfortunes befell them because of their sins. Such have

a strong impact, and are of manifest benefit to the hearts of men. For example, the story of Adam in his rebellion and banishment from Paradise. It is related that when he ate of the tree, the garments vanished from his body and he was left naked. The crown and the diadem were so embarrassed that they sought to disappear from him. Gabriel then came to him, took the crown from his head and loosened the diadem from his forehead. It was announced from above the throne: 'Descend [O Adam and Eve] from My Presence! One who has transgressed against Me cannot be close to Me!' Adam turned to Eve weeping, and said: 'This is the first misfortune of the transgression, we have been removed from the presence of the Beloved.'¹⁴⁷²

It is related that when Solomon was punished for his error, because of the idol which was worshipped in his home [for] forty days, - (It is said: because a woman asked him to give judgement in favour of her father and he said yes but did not do so; or, that because of his attitude toward her he wished in his heart that [53] the judgement be for her father against his opponent.) - his kingdom was taken away for forty days. He fled, forlorn. He would beg, with palm out, but would not be fed. If he said: 'Feed me, for I am Solomon, son of David', he was taken up, driven off and beaten. It is told that he asked for food from a woman's household ⁴⁷³ She, however, chased him away and spat in his face. Another version says: An old woman brought out a jar containing urine and emptied it on his head. [All this happened] until, after the end of the fortieth day of chastisement, God dislodged the seal ring from the belly of the whale, and Solomon put it on⁴⁷⁴ The birds then came and perched on his head. The jinn, devils and beasts also came and assembled round him. Some of those who had offended him apologized. Solomon said: 'I do not blame you for what you have done before, nor do I praise you for your excuse now. Indeed, this affair was [ordained] in the heavens and was inevitable ⁴⁷⁵

It is related in the Isrii'iliyyit that a man married a woman from another town, then sent his servant to bring her

to him. She sought to tempt and seduce him. He, however, fought her and resisted the temptation. God made him a prophet. for the blessing of his piety, and he became a prophet among the children of Israel. In the stories of Moses [it is reported] that he said to al-Khadir:⁴⁷⁶ 'For what deed has God revealed to you knowledge of the Hidden?' It is related that the wind was carrying Solomon, and he glanced at his gown, and it was new. He seemed to like

it. The wind put him down. He said [to the wind]: 'Why did you do this though I did not order you?' It said: 'But we obey you only when

you obey God.'⁴⁷⁷

It is also related that God communicated to Jacob: 'Do you know why I have separated you from your child Joseph?' I FEAR THE WOLF MAY EAT HIM, WHILE YOU ARE HEEDLESS OF HIM⁴⁷⁸ Why did you fear the wolf and not appeal to Me? Why did you consider his brothers' heedlessness, and not consider My guarding him? Do you know

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why I returned him to you?' Jacob replied: 'No!' God said: 'Because you appealed to Me and said: HAPLY GOD WILL BRING THEM ALL TO ME ⁴⁷⁹ And because you also said: DEPART, MY SONS, AND SEARCH OUT TIDINGS OF JOSEPH AND HIS BROTHER. DO NOT DESPAIR [OF GOD'S COMFORT]'.⁴⁸⁰ Thus, also, when Joseph said to the king's attendant: 'MENTION ME IN THY LORD'S PRESENCE',⁴⁸¹ God said: SATAN CAUSED HIM TO FORGET TO MENTION HIM TO HIS MASTER, SO THAT HE CONTINUED IN THE PRISON FOR CERTAIN YEARS ⁴⁸²

Such stories are innumerable. The Koran and traditions have not adduced these just for evening entertainment. Rather, their object is .con templation and pondering so that you may learn that even the prophets are not forgiven their minor sins. How, then, can others be forgiven major sins? Certainly, they were fortunate⁴⁸³ that they were swiftly overcome with punishment in this. world, so that it was not put off to the hereafter. The wretched, however, are those given time to increase their misdeeds, for the chastisement of the hereafter is graver and greater. These kinds of stories should also be told, frequently, to those persisting in sin; for it is effective in stimulating the urge for repentance.

The third type is that the preacher should make them realize that one may expect that chastisement for sins is to be expedited in this world, and that the afflictions of man come as a result of his offenses. Many a man, however, is indulgent in the matter of the hereafter, and, because of his ignorance, fears more God's punishment in this world. It is necessary, therefore, to frighten him therewith. In most cases, the chastisement for all the sins [of a person] is expedited in this world, as is related in the story of David and Solomon. Because of his sins a man may become poor, his rank among people may decline, and he may fall into the hands of his enemies. The Prophet said: 'Indeed, a man is deprived of sustenance on account of a sin he commits.'⁴⁸⁴ Ibn Mas'iid⁴⁸⁴ said: 'I reckon that a man forgets knowledge through a sin he commits, and this is the meaning of the Prophet's word: 'One who perpetrated (*garafa*) a sin, intelligence withdraws from him (*faragahu*), never to return.'b An old master said: 'The curse is not the black face or loss of wealth; nay, the curse is that you disengage yourself from a sin only to fall into another which is like it or. worse.' It is as he said, for the curse is expulsion and alienation. Unless he is assisted toward the good, evil comes easily to him, and he is removed [from the divine grace]. To be without divine assistance toward success [in acting righteously] is the greatest deprivation. Each sin invites another and it is compounded. Man is then deprived

thereby of the beneficial nourishment of social intercourse with the [54] 'ulama' who rebuke sin, and with the righteous; nay, he is detested by God so that the righteous may detest him.

It is related about one of the gnostics that he was walking in mud, holding his clothes, wary of his foot slipping, but he slipped and fell. He got up and was walking in the middle of the mire, crying and saying: 'This is the image of man. Continuously he is wary of sins and avoids them until he tumbles into one and, then, two, after which he plunges into sinning.' This is an allusion that the punishment of sin is expedited by the drift into another sin. That is why Fudayl⁴⁸⁵ said: 'That which you have blamed on the vicissitude of time and the brutishness of brethren, is the result of your sins.' Somebody said: 'I certainly recognize the punishment for my sin in the ill nature of my ass.' Another said: 'I recognize the punishment even in a mouse in my house.' One of the Syrian sufis said: 'I noticed a Christian lad of handsome countenance. I stopped and stared at him. Then, Ibn al-Jala' ad-Dimashgi⁴⁸⁶ passed me. He seized hold of my hand, and I felt embarrassed before him. I said: "O Abii'Abdallah!

By Almighty God, I was amazed by this beautiful form and this masterful piece of workmanship and [by] how it was created for hellfire!" He squeezed my hand and said: "You shall encounter the punishment [for this staring] after awhile." ' The Syrian said: 'I was punished for it thirty years later.' Abu Sulayman ad-Darani said: 'Sexual maturation is a punishment,' and 'no one misses the communal prayer except through the commission of sin.' In a tradition [it is said]: 'What you blame on your time is really due to your deeds which are corrupt.'^a A tradition: "God says: 'The least that I shall do to a man, if he prefers his craving to obedience to Me, is that I shall deprive him of the delight of My discourse.'"^b

It is told of Abu 'Amr b. 'Alwan, in a story that would take too long, that he said: 'One day, as I was standing in prayer, my heart was seized by desire. It continued in my mind until a craving of men was born from it. I fell to the ground, and my entire body turned black. I hid myself at home, and did not emerge for three days. I was purging my body with soap, in the bath. The blackness, however, was only compounded, until, after three nights, it was undone. I then encountered al-Junayd⁴⁸⁷ who had sent for me, summoning me from ar-Raqqā. When I came to him he said to me: "Were you not ashamed before God? I stood before Him but then your soul concealed a craving until it tenderly⁴⁸⁸ overpowered you and removed you from before God. Had I not prayed to God for you and turned to Him in repentance on your behalf, surely

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you would have met God with that colour." I wondered how he knew of that, for he was in Baghdad while I was in ar-Raqqā.'

Know, that whenever man sins be blackens the face of his heart. If he is happy, the blackness becomes apparent upon his exterior so as to rebuke him. If he is wretched, it is concealed from him, until he becomes engrossed in sin and liable to hellfire. There are numerous traditions concerning the injurious [consequences] of sin in this world, such as poverty, sickness, et cetera. But the calamity of sin; in this world, in general, is that man acquires following it another sin. If he is tempted by a thing, it becomes a punishment, and he is deprived of sustenance to compound his wretchedness. Even if bounty comes his way to win him over, he is denied the feeling of gratitude, so that he is punished for his ingratitude. But in the case of the obedient, it is part of the blessing of his obedience that any bounty, for him, is a reward for his obedience and he is divinely assisted toward gratitude for it; while each tribulation becomes an atonement for his sins, and adds, thereby, to his stature.

The fourth type is [for the preacher] to talk of the punishments that befell individual sins such as wine imbibing, fornication, theft, murder, slander, arrogance and envy. These sins are innumerable. To talk of them to the wrong people, is like applying the remedy to the wrong spot. Tha 'Rim should be like the skilled physician, diagnosing first, by the pulse, the external appearance and the reflexes, the internal maladies and, then, engaging in their treatment. By concatenation of circumstances he infers the hidden qualities. In facing what he has learned let him emulate God's Apostle. When someone said to the Prophet: 'O Apostle of God, counsel me but do not overburden me!', the Prophet said: 'Do not be angry.' Another man asked the Prophet: 'O Apostle of God, counsel me.' The Prophet said: [55] 'You must renounce [the aspiration] for other people's wealth. Indeed, such is [true] wealth. Beware of greed, it is the everpresent poverty. Pray a final prayer.⁴⁸⁹ Beware of what one has to apologize for.'^b A man said to Muhammad b. Wasi':⁴⁹⁰ 'Counsel me!' He said: 'I advise you to be an angel in this world and the next!' The man asked: 'How do I [achieve] that?' He said: 'Practice asceticism.'⁴⁹¹

It seems that the Prophet discerned, in the first questioner, the signs of anger, and restrained him therefrom. In the second questioner he discerned the signs of greed and perseverance in this expectation of the wealth of others. Muhammad b. Wasi' discerned in his petitioner, the signs of preoccupation with this world.

A man said to Mu'ad:⁴⁹² 'Counsel me!' He said: 'Be merciful, and I will guarantee you Paradise.'⁴⁹³ Apparently he detected in the man traces of coarseness and harshness.

A man said to Ibrahim b. 'Adham:⁴⁹⁴ 'Counsel me!' He said: 'Be careful about people! You need people, and must be with others. Men are human. But not all men are human. Gone are the human beings (*rids*) what remains is the monkey (*nisnds*). I do not consider them as people, nay, they have plunged into the water of despair (*ya's*).'^c It seems, then, as if Ibn Adham discerned in him the damage of [excessive] association, and pointed to what was prevailing in his situation, at the time. That was his injury [of or by] others. It is more proper that a statement should fit the state of the questioner, rather than that of the speaker.

Mu'awiya⁴⁹⁵s wrote to 'A'isha: 'Write me a letter, giving me therein counsel but make it brief.' She wrote to him: 'From 'A'isha to Mu'awiya, peace be upon you! I heard the Apostle of God say: "One who seeks God's pleasure through men's displeasure, God protects him from the trouble of men, and one who seeks God's displeasure through men's pleasure, God puts him in charge of men."^d Farewell!' Consider her cleverness in how she ventured upon the bane that confronts rulers, namely, the control over men versus the desire to please them.

She wrote him on another occasion: 'Fear God! If you fear God, He will protect you from men. If, however, you fear men, they will not avail you against God. Farewell!'

Therefore, it should be the concern of every counselor to detect the hidden qualities and discern the appropriate conditions, so that he might deal with the significant. To narrate all the spiritual exhortations in the individual cases is impossible, and, to engage in preaching on what does not call for preaching is a waste of time.

You might say:

If the preacher is speaking to an assembly, or is asked for counsel by someone with whose inner state he is unfamiliar, how is he to act?

The path for him, in such a case, is to preach that which is of universal application, generally or mostly. For in the religious studies there are nutriments and remedies. The nutriments are for all, and the remedies are for the sick.

A case in point is what is related of a man who said to Abr Sa'id al Khudri:⁴⁹⁶ 'Counsel me!' He replied: 'You must fear God, it is the beginning of all good. You must exert yourself in *jihdd*,⁴⁹⁷ it is the monasticism of Islam. You must read the Koran, it is an illumination for you among the earthly host and a remembrance for you among the



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heavenly host. You must be silent, except for the good. Thus you will triumph over Satan.'

Also, a man said to Hasan:⁴⁹⁸ 'Counsel me!' He said: 'Honour God's command and He will honour you.'

Lugman⁴⁹⁹ said to his son: 'My son, join the throng around the scholars, but do not dispute with them lest they hate you. Take from this world your subsistence, and spend the rest of your acquisitions for your hereafter. Do not reject this world totally lest you be a burden to and dependent upon others. Fast, so as to curb your craving but not so as to damage your prayer. For prayer is superior to fasting. Do not keep the company of the foolish, and do not associate with the two-faced.' He also said: 'My son, do not laugh without amazement; do not proceed without aim; do not ask of what is of no concern to you; do not squander your wealth to promote the property of another. For your stock is that which you prepared [of good deeds] ahead of time, and the stock of others is that which you leave [to others]. My son, one who is compassionate is treated with compassion; one who is silent is safe; he whose word is good gains, he whose word is evil sins, and he who does not master his tongue regrets.'

A man said to Abu H'azim:⁵⁰⁰ 'Counsel me!' He said: 'Adhere to that which you would consider precious when facing death; [56] avoid that which you would consider a misfortune when facing death.'

Moses said to al-Khadir: 'Counsel me!' Al-Khadir said: 'Be benign and be not angry; be useful, not harmful; eschew obstinacy; go not without need; and do not laugh without wonderment. O son of 'Imran,⁵⁰¹ do not scold sinners for their errors, cry over your own.'

A man said to Muhammad b. Karram:⁵⁰² 'Counsel me!' Ibn Karram said: 'Strive to please thy Creator in the same measure as you seek your own satisfaction.'

A man said to Hamid al-Lafaf: 'Counsel me!' He said: 'Make for your religion a cover like the cover on the Koran, lest⁵⁰³ it should get soiled by troubles.' The man asked: 'What is the cover of religion?' He said: 'Renouncing worldly pursuit except for the minimum; abstention from talking much unless it is necessary; reducing social intercourse to a minimum.'

Hasan [al-Basri] wrote to 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz⁵⁰⁴ saying: 'Fear that which God has alarmed you about, be cautious of that which God has cautioned you about, and take from what is in your hands (*fī* yadayka) to what is ahead of you (*bayna* yadayka). At the time of death the ultimate message shall reach you. Farewell!'

'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz wrote to Hasan asking for his admonition. Hasan replied: 'The greatest terror and the horrors are ahead of you, and you cannot escape from witnessing them, be it in salvation or perdition. Know, that he who takes his soul to account gains, and he who is negligent of his soul loses. He who contemplates the consequences is saved, but he who follows his mood errs. He who is meek gains; he who fears is safe; he who is safe learns by example; he who learns by example gains insight; he who has insight understands, and he who understands knows. If you have slipped, return. If you have regret, uproot [the evil]. If you are ignorant, ask. And, if you are angered, forbear.'

Mitraf b. 'Abdullah⁵⁰⁵ wrote to 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz: 'This world is an abode of punishment. For it the

senseless are gathering [goods] and, by it one who has no knowledge is deluded. O Commander of the Faithful! Be in it like one whose injury is treated, enduring the severity of the remedy for fear of the consequences of the disease.'

'Umar also wrote to 'Adi b. Artā⁵⁰⁶ saying: 'This world is an enemy of God's friends⁵⁰⁷ and of God's enemies. It distresses His friends, and deludes His enemies.' He also wrote to one of his governors: 'You have the power to oppress people. If you intend to wrong one, remember God's power over you. Know that if you cause any trouble to the people, the responsibility remains yours. Know, also, that God takes to account the oppressors on account of the oppressed. Farewell!'

This is how the admonition should be - for the masses or when the preacher does not know the specifics of the case. These exhortations are like the nutriment by which all the people can benefit. But, because of the lack of such as these preachers, the gate of learning from admonition is barred, sins predominate, and decay proceeds apace. The people are afflicted with preachers who parade rhymed prose and recite verses, take upon themselves to talk of that which is beyond the range of their knowledge, and imitate others. The masses lost their respect for the preacher. The preacher's words do not emanate from the heart so as to reach the heart. Rather, the speaker is arrogant, the listener burdened, and each of them is slipping and failing.

Seeking a physician, therefore, is the start of the treatment for the sick, and seeking the 'ulama', is the beginning of treatment for sinners. This is one of the pillars and principles of treatment.

The second principle is forbearance (*sabr*). The point of the need for forbearance is that the patient's illness is prolonged because he takes what is harmful to him. He consumes that, either because he is unaware it is harmful, or because of the intensity of his craving. Such action has

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two causes. What we have mentioned is the treatment for the unawareness. There remains, then, the treatment of craving, but we have already discussed the method of its treatment in the Book on Discipline of the Soul⁵⁰⁸. The gist of it is that, when his voracity for a harmful food becomes intense, the patient will perceive the magnitude of its harm. Then he should remove that from his scope of vision and not keep it. Then he will seek to distract himself from it with something which approximates it in form but not in virulence. Then, by virtue of fear, he should overcome the pain caused by abstention. Under all conditions, the bitterness of forbearance is inevitable, and thus he will treat the craving for transgression.

A young man, for example, when desire overcomes him, becomes incapable of controlling his eye, heart or limbs in the pursuit of his desire. He must realize the harm of his sin by examining the relevant fearful passages⁵⁰⁹ in the Koran and in the Tradition. When his dread is intensified, he keeps his distance from the factors inciting his drive.

The external stimulant of desire is [57] the presence of the object of desire and gazing at it. The treatment is flight and isolation. The internal stimulant is the consumption of delicious foods. Its treatment lies in hunger and prolonged fasting. All this can be achieved only through forbearance. One shows forbearance, however, only from fear, but one fears only from knowledge, and, one gains knowledge only from insight and reflection or from listening and emulation. The first order of business, then, is attendance at invitational assemblies (*dhikr*); then, listening, with a heart devoid of other engagements, devoted to attention; then reflection on it unto perfect understanding. Thereupon fear will certainly be aroused. With fear rising, forbearance will be facilitated, and the requisites of seeking treatment will develop. Behind that lie divine assistance toward success and divine facilitation.

One who gives, of his heart, proper attention, perceives the dread [of sin] and fear of God, expects recompense and CONFIRMS THE

REWARD MOST FAIR,⁵¹⁰ God eases him to Easing⁵¹¹ BUT AS FOR HIM WHO IS A MISER AND SELF-SUFFICIENT AND CRIES LIES TO THE REWARD MOST FAIR,⁵¹² God will ease him TO THE HARDSHIP⁵¹³ Only the clarification of the paths of guidance falls upon the prophets. Yet, TO GOD BELONGS THE FIRST AND THE LAST^{514, 515}

You might assert:

The entire matter reverts then to [a question of] faith, because renunciation of sin is impossible without forbearance; forbearance is possible

only through the experience of fear; fear sets in only through knowledge; knowledge is attained solely through confirming [the belief in] the magnitude of injury caused by sins, and confirmation of the magnitude of sins' harm is confirmation of the belief in God and His Apostle, which is faith. It appears, then, that one who persists

in sin does so only because he is not a believer.

Know, that this persistence is not due to the loss of faith but rather to its weakness, inasmuch as every believer believes firmly that transgression is a cause of alienation from God, and is the cause of punishment in the hereafter. The reason, however, for his falling into sin is manifold.

Firstly, the promised punishment is concealed and not in [immediate] attendance. The soul is predisposed to being influenced by what is at hand. The effect upon the soul of the promised chastisement is weak compared to the impact of that which is present.

Secondly, the gratification of the cravings leading to sin are consummate and they immediately grab the throat. Because of habituation and custom, - habit serving as the fifth element⁵¹⁶ - [this pressure] is vigorous and overpowers the soul. The soul finds it hard to shift from the immediate to the fear of the future. That is why it says: NO INDEED; BUT YOU LOVE THE HASTY WORLD AND LEAVE BE THE HEREAFTER,⁵¹⁷ and, NAY, BUT YOU PREFER THE PRESENT LIFE⁵¹⁸ The Prophet expressed how difficult this is in his sayings: 'Paradise is encircled by adversities, and hellfire by cravings';a 'God created hellfire. Then He said to Gabriel: Go and look at it. He looked at it, then said: By Your Glory! No one who hears of it shall enter it. God then encircled it with the desires, then said again: Go look at it. He looked at it and said: By Your Glory! I am afraid that none shall remain who will not enter it. God created Paradise. He said to Gabriel: Go and look at it. He did, and said: By Your might! Everyone who hears will [seek] to enter it. God then surrounded it with adversities and said: Go and look at it. He did, and said: By Your might! I am afraid that none shall enter.'b Thus the immediate oppressiveness of the desires, and the relegation of punishment into the future are two obvious causes in the self abandon despite the presence of the basic faith. Nobody who, while sick and because of his thirst, drinks ice water denies, thereby, the basis of medicine. Nor does he deny the fact that ice water is harmful for him. But the craving overcomes him, and the pain of desisting is supreme, so that the anticipated pain seems minimized.

Thirdly, every believing sinner is, generally, determined to repent and

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to atone the evil through pious deeds. Further, it has been promised that such will restore him. Continued hope, however, prevails over the natural dispositions, and man keeps postponing repentance and atonement. Yet, since his hope is for divine help towards success in repentance, he may often proceed despite faith toward sin.

Fourthly, every convinced believer maintains that sins do not necessitate chastisement to the extent of precluding forgiveness. [58] He sins, therefore, and anticipates forgiveness trusting in God's generosity.

These are four causes that lead to persistence in sin, despite the survival of the basic faith.

Certainly, the sinner might come up with a fifth reason, that impairs that basic faith. Namely, he may doubt the authenticity of the prophets. This is unbelief. He is like the one whom the physician cautioned about consuming what would, in his ill state, harm him. If the man cautioned does not consider the warner a medical authority, the patient may deny or doubt the physician. He will, therefore, pay no attention to the doctor. But such is unbelief.

You might say:

What, then, is the treatment for the five causes? I say that it is reflection (fikir).

That is that man persuade himself in the first instance, i.e., the relegation of punishment, that everything that is to come, is [truly]. coming; that, for those who watch, the morrow is nigh, and that death is closer to everyone than his shoe lace; what shall make him know, perhaps the Hour is nigh,⁵¹⁹ and when that which has been put off takes place it is merely the consummation of the prophetic message. He should remind himself that, in this world, he is weary forever for fear of something in the future. Thus, a man travels overseas and undergoes hardship of journeys for the sake of gain which he thinks he might need at another time. Yet if he falls ill, and a Christian physician tells him that drinking cold water will harm him and lead to his death, and cold water is, to his mind, the most delicious of things, he abandons drinking it, despite the fact that the pain of death is only of an instant, if he did not fear what follows it, and departure from this world is [anyhow] inescapable. Yet what is the proportion between his existence in this world to his absence for ever and ever! Let him consider how quickly he is going to abandon his pleasures at the instruction of a non-Muslim with no miracle to support his medicine. Then he will say: 'How does it befit my intelligence that the word of the prophets, supported by miracles, should be inferior in my eyes to that of a Christian who claims [the knowledge of] medicine without any [supporting] miracle and without any confirmation except by the common folk? How can the torment of hellfire be less, to me, than the torment of disease, when each day in the hereafter is like fifty thousand years of this world?'

Through this same contemplation he treats the delight which is overcoming him. He will force himself to abandon it by saying: 'If I am unable to renounce my delights during the days of my life which are few, how, then, shall I ever be able to do so? If I am not able to endure the pain of forbearance, how, then, could I withstand the pain of hellfire? If I am unable to renounce the vanities of this world despite its vexations, disturbances, and the blend of its delight and grief, how can I forgo the bliss of the hereafter?'

As for postponement of repentance, he can treat it by reflection on [the fact] that most of the anguish of the people of hellfire stems from procrastination, as the procrastinator builds on what is not his, namely immortality. Yet perhaps he will not survive, and, if he survives, he may be unable to desist tomorrow, just as he is unable to abstain today. I wish I knew; did he not fail, in the present, only because of the triumph of craving, which craving is not going to leave him on the morrow, but rather is compounded since it is reinforced through habituation. Now, the craving which a man reinforced by habit is not like the one which he did not reinforce. Because of this the procrastinators perish, for they suppose there is a difference between things identical. They do not realize that all days are similar in that forgoing cravings is always painful, on any day.

A fitting analogy is: one who needs to uproot a tree but sees that it is strong and will not be extirpated except with great difficulty. He says: 'I will put it off for a year and then come back to it.' But he knows that the longer the tree survives, the more its deeprootedness increases, while the older he gets the more he becomes weak. There is, then, no stupidity grosser than his in the world: when he, in his prime, fails to stand up to the weak, and begins to anticipate triumph over the rival while he himself is getting weak and the weak one is getting strong.

As for the fourth idea, i.e., the expectation of God's forgiveness, its treatment is as above. The man is like one who dissipates all his property, leaving himself and his family paupers, expecting that God, in His generosity, will provide for him the discovery of a treasure amidst ruins. The possibility of forgiveness of sins [in such a manner] is like this possibility. He is like one who fears spoliation at the hand of oppressors in his country, and [yet], he leaves his treasures in the courtyard of his

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home. He was able to bury and hide them but did not do so. He said: 'I look to God's generosity, it may bring either inadvertence or distress upon the pillaging tyrant so that he will miss my home, or, when he turns to my home he will be struck down at the gate! Both death and inadvertence are possible. Such things occur in fictional stories, and I anticipate the like from divine kindness.' One who anticipates this, anticipates the possible. Yet he is extremely silly and ignorant. For it may not happen and not be ^{so, 520}

[59] As for the fifth cause, i.e., doubt, this is unbelief. It is to be treated with those elements which would make him learn the veracity of the prophets. But this would take long. It is possible, however, to treat it with simple knowledge which would befit the bounds of his intelligence. He should be asked: 'Is the truth of what the prophets said, supported as they are by miracles, possible? Or, do you maintain that you know that it is impossible, in the same manner as you know the impossibility of one person being in two places at the same time?' If he says: 'I know that it is as impossible as the latter,' then he is stupid and idiotic. It would seem that such creatures do not exist among sensible people. But if he said: 'I am in doubt about it,' then let him be asked: 'If some unknown person were to tell you, as you were leaving your meal at home for an instant, that a viper had licked it, and put its poison in it, and you could admit his truthfulness, would you then eat the meal or, even be it the most delicious of foods, would you forgo it?' He would answer: 'I would most certainly leave it. I would say: if he has lied, I shall merely miss this food. To forgo it may be hard but sensible. If, on the other hand, he was right, I might lose my life. Compared to the discomfort of abstention from food and its waste, death is harsher.' Say to him then: 'By Almighty God, how can you defer the truth of all the prophets, despite all their miracles, and the veracity of all the saints, scholars and sages, nay, of all categories of sensible people - I do not mean thereby the ignorant of the masses but rather those possessed of intellect - in favour of the truth of one unknown man who may have some purpose of his own?'

All reasonable men believe in the Last Day and acknowledge reward and punishment, even if they differ as to particulars. If they are right, you are on the brink of a chastisement which is to continue forever. If, on the other hand, they are wrong, you miss nothing save some cravings of this passing and vexatious world. There can remain no hesitation for him, if he is intelligent, following this reflection, for there is no comparison between a lifetime and eternity. Nay, were we to pre-

sume that the world is filled with a speck, and that a bird gathers, every million years, one granule of it, still surely the speck would come to an end, and eternity would not be diminished at all. How could a sensible man's mind waver about forgoing desires for say, a hundred years, for the sake of bliss eternal? That is why Abu l-'Ala' Ahmad b. Sulayman at-Tanukhu al-Ma'arri⁵²¹ said:

The astrologer and physician both of them Deny the resurrection of the body. "Oh, get ye gone," said I; if your belief 'Tis upon you perdition falls, not me ⁵²²

Therefore, 'Ali said to one whose intelligence fell short of true understanding and was a doubter: 'If what I said is correct, we will all be saved; if not, I am saved and you perish.' That is to say, the sensible man follows the path of safety in all situations.

You might ask:

These matters are evident but they are attained only through reflection. But what about the hearts? They give up reflection about these matters, and consider [them] too burdensome. What is the treatment for the hearts by which to return them to reflection, especially in the case of a man who believes in the basis and ramification of religion?

Know, then, that the impediment to reflection is twofold. Firstly, functional reflection is the reflection of the punishment of the hereafter, its terrors and afflictions, the grief of sinners over their exclusion from the everlasting bliss. This reflection is stinging and painful to the heart. The heart, therefore, shuns it, and takes delight in reflecting on worldly matters for comfort and relaxation. Secondly, reflection is an immediate impediment distracting from the worldly delights and the gratification of cravings. Every man, in every state and with every breath, has a craving which overtakes him and enslaves him. His intellect then becomes subservient to his craving. Therefore, man is busy to set his ruse [to gratify it], and it becomes his delight to pursue the ruse, or to start the gratification of his craving. But reflection holds him back from that.

To treat these two obstructions, he should say to his heart: 'How great is your foolishness in being wary of reflecting on death and what follows it, because of the pain caused by the mention of death, despite the disdain for the pain of struggling with death. How will you endure sustaining it, whenever it happens, seeing that [at the same tune], you are unable to endure the very admission of death and what follows it, and

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are pained thereby? To treat the second impediment, i.e., that reflection makes you miss worldly pleasures is graver and more decisive. For, pleasures of the hereafter are infinite and unmarred, while the worldly pleasure are quickly obliterated and are mixed with vexations. In this life there is no pleasure free of worry. [The more so] as in repenting of transgressions and in concern for obedience lies delight in conferring with God, repose in perceiving and obeying Him [60] and constant closeness to Him. If the obedient had no other recompense for his deeds than what he feels of the sweetness of obedience and the spirit of intimacy in converse with God, that would surely be sufficient. The more so, when to this is added the bliss of the hereafter. Certainly, this pleasure does not occur at the initial stage of repentance, but after man endures [in penitence] for a long time, the good having become habit as before the evil was. The soul is receptive - as you train it, so it becomes habituated. Good is habit, and evil is [sheer] obstinacy.

These reflections, therefore, induce fear which in turn induces the ability to forgo pleasures. The stimulant of these reflections is exhortation of the preachers, and admonitions which penetrate into the heart through innumerable appropriate motifs. Reflection then becomes consonant with temper, and the heart tends toward it. The cause which projects harmony between the temper and the reflection, which [itself] is the cause of goodness, is termed succour (*tawflq*), inasmuch as succour is the fusion of will and the faculty which is obedience useful unto the hereafter.

It is related in a long tradition that 'Ammar b. Yasir⁵²³ arose and said to 'Ali b. Abi Talib: 'O Commander of the Faithful! Inform us about unbelief. Upon what is it built?' 'Ali answered: 'It is built upon four props: on rudeness; blindness; heedlessness; and doubt. One who is rude scorns the truth, proclaims the false and hates the learned⁵²⁴ One who is blind forgets the invocation [of God's name]. One who is heedless swerves from good sense. One who doubts, the desires mislead him, then, only to be seized by sighing and regret, and what he was not considering [possible] concerning God appears to him now.'

What we have mentioned explains some of the damages wrought by neglect of reflection. So much for [the discussion of] repentance.

If forbearance is one of the pillars of continued repentance, it is imperative to explain it. We will, therefore, discuss it, God willing, in a separate treatise.

The quotations from the hadith lore have been checked with the help of (1) the notes of the editor of the Arabic text, and (2) the *Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane*, ed. by A. J. Wensinck, J. P. Mensing, J. Brugmav; 7 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1936-1969).

Ibn Hanbal's *Musnad* is referred to in the old (recently reprinted) edition; Bukhari, in the Krehl-Juynboll edition; Tirmidhi, in the edition by A. R. M. 'Uthman, Cairo 1965; Ibn Maja, in the edition by M. F. 'Abd al-Baqi, Cairo 1372-3/1952-3; Darimi, in the Damascus edition, 1349 A.H.; Muslim, in the Cairo (1283) edition. The references to Ibn Hanbal are by volume and page; the other references are by numbers of treatise and section. E.G. IM 37:7 = Ibn Maja, Zuhd, section seven. (References are noted in the translation by lower case letters.)

Key

n.c. non-canonic. The saying in question does not occur in the canonized collections, though it may appear in later collections.

n.t. = not traceable.

B = Bukhari. D = Darimi.

H = Ahmad ibn Hanbal. IM = Ibn Maja. M = Muslim. T = Tirmidhi.

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32 a. H. 1376, VI 264; IM 37:30 (N4252). 32 b. IM 5:78 (N 1081).

34 a. IM 37:30 (N 4250); H IV 271, 273, 283.

APPENDIX A

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35 a. IM 37:30 (N4249) humouristic note: in his rejoicing and utter confusion the man verges on blasphemy.

39 a. IM 36:3 (N 3936).

44 a. D 8:26.

45 a. H V 153, 236. Cf. IM 37:30 (N 4253). 46 a. ? B 8:15-16.

b.

49 a. n.t.

51 a. H IV 395, 404.

b. H 11 1238; IM 37:30 (N 4248).

c, n.c.

d. H 1289.

e. n.t.

f. H 11129, 41.

g. Cf. H V 236. 56 a. H VI 240.

b. H II 400; B 80:4.

c. H 11201.

57 a. The editor points out that in this section al-Ghazali depends on Abu Talib al-Makki.

b. n.c.

58 a. H 1113; B 81:32. 59 a. ?

b. B 55:23, 86:44; H III 131, 134.

c. n.t.

64 a. M 2:16; H II 400; B 9:6. 66 a. n.c.; attributed to 'Ali. 67 a. H II 168, 173.

b. H II 244; B 79:1.

c. H II 377; B 65 on Koran 19:1. 69 a. H V 170; B 81:51. 70 a. Cf. H IV 226. 72.a. H 111230.

73 a. B 97:15, 22, 55. 75 a. H I 379. 76 a. Cf. B 59:8.

b. n.c.

c. H I 173, 174; B 75:3.

d. H 1380; B 78:53.

78 a. Cf. IM, Mugaddima 7 (N 59).

- 80 a. n.c.
 b. H VI 41, 208.
 c. H II 313, 370; IM, N 4328. 81 a. B 2:32.
 82 a. B 80:4. 83 a. B 78:60. 84 a. H IV 357. 86 a. n.c. 88 a. D 5:2.
 b. D 20:74. 89 a. n.c.
 b. H VI 157. 90 a. H III 61f. 91 a. H V 348. 93 a. H 111172. 102 a.
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 b. H 11409, 444, 476; B 24:60. 103 a. T, Du'a 128. 104 a. n.c.
 b. H 111387.
 c. n.c.
 105 a. H III 198; IM, N 4251. 106 a. IM, N 76. 109 a. n.t.
 b. n.c.
 c. H V 152.
 d. IM, N 4253.
 e. n.c.
 f. H IV 393, 403.
 110 a. B 80:2 (?), H IV 166 (?). 113 a. H IV 151. 118 a. n.c.
 b. n.c.
 c. n.c.
 120 a. IM 36:22 (N 4022).
 b. n.t. 121 a. n.c.
 b. n.c.
 122 a. B 78:76.
 b. Cf. IM 37:1 (N 4102).

- 123 a. T 34:65.
 127 a. H II 260, 380.
 b. T 36:21 (N 2685).

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NOTES

Abbreviation Key

- T - al-Ghazzali, *Ihya' 'Ulum ad-Din*, vol. 4, pp. 1-60.
- MS - Manuscript referred to in, Hitti, et al., *Descriptive Catalogue of the Garrett Collection of Arabic Manuscripts in the Princeton University Library*, (Princeton, 1938) no. 1481.
- Z - al-Zayyid al-Murtada al-Zabidi, *Ithaf al-Sddah al-Muttaḡin bi-Sharh Ihya' 'Ulum ad-Din*.
- C - text of T contained in body of Z.
- D - text of T contained in the margin of Z.
- M - M. Maimonides, *Yad Ha-Hazaqah: Mishne Torah*.
- K - Koran citation (sura: verse).
- W - S. Wilzer, "Untersuchungen zu Gazzalis Kitab at-Tauba", *Der Islam* 32 (1957), pp. 237-309.
- W(2) - S. Wilzer, "Untersuchungen zu Gazzalis Kitab at-Tauba", *Der Islam* 33 (1958), pp. 51-120.
- A-G - G. C. Anawati, and L. Gardet, *Mystique Musulmane*. EI - *Encyclopedia of Islam*, second edition.
- SEI - *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*. TB - *Babylonian Talmud*.
- Studies* - H. Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies in al-Ghazzali*.

1. Muhammad Murtada al-Zabidi (1145-1205/1732-91), a distinguished philologist and lexicographer, was born in India and lived, for the greater part of his life, in Egypt. His commentary, *The Precious Gift of the God fearing Masters*, was printed in thirteen volumes in Fas (1883-96), and in ten volumes in Cairo (1893). Cf. C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, 1422, II 287f., and Suppl. II 398f.
2. e.g., Genesis 13:33; Exodus 33:11; Leviticus 25:27; 1 Samuel 18:6.

3. e.g. Deuteronomy 4:30, 30:2; I Kings 8:47-8; Jeremiah 3:7, 12, 14, 22, 15:7, 18:8, 44:5; Ezekiel 3:19, 13:22, 18:21, 23, 27, 30, 33:9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19; Hosea 5:4, 7:10, 14:2, 3.
4. e.g., Deuteronomy 13:18; II Kings 23:26; Jeremiah 4:8, 23:20, 30:24.
5. W(2), p.82.
6. Jonah 3:10. The inhabitants of Ninveh did, in fact, effect an acceptable 'return' and were forgiven.
7. II Kings 23:25. Here the repentance and reforms of King Josiah are lauded. This theme is especially evident in Ezekiel, e.g., 3:19, 33:11, 18:23.
8. e.g., Leviticus 4:1-31. 9. Leviticus 16.
10. e.g., Ezekiel 33:14f.
11. *Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion*, s.v. repentance. 12. Zachariah 1:3; Malachi 3:7.
13. As, for example, the tension between and synthesis of ritual atonement and repentance. TB, *Yoma* 85b.
14. E. Urbach, *The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs*, vol. I, p.463. 15. *Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion*, s. v. repentance. 16. E. Urbach, *The Sages*, vol. I, pp. 462f. 17. TB, *Pesachim* 54a.
18. TB, *Yoma* 86b.
19. TB, *Berakhot*, 34b.
20. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, pp. 252f.; W, p. 291. 21. Philo of Alexandria, c.20 B.C.E.-50 C.E. 22. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, pp. 252, 255. 23. Matthew 3:2.
24. Mark 1:15, 2:17; Matthew 2:17, 9:13, 12:41; Luke 5:32, 11:32. 25. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, s.v. repentance. 26. Galatians 2:20. Cf. Colossians 3:9f. 27. Galatians 2:20; John 3:3, 15, 18, 6:47, 14:1. 28. W(2), pp. 77f.
29. Luke 13:5.
30. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, s. v. repentance. 31. Luke 15:4-10.
32. W(2), p:71; J. Obermann, *Der philosophische and religiose Subjektivismus Ghazalr*, p.233, note 3. 33. e.g., K 2:155 (160). 34. e.g., K 2:51 (54).
35. e.g., K.2:35 (37).
36. K 40:2(3).
37. K 13:29(30), 25:71.
38. K 3:84(90), 4:21 (17), 4:22 (18), 9:105 (104), 42:24 (25). 39. K 9:113 (112), 66:5.
40. e.g., K 2:35 (37). 41. K 2:222.
42. In dating the Koranic citations I have used the chronologies of Muir, Noldeke, Grimme and the Egyptian edition of the Koran as given in W. M. Watt, *Bell's Introduction to the Qur'an*, (Edinburgh, 1970), pp. 206-213.
43. K 20:120 (122).
44. K 2:35 (37), 51 (54), 122 (128), 155 (160), 4:20 (16), 67 (64), 9:105 (104), 119 (118), 49:12.
45. e.g., K 12:53, 14:39 (36).
46. e.g., K 7:149 (physical), 7:167 (168) (religious).
47. e.g., K 17:27 (25), 38:18 (19).
48. e.g., K 31:14 (15), 39:11 (8).
49. W(2), p. 73, note 11.
50. K 3:12 (14).
51. K 34:10.
52. K 60:4.
53. W(2), pp. 77f.
54. K 4:22 (18).
55. K 4:21 (17), 8:39 (38), 9:5.
56. K 19:61 (60), 20:84 (82), 25:70f., 28:67. 57. K 66:8.
58. K 2:222.
59. Cf. SEI, s.v. Khatai'a. 60. K 3:129 (135).

61. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, s.v. Arabs (Ancient). 62. K 58:9-10 (8-9).
 63. Leviticus 16. 64. K 11:116 (114).
 65. e.g., K 2:75 (18); 4:112; 26:82. 66. SEI, s.v. Khati'a. 67. K 28:15 (16).
 68. K 2:75 (81), 85:11.
 69. Where both man and god(s) are locked into an immutable causality. Cf. *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, s.v. Sin
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 147
 (Buddhist).
 70. K 2:284, 3:124 (129).
 71. K 42:35 (37), 53:33 (32).
 72. W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazzali*, pp. 20ff. 73. R. A. Nicholson, *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*, p. 57. 74. EI, s.v. al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid Muhammad; EI, s.v. al-Ghazzali, Ahmad. Cf. G. E. von Grunebaum, *Classical Islam*, pp. 151 ff.; SEI, s.v. madrasa.
 75. Al-Ghazzali, *al-Munqidh min ad-Dalal*; W. M. Watt published an English translation in his work, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazzali*, pp. 19-85; a Hebrew translation was published by H. Lazarus-Yafeh, *Ha-Podeh min Ha-T'ayah Veba-Taut*.
 76. W. M. Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazzali*, p. 12. 77. W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, p. 20. 78. *Studies*, p. 365.
 79. al-Ghazzali, *al-Munqidh*, p. 126.
 80. EI, s.v. al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid Muhammad.
 81. Al-Ghazzali viewed withdrawal and extreme asceticism, except a temporary healing regimen, to be as bad as hedonism. Cf. *Studies*, pp. 429f.
 82. Al-Ghazzali, *al-Munqidh*, pp. 140f. In reference to al-Ghazzali as renewer, see EI, s.v. al-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid Muhammad.
 83. W. M. Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazzali*, p. 12, L. Zolondek, *Book XX of al-Ghazzali's Ihya'*, p. 16.
 84. Professor Lazarus-Yafeh's pioneering study of al-Ghazzali's linguistic usage is very enlightening in this area. She is able to highlight al-Ghazzali's commitment and contribution as teacher and guide. *Studies*, pp. 44-248.
 85. For a partial listing, see *Studies*, pp. 46ff.
 86. P. K. Hitti, *Makers of Arab History*, p. 156; W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, p. 151; L. Zolondek, *Book XX of al-Ghazzali's Ihya'*, pp. 1ff.
 87. *Studies*, p. 51.
 88. Al-Ghazzali, "The Beginning of Guidance", *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazzali*, trans. W. M. Watt, pp. 107, 151f.
 89. T, p. 27; *Studies*, p. 349. The idea of such a division was quite common in medieval Islam. It probably was introduced from the Greek philosophical tradition, and also found its way into Judaism and Christianity. See, *Studies*, p. 391, note 2. 90. *Studies*, p. 362.
 91. *Studies*, pp. 352f.
 92. W(2), pp. 75f.
 93. e.g., Free Will and Predestination, The Last Judgement, Belief and Heresy, *Ta'wil*, etc.
 94. *Studies*, p. 373.
 95. W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, pp. 151, 153f., 165. Cf. al-Ghazzali, *The Book of Knowledge*, trans. N.A. Faris, pp. 3-5.
 96. W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, pp. 176f. For an interesting survey of the place of the religious commandments in the philosophy of al-Ghazzali, see the chapter by that name in *Studies*, pp. 412-436.
 97. *Studies*, pp. 412f. Law is the starting point on the road to gnosis (*ma'rifa*). Many sufis viewed law, therefore, as obsolete once one

has embarked on the Way. They tended, then, to libertinism. Not so al-Ghazzali. For him the Law remains the basis upon which man elevates himself and it is not to be abrogated. See, W, p. 262.

98. *Studies*, p. 378.
 99. T, p. 11
 100. W, p. 251.
 101. T, p. 11; W, pp. 252ff.
 102. T, p. 27. Cf. R. A. Nicholson, "Mysticism", *The Legacy of Islam*, eds. Arnold and Guillaume, pp. 213f.
 103. T, p. 25; W, p. 255.
 104. Cf. E. Underhill, *Mysticism*, pp. 413-443. 105. *Studies*, p. 352.
 106. W, pp. 258, 281.
 107. Cf. K 2:191 (195), 222, 9:4, 7, 109 (108). 108. T, p. 31.
 109. W, p. 256.
 110. K. 2:274 (272), 6:52, 13:22, 18:27(28), and others. 111. TB, *Berakhot*, 17b.
 112. *M, Yesodei Ha-Torah*, 1:1,6. 113. *M, Teshubah*, 8:1, 2. 114. W, pp. 257ff. 115. T, p. 23; W, pp. 256, 259. 116. W, p. 270.
 117. *Studies*, pp. 321ff.
 118. There is a parallel concept in rabbinic Judaism. TB, *Avot*, 4:21. 119. T, p. 19; *Studies*, pp. 321 ff. 120. *Studies*, pp. 322f.
 121. TB, *Avodah Zarah*, 3a.
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122. TB, *Berakhot*, 56b. 123. T, p. 24.
 124. T, pp. 24, 38, *Studies*, pp. 322, 425f. 125. W, p. 260.
 126. T, pp. 4, 36; *Studies*, pp. 429f. Cf. J. Obermann, *Der philosophische und religiöse Subjektivismus Ghazaas*. 127. T, p. 11; W(2), pp. 78f.
 128. Cf. T, p. 29.
 129. T, pp. 9f.; W, pp. 246f. 130. T, pp. 25f.
 131. W, p. 290. Cf. I Kings 8:46; II Chronicles 6:36; Ecclesiastes 7:21. 132. Genesis 8:21.
 133. T, pp. 7f., 16, 50; W, pp. 294f.
 134. T, pp. 13, 45. Goldziher has pointed out the parallel between *galb salim* and the biblical *leb shdlem*. See W, p. 278, note 38. Cf. I Kings 8:61, 11:4, 15:3; I Kings 20:3; Isaiah 38:3; I Chronicles 29:9; II Chronicles 19:9. 135. T, pp. 24-32.
 136. T, p. 50.
 137. T, p. 2.
 138. T, p. 10. Al-Ghazzali does, however, give a mystical interpretation in his book, *Mizdn al-'a'ural*.
 139. W, pp. 249f. Cf. SEI, s.v. 'isma and sira.
 140. Cf. W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, pp. 82-86. 141. W, p. 250.
 142. T, pp. 52f.
 143. T, pp. 10, 16, 34.
 144. T, pp. 49f.; W, p. 274.
 145. T, pp. 7, 9; *Studies*, pp. 357-363. 146. W, pp. 275ff.
 147. T, pp. 12f. Cf. TB, *Avot*, 4:2. 148. T, p. 10; *Studies*, pp. 312-320.
 149. W, pp. 289f.
 150. W, pp. 278f.; M.G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 1, pp. 158f.
 151. W, p. 279; G. F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, vol. 2, pp. 10ff.
 152. W, p. 280; *Studies*, pp. 412f.
 153. M. Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed*, I, 54; III, 27, 28, 33, 54. 154. Nonetheless Maimonides emphasized his belief in the ongoing obligatoriness of the commandments. *M. Yesodei Ha-Torah*, 9:1.
 155. *Studies*, pp. 412-436.

156. These debates often began and developed within a specific political context. The khariji groups, for example, originated in the upheaval surrounding the caliphate of 'Ali. Most of these groups developed ideologies which became progressively less centered in politics. The political influence of these ideologies, with the exception of shi'ism, were negligible in the time of al-Ghazzali. The political context, therefore, is not mentioned. See, W. M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*.
157. K 2:75 (81).
158. K 4:35 (31).
159. W. M. Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, pp. 110-114.
160. W(2), p. 51; W. M. Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, pp. 94-104.
161. W. M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, p. 67; SEI, s.v. al-Mu'tazila.
162. W(2), p. 52; W. M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, pp. 32-34.
163. W(2), p. 52; Cf. W. M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, pp. 82-89.
164. W(2), p. 67.
165. T, pp. 3, 26ff. There are various levels of Paradise (i.e. salvation). Man's proximity to God will conform to what he has earned in this life. Cf. EI, s.v. al-djanna.
166. T, p. 29; W, p. 270 (text and note 32).
167. W. M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, p. 17. Andrae's ideas of salvation through the community of Islam is, at best, misleading by his use of christologically influenced terminology. W, p. 186.
168. This is still consistent with al-Ghazzali positing the transfer of credits or debits between sinners and victims of injustice. T, p. 30.
169. W(2), p. 110.
170. W, p. 300.
171. The dimension of national covenant found in Judaism is not to be found in Islam. Cf. W(2), p. 82.
172. T, pp. 50f. Cf. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya' 'Ulum ad-Din*, vol. 1, Bk 1.
173. W, p. 286. Note the difference between al-Ghazzali's conception of the '*ulama*'; the priests of the Church who had special powers of dispensation and absolution; and the shi'i imams who were con-

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- sidered infallible and charismatic. 174. T, pp. 16f.
175. T, p. 32; W, p. 308.
176. T, p. 33. This is parallel to the rabbinic category of *hoteh u-mahti* (one who sins and causes others to follow suit which is the only category of sinner universally condemned by talmudic authorities to eternal perdition. Cf/ TN. *Sanhedrin*, Chapter 11; TB, *Avot* 5:21.
177. T, pp. 17-20.
178. T, p. 32.
179. W, p. 248; W(2), p. 85. 180. T, p. 16.
181. *Studies*, p. 358 (based on al-Ghazzali's *Kitab Sharh Aja'ib al-qalb*).
182. W. M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, p. 31.
183. W(2), p. 58. The Mu'tazila's position also had a political dimension. They were involved in the 'Abbasid movement and, like the *Khawdrij*, they fought the Umayyads. Cf. SEI, s.v. al-mu'tazila. 184. M. G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, vol. 1, p. 264.
185. W. M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, pp. 86ff. There was an expression: 'More obscure than the *kasb* of the ash'aris.' 186. Philippians 2:12f.
187. T, pp. 5f. Cf. W(2), p. 95.
188. T, pp. 2f.; W, p. 249; W(2), p. 56; *Studies*, p. 353.
189. T, pp. 6f.; W(2), p. 91 (for a treatment of the parable see note 1 on p. 91).
190. W, p. 282.
191. A. J. Wensinck, *La pence de Ghazzali*, p. 143. 192. W(2), pp. 97f.
193. T. I. DeBoer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, pp. 57f. 194. T, pp. 4, 24, 27; W(2), pp. 56f.
195. T, p. 50.

196. W(2), p. 60.
197. J. Obermann, *Der philosophische and religidse Subjektivismus Ghazalu*, pp. 232ff.
198. Ibid., p. 239.
199. T, pp. 30, 45; W(2), p. 68.
200. W. M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, pp. 66ff.; SEI, s.v. al-Mu'tazila; W. p. 254; W(2), p. 114. (The other major proposition was God's unity - i.e., no attributes separate from His essence.)
201. W, p. 254.
202. T, p. 28; W(2), pp. Off. 203. T, p. 27; W(2), p. 57.
204. T, pp. Off.; W(2), pp. 115f. 205. T, p. 30.
206. T, p. 15.
207. *Studies*, pp. 382-388.
208. Al-Ghazzali discusses the necessarily subjective and limited ability of the gnostic to convey to others his acquired insights. Cf. T, pp. 28f.
209. Such borrowing, quite often literal, was not unusual or negatively valued. Cf. *Studies*, pp. 35f., note 20.
210. Numbers in brackets refer to page in T.
211. MS „„ 1 J1~ t.a .
212. MS ~La,11~r,J1 f r) ~,
213. MS r)1_Jl :Js i-o om.
214. Z, p. 497; Ru'ba b. Bi'a of the Ta'y tribe lost his recalcitrant son Akhzam, and was attacked by the sons of Akhzam, his grandsons. He exclaimed in rhyme that he recognized therein the self same disposition that he had observed in Akhzam. This became proverbial of the recognition of inherited characteristics.
215. MS v I ,t.- in both cases, delete L L, .
216. MS ... is necessary in extricating the human essence from the Satanic impurities...: _ . L.> C,~ L; 'I I L,ai ,; U^{JI}
217. MS ... lesser of the two evils. v J._ I v~,a I .
218. MS j (...;.
219. MS .i h.
220. MS L,J . t.: LJ 1.
221. MS v. U I .L,i1.
222. MS J1: jr l_j t Jw1) Jjl ...JG. 223. MS
224. d. 283/896 225. MS_j.v1
226. T a: (;f; MS ,i (i; Read a: L 227. MS S :.r-.
228. K 24:35
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229. MS J1...:
230. K 24:31. 231. K 66:8. 232. MS l .i 233. K 2:222. 234. K 37:94(96). 235. MS_L 1J1. 236. MS ;_ . ~ I ; , i. 237. K 33:62.
238. Koranic idiom. Cf. K 16:79(77) and 54:50. 239. T LA_s ~-,J; ; Read La_m b. 240.

- K 54:49.
241. K 54:50. 242. **ل<J I**
- 243.: -,4U **I 6** and **X1.1 I J tt**. Cf. al-Ghazzali, *The Foundations of the Articles of Faith*, trans. N. A. Faris, p.119. 244. Cf. K 8:17.
245. K 9:14.
246. Cf. K 72:27.
247. MS **U!-j**.
248. MS **1.1.**
249. Cf. al-Ghazzali, *The Book of Knowledge*, trans. N. A. Fans, p.223; *Studies*, v. 357-363.
250. MS J.ol yl.
251. Cf. K 9:21 and 76:20.
- 252.. Read **r**__,
253. K 36:8-10.
254. MS om.
255. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya' 'Ulum ad-Din*, vol. 1, Bk 1. The subject raised here is discussed in section six.
256. K 24:31.
257. al-Ghazzali, *Foundations*, p. 119; *Studies*, pp. 264-348.
258. K 17:64(62). 259. K 48:2.
260. MS ash vi•
261. K 83:14.
262. MS **ar I, J~**
- 1.c~..a**
263. MS **-ti**.
- r**
264. MS : **L,1 I J LS**
265. MS J L, i I. 266. d. 234/849-50.
267. MS yA y.
268. K 34:53(54).
269. K 63:10-11. 270. K 4:22(18). 271. K 4:21(17).
272. Legendary figure of pre-Islamic times to whom great wisdom is attributed. Cf. SEI, s.v. Lukman.
273. **cj_ 1.**
274. K 2:38(40).
275. K 23:8 and 70:32. 276. K 91:9.
277. Read **Cr**
278. K 42:24(25). 279. K 40:2(3).
280. MS **:j_ '~ ftsZ**
- y.**
281. d. 713.
282. K 17:27(25).
283. Ibn 'Iyad, d. 802. 284. d. 692-3. 285. MS **Lr-6** om.
286. d. 32 A.H.
287. MS **r_v S.u.**
288. K 8:39(38).
289. A Jew of Medina who accepted Islam, d. 43/663-4. 290. The second Caliph, d. 23/644.
291. Early Sufi who was among the first to develop the teachings of gnosis (ma'rifa), 180/796-246/861. Cf. EI, s.v. Dhu 'l-Nun, Abu 'l-Fayd.
292. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya'*, vol. 3, Bk 1. 293. K 79:24.

294. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya'*, vol. 3. 295. MS **√11**.

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296. K 4:35(31).

297. K 53:33(32).

298. The son of Egypt's conqueror, 'Amr. See EI, s.v. 'Amr b. al-'As. 299. One of the earliest Muslims, he was a companion of the Prophet

and a Koran reader, d. 32/652-3. See EI, s.v. Ibn Mas'fld. 300. 68/687-8.

301. K 4:35(31).

302. d. 996.

303. MS سج / om.

304. Made of wood of the arak tree. 305. Sa'd b. Malik b. Sinan, 74/693-4. 306.

K 4:35(31).

307. MS **t.. L.:** I om. 308. K 51:56. 309. MS *J.a* 1 om.

310. MS V_{1b}.

311. Read ~..a~ .

312. MS

313. MS and C₁;Li1~, yvi ~1, L. 314. Read •L₁11.

315. A small coin of little value.

316. Mystic, author of *Qfl* al-Qulfb from which al-Ghazzali drew much material, d. 386/998. Cf. EI, s.v. Abu Talib al-Makki. 317. MS and C₁₃ }4.

318. C 1.;₁11.

319. C Y om.

320. C_u L+.

321. K 4:35(31).

322. MS and C سج

323. d. 58/678.

324. MS **J (;:)** .

325. The great jurist, d. 204/820.

326. An intoxicating beverage made from raisins and dates. 327. K 29:42(43).

328. d. 110/729.

M

329. MS and c^{-L1} L.; **U**.

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330. Z, p. 548. al-Zabidi indicates that this refers to Jesus. Cf. Matthew 7:6.

331. MS Lid om.

332. MS ج^{-Y} 1~1com. 333. MS &J...

334. K 29:42(43).

335. MS acid C ILU1.

336. Cf. SEI, s.v. al-lawh al-mahf6z.

337. K 2:111(117), 3:42(47), 3:52(59), 6:72(73), 16:42(40), 19:36(35), 36:82, 40:70(68).

338. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya'*, vol. 1, Bk 2; available in Faris' translation. 339. Lit. - successful, victorious, winner.

340. Al-Janna, within the later theological speculation, is portrayed as a multi-leveled and gradated series of gardens. Cf. EI, s.v.

al-Djanna.

341. Cf. K 83:15.

342. MS and C C:.. G₁•.r..

343. K 104:6-7.

344. *Diwan al-Mutanabbi*, ed. F. Dieterici, p. 8.

345. *Harisa* - a sweet pastry made of flour, melted butter and sugar. -346. K 50:36(37).

347. al-Ghazzali, *Knowledge*, p. 141. 348. K 17:87(85).

349. MS _U 6.

350. al-Ghazzali, *Knowledge*, p. 141.

351. Cf. K 62:4.

352. Cf. K 2:99(105). 353. K 2:272(269). 354. K 6:91.

355. K 41:30; 46:12(13).

356. al-Ghazzali, *Knowledge*, p. 94. 357. K 19:72-3(71-2).

358. 21/642-110/728. Preacher and ascetic of the Umayyad period. Had a profound influence on different types of personalities and is extensively quoted in Islamic literature. EI, s.v. Hasan al-Basri.

359. MS _i L.; I om. 360. K 41:46. 361. K 40:17.

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362. K 53:40(39).

363. K 99:7-8. 364. K 4:44(40). 365. Cf. K 101-5.

366. Cf. K 56:26-37, 89(88). 367. Cf. K 33:72. 368. K 59:19. 369.

Cf. K 53:7. 370. K 32:12.

371. al-Ghazzali, lhyd', vol. 4, Bk 5.

372. MS _C

373. Abu 'Abdallah Ahmad b. Yahya b. Jala' al-Baghdadi (III/IX cent.).

374. K 41:46.

375. K 4:44(40). 376. K 53:40-11. 377. K 74:41. 378.

K 61:5.

379. K 13:12(11). 380. K 53:11.

381. Cf. EI, s.v. a'raf. 382. MS ₁₁₅ om

383. 'A'isha bint Abi Bakr, wife of Muhammad, d. 58/678.

384. See note 338 above. 385. K 32:17.

386. Woman mystic and saint, d. 185/801 (Palestine). Cf. SEI, s.v.

Rabi'a al-Adawiya.

387. Evidently with reference to the proverb: [Find out who is going to be] the neighbour before [you take] the house. 388. K 29:64.

389. K 58:9(8)

390. K 9:68(67).

391. K 36:11(12).

392. 'Abdullah ibn 'Abbas, cousin of the Prophet, d. 68/687-8.

393. A term covering folkloristic or moralistic stories preserved in various literary sources which because of their biblical or imagined context are related to the ancient Israelites. See EI, s.v. *Isra'iliyat*.

394. *Dhikr* is remembering God with mind or tongue and glorifying Him with certain fixed phrases. There developed two lines in the exposition and function of *dhikr*, both within Sufi ranks (although not exclusively). Firstly, *dhikr* is used as a liturgical device, part of the simple prayer regimen. Secondly, *dhikr* became a technique used in attaining the sufi *ittihad* [substantial identification] with God. Cf. EI, s.v. *Dhikr*.

395. C _{a:oi,,a.~./l} Is; (;; aJ _{JrJ} G _r, J I _L I
_{v;S.iJ h~ L J i ;J Lw. Lt.: L. L J L S_D}

Lr-J' ~-Y Lt cs°L'''~ I

& ut J I ~:J 1 & U L

cl.

:1.,W 1

1 j;;,1 I ~;

MS ~il h o m ~ ~ u / j L j t J / a,; U .1 S I .L A

396.

397. On the basis of K 9:60 it was claimed that eight categories of people are entitled to benefits from the community alms. Cf. Th. W. Juynboll, *Handbuch des Islamischen Gesetzes*, pp. 106-7; Abu Shuja', and Ibn Qasim al-Ghazzi, *Fath al-Qarlb*, ed. and trans. L.W.C. Van den Berg, pp. 246ff.

398. Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi'i, 204/820, the great jurist.

399. K 11:116(114).

400. C and D _v t_j.

401. See note 382 above.

402. Cf. K 4:94(92) and EI, vol. 1, p.25.
 403. Contemporary of the Prophet a.id general in the early conquests,
 d. 21/641-2.
 404. al-Ghazzali, *Ihyd'*, vol. 2, Bk 4. 405. MS *r*[^].
 406. Cf. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya'*, vol. 3, Bk 4, pp. 143ff.
 407. Lit. - is a slave to.
 408. The two most important canonical collections of Tradition. Both
 are called Sahih [sound]. They were compiled respectively by
 Muhammad ibn 'Isma'il al-Bukhari (d. 870) and Muslim ibn
 al-Hajjaj (d. 875).
 409. Sa'd ibn Malik ibn Sinan Abu Sa'id al-Khudri, 74/693-4. 410. MS I,,;.
 411. C.,I 1J . 412. C Zlc

j1 1I~ ~;,1I

413. See note 326 above. Differentiated from *khamr* which is made from
 158

159

grapes. Cf. SEI, s.v. nabidh.

414. Ibn Abi-l-Hawwari (d. 860) and Abu Suleiman ad-Darani (d. 830), both Syrian mystics. Cf. A-G, pp. 26f.
 415. c_L t_L . , t_L . L , Z, p. 26f. 416. MS *e-U* j.
 417. al-Ghazzali, *Ihyd'*, vol. 3, Bk 2.
 418. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya'*, vol. 1, Bk 1. 419. al-Ghazzali, *Ihyd'*, vol. 3.
 420. While not explicitly mentioning the biblical story of Uriah, the
 Koran indicates David's guilt feelings in that regard. Cf. K 38:21-25
 and EI, s.v. Dawdd.
 421. Hasan b. 'Ali, the Prophet's grandson. 422. Cf. K 66:8.
 423. Cf. K 89:27-8. 424. Cf. K 75:2.
 425. K 53:33(32).
 426. K 3:129-30(135-6).
 427. D
 . r a : l I j : . . Y : l L l j s - . . . i j L a : l s l L . l t
 428. K 28:54.
 429. Cf. K 12:18. 430. K 9:103(102). 431. K 91:6-10. 432.
 Cf. K 12:53. 433. Cf. K 4:97(95).
 434. MS j 13s> Y 1. 435. K 53:40(39).
 436. K 51:22.
 437. K 32:12. The root NKS appears both in 'handing their heads', and in 'standing on one's head'.
 438. K 53:40(39).
 439. al-Ghazzali, *Ihyd'*, vol. 1, Bk 9.
 440. Bending of the body followed by two prostrations. Part of the Muslim worship rites.
 441. C and D (A. _ . 442. Lit. - God's verses. 443. See note 385
 above. 444. See note 438 above.
 445. K 8:33.
 446. Abu Muhammad Sahl ibn 'Abdallah ibn Yunus al-Tustari, d.
 283/896. A-G, p. 34.
 447. *Khuila* - divine friendship; Cf. hard - friend, with reference to
 Abraham. See, A-G, p. 26.
 448. MS l.JS i 71. 449. K 9:113(112). 450. K 99:7.
 451. D
 45:. Sa'id b. Salam al-Maghribi, d. 323/935. 453. K 9:121(120), 11:117(115), 12:90.
 454. K 4:44(40).
 455. K 16:43(41); 39:27(26); 68:33.
 456. MS :. a.. Also in Z.

457. Z attributes this remark to Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz, d. 286/899. Cf. Arberry's translation from Farid a-Din 'Attar's, *Tadhkirat al-Ayliya*, in A.S. Arberry, *Muslim Saints and Mystics*, pp. 218ff. 458. Ja'far b. Muhammad as-Sadiq, the sixth of the twelve Shi'i Imams, d. 148/756.

459. Or: Persistence Complex. 460. K 16:110(108-9). 461. Lit. - paste, putty.

462. MS **a** I, fs j 463. C and D LU-.

464. C J. S; s i J I j I ~, m.

465. MS, C and D 11.1. c J. Or else, as T has it: Since they know why they were created, would that they acted in accord with what they know.

466. MS, C and D I P. I ;

467. Cf. K 17:94(92). 468. K 35:39(41).

469. 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second Caliph, d. 22/644. al-Zabidi attributes this to Ibn 'Umar (Z, p. 612).

470. Ibn Jabr al-Makki al-Makhzami, 101/722-3. 471. Hasan al-Basri. See note 358 above.

472. Cf. EI, s. v. Adam; H. N. Bialik, and Ravnitski, *Sefer Ha-Agada*, p. 17, par. 94; L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. 1, p. 79.

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473. MS ; r I ~.. 474. MS J U om.

475. Cf. K 38-35, 40; SEI, s.v. Sulaiman; I Kings 11:7 et seq.; I Kings 14:21; TB, *Sanhedrin* 20b, 21b; TB, *Shabbat* 56b; TB, *Gittin* 68b; *Kohelet Raba* 7; EJ, s.v. Solomon; L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, vol. 4, pp. 169-172.

476. Cf. SEI, s.v. al-Khadir. A legendary figure associated with the story in the Koran, 18:60-82.

477. Cf. K 21:81; 38:37; *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, s.v. Solomon; L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, vol. 4, p. 162. 478. K 12:31.

479. K 12:83. 480. K 12:87. 481. K 12:42. 482. K 12:42.

483. C and D r: i L.

484. 'Abdullah b. Ghafil b. Habib ... b. Hudayl, famous companion of the Prophet, often cited in the *Revival*, d. ca. 32/652-3. 485. Al-Fudayl ibn 'Iyad, 187/802.

486. According to al-Zabidi (Z, p. 618) this is 'Abdullah b. Ahmad b. Yahya al-Jala' al-Baghdadi. See note 373 above.

487. Abu-I-Qasim b. Muhammad, one of the greatest orthodox exponents of Sufism, d. 298/910. A-G, pp. 34f.; EI, s.v. al-Djunayd.

488. Perhaps this should read i.iJJ L and be translated: ... until it overpowered you in ar-Raqqa ...

489. Cf. Z, La, ' sL t5

490. A-G, p. 139.

491. Lit. - Practice abstention from this world.

492. Mu'ad ibn Jabal, 18/639.


493. Note the rhyme L ., rj • L.r~ .

494. Ibrahim b. Adham, 161/778. A-G, pp. 30f, 495. First Caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, d.

680. 496. See note 304 above.

497. In law *jihad* consists of military action whose object is the expansion of Islam or its defense. It is a duty but through the ages there developed differing and often limiting applications. By the late Middle Ages the fulfillment of this duty was often viewed as a collective duty whose execution was mandated to the judgement of the ruler. *Jihad*, however, was considered the more important of the two. It is effort directed upon oneself for the attainment of moral and religious perfection. EI, s.v. Djihad.

498. al-Basri. See note 358 above. 499. See note 272 above.
500. Salamat b. Dinar al-Madani, a famous Follower.
501. 'Imran - father of Mary the prophetess. Cf. K 3:30-1; *El*, s.v. 'Imran.
502. The ascetic Muhammad b. 'Abdallah as-Sijistani, d. 255/869 in Jerusalem. A-G, p. 31. 503. C)-f.
504. 'Umar II, Umayyad Caliph, d. 720.
505. A contemporary of Hasan al-Basri (I-II/VIII century). 506. 'Umar II's governor in Basra. 507. i.e., the saints.
508. al-Ghazzali, *Ihya'*, vol. 3, Bk. 2. 509. MS, C and D 510. K 92:6.
511. Cf. K 92:7. 512. K 92:8-9. 513. K 92:10. 514. Cf. K 92:11. 515. K 53:25.
516. Air, earth, fire, and water were considered by ancient philosophers to be the four basic elements. 517. K 75:20-1.
518. K 87:16. 519. Cf. K 42:17.
520. MS om. ^{off}: Y_j of the printed edition:
... for this may be impossible and may not happen. 521. The blind poet, d. 1057.
522. R.A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry*, p. 185. 523. d. 37 A.H.
524. 'Ulama', the religious authorities.



IBN 'ARABI

A Prayer for Spiritual
Elevation and Protection

دُورِ الْإِلَهِيِّ

Study, translation,
transliteration and Arabic text

SUHA TAJI-FAROUKI

A Prayer for Spiritual
Elevation and Protection

Muḥyiddīn Ibn ‘Arabī

A Prayer for Spiritual Elevation and Protection

al-Dawr al-a’lā (Ḥizb al-wiqāya)



Study, translation, transliteration and Arabic text

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To God alone belong the Most Beautiful Names,
so call upon Him through them

Qur'an 7: 180

I take refuge in the Perfect Words of God from
the evil of that which He has created

A saying of the Prophet Muhammad

Whoever recites [this prayer] will be like the
sun and the moon among the stars

Muḥammad al-Dāmūnī,

al-Durr al-thamīn li-sharḥ Dawr al-a' lā li-sīdī Muḥyī al-Dīn

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FOREWORD

MICHEL CHODKIEWICZ

Born in Spain and having died in Syria, like the ‘blessed tree’ mentioned in the ‘Light’ verse of the Qur’an Ibn ‘Arabī (1164–1240) is ‘neither of the east nor of the west’, for he belongs equally to both. Recognized as the Spiritual Master *par excellence* (*al-Shaykh al-Akbar*), he has been a source of inspiration and a definitive reference-point for the Muslim mystical tradition from Andalusia to China for more than eight centuries. Christian Europe, which since the Middle Ages had passionately studied so many Arabic authors, was for a long time unaware of him. It had to wait until the end of the nineteenth century before it began to discover some of the hundreds of works he has left us, and even then this interest was at first limited to narrow circles of Orientalists.

In contrast, the last few decades of the twentieth century have seen a sudden increase in the number of translations, critical editions, studies and commentaries on his works. Even more surprisingly, their audience has gradually extended to encompass readers who, *a priori*, have felt no particular attraction to Islamic culture, and indeed appeared to have no reason to be interested in writings of such intimidating depth. Undoubtedly, such readers felt that an academic approach which focused on the doctrinal authority Ibn ‘Arabī has exercised over sufism took into account only one aspect of the man. As an eminent figure of sainthood the *Shaykh al-Akbar* is thus not only a *Lesemeister*: he is also – and even more so, a *Lebemeister*, since he teaches us not only how to think, but how to live.

Witness, for example, the care he has shown in the five hundred and sixtieth (and final) chapter of his *Meccan Revelations* (*al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya*). Here, at the end of thousands of pages, where a veriginous metaphysics is developed in a language of extreme technical

precision, he gathers together, using very simple words, the rules of conduct from which, he tells us, both the wayfarer (*al-sālik*) and the one who has arrived at his destination (*al-wāṣil*) may benefit. For him – and for every spiritual master worthy of the name – the knowledge of the saints must take hold of the whole person. It is not addressed to the intellect alone.

It is for this very reason too that, within the immense Akbarian corpus, one finds alongside numerous scholarly treatises some quite short texts, which at first sight seem to fall within the domain of simple devotional literature. Yet the reality is utterly different. These prayers (*ṣalawāt*, *aḥzāb*, *awrād*), transmitted from master to disciple, are much more than pious litanies. They are inspired invocations, each structured around a series of Divine Names. Every Name conceals secrets and powers that are its own: it must arise at a precise moment in the recitation in order for it to be effective. Such effectiveness is not magic, however. It presupposes that certain conditions are satisfied, the most important of which is purity of intention. In addition, the diversity of these forms of prayer and the modes of their use – whether regularly or occasionally, at a particular time or not, recited alone or in groups etc. – reflect the variety of individual or collective situations, and of interior dispositions.

It is one of these prayers, *al-Dawr al-a' lā* (known also as the *Ḥizb al-wiqāya*), which can be found at the centre of the little book before you. At the centre, for it is surrounded by much precious information. Suha Taji-Farouki does not limit herself simply to establishing the text with rigorous exactitude, and providing a translation and transliteration of it. Combining a meticulous examination of written sources with patient fieldwork, she tells for the first time the long history of this prayer, identifying each of the personalities in the chains of transmission. Based upon many testimonies and from her own observations, she shows above all that the practice of the *Dawr* lives on today in very diverse milieux. With as much knowledge as empathy, she thus demonstrates the continuing currency of Ibn 'Arabi's teaching.

Paris, 2006

INTRODUCTION

There is a growing body of critical editions, translations and analyses of the works of Ibn ‘Arabī, yet relatively little attention has been paid to dimensions of his corpus of a more specifically liturgical or devotional character.¹ The most extensive collection of prayers attributed to him arises in the major compilation of Sunni devotional texts by the Naqshbandi–Khalidi Ahmed Ziya’uddin Gümüshanevi (d.1894), known by the title *Majmū‘at al-aḥzāb*.² While a few of these prayers have since been published and some such publications claim, if implicitly, to present critical editions, editors often provide scant (or no) information concerning the manuscripts on which they have drawn,³ and it is consequently difficult in some cases to be certain of their origin or precision. A critical compilation/edition of all these prayers, that rationalises titles and texts, addresses questions of attribution and explores the accompanying commentary tradition, is still to be produced.

As a modest contribution to this end (and taking into account the relatively few studies of Muslim and sufi prayer and prayer texts more generally), this study focuses on a single small prayer which has as its full title *al-Dawr al-a’ lā al-muqarrib ilā kulli maqām al-a’ lā* (The Most Elevated Cycle that brings one close to Every Station of The Most High), often contracted to *al-Dawr al-a’ lā* (The Most Elevated Cycle) or *Dawr al-a’ lā* (The Cycle of The Most High): it is also known as *Ḥizb al-wiqāya* (The Prayer of Protection).⁴ As in the case of other prayers attributed to him, this does not appear in Ibn ‘Arabī’s bibliographic records (the *fihris* and *ijāza*) and is not mentioned in any of his works. Yet as one contemporary sufi shaykh and specialist in his thought has put it, ‘there is a consensus among the people of the Way of God [*ahl ṭarīq Allāh*] concerning its attribution to the Shaykh al-Akbar.’⁵ A clear majority of the substantial number of manuscript copies surveyed for this study explicitly attribute the

prayer to Ibn 'Arabī either in the title or through a chain of transmission. Of those that do not make such an attribution, none attribute it to any other author. Given this and evidence of its widespread circulation and use both past and present, it represents an important element in any project to delimit and clarify the specifically liturgical dimension of Ibn 'Arabī's corpus.

This study examines three major aspects of the prayer. Chapter 1 explores its contemporary life, providing an indication of its circulation and use through examples from different arenas. Chapter 2 focuses on historical dimensions based on manuscript copies spanning the last four centuries, exploring facets of the presentation and transmission of the prayer. Chapter 3 examines perceptions of the prayer's properties and recommendations concerning its use. The discussion touches on aspects of its composition and the interplay within it between invocations of Divine Names, specific supplications and Qur'anic quotations. This chapter also provides a translation of the prayer, an Arabic text resulting from a considered evaluation of copies reviewed, and a transliteration. Finally, an Appendix sets out details of manuscript copies and chains of transmission discussed.

Notes

1. Two exceptions can be mentioned. (a) Ryad Atlagh, 'L'Oraison de personne, donation et noms divins chez Ibn 'Arabī (À propos de *Da'wat asmā' Allāh al-ḥusnā* attribuée à Ibn 'Arabī)', *Bulletin d'Études Orientales* LI (1999), pp.41–107 provides a critical edition and discussion of the prayer mentioned in the title, with a lengthy treatment of Ibn 'Arabī's position concerning prayer in general, and the place of the Divine Names in this. (b) Ibn 'Arabī, *The Seven Days of the Heart: Prayers for the Days and Nights of the Week (Awrād al-usbū')*, tr. Pablo Beneito and Stephen Hirtenstein (Oxford, 2000) provides a detailed discussion of the daily/nightly prayers for the week and a translation based on a critical edition still to be published. Throughout the present study, these daily/nightly prayers for the week attributed to Ibn 'Arabī are referred to as *Awrād*.

2. See Ahmed Ziya'uddin Gümüshanevi, *Majmū'at al-aḥzāb* (Istanbul, n.d.), 3 volumes: 1, pp. 2–83.

3. For example, *Majmū' ṣalawāt wa awrād sīdī Muhyī al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī raḍīya Al-lāhu 'anhu*, compiled by Muhammad Ibrahim Muhammad Salim (n.p., 2000) encompasses a group of *ṣalawāt* (prayers upon the Prophet) and the *Awrād*. Salim is author of *Ta'yīd al-ṣūfīya fī'l-majmū'a al-Ḥatīmīya*, where he also presents some of these prayers.

4. On the term *ḥizb* (pl. *aḥzāb*), which has come to be applied to any single group of supererogatory liturgical formulae, and its relation to *wird* (with which it is often interchangeable: for example I {see Appendix}, fol. 62b refers to *al-wird al-musammā bi'l-dawr al-a' lā* [The *wird* called...]; in Genel 43, fol. 29b, the text of the prayer is headed thus: *hādhihi al-awrād al-musammā bi'l-dawr al-a' lā* [These are the *awrād* that are called...]), see Constance E. Padwick, *Muslim Devotions: A Study of Prayer-Manuals in Common Use* (Oxford, 1996/1961), pp. 20–25; 'Hizb', EI², 3, pp. 513–514; 'Wird', EI², 11, pp. 209–210. On these and other terms commonly applied to liturgical texts (such as *du'ā* and *ḥirz*), see also Richard J. A. McGregor, 'A Sufi Legacy in Tunis: Prayer and the Shadhiliyya', *IJMES* 29 (1997), pp. 263–267; 'Du'a', EI², 2, pp. 617–618; below.

The term *dawr* (pl. *adwār*), signifying a turn or revolution, does not appear to be as widely used as *ḥizb/wird*: indeed, no other case of its use is known to the present author. In our sources the term *dawr* is applied both to our prayer as a whole, and to its individual verses. Thus some copies (e.g. K) describe each of the prayer's individual verses as a *dawr*, marking them in order as *al-dawr al-awwal*, *al-dawr al-thānī*, etc. D, pp. 6–7 elaborates on the significance of the term in the prayer's name thus: 'This prayer has been called *al-Dawr al-a' lā* because...it turns upon (*yadūru 'alā*) the Name of God the Ever-Exalted, from Whom all things begin and to Whom is their end... and because its secrets circulate with (*tadūru ma'a*) the one who reads it day and night, in secret and in public, awake and asleep, in good health and in sickness, in hard times

Introduction

and good, in this life, the hereafter and the *barzakh*...[It is] “the most elevated” *dawr* because of the abundant help and secrets it contains...’ The attempt by McGregor, ‘A Sufi Legacy in Tunis’, p. 266 to apply to the prayer an understanding of the term *dawr* derived from usage in the context of religious celebrations in contemporary Egypt, where it denotes a vocal piece drawn from colloquial poetry and involving a choral refrain, is unsustainable. Finally, it is notable that Yazma Bağışlar 2934, fol. 39b, describes the prayer as *Ḥizb al-dawr al-a’ lā*.

On the relative scholarly neglect of sufi prayer texts and recitation, see for example McGregor, ‘A Sufi Legacy in Tunis’, p. 255. It is remarkable that no follow-up study to Padwick’s classic work has yet been attempted.

5. Mahmud Mahmud al-Ghurab, *al-Ṭarīq ilā Allāh: al-shaykh wa’l-murīd min kalām al-Shaykh al-Akbar* (Damascus, 1991), p. 194 n. 1.

1

THE *DAWR* TODAY

Contemporary contexts

Like all liturgical texts originating with sufi figures, the *Dawr al-a' lā* effectively has a double life in the modern world. One of these, a continuation of its traditional past, is hidden, mediated through spiritual authority to permit its use exercised by the sufi shaykh to his disciple (*murīd*) typically in the context of a sufi order or *ṭarīqa* affiliation, and symbolised by the granting of a special authorisation (*ijāza*). The other is visible, open and public, a destiny arising out of the shattering of traditional systems and modes in the acquisition and transmission of religious knowledge in Muslim societies, and driven by the impacts of print and other modern information technologies alongside mass literacy.¹ The following examples illustrate this double life, and at the same time convey something of the diversity of contemporary users of the prayer. In general terms, while it appears in some of the many collections of prayers readily available across the Muslim world today, the *Dawr* is not as well known as other, comparable, prayers.²

Damascus

The prayer is recited collectively during certain of the open weekly gatherings devoted to calling down prayers and blessings upon the Prophet (*majālis al-ṣalāt 'alā al-nabī*³) held at the mosque adjacent to Ibn 'Arabī's mausoleum in the Shaykh Muhyi'l-Din neighbourhood, the Salihyya district, Damascus. During 2003, for example, it was read collectively at two of the eight *majālis* scheduled each week. One

was established quite recently and is held between noon (*ẓuhr*) and afternoon (*‘aṣr*) prayers on Friday:⁴ the other, which takes place before dawn (*fajr*) prayers on Saturday, is long-standing.⁵ The text of the prayer is available in the form of a photocopied sheet stored in the imams’ room in the mosque, from where it is occasionally distributed. It also appears for distribution from time to time in the form of a small pamphlet, often printed together with a hadith or Qur’anic verses.⁶ In addition, some of the larger pamphlets printed specifically for use in various *majālis* (and effectively the property of those *majālis*) encompass the prayer.⁷ Reaching a wider circulation, it appears in a popular collection of prayers compiled by former Mufti of Syria Muḥammad Abū’l-Yusr ‘Ābidīn (d.1981) and published by his heirs,⁸ and in a more recent collection distributed free, published as a joint venture between Turkish and Syrian publishers.⁹ It can also be found on the margin of editions of al-Jazūlī’s popular Sunni prayer manual *Dalā’il al-khayrāt* that circulate in Damascus.¹⁰ Finally, it is presented in one of the many privately published works of an Egyptian sufi shaykh and interpreter–disseminator of Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought long settled in Damascus, Maḥmūd al-Ghurāb.¹¹

The prayer is thus easily accessible to people of all backgrounds in Damascus. At the same time, in some circles there traditional sufi modes of transmission continue. The *ijāza* in this context is understood to unlock the prayer’s secrets for the *murīd* in a way that protects him from potential harm: it also ensures that these secrets remain the preserve of those suitably prepared to receive them. The *ijāza* often encompasses an instruction concerning the time and frequency of recitation. It may require the *murīd* to situate the prayer, whenever they recite it, within a cluster of other prayers and formulae, or involve making precise additions at certain points in the text. Specific to each *murīd*, such prescriptions are not arbitrary, and may indeed have been received by the shaykh in a dream or vision. Tailored to the *murīd*’s level, they may be changed as he advances on the spiritual journey.

The vitality of this mode of transmission can be illustrated through the practice of Aḥmad al-Ḥārūn (d.1962), widely recognised

in Damascene sufi circles as an important saint, and his prominent disciples.¹² For example, al-Ḥārūn granted an *ijāza* to his disciple Maḥmūd al-Ghurāb to read the prayer once every thirty-six hours (this *ijāza* also encompassed the *Awṛād*, Ibn ‘Arabī’s daily prayers).¹³ He gave an *ijāza* to his disciple Mamdūḥ al-Naṣṣ to read it once every twenty-four hours (again, in addition to the *Awṛād*). Al-Naṣṣ in turn gave his son Muḥammad Sāmīr an *ijāza* to read the prayer daily, this time preceded by al-Nawawī’s *Ḥizb* and followed by recitation of *sūrat* al-Fātiḥa for the souls of the Prophet, Ibn ‘Arabī and al-Ḥārūn.¹⁴

Such instructions for reading the prayer sometimes migrate out of the sphere of esoteric transmission to accompany printed copies, thereby becoming available for general application. For example, ‘Ābidīn prefaces the prayer with a note explaining that his grandfather had received a direct instruction from Ibn ‘Arabī (through a *karāma* or act of spiritual grace granted the two of them) to read it twice daily, once following the morning (*ṣubḥ*) prayer and again after the sunset one (*maghrib*). In the case of a specific matter of importance, Ibn ‘Arabī had instructed him to read it three times following the afternoon prayer.¹⁵ ‘Ābidīn also provides detailed instructions concerning what must be recited before and after the prayer.¹⁶

From the ulama to the illiterate, conviction of the prayer’s potency is widespread in Damascene sufi circles and among Ibn ‘Arabī’s local devotees, who attach themselves to his mosque.¹⁷ One such devotee attributes this potency to the fact that the prayer encompasses many Divine Names, another to its special quality as the summation of all of Ibn ‘Arabī’s teachings, indeed ‘the essence of his entire knowledge.’ Devotees believe that if the prayer is recited with right intention, absolute certainty of its power and the aim of pleasing God while repudiating the pull of this world, it can draw the reciter into the Prophet’s presence (*al-ḥaḍra al-Muḥammadiyya*): the Prophet then appears to them ‘through Ibn ‘Arabī’, especially in dreams. Drawing on their personal experiences, some point out that whoever reads the prayer with sincerity of heart and utter conviction while making a specific plea will have their wish granted. They relate how they read

it with the intention of seeking help in relation to concrete problems, and are always confident of a positive response. For example, one devotee tells how when he recites the prayer with this specific request in mind, Ibn 'Arabī appears to him in dreams and shows him how to solve practical problems at work that require technical knowledge in which he has no training. Whenever he is guided to solve a work problem in this way, he refuses payment for the job, for he attributes his success in it to Ibn 'Arabī's *baraka* or blessing, through the prayer, rather than his own effort. He relates with gratitude how he has developed a new career and improved his family's material circumstances through the help granted him in response to requests mediated through the prayer.

Istanbul

The earliest printed versions of the prayer appeared in Istanbul during the late 19th century, in Gümüşhanevi's *Majmū'at al-aḥzāb*¹⁸ and the *Dalā'il al-khayrāt*,¹⁹ for example. The first modern Turkish transliteration of the prayer was published in 1998 by a publishing company owned by a devotee of Ibn 'Arabī. This small booklet also provides the Arabic text and a clarification of the prayer's meanings in Turkish.²⁰ By 2004, more than thirty thousand copies had been printed, distributed free throughout Turkey in response to internet requests, via bookshops, in mail-shots, etc. It is reprinted every few months to meet demand, and people of all kinds order and read it, including many who are outwardly 'çok-modern'.

While the prayer thus circulates openly in print, it is also still transmitted through *ijāza* granting in 'hidden' sufi circles in Istanbul. For example the Naqshbandi Shaykh Ahmed Yivlik (d.2001) granted *ijāzas* to read the prayer to certain of his own disciples and to other sufis in Istanbul.²¹ For some his instruction was to read it twice a day, in certain cases following the *Awṛād*; for others, on its own. His own *ijāza* to read the prayer is connected to a line of Naqshbandi shaykhs.²²

The United Kingdom

During the late 1960s, a copy of the prayer was brought to London by Bulent Rauf (d.1987), a western-educated descendant of the Ottoman elite. Rauf was the great-grandson of Ismail Pasha (d.1895), khedive of Egypt from 1863 to 1879.²³ Ismail's daughter, Rauf's maternal grandmother, was Princess Fatma Hanim (b.1850), who died some time after the end of World War I.²⁴ Fatma Hanim had commissioned a copy of the prayer to be made for her by the 'Head Calligrapher', apparently in AH 1341/1922–23 CE: it was bound in red leather and embellished with gold. After she died, it came into her grandson's possession.

Rauf became the pivotal figure in a new religious movement that emerged under the name 'Beshara' in the south of England during the early 1970s. In response to the requests of young counterculture seekers interested in the spirituality of 'the east', he conveyed the teaching of Ibn 'Arabī as the basis of a monistic, experiential and supra-religious spirituality. He designed courses in 'esoteric education' aiming at self-knowledge, which were eventually offered in dedicated schools established by the movement.²⁵ Some of the early students noticed Fatma Hanim's beautiful copy of the *Dawr* in Rauf's possession, and his printed copy of the *Awrād*. They enquired whether these prayers could be made available in transliteration. Rauf agreed and assigned two students to the task, one of whom could read Arabic. This student rendered the text into Hebrew transliteration (his native tongue), and from that into English transliteration (they had no knowledge of a transliteration system for Arabic). Rauf corrected and completed the text with diacritical marks, and it was distributed to all involved in Beshara. He did not give guidelines for its recitation, but emphasised its protective effect. This text was published in 1981 alongside the original by the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society (MIAS), which had been established during the mid-1970s by some of those involved in Beshara.²⁶ The inclusion of the phonetic English transliteration is specifically aimed

at the non-Arabic-speaking Beshara constituency (which today has international extent) and others unable to read the Arabic original, making it possible for them to recite the text.²⁷ The MIAS website suggests how the prayer can be used for the purposes of protection: ‘this prayer...protects its recipient. In microfiche form, it is frequently carried as an amulet or displayed in a significant place.’²⁸ Many involved in Beshara wear the microfiche form in a silver encasement on a neck-chain: they also position it above the inside of a main door at home. Sometimes a framed photocopy of the first page of the prayer is displayed. Some read the prayer regularly, while others resort to it in times of difficulty or to ward off perceived evil.

Notes

1. The modern period has witnessed the widening accessibility of sufi resources beyond the initiated and prepared, a trend that has accelerated since the late 20th century. See for example Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufi Thought and its Reconstruction, in Suha Taji-Farouki and Basheer M. Nafi, eds., *Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century* (London, 2004), pp.123–124; Garbi Schmidt, Sufi Charisma on the Internet, in David Westerlund, ed., *Sufism in Europe and North America* (London, 2004), pp. 109–126.

On the general impacts of print (and later mass education, literacy and new media) on traditional notions of religious authority and on systems for learning and transmitting religious knowledge, see for example Francis Robinson, ‘Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print’, *Modern Asian Studies* 27: 1 (1993), pp.229–251; Dale F. Eickelman, The Art of Memory: Islamic Education and its Social Reproduction, in Juan I. Cole, ed., *Comparing Muslim Societies: Knowledge and the State in a World Civilization* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1992), pp.97–132; idem, Islamic Religious Commentary and Lesson Circles: Is there a Copernican Revolution?, in G. W. Most, ed., *Commentaries {Kommentar}* (Göttingen, 1999), pp. 121–146.

While our interest here is in the contemporary situation, it should be noted that very few of the liturgical texts associated with the *ṭarīqas* remained confined to their membership even in pre-modern times.

2. Padwick’s survey of ‘popular’ prayer manuals gathered from cities across the Muslim world during the 1950s encompasses the *Dawr*, but she does not consider it among their best-known contents. In addition to the examples below, it appears in the popular prayer collection *Manba’ al-sa’ādāt*, p. 255, published in Beirut: see McGregor, ‘A Sufi Legacy in Tunis’, p. 275 n. 63. Our examples do not encompass the world of Shi’i Islam, but we would point out that the prayer appears to be less widely known and used there than in Sunni contexts.

3. On the *ṣalawāt* or *taṣliya*, the practice of calling down prayers and blessings upon the Prophet, see Annemarie Schimmel, *And Muhammad is His Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1985), pp. 92 ff; Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, pp. 152 ff.

4. Held at a time when families gather at home for lunch after the Friday prayer, attendance at this *majlis* (established in 2001) is not substantial. During February 2003, the *majlis* was led by Muḥammad Amīn ‘Āshūr, a disciple of the revered Shadhili Aḥmad al-Ḥabbāl al-Rifā’ī. Beginning immediately after the end of the *khaṭīb*’s lesson, it opened with the calling down of peace and blessings upon the Prophet. A pamphlet was distributed: *Ṣalawāt ‘alā al-nabī al-karīm sayyidinā rasūl Allāh li’l-shaykh Aḥmad al-Dardayrī al-Khawātī*. ‘Āshūr called for recitation of *sūrat* al-Fātiḥa for the soul of Ibn ‘Arabī, and the assembly proceeded to recite the *Dawr*; printed in the pamphlet’s last few pages, at considerable speed. On completing this, the *majlis* re-

cited *sūrat* al-Fātiḥa, a *ṣalawāt* by Aḥmad al-Dardayrī al-Khalwatī, al-Fātiḥa again, and *Manzūmat asmā' Allāh al-ḥusnā al-Dardayrīya*. A substantial amount of text was completed in forty minutes. 'Āshūr recited al-Fātiḥa and asked those present to recite it for the benefit of certain individuals in need. He then led the *majlis* in reading *sūrat* Yā Sīn. Thereafter, the *tahlīl* (*lā ilāha illā Allāh*) was repeated. Two *majlis* 'servants' arrived with large bags of bread, which they began to distribute, marking the end of the *majlis*. 'Āshūr continued to call down peace and blessings upon the Prophet followed by spontaneous supplication, in which he asked God to grant victory to the Muslims over those who aggress against them, to heal the sick, to forgive those who have transgressed, and to have mercy upon the dead. The congregation affirmed his emotional prayers with '*āmīn*' at each pause. Reflecting the concerns of the hour, he asked God to destroy enemy planes, to grant victory to the Palestinians, and to protect Syria, using al-Fātiḥa as an adjuration throughout. He asked God to accept the *majlis* through the standing of the prophets, their wives and mothers, and the companions and saints, 'especially those at whose doorsteps we sit – Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn, and Shaykh al-Nābulusī – through their *baraka* and *karāmāt*, achieved through Allāh Himself.' He asked God to compensate anyone who had spent towards the *majlis* and requested donations for an unnamed person in difficult circumstances.

5. According to one of the mosque imams, this *majlis* – set apart from all others by recitation of Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī's *Wird al-saḥar* (known also as *al-Faṭḥ al-qudsī wa'l-kashf al-unsī*), was established over seventy years ago by the Rifa'i Hāshim Abū Ṭawq (1847–1962). According to Muhammad Mutī' al-Hafiz and Nizar Abaza, *Ta'rīkh 'ulamā' Dimashq fī'l-qarn al-rābi'* '*ashar al-hijrī*' (Damascus, 1986), 2, p. 769, Abū Ṭawq personally led recitation of *Wird al-saḥar* at the mosque every Saturday before *fajr* for forty-five years. Some local sources hold that this *majlis* was instituted by Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī himself together with 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, and suggest that it has been held there continuously since. In 1960, Abū Ṭawq handed responsibility for the *majlis* to Salīm al-'Amm, who had committed himself to the mosque in 1942.

Al-'Amm opened a *majlis* during February 2003 with recitation of al-Fātiḥa, Qur'anic verses, supplication and the *istighfār* (forgiveness) formula. A booklet was distributed: *Majmū' al-awrād al-kabīr: yashtamil 'alā al-ma'thūr 'an al-a'imma wa'l-aqtāb min al-ṣalawāt 'alā al-nabī wa'l-awrād wa'l-ad'iya wa'l-adhkār wa'l-aḥzāb wa'l-istighfārāt*. Al-'Amm led the *majlis* in reciting with great beauty *Wird al-saḥar*, with its repetitions of Divine Names and lyrical flourishes. At a transitional point, the *majlis* 'servant' distributed halva sandwiches. Al-'Amm launched into spontaneous, at times tearful, supplication. He called for peace upon the Prophet and his companions, ulama, *muḥaddithūn*, and all people of faith. Salams were addressed to the Prophet, referring to the fact that the *majlis* was taking place in his presence, and to Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī. After further supplication, recitation of al-Fātiḥa and the calling down of blessings upon the prophet, he returned to the *wird*. Having completed it, he repeated the *tahlīl* alone, then followed each time by an emphatic 'Lord have mercy on me!' or 'Lord forgive me!' After further supplication, he led those gathered in reciting the

Dawr al-a' lā at some speed. At its end, he emphasised to the *majlis* the importance of reading the *Dawr* frequently, at least once a day. With this the *majlis* ended, as the time for the dawn *adhān* approached.

6. For example, in 2003 it appeared in a small booklet: *al-Dawr al-a' lā li-sīdī sulṭān al-ʿarīfīn wa ʿumdat al-mukāshifīn wa zubdat al-wāṣilīn wa khātimat al-awliyāʾ al-muḥaqqiqīn, al-shaykh al-akbar mawlānā Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-ʿArabī, raḍiya Allāh taʿālā ʿanhu wa arḍāhu*. It is prefaced by a hadith that stresses the potency of certain Qurʾanic formulae when repeated, and followed by a poem in praise of Ibn ʿArabī by local poet Aḥmad al-Zarrūq (d.1955: on him see Hafiz and Abaza, *Taʾrīkh ʿulamāʾ Dimashq*, 3, pp.257–259), another hadith (underlining the importance of avoiding the prohibited), the end of the Thursday morning prayer from the *Awṛād* attributed to Ibn ʿArabī but without explicit identification of its origin, and finally a *ṣalawāt* by Aḥmad al-Badawī.

7. For example, in the two pamphlets mentioned in notes 5–6 above, on pp. 185–193 of *Majmūʾ al-awṛād al-kabīr*. The pamphlet *Ṣalawāt ʿalā al-nabī al-karīm sayyidinā rasūl Allāh liʾl-shaykh Aḥmad al-Dardayrī al-Khalwatī* begins with an open permission to read the *ṣalawāt* of al-Dardayrī (tracing back his Khalwati initiation to Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī and then Muḥammad b. Sālīm al-Ḥifnāwī). The *ṣalawāt* is followed by *sūrat Yā Sīn*, the *Dawr* and additional *ṣalawāt*. Pamphlets such as these two carry a statement that they are a *waqf* of the *majlis*.

8. *Al-Awṛād al-dāʾima maʿa al-ṣalawāt al-qāʾima*, collected and arranged by Muhammad Abuʾl-Yusr ʿAbidin, ed. shaykh Bashir al-Bari, former Mufti of Damascus, 4th edn. (Damascus, 1991), pp. 38–45. On ʿAbidin, see Hafiz and Abaza, *Taʾrīkh ʿulamāʾ Dimashq*, 2, pp.968–973. According to sources in Damascus who knew him, he advised people to read some of Ibn ʿArabīʾ writings daily, suggesting specifically *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya*.

9. *Awṛād usbūʿiya liʾl-shaykh al-ʿarīf Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī* (Istanbul and Damascus, n.d.), pp.60–66, published by Kitsan (Istanbul) and Dar al-Bayruti (Damascus). On Kitsan and for further details concerning the genesis of this publication, see below.

10. For example, Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Jazūlī, *Dalāʾ il al-khayrāt wa yalīhi qaṣīdat al-burda wa qaṣīdat al-munfarija [wa bi-hāmishihi majmūʾat al-awṛād waʾl-aḥzāb waʾl-adʿiya waʾl-istighāthāt]*, intro., Salah al-Din Abuʾl-Jihad Nakahmayy (Aleppo, 1420), on the margin of pp.241–251: it is among a collection of prayers independent of the *Dalāʾ il*, added to the text when it was first printed.

11. Al-Ghurab, *al-Tarīq ilā Allāh*, pp.194–197. Although al-Ghurab suggests that this is a critical edition he does not indicate which or how many manuscripts he used and gives very few variants. (He also presents a critical edition of the *Awṛād*, for which he again provides little detail on the manuscript base used. See pp.173–193.) Born in Tanta in 1922, al-Ghurab settled in Damascus during the 1950s: on him see further below. For a partial list of his publications, see Ahmad b. Muhammad Ghunaym, *al-ʿArīf biʾllāh al-shaykh Aḥmad al-Hārūn: siratuhu wa karāmātuhu* (Damascus, 1992), p.67 n.1.

12. Born in al-Salihiyya, Damascus in 1900, al-Ḥārūn worked for many years as a stonemason. He acquired literacy skills late in life, and dedicated himself to studying and writing on the natural sciences and issues of faith. Widely circulating stories of his *karāmāt* centre on his ability to cure the sick. He reportedly had a very close relationship to Ibn ‘Arabī (his writings include a commentary on *K. Mā lā yu’awwal ‘alayhi*). Al-Ḥārūn’s relationships with his own disciples had no particular *ṭarīqa* framework. On him see Ghunaym, *al-‘Arif bi’llāh al-shaykh Aḥmad al-Ḥārūn*; Hafiz and Abaza, *Ta’rīkh ‘ulamā’ Dimashq*, 2, pp. 753–762; ‘Izzat Hasriya, *al-shaykh Arslān al-Dimashqī wa fīhi lamḥa ‘an al-shaykh Aḥmad al-Ḥārūn* (n.p., 1965), pp. 163–180.

13. See al-Ghurab, *al-Ṭarīq ilā Allāh*, p. 194. Al-Ghurāb first encountered al-Ḥārūn in 1955 and remained with him until his death (interview with al-Ghurāb, Damascus, 2003). For the details of their relationship and perceptions of al-Ghurāb as al-Ḥārūn’s *khalīfa*, see Suha Taji-Farouki, *At the Resting-place of the Seal of Saints: Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī and his Mausoleum-Mosque Complex in Contemporary Damascus* (forthcoming).

14. Interview with Muḥammad Sāmīr al-Naṣṣ (Damascus, 2004): al-Naṣṣ is a US-trained medical doctor, presently imam in Nafidh Mosque and *fiqh* teacher at Ma’had al-Fath. A recognised expert in the readings and recitation of the Qur’an (he teaches recitation at the Shaykh Muḥyī’l-Dīn Mosque), he is author of *al-Wasīla ilā fahm ḥaqīqat al-tawassul* (Damascus, 2003) and *Mafhūm al-bid’a bayna al-ḏīq wa’l-sa’a* (Damascus, 2002). On him see <http://www.as-shifa.org.uk/ulum/shaykhsamir.htm> and <http://www.ihyaafoundation.com/index.php?page=scholars#samir>. Note that al-Nawawī composed a daily *wird* and *K. al-Adhkār al-yawmīya wa’l-laylīya*.

A separate example arises in the Shadhili Muḥammad al-Ḥāshimī al-Jazā’irī {al-Tilimsānī} (d.1961) granting an *ijāza* to read the prayer to the Rifa’i Muḥammad al-Durra, who granted it to his son, Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Durra, presently imam at the al-Talha wa’l-Zubayr Mosque in ‘Ayn Tarma on the outskirts of Damascus. Al-Durra has been active in publishing Rifa’i texts: for example, *Mi’rāj al-wuṣūl ilā ḥaḍarāt al-riḍā wa’l-qabūl bi-tawajjuhāt sādātīnā al-sāda anjāl al-marḥūm al-sayyid Tāj al-Dīn al-Ṣayyādī* (Damascus, 1418) (interview with al-Durra, Damascus, 2004). On al-Ḥāshimī, see Hafiz and Abaza, *Ta’rīkh ‘ulamā’ Dimashq*, 2, pp. 747–751.

15. *Al-Awrād al-dā’ima ma’a al-ṣalawāt al-qā’ima*, p. 38.

16. Ibid., pp. 38–39; 45. The supplicant must first recite al-Fātiḥa with the *basmala* four times, each with the same breath, then the first three verses of *sūrat al-An’ām*, then a specific *ṣalawāt* formula seven times, followed by a specific prologue to the *Dawr*. After completing the *Dawr*, he must recite *sūrat al-Inshirāḥ* three times followed by another *ṣalawāt*, completing by reciting al-Fātiḥa for the Prophet and Ibn ‘Arabī. Historical examples of such recommendations are detailed below.

17. This paragraph draws on interviews in Damascus in 2003–04.

18. Gümüṣhanevi became attached to Abdülhamid II’s court and served his regime and pan-Islamic policies. On him see Alexander Knysh, *Islamic Mysticism: A Short History* (Leiden, 2000), p. 228; Butrus Abu-Manneh, Shaykh Ahmed Ziya’uddin Gümüṣhanevi and the Ziya’i-Khalidi Sub-order, in Frederick de Jong, ed., *Shia Islam*,

Sects and Sufism: Historical Dimensions, Religious Practice and Methodological Considerations (Utrecht, 1992), pp. 105–117.

19. For example: Reşid Efendi 1135 (AH 1288), Düğümlü Baba 500 (AH 1285), Nafiz Paşa 762 (AH 1285), Hayri Abdullah Efendi 230 (AH 1302). In the first three printings it is pp. 197–203, in the last one, pp. 193–199. In all cases, the text of the *Hizb* of al-Nawawī is on the margin of the *Dawr*, and it is followed by *al-qaşida al-munfarija*. In currency in Istanbul today is a facsimile reprint of Hayri Abdullah Efendi 230 as *Delâil-i-Hayrat: Salâvât-i-Şerifler* (Istanbul, n.d.). Not all more recent editions of the *Dalâ’ il* printed in Istanbul incorporate the prayer. For example, it appears in *Delâilü’l-Hayrat ve Şevârikü’l Envâr fî zikri’s-salâti ale’n-nebiyyi’l-muhtâr: Delâilü’l-Hayrat ve Tercümesi* (Istanbul, n.d.), pp. 288–301, but not in *Delâil’ül Hayrât ve Şevârik’ul Envâr* (Istanbul, n.d.). Both are pocket versions. The version incorporating the prayer is published (by Yasin Yayinevi) and sold within the orthodox Naqshbandi neighbourhood of Çarşamba in the Fatih district.

20. *Şeyh’ül Ekber Muhyiddîn Ibn’ül Arabî (K. S.) Özel Dua’si “Hizb-ud’Devr’ul A’lâ”: Orjinali, Türkçe okunuşu ve Mânâsi* (Istanbul, n.d.). The translator is Kemal Osmanbey, a Syrian of Turkish origin, his grandfather having been an official at the court of Sultan Abdülaziz who was granted lands in Syria. Resident in Istanbul since 1988, Osmanbey brought a copy of the prayer from the Shaykh Muhyi’l-Din Mosque for Remzi Gökner, owner of Kitsan publishers. They agreed that Osmanbey would translate it (possibly with the help of Gökner’s wife Şukran Gökner: see below) and Kitsan would publish it. Osmanbey is a medical doctor who currently practises acupuncture. He is particularly interested in the spirit world: his publications include *Ruh Aleminde bir Seyahat* (Istanbul, 1995) and *Haqa’iq ‘an tanâsukh al-arwâh wa’l-ḥassa al-sâdisa* (Beirut, 2002). Kitsan, established by Gökner in 1980, specialises in sufi books: its publications include a few Turkish translations of works attributed to Ibn ‘Arabî such as *Tuhfe’tüs Sefere* and *Mevaki’un Nücüm*. On Kitsan, see <http://www.kitsan.com>.

21. Yivlik, who worked as a civil servant, has been described by close disciples as ‘a spiritual son and lover of Ibn ‘Arabî’. According to one disciple, he read continuously from the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* and *al-Futūḥât al-Makkîya* and made frequent visits to Ibn ‘Arabî’s tomb in Damascus. While himself not a scholar, he has rendered at least one sufi work into modern Turkish: Selim Divane, *Miftah-u müşkilât’ül-ârifîn âdâb-u tariki’l-vâsilîn*, tr. from Ottoman by Ahmed Sadik Yivlik (Istanbul, 1998). Yivlik led a circle of about twenty disciples in Istanbul reading translations of Ibn ‘Arabî’s works, including some non-Turks and illiterates. Gökner’s son and wife Şukran were among his close disciples, his wife having personally funded the joint Kitsan–Dar al-Bayruti publication *Awrad usbū’îya li’l-shaykh al-‘arif Muhyi’l-Dîn Ibn ‘Arabî* detailed above. One thousand copies were published, the majority distributed free in Damascus in 2004, the remainder in Istanbul. Dar al-Bayruti has planned a reprint, which Kitsan has stipulated must also be distributed free. The dedication in the booklet points to the relationship between Şukran Gökner, Yivlik and Ibn ‘Arabî. She writes: ‘To Ahmed Sadiq Yivlik, who made known to me the Shaykh al-Akbar’s

stature. May God sanctify his secret and cause him to live in His Spacious Gardens with the Shaykh al-Akbar.' Şukran Göknaar has herself published a few titles with Kitsan, including *Rüya Tabirleri*. She intends to facilitate production of a Turkish version of the *Awrad*.

22. His shaykh 'Ali Bahjat Efendi received it from the latter's shaykh Hayrullah Efendi, who received it from his shaykh Ali Bahjat Efendi Ekber. Thanks are due to Mahmud Kiliç for this information.

23. A controversial figure in Egyptian history seen either as an extravagant incompetent or a far-sighted if unlucky modernizer, Ismail eventually became unpopular both at home and with the European powers, and was finally deposed by Sultan Abdülhamid under European pressure. See M. E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792–1923* (London and New York, 1987), pp. 155–157; 214–215; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (Cambridge, 1989), passim. See also Family Tree of Mehmet Ali Bulent Rauf, in Bulent Rauf, *The Last Sultans*, ed. Meral Arim and Judy Kearns (Cheltenham, 1995).

24. See The Child across Time, in Bulent Rauf, *Addresses II* (Roxburgh, Scotland, 2001), p. 90. She was the sister of Mehmet Tevfik Pasha, who succeeded his father Ismail as khedive, and of Ahmet Fuad I Pasha, who would become the first king of Egypt.

Fatma Hanim appears to have had a special connection with the Celvetiyye, assuming responsibility with her daughter for restoring the mausoleum-mosque complex of the Celveti saint and effectively the first shaykh of the *ṭarīqa* Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi (d.1628) in Üsküdar, Istanbul, after it was damaged in a thunderstorm in 1910. On this complex see Raymond Lifchez, The Lodges of Istanbul, in Lifchez, ed., *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey* (Berkeley, LA and London, 1992), pp. 113–117. On her pivotal role in the renovation (which took place some years after the damage was inflicted) and the gifts and donations she made, see H. Kamil Yilmaz, *Azîz Mahmûd Hüdâyî: Hayati, Eserleri, Tarîkati* (Istanbul, 1999), p. 262 and n. 20; Kemaleddin Şenocak, *Kutbu'l-ârifîn Seyyid Azîz Mahmûd Hüdâyî (K. S.)* (Istanbul, 1970) p. 30 n. 2.

25. For a comprehensive study of the movement and associated figures see Suha Taji-Farouki, *Beshara and Ibn 'Arabî: A Movement of Sufi Spirituality in the Modern World* (forthcoming).

26. *The Hizbu-l Wiqāyah of Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi* (MIAS, Oxford); reprinted 2003. The *Awrad* were published first in 1979 as Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi, *Wird* (MIAS, Oxford); reprinted 1988.

27. See <http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/Publications.html>.

28. Ibid.

2

A PRAYER ACROSS TIME

Historical dimensions

Based on the manuscript collection in the Suleymaniye Library (Istanbul), which holds over forty distinct copies, it is possible to construct a picture of the transmission, presentation and use of the *Dawr* during the last four hundred years.¹ Around a half of these copies are explicitly dated, or can be dated approximately based on contextual information: the earliest dates from the late 11th/17th century, the greatest number from the 13th/19th century.² The prayer appears in a variety of settings. For example there are seven commentaries, four in Arabic and three in Ottoman Turkish, the earliest probably from the late 12th/18th century.³ Beautiful individual copies bound alone or with another short prayer and embellished with gold were most likely produced at the request of important figures (like that brought to London by Rauf).⁴ The *Dawr* sometimes appears as the only prayer alongside several non-devotional works, of which some may also be attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī.⁵ It is found in compilations devoted exclusively to prayers and prayer-commentaries, including at times other prayers attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī,⁶ and other kinds of devotional text.⁷ It appears also in collections of prayers and non-devotional tracts, the latter sometimes attributed to figures associated with the school of Ibn ‘Arabī.⁸ There are copies of the prayer in personal notebooks that hold an intimate record of an individual’s favourite poetic verses, prayers, Qur’anic verses and fragments from the works of various Islamic authorities, in addition to spiritual reflections, supplications, talismans, numerological codes and short devotional texts.⁹


The repeated copying of the prayer in diverse settings bears


witness to its circulation and use over the last four hundred years.¹⁰ Pointing to its constituency of readers during the closing years of Ottoman rule, the Suleymaniye copies have been drawn from collections gathered from *tekkes* and *dergas* associated with diverse *ṭarīqas* (such as Şazeli and Dügümlü Baba), madrasas attached to mosques, pashas' collections and collections endowed by sultans. The earlier copies provide some indication of the prayer's users four hundred years ago, but chains of transmission or authorities (*sanad*, pl. *asnād*)¹¹ attached to seven copies make it possible to trace the history of its use and transmission beyond the date of our earliest copy to the time of its author. These chains illuminate two aspects in the prayer's transmission. Vertically, they identify key figures in its passage from generation to generation, while suggesting that it has indeed been in continuous use in every generation since its author's day. Horizontally, the chains elucidate the circles within which the prayer was disseminated, pointing to their geographical loci, *ṭarīqa* affiliations and intellectual orientations and identifying figures who served as a nexus between different circles within the larger network. We give below biographical information concerning figures in six chains,¹² arranged by century from the earliest to the most recent. The treatment does not aspire to be exhaustive, but focuses on significant historical figures.¹³ The chains themselves are presented as they appear in our sources in an Appendix. A diagram of these chains is also provided below, using readily identifiable names as elaborated in the biographical notes. After each name in these notes, the chain(s) in which the figures concerned appear are identified by a capital letter, for ease of location in terms of sources (as set out in the Appendix), and in the diagram (overleaf).

Any discussion of such chains must pay due attention to the cultural and social setting from which they emanate, with its associated practices and priorities. With this in mind, they can be investigated in terms of the plausibility of their individual links, encompassing chronology and the circumstances of the *ijāza* implicit within and underpinning each link.¹⁴ We attempt such an investigation below. Finally, we consider how the picture that emerges from these chains

Historical dimensions

can illuminate important trends and tendencies in Islamic culture and thought during specific historical periods.





Chains of Transmission of *al-Dawr al-a'la*

Transmitters of the prayer

7th century AH

Sa‘d al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī
{E} [d.656/1258]

The second son of Ibn ‘Arabī; born in Malatya in AH 618. He left an important diwan. A student of hadith, he visited Cairo and lived in Aleppo.¹⁵

Raḍī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. M b. Ibrāhīm b. Abū Bakr b. M
al-Ṭabarī al-Makkī {D} [d.722/1322]

Also known as al-Raḍī al-Ṭabarī and Raḍī al-Dīn Abū Ishāq, a Shafi‘i born in AH 636 who held the position of imam at the Maqām Ibrāhīm (‘Station of Abraham’) in Mecca.¹⁶ Son of a shari-fian (Husayni) family respected far and wide for its learning and one of the oldest of the established families in Mecca (Raḍī al-Dīn’s ancestor settled there c.570), well-connected and with top-ranking positions of *qāḍī* (judge), imam, mufti, *khaṭīb* (preacher) and teacher passing from generation to generation. Writing in the 17th century, the biographer al-Muḥibbī reported that from 673/1274 the family had held the imamate of the Maqām Ibrāhīm exclusively and continuously.¹⁷ Raḍī al-Dīn studied under prominent figures and became learned in the Shafi‘i *madhhab* (school of law). He was outstanding in piety, humbleness and charitableness, and never left the Hijaz.¹⁸ The many examples listed by the biographer Ibn al-‘Irāqī suggest that he was a significant figure in transmitting works to his contemporaries, including many visitors to Mecca.¹⁹

Abū Muḥammad al-Qāsim b. Muẓaffar b. Maḥmūd b. Tāj al-
Umanā’ Aḥmad Ibn ‘Asākir {A}

A member of the Banū ‘Asākir clan, which held an important position in Damascus during AH 470–660 and produced a dynasty of Shafi‘i

scholars.²⁰ He appears under the full name given here as having received an *ijāza* from Ibn ‘Arabī for the latter’s *K. al-Mu’ashsharāt al-maymūna*.²¹ According to Yahya, he also appears in a chain attached to *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* (where his name is given as Abū Muḥammad al-Qāsim b. al-Muẓaffar b. Muḥammad al-Ṭabīb), for which he also received an *ijāza* directly from the author.²² In a collection in his hand of works by Ibn ‘Arabī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī, al-Qāsim refers to the latter in terms suggesting he may have been among Qūnawī’s disciples.²³ Among those to whom he gave *ijāzas* is **Burhān al-Dīn al-Tanūkhī**.²⁴

8th century AH

Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Mu’min b. Khalaf al-Dimyātī

{E} [d.705/1306]

Born in AH 613, an Egyptian hadith scholar and one of the most important figures in hadith transmission of the last third of the 7th century AH. He is best known for his *mu’jam shuyūkh* or dictionary of authorities. This gives the names of his shaykhs and those he met and from whom he received works in many fields, providing a record of hadith and other texts collected during numerous travels in Egypt, the Hijaz, Iraq and Syria.²⁵ His first visit to Syria was in 645. He returned to the north of the country on either side of a visit to Baghdad in 650, and between late 654 and late 656 he stayed several times (or possibly settled continuously) in Damascus.²⁶ The *mu’jam* includes **Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Ibn al-‘Arabī Sa’d al-Dīn al-Ṭā’ī al-Dimashqī**.²⁷

al-Nūr/Nūr al-Dīn Abū’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. ‘Umar b. Abū Bakr al-Wānī [al-Khilāṭī al-Ṣūfī] {F} [d.727/1327]

Born in c.635 or 637 and known as Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, he settled in Egypt. Two chains attached to *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* give him transmitting from Ibn ‘Arabī and to **Ismā‘īl al-Jabartī**.²⁸ The *silsila* (chain of transmission) of the *khirqā akbarīya* (akbarian mantle) as given

by Muḥammad Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī also passes from Ibn ‘Arabī to him and from him to Ismā‘īl al-Jabartī.²⁹ He appears in the *ma‘ājim shuyūkh* of certain of his contemporaries.³⁰ He took works from various well-known authorities and was celebrated for his teaching and transmission of hadith, in which he connected young to old during his long life (he died aged 92).³¹

Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. Yūsuf b. Idrīs al Kurdī al-Ḥarāwī³² {E} [d.781/1379]

Born in Dimyat, his date of birth is given as AH 696/7 (or 687 or 701).³³ Through the agency of his maternal uncle ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Dimyātī, he audited works from **Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Mu‘min b. Khalaf al-Dimyātī** (who died when Nāṣir al-Dīn was eight years old).³⁴ He also received *ijāzas* from other shaykhs in Cairo. He transmitted to hadith scholars, linked young to old through his long life, and became unrivalled in this field. People sought him out to audit works and acquire *samā’s* (certificates of audition) from him (the biographer Ibn al-‘Irāqī reports that he studied under him many works received from al-Dimyātī through *ijāzas*). He was a soldier who served as one of the sultan’s axe-bearers (and was thus known as al-Ṭabardār). He was well known for his piety, probity and love of the good. He transmitted to **Muḥammad b. Muqbil al-Ḥalabī**.³⁵

9th century AH

Burhān al-Dīn Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. Sa’īd al-Tanūkhī al-Ba’lī³⁶ {A} [d.800/1398]

Known as al-Burhān al-Shāmī, he was born in Damascus in AH 709 and grew up there, but later settled in Cairo (his family originated from Ba’l [Ba’albek]). He received *ijāzas* from over three hundred (by some accounts nearly four hundred) authorities, including **al-Qāsim Ibn ‘Asākir**. He studied hadith, *fiqh* or jurisprudence (in Hama, Aleppo and Cairo as well as other locations) and Qur’an readings/recitation, and was authorised to teach and issue

legal opinions. A highly respected scholar, he became 'shaykh of Egypt' both in hadith transmission and Qur'an readings. Among the many who studied under and transmitted works from him was **Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī**, who reports that he spent a long time in close companionship with him (and experienced 'the *baraka* of his supplication'). Ibn Ḥajar detailed hadiths narrated by those listed in al-Tanūkhī's *mu'jam*, and developed certain of al-Tanūkhī's works on hadith.³⁷ The historian and biographer Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d.748/1352) also studied under al-Tanūkhī and transmitted hadith from him. When al-Tanūkhī lost his sight, he became known as al-Burhān al-Shāmī 'the Blind'.³⁸

Ismā'īl al-Jabartī al-Zabīdī {F} [d.806/1404]

Charismatic sufi shaykh and ardent follower of Ibn 'Arabī. Together with his disciple 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī (d.832/1429), he disseminated the works of Ibn 'Arabī in Zabid, giving rise to a sufi movement in Rasulid Yemen committed to his teachings and those of his school.³⁹

al-Jamāl/Jamāl al-Dīn [Abū'l-Mahāsīn] Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm [b. Aḥmad b. Abū Bakr] al-Murshidī [al-Makkī] {D}

Meccan hadith scholar who transmitted works in hadith to 'Umar Ibn Fahd al-Makkī.⁴⁰

Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī {A} [d.852/1448]

Prominent Egyptian hadith scholar (author of *Fath al-bārī*, the great commentary on the *Saḥīḥ*), biographer and Shafī'i mufti; often regarded as the greatest 'ālim (scholar) of his generation, he held the position of Chief Judge of Egypt and Syria for a total of twenty-one years.⁴¹ As noted above, he transmitted from **al-Tanūkhī**. In evaluating his attitude towards Ibn 'Arabī Knysh describes him as an adversary and critic,⁴² but suggests at the same time that, in spite of some biographers' attempts to depict him as an implacable enemy, Ibn Ḥajar presented the widest possible spectrum of opinions on Ibn 'Arabī and avoided any clear-cut judgement of heresy or unbelief.

On this basis, he concludes that his position can be described as ‘agnostic’.⁴³ Ibn Ḥajar’s writings were for some time to come perhaps the last to present a favourable view of Ibn Taymīya outside of strict Hanbali circles (by the mid-14th century the salafi view of Islam as articulated by Ibn Taymīya was largely eclipsed by the Ash‘ari–sufi ulama establishment, which dominated the Sunni cultural milieu).⁴⁴

Muḥammad Abū’l-Faṭḥ b. Abū Bakr [Zayn al-Dīn/al-Zayn] al-Marāghī [Sharaf al-Dīn al-Qurashī al-Makkī] {F} [d.859/1455]
Known as al-Marāghī al-ṣaghīr (‘the younger’), born in Medina in AH 775, he was a *faqīh* (jurist) and hadith scholar who left a number of works and appears in many chains of transmission. According to one of them, he transmitted Ibn Arabī’s works and all that he transmitted to **Zakariyā al-Anṣārī**. He transmitted his *fihris* (bibliography) to ‘**Umar b. Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Fahd**’.⁴⁵ He died in Mecca and has been described as a saint.⁴⁶

Muḥammad b. Muqbil al-Ḥalabī al-Ṣīrafī {E} [d.870/1466]
A highly important hadith transmitter (described as *musnid al-dunyā fī ‘aṣrihi*, ‘the most important hadith transmitter on earth in his time’), as the last remaining person to have transmitted from al-Fakhr Ibn al-Bukhārī’s last living companion (al-Ṣalāḥ M b. Ibrāhīm b. Abū ‘Umar al-Maqdisī al-Ṣāliḥī al-Ḥanbalī), and thus from al-Fakhr himself through a single intermediary.⁴⁷ Those who transmitted hadith from Muḥammad b. Muqbil during his long life participated in the honour associated with his ‘high’ chain of authorities, flowing from his status as last link with a revered, bygone generation. They included Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī⁴⁸ and **Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī**, to whom Muḥammad b. Muqbil sent a written *ijāza* (from Aleppo to Egypt) in AH 869.⁴⁹

Sirāj al-Dīn/al-Sirāj ‘Umar [Najm al-Dīn] b. Muḥammad [Taqī al-Dīn] Ibn Fahd al-Makkī {D} [d.885/1480]
Known also as Abū’l-Qāsim and Abū Ḥafṣ, a sharifian (al-Hāshimī al-‘Alawī) and a Shafī‘i, he was born c.812. His grandfather had

taken his father Taqī al-Dīn (b.787 in Egypt) to settle in Mecca, where he audited works and received *ijāzas* from many shaykhs, and became a well-respected authority and prolific author.⁵⁰ The family produced a number of important transmitters, including ‘Umar.⁵¹ ‘Umar detailed hadiths narrated by those listed in the *mu‘jam* of **Abū’l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad al-Marāghī**, among others.⁵² He transmitted to **Zakariyā al-Anṣārī** and **al-Suyūṭī**, among others.⁵³ He left a number of bibliographies and lists of teachers (*mashyakha*) pertaining both to himself and to others, and various works, including important historical works focusing on Mecca: *Itḥāf al-warā bi-akhbār Umm al-Qurā*; *al-Taysīr bi-tarājim al-Ṭabarīyīn*; *al-Durr al-kamīn bi-dhayl al-‘Iqd al-thamīn (fī ta’rīkh al-balad al-amīn)*.⁵⁴

10th century AH

Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī {E} [d.911/1505]

Great Egyptian polymath, prolific author and ‘orthodox’ (Shadhili) sufi who spearheaded an apology for sufism and its leading figures. This encompassed a defence of the orthodoxy of Ibn ‘Arabī in, for example, *Tanbīh al-ghabī bi-tabrī‘at Ibn ‘Arabī*, written as a refutation of al-Biqā‘ī’s *Tanbīh al-ghabī bi-takfīr Ibn al-Fāriḍ wa Ibn ‘Arabī*.⁵⁵ Those from whom he transmitted included **Muḥammad b. Muqbil al-Ḥalabī**.⁵⁶

[‘Izz al-Dīn] ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Umar Ibn Fahd al-Makkī {D} [d.921–22/1515–16]

A Shafi‘ī known also as Abū’l-Khayr and Abū Fāris, he was born in Mecca in AH 850. He audited works from his father ‘**Umar Ibn Fahd al-Makkī** and grandfather Taqī al-Dīn. His father acquired *ijāzas* for him from various scholars including **Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī**,⁵⁷ and took him to audit works from **al-Marāghī** among others. He then travelled widely through the Hijaz, Egypt, Syria and Palestine, gathering uncountable *samā‘*s and *ijāzas*. He read works with **Zakariyā al-Anṣārī** and spent time with al-Sakhāwī, among others.

He distinguished himself particularly in hadith scholarship in the Hijaz (he signed himself *khādim al-ḥadīth fī l-ḥaram al-Makkī*, ‘the servant of hadith in the Sacred Precinct of Mecca’).⁵⁸ His *mu’jam shuyūkh* encompasses a thousand shaykhs.⁵⁹ In addition to works on hadith, he produced *Nuzhat dhawī al-aḥlām bi-akḥbār al-khuṭabā’ wa’l-a’imma wa quḍāt balad Allāh al-ḥarām* (‘The dreamer’s stroll through the stories of preachers, imams and judges of God’s sacred land’). The historian Muḥammad Ibn Ṭūlūn was among those who transmitted from him,⁶⁰ while those to whom he transmitted included **Yahyā b. Makram b. Muḥibb al-Dīn {Abū’l-Ma’ālī} b. Aḥmad al-Ṭabarī**.⁶¹

Zakarīyā b. Muḥammad al-Anṣārī {F/A} [d.926/1520]

Born in AH 823–24, a revered Egyptian sufi and Shafi’i authority. He studied, among others, under **Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī**,⁶² and became associated with numerous *ṭuruq* (pl. of *ṭarīqa*). His renown in the exoteric sciences (especially *fiqh*: he acted as Shafi’i grand *qāḍī* for twenty years and his commentaries on Shafi’i law became part of the madrasa curriculum) enabled him to protect his spiritual life from external scrutiny. He shared this dimension only with his closest pupils, such as ‘**Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha’rānī**, who regarded him first and foremost as a saint and recorded his *karāmāt*.⁶³ His many works include some relating to *taṣawwuf* (sufism), such as commentaries on the writings of al-Qushayrī and Shaykh Arslān.⁶⁴ During the controversy caused in Cairo by the anti-monistic campaign of al-Biqā’ī aimed at Ibn al-Fāriḍ and Ibn ‘Arabī (874/1469), the sultan sought his expert opinion to put an end to the agitation caused by the affair: he defended them.⁶⁵ His many students included **Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī**,⁶⁶ who received *ijāzas* in all of Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī’s works when he studied under him during a visit to Cairo.⁶⁷ According to one chain, Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī transmitted the works of Ibn ‘Arabī (and all that the latter transmitted) from **Abū’l-Faḥ al-Marāghī**.⁶⁸

‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. Aḥmad al-Sha‘rānī⁶⁹ {F} [d.973/1565]

Egyptian scholar, Shafi‘i mufti, historian of sufism (through his *ṭabaqāt* or biographical compilations, among them the immensely popular *al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*), sufi and apologist for sufis. He was a devoted student and defender of the orthodoxy of Ibn ‘Arabī (through, among others, the ‘deliberate interpolation’ hypothesis),⁷⁰ and popularised his teachings through the accessible and widely circulated *al-Yawāqīt wa’l-jawāhir*, for example. The best known and most exalted of his teachers was **Zakariyā al-Anṣārī**, who initiated him into the way in AH 914.⁷¹ His sufism has been described as ‘orthodox, middle-of-the-road’ (he identified with the orthodox way of al-Junayd and attacked the excesses of some *ṭarīqas*).⁷² His stance as a sufi, *faqīh*⁷³ and scholar of hadith was underpinned by reformist, even salafi, tendencies.⁷⁴

‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Quddūs al-Shinnāwī {F}

Grandson of Muḥammad al-Shinnāwī (d.932), who was a popular leader and Aḥmadī shaykh (after the popular saint Aḥmad {al-Sayyid} al-Badawī [d.675/1276]) who spread his *dhikr* (practice of remembrance of God) through the surrounding area from his *zāwiya* (sufi centre) in Mahallat Ruh west of Cairo, authorising the masses (and even women and children) to arrange *dhikr* sessions.⁷⁵ Muḥammad al-Shinnāwī had initiated **‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī** into his way and designated him to teach *dhikr* and to educate *murīds* in AH 932.⁷⁶ After Muḥammad’s death his sons, including ‘Abd al-Quddūs, who became his successor, were hostile to the powerful disciple al-Sha‘rānī, but he served them and asked ‘Abd al-Quddūs to guide him as his shaykh. In the event, ‘Abd al-Quddūs became a disciple of al-Sha‘rānī, who initiated and guided him in the Aḥmadī way.⁷⁷ This relationship presumably also encompassed the son of ‘Abd al-Quddūs, ‘Alī, father of **Abū’l-Mawāhib Aḥmad al-Shinnāwī**.

Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī {A/E} [d.984/1576]

His family migrated from Gaza to Damascus ten generations before he was born in AH 904, and quickly became well established and

respected there for its learning. His father Raḍī al-Dīn reportedly took Badr al-Dīn while a toddler to a shaykh who conferred upon him the *khirqā*, taught him *dhikr* and gave him *ijāzas*.⁷⁸ Early instruction received from his father was supplemented by instruction from the ulama of Damascus (he studied hadith and *taṣawwuf* in particular under Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan Ibn al-Shuwaykh al-Maqdisī). He accompanied his father to Cairo at the age of twelve, and stayed there for five years, during which time he studied under various authorities, particularly **Zakariyā al-Anṣārī**. His father also acquired *ijāzas* for him from **Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī** and introduced him to the saints of Egypt. They returned to Damascus in 921.

Badr al-Dīn launched a long career in Damascus as a teacher (including in the Umayyad Mosque) and Shafī'i mufti. He produced many works, assumed several positions and drew students from far and wide, among them the great-grandfather of 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, Ismā'īl (d.993).⁷⁹ He loved the sufis and was at pains to advise them if he heard they had acted in a way contrary to the shari'a. A respected and prominent figure, he was the father of **Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī**.

11th century AH

Abū'l-Mawāhib Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Quddūs al-Shinnāwī
{F} [d.1028/1619]

Also known as al-Khāmī and hailing from the important Egyptian sufi al-Shinnāwī family, he was born in 975/1568 in Mahallat Ruh west of Cairo and studied in Cairo and Medina, where he settled.⁸⁰ A prominent sufi, he became the leading shaykh of the Naqshbandiyya in Medina in his time. The order was introduced to Medina (with the Shattariyya) by the Indian Shaykh Šibghatallāh b. Rūḥallāh al-Sindī (al-Barwajī), who settled there in 1596 or 1605: he initiated al-Shinnāwī, became his teacher, and authorised him to educate *murīds*, teach the *dhikr* and confer the *khirqā*.⁸¹ While he studied hadith with its major scholars, al-Shinnāwī does not appear to have been regarded

as a hadith scholar himself.⁸² Nonetheless, he emerged as a dominant figure in the intellectual milieu of the Haramayn, where he was an outspoken adherent of the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* (the Oneness of Being). His many students included **Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Qushāshī** (who venerated his teacher as the saintly ‘Seal of his time’). Brockelmann lists five of al-Shinnāwī’s works, including *al-Iqlīd al-farīd fī tajrīd al-tawḥīd*, on which al-Nābulusī later wrote a commentary.⁸³

‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ḥusaynī al-Ṭabarī al-Makkī al-Shāfi’ī {D} [d.1033/1624]

Grandson of **Yaḥyā b. Makram b. Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī** {D}, member of important sharīfian family long established in Mecca and holders of the imamate of the Maqām Ibrāhīm since AH 673. Born in 976, by the age of twelve ‘Abd al-Qādir had memorised the Qur’an and led Ramadan night prayers at the Maqām. From 991, he studied with prominent shaykhs (including, for example, al-Shams Muḥammad al-Ramlī al-Miṣrī al-Shāfi’ī and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sharbīnī), having received an *ijāza* from some of them to pass on the works he had already memorised. After encompassing a broad range of disciplines and works, he composed numerous texts, including, for example, *Durrat al-aṣḍāf al-sanīya fī dharwat al-awṣāf al-Ḥusaynīya*, *‘Uyūn al-masā’il min a’yān al-rasā’il*, *Iḥām al-majāri fī iḥām al-Bukhārī* and *‘Arā’ is al-abkār wa gharā’ is al-afkār*. The biographer al-Muḥibbī describes him as ‘the imam of Hijazi imams’.⁸⁴

Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī {A/E} [d.1061/1651]

Born in 977/1570, he attended the public lessons of his father **Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī** and received *ijāzas* from him while still a child (Badr al-Dīn died when Najm al-Dīn was seven years old). He studied under and received *ijāzas* from various scholars,⁸⁵ then held office and taught from a young age in several locations, continuing thus throughout his long life. He was Shafi’i mufti in Damascus for thirty-five years up to his death (from 1025). He also taught hadith and read al-Bukhārī in the Umayyad Mosque for twenty-seven years (from 1034).⁸⁶ Among his numerous and well-known students

was Ismā'īl, the father of 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d.1062).⁸⁷ He was also an early teacher and shaykh of 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī⁸⁸ himself and of **Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī**.⁸⁹ His numerous writings encompass works on hadith, *tafsīr* (exegesis), *fiqh*, *taṣawwuf* and travelogues. As a historian, he is author of the biographical work *al-Kawākib al-sā'ira bi-a'yān al-mi'a al-āshira*, and its continuation *Luṭf al-samar wa qatf al-thamar: min tarājim a'yān al-ṭabaqa al-ūlā min al-qarn al-ḥādī 'ashar*. His reputation and particularly his expertise in hadith⁹⁰ became known beyond Syria, especially in the Hijaz. He made twelve trips to the Haramayn: during the last one (1059), he was inundated with requests for *ijāzas*, including from scholars such as al-Shams Muḥammad al-Bābilī, who expressed their admiration for his exceptional knowledge.⁹¹ As far as his *ṭarīqa* affiliations are concerned, the primary one was to the Qadiriyya. Some of his contemporaries described him as one of the three *abdāl* (category of saints) in Syria.⁹²

Ṣafī al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Yūnus al-Qushāshī
{B/C/D/F} [d.1071/1661]

Hailing from a Jerusalem family with sharifian descent, his father (whose shaykh was the Maliki Muḥammad b. 'Īsā al-Tilimsānī) migrated to Medina. Ṣafī al-Dīn's early education was under his father's wing, and included a trip to Yemen in AH 1011, where he joined circles of prominent ulama. Returning to Medina after a stay in Mecca, he met **Abū'l-Mawāhib al-Shinnāwī**, who initiated him into the sufi way. He studied under al-Shinnāwī, Ṣibghatallāh and numerous other shaykhs (perhaps as many as one hundred), becoming affiliated to many *ṭarīqas* including the Qadiriyya, Shattariyya, Shadhiliyya and Naqshbandiyya. He developed a close attachment to al-Shinnāwī, married his daughter, and became his *khalifa* (deputy) in life and later his successor as shaykh in the Shattariyya. A charismatic figure, he attracted a large influx of students and disciples in Medina and became established as one of the greatest sufis of his time, as well as a teacher of theology and shari'a in his own right.⁹³ **Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī** was the most prominent of his students (and al-Qushāshī was al-Kūrānī's major and most influential teacher): another was

‘Abdallāh b. Sālim al-Baṣrī (d.1134).⁹⁴ He has been counted as one of four influential ulama who would shape the Medinan intellectual milieu of the late 17th century. Thanks to his charisma and learning, al-Qushāshī left behind a cohesive group of followers loyal to his approach and cutting across *fiqh madhhabs* and sufi *ṭarīqas*.⁹⁵

Al-Qushāshī was described by the biographer al-Muḥibbī as ‘the imam of all those who believed in *waḥdat al-wujūd*’.⁹⁶ His importance in transmitting the doctrines of the school of Ibn ‘Arabī to various parts of the Muslim world through his students has been emphasised: for example, the Sumatran ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf Singkel was a student of his for twenty years.⁹⁷ Al-Qushāshī has been identified as a link in one of the still ‘living’ chains of transmission of the *khirqā akbarīya*. He reportedly claimed the office of Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood for himself, attaining this after having studied under five teachers.⁹⁸

Al-Qushāshī’s interest in theology has been recognised: while the majority of his writings were glosses or commentaries on major sufi tracts (such as al-Jīlī’s *al-Insān al-kāmil*) as well as works on *uṣūl* (the principles of the faith), he thus also compiled three treatises on the issue of *kasb* (acquisition), a principal concept of Asha’ri doctrine, at least one of which invited some controversy. He was also involved in hadith scholarship, encompassing sufi interpretations of hadith⁹⁹ and an approach that adumbrated emerging trends that became more distinct in the next generation.¹⁰⁰ On this and other grounds, a possible (embryonic) reformist tendency can be identified alongside his mystical vocation and commitment to maintaining sufi traditions.¹⁰¹

Zayn al-‘Ābidīn b. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Ṭabarī al-Ḥusaynī al-Makkī al-Shāfi‘ī {D} [d.1078/1667]

Born in AH 1002, he studied under his father ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad b. Yahyā al-Ḥusaynī al-Ṭabarī and the prominent shaykhs of Mecca and Medina such as ‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Ḥiṣārī al-Mu‘ammar, receiving *ijāzas* from them. Among others, Muḥammad al-Shillī Bā‘alawī and al-Ḥasan b. ‘Alī al-‘Ujaymī al-Makkī received *ijāzas* from him. He was not as celebrated as his father.¹⁰²

12th century AH

Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī {B/C/D/F} [d.1101/1689]

The most outstanding of **Aḥmad al-Qushāshī**'s disciples, he shared a special relationship with his teacher, and became his son-in-law and designated heir.¹⁰³ Born in 1023/1615, al-Kūrānī studied a wide range of subjects under many teachers in his native Shahrazur and then in Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo and Medina, where he finally settled.¹⁰⁴ He was initiated into and authorised to teach several *ṭarīqas* including the Shattariyya, Qadiriyya, Chishtiyya and his primary *ṭarīqa*, the Naqshbandiyya. On al-Qushāshī's death in 1661 he succeeded him as supreme shaykh of the Shattariyya as well as in his major teaching post,¹⁰⁵ and as 'the chief exponent of Ibn 'Arabī's legacy in Medina'.¹⁰⁶

A Shafi'i *'ālim*, al-Kūrānī's importance to the intellectual life of Medina in his time is such that he has been described as 'the doyen of the city's ulama'.¹⁰⁷ His influence reached far beyond Medina, however, as the 'undisputed leader' of the school of Ibn 'Arabī in his epoch.¹⁰⁸ For example, his influence on Indonesian Islam has been documented, mediated through his important Indonesian disciples like 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Singkel.¹⁰⁹ One of al-Kūrānī's works on the principle of *wahdat al-wujūd*, *Ithāf al-dhakī*, was written at the request of Indonesian disciples, and another (refuting an earlier denunciation of the principle as heretical pantheism by Nuruddin Raniri [d.1666] of Aceh) was produced for an Indonesian audience.¹¹⁰ Leading Indian ulama requested a fatwa from him (among the prestigious ulama of the Hijaz) in 1682 on the ideas of Aḥmad Sirhindī (d.1624), founder of the Mujaddidiyya branch of the Naqshbandiyya, whom they opposed.¹¹¹

A versatile and prolific author, al-Kūrānī's interests encompassed hadith, *fiqh* and *kalām* (theology) alongside *taṣawwuf*. His emphasis on hadith as a source for understanding and defining aspects of religion and for shari'a (and thus his role in the rising 17th–18th century interest in hadith scholarship as a means for reforming *fiqh* and

theology) was such that, after his death, there was a remarkable increase among his Medinan students and junior colleagues in writing commentaries on hadith collections.¹¹² Described as having been 'by nature a conciliator',¹¹³ his complex intellectual position reconciled his loyalty to Ibn 'Arabī's teaching with commitment to a salafi outlook. He thus reinterpreted the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* in accordance with the orthodox Islamic view by emphasising the Qur'an and Sunna as the ultimate frame of reference and insisting on the interdependency of the sufi vision and the obligations of shari'a 'in accordance with *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* (the venerable forefathers)'. It seems he undertook to revisit the major issues of sufism and theology with a view to reconstructing their dominant modes (expressed through *waḥdat al-wujūd* and late Ash'ari dogma), in order to bring them into line with what he saw as the original Islamic view, drawing on the legacy of Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Taymīya (and the latter's student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya) in projecting his vision of this original view.¹¹⁴ On this basis, he stands as a significant precursor to the reformist currents that were to gain powerful expression across the Muslim world during the 18th century. Effectively replacing al-Qushāshī's authority, he served as an important point of reference for a large number of ulama throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries, contributing to the rehabilitation of Ibn Taymīya and to opening the door for the re-emergence of the salafi school of thought in different parts of the Muslim world.¹¹⁵

Muḥammad al-Budayrī al-Dimyāṭī {B} [d.1140/1728]

Known as Ibn al-Mayyit, he hailed from a sharifian family whose ancestor came to Dimyat from Jerusalem. After his early education in Dimyat, he moved to al-Azhar. During 1091–92 (1680–81) he joined **Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī** for a year, became closely identified with him and studied under him works on *taṣawwuf*, hadith and *fiqh*. While he regarded himself principally as a Naqshbandi (he later shifted this affiliation to a Sirhindī *silsila* specifically), he had affiliations to several *ṭarīqas*. He travelled between Dimyat, Cairo, Medina and Jerusalem, and became acquainted in each place with the most

illustrious circles of ulama of the time. In Cairo he was closely associated with the Bakrīs, and in Damascus with the circles of ‘**Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī** and his disciples.¹¹⁶ He was highly regarded as a hadith scholar and sufi teacher. **Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī** studied hadith with him in Jerusalem and was initiated into the Naqshbandiyya by him. Al-Budayrī was also the main teacher of **Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Ḥifnāwī**.¹¹⁷

‘**Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī** {A/E} [d.1143/1731]

Damascene sufi, hadith scholar,¹¹⁸ traveller and poet. His prolific writings are underpinned by veneration of Ibn ‘Arabī and defence of his metaphysical system, and dominated by the concept of *waḥdat al-wujūd*: he considered himself Ibn ‘Arabī’s spiritual son and disciple, and was his devotee and interpreter. He taught at the Umayyad Mosque and the Salimiyya madrasa at Ibn ‘Arabī’s mosque–tomb complex (from AH 1115), but his self-appointed role was as defender of sufism and its controversial practices and doctrines. His stance provoked serious criticism and attack, especially because he taught the works of Ibn ‘Arabī to common folk as well as to the elite.¹¹⁹ Affiliated to the Qadiri and Naqshbandi *ṭarīqas*, he seems to have had limited participation and interest in *ṭarīqa* sufism, and to have set more store by his own uwaysi or ‘Theo-didactic’ sufism, including especially his link to Ibn ‘Arabī as uwaysi master (although he himself had close disciples, this was not in a *ṭarīqa* framework).¹²⁰

By the age of twelve, ‘Abd al-Ghanī had already received *ijāzas* (including in Ibn ‘Arabī’s works) in the company of his father Ismā‘īl from **Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī** among other high-ranking ulama such as ‘Abd al-Bāqī Taqī al-Dīn b. Mawāhib al-Ḥanbalī (the Hanbali mufti of Damascus). His father, who was his first teacher and who died when he was twelve, appears as the prior link in several of ‘Abd al-Ghanī’s *ijāzas* in hadith collections and the writings of Ibn ‘Arabī: he had in fact been given the *ijāzas* of his father *en masse* as a child.¹²¹ It is noteworthy that one of his last compositions was a commentary on the *ṣalawāt* of Ibn ‘Arabī.¹²²

Ṭāhir b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥasan al-Kūrānī [Muḥammad Abū'l-Ṭāhir] {D} [d.1145/1733]

Born in Medina in 1081, he studied with his father **Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī** and other great shaykhs, including his father's colleagues and associates like al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī al-'Ujaymī al-Makkī and 'Abdal-lāh b. Sālīm al-Baṣrī.¹²³ He took his father's position as a teacher in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina and rose to assume the position of Shafi'i mufti in the city for a time. On his father's death he succeeded him as supreme shaykh of the Shattariyya (but the leading position of the ulama of Medina fell to one of Ibrāhīm's students). His works include *Ikhtisār sharḥ shawāhid al-Riḍā al-Baghdādī*.¹²⁴ The students who attended his many lessons (through which his father's teachings continued to be disseminated) included the Indian hadith scholar Muḥammad Ḥayāt al-Sindī (d.1163/1749),¹²⁵ who taught hadith in Medina for twenty-five years to numerous students, among them Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. They included also the great Indian Naqshbandi reformist Shāh Walī Allāh (d.1177/1763). The latter's stay in Medina during 1731–32 in Ṭāhir's circle had a lasting impact on his intellectual orientations: according to Shāh Walī Allāh's son, it amounted to a turning point in his career.¹²⁶ Al-Kattani observes that his own transmission from Ṭāhir proceeds via **Muḥammad Sa'īd Sunbul**, among others.¹²⁷

Muṣṭafā Kamāl al-Dīn al-Bakrī {A/B/C} [d.1162/1749]

Born in Damascus and reputed to have revived the Khalwati *ṭarīqa* in the Arab *mashriq* (east) of the 18th century. He was the most celebrated and important disciple of 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī: he read several of Ibn 'Arabī's works under him during his sojourns in Damascus and his own writings were to be profoundly influenced by Ibn 'Arabī's thought. He studied hadith under **Muḥammad al-Budayrī al-Dimyātī** in Jerusalem and under 'Abdallāh b. Sālīm al-Baṣrī: he was also a student of al-Kūrānī's son Ilyās (d.1138), who had moved to Damascus.¹²⁸ He was initiated into the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Khalwatiyya, in the latter case by a shaykh who followed the way of the Qarabashiyya branch. Al-Bakrī became his sole

successor on the shaykh's death in 1121/1709, having earlier been granted a general permission to initiate and appoint *khalīfas*. He went on to gain many disciples especially in Cairo and Jerusalem: his most important *khalīfā* was **Muḥammad b. Sālīm al-Ḥifnāwī**. Al-Bakrī was a prolific writer (mainly on *sulūk* and *adab*, the sufi path, its culture and manners, but he also composed *awrād* {pl. of *wird*}, of which the best known is *Wird al-saḥar*). Like his teacher al-Nābulusī (on whom he wrote a reverential biography, and from whom he records that he received a general *ijāza* for all his lines of transmission and a specific one for his writings), he laid claim to a direct relation to Ibn 'Arabī, and direct authorisation by him. Like him, he too made several extensive journeys, moving especially between Jerusalem and Cairo, where he died.¹²⁹

Muḥammad Sa'īd (b. Muḥammad) Sunbul [al-Makkī]
{D} [d.1175/1762]

Prominent Meccan scholar and Shafi'i mufti: he transmitted from Ṭāhir b. Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī among others, and to his son **Muḥammad Ṭāhir Sunbul**, among others.¹³⁰

Muḥammad b. Sālīm al-Ḥifnāwī/al-Ḥifnī¹³¹{B/C} [d.1181/1767]

An important disciple and associate of **Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī** involved in renewing activity of the Khalwatiyya in Egypt. He was born in AH 1100 in Hifna, a village in the Bilbis district of Egypt, and studied from a young age in Cairo. On receiving *ijāzas* from his teachers there (the best known including **Muḥammad al-Budayrī al-Dimyātī**, through whom he received his Naqshbandi affiliation), in 1122 he established lessons in logic, *fiqh*, *uṣūl*, hadith and *kalām* attended by many students. He produced many works and became known for his *karāmāt*. He had been introduced to the sufi way by a certain Aḥmad al-Shādhilī al-Maghribī (known as al-Maqqarī): he then met **Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī** in 1133, who initiated him into the Qarabashiyya-Khalwatiyya and trained him in its path. Al-Bakrī eventually placed him above all his *khalīfas*, and he became the only one he had invested with absolute authority who also survived him. Al-Ḥifnāwī

is reputed to have succeeded in reviving the *ṭarīqa* across Egypt, attracting large numbers of people and introducing it to the community of ulama at al-Azhar. Among his important *khalīfas*/disciples were **Maḥmūd al-Kurdī**, ‘Abdallāh al-Sharqāwī (Shaykh al-Azhar) and Aḥmad al-Dardayr, who is perhaps the best known.¹³²

Muḥammad al-Tāfilātī al-Khalwatī {B} [d.1191/1777]

Brockelmann gives his full name as Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Tāfilātī al-Maghribī,¹³³ al-Murādī as Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib al-Mālikī al-Ḥanafī al-Tāfilātī al-Maghribī.¹³⁴ The narrative here is based on al-Murādī’s biographical entry.¹³⁵ Born in Morocco, al-Tāfilātī first studied under his father, a man of moderate learning. Before reaching puberty he taught students *al-Sanūsīya*, which he had studied under Shaykh Muḥammad al-Sa’dī al-Jazā’irī. He travelled to Tripoli and from there to al-Azhar in Cairo. He remained in Egypt for two years and eight months and studied under **Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Ḥifnāwī**, among many others. While travelling by sea to visit his mother he was captured and taken to Malta, where he was held for over two years. He engaged there in a lengthy debate on matters of Muslim belief with Christian monks, among them one with some knowledge of Arabic. This monk eventually gave up the debate defeated, astonished that such knowledge could be held by someone young enough to be his grandson. Muḥammad’s renown spread in Malta among monks and notables, and he was treated respectfully wherever he went. A vision he had eventually sealed his release and he made for Egypt, travelling from there to the Hijaz several times. He went to Yemen, Oman, Basra, Aleppo, Damascus and Anatolia (*al-Rūm*) and settled in Jerusalem, where he was appointed Hanafi mufti. His works number some eighty: in addition to his commentary on the prayer (*al-Durr al-aghla bi-sharḥ al-Dawr al-a’lā*),¹³⁶ Brockelmann mentions his *Ḥusn al-istiḳṣā’ bi-mā ṣaḥḥa wa thabata fī’l-masjid al-aḳṣā*.¹³⁷ Al-Tāfilātī appears in the chains of authorities of various later Damascene scholars.¹³⁸

Maḥmūd al-Kurdī {C} [d.1195/1780–81]

A *khalīfa* of **Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Ḥifnāwī** and known also as al-Khalwatī, he was born in Kurdistan. He adopted a life of pious devotion, asceticism and isolation early on, and is reputed to have met frequently with Khidr and to have received the contents of al-Ghazālī's *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* without reading. When aged eighteen he saw al-Ḥifnāwī in a dream, and was told that this was his shaykh. He travelled to Egypt to find him, was initiated by him into the Khalwati way and eventually granted an *ijāza* to bring people into it: al-Ḥifnāwī would send those who wished to enter the way to him. He also developed a close relationship with **Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī**, whom he had met when the latter came to Cairo. He was celebrated for his *baraka* and the fact that he frequently saw the Prophet in dreams. After al-Ḥifnāwī's death al-Kurdī reportedly brought many people into the way and appointed *khalīfas* himself. He produced a treatise as the result of a dream in which he saw Ibn 'Arabī give him a key and tell him to 'open the vault' (there is a commentary by his *khalīfa* and Shaykh al-Azhar 'Abdallāh al-Sharqāwī on this). He is also author of *al-Sulūk li-abnā' al-mulūk*.¹³⁹

Muḥammad Kamāl al-Dīn al-Bakrī, Abū'l-Futūḥ

{A} [d.1196/1781–82]

Born in Jerusalem in 1143/1731, he was shaykh to the historian al-Murādī (author of the biographical work *Silk al-durar*).¹⁴⁰ Among others, he studied under **Muḥammad b. Sālim al-Ḥifnāwī** and Muḥammad, a third son of Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī. He took the Khalwati *ṭarīqa* from his father **Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī**. His works include a biography of his father, *Kashf al-ẓunūn fī asmā' al-shurūḥ wa'l-mutūn*, a commentary on *al-Ṣalāt al-Mashīhiya* and a diwan.¹⁴¹

Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd b. 'Alī al-Dāmūnī {C} [d. after 1199/1785]

In full Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd b. 'Alī al-Dāmūnī al-Shāfi'ī al-Khalwatī al-Naqshbandī al-Jalwatī, from al-Damun, Palestine: author in 1199/1785 of *Hikam*.¹⁴² He entitled his commentary on the prayer *al-Durr al-thamīn li-sharḥ Dawr al-a' lā li-sīdī Muḥyī al-Dīn*.

He describes how he was asked by his close and saintly companion Ḥusayn al-Ḥiṣnī¹⁴³ to elaborate for him the contents of the prayer. Having consulted and sought a guiding sign, he spent a few days in the hope of receiving divine permission to proceed, seeking this through the mediation of Ibn ‘Arabī, who might reveal the prayer’s secrets to him as its author. Once permission was received, he began. Al-Dāmūnī mentions Ibn ‘Arabī first among his teachers ‘whose insight is elixir’. Having detailed his chain of authorities, he adds that he has ‘another, more elevated, chain – for it is from me to [Ibn ‘Arabī]: it was he who gave me to drink of his pure wine, quenching my thirst in the world of similitudes, then guided me to him. It was he who brought me to live in Damascus, and gave me permission to guide elite and common folk alike. Thanks be to God for these momentous blessings, and for the greatest blessing of all: my attachment (*intisābī*) to this imam.’¹⁴⁴ His father Maḥmūd b. ‘Alī al-Dāmūnī authored a defence of al-Nābulusī, *al-Shihāb al-qabasī fī radd man radda ‘alā ‘Abd al-Ghanī*.¹⁴⁵

13th century AH

Ibrāhīm b. Ismā‘īl b. ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī

{E} [d.1222/1807]

Ibrāhīm’s father Ismā‘īl (b.1085) was the only one of ‘Abd al-Ghanī’s sons to survive him. Born in AH 1138, Ibrāhīm became an outstanding ‘*ālim*’ of his time.¹⁴⁶ A prominent member of Damascene society, he inherited his father’s teaching post at the Salimiyya mosque,¹⁴⁷ and became shaykh *qurrā’* (leading Qur’an reciter).¹⁴⁸ The confluence of several chains of transmission relating to *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* through him is noteworthy.¹⁴⁹

Muḥammad al-Jundī al-‘Abbāsī al-Ma‘arrī {A} [d.1264/1848]

He served as Hanafi mufti in his place of origin, Ma‘arrat Nu‘man, Syria. Initially a follower of Shaykh Khālīd al-Naqshbandī, who was responsible for spreading the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya widely

among Arabs, Kurds and Turks during the early 19th century, it is most likely that al-Jundī did not maintain contact with his successors after Shaykh Khālīd's death in 1242/1827.¹⁵⁰

Muḥammad Amīn al-Jundī al-‘Abbāsī al-Ma‘arrī

{A} [d.1285/1868]

Born in Ma‘arrat Nu‘man, Syria in AH 1229, he was educated by his father **Muḥammad al-Jundī**,¹⁵¹ from whom he took the Khalwati way. In Aleppo he studied hadith under Maḥmūd Efendi al-Mar‘ashī and was a student of the mufti ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mudarris. Returning to Ma‘arrat Nu‘man, he served there as *qāḍī* and then as mufti following his father's death in 1264, until 1266 when he was summoned to Damascus to serve as Arab scribe of the Turkish army in Syria. In 1277 he was appointed Hanafi mufti of Damascus, and remained in this post until his removal in 1284. Thereafter he was appointed to the Ottoman state *shūrā* (council) in the capital, and served on several important official missions. His writings (some in Arabic, others Ottoman Turkish) include a work on the excellence of Syria, and a diwan. His Ottoman Turkish commentary on the *Dawr* was written in 1280, while he was still Hanafi mufti of Damascus. A reformist *‘ālim*, he was proficient in the teachings of Ibn ‘Arabī as well as the new sciences of the era. When the Amir ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā‘irī settled in Damascus, al-Jundī became one of his close associates: he also participated with him in rescuing Christians, and wrote poetry in praise of him.¹⁵²

Muḥammad Ṭāhir Sunbul [al-Makkī] {D}

Son of **Muḥammad Sa‘īd Sunbul**, prominent Hijazi scholar who transmitted from his father and transmitted to, among others, **Yāsīn b. ‘Abdallāh al-Mīrghanī**.¹⁵³

Muḥammad Yāsīn b. ‘Abdallāh b. Ibrāhīm al-Mīrghanī {D}

‘Abdallāh b. Ibrāhīm al-Mīrghanī al-Makkī al-Ṭā‘ifī the father (d.1207/1793), known as al-Maḥjūb, was a prominent sufi and influential *‘ālim*. Born in Mecca into a sharifian family, he attached

himself to Yūsuf al-Mahdalī (who was known as *al-quṭb* or the axis of his time) and became an uwaysi sufi after the latter's death, receiving learning directly from the Prophet. While stories of his *karāmāt* are plentiful, he also left a substantial number of works.¹⁵⁴ He has been counted as part of the late 18th century reformist network, of which the Haramayn was the crossroads (his students included Muḥammad Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, for example). The Mīrghanī family appears to have been politically active: in 1166/1752–53, a time of political upheaval in Mecca, 'Abdallāh had moved to Ta'if apparently as a result of his opposition to the Zaydi sharifs.¹⁵⁵

One of 'Abdallāh's sons became the father of Muḥammad 'Uthmān al-Mīrghanī (d.1852). Born a year after his grandfather 'Abdallāh's death, 'Uthmān became one of the most important students of the major reformist Moroccan sufi teacher Aḥmad b. Idrīs (d.1837), and founder of the Khatmiyya (or Mīrghaniyya) order.¹⁵⁶ 'Uthmān's paternal uncle Muḥammad Yāsīn became his guardian upon the death of his father when 'Uthmān was ten years old. Himself childless, Muḥammad Yāsīn took on his nephew's education. Muḥammad Yāsīn later taught hadith to another student of Aḥmad b. Idrīs, the Yemeni al-Ḥasan 'Ākish, when he came to Mecca. He was also a teacher of Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Sanūsī (d.1276/1859), Aḥmad b. Idrīs' closest student and founder of the Sanusiyya *ṭarīqa*, when he arrived in Mecca in 1241/1826. Muḥammad Yāsīn wrote at least one work, *'Unwān ahl al-'ināya 'alā kashf ghawāmiḍ al-nuqāya*, a gloss on al-Suyūṭī's *Itmām al-dirāya*.¹⁵⁷

Abū'l-Maḥāsīn Muḥammad b. Khalīl (al-Mashīshī) al-Qāwuḡī al-Ṭarābulusī al-Shāmī al-Ḥanafī {D} [d.1305/1888]

Possibly also known as Shams al-Dīn, he was born in 1225/1810, and was a hadith scholar, sufi and *faqīh*. He has been described as *'musnid bilād al-Shām'* ('the most important hadith transmitter of Greater Syria') of his time, and his chains occupied a pivotal role well into the 20th century in most of Egypt, Syria and the Hijaz. He transmitted from many scholars, including Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Sanūsī, al-Burhān al-Bājūrī and **Yāsīn b. 'Abdallāh al-Mīrghanī** (he wrote

a commentary on *al-Mu' jam al-wajīz* by 'Abdallāh al-Mīrghanī).¹⁵⁸ A prolific writer, he produced some one hundred works, including many on hadith.¹⁵⁹ His *al-Ṭawr al-aghla' alā al-wird al-musammā bi'l-Dawr al-a' lā* was printed in Damascus, AH 1301.¹⁶⁰ Brockleemann also lists a commentary on *Hizb al-bahr* entitled *Khulāṣat al-zahr 'alā Hizb al-bahr*.¹⁶¹ Noteworthy, too, is his *Shawāriq al-anwār al-jalīya fī asānīd al-sāda al-Shādhiliya*, for al-Qāwuqjī was a Shadhili shaykh and founder of a sub-order of the *ṭarīqa* which seems to have taken his name.¹⁶² He died in Mecca.¹⁶³

Chains and authorisations

The chains elucidated here are embedded in a vast web of interconnections among members of the *ahl al-'ilm* (community of scholars) spanning the centuries of Islamic history, a network of personal contacts forming a highway along which authority, learning and *baraka* have travelled from the past into the future while criss-crossing the lands of Islam. Individuals sought out *ijāzas* through personal contact with shaykhs who had themselves acquired *ijāzas* through personal contact: the *ijāza* was thus in part 'an emblem of a bond to a shaykh'.¹⁶⁴ While it served the forging of connections to powerful men of the learned elite (those older and more knowledgeable), it also made possible the appropriation of some of their authority, and that of others in the associated chains of transmission. Finally, it acted as a vehicle for the acquisition and transmission of *baraka*, of which 'ilm or learning was one important form. The conferring of an *ijāza* thus admitted an individual to a particular scholarly and spiritual genealogy, and this was just as important as the precise identity and content of the work(s) transmitted (if indeed not more important in some circumstances). In general terms, the *mujīz* (granter of an authorisation) was the key to insertion into chains of transmission of 'ilm so highly valued that the resulting pedigrees rivalled blood-lines in importance.¹⁶⁵ This importance is reflected in the careful attention given to recording

and incorporating chains of transmission of texts, as in the case of the *Dawr*.

Turning to the plausibility of individual links within our chains and the *ijāzas* that underpin them, those links identified appear generally compatible with the chronology, known associations (especially relations with shaykhs and teachers) and geographical movements of the figures in question. Of particular interest are nine links underpinned by *ijāzas* conferred on young children who typically had not yet reached the age of reason.¹⁶⁶ In some cases, as set out above, we have reports of these children receiving *ijāzas* from the authorities in question in the company of their fathers (and in one case, of the father soliciting *ijāzas* specifically for them, another common practice).¹⁶⁷ Perhaps a ‘child *ijāza*’ stands up more successfully to scrutiny when the text concerned is a small prayer which children, accustomed to memorising Qur’an from an early age, could readily have committed to heart at the instigation of fathers eager to place them under its protection, and to acquire for them the potential benefits associated with the accompanying *ijāza* and chain.¹⁶⁸

Insertion of an individual into one of our chains through an *ijāza* conferred on them the *baraka* of the line of transmission, intensifying the *baraka* of the prayer itself. It also brought them into ultimate contact with the prayer’s author. It was not just a case of acquiring, committing to memory and inscribing on the heart the prayer text (itself undoubtedly *baraka* bearing and encompassing the ‘perfect and complete’ Word, as we shall see below), something which could be done from a written copy. Initiation into the prayer was thus as much a case of participating in the spiritual lineage anchored in its saintly author and transmitted through a living shaykh.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, it is likely that even into the modern period prayers like the *Dawr* were mainly experienced as oral performances rather than written texts, further underlining the importance of personal contact.

Regarding certain specifics of our chains, we might ask whether any of our figures appear in chains of transmission associated with other works by Ibn ‘Arabī. Yahya lists a number of such chains which can be compared with the six examined here.¹⁷⁰ {E} from Ibn ‘Arabī

through to al-Suyūṭī is repeated in four chains, viz. 2a (attached to RG 13a, *Akhbār mashāyikh al-Maghrib*; RG 30, *‘Anqā’ mughrīb*; RG 38, *al-Arba‘ūn ḥadīth*; RG 134, *al-Faṭḥ al-Fāsī*; RG 135, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya*; RG 150, *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*; RG 336, *al-Kashf al-kullī* and RG 725, *al-Taḥṣīr*) and 6a, 6e and 6f (all three attached to RG 135, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya*).¹⁷¹ In like fashion, {F} from Ibn ‘Arabī through to al-Qushāshī is repeated in chain 6d attached to *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* (with the link between Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī and al-Jabartī al-Zabīdī missing, viz., Abū’l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad b. al-Qaymānī al-Marā’ī) and from Ibn ‘Arabī through to al-Sha’rānī in chain 6c attached to *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* with the same omission. The missing chain of authorities linking al-Qushāshī back to Ibn ‘Arabī in {B} and {C} as elaborated in {F} is thus mostly corroborated by Yahya’s 6d i.¹⁷² Chains 6a, b, c, d, e and f (all attached to *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya*) all culminate in the grandson of ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, Ibrāhīm b. Ismā‘īl (see {E}). Finally, several well-known links appearing in our chains reappear in those listed in Yahya: these include Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī ~ Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī ({A}; Yahya’s 6b and 6d ii) and Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī ~ Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī ({A}; Yahya’s 6d).

Referred to briefly above, al-Qushāshī’s chain of transmission from Ibn ‘Arabī stands out for the important place it occupies on our chain map, for his status, and for his association with the prayer in a further copy, where its attribution to Ibn ‘Arabī and a description of its properties are given on his authority.¹⁷³ Al-Tāfilātī {B} and al-Dāmūnī {C} both refer to this chain without elaboration using the phrase *bi-sanadihi al-muttaṣil ilā [Ibn ‘Arabī]* (‘through his chain of transmission going back to [Ibn ‘Arabī]’), implying perhaps that it was very well known at the time.¹⁷⁴ (It is noteworthy that the *silsila* of the *khirqā akbarīya* as given by al-Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī also connects al-Qushāshī to Ibn ‘Arabī without elaboration.)¹⁷⁵ {F} provides an indication of one chain from Ibn ‘Arabī to al-Qushāshī, while {D} provides an alternative through Zayn al-‘Ābidīn al-Ṭabarī al-Makkī.¹⁷⁶

More than five generations after Ibn ‘Arabī’s death, key geographical foci in the routes of the prayer mapped through the chains are the Hijaz (Mecca and Medina); Syria (Damascus); Egypt (Cairo);

and Palestine (Jerusalem). Two 17th–18th century figures who served as a nexus between different geographical centres through their travels are Muḥammad al-Budayrī al-Dimyātī {B} and Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī {A/B/C}.¹⁷⁷ Al-Budayrī connected the influential Hijazi centre¹⁷⁸ with Cairo (where al-Ḥifnāwī studied under him), and with Jerusalem (where Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī studied under him). Al-Bakrī, too, connected Damascus and Cairo (as well as Jerusalem), but without the direct Hijazi link:¹⁷⁹ born in 1688 CE, al-Bakrī's link to Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (d.1689 CE) in {C} should most likely be ruled out in favour of an omission, probably of the latter's son Ilyās, with whom al-Bakrī studied in Damascus. It is noteworthy that al-Tāfilātī apparently first acquired the prayer from al-Ḥifnāwī during his early sojourn in Cairo, making it possible for him to transmit it during his extensive travels thereafter. Such figures often formed part of very extensive scholar networks, through which the prayer may well have been transmitted into more distant regions of the Islamic world.¹⁸⁰

A strong Naqshbandi or Khalwati association is evident among the figures in our chains from the 17th century,¹⁸¹ but for many of them multiple *ṭarīqa* affiliations were the norm, especially prior to the 18th or 19th centuries. The prayer was thus used alongside liturgical and devotional prescriptions associated with particular *ṭarīqa* affiliations, whether multiple or single. Prayers attributed to the eponymous founders of *ṭarīqas* have found a natural constituency among those affiliated to these *ṭarīqas*, where they have also been routinely recited in collective rituals. Indeed the emergence of an independent *ṭarīqa* from an existing one has often been accompanied by the composition of new *aḥzāb* (pl. of *ḥizb*).¹⁸² Although not associated exclusively with any particular *ṭarīqa*, the saintly stature of the *Dawr*'s author appears to have secured its circulation and use within many different *ṭarīqas*.

Windows onto Islamic culture and thought

How can the chains discussed here, which encompass several major figures of Islamic scholarship and *taṣawwuf*, illuminate trends in historical Islamic culture and thought? Alongside those who may be described as non-reformist (and who appear to have been uncompromising in their defence of sufi culture, including its more controversial elements), it is noteworthy that these figures also feature ulama of reformist orientation, those critical of aspects of the prevailing religious-cultural milieu and the existing order. Some sought to contain sufi 'excesses' by reasserting the interdependence of spheres of *taṣawwuf* and shari'a, and addressed other aspects of the dominant culture by emphasising the primacy of the Qur'an and Sunna as the ultimate framework for religious understanding and the source of shari'a. Such ulama often expressed appreciation for the reformist legacy of Ibn Taymīya (d.1328), and their positions evince salafi tendencies, whether in matters of *kalām* or *fiqh*, attitudes towards *madhhab* affiliation, or the emphasis of hadith scholarship as a means to reassert scriptural primacy, for example. Focusing on such figures in the chains serves to highlight the complex, overlapping identities of historical Islamic culture, which could contemplate a profound commitment to sufism (including the embrace of *waḥdat al-wujūd*) alongside a *salafi-inspired* reformist outlook (the latter dimension being at times underreported in the context of Ibn 'Arabī studies). While its content presents no specific doctrinal problem, the use and transmission of the prayer by such figures nonetheless furnishes evidence of their conviction of its author's importance (and saintly status), underlining an inclusive commitment to his legacy upheld in tandem with salafi tendencies.

In the 9th/15th century, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī's association with the prayer is noteworthy in the light of his ambivalence towards Ibn 'Arabī, and his favourable view of Ibn Taymīya.¹⁸³ His reservations concerning the prayer's author, such as they were, did not invalidate for him the *baraka* that flowed from use of it, received through a chain

directly from its author. In the 10th/16th century ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī’s association with the prayer is noteworthy when viewed not in terms of his capacity as an apologist for Ibn ‘Arabī, but as the first in a long line of late reformist or salafi-oriented sufi ulama, followed in the 11th–12th/17th–18th centuries by the highly influential al-Qushāshī (heir to al-Sha‘rānī’s legacy) and especially his student Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī, and the latter’s students of the next generation. As in al-Kūrānī’s case, a number of these later sufi-salafi ulama re-interpreted *waḥdat al-wujūd*, in its capacity as the most controversial aspect of sufi doctrine, to make it conform to Islamic orthodoxy. At the same time, they evinced a rising interest in Ibn Taymīya’s intellectual legacy (following its virtual eclipse by the mid-14th century with the rise to dominance of *taṣawwuf* allied with Ash‘ari theology),¹⁸⁴ and thus perhaps contributed to a re-emergence or revival of the salafi school from the late 17th century.¹⁸⁵ In the 13th/19th century, the two al-Jundīs, father and son, can finally be mentioned. The former was a follower of the shari‘a-minded reformist Naqshbandi Shaykh Khālīd, who had called for returning to the Qur’an and Sunna, yet read the works of Ibn ‘Arabī and felt a spiritual affinity with him.¹⁸⁶ Muḥammad Amīn al-Jundī the son was a reformist *‘ālim* in his own right and also a close associate of the Amir ‘Abd al-Qādir (whose own reformist tendencies and shari‘a-minded, scripturalist sufism combined with a devotion to Ibn ‘Arabī have been widely noted, and whose ulama followers launched the Salafi reform movement in Syria).¹⁸⁷

The blending of sufi and salafi thought is thus illustrated by several of the figures associated with the prayer, both in pre-modern and modern periods. Within this blend, which itself became increasingly significant for later reformists or ‘revivalists’, it was salafism that came to prominence under the conditions and pressures of modernity.¹⁸⁸ Were it possible to map the continuation of the chains discussed here across the 20th century, it would be of interest to ascertain the orientations of new links in terms of this framework, and in particular to discover whether any who avail themselves of the prayer’s *baraka* can be counted as contemporary salafis, seeking

inspiration in Ibn Taymīya's legacy.¹⁸⁹ A defining aspect in the self-appropriation of the 'salafi' banner in the modern world has of course been a powerful anti-sufism, in which Ibn 'Arabī's legacy looms large. This is not the whole story, however. Through the inclusive tendencies of some of the most eminent historical figures of *'ilm* and *taṣawwuf* associated with it, this small prayer of Ibn 'Arabī points up with striking clarity the anomalous character of the uncompromising salafi–sufi dichotomy perpetuated in some contemporary Muslim circles.

Notes

1. The Turkish collections offer what is arguably the most important manuscript base for the works of Ibn 'Arabī in general. We have supplemented the specific Suleymaniye collection, the largest by far, with copies from the following Turkish libraries: University of Istanbul Library Collection, Ulu Cami (Bursa), Genel (Inebey, Bursa), Beyazid (Istanbul), Mevlana Museum (Konya), Ankara Milli. Relating to the Suleymaniye collection, the following errors in Osman Yahya, *Histoire et classification de l'oeuvre d'Ibn 'Arabī* (Damascus, 1964), 1, p.294 (RG 244) can be pointed out. Dügümlü Baba 4146 and 4137 and Esad Efendi 4036 are unrecognisable numbers; Dügümlü Baba 194, Hacı Mahmud Efendi 461 and Esad Efendi 1330 are irrelevant. Şehid Ali Paşa 2796 is a fragment of the *Awṛād* that sometimes appears described as *Istighātha* but here is described as *Hizb* al-Shaykh al-Akbar. Note also that Ulu Cami 954 (Bursa) is irrelevant.

2. All of the copies surveyed here are thus relatively late. It may well be that earlier copies can be uncovered: Yahya, *Histoire*, 1, p.294 lists those in Damascus, Cairo, Rabat, Paris and Berlin not examined in this study and apparently undated.

3. For details of four of these which have chains of transmission attached and a fifth without, see Appendix. The remaining two, both in Ottoman Turkish, are as follows: (i) 'Alī al-Waṣfī b. Ḥusayn al-Ḥusaynī (Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4217, detailed commentary on individual words and phrases fols. 1a–94a; the text of the prayer is repeated with further comments verse by verse fols. 99b–110a), dated AH 1261. (ii) Anonymous (Hacı Reşid Bey 104), undated, 20 fols. For additional copies of some of the commentaries referred to here and further commentaries on the prayer held in collections outside of Turkey, see Yahya, *Histoire*, 1, pp.294–295.

It has been suggested that the first sustained systematic commentary on a sufi prayer is that composed by Dā'ūd Ibn Bākhilā (d.733/1332) on al-Shādhilī's *Hizb al-baḥr*. See Richard J. A. McGregor, *Sanctity and Sainthood in Medieval Egypt: The Wafā' Sufi Order and the Legacy of Ibn 'Arabī* (Albany, NY, 2004), pp.34–35.

4. Other examples include Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4141 (dated AH 1275), Yazma Bağışlar 2180 (undated and followed by a *wird* attributed to Abū Bakr b. 'Abdallāh al-'Aydarūs and an untitled anonymous supplication), A 5705 [University of Istanbul Library] (dated 1793 CE and followed by a prayer by Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī and a *ṣalawāt* attributed to Ibn 'Arabī: see below), A 4344 [University of Istanbul Library] (dated AH 1318, each line surrounded by a gold-leaf border, with only eight lines per page) and Nafiz Paşa 702, on which see note 6 below.

5. For example, I. Note that Ankara Milli 489 binds together the *Dawr* (as part of an undated hand) with works by Ibn 'Arabī (e.g. *R. al-Alif*, *Mashāhid al-asrār*, *K. al-Bā'*) in several hands.

6. Examples include G, K (*Ṣalawāt kubrā*), M, Şazeli 106 (*Istighātha*, *Awṛād*, *Ṣalawāt kubrā*), Esad Efendi 1330 (*Ṣalāt sharīfa*), A 5705 [University of Istanbul

Library] (*Ṣalawāt sharīfa*), Nafiz Paşa 702 (an undated compilation of the *Awṛād* and the *Dawr*), Genel 43 (*Awṛād* dated AH 1179, copy made in Damascus) and Arif-Murad 58 (printed, undated, encompassing the *Awṛād*). Şazeli 106 encompasses the date AH 1139. Esad Efendi 1330 is dated from AH 1194 to 1219.

7. For example, M. Note that Esad Efendi 1330 includes prayers by al-Nawawī, al-Shādhilī and Ibn Mashīsh. Esad Efendi 267 (undated) encompasses a treatise on the names of the Prophet and one on the names of his Companions who were at Badr, plus a commentary on a prayer by al-Shādhilī. Şazeli 106 encompasses prayers by al-Shādhilī, al-Nawawī, Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, al-Shāfi‘ī, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, Ma‘rūf Karkhī, Imām ‘Alī and supplications of the prophets. L encompasses among others the protective prayer of Abū Madyan Shu‘ayb. Genel 43 has *Ḥizb al-naṣr* by al-Shādhilī and others; Arif-Murad adds *Ḥizb al-baḥr* of al-Shādhilī, *al-Ṣalawāt al-munjīya* and other short prayers.

8. Şazeli 157 (undated), for example, includes prayers and prayer-commentaries, poems and works by Isma‘il Hakki Bursevi (including a commentary on the prayer of Ibn Mashīsh), Sari ‘Abdullah Efendi (including *Maslak al-‘ushshāq*) and Nawa‘i Efendi (parts of a commentary on the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*).

9. Examples are J, F, and Hacı Mahmud Efendi 6287 (possibly dated AH 1252), the latter by Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Jalīl al-Mawṣilī al-Jilī. See also Beyazid 7880 (undated), Esad Efendi 3674 (possibly dated AH 1203 or before).

10. The copying of texts was often done out of a desire for benefit or *baraka*, out of love for the author, or as a means whereby the copyist endeavoured to bring themselves into the living or dead author’s presence. For examples relating to devotees of Ibn ‘Arabī who copied his works after his death, see Michael Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice in Medieval Damascus, 1190–1350* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 144. Some believed that copying had a talismanic power bringing spiritual benefit: Chamberlain cites the example of Ibn al-Jawzī, who requested that after his death all the pens with which he had copied hadith should be gathered and heated in water, which was to be used to wash his corpse. Comparing ‘ilm with prayer, some writers urged copyists to carry out their work only when in a state of ritual ablution. See *ibid.* p. 136.

11. On the general notion of *sanad*, literally a support or stay, applied to the chain of authorities that validates transmitted knowledge, see ‘Sanad’, EI², Supplement 9–10, p. 702 (for the related term *isnād* [pl. *asānīd*] applied in the context of hadith transmission, see ‘Isnad’, EI², 4, p. 207). In setting out their chains of transmission, some of our sources explicitly use the term *sanad*. Within the chains, some use the verbs *akhadha* ‘an and *rawā* ‘an (to take/transmit from) and others *ajāza* (to grant permission, reflecting the fact that an *ijāza* underpins each link in a chain).

12. A seventh chain attached to the prayer (and the *Awṛād*) is recorded in Yahya, *Histoire*, 2, p. 540 (no. 1, attached to RG 16a) and discussed in Ibn ‘Arabī, *The Seven Days of the Heart*, pp. 174–175. While we do not discuss this chain here we would point to the fact that the transmitter from Ibn ‘Arabī died in AH 727: this suggests a possible ‘child *ijāza*’ (on which see below). G, apparently its original source, has been the

basis of a number of printings (Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4179, Düğümlü Baba 490 and 489, for example).

13. Biographical notes provided here vary in length depending on how well known a figure is, the availability of information and the accessibility of sources: detail is provided when this is of interest or relevance to our focus and/or is not readily accessible to the non-Arabist.

14. For a fascinating glimpse of the cultural and social context within which the significance and operation of the *ijāza* can be properly understood (as played out in late 12th to mid-14th century CE Damascus), see Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice*, ch. 4. The author points to the prestige attached to scholarly pedigrees in the form of chains of transmission, and the concern of the learned elite to emphasise them as an integral part of their strategies of social survival, advanced through cultural practices associated with knowledge. The same emphasis is reflected in the production of the *mashyakha* or *mu' jam* literature, a genre listing the shaykhs an individual had studied with or heard hadith from.

Of our chains, {A} and {E} are associated with an *ijāza* in which the transmitter grants permission to a specific individual to read the prayer, thus perpetuating the chain. *Ijāzas* addressed to a specific individual arise also in Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4141 (fol. 9a, dated AH 1275) and in Esad Efendi 1442 (fol. 52a, undated). In the latter case it encompasses the *Awrad* as well as the *Dawr* and is granted to Muḥammad Rafī' Efendi by Muḥammad 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Jalīl al-Baghdādī, who describes himself as *khādim ni'āl al-sāda al-Qādirīya*, and has added the *Dawr* and *ijāza* at the end of this copy of *K. al-Rashahāt al-anwarīya fī sharḥ al-awrad al-akbarīya*: on the margin of the *Awrad*, the latter is by Ḥasan al-Kurdī. According to Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen litteratur* (Leiden, 1943–49) [hereafter 'GAL'], II, pp. 453, 473, Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Kurdī al-Qādirī al-Bānī al-'Alawānī al-Jilānī al-Kūrānī al-Naqshbandī (d.1148/1735) also wrote *Risāla fī qawl al-Shaykh al-Akbar wa qawl al-Jilī* and *Risāla fī anna 'ilm Allāh muḥīt bi-nafsihi am lā*. Yahya, *Histoire*, 1, p. 289 records him as author of a commentary on Ibn 'Arabī's *K. al-Ḥikam* (RG 233).

15. See Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ al-tīb min ghuṣn al-Andalus al-raṭīb*, ed. Ihsan Abbas (Beirut, 1968), II, p. 170. For further biographical references, his inclusion in *samā's* and a discussion of the possible identity of his mother (Khātūn Maryam bint Muḥammad, known as Umm al-Jawbān: Sa'd al-Dīn was apparently also known as al-Jawbān and 'Alā' al-Dīn), see Claude Addas, *Quest for the Red Sulphur: The Life of Ibn 'Arabī* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 265 n. 118, 86–87, 228; Stephen Hirtenstein, *The Unlimited Mercifier* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 261–62 n.30; also p. 182.

16. See Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Raḥīm b. al-Ḥusayn Ibn al-'Irāqī, *al-Dhayl 'alā al-'ibar fī khabar man 'abar*, ed. Salih al-Mahdi 'Abbas (Beirut, 1989), 2, p. 527. On him see also 'Abd al-Hayy b. 'Abd al-Kabir al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris wa'l-athbāt wa mu' jam al-ma'ājim wa'l-mashyakhāt wa'l-musalsalāt*, ed. Ihsan 'Abbas (Beirut, 1982–86), p. 431; Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī, *Dhayl ta'rīkh al-Islām*, ed. Mazin b. Salim al-Bawazir (Riyadh, 1998), p. 202.

The Maqām Ibrāhīm is the (site of) the miraculous stone on which Ibrāhīm is

believed to have stood while building the Ka'ba, and which bears his footprints. Through the revelation of Q 2: 125, the Prophet established the site as a place of prayer (Ibrāhīm and Ismā'il had reportedly prayed there when they had completed their work of building). In early Islam, the stone was encased in a wooden box and raised on a platform, usually locked inside the Ka'ba. Today it stands in a glass encasement about twenty cubits from the Ka'ba, and pilgrims perform two prayer cycles as close as possible behind it. See 'Maqam Ibrahim', EI², 6, pp. 104–107.

17. On the family see Muḥammad b. Faḍlallāh (Amīn) al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar fī a'yān al-qarn al-ḥādī 'ashar* (Cairo, 1284), 2, pp. 461–462.

18. See Aḥmad Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina fī a'yān al-mī'a al-thāmina*, ed. Muhammad Sayyid Jadd al-Haqq (Cairo, 1966), 1, p. 56.

19. At times alongside his brother, al-Ṣafī al-Ṭabarī: for these examples, see Ibn al-'Irāqī, *al-Dhayl 'alā al-'ibar*, index. See also al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, 1, p. 56.

It may appear that Raḍī al-Dīn was born too late to have transmitted directly from Ibn 'Arabī (who died when he was four years old), but the possibility of such a link in the form of a 'child *ijāza*' (perhaps through the agency of his father or another male relative) cannot be ruled out: on such *ijāzas* see below.

We must mention the possibility that instead of the figure identified here, Raḍī al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī might be the Shafī'i mufti and member of the same family Aḥmad b. 'Abdallāh al-Ṭabarī al-Makkī (d.694) listed by Yahya, *Histoire*, 1, p. 133 as a defender of Ibn 'Arabī. There is no evidence that the latter was known as Raḍī al-Dīn/al-Raḍī, however. Other members of the important al-Ṭabarī al-Makkī family appear later in chain {D}.

It is noteworthy that Ibn 'Arabī had encountered the previous imam of the Maqām Ibrāhīm during a visit to Mecca in AH 598, in the person of the father of Niẓām, Shaykh Abū Shujā' Zāhir b. Rustam al-Iṣfahānī (d.609/1212), from whom he received an *ijāza* for Tirmidhī's collection of hadith. See Addas, *Quest for the Red Sulphur*, pp. 209–210; Ibn al-'Arabī, *The Tarjumān al-Ashwāq*, ed. Reynold A. Nicholson (London, 1978), p. 3.

20. See 'Ibn 'Asakir', EI², 3, pp. 713–715. Ibn 'Arabī himself listed another figure called al-Qāsim Ibn 'Asākīr among his own hadith instructors, who died in 600/1203. See Alexander Knysh, *Ibn 'Arabī in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam* (Albany, NY, 1999), p. 334 n. 118.

21. Yahya, *Histoire*, RG 484. See A3320 [University of Istanbul Library], fol. 17a. Note that this *ijāza* including Ibn 'Asākīr is not recorded in *Histoire*, 2, p. 393. The same work arises in Halet Efendi 245, where it appears under a different title, *R. al-Ḥurūf bi'l-manẓūmāt*: fol. 260b records him transmitting the work through an *ijāza* from Ibn 'Arabī, and fol. 271a records him receiving an *ijāza* for it from Ibn 'Arabī and from his son 'Imād al-Dīn.

22. See Yahya, *Histoire*, 2, p. 540, chain 6b.

23. See Esad Efendi 1413, frontispiece. The author thanks Stephen Hirtenstein for this and manuscript information above relating to Ibn 'Asākīr.

24. See al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p.221: see also p.581.
25. On him see EI², 2, p.292; Georges Vajda, ed., *Le Dictionnaire des autorités de 'Abd al-Mu'min al-Dimyati* (Paris, 1962). For a list of his writings, see Brockelmann, *GAL*, II, p.88; Sup. II, p.79.
26. See Vajda, ed., *Le Dictionnaire des autorités*, p.12.
27. Ibid., p.123. He does not appear in the index of *samā's*, however.
28. See Yahya, *Histoire*, 2, p.540, chains 6c and d.
29. See Addas, *Quest for the Red Sulphur*, p.320.
30. Such as Ibn 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Maqdisī: see al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p.645; also pp.638, 997.
31. For examples of his students, teaching and transmissions, see al-Dhahabī, *Dhayl ta'rīkh al-Islām*, pp.152, 409, 455, 369; al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, 3, p.163.
32. The full name given here follows that in Ibn al-'Irāqī, *al-Dhayl 'alā al-'ibar*, 2, p.492: the author also spells the name al-Ḥarrāwī, while all other sources do not double the r (we follow this majority position here). 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab* (Cairo, 1351), 6, p.272 gives as his full name Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Yūsuf b. 'Alī b. Idrīs al-Ḥarāwī {al-Ṭabardār}. Al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, 4, p.216 gives it as Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Yūsuf b. Idrīs al-Dimyātī al-Ḥarāwī {Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭabardār}. None of these refer to him as 'Abū Ṭalḥa' or as 'al-Zāhid'. Al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p.319 mentions 'Abū Ṭalḥa al-Ḥarāwī al-Zāhid' and p.549 Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Yūsuf al-Ḥarāwī (Nāṣir al-Dīn), evidently the same person. Note that the name is spelled differently in all three appearances in chains in Yahya, *Histoire*, 2, pp.540–541 (as Ṭalḥa al-Ḥarrāwī, Abū Ṭalḥa al-Kharrāwī, and Abū Ṭalḥa al-Ḥarrawī).
33. For the former see Ibn al-'Irāqī, *al-Dhayl 'alā al-'ibar*, 2, p.492 and Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab*, 6, p.272. For the latter see al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, 4, p.216.
34. See Ibn al-'Irāqī, *al-Dhayl 'alā al-'ibar*, 2, pp.492–493; Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-dhahab*, 6, p.272.
35. See al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp.319 and 549. This gives, respectively, Abū Ṭalḥa al-Ḥarāwī al-Zāhid and Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Yūsuf al-Ḥarāwī transmitting (p.319 Ibn 'Arabi's works specifically) from Sharaf al-Dīn al-Dimyātī, and to Muḥammad b. Muqbil al-Ḥalabī.
36. Al-'Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, 1, p.11 gives his full name as Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Wāḥid b. 'Abd al-Mu'min b. Sa'īd b. Kāmil b. 'Alwān al-Tanūkhī.
37. In each case al-'Asqalānī describes his contribution through the expression *takhrīj*. In relation to works of hadith this typically means 'to quote, publish or give the *isnād*' of a hadith. (It may also indicate 'bringing out' the implications of hadith for the rules of *fiqh*, encompassing an explanation of use and shortness of associated chains of transmission, and making for easy identification of hadith relevant to specific subjects.) See Roy Mottahedeh, Review of Richard W. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur* (Cambridge, MA, 1972), *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 95: 3 (1975), p.492.

38. See further al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp. 220–222, 1014, index; al-‘Asqalānī, *al-Durar al-kāmina*, 1, pp. 11–12.

39. On him see Knysh, *Ibn ‘Arabī*, pp. 226, 237; idem, ‘Ibn ‘Arabī in the Yemen: His Admirers and Detractors’, *JMIAS* XI (1992), pp. 44 ff; for detailed sources discussing his biography and work, p. 59 n. 35.

40. See al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp. 553, 110–111. The name al-Murshidī may refer to one of his ancestors or Munyat Rashid, an Egyptian village. Note the appearance of al-Murshidī in a chain relating to the *Ḥizb* of al-Nawawī: p. 1144.

41. On him see EI², 3, pp. 776–778.

42. Knysh, *Ibn ‘Arabī*, pp. 26, 135.

43. Ibid., pp. 128–129; see also chs. 5, 8; idem, Ibn ‘Arabī in the Later Islamic Tradition, in S. Hirtenstein and M. Tiernan, eds., *Muḥyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī: A Commemorative Volume* (Shaftesbury, 1993), pp. 308, 313. Similarly, Yahya, *Histoire*, 1, pp. 130, 134 includes Ibn Ḥajar both among the mufti defenders and opponents of Ibn ‘Arabī.

44. See Basheer M. Nafi, ‘Tasawwuf and Reform in Pre-Modern Islamic Culture: In Search of Ibrahim al-Kurani’, *Die Welt des Islams* 42: 3 (2002), p. 329. Cf. idem, ‘Abu al-Thana’ al-Alusi: An ‘Alim, Ottoman Mufti, and Exegetist of the Qur’an’, *IJMES* 34 (2002), p. 466.

By the term *salafi* we refer here to a view of Islam shaped by the defining principles of the legacy of Aḥmad Ibn Taymīya (d.1328), whose vision of Islam represented an attempt to restore the pristine faith as understood and practised by the *salaf al-ṣāliḥ* or righteous forefathers of the Islamic community. These principles served to reinstate the ultimate authority of the original Islamic texts against the accumulated Islamic tradition, to protect *tawḥīd*, uphold the absence of contradiction between revelation and reason, and establish the unity of the community. Ibn Taymīya’s call to return to a direct understanding of the Qur’an and hadith was in opposition to the invocation of Greek philosophical concepts/tools by Ash‘ari and Mu‘tazili theological schools (which threatened to undermine the proper relationship of reason to revelation). It was also set against unreserved following of the opinions of the *madhāhib* (legal school) founders through *taqlīd*. He rejected sectarian and *madhhab*-based divisions and denounced the excesses of popular *taṣawwuf* and the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* for its threatened undermining of *tawḥīd* and divine transcendence. Given its reformist thrust, this legacy was eventually to become a major source of inspiration for those Sunni ulama who sought to challenge the dominant culture of Ash‘arism and to reform aspects of sufi belief and practice. For a concise introduction to Ibn Taymīya’s thought and legacy, see Itzhak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden, 2001), pp. 263–268. See further Henri Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taki al-Din Ahmad b. Taimiya* (Cairo, 1939).

45. Al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp. 319, 554.

46. Ibid., pp. 617, 554.

47. On Hanbali *faqīh* al-Fakhr Ibn al-Bukhārī (Abū’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Aḥmad b.

‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Maqdisī, AH 596–690), see *ibid.*, pp. 633–634. On his importance as a hadith transmitter by virtue of his ‘high’ chain, see pp. 588, 947, 1013.

48. See for example *ibid.*, p. 991.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 549. For further accounts of Muḥammad b. Muqbil transmitting to al-Suyūṭī, see pp. 627, 634.

50. On the father see *ibid.*, p. 270.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 910 ff.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 617, 911.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 110–111, 669.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 669; *al-Taysīr bi-tarājīm al-Ṭabarīyīn* is also known as *al-Tabyīn fī tarājīm al-Ṭabarīyīn*: see al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 2, p. 457.

55. On him see EI², 9, pp. 913–916; for details concerning his contribution to the late 9th-century AH debate concerning Ibn ‘Arabī’s teachings see Knysh, *Ibn ‘Arabī*, pp. 79–81, 119–120, 213, 223. Yahya, *Histoire*, 1, p. 134 lists him among the defenders of Ibn ‘Arabī. See also Knysh, *Ibn ‘Arabī in the Later Islamic Tradition*, pp. 312, 316–317.

56. Al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p. 1014.

57. See also *ibid.* p. 853.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 755–756.

59. See *ibid.*, pp. 619, 755.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 755–756, 677, 684.

61. See *ibid.* pp. 756, 1125, 853, also 958–959.

62. See Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā’ira bi-a’yān al-mi’a al-’āshira*, ed. Jibrail S. Jabbur (Harissa, Lebanon, 1959), 1, pp. 197–198.

63. See Michael Winter, *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings of ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha’rānī* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1982), pp. 54–55; EI², 11, p. 406. For autobiographical accounts transmitted from Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī to al-Sha’rānī and other accounts related by al-Sha’rānī concerning him, see for example al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā’ira*, 1, pp. 196–198, 200–201. His early reputation for a love of the sufis, for attending their *dhikr* sessions and studying their works, had led his peers to suggest that he would be ‘no use’ as a *faqīh*: when he went on to excel in the exoteric sciences, some of them became jealous. See *ibid.*, pp. 198, 200.

64. See al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā’ira*, 1, p. 202.

65. See *ibid.*, pp. 203–204 (as al-Ghazzī puts it, ‘He understood through *dhawq* {spiritual ‘taste’} the words of the folk, and would explain what the people of the way said in the most perfect way, providing excellent answers concerning this if part of it appeared ambiguous to people.’); Knysh, *Ibn ‘Arabī*, p. 212; Th. Emil Homerin, *From Arab Poet to Muslim Saint: Ibn al-Farid, His Verse and His Shrine* (Columbia, SC, 1994), pp. 69–73; Winter, *Society and Religion*, pp. 163–164. Yahya, *Histoire*, 1, p. 134 lists him among the defenders of Ibn ‘Arabī.

66. See al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā’ira*, 1, p. 199.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

68. Al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p. 319.

69. Also spelled Sha'rawī: see Brockelmann, *GAL*, II, p. 441.

70. See for example Knysh, *Ibn 'Arabī in the Later Islamic Tradition*, p. 311; Winter, *Society and Religion*, pp. 165–172. The 'deliberate interpolation' hypothesis was a historical stratagem used in Islamic culture to deal with difficulties presented by certain texts from the perspective of 'orthodoxy'. It was used to exonerate Ibn 'Arabī, for example, by casting doubt on the attribution of the *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* to him in its extant form, on the grounds that specific problematic statements had been inserted into the text.

71. Winter, *Society and Religion*, p. 55.

72. See EI², 9, p. 316. On him see further Winter, *Society and Religion*.

73. See for example David Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (New York and Oxford, 1990), p. 50; for his attitude towards the *madhāhib* and *madhhab* affiliation see Winter, *Society and Religion*, pp. 224, 236–241.

74. See Nafi, 'Abu al-Thana' al-Alusi', p. 489 n. 7.

75. See Winter, *Society and Religion*, p. 57; al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā'ira*, 1, pp. 97–98.

76. Winter, *Society and Religion*, pp. 99, 139–140. This was the only one of his many shaykhs to give him such authorisation. Al-Sha'rānī expressly referred to al-Shinnāwī as al-Aḥmadī. Several of his other shaykhs were also Aḥmadīs, associated with the Ahmadiyya, 'the order of Aḥmad al-Badawī': *ibid.*, p. 98. More commonly known as the Badawiyya, this is characterised by a popular cult centred on al-Badawī, his *mawlid* and his tomb in Tanta, Egypt. For al-Sha'rānī's accounts of al-Shinnāwī conversing with al-Badawī at the latter's tomb see al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā'ira*, 1, p. 98.

77. Winter, *Society and Religion*, pp. 99, 138.

78. This was Abū'l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad al-Iskandarī al-Mazzī. The account here draws on al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā'ira*, 3, pp. 3–10.

79. See Barbara Rosenow von Schlegell, *Sufism in the Ottoman Arab World: Shaykh 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d.1143/1731)*, PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1997, p. 29.

80. See Brockelmann, *GAL*, II, p. 514.

81. See al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 1, p. 244; Martin van Bruinessen, 'Origins and Development of the Sufi Orders (*tarekat*) in Southeast Asia', *Studia Islamika* (Jakarta) 1: 1 (1994); *idem*, 'Shari'a Court, Tarekat and Pesantren: Religious Institutions in the Sultanate of Banten', *Archipel* 50 (1995), p. 179. On Şibghatallāh (d.1015/1606–07), see Atallah S. Copt, 'The Naqshbandiyya and its Offshoot, the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Haramayn in the 11th/17th Century', *Die Welt des Islams* 43: 3 (2003), p. 323. He had received Ibn 'Arabī's doctrine (which he propagated in the Haramayn) from his shaykh Wajīh al-Dīn al-'Alawī (d.1609), an 'outstanding advocate' of Ibn 'Arabī and his doctrine in India. See further Khaled El-Rouayheb, 'Opening the Gate of Verification: The Forgotten Arab-Islamic Florescence of the 17th Century', *IJMES* 38 (2006), pp. 271; 247 n. 51.

82. See John O. Voll, ‘‘Abdallah Ibn Salim al-Basri and 18th Century Hadith Scholarship’’, *Die Welt des Islams* 42: 3 (2002), p. 367.

83. See Brockelmann, *GAL*, II, p. 514. He also wrote *Risāla fī waḥdat al-wujūd*: see al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 1, p. 244.

84. This paragraph is based on al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 2, pp. 457–464.

85. On his teachers see Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, *Luṭf al-samar wa qatf al-thamar min tarājīm a’yān al-ṭabaqa al-ūlā min al-qarn al-ḥādī ‘ashar*, ed. Mahmud al-Shaykh (Damascus, 1981), 1, pp. 31–36. Particular mention should be made of his shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Yūnus al-‘Īthāwī, Shafī’i mufti.

86. See ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar, *Hilyat al-bashar fī ta’rīkh al-qarn al-thālith ‘ashar* (Beirut, 1993/1961), 1, p. 153; al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā’ira*, 1, pp. xi–xxi. For further details of his posts see al-Ghazzī, *Luṭf al-samar*, 1, pp. 45–55.

87. See al-Ghazzī, *Luṭf al-samar*, 1, p. 97.

88. See von Schlegell, *Sufism*, pp. 32, 43, 78; Zuhayr Khalil al-Burqawi, *‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī wa taṣawwufuhu* (Amman, 2003), p. 95.

89. Al-Ghazzī, *Luṭf al-samar*, 1, p. 96; Muḥammad Khalīl b. ‘Alī al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar fī a’yān al-qarn al-thānī ‘ashar* (Cairo, 1301), 1, p. 5; Nafī, ‘Tasawwuf and Reform’, p. 321.

90. For his works in this field see al-Ghazzī, *Luṭf al-samar*, 1, pp. 108–111.

91. See al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 4, p. 199.

92. Ibid., p. 200; see also al-Ghazzī, *Luṭf al-samar*, 1, p. 84.

93. John O. Voll, ‘Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: An Analysis of an Intellectual Group in Eighteenth-century Madina’, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 38: 1 (1975), pp. 32–33 indicates something of al-Qushāshī’s importance to 18th-century Medinan ulama circles based on intellectual lineages among them leading back to him.

94. See ibid., p. 34. Editor of the six major Sunni collections of hadith and described by al-Jabartī as ‘the seal of hadith scholars’, al-Baṣrī was a teacher of Muḥammad Ḥayāt al-Sindī. On him see Voll, ‘Abdallah Ibn Salim al-Basri’, pp. 356–372.

95. See Nafī, ‘Tasawwuf and Reform’, pp. 312–320.

96. Al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 1, p. 345.

97. See EI², 5, pp. 525–526. On Singkel see below. Note that al-Qushāshī was centrally involved in the polemic engaged with Sirhindī’s *khalīfa* Ādam al-Banūrī during meetings in Medina on specific points of doctrine as interpreted by Ādam. See Copt, ‘The Naqshbandiyya’, pp. 332–337.

98. Michel Chodkiewicz, *Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn ‘Arabī* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 135–136; al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 1, p. 345.

99. ‘mazj al-ḥaqā’iq bi’l-aḥādīth al-nabawīya’ as described in al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fuhāris*, p. 971.

100. See Voll, ‘Abdallah Ibn Salim al-Basri’, p. 368.

101. See Nafi, 'Tasawwuf and Reform', p. 314 (and for further detailed sources on al-Qushāshī, see p. 312 n. 10–13); cf. al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p. 971.

102. Al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 2, pp. 195–196. Voll, 'Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi', p. 33 n. 8 mentions him in passing among a group of teachers in 18th-century Medina. His brother 'Alī (d.1070/1659–60) was imam and Hanafi mufti at the Ḥaram (Sanctuary) in Mecca. See Coptý, 'The Naqshbandiyya', pp. 330–331.

103. See al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar*, 1, p. 345.

104. For a detailed overview of his education, see Nafi, 'Tasawwuf and Reform', pp. 321 ff.

105. Voll, 'Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi', p. 34.

106. See Alexander Knysh, 'Ibrahim al-Kurani (d.1101/1690), An Apologist for *waḥdat al-wujūd*', *JRAS* Series 3, 5: 1 (1999), p. 46.

107. Martin van Bruinessen, 'Kurdish 'Ulama and their Indonesian Disciples', at http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Kurdish_ulama_Indonesia.htm, 20pp: pp. 4–5. On his stature see further El-Rouayheb, 'Opening the Gate', p. 274.

108. Knysh, 'Ibrahim al-Kurani', p. 45. Van Bruinessen, 'Kurdish 'Ulama', p. 5 describes the mature al-Kūrānī as 'the leading representative of Ibn 'Arabī's doctrines in Medina and perhaps throughout the entire Muslim world.'

109. Singkel became particularly close to al-Kūrānī, who gave him an *ijāza* to teach the Shattariyya *ṭarīqa*. He was the first to introduce the *ṭarīqa* to Indonesia, establishing it there as a moderate force as part of a broader reconciliation of mystics and legalists, and was thus a major influence on the revival of orthodox sufism, combined with shari'a, in Sumatra. See van Bruinessen, 'Kurdish 'Ulama', p. 4; Voll, 'Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi', p. 39; idem, 'Abdallah Ibn Salim al-Basri', p. 370; Anthony Johns, Islam in Southeast Asia: Problems and Perspectives, in C. D. Cowan and O. W. Walters, eds., *Southeast Asian History and Historiography: Essays Presented to D. G. E. Hall* (Ithaca, NY, 1976), pp. 314–319.

110. Van Bruinessen, 'Kurdish 'Ulama', p. 5; Nafi, 'Tasawwuf and Reform', pp. 334 ff. On al-Kūrānī's role in transmitting hadith via the Yemeni Mizjaji family, see John O. Voll, Linking Groups in the Networks of Eighteenth Century Revivalist Scholars: The Mizjaji Family in Yemen, in Nehemia Levtzion and John O. Voll, eds., *Eighteenth-Century Islamic Renewal and Reform* (Syracuse, NY, 1987), p. 76.

111. Al-Kūrānī responded himself and also asked his student Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Rasūl al-Barzanjī to respond. The latter wrote two treatises (dated 1682 and 1683) severely criticising Sirhindī: these were endorsed by leading ulama of the Hijaz, who agreed unanimously that Sirhindī's ideas amounted to serious deviation. (It is unlikely, however, that al-Kūrānī would have agreed that Sirhindī be labelled an unbeliever [*kāfir*]: see Coptý, 'The Naqshbandiyya', pp. 338–345, which also illuminates the political context of the Indian request for a fatwa, and the interests of the Sharif of Mecca in his relations with the Mughal ruler.) Many more works of the same kind appear to have been written in the context of this controversy over Sirhindī's views: see further Yohanan Freidmann, *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī: An Outline of his Thought*

and a Study of his Image in the Eyes of Posterity (Montreal and London, 1971), pp. 7–8, 96–97; Athar Abbas Rizvi, *A History of Sufism in India*, II (New Delhi, 1983); van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish ‘Ulama’, p. 5.

On Sirhindī, who projected himself as the renovator of the second millennium and sought to replace the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* with that of *waḥdat al-shuhūd*, mounting a comprehensive reformist challenge to the *ṭarīqas* aimed at reconciling *taṣawwuf* with the shari‘a and reinstating the centrality of the Sunna, see further Muhammad Abdul Haq Ansari, *Sufism and Shari‘ah: A Study of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī’s Efforts to Reform Sufism* (Leicester, 1986).

Nafi, ‘Tasawwuf and Reform’, pp. 324–235, 247 points out that when al-Kūrānī joined the Naqshbandiyya through al-Qushāshī this was *not* through the Sirhindī line: later in his career, however, his students were initiated through this line.

112. See Basheer M. Nafi, ‘He was a Teacher of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: Muhammad Hayat al-Sindi and the Revival of the Traditionist Methodology’, unpublished paper. Voll, ‘‘Abdallah Ibn Salim al-Basri’, p. 366 suggests that his approach to hadith studies formed part of an emergent, more textualist, mode. Note also that al-Kūrānī was a teacher of ‘Abdallāh b. Sālīm al-Baṣrī in hadith instruction: see *ibid.* pp. 364–365. On the interest in hadith scholarship among ulama with strong sufi affiliations in the 17th and 18th centuries, see John O. Voll, ‘Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs: An Ulama Group in the 18th Century Haramayn and their Impact in the Islamic World’, *Journal of Asian and African Studies* XV: 3–4 (1980), pp. 264–272.

113. See for example EI², 5, p. 433; Knysh, ‘Ibrahim al-Kurani’, p. 42.

114. As Nafi, ‘Tasawwuf and Reform’ pp. 323–324 points out, al-Kūrānī’s view of Ibn Taymīya was positively influenced by his main Damascene teacher, Hanbali mufti and the most eminent Hanbali ‘*ālim* in Damascus at the time, ‘Abd al-Bāqī Taqī al-Dīn b. Mawāhib al-Ḥanbalī (d. 1070/1660). See also *idem*, ‘He was a Teacher’.

In relation to issues of *kalām* and late Ash‘arism, Nafi surveys al-Kūrānī’s treatment of such questions as the Qur‘an and the divine speech, the attributes of God, and the concept of *kasb* (acquisition of actions), pointing out where he parted company with late Ash‘ari dogma and declared his adherence to the salafi position, at the same time serving the end of rehabilitating the latter in dominant sufi–Ash‘ari circles. See Nafi, ‘Tasawwuf and Reform’, pp. 330–334, 339–342. He suggests that, in rejecting corporeity, anthropomorphism and allegorical interpretation, al-Kūrānī effectively constructed ‘a salafi foundation for Sufism’. See *ibid.* p. 337. For details of al-Kūrānī’s views on *waḥdat al-wujūd*, which amount to ‘an attempt to legitimate [it] not only in the eyes of the strict Muslim but even in the eyes of the...salafi’, see *ibid.* pp. 337–338.

It is noteworthy that ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī disagreed profoundly with al-Kūrānī’s (strongly salafi) view regarding the issue of *kasb*: see von Schlegell, *Sufism*, p. 19 n. 51. For other reactions to his views on free will, see El-Rouayheb, ‘Opening the Gate’, p. 281 n. 86.

Note finally an *ijāza* and advice from al-Kūrānī addressed to specific individuals (dated AH 1095 and 1096, respectively) concerning their perusal of Ibn ‘Arabī’s works

and the issue of reading these with/to others. He clarifies the attitude and approach appropriate to a beneficial and blessed reading and discussion of Ibn 'Arabī's words (viz., *bi-sharṭ al-īmān bi'l-mutashābihāt ma'a laysa kamithlihi shay'*), warning that holding rigidly to the belief of the theologians (*mutakallimūn*) in such reading will be fruitless. Thus, if they find someone with the right attitude (*idhā ra'aytum aḥadan yu'min bi'l-mutashābihāt al-qur'āniya wa'l-tanzīh*), then it is fine to read with him. See A 3239 [University of Istanbul Library], fol. 151a.

115. See Nafi, 'Tasawwuf and Reform', pp. 342, 350.

116. On his relationship with al-Nābulusī, see 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, *al-Haqīqa wa'l-majāz fī riḥlat bilād al-Shām wa Miṣr wa'l-Hijāz*, ed. Riyad 'Abd al-Hamid Murad (Damascus, 1989), p. 324 ff.

117. See Nafi, 'Tasawwuf and Reform', pp. 346–347; al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp. 216–218.

118. His *Dhakhā'ir al-mawārith fī'l-dalāla 'alā mawāḍi' al-aḥādīth* set out all the books of sound hadith collections by the first transmitters' names: see von Schlegell, *Sufism*, p. 3.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

120. See *ibid.*, chs. 2–4. For further detail on al-Nābulusī, see Elizabeth Sirreyeh, *Sufi Visionary of Damascus: 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nabulusi, 1641–1731* (London and New York, 2005); Bakri Aladdin, *Abdalghani al-Nabulusi (d.1143/1731): oeuvre, vie et doctrine*, 2 vols., PhD thesis, University of Paris I, 1985; al-Burqawi, 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī wa ṭasawwufuhū; EI², 1, p. 60.

121. See von Schlegell, *Sufism*, pp. 33, 43, 250–251. Al-Nābulusī explicitly mentioned in relation to *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* that he had inner (*bāṭinī*) paths of transmission which he could not make public.

122. See *ibid.*, p. 8.

123. See Voll, 'Abdallah Ibn Salim al-Basri', pp. 363, 369.

124. For further detail see al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp. 495–496; al-Bitar, *Ḥilyat al-bashar*, 2, p. 715; al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar*, 4, p. 27; Voll, 'Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi', pp. 33, 39; Knysh, 'Ibrahim al-Kurani', p. 46.

125. On him see Nafi, 'He was a Teacher'; Voll, 'Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi'.

126. See Aziz Ahmad, 'Political and Religious Ideas of Shah Wali-ullah of Delhi', *The Muslim World* LII: 1 (1962), p. 22; J. M. S. Baljon, *Religion and Thought of Shah Wali Allah, 1702–1762* (Leiden, 1986), pp. 5–6; Hafiz A. Ghaffar Khan, 'Shah Wali Allah: On the Nature, Origin, Definition and Classification of Knowledge', *Journal of Islamic Studies* 3: 2 (1992), pp. 203–213; Nafi, 'Tasawwuf and Reform', p. 344.

A third student was the leading Naqshbandi shaykh in Medina, Ismā'īl b. 'Abdal-lāh al-Uskudārī (d.1182/1768–69). See Copty, 'The Naqshbandiyya', p. 345.

127. See al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p. 497.

128. See Nafi, 'Tasawwuf and Reform', p. 347.

129. See EI², 1, pp. 965–966; Voll, 'Abdallah Ibn Salim al-Basri', p. 369; von Schlegell, *Sufism*, pp. 55–58, 128, 277. Frederick De Jong, Mustafa Kamal al-Din al-Bakri (1688–1749): Revival and Reform of the Khalwatiyya Tradition? in Levzion

and Voll, eds., *Eighteenth-Century Islamic Renewal and Reform*, pp.117–132 revisits earlier projections of al-Bakrī inspiring a Khalwati revival in the 18th century and reforming the Khalwati way. For another view, see B. G. Martin, A Short History of the Khalwatiyya Order of Dervishes, in N. Keddie, ed., *Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500* (Berkeley, CA, 1972), pp.275–305.

130. Al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp.100–102. See further index.

131. Note that in chain {B} ‘al-Ḥanafī’ is a misreading of al-Ḥifnī by the copyist. The same copyist misreads al-Bakrī as al-Kubrā.

132. On al-Ḥifnāwī see ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī, *‘Ajā’ib al-āthār fī’l-tarājim wa’l-akhbār* (Beirut, n.d.), 1, pp.339–354; de Jong, Mustafa Kamal al-Din al-Bakri, pp.118, 120, 126–7. For his writings see al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar*, 4, p.49. For further sources on him, see Nafi, ‘Tasawwuf and Reform’, p.347 n.121. Note that al-Ḥifnāwī had himself assumed the position of Shaykh al-Azhar from 1757/58 until his death in 1767.

Al-Dardayr introduced certain changes to the litany of the Khalwati *ṭarīqa*, incorporating into this his *Ṣalawāt* and *Manzūma* (see ch. 1 n.4). These changes were retained by most of the *ṭarīqa* branches that emerged later. See de Jong, Mustafa Kamal al-Din al-Bakri, pp.127, 132 n.82.

133. Brockelmann, *GAL*, II, p.436.

134. Al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar*, 4, p.102. The Wadi Tafilat in the southeast region of Morocco was the centre of the Kharijite emirate centred on Sijilmassa (8th–9th centuries CE). The Idrisid dynasty originated from this region.

135. See *ibid.*, pp.102–108. For further sources, see al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp.268–269.

136. B; A 4305 [University of Istanbul Library] is another copy (40 fols.) apparently dated AH 1273.

137. Brockelmann, *GAL*, II, p.436; see also I, p.580. For further details of his works, see al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp.268–269.

138. For example, al-Kuzbarī al-Waṣīt [Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān], son of the foremost hadith scholar in the Syrian Ottoman provinces (d. AH 1221). He also appears in the *thabat* (list of authorities) of Maḥmūd Ḥamza al-Ḥusaynī (d.1305). See al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp.485, 880.

139. On him see al-Jabartī, *‘Ajā’ib al-āthār*, 1, pp.553–558; 348, drawn on here.

140. De Jong, Mustafa Kamal al-Din al-Bakri, p.117; von Schlegell, *Sufism*, pp.57 n.157; 277.

141. See al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar*, 4, pp.14–15.

142. Brockelmann, *GAL*, Sup. II, p.479.

143. Son of an important notable family of Damascus.

144. C, fols. 2b–3a.

145. Brockelmann, *GAL*, Sup. II, p.474.

146. Al-Bitar, *Ḥilyat al-bashar*, 1, p.3.

147. See von Schlegell, *Sufism*, pp.36 ff.

148. See Aḥmad al-Budayrī al-Ḥallāq, *Ḥawādith Dimashq al-yawmīya*, 1154–1175/1741–1762, ed. Ahmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karim (Damascus, 1959), p. 52.

149. See Yahya, *Histoire*, 2, pp. 540–541.

150. On Muḥammad al-Jundī see al-Bitar, *Ḥilyat al-bashar*, 1, pp. 349–350; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, p. 61.

Khālīd al-Naqshbandī (1776–1826) was born in Shahrzur in northern Iraq. He studied there, in Damascus and the Hijaz and travelled to Delhi, where he studied with the leading Naqshbandī master, who gave him an *ijāza* and an instruction to spread the *ṭarīqa* in the Ottoman lands. His successes in this during the first part of the 19th century (he appointed at least 67 *khalīfas* among Kurds, Turks and Arabs) were such that the line he initiated became known as the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya (or Mujaddidiyya-Khalidiyya). He lived consecutively in Sulaymaniyya, Baghdad and Damascus. On him see Albert H. Hourani, *Sufism and Modern Islam: Mawlana Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order*, in Hourani, ed., *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (London, 1981), pp. 75–89; Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, chs. 1–2; van Bruinessen, ‘Kurdish ‘Ulama’, pp. 9–10; Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘Salafiyya and the Rise of the Khalidiyya in Baghdad in the Early Nineteenth Century’, *Die Welt des Islams* 43:3 (2003), pp. 364–367.

151. In chain {A} Amīn al-Jundī refers to his father simply as Muḥammad Efendī al-Jundī, while his note at the end of the commentary identifies his father as ‘Muḥammad Sa‘īd Efendī *min sulālat* Āl Ramaḍān b. al-ḥajj Ishāq Efendī al-muftī fi madīnat Aṭana [al-Astāna?] fi-mā maḍā min al-zamān.’ (A, fol. 52a) He also signs himself in the same place as ‘Jundī Zāde Muḥammad Amīn al-‘Abbās al-muftī bi-Dimashq’. Al-Bitar, *Ḥilyat al-bashar*, 1, p. 343 confirms Amīn’s descent from al-‘Abbās, the Prophet’s uncle, and includes in his full name a mention of Ishāq thus: Amīn Efendī b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. Ishāq b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-Jundī al-Ma‘arrī. (Note the existence of a near contemporary also named Amīn b. Muḥammad Sa‘īd in al-Bitar, *Ḥilyat al-bashar*, 1, p. 342.)

152. See al-Bitar, *Ḥilyat al-bashar*, 1, pp. 343–364; Muhammad Jamil al-Shatti, *A‘yān Dimashq fi’l-qarn al-thālith ‘ashar wa nisfal-qarn al-rābi’ ‘ashar*, 1201–1350 (n.p., 1972), 2nd edn., pp. 67–69. For further references, see Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, p. 216 n. 72–73.

On the thought of the Amir ‘Abd al-Qādir and the Akbari awakening among the ulama of Damascus associated with him, see Michel Chodkiewicz, *The Spiritual Writings of Amir ‘Abd al-Kader* (Albany, NY, 1995); Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, chs. 5–6; Commins, *Islamic Reform*, pp. 26–30: on his rescue of Christians, p. 28.

153. See al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p. 1137; R. S. O’Fahey, *Enigmatic Saint: Ahmad b. Idris and the Idrisi Tradition* (London, 1990), p. 66 n. 44. There is some confusion in the literature surrounding this man. Al-Kattani records a Muḥammad Ṭāhir b. Sa‘īd Sunbul *al-Makkī* [index and e.g. pp. 364, 805, 1147], but also gives a Muḥammad Ṭāhir b. Sa‘īd Sunbul *al-Madanī* [e.g. pp. 199, 694], as given also by O’Fahey. {In places, al-Kattani refers simply to a Muḥammad Ṭāhir Sunbul. To add to the confusion, al-Bitar, *Ḥilyat al-bashar*, 2, p. 747 gives a Ṭāhir b. Sa‘īd Sunbul

known as ‘Sunbul al-Dimashqī’ (1150–1218): see also 3, p.1325, where he gives Muḥammad b. Sa‘īd Sunbul (d.1218).} The verification in the literature of the existence of a Muḥammad Ṭāhir b. Sa‘īd Sunbul of the Hijaz, who transmitted from his father and to Yāsīn al-Mīrghanī, is ultimately what concerns us: al-Kattani’s crucial reference gives Yāsīn transmitting from Ṭāhir without specifying whether he is al-Makkī or al-Madanī: see p.1137. On his association with the Mīrghanī family, see O’Fahey, *Enigmatic Saint*, pp.65–66.

154. Al-Bitar, *Hilyat al-bashar*, 2, pp.1101–1102, drawing on al-Jabartī, ‘*Ajā’ ib al-āthār*. See also O’Fahey, *Enigmatic Saint*, pp.61, 143. R. S. O’Fahey and Bernd Radtke, ‘Neo-Sufism Reconsidered’, *Der Islam* 70: 1 (1993), p.58 suggest that he may have fought back against the Wahhabi doctrine on the issue of saintly mediation.

155. O’Fahey, *Enigmatic Saint*, p.143.

156. On this order see ‘Mirghaniyya’, EI², 7, p.124. On ‘Uthmān, see O’Fahey and Radtke, ‘Neo-Sufism Reconsidered’, p.58.

157. See O’Fahey, *Enigmatic Saint*, pp.93, 132–133, 143 n.34. See further al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, pp.103, 122, 197, 253, 557, 904, 906 and 1143.

158. On this transmission, see for example al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p.1137.

159. See *ibid.*, pp.104–106. Another printed work is *al-Lu’lu’ al-marsū’ fī-mā lā aṣl lahu aw aṣluhu mawḍū’* (Cairo, 1305): *ibid.*, p.106; Brockelmann, *GAL*, Sup. II, p.776.

160. A second printing is entitled *K. al-Ṭawr al-aghla fī sharḥ al-Dawr al-a’lā* (Cairo, n.d.).

161. See Brockelmann, *GAL*, Sup. II, p.776; cf. McGregor, *Sanctity and Sainthood*, pp.176–177 n.50.

162. See D, front page and p.159, for example. His own shaykh was reportedly a Shadhili namesake of ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī, whom al-Qāwuqjī admired greatly and whom he projected as an important link in chains of Shadhili teachers: see Winter, *Society and Religion*, pp.70, 88. He also wrote *Barwāriq al-anwār al-jalīya fī asānīd al-sādāt al-ṣūfīya*: al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p.254.

163. On him see further al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, index (under Muḥammad b. Khalīl al-Qāwuqjī).

164. See Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice*, p.89.

165. See for example *ibid.*, pp.109–110.

166. The principle of the pre-eminent value attached to oral testimony in Islamic culture was maintained from early times through an increasingly elastic application of the *ijāza* to transmissions that could not be guaranteed by direct study of the text transmitted and the effective meeting between a transmitter and a receiver capable of understanding the text (which could often require a considerable period of companionship between the two). While early authorities such as al-Shāfi‘ī expressed serious reservations concerning this, *ijāzas* that did not denote a genuine authentication of learning actually accomplished became widely accepted in practice. The ‘child *ijāza*’ is one of several such categories: others are *ijāzas* granted to children still unborn or for works yet to be written; those obtained through a casual encounter or short,

unplanned interview; those requested and granted through correspondence without any actual meeting between the authority and the receiver (signalling an ‘approval’ of existing knowledge rather than actual transmission), and the ‘general *ijāza*’ encompassing an entire oeuvre and typically granted without the actual hearing of texts. See ‘Idjaza’, EI², 3, pp.1020–1022; further von Schlegell, *Sufism*, pp.53, 125–128; Richard W. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur* (Cambridge, MA, 1972), p. 50. Note that by focusing on the *ijāza* as an authentication of knowledge acquired through transmission based on the direct study of a text and the effective meeting between a transmitter and a receiver capable of understanding it (and designating all other kinds of *ijāza* in contrast as ‘formulaic’ or ‘fictitious’), there is a danger of neglecting other dimensions of its significance and role. Highlighted here, these other dimensions come to the fore in the case of a small prayer such as the *Dawr*, which required neither great feats of understanding nor a lengthy spell of companionship and direct study.

Links apparently underpinned by ‘child *ijāzas*’ in our chains are: {D} Ibn ‘Arabī ~ Raḍī al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī; {F} Ibn ‘Arabī ~ al-Wānī; {A} Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī ~ Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī; {E} al-Suyūṭī ~ Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī; {E} al-Dimyāṭī ~ al-Ḥarāwī; {E} al-Ḥarāwī ~ al-Ḥalabī; {A and E} Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī ~ Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī; {A and E} Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī ~ ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī; {E} ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī ~ Ibrāhīm b. Ismā‘īl b. ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī.

167. To give another example, when the historian ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Abū Shāma’s son died aged eight, his father wrote that he had taken him to hear hadith and other texts from over one hundred and seventy shaykhs. See Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice*, p. 140. Fathers would take their sons to shaykhs for *baraka*. In hadith transmission, they might take them very young to the oldest shaykhs in order to shorten the chain between them and the Prophet, raising concerns that ‘one’s shaykhs and their shaykhs were too young to understand the content of what they transmitted’. See *ibid.*, p. 139; cf. Bulliet, *The Patricians of Nishapur*, pp. 50–51, emphasising that ‘the most important educational link was between the child and the old man’. In general, the insertion of young people into chains of transmission formed a central part of their initiation into the culture of the learned elite. See Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice*, pp. 88, 118–119, 124–125, 139–140.

168. Compare, for example, with Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī’s general *ijāza*, received from his father Badr al-Dīn who died when he was seven, in all 41 of Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī’s works. See al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā’ira*, 1, p. 202.

169. As a general point, young people in medieval Damascus were cautioned against ‘taking texts as shaykhs’ and were urged to read only under the personal supervision of a shaykh: among other things, this would link them with all those who had transmitted the text before them, conferring on them the *baraka* of the line of transmission. See Chamberlain, *Knowledge and Social Practice*, pp. 138–139, 141–142, 148.

170. See Yahya, *Histoire*, 2, Addenda B and D.

171. The same chain from Ibn ‘Arabī to al-Suyūṭī appears in al-Kattānī’s description of one route via which he transmits all of Ibn ‘Arabī’s works (and all that the latter himself transmitted): see *Fihris al-fahāris*, p. 319.

172. The chain from al-Qushāshī back to Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī appears also in an *ijāza* in al-Qushāshī's hand for the *Ṣaḥīḥ*: see al-Kattani, *Fihris al-fahāris*, p. 971.

173. I, fol. 62a. Alongside al-Qushāshī, Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī, al-Dimyātī, al-Ḥifnāwī and al-Bakrī, Zakarīyā al-Anṣārī, the Ghazzīs and 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī deserve mention for their critical positions within the chain map.

174. In this context the possibility of this being shorthand for a direct, uwaysi connection to Ibn 'Arabī is greatly weakened by the specific phraseology used.

175. See Addas, *Quest for the Red Sulphur*, p. 320.

176. Note that al-Qushāshī gives his *silṣila* in 'ṭarīq al-shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn' thus: al-Qushāshī ~ Abū'l-Mawāhib al-Shinnāwī ~ his father 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Quddūs ~ 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī ~ Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī ~ Kamāl al-Dīn M b. M b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Shāfi'ī (also known as Imām al-Kamālīya) ~ Shams al-Dīn M b. M al-Jazarī ~ Zayn al-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar b. al-Ḥasan b. Yazīd b. Amīla al-Marāshī ~ 'Izz al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm al-Fārūthī al-Wāsiṭī ~ Ibn 'Arabī. See Aḥmad al-Qushāshī, *al-Simṭ al-majīd fī talqīn al-dhikr wa'l-bay'a wa ilbās al-khirqa wa salāsil ahl al-tawḥīd* (Haydarabad, AH 1327/28), pp. 105–106. Cf. p. 122: al-Qushāshī ~ his father and al-Shinnāwī ~ Ismā'il al-Jabartī ~ Jamāl al-Dīn al-Dajā'ī al-Zabīdī ~ Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. 'Umar b. 'Alī al-'Alawī al-Zabīdī ~ Jamāl al-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Kūhī al-Ashkāhī ~ Najm al-Dīn 'Abdallāh b. M al-Iṣfahānī ~ 'Izz al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Fārūthī al-Wāsiṭī ~ Ibn 'Arabī. The author thanks Michel Chodkiewicz for providing this.

177. It has been argued that the travels of ulama combined with the wide influence of sufi *ṭarīqas* to make the 18th century in particular a time of increasing cosmopolitan interaction in parts of the Muslim world. See Levtzion and Voll, Introduction, in Levtzion and Voll, eds., *Eighteenth-Century Islamic Renewal and Reform*, p. 5.

178. The Haramayn were an important meeting place given their central location and the requirement for the pilgrimage, but scholars and students also came there from all parts of the Muslim world specifically to teach and study: rich exchange took place there among scholars, particularly in Medina. See *ibid.*, p. 7; Voll, 'Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs', pp. 264 ff. As Coptý, 'The Naqshbandiyya', pp. 321–322 details, the reputation of the Haramayn as centres of learning was enhanced as a result of Mamluk and Ottoman support for institutions and positions associated with both 'ilm and *taṣawwuf*.

179. As well as serving as gateways to the Haramayn, Cairo and Damascus were important centres of learning in their own right.

180. On general patterns of communication and interaction among scholars at this time, see Levtzion and Voll, Introduction, p. 8.

181. The influence of both *ṭarīqas* became particularly widespread from the following century: see, for example, Butrus Abu-Manneh, 'Transformations of the Naqshbandiyya, 17th–20th Century: Introduction', *Die Welt des Islams* 43:3 (2003), p. 303. Significantly, El-Rouayheb, 'Opening the Gate', pp. 264, 271–273 links the growing and increasingly open support for the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd* and for Ibn 'Arabī in the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire from the 17th century to the

spread there of originally non-Arab *ṭuruq*, such as the Naqshbandiyya and the Khalwatiyya.

182. McGregor, *Sanctity and Sainthood*, p. 74 points to the Wafa'iyya's emergence from the Shadhiliyya as a case in point.

183. Note that he also appears in chains attached to *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya*: see Yahya, *Histoire*, 2, p. 540, 6b and 6d ii.

184. See Nafi, 'Tasawwuf and Reform', p. 329.

185. For different views in the debate concerning the possible characterisation of the constitutive elements of this position in terms of a rising revivalist/reformist 'neo-Sufism' (in combination with certain other elements) see, for example, O'Fahey, *Enigmatic Saint*, pp. 2 ff.; O'Fahey and Radtke, 'Neo-Sufism Reconsidered', and Ahmad Dallal, 'The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750–1850', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 113: 3 (1993), pp. 341–359.

The affiliation of several of these ulama to the Naqshbandiyya is noteworthy: Medina was a major centre for the *ṭarīqa* during the 17th century. See van Bruinessen, 'Shari'a Court', p. 179; Voll, 'Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs', p. 268; Copty, 'The Naqshbandiyya', p. 322. While one cannot generalise about this *ṭarīqa* as a whole, it was to develop a strong tradition of reform at least through the Mujaddidi line. On attitudes towards Ibn 'Arabī in the *ṭarīqa* prior to Sirhindī, see Hamid Algar, 'Reflections of Ibn 'Arabī in Early Naqshbandi Tradition', *JMIAS* X (1991), pp. 45–66.

186. See Algar, 'Reflections of Ibn 'Arabī', p. 60. On his legacy, see Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, ch. 2. As Abu-Manneh, 'Salafiyyah' demonstrates, Shaykh Khālīd's call came substantially as a reaction (and challenge) to the expansion in Baghdad of an at least partly Wahhabi-inspired Salafi worldview. He provided an alternative religious path for the community, projected as better reflecting the substance of Islam than Salafi beliefs alone (as embodied in the city's rising Salafi trend). Shaykh Khālīd was heir to the legacy of Shāh Walī Allāh, 'whose belief in *waḥdat al-wujūd* did not stop him from writing a treatise on the virtues of Ibn Taymīya and embracing a range of his ideas'. See Nafi, 'Abū al-Thana' al-Alusi', p. 488.

187. See David Commins, 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī and Islamic Reform', *The Muslim World* 78 (1988), pp. 121–131; idem, *Islamic Reform*, pp. 26–30. On the Salafiyya of late Ottoman Damascus see Weismann, *Taste of Modernity*, ch. 8.

188. Cf. Stefan Reichmuth, 'Arabic Literature and Islamic Scholarship in the 17th/18th Century: Topics and Biographies', *Die Welt des Islams* 42: 3 (2002), p. 287.

189. Such a line of enquiry might also be pursued by expanding the characterisation of contemporary users summarised earlier.

3

THE PRAYER FOR SPIRITUAL ELEVATION AND PROTECTION

Properties'

Many who have presented or transmitted the prayer during the last four hundred years have emphasised the importance of reciting it diligently and of taking it, as one puts it, 'as a regular practice (*wird*)'.² Several recommend that it be recited every morning and evening,³ and some in the morning only. Others add that it should also be recited in times of difficulty or distress.⁴ One way to encourage regular reading has been to tie the prayer to the *Awṛād*, as in some *ijāzas* associated with it among certain contemporary sufi circles discussed earlier. In one copy the prayer is integrated into a daily/nightly reading cycle, repeated fourteen times: an opening prayer (*ḥizb iftitāḥ*), a numbered interface text (*ḥiṣār*), Ibn 'Arabī's *wird* for the day/night, the *Dawr* and a concluding prayer (*ḥizb al-ikhtitām*).⁵ Other copies incorporate it after the full complement of the *Awṛād*:⁶ where this is not the case, the owner of an *Awṛād* copy sometimes adds it by hand at the end.⁷ Yet there are many more cases where the prayer is not associated with the *Awṛād*,⁸ and several copies offer specific advice concerning what should be recited before⁹ and after¹⁰ it without reference to the *Awṛād*. Such recommendations typically encompass the *ṣalarwāt*, invocations of Divine Names and formulae emphasising God's unique power, but there are many variations.¹¹

In more substantial treatments recommendations concerning recitation of the prayer are intertwined with a detailing of its special properties (*khawāṣṣ*), for the latter are activated only through its proper use. Commentators and copyists outdo each other in

describing these. By way of illustration, a particularly comprehensive statement of the prayer's properties by the AH 12th–13th century commentator al-Dāmūnī (written in rhymed prose in Arabic) is given below.¹²

I ask Allāh...that [the prayer] may benefit whoever recites it with sincerity and firm inner belief, and that it may achieve their desired end for whoever perseveres in the benefits it contains, for He is the One who Bestows with Noble Generosity, the One who Knows the condition of those who recite. Whoever uses what is in the prayer or recites it with complete inner belief may achieve their desired goal, but whoever recites it or uses its benefits while raising objections will gain nothing but distress and corruption. I include...some of the benefits of this great prayer, in respect to which the response will never fail provided that one has a pure heart. Among its benefits are the following:

Whoever reads it regularly and diligently morning and evening need not fear poverty, blindness or broken bones. He will be in God's secure custody en route and at rest on land and at sea. He need not fear beasts of prey, loss of his possessions, accidents, aches and pains, illnesses, shadow companions (male and female), disobedient and insolent jinn, or malicious storm demons.¹³ He need not fear the arrows of war, for he will always be victorious, never defeated. He need not fear any kind of enemy, human or jinn.¹⁴ He need not fear highway robbers, for Allāh will rip to utter shreds anyone who stands against him. If the one who recites the prayer boards a ship, he need not fear harm or malady, being taken captive, drowning, or any epidemic, be it airborne or earth-bound, on land or at sea, nor the ship being holed and torn apart.¹⁵

Whoever recites the prayer will be safe from enemies and evil oppressors and from all the unjust and envious in all the worlds.¹⁶ He will be respected and well-liked by all who see him, and they will be unable to endure being away from him. He will be like the sun and the moon among the stars: the heavenly and

earthly worlds will love him all his life. He will be protected from migraine, headache, throbbing and shooting pain, tooth, ear, eye and stomach ache, facial palsy, hemiplegia, convulsions, and every malady that afflicts humankind.¹⁷ He will be protected from devilish insinuations and thoughts, will have pleasant dreams, and will see only what gladdens him in all his days.

Whoever recites [the prayer] will be released from imprisonment, constraint and captivity, especially if his reciting is deep-rooted and strong. [Reciting the prayer] makes childbirth easy for the divorcee, and through it every pressing need is met. It removes fevers and chills, and brings home strays and runaways. It reminds one of the Testimony of Faith (*shahāda*) at the time of death, and helps one in the questioning of the two angels, and in the fear caused by sudden death.¹⁸ It awakens the heart from the slumber of heedlessness, and helps in sincere repentance and in erasing one's lapses and errors. It elevates one to the highest stations, in this world and after death. It preserves one from association with the Evil One¹⁹ and from the serious afflictions that affect babies.²⁰ It safeguards the one who recites it from all kinds of jinn, from colic and neuralgia, and from all winds, especially the ill wind²¹ of the evening and morning. It protects against the sting of scorpions and the bite of vipers and snakes, against infectious diseases and plague, and whatever harms humankind. It thwarts black magic and all machinations, and the knots of ill-intent.²² It repels from whoever recites it the army and soldiers of the enemy, bequeaths the memorising of knowledge and the meanings of the glorious Qur'an, and preserves the heart and mind from thoughts [insinuated by] the accursed [Satan]. If recited after *ʿaṣr* it removes misery and poverty, especially if *sūrat al-Wāqīʿa* is recited too, because this *sūra* is an irresistible force.²³

We have mentioned just some of the benefits: strive for them, you who have freed yourself from bondage to habits. Benefit is in accordance with sincerity, faithfulness and firm inner belief; lack of benefit results from distrust and ignominious objecting.

The one who firmly believes will be in enduring felicity in this world, in the isthmus (*barzakh*) and on the Appointed Day, while the one who raises objections will be in a painful torment: hell suffices for him, an evil resting place.

These results arise only through the [spiritual] breaths (*al-anfās*), that is, by receiving [instruction regarding] them from Masters of Wisdom (*al-sāda al-akyās*).²⁴ If someone is without these [spiritual] breaths, it is as if he builds a wall without a foundation. However, if he can't find a perfect one (*al-kāmil*), then he should make pure his intention in this matter, and perhaps he will acquire some of these benefits, if his innermost intention is good. What we have mentioned is sufficient for those who seek, and the [prayer's] benefits are not hidden from the perfect ones.

Many of the properties detailed above and in comparable lists reflect the preoccupations of a pre-modern world in which forces of nature, often attributed to active but imperceptible spirits such as the jinn, were a potent reminder of the precariousness of human life.²⁵ Special liturgical texts attributed to various saints of early and medieval Islam served at the front line in the effort to ward off these threats to life and limb, by subduing such forces.²⁶ They could also be used to neutralise the potential hostility or harmful intentions of jinn in any other circumstances, as indeed those of fellow men. The protective power attributed to such texts conferred a talismanic character upon them, reflected in the sense which has become attached to terms such as *ḥizb* and *ḥirz* commonly used to designate them²⁷ (and in the instructions for use that often accompany them). The power or *baraka* of such texts is perceived to derive from that which inheres in the Qur'anic verses, *ṣalawāt* (and sometimes *muḥaṭṭa'āt* or letter clusters prefacing certain *sūras*) they encompass.²⁸ The saintly stature of their authors confers a particular efficacy upon them, for it is believed that the prayers of a saint are more likely to be heard. As inspired compositions bestowed only upon saintly figures, such texts indeed serve as vehicles for their authors' spiritual authority²⁹ and, of more immediate interest to the suppliant, for the unique inter-

cessory potential that flows from their closeness to God as His friends.

Taking its place in this liturgical arsenal, the *Dawr* appears alongside a wide range of other protective prayers in our sources, notably the *aḥzāb* of Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī³⁰ and the *ḥirz* of Abū Madyan,³¹ but also less well-known prayers with properties of healing or defending against the plague, for example.³² Commentators draw out the protective potential of the *Dawr* by sketching talismans and 'magic squares' with words, letters and numbers: these represent individual verses, and are often accompanied by details of their specific uses.³³ Copyists enhance this protective quality by inserting additional supplications with protective force.³⁴ While most of our sources stress the importance of *reciting* the prayer if its protective and other benefits are to be enjoyed,³⁵ the talismanic character of the text is highlighted by the latest of our commentators, al-Qāwuqjī, who suggests that such benefits accrue from simply carrying the text. The dead, too, can benefit, he adds, for if it is buried with them they will be protected from the torment of the grave.³⁶

As al-Dāmūnī's list makes clear, the prayer's powers also encompass the materialisation of 'positive' effects with regard to relations in the world, in particular the awakening of esteem and affection in people's hearts. Some mention that it can bring forth obedience 'in both earthly and heavenly realms' to whoever recites it. Other lists add to this the power to facilitate exigencies of buying, selling and other kinds of transaction.³⁷ Of particular interest to those who travel the spiritual journey of *taṣawwuf*, further benefits are reflected in the prayer's title. One copyist thus offers the following version of this: *Ḥizb al-wiqāya li-man arāda al-wilāya*, 'prayer of protection for one who strives for close friendship [with God]'.³⁸ Commentators and copyists repeat that people of verification who are sincere in service have 'tried and tested' the prayer's special properties. Through their pure, elevated spiritual resolution (*himma*), they have experienced its benefits and witnessed uncountable secrets.³⁹

According to commentators and copyists, the prayer is thus 'an eternal secret': it is 'a sharp sword' that emanates from 'the most

secret of affairs'.⁴⁰ As in the case of other prayers, they attribute the powers of the *Dawr* to the Qur'anic verses and Divine Names it encompasses.⁴¹ The benefits associated with both elements are explained, but commentators pay particular attention to the Divine Names,⁴² citing well-known Qur'an and hadith texts that urge use of these in supplication and detail the benefits that are associated with them.⁴³ As al-Dāmūnī puts it, the Names are thus 'the door – indeed the keys to the locked doors, and they encompass a speedy response for anyone who orients his heart to his Lord.'⁴⁴ Al-Tāfilātī repeats a caution advanced by scholar-mystics that the Divine Names should be used not for the exclusive end of earthly fortune, but out of pure obedience to His command to use them in supplication. Thus entrusting matters to God, he explains, it becomes possible for one to succeed in worshipping Him as the goal, *and* in having one's earthly requests met consequentially.⁴⁵

Like al-Dāmūnī, most commentators and copyists single out as a *sine qua non* for actualising the prayer's benefits the sincerity of the reader's intention, and their purity of heart.⁴⁶ Some explicitly add to this the need, to which al-Dāmūnī alludes, for 'permission from a guide (*murshid*) perfect in knowledge and conduct'.⁴⁷ In the absence of such guidance, however, recitation of the prayer is still encouraged (with pure intention), as is the hope for actualising at least some of its potential benefits.⁴⁸ This suggests that such recitation without a specific *ijāza* was countenanced, in evidence and perhaps even relatively widespread by the late 18th century, adumbrating popularisation of the prayer in the following centuries.

The text and its contents

It seems more appropriate in discussing a prayer like the *Dawr* to think in terms of a stable text and its variants, rather than a critical edition. As a living text in constant use, versions displaying small differences have become established as equally acceptable across time, reflecting a cumulative process of variation taking place at the

interface between oral transmission and committing to writing, and possibly compounded by the operation of personal preference and tricks of memory. The variants of which they are aware (which they may have discovered in written copies they have surveyed) have indeed been carefully marked by some who have presented the prayer in the last few centuries, pointing to a conviction of the equal validity and prayerful importance of each of these.⁴⁹ At the same time, copyists and commentators implicitly showcase their own ‘personal’ text, which they may have received through an authorisation from a shaykh.

Towards establishing a stable text of the prayer and identifying accepted variations in this we surveyed a wide range of written copies, in the hope of building a picture of how it has been recorded (and thus recited) and transmitted through the last four centuries. There are numerous differences in these copies: perhaps somewhat surprisingly, these also touch the Qur’anic content. In some cases this reflects a legitimate Qur’anic alternative, but in others it must be attributed to inaccuracy of presentation.⁵⁰ Many apparent textual differences in prayer copies can of course be put down to errors of hearing, memorisation, reading or copying, but there are also interpolations, some pious, others explanatory in character. We do not mention each and every difference in the notes accompanying the text, as is often done in critical editions. As our target is a text we hope may serve as a ‘standard’ version that is readily usable, only significant and interesting differences felt to constitute genuine variations are recorded. In preparing the text the aim was to bring out in the best possible form the meanings of the prayer and the sentiments that infuse it, while paying due attention to internal structure and consistency (both of the overall text and its individual verses), literary dimensions, and aspects of auditory texture like rhythm and fluency.

One might legitimately ask why it is worthwhile to produce such a text. First, from a devotional perspective it can be important for those who use the prayer to be confident of reciting an authentic and accurate text. Differences between printed versions specifically (i.e.

those actually in use today for devotional purposes) reviewed by the present author may not appear great, but they are significant enough to be noteworthy. Moreover, there are grammatical errors and spelling inaccuracies in several of these. Second, the identification of a stable text makes possible a well-founded mapping in the prayer of characteristic motifs and subtleties of its author's perspective.

The text we present is based on thirteen copies set out in the Appendix, all but one of them in the form of unpublished manuscripts. These are the most important of the copies reviewed, selected for their association with a chain of transmission, a specific date (paying particular attention to the earliest specifically), or a known figure.⁵¹ Two further copies with full vowels were closely consulted for clarity. Five of the copies used arise in commentaries on the prayer. Particular care must be exercised in working with these as the greater volume of text involved can make it more likely for the copyist (or scribe) to introduce errors.⁵²

The *Dawr* has thirty-three verses, suggesting the image of the traditional string of prayer-beads (*tasbīḥ*; *subḥa*). Its recitation also evokes the image of a necklace: Divine Name pairs and Qur'anic texts form focal points of precious stones, strung together and set off by supplications and rhythmic word chains. Each verse begins with the invocation of two Divine Names and ends in Allāh, the Complete or Unifying Name (*al-ism al-jāmi'*), with which the prayer as a whole also begins (*Allāhumma*).⁵³ Within each prayer verse the Names invoked, the specific object of the supplication and the Qur'anic text are integrated, the latter (more precisely its Qur'anic context) effectively furnishing an illustrative and explanatory scenario for the former.

As Qur'anic texts and invocations of Divine Names form the prayer's outstanding features, the notes that accompany the translation elaborate on these areas specifically.⁵⁴ Where this is not given in the prayer we provide the full Qur'anic verse, indicating how the author of the prayer has quoted this.⁵⁵ We detail the immediate context of each Qur'anic text quoted, making it possible to elaborate the relationship between this and the specific object of supplication.

The notes also identify Names invoked that do not derive from the traditional list of ninety-nine,⁵⁶ pointing up those among them that can be found in the Qur'an.⁵⁷

In rendering the Names into English we have drawn on Ibn 'Arabī's explication of these in his *K. Kashf al-ma'na 'an asmā' Allāh al-ḥusnā*.⁵⁸ Here he provides a threefold elaboration of the qualities of each Name as the servant might relate to them: first, from the perspective of the servant who has 'absolute need' for these qualities, since they denote the Essence (*al-ta'alluq*); second, a spiritual knowledge and realisation of the meanings of these qualities as they relate to the Divine Himself and as they relate to the servant (*al-taḥaqquq*); and third, in the manifestation of these qualities in the servant in a manner appropriate to the servant, just as they appear in Him (*al-takhalluq*).⁵⁹ To bring out this understanding of the qualities of the Names it was necessary in several cases to provide extended meanings in the translation, given in square brackets. Beyond this, a few such brackets are also used as an aid to accuracy and clarity in rendering the sense of the original (including some Qur'anic texts) into English.

With respect to the prayer's Qur'anic content, over a third of the Qur'anic texts incorporated take the form of a direct divine address to a prophet, or appear on the tongue of a prophet. Moses (Mūsā) features most frequently among them, but there are also utterances by Abraham (Ibrāhīm) and Joseph (Yūsuf), for example.⁶⁰ Prayer verse 13, which incorporates part of a Qur'anic verse concerning Joseph, serves to illustrate the rich and subtle composition which shapes the prayer text, while pointing also to the operation of different levels of meaning within it. Taken from the story of Joseph in *sūrat Yūsuf*, the Qur'anic verse in question tells of the impact of Joseph's stunning beauty on the women invited by the wife of the Egyptian in whose employ he was. They had been whispering maliciously that she had been soliciting him, but when they saw him they were so astounded that they cut their hands with the knives provided for the banquet to which she had invited them. The verse ends with their exclamation 'This is no mortal; he is no other than a

noble angel!’ In verse 13 of the prayer, the supplicant solicits a vision of the Divine Beauty, as in the vision experienced by the women of the beauty embodied by Joseph. The request is addressed through the Names of Majesty (invoking explicitly the Names *al-ʔalīl* and *al-Kabīr*), so that through them the Divine Beauty will descend in His Solicitous Majesty. Verse 13 thus alludes to an experience of utter awe in the face of Beauty which discloses the Divine Majesty, Perfection and Solicitude (*ijlāl, ikmāl, iqbāl*).⁶¹ The framing of the request in terms of the metaphor of ‘clothing with a robe’ resonates immediately with Joseph’s own ‘cloak of many colours’, but also with the *khirqā* or sufi mantle, a symbol of those Perfect Servants in whom the divine qualities appear through the mysteries of *takhalluq* referred to above.

Regarding the literary style of the prayer, while it is impossible to emulate the original an effort has been made to retain characteristic features of this in translation, particularly those relating to auditory texture. These include the ending of each of the prayer’s verses in ‘Allāh’,⁶² and the frequent multiple word chains. In the latter case repeated word patterns that help build rhythm (using particular forms of the verbal noun, for example) cannot be repeated in translation.⁶³

It remains finally to underline the embedded-ness of the prayer text (like other works of Ibn ‘Arabī) in the universe of traditional Muslim piety, a universe ultimately rooted in the revealed text with its leitmotifs of man’s utter dependence and vulnerability, and the potential nobility of his aspirations and destiny.

TRANSLATION AND ARABIC TEXT

The Most Elevated Cycle
that brings one close to
Every Station of The Most High

by
Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn
Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. al-‘Arabī

الدَّورُ الْأَعْلَى

المُقَرَّبُ إِلَى كُلِّ مَقَامٍ الْأَعْلَى

للشيخ محي الدين محمد بن علي بن العربي

تحقيق سهى التاجي الفاروقي

In the Name of Allāh, the All-Compassionate, the Most Merciful

1. O Allāh! O You who are the Ever-Living, the Self-Subsisting!
In You I establish my protection: shelter me with the shielding,
protective sufficiency and safeguarding, the reality and proof,
the stronghold and security of *In the Name of Allāh*.⁶⁴
2. Admit me, O You who are the First and Last, to the hidden
domain of the unknowable, secret and encompassing treasure
of *As Allāh wills! There is no power save in Allāh*.⁶⁵
3. Unfurl over me, O You who choose Clemency [over censure],
who Veil in Protection,⁶⁶ the sheltering wing, the covering
veil, the preservation and deliverance of *Hold fast to the bond of
Allāh*.⁶⁷
4. Build around me, O You who are the All-Encompassing,⁶⁸ the
All-Powerful, the secure, encircling wall, the glorious canopy,
the might and majesty of *That is better, that is of the signs of
Allāh*.⁶⁹
5. Place me under Your protection, O You who are Observant
[of all needs] and Responsive [to all requests]: preserve my
soul and faith, my family and children, my home and estate,
through the watchfulness, protectiveness and timely relief and
assistance of *But [Satan] will not hurt them anything, save by the
leave of Allāh*.⁷⁰

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

١ اللَّهُمَّ يَا حَيُّ يَا قَيُّوْمُ بِكَ تَحَصَّنْتُ فَاحْمِنِي بِحِمَايَةِ كِفَايَةِ وَقَايَةِ حَقِيقَةِ

بُرْهَانِ حِرْزِ أَمَانِ بِسْمِ اللَّهِ

٢ وَأَدْخِلْنِي يَا أَوَّلُ يَا آخِرُ مَكْنُونٍ غَيْبٍ سِرِّ دَائِرَةِ كَنْزِ مَا شَاءَ اللَّهُ لِقُوَّةِ

الْأَبَالَةِ

٣ وَأَسْئَلُ عَلَيَّ يَا حَلِيمُ يَا سَتَّارُ كَنْفَ سِتْرِ حِجَابِ صِيَانَةِ نَجَاةِ

وَأَعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ

٤ وَابْنِ يَا مُحِيطُ يَا قَادِرُ عَلَيَّ سُورِ أَمَانِ إِحَاطَةِ مَجْدِ سُرَادِقِ عِزِّ¹

عَظْمَةِ ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ² ذَلِكَ مِنْ آيَاتِ اللَّهِ

٥ وَأَعِزَّنِي يَا رَقِيبُ يَا مُجِيبُ وَأَحْرُسْنِي فِي نَفْسِي وَدِينِي وَأَهْلِي

وَوَلَدِي وَدَارِي وَمَالِي³ بِكَلاَةِ إِعَاذَةِ إِغَاثَةِ⁴ وَلَيْسَ بِضَارِّهِمْ شَيْئًا⁵ إِلَّا

بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ

-
1. A: word missing. B: missing but gives as alternative
 2. D omits ذلك خير but gives as alternative
 3. Order of the last four words varies, some omit مالي or داري
 4. D, E and M add إِعَاذَةِ
 5. D: وما هم بضارين به من احد (Q.2:102)

6. Shield me, O You who Protect [from corruption] and Repel [all evil],⁷¹ by Your Names, Verses and Words, from the evil of Satan and of the powerful, such that if an oppressor or tyrant treats me unjustly, he will be taken by *An enveloping chastisement of Allāh*.⁷²
7. Deliver me, O You who Abase [those who would set themselves above You] and who Avenge [without pardon], from Your iniquitous slaves who wrong me and from their minions, such that if one of them intends me ill, Allāh will forsake him, *Setting a seal upon his hearing and his heart, and laying a cover on his seeing. Who then will guide him, after Allāh?*⁷³
8. Protect me, O You who Seize and Vanquish, from their treacherous deception: repel them from me censured, driven away in blame and routed, through the damaging, corrupting and destruction in *And there was no host to help him, apart from Allāh*.⁷⁴
9. Let me taste, O You who are Ever Glorified and Praised,⁷⁵ Ever Sanctified and Holy, the sweet delight and intimate converse of *Come forward and fear not; for surely you are among those who are secure*⁷⁶ in the shelter of Allāh.

- ٦ وَقَنِي يَا مَانِعُ يَا دَافِعُ^٦ بِأَسْمَائِكَ^٧ وَأَيَاتِكَ وَكَلِمَاتِكَ شَرَّ الشَّيْطَانِ
وَالسُّلْطَانِ فَإِنْ ظَالِمٌ أَوْ جَبَّارٌ بَغَى عَلَيَّ أَخَذْتُهُ غَاشِيَةً مِنْ عَذَابِ اللَّهِ
٧ وَنَجِّنِي يَا مُدْلٍ يَا مُنْتَقِمٌ مِنْ عِبِيدِكَ الظَّالِمَةِ^٨ الْبَاغِينَ عَلَيَّ وَأَعْوَانِهِمْ
فَإِنْ هُمْ لِي مِنْهُمْ أَحَدٌ^٩ بِسُوءِ خَذَلَهُ اللَّهُ^{١٠} وَخَتَمَ عَلَى سَمْعِهِ وَقَلْبِهِ وَجَعَلَ
عَلَى بَصَرِهِ غِشَاوَةً فَمَنْ يَهْدِيهِ مِنْ بَعْدِ اللَّهِ
٨ وَاكْفِنِي يَا قَابِضُ يَا قَهَّارُ خَدِيعَةَ مَكْرِهِمْ وَارْدُدْهُمْ عَنِّي مَذْمُومِينَ
مَذْمُومِينَ مَدْحُورِينَ بِتَخْسِيرِ تَغْيِيرِ تَدْمِيرِ^{١١} فَمَا كَانَ لَهُ مِنْ فِتَّةٍ يَنْصُرُونَهُ
مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ
٩ وَأَذِقْنِي يَا سُبُّوحُ يَا قُدُّوسُ لَذَّةَ مُنَاجَاةٍ أَقْبَلُ وَلَا تَخَفْ إِنَّكَ مِنْ
الْأَمِينِينَ فِي كَنْفِ^{١٢} اللَّهِ

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6. E, G, H, I, J and M: نافع: C: رافع: H adds يا باري
7. B and C: بِحَقِّ أَسْمَائِكَ
8. D, E, F, G, H, K and M: الظالمين
9. A, D, E, G, L and M: احد منهم
10. G and H: أَخَذَ لَهُ اللَّهُ (H gives خَذَلَهُ اللَّهُ as alternative)
11. Word chain varies: some give تجسير / تحسير instead of or in addition to تدمير and give تكبير instead of or in addition to تخسير
12. E and I: بِفَضْلِ اللَّهِ and in margin فِي كَنْفِ or فِي كَنْفِ اللَّهِ بِفَضْلِ اللَّهِ ; F, G, J and K: بِفَضْلِ اللَّهِ. H omits the phrase and proceeds directly from مِنَ الْآمِنِينَ to verse 10, thus collating verses 9 and 10 into a single verse. Note that the Qur'anic verse ends with الْآمِنِينَ

10. And let them taste, O You who inflict Harm and take away Life, the exemplary punishment, the evil consequences and annihilation in *So the last remnant of the people who did evil was cut off. Praise belongs to Allāh.*⁷⁷
11. Make me safe, O You who are Peace of Perfection, the Giver of Security, from the sudden sorties of the enemy forces, through the aim of the beginning of the verse *For them are good tidings in the life of this world and in the hereafter. There is no changing the words of Allāh.*⁷⁸
12. Crown me, O You who are the Sublimely Magnificent, the One who Raises in Honour, with the crown of the awesome grandeur, the majestic dominion, the sovereignty, might and magnificence of *And do not let their saying grieve you. Indeed the honour and glory belong to Allāh.*⁷⁹
13. Clothe me, O You who are Solicitous in Benevolent Majesty, the Incomparably Great, in the robe that renders the august majesty, complete perfection and attentive solicitude in *And when they saw him, they so admired him that they cut their hands, saying 'May we be saved by Allāh!'*⁸⁰
14. Bring down upon me, O You who are the Eminent in Affection, the Constant in Love, love [extended] from You, so that through it the hearts of Your servants will be guided to me, yielding to me with love, affectionate and unwavering, from the filling with love, the softening of hearts and the coming into loving union in *They love them as if it were love for Allāh, but those who believe are more ardent in love for Allāh.*⁸¹

١٠. وَأَذْفَهُمْ يَا ضَارُّ يَا مُمِيتُ نَكَالٍ وَبَالٍ زَوَالٍ فَقُطِعَ دَابِرُ الْقَوْمِ الَّذِينَ
ظَلَمُوا وَالْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ

١١. وَأَمْنِي يَا سَلَامُ يَا مُؤْمِنُ¹³ صَوْلَةٌ جَوْلَةٌ دَوْلَةٌ الْأَعْدَاءِ بِغَايَةِ بَدَايَةِ آيَةٍ
لَهُمُ الْبُشْرَى فِي الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا وَفِي الْآخِرَةِ لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِكَلِمَاتِ اللَّهِ

١٢. وَتَوَجَّجْنِي يَا عَظِيمُ يَا مُعِزُّ بِتَاجِ مَهَابَةٍ كِبْرِيَاءِ جَلَالِ¹⁴ سُلْطَانِ مَلَكُوتِ
عِزِّ عَظْمَةٍ¹⁵ وَلَا يَحْزُنْكَ قَوْلُهُمْ إِنَّ الْعِزَّةَ لِلَّهِ

١٣. وَالْبِسْنِي يَا جَلِيلُ يَا كَبِيرُ خِلْعَةِ اجْلَالِ اِكْمَالِ¹⁶ اِقْبَالِ فَلَمَّا رَأَيْتُهُ
اَكْبَرْتُهُ وَقَطَعَنْ أَيْدِيَهُنَّ وَقُلْنَ حَاشَ لِلَّهِ

١٤. وَالْقِي يَا عَزِيزُ يَا وَدُودُ عَلَيَّ مَحَبَّةٌ مِنْكَ فَتَنْقَادَ وَتَخْضَعَ¹⁷ لِي بِهَا
قُلُوبُ¹⁸ عِبَادِكَ بِالمَحَبَّةِ وَالْمَعَزَّةِ وَالْمَوَدَّةِ مِنْ تَعْطِيفٍ تَلْطِيفٍ¹⁹ تَأْلِيفٍ
يُحِبُّونَهُمْ كَحُبِّ اللَّهِ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَشَدُّ حُبًّا لِلَّهِ

13. E adds يَا مُهْمِنُ in margin as alternative

14. C: جمال. G, H and M omit word

15. K adds جبروت; some change the order to سُلْطَانِ مَلَكُوتِ

16. Some give instead جلال and كمال; some add جمال and vary the order

17. A: حَتَّى تَنْقَادَ وَتَخْضَعَ

18. G, H, I, J, L and M omit word

19. F, G, H, I, J and K omit word

15. Show upon me, O You who are the Manifest and Hidden, traces of the luminous mysteries of *He loves them and they love Him: [they are] soft towards the believers, hard on the unbelievers, striving in the path of Allāh.*⁸²
16. Turn my face, O Allāh, O You who are the Eternal Refuge, the Essential Light, with the sheer purity, beauty, intimacy and illumination of *So if they dispute with you, say, 'I have surrendered myself to Allāh'.*⁸³
17. Beautify me, O You who are the Originator [in Beauty] of the heavens and the earth,⁸⁴ who possess Sublime Majesty and Ennobling Generosity, with the flawless fluency, supreme eloquence and surpassing skill in *'Unloose the knot upon my tongue, so that they understand my words'*⁸⁵ through the kindly, merciful gentleness of *Then their skins and their hearts soften to the remembrance of Allāh.*⁸⁶
18. Gird me, O You who are the Most Severe in Assault,⁸⁷ the All-Compeller, with the sword of awesome forcefulness and invincible power, from the glorious strength, omnipotence and might in *There is no help to victory except from Allāh.*⁸⁸
19. Give me ever, O You who Expand and Open up to Victory, the joyful delight in *'My Lord, lay open for me my chest, and ease for me my task'*⁸⁹ through the subtle sentiments, the inner affections in *Did we not lay open for you your chest?;*⁹⁰ and through the happy exuberance and glad tidings in *That day the believers shall rejoice, in the victorious help of Allāh.*⁹¹

- ١٥ وَأَظْهَرُ عَلَيَّ يَا ظَاهِرُ يَا بَاطِنُ أَثَارَ اسْرَارِ أَنْوَارٍ يُحِبُّهُمْ وَيُحِبُّونَهُ
أَذَلَّةٍ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ أَعِزَّةٍ عَلَى الْكَافِرِينَ يُجَاهِدُونَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ
- ١٦ وَوَجَّهَ اللَّهُ يَا صَمَدُ يَا نُورُ وَجْهِي بِصَفَاءِ جَمَالِ أَنْسِ اشْرَاقٍ²⁰
فَإِنْ حَاجُّوكَ فَقُلْ أَسَلَمْتُ وَجْهِي لِلَّهِ
- ١٧ وَجَمَّلَنِي يَا بَدِيعَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ يَا ذَا الْجَلَالِ وَالْإِكْرَامِ
بِالْفَصَاحَةِ وَالْبَلَاغَةِ وَالْبَرَاءَةِ²¹ وَأَحْلَلَ عُقْدَةً مِنْ لِسَانِي يَفْقَهُوا قَوْلِي
بِرَافَةِ رَحْمَةٍ²² رِقَّةً ثُمَّ تَلِينَ جُلُودَهُمْ وَقُلُوبَهُمْ إِلَى ذِكْرِ اللَّهِ
- ١٨ وَقَلَّدَنِي يَا شَدِيدَ الْبَطْشِ يَا جَبَّارُ بِسَيْفِ الْهَيْبَةِ²³ وَالشَّدَّةِ وَالْقُوَّةِ
وَالْمَنْعَةِ مِنْ بَأْسٍ جَبَرُوتٍ عِزَّةٍ وَمَا النَّصْرُ إِلَّا مِنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ
- ١٩ وَادِمَ عَلَيَّ يَا بَاسِطُ يَا فَتَّاحُ بِهِجَةً مَسْرَّةً رَبِّ اشْرَحْ لِي صَدْرِي
وَيَسِّرْ لِي أَمْرِي بِلَطَائِفِ عَوَاطِفِ²⁴ أَلَمْ تَشْرَحْ لَكَ صَدْرَكَ وَبَشَّائِرِ
بَشَائِرِ²⁵ وَيَوْمَئِذٍ يَفْرَحُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ بِنَصْرِ اللَّهِ

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20. Some add to this chain جلال or بهجة or ضياء
21. B, C, D and F: والبراعة والبلاغة
22. B, D omit word
23. G and H omit word
24. H and I add: عوارف
25. C omits word. D: وببشارة اشارة (with alternative وببشائر بشارت)

20. Send down upon my heart, O Allāh, O You who are the Most Subtly Benevolent, the Supremely Kind [who establishes True Welfare],⁹² faith, tranquillity and peaceful calm,⁹³ that I may be of *Those who have faith and whose hearts are at peace in the remembrance of Allāh*.⁹⁴
21. Pour over me, O You who are the Superlatively Forbearing and Steadfast, to Whom all Gratitude is due for Your blessings, the steadfastness of those who have armed themselves with the unshakable resolve, certitude and empowerment of *'How often has a small unit overcome a sizeable one, by the permission of Allāh*'.⁹⁵
22. Preserve me, O You who are the All-Preserving Guardian, to Whom all things are Entrusted, before me and behind me, on my right and on my left, above me and below me, through the ever-present, witnessing, assembling hosts of *He has attendant angels, before him and behind him, watching over him by the command of Allāh*.⁹⁶
23. Plant firm my feet, O Allāh, O You who are the One who Stands [over every soul],⁹⁷ the Forever Enduring,⁹⁸ as You made firm the one who said *'How should I fear what you have associated [with Him], when you do not fear [the fact] that you have established associates beside Allāh?*'⁹⁹
24. Help me, O You who are the Best Protector, the Most Excellent Helper,¹⁰⁰ against the enemy, in the way that You helped the one to whom [his people] said *'Are you making fun of us?' He replied, 'I take refuge in Allāh*'.¹⁰¹
25. Support me, O You who Demand¹⁰² and Prevail in Victory,¹⁰³ with the strengthening support of Your Prophet Muhammad, upon whom be the blessings and peace of Allāh, who was given the mighty and honoured rank of *We have sent you as witness, bearer of good tidings and warner, so that you [all] may have faith in Allāh*.¹⁰⁴

- ٢٠ وَأَنْزِلِ اللَّهُمَّ يَا لَطِيفُ يَا رَوْفُ بِقَلْبِي الْإِيمَانَ وَالْأُطْمِينَانَ
وَالسَّكِينَةَ²⁶ لَاكُونَ مِنَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَتَطْمَئِنُّ قُلُوبُهُمْ بِذِكْرِ اللَّهِ
- ٢١ وَأَفْرِغْ عَلَيَّ يَا صَبُورُ يَا شَكُورُ صَبْرَ الَّذِينَ تَدْرَعُوا²⁷ بِثَبَاتٍ يَقِينٍ
تَمَكِّنِ كَمْ مِنْ فِتْنَةٍ قَلِيلَةٍ غَلَبَتْ فِتْنَةً كَثِيرَةً بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ
- ٢٢ وَاحْفَظْنِي يَا حَفِيزُ يَا وَكِيلُ مِنْ بَيْنِ يَدَيَّ وَمِنْ خَلْفِي وَعَنْ يَمِينِي
وَعَنْ شِمَالِي وَمِنْ فَوْقِي وَمِنْ تَحْتِي بِوُجُودِ شُهُودِ جُنُودٍ لَهُ مُعَقَّبَاتٌ مِنْ
بَيْنِ يَدَيْهِ وَمِنْ خَلْفِهِ يَحْفَظُونَهُ مِنْ أَمْرِ اللَّهِ
- ٢٣ وَثَبَّتِ اللَّهُمَّ يَا قَائِمُ يَا دَائِمُ قَدَمَيَّ كَمَا ثَبَّتَ الْقَائِلَ وَكَيْفَ أَخَافُ مَا
أَشْرَكْتُكُمْ وَلَا تَخَافُونَ أَنْكُمْ أَشْرَكْتُكُمْ بِاللَّهِ
- ٢٤ وَأَنْصُرْنِي يَا نِعَمَ الْمَوْلَى وَيَا نِعَمَ النَّصِيرِ عَلَى الْأَعْدَاءِ²⁸ نَصْرَ
الَّذِي قِيلَ لَهُ اتَّخَذْنَا هُزُوءًا قَالَ أَعُوذُ بِاللَّهِ
- ٢٥ وَأَيِّدْنِي يَا طَالِبُ يَا غَالِبُ بِتَأْيِيدِ نَبِيِّكَ مُحَمَّدٍ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ
الْمُؤَيَّدِ²⁹ بِتَعَزِيزِ تَوْقِيرِ أَنَا أَرْسَلْنَاكَ شَاهِدًا وَمُبَشِّرًا وَنَذِيرًا لِتُؤْمِنُوا بِاللَّهِ

26. B, F, K and M add وَالْوَقَارَ

27. C, H and M: تَضَرَّعُوا

28. F, G, H, I, J and M: اَعْدَائِي. D omits the phrase, but gives as alternative

29. B, C, D, F, G, H: الْمُؤَيَّدِ

26. Suffice me, O You who Suffice in every need,¹⁰⁵ who Restore [to Wholesomeness],¹⁰⁶ against [all] afflictions and ills, through the great benefit and lesson in *If We had sent down this Qur'an upon a mountain, you would have seen it humbled, reduced to rubble out of the fear of Allāh.*¹⁰⁷
27. Confer upon me, O You who Bestow Blessings Freely, who Provide Nourishment and Sustenance, the arising, arriving and accepting of the arranging, making easy and rendering suitable for use [contained] in *Eat and drink of the provision of Allāh.*¹⁰⁸
28. Enjoin on me, O You who are Wholly and Only One,¹⁰⁹ the Utterly Unique,¹¹⁰ the [constant duty of the] word of Oneness, which You imposed upon Your beloved Muhammad, upon whom be the blessings and peace of Allāh, when You said *Know then that there is no god but Allāh.*¹¹¹
29. Invest me, O You who are the Close Friend and Patron, the Supremely High, with Your close friendship, protective care and keeping, and flawless wholesomeness, through the utmost provision, favour and support of *That is of the grace of Allāh.*¹¹²
30. Give me, O You who are Rich beyond need, the Noble who respond in Generosity [to all requests], the honour of felicity, esteem, munificence and unconditional forgiveness, as You honoured *Those who lower their voices in the presence of the Messenger of Allāh.*¹¹³

- ٢٦ وَكَفَّنِي يَا كَافِي يَا شَافِي الْإِدْوَاءَ وَالْأَسْوَاءَ³⁰ بِعَوَائِدِ فَوَائِدِ لَوْ
أَنْزَلْنَا هَذَا الْقُرْآنَ عَلَى جَبَلٍ لَرَأَيْتَهُ خَاشِعًا مُتَصَدِّعًا مِنْ خَشْيَةِ اللَّهِ
٢٧ وَآمَنْنُ عَلَى يَا وَهَّابُ يَا رَزَّاقُ بِحُصُولِ وَصُولِ قَبُولِ تَدْبِيرِ³¹ تَيْسِيرِ
تَسْخِيرِ كُلُّوْا وَاشْرَبُوا مِنْ رِزْقِ اللَّهِ
٢٨ وَالْزَمْنِي يَا وَاحِدُ يَا أَحَدُ كَلِمَةِ التَّوْحِيدِ³² كَمَا أَلَزَمْتَ حَبِيبَكَ مُحَمَّدًا
صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ حَيْثُ قُلْتَ فَأَعْلَمُ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ³³
٢٩ وَتَوَلَّنِي يَا وَلِيُّ يَا عَلِيُّ بِالْوِلَايَةِ وَالْعِنَايَةِ وَالرِّعَايَةِ³⁴ وَالسَّلَامَةِ بِمَزِيدِ
إِيرَادِ إِسْعَادِ إِمْدَادِ³⁵ ذَلِكَ مِنْ فَضْلِ اللَّهِ³⁶
٣٠ وَآكْرَمْنِي يَا غَنِيُّ يَا كَرِيمُ بِالسَّعَادَةِ وَالسِّيَادَةِ وَالْكَرَامَةِ وَالْمَغْفَرَةِ
كَمَا أَكْرَمْتَ الَّذِينَ يَغْضُونُ أَصْوَاتَهُمْ عِنْدَ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ

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30. Some give ^{الادواء} instead of ^{شرّ الاعداء}. Some split the pair of Names, giving in varying order: ^{يا كافي الاسواء} ^{يا شافى الادواء}:
31. C, E, G, H, J and M omit word. B, D and L give it after ^{تيسير}
32. A, B, C, E, F, H and K give: ^{التقوى}
33. B, C, H, J and L omit verse ٢٨
34. Some omit this or the preceding word or change their order
35. C, D and J add ^{ذلك خير}
36. F and L give instead ^{ذلك فضل الله} (Q.57:21; 62:4)

31. Turn to me, O You who Turn constantly in Forgiveness, the Clement, with pardon and counsel, so that I may be of *Those who, when they commit an indecency or wrong themselves, remember Allāh and ask for forgiveness of their wrong-doings – and who forgives wrong-doings save Allāh?*¹¹⁴
32. Seal my days, O You who are the All-Compassionate, the Most Merciful, with the finest conclusion [of] those who are delivered and [those] who are full of hope: *O My servants who have transgressed against yourselves, do not despair of the mercy of Allāh.*¹¹⁵
33. Bring me to dwell, O You who are the All-Hearing, the Ever-Near,¹¹⁶ in a Garden prepared for the god-fearing: *Their call therein is ‘Glory to You, O Allāh’, their greeting therein is ‘Peace’, and their call culminates in ‘Praise belongs to Allāh’.*¹¹⁷

O Allāh, O Allāh, O Allāh, O Allāh!

O You who are Pure Beneficence,
O You who are Pure Beneficence,
O You who are Pure Beneficence,
O You who are Pure Beneficence!

O All-Compassionate One, O All-Compassionate One,
O All-Compassionate One, O All-Compassionate One!

O You who are Sheer Mercy, O You who are Sheer Mercy,
O You who are Sheer Mercy, O You who are Sheer Mercy!

٣١ وَتُبْ عَلَيَّ يَا تَوَّابُ يَا حَلِيمٌ³⁷ تَوْبَةً نَّصُوحاً لَّا كُفُونَ مِنَ الَّذِينَ إِذَا
فَعَلُوا فَاَحْشَةً أَوْ ظَلَمُوا أَنْفُسَهُمْ ذَكَرُوا اللَّهَ فَاسْتَغْفَرُوا لِذُنُوبِهِمْ وَمَنْ
يَغْفِرُ الذُّنُوبَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ³⁸

٣٢ وَاخْتِمْ لِي يَا رَحْمَانُ يَا رَحِيمُ بِحُسْنِ خَاتِمَةِ النَّاجِينَ وَالرَّاجِينَ³⁹ يَا
عِبَادِي الَّذِينَ أَسْرَفُوا عَلَى أَنْفُسِهِمْ لَا تَقْنَطُوا مِنْ رَحْمَةِ اللَّهِ
٣٣ وَاسْكِنِّي يَا سَمِيعُ يَا قَرِيبُ جَنَّةً⁴⁰ أُعِدَّتْ لِلْمُتَّقِينَ⁴¹ دَعَاؤُهُمْ فِيهَا
سُبْحَانَكَ اللَّهُمَّ وَتَحِيَّتُهُمْ فِيهَا سَلَامٌ وَآخِرُ دَعَاؤُهُمْ أَنْ الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ

يَا اللَّهُ يَا اللَّهُ يَا اللَّهُ يَا اللَّهُ

يَا نَافِعُ يَا نَافِعُ يَا نَافِعُ يَا نَافِعُ

يَا رَحْمَانُ يَا رَحْمَانُ يَا رَحْمَانُ يَا رَحْمَانُ

يَا رَحِيمُ يَا رَحِيمُ يَا رَحِيمُ يَا رَحِيمُ⁴²

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37. F, I and K give instead يا تَوَّاب يا رَحِيم G gives instead يا حَكِيم يا تَوَّاب
38. H and J omit verse ٣١
39. H gives والراجين من انعطاف رحمة قل . I gives والراجين قل A, B, E and K give والراجين الذين
الراجين الذين قلت فيهم C gives قيل لهم
40. Some (including A, B, D and L) add عَدْنِ
41. A, B, E, F, G, I, J, K and L add: الذين
42. The copies vary in the number of repetitions of these Names. The Names

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I ask of You through the sacred sanctity of these Names, Verses and Words,¹¹⁸ an authoritative strength that brings success,¹¹⁹ a bountiful livelihood, a joyful heart, abundant knowledge, beneficent works, a luminous grave, an easy account [on the Day of Reckoning] and a goodly portion in Paradise. May Allāh bless our master Muhammad and his family and companions; may the peace of Allāh be upon them, a plentiful peace, until the Day of Resurrection. Praise be to Allāh, Lord of the worlds.

وَأَسْأَلُكَ⁴³ بِحُرْمَةِ هَذِهِ الْأَسْمَاءِ وَالْآيَاتِ وَالْكَلِمَاتِ⁴⁴
 سُلْطَانًا نَصِيرًا وَرِزْقًا كَثِيرًا⁴⁵ وَقَلْبًا قَرِيرًا
 وَعِلْمًا غَزِيرًا⁴⁶ وَعَمَلًا بَرِيرًا⁴⁷ وَقَبْرًا مُنِيرًا
 وَحِسَابًا يَسِيرًا وَمُلْكًا فِي الْفِرْدَوْسِ كَبِيرًا
 وَصَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَى سَيِّدِنَا مُحَمَّدٍ وَعَلَى آلِهِ وَصَحْبِهِ
 وَسَلَّمْ تَسْلِيمًا كَثِيرًا
 إِلَى يَوْمِ الدِّينِ
 وَالْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ⁴⁸

used also vary, with the occasional addition/substitution of e.g. رافع, دافع and نور. Alongside the one represented here, another common version is as follows: يا نافع يا رحمان يا رحيم; 3 or 4 x يا الله. At this point further text is added in K (al-Ḥiṣārī comments on fol.120a that he received this version through a chain connecting his shaykh to Ibn ‘Arabī); it appears as an alternative in A and D. The version given here follows K with some amendments:

وَبِقُدْرَةِ بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ ارْفَعْ قُدْرِي وَأَشْرَحْ صَدْرِي وَيَسِّرْ أَمْرِي وَأَرْزُقْنِي مِنْ حَيْثُ لَا أَحْتَسِبُ
 بِفَضْلِكَ وَإِحْسَانِكَ وَكَرَمِكَ. يَا هُوَ يَا هُوَ يَا هُوَ. كَهَيْعِصَ حَمِّ عَسَقٍ. وَأَسْأَلُكَ بِجَمَالِ الْعِزَّةِ وَجَلَالِ الْهَيْبَةِ
 وَعِزِّ الْقُدْرَةِ وَجَبْرُوتِ الْعِظَمَةِ أَنْ تَجْعَلَنِي مِنْ عِبَادِكَ الصَّالِحِينَ الَّذِينَ لَا خَوْفَ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ

43. E, J, K and L add اللهم
44. E and K add ان تجعل لي من لدنك
45. Some add or substitute واسعاً and/or يسيراً. Phrase missing in J
46. Phrase وعلماً غزيراً missing from G and H
47. Phrase وعملًا بريرًا missing from F, G, H and J; given as alternative in M
48. Some copies give different expanded versions of the ṣalawāt

al-Dawr al-a‘lā **al-muqarrib ilā kulli maqām al-a‘lā**

Bismi-llāhi-r-raḥmāni-r-raḥīm

1. Allāhumma yā Ḥayy yā Qayyūm, bika taḥaṣṣantu fa-ḥminī
bi-ḥimāyati kifāyati wiqāyati ḥaqīqati burhāni ḥirzi amāni
bismi-llāh
2. wa-adkhilnī yā Awwal yā Ākhir, maknūna ghaybi sirri dā’ irati
kanzi *mā shā’a-llāh lā qūwata illā bi-llāh*
3. wa-asbil ‘alayya yā Ḥalīm yā Sattār, kanafa sitri ḥijābi ṣiyānati
najāti *wa-‘taṣimū bi-ḥabli-llāh*
4. wa-bni yā Muḥīt yā Qādir ‘alayya sūra amāni ihāṭati majdi
surādiqi ‘izzī ‘aẓamati *dhālika khayrun; dhālika min āyāti-llāh*
5. wa-a’idhnī yā Raqīb yā Mujīb, wa-ḥrusnī fī nafsī wa-dīnī wa-
ahlī wa-waladī wa-dārī wa-mālī, bi-kalā’ati i’ādhati ighāthati
wa-laysa bi-ḍarrihim shay’an illā bi-idhni-llāh
6. wa-qinī yā Mānī’ yā Dāfi’ bi-asmā’ik wa-āyātik wa-kalimātik
sharra-sh-shayṭāni wa-s-sulṭān, fa-in ṣālimun aw jabbār baghā
‘alayya akhadhathu *ghāshiyatun min ‘adhābi-llāh*
7. wa-najjinī yā Mudhill yā Muntaqim min ‘abīdika-ẓ-ẓalama al-
bāghīn ‘alayya wa a’wānihim, fa-in hamma lī minhum aḥadun
bi-sū’ khadhalahu-llāh *wa-khatama ‘alā sam’ihi wa-qalbihi wa-
ja’ala ‘alā baṣarihi ghishāwatan fa-man yahdīhi min ba’ di-llāh*

8. wa-kfinī yā Qābiḍ yā Qahhār khadī‘ata makrihim, wa-rdudhum ‘annī madhmūmīn madh‘ūmīn madḥūrīn bi-takhsīri taghyīri tadmīri *fā-mā kāna lahu min fī‘atin yanṣurūnahu min dūni-llāh*
9. wa-adhiqnī yā Subbūḥ yā Quddūs ladhdhata munājāti *aqbil wa-lā takhaf; innaka mina-l-āminīna fī kanafi-llāh*
10. wa-adhiqhum yā Ḍārr yā Mumīt nakāla wabāli zawāli *fā-quṭi‘a dābiru-l-qawmi-lladhīna ṣalamū; wa-l-ḥamdu li-llāh*
11. wa-āminnī yā Salām yā Mu‘min ṣawlata jawlati dawlati-l-a‘dā‘i bi-ghāyati bidāyati āyati *lahumu-l-bushrā fī-l-ḥayāti-d-dunyā wa-fī-l-ākhirā; lā tabdīla li-kalimāti-llāh*
12. wa-tawwijnī yā ‘Azīm yā Mu‘izz, bi-tāji kibriyā‘i jalālī sulṭānī malakūti ‘izzī ‘aḥamati *wa-lā yaḥzunka qawluhum; inna-l-‘izzata li-llāh*
13. wa-albīsnī yā Jalīl yā Kabīr, khil‘ata ijlālī ikmālī iqbālī *fā-lammā ra‘aynahu akbarnahu wa-qatṭa‘na aydiyahunna wa-qulna ḥāsha li-llāh*
14. wa-alqi yā ‘Azīz yā Wadūd ‘alayya maḥabbatan minka fa-tanqāda wa-takhḍa‘a lī bihā qulūbu ‘ibādika bi-l-maḥabba wa-l-ma‘azza wa-l-mawadda, min ta‘ṭīfī talṭīfī ta‘līfī *yuhibbūnahum ka-ḥubbi-llāh; wa-lladhīna āmanū ashaddu ḥubban li-llāh*
15. wa-aḥzir ‘alayya yā Zāhir yā Bāṭin āthāra asrāri anwāri *yuhibbuhum wa-yuhibbūnahu adhillatin ‘ala-l-mu‘minīn a‘izzatin ‘ala-l-kāfirīn yujāhidūna fī sabīli-llāh*
16. wa-wajjihi-llāhumma yā Ṣamad yā Nūr wajhī bi-ṣafā‘i jamālī unsi ishrāqī *fā-in ḥājjūka fā-qul aslamtu wajhī li-llāh*

17. wa-jammilnī yā Badī‘a-s-samāwāti wa-l-arḍ, yā Dha-l-Jalālī wa-l-Ikrām, bi-l-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha wa-l-barā‘a *wa-ḥlul ‘uqdatan min lisānī, yafqahū qawlī* bi-ra‘ fati raḥmati riqqati *thumma talīnu julūduhum wa-qulūbuhum ilā dhikri-llāh*
18. wa-qallidnī yā Shadīda-l-baṭsh yā Jabbār bi-sayfi-l-hayba wa-sh-shidda wa-l-qūwa wa-l-mana‘a, min ba‘si jabarūti ‘izzati *wa-ma-n-naṣru illā min ‘indi-llāh*
19. wa-adim ‘alayya yā Bāsīṭ yā Fattāḥ, bahjata masarrat rabbi-shrah lī ṣadrī, wa-yassir lī amrī *bi-laṭā‘ifi ‘awāṭifi a-lam nashrah laka ṣadrak wa-bi-ashā‘iri bashā‘iri wa-yawma‘idhin yafraḥu-l-mu‘minūna bi-naṣri-llāh*
20. wa-anzil allāhumma yā Laṭīf yā Ra‘ūf bi-qalbī-l-īmān wa-l-iṭmīnān wa-s-sakīna, li-akūna mina-*lladhīna āmanū wa-taṭma‘innu qulūbuhum bi-dhikri-llāh*
21. wa-afrigh ‘alayya yā Ṣabūr yā Shakūr ṣabra-*lladhīna tadarra‘ū* bi-thabāti yaqīni tamkīni *kam min fi‘atin qalīlatin ghalabat fi‘atan kathīratan bi-idhni-llāh*
22. wa-ḥfaznī yā Ḥafīẓ yā Wakīl min bayni yadayya wa-min khalfī, wa-‘an yamīnī wa-‘an shimālī, wa-min fawqī wa-min taḥtī, bi-wujūdi shuhūdi junūdi *lahu mu‘aqqibātun min bayni yadayhi wa min khalfihi, yahfazūnahu min amri-llāh*
23. wa-thabbiti-llāhumma yā Qā‘im yā Dā‘im qadamayya, kamā thabbatta-l-qā‘il *wa-kayfa akhāfu mā ashraktum wa-lā takhāfūna annakum ashraktum bi-llāh*
24. wa-nṣurnī yā Ni‘ma-l-Mawlā wa-yā Ni‘ma-n-Naṣīr ‘ala-l-a‘dā‘i *naṣra-lladhī qīla lahu atattakhidhunā huzuwā; qāla a‘ūdhu bi-llāh*

25. wa-ayyidnī yā Ṭālib yā Ghālib, bi-ta'yīdi nabīyika Muḥammad
ṣalla-llāhu 'alayhi wa-sallam, al-mu'ayyad bi-ta'zīzi tawqīri *innā
arsalnāka shāhidan wa mubashshiran wa-nadhīrā, li-tu'minū bi-llāh*
26. wa-kfinī yā Kāfī yā Shāfī, al-adwā'a wa-l-aswā'a, bi-'awā'idi
fawā'idi *law anzalnā hadha-l-qur'āna 'alā jabalin la-ra'aytahu
khashī'an mutaṣaddi'an min khashyati-llāh*
27. wa-mnun 'alayya yā Wahhāb yā Razzāq bi-ḥuṣūli wuṣūli qabūli
tadbīri taysīri taskhīri *kulū wa-shrabū min rizqi-llāh*
28. wa-alzimnī yā Wāḥid yā Aḥad kalimata-t-tawḥīd kamā alzamta
ḥabībika Muḥammad ṣalla-llāhu 'alayhi wa-sallam, ḥaythu
qulta *fa-'lam annahu lā ilāha illa-llāh*
29. wa-tawallanī yā Walīy yā 'Alīy bi-l-wilāya wa-l-'ināya wa-r-
ri'āya wa-s-salāma bi-mazīdi īrādi is'ādi imdādi *dhālika min
fadli-llāh*
30. wa-akrimnī yā Ghanīy yā Karīm bi-s-sa'āda wa-s-siyāda wa-
l-karāma wa-l-maghfira kamā akramta-*lladhīna yaghuḍḍūna
aṣwātahum 'inda rasūli-llāh*
31. wa-tub 'alayya yā Tawwāb yā Ḥalīm tawbatan naṣūḥā, li-akūna
mina-*lladhīna idhā fa'alū fāḥishatan aw ḡalamū anfusahum
dhakaru-llāh fa-staghfarū li-dhunūbihim wa-man yaghfiru-dh-
dhunūba illa-llāh*
32. wa-khtim lī yā Raḥmān yā Raḥīm bi-ḥusni khātimati-n-nājīn
wa-r-rājīn yā 'ibādiya-*lladhīna asrafū 'alā anfusihim lā taqnaṭū
min raḥmati-llāh*
33. wa-askinnī yā Samī' yā Qarīb jannatan u'iddat li-l-muttaqīn,
*da'wāhum fihā subḥānaka-llāhumma wa-taḥiyyatuhum fihā
salām, wa-ākhiru da'wāhum ani-l-ḥamdu li-llāh*

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yā Allāh, yā Allāh, yā Allāh, yā Allāh

yā Nāfi‘, yā Nāfi‘, yā Nāfi‘, yā Nāfi‘

yā Raḥmān, yā Raḥmān, yā Raḥmān, yā Raḥmān

yā Raḥīm, yā Raḥīm, yā Raḥīm, yā Raḥīm

wa-as’aluka bi-ḥurmati hādhihi-l-asmā’ wa-l-āyāt wa-l-kalimāt
sulṭānan naṣīrā, wa-rizqan kathīrā, wa-qalban qarīrā,
wa-‘ilman ghazīrā, wa-‘amalan barīrā, wa-qabran munīrā,
wa-ḥisāban yasīrā, wa-mulkan fi-l-firdawsī kabīrā,
wa-ṣalla-llāhu ‘alā sayyidinā Muḥammad wa-‘alā ālihi
wa-ṣaḥbihi wa-sallama taslīman kathīrā,
ilā yawmi-d-dīn, wa-l-ḥamdu li-llāhi rabbi-l-‘ālamīn

Notes

1. The following discussion draws only on Arabic sources: further examples in Ottoman Turkish arise in Yazma Bağışlar 2934 and Hacı Mahmud Efendi 3950, for example.

2. See F, fol. 144b. The signification of *wird* here is that of a specified time devoted regularly to such practice. The *wird* is thus often understood to comprise a set, supererogatory personal devotion observed at specific times, usually at least once during the day and once more at night. See ‘Wird’, p.209.

3. See Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4061, Esad Efendi 1442, Düğümlü Baba 506, I.

4. Beyazid 7880 recommends reading it three times in the morning. M recommends that it be read a little before the dawn prayer, D and F after it.

5. Nafiz Paşa 702: for a complete cycle, see for example fols. 4a–14b.

6. G, M, Arif-Murad 58, Şazeli 106, Genel 43, the latter added in a different hand.

7. For example, Esad Efendi 1442: the *Dawr* is added at the end of *K. al-Rashaḥāt al-anwarīya fī sharḥ al-awrād al-akbarīya*, itself on the margin of the *Awrād*.

8. The great majority of copies of the *Awrād* likewise appear without the prayer. To mention an early example, Veliyuddin 1833 encompasses (alongside the *Awrād*) *K. Marwāqī’ al-nujūm*, *K. al-Isrā’* (copy dated AH 977, made in Damascus at the shrine of Ibn ‘Arabī by Jibrīl b. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn al-Ghazzī), extracts from *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* and parts of the *Tarjumān al-ashwāq*, plus a supplication for the Day of ‘Arafa, from *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya*.

9. Beyazid 7880 recommends that *Ḥamīd Wahhāb* be recited 76 times before each reading of the prayer. M recommends beginning with the *ṣalawāt* and then repetition of *ya Ḥayy, ya Qayyūm* 174 times. Genel 43, fol. 29b details the following ‘keys’ to the prayer:

O Allāh! O You in whose hand are the keys of the secrets of the unknowns, and the lamps of the lights of the hearts! I ask You through our master Muḥammad (may the peace and blessings of Allāh be upon him), to open for me the locked doors of these treasures, and to unveil for me the realities of these symbolic allusions. *Yā Hū yā man Hū* {7 times}. I ask You to bless the Sun of the gnostic sciences of Your Names, the Source of the secrets of Your light, who is the noble original Light-Tree and the radiant outpouring of the Origin, and the one who possesses the knowledges of the chosen (*al-‘ulūm al-iṣṭifā’īya*), under whose banner the prophets march. [I ask you to bless him] by the number of those You have created and sustained, from whom You have taken life and to whom You have given life, until You resurrect those You have annihilated. *Yā Laṭīf* {129 times}, *al-ṣalāt wa’l-salām ‘alayka yā rasūl Allāh* {29 times}, *Allāhu laṭīf bi-‘ibādīhi yarzuqu man yashā’ wa huwa’l-Qawī al-‘Azīz* {10 times}.

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10. Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4137 and Genel 43 recommend reciting *sūrat al-Inshirāḥ* and the *ṣalawāt* three times on completion. Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4146 recommends reciting *Yā lā ilāha illā Allāh al-Raḥīm al-Raḥīm* 15 times. One copy on which our copy 'I' draws gives a special supplication at the end, the only one in our sources that encompasses specific mention of the prayer's author as saintly intercessor. The supplication proceeds thus (fol. 64a):

O Allāh, by Your permission and grace grant that the spiritual reality (*rūḥānīya*) of the Muhammadan Heir, the shaykh and my master Muḥyī al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-'Arabī (may Allāh sanctify his secret) be of support to us, that it intercede and mediate for us with the Envoy of Allāh (may the peace and blessings of Allāh be upon him), and that it bring us glad tidings of the Compassionate Beatitude. Expand my chest, elevate my standing, and provide for me my sustenance without debit or credit, and be for us not against us, O You from Whom all help is sought. Amen. By Your Mercy, O Most Merciful of the Merciful.

11. An example of such introductory and concluding recommendations currently circulating in print in Damascus is that provided by Abū'l-Yusr 'Ābidīn, referred to earlier.

12. See C, fols. 3b–5a.

13. The Arabic plurals *quranā'*, *tawābi'*, *marada* and *zawābi'* require clarification. Used in the Qur'an eight times, *qarīn* (pl. *quranā'*) denotes an inseparable or intimate companion, commonly referring to man's spirit companion. According to Q 4: 38, Satan can be a *qarīn* (he indeed follows men everywhere), and Q 43: 36 describes God assigning 'a satan' to man as a *qarīn* when he turns away from the remembrance of Him. See also Q 50: 27. The oldest exegetical tradition posits a *qarīn* at the side of every human in the form of a satan or jinn who tempts him to evil (even prophets have such a satan-companion, but the Prophet Muḥammad converted his own to Islam). At the same time, there is at his side an angel, who induces him to good. These figures should not be confused with the recording angels. See 'Qarin', EI², 4, pp. 643–644. There are several hadith references to the *quranā'*: see for example Muslim, 4, 260 and 50: 69 [after A.J. Wensinck, *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition* (Leiden, 1927)].

Tābi'a (pl. *tawābi'*) refers to a jinn female, who loves a man and follows him everywhere: it does not appear in the Qur'an. *Mārid* (pl. *marada*) denotes someone who is insolent in rebellion: it is used in the Qur'an thus, and applied by extension to Satan (it is also a bad jinn's name). *Zawba'a* (pl. *zawābi'*) denotes a suddenly rising wind that whips up whirling sand or dust clouds, but also a terrible and malicious jinn believed to preside over such windstorms and hurricanes.

14. On the jinn in the Qur'anic worldview and in Muslim folklore, see *The Message of the Qur'an*, tr. and explained by Muhammad Asad (Bristol, UK, 2003), Appendix III; 'Djinn', EI², 2, pp. 546–549.

15. Suggested here are the kinds of property associated with al-Shādhilī's popular *Ḥizb al-baḥr*, which asks that the sea be 'subjugated' to those who are crossing it.

16. Associated with the evil eye, envy is recognised as a source of harm in Q 113: 5. The phrase *mā shā'a Allāh* (As God wills!) is used as protection against it: see Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, p. 88.

17. A popular belief that the jinn could inflict various illnesses, especially those involving paralysis (such as hemiplegia) is noteworthy here. See 'Djinn', p. 548.

18. On the *shahāda* as the desired final utterance at the moment of death and the visitation and questioning of the two angels Munkar and Nakīr on the first night in the tomb (according to the hadith), see Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, pp. 132–133, 278–279, respectively.

19. *qarīn al-sū'*: literally 'the one who associates with evil' or 'the one for whom evil is an associate', Satan. According to Q 4: 38, 'the one for whom Satan is a companion; what an evil companion he has!'

20. This is a loose rendering of *umm al-ṣibyān*. Classical dictionaries suggest this may denote baby colic, or epilepsy. According to a hadith the Prophet said 'When a man has a newborn child and utters the *adhān* (the call to prayer) in his right ear and the *iqāma* (the second call) in his left ear, *umm al-ṣibyān* will not affect the child.' Cited by al-Ghazālī under 'Etiquette Concerning Having Children', in *Marriage and Sexuality in Islam: A Translation of al-Ghazali's Book on the Etiquette of Marriage from the Ihya'*, tr. Madelain Farah (Salt Lake City, UT, 1984), p. 114, including details of the hadith. Note finally the association of the root meaning of the word with the (sterile) east wind.

21. Literally the red wind: *al-rīḥ al-aḥmar*. The general association in this list of jinn (themselves fashioned out of 'the fire of scorching winds' according to Q 15: 27) with winds that cause ill health is noteworthy. For examples of the Prophet's prayers for protection from the evil of the wind, see A. H. Farid, *Prayers of Muhammad* (Lahore, 1999), p. 233.

22. *al-'uqūd*, literally knots; also compacts or bargains struck. Note also '*aqada nāṣiyatahu*: he tied his forelock in preparation to attack or do harm to someone, and Q 113: 4, where the 'blowing upon knots (*'uqad*)' denotes occult activities.

On the widespread persistence in Muslim societies of the belief in and practice of magic (and the role in it of the jinn, under the command of a practitioner), advice concerning how to protect oneself from its effects and attitudes towards it among various contemporary Muslim authorities, see for example Remke Kruk, 'Harry Potter in the Gulf: Contemporary Islam and the Occult', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 32: 1 (2005), pp. 47–73; <http://www.muttaqun.com/jinn.html> and <http://www.islamawareness.net/Jinn/>. Texts of Qur'an and hadith of course affirm the reality of magic, but tend to refer to it in condemnatory terms (with some exceptions).

23. Literally: 'an army difficult to repel'.

24. On the notion of [spiritual] breaths in Ibn 'Arabī's thought, see William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabī's Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany, NY, 1989), p. 402 n. 18. In the present context, the reference is possibly to 'the fragrances of nearness to God'. Chittick cites Ibn 'Arabī thus: 'When the Gnostics smell

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the perfume of these breaths...they come to know a divine person who has the mystery which they are seeking and the knowledge which they want to acquire...'

25. To take an example from Damascus, al-Budayrī's chronicle of daily life in the city during a period of al-Dāmūnī's lifetime records floods, severe cold, earthquakes and windstorms (as well as swarming locusts, the spread of leprosy and devastating outbreaks of plague). See al-Budayrī, *Ḥawādith Dimashq al-yawmīya*, pp.52, 56–57, 223, 228, for example.

26. As Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology of Religion* (Oxford, 1973), pp.33–34 points out in relation to the notion of *baraka*, according to the traditional Muslim view there is 'a whole complex of forces, thought in an ultimate sense to constitute as well as to govern the world. There are maleficent powers to be warded off by the saints, by amulets, talismans, verses of the Qur'an, the virtuous life, and trust in God. And where the balance turns against you there is the final radical explanation of the mystery of God's will.'

27. As Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, pp.23, 25 points out, use of the term *ḥizb* evinces an 'unacknowledged tendency...towards semi-magical protection', while the term *ḥirz* (often used as synonymous with *ḥizb*) in the title of a prayer can indicate its use as a talisman or amulet. A *ḥizb* or *ḥirz* often comprises a selection of Qur'anic verses and small supplications printed in a tiny booklet which can be easily carried on the person: this may be referred to by a further synonym, *ḥijāb*. A very well-known example printed as a tiny booklet and frequently carried is *al-Ḥiṣn al-ḥaṣīn min kalām rabb al-ālamīn* ('The Impregnable Fortress from the Words of the Lord of the Worlds'), compiled by Shams al-Dīn M b. M al-Jazarī (d.833/1429): see below. Use of the term *ta'wīdh* (and other derivatives from the same root) to denote protective or 'refuge-taking' prayers, often worn as amulets, must finally be noted (these include the final two *sūras* of the Qur'an, *al-mu'awwidhatān*). See further Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, ch. 6; 'Tilsam', EI², 10, pp.500–502; 'Tamima', EI², 10, pp.177–178. For examples of the Prophet's prayers in the formula of seeking refuge in God, see Farid, *Prayers of Muhammad*, pp.245–249.

28. Indeed, as Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, p.xxii notes, some are simply strings of Qur'anic verses 'with more or less connection of subject', put together for devotional use.

For an introduction to perceptions concerning the power of the Word of God and prayer, and the general spheres of use to which sufi prayers have been put, see Carl Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism* (Boston and London, 1997), pp.89–91.

29. Compare with McGregor, *Sanctity and Sainthood*, pp.35, 74.

30. Eight different prayers by al-Shādhilī appear in our sources, the most frequent being *Ḥizb al-baḥr* (which has been described as the most famous of all *aḥzāb*: see 'Ḥizb', p.513) and *Ḥizb al-naṣr*. On *Ḥizb al-baḥr* see McGregor, *Sanctity and Sainthood*, pp.34–35; on the use of *aḥzāb* attributed to al-Shādhilī in the contemporary Tunisian Shadhiliyya, see idem, 'A Sufi Legacy in Tunis', pp.269–271.

31. Abū Madyan Shu'ayb b. al-Ḥusayn al-Anṣārī (d.549/1198), a seminal figure of sufism in Muslim Spain and North Africa and profoundly influential on Shadhili and

Qadiri traditions: on him see *The Way of Abu Madyan: The Works of Abu Madyan Shu'ayb*, tr. and compiled by Vincent J. Cornell (Cambridge, 1996); EI², 1, pp. 137–138. Known fully as *Ḥirz al-aqṣām*, this is not included in Cornell's collection of Abū Madyan's works.

The juxtaposition of prayers associated with the Shadhili tradition (that of Ibn Mashīsh can also be mentioned in this context) with those of Ibn 'Arabī reflects the strong appreciation within this tradition for the legacy of Ibn 'Arabī. Perhaps also relevant in this regard is the appearance of *muqatta'āt* in some versions of the prayer ending, as form a prominent feature of al-Mahdawī's *ṣalawāt* (see Pablo Beneito and Stephen Hirtenstein, 'The Prayer of Blessing [upon the Light of Muhammad] by 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Mahdawī', *JMAS* XXXIV (2003), p. 28 n. 43 and p. 30 n. 47), and of *Ḥizb al-baḥr* (the latter encompassing the same letter clusters that appear in some of the *Dawr* endings).

32. For an example of the former, see L, fols. 133 onwards; for the latter, see Hasan Husnu Paşa 583 fol. 212b, where the prayer is followed by a supplication concerning plague reported from Abū Ḥanīfa. Şazeli 106 presents a particularly interesting range of *aḥzāb* and *aḥrāz* with many different uses, including soothing crying babies and meeting enemies, for example.

While individual prayers have been associated with specific spheres of protection there does not appear to have been a strict division among them, and copyists may have drawn on a common pool of properties. Thus the description of the *Dawr*'s properties in Dügümlü Baba 490, fols. 31b–32a, appears also in G, fols. 66a–67a, where it applies to Abū Madyan's *Ḥirz al-aqṣām*, which prayer is omitted from the former compilation (on the relationship between these two compilations see Appendix): the copyist simply replaces *ḥirz* with *Ḥizb al-wiqāya* throughout the description of properties. Note also in this regard the comprehensive scope of the properties attributed to *al-Ḥiṣn al-ḥaṣīn*, set out in the preamble to it.

33. Particularly in D, but al-Dāmūnī also states his intention in his commentary to 'bring out some of the talismans and secrets' of the prayer (see C, fol. 3b), and provides some squares towards the end of his work. On talismanic 'magic squares', typically consisting of 9 or 16 compartments incorporating numbers or letters representing words (for example the letters of the Name Allāh written in a different order four times), see 'Tilsam', p. 501; 'Wafq', EI², 11, pp. 28–31.

34. For example Nafiz Paşa 702 adds on the margin of eight out of fourteen copies of the prayer presented a supplication that begins thus (towards the end of the prayer, for example fol. 25b) and ends with *sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ* (note that the same supplication is woven into the prayer before the end *ṣalawāt* in I):

I establish my protection from all of His creatures in a fortress whose foundation is *lā ilāha illā Allāh*, whose wall is *Muḥammad rasūl Allāh*, whose key is *lā ḥawla wa lā qūwata illā bi'llāh al-'Alīy al-'Azīm*...

M follows his recommendation concerning the prayer's recitation (see n. 9 above) with this supplication (fol. 109b):

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This is a magnificent, blessed protective prayer. In the Name of God the Creator, the Greatest: a protection against what I fear and am wary of. There is no power for any creature before the Creator. *Kāf Hā' Yā' 'Ayn Šād. Hā' Mīm Sīn Qāf*. All faces submit to the Living, the Self-Subsisting [Q 2: 111]. May whoever perpetrates oppression fail. God is sufficient as Protector and He is the Most Excellent Trustee.

35. As McGregor, 'A Sufi Legacy in Tunis', p.267 suggests, prayers perhaps acquire 'an added spiritual dimension' when recited: see also pp.269–270.

36. D, p.6. See also *The Hizbu-l Wiqāyah of Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabī*. Compare with Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, pp.278–279.

37. See for example F, fol. 144b; D, p.6; Düğümlü Baba 506, fol. 2a and I, fol. 62a.

38. Yazma Bağışlar 2934, fol. 39b. D, p.6 points to its benefits for 'reaching the ranks of spiritual mastery' (*bulūgh marātib al-siyāda*).

39. See B fol. 2a; F, fol. 144b.

40. See K, fol. 51b; F, fol. 144b; D, p.3.

41. Al-Ḥiṣārī indeed refers to the prayer as *al-Ḥizb al-qur'ānī*. See K, fol. 51b. It is noteworthy that some copyists mark Qur'anic verses in red (e.g. G), while others mark the Divine Names thus (e.g. I). A few add the numerical value of each Name close to it (e.g. Hasan Husnu Paşa 583, fols. 211b–212b).

The preamble to *al-Ḥiṣn al-ḥaṣīn* furnishes an example of this intense focus on the power of Qur'anic verses and Divine Names, the former as a remedy (*shifā'*) and vehicle for mercy, the latter as a medium for supplication, in the context of a popular *ḥirz*.

42. Certain commentaries elaborate at length on the choice, location and significance of Divine Names in the prayer: their treatment must form the subject of a separate study.

43. See C, fols. 5a–b; B, fols. 3a, 4a; I, fol. 62a (the explanation in the latter is given on al-Qushāshī's authority). Qur'an 7: 180 and Muslim, *Dhikr*, no. 6, respectively, are cited.

44. C, fol. 5a. It is a fundamental principle of all prayerful supplication (*du'ā'*) for requests to be addressed to God through the evocation of His Names and Attributes, for His Essence is unknowable and unapproachable, and He cannot be understood in an affirmative way in respect of it: the particular Names and Attributes used thus define and shape the supplication. This pattern assumes a sophisticated expression in the *Dawr*, as illustrated below. See 'Du'a', EI², 2, p.618; Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, pp.104–107.

45. B, fol. 3b. He cites the similitude of someone who seeks the good offices of one of the ministers serving the most powerful king on earth in seeking the corpse of a dog or a donkey: the king will surely respond by throwing him out.

46. Note that al-Dāmūnī repeats in his preamble and concluding remarks the need for 'complete inner belief', reflecting a central principle elaborated in discussions of the conditions and rules (*adab*) of prayer (*du'ā'*), that contribute towards a

guarantee of efficacy: for it to be received by God, one must pray with a feeling of conviction that the prayer will be answered. See ‘Du’a’ p. 618. On the common emphasis of sincere intention in the preamble to prayers see also Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, pp. 52–54. This emphasis is well illustrated in the preamble to *al-Ḥiṣn al-ḥaṣīn*.

47. B, fol. 2b; I, fol. 62a, for example.

48. See *ibid.* By way of further encouragement for its use without a guide, I and B cite the saying ‘If you are not one of them, then emulate them, for there is success and salvation (*falāḥ*) in emulating the noble.’

49. Variants are denoted by the term *nuskhā* (copy) in the margin.

50. Among others, examples of such inaccuracies arise in the following copies and verses of the *Dawr*: A verse 15, C verse 23, and H verse 7.

51. Given that four chains of transmission pass through Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī, the apparent source of H, the question arose as to whether there might be consistency between H, B, C, D and F (and possibly also I, which apparently emanated from al-Qushāshī, from whom al-Kūrānī received the prayer). In the event the attempt to identify an al-Kūrānī (or any other) ‘family’ or ‘version’ of the prayer was not felt to be a fruitful approach (by way of illustration, we would cite the existence of differences even between H and H2: see Appendix).

52. Copyists can forget to distinguish the text of the prayer from that of the commentary (often done using red ink or a red over-line), or mark parts of the commentary thus as prayer text. Confusion can also arise when an unmarked word from the prayer text appears in a gloss on another word in it, or when the commentator’s explanations require him to alter the constructions in which specific words or phrases appear, and the associated vowels. Examples arise in B, fols. 9a, 23b, 24b, 27b, 34a; C, fol. 76a; and D, p. 37.

53. This All-Comprehensive Name denotes ‘not only the Essence of God but also the sum total of every attribute that the Essence assumes, in relationship to the creatures.’ See Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, p. 20. For an introduction to the Divine Names and Attributes in Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought see *ibid.*, pp. 8–11; 33 ff.

54. We also comment in passing on similarities with the *Awṛād*, but no systematic or thorough comparison is attempted. In addition, we point out examples of resonances with certain traditional prayers of the Prophet.

It should be noted that we do not attempt a detailed analysis of the content, structure, imagery and literary composition of the prayer, and the commentaries identified earlier are not applied to such an end. It is felt that the associations within each verse (between verbs used to express supplications, Names invoked, Qur’anic texts and word chains), and progressions within and between particular clusters of the prayer’s verses, are best left to the reader’s close contemplation.

55. Renderings of Qur’anic text, indicated in the translation in italics, are loosely based on A. J. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted* (Oxford, 1991), which has been extensively adapted as appropriate. The numbering of verses used in Qur’anic references follows that in *The Holy Qur’an: Translation and Commentary* by A. Yusuf Ali (n.p., n.d.).

56. The traditional list according to a well-known version of a hadith transmitted by Abū Hurayra can be found in Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God: al-Maṣṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā*, tr. with notes by David B. Burrell and Nazih Daher (Cambridge, 1999), pp.49–51. Another version of this list, also given on the authority of Abū Hurayra, substitutes other Names for some of the ninety-nine in the first one: see pp. 167–169.

57. Some Names appear in neither version of the list but are noted as such in the Qurʾan or derived from expressions associated with the Divine therein. See *ibid.*, pp. 167–169.

58. Ibn ʿArabī, *K. Kashf al-maʿna ʿan asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā*, ed. and tr. Pablo Beneito (Murcia, Spain, 1997): 2nd revised edn.

59. See *ibid.*, p. 11. For elaboration, see Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, pp. 21–25 (on *takhalluq*) and pp. 48, 60 (on *taʿalluq*). The same terms were used by al-Mahdawī and apparently first expounded by Abū Madyan: see Beneito and Hirtenstein, ‘The Prayer of Blessing [upon the Light of Muhammad] by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Mahdawī’, p. 30 n. 49.

60. There does not appear to be any direct correlation between the structure of the prayer as a whole and the inclusion (and order of inclusion) of particular prophets, however. It is also noteworthy that supplications by prophets in the Qurʾanic text are used in the prayer in an indirect manner, as illustrated by verses 17 and 19, in contrast with such usage as arises in *Ḥizb al-baḥr*, for example: see McGregor, *Sanctity and Sainthood*, pp. 44–46.

61. On Ibn ʿArabī’s projection of the true relationship between Divine Beauty and Majesty, and the human response to these, see his *K. al-Jalāl waʾl-jamāl*, tr. by R. T. Harris, *JMIAS* VIII (1989), pp. 5–8.

62. For this reason we do not use the translation ‘God’.

63. Another example of the use of such word chains in the genitive case in a text attributed to Ibn ʿArabī arises in *Khuṭba ukhrā [Another Preface]* (Ṣehit Ali 1341, fols. 405b–406a, part of a collection of Ibn ʿArabī’s works dated AH 724). Here we see, for example, *bi-wiṣāli ittiṣāli jamāli kamāli* and *iftitāḥi arwāḥi irtiyāḥi misbāḥi rawāḥi riyāḥi* and *idrāji ibrāji zujāji sirāji wahnāji*. The author thanks Stephen Hirtenstein for this information.

64. Every *sūra* of the Qurʾan but one is prefaced by ‘In the Name of Allāh, the All-Compassionate, the Most Merciful’, and the *Dawr*, like all other all prayers, opens with it. Both this and a contraction of it (‘In the Name of Allāh’, referred to in shorthand as the *basmala*) permeate Muslim oral and written expression. On its application before action as a consecration, its quality as a word of power, and its popular use as an amulet (its description in this verse as a *ḥirz* is noteworthy), see Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, pp. 94 ff.

65. Q 18: 39, in full: ‘Why did you not say, on entering your garden, “As God wills! There is no power save in God!” If you see me less than you in wealth and children.’ Part of the parable of the two men, one of them boasting to the other that he has been given greater wealth and strength, declaring that he did not believe his

garden would ever perish, nor that the Resurrection would come to pass. On observing his attitude, his companion asked why he did not acknowledge God's generosity and power, for He may invert their fortunes, and ruin his garden, as indeed happened.

Like the *basmala*, the phrases *mā shā'a Allāh* and *lā qūwata illā bi'llāh* (and the expanded version of the latter *lā ḥawla wa lā qūwata illā bi'llāh*, referred to in shorthand as the *ḥawqala*) also permeate Muslim expression. Note that the *ḥawqala* is described as a treasure (*kanz*) also in the Sunday morning prayer in the *Awṛād*, where it is also tied to the unknowable (*min khazā' in al-ghayb*): see Ibn 'Arabī, *Wird*, p. 7.

66. *Al-Sattār* is not one of the ninety-nine Names, but appears in supplications and devotional literature. For example, the Wednesday morning prayer in the *Awṛād* encompasses *anta Sattār al-'uyūb* (You are the One who Veils shortcomings), and invokes God through this attribute (*yā Sattār*): see Ibn 'Arabī, *Wird*, p. 32.

67. Q 3: 103, in full: 'Hold fast to the bond of God, together, and do not scatter; remember God's blessing upon you when you were enemies, and He brought your hearts together, so that by His blessing you became brothers. You were on the brink of a pit of Fire, and He delivered you from it; thus God makes clear to you His signs, so haply you will be guided.' The verse is addressed to those who have attained to faith.

68. The Name *al-Muḥīṭ* appears in the alternative version of the list of ninety-nine given on the authority of Abū Hurayra, and the expression *muḥīṭ* appears several times in the Qur'an in reference to the Divine, as in Q 2: 19, 3: 120, 8: 47, 41: 45, 85: 20, 4: 108, 4: 126 (e.g. 'God encompasses everything'; 'God encompasses the things they do').

69. Q 7: 26, in full: 'Children of Adam! We have sent down on you a garment to cover your nakedness, and as a thing of beauty; and the garment of godfearing (*libās al-taqwā*) – that is better; that is of the signs of God; haply they will remember.'

70. Q 58: 10, in full: 'Conspiring secretly together is of Satan, that the believers may sorrow; but he will not hurt them anything, except by the leave of God. And in God let the believers put all their trust.' Q 58: 9 urges the believers not to conspire secretly together in sin, enmity and disobedience to the Prophet, but in piety and godfearing.

The root '*awadha*, which signifies seeking God's protection or refuge, is of course always applied in relation to the seeking of protection against Satan, as in the formula *a'ūdhu bi'llāh min al-shayṭān al-rajīm*. On refuge-taking or protection seeking (*ta'awwudh*) in Muslim prayer, see Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, ch. 6.

71. *Al-Dāfi'* is not one of the ninety-nine Names, but is used in supplications and devotional literature (for example, *yā Dāfi' al-balā'*: O You who Repel misfortune). The Tuesday morning prayer in the *Awṛād* encompasses *idfa' 'annī kayd al-ḥāsīdīn* ('Repel from me the deceitful plots of the envious!'), and the Wednesday morning prayer invokes God through this attribute (*yā Dāfi'*): see Ibn 'Arabī, *Wird*, pp. 25, 32, respectively.

72. Q 12: 107, in full: 'Do they feel secure that there shall come upon them no

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enveloping of the chastisement of God, or that the Hour shall not come upon them suddenly when they are unaware?’ Q 12: 106 provides the reference: ‘And the most part of them believe not in God, but they associate other gods with Him.’ *Ghāshiya* refers specifically to the Resurrection (which covers and encompasses all of mankind), or to Hellfire, which will overspread the faces of the unbelievers.

This verse of the prayer is the first of several in which an imprecatory aspect is expressed, through which the supplicant seeks harm for those who justly deserve it.

73. Q 45: 23, in full: ‘Has thou seen him who has taken his caprice to be his god, and God has led him astray out of a knowledge, setting a seal upon his hearing and his heart, and laying a cover on his seeing? Who then will guide him, after God? What, will you not remember?’ Note that the part of this Qur’anic verse cited in the prayer forms the second part of a conditional clause (thus pointing to a hypothetical future): in the Qur’anic verse it describes something past.

74. Q 28: 81, in full: ‘So, We made the earth to swallow him and his dwelling and there was no host to help him, apart from God, and he was helpless.’ This refers to Qārūn, one of the people of Moses to whom God had given great treasures, but who became insolent towards his people and boastful. The prayer captures the significance of Qārūn’s destruction both for the supplicant and for those who have mistreated him. (Qārūn is often identified with the Biblical Korah, but this has been called into question. See *The Message of the Qur’an*, p. 672 n. 84.)

Note the occurrence of the phrase ‘driven away in blame and routed’ (*madh’ūman madhūran*) in Q 7: 18, addressed to Iblis on his expulsion from Paradise.

75. *al-Subbūh* is not one of the ninety-nine Names. It appears twinned with *al-Quddūs* in the Wednesday evening prayer of the *Awrād*: see Ibn ‘Arabī, *Wird*, p. 29; further Ibn ‘Arabī, *The Seven Days of the Heart*, p. 87.

76. Q 28: 31, in full (beginning with a continuation of the divine address to Moses from within the burning bush): “‘Cast down your staff!’ And when he saw it quivering like a serpent, he turned round retreating, and did not turn back. “Moses, come forward and fear not; for surely you are among those who are secure.”

77. Q 6: 45. Truncated here, the Qur’anic verse continues: ‘the Lord of the worlds’. It appears at the end of a series addressed to the Prophet, explaining how messengers were sent to communities before him, how they forgot what they had been reminded of, and how they were suddenly seized and confounded.

The pairing of verses 9 and 10 of the *Dawr* is noteworthy. In verse 9, the supplicant requests what is desirable and beneficial for himself; in verse 10, he seeks what is harmful for his enemies. Benefit bestowed by the Divine (through the Name *al-Nāfi’*) pivots on the provision of that which is enjoyable (*ladhdha*, mentioned in verse 9) according to Ibn ‘Arabī, while the Names *al-Nāfi’* and *al-Dārr* are twinned opposites. See Ibn ‘Arabī, *K. Kashf al-ma’na*, p. 178.

78. Q 10: 64, in full: ‘For them are good tidings in the life of this world and in the hereafter. There is no changing the words of God; this is the mighty triumph.’ Q 10: 62–63 provides the reference: ‘Surely God’s friends – no fear shall be on them neither shall they sorrow. Those who believe, and are godfearing – ...’

79. Q 10: 65, in full: ‘And do not let their saying grieve you. Indeed the honour and glory belong to Allāh altogether; He is The All-Hearing, The All-Knowing.’ The Qur’anic verse is addressed to the Prophet Muhammad regarding his dealings with the polytheists.

80. Q 12: 31, in full: ‘When she heard of their malicious talk, she sent to them and prepared for them a banquet and gave to each of them a knife. “Come forth and attend to them”, she said. And when they saw him, they so admired him that they cut their hands, saying “May we be saved by God! This is no mortal; he is no other than a noble angel.”’ See earlier discussion for the Qur’anic context.

81. Q 2: 165, in full: ‘Yet there be men who take to themselves compeers apart from God; they love them as if it were love for God; but those who believe are more ardent in love for God. O if the evildoers might see – when they see the chastisement – that power altogether belongs to God, and that God is terrible in chastisement.’

82. Q 5: 57, in full: ‘O believers, whosoever of you turns from his religion, God will assuredly bring forth a people He loves, and who love Him; [they are] soft towards the believers, hard on the unbelievers, striving in the path of God, not fearing the reproach of any reproacher. That is God’s bounty; He gives it unto whom He will; and God is All-embracing, All-knowing.’

83. Q 3: 20, in full: ‘So if they dispute with you, say, “I have surrendered myself [my face] (*wajhī*) to God, and whosoever follows me!” And say to those who have been given the Book and to those who have not, “Have you surrendered [to Him]?” If they have surrendered, they are rightly guided; but if they turn their backs, your duty is but to deliver the Message. And God sees His servants.’ (Note that *wajh*, literally ‘face’, denotes by extension one’s will or self.) Q 3: 19 refers to disputes between the Prophet and the People of the Book: ‘The true religion with God is Islam. Those who were given the Book were not at variance except after the knowledge came to them, being insolent one to another. And whosoever disbelieves in God’s signs, God is swift at the reckoning.’

84. *Al-Badī’* (one of the ninety-nine Names) appears twice in the Qur’an as here (Q 6: 101 and 2: 117).

85. Q 20: 27–28. This is part of a supplication made by Moses in response to the divine instruction to go to the transgressing Pharaoh.

Note the resonance in this part of the prayer verse with a request that appears in a prayer taught by the Prophet to ‘Alī to help in memorising the Qur’an, thus: *Al-lāhumma badī’ al-samāwāti wa’l-arḍ dhā’l-jalālī wa’l-ikrām...as’aluka bi-jalālīka...an tutliqa bi-hi lisānī...* For the full text and details of the hadith, see Farid, *Prayers of Muhammad*, p. 227.

86. Q 39: 23, in full: ‘God has sent down the most excellent discourse as a Book, consistent within in its oft-repeated [truths], at which shiver the skins of those who fear their Lord; then their skins and hearts soften to the remembrance of God. That is God’s guidance, whereby He guides whomsoever He will; and whoever God leads astray has no guide.’

The Prayer for Spiritual Elevation and Protection

87. This is not one of the ninety-nine Names. Q 85: 12 gives ‘Surely your Lord’s assault is terrible (*inna baṭsha rabbika la-shadīd*)’. See also Q 44: 16.

88. Q 3: 126, in full: ‘God ordained this but as a glad tidings to you, and that your hearts might thereby be at rest. There is no help to victory except from God, the All-Mighty; the All-Wise.’ The Qur’anic context is the battle of Uhud; the immediate reference is to the reminder that God’s help would be forthcoming, as it was at Badr (two clans among the Prophet’s forces at Uhud had been on the point of losing heart and joining the deserters). See also Q 8: 10, referring to the battle of Badr.

89. Q 20: 25–26, part of a supplication uttered by Moses, on receiving the divine instruction to go to the transgressing Pharaoh, continued by the Qur’anic verses included in prayer verse 17: see n. 85 above.

90. Q 94: 1. The opening verse of *sūrat al-Inshirāḥ*, used in times of difficulty. Revealed very soon after Q 93 during the early years of his mission and a time of considerable trial for the Prophet, it reassures him of God’s continuing help. The juxtaposition in the prayer verse of this Qur’anic verse with Q 20: 25, conveying Moses’ request for the ‘expansion of his breast’, is noteworthy.

91. Q 30: 4–5, in full (including 3): ‘The Byzantines have been vanquished in the nearer part of the lands; after their being vanquished, they will be victorious in a few years. To God belongs the Command before and after. That day the believers shall rejoice in the victorious help of God; He helps whomsoever He will, and He is the All-Mighty, the All-Compassionate.’ ‘That day’ is understood to be a prediction of the battle of Badr which took place 8–9 years later, during which the Muslims would rejoice at their decisive victory over the unbelievers of Quraysh. (It refers also to the victories of Heraclius over the Persians: Badr coincided with a stage in these.)

92. This pair of Names appears (in reverse order) in the Wednesday morning prayer of the *Awṛād*. See Ibn ‘Arabī, *Wird*, p. 32.

93. On *iṭmīnān* and *sakīna*, the latter denoting both God-inspired peace of mind and the presence of God, see Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, pp. 122–125.

94. Q 13: 28. Truncated here, it ends: ‘Surely in God’s remembrance the hearts are at rest.’

95. Q 2: 249, uttered on the tongue of the small band of believers who went out with Saul (Ṭālūt) to meet Goliath (Jālūt) and his hosts, then routed them by the leave of God. In full: ‘And when Saul set out with his forces he said “God will try you with a river; whoever drinks of it is not of me, and whoever does not taste it is of me (as are those who scoop just a mouthful).” But they drank of it, except a few of them. When he crossed it, together with those who believed along with him, they said “We have no power today against Goliath and his forces!” Yet those who were certain that they would meet God said “How often has a small unit overcome a sizeable one, by the permission of God! God is with those who are patient in adversity.”’ Note that Q 2: 250 continues with their supplication on meeting Goliath and his forces, thus: ‘Our Lord! Pour out over us steadfastness, make firm our feet and give us aid against the people of the unbelievers.’ The prayer verse 21 uses the same language and imagery as arises in their supplication (*afrigh ‘alaynā ṣabran wa thabbit aqdāmanā...*).

96. Q 13: 11, in full: 'He has attendant angels, before him and behind him, watching over him by the command of God. God changes not what is in a people, until they change what is in themselves. If God wills evil for a people, there is no turning it back. Apart from Him, they have no protector.' Q 13: 9–10 explains the encompassing of the unseen and the visible by the Divine Knowledge, with the following effect (achieved through the surrounding recording angels): 'Alike of you is he who conceals what he says and he who proclaims it, he who hides himself in the night, and he who sallies by day.'

Note the resonance in this prayer verse with a request that appears in a prayer attributed to the Prophet, which he reportedly recited every morning and night: *Al-lāhumma aḥfaznī min bayna yadayya wa min khalfī wa 'an yamīnī wa 'an shimālī wa min fawqī*... For details of the hadith see Farid, *Prayers of Muhammad*, pp. 150–151.

97. *Al-Qā'im* is not one of the ninety-nine Names but appears, for example, in Q 13: 33: 'What, He who stands over every soul for what it has earned? And yet they ascribe to Allāh associates (*a-fa-man huwa qā'im 'alā kulli nafsin bi-mā kasabat wa ja'alū li'llāhi shurakā'*)'.

98. *Al-Dā'im* appears in the alternative list of ninety-nine Names given on the authority of Abū Hurayra: see al-Ghazālī, *The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God*, p. 167.

99. Q 6: 81, in full: 'How should I fear what you have associated [with Him], when you do not fear [the fact] that you have established associates beside God, concerning which He has not sent down on you any authority? Which of the two parties has better title to security, if you have any knowledge?' This is on the tongue of Abraham, while he was disputing with his people concerning his repudiation of their polytheism.

100. These two Names appear thus together in Q 8: 40 (see also 22: 78); for further examples of references to God as the Protector of those who believe, see Q 47: 11 and 3: 150. They are not among the ninety-nine Names.

101. Q 2: 67, in full: 'And when Moses said to his people "God commands you to sacrifice a cow." They said, "Are you making fun of us?" He replied, "I take refuge in Allāh lest I should be one of the ignorant."' The context is the well-known exchange between Moses and his people, which culminated in their sacrificing the cow.

102. *Al-Ṭālib* is not one of the ninety-nine Names. It arises in the Wednesday morning prayer of the *Awṛād* (*anta...al-Ṭālib wa'l-maṭlūb*) for example: see Ibn 'Arabī, *Wird*, p. 31. Cf. Q 58: 21.

103. *Al-Ghālīb* is not one of the ninety-nine Names but is used in the Qur'an of the Divine in 12: 21, thus: 'Allāh prevails in His purpose, but most men know not' (*wa Allāh ghālīb 'alā amrihi wa lākin akthar al-nās lā ya'lamūn*). Cf. Q 58: 21.

104. Q 48: 8–9, in full: We have sent you as witness, bearer of good tidings and warner, so that you [all] may have faith in God and His Messenger, and succour Him and reverence Him, and that you may give Him glory dawn time and evening.'

105. *Al-Kāfī* appears in the alternative list of ninety-nine Names given on the authority of Abū Hurayra: see al-Ghazālī, *The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God*,

pp. 167. In the sense of sufficiency, the root verb appears of the Divine several times in the Qur'an in relation to His sufficiency as a Guardian (*wakīl*), a Reckoner (*ḥasīb*), a Helper (*naṣīr*), a Protector (*walī*), as One who knows (*ʿalīm*), and as a Witness (*shahīd*), for example. See for example Q 4: 81, 33: 39, 25: 31, 4: 45, 4: 70, 4: 166; also 33: 25.

106. *Al-Shāfi* is not one of the ninety-nine Names: the root is used in the Qur'an to characterise its own contents (e.g. Q 17: 82 and 41: 44); see also Q 10: 57; 9: 14.

107. Q 59: 21. Truncated here, the verse ends: 'And those similitudes – We strike them for men; haply they will reflect.'

108. Q 2: 60, in full: 'And when Moses sought water for his people We said, "Strike with your staff the rock", and there gushed forth from it twelve fountains; all the people knew now their drinking place. "Eat and drink of the provision of God, and do not make mischief in the earth, spreading corruption." The part of this verse quoted in prayer verse 27 is on the tongue of Moses.

109. This Name, which appears in the traditional list of ninety-nine, is always twinned in the Qur'an with *al-Qaḥḥār*. See Q 40: 16, 39: 4, 38: 65, for example.

110. *Al-Aḥad* appears in the alternative list of ninety-nine Names given on the authority of Abū Hurayra: see al-Ghazālī, *The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God*, p. 167. (See also Q 112: 1: 'Say: "He is Allāh, One."')

111. Q 47: 19, in full: 'Know then that there is no god but God, and ask forgiveness for your sin, and for the believers, men and women. And God knows your comings and goings and your lodging.' The word of Oneness (*kalimat al-tawḥīd*) is shorthand for the first part of the *shahāda*.

112. Q 12: 38, in full thus: 'And I have followed the creed of my forefathers Abraham, Isaac (Iṣḥāq) and Jacob (Ya'qūb). Not ours is it to associate others with God. That is of the grace of God to us, and to all mankind; but most men are not thankful.' This is on the tongue of Joseph, in the context of a discussion of their dreams with his fellow prisoners: he had been imprisoned following his refusal to bow to the demands of his employer's wife.

Note that the three terms in the phrase *bi'l-wilāya wa'l-'ināya wa'l-ri'āya* appear together also in the Sunday morning prayer of the *Awṛād*, thus: *bi-'ayn al-rahma wa'l-'ināya wa'l-ḥifẓ wa'l-ri'āya wa'l-ikhtisās wa'l-wilāya*. See Ibn 'Arabī, *Wird*, p. 9.

113. Q 49: 3, in full: 'Surely those who lower their voices in the presence of the Messenger of God, those are they whose hearts God has tested for godfearing; they shall have forgiveness and a mighty wage.' The verse appears in a sequence advising the believers how they should behave in the presence of the Prophet and towards each other.

114. Q 3: 135. Truncated here, after a pause the Qur'anic verse ends: 'and who do not knowingly persist in the things they did.' This verse appears in a sequence describing the righteous, whose reward will be Paradise. Note that the Qur'anic verse begins with 'And', which is omitted in prayer verse 31.

115. Q 39: 53, in full: 'Say! "O My servants who have transgressed against yourselves: do not despair of the mercy of God. Surely God forgives sins altogether; Surely He is the All-Forgiving, the All-Compassionate."'

116. *Al-Qarīb* appears in the alternative list of ninety-nine Names given on the authority of Abū Hurayra (see al-Ghazālī, *The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God*, p. 167), and is used of the Divine in Q 2: 186, 11: 61 and 34: 50 (in the final case, in the pair here: *Samī‘ Qarīb*).

117. Q 10: 10. Truncated here, it ends: ‘Lord of the worlds.’ Q 10: 9 provides the reference: ‘Surely those who believe, and do righteous deeds, their Lord will guide them for their belief; beneath them rivers flowing in gardens of bliss.’

‘A Garden prepared for the god-fearing’ is a contraction of a description appearing in Q 3: 133: ‘And vie with one another, hastening to forgiveness from your Lord, and to a Garden whose breadth is as the heavens and the earth, prepared for the god-fearing.’

118. Perfect and complete, the power of the Word of God is repeatedly acknowledged in prayer and invocation (see for example ‘Tamima’, p. 177; Padwick, *Muslim Devotions*, p. 86). The Prophet is reported to have said that whoever recites the formula *a‘ūdhu bi-kalimāt Allāh al-tāmmāt min sharri mā khalaq* in the morning and the evening will never come to harm: for details of the hadith see Farid, *Prayers of Muhammad*, p. 150. Ibn ‘Arabī advised use of this formula (incorporating the word *kullihā* after *kalimāt Allāh al-tāmmāt*) by the traveller alighting for rest during the night, to protect his night-camp from harm: see Ibn ‘Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* (Beirut, n.d.), IV, p. 505.

119. *Sulṭān naṣīr* arises as the object of a request in Q 17: 80 (which furnishes a much-used supplication), thus: ‘And say: “My Lord, lead me in with a sincere ingoing, and lead me out with a sincere outgoing; grant me from You an authoritative strength that brings success.”’

APPENDIX

Manuscript copies and chains of transmission

Copies A–I used in presenting the Arabic text are detailed below. With respect to chains of transmission, the lengthy epithets attached to figures are omitted unless they are of specific help for the purposes of identification: titles and positions are retained. Of these chains, to our best knowledge only **D** and **G** have been printed.

A. Hacı Mahmud Efendi 3950

Al-Jundī commentary (in Ottoman Turkish) dated **AH 1280**: 52 fols., some vowels. Al-Jundī claims that this chain (fols. 50b–51a) encompasses the *Dawr* and ‘all of Ibn ‘Arabī’s other *awrād* and writings’. He provides an *ijāza* in the *Dawr* and the *ṣalawāt* of Ibn ‘Arabī to ‘Abd al-Nāfi‘ Efendi.

Jundī Zāde Muḥammad Amīn al-‘Abbās, Mufti of Damascus ~ his father Muḥammad Efendi al-Jundī ~ ‘Umar al-Bāqī ~ Muḥammad Kamāl al-Dīn al-Šiddīqī ~ his father Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī al-Šiddīqī ~ ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī ~ Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī ~ Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī ~ al-qāḍī Zakarīya al-Anṣārī ~ ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī ~ Ibrāhīm ‘Abd al-Wāḥid al-Tanūkhī ~ Qāsim b. ‘Askar (sic) ~ Ibn ‘Arabī

B. Dügümlü Baba 506

Al-Tāfilātī commentary (in Arabic) copy dated **AH 1251** (Medina): 30 fols., with some vowels. Al-Tāfilātī claims that this chain (fol. 3a) encompasses the *Dawr* and ‘all of Ibn ‘Arabī’s writings’. He adds that he has chains of authorities other than this one, but does not specify them.

Muḥammad al-Tāfilātī al-Khalwatī, Mufti of Jerusalem ~ his teacher Muṣṭafā al-Kubrā (sic) al-Khalwatī and his shaykh Muḥammad

b. Sālim al-Ḥanafī (sic) al-Miṣrī; the latter two ~ their shaykh Muḥammad al-Budayrī al-Dim'yātī ~ his shaykh Mullā Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī al-Madanī ~ his shaykh Aḥmad al-Qushāshī al-Dajānī al-Madanī, via his chain to Ibn 'Arabī

C. Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4212

Al-Dāmūnī commentary (in Arabic) **undated**: 83 fols., no vowels. Chain appears fol. 3a.

Muḥammad Maḥmūd b. 'Alī al-Dāmūnī ~ his teacher Maḥmūd al-Kurdī al-Kūrānī ~ Muḥammad b. al-shaykh al-Sālim al-Ḥafnāwī (sic) ~ Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī ~ Mullā Ibrāhīm al-Kurdī al-Kūrānī al-Madanī ~ Aḥmad al-Qushāshī al-Dajānī, via his chain to Ibn 'Arabī

D. Al-Qāwuqjī commentary

Printed version in Arabic (Damascus, **AH 1301**), copy of Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4213: 160 pp., with few vowels, ending in a commentary on the *ṣalawāt* of Ibn 'Arabī (pp. 106 ff.). Al-Qāwuqjī explains that he transmits the *Dawr* 'like Ibn 'Arabī's other resplendent works' through this chain (pp. 3–4).

Muḥammad b. Khalīl al-Qāwuqjī al-Ṭarābulusī ~ Yāsīn b. al-quṭb 'Abdallāh al-Mīrghanī al-Makkī ~ Muḥammad Ṭāhir Sunbul ~ his father Muḥammad Sa'īd Sunbul ~ Muḥammad Ṭāhir al-Kurdī ~ his father Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī al-Kurdī ~ Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Qushāshī ~ Zayn al-Ābidīn al-Ṭabarī ~ his father 'Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā ~ his grandfather Yaḥyā al-Ṭabarī al-Makkī ~ al-ḥāfiẓ 'Abd al-'Azīz b. al-ḥāfiẓ 'Umar b. Fahd ~ his father ~ al-Jamāl Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Murshidī ~ Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallāh b. Sulaymān al-Shināwizī ~ Raḍī al-Dīn al-Ṭabarī al-Makkī ~ Ibn 'Arabī

E. Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4053

Copy of prayer alone, **undated**: 5 fols. with full vowels. Chain (fol. 5a) added in a different hand, viz. that of 'Alī Efendi, granting an *ijāza* to read the *Dawr* to Aḥmad Muẓaffar b. Muṣṭafā Mas'ūd.

'Alī Efendi b. Sulaymān b. al-shaykh Muṣṭafā b. al-shaykh 'Abd al-Karīm (may be crossed out) 'Umar, teacher in Dār al-'Alīya ~

‘Abdallāh Ṣidqī al-Diyarbakrī, also called al-Qirmānī {or, ‘Abdallāh Ṣidqī ~ al-Diyarbakrī, also called al-Qirmānī} ~ his brother Muḥammad Zanqī{?} ~ Ismā‘īl Īdanjakī in Medina (*al-mujāwir fī*) ~ Ibrāhīm the grandson {of} ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī ~ his grandfather ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī ~ his shaykh Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī ~ his father Badr al-Ghazzī ~ al-ḥifẓ al-Suyūṭī ~ al-Shams Muḥammad b. Muqbil al-Ḥalabī ~ Abū Ṭalḥa al-Ḥarāwī al-Zāhidī (sic) ~ al-Sharaf al-Dimyāṭī ~ Sa‘d al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Shaykh al-Akbar ~ his father Ibn ‘Arabī

F. Reşid Efendi 1051

Personal compilation of prayers, *ṣalawāt*, Qur’anic verses, supplications, poems (including Ka‘b b. Zuhayr’s famous *Bānat Su‘ād*), an alphabetical list of the names of the Companions who fought at Badr (compiled apparently at the request of a ruler), fragments from al-Buṣayrī and al-Suyūṭī, a *ḥizb* by Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī, a list of the Prophet’s names, his wives and a summary of the signs of the Mahdi drawn from the hadith. The hand throughout is apparently that of Muḥammad Musawwid Zāde al-Ṭarabzūnī. No vowels, 160 fols. Note that fol. 144a carries the date **AH 1169** (the *Dawr* begins on fol. 144b). (The earliest date in the compilation is 1159; the latest is 1171.) The chain appears on fol. 145a.

Muḥammad al-shahīr bi-Musawwid Zāde al-Ṭarabzūnī ~ Ibrāhīm ~ Khayr al-Dīn ~ Muḥammad al-mashhūr bi-Kāmil Zāde al-Ṭarabzūnī ~ ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mawṣilī ~ his shaykh Faṭḥ Allāh al-Mawṣilī ~ his shaykh Khalīl al-Baghdādī al-ṣūfī ~ Ibrāhīm al-Madanī al-ṣūfī ~ Ṣafī al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-ṣūfī ~ his shaykh Abū’l-Mawāhib Aḥmad b. ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Quddūs al-‘Abbāsī al-Shinnāwī then al-Madanī al-ṣūfī ~ his father ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Quddūs ~ his shaykh ‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. Aḥmad al-Sha‘rāwī al-ṣūfī ~ his shaykh Zayn al-Dīn Zakarīyā b. Muḥammad al-qāḍī al-faḥīh al-ṣūfī ~ Abū’l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad b. al-Qaymānī{?} al-Marāghī al-ṣūfī ~ his shaykh Sharaf al-Dīn Ismā‘īl b. Ibrāhīm ‘Abd al-Ṣamad al-Hāshimī al-‘Uqaylī al-Jabartī al-Zabidī al-ṣūfī ~ Abū’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. ‘Umar al-Wānī al-ṣūfī ~ Ibn ‘Arabī

G. Laleli 1520

Beautiful gold-embellished compilation in a single hand of prayers attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī (the *Awṛād*, *Dawr al-a’lā*, *Ḥizb al-aḥādīya*, *Tawajjuh waqt al-saḥar*, *Tahsīn*) followed by a prayer attributed to Abū Madyan and a list of the names and dates of death of the rightly guided caliphs and the imams of the main four Sunni *fiqh madhāhib*: 70 fols., dated **AH 1164** (f. 67b). The introduction gives an ‘open’ *ijāza* (to anyone wishing to read the texts in question) and a chain which appear to be associated with the entire contents of the compilation of ‘*awṛād* and *adhkār*’. (See manuscript frontispiece; Beneito and Hirtenstein, *The Seven Days of the Heart*, pp. 174–175, giving a translation and discussion of this *ijāza* and chain. We give the chain below for the sake of completeness). The *Dawr* text (fols. 31a–36a) is very clear and has full vowels. (Note that, sometimes omitting some of the smaller texts, Düğümlü Baba 490 and 489 and Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4179, the last used by Beneito and Hirtenstein, all printed facsimiles, are versions of Laleli 1520, retaining the *ijāza* and chain.)

Muḥammad al-Madanī b. Sa’d al-Dīn al-Baṣrī ~ Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-‘Alawī al-Yamanī ~ ‘Abd al-Shakūr al-Mu‘ammar ~ Shāh Mas‘ūd al-Iṣfārā’īnī al-Mu‘ammar ~ ‘Alī al-Qūnawī ~ Ibn ‘Arabī

H. Hamidiye 1440

Compilation in a single hand of works by Ibrāhīm b. Ḥasan al-Kūrānī: *Majmū‘at rasā’il*, including *Maslak al-ta’rīf bi-taḥqīq al-taklīf ‘alā mashrab ahl al-kashf wa’l-shuhūd al-qā’ilīn bi-tawḥīd al-wujūd*,¹ 200 fols., addressing theological issues relating to the doctrine of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. Contents recorded from AH 1086 to 1094 in al-Kūrānī’s presence in Medina by a disciple, several of them in al-Kūrānī’s home on the outskirts of Medina² and one at the rear of al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf al-Nabawī (the Prophet’s Noble Sanctuary) there.³ The *Dawr* (fols. 31b–32b) is the only prayer in this collection and the only text not by al-Kūrānī. It has few vowels. Note that the copy of the text ending on fol. 31a is dated **AH 1089** (and made at al-Kūrānī’s house on the outskirts of Medina), which is likely also to

be the date of the *Dawr* copy, which it can be presumed was recorded from al-Kūrānī alongside his own works.

It is noteworthy that **Ragīb Paşa 1464** (193 fols.) is a second compilation of the same overall title as H, in a different hand from the latter: there is no evidence in this case that the scribe was al-Kūrānī's disciple. It seems that al-Kūrānī requested that a second copy of H (which we can call H2) be made after that compilation had been completed in 1094. Some texts thus give the same details of time/place as texts in H. Others then add a 'final copy' date some five or six years later. The *Dawr* (fols. 31a–32 b)⁴ follows on the same page on the end of a text by al-Kūrānī concerning which it is recorded that the rough copy was made from al-Kūrānī in his house on the outskirts of Medina in **AH 1089** and the final one copied out in his house adjacent to Bāb al-Raḥma of the Prophet's Mosque in **AH 1094**.⁵ The *Dawr* is followed (fol. 32b) by a verse from al-Shāfi'ī, an anonymous supplication and an untitled and un-attributed portion of Ibn 'Arabī's Tuesday morning *wird*.

I. Pertev Paşa 644

Compilation in a single hand of works by or attributed to Ibn 'Arabī (*K. al-Hū*, *K. al-Ḥaqq*, *K. al-Ḥalāla*, *K. al-Bā'*, *K. al-Naşā' ih*, *R. al-Anwār*) plus various other texts, including a fragment from al-Sulamī and a prayer by Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī. The *Dawr* (fols. 62b–64a) is prefaced by a discussion of its properties. **Undated**, but the preface suggests that this version was received from al-Qushāshī.

J. Murad Buhari 320

Personal compilation of prayers, talismans, poems, etc. dated **AH 1203** (fol. 127a) in the hand of, and signed by Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh al-Ḥādī. The *Dawr* (fols. 60b–63a) is without vowels.

K. İzmirli Hakki 3635

Compilation in a single hand of prayers (including *al-Ṣalāt al-kubrā* attributed to Ibn 'Arabī and prayers by al-Shādhilī) and accompanying commentaries, 160 fols. Commentary on the *Dawr* by Ḥusayn

b. Ismā'īl b. Muṣṭafā al-Ḥiṣārī (fols. 51b–120b, the text of the prayer repeated fols. 121b–125b), entitled *Kashf al-kurūb wa fath jamī' al-abwāb wa kashf al-lughūb*. Copy dated **AH 1282** (fol. 125b), but the preamble has the author report that he wrote the commentary in **AH 1205** (fol. 51b). (Copy A 3470 [University of Istanbul Library] is incomplete and undated.)

L. Esad Efendi 415

Collection in a single hand of Ottoman Turkish and Arabic religious texts and prayers (including the *hırz* of Abū Madyan), 161 fols. The *Dawr* (fols. 158b–161a) has some vowels and is dated **AH 1220**.

M. Reşid Efendi 501

Compilation in a single hand of prayers by Ibn 'Arabī (*Ḥizb al-'arīf bi'llāh*, *Du'ā' asmā' Allāh al-ḥusnā*, *Ḥizb al-nūr*, the *Awrad*, *Ṣalawāt sharīfā*) and others (including those by 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, al-Shādhilī, 'Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī, al-Shāfi'ī and Imām 'Alī), as well as anonymous supplications and protective prayers, all in one hand, 126 fols. Possibly dates to the lifetime of al-Nābulusī, i.e. **before AH 1143**, as the copyist, possibly his disciple, refers to him twice in terms that suggest he was still alive (e.g. fol. 94a). The *Dawr* (fols. 109b–111b) has full vowels and plentiful marginal alternatives.

Alongside these copies, particular attention was paid in producing the text to two copies with full vowels: Nafiz Paşa 702 and Ankara Milli 489.

In addition to those referred to throughout our text and notes, the following copies were also consulted: Izmirli Hakki 1516 (undated), Esad Efendi 1405 (undated), Ulu Cami 936 (dated AH 1194), Esad Efendi 3430 (undated).

Notes

1. Knysh, 'Ibrahim al-Kurani', p. 41 n. 10 refers to a copy of the same title in what may be a comparable collection: *Majmū'a*, Yahuda Collection, #3869.

2. For example fols. 29a, 30a–b, 34b. Texts here end with comments such as the following (fol. 29a): 'Our shaykh the author, may God cause us to benefit from him, said: "The rough copy was completed at noontime on Tuesday 11th Šafar 1086, in my home in the outskirts of al-Madīna al-Munawwara: the best prayer and blessing be upon the most excellent of its inhabitants..."'

3. See fol. 46a, dated 1088: his disciple (the scribe) here asks God to keep al-Kūrānī safe, to preserve him and give him strong health.

4. The text of the *Dawr* in H2, which has many vowels, is identical to H with the exception that the scribe fails to incorporate four marginal additions, on one occasion adds his own insertion in the margin (*sirr* after *majd* in verse 4), and chooses *yahdīhi* in verse 7 (given in the margin in H) over the erroneous *yahdī* (given in the text in H). These differences do not merit its separate inclusion in preparing our text, but they do serve to point up the extent to which copyists and scribes have felt justified in showcasing a 'personal' version of the prayer.

5. For example, fol. 31a has: 'The author, may God cause us to benefit from him, said: "The rough copy was completed before noon on Thursday 30th Muḥarram at the beginning of 1089 in my house on the outskirts of al-Madīna al-Munawwara... the final copy (lit. its copying out and embellishment) was completed on the afternoon of Saturday the 22nd of Rajab 1094 in my house adjacent to Bāb al-Raḥma of the Prophet's Mosque.'" Similar examples arise in fols. 30a and 26a.

Note that the latter part of this compilation encompasses two additional texts by al-Kūrānī (one of them recorded in 1084 and another after his death) and two by al-Ghazālī. From f. 95a (encompassing one of the additional al-Kūrānī texts) it is in a second hand.

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
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*‘Whoever recites this prayer will be like the sun
and the moon among the stars’*

This is the first study of a widely used and much-loved prayer by Ibn ‘Arabī. The *Dawr al-a‘lā* (‘The Most Elevated Cycle’), also known as the *Hizb al-wiqāya* (‘The Prayer of Protection’), is a prayer of remarkable power and beauty. It is said that whoever reads it with sincerity of heart and utter conviction, while making a specific plea, will have their wish granted.

This precious book provides a definitive edition of the Arabic text, a lucid translation and a transliteration for those unable to read Arabic. In addition, there is an illuminating analysis of the transmission and use of the prayer across the centuries. Of particular interest are the major figures in Islamic scholarship and mysticism who have been associated with it, and perceptions of its properties.

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
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الجزء الرابع

[السفر الثاني]

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

المرحلة في علم الطبيعي

إن الترتيب الطبيعي وإن استدعى تقديم مباحث الجواهر وأقسامها - على مباحث الأعراض وأقسامها لكن أخرنا البحث عن الجواهر لوجهين أحدهما أن أكثر أحوالها لا يبرهن إلا بأصول مقررة في أحكام الأعراض. و ثانيهما أن معرفتها شديدة المناسبة لأن يقع في العلم الإلهي و علم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣

المفارقات الباحث عن ذوات الأشياء وأعيانها دون أن يقع في الفلسفة الباحثة عن الكليات والمفاهيم العامة وأقسامها الأولية فلهذين الوجهين قدمنا أحكام الأعراض على مباحث الجواهر وفيها مقدمة وفنون

أما المقدمة ففي بيان عدد المقولات

وهي عند الفلاسفة عشرة الجوهر والتسعة الباقية العرضية وهي الكم والكيف والإضافة والأيّن والوضع ومتى و الملك وأن يفعل وأن ينفعل.

وفيها مباحث أربعة أحدها إثبات أن كلا منها جنس لما تحته وهو لا يظهر إلا بخمسة أمور - الأول اشتراك الأقسام التي جعلت تحت كل من هذه العشرة في معنى وما هو أقل ما يجب في الجنس.

الثاني أن يكون ذلك المعنى الذي هو جهة الاشتراك وصفا ثبوتيا لأن السلوب لا تكون أجناسا للموجودات اللهم إلا أن يكون عنوانات يشار بها إلى معاني كلية - كما في الجوهر والكيف.

الثالث أن يكون الوصف الثبوتي مقولا على ما تحتها بالتواطؤ لا بالتشكيك - إذ التشكيك عندنا لا يكون إلا في الوجودات لا في الماهيات والوجود غير داخل في الماهيات.

الرابع أن يكون داخلا فيما تحتها من الأنواع لا أعراضا خارجا **الخامس** أن يكون تمام الماهية الجزء المشترك بينهما و ثانيها أن هذه العشرة لا يوجد اثنان منها داخلين تحت جنس ولم يوجد في كلام الأقدمين برهان على هذا.

بل الشيخ حكى أن من الناس من زعم أن الفعل والانفعال هما نفس الكيفية وهذا فاسد لأن التسخين مثلا لو كان هو السخونة لكان كل مسخن متسخنا و لكانت الحركة متسخنا و هو باطل.

و أما التسخن و التسود فهو طلب السخونة و طلب السواد و طلب الشيء يستحيل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٤

أن يكون ذلك الشيء لاستحالة كون الشيء طلبا لنفسه و من الناس من جعل المقولات أربعا الجوهر والكم والكيف و جعل النسبة جنسا للشيء الباقية و وافقهم صاحب البصائر و صاحب المطارحات جعلها خمسة هذه الأربعة و الحركة و له حجة على الحصر فيها سننقلها أولا ثم نبين وجه الخلل فيها [قال فيها] و لما حصرنا المقولات المشهورة في خمسة وجدنا بعد ذلك في موضع لصاحب البصائر حصرها في أربع و هي الأربعة المذكورة قال و إذا اعتبرت الحصر الذي ذكره لا تجده صحيحا فإن الحركة لم تدخل تحت الجوهر لأنها عرض و لا تحت الكم لأنها ليست نفس الكم - و إن كان لها تقدير و لا يلزم من كون الشيء متقدرا كونه كما بذاته و ليست بكيف - فإن الكيفية هيئة قارة لا تقتضي القسمة و لا النسبة لذاتها و إن عرض لها النسبة إلى المحل.

عقدة و حل -

أقول هذا الكلام كما يرد ظاهرا على الحصر المذكور يرد على الحصر للعرض في التسع حيث إنهم يجعلوا الحركة مقولة أخرى فهذه عقدة على القائلين لكل من المذهبين فيجب دفعها و الحل أن الحركة هي عبارة عن نحو وجود الشيء التدريجي الوجود و لا ماهية له إلا الكون المذكور و الوجود خارج عن الماهيات الجوهرية و العرضية و الطبيعية التي يلحقها الجنسية لا يجوز أن يكون خارجا عن ماهية الأنواع فالحركة ليست بجنس فضلا عن أن تكون مقولة و الذي يذكر في مباحث الحركة أن وحدتها قد تكون جنسية و نوعية و شخصية فذلك باعتبار ما تعلق به.

ثم قال فإذا الأقرب لمن يريد أن يحصر المقولات في الخمسة أن يقول الماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥

التي هي وراء الوجود إما أن يكون جوهر أو غير جوهر و هو الهيئة فهي إما أن يتصور ثباتها أو لا يتصور فإن لم يتصور ثباتها فهي الحركة و إن تصور ثباتها فإما أن لا يعقل دون القياس إلى غيرها فهي الإضافة و إما أن يعقل دون ذلك فإما أن يوجب المساواة و اللامساواة و التجزي أو لا فإن أوجب فهو الكم و إلا فهو الكيف فالكيف قد وقع في آخر التقسيم و له مميزات عن كل واحد من أطراف التقسيم فهو من حيث هو هيئة امتاز عن الجوهر و من حيث إنها قارة امتاز عن الحركة و من حيث إنها لا تحتاج في تصويره إلى تصور أمر خارج عنه و عن موضوعه امتاز عن الإضافة و من حيث إنها لا تحوج إلى اعتبار تجز امتاز عن الكم و اشتمل تعريفه على جميع أمور يفصله عن المشاركات الأربعة فهذا هو بيان الحصر في الخمسة ثم أخذ في بيان أن متى و الأين و غيرهما لا يعقل إلا مع النسبة و ساق الكلام في واحد واحد إلى آخر هذا الكلام.

بحث آخر معه اعلم أن النسبة ليست أمرا مستقلا الماهية يمكن تعقلها من حيث هي هي مع قطع النظر عن المنسوب و المنسوب إليه و لا أيضا يمكن تجريدها في العقل عن المنتسبين و كل ما لم يمكن تجريدها لا في الخارج و لا في العقل عن شيء و لا أيضا يمكن اعتبارها من حيث هي معزولا فيه النظر عما عداه فلا يمكن أخذه طبيعة محمولة على جزئيات لها إلا مع ذلك الشيء فالنسبة لا تكون جنسا أو نوعا محمولا على ما تحتها إلا مأخوذا معها جنس ما هي نسبة له أو نوعه فكون النسبة جنسا أو نوعا أو شخصا لا يستصح و لا يستقيم إلا بأن يكون ذو النسبة بما هو ذو النسبة أحد هذه الأمور.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول النسبة المكانية وهي الأين مثلا يجوز كونها جنسا لكل ما يؤخذ معها المكان من النسب و كذا مقولة متى وهي نسبة الشيء إلى الزمان يصح وقوعها باعتبار أخذها مع الزمان جنسا لكل نسبة يؤخذ معها نوعا من الزمان فيكون تلك النسب المأخوذة مع الأنواع أنواعا لمتى و ما يؤخذ معها أشخاص الزمان أشخاصا - مندرجة تحت مقولة متى لاندرج تلك الأشخاص الزمانية تحت مطلق الزمان فإذا لو وجد لهذه المعاني السبعة التي تحصلت باعتبارها ماهيات النسب السبع معنى جامع مشترك متواطىء داخل في قوامها لأمكن القول بأن النسبة جنس لهذه النسب السبع كما لو كان ذلك المعنى جنسا فرضا للزمان و المكان و لنفس الأجزاء التي لذوات الأوضاع و نفس الكيفية التي في أن يفعل و أن يفعل و كذا للجوهر باعتبار نسبة الإضافة و كذا لأطراف الملك كالقميص و العمامة و منهم من جعل المضاف جنسا للسته الباقية النسبية - و الشيخ أبطل ذلك القول بأن كون الشيء منسوباً و إن استلزم كونه مضافاً لكن الثاني عارض للأول غير داخل في تلك الستة فإن كون الشيء في الدار مثلا هي نسبته التي هو بها أين و هذه النسبة ليست إضافة بل أيناً.

ثم إذا اعتبرت التكرير وجدت الموصوف بالأين يعرض له من حيث هو ذو أين - أن يصير معقول الماهية بالقياس إلى ما هو فيه من حيث هو محوي و ذلك حاو لا من حيث هو أين فقط بل من حيث هو محوي و ذلك حاوية فيعرض له الإضافة و كما أن كون الشيء بياضا شيء و كونه لذي البياض شيء آخر كذلك كون الشيء في مكان شيء و كونه ماهية مقولة بالقياس إلى غيره شيء آخر و الأول موضوع للثاني من حيث أن يصير النسبة شاملة للطرفين الحاوي و المحوي و هذا معنى قولهم إن النسبة تكون لطرف واحد و الإضافة للطرفين.

و ثالثها أنه لا مقولة خارجة عن هذه العشرة و الشيخ احتج على ذلك بحجة ضعيفة اعترف برداءتها و لذلك طويناها فإن قيل هنا أمور خارجة عن العشرة كالوحدة و النقطة و الآن الوجود و الشيئية و الحركة و الاعتبار العامة و كذلك الفصول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧

البسيطة و مفهوم المشتقات كالأبيض و الحار و أمثالهما و كذلك الأعدام كالعمى و الجهل قلنا أما الأعدام بما هي عدم فيجب خروجها لأن كلامنا من الأمور الوجودية و هي من جهة ملكاتها كالعلم و البصر ملحقة بالملكات بالعرض و كلامنا فيما بالذات - و كذلك حكم المشتقات و المركبات لأن الوحدة معتبرة في تقسيم الممكن إلى هذه العشرة كما أن الوجود معتبر و أما خروج نفس الوجود فلأن الكلام في الماهيات و الوجود خارج عنها كما علمت و أما الوحدة فهي عندنا نفس الوجود كما علمت و أما النقطة فهي عدمية و أما الحركة فهي نحو من الوجود كما أشرنا إليه و أما الفصول البسيطة فهي بالحقيقة عبارة عن الوجودات الخاصة للماهيات النوعية و أما الشيئية و الممكنية من الأمور الشاملة فلا تحصل لها إلا بالخصوصيات.

قال الإمام الرازي لقائل أن يقول إن الوحدة و النقطة داخلتان في مقولة الكيف - لأنهما عرض لا يتوقف تصوره على تصور شيء خارج عن حامله و لا يقتضي قسمه و لا نسبه في أجزاء حامله و الشيخ لم يتعرض لإبطال هذا الوجه أقول قد علم وجه اندفاعه.

واعلم أن الشيخ حكى عن بعضهم إدخالهما في الكم ثم أبطل ذلك بأن الكم - ما يقبل المساواة والمفاوتة لذاته و ذلك لا يحمل عليهما و حكى عن قوم أنهم أبطلوا ذلك بأن الوحدة مبدأ للكم المنفصل و النقطة مبدأ للكم المتصل و المبدأ خارج عن ذي المبدأ و إلا لكان مبدأ نفسه ثم أبطل هذا الإبطال بأن الوحدة ليست مبدأ إلا لقسم من الكم و هو المنفصل و النقطة إن ثبت مبدئيتها فهي ليست أيضا مبدأ إلا للكم المتصل فلا يلزم من كون كل منهما مبدأ لبعض الأنواع أن يصير مبدأ لنفسه و حكى عن آخرين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٨

أنهم يدخلونها تحت مقولات كثيرة باعتبارات مختلفة فالنقطة من حيث هي طرف من المضاف و من حيث هي هيئة ما من الكيف و ذلك باطل لأن الماهية الواحدة يستحيل أن يتقوم بجنس و بما ليس ذلك الجنس.

و الشيخ قد سلم خروج هذه الأمور عن المقولات العشر و ذلك لا يناقض دعوى عشرية الأجناس العالية فإن الدعوى أن كل ما كانت له ماهية متحصلة من جنس و فصل فهو تحت إحدى هذه المقولات فالبسائط كنفس الأجناس العالية و الفصول الأخيرة و الأنواع البسيطة و الهويات الشخصية خروجها غير قادح في الحصر كما أن من ادعى أن أهل المدينة عشرة أقوام فإذا وجدنا أقواما بداءة غير متمدين لم يقدح ذلك في دعوى عشرية المدينين.

و رابعها عن كيفية انقسام هذه المقولات إلى أنواعها فلا بد من تحقيق أن تقسيمها إلى أقسامها هل هي بالفصول أو بالعوارض و تقسيمها إلى العوارض أيضا قد يكون مطابقا للتقسيم بالفصول كما إذا قسمنا الحيوان إلى قابل العلم و غير قابل العلم - فإنه يطابق لتقسيمه إلى الناطق و غير الناطق و قد لا يكون كتقسيم الحيوان إلى الذكر و الأنثى

الفن الأول في مقولة الكم و إثبات وجودها و وجود أقسامها و إثبات عرضيتها و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في تعدد الخواص التي بها يمكن معرفة ماهية الكم المطلق و هي ثلاث

الأولى التقدير و المساواة و المفارقة

و هي أمور إضافية لكن عروضها للأشياء من جهة أنها كم أو ذو كمية لا بسبب الطبيعة الجسمية العامة أو الخاصة -

الثانية قبول القسمة

و هي تشتمل على قسمين أحدهما كون الشيء بحيث - يمكن أن يتوهم فيه شيان مثله و يتوهم لكل من الشئيين أيضا شيان مثل الأول و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٩

هكذا لا يقف إلى غير النهاية و هذا المعنى يلحق المقدار لذاته و لا يوجب لحوقه للجسم تغييرا فيه و حركة له مكانية و الثاني حدوث الافتراق و الانفكاك و هو عبارة عن حدوث هويتين للجسم بعد أن كانت له هوية واحدة من نوعهما و لا بد في هذا المعنى من حركة و انفعال و هذا المعنى من عوارض المادة و يستحيل عروضه للمقدار كما ستعلم في مباحث الهيولى و لكن تهيو المادة لقبول هذه الانقسام إنما هو بسبب المقدار - و لا يلزم من كون الشيء مهينا للمادة لقبول معنى أن يكون ذلك الشيء مستعدا لذلك المعنى و إلا لكان كل معد مستعدا لما يعد و لا يلزم أيضا بقاء ذلك المقدار عند حصول الانقسام كما أن الحركة تعد الجسم لأن يسكن في مكان فهي لا تبقى مع السكون.

الثالثة كونه بحال يمكن أن يصير معدودا بواحد

و ذلك لأنه قد ثبت كما سيجيء أن الجسم المتصل واحد قابل لانقسامات انفكاكية غير متناهية لكن لا يجوز خروج الجميع من القوة إلى الفعل و كل جسم صح أن يقال يجب أن يكون انقساماته متناهية و صح أن يقال يجب أن يكون انقساماته غير متناهية و كلا المعنيين من عوارض المادة بواسطة المقدار.

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول كل جسم قابل للتصنيف إلى غير النهاية و التصنيف في المقدار تضعيف في العدد و بالجملة كل تبعض في المقدار تكثير في العدد و العدد غير متناه في جانب الزيادة و هو منته في جانب النقصان إلى الواحد و المقدار غير متناه في طرف النقصان و هو منته في طرف الزيادة و لما ظهر أن المقدار لذاته قابل للتجزئة و جب أن يكون لذاته قابلا للتعدد فإذا الكم مطلقا سواء كان منفصلا بالفعل كالعدد أو منفصلا بالقوة بالفعل كالمقدار فإنه قابل لأن يوجد فيه واحد يصير هو معدودا بذلك الواحد - فظهر بهذا التحقيق أن للكمية خواص ثلاث لا يشاركها غيرها فبعضهم اقتصر على الأولى في التعريف فقال عرض يقبل المساواة و عدمها و هو ضعيف لأن المساواة لا يمكن تعريفها - إلا بكونها اتحادا في الكم فيكون دوريا و بعضهم من ضم إليها الخاصة الثانية و هي قبول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٠

القسمة و هو خطأ لأنه تعريف بالأخص حيث إن قبول القسمة من عوارض الكم المتصل - لا المنفصل إلا بالاشتراك الاسمي فالأولى ما فعله الشيخان فعرفاه بأنه الذي بذاته - يمكن أن يوجد فيه شيء واحد عاذا فهذا صحيح لا يختلف في المتصل و المنفصل و ليس فيه دور لأن الواحد استعمل فيه و هو مساوق للوجود غني عن التعريف و كذلك العدد غني عنه

فصل (٢) في الفرق بين المقدار و الجسمية و ذلك من ستة أوجه

أربعة منها مبنية على نفي الجزء الذي لا يتجزى

فالأول أن الجسم الواحد يتوارد عليه المقادير المختلفة

و الجسمية المخصوصة باقية بحالها كالشمعة المتشكلة بأشكال مختلفة يتوارد عليها الأبعاد الطولية و العرضية و العمقية مع إثبات ذاتها في حد جسميتها فيدل على كون تلك المقادير زائدة على الجسمية فإن قيل الجسم الكروي إذا انعكس لم يتغير مقداره إذ هو مساو لما كان أولا في المساحة فنقول إنك ستعلم أن المساوي قد يكون بالفعل و قد يكون بالقوة و إن أمثال هذه الأشكال المختلفة لا مساواة لها بالحقيقة إلا بالقوة و الذي بالقوة ليس بموجود بعد.

و الوجه الثاني أن الأجسام مشتركة في الجسمية و مختلفة في المقادير

و هذا المسلك لا يحتاج إلى تعاقب المقادير على الجسم الواحد و اعترض صاحب حكمة الإشراق بأنه كما أن الأجسام مشتركة في الجسمية و مختلفة في المقادير فهي كذلك مشتركة في كونها متقدرة فإن كان اشتراكها في الجسمية و اختلافها في المقادير المخصوصة يوجب كون المقادير أعراضا زائدة على جسميتها لزم أن يكون اختلافها في المقادير المخصوصة بعد اشتراكها في أصل المتقدريه يوجب أن يكون المقادير المخصوصة أعراضا زائدة على متقدريتها حتى يكون مطلق المقدار عرضا و المخصوص

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عرضا آخر و ذلك محال و إلا لزم التسلسل المحال كما يظهر بأدنى تأمل فكما لم يلزم بل بطل أن يكون أصل المقدار موجودا مغايرا للمقدار المخصوص إلا في الذهن بحسب التعيين و الإبهام فكذلك جاز أن يكون الأجسام مشتركة في الجسمية و متميزة بمقاديرها المخصوصة و إن لم يكن المقدار موجودا مغايرا للجسمية أقول هذا البحث قوي جدا و ستعلم وجه انحلاله.

الوجه الثالث أن الأجسام صح أن يكون بعضها مقدرا للبعض عادا له

و بعضها مقتدرا معدودا بالآخر فالمقدار العاد في أكثر الأمر يخالف المتقدر المعدود فليست المقدرية و المعدودية بنفس الجسمية التي يستحيل أن يخالف فيها جسم جسما و الإراد المذكور متوجه عليه أيضا.

الوجه الرابع أن الجسم الواحد يسخن فيزداد حجمه

من غير انضمام شيء إليه - و لا لوقوع خلاء فيه لاستحالة و يبرد فيصغر حجمه من غير انفصال شيء منه أو زوال خلاء كان و ذلك الجسم محفوظ الهوية في الحالين فهو مغاير للمقادير و هذه الحجة أيضا مبنية على نفي الجزء الذي لا يتجزى لا بتناء التخلخل و التكاثر على نفيه.

الوجه الخامس أن وجود السطح من توابع المادة

على ما ستقيم البرهان عليه و تابع المادة ليس نفس الجسمية لأنها مقومة إياها متقدمة عليها بالعلية فإذن السطح مغاير للجسمية و إذا ثبت عرضية السطح ثبت عرضية الخط لكونه من عوارض على وجه أولى.

و السادس الخط و السطح غير داخليين في معنى الجسم

لأن من عقل أو فرض جسما غير متناه فقد عقل و فرض جسما لا جسما لكونه محالا فلما صح انفكاكهما عن الجسم لذاته و إن لم ينفكا عنه بسبب غير الجسمية فثبت مغايرتهما إياه و سيما الخط بصحة انفكاكه عن الجسم بل و عن البسيط في الوجودين كما في الكرة الساكنة - و أما الكرات المتحركة دائما التي تعينت فيها مناطق و محاور فإن الجسمية فيها متقدمة على حركاتها المتقدمة على تعيين الدوائر و الخطوط فيستحيل أن

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يتقوم الجسمية بها و إلا لزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه و هو محال. و لقائل أن يقول ما ذكرتموه منقوض بالهيولى و الصورة فإنهما داخلتان في قوام الجسم و قد لا يعلمها من علم الجسم و الذهول عنهما عند العلم بالجسم لا ينافي كونهما مقومين له فكذلك هاهنا و الجواب أن من علم الجسم جوهرًا مركبا من الجواهر الفردة - فلم يعلم حقيقة الجسم و من علمه جوهرًا متصلا بلا مادة فعلم حقيقته و إن كان علما ناقصا و من علمه مادة بلا صورة فما علمه بالحقيقة ثم من جعل المقادير مقومة للجسم جعلها من باب الصورة لا من باب المادة و أيضا لما صح أن يكون الهيولى مجهولة - عند ما يكون الصورة معلومة لا جرم و جب تغايرهما فكذلك إذا علمنا الجسمية و شككنا في وجود السطح كان وجوده مغايرا لوجود الصورة.

حكمة مشرقية

إن الذي أفاض علينا من بحر فضله في عرضية المقادير التعليمية للجسم الطبيعي هو أنا نمهد أولا أن كل ما هو داخل مع

شيء آخر في حقيقة معنى جنسي فلا بد أن يكون مبادي أحدهما و مقوماته و مكملاته بعينها مبادي و مقومات و مكملات للآخر أيضا و كذا أقسام أحدهما يدخل في أقسام الآخر فإذاً لو كانت الجسمية عين المقدار - لكان محصل أحدهما محصل الآخر و لا شبهة في أن الجسمية بالمعنى الذي هو جنس - يفتقر إلى مقومات فصلية و مع انضمام الفصول الأولية قد يحصل لها أنواع إضافية - هي أيضا إذا أخذت من حيث هي هي بلا شروط يكون معاني غير تامة مفتقرة إلى فصول أخرى بعد تلك الفصول و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى أنواع محصلة لا يتصور تحصيل بعدها و الجسمية بالمعنى الذي هو مادة يفتقر إلى صورة كمالية كالعنصرية - و بعد انضمامها إلى أخرى كالنممية و أخرى كالحساسة و أخرى كالناطقة ثم هذه المبادي و المقومات التي في القبيلتين كلها من الأحوال و الكمالات التي كان

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الافتقار إليها في تحصيل الموجود بما هو موجود أو في الجوهر بما هو جوهر أو في الجوهر المنفعل بما هو جوهر منفعل أو في الجوهر المنفعل المكيف بالكيفية المزاجية بما هو ذو مزاج أو في النامي من حيث نموه أو في الحيوان من جهة حيوانية - و أما المقدار المطلق الجنسي فإذا احتاج إلى معنى فصلي يجب أن يحتاج إليه من جهة كمية و مقدارية فلا جرم يتحصل أولا بكونه جسما تعليميا و سطحا و خطأ - فإنها من العوارض الأولية للمنقسم من حيث هو منقسم إنه هل انقسامه في جهة فيتحصل خطأ أو في جهتين فيتحصل سطحا أو في جهات فيتحصل جسما و كذلك كل منها إذا تحصل تحسلا آخر يجب أن يكون تحصله من باب المعاني و الكمالات التي تلحق المقادير بما هي مقادير متصلة كانت أو منفصلة كالطول و القصر كالعادية و المعدودية و التشارك و التباين و المنطقية و الأصمية و غير ذلك فاللازم باطل فكذا الملزوم و بهذا يعلم وجه اندفاع الإشكال الوارد على الوجه الثاني و الثالث جميعا

فصل (٣) في تقسم الكم إلى المتصل و المنفصل

و تقسيم المتصل إلى أنواعه و إن المنفصل هو العدد لا غير و في بطلان القول بأن القول كم منفصل و الثقل و الخفة كم متصل فنقول يطلق لفظ المتصل لمعنيين حال المقدار في نفسه و حاله بالإضافة إلى مقدار آخر. فالأول فصل الكم و له تعريفان أحدهما كون الكم بحيث يمكن أن يفرض فيه أجزاء تتلاقى على الحدود المشتركة. و الحد المشترك ما يكون بداية لجزء و نهاية لآخر و ثانيهما كونه قابلا للانقسامات الغير المتناهية بالقوة و المنفصل يقابله في كلا المعنيين.

و الثاني و هو المعنى الإضافي و هو أيضا على وجهين أحدهما كون مقدارين نهايتهما واحدة كخطي الزاوية و كقسمي الجسم الأبلق و ثانيهما كون مقدارين

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نهاية أحدهما ملازمة لنهاية الآخر في الحركة و المنفصل أيضا يقابله فيهما جميعا. **إذا تقرر هذا** فنقول الكم المطلق ينقسم إلى متصل بالمعنى الحقيقي و منفصل يقابله و المتصل إما أن يكون ثابتة الذات قارة الأجزاء أو لا يكون الأول هو المقدار المنقسم إلى ما له امتداد واحد و هو الخط أو ما له امتدادان متقاطعان على القيام و هو السطح و يقال له البسيط أو له امتدادات ثلاثة متقاطعة على القوائم و هو الجسم التعليمي و هو أتم المقادير

لقبوله القسمة إلى جهات ثلاث و يقال له التخين و التخن لأنه حشو ما بين السطوح - و العمق لأنه تخن نازل من فوق و السمك لأنه تخن صاعد من أسفل و قد ترسم المقادير الثلاثة على وجه آخر غير ما خرج من هذا التقسيم فيقال الخط ما يرتسم من حركة النقطة على بسيط و السطح ما يرتسم من حركة الخط خلاف مأخذ امتداده - و الجسم ما يرتسم من حركة السطح ارتفاعا و انحطاطا و ستعلم أنه مجرد تمثيل لا تحقيق فيه أما المتصل الذي لا يكون له قرار الذات فهو الزمان و تحقيق ماهيته و أحكامه موكول إلى مباحث الحركة لشدة تعلقه بها.

فظهر أن أقسام الكم المتصل أربعة الخط و السطح و الجسم و الزمان و منهم من ظن أن المكان قسم خامس و هو باطل بل هو قسم من السطح مع إضافة إلى المحوي - عند القائلين بكونه سطحا و سيأتي تحقيق القول بالمكان و أما الكم المنفصل فهو العدد أما كميته فلكونه لذاته معدودا بواحد فيه أو ليس فيه و أما أنه ينفصل فإنه ليس بين أجزائه حد مشترك فإنك إذا قسمت الخمسة إلى ثلاثة و اثنين لم تجد حدا مشتركا بينهما و إلا فإن كان منها بقي الباقي أربعة و إن كان من الخارج كانت الجملة ستة و من المحال أن يوجد كم منفصل غير العدد لأن المنفصل قوامه من المتفرقات - و قوامها من المفردات و هي آحاد و كل منها واحد فالواحد إما أن يؤخذ من حيث هو واحد أو يؤخذ بأنه شيء معين كإنسان أو مثلث و ذلك الشيء واحد - و الوحدة نفس الواحد بما هو واحد لا بما هو ذو خصوصية إذ لا مدخل للخصوصية في كون الشيء واحدا كما علمت في باب الوجود فلا شك في أن الوحدات

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هي التي يتألف منها لذاتها كمية منفصلة و كم منفصل لذاته يكون ما عدده مبلغ تلك الوحدات دون الحوامل للوحدات فهي حاملة للعدد بالعرض كما أن كلا منها واحد بالعرض.

و بهذا التحقيق ظهر فساد مذهب من ظن أن القول كم منفصل و جعل الكم المنفصل جنسا لنوعين قار و هو العدد و غير قار و هو القول و استدل عليه بأن القول مركب من المقاطع و يتقدر بها و هي أجزاء له و كل ذي جزء مقدر بجزئه و هو كم و الخطأ في الكبرى فإنه ليس كلما يتقدر بجزء فهو كم بالذات بل يجوز أن يكون له حقيقة أخرى و قد عرض له إما مقدار أو عدد و صار له بسببه جزء يعده و المقطع الحرفي ليس جزئيه إلا لأنه واحد و القول كثير فله خاصية الكمية لكونه ذا كثرة لا لذاته كما أن للمقطع خاصة الوحدة لكونه ذا وحدة فإذا لم يلتفت إلى العارض - و التفت إلى ذاته من حيث هي كيفية محسوسة لم يكن القول كمية و لا كما و لا المقطع وحده و لا واحدا و إلا لكانت الأشياء كما بالذات و واحدا بالذات و أما الثقل و الخفة فالذي غرهم في تكمهما أمران أحدهما قبولهما للمساواة و عدمها و الثاني قبولهما للتجزية و كلاهما باطل أما الأول فلأن المساواة في الكم هو أن يفرض لشيء حد ينطبق على حد شيء آخر و ينطبق كليته على كلية الآخر فإن انطبق الحدان الآخران قيل له إنه مساو - و إن لم ينطبق قيل لأحدهما إنه زائد و للآخر أنه ناقص و هذا مما يستحيل ثبوته فيهما لأن الثقل قوة محركة إما طبيعية و هي من باب الجوهر أو الميل الذي هو العلة القريبة للحركة و هو من باب الكيف و محال أن يقع شيء تحت مقولتين بالذات بل لا بد أن يكون أحدهما بالعرض و أما الثاني فلأن قبول التجزئة كما يقال ثقل هذا نصف ثقل ذاك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦

هو بسبب أن حركته في الزمان في نصف المسافة التي للآخر أو في المسافة في نصف الزمان للآخر فعروض هذا المعنى بسبب تأثيره في الحركة المتعلقة بالمسافة والزمان

فصل (٤) في تقسيم آخر للكم وهو التقسيم إلى ذي وضع و غير ذي وضع

الوضع يطلق على معان ثلاثة

أحدها كون الشيء مشاراً إليه بالحس

بالفعل أو بالقوة والإشارة تعيين الجهة التي يخص الشيء من جهات هذا العالم كما في الشفاء و بهذا المعنى للنقطة وضع و ليس للوحدة وضع -

و ثانيها معنى أخص من هذا المعنى

و هو كون الكم بحيث يمكن أن يشار إليه في جهة

و ثالثها معنى يشتمل عليه مقولة من التسع

و هو حالة الجسم من جهة نسبة أجزائه بعضها إلى بعض في جهاته و هذا الوضع لا يقال بالحقيقة الأعلى الجواهر المادية و المعنى الثاني فصل الكم و كأنه منقول من المعنى الثالث الذي هو جزء المقولة فكأنه لما كان وضع الجسم الذي هو من باب الجوهر إنما هو بسبب حال أجزائه بعضها عند بعض ظن أن ذلك أمر يقارنه إذا اعتبر في الجسم الذي من باب الكم و أن لم يكن الجسم الذي من باب الكم و لا السطح و لا الخط يجب له بذاته الجهات و المكان - لكن الجسم التعليمي له أجزاء بالقوة لها اتصال و ترصيف و إلى كل منها إذا فرض موجوداً إشارة أنه أين هو من صاحبه و كذا السطح و الخط فهذا المعنى كالمناسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧

لذلك المعنى فسمي باسمه

و إذا علمت ذلك فنقول الكم إما أن يكون ذا وضع أو لا يكون و الكم ذو الوضع ثلاثة الخط و السطح و الجسم و الباقي غير ذي وضع أما الزمان فظاهر لعدم الاقتران بين أجزائه و أما العدد فلعدم اتصال أجزائه مع أنها ثابتة و توهم بعضهم أن الجسم المتحرك لا وضع له.

و الشيخ أبطل هذا الوهم بأنه إن عني الوضع الذي من المقولة فربما أوهم صدقا و ليس كذلك فإنه فرق بين أن لا يكون للشيء وضع و بين أن لا يكون له وضع قار - كما أنه فرق بين أن لا يكون في أين و بين أن لا يكون في أين قار و كما أن الحركة عند التحقيق لا تخرج الجسم عن أن يكون الجسم ذا أين و إن أخرجه عن أن يكون ذا أين قار فكذلك حال الحركة بالقياس إلى الوضع لكن الوضع الذي يعتبر في مقولة الكم غير ذلك الوضع و هو غير متغير و لا متبدل في الجسم المتحرك و إن تحرك - فإن الحركة لا يعدم شيئاً من شرائط هذا الوضع الذي هو في الكم فإن نسبة أجزائه بعضها إلى بعض بالقرب و البعد محفوظة و إن كانت الحركة لا تحفظ نسبة الأجزاء - إلى جهات العالم و من عادة القوم أن يذكروا هاهنا معاني الطول و هي خمسة و معاني العرض و هي أربعة و معاني العمق و هي أيضاً أربعة لكن أخرنا ذكرها إلى مباحث الجسم الطبيعي لدقيقة و هي أنه إن أريد بالطول و العرض و العمق المعنى الأول أعني نفس الامتدادات فهي كم بالذات من نوع الخط و راجعة إليه و إن أريد سائر المعاني - فهي كميات مأخوذة مع إضافات لا تخرج مفهوماتها

عن أمور طبيعية فذكرها في مباحث الجسم الطبيعي أولى

فصل (٥) فيما ليس بكم بالذات وإنما هو بالعرض وهو على وجوه أربعة

فأولها أن يكون أمرا موجودا في الكم

مثل الأمور التي عددها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨

و ثانيها أن يكون الكم موجودا فيه

و ذلك إما متصل أو منفصل فالمنفصل يوجد في المفارقات و الماديات و أما المتصل فيوجد في الماديات و هو ظاهر و في المفارقات عند من ذهب إلى أن في الوجود عالما مقداريا غير هذا العالم المادي و قد يكون المتصل بالذات متصلا و منفصلا بالعرض كالزمان مثلا متصل بالذات و بالعرض من جهة المسافة و منفصل بالعرض بحسب انقسامه إلى الساعات و الأيام إذ لا امتناع في كون الشيء تحت مقولة ثم يعرض له شيء من تلك المقولة و أما المتصل الغير القار بالعرض فهو كالحركة و لذلك يوصف بأوصاف المقادير من الطول و القصر و المساواة و اللامساواة من جهة الزمان و قد يوصف بهذه الأوصاف من جهة المسافة أيضا

و ثالثها ما يكون كميته بسبب حلوله في المحل الذي حصل له الكم

كما يقال للسواد إنه طويل و عريض و عميق بسبب حصوله في محل في الكم

و رابعها أن يكون قوى مؤثرة في أشياء يقال عليها الكم بالذات

فيقال لتلك القوى إنها متناهية أو غير متناهية لا لأن نفس القوة كذلك بل باعتبار اختلاف ظهور الفعل عنها شدة أو عدة أو مدة- و الفرق بين اعتبار الشدة و المدة من وجهين أحدهما أن الزيادة في الشدة يوجب النقصان في المدة و الثاني أن الذي يتفاوت فيه القوى بحسب الشدة [المدة] ربما لا يتفاوت فيه بحسب المدة [الشدة].

إذا وقع الفراغ عن تعريف الكم و أقسامه الأولية فلنشرع في ذكر أحكامه و أقسامه

فصل (٦) في أن الكم لا ضد له أما المنفصل فلوجوه ثلاثة

أحدها أن كل عدد يقوم الأكثر منه و يتقوم بالأقل منه

و الضدان لا يقوم أحدهما الآخر و لا يتقوم به

و ثانيها أنه لا يوجد بين عددين غاية الخلاف

لكونهما غير واقف إلى حد لا يقبل الزيادة و الاثنان و إن كان في غاية الخلاف بالقياس إلى الألف مثلا لا يكون ضده لأن التضاد من الجانبين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٩

لكن الألف ليس ضدا له لأنه ليس في غاية البعد منه

و ثالثها أن اتحاد الموضوع القريب و التعاقب عليه شرط المتضادين

و ليس العدد كذلك فإن الثلاثة مثلا عبارة عن جميع وحدات يتقوم صورتها باجتماع وحدة و وحدة و وحدة و يستحيل

عروض الاثنينية لموضوعها القريب بعينه إلا بأن يفسد وإلا فموضوع الاثنينية غير موضوع الثلاثة و أما المتصل فليس المقادير الثلاثة الأجسام و السطوح و الخطوط بعضها مضادا للآخر لثلاثة براهين أيضا- الأول أن كلا منها إما قابل للآخر أو مقبول له و المقبول لا بد و أن يتقوم بالقابل فكيف يكون ضده و الثاني أنه لا يوجد مقدار في غاية البعد عن الآخر و الثالث أن موضوعها القريب ليس متحدا.

شكوك وإزالات-

س الزوجية كمية مضادة للفردية

ج إنها ليست من باب الكم لعدم قبولها المساواة و القسمة لذاتها بل هي من باب الكيف و لأن الفردية ليست وجودية لأنها عدم الزوجية فالتقابل بينهما بالعدم و الملكة دون التضاد و لأن موضوعهما ليس واحدا.

س الاستقامة و الانحناء كميتان متضادتان-

ج هما من باب الكيف و أيضا هما فصلان لا يمكن تبدل أحدهما بالآخر إلا بتبدل المحل فالخط المستقيم لا يصير منحنيا- إلا بانعدام السطح الذي فيه فلا يمكن تعاقبهما على محل و هو شرط التضاد.

س المتصل ضد المنفصل مع أنهما كميتان

ج هما فصلان لنوعي الكم و الفصل لا يندرج تحت جنسه بحسب الماهية و إن اندرج تحته بالوجود فلا يكون من أقسام الكم بالذات بل بالعرض على أن أحدهما عديمي إذ الانفصال عدم الاتصال عما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠

من شأنه أن يكون متصلا بحسب نوعه كالعناصر أو بحسب جنسه كالفلك.

س المساوي ضد المتفاوت و العظيم ضد الصغير و الكثير ضد القليل و كلها كميات

ج هذه إضافات في كميات لا أنها في أنفسها و ماهياتها كميات على أن أمثال هذه المعاني يستحيل عروض التضاد لها كما ستعلم في باب المضاف.

س المكان الأعلى ضد المكان الأسفل

ج موضوعهما القريب ليس واحدا بالذات و امتنع تعاقبهما على موضوع واحد نعم الحصول في الفوق و الحصول في السفلى متضادان و هما غير المكان و أيضا المكان بما هو مكان ليس بفوق و لا تحت- لأنهما إضافيان بالفوق بالقياس إلى ما تحته و كذلك العكس و الأمور الإضافية- امتنع عروض التضاد لها

فصل (٧) في أن الكم لا يقبل الاشتداد و التضعف

قالوا الفرق بينهما و بين الازدياد و النقص بوجهين-

أحدهما أن الزائد على شيء في الكم يمكن أن يشار فيه إلى مثل و زيادة

و الأشد من آخر في الكيف لا يمكن فيه ذلك.

أقول و لأحد أن يجيب عنه بأن هذا الفرق بحسب اختلاف الموضوع لهما- في حد نفسه فإن الكم في حد نفسه بحيث يمكن أن يشار فيه إلى شيء و شيء آخر- متباين له في الوجود أو الوضع و الكيف ليس كذلك ثم إن فضيلة شيء على آخر من نوعه أو جنسه يجب أن يكون بشيء من بابه فلا جرم كان الأفضل في الكم بأمر متميز في الإشارة بخلاف

الأفضل في الكيف لا لأن طبيعة الاشتداد اقتضت ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١

الثاني أن التفاوت بالأزيد و الأنقص غير منحصر

و التفاوت بالأشد و الأضعف منحصر بين طرفي الضدين فإن بينهما غاية الخلاف. أقول و هذا أيضا فرق بحسب معنى خارج عن الازدياد و الاشتداد بل هذا أمر راجع إلى ماهية الكم و ماهية الكيف حيث لا ينتهي أحدهما في الزيادة و ينتهي الآخر فيها مع أن الزيادة معنى واحد فيهما جميعا اللهم إلا أن يصطلح بأن يسمى أحد الاستكمالين بالزيادة و ثانيهما بالاشتداد فيكون مجرد تسمية. قال الشيخ في الشفاء بعد أن حقق أن لا تضاد في الكم و كذلك ليس في طبيعته تضعف و اشتداد و لا تنقص و ازدياد لست أعني بهذا أن كمية لا تكون أزيد من كمية أو أنقص - و لكن أعني أن كمية لا تكون أشد و أزيد في أنها كمية من أخرى مشاركة لها و لا خط أشد خطية أي أشد في أنها ذو بعد واحد من آخر و إن كان من حيث المعنى الإضافي أزيد من آخر أعني الطول الإضافي.

أقول و هكذا حال الكيف عندهم فإن سوادا لا يكون أشد في أنه سواد من آخر لكن وجود هذا أشد و أكمل من وجود ذاك كما أن وجود الخط الطويل أكمل من القصير فالتفاوت في مثل هذه الأمور يرجع إلى اختلاف حال الوجودات دون الماهيات عندنا و الوجود بذاته أشد و أضعف و أتم و أنقص كما علمت. و اعلم أن هذين الوضعين أعني نفى التضاد و نفى الاشتداد و التنقص ليسا من خواص الكم فإن الجوهر لا ضد له و كذا بعض أقسام الكيف لا ضد له و إنما الخواص المساوية للكم هي الثلاثة المذكورة أولا و خاصة رابعة و هي قبول النهاية و اللانهاية فلتكلم فيه

فصل (٨) في إثبات تناهي الأبعاد و عليه براهين كثيرة نذكر منها ثلاثة

الأول و هو المعول عليه أنه لو وجد أبعاد غير متناهية لاستحال وجود حركة مستديرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢

لأننا إذا فرضنا خطا غير متناه و كرة خرج من مركزها خط مواز لذلك الخط فإذا تحركت الكرة حتى صار الخط الخارج من مركزها مسامتا للخط الغير المتناهي بعد أن كان موازيا له فلا بد في الخط الغير المتناهي من نقطة - يقع عليها أول المسامطة و لكن ذلك محال لأنه لا نقطة في ذلك الخط إلا و فوقها نقطة أخرى - و أمكن وقوع الخط الخارج من مركز الكرة بحيث يكون مسامتا لكل واحدة من تلك النقطة و المسامطة مع النقطة فوقانية أبدا قبل المسامطة مع التحتانية لأن المسامطة مع كل منها بميل خاص عن موازاة ذلك الخط و بحصول زاوية خاصة بين الخطين أو بين الخط الموازي و موضع ميله لأنهما كالمبادلتين المتساويتين دائما - فلا جرم لا يحصل مسامطة مع نقطة بزواوية إلا و يحصل قبلها مسامطة أخرى بزواوية أقل مع نقطة فوق تلك النقطة و هكذا و لما كانت النقطة غير متناهية استحال أن يكون هناك نقطة هي أول نقط المسامطة لكن التالي محال لأن هذه الحركة حادثة و لها ابتداء بمعنى الطرف و إن لم يكن لحدوثها أول أن حدثت فيه و ليس لتلك النقطة المتصلة أول لا بمعنى الطرف و لا بمعنى آخر.

شك و اندفاع

و من أكابر المتأخرين من قدح في هذا البرهان بأن حدوث زاوية المسامطة كسائر الزوايا من الأمور التي لا أول لزمان حدوثها فلا يجب أن يكون لنقط المسامطة نقطة أولى كما لا يكون للزوايا التي بإزائها زاوية أولى إذ كل زاوية حدثت بالحركة في أن فزاوية أخرى أقل منها قد حدثت في أن قبل أن حدوثها فلا زاوية توصف بالأولية المطلقة عند ميلان أحد الضلعين عن الآخر بعد انطباقهما فكذا لا نقطة في الخط الغير المتناهي هي توصف بأنها أولى نقط المسامطة. أقول هب أن الزاوية ليس لها أول أن يكون حدوثها بالحركة فيه لكن لها حد أول يبتدئ وجودها منه متعاضدا إلى مبلغ كسائر الأمور التدريجية الحصول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٣

فعلى وزان حدوث زاوية المسامطة تدريجا كأن يجب حدوث خط من سيلان نقطة التقاطع الذي بين الخط الغير المتناهي و الخط المسامت له على وجه يكون لتلك النقطة السيالة بل للخط الذي حدثت من سيلانها بل لذلك الخط المفروض أولا- أول بمعنى طرف يبتدئ منه النقط المتصلة السمتية و إن لم يكن لها أو للخط المذكور أول بالمعنى الآخر يعني أول الأناث الذي حدثت فيه الزاوية و ما بإزائها من النقط.

البرهان الثاني لو كانت الأبعاد غير متناهية لجاز أن يخرج امتدادان عن مبدأ واحد

كساقبي مثلث لا يزال البعد بتزايد إلى غير النهاية فيكون مقدار الانفراج بين الخطين على نسبة مقدار الامتدادين الغير المتناهي فيكون غير متناه أيضا مع كونه محصورا بين حاصرين هذا خلف و هذا هو المسمى بالبرهان السلمي و قد شرحناه و ما يرد عليه و ما يمكن الذب عنه في شرح الهداية.

البرهان الثالث نفرض بعد أ ب غير متناه إما من الطرفين أو من طرف واحد

و على التقديرين يفرض فيه حد و ليكن ج و حد آخر و هو د فيكون خط ج ب الغير المتناهي في طرف ب أزيد من خط د ب الغير المتناهي في طرف ب بمقدار ج د- فإذا فرضنا انطباق نقطة د على نقطة ج فلا يخلو إما أن يمتدأ معا إلى غير النهاية فيكون الزائد مثل الناقص و هو ممتنع أو يقصر د ب عنه فيكون متناهي في طرف ب منقطعاً- و ج ب أزيد من د ب بمقدار ج د المتناهي فيكون المجموع أعني ج ب متناهي في جهة ب- و هو المطلوب قال الإمام الرازي و على هذا البرهان شك يعسر حله و هو أن تطبيق نهاية الناقص على نهاية الزائد إنما يمكن على أحد وجوه ثلاثة- أحدها أن يتحرك الناقص بكليته إلى جهة نهايته حتى ينطبق نهايته على نهايته أو يتحرك الزائد بكليته عن جهة نهايته حتى ينطبق النهايتان.

و ثانيها أن يزداد الناقص أو ينتقص الزائد حتى يتطابقا في الطرف.

و ثالثها أن يكونا بحالهما و لكنه يوضع نهاية الزائد على نهاية الناقص- و حينئذ يظهر في الزائد فضلة لا ينطبق بها على الناقص بل يبقى متجافية عنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤

ثم لا يزال يزيد تلك الفضلة من جانب إلى جانب حتى يظهر من الطرف الآخر- ثم قال فادعاء التطبيق على الوجه الأول

مصادرة على المطلوب لأن الحركة غير ممكن فيما لا يخلو مكان عنه و بالوجه الثاني لا يلزم منه محال إذ كل منهما بعد النمو و الذبول صار مساويا للآخر و بالوجه الثالث للخصم أن يقول يبقى تلك الفضلة أبدا مع لا تناهي الخطين و لا ينتهي إلى حيث تزول فإذا هما يمتدان إلى غير النهاية - و لا يلزم جعل الناقص مساويا للزائد لأن تلك الفضلة موجودة أبدا.

أقول ادعاء التطبيق على كل واحد من الأنحاء الثلاثة جائز مفيد للمطلوب.

أما على الوجه الأول فحركة الكل أي الزائد و إن سلم أنه غير ممكن - لكن حركة الجزء أي الناقص ممكن فإنه يتصور فيه أن يخلو مكانا و يشغل غيره.

و أما على الوجه الثاني فلأن التطبيق و إن حصل بعد ازدياد الناقص و انتقاص الزائد لكن يفيد ما هو المطلوب لأن تلك الزيادة أو ذلك النقصان بقدر خط ج د فالخط الزائد إذا صار بعد نقصان مقدار متناه عنه مساويا للمتناهي كان متناهيًا لا محالة.

و أما على الثالث فتلك الفضلة المتجافية قدر متناه لأنه بما يقتضيه مقدار ج د - فإذا حصل التطبيق فيما سواها مع المتناهي فعلم تناهي البعد المشتمل على تلك الفضلة و على ما سواها و هاهنا براهين كثيرة تركنا ذكرها مخافة الإطراب و الإسهاب لأن المطلوب حاصل بما دونها

إشكالات و انحالات فلنذكرها على صورة السؤال و الجواب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥

س الإنسان كما يشهد فطرته بامتناع حصول الجسم الواحد في مكانين في زمان واحد كذلك يشهد بامتناع انتهاء هذه الأبعاد إلى مقطع لا يتجاوزه فالحكم بامتناعه يوجب الشك في الأوليات.

ج لعل ذلك من بديهة الوهم و لا نسلم أن الجزم به كالجزم في الأوليات مثل الواحد نصف الاثنين بل لا نسلم أن الوهم جازم بوجود البعد الغير المتناهي غاية الأمر أنه يصعب عليه تصور بعد لا يكون بعده بعد آخر.

س أن إنسانا لو وقف على طرف العالم فهل يمكن له مد اليد إلى خارج العالم أو لا يمكن فعلى الأول يلزم الخلف لوجود البعد الخارج عن جميع الأبعاد و كذا على الثاني لوجود جسم يمنع عن ذلك.

ج لا يمكنه ذلك لا لوجود مانع مقداري عنه بل لفقد الشرط بل الشروط - فإن الجسم الذي هناك ليس في طبعه حركة مكانية بل حالة هناك يشبه بأحوال ما في عالم المثال.

س إن العالم لو كان متناهيًا فلو قدرنا أزيد مما هو عليه الآن بذراع كان حيزه أوسع من هذا الحيز و لو قدرنا أزيد بذراعين لكان أوسع من ذلك الأوسع - و هكذا فخارج العالم أحياز وجودية هي مقادير أو ذوات مقادير.

ج هذا مجرد أمر وهمي لا حاصل له في الوجود فلا عبرة به.

س الجسمية حقيقة واحدة كلية غير مقتضية لانحصار نوعها في شخصها كما دل عليه الحس و البرهان جميعا و جزئيات كل كلي غير متناهية عند العقل بحسب القوة و ليس بعضها أولى بالإمكان عن بعض لأن الإمكان إذا كان من لوازم الماهية كان مشتركا بين أفرادها جميعا فإذن في الوجود إمكان أجسام غير متناهية فهي موجودة لأن الواجب عام الفيض و الاستحقاق ثابت فيجب الإيجاد.

ج الموانع قد تكون في خارج الماهية لعدم انحصار المانع فيما هو من لوازم ماهية الشيء فإن الجسمية وإن لم يمنع من الكثرة فالوجود الصوري الذي للفلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦

يمنع أن يكون نوعه إلا في شخص واحد.

س هذا يشكل في جزء من أجزاء الفلك حيث طبيعته الكل فكانت الكثرة والكلية أمراً حاصلاً للطبيعة بالقياس إلى أجزائه فيحتمل عدم التناهي في أعداد ما يشارك تلك الأجزاء.

ج إن جزء الفلك ليس بفلك إذ الفلك بما هو فلك لا جزء له مقدارياً لأنه حيوان يتقوم مادته بصورة نفسانية لا جزء لها بحسب المقدار وطبيعة الفلك ونفسه شيء واحد في الوجود متغاير بالاعتبار إنما الأجزاء المقدارية لجسمية الفلك بالمعنى الذي هي مادة لا بالمعنى الذي هي جنس.

س الزمان لا بداية له ولا نهاية له فلا يكون للكون بداية ونهاية فيجب في الوجود مادة غير متناهية.

ج لا تناهي الكون غير مستلزم للاتناهي المادة لأن الجسم الواحد قد يتشكل بأشكال مختلفة في أحوال مختلفة.

س المقدار كالعدد في قبوله للاتناهي والعظم كالصغر في قبوله للاتناهي.

ج هذا مجرد قياس بلا جامع فلا يفيد وهما فضلاً عن الظن فكيف باليقين - س كما أن الجسم لا ينتهي في الصغر إلى ما لا يوجد أصغر منه وإن كانت الانقسامات كلها لا يخرج إلى الفعل كذلك لا ينتهي إلى العظم إلى ما لا أعظم منه وامتنع وجود عظم غير متناه.

ج ذكر الشيخ أن هذا يصح من وجه ولا يصح من وجه أما الصحة فلك أن تقسم ذراعاً إلى نصفين ثم تنصف النصف و تضم نصفه إلى النصف الآخر ثم تضم نصف الربع إلى ذلك المجموع وهكذا فلا تزال تنقص من هذا الناقص و تزيد في ذلك الزائد إلى غير النهاية و مع ذلك لم يبلغ الزيادات بالجسم المزيد عليه من حد نصف الذراع إلى حد كله و أما عدم الصحة فإن وصول الجسم إلى كل حد في العظم و النمو مستحيل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧

و ليس ذلك كالصغر لعدم الحاجة هاهنا إلى شيء خارج عن المقوم كما هناك فإن التزايد إما بسبب مادة تضم أو بالتخلخل و على التقديرين يوجب مواد جسمية غير متناه أو حيز غير متناه و كلاهما محال.

س الحركة القطعية موجودة عند الحكماء و حركة الفلك غير متناهية عندهم - و كل جزء من أجزاء الحركة و هي متباينة الوجود يوجد مع جسم و مسافة ففي الوجود أجسام بلا نهاية.

ج هذا غير مستحيل عندهم إنما المحال وجود أجسام غير متناهية في زمان واحد لا في أزمنة غير متناهية.

س ما ذكرتموه من الحجة منقوض بالنفوس المفارقة من الأبدان من زمان الطوفان إلى ما مضى فإنها أقل من المفارقة من هذا الزمان إلى ما مضى مع كونها غير متناهية.

ج قالت الحكماء كل كثرة لها اجتماع و ترتيب في الطبع أو في الوضع - فدخل اللانهاية فيها ممتنع و أما إذا لم يجتمع كالحركات و الأزمنة أو اجتمعت و لا ترتيب لا في الطبع كالعلل و المعلولات و لا في الوضع كالمقادير فاحتمال الزيادة

و النقصان فيها لا يوجب التناهي و قد أشكل على كثير من أهل النظر هذا إذا لم يشترطوا في احتمالهما للتناهي إمكان المطابقة فصار ذلك شبهه عظيمة وقعوا بسببها في ضلالات كثيرة فمنهم من جحد بقاء النفوس بعد بوار البدن إذ لو بقيت لكان عددها كعدد الأبدان غير متناهية إذ لا أولوية للبعض بالبقاء و لبطلان التناسخ و منهم من ذهب إلى حقيقة التناسخ ليكون أعداد النفوس متناهية و هي متكررة الرجوع إلى أبدانها و منهم من ذهب إلى وجوب تناهي الحركات و الانفعالات و إن أوجب التعطيل في صنع الله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٨

وجوده حذرا من ارتكاب القول بعدد غير متناه في الأشخاص أو في الأبعاض بوجه من الوجوه كل ذلك لأجل اعتقادهم بأن كل ما يحتمل الزائد و الناقص فهو متناه.

و الذي يكشف عن هذه الشبهة أن العلم بأن كل ما يحتمل الزيادة و النقصان - يكون متناهيًا إما من البديهيات أو من النظريات و الأول باطل و إلا لم يقع الاختلافات فيه بين العقلاء لكنهم اختلفوا فمنهم من زعم أن أجزاء الجسم غير متناهية بالفعل - و منهم من ركب العالم من أجزاء كرية الشكل لا نهاية لها و منهم من قال بالخليط الغير المتناهي و المسلمون اتفقوا على أن معلومات الله و مقدوراته لا نهاية لها و منهم من ذهب إلى أن أنواع الأكوان المقدورة لله تعالى غير متناهية و الجزء الذي لا يتجزى عندهم يمكن حصوله في أحياء غير متناهية على البدل و منهم من أثبت في العدم ذواتا غير متناهية و كذلك يعلم بالبديهة أن مراتب العدد غير متناهية مع أن الألوف الغير المتناهية أكثر من الأحاد الغير المتناهية بألف مرة و الحركات المستقبلية سيما حركات أهل الجنة غير متناهية مع أن كلا من هذه الأمور قابل للزيادة و النقصان.

و إذا ضممنا هذه المعتقدات مع اعتقاد الفلاسفة صار إجماعا منعقدا بين العقلاء - على أن الغير المتناهي مما يجوز أن يقبل الزيادة و النقصان فكيف يكون العلم بامتناعه بديهيا فإذن هذه القضية لا يمكن الجزم بها إلا بالبرهان و ذلك البرهان لا يتقرر إلا فيما يحتمل التطبيق.

و بيانه أن الموجب للتناهي هو أنه يجب انتهاء الناقص إلى حد لا يبقى منه شيء و يبقى من الزائد بعده و هذا إنما يجب أن لو تعذر وقوع جزء من الجملة الناقصة في مقابلة جزءين من الزائدة و إلا لم يجب انتهاء الناقص إلى حد لا يكون بعده للزائد شيء بإزائه منه و ذلك فيما يحتمل الانطباق و فيما يمتنع انطباق جزءين من إحدى الجملتين على جزء واحد من الأخرى كاستحالة وقوع جسمين في حيز

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واحد و كاستحالة وقوع علة و معلول في مرتبة إحداهما فلا جرم إذا شغل جزء من إحداهما بمماساة جزء من الأخرى استحال اشتغاله بعينه بمماساة جزء آخر من الأخرى - و هذا يوجب انتهاء الناقصة إلى حد ينقطع و يبقى بعده من الزائدة شيء هو مقدار الزائدة أو عدده و أما الأمور التي لا انطباق بينها لا بالطبع و لا بالوضع بل بالجعل فقط - فكلما يجعل الوهم من إحدى الجملتين بقوته الخيالية بإزاء الآخر من الأخرى يكون عددا متناهيًا لكن يمكن أن يبقى من الجملتين ما لا يقوي الوهم بل العقل على استحضاره لأن عقولنا و نحن في هذه الدار لا تقدر على أفعال و انفعالات

غير متناهية - فلم يظهر الخلف في البواقي إلا بهذا الشرط و أما الشرط الآخر و هو الحضور فستعلم.

هداية في تحقيق معنى اللانهاية في الحوادث الماضية و المستقبلية

أما الماضية فإذا قلنا للأشخاص الماضية إنها غير متناهية فمعناه إما أن كل واحد من الأشخاص غير متناه و هو ظاهر البطلان و إما أن الجملة حال الاجتماع لها عدد غير متناه فهذا إما بحسب الوجود أو بحسب الوهم و كل منها إما بمعنى العدول أو بمعنى السلب فهذه أربعة أقسام.

أما الأول

و هو كقولنا جملة الأشخاص الماضية أمر له عدد غير متناه فباطل - لأن موضوع القضية أمر غير موجود و ممتنع الوجود لأن جملة أشياء كل منها لا يثبت مع الآخر استحالة وجودها كيف و الجملة بما هي جملة لو كانت موجودة فاما في الماضي أو في الحال أو في الاستقبال أو في كل الأزمنة و كل هذه الأقسام الأربعة باطلة ضرورة.

و كذا القسم الثاني

و هو أن جملة الأشخاص الماضية أمر له عدد غير متناه في الذهن باطل لأن الذهن لا يقوى على استحضار عدد لا نهاية له بالفعل فثبت أن موضوع هذه القضية ممتنع الوجود في الأذهان و في الأعيان فيستحيل أن يحكم عليه بالأحكام الثبوتية و العدولية إلا بأن يقال إن المتهم من جملة الأشخاص الماضية بحيث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٠

أي عدد أخذته يجد غيره حاصلًا فيه و لا ينتهي في الحساب إلى واحد غير مسبوق بغيره.

و أما القسم الثالث

فهو صحيح إذ الحكم السلبي لا يقتضي وجود الموضوع - فصح الحكم بأن ليست الأشخاص متناهية إلى حد و يكفي لصحة هذا الحكم أن يتصور الأشخاص بوجه إجمالي

و كذا القسم الرابع

و هو الحكم السلبي بحسب الوهم بأن يقال كل ما يتوهمه العقل من الأشخاص الماضية فليست مما لا يمكن الزيادة عليه و أما النظر في الحوادث المستقبلية فاما في وجودها و إما في تنهايتها و لا تنهايتها - و أما النظر في وجودها فلا شك أنها ليست بموجودة بالفعل بل بالقوة بمعنى أن كل واحد ممكن الوجود في وقت لا أن الجميع يمكن وجودها في وقت و أما النظر في تنهايتها و عدم تنهايتها.

فاعلم أنه يصح أن يقال الأشياء التي في طريق التكون أنها أبدا متناهية بالفعل - و يصح أن يقال إنها أبدا متناهية بالقوة و يصح أن يقال إنها أبدا غير متناهية لا بالفعل و لا بالقوة كل بمعنى آخر أما أنها متناهية بالفعل أبدا فلأنها أبدا واصلة إلى حد معين - فهي متناهية إليه في ذلك الوقت و أما أنها متناهية بالقوة أبدا فذلك بالقياس إلى النهايات الأخرى التي هي بالقوة و أما أنها غير متناهية لا بالفعل و لا بالقوة فبالقياس إلى النهاية الأخيرة التي لا يكون بعدها شيء آخر و الحاصل أنها بالقياس إلى النهاية الحاضرة متناهية بالفعل و بالقياس إلى ما يستحضر متناهية بالقوة و بالقياس إلى النهاية التي لا يكون بعدها شيء آخر غير متناهية لا بالفعل و لا بالقوة

فصل (٩) في بقية أحكام اللانهاية و هي خمسة أبحاث

البحث الأول أن اللانهاية قد يعنى بها نفس هذا المفهوم و قد يعنى بها شيء آخر
موصوف باللانهاية كما أن العدد قد يعنى به نفس العدد و قد يعنى ذو العدد

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣١

ثم إن بعض الأوائل جعل طبيعة اللانهاية مبدأ العالم و هو باطل أما أولا فلأنها معنى عدمي لا تحصل له و أما ثانيا فلأن اللانهاية لا يخلو إما أن يكون منقسما أو لا يكون فإن كان منقسما وجب أن يكون جزؤه مساويا لكله لأنه ليس هناك طبيعة أخرى وراء ذلك المفهوم فيجب أن يكون كل واحد من أجزائه غير متناهية أيضا و هو محال و إن لم يكن قابلا للقسمة فهو غير متناه على المعنى السلب لا على معنى العدول الذي هو المراد.

البحث الثاني فى أن الموصوف باللانهاية لا بد أن يكون مادة لا صورة

لأن الموصوف به طبيعة عدمية و ذلك لأنه لا ينتهي إلى بطلان القوة عنه بل القوة محفوظة فيه دائما و هي متعلقة بالمادة لا بالصورة التي هي بالفعل بل هي جهة الفعلية فخرج من هذا أن ما لا نهاية له لا يكون كلا و جملة لأن الكل صورة تامة أو ذو صورة تامة - و اللانهاية طبيعة عدمية و من هاهنا يتحدثس اللبيب أن هذا العالم طبيعة عدمية حادثة الوجود لا تامة له في نفسه إلا بعالم آخر و هو صورته التامة و فعليته التي لا قوة لها.

البحث الثالث أن الجسم الذي لا نهاية له يستحيل أن يتحرك

لأنه إما أن يكون غير متناهي الجهات كلها فذلك ظاهر إذ لم يوجد لحركته مكان و لم يخل عنه مكان أو يكون متناهي في بعضها فذلك إما بمقتضى طبيعته أو بقسر قاصر فالأول محال إذ الطبيعة الواحدة يتساوى فعلها من كل الجوانب و الثاني لا يخلو إما أن إفادة القاصر ذلك الحد بأن قطعه أو جعله محدودا من غير قطع كما يجعل المتناهي صغيرا بالتكثيف - و كبيرا بالتلطيف و التسخين فعلى التقديرين فشان ذلك الجسم إما أن يكون غير متناه بمقتضى طبيعته و متناهي بالقاصر و سيأتي بطلانه في البحث الرابع ثم على تقدير صحته إذا فرضنا حركة الجسم المحدود من جانب دون جانب إلى الجهة الفارغة عنه فلا يخلو إما أن يخلى من الجهة المقابلة أو لا يخلى فعلى الثاني لم ينتقل إليه بل ازداد حجما من هذا الجانب و إن أخلى فالجهة الغير المتناهية ثم هذه الحركة ليست

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٢

طبيعية لأن مطلوب الطبيعة محدود معين بالضرورة و المحدود لا ينتقل إليه ما لا حد له و إذا لم يكن الحركة طبيعية لم تكن قسرية إذ القسر على خلاف الطبع فحيث لا طبع لا قسر.

البحث الرابع من الحكمة المشرقية أن الجسم الغير المتناهي لا وجود له

فضلا عن أن يكون متحركا أو ساكنا و ذلك لأن العلة القريبة لأحوال الجسم من مقداره و شكله و وضعه و سائر أحواله هي طبيعته السارية فيه و هي قوة جسمانية و كل قوة جسمانية فهي متناهية التأثير و التأثر فلو كان مقدار الجسم غير متناه يلزم صدور فعل غير متناه من القوة الجسمانية و هو محال.

البحث الخامس أن الجسم لو فرض كونه غير متناه لكان فعله و انفعاله واقعا لا في زمان

و ذلك لأنه لو فعل فعلا زمانيا فمفعله إما أن يكون متناهي أو غير متناه - فعلى الأول فمن شأن جزئه أن ينفعل من جزء

من الفاعل فإذا فعل جزء من غير المتناهي في المتناهي أو في جزء منه كانت نسبة ذلك الزمان إلى الزمان الذي يفعل فيه غير المتناهي كنسبة قوة غير المتناهي إلى قوة المتناهي إذ الأجسام كلما كانت أعظم كانت قوتها أقوى و زمان فعلها أقصر فيجب من ذلك أن يكون فعل غير المتناهي لا في زمان و قد فرض في زمان و إن كان ذلك المنفعل غير متناه كانت نسبة انفعال جزء منه إلى انفعال الكل كنسبة الزمانين فيجب أن يقع انفعال كل جزء منه لا في زمان فيكون انفعال الجزء الأصغر أسرع من انفعال الجزء الأكبر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٣

الكائن لا في زمان فيكون الخلف فيه أظهر و أمحل فإذا عرفت ذلك من جهة الفعل - فلك أن تعرف مقابله من جهة الانفعال

فصل (١٠) في أن المقادير هل يمكن تجردها عن المادة و في أحكام أخرى بين الثلاثة

أما الأول فقالوا لا شبهة في أن المقادير المتواردة على الجسم مادية

كما مر فلو فرضنا مقدارا مجردا لكان تجرده إما لماهيته أو للوازم ماهيته أو لأمر عارض - فعلى الأول و الثاني يلزم استغناء هذه المقادير عن المحل لذاتها و هي مفتقره هذا خلف.

أقول و هذا إنما يلزم لو كان المقدار الجسمي طبيعة نوعية غير مشككة - و لا متفاوتة الأفراد في المقدارية و الحكماء جعلوا مراتب الأشد و الأضعف من كيف أنواعا متخالفة مشتركة في الجنس و قد مر أن الاختلاف بالأزيد و الأنقص و الأعظم و الأصغر هو بعينه مثل الاختلاف بالأشد و الأضعف في أنهما بمجرد الكمال و النقص - فإذا لم يكن المقدار طبيعة نوعية بل جنسية لا يلزم اتفاق أفرادها في مقتضى الماهية المشتركة لأنها لا تحصل لها إلا بالفصول و الاقتضاء فرع التحصيل و أما الشق الأخير و هو أن التجرد لأمر عارض فقالوا لا يخلو إما أن يكون أمرا حالا في المقدار أو المقدار حال فيه أو هما حالان في محل آخر فإن كان المقدار حالا فيه فهو إما مفتقر إلى الموضوع أو مستغنى عنه و على أي الوجهين كان المقدار غير مستغن عن الموضوع و إن كان المقدار محلا له فذلك المقدار إن كان مفتقرا إلى الموضوع لذاته امتنع له عروض ما يغنيه عن الموضوع و إن كان غنيا لذاته امتنع له عروض ما يحوجه إليه لأن ما بالذات لا يزول بالغير و إن كانا حالين في محل فالفاسد [فالمطلوب] أظهر.

أقول هذا أيضا موقوف على أن يكون المقدار نوعا محصلا و يكون العارض له عارضا في الوجود و إلا فلاحد أن يختار الشق الثاني و يقول إن حلول ما يحل المقدار ليس حلو لا خارجيا بل بحسب التحليل في الذهن و أن الماهية المقدارية في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٤

ظرف التحليل ماهية ناقصة لا يقتضي شيئا من الغناء و الحاجة إلا بما يتحد معه في الوجود - و يحله عند التحليل كسائر الصور النوعية فإن الجسم بما هو جسم لا يقتضي في ذاته أن يكون حيوانا و لا أن يكون غير حيوان بل كل من الاقتضاءين حصل له بصورة أخرى محصلة للجسمية الطبيعية فهكذا حال التعليمية و ذلك لأن حلول تلك الصور عندنا حلول اتحادي للجسم بما هو جسم.

عقدة و حل عرشي

و لك أن تقول فإذن يلزمك تجويز الخلاء في الخارج لأنه مقدار مجرد.

فاعلم أن الخلاء على تقدير وجوده ليس مجرد مقدار بل مقدار ذو وضع واقع في جهات العالم و المقدار في ذاته لا وضع له بهذا المعنى و قد مر الفرق بين الوضع الذي هو بمعنى المقولة و الذي يوجد في المقادير.

ثم اعلم أن كلما يتصوره الإنسان و له معنى محصل في خياله أو في عقله فيمكن وجوده في الخارج إلا لمانع و المانع إنما هي متحققه في هذا العالم المادي الواقع تحت الجهات القابل للمتضادات و سنقيم البرهان على وجود الصور المفارقة المقدارية في الخارج كما على وجود الصور المفارقة العقلية فيه فإذا تخيلنا الأبعاد الثلاثة من غير أن يلتفت إلى شيء من المادة و أحوالها كان ذلك المتخيل جسماً تعليمياً و لا يوجد في الخيال إلا متناهيها و إذا تخيلنا الجسم المتناهي فقد تخيلنا انقطاعه و نهايته و ذلك هو السطح باعتبار كونه منقسماً في الجهتين لا باعتبار التناهي لكونه عدمياً و العدمي لا يقع تحت مقوله و ذلك السطح باعتبار تجرده عن الأحوال المادية من الألوان و الصقالة و الخشونة و غيرها هو الجسم التعليمي و كذلك الخط التعليمي لكنهما لا يفترقان عن الجسم التعليمي و قد عرفت فيما مضى الفرق بين أن ينظر إلى الشيء لا بشرط أن يكون معه غيره و بين أن ينظر إليه بشرط أن لا يكون معه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٥

غيره فالمقدار ذو الأبعاد الثلاثة يمكنك أن تتخيله بالاعتبارين جميعاً فاما السطح و الخط فلا يمكن تخيلهما إلا بالاعتبار الأول دون الثاني و كذا النقطة.

إذا عرفت هذا فنقول هذه الثلاثة من عوارض الجسم الطبيعي أما بيان عرضية الجسم فمن وجهين أحدهما أنه يزيد و ينقص و الجوهر باق على طبيعة نوعه و ثانيهما أن الجسم البسيط إذا قسم بقسمين كان نصفه مساوياً لكله في الماهية و مخالفاً له في المقدار و لو كان المقدار مقوماً لهما كان الاختلاف فيه اختلافاً في الطبيعة و أما عرضية الثلاثة الباقية فهي فرع وجودها فمن الناس من أنكر كونها وجودية - لكونها عبارة عن نهاية شيء و نهاية الشيء نفاده و فناؤه.

و التحقيق أن لكل من الخط و السطح اعتبارات ثلاثة فالسطح فيه اعتبار أنه نهاية و اعتبار أنه يقبل فرض بعدين على التقاطع القائي و اعتبار أنه يقدر و يمسح و يشكل و يكون أعظم من آخر أو أصغر أو يساويه أما أنه نهاية فليس هو بهذا الاعتبار مقداراً و لا تحت مقولة و لكن لكونه نهاية لشيء هو قابل للأبعاد الثلاثة لزمه من هذه الحيثية أن يكون قابلاً لفرض بعدين فهو بهذا الاعتبار تحت مقولة المضاف و إن [إذا] كان مضافاً لا يكون إلا مقداراً.

و ستعلم الفرق بين المضاف الحقيقي و المشهوري و أما أنه ذو بعدين فليس هو بهذا الاعتبار مقداراً و لا كما بل مقداريته إنما هي باعتبار ما يخالف به سطحاً آخر و لا يمكن أن يخالفه بالمعنى الآخر الوجودي و لا العدمي و لكن من الوجوه كلها عرض أما كونه نهاية فلما مر أنه ليس عدماً بحثاً بل شيئاً هو نهاية فهو من حيث هو نهاية أمر عارض للجسم الطبيعي المتناهي لأنه موجود فيه لا كجزء منه و لا يقوم دونه و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٦

أما كونه عارضاً للمقدار التعليمي فمحل تأمل و أما المعنيان الآخران - **فنقول** لما ثبت أنه من حيث هو مقدار عرض و

معلوم أن نسبته إلى كونه بحيث يفرض فيه بعدان ليست كنسبة المقدارية إلى الصورة الجسمية بل نسبته إلى ذلك المعنى نسبة الفصل إلى الجنس لا نسبة عارض إلى معروض فكان المجموع عرضاً لا أن أحدهما عرض و الآخر ليس بعرض و على هذا القياس حال الخط في كونه نهاية و في كونه بعداً واحداً و في كونه مقدارا و أما النقطة فليس فيه من هذه الاعتبارات إلا كونها نهاية للخط و إذا ثبت وجود الخط و السطح ثبت عرضيتهما لأن كلا منهما يزول و يطرأ على الجسم الطبيعي و هو بحاله.

و لك أن تستدل على وجودهما بأننا نجد الأجسام متماسة و التماس أن كان بتمام ذواتها أو ببعضها لزم التداخل فهو يكون بأطرافها و ما به التماس يجب أن يكون موجوداً- و التماس بالسطح ظاهر و التماس بالخط كما في المسنمات فإن أشكل عليك وقوع الملاقاة بالعرض فاعلم أن الملاقي و الملاقى له هو الجسم لا محالة لكن باعتبار طرفه و وجهه أن السطح و الخط بالاعتبار الذي هما به طرف عديماني فعلى هذا صح القول بأن تلاقي الجسمين المتلاقيين قد وقع بالذات و الجوهر إذ لا فاصل بينهما و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٧

أنه قد وقع بالخط أو السطح لما مر.

واعلم أن الذي يقال أو ينقل من القدماء أن النقطة ترسم بحركتها الخط و الخط ترسم بحركته السطح و السطح الجسم فهذا إن كان منقولاً من الحكماء فهو إما من رموزهم و تجوزاتهم كما هو عادة الأوائل أو يكون من باب التخيل بأن تفعل النقطة في الخيال بحركتها خطأ يفعل بحركته في جهة أخرى سطحاً يفعل بحركته في جهة ثالثة جسماً كل ذلك في الخيال و أما في الوجود فالجسم يتقدم على البسيط المتقدم على ضلعه المتقدم على طرفه تقدم ذي النهاية على نهايته

فصل (١١) في مباحث أخرى متعلقة بالمقادير

الأول أن المقدار المعين الذي في هذا العالم هو من توابع المادة

لأنه لا يقتضيه الصورة الجسمية لذاتها و إلا لاشتكت الأجسام كلها فيه و لما مر أن الجسم الواحد يختلف عليه المقادير و ليس أيضاً بسبب الفاعل بلا مشاركة المادة لأن الفاعل إذا أعطى مقدارا لصورة جسمية بعد ما لم يكن فذلك إما بأن يتمدد إلى جانب أو بأن ينتقص من جانب و ذلك لا يكون إلا بأن ينفعل و الانفعال من توابع المادة لكن لا مطلقاً بل بسبب أحوال يعرض المادة و يخصص استعدادها لمقدار دون مقدار و الاستعداد أيضاً من باب الإمكانيات فلا ينفك عن طبيعة مخصوصة صورية تفعل بذاتها أو بقسر قاسر و كلاهما يرجع إلى صورة نوعية مع مادة قابلة.

واعلم أن المقدار المعين و إن أمكن تجريدنا عن المادة و لواحقها إما في الخيال أو في عالم آخر لكن لا يمكن تجريد الصورة المعينة عن المادة إلا بأن يصير وجودها وجوداً آخر أقوى و أتم من هذا الوجود حيث يسلب عنه كثير من لوازم هذا الوجود.

الثاني أن الاستقامة و الانحناء فصلان منوعان للخط

لا يمكن أن يكون خط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٨

واحد مورد الاستقامة والانحناء وكذلك الاستواء والاستدارة للسطح فسلان له و كذا مراتب التقويسات المتفاوتة و التدويرات المتفاوتة في الخطوط و السطوح كلها فصول متنوعة تلك الفصول من مقولة كيف كما سيأتي في باب الكيفيات المختصة بالكميات.

الثالث أنه كما أن النقطة غير منقسمة

لأنها نهاية الخط و لو كان لها جزءان كان الآخر هو النهاية فكذلك الخط لا يتجزى في العرض و السطح في العمق بالبيان المذكور فعلم أن النقط إذا اجتمعت لا يحصل من تراكمها الخط لأن الواسطة إن منعت الطرفين عن التداخل [الملاقاة] فانقسمت و إن لم يمنع فتداخلت الجميع - و المقدار لا يحصل إلا من أجزاء متباينة الوضع غير متداخلة و بهذا البيان يظهر أن لا يحصل السطح من تأليف الخطوط و لا الجسم من اجتماع السطوح.

الرابع أنه يستحيل أن يوجد نسبة عددية أو مقدارية

صمتية بين اثنين من هذه الثلاثة بالبيان المذكورة.

الخامس رسم أقليدس النقطة بما لا جزء له

فقل غرضه تمييزها عن المقادير - و إلا فالرسم صادق على الوحدة و الباري جل مجده فمن أراد الرسم لتمييز لها عما سواها فلا بد من قيد آخر فقالوا النقطة شيء ذو وضع لا ينقسم أو لا جزء له و الباري تعالى ليس له وضع و لا إليه إشارة و كذا الوحدة و منهم من رسمها بأنها نهاية للخط.

أقول و لا ينتقض بنقطة رأس المخروط و لا بمركز الكرة لأن الأولى ليست نهاية إلا لسهم المخروط لا لجسمه أو سطحه كما توهمه بعض المتأخرين و الثانية نهاية لأنصاف الأقطار المتقاطعة و لو في الوهم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٣٩

واعلم أن كثيرا من أحوال العدد قد ذكرناه في مباحث الوحدة و الكثرة - فبقي علينا من مباحث الكم أمر الزاوية و أمر المكان و أما أحوال الزاوية فنؤخرها - إلى الكيفيات المختصة بالكميات و أما أمر المكان فنذكرها الآن

فصل (١٢) في المكان و إنيته

[حجج المنكرين للمكان و الجواب عنها]

الشيء قد يكون معلوما من جهة بعض أماراته و خواصه دون بعض فيصير مطلوبا من تلك الجهة نفيا و إثباتا و تنوعا و تقسيما و المفهوم من المكان ما يصح أن ينتقل الجسم عنه أو إليه و أن يسكن فيه و أن يكون مشارا إليه بأن يقال للجسم هنا أو هناك و أن يكون مقدرا له نصف و ربع و أن يكون بحيث يمتنع حصول جسمين في واحد منه - فهذه أربع أمارات تصالح عليها المتنازعون لثلا يكون النزاع لفظيا فاختلفوا فيه - فمنهم من أنكر وجوده محتجا بأنه لو كان موجودا لكان إما جوهرًا أو عرضًا و كلاهما محال.

أما الأول فلأنه لو كان جوهرًا لم يكن مجردا لقبوله الوضع فيكون جسما و هو محال لاستلزامه التسلسل لأن كل جسم فله مكان فإذا كان المكان جسما كان له مكان و يتسلسل لا إلى نهاية و لأنه يلزم تداخل الأجسام و أما كونه عرضا فلأنه إما أن يقوم بالتممكن فينتقل بانتقاله فلا يكون الانتقال إليه أو منه بل معه و أيضا لا يكون الجسم فيه بل هو في الجسم

أو يقوم بغير المتمكن فلم يكن من أحوال الجسم المتمكن بل يكون المتمكن شيئا آخر لأن المتمكن من قام به المكان فيجب أن يكون هو الحاوي لا المحوي.
حجة ثانية لهم لو كان المكان لا بد منه للحركة فلا يخلو إما أن يكون المكان محتاجا إلى الحركة وهو محال لتحقيقه مع عدم الحركة أو الحركة محتاجة إليه وهو أيضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٤٠

محال لأن العلة للشيء إحدى العلل الأربع وهو ليس بفاعل للحركة لأن فاعلها طبيعة أو إرادة أو قسر ولا عنصر لأن العلة العنصرية لها هي المتحرك ولا صورة وهو ظاهر ولا غاية لأن العلة التمامية للشيء إنما يجب وجودها في الأعيان عند الوصول إلى الغاية والمكان يجب وجوده قبل الوصول إلى الغاية ولأن الكمال إما خاص وإما مشترك والخاص صورة الشيء والمكان ليس صورة المتحرك والمشارك ما يكون له ولغيره والمكان عندكم خاص.
حجة ثالثة لهم لو كان كل جسم في مكان لكانت الأجسام النامية في مكان - وكان مكانها يتحرك معها فكان لمكانها مكان إلى غير النهاية و بطلان التالي يستلزم بطلان المقدم.
حجة رابعة لهم الحركة عبارة عن الانتقال والاستبدال للقرب والبعد - فلو كان هذا الانتقال يوجب مكانا لأوجب للنقطة مكانا لأنها قد يقع لها الانتقال والتالي محال. والجواب أما عن الأولى فبأن المكان إما جوهر مقداري ليس بجسم مادي فلا يلزم التداخل المستحيل ولا التسلسل وإما عرض قائم بغير المتمكن لأنه عبارة عن السطح الباطن من الجسم الحاوي المماس لظاهر المحوي وأما حديث الاشتقاق فقضية غير عقلية فلا يجب ثبوتها فربما لم يوجد كما في كثير من الأعراض ثم لا نسلم أن المتمكن مشتق من المكان بل من التمكن وهو صفة الجسم المتمكن ولو سلم اشتقاقه من المكان فكثيرا ما يشتق الاسم من العرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٤١

الكائن في شيء آخر كالمعلوم المشتق من العلم وهو في العالم.
وعن الثانية أن الحركة محتاجة إلى المكان ولا نسلم كون المحتاج إليه منحصرا في أحد الأمور المذكورة فإن الاثنين محتاج إلى الواحد وهو غير العلل الأربع بل المراد ما يتقدم بالطبع وإن كان شرطا غير هذه الأربع.
وعن الثالثة أن النامي يستبدل بنموه مكانا بعد مكان فلا يلزم ما قالوه.
وعن الرابعة بالفرق بين ما بالذات وما بالعرض والقائلون بوجوده قوم منهم من يدعون البداهة وهو أولى وقوم يستدلون عليه بوجوده منها أن الانتقال عبارة عن التغير في الآن لأنه قد يوجد هذا التغير مع ثبات الجوهر وكمه وكيفه ووضعه وسائر الأعراض وقد لا يقع هذا الانتقال ويتغير في كل من تلك الأمور فعلم أن هذا الانتقال هو تغير في الآن أعني في النسبة إلى المكان فثبت وجوده ومنها أن نشاهد سما حاضرا ثم يغيب ويحضر جسم آخر حيث هو فالبداهة تحكم بأن للمتعاقلين مورد مشترك وليس ذلك إلا المكان لأنه هو الذي كان للأول ثم صار للآخر ومنها أن وجود الفوق والسفل معلوم بالضرورة وذلك يقتضي وجود المكان وفي الكل محل تأمل.

[وجه الجمع بين الأقوال]

و اعلم أنه ذكر بعض العلماء وجهها تضبط به المذاهب في أمر المكان و هو أن هذا الأمر المعلوم ببعض الأمارات ليس بخارج عن الجسم و أحواله فهو إما جزء الجسم أو لا فإن كان جزءاً فهو إما هيولاه أو صورته و إن لم يكن جزء و لا شك أنه يساويه فهو إما عبارة عن بعد يساوي أقطاره و إما عبارة عن سطح من جسم يلاقيه - سواء كان حاوياً له أو محوياً له و إما عبارة عن السطح الباطن للجسم الحاوي - المماس للسطح الظاهر من المحوي فهذه خمسة مذاهب و إلى كل منها ذاهب.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢

و احتج الذاهب بأنه الهولي

بأن المكان يتعاقب عليه المتمكنات و المادة يتوارد عليه الصور فيكون هو هي و الزاعم بأنه صورة بأن المكان محدود حاصر - و الصورة محدودة حاصرة و القياسان من موجبتين في الشكل الثاني فلا ينتجان - و إن صحح الأول بأن المكان يتعاقب عليه المتمكنات و كلما يتعاقب عليه المتمكنات فهو مادة. و الثاني بأن المكان محدود حاصر و كل محدود حاصر فهو صورة تصوير الكبرى كاذبة و الذي دل أيضاً على فساد هذين المذهبين أمور أحدها أن المكان يترك بالحركة و الهولي و الصورة لا تتركان. و ثانيها أن المكان يطلب بالحركة و هما لا تطلبان بالحركة. و ثالثها أن المركب ينسب إلى الهولي فيقال باب خشبي و لا ينسب إلى المكان

فصل (١٣) في تحقيق ماهية المكان

قد علم في الفصل السابق إنية المكان

[وجود المسلكين في ذلك]

فنقول في تحقيق ماهيته أن الجسم لا شبهة في أنه مال للمكان بكليته فلم يجز أن يكون غير منقسم و لا منقسماً في جهة بل إما في جهتين فيكون سطحاً أو في الجهات فيكون بعداً و إذا كان سطحاً لا يجوز أن يكون حالاً في المتمكن و إلا لانتقل بانتقاله بل فيما يحويه و لا بد أن يكون مماساً للمتمكن حاوياً له من جميع الجوانب و إذا كان بعداً لم يجز أن يكون عرضاً لتوارد المتمكنات عليه و لا مادياً و إلا يلزم تداخل الجواهر المادية فالمكان إما السطح

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المذكور و هو مذهب المعلم الأول و أتباعه كالشيخين و غيرهما و أما البعد المجرد المنطبق على مقدار الجسم بكليته و هو مذهب أفلاطن و الرواقيين و الأقدمين و تابعهم المحقق الطوسي فكانه جوهر متوسط بين العالمين و مما يؤيد مذهبهم أنا سنجيم البرهان على وجود عالم مقداري محيط بهذا العالم لا كإحاطة الحاوي بالمحوي - بل كإحاطة الطبيعة للجسم و الروح للبدن و ليكن المكان من هذا القبيل و هو مؤيد أيضاً بالآمارات كما ستعلم و أصحاب البعد منهم من زعم أن العلم به ضروري لأن الناس كلهم يحكمون أن الماء فيما بين أطراف الإناء و أن مكان نصف الماء نصف مكان كله و كذا لكل جزء جزء منه بأي وجه قسم و منهم من احتج عليه و لهم في ذلك مسلكان أحدهما ما يثبت البعد و ثانيهما ما يبطل السطح -

[ما يبطل المسلك الأول]

أما المسلك الأول فمن وجهين - الأول أن اختلاط الأمور إذا كان منشأ للاشتباه فإنما يزول الاشتباه برفع شيء بعد شيء منها حتى لا يبقى إلا واحد فيحصل التميز والبعد من هذا القبيل - فإننا إذا توهمنا خروج الماء من الإناء وعدم دخول الهواء فيه فيلزم أن يكون البعد الثابت بين أطراف الإناء موجودا وهو المطلوب والثاني أن كون الجسم في المكان ليس بسطحه فقط بل بحجمه فيكون كالجسم ذا أقطار ثلاثة -

[ما يبطل المسلك الثاني]

و أما المسلك الثاني فلوجه - الأول أنه يلزم كون الشيء ساكنا ومتحركا في زمان واحد فإن الطير الواقف في الهواء و السمك الواقف في الماء عند ما يجري الهواء و الماء عليهما متحركان - فإن الذي فرض مكانا لهما قد تبدل عليهما. والثاني أن المكان يجب أن يكون أمرا ثابتا ينتقل منه و إليه المتحرك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤

و نهايات المحيط قد يتحرك من موضع إلى موضع و لو بالتبع فلا يكون السطح مكانا. و الثالث أن المكان متصف بالفراغ و الامتلاء و هو نعت البعد لا نعت السطح. و الرابع لو كان المكان سطحاً لم يكن لأجزاء الجسم مكان و هو محال لأن جزء الجسم جسم. و الخامس أن النار بكيته تطلب مكان فوق و الأرض بكيته تطلب مكان أسفل و محال أن يكون المطلوب هو النهاية لكونه عدمياً و لكونه يستحيل أن تحصل ملاقة الجسم بكيته أي بذاتها لها فإن المطلوب هو البعد على الترتيب. السادس أنه يلزم أن لا يكون للجسم الأقصى مكان و ينتقض أيضاً بكثير من الأجسام التي لا مكان [مكانية] لمكانها كجسم طبلي له سطحان مستديران متوازيان منطبقان على سطح جسمين كذلك من الجانبين أو مقعران منطبقان على محدبين فيهما و في تمام دوره نقر و تقعر مستدير و لا يظهر لهذين الجسمين مكان بتفسيرهم. السابع أنه يلزم بقاء المكان بحاله مع نقصان المتمكن بل زيادته مع ذلك النقصان و بقاء المتمكن بحاله مع زيادة المكان فالأول يظهر في الزق المملو ماء أو هواء إذا نقص منه شيء مما فيه و الثاني في الجسم المثقوب و الثالث في الشمعة المجتمعة إذا انبسطت و الجسم إذا قسمت أقساماً متوازية لكن المساواة بين المكان و المتمكن لازمة هذا خلف.

[ادلة القول بالسطح]

و للقائلين بالسطح أجوبة عن هذه الوجوه مذكورة في كتب القوم تركنا ذكرها لأنها ضعيفة و المقرر المشهور عندهم أن مكان كل سافل من الكرات الكلية الثلاثة عشر التي كلها العالم الجسماني كما عليه الجمهور هو سطح باطن ما فوقه و

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ظاهر ما تحته الإمكان الأسفل فإنه باطن الماء و الهواء مع الانفصال الواقع بينهما - فليس للمتمكن الواحد مكان واحد متصل و ليس للمحاط شيء من مكانه الطبيعي - و يمكن الجواب عن هذا بما لا يخلو عن قصور و عمدة ما وقع الاحتجاج به لأصحاب السطح أن المكان لو كان بعدا يلزم اجتماع بعدين متماثلي الماهية من غير امتياز و متى اجتمع المثلان في مادة واحدة فليس بأن يكون أحدهما عارضا و الآخر غير عارض - أولى من أن يكون كلاهما عارضين أو

أحدهما عارضا للآخر فالكل يوجب ترجيحاً بلا مرجح.

و الجواب منع اتحادهما بالماهية النوعية و ربما احتجوا بأن تجويز أن بين طرفي الإناء شخصان من البعد مع أن الماهية واحدة و الإشارة واحدة تجويز كون الشخص الإنساني المشار إليه شخصين بل ليس بأن يكون شخصين أولى من أن يكون أشخاصا كثيرة بل غير متناهية.

و الجواب بعد المنع المذكور أن وحدة الشيء بوحدة آثاره و لوازمه و أسبابه فإذا كانت واحدة كان واحدا و إذا تعددت كان متعددا و آثار البعد و لوازمه غير آثار الجسم و لوازمه فإن الجسم الذي في البعد المذكور يخرج منه و يدخل فيه و هو هو بحاله فعلم أنهما اثنان.

فإن قلت الامتياز بين البعد الذي بين أطراف الإناء و جسم ما متعذر فإن فرض عدم دخول جسم آخر فيه عند خروج الماء منه مستحيل قلنا التميز حاصل بأن ذلك البعد أمر متعين في ذاته و مطلق الجسم لا تعين له إلا بواحد من المخصوصات فإذا امتاز البعد من كل منها امتاز عن الجسم الطبيعي مطلقا.

حجة أخرى للنافين للبعد المجرد قالوا هذه الأبعاد المفارقة إما متناهية أو غير متناهية و الثاني باطل بما سبق من البراهين فتعين كونها متناهية و كل متناه فله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٤٦

حد أو حدود فيكون مشكلا و ذلك الشكل إما لذاته أو بفعل غيره فإن كان لذاته كان شكل جزئه مساويا لشكل كله لاشتراك كله و جزئه في الطبيعة النوعية و قد ثبت وجوب اتفاق المشتركين في الماهية في لوازمها و لو كان كذلك لما كان الشكل حاصلا لكليه فإذا كان ذاته تقتضي شكلا لم يكن الشكل حاصلا له هذا خلف و إن كان بسبب الفاعل من غير مادة لكان المقدار مستقلا بقبول الفصل و الوصل و التمدد و ذلك محال فبقي أن يكون بسبب المادة فإذا المقدار مادي فيكون جسما فإذا البعد جسم هذا خلف.

حجة أخرى لهم أنا نشاهد الأجسام متمانة من التداخل و منشأ الممانعة ما يقتضي كونا في الحيز لذاته و الذي يقتضي الحصول في جهة و حيز لذاته هو المقدار فقط لا الهيولى أو الصورة و الأعراض أما الهيولى فلأنها في حد ذاتها مجردة عن الوضع و الحيز كما سنبين في موضعه و أما الصورة فلأن الجسم الواحد قد يتحلل فيشغل حيزا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٤٧

كبيرا و يتكاثر فيشغل حيزا صغيرا مع بقاء صورته الجسمية بحالها فعلم أنها في حد ذاتها ليست شاغلة للحيز و إلا لما اختلفت الشغل مع اتحادها و أما سائر الصور و الأعراض فلا يشغل الأحياء شغلا بالذات بل الشاغل بالذات هو المقدار فعلمنا أن المانع من التداخل هو المقدار فلو كان المكان بعدا يلزم التداخل المستحيل.

أقول الترديد غير حاصر و المانع في كل منها إلا الأعراض و ارد لاحتمال أن يكون المانع من التداخل الهيولى مع المقدار أو الصورة معه أو هو مع المادة- و الذي يؤيد هذا أنا نتخيل مقدارا عظيما مثل العالم بمجموع ما فيه من السماوات و الأرضين و نتخيل مقدارا آخر أضعاف المقدار الأول أو مثله داخلا فيه و هكذا نتخيل فسحة بعد فسحة بحيث لا تمانع فيها و لا تفاسد بل مع بقاء هذه العوالم المقدارية بحالها و كثير من أهل السلوك يشاهدون في بداية سلوكهم عوالم

كثيرة مقدارية لا تراحم ولا تضايق بينها وما يروى عن قائدنا و هاديننا ص - أنه رأى ما بين قبره و منبره روضة من الجنان و رأى في عرض الحائط جنة عرضها السماوات و الأرض و رأى مرة جبرئيل كأنه طبق الخافقين و رأى أمته ليلة المعراج - و قد انسد الأفق بوجوه أختارها.

و أيضا القائلون بأن الرؤية بانطباع شبح المرئي في العضو الجليدي - يلزمهم التداخل في المقدار لكن لما كان مقدار الشبح مجردا و إن كان مقدار العضو ماديا جاز التداخل بينهما فعلم من هذا كله أن المانع من دخول الأجسام - بعضها في حيز بعض ليس مجرد المقدار بل بشرط المادة و السر فيه أن معنى كون الشيء ماديا أنه مصحوب بالقوة و الاستعداد بما هو استعداد لا يجمع الفعلية إلا أن الكم المتصل في قبول التعدد فإذا صار منفصلا انعدمت هويته الاتصالية و في المنفصل قوة الاتصال فإذا اتصلت المنفصلات بطلت هوياتها الاتصالية - فكذا في شأن الجسم أن يحل مكانا و لا يحصل ذلك إلا بزواله مع المكان الأول - و كما لا يحل جسم مكانين معا لا يحل جسمان مكانا واحدا لا لإبء المكان عنهما بل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٤٨

لإبء أحدهما عن الاجتماع مع الآخر كإبء أجزاء كل جسم أن يجتمع اثنان منها في حيز واحد فعلم أن ذلك من خاصية المادة لا غير.

[دليل كون المكان بعدا ثالثا]

ثم من أمعن النظر في حال كل جسم طبيعي يجد أن في جبلته طلب المكان الطبيعي و المحافظة عليه و ذلك مما له مدخل في صلاح وجود الجسم بما هو جسم - لا بما هو ذو سطح و ليس في طبع الجسم بما هو جسم أن يطلب شيئا لا يوجد له بالحلول - و لا بالمداخلة التامة معه و نفس السطح الذي للحاوي يمتنع الحصول للمحوي و لا المماس له ممكن الحصول له بما هو جسم و قد لا يكون موجودا عند طلب الجسم المكان و الحركة في الكيف و إن كان فيها طلب كيفية لا تكون بعينها حاصلة - إلا أن المتحرك فيها ما دامت حركته يكون له كيفية متصلة إلى أن يتصل إلى تلك الكيفية المطلوبة و كذا الحركة في الكم و الوضع و غيرهما فالمكان إن كان بعدا و الأين نسبة الجسم إليه فحال الحركة فيه كما ذكرنا فيوجد في الحركة فرد من الأين التدريجي المتصل المنطبق على المكان المتصل الممتد بين ابتداء الحركة و انتهائها الذي هو المطلوب بالحركة و أما إذا كان المكان سطحا و الأين عبارة عن نسبة الجسم إليه فلا يتصور فرد تدريجي اتصالي للسطح و لا للنسبة إليه ذا لا سطح في كل آن لاستلزامه تتالي السطوح و تركيب الزمان و المكان من غير المنقسمات - و لا في زمان الحركة فرد زمني من السطح و هذا أيضا يرشدك إلى كون المكان بعدا

فصل (١٤) في الرد على القائلين بالخلاء و هم طائفتان

و الأكثرون منهم زعموا أن الخلاء أمر غير وجودي أي ليس أمرا وجوديا - قال الإمام الرازي نحن نعبر عن مذهبهم بعبارة لا توهم كونه أمرا وجوديا.

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فنقول إنا نجوز وجود جسمين لا يتلاقيان و لا يكون بينهما ما يلاقيهما قالوا أما الذي توهم كون الخلاء وجوديا و أن بين

دينك الجسمين أبعادا فذلك وهم كاذب - كما أن من توهم أن خارج العالم خلاء أو ملاء وهم باطل ومنهم من سلم أن الخلاء أمر وجودي والذي يدل على بطلان القول الأول أن الجسمين إذا فرضا بحيث لا يلاقيهما جسم قد يكون ما بينهما قدر ذراع وقد يكون ما بينهما أكثر من ذراع والقابل للمساواة والمفاوتة لا يكون إلا كما موجودا لا موهوما محضا فيكون جوهريا مقداريا لا محالة وهذا بخلاف الأبعاد المتوهمة خارج العام فإنها أمور كاذبة ممتنعة الوجود و أما الذي دل على بطلان مذهب الفريق الثاني أمران.

الأول الخلاء مما يمكن مسحه وتقديره كما مر وهو من خواص الكم هو إما كم أو متكمم و الكم إما منفصل أو متصل و كون الخلاء كما منفصلا باطل لأن حصوله من وحدات غير متجزية و كان يستحيل أن يطابقه الجسم القابل للانقسام لا إلى حد و لأن الكم المنفصل عدد و العدد غير ذي وضع و مكان الجسم ذو وضع فالخلاء إذا كان كما فهو متصل و إن كان كما متصلا فهو إما ذو وضع بالذات أو ذو وضع بالعرض فإن كان الأول فهو جسم و المفروض خلافه و إن كان الثاني فيكون مقارنا لجوهر ذي وضع فلم يكن خلاء هذا خلف.

و هذا التقرير أولى مما قيل فإذا كان كما متصلا بالذات فلا شك أنه كم ذو وضع بالذات فإن الخلاء مقدار و متى كان كذلك استحال أن يوجد إلا في المادة فيكون جسما هذا خلف.

و ذلك لأنه قد مر أن مجرد كون الشيء مقدارا غير مستلزم لكونه ذا وضع و أما إذا كان كما بالعرض فيكون متصلا بالعرض لما عرفت فلم يكن بحيث إذا فرض مجردا عن الأجسام و المقادير يكون قابلا للأبعاد و المفروض خلافه هذا خلف.

و هذا أولى مما يقال فحينئذ لا يخلو إما أن يكون الخلاء حالا في المقدار - أو المقدار حالا فيه أو هما حالان في ثالث فعلى الأول يكون حالا في المادة لأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٠

المقدار حال فيها و الحال في شيء حال في ذلك الشيء فيكون الخلاء ملاء و كذا على الثاني لأن محل المقدار مادة و على الثالث كان الخلاء جسما إذ لا معنى للجسم إلا الذي فيه قابلية الأبعاد فثبت أن الذي فرض خلاء فهو جسم فالقول به باطل.

حجة أخرى أن الجسم لو حصل في الخلاء لاستحال أن يكون متحركا أو ساكنا و التالي محال فالمقدم مثله بيان الاستلزام أن الخلاء لا يخلو إما أن يكون متشابه الأجزاء أو مختلفها و الثاني محال لأن ما به يخالف جزؤ جزأ إما أن يكون لازما لذلك الجزء أو لا فإن لزم فاللزوم إما لنفس ماهية الجزء أو لأمر زائد عليه.

الأول باطل لأن الخلاء عبارة عن الأبعاد المفارقة فلا اختلاف بين أجزائه في هذا المفهوم كيف و أجزاء المتصل الواحد متشابه في الماهية.

و الثاني أيضا باطل لأن لوازم الماهية مشتركة بين أفرادها و إن كان وجه التخالف عارضا فالفرض زواله لكونه ممكن الزوال حتى يحصل التساوي بين الأجزاء المفروضة للخلاء و إذا كان كذلك استحال أن يكون موضع مطلوبا بالطبع للجسم - و الآخر مهروبا عنه بالطبع و إذا كان كذلك لم يكن للجسم مكان طبيعي فحينئذ لا يكون له سكون طبيعي و لا حركة طبيعية و بهذا ثبت أن لا يكون له حركة و لا سكون قسريان لأن القسر فرع الطبع و لا أن يكون له حركة إرادية أو

سكون إرادي لاستحالة أن يخص أحد المثلين بحكم دون الآخر. أقول و هذه الحجة لا تفيد أزيد من أن لا يكون مجرد البعد مطلوباً داعياً للحركة - فيجوز أن يكون مطلوب المتحرك مكاناً مع ترتيب خاص و أيضاً لا يلزم إذا كان لشيء واحد إمكانية متشابهة أن يمتنع سكونه في واحد منها فإن أمثال هذه المواضع إن اتفق للجسم الحصول فيه وقع بطبعه فيه كحال أجزاء العنصر الكلي كالماء و الهواء و لو لا ذلك لما كان سكون و لا حركة بالطبع لشيء من أجزاء العنصر الواحد في حيزه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥١

حجة أخرى و هي المعول عليها أن الجسم إذا تحرك في مسافة فكل ما كانت مسافته أرق كانت الحركة فيها أسرع و بالعكس أبطأ لأن الرقيق شديد الانفعال و الغليظ شديد المقاومة للدافع فإذا فرضنا حركة في خلاء فهي لا بد أن يكون في زمان لأنها قطع مسافة منقسمة إلى أجزاء بعضها مقطوع قبل بعض بالزمان و لنفرض حركة أخرى لذلك الجسم في ملاً على تلك المسافة و زمانه أطول من زمان عديم المعاق على نسبة معينة و ليكن زمان الأولى عشر زمان الثانية ثم لنفرض حركة ثالثة له في ملاً أرق من ذلك الملاً بنسبة الزمانين فإذا كانت رفته عشرة أضعاف رقة الملاً الأول كان زمان الحركة فيه عشر زمان الحركة الثانية لما قررنا أن زيادة اللطافة توجب نقصان الزمان على نسبتها فوجب أن يكون زمان الحركة الثالثة الذي هو عشر زمان الحركة الثانية مساوياً لزمان الحركة الأولى فيلزم أن يكون الحركة مع العائق كهي لا معه فإن فرضت رقة المسافة الثالثة على نسبة أكثر من نسبة الزمانين كان زمان حركتها أقل من زمان الحركة الخلائية و هذا أشنع حيث يلزم أن يكون الحركة مع العائق أسرع من الحركة لا معه.

و اعترض بأن المحال إنما لزم من إخراج الحركة من أن يستحق لذاتها زماناً معيناً بل جعلتم استحقاقها للزمان بحسب ما في مسافتها من المقاومة - و ذلك باطل لأن الحركة ماهيتها قطع و لا محالة قطع جزء المسافة سابق على قطع الكل و كذا قطع جزء الجزء سابق على قطع الجزء فالحركة لذاتها تستدعي زماناً و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٢

لذلك حركة الفلك في زمان و إن لم يكن لها مقاوم و لا عائق نعم قوام المسافة يوجب طول الزمان لا أصله فإذا ثبت ذلك فالحركات الثلاثة متفقة في أصل الزمان الذي بإزاء أصل الحركة و هو حاصل للحركة التي في الخلاء و أما الذي بإزاء المقاومة فلا شك أنه يقصر لقلة المقاومة و يطول بكثرتها فالساعة الواحدة في مقابلة أصل الحركة - و باقي الساعات بإزاء المقاومة كالتسعة مثلاً فإذا كانت مقاومة أخرى عشر تلك المقاومة - كانت تلك الحركة تستحق ساعة واحدة لأجل ذاتها و عشر تسعة ساعات أعني تسعة أعشار ساعة لأجل ما فيها من المقاومة و المجموع ساعة و تسعة أعشار ساعة فلا يلزم من هذا تساوي زمان ذي المعاق و عديمه و هذا الشك مما أورده صاحب المعبر و استحسنة الإمام الرازي و ستعلم وجه اندفاعه في بحث الميل.

حجة أخرى سيأتي في مباحث الحركة أن الحجر إذا رمي قسراً إلى فوق فهو إنما يتحرك لأن المحرك أفاده قوة تحركه إلى فوق و تلك القوة إنما تبطل لمصادمات الهواء فلو لم يكن في المسافة هواء بل خلاء صرف فلا مصادمة و لا تضعف فلا رجوع للمرمي إلا بعد وصوله إلى سطح الفلك و لما لم يكن كذلك علم أن المسافة غير خالية و هذه ضعيفة

لعدم دلالة على وجود الملا في العالم فضلا عن وجوبه ولا يدل على أزيد من وجود الهواء في بعض المسافات التي يرمى فيها الحجر مع جواز أن يكون في خللها خلاء كثير و بعد ما ينتهي حركتها إلى السماء أيضا خلاء صرف

فصل (١٥) في ذكر أمارات استبصارية تدل على بطلان الخلاء

الأول أن الإناء الضيق الرأس المملو من الماء

إذا كان في أسفله ثقبه ضيقة ينزل الماء منها إذا فتح رأسه و لم ينزل إذا سد فعلم أن عدم نزول الماء مع ثقله الطبيعي - لضرورة امتناع الخلاء و أما النقض بنزول الزيت و بنزول الماء عند اتساع الثقب و بعدم نزوله أيضا إذا كان نصف الإناء فيه هواء فمندفع بأن فرط ثقل الزيت ربما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٣

أوجب زيادة مدافعة الهواء فيضطره ذلك إلى التحرك فإذا لم يجد مكانا وراءه اضطره ذلك إلى مزاحمة الزئبق كما في مزاحمته للماء و دخوله من نواحي الثقب و إن تعذر ذلك احتبس الزئبق و لم ينزل لأن الطبيعة تفعل الأسهل فالأسهل و لا يمتنع أيضا أن يكون وقوف الماء أسهل على الطبيعة من تعظيم حجم الهواء.

الثاني أن الأنبوبة إن أغمس أحد طرفيها في الماء و مص الطرف الآخر

يصعد الماء حال خروج الهواء مع ثقله الطبيعي فما هذه المتابعة منه للهواء إلا لامتناع الخلاء - من هذا القبيل ارتفاع اللحم عند مص المحجمة و تلازم السطوح ليس بسبب أن الخلاء للخلاء قوة جاذبة كما سنبطله و مما يؤيد ذلك أنه إذا أفرط الإنسان في مص القارورة أو المحجمة و كانت رقيقة انكسرت و إذا وضعنا المحجمة على السندان و مصصناها فإنه يرتفع السندان بارتفاعها.

الثالث أنا إذا أدخلنا رأس الأنبوبة في قارورة و سدنا الخل الذي بين عنق القارورة و الأنبوبة

فإذا جذبنا الأنبوبة المصمتة تنكسر القارورة إلى الداخل - و إن أدخلناها تنكسر إلى الخارج و إن مصصنا المجوفة تنقلب هواؤه نارا و ربما ينشق -

الرابع لو أمكن الخلاء فينزل الماء من الأواني الضيقة الرأس و لا يلزم الحاجة إلى صعود الهواء داخل الإناء

فكنا لا نرى النفاخات و البقايق.

و لأصحاب الخلاء متمسكات ضعيفة كلزوم الدور في كل حركة مكانية - أو إيجاب حركة بقعة لانتقال السماوات من مواضعها و بأن التخلخل و التكاثف علامة تحقق الخلاء و بأن النمو بنفوذ جسم في داخل النامي فيكون فيه أجواف خالية و بأن كل جسم لو وجب أن يماس سطحه بسطح جسم آخر يلزم منه تحقق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٤

أجسام بلا نهاية و هو محال و إن لم يجب فجاز أن يوجد جسم لا يجاوره جسم آخر - فجاز الخلاء و الكل مندفع بأدنى تأمل و أقوى متشبثاتهم أنا إذا رفعنا سطحاً أملس واقعا أعلى سطح أملس مثله رفعا متساويا دفعة عند الحس فلا يخلو في الحقيقة إما أن يرتفع بعض أجزاء السطح الأعلى قبل بعض يلزم وقوع التفكك في ذلك الجسم - و هو مما يكذبه

الحس سيما في الحجر و الحديد مثلا أو يرتفع أجزاءه معا فيلزم من ذلك خلو وسطهما وقتا من الزمان من الجسم لأن ذلك الجسم ينتقل من الخارج إلى الوسط و ليس انتقاله من الثقب التي فيها إذ رب جسم لا ثقبه فيه و لو كانت لكان بين كل ثقبين سطح متصل لا محالة فعلم أن انتقال الأجسام إلى الوسط يكون من الجوانب فبالضرورة يحتاج أن يمر بالطرف أولا لا امتناع أن يكون في الوسط دفعة بلا مادة أو بلا استحالة لأن كل استحالة في زمان أو أن يوجد في الوسط حين كونه في الطرف لا امتناع حصول الجسم الواحد في مكانين فإذا كان مرورها بالطرف قبل مرورها بالوسط كان الوسط خاليا قبل ذلك و هو المطلوب.

و جوابه منع إمكان الارتفاع لمثل ذلك السطح الأملس و ما يرفعه من السطوح فلا يخلو من خشونة و تضاريس و إن خفي ذلك على الحس.

و ربما تمسكوا بعلامات أولها أن القارورة إذا مصت مصا شديدا و ضم الثقب بالإصبع ثم كبت الثقب في الماء و أزيل الإصبع دخل فيها ماء كثير فلو كانت مملوءة هواء بعد المص لم يدخل الماء فيها بعد المص كما لم يدخل فيها قبله. و ثانيها لو الصقنا أحد جانبي الزق مع الآخر بحيث لا يبقى فيها شيء من الهواء و شددنا الجوانب شدا و ثيقا ثم رفعنا أحد الطرفين عن الآخر فحصل بينهما جوف خال و هو المطلوب. و ثالثها أن التجربة دلت على إمكان دخول مسيلة في زق مضموم الرأس يزاحم فيه الهواء بحيث انتفخ به فلو لم يكن فيه خلاء لم يمكن دخولها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٥

و رابعها أنا نرى إناء مملوا من رماد يسعه معه ملء ماء فلو لا أن هناك خلاء لاستحال ذلك. و خامسها أن الدن يملأ شرابا ثم يجعل الشراب بعينه [في زق] ثم يجعلان معا في ذلك الدن بعينه فيسعهما الدن فلو لا أن في الشراب خلاء انعصر فيه مقدار مساحة الزق لاستحال ذلك. و الجواب عما ذكره أولا أنه لو كان العلة ما ذكرتم لما وجب صعود الماء - لأن الهواء الخارج قد وجد مكانا فارغا و فراغ بعض القارورة أمر ممكن عندهم فهذا بأن يستدل به على بطلان الخلاء أولى. و التحقيق أن الكيفيات و الحركات كما تكون طبيعية و قسرية كذلك المقادير قد تكون طبيعة و قد تكون قسرية و المادة الواحدة يجوز أن تقبل مقدارا عظيما - بعد ما قبلت مقدارا صغيرا و حركة المص موجبة للسخونة الموجبة للتخلخل و كانت شديدة التهيو للعود إلى مقدارها الطبيعي فإذا لقيها برد الماء تكاثف عودا إلى مقداره الطبيعي - فتبعه الماء لضرورة الخلاء.

و عما ذكره ثانيا أن الهواء يدخل في مسام الزق و قد جرب ذلك بما يدل على وجوب الملاء فيكون عليهم لا لهم. و عن الثالث بإمكان انقباض ما في الزق أو انبساط محيطته أو ارتفاع جانب منه كل ذلك بقدر ما دخل من رأس المسيلة فيه.

و عن الرابع بأنه كذب محض.

و عن الخامس بأنه يجوز أن لا يظهر تفاوت مقدار الزق في الحب للحس - أو يكون الشراب ينعصر فيخرج منه بخار أو هواء أو يتكاثف فيصير أصغر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٦

فصل (١٦) في أن الخلاء لو ثبت لم يكن فيه قوة جاذبة ولا دافعة للأجسام

زعم محمد بن زكرياء الرازي أن له قوة جاذبة للأجسام ولهذا يحتبس الماء - في الأواني التي تسمى سراقات الماء و ينجذب في الأواني التي تسمى زرقاات الماء و منهم من أثبت له قوة دافعة لها إلى فوق و يدل على بطلان الأول أن الخلاء متشابه الأجزاء فلو كان فيه جذب لما اختص ببعض الجهات و على بطلان الثاني إن الخلاء المحرك إما المبتوث في داخل الجسم أو في خارجه المحيط به.

فعلى الأول إما أن يكون محركاً لأجزائه أو لكليه و الأول محال لأن كل واحد من أجزاء الجسم ليس فيه خلاء فلم يكن حركتها بسبب الخلاء بل بمحرك آخر - فإذا حرك مجموع المحركات مجموع الأجزاء كان الجسم متحركاً لا محالة بسبب ما حركها لا بسبب آخر.

و الثاني أيضاً محال لأن تحريك ما يتركب عن الأجزاء لا يمكن إلا بتحريك أجزائه كما أن علة المركب لا بد أن تكون علة لأجزائه و أما على الثاني فمعلوم أن الخلاء المحيط بجسم كبير لا يصعده إلى فوق فإذا لا ينفع من الخلاء إلا جسم يتخلخل الخلاء بين جزء من أجزائه فرجع إلى أن بعض الأجسام مقتضى طبعه أن يتباعد بعض أجزائه عن بعض فيلزم هرب الأجزاء المتجانسة بعضها عن بعض و هو باطل لأن التجانس علة الضم و يلزم هربها إلى جهات مختلفة مع اتحاد الطبيعة و أيضاً إن لم يكن هناك مهروب عنه فالهرب عنه محال و إن كان فيلزم كون كل منها مهروباً عن نفسه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٧

لاتحاد الماهية وجه آخر الخلاء الموجب للدفع و حركة الجسم إلى فوق لا بد و أن يكون ملازماً له منتقلاً معه فيحتاج الخلاء إلى مكان طبيعي له حتى يكون مطلوباً يتحرك إليه ثم إن لم يكن ملازماً بل لا يزال الجسم يستبدل في حركته خلاء بعد خلاء فلا يكون ملاقاته للخلاء إلا في آن و في الآن الواحد لا يحرك شيء شيئاً و بعد الآن لا يكون ملاقياً له إلا أن يقولوا إن الخلاء يعطي للجسم قوة محركة يحركه إلى جهة و هذا ينافي تشابه الخلاء.

تذنيب -

زعم المتكلمون أن مكان الجسم ما يستقر عليه الجسم فيمنعه من النزول ثم لما تأملوا عرفوا أن الجسم الأسفل ليس بكليته مكاناً للجسم الذي فوقه بل سطح الأسفل هو المكان مع أنهم يجعلون للسهم النافذ في الهواء مكاناً مع أنه ليس تحته ما يمنعه من النزول فلو كان الأسفل مكان سطح منه و من الناس من يجعل السطح مكاناً كيف كان و يقولون كما أن سطح الجرة مكان الماء كذلك سطح الماء مكان للجرة.

و احتجوا بأن الفلك الأعلى ذو مكان لأنه متحرك و ليس له نهاية حاوية من محيط - فمكانه سطح ما تحته و الحجة ضعيفة لأن حركة الفلك ليست مكانية بل وضعية و مما دل على فساد مذهبهم بل مذهب القائلين بالسطح مطلقاً.

أن الجمهور اتفقوا على أن الجسم الواحد ليس له إلا مكان واحد كما مرت الإشارة إليه و من الناس من ذهب إلى أن مكان الجسم جسم يحيط به من جهة الإحاطة - و يرد عليه أنه [يلزم] أن يكون المكان من قبيل الإضافات و أن لا يكون للمحدد مكان - فعلم أن أسلم المذاهب و أتمها القول بالبعد و هذا البعد امتداد غير وضعي لذاته ليست إحاطته للابعد

الجسمانية و لا انطباقه عليها إحاطة و انطباقا لذي وضع بذى وضع آخر و عليه براهين تناهي الأبعاد الوضعية لا يجري في بيان تناهيه لعدم كونه ذا وضع

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٨

لذاته و فوق كل بعد مادي بعد آخر مادي إلى أن ينتهي إلى بعد هو آخر الأبعاد المادية الوضعية و فوقه بعد غير محتاج إلى مادة و لا قوة انفعالية لغلبة أحكام الفعلية و الصورية عليه و هو غير متشكل بشكل من الأشكال الوضعية و لا أيضا يقابل الإشارة الحسية بل يقبل الإشارة الخيالية و يشبه أن يكون المراد بسدرة المنتهى في لسان الشريعة هو آخر الأبعاد الوضعية و بالعرش الذي يستوي عليه الرحمة الإلهية هو ما يحيط بجميع المتماديات الحسية إحاطة غير وضعية فيكون ذا جهتين و واسطة بين العالمين فمن أحد الجانبين و هو الأعلى ينفع عن الحق بالصور و التماثيل و من الجانب الأسفل يتصل بالصور الجسمية النوعية و أبعادها المادية كالخيال الذي فينا فإنه جوهر مقداري ذو فسحة امتدادية و هو ينفع عن الحق بالصور المثالية الفائضة منه عليه و يتصل بالبدن و مقداره المادي لأجل ضعف وجوده ابتداء فإذا استكمل ينفصل عن البدن لا كانفصال جسم عن جسم بل كانفصال كاتب عن كتابته أو قائل عن قوله و موضع تحقيق هذا المقصد حين خوضنا في علم المعاد- و سيأتي باقي مباحث الكم في البحث عن الزمان و من الله العصمة و السداد

الفن الثاني في مقولة الكيف

و هو مشتمل على مقدمة و أربعة أقسام

المقدمة في رسم الكيف و تقسيمه إلى أنواعه الأربعة

أما الرسم

فاعلم أن لا سبيل إلى تعريف الأجناس العالية إلا الرسوم الناقصة إذ لا يتصور لها جنس و هو ظاهر و لا فصل لأن التركيب من الأمرين المتساويين يكون كل منهما فصلا مجرد احتمال عقلي لا يعرف تحققه بل إنما يقام الدليل على انتفائه و لم يظفر للكيف بخاصة لازمة شاملة إلا المركب من العرضية و المغايرة للكم و الأعراض النسبية لكن هذا التعريف لها تعريف للشيء بما يساويه في المعرفة و الجهالة لأن الأجناس العالية ليس بعضها أجلى من البعض و لو جاز ذلك لجاز مثله في سائر المقولات بل ذلك أولى لأن الأمور النسبية- لا تعرف إلا بعد معروضاتها التي هي الكيفيات فعدلوا عن ذكر كل من الكم و الأعراض

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٥٩

النسبية إلى ذكر خاصته التي هي أجلى فقالوا كما هو المشهور أنه هيئة قارة لا يوجب تصورها تصور شيء خارج عنها و عن حاملها و لا يقتضي قسمة و لا نسبة في أجزاء حاملها- فكونه قارة يميزها عن أن يفعل و عن أن ينفع و كونه لا يوجب تصورها تصور غيرها عن المضاف و الأين و المتى و الملك و كونها غير مقتضية لقسمة يميزها عن الكم- و غير مقتضية لنسبة في أجزاء حاملها عن الوضع و فيه موضع أبحاث.

أحدها أن المفهوم من أن يفعل مؤثرية الشيء في الشيء و ذلك الشيء إما متغير أو ثابت فإن كان ثابتا كانت مؤثريته أيضا ثابتة لأنها من لوازم ماهية المؤثر و لازم الثابت ثابت فقولنا هيئة قارة لا يفيد الاحتراز عنها و إن كان متغيرا لم يكن

المؤثرية حكما زائدا على ذاته بل يكون مؤثرية المتغير كمؤثرية الثابت أمرا عقليا كسائر الإضافات التابعة للذوات فلا حاجة إلى الإخراج عنها بقيد و كذا الكلام في المفهوم من أن ينفع. و ثانيها أن قولنا لا يفيد تصورهما تصور شيء خارج عنها و عن حاملها يفيد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٠

الاحتراز عن تينك المقولتين فلم يكن إلى ذكر القارة حاجة في الاحتراز عنهما - فإن قيل احترزنا به عن الزمان قلنا الزمان خارج بقيد عدم القسمة مع سائر الكميات - لأنه يقتضي قسمة حاملة و هو الحركة. و ثالثها أن الصوت من مقولة كيف لعدم دخوله تحت غيرها و لا تحت الحركة - كما هو رأي أهل التحصيل لكنه هيئة غير قارة لأن أجزاءه غير مجتمعة في آن و هو بين بنفسه و لأنه معلول للحركة و معلول غير القار غير قار. و رابعها أن التعريف صادق على الوحدة و النقطة لا يقال كل منهما يوجب تصوره تصور شيء آخر لأن الوحدة معنى يلزمه عدم الانقسام و النقطة نهاية الخط - لأننا نقول إن كان التغير عن كيف بأنه لا يلزم من تعقله تعقل شيء آخر فلعل أكثر أقسام كيف يخرج عنه إذ لا يمكن تصورنا الاستقامة و الانحناء إلا في المقدار و إن لم نشترط ذلك بل إن لا يلزم من تعقله تعقل شيء خارج عن محله فقد توجه الإشكال فيهما. و خامسها أن الإدراك و العلم و القدرة و الشهوة و الغضب و سائر الأخلاق النفسانية لا يمكن تصورهما إلا بتصور متعلقاتها من المدرك و المعلوم و المشتبه و المغضوب عليه. فإن قيل كل منها لا يقتضي تصوره تصور الغير و لكن تصورهما سابق على تصور متعلقاتها بخلاف النسب و الإضافات فلا بد أن يتصور المنسوب و المنسوب إليه أولا حتى يتصور تلك الأمور النسبية قلنا إن الفرق صحيح إلا أن عبارة التعريف لا تفيده إلا أن يقرأ الأول منصوبا و الثاني مرفوعا و حينئذ لا يلائم هذه القراءة لتمام الرسم. و سادسها هب أنا حملنا عبارة التعريف ما لا يوجب تصوره غيره على ما لا يكون تصوره معلولا لتصور غيره فمع ذلك لا يطرد في الأشكال كالتربيع و التثليث و خواص الأعداد كالجذرية و المكعبية مع أنها معدودة من أنواع كيف. و سابعها أن الهيئة لفظ مشترك بين أمور فيقال هيئة الوجود و هيئة الاستقلال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦١

و الاستقرار و يقال هيئة الجوهرية و العرضية و يقال هيئة الجلوس و الاضطجاع و يقال هيئة التأثير و التاثر و ليس لها معنى جامع و الاجتناب عن مثل هذه الألفاظ في التعريفات لازم. و يمكن الجواب عن أكثر هذه الإيرادات لكن الأقرب أن يقال هو عرض - لا يتوقف تصوره على تصور غيره و لا يقتضي القسمة و اللاقسمة في محله اقتضاء أوليا - فبالعرض خرج الباري تعالى و الجوهر و بالذي لا يتوقف تصوره على تصور غيره - خرجت الأعراض النسبية فإن تصوراتها متوقفة على تصور أمور آخر بخلاف الكيفيات فإنه لزم من تصوراتها تصور غيرها إلا أن تصوراتها معلولة و تصورات غيرها و يدخل فيه الصوت إذ لا يتوقف تصوره على تصور غيره و بقولنا لا يقتضي القسمة و اللاقسمة خرج الكم و خرجت الوحدة و النقطة و بقولنا اقتضاء أوليا احترزنا به عن العلم بالمعلومات التي لا تنقسم فإنه لذاته يمنع من الانقسام و لكن ليس ذلك اقتضاء أوليا بل بواسطة وحدة المعلوم.

وَأَمَّا تَقْسِيمُهُ إِلَى أَنْوَاعِهِ

فينحصر بالاستقراء في أقسام أربعة الكيفيات المحسوسة و النفسانية و المختصة بالكميات و الاستعدادية و التعويل في الحصر على الاستقراء و قد تبين بصورة التردد بين النفي و الإثبات فيحصل بحسب اختلاف التعبير عن كل قسم بما له من الخواص طرق متعددة و حاصلها أن الكيف إن كان هو القسم الأول فهو الأول و إن كان الثاني فالثاني أو الثالث فالثالث و إلا فالرابع و المنع عليه ظاهر فلا يصلح إلا وجه ضبط لما علم بالاستقراء على أن بعض الخواص مما فيه خفاء - كتعبير الإمام الرازي عن الكيفيات النفسانية بالكمال و تعبیر الشيخ عنها بما لا يتعلق بالأجسام و عن الاستعداد بما يختص به الجسم من حيث الطبيعة و عن المحسوسات بما يكون فعله بطريق التشبيه أي جعل الغير شبيها كالحرارة لجعل المجاور حاراً أو السواد يلقي شبحه أي مثاله على العين لا كالثقل فإن فعله في الغير التحريك لا الثقل. قال الرازي و هذا تصريح منه بإخراج الثقل و الخفة من المحسوسات مع تصريحه في موضع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٢

آخر من الشفاء عند شروعه في بيان الكيفيات المحسوسة أنها من هذا الباب و ذكر في موضع آخر منه أنه لم يثبت بالبرهان أن الرطب يجعل غيره رطبا و اليابس يجعل غيره يابسا.

أقول و ستعلم الجواب عن هذين الإشكاليين و كتعبيره عن المختصة بالكميات - بما يتعلق بالجسم من حيث الكمية. قال الرازي هذا تضعيع الكيفية المختصة بالعدد يعني من جهة أنها تتعلق بالمجردات - و بهذا اعترض على قولهم إن البحث عن أحوال العدد ما يستغني عن المادة ذهنياً لا خارجاً - هي الرياضيات بأن من جملتها البحث عن أحوال العدد و هو ما يستغني عن المادة في الخارج أيضاً.

أقول كلا البحثين مدفوع بما سيظهر من بحثنا عن حدوث العالم أن العدد لا يعرض للمفارق العقلي لا بالذات و لا بالعرض و هو عارض للنفس واسطة الأبدان و ربما يدفع بأن العدد الذي يبحث عنها في الرياضيات قد يقع في البحث عنه من حيث افتقاره عن المادة في الخارج لتحصيل الأغراض كالمساحة و الجمع و التفريق و الضرب - و القسمة و غير ذلك و فيه نظر.

و ربما يقال المراد ما يتعلق بالجسم في الجملة و إن لم يختص به و كيفيات العدد كذلك و يدفع بأنه حينئذ يكون معنى كون الكيفيات النفسانية ما لا يتعلق بالأجسام أنها لا يتعلق بها أصلاً و ليس كذلك بل المعنى أنها لا يتعلق بها خاصة - بحيث يستغني عن النفس.

أَمَّا الَّذِي ذَكَرَهُ فِي بَيَانِ الْحَصْرِ فِي الْأَنْوَاعِ الْأَرْبَعَةِ فَطَرَقَ أَرْبَعَةً.

الأول ما ذكره الرازي

و هو أن الكيفية إما مختصة بالكمية كالاستدارة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٣

و التربيع و الزوجية و الفردية أو لا و هو إما أن تكون محسوسة أو لا و المحسوس هو المسمى بانفعالات إن كانت سريعة الزوال كحمرة الخجل و بالانفعالية إن كانت راسخة و إن لم تكن محسوسة فإما استعداد نحو الكمال أو لا فالأول

هو المسمى بالقوة إن كان استعدادا نحو الانفعال ولا قوة و ذهنيا إن كان استعدادا شديدا نحو الانفعال و الثاني هو المسمى بالحال إن كان سريع الزوال كغضب الحليم و ملكة إن كانت بطيء الزوال كحلمه فهذا تقسيمه الذي ذكره و من الجائز وجود كيفية جسمانية غير مختصة بالكم و لا محسوسة و لا ماهيتها نفس الاستعداد فلا جرم بأن ما يكون كمالات لا بد و أن تكون كيفية نفسانية لأنه دعوى بغير دليل إلا الاستقراء.

الثاني أن الكيفية إما بحيث يصدر عنها أفعال على التشبيه أو لا

و الأول مثل الحار يجعل غيره حارا و السواد يلقي شبحه في العين و هو مثاله لا كالثقل فإن فعله في جسمه التحريك و ليس ذلك بثقل و الثاني إما أن يكون متعلقا بالكم من حيث هو كم أو لا يكون و الذي لا يكون فإما أن يوجد للأجسام من حيث هي طبيعية أو في النفوس من حيث هي نفسانية.

الثالث الكيفية إما أن تكون متعلقة بوجود النفس أو لا يكون كذلك

و الذي لا يكون فإما أن يتعلق بالكمية أو لا يتعلق و الذي لا يتعلق فإما أن يكون هويتها أنها استعداد أو هويتها أنها فعل فالأول هو الحال و الملكة و الثاني هو المختصة بالكمية - و الثالث القوة و اللاقوة و الرابع الانفعاليات و الانفعالات.

الرابع أن الكيفية إما أن تفعل على طريق التشبيه و هي الانفعاليات و الانفعالات أو لا يكون كذلك

و حينئذ إما أن لا يتعلق بالأجسام و هي الحال و الملكة أو يتعلق و ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٤

المتعلق إما من حيث كميته و هي المختصة بالكميات أو من حيث طبيعتها و هي القوة و اللاقوة و هذه الطرق الثلاث هي التي ذكرها الشيخ في الشفاء و الكل ضعيفة متقاربة

القسم الأول في الكيفيات المحسوسة و فيه خمسة أبواب

الباب الأول في أحكام كلية لهذا القسم و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في خاصيته و في تقسيمه بقسميه و سبب التسمية

أما الخاصة المساوية التي تعم أفرادها

فهي أنها تفعل في موادها أشياء يشاركها في المعنى - فإن الحار يجعل غيره حارا و البارد يجعل غيره باردا و الألوان يقرر أشباحها في البصر قيل هذه الخاصة غير عامة لخروج الثقل و الخفة و لأنه ذكر الشيخ في فصل الأسطقسات من طبيعيات الشفاء في بيان أنه لم سميت الرطوبة و اليبوسة بالكيفيتين المنفعلتين أنه لم يثبت بالبرهان أن الرطب يجعل غيره رطبا و اليابس يجعل غيره يابسا فعلى هذا هاتان المحسوستان - لا تفيدان ميل نفسيهما.

أقول يمكن الجواب بأنهما يفعلان في الحس مثلهما و كذا الثقل و الخفة - فعلم شمول هذه الخاصة لجميع المحسوسات و الذي ذكره الشيخ في أثناء تقسيم الكيفيات أن السواد يلقي شبحه في العين و هو مثاله لا كالثقل فإن فعله في جسمه التحريك و ليس ذلك بثقل معناه أن فعل السواد في البصر لا كفعل الثقل في جسمه - و غرضه الفرق بين الفعل في مادة الإدراك و بينه في مادة الجسم حيث إن الأول مثال الشيء بخلاف الثاني فليس فيما ذكره تصريح بأن الثقل و الخفة ليسا من المحسوسات كما زعمه الرازي و كذا قوله في الرطوبة و اليبوسة إنه لم يثبت بالبرهان جعلهما الغير رطبا و يابسا معناه نفي كونهما فاعليين مثل نفسيهما في المواد لا في القوى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٥

الحسية كيف و قد صرح في كثير من المواضع أن كل محسوس مما له صورة مساوية في الحس و لا فرق في ذلك بين المبصرات كالألوان و بين الملموسات كالثقل و الخفة - و هذا هو الذي وعدناه في الفصل المقدم.

و أما الخاصة الغير الشاملة فكثير

لا يحتاج إلى البيان.

و أما التقسيم

فالكيفية المحسوسة إن كانت راسخة كصفرة الذهب و حلاوة العسل سميت انفعاليات و ذلك لانفعال الحواس عنها أولا و لكونها بخصوصها أو عمومها مانعة للمزاج الحاصل من انفعال العناصر بموادها فالخصوص كما في كفيات المركبات كحلاوة العسل و العموم كما في كفيات البسائط كحرارة النار فإن الحرارة بما هي حرارة قد تكون مانعة للمزاج الحاصل بالتركيب و انفعال المواد و هذا معنى قولهم بشخصها أو نوعها و إلا فالحرارة أنواع كثيرة فالحرارة النارية و إن لم يكن حصولها بانفعال المادة لكن من شأن الحرارة المطلقة أن يحدث بالانفعال في مادة و كذا الحلاوة العسلية و إن لم يكن في العسل على سبيل انفعال من العسل لكنها إنما حدثت على انفعال في أمور تكونت عسلا فانفعلت انفعالا صارت لأجل ذلك حلوة و إن كانت غير راسخة سميت انفعالات لأنها لسرعة زوالها شديدة الشبه بأن تنفعل فهي و إن كانت داخلية في القسم الأول لأجل السببين المذكورين لكنها لقصر زمانها و سرعة زوالها امتنعت عن اسم جنسها و اقتصر على مجرد الانفعال

فصل (٢) في الرد على القول بأن كفيات الأجسام نفس أشكالها و بأنها نفس الأمزجة

زعم بعضهم أن لا حقيقة للكفيات المحسوسة بل هي مجرد انفعالات تعرض للحواس فإذا قيل لا بد لانفعال الحاسة من بعضها دون بعض و ببعض الكفيات دون بعض من سبب و إلا لانفعال البصر من الشفاف مثل ما ينفعل من الملون أجابوا بأن الأجسام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٦

مركبة من أجزاء غير متجزية بالفعل و إن تجزت بالفرض و هي على أشكال متخالفة و على تراكيب و أوضاع متخالفة و ذلك الاختلاف يوجب اختلاف الآثار الحاصلة في الحواس فالذي يفرق البصر يسمى بالبياض و الذي يجمعه بالسواد و كذا في المطعوم - الذي يقطع العضو تحريفا إلى عدد كثير لكون أجزائه صغارا شديدة النفوذ هو الحريف و المتلاقي لذلك القطع هو الحلو و كذلك القول في الروائح و الملموسات كالحرارة و البرودة.

و بالجملة فاختلف الأشكال يوجب اختلاف الإحساسات و الحواس إنما ينفعل من الأشكال لا من كيفية أخرى و هذا المذهب سهل الدفع فإن ما في الحواس صورة المحسوسات و مثالها و مثال الشكل غير مثال الطعم و اللون و غيرهما و سيجيء أيضا في مباحث الكون و الفساد بطلان هذا المذهب - ثم الذي يميز اللون عن الشكل أن الشكل محسوس باللمس و اللون غير محسوس به فأحدهما غير الآخر فإن قيل المحسوس بالحقيقة هو الصورة الحاصلة في الحس فيجوز أن يفيد الشكل المخصوص لآلة البصر أثرا و لآلة اللمس أثرا آخر قلنا الآثار الحاصلة في الحواس إن كانت

أشكالاً و الشكل ملموس فالأثر الحاصل في العين ملموس هذا خلف و إن لم يكن أشكالاً فثبت القول بوجود كـيفيات وراء الأشكال لأن صور الشيء و مثاله لا بد و أن يكون مطابقاً له و مما يحتج به على إثبات هذه الكيفيات أن الألوان و الطعوم و الروائح فيها تضاد بخلاف الأشكال إذ لا تضاد فيها.

حجة أخرى قالوا إن الإحساس بالشكل متوقف على الإحساس باللون و لو كان اللون شكلاً لتوقف الشيء على نفسه قالوا إن الإنسان الواحد قد يرى جسماً واحداً - على لونين مختلفين بحسب وضعين منه كطوق الحمامة يرى مرة شقراء و مرة على لون الذهب بحسب اختلاف المقامات.

و أيضاً السكر في فم الصفاوي مر و في فم غيره حلو فلا حقيقة لهذه الأشياء إلا انفعال الحواس و لا اختلاف الإحساسات إلا اختلاف المنفعلات و الانفعالات بحسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٧

الأوضاع المختلفة.

و الجواب أما طوق الحمامة فليس المرئي منه شيئاً واحداً بل هناك أطراف الريش ذوات جهات و لكل جهة لها لون يستر لون الجهة الأخرى بالقياس إلى القائم الناظر - فللوضع مدخل في الرؤية لاشتراط المقابلة فيها لأن المرئي هو الوضع و ليس الأجناس مجرد انفعال الحواس عن محسوساتها و ليس صدق اختلاف الإحساسات لانفعالات المنفعلات.

و اعلم أن جماعة زعموا أن الكيفيات نفس الأمزجة و أن المزاج إذا كان على حد ما كان لونا و طعماً معينين و إذا كان على حد آخر و بحال آخر كان لونا و طعماً آخر - و ليس سائر الكيفيات التي تجري مجراها شيئاً و المزاج شيئاً آخر بل كل منها مزاج مخصوص يفعل في اللامسة شيئاً و في الباصرة شيئاً آخر و الذي يدل على بطلانه أن جميع الأمزجة على حدودها الواقعة بين الغايات ملموسة و لا شيء من الألوان ملموساً فليس شيء من المزاج لونا.

و أيضاً فهذه الكيفيات يوجد فيها غايات في التضاد و الأمزجة متوسطة ليست بغاية فهي أمور غير الأمزجة

الباب الثاني في الكيفيات الملموسة

و هي الحرارة و البرودة و الرطوبة و اليبوسة و اللطافة و الكثافة و اللزوجة و الهشاشة و الجفاف و البله و الثقل و الخفة و قد أدخل في هذا الباب الخشونة و الملامسة و الصلابة و اللين فلنذكر كلا منها في هذا الباب و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في حد الحرارة و البرودة

قال الشيخ في الشفاء الحرارة كيفية تفرق بين المجتمعات و تجمع بين المتشاكلات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٨

و البرودة هي التي تجمع بين المتشاكلات و غير المتشاكلات و ذكر في رسالة الحدود في الحرارة أنها كيفية فعلية محركة لما فيه إلى فوق لإحداثها الخفة فيعرض أن يجمع التشابهات و يفرق المختلفات أي صدور هذا الجمع و التفريق ليس صدوراً أولياً بل ذلك تابع للخاصية الأولى و هي التحريك إلى فوق و التخفيف فهذا الرسم المذكور في الحدود أولى من المذكور في الشفاء فإذا فعلت الحرارة فعلها الأولى يحدث بتخليها الكثيف تخلخلاً من باب الكيف - أي رقة القوام و يقابله التكاثف بمعنى غلظ القوام و بتصعيده اللطيف من الأجزاء تكاثفاً - من باب الوضع أي اجتماعاً

للأجزاء الوجدانية الطبع بخروج الجسم الغريب عما بينها و يقابله التخلخل بمعنى انتفاش الأجزاء بحيث يخالطها جرم غريب و معنى الفعلية في الحرارة جعل الغير سببها لا مجرد أثر ما أعم من الحركة و غيرها ليكون قوله فعلية محرركة بمنزلة قولنا جسم حيوان على ما زعمه الإمام.

و بالجملة فالخاصية الأولية للحرارة هي إحداث الخفة و الميل المصعد ثم يترتب على ذلك بحسب اختلاف القوابل آثارا مختلفة من الجمع و التفريق و التبخير و غير ذلك.

و تحقيقه أن ما يتأثر عن الحرارة إن كان بسيطا استحال أولا في الكيف ثم يفضي به ذلك إلى انقلاب الجوهر فيصير الماء هواء و الهواء نارا و ربما يفرق المتشابهات بأن يميز الأجزاء الهوائية من النارية و يتبعها ما يخالطها من الأجزاء الصغار المائية و إن كان مركبا فإن لم يشتد التحام بسائطه و لا خفاء في أن الألفظ أقبل للصعود لزم تفريق الأجزاء المختلفة و يتبعه انضمام كل إلى ما يشاكله بمقتضى الطبيعة و هو معنى جمع المتشاكلات و أن أشد التحام البسائط فإن كان اللطيف و الكثيف القريبين من الاعتدال حدثت من الحرارة القوية حركة دورية لأنه كلما مال اللطيف إلى التصعد - جذبه الكثيف إلى الانحدار و إلا فإن كان الغالب هو اللطيف يصعد بالكلية كالنوشادر و إن كان هو الكثيف فإن لم يكن غالبا جدا حدثت يسيل كما في الرصاص أو تليين كما في الحديد و إن كان غالبا جدا كما في الطلق حدثت مجرد سخونة و احتيج في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٦٩

تليينه إلى الاستعانة بأعمال آخر و عدم حصول التصعد و التفرق بناء على العائق لا ينافي كون خاصيتها التصعيد و التفريق للمختلفات و الجمع للمتشابهات.

فعلى ما ذكرنا اندفع ما قيل أما أنها يجمع المتشاكلات فليس كذلك لأنها تفرق الماء بالتصعيد و كذلك ترمد الحطب و تفرقه و أما أنها تفرق المختلفات فليس كذلك - لأنها لا تقوى على تفريق الأجزاء العنصرية التي في الطلق و النورة و الحديد و الذهب - و الحيوان المسمى بالسمندر بل قد يجمع بين المتشاكلات [المتخالفات] أيضا كما يزيد بياض البيض و صفرتها تلازما.

لأننا نقول أما تفريق الماء فليس كذلك بل إذا أحالت جزء منه هواء وقع التفرق بينه و بين الماء لاختلاف الطبيعتين ثم يلزم أن يختلط بذلك أجزاء مائية فيصعد مع الهواء بخارا و أما فعلها في الحطب فلأن أجزاءها الأرضية متماسكة بالمائية فإذا فرقت بينهما عرض يتأثر الأجزاء اليابسة الرمادية و أما الطلق و النورة و الحديد فالنار قوية على تسيلها بإعانة الحيل التي يتولاها أصحاب الأكسير و خصوصا إذا أعينت بما يزيد لها اشتعالا كالكبريت و الزرنيخ و أما الذهب فالنار إنما لا تفرقه لأن التلازم بين بسائطه شديد جدا فكلما مال شيء منها إلى التصعد حبسه المائل إلى الانحدار فيحدث من ذلك حركة دورية و لو لا المانع لفرقته النار و عدم الفعل لعائق ليس دليلا على انتفاء الفاعلية - و أما عقد النبض فليس جمعا له بل هو إحالة في قوامه ثم إن النار يفرقه عن قريب بالتقطير - **ثم اعلم** أن هذا التعريف و كذا نظائرها أعني التي للمحسوسات ليس بحد - فإنه غير مركب من المقومات و لا أيضا برسم لأنه التعريف بلازم بين ينتقل منه الذهن إلى ماهية الملزوم و هاهنا ليس كذلك فإن من لم يشاهد النار لا ينتقل ذهنه من فهم الحركة إلى فوق إذ الجمع بين المتشاكلات و التفريق بين المختلفات - إلى فهم أن المؤثر في ذلك هو الحرارة بل الفائدة في هذه الرسوم لهذه

الكيفيات ذكر خواصها وآثارها بحيث يميزها عن غيرها عند العقل بعد ما أفاده الحس ما هو الممكن في ذلك وهي حاصلة بذكر هذه اللوازم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧٠

واعلم أن من القدماء من أنكر وجود البرودة وجعلها عدما للحرارة و رد بأن الجمود و التكثيف كالسيلان و الترقيق فعلا و جوديان مقابلان لهما و لا يمكن إسناد الفعل الوجودي إلى العدم و لا إلى الجسمية المشتركة فلا بد من وجود كيفيتين و جوديتين - لتكونا مصدرين لهذه الأفعال الأربعة المتقابلة.

ويمكن أن يؤول كلام القدماء بأن وجود الحرارة أقوى من وجود البرودة - فوجود البرودة عادم لشدة الوجود و لذلك فعل الحرارة أشبه بالوجودي من فعل البرودة لأن السكون و الجمود أشبه بالعدم من الحركة و لأن الحرارة قد تكون جوهرًا سماويا كالطبيعة الفائضة من عالم النفوس على أبدان فتفعل أفعالا غريبة مخالفة - لفعل هذه الحرارة العرضية

فصل (٢) في ماهية الحرارة الغريزية و إنيتها

ربما يتوهم أن إطلاق الحرارة على حرارة النار و على الحرارة الفائضة من الأجرام الكوكبية و على الحار الغريزي الفائض من عالم النفوس و على الحرارة الحادثة بالحركة بحسب اشتراك الاسم و ليس كذلك لأنه لمفهوم واحد و هو الكيفية المحسوسة التي توجب التلطيف و التصعيد و إن كانت الحرارة مختلفة بالحقيقة و الذي يشك فيه اختلاف المفهوم إنما هو في إطلاق الحار على النار و على النيران السماوية - و على الطبيعة الفاعلة في الأبدان و على الأدوية و الأغذية التي يظهر منها حرارة في بدن الحيوان و هل في كل من الكواكب و الدواء صفة مسماة بالكيفية المحسوسة - التي تكون في النار أم ذلك توسع و إطلاق الحار على ما منه الحرارة و إن لم يسم في المسمى بالحرارة فيه تردد.

والحق أنه لو ثبت فيما منه الحرارة أنه يفعلها بالذات فهو حار فإن القوى تعرف بأفاعيلها و الأثر من جنس المؤثر و إن فعلها بالعرض بأن يسد المسام أو يجمع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧١

الحرارة أو يمنعها عن التخليل فليس بحار.

واختلفوا في أن الحرارة الغريزية التي بها قوام الحياة في الحيوان و النبات هل هي مخالفة بالنوع للحرارة الخارجية أم لا. قال الشيخ في القانون الحار الخارجي إذا حاول أن يبطل الاعتدال فإن الحار الغريزي أشد الأشياء مقاومة له حتى إن السموم الحارة لا يدفعها إلا الحرارة الغريزية - فإنها آلة للطبيعة تدفع ضرر الحار الوارد بتحريك الروح إلى دفعه و يدفع ضرر البارد الوارد بالمضادة و ليس هذه الخاصية للبرودة فإنها إنما تنازع و تعاقب الحار الوارد بالمضادة فقط و لا تنازع البارد الوارد فالحرارة الغريزية هي التي تحمي الرطوبات الغريزية عن أن يستولي عليها الحرارة الغريبة فالحرارة الغريزية للقوى كلها - و البرودة منافية لها و لذلك يقال حرارة غريزية و لا يقال برودة غريزية و حكى في حيوان الشفاء عن المعلم الأول أنه قال الحرارة المعنوية التي بها يقبل البدن علاقة النفس ليس من جنس الحار الأسطقيسي الناري بل من جنس الحار الذي يفيض عن الأجرام السماوية فإن المزاج المعتدل بوجه ما مناسب لجوهر السماء لأنه منبعث عنه و فرق بين الحار السماوي و الحار الأسطقيسي و اعتبر ذلك بتأثير حر الشمس في عين الأعشى دون حر النار فتلك

الحرارة تتبعها الحياة التي لا تتبع النارية و بسببها صار الروح جسماً إلهياً نسبته من المني و الأعضاء نسبة العقل من القوى النفسانية فالعقل أفضل المجردات و الروح أفضل الأجسام.

و زعم الإمام الرازي أنها هي النارية فإن النار إذا خالطت سائر العناصر أفادت حرارتها للمركب طبخاً و اعتدالاً و قواماً لتوسطها بانكسار سورتها عند تفاعل العناصر بين الكثرة المفضية إلى إبطال القوام و القلة العاجزة عن الطبخ الموجب للاعتدال فتلك الحرارة هي المسماة بالحرارة الغريزية و إنما تدفع حر الغريب لأن الحر الغريب يحاول التفريق و تلك الحرارة أفادت من النضج و الطبخ ما يعسر عنده على الغريبة تفريق تلك الأجزاء فهذا السبب يدفع الحرارة الغريزية الحرارة الغريبة فالتفاوت بين الحرارتين ليس في الماهية بل في الدخول و الخروج حتى لو توهمنا الغريبة جزءاً و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧٢

الغريزية خارجة لكائن الغريبة تفعل فعل الغريزية.

أقول يلزم على ما ذكره أن يكون الشيء عند انكساره و ضعفه تفعل أفعالا - لا تقوى على شيء منها عند كماله و شدته.

و أيضا الفرق حاصل بين عدم انفعال الشيء عن المفسد المضر و بين أن يدفع ضرره الحاصل فالحرار الغريزي يدفع عن البدن الحرارة الغريبة التي وردت البدن و أمرضتها زماناً و لا شك أن الحرارة الأسطقسية التي في البدن تشتد بورود حرارة أخرى غريبة كمن يحترق بدنه بالنار أو يتسخن بالأهوية الحرارية أو بالحميات فالتى تقاوم هذه الأشياء المقوية لهذه الحرارة و تدفعها عن البدن و تعالجه و تعيده إلى الصحة و السلامة بعد إشراقه على الافتراق و الفساد ما هي هذه الأفاعيل تصدر عن النارية - التي هي مكسورة مقهورة على تقدير وجودها و عدم انخلاعها كسائر الصور الأسطقسية كما هو المذهب المنصور أم هي صادرة عن لا شيء أو عن البرودة التي لا فعل لها إلا القعود و السكون أو عن النفس و النفس لا يعقل إلا بواسطة القوى و الكيفيات - فما أبعد عن الحق قول من نسب التنمية و التغذية و التوليد بما في كل منها من الترتيبات - و التشبيهات و التعديلات إلى الحرارة التي شأنها الإحراق و التفريق.

و أيضا الحرار الأسطقي كباقي الأسطقسات بطبائعها متداعية إلى الانفكاك مجبورة بالقسر على الالتيام فالذي يجبرها على الالتيام و يحفظها عن التفريق هو الحرار الغريزي - باستخدام النفس أو الطبيعة إياه إذ قد ثبت في موضعه أن هذه الأفاعيل الطبيعية لا يتم إلا بشيء من هذه الكيفيات الأربع سيما الحرارة و من نظر حق النظر يعلم أن نسبة الحرارة إلى الطبيعة كنسبة الميل إلى القوى المحركة فكما أن طبيعة النار حارة الجوهر كما أن مفيد الوجود وجودي الجوهر فكذلك مبدأ الحرارة الغريزية نفساً كان أو طبعا طبيعة فلكية أو عنصرية يجب أن يكون حار الذات بذاته لا بحرارة زائدة بل ذاته بذاته حرارة و حارة إلا أن تلك الحرارة نوع آخر أعلى و أشرف من هذه الحرارة و ذاته بالحقيقة نار أخرى أجل من هذه النيران و هي محيطة بهذه لا إحاطة وضعية فقط كإحاطة السماء بكرة الأثير بل إحاطة قهرية عليه غير محسوسة بهذه الحواس بالطبيعة و النفس عندنا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧٣

حارتان غريزيتان و لها طبقات كثيرة الروح التي هي مطية النفس في هذا العالم جوهر ناري غير مركب من العناصر كما زعمه الجمهور بل هي من جنس الأجرام السماوية غير قابلة للموت و البرد لكونها حية بالذات نعم قد تعدد و لا يوجد

لأنها تموت و فرق بين الفساد و العدم كما أنه فرق بين الوجود و التكوين و هذه المباحث بعيدة عن أذهان أكثر المستقلين بالفكر فضلا عن المقلدين

فصل (٣) في ماهية الرطوبة و اليبوسة و إنيتها

ورد في كلام بعض المتقدمين أن رطوبة الجسم كونه بحيث يلتصق بما يلامسه - و رده الشيخ بأن الالتصاق لو كان للرطوبة لكان أشد الأجسام التصاقا أشدها رطوبة فما ليس كذلك و إلا لكان العسل أرطب من الماء فالمعتبر في الرطوبة سهولة القبول للتشكل و تركه فهي الكيفية التي بها يكون الجسم سهل التشكل بشكل الحاوي الغريب و سهل الترك له و اليبوسة هي التي يعسر بها قبول الشكل الغريب و تركه **و قال الإمام الرازي** بأن المعتبر في الرطوبة سهولة الالتصاق و يلزمها سهولة الانفصال فهي كيفية بها يستعد الجسم لسهولة الالتصاق بالغير و سهولة الانفصال عنه و لا نسلم أن العسل أشد التصاقا من الماء إن عנית به سهولة الالتصاق إذ لا شك أن الشيء كلما كان أرطب كان أسهل التصاقا من الماء و إن عנית لشدة الالتصاق أو كثرت دوام الالتصاق فنحن لا نفسر الرطوبة بدوام الالتصاق حتى يلزمها أن يكون الأدوم التصاقا أرطب.

و أيضا ليست الرطوبة نفس الالتصاق حتى يكون الأدوم أرطب بل الالتصاق عرض من باب الإضافة و الرطوبة من باب الكيف بل هي ما به يستعد الجسم للالتصاق و يلزمها لا محالة سهولة الانفصال المنافي لصعوبة الانفصال. أقول اعتراض الشيخ ليس على تفسير الرطوبة بسهولة الالتصاق و الانفصال كما يدل عليه ظاهر كلامه و لهذا يوجد هذا التفسير في بعض كتبه بل مبناه على أنه لا تعرض

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في كلامهم بذكر السهولة في جانب الالتصاق و لا بذكر الانفصال أصلا على أن ما ذكره - من استلزام سهولة الالتصاق سهولة الاتصال محل منع.

و قد أورد على اعتبار سهولة الالتصاق أنه يوجب أن يكون اليابس المدفوق جدا - كالعظام المحترقة رطبا لكونه كذلك و يجاب بأنه يجوز أن يكون ذلك لفرط مخالطة الأجزاء الهوائية و هذا إنما يتم على رأي من يقول برطوبة الهواء بمعنى سهولة الالتصاق أعني البلة لو لا مانع فرط اللطافة لا على رأي من لا يقول بها و اعترض على التعريف بسهولة الأشكال بوجوه - منها أن النار أرق العناصر و أطفها و أسهلها قبولاً للأشكال فيلزم أن يكون أرطبها و بطلانه ظاهر و أجيب بأن لا نسلم سهولة قبول الأشكال الغريبة في النار الصرفة و إنما ذلك فيما يشاهد من النار المخالطة بالهواء.

فإن قيل إذا أوقد التنور شهرا أو شهرين انقلب ما فيه من الهواء نارا صرفة أو غالبية مع أن سهولة قبول الأشكال بحالها قلنا لو أوقد ألف سنة فمداخلة الهواء بحالها.

و منها أنه بمقتضى هذا التعريف كان الهواء رطبا لكنهم اتفقوا على أن خلط الرطب باليابس يفيد استمساكا عن التشتت و خلط الهواء بالنيران ليس كذلك فليس رطبا هذا خلف.

و الجواب أن ذلك إنما هو في الرطب بمعنى البلة فإن إطلاق الرطوبة على البلة شائع.

و منها أنها توجب أن يكون المعتبر في كون الجسم يابسا صعوبة قبول الأشكال - فلم يبق فرق بين اليبوسة و الصلابة و يلزم كون النار صلبه لكونها يابسة.

و الجواب أن اللين كيفية تقتضي قبول الغمر في الباطن و يكون للشيء بها قوام غير سيال و الصلابة بخلافه فهما يغييران الرطوبة و اليبوسة بهذا الاعتبار إلا أنه يشبه أن يكون مرجع قبول الغمر و لا قبوله إلى الرطوبة و اليبوسة و الحق أن تعريف الرطوبة بكيفية تقتضي سهولة اللصوق و تركه أولى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧٥

و أما اليبوسة فربما يقال في تحقيقه إن من الأجسام ما يتفرق أجزاءه و يتحرك بسهولة إما لضعف تماسك الأجزاء بعضها ببعض و إما لتركه من أجزاء صغار مع صلابة كل منهما فالأول هو اليابس و الثاني هو الهش فاليبوسة كيفية تقتضي كون الجسم السريع التفرغ عسير الاجتماع.

فظهر الفرق بينها و بين الهشاشة كما بينها و بين الصلابة و أما بيان إنيتهما - فاعلم أنا قد أشرنا إلى أن تفسير الرطوبة بالكيفية التي معها يكون الجسم سهل الالتصاق و تركه أولى فإذا كانت كذلك فهي لا محالة صفة وجودية و هي من المحسوسات لا محالة و كذلك اليبوسة لما مر.

و أما إذا قلنا هي التي لأجله سهل قبول الأشكال فهو كلام مجازي إن أريد به ظاهره فإن السهل و الصعب من باب المضاف و الرطوبة و اليبوسة ليستا منه.

بل التحقيق فيه أن الرطب هو الذي لا مانع له في طباعه عن قبول الأشكال الغريبة - و عن رفضها و اليابس هو الذي في طباعه مانع يمنع من ذلك مع إمكانه فعلى هذا يشبه أن يكون التقابل بينهما بالعدم و الملكة فلم يكن الرطوبة وجودية و لا أيضا محسوسة بالذات بل كان الإحساس بها عبارة عن عدم الإحساس بمانع عن التشكل و الذي يؤكد ما ادعيناه أنهما سواء فسرت بالقابلية أو بعلة القابلية و سواء كانت القابلية صفة عدمية أو وجودية فهي لا يلزم أن تكون صفة زائدة على الجسم أما على تقدير كونها قابلية و القابلية عدمية فظاهر و أما على تقدير كونها قابلية و القابلية وجودية فلأن هذه القابلية حاصلة للجسم لذاته مع سائر القابليات لأن شأن الجسم قبول التشكلات - و لذلك كان هذا القبول حاصلًا لليابس أيضا و أما على تقدير كونها علة للقابلية و القابلية وجودية فلأنه لما كانت قابلية الجسم للأشكال حكما ثابتا لذاته استحال أن يستدعي علة زائدة و أما على تقدير كونها علة للقابلية و هي عدمية فعدم الحاجة إليه أظهر فثبت أن الرطوبة بهذا التفسير ليست وجودية فلا يشبه أنها غير محسوسة و لهذا لا يقع الإحساس بالهواء عند كونها معتدلا لا حر فيه و لا برد و لا حركة و لو كانت رطوبتها وجودية كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧٦

الإحساس به دائما فلم يكن شك في كون هذا الفضاء خلاء.

و اعلم أن الشيخ مال في فصل الأسطقات إلى أن الرطوبة غير محسوسة و ذكر في كتاب النفس أنها محسوسة قال بعض العلماء لعله أراد بالغير المحسوسة هي التي بمعنى سهولة قبول الأشكال و لا بالمحسوسة هي التي بمعنى سهولة الالتصاق أعني البلة و هذا حسن و الله أعلم بالصواب

فصل (٤) في اللطافة و الكثافة و اللزوجة و الهشاشة و البلة و الجفاف

اللطافة قد تطلق على رقة القوام كما في الماء و الهواء و على سهولة قبول الانقسام إلى أجزاء صغيرة جدا و للغلظة

معنيان مقابلان لهما قال في طبيعيات الشفاء يشبه أن يكون التخلخل مشابهاً للطف بالمعنى الأول مع زيادة معنى فإنه يفيد الرقة مع كبر في الحجم و الرقة أيضاً تستلزمه إلا أن التخلخل يدل على الكبر بالتضمن و هي بالالتزام- و يقال التخلخل و يراد به تباعد أجزاء الجسم بعضها عن بعض على فرج يشغلها ما هو الطف منها و هذا المعنى غير مشغول به هاهنا.

ثم قال لكن اللطيف و المتخلخل بالمعنى الأول غير نافع في الفعل و الانفعال إلا بالعرض و قال في قاطيغوريوس يقال التخلخل الانتفاش كالصوف المنفوش و يقال لما إذا صار الجسم إلى قوام أقبل للتقطيع و التشكيل من انفعال يقع فيه و يقال لقبول المادة حجماً أكبر فالأول من الوضع و الثاني من الكيف و الثالث من الإضافة في الكم أو كم ذو إضافة و للتكاثر معان ثلاثة مقابلة لها.

و اعترض عليه بأن اللطيف و المتخلخل بالمعنى الأول هناك هو بعينه الرقة المفسر هاهنا بسهولة قبول التقطيع و التشكيل و قد حكم هناك بأنه غير نافع في الفعل و الانفعال إلا بالعرض مع أنه الذي فسر به الرطوبة فلزم خروج الرطوبة من الكيفيات النافعة فيهما مع أن إثبات ذلك مطلوب له في ذلك الفصل من الطبيعي و الأولى أن يقال سهولة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧٧

قبول الأشكال هي الرقة و اللطافة فاما سهولة الالتصاق بالغير و الانفصال هي الرطوبة النافعة في الفعل و الانفعال و الكثافة عبارة عن صعوبة قبول الأشكال.

و أما اللزوجة فكيفية مزاجيه غير بسيطة المعنى لأن اللزج ما يسهل تشكيله بأي شكل أريد و لكن يصعب تفريقه بل يمتد متصلاً فهو مؤلف من رطب و يابس شديد الالتحام و الهش ما يخالفه فهو ما يصعب تشكيله و يسهل تفريقه لغلبة اليابس و قلة الرطب مع ضعف المزاج.

و أما البلة فاعلم أن هاهنا رطباً و مبتلاً و منتقعا فالرطب هو الذي صورته النوعية - تقتضي الرطوبة بمعنى قبول الالتصاق و الانفصال و المبتل ما يعرضه الرطوبة بمقارنة الرطب فإن نفذت الرطوبة في باطنه فهو المنتقع و الجفاف مقابل البلة

فصل (٥) في الثقيل و الخفيف و فيه مباحث

أولها أن الشيخ قال في الحدود الاعتماد و الميل كيفية

بها يكون الجسم مدافعاً لما يمنعه عن الحركة فدل على أنه مبدأ المدافعة لا نفسها و هي غير الحركة كما في الثقيل المسكن في الجو و الزق المنفوخ المسكن تحت الماء فإنه يحس منهما الميل الهابط و الصاعد و غير الطبيعة لأنها قد تكون نفسانية و لعدمها عند كون الجسم في حيزه الطبيعي و لأن المدافعة تشدد و تضعف و الطبيعة بحالها.

و ثانيها أن لمن أثبت الميل أمراً غير المدافعة

أن يقول الحلقة التي يجذبها الجذبان المتساويان حتى وقفت في الوسط لا شك أن كلا منهما أثر فيها فعلاً يمنع عن تحريك الآخر إياها غير المدافعة لعدم حصولها و ليس ذلك نفس الطبيعة لأن فعلها إلى جانبي العلو و السفلى و فعلهما لو تم فإلى جانبين غيرهما فثبت أن لهذه المدافعة مبدأ غير الطبيعة و غير القوة النفسانية.

و ثالثها أن الخفة و الثقل قد عرفهما الشيخ في الحدود

بقوله الثقل قوة طبيعية يتحرك بها الجسم إلى الوسط بالطبع و الخفة قوة طبيعية يتحرك بها الجسم عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧٨

الوسط بالطبع وليس المراد من الوسط نفس المركز بل موضع ينطبق مركز الثقل - أو مركز ثقله على مركز العالم عند كونه في ذلك الموضع و مركز الثقل عبارة عن نقطة - يتعادل ما على جوانبها ثقلا بمعنى أن ثقل كل جانب يساوي ثقل مقابله.

أقول قوله بالطبع ليس مكررا كما زعمه بعض و لا صفة للمركز احترازا عن مراكز الكرات الخارجة المراكز لأن الثقل لا يتحرك إليها بل إلى ما هو المركز بالطبع و هو مركز الجسم الأول الفاعل للجهات كما زعمه الرازي بل صفة للحركة احترازا عن الحركة القسرية على ما هو التحقيق من أن فاعلها هي الطبيعة التي في المقسور - ليخرج عن الثقل الخفيف المتحرك إلى الوسط بالقسر و عن الخفيف الثقيل المرمي إلى الفوق ثم إن قوله قوة [طبيعة] يدل على أن الميل غير الطبيعة سواء كان نفس المدافعة أو ما به المدافعة.

و رابعها أقسام الميل الطبيعي و قسري و نفساني

و الطبيعي لا يكون إلا إلى جهة من الجهات و الجهة الحقيقية اثنتان فالميل الطبيعي اثنتان الثقل و هو الميل السافل و الخفة و هو الميل الصاعد و القسري على خلاف الطبيعي و أما النفساني فقد يكون مستديرا - و قد يكون مستقيما و قد يختلف باختلاف الإرادات.

و خامسها أن الميل الطبيعي لا يوجد في الأجسام عند ما يكون في أحيائها الطبيعية.

قال الإمام الرازي هذا مما نص عليه الشيخ في كتاب السماء و العالم من الشفاء من غير حجة إقناعية فضلا عن البرهانية. أقول هذا في الوضوح بمنزلة لا يحتاج إلى البرهان بعد تصور الميل و مبدئه و لازمه عند عدم المانع.

و سادسها أن الميل قد يراد به نفس المدافعة

و قد يراد به السبب القريب لها - و هو المنبعث من الطبيعة عند حاجتها إليه حين خروجها عن الموضع الطبيعي أو النفس عند الإرادة باستخدام الطبيعة و كما أن من الممتنع وجود حركتين مختلفتي الجهة من الجسم بالذات لأن الحركة الواحدة تقتضي قربا إلى موضع ما و يلزمه البعد عن خلاف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٧٩

جهته فلو وجدت حركتان كذلك يلزم الجسم الواحد التوجه و عدمه إلى كل من المقصدين فكذلك من الممتنع أن يوجد ميلان مختلفان بالفعل في جسم واحد سواء أريد بالميل نفس المدافعة أو سببها القريب منها فعلى ما ذكرنا اندفع التناقض الذي أورده الإمام الرازي على كلامي الشيخ في الموضعين من الشفاء.

أحدهما ما قال في الفصل الذي تبين فيه أن بين كل حركتين سكونا بالفعل - و لا تصغ إلى قول من يقول إن الميلين يجتمعان فكيف يمكن أن يكون في شيء بالفعل مدافعة إلى جهة و فيه بالفعل التنحي عنها و لا تظن أن الحجر المرمي إلى فوق - فيه ميل إلى أسفل البتة بل فيه مبدأ من شأنه أن يحدث ذلك الميل إليه إذا زال العائق - و الثاني ما قال في الفصل الذي يتكلم فيه في الحركة القسرية السبب في الحركة القسرية قوة يستفيد بها المتحرك من المحرك يثبت فيه مدة إلى أن يبطله مصاكات كانت يتصل عليه مما يماسه و ينحرق به و كلما ضعف بذلك قوي عليه الميل الطبيعي - فقول

قوي عليه الميل الطبيعي يشعر بوجود الميل الطبيعي مع الميل القسري ولكن المراد منه مبدأ المدافعة أو قوتها بمعنى الإمكان الاستعدادي المقابل للفعل و أما الحلقة الساكنة مع أنها المجذوبة إلى جهتين فنحكم بوجود استعداد بعيد للمدافعتين - لا وجودهما و لا وجود مبدئيهما القريين.

و سابعها أن الميل كما يكون إلى الجهات المكانية كذلك يكون إلى المقاصد الكيفية و الكمية و الوضعية

بل الجوهرية كما مضى في مباحث الحركة بل الميل لما كان هو السبب القريب للحركة ينقسم إلى انقسامها فمنها ما يحدث فيه من طباع المتحرك - فتقسم إلى ما يحدثه الطبيعة كميل الحجر عند هبوطه و إلى ما يحدثه النفس كميل النبات إلى التزايد في الكم و إلى الاستحالة في الكيف كميل العنب من الحموضة بل من المرارة إلى الحلاوة و من الخضرة إلى الصفرة و ميل الحيوان عند اندفاعه الإرادي إلى جهة و منه ما يحدث من تأثير قاسر خارج من الجسم كميل السهم عند انفصاله من القوس و الكل عندنا بسبب الطبيعة سواء كانت مستقلة أو مقهورة للنفس أو مقسورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٨٠

بأمر خارج لكن المحسوس من هذه الأقسام ليس إلا الميل المكاني و القسري منه يختلف الأجسام في قبوله و التعصي عنه بأمور ذاتية أو عرضية فالاختلاف الذاتي هو ما بحسب قوة الميل الطباعي و ضعفها فالأقوى بحسب الطبع أكثر تعصيا و امتناعا - من قبول الميل القسري و الأضعف أقل امتناعا و الاختلاف العرضي إما لعدم تمكن الفاسد منه كالرملة الصغيرة أو لعدم تمكنه من دفع الممانع كالتنبية أو لتخلخله الذي لأجله يتطرق إليه الموانع بسهولة كالريشة أو لغير ذلك.

و ثامنها أنه كما يجوز اجتماع حركتين متخالفتي الجهة في جسم واحد

إحداهما بالذات و الأخرى بالعرض كحركة الشخص بنفسه في سفينة متحركة يحركه بالعرض كذلك يجوز أن يوجد ميلان مختلفان في جسم واحد بالفعل أحدهما بالذات و الآخر بالعرض كحجر يحمله إنسان يمشي فإنه يحس بثقله و هو ميله بالذات و يخرق الهواء منه و هو ميله بالعرض الذي للإنسان بالذات لكن لا يجوز اجتماع ميلين متخالفين أحدهما بالطبع و الآخر بالقسر كما لا يجوز اجتماع حركتين مختلفتين كذلك نعم الميل يشتد و يضعف أما الطبيعي فبحسب اختلاف الجسم ذي الطبيعة في الكم فالأكبر أشد ميلا من الأصغر أو في الكيف كالتكاثف و التخلخل فالأكثف أشد ميلا للهبوط من الألف و بالعكس للصعود و في الوضع كاندماج الأجزاء و انتفاشها - و قد يختلف أيضا بأسباب خارجة من رقة قوام المسافة و غلظه و أما القسري فبحسب ما أشرنا إليه.

إذا تقرر ذلك فاعلم أنه إذا طرأ على جسم ذي ميل طبيعي بالفعل ميل قسري - يتقاوم السببان أعني القاسر و الطبيعة فإن غلب القاسر و صارت الطبيعة مقهورة حدث ميل قسري و بطل الطبيعي ثم أخذ الموانع الخارجية مع الطبيعة في إفنائه قليلا قليلا - فبأخذ الميل القسري في الانتقاص و قوة الطبيعة في الازدياد إلى أن تقاوم الطبيعة الباقي من الميل القسري فيبقى الجسم عديم الميل ثم تجدد الطبيعة ميلها مشوبا بآثار الضعف الباقية فيها و يشتد بزوال الضعف فيكون الأمر بين قوة الطبيعة و الميل القسري قريبا

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من الامتزاج الحادث من الكيفيات المتضادة انتهى.

وقد مثل الشيخ حال الميلين الطبيعي و القسري كما يشاهد في الحجر المرمي حالتي صعوده و هبوطه و كيفية التقاوم بينهما بحال الماء في حدوث الحرارة- المنبعثة فيه من تأثير غيره حيث يبطل به البرودة المنبعثة من طباعه إلى أن تزول تلك الحرارة بأسباب خارجة شيئاً فشيئاً فيعود انبعاث البرودة من طباعه فإنه لا يجتمع في الماء حرارة و برودة بل يكون أبداً مكيفاً بكيفية واحدة متوسطة بين غايتي الحرارة الغربية و البرودة الذاتية تارة أميل إلى هذه فتسمى حرارة و تارة أميل إلى تلك فتسمى برودة و تارة متوسطة بينهما فلا تسمى باسميهما و ذلك بحسب تفاعل الحرارة العارضة و الطبيعة مع ما يعاونها من الأمور الخارجية كالهواء المبرد الحاوي لذلك الماء فكذلك لا يجتمع في جسم ميلان- بل يكون دائماً ذا ميل واحد شديد أو ضعيف قسري أو طبيعي و عند تقاوم الميل القسري و الطبيعة- كأنه ينعدم الميل بالكلية لكن الفرق بين الميلين الطبيعي و القسري للحجر و بين البرودة الذاتية و الحرارة القسري للماء أن خلوا الجسم من الميل ممكن كما في كونه عند حيزه الطبيعي و كما في حالة سكونه بين الحركتين الصاعدة القسرية و الهابطة الطبيعية و كما في الحلقة التي تجاذب طرفاه بقوتين متساويتين و لكن خلوا الماء عن مرتبة من الحرارة و البرودة غير ممكن لأن بعض الأضداد يجوز خلوا الموضوع القابل عنها و بعضها لا يجوز خلوه عنها.

و تاسعها أنه هل يجوز اجتماع الميلين إلى جهة واحدة

أحدهما طبيعي و الآخر غريب أما الجسم الإبداعي الذي وجد على كماله الأتم من غير عائق عن ميلها الطباعي- كالأفلاك في حركاتها الوضعية و كالعناصر الكلية في حركاتها لو فرض في العالم خلاء- و هي في غير أحيائها كان ذلك ممتنعاً لأن قاعدة الإمكان الأشرف دلت على أنها في أقصى الممكن من قواها الطبيعية فميلها بالغة إلى الغاية فلا يمكن الزيادة عليها من خارج- و أما في غيرها حيث يكون الجسم معارضا بما يدفعه مثل الحجر الهاوي فإن الهواء يقاومه في ميله فلا يبعد أن يحصل معه معاون من ميل خارج يوجب سرعة حركته.

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و عاشرها أن المعتزلة من المتكلمين يسمون الميل اعتماداً

و يقسمون الاعتماد إلى لازم كاعتماد الثقل إلى السفلى و الخفيف إلى فوق و غير الطبيعي مختلفاً و منهم من جعل الاعتماد في الجسم واحداً لكنه يسمى بأسماء مختلفة بحسب الاعتبار فيسمى اعتماد واحد بالنسبة إلى السفلى ثقلاً و إلى العلو خفة و إن لم يكن له بالنسبة إلى سائر الجهات اسم مخصوص.

و ذهب بعض آخر إلى أنها متعددة متضادة لا يقوم بجسم واحد اعتمادان بالنسبة إلى جهتين و منهم كالجبائي على أن الاعتماد لازماً كان أو مختلفاً غير باق.

و قال أبو هاشم بل اللازم باق بحكم المشاهدة كما في الألوان و الطعوم و قال الجبائي إن الاعتماد لا يولد حركة و لا سكونا و إنما ولدهما الحركة- فإن من فتح باباً أو رمى حجراً فما لم يتحرك يده لم يتحرك المفتاح و لا الحجر ثم الحركة في المفتاح و الحجر تولد حركة بعد حركة و تولد سكونه في المقصد و أبو هاشم على أن المولد للحركة و السكون هو الاعتماد.

و استدلل أيضاً بأن حركة الرامي متأخرة عن حركة الحجر المرمي لأنه ما لم يندفع الحجر من حيزه امتنع انتقال يد الرامي

إليه لاستحالة التداخل بين الجسمين و هو ضعيف لأنه إن أريد التأخر بالزمان فاستحالة التداخل لا يوجب ذلك - لجواز أن يكون اندفاع هذا و انتقال ذلك في زمان واحد كما في أجزاء الحلقة التي تدور على نفسها بل الأمر كذلك و إلا لزم الانفصال و إن أريد بالذات فالأمر بالعكس - إذ ما لم يتحرك اليد لم يتحرك الحجر و لهذا يصح أن يقال تحركت اليد فتحرك الحجر دون العكس فالأقرب لمن قال بالتوليد أن المولد للحركة و السكون قد يكون هو الحركة و قد يكون الاعتماد فإنه يولد أشياء مختلفة من الحركات و غيرها بعضها لذاته من غير شرط كتوليد الحركة لأنه السبب القريب لها و بعضها بشرط كتوليده أوضاعا مختلفة للجسم بشرط حركاته و كتوليد عود الجسم إلى حيزه الطبيعي بشرط خروجه عنه و كتوليده للألم بشرط توليده تفرق الاتصال و الأصوات بشرط توليده المصاكة.

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هذا تقرير مذهبهم في الميل و أما على قوانين الحكماء فقد علمت أن الميل غير باق في المواضع التي ذكرناها و أنه مما يشتد و يضعف و الشدة و الضعف يوجبان تبدل الشيء لذاته فالميل غير ضروري البقاء في كل جسم بشخصه و إنما الباقي في كل جسم شخصي هو الطبيعة الجوهرية المقومة له و أما الذي استدل به بعض العلماء على بقاء الميل في حال الوصول إلى المطلوب من أنه يفعل الإيصال لأنه المحرك و المدافع إليه - و المدافع هو بعينه الموصل إليه و يمنع انفكاك المعلول عن علته فذلك صحيح يقتضي وجود الميل إلى أن الوصول و لا يقتضي بقاءه كما لا يقتضي بقاء الحركة بل استحالتهم لأن المستدعي للميل و الحركة هو خروج الجسم عما هو المطلوب طبعاً كان أو قسراً أو إرادة و هو غير باق في زمان الوصول إلى المطلوب فلا يمكن الميل المحرك إليه لاستلزامه تحصيل الحاصل.

و حادي عشرها أن الميل هيئة قارة

و إن وقع في بعض أفرادها تدريج و ليس كالحركة التي لا يتصور إلا تدريجاً لشيء كالآل و الكم و غيرهما و ذلك لأن الميل لا بد من وجوده عند الوصولات إلى حدود مطالب غير منقسمة في الحدوث و الموجود في حد غير منقسم كان موجوداً في آن و إن استمر قبله أو بعده أيضاً.

و ثاني عشرها أن لا تفاعل بين الثقل و الخفة

إذ الثقل يوجب حركة الجسم إلى جانب المركز و الخفة إلى جانب المحيط فكل منهما يوجب تباعد جسمه عن جسم الآخر فالوصفان الموجبان تباعد الجسمين إلى غاية التباعد يستحيل أن يجتمعا حتى يتفاعلا.

و قد علمت أن السكون الذي بين حركتي الصاعدة و الهابطة إنما حصل من تفاعل بين الطبيعة و الميل القسري الصاعد لا بين الميلين لعدم اجتماعهما بل هما منعتمان جميعاً في ذلك الزمان إلا في الطرفين ففي آن أوله كان آخر زمان الميل القسري و قد قاومته الطبيعة حتى أزالته و في آن آخره كان أول زمان الميل الطبيعي و قد أحدثته الطبيعة بعد فراغها عن آثار شواغل الميل القسري

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فصل (٦) فيما يظن دخوله في الكيفيات اللمسية و ليس منها

فمن ذلك الخشونة و الملاسة و الصلابة و اللين و إنما يقع الاشتباه في مثل هذه الأمور لعدم الفرق بين ما بالذات و ما

بالعرض فالخشونة اختلاف الأجزاء و الملاسة استواءها و هما من باب الوضع على أن المحسوس ليس مجرد الوضع أيضا بل أمر آخر من صلابة أو لين أو حرارة أو برودة أو غيرهما فليسا من هذا الباب.

أما اللين فله صفتان الانغمار الحاصل فيه و هو من باب الحركة مع تقعير في سطحه منها و هو من باب الكيفيات المختصة بالكميات و ليس اللين نفس هاتين الصفتين لأنه موجود مع عدمهما و لأن اللين غير محسوس بالبصر و هما محسوسان به - فاللين عبارة عن استعداد تام نحو الانغمار و كذا الصلب فيه أمور بعضها عدمي و هو عدم الانغمار و بعضها وجودي فمنه المقاومة المحسوسة و منه بقاء الشكل و ليست الصلابة شيئا منها.

أما العدم فظاهر أما الشكل فقد علمت أما المقاومة فلو كانت صلابة كان الهواء الذي في الزق المنفوخ صلبا و كذا الرياح الهابة بل الصلابة هي الاستعداد الطبيعي نحو الانفعال و الاستعداد و الاستعداد ليسا مما يدرك بالحس فضلا عن اللمس فالصلابة و اللين من باب الكيفيات الاستعدادية.

و أما سائر الكيفيات الحاصلة بالامتزاج بين أوائل الملموسات أعني الأربع الفعليتين و الانفعاليتين فاللائق بذكرها موضع آخر حين نشغل بذكر مباحث الأجسام الطبيعية.

و أما الكيفيات المذوقة و إن ناسب أن تردف بهذا المقام لكون المذوق تلو الملموس - لكن أخرناها لكون البحث عنها مختصرا فحاولنا إرداف الكيفيات المبصرة بهذا الموضع - استمدادا من فاعل الخير و الجود و استجلابا لإفاضة العلم و إكمال الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٨٥

الباب الثالث في الكيفيات المبصرة و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في إثبات الألوان

ذهب بعض الناس إلى أن لا حقيقة للون أصلا

بل جميع الألوان من باب الخيالات كما في قوس قزح و الهالة غيرهما فإن البياض إنما يتخيل من مخالطة الهواء - للأجسام الشفافة المتصغرة جدا لكثرة السطوح المتعاكسة عنها النور بعضها من بعض كما في الثلج فإنه لا سبب هناك إلا مخالطة الهواء و نفوذ الضوء في أجزاء صغار جمادية و كثرة انعكاساته و كما في زبد الماء و المسحوق من البلور و الزجاج الصافي - و أما السواد فمن عدم غور الضوء في الجسم لكثافته و اندماج أجزائه.

و الحاصل أن البياض هو راجع إلى النور و السواد إلى الظلمة و باقي الألوان متخيلة من تفاوت اختلاط الشفيف بالهواء و ربما يسند السواد إلى الماء نظرا إلى أنه يخرج الهواء فلا يكمل نفوذ الضوء إلى السطوح و لأجل هذا يميل الثوب المبلول إلى السواد - و المحققون على أنها كيفيات متحققة لا متخيلة و إن كانت متخيلة في بعض المواضع أيضا - و ظهورها في الصورة المذكورة بتلك الأسباب لا ينافي تحققها و حدوثها بأسباب أخرى - التي هي باستحالات المواد.

[كلام الشيخ في ذلك]

و اعلم أن الشيخ ذكر في فصل توابع المزاج من ثمانية الفن الرابع من الطبيعيات أنه لم يعلم أنه هل يحصل البياض بغير هذا الطريق المذكور أم لا و لكن في المقالة الثالثة من علم النفس قد قطع بوجود ذلك فقال إنه لا شك في أن اختلاط الهواء بالمشف سبب لظهور اللون و لكننا ندعي أن البياض قد يحدث من غير هذا

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الوجه بوجوه - أحدها كما في البيض المسلوق فإنه يصير أشد بياضا مع أن النار لم يحدث فيه تخلخلا وهوائية بل أخرجت الهوائية عنه و لهذا صار أثقل.

و ثانيها كما في الدواء المسمى بلبن العذراء فإنه يكون من خل طبخ فيه مرداسنج حتى انحل فيه ثم يصفى حتى يبقى الخل في غاية الإشفاف ثم يطبخ المرداسنج في ماء طبخ فيه القلي و يبالغ في تصفيته ثم يختلط الماءان فينعتقد فيه المنحل الشفاف من المرداسنج و يصير في غاية الإيباض كاللبن الرائب ثم يجف بعد الإيباض فليس إيباضه لأنه شفاف متفرق قد دخل فيه الهواء و إلا لم يجف بعد الإيباض و كما في الجص فإنه يبيض بالطبخ بالنار لا بالسحق و التصويك مع أن تفرق الأجزاء و مداخله الهواء فيه أظهر.

و ثالثها اختلاف طرق الاتجاه من البياض إلى السواد حيث يكون تارة من البياض إلى الغبرة ثم العودية ثم السواد و تارة إلى الحمرة ثم القتمة ثم السواد و تارة إلى الخضرة ثم النيلية ثم السواد يدل على اختلاف ما يتركب عنه الألوان إذ لو لم يكن كذلك لم يكن في تركيب السواد و البياض إلا الأخذ في طريق واحد و لم يكن اختلاف إلا بالشدة و الضعف لهما.

و رابعها انعكاس الحمرة و الخضرة و نحوهما من الألوان إذ لو لم يكن اختلافها إلا لاختلاط المشف بغيره لوجب أن لا ينعكس من الأحمر و الأخضر و غيرهما إلا البياض لأن السواد لا ينعكس بحكم التجربة. هذا تلخيص ما أفاده في الشفاء و دلالة هذين الوجهين على أن سبب اختلاف الألوان لا يجب أن يكون هو التركيب بين السواد و البياض أقوى من دلالتهم على أن سبب البياض لا يجب أن يكون مخالطة الهواء للأجزاء الشفافة مع أن في كل منهما موضع نظر لجواز أن يقع تركيب السواد و البياض على أنحاء مختلفة و أن يقع انعكاس السواد عند الامتزاج لا عند الانفراق.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٨٧

و العجب أن صاحب كتاب المواقف فهم عن سوء فهمه أو سوء ظنه بمثل الشيخ عن بعض عبارات الشفاء حيث يقول في بيان سبب البياض في الصورة المذكورة أن اختلاط الهواء بالمشف على الوجه المخصوص سبب لظهور لون أبيض و لرؤية لون البياض أنه ينكر وجود البياض فيها بالحقيقة فنسبه إلى السفسطة حاشاه عن ذلك.

و منهم من نفى البياض و أثبت السواد تمسكا بأن البياض ينسلخ و السواد لا ينسلخ - و دفع بأن قولهم للأسود أنه غير قابل للبياض إن عنوا به على سبيل الاستحالة فغير صادق - إذ كذبهم الشيب بعد الشباب و إن عنوا به على سبيل الانصباغ فسيبه أن الصبغ المسود لما فيه قوة قابضة فيخالط و ينفذ و المبيضات غير نافذة و نقل عن أصحاب الإكسير أنهم ينتقلون نحاسا كثيرا برصاص مكلس و زرنخ مصعد و ذلك يبطل ما قالوه و ربما تمسكوا بأن مادة البياض تقبل الألوان و مادة السواد لا تقبلها فدل على أن مادة البياض عارية عن اللون.

و دفع بأنه يجوز أن يكون الحقيقي مفارقا و التخيلي لازما لزوال سبب الأول و لزوم سبب الثاني.

أقول لا شبهة في أن القابل ما دام اتصافه بلون لا يمكن اتصافه بلون آخر فمادة البياض ما دام بياضه لا يمكن أن يتصف

بلون آخر وكذا في السواد و سائر الألوان بلا فرق فإن فرق بأن انسلاخ السواد عن محله غير ممكن كان رجوعا إلى الوجه الأول و انسلاخ الشيء و عدم انسلاخه من أضعف الدلائل على العدم و الوجود فرب وجودي ينسلخ و رب عدمي لا ينسلخ كالأعمى و البصر حيث ينسلخ الوجودي و لا ينسلخ العدمي.

و ربما احتج بأن محل البياض يقبل جميع الألوان و كل ما يقبل الشيء يجب أن يكون عاريا عنه فمحل البياض يجب أن يعرى عن الألوان كلها.

و الجواب أن الصغرى كاذبة لأنه يقبل ما سوى اللون الأبيض الذي فيه فلا يلزم إلا عراؤه عن غير ذلك البياض و إن أريد بالقبول المجامع للفعلية منعنا الكبرى

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و هو ظاهر.

و ربما قيل لو كان القابل للشيء واجب الانخلاع عنه لكان ممتنع الاتصاف به و اللازم باطل فكذا الملزوم و هو منفسخ بأن القضية مشروطة فلا يلزم إلا امتناع الاتصاف ما دام قابلا و ذلك حق.

تتمة-

اعلم أن كل ما يحدث من الألوان بسبب طبخ صناعي أو نضج طبيعي - و بالجملة باستحالة للمادة فهو لون طبيعي و كل ما يحدث دفعه في محل و إن كان بعد حركة مكانية فهو لون غير طبيعي كالألوان و القزحية و الزجاجية و ألوان المسحوقات المشقة كالجمد المكسور بأجزاء صغيرة و كلا القسمين موجودان لكن أحدهما مادي حاصل بانفعال المادة و الآخر من تعينات النور الحاصل و اختلاف ظهوره على الأبصار حسب اختلاف المظاهر.

ثم إن القائلين بكون السواد و البياض كيفيتين حقيقتين - **منهم** من زعم أنهما أصل الألوان و البواقي بالتركيب و ذكروا في بيانه وجوها ضعيفة.

و منهم من ذهب إلى أن أصول الألوان و هي السواد و البياض و الحمرة و الصفرة و الخضرة و البواقي بالتركيب بحكم المشاهدة و لا يخفى أن المشاهدة إنما تفيد أن التركيب المخصوص يفيد اللون المخصوص و أما أن ذلك اللون لا يحصل إلا من هذا التركيب و لا يكون له حقيقة مفردة فلا

فصل (٢) في النور المحسوس

و اعلم أن النور إن أريد به الظاهر بذاته و المظهر لغيره فهو مساوق للوجود

بل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٨٩

نفسه فيكون حقيقة بسيطة كالوجود منقسما بانقسامه فمنه نور واجب لذاته قاهر على ما سواه و منه أنوار عقلية و نفسية و جسمية و الواجب تعالى نور الأنوار غير متناهي الشدة - و ما سواه أنوار متناهية الشدة بمعنى أن فوقها ما هو أشد منها و إن كان بعضها كالأنوار العقلية لا يقف آثارها عند حد و الكل من لمعات نوره حتى الأجسام الكثيفة فإنها أيضا من حيث الوجود لا تخلو من نور لكنه مشوب بظلمات الأعدام و الإمكانيات كما بيناه في شرحنا لحكمة الإشراق و إن أريد

به هذا الذي يظهر به الأجسام على الأبصار فاختلّفوا في حقيقته فمنهم من زعم أنه عرض من الكيفيات المحسوسة.

و منهم من زعم أنه جوهر جسماني

لكن ينبغي على من يرى أنه عرض أن يعلم أنه ليس من الأعراض التي تحصل بانفعال المادة و بالاستحالة بل يقع دفعة من المبدأ الفياض في محل قابل إياه إما بمقابلة نير و إما بذاته و كذا ينبغي على من يزعم أنه جسم أن يدّعي أنه ليس من الأجسام المادية المشتملة على قوة استعدادية تنفعل بها عن تأثير فاعل غريب فهو على تقدير جسميته يكون خاليا عن الكيفيات الانفعالية - كالرطوبة و اليبوسة و الثقل و الخفة و اللين و الصلابة و أمثالها و كذا عن الكيفيات الفعلية المقتضية لتلك الانفعالات كالحرارة الموجبة للحركة إلى فوق و للتفريق و الجمع و ما شابهها و كالبرودة الموجبة للثقل و الكثافة و الجمود و أمثالها بل لا بد و أن يكون من الأجسام الكائنة دفعة بلا استحالة و انتقال لكن الزاعمين أنه جسم اشتهر بينهم أن النور أجسام صغار تنفعل عن المضيء و يتصل بالمستضيء و ذلك ممتنع لأن أكثر النيرات المضئية أجرام كوكبية دائمة الإنارة لا ينفصل أجزاؤها عنها دائما و إلا يلزمها الذبول و الانتقاص و خلو مواضعها عن تمام مقدارها أو مقدار أجزائها - أو كونها دائمة التحليل مع إيراد البدل عما يتحلل عن جرمها فيكون أجسامها أجساما مستحيلة غذائية كائنة فاسدة و ذلك محال من الفلكيات و أما الذي ذكر في كتب الفن لا يبطال مذهب القائلين بكون الأنوار المبصرة أجساما فوجوه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٩٠

الأول أنه لو كان النور جسما متحركا لكانت حركة طبيعية و الحركة الطبيعية إلى جهة واحدة دون سائر الجهات لكن النور يقع على الجسم في كل جهة كانت له.

والثاني أن النور إذا دخل من الكوة ثم سدناها دفعة فتلك الأجزاء النورانية إما أن يبقى أو لا يبقى فإن بقيت فهل بقيت في البيت أو يخرج.

فإن قيل إنها خرجت عن الكوة قبل انسدادها فهو محال لأن السد كان سبب انقطاعها فلا بد أن يكون سابقا عليه بالذات أو بالزمان و إن بقيت في البيت فيلزم أن يكون البيت مستنيرا كما كان قبل السد و ليس كذلك و إن لم يبق فيلزم أن يكون تخلل جسم بين جسمين يوجب انعدام أحدهما و هو معلوم الفساد.

و الثالث أن كونها أنوارا إما أن يكون عين كونها أجساما و إما أن يكون مغايرا لها و الأول باطل لأن المفهوم من النورية مغاير للمفهوم من الجسمية و لذلك يعقل جسم مظلم و لا يعقل نور مظلم و إما أن قيل إنها أجسام حاملة لتلك الكيفية تنفصل عن المضيء و تتصل بالمستضيء فهذا أيضا باطل لأن تلك الأجسام إما محسوسة أو غير محسوسة فإن لم تكن محسوسة كانت ساترة لما وراءها و يجب أنها كلما ازدادت اجتماعا ازدادت سترها لكن الأمر بالعكس فإن الضوء كلما ازداد قوة ازداد إظهارا.

و الرابع أن الشمس إذا طلعت من الأفق يستنير وجه الأرض كله دفعة و من البعيد أن ينتقل تلك الأجزاء من الفلك الرابع إلى وجه الأرض في تلك اللحظة اللطيفة - لا سيما و الخرق على الأفلاك ممتنع. أقول و هذه الوجوه في غاية الضعف كما بيناه فيما كتبنا على حكمة الإشراق.

أما الوجه الأول فلأن كون النور جسما لا يستلزم كونه متحركا و لا كون حدوثه بالحركة بل مما يوجد دفعة بلا حركة.

وأما الوجه الثاني فلنأخذ أن يقول إن قيام المجعول بلا مادة إنما يكون بالفاعل الجاعل إياه مع اشتراط عدم الحجاب المانع عن الإفاضة فإذا طرأ المانع لم يقع الإفاضة فينعدم المفاض بلا مادة باقية عنه لأن وجوده لم يكن بشركة المادة فكذا

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عدمه فعند انسداد الباب عن الإفاضة ينعدم الشعاع عن البيت دفعة ولا فرق في ذلك بين كونه عرضاً أو جوهرًا والسر فيهما جميعاً أن النور مطلقاً ليس حصوله من جهة انفعال المادة - و شركة الهیولی كسائر الجواهر والأعراض الانفعاليات ولذلك لا ينعدم شيء منها دفعة - لو فرض حجاب بينها وبين مبدئه الفاعلي إلا بعد زمان وعقيب استحالة.

وأما الذي ذكره ثالثاً فجوابه أن المغايرة في المفهوم لا تنافي الاتحاد والعينية في الوجود كنفس الوجود فإن مفهومه غير مفهوم الجسم ولكن وجود الجسم حين جسميته - فما ذكره مغالطة من باب الاشتباه بين مفهوم الشيء وحقيقته وإلا لا تنقض الدليل بالوجود لجريانه فيه بأن يقال المفهوم من الموجودية غير المفهوم من الجسمية - ولذلك يعقل جسم معدوم ولا يعقل وجود معدوم.

والحل فيهما جميعاً أن مفهوم النور والوجود غير مفهوم الجسم لكن المفهومات المختلفة قد تكون في الأعيان ذاتاً واحدة من غير تعدد في وجودها وأما المذكور رابعاً - فلأن مبناه أيضاً على الانفصال والقطع للمسافة لا على مجرد الجوهرية والجسمية

فصل (٣) في حقيقة النور وأقسامه

النور غني عن التعريف كسائر المحسوسات وتعريفه بأنه كيفية هي كمال أول للشفاف من حيث إنه شفاف أو بأنه كيفية لا يتوقف الإبصار بها على الإبصار بشيء آخر - تعريف بما هو أخفى وكان المراد به التنبيه على بعض خواصه و المعترفون بأنه كيفية اختلفوا.

فمنهم من ذهب إلى أنه عبارة عن ظهور اللون فقط وقالوا إن الظهور المطلق هو الضوء والخفاء المطلق هو الظلمة والمتوسط بينهما الظل ويختلف مراتبه بمراتب

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القرب والبعد عن الطرفين فإذا ألف الحس مرتبة من مراتب الخفاء ثم شاهد ما هو أكثر ظهوراً من الأول وظن أن هناك بريقاً وشعاعاً وليس الأمر كذلك بل ذلك بسبب ضعف الحس والدليل عليه أن ظهور بعض اللامعات بالليل المظلم دون النهار لضعف الحس في الظلمة.

فزعم أنها كيفية زائدة ولذلك إذا قوي البصر بنور السراج لم يراها وكذا نسبة لمعان السراج إلى لمعان القمر ونسبة لمعانه إلى نور الشمس من حيث إن لمعان السراج يزول عند ظهور القمر وهو يزول عند ظهور الشمس والسبب فيه ما ذكرنا من ضعف الحس ومن هؤلاء من بالغ حتى قال ضوء الشمس ليس إلا الظهور التام للونها وذلك يبهل البصر فحينئذ يخفى لونها لا لخفاءه في نفسه كما أنا نحس بالليل بلمعان اللوامع ولا نحس بألوانها لكون الحس لضعفه في الليل يبهله ظهور تلك الألوان فلا جرم لا يحس بها.

ثم إذا قوي في النهار بنور الشمس لم يصير مغلوبا لظهور تلك الألوان فلا جرم يحس بها هذا بيان مذهبهم.
أقول لا بد أولا من تحقيق محل الخلاف في أن النور كيفية زائدة على اللون أو نفس الظهور.

فنقول من قال بأنه نفس الظهور فهو لا يخلو إما أن يريد به الظهور أو مجرد هذه النسبة و الثاني باطل و إلا لكان الضوء أمرا عقليا واقعا تحت مقولة المضاف فلم يكن محسوسا أصلا لكن الحس البصري مما ينفع عن الضوء و يتضرر بالشديد منه حتى يبطل و الأمور الذهنية لا يؤثر مثل هذا التأثير فثبت أن الضوء عبارة عما يوجب الظهور فيكون أمرا وجوديا لكن بقي الكلام في أنه عين اللون أو غيره و قد تكلمنا في ذلك في تعاليقنا على ضوابط الإشرافيين عند مقاوماتنا للوجوه التي ذكرت هناك حتى استقر الرأي على أن النور المحسوس بما هو محسوس عبارة عن نحو وجود الجوهر المبصر الحاضر عند النفس في غير هذا العالم و أما الذي في الخارج بإزائه فلا يزيد وجوده على وجود

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اللون و الذي وقع الاستدلال على مغايرتهما فوجوه مقدوحة - الأول أن ظهور اللون إشارة إلى تجدد أمر فهو إما اللون أو صفة نسبية أو غير نسبية و الأول باطل لأن النور إما أن يجعل عبارة عن تجدد اللون أو اللون المتجدد - و الأول يقتضي أن لا يكون مستنيرا إلا في أن تجدد و الثاني يوجب كون الضوء نفس اللون فلا يبقى لقولهم الضوء هو ظهور اللون معنى و إن جعلوا الضوء كيفية ثبوتية زائدة على ذات اللون و سموه بالظهور فذلك نزاع لفظي و إن زعموا أن ذلك الظهور تجدد حال نسبية فهذا باطل لأن الضوء أمر غير نسبي فلا يمكن تفسيره بالحالة النسبية.
و الثاني أن البياض قد يكون مضيئا مشرقا و كذا السواد فلو كان ضوء كل منهما عين ذاته لزم أن يكون بعض الضوء ضدا لبعضه و هو محال لأن ضد الضوء الظلمة.
الثالث أن اللون يوجد بدون الضوء كالسواد الذي لا يكون مضيئا و كذا سائر الألوان و كذا الضوء يوجد بدون اللون كالماء و البلور إذا وقع عليهما الضوء فهما متغايران لوجود كل منهما بدون الآخر.
الرابع أن الجسم الأحمر مثلا المضيء إذا انعكس منه إلى مقابله فتارة ينعكس الضوء منه إلى جسم آخر و تارة ينعكس منه الضوء و اللون معا إذا قويا حتى يحمر المنعكس إليه فلو كان الضوء مجرد ظهور اللون لاستحال أن يفيد لغيره لمعانا ساذجا.

فإن قيل هذا البريق عبارة عن إظهار اللون في ذلك القابل.

فنقول فلما إذا اشتد لون الجسم المنعكس منه ضوءه أخفى ضوء المنعكس إليه و أبطله و أعطاه لون نفسه.

أقول أما الوجه الأول فهو مقدوح بأن ظهور اللون عبارة عن وجوده و هو صفة حقيقية من شأنها أن ينسب و يضاف إلى القوة المدركة و بهذا الاعتبار يقع له التجدد.

و قوله يوجب أن يكون الضوء نفس اللون قلنا نعم و لكنهما متغايران بالاعتبار كما أن الماهية و الوجود في كل شيء واحد بالذات متغايران بالاعتبار فإن الضوء يرجع معناه إلى وجود خاص عارض لبعض الأجسام و الظلمة عبارة عن عدم ذلك الوجود بالكلية و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٩٤

الظل عبارة عن عدمه في الجملة و اللون عبارة عن امتزاج يقع بين حامل هذا الوجود النوري و حامل عدمه على أنحاء مختلفة و قد مرت الإشارة إلى ضعف الأدلة الموردة على إبطال كون الألوان غير زائدة على مراتب تراكيب الأنوار فعلى هذا صح معنى قولهم الضوء هو ظهور اللون و صح أيضا لو قال أحد إنه غير اللون لأن النور بما هو نور لا يختلف إذ لا يعتبر فيه امتزاج و لا شوب مع عدم أو ظلمة و الألوان مختلفة.

و أما الوجه الثاني فهو أيضا مندفع بما مهدنا و بأن الألوان و إن لم يكن غير النور - إلا أن مراتب الأنوار مختلفة شدة و ضعفا و مع الاختلاف بالشدة و الضعف قد يختلف بوجوه أخرى بحسب تركيبات و تمزيجات كثيرة تقع بين أعداد من النور و إمكانها و فعليتها و قوتها و ضعفها و أصلها و عارضها و أعداد من الظلمة أعني عدم ملكة النور و إمكانها و فعليتها و قوتها و ضعفها و أصلها و فرعها فإن هذه الألوان أمور مادية في الأكثر أو متعلقة بها و المادة منبع الانقسام و التركيب بين الوجودات و الأعدام و الإمكانيات - فليس بعجب أن يحصل من ضروب تركيبات النور بالظلمة هذه الألوان التي نراها فيقع تلك الأقسام في محالها على الوجه المذكور ثم يقع عليها نور آخر بمقابلة المنير و من قال بأن الضوء عين اللون لم يقل بأن كل ضوء عين كل لون كما أن من قال بأن الوجود عين الماهية لم يقل بأن كل وجود عين كل ماهية ليلزمه أن لا يطرا وجود على وجود و لا تضاد وجود لوجود فالألوان متخالفة الأحكام و بعضها أمور متضادة لكن بما هي ألوان لا بما هي أنوار كما أن الموجودات متخالفة الأحكام و بعضها أشياء متضادة لكن بما هي ماهيات لا بما هي موجودات مع أن الوجود و الماهية واحد و كذلك النور و اللون واحد لا يخفى ذلك على من تتبع كلامنا مع قلب ذكي.

و أما الوجه الثالث فسيبل دفعه سهل بما بيناه و كذا الوجه الرابع بأدنى إعمال روية فإن عدم ظهور اللون قد يكون لضعف اللمعان الواقع على شيء و قد يكون لشدة اللمعان فالواقع على المقابل من عكس المضيء الملون قد يكون ضوءه فقط و ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٩٥

عند قصور الضوء و اللون أو قصور استعداد القابل المقابل و قد يكون كلاهما لقوتهما و قوة استعداد المنعكس إليه على أن الكلام في مباحث العكوس طويل و كون المنعكس من الجسم المضيء إلى جسم آخر ضوءه دون لونه ربما كان لأجل صقالته - فإن الصقيل قد يكون ذا لون و ضوء لكن المنعكس منه إلى مقابله ليس إلا ما حصل من نير آخر بتوسطه على نسبة وضعية مخصوصة بينهما له إليهما لا اللون و الضوء اللذان يستقران فيه فالمنعكس في ذلك المقابل ليس إلا الضوء فقط من ذلك النير لا من المنعكس منه إلا أن يكون المنعكس إليه أيضا جسما صقيلا فيقع فيه حكاية منهما أو من أحدهما أيضا

فصل (٤) في الفرق بين الضوء و النور و الشعاع و البريق و الظل و الظلمة و في أن الألوان إنما تحدث بالفعل عند حصول الضوء

ضوء المضيء إن كان من ذاته لا بأن يفيض عليه من مقابله كما للشمس يسمى ضياء و إلا فعرض كالقمر و يسمى نورا أخذا من قوله تعالى **هُوَ الَّذِي جَعَلَ الشَّمْسَ ضِيَاءً وَ الْقَمَرَ نُورًا** أي ذات ضياء و ذا نور و اللمعان هو النور الذي به يستر لون الجسم و هو أيضا ذاتي و عرضي و الأول يسمى شعاعا و الثاني كما للمرأة يسمى بريقا و ربما يسمى

العرضي الحاصل من مقابلة المضيء لذاته كنور القمر و نور وجه الأرض الضوء الأول- وإن كان من مقابلة المضيء لغيره كضوء وجه الأرض قبل طلوع الشمس و كضوء داخل البيت من مقابلة الهواء المقابل للشمس فهو الضوء الثاني و الثالث و هكذا على اختلاف الوسائط بينه و بين المضيء بالذات و يسمى ظلاً أولاً و ثانياً و هكذا يتقدم الظل على الضوء بمرتبة- إلى أن ينتهي الضوء بالكلية و ينعدم فيسمى ظلمة و هو عديمي لأننا إذا أغمضنا العين كان حالنا كما فتحنها في الظلمة لا ندرك شيئاً فوجب أن لا يكون كيفية من الجسم المظلم و لأننا لو قدرنا خلو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٩٦

الجسم عن النور من غير انضيااف صفة أخرى و لا إضافة قوة إمكانية لم يكن حاله إلا هذه الظلمة و متى كان كذلك لم يكن أمراً وجودياً بل سلبياً محضاً.

و اعلم أن الألوان غير موجودة بالفعل في حال كونها مظلمة عند الشيخ و أتباعه- و الدليل عليه أنا لا نراها في الظلمة فهو إما لعدمها أو لوجود عائق عن الإبصار و الثاني باطل فإن الظلمة عدمية و الهواء نفسه غير مانع من الرؤية كما إذا كنت في غار مظلم و فيه هواء كله على تلك الصفة فإذا صار المرئي مستنيراً رأيته و لا يمنعك الهواء الواقف بينه و بينك و ربما يقال هذا التردد غير حاصر لاحتمال شق آخر و هو عدم شرط الرؤية.

و يدفع بأن اللون إذا كان في نفسه من الكيفيات المبصرة فعند وجود الحس الصحيح يجب أن يكون مدركاً و إلا لم يكن في نفسه مرئياً.

و لقائل أن يقول لا شك أن اللون له ماهية في نفسه و له أنه يصح أن يكون مرئياً- فلعل الموقوف على وجود الضوء هو هذا الحكم.

و بالجملة للجسم مراتب ثلاث استعداد أن يكون له لون معين و وجود ذلك اللون و كونه بحيث يصح أن يرى فلم لا يجوز أن يكون المتوقف على وجود الضوء هذا الحكم الثالث لا أصل وجود اللون.

أقول و الأولى أن يجعل هذه المسألة متفرعة على مسألة كون اللون عين الضوء أو غيره فإن كان من مراتب الضوء لم يكن موجوداً حالة الظلمة و إن كان غيره أمكن أن يكون موجوداً في تلك الحالة و لا نراها لفقدان شرط الإبصار.

تذنيب-

ربما يظن أن الظلمة من شرائط رؤية بعض الأجسام كالأشياء التي تلمع بالليل و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٩٧

نفى الشيخ ذلك و قال لا يمكن أن يكون الظلمة شرطاً لوجود اللوامع مبصرة و ذلك لأن المضيء مرئي سواء كان الرائي في الظلمة أو في الضوء كالنار نراها سواء كانت في الضوء أو في الظلمة و أما الشمس فإنما لا يمكننا أن نراها في الظلمة لأنها متى طلعت لم تبق الظلمة و أما الكواكب و اللوامع فإنما ترى في الظلمة دون النهار لأن ضوء الشمس غالب على ضوئها و إذا انفعل الحس عن الضوء القوي لا جرم لا ينفعل عن الضعيف و أما في الليل فليس هناك ضوء غالب على ضوئها فلا جرم ترى.

و بالجملة فصيورتها غير مرئية ليس لتوقف ذلك على الظلمة بل لما ذكر فظهر أن الظلمة ليست من شرائط هذا الباب

الباب الرابع في الكيفيات المسموعة و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في علة حدوث الصوت

علته القريبة تموج الهواء و سبب التموج إمساس عفيف أو تفريق عفيف كقرع النقارة و قلع الكرباس فيحصل من كلا الأمرين تموج من جهة انقلاب الهواء من القارع - أو انبساطه من القالع إلى الجانبين بعنف شديد فيلزم المتباعد من الهواء أن ينقاد للشكل و الموج الواقعين في المتقارب و هكذا يحدث انصدام بعد انصدام مع سكون قبل سكون إلى أن ينتهي ذلك إلى الهواء الذي عند الصماخ و ليس الصوت نفس التموج كما ظنه بعض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٩٨

الناس و لا نفس القلع و القرع كما زعمه آخرون فإن التموج محسوس باللمس لأن الشديد منه ربما ضرب عن الصماخ فسده و القلع و القرع محسوسان بالبصر بتوسط اللون و لا شيء من الأصوات يحس باللمس أو البصر فليس التموج بصوت و لا القلع و القرع و أيضا الشيء قد يعلم منه أنه تموج أو قلع أو قرع و يجهل كونه صوتا و قد يعلم الصوت عند ما يكون الأمور الثلاثة مجهولة فهي غير الصوت

فصل (٢) في إثبات وجود الصوت في الخارج

لأحد أن يقول إن الصوت لا وجود له في الخارج بل إنما يحدث في الحس من ملاسة الهواء المتموج و استدلوا على ذلك بأننا كما أدركنا الصوت أدركنا مع ذلك جهته أيضا و معلوم أن أثر الجهة لا يبقى في المتموج الذي عند الصماخ فكان يجب أن لا يدرك جهاتها كما أن اليد تلمس ما تلقاه و لا يشعر به إلا حيث تلمس من غير أن يدرك الفرق بين وروده من اليمين أو من الشمال لأنها لا تدرك إلا حين انتهى إليها و لا التمييز بين الجهات و لما كان بالسمع يقع التمييز بين الجهات و كذا بين القريب و البعيد من الأصوات علمنا أن ندرك الأصوات الخارجية حيث هي فيكون موجودا خارج الصماخ.

و اعترض بأننا إنما ندرك الجهة لأن الهواء القارع للصماخ إنما توجه من تلك الجهة و إنما تميز بين القريب و البعيد لأن الأثر الحادث عن القرع القريب أقوى و عن البعيد أضعف.

ودفع الأول بأن ذا الصوت قد يكون على يمين السامع و يسمع بالإذن الأيسر لانسداد في الإذن الأيمن و له شعور بالجهة و الثاني بأنه باطل و إلا لما كنا ندرك التفرقة بين البعيد القوي و القريب الضعيف و لكننا إذا سمعنا صوتين متساويين في البعد مختلفين بالقوة و الضعف وجب أن يظن اختلافهما بالقرب و البعد.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٩٩

أقول لكن الإشكال باق بأن المدرك و المحسوس لا بد و أن يكون أمرا موجودا - عند المدرك حالة إدراكه و الموجود عند الجوهر الحاس لا بد و إن يكون ملاصقا له - و هيئة الصوت و شكل التموج و إن كانا موجودين عند السامعة لكن صفتي القرب و البعد غير موجودتين عندها.

و التحقيق أن يقال إن تعلق النفس بالبدن يوجب تعلقها بما اتصل به كالهواء المجاور بحيث كأنهما شيء واحد تعلقت به النفس تعلقا و لو بالعرض فكلما حدث فيه شيء مما يمكن للنفس إدراكه بشيء من الحواس من الهيئات و مقادير

الأبعاد بينها والجهة التي لها وغيرها فأدركت النفس له كما هو عليه

فصل (٣) في سبب ثقل الصوت وحدثه ومعنى الصداء والطنين والحرف

سبب الحدة صلابة المقروع و ملاسته في بعض الأجسام وقصره و شدة انحرافه في بعضها و ضيق منفذ الهواء و قربها من المنفخ في بعضها فيحدث عن هذه الأسباب هيئة - يتأدى إلى السمع على هذه الصورة و هي الزيرية و سبب الثقل أضداد هذه الأسباب و هي البمية و كلاتهما محتملة للزيادة و النقصان فإن زادت الأسباب زادت المسببات على نسبتها و بالعكس.

و أما الصداء فحصله لأن الهواء إذا تموج و قاوم ذلك التموج جسم صلب كجبل أو جدار بحيث لا ينفذ فيه الهواء المتموج بل يرد و ينصرف إلى جانب الخلاف و يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٠٠

شكله شكل الأول و على هيئته كما يلزم الكرة المرمي بها إلى الحائط أن يرجع القهقري - فحينئذ يحدث من ذلك صوت هو الصداء و إذا تكرر ذلك من الجانبين لوجود ما يوجب ذلك الانصراف في الطرفين يسمى طنينا كما يحدث فيما بين الطست المقروع طرفه بقارح و أما الحرف فقد يعرض للصوت كيفية بها يتميز عن صوت آخر يماثله في الحدة و الثقل تميزا في المسموع فتلك الكيفية العارضة هي الحرف في عبارة الشيخ و معروضها في عبارة جمع من العلماء و مجموع العارض و المفروض في عبارة بعضهم.

أقول و الكل صحيح وجهه أن نسبة تلك الهيئة إلى أصل الصوت كنسبة الفصل إلى الجنس لا كنسبة العرض إلى الموضوع فهما موجودان بوجود واحد و إنما العروض في ظرف التحليل العقلي لا في الخارج بأن يمكن و قيد المماثلة بالحدة و الثقل أي الزيرية و البمية احتراز عنهما فإن كلا منهما يفيد تميز صوت عن صوت آخر تميزا في المسموع لكن الصوتين يكونان مختلفين بالحدة و الثقل ضرورة و قيد التميز بالمسموع احترازا عن مثل الطول و القصر و الطيب و غيره فإن التميز بها لا يكون تميزا في المسموع لأنها ليست بمسموعة لكن في كونها من الكيفيات نظر فالأولى به أن يكون احترازا عن مثل الغنة و البحوحة.

بقي الكلام في دلالة قولنا تميزا في المسموع على أن يكون ما به التميز مسموعا - و في أن الحدة و الثقل من المسموعات دون الغنة و البحوحة.

قال بعض العلماء و الحق أن معنى التميز في المسموع ليس أن يكون ما به التميز مسموعا بل أن يحصل به التميز في نفس المسموع بأن يختلف باختلافه و يتحد باتحاده كالحرف بخلاف الغنة و البحوحة و غيرها فإنها قد تختلف مع اتحاد المسموع و بالعكس و لا خفاء في أن هذا التعريف و أمثاله التي للمحسوسات تعريف بالأخفى - بل المقصود مزيد توضيح للماهية الواضحة عند العقل و تنبيه على خواصها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٠١

فصل (٤) في تقسيم الحروف إلى صامت و مصوت و إلى آني و زماني

الحركات الثلاث تعد عندهم في الحروف و يسمى المصوتة المقصورة و الألف و الواو و الياء إذا كانت ساكنة متولدة

من حركات تجانسها أعني الألف من الفتحة - و الواو من الضمة و الياء من الكسرة يسمى المصوتة الممدودة و هي المسماة في العربية بحروف المد و اللين لأنها كانت مدات للحركات و ما سوى المصوتة يسمى صامتة و يندرج فيها الواو و الياء المتحركتان أو الساكنتان إذا لم يكن قبل الواو ضمة و قبل الياء كسرة.

و ليست الألف إلا مصوتا و إطلاقها على الهمزة بالاشتراك الاسمي و ليس المراد بالحركة و السكون هاهنا ما هي من خواص الأجسام بل الحركة عبارة عن كيفية حاصلة في الحرف الصامت من إمالة مخرجة إلى مخرج إحدى المدات فإلى الألف فتحة و إلى الواو ضمة و إلى الياء كسرة و لا خلاف في امتناع الابتداء بالمصوت.

إنما الخلاف في أن ذلك بسكونه حتى يمتنع الابتداء بالساكن الصامت أيضا أو لذاته لكونه عبارة عن مدة متولدة من إشباع حركة تجانسها فلا يتصور إلا حيث قبلها صامت متحرك و هذا هو الحق لأن كل سليم الحس يجد من نفسه إمكان الابتداء بالساكن و إن كان مرفوضا في لغة العرب و ينقسم الحرف باعتبار آخر إلى آني و زماني لأنه إن أمكن تمديده كالفاء فزماني و إن لم يكن كالطاء فآني.

و إنما يوجد في أول زمان إرسال النفس كما في طلع أو في آخر زمانه كما في غلط و ما وقع في وسط الكلمة يحتمل الأمرين و عروض الآني الصوت يكون بمعنى أنه طرف له كالنقطة للخط و من الآني ما يشبه الزماني كالحاء و الخاء و نحوهما - مما لا يمكن تمديده لكن يجتمع عند التلفظ بواحد منها أفراد متماثلة و لا يشعر الحس باعتبار زمان بعضها عن البعض فيظن حرفا واحدا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٠٢

و اعلم أن الحرف الصامت مع المصوت المقصور يسمى مقطعا مقصورا و مع الصوت الممدود يسمى مقطعا ممدودا.

الأول مثل ل بالفتح أو الضم أو الكسر.

و الثاني مثل لا و لو و لي و قد يقال المقطع الممدود بمقطع مقصور مع صامت ساكن بعده مثل هل و قل و بع لمماثلته المقطوع الممدود في الوزن.

و اعلم أن الاختلاف الواقع بين الحروف التسعة و عشرين في لغة العرب و ما سواها في بعض اللغات اختلاف بالنوع فهي أنواع متخالفة يختلف أفراد كل منها بعوارض مصنفة أو مشخصة أما التصنيف فكا لا اختلاف بكونها ساكنا أو متحركا مضموما أو مفتوحا - أو مدغما أو مدغما فيه و غير ذلك و أما التشخيص فكون هذا الباء الذي يتلفظ به زيد الآن أو في وقت آخر و يتلفظ به عمرو في وقت مخصوص و وضع مخصوص و إيراد هذه المسائل أليق بالعلوم الطبيعية

الباب الخامس في الكيفية المذوقة و المشمومات و في إثبات عرضيتهما و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في الطعوم الأجسام إما أن تكون عديمة الطعم أو ذوات طعوم

و الأول هو التفه المسيخ و هو إما عادم الطعم حقيقة و إما عادمه حسا فقط - فإن النحاس و الحديد و أمثالهما مما لا يتحلل منه شيء يغوص في اللسان فيدركه و لكن إذا احتيل في تحليله و تلطيفه ينفصل منه أجزاء صغار يظهر له طعم قوي و أما الذي له طعم فبسائط الطعوم الحاصلة في أفراد تسعة أقسام - **الحرافة** و الملاحه و المرارة و الدسومة و الحلاوة و التفه و العفوصة و القبض و الحموضة - و ذلك لأن ذا الطعم إما لطيف الجسم القابل أو كثيفة أو معتدلة و الفاعل

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في الثلاثة إما حرارة أو برودة أو قوة معتدلة بينهما فالحرار إن فعل في الكثيف حدثت المرارة وإن فعل في اللطيف حدثت الحرافة وإن فعل في المعتدل حدثت الملوحة - و البارد إن فعل في الكثيف فالعفوصة و في اللطيف فالحموضة و في المعتدل فالقبض و المعتدل إن فعل في اللطيف حدثت الدسومة و في الكثيف الحلاوة و في المعتدل التفه - فالحرارة أسخن الطعوم ثم المرارة ثم الملوحة لأن الحريف أقوى على التحليل من المر ثم المالح كأنه مر مكسور برطوبة باردة لأن سبب حدوث الملح مخالطة رطوبة مائية قليلة الطعم أو عديمته أجزاء أرضية محترقة يابسة المزاج مرة الطعم مخالطة باعتدال فإنها إن كثرت أمرت.

و مما يدل على أن المالح دون المر في السخونة أن البورق و الملح المر أسخن من الملح المأكول و العفص أبرد ثم القابض ثم الحامض و لذلك يكون الفواكه الحلوة - أولاً فيها عفوصة شديدة التبريد فإذا اعتدلت قليلاً بإسخان الشمس المنضج لها مالت إلى الحموضة مثل الحصرم و فيما بين ذلك يكون ذا قبض يسير ليس بعفوصة ثم ينتقل إلى الحلاوة و العفص و القابض متقاربان في الطعم لكن القابض يقبض ظاهر اللسان و العفص باطنه أيضاً.

و قد يتركب طعمان في جرم واحد مثل اجتماع المرارة و القبض في الحضض و يسمى البشاعة و كاجتماع الحلاوة و الحرافة في العسل المطبوخ و كاجتماع المرارة و الحرافة و القبض في الباذنجان و كاجتماع المرارة و التفه في الهندباء و يشبه أن يكون هذه الطعوم إنما يكون بسبب أنها مع ما تحدث ذوقاً تحدث بعضها لمساً أيضاً فيتركب من الكيفية الطعمية و من التأثير اللمسي واحد لا يتميز في الحس فيصير ذلك كطعم واحد متميز.

فمن الطعوم المتوسطة بين الأطراف ما يصحبه تفريق و إسخان و يسمى الجملة حرافة و آخر يصحبه تفريق من غير إسخان و هو الحموضة و آخر يصحبه تكثيف و تجفيف و هو العفوصة و على هذا القياس هذا ما يليق بالحكمة من أحكام الطعوم و أما الزائد على هذا القدر فاللائق بإيرادها فيه علم الطب

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فصل (٢) في الروائح المشمومة ليس لأنواع الروائح عندنا أسماء إلا من جهات ثلاثة

أحدها جهة الإضافة إلى موضوعاتها كرائحة المسك و رائحة العنبر و رائحة السرجين.

و ثانيها من جهة الموافقة و المخالفة كما يقال طيبة و منتنة من غير تحصيل معنى فصلي فيهما.

و ثالثها أن يشتق لها اسم من شاكلتها للطعم فيقال رائحة حلوة و رائحة حامضة - كان الروائح التي اعتيدت مقارنتها للطعوم ينسب إليها و يعرف فهذا آخر الكلام في أحوال الكيفيات المحسوسة تبعاً لما ذكر في كتب القوم كالشفاء و غيره.

و أما الكلام في كيفية الإحساس بها فسيأتي في القسم الثاني لهذا الفن و هو البحث عن الكيفيات النفسانية و لنا في هذه الكيفيات المحسوسة كلام أرفع من هذا النمط سنعود إلى ذكره و تحقيق وجود آخر لها و غيرها و إثبات أن لها كينونة صورية بلا مادة في عالم آخر غير عالم الأضداد و الاستحالات حين اشتغالنا بعلم المعاد - و موطن النفوس الإنسانية عند المفارقة عن هذه الأجساد

القسم الثاني من الأقسام الأربعة التي للكيف القوة واللاقوة وفيه فصول

فصل (١) في أنواعه أنواع هذا القسم من الكيفية ثلاثة

الأول استعداد شديد على أن يفعل كالممرضية واللين و يسمى باللاقوة.

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و الثاني استعداد شديد على أن لا يفعل كالمصاحية والصلابة.

و الثالث استعداد شديد على أن يفعل كالمصارعية و هذان القسمان يسميان بالقوة أما المعنى المحصل الذي يشترك فيه هذه الثلاثة و يكون تمام الأمر المشترك الذاتي لها حتى يكون نوعا لمطلق الكيف و جنسا لهذه الثلاثة فقد ذكر أمران - **أحدهما** أنه استعداد جسماني كامل نحو شيء من خارج.

و ثانيهما أنه المبدأ الجسماني الذي به يتم حدوث أمر خارج بمعنى أن حدوثه مترجح به و الثاني أولى من الأول لأن الاستعداد من باب المضاف إذ لا يعقل إلا بين شيئين مستعد و مستعد له فكيف يكون نوعا من الكيف و هذا الرسم متناول للأقسام الثلاثة لأن الفاعل و المنفعل يشتركان في أن حدوث الحادث إنما يتم بها.

ثم إن القوة على الانفعال يترجح بها حدوث ذلك الانفعال و كذا القوة للمقاومة يترجح بها حدوث المقاومة و القوة على الفعل كذلك و الأقسام الثلاثة المشتركة في كونها مبادي جسمانية لحدوث حوادث مترجحة بها.

قال الشيخ في قاطيقورياس و أما الجنس الآخر من أجناس الكيفيات التي هي أنواع الكيفية العامة فيجب أن يتصور على أنه استعداد جسماني كامل نحو أمر خارج بجهة من الجهات لا القوة التي هي في المادة الأولى و لا قوة الجواز فإن كل إنسان بالقوة صحيح و مريض لكن يتمه الاستعداد حتى يصير هذه القوة بحكم الجواز الطبيعي - وافرة من جهة أحد طرفي النقيض فلا يكون في قوة الشيء أن يقبل المرض أو أن يصرع غيره فقط كيف كان بل أن يكون قد يترجح قبول المرض على قبول الصحة أو يرجح - لا قبول الصرع على قبول الصرع و المصاحية و الممرضية و الهيئة الصارعية و الهيئة الانصراعية و الصلابة المترجح فيها أن لا ينغمر و اللين المترجح فيها أن ينغمر من هذا الباب انتهى.

ثم اعلم أنه لا خلاف في أن القوة على الانفعال و القوة على المقاومة داخلتان تحت هذا النوع و أما أن القوة على الفعل هل هي داخلية تحت هذا النوع فالمشهور أنها منه و الشيخ أخرجها منه و هو الحق كما سيظهر لك وجهه فإذا أريد تلخيص معنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٠٦

جامع للقسمين دون الأمر الثالث فيقال إنه كيفية بها يترجح أحد جانبي القبول و الالاقبول لقابليها.

و أما بيان أن القوة على الفعل لا تصلح أن تكون داخلية تحت هذا النوع كما ذهب إليه الشيخ فيحتاج أولا إلى أن يعرف أصلا كلياً و هو أن جهات الفعل دائما يكون من لوازم الذات لأن كل ذات لها حقيقة فلها اقتضاء أثر إذا خلي و طبعه و لم يكن مانع يفعل ذلك الأثر فلا يحتاج في فعلها إلى قوة زائدة عليها و إذا فرض إضافة قوة أخرى لها لم يكن تلك الذات بالقياس إليها فاعلة لها بل قابلة إياها و إذا اعتبرت الذات و القوة معا كان المجموع شيئا آخر إن كان له فعل كان فعله لازما من غير تراخي استعداد له لحصول ذلك الفعل و لو فرض ذلك الاستعداد للفاعلية له كان يلزمه أولا قوة

انفعالية لحصول ما يتم به كونه فاعلا فذلك الاستعداد المفروض لم يكن بالحقيقة لفاعليته بل لانفعاله فليس للفاعلية استعداد بل للمنفعالية أولا وبالذات وللفاعلية بالعرض - فثبت مما بينا بالبرهان أن لا قوة ولا استعداد بالذات لكون الشيء فاعلا بل إنما القوة والاستعداد للانفعال ولصيورة الشيء قابلا لشيء بعد أن لم يكن

فصل (٢) في تحقيق ما ذكرناه بوجه تفصيلي

قال الشيخ في قاطيقورياس لمشكك أن يتشكك في أنه هل المصارعة في هذا الباب داخلة من حيث إن لا ينصرع أو من حيث ينصرع فإن كانت من حيث لا ينصرع يكون المثونة في دفع الشك خفيفة و يكون هذا الجنس هو تأكد أحد طرفي ما عليه القوة الانفعالية في أن يفعل و أن لا يفعل لكنه يعرض أن يضع استعدادا من حيث يحرك غيره من الأقسام - إذ لا يصلح أن يوجد في الأجناس الأخرى أو يصعب و إن كان من حيث ينصرع فإن الشبهة الأولى تتأكد و كأنك قد فهمتها و لسنا نعني بالقوة المصارعية القوة الأولى المحركة النفسانية التي هي جوهر لا يقبل الأشد و الأضعف بل هذه ككمال لتلك من جهة مواتاة

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الأعضاء نسبتها إليه نسبة شدة الذكاء و الفهم إلى النفس الناطقة.

فنقول الآن المصارعة يجب أن يعلم أنها متعلقة بأمر ثلاثة أمر في البدن و أمر في القوة المحركة و أمر في القوة الدراكة أما ما يتعلق في القوة الدراكة فهي معرفة ما صناعية بحبل المصارعة كمعرفه صناعة الرقص و الضرب بالعود. و بالجملة فهو من أصناف المعرفة بكيفية أفعال تتعلق بالحركة كصناعة البناء و الكتابة و أما ما يتعلق بالقوة المحركة فهو ملكة يحسن بها تصريف العضل على إدراك الغرض في المصارعة فهاتان إما حالتان إن ضعفتا و إما ملكتان إن قويتا و تمكنتا و ليسا من الأمور البدنية الصرفة.

و أما الثالث و هو الباقي فهو أمر بدني يقوى و هو كون الأعضاء بحيث يعسر عطفها و نقلها فهذا من هذا الباب فقد زالت الشبهة و تقرر أن هذا الجنس هو استكمال استعداد أحد طرفي ما عليه القوة بمعنى الجواز حتى يكون شديد الاستعداد لوجود ما إذا وجد كان انفعالا بالفعل كالمراضية أو شديد الاستعداد لأن لا يوجد فيه و هذا كالمصاحبة. و بالجملة فإن هذه القوة إما أن يستكمل آخذة نحو التغير عن الحالة الطبيعية الملائمة و هو اللاقوة و إما أن لا يتغير عنها و هي القوة الطبيعية انتهى.

و ربما قيل إن القدرة على تلك الأفعال لها اعتبار من حيث إنها قدرة و اعتبار من حيث إنها قدرة شديدة و من حيث إنها فاعلة بسهولة فهي من حيث إنها قدرة فهي من الحال أو الملكة و من حيث إنها شديدة أو فاعلة بسهولة فهي من هذا النوع.

فأجيب كما في الشفاء بأن الذي فيه قوة أن ينصرع أشد ففيه قوة الصرع حاصلة لكنها ضعيفة و الذي فيه قوة الصرع أشد ففيه قوة الانصرع حاصلة لكنها ضعيفة ففي كل منهما قوة الأمرين حاصلة و لكنها في أحدهما أقوى و في الآخر أضعف فهذا الاختلاف إما أن يكون في الماهية أو في العوارض فإن كان في الماهية وجب أن لا يكون شدة القوة خارجة عن ذات القوة فإن الشيء لا يختلف باختلاف ما ينضم إليه من الخارج و إذا لم يكن الشدة موجودا آخر بل القوة القوية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٠٨

موجود واحد و هو بماهيته الوجدانية مخالفة للقوة الضعيفة فإذا كانت تلك الحقيقة داخلية في أحد الجنسين امتنع دخولها في الجنس الآخر وإن كان الاختلاف بينهما في العوارض فذلك باطل و مع بطلانه يفيد المقصود. و أما وجه بطلانه فلأنه يلزم أن يكون قوة واحدة باقية يعرض له الشدة لا لقوة أخرى انضافت إليها بل كيفية غير القوة تقارن القوة فيصير بها أشد تأثيرا و فعالة و هذا محال و أما بيان أنه مع بطلانه يفيد المقصود فلأن القوة القوية إذا كانت من نوع القوة الضعيفة و القوة الضعيفة غير داخلية في هذا القسم من الكيفية فالقوة القوية غير داخلية فإن مثل الشيء إذ لم يكن تحت جنس لم يكن الشيء أيضا تحت ذلك الجنس.

و مما يحتج به أيضا على بطلان مذهبهم أن الحرارة لها قوة شديدة على الإحراق - فلو كانت داخلية في هذا الباب مع دخولها في الجنس المسمى بالانفعاليات و الانفعالات لزم تقومهما بجنسين و هو محال فثبت بهذا أن القوة الشديدة غير داخلية في هذا الجنس

فصل (٣) في تحقيق أن اللين و الصلابة من أي جنس من أجناس الكيف

قد مرت الإشارة في قسم الكيفيات اللمسية إلى أن أحدهما أعني الصلابة استعداد طبيعي نحو اللانفعال و الآخر أعني اللين استعداد طبيعي نحو الانفعال فليس أحدهما بأن يجعل عدما للآخر أولى من العكس فإذن ليس التقابل بينهما تقابل العدم و الملكة - فهما إذن كفتان وجوديتان و لكن لأحد أن يقول ذلك الاستعداد الطبيعي يلزمه ثلاثة أشياء أحدهما عدمي و الآخران وجوديان أما العدمي فهو اللانغمار و أما الوجوديان فأحدهما المقاومة المحسوسة و الثاني بقاء شكله على ما كان عليه و ذلك الاستعداد لا يجوز أن يكون عدما لأنه علة الأمرين الوجوديين و علة الوجودي

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وجودي فذلك الاستعداد أمر وجودي.

و أيضا فالانغمار كما سبق عبارة عن حركة في سطح الجسم مقارنة لحدوث شكل مخصوص فيه و استعداد له لقبول الحركة لأنه جسم طبيعي و استعداد له لقبول ذلك الشكل لأنه متكمم و إذا كان كونه جسما طبيعيا ذا كمية هو العلة لهذه القابلية امتنع أن يكون هناك كيفية أخرى تفيد هذه القابلية لأن ما ثبت لذات الشيء لا يكون بعلة أخرى و إذا ثبت أن استعداد الانفعال ليس بكيفية زائدة و جب أن يكون الاستعداد نحو اللانفعال لعله وجودية أو يستحيل أن يكون سببه نفس المادة التي هي علة للاستعداد و لا أيضا زوال وصف عن المادة إذ ليس الاستعداد للانفعال علة وجودية حتى يكون زوالها علة الاستعداد للانفعال فالاستعداد للانفعال أمر وجودي فمن هذه المعاني يغلب على الظن أن التقابل بينهما تقابل العدم و الملكة.

أقول يمكن حل هذا الإشكال بأن تعريف الأشياء الواقعة تحت الأجناس المحصلة - قد يكون بأمور عدمية أو نسبية أو بشيء يكون تحت جنس آخر و ما نحن فيه أي كون الصلب بحيث لا ينغمر تعريف لأمر وجودي بصفة عدمية و كون اللين بحيث ينغمر تعريف له بنوع من مقولة أخرى و هي بمقولة أن ينفع فكون اللين و الصلابة وجوديتين تحت هذا النوع من الكيفية أعني القوة و اللاقوة لا ينافي تعريف أحدهما بعدمي و الآخر بوجودي من مقولة أخرى.

و أما قول القائل أن علة قابلية الجسم اللين لقبول الانغمار هي كونه جسما متكما فممنوع إذ لا نسلم أن مجرد الجسمية

الطبيعية مع المقدارية يكفي لقبول هذا النحو من الحركة على هذا الشكل وهي الانغمار وإن كفا لقبول مطلق الحركة و مطلق الشكل فإذا لم يكف الجسمية مع المادة الأولى و الكمية للانغمار فلا بد هاهنا من حالة وجودية أخرى هذا ما سنح لي في دفع الإشكال.

لكن بقي شيء آخر وهو أن الاستعداد و الاستعداد أمور عقلية كالإمكان و الامتناع و الوجوب و نظيرها فهي إما عدمية أو إضافية و الإعدام ليست تحت مقولة و الإضافات تحت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١١٠

مقولة الإضافة.

فبقي الكلام في أمور هي مقتضية لعدم أو إضافة لكن نعلم بالضرورة أنه إذا حصلت الجسمية مع بعض الكيفيات الجسمية كالحرارة و البرودة و الرطوبة و اليبوسة حصلت مثل هذه الاستعدادات و إن لم يكن كيفية وجودية أخرى يسمى الاستعدادية و ليس المخلص عن هذا إلا بأن يقال إن كون المادة بحيث يكون الإمكان الذي فيه نحو القبول أو اللاقبول قريبا من الفعل بسبب كيفية أو شدة كيفية حصلت فيها حالة غير الإمكان و الجواز العقلي لأن ذلك غير قابل للقرب و البعد و لا الرجحان لأحد الطرفين بخلاف هذا الإمكان و غير نفس الكيفية و لا داخله في باقي المقولات

القسم الثالث في الكيفيات التي توجد في ذوات الأنفس

و هي على الجملة منقسمة إلى الحال إن لم تكن راسخة و إن كانت راسخة سميت بالملكة - قيل الافتراق بينهما افتراق بالعوارض لا بالفصول إذ لا يجب تغايرهما بالذات فإن الأمر النفساني في ابتداء تكونه قبل صيرورته مستحكما يسمى حالا فإذا صار هو بعينه مستحكما سمي ملكة فيكون الشخص الواحد قد كان حالا ثم تصير ملكة كما أن الشخص الواحد قد كان صبيا ثم يصير رجلا.

أقول من أراد أن يعرف فساد هذا القول فينبغي أن ينظر في أمر الحال و الملكة في باب العلم فإن الحال هو الصورة الحاصلة و هي من الأعراض التي موضوعها النفس.

و أما إذا صار العلم ملكة فلا بد أن يتحد النفس بجوهر عقلي و به يصير جوهرها فعلا لمثل تلك الصور و أمثالها و الفاعل كيف يكون متحد الهوية مع المفعول كيف و هذا الاستحكام كمالية لما كان أولا حالا غير مستحكم و عندهم أن الأشد و الأضعف مختلفان نوعا فهما بأن يختلفا شخصا كان أولى.

واعلم أنه إذا كان مفهوم الملكة يدخل فيه قوة ما أو قدرة ما فحصول الصورة العلمية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١١١

الثابتة لنفوس الأفلاك و غيرها من الصفات كالقدرة و الإرادة التي لها و كذا علوم العقول - كما اشتهر عند متأخري الحكماء و قوم ممن قبلهم أنها صور زائدة فيها يخرج عن الحال و الملكة لأنها ليست سريعة الزوال و لا بطيئة الزوال و ليست قوة قريبة و لا بعيدة بل فعل مجرد لصور حاصلة و ليست أيضا داخله في سائر الكيفيات الاستعدادية و لا المحسوسة و لا التي في الكميات فيشكل الأمر فيها على قانونهم في تقسيم الكيف إلى أنواع محصورة في الأربعة فإذا أريد تعميم التقسيم بدلت النفسانية بكمال غير محسوس - و لا يؤخذ في حد الملكة القوة و القدرة بل هيئة ثابتة لا

يحسن جنسها أو يؤخذ لها قسم آخر.

فيقال إما حال أو ملكة أو أمر آخر غيرهما لتدخل فيها الإرادة الكلية لنفوس الأفلاك و صورها الثابتة العلمية فيكون كمالات غير استعدادي يوجب ثابت لا يزول و يكون قسيم الحال و الملكة.

و اعلم أنه يندرج تحت هذا النوع أعني الحال و الملكة أنواع كثيرة غير محصورة لكن المذكور منها في كتب هذا الفن عدد قليل و أما في كتب الصوفية فعد من منازل السائرين و مقامات العارفين مبلغ كثير كسبعمئة و نحوها فلنذكر من الأنواع التي جرت العادة بذكرها هاهنا كلا في مقالة إلا العلم فإنه لشرفه و غموض مسائله أفردنا للبحث عن أحكامه و أحواله بابا على حدة و أما سائر الكيفيات كالقوي و الأخلاق فها نذكرها في فصول

فصل (١) في القدرة

قد مر تحقيق القدرة في البحث عن معنى القوة من أنها حالة نفسانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١١٢

للحيوان بها يصح أن يصدر عنه الفعل إذا شاء و لا يصدر عنه إذا لم يشأ و ضد ذلك هو العجز و كل منهما قد يختلف بالقياس إلى بعض الأفعال دون بعض إذ ليس معنى القادر مطلقاً أن يصح منه صدور كل ما يشاء و إلا لم يصح إطلاق القادر على غير الباري جل اسمه من الحيوانات و غيرها فرب قادر لم يصح منه إلا صدور بعض قليل من الأشياء و لا صدوره و هذه القدرة التي في الحيوان صفة إمكانية - متساو نسبتها إلى وجود الفعل و عدمه و صدوره و تركه لكن إذا ضمنت المشية أي الإرادة إليها خرجت نسبتها عن صرف الإمكان إلى أحد الجانبين فصار تعلقها بأحد الجانبين إما واجبا إن بلغت الإرادة إلى حد الإجماع أو راجحا إن بقي التردد.

و أما القدرة التي هي عين المشية التي هي عين العلم بوجه الخير و النظام الأتم - فهي خارجة عن حدود الإمكان باللغة إلى حد الوجوب كما في الباري جل ذكره فقدرته ليست من الكيفيات النفسانية التي إذا قيست إلى ممكن آخر لم يجب وجوده عند وجودها - و لا عدمه عند عدمها لعدم العلاقة السببية و المسببية بينها و ليست نسبة قدرة الله تعالى إلى الموجودات كلها هذه النسبة أي الإمكان فقط لأنها كلها بقدرة الله وجدت و وجبت - فقدرته تامة الفعل لأنها عين العلم و الإرادة و قدرة الحيوان ناقصة فلو كانت قدرة الحيوان عين إدراكه و إرادته لفعل أو ترك لكانت تامة واجبة الفعل عنها فكانت حينئذ فعلا لا قوة و كان الفعل معها واجبا لا ممكنا فقط فقد علمت أن نسبة القدرة التي هي في الحيوان إلى القدرة التي معها العلم و الإرادة نسبة النقص إلى الكمال و كل ما يوجد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١١٣

في الناقص يوجد في التام إلا ما يرجع إلى القصور و الفتور من الأمور العدمية و الإمكانية. فلهذا يصح إطلاق القدرة على ذات الباري جل اسمه بمعنى أنه إن شاء فعل و إن لم يشأ لم يفعل و إن كانت المشية عين قدرته و كذا العلم الأتم الأحكم بمعنى أن وجودا واحدا علم و إرادة و قدرة و كلها موجودة بوجود وحداني صمدي و لو كان الشرط في القدرة أن لا يكون عين الإرادة و لا مستلزمة إياها حتى يلزم أن يوجد زمان كان القدرة و لم يكن فيه المشية لمقدور لا لوجود و لا لعدم أو لا بد أن يكون وقت كانت المشية غير المشية التي لوجود هذا المقدور و لم يكن

هناك هذا المعنى العام للقدرة بل معنى آخر خارجا بتمامه أو بعضه من المعنى الذي وقع التعريف به للقدرة فإن التعريف المشهور شامل للقدرة التامة و الناقصة جميعا وإذا شرط فيها كونها مع عدم الإرادة أو إرادة العدم لزم كونها ناقصة فإن القدرة إذا كملت جهات مؤثرته و مبدئته وجب أن يقترن بالإرادة و وجب أن يوجد معها صدور الأثر بلا تراخ فهذه هي القدرة التامة

فصل (٣) في الإرادة

و هي في الحيوان من الكيفيات النفسانية و يشبه أن يكون معناها واضحا عند الفعل [العقل] غير ملتبس بغيرها إلا أنه يعسر التعبير عنها بما يفيد تصورها بالحقيقة و هي تغاير الشهوة كما أن مقابلهما و هي الكراهة تغاير النفرة و لذا قد يريد الإنسان ما لا يشتهي كشرب دواء كريهه ينفعه و قد يشتهي ما لا يريده كآكل طعام لذيث يضره و فسرهما المتكلمون بأنها صفة مخصصة لأحد طرفي المقدور و قيل هي في الحيوان شوق متأكد إلى حصول المراد و قيل إنها مغايرة للشوق المتأكد فإن الإرادة هي الإجماع و تصميم العزم إذ قد يشتهي الإنسان ما لا يريده و قد يريد ما لا يشتهي كما ذكرنا و الفرق بينهما بأن الإرادة ميل اختياري و الشوق ميل طبيعي.

قيل و لهذا يعاقب الإنسان المكلف بإرادة المعاصي و لا يعاقب باشتهاؤها و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١١٤

هو: جعلوا مبادي الأفعال الاختيارية التي للحيوان خمسة التصور و اعتقاد النفع أو دفع الضرر و الشوق و الإجماع المسمى بالإرادة و القوة المحركة.

و الأولون إنما أسقطوا الإجماع و جعلوه نفس الشوق المتأكد و في جعل القصد و الإرادة من الأفعال الاختيارية نظر إذ لو كان الأمر كذلك لاحتاج إلى قصد آخر و يلزم التسلسل و القول بأن البعض اختياري دون البعض تحكم لا يساعده الوجدان - بل الظاهر أنه إذا غلب الشوق تحقق الإجماع بالضرورة و مبادي الأفعال الاختيارية ينتهي إلى الأمور الاضطرارية التي تصدر من الحيوان بالإيجاب فإن اعتقاد اللذة أو النفع يحصل من غير اختيار فيتبعه الشوق فيطيعه القوة المحركة اضطرارا فهذه أمور مترتبة بالضرورة و الاختيار في الحيوان عبارة عن علمه و الشوق التابع له سببا للفعل و قدرته عبارة عن ذلك السبب للفعل كالقوة المحركة التي للأعضاء و أما إرادة الله فعند الحكماء - هو عبارة عن علمه بنظام العالم على الوجه الأتم الأكمل.

فإن هذا العلم من حيث إنه كاف في وجود النظام الأتم و مرجح لطرف وجودها على عدمها إرادة و العلم فينا أيضا إذا تأكد يصير سببا للوجود الخارجي كالماشي على شاطئ جدار ضيق العرض إذا غلبه توهم السقوط يصير سببا لسقوطه و من هذا القبيل تأثير بعض النفوس بالهمة و العين الذي علم تأثيره بالتجارب و أخبار المخبر الصادق فلا يستبعد أن يكون العلم الأزلي سببا لوجود الكائنات

فصل (٣) في حد الخلق و أقسامه

الخلق ملكة يصدر بها عن النفس أفعال بالسهولة من غير تقدم روية و ليس الخلق عبارة عن القدرة على الأفعال لأن القدرة نسبتها إلى الضدين واحدة كما سبق - و ليس أيضا عبارة عن نفس الفعل لأنه عبارة عن كون النفس بحال يصدر عنها الصناعة - من غير روية كمن يكتب شيئا و لا يروي في كتابة حرف أو يضرب بالعود و لا يروي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١١٥

في كل نقرة نقرة بل ربما يتبدل في فعله إذا روى لأن مبدأ فعله هذا بعد أحكام الملكة ليس روية بل شيء نسبته إلى الروية كنسبة الطبيعة إلى الفكر والطبيعة شيء مخالف للروية وإن لم يكن يخالف العلم في كثير من الطبائع كالطبائع الفلكية إذ طبيعتها عين العلم والشعور بلا روية والخلق كأنه شيء متوسط بين الطبيعة وهذه الإرادة الفكرية وكأنه أمر حاصل عقيب تعمل واكتساب فليس للأفلاك والمبادي خلق بل مبادي أفاعيلها كلها طبيعة أو عقل وليس الخلق أيضا يلزمه المبدئية للفعل بل كونه بحيث إذا أريد الفعل يصدر بلا صعوبة وروية وكذلك ملكة العلم للعالم ليس أن يحضر المعلومات بل أن يكون مقتدرا على إحضار معلوماته من غير روية.

واعلم أن كل حال وملكة فهو صفة وجودية لا محالة وكل صفة وجودية فهي من حيث إنها صفة وجودية كمال سواء سميت فضيلة في العرف أو الاصطلاح أو الشرع أو رذيلة لكن بعض تلك الصفات مما يوجب زوال كمالات أخرى مخصوصة بنفوس شريفة وبعضها ليست كذلك بل يزيد بها تلك النفوس شرفا وبهاء فهذه هي الفضائل للقوة العاقلة التي للإنسان وأضدادها هي الرذائل لها وما من رذيلة للنفوس الإنسانية كالشره والفجور والتهور والجربزة إلا وهي فضيلة لبعض النفوس السافلة فإن إفراط الشهوة كمال للبهائم رذيلة للإنسان لمكان نفسه الناطقة.

واعلم أن الحكمة بمعنى إدراك الكليات والعقليات الثابتة الوجود كمال للإنسان بما هو إنسان كلما زاد كان أفضل. وأما غيرها من الملكات فلها طرفا إفراط وتفریط ومتوسط بينهما والفضيلة في المتوسط لا في الطرفين. أما الإفراط فلأن حصولها ضار لغيرها أعني ملكة العلم الذي هو أصل الفضائل - وأما تفریطها فلأن عدمها بالكليّة أو نقصانها المفرط يوجب فقد ما يتوقف عليها من تحصيل الخير الباقي وهو الكمال العقلي. واعلم أن رءوس الفضائل النفسانية والأخلاق الإنسانية التي هي مبادي الأعمال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١١٦

الحسنة ثلاثة الشجاعة والعفة والحكمة ومجموعها العدالة وهذه الحكمة غير الحكمة بالمعنى الأول التي إفراطها أفضل ولكل واحد من هذه الثلاث طرفان هما رذيلتان.

أما الشجاعة فهي الخلق الذي يصدر عنه الأفعال المتوسطة بين أفعال التهور والجبن - وهذان الطرفان رذيلتان. وأما العفة فهي الخلق الذي يصدر عنه الأفعال المتوسطة بين أفعال الفجور والخمود وهذان الطرفان رذيلتان. وأما الحكمة فهي الخلق الذي يصدر عنه الأفعال المتوسطة بين أفعال الجربزة والغباوة وهذان الطرفان رذيلتان واشتبه على بعض الناس وظن أن الحكمة العملية المذكورة هاهنا هي بعينها ما هو قسيم الحكمة النظرية حيث يقال إن الحكمة إما نظرية وإما عملية وذلك الظن فاسد كما أشرنا إليه فإن هذه الحكمة العملية خلق نفساني يصدر منه الأفعال المتوسط بين أفعال الجربزة والغباوة.

وأما إذا قالوا الحكمة منها ما هو نظري ومنها ما هو عملي لم يريدوا به الخلق لأن ذلك ليس جزءا من الفلسفة بل التي هي إحدى الفلسفتين أرادوا بها معرفة الإنسان بالملكات الخلقية أنها كم هي وما هي وما الفاضل منها وما الردي منها ومعرفة كيفية تحصيلها واكتسابها للنفس أو إزالتها وإخراجها عن النفس ومعرفة السياسات المنزلية والمدنية - و

بالجملة معرفة الأمور التي لنا مدخلية في إدخالها في الوجود وإخراجها عن الوجود بوجه وهذه المعرفة ليست غريزية بل متى حصلنا كانت حاصلة لنا من حيث هي معرفة وإن لم نفعل فعلا ولم نتخلق بخلق فلا يكون أفعال الحكمة العملية الأخرى موجودة لنا من حيث هي معرفة.

و بالجملة إن الحكمة العملية قد يراد بها نفس الخلق وقد يراد بها العلم بالخلق - وقد يراد بها الأفعال الصادرة عن الخلق فالحكمة العملية التي جعلت قسيمة للحكمة العلمية النظرية هي العلم بالخلق مطلقا وما يصدر منه وإفراطه أيضا فضيلة كما مر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١١٧

و الحكمة العملية التي جعلت إحدى الفضائل الثلاث هي نفس الخلق المخصوص المبين لسائر الأخلاق وإفراطه كتفريطه رذيلة.

فظهر الفرق بين البابين وإذا عرفت ذلك فمجموع الأخلاق الثلاثة المتوسطة - بل هيئة اجتماعها عدالة ومقابلة الجور في أي جانب كان من الأطراف وهي المعبر عنها بالصراط المستقيم الواقع على متن الجحيم أو ما يوجب استحقاق عذاب الجحيم

فصل (٤) في حقيقة الألم واللذة

الموجود من كلام الحكماء في تعريف اللذة والألم هو إدراك الملائم وإدراك المنافي. و زعم بعض الأطباء كمحمد بن زكرياء الرازي أن اللذة عبارة عن الخروج عن الحال الغير الطبيعية والألم عبارة عن الخروج عن الحالة الطبيعية فعلى هذا لم يكن لشيء من اللذات والآلام وجود دائمى والتجربة أيضا يقوي هذا الظن فإننا نشاهد أن جميع ما يعد من أقسام ما يقع به اللذة في هذا العالم إنما غاية اللذة بها عند أوائل حدوثها وإذا استقرت زالت اللذة فكم من صاحب ثروة أو جاه أو مشتهي لطيف لا يكون لذته كلذة فقير بشيء نزر حقير منها لا يعد في الحساب معها لحقارته وكذلك قياس الآلام فإن أكثر الآلام بل كلها إذا دامت ولم يتجدد شيء منها لم يكن بها تألم لصاحبها كما نشاهد من كثير من الممنونين بالجراحات والمصائب والأمراض أفراح في كثير من أوقات اتصافهم بها فلا بد لحل

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هذا الإشكال.

فنقول إما سبب هذا الظن فذلك من باب أخذ ما بالعرض مكان ما بالذات - وذلك لأن اللذة لا تحصل إلا بإدراك فهذه اللذات الحسية لا تتم إلا بإدراكات حسية - والإدراك الحسي سيما اللمسي منه لا يكون إلا بانفعال الآلة عن ورود الضد وإذا استقرت الكيفية الواردة لم يحصل انفعال فلم يحصل شعور فلا تحصل لذة لمسية وغيرها - إلا عند تبدل الحال الغير الطبيعي فلاجل ذلك ظن أن اللذة نفسها هي ذلك الانفعال - وأما بيان بطلان هذا الظن فلأن الإنسان قد يستلذ من النظر إلى الصور الحسنة - التي لم يكن عالما بوجودها مشتاقا إليها سابقا حتى يقال بأن النظر إليها يدفع ضرر الاشتياق وألم الفراق وكذلك ربما يدرك مسألة علمية من غير طلب وشوق إليها ولا تعب فكري في تحصيلها كما في عقيب

انحلال الشبهات المشكلة التي قد تعب في حلها حتى يقال بأن الاستلذاذ لها لأجل زوال أذى الانزعاج الفكري و كذلك إذا أعطي له مال عظيم أو منصب جليل لم يكن متوقعا له و لا طالبا لحصوله حتى يقال بأن حصول هذه الأمور يدفع الم الطلب و الشوق مع أن كل هذه الأمور لذيدة فبطل هذا المذهب.

قال الشيخ في رسالة في الأدوية القلبية الفرحة لذة ما و كل لذة هي إدراك لحصول الكمال الخاص بالقوة المدركة مثل الإحساس بالحلو للحاسة الذوقية و بالعرف الطيب للحاسة الشمية و الشعور بالانتقام للقوة الغضبية و الشعور بالمتوقع النافع - و هو الأمل للقوة الظانة أو المتوهمة و كل كمال فهو أمر طبيعي و ينعكس و كل شعور بأمر طبيعي للقوة فهو التذاذها له و ربما يتفق في بعض القوى أن لا يلتذ إلا عند مفارقة الحالة الغير الطبيعية كان الثبات على الحالة الطبيعية لا يكون لذيدا وإنما وقع هذا السهو بسبب أخذ ما بالعرض مكان ما بالذات و قد عرف في كتاب سفسطيقا أن هذا أحد المغالطات.

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أما بيان هذا في مسألتنا هذه فهو أن من المدركات ما لا يدرك إلا عند الاستحالة - و هو مثل الملموسات فإن الكيفية إنما تحس بها ما دام العضو اللامس مضادا لها في الكيفية و ينفع عنها فإذا انفعل و استقر صارت الكيفية مزاج العضو فلم يحس به إذ كل حس فهو باستحالة ما و الشيء لا يستحيل عن نفسه و لهذا لا يتأذى صاحب الدق بالحرارة الشديدة التي هي أشد من حرارة الحمى المحرقة و يتأذى صاحب الحمى المحرقة بما هو دون ذلك و ذلك لأن حرارة الدق متمكنة من الأعضاء كالمزاج لها و مزاج الأعضاء يخالفها و حرارة الحمى المحرقة طارية عليها و الأطباء يخصون ما يجري مجرى الدق - باسم سوء المزاج المستوي و ما يجري مجرى المحرقة باسم سوء المزاج المختلف - و قد تبين أن السبب في عدم الالتذاذ بما يستقر من الكمالات الحسية هو عدم الإدراك - و سبب اللذة عند ابتداء الخروج إلى الحالة الطبيعية هو حصول الإدراك و لما عرض أن كان حصول الإدراك مع الخروج من الحالة الغير الطبيعية عرض أن كان اللذة مع الخروج عنها فظن أن ذلك سببها و ليس الأمر كذلك بل السبب حصول الكمال فهذا هو سبب اللذة انتهى. و ذكر في القانون أن الوجد الإحساس بالمنافي.

و قال في الفصل الأخير من المقالة الثامنة من إلهيات الشفاء أن اللذة ليست إلا إدراك الملائم من جهة ما هو ملائم. و قال في فصل المعاد من المقالة التاسعة إن القوى تشترك في أن شعورها بموافقها و ملائمها هو الخير و اللذة الخاصة بها و موافق كل واحد منها بالذات و الحقيقة - هو حصول الكمال الذي هو بالقياس إليه كمال بالفعل قال فخر المناظرين اللذة و الألم حقيقتان غنيتان عن التعريف.

إذ كما أن التصديقات المكتسبة يجب أن تنتهي إلى تصديق غني عن البرهان - و كذلك التصورات المكتسبة يجب انتهائها إلى تصورات غنية عن التعريف و كما أن القضايا الحسية لا يحتاج صحتها إلى البرهان كعلم الإنسان بألمه و لذته فتصور هذه

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الأمور المتقدمة على التصديق بها أولى بأن يكون غنيا عن التعريف بل هاهنا بحث لا بد منه و هو أن معرفة الحال التي

نجدها من النفس التي سمينها باللذة ^أ هي نفس إدراك الملائم ^{أو} أمر مغاير لذلك الإدراك و بتقدير كونه مغايرا لذلك الإدراك ^أ هو معلول له - ^{أو} لشيء آخر ^{و إن} لم يوجد إلا مع ذلك الإدراك.

فهذه أمور لا بد من البحث عنها و إلى الآن لم يتضح عندي شيء من هذه الأقسام بالبرهان و لكن الأقرب أن الألم ليس هو نفس إدراك المنافي لأن التجارب الطبية شهدت بأن سوء المزاج الرطب غير مؤلم مع أنه محسوس و لو كان الأمر الغير الطبيعي هو نفس الألم لاستحال أن يوجد مع عدم الألم و به ثبت أيضا أن إدراك المنافي وحده لا يكفي في اقتضاء الألم انتهى أقول دعواه أولا بأن اللذة و الألم و العلم أمور غنية عن التعريف كما أن علمنا بأن لنا لذة ^{أو} ألما غني عن البرهان بل هما أولى بالغناء عن التعريف من القضية الحسية بالغناء عن البرهان ينافي اعترافه ثانيا بالجهل بامتياز كل منهما عن العلم بالمنافي و الملائم ^{أو} اتحادهما مع ذلك العلم.

ثم استدلاله ثالثا على أن الألم ليس نفس الإدراك بالمنافي و لا مستلزما له أيضا - فهذا عجيب من مثله في الفضل و البراعة.

و أما البرهان على أن اللذة هي عين الإدراك بوجود الكمال و كذا الألم عين الإدراك بما يضاد الكمال ففي غاية الوضوح و الإنارة بعد تحقيق الإدراك و الوجود و الكمال أما الوجود فليس الأمر فيه كما توهمه هو و من في طبقته و أتباعه من المتأخرين - من أنه أمر عقلي انتزاعي كالشيئية و الممكنية و أمثالهما بل هو أمر عيني حقيقي يطرد به العدم فهو نفس هوية الشيء و به يتشخص كل ذي ماهية و الوجود مختلف في الأشياء ذوات الماهيات لأن وجود الإنسان مثلا غير وجود الفرس و وجود السماء غير وجود الأرض و الوجود بهذا المعنى كما أنه متفاوت في أنواع الماهيات كذلك مما يشتد و يضعف و يكمل و ينقص و وجود كل شيء هو خير له و كمال ذلك الوجود كمال الخير له و زوال

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ذلك الوجود منه شر له و وبال و زوال كماله أيضا شر دون ذلك الشر سواء أدرك وجوده ^{أو} كمال وجوده ^{أو} لم يدرك ^{أو} أدرك عدمه ^{أو} عدم كماله ^{أو} لم يدرك كما في الجمادات و غيرها فإن الوجود ^{أو} الكمال شيء و إدراك ذلك الوجود ^{أو} الكمال شيء آخر.

و أما العلم و الإدراك مطلقا فليس كما زعمه هذا التحرير عبارة عن إضافة محضة بين العالم و معلومه من غير حاجة إلى وجود صورة و إلا فلم يكن منقسما إلى التصور و التصديق و لا أيضا متعلقا بالمعدوم حين عدمه و لا أيضا حصل علم الشيء بنفسه إذ لا إضافة بين الشيء و المعدوم و لا بينه و بين نفسه بل المراد بالعلم هو نفس الصورة الموجودة المجردة عن المادة ضربا من التجرد للذات المجردة أيضا ضربا من التجرد من حيث تجرده و مراتب التجريد متفاوتة فللمحسوسة عن أصل المادة و للمتخيلة عنها و عن الوضع و للمعقولة عنهما و عن المقدار أيضا.

و هذه الصورة مماثلة للمعلوم و هي قد تكون مماثلة للعالم كعلم الإنسان بذاته إذا كان بصورة زائدة عليها و قد يكون عينه كوجود الصورة المجردة القائمة بذاتها فإن تلك الصورة علم و معلوم و عالم أيضا لصدق مفهوماتها الثلاثة عليها و قد يكون مماثلا لبعض قوى العالم كعلم الإنسان بالمحسوسات الملائمة لحواسها كالألوان الملمعة و الأصوات الطيبة و الروائح البهية و المطاعم الشهية و الملابس الناعمة - و قد يكون الصورة مضادة للعالم ^{أو} لبعض قواه فالأول كشعور الإنسان بصورة جهله و حمقه و رذائله.

و أما الثاني فكأحساسه بالألوان الكدرة المظلمة و الأصوات الكريهة و الروائح الممتنة و المذوقات المرة العفصة و الملابس الخشنة.

فإذا تقررَت هذه المعاني فعلم أن الوجود في نفسه خير و بهاء كما أن العدم في نفسه شر على ما حكم به الفطرة و إذا حصل الوجود لشيء كان خيرا و بهاء لذلك الشيء و العلم عبارة عن ضرب من وجود شيء لشيء فيكون أيضا كمالاته إلا أن يكون مضرا و مضادا لكمال آخر له فإن وجود الحرارة لو أمكن اجتماعه مع البرودة و حصوله لها

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لكان كمالاتها لكن لما كان وجودها للبرودة يوجب زوال وجودها الذاتي الذي كان لها فيكون عائدا إليها بالعدم لذاتها و كل صفة يكون وجودها لشيء مستلزما لعدم ذات ذلك الشيء لم يكن كمالاته بل شر و آفة لكن لا بما هو وجود بل بما هو معدوم لوجوده فالشر بالذات هو العدم.

فكل علم بما هو غير مضاد لوجود العالم به فهو خير له و ذلك الخير لا محالة لذة - لما مر أن الوجود خير سواء أدرك أو لم يدرك لكن متى كان ذلك الخير نفس الإدراك - كان إدراكا هو محض الخير كان لذة و بهجة إذ كل أحد يعلم أنه إذا كان لشيء كمال و قوة كما يتصور في حقه من الوجود و كان مدركا لذلك الكمال الشديد بلا آفة كان ملتذا و متى لم يكن له شعور بذلك الكمال لم يكن له لذة فاللذة إذن عين الشعور بالكمال.

و قولنا و متى لم يكن له شعور بكماله لم يكن له لذة ليس غرضنا إثبات هذا الحكم بالدوران بل ندعي بعد ما قدمنا من المقدمات أن الوجود خير و إدراك حصول الخير للمدرك خير آخر لذلك المدرك و كل إدراك يكون ذلك الإدراك بعينه خيرا و بهاء للمدرك أو لبعض قواه و أجزاءه فهو عين اللذة و البهجة له لذاته أو لأجل بعض قواه و لذلك إذا حصل للشيء أمر وجودي يؤدي إلى زواله أو زوال شيء من كماله أو كمال قواه و كان ذلك الأمر صورة إدراكية له فإدراكه عين وجود ذلك المزيل المضاد و كل وجود مزيل مضاد لشيء إذا حصل كان ضارا له و الإدراك الضار بالشيء ألم له لا محالة و لو لم يكن ذلك الضار إدراكا لم يكن بعينه ألما كما إذا فرق بين أجزاء جسم و زالت وحدته الاتصالية كان ذلك شرا و خيرا له و ليس بالم.

و أما إذا وقع تفرق اتصال في العضو اللمس و حصلت في الحس صورته كانت صورة التفرق منافية لصورة الكمال الذي هو الاتصال و كانت تلك الصورة الإدراكية عين التفرق كانت بعينها شرا و ألما. و اعلم أن صورة التفرق غير نفس التفرق بوجه و عينه بوجه إذ لو كانت نفس التفرق

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لم يكن ألما إذ لا ألم للهوى و لا للعدم و لو لم يكن صورة مساوية له في المعنى لم يكن منافيا للاتصال الذي هو الكمال و لا أيضا علما بل معلوما و المعلوم الخارج عن المدرك لا يكون ألما له و لا لذة لأن ما خرج عن الشيء ليس كمالاته و لا ضد كمال له.

و بالجملة فاللذة كمال خاص بالمدرك بما هو إدراك لذلك الكمال و الألم ضد كمال خاص بالمدرك بما هو إدراك لذلك الضد.

فثبت بالبرهان أن اللذة نفس الإدراك بالملائم و الألم نفس الإدراك بالمنافي.
و أما استدلاله على أن الألم غير الإدراك بالمنافي بأن سوء المزاج الرطب غير مؤلم مع أنه مناف.
فجوابه بعد تسليم أنه غير مؤلم أنا لا نسلم أن إدراكه حاصل لما هو مناف له - فإن الألم إدراك المنافي لذلك المدرك لا
لغيره ففي الإنسان قوى متعددة ربما كان منافي بعضها مدركا للآخر من غير أن يكون منافيا له و مدرك بعضها منافيا
للآخر من غير أن يكون مدركا له فلم يحصل فيه ألم و لأن سوء المزاج البارد مما يوجب زوال الحس اللمسي وإذا لم
يكن حس لم يكن ألم له و إن كان مدركا لحس آخر مما لم يكن منافيا له كالتخيل أو التعقل فإن تخيل سوء المزاج و
تعقله ليس مولما للخيال و العقل بل إنما المؤلم هو الإدراك الذي لحامل ذلك المزاج اعنى القوة اللمسية التي له إن كانت
موجودة غير متبلدة و لا متخدرة كما في نحو الفالج و غيره فصاحب الفالج ليس متألما ذا وجع لعدم الحس اللمسي
الذي له هذه الآفة.
و بما ذكرنا ظهر اندفاع إشكال آخر و هو أن المريض قد يلتذ بالحلاوة و هي مما لا يلائمه بل يمرضه و يتنفّر عن
الأدوية و هي مما يلائمه و ينفعه فدل على أن اللذة

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غير إدراك الملائم و الألم غير إدراك المنافي.
و وجه الدفع أن الحلو ملائم لقوته الذوقية و ليس آفة لها بالفعل بل قوة و كمالاتها و كذا الأدوية البشعة ليست ملائمة و
لا نافعة للقوة الذوقية و إنما عدم ملائمة الحلو و وجود ملائمة البشع لأن ذلك يوجب زيادة الخلط الردي المنافي لمزاج
البدن و هذا يوجب دفع ذلك الخلط الردي فيعود ذلك وبالا و هذا نفعاً لا لأجل إدراكيهما و لو فرض الإدراك للحلو
حاصلا و لم يعرض أمر آخر كان خيرا محضاً و لذة.
و لو أدرك البشاعة و المرارة و لم يعرض أمر آخر كان شراً محضاً و ألماً و الأمر العارض هو الذي يخرج الدواء خلطاً
موزياً أو يحيله إلى خلط جيد يتغذى به أو يقوي البدن فلهذين الأمرين يحصل الضرر و الانتفاع لا بمجرد الإدراكين
الأولين

فصل (٥) في إبطال القول بأن المؤلم الموجه في الجميع هو تفرق الاتصال

قال إمام الأطباء جالينوس إن السبب الذاتي للوجع و هو الألم الحسي

هو تفرق الاتصال فإن الحار إنما يوجع لأنه تفرق الاتصال و البارد إنما يوجع أيضاً إذ يلزمه تفرق الاتصال لخلاف جانب
الجمع و التكثيف و الأسود في المبصرات يؤلم لشدة جمعه و الأبيض لشدة تفريقه و المر و الحامض يؤلم لفرط
تفريقه و العفص لفرط تقبيضه فيتبعه تفرق الاتصال و كذا الأصوات القوية يؤلم بالتفرقة بعنف من الحركة الهوائية عند
ملاصقته للصماخ.

و بالجملة فالأطباء اتفقوا على أن تفرق الاتصال سبب ذاتي للوجع.

أقول لا شك أن لفظه اللذة و الألم عند العامة لا يطلقان إلا للحسي فقط بناء على عدم تفتنهم بنحو آخر من الوجود و لا
شبهة في أن موضوع كل حس جسم لطيف - متفاوت في اللطافة له صورة اتصالية و له أيضاً كيفية مزاجية اعتدالية
فسبب الألم إما زوال اتصاله بورود الانفصال أو زوال مزاجه بورود ضد المزاج.

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فلهذا وقع الاختلاف بينهم فجالينوس و أكثر الأطباء على أن السبب الذاتي هو تفرق الاتصال و سوء المزاج المختلف سبب بالعرض و غيرهم كجماعة من المتأخرين - منهم الإمام الرازي على العكس و الشيخ على أن كلا منهما يصلح سببا بالذات كما يكون بالعرض و على كل منها احتجاجات و استدلالات أعرضنا عن ذكرها مخافة التطويل الممل و تفاصيلها موجودة في شرح العلامة الشيرازي للقانون.

و استدلل في المباحث المشرقية على بطلان مذهب الأطباء بوجوه

الأول أن تفرق الاتصال يرادف الانفصال

و هو عديم فلا يصلح علة للوجع لأنه وجودي.

الثاني أنه لو كان سببا للوجع لكان الإنسان دائم الوجع

لأنه دائما في تفرق الاتصال بواسطة الاغتذاء و التحلل لأن الاغتذاء و النمو إنما يكونان بنفوذ الغذاء في الأعضاء و التحلل إنما يكون بانفصال شيء من الأعضاء.

لا يقال هذا التفرق لكونه في غاية الصغر لا يؤلم إذ لا يحس بالمه سيما و قد صار مألوفاً بدوامه.

لأننا نقول كل تفرق و إن كان صغيرا لكن جملتها كثيرة جدا لأن التغذية و النمو شيء غير مختص بجزء دون جزء و إذا كان كذلك فلو كان تفرق أجزاء البدن غير مؤلم لكان كل تفرق كقطع العضو كذلك لأن حكم الأمثال واحد و لما لم يكن كذلك علمنا أن التفرق غير مؤلم لذاته بل إذا كان معه سوء مزاج.

الثالث أن التفرق لو كان سببا بالذات لما وقع الأثر متأخرا عنه بحسب الزمان و اللازم باطل

لأن قطع العضو متى حصل بآلة في غاية الحدة و بأسرع زمان لا يحس بالألم إلا بعد لحظة ربما يحصل فيها سوء المزاج.

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الرابع أن تفرق الاتصال لو كان مولما لكان الجراحة العظيمة أشد إيلاما من لسعة العقرب

لكون التفرق في الجراحة أكثر.

و الجواب

أما عن الأول فبان الانفصال و نظائره من الأمور التي تحدث - في المواد القابلة عقيب استعداداتها بأسباب و شرائط ليست أعداما صرفة لا حظ لها من الوجود - بل لها قسط من الوجود و لما هياتها تحصل في الخارج كسائر الماهيات الضعيفة الوجود و وجودها عبارة عن كون موضوعاتها بحيث ينتزع منها عنواناتها و مفهوماتها السلبية - من جهة اقتران تلك الموضوعات بنقائص و قصورات و استصحابها إياها لا لذواتها فهي من العوارض لا من الذاتيات فهي بأنفسها من الشرور بالذات و كذا العلم بها - لأن كل علم متحد مع المعلوم به و لأجل ذلك صح عد الألم من الشرور بالذات.

و من هاهنا يندفع الشبهة التي أوردها بعض المتأخرين على الحكماء - حيث حكموا بأن الشرور بالذات هي الأعدام لا غير مع أننا نعلم بالضرورة أن الألم و هو إدراك المنافي شر بالذات و الإدراك أمر وجودي و ذلك لأن الإدراك للشيء هو بعينه وجود ذلك الشيء إن ذهننا فذهنا و إن خارجا فخارجا فكما أن وجود الإنسان هو عين معنى الإنسان في الخارج و

كذلك وجودات الأعدام في الخارج كالتفرق و العمى و الصمم و الجهل هي نفس تلك الأعدام فكذا إدراكات تلك الأعدام اعنى حضورها للقوة المدركة فهذا الحضور و الإدراك من أفراد العدم بالذات - و لهذا يكون الألم شرابا لذات و إن كان من أفراد الوجود.

و الحاصل أن حقيقة الوجود في هذه الأمور العدمية التي هي أعدام الملكات هي بعينها حيثية العدم في الخارج كسائر الوجودات مع ماهياتها في الخارج و كذا حكم شرعية الآلام التي هي بعينها حضورها للمشاعر و خيريتها في كونهما متحدتين بالذات - متغايرتين بحسب المفهوم كالماهية و الوجود فافهم ذلك و اغتنم به فإنه كسائر نظائره

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٢٧

لا يوجد في غير هذا الكتاب و ربما يجب عما ذكره بأن الانفصال و كذا التفرق له معنيان عدمي هو زوال الاتصال - و وجودي هو حدوث كثرة الاتصالات و المتصلات و هذا هو المؤلم دون ذلك العدم. أو نقول المراد من التفرق حركة بعض الأجزاء عن بعض و هو غير مرادف للانفصال الذي هو بمعنى عدم الاتصال و لو سلم ذلك فيلزمه لا محالة كون هيئة العضو فاقدة كماله اللائق به و أمكن إدراكه من هذه الجهة فيكون موجبا بذاته بمعنى أنه ليس بتوسط سوء المزاج و إن كان بتوسط ما يلزمه من خروج الهيئة العضوية عن كمالها و لو سلم فالمراد بالسبب هاهنا المعد أي الفاعل لإعداد العضو لقبول الوجود لا المؤثر الموجد و لا امتناع في كون التفرق العدمي بحيث متى حصل اقتضى الألم كسوء المزاج و هذا أجوبة جدلية.

و التحقيق ما ذكرناه أولا و أما عن الثاني و الثالث فبأننا لا نعني بكون تفرق الاتصال مؤلما أن نفسه مؤلم أو هو تمام علة الألم بحيث لا يتخلف عنه الوجود بل نعني أن الصورة الحسية من التفرق إن كانت في عضو حساس مع التفات النفس إليه و الشعور به من غير أن يصير تلك الصورة مستمرة مألوفة لما مر من أن الوجود بما هو وجود مألوف مطبوع - و كون التفرق ألما بشرط أن يدرك من جهة كونه منافيا لكيفية العضو أو اتصاله فهو مؤلم بالذات بمعنى عدم التوقف على سوء المزاج بل من جهة ما يلزمه من فقدان هيئة العضو أو مادته كماله اللائق به و حينئذ يجوز أن لا يكون للتفرق الواقع في الاغتذاء - و التحلل صورة مدركية للحس أو يكون قدر ما يدركه من الصورة مألوف لا يضر و لا يؤلم - أو يكون إدراكه لا من جهة كونه منافيا و تفرقا بل من جهة كونه نافعا للبدن بتبقيّة الصحة و القوة و تنقية البدن عن الفضول.

و ما ذكره من لزوم استواء التفرقات في الأحكام ظاهر الاندفاع كيف و التفرق الغذائي طبيعي دائم في أجزاء صغيرة يترتب عليه للبدن مصالح كثيرة و قطع العضو ليس كذلك على أن التحقيق عندنا أن التغذية و التنمية ليستا مستلزميتين لمداخلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٢٨

أجزاء الغذاء بين أجزاء المغتذي و النامي كما سيجيء في مباحث إثبات القوى النفسانية في علم النفس. و أقول أيضا إن الإنسان لم يكن له نحو من الوجود من بدو خلخته إلى هذا الحد الذي بلغ إليه عمره إلا هذا الوجود التحليلي فيمكن أن يكون دائم الألم لكن لما لم يدرك نحو آخر من الوجود الذي ليس فيه هذا النحو من التفرق ظن أن

لا أَلَمَ له و لذلك لو فرض إنسان قد أدرك ما لأهل النشأة الباقية من الوجود الذي لا يشوبه هذه الأعدام و التفرقات ثم كلف بالبقاء في هذا العالم لمات وجعا و تألما.

و بالجملة هذا التفرق الحاصل بالتحلل كالحركة الجوهرية التي أثبتناها للطبائع التي نحو وجودها وجود تبدلي حدوثه في كل آن يوجب زوال الحادث في الآن السابق و مع ذلك لا يقع الإحساس بألم التفرقة في هذا الوجود لما بينا من أن القوة الدراكة وجودها هذا الوجود و وجود الشيء غير مؤلم له كما أن سوء المزاج لأحد ربما يكون مثل المزاج الصحيح لغيره فكان مؤلما لهذا ملذا لذلك و أما الذي ذكر من عدم تألم مقطوع العضو دفعه إلا بعد لحظة فهذا لا يقتضي عدم كون صورة القطع مؤلمة فإن القطع إن كان مع شعور به و التفات إليه كان مؤلما البتة و إن كان مع عدم الشعور و الالتفات فلا يدل على ما ادعاه ألا ترى أن من صرف فكره إلى أمر أهم شريف كالخائض في مسألة علمية أو إلى أمر خسيس أيضا كاللعب بالشطرنج أو متوسط كالابتلاء بوجع أقوى أو الوقوع في معركة أو الاهتمام بمهم دنيوي ربما لا يدرك ألم الجوع و العطش و كثير من الموزيات و كذا حكم المستلذات.

و أما الجواب عن الرابع فبان ذلك إنما يلزم لو كان ألم لسع العقرب أيضا لتفرق الاتصال فقط و هو ليس بلازم لجواز أن يكون لما يحصل بواسطة الكيفية السمية من سوء مزاج مختلف يكون أقوى تأثيرا من الجراحة العظيمة. و ما ذكره إنما يرد نقضا على من لم يجعل التأثير إلا لتفرق الاتصال دون سوء المزاج كما اشتهر من جالينوس و أتباعه على أنه يمكن الجواب من قبلهم بأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٢٩

سبب الإيلام الشديد في السموم ربما كان لأجل تقطيعات كثيرة في العضو مع وجود القوة الحسية و أما قطع العضو ففيه تفرق واحد و مع ذلك لم يبق القوة اللمسية - التي للعضو المفصول بل للباقي كان المحل الباقي الذي وصل أثر القطع إليه أو قبل ذلك القطع أقل قدرا من العضو الذي سرى فيه أثر التفرق الحاصل من ذلك السم.

و اعلم أن لكل من هذه المذاهب وجه صحيح - أما الذي ذكره الأطباء فيمكن تصحيحه بأن المؤلم ليس نفس تفرق الاتصال بل صورته الحادثة لأن هذه الموجودات جسمانية الوجود و الوجود كما مر عين الوحدة فوجودها يتقوم بوحدة الاتصال و التفرق ضده و ضد الوجود سبب ذاتي للألم لأن إدراكه كما مر هو الألم.

و أما مذهب مخالفيهم و هو أن المؤلم هو سوء المزاج فلأن نسبة الكيفية المزاجية إلى الوحدة الاتصالية كنسبة الصورة إلى المادة و الشيء شيء بصورته لا بمادته فالحيوان حيوان بصورة مزاجه لا بمادة جسده إلا بالعرض حتى لو أمكن صورة الكيفية المزاجية الحيوانية بلا مادة لكان حيوانا فضعف كل حيوان بما هو ذلك الحيوان من حيث الصورة مزاج آخر يخالف مزاجه و من حيث المادة اتصال آخر يخالف اتصاله و جانب الصورة هو الأصل فالمضاد المؤلم بالذات له هو سوء المزاج المختلف له لا تفرق اتصاله.

و أما مذهب الشيخ و من تبعه و هو الأصح الأحق فلأن التركيب بين المادة و الصورة اتحادي فصلاحي كل منهما صلاح الآخر و فساده فساده

فصل (٦) في أن المؤلم أي نوع من سوء المزاج

اشترط الشيخ في سوء المزاج المؤلم أن يكون حارا أو باردا لا رطبا و يابسا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣٠

و أن يكون مختلفا لا متفقا.

أما الأول فلأن الرطوبة و اليبوسة من الكيفيات الانفعالية

دون الفعلية و أورد عليه بأنه إن أريد أنهما ليستا فاعلتين و المؤلم بالذات فاعل فيشكل بجعل اليبوسة سببا لتفريق الاتصال أو كليهما لكثير من الأمراض فليكونا سببين للوجع بهذا المعنى من غير توسط تفرق الاتصال فلا ينحصر السبب فيه و في سوء المزاج الحار أو البارد و أما السبب بالذات بمعنى المؤثر بالطبع فلا دليل على كون الحار و البارد و تفرق الاتصال كذلك و إن أريد أن الوجع إحساس ما و الإحساس انفعال و الانفعال لا يكون إلا عن فاعل و هما ليسا من الكيفيات فيشكل بتصريح الشيخ في مواضع من كتبه بل إطلاق القوم على أنهما من الكيفيات المحسوسة بل أوائل الملموسات - و عند خروجهما عن الاعتدال يكونا متنافيين فإدراكهما من حيث هما كذلك يكون ألما.

ثم ذكر الشيخ أن سوء المزاج اليابس قد يكون مؤلما بالعرض لأنه قد يتبعه لشدة القبض تفرق الاتصال المؤلم بالذات و اعترض بأن الرطب أيضا قد يستتبعه بواسطة التحديد [التمديد] اللازم لكثرة الرطوبة المحوجة إلى مكان أوسع. و أجيب بأن ذلك إنما يكون في الرطوبة التي مع المادة فيكون الموجب هو المادة لا الرطوبة نفسها.

و أما الثاني فلأن سوء المزاج المتفق غير مؤلم

و لذلك سمي بالمتفق و المستوي حيث شابه المزاج الأصلي في عدم الإيلام و ذلك لأنه عبارة عن الذي استقر في جوهر العضو و أبطل المقاومة و صار في حكم المزاج الأصلي فلا انفعال فيه للحاسة فلا إحساس فلا ألم و أيضا المنافات إنما يتحقق بين شيئين فلا بد من بقاء المزاج الأصلي عند ورود الغريب لتحقيق إدراك كيفية متنافية لكيفية العضو فيتحقق الألم.

و أيضا الدق أشد حرارة من الغب لأن الجسم الصلب لا يتسخن إلا عن حرارة قوية و لأنها تستعمل فيه مبردات أقوى مما يستعمل في الغب و لأنها تؤدي إلى ذوبان مفرط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣١

من الأعضاء حتى الصلبة منها و صاحب الدق لا يجد من التهاب ما يجده صاحب الغب - و ما ذلك إلا لكون سوء المزاج المتفق لا يحس به و أيضا المستحم في الشتاء يشمئز بدنه عن الماء الفاتر و يتأذى به ثم إنه بعد ذلك يستلذه و يستطيعه ثم إذا استعمل ماء حارا تأذى به ثم بعده يستلذه ثم إذا استعمل الماء الأول استبرده و تألم به و ذلك لما ذكرنا.

و توضيح ذلك أن المنافاة وصف لا يتحقق إلا عند ثبوت أمرين ليكون أحدهما منافيا للآخر فإذا كان لعضو كيفية فورد عليه ما يضاد كفيته فلا يخلو إما أن يكون الوارد عليه قد أبطل كيفية ذلك العضو أو لم يبطل فإن أبطل فلم يكن هناك كيفيتان بل هناك كيفية واحدة فلم يكن المنافات حاصلة فلا يكون الألم حاصلا و أما إذا كان الوارد لا يقوى على إبطال كيفية العضو فحينئذ يكون المنافاة حاصلة بين كيفية العضو و كيفية الوارد عليه فحصل الشعور بتلك المنافات حينئذ فلا جرم يتحقق الألم فهذا هو السبب في أن سوء المزاج المتفق لا يؤلم و سوء المزاج المختلف يؤلم هذا ما قيل.

أقول فيه شك و تحقيق.

أما الشك فهو أن قوام العضو الشخصي بالكيفية الشخصية المزاجية فإذا ورد شخص آخر مناف لها في التشخص مساو لها في النوع وجب أن يبطل الأولى - وإلا لزم اجتماع المثليين بل المتنافيين في محل واحد فإذا بطلت الأولى فبأي قوة أدركت الثانية.

وأما التحقيق فهو أن الأولى وإن بطلت فصورته المحسوسة حاضرة عند النفس و كانت مألوفة للنفس فيتأدى بورود الثانية الموجب لزوال المألوفة و قوام العضو في كل وقت بكيفية أخرى من عوض المزاج و حافظ الجميع هو النفس لا العضو.

و اعلم أن سوء المزاج المختلف قد لا يوجع بل لا يدرك أصلا و ذلك إذا كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣٢

حدوثه بالتدريج فإن الحادث منه أولا يكون قليلا جدا فلا يشعر به و بمنافاته و في الزمان الثاني يكون الزيادة على تلك الحالة غير مشعور بها و كذا في كل زمان و هذا بخلاف ما يحدث دفعه فإنه لكثرتة يكون مدركا ثم يستمر إدراكه ما دام مختلفا

فصل (٧) في تفصيل اللذات و تفضيل بعضها على بعض

كل من اللذة و الألم ينقسم بحسب القوة المدركة إلى العقلي و الوهمي و الخيالي و الحسي و ينحصر في هذه الأربعة عند البحث و التحقيق أما الحسي فظاهر كتكيف العضو اللامس بالكيفية الملموسة الشهية و الذائق بالحلاوة.

و أما الخيالي فكتخيل اللذات الحاصلة و المرجوة الحصول للظفر و الانتقام.

و أما الوهمي فكالظنون النافعة و الأمانى المرغوبة كما قيل

أمانى إن تحصل تكن غاية المنى وإلا فقد عشنا بها زمنا رغدا

و أما العقلي فلأن للجوهر العاقل أيضا كمالات و أن يتمثل فيه ما يتعقله من الواجب تحصيله بقدر الاستطاعة ثم ما يتعقله من صور معلوماته الثابتة المترتبة أعني نظام الوجود كله تمثلا مطابقا خاليا عن شوائب الظنون و الأوهام بحيث يصير عقلا مستفادا و عند من تصير النفس بعينها متحدة بالعقل الذي هو كل هذه الموجودات فيصير حينئذ لاذا و لذة و ملتذا في باب اللذة العقلية لا ذا لذة فقط.

و بالجملة لا شك أن هذا الكمال خير للجوهر العاقل و هو مدرك لهذا الكمال عند ذلك فإذا هو ملتذ بذلك فهذه هي اللذة العقلية و أما الألم العقلي فهو أن يحصل لما من شأنه ذلك الكمال ضده و يدرك صورة ضده من حيث هو ضده و أما من ليس من شأنه أن يحصل له ذلك فهو فارغ عن هذا الألم.

ثم إذا قايستنا بين هذه اللذة العقلية و التي لسائر القوى سيما الحس فالعقلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣٣

أكثر كمية و أقوى كيفية.

أما الأول فلأن عدد تفاصيل المعقولات أكثر بل يكاد أن لا يتناهى و وجودها أدوم فلا ينقطع.

و أما الثاني فلأن العقل يصل إلى كنه الموجود المعقول و الحس لا يدرك إلا ما يتعلق بالظواهر و القشور فيكون

الكمالات العقلية أكثر وأدوم وأتم وإدراكاتها كذلك فاللذات التابعة لهما على قياسهما وبحسب هذا يعرف حال الآلام عند التنبه لفقد تلك الكمالات.

و اعلم أن اللذة العقلية إذا كملت فهي خارجة عن جنس الكيفيات النفسانية - لأنها حينئذ جوهر عقلي لا كيفية نفسانية. فإن قيل الحسي من اللذة والألم أيضا ينبغي عدهما من الكيفيات المحسوسة - دون الكيفيات النفسانية. أجيب بأن المدرك بآلة الحس هو الكيفية التي يلتذ بها أو يتألم منها كالحلاوة والمرارة وأما نفس اللذة والألم التي هي الإدراك والنيل فلا سبيل للحواس الظاهرة إلى إدراكها.

أقول هذا مما ذكره بعض الفضلاء وهو ليس بسديد لأن المراد باللذة والألم ليس المعنى العقلي النسبي وإلا لكانا من مقولة المضاف بل المراد ما يستلذه النفس أو يتألم به وهما من جنس الإدراك والإدراك كما هو التحقيق هو الصورة لا النسبة.

فالتحقيق أن يقال إن ما يعد من جنس الكيفيات المحسوسة هي الموجودة في مواد الأجسام لا الموجودة في آلات الإدراك من حيث هي آلات الإدراك وهذه الموجودة في الحواس إنما يطلق عليها اسم الحرارة والبرودة والحلاوة والمرارة من باب إطلاق ماهية المعلوم على العلم كما يقال في العلم بالجواهر إنه جوهر معناه أنه معقول من ماهية جوهرية مع أنه من الكيفيات النفسانية فالعلم بالجواهر جوهر ذهني عرض خارجي نفساني كما سنبين في باب العقل والمعقول فكذا إطلاق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣٤

المحسوس على الحس أي الصورة الموجودة في آلة النفس فتلك الصور كلها كيفيات نفسانية عندنا وليس شيء منها محسوسا لأحد بإحدى الحواس ولا يمكن إدراكها إلا بالنفس لا بالحس إذ لا توسط للحس في الحس بل في المحسوس الخارج عنه.

فإن قلت فما قولك في اللذة البصرية فإن المحسوس بالبصر هو الأمر الخارجي - إذ لو كان الإبصار بانطباع صورة المرئي في العضو المخصوص لزم فساد انطباع العظيم في الصغير وغير ذلك من المفاسد.

قلت مذهبا في الإبصار أمر آخر غير المذاهب المشهورة فإنه يتمثل الصورة المبصرة للنفس في غير هذا العالم وتلك الصورة أيضا ليست من جنس هذه الكيفيات - المسماة بالحسيات بل لونها وشكلها من جنس الكيفيات النفسانية وهي قائمة بالنفس لا بآلة البصر قيام المفعول بالفاعل لا الحال بالمحل فليدرك غور هذا التحقيق فإنه شريف جدا نافع في علم المعاد وموعد بيانه غير هذا الموضع.

ومما ينبغي أن يعلم هاهنا أنه نقل عن جالينوس أنه قال إن اللذة والألم يحدثان في الحواس كلها وكما كان الحس أكثر كانت مقاومته مع الوارد أكثر فكان الألم واللذة أقوى والطف الحواس البصر لأنه يتم بالنور الذي يشبه النار التي هي الطف العناصر فلا جرم لا يكون اللذة والأذى في البصر إلا قليلا والسمع أقل لطافة من البصر لأن آتة الهواء المقروع فلا جرم صارت اللذة والأذى في هذه الحاسة أكثر منها في البصر ثم الشم أقل لطافة من السمع لأن محسوسه البخار وهو أغلظ من الهواء - فلا جرم اللذة والأذى في الشم أكثر منها في البصر والسمع والذوق أغلظ من الشم لأن آتة الرطوبة العذبة في درجة الماء فلا جرم اللذة والأذى في الذوق أكثر واللمس أغلظ من جميع الحواس لأنه في

قياس الأرض فكانت مقاومته مع الوارد أقوى و أبطأ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣٥

فلا جرم صارت اللذة و الأذى فيه أقوى.

أقول إن جالينوس لم يكن حكيم النفس و لا لطيف القلب ذكيا فما ذكره يلزم منه أن يكون لذة الخيال أضعف من اللذات الحسية كلها إذ لا يتصور هناك مقاومة - و كذا اللذة العقلية و كأنه لم يدركها.

ثم المقاومة و عدمها مما لا مدخل لها في أصل اللذة و الألم بل لو كان ففي دوامها - إذ لذة كل قوة بإدراك صورة ملائمة لها و ألمها بصورة ضدها نعم لكل قوة حد من حدود الوجود بعضها أقوى و بعضها أضعف و بعضها الطف و بعضها أكثف و أقوى الوجودات أقواها لذة.

و لا نسلم أن ما هو أكثف فهو أقوى و ما هو الطف فهو أضعف و لا نسلم أيضا أن النار أضعف العناصر و الأرض أقوى بل العكس في الجميع أولى و أحق عند التحقيق - فإن وجود الجن و الشياطين أقوى من وجود الحيوان و الإنسان و لهما أفاعيل شاقة و أعمال قوية لا يقدر على عشر من أعشارها البشر كما هو متواتر الصدق إجمالا و إن كانت الخصوصيات آحاديا و أيضا الفلك و ما فيه لا شبهة في أنها الطف من العناصر - و هي مع ذلك أقوى و أقوم منها من غير شبهة فإدراكها أقوى فيكون الذ فعلم أن الألفظ أقوى إدراكا فيكون أشد إلذاذا.

و أما حال هذه الحواس فالوجه في تفاوت إدراكاتها لمدرجاتها أن المزاج الحيواني حاصل من هذه المواد العنصرية و نفسه منبعثة من مزاجه.

ثم الغالب على بدنه الأرض ثم الماء ثم البخار ثم الهواء ثم النار و بعدها ابتدئ الأرواح و الأفلاك و الأملاك فلهذا الغالب على أكثر الأفراد بحكم المناسبة الجنسية إدراك الملموسات ثم المطعومات ثم المشمومات ثم المسموعات و المبصرات ثم المتخيلات و المظنونيات ثم العقليات و اليقينيات و هكذا قياس لذاتهم و آلامهم التابعة لمدرجاتهم

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فصل (٨) في تعقيب ما قاله الشيخ في لذة الحواس و حل ما يشكل فيه

قال في الفصل الثالث من المقالة السادسة من علم النفس من طبيعيات الشفاء

الحواس منها ما لا لذة لفعلها في محسوساتها و لا ألم.

و منها ما يلتذ و يتألم بتوسط المحسوسات فأما التي لا لذة لها و لا ألم فمثل البصر - فإنه لا يلتذ بالألوان و لا يتألم بذلك بل النفس يتألم بذلك و يلتذ و كذا الحال في الأذن - فإن تألمت الأذن من صوت شديد و العين من لون مفرط كالضوء فليس تألمها من حيث يسمع أو يبصر بل من حيث يلمس فإنه يحدث فيه ألم لمسي و كذلك يحدث فيه بزوال ذلك لذة لمسية.

و أما الشم و الذوق فإنهما يتألمان و يلتذان إذا تكيفا بكيفية مناصرة أو ملائمة.

و أما اللمس فإنه قد يتألم بالكيفية الملموسة و قد يلتذ بها و قد تلتذ و يتألم بغير توسط كيفية من المحسوس الأول بل بتفريق الاتصال و التيامه انتهى ما قال الشيخ و اعترض عليه بعض شارحي القانون و هو المسيحي بقوله هذا في غاية

الإشكال.

أما أولاً فإنه كان يرى و يعتقد أن المدرك للمحسوسات الجزئية هي الحواس - فمذهبه في هذا الموضع إما أن يكون هو ذاك أو لا يكون فإن كان الأول فيكون ناقض كلامه في البصر و السمع و إن كان الثاني فيكون قوله في غير السمع و البصر قولاً فاسداً.

و أما ثانياً فلأن كل واحد من الحواس له محسوس خاص يستحيل أن يدركه غيره و بديهية العقل حاكمة بهذا و حينئذ نقول كيف يتصور أن يقال إن القوة اللامسة الحاصلة في الأذن و العين هي المدركة للصوت المفرط و اللون الموزني. و أما ثالثاً فلأن ذلك مناقض لحدة اللذة و الألم فإنه حد اللذة على ما عرفت - بأنها إدراك الملائم من حيث هو ملائم و الملائم للقوة الباصرة إدراك المبصرات الحسية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣٧

لا اللمسية.

و أما رابعاً فلأن إدراك هذه المحسوسات إما أن يكون لذة و ألماً للحواس أو لا يكون فإن قال بالأول يكون إدراك البصر للألوان الحسنة لذة و إدراكه للألوان الموزية ألماً و إن قال بالثاني فلا يكون للمس لذة و لا ألم و لا للشم و الذوق و إن كان لذة و ألماً للبعض دون بعض كان ذلك ترجيحاً من غير مرجح و هو محال لأن هذه الحواس الخمس كلها وسائط للنفس في إدراك المحسوسات الجزئية.

ثم قال المسيحي و الحق عندي في هذه المسألة أن يقال الملائم للقوة الباصرة الألوان الحسنة و القوة السامعة الأصوات الطيبة و كذلك في باقي الحواس و إن إدراكها لهذه الأمور لذة بناء على أن الإدراك حضور صورة المدرك للمدرك - و إذا كان كذلك فيكون كل من الحواس الظاهرة له اللذة إذ لا معنى للذة إلا إدراك الملائم من حيث هو ملائم و كذا الألم و قال الإمام الرازي في كتاب المباحث بعد نقل كلام الشيخ هذا ما قاله الشيخ و هو الحق. فإن قيل لا شك أن الملائم للبصر هو الإبصار فكيف زعم الشيخ أن العين لا تلتذ بذلك مع أنه حد اللذة بأنها إدراك الملائم.

فنقول أما نحن فلا نساعد على أن في العين قوة مدركة بل المبصر و السامع هو النفس و هذه الأعضاء آلات لها في هذه الإدراكات فاندفع عنا هذا الإشكال.

و أما على مذهب الشيخ فالعذر أن الألوان ليست ملائمة للقوة الباصرة فإنه يستحيل اتصاف القوة الباصرة بالألوان بل إدراك الألوان أمر يلائم للقوة الباصرة - و الشيخ لم يجعل حصول الملائم لذة بل جعل إدراكه لذة و الباصرة إذا أبصرت حصل لها الملائم الذي هو إدراك الألوان و لم يحصل له إدراك هذه الملائم فإنها لم يدرك كونها مدركة بل النفس تدرك الأشياء و تدرك أنها أدركت تلك الأشياء فلا جرم يحصل لها اللذة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣٨

ثم اعترض على نفسه فيما اختاره من أن المدرك هي النفس لا الحواس - و في هذا التوجيه الذي ذكره لكلام الشيخ بما لم يقدر على دفعه معه أنه ادعى أولاً حقية كلام الشيخ فقال ما حاصله أن هذه المحسوسات إما أن يسلم كونها ملائمة

لهذه الحواس أو يقال الملائم للحواس هو الإحساس لا المحسوس فإن سلم كون المحسوس ملائما للحواس كان إدراكها إدراكا للملائم.

فقوله بعد ذلك البصر لا يلتذ بالألوان يناقض قوله اللذة هي إدراك الملائم وأما أن منع من ذلك و زعم أن الملائم لها هو الإحساس لا المحسوس فلا يخلو إما أن نقول بأن حصول الملائم هو اللذة أو إدراكه هو اللذة فإن قال بالأول لزمه تسليم لذة البصر وإن قال بالثاني لزمه أن لا يثبت اللذة في حاسة اللمس لأنه ليس الملائم لها الملموسات بل الإحساس بها وليس لها إدراك لذلك الإحساس فهذا وجه الإشكال انتهى كلامه

و قال العلامة الشيرازي في شرح الكليات للقانون

بعد ما نقل كلام المسيحي وفيه نظر.

أما فيما ذكره أولا فبأن لا نسلم أن مذهب الشيخ أن المدرك للمحسوسات هي الحواس بل لا مدرك ولا حاكم ولا ملتذ ولا متألم عند الشيخ وغيره من الراسخين في الحكمة غير النفس وإطلاق هذه الألفاظ على الحواس بضرب من المجاز وإسناد معانيها إلى الحواس من أغلاط المتأخرين كالإمام الرازي ومن اقتفى أثره إلا أن إدراكها يختلف فمن المدركات ما يدركها بذاتها كالكليات.

ومنها ما يدركها بواسطة الآلات وهي الجزئيات وذلك بأن يتكيف آلات الحواس بالمحسوسات الخاصة بها فتدركها النفس وذلك لأن الإدراك حضور صورة المدرك فيما به يدرك ولأنها تدرك الكليات بذاتها والجزئيات بآلاتها يكون حضور الكليات في ذاتها وحضور الجزئيات المحسوسة في آلات الحواس لكن لما كان الإحساس انفعال الحاسة بل آلتها عن محسوسها الخاص وجب انفعال آلة كل حاسة عن محسوسها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٣٩

الخاص بها وتكيفها بذلك المحسوس إلا أن انفعال بعض آلات الحواس وتكيفها بمحسوسها - يكون بحيث إن النفس يدركها حيث ينفع الآلات عن محسوساتها كالذائقة والشامة واللامسة.

ومنها ما لا يكون كذلك كالباصرة والسامعة ولهذا فإن الإنسان يدرك لذة الحلو في الفم ولذة الرائحة الطيبة في الشم ولذة النعومة في آلة اللمس - ولا يدرك لذة الصور الحسنة في الجليدية ولا في ملتقى العصبتين ولا لذة الصوت في العصبية المستفرشة وإن كانت آلتا السمع والبصر يتكيفان بالكيفيات المسموعة والمبصرة لا لما قيل إن انفعال بعض آلات الحواس وتكيفها بمحسوسها زمني وانفعال آلات البعض آني فالأول كاللامسة والذائقة والشامة وأما الثاني فكالباصرة والسماعة والهمم إلا على طريق الندرة كما إذا نظرنا إلى ضوء قوي أو خضرة شديدة وصدقنا النظر فيه ثم حولناه إلى غيره فبقى الضوء والخضرة في الجليدية - وكذا في آلة السمع قد يبقى تكيفها زمانا يسيرا كما يقال الصوت بعد في أذني.

فمراد الشيخ أن آلة الثلاث الأول تنفع عن محسوسها زمانا له قدر بحيث يدركها النفس وتلتذ أو تتألم وآلة الأخيرين لا تنفع عن محسوسها ولا يتكيف بها زمانا له قدر بحيث يدركه النفس فتلتذ أو تتألم.

هذا ما قالوه وهو كلام رخو سخي لا شتراك الحواس في كون إدراكها آتيا - وأما أن بعضها آني وبعضها زمني فغير مسلم فمن ادعاه فلا بد من دليل.

ثم إن الشيخ لم يذهب إلى أن آلي السمع والبصر لا يتكيفان بمحسوساتها بل يتكيفان به كتكيف الثلاث البواقى بمحسوساتها إلا أن السمع والبصر لا يلتذان بالمسموعات والمبصرات من حيث يسمع ويبصر بخلاف البواقى فإن الذائقة تلتذ من حيث تذوق والشامة من حيث تشم واللامسة من حيث تلمس والسبب فيه ما ذكرنا من أن النفس تدرك لذة الثلاث من حيث يتكيف آلاتها بمحسوساتها ولا يدرك لذة الآخرين حيث يتكيف آلتاهما بمحسوسيهما.

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٠

و على هذا فالجواب الحق أن يقال لا نسلم أن مذهبه ذلك و سنده ما ذكرناه.
و أما فيما ذكره ثانيا فلأن الشيخ لا يقول إن المدرك للصوت العظيم واللون المفرط لامسة الأذن والعين بل المدرك لهما هو السامعة والباصرة والمتألم آلة لامستها بطريق تفرق اتصال يحدثه الصوت المفرط فى لامسة الأذن واللون الموزي فى لامسة العين.

و أما آلة السمع والبصر فلا يتألم منهما لأن إدراكهما آتى لا زمانى على ما قيل لبطلان ذلك بل لأنهما لا يتألمان من حيث يسمع ويبصر.

و أما فيما ذكره ثالثا فلأنه مبني على أن الملائم للقوة الباصرة إدراك المبصرات - و على أن الشيخ ذهب إلى أن مدرك المبصرات لامسة العين وهما ممنوعان لأن الملائم والموافق إنما يكونان للنفس لا لغيرها من القوى ولأنه ذهب إلى أن المتألم من اللون الموزي هو لامسة العين لا باصرة العين والمدرك باصرتها لا اللامسة وهو كلام حق.

و أما فيما ذكره رابعا فلأننا لا نسلم أنه إن كان ألما ولذة فى البعض دون البعض - كان ذلك ترجيحاً من غير مرجح وهو إدراك النفس لذة الحواس حيث ينفعل آلاتها عن محسوساتها.

و أما الحق الذى اختاره فباطل لأن الملائم والموافق إنما يكونان للنفس لا للقوى - وأن القوة لا تدرك شيئاً ليقال إن إدراكها لهذه الأمور هي اللذة فهذا ما عندي فى هذا المقام انتهى كلام العلامة الشيرازي

أقول وفيه أبحاث

أما أولا فلأن ما ذكره من أن لا ملتذ ولا متألم إلا النفس فليس على إطلاقه بصحيح فإن النفس ذات نشأت متفاوتة فقد يتحد بالعقل وقد يتحد بالحواس وإذا اتحدت بالعقل الفعال يفعل فعله وإذا اتحدت بالحواس تفعل فعلها ومعلوم أن فعل الحواس يناسب الحواس وفعل كل حاسة يناسب تلك الحاسة وإدراك المناسب لذة

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤١

فيجب أن يكون لذة السمع والبصر بإدراك المسموع والمبصر كما أن لذة الثلاث البواقى بإدراك محسوساتها من غير فرق.

و أما ثانيا فلأن الفرق الذى ذكره من أن إدراك النفس للمحسوسين الأولين - لا يكون حيث ينفعل الآلة وإدراكها للمحسوسات الثلاثة الباقية يكون حيث ينفعل الآلة على تقدير تسليمه لا مدخل له فى الفرق بين الموضعين فى إثبات اللذة لبعض الحواس وعدمها للبعض الآخر فإن كلام الشيخ ناص فى وجود اللذة وعدمها للآخرين وكون محل الإدراك غير موضع الانفعال فى بعضها وعينه فى بعض آخر لو فرض تسليمه وصحته فأى مدخلية لهما فى كون أحدهما منشأ

لذة الحواس دون النفس و الثاني منشأ لذة النفس دون الحواس.

و أما ثالثا فلأن إدراك الحواس ليس إلا تكيفها بصور محسوساتها و هو قد اعترف بأن آتني السمع و البصر قد تكيفا بمحسوسيهما و لا شبهة في أن التكيف بصورة المدرك الملائم إذا كان إدراكا كان لذة لا محالة لأنه إدراك الكمال و إدراك كل كمال لشيء كان لذة لذلك الشيء به فيلزم من ذلك أن يكون إدراكهما لمحسوسيهما الذي هو تكيفهما بكيفيتي ذينك المحسوسين لذة لهما فما السبب فيما حكم بأن السمع و البصر لا يلتذان بالمسموع و المبصر من حيث يسمع و يبصر - بخلاف البواقي.

فإن قال السبب أن النفس تدرك لذة هذه الثلاث من حيث يتكيف الآلة و لا يدرك لذة الآخرين حيث يتكيف الآلة. **قلنا** لا نسلم ذلك و على فرض تسليمه لا يوجب هذا الفرق فرقا في اللذة و عدمها فإن حيث و حيث لا مدخل له فيما نحن بصدده إذ اللذة تابع الإدراك فالإدراك إن كان للنفس كانت اللذة لها و إن كان للحس كانت اللذة له. **و أما رابعا** فلأن منعه لكون الملائم لقوة الباصرة إدراك المبصرات غير وارد فإن الملائم لكل قوة إدراك ما يناسبها و لا شبهة في أن اللون و الضوء كمال للمشف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٢

و اللطيفة الجليدية مشفة و إدراكها كمال ملائم لها.

فالصواب في جواب المسيحي عما أورده ثالثا على الشيخ أن يقال للعين قوة لمسية و قوة بصرية لأن في جرمها ما يكون من باب الملموسات و فيه أيضا ما يكون من باب الألوان و الأضواء و ما يدرك بالعين كذا اللون المفرط و كذا الضوء الشديد أيضا فيه جهتان جهة مبصرة و جهة ملموسة فالإبصار بالباصرة و اللمس باللامسة فلا تناقض لاختلاف الموضوعين و الإدراكين و المدركين.

و أما خامسا فالذي ذكره أخيرا في إبطال الحق الذي اختاره المسيحي ليس بحق بل الحق حقه و الباطل إبطال ذلك الحق و كلام الشيخ أيضا حق لكن المسيحي لم يقدر على فهمه و حل الإشكال الوارد عليه و إنني لقضيت العجب من هؤلاء النحارير الثلاثة أعني المسيحي و الرازي و الشيرازي و غيرهم من شراح القانون و سائر العلماء بعدهم حيث لم يقدر أحد منهم على حل ما ذكره الشيخ و تحقيقه مع اعتنائهم بالتفتيش له و البحث عنه و الحمد لله على ما من علينا من فضله و حكمته.

فنقول لتحقيق هذا المقام إن الحيوان بما هو حيوان حاصل الهوية من جوهر جسماني تكيف بكيفية مزاجية من باب أوائل الملموسات و لكل حيوان بل لكل عضو منه حد اعتدالي من حدود تلك اللسمية و صلاحه و فساد منوطان بانحفاظ هذه الكيفية المزاجية نوعا أو شخصا و بعدمه و له في هذه الكيفية كمال و نفس و له قوة مدركة لهذه الكيفية يسمى باللامسة و هي سارية في كل بدنه و أجزائه إلا ما شد و الأعضاء الحسية كالعين و الأذن و اللسان و الخيشوم أيضا داخلية فيما يسري فيه قوة اللمس كما هي داخلية فيما يسري تلك الكيفية اللسمية.

و لا شك أن اللذة هي إدراك الملائم من حيث هو ملائم و الألم إدراك ضده من حيث هو ضده و قد مر أن الملائم لكل شيء ما يكون كمالا و قوة له و كمال الشيء يجب أن يكون من نوعه و ضده من نوع جنسه القريب فإدراك الملموسات الملائمة كمال للقوة اللسمية التي في سائر الأعضاء فيكون لذة لها بالذات و للنفس بواسطتها و إدراك ضدها يكون ألما

لها بالذات و للنفس بالواسطة فالملائم و المنافي للحيوان بما هو حيوان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٣

إنما هما من جنس الملموسات و إدراكهما لذة ألم للقوة الحيوانية اللمسية التي لا يخلو منها و من مدركها حيوان. ثم بعد هذه الكيفية اللمسية و قوة إدراكها اللمسي في قوام بدن الحيوان الكيفية الذوقية التي بها و بقوة إدراكها ينحفظ بدنه و يبقى إلى غاية نشوه و كما أن بدنه من جنس الملموسات و كماله منوط بكمالها كذلك من جنس المذوقات التي يغتذي بها- فللقوة الذوقية كمال ذوقي و بإزائه لذة ذوقية و لها مناف من هذا الباب و لأجله ألم- و بعد هاتين الكيفيتين درجة كمالية من مدركات الشامة لم يحتج إليها أعضاؤه الكثيفة كثير احتياج في القوام إلا أنها مما يتغذى بها لطائف أعضائه كالأرواح البخارية فلأن الروح كمال الروح فيكون للقوة الشامة باللطيفة التي في الخيشوم لذة في إدراك الروائح الطيبة و ألم في إدراك الشمائم المنتنة الكريهة و كل هذه الكيفيات الثلاث- مما يتصف به البدن الحيواني و أعضاؤه.

و أما مدركات الباصرة و السامعة فالحيوان بما هو حيوان غير متحصل القوام منها و لا شيء من أعضائه متقوم بالنور أو الصوت لأن كيفية الضوء من الهيئات البعيدة عن أعماق الجسم بما هو جسم فضلا عن الحيوان لأنه جسم كثيف ظلماني و إنما يعرض الضوء و اللون التابع له لسطوحه و أطرافه الخارجة عن حقيقة الجوهر و ماهيته. و كذا الصوت الذي هو أبعد الأعراض عن حقيقة جسم ذي الصوت فليس الجسم الحيواني و لا عضو من أعضائه ذا كيفية مبصرة أو مسموعة حتى يكون حصول شيء منهما كمالا له فيكون إدراكه إدراك الكمال المناسب لذلك العضو فيكون لذة و إدراك ضده إدراكا للمنافي نعم إدراك المبصرات النورية لذة و كمال للقوة النفسانية الباصرة لا للعين و إدراك الأصوات الحسنة لذة و ملائم للقوة النفسانية السمعية لا للأذن فالملائم و المنافي لهذين العضوين غير الملائم و المنافي لهاتين القوتين بخلاف الملائم و المنافي للقوى الثلاثة الشمية و الذوقية و اللمسية فإنهما بينهما ملائم و مناف للأعضاء.

و بالجملة الحيوان بما هو حيوان من جنس الملموس و المطعوم و المشموم و ليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٤

الحيوان بما هو حيوان من جنس الأصوات و الألوان و لهذا إذا قطع عنه الملموس ساعة يهلك- و المطعوم يوما أو يومين يموت و المشموم زمانا قصيرا أو طويلا يتضرر به و لا كذلك إذا بقي في غار مظلم قطع عنه الأنوار و الألوان و الأصوات إذ لا يتفاوت حاله اللهم إلا الحيوان الإنساني لمكان نفسه التي هي من عالم الأنوار و عالم النسب الشريفة العددية فيلتذ عن رؤية الأنوار و استماع النغمات الموزونة و يتألم عن الظلمات و الألوان الكدرة الموحشة و أما تضرر العين عن الضوء الشديد أو اللون المفرط- فمن جهة لامسة العين إذ لا يخلو الهواء المتوسط المماس للعين عن كيفية حر شديد- أو برد شديد في الصورتين يتضرر بها العين و كذا كضرر الصماخ عن الصوت الشديد- فلاجل مصادمة الهواء القارح للصماخ كما لوح إليه الشيخ لا أن اللامسة أدركت الضوء و الصوت و لا أن الباصرة و أدركت الهواء الملموس أو السامعة لمست القارح من الهواء- فالملخص أن الملائم و المنافي للحواس التي هي قوى جسمانية و

لآلاتها ومحالها التي هي أجسام مركبة كثيفة هو من مدركات اللامسة والذائقة والشامة. وأما مدركات الباصرة والسماعة فليست ملائمة ولا منافية لمواضع إدراكاتهما - ولا لهما من حيث هما حالتان للعين والأذن بل من حيث هما قوتان للنفس فلا جرم ثبت للثلاث الأول لذات وآلام ولا تثبت لهما تين لذة ولا ألم بل للنفس بواسطتهما فهذا ما عندي في هذا المقام والله ولي الفضل والإنعام

فصل (٩) في الصحة والمرض وهما من الكيفيات النفسانية

أما الصحة فعرّفها الشيخ في أول القانون بأنها ملكة أو حالة تصدر عنها الأفعال من الموضوع لها سليمة وليست كلمة أو للترديد المنافي للتحديد بل للتنبيه على أن جنس الصحة هو الكيفية النفسانية سواء كانت راسخة أو غير راسخة فلا يختص بالراسخة كما زعم البعض على ما قال الشيخ في الشفاء إنها ملكة في الجسم الحيواني يصدر عنه لأجلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٥

أفعاله الطبيعية وغيرها سليمة غير مئوفة لخروج ما هو صحة بالاتفاق فليس هناك شك لا في ذاتي ولا في عرضي على ما قاله صاحب المباحث إنه لا يلزم من الشك في اندراج الصحة تحت الحال أو الملكة شك في شيء من مقومات الصحة بل في عوارضها لأن المخالفة بين الحال والملكة إنما هي بعارض الرسوخ وعدمه على أنك قد عرفت ما فيه وهذا التعريف شامل لصحة الإنسان وغيره من الحيوانات وما ذكره صاحب المباحث بأنه يتناول صحة النبات أيضا وهو ما إذا كانت أفعاله من الجذب والهضم والدفع سليمة غير سديد لأن الحال والملكة إنما يكونان من الكيفيات النفسانية أي المختصة بذوات الأنفس الحيوانية على ما صرحوا به وعلى هذا يلزم في تعريف الشفاء تكرار. اللهم أن يراد بالملكة والحال الراسخ وغير الراسخ من مطلق الكيفية - أو يراد بالأنفس أعم من الحيوانية والنباتية وكلاهما خلاف الاصطلاح.

وأما ما ذكر في موضع آخر من القانون أن الصحة هيئة بها يكون بدن الإنسان في مزاجه وتركيبه بحيث يصدر عنه الأفعال كلها صحيحة سليمة فمبني على أن الصحة المبحوث عنها في الطب هي صحة الإنسان والمراد بصحة الأفعال وسلامتها خلوصها عن الآفة بكونها على المجرى الطبيعي على ما يناسب المعنى اللغوي - فلا يكون تعريف صحة البدن والعضو بها تعريف الشيء بنفسه.

ولهذا ذكر بعضهم أن الصحة في الأفعال أمر محسوس وفي البدن غير محسوس - و تعريف غير المحسوس بالمحسوس جائز.

واعترض بأن قوله تصدر عنه الأفعال مشعر بأن المبدأ تلك الملكة أو الحال - وقوله من الموضوع مشعر بأن الموضوع أعني البدن أو العضو هو المبدأ وأجيب بوجهين - أحدهما أن الصحة مبدأ فاعلي والموضوع قابلي والمعنى كيفية يصدر عنها الأفعال الكائنة من الموضوع الحاصلة فيه صحيحة سليمة.

و ثانيهما أن الموضوع فاعل واسطة بمنزلة آلة العلة الفاعلية والمعنى ما يصدر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٦

لأجلها وبواسطتها الأفعال من الموضوع ولكن جعل البدن فاعلا والقوة النفسانية آلة غير مرضي فإن البدن بما هو بدن

قابل و القابل لا يكون فاعلا.

و التحقيق أن القوى الجسمانية لا يصدر عنها أفعالها إلا بشركة موضوعاتها- لأن أفعالها كذواتها متقومة بالموضوع و المادة فالمسخن مثلا هو النار و النارية علة لكون النار مسخنة لغيرها فالمراد أن الصحة علة لكون البدن مصدر الفعل السليم- و هذا المعنى مفهوم واضح في عبارة القانون في التعريف الثاني و أوضح منه في عبارة الشفاء لأن اللام في التعليل أوضح من الباء و هي من عن فاندفاع الاعتراض عنها في غاية الوضوح.

و أما المرض فقد عرفه الشيخ بأنه هيئة مضادة للصحة أي ملكة أو حالة يصدر عنها الأفعال من الموضوع لها غير سليمة و ذكر في موضع من الشفاء أن المرض من حيث هو مرض بالحقيقة و هو عدم لست أعني من حيث هو مزاج أو الم و هذا مشعر بأن بينهما تقابل العدم و الملكة و وجه التوفيق بين كلاميه على ما أشار إليه بعض الفضلاء.

و هو أن الحصة عنده هيئة هي مبدأ سلامة الأفعال و عند المرض تزول تلك الهيئة و تحدث هيئة هي مبدأ الآفة في الأفعال فإن جعل المرض عبارة عن عدم الهيئة الأولى و زوالها فبينهما تقابل العدم و الملكة و إن جعل عبارة عن نفس الهيئة الثانية فبينهما تقابل التضاد و كأنه يريد أن لفظ المرض مشترك بين الأمرين أو حقيقة في أحدهما مجاز في الآخر و إلا فالإشكال باق.

و قيل المراد أن بينهما تقابل العدم و الملكة بحسب التحقيق و هو العرف الخاص على ما مر و تقابل التضاد بحسب الشهرة و هو العرف العامي لأن المشهور أن الضدين أمران ينسبان إلى موضوع واحد و لا يمكن أن يجتمعا كالزوجية و الفردية لا بحسب التحقيق ليلزم كونهما في غاية التخالف تحت جنس قريب و قد عرفت في مبحث التقابل تخالف الاصطلاحين.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٧

و أن الشيخ قد صرح بذلك حيث قال إن أحد الضدين في التضاد المشهور قد يكون عدما للآخر كالسكون للحركة و المرض للصحة لكن قوله هيئة مضادة- ربما يشعر بأن المرض أيضا وجودي كالصحة و لا خفاء في أن بينهما غاية الخلاف- فجاز أن يجعلوا ضدين بحسب التحقيق مندرجين تحت جنس واحد هو الكيفية النفسانية و اعترض صاحب المباحث بأنهم اتفقوا على أن أجناس الأمراض المفردة ثلاثة- سوء المزاج و سوء التركيب و تفرق الاتصال و لا شيء منها بداخل تحت الكيفية النفسانية المسماة بالحال و الملكة.

أما سوء المزاج فلأنه إما نفس الكيفية الغريبة التي بها خرج المزاج عن الاعتدال على ما يصرح به حيث يقال الحمى حرارة كذا و كذا و هي من الكيفيات المحسوسة- و إما اتصاف البدن بها فهو من مقولة أن ينفع.

و أما سوء التركيب فلأنه عبارة عن مقدار أو عدد أو وضع أو شكل أو انسداد مجرى مخل بالأفعال و ليس شيء منها داخلا تحت الحال و الملكة و كذا اتصاف البدن بها و ذلك لأن المقدار و العدد من الكميات و الوضع مقولة برأسها و الشكل من الكيفيات المختصة بالكميات و الاتصاف من مقولة أن ينفع.

و أما تفرق الاتصال فلأنه عديم لا يدخل تحت مقولة و إذا لم يدخل المرض تحت الحال و الملكة لم يدخل الصحة تحتها لكونه ضدا لها هذا حاصل تقريره لا ما ذكره في المواقف- من أن سوء المزاج و سوء التركيب و تفرق الاتصال إما من المحسوسات أو الوضع أو عدمه [أو العدم] فإنه اختصار مخل كما قيل و العذر بأنه لم يعتد بباقي المحتملات

لظهور بطلانها ظاهر البطلان لأن قولنا سوء التركيب إما مقدار مخل بالأفعال أو عدد أو وضع أو انسداد مجرى كذلك ليس بيانا للمحتملات بل للأقسام كما لا يخفى.

و أما الجواب عن الاعتراض المذكور ففي غاية السهولة وهو أن تقسيمهم المرض بكذا وكذا فيه مسامحة والمراد منه منشأ المرض إما سوء المزاج أو سوء التركيب أو تفرق الاتصال فالمقصود أنه كيفية نفسانية تحصل عند أحد هذه الأمور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٨

و تنقسم باعتبارها وهذا معنى ما قيل إنها منوعات أطلق عليها اسم الأنواع وذلك كما يطلق الصحة على اعتدال المزاج أو المزاج المعتدل فيقال مزاج صحيح مع أن المزاج من الكيفيات المحسوسة

فصل (١٠) في الوسطة بين الصحة والمرض

ثم وقع الاختلاف بينهم في ثبوت الوسطة بين الصحة والمرض وليس الخلاف في ثبوت حالة لا يصدق عليها الصحة ولا المرض كالعلم والقدرة والحياة إلى غير ذلك مما لا يحصى بل في ثبوت حالة و صفة لا يصدق معها على البدن أنه صحيح أو مريض - بل يصدق أنه ليس بصحيح ولا مريض فأثبتها جالينوس كما للناقهين والمشايخ والأطفال و من ببعض أعضائه آفة دون البعض.

ورد عليه الشيخ أن الذي رأى أن بين الصحة والمرض وسطا هو حال لا صحته ولا مرضه وإنما ظن ذلك لأنه نسي الشرائط التي ينبغي أن تراعى في حال ما له وسط وما ليس له وسط وتلك الشرائط أن يفرض الموضوع واحد بعينه في زمان واحد بعينه وأن يكون الجزء واحدا بعينه والجهة والاعتبار واحدة بعينها فإذا فرض كذلك و جاز أن يخلو الموضوع عن الأمرين كان هناك واسطة فإن فرض إنسان واحد واعتبر منه عضو واحد أو أعضاء معينة في زمان واحد و جاز أن يكون معتدل المزاج سوي التركيب أو لا يكون معتدل المزاج سوي التركيب بحيث يصدر عنه جميع الأفعال - التي يتم بذلك العضو والأعضاء سليمة وأن لا يكون كذلك فهناك واسطة وإن كان لا بد من أن يكون معتدل المزاج سوي التركيب أو لا يكون معتدل المزاج سوي التركيب - إما لأنه أحدهما دون الآخر أو لأنه ليس ولا واحد بينهما واسطة انتهى كلامه وهو قد اعتبر في المرض أن لا يكون جميع أفعال العضو سليمة إما لكونه عبارة عن عدم الصحة التي هي مبدأ سلامة جميع الأفعال أو عن هيئة لها يكون شيء من الأفعال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٤٩

مؤثرا ولا خفاء في انتفاء الوسطة حينئذ.

وأما إذا اعتبر في المرض أن يكون جميع الأفعال غير سليمة بأن يجعل عبارة عن هيئة يكون جميع أفعال العضو أعني الطبيعية والحيوانية والنفسانية مؤثفة فلا خفاء في ثبوت الوسطة بأن يكون بعض أفعال العضو سليما دون البعض وإن اعتبرت آفة جميع الأعضاء فثبوت الوسطة أظهر وعلى هذا يكون الاختلاف مبني على الاختلاف في تفسير المرض. ولأجل ذلك قال صاحب المباحثات ويشبه أن يكون النزاع لفظيا فمن نفي الوسطة أراد بالصحة كون العضو الواحد أو الأعضاء الكثيرة في وقت واحد أو أوقات كثيرة - بحيث يصدر عنها الأفعال سليمة وبالمرض أن لا يكون كذلك و من أثبتها أراد بالصحة كون كل الأعضاء بحيث يصدر عنها الأفعال سليمة وبالمرض كون كل الأعضاء بحيث يكون أفعاله

مؤوفة و في كلام الشيخ ما يشعر بابتنائه على الاختلاف في تفسير الصحة حيث ذكر في أول القانون أنه لا يثبت الحالة الثانية إلا لأن يحدوا الصحة كما يشتهون و يشترطوا شروطا ما بهم إليها حاجة و ذلك مثل اشتراط سلامة جميع الأفعال ليخرج صحة من يصدر عنه بعض الأفعال سليمة دون البعض و من كل عضو ليخرج صحة من بعض أعضائه صحيح دون البعض و في كل وقت ليخرج صحة من يصح شتاء و يمرض صيفا و من غير استعداد قريب لزوالها ليخرج صحة المشايخ و الأطفال و الناقهين

فصل (١١) في الفرح و الغم و غيرهما

قد يعرض للنفس كفيات تابعة لانفعالات تحدث فيها لما يرتسم في بعض قواها من الأمور النافعة و الضارة.

فمنها الفرح و الغم

فالفرح هو كيفية نفسانية يتبعها حركة الروح إلى خارج البدن طلبا للوصول إلى الملد و الغم و هو كيفية نفسانية يتبعها حركة الروح إلى داخل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٥٠

البدن خوفا من موذ واقع عليها [عليه].

و منها الشهوة

و هو كيفية نفسانية يتبعها حركة الروح إلى الظاهر جذبا للملائم طلبا للتلذذ.

و منها الغضب

و هو كيفية نفسانية يتبعها حركة الروح إلى الخارج دفعا للمنافر طلبا للانتقام.

و منها الفزع

و هو ما يتبعها حركة الروح إلى الداخل خوفا من الموزي واقعا كان أو متخيلا.

و الحزن

و هو ما يتبعها حركة الروح إلى الداخل قليلا قليلا.

و منها الهم

و هو ما يتبعها حركة الروح إلى الداخل و الخارج بحدوث أمر يتصور منه خير يقع أو شر ينتظر و هو مركب من خوف و رجاء فأيهما غلب على الفكر تحركت النفس إلى جهته فللخير المتوقع إلى جهة الظاهر و للشر المنتظر إلى جهة الداخل - فلذلك قيل إنه جهاد فكري.

و منها الخجل

و هو ما يتبعها حركة الروح إلى الداخل و الخارج لأنه كالمركب من فزع و فرح حيث ينقبض الروح إلى الباطن ثم يخطر ببالي أنه ليس فيه كثير مضرة فينبسط ثانيا و هذه كلها إشارة إلى ما لكل واحد منها من الخواص و اللوازم - و إلا فمعانيها واضحة عند العقل و كثيرا ما يتسامح فيسر بنفس الانفعالات كما يقال الفرح انبساط القلب و الغم انقباضه و الغضب غليان دم القلب و الغم انحصار القلب و انقباض الدم الذي فيه و السرور انبساط القلب و الدم و ذلك باطل لأن كلا منها كيفية نفسانية إذا عرضت يلزمه هذه الانفعالات في الجوهر المنفعل عن النفس و هي لطيفة بخارية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٥١

و منها الحقد

و هو كيفية نفسانية لا يوجد إلا عند غضب ثابت و أن لا يكون الانتقام في غاية السهولة و لا في غاية العسر أما أن الغضب يجب أن يكون ثابتاً فلأنه لو كان سريع الزوال لم يتقرر صورة الموزي في الخيال فلا يجتذب النفس إلى طلب الانتقام - و أما أنه يجب أن لا يكون الانتقام في غاية السهولة فلوجهين أحدهما أن الانتقام إذا كان سهلاً اشتغلت النفس بحركة الانتقام و اشتغال النفس بالقوة المحركة يمنعها من الاشتغال بانحفاظ صورة أخرى. و ثانيهما أن الشوق إلى الانتقام إذا اشتد و لم يكن منه خوف بلغ تأكده و سهولة حصوله أن صار عند الخيال كالحاصل و الحاصل لا يطلب حصوله فلا جرم لا يبقى الشوق إلى تحصيله و لذلك فإن الانتقام من الضعفاء لما كان سهلاً سقط التشوق إليه و الدليل على أن حال الخيال في الرغبة و الرهبة مبني على المحاكيات لا على الحقائق كما ينفر النفس عن العسل إذا شبه بمرة مقيئة و عن سائر المطاعم و المشارب إذا كانت صورها شبيهة بصور أجسام مستقذرة و كذلك الشيء الذي يسهل حصوله نزل عند الخيال منزلة الحاصل فلا يبقى شوق إلى تحصيله و أما أنه يجب أن لا يكون الانتقام في غاية العسر بل يكون في محل الطبع فلأن الموزي إذا كان عظيماً مثل الملوك فإن اليأس عن الانتقام منه و الخوف يمنع ثبات صورة الشوق إلى الانتقام في النفس فثبت بهذا أن الحقد إنما يوجد عند وجود غضب ثابت متوسط بين الشدة و الفتور

فصل (١٢) في أسباب الفرح و الغم

اعلم أن الله سبحانه خلق بقدرته جرماً لطيفاً روحانياً قبل هذه الأجسام الكثيفة الظلمانية و هو على طبقات متفاوتة في اللطافة كطبقات السماوات و هو المسمى بالروح النفساني و الحيواني و الطبيعي بحسب درجاته الثلاث في اللطافة و جعله للطافته و توسطه بين العقول و الأجسام المادية مطية للقوى النفسانية تسري بها في الأعضاء الجسدانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٥٢

و جعل التعلق الأول من القوى النفسانية مختصاً بهذا الروح و فائضاً ثانياً بتوسطه في الأعضاء البدنية و مادة الروح لطيف الأخلاط و بخاريتها كما أن مادة خلقة الجسد من كثيف الأخلاط و أرضيتها فنسبة الروح إلى صفوة الأخلاط كنسبة الجسد إلى كدرها و كما أن الأخلاط إنما يتجوهر منها الأعضاء لامتزاج بينها يؤدي إلى صورة واحدة مزاجية يستعد بها لقبول الأحوال التي لم يستفد من العناصر كذلك الصفوة من الأخلاط إنما يتجوهر منها الأرواح لقبول القوى النفسانية التي لم يستفد من البسائط.

ثم إنك ستعلم أن المبدأ الإلهي عام الفيض دائم الجود لا لتخصيص فيضه و جوده من قبله بواحد دون واحد و لا بوقت دون سائر الأوقات بل إنما يقع التخصيص بواحد أو وقت دون واحد و وقت آخرين من جهة تخصيص المواد و الأسباب الناشئة من قبلها لا من قبله فلا جرم لا بد لنا أن نعرف الأسباب المعدة لوجود هذه الكيفيات النفسانية - لأن لا يعترينا شك في عدم تغير واجب الوجود و صفاته الأولية أعادنا الله من ذلك - فاتفق الحكماء و الأطباء على أن الفرح و الغم و الخوف و الغضب كيفيات تابعة للانفعالات الخاصة بالروح الذي ينبعث عن التجويف الأيسر من القلب و يسري

صاعدا لطيفه إلى الدماغ وهابطا كثيفه إلى الكبد و سائر الأعضاء.

ثم إن كلا من هذه الانفعالات يشتد و يضعف لا بسبب الفاعل فإنما يتبع في اشتداده و ضعفه اشتداد استعداد جوهر المنفعل و ضعفه.

و الفرق بين القوة و الاستعداد كما وقعت الإشارة إليه في مباحث القوة و الفعل و في غيرها أن القوة تكون بعيدة و الاستعداد قريبا و أن القوة على الضدين سواء و الاستعداد على الضدين لا يكون سواء فإن كل إنسان يقوى على أن يفرح و يحزن إلا أن منهم من هو مستعد للفرح فقط و منهم من هو مستعد للغم فقط و الاستعداد استكمال القوة بالقياس إلى أحد المتقابلين فلنذكر السبب لحصول الاستعداد للفرح.

فنقول إن الذي يعد النفس للفرح أمور ثلاثة

كما ذكره الشيخ في رسالته في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٥٣

الأدوية القلبية.

الأول كون الروح على أفضل أحواله في الكم و الكيف

أما في الكم فهو أن يكون كثير المقدار و ذلك لأمرين.

أحدهما أن زيادة الجوهر في الكم يوجب زيادة القوة في الشدة كما تبين في الأصول الطبيعية.

و الثاني أنه إذا كان كثيرا فيبقى منه قسط و اف منه

في المبدأ و يبقى قسط و اف للانبساط الذي يكون عند الفرح لأن القليل ينحل به الطبيعة و تضبطه عند المبدأ أو لا يمكنه من الانبساط و أما في الكيف فأن يكون معتدلا في اللطافة و الغلظ و أن يكون شديد النورانية و افره جدا فيكون مشابقتها لجوهر السماء شديدة فهذه هي أسباب الاستعداد للذة و الفرح و اللذة كالجنس للفرح الذي هو كالنوع فالروح التي في القلب إذا كانت كثيرة المقدار معتدلة في المزاج ساطعة النورانية كانت شديدة الاستعداد للفرح و إذا عرفت ذلك ظهر أن المعد للغم إما قلة الروح كما للناقهين - و المنهوكين بالأمراض و المشايخ و أما غلظته كما للسوداويين و المشايخ فلا يبسط لكثافتها و أما رفته كما للنساء و المنهوكين فلا يفي بالانبساط و أما ظلمته كما للسوداويين.

الثاني أمور خارجية و هي كثيرة - قال الشيخ فمنها قوية و منها ضعيفة و أيضا منها معروفة و منها غير معروفة و مما لا يعرف ما قد اعتيد كثيرا و كل ما اعتيد كثيرا سقط الشعور به و الأسباب المفرحة و الغامة ما كان منها قويا و ظاهرا فلا حاجة إلى ذكره و أما الأخرى فمثل تصرف الحس في ضياء العالم و الدليل على إلذاهه إيحاش ضده و هو الإقامة في الظلمة و مثل مشاهدة الشكل و الدليل على تفريجه غم الوحدة.

و في هذا الاستدلال نظر إذ لا يلزم من كون الشيء على صفة كون ضده على ضد تلك الصفة فإن الشيخ نفسه قد بين في كتاب الجدل أن هذه قضية مشهورة و هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٥٤

باطلة في نفسها فعلى هذا لا يلزم من كون الظلمة موحشة أن يكون تصرف الحس في ضياء العالم لذيدا و مثل التمكن

من المراد في الوقت و الاستمرار على توقف مقتضى القصد من غير شاغل و كذا العزائم و الآمال و ذكر ما سلف و رجاء ما يستقبل و تحدث النفس بالأمانى و المحادثة و الاستغراب و الاغتراب و التعجب و الإعجاب و مصادفة حسن الإصغاء من المجاور و المساعدة و الخديعة و التلبس و الغلبة في أدنى شيء و غير ذلك.

و أما الأسباب العامة الخارجة فمقابلات هذه الأمور المذكورة و هي مثل تذكر الأخطار التي عرضت و الآلام التي قوسيت و الأحقاد و ما غاظ من المعاملات و المعاشرات و مثل توهّم المخاوف في المستقبل و خصوصاً من الواجب عن مفارقة هذه الدار الدنيا التي تصرف عنها قناعة العاقل بما لا بد منه و الفكر في غيره من المهمات الأخروية التي يجب السعي فيها و مثل الانقطاع عن الشغل و الفكر العارض و القصور عن المراد و غير ذلك مما لا يحصى فهذه و أمثالها ترد على نفس المستعد للغم فتغمه - ثم التخيّل بفوته في السوداوي مما يعين ذلك بإيراد الأشباه و المحاكيات لما يوحش و يغم و إنما يقوى التخيّل في السوداوي لئيس مزاج الروح الموضوع فتخف حركتها و لإعراض العقل عن القوى الباطنة لفساد مزاج الروح التي فيها و اختصاص حركاتها على مقتضى ما يعد له ذلك المزاج و الكيفية الرديّة المظلمة.

الثالث أن تكرّر الفرح يعد النفس للفرح

و تكرّر الغم بعد النفس للغم لما ذكره الشيخ أن كل فعل ذي ضد إذا تكرّر فإن القوة عليه تشتد و كل قوة تشتد يصير استعدادها أشد.

و بيانه بوجهين أحدهما الاستقراء فإن الجسم إذا سخن مراراً متوالية استعد لسرعة التسخن و كذا إذا أبرد و كذا إذا تخلخل و كذا إذا تكثف و القوى الباطنة تصير لها عند تكرّر أفعالها و انفعالاتها ملكة قوية ما كان حالاً و بمثل هذا تكتسب الأخلاق.

و ثانيهما القياس المأخوذ عن المشهودات فإن كل انفعال حدث للشيء فهو مناسب لجوهره و المناسب للشيء معاند لضده و المعاند للضد إذا تمكن مراراً نقص من

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استعداد القوة عليه للقابل له فيزداد في استعداد ضده الذي هو مناسبه.

فهذا هو بيان هذا المعنى بالاستقراء و القياس المقبولي.

و أما التحقيق البرهاني فالكلام فيه أرفع من هذا النمط إذ المقصد أيضاً ليس في الجلالة بحيث لم يجز الاكتفاء فيه بما دون البرهان اللامي الدائمي و إن كان ذلك أيضاً مقدوراً بل يصح القناعة فيه بما يؤكد الظن كما فعله الشيخ فقال على طريقة البحث الطبيعي و هو أن الفرح يلزمه أمران - أحدهما تقوية القوة الطبيعية.

و الثاني تخلخل الروح لما يكلفها الفرح لأنه كيفية نفسانية و النفس متصرفة في الروح التي هي مطية قواها من الانبساط و يتبع [منبع] تقوي القوة الطبيعية أمور ثلاثة.

أحدها اعتدال مزاج الروح.

و ثانيها كثرة توليدها بدل ما يتحلل.

و ثالثها حفظها عن استيلاء التحلل عليه أما تخلخل الروح فيتبعه أمران - أحدهما الاستعداد للحركة و الانبساط للطف

القوام و الثاني انجذاب المادة العادية إليه بحركته بالانبطاش إلى غير جهة الغذاء و من شأن كل حركة بهذه الصفة أن تستتبع ما وراءها لتلازم صفائح الأجرام و امتناع الخلاء.

و بالجملة انجذاب المتأخر عند سيلان المتقدم كما في الرياح و كذلك المياه- فتكرر الفرح بهذا المعنى يعد للفرح و أما الغم إذا تكرر اشتدت القوة عليه لأن الغم يتبعه أمران مقابلان للوصفين التابعين للفرح.

أحدهما ضعف القوة الطبيعية.

و الثاني تكاثف الروح للبرد الحادث عند انطفاء الحرارة الغريزية لشدة الانقباض و الاحتقان من الروح و يتبع ذلك أضداد ما ذكرنا فثبت أن تواتر الفرح بعد الفرح يعد الروح للفرح و تواتر الغم بعد الغم يعد الروح للغم فالفرحان لا يعمل فيه من

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الغامات إلا القوى و يعمل فيه المفرحات الضعيفة و الممنو بالغم حاله بالضد مما ذكر

فصل (١٣) في ضعف القلب و قوته و الفرق بين الأول و بين التوحش و كذا بين الثاني و بين النشاط

و اعلم أن هاهنا حالة هي ضعف القلب و أخرى هي التوحش و ضيق الصدر و هما متشابهان و بينهما فرق و كذلك هاهنا حالة هي قوة القلب و أخرى هي النشاط و انشراح الصدر و هما أيضا متشابهان و بينهما فرق و يشكل الفرق بينهما لتلازمهما في أكثر الأمر- و لأن الأولين يظن بهما حالتان انفعاليتان و الثانيةين يظن بهما حالتان فعليتان و بين طرفي كل واحد من القسمين فرق ظاهر من وجوه-

أما الأول

فليس بمتلازمين لأنه ليس كل ضعيف محزانا و لا بالعكس و أيضا ليس كل قوي القلب مفراحا و بالعكس.

و أما الثاني

فلأن الحدود متخالفة و ذلك لأن ضعف القلب حال بالقياس إلى الأمر المخوف من جهة قلة احتماله و ضيق الصدر حال بالقياس إلى الأمر الموحش من جهة قلة احتماله و المخوف هو الموزني البدني و الموحش هو الموزني النفساني.

و أما الثالث

فلأن اللوازم النفسانية مختلفة فضعف القلب يحرك إلى الهرب و التوحش و ضيق الصدر قد يحرك إلى الدفع و المقاومة و يرغب كثيرا في ضد الهرب و هو البطش و لذلك فإن القوة كثيرا ما يفتر عند ضعف القلب مع أنها كثيرا ما تهيج عند التوحش و أيضا أن في ضعف القلب انفعالين انفعال بالتأذي و انفعال بالتشوق إلى حركة المباعدة و في ضيق الصدر انفعال واحد و هو بالتأذي فقط و ليس يلزم من ذلك التشوق إلى الهرب على سبيل الطبع بل ربما اختار مقتضاه لغرض آخر فيكون ذلك شوقا اختياريا لا شوقا حيوانيا و ربما اختار المقاومة و البطش.

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و أما الرابع

فلأن اللوازم البدنية متخالفة لأن ضعف القلب يلزمه عند حصول الموزني الذي يخصه خمود من الحرارة الغريزية و

استيلاء من البرودة و ضيق الصدر يلزمه كثيرا عند حصول الموزي الذي يخصه اشتعال من الحرارة الغريزية.

و أما الخامس

فلأن الأسباب الاستعدادية متخالفة فإن ضعف القلب قد يتبع لا محالة رقة الروح بإفراط و برد المزاج و ضيق الصدر قد يتبع كثافة الروح و سخونة مزاجه

فصل (١٤) في سبب عروض هذه العوارض البدنية لأجل تكيف النفس بتلك الكيفيات النفسانية

اعلم أن العوالم متطابقة و النشأة متحاكية كل ما يعرض في أحد العوالم ينشأ منه ما يوازنه و يحاكيه في عالم آخر و هكذا الإنسان عالم صغير مشتمل على ثلاث مراتب أعلاها النفس و أدناها البدن بما فيه من الخلط الصالح و هو الدم و أوسطها الروح فكما سنح في النفس كيفية نفسانية يتعدى أثر منه إلى الروح و بواسطته ينزل في البدن و كلما يسنح حالة جسمانية للبدن يرتقي أثر منه بواسطة الروح إلى النفس فالنفس و البدن متحاكيان متعاقبان لعلاقة السببية و المسببية بينهما بوجه - و كما أن جوهر أحدهما يحاكي جوهر الآخر فكيفه لكيفها و انفعاله لانفعالها و استحالاته لاستحالاتها و هكذا حكم الروح الذي هو برزخ بينهما فإذا طرأت كيفية نفسانية كاللذة سواء كانت عقلية أو خيالية مثلا و هو كما علمت صورة كمالية علمية أو خيالية بطراً بسببها انبساط في الروح الدماغية المعتدل و بتوسطه للبدن اهتزاز

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٥٨

و ظهور للدم الصافي و احمرار للوجه.

و إذا طرأ على النفس خوف أو ألم ينقبض الروح إلى الداخل و بتوسطه يحدث في البدن انقباض في الوجه و اصفرار في الوجه و هكذا القياس في سائر الكيفيات النفسانية و العوارض البدنية و كما أن الروح مطية للقوى النفسانية فالدم أيضا مركب لهذه الروح يتحرك بحركتها تارة إلى الخارج و تارة إلى الداخل و ذلك إما دفعة و إما قليلا قليلا و الحركة إلى الخارج قد يكون للذة و النشاط و قد يكون للغضب و قد يكون للرجاء و التوقع و ما يجري مجراه و الحركة إلى الداخل قد يكون للألم و الحزن و قد يكون للخوف و الهرب و الفكر و ما يجري مجراه.

ثم الحركات الخارجية و الداخلية متفاوتة في الزمان كالسرعة و البطء و في الكم كالانبساط و الانقباض و في الكيف كاشتداد الحرارة و الحمرة في الدم و مقابلهما و كذا متفاوت الحركة في هذه المعاني بحسب اشتداد الكيفية النفسانية الباعثة إياها و ضعفها ففي الغضب الشديد يتحرك الروح مع مركبه الذي هو الدم إلى الخارج دفعة.

و ربما ينقطع مدده أو ينطفئ بسبب الاحتقان فيموت صاحبه و في الفرح يتحرك يسيرا يسيرا إذا كان الفرح معتدلا و في الفرح المفرط و إن كانت حركته بحسب الزمان بطيئا لكن بحسب الكم يكون انبساطه عظيما فربما يؤدي إفراطه إلى زوال الروح بالكلية و كذا الحال في الحركة إلى الداخل ففي الفزع الشديد دفعة و في الحزن قليلا قليلا و فيهما أيضا قياس ما ذكرنا على العكس و قد يتفق أن يتحرك إلى الجهتين في وقت واحد إذا كانت الكيفية النفسانية يعرضها عارضان مثل الهم فإنه قد يعرض معه غضب و حزن فيختلف الحركتان و مثل الخجل فإنه ينقبض أولا إلى الباطن ثم يعود العقل فينبسط المنقبض فيثور إلى الخارج و يحمر اللون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٥٩

فصل (١٥) في مناسبة ما بين شيء من تلك الكيفيات النفسانية وبين الدم الذي هو حامل الروح الحامل لآثار تلك الكيفيات

قال الشيخ الدم الكثير الصافي إن كان معتدل القوام والمزاج أعد للفرح - لكثرة ما يتولد منه من الروح الساطع و أما إن كان كثيرا و صافيا و معتدل القوام - لكنه زائد في السخونة أعد للغضب لكثرة اشتعاله و سرعة حركته فاما إن كان الدم كثيرا و صافيا لكنه رقيق القوام بارد مائي أعد للجبن و لضعف القلب لأن الروح المتولد منه يكون ثقیل الحركة إلى الخارج قليل الاشتعال لبرده و رطوبته فيقل فيه الاستعداد للفرح و الغضب و يكون لرقته سهل التحلل و لبرده قليل التولد و الدم الكدر الغليظ الزائد في الحرارة يعد للغم و الغضب الثابت الذي لا ينحل أما الغم فلما يتولد من الروح الكدر و أما الغضب فله سرعة اشتعاله لحرارته و أما ثبات الغضب فلأنه كثيف إذا تسخن لم يبرد بسرعة.

و أما غضب الدم الصفراوي الرقيق فيكون أسرع هيجانا و أسرع انحلالا لأن الروح المتولدة عن ذلك الدم أشد حرارة و هو مع ذلك غير كثيف و إذا كان دمه صافيا مشرقا كان مع ذلك مفراحا و الدم الغليظ الغير الكدر إذا كان زائدا في الحرارة و هو في النواذر كان صاحبه غير محزان و يكون شجاعا قوي القلب و يكون غضبه أقل لأن المفرحية تكسر من الغضب و المحزنة تعد للغضب لأن الغضب حركة إلى الدفع و المفرحية مناسبة للذة و اللذة يكون الحركة فيها نحو الجذب - و هذا الإنسان يكون غضبه في الأمور عظيما و يكون شديدا لتسخن روحه و لذلك بعينه قليل الخوف و الدم الغليظ الغير الكدر الزائد في البرودة يكون صاحبه لا محزانا و لا مفراحا و لا يشتد غضبه و يكون جنبه إلى حد و يكون بليدا في كل أمر سالما لأن روحه يكون شبيه دمه و الدم الغليظ الكدر و الزائد في البرودة يكون صاحبه متوحشا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٠

محزانا ساكن الغضب إلا في أمر عظيم و ثبت غضبه دون ثبات الحار المزاج الذي يشاكله في سائر الأوصاف و فوق ثبات الرقيق القوام و يكون حقودا.

قال الشيخ في سبب شدة الفرخ في شارب الخمر و شدة الغم في السوداوي أما الأول

فلأن الخمر إذا شربت باعتدال ولدت روحا كثيرة معتدلة في الرقة و الغلظ شديدة النورانية و ذلك هو السبب الأول و سببته للفرخ أن الروح إذا كانت كثيرة معتدلة ساطعة يستعد للانفعال من أدنى سبب من المفرحات فإن المستعد للشيء يكفيه أضعف أسبابه مثل الكبريت في الاشتعال فإنه يشتعل بأدنى نار لا يشتعل الحطب بأضعافها و لهذا يكثر فرخ شارب الخمر حتى يظن به أنه يفرح لذاته - و ليس كذلك لأن حدوث أثر لا عن مؤثر محال.

و السبب الثاني

أن تلك الأرواح يكون الدماغية منها شديدة الرطب و شديد التموج لما يتصعد إليها من البخارات الرطبة المضطربة فلرطوبتها لا يدعن للتحريك اللطيف الروحاني و لاضطرابها لا يدعن للتشكيل الروحاني و حينئذ يصعب على العقل - أن يستعمله في الحركات الفكرية فيعرض القوة العقلية عنها إغراضا بقدر مقتضى حالها ريثما يعتدل مزاجها و يسكن تموجها.

و إذا قل استعمال العقل لتلك الأرواح صارت تلك الأرواح مشغولة بما يرد عليها - من الأسباب الخارجة و لذلك تأثرها

من الأسباب النافعة في اللذة أكثر من تأثرها من الأسباب النافعة في الجميل و من النافعة في الحال أكثر من النافعة في المستقبل و من الذي بحسب الظن أكثر من الذي بحسب العقل.

و السبب الثالث

أن الحس الظاهر أقدر على تحريك الروح الباطن من العقل على تحريكه و لذلك فإن العقل إذا استصعبت الروح الباطن عليه استعان بالحس فيمكن منه كما في العلوم الهندسية و إذا كان كذلك قل تأثير المفرحات المستقبلية - و الجميلة و العقلية في نفس الشارب و استولى عليه تأثر المفرحات اللذيذة و العاجلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦١

و الحسية و لأن استعداده شديد فيكفيه منها أدنى سبب كما للصبي فيظن أنه يفرح بلا سبب و ذلك محال فقد اجتمع لشارب الخمر أمور ثلاثة.

أحدها استكمال جوهر روحه في الكم و الكيف.

و ثانيها اندفاع الأفكار العقلية عنه التي ربما يكون أسبابا للغم.

و ثالثها استعمال تخيله و تفكره في المحسوسات الخارجة التي هي أسباب اللذة فلا جرم يكمل فرحه و يقوى نشاطه. أقول هذه الأمور المذكورة إذا اطلع عليها ناقص العقل يصير منشأ لإقدامه على فعل الشرب و أما إذا اطلع عليها عاقل يصير بعض هذه الأسباب بل كلها باعثا لإعراضه عنه و إن لم يصل إليه حكم الشريعة الإلهية سيما و قد نص على تحريمه و تقبيحه بأبلغ تأكيد فإن الإنسان مخلوق للنشأة الثانية و كماله العقلي إنما يحصل بارتحاله عن هذه النشأة و رجوعه عنها إلى جوار الله و عالم ملكوته و ذلك بمطالعة العقليات الدائمات و الابتهاج بها دون الحسيات الدائرات و التلذذ بها.

و أما الثاني فهو غم السوداوي فلأن حاله بالضد من ذلك و الأسباب في حقه أضداد لتلك الأسباب فإن جوهر روحه قليل المقدار ضعيف الكيفية فينفع من الأسباب المؤذية و الغامة لاستعداده للغم فيكون قوي التخيل مصروفا في الأمور البعيدة المستقبلية لأن روحه التي في البطن الأوسط من الدماغ تخفف حركتها بجفافها لما يفيد السوءاء من اليبس. ثم إنه لقوة تخيله تصور الأشباه و المحاكيات للأمور الموحشة و الغامة فكانه يشاهدها قائمة في الخارج واقعة عليه فيكثر غمه و أكثر ما في هذه الفصول إنما نقلناها عن المقالة التي جمعها الشيخ في الأدوية القلبية. و هذه المسائل و إن كانت أنسب بالطبيعات إذ كان المنظور إليه فيها ما يعرض الجسم من حيث انفعاله و لكن نظرنا فيها إلى نحو الوجود لأنواع الكيفيات النفسانية و أحوالها و عوارضها و ما يطابقها و ما يوازها من أحوال الجسم و عوارضه و هذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٢

آخر الكلام في هذا القسم من الكيفيات

القسم الرابع في الكيفيات المختصة بالكميات و فيه ثلاث مقالات

و قبل الشروع فيها نورد بحثين

الأول في معرفة حقيقة هذا النوع

و هي أنه كيفية تعرض أولا للكمية و بواسطتها للجسم.

فإن قلت الخلقة عبارة عن مجموع اللون و الشكل و هي تعرض أولا للجسم الطبيعي فإنه ما لم يكن جسم طبيعي لم يكن هناك خلقة قيل الأمور العارضة لكمية - منها ما هي عارضة لها بما هي هي و منها ما هي عارضة بما هي كمية شيء مخصوص - كالفطوسة و هي التعيير العارض لمقدار جسم مخصوص هو الأنف و في كلا القسمين يكون العارض من عوارض الكمية عند كثير من العلماء.

و أما أنا فأقول أما الكيفيات النفسانية فمعلوم أنها ليست من عوارض الكم - و أما الاستعدادية و اللا استعدادية فليست حاملها العمق و بتوسطه الجسم بل يحملها المادة المنفصلة بتوسط صورة توجبها و أما المحسوسة فهي أيضا مما يوجبها انفعالات الجسم المادي بما هو مادي منفعل فلا بد أن يكون المختصة بالكميات مما ليس فيه انفعال أصلا. فيرد الإشكال علينا في أمرين أحدهما الخلقة أنها من أي الكيفيات فأقول الخلقة يشبه أن يكون وحدتها غير حقيقية لأنها ملتزمة من أمرين من الشكل و هو من الكيفية المختصة بالمقدار و من اللون و هو من الكيفية المحسوسة و ثانيهما اللون فإن حامله هو السطح كما عرفت فإن الجسم بنفسه غير ملون بل معنى كونه ملونا أن سطحه ملون فإذا يتوجه هاهنا أن يكون اللون و كذا الضوء داخلين في هذا النوع لأن حاملهما الأول هو السطح مع أنهما داخلان تحت النوع المسمى بالانفعاليات و الانفعالات فيكون الحقيقة الواحدة داخلية تحت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٣

جنسين و هو محال و هذا الإشكال مما استصعبه بعض.

فأقول هما من عوارض السطح لكن من جهة ما يعرض لجسمه من مزاجه المخصوص و لو كانا من عوارض السطح لذاته لكان كل سطح ملونا مضيئا و ليس كذلك.

و البحث الثاني في أقسامه و هي أربعة

في المشهور الأول الشكل و هو ما أحاط به حد أو حدود إحاطة تامة و الزاوية و هي ما أحاط به خطان يلتقيان عند النقطة أو ما أحاط به سطح أو سطوح ينتهي بنقطة أو يتلاقى عند نقطة إحاطة غير تامة.

الثاني ما ليس بشكل و لا زاوية مثل الاستقامة و الاستدارة.

و الثالث هو المسمى عندهم بالخلقة و هي ما يحصل من اجتماع اللون و الشكل.

و الرابع الكيفيات العارضة للعدد مثل الزوجية و الفردية و الترييع و التجذير و التكعيب.

ثم المسائل المهمة التي يجب أن يبحث عنها في هذا الموضوع هي هذه أحدها أن يعرف المعنى الجامع لهذا الجنس و ثانيها النظر فيما قيل من الرسم المشهور و ثالثها تحقيق الحال في أن الشكل من الكيف و ليس من الوضع و رابعها حال الزاوية أنها في أي مقولة هي واقعة و خامسها حال الخلقة و أنها كيف وقوعها في جنس واحد - من أنواع عند القائلين به و سادسها حال ما يجري مجراه إذا اتفق إن كان يصدق عليه مقولتان فإلى أيهما ينسب الواحد الحاصل من الجملة.

أما البحث عن المعرفة فقد أشرنا إليه فيدخل في التعريف الشكل و الاستقامة و الانحناء و التسطیح و التحديد و التكعيب و التعيير و الزوجية و الفردية و أما الاعتراض عليه بحال اللون فقد دفعناه و كذا أشرنا إلى وجه الدفع في

انتقاض التعريف بالخلقة - من أنها ليست ذات وحدة حقيقية و كل مركب ليس ذا وحدة حقيقية فلا بأس باندرجاه تحت جنسين لكن الشيخ لم يسلك هذا المسلك و إلا لزم كون الخلقة بالذات من هذا النوع و إن كان أحد جزئيه من نوع آخر.

فقال إن الأمور التي تعرض للكمية منها ما يعرض للكمية نفسها لا بشرط أنها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٤

كمية لشيء و منها ما يعرض للكمية في نفسها بشرط أنها كمية لشيء فيكون الكمية هي المعروض الأولى له في ذلك الشيء ثم الشيء فليس إذا كان لا يعرض له أمر - إلا و هو كمية شيء يجب أن يكون إذا عرض له الأمر لم يكن عروضه أولياً فإنه لا سواء قولنا إن الكمية يعرض له الأمر عند ما يكون في شيء و قولنا إن الكمية إنما يعرض لها الأمر لأنها في الشيء الذي عرض له الأمر كما لو قال أحد في النفس لا يعرض لها النسيان إلا و هي في البدن لم يدل ذلك على أن النسيان إنما يعرض للبدن و بتوسطه للنفس كما أن الحركة تعرض للبدن و بتوسطه يقال على بعض قوى النفس ثم اللون حامله الأول هو السطح كما هو المشهور.

و تحقق في العلم الطبيعي أن الجسم في نفسه غير ملون بل معنى أنه ملون أن سطحه ملون فالخلقة تلتئم من شيء حامله السطح بذاته أو ما يحيط به السطح و هذا الشيء هو الشكل و شيء حامله السطح و لكن كونه نهاية لجسم ما طبيعي و هذا الشيء هو اللون فإذا الخلقة تلتئم من أمرين حاملهما الأول هو الكم و بسببه يقال على الجسم انتهى ما ذكره الشيخ.

و قد عرفت ما فيه و أما سائر الأبحاث فيجيء في بعض الفصول

المقالة الأولى في الاستقامة والاستدارة و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في حقيقتهما

قد عرفت استقامة الخط بكونه بحيث أي نقطة فرضت فيه كانت بالكلية على سمت واحد أي لا يكون بعضها أرفع و بعضها أخفض و هذا التعريف منسوب إلى أقليدوس - و قد عرفت أيضاً بكونه أقصر الخطوط الواصلة بين نقطتين و هذا منسوب إلى أرشميدس - و يرد الإشكال إما على تعريف أقليدوس فللزوم الدور فإن كون النقطة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٥

المفروضة أو الموجودة على سمت واحد معناه على بعد واحد و هو معنى الخط المستقيم بعينه و إما على تعريف أرشميدس فبأن المستدير يمتنع أن يصير مستقيماً فإذا امتنع ذلك امتنع التطبيق بينهما و إذا امتنع التطابق امتنع الحكم بأن أحدهما أقصر أو أزيد و سيأتي ما فيه.

و الحق أن المطلوب بديهي و التعريفات للتنبيه على بعض الخصوصيات و قد عرفت أيضاً المستقيم بأنه الذي يطابق أجزاءه بعضها بعضاً على جميع الأوضاع فإن المستدير إذا قطع منه شيء فربما ينطبق عليه في بعض الأوضاع كما إذا جعل محدب كلا القوسين في جهة واحدة دون وضع آخر كما إذا جعل محدب أحدهما في غير جانب محدب الآخر. و قد عرفت بوجه رابع و هو أنه الذي إذا ثبت نهايته و أدير لم يتغير وضعه - يعني أنه إذا قتل لم يتغير وضعه و أما

القوس فعند الفتل يتغير الجهة المحدبة إلى غير وضعها و بوجه خامس هو ما يمكن أن يستر طرفه وسطه إذا وقع طرفه في مقابلة إحدى العينين بعد ضم الأخرى و المناقشة في كل منها مدفوعة بما ذكرناه و هذه التعاريف ما خلا الرابع جارية في السطح المستوي

فصل (٢) في معرفة الدائرة وإثبات وجودها

اعلم أن هذا الجنس من الكيفيات التي في الكميات بعضها عارضة للمنفعلة و بعضها للمتعصل أما التي للمنفصل فبعضها معلومة الوجود بالضرورة لا يحتاج إلى حجة كالزوجية و الفردية و غير ذلك و بعضها نظرية يبرهن عليه في صناعة الحساب و أما عرضيتها فلكونها من عوارض العدد و هو عرض و عارض العرض أولى بأن يكون عرضا و أما التي تعرض للمقادير فليس وجودها ضروريا بينا و ليس للمهندس أن يبرهن على وجودها جميعا بل له أن يأخذ بعضها عن الفيلسوف على طريق التسلم و يبرهن على وجود الباقي كما في القياسات الاستثنائية التي مقدمها الاستثنائية كانت ثابتة في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٦

موضع آخر فإن سائر الأشكال إنما يبين له بوضع الدائرة و تسليم وجودها فإن المثلث الذي هو أول أشكالها المسطحة يصح وجوده إن صحت الدائرة و كذا المربع و الخمس و سائر الأشكال المسطحة و المجسمة.

و أما الكرة

فإنما يصح وجودها على طريق المهندسين إذا أدير دائرة في دائرة و الأسطواني إذا حركت دائرة حركة يلزم فيها مركزها في أول الوضع لزوما على الاستقامة و المخروط إذا حرك مثلثا قائم الزاوية على أحد ضلعي القائمة حافظا لطرف ذلك الضلع مركز الدائرة و دائرا بالضلع الثاني على محيط الدائرة.

أما تعريف الدائرة

فهو سطح مستوي يحيط به خط واحد يفرض في داخله نقطة كل الخطوط المستقيمة الخارجة منها إليه متساوية و تقييد النقطة بالدخول غير لازم في التعريف فإنه لو قيل الدائرة سطح يحيط به خط واحد يمكن أن يفرض نقطة كل الخطوط الخارجة منها إليه متساوية لكان صحيحا.

و اعلم أنه لا شك في وجود الخط المستقيم و أما الدائرة فقد أنكرها أكثر مثبتي الجزء الذي لا يتجزى فوجب على الحكيم دون غيره كما عرفت بأن يقيم البرهان على وجودها و للحكماء في إثبات الدائرة حجج ثلاث - الأولى أنا إذا تخيلنا بسيطا مستويا و خطا مرسوما في ذلك البسيط و تخيلنا إحدى نقطتيه ثابتة و الأخرى متحركة حولها إلى أن يعود إلى الموضع الذي بدئت منه فإنه يحدث دائرة لأن ما رسمته النقطة مسافة لا عرض لها فهي إذن خط مستدير و الأبعاد في جميع الجوانب من النقطة الثابتة إلى ذلك المستدير متساوية لأنها بمقدار ذلك المستقيم فثبت القول بالدائرة. و ثانيها أن الأجسام البسيطة أشكالها الطبيعة كما ستعرفه هي كرات و إذا قطعت الكرة بسطح مستوي حدثت لا محالة دائرة.

و ثالثها أنا إذا فرضنا جسما ثقيلا و نجعل أحد طرفيه أثقل من الآخر - و نجعله قائما على السطح قياما معتدلا مماسا له بطرف الأخف فلا شك أن الطرف الملاقي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٧

منه للسطح يماس بنقطة منه نقطة من السطح إذا أميل ذلك الجسم حتى سقط فلا يخلو إما أن يثبت تلك النقطة التي منه بمنزله رأس المخروط موضعها أو لا يثبت - فإن ثبت فكل واحد من النقط التي فرضت في رأس المتحرك قد فعلت ربع دائرة وإن لم يثبت فلا يخلو إما أن يكون مع حركة هذا الطرف إلى أسفل يتحرك الطرف الآخر إلى فوق فيكون كل نقطة فرضت في جانبي ذلك الجسم بل في قسميه الصاعد والهابط قد فعلت دائرة فيحصل من هذه النقاط دوائر بعضها محيطة بالأخرى - و مركز الجميع هي النقطة المحدودة بين القسم الصاعد والهابط أو يكون غير صاعد بل متحركا على السطح منجرا على بعد منه فيفعل الطرف الآخر خطا منحنيا غير مستدير وهذا الشق محال لأن هذا الانجرار ليس طبيعيا ولا أيضا قسريا لأن القاسر ليس إلا أن الطرف العالي لثقله يحرك إلى الأسفل وليس يدفع هذا الطرف إلى تلك الجهة بل إن دفعه على حفظ الاتصال ودفعه على خلاف جهة حركة العالي - كان ذلك لثقل العالي و اتصاله بالسافل فيضطر إلى ترفع السافل حتى يهبط منحدرًا فينقسم الجسم إلى قسمين فيعود ما ذكرناه من وجود الدائرة بل الدوائر وإذا ثبت الدائرة ثبت المثلثات و القوائم الزاوية و المربع و المستطيل و بإثباتها يثبت المجسمات. أما الكرة فمن الدائر كما وصفنا و أما المخروط بأقسامه من قائم الزاوية وحادها ومنفرجها فمن أقسام المثلث و أما المكعب فمن المربع و أما الأسطوانة فمن المستطيل - وإذا ثبت الدائرة ثبت المنحني أيضا و ذلك إذا قطع المخروط أو الأسطوانة بسطح محارف غير مواز للقاعدة و لا قائم عليها و قد علمت في بيان اتصال الجسم إلزام القائلين بالجزء للاعتراف بوجود الدائرة على طريقتهن وإذا ثبت الدائرة على أصلهم بطل أصلهم من إثبات الجزء بإقامة الحجج الهندسية عليهم بإلزامهم كون مربع قطر المربع مساويا لضعف مربع ضلعه فيلزم عليهم النسب الصمية في كثير من المقادير و لا يمكن تلك النسبة في العدد مطلقا و بإلزامهم قسمة الخط على أي وجه أريد مثل أن يكون بحيث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٨

ضرب مجموعة في أحد قسميه كمربع القسم الآخر و لا يمكن تلك في كل عدد بل في بعض الأعداد إلى غير ذلك

فصل (٣) في أن المستقيم و المستدير يتخالفان نوعا و تحقيق أن الكيفية بأي معنى يكون فصلا للكمية

أما [المطلب] الأول

فنقول لا شبهة في أن بين أفراد المستقيم و المستدير تخالفا فهو إما بالعوارض الخارجية أو بالفصول الذاتية لكن الأول باطل و ذلك لأن الموصوف بالاستقامة أعني الخط لا يخلو إما أن يجوز عند العقل بقاؤه و زوال وصف الاستقامة - و جريان وصف الانحناء عليه أو لا يجوز إذ لا واسطة بينهما لا جائز أن يبقى الخط بعينه في الحالين جميعا و ذلك لأن الخط نهاية السطح و عارضة كما أن السطح نهاية الجسم و عارضة و لا يمكن أن يتغير حال النهاية إلا و يتغير حال ذي النهاية فما لم يتغير حال السطح في انبساطه و تماديه لا يمكن أن يتبدل حال الخط من الاستقامة إلى الاستدارة أو بالعكس و ما لم يتغير حال الجسم في انبساطه و تماديه لا يمكن أن يتبدل حال السطح فإن الكري من الجسم غير المكعب و الدائرة من السطح غير المربع و إذا صار المعروض معروضا آخر بالعدد كان العارض غير العارض الأول بالعدد فإذا امتنع بقاء المستقيم من الخط بعينه مع زوال الاستقامة فعلم أن الاستقامة إما فصله أو لازم فصله و كذا

المستدير من الخط يستحيل زوال استدراته إلى الاستقامة أو إلى استدارة أخرى مع بقاءه بعينه. فعلم أن الاستدارة و كذا أفرادها المتخالفة في شدة التقويس و ضعفها فصول ذاتية أو لوازمها فالدوائر المختلفة بالعظم والصغر متخالفة بالنوع و على هذا القياس أحوال السطوح في استوائها و تحديباتها من أنها مقومات و منوعات لا عوارض و مصنفات فمحيطات الكرات المختلفة بالعظم و الصغر متخالفة بالنوع فالجسم إذا انحنى بعد ما لم يكن فلا بد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٦٩

هناك من تفرق اتصال و تقطع انبساطه يوجب كون السطح منقسماً إلى سطوح و كذا المستوي من السطح إذا التوى يوجب انقسام الخط إلى الخطوط و القسمة في المقادير توجب إبطالها فإن السطح الواحد لا يجوز أن يكون موضوعاً للانبساط و الانزواء و لا الخط الواحد موضوعاً للطول و القصر و لا الجسم التعليمي الواحد يجوز أن يصير موضوعاً للعظم و الصغر بل التخلخل معناه كون المادة الأولى مما يتوارد عليه أفراد المقادير.

و أما المطلب الثاني

فاعلم: أن الفصول البسيطة مجهولة الأسامي إلا باللوازم و لا يجوز أن يكون ماهية الفصل غير ماهية الجنس بل الفصول بالحقيقة هي وجودات مخصوصة يلزمها ماهية الجنس و ليس لزوم الجنس لها و عروضه إياها عروضاً خارجياً أو ذهنياً بمعنى أن يكون للعارض وجود و للمعروض وجود آخر بل وجود الفصول بعينه نحو من أنحاء وجود الجنس لكن العقل بضرب من التحليل يحكم بالمغايرة بينهما من جهة التعيين و الإبهام كما بين الوجود الشخصي و الماهية النوعية. **إذا تقرر هذا فنقول** لكل وجود فصل لازم مخصوص كما أن له لازماً مشتركاً هو المعنى الجنس فلما لم يمكن التعبير عن الوجود و التسمية له عبر عنه بلازمه المخصوص و سمي باسمه لما مر في صدر هذا الكتاب أن الوجودات الخاصة بمجهولة الأسامي و إنما الأسامي للمعاني الذهنية و الكليات المعقولة فإذن قد ظهر أن مثل الاستقامة و الاستدارة و الكروية و التكعب و سائر الأشكال و الزوايا التي هي من باب الكيف ليست بفصول ذاتية بالحقيقة للكم المتصل و كذا الزوجية و الفردية و التشارك و التباين و المجذورية و الأصمية ليست بفصول بالحقيقة للكم المنفصل بل إنما هي لوازم فصول و علامات لها أقيمت مقامها فلا يلزم هاهنا كون ماهية واحدة تحت مقولتين بالذات و الآخر بالعرض.

تفريع.

الدوائر المختلفة بالصغر و الكبير مختلفة لما علمت أنه يستحيل أن ينتقل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٠

الخط الواحد من انعطاف مخصوص إلى انعطاف آخر مع بقاءه في الحالين - فكان ذلك الانعطاف المخصوص من لوازم ماهية النوعية فما قاله المهندسون إن وتر الزاوية القائمة من كل دائرة هو ربع الدور و مقداره تسعون درجة و كذا مقدار نصفه دائماً خمس و أربعون درجة و هو وتر نصف القائمة من القسي ليس مما يوجب أن يكون أرباع الدوائر المختلفة بالعظم و الصغر متساوية بل يلزم أن تكون متشابهة لاتحادها في الزاوية التي هي أوتارها أو في النسبة إلى كل الدور فالاتحاد بين تلك القسي ليس في الماهية و لوازمها بل في أمر خارج فهي ليست متماثلة بل متشابهة أو متناسبة و كذا

الحكم في سائر أجزاء الدوائر المتناسبة من القسي

فصل (٤) في أن المستقيم والمستدير ليسا متضادين

و ذلك لوجهين أحدهما أن الموضوع القريب للاستقامة والاستدارة ليس واحدا بالعدد كما عرفت و وحدة الموضوع القريب شرط للتضاد بين أمرين و الوجه الآخر أن بين المتضادين غاية التخالف فالمستقيم وإن كان في غاية التخالف عن المستدير لكن ليس كل مستدير في غاية التخالف عن المستقيم و أحد الشئيين إذا كان ضدا للآخر يكون الآخر ضدا له فلو كان مطلق الاستقامة مضادا لمطلق الاستدارة لكان المستقيم الشخصي يضاده مستدير شخصي واحد فإن ضد الواحد بالشخص واحد بالشخص كما أن ضد الواحد بالعموم واحد بالعموم و ليس الأمر هاهنا كذلك - فإن كل خط مستقيم مشار إليه أمكن أن يصير و ترا القسي غير متناهية لا تشابه بين اثنين منها و ليس فيها ما هو على غاية البعد من المستقيم و ضد الواحد لا يكون إلا واحدا كما مر فلم يكن شيء منها ضدا له و إذا لم يكن شيء من تلك القسي ضدا للوتر - فلم يكن الوتر أيضا ضدا له إذ التضاد من النسب المتكررة في الجانبين فإذا لم يوجد مستدير يكون في غاية الخلاف عن المستقيم لم يثبت بينهما فكذا بين المستديرات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧١

بطريق أولى

فصل (٥) فيما قيل من منع النسبة بين المستقيم والمستدير من المساواة والمفاضلة

قالوا لا يمكن المساواة بينهما مستدلين بأن المستقيم لما امتنع أن يصير مستديرا فامتنع أن يصير منطبقا عليه فإذا امتنع الانطباق بينهما امتنع أن يوصف أحدهما بأنه مساو للآخر أو أزيد أو أنقص فلا يوصف بأنه نصفه أو ثلثه أو عاد له أو مشارك له.

و أورد عليهم أنا نعلم يقينا أن الوتر أقصر من قوسه و أن القسي المتحدة الوتر بعضها أقصر من الأخرى. فأجاب بعضهم تارة بعدم تسليم ذلك كما بين الخط و السطح و الجسم و سائر الأجناس المتخالفة و تارة بتسليم مطلق الزيادة و النقصان دون تجويز المساواة - كما يعلم يقينا أن كل زاوية مستقيمة الخطين أعظم من زاوية حادة عن قوس و خط مستقيم مماس له و أصغر من زاوية تحدث بين قطر الدائرة و محيطه لكن يستحيل أن يقع المساواة بين مستقيمة الخطين و مختلفهما.

و صاحب المباحث رجع الأول فقال و الأولى أن يمنع كون القوس أعظم من الوتر كيف و الأعظم ما يوجد فيه الأصغر و ليس يمكن أن يوجد في القوس مثل الوتر - بل ذلك بحسب الوهم و أن المستدير لو أمكن صيرورته مستقيما لكان حينئذ يوجد فيه مثله و زيادة و لما لم يكن ذلك كان التفاوت بحسب وهم غير ممكن الوجود.

أقول لقائل أن يقول هم صرحوا بأن التطبيق بين الدائرة و الخط المستقيم - وإن لم يمكن بحسب الإن دفعه لأن الملاقة بينهما في كل أن لا يمكن إلا بنقطة لكن يمكن الانطباق بينهما بحسب الزمان كما في الكرة المدحرجة على سطح مستو فإن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٢

كان كذلك أمكن اتصافهما بالمساواة و المفاضلة و لذلك عرف أرشميدس الخط المستقيم بما سبق ثم استحاله أن يصير شيء شيئا آخر لا يستلزم استحاله انطباقه عليه - لكن يمكن دفعه بأن اشتغال الزائد على المثل بالقوة القريبة من الفعل معتبر في المفاضلة و ذلك متنف هاهنا إذ ليس بعض المستدير مماثلا في الماهية للمستقيم.

اللهم إلا أن يقال إن المماثلة بينهما باعتبار الجنس القريب المأخوذ مجردا عن الزوائد العقلية [الفصلية] من الاستقامة و الاستدارة أعني المقدار الخطي المنقسم في جهة واحدة فقط دون غيرها من المخصصات فإن هذه التعليميات أمور خيالية - للوهم أن يجردوها عن الموارد و نحن نعلم أن الخيال يقدر أن يصير المنحني مستقيما و المستقيم منحنيا مع بقاءه و إن لم يمكن للخيال أن يتخيل مطلق المقدار مجردا عن خصوصيات الخطية و السطحية و الجسمية لشدة إبهامه الجنسي.

فلأجل ذلك ساغ القول بوجود النسبة بين الخطين المختلفين و السطحين المختلفين بوجه من الوجوه كما في الوجود الزماني أو بحسب الخيال لا بحسب الخارج و لا في الوجود الدفعي.

و هذا ما يمكن أن يقال و بالله التوفيق

المقالة الثانية في الشكل و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في تعريفه

قد عرفه المهندسون بأنه الذي يحيط به حد واحد أو حدود و هو مسطح و مجسم - و ذو الحد إذا كان سطحاً كان حده خطأ و إذا كان جسماً كان حده سطحاً و أما النقطة فلم يكن حداً للشكل إذ الهيئة الحاصلة للخط باعتبار كونه محدوداً بنقطتين لا يسمى شكلاً و لا الخط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٣

باعتباره و إن كانت إحاطتهما بالخط تامة لا كما زعمه بعضهم أنه يخرج بقيد كون الإحاطة تامة أما كون المحيط حداً واحداً فكما للدائرة و الكرة و أما كونه حدوداً متعددة فكما للمربع و المكعب و كما لنصف الدائرة و نصف الكرة إذا كانت الحدود مختلفة.

فإذا تقرر ذلك فنقول في كل شكل أمور ثلاثة أحدها الموضوع - و الثاني حده أو حدوده و الثالث الهيئة الحاصلة فيه. فالمربع مثلاً حقيقة ملتزمة من سطح و حدود أربعة و هيئة مخصوصة يسمى بالتربيع و هي مغايرة لذلك السطح و الحدود و لذلك لا يحمل عليه و عليها و لا شيء منهما يحمل عليه.

فلا يقال التربيع ما يحيط به الحدود الأربعة و لا العكس و لا التربيع هو السطح و لا العكس لأن المربع عبارة عن سطح يوصف بكذا و كذا و لا شك أن السطح و إن أخذ مع ألف قيد فإنه لا يخرج من كونه سطحاً فظهر أن هذه المقادير المحدودة ليست من باب الكيف و لا يجوز أن يكون المركب من المقدار و الهيئة المخصوصة من باب الكيف و إن لم يكن من باب الكم أيضاً لما علمت من امتناع كون ماهية واحدة تحت مقولتين أو جنسين متباينين و قد علمت أيضاً أن ما يعد من الفصول الذاتية لأنواع المقادير و الأعداد ليست هذه الكيفيات بل هي أمور مجهولة تعرف بهذه اللوازم و لا استحالة في كون بعض المقولات لازماً لبعض أخرى في الوجود فإذن قد وضح أن الذي يمكن أن يعد من باب الكيف هو الهيئة العارضة فإذا ثبت هذا فيشبه أن الرسوم المذكورة في الأشكال غير محققة للأمور التي هي من باب الكيف بل

لما يستعمله المهندسون و كذا الأحكام فيقولون هذا الشكل مساو لشكل آخر أو أعظم أو أصغر أو نصفه أو ثلثه كما يقولون أن المسدس على الدائرة أعظم منها و الذي في الدائرة أصغر منها و أن الزاوية القائمة في المثلث المتساوي الساقين ضعف كل من الباقيين و كل منها نصفها فإنما يعنون بذلك المقدار المشكل لا شكله لأن الشيء الذي يحيط به الحدود بالذات هو المقدار و المقدار كم بالذات و الشكل كيف و كيف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٤

ليس بكم فإن المربع غير التربيعة و المدور غير التدوير.
أقول بقي هاهنا شيء آخر و هو أنه كما أن الواحد قد يعنى به نفس الواحد بما هو واحد و قد يعنى به شيء آخر هو واحد و كذا المضاف قد يعنى به نفس المضاف لا مقولة أخرى كالجوهر أو الكم أو غيرهما هو المضاف و قد يعنى به شيء آخر هو ذو إضافة - كذا الأب الموصوفة بأنه أب فكذا الحكم هاهنا فالمثلث يمكن أن يراد به نفس المثلث لا شيء آخر ذو تثليث كما يقال أبيض و يعنى به العارض فحينئذ لم يبق بين الشكل و المشكل فرق و أيضا لو فرض مقدار المثلث مجردا عن المادة كما في التخيل لا يحتاج في كونه مثلثا إلى كيفية عارضة له حتى يصير بها مثلثا بل ذاته بذاته مثلث و تثليث أي ما به يكون الشيء مثلثا.

و أما إن أريد بهذه الأشكال نفس المعاني المصدرة الانتزاعية فليست حينئذ إلا أمرا عقليا اعتباريا من باب النسب الإضافية العقلية كالشيئية و الجوهرية و أمثالها - فالمهندس يريد بالأشكال نفس هذه المقادير المحدودة فهي إشكال و مشكلات كما وصفنا و أما غيرهم فيريدون بالشكل المعنى العارض للمواد الطبيعية المأخوذ مفهومه من حالة انفعالية تعرض للجسم الطبيعي من جهة مقداره.

هذا ما تيسر لنا في تحقيق هذا المقام و هو ثاني تلك الأبحاث المشكلة لكننا نقول يشتهيه أمر هذه الهيئة الشكلية بأمر الوضع و هو ثالث الأبحاث الخمسة المذكورة في صدر الكلام في هذا النوع فلتكلم فيه

فصل (٢) في أن الهيئة المذكورة هل هي من الكيف أو من الوضع

أما وجه الاشتباه بين الشكل و الوضع فلأن الشكل هيئة حاصلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٥

في المقدار أو المتقدر من جهة إحاطة حده أو حدوده به و أن الوضع باعتبار أحد معانيه - هو الهيئة الحاصلة للشيء بسبب نسبة أجزائه بعضها إلى بعض و لا شك أن التربيعة مثلا هيئة حاصلة للشيء بسبب نسبة أطرافه و حدوده إليه فهو من الوضع.

و أما وجه الحل فنقول قد عرض هذا الغلط من جهة اشتراك الاسم في معاني الوضع فيقال وضع لحصول الشيء في موضعه و هذا هو نفس مقولة الأين و يقال لكون الشيء مجاورا لشيء من جهة مخصوصة كما يقال هذا الخط عن يمين ذلك الخط و هذا المعنى نوع من مقولة المضاف بل هو نفس المجاورة و لا شك أن ماهيته معقولة بالقياس إلى غيره و يقال وضع للهيئة الحاصلة للجسم بسبب نسبة بعض أجزائه إلى بعض في الجهات بسبب حصول الوضع الإضافي لأجزائه حتى إذا وجدت أجزاؤه على إضافي ما لبعضها إلى بعض حصل للكل بسبب ذلك هيئة و هي الوضع.

فهذا المعنى هو المقولة فالمجاورة المخصوصة صفة للأجزاء من باب الإضافة - و الوضع صفة للمجموع فإن الجلوس نوع من الوضع صفة للجالس ب كله و المجاورة المخصوصة بين كل عضو منه و عضو آخر هي صفة للأعضاء و مع ذلك لا بد أن يكون لها نسبة إلى ما يخرج عنها إذ لو ثبت نسب الأعضاء و بقية الأجزاء الداخلة على نسبها و زالت النسبة بينها و بين الخارج عن جواهرها لم يكن الجالس جالسا.

فإذا تقرر هذا فمن قال إن الشكل هو الوضع فقد غلط من وجوه.

أحدها أنه أخذ الحدود مكان الأجزاء و إنما الاعتبار في الوضع بالأجزاء و في الشكل بالحدود.

و ثانيها أنه زعم أن هذا الوضع من المقولة الخاصة و ليس كذلك بل من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٦

المضاف و الذي من المقولة هو وضع أجزاء الشيء عند شيء خارج أو مباين لا وضع أجزاءه في نفسه.

و ثالثها أنه زعم أن الشيء إذا كان متعلقا بمقولة فهو منها و ليس كذلك فإن المربع لا يحصل إلا بعدد الخطوط و ليس المربع عددا بل مقدارا فالتربيع و إن حصل من وضع بين حدوده لا يلزم أن يكون من الوضع فلم يكن الشكل داخلا في مقولة الوضع.

فإن قلت أليسوا جعلوا الكيف ما لا يوجب تصوره تصور غيره و هيئة التربيع يوجب تصورها تصور غيرها فإن تلك الهيئة لا يمكن تصورها إلا عند تصور النسب بين أطراف المربع التي لا يعقل إلا بعد تعقل السطح و أطرافه.

قلنا هذه الكيفية أعني الشكل ليس أن تصورها مما يتضمن تصور غيرها و إن كان تصورها بسبب تصور غيرها و بين المعنيين فرق فإن الشكل هيئة تحصل للشيء بسبب هيئة نسبية تحصل بين أطرافه لا أنه بعينه تلك الهيئة النسبية بل الشكل صفة قارة - و ما بين الحدود إضافات كالميمنية و الميسرية و الفوقية و التحتية و غيرها من صفات المجاورة.

فقد علم أن الشكل لا يتعلق بالوضع بمعنى المقولة بل بالوضع الذي من الإضافة على وجه السببية لا الدخول.

ثم إن الدائرة لا يتعلق بهذا الوضع أيضا بل يتم حقيقتها بأن لحددها هيئة خاصة في الانحناء و أما هيئة محيط الدائرة و محيط الكرة و أمثالها فهي هيئات بسيطة من هذا الباب و إن لم يسم إشكالا لعدم صدق الرسوم عليها إلا أن يعمم في التعريف.

و قيل الشكل هيئة تحصل للمقدار من جهة كونه محدودا بحد أو من جهة كونه حدا للمحدود

فصل (٣) في حال الزاوية و أنها من أي مقولة هي و هو البحث الرابع

أما الفرق بينها و بين الشكل

فبأن الزاوية إنما هي زاوية لأجل كون المقدار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٧

محدودا بين حدين أو حدود متلاقية بحد فالمسطحة مثلا هو الشيء الذي يحيط به حدان متلاقيان بنقطة سواء أحاط معهما ثالث أو رابع أو لا يحيط فإن لم يحط معهما ثالث - فلا يخلو أيضا حداه يلتقيان عند حد مشترك آخر لهما أو لا يلتقيان بالفعل سواء التقيا إذا مدا أو لم يلتقيا و لو مدا في الوهم إلى غير النهاية فإن التقيا فيكون كمحيطي الإهليلجي و

الهلالى والنعلى و غير ذلك.

فالسطح الذي لا يتحدد بثالث

فحاله من حيث كونه بين حدين متلاقين أو هو من تلك الحيشية زاوية و الذي يتحدد بحد أو حدود غيرهما أو يتحدد بحددين يلتقيان في الجانبين فحاله تلك أو هو من تلك الحيشية شكل فإن لم يعتبر كون السطح و إن أحيط به في جميع الجوانب الإحالة من جهة حديه الملتقيين بنقطة واحدة كان بهذا الاعتبار زاوية و بالاعتبار المذكور شكلا فالنظر في السطح بكونه بين حدين يلتقيان عند نقطة غير النظر فيه بكونه محدودا في جميع الجوانب سواء كان بخط كالدائرة أو بخطين كنصفها و كالأهليلجى.

فالأول اعتبار الزاوية و الثاني اعتبار الشكل فالحد نظير الحد و المقدار نظير المقدار و الهيئة نظير الهيئة فكما أن المهندس إذا قال شكل ذهب إلى المشكل فكذا إذا قال زاوية كان المراد السطح ذا الزاوية.

و كذا إذا قيل منصفة أو مضعفة أو عظمى أو صغرى و كذا الكلام في الزوايا المجسمة بحسب الاعتبارات المذكورة فإذا يمكن أن يظن أحد أن الخلاف في أن الزاوية كم أو كيف بعينه الخلاف في كون الشكل كما أو كيفا حتى يرجع إلى تخالف اصطلاحى المهندسين و غيرهم لو لا شيء يمنع عن ذلك و هو أن ذا الزاوية المسطحة لا ينقسم إلا في جهة واحدة و هي الجهة التي بين الضلعين المحيطين لا الجهة الأخرى التي بين الرأس و القاعدة.

و كذا المجسمة لا تنقسم إلا في جهتين دون الثالثة التي بين رأس المخروط و قاعدته فهذا مما يوجب الشك في أمر الزاوية هل المسطحة منها هي عين السطح

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٨

و المجسمة عين الجسم عند المهندس أو غيرهما.

و كذا الهيئة العارضة

هل عرضت للسطح في المسطحة و للجسم في المجسمة أو غيرهما و لأجل هذا الشك قد تكلف بعض الناس بما لا يعنيه و هو أن الزاوية جنس آخر من الكم متوسط بين الخط و السطح و في المجسمة بين السطح و الجسم ظانا أن الخط يتكون عن حركة النقطة و السطح من حركة الخط بتمامه و كليته على عمود عرضا فإذا ثبت أحد طرفيه و يحرك فعل شيء بين الخط و السطح و كذلك بين السطح و الجسم و هو توهم فاسد فإن المقدار الذي بين الخطين سطح بالضرورة لانقسامه إلى جهتين من حيث هو سطح و كذا المقدار الذي عند تلاقي السطوح إلى نقطة تقبل القسمة إلى ثلاث جهات بالضرورة فهو جسم بالضرورة و إن كان سطح الزاوية من حيث هو ذو زاوية أو زاوية لا يقبل الانقسام إلا في جهة و كذا قياس الجسم الذي هو ذو زاوية أو زاوية لا ينقسم إلا في جهتين دون أخرى.

فالحق أن الزاوية المسطحة عند المهندس سطح محدود في الواقع اعتبر تحديد بعض جهاته دون بعض باعتبار هيئة عارضة له و عند الطبيعي نفس تلك الهيئة العارضة للسطح بالاعتبار المذكور.

و كذا في المجسمة فهذا هو حال البحث الرابع من تلك الأبحاث و هاهنا شيء آخر و هو أن الهيئة الحاصلة للمقدار الجسمى باعتبار وقوعه بين سطحين يلتقيان عند خط سواء كان أحدهما قائما على آخر قياما معتدلا أو مائلا إليه أو عنه هل يسمى زاوية مجسمة أم لا.

قال الشيخ في قاطيغورياس الشفاء بالحري أن يكون هاهنا معنى جامع للزاوية التي عن خطين و التي عن سطوح عند نقطة و التي عن سطحين عند خط و يكون هذا المعنى الجامع كون المقدار ذا حدود فوق واحدة ينتهي عند حد واحد مشترك لها من حيث هو كذلك - فإن حصل اسم الزاوية لهذا المعنى الجامع لم يكن بعيدا عن الصواب و كان انتهاء الزاوية المجسمة عند النقطة لا لأنه زاوية إذ له من تلك الحيثية أن ينتهي حدوده

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٧٩

عند حد واحد ثم عرض إن كانت الحدود خطوطا عرض إن كانت النهاية نقطة ثم إن أبي أحد هذا و جعل اسم الزاوية للمقدار من حيث هو منته إلى نقطة لم أناقشه فيه و صار معنى الزاوية أخص مما ذكرناه و خرج من جملة الزاوية و من جملة الشكل شيء يعرض أيضا للمقادير من جهة الحدود

فصل (٤) في احتجاج كل من الفريقين في أمر الزاوية أنها كم أو كيف

احتج القائل بأنها كم

لقبولها القسمة و قبولها المساواة و اللامساواة و هذا مشترك بين الكم و كيف المختص به و الفرق بينهما بأن في أحدهما بالذات و في الآخر بالعرض - فأصل قبول القسمة و المساواة و عدمها على الإجمال لا يكفي في هذا المطلب. و احتج ابن الهيثم على إبطال ذلك بأنه قال كل زاوية فإن حقيقتها تبطل بالتضعيف مرة أو مرات و لا شيء من المقدار تبطل حقيقته بالتضعيف مرة أو مرات فلا شيء من الزاوية بمقدار.

بيان ذلك أن القائمة إذا ضوعفت مرة واحدة ارتفعت حقيقتها و إلحاده إذا ضوعفت مرات بطلت حقيقتها فثبت أن الزاوية تبطل بالتضعيف.

أقول يمكن الجواب بأن الزاوية نوع من المقدار أو صنف منه و تضعيفها و إن أبطلها من حيث كونها نوعا مخصوصا و لكن لم يبطلها من حيث كونه مقدارا - فإن الثلاثة مثلا نوع من العدد إذا ضوعفت لم يكن المجموع ثلاثة بل ستة فبطلت بالتضعيف من حيث كونها نوعا خاصا و لم يبطل من حيث كونها عددا ألا ترى أن القوس كنصف الدائرة خط بالاتفاق فإذا ضوعفت لم يبق كونها قوسا بل خطأ مستديرا.

و احتج من قال إنها من كيف

بأنها تقبل المشابهة و اللامشابهة و ليس ذلك بسبب موضوعها الذي هو الكم فإذن ذلك لها بالذات فيكون كيفا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٠

و أما قبولها المساواة و عدمها فبسبب موضوعها الذي هو الكم كما أن الأشكال يقبل ذلك بسبب موضوعاتها. و يرد عليه أن اتصاف الشيء بصفة إذا لم يكن بالذات كان إما بواسطة معروضة أو بواسطة عارضة فما لم يبطل كون اتصاف الزاوية بالمشابهة بواسطة أمر عارض لم يظهر بمجرد إبطال كون الاتصاف بها بواسطة المقدار المعروض إن قول المشابهة عليها قول بالذات و هم ما أبطلوا ذلك فلم يظهر ما ادعوه.

و الإنصاف أن وزان الزاوية كوزان الشكل في أن فيها مقدارا قابلا للقسمة و المساواة و اللامساواة و غيرها في ذاته و مقدارا من حيث كونه معروضا لهيئة خاصة - تحصل لأجل تلاقي خطية عند نقطة كما في المسطحة مثلا و نفس تلك

الهيئة العارضة.

فالأول أي المقدار بما هو مقدار بل السطح بما هو سطح مع قطع النظر عن عارضة خارج عن كونه زاوية.

و المعنى الثاني هو الزاوية عند المهندسين.

و المعنى الثالث هو الزاوية عند غيرهم و لا اشتباه في هذه المعاني إنما الإشكال فيما مر أن السطح المذكور لم يخرج من كونه سطحاً لأجل كونه ذا هيئة مخصوصة فلما ذا لا يقبل الانقسام في الجهتين كسائر السطوح المكيفة بالكيفيات الأخر كاللون و أمثاله.

و الحل ما أشرنا إليه و نوضح ذلك فنقول في الفرق بين هذه الكيفية و الكيفية الانفعالية بأن تلك الكيفيات تحل في نفس المقدار بل في ذي المقدار من حيث ذاته المنقسمة - فلا جرم ينقسم بانقسام المحل بأي قسمة وقعت.

و هذا بخلاف عروض الكيفيات التي تخص بالكم فإن حلولها في الأكثر لأجل هيئات التناهي و الانقطاع و التناهي معنى يخالف معنى المقدار لأنه عدم المقدار مع شيء ذي إضافة إليه و المقدار المأخوذ مع نهاية مخصوصة أو وحدة خاصة لا يلزم أن يكون منقسماً بأجزاء متماثلة مماثلة للكل المأخوذ بتلك الحثية كالدائرة مثلاً فإنها سطح معروض لوحدة خاصة من جهة حده و نهايته و هو غير قابل للقسمة بأجزاء متماثلة مماثلة للكل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨١

إذ ليست أقسامه كلها دوائر بأي وجه انقسم.

و أما قولك نصف دائرة أو ثلث دائرة فالمراد منه جزء مادته لا جزء صورته - فمعنى نصف الدائرة كونه نصف ذلك السطح بما هو سطح لا بما هو سطح معروض لخط واحد و هذا كما يقال نصف الفلك أو نصف الحيوان و أريد به نصف المادة بما هي مادة - لا بما هي جنس و لا بما هي مقيدة بكمال مخصوص.

فهكذا حال الزاوية فإنها تقبل الانقسام بأجزاء يمكن أن ينحفظ فيها القيد المأخوذ بكماله إلا فيما يرجع إلى الجزئية و الكلية فإن الكمال الساري في أبعاد الشيء - لا بد و أن يكون جزؤه كجزئه أصغر من حصة الكل كالكل و ذلك القيد هو كون السطح عند ملتقى الخطين فلا جرم انقسمت بخط يقع بين الخطين المتلاقين أخذاً من الوتر إلى الرأس أو بخطوط كذلك إلى لا نهاية لأنها تنحفظ في جميع هذا النحو من القسمة حال الحثية المذكورة إلا فيما هو من ضرورات التجزئة بالمتماثلات كما مر و لا يقبل الانقسام بنحو آخر من حيث كونه زاوية لعدم انحفاظ تلك الحثية فيه و إنما ينقسم من جهة أخرى بما هي سطح فقط لا بما هي زاوية و نظير حال الزاوية في قبول القسمة في إحدى الجهتين دون الأخرى حال الأسطوانة المستديرة أو المضلعة و هي مقدار و جسم بلا شبهة لكنه من حيث كونه ذا شكل أسطواني أو شكلاً أسطوانياً قابلاً للقسمة في جهة - ما بين القاعدتين دون باقي الجهات لعدم انحفاظ الهيئة إلا في تلك القسمة دون غيرها - و إنه ولي الهداية

فصل (٥) في نفي الأشد و الأضعف و التضاد في الأشكال

هذا الجنس من الكيفيات لا يقبل الاستحالة فلا يقبل التضاد فلا مربع أشد تربيعاً من مربع و لا عدد أشد زوجية من عدد آخر و ذلك لأن كلما يقبل الأشدية فلا بد أن ينازع بالأضعف و الأشد في الموضوع القريب كالسواد و البياض و الحرارة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٢

و البرودة في الانفعاليات و كالمصاحية و الممرضية في القوة و اللاقوة و كالعلم و الجهل و السخاوة و البخل في النفسانيات فينسلخ الموضوع من بعضها إلى البعض - انسلاخا من كيفية منها و تلبسا بالأخرى و هذا دأب جميع الأضداد التي بينها وسائط - التي ليس زوال الموضوع عن أحدها مقارنا لوجود الطرف الآخر بل ربما خلا عن الطرفين إلى توسط فهذه الوساطة كأنها محدودة كالعدالة التي في حاق الوسط بين إفراطين و العفة التي هي متوسط بين إفراطين لكن هذه المتوسطات إذا قربت المواد الجزئية و اعتبرت في الأشخاص ربما لم يعتبر توسطها الحقيقي فقل عدالة زيد أشد من عدالة عمرو و إن كانت العدالة بحسب ما يدرك بالحد لا بالحس لا يقبل الأزيد و الأنقص.

و أما هذا الجنس الرابع من الكيفية التي تختص بالكم فهي من الأمور التي لا أشدية و لا أضعفية لها فلا أضداد لها كالمربع و الخمس و غير ذلك فإنها لا تقبل الأشد و الأضعف و لا الأزيد و الأنقص فإذا زيد المربع فيراد بالمادة لا بصورة التربيع و لم يتيسر زيادة المادة مع اتحاد التربيع الحقيقي بل تشكلا شبيها به قد خفي عند الحس تخالفه له فيكون تربيع أصح من تربيع آخر لكونه تربيعا حسيا لا حقيقيا كالعدالة في زماننا هذا فإنها توجد بحسب الحس لا بحسب الحقيقة فيقال فلان عدل من فلان.

و أما كون حرارة أشد من حرارة أخرى أو سواد أشد من سواد آخر فليس ذلك بحسب الحس فقط بل بالحقيقة و ليس حال الحرارتين في أن أحدهما أشد - كحال التربيعة في أن أحدهما أصح تربيعا بل ذلك بحسب الحقيقة و هذا بحسب الحس كالعديتين فالربع الحسي كالعادل الحسي يقبل الأشد و الأضعف حسا لا حقيقة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٣

و قد علمت أن الاستقامة و الاستدارة لا يقبل التضاد و كذا التحديب و التقعير ليسا بمتضادين لأن محل هذه الكيفيات إما الخطوط و إما السطوح فيستحيل أن يصير السطح المقتب مستويا أو مقعرا مع بقاءه في الحالين فسقط ظن من توهم أن في الأمور السماوية تضادا لأجل ما فيها من التقعير و التقعير لأن موضوعهما سطحان متغايران يمتنع اتصاف أحدهما بمثل ما يتصف به الآخر.

و أما الزوجية و الفردية فيتوهم في ظاهر الأمر أنهما متضادتان و ليس كذلك - لعدم تعاقبهما على الموضوع و لأن كل معنيين و إن سميا باسمين محصلين لا يكفي في كونهما متضادين عدم اجتماعهما في الموضوع فإن الفرد و إن كان محصل الاسم لكنه غير محصل المعنى إذ الزوج هو العدد المنقسم إلى متساويين و الفرد هو الذي ليس كذلك فمجرد كونه لا ينقسم لا يوجب إلا سلبا يقارن جنس الموضوع لا نوعه و هذا لا يوجب الضدية فإن فهم للفردية معنى محصل فذلك المعنى أكثر أحواله أنه معنى مباين لا يشارك في الموضوع هذا خلاصة ما ذكره الشيخ في هذا المقام

المقالة الثالثة في حال الخلقة و كيفيات الأعداد و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في حال الخلقة و هو البحث الخامس

إنك علمت مما ذكر مرارا أن وحدة الوجود معتبرة في جميع الحقائق في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٤

كل تقسيم بحسب حال المقسم ففي التقسيم إلى الأنواع يعتبر الوحدة النوعية و في الأشخاص الشخصية و إلا فلم يكن شيء من التقسيمات منحصرًا عقلا في أقسامه كالكلمة إذا قسمت إلى أنواعه لم تكن منحصرة في الاسم و الفعل و الحرف بل يلزم أنوع غير متناهية في الكلمة بحسب تركيب بعضها إلى بعض أنحاء من التركيب فإذا قلنا أن يقول إن الخلقة عبارة عن مجموع اللون و الشكل كل واحد منهما داخل تحت جنس آخر فلو جعلتم لكل شيئين يجتمعان نوعية على حدة بلغت الأنواع إلى حد اللانهاية - لا مرة واحدة بل مرارا غير متناهية.

فالجواب إما بما أشرنا إليه سابقا إذ لا داعي يلجئنا إلى القول بكون الخلقة كيفية وحدانية أو حقيقة واحدة و إن كان الاسم واحدا إذ كثيرا ما يكون الاسم واحدا محصلا و المسمى كثيرا أو غير محصل.

و إما بأن نقول إن الشكل إذا قارن اللون حصل بسبب وجودهما كيفية أخرى بها - يصح أن يقال إنه حسن الصورة أو قبيح الصورة فهما كالسببين لوجود الخلقة لا المقومين لماهيته - فالحسن و القبح الحاصلان للشكل وحده أو للون وحده غير الحسن و القبح الحاصلين للخلقة - فلما حصل للخلقة خاصة لم يحصل لواحد منهما و لا للمجموع على سبيل التوزيع فعلم أنه يحصل هاهنا هيئة مخصوصة عند اجتماعهما فلا جرم كانت هاهنا هيئة منفردة سميت بالخلقة - موصوفة بالحسن و القبح بالمعنى المغاير لما في كل واحد من اللون و الشكل من حسنهما و قبحهما لكن هذا الوجه إنما يتم إن لو ثبت أن الحسن اللازم لخلقة ما ليس أمرا تأليفيا مركبا من حسن اللون و حسن الشكل و كذا القبح و هذا محل تأمل و ليس البحث من المهمات فلا بأس بإغفاله

فصل (٢) في أنه هل يجوز تركيب في الأعراض من أجناس و فصول أو مادة و صورة عقليتين

المشهور عند الجمهور عدم تجويز أن يكون لأنواع من الأعراض تركيب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٥

من جنس و فصل تجويزهم في الجواهر و لأجل ذلك استشكلوا حال الخلقة في أن يكون نوعا واحدا من الكيفيات. و الشيخ أجاب عنهم بأن لا نمنع أن يكون أعراض مركبة من أعراض كيف و العشرة عرض لأنه عدد فهو كم مركب من خمسة و خمسة و المربع عرض و هو ملتئم من أن يكون هناك محدود و حدود أربعة بل نعني أن الجواهر قد يوجد فيها ما يناسب طبيعة جنسها و ما يناسب طبيعة فصلها و إن لم يكن أحدهما طبيعة الجنس و الآخر طبيعة الفصل و الأعراض لا يوجد فيها ذلك و إن وجدت لها أجزاء فلا يكون جزء منها جنسا و الآخر فصلا.

أقول و في كلامه بعض مؤاخذه فأولا أنه قد صرح في الإلهيات أن العدد كالعشرة ليس مركبا من الأعداد كالخمسة و الخمسة للعشرة و لا الأربعة و الستة و لا غيرهما بل من الآحاد فالحق أن ماهية العدد أمر بسيط لا اختلاف أجزاء فيها لكنها ضعيفة الوحدة لأنها عين الكثرة فاختلاف أنواعها بمجرد زيادة الكثرة و نقصها فلاجل ذلك لا تمامية لأنواعها.

و ثانيا أن المربع سواء أريد الهيئة العارضة أو الذي رامه المهندسون فهي ماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٦

بسيطة بحسب الخارج و إن كان لها جنس و فصل عقليان عند التحليل فإن السطح و الخطوط الأربعة و النقاط ليست أجزاء لحقيقة المربع أو التريبع و إلا لزم تركيب حقيقة واحدة من أجناس مختلفة و هو محال كما أفاده هو و غيره من

الحكماء المحصلين - بل الأمور المذكورة من الشرائط الخارجية دون المقومات.

و أما تحقيق البحث السادس و هو أن يعرف ما يتركب وجوده من مبدئي أثرين - إلى أيهما أميل فقد أشرنا في نظير هذا المقام عند مباحث الصور النوعية إلى قاعدة وضعناها لتعرف حال الشيء الصوري في أنه جوهر أو عرض بها يعرف أن المشكوك فيه جوهر أو عرض فقد وضع هاهنا نظير تلك القاعدة.

فقال الشيخ لا يخلو إما أن أحدهما أولى بأن يكون موصوفا و الآخر صفة - كالمربع الذي يعنى به سطح ذو هيئة فإن السطح هو الموصوف و الهيئة عارضة له فالجملة من مقولة الموصوف فإن السطح ذا الهيئة سطح لا هيئة و المجموع يحق عليه أنه سطح.

و أما إذا اختلفا و ليس أحدهما أولا للشيء و الآخر ثانيا بسبب الأول و بعده - فإن ذلك الاجتماع منهما يكون جمعا عرضيا و لا يكون على سبيل أمر له اتحاد في طبعه - و يكون كحال الكتابة و الطول فلا يكون للكتابة و الطول اجتماع يحصل منه جملة واحدة فلا يستحق ذلك مقولة بل يدخل في المجموع و المجموع مركب فيكون مقولات هذه الأشياء أيضا مركبة من مقولات.

أقول التحقيق أن الواقع تحت شيء من المقولات أو الأجناس لا يكون إلا أمرا وحدانيا و التركيب لا يكون إلا بحسب ما يخرج عنه و حقيقة المربع ليست إلا مقدارا فقط مع تعيين خاص و ذلك التعين هو فصله المتحد مع جنسه في الوجود و الجعل و وجود الخطوط و الزوايا و النقاط كلها من لوازم ذلك الفصل لا من أجزائه و هكذا الأمر في جميع الأشكال المسطحة و المجسمة الكثيرة الأضلاع و غيرها فالمجسم الذي هو ذو اثني عشر ضلعا مخمسات مثلا مقدار واحد يتحصل بفصل واحد لا تركيب له إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٧

باعتبار اللوازم و لو سألت الحق فالأمر فيما يسمى بالمركبات الجوهرية أيضا يجري مجرى ما ذكرناه لكن الحدود قد يؤخذ من ذات الشيء باعتبار معنى يعمه و غيره و معنى يخصه كلا المعنيين في ذاته من حيث هي مصداق لهما و قد يؤخذ من أمور مكتنفة - فالجنس من مادته و الفصل من صورته و إن كانت الصورة بحيث يكون فيها كفاية في جميع المعاني التي توجد في مادتها المقومة بتلك الصورة و سترجع إلى زيادة إمعان لهذا المطلب إن شاء الله تعالى

فصل (٣) في خواص الأعداد و كيفياتها

البحث عن هذه الأمور أليق بالعلوم الجزئية مثل الأرثماطقي و المساحة و غيرها و الذي نختر أن نذكره هاهنا أمور - أحدها أن لا تضاد بين أحوال العدد كالزوجية و الفردية و العادية و المعدودية و الصمم و التشارك و القسمة و الضرب فإن هذه الأمور بعضها مما يفقد فيه بعض شرائط التضاد و بعضها مما يفقد فيه أكثر الشرائط في التضاد و الجمع مشترك في أن لا اشتراك لاثنيين متخالفين منها في موضوع واحد قريب لهما و بعض الطرفين مما يكون أحدهما عدما و بعضها كالقلة و الكثرة و إن فرضا وجوديين ليس في كل منهما غاية التخالف عن الآخر فلا تضاد في خواص العدد كما لا تضاد في أصل الأعداد.

و ثانيها أن لا اشتداد و تضعف و لا ازدياد و تنقص في تلك الخواص لما مر من أن الموضوع لا يستحيل من فرد إلى فرد فكما أن القوس الواحد لا يشتد في تقوسه و انحناؤه إلى انحناء أشد بل يبطل عند ذلك فكذلك لا يشتد العدد في

زوجيته أو تكعبه و تجذيره إلى زوجية أخرى أتم زوجية كزوج الزوج أو جذر الجذر أو كعب الكعب إلا بأن يبطل موضوعه إلى موضوع آخر.

و ثالثها أن الزوجية و الفردية ليستا من الأمور الذاتية لأنهما مقولتان على ما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٨

تحتهما من الأعداد المتخالفة الأنواع بمعنى واحد محصل و لو كانتا ذاتيتين لبعض ما يدخل فيهما لكانتا ذاتيتين للكل مما يدخل فيهما إذ لا مزية للبعض على البعض في نفس شيء من هذين المعنيين فيلزم أن يكون معنى الزوج داخلا في حقائق جميع الأزواج - و كذا الفرد في جميع الأفراد و إذا كان كذلك لكانا نعرف عددا إلا و نعرف بالبداهة أنه زوج أو فرد و ليس كذلك فإن العدد الكثير لا يعرف زوجيته و فرديته إلا بالتأمل فعرفنا أنهما ليسا بذاتيين و إلا لكانا بين الثبوت لما تحتتهما و ليكن هذا آخر ما قصدنا إirاده من الكلام في مقولة الكيف و لواهب العقل ثناء لا يتناهى و لرسوله و اله صلاة لا تحصى

الفن الثالث في بقية المقولات العرضية و فيه مقالات

المقالة الأولى في المضاف و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في ابتداء الكلام في المضاف

اعلم أن لجميع المقولات اقتداء بالموجود و الواحد إذ قد يراد بالموجود مثلا الموجود البحث و قد يراد به المنعوت به و قد يراد به الشيء الموجود كالإنسان مع صفة الوجود.

فالأول كالكلي المنطقي.

و الثاني كالكلي الطبيعي.

و الثالث كالكلي العقلي و هو المجموع المركب من المعقول الأول كالإنسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٨٩

و المعقول الثاني كالنوع المنطقي و كذا حال الأبيض في إطلاقه تارة على العارض - و تارة على المعروض و تارة على المجموع إلا أن ظرف العروض و نحوه مختلفان في هذه الأقسام الثلاثة.

ففي الأبيض و أشباهه كان العروض في الخارج و الموضوع اعتبر فيه الوجود الخارجي و القضية التي حكم فيها على شيء بأنه أبيض مثلا خارجية مفاد الحكم و مطابقة فيها ثبوت شيء لشيء و اتصافه به في الخارج و هو فرع على ثبوت المحكوم عليه و المثبت له في ذلك الظرف و في الكلي و كذا الجزئي أو النوع أو الجنس أو ما يجري مجراها - يكون العروض في الذهن.

و الموضوع اعتبر فيه الوجود الذهني و القضية التي حكم فيها على شيء بأنه كلي أو جزئي أو نوع أو ذاتي أو عرضي أو قضية أو قياس مثلا ذهنية مفاد الحكم و مطابقة فيها ثبوت شيء لشيء و اتصافه به في الذهن فقط و هو فرع على ثبوت المحكوم عليه - و المثبت له في ذلك الظرف و في الوجود و الواحد يكون العروض في اعتبار التحليل - و الموضوع اعتبر فيه حال ذاته من حيث هي مجردة عن الوجودين.

و القضية التي حكم فيها على الماهية بأنها موجودة أو واحدة أو علة أو معلول أو واجبة أو ممكنة ليست خارجية صرفة و إن كان المحمول وجودا خارجيا كقولنا الإنسان موجود و لا ذهنية صرفة و إن كان المحمول وجودا ذهنيا كقولنا الإنسان معقول بل حقيقة واقعية مفاد الحكم و مطابقة فيها هو الاتحاد بين معنى الموضوع و معنى المحمول في الوجود و هو متفرع على تحصيل معنى الموضوع و ماهيته من حيث هي في ظرف التحليل إذا جرده العقل عن كل ما هو زائد عليه من حيث نفسه و ذاته سواء كان من عوارض وجوده أو من عوارض ماهيته كنفس الوجود و الإمكان و المجعولية و نظائرها.

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول فكذاك حكم المضاف في الاعتبار الثلاثة فإنه قد يراد بالمضاف نفس معنى الإضافة وحدها و قد يراد به الأمر الذي عرضت له الإضافة و قد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٩٠

يراد به مجموع الأمرين.

و أما الاعتبار الثاني فهو خارج عن غرضنا.

و أما الاعتبار الأول فهو المقولة و أما الاعتبار الثالث فهو مجموع الاعتبارين.

و لما كان الوقوف على المجمل أسهل من الوقوف على المفصل بتحليل بسائطه - لا جرم عرفت الحكماء المضاف في أوائل المنطق أعني فن قاطيغورياس بأنه الذي ماهيته مقولة بالقياس إلى غيره و هذا الرسم يندرج فيه الإضافات و المضافات و المعنى بكون ماهية الشيء مقولة بالقياس إلى غيرها هذا ليس مجرد كون تعقل ماهيته مستلزما لتعقل شيء آخر كيف كان و إلا لكان كل ماهية بالقياس إلى لازمها من مقولة المضاف و ليس كذلك فإن كثيرا من الملزومات و اللوازم لها ماهيات مستقلة في معقوليتها و هي في حدود أنفسها ليست من مقولة المضاف بل معناه أنه لا يتقرر ماهيته في الذهن و لا في العين - إلا و يكون الآخر كذلك مثل الأبوة لا يتقرر لشيء في أحد الوجودين إلا و يكون البنوة متفرقة للآخر

فصل (٢) في تحقيق المضاف الحقيقي

و لك أن تقول هذا الرسم فاسد فإن قولهم مقولة بالقياس إلى غيرها يرجع حاصل القياس فيه إلى الإضافة أو إلى نوع من الإضافة فيكون تعريفا للشيء بنفسه أو بما يتوقف عليه هذا مفهوم قولهم بالقياس إلى غيرها.

و أما مفهوم كون الشيء مقولا بالقياس إلى غيره أنه يحوج تصورها إلى تصور أمر خارج عنه فربما قيل لهم إن عنيتم به أنه يحوج تصويره إلى تصور أمر خارج أنه يعلم به فيلزم الدور في المتضايقين و إن عني أنه يكون معه فكثير من غير المتضايقين كذلك كالسقف يعقل معه الحائط و ليس ماهيتهما ماهية المضافين قالوا ينبغي أن يعقل معه من جهة ما هو بإزائه فإذا بوحت و فتش عن هذه الموازنة يرجع إلى معنى الإضافة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٩١

و قريب من هذا قول من قال إن المضاف هو الذي وجوده أنه مضاف و قد اعتذر بأن المضاف الذي أخذ في التعريف غير المضاف المحدود بل الذي في الحد هو المضاف المركب و هو أشهر من المضاف البسيط.

وقد أورد في كتب الفن ما حاصله أنه يجوز أن يكون للشيء جنس أو ما يشبه الجنس أشهر منه و يرى الخاصة اسم الأمر العام لما هو نوع له أو يشبه النوع أليق به - فينقلون الاسم إليه كما في الإمكان العام. و نقل الاسم العامي إلى الخاصي فكذا المضاف يقع على البسيط كالأبوة و على المجموع المركب من البسيط و غيره كالأب فهو يعمها و الخاصة نقلوا اسم المضاف إلى الخاص الذي هو البسيط و هذا خطأ كما أشار إليه بعض العلماء إذ لا عموم و لا خصوص هاهنا و ليس للمضاف معنى يجمعهما و ليس نسبة الإمكان العامي إلى الخاصي كنسبة المضاف المركب إلى المضاف البسيط و لا يصح أن يكون للعام زيادة معنى لا يوجد في الخاص.

أقول و الأولى أن يعتذر من جهة الرسم الأول أن المضاف الذي يؤخذ في الرسم أو يتضمنه الرسم هو المضاف بالمعنى الثاني أعني ما يصدق عليه مفهوم المضاف كلفظ القياس و لفظ المعقول لا المضاف الحقيقي البسيط و لا المركب منه و من الموضوع له و لا فساد في كون المعرف للشيء مشتملا على فرد منه إذ التعريف إنما هو للمفهوم لا الفرد فلا يلزم توقف الشيء على نفسه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٩٢

و عن الثاني و هو قولهم أن المضاف هو الذي وجوده أنه مضاف بأن التعريف للتنبيه فإن معرفة المضاف بسيطاً كان أو مركباً فطرية و قد يحتاج إلى تذكير و تنبيه في الفرق بين البسيط و المركب فينسب به بأن للمركب جزء من مقولة أخرى كالأب فإنه جوهر في نفسه لحقته الأبوة و كالمساواة فإنه كم لحقه الاتفاق و كالمشابهة فإنه كيف لحقته الموافقة مع مثله و ليس الكم الموافق و لا كيف الموافق بسيطاً - بل مركباً من حيث هو كذا.

و أما الفرق بين الإضافة و النسبة فبأنه ليس كل نسبة إضافة بل إذا أخذت مكررة - و معنى هذا أن يكون النظر لا في نفس النسبة فقط بل بزيادة أن هذه النسبة يلزمها نسبة أخرى فإن السقف له نسبة إلى الحائط بأنه يستقر عليه و للحائط أيضاً نسبة إليه بأنه مستقر عليه و لهذا قالوا إن النسبة لطرف واحد و الإضافة تكون للطرفين.

فإذا علمت رسم المضاف فنقول إن المضافين قد يكون اسم كل منهما دالاً بالتضمن على ما له من الإضافة كلفظي الأب و الابن و قد يكون أحد المضافين اسمه كذلك دون الآخر و هو على قسمين لأنه إما اسم المضاف أو اسم المضاف إليه.

فالأول كالجناح فإنه مضاف إلى ذي الجناح و لفظة الجناح دالة بالتضمن على الإضافة إلى ذي الجناح فاما ذو الجناح فإنه يدل على ما له من الإضافة لفظة ذو.

و الثاني كالعالم فإنه المضاف إليه للعلم و لفظة العالم دالة بالتضمن على ذلك.

و أما العلم و هو المضاف فإنما يدل على ما له من الإضافة حرف يقترب به و هو كاللام في قولك العلم علم للعالم

فصل (٣) في خواص طرفي الإضافة

فمنها التكافؤ في تلازم الوجود خارجاً و ذهناً بالقوة أو بالفعل و في العدم أيضاً كذلك و هذا مما يشكل في باب تقدم بعض أجزاء الزمان على بعض و تأخر الآخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٩٣

عنه فهما متضايقان مع أنهما ليسا متكافئين معين و أيضاً إنا نعلم أن القيامة ستكون - و العلم و المعلوم متضايقان فبينهما

إضافة بالفعل مع أن القيامة معدومة و العلم بها موجود.

و أجاب الشيخ عن الأول بأن المتقدم و المتأخر يعتبران من وجهين - أحدهما بحسب الذهن مطلقا و هو أن يحضر الذهن زمانين فيجد أحدهما متقدما و الآخر متأخرا فهما قد حصلا جميعا في الذهن.

و الثاني بحسب الوجود مستندا إلى الذهن و هو أن الزمان المتقدم إذا كان موجودا فموجود من الآخر أنه ليس بموجود هو و يمكن أن يوجد إمكانا يؤدي إلى وجوده و هذا كونه متأخرا و هذا الوصف للزمان الثاني موجود في الذهن عند وجود الزمان المتقدم و إذا وجد المتأخر فإنه موجود في الذهن حينئذ أن الزمان الثاني [الأول ظ] ليس موجودا و نسبته إلى الذهن نسبة شيء كان موجودا ففقد و هذا أيضا موجود مع الزمان المتأخر فأما نسبة المتأخر على وجه آخر غير ما ذكرنا فلا وجود له في الأمور لكن في الذهن.

أقول ما ذكره غير واف بحل الإشكال فإن الإضافات بين أجزاء الزمان و إن لم يوجد في العقل ما لم يعتبرها لكن تلك الأجزاء بحيث إذا اعتبرها العقل منقسمة بالأيام و الشهور و السنين فيجد بينها نسبة و يحكم بتقدم بعضها على بعض في الذهن - لكن بحسب الخارج فإضافة التقدم و التأخر بين أجزائه كإضافة الفوقية و التحتية بين أجزاء الفلك فإن الأجزاء و إن كانت بالقوة و كذا الإضافات و إن كانت بالقوة - لكنها بحيث إذا فرض فعليتها كانت الإضافة بينها على الوجه الذي يكون في سائر المضافات و تحقق الإضافة يوجب تحقق المعية بين وجودي المتضايفين في ظرف الاتصاف لا في الذهن فقط.

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و الذي ينحل به الشبهة ما حققناه في موضع آخر فليرجع من أراد.

ثم إنه يرد على ما ذكره شيء آخر و هو أن قوله في الاعتبار الثاني أن الزمان المتقدم إذا كان موجودا فموجود من الآخر أنه ليس هو بموجود فيه بحث لأنه يوهم أن اللاوجود وجود و ذلك ظاهر الاستحالة فإن اللاوجود لو كان وجودا لكان الشيء نقيضا لنفسه و هو محال فإذا كان جزء من الزمان موجودا و لم يكن الجزء الآخر موجودا فاللاوجود للجزء الآخر ليس أمرا وجوديا حتى يقع بينه و بين الجزء الحاضر إضافة وجودية.

اللهم إلا أن يراد به مفهوم اللاوجود المقيد ذلك الوجود بأنه في الزمان الأول - لأن وجود كل جزء من الزمان يستلزم لا وجود الجزء الآخر كما يقتضيه وصف التقدم و التأخر.

لكن يرد الكلام بأن الموصوف باللاوجود بهذا المعنى يجب أن يكون موجودا - و أيضا بتقدير أن يكون المراد نفس لا وجود الجزء المستقبل لكن ليس الجزء الحاضر متقدما على لا وجود الجزء المستقبل بل على وجود المستقبل و وجود المستقبل غير حاضر و إلا لم يكن مستقبلا فما هو المضاف غير موجود و لا حاضر و ما هو الحاضر غير مضاف فقوي الإشكال و الوجه ما أومأنا إليه.

و أما الجواب عن الثاني فهو أن المعلوم بالحقيقة هو الصورة الحاضرة عند العقل و الإضافة بالحقيقة بين العلم و ماهية المعلوم و المعلوم من القيمة أنها ستكون لا عين وجود القيمة.

أقول و يرد عليه سكان أحدهما أن العلم من الموجودات الخارجية و لهذا عد من الكيفيات النفسانية و قد حكمتكم بأن أحد المضافين إذا كان موجودا في الخارج - و جب أن يكون الآخر أيضا موجودا فيه بما هو مضاف و ليس ماهية المعلوم

بما هي ماهية معلومة من الموجودات العينية.
و الثاني أن العلم في الحقيقة نفس وجود ماهية المعلوم عند العاقل و ليس بين

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الوجود و الماهية تغاير حتى يقع بينهما إضافة العلم و المعلوم.
و الجواب عن الأول أن العلم و إن كان من حيث كونه عرضاً قائماً بالذهن من الموجودات الخارجية لكن من حيث كونه حكاية عن ماهية شيء له وجود في الخارج من الموجودات الذهنية فالعلم و ماهية المعلوم كلاهما ذهنيان.
و عن الثاني أن الإضافة بين العلم و المعلوم به بالذات بعينها كالإضافة بين الوجود و الماهية الموجودة به بالذات أمر اعتباري حاصلة بين أمرين متغايرين بالاعتبار متحدين بالذات فكما أن الموجود في الخارج أمر واحد إذا حلله العقل إلى ماهية و وجود - عرضت لهما إضافة الوجود و ذي الوجود فكذا الموجود في الذهن صورة واحدة هي موجود ذهني إذا حلله العقل إلى ماهية و وجود ذهني عرضت لهما إضافة العلم و المعلوم - إذ العلم نفس وجود الشيء مجرداً عن المادة و لواحقها و كذا الكلام في الحس و المحسوس أي الصورة الموجودة في الحس و هي عندنا من الكيفيات النفسانية المحاكية للكيفيات التي تسمى بالمحسوسات.

و قد عدوا من أحكام المضاف أن المتضايفين قد لا يقع لهما تكافؤ في الوجود من جهة أخرى فقد يكونان بحيث يصح وجود كل منهما مع عدم الآخر [و يصح وجود الآخر مع عدم الأول ظ] كما في العلم و الحس أعني الإدراكين لا القوتين المتشاركتين لهما في الاسم فإن ذات العلم و الحس لا يصح وجودهما مع عدم ذات المعلوم و المحسوس - و لكن ذات المعلوم و ذات المحسوس يصح وجود كل منهما مع عدم العلم و الحس - و قد يكونان بحيث يجوز وجود كل منهما بدون وجود الآخر كالمالك و المملوك - فإنه يجوز وجود ذات المالك مع عدم المملوك و وجود ذات المملوك مع عدم المالك - و منه ما يمتنع وجود ذات أحدهما عند عدم ذات الآخر كالمعلول الذي لا يكون أعم من علته كحركة اليد و حركة المفتاح المخصوصتين هذا ما ذكره الشيخ و غيره.
و أقول هاهنا موضع بحث و تحقيق فإنك إذا نظرت حق النظر لوجدت أن الذات التي حكموا عليها بأنها معروض المضاف فهي في أكثر الأمر ليست كذلك.

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فالشيوخ ذكر في الحكم بعدم وجوب التكافؤ في الوجود بين الذاتين الموصفتين بالإضافة لا من جهة إضافيتهما مثالين أحدهما ذات العلم و المعلوم و ثانيهما ذاتا الحس و المحسوس.
فقال ذات العلم في جوهره قد لزمه دائماً أن يكون مضافاً إلى المعلوم موجوداً معه و ذات المعلوم في جوهره لا يلزمه ذلك فإنه قد يوجد غير مضاف إليه العلم و كذلك حال هذا الحس فإن ذاته لا ينفك عن لزوم الإضافة إياه و ذات المحسوس تنفك - و لا يجب أن لا يكون موجوداً حين لا يكون الحس موجوداً إذ يجوز أن لا يكون حيوان حساس موجوداً و يكون العناصر المحسوسة موجودة هذا حاصل كلامه.
و لأحد أن يقول الذات التي تعلق العلم بها بالحقيقة فهي دائماً معلومة لا يمكن غير هذا و التي لم تعلق بها العلم فهي

غير معلومة بهذا العلم أبداً لا في هذا الوقت ولا في سائر الأوقات فإن الوجود الصوري العلمي دائماً معلومة والوجود المادي المحجوب عن ما يدركه من حيث كونه مغشواً بالغواشي أبداً مجهول.

وكذا الكلام في ذات الحس الذي بمعنى الصورة لا بمعنى القوة وكذا ذات المحسوس الذي بمعنى الصورة لا بمعنى المادة لا ينفك إحداهما عن الآخر كما لا ينفك العارضان البسيطان أحدهما عن الآخر.

فكما أن مفهوم الحسية والمحسوسية يتكافئان في الوجود العقلي ويعقلان معاً - فكذا الذاتان المعروضتان لذيتك الإضافيتين متكافئتين في الوجود الحسي.

وكذا الكلام في كل ما هو معروض الإضافة أولاً وبالذات وأما الذات التي هي موصوفة بالمحسوسية والمعلومية ولو بالعرض فهي أيضاً عند البحث والتفتيش يظهر أنها مقارنة في الوجود لوجود ذات الحس وذات العلم فإن الكيفية السمعية القائمة بالهواء المقروء المتموج مثلاً مسموعة بالعرض وذلك عند قرعه للسمع وهي مقارنة في الوجود للصورة المسموعة بالذات وغير تلك الصورة الإدراكية وغير التي توجد في الخارج عند قرع السمع غير مدركة لا بالذات ولا بالعرض فلا إضافة إليها

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في وقت من الأوقات أصلاً لا بالذات ولا بالعرض.

وكذا الكيفية اللمسية كالحرارة النارية الحاضرة عند آلة اللمس صح أن يقال إنها ملموسة بالعرض لا بالذات لأن الملموسة بالذات هي كيفية نفسانية - محاكية للحرارة الخارجية كما مرت الإشارة إليه وأما التي هي خارجة عن التصور - وعن الحضور الوضعي عند آلة اللمس فلا إضافة إليها لا بالذات ولا بالعرض فثبت أن التكافؤ في الوجود والعدم كما لزم في المضافين البسيطين فكذا في الذاتين اللتين هما معروضاهما من حيث هما هما وإن قطع النظر عن وصف الإضافة.

فإن قلت الحس البصري لا يدرك به إلا الأمر الخارجي بعينه عند من أبطل الانطباع لاستحالة انطباع العظيم في الصغير وأبطل خروج الشعاع أيضاً فيكون الإبصار عنده مجرد إضافة إدراكية إلى الموجود الخارجي بعينه.

أقول أما أولاً فقد كان كلامنا في إضافة الحس الذي بمعنى الصورة الإدراكية - وهي عند هذا القائل عين الصورة الخارجية فلا انفكاك بينهما وأما الإضافة الوضعية التي بين جوهر الحاس وذات الأمر الخارجي الذي قيل وقع إليه إضافة الإبصار فطرفها بالحقيقة كطرفا سائر الإضافات الوضعية التي عند البحث والتحقيق لا يكونان إلا معاً.

وأما ثانياً فإن المبصر بالذات صورة مقدارية حاضرة عند النفس مجردة عن المواد وهي الحس والمحسوس أي البصر والمبصر وهما معلومان إذ لا تغاير بينهما إلا بحسب الاعتبار.

ومما عد أيضاً من خواص المتضايفين وجوب انعكاس كل منهما على الآخر ومعنى الانعكاس أن يحكم بإضافة كل منهما إلى صاحبه من حيث كان مضافاً إليه فكما يقال الأب أب للابن يقال الابن ابن للأب وهذا الانعكاس إنما يجب إذا أضيف كل منهما من حيث هو مضاف إلى الآخر.

وأما إذا أضيف لا من حيث هو مضاف فلم يجب هذا الانعكاس كما يقال الأب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٩٨

أب للصبي أو للإنسان أو للأسود لم يجب الانعكاس.

فلا يقال الصبي صبي للأب أو الإنسان إنسان للأب وقد يصعب رعاية قاعدة الانعكاس في المضاف والطريق فيه أن يجمع أوصاف الشيء فإن تلك الأوصاف إذا وضعته ورفعت غيره بقيت الإضافة أو رفعته ووضعت غيره ارتفعت الإضافة فهو الذي إليه الإضافة الحقيقية الواجبة الانعكاس فإنك إذا رفعت من الابن أنه حيوان أو إنسان أو ناطق أو كاتب أو غير ذلك واستبقيت كونه ابنا بقيت إضافة الأب إليه وإن رفعت كونه ابنا واستبقيت هذه الأوصاف كلها لم يبق الإضافة.

فعلت بهذا أن التعادل الحقيقي في الإضافة هو بين الأب والابن فهما اللذان ينعكس أحدهما على الآخر وإذا اختل التعادل لا يجب الانعكاس فإذا قيل السكان سكان للسفينة والرأس رأس للحيوان لا يصح أن ينعكس فيقال السفينة سفينة للسكان - والحيوان حيوان للرأس وإنما يجب التعادل إذا قيل الرأس رأس لذي الرأس والسكان سكان لذي السكان.

وقالوا إن هذا الانعكاس منه ما لا يحتاج إلى حرف النسبة وذلك إذا كان للمضاف بما هو مضاف لفظ موضوع كالعظم والصغر ومنه ما يحتاج إلى ذلك وإما أن يتساوى حرف النسبة من الجانبين كقولنا العبد عبد للمولى والمولى مولى للعبد وإما أن لا يتساوى كقولنا العالم عالم بالعلم والعلم علم للعالم

فصل (٤) في تحصيل المعنى الذي هو نفس مقولة المضاف الذي هو أحد الأجناس العشرة العالية

فنقول إن الرسم المذكور الذي ماهيته مقولة بالقياس إلى غيره قد يعنى به نفس هذا المفهوم أي نفس أنها مقولة بالقياس إلى غيرها وقد يعنى به ماهية أخرى يصدق عليها بالذات أن ماهيته مقولة بالقياس إلى غيرها وقد يعنى به ما له ماهية أخرى غير معنى المضاف الذي هو المقولة وغير المضاف الذي هو من المقولة وذلك كالآب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ١٩٩

فإنه وإن كان معقولا بالقياس إلى الابن إلا أن له في نفسه وراء هذه المعقولة و وراء أبوته - ماهية غير معقولة بالقياس إلى الابن وهي كونه إنسانا وفرسا أو شيئا آخر.

و أما الأبوة فليس لها ماهية إلا هذه الماهية المعقولة بالقياس فها هنا ثلاثة أمور - أحدها ما يحمل عليه الرسم المذكور حملا ذاتيا أوليا لا صدقا متعارفا كما في القضايا المتعارفة وهو المقولة التي هي إحدى المقولات العشر.

و ثانيها ما هو نوع من أنواعه سواء كان في نفسه جنسا أو نوعا سافلا وهو الذي يحمل عليه المقولة حملا بالذات كما في صدق الذاتيات على أفرادها الذاتية.

و ثالثها ماهية أخرى تحت الجوهر أو الكم أو الكيف أو غيرها يصدق عليها مقولة المضاف أو نوعه حملا بالعرض كحمل الأبيض على الإنسان فهكذا ينبغي أن يحقق الفرق وفي أكثر الكتب لم يتعرضوا لبيان الفرق بين نفس المقولة وما هو نوع منها بل اقتصروا على بيان الفرق بين العارض الذي هو الإضافة ومعرضها.

ولذلك قال الشيخ ثم المضاف الذي يجعلونه مقولة فهو أيضا شيء ذو إضافة لأنه شيء معقول الماهية بالقياس إلى غيره وإذا كان كذلك فقد شارك هذا المضاف الذي هو المقولة المضاف الذي ليس هو المقولة فلا يكون بينهما فرق.

أقول الفرق ما أشرنا إليه و هو أن الأول هو نفس ما يعبر عنه بأنه معقول الماهية بالقياس كما أن الجوهر الذي هو المقولة هو نفس ما يعبر عنه بأنه الماهية التي إذا وجدت كانت لا في موضوع فالمضاف الذي هو المقولة هو نفس مفهوم لفظ المضاف.

و أما الشيئية فهو أمر لا ينفك عنه المضاف الذي هو المقولة و لا يمكن أن يسلب عنه لكن الشيئية التي اعتبرت في مفهوم المضاف نفسه ليست إلا شيئية عامة لا يتحصل إلا بكونها إضافة و مضافا لا كالأبيض إذا أريد به شيء غير البياض وصف بالبياض.

فإننا لو جعلنا المشتق اسمه من الأعراض و أردنا بالشيئية الشيئية المفهومة في المشتق من حرف اللام أو ذي أو الهيئة الاشتقاقية لصارت المقولات غير متناهية و لهذا لم يجعل المضاف المطلق الشامل للمركب أيضا مقولة بل المضاف الذي لا ماهية له سوى كونه مضافا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠٠

فلو قال أحد إن الإضافة أيضا شيء معقولة ماهيته بالقياس إلى الغير فوجب أن لا تجعل مقولة. قلنا إن الشيئية المحمولة على المضاف الحقيقي أعني المقولة أو نوعا منها لا تخصص لها إلا بكونها مضافا. و أما الشيئية التي تحمل على المعنى الآخر فإنه ليس تخصصها بكونها مضافا بل بأمر آخر و هو كونه إنسانا أو دارا أو شيئا آخر ثم يلحقه بعد ذلك التخصيص بالإضافة - فالأب في غير المقولة جوهر يلحقه الأبوة و الأب الذي هو من المقولة شيء هو بعينه الأبوة و العرضي بهذا المعنى عين العرض كما أن الناطق أيضا شيء هو نفس الصورة الجوهرية

فصل (٥) في أن الإضافة هل تكون موجودة في الخارج أم لا

و اعلم أن كثيرا من الأشياء ما هي موجودة لا بوجود مستقل كمفهوم العرض و ماهية الجنس و الفصل في البسيط فإن أمثال هذه الأشياء لا يوجد بوجودات مستقلة و من هذا القبيل الإضافات و النسب فإن وجود الإضافة ليس بخارج عن وجود الجوهر و الكم و الكيف و غيرها بل وجودها وجود أحد هذه الأشياء بحيث يعقل منهما معنى غير ماهياتها معقولا ذلك المعنى بالقياس إلى غيره فالسقف مثلا له وجود وضعي - إذا عقل معه الإضافة إلى الحائط و كذا السماء لها وجود واحد وضعي يعقل منه ماهية السماء و هي جوهر و يعقل معها معنى آخر خارج عن ماهيتها و هو معنى الفوقية - و معنى كون الشيء موجودا أن حده و معناه يصدق على شيء موجود في الخارج

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠١

صدقا خارجيا كما هو في القضايا الخارجية كقولنا الإنسان كاتب أو أبيض فالمضاف بهذا المعنى موجود لصدق قولنا السماء فوق الأرض و زيد أب و هذا بخلاف الأمور الذهنية كقولنا الحيوان جنس و الإنسان نوع فإن الجنسية و النوعية و ما أشبههما ليست من الأحوال الخارجية التي تثبت للأشياء في الأعيان بل في الأذهان. و بهذا يعلم فساد رأي من زعم من الناس أن الإضافة غير موجودة في الأعيان بل من الاعتبارات الذهنية كالكلية و الجزئية.

و احتج عليه [الإضافة غير موجودة] بأمور

الأول أن الإضافة لو وجدت في الخارج لزم التسلسل

لأنها تكون لا محالة موجودة حينئذ في محل فكونها في المحل شيء وكونها في نفسها شيء آخر فإن الأبوة مفهومها غير معنى كونها في محلها فيكون إضافتها إلى المحل إضافة أخرى والكلام فيها كالكلام في الأول و يلزم منه التسلسل فأجاب الشيخ عنه بأن قال يجب أن ترجع في حل هذه الشبهة إلى حد المضاف المطلق.

فنقول المضاف هو الذي له ماهية معقولة بالقياس إلى غيره فكل شيء في الأعيان - يكون بحيث ماهيته إنما يعقل بالقياس إلى غيره فذلك الشيء من المضاف لكن في الأعيان أشياء كثيرة بهذه الصفة فالمضاف في الأعيان موجود.

ثم إن كان في المضاف ماهية أخرى فينبغي أن يجرى ما له من المعنى المعقول بالقياس إلى غيره فذلك المعنى هو بالحقيقة المعنى المعقول بالقياس إلى غيره و غيره إنما هو معقول بالقياس إلى غيره بسبب هذا المعنى وهذا المعنى ليس معقولاً بالقياس إلى غيره بسبب شيء غير نفسه بل هو مضاف لذاته فليس هناك ذات و شيء هو الإضافة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠٢

بل هناك مضاف بذاته لا بإضافة أخرى فينتهي من هذا الطريق الإضافات و أما كون هذا المضاف بذاته في هذا الموضوع فله وجود آخر مثلاً وجود الأبوة في الأب و ذلك الوجود أيضاً مضاف فليكن هذا عارضاً من المضاف لزم المضاف و كل واحد منهما مضاف لذاته إلى ما هو مضاف إليه بلا إضافة أخرى فالكون محمولاً مضاف لذاته و الكون أبوة مضاف لذاته.

هذا ما قاله في إلهيات الشفاء و هو كلام واضح رفع الشبهة لوجهين بالمعارضة و الحل حيث أقام البرهان أولاً على أن المضاف من الهيئات الموجودة في الأعيان ثم دفع التسلسل من الوجه الذي أمكن إirاده من لزوم التكرير كما يورد في باب الوجود و الوحدة و نظائرها فدفع هاهنا كما دفع هناك من أنها تنتهي إلى ما هو مضاف بذاته - لا بإضافة أخرى عارضة.

و أما الإضافات المختلفة المعاني فلا يلزم أن يكون لكل إضافة إضافة مخالفة لها بالماهية لازمة إياها حتى يلزم التسلسل و لا يندفع فإن إضافة الأبوة و إن لزمها في الوجود إضافة الحالية و العروض لكن لا يجب أن يلزم إضافة أخرى مخالفة لها.

و كذا ثالثة و رابعة و هكذا إلى لا نهاية اللهم إلا بحسب اعتبارات عقلية متماثلة - أو متخالفة ينقطع بانقطاع اعتبارات العقل.

الحجة الثانية

ما مر من كون إضافة التقدم و التأخر لو كانت موجودة لكان الماضي و المستقبل من الزمان موجودين معاً.

و الجواب ما أشرنا إليه في مباحث التقابل و موضع آخر أن معية أجزاء الزمان لا يمكن أن يكون آنية بأن يكون السابق و اللاحق موجودين في آن واحد إنما ذلك شأن معية الآنات و الآنيات بل معيتها اتصالها في الوجود الوجداني التدريجي - الذي معيتها فيه عين التقدم و التأخر فيه كما أن وحدة العدد عين كثرته لشيء من الأشياء

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فصل (٦) في نحو وجود المضاف في الخارج

واعلم أن في خصوصية وجود المضاف في الخارج و تعيينها إشكالا من وجوه -

منها أن الإضافة لو كانت موجودة لكانت مشاركة لسائر الموجودات في الوجود

و متميزة عنها بخصوصية و ما لم يقيد الوجود بتلك الخصوصية لم يوجد الإضافة في الأعيان فيكون ذلك القيد [التقيد] سابقا على وجود الإضافة لكن التقيد هو نفس الإضافة فإذا لم يوجد الإضافة إلا بوجود إضافة قبلها و هكذا الكلام في وجود الإضافة السابقة فيكون تحقق الإضافة الواحدة مشروطا بإضافات غير متناهية من أمثالها.

و منها أن الوجود من حيث هو وجود إما أن يكون مضافا أو لا يكون مضافا

فإن كان مضافا فكل وجود مضاف و ليس كذلك و إن لم يكن مضافا فالإضافة لو كانت موجودة فهي لا تكون مضافة من حيث إنها تكون موجودة فالموجود من حيث هو موجود غير مضاف و المضاف من حيث هو مضاف غير موجود و هو المطلوب.

و منها أنه لو كانت الإضافة أمرا وجوديا لزم أن يكون الباري جل مجده محلا للحوادث

لأن له مع كل حادث إضافة بأنه موجود معه و تلك المعية ما كانت حاصلة قبل ذلك و يزول بعد زوال ذلك الحادث فيجب أن يكون الباري محلا للحوادث فيكون جسما أو جسمانيا تعالى عنه علوا كبيرا.

و تحقيق القول في وجود المضاف

بحيث يدفع هذه الشكوك و أشباهها - هو أن وجود الإضافة ليس وجودا مباينا لوجود سائر الأشياء بل كون الشيء سواء كان في نفسه جوهرًا أو عرضا بحيث إذا عقل عقل معه شيء آخر هو نحو وجود الإضافة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠٤

فالعلة كالعقل مثلا لها ذات موجودة بوجود يخصها من حيث هي جوهر عقلي و كون ذلك الوجود بحيث له تأثير في وجود الغير هو وجود العلة بما هي علة و العلة نوع من المضاف فهذا الوجود منسوب إلى الجوهر بالذات و إلى المضاف بالعرض.

و إنما قلنا بالعرض لأن مفهوم العلية خارج عن ذاتيات هذا الوجود إذا قطع النظر إليها عما سواها و كذا وجود المضاف من حيث هو مضاف مغاير بالاعتبار لوجود الجوهر بما هو جوهر لكن الفرق بين ماهية الجوهر الذي هو العلة و بين عليته و إضافته بالماهية و الحد فإن حد الجوهر غير حد المضاف و الفرق بين وجوديهما بالاعتبار فالوجود الجوهرى إذا أخذ في نفسه كان جوهرًا و إذا قيس إلى غيره كان مضافا فكون هذا الوجود بحيث إذا عقل على الوجه الذي يكون في الخارج يلزم من تعقله تعقل شيء آخر هو وجود المضاف.

و بالجملة أن المضاف بما هو مضاف بسيط ليس له وجود في الخارج مستقل مفرد بل وجوده أن يكون لاحقا بأشياء كونها بحيث يكون لها مقايضة إلى غيرها - فوجود السماء في ذاتها وجود الجواهر و وجودها بحيث إذا قيس إلى الأرض عقلت الفوقية وجود الإضافات.

و كذا الكم له وجود في نفسه من حيث هو كم و هو كون الشيء بحيث يمكن لذاته أن يصير مساويا لشيء أو أعظم أو أصغر منه و أما وجوده بحيث يكون بالفعل مساويا مثلا هو وجود المساوي فوجود المساوي غير وجود الكم لأن

المساوي لم يبق مساويا إذا قيس إلى ما هو أعظم منه أو أصغر.
و أما النوع من الكم فهو أبداً بحال واحد في نفسه لا يتغير فوجود واحد يصلح لأن يصير وجوداً لإضافات كثيرة كالواحد مثلاً له وجود في نفسه هو عين وحدته - وذلك الوجود يصدق عليه أنه نصف الاثنين و ثلث الثلاثة و ربع الأربعة وهكذا إلى غير النهاية من غير استحالة ولا لزوم تركيب في الواحد بما هو واحد فتحصيل المضاف و تنويعه يتصور من وجهين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠٥

أحدهما أن يعتبر معه معروضة كمجموع الجسم و الأبيض و هو ليس من المقولات كالكم المساوي أو كيف الموافق.
و ثانيهما أن يعتبر المضاف مخصصاً بنحو تخصيص ينشأ من الملحق به و يوجدان معا في العقل كعارض واحد و هذا هو تنويع الإضافة و تحصيلها فإن كون المساوي مضافاً ليس ككون الكم مساوياً أو مضافاً فالمساواة موافقة في الكم [اتفاق الكم] و هي غير الكم الموافق و كذا المشابهة موافقة في كيف و هي غير كيف الموافق.
و بالجملة المضاف الذي هو المقولة و الجنس الذي هو للمضافات البسيطة [المضاف البسيط] و فصل نوعه الذي هو بالحقيقة نوع لها لا يكون جعل أحدهما غير جعل الآخر بل يكون طبيعة الجنسية و الفصلية فيه أي في ذلك النوع أمراً واحداً.

فإن قيل إن المساواة و المشابهة اتفقتا في موافقة ما و اختلفتا في التخصيص بالكم أو بالكيف فيكون المساواة و المشابهة إما من نوع واحد و قد قلتم أنهما نوعان متباينان أو هما متميزان بالكلم و كيف أو بإضافتين أخريين فإن كانت الكمية و الكيفية نفس الفصل فالمفروض مضافاً بسيطاً يكون مركباً هذا خلف و أيضاً يلزم كون نوع واحد تحت مقولتين أو تحصيل مقولة بنوع من مقولة أخرى و الكل محال أو يكون فصل الإضافة التي هي الموافقة إضافة أخرى إلى الكمية أو إلى الكيفية لا نفس الكمية و الكيفية فيكون فصل الإضافة إضافة و هو أيضاً ممتنع مع أنه يرجع الكلام إلى أن الإضافة الثانية بما ذا يمتاز عن الإضافة الأولى فيعود المحذورات جذعاً.

أقول الاتفاق معنى جنسي لا يتحصل بمعنى مغاير له بل بمنى نسبته إليه نسبة التعيين إلى الإبهام فإن الاتفاق إذا تحصل بأنه في الكم حتى صار مساواة لم يتحصل بنفس الكم حتى يلزم كون مقولة متحصلاً بمقولة أخرى و لا أيضاً بإضافة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠٦

أخرى إلى الكم حتى يلزم تحصل إضافة بإضافة أخرى بل تحصل و تنوع بأنه في الكم لا بالكم و لا بإضافة إليه.
و هذا كسائر فصول الأجناس فإن فصل الحيوان و هو الجسم النامي الدراك - هو عبارة عن تعيين الدراك بأنه ناطق لا أن الناطق ينضم إلى الدراك فيصير مجموعاً من المدرك و الناطق بل المدرك الذي هو الناطق و كذا الكلام في نسبة المدرك إلى النامي و النامي إلى الجسم و الجسم إلى الجوهر و الغلط قد ينشأ من الاشتباه بين الجنس و المادة.
و إذا تقرر هذه المعاني فلنرجع إلى حل الشكوك.

أما الأول فسلمنا أن وجود الإضافة مشارك لسائر الوجودات في الوجود و سلمنا أنه يجب أن يمتاز عن غيرها لكن لا نسلم أن ذلك الامتياز لا بد أن يكون بقيد زائد فإن كثيراً من الوجودات يمتاز عن غيرها بنفس وجوداتها - إذ الاشتراك

في الوجود المطلق اشتراك في أمر انتزاعي عقلي إذ ليس لحقائق الوجودات بما هي وجودات كلي طبيعي يكون نوعا لأفراده حتى يحتاج في تمايزها إلى قيود زائدة.

ثم القيود قد يكون نسبتها إلى ما قيد بها كحال فصول الجنس فليس تقييد الجنس بفصله كتقييد الشيء بأمر زائد عليه جعلاً ووجوداً حتى يقع بينهما إضافة هي نفس التقييد أو إضافة أخرى بل ربما كان أعم وأخص بحسب المعنى والمفهوم موجوداً بوجود واحد بسيط في الخارج.

و أما الثاني فنقول إن الموجود في نفسه إما ممكن أو واجب أو جوهر أو عرض و كونه بحال و نحو من الوجود إذا عقل يلزم من تعقله تعقل شيء آخر هو من المضاف فكل وجود من حيث وجود لم يلزم أن يكون مضافاً بل من حيث كونه على نحو آخر مخصوص فإن الحيوان في نفسه إذا قطع النظر عن غيره له وجود و كونه بحيث يوجد من فضله مادته حيوان آخر وجود آخر.

فالأول نوع من مقولة الجوهر و هذا نوع من مقولة المضاف.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠٧

و أما الثالث فنقول ليس للإضافة وجود متقرر كسائر الأعراض حتى يكون حدوثها لشيء و زوالها عنه يوجب انفعالا و تغيرا في ذات الموصوف بها أو في صفاته الحقيقية فإن تجددتها و زوالها قد يكون بسبب تجدد أحد الطرفين بخصوصه مع ثبات الطرف الآخر فإن صيرورة أحد في المجلس ثاني الاثنين بعد ما لم يكن كذلك و ثالث الثلاثة و رابع الأربعة و هكذا لا يوجب تغيرا في ذاته و لا في صفاته المتضررة فكذلك تغير الإضافات لا يوجب في واجب الوجود تغيرا لا في ذاته و لا في صفاته الكمالية و فهم هذا المعنى بعد الإحاطة بما قدمنا غير صعب

فصل (٧) في أن تحصل كل من المتضايفين كتحصل الآخر إن كان جنسا فجنس و إن نوعا فنوع و إن صنفا فصنف و إن شخصا فشخص

فالأبوة إذا أخذت مطلقة فبإزائه البنوة المطلقة و إذا أخذت أبوة نوعية فبإزائه بنوة كذلك و إذا حصلت الأبوة حتى صارت شخصية صار الجانب الآخر بنوة شخصية - و لكن يجب أن يعلم أن ذلك إنما يطرد إذا كان التحصيل تحصيلاً للإضافة أما إذا كان تحصيلاً لموضوع الإضافة لم يلزم أن يتحصل المضاف المقابل له فإن من الموضوعات الشخصية ما يضيف الإضافات كما يقال ابن هذا الرجل فإن ابن الشخص يصح أن يحمل على جماعة لا يجب انحصارهم في عدد معين بحيث لا يصح الزيادة عليه بل أبوة زيد لعمر و يتعين بتعيينهما جميعاً و جانب الأبوة و إن كان قد يتوهم أنه يخالف ما قلناه - لكن هو مثله و إن كان لا يصح أن يقال لزيد أبوان أو أمان لأن ذلك بسبب خارجي - لا أن الإضافة من طرف واحد يتشخص دون الطرف الآخر بل في بعض يحتاج الإضافة في التعيين الشخصي إلى اعتبار أكثر من تعيين اللذين بينهما الإضافة و لا يكفي فيهما ما يكفي في تعيين الأبوة التي هي لعمر و بالنسبة إلى زيد بتعيينهما كجواز زيد لعمر و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠٨

فإنه لا يتشخص بتعيينهما بل يحتاج إلى تعيين داريهما مع تعيينهما فمن المضاف ما هو جنس عال بعد المقولة كالموافق

و منه ما هو جنس متوسط دونه كالمساوي و أدنى منه كالمساوي في السطح و بعده المساوي في الشكل كالمثلثين و بعده ما في المثلثين القائم الزاوية و أخص منه إذا كان القائم الزاوية زاويتيها الباقيتان متساويتان فهذه تحصيلات فصلية.

و أما التحصيل الصنفي فهو أن يتحصل الإضافة لموضوع ثم يقتزن بذلك الموضوع عارض غريب لو لم يكن لم يبعد أن يبقى تلك الطبيعة من الإضافة كأبوة الرجل العادل و أبوة الرجل الجائر

فصل (٨) في تقسيم المضاف من وجوه

منها أن من المضاف ما هو مختلف في الجانبين

كالأب و الابن و كالضعف و النصف و كالجذر و المجذور و منه ما هو متفق فيهما كالمساوي و المساوي و الأخ و الأخ و الجار و الجار.

ثم المختلف قد يكون اختلافه محدودا كالنصف و الضعف و منه ما لا يكون محدودا و غير المحدود منه ما يكون مبنيا على محدود كالكثير الأضعاف و القليل الأضعاف و الكل و الجزء منه و منه ما ليس محدودا و لا مبنيا على المحدود مثل الزائد و الناقص.

و منها أن المضافين إما شيئان غير محتاجين في عروض الإضافة إلى اتصافهما بصفة أخرى

حقيقية غير وجود الموضوع مثل المتيامن و المتياسر و المتقدم و المتأخر.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٠٩

و إما أن يكون في كل منهما صفة حقيقية غير ذات الموضوع لأجلها صار مضافا كالعاشق و المعشوق فإن في العاشق هيئة إدراكية هي إضافة العشق و في المعشوق هيئة مدركة لأجلها صار معشوقا لعاشقه و إما أن يكون في أحدهما مثل العالم و المعلوم - فإن العالم يحصل في ذاته كيفية هي العلم صار بها مضافا و المعلوم لم يحصل في ذاته شيء آخر به صار معلوما.

هذا ما يستفاد من كلام الشيخ و غيره و لي فيه نظر كما قدمنا بيانه.

و منها ما قال الشيخ في الشفاء يكاد يكون المضافات منحصرة في أقسام المعادلة - و التي بالزيادة و التي بالفعل و الانفعال و مصدرها من القوة و التي بالمحاكاة.

فأما التي بالزيادة فإما من الكم و هو ظاهر و أما من القوة فكالغالب و القاهر و المانع.

و أما التي بالفعل و الانفعال فكالأب و الابن و القاطع و المنقطع و التي بالمحاكاة كالعلم و المعلوم و الحس و المحسوس فإن العلم يحاكي هيئة المعلوم و الحس يحاكي هيئة المحسوس و وجه الضبط لا يخلو تحصيله عن صعوبة.

و منها أن المضاف عارض لجميع المقولات

ففي الجوهر كالأب و الابن و العالم و المعلوم و في الكم أما المتصل فكالعظيم و الصغير و أما المنفصل فكالكثير و القليل و في كيف كالأحر و الأبرد و في المضاف كالأقرب و الأبعد و في الأين كالعالي و السافل و في المتى كالأقدم و الأحدث و في النصفة كالأشد انتصابا و انحناء و في الملك كالأكسى و الأعرى و في الفعل كالأقطع و الأصرم و في الانفعال كالأشد تسخنا و تقطعا و الأضعف

فصل (٩) في أن المضاف هل يقبل التضاد والأشد والأضعف أم لا

واعلم أن المضاف بما هو مضاف طبيعة غير مستقلة الوجود بنفسها كما تبين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٠

فهي تابعة في جميع الأحكام الوجودية لوجود موضوعاتها والتضاد والتقدم والتأخر والقوة والفعل وأشباهها من أحوال الوجود يعرض للموضوعات الإضافية بالذات ولإضافاتها بالعرض ومن هذا القبيل التضاد فإذا اعتبر بين الحار والبارد تضاد حقيقي كان بين إضافتهما أي الأحر والأبرد تضاد بالتبع وأما عروض التضاد لشيء من المضافين مع قطع النظر عن موضوعيهما فذلك غير صحيح.

واعلم أنه قد ذكر الشيخ في باب الكم عند بيانه أن العظيم لا يضاد الصغير - ما يشعر بأن التضاد لا يعرض للإضافات و يبين ذلك بوجهين - أحدهما أن تقابل التضاد ليس بعينه تقابل التضايف بل المتضادان يعرضهما إضافة التضاد وذلك لأننا قد نجد طبائع الأضداد لا يتضايف ونجد كثيرا من المتضايفين لا تضاد بينهما كالعلم والمعلوم والجوار والجار. ثم نعلم أن التضاد من حيث هو تضاد من باب التضايف فيجب أن يكون في المتضادين شيء لا تضايف فيه فلما كان التضاد من حيث هو تضاد متضايفا بقي أن يكون الشيء الذي في المتضادين و ليس بمتضايف هو موضوعات التضاد فثبت أن المضادة لا يوجد إلا في موضوعات غير متضايفة.

و الثاني أن الإضافات طبائع غير مستقلة بأنفسها فيمتنع أن يعرض لها التضاد - لأن أقل درجات العروض أن يكون مستقلا بتلك المعروضة.

ثم إنه قال في باب الإضافة أن المضاف يعرض له ما يعرض لمقولته ولما كانت الضعفية تعرض للكم و كان لا مضادة للكم لم يعرض للضعفية مضادة ولما كانت الفضيلة عارضة للكيف و هي تضاد الرذيلة جاز أن يعرض لهذه الإضافة تضاد و كذلك الحار لما كان ضدا للبارد كان الأحر ضدا للأبرد و لا تناقض بين كلاميه كما توهمه بعض المتأخرين لما أشرنا إليه.

فيحمل كلامه على أن نفي التضاد عنها باعتبار ذاتها استقلالا وإثباته لها من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١١

جهة اتباعها لبعض موضوعاتها فالشيخ أطلق القول في باب الكم أن الإضافات لا تتضاد و عنى بذلك أنها لا تتضاد استقلالا لأنها لا تضاد تبعا في مواضع أخرى غير أنواع الكم و أفراده.

فإذا تبين هذا فنقول و هكذا القياس في قبول المضاف الأشد والأضعف والأزيد والأنقص فكل مقولة يقبل شيئا من هذه المعاني يقبله المضاف بتبعية موضوعة فهذه أحكام و أحوال كلية للمضاف و لا بأس بذكر أحكام لبعض أقسامها

فصل (١٠) في الكلي والجزئي والذاتي والعرضي

[المانى الثلاثة للكلي]

مفهوم الكلي وصف إضافي عارض للماهيات و هو اشتراكه بين كثيرين و ما من ماهية غير الوجود إلا و يمكن أن يعرضه هذا الوصف و إنما يخرج هذا الوصف لها من القوة إلى الفعل عند حدوث أفرادها و هذه الكلية الإضافية غير

كون الشيء بحيث يحتمل صدقه على كثيرين أو اشتراكه بينها و ذلك أن الكلي قد يراد به مجرد هذا الوصف و قد يراد به معروضه و قد يراد به مجموع الأمرين و مرادنا هذا نفس هذا الوصف الإضافي و كذلك الجنسية وصف إضافي عارض لبعض الماهيات فالجنس أيضا قد يراد به معروض هذا الوصف و هو الحيوان و قد يراد به نفس هذا الوصف و قد يراد به مجموع العارض و المعروض.

فالأول يسمى جنسا طبيعيا و الثاني منطقيا و الثالث عقليا و الأول أي المفهوم الكلي مضاف بسيط و الثاني مقولة و الثالث مضاف مركب و هذا الكلام في النوع و الفصل و الخاصة و العرض و هذه الإضافات كلها ذهنيات.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٢

إذا عرفت ذلك فنقول الكلي الذي هو المعنى الإضافي جنس لخمس أنواع - الجنس و النوع و الفصل و الخاصة و العرض و يراد بهذه الأمور مفهوماتها لا معروضاتها لا المركب منها و من معروضاتها بل نفس هذه الأوصاف الإضافية و لأجل ذلك كان المقسم لها معروضا للجنسية بالقياس إليها و صار كالجنس الطبيعي و كل من الخمسة نوعا لها و إن لم يكن بالقياس إلى أفراد طبيعة موضوعة كذلك بل كان جنسا أو فصلا أو غيرهما فالنوع بهذا المعنى غير مندرج تحت الجنس بهذا المعنى بل هما متباينان تباين أخصين تحت أعم واحد.

و إذا قيل إن النوع مندرج تحت الجنس و إن الفصل و الجنس داخلان في ماهية - ما عني به أن وصف النوعية تحت وصف الجنسية و لا أن مفهوم الفصل و الجنس داخل في ماهية النوع أو في وصف النوعية بل عنوا بذلك أن موضوع النوعية أي النوع الطبيعي - مندرج تحت معروض الجنسية أو يدخل في ماهيته إذا كانت مركبة طبيعة جنسية أي ماهية موصوفة بأنه جنس.

و كذا الكلام في الفصل و دخوله في النوع و أما الأوصاف الخمسة فكلها أنواع حقيقية متباينة تحت جنس واحد هو الكلي بما هو كلي و حمل الجنس عليه حمل عارض إضافي على معروضه و لكن حمل الكلية على الجنسية حمل مقوم جنسي على متقوم به.

فهذه اعتبارات لطيفة دقيقة لا بد من تفتن لها لأن الجهل بها و الإغفال عنها يوجب الغلط كثيرا فإن الكلي مثلا قد يراد به نفس الطبيعة التي من شأنها أن يعقل عنها صورة تعرض لها الكلية و قد يعني به الطبيعة التي تعرض لها الكلية و قد يعني به كون الطبيعة مشتركة بالفعل بين كثيرين و قد يراد كون الطبيعة بحيث يصدق عليها أنها لو قارنت نفسها لا هذه المادة و الأعراض بل تلك المادة و الأعراض لكان ذلك الشخص الآخر و هذه المعاني كلها غير الكلي بالمعنى المنطقي.

و القوم اتفقوا على وجود المعنى الأول و الثاني و الرابع منها في الأعيان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٣

و اختلفوا في وجود المعنى الثالث

و هو الصور المفارقة الأفلاطونية و قد سبق منا أن الكلي الطبيعي غير موجود بالذات بل الموجود بالذات هو الوجود الخاص - و قد أحكمنا أيضا البنيان الأفلاطوني و شيدنا قواعد ذلك بعد الاندراست.

و من جملة أقسام المضاف الكل و الجزء و إضافتهما غير إضافة الكلّي و الجزئي - و الفرق بينهما و بين هذين من وجوه - أحدها أن الكل من حيث هو كل موجود في الخارج و أما الكلّي من حيث هو كلي فلا وجود له إلا في الذهن. و الثاني أن الكل يعد بأجزائه و الكلّي لا يعد بجزئياته.

الثالث أن الكلّي قد يكون مقوما للجزئي و الكل يكون مقوما بالجزء.

الرابع أن طبيعة الكل لا يصير هو الجزء و أما طبيعة الكلّي فإنها تصير بعينها جزئية مثل الإنسان فإنه صار عين هذا الإنسان.

و الخامس أن الكل لا يكون كلا بكل جزء منه وحده و الكلّي كلي بكل جزئي وحده لأنه محمول عليه.

السادس أن أجزاء الكل محصورة غير متناهية و جزئيات الكلّي غير متناهية.

و من جملة أقسام الإضافات و التام و الناقص و المكتفي و فوق التمام فالتام هو الذي يحصل له جميع ما ينبغي أن يكون حاصلًا له و هو الكامل أيضا و هو المقول على أشياء كثيرة.

فتارة يقال للعدد إنه تام إذا كان جميع ما ينبغي أن يوجد لشيء من العدد - يكون قد حصل له و الجمهور لا يطلقون على عدد هو أقل من الثلاثة أنه تام و كون الثلاثة تامة لأن لها مبدءا و وسطا و نهاية و العلة في ذلك أنه لا شيء من الأعداد يمكن أن يكون تاما في عدديته إذ يوجد في عدد أزيد منه ما ليس فيه بل إنما يكون تاما في العشرية أو في الخمسية. و أما من حيث هو مبدءا و منتهى يكون ناقصا من جهة أنه ليس بينهما ما من شأنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٤

أن يكون بينهما و هو الوسطة و قس على ذلك سائر الأقسام و هو أن يوجد المبدءا و الوسطة فقط أو العكس و لا واسطة ثم من المحال أن يكون مبدئان في الأعداد - ليس أحدهما واسطة بوجه إلا لعددین و كذا القول في المنتهى. و أما الوسائط فقد يجوز أن يكون كثيرا لأن جملتها في أنها واسطة كشيء واحد ثم لا يكون للكثير حد توقف عليه فإذا حصول البداية و النهاية و التوسط غاية التمام و أقل عدد يوجد فيه ذلك هو الثلاثة.

فهذه حكاية ما ذكره الشيخ في الشفاء و تارة يقال تامة للمقادير كما يقال - فلان تام القامة إذا كانت محدودة بما يليق بأمثاله إذ المقادير لا تعرف إلا بالتحديد الذي يلزمه التقدير و تارة يقال للكيفيات و القوى إنها تامة مثل أن يقال هذا تام القوة و تام الحس و تام العلم و تارة يقال تمام في اصطلاح الحكماء و يريدون به أن يكون جميع كمالات الشيء حاصلة له بالفعل و ربما يشترطون في ذلك أن يكون وجوده و كمالات وجوده له من نفسه لا من غيره.

و إذا كان مع ذلك مبدءا لكمالات غيره فهو فوق التمام لأن فيه الوجود الذي ينبغي له بكماله و قد فضل عنه وجود غيره أيضا و ليس في الموجودات شيء بهذه الصفة إلا واجب الوجود.

و أما العقول فهي تامة بالتفسير الأول و غير تامة بالتفسير الثاني فإن الممكنات الفاقرات الهويات معدومة في حدود ذواتها و أما الذي دون التمام فهو قسمان - أحدهما المكتفي و هو الذي أعطى ما به يتمكن من تحصيل كمالاته مثل النفوس التي للسماويات فإنها أبدا في اكتساب كمالاتها من غير حاجة لها إلى مكمل خارجي - كالمعلم البشرية فينا بل مكملها و معلمها و مخرجها من القوة إلى الفعل جوهر عقلي فياض غير مباين الوجود لوجوداتها و كذلك حال نفوس الأنبياء ع - لأنهم أيضا مكتفون حيث أعطاهم الله ما به تمكنوا من تحصيل كمالاتهم و قرباتهم من الله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٥

كما ستعرف جميع ذلك في مواضعه و الآخر الناقص و هو الذي يحتاج إلى أمر خارج - يمدّه بالكمال مثل الأشياء التي تكون في الكون و الفساد.

و الفرق بين التام و بين الكل و الجميع بالاعتبار فإنها متقاربة المعاني و ذلك بأن التام ليس من شرطه أن يحيط بكثرة بالفعل و لا بالقوة مثل كون الباري تاما و الكل و الجميع من شرطهما ذلك.

و أما التمام و الكل فيما فيه كثرة فهما متحدان في الموضوع و الفرق بأنه بالقياس إلى الكثرة الموجودة المحصورة فيه كل و بالقياس إلى ما يبقى شيء خارجا عنه تام.

فإن قلت فما معنى قول بعض أساطين الحكمة و التحقيق أن الباري كل الأشياء و قد تقرر أن كون الشيء كلا لا بد فيه من حضور كثرة في ذاته.

قلت ذلك معنى غامض حق يلزم من بساطته و أحديته أن يكون بحيث لم يكن حقيقة من الحقائق خارجا من ذاته بذاته و مع كونه كل الأشياء لا يوجد فيه شيء من الأشياء حتى يكون هناك كثرة لا بالفعل و لا بالقوة

المقالة الثانية في بقية المقولات و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في حقيقة الأين

عرف الأين بأنه هو كون الشيء حاصلًا في مكانه و ينبغي أن لا يكون نفس نسبة الشيء إلى مكانه و إلا لكان نوعا من مقولة المضاف بل أمرا و هيئة يعرض له الإضافة إلى مكانه.

و ربما قيل كما أن السواد له ماهية و إضافة المحل عرض لمهيته فكذا الأين له ماهية و كونه في المكان إضافة عارضة لها و هو ليس بشيء فإن كون الشيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٦

في المكان ليس ككون السواد في المحل فإن وجود السواد بعينه هو وجوده في المحل لا أمر زائد على وجوده و إن لم يكن عين مهيته لكن زيادة الوجود على الماهية إنما هي بحسب التصور لا بحسب الواقع و هذا بخلاف كون الشيء في المكان فإنه لا بد أن يكون هذا الكون في المكان أمرا زائدا على وجوده في نفسه و إلا لم يكن صفة زائدة على هذا الجوهر الجسماني و لكان قد بطل وجوده في نفسه عند مفارقة مكانه - و حصل له وجود آخر و لصار المعدوم بعينه معادا فليس كون الشيء في المكان كونه في الأعيان فإن كونه في الأعيان نفس وجوده و لو كان كونه في المكان وجودا له لكان كونه في الزمان أيضا وجودا له فكان لشيء واحد وجودات كثيرة.

أقول و يمكن أن يقال إن الشيء الجسماني كونه في المكان المطلق أو في الزمان مطلقا و إن كان هو بعينه نحو وجوده الخاص به لا أمرا زائدا عليه إلا أن كونه في مكان معين أو زمان معين أمر زائد على وجوده في نفسه فذلك الأمر الزائد نسبيته الأين أو المتى و كل منهما غير نفس الإضافة لأن المراد منه مبدء إضافة المكان أو الزمان.

و قد استدلل صاحب المباحث على أن الكون في المكان ليس هو بعينه الكون في الأعيان الذي هو الوجود بوجه آخر و هو أن الوجود وصف مشترك في الموجودات كلها فلو كان حقيقة الوجود في الأعيان هو الكون في المكان لكانت

الموجودات كلها كائنة في المكان و حيث لم يكن كذلك علمنا أن كون الشيء في المكان مفهوم مغاير لوجود الشيء في نفسه.

أقول هو متقوض بكل من الموجودات المخصوصة لجريان ما ذكره فيه فيلزم عليه مما ذكره أن يكون كون الجسم ماديا و كون العقل مفارقا و كون الحيوان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٧

حساسا بأمور زائدة على نفس وجودها و ليس كذلك.

و دفع ما ذكره بأن الوجود المطلق الكلبي كما مر مرارا أمر مشكك عرضي لأفراده و ليس لحقيقة الوجود طبيعة كلية نوعية أو جنسية مشتركة بين جميع أفراد الوجود

فصل (٢) في تقسيم الأين

و هو من طريقتين أحدهما إن من الأين ما هو أول حقيقي و منه ما هو ثان غير حقيقي.

فالأول كون الشيء في مكانه الخاص به الذي لا يسعه فيه غيره معه ككون الماء في الكوز.

و الثاني كما يقال فلان في البيت فإن البيت يسعه و غيره فليس جميع البيت مشغولا به وحده و أبعد منه كونه في الدار و بعده البلد ثم العراق مثلا ثم الإقليم ثم المعمورة ثم عالم العناصر ثم العالم الجسماني باعتبار أن يحويه المحدد للجهات و هذا هو الغاية فإن كون الشيء في العالم مطلقا ليس بأين أصلا.

الطريق الثاني إن الأين منه جنسي و هو الكون في المكان و منه نوعي و هو الكون في الهواء أو الماء أو فوق أو تحت و منه شخصي ككون هذا الشخص في هذا الوقت في مكانه الحقيقي و قد يقال إنه لا بد لكل أين شخص حقيقي من صفة قائمة بالتممكن هي علة ذلك الأين.

و اعترض عليه صاحب المباحث بأن هذا باطل لأن تلك الصفة إما أن يكون ممكن الحصول في المتمكن عند ما لا يكون في مكانه الحقيقي المعين أو لا يكون - فإن أمكن لم تكن تلك الصفة علة لذلك الكون في المكان المعين و إلا لزم تخلف المعلول عن علته و إن لم يكن فحينئذ يتوقف حصولها في المتمكن على حصوله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٨

في ذلك المكان المعين فلو توقف الحصول في ذلك المكان على حصول تلك الصفة فيه لزم الدور و هو محال.

أقول فيه نظر من وجهين أحدهما إن تلك الصفة يمكن أن يكون جزء من العلة أو معدا أو شرطاً فلا يلزم مقارنتها للمعلول على وجه الضرورة.

و ثانيهما إن حصول تلك الصفة و إن لم يتحقق إلا عند كون المتمكن في مكانه لكن ذلك بحسب الظرفية المقارنة لا بحسب السببية و التقدم و الفرق بين المعنيين كالفرق بين القضية المشروطة ما دام الوصف و المشروطة بشرط الوصف - و الثانية أخص من الأولى و الأعم لا يستلزم الأخص فإن كل كاتب يحتاج إلى حركة الأصابع في وقت الكتابة و تلك الحركة ضرورية على ذلك الوقت بأسبابها المؤدية إليها في ذلك الزمان و ليس أن الكتابة أوجبت تلك الحركة بل العكس أولى فإن وجود تلك الحركة يقتضي وجود الكتابة في الخارج

فصل (٣) في تنمة أحوال الأين فمنها أنه يعرض له التضاد

فإن الكون في المكان الذي عند المحيط هو مقابل للكون الذي عند المركز و هما أمران وجوديان بينهما غاية التضال و لا يجتمعان في موضوع واحد في آن واحد و صح تعاقبهما عليه فهما متضادان.

و منها أنه يقبل الأشد و الأضعف

لكن قبوله لهما ليس بحسب جنس الأين - فإن كون الشيء في مكانه لا يكون أشد من كون شيء آخر في مكانه لأن مفهوم الحصول في المكان لا يقبل الشدة و الضعف بل إنما يقبل الجسمان الأشد و الأضعف بحسب طبيعة نوعية لمكانها كالقوى أو تحت أو فيهما [غيرهما] كالجسمين إذا كانا في القوى و أحدهما أعلى من الآخر أي كان أقرب إلى الحد الذي هو المحيط فهو أشد فوقية من الآخر.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢١٩

فقد ثبت من هذا أن الأشد و الأنقص لم يتطرق إلى نفس الأين بما هو أين - بل إلى نوع منه و هو القوى أو تحت و لكن ليس كما زعمه صاحب المباحث أن ذلك الأشد و الأضعف إنما هو في إضافة عارضة للأين و هو القوى و التحتية لما مر من أن الإضافة ليست قابلة للأشد و الأضعف لذاتها

فصل (٤) في حقيقة متى و أنواعه

من جملة ما عد من المقولات متى

و هو كون الشيء في زمان واحد أو في حد منه فإن كثيرا من الأشياء يقع في أطراف الأزمنة و لا يقع في الأزمنة مع أنه يستل عنها بمتى كالوصلات و المماسات و سائر الأشياء الواقعة لوقوعها في أمر له تعلق ما بالزمان و حال هذا الكون بعينه حال ما قبله و أمر متى العام و الخاص باعتبار كون الشيء في زمان مطلق أو زمان خاص أو [زمان] شخص.

فمنه ما هو متى حقيقي

و هو كون الشيء له زمان مطابق له لا يفضل عنه -

و منه ما هو ثان غير حقيقي

و هو كون هذه الحركة الواقعة في ساعة مثلا في أول اليوم أو في الشهر أو في السنة أو في القرن أو في زمان الإسلام أو في الزمان مطلقا على قياس ما مر في الأين و الفرق بين البابين أن الزمان الحقيقي الواحد يشترك فيه الكثيرون.

و أما المكان الحقيقي الواحد فلا يشترك فيه كثيرون هكذا قيل و ليس بسديد فإن عدم الشركة في المكان الحقيقي إنما يصح القول به مع وحدة الزمان حقيقة فكذا مع وحدة المكان حقيقة لا يمكن الشركة في الزمان الحقيقي فكما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢٠

أن لكل متمكن أينما يخصه فكذا لكل حادث متى يخصه و لا تكون مشتركة بينه و بين غيره و لذا قيل لكل من الزمان و المكان أسوة بالآخر.

ثم قالوا إن الأمور التي لها متى بالذات هي الحركات و المتحركات لا متى لها من حيث جوهرها بل من حيث حركاتها و

جواهرها في الزمان بالعرض.

أقول إن وجود الطبيعة الجوهرية متجددة سيالة فذلك كون تدريجي يطابق الزمان و كذا بعض الكميات و الكيفيات و الأوضاع و الأيون التدريجية الوجود لها أكون تدريجية و الحركة عبارة عن تدرج واقع في الكون لا الكون التدريجي فهي معنى نسبي إضافي و قد مر أن المعنى الإضافي لا يوصف بالزيادة و النقصان و الأشد و الانقاص إلا بالعرض فالمتى إنما يلحق أولا و بالذات لتلك الأكون و الوجودات - و ثانيا لمهياتها و أما الحركة فلا تدرج لها بل هي عين التدرج فلا متى لها بالذات بل بالعرض.

و اعلم أن من اقتصر في تعريف الزمان أنه مقدار الحركة من جهة التقدم و التأخر فيلزمه من جهة الاقتصار على هذا التعريف أن يكون مقدار كل حركة في العالم العنصري أيضا زمنا بنفسه فيحتاج إلى التقييد بأمر آخر و هو أن يوجد في الحد مقدار حركة الفلك أو حركة لا تنقطع أو أظهر الحركات أو أسرعها أو أشدها

فصل (٥) في الوضع

و هو كون الجسم بحيث يكون لأجزائه بعضها إلى بعض نسبة في الجهات المختلفة

كالقيام و القعود و ليس هو النسبة و ذلك لأن النسبة و إن كانت واقعة بين أجزائه لكنها من باب الإضافة كالجوار و نحوه بل كون الجسم بحيث يكون لأجزائه هذه النسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢١

هو الوضع كما مر.

و قد مرت الإشارة أيضا إلى أن هذا الوضع ليس الوضع الذي يوجد في النقطة و هو كون الشيء مشارا إليه بالحس و ليس الوضع المذكور في الكم - فإن هذا الوضع يعتبر فيه نسب الأجزاء إلى الحاوي و المحوي و الجهات الخارجية و الوضع المذكور في تقسيم الكم لا يعتبر فيه ذلك و لكن الذي ذكروا فيه من كون الشيء بحيث يشار إليه أنه أين هو مما يتصل به اتصالا ثابتا لا يخلو عن خلط - فإن هذا الأين لو كان أينا حقيقيا لم يبق فرق بين الوضع بهذا المعنى و الذي هو نفس المقولة فإن الأجزاء ليس لها أين بالفعل و ليست أيونها مما ينضاف بعضها إلى بعض - على وجه يقال لبعض منها أنها أين هي من الآخر.

و لو فرق بينهما بأن أحدهما للمقدار و الآخر للجسم الطبيعي فنقول إن الجسم الطبيعي إنما يلحق الوضع إليه بتوسط المقدار التعليمي و لو لا عروض المقدار لم يصح له فرض التجزي و القسمة المقدارية كما بين في باب الكم فيلحق الوضع الجسم كيفما كان بتوسط المقدار.

و الحق عندنا أنه لا بد من تحصيل الفرق بين الوضع الذي من خواص الجسم و الوضع الذي يوجد في الكم و أطرافه لأن مجرد كون الشيء كما أو مقدارا متصلا لا يكفي لقبوله الإشارة الحسية بأنه هاهنا أو هناك أو في الفوق أو في التحت أو جهة من جهات إنما ذلك شأن الكم الاتصالي مع اقترائه بالمادة القابلة للانفعالات - و الحركات و الاختلافات فمجرد المقدار لا يقبل الإشارة الحسية بل الخيالية لكن القوم قد تسامحوا و أطلقوا الحس و أرادوا ما يقابل العقل فالنقطة و الخط و السطح و الثخن كلها ليس شيء منها في ذاته واقعة في جهة من الجهات و لا للحس إليها إشارة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢٢

إلا مع المادة بأن كان وجوده في المادة مصححا لقبوله للإشارة والجهة والانقسام وغير ذلك فإن المقدار إذا فرض مجردا عن المادة كما في الخيال كان ذا نهاية مقدارية وذا أجزاء لها هيئة اتصال بمعنى غير ما ذكره من كونها على وجه يقال لكل منها أين هو من صاحبه ويتصور له أيضا شكل من غير أن يكون للشكل أين. وله أيضا سطوح وخطوط لها أوضاع بمعنى آخر وللخط نقطة لها وضع خاص لا بمعنى الإشارة الحسية. وبالجمله فكما للعقل إشارة وللحس إشارة غيرها فكذا للقوة الخيالية إشارة إلى المقادير وأطرافها غير تينك الإشارتين وللعقل وضع يختص بالعقليات والكليات وللخيال وضع يوجد للأشباح الإدراكية وللحس وضع يختص بالماديات سواء كان للنقطة أو للمقدار المنقسم في بعض الجهات لا كلها أو في الجسم المنقسم في جميع الجهات - والوضع الذي هو من المقولة هو هذا المعنى الأخير وكذا الوضع الذي جزء المقولة - لا يوجد إلا في عوارض المادة. فإن النقطة ما لم تقع في هذا العالم لم يكن قابلا للإشارة الحسية والخط والسطح ما لم يقعا في المادة القابلة لم يكن أجزاءهما بحيث يصح أن يقال يعرض لبعض منها بالقياس إلى بعض أين هو من الآخر.

ثم الوضع قد يكون بالطبع وقد يكون لا بالطبع

وقد يكون بالفعل وقد يكون بالقوة - والذي بالطبع وبالفعل كوضع الأرض من الفلك فإن حيزيهما متميزان بالفعل واما الذي بالفعل وليس بالطبع كحال ساكن البيت من البيت فإن الوضع حاصل لهما بالفعل لكن اختلاف حيزيهما ليس اختلافا طبيعيا واما الذي بالقوة كما يتوهم قرب دائرة الرحى إلى قطبها ونسبته إلى دائرة القطب ليست بالفعل إذ لا دائرة بالفعل فلا وضع إلا بالتوهم أو بالقوة والوضع مما يقع فيه التضاد والشدّة والضعف. أما التضاد فكون الإنسان رأسه إلى السماء ورجله إلى الأرض مضادا لوضعه إذا صار معكوسا والوضعان معنيان وجوديان متعاقبان على موضوع واحد من غير أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢٣

يجتمعا فيه وبينهما غاية الخلاف وكذا الحال في الاستلقاء والانبطاح.

وأما الشدة فكالأشد انتصابا أو الأكثر انحناء.

فإن قلت أليس قد مر في مباحث الكيف المختص بالكم أنه لا يقبل التضاد ولا الشدة وحكمتكم بأن استدارة الخط أو تحديب السطح لا يشتد ولا يضعف فهنا كيف يحكمون بأن الاستقامة والانحناء يقبلان التفاوت مع أن هذه الصفات لا يعرض أولا إلا للمقادير.

أقول نسبة هذه الاستقامة والانحناء وأمثالها إلى المذكور هناك كنسبة هذا الوضع الذي هو المقولة إلى تلك الأوضاع فالمستدير مثلا إذا كان مجردا عن المادة - لا يمكن أن يصير أشد استداره مع بقاء الموضوع إذ لا مادة هناك حتى يقبل التبدل - بخلاف ما إذا وقع شيء من الاستدارة والانحناء أو غيرهما في مادة مخصوصة لأنه يصير حينئذ واقعا تحت مقولة الوضع ويقبل التضاد والشدّة والضعف وغير ذلك فالانحناء الطبيعي يقبل الأشد دون التعليمي وهذا من مقولة الوضع دون ذلك.

فاعلم هذا فإنه شيء يغفل عنه الأكثرون

فصل (٦) في الجدة

و مما عد في المقولات الجدة و الملك و هو هيئة تحصل بسبب كون جسم في محيط بأكمله أو بعضه بحيث ينتقل المحيط بانتقال المحاط مثل التسليح و التقمص و التعمم و التختم و التنعل - و ينقسم إلى طبيعي كحال الحيوان بالنسبة إلى إهابه و غير طبيعي كالتسليح و التقمص - و قد يعبر عن الملك بمقولة له فمنه طبيعي ككون القوى للنفس و منه اعتبار خارجي ككون الفرس لزيد ففي الحقيقة الملك يخالف هذا الاصطلاح فإن هذا من مقولة المضاف لا غير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢٤

فصل (٧) في مقولتي أن يفعل و أن يفعل

أما الأول فهو كون الجوهر بحيث يحصل منه أثر في غيره غير قار الذات ما دام السلوك في هذا التأثير التجدي كالتسخين ما دام يسخن و التبريد ما دام يبرد.

و أما الثاني فهو كون الجوهر بحيث يتأثر عن غيره تأثيراً غير قار الذات ما دام كونه كذلك مثل التسخين و التسود. فإذا فرغ الفاعل من فعله أو المنفعل من انفعاله و بالجملة عن النسبة التي بينهما من تجدد التأثير و التأثر لا يقال إن هذا محرك و ذاك متحرك و ينتهي التسخين إلى السخونة القارة - و التسود إلى السواد القار فالتعبير عنهما بأن يفعل دون الفعل و بأن يفعل دون الانفعال لأجل أن الفعل و الانفعال قد يقالان للإيجاد بلا حركة و للقبول بلا تجدد ككون الباري فاعلاً للعالم و كون العالم منفعلاً عنه و ليس في ذلك حركة لا في جانب الفاعل و لا في جانب القابل بل وجود يستتبع وجوداً و يعرض لهما إضافة فقط فالفاعل و المنفعل بذلك المعنى إضافتان فقط بخلاف هذين المعنيين الواقعيين تحت الزمان. و أما الحالة التي تقع للفاعل المتجدد عند انقطاع تحريكه و للمنفعل عند انقطاع تحريكه كالقطع في نهاية الحركة و احتراق الثوب بعد استقراره فهل تكونان من هذين البابين أم لا.

فنقول هما من حيث تخصيصهما بأنهما في نهاية الحركتين يصح عدتهما من هاتين المقولتين و كذا الحال في جميع ما يقع في حدود الحركة و أطرافها الدفعية - و إذا لم يعتبر تخصيصهما كذلك فليسا من المقولتين و قد يعرض في هاتين المقولتين

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التضاد و الاشتداد.

و أما التضاد فالتبويض ضد التسويد و التسخين ضد التبريد كما أن البياض ضد السواد و السخونة ضد البرودة. و أما الاشتداد فإن من الاسوداد الذي هو في السلوك إلى غاية ما هو أقرب إلى الاسوداد الذي هو في الغاية من اسوداد آخر و كذلك قد يكون بعض التسويد - أسرع وصولاً إلى الغاية من بعض آخر منهما [منه] و هذا الاشتداد و التناقص غير الشدة و النقص اللذين في الكيف كالسواد فإنهما ليسا بالقياس إلى السواد نفسه بل بالقياس إلى الاسوداد الذي هو عبارة عن الحركة إلى السواد فإن السلوك إلى السواد غير السواد هذا ما قيل.

و اعلم أن وجود كل منهما في الخارج ليس عبارة عن نفس السلوك إلى مرتبة - فإنه بعينه معنى الحركة و لا أيضاً وجود كل منهما وجود المقولة التي يقع بها التحريك و التحرك كالكيف مثل السواد و الكم مثل مقدار الجسم النامي أو الوضع

كالجلوس و الانتصاب و لا غير ذلك بل وجودهما عبارة عن وجود شيء من هذه المقولات ما دام يؤثر أو يتأثر فوجود السواد أو السخونة مثلا من حيث إنه سواد من باب مقولة الكيف و وجود كل منهما من حيث كونه تدريجيا يحصل منه تدريجي آخر أو يحصل من تدريجي آخر هو من مقولة أن يفعل أو أن يفعل. و أما نفس سلوكه التدريجي أي خروجه من القوة إلى الفعل سواء كان في جانب الفاعل أو في جانب المنفعل فهو عين الحركة لا غير فقد ثبت نحو وجودهما في الخارج و عرضيتهما

فصل (٨) في دفع ما أورد على موجوديتهما

و قال صاحب المباحث في هذا المقام عندي أن تأثير الشيء في الشيء يستحيل أن

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يكون وصفا ثبوتيا زائدا على ذات المؤثر و ذات الأثر و كذا تأثر الشيء عن الشيء و هو قابليته - يستحيل أن يكون وصفا ثبوتيا زائدا على ذات القابل و ذات المقبول.

أما التأثير فلو كان أمرا ثبوتيا لكان من جملة الأمور التي لا بد لوجودها من مؤثر أيضا فيكون تأثير ذلك المؤثر في ذلك التأثير زائدا عليه فننقل الكلام إليه و يفضي إلى التسلسل و هو محال و بتقدير أن لا يكون محالا فالإلزام حاصل و ذلك لأنه إذا كان بين كل مؤثر و أثر واسطة هي التأثير حتى فرضت أمور غير متناهية مترتبة فلا يخلو إما أن يكون تلك الأمور متلاقية أو لا يكون شيء منها متلاقية.

فإن تلاقى بمعنى أن يفرض مؤثر و متأثر لا يتخللهما ثالث فحينئذ وجد مؤثر - لا يكون تأثيره زائدا على ذاته و ذات أثره فحينئذ لا يكون تأثير الأول في الثاني زائدا عليهما و لا تأثير الثاني في الثالث و الثالث في الرابع و هكذا أمور زائدة على ذواتها و ذوات آثارها.

و إن لم يتلاقى بمعنى أن لا يوجد هناك أمران لا يتخللهما ثالث فهذا نفي للمؤثرية إذ لم يوجد هناك ما يكون ذاته مؤثرا في ذات آخر و أما القابلية فلو كانت ثبوتية يجري الكلام بعينه فيه و يعود التسلسل و المحذور بعينهما.

قال فهذا برهان قاطع على أن المؤثرية و المتأثرية لا يجوز أن يكونا وصفين ثبوتيين و ستعرف في باب العلل أن المؤثرية لو كانت وصفا ثبوتيا يلزم نفي الواجب الوجود تعالى شأنه انتهى ما ذكره تلخيصا.

أقول هذا الكلام بطوله قد نشأ من سوء فهم بعض أصول الحكمة كمسألة الوجود و زيادته على الماهية و أن لكل ماهية نحو خاصا من الوجود و الماهيات كما أنها متخالفة بالمعنى و المفهوم كذلك متخالفة بالوجود لكن وجود بعضها قد يتحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢٧

بوجود الآخر ضربا من الاتحاد و موجودية كل ماهية أو معنى في الخارج عبارة عن صدق حده على شيء في الخارج كما ذكره الشيخ في إثبات نحو وجود المضاف في الخارج بأنه في الأعيان أشياء كثيرة بهذه الصفة أي كونه بحيث إذا عقل عقل معه شيء آخر.

إذا تقرر ذلك فنقول كما أن كثيرا من الموجودات يصدق عليها حد الجوهر - أو الكم أو الكيف و غيرهما و كذا حدود

أنواعها كحد الفلك أو الحيوان أو السواد أو السطح أو غير ذلك فيجزم بوجود هذه المقولات وأجناسها وأنواعها فكذا يوجد في الخارج أمور كثيرة يحمل على بعضها بحسب الخارج حد واحد من هاتين المقولتين وعلى بعض حد الأخرى فيكون كل منهما من الموجودات الخارجية - دون الموهومات التي لا وجود لها في العين ودون المعاني المنطقية كالكلية والجزئية - ومفهوم النوع والجنس والفصل وغيرها من المعقولات الثانية التي شرط عروضها كون الموضوع متعينا في الذهن ودون السلوب والمعاني السلبية.

وذلك لأنه لا معنى لوجود شيء في الخارج إلا كونه بحيث يصدق معناه على شيء صدقا خارجيا كما في محمولات القضايا الخارجية.

و أما الكلام في أن وجودهما هل هو زائد على وجود ذات المؤثر وذات المتأثر - ليكونا من الأعراض أو لا فيكونا من الجواهر فذلك مطلب آخر.

ولك أن تقول في بيان عرضيتهما بأن لكل من المؤثر والمتأثر على الوجه المذكور ماهية أخرى ولها حد آخر غير كونه فاعلا أو منفعلا فإن السواد يمكن وجود نوعه في سواد لا يشتد أي لا يتحرك في سواديته فيكون اسوداده بأمر زائد على سواديته وكذا للتسخين وجود غير تدريجي يتحقق نوع السخونة فيه فكون السخونة مؤثرة في شيء على التدريج أمر زائد على وجود السخونة.

و أما قوله لو كان التأثير أمرا ثبوتيا لكان من جملة الأمور التي لا بد لوجودها من مؤثر.

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فنقول إن بعض الصفات وإن احتاجت إلى مؤثر لكن لا يحتاج إلى مؤثر جديد غير جاعل موصوفاتها فإن جعل كما لا يتخلل بين الذات والذاتيات فلا يتخلل أيضا بين وجود الملزوم ووجود لازمة فإن الجاعل كما لا يجعل النار جوهرًا بعد جعلها موجودة فكذا لا يجعلها حارة بعد جعلها موجودة بل جعل وجودها بعينه جعل حرارتها على وجه التبعية مع أن وجود الحرارة غير وجود النارية لأن النار جوهر و الحرارة عرض فكذا الحال فيما نحن فيه.

فنقول التأثير التجديدي وإن كان أمرا موجودا في الخارج لكن من لوازم هوية بعض أفراد المقولات فالحرارة المسخنة مثلا قد لا يكون كونها مسخنة أمرا زائدا على وجود ذاتها الشخصية وإن كان زائدا على ماهيتها ثم على تقدير زيادتها على ذاتها الشخصية قد لا يكون مفتقرا إلى جاعل آخر غير جاعل الذات بل ولا إلى جعل آخر غير جعل الذات لكونه من لوازم تلك الهوية الوجودية ولازم الهوية كلازم الماهية غير مفتقر إلى جعل مستأنف غير جعل تلك الهوية فثبت أن كون التأثير التجديدي - موجودا زائدا على ذات المؤثر ليس مما يحتاج إلى تأثير آخر ولا إلى مؤثر آخر.

وكذا قوله فيكون تأثير المؤثر في ذلك التأثير زائدا عليه غير مسلم إذ لا يلزم من كون التأثير التجديدي الذي هو من مقولة أن يفعل أمرا زائدا على ذات المؤثر أن يكون التأثير الإبداعي أمرا زائدا على ذات الفاعل في الخارج بل هو بعينه إضافة الفاعلية والإبداع ووجود الإضافات قد علمت أنها غير مستقلة في الخارج

الفن الرابع في البحث عن أحكام الجواهر وأقسامها الأولية

فإنها من عوارض الموجود بما هو موجود فحري بها أن يذكر في العلم الكلي الباحث عن عوارض الموجود من غير نظر إلى خصوصيات الأشياء وفيها مقدمة ومطالب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٢٩

أما المقدمة ففي بيان ماهية الجوهر و العرض و أحوالهما الكلية و فيها فصول

فصل (١) في تحقيق ماهيتهما

اعلم أن مفهومات الأشياء بعضها موجودة بالذات و بعضها موجودة بالعرض.

فمثال الأول قولنا الإنسان حيوان فإن الوجود المنسوب إلى الإنسان بعينه منسوب إلى الحيوان الذي يحمل عليه بالحقيقة.

و مثال الثاني زيد أعمى و زيد أبيض فإن الوجود المنسوب إلى زيد بعينه - ليس منسوباً إلى العمى و البياض بالحقيقة بل بضرب من المجاز بواسطة نحو علاقة للمحمول بالموضوع سواء كان عدماً أو وجودياً و تلك العلاقة أن يكون مبدأ المحمول منتزعا عنه أو قائما به فالوجود في القسم الثاني هو الموضوع و لكن نسب وجوده إلى المحمول بالعرض و هذا النحو من الوجودية غير محدود فلنعرض عنه و نشغل بالموجود بالذات.

فنقول قد علمت أن كل موجود إما أن يصح أن يقال إن إنيته ماهيته بمعنى أن لا ماهية له إلا الوجود الصرف الذي لا أتم منه أو لا يصح فالأول قد سلف بعض أحكامه بحسب المفهوم و سيأتي البحث عن بيان وجوده و أوصافه الكمالية و أحكامه الوجودية - و كلامنا الآن فيما وجوده غير ماهيته بالمعنى الذي سلف منا ذكره أي ليس وجوده بذاته بل بغيره فأقدم أقسام هذه الموجودات هو الجوهر و ذلك لأن هذا الموجود - لا يخلو إما أن يكون في محل أو لا يكون و المراد من كون الشيء في المحل أن يكون وجوده في شيء آخر لا كجزء منه مجامعا معه لا يجوز مفارقه عنه.

و قد أشكل على القوم هاهنا تفسير كون الشيء في محل و استصعبوه لما في لفظة في من الاشتراك و التشابه بين معاني كثيرة كما نقول في الزمان و في المكان و في الذهن و في الخارج و في الغاية و في الكل و في الأجزاء و في العام و في الخصب و في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٣٠

الراحة و في اللفظ فلا اشتراك لها في معنى واحد يجمع الكل و ليست نفس الإضافة مما يصلح أن يكون مراده بلفظة في و إلا لصدقت على معنى مع و من و على و غيرها من المعاني الحرفية و لصدقت على الأبوة و البنوة و غيرهما. و تخصيص الإضافة بعدم الاستقلال بالمفهومية و غيره و إن أخرج المعاني الاسمية - إلا أن الخصوصية الواحدة منها لا تبلغ في النزول و تقليل الشركاء إلى حيث يشمل المعاني المستعملة فيها لفظة في و يخرج الأغيار و كما أن كلا من معنيي متى و الآن - مما يستعمل فيهما لفظة في و لا يشملهما معنى واحد يخصهما بل لكل منها خصوصية يدخلها فيما وضع له اللفظ.

فكذا القياس إذا انضمت معهما أمور أخرى يكون على هذا المنوال.

نعم يمكن أن يقال إن استعمال في في كثير من هذه المواضع على المجاز التشبيهي ككون الكل في الأجزاء لكونه عين الجميع و ككون الجزء في الكل - فلو كان الكل في الجزء بالمعنى الذي يكون الجزء في الكل يلزم اشتغال الشيء على نفسه و هو أمر مستحيل بداهة.

فإن قلت لفظة في موضوعة لمعنى الاشتمال والإحاطة وهو يجمع الكل فيكون اشتراكه معنويا. قلت الكلام يعود فيما ذكرت جذعا لأنه بعينه معنى الظرفية وهو مختلف فإن ظرفية الزمان للحركة ليست كظرفية المكان للجسم وكذا كون الشيء في الحركة غير كون الحركة في الشيء والغرض أن كون الشيء في المحل ليس له معنى محصل شامل للمواضع التي يستعمل فيها وليس الغرض النظر في معنى اللفظ بما هو معنى اللفظ ليكون خارجا عن هذا الفن وإن كان المذكور أيضا فضلا على ما يقصده السالك المستقيم الطريق. فإذا كان في المحل اشتراكه لفظيا فكل ما ذكره من القيود لا يكون فاصلا معنويا وقيدا احترازيا إذ اللفظ المشترك لا يحتاج إلى أمر مميز معنوي إذ ليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٣١

فيه معنى واحد جنسي أو عرض عام بل معاني متعددة ينصرف إلى كل منها بقرينة خارجة لفظية أو معنوية فإن طريق إزالة الشبهة باشتراك الاسم إما بالحد أو بالرسم - أو بنفي المعاني الداخلة تحت الاسم المشترك حتى يدل على ما يبقى لا من ذاته بل بسلب ما ليس هو مقصودا وإذا كان الحال كذلك فالمذكور في تعريف الحلول - وهو وجود الشيء في شيء لا كجزء منه شائعا فيه بالكلية مع امتناع المفارقة عنه يكون كقرائن للفظ في المستعملة في هذا الموضع بالنسبة إلى مواضع الاستعمال - لكونه يقوم مقام الرسم في القيود المترتبة والخواص المميزة مع مساهلة ما بأنه لو فرض هاهنا أن المنسوب إلى شيء ففي كان له معنى مشترك بين ذي المحل وغيره - كان المذكور في التعريف قيودا مميزة لذي المحل من حيث هو ذو المحل عن المشاركات في أمر معنوي فكان يمتاز إما بالشيوع والمجامعة بالكلية فعن كون الخاص في العام و كون الشيء في الزمان والمكان.

و أما بامتناع المفارقة والانتقال فعن الكون في المكان أيضا وفي الخصب وغيره وقد عرف معنى في الشيء هاهنا أي الحلول بتعريفات كثيرة ليس شيء منها خاليا عن الفساد والخلل.

إما طردا أو عكسا أو كليهما كقولهم الاختصاص الناعت و كقولهم اختصاص شيء بشيء بحيث يكون أحدهما نعتا والآخر منوعتا به فانتقض عكسه بالسواد والبياض وغيرهما إن كان المراد بالنعت الحمل بالمواطاة و طرده بالمكان والكوكب بل الجسم مطلقا إن كان المراد به الحمل بالاشتقاق.

و ربما تكلف بعضهم بأن المراد غير الاشتقاق الجعلي و كقولهم إن الحلول كون الشيء ساريا في شيء بحيث يكون الإشارة إلى أحدهما إشارة إلى الآخر.

ثم زادوا قيودا آخر عليه حين ما ورد النقض فيه بأحوال المجردات عن المادة - بقولهم تحقيقا أو تقديرا فبقي النقض بالنقطة والأبوة وغيرها مما لا سراية فيه - فالتجئوا بنفي وجود هذه الأشياء عن الخارج و لم ينتبهوا لأن لا اختصاص لهذا الإيراد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٣٢

بالأطراف والحدود الخارجية بل النقض وارد بالخياليات والوهميات منها.

وقد ذكرنا في شرح الهداية الأثيرية شطرا من النقوض والأبحاث الواردة على التعاريف المذكورة للحلول.

وأما الذي ألهمنا الله تعالى من خزائن علمه في تعريف الحلول هو أن يقال - معناه كون الشيء بحيث وجوده في نفسه وجوده لشيء آخر على وجه الاتصاف لأن لا يرد النقص بالجواهر الصادرة عن الواجب تعالى والمبادي العالية حسب ما هو التحقيق - من أن وجود المعلول في نفسه هو وجوده لموجده.

وهذا التعريف سالم عن النقوض والإيرادات طردا وعكسا لصدقه على الأعراض والصور الحالة كلها وكذبه عن سائر الحصولات النسبية التي ليست على وجه الحلول - ككون الجزء في الكل والجزئي في الكلي وكون الشيء في الزمان وفي المكان - وفي الراحة وفي الخصب وكحصول الفصل للجنس فإن وجوده عين وجود الجنس لاله وكذا حصول الوجود للماهية لأنه نفس وجودها لا وجود شيء لها كما علمت سابقا وبالجمل لا خلل في هذا التعريف كما يظهر بالتفتيش والتأمل.

وإذا علمت معنى الحلول هكذا علمت أن الحال مفتقر لا محالة إلى محله - إما في وجود ذاته الشخصية وقوام ماهيته النوعية لذاتها جميعا أو في وجود ذاته الشخصية دون حقيقته النوعية حتى يمكن أن يكون لحقيقته نحو من الوجود مستقلا بذاته من غير محل فالأول يسمى عرضا عند الكل والثاني يسمى عند المحصلين من المشائين صورة. فحينئذ نقول لا يجوز أن يكون للمحل افتقار في وجوده إلى الوجود الشخصي للحال سواء كان عرضا أو صورة وإلا لدار الافتقار من الجانبين بجهة واحدة وهو دور مستحيل.

فالمحل إما أن يكون مستغنيا عن الحال حقيقة وتشخصا ماهية وجودا فيسمى باسم الموضوع عند الكل أو يكون مفتقرا في وجوده الشخصي إلى الوجود المطلق العامي

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للحال بأي تشخص يكون فيسمى عند هؤلاء بالهيولى فالعرض والصورة يشتركان في أمر يعمهما وهو مفهوم الحال وكذا الموضوع والهيولى يشتركان في أمر يعمهما وهو مفهوم المحل ومحل الشيء سواء كان ذلك الشيء صورة أو عرضا أو عرضا في صورة أو عرضا في عرض إن جاز ذلك لا بد وأن ينتهي آخر الأمر إلى محل لا محل له فيكون مقوما للجميع فكل عرض مفتقر في وجوده إلى الجوهر دون العكس فثبت أن الجوهر أقدم بالطبع من العرض.

وأما عند أتباع الرواقيين فكل حال عرض ولا شيء من الجوهر بحال لكن بعض الأعراض عندهم مقوم للجوهر متقدم عليه لأنهم جوزوا تركيب الجوهر من محل جوهر وحال عرض فليس الجوهر مطلقا متقدما بالطبع على العرض وسيأتي تحقيق هذا المقام من ذي قبل إن شاء الله.

ثم إنهم يفرقون بين الصورة والعرض فرقا اعتباريا لا حقيقيا وكذا بين الموضوع والهيولى وهو أن كل معنى نوعي سواء كان طبيعيا أو صناعيا إذا كان له تألف ما من حال ومحل مطلقين كالسرير مثلا يكون المحل عندهم يسمى مادة كالخشب - والحال يسمى صورة كالهئية المخصوصة باعتبار كونهما جزءين لأمر واحد نوعي مطلقا - وليس من شرط الجزء الصوري عندهم أن يكون محصلا لمحله حتى يكون جوهر - لكون مقوم الجوهر أولى بالجوهريته منه ولا من شرط الجزء المادي أن يكون مفتقرا إلى الحال في نحو وجوده النوعي بل المسمى صورة عندهم هو بعينه نفس العرض مع اشتراط كونه جزأ للمركب وكذا المسمى مادة عندهم نفس الموضوع - مع اعتبار كونه جزء للمركب منه ومن ما يحله فعلى هذا جميع الأعراض المخصصة والمصنفة يصلح عندهم أن يكون صورا ومحالها هيولياتها.

فإذا تقرر تغاير المذهبيين و تخالف الاصطلاحين في هذه المعاني والأسامي - مع ما سلف من ضوابط الميزان أن رفع العام أو لازمه المساوي أخص من رفع الخاص أو لازمه المساوي و قلنا إن معنى الجوهر أو لازمه المساوي له ما لا يكون في موضوع.

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فنقول اللاكون في الموضوع أعم من اللاكون في المحل لما عرفت أن الموضوع أخص من المحل عند المشائين فنقيضاهما يكونان بالعكس فيكون الجوهر أعم مما يكون في محل و مما لا يكون فيه إذ كلاهما يندرجان تحت معنى الوجود لا في موضوع.

و كذا العرض و هو ما يكون في موضوع يشمل الحال و المحل عند من جوز قيام العرض بالعرض فيكون أعم من كل منهما بوجه لأن الحال قد يكون عرضا و قد يكون صورة و المحل قد يكون جوهرًا و قد يكون عرضا على هذا التقدير. **و إذا ثبت** ما ذكرناه فيكون الأقسام الأولية للجوهر على مذهب أولئك القوم خمسة لأنه إما أن يكون في محل أو لا يكون فيه و الكائن في المحل هو الصورة المادية و غير الكائن فيه إما أن يكون محلا لشيء يتقوم به أو لا يكون و الأول هو الهيولى - و الثاني لا يخلو إما أن يكون مركبا من الهيولى و الصورة و هو الجسم أو لا يكون - و حينئذ لا يخلو إما أن يكون ذا علاقة انفعالية بالجسم بوجه من الوجوه و هو النفس أو لا يكون و هو العقل.

و الأجود في هذا التقسيم أن يقال الجوهر إن كان قابلا للابعد الثلاثة فهو الجسم و إلا فإن كان جزء منه هو به بالفعل سواء كان في جنسه أو في نوعه فصورة إما امتدادية أو طبيعية أو جزء هو به بالقوة فمادة و إن لم يكن جزء منه فإن كان متصرفا فيه بالمباشرة فنفس و إلا فعقل و ذلك لما سيظهر من تضعيف ما حققناه من كون الجوهر النفساني الإنساني مادة للصورة الإدراكية التي يتحصل بها جوهرًا آخر كماليا بالفعل من الأنواع المحصلة التي يكون لها نحو آخر من الوجود غير

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الوجود الطبيعي الذي لهذه الأنواع المحصلة الطبيعية.

و تحقيق ذلك المرام من فضل الله علينا و جوده

فصل (٢) في تعريف العرض

هذا المقصد و إن خرج من التقسيم الذي وقع لذي المحل مطلقا إلا أنا نورد هاهنا ما ذكر في تعريف العرض اقتداء بالآقدمين.

فنقول العرض هو الموجود في شيء غير متقوم به

لا كجزء منه و لا يصح قوامه دون ما هو فيه فهذه قيود أربعة فقولنا في شيء لاستحالة وجود عرض واحد في شيئين أو ما زاد عليهما.

أما العدد و معنى الكل و البنية و غيرها

فالموضوع في كل منها من حيث كونه موضوعا له أمر واحد لعدم اشتراط كون المحل للعرض واحدا حقيقيا بل يكفي

جهة وحدة بها يكون الموضوع واحدا كالعشرية فإن موضوعها مجموع الوحدات التي فيها لا كل واحد وإلا لكانت العشرة عشرات و مجموع الوحدات أمر واحد.

فإن قلت ننقل الكلام في كيفية عروض تلك الوحدة لها.

قلنا لا يلزم أن يكون جهة الوحدة نسبتها إلى الموضوع نسبة العرض الخارج بل ربما تكون مقومة لقوام ما اعتبرت هي معه كحال الوجود بالنسبة إلى الماهية و خصوصا على ما ذهبنا إليه كما مر ذكره سابقا من أن لكل شيء وحدة هي بعينها نحو وجوده الخاص الذي به يتحقق ذلك الشيء و قد سبق أيضا أن الوجود ليس عرضا لما هو موجود به بل الوجود لكل شيء صورة ذاته المحصلة به حقيقته الموجودة و بذلك كان يخرج الجواب عن الشبهة التي أعيت أذهان الفضلاء عن حلها كما علمت.

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و أما الإضافات و خصوصا المتشابهة الطرفين

كالتجاور و المقاربة و المعية و الأخوة و غيرها فسيجيء أن كلا من الطرفين سواء كانا متخالفين كالعلية و المعلولية أو القبلية و البعدية أو متماثلين كالتماثل و التجانس مختص بأمر لا يوجد في صاحبه.

و ربما يتوهم أن قولنا في شيء لإخراج وجود الكل في الأجزاء و هو فاسد - لأن وجود الكل في الأجزاء قول مجازي و إنما هو موجود بحسب نفسه في نفسه لا في الأجزاء إذ لو كانت لوجوده نسبة إلى الأجزاء فإما أن يكون وجوده في كل جزء جزء فيكون كل منهما كلا فيكون حينئذ كالات لا كل واحد و المفروض خلافه هذا محال.

و إما أن يكون في مجموع الأجزاء و هو أيضا محال لأنه نفس المجموع لا أنه موجود في المجموع و إلا لكان الشيء موجودا في نفسه و هو محال إذ لا مغايرة بين الشيء و نفسه فلكل كل صورة تامة في أجزائه هي نفس وجود أجزائه جميعا - لا أنه شيء آخر موجود في أجزائه كما ظن و لا أنه موجود في واحد واحد كما توهم.

و من هاهنا ينكشف ما حققناه من أن الصورة النوعية للمركب الخارجي هي عين وجود ذلك المركب و أن التركيب اتحادي فيما له مادة و صورة في الخارج و أن العشرة مثلا صورتها عين جميع الوحدات التي هي مادتها.

فعليك بالتثبت في هذه الأمور من دون تلثم و تزلزل و أما قولنا غير متقوم به فاحتراز عن وجود ما يحل في المادة و تقومها موجودة بالفعل نوعا من الأنواع - فلا جرم لا يكون عرضا بل صورة جوهرية.

اعلم أن صفات الأمور يكون على أقسام

لأن الموصوف إما أن يكون قد استقرت له ذات متقررة بالفعل أم لا يكون.

فعلى الأول إما أن يكون الصفة التي تلحقها خارجة عنه لحوق عارض لازم أو مفارق أو ليست تلحقه من خارج بل هو جزء من قوامه.

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و على الثاني إما أن يكون الصفة تلحقه ليتقرر بها ذاته سواء كانت جزءا من معنى ذاته أو ليست جزءا من معنى ذاته أو لا يكون الصفة مما يتقرر ذاته - بل لحوقها يكون لحوق أمر يلحق الشيء بعد تمام تقريره و وجوده بحسب التبعية - لما

يقرره بالذات لحوقا لازما أو مفارقا فالمثال للأول وجود البياض للجسم أو الضحك للإنسان و للثاني وجود النفس للحيوان و للثالث وجود الصورة الطبيعية للجسم المطلق بما هو طبيعة امتدادية على الإطلاق و للرابع وجود الصورة للهيولى و للخامس وجود البياض أو التحيز للهيولى.

و أما وجود الفصل للنوع أو للجنس من حيث كون الفصل مأخوذا فصلا- و الجنس جنسا فهو قول مجازي كما مر لأن هذه الأمور إذا أخذت على الوجه المذكور- يكون وجود الجميع واحدا و مقتضى النسبة سواء كانت بفي أو اللام هو الغيرية فذلك مما قد خرج بالقيد الأول و أما أخذ كل من الجنس و الفصل أمرا محصلا بحسب المفهوم و المعنى فيكون نسبة الفصل إلى حد النوع بالدخول في تقرير ماهيته و تحصيل معناه- و إلى الجنس بالدخول في تقوم وجوده و فعلية ذاته كما مر في مبحث الماهية فيكون خارجا عن مفهوم العرض بالقيد الثاني.

و منهم من فسر العرض بما يتقوم بشيء متقوم بنفسه

و هو بظاهره فاسد عند من جوز قيام العرض بعرض و إلا لزم كون العرض الذي هو المحل جوهرًا و لكن ذلك لم يثبت عندنا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٣٨

و أما الأمثلة التي ذكروها في إثبات قيام عرض بعرض آخر كالسرعة للحركة و الاستقامة للخط و الشكل للسطح و النقطة للخط و الخط للسطح فمحل تأمل لأن جميع هذه الأوصاف نسبتها إلى الموصوفات بها من الأعراض أشبه بنسبة الفصول إلى الأجناس إلى الأجناس في الماهيات البسيطة من نسبة الأعراض إلى الموضوعات. و العجب أن الشيخ الرئيس ممن جوز قيام العرض بعرض آخر و قال ليس بمستنكر. و احتج عليه بالأمثلة المذكورة مع أنه قد صرح بأن الاستقامة و الاستدارة من فصول الخط و السطح و هو أيضا قد قرر أن مناط الفرق بين الحال عرضا في شيء أو مقوما هو جواز تحصيل ذلك المحل بحسب نوعيته بدون ذلك الأمر الحال و مقابلة عدم جواز تحصيله كذلك فإن كان الأول فالحال عرض و المحل موضوع و عرض- و إن كان الثاني فهما صورة و مادة أو فصل و جنس.

فعلى هذا لا شك أن الحركة لا يمكن وجودها إلا مع حد من السرعة و البطء- و لا شك أن الحركة السريعة مثلا ليس لها من حيث كونها حركة وجود تام في حد حقيقتها و نوعيتها بحيث إذا لوحظت معراة عن مراتب السرعة و البطء- يكون قد تمت حقيقتها ثم قد لحقتها مرتبتها من السرعة بعد تمام حقيقتها بل إنما يتم بشيء من حدود السرعة و البطء فيكون هي من الفصول المقومة للموصوف لا من الأعراض المتقومة به.

و احتج الشيخ أيضا بقوله هذه الأعراض تنسب إلى الوحدة و الكثرة و هذه كما سنبين لك كلها أعراض.

و أقول إنك قد علمت في مباحث الوحدة و الكثرة ضعف ما ذكره هو و غيره في عرضية الوحدة و دريت أن وجود كل شيء هو وحدته و تشخصه و الوجود في الموجود ليس عرضا فيه لتقومه بالوجود بل وحدة العرض كوجوده عرض بعين عرضية ذلك العرض و كذا وحده الجوهر جوهر كوجوده و ليست الكثرة إلا الوحدات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٣٩

و حكمها في الجوهرية و العرضية حكم الوحدات.

و ربما فسر بعضهم المتقوم بنفسه بأن معناه المتقوم لا بما يحل فيه.

و قد ذهل أن المعنى المجازي للألفاظ مهجور في التعريفات الحقيقية.

و أما قولنا لا كجزء فاحتراز عن وجود الجزء في الكل و وجود طبيعة الجنس في طبيعة النوع الواحد من حيث هما طبيعتان و من وجود عمومية النوع في عمومية الجنس من حيث هما عامان و من وجود كل من المادة و الصورة في المركب - فإن كل واحد من هذه الأمور موجود في شيء هو جزء منه و وجود العرض في الموضوع ليس كذلك.

و أما قولنا لا يمكن قوامه دون ما هو فيه فالمراد به استحالة وجود ذلك الشيء من حيث طبيعته إلا في محل و من حيث شخصيته إلا في ذلك المحل المعين و بهذا يقع الامتياز بين وجود العرض في موضوعه و بين وجود الجسم في الزمان و وجوده في المكان و وجود الشيء في الغاية و الغرض ككون النفس في السعادة و كون المادة في الصورة و ذلك لجواز مفارقة هذه الأشياء عن ما ينسب إليها بفي بحسب الطبيعة فلو كان في شيء منها امتناع مفارقة فهو لأمر خارج عن ذاته و عن نحو وجوده الخاص كلزوم الكواكب في فلكه و لزوم المحوي من الفلك في حاوية فهو لا يقتضي العرضية.

ثم عدم مفارقة الجسم عن حيز مطلق و زمان مطلق و عدم مفارقة الإنسان - لا عن غاية مطلقة و عرض مطلق لا يوجب كون المنسوب إليه موضوعا و ذلك لأن معنى عدم القوام دون ما هو فيه كما مر هو أن الشيء بطبيعته يقتضي محلا و بشخصيته يقتضي محلا شخصيا و الأمور الكلية لا وجود لها من حيث كليتها في الخارج و ما لا وجود له يستحيل أن يوجد فيه شيء آخر في الخارج و كلامنا في أن العرض في الموضوع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤٠

بحسب الوجود الخارجي لا بحسب الوجود الذهني على أن في الحكم بأن كل جسم يستدعي مكانا عاما أو خاصا مناقشة لاستحالة كون المحدد ذا مكان و تبديل لفظ المكان بالحيز لا يفيد لعدم صدق الموجود في موضوع على الموجود في الحيز - إذا أريد منه غير المكان كالوضع و المحاذاة و كذا في كون كل جسم في زمان - على طريق اللزوم المستوعب للأزمنة و الآتات جميعا كما هو شأن العرض بالقياس إلى الموضوع محل نظر و ذلك لأن الجسم عند حصوله في الآن لا يكون في زمان.

فإن قلت لو صح وجود الجسم في أن فهو عند كونه فيه إما متصف بالحركة أو بالسكون إذ لا يمكن خلوه عنهما جميعا و الاتصاف بكل منهما يقتضي مقارنة الزمان لأن كلا منهما زماني فيلزم كون الجسم مقارنا للزمان عند كونه مفارقا عنه و هو محال.

قلت يمكن الجواب عنه بوجهين - الأول أن نختار الشق الأول و نقول إن الجسم المتحرك كالفلك مثلا يتصف في كل آن من الآتات المفروضة في زمان حركته بأنه متحرك أي متصف بالحركة و هذا بحسب المفهوم أعم من أن يكون حركته واقعة في نفس ذلك الآن أو في الزمان الذي هو حد من حدوده فإن قولنا هذا الجسم متحرك في الآن أو متصف بالحركة في الآن يحتمل وجهين - أحدهما أن قولنا في الآن يكون قيذا و ظرفا للاتصاف بالحركة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤١

و ثانيهما أن يكون قيداً و ظرفاً لنفس الحركة لا للاتصاف بها.
 فالأول لا يستدعي أن يكون وجود الحركة في الآن و لا السكون و إن كان معناه سلب الحركة عما من شأنه أن يكون متحركاً و ذلك لأن نفي الحركة في الآن إذا كان قيداً للنفي أي الحركة لا يستلزم أن يكون النفي و الرفع فيه حتى يلزم منه كون السكون في الآن لأن رفع المقيد إما برفع ذاته المقيدة أو برفع قيده فيكون رفعه أعم من رفع كل منهما و العام لا يوجب الخاص فيجوز أن يتحصل رفع الحركة في الآن بوجود الحركة لا في الآن بل في الزمان الذي هو طرفه لصدق رفع الحركة في الآن عليه.
 و الثاني أن التردد غير حاصر لجواز أن لا يكون الجسم متحركاً في الآن و لا ساكناً في الآن لأن ارتفاع النقيضين أو ما يساووقهما و إن استحال عن نفس الأمر لكن لا استحالة في ارتفاعهما عن مرتبة من مراتب نفس الأمر و حيثية من حيثيات الواقع و حد من حدود الأمر الواقعي فكما أن زيدا الموجود مثلاً في الأرض لا يكون في السماء متحركاً و لا ساكناً مع ذلك فهو إما متحرك أو ساكن في الواقع إذ الواقع أوسع و أشمل مما ذكر.
 فإن قلت إن الأجرام الكوكبية إبداعية الوجود عند القوم فيمتنع عليها المفارقة عن أمكنتها الخاصة فيكون أعراضاً لصدق قولنا الموجود في موضوع لا يمكن مفارقتها عنه.
 قلت قد علمت أن استحالة المفارقة عن الموضوع في العرض لأجل أن تشخصه بنفس الموضوع بخلاف تلك الأجرام فإن تشخص كل منها بذاته و بأمور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤٢

متقرر في ذاته لا بحصوله في مكانه و ذلك لأن نوعها مقصور على شخصها في الوجود الطبيعي فالمشخص لها من طبيعة نوعها و حصولها لتلك الأحياء تابع لتشخصها و نحو وجودها.
 فإن قلت ما ذكرت غير جار في مواد الأجرام الفلكية فإنها موجودة في صورها و صورها متحصلة القوام و ليست المواد جزءاً منها و لا يصح قوامها دون ما هي فيه أعني الصور.
 قلت قد تفصى بعض الفضلاء عن هذا الإشكال بقوله لا نسلم أن المادة يصح أن يقال إنها في الصور لأننا ذكرنا أن معنى في هو أن يكون ناعماً للمحل و المادة لا تنعت الصورة بل الأمر بالعكس انتهى قوله.
 و هو في غاية السقوط فإن المراد من قوله لا يصح أن يقال إن كان مانعاً لفظياً فهو غير مجد في تحقيق الحقائق و إن كان مانعاً معنوياً فهو غير ثابت مما ذكره لما سبق أن مجرد الناعتية لا يصلح أن يكون رسماً للحالية سواء كان المراد بالنعته ما يحمل على الشيء مواطاة و يقال له حمل على أو اشتقاقاً و يقال له وجود في.
 ثم إن أريد بالناعت التابع للشيء في الوجود فيكون الهيولى حرياً بهذا المعنى لأنها في الوجود تابعة للصورة كما سيجيء فلا وجه لما ذكره من التعكيس - بل الحق في الجواب أن يقال إن الهيولى أمر مبهم الوجود بالقوة إنما يتحصل وجودها بالفعل بالصورة بمعنى أن الصورة بنفسها نحو وجود الهيولى بخلاف العرض لأن له وجوداً تابعاً لوجود موضوعه لا أن وجودها بنفس الموضوع.
 و بالجملة معنى العرض هو الموجود في شيء متقوم بنفسه و معنى الهيولى هو الموجود بشيء متقوم بنفسه.

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و بعبارة أخرى وجود العرض في نفسه هو وجوده للموضوع و وجود الهيولى في نفسها هو وجود صورتها الموضوعية و بين المعنيين فرقان واضح.

و اعلم أن بين العرض و الهيولى مشاركة في خسة الوجود و ضعف الحقيقة

و لكل منهما فضيلة على الآخر و دناءة بوجه آخر أما فضيلة العرض فلكونه متميز الوجود عن وجود الموضوع و أما دناءة ته فلكونه خارجا عن قوام ذات الموضوع - ساقطا عن الحصول في تلك المرتبة.

و أما فضيلة الهيولى فلكونها داخلية في قوام الموضوع و أما دناءة لها فلكونها مبهمة الذات غير متميزة الوجود

فصل (٣) في رسم الجوهر و هو الموجود لا في موضوع

قد مر تحقيق معناه في مباحث الوجود بوجه لا انتفاض لطرده بالواجب تعالى - و لا لعكسه بالصور المعقولة للذهن عند من ذهب إلى أنها قائمة بالذهن على وجه الحلول.

و أما على ما ذهبنا إليه من أن الصور الجوهرية الخيالية غير مرتسمة في الخيال و لا العقلية مرتسمة في العقل بل العاقل يتحد بالمعقول و النفس الخيالية و الحسية يتحد بصورها الخيالية و الحسية فلا إشكال.

و اعلم أن لنا منهجا آخر في دفع الإشكال بالصور الجوهرية الثابتة في الذهن و هو أن عنوانات الأشياء التي تحصل بأنفسها في الذهن لا يلزم أن يكون كل منها فردا لنفسه فالذي في الذهن من الجوهر هو مفهوم قولنا الموجود لا في الموضوع و كذا الحاصل فيه من الحيوان هو مفهوم قولنا جوهر قابل للأبعاد نام حساس و لا يلزم أن يكون مفهوم الجوهر فردا لنفسه و لا أيضا معنى الحيوان فردا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤٤

لنفسه حتى يكون ذلك المعنى مما يصدق عليه جسم ينمو و يحس و يتحرك بل الذي يلزم من وجود معاني الأشياء في الذهن أن يكون كل من تلك المعاني متضمنا لما يدخل في معناه و يحمل هي عليه حملا ذاتيا أوليا و لا يلزم أن يكون هي صادقة عليه محمولة له حملا عرضيا متعارفا.

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول لا منافاة بين كون الشيء مفهوم الجوهر و فردا للعرض - كما لا منافاة بين كون معنى ذهني مفهوما للجزئي و فردا للكل.

و اعلم أيضا أنه قد سبقت الإشارة إلى أنه إذا أطلق لفظ مشتق كالموجود و الواحد و الكاتب مثلا من غير تقييد بشيء أصلا فحينئذ يتصور معناه على وجهين - أحدهما أن يكون هناك شيء ذلك الشيء يكون موجودا أو واحدا أو غيرهما - حتى ينحل معنى المشتق إلى معروض و عارض و نسبة بينهما فأريد بالواحد مثلا إنسان موصوف بأنه واحد ففيه معنى الإنسانية و معنى آخر يغايره هو معنى الواحد - و نسبة بينهما بالمعروضية لأحدهما و العارضية للآخر.

و ثانيهما الأمر البسيط الذي لا يقبل التحليل بعارض و لا معروض و لا نسبة إلا بمجرد الاعتبار و الفرض من غير سبب يقتضي ذلك كنفس مفهوم الواحد من حيث هو واحد لست أقول أن بداهة العقل يحكم بوجود كل من هذين المعنيين في الخارج كلا فإن الحكم بوجود كل منهما لا يتأتى إلا بحجة و برهان بل الغرض أن مفهوم اللفظ عند الإطلاق لا يأبى

عن إرادة شيء من هذين المعنيين عنه و هكذا الحال في لفظ الوجود فإنه يحتمل المعنيين اللذين أشرنا إليهما أعني البسيط و المركب لكن المراد هاهنا هو المعنى المركب بقرينة أن الكلام في تعريف الأمر الذي من الأجناس العالية و المفهومات و الوجود بالمعنى البسيط ليس كذلك.

و قد علمت فيما سبق أن ما يعرضه الكلية و العموم فهو غير حقيقة الوجود البحت حتى مفهوم الوجود و الشيئية فإنهما مع بساطتهما مما يخرج عن حقيقة الوجود لتعاليتها عن أن يكون لها صورة ذهنية مطابقة لكنها.

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و الذي في الذهن يكون وجهها من وجوها لا كنها لها و هو حكاية الوجود لا عينه فيكون مفهوم الوجود أو الموجود يعرضه العموم و الكلية كسائر الأمور الذهنية.

فقولنا الجوهر موجود لا في موضوع أنه ماهية كلية حق وجودها أن لا يكون في موضوع فإن وجود كل شيء الخاص به هو ما يكون مبدأ لآثاره المخصوصة و منشأ لأحكامه المعينة المتميزة بها عن غيره فالوجود الذي نسب إليه هو ما لا يكون في موضوع فإذا حضرت ماهيته في النشأة الذهنية وجدت فيها بنحو آخر من الوجود فلم يكن هذا مما يتبدل به ماهيتها و حال جوهريتها لجواز أن يكون لماهية واحدة أنحاء متعددة من الوجود بحسب عوالم متعددة و نشآت مختلفة.

كيف و قد ترى معنى واحدا في هذا العالم تارة موجودا بوجود استقلالي تجردي - و أخرى موجودا بوجود مادي كالعلم و القدرة المشتركين بين الملك و الحيوان - و كذا يوجد معنى واحد تارة بوجود إبداعي محفوظ عن الخلل و أخرى بوجود كائن فاسد كالجسمية المشتركة بين الفلكيات و العنصریات و جسمية الفلك في القوة و الشدة كما قال تعالى - **وَجَعَلْنَا السَّمَاءَ سَقْفًا مَحْفُوظًا** و قال **وَبَنَيْنَا فَوْقَكُمْ سَبْعًا شِدَادًا** و قال في حق الأرض و ما يتركب منها **كُلٌّ مِّنْ عَلَيْهَا فَإِنَّ إِيَّكَ مَيِّتٌ وَ إِنَّهُمْ مَيِّتُونَ**.

و أما الفناء و الموت العام للجميع فهو ضرب آخر من العدم غير الفساد و هو المشار إليه في قوله تعالى **وَنُفِخَ فِي الصُّورِ فَصَعِقَ مَنْ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَنْ فِي الْأَرْضِ**.

فالمعاني الجوهرية و إن كانت في موضوع الذهن كما يراه القوم لكن يصدق عليها أنها مستغنية الوجود الخارجي عن الموضوع فيكون جوهرها بهذا المعنى.

و أما الباري جل ذكره فهو مقدس عن صدق هذا المعنى في حقه لكونه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤٦

قيوما بذاته لا بنحو خاص من الوجود.

هذا إذا كانت الجوهرية حال الماهية.

و أما إذا كان المراد به الوجود الجوهرى فامتيازه عن الواجب بالإمكان و الوجوب و النقص و الكمال و المراد بالنقص أنه وجود محدود بحد لا يتجاوزه و به يغاير الكم و كيف و غيرهما من المقولات و أشياء أخرى و الواجب جل ذكره لا يحد بحد و لا ينتهي إلى غاية بل غاية الأشياء محيط بالكل.

وَهُوَ الْأَوَّلُ وَالْآخِرُ وَالظَّاهِرُ وَالْبَاطِنُ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ مُحِيطٌ.

وَأما امتيازُه عن وجودات الأعراض حتى عن وجود المعاني الجوهرية في الذهن كما هو رأيهم من أن تشخصاتها بنحو الحلول فيه فبالاستغناء عن الموضوع له و عدم الاستغناء لها فأتقن ما علمناكه فإنك لم تجد في الكتب المتداولة على هذا الوضوح و الإنارة

فصل (٤) في أن حمل معنى الجوهر على ما تحته حمل الجنس أم لا

اعلم أن أكثر الحكماء على أن حمل معنى الجوهر على ما تحته حمل المقوم المقول في جواب ما هو بحسب الشركة و الأقلون على أن حمله كحمل اللوازم الخارجة و ربما تمسكوا على هذا بحجج ضعيفة - أولها أن الوجود داخل في معناه و هو خارج عن الماهيات و سلب الموضوع أيضا خارج عنها لاستحالة تقوم حقيقة من الحقائق من الأعدام و السلوب و المركب من الخارج خارج فالجوهر مفهومه خارج عن كل ماهية حقيقية. و ثانيها أنه لو كان جنسا لكان الواجب لاشتراك الجوهرية بينه و بين غيره مركبا من جنس و فصل. و ثالثها أنه لو كان جنسا لكان العقول و النفوس لاشتراكها مع الأجسام في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤٧

الجوهرية غير بسيط الحقيقة فيكون الصادر الأول عن الواحد الحقيقي كثيرا و به ينهدم قاعدتهم في امتناع صدور الكثرة عن الذات الأحدية.

و رابعها أنه يتفاوت صدقه على المبدع و الكائن و المجرد و المادي و البسيط و المركب بالتقدم و التأخر و كذا بالأولية و عدمها فإن جوهر العالم الأعلى أولى بالجوهرية من السفليات و الجوهر الصوري أولى بالجوهرية من الجوهر الهولي.

و خامسها أن كليات الأجسام مساوية لجزئياتها في المعنى و الماهية فلو كانت الجوهرية مقوما لها لكانت مساوية لها فيها و هو ضروري البطلان.

و أما بيان الخلل في هذه الوجوه ففي الأول بما مر مرارا من الفرق بين الموجود بما هو موجود مجردا عن الموضوع و بين ما من شأنه أن يكون موجودا بلا موضوع - و أن أحدهما عارض للماهيات كلها و الآخر يصلح لأن يكون مقوما لبعضها.

و في الثاني أيضا يعرف الخلل بما ذكرنا في الأول.

و في الثالث ينحل العقدة فيه بوجوه - الأول أن المعلول الأول بسيط الذات في الخارج فيصح صدوره الخارجي عن الذات الأحدية الثاني أنه عند التحليل و من حيث اعتبار التركيب العقلي يحكم العقل بتقدم الفصل على الجنس و لا استحالة في أن يكون تأثير المؤثر في الفصل أقدم من تأثيره في الجنس تقدما عقليا.

و في الرابع بما حققه المحققون من محصلي الحكماء أن التقدم و التأخر في شيء إما أن يكون في نفس المفهوم من ذلك الشيء أو في مفهوم آخر.

فالأول كتقدم الجوهر على العرض في معنى الوجود لكون وجود الجوهر علة و متقدما و وجود العرض القائم به معلولا و متأخرا فمعنى الجوهر ليس من حيث كونه معناه علة لمعنى العرض بل وجود أحدهما سبب لوجود الآخر فيكون

الجوهر بوجوده سببا للعرض بوجوده.

و الثاني كتقدم بعض أنواع الجوهر على بعض آخر أو بعض أفراد نوع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤٨

واحد منه على بعض آخر فإن تقدم الأب على الابن ليس في معنى الإنسانية حتى يكون حد الإنسانية للابن أي حمله عليه متوقفا على ثبوته و حمله على الأب بأن يكون جاعل جعل الإنسانية للابن قبل أن جعل الإنسانية الابن. كيف و قد ثبت أن لا تأثير للجعل في نفس الماهيات فكيف يكون ماهية بعضها سببا لماهية آخر متقدمة عليها بل الحق أن صدق الإنسان عليهما بالسوية بل صدق جميع الماهيات على ذوات الماهيات بالسوية كما مر تحقيقه. و أما وجودها الزماني أو غير الزماني ففي بعضها قبل و في بعضها بعد فالوجود في الأب قبل الوجود في الابن قبلا بالزمان و كذا الحال في التقدم الذاتي بين العقل و الجسم و في نسبة الهيولى و الصورة إلى ما يتركب منه فإن الجزء الخارجي للجوهر كالهوى ليس سببا لكون المركب كالجسم جوهرًا لكون الجسم لذاته جوهرًا من غير سبب و لا اشتراط للهوى و الصورة في حمل الجوهرية على الجسم - و لا جوهرية شيء منهما في أنهما جوهرية سببا لجوهرية جوهر ما سواء كان جسما أو غيره.

لست أقول في كونه جوهرًا موجودًا إذ فرق بين كون الهيولى و الصورة - أخلق بالموجود من حيث هو موجود من الجسم و بين كونهما أخلق بالموجود لا في موضوع بالمعنى الذي علمت مرارا من الجسم و هذا كالعدد في كونه كمية منفصلة - لا تقدم للجزء منها على الكل و إنما تقدم الجزء كالخمس على الكل كالعشرة في الوجود و هو خارج عن معنى الكمية المنفصلة.

هذا ما ذكره الحكماء في مثل هذا المقام و قد مر تحقيق التشكيك فيما سبق منا فتذكره و سنزيدك بيانا في الفصل التالي لهذا الفصل لإثبات الجواهر الأولى و الثانية و ما بعدها. و أما الخامس فكلييات الجواهر جواهر بالحمل الأولى لا الشائع الصناعي - و سنعيد القول في بيانه بزيادة توضيح.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٤٩

بحث و كشف

و ربما يوجد في كلامهم الاستدلال على كون كلييات الجواهر جواهر بوجوه ثلاثة سموها براهين. الأول أن معنى الجوهر الذي جنسوه كون الشيء بحال متى وجد في الخارج كان مستغنيا عن الموضوع كما سبق و لا شك أن الصور الكلية الذهنية بالصفة المذكورة فيكون جواهر. و الثاني أن الكليات تحمل على الجزئيات التي لا شك في جوهريتها بهو هو و لا شيء من الأعراض مقولة عليها كذلك فلا شيء من كلييات الجواهر بأعراض و كل ما لم يكن بعرض كان جوهرًا فكلييات الجواهر تكون جواهر و هو المطلوب.

و الثالث أن جوهرية الشخص إن كان لهويته الشخصية و جب أن لا يكون ما عداه من الأشخاص جوهرًا و إن لم يكن لشخصيته بل لماهيته و جب أن يكون الماهية جوهرًا فيكون الماهية الكلية جوهرًا و هذه الوجوه الثلاثة كلها سخيصة

عندنا- و هي أشبه بالمغالط منها بالبراهين.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٠

أما بيان الغلط في الوجه الأول فلأننا لا نسلم أن ماهية الجوهر المعقولة في الذهن مما يصح و يمكن له الخروج عن الموضوع الذي هو الذهن و الاستغناء عن ما يقوم به- كيف و الكلي من الجوهر موجود في الموضوع الخارجي الذي هو الذهن و هو محل مستغن عن الحال فيكون عرضا لكونه علما يعلم به معلومه.

نعم معلومه جوهر و هي الماهية المطلقة لا بشرط كونها معقولة أو محسوسة فهأنا مغالطات و اشتباهات. أحدها الخلط بين الاعتبارين المذكورين في مبحث الماهية و هما أخذ الماهية كلية و معقولة تارة و أخذها مطلقة و لو عن هذا الإطلاق تارة أخرى و هو المراد بالكلي الطبيعي الذي وقع الاختلاف في أنه موجود بعين وجود الأشخاص أم لا بل إنما وجوده بمعنى وجود أشخاصه فنشأ الغلط من اشتراك لفظ الكلي بين المعنيين. و ثانيها الخلط بين كون الشيء نفس ماهية الجوهر أو كونه ذا ماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥١

جوهريّة.

و الحق في كليات الجواهر الذهنية هو المعنى الأول دون الثاني فإن مفهوم العقل الأول ليس ذا العقل الأول و مفهوم القائم بنفسه ليس قائما بنفسه و هذا بعينه هو الغلط في سوء اعتبار الحمل و الخلط بين معنيي الحمل الأولي و الصناعي.

و ثالثها الاشتباه بين العلم و المعلوم و هما ليسا بواحد في جميع المواضع و في جميع الأحكام فإن العلم بالمتنوع ليس ممتنعا و العلم بالمعدوم ليس معدوما.

و رابعها الاشتباه بين الموجود الذهني و الموجود في الذهن و ليس كل ما يوجد في الذهن يكون وجوده ذهنيًا فإن القدرة و الشجاعة الموجودتين في القادر و الشجاع من صفات نفسيهما و النفس ذهن و صفة الذهن موجودة فيه فهي ليست ذهنية بالمعنى المقابل للموجود المتأصل و إن كانت موجودة في الذهن فقدره القادر و شجاعة الشجاع موجودتان بوجود أصيل في الذهن فكذلك الكلي المعقول من الجوهر موجود خارجي من عوارض النفس و هو بعينه جوهر ذهني أي عنوان مأخوذ من الجوهر موجود في النفس من غير أن يصدق عليه معنى الجوهر صدق الطبيعة الكلية على فردها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٢

فالذي يستصح به مذهب جمهور القوم من الحكماء أن كليات الجواهر أي معقولاتها التي في الذهن ليست بجواهر بالحمل الشائع.

اللهم إلا أن يراد بها المعقولات القائمة بذواتها كما هو مذهب أفلاطون و الأفلاطونيين.

و أما بيان سخافة الوجه الثاني فلأننا لا نسلم أن الكليات بما هي كليات- محمولة على الجزئيات بل هي بهذه الحيثية

مباين الوجود لوجود الجزئيات.

لأن وجودها وجود عقلي و الجزئيات قد يكون وجودها وجودا ماديا فلا يكون هي محمولة عليها بأنها هي إذ الحمل هو الاتحاد بين الطرفين في الوجود.

فإن قيل ألم يكن الكلي محمولا على معنى الإنسان مثلا و الإنسان محمول على زيد و عمرو فيكون الإنسان الكلي محمولا على أشخاصه فإذا كان زيد جوهرًا في ذاته كان الإنسان الكلي أيضا جوهرًا فالكلي من الجوهر جوهر. قلنا في هذا الكلام مغالطة فإن الإنسان المذكور في الحكمين أعني قولنا زيد إنسان و الإنسان معقول ليس أمرا واحدا بالمعنى و الحثية فلم يتكرر الأوسط و لو كان مثل هذا الاستدلال صحيحا لكان الجزئي كليا و النوع جنسا فإن الإنسان يحمل على زيد بهو هو و الكلي يحمل على الإنسان بهو هو - فيكون زيد كليا و هو ممتنع و كذا مفهوم الجنس يحمل على الحيوان المحمول على الإنسان فيكون الإنسان جنسا و هو محال. و أن مثل هذه الأقيسة معدود في باب المغالطات في كتب المنطق و منشؤها الخلط بين الأحكام الذهنية و الخارجية من جهة أخذ الوسط في الصغرى من وجه و في الكبرى من وجه آخر فلم يتكرر فيهما بمعنى واحد ذاتا و اعتبارا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٣

و بالجملة فقوله الكليات يحمل على الجزئيات الجوهرية إن أراد من الكلي مفهوم الكلي و هو الكلي المنطقي و معروضه بما هو معروضه أو مجموع المعروض و العارض على وجه التقييد فغير صحيح و إن أراد منه نفس الماهية التي من شأنها أن تكون معروضة للكليات أي الماهية من حيث هي هي بلا اعتبار قيد آخر - و هي التي يقال لها الكلي الطبيعي فليس المبحوث عنه هاهنا هو الكلي بهذا المعنى - لأن البحث في أن الصورة المعقولة من الجوهر بما هي صورة معقولة هل هي جوهر أم عرض.

و أما سخافة الوجه الثالث فلأن الوسط و هي الماهية لم يتكرر في الجانبين بمعنى واحد فإن جوهرية الشخص كزيد مثلا مسلمة أنها لماهيته الإنسانية لكن لا نسلم أن الماهية المعقولة منه جوهر بل اللازم منه أن الماهية المطلقة أعم من أن تكون محسوسة أو معقولة ماهية جوهر أي ماهية أمر وجوده لا في موضوع فاللازم منه أن يكون بعض أفرادها أعني المحسوسات الخارجية جواهر إذ المهمة في قوة الجزئية فيكفي لصدقها تحقق المحمول في بعض الأفراد. فثبت في هذا المقام و لا تكن من الخالطين و لنرجع إلى ما كنا فيه من تحقيق كون الجوهر جنسا لما تحته من الأفراد الخارجية أم عرضا لازما

ظنون وإزاحات

إن لصاحب المباحث المشرقية وجوها من الحجج اعتمد عليها في نفي كون معنى الجوهر مقوماً للأنواع المتدرجة تحته. فلنورد كلا منها على الوجه الذي قرره ثم نذكر بيان الواقع فيه.

فالوجه الأول

أن الجوهر لو كان جنسا للأنواع الداخلة فيه لوجب أن يمتاز بعضها عن بعض بفصول. و تلك الفصول إما أن تكون في ماهياتها جواهر أو لا يكون فإن لم تكن كانت أعراضا و ذلك محال لأن العرض قوامه بالجوهر و ما يتقوم بالشيء لا يكون مقوماً له فتعين أن يكون جوهرًا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٤

فقول الجوهر عليها إما أن يكون قول الجنس أو قول اللوازم.
فإن كان الأول يحتاج الفصل إلى فصل آخر ويتسلسل.
وإن كان الثاني فهو المطلوب و قول هذا مختل بوجوه - و أما أولا فلأننا نختار أن فصل الجوهر ليس بجوهر في ذاته و لا يلزم من هذا أن يكون عرضا إذ المعتبر في تقسيم الممكن إلى الجوهر و العرض هو الأمر المتأصل في الوجود المتميز الذات عن غيره و مفهوم الفصل البسيط و كذا الجنس القاصي ليس كذلك إذ ليس ذا ماهية تامة الذات.
و أما ثانيا فنختار أن فصل الجوهر جوهر و لا يلزم منه أن يكون الجوهر داخلا في حد نفسه حتى يحتاج إلى فصل آخر و لا أن يكون عرضا لازما من العوارض الخارجية حتى يكون هو في مرتبة وجوده الخاص عرضا غير جوهر.
بل نقول فصل الجوهر جوهر في نفس الأمر و إن لم يكن جوهرًا في مرتبة ذاته من حيث هي و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون هو في تلك المرتبة عرضا لما عرفت من جواز خلو بعض مراتب الشيء من ثبوت المتقابلين كما أن زيدا ليس من حيث إنسانيته موجودا و لا يلزم منه أن يكون من تلك الحثيثة معدوما - و إلا كان ممتنع الوجود و كذلك ليس زيد من حيث ماهيته متشخصا و لا يلزم منه أن يكون كليًا في ذاته.
و بالجملة ما يقال إن الفصل من عوارض الجنس أو الجنس من عوارض الفصل - أو الوجود من عوارض الماهيات فليس المراد بالعروض في هذه المواضع و أمثالها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٥

هو العروض بحسب الوجود بمعنى أن يكون للعارض وجود غير وجود المعروف - بل هذا النحو من العروض إنما يتحقق في ظرف التحليل بين معنيين موجودين بوجود واحد.
فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول فصل الجوهر جوهر في الواقع و لكن لا يدخل معنى الجوهر في حده و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يحتاج إلى مميز آخر لأجل اشتراكه مع النوع الذي هو فيه و مع الأنواع الأخر في معنى الجوهرية لا مكان أن يمتاز بنفسه و ذاته عن النوع الذي يقومه و يميزه بالجزئية و الكلية و بالبساطة و التركيب و عن الأنواع التي يميز عنها بالمخالفة التامة و المبينة الكلية ذاتا و وجودا.
و أما ثالثا فبان التحقيق عندنا كما لوحنا إليه أن حقائق الفصول البسيطة - هي الوجودات الخاصة للمعيات و الوجود بنفسه متميز و بحسب مراتبه في الشدة و الضعف و الكمال و النقص يتحصل الماهيات و يمتاز بعضها عن بعض كما علمت و سينكشف لك هذا المقصد أي كون الفصول البسيطة الاشتقاقية هي عين الوجودات من ذي قبل عند كلامنا في مباحث الصور النوعية إن شاء الله تعالى.
و أما رابعا فلانتقاض ما ذكره في كل جنس إذ لو صح ما ذكره يلزم أن لا يكون شيء من الأشياء جنسا لما تحته كالحيوان مثلا فإن فصله الذي يتحصل منه نوع حيواني إن كان حد ذاته حيوانا فيجب أن يمتاز من سائر الأنواع الحيوانية بفصل آخر و إن لم يكن حيوانا فيلزم أن يتقوم ماهية الحيوان من غير الحيوان - فيكون اللاحيوان صادقا على الحيوان لصدق حمل الفصل على النوع الذي يتقوم منه.

و الحل في الجميع أن جنسية الجنس لا يقتضي أن يكون جنسا لجميع ما يندرج تحته سواء كان نوعا محصلا أو فصلا محصلا بل الأجناس كلها عرضيات بالقياس إلى الفصول البسيطة القاصية لكن يجب أن يعلم أن عارضية الجنس للفصل ليس بحسب الوجود كما ينساق إليه بعض الأفهام القاصرة و منه ينشأ أمثال هذه الأغاليط بل على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٦

نحو عروض الماهية النوعية للتشخص و العجب عن مثله كيف غفل عن كون الجوهر - الذي هو الجنس عرضيا للفصول الجوهرية مع أنه مصرح به في عدة مواضع من الشفاء و النجاة و غيره. و أما خامسا فإن الذي ذكره في إبطال الشق الثاني و هو قوله لأن العرض قوامه بالجوهر و ما يتقوم بالشيء لا يكون مقوما له فيه نوع من الالتباس إذ لو فرض كون جوهر مركبا من جوهر و عرض يقوم بذلك الجوهر لم يلزم فيه كون المقوم للشيء ما يتقوم به فإن الجوهر المتقوم بذلك العرض و هو المركب غير الجوهر المقوم له و هو البسيط كما لا يخفى و هذا الاحتمال و إن لم يكن صحيحا عندنا لكن الغرض التنبيه على فساد احتجاجه.

و الوجه الثاني

من الوجوه التي اعتقدها و اعتمد عليها أن النفس الإنسانية جوهر مجرد قائم بنفسه و يستدل على أن علمها بنفسها لا يمكن أن يكون مكتسبا و الحكماء اتفقوا على ذلك و إذا كان كذلك فلو كان الجوهر ذاتيا لها كان من الواجب أن يكون العلم بجوهريتها حاصلًا دائما و يكون علما أوليا. أقول و الحق في الجواب عن هذا الإيراد أن يقع الاستمداد فيه من بعض الأصول منا التي سلفت في مبحث الماهية و غيره من كيفية اندراج النفس و سائر البسائط الوجودية تحت مقولة الجوهر باعتبار و عدم اندراجها باعتبار آخر و من أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٧

قول الموجود لا في موضوع على الماهيات الجوهرية بمعنى و بمعنى آخر على الوجودات المستغنية عن الموضوع و هو بأحد المعنيين يصلح لأن يكون جنسا لطائفة من المعاني الخارجة عنها طبيعة الوجود. و بمعنى آخر ليس إلا عرضيا منتزعا عن الوجودات صادقا عليها و على تلك الماهيات و من أن المعلوم بالعلم الحضور هو وجود المعلوم و هويته دون مفهومه و ماهيته الكلية و من أن النفس و سائر البسائط الصورية وجودات متفاوتة الحصول.

فحينئذ نقول إن النفس الإنسانية بل كل صورة نوعية حيوانية و غير حيوانية - أمور بسيطة و وجودات مختصة لا يمكن العلم بخصوصياتها إلا بحضور هوياتها في أنفسها عند من له صلاحية العلم كما ذكره المعترض و سلمه فيجوز حضورها و شهودها له مع غفلته عن كل معنى كلي فضلا عن الأمور النسبية و السلبية.

و يمكن الجواب عنه بوجه آخر أنسب للطريقة المشهورة و هو أن معنى الجوهر المشهور عنوان لحقيقة واحدة جنسية مشتركة في الجواهر عبر عنها العقل بالموجود لا في موضوع و مفهوم الموجود عرض عام للكل و مفهوم قولنا لا في موضوع سلب مضاف و المركب من العرض العام و سلب شيء لا يكون جنسا للحقائق الخارجية - بل الجنس هو

الطبيعة البسيطة المشتركة بين الجواهر و لا يمكن التعبير عنها إلا بأمور عرضية خارجة عنها فيكون المجموع رسما لها إلا أنها لما كانت عنوانا لها و مرآة لملاحظتها أقيمت مقام الحد.

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول إن النفس على تقدير كونها مندرجة تحت مقولة الجواهر - اندراج النوع تحت الجنس المقوم له لكن المقوم لها ليس الرسم المذكور بل ذلك الأمر البسيط فحينئذ لا يلزم عند تصور النفس ذاتها بذاتها حضور مفهوم الجواهر أعني رسمه المذكور فلا يستحيل وقوع الشك في ثبوت هذا العنوان لهما - و لا يلزم العلم بثبوت السلب عن الموضوع لها نعم كل من رجع إلى ذاته يجد ذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٨

حاضرة عنده مع جواز سلب كل أمر عنه فإذا ظهر له أن هذه الحالة يسمى في عرف الحكماء بالجهرية و أن الموصوف بها إذا كان في حد ذاته مع قطع النظر عن غيره موصوفا بها كان جوهرها و كان الجوهر ذاتيا له فعند ذلك لا يشك في كون ذاته جوهرها و من توقف في كون نفسه جوهرها أو عرضا فذلك إما لعدم اطلاعه على معنى الجوهر أو لعدم تهذيبه و تلخيصه لهذه المعاني الثابتة عنده أو لاستغراقه فيما يشغل سره و يحجب عنه عن درك الحق و مثل هذه الحجب و الغفلات واقع لأكثر الخلق لاشتغالهم بما يلهيهم عن تذكر ذواتهم و مقوم ذواتهم و ما ينسيهم أنفسهم و يحول بين المرء و قلبه كما أشار إليه تعالى في كثير من آيات الكتاب المبين.

و مما يجب أن يعلم أيضا أن النفس الإنسانية في أول تكونها ليست مفارقة القوام عن البدن بالفعل بل لها استعداد القوام بنفسه و الاستغناء عن المحل و المفارقة عن المواد عند استكمالها بإدراك العقلية و تصفيتها عن الكدورات و ليست هذه الحالة لكل أحد بل الذي يدعى أن لكل إنسان أن يلاحظ نفسه كأنها فارقت الأجسام و الأوضاع و الأمكنة و الحركات و الأزمنة في معرض المنع بل الظاهر أن أكثر الناس لا يمكنهم هذه الملاحظة و لا يتيسر لهم تجريد النظر إلى ذاتهم و تلخيصها عن الزوائد لانغمارها في ظلمة بحر الهوى و غسق ليل الطبيعة

و الوجه الثالث

من الوجوه المعتمد عليها عنده أن لكل ماهية جوهرية يتصور أمور ثلاثة استغناؤها عن الموضوع و كون الماهية علة للاستغناء عنه بشرط الوجود - و الماهية التي عرضت لها هذه العلية.

فإن أريد بالجواهر المعنى الأول فلكونه معنى سلبيا لا يصلح للجنسية و إن فسر بالثاني لم يكن ذلك أيضا معنى جنسيا لأن العلية حكم من أحكام الماهية يلحقها بعد تمام تحققها فإن الشيء ما لم يتحقق ماهيته استحال أن يصير علة بالفعل لشيء من الأشياء على أن عليه العلة ليست أمرا ثبوتيا فضلا عن أن يكون معنى جنسيا - و إن فسر بالثالث فنقول من الجائز أن يكون معروض هذه العلية في كل جوهر هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٥٩

خصوص كونه ذلك الجوهر ففي الجسم خصوص كونه جسما و في العقل خصوص كونه عقلا لجواز اشتراك الماهيات المختلفة في لازم واحد و إذا كان ذلك محتملا لم يكن هناك أمر مشترك فكيف يجعل الجوهرية جنسا مع أن أدنى مراتبه أن يكون وصفا مشتركا فيه و فيه بحث.

أما أولاً فلأن ما ذكره يجري مثله في كل معنى يدعى فيه الجنسية - فالحيوان لا شبهة لأحد في أنه جنس طبيعي لأنواع الحيوانات و ما ذكره في معناه ليس إلا الإدراك و التحريك الإرادي مع الجسم النامي و هو أيضاً مما يدعى فيه الجنسية - و معناه مؤلف من الجسمية و نوع من الحركة كالتغذية و التنمية و التوليد و الجسم أيضاً قيل إنه جنس للأجسام يوجد في حده الجوهر القابل و شيء من هذه المعاني غير صالح لأن يكون جنساً أو ذاتياً لأنواع الجسمية و الحيوانية لأن كلا منها إما معنى نسبي أو سلبي و مع ذلك الأمر غير مشتبة على ذي الحدس الصحيح و القلب السليم لأن المراد مبادي هذه الأمور و كذا حال الفصول كلها لأنها أمور بسيطة عبر عنها بلوازمها و آثارها.

فما من فصل إلا و قد ذكر في التعبير عنه صفة نسبية أو استعدادية كالحساس و الناطق فإنهما فصلان مقومان للحيوان و الإنسان و قد فسر الأول بالإدراك مطلقاً و الإدراك الجزئي و الثاني بإدراك الكليات و الإدراك أمر سلبي عند بعضهم و إضافة عند بعض آخر و هما خارجان من الحقائق المتأصلة الخارجية فكيف يكون كل منهما مقوماً لحقيقة موجودة و الحل في الجميع أن المقصود من هذه المعاني مبادئها الخارجية و موصوفاتها العينية التي لا يمكن التعبير عنها إلا بهذه اللوازم.

و لست أقول المبادي و الموصوفات من حيث كونها مبادي أو موصوفات - حتى يعود الكلام بأن مقوماتها أمور نسبية إضافية و لا يمكن دخول الإضافة تحت مقولة الجوهر بل المراد نفس ذاتها المشار إليها بهذه النعوت و الأوصاف الانتزاعية المنتزعة عن حاق حقيقتها و لأجل ذلك صيرت عنواناً لذواتها و أقيمت مقام الحدود لها.

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و أما ثانياً فلأن الشقوق التي ذكرها غير حاصرة لجواز أن يكون المعنى الذي وقع جنساً هو كون الذات بحيث إذا وجدت يكون وجودها الخارجي مفارقاً عن الموضوع كما علمت و هذا المعنى ثابت لها سواء كانت في الخارج أو في الذهن - و سواء كانت محققة الوجود أو مقدرة.

و أما ثالثاً فلأن ما ذكره من تجويز اشتراك الأمور المخالفة في أمر واحد - لازم غير صحيح من كل وجه إذ قد أقيم البرهان على استحالة كون المتخالفات مشتركة من حيث تخالفها في أمر واحد و كذا يستحيل اشتراك المتخالفات في أمر لازم - لكل واحد من حيث حقيقة ذاته مع قطع النظر عن غيره إلا لمقوم جامع إذ كما يستحيل استناد معلول واحد شخصي إلى علتين مستقلتين و كذا استناد معلول نوعي إلى طبيعتين مختلفتين إلا من جهة اشتراكهما في أمر ذاتي كما علم في موضعه - كذلك يمتنع أن يكون لأشياء متخالفة لازم ذاتي هو مقتضى كل منهما بنفس ذاته إلا لجامع ذاتي و هاهنا كذلك فإن جميع الماهيات الجوهرية تشترك في أمر واحد حاصل لها على وجه اللزوم مع قطع النظر عن الأمور الخارجة و هو كونها عند وجودها الخارجي مستغنية عن الموضوع.

فهذا المعنى إما مقوم مشترك لها أو لازم لأمر مقوم لها مشترك بينها فيكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦١

جنساً لإحالة العقل السليم أن يعرض أمر واحد لأمور كثيرة مختلفة لذواتها بلا جهة واحدة في ذاتها جامعة لمعانيها بحسب أنفسها.

و أما رابعا فغاية الأمر فيما ذكره احتمال أن لا يكون مفهوم الجوهر جنسا لما تحته مع اشتراكه بينها كما دل عليه قوله و إذا كان ذلك محتملا لم يكن هناك أمر مشترك و أين هذا من الدليل المعتمد عليه على أن قول الجوهر على ما تحته قول عرضي خارج.

و أما خامسا فلا يخفى أن كلامه في هذا الموضع مشتمل على التناقض إذ قد سلم أن معنى الجوهر بحسب التفسير الثالث الذي ذكره مشترك بين الماهيات المختلفة بمعنى واحد لكن جواز أن يكون عروضه لكل ماهية بحسب خصوص تلك الماهية لا لأمر ذاتي مشترك بينها ثم قال و إذا كان ذلك محتملا لم يكن هناك أمر مشترك - فكيف يجعل الجوهرية جنسا مع أن أدنى مراتبه أن يكون وصفا مشتركا فيه.

الوجه الرابع

أن الماهية التي يقال عليها إنها جوهر إما بسيطة و إما مركبة أما البسيط فغير داخل تحت جنس و إلا لاحتاج إلى ما يميزه عن النوع الآخر فيكون مركبا و قد فرض بسيطا هذا خلف.

فالجوهر البسيط داخل تحت الجوهر و ليس داخلا تحت الجنس فلا يكون الجوهر جنسا و أما المركب ففيه أجزاء بسيطة و كل واحد منها إما غني عن الموضوع أو ليس غنيا عنه فإن لم يكن كان مقومات الجوهر أعراضا و المتقوم من العرض لا يكون جوهرًا فالمركب ليس جوهرًا و قد فرض جوهرًا هذا خلف.

و إن كان تلك الأجزاء جوهرًا و ليس لها جنس لبساطتها فلا يكون الجوهر جنسا لما تحته أصلا و هو المطلوب. و فيه بحث من وجوه - الأول انتقاض ما ذكره بكل جنس بسيط بل بكل جنس سواء كان بسيطا أو مركبا و ذلك لجريان صورة الدليل فيه مع تخلف المدعى إذ لأحد أن يقول مثل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦٢

ما قاله في الحيوان من أنه ليس جنسا للحيوانات و إلا لكانت الماهية المقول عليها الحيوان - إما أمرا بسيطا أو مركبا فإن كان بسيطا فلم يكن الحيوان جنسا له مع كونه مقولا عليه و إن كان مركبا فأجزاؤه إما حيوانات أو ليست بحيوانات و يتم الدليل شبه ما ذكره فيلزم أن لا يكون للأشياء جنس في الوجود و اللازم باطل كما لا يخفى - فالملزوم كذلك فعلم أن ما ذكره مغالطة باطلة.

الثاني و هو الحل أن يقال إن البسيط الذي تركب منه و من غيره النوع - المندرج تحت جنس إن لم يكن مندرجا تحته فذلك يتصور من وجهين أحدهما أنه لم يصدق عليه معنى ذلك الجنس و الثاني أنه يصدق و لكن ليس ذاتيا له فلا يكون مندرجا تحته اندراج النوع تحت الجنس.

و الشق الأول أيضا يحتمل وجهين أحدهما أنه لم يصدق عليه معنى الجنس - لكونه عين معنى الجنس و الشيء لا يكون فردا لنفسه.

و ثانيهما أن لا يكون كذلك فهنا ثلاثة وجوه في عدم اندراج الشيء تحت الجنس.

و الذي يمنع أن يكون المركب من غير المندرج تحت الجنس و من أمر آخر نوعا من أنواع ذلك الجنس هو أحد هذه الوجوه الثلاثة لا غير فالإنسان مثلا ماهية واقعة تحت جنس الحيوان و هو مركب من جزئين هما الحيوان و الناطق و ليس شيئا منهما مندرجا تحت الحيوان اندراج الشيء تحت الذاتي الأعم له أما الحيوان المطلق المأخوذ جنسا فهو غير

مندرج تحت نفسه إذ لا تغاير هناك أصلاً.

و أما الحيوان المأخوذ مجرداً عن القيود الفصلية فهو إما غير موجود في الخارج فلا يكون مقوماً لنوع موجود فيه.
و أما مادة للمركب منه و من الفصل فلا يكون جنساً محمولاً على ذلك النوع المركب على ما عرفت من تفاوت الاصطلاحين في التجريد.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦٣

و أما الناطق مطلقاً فالحيوان عرضي له.

و أما المأخوذ مجرداً فالحيوان غير مقول عليه إما لعدم وجوده على أحد الاصطلاحين و إما لكونه صورة لا فصلاً و الحيوان مادة لا محمولاً.

فإن قلت الحيوان المأخوذ مجرداً مندرج تحت الحيوان المأخوذ مطلقاً اندراج النوع تحت الجنس لأنه الجنس بعينه مع قيد التجرد فيكون نوعاً منه.

قلت الجنس المأخوذ على هذا الوجه و إن كان نوعاً لكنه نوع اعتباري عقلي لا تحصل له في الخارج من هذه الحيثية إذ لو كان متحصلاً فيه لكان مركباً من الجنس و الفصل و قد فرض بسيطاً هذا خلف على أن مثل هذا الاندراج لو كفى في كون الشيء واقعا تحت معنى جنسي في الخارج فليكيف في محل النزاع أعني الجوهر البسيط أو أحد جزئي النوع الجوهرية و هو معنى الجوهر المأخوذ مجرداً عن شرط و قيد فجاز أن يكون البسيط جوهرًا موجوداً

فصل (٥) في كون بعض الجواهر أول و أولى من بعض

عادة الحكماء أن يقسموا الجواهر إلى جواهر أولى كالأشخاص و إلى جواهر ثانية كالأنواع و إلى الثوالت كالأجناس و حكموا بأن الأشخاص لأوليئها أولى بالجوهريّة من الأنواع و كذا الأنواع أولى بالجوهريّة من الأجناس - و قالوا ليس المراد أنها كذلك باعتبار نفس المعنى الذي به يكون الجوهر جنساً - فإن من قواعدهم أن الذاتي لا يكون متفاوتاً بوجه من وجوه التشكيك و قد سبق تحقيق الأمر فيه سابقاً بل باعتبار ما يستدعيه مفهوم الجوهر من الوجود المعتبر في تعريفه أو الاستغناء عن الموضوع عند الوجود بالفعل أو باعتبار الشرف و الفضيلة - فالأشخاص بحسب هذه المعاني أولى بالجوهريّة من الأنواع و أحق بكونها موجوداً مستغنياً عن الموضوع لأنها أشد استغناء عنه و أسبق وجوداً من الأنواع الكلية و أقدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦٤

تسمية بالجواهر منها أما من جهة الاستغناء و الحاجة فلأن الكلي محتاج إلى الشخص - إذ لو لا الشخص لما كان للكلي وجود بخلاف العكس إذ لو احتاج الشخص إلى الكلي في الوجود لاحتاج الشخص إلى شخص آخر يكون معه ليكون الكلي مقولاً عليهما و ليس كذلك كما بين سابقاً و أما من جهة الوجود لا في موضوع فالأشخاص قد حصل لها ذلك الوجود و الكليات لم يحصل لها ذلك بعد لأن الكلية من الأمور النسبية فيحتاج الكليات إلى ما يضاف هي إليه بالكلية و أما من حيث الفضيلة - فالقصد من الطبيعة في الإيجاد و التكوين متوجه إلى صيرورة النوع شخصاً ليتمكن أن يحصل في الأعيان.

و اعلم أنهم إذا قالوا إن الجواهر المحسوسة أولى بالجوهريّة من المعقولة لم يعنوا بالمعقولة إلا ذهنيات الأمور المحسوسة و ماهياتها الكلية لا الذوات العقلية و المفارقات الشخصية فإنها أولى بالجوهريّة و الوجود من الكل لأنها أسبق السوابق الجوهريّة و أقواها في الوجود لكونها أسبابا فعالة لوجود غيرها من الشخصيات - و النوعيات و قياس الأنواع إلى الأجناس في الأوليّة و الأولوية كقياس الأشخاص إلى الأنواع فإن الطبيعة النوعية أقرب إلى التحصيل و أكمل في الوجود و أتم في جواب السائل عن ماهية الشيء من الطبيعة الجنسية و أما الفصول المنطقية أعني المشتقات فهي جواهر لكونها محمولة على الجوهر حمل على و أما البسيطة فهي أيضا جواهر لأنها مقومات للأنواع الجوهريّة و المقوم للجوهر جوهر هذا ما ذكره القوم.

و فيه ما لا يخفى من المساهلة تعرف بتذكر ما أسلفناه في كيفية حال الفصول البسيطة في باب الجوهريّة و أيضا لو كان حمل الشيء على الجوهر مقتضيا لجوهريّة ذلك الشيء لكان الأبيض جوهرًا مع أنه عرض.

أبحاث و أجوبة -

إن لشيخ أتباع الإشراقيين وجوها من الاعتراض على الحكماء أصحاب المعلم الأول.

أحدها أنه أستم قلتم إن الجوهر جنس و الجنس لا يقع على ما تحته بالتشكيك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦٥

فإن قلتم ليست الأولوية في الجوهريّة بل في معنى آخر فبطل قولكم - إن الجواهر الشخصية أولى بالجوهريّة من الأنواع و الأنواع من الأجناس بل كان يجب أن يقولوا بعضها أولى بالوجود من بعض أو أولى بالاستغناء عن الموضوع من بعض لا بالجوهريّة.

و ثانيها أنه لا يصح أيضا أن يقال إن الأشخاص أولى بالوجود العيني من النوع و الجنس

لأنهما كليان و الكلّي لا وجود له من حيث كونه كليًا فلا وجود لها من حيث الجنسية و النوعية ليكون حمل الموجود العيني عليهما بالتفاوت.

اللهم إلا أن يراد بالكلّي الطبيعة من حيث هي فحسب سواء كانت في الأعيان أو في الذهن و حينئذ لا يكون الشخص أولى بالجوهريّة من النوع أيضا فإن الشخص زاد على الطبيعة النوعية بأعراض زائدة و جوهريّة زيد إنما هي باعتبار إنسانيته - لا باعتبار سواده و بياضه فلا معنى أصلا لهذه الأولوية في الجوهريّة.

و ثالثها أن من قال إن الجوهريّة يقع بالتشكيك له أن يقول

إن البسيط أولى بالجوهريّة من المركب كالجسم مثلا فإنه مركب من جوهرين هما الهولي و الصورة و المجموع هويته تحصل من الأجزاء فلو لا جوهريّة أجزائه ما كان المجموع جوهرًا فكما أنه لحقت الجسميّة بالإنسان بتوسط الحيوان فكذلك لحقت الجوهريّة بالمجموع الذي هو الجسم بتوسط جزئية و كما أنه لو لا جسميّة الحيوان ما كان الإنسان جسمًا فكذلك لو لا جوهريّة الجزئين ما كان مجموعهما جوهرًا.

ثم إذا كانت الجسميّة لاحقة بالإنسان بتوسط الحيوان و الجوهريّة أيضا لحقت بالحيوان بواسطة الجسميّة و النفسية فيكون الجوهريّة بالجسم أولى منه بالمجموع.

و رابعها أن الوجود عند من لا صورة له في الأعيان لا يصلح للعلية و المعلولية

فالعلل و المعلولات الجوهرية لا يتقدم بعضها عن بعض بالوجود لأنه وصف اعتباري عنده لا وقوع له في الأعيان فلا يبقى التقدم في الجواهر العلية و المعلولية إلا بالذات و الحقيقة.

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و خامسها أن الجسم المركب من الهولي و الصورة

لما بين أن جعل كل منهما منه غير جعل الأخرى فهما موجودان و مجموعهما جسم فالجسم لا جوهرية له في نفسه فإنه ليس إلا الجوهرين و معنى الاجتماع بينهما و الجمعية بينهما أمر اعتباري و عرض من الأعراض فلا يحصل به جوهرية ثالثة غير ما لجزئية إذ المجموع ما زاد على الجزئين إلا بالاجتماع و هو عرض فالجوهرية ليست على سبيل الاستقلال للمجموع و الشيء الواحد لا يجوز أن يكون جوهرًا و عرضًا. هذه خلاصة أبحاثه على الحكماء و أنا أريد أن أجيب عنها جميعًا بعون الله و حسن توفيقه.

أما عن البحث الأول

فلأن كون بعض الجواهر أولى من بعض في الجوهرية ليس مناقضًا للحكم بأن الجوهر لا يقع على أفراده بالتشكيك فإن معنى ما حكموه كما أشرنا إليه سابقًا أن نفس الجوهرية لا يكون ما به التفاوت لا أنها لا يكون فيه التفاوت و هذا بعينه نظير ما ذكره الشيخ في فصل خواص الكم من قاطيغورياس الشفاء بعد ما ذكر أن ليس في طبيعة الكم ازدياد و لا تنقص.

لست أعني بهذا أن كمية لا تكون أزيد و أنقص من كمية و لكن أعني أن كميته لا تكون أزيد في أنها كمية من أخرى مشاركة لها فلا خط أشد خطية أي في أنه ذو بعد واحد من خط آخر و إن كان من حيث المعنى الإضافي أزيد منه أعني الطول الإضافي فلا يجوز أن يكون كمية أشد و أزيد في طبيعتها من كمية أخرى أنقص أو أكثر منها و بالغ في بيانه بإيراد الأمثلة الموضحة فكذلك مقصودهم من كون بعض الجواهر أولى في الجوهرية من بعض ليس أنه كذلك بالمعنى الجنسي و بحسبه حتى يكون ما فيه التفاوت عين ما به التفاوت بل مجرد كون بعض الأفراد أولى في الجوهرية و إن لم يكن كذلك بحسب نفس كونه جوهرًا.

و هذا هو محل الخلاف بين الفريقين كما أسلفناه فأما إذا قلنا مثلاً أن زيدا الأب أقدم في الإنسانية من عمرو الابن فهذا لا ينافي ما قد كنا أثبتنا من قولنا أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦٧

لا تفاوت في نفس الماهية أو الذاتي.

نعم لو قلنا إن زيدا من حيث كونه إنساناً أقدم من عمرو كان في الكلام تناقض فالحاصل أن بعض الجواهر أقدم و أولى من بعض في الجوهرية من حيث سبق وجود جوهريته لا من حيث سبق جوهريته بما هي هي و هذا الفرق مما تقع الغفلة عنه كثيراً فينشأ منه الاشتباه بين ما هو محل الخلاف بينهم و غيره

و أما الجواب عن البحث الثاني

فلأن الكلي و إن لم يكون موجوداً في الخارج إلا أنه موجود في ذهن بوجود عقلي متشخص بصفات النفس بل

موجود بنحو آخر من الوجود غير الذي به يكون موجودة أفراد الماهية التي عرضت لها هذه الكلية في الخارج فإن ماهية الإنسان مثلا لها نحو وجود في الخارج بعين وجود أفرادها الخارجية يترتب عليه آثار مخصوصة بها فإذا وجدت في النفس و عرضت لها الكلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦٨

كان وجودها حينئذ وجودا يترتب عليه آثار مخصوصة بنوع من الكيف النفساني و هو العلم فيكون في الذهن من باب الكيف لكونه مصداقا له و فردا منه و ليس من باب الجوهر و إن كان هو بعينه نفس معنى الإنسانية إذ ليس مصداقا و لا فردا منه كما مر تحقيقه مرارا و لا شبهة في أن الجوهر الخارجي أولى بالجهرية لكونه مما يصدق عليه الجوهرية بالذات من الجوهر الذهني لأنها غير صادقة عليه حملا متعارفا- بل هو مجرد مفهومها المعبر فيه. و هذا وجه آخر لطيف في توجيه كلامهم من أن الأشخاص الجوهرية أولى بالجهرية من الأنواع والأجناس.

و أما الجواب عن البحث الثالث

فإن نقول حسب ما لوحنا إليه سابقا أن الجوهر المفسر بقولنا الموجود لا في موضوع يعتبر بوجهين أحدهما حال الماهية و الآخر حال الوجود المستغني عن الموضوع لأن الوجود عند هؤلاء القوم موجود بحسب نفسه كما مر ذكره فالتقدم و التأخر إذا وصف بهما الماهيات يكون ملاك التقدم و التأخر غيرها كالوجود في التقدم العلي و التأخر المعلولي- و كذا الزمان في التقدم و التأخر الزمانيين و المكان و غيره في الرتبين و الشرف و الخسة و أما إذا وصف بهما الوجود فربما يكون الملاك أيضا نفسه.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول لا شك في أن وجود الجوهر المركب بما هو مركب- غير وجود البسائط فجوهريته بالعدد غير جوهرية جزئية و يتوقف عليهما و أما أن جوهرية المركب كالجسم مثلا في أنها جوهرية غير جوهرية الجزئين في كونهما جوهرين و بحسبهما متوقفة عليهما فالحكماء المشاءون و أتباعهم يتحاشون عن ذلك فمن الذي قال إن جوهرية الجسم في كونها معنى الجوهر غير جوهرية الهيولى و الصورة بل الذي قالوا به ليس إلا أن جوهرية المركب غير جوهرية الجزئين بالوجود و العدد و هذا أمر واضح في النوع الواحد الطبيعي.

و أما فيما ليست له وحدة طبيعية كالحجر الموضوع بجانب الإنسان فليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٦٩

هناك سوى الجوهرين جوهر ثالث كما ذكره.

و بالجملة الجوهرية لا ينقل من العلة إلى المعلول لأنها مفهوم واحد لا تفاضل فيه و لا تعدد من حيث المعنى و المفهوم.

و أما الوجود فالحق فيه كما سبق أنه بنفس حقيقته و ذاته يكون متقدما و متأخرا و جاعلا و مجعولا و تعدده و تكثره ليس من نحو تكثر مفهوم واحد كلي نوعي أو جنسي لأن تعدد المعاني و الماهيات إنما يكون بالوجود و تعدد الوجود بنفسه كما تعرفه الراسخون في العلم و حرمت هذه المعرفة على غيرهم و ما يقع منه في الذهن و يعرضه العموم و الكلية ليس حقيقة الوجود بل وجهها من وجوها و حكاية عنها و هو المفهوم العام المصدري.

والحاصل أن جوهرية العلة و الجزء لجوهرية المعلول و المركب في أنها جوهرية و هي أقدم و أفضل في أنها موجود من جوهرية المعلول و المركب و ملاك التقدم و الفضيلة في الوجود نفس الوجود كما مر فالجسمية أقدم بالوجود من الحيوانية لا في الجوهرية و كذا الحيوان أولى و أقدم وجودا من الإنسانية لا بالجسمية و الجوهرية فكما أنه لحقت الجسمية بالإنسان بتوسط الحيوان في كونها موجودة لا في كونها جسمية فكذلك لحقت الجوهرية بالحيوان بتوسط الجسمية في كونها موجودة لا في كون الجوهرية جوهرية و كذا لو لا جوهرية الجزءين موجودة ما كان مجموعهما جوهرًا موجودًا لا أنه لو لا جوهرية الجزءين جوهرية - ما كان مجموعهما جوهرًا لأن الجوهرية للمجموع كالجوهرية للجزئين من غير تفاوت و ليست إحداها مستفادة من الأخرى فلا وجه للتفريع الذي ذكره من قوله - فيكون الجوهرية بالجسم أولى منه بالمجموع.

و أما الجواب عن البحث الرابع

فنقول إن من قال بنفي العلية و المعلولية - و التقدم و التأخر في الماهيات الجوهرية بل في الماهيات مطلقا هم الحكماء المشاءون - و من مذهبهم أن للوجود صورة في الأعيان بل الصورة العينية لكل شيء ليست إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧٠

نحو وجوده.

و أما من ذهب إلى أن الوجود لا حقيقة له و لا صورة منه في الخارج فلا محالة يلزمه القول بأن العلية و المعلولية و التقدم و التأخر الذاتيين لا يكون إلا من جهة الماهيات و بحسبها فإذا كانت العلة و المعلول جوهرين كالعقل و النفس أو كالمادة و الصورة و ما يتركب منهما فلا بد على مذهبه أن يكون الماهية الجوهرية في كونها ماهية جوهرية علة لماهية جوهرية أخرى كذلك لأن هذا من ضروريات كون الوجود أمر اعتباريا فإن الأمر الاعتباري لا يكون فاعلا مؤثرا و لا مجعولا منفعلا فما ذكره هذا المعترض غير وارد على شيء من المذهبيين بل ذلك وارد على من جمع في مذهبه من كل واحد من المذهبيين شيئا فرأى رأي المشائين في نفي التفاوت بين الذاتيات و الماهيات بالتقدم و التأخر و الأولوية و عدمها و رأى رأي الرواقيين في أن الوجود أمر ذهني لا تأثير لها و لا تأثر و إنما الجاعلية و المجعولية بحسب الماهيات لا غير فيلزم عليه التناقض و قد مر في أوائل هذا السفر ورود هذا الإلزام على جمع من الأعلام و قد خرقوا الإجماع المركب الواقع من الحكماء العظام و صادموا البرهان المتبع للعقول في الأحكام.

و أما الجواب عن البحث الخامس

فإننا نقول إن جوهرية الجسم و إن لم تكن غير جوهرية مجموع الجزءين و لا زائدة عليهما إلا أن جوهريته غير جوهرية كل واحد من الجزءين بالعدد بناء على ما ذهب إليه تبعا لأكثر القوم من أن جعل المادة غير جعل الصورة فأما إذا كان جعلاهما واحدا لم يكن لأحد أن يقول - جوهرية الجسم غير جوهرية كل منهما بالعدد كما في النوع البسيط بالنسبة إلى جنسه و فصله فالجسم جوهر موجود لا محالة و ليس وجوده الجوهرية على ما اختاره عين وجود أحد جزئيه و لا جوهرية الجزء و الكل واحدا بالعدد بل بحسب المفهوم من المعنى الجنسي فمجرد أنه لم يكن معنى الجوهرية التي في الكل غير معنى الجوهرية التي في الجزءين لم يلزم أن لا يكون الكل في نفسه جوهرًا ثالثا بل للكل جوهرية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧١

أخرى غير الجوهريتين اللتين للجزئين بالعدد لا في كونها جوهرية ولا في كون الكل جوهرًا فجوهرية الكل جوهرية
ثالثة غير جوهرية الهيولى و جوهرية الصورة- إلا أنها ليست غير جوهرية المجموع بما هو مجموع وليست غير
جوهرية كل واحد من الجزئين في معنى الجوهرية و بحسبها بالعدد

فصل (٦) في ذكر خواص الجوهر

منها أنه لا ضد له.

و هذا إن عني بالمتضادين ما يتعاقبان على موضوع واحد و بينهما غاية الخلاف.
و أما إن عني بالموضوع ما هو أعم من موضوع الأعراض و مادة الجواهر- أي المحل مطلقا كان للجوهر ضد كالصورة
النارية فإنها تضاد الصورة المائية و نقل بعضهم عن الشيخ الرئيس أن هذا النزاع لفظي و هو ليس كذلك كما سنشير إليه
و يشارك الجوهر في هذه الخاصية بعض أنواع الكم إذ لا ضد للعدد كالثلاثة و الأربعة- لعدم التعاقب لهما على موضوع
واحد و أيضا ما من عدد إلا فوقه عدد آخر فلا يكون بين عددين غاية التباعد.
اللهم إلا عند من لا يشترط غاية التباعد في التضاد.

و قد علمت تخالف الاصطلاحين فيه بين المنطقيين و الإلهيين قالوا و من توابع هذه الخاصية خاصة أخرى للجوهر و
هو نفي الاشتداد و التضعف عنه إذ الاشتداد و التضعف إنما يكونان فيما يقبل التضاد لأن معانها الحركة نحو الكمال أو
النقص- و أجزاء الحركة غير مجتمعة في محل واحد و لأن بقاء الموضوع شرط في تمام الحركة و المسافة فهو إن كان
الفرد الضعيف فيبطل بالاشتداد و إن كان الفرد الشديد فيبطل بالتضعف فلا يكون موضوع باقيا فلا حركة في الجوهر و
ستعلم ضعف هذا القول عند كلامنا في إثبات حدوث العالم بوقوع الاستحالة في الطبائع و صور الجوهرية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧٢

و لقائل أن يقول أيضا إن عد هذا الحال خاصة للجوهر غير مستقيم فإن الكم لا يقبلهما عندهم لأن المحققين لا يفرقون
بين الاشتداد و التضعف و بين الازدياد و التنقص في المعنى فإن الحركة في الكمال معنى واحد سواء كانت في الكيف
و سمي بالاشتداد أو في الكم و سمي بالازدياد و كذا الحركة في التنقص معنى واحد سواء سمي بالتضعف أو بالتنقص
و لأن الكمية الواحدة المعينة أيضا يبطل بالازدياد و الانتقاص إذا كانت متصلة و إذا كانت منفصلة فليس ما هو الزائد
عين ما هو الناقص- فلا حركة للكم في كميته فكذا لا حركة للكيف في كفيته لأن الاشتداد ليس بأن كيفية ما تبقى
بعينها و يضم إليها مثلها فإن الشديد من الكيفية عرض بسيط كالضعيف منها ليس أنه يتألف من أمثال الضعيف كما مر
نعم المادة يتحرك في المقادير- كما يتحرك الموضوع في الكيفيات.

لكنك تعلم أن مقصودهم ليس أن الجوهر لا يتحرك بل أن لا حركة فيه- فلا يكون وزانه أن لا حركة للكم و لا للكيف
بل الوزن إنما يتحقق لو ثبت أن لا حركة في الكم أو لا اشتداد و لم يثبت مما ذكر فلا يبطل الخاصة المذكورة بما أورده
و كثيرا ما يقع الاشتباه بين هذين المعنيين لمن نظر في كلامهم حتى إن صاحب حكمة الإشراق غير العبارة في
المطارحات عند عده خواص الجوهر فقال و من أحوال الجوهر الغير العامة و من خواص الجوهر أنه لا يشتد و لا
يضعف و هذا لاستحالة التضاد فيه فإن الاشتداد و التضعف إنما يكونان بين الضدين و هذا ليس خاصة الجوهر فإن الكم

أيضا لا يقبلهما على ما سيأتي فيه الكلام انتهى قوله.

و ليس فيما ذكره في مستأنف كلامه إلا نفي الحركة من الكم لا نفيها فيه و أين هذا من ذاك كيف و المتحرك بالذات في كل حركة ليس إلا الجواهر المادية - بل الذي عد من الخواص لمقولة الجوهر نفي كونه حاصلا بالتدرج متحركا و هذا ما راموه بقولهم لا اشتداد و لا حركة لها بدلا عن قولهم لا اشتداد و لا حركة فيها و لهذا قالوا إن جوهر لا يكون أشد في الجوهرية من جوهر آخر و إن كان أولى منه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧٣

في الوجود لأن الأولوية تتعلق بوجود الشيء و الأشدية تتعلق بماهيته

بحث و تحقيق

و لأصحاب المكاشفة المؤيدين بقوة البرهان و نور العرفان هاهنا نظر حكمي - و هو أن الاشتداد كما يقع في كيف يقع في الجوهر و أن الموضوع للحركة الجوهرية في الطبائع المادية وحدته الشخصية محفوظة بوحدة عقلية نورية فاعلية للفاعل العقلي الحافظ للشخص الطبيعي في مراتب الاستعمالات الذاتية و الأطوار الوجودية و بوحدة إبهامية قابلية للمادة المنحفضة وحدتها في مراتب الانفعالات و الانقلابات فإذا نصح وقوع الحركة في الجوهر إما في مراتب التمامية و الكمال أو في مراتب الانتقاص لكن الأولى بحسب مقتضى الطبيعة من جهة العناية الربانية - و الثانية بحسب قسر القاسر أو قصور القابل فالأول كما في استكمالات الجوهر الإنساني من لدن كونه جنينا بل منسيا إلى غاية كونه عقلا بالفعل و ما فوقه فإن العقل الصافي و الذهن السليم يحكم بأن التفاوت في هذه المراتب الإنسانية ليس بأمور عرضية زائدة من أحوال المزاج و غيره من المقدار و الوضع و ما يجري مجراها - حتى إنه لا فرق بين الطفل الناقص و الشيخ الكامل إلا بالأعراض فإن بطلان هذا قريب من البديهيات.

و أما الثاني فكانقلاب العناصر بعضها إلى بعض فإن الماء إذا صار هواء عند ورود الحرارة الشديدة عليه المضغفة للمائية قليلا قليلا بالتدرج حتى يقرب طبيعته طبيعة الهواء فيصير هواء فليس ذلك بأن الماء مع كونه ماء صار هواء - أو نفذ الماء في آن و حدث الهواء في آن آخر مجاور له فيلزم تتالي الأئين و هو محال - أو غير مجاور له فيلزم تعري الماء عن الصور بينهما و هو أيضا محال بل الحق أن الجوهر المائي تنقصت جوهريته المائية على التدرج حتى صار هواء و ذلك لأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧٤

الموضوع لهذه الحركة الجوهرية هو الهولي و لكن لا بنفسها لعدم قوامها إلا بصورة ما بل هي مع صورة ما لا على التعيين موضوع لهذه الحركة وإنما يقع حركتها في خصوصيات الصور الجوهرية و هذه كالحركة الكمية فإن الهولي مادة الكم المقداري لا يمكن خلوه عن مقدار ما فهي مع مقدار ما باقية موضوعة للحركة في خصوصيات المقدار فلا تبطل وحدتها المعتمدة في بقائها و انحفاظها بتعاقب الصور عليها كما لا تبطل بتوارد المقادير عليها.

و قد علمت أن المقدار التعليمي ليس مما يمكن تجرد المادة عنها لا في الوجود و لا في الوهم أيضا فإذا الموضوع للحركة الجوهرية باق بعينه بحاله التي اعتبرت في قوام وجوده و مع توارده خصوصيات الجوهر الصوري عليه فلا

محذور في ذلك كما زعمه الشيخ الرئيس و متابعه.

و أيضا فلو لم يكن حد مشترك بين الماء و الهواء حتى يكون أسخن الأفراد المائية و أبرد الأفراد الهوائية يلزم المحذور المذكور أنفا من خلو الهيولى من كافة الصور في أن فهو مستحيل اتفاقا و برهانا و هذا مما لا مخلص لهم عنه إلا بتجوير الحركة في الصور الجوهرية أي الاشتداد و التضعف.

تنبيه

و مما ينبه على هذا المطلب و يؤكد أنه المنى في الرحم يزداد كمالات حتى يصدر عنه فعل النبات ثم يتكامل حتى يصدر عنه أفعال الحيوان ثم آثار الإنسانية - فلو كان حدوث هذه الكمالات فيه دفعا بلا تدرج في الاشتداد و الاستكمال على سبيل فساد دفعي و كون أني يلزم تعاقب الفواعل المتباينة الذوات على مادة مشتركة - و ذلك غير صحيح في الأفاعيل الطبيعية فإن تفويض أحد الفاعلين مادة فعله إلى الآخر - إنما يصح في الصناعات الاختيارية الواقعة بالقصد و الروية دون الطبيعية فإن مادة كل فعل طبيعي متقوم بفعله.

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و أيضا لا شك أن للطبيعة القائمة بمادة النطفة اقتضاء في الاستكمال و توجهها غريزيا نحو تحصيل الكمال و ليس توجهها و اقتضاؤها مبطلا لنفسه و مفسدا لصورته - فمن أين حصلت علة الفساد و سبب البطلان للصورة الأولى حتى يحدث الثانية و الطبيعة لا يقتضي إلا حفظ صورتها و التوجه إلى غايتها و كمالها بإمداد من القوى العالية.

فكما أن الصورة الطبيعية كمال للمادة الجسمية فكذا الصورة النباتية كمال - و سبب غائي للصورة الطبيعية و كذلك الحيوانية غاية كمالية للنفس النباتية و هلم جرا إلى درجة العقل المستفاد و ما بعده و في جميع هذه الدرجات و المقامات وحدة - موضوع الحركة محفوظة بواحد بالعموم من الصورة و هو نوع ما من الصور المتعاقبة على الاتصال يستحفظه وحدته الاتصالية بواحد بالعدد من الجوهر الفعال المفيض للكمال بعد الكمال حسب تزايد الاستكمال بتوارد الأحوال و الاتصال أيضا ضرب من الوحدة الشخصية و إن كان على سبيل التدرج و عدم الاستقرار و هذا و إن كان فيه حيد عن المشهور لكنك تعلم أن العاقل لا يحيد عن المشهور و لا يجاوز ما عليه الجمهور ما وجد عنه محيصا.

ثم من نظر في أطوار الإنسان و عجائب نشأته و عوالمه و رآه كيف تعرج تارة إلى سماء العقل رقيا و ينزل إلى أرض الطبيعة هوبا لم يبق له شك في أن له اشتدادا و تضعفا بحسب جوهر ذاته و إنني لا أبالي بمخالفة الجمهور و مجاوزة المشهور بل المسافر يفرح بها و يفتخر فإن الجمهور مستقرون ساكنون في البلد الذي هو مسقط رؤوسهم و أرض ولادتهم و أول منزل وجودهم و إنما يسافر منه و يهاجر الآحاد منهم دون الأعداد.

و أما الذي يكسر سورة استنكارك و استبعادك حيث تقول إنه يلزم الانقلاب في الماهيات و الذاتيات فهو أنك إن تحققت و أدعنت ما أسلفناه في أن الوجود هو الأصل في الوجودية و الوقوع و الماهيات تابعة لأنحاء الوجودات و علمت أن أفراد الوجود بعضها أشد و بعضها أضعف كما أن بعضها أقدم من بعض بالذات لعلمت أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧٦

الاشتداد سواء كان في الهيئة الكيفية أو في الصورة الجوهرية حركة في وجود الشيء لا في ماهيته.

والمشاءون قائلون بأن مراتب الأشد والأضعف أنواع مختلفة لكنها عند الاشتداد ليست متميزة موجودة بالفعل وإلا لزم تركيب الحركة من أكوأانية غير متناهية وهو محال وانكشف لك أن انحفاظ الماهيات على ما هي هي في كل مرتبة من الوجود بحاله من غير انقلاب فيها فإن كل معنى من المعاني وكل ماهية من الماهيات بحسب ذاته ليس إلا نفسه وكذا كل نحو خاص من الوجود ليس إلا نفسه إلا أن لحقيقة الوجود أنحاء وأطوارا كثيرة في شئون ذاتها ودرجات نفسها لا يجعل جاعل وتأثير فاعل وهو شديد الغموض ليس هاهنا موضع كشفه ولنرجع إلى ما فارقناه.

فنقول ومن خواص الجوهر كونه مقصودا بالإشارة قيل إنها دلالة حسية أو عقلية إلى الشيء بحيث لا يشترك فيها غيره فالإشارة لو كانت إلى الأعراض فهي إن كانت حسية فمحسوسية الأعراض إنما هي بأمور تابعة للمواد والأجرام فالإشارة إليها تابعة للإشارة إلى محالها وإن كانت إشارة عقلية فهي لا تتناول الأعراض الشخصية - إلا من جهة العلم بأسبابها وعللها فلا يكون العلم بها إلا كليا فلا يكون إشارة إذ الإشارة إلى شيء لا يحتمل الشركة كما قلنا.

ومن هاهنا يعلم أن كليات الجوهر أيضا لا يمكن الإشارة إليها ككليات الأعراض فقد أخطأ من ظن أن هذه الخاصة شاملة لجميع الجواهر وكذا الجوهر الجزئي الجسماني غير قابل للإشارة العقلية لكونه غير معقول على ما هو المشهور عندهم - فلا يشار إليه بإشارة عقلية إلا بتبعية العلم بأسبابها وعللها.

ومنهم من زعم أن العرض قابل للإشارة العقلية لأنها تعقل من حيث طبيعته دون الإضافة إلى محل مخصوص فلم يبق فرق بين الجوهر والعرض في قبولها إذ الكلي من كل منهما مقصود بالإشارة العقلية والجزئي من كل منهما مقصود بالإشارة الحسية - إلا أن من عرف معنى كون الشيء مقصودا بالإشارة وأن مرجعها نحو من الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧٧

الحضورى ولا يكفي فيها مطلق المعلوماتية على الوجه الكلي لم يشته عليه الأمر - فإن ماهية العرض مما يتقوم وجوده بالموضوع بخلاف الجوهر فإنه لا حاجة له إلى محل.

والذي يتوهم فيه الحاجة إلى المحل من الصور المادية ليس كما توهم فإن الحاجة لها إلى المادة ليست في تقويم وجودها بل في لوازم شخصيتها كما سيجيء - فماهية كل جوهر بحسب وجودها الذهني التي يعرضه العموم والاشتراك مما لا شبهة في قبولها للإشارة العقلية من حيث تعيينها العقلي الذهني وإن لم يقبلها من حيث إبهامها الخارجي بخلاف ماهية العرض فإنها تابعة لغيرها في الوجود مطلقا - فليست مقصودة إلا بالعرض كما يظهر بالوجدان.

وأما الجوهر المفارق البحث فهل يمكن أن يقع إليها إشارة عقلية مخصصة عينا وعقلا فالمشاءون ينكرونها إلا في علم المفارق بذاته وصفاته الذاتية والرواقيون أثبتوها.

والحق في ذلك مع الرواقيين كما سيأتي في مباحث علم الله ومن خواص الجوهر كونه موجودا لنفسه بالمعنى المقابل للوجود النسبي وهذه يختص بما لا محل له من الجواهر فإن الصور المادية وكذا كليات الجواهر على رأي المشائين وجودها لغيرها إذ ليس قوامها بذاتها أصلا وإنما قلنا على رأي المشائين لما مر من مذهب الأقدمين من وجود الكليات الطبيعية في عالم المفارقات قائمة بأنفسها.

ولقائل أن يقول أما الصور المادية فهي من حيث طبيعتها مستغنية عن المادة

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و إنما الحاجة لها إلى المادة من حيث تشخصها و ليست المادة متقومة بها بخصوصها لبقاء المادة دونها فما هو أصل الجوهر و حقيقته فليس وجوده لغيره و ما هو لغيره فهو عرض **و أما الكليات و الصور الذهنية** فقد مر أنها ليست من مقولة الجوهر بل من مقولة الكيف و إن كانت حدودها و معانيها الجوهرية حاصلة في العقل و الجوهر محمول عليها لا بالحمل الشائع الصناعي فلم ينقدح لشيء من القليلين عموم هذه الخاصية للجوهر.

لكننا نجيب عن الأول بأن الجوهر الصوري و إن كان بحسب الماهية مستغنيا عن المادة إلا أنه لما كانت ماهية متحدة مع التشخص في نحو من الوجود اتحادا بالذات - صدق أن هذا النوع من الجوهر وجوده الشخصي لغيره.

و عن الثاني أيضا بمثل ما ذكرناه فإن ماهية الإنسان واقع تحت مقولة الجوهر بالذات فيكون جوهرًا لكن يصدق عليها أنها مما يوجد مفتقرا إلى موضوع عقلي قائما به فتكون عند وجودها الذهني موجودة لغيرها فهذه الخاصية ليست ثابتة لمقولة الجوهر في جميع أفرادها الشخصية التي يحمل عليها معنى الجوهرية أو يشمل في ذواتها عليه.

و من خاصية الجوهر أن الواحد العددي منه يقبل صفات متقابلة كالسواد و البياض للجسم و الرجاء و الخوف في النفس.

فإن قلت الظن الواحد قد يكون صادقا و قد يكون كاذبا و هو نوع من العلم القائم بالنفس و العلم الحسولي عرض فالكيف أيضا اشترك مع الجوهر في هذا الوصف.

قلت المراد تبدل تلك الصفات المتضادة في أنفسها لا بحسب نسبتها إلى أمر خارج و الصدق و الكذب من الأمور النسبية فالظن الصادق إذا كذب كان لتغير الأمر الخارج عنه فالصورة العقلية بحالها عند ما كذبت نسبتها إلى الواقع بعد الصدق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٧٩

و هذا أيضا من الخواص الغير الشاملة فإن الجواهر المفارقة لا تغير فيها و العالم العقلي مصون عن التبدل و التجدد و لوحه محفوظ عن النسخ و المحو و الإثبات و إنما القابل لشيء منها هو ما دون ذلك العالم كالعالم النفساني السماوي فإن فيه كتاب المحو و الإثبات لتطرق النسخ و و التبديل في النفوس لقوله تعالى **يَمْحُوا اللَّهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُثَبِّتُ وَ عِنْدَهُ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ**.

و لا يتوهم أن الكلي من الجوهر الذي عندهم من الجواهر الثانية أو الثالثة مما يتغير لأجل كونه محمولا على الأبيض تارة و على الأسود أخرى لأن ذلك لمطابقتها للمختلفات لا لتغيره بالذات في صفة من الصفات فالكلي يشتمل على كل شخص و ليس بحق أن كل شخص منه أبيض و كل شخص منه أسود فلا يتغير الجواهر الثواني - و الثوالت من جهة ما هي ثوان و ثوالت أعني الأنواع و الأجناس كما لا يتغير المفارقات بالفعل و لا يتوهم أن هذه الخاصية توجد في الأعراض بواسطة أن تتخيل - أن اللون المطلق يجوز كونه سوادا و بياضا فتغير من السواد إلى البياض و ذلك لأن البياض إذا بطل فصله بطلت لونيته لأنهما مجعولان بجعل واحد فإذا زال لون زال بتمامه و حصل لون آخر و ليس يجوز انسلاخ فصله مع بقاء سنخ منه لأن ذلك غير ممكن التحقق في النوع البسيط و اللون المطلق العقلي نسبته إلى الجميع سواء.

و ما اشتهر من أن في الجنس استعدادا لوجود الفصول فذلك إنما يصح في جنس الأنواع المركبة لا بما هو جنس بل بما هو مأخوذ مادة.

و قد علمت الفرق بين الاعتبارين فيما سبق فلو أطلق في جنس البسائط أنه مما يقبل الفصول فمعناه أن الوهم يمكنه أن يجرد الطبيعة الجنسية كاللونية مثلا- فينسبه إلى أي الفصلين شاء كالباضية للبصر و المفرقية له على أن ما عد من خواص الجوهر هو القبول الخارجي لأمرين متقابلين يعرضان لقابل واحد و لو أن الكلي بما هو كلي يقبلهما لكان كل لون سوادا أو بياضا و لو كانت طبيعة اللون تقبل السواد كانت مسودة لا سوادا كذا لو قبلت البياض كانت مبيضة لا بياضا فلم يكن في الوجود سواد ما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٨٠

و لا بياض ما و لو كانا لم يكونا معا بل على التعاقب في الوجود و كثيرا ما يقع الغلط من الاشتباه بين الوحدة العددية و الوحدة المعنوية

فصل (٧) في استحالة أن يكون موجود واحد جوهر و عرضا

هذا الحكم مما يعرف صدقه ضرورة بملاحظة مفهوم الجوهر و العرض لكون أحدهما بمنزلة سلب الآخر و الشيء و سلبه لا يصدقان على شيء بدهاة فإن مفهوم العرض الموجود في موضوع و مفهوم الجوهر الموجود لا في موضوع فلا نعني بالجوهر إلا ما لا يكون متعلق الوجود بالموضوع و لا بالعرض إلا ما يكون متعلق الوجود بموضوع ما أي موضوع كان فالشيء الواحد يستحيل أن يصدق عليه هذان المفهومان و قد جوز ذلك قوم من القدماء و الشيخ الرئيس استبعده و لهم وجوه تمسكوا بها.

أحدها أن فصول الجواهر جواهر مع أن الحكماء يقولون كثيرا من الفصول أنها كفيات و الكفيات أعراض فتلك الفصول تكون جواهر و أعراضا معا.

و قد أجاب الشيخ عنه بأن إطلاق الكيف على الفصول و على التي من مقولة الأعراض بالاشتراك اللفظي. و يمكن أن يقال في نفي كون فصول الجواهر أعراضا إن الفصل كما مر ليس موجودا متميزا عن الجنس إلا في العقل عند التحليل فلو كان عرضا للجنس لوجب أن يتميز وجوده عن وجود ما يتوهم كونه موضوعا له ضرورة أن وجود العرض مبين لوجود موضوعه في الواقع و الفصل متحد مع الجنس في الوجود لأنه يحمل عليه حمل هو هو. و أما عند التحليل العقلي و اعتبار كل منهما متميزا عن صاحبه فيكون نسبة الفصل إلى الجنس حينئذ نسبة الصورة إلى المادة لا نسبة العرض إلى موضوعه فيكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٨١

الفصل صورة عقلية و الجنس مادة عقلية يحتاج في تحصيل وجودها و تعيينها إلى تلك الصورة إذ المبهم لا وجود له بالاستقلال و كذا الحال في فصول المركبات و أجناسها- إلا أن لها في الخارج أيضا تعددا في الوجود بوجه فيكون مادة و صورة خارجيتين لا عرضا و موضوعا.

و ثانيها أن الصورة موجودة في حامل الصورة لا كجزء منه فكانت عرضا و كانت في الجوهر المركب منهما جزء منه و

جزء الجوهر جوهر فكان أمر واحد جوهرًا و عرضًا.

و الجواب أن الصورة ليس وجودها في حامل الصورة كوجود الشيء في الموضوع - ولا في المركب أيضًا كذلك على ما قرره ولا وجود لها في غير هذين فلا يكون عرضًا أصلاً لعدم حاجتها إلى شيء من الأشياء حاجة العرض إلى الموضوع فيكون جوهرًا في ذاتها مطلقًا.

و ثالثها أن الحرارة جزء من الحار و الحار جوهر فالحرارة جزء الجوهر و جزء الجوهر جوهر فالحرارة جوهر بالنسبة إلى الحار من حيث هو حار لكنها عرض بالنسبة إلى الجسم القابل لها فهي تكون جوهرًا و عرضًا بالنسبة إلى الأمرين. و الجواب أن الحرارة إن أريد بها الطبيعة النارية الغير المحسوسة فحالتها كما علمت من أن وجودها في الجسم الناري أعني مادة النار ليس كوجود شيء في الموضوع - بل كوجود شيء في المادة أعني الصورة و إن أريد بها الكيفية المحسوسة فهي ليست جزءً للحار لا في النار و لا في غيرها إلا بمجرد الفرض و الاعتبار. و رابعها إن العرض في المركب كجزء منه فلا يكون عرضًا فيه و كل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٨٢

ما لا يكون عرضًا في الشيء كان جوهرًا فيه لكنه بالنسبة إلى القابل له عرض فالشيء الواحد يكون جوهرًا و عرضًا. و الجواب أن هذه شبهة نشأت من الخلط بين مفهومي الجوهر و الجوهرى و كذا بين مفهومي العرض و العرضى فإن الأخيرين أعني الجوهرى و العرضى أمران نسيان - و الأولان أمران حقيقيان فكما أن الجوهر دائماً في ذاته لا يتغير جوهريته بالقياس إلى شيء بل لأنه في نفسه غير مفتقر إلى موضوع أصلاً فكذا العرض في نفسه لا بالقياس إلى شيء. و أما العرضية أو الجوهرية بمعنى كون الشيء عرضياً أي خارجاً محمولاً أو جوهرياً أي ذاتياً فذلك مما يكون بناؤه على أحد هذين الاعتبارين - و إحدى هاتين النسبتين أعني الدخول في شيء و الخروج عنه فهما هنا احتمالات - فإن شيئاً واحداً يجوز أن يكون عرضاً في نفسه و عرضياً لشيء و يجوز أن يكون عرضاً في نفسه و جوهرياً لشيء و أن يكون جوهرًا في نفسه و جوهرياً لشيء أو جوهرًا في نفسه و عرضياً لآخر كالإنسان بالقياس إلى الضاحك و يحتمل أيضاً أن يكون شيء واحد عرضاً في نفسه و جوهرياً و عرضياً لشيئين آخرين كالبياض فإنه عرض في نفسه و عرضى بالقياس إلى الجسم القابل و جوهرى بالقياس إلى المركب منهما و أن يكون شيء واحد جوهرًا في نفسه و جوهرياً و عرضياً بالقياس إلى آخرين كالحيوان فإنه جوهر في نفسه و جوهرى للإنسان و عرضى للماشى. فقد انكشف أن مجرد كون الشيء في المركب جزء له لا يوجب كونه جوهرًا إلا إذا لم يكن ماهيته محتاجة إلى الموضوع فإن كانت ماهيته مفتقرة إلى الموضوع فهو عرض سواء كان جزءاً للمركب أم لا و ما وجد في كلام القوم أن جزء المركب الجوهرى جوهر فهو مشروط بأن يكون المركب ذا طبيعة واحدة

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لأن جزء المركب الطبيعى إذا وجد في شيء فلا يكون وجوده فيه كوجود شيء في موضوع - بل كوجوده في مادة له و هذه المعاني مبسوطة في قاطيعورياس الشفاء بما لا مزيد عليه. فمن أراد فليرجع إلى ما هناك لكن ما ذكرناه يكفي للسالك الطالب لأن غرضه مجرد السلوك إلى مطلوبه و تحصيل ما لا

يتم الواجب من مطلوبه إلا به وإزالة الموانع ورفع العوائق والقواطع والمجاهدة مع الشياطين والمدافعة مع قطاع الطريق والمضلين لا الإحاطة بجميع الأقوال والمذاهب والأبحاث.

عقدة وحل -

ثم العجب من صاحب المباحث المسماة بالمشرقية أنه بعد ما نقل أكثر هذه المعاني مرارا كثيرة في كتبه وشروحه لكلام الحكماء رجع وقال إن لهم أن يحتجوا لمذهبهم أن كل ما حل في شيء فإنه يكون لذلك الحال اعتبار أنه في محل و اعتبار أنه في المجموع.

أما الاعتبار الثاني فلا شبهة في أنه لا يوجب العرضية لأنه جزء و من شرط العرض أن لا يكون جزء و أما اعتبار كونه في المحل فلا يخلو إما إن يعقل محل - يتقوم بما يحل فيه أو لا يعقل و الأول باطل لوجهين - أحدهما أن الحال محتاج في وجوده إلى المحل فلو احتاج إليه المحل لدار الاحتياج من كل منهما إلى الآخر و الدور باطل.

الثاني أن هيولى العناصر مشتركة بين صورها فلو كان لوجود شيء من الصور العنصرية مدخل في تقويم وجود الهيولى و تتميم ذاتها لزم ارتفاع الهيولى عند ارتفاع تلك الصورة فحينئذ لا يكون الهيولى مشتركة هذا خلف فيكون الحال

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جوهرها و عرضها و هذه هي العقدة التي لفقها من قبل المجوزين لكون الواحد جوهرها و عرضها. و أما حلها فبتذكر ما سلف حتى تظهر وجوه الفساد فيما ذكره.

أما أولا فلأنه خلط بين الجوهر و الجوهرى أعني الذاتى و بين العرض و العرضى أعني الخارج عن الذات فاستدل على جوهرية كل ما حل في موضوع بأنه جزء للمجموع و جزء المجموع لا يكون عرضا.

و الحق أن جزء المجموع لا يكون عرضيا له لأنه لا يكون عرضا في نفسه - فلا يوجب كونه جزء الشيء كونه جوهرها في نفسه بل كونه جوهريا لغيره فلا منافاة بين كون الشيء عرضا في نفسه جوهريا لغيره.

و أما ثانيا فقد وقع الخلط و الاشتباه أيضا بين حال الشيء في نفسه و بين حاله منتسبا إلى غيره فاستدل من نفي أحدهما على إثبات مقابل الآخر و ذلك باطل - فإن عدم كون الشيء عرضيا لا يوجب كونه جوهرها إذ ليس مقابلا له إنما المقابل له الجوهرى بمعنى الذاتى فلا يثبت من نفي كون الشيء عرضيا إلا كونه ذاتيا و ليس كل ذاتى جوهرها في نفسه فإن اللونية مثلا ذاتية للسواد و ليست جوهرها.

و أما ثالثا فما ذكره من الدور ليس بمستحيل مطلقا لأن جهة الاحتياج بين الحال المقوم للمحل كالصورة و المحل المتقوم به كالهيولى مختلف كما ستقف عليه في مباحث التلازم بين المادة و صورة و ليس كل ما يطلق عليه لفظ الدور و لو بالاشتراك مستحيلا إنما المحال من الدور ما يكون جهة الافتقار في الطرفين واحدة - لأن البرهان إنما أقيم على هذا لا على غيره و إن أطلق لفظ الدور عليه لغة و عرفا.

و أما رابعا فلما سيجيء من إثبات أن المادة مفتقرة في تقويمها إلى نوع من الصور أي نوع كان و ليست مفتقرة أصلا إلى شيء من الأعراض نحوا من الافتقار.

و هذا هو مناط الفرق بين كون الحال صورة و بين كونه عرضا فالعرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٤، ص ٢٨٥

طبيعة ناعية لا يمكن قوامها إلا بالمحل.

و أما الصور الجوهرية فحاجتها إلى المحل ليست بطبيعتها بل بعوارض شخصيتها و لوازم وجودها الخارجي.

فليكن هذا آخر ما قصدنا ذكره من خواص الجوهرية و العرضية

THE MYSTERIES OF FASTING

BEING A TRANSLATION WITH NOTES

of
The Kitab Asrar al-Sawm
of
Al-Ghazzali's "Ihya' `Ulum al-Din"

By
NABIH AMIN FARIS
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

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PREFACE

The practice of fasting as a spiritual discipline is both ancient and widespread. It antedates Islam, even among the Arabs, and from time immemorial has been observed in various ways by Jews, Christians, and eastern and pagan religions. The Prophet himself, according to several authentic traditions¹ was wont to observe, like his own tribe of Quraysh, the fast of 'Ashura' on the tenth day of Muharram. The custom was taken over from the Jewish "Asor fast of the Day of Atonement, which fell on the tenth of Tishri. "When the Prophet came to Medina he found the Jews fasting on the Day of 'Ashura. When they were asked about it they said: 'This is the Day on which God gave victory to Moses and the children of Israel over Pharaoh, so we keep it as a fast to honour it'. The Prophet replied: 'We are more worthy of Moses than you are', and commanded that it be kept a fast."² After the break with the Jews the fast or Ramadan was instituted, but the custom of fasting 'Ashura' became optional and supererogatory. It commemorates the day on which Noah left the ark.³

Though not one of the four pre-Islamic sacred

1. See Muslim, *Sabib*, Dar al-Tib'ah al-'Ammah, Cairo 1330, Vol. III, pp.146-50; al-Bukhari, *Sabib*, Sawm: 1, 69.
2. Muslim, *Sabib*, Vol.III, p.149.
3. Ibn-al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi-l-Tarikh*, Cairo 1303, Vol. I, p.25.

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months, namely dhu-'l-Qa'dah, dhu-'l-Hijjah, Muharram, and Rajab, during which fighting was unlawful, Ramadan was of special religious significance among the Quraysh. Those of them, who desired to do penance were accustomed to go to Mt. Hira' upon the beginning of Ramadan where they performed their *tabannuth* (religious devotion and penance). The exercises lasted the entire month, and at its conclusion the devotees made their way to the Kaaba, where they performed the circumambulation seven times and then returned home to resume normal life. The Prophet himself observed the same custom.⁴ And it was during one of those vigils of devotion and penance in Ramadan that the Prophet received his first divine revelation.⁵ The Qur'an specifically states this, and links the institution of Ramadan as the proper month of fasting for Muslims with the month "wherein the Qur'an was sent down to be a guidance to the people, and as a clear sign of Guidance and Salvation."⁶ The night on which the first revelation took place is known as the Laylat al-Qadr (the Night of Power), "which is better than a thousand months; in it the angels and the Spirits descend, by the leave of their Lord, upon every command. Peace it is, till the rising of dawn."⁷ It was also in Ramadan that the Prophet won his first major decisive victory at Badr, which was interpreted as the

4. Ibn-Hisham, *Sirat Rasul Allah*, ed. F. Wustenfeld, Leyden, 1858-1860, pp.151-52; tr. A. Guillaume, Oxford University Press, 1955, pp.105-6; al-Baladhuri, *Ansab al-Ashraf*, ed. M. Hamid Allah, Cairo 1959, p.105.

5. Ibn-Hisham, p.152.

6. *Surab* ii: 185. Quranic quotations in the Preface are after the translation of A.J. Arberry, Oxford 1964. Numbering of verses follow that of the Cairo edition of King Fuad, A.H. 1342.

7. *Surab* xcvi: 3-5.

divine sanction of the new faith,⁸ the miraculous Furqan⁹ which distinguished good from evil. For all these reasons, the institution of Ramadan as the proper month of fasting became quite natural. The battle of Badr took place in Ramadan, A.H.2 [February-March A.D.624], and, in all likelihood, the fast of Ramadan to be fully observed was that of A.H. 3 [February 15-March 16, A.D. 625].

The following pages are a translation of the *Kitab Asrar al-Saum* (On the Mysteries of Fasting) which is the fifth book of the first quarter of the *Ibya'* 'Ulum al-Din. The translation is based on three printed texts and one in manuscript form. The printed texts are: first that printed at Kafr al-Zaghari in A.H. 1352 from the older Cairo edition of A.H. 1289; second, that contained in the text of the *Ithaf al-Sadab al-Muttaqin bi-Sharb Ibya'* 'Ulum al-Din of al-Sayyid al-Murtada al-Zabidi (d.1791); third, that reproduced in the margin of the same *Ithaf al-Sadab*; and fourth, the text preserved in a four-volume manuscript in the Garrett Collection of Arabic Manuscripts in the Princeton University Library (No.1481). In the translation of Quranic verses, I have depended mainly on J.M. Rodwell's version.

It is my hope that by making still another Book of the *Ibya* available in English, non-Arabic-speaking scholars will be benefited, even from my mistakes.

Beirut,
February 15, 1967

Nabih Amin Paris

8. *Surab* iii: 123.

9. *Surab* viii: 41, 42.

also said, "Verily, the patient shall be repaid: their reward shall not be by measure."¹³ Fasting comprises one-half of fortitude and its reward transcends reckoning and calculation. To have an idea of its excellence you have only to remember the words of the Apostle when he said, "By Him who holds my life in His hand, the soul breath of the fasting man's mouth is more fragrant before God and better pleasing to Him than redolent musk." "The fasting man abjureth his food and drink and suppresseth his appetite for My sake," said the Lord, "and I shall reward him for it."¹⁴ The Apostle also said, "Verily Paradise hath, [among others], a gate which is called al-Raayyan and through which no one shall enter except those who have observed the fast."¹⁵ And again, "Two joys are prepared for him who observes the fast; the joy of breaking the fast and that of meeting his Lord."¹⁶ On another occasion he said, "Everything hath a gateway and the gateway of worship is fasting."¹⁷ And again he said, "The sleep of the fasting man is worship."¹⁸

Abu Hurayrah related that the Apostle once said, "When the month of Ramadan arriveth, the gates of Paradise are flung open while those of Hell are closed. At the sametime all the devils are put in chains [212]

13. Surab xxxix:13.

14. Al-Bukhari, Sawm: 2, 9.

15. Idid, Sawm: 4.

16. Muslim, Siyam: 162, 164, 165; al-Bukhari, Sawm: 9.

17. Unidentified

18. Unidentified

BOOK VI

On the Mysteries of Fasting

INTRODUCTION

Praise be to God who hath shown great favour unto His servants by delivering them from the wiles of Satan; who hath thwarted the hopes of the devil and frustrated his designs by making fasting a bulwark and a shield for His saints; who hath opened the gates of Paradise unto them and taught them that the way of Satan to their hearts lieth in secret lust; who hath made known unto them that only through subduing its secret lust could the soul at rest assert its superiority.

In accordance with the words of the Apostle that "fasting comprises half of fortitude"¹⁰ and "fortitude forms half of belief",¹¹ fasting equals one-fourth of belief. Furthermore, it is distinguished from the other pillars [of Islam] by its special and peculiar position in relation to God, since He said through the mouth of His Prophet "Every good deed will be rewarded from ten-to-seven hundred fold except fasting which is endured for My sake and which I shall reward."¹² God

10. Literally *sabr*, i.e., patience. Unidentified.

11. Unidentified.

12. Cf. al-Bukhari, Sawm: 2; Muslim, Siyam: 160, 162-164.

and a herald crieth out, 'O thou who seekest good come hither, and thou who desireth evil desist'.¹⁹

Commenting on the words of God, "Eat ye and drink with healthy relish, for what ye did aforetime in the days that have gone by,"²⁰ Waki²¹ said that "the days that have gone by," were the days of fasting, since during those days [men and women] have abstained from food and drink.²²

On another occasion the Apostle himself included the renunciation of the world and fasting [in the list of things which lift man to] the rank [of the angels]. Thus he said, "Verily God will make His angels vie with the ascetic young man saying, 'O young man who hast suppressed thy carnal lust for My sake and who hast consecrated the prime of thy life unto Me, thou art in My sight as one of My angels'."²³

And again the Apostle said that God would address His angels concerning fasting and say, "O My angels! Behold My servant: he hath suppressed his carnal lust, abjured his pleasures, and given up his food and drink—he hath done all that for My sak."²⁴

Concerning the words of God "No soul knoweth what joy is reserved for them in recompense of their

19. Ibn-Majah, Siyam: 1.
20. Surab Ixix:24.
21. Ibn-el-Jarrah, A.H.197 A.D. 812: ibn-Sa'd, Vol. VI, p.275.
22. Cf. al-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayan, Vol. XXX, p.39.
23. Cf. ibn-Majah, Masajid: 19.
24. Unidentified.

works"²⁵ it has been said that "their works" were fasting since God said, "Verily the patient shall be repaid: their reward shall not be by measure."²⁶ Thus will the reward of the fasting man be generous and even profuse and it will be beyond imagination or estimate. It is very meet that it be so, because fasting belongs to God and, by virtue of this relationship, it has been rendered noble, although all the acts of worship belong to God, just as the House (*al-Bayt*)²⁷ has been made noble by its special relationship to God, although the whole earth is His also. Fasting belongs to God in two respects: first, because it is a form of desisting and relinquishing, in its very nature concealed from human sight, whereas all the other acts of worship are apparent and exposed to it. It stands alone as the only act of worship which is not seen by anyone except God. It is an inward act of worship performed through sheer endurance and fortitude. Second, because it is a means of vanquishing the enemy of God, Satan who works through the appetites and strengthened by eating and drinking. For this reason the Apostle said, "Verily Satan affects the son of Adam by pervading his blood. Let him therefore make this difficult for Satan by means of hunger."²⁸ For the same reason he told 'A'ishah, "Persist in knocking the door of Paradise." When she asked, "With what shall I knock the door of Paradise?" he replied.

25. Surab xxxiii:17.
26. Surab xxxix:13.
27. *Al-Bayt* and *al-Bayt al-'Atiq* (the old house) denote the Ka'bah.
28. Cf. ibn-Majah, Siyam: 65; abu-Dawud, Sawm: 78.

"With hunger."²⁹ The excellence of hunger will be discussed under the section which deals with the evils of gluttony and the remedy therefrom [in the Book on the Two Appetites] in the Quarter on the Destructive Matters of Life.³⁰

Whereas fasting is primarily a method of subduing Satan, blocking his path, and placing obstacles in his way, it deserves a special place in relation to God, since subduing the enemy of God is an aid to Him, and His aid is not forthcoming unless men aid Him. Thus He said, "If ye aid God, He will help you, and will set your feet firm."³¹ The servant should take the initiative and commence his efforts and God will crown him with success by guiding him into His ways. For this reason God said, "And whoso maketh efforts for Us, in Our ways will We guide them,"³² God also said "Verily God changeth not what a people hath until they change it for themselves."³³ Change increases temptation and strengthens the appetites which are the grazing grounds of the devils and their pasturing land. As long as they are fertile the devil will continue to frequent them, and as long as he frequents them the Majesty of God will not be revealed to the servant and [His glory] will always remain concealed from him. The Apostle said, "Had it not been for the fact that the devils hover around the hearts of the children of

29. Unidentified.
30. See Vol. III, Bk. iii, sect. 1.
31. Surab xiv:8.
32. Surab xxix:69.
33. Surab xiii:12.

Adam, the latter would have readily lifted their hearts unto the Kingdom of Heaven."³⁴ In this respect fasting becomes the gateway to worship and a protection [against the fires of Hell].³⁵

Since its excellence has become so very important, it is necessary to describe its outward and inward conditions by enumerating its principles and regulations as well as its inward rules. We shall discuss this under three sections.

34. Unidentified.
35. Cf. ibn-Majah, Siyam: 1; al-Bukhari, Sawm: 2.

cumbent upon both towns alike. But if the distance were more than two days' journey, each town would have its own arrangement, and what would be incumbent upon the one would not extend to the other.

The second outward duty is intention (*niyyah*). Every night before the dawn of the following day³⁶, the person should specifically and deliberately entertain the intention of fasting. If he should entertain the intention to fast [213] the month of Ramadan but fail to renew his intention every night, his fast would not be valid. This is what we meant when we said every night. If he should entertain the intention during the daytime his fast would, not be valid. This is true of the fast of the month of Ramadan and of the obligatory fasts (*saum al-fard*), but the voluntary fasts (*saum al-tatawuni*) are excepted. This is what we meant. When we said that the intention of fasting should be entertained during the night before the day of fasting.

If he should entertain the intention to fast either the month of Ramadan or the obligatory fasts but fails to be specific, his fast would not be valid. The obligatory fast as well as the fast of the month of Ramadan are ordained by God and their observance should be the result of specific intention.

If during the doubtful night (*Laylat al-Shak*)³⁷ he should entertain the intention to fast the following day, if it would belong to Ramadan, then his fast would not be valid, unless his intention is supported by the word of a trustworthy witness. The possibility that the trust-

36. *Ar. mubayyatab.*
37. The thirtieth night in Sha'ban.

SECTION I
On the Outward Duties and Regulations [of Fasting] and the Duties Attending the Breaking of it.

THE OUTWARD DUTIES

The outward duties relative to fasting are six: the first duty is to watch the beginning of the month of Ramadan [and announce it] at the observation of the new moon (*al-hilal*). But if the clouds should make the observation of the new moon impossible then the length of Sha'ban should be extended to thirty days. By observation we mean actual sighting [of the new moon]. It is established by the word of one veracious and trustworthy witness, while that of the new moon of Shawwal is not established except by the word of two witnesses. This is merely a [means of] precaution for [the preservation of the purity of] worship. Anyone who hears a trustworthy witness assert that he had seen the new moon and believes him, fasting thereupon becomes incumbent upon him, even though the judge (*al-qadi*) should fail to announce the arrival of the new month. In the matter of worship, therefore, let each person do whatever he deems best.

Whenever the new moon is seen in one town but is not seen in another, and the distance between the two is less than two days' journey, fasting becomes in-

worthy witness ('*adl*) might be mistaken or even lying should not affect the determination of the person who has planned to fast the following day. Similarly, any attendant circumstances such as doubt concerning the last night of Ramadan would not prevent the person from entertaining the intention to fast the following day. Nor would the intention to fast be affected if its entertainment depended upon mere conjecture, as in the case of a person imprisoned in a dark dungeon, who thinks that the month of Ramadan had arrived; whatever doubts he might have would not prevent him from entertaining the intention to fast. Again, if a person should be uncertain of the night of doubt, the verbal expression of his intention to fast [following day] would not avail because the seat of intention is the heart, wherein it is inconceivable to entertain doubt in conjunction with certainty. Thus, if in the middle of Ramadan one should say that he would fast the following day if that day were of Ramadan, no harm could be done because it is mere repetition of words, while in the seat of intention there would be no room for doubt or hesitation, rather it is positively certain that [the following day] is of Ramadan. He who formulates his intention during the night [and decides to fast the following day] and then eats while it is yet night will not invalidate his intention. If a woman in a state of menstruation should entertain the intention of fasting [on the he following day] and her period come to an end before dawn, her fast would be valid.

The third duty is that, as long as he remembers that he is fasting, the individual should abstain (*imsak*) from intentionally allowing any material substance, such as food, drink, snuff, and enema, to enter his

body. All these render his fast invalid. It is not, however, invalidated by phlebotomy and cupping, nor by forcing the probe into the ear or the orifice of the penis unless the probe reaches the bladder. Whatever enters the body unintentionally, such as dust, flies, or the body intentionally, such as dust, flies, or water during the finishing of the mouth will not invalidate the fast. Water, which enters the body during the rinsing of the mouth, however, will invalidate the fast if the individual goes to excess in rinsing his mouth, because he would then be [deliberately] negligent. This is what we meant when we said intentionally. We said 'as long as he remembers that he is fasting' in order to exempt [from this ruling] the one who has forgotten that he was fasting and whose eating will not invalidate his fast. But if the person should intentionally eat either at the beginning or at the end of the day, and later finds that his eating has encroached upon the actual period of daylight it would be his duty to make amends (*qada*). But if he should, to the best of his ability, continue to believe [that he had not eaten outside the prescribed time], he would not have to make amends. Yet he should not eat either in the early morning or in early evening except after careful and thorough examination [of the time].

The fourth duty is abstinence (*imsak*) from sexual intercourse. The definition of sexual intercourse is the disappearance of the glands of the penis [in the vulva]. If the person, forgetting that he is fasting, should have sexual intercourse, he would not, because of it, break the fast. If, during the night, he should either have sexual intercourse or experience an erotic dream, and wake up in the morning in a state of impurity (*jumub*),

his fast would not thereof be broken. If the dawn breaks while he is copulating with his wife, and he stops immediately, his fast remains intact; but if he continues [until he reaches the orgasm] his fast will be invalidated, and atonement (*kaffarab*) becomes incumbent upon him.

The fifth duty is abstinence from deliberate seminal emission (*istimna'*), either through sexual contact or through no sexual contact. For deliberate seminal emission breaks the fast. The person, however, will not break his fast if he kisses his wife or lies with her unless in so doing he emits the seminal fluid. Nevertheless, both are disapproved except where the man be advanced in age and in full control of his impulses, in which case there will be no harm in kissing, although abstinence therefore is better and more desirable. If he fears that as a result of kissing [and toying] he may emit the seminal fluid, and yet kisses with the result that the seminal fluid is emitted, he breaks his fast because he was [deliberately] negligent.

The sixth duty is abstinence from vomiting, because it renders the fast invalid. But, if one cannot help it, his fast remains intact and valid. And if a person swallows phlegm or mucus from his throat or chest, he will not invalidate his fast. This has been made permissible because of the prevalence of the affliction. But if he swallows either after it had gotten to his mouth, he will break his fast.

The Duties Attending the Breaking of the Fast

The duties attending (*lawazim*) the breaking of the fast are four, namely, making amends (*qada'*) atonement (*kaffarab*), expiation (*fiḍyah*), and absti-

nence from food and drink for the rest of the day in imitation of those who are fasting.

Making amends (*qada'*), is obligatory upon every responsible Muslim who has neglected to observe the fast with or without any excuse. Thus the menstruating woman, as well as the apostate, is under obligation to make amends for [every] fasting [which she or he fails to observe]; while the believer, the minor, and the insane are under no such obligation. Making amends for days omitted in Ramadan need not be consecutively performed, but may be performed either at different intervals or all at once.

The atonement (*kaffarab*), is not obligatory except after sexual intercourse. Seminal emission, food and drink require no atonement. The atonement consists of freeing one slave. If this is not possible, the fasting of two consecutive months will suffice; however, if this also be beyond the man's power he should feed sixty poor men, [giving] each a bushel [of wheat, or barley or dates].

As to abstinence from food and drink for the rest of the day, it is obligatory upon anyone who broke the fast [without any excuse] or failed to carry out [all its requirements]. The menstruation woman is under no obligation to fast for the rest of the day if she has already become pure. Similarly the traveller, who at the end of two days' journey, arrives not in a state of fasting, is under no obligation to fast for the rest of the day. It is also obligatory to abstain from food and drink on doubtful days when only one trustworthy witness has declared that he has seen the new moon. Furthermore, when on travel, unless it is unbearable,

it is better to fast than not to fast. No one should break his fast on the day when he embarks on a journey if he has already begun that day by fasting, nor on the day when he comes in from a journey, if he has already begun that day by fasting.

As to expiation (*fiḍyah*), it is obligatory upon pregnant and nursing women, if they should not fast for the sake of their children. Besides making amends for days thus omitted, they should give in expiation a bushel of wheat to the poor for each day they did not fast. The aged man who does not fast [because of his infirmity] should give a bushel [of wheat] for every day thus omitted.

The Practices Connected with the Fast

The practices connected with the fast are six. They are delaying the time of the *suhur*,³⁸ speeding the breaking of the fast by eating dates or drinking water before performing prayer, putting away the toothpick after sunset, generous giving during the month of Ramadan, especially because of its special excellences which were discussed in the Book on Almsgiving, special study of the Qur'an, and retreating (*i'tikaf*) into the mosque, especially during the last ten days of the month of Ramadan. It was the custom of the Apostle of God, upon the arrival of the last ten days of the month of Ramadan, to roll up his mattress, fasten his mantle around his waist [214], and, making his family do the same, continue in his worship [until the

38. Suhur signifies the eating of the last meal which the fasting Muslim is allowed to have just before day break. The meal itself is called the *Suhur*.

end of the ten-day period]³⁹ since during these ten days the Night of Power (*Laylat al qadr*) falls. More probably the Night of Power falls on an odd night; most likely among these is the [twenty] first, or the [twenty-] third, or the [twenty-] fifth, or the [twenty-] seventh. During this ten-day retreat, the continuous observance is preferred.

If the person vows or states his intention to observe these days in retreat continuously, the continuity of his observance is broken if he leaves [the mosque] without [justifiable] necessity, such as leaving in order to call on some sick person, or to attend a funeral, or to visit a friend, or to renew his purification. But if he interrupts his retreat in order to answer a call of nature, the continuity of his observance will not be broken. The person may, during the period of retreat, perform his ablutions at his [own] home, but he may not attend to any other work on his way [from and back to the mosque]. The Apostle of God was wont not to leave the mosque, except for answering the call of nature, and on his way [from and back to the mosque], he did not inquire about the sick except as he passed by [without stopping]⁴⁰ The continuity of the observance of the retreat will be broken through sexual intercourse, but not through kissing. While in the mosque the person may use perfumes and contract marriage. [Continuity is not broken] through eating, sleeping, and washing of the hands in a basin because they are all [unavoidable and] necessary. Nor is it broken by the emergence of a part of the body

39. Al-Bukhari, *Laylat al-Qadr*: 5.

40. Abu-Dawud, *I'tikaf*: 4.

[from the mosque], for the Apostle of God was wont to put his head out to be massaged by 'A'ishaha' who was in an [adjacent] chamber.⁴¹ Whenever the person leaves his retreat in order to answer a call of nature, he should restate his intention upon returning to resume the retreat, unless he had stated his intention for the ten-day period in advance. Despite this, however, the renewal of the intention is better.

SECTION II
*On the Mysteries of Fasting and its
Inward Conditions*

Now that fasting is of three [successive] grades, namely, the fasting of the general public (*sawm al-'umum*), the fasting of the elite among the select few (*sawm Kbusus al-kbusus*).

The fasting of the general public involves refraining from satisfying the appetite of the stomach and the appetite of the sex, as has already been discussed.

The fasting of the select few is to keep the ears, the eyes, the tongue, and hands, and the feet as well as the other senses free from sin.

The fasting of the elite among the select few is the fast of the heart from mean thoughts and worldly worries and its complete unconcern with anything but God. Such a fast is broken by thinking on anything other than God and the last day, as well as by concern over this world, except in so far as it promotes religion which belongs to the hereafter. Thus, those whose hearts are sanctified have said, "He who spends his day worrying over what he will have for breaking his fast sins." This is because he has little confidence in the bounty of God and little faith that the livelihood promised unto him will be received. In this rank stand the prophets, the saints and the favourites of God the most high. We shall not dwell very long on the verbal description of the kind of fasting but shall define it

41. Al-Bukhari, *I'tilaf*: 19.

through its active operation. It is to seek God with all of one's strength and to turn away from all other things besides Him. In short, it is to embody the words of God when He said, "Say 'God, then leave them in their pastime of cavillings."⁴²

The fasting of the select few, which is the fasting of the virtuous men, is to keep the senses free from sin and is accomplished through six things: To refrain from looking at anything blameworthy and disapproved, or anything which occupies the person and diverts him from remembering God. The Apostle said, "The coveting glance is one of the poisoned arrows of the devil. He who for fear of God abstains therefrom will receive from Him a belief, the sweetness of which will fill his heart."⁴³

Jabir⁴⁴ related on the authority of Anas that the Apostle of God once said, "Five things break the fast: the telling of lies, backbiting, tale-bearing, perjury, and the casting of coveting and lustful eyes."⁴⁵

The second is to keep the tongue free from raving, lying, backbiting, tale-bearing, obscenity, abusive speech, wrangling, and hypocrisy, and to impose silence upon it. Furthermore, it should be employed in the remembrance and glorification of God and engaged in reading of the Qur'an. Of such is the fasting of the tongue. We have it on the authority of Bishr ibn-al-Harith that Sufyan [al-Thawri] once said, "Backbiting renders fasting of no effect." Quoting

42. Surab vi: 91.
43. Unidentified.
44. Perhaps Jabir ibn-'Abdullah al-Ansari.
45. Unidentified.

Mujahid, Layth⁴⁶ once said, "Two traits render fasting of no effect: backbiting and lying."

The Apostle of God said, "Verily, fasting is like unto a shield; therefore whenever one of you fasteth, let him not speak unseemly or act foolishly. If anyone disputeth with him or sweareth at him, let him say, 'I am fasting, verily I am fasting.'⁴⁷ In another tradition we read about women who lived during the lifetime of the Apostle. As they were fasting one day pangs of hunger and the darts of thirst proved too much for them to endure, and they almost collapsed. Consequently, they sent to the Apostle of God asking him permission to break their fast. In reply he sent them a cup saying, "Vomit into this cup what ye have eaten." [215] To the amazement of all present the one filled half the cup with pure blood and tender flesh and the other filled up the second half of the cup with the same thing. Thereupon the Apostle said, "These two women have fasted from that which God hath made lawful unto them and have broken their fast by doing that which He hath made unlawful unto them. They sat down and engaged in backbiting. The flesh and blood which they vomited is the flesh and blood of those people whom they have traduced."⁴⁸

The third to close the ears to every reprehensible thing because everything which is unlawful to utter is also unlawful to hear. For this reason, God regarded the listener and the 'sharks' of unlawful trade alike when He said, "Listeners to falsehood, 'sharks' of the

46. Ibn abi-Sulaym, died between A.H. 136 and 143/A.D. 754 and 760. Cf. ibn-Sa'd, Vol. VI, pp.243-44; ibn-Qutaybah, p.241; Shadbarat al-Dbabab, Vol. I, pp.207-212.
47. Al-Bukhari, Sawm: 2.
48. Unidentified.

unlawful trade."⁴⁹ And again, "Had not the masters and the 'divines' forbidden their uttering wickedness and devouring unlawful trade, bad indeed would have been their deeds."⁵⁰ Silence therefore, in the face of backbiting is unlawful. Said God, "Ye are, then, like unto them."⁵¹ The Apostle also said, "The backbiter and he who listens unto him are partners in sin."⁵²

The fourth is constraining the rest of the senses from sins, restraining the hand from reaching evil, and curbing the foot from pursuing wickedness, as well as avoiding questionable foods at the break of the fast. Otherwise, if the fast is going to be abstinence from lawful things, it will have no significance at all. Such a fasting man is like one who builds a cabin but destroys a capital.⁵³ For lawful food is harmful not because of its quality but because of its quantity and fasting is designed to induce moderation. Similarly, the person who, for fear of the bad effect of an excessive dose of medicine, resorts to taking a dose of poison, is indeed foolish. The unlawful is poison detrimental to religion while the lawful is like a medicine a little of which is beneficial but the excess of which is harmful. The purpose of fasting is to induce moderation therein. The Apostle of God said, "Many a man gets nothing out of his fast except hunger and thirst."⁵⁴ In explanation of this it has been said that [the Apostle] meant the person who breaks his fast on unlawful things. Others said that he meant the person who abstains from law-

49. Surab v: 46.

50. Surab v: 68.

51. Surab iv: 139.

52. Unidentified.

53. Lit. builds a castle and destroys a region.

54. Ibn-Majah, Siyam: 21.

ful food and breaks his fast on the flesh of men through backbiting which is unlawful. Still others said that the Apostle meant the person who does not keep his senses free from sin.

The fifth is that when breaking his fast, a person should not overeat of [even] the lawful food, thereby stuffing his belly full. For there is no vessel more abominable unto God than a belly stuffed with lawful food. How could any one expect to overcome the enemy of God and subdue his own appetite through fasting if, when he breaks his fast, he compensates himself for what he had missed during the day and even helps himself to more foods and drinks of diverse kinds. It has thus become the custom to store up all the food for the month of Ramadan, wherein more food and drink are devoured than in several months. Yet it is well known that the purpose of fasting is hunger and the suppression of lust so that the soul might be able to attain piety. If the stomach were not given any food from the early morning until the evening so that its appetite became aroused and its desire increased and then it were fed with delicacies and stuffed to satiety therewith, its pleasure would be enhanced and vitality doubled, consequently giving rise to passions otherwise dormant. The spirit as well as the secret of fasting is to weaken the flesh which is Satan's tool for turning men back to evil. [Such weakening of the flesh] is never achieved unless a person reduces his food to the amount of food which he would have eaten in the evening if he were not fasting. But if, on breaking his fast, he should eat an amount of food equivalent to what he would have eaten during both the day time and the evening, he would reap no benefit from his fast. As a matter of fact, among the proprieties of fasting is that the person should not sleep much during the daytime but rather stay up so

that he might feel the pangs of hunger and the flames of thirst and become conscious of the weakness of the flesh, with the result that his heart would be cleansed and purified. He should maintain his flesh in such a state of weakness during the Night of Power so that he might find his night worship (*tabajjud*) easier to perform and his [night] portions (sing. *wird*) easier to read. It is hoped, then, that Satan will not hover around his heart and that he will be able to lift his eyes unto the kingdom of heaven. In this connexion, the Night of Power represents the night on which a glimpse of the invisible world is revealed to man. It is also the night which is alluded to by the words of God when He said, "Verily We have sent it down on the Night of Power."⁵⁵

He who buries his head deep into a nose-bag full of food, cannot hope to see the invisible world. Even if he keeps his stomach empty, he will not be able to remove the veil and see the invisible world unless he also empties his mind from everything except God. This is the whole matter, the basis of which is to cut down the amount of food one eats. This will be further discussed in the book on the various kinds of food.

The sixth is that, after breaking the fast, his heart should remain in state of suspense between fear and hope, since he does not know whether his fast will be accepted, and consequently he will be one of the favourites of God, or rejected, and he will be one of those who have incurred divine disfavour. He should remain in such a state of suspense after every act of worship.

It has been related that al-Hasan ibn-abi al-Hasan [Yasar] al-Basri once passed by a group of men who

55. *Surah xcvi*: 1.

were rollicking and laughing and said unto them, "Verily God has made the month of Ramadan a race-course where men compete in His worship. Some have won their race and were crowned with success, while others lagged behind and lost. We are surprised and astonished at the man who wastes his time in indolence and laughter on the day when the earnest finish victorious and the idle meet with failure and disaster. By God, if the veil were to be removed, you will find the good man occupies with his good works and the evildoer with his evil deeds." In other words the joy of the man whose fast has been accepted will occupy him and keep him from indolence, while the agony and regrets of the man whose fast has been rejected will take all joy from his heart and make laughter impossible.

It was related on the authority of al-Ahnaf ibn-Qays that he was once told, [216] "Thou art an old and aged man, and fasting would make thee weak." To which he replied, "This fast is my preparation for a long journey. Verily to endure the yoke of God's service is easier than to endure the yoke of His torture." Such words depict the inward meaning of fasting.

If you then ask, "How can the jurists approve the fasting of a person who confines himself to restraining the appetite of his stomach and the urge of his sex instinct, but neglects these inward aspects of the fast; how, then, can they say that his fast is valid?" Then know that the jurists of the outward law support its formal requirements by means of proofs far weaker than those with which we established its inward conditions, especially those of backbiting and the like. At any rate, the jurists of the outward law are not expected to concern themselves with any obligations other than those which are within the reach of the ordinary common folk who are occupied

with the affairs of this world. On the other hand, the learned men of the hereafter mean by validity acceptance and by acceptance the achievement of the intended purpose. By the purpose intended in fasting they understood the taking over of one of the qualities of God, namely, endurance (*samadiyah*) as well as following in the example of the angels by refraining, as much as possible, from carnal lust while man, by virtue of his ability to overcome lust through the light of reason, stands above the animals [which possess no such light]. On the other hand, because he is subject to carnal lust and is judged by his ability to fight [its temptations]. The more he indulges in lust the lower he descends and the closer he comes to the level of the animals. The more he suppresses his lust the higher he ascends and the closer he comes to the level of the angels. The angels stand in close proximity to God, and whoever follows in their footsteps and emulates their example draws like them nigh unto God. But this proximity (*qurb*) is not one of location but one of qualities and attributes.

If, among the men of insight and the physicians of the heart, this be the secret of fasting, what good-will there be in delaying a meal and combining two at sunset while indulging in the satisfaction of all the other physical desires and lusts throughout the day? And if there were good in such a behaviour what would the words of the Apostle when he said, "Many a man gets nothing out of his fast except hunger and thirst,"⁵⁶ mean? For this reason abu-al-Darda once said, "How good is the sleep of the wise men and how excellent is their eating; behold how they put to shame the wakefulness of the foolish and their fasting. Verily the weight of an atom of the worship of the faithful and

56. Ibn-Majah, Siyam:21.

pious is better than the weight of mountains of the worship of those who are misguided [and those in error]." Consequently, one of the learned men said, "Many a fasting man is not truly fasting, and many a man not abstaining from food and drink is truly fasting." The man who is truly fasting while not abstaining from food and drink is he who keeps himself free from sin; and the fasting man who is not truly fasting is he who, while he hungers and thirsts, allows himself every freedom in sin. But everyone who truly understands fasting and its secret knows that he who abstains from food, drink, and sexual intercourse but commits [all manner of] sins is like the person who, in performing the ablution runs his hand over one of his members thrice, thereby outwardly fulfilling the Law as far as the member is concerned, but neglecting the truly important thing which is the actual washing. Consequently, because of his ignorance, his prayer is rejected. On the other hand, he who breaks the fast through eating but observes it by keeping himself free from sin is like the person who, in performing the ablution, washes each of the members of his body once only. His prayers are, by the will of God, accepted because he has fulfilled the principal thing in the ablution, although he has failed to fulfil the details. But he who does both is like the person who, in performing the ablution, washes each member of his body thrice, thereby fulfilling both the principal purpose of ablution as well as its elaborate details, which constitutes perfection. The Apostle once said, "Verily fasting is a trust; let each, therefore, take good care of his trust."⁵⁷ Again when he recited, "Verily God enjoineth you to give back your trusts to their owners,"⁵⁸ he raised his hands and touching his ears

57. Unidentified.

58. Surah iv: 61.

and eyes said, "[The gift of] hearing and [the gift of] seeing are each a trust [from God]." Similarly [the gift of speech is a trust], for if it were not so the Apostle would not have said, "If anyone disputeth with another and sweareth at him let the latter say, 'I am fasting, verily I am fasting'."⁵⁹ Or in other-words, "I have been interested with this my tongue in order to keep and hold, not in order to give it free rein in retort and reply to thee."

It is clear, then, that every act of worship is possessed of an outward form and an inner [secret], an external husk and internal pith. The husks are of different grades and each grade has different layers. It is for you to choose whether to be content with the husk or join the company of the wise and the learned.

59. Cf al Bukhari, Sawm, 2.

SECTION III
On Voluntary Fasting and the Arrangement
of Portions therein

Know that the desirability of fasting becomes more certain on special days of particular excellence. These days of excellence recur either annually, or monthly, or weekly.

Besides those of Ramadan, the annual days of excellence are the day of 'Arafah (*Yawm 'Arafah*),⁶⁰ the day of 'Ashura' (*Yawm 'Ashura*'),⁶¹ the first ten⁶² days of Dhu-al-Hijjah, and the first ten days of al-Muharram. Similarly, the sacred months⁶³ are, in their entirety, a fitting time for fasting, and of special excellence.

The Apostle of God was in the habit of frequently fasting during [the month of] Sha'ban to the extent where it would be thought that he was in Ramadan.⁶⁴ In another tradition [we read], "Besides the month of Ramadan, the most excellent month for fasting is the

60. The ninth day of Dhu-al-Hijjah when the pilgrim proceeds to Mount 'Arafa in order to observe the vigil of the feast of sacrifice (*Id al-Adha*).
61. The tenth day of al-Muharram.
62. Actually only the first nine days ending with the day of 'Arafah are included.
63. Dhu-al-Qa'dah, Dhu-al-Hijjah, al-Muharram, and Rajab.
64. Cf al-Bukhari, Sawm: 52.

month of God [217] al-Muharram.⁶⁵ This is because al-Muharram is the first month of the year; hence, to commence the year right is more pleasing to God and given greater hope that His blessing will continue through. The Apostle also said, "The fast of one single day during a sacred month is more excellent than the fast of thirty days during another; and the fast of one single day during Ramadan is more excellent than that of thirty days during another sacred month."⁶⁶ In another tradition we have, "He who fasts three days—Thursday, Friday, and Saturday—during a sacred month, will be credited by God with nine hundred years of worship for each day."⁶⁷ And again, "When the 'ides' of Sha'ban are gone, there should be no fasting until Ramadan is one."⁶⁸ It is therefore desirable that one should, if he were fasting during Sha'ban, break his fast a few days before the beginning of Ramadan. But if he should continue his fast through Sha'ban into Ramadan his action will be perfectly permissible since the Apostle of God himself has done that once, although, ordinarily, he allowed a period of no fasting to intervene.⁶⁹ Nor is it permissible for him to prepare for the arrival of Ramadan with a fast of two or three days from Sha'ban unless he observes the corresponding portions.

Some of the Companions disapproved of fasting the whole of the month of Rajab, lest it would become equal to the month of Ramadan in excellence and importance. The excellent months (*al-asbbur al-*

65. Al-Nasa'i, Qiyam al-Layl: 6.
66. Unidentified.
67. Unidentified.
68. Al-Tirmidhi, Sawm: 38.
69. Abu-Dawud, Sawm: 11.

fadilab) are Dhu-al-Hijjah, al-Muharram, Rajab, and Sha'ban, while the sacred months (*al-asbbur al-burum*) are Dhu-al-Qa'dah, Dhu-al-Hijjah, al-Muharram, and Rajab. Of these one, [i.e., Rajab], stands alone, and three follow successively one after the other. The most excellent of these is Dhu-al-Hijjah because in it fall the appointed days (*al-ayyam al-ma'lumat*) and the numbered days (*al-ayyam al-ma'dudat*). Dhu-al-Qa'dah is one of the sacred months as well as one of the months of pilgrimage. On the other hand Shawwal is one of the months of pilgrimage, but not one of the sacred months, while neither al-Muharram nor Rajab is a month of pilgrimage.

The Apostle, as we see it recorded in the following tradition, once said, "No good works are more excellent or more acceptable to God than those which are performed during the [first] ten days of Dhu-al-Hijjah. Verily the fast on one of these days is equal to the fast of one whole year, and the prayer during one of these nights is equivalent to the prayer during the Night of Power (*laylat al-qadr*)." He was then asked, "Not even holy war for the cause of God is better?" To which he replied, "Not even holy war for the cause of God is better except when the person's steed is killed and his own blood is shed."⁷⁰

The excellent days which recur every month are the first, the middle, and the last days of each month. In the middle of each month fall the days of the bright nights (*al-ayyam al-bid*). These are the thirteenth, the fourteenth, and the fifteenth days of each month.⁷¹

70. Al-Tirmidhi, Sawm: 52.
71. Cf. al-Bukhari, Sawm 60.

The excellent days which recur every week are Monday, Thursday, and Friday. These are the excellent days of the week on which it is desirable to fast and do good since, because of the special beneficence of these days, the reward of the acts performed thereon is multiplied double-fold.

As to life-long fasting (*saum al-dabr*) it is all-inclusive. Mystics (*salikun*) hold different views concerning it. Some of them, basing their opinion on several traditions,⁷³ have viewed it with disfavour. The truth of the matter is, that it is viewed with disfavour for two reasons: the one is that, by fasting the whole duration of his life, the person will have to abstain from eating even on the two feasts,⁷⁴ [namely the feast of Ramadan (*al-Fitr*) and the feast of Sacrifice (*al-Adba*) as well as on the days of orientation (*ayyam al-tasbriq*);⁷⁵ the other is that by so doing, he departs from the established practice of the Apostle and makes fasting a yoke for himself although God would like him to enjoy his liberties just as much as He would want him to fulfil his obligations. If, however, there are no such [dangers] and the person deems it good for himself to observe a life-long fast, let him by all means do so since several of the Companions and the followers have done the same. The Apostle, according to a tradition related by Abu-Musa al-Ash'ari,⁷⁶ said,

73. Cf. al-Tirmidhi, Sawm: 56; al-Bukhari, Sawm: 56.
74. See al-Tirmidhi, Sawm: 58.
75. Ibid., Sawm: 59.
76. One of the two umpires at the alleged arbitration after Siffin. He died A.H. 52/A.D. 672, Ibn-Quaybah, pp.135-36; ibn-Sa'd, Vol. IV, pp.78-86, Vol. VI, p.9.

"He who observes a life-long fast has no place in Hell, and will live to the ripe age of ninety."⁷⁷

There is, however, besides the lifelong fast, and beneath it in merit, another state, namely, fasting on alternate days (*saum nisf al-dabr*). It is harder to observe and more effective in mortifying the flesh. Several traditions in praise of its excellence have been related, especially relative to the state of the fasting servant who fasts one day and enjoys the blessings of God on the other. The Apostle said, "The keys to the coffers of the world and the treasures of the earth have been offered to me, but I declined to accept them saying, 'I had better hunger one day and be full another. When I am full, my praise shall I offer unto God and when I hunger, unto Him shall I offer my supplications'.⁷⁸ And again, "The most excellent fasting is that of my brother David; he was wont to fast one day and omit the other."⁷⁹

Of the same nature is the Apostle's argument with 'Abdullah ibn-'Amr⁸⁰ on the subject of fasting. 'Abdullah, replying to one of the suggestions of the Apostle, said, "I can stand a more [strenuous] fast than that." Thereupon the Apostle retorted, "Fast on alternate days." But again 'Abdullah said, "I want something more excellent." To which the Apostle replied, "There is nothing which is more excellent than that."⁸¹ It has

77. Al-Tayalisi: 513, 514.
78. Cf. al-Tirmidhi, Zuhd: 35.
79. Cf. al-Bukhari, Sawm: 56, 58, 59.
80. Ibn-al-'As. A.H. 65/A.D. 684-85: ibn-Sa'd, Vol.IV, pt.2, pp. 8-13, Vol.VII, pt. 2, pp 189-90.
81. Al-Bukhari, Sawm: 56, 58, 59; cf. ibn-Sa'd Vol. IV> pt.2. p.9.

also been related that the Apostle of God never fasted a whole month except in Ramadan.⁸²

He, who is unable to fast on alternate days (*nisf al-dabr*) throughout his entire life may try to fast every third day (*Thulth al-dabr*); i.e., he may fast on one day and break the fast on the following two, and fasts for three days at the beginning of the month, three at the middle, and three at the end of the month, he will have fasted one-third of his entire life and his fasting days will coincide with the excellent seasons. If he fasts on Monday, Thursday and Friday [of every week] he will approximate the one-third.

If the excellent seasons have been determined, the real meaning of fasting will have to be understood before attaining perfection. The main purpose of fasting is to purify the heart and to concentrate all its attention upon God. Those versed in the science of the subtleties of the inner [self] examine its different conditions; for possibly it may require continued fasting, or uninterrupted fasting, or a mixture of both.

If, however, the individual comprehends the real meaning of fasting and, through the observation of his own heart, ascertains its place and value in the journey on the road to the hereafter, he will not fail to find out where the welfare of his heart lies. This does not necessitate a continuous routine. For this reason, it has been related that the Apostle was wont to fast until everyone thought that he never ate, and he used to eat until everyone thought that he never fasted. Similarly, he was wont to sleep until everybody thought that he never woke up and used to stay up until everybody thought that he never went to bed.⁸³ In all this, he was

82. Al-Bukhari, Sawm: 53.

83. Cf. Al-Bukhari, Sawm: 53.

guided by the light of prophecy which revealed to him the proper conduct for every occasion and season.

Some of the learned men have viewed with disfavour the practice of allowing more than four days to intervene between each fast. This is just about equal to the period of feasting after Ramadan [or the feast of Sacrifice] and to the days of orientation (*ayyam al-tasbriq*). They pointed out that such a practice would harden the heart, give rise to bad habits, and increase the possibilities of passion and lust. In my opinion this is true of most people, especially those who eat twice every day and night.

This is what we have planned to discuss concerning the routine of voluntary fasting.

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الجزء الثاني

[تتمة السفر الأول]

[تتمة المسلك الأول]

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

المرحلة الرابعة في الماهية و لواحقها و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في الماهية

إن الأمور التي تليها لكل منها ماهية و إنية و الماهية ما به يجب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣

عن السؤال بما هو كما أن الكمية ما به يجب عن السؤال بكم هو فلا يكون إلا مفهوماً كلياً و لا يصدق على ما لا يمكن معرفته إلا بالمشاهدة و قد يفسر بما به الشيء هو هو فيعم الجميع و التفسير لفظي فلا دور و الماهية بما هي ماهية أي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٤

باعتبار نفسها لا واحدة و لا كثيرة و لا كلية و لا جزئية و الماهية الإنسانية مثلاً لما وجدت شخصية و عقلت كلية علم أنه ليس من شرطها في نفسها أن تكون كلية أو شخصية - و ليس أن الإنسانية إذا لم تخل من وحدة أو كثرة أو عموم أو خصوص يكون من حيث إنها إنسانية إما واحدة أو كثيرة أو عامة أو خاصة و هكذا الحكم في سائر المتقابلات التي ليس شيء منها ذاتها أو ذاتها و سلب الاتصاف من حيثية لا تنافي الاتصاف من حيثية أخرى و ليس نقيض اقتضاء الشيء إلا لا اقتضائه لا اقتضاء مقابله - يلزم من عدم اقتضاء أحد المتقابلين لزوم المقابل الآخر و ليس إذا لم يكن للممكن في مرتبة ماهية وجود كان له فيها العدم لكونه نقيض الوجود لأن خلو الشيء عن النقيضين في بعض مراتب الواقع غير مستحيل بل إنما المستحيل خلوه في الواقع لأن الواقع أوسع من تلك المرتبة ألا ترى أن الأشياء التي ليست بينها علاقة ذاتية ليس وجود بعضها و لا عدمها في مرتبة وجود الآخر أو عدمه على أن نقيض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥

وجود الشيء في مرتبة من المراتب دفع وجوده فيها بأن تكون المرتبة ظرفاً للمنفى لا للنفي أعني رفع المقيد لا الرفع المقيد و لهذا قالوا لو سئل بطرفي النقيض كان الجواب الصحيح سلب كل شيء بتقديم السلب على الحيثية فلو سئل أن الإنسان من حيث هو موجود أو معدوم يجب بأنه ليس من حيث هو موجوداً و لا معدوماً و لا غيرهما من العوارض بمعنى أن شيئاً منها ليست نفسه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦

ولا داخلا فيه وإن لم يكن خاليا عن شيء منها أو نقيضها في نفس الأمر ولا يراد من تقديم السلب على الحيثية أن ذلك العارض ليس من مقتضيات الماهية حتى يصح الجواب بالإيجاب في لوازم الماهية كما فهمه بعض لظهور فسادها ولا الغرض من تقديمه عليها أن لا يكون الجواب بالإيجاب العدولي لأن مناط الفرق بين العدول والتحصيل في السلب تقديم الرابطة عليه وتأخيرها عنه لا غير فلو سئلنا بموجبتين هما في قوة النقيضين أو بموجبة و معدولة كقولنا الإنسان إما واحد أو كثير وإما ألف وإلا ألف لم يلزمنا أن نجيب البتة وإن أجبنا أجبنا بلا هذا ولا ذاك بخلاف ما إذا سئلنا بطرفي النقيضين لأن معنى السؤال بالموجبتين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧

بحسب العرف أنه إذا لم يتصف بهذا اتصف بذاك والاتصاف لا يستلزم الاتحاد- وليس أن الإنسانية الكلية إنسانية واحدة بالعدد موجودة في كثيرين كما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨

أسلفنا ذكره فإن الواحد العددي لا يتصور أن يكون في أمكنة كثيرة ولو كانت إنسانية أفراد الناس أمرا واحدا بالعدد لزم كونه عالما جاهلا أبيض أسود- متحركا ساكنا إلى غير ذلك من المتقابلات وليس نسبة المعنى الطبيعي إلى جزئياته نسبة أب واحد إلى أولاد كثيرين كلهم ينسبون إليه بل كنسبة آباء إلى أبناء نعم المعنى الذي يعرض له أنه كلي في الذهن يوجد في كل واحد وليس كل واحد إنسانا بمجرد نسبته إلى إنسانية تفرض منحازة عن الكل بل لكل واحد منها إنسانية أخرى هي بالعدد غير ما للآخر وأما المعنى المشترك فهو في الذهن لا غير

فصل (٢) في الكلي والجزئي

الكلي على الاصطلاح الذي معناه بحسب ذلك أنه يحتمل الشركة أو لا يمنع الشركة يمتنع وقوعه في الأعيان فإنه لو وقع في الأعيان حصلت له هوية متشخصة غير مثالية فلا يصح فيها الشركة. فإن استشكل أحد بأن الطبيعة الموجودة في الذهن لها أيضا هوية موجودة متخصصة بأمور كقيامها بالنفس وتجردها عن المقدار والوضع وكونها غير مشار إليه بل كل واحدة من الصور العقلية صورة جزئية في نفس جزئية فامتنع اشتراكها- أو لا ترى أن الصورة الموجودة في ذهن زيد يمتنع أن يكون بعينها موجودة في أذهان متعددة فإن كانت الصورة العقلية كليتها باعتبار المطابقة فالجزئيات أيضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩

يطابق بعضها بعضا فيلزم أن يكون الجزئيات كلية.

قيل إن الكلية هي مطابقة الصورة العقلية لأمور كثيرة لا من حيث كونها ذات هوية قائمة بالذهن بل من حيث كونها ذاتا مثالية إدراكية غير متأصلة في الوجود فهي وجودها كوجود الإللال المقتضية للارتباط بغيرها من الأمور- سواء كانت

ذهنية أو خارجية و سواء تقدمت هي عليها أو تأخرت فمن الكلي ما يتقدم على الجزئيات الواقعة في الأعيان كتصورات المبادي لمعلولاتها فيسمى ما قبل الكثرة.

و منها ما يستفاد من الخارج كعلومنا الكلية المنتزعة من الجزئيات الخارجية - فيسمى ما بعد الكثرة و مما يحقق معنى المطابقة أنك إذا رأيت شخصا إنسانيا حصل في ذهنك صورة الإنسان المبراة عن العوارض ثم إذا أبصرت شخصا آخر منه لا يقع فيه صورة أخرى و لا يحتاج إلى صورة أخرى إلا إذا غابت الأولى عن ذهنك كقابل رشم من طوابع جسمانية متماثلة يقبل رश्ما من الأول و لا يختلف بورود أشباهه عليه و إذا قيل في الكتب إن الكلي واقع في الأعيان أو يشار إليه - فإنما يعنون به الطبيعة التي يعرض لها إذا وجدت في الذهن أن تكون كلية و الأشياء المشتركة في معنى كلي يفترق بأحد أمور أربعة كما أشرنا إليه لأن الاشتراك إن كان في عرضي لا غير فالافتراق بنفس الماهية كالسواد و السطح و إن لم يكن الاشتراك في عرضي خارج فقط فقد يفترقان بفصل إن كانت الشركة في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠

معنى جنسي أو بعرضي غير لازم إن كانت الشركة في أمر نوعي إذا اللازم للنوع لازم للفرد فيتفق في الجميع و إن كان يجوز أن يكون المميز لها لازم الشخص - لا لازم النوع أو بتمامية و نقص في نفس الطبيعة المشتركة لما عرفت من وهن قاعدة المتأخرين في وجوب اختلاف حقيقة التام و الناقص مما سبق.

و الحق أن تشخص الشيء بمعنى كونه ممتنع الشركة فيه بحسب نفس تصويره - إنما يكون بأمر زائد على الماهية مانع بحسب ذاته من تصور الاشتراك فيه فالمشخص للشيء بمعنى ما به يصير ممتنع الاشتراك فيه لا يكون بالحقيقة إلا نفس وجود ذلك الشيء كما ذهب إليه المعلم الثاني فإن كل وجود متشخص بنفس ذاته و إذا قطع النظر عن نحو الوجود الخاص للشيء فالعقل لا يابى عن تجويز الاشتراك فيه - و إن ضم إليه ألف مخصص فإن الامتياز في الواقع غير التشخص إذ الأول للشيء بالقياس إلى المشاركات في أمر عام و الثاني باعتباره في نفسه حتى إنه لو لم يكن له مشارك لا يحتاج إلى مميز زائد مع أن له تشخصا في نفسه و لا يبعد أن يكون التميز يوجب للشيء استعداد التشخص فإن النوع المادي المنتشر ما لم يكن المادة متخصصة الاستعداد لواحد منه لا يفيض وجوده عن المبدأ الأعلى.

فما نقل عن الحكماء أن تشخص الشيء بنحو العلم الإحساسي أو المشاهدة الحضورية يمكن إرجاعه إلى ما قلناه فإن كل وجود خاص لا يمكن معرفته بذاته إلا بنحو المشاهدة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١

و كذا ما ذهب إليه شيخ الإشراق في المطارحات من أن المانع للشركة كون الشيء هوية عينية لما مر من أن الشركة في الحقيقة لا معنى لها إلا المطابقة و لا كل مطابقة بل مطابقة أمر لا يكون له هوية عينية متأصلة فإن الهوية العينية في الحقيقة - ليست إلا الوجود الخاص للشيء لكن هذا الشيخ العظيم القدر قد أكد القول - في أن الوجود أمر ذهني لا هوية له في الأعيان و العجب أن التشخص عنده إذا كان بنفس الشيء الذي هو غير الوجود و غير الوجود أما نفس الماهية المشتركة أو هي مع مادة و عوارض أخرى من كم أو وضع أو زمان و هو معترف بأن كل واحد من هذه الأشياء نفس تصورهما لا يمنع الشركة و أن مجموع الكليات كلي فهذه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢

الهوية العينية إذا كانت أمرا خارجا عن الوجود الخاص الذي خصوصيته بنفس ذاته كما مر فأى شيء فيه موجب لمنع الشركة و كذا ما اختاره بعض المدققين من أن تشخص كل شخص بجزء تحليلي له يمكن حمله على الوجود فإن الوجود لا يمتاز عن الماهية في الأعيان و ما قيل من أن تشخص الشيء بالفاعل فهو أيضا صحيح فإن الفاعل مفيد الوجود و الوجود عين التشخص - فمفيد الوجود هو مفيد التشخص و قد علمت أيضا أن كل وجود يتقوم بفاعله فكل تشخص يتقوم بفاعل ذلك التشخص لكن كلامنا في السببية القريبة لتشخص الشيء المتشخص.

و كذا ما هو مختار لبعض و هو أن تشخص الشيء بارتباطه إلى الوجود الحقيقي الذي هو مبدأ جميع الأشياء لأنك قد علمت أن الماهيات إنما ترتبط بالفاعل الحق لأجل وجوداتها لا لأجل مفهوماتها في نفسها فبالوجود يرتبط كل شيء إلى علته و هكذا إلى ما هو علة الجميع فالوجودات في الحقيقة ظلال و إشارات له تعالى.

و أما ما قال بعض أهل العلم من أن الشخص نفس تصويره يمنع الشركة و ليس ذلك بسبب مقوماته فإن المقومات لذاتها لا تمنع الشركة و لا بسبب لازم فإنه متفق فلا يمنع الشركة و لا بسبب عارض مفارق فإنه أيضا لا يمنع الشركة فتعين أن يكون بسبب المادة.

فيجب حمله على التميز الذي هو شرط للتشخص فإن الهولي حالها في التشخص و منع الشركة بحسب التصور حال غيرها بل النوع المتكرر الأفراد ما لم يتخصص المادة الحاملة لأفراده بوضع خاص و زمان خاص لا يوجد فرد منه دون غيره

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣

فعلم أن المادة أيضا غير كافية لتمييزه فإن كثيرا من الصور و الهيئات مما يقع شخصان منه في مادة واحدة في زمانين و امتياز [و امتاز] أحدهما عن الآخر لا بالمادة بل بالزمان.

و هكذا القول في حمل ما ذهب إليه بهمنيار من أن التشخص بسبب أحوال المادة من الوضع و الحيز مع اتحاد الزمان فإن المقصود منه المميز المفارق بين الشيئين لا ما يجعل الطبيعة شخصية و لهذا حكم حيث رأى الوضع مع الزمان متبدلا مع بقاء الشخص بأن المشخص هو وضع ما من الأوضاع الواردة على الشخص في زمان وجوده و لولا أن مراده من المشخص علامة الشخص و لازم وجوده كيف يصح منه هذا الحكم فإن الشخص المادي كزيد مانع من فرض الشركة فيه بدون اعتبار وضعه.

و كذا المراد من قولهم يجوز أن يمتاز كل واحد من الشيئين بصاحبه فإن توقف امتياز الطائر على الولود و امتياز الولود على الطائر ليس بدور إذ الممتنع توقف ذات كل منهما على ذات الآخر أو توقف امتياز كل منهما على امتياز الآخر و أما توقف امتياز كل منهما على نفس الآخر فلا يلزم منه محذور كما سيجيء في حال المتضايقين.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤

بحث و تعقيب:

قد أورد على قولهم إن الشئيين من نوع واحد يمتاز أحدهما عن الآخر إن اتحد المحل بالزمان بأن الزمان نفسه إذا كان مقدارا لحركة الفلك فمحله جسم واحد فيما ذا يمتاز مع وحدة المحل جزء منه من جزء آخر.

و الجواب أن التميز بين أجزاء الزمان بنفس ذاتها فإن المسمى بالزمان حقيقة متجددة متصرمة وليست له ماهية غير اتصال الانقضاء و التجدد فالسؤال بأنه لم يختص يوم كذا بالتقدم على يوم كذا و بم امتاز أحدهما عن الآخر مع تشابههما و تساويهما في الحقيقة يرجع إلى مثل أن يقال لم صار الفلك فلكا فإن يوم كذا لا هوية له سوى كونه متقدما على يوم كذا و متميزا عنه كما أن تقدم الاثنين على الثلاثة طبعاً و امتيازها عنها ليس إلا بنفس كونه اثنين و يتضح ذلك اتصاحا شديداً - بأن امتياز ذراع من الخط عن نصفه ليس بشيء خارج عن نفس هويته لأنها مع قطع النظر عن الأمور الخارجة من المحل و الزمان يمتاز عنه فقد علم أن التميز عن المشاركات النوعية قد يحصل بنفس الحقيقة و ما وجد في كلام الشيخ من أنه ليس شيء من المقولات يتشخص بذاته إلا الوضع فمراده الامتياز عن الغير مطلقاً مع وحدة الزمان فإنه لا يحصل الامتياز مع وحدة الزمان إلا بالوضع كما أنه لا يحصل الامتياز مع وحدة الوضع إلا بالزمان و أما امتياز كل وضع عن وضع كالقعود عن القيام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥

فحاله كحال امتياز زمان عن زمان و مقدار عن مقدار من أنه مما يحصل بنفس حقائقها - و التشخص بالمعنى المذكور قد يكون بنفس الذات كما في واجب الوجود و قد يكون بلوازم الذات كالشمس فإن الوضع هناك من لوازمها و قد يكون بعارض لاحق في أول الوجود و قد بين أنه من باب الوضع و الزمان لا غير و أما تشخص النفس بالعلاقة التي بينها و بين البدن و تشخص القوى البدنية فبالبدن الذي هي فيه

فصل (٣) في أنحاء التعيين

قد مضى أن تعين الشيء غير تشخصه إذ الأول أمر نسبي دون الثاني لأنه نحو وجود الشيء و هويته لا غير فالتعيين ما به امتياز الشيء عن غيره بحيث لا يشاركه فيه - و هو قد يكون عين الذات كتعيين الواجب الوجود الممتاز بذاته عن غيره و كتعينات الماهيات الإمكانية و المفهومات العقلية في الذهن فإنها أيضاً عين ذواتها و قد يكون أمراً زائداً على ذاته حاصلًا له دون غيره كامتياز الكاتب من الأمي بالكتابة - و قد يكون لعدم حصول ذلك الأمر له كامتياز الأمي من الكاتب بعدم الكتابة و الأول لا يخلو من أن يعتبر حصول هذا الأمر له مع قطع النظر عن عدم حصول غير ذلك الأمر له كاعتبارنا حصول الكتابة لزيد مع قطع النظر عن عدم حصول الخياطة له أو يعتبر حصوله مع عدم حصول غيره له فالتعيين الزائد قد يكون وجودياً - و قد يكون عدمياً و قد يكون مركباً منهما و النوع الواحد قد يجمع لجميع أنواع التعيين فالإنسان مثلاً ممتاز بذاته عن الفرس و بحصول صفة وجودية في فرد من أفراد - يمتاز عن المتصف بصفة أخرى وجودية كزيد الرحيم الممتاز عن عمرو القهار و عن المتصف بصفة عدمية كالعليم عن الجهول و يمتاز الكاتب الغير الخياط عن الخياط الغير الكاتب بصفة وجودية مع عدم صفة أخرى و بالعكس و التعينات الزائدة كلها من لوازم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦

الوجودات حتى إن الأعدام المتميزة بعضها عن بعض تمايزها أيضاً باعتبار وجوداتها في أذهان المعبرين لها أو باعتبار

وجودات ملكاتها لا أن لها ذوات متميزة بذواتها أو بصفاتهما و الحق أن التميز بالصفات الزائدة يرجع في الحقيقة إلى تميز تلك الصفات و تميزها يكون بنفسها لا بصفة أخرى و إلا لزم التسلسل المستحيل - فالتمييز بالذات منحصر فيما يكون بحسب نفس الذوات لا بأمر زائد على التمييز إلا بالعرض

فصل (٤) في الفرق بين الجنس و المادة و بين النوع و الموضوع

إن الماهية قد تؤخذ بشرط لا شيء بأن يتصور معناها بشرط أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧

ذلك المعنى وحده بحيث يكون كل ما يقارنه زائدا عليه فيكون جزءا لذلك المجموع مادة له متقدما عليه في الوجودين فيمتنع حمله على المجموع لانتفاء شرط الحمل و هو الاتحاد في الوجود و قد يؤخذ لا بشرط شيء بأن يتصور معناها مع تجويز كونه وحده و كونه لا وحده بأن يقتصر مع شيء آخر فيحمل على المجموع و على نفسه وحده و الماهية المأخوذة كذلك قد تكون غير متحصلة بنفسها في الواقع - بل يكون أمرا محتملا للمقولية على أشياء مختلفة الماهيات و إنما يتحصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨

بما ينضاف إليه فيتخصص به و تصير بعينها أحد تلك الأشياء فيكون جنسا و المنضاف إليه الذي قومه و جعله أحد تلك الأشياء فصلا و قد تكون متحصلة في ذاتها غير متحصلة باعتبار انضياف أمور إليها يجعلها كل واحد منها إحدى الحقائق المتأصلة كالأنواع الداخلة تحت جنس فهي في نفسها نوع بل شخص واحد من نوع كهيولى عالم العناصر و من هذا نشأ اختلافهم في كون وحدتها نوعية أو شخصية و لا معنى للتنازع لأنها في حد ذاتها نوع منحصر في شخص و إذا أخذت لا بشرط شيء حصل لها إبهام جنسي بالقياس إلى الصور المتنوعة المنضافة إليها - فالحيوان مثلا إذا أخذ بشرط أن لا يكون معه شيء و إن اقترن به ناطق مثلا صار المجموع شيئا مركبا من الحيوان و الناطق و لا يقال له حيوان كان مادة و إذا أخذ بشرط أن يكون مع الناطق متخصصا و متحصلا به كان نوعا و إذا أخذ لا بشرط أن يكون معه شيء و أن لا يكون كان جنسا فالحيوان الأول جزء الإنسان متقدم عليه في الوجود و الثاني نفسه و الثالث جنسه و جنس الأول أيضا فيكون محمولا و لا يكون جزءا و إنما يقال للجنس أو الفصل جزء من النوع لأن كلا منهما يقع جزءا من حده ضرورة أنه لا بد للعقل من ملاحظتهما - في تحصيل صورة مطابقة للنوع الداخل تحت الجنس فبهذا الاعتبار يكون مقدما على النوع في العقل بالطبع و أما بحسب الخارج فيكون متأخرا عنه لأنه ما لم يوجد الإنسان مثلا في الخارج لم يعقل له شيء يعمه و غيره و شيء يخصه و يحصله و يصيره هو هو بالفعل هذا خلاصة كلام الشيخ في الشفاء و فيه أبحاث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩

الأول أن مورد القسمة هو الماهية المطلقة و هي ليست إلا المأخوذة لا بشرط شيء فيلزم من تقسيمها إلى المأخوذة لا بشرط شيء و إلى غيرها تقسيم الشيء إلى نفسه و إلى غيره.

و الجواب أن المقسم وإن كانت الماهية المطلقة إلا أن العقل ينظر إليها لا من حيث كونها مطلقة و يقسمها إلى نفسها معتبرة بهذا الاعتبار و إليها معتبرة بالنحوين الآخرين فالمقسم طبيعة الحيوان مثلا و القسم مفهوم الحيوان المعتبر على وجه الإطلاق و لا شك أن الأول أعم من الثاني.

الثاني أن المفهوم من المأخوذ بشرط أن يكون وحده هو أن لا يقارنه شيء أصلا زائدا كان أو غير زائد و حينئذ يكون القول بكونه جزءا متضمنا لما هو زائد عليه تناقضا لأن المراد هو أن لا يدخل فيه غيره على ما صرح به الشيخ حيث قال إذا أخذنا الجسم جوهرًا ذا طول و عرض و عمق من جهة ما له هذا و يشترط أنه ليس داخلا فيه معنى غير هذا بل بحيث لو انضم إليه معنى غير هذا مثل حس أو تغذ أو غير ذلك كان معنى خارجا عنه فـالجسم مادة.

و الجواب أن المراد من المأخوذ وحده كونه كذلك بحسب الذات و الماهية - أي لا يحتاج في تتميم ذاته إلى شيء آخر حتى لو انضم إليه شيء صار ماهية أخرى غير الأولى فهي في حد نفسها كاملة تامة بخلاف المأخوذ لا بشرط فإنه ماهية ناقصة يحتاج إلى تمام و لا ينافي ذلك كونه جزءا له و لما يزيد عليه لأن المجموع ماهية أخرى.

الثالث أنه جعل غير المبهم من أقسام المأخوذ بلا شرط شيء و صرح أخيرا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٠

بأنه مأخوذ بشرط شيء.

و الجواب أن مبناه على أن الأول أعم من الثاني فلا منافاة.

الرابع أن النوع هو مجموع الجنس و الفصل و جعله عبارة عن المتحصل بما انضاف إليه و المأخوذ بشرط شيء تسامح فـالجسم مثلا ليس نفسه تصوير بإضافة النفس و الحساسية و المتحركة نوعا بل الجسم مع مجموع هذه الأمور نوع حيواني.

و الجواب أنه مبني على أن الجنس و الفصل و النوع واحد بالذات و حقيقة الكلام أن المأخوذ لا بشرط شيء إذا اعتبر بحسب التباين بينه و بين ما يقارنه من جهة و الاتحاد من جهة كان ذاتيا محمولا و إذا اعتبر بحسب محض الاتحاد كان نوعا و هو المراد بالمأخوذ بشرط شيء.

الخامس أن المادة إذا كانت من الأجزاء الخارجية فمن أين يلزم تقدمها في الوجود العقلي - و الجواب أن ذلك من جهة أن تصور النوع كالإنسان مثلا يتوقف على تصور جنسه و فصله و معروض الجنسية و الجزئية شيء واحد هو ماهية الحيوان و التباين إنما هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١

بحسب اعتباره في الأول لا بشرط شيء و في الثاني بشرط لا شيء.

السادس أن ما هو الحيوان في الخارج فهو بعينه الجسم فكيف يكون الجسم بشرط لا موجودا فيه مقدما عليه.

و الجواب أن الجسم الذي هو مادة النفس موجود آخر غير الجسم المحمول على ما حصل من انضمام النفس إليها أعني المجموع فهنا جسمان موجودان أحدهما جزء للآخر و هكذا في كل نوع مركب تركيبا طبيعيا.

السابع أنه كما أن الجنس يحتمل أن يكون أحد الأنواع فكذلك النوع يحتمل أن يكون أحد الأشخاص فكيف جعل الأول

مبهما غير متحصل و الثاني متحصلا غير مبهم.

و الجواب أن العبرة بحال الماهيات و الحقائق الكلية من حيث كونها معقولة فالإبهام و عدمه بالقياس إلى الإشارة العقلية فالجنس مبهم لأنه ماهية ناقصة يحتاج إلى متمم بخلاف النوع فإنه ماهية كاملة لم يبق له تحصيل منتظر - لا باعتبار الوجود الخارجي و قبولها الإشارة الحسية و ذلك إنما يحصل بالأعراض الخاصة إما إضافات فقط كشخصيات الأمور البسيطة من الصور و الأعراض فإن تشخصها بحصولها في محالها أو أحوال زائدة على الإضافات فمع التحفظ على هذا الفرق - لا ريب لأحد في عروض الإبهام و التحصيل للنوع بالقياس إلى العوارض التي هي لوازم - و علامات للتشخص فيجري فيها بل في كل كلي سواء كان ذاتيا أو عرضيا - الاعتبار الثلاثة المذكورة فماهية الفصل إذا أخذت بشرط لا شيء فهي جزء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢

و صورة و إذا أخذت لا بشرط شيء فهي محمول و فصل و إذا أخذت مع ما يتقوم بها فهي عين النوع و ماهية العرض أيضا عرض و عرضي و مجموع حاصل منهما جميعا - بالاعتبارات الثلاثة و الفرق بين المجموعين أن الأول ماهية طبيعية لها وحدة ذاتية - بخلاف الثاني فإنه ماهية اعتبارية و الأولى أن يسمى ماهية النوع المأخوذة بالاعتبار الأول موضوعا بدل المادة و كذا ماهية الجنس المأخوذة كذلك بالقياس إلى العوارض دون الفصول لأن المحل المتقوم بما يحل فيه مادة له و المستغني عما يحل فيه موضوع له فشيء واحد يجوز أن يكون مادة و موضوعا بالقياس إلى شيئين.

نكتة -

و لما علمت أن الطبيعة الجنسية ماهية مبهمة ناقصة تحتاج في حد حقيقتها إلى فصل فلا يتصور أن يحتاج إلى الفصل في بعض المواضع و يستغني عنه في بعضها فلو تحصل دون فصل فتكون مستغنية بحسب الماهية و قد فرض الافتقار إليه بنفس الماهية فالحقائق البسيطة يستحيل أن يزول فصلها عن طبيعة جنسها إلى بدل لأنه إذا زال الافتقار إلى الفصل فبقيت [فيبقى] الطبيعة محصلة دونه فما كانت طبيعة جنسية فعلم أن الافتقار إلى الفصل ليس لمجرد التمييز لأنه يحصل بالعوارض أيضا بل لكون الماهية في حد ذاتها ناقصة يحتاج إلى تمام فلا يجوز التقوم بالفصل في موضع و بعدمه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣

في موضع آخر إلا بحسب الاعتبار العقلي فإن المأخوذ بشرط لا من الماهية الجنسية نوع عقلي و مما يجب أن يعلم أنه فرق ما بين الجنس في المركبات الخارجية و بينه في البسائط فإن الجنس في المركبات الخارجية يمكن أن يجرد عن جنسيته و يؤخذ بحيث يصير نوعا حقيقيا لا بفصل من الفصول بل بنفس طبيعته و ذلك لأن جنسية الجسم مثلا ليست باعتبار أنه مجرد جوهر متكمم غير داخل فيه شيء آخر كالإنسانية و الفرسية و غير ذلك إذ هو بهذا المعنى متفق الحقيقة في الأجسام غير مختلف بشيء داخل بل بأمور تنضاف إليه من خارج و هو بهذا المعنى لا يصدق على الإنسان و الفرس و غيرهما من النظائر لأنها مركبة منه و من شيء آخر بل تكون مادة لها - فيكون الجسم نوعا محصلا في الواقع لأن حقيقته قد تمت و تحصلت بحسب الواقع - و إلا لما أمكن أن ينتقل الجسم من الجمادية إلى الحيوانية و النباتية بل إنما يكون جنسا بمعنى أنه جوهر ذو طول و عرض و عمق بلا شرط أن لا يكون غير هذا أو يكون - و إذا أخذ هكذا

فكونه ذا حس أو تغذ لا يلزم أن يكون خارجا عنه لاحقا به إذ يصدق على الحساس و المتغذي و غيرهما من الحقائق المختلفة الجسمانية و أنها جوهر ذو أقطار ثلاثة - وإن لم يصدق عليها أنها جوهر ذو أقطار ثلاثة فقط و أما الجنس في البسائط كاللونية فلا يمكن أن يقرر لها ذات إلا أن ينوع بالفصول و لا يوجد في الخارج لونية و شيء آخر غير اللونية يحصل منهما البياض كما يوجد في الخارج جسيمة و صورة أخرى غير الجسمية يكون الإنسان حاصلًا منهما و ما نقل عنهم أن الجنس و الفصل مطلقا جعلهما واحد و جعل الجسم

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بعينه جعل الحيوان لو كان صحيحا يكون المراد منه أن الجنس باعتبار جنسيته و إبهامه ليس جعله غير جعل أحد من الفصول و أما باعتبار طبيعته من حيث هي فوجوده غير وجود الفصل. و ما قيل من أن الحيوان إذا مات لم يبق جسميته بعينه بعد الموت بل حدث جسمية أخرى غير صحيح كيف و لا بد من مادة باقية يتوارد عليها الصور و الأعراض سواء كان جسما بسيطا أو هيولي و تلك المادة هي الجنس القاصي للمركبات - بل جسمية الحيوان من حيث جسميتها باقية بعد موته كما كانت و إن زالت عنها حيثية كونها بدنا أو جسما حيوانيا و أما أن هويتها قد بطلت و حصلت لها هوية أخرى - فهو قريب من مجازفات أصحاب الطفرة و التفكيك و استحاله بقاء الأعراض.

فائدة -

ربما يقرع سمعك في الكتب ما قد يحكم على الطبائع العامة أنه إن وجب تخصصها بأحد الجزئيات فلا يوجد غيرها و إن أمكن فلحوقها به لعله.

فاعلم أن ذلك إنما يستصح إذا كانت الطبيعة مما لها صورة في الأعيان أما مثل اللونية للبياض و السواد فلا يقال إن اقتضت التخصص بالبياض لكان كل لون بياضا - و إن لم يقتض فكون اللون بياضا يكون لعله لأن اللونية بما هي لونية ليست لها صورة في الأعيان متميزة عن مفرقية البصر حتى يشار إليها بكونها كذا أو كذا بل إذا كانت طبيعة كالجسمية أو الهيولى مما لها تحقق في الأعيان فتخصصها بالنارية أو الفلكية أو بعض الهيئات كالحركة و التحيز و الاستدارة و غيرها لو كان للجسمية لما صح وجود جسم غير متخصص بتلك الصورة أو الهيئة و إلا فلا بد هناك من علة زائدة على الجسمية - فلا مانع من بقاء مادة يتوارد الصور و الأعراض عليها

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فصل (٥) في معرفة الفصل و في الفرق بين الفصل و ما ليس بفصل و في كيفية اتحاده مع الجنس

إن ما يذكر في التعاريف بإزاء الفصول فبالحقيقة هي ليست بفصول بل هي لوازم و علامات للفصول الحقيقية فالحساس و المتحرك ليس شيء منهما بحسب المفهوم فصلا للحيوان بل فصله كونه ذا نفس دراية متحركة و ليست الإدراكية و المتحركة عين هوية النفس الحيوانية بل من جملة لوازمه و شعبه لكن الإنسان ربما يضطر لعدم الاطلاع على الفصول الحقيقية أو لعدم وضع الأسامي لها إلى الانحراف عنها إلى اللوازم و العلامات فالمراد من الحساس ليس نفس هذا المفهوم المتقوم بالانفعال الشعوري أو الإضافة الإدراكية و إلا لزم تقوم الشيء من المقولات المتباينة و قد تحقق

عندهم أن الشيء الواحداني لا يندرج تحت مقولتين إلا بالعرض بل الفصل الحقيقة هو الذي له مبدأ هذه الأمور وهكذا في نظائره فكل معنى إذا اعتبر معه معنى آخر فإن كان مما يغيّره بحسب التحصل والوجود فذلك المعنى ليس فصلا له - بل عرضا خارجا عنه وإن كانت المغايرة بينهما باعتبار الإبهام والتحصل كان فصلا - قال الشيخ في إلهيات الشفاء العقل قد يعقل معنى يجوز أن يكون ذلك المعنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦

نفسه أشياء كثيرة كل واحدة منها ذلك المعنى في الوجود فيضم إليه معنى آخر يعين وجوده بأن يكون ذلك المعنى مضمنا فيه وإنما يكون آخر من حيث التعيين والإبهام لا في الوجود انتهى.

بحث و تحصيل:

قد ذهب بعض الناس إلى نفي الأجزاء العقلية في البسائط - وأرجعها إلى اللوازم بأن يكون اللازم المشترك هو الجنس - واللازم المختص هو الفصل و حيث يلزم عليه كون البسائط المتباينة الذوات - مشتركة في أمر عرضي بلا جهة جامعة فيها مصححة لعروضه و كان متحاشيا عن تجويز انتزاع أمر واحد من نفس حقائق متخالفة ارتكب القول بأن الجنس و الفصل في الماهية البسيطة كلاهما مأخوذان من اللوازم الخاصة لها في الواقع لكن الأمر المسمى بالجنس مأخوذ من اللازم المشكوك الاختصاص و المسمى بالفصل من اللازم المتيقن الاختصاص.

و فيه من التكلف ما لا يخفى على أحد و بناء ما أوقعه في ذلك هو ما ربما يتوهم - أن السواد مثلا إذا فصلناه إلى اللون و قابض البصر فإن طابق كل منهما نفس السواد - فلا فرق بينهما ثم إذا طابقت اللونية نفس السواد فهي تطابق بعينها نفس البياض أيضا فيلزم كون السواد و البياض شيئا واحدا و إن طابقتها أحدهما و طابق الآخر شيئا آخر فيكون السواد أحدهما فقط و إن طابق كل منهما شيئا من السواد غير ما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧

طابقه الآخر فيتربك في الخارج و قد فرض بسيطا فيه هذا خلف فعلم أنه الأجناس و الفصول في البسائط أمور اعتبارية فالسواد مثلا وجوده في النفس كما هو في العين - فلا ذاتي له بوجه من الوجوه.

و وجه اندفاعه ما لوح إليه من أن المعاني التي كل منها ماهية كاملة متحصلة - إذا أخذت من نفس ماهية لوجب كون المأخوذ منها تلك المعاني من الحقائق المركبة - و كل متحصل يتحد مع متحصل آخر يكون متحدا مع متحصل ثالث يتحد الأول مع الثالث أيضا و أما إذا كانت المعاني المأخوذة عنها بعضها ناقصا في ذاته أو باعتبار أخذه مبهما و بعضها بخلاف ذلك و يكون اقتران بعضها إلى بعض كاقتران قوة إلى ضعف أو كمال إلى نقص إلى غير ذلك من العبارات فلا يستدعي كون المنتزعة منها حقيقة مركبة و كذا الماهية المبهمة إذا اتحدت مع كل واحد من الأشياء و تحصلت بها لا يوجب اتحاد تلك الأشياء بعضها مع بعض كالحيوان المتحد مع الإنسان و الفرس مع تباينهما.

توضيح الكلام أن الحثيات و المعاني المنتزعة عن الحقائق منها ما ينتزع من حقيقة بحسب حالها في الواقع و منها ما ينتزع منها باعتبار ملاحظة العقل بأن يتصور العقل المعنى الذي هو مخلوط في نفس الأمر بالأمور المحصلة و متحد معها غير مخلوط و لا متحدا بل أمرا مبهما و يضم إليه المعاني المخصوصة و هذا الانضمام ليس كانضمام شيء محصل

بشيء محصل حتى يكونا شيئين متميزين في نفس الأمر وقد حصل بانضمامهما شيء ثالث كاتحاد المادة بالصورة بل كانضمام شيء إلى شيء لا تميز بينهما إلا بحسب التعيين والإبهام فالأول يقتضي التركيب في الواقع والثاني يقتضيه في اعتبار العقل - وإن كان ذلك الاعتبار اعتبارا صادقا بحسب مرتبة من الواقع. فإن قلت إذا أخذ كل واحد من معنيي الجنس والفصل من نفس ماهية بسيطة - ثم اعتبر باعتبار يكونان بها مادة و صورة فكان كل منهما متحصلا فيكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨

الانضمام بينهما انضمام متحصل بمتحصل فيلزم من ذلك أن يكون المأخوذ منه مركبا خارجيا بناء على أن الأمور المتباينة لا يطابق ذاتا أحدية. قلت أخذ الجنس والفصل عن البسيط على وجه يكون كل منهما أمرا متحصلا - حتى يكون الجنس مادة عقلية والفصل صورة عقلية وبالجملة صيرورة البسيط بحيث يكون مركبا من مادة و صورة إنما هو بمجرد وضع العقل لا غير إذ لا تركيب هناك بهذا الوجه أصلا بل ذلك أمر يفرضه العقل بمجرد اعتبار غير مطابق للواقع. فإن قلت الحد عين المحدود فكيف يتصور أن يكون المحدود نوعا بسيطا - لا تركيب فيه أصلا إلا بمجرد فرض العقل و الحد مركبا من معان متعددة كل منها غير الآخر. قلت مقام الحد مقام تفصيل المعاني المأخوذة من نفس ذات و ملاحظتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩

فردا فردا و مقام المحدود إجمال تلك المعاني فالتركيب في الحد لا يوجب التركيب في المحدود وإن كان الحد و المحدود شيئا واحدا بالذات لما علمت من كيفية أخذ المعاني من ذات بسيطة

فصل (٦) في كيفية تقوم الجنس بالفصل

هذا التقويم ليس بحسب الخارج لاتحادهما في الوجود والمتحدان في ظرف لا يمكن تقوم أحدهما بالآخر وجودا بل بحسب تحليل العقل الماهية النوعية إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠

جزئين عقليين و حكمه بعلية أحدهما للآخر ضرورة احتياج أجزاء ماهية واحدة بعضها إلى بعض و المحتاج إليه و العلة لا يكون إلا الجزء الفصلي - لاستحالة أن يكون الجزء الجنسي علة لوجود الجزء الفصلي و إلا لكانت الفصول المتقابلة لازمة له فيكون الشيء الواحد مختلفا متقابلا هذا ممتنع فبقي أن يكون الجزء الفصلي علة لوجود الجزء الجنسي و يكون مقسما للطبيعة الجنسية المطلقة - و علة للقدر الذي هو حصة النوع و جزء للمجموع الحاصل منه و مما يتميز به عن غيره.

وهم وتنبيه

: ربما يتوهم أحد أن الناطق مثلا إن كان علة للحيوان المطلق لم يكن مقسما له وإن كان علة للحيوان المخصوص فلا بد

وأن يفرض تخصصه أولاً حتى يكون الناطق علة له لكن ذلك الحيوان متى تخصص فقد دخل في الوجود واستغنى عن العلة بوجوده و الحل في ذلك أن الفصل لكونه علة لطبيعة الجنس متقدم عليها فسببية السبب ليس لأن المعلول اقتضاه لكونه ما وجد بعد في مرتبة السبب بل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١

لا يجاب السبب وجوده فكذلك هاهنا ليس أن الحيوان بحيوانيته اقتضى أن يكون له فصل وإنما من قبله الحاجة المحضة من دون اقتضاء أمر معين لكن الناطقية اقتضى بحسب ذاتها أن يلزمها الحيوانية المعينة المطلقة فالحاجة المطلقة إنما جاءت من قبل الحيوان و تعين المحتاج إليه إنما جاء من قبل الفصل و تعدد العلل لمعلول واحد جنسي غير مستنكر لضعف الوحدة في الطبيعة الجنسية.

و العجب من صاحب المباحث المشرقية مع تفتنه بهذا الأصل حيث ذهل عنه حين أقام حجة على إثبات الهيولى و قد أهمل في إعماله و أعجب من ذلك أنه قال بعد ذكر تلك الحجة و قد أوردتها على كثير من الأذكيا فما قدحوا في شيء من مقدماته و خلاصة حجته المذكورة في إثبات الهيولى لجسمية الفلك أن جسمية الفلك يلزمها مقدار معين و شكل معين لعدم قبولها الكون و الفساد و سبب اللزوم إما نفس الجسمية أو أمر حال فيها أو مباين لها لكن الأول باطل و إلا لزم اشتراك الأجسام معها في المقدار و الشكل المعين و كذا الثاني لأن الكلام في لزومه أت بعينه - و الثالث أيضا لتساوي نسبة المباين إلى جميع الأجسام فبقي أن يكون لزوم التشكل و التقدر لجسمية الفلك بواسطة محل تلك الجسمية و هو المطلوب انتهى.

و لا يخفى أن الصورة المنوعة للفلك التي هي مبدأ فصله المقوم لجنسه الذي هو الجسم المطلق متقدم في مرتبة الوجود على الجسمية فيكون علة للزوم المقدار و الشكل المختصين بالفلك و لا يلزم شيء من المفاسد التي ذكرها هناك فتفطن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢

فصل (٧) في تحقيق اقتران الصورة بالمادة

اعلم أن الصورة قد يقال على الماهية النوعية و على كل ماهية لشيء كيف كان و على الحقيقة التي يقوم المحل [المادة] بها و على الحقيقة التي يقوم المحل باعتبار حصول النوع الطبيعي منه و على كمال للشيء مفارقا عنه - و لو نظرت حق النظر في موارد استعمالها جميعا لوجدتها متفقة بالذات في معنى واحد هو ما به يكون الشيء هو هو بالفعل و لأجل ذلك استتم قولهم صورة الشيء هي ماهيته التي بها هو ما هو مع تعقيبه بقولهم و مادته هي حامل صورته و ليس متناقضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣

و توضيح هذه الدعوى بتقديم مقدمة هي أن المادة في كل شيء أمر مبهم - لا تحصل له أصلا إلا باعتبار كونه قوة شيء ما و الصورة أمر محصل بالفعل به يصير الشيء شيئا مثلا مادة السرير هي قطع الخشب لكن لا من حيث لها حقيقة

خشبية و صورة محصلة فإنها من تلك الحثية حقيقة من الحقائق و ليست مادة لشيء أصلا بل ماديتها إنما هي من حيث كونها تصلح لأن يكون سريرا أو بابا أو كرسي أو غير ذلك و تعصيا و امتناعها عن قبول أشياء أخر ليس لجهة قوتها و استعدادها بل لأجل فعليتها و اقترانها بصورة مخصوصة يمنعها عن التلبس بتلك الأشياء لأجل التنافي الواقع بين طبيعتها و طبائع تلك الأشياء فالحقيقة الخشبية مثلا لها جهة نقص و جهة كمال فمن جهة نقصها يستدعي كمالا آخر و من جهة كونها كمالا يمنع عن قبول كمال آخر و من هاتين الجهتين ينتظم كون السرير ذا مادة و صورة و كذا [لذا] نقول حقيقة الخشب صورتها الخشبية و مادتها هي العناصر لا من حيث كونها أرضا أو ماء أو غيرهما بل من حيث كونها مستعدة بالامتزاج لأن يصير جمادا أو نباتا أو حيوانا إلى غير ذلك من الأشياء المخصوصة دون غيرها لأجل العلة التي ذكرناها و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى مادة لا مادة لها أصلا إذ لا تحصل لها و لا فعلية إلا كونها جوهر مستعدا لأن يصير كل شيء بلا تخصص - في ذاتها بواحد دون واحد لعدم كونها إلا قابلا محضا و قوة صرفة و إلا يلزم الدور أو التسلسل فهي مادة المواد و هيولى الهيوليات و كونها جوهر لا يوجب تحصلها إلا تحصل الإبهام و كونها مستعدة لا يقتضي فعليتها إلا فعلية القوة و إنما الفرق بينها و بين العدم أن العدم بما هو عدم لا تحصل له أصلا حتى تحصل الإبهام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤

و لا فعلية حتى فعلية القوة لشيء بخلاف الهيولى الأولى إذ لها من جملة الأشياء - هذا النحو من التحصل و الفعلية لا غير دون غيرها إلا من جهتها فهي أخس الأشياء حقيقة و أضعفها وجودا لوقوعها على حاشية الوجود و نزولها في صف نعال محفل الإفاضة و الوجود.

فبعد تمهيد هذه المقدمة يتفطن اللبيب منها بأن كل حقيقة تركيبية - فإنها إنما تكون تلك الحقيقة بحسب ما هو منها بمنزلة الصورة لا ما هو منها بمنزلة المادة فإن المادة من حيث إنها مادة مستهلكة في الصورة استهلاك الجنس في الفصل إذ نسبتها إليها نسبة النقص إلى التمام و الضعف إلى القوة و تقوم الحقيقة ليس إلا بالصورة و إنما الحاجة إليها لأجل قبول آثارها و لوازمها و انفعالاتها الغير المنفكة عنها من الكم و الكيف و الأين و غيرها حتى لو أمكن وجود تلك الصورة مجردة عن المادة لكانت هي تلك الحقيقة بعينها لما علمت أن المادة لا حقيقة لها أصلا إلا قوة حقيقة [الحقيقة] و قوة الحقيقة من حيث إنها قوة الحقيقة ليست حقيقة فالعالم عالم بالصورة العالمية لا بمادتها و السرير سرير بهيئته المخصوصة لا بخشبيته و الإنسان إنسان بنفسه المدبرة لا ببدنه و الموجود موجود بوجوده لا بماهيته فصورة العالم لو كانت مجردة لكانت عالما و الهيئة السريرة لو تحققت بلا خشب لكانت سريرا و كذا نفس الإنسان حين انقطاعها عن علاقة البدن إنسان و الوجود المجرد عن الماهية موجود كالواجب تعالى و أشير إلى ذلك بما قالوا - الإنسان إذا أحاط بكيفية وجود الأشياء على ما هي عليه يصير عالما معقولا مضاهيا للعالم الموجود و قيل في الأشعار الحكيمية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥

ده بود آن نه دل كه اندر وی گاو و خر باشد و ضیاع و عقار

و من هذا السبيل تحقق وجه لما صار إليه قدماء المنطقيين من تجويز التحديد بالفصل الأخير وحده مع أن الحد عندهم

ليس لمجرد التنزيل لاكتناه حقيقة الشيء و ماهيته.

حكمة عرشية:

قد انكشف لك مما ذكرناه في هذا الفصل و من إشارات سابقة في بعض الفصول الماضية أن ما يقوم و يوجد به الشيء من ذوات الماهيات سواء كانت بسيطة أو مركبة ليس إلا مبدأ الفصل الأخير لها- و سائر الفصول و الصور التي هي متحدة معها بمنزلة القوى و الشرائط و الآلات و الأسباب المعدة لوجود الماهية التي هي عين الفصل الأخير بدون دخولها في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦

تقرر ذاته و قوام حقيقته و إن كان كل منها مقوما لحقيقة أخرى غير هذه الحقيقة- مثلا القوى و الصور الموجودة في بدن الإنسان بعضها مما يقوم المادة الأولى لأجل كونها جسما فقط كالصورة الامتدادية و بعضها يقومها لأجل كونها جسما نباتيا كقوى التغذية و التنمية و التوليد و بعضها لأجل كونها حيوانا كمبدأ الحس و الحركة الإرادية- و بعضها لأجل كونها إنسانا كمبدأ النطق و كل من الصور السابقة معدة لوجود الصورة اللاحقة ثم بعد وجود اللاحقة ينبعث عنها و يقوم بها في الوجود فما كانت من الأسباب و الشرائط و المعدات أولا صارت أمثالها من القوى و التوابع و الفروع أخيرا و تكون الصورة الأخيرة مبدءا للجميع و رئيسها و هي الخوادم و الشعب و سينكشف من تلك الأصول و مما سيأتي أن حقيقة الفصول و ذواتها ليست إلا الوجودات الخاصة للماهيات التي هي أشخاص حقيقية فالوجود في الخارج هو الوجود لكن يحصل في العقل بوسيلة الحس أو المشاهدة الحسورية من نفس ذاته مفهومات كلية عامة أو خاصة و من عوارضه أيضا كذلك و يحكم عليها بهذه الأحكام بحسب الخارج- فما يحصل في العقل من نفس ذاته يسمى بالذاتيات و ما يحصل فيه لا من ذاته بل لأجل جهة أخرى يسمى بالعرضيات فالذاتي موجود بالذات أي متحد مع ما هو الموجود اتحادا ذاتيا و العرضي موجود بالعرض أي متحد معه اتحادا عرضيا و ليس هذا نفيا للكلبي الطبيعي كما يظن بل الوجود منسوب إليه بالذات إذا كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧

ذاتيا بمعنى أن ما هو الموجود الحقيقي متحد معه في الخارج لا أن ذلك شيء و هو شيء آخر متميز عنه في الواقع

فصل (٨) في كيفية أخذ الجنس من المادة و الفصل من الصورة

الجنس مأخوذ في المركبات الخارجية من المادة و الفصل من الصورة- و ربما يتشكك فيقال الجسم بحسب التفصيل يشتمل على مادة و صورة كما سيجيء- و كلاهما جوهر عند أصحاب المعلم الأول و أتباعه و المفهوم من ماهية النوعية جوهر ممتد في الجهات فليس أخذ مفهوم الجوهر عن المادة أولى من أخذه من الصورة لأن نسبته إليهما على السواء لأن كلا منهما نوع من الجوهر- فنقول في تحقيق ذلك إن لكل واحدة من الهيولى و الصورة ماهية بسيطة نوعية- تتركب في العقل من جنس مشترك بينهما و فصل يحصله ماهية نوعية و يقومه وجودا و ذلك هو مفهوم الجوهر و الفصلان هما الاستعداد لأحدهما و امتداد للآخرى- فكما أن الهيولى هي الهيولى بالاستعداد كذلك الصورة هي تلك الصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨

لأجل كونها ممتدة لكن كون الهيولى مستعدة ليس يجعلها شيئا من الأشياء المتحصلة بل إنما لها استعداد الأشياء المتحصلة و قوتها فإذا نظرت إليها لم يبق منها عندك من التحصيل إلا كونها جوهرًا الذي لا يوجب إلا نحواً ضعيفاً من التحصيل - غاية الضعف بخلاف الصورة فإن الجوهر متحد مع مفهوم الممتد و منغمر فيه كما علمت من فناء الجنس في الفصل فالهيولى في الجسم ليس إلا جوهرًا محضاً له في الوجود قابلية التلبس بأية صورة و صفة كانت كما أن الجنس ليس له إلا مفهوم الجوهر الممكن له في نفس ذاته الاتحاد بقيوده المتنوعة و المشخصة و الإمكان الاستعدادي في المادة بإزاء الإمكان الذاتي في الجنس و كذلك الصورة فيه هي الجسمية و الاتصال كما أن الفصل له هو مفهوم قولنا الممتد و هو أمر بسيط لا يدخل فيه شيء لا عاماً و لا خاصاً على ما عليه المحققون حيث ذكروا أن ذكر الشيء في تفسير المشتقات بيان لما رجع إليه الضمير الذي يبرز فيه لا غير و يؤكد ذلك قول الشيخ في الشفاء و هو أن الفصل الذي يقال بالتواطؤ معناه شيء بصفة كذا جوهرًا أو كيفاً مثاله أن الناطق هو شيء له نطق فليس في كونه شيئاً له نطق هو أنه جوهر أو عرض إلا أنه يعرف من خارج أنه لا يمكن أن يكون هذا الشيء إلا جوهرًا أو جسمًا انتهى.

فقد ظهر وجه كون الجنس في ماهية الجسم مأخوذاً من الهيولى و الفصل من الصورة و هكذا الحكم في نظائره من الحقائق التركيبية بإجزاء ما ذكرناه فيه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٩

و لنا في هذا المقام زيادة تحقيق و توضيح للكلام فاستمع لما يتلى عليك من الأسرار ملتزماً صونه عن الأغيار الأشرار و هو أن الحكماء قد أطبقوا على أن الجنس بالقياس إلى فصله عرض لازم كما أن الفصل بالقياس إليه خاصة ثم ذكروا أن الجنس في المركبات الخارجية متحد مع المادة و الفصل مع الصورة فيلزم من هذين الحكمين عدم كون فصول الجواهر جواهر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٤٠

بمعنى كونها مندرجة تحت معنى الجواهر اندراج الأنواع تحت جنسها بل كاندراج الملزومات تحت لازمها الذي لا يدخل في ماهيتها و يلزم من هذا عدم كون الصور الجسمية و غيرها جوهرًا بالمعنى المذكور فيه و إن صدق عليها معناه صدقاً عرضياً - و لا يلزم من عدم كونها تحت مقولة الجوهر بالذات اندراجها تحت إحدى المقولات التسع العرضية حتى يلزم تقوم نوع جوهري من العرض فإن الماهيات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٤١

البسيطة خارجاً و عقلاً ليست واقعة في ذاتها تحت شيء من الأجناس و لا يقدر ذلك في حصر المقولات في العشر على ما أوضحه الشيخ في قاطيغورياس الشفاء فإن المراد من انحصار الأشياء فيها أن كل ما له من الأشياء حد نوعي فهو منحصر في هذه المقولات بالذات و لا يجب أن يكون لكل شيء حد و إلا يلزم الدور أو التسلسل بل من الأشياء ما

يتصور بنفسها لا بحدّها كالوجود و كثير من الوجدانيات فإن قلت إن الإنسان مركب من البدن الذي هو مادته و نفسه التي هي صورته و قد برهن على جوهرية النفس و تجردها و بقائها بعد بوار البدن ببراهين قطعية كما ستقف عليها إن شاء الله تعالى و ما ذكرت في أمر الصور من عدم جوهريتها فهو بعينه جار في النفس الناطقة لأنها صورة أيضا و مبدءا للفصل في حد الإنسان.

قلت إن للنفس الإنسانية اعتبارين اعتبار كونها صورة و نفسا و اعتبار كونها ذاتا في نفسها و مناط الاعتبار الأول كون الشيء موجودا لغيره و مناط الاعتبار الثاني كونه موجودا في نفسه أعم من أن يكون موجودا لنفسه أو لغيره- و لما كانت الصورة الحالة وجودها في نفسها بعينه وجودها للمادة فالاعتباران فيها متحد بخلاف الصورة المجردة فإن وجودها في نفسها لما كان هو وجودها لنفسها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢

بناء على تجردها في ذاتها عن المادة فيختلف هناك الاعتباران و يتغير بحسبهما الوجودان و لهذا زوال الصورة الحالة عن المادة يوجب فسادها في نفسها بخلاف الصورة المجردة فإن وجودها للمادة و إن استلزم وجودها في نفسها لكن زوالها عن المادة لا يوجب فسادها في نفسها و ذلك لتغير الوجودين.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول كون الشيء واقعا تحت مقولة بحسب اعتبار وجوده في نفسه لا يوجب كونه واقعا باعتبار آخر تحت تلك المقولة بل و لا تحت مقولة من المقولات فالنفس الإنسانية و إن كانت بحسب ذاتها جوهرًا و بحسب نفسيته مضافًا- لكن بحسب كونها جزءًا للجسم باعتبار و صورة مقومة لوجوده باعتبار آخر لا يجب أن يكون جوهرًا كما في سائر صور المادية على ما علمت فكون النفس جوهرًا مجردًا و إن كان حقا لكن كونها مقومة لوجود الجسم صادقا عليها و على الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو باعتباره مادة الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو باعتباره جنس ليس باعتبار كونها ذاتا جوهرية منفردة فإن كونها حقيقة أحديه شيء و كونها حالا من أحوال البدن شيء آخر نظير ذلك ما يقال في دفع ما يرد على قاعدة الحكماء أن كل حادث يسبقه استعداد مادة من الانتقاض بالنفوس المجردة الحادثة كما هو رأي المعلم الأول و هو أن البدن الإنساني لما استدعى باستعداده الخاص صورة مدبرة له متصرفه فيه أي أمرا موصوفا بهذه الصفة من حيث هو كذلك فوجب على مقتضى جود الواهب الفياض وجود شيء يكون مصدرا للتدابير الإنسية و الأفاعيل البشرية و هذا لا يمكن إلا أن يكون ذاتا مجردة في ذاتها فلا محالة قد فاض عليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣

حقيقة النفس لا من حيث إن البدن استدعاها بل من حيث عدم انفكاكها عما استدعاه البدن فالبدن استدعى بمزاجه الخاص أمرا ماديا لكن جود المبدء الفياض اقتضى ذاتا قدسية و كما أن الشيء الواحد يكون جوهرًا و عرضا باعتبارين- كما مر فكذلك قد يكون أمر واحد مجردا و ماديا باعتبارين فالنفس الإنسانية مجردة ذاتا مادية فعلا فهي من حيث الفعل من التدبير و التحريك مسبوقه باستعداد البدن مقترنة به و أما من حيث الذات و الحقيقة فمنشأ وجودها جود المبدء الواهب لا غير فلا يسبقها من تلك الحيثية استعداد البدن و لا يلزمها الاقتران في وجودها به و لا يلحقها شيء من مثالب الماديات إلا بالعرض فهذا ما ذكرته في دفع ذلك الإيراد على تلك القاعدة فانظر إليه بنظر الاعتبار إذ مع وضوحه

لا يخلو عن غموض و يمكن تأويل ما نقل عن أفلاطون الإلهي في باب قدم النفس إليه بوجه لطيف.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤

طريقة أخرى ثم إنك لو تأملت في أصولنا السابقة و تذكرت ما بينه الشيخ المتأله السهروردي في كتابيه من كون النفس ذات حقيقة بسيطة نورية و ذلك في حكمة الإشراف و إنية صرفة و ذلك في التلوينات و المال واحد- إذ الظهور عين الفعلية و الوجود و قد بين بالأصول الإشرافية كون النور حقيقة بسيطة لا جنس لها و لا فصل و ليس الاختلاف بين أفرادها بأمر ذاتي بل إنما هو بمجرد الكمال و النقص في أصل الحقيقة النورية الوجودية لعلمت أن الذوات المجردة النورية غير واقعة تحت مقولة الجوهر و إن كانت وجوداتها لا في موضوع- فعليك يا حبيبي بهذه القاعدة فإن لها عمقا عظيما ذهل عنه جمهور القوم و بمراجعة كتبه و قواعده في دفع شكوك تستعرض لك فيها

نكتة مشرقية:

لعلك قد تفتنت مما تلوناه عليك سابقا و لاحقا بأن العالم كله وجود و الوجود كله نور و النور العارض نور على نور فانظر إلى البدن الإنساني كيف يكون من حيث اشتماله على الصور و القوى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥

التي هي مبادي الأفاعيل معسكر الجنود النفس النورية الأسفهدية في عالم الأضداد و محلا لأنوارها و آثارها و تلك القوى و الآلات مع أمير جيشها جميعا- وجودات صرفة و أنوار محضة كسرج متفاوتة في النور مترتبة بحسب النضد و الترتيب- بعضها فوق بعض مشتعلة من نور واحد بل مقهورة تحت استقلاله كما يشاهد من عدم استقلال الأنوار الضعيفة في مشهد النور القوى في التأثير و الإنارة فهكذا حكم عالم الوجود جميعا في كونها أشعة و أنوارا و أضواء للذات الأحدية الواجبية- إذ الوجود كله من شروق نوره و لمعان ظهوره كما هو مشاهد من الشمس المحسوس الذي هو المثل الأعلى له في السماوات و الأرض إلا أن بين الأشعتين فرقا و هو أن أشعة شمس العقل أحياء عاقلة ناطقة فعالة و أشعة شمس الحس أعراض و أنوار لغيرها لا لذاتها غير أحياء عاقلة فاعلة و سيأتيك تفصيل هذه الأحكام في مواضعها إن شاء الله تعالى.

ذكر إجمالي:

كلما كانت الصورة أشد فعلية و شرفا و نورية كانت المادة القابلة لها أشد انفعالا و خسة و ظلمة.

ذكر تفصيلي:

الهولى الأولى كما سيتضح منبع الخسة و مركز دائرة الشر و الوحشة تلك عجوزة شوهاء لم يصادفها نفس نورية إلا بعد تحليلها بحلل الصور الجسمية و النوعية و تنورها بنور القوى و الكيفيات و خروجها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦

عن صرافة قوتها و سذاجة وحشتها و ظلمتها و حيث تحقق أن مبدأ تلك الصور- و القوى و الكيفيات بعد تعلق النفس هي النفس بتأييد المبدأ الأعلى فإذا انقطع تعلق النفس عنها و أنبت فيضان ما يفيض عليها من القوى و الكيفيات التي

كانت البستها و حللها صارت كأنها راجعة إلى صرافة هيوليتها المعراة عن كل حلية و صفة في نفسها فأصبحت معرضا للانمحاق و التلاشي موحشة للطبع مستكرهة عليه - كما يشاهد من استيحاش الإنسان عن رؤية أجساد الأموات الإنسانية و انقباضه عن الانفراد بميت سيما في الليل المظلم

فصل (٩) في تحقيق الصور و المثل الأفلاطونية

قد نسب إلى أفلاطون الإلهي أنه قال في كثير من أقاويله موافقا لأستاده سقراط إن للموجودات صور مجردة في عالم الإله و ربما يسميها المثل الإلهية و أنها لا تدثر و لا تفسد و لكنها باقية و أن الذي يدثر و يفسد إنما هي الموجودات التي هي كائنة.

قال الشيخ في إلهيات الشفاء ظن قوم أن القسمة توجب وجود شيئين في كل شيء كإنسانين في معنى الإنسانية إنسان فاسد محسوس و إنسان معقول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧

مفارق أبدي لا يتغير و جعلوا لكل واحد منهما وجودا فسموا الوجود المفارق وجودا مثاليا و جعلوا لكل واحد من الأمور الطبيعية صورة مفارقة و إياها يتلقى العقل إذ كان المعقول شيئا لا يفسد و كل محسوس من هذه فهو فاسد - و جعلها العلوم و البراهين تنحو نحو هذه و إياها تتناول و كان المعروف بأفلاطون و معلمه سقراط يفرطان في هذا الرأي و يقولان إن للإنسانية معنى واحدا موجودا يشترك فيها الأشخاص و يبقى مع بطلانها و ليس هو المعنى المحسوس المتكرر الفاسد فهو إذن المعنى المعقول المفارق انتهى و نحن بعون الله و توفيقه نذكر أولا وجوه ما قيل في تأويل كلامه و ما يقدح به في كل من وجوه التأويل ثم ما هو الحق عندي في تحقيق الصور المفارقة و المثل.

فنقول قد أول الشيخ الرئيس كلامه بوجود الماهية المجردة عن اللواحق لكل شيء القابلة للمتقابلات و لا شك أن أفلاطون الذي أحد تلاميذه المعلم الأول مع جلالة شأنه أجل من أن ينسب إليه عدم التفرقة بين التجريد بحسب اعتبار العقل و بين التجريد بحسب الوجود أو بين اعتبار الماهية لا بشرط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨

اقتران شيء معها و بين اعتبارها بشرط عدم الاقتران أو الخلط بين الواحد بالمعنى و الواحد بالعدد و الوجود حتى يلزم من كون الإنسانية واحدا بالمعنى - كونها واحدا بالعدد و الوجود و هو بعينه يوجد في كثيرين و الجهل بأن الإنسان إذا لم يكن في حد ذاته شيئا من العوارض كالوحدة و الكثرة لزم أن يكون القول - بأن الإنسان من حيث هو إنسان واحد أو أبدي أو غير ذلك مما هو معاين لحده قولاً مناقضاً أو الظن بأن قولنا الإنسان يوجد دائما معناه أن إنسانية واحدة بعينها باقية كيف و التفرقة بين هذه الأمور و التمييز بين معانيها مما لا يخفى على المتوسطين من أولي ارتياض النفس بالعلوم العقلية فضلا عن أولئك العظماء.

و قال المعلم الثاني في كتاب الجمع بين رأيي أفلاطون و أرسطو إنه إشارة إلى أن للموجودات صوراً في علم الله تعالى باقية لا تتبدل و لا تتغير و بين ذلك بعض المتأخرين حيث قال إن في عالم الحس شيئا محسوسا مثل الإنسان مع مادته و عوارضه المخصوصة و هذا هو الإنسان الطبيعي و لا شك في أن يتحقق شيء هو الإنسان منظورا إلى ذاته من حيث

هو هو غير مأخوذ معه ما خالطه من الوحدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩

والكثرة وغيرهما من الأعراض الزائدة على الإنسانية وهو المعنى الذي يحمل على كثيرين من زيد وعمرو والإنسان المجرد عن العوارض الخارجية المتشخصة بالتشخصات العقلية فحين يحمل العقل الإنسان على زيد وعمرو التفت لا محالة إلى معنى مجرد من العوارض الغريبة حتى إنه مجرد عن التجرد والإطلاق - فهذا المعنى له وجود لا محالة فإما أن يكون ذلك الوجود في الخارج أو في العقل - وعلى الأول لزم أن يكون الشخص عارضا خارجيا مؤخرا عن الماهية في الوجود - فتعين الثاني وهو كونه موجودا في العقل متشخصا بشخص عقلي بحيث يمكن أن يلتفت إليه بدون الالتفات إلى تشخصه وهذا المعنى جوهر لحمله على الجواهر حملا اتحاديا فيثبت بذلك وجود جواهر عقلية في العقول يكون تلك الجواهر ماهيات الموجودات الخارجية وهذا هو بعينه مذهب أفلاطون فإن قيل المشهور أن أفلاطون أثبت الجواهر العقلية في الأعيان بحيث هي ماهيات كليات للأفراد الخارجية.

قلت لعل مراده بالأعيان العقول فإنها أعيان العالم الحسي والعالم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٠

الحسي إنما هو ظل لها عنده انتهى كلامه وهذا التأويل مستبعد جدا إذ المنقول عن أفلاطون والأقدمين وتشنيعات اللاحقين من أتباع أرسطو على مذهبهم يدل على أن تلك الصور موجودة في الخارج قائمة بذواتها لا في موضوع و محل وقد نقل عنه أنه قال إني رأيت عند التجرد أفلاكا نورية وعن هرمس أنه كان يقول إن ذاتا روحانية أقت إلى المعارف فقلت من أنت قال أنا طباعك التام ولو لم يكن لكلماتهم دلالة صريحة على أن لكل نوع موجودا مجردا شخصيا في العالم الإبداع - لما شنعوا عليهم بما نقله الفارابي من أنه يجب من أقوالهم أن يكون في العقول خطوط و سطوح و أفلاك ثم توجد حركات تلك الأفلاك والأدوار وأن يوجد هناك علوم مثل علم النجوم وعلم اللحون و أصوات مؤتلفة وطب و هندسة و مقادير مستقيمة و آخر معوجة و أشياء باردة و أشياء حارة و بالجملة كيفية فاعلة و منفعة - و كليات و جزويات و مواد و صور في شاعات أخر و قال شيخنا وسيدنا و من إليه سندنا في العلوم أدام الله علوه و مجده في بعض كتبه العقلية أن القضاء على ضربين مختلفين علمي وعيني و كما يصح أن يعنى به ظهور في العلم و تمثيل في العالم العقلي فكذلك يصح أن يعنى به وجود في الأعيان و علمناك أنه يمتنع اللانهاية بالفعل في القدر لأن القضاء قرب القضاء و القدر وراء ما لا يتناهى و لا يضيق عن الإحاطة بجملة ما لا نهاية له مجملة و مفصلة و هو واسع عليم و أن ما يوجد في وعاء الدهر و يتم وجوده التدريجي بالفعل في أفق التغير و يبقى تحققه بتمامه في وعاء الدهر بقاء دهريا لا زمانيا فإنه يجب أن يكون متناهي الكمية سواء كان في الآزال أو في الآباد و أن الماديات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥١

ليست في القضاء أعني بحسب الوجود العيني في وعاء الدهر الوجودي عند رب القضاء و القدر متأخرة عن حصول موادها بل هي و موادها بحسب ذلك في درجة واحدة - فلو سمعنا نقول إن الماديات إنما هي مادية في القدر و في أفق

الزمان لا في القضاء الوجودي في وعاء الدهر و في الحصول الحضوري عند العليم الحق فافقه أنا نعني بذلك سلب سبق المادة في ذلك النحو من الوجود لا مفارقة المادة و الانسلاخ عنها هناك حتى يصير المادي مجردا باعتبار آخر و أحق ما يسمى به الموجودات الزمانية بحسب وقوعها في القضاء العيني أي تحققها في وعاء الدهر المثل العينية أو القضائية و الصور الوجودية أو الدهرية و بحسب وقوعها في القدر أي حصولها في أفق الزمان الأعيان الكونية أو الكائنات القدرية فهذا سر مرموز الحكماء من أهل التحصيل و إني لست أظن بإمام اليونانيين غير هذا السر إلا أن أتباع المعلم المشائية أساءوا به الظن و استناموا إلى ما سولته لهم أو هامهم و قصرُوا في الفحص [و وفروا] و وقروا [و وفروا] على وقيعتهم في المثل الأفلاطونية و عد مساويها- فلم يكن اعتمادهم إلا لانطفاء نور الحكمة و تفاشي ديجور الظلمة انتهت عبارته. و حاصلها أن جميع الماديات و الزمانيات و إن كانت في أنفسها و بقياس بعضها إلى بعض مفتقرة إلى الأمكنة و الأزمنة و الأوضاع الموجبة لحجاب بعضها عن بعض لكنها بالقياس إلى إحاطة علم الله تعالى إليها علما إشراقيا شهوديا و انكشافا تاما و جوديا في درجة واحدة من الشهود و الوجود لا سبق لبعضها على بعض من هذه الحيشية فلا تجدد و لا زوال و لا حدوث لها في حضورها لدى الحق الأول- فلا افتقار لها في هذا الشهود إلى استعدادات الهيولانية و أوضاع جسمانية- فحكمها من هذه الجهة حكم المجردات عن الأمكنة و الأزمنة فالأقدمون من الحكماء ما راموا بالمثل المفارقة إلا هذا المعنى دون غيره لثلا يرد عليهم المحذورات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٢

الشيعة المشهورة و لك أن تقول بعد تسليم إن الأشخاص الكائنة التي وجودها ليس إلا وجودا ماديا صح كونها مجردة باعتبار آخر لكن لا ريب في أنها متعددة في وجوداتها و المنقول عن أفلاطونيين من أن لكل نوع جسماني فردا مجردا أبديا دال على وحدتها كما يدل على تجردها كيف و التجرد أيضا مستلزم للوحدة كما برهن عليه فحمل كلامهم على ذلك المعنى في غاية البعد.

و أول بعضهم المثل الأفلاطونية إلى الموجودات المعلقة التي هي في عالم المثل و هو أيضا غير صحيح لما سبق أما أولا فلأن هؤلاء العظماء القائلين بالمثل و الأشباح المعلقة قائلون أيضا بالمثل الأفلاطونية. و أما ثانيا فلأن تلك المثل نورية عظيمة ثابتة في عالم الأنوار العقلية- و هذه الأشباح المعلقة ذوات أوضاع جسمانية منها ظلمانية يتعذب بها الأشقياء- و هي صور سود زرق مكروهة يتألم النفوس بمشاهدتها و منها مستنيرة يتنعم بها السعداء و هي صور حسنة بهية بيض مرد كأمثال اللؤلؤ المكنون.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٣

و ذهب الشيخ المتأله المتعصب لأفلاطون و معلميه و حكماء الفرس موافقا لهم- إلى أنه يجب أن يكون لكل نوع من الأنواع البسيطة الفلكية و العنصرية و مركباتها النباتية و الحيوانية عقل واحد مجرد عن المادة معتن في حق ذلك النوع- و هو صاحب ذلك النوع و ربه

و قد استدل على إثباتها بوجوه.

الأول ما ذكره في المطارحات

و هو أن القوى النباتية من الغذائية و النامية و المولدة أعراض أما على رأي الأوائل فلحلولها في محل كيف كان و أما على رأي المتأخرين فلحلولها في محل يستغني عنها لأن صور العناصر كافية في تقويم وجود الهيولى و إلا لما صح وجود العناصر و الممتزجات العنصرية - و إذا كانت الصور كافية في تقويم الهيولى لزم أن يكون القوى الثلاثة المذكورة أعراضا و إذا كانت هذه القوى أعراضا فالحامل لها إما الروح البخاري أو الأعضاء - فإن كان هو الروح الذي هو دائم التحلل و التبدل فيتبدل القوى الحالة بتبدل محالها و إن كان الأعضاء و ما من عضو منها إلا و للحرارة سواء كانت غريزية أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٤

غريبة عنها عليها سلطنة فالأجسام النباتية لاشتمالها على رطوبة و حرارة - شأنها تحليل الرطوبة فيتبدل أجزاؤها و يتحلل دائما فإذا بطل جزء من المحل بطل ما فيه من القوة و يتبدل الباقي بورود الوارد من الغذاء فالحافظ للمزاج بالبدل و المستبقي زمانا يمتنع أن يكون هو القوة و الأجزاء الباطلة لامتناع تأثير المعدوم و كذا الحافظ و المستبقي له لا يجوز أن يكون القوة و الأجزاء التي ستحدث بعد ذلك لأن وجودها بسبب المزاج فهي فرع عليه و الفرع لا يحفظ الأصل و لأن القوة النامية تحدث بسبب إيراد الوارد من الغذاء في المورد عليه خلا [خلالا] تستلزم تحريك الوارد و تحريك المورد عليه إلى جهات مختلفة و يسد بالغذاء ما يحلل منه و يلصقه بالأجزاء المختلفة الماهيات و الجهات - فهذه الأفاعيل المختلفة مع ما فيها من التركيب العجيب و النظام المتقن الغريب و الهيئات الحسنة و التخاطيط المستحسنة لا يمكن صدورها عن طبيعة قوة لا إدراك لها و لا ثبات في النبات و الحيوان و ما ظن أن للنبات نفسا مجردة مدبرة فليس بحق و إلا لكانت ضائعة معطلة ممنوعة عن الكمال أبدا و ذلك محال ثم القوة المسماة عندهم بالمصورة قوة بسيطة فكيف صدر عنها تصوير الأعضاء مع المنافع الكثيرة - في حفظ الأشخاص و الأنواع و غير ذلك مما هو مذكور في كتب التشريح

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٥

و العاقل الفطن إذا تأمل ذلك و ما انضم إليه من الحكم و عجائب الصنع التي في كتاب الحيوان و النبات علم أن هذه الأفاعيل العجيبة و الأعمال الغريبة لا يمكن صدورها عن قوة لا تصرف لها و لا إدراك بل لا بد و أن تكون صادرة عن قوة مجردة عن المادة مدركة لذاتها و لغيرها و يسمى تلك القوة المدبرة للأجسام النباتية عقلا و هو من الطبقة العرضية التي هي أرباب الأصنام و الطلسمات.

فإن قلت يجوز أن يكون تلك القوة الفاعلة لأبداننا و المدبرة لها هي نفوسنا الناطقة.

قلنا نحن نعلم بالضرورة غفلتنا عن هذه التدابير العجيبة و نجدها لا خبر عندنا بأنها متى صارت الأغذية في الأعضاء المختلفة المتباعدة و لا شعور لنا حين كمال عقلنا بأوان تميزها بالأخلاق و ذهابها إلى الأعضاء المختلفة و الأوضاع و الجهات و صيرورتها مشكلة بالأشكال المختلفة و التخاطيط العجيبة فضلا عن بدو فطرتنا و زمان جهلنا و نقصنا فالفاعل لهذه الأفعال غير نفوسنا و ليست

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٦

مركبة لتفعل بجزء و تدرك بجزء آخر

الوجه الثاني أنك إذا تأملت الأنواع الواقعة في عالمنا هذا وجدت أنها غير واقعة بمجرد الاتفاقات

و إلا لما كانت أنواعها محفوظة عندنا و أمكن حينئذ أن يحصل من الإنسان غير الإنسان و من الفرس غير الفرس و من النخل غير النخل و من البر غير البر و ليس كذلك بل هي مستمرة الثبات على نمط واحد - من غير تبدل و تغيير فالأمور الثابتة على نهج واحد لا يبتني على الاتفاقات الصرفة ثم الألوان الكثيرة العجيبة في ريش الطواويس ليس كما يقول المشاءون من أن سببها أمزجة تلك الريشة مع أنهم لا برهان لهم على ذلك و لا يمكنهم تعيين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٧

تلك الأسباب للألوان فكيف يحكمون بمثل هذه الأحكام المختلفة من غير مراعاة قانون مضبوط في ذلك النوع فالحق عند ذلك ما قاله القدماء إنه يجب أن يكون لكل نوع من الأنواع الجسمية جوهر مجرد نوري قائم بنفسه هو مدبر له و معتن به و حافظ له و هو كلي ذلك النوع و لا يعنون بالكلي ما نفس تصور معناه لا يمنع وقوع الشركة فيه و كيف يمكن لهم أن يريدوا به ذلك المعنى مع اعترافهم بأنه قائم بنفسه و هو يعقل ذاته و غيره و له ذات متخصصة لا يشاركها فيه غيره و لا يعتقدون بأن رب النوع الإنساني أو الفرسى أو غيرهما من الأنواع إنما أوجد لأجل ما تحته من النوع - بحيث يكون ذلك النوع قابلاً و مثلاً لذلك العقل المجرد فإنهم أشد مبالغة في أن العالي لا يحصل لأجل السافل الذي تحته بالمرتبة و لو كان مذهبهم هذا للزم أن يكون للمثال مثال آخر و هكذا إلى غير النهاية و ذلك محال بل الذي يعنون به أن رب النوع لتجرده نسبته إلى جميع أشخاص النوع على السواء في اعتنائها بها و دوام فيضه عليها و كانه بالحقيقة هو الكل و الأصل و هي الفروع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٨

الوجه الثالث استدلالهم عليها من جهة قاعدة إمكان الأشرف و الأخس

فإن الممكن الأخس إذا وجد فيجب أن يكون الممكن الأشرف قد وجد قبله - و برهانه مذكور في كتبه و لما كان عجائب الترتيبات و لطائف النسب واقعة في العالم الجسماني من الأفلاك و الكواكب و العناصر و مركباتها و كذلك في عالم النفوس من العجائب الروحانية و الغرائب الجسمانية من أحوال قواها و كيفية تعلقها بالأبدان و لا شك أن عجائب الترتيب و لطائف النسب و النظام الواقع في العالم العقلي النوري أشرف و أفضل من الواقع في هذين العالمين الآخرين في الوجود فيجب مثلها في ذلك العالم كيف و غرائب الترتيب و عجائب النسب في العالم الجسماني أظلال و رسوم لما في العالم العقلي فهي الحقائق و الأصول و الأنواع الجسمانية فروع لها حاصلة منها ثم القائلون بالمثل الأفلاطونية لا يقولون للحيوانية مثال و لكون الشيء ذا رجلين مثال آخر و لكونه ذا جناحين مثال آخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٥٩

و كذا لا يقولون لرائحة المسك مثال و للمسك مثال آخر و لا لحلاوة السكر مثال و للسكر مثال آخر بل يقولون إن كل ما

يستقل من الأنواع الجسمانية له أمر يناسبه في عالم القدس حتى يكون كل نور مجرد من أرباب الأصنام في عالم النور المحض له هيئات نورانية [روحانية] من الأشعة العقلية - و هيئة اللذة و المحبة و العز و الذل و القهر و غير ذلك من المعاني و الهيئات فإذا وقع ظله في العالم الجسماني يكون صنمه المسك مع ريحه الطيبة و السكر مع الطعم الحلو أو الصورة الإنسانية أو الفرسية أو غيرهما من الصور النوعية على اختلاف أعضائها و تباين تخاطيبتها و أوضاعها على التناسب الموجود في الأنوار المجردة هذه أقوال هذا الشيخ المتأله في هذا الباب

و لا شك أنها في غاية الجودة و اللطافة لكن فيها أشياء

منها عدم بلوغها حد الإجداء

حيث لم يعلم من تلك الأقوال أن هذه الأنوار العقلية أهي من حقيقة أصنامها الحسية حتى إن فردا واحدا من جملة أفراد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٠

كل نوع جسماني يكون مجردا و الباقي ماديا أم ليس كذلك بل يكون كل من تلك الأنوار المجردة مثالا لنوع مادي لا مثلا لأفراده و المروي عن أفلاطون و تشنيعات المشاءين عليه يدل دلالة صريحة على أن تلك الأرباب العقلية من نوع أصنامهم المادية و يؤيد ذلك تسمية حكماء الفرس رب كل نوع باسم ذلك النوع - حتى إن النبتة التي يسمونها هوم التي تدخل في أوضاع نواميسهم يقدسون لصاحب نوعها و يسمونها هوم إيزد و كذا لجميع الأنواع فإنهم يقولون لصاحب صنم الماء من الملكوت خرداد و ما للأشجار سموه مرداد و ما للنار سموه أردي بهشت - و صاحب الإشراق حمل كلام المتقدمين في تلك الأرباب و تسميتهم كل رب باسم صنمه على مجرد المناسبة و العلية لا على المماثلة النوعية كما يدل عليه قوله في المطارحات و إذا سمعت أنباذقلس و أغاثا ذيمون و غيرهما يشيرون إلى أصحاب الأنواع فافهم غرضهم و لا تظن أنهم يقولون إن صاحب النوع جسم أو جسماني أو له رأس و رجلان و إذا وجدت هرمس يقول إن ذاتا روحانية أقت إلي المعارف فقلت لها من أنت فقال أنا طباعك التام فلا تحمله على أنه مثلنا انتهى.

و منها أن الرجلين و الجناحين و غير ذلك من الأعضاء إذا كانت من أجزاء ذات الحيوان

كيف يكون ذات بسيطة نورية مثالا له سواء أخذت وحدها أو مع هيئاتها النورية و المماثلة بين المثال و الممثل له و إن لم يشترط من جميع الوجوه لكن يلزم أن يقع الجوهر من كل منهما بإزاء الجوهر من الآخر - و العرضي بإزاء العرضي.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦١

و منها أن تلك الأرباب عنده من حقيقة النور و الظهور

و أصنامها إما برازخ أو هيئات ظلمانية و أي مناسبة بين الأنوار و هيئاتها النورية و بين البرازخ و هيئاتها الظلمانية كيف و جميع الأنوار المجردة العقلية و النفسية و المحسوسة الكوكبية و العنصرية عندهم حقيقة واحدة بسيطة لا اختلاف بينها إلا بالشدة و الضعف أو بأمور الخارجة و الأنوار العقلية العرضية التي هي أصحاب الأصنام آثارها ماهيات متخالفة الذوات كما هو رأيهم في أن أثر الجاعل الماهية دون الوجود لأنه من الاعتبارات الذهنية و لا شك أن اختلاف الآثار - إما لاختلاف في القابل أو لاختلاف في الفاعل و إذا كان الأثر لا قابل له فهو لاختلاف الفاعل لا محالة و إذا كان آثار العقول

مختلفة و ليس الاختلاف بين الآثار بمجرد اختلاف القابل إذ القوابل و استعداداتها من جملة معلولاتها المختلفة مع أنه لا قابل للقوابل و لا لاختلاف تلك الفعالة إذ لا اختلاف بينها إلا بالكمال و النقص فيجب أن يكون اختلاف آثارها أيضا على هذا المنوال و هذا أيضا مما يوقع الطمأنينة في أن آثار العقول و المبادي الرفيعة التي هي إنيات وجودية نورية يجب أن يكون وجودات الماهيات دون معانيها الكلية و أن اختلاف الماهيات المنتزعة عن أنحاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٢

الوجودات إنما هو لأجل اختلاف مراتب الوجودات شدة و ضعفا و تقدما و تأخيرا- و تركيبا و وحدانا فللوجودات باعتبار مراتبها و نسبها الواقعة بينها لوازم متخالفة أما تنظر إلى العدد و مراتبه المتخالفة الخواص و الآثار مع أنها حصلت من الأحاد و الواحد متشابه فيها فإن للمراتب و النسب خواص عجيبة و آثار غريبة يعلمه أصحاب العلوم العددية و الصنائع النجومية

تنبيه:

فالحري أن يحمل كلام الأوائل على أن لكل نوع من الأنواع الجسمانية فردا كاملا تاما في عالم الإبداع هو الأصل و المبدأ و سائر أفراد النوع فروع و معاليل و آثار له و ذلك لتمامه و كماله لا يفتقر إلى مادة و لا إلى محل متعلق به بخلاف هذه فإنها لضعفها و نقصها مفتقرة إلى مادة في ذاتها أو في فعلها و قد علمت جواز اختلاف أفراد نوع واحد كمالا و نقصا- و قول بعضهم إن الحقيقة الواحدة كيف يقوم بعضها بنفسه و بعضها بغيره و لو استغنى بعضها عن المحل لاستغنى الجميع ليس بصحيح مطلقا بل في المتواطئة فإن استغناء بعض الوجودات عن المحل إنما هو بكماله و كماله بجوهريته و قوته و غاية نقصه بعرضيته و ضعفه و إضافته إلى محل فلا يلزم من حلول شيء حلول يشاركه في الحقيقة المشتركة بعد التفاوت بينهما بالكمال و النقص و الشدة و الضعف و علمت أيضا أن كلا من الأنواع الجسمانية يتنوع و يتحقق و يتقوم بمحض الصورة النوعية التي هي متحدة مع الفصل الأخير و المادة في الجميع أمر مبهم وجودها قوة شيء آخر كما أن الجنس المأخوذ منها ماهية ناقصة متحدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٣

مع الفصل و باقي الصور و القوى و الكيفيات و مبادي الفصول في المركب بمنزلة الشرائط و الآلات و الفروع لذات واحدة هي بعينها صنم لصاحب نوعه كما أنها أصنام لأصحاب أنواعها نسبتها إليه نسبة الفروع إلى أصل واحد و كذا الهيئات و النسب و الأشكال التي فيها أطلال لهيئات عقلية و نسب معنوية في أربابها النورية- و نسبة صاحب النوع الإنساني المسمى بروح القدس و هو عقله الفياض عليه إلى أصحاب سائر الأنواع الحيوانية و النباتية كنسبة الأصنام إلى الأصنام فهذه الصور النوعية المادية كالإنسانية و الفرسية و الثورية و غيرها من الأنواع و إن كانت مفتقرة في عالمنا هذا إلى أن تقوم بمادة حسية فهي غير مفتقرة في العالم العلوي إلى قيامها بذلك بل هي في ذلك العالم العقلي مجردة عن المادة قائمة بذاتها مستغنية عما تحل فيه كما أن الصور الذهنية و هي المأخوذة من الأمور الخارجة أعراض قائمة في الذهن لا تقوم بذاتها و إن كانت مأخوذة من الجواهر القائمة بذواتها فكذلك يكون حكم صور الأنواع الجسمانية الحاصلة في المادة من تلك المثل المجردة العقلية الأفلاطونية فإن للصور المجردة العقلية كمالية في حد ذاتها و تمامية

في ماهياتها به تستغني عن القيام في المحل و أما الصور الجسمانية التي هي أصنامها فإن لها نقصا يحوج إلى القيام بالمحل لكونها كمالاتا لغيرها- فلا يمكن أن يقوم بذاتها كالجواهر الصورية الموجودة في الذهن المأخوذة من الأمور العينية المادية فإنها وإن كانت مجردة عن المادة في العقل فهي غير مجردة عن المادة في الخارج فكذلك يكون حكم الصور العقلية التي هي أرباب الأنواع- فإنها وإن كانت مجردة في عالم العقل فأصنامها و أطلالها الجسمانية أعني الصور النوعية غير مجردة عن المادة و لا يتوهم من إطلاقهم المثل على الصور العقلية القائمة بذواتها في عالم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٤

الإله أن هؤلاء العظماء من الفلاسفة يرون أن أصحاب الأنواع إنما وجدت من المبدع الحق- لتكون مثلاً و قوالب لما تحتها لأن ما يتخذ له المثال و القالب يجب أن يكون أشرف و أعلى لأنه الغاية و لا يصح في العقول هذا فإنهم أشد مبالغة من المشاءين في أن العالي لا يكون لأجل السافل بل عندهم أن صور الأنواع الجسمانية أصنام و أطلال لتلك الأرباب النورية العقلية و لا نسبة بينها في الشرف و الكمال ثم كيف يحتاج الواجب تعالى في إيجاد الأشياء إلى مثل ليكون دستورات لصنعه و برنامجات لخلقه- و لو احتاج لاحتاج في إيجاد المثل إلى مثل أخرى إلى غير النهاية. فإن قلت قد خالفت المعلم الأول حيث يرد على هذا المذهب.

قلت الحق أحق بالاتباع مع أن رده إما على ما يفهمه الجمهور من ظاهر كلام أفلاطون و الأقدمين فإن من عادتهم بناء الكلام على الرموز و التجوزات- خصوصا في هذا المبحث الذي يخرس فيه الفصحاء و تكل منه الأفهام فضلا و شرفا- و إما لشوب حبه للرئاسة اللازم عن معاشرة الخلق و خلطه الملوك و السلاطين و إلا فكتابه المعروف بأثولوجيا يشهد بأن مذهبه وافق مذهب أستاذه- في باب وجود المثل العقلية للأنواع و الصور المجردة النورية القائمة بذواتها في عالم الإبداع حيث قال في الميمر الرابع منه- إن من وراء هذا العالم سماء و أرضا و بحرا و حيوانا و نباتا و ناسا سماويين- و كل من في هذا العالم سماوي و ليس هناك شيء أرضي البتة و قال فيه أيضا إن الإنسان الحسي إنما هو صنم للإنسان العقلي و الإنسان العقلي روحاني و جميع أعضائه روحانية ليس موضع العين غير موضع اليد و لا مواضع الأعضاء كلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٥

مختلفة لكنها في موضع واحد.

و قال في الميمر الثامن منه أن الشيء الذي يفعل بها النار هاهنا إنما هي حياة نارية و هي النار الحقة فالنار إذن التي فوق هذه النار في العالم الأعلى هي أخرى أن تكون نارا فإن كانت نارا حقا فلا محالة أنها حياة و حياتها أرفع و أشرف من حياة هذه النار لأن هذه النار إنما هي صنم لتلك النار فقد بان و صح أن النار التي في العالم الأعلى هي حياة و أن تلك الحياة هي المفيضه القيمة بالحياة على هذه النار- و على هذه الصفة يكون الماء و الهواء هناك أقوى فإنهما هناك حيان كما هما في هذا العالم إلا أنهما في ذلك العالم أكثر حياة لأن تلك هي التي تفيض على هذين اللذين هاهنا الحياة.

و قال فيه أيضا أن هذا العالم الحسي كله إنما هو مثال و صنم لذلك العالم- فإن كان هذا العالم حيا فبالحري أن يكون ذلك العالم الأول حيا و إن كان هذا العالم تاما كاملا فبالحري أن يكون ذلك العالم أتم تماما و أكمل كمالا لأنه هو المفيض على هذا العالم الحياة و القوة و الكمال و الدوام فإن كان العالم الأعلى تاما في غاية التمام فلا محالة أن هناك

الأشياء كلها التي هاهنا إلا أنها فيه نوع أعلى وأشرف كما قلنا مرارا فثم سماء ذات حياة وفيها كواكب مثل هذه الكواكب التي في هذه السماء غير أنها أنور وأكمل وليس بينها افتراق كما يرى هاهنا وذلك أنها ليست جسمانية و هناك أرض ليست ذات سباح لكنها كلها عامرة وفيها الحيوان كلها والطبيعة الأرضية التي هاهنا وفيها نبات مغروس في الحياة وفيها بحار وأنهار جارية جريا حيوانيا وفيها الحيوان المائية كلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٦

و هناك هواء وفيه حيوان هوائية حية شبيهة بذلك الهواء والأشياء التي هناك كلها حية وكيف لا تكون حية وهي في عالم الحياة المحض لا يشوبها الموت البتة - و طبائع الحيوان التي هناك مثل طبائع هذه الحيوانات إلا أن الطبيعة هناك أعلى وأشرف من هذه الطبيعة لأنها عقلية ليست حيوانية.

فمن أنكر قولنا وقال من أين يكون في العالم الأعلى حيوان و سماء و سائر الأشياء التي ذكرناها قلنا إن العالم الأعلى هو الحي التام الذي فيه جميع الأشياء - لأنه أبدع من المبدع الأول التام ففيه كل نفس و كل عقل و ليس هناك فقر و لا حاجة البتة لأن الأشياء التي هناك كلها مملوءة غنى و حياة كأنها حياة تغلي و تفور و جري حياة تلك الأشياء إنما تنبع من عين واحدة لا كأنها حرارة واحدة فقط أو ريح واحدة فقط بل كلها كيفية واحدة فيها كل كيفية يوجد فيها كل طعام و نقول إنك تجد في تلك الكيفية الواحدة طعام الحلاوة و الشراب و سائر الأشياء ذوات الطعوم و قواها و سائر الأشياء الطبية الروائح و جميع الألوان الواقعة تحت البصر و جميع الأشياء الواقعة تحت اللمس و جميع الأشياء الواقعة تحت السمع أي اللحون كلها و أصناف الإيقاع و جميع الأشياء الواقعة تحت الحس و هذه كلها موجودة في كيفية واحدة مبسطة على ما وصفناه لأن تلك الكيفية حيوانية عقلية تسع جميع الكيفيات التي وصفناه و لا يضيق عن شيء منها من غير أن يختلط بعضها ببعض - و يفسد بعضها ببعض بل كلها فيها محفوظة كأن كلا منها قائم على حدة و قال في الميمر العاشر من كتابه إن كل صورة طبيعية في هذا العالم - هي في ذلك العالم إلا أنها هناك بنوع أفضل و أعلى و ذلك أنها هاهنا متعلقة بالهيولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٧

و هي هناك بلا هيولى و كل صورة طبيعية فهي صنم للصورة التي هناك الشبيهة بها فهناك سماء و أرض و حيوان و هواء و ماء و نار فإن كان هناك هذه الصور فلا محالة أن هناك نباتا أيضا.

فإن قال قائل إن كان في العالم الأعلى نبات فكيف هي هناك و إن كان ثم نار و أرض فكيف هما هناك فإنه لا يخلو من أن يكونا هناك إما حيين و إما ميتين فإن كانا ميتين مثل ما هاهنا فما الحاجة إليها هناك فإن كانا حيين فكيف يحييان هناك. قلنا أما النبات فنقدر أن نقول إنه هناك حي أيضا و ذلك أن في النبات كلمة فاعلة محمولة على حياة و إن كانت كلمة النبات الهولاني حية فهو إذن لا محالة نفس ما أيضا و أخرى أن تكون هذه الكلمة في النبات الذي في العالم الأعلى و هو النبات الأول إلا أنها فيه بنوع أعلى و أشرف لأن هذه الكلمة التي هي في هذا النبات إنما هي من تلك الكلمة إلا أن تلك الكلمة واحدة كلية و جميع الكلمات النباتية التي هاهنا متعلقات فاما كلمات النبات التي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٨

هاهنا فكثيرة إلا أنها جزئية فجميع نبات هذا العالم جزئي وهو من ذلك النبات الكلي وكلما طلب الطالب من النبات وجده في ذلك النبات الكلي.

فإن كان هذا هكذا قلنا إنه إن كان هذا النبات حيا فبالحري أن يكون ذلك النبات حيا أيضا لأن ذلك النبات هو النبات الأول الحق فأما هذا النبات فإنه نبات ثان وثالث لأنه صنم لذلك النبات وإنما يحيي هذا النبات بما يفيض عليه ذلك النبات من حياته وأما الأرض التي هناك إن كانت حية أو ميتة فإننا سنعلم ذلك إن نحن علمنا ما هذه الأرض لأنه صنم لتلك فنقول إن لهذه الأرض حياة ما وكلمة فاعلة فإن كانت هذه الأرض الحسية التي هي صنم حية فالحري أن تكون تلك الأرض العقلية حية وأن تكون هي الأرض الأولى وأن تكون هذه الأرض أرضا ثانية لتلك الأرض شبيهة بها والأشياء التي في العالم الأعلى كلها ضياء لأنها في الضوء الأعلى ولذلك كان كل واحد منها يرى الأشياء كلها في ذات صاحبه فصار لذلك كلها في كلها والكل في الواحد منها والواحد منها هو الكل والنور الذي يسبح عليها لا نهاية له فلذلك صار كل واحد واحد منها عظيما انتهت عباراته النورية وكلماته الشريفة بنقل عبد المسيح بن عبد الله الحمصي وإصلاح يعقوب بن إسحاق الكندي وفيها تصريحات واضحة بوجود المثل الأفلاطونية وأن للأشياء الكونية صورة نورية عقلية في عالم العقل وإياها يتلقى الإنسان حين إدراكه للمعقولات الكلية وإن كان إدراكه لها لأجل تعلقه بالبدن والكودورات والظلمات إدراكا ناقصا كإدراك البصر شيئا بعيدا في هواء مغبر مغيث ولذلك السبب يرى الإنسان الأمور العقلية التي هي إنيات محضة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٦٩

متشخصة بذواتها وأنوار صرفة واضحة بأنفسها مبهمة كلية محتملة الصدق عنده على كثيرين كروية شبح يراه من بعيد فيجوز كونه إنسانا أو فرسا أو شجرا إلا أن هاهنا من جهة تعيين الوضع لذلك الشبح لم يجوز إلا كونه واحدا من المختلفات أيها كان وهناك يحتمل عنده كون المدرك العقلي كثيرة بالعدد صادقا عليها لعدم الوضع وبالجملة مناط الكلية والعموم ضعف الوجود وهنه وكون الشيء شبحي الوجود سواء كان بحسب ذاته وماهيته أو بحسب قلة تحصله عند المدرك بعد أن لا يكون ماديا محسوسا وذلك لكلال القوة المدركة وقصورها عن إدراك الأمور الوجودية النورية والمعقولات الشعشعانية بلا حجاب وامتراء غشاوة وعماء لأجل التعلق بعالم الهيولى والظلمات.

إجمال فيه إكمال:

قد ورد في كلام القدماء وشيعتهم الحكم بوجود عالم عقلي مثالي يحدو حذو العالم الحسي في جميع أنواعه الجوهرية والعرضية.

فمنهم من حملة على العالم المثالي الشبحي المقداري - ومنهم من قال إنه إشارة إلى الصور التي في علم الله القائمة بذاته تعالى - كما اشتهر عن المشاءين وأن قيام الصور بنفسها على ما نقل عن القدماء عبارة عن قيامها بذات باريها عز اسمه الذي هو أقرب إليها وأقوم في تحصلها عن نفسها - لأن نسبتها إلى ذاتها بالإمكان ونسبتها إلى قيومها بالوجوب. ومنهم من قال إنه إشارة إلى رب النوع وصاحب الطلسم فإن لكل نوع جرمي وطلسم برزخي عقلا يقومه ونورا يدبره وليس كليتها كما وقع في كلامهم - باعتبار صدقها على كثيرين فإنها غير صادقة على جزئيات الأجرام وأشخاص

البرازخ لكونها مفارقات نورية و عقولا قادسة و إنما كليتها باعتبار استواء نسبة فيضها إلى جميع أشخاص طلسمها النوعي.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧٠

و منهم من ذهب إلى أنه إشارة إلى هذه الصور الهيولانية في هذا العالم باعتبار حضورها و ظهورها عند المبدأ الأول و مثولها بين يديه و عدم خفائها و غيوبتها بذواتها عن علمه إذ هي بهذا الاعتبار كأنها مجردة من المواد و الأزمنة و الهياث الحسية و الغشاوات المادية لعدم كونها حجابا عن شهودها و وجودها لدى الباري - فهي بذواتها معقولة له تعالى كسائر الكليات و المجردات متمثلة بين يديه.

أقول و الأظهر أن أولئك الأكابر من الحكماء و الأعظم من الأولياء المتجردين عن غشاوات الطبيعة الواصلين إلى غايات الخليفة حكموا بأن الصور المعقولة من الأشياء مجردة قائمة بذواتها و إياها يتلقى العقلاء و العرفاء في معقولاتهم و معارفهم إذ لها وجود لا محالة فهي إما قائمة بذواتها أو حالة في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧١

محل إدراكي منا و الثاني باطل و إلا لما غاب عن محله الذي هو النفس و لا سيما إذا كانت من النفوس المشرفة الزكية و لا كيفية حلولها فيه.

فإن قيل إنها حين غيوبتها عن النفس ليست قائمة بها موجودة فيها بل يكون قيامها دائما بجوهر عقلي مفارق و هو خزانة المعقولات فيدركها حين اتصالها به و توجهها إليه و استحقاقها لفيضان تلك الصور منه عليها.

قلنا مع الإغماض عما مر من مفسد ارتسام صور الحقائق في النفس - يلزم انتقاش جوهر عقلي بصور الحقائق و الأنواع المتكثرة المتكافئة الوجود في مرتبة واحدة على سبيل الإبداع و ذلك باطل لأن انتقاش المبادي العقلية بصور ما تحتها لا يجوز أن يستفاد مما تحتها و إلا لزم انفعال العالي عن السافل و استكمال به و القدماء أشد مبالغة في استحالة هذا من المشاءين أتباع المعلم الأول فبقي أن يفيض عليها مما فوقها و ذلك يؤدي إلى صدور الكثير عن الواحد الحق المحض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧٢

أو حصول صور الأشياء في ذاته تعالى علوا كبيرا و جميع هذه الأمور مستقبح عند حكماء الإشراف.

و أيضا يجب على ذلك التقدير أن لا يغيب عن النفس حين إدراكها لذواتها - و التفطن لحقائقها محلها و كيفية حلولها فيه فإن العلم ليس إلا عدم الغيبة عن الذات المجردة و محل الأمور الغير الغائبة غير غائب اتفاقا بل ضرورة و كذا كيفية حلولها في محلها التي هي نحو وجودها فرضا فظهر وجود أمور كلية قائمة بذواتها - لا في محل منطبقة على جزئياتها المادية و كليتها إذا أخذت لا بشرط التجرد و اللاتجرد - و إذا جرد الجزئيات عن المواد و قيودها الشخصية و صفاتها الكونية الحسية و بالجملة اشتراكها كاشترائك الصور القائمة بالعقل و كليتها ككليتها بلا استلزام شيء من المفسد و ما ذكر في الكتب لامتناع وجود الكلي بما هو كلي في الخارج فجميع ذلك بعينه قائم في امتناع وجوده في العقل أيضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧٣

عقدة وفك:

قد ذكر الشيخ في إلهيات الشفاء لإبطال وجود المثل و التعليميات هذا القول إنه إذا كان في التعليميات تعليمي مفارق للتعليمي المحسوس فإما أن لا يكون في المحسوس تعليمي البتة أو يكون فإن لم يكن في المحسوس تعليمي وجب أن لا يكون مربع ولا مدور محسوس وإذا لم يكن شيء من هذا محسوسا فكيف السبيل إلى إثبات وجودها بل إلى مبدأ تخيلها فإن مبدأ تخيلها كذلك من الوجود المحسوس حتى لو توهمنا واحدا لم يحس شيئا منها لحكمنا أنه لا يتخيل بل لا يعقل شيئا منها على أننا أثبتنا وجود كثير منها في المحسوس وإن كانت طبيعة التعليميات قد توجد أيضا في المحسوسات - فيكون لتلك الطبيعة بذاتها اعتبار فيكون ذاتها إما مطابقة بالحد والمعنى للمفارق - أو مباينة له فإن كانت مفارقة له فيكون التعليميات المعقولة أمورا غير التي نتخيلها أو نتعقلها ونحتاج في إثباتها إلى دليل مستأنف ثم نشغل بالنظر في حال مفارقتها ولا يكون ما عملوا عليه من الإخلاد إلى الاستغناء عن إثباتها والاشتغال بتقديم الشغل في بيان مفارقتها عملا يستنام إليه وإن كانت مطابقة مشاركة له في الحد فلا يخلو إما أن يكون هذه التي في المحسوسات إنما صارت فيها لطبيعتها وحدها فكيف يفارق ما له حدها وإما أن يكون ذلك أمرا يعرض لها بسبب من الأسباب - وتكون هي معروضة لذلك وحدودها غير مانعة عن لحوق ذلك إياها فيكون من شأن تلك المفارقات أن تصير مادية ومن شأن هذه المادية أن يفارق وهذا هو خلاف ما عقدوه وبنوا عليه أصل رأيهم وأيضا فإن هذه المادية التي مع العوارض إما أن تحتاج إلى مفارقات غيرها لطبائعها فيحتاج المفارقات أيضا إلى أخرى وإن كانت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧٤

هذه إنما يحتاج إلى المفارقات لما عرض لها حتى لو لا ذلك العارض لكانت لا تحتاج إلى المفارقات البتة ولما كان يجب أن يكون للمفارقات وجود فيكون العارض للشيء يوجب وجود أمر أقدم منه وغنى عنه ويجعل المفارقات محتاجة إليها حتى يجب لها وجود فإن لم يكن الأمر كذلك بل كان وجود المفارقات يوجب وجودها مع هذا العارض فلم يوجب العارض في غيرها ولا يوجب في أنفسها والطبيعة متفقة - وإن كانت غير محتاجة إلى المفارقات فلا يكون المفارقات عللا لها بوجه من الوجوه ولا مبادي أولى ويلزم أن يكون هذه المفارقات ناقصة فإن هذا المقارن يلحقه من القوى والأفاعيل ما لا يوجد للمفارق وكم الفرق بين شكل إنساني ساذج وبين شكل إنساني حي فاعل انتهى كلامه بالفاظه.

أقول وخلاصة حجته الأولى أن الحقيقة الواحدة التي هي ذات حد واحد وماهية واحدة لا يختلف أفرادها في التجرد والتجسم والغناء والحاجة إلى المادة والمعقولة والمحسوسة ولا شك أن كلامه إنما يكون تاما في المتواطئة من الماهيات - دون المشككة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧٥

وأيضا يتوقف على أن الذات أو الذاتي بما هي ذات أو ذاتي لا يتفاوت في حقيقتها وماهياتها وقد مر حال ذلك كيف وهو أول المسألة في هذا المقام - وبناء البحوث عليه وكثير من قواعد المتقدمين مبنية على تجويز كون حقيقة واحدة

بنفس ذاتها كاملة غنية و ناقصة فقيرة لا بجعل جاعل يتخلل بين ذاتها و فقرها أو غناها بل الغني منها يكون غنيا لذاته و الفقير فقيرا لذاته فمن جعل ذات الفقير - جعلها بنفس ذلك الجعل فقيرا لا بجعل مستأنف فالفقير منها فقير بذاته محتاج بنفسه إلى جاعل لا لأجل كونه فقيرا و محتاجا أي من جهة حمل هذا المعنى عليه و نقاوة حجته الثانية أن أفراد حقيقة واحدة لا يكون بعضها سببا و بعضها مسببا لذاتها - و أن المعلول إذا كان لذاته معلولا لفرد آخر من نوعه يلزم أن يكون ذلك الآخر أيضا معلولا لفرد آخر و هكذا يعود الكلام إلى أن ينتهي إلى الدور أو التسلسل المستحيلين - و هذا أيضا يبتني على استحالة كون الطبيعة المتفككة متفاوتة في التقدم و التأخر - و الأولية و عدمها و الغنى و الافتقار.

و اعلم أن المنقول عن أفلاطون و حكماء الفرس و القدماء من اليونانيين القول بمفارقة النوعيات و تجرد الصور الجوهرية لحقائق الأجسام الطبيعية و أما التعليميات فإنها عندهم ماديات في وجودها البتة و إن فارقت المادة في الحد فليس يجوز عندهم وجود بعد قائم لا في مادة و برهانه على ما سيجيء أنه لو كان مجردا لكان إما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧٦

متناها أو غير متناه و الثاني باطل لما سيأتي من بيان استحالة عدم تناهي الكميات القارة و غير القارة لا لما في الشفاء من أن عدم تناهيه عند التجرد إما لأنه مجرد طبيعة فيلزم أن يكون كل بعد غير متناه و إن لحقه لتجرده عن المادة كانت المادة مفيدة الحصر و الصورة و كلا الوجهين محال لما علمت من عدم جريانه فيما يتفاوت كمالا و نقصانا و الكميات من هذا القبيل و الأول أيضا مستحيل لأن انحصار البعد حين تجرده في حد محدود و شكل مقدر لا يكون إلا لانفعال عرض له من خارج طبيعته و الانفعال كما ستعلم من عوارض المادة بالذات فيكون غير مفارق - و قد فرضناه مفارقا هذا خلف و الحجتان المذكورتان و إن أوردهما الشيخ على القائلين بمفارقة التعليميات لكنهما بعينهما جاريتان من قبله في إبطال الصور المفارقة - و اردتان بحسب أسلوبه على هذا المذهب و لذلك نقلناهما و أجبنا عنهما بما يوافق رأي القائلين بالمثل الأفلاطونية و الصور المفارقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٧٧

تلويح استناري:

لعلك إن كنت أهلا لتلقي الأسرار الإلهية و المعارف الحققة - لتيقنت و تحققت أن كل قوة و كمال و هيئة و جمال توجد في هذا العالم الأدنى فإنها بالحقيقة ظلال و تمثالات لما في العالم الأعلى إنما تنزلت و تكدرت و تجرمت بعد ما كانت نقية صافية مقدسة عن النقص و الشين مجردة عن الكدورة و الرين متعالية عن الآفة و القصور و الخلل و الفتور و الهلاك و الدثور بل جميع صور الكائنات و ذوات المبدعات آثار و أنوار للوجود الحقيقي و النور القيومي - و هو منبع الجمال المطلق و الجلال الأتم الأليق الذي صور المعاشيق و حسن الموجودات الروحانية و الجسمانية قطرة بالنسبة إلى بحر ذلك الجمال و ذرة بالقياس إلى شمس تلك العظمة و الجلال و لو لا أنواره و أضواؤه في صور الموجودات الظاهرية لم يكن الوصول إلى نور الأنوار الذي هو الوجود المطلق الإلهي فإن النفس عند افتنانها بالمحبوب المجازي الذي هو من وجه حقيقي تتوجه إلى المحبوب الحقيقي المطلق الذي هو الصمد لكل شيء و الملجأ لكل حي و تتولى جنبابه الكريم منبع الأنوار و معدن الآثار فيحصل لها الوصول إلى الحضرة الإلهية و يتنور باطنها بنوره - فتدرك الأمور

الكلية و الصور المفارقة العقلية لصيرورتها حينئذ عقلا مدركا للكليات - ألا ترى أن آثار أنواره التي ظهرت في عالم الملك و تنزلت عن مراتبها الروحانية العقلية و لاحت في صور الجزئيات و اتسمت بالحسن و اللطافة و الغنج و الدلال - مع أنها ضعفت بصحبة الظلمة الجسمية و تكثفت بالكثافة المادية بعد نقائها و صفائها و تجردها كيف تدهش العقول و تحير الأبواب و أصحابها و توقع في الفتن و المحن

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طلابها فما ظنك في الجمال المطلق الذاتي و النور الساطع الإلهي الذي في غاية العظمة و نهاية الكبرياء و الكمال المدهش للعقول و القلوب من وراء سبعين ألف حجاب نوراني و ظلماني

كما روي عن رسوله ص: أن لله سبعين ألف حجاب من نور و ظلمة لو كشفها لأحرقت سبحات وجهه ما انتهى إليه بصره من خلقه

و تفتن مما

قَالَ ع: إِنْ هَذِهِ النَّارُ مِنْ نَارِ جَهَنَّمَ غَسَلَتْ بِسَبْعِينَ مَاءً ثُمَّ أُنْزِلَتْ

و قس النور عليها في استنارته و احتجابه إذ لولاه لما كان للعالم وجود و لا ذوق و لا شهود لاحتراقه و اضمحلاله من سطوعه فكما أن حرارة هذه النار الجسمانية التابعة لصورتها النوعية شرر من نار قهر الله المعنوية بعد تنزلها في مراتب كثيرة كتزلزلها في مرتبة النفس بصورة الغضب إذ ربما يؤثر شدة الغضب في إحراق الأخلاط مع رطوبتها - ما لا يؤثر النار في الحطب مع سورة اللهب و من هذا يعلم أن كل مسخن لا يجب أن يكون حارا فكذلك الأنوار المحسوسة من النيران و الكواكب أظلال و أشباح لأنوار لطف الله المعنوية و آثار لأضواء ملكوته و أشعة جماله بعد حبوطها في منازل أمره و خلقه.

إيقاظ عقلي:

لا يخفى على من تنور قلبه و استضاء عقله بعد التأمل فيما مر من القواعد و الأصول أن الغرض الأقصى في وجود العشق في جبلة النفوس و محبتها لشمائل الأبدان و محاسن الأجسام و استحسانها زينة المواد و الأجرام إنما هو تنبيه لها من نوم الغفلة و رقدة الجهالة و رثاسة لها من تخريج الأمور الجسمانية و الأصنام الهيولانية إلى المحاسن الروحانية و الفضائل العقلانية

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و الأنوار الإلهية و دلالة على معرفة جواهرها و شرف عنصرها و محاسن عالمها و صلاح معادها و ذلك لأن جميع المحاسن و الفضائل و كل الزينة و المشتهيات المرغوب فيها اللواتي ترى على ظواهر الأجرام و جلود الأبدان إنما هي أصباغ و نقوش و رسوم صورتها أرباب أنواعها و ملائكة تدبيرها في المواد و الأسطقسات قد زينت بها كيما نظرت النفوس إليها حنت إليها و تشوقت نحوها و قصدت لطلبها بالنظر إليها و التأمل لها و استنبطت خالصها المجرد عن مغشوشها المحسوس و تعرفت لبها المصفى عن قشرها المكدر بانتزاعها الكلبيات من الجزئيات و تفتننها بالعقليات من الحسيات و رفضها الدنيا لأجل الآخرة كل ذلك كيما يتصور تلك الرسوم و المحاسن في ذاتها و اتصلت بها و تمثلت

لديها حتى إذا غابت تلك الأشخاص الجرمانية عن مشاهدة الحواس بقيت تلك الصور المعشوقة المحبوبة مشاهدة لها مصورة فيها لها صورة روحانية نقية صافية باقية معها معشوقاتها متصلة بها اتصالاً معنوياً لا يخاف فراقها ولا تغييرها فيستغني حينئذ بالعيان عن الخبر والبيان ويزهد عن ملاقات الألوان ويتخلص عن الرق والحدثان والدليل على صحة ما قلناه يعرفه من عشق يوماً لشخص من الأشخاص ثم تسلى عنه أو فقدته مدة ثم إنه وجدته من بعد ذلك - وقد تغير هو عما كان عهده عليه من الحسن والجمال وتلك الزينة والمحاسن - التي كان يراها على ظاهر جسمه و سطوح بدنه فإنه متى رجع عن ذلك فنظر إلى تلك الرسوم والصور التي هي باقية في نفسه منذ العهد القديم وجدها بحالها لم يتغير ولم يتبدل وراها برمتها فشاهدها في ذاتها حينئذ ما كانت تراها من قبل لم تدثر ولم يفسد بل باقية ببقاء علتها الجاعلة ودوام فاعلها القائم ورب صنمها الدائم - وحينئذ يجد من نفسها وفي جوهرها ما كانت تطلب قبل ذلك خارجاً عنها فعند ذلك

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يرفضه و يعلم و يقر بأن تلك الصور الحسان و الشمائل و الفضائل التي كانت تراها على ذلك الشخص ليست محبوسة فيه ثابتة له محصورة عنده بل مرسومة في جوهرها متصورة في ذاتها باقية ثابتة على حالة واحدة لم تتغير وإنما ذلك الشخص كان دليلاً عليها كغيره من الأشخاص الصنمية التي تكون دلائل على الأنوار العقلية و مظاهر للمعاني النورية فإذا فكر العاقل اللبيب فيما وصفناه استيقظت نفسه من نوم غفلتها و استفلت بذاتها و فازت بجوهرها و استغنت عن غيرها و استراحت عند ذلك من تعبها و عنائها و مقاساتها محبة غيرها و تخلصت من الشقاوة التي تعرض لعاشقي الأجسام و محبي الأجرام من الأبدان الإنسانية و الدراهم و الدنانير و اليواقيت و الدرر - و الضياء و العقار و البساتين و الأشجار و الثمار و غيرها من الدائرات البائدات و قد قال الله تعالى **وَالْبَاقِيَاتُ الصَّالِحَاتُ خَيْرٌ عِنْدَ رَبِّكَ ثَوَابًا وَ خَيْرٌ أَمَلًا** فإذا انتبهت النفس من نوم الغفلة و استيقظت من رقدة الجهالة و فتحت عين بصيرتها و عاينت عالمها و عرفت مبدأها و معادها لتيقن أن المستلذات الجسمية و المحاسن المادية - كلها كعكوس الفضائل العقلية و خيالات الأنوار الروحانية ليست لها حقيقة متصلة و ذات مستقلة بل كسراب بقية يحسبه الظمان ماء حتى إذا جاءه لم يجده شيئاً و وجد الله عنده فوفاه.

تنوير رحمانى:

إن الباري جل ثناؤه بمقتضى رحمته و لطفه جعل الأمور الجسمانية المحسوسة كلها مثالات دالات على الأمور الروحانية العقلية و جعل طريق الحواس درجاً و مراقي يرتقى بها إلى معرفة الأمور العقلية التي هي الغرض الأقصى في وقوع النفس في دار المحسوسات و طلوعها عن أفق الماديات و كما أن المحسوسات فقراء الذوات إلى العقلية لكونها رشحات لأنوارها و أطلالا لأضوائها فكذلك معرفة الجسمانيات المحسوسة هي فقر النفس و شدة حاجتها و معرفة الأمور العقلية هي غناها و نعيمها و ذلك أن النفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨١

في معرفة الأمور الجسمانية محتاجة إلى الجسد و آلاته ليدرك بتوسطها الجسمانيات - و أما إدراكها للأمور الروحانية

فيكفيها ذاتها و جوهرها بعد ما يأخذها من طرق الحواس بتوسط الجسد فإذا حصل لها ذلك و صارت عقلا و عاقلا بالفعل فقد استغنت عن الحواس و عن التعلق بالجسد فاجتهد يا حبيبي في طلب الغنى الأبدي بتوسط هذا الهيكل و آلاته ما دام يمكنك قبل فناء المدة و تصرم العمر و فساد الهيكل و بطلان وجوده و احذر كل الحذر أن تبقى نفسك فقيرة محتاجة إلى هيكل لتنعيم به و تكمل فتكون ممن يقول يا ليتنا نرد فنعمل صالحا غير الذي كنا نعمل أو تبقى في البرزخ إلى يوم يبعثون و من أين لهم أن يشعر و أيان يبعثون ما دامت هي ساهية لاهية غافلة مقبلة على الشهوات و الزينة الطبيعية و الغرور بالأماني في هذه الحياة الحسية المذمومة التي ذمها رب الأرباب في مواضع كثيرة من كتابه العزيز ثم ذم الذين لا يعرفون هذه الأمور المعقولة و أرباب الأصنام و أصحاب البرازخ العلوية و السفلية و لم يرتق نظرهم من الأمور المحسوسة و لم يعرفوا إلا إياها حسب فقال **رَضُوا بِالْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا وَاطْمَأْنُونُوا بِهَا وَ الَّذِينَ هُمْ عَنْ آيَاتِنَا غَافِلُونَ** يعني عن أمور الآخرة و دار النعيم التي ترتقي إليها نفوس الأخيار بعد مفارقتها الأبدان كما ذكر في القرآن المجيد - **إِلَيْهِ يَصْعَدُ الْكَلِمُ الطَّيِّبُ** يعني روح المؤمن **وَالْعَمَلُ الصَّالِحُ يَرْفَعُهُ** يعني معارف العقلية ترغبه فيها و ترقيه إلى هناك

المرحلة الخامسة في الوحدة و الكثرة و لواحقهما

من الهووية و أقسامها و الغيرية و أصناف التقابل المعروفة.

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فصل (١) في الواحد و الكثير

اعلم أن الوحدة رفيق الوجود

يدور معه حيثما دار إذ هما متساويان في الصدق على الأشياء فكل ما يقال عليه إنه موجود يقال عليه إنه واحد و يوافقه أيضا في القوة و الضعف فكل ما وجوده أقوى كانت وحدانيته أتم بل هما متوافقان في أكثر الأحكام و الأحوال و لذلك ربما ظن أن المفهوم من كل منهما واحد - و ليس كذلك بل هما واحد بحسب الذات لا بحسب المفهوم فبالحري أن نتكلم في الوحدة و أحوالها المختصة مثل الهووية و التجانس و التماثل و التوافق و التساوي و التشابه و نتكلم في مقابلتها من الكثرة و أحكامها من الغيرية و الخلاف - بل الكلام في الجانب المقابل للوحدة أكثر لتشابه الوحدة و تفنن الكثرة و تشعبها.

فنقول إن للوحدة كما أشرناه أسوة بالوجود في أكثر الأحكام.

فمنها أنه لا يمكن تعريفها كسائر الأمور المساوية للوجود في العموم إلا مع الدور أو تعريف الشيء بنفسه فقد قيل الواحد هو الذي لا ينقسم من الجهة التي يقال إنه واحد و هذا يشتمل على تعريف الشيء بنفسه و على الدور أيضا لأن الانقسام المأخوذ فيه معناه معنى الكثرة و يقال في تعريف الكثرة إنها المجتمعة من الوحدات و هذا أيضا تعريف للكثرة بالاجتماع الذي هو نفس مفهوم الكثرة و هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨٣

مأخوذ صريحا و ضمنا في لفظ جمع الوحدات الذي لا يفهم معناه إلا بالكثرة - و تعريف لها بالوحدة التي لا تعرف إلا

بالكثرة فيشتمل على الفسادين المذكورين في مقابلتها وقس على ما ذكرناه سائر ما قيل في تعريفهما في الفساد بل الحق أن تصورهما أولي مستغن عن التعريف.

لكن هاهنا شيء يجب التنبيه عليه وهو أن الكثرة أعرف عند الخيال والوحدة عند العقل فكل منهما وإن كانت من الأشياء المرتسمة في الذهن بديا لكن الكثرة مرتسمة في الخيال أولا لأن ما يرسم في الخيال محسوس والمحسوس كثير والوحدة أمر عقلي لأن المعقولات أمور عامة أول ما يتصرف العقل فيها بالتقسيم - يتصور كلا منها واحدا ثم يقسمه إلى كذا وكذا وإلى ما لا يكون كذا فلنا أن نعرف الكثرة بالوحدة تعريفا عقليا بأن نأخذ الوحدة أولية التصور بذاتها وأن نعرف الوحدة بالكثرة تعريفا تنبيها ودلالة على أن المراد بهذه اللفظة الشيء المعقول عندنا عقلا أوليا وإشعارا عليه بسلب هذا منه ففي الأول تعريف لمعنى خيالي بمعنى عقلي وفي الثاني تنبيه على معنى عقلي بمعنى خيالي فلا يلزم دور على هذه الطريقة.

فنقول الواحد ما لا ينقسم من حيث إنه لا ينقسم

والتقييد بالحيثية ليندرج فيه الواحد الغير الحقيقي لانقسامه في بعض الوجوه فلا يصدق عليه أنه لا ينقسم - فلا يندرج في التعريف بدون التقييد وعند التقييد يندرج لأنه لا ينقسم من بعض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨٤

الحيثيات فالتقييد بالحيثية يفيد اندراج الغير الحقيقي في التعريف المذكور فالواحد إذن قد يكون عين الوحدة وهو الواحد بما هو واحد على قياس الموجود بما هو موجود وذلك أحق الأشياء بالوحدة وقد يكون غيرها. وهذا على ضربين حقيقي وغير حقيقي وهو ما يكون أشياء متعددة مشتركة في أمر واحد هو جهة وحدتها وهي إما مقومه لتلك الأشياء أو عارضة لها أو لا مقومة ولا عارضة لها بل إضافة محضة فيها كما يقال حال النفس عند البدن كحال الملك عند المدينة.

و الأول قد يكون جنسا لها وهو الواحد بالجنس كالإنسان والفرس المتحددين في الحيوان وقد يكون نوعا لها وهو الواحد بالنوع ويساوقه الاتحاد في الفصل أيضا كزيد وعمر المتحددين في الإنسانية والناطقية. والثاني قد يكون محمولا لها وهو الواحد بالمحمول كالقطن والثلج المتحددين في الأبيض المحمول عليهما وقد يكون موضوعا لها وهو الواحد بالموضوع كالكتاب والضاحك المتحددين في الإنسان المحمولين عليه. والثالث وهو الواحد بالإضافة ثم إن الاتحاد في الأوصاف العرضية والذاتية يتغير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨٥

أسماءه بتغير ما نسب إليه فالمشاركة في المحمول إذا كانت في النوع يسمى مماثلة وفي الجنس مجانسة وفي الكيف مشابهة وفي الكم مساواة وفي الوضع مطابقة وفي الإضافة مناسبة وظاهر أن جهة الوحدة في الواحد الغير الحقيقي هي الواحد الحقيقي وهو في هذا المقام ما يكون جهة الوحدة فيه ذاته بذاته وإن كان الأخرى به أن لا يطلق إلا على ما لا ينقسم أصلا كالواجب تعالى وذلك الواحد الحقيقي بالمعنى الأعم قد يكون واحدا جنسيا وقد يكون واحدا نوعيا وقد يكون واحدا عدديا أي شخصا وهو إما أن لا ينقسم بحسب الخارج أصلا أو ينقسم والثاني قد يكون واحدا

بالاتصال وهو الذي ينقسم بالقوة إلى أجزاء متحدة في تمام الحقيقة انقساماً لذاته كالمقدار أو لغيره كالجسم الواحد البسيط من الماء والهواء فإن قبوله الانقسام بواسطة المقدار القائم به وإن أعداد القسمة و تصحيحها من أجل المادة و قد يكون واحداً بالتركيب وهو الذي له كثرة بالفعل وهو الواحد بالاجتماع وذلك إما أن يكون حاصلًا فيه جميع ما يمكن حصوله فيه فهو واحد بالتمام وإن لم يكن فهو كثير و يسمونه الناس غير واحد و التمامية إما بحسب الوضع كالدرهم الواحد أو الصناعة كالبيت التام أو الطبيعة كالإنسان إذا كان تام الأعضاء و الخط المستقيم لقبوله الزيادة في استقامته أياً ما كان - فليس بواحد من جهة التمام بخلاف المستدير إذا أحاط بالمركز من كل جهة فإنه واحد بالتمام و أما الأول وهو الذي لا ينقسم بحسب الخارج أصلاً أي لا بالقوة كالمتمصل و لا بالفعل كالمجتمع فهو إما أن يكون ذا وضع وهو النقطة الواحدة أو غير ذي وضع وهو المفارق كالعقل و النفس الشخصيتين وإنما شرف كل موجود بغلبة الوحدة فيه - وإن لم يخل موجود ما عن وحده حتى أن العشرة في عشرينه واحدة فكل ما هو أبعد عن الكثرة فهو أشرف و أكمل و حيثما ارتقى العدد إلى أكثر نزلت نسبة الوحدة إليه إلى أقل فالأحق بالوحدة هو الواحد الحقيقي و أحق أقسامه بها ما لا ينقسم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨٦

أصلاً لا في الكم و لا في الحد و لا بالقوة و لا بالفعل و لا ينفصل وجوده عن ماهيته. ثم ما لا ينقسم في الكم أصلاً قوة و فعلاً و إن تصور انقسامه إلى أجزاء الحد ذهنيًا كالعقل و النفوس عند المشاءين و ما لا ينقسم منه إلى الجزئيات أحق بالوحدة - كالعقل مما ينقسم إليها كالنفس الإنسانية. ثم الواحد بالاتصال كالواحد من الخط و الماء و هو قابل القسمة إلى أجزاء متشاركة في الحد و من هذا القسم ما لا ينقسم بحسب الفك و القطع كالفلك فهو أحق باسم الوحدة مما ينقسم بحسبه كالمتمصلات العنصرية أجساماً أو مقادير و منه أيضاً ما لا ينقسم قسمة الكلّي إلى الجزئيات و إن انقسم إلى مادة و صورة كالفلكيات أحق بالوحدة مما ينقسم بوجهين كالعنصریات المركبة مطلقاً و مما هو بالعكس كالمقادير من وجه. ثم الواحد بالاجتماع و أحق أقسامه بالوحدة ما يكون اجتماعه طبيعياً كالإنسان الواحد المجتمع من نفس ذات قوي و بدن مركب من أمشاج و أعضاء و جلد و عظام و غيرها و وحدته ظل لوحدة النفس كما أن وجوده كذلك على ما مر في مباحث الماهية. ثم الواحد العددي أحق بالوحدة من الواحد النوعي لكون وحدته ذهنية و هو من الواحد الجنسي لشدة إبهامه و كونه ذهنية و كذا الأجناس بحسب مراتب بعدها - عن الواحد الشخصي تضعف نسبة الوحدة إليها فقد علم أن الواحد مقول على ما تحته بالتشكيك كما أن الوجود كذلك و أما الكثير فهو ما يقابل الواحد في جميع معانيه و اعلم أن الوحدة كالوجود غير مقومة لماهية شيء من الأشياء لست

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨٧

أقول لإنهية لأن الوحدة عندنا غير زائدة على الوجود و ذلك أنه ليس إذا فهمت الإنسان و فهمت الواحد يجب أن يسنح لك أن الإنسان واحد فبين أن الواحدية ليست مقومة للإنسان بل من اللوازم فيكون الوحدة عارضة له لكن يجب عليك

أن تتأمل فيما أسلفناه من أن كيفية عروض الوجود للماهيات على أي وجه حتى يتبين لك أن كون الوحدة زائدة على الماهيات سبيله ما ذا فتفطن و لا تكن من الغافلين

تلويح:

و من جملة المضاهاة الواقعة بين الوحدة و الوجود إفادة الواحد بتكراره العدد مثالا لإيجاد الحق الخلق بظهوره في صور الأشياء و تفصيل العدد مراتب الواحد مثال لإظهار الموجودات وجود الحق و نعوته الجمالية و صفاته الكمالية و كون الواحد نصف الاثنين و ثلث الثلاثة و ربع الأربعة إلى غير ذلك مثال للنسب و الإضافات اللازمة للواجب بالقياس إلى الممكنات- و ظهور العدد بالمعدود مثال لظهور الموجودات الإمكانية بالماهيات و هي بعضها حسية و بعضها عقلية كما أن بعض المعدود في الحس و بعضها في العقل و من اللطائف أن العدد مع غاية تباينه عن الوحدة و كون كل مرتبة منه حقيقة برأسها موصوفة بخواص لا يوجد في غيرها إذا فتشت حاله لا يوجد فيه و لا في حقائق مراتبه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨٨

المختلفة غير الوحدة و أنك لا تزال تثبت في كل مرتبة من المراتب عين ما تنفيه في مرتبة أخرى مثلا تقول إن الواحد ليس من العدد باتفاق المحققين و أهل الحساب مع أنه عين العدد إذ هو الذي بتكرره يوجد الأعداد و يلزمه في كل مرتبة لوازم و خصوصيات و كذلك يصح لك أن تقول لكل مرتبة إنها مجموع الأحاد لا غير- و يصح لك أن تقول إنها ليست مجموع الأحاد فقط لأن مجموع الأحاد جنس كل مرتبة من المراتب لأن كل مرتبة حقيقة برأسها موصوفة بخواص لا يوجد في غيرها- فلا بد لها من أمر آخر غير جميع الأحاد فلا تزال تثبت عين ما تنفي و تنفي عين ما تثبت و هذا الأمر العجيب بعينه حال العرفاء في باب ما يقولون إن الحق المنزه عن نقائص الإمكان بل عن كمالات الأكوان هو الخلق المشبه و إن كان قد تميز الخلق بإمكانه و نقصه عن الخالق بوجوبه و شرفه.

وهم و تنبيه:

لا تصغ إلى من يقول الوحدة من الاعتباريات و ثواني المعقولات- متشبها بما يعتمد عليه من أنه لو كانت الوحدة موجودة لكانت له وحدة أخرى و هكذا حتى يتسلسل إلى غير النهاية و ادفعه بتذكر ما سلف من أن حقيقة الوحدة في واحدته مستغنية عن وحدة أخرى يعرضها اللهم إلا بمحض اعتبار العقل في مرتبة متأخرة عنها إذ للعقل أن يعتبر للوحدة وحدة و لوحدة الوحدة وحدة أخرى و هكذا و خطرات العقل لا ينتهي إلى حد لا أنه يذهب إلى لا نهاية و بينهما فرق و الأول غير مستحيل دون الثاني و خلاصة القول إن لفظ الوحدة يطلق بالاشتراك الصناعي على معنيين أحدهما المعنى الانتزاعي المصدري أي كون الشيء واحدا و لا شبهة في أنه من الأمور العقلية التي لا تحقق لها خارجا و الآخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٨٩

ما به يكون الشيء واحدا بالذات و يمنع وقوع الكثرة فيها و هذا المعنى من لوازمه نفي الكثرة بخلاف المعنى الأول فإنه من لوازم نفي الكثرة و الوحدة بالمعنى الانتزاعي ظل للوحدة الحقيقية الأصلية ينتزع فيها من نفس ذاتها و في غيرها لأجل ارتباطه و تعلقه بها فقد علم أن الوحدة الحقيقية و الهوية الشخصية- و الوجود الحقيقي لا الانتزاعي كلها واحدة

بالذات متغايرة بحسب الاعتبار كما مر مرارا.

شك و تحقيق:

ليس لك أن تقول الوحدة مغايرة للهوية لأن الجسم المتصل إذا لم يطرأ عليه شيء من أسباب القسمة كان شخصا واحدا- فإذا ورد عليه التفريق حتى يكثر فهوية ذلك الجسم باقية و وحدته زائلة و الباقي غير الزائل فالهوية غير الوحدة لأننا نجيبك عنه بأن وحدة الاتصال الذي هو عين هوية الجوهر الاتصالي كلما زالت عن اتصال ذلك الجسم بطلت هوية ذلك الاتصال و وجد اتصالان آحران بل زوال الوحدة الاتصالية عين بطلان هوية المتصل بذاته. فإن رجعت و قلت هب أن تلك الصورة الاتصالية عدمت لكن الكلام في الجسمانية الباقية حالة الفصل و الوصل فيقبل الوحدة تارة و الكثرة أخرى و هي باقية الوجود في الحالين. قلنا الهيولى الجسمانية جوهر قابل ليس لها إلا هوية القبول و الاستعداد- فيطرأ عليها الوحدة الاتصالية و الكثرة المقابلة لها و هي بحسب ذاتها ليست متصفة بالوجود الاتصالي و الوحدة الاتصالية و لا بالمعنى المقابل لها حتى ينعدم بزوال أحدهما- كما في الجوهر الامتدادي و هي إنما تتصف بحسب ذاتها بوجود استعدادي و وحدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩٠

قابلية لا يزولان عنها في جميع الأحوال بل هي في جميع المراتب و الأوضاع مستحفظة لوحدها التي هي هويتها اللازمة و كل واحدة من وحدة الجسم و كثرته يطرأ عليها لأن اتصافها بهما إنما هو بالعرض لا بالذات و ظني أن سليم الفطرة- لا يريب في أن الشيء لا يكون في ذاته محلا لوحده و كثرته فإن هوية شيء لا يقبل التعدد.

إنارة:

و لعلك تقول حسبما وجدت في كتب الفن كالشفاء و غيره- إن الوحدة مغايرة للوجود لأن الكثير من حيث هو كثير موجود و لا شيء من الكثير من حيث هو كثير بواحد ينتج فليس كل موجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩١

بما هو موجود بواحد فإذا الوحدة مغايرة للوجود نعم يعرض لذلك الكثير وحدة و خصوصية لا أنه يعرض الكثرة لما عرضت له الوحدة فيقال لك إن أردت بالموصوف بالحيثية المذكورة في المقدمتين ما يراد منه في مباحث الماهية لأجل التميز بين الذاتي و العرضي فالصغرى ممنوعة لأن الكثير بهذا المعنى لا موجود و لا معدوم- و إن أردت أن الموصوف بالكثرة موجود في الواقع فالكبرى ممنوعة إذ كما أنه موجود فهو واحد أيضا إذ ما من شيء إلا و له وحدة لكن لقائل أن يقول بعد اختيار الشق الأخير إن الوحدة عرضت للكثرة لا لما يعرض له الكثرة فموضوعاهما متغايران مثلا العشرة عارضة للجسم و الوحدة عارضة للعشرة من حيث إنها عشرة- فهنا شيان الكثرة و موضوعها فالكثرة للموضوع و الوحدة لتلك الكثرة فوحدة الكثرة لا تناقض تلك الكثرة لعدم اتحاد الموضوع بخلاف وحدة موضوع الكثرة- فإنها تنافي كثرته مع اتحاد الزمان و لا ينافي وجوده فثبت المغايرة بين الوجود و الوحدة فيمكن أن يقال الوحدة كالوجود على أنحاء شتى و كل وحدة خاصة يقابلها كثرة خاصة و الوحدة المطلقة يقابلها الكثرة المطلقة كما أن الوجود الخاص الذهني أو الخارجي يقابله العدم الذي بإزائه و العدم المطلق بإزاء الوجود المطلق- و الدعوى أن وحدة ما لا ينفك عن

وجود ما بأي اعتبار أخذ فإذا ظهر ذلك فنقول ما ذكرتم لا يدل على مغايرة الوحدة المطلقة للوجود إذ الكثير المقابل له لا وجود له إذ كل موجود فله وحدة و لو بالاعتبار و تحقيق المقام أن موضوع الكثرة - كالرجال العشرة مثلا من حيث كونهم عشرة ليس لهم وجود غير وجودات الأحاد - إلا بمجرد اعتبار العقل كما هو التحقيق لأن كل موجود خارجي لا بد له من وحدة خارجية كيف و لو كان الحجر الموضوع بجانب الإنسان موجودا في الخارج لا ينضبط شيء من التقاسيم و لو لم يكن الوحدة الخارجية معتبرة لم ينحصر المقولات عندهم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩٢

في العشر إذ المركب من الجوهر و كيف لا جوهر و لا كيف فيكون مقولة أخرى - و كذا المركب من كيف و الأين ليس شيئا منهما فيكون مقولة أخرى و هكذا يرتقي عدد المقولات في التراكيب الثنائية و الثلاثية و الرباعية إلى العشارية إلى مبلغ كثير و كذا الكلام فيما يندرج تحت مقسم كلي من الأجناس و الأنواع فقد علم أن الكثير من حيث الكثرة لا وجود له إلا بالاعتبار كما أن للعقل أن يعتبرها موجودة فله أن يعتبرها شيئا واحدا لا يقال المراد مما ذكرناه مفاد القضية الوصفية و هو أن الكثير بشرط الكثرة موجود بنحو من الأنحاء و لا يمكن اتصافه بالوحدة المقابلة لها للمنافاة بينهما فالكثير لا يكون واحدا و محصل ذلك أن صفة الوحدة ينافي الكثرة و الوجود لا ينافيها.

قلنا إن أردتم بالكثرة المطلقة المقابلة للوحدة المطلقة منعنا الصغرى و إن أردتم الكثرة الخاصة فالنتيجة تكون حكما بالمنافاة بين الكثرة و الوحدة المقابلة لها لا بين الكثرة الخاصة و الوحدة بوجه آخر فلا يلزم منه إلا المغايرة بين نحو من الوجود و نحو من الوحدة و هذا ليس بضائر و كذا الحكم إذا قرر الكلام - بأن وصف الكثرة لا يأتى عن اتصافه بالوجود فتفطن و لا تزل قدمك بعد توكيدها

فصل (٢) في الهو و ما يقابلها

قد علمت أن بعض أقسام الوحدة هو ما يعرض الكثير من جهة اشتراكها في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩٣

معنى من المعاني فالهوهو عبارة عن الاتحاد بين شيئين في الوجود و هما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩٤

المتغايران بوجه من الوجوه المتحدان في الوجود الخارجي أو الذهني سواء كان الاتحاد بينهما في الوجود بالذات بمعنى كون واحد منهما موجودا بوجود ينسب ذلك الوجود إلى الآخر بالذات فيكون الحمل بالذات كقولنا زيد إنسان فإن الوجود المنسوب إلى زيد هو بعينه منسوب إلى الإنسان أو كان الاتحاد بينهما في الوجود بالعرض و هو ما لا يكون كذلك سواء كان أحدهما موجودا بوجود بالذات و الآخر موجودا بذلك الوجود بالعرض - كقولنا الإنسان كاتب فإن جهة الاتحاد بينهما وجود واحد منسوب إلى الموضوع بالذات و إلى المحمول بالعرض أو لا يكون و لا واحد منهما موجودا بالذات بل يكون كلاهما موجودا بوجود أمر غيرهما بالعرض كقولنا الكاتب متحرك فإن جهة الاتحاد بينهما هو الموجود المنسوب إلى غيرهما و هو الإنسان فثبت أن جهة الاتحاد في الهوهو قد يكون في الطرفين و قد يكون في

أحدهما و قد يكون خارجا عنهما.

تنبيه تحصيلي:

قد علمت أن الوحدة الاتصالية من أنحاء الوحدة الحقيقية فالواحد بالاتصال يجب أن يكون واحدا بالموضوع غير منقسمة إلى صور مختلفة بل إلى أجزاء متشابهة الحقيقة التي وجودها بالقوة على ما سيجيء - ولأن كلما كانت وحدته بالفعل كانت كثرته بالقوة فالقول بأن أجزاء المتصل الوحداني يمكن تخالفها بحسب الصور من سخائف الكلام.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩٥

لكن لقائل أن يقول فقد لزم بما وضعت من معنى الهو هو صحة الحمل - بين أبعاض المتصل الواحد المقداري و بينها و بين الكل فتقول هذا النصف من الذراع نصفه الآخر أو كله أو بعضه إذ مجرد الاتحاد في الوجود مصحح للحمل مواطاة - مع جهة كثرة اعتبارية وهمية أو فرضية.

ف قيل في دفعه تارة بأن المعتبر في الحمل اتحاد الشئيين المتغايرين بحسب المعنى و المفهوم المتحددين في الوجود و جزئية الجزء المعين المتصل من حيث التعيين الشخصي لا من حيث الماهية إذ هو من جهة الماهية الاتصالية ليس على تعيين شيء من الامتدادات ليصلح انتزاع جزء منه غير جزء فيدفع بأن كثيرا ما يتحقق الحمل - في الخصوصيات الشخصية كقولك زيد بن عمرو أو زيد هذا الكاتب و تارة بما ذكره بعض المحققين بأن الحمل مطلقا و إن كان هو الاتحاد في الوجود لكن التعارف الخاصي خصه بذلك مع عدم الاختلاف في الوضع كما خصه من بين مطلق الاتحاد بالاتحاد في الوجود و يقتضي اثنيية ما و وحدة ما إذ لو كانت الوحدة الصرفة لم يتحقق أو الكثرة الصرفة لم يصدق. و تصدى لإبطاله بعض الأماجد عز مجده - أولا بأن هذا تخصيص لا يناسب طور الحكمة - و ثانيا بأن الكلام ليس في إطلاق لفظ الحمل بحسب عرفهم حتى يجري فيه هذا الطور بل في أن كون المتصل المقداري عين جزئه بحسب الأعيان إنما لزم من الاتحاد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩٦

بينهما في الوجود و يستلزم من ذلك أن يقال فيهما هو هو إذ الهوية عين الوجود و الهوهوية هي الاتحاد في الوجود فظهر من هذا أن تخصيص تحصيل الحمل بالاتحاد في الوجود ليس بحسب اللفظ أو التعارف بل على كون سائر أنواع الوحدة غير صالحة لتصحيح الحمل بحسب الذات و الوجود بل بحسب جهة الوحدة ثم قال في فك العقدة إن معيار الحمل في الذاتيات أن ينسب وجود ذي ذاتي إليها بالذات لا من حيث إنها أبعاض الأمر الواحد الموجود و في العرضيات أن ينسب إليها وجود المعروض بالعرض - لا من حيث إنها أبعاضه و الأجزاء المقدارية و إن كانت موجوديتها عين وجود المتصل الواحد لكن ذلك ليس من حيث إنها أمور موجودة براء و سها اتفق إن كان وجودها عين وجود ذلك الواحد كما في الطبائع المحمولة بل من حيث إنها أبعاض الموجود الواحد - فلا تغاير هناك بحسب الوجود و لا حمل انتهى كلامه زيد إعظامه و إفخامه.

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و فيه أن كون الشيء جزءا لشيء آخر يصدق فيه أنه مانع من تحقق الحمل بينهما ولكن ذلك ليس بسبب غلبة العينية بينهما المتجاوزة عن حريم القدر المعتبر منها في صحة الحمل بل من جهة زيادة غيرية المخلة بالوحدانية المأخوذة فيه فإن المعتبر في الحمل والهوية وحدة الوجود في الطرفين واثنية المفهوم فيهما ولو بحسب الاعتبار وهاهنا الأمر بالعكس من ذلك فإن الجزئية والكلية توجبان المباينة في الوجود لتقدم وجود الجزء على وجود الكل.

فالجواب المحصل أن المتصل الوحداني ما لم ينقسم بوجه من الوجوه سواء كان في الخارج قطعاً وكسراً أو في الذهن وهما وعقلاً أو بحسب اختلاف العرضين - لم يتحقق المغايرة فيه أصلاً فلا يمكن فيه حمل شيء آخر ولو بالاعتبار وإذا تحقق شيء من أنحاء القسمة التي معناها ومفادها إحداث الهويتين المتصلتين وإعدام الهوية التي كانت من قبل كما يرد عليك بيانه في موضعه عرضت الاثنية في الوجود فأين هناك هوية واحدة تنسب إلى شيئين التي هي معيار الحمل

فصل (٣) في أن اتحاد الاثنين ممتنع

بمعنى صيرورة الذاتين ذاتاً واحدة لأنهما بعد الاتحاد إن كانا موجودين كانا اثنين لا واحداً وإن كان أحدهما فقط موجوداً كان هذا زوالاً لأحدهما وبقاء للآخر - وإن لم يكن شيء منهما موجوداً لكان هذا زوالاً لهما وحدوثاً لأمر ثالث وعلى التقادير فلا اتحاد كما هو المفروض وسبب الاشتباه لمن جوز الاتحاد بين الشيئين - ما يرى من صيرورة الأجسام المتعددة المتشابهة أو المتخالفة بالاتصال أو الامتزاج جسماً واحداً كما إذا جمع المياه في إناء واحد أو مزج الخل والسكر فصار سكرنجين - وما يرى بحسب الكون والفساد من صيرورة الماء والهواء بالغليان هواء واحداً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩٨

وبحسب الاستحالة من صيرورة الجسم المتكيف بكيفيتين ذا كيفية واحدة ولم يعلم أنه لم يلزم في شيء من هذه الصور اتحاد بين الشيئين بحسب الحقيقة بل بحسب العبارة والإطلاق العرفي من باب التجوز تنزيلاً لمادة الشيء منزلة ذلك الشيء في بعض الأحكام وما نسب إلى بعض الأقدمين من اتحاد النفس حين استكمالها بالعقل الفعال وكذا ما نقل عن الصوفية من اتصال العارف بالحق فيعني به حالة روحانية تليق بالمفارقات لا أن هناك اتصال جرمي أو امتزاج ولا بطلان إحدى الهويتين بل على الوجه الذي ستعرف في هذا الكتاب في موضع يليق بيانه

فصل (٤) في بعض أحكام الوحدة والكثرة

إن الوحدة ليست بعدد وإن تألف منها لأن العدد كم يقبل الانقسام - والوحدة لا يقبله ومن جعل الوحدة من العدد أراد بالعدد ما يدخل تحت العد فلا نزاع معه لأنه راجع إلى اللفظ بل هي مبدأ للعدد لأن العدد لا يمكن تقويمه إلا بالوحدة لا بما دون ذلك العدد من الأعداد فإن العشرة لو تقومت بغير الوحدات لزم الترجيح من غير مرجح فإن تقويمها بخمسة وخمسة ليس أولى من تقويمها بستة وأربعة ولا من تقويمها بسبعة وثلاثة والتقوم بالجميع غير ممكن وإلا لزم تكرار أجزاء الماهية - المستلزم لاستغناء الشيء عما هو ذاتي له لأن كلا منها كاف في تقويمها فيستغنى به عما عداه وإن أخذ تقويمها باعتبار القدر المشترك بين جميعها لا باعتبار الخصوصيات كان اعترافاً بما هو المقصود إذ القدر المشترك بينهما هو الوحدات.

ومن الشواهد أنه يمكن تصور كل عدد بكنهه مع الغفلة عما دونه من الأعداد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٩٩

فلا يكون شيء منها داخلا في حقيقته فالمقوم لكل مرتبة من العدد ليس إلا الوحدة المتكررة فإذا انضم إلى الوحدة مثلها حصلت الاثينية وهي نوع من العدد وإذا انضم إليها مثلاها حصلت الثلاثة وهكذا يحصل أنواع لا تنهاى بتزايد واحد واحد لا إلى نهاية إذ التزايد لا ينتهي إلى حد لا يزداد عليه فلا ينتهي الأنواع إلى نوع لا يكون فوقه نوع آخر وأما كون مراتب العدد متخالفة الحقائق كما هو عند الجمهور - فلاختلافها باللوازم والأوصاف من الصمم والمنطقية والتشارك والتباين والعادية والمعدودية والتحذير والمالية والتكعب وأشباحها واختلاف اللوازم يدل على اختلاف الملزومات وهذا مما يؤيد ما ذهبنا إليه في باب الوجود من أن الاختلاف بين حقائقها إنما نشأ من نفس وقوع كل حقيقة في مرتبة من المراتب - فكما أن مجرد كون العدد واقعا في مرتبة بعد الاثينية هو نفس حقيقة الثلاثة - إذ يلزمها خواص لا توجد في غيره من المراتب قبلها أو بعدها فكذلك مجرد كون الوجود واقعا في مرتبة من مراتب الأكوان يلزمه معان لا توجد في غير الوجود الواقع في تلك المرتبة فالوحدة لا بشرط في مثالنا بإزاء الوجود المطلق والوحدة المحضة المتقدمة على جميع المراتب العددية بإزاء الوجود الواجبي الذي هو مبدأ كل وجود بلا واسطة ومع واسطة أيضا والمحمولات الخاصة المنتزعة من نفس كل مرتبة من العدد بإزاء الماهيات المتحدة مع كل مرتبة من الوجود و كما أن الاختلاف بين الأعداد بنفس ما به الاتفاق فكذلك التفاوت بين الوجودات بنفس هوياتها المتوافقة في سنخ الموجودية وعلى ما قررناه يمكن القول بالتخالف النوعي بين الأعداد نظرا إلى التخالف الواقع بين المعاني المنتزعة عن نفس ذواتها بذواتها - وهي التي بإزاء الماهيات المتخالفة المنتزعة عن نفس الوجودات ويمكن القول بعدم تخالفها النوعي نظرا إلى أن التفاوت بين ذواتها ليس إلا بمجرد القلة والكثرة في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٠

الوحدات ومجرد التفاوت بحسب قلة الأجزاء وكثرتها في شيء لا يوجب الاختلاف النوعي في أفراد ذلك الشيء وأما كون اختلاف اللوازم دليلا على اختلاف الملزومات - فالحق دلالة على القدر المشترك بين التخالف النوعي والتخالف بحسب القوة والضعف والكمال والنقص كما مر تحقيقه

فصل (٥) في التقابل

قد أشرنا إلى أن لكل واحد من الوحدة والكثرة أعراضا ذاتية ولواحق مخصوصة كما أن لكل منهما عوارض مشتركة بينها وبين مقابلها كالوحدة والاشتراك والحلول والإضافة إلى المحل بنحو كالقيام وإلى مقابلها بنحو آخر كالتقابل فكما أن من العوارض الذاتية للوحدة الههوية بالمعنى الأعم وهو مطلق الاتحاد والاشتراك - في معنى من المعاني فمقابلها يعرض لمقابلها كالغيرية ومنها التقابل المنقسم إلى أقسامه الأربعة أعني تقابل السلب والإيجاب والملكة والعدم والضدين والمتضايفين أما تحصيل معنى التقابل فهو أن مقابل الههوية على الإطلاق الغيرية فالغيرية منه غير في الجنس ومنه غير في النوع وهو بعينه الغير في الفصل ومنه غير بالعرض وهكذا على قياس الاتحاد في هذه المعاني لكن الغير بصفة غير الذات اختص باسم المخالف وكذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠١

الغير في التشخص و العدد اختص باسم الآخر بحسب اصطلاح ما كما أن الهو هو يراد منه الاتحاد في الوجود و المماثلة أيضا من أقسام الغيرية بوجه و كذا المجانسة و المشاكلة و نظائرها لأنها بالحقيقة من عوارض الكثرة إذ لو لا الكثرة ما صحت شيء منها فعدهما من عوارض الكثرة أولى فإن جهة الاتحاد في الجميع ترجع إلى التماثل لأن المثلين هما المتشاركان في حقيقة واحدة من حيث هما كذلك فالإنسان و الفرس من حيث هما إنسان و فرس ليسا بمثلين لكنهما متجانسان باعتبار اشتراكهما في الحيوانية و الحيوانيتان الموجودتان فيهما مشتركان في حقيقة واحدة نوعية - فالتجانس يرجع إلى التماثل في جزء الحقيقة و هو الذي يكون جنسا حين أخذه لا بشرط شيء و قد علمت أن الطبيعة الجنسية إذا أخذت أعدادها مجردة عما اختلف بها من الفصول تكون نوعية فيكون أفرادها متماثلة و كذا الحال في الأصناف الأخر من الواحد الغير الحقيقي فالمشابهة ترجع إلى المماثلة في الكيف و المساواة ترجع إلى المماثلة في الكم و هكذا و جهة الوحدة في المماثلة ترجع إلى الوحدة الذهنية للمعنى الكلي المنتزع من الشخصيات عند تجريدتها عن الغواشي المادية - فيكون جهة الوحدة فيها ضعيفة بخلاف جهة الكثرة فإنها خارجية و التقابل أخص من الغيرية إذ التغير بين الأشياء المادية إذا كان بالجنس الأعلى لا يمنع مجرد تغايرها بالجنس الأعلى عن جواز اجتماعها في مادة واحدة و أما التغير الذي بحسب الأنواع المتفقة في جنس دون الأعلى فيستحيل معه الاجتماع في موضوع واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٢

فالتقابل هو امتناع اجتماع شيئين متخالفين في موضوع واحد في زمان واحد من جهة واحدة فخرج بقيد التخالف التماثل و بقيد امتناع الاجتماع في محل التغير - الذي بين البياض و الحرارة مما يمكن اجتماعهما في محل واحد و دخل بقيد وحدة المحل مثل التقابل الذي بين السواد و البياض مما يمكن اجتماعهما في الوجود كسواد الحبشي - و بياض الرومي و بقيد وحدة الجهة مثل التقابل الذي بين الأبوة و البنوة مما يمكن اجتماعهما في محل واحد باعتبار جهتين قيل و بقيد وحدة الزمان تقابل المتضادين المتعاقبين على موضوع واحد المجتمعين فيه في الواقع و الدهر إذ الاجتماع في أفق الواقع و ظرف الدهر لا ينافي التعاقب الزماني كما أن عدم الاجتماع المكاني لا ينافي الاجتماع بحسب ظرف آخر كالزمان و نحو آخر فما قيل من أن التقييد بوحدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٣

الزمان مستدرك لأن الاجتماع لا يكون إلا في زمان واحد غير صحيح و كان القائل به لم يرتق فهمه كوهمه من سجن الزمان و هاوية الحدثن و إنما عدلنا عن التعريف المشهور في الكتب لمفهوم المتقابلين إلى تعريف مفهوم التقابل لأن صيغة اللذان في قولهم المتقابلان هما اللذان لا يجتمعان في شيء واحد في حالة واحدة من جهة واحدة يشعر بما لهما ذات و العدم و الملكة و الإيجاب و السلب لا ذات لهما و إن أمكن الاعتذار بأن معنى مثل هذه الألفاظ مأخوذ بحسب التصور الذهني و السلوب و الأعدام كلها بحسب المفهوم الذهني أمر فيكون معنى هذا التعريف أن المتقابلين هما المتصوران اللذان لا يصدقان على شيء واحد في حالة واحدة من جهة واحدة.

و أما وجه كون التقابل أربعة أقسام أن المتقابلين إما أن يكون أحدهما عدما للآخر أو لا و الأول إن اعتبر فيه نسبتها إلى قابل لما أضيف إليه العدم فعدم و ملكة و إن لم يعتبر فيه تلك النسبة فسلب و إيجاب و الثاني إن لم يعقل كل منهما إلا

بالقياس إلى الآخر فهما المتضايغان وإلا فهما متضادان.

وقد يقال في وجه الحصر لأنهما إما وجوديان أو لا وعلى الأول إما أن يكون تعقل كل منهما بالقياس إلى الآخر فهما متضايغان أو لا فهما متضادان وعلى الثاني يكون أحدهما وجوديا والآخر عديميا فإما أن يعتبر في العدمي محل قابل للوجودي - فهما العدم والملكة أو لا فهما السلب والإيجاب.

و يرد عليه الاعتراض أما أولا فبجواز كونهما عديمين كالعمى واللاعمرى - المتقابلين بالسلب والإيجاب وما يجاب به من أن اللاعمرى بعينه هو البصر فالتقابل بينهما بالعدم والملكة فهو فاسد لأن تعقل البصر لا يتوقف على انتفاعه و تعقل سلب انتفاء البصر متوقف عليه قطعاً فلا يتحدان مفهومهما وإن كانا متلازمين صدقا و الغلط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٤

ناش من عدم الفرق بين ما بالذات و ما بالعرض.

و أما ثانياً فبأن عدم اللازم يقابل وجود الملزوم كوجود الحركة لجسم مع انتفاء سخونته اللازمة لها عنه و ليس داخلا في العدم والملكة و لا في السلب و الإيجاب إذ المعتبر فيهما أن يكون العدمي منهما عدما للوجودي.

و يمكن الجواب بالفرق بين ما بالذات و ما بالعرض فإن التقابل أولا و بالذات في المثال المذكور إنما هو بين السخونة و انتفائها لكن لما كان انتفاؤها مستلزما لانتفاء الحركة صار مقابلا لها بالعرض.

و اعلم أن مقولية التقابل على أقسامه بالتشكيك و أشدها في باب السلب و الإيجاب لأن منافي الشيء إما رفعه أو ما يستلزم رفعه لأن ما عداهما ممكن الاجتماع مع ذلك الشيء و لا شك أن منافاة رفع الشيء معه إنما هي لذاتيها و لذلك يحكم العقل بالمنافاة بينهما بلا توقف بمجرد ملاحظتهما مع قطع النظر عما عداهما تفصيلا و إجمالا و أما منافاة مستلزم رفع الشيء له فإنما هي لاشتماله على الرفع - فيكون منافاته لا لذاته بل على سبيل التبعية فالمنافاة الذاتية إنما هي بين الإيجاب و السلب و أما فيما سواهما فتكون تابعة لمنافاتهما فيكون التقابل بينهما أشد و أقوى هكذا قيل.

و فيه بحث إذ التنافي بالذات على الوجه الذي ذكر في معنى المنافي يلزم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٥

أن لا يتحقق بين الشئيين أصلا فإن أحد الطرفين في السلب و الإيجاب و إن كان منافيا بالمعنى المذكور للطرف الآخر كالسلب للإيجاب لكن الطرف الآخر الذي هو الإيجاب لا يكون منافيا لمقابله بالذات بل المنافي بالذات له سلب السلب المستلزم للإيجاب و الأولى أن يراد من الرفع أو السلب المعنى المصدري على الوجه المطلق الذي يمكن أخذه بمعنى الفاعل أو المفعول

فصل (٦) في بيان أصناف التقابل و أحكام كل منها

فمن جملة التقابل ما يكون بحسب السلب و الإيجاب -

و هو قد يطلق على ما يعتبر في مفهومه القضية و هو التناقض في اصطلاح المنطقيين و يلزمه امتناع اجتماع المتقابلين صدقا و كذبا في نفس الأمر كزيد أبيض و ليس زيد بأبيض و قد يطلق على ما بين المفردات كما بين مفهوم و رفعه في نفسه كالبياض و اللابيض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٦

أو بحسب الانتساب إلى شيء آخر بالحمل كزيد أبيض و زيد لا أبيض فإن كل مفهوم إذا اعتبر في نفسه و ضم إليه مفاد كلمة النفي حصل مفهوم آخر في غاية البعد عنه و لا يعتبر في شيء منهما صدق أو لا صدق على شيء و إذا حمل على شيء موافاة أو اشتقاقا كان إثباته له تحصيلًا و إثبات سلبه له إيجاب سلب المحمول - وإنما يتنافيان صدقًا لا كذبًا لجواز ارتفاعهما عند عدم الموضوع و لذا قال الشيخ في الشفاء أن المتقابلين بالإيجاب و السلب إن لم يحتمل الصدق فبسيط كالفرسية و اللافرسية و إلا فمركب كقولنا زيد فرس و زيد ليس بفرس فإن إطلاق هذين المعنيين على موضوع واحد في زمان واحد محال و قال أيضا معنى الإيجاب وجود أي معنى كان سواء كان باعتبار وجوده في نفسه أو وجوده لغيره و معنى السلب سلب أي معنى كان سواء كان لا وجودا في نفسه أو لا وجودا لغيره انتهى فقد علم مما ذكر أن التقابل أعم من التناقض المعرف باختلاف قضيتين إيجابا و سلبا كذا و كذا لتحققه في المفردات دون التناقض فقد سها من قال إن التناقض هو نفس التقابل الإيجابي و السلبي و كذا ما وقع في عبارة التجريد أن تقابل السلب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٧

و الإيجاب راجع إلى القول و العقد ليس بصواب كيف و تقابل القضيتين ليس من حيث إنهما قضيتان و لا باعتبار موضوعهما بل باعتبار الإيجاب و السلب المضاف إلى شيء واحد فالتقابل بالحقيقة إنما يكون بين نفس النفي و الإثبات و في القضايا بالعرض - اللهم إلا أن يتكلف كما في بعض شروحه و يراد من الإيجاب و السلب إدراك الوقوع و اللاتوقوع و هما أمران عقليان و اردان على النسبة التي هي أيضا عقلية فإذا حصل في العقل كان كل منهما عقدا أي اعتقادا و إذا عبر عنهما بعبارة كان كل من العبارتين قولًا ثم بما حققناه من أن التقابل بالذات في القضايا إنما هو بين نفس النفي و الإثبات و بين القضايا بالعرض اندفع ما قيل إن بعضهم اعتبروا في مفهوم التقابل عدم الاجتماع في الموضوع بدل المحل و صرحوا بأن لا تضاد بين الصور الجوهرية إذ لا موضوع لها لأنه المحل المستغني عن الحال و محل الصور هي المادة المحتاجة إليها في تقوم و اعتبر الآخرون المحل مطلقا فثبتوا التضاد بين الصور النوعية العنصرية فعلم من اختلاف الفريقين في كون مورد الإيجاب و السلب موضوعا أو محلا أن المراد من عدم الاجتماع المأخوذ في التقابل عدم الاجتماع بحسب الحلول لا بحسب الصدق و معلوم أن من التقابل ما يجري في القضايا كالتناقض و التضاد فإن قولنا كل حيوان إنسان نقيض لقولنا بعض الحيوان ليس بإنسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٨

و ضد لقولنا لا شيء من الحيوان إنسان على ما قال الشيخ في الشفاء ليس الكلبي السالب يقابل الكلبي الموجب مقابلة بالتناقض بل هو مقابل من حيث هو سالب لمحموله مقابلة أخرى فلنسم هذه المقابلة تضادا إذا كان المتقابلان مما لا يجتمعان صدقًا أصلا و لكن قد يجتمعان كذبا كالأضداد في الأمور انتهى مع أن القضايا لا يتصور اعتبار ورودها على شيء بحسب الحلول فيه و كلام هذا القائل لا يخلو عن خلط إذ الاختلاف الذي نقله إنما وقع منهم في باب التضاد حيث اعتبر فيه تعاقب المتضادين إما على موضوع واحد أو محل واحد لا في مفهوم مطلق التقابل المعروف - بكون

الأمرين بحيث لا يجتمعان في شيء واحد سواء كان عدم الاجتماع بحسب الوجود والتحقق أو بحسب الحمل والصدق كيف ولو كان اختلاف المذكور بينهما في مطلق التقابل لزم منه نفي التقابل بين الفرس واللافرس بمثل البيان الذي ذكره لعدم كون الفرس ذا محل وذلك فاسد.

و من أحكام الإيجاب والسلب -

أن تقابلهما إنما يتحقق في الذهن أو اللفظ - مجازاً دون الخارج لأن التقابل نسبة والنسبة في التحقق فرع منتسبها - وأحد المنتسبين في هذا القسم من التقابل سلب والسلوب اعتبارات عقلية لها عبارات لفظية فالنسبة بينهما عقلية صرفة وأما عدم الملكة فله حظ ما من التحقق باعتبار أنه عدم أمر موجود له قابلية التلبس بمقابل هذا العدم - وهذا القدر من التحقق الاعتباري كاف في تحقق النسبة بحسب الخارج فإن لكل شيء مرتبة من الوجود ومرتبة النسبة هي كونها منتزعة من أمور متحققة في الخارج أي نحو كان من التحقق كالإنسانية والحيوانية من الذاتيات والمشى والكتابة من العرضيات.

و من أحكامهما عدم خلو الموضوع عنهما في الواقع

لا في كل مرتبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٠٩

من مراتب الواقع فإن الأشياء التي ليست بينها علاقة ذاتية يخلو كل منها في مرتبة وجود الآخر عن كونه موجوداً أو معدوماً وكذا العرضيات في مرتبة الماهيات من حيث هي كما علمت.

و من أحكام هذا التقابل أيضاً أن تحققه في القضايا مشروط بثمان وحدات مشهورة

مع زيادة وحدة هي وحدة الحمل في القضايا الطبيعية لأن بعض المفهومات - قد يكذب على نفسه بالحمل المتعارف فيصدق نقيضه عليه مع أنه قد يصدق على نفسه - كسائر المفهومات بالحمل الأولي الذاتي وفي المحصورات مشروط بالاختلاف في الكمية لكذب الكليتين مع تحقق الوحدات كقولنا كل حيوان إنسان ولا شيء من الحيوان إنسان فعلم أنهما ليستا متناقضتين وإن كانتا متضادتين كما مر والتضاد لا يمنع كذب الضدين معا وصدق جزئيتين كذلك كقولنا بعض الحيوان إنسان - وليس بعض الحيوان إنسان وفي الموجهات مشروط بالاختلاف على الوجه المقرر - وإلا لم يتحقق التناقض لصدق الممكنتين وكذب الضروريتين في مادة الإمكان مع تحقق باقي الشرائط ومن خاصية هذا التقابل استحالة الواسطة بين المتقابلين به وامتناع اجتماعهما صدقا وكذبا فلا يخلو شيء عن فرسية ولا فرسية وقد يخلو عن طرفي سائر أقسام التقابل ولا يصدق على المعدوم شيء من طرفي المتقابلين إلا السلب والإيجاب

و من جملة التقابل تقابل التضاييف

و المتضاييفان هما وجوديان يعقل كل منهما بالنسبة إلى الآخر كالأبوة والبنوة فإنهما لا يصدقان على شيء واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٠

من جهة واحدة وإحدهما لا تعقل إلا مع الأخرى

وهم وتنبيه:

ربما اشتبه عليك الأمر فتقول كيف يجعل التضايف قسما من التقابل و قسيما للتضاد و الحال أن التضايف أعم من أن يكون تقابلا أو تضادا أو تماثلا أو غير ذلك بل يكون جنسا لهما فيلزم كون الشيء قسما لقسمه و قسيما له أيضا.

و ربما يجاب عنه بأن مفهوم التضايف أعم من مفهومي التقابل و التضاد العارضين لأقسامهما و هذا لا ينافي كون معروض التقابل أعم منه و معروض التضاد مباينا له فمفهوم كل منهما مندرج تحت المضاف لكن من حيث الصدق على الأفراد - أحدهما أعم منه و الآخر مبائن له فلا منافاة.

و بوجه آخر مفهوم التضايف من حيث هو أعم من مفهوم التقابل و من حيث إنه معروض لحصة من التقابل أخص منه على قياس كون مفهوم الكلي من حيث هو هو - أعم من مفهوم الجنس و من حيث إنه معروض لمفهوم الجنس أخص منه.

و الحق في الجواب أن يفرق بين مفهوم الشيء و ما يصدق هو عليه فمفهوم التضايف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١١

من أقسام مفهوم التقابل لكن مفهوم التقابل مما يصدق عليه التضايف و قد يكون مفهوم الشيء مما يصدق عليه أحد أنواعه كمفهوم الكلي الذي هو شيء من آحاد مفهوم الجنس و في الأمور الذهنية و العوارض العقلية كثيرا ما يكون مفهوم الشيء فردا له و فردا لفرد كذا كما يكون فردا لمقابله كمفهوم الجزئي الذي هو فرد من الكلي و مقابل له أيضا باعتبارين و من التقابل ما يكون بين المتضادين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٢

و المتضادان على اصطلاح المشاءين هما الوجوديان غير المتضايفين المتعاقبان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٣

على موضوع واحد لا يتصور اجتماعهما فيه و بينهما غاية الخلاف و قد مرت الإشارة إلى أن الطبائع الجنسية لا يتقابل فالتضاد إنما يعرض للأنواع الأخيرة كما يدل عليه الاستقراء و قد ظن بعضهم وقوع التضاد في الأجناس لزعمهم أن الخير و الشر متضادان - و كل واحد منهما جنس لأنواع كثيرة و هذا الظن باطل من وجهين - الأول أن التقابل بينهما ليس بالتضاد لكون أحدهما عدما للآخر إذ الخير وجود أو كمال وجود و الشر عدم الوجود أو عدم كمال الوجود.

و الثاني أنهما ليسا بجنسين لأن الخير و الشر إما أن يراد بهما ما هو بحسب الواقع و قد علمت أنهما يرجعان إلى الوجود و العدم و إما أن يراد بهما ما بالقياس إلى طبيعة الإنسان فكل ما يوافقه و يلائمه نسميه خيرا و كل ما يخالفه و ينافره نسميه شرا و الموافقة و المخالفة و سائر ما أشبههما نسب و اعتبارات خارجة عن أحوال الماهيات فلا يكون شيء منها جنسا لما اعتبر وصفا لها و أما إذا اعتبر نفس الملائمة و المنافرة مجردتين عن معروضيهما كانت كل واحدة منهما ماهية نوعية فالتضاد بينهما ليس تضادا بين الجنسين و من شرط التضاد أن يكون الأنواع الأخيرة - التي توصف به داخلية تحت جنس واحد قريب و كون الشجاعة تحت الفضيلة و التهور المضاد لها تحت الرذيلة لا يرد نقضا على هذه القاعدة لأن كل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٤

واحد منهما في نفسه كيفية نفسانية و كونه فضيلة أو رذيلة إنما هو صفة عارضة له لا أنها مقومة له فالفضيلة و الرذيلة ليستا من الأجناس للفضائل و الرذائل النفسانية ثم إن الشجاعة ليست ضدًا لشيء من التهور و الجبن لكونها واسطة بينهما - و أما الطرفان فلكونهما في غاية التباعد كانا متضادتين بل تضاد الشجاعة مع كل منهما تضاد بالعرض إذ الشجاعة ماهية لها عارض و هو كونها فضيلة و كل من التهور و الجبن ماهية لها عارض هو كونها رذيلة و التضاد بالحقيقة بين العارضين - و في المعروضين بالعرض و أما التضاد بين التهور و الجبن فنوع آخر من التضاد غير ما يكون باعتبار الفضيلة و الرذيلة و من أحكام التضاد على ما ذكرناه من اعتبار غاية التباعد أن ضد الواحد واحد لأن الضد على هذا الاعتبار هو الذي يلزم من وجوده عدم الضد الآخر فإذا كان الشيء وحدانياً وله أضداد فإما أن يكون مخالفتها - مع ذلك الشيء من جهة واحدة أو من جهات كثيرة فإن كانت مخالفتها معه من جهة واحدة فالمضاد لذلك الشيء بالحقيقة شيء واحد و ضد واحد و قد فرض أضداداً - و إن كانت المخالفة بينها و بينه من جهات عديدة فليس الشيء ذا حقيقة بسيطة بل هو كالإنسان الذي يضاد الحار من حيث هو بارد و يضاد البارد من حيث هو حار و يضاد كثيراً من الأشياء لاشتماله على أضدادها فالتضاد الحقيقي إنما هو بين الحرارة و البرودة و السواد و البياض و لكل واحد من الطرفين ضد واحد و أما الحار و البارد فالتضاد بينهما بالعرض فالشيئان إذا كان بينهما تضاد حقيقي يكون بين محليهما بما هما محلاهما تضاد بالعرض فمن الضدين ما بينهما وسائط و منهما ما لا وسائط بينهما - سواء كان الوسط حقيقياً كما بين الحار و البارد من الفاتر أو غير حقيقي مرجعه الخلو عن جنس الطرفين كاللاخفيف و اللاتقيل فإن الفاتر لا يخرج من جنس الحرارة و البرودة بخلاف اللاخفيف و اللاتقيل لخروجه عن جنس الخفة و الثقل كالفلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٥

و قد يكون أحد الضدين على التعيين لازماً لموضوع كالبياض للثلج و السواد للقار و قد لا يكون و حينئذ إما أن يمتنع خلو المحل عنهما كالصحة و المرض للإنسان - أو يمكن كالثقل و الخفة للفلك و على هذا الاصطلاح لا تضاد حقيقياً بين الجواهر إلا باعتبار ما يعرض لها من المتضادات و أما على اصطلاح المتقدمين - ففي الماديات من الصور المتخالفة المتعاقبة على محل واحد متضاد حقيقي و كذا يجوز عندهم أن يكون لشيء واحد أضداد كثيرة حيث لا يشترطون في التضاد غاية الخلاف فالسواد عندهم كما يضاد البياض يضاد الحمرة أيضاً لأن اصطلاحهم يحتمل ذلك.

شك و تحقيق:

و هاهنا إشكال قوي و هو أن المقولات العالية قد علمت أن لا تضاد بينهما لاجتماع بعضهما مع بعض في جوهر واحد جسماني - و كذا الاشتراك في الجنس البعيد لا يكفي في امتناع الاجتماع فإن الطعم يجتمع مع السواد مع كونهما من مقولة واحدة فلا بد من كون المتضادين تحت جنس قريب و من كونهما مختلفين بالفصل فحينئذ إن كان بينهما تضاد فلا يكون تضادهما من حيث الجنس بل من حيث الفصل فالمتضادان بالذات هما الفصلان على أن الفصلين لا يشتركان في الجنس القريب لكونه خارجاً عن حقيقتيهما كما سبق و قد شرط كون المتضادين تحت جنس قريب هذا خلف و أيضاً تعاقب الفصول في أنفسها على موضوع واحد كما هو شرط التضاد غير متصور إذ لا استقلال لها في الوجود حتى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٦

ينسب إلى الموضوع الواحد ولا يمكن تعاقبها على جنس واحد كما علمت - ويمكن التفصي عنه بأن الجنس والفصل متحدان في الوجود والجعل وهما موجودان بوجود واحد بلا تغاير بينهما في الخارج وهما عين النوع في الخارج فصفاً الفصول في الأعيان بعينها صفات الأنواع المتقومة بها في نحو ملاحظة العقل ولما كان التضاد من الأحكام الخارجية للتضادات فلا محالة يكون الموصوف بها الأنواع بذواتها دون الفصول بما هي فصول والحاصل أن التضاد بين المتضادين - وإن كان باعتبار فصل كل منهما ولكن التعاقب في الحلول في موضوع باعتبار نوعيتهما لأن الحلول في شيء نحو من الوجود والوجود لا يتعلق إلا بما يستقل في التحصل الخارجي والفصول لا استقلال لها في الخارج واتصاف كل من النوع والفصل - المقوم بالصفات الخارجية للآخر إنما هو بالذات لا بالعرض لاتحادهما في الوجود الخارجي دون الصفات الذهنية التي تعرض لكل منهما باعتبار مغايرتهما في الذهن -

و مما عد في المتقابلين الملكة والعدم

وهما أمران يكون أحدهما وجوديا والآخر عدميا أي عدما لذلك الوجودي سواء كان بحسب شخصه في الوقت أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٧

في غير الوقت أو بحسب النوع أو بحسب الجنس قريبا كان أو بعيدا فالعمى والظلمة وانتثار الشعر بداء الثعلب الذي هو بعد الملكة والمرودية التي هي قبلها - وعدم البصر الممكن في حق الشخص الأعمى وانتفاء اللحية للمرأة الممكن لنوعها - كل هذه عدميات في التحقيق مشروط فيها بالإمكان والقوة ولذا لم يصدق على المعدوم - وأما في المشهور فالملكة هي القدرة للشيء على ما من شأنه أن يكون له متى شاء - كالقدرة على الإبصار والعدم انتفاء هذه القدرة مع بطلان التهيؤ في الوقت الذي من شأنه أن يكون كالأعمى لا كالجرو قبل فتح البصر واصطلاح المنطقيين في العدم والملكة هو المعنى الأول وكذا اصطلاحهم في المتضادين مجرد كونهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٨

غير مجتمعين في موضوع واحد وأما الإلهيون فقد اعتبروا في كل منهما قيدا آخر أما في المتضادين فكونهما في غاية التباعد وفي الملكة والعدم أن يكون العدمي سلبا للوجودي عما من شأنه أن يكون في ذلك الوقت فكل من قسمي التقابل بالمعنى الأول أعم منه بالمعنى الثاني عموم المطلق من المقيد إلا أن المطلق من التضاد يسمى بالمشهوري لكونه المشهور فيما بين عوام الفلاسفة والمقيد بالحقيقي لكونه المعتمد في علومهم الحقيقية والملكة والعدم بالعكس من ذلك حيث يسمون المطلق بالحقيقي والمقيد بالمشهوري والقدح الذي يلزم في انحصار التقابل في الأقسام الأربعة من تقابل الالتقاء والمرودة وتقابل البصر وعدمه عن العقرب أو الشجر لكونه خارجا عن التضاد وعن الملكة والعدم على التفسير الأنحصر تفصوا عنه بأن الحصر إنما هو باعتبار المعنى الأعم أعني المشهوري من التضاد والحقيقي من الملكة والعدم ليدخل أمثال ذلك فيه

بحث ومخلص:

و هاهنا إشكال من وجهين -

الأول أن الضدين في اصطلاح المنطق كما صرح به الشيخ الرئيس و غيره لا يلزم أن يكون كلاهما

وجوديين

بل قد يكون أحدهما عدما للآخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١١٩

كالسكون للحركة و الظلمة للنور و العجمة للنطق و الأنوثة للذكورة و الفردية للزوجية و في كلام بعضهم أن التضاد بالمعنى المشهوري اسم يقع على التضاد الحقيقي و على بعض أقسام الملكة و العدم أعني ما يوجد فيه التعاقب على موضوع واحد بناء على اشتراطهم ذلك في التضاد المشهوري و الحق أنه أعم من ذلك - لعدم إمكان الانتقال في بعض هذه الأمور كالذكورة و الأنوثة و الزوجية و الفردية - على أن تقابل الزوجية و الفردية راجع عند التحقيق إلى الإيجاب و السلب - فعلى أي تقدير لا يكون قسيما لتقابل الملكة و العدم و تقابل الإيجاب و السلب -

الثاني أن غاية الخلاف شرط في التضاد المشهوري أيضا

كما هو مصرح به في كلام الحكماء كالشيخ و غيره فيلزم خروج تقابل السواد و الحمرة و كذا تقابل الحمرة و الصفرة مثلا عن الأقسام.

و قد التزمه بعضهم و سموا مثل ذلك بالتعاند فيزيد عندهم قسم خامس في أقسام التقابل. و قد تخلص بعض آخر عنه ببيان أن تقابل الأوساط تقابل حقيقي أيضا كتقابل الأطراف فإن كل مرتبة من السواد مثلا مشتمل على طبيعة السواد المطلق الذي لا يقبل الأشد و الأضعف عند المشاءين و على خصوصية كونه على هذا الحد من السواد - و هو بالنسبة إلى مرتبة أخرى تحتها سواد و بالنسبة إلى مرتبة أخرى فوقها بياض - و لذا قال الشيخ في قاطيغورياس الشفاء السواد الحق لا يقبل الشدة و الضعف بل الشيء الذي هو سواد بالقياس إلى آخر فإذا ثبت ذلك فكل وسط من أوساط السواد - باعتبار نفسه في حكم الطرف إذ لا تفاوت بينهما عندهم باعتبار الطبيعة المشتركة - و كذلك باعتبار مقايسته إلى سواد دونه في المرتبة أو إلى البياض الطرف أو البياض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢٠

الوسط إذ كونه سوادا ضعيفا إنما يتحصل إذا قيس إلى سواد أشد لكن إذا قيس إليه كان ذلك سوادا بالنسبة إلى هذا و هذا لا يكون سوادا بالنسبة إليه بل بياضا لا فرق بينه و بين بياض الطرف في هذه الملاحظة و كذا حكم أوساط البياض فثبت أن التضاد الحقيقي كما يوجد بين الأطراف يوجد بين الأوساط فإن لها جهتي الاختلاف و التوافق و التقابل إنما هو باعتبار الأول فلا يزيد في التقابل قسم خامس.

هذا خلاصة ما ذكره بعض أجلة المتأخرين و هو لا يستقيم على ما اخترناه - من طريقة أسلاف الحكماء في الأشد و الأضعف.

و يرد عليه أيضا أن لكل شيء ماهية متحصلة في ذاتها لا بالقياس إلى ما عداها - اللهم إلا أن يكون مضافا حقيقيا يقترب مع تعقله و وجوده تعقل شيء آخر و وجوده - و لا شك أن الألوان من مقولة الكيف لا من مقولة المضاف فلكل منها

ماهية متحصلة - لا بالقياس إلى غيره و التضاد من الأمور التي تعرض للمتضادين بحسب ذاتيهما لا بمقايضة أحدهما للآخر و لا لغيرهما و إن كان مفهوم التضاد من جزئيات الإضافة فالمقابلة بين الحمرة و الصفرة مع قطع النظر عن قياسهما إلى الأطراف ثابتة جزما و ليست من أقسامهما شيئا إلا التضاد.

مخلص:

فالحق أن يقال في وجه التفصي عن هذا الإشكال - أما عن قبل المشاءين فبأن التضاد إنما ثبت بالذات بين طبيعتي السواد و البياض مع قطع النظر عن خصوصيات الأفراد فكل مرتبة من مراتب السواد - يضاد لكل مرتبة من مراتب البياض باعتبار اشتغال هذه على طبيعة أحد الضدين - و تلك على طبيعة الضد الآخر لا باعتبار الخصوصيات فالتضاد بين الوسطين كالحمرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢١

و الصفرة باعتبار كون أحدهما سوادا و الآخر بياضا تضاد بالذات و أما باعتبار الخصوصيتين من كون أحدهما حمرة و الآخر صفرة فبالعرض فالتضاد بين الأوساط - يرجع إلى ما يرجع إليه التضاد بين الأطراف فلم يزد التقابل على الأربعة. و أما من قبل الأقدمين فبأن التقابل بين مراتب كيفية واحدة تقابل في الكمال و النقص كما في مراتب الكمية من نوع واحد و أما تقابل مرتبة ضعيفة من السواد - مع مرتبة ضعيفة من البياض فعلى قياس ما ذكر في الطريقة الأخرى من أن التضاد بالذات إنما هو بين سنجيهما مع قطع النظر عن الخصوصيات لكن بقي الكلام في أن جميع الألوان من مراتب السواد و البياض أم ليس كذلك و ما ذكرناه كما ذكره يتم على الأول لا على الثاني و بناء الإشكال على مجرد الاصطلاح و هو أمر هين في العقليات و العلوم الحقيقية.

نكتة:

لما تبين اتصاف كل واحد من الموجودات بإضافة و سلب إذ ما من موجود إلا و له إضافة إلى غيره بالعلية أو المعلولية أو غيرهما - و يسلب عنه أشياء و لا أقل ما هو نقيضه فتقابل التضاييف لا يخلو عن جنسه شيء من الأشياء - حتى واجب الوجود فإنه مبدأ للأشياء و إن خلا عن آحاد جزئياته كالأبوة و البنوة و المجاورة - و كذا تقابل الإيجاب و السلب لا يخرج منه مطلقا و لا من كل واحد من جزئياته كالحجرية و اللاحجرية شيء من الأشياء و أما القسمان الأخيران من التقابل أعني العدم و الملكة و التضاد فكما يخلو بعض الموجودات عن خاصتهما [خاصهما] كالبرودة و الحرارة و العمى و البصر فكذلك يخلو عن مطلق تقابلهما أشياء فإن المفارقات لا تقبل الضدين - و لا العدم المقابل للملكة إذ كل ما يمكن لها بالإمكان العام فهو حاصل لها فلا يصح فيها هذان القسمان من التقابل لا عاما و لا خاصا

فصل (٧) في التقابل بين الواحد و الكثير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢٢

كيفية التقابل بين الواحد و الكثير من العلوم الربانية

التي حارت فيه عقول أهل النظر و أصحاب الفكر و إنما خص بمعرفتها الراسخون في العلم لأن تقابلهما ليس بتقابل العدم و الملكة و لا السلب و الإيجاب لأنهما وجوديان فلا يكون أحدهما سلبا للآخر و لا تقابل المتضادين لعدم غاية

الخلاف المعتبرة في التضاد بينهما إذ ما من عدد إلا ويتصور أكثر منه ولعدم التعاقب على موضوع واحد عددي ووحدة الهيولى المتعاقبة عليها الاتصالات والانفصالات وحدة بهمة ظلية ثم الكثرة تتقوم بالوحدة ولا يمكن تقويم ماهية أحد المتضادين بشيء من نوع الآخر وليس بينهما تقابل التضاييف وإلا لكان ماهية كل منهما معقولة بالقياس إلى الأخرى وليس كذلك أما من جانب الوحدة فبين أن معقوليتها كوجود ذاتها يمكن أن ينفك ويتجرد عن وجود الكثرة ومعقوليتها وأما من جانب الكثرة فإن الكثرة كثرة في ذاتها بسبب الوحدة لا بالقياس إلى الوحدة والفرق بين المعنيين واضح وقياسها إلى الوحدة من جهة كونها معلولة لها لا من جهة كونها هي الكثرة إذ كون الكثرة كثرة غير كونها معلولة وليست الكثرة نفس المعلولة على قاعدة القوم ثم إنا نجد التقابل بينهما من جهة تمانعهما لا من جهة عليتهما وارتباطهما.

وأيضا كون الشيء بحسب جوهره و ماهيته مضافا إلى شيء يوجب كون ذلك الشيء أيضا كذلك فلو كانت الكثرة جوهرية الإضافة لكانت الوحدة أيضا جوهرية الإضافة كما هو شأن المتضاييفين في الانعكاس.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢٣

وأيضا يلزم كونهما متكافئين في التحقق وجودا وتعقلا من حيث هذه هذه وتلك تلك وليس كذلك.

و من الناس من ظن أن التقابل بينهما ليس تقابلا ذاتيا

لكنهما مما عرض لهما تقابل التضاييف من جهة أن الوحدة مقومة للكثرة والكثرة معلولة متقومة بها - وهذا الكلام لا يخلو من خلط لأننا نفهم تقابلا بين الواحد والكثير اللذين كل منهما ينافي الآخر ويبطله عند حدوثه وجوده والوحدة التي يزيلها ويبطلها - الكثرة الطارئة ليست بعلّة لتلك الكثرة لأنها تتقوم بوحدة أخرى من نوعها والمتقومة بها مقابلة لنوع آخر من الوحدة غير ما يتقوم بها كوحدة الاتصال وكثرته فإننا إذا قسمنا الجسم بنصفين فهناك وحدتان وحدة كانت قبل القسمة عارضة للمتصل الوحداني وهي ليست جزء للاثينية العارضة لمجموع النصفين ووحدة أخرى هي عارضة لأحد النصفين هي المقومة للاثينية ولا شبهة في عروض تقابل التضاييف بين الوحدة الحادثة والاثينية لكن الكلام في تقابل الوحدة [السابقة] والاثينية الطارئة أنه من أي قسم من التقابل.

فإن قلت نفس مفهوم التقابل من باب الإضافة فثبت أن تقابل الوحدة والكثرة هو التقابل التضاييفي.

قلت هذا المفهوم من الطبائع العامة العقلية التي لا يمكن تحققها إلا في ضمن شيء من أقسامها وكلامنا في تحقيق التقابل بين الواحد والكثير أنه بأي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢٤

نحو من الأنحاء فما لم يتحقق أولا أحد أقسامه المعينة لم يتحقق هذا المفهوم في نفسه حتى يصدق عليه أنه جزئي من جزئيات مفهوم الإضافة على الوجه الذي مر.

و منهم من زعم أن التقابل بين الواحد والكثير ليس بالذات

و احتج عليه بأن موضوع المتقابلين يجب أن يكون واحدا بالشخص وموضوع الوحدة والكثرة ليس كذلك لأن طريان الوحدة إما على نفس الكثرة أو على الأشياء المتعددة التي صارت بالاجتماع شيئا واحدا هو المجموع من حيث

المجموع أو على شيء غيرها يحدث عند زوالها بحدوث الاتصال الوجداني و على أي تقدير ليس موضوع أحدهما هو بعينه موضوع الآخر و قس على ذلك طريان الكثرة على الوحدة نفسها أو موضوعها.

و فيه بحث من وجوه الأول النقض بأن الدليل لو تم لدل على نفي التقابل بين الوحدة و اللاوحدة و الكثرة و اللاكثرة و هو بين الفساد.

و الثاني أن موضوع المتقابلين لا يلزم أن يكون واحدا شخصيا بل قد يكون وحدته نوعية أو جنسية قريبة أو بعيدة كالرجولية و المرئية للإنسان - و الذكورية و الأنثوية للحيوان و الحركة و السكون للجسم أو بحسب أمر أعم من هذه الأمور كلها كالخيرية و الشرية للشيء كيف و لو كان كذلك للزم أن لا يكون للذاتيات و اللوازم تقابل مع سلوب و نقائص لها لعدم بقاء الشخص عند زوالها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢٥

الثالث أن ما ذكره على تقدير تمامه إنما يتم في الوحدة الشخصية و الكثرة المقابلة لا في غيرها فإن الواحد بالمحمول أو الموضوع أو بالمناسبة مثلا قد يتكرر فيها مع بقاءه.

الرابع أن بقاء الموضوع بأي وجه كان ليس من شرائط مطلق التقابل بل لبعضها كالتضاد كما صرح به شيخ الرئيس في قاطيغورياس الشفاء حيث قال و أما المتضايغان فليس يجب فيهما التعاقب على موضوع واحد أو اشتراكهما في موضوع واحد حتى يكون الموضوع الذي هو علة لأمر يلزمه لا محالة إمكان أن يصير معلولا - أو يكون هناك موضوع مشترك و إن كانت العلية و المعلولية من المضاف.

و منهم من رأى أن التقابل بينهما بالذات من باب التضاد

و استدل أما على أن التقابل بينهما بالذات فبأننا إذا نظرنا إلى مجرد مفهوميهما و قطعنا النظر عن كون أحدهما علة أو مكيالا للآخر جزمنا بعدم اجتماعهما في ذات واحدة في زمان واحد من جهة واحدة و أما على أن التقابل بينهما بالتضاد فلأنه ليس بشيء من الأقسام الثلاثة الباقية للتقابل أما التضايف فلعدم كون الوحدة و الكثرة متكافئين - وجودا و تعقلا كما مر و المتضايغان يجب أن يكونا كذلك و أما القسمان الآخران - فلكون أحد المتقابلين فيهما سلبا للآخر و الوحدة لكونها مقومة للكثرة ليست سلبا لها و الكثرة لكونها مما يتقوم بالوحدة لا يكون سلبا لها و إلا لكان الشيء علة لعدمه و ما يقال من أن الضد لا يتقوم بضده فمجرد دعوى بلا دليل مع أن الواقع بخلافه ألا ترى أن البلقة ضد لكل واحد من السواد و البياض مع أنه يتقوم بهما.

بحث و تقويم:

كلام هذا القائل لا يخلو من تزلزل و اضطراب لأن الحكم على هذا التقابل بالتضاد بنفي كونه أحد الأقسام الباقية مع انتفاء شرط التضاد من جواز التعاقب على موضوع واحد و كون الطرفين على غاية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢٦

التباعد ليس أولى من الحكم عليه بكونه أحد البواقي فيكون تخصيصا من غير مخصص و أما قوله امتناع تقويم الضد بال ضد مجرد دعوى بلا دليل فهو افتراء لأن دليلهم أن الضدين متفاسدان فلا يمكن حصول ماهية حقيقية من ضدها و لا

من الضدين و الأبلق ليست له ماهية وحدانية بل وحدته بمجرد الفرض و الاعتبار فظهر أن لا حاصل لما ذكروا في بيان
تحصيل قسم من التقابل في تقابل الواحد و الكثير فيجب عليهم أن يجعلوا له قسما خامسا إلا أن المشهور ما ذكرناه من
الأقسام الأربعة مع خواصها و لوازمها

المرحلة السادسة في العلة و المعلول و فيه فصول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٢٧

فصل (١) في تفسير العلة و تقسيمها

فنقول العلة لها مفهومان

أحدهما هو الشيء الذي يحصل من وجوده وجود شيء آخر و من عدمه عدم شيء آخر و ثانيهما هو ما يتوقف عليه
وجود الشيء - فيمتنع بعدمه و لا يجب بوجوده و العلة بالمعنى الثاني تنقسم إلى علة تامة و هي التي لا علة غيرها على
الاصطلاح الأول و إلى علة غير تامة تنقسم إلى صورة

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و مادة و غاية و فاعل.

و القائل بأن إطلاق اسم العلة على هذه الأربعة بالاشتراك مخط لا سيما و يذكر - أن العلة تنقسم إلى كذا و إلى كذا بل
الحق أنها مقولة على الكل بالمعنى الثاني.

و ربما يقولون إن العلة إما أن يكون جزءا للشيء أو لا يكون و الجزء ينقسم إلى ما به يكون الشيء بالفعل و هي الصورة
و إلى ما به يكون الشيء بالقوة و هي المادة - و التي ليست بجزء إما أن يكون ما لأجله الشيء و هي الغاية أو ما يكون
به الشيء و هو الفاعل و قد يخص الفاعل بما منه الشيء المباين من حيث هو مباين و يسمى ما منه الشيء المقارن
باسم العنصر و المادة أيضا يختلف اعتبار عليتها إلى ما منها كالنوع العنصري و إلى ما فيها كالهيات فربما يجمع الجميع
في اسم العلة المادية لاشتراكها في معنى القوة و الاستعداد فيكون العلل أربعا.

و ربما يفصل فيكون خمسا و الصورة أيضا يختلف نحو تقويمها للمادة - و للمجموع منها و الأولى إرجاعها بالاعتبار
الأول إلى الفاعلية و إن كانت مع شريك غير مقارن موجب لإفادة هذه العلة و إقامة قرينها بها كما سيتضح بيانه في
بحث كيفية

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التلازم بين المادة و الصورة فالصورة و إن كانت صورة للمادة لكن ليست علة صورية لها بل علة فاعلية لها فعلم من
ها هنا أيضا فساد ظن من خصص الفاعل بالغير المقارن و القابل أيضا إذا كان مبدءا لما فيه لا يكون مبدءا للصورة لتقدمها
عليه بل للعرض لتقومه أولا بالصورة بالفعل لأنه باعتبار ذاته إنما يكون بالقوة و ما بالقوة من جهة ما هو بالقوة لا يكون
مبدءا البتة و لكن يكون مبدءا لماهية المركب أو لوجود العرض بعد ما تقوم بالصورة.

و اتضح بما ذكرناه أن كل واحدة من المادة و الصورة مما يكون علة قريبة و بعيدة للمركب منهما باعتبارين أما الصورة

فإذا كانت صورة حقيقية مقولة من الجوهر - تكون مقومة للمادة بالفعل و المادة علة للمركب فيكون الصورة علة لعله المركب - بهذا الاعتبار و لكنه من حيث هي جزء صوري للمركب علة صورية له فلا واسطة بينهما - و أما المادة فإذا كان المركب ماهية صنفية و كانت الصورة هيئة عرضية تكون المادة موضوعا مقوما لذلك العرض الذي هو علة صورية للمركب الصنفي فكانت المادة علة المركب من هذه الجهة على أنها من حيث كونها جزءا للمركب علة مادية له فلا واسطة بينهما.

و بالجملة المادة و الصورة علتان قريبتان للمعلول من حيث هما جزءان له فيكون إحداهما علة صورية و الأخرى علة مادية و إذا كانت إحداهما علة المركب فليس نحو تقويمها للمركب هذا النحو بل المادة في تقويمها التوسيطي للمركب ليست علة مادية له و كذا الصورة في تقويمها التوسيطي للمركب ليست سببا صوريا.

ثم اعلم أن هذه العلل الأربع يوجد بينها مناسبات و ارتباطات كثيرة.

منها أن كل واحد من الفاعل و الغاية سبب للآخر

من جهة فالفاعل من جهة سبب للغاية و كيف لا و هو الذي يحصلها في الخارج و الغاية من جهة سبب

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للفاعل و كيف لا و هي التي يفعل الفاعل لأجلها و لذلك إذا قيل لك لم تتراض فتقول لأصح و إذا قيل لم صححت فتقول لأنني ارتضت فالرياضة سبب فاعلي للصحة و الصحة سبب غائي للرياضة و الفاعل علة لوجود ماهية الغاية في العين - لا لكون الغاية غاية و لا لماهيتها و الغاية علة لكون الفاعل فاعلا.

و منها أن كل وحدات من المادة و الصورة سبب للآخرى بوجه آخر

كما أشير إليه.

و منها أن بعض هذه العلل مما يتحد مع بعض آخر

كما سيجيء أن فاعل الكل هو غاية الكل وجودا و عقلا و ربما يتفق أن يكون ماهية ثلاث منها و هي الفاعل و الصورة و الغاية ماهية واحدة فإن في الأب مبدءا لتكون الصورة الأدمية من النطفة و هو صورة الأدمية لا شيء آخر منه و ليس الحاصل في النطفة إلا صورة آدمية و هي أيضا الغاية التي يتحرك إليها النطفة لكنها من حيث تقوم مع المادة نوع الإنسان فهي صورة و من حيث يبتدي تحريكها منه فهي فاعلة و من حيث ينتهي تحريكها إليه فهي غاية فإذا قيست تلك الوحدة إلى المادة و المركب - كانت صورة و علة صورية باعتبارين و إذا قيست إلى الحركة كانت فاعلة مرة و غاية مرة فاعلة باعتبار ابتداء الحركة و هي صورة الأب و غاية باعتبار انتهاء الحركة - و هي صورة الابن كما فصل في كتاب الشفاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣١

فصل (٢) في وجوب وجود العلة عند وجود معلولها و في وجوب وجود المعلول عند وجود علته

أما الأول فالمعلول لما كان في ذاته ممكن الوجود و العدم لما عرفت أن الوجوب و الامتناع يغنيان الشيء عن الحاجة إلى العلة فلا بد في رجحان أحد طرفيه على الآخر - من الاحتياج إلى المرجح و لا بد أن يكون ذلك المرجح حاصلًا

حال حصول ذلك الترجيح وإلا لكان غنيا عنه ثم المرجح للوجود لما امتنع أن يكون عديميا وجب أن يكون وجوديا فإذن لا بد من وجود المرجح حال حصول الراجح وهو المطلوب وأما الثاني فقال المحصلون إن واجب الوجود إذا كان مرجحا لوجود غيره فإما أن يكون لذاته المخصوصة - مرجحا لوجود ما سواه فلا يتقدم على وجود الممكنات غير ذاته أو لأمر لازم له كما يفرض صفة لذاته على ما يتوهمه العامة من أن له صفات واجبة الوجود فالمرجح دائم فيدوم الترجيح إذ لو حصل هو ولا يفرض معه من الصفات الدائمة ولم يحصل الشيء فليس مؤثر الوجود الممكنات بحيث لم يتوقف تأثيره على غيره وذلك لأن ما به يكون المؤثر مؤثرا متى تحقق فصدور الأثر عنه إما ممكن أو واجب فإن كان ممكنا استدعى سببا آخر مرجحا فحينئذ لا يصير المرجح مرجحا إلا مع ذلك المرجح الآخر وقد فرضنا أن مؤثره غير محتاج إلى شيء آخر هذا خلف ثم الكلام في صدور الأثر بعد انضمام ذلك المرجح باق فإما أن يلزم التسلسل أو يثبت أنه متى وجد المؤثر بتمامه وجب الأثر ودام بدوامه وأما إن كانت مؤثرته لا لذاته المخصوصة ولا لشيء من لوازم ذاته كانت لأمر منفصل وهو إن كان حادثا فالكلام فيه كالكلام في المعلول الأول ولا يتسلسل بل لا بد وأن ينتهي إلى واجب الوجود - فيعود الكلام إلى أنه يلزم دوامه بدوام علته وذلك لا يختلف بأن يسمى ذلك الحادث - وقتا أو مصلحة أو داعيا أو إرادة أو أي شيء كان.

فإن قيل الباري تعالى فاعل مختار ويجوز أن يختار باختيار قديم إحداث

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شيء معين في زمان معين دون غيره من الأزمنة.

قلنا وهل أمكنه أن يختار الإيجاد في غير ذلك الوقت أم لم يمكن فإن لم يمكن ذلك فهو موجب لا مختار.

وأيضا وجب حينئذ تحقق الفعل مع كونه في ذلك الوقت في الأزل.

وأيضا عند وقوع ذلك الفعل يبطل الاختيار لإيقاعه فذلك الاختيار لا يكون واجبا وإلا لم يبطل عند وقوعه ولا من لوازم ذاته لما ذكرناه فلا بد وأن يكون وجوبه بعله أخرى لأن الذات لو كفت في وجوبه لما بطل عند وقوع الفعل بل دام بدوامها وليس كذلك وكونه واجبا بعله أخرى أيضا محال لأن ما عدا ذاته يستند إلى اختياره فلو كان اختياره مستندا إلى ما عدا ذاته يلزم الدور وإن كان يمكنه أن يختار إيقاع العالم في غير ذلك الوقت الذي اختار إيقاعه فيه لم يترجح أحد الاختيارين على الآخر إلا لمرجح وننقل الكلام إلى ذلك المرجح فهو إن كان اختيار آخر تسلسلت الاختيارات وانتهت إلى ذاته فعاد الكلام في صدور أول الصوادر عن ذاته سواء كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣٣

اختيارا أو شيئا آخر فعند ذلك افترق الناس و تحزبوا أحزابا.

فمنهم من قال بجواز أن يختار المختار أحد الأمرين متساويين دون الآخر لا لأمر أوجب عليه ذلك كما أن الهارب من السبع إذا عن له طريقان متساويان من جميع الوجوه فإنه يسلك أحدهما باختياره دون الآخر لا لمرجح.

و منهم من قال شأن الإرادة تخصيص أحد الجانبين المتساويين بالوقوع - لا بناء على أولوية أو داع أو لمية بل لأن خاصية الإرادة أن ترجح أحد المتماثلين - من دون الحاجة إلى مرجح و لمية لأن كونها صفة مرجحة من الصفات

النفسية لها- و من لوازم الماهية و هي غير معللة فإن كون الإنسان حيوانا لا يعلل و لا كون المثلث ذا الزوايا بعلّة. و منهم من قال إنه تعالى عالم بجميع المعلومات فيعلم أنه أي المعلومات يقع و أيها لا يقع فما علم منه أنه سيقع يكون واجب الوقوع لأنه لو لم يقع كان علمه جهلا و إذا كان ذلك مختصا بالوقوع و غيره ممتنع الوقوع فلا جرم يريد ما يعلم أنه يقع و لا يريد غيره لأن إرادة المحال محال.

و منهم من قال إن أفعاله تعالى غير خالية عن المصالح و إن كنا لا نعلم تلك المصالح فتخصيص الباري بإيجاده بوقت معين لأجل كونه عالما بأن وقوعه في ذلك الوقت متضمن مصلحة يفوت إن وقع في غيره.

و منهم من قال عدم صدور الفعل عنه في الأزل ليس لأمر يرجع إلى الفاعل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣٤

بل لأمر يرجع إلى الفعل من حيث إن الفعل ما له أول و الأزل ما لا أول له و الجمع بينهما متناقض ممتنع.

أقول هذا القول مما له وجه صحيح لو تفتن قائله به كما سيظهر لك في حدوث عالم الأجسام.

و منهم من أثبت على واجب الوجود إرادات متجددة غير متناهية سابقة و لاحقة- و زعم أنه يفعل شيئا ثم يريد بعده شيئا آخر فيفعل ثم يريد.

و لنشرع في هدم بنیان هذه الأقوال و بيان الخلل فيها.

أما القول بأنه لم لا يجوز ترجيح أحد الاختيارين لا لمرجح فدفعه بوجهين - الأول أن الطريق إلى إثبات الصانع ينسد بسببه فإن الطريق إليه هو أن الجائز لا يستغني عن المؤثر فلو أبطنا هذه القاعدة لم يمكننا إثبات واجب الوجود.

الثاني ما سبق من بيان حاجة الممكن الوجود و العدم إلى السبب مع أنه معلوم بالبداهة و من أنكره عانده لسانا و أقر به ضميرا و ما أورده من الصور فما لم يتحقق هناك مرجح استحالة حصول أحد الجانبين فإن وجود المرجح غير العلم بوجوده و الضروري هو وجوده لا العلم به و ربما ينفك أحدهما عن الآخر و هذا مما يجده العاقل من نفسه أحيانا فإنه عند تساوي الدواعي للجهات يقف في موضعه و لا يتحرك ما لم يظهر مرجح.

و أما قول من قال كون الإرادة مرجحة صفة ذاتية و هي من خاصيتها فلا حاصل له فإن الإرادة إذا كان الجانبان بالنسبة إليها سواء لا يتخصص أحدهما إلا بمرجح

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣٥

إذا لا يقع الممكن إلا بمرجح و أما الخاصية التي يدعونها فهو هوس ليس لو اختير الجانب الآخر الذي فرض مساويا لهذا الجانب كانت تلك الخاصية حاصلة معه أيضا- ثم تعلق الإرادة بشيء مع أن نسبتها إلى الجانبين متساوية غير معقول فإن الإرادة ما حصلت أولا إرادة بشيء ثم تعلقت فإن المرید لا يريد أي شيء اتفق و لا شيئا ما مطلقا فإنها من الصفات الإضافية و لا يعقل إرادة غير مضافة إلى شيء و لا أيضا مضافة إلى شيء ما على الإطلاق ثم يعرض لتلك الإرادة التخصيص ببعض جهات الإمكان- بل إذا وقع تصور و حصل إدراك مرجح لأحد الجانبين يحصل إرادة متخصصة بأحدهما- فالترجح متقدم على الإرادة و أما الذي ذكره ثالثا أنه يريد ما علم أنه سيقع فنقول علمه بوقوعه في وقت كذا إذا كان تابعا لوقوعه في ذلك الوقت المعين و لا شك أن تخصيص وقوعه- في ذلك الوقت تبع لقصد

إلى إيقاعه فيه فلو كان القصد إلى إيقاعه فيه تابعا لعلمه بوقوعه فيه لزم الدور.
و أيضا قد علمت بطلان شيئية المعدومات و أن الماهيات تابعة للوجودات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣٦

و ستعلم أن علمه تعالى سبب لتحصل الممكنات متقدم عليها لا أنه تابع لحصولها.
و أما الذي ذكره رابعا من رعاية مصالح العباد فنقول المصلحة المرتبة على وقوع الفعل في وقت معين إما أن يكون من لوازم وجود ذلك الفعل فحينئذ يترتب عليه متى وجد و ما يكون كذلك لا يكون مرجحا لوقت دون وقت و إما أن لا يكون من لوازم وجود ذلك الفعل فحينئذ ترتب تلك المصلحة على حصوله في ذلك الوقت دون سائر الأوقات من قبيل الجائزات فننقل الكلام إلى سبب التخصيص به دون غيره من الأوقات اللهم إلا أن يكون المؤثر في التخصيص بذلك الوقت ذات الوقت فيكون الوقت أمرا وجوديا - و لا وقت إلا و قبله وقت آخر فإذا كانت الأوقات موجودة و هي مترتبة لا محالة و ممكنة الوجود و صادرة عن البارئ تعالى فمؤثرته تعالى تكون دائما و هو المطلوب - و أيضا فكيف يقنع العاقل من عقله بأن يقول لو زاد في مقدار هذا العالم بما لا يحصى أضعاف أضعافه بطلت مصالح العباد و لو قدم خلقه على الوقت المعين زمانا لا يحصى أضعاف أضعافه بطلت مصالحهم.
و أيضا يلزم أن يكون فعل الله المطلق معللا بغيره و أما قولهم إنما يحصل سابقا لامتناع الفعل فهذا و إن كان له وجه في جزئيات الأفعال و خصوصيات الطبائع المتجددة بهوياتها الشخصية لكن يمتنع القول به في مطلق الصنع و الإيجاد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣٧

لما سنبنين أن الممكن إنما يفتقر إلى العلة لإمكانه لا لحدوثه و أنه لا يجب في الفعل المطلق سبق عدم و أن كون العالم ممكن الحدوث ليس له ابتداء إذ لا وقت يفرض لأن يكون أول أوقات الإمكان للشيء إلا و هو ممكن الحدوث قبله - ثم تخصيص الشيء بوقته و كونه مسبقا بعدم الخاص الزماني إنما يوجد و يحصل بعد وجود الزمان كما أن تخصيصه بمكان خاص دون غيره إنما يتحقق بعد وجود المكان.

وهم وإزالة:

قال بعضهم إن العالم سواء كانت قديم الذات أو لم يكن فلا يخلو عن صفات حادثة و تغيرات و استحالات لا ينفك عن زوال شيء و حدوث آخر فبأي طريق وقع الاستناد إلى الواجب تعالى في هذه الحوادث - فليقع في استناد أصل العالم إليه مع أن يكون محدثا و دفع بأن العلة قد تكون معدة و قد تكون مؤثرة أما المعدة فيجوز تقدمها على المعلول إذ هي غير مؤثرة في وجود المعلول بل هي تقرب الأثر إلى المعلول و أما المؤثرة فإنها يجب أن تكون مقارنة للأثر موجودة معه مثاله في الأفعال الطبيعية هو أن الثقل علة للهوى فكما وصل الثقل منتها إلى حد من حدود المسافة في هوية يصير ذلك الانتهاء سببا لاستعداد - أن يهوى منه إلى الحد الذي يليه فالعلة المؤثرة في الوصول إلى كل حد هي الثقل - و المعدة هي الحركة السابقة على ذلك الوصول فهذه الطريقة يمكن استناد الحوادث - بواسطة حركة يقرب العلة إلى المعلول و يجعل المادة مستعدة لقبول التأثير إلى سبب قديم مؤثر في وجود العالم بجميع أفراد و أجزائه السابقة و اللاحقة فإن كل شيء فرض أول الحوادث أو ابتداءها فلا بد و أن يكون قبله حركة و تغير ليكون سببا لحدوث

الاستعداد و قرب المناسبة لذلك الحادث من المفيض.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣٨

و من هاهنا يحصل مبدأ برهان آخر على دوام الفاعلية و عدم انقطاع الفيض و الوجود على الممكنات و بيانه أن هذه الحوادث لا بد لها من أسباب و لا بد و أن يكون أسبابها حادثة أو بمداخلة أمور حادثة فيما أن يكون حدوثها لحدوث علتها المؤثرة دفعة أو لحدوث علتها المعدة المقربة لعلتها منها و الأول يوجب وجود علل - و معلولات غير متناهية دفعة و هو محال فإذن حدوثها لأجل حدوث قرب من علتها - و ذلك القرب لأجل علة معدة يصير الحادث بها مستعدا لقبول الفيض عن واهب الصور - فتلك الأمور المتعاقبة إما أن يكون إنيات الوجود و هو محال كما ستعلم و مع محاليته لا يكون بينها اتصال فلا يحصل المواصلة و الارتباط بين الحادث و بينها فلم يكن السابق ضروري الانتهاء إلى اللاحق فلم تكن معدة فيبقى أن تلك الأمور المتعاقبة كشيء واحد متصل لا حدود له بالفعل و ذلك الشيء إما هوية اتصالية متدرجة الوجود لذاته أو ما يتعلق بها كالزمان و الحركة فثبت أن السبب القريب لحدوث الحوادث أمر متقضى متجدد على نعت الاتصال غير مركب من أمور آنية غير منقسمة و هذا من مبادي العلم الطبيعي - به تثبت مسألة إبطال الجزء الذي لا يتجزى و اتصال الجوهر الجسماني فظهر أنه يمتنع حدوث حادث إلا و قبله حادث آخر لا إلى نهاية و للمخالفين لهذا الأصل مسلكان الأول أن الفعل لا يكون إلا بعد سبق العدم و الأزل ما لا أول له و الجمع بينها تناقض و الآخر أن كون الحركات و الحوادث لا أول لها ممتنع من وجوه سيأتي بيانها و بيان دفعها

فصل (٣) في أن ما مع العلة هل يكون متقدما على المعلول

ذكر الشيخ في النهج السادس من الإشارات أن ما مع العلة المتقدمة على المعلول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٣٩

لا يجب تقدمه على المعلول لأن تقدم العلة على المعلول ليس بالزمان حتى يجب أن يكون ما معه متقدما عليه أيضا بالزمان بل ذلك التقدم لأجل العلية و الذي مع العلة إذا لم يكن علة لم يكن له تقدم بالعية و إذا لم يكن تقدم بالزمان و لا بالعية فليس هناك تقدم أصلا.

قال بعض العلماء و فيه بحث و هو أنه ليس كل تقدم إما بالعية و إما بالزمان حتى يلزم من عدمهما عدم التقدم أصلا بل من أقسام التقدم ما يكون بالطبع - كتقدم الواحد على الاثنين فيجوز أن يكون تقدم ما مع العلة للشيء تقدما آخر غير تقدم ما بالعية و الزمان.

أقول ليس غرض الشيخ نفي سائر التقدّمات عن الذي مع التقدم بالعية بل التقدم الذي بإزاء المعية فإن المراد من ما مع العلة ما يكون معيته هذه المعية التي بالقياس إلى التقدم بالعية فأشار إلى قاعدة كلية و هي أن ما مع الشيء المتقدم في بعض التقدّمات يكون متقدما أيضا كتقدم المعلول الآخر و في بعضها ليس كذلك - فمن قبيل الأول ما مع المتقدم بالزمان فإنه لا بد و أن يكون متقدما أيضا بالزمان - و من قبيل الثاني ما مع المتقدم بالعية على شيء إذ لا يتقدم هذا التقدم على ذلك الشيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤٠

و كذا الحال فيما مع المتقدم بالطبع كالجنس و خاصته كالحيوان و الماشي فإن الأول متقدم بالطبع على الإنسان دون الآخر و هما متأخران جميعا عن الجنس العالي كالجوهر و كذا من قبيل الأول أيضا ما مع المتقدم بالشرف لأنه الذي له فضيلة كفضيلة ذلك المتقدم فيكون ذا تقدم في الفضيلة مثل تقدمه و كذا إذا كان أحدهما متأخرا في الفضيلة عن واحد و هكذا المتقدم بالرتبة كتقدم الحيوان و ما معه فصلا مقوما أو خاصة بالرتبة على الإنسان مثلا إذا كان المبدأ هو الجنس العالي و على الجوهر إذا كان المبدأ زيدا مثلا.

ثم إن هاهنا بحثا آخر مع الشيخ قد توهمه الإمام الرازي و ذكر في سائر كتبه - من أنه حكم بأن الفلك الحاوي مع علة الفلك المحوي إذا صدرا عن علة واحدة فيكونان معين ثم إن علة المحوي متقدمة عليه و لا يمكن للحاوي تقدم عليه - لأن وجود المحوي و عدم الخلا في الحاوي متلازمان معا فلو احتاج وجود المحوي إلى الحاوي لاحتاج عدم الخلا إليه فيكون عدم الخلا محتاجا إلى الغير و ما يحتاج إلى الغير كان ممكنا لذاته فعدم الخلا ممكن لذاته هذا خلف ثم ذكر الشيخ في السماء و العالم من الشفاء في بيان تأخر الأجرام العنصرية - عن الإبداعات بالطبع فقال ثبت أن الإبداعات علل لتحدد أحيائها و أحيائها معها بالذات و المتقدم على المعلول متقدم فلما كان الإبداعات متقدمة على أحياء العنصریات - وجب تقدمها على العنصریات.

قال هذا الكلام تصريح بأن المتقدم على المعلول متقدم و الكلام الأول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤١

تصريح بأن ما مع المتقدم ليس بمتقدم و لا بد من فرق بين الموضوعين يدفع به التناقض و هو مشكل جدا. أقول لا تناقض أصلا و الفرق بين الموضوعين في غاية الوضوح و الانجلاء فإن المعية بالعلية عبارة عن معية أمرين هما معلولا علة واحدة و التقدم بالعلة إما نفس كون الشيء علة أو ما يلزم ذلك ثم إن ذلك الشيء الواحد لا يكون له علتان و قد يكون له معلولان فالمعلولان هما معان و هما متأخران عن علتتهما فما مع المتأخر متأخر لا محالة و لكن إذا كان أحد المعين علة لشيء متقدما عليه فيمتنع أن يكون المعلول الآخر علة له أيضا و إلا لزم اجتماع علتين على معلول واحد فلا إشكال.

و العجب أن المحقق الطوسي ذهل عن هذا الفرق الواضح الجلي و تكلف في الجواب شيئا آخر مما لا وجه له و هو أن المعية قد تكون بالذات و قد تكون لا بالذات و بالطبع بل بمجرد الاتفاق و لا شك أن وقوع اسم المعلول في الموضوعين - ليس بمعنى واحد فلعل الفرق هو تلك المبينة المعنوية

فصل (٤) في إبطال الدور و التسلسل في العلل و المعلولات

و يمكن التعبير عنهما بعبارة جامعة و هي أن يتراعى عروض العلية و المعلولية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤٢

لا إلى نهاية بأن يكون كل ما هو معروض للعلية معروضا للمعلولية فإن كانت المعروضات متناهية العدد فهو الدور بمرتبة إن كانت اثنين أو بمراتب إن كانت فوق الاثنين و إلا فهو التسلسل

أما بطلان الدور

فلأنه يستلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه - و تأخره عن نفسه و حاجته إلى نفسه و الكل ضروري الاستحالة لأن الشيء إذا كان علة لشيء كان مقدما عليه بمرتبة و إذا كان الآخر مقدما عليه كان الشيء مقدما على نفسه بمرتبتين هذا في الدور المصرح ثم كلما يزيد عدد الواسطة يزيد عدد مراتب تقدم الشيء على نفسه مع مرتبة أخرى يزيد عليها. و أيضا ربما يستدل بأن التقدم و التأخر أو التوقف أو الاحتياج نسب - لا تعقل إلا بين شيئين و بأن نسبة المحتاج إليه إلى المحتاج بالوجوب و عكسها بالإمكان.

و الكل ضعيف أما حكاية النسب فليس كل نسبة مما يقتضي التغير الخارجي - بل ربما يكفي التغير الاعتباري كالعاقلية و المعقولية و أما حكاية الإمكان و الوجوب فالوجوب لا ينافي الإمكان في التحقق فإن نسبة الإمكان إلى الوجوب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤٣

نسبة النقص إلى الكمال نعم هما مختلفان بحسب الاعتبار فالمصير إلى ما ذكر أولا. فإن قلت إن أريد بتقدم الشيء على نفسه التقدم بالزمان فغير لازم في العلة - أو التقدم بالعلة فهو نفس المدعى لأن قولنا الشيء لا يتقدم على نفسه بمنزلة قولنا الشيء لا يكون علة لنفسه. قلنا المراد بالتقدم المعنى المصحح لقولنا وجد فوجد على ما هو اللازم في كون الشيء علة لشيء بمعنى أنه ما لم يوجد العلة لم يوجد المعلول ألا ترى أنه يصح أن يقال - وجدت حركة اليد فوجدت حركة الخاتم - و لا يصح أن يقال وجدت حركة الخاتم فوجدت حركة اليد و هذا المعنى بديهي الاستحالة - بالنظر إلى الشيء و نفسه - فإن قلت يجوز أن يكون الشيء علة لما هو علة له من غير لزوم تقدمه على نفسه و سند المنع وجهان. أحدهما أن المحتاج إلى المحتاج إلى الشيء لا يلزم أن يكون محتاجا إلى ذلك الشيء - فإن العلة القريبة للشيء كافية في تحقيقه من غير احتياج إلى البعيدة و إلا لزم تخلف الشيء عن علته القريبة. و ثانيهما أن يكون الشيء بماهيته علة لشيء هو علة لوجود ذلك الشيء. قلنا اللزوم ضروري و السند مدفوع لأنه ما لم يوجد العلة البعيد للشيء لم يوجد القريبة و ما لم يوجد القريبة لم يوجد ذلك الشيء و هو معنى الاحتياج و التخلف إنما يلزم لو وجدت القريبة بدون البعيدة من غير وجود المعلول و لأن كون ماهية الشيء علة لما هو علة لوجوده مع أنه ظاهر الاستحالة لما فيه من وجود المعلول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤٤

قبل وجود العلة ليس مما نحن فيه أعني الدور المفسر بتوقف الشيء على ما يتوقف عليه لتعدد الجهات في الموقوف عليه كما أن الصورة تتوقف على المادة بجهة و توقفت عليها المادة بجهة أخرى.

و أما بيان استحالة التسلسل فلو جوه كثيرة

الأول ما أفاده الشيخ في الهيئات الشفاء

و هو أنه بعد ما حقق أن علة الشيء بالحقيقة هي التي تكون موجودة معه - نقول إذا فرضنا معلولا و فرضنا له علة و لعلته علة فليس يمكن أن يكون لكل علة بغير نهاية لأن المعلول و علته و علة علته إذا اعتبرت جملتها في القياس الذي

لبعضها إلى بعض كانت علة العلة علة أولى مطلقة للآخرين و كان للآخرين نسبة المعلولية إليها وإن اختلفا في أن أحدهما معلول بالواسطة و الآخر معلول بلا واسطة و لم يكونا كذلك لا الأخير و لا المتوسط لأن المتوسط الذي هو العلة المماسية للمعلول علة لشيء واحد فقط و المعلول ليس علة لشيء و لكل واحد من الثلاثة خاصية فكانت خاصية الطرف المعلول أنه ليس علة لشيء و خاصية الطرف الآخر أنه علة لكل غيره و خاصية الوسط أنه علة لطرف و معلول لطرف سواء كان الوسط واحداً أو فوق واحد و إن كان فوق واحد فسواء ترتب ترتيباً متناهيًا أو غير متناه فإنه إن ترتب كثرة متناهية كانت جملة عدد ما بين الطرفين كواسطة واحدة - يشترك في خاصية الواسطة بالقياس إلى الطرفين فيكون لكل من الطرفين خاصية - و كذلك إن ترتب في كثرة غير متناهية فلم يحصل الطرف كان جميع الغير المتناهي في خاصية الواسطة لأنك أي جملة أخذت كانت علة لوجود المعلول الأخير و كانت معلولة إذ كل واحد منها معلول و الجملة متعلقة الوجود بها و متعلقة الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤٥

بالمعلول معلول إلا أن تلك الجملة شرط في وجود المعلول الأخير و علة له و كلما زدت في الحصر و الأخذ كان الحكم إلى غير النهاية باقياً فليس يجوز أن يكون جملة علل موجودة و ليس فيها علة غير معلولة و علة أولى فإن جميع غير المتناهي كواسطة بلا طرف و هذا محال انتهت عبارته و هذا أسد البراهين في هذا الباب.

و الثاني برهان التطبيق

و عليه التعويل في كل عدد ذي ترتيب موجود سواء كان من قبيل العلل و المعلولات أو من قبيل المقادير و الأبعاد أو الأعداد الوضعية هو أنه لو وجدت سلسلة غير متناهية ينقص من طرفها المتناهي شيئاً واحداً أو متناهيًا - فيحصل جملتان إحداها يبتدي من المفروض جزءاً أخيراً و الأخرى من الذي فوقه - ثم يطبق بينهما فإن وقع بإزاء كل جزء من التامة جزء من الناقصة لزم تساوي الكل و الجزء و هو محال و إن لم يقع كذلك فلا يتصور ذلك إلا بأن يوجد جزء من التامة لا يكون بإزائه جزء من الناقصة فلزم منه انقطاع الناقصة بالضرورة و التامة لا تزيد عليها إلا بواحد أو متناه كما هو المفروض فلزم تناهيها أيضاً ضرورة أن الزائد على المتناهي بالمتناهي متناه.

و اعترض عليه بوجهين

أحدهما نقض أصل الدليل

بأنه لو صح لزم أن تكون الأعداد متناهية لأننا نفرض جملة من الواحد إلى غير النهاية و أخرى من الاثنين إلى غير النهاية ثم نطبق بينهما فيلزم تناهي الأعداد و تناهي الأعداد باطل بالاتفاق و أن تكون معلومات الله تعالى متناهية إذا نطبق بينها و بين الناقصة منها بواحدة و أن تكون الحركات الفلكية متناهية لتطبيق بين سلسلة من هذه الدورة

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و أخرى من الدورة التي قبلها و تناهيها باطل عند الفلاسفة

و ثانيهما نقض المقدمة القائلة بأن إحدى الجملتين إذا كانت أنقص من الأخرى لزم انقطاعهما

بأن الحاصل من تضعيف الواحد مراراً غير متناهية أقل من تضعيف الاثنين مراراً غير متناهية مع لا تناهيها اتفاقاً و

مقدورات الله تعالى أقل من معلوماته - لاختصاصها بالممكنات مع لا تناهي المقدورات و دورات زحل أقل من دورات القمر ضرورة مع لا تناهيها عندهم.

و حاصل الاعتراض أنا نختار أنه يقع بإزاء كل جزء من التامة جزء من الناقصة - و لا نسلم لزوم تساويهما لأن ذلك كما يكون للتساوي و إنما فقد يكون لعدم التناهي - و إن سمي مجرد ذلك تساويا فلا نسلم استحالته فيما بين التامة و الناقصة بمعنى نقصان شيء من جانبها المتناهي و إنما يستحيل ذلك في الزائدة و الناقصة بمعنى كون إحداها فوق عدد الأخرى و هو غير لازم فيما بين غير المتناهيين و إن نقص من إحداها الوف.

و قد يجاب عن المنع بدعوى الضرورة في أن كل جملتين إما متساويتان أو متفاوتتان بالزيادة و النقصان و أن الناقصة يلزمها الانقطاع.

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و عن النقوض بتخصيص الحكم أما عند المتكلمين فيما دخلت تحت الوجود - سواء كانت مجتمعة كما في سلسلة العلل و المعلولات أو لا كما في الحركات الفلكية - فإنها هي المعدات فلا يرد الأعداد لأنها من الاعتبارات و لا يدخل في الوجود من المعدودات إلا ما هي متناهية و كذا معلومات الله تعالى و مقدوراته لأنها عندهم متناهية في الحقيقة و معنى لا تناهيها أنها لا تنتهي إلى حد لا يكون فوقه عدد - أو معلوم أو مقدور آخر.

و أما عند الحكماء فبما تكون موجودة معا بالفعل مترتبة و ضعا كما في سلسلة المقادير على ما يذكر في سلسلة العلل و المعلولات فلا يرد الحركات الفلكية لكونها غير مجتمعة و لا جزئيات نوع واحد غير محسوسة كالنفوس الناطقة على تقدير عدم تناهيها كما اعتقده بعضهم لكونها غير مترتبة.

لا يقال التخصيص في الأدلة العقلية اعتراف ببطالانها حيث يتخلف المدلول عنها - لأننا نقول إن الدليل لا يجري في صورة النقض بل يختص جريانه بما عداها - أما عند المتكلمين فنظرا إلى أن ما لا تحقق له لا يمكن التطبيق فيه إلا بمجرد الوهم و استحضاره و الوهم لا يقدر على استحضار أمور غير متناهية و اعتبار التطبيق بين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤٨

أحاديها مفصلا فينقطع بانقطاع الاستحضار و الاعتبار بخلاف ما إذا كانت السلسلة موجودة في نفس الأمر فإنه لا بد أن يقع بإزاء كل جزء من السلسلتين جزء من الأخرى - فيحكم العقل حكما إجماليا مطابقا لما في الواقع من غير حاجة إلى الملاحظات التفصيلية و أما عند الحكماء فنظرا إلى أن التطبيق بحسب نفس الأمر إنما يتصور فيما له مع الوجود ترتب و ضعي أو طبيعي ليوحد بإزاء كل جزء من هذه جزء من تلك فلا يجري في الأعداد و لا في الحركات الفلكية و لا في النفوس الناطقة.

قال بعض علماء الكلام و الحق أن تحقق الجملتين من سلسلة واحدة ثم مقابلة جزء من هذه بجزء من تلك إنما هو في العقل دون الخارج فإن كفى في تمام الدليل حكم العقل بأنه لا بد أن يقع بإزاء كل جزء جزء فالدليل جار في الأعداد - و في الموجودات المتعاقبة أو المجتمعة المترتبة أو غير المترتبة لأن للعقل أن يفرض ذلك في الكل و إن لم يكف ذلك بل اشترط ملاحظة أجزاء السلسلتين على التفصيل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٤٩

لم يتم الدليل في الموجودات المترتبة فضلا عما عداها لأنه لا سبيل للعقل إلى استحضار الغير المتناهية إلا في زمان غير متناه.

أقول الفرق بين الأمرين فرقا مؤثرا حاصل فإن التطبيق وإن كان فعل العقل و يكون في الذهن البتة لكن قد يكون بحسب حال الواقع و قد لا يكون كذلك - ففي الأول يكفي في حكمه بالتطبيق بين آحاد كل من السلسلتين مع ما يحاذيه - ملاحظة واحدة إجمالية لأن مصداق هذا الحكم و مطابقة متحقق في الواقع بلا تعمل العقل في أعمال رويته لواحد واحد منها و أما إذا لم يكن آحاد السلسلة موجودة - أو لم يكن متعلقا ببعض آحادها ببعض تعلقا طبيعيا أو وضعيا فلا يكفي الملاحظة الإجمالية بل لا بد من ملاحظات تفصيلية و تطبيقات كثيرة حسب كثرة الصور المستحضرة في الذهن باستخدام القوة الخيالية و هذا في المثال الحسي كما إذا أخذت بيدك طرف جبل ممدود متصل أجزاءها بعضها ببعض و تريد جر الجمع فجررت طرفها فلا بد من تحريك الطرف الآخر و تحريك واحد واحد من أجزاء ذلك الجبل الممدود و أما إذا كانت الأجزاء و إن كانت متجاوزة غير متصلة و أردت تحريك الجميع فلا بد من تعاملات كثيرة بيدك و تحريكات عديدة بحسب عدد أجزاء السلسلة و هكذا فيما نحن فيه

تأييد و تذكرة:

قال أفضل المتأخرين العلامة الطوسي في نقد المحصل - الدليل الذي اعتمد عليه جمهور المتكلمين في مسألة الحدوث يحتاج إلى إقامة حجة على امتناع حوادث لا أول لها في جانب الماضي فنورد أولا ما قيل فيه و عليه ثم أذكر ما عندي فأقول الأوائل قالوا في وجوب تناهي الحوادث الماضية أنه لما كان كل واحد منها حادثا كان الكل حادثا و اعترض عليه بأن حكم الكل ربما يخالف الحكم على الآحاد ثم قالوا الزيادة و النقصان - يتطرقان إلى الحوادث الماضية فتكون متناهية و عورض بمعلومات الله تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٠

و مقدوراته فإن الأولى أكثر من الثانية مع كونهما غير متناهيين ثم قال المحصلون منهم الحوادث الماضية إذا أخذت تارة مبتدأة من هذا الآن مثلا ذاهبة إلى غير النهاية في الماضي و تارة مبتدأة من قبل هذا الوقت من السنة الماضية ذاهبة في الماضي - و طبقت إحداها على الأخرى في التوهم بأن يجعل المبدءان واحدا و أخذا وهما في الذهاب إلى الماضي متطابقين استحالة تساويهما و إلا كان وجود الحوادث الواقعة في الزمان الماضي الذي بين الآن و بين السنة الماضية و عدمها واحدا و استحالة كون المبتدأة من السنة الماضية زائدة على المبتدأة من الآن لأن ما ينقص عن المتساويين لا يكون زائدا على كل واحد منهما فإذاً يجب أن يكون المبتدأة من السنة الماضية في جانب الماضي أنقص من المبتدأة من الآن في ذلك الجانب - و لا يمكن ذلك إلا بانتهائها قبل انتهاء المبتدأة من الآن و يكون الأنقص متناهيًا - و الزائد عليه بمقدار متناه يكون متناهيًا فيكون الكل متناهيًا.

و اعترض الخصم عليهم بأن هذا التطبيق لا يقع إلا في الوهم و ذلك بشرط ارتسام المتطابقين فيه و غير المتناهي لا يرتسم في الوهم و من البين أنهما لا يحصلان في الوجود معا فضلا عن توهم التطبيق بينهما في الوجود فإذاً هذا

الدليل موقوف - على حصول ما لا يحصل لا في الوهم ولا في الوجود وأيضا الزيادة والنقصان إنما فرض في طرف المتناهي لا في الطرف الذي وقع النزاع في تناهيه فهو غير مؤثر فهذا حاصل كلامهم في هذا الموضوع.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥١

و أنا أقول أن كل حادث موصوف بكونه سابقا على ما بعده و بكونه لاحقا بما قبله و الاعتباران مختلفان فإذا اعتبرنا الحوادث الماضية المبتدأة من الآن تارة من حيث كل واحد منها سابق و تارة من حيث هو بعينه لاحق كانت السوابق و اللواحق المتباينان بالاعتبار متطابقين في الوجود و لا يحتاج في تطابقهما إلى توهم تطبيق و مع ذلك يجب كون السوابق أكثر من اللواحق في الجانب الذي وقع النزاع فيه فإذا اللواحق متناهية في الماضي لوجوب انقطاعها قبل انقطاع السوابق - و السوابق زائدة عليها بمقدار متناه فتكون متناهية أيضا انتهى كلامه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٢

بقي هاهنا شيء آخر و هو أن كل عدد كالعشرة مثلا فلا بد فيه من ترتب ضروري - لا بين أوله و ثانيه و ثالثه بل بين الواحد و الاثنين و الثلاثة فإن الواحد يتقدم على الاثنين تقدما بالطبع و إن لم يكن متقدما على الواحد و كذا الكلام في الاثنين بالقياس إلى الثلاثة و الثلاثة إلى الأربعة فلو دخل في الوجود عدد غير متناه - كما اعتقدوه في النفوس الناطقة لكان الاجتماع و الترتب كلاهما حاصلًا عند ذلك - فيجري فيه برهان التطبيق اللهم إلا أن يقال لا نسلم أن غير الواحد مقدم على عدد من الأعداد و الشيخ بين ذلك في إلهيات الشفاء.

و الثالث أنها لو تسلسلت العلل و معلولاتها من غير أن ينتهي إلى علة محضة

لا يكون معلولا لشيء فهناك جملة هي نفس مجموع الممكنات الموجودة المعلوم كل واحد منها بواحد فيها و تلك الجملة موجود ممكن أما الوجود فلانحصار أجزائها في الموجودات و معلوم أن المركب لا يعدم إلا بعدم شيء من أجزائه - و أما الإمكان فلافتقارها إلى جزئها الممكن و معلوم أن المفتقر إلى الممكن لا يكون إلا ممكنا ففي جعلها نفس الموجودات الممكنة تنبيه على أنها مأخوذة بحيث - لا يدخل فيها المعدوم و الواجب.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٣

لا يقال المركب من الأجزاء الموجودة قد يكون اعتباريا لا تحقق له في الخارج - كالمركب من الإنسان و الحجر و من السماء و الأرض.

لأننا نقول المراد أنه ليس موجودا واحدا يقوم به وجود غير وجودات الأجزاء - و إلا فقد صرحوا بأن المركب الموجود في الخارج قد لا يكون له حقيقة - مغايرة لحقيقة الأحاد كالعشرة من الرجال و قد يكون مع صورة منوعة كالمركبات من العناصر و أما بدونها بأن لا يزداد إلا هيئة اجتماعية كالسيرير من الخشب و سيأتي ما فيه و إذا كانت الجملة شيئا موجودا ممكنا فموجودها بالاستقلال إما نفسها و هو ظاهر الاستحالة و إما جزؤها و هو أيضا محال لاستلزامها كون ذلك الجزء علة لنفسه - و لعلله لأنه لا معنى لإيجاد الجملة إلا بإيجاد الأجزاء التي هي عبارة عنها و لا معنى لاستقلال الموجد إلا استغناؤه عما سواه و إما أمر خارج عنها و لا محالة يكون موجدا لبعض الأجزاء و ينقطع إليه سلسلة المعلولات لأن

الموجود الخارج عن سلسلة الممكنات - واجب بالذات و لا يكون ذلك البعض معلولا لشيء من أجزاء الجملة لامتناع اجتماع العلتين المستقلتين على معلول واحد إذ الكلام في المؤثر المستقل بالإيجاد فيلزم الخلف من وجهين لأن المفروض أن السلسلة غير منقطعة و أن كل جزء منها معلول لجزء آخر و بما ذكر من التقرير اندفع النقوض الواردة على الدليل - أما تفصيلا فبأنه إن أريد بالعلة التي لا بد هاهنا منها لمجموع السلسلة العلة التامة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٤

فلا نسلم استحالة كونها نفس السلسلة و إنما يستحيل لو لزم تقدمها و قد تقرر أن العلة التامة للمركب لا يجب بل لا يجوز تقدمها إذ من جملتها الأجزاء التي هي نفس المعلول فإن قيل فيلزم أن يكون واجبا لكون وجودها من ذاتها و كفى بهذا استحالة - قلنا ممنوع و إنما يلزم لو لم يفتقر إلى جزئها الذي ليس نفس ذاتها سواء سمي غيرها أو لم يسم و إن أريد به العلة الفاعلية فلا نسلم استحالة كونها بعض أجزاء السلسلة و إنما يستحيل لو لزم كونها علة لكل جزء من أجزاء المعلول حتى نفسه و علة و هو ممنوع لجواز أن يكون بعض أجزاء المعلول المركب مستندا إلى غير فاعله كالخشب من السرير سلمناه لكن لا نسلم أن الخارج من السلسلة يكون واجبا - لجواز أن يوجد سلاسل غير متناهية من علل و معلولات غير متناهية و كل منها يستند إلى علة خارجة عنها داخلة في سلسلة أخرى من غير انتهاء إلى الواجب - و لو سلم لزوم الانتهاء إلى الواجب فلا يلزم بطلان التسلسل لجواز أن يكون مجموع العلل و المعلولات الغير المتناهية موجودا ممكنا مستندا إلى الواجب و أما إجمالا فبأنه منقوض بالجملة التي هي عبارة عن الواجب و جميع الممكنات الموجودة فإن علتها ليست نفسها و لا جزءا منها كما ذكر و لا خارجا عنها - لاستلزامه مع تعدد الواجب معلولية الواجب و اجتماع المؤثرين إن كان علة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٥

لكل جزء من أجزاء الجملة واحد الأمرين إن كان علة لبعض الأجزاء و وجه الاندفاع أنا قد صرحنا بأن المراد بالعلة الفاعل المستقل بالإيجاد و أخذنا الجملة نفس جميع الممكنات بحيث يكون كل جزء منها معلولا لجزء و لم يكن الخارج عنها إلا واجبا و أقل ما لزم من استقلاله بالعلة أن يوجد في الجملة جزء لا يكون معلولا لجزء آخر بل للخارج خاصة و هو معنى الانقطاع و لم يمكن أن يكون المستقل بالعلة جزء من الجملة للزوم كونه علة لنفسه و لعلله تحقيقا لمعنى الاستقلال - إذ لو كان الموجد لبعض الأجزاء شيئا آخر لتوقف حصول الجملة عليه أيضا فلم يكن أحدهما مستقلا و هذا بخلاف المجموع المركب من الواجب و الممكنات فإنه جاز أن يستقل بإيجاده بعض الأجزاء التي هو موجود بذاته مستغن عن غيره و أما السرير ففاعله المستقل ليس هو النجار وحده بل مع فاعل الخشب نعم يرد على المقدمة القائلة بأن العلة المستقلة للمعلول المركب من الأجزاء الممكنة علة لكل جزء منه اعتراض و هو أنه إما أن يراد أنها بنفسها علة مستقلة لكل جزء حتى - يكون علة هذا الجزء هي بعينها علة ذلك الجزء و هذا باطل لأن المركب قد يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٦

بحيث يحدث أجزاءه شيئاً فشيئاً كخشبات السريبر و هيئته الاجتماعية فعند حدوث الجزء الأول إن لم يوجد العلة المستقلة التي فرضناها علة لكل جزء لزم تقدم المعلول على علته و هو ظاهر البطلان و إن وجدت لزم تخلف المعلول أعني الجزء الأخير عن علته المستقلة بالإيجاد و قد مر بطلانه و إما أن يراد أنها أي علة المجموع علة لكل جزء من المركب إما بنفسها أو بجزء منها بحيث يكون كل جزء معلولاً لها أو لجزء منها من غير افتقار إلى أمر خارج عنها و إذا كان المعلول المركب مركب الأجزاء كانت علته المستقلة أيضاً مركبة الأجزاء يحدث كل جزء منها بجزء منها يقارنه بحسب الزمان و لا يلزم التقدم و لا التخلف و هذا أيضاً فاسد من جهة أنه لا يفيد المطلوب أعني امتناع كون العلة المستقلة للسلسلة جزءاً منها إذ من أجزائها ما يجوز أن يكون علة بهذا المعنى من غير أن يلزم عليه الشيء بنفسه أو لعله و ذلك مجموع الأجزاء التي كل منها معروض للعلية و المعلولية بحيث لا يخرج عنها إلا المعلول المحض المتأخر عن الكل بحسب العلية المتقدم عليها بحسب الرتبة حيث يعتبر من الجانب المتناهي - و لهذا يعبر عن ذلك المجموع تارة بما قبل المعلول الأخير و تارة بما بعد المعلول الأول ففي الجملة علة هي جزء من السلسلة يتحقق السلسلة عند تحققها و يقع لكل جزء منها جزء منها و لا يلزم من عليتها للسلسلة تقدم الشيء على نفسه.

فإن قيل المجموع الذي هو العلة أيضاً ممكن يحتاج إلى علة.

أجيب بأن علته المجموع الذي قبل ما فيه من المعلول الأخير و هكذا في كل مجموع قبله لا إلى نهاية.

فإن قيل ما بعد المعلول المحض لا يصلح علة مستقلة بإيجاد السلسلة لأنه ممكن محتاج إلى علته و هكذا كل مجموع يفرض فلا يوجد السلسلة إلا بمعاونة من تلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٧

العلل و لأنه ليس بكاف في تحقق السلسلة بل لا بد من المعلول المحض أيضاً.

قلنا هذا لا يقدح في الاستقلال لأن معناه عدم الافتقار في الإيجاد إلى معاون خارج و قد فرضنا أن علة كل مجموع أمر داخل فيه و ظاهر أنه لا دخل لمعلوله الأخير في إيجاد.

فإن قيل إذا أخذت الجملة أعم من أن يكون سلسلة واحدة أو سلاسل غير متناهية على ما ذكرتم فهذا المنع أيضاً مندفع إذ ليس هناك معلول أخير و مجموع مركب قبله.

قلنا بل وارد بأن علتها الجزء الذي هو المجموعات الغير المتناهية التي قبل معلولاتها الأخيرة الغير المتناهية.

فإن قلت نحن نقول في الابتداء علة الجملة لا يجوز أن يكون جزء منها لعدم أولوية بعض الأجزاء أو لأن كل جزء يفرض فعليته أولى فيه بأن يكون علة للجملة لكونها أكثر تأثيراً.

قلنا ممنوع بل الجزء الذي هو ما قبل المعلول الأخير متعين للعلية لأن غيره من الأجزاء لا يستقل بإيجاد الجملة على ما لا يخفى

هدم وتحقيق:

اعلم أن هذا المسلك من البيان في إبطال التسلسل و إثبات الواجب في غاية الوهن و السخافة لما حققناه سابقاً أن الوجود في كل موجود عين وحدته و الوحدة في كل شيء عين وجوده بالمعنى الذي مر فقولهم إن المركب من الإنسان و الحجر موجود غير صحيح إن أريد به أن المجموع موجود ثالث غير الموجودين فعلى هذا يرد على أصل

الدليل منع آخر وهو أنا لا نسلم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٨

افتقار الجملة المفروضة إلى علة غير علل الآحاد وإنما يلزم لو كان لها وجود مغاير لوجودات الآحاد المعللة كل منها بعلّة و قولكم إنها ممكن مجرد عبارة بل هي ممكنات تحقق كل منها بعلّة فمن أين يلزم الافتقار إلى علة أخرى و هذا كالعشرة من الآحاد لا يفتقر إلى علة غير علل الآحاد.

و ما يقال إن وجودات الآحاد غير وجود كل منها كلام خال عن التحصيل - إذ كون الجميع غير كل واحد منها لا يستدعي أن يكون له وجود في الخارج غير وجود الآحاد.

و الذي يقال إن انعدام المركب بانعدام شيء من أجزائه كلام صحيح معناه أن كل مركب له حقيقة و له وحدة حقيقية فانعدامه بانعدام جزئه و ليس معناه أن كل تركيب توهمه العقل بين شيئين فإذا وجد الشيطان كان المركب موجودا و لا ينعدم إلا بانعدام الأجزاء.

و أيضا كون الشيء منعما بانعدام شيء لا يقتضي كليا أن يكون يوجد متى وجد.

فعلى هذا ظهر بطلان قول المتأخرين إن عليّة الشيء لنفسه جائز لأن مجموع الموجودات من الممكن و الواجب موجود ممكن لاحتياجه إلى الآحاد و لا علة له سوى نفسه لأن علته إما جزؤه و هو محال لاحتياجه إلى بقية الأجزاء و إما خارج عنه و لا خارج عنه فتعين أن يكون نفسه و لا محذور فيه لأن توقف ذلك المجموع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٥٩

على كل واحد من الآحاد لا يستلزم توقفه على المجموع حتى يلزم توقف الشيء على نفسه نعم لو أريد بالعلّة العلة الفاعلية المستقلة فهي جزؤه أي جزء مجموع الموجودات أعني الواجب أو ما فوق المعلول الأخير المنتهي إلى الواجب. و كذا قولهم إن المحال كون الشيء علة لنفسه أو ما في حكمه فيما يجب تقدمه على المعلول إذ حينئذ يلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه و أما كون الشيء علة تامة لنفسه فليس بمستحيل على إطلاقه بل هو واقع في مجموع الواجب و معلوله الأول أو جميع معلولاته كما مر انتهى.

فإنه لا يخفى سخافته جدا إذ لا معنى عند العقل السليم لكون شيء موجودا ممكنا لذاته و مع ذلك لا يحتاج في وجوده إلى أمر خارج عن ذاته فإن المركب الذي حكموا بأنه موجود ممكن لو كان له وجود غير وجود الآحاد و إمكان غير إمكان الآحاد فله علة غير علة الآحاد فالحكم بأن الوجود له غير تلك الوجودات و العلة له عين علته كلام لا طائل تحته.

قال بعض المدققين المتعدد قد يؤخذ مجملا و هو بهذا الاعتبار واحد و اللفظ الدال عليه بهذا الاعتبار واحد مثل المجموع و الكل و قد يؤخذ مفصلا و اللفظ الدال عليه بهذا الوجه متعدد مثل هذا و ذاك و قد يختلفان في الحكم فإن مجموع القوم - لا يسعهم دار ضيق و هم لا معا يسعهم إذا علم ذلك فنختار أن مرجح وجودهما معا - هو هما مأخوذا لا معا لاحتياجه إلى كل واحد من جزأيه و يكفيان في وجوده فيكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٠

هذا وذاك علتين يترجح وجود مجموعهما بهما فإن نقل الكلام إليهما لا معا بل مفصلا فإنه أيضا ممكن فيحتاج إلى مرجح قلنا لا نسلم أنهما مأخوذان على هذا الوجه ممكن بل هو بهذا الوجه اثنان واجب و ممكن موجود به. أقول هذا المدقق أصاب شيئا من التحقيق و أخطأ في شيء أما الذي أصاب - فقله هما مفصلا ليس ممكنا و لا واجبا بل هما شيئا أحدهما واجب و الآخر ممكن موجود به و أما الذي أخطأ فيه فهو أن الإجمال و التفصيل من أعمال العقل و لا يجعلان الشيء في الخارج تارة موجودا و الأخرى معدوما فمجموع السماء و الأرض سواء أخذهما العقل مجملا أو مفصلا لا يتغير حكمهما في الخارج بل في العقل فقط فللعقل أن يأخذهما شيئا واحدا موجودا في الذهن و لا يصيران بهذا الاعتبار وحدانيا في الخارج - كما أن للوهم أن يقسم السماء بقسمين و لا يصير بهذا الاعتبار متعددا في الخارج - بل في الذهن فقط فالإجمال و التفصيل اعتباران عقليان يوجبان اختلاف الملاحظة - و لا يوجب اختلاف في نفس الأمر الملحوظ ثم إن المثال الذي ذكره ليس من التفاوت - الذي وقع فيه من حيث الإجمال و التفصيل بل التفاوت هناك إما بالموضوع و إما بالمحمول إن كان الموضوع واحدا فإن الكل المجموعي سواء أخذ مجملا أو مفصلا متصف - بأن الدار تسعهم على التعاقب الزماني و لا يتصف بأنها تسعهم مجتمعين في الزمان - و هذا ما في هذا المقام. و أما الذي أورده بعض من أنه يتوجه عليه لزوم الأمور الغير المتناهية المترتبة - بمجرد فرض وجود الاثنين. فليس بوارد إذ لا يلزم من اعتبار مجموع الشئيين اعتبارهما مع تلك الجمعية تارة أخرى لاستلزم ذلك تكرار أجزاء الماهية إذ المراد بالمجموع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦١

معروض الهيئة الاجتماعية بدون اعتبار الوصف أعني ذات الاثنين فمن ادعى أن الاثنين موجود مباين لكل منهما لا يلزم عليه كون الهيئة و الاثنينية موجودة كما أن الواحد موجود و إن لم يكن وصف الوحدة أي الواحدية موجودة. ثم لقائل أن يقول العدد موجود عند أكثر الحكماء و هو غير الآحاد بالأسر - فكيف يحكم بأن المركب لا وجود له غير وجود الآحاد. قلنا العدد موجود بمعنى أن في الوجود وحدات كثيرة و لا نسلم أنها غير الآحاد بالأسر بل هو عينها و أما أخذ العدد و الكثرة كأنه شيء واحد له حكم آخر غير حكم الآحاد كالعشرية و المجزورية و الأصمية و التامية و غيرها فذلك لا محالة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٢

في الذهن و إن كان للحكم بها مطابق و مصداق في الخارج من جهة وجود الآحاد الكثيرة.

الرابع برهان التضاييف

و هو أنه لو لم ينته سلسلة العلل و المعلولات إلى علة محضة لا يكون معلولا لشيء لزم عدم تكافؤ المتضاييفين لكن التالي باطل فكذا المقدم أو نقول لو كان المتضاييفان متكافئين لزم انتهاء السلسلة إلى علة محضة - لكن المقدم حق فكذا التالي بيان حقية هذا المقدم و بطلان ذلك التالي هو أن معنى التكافؤ فيهما أنهما بحيث متى وجد أحدهما في العقل أو

في الخارج وجد الآخر وإذا انتفى انتفى ووجه اللزوم أن المعلول الأخير يشتمل على معلولية محضة و كل مما فوقه على علية و معلولية فلو لم ينته السلسلة إلى ما يشتمل على علية محضة لزم في الوجود معلولية بلا علية فإن قيل المكافي لمعلولية المعلول المحض علية المعلول الذي فوقه بلا وسط لا علية العلة المحضة. قلنا نعم لكن المراد أنه لا بد أن يكون بإزاء كل معلولية علية و هذا يقتضي ثبوت العلة المحضة و للقوم في التعبير عن هذا البرهان عبارتان.

إحدهما لو تسلسلت العلل و المعلولات إلى غير النهاية لزم زيادة عدد المعلول على عدد العلية و هو باطل ضرورة تكافؤ العلية و المعلولية بيان اللزوم أن كل علة في السلسلة فهي معلولة على ما هو المفروض و ليس كل ما هو معلول فيها فهو علة كالمعلول الأخير.

و ثانيتهما نأخذ جملة من العليات التي في هذه السلسلة و أخرى من المعلوليات - ثم نطبق بينهما فإن زادت أحاد أحدهما على الأخرى بطل تكافؤ العلية و المعلولية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٣

لأن معنى التكافؤ أن يكون بإزاء كل معلولية علية و بإزاء كل علية معلولية و إن لم تزد لزم علية بلا معلولية ضرورة أن في جانب التناهي معلولية بلا علية و هو المعلول الأخير فيلزم الخلف لأن التقدير عدم انتهاء السلسلة إلى علة محضة.

الخامس قريب المأخذ مما سبق

و هو أنا نحذف المعلول الأخير من السلسلة المفروضة و نجعل كلا من الأحاد التي فوقه متعددا باعتبار صفتي العلية و المعلولية - لأن الشيء من حيث إنه علة غيره من حيث إنه معلول فحصل جملتان متغايرتان - باعتبار إحدهما العلل و الأخرى المعلولات و لزم عند التطبيق بينهما زيادة وصف العلية ضرورة سبق العلة على المعلول فإن كل علة [علية] لا ينطبق على المعلول الذي في مرتبتها بل على معلول [لية] علتها المقدمة عليها بمرتبة لخروج المعلول الأخير و عدم كونه معروضا للعية فلزم زيادة مراتب العلل بوحدة و إلا بطل السبق اللازم للعية و معنى زيادة مرتبة العلية أن يوجد علة لا يكون بإزائه معلول و فيه انقطاع السلسلتين.

السادس برهان الحيثيات

و هو جار في العلل و المعلولات و في غيرهما من ذوات الترتب و الأوضاع تقريره أن ما بين معلول الأخير أو ما يشبهه و كل من الأمور الواقعة في السلسلة متناه ضرورة كونه محصورا بين حاصرين و هذا يستلزم تناهي السلسلة لأنها حينئذ لا تزيد على المتناهي إلا بواحد بحكم الحدس و أنه إذا كان ما بين مبدأ المسافة و كل جزء من الأجزاء الواقعة فيها لا تزيد على فرسخ فالمسافة لا تزيد على فرسخ إلا بجزء هو المنتهي إن جعلنا المبدأ مدرجا على ما هو المفهوم من قولنا سني ما بين خمسين إلى ستين و إلا فجزءين فيصلح الدليل المنظر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٤

و إصابة المطلوب و إن لم يصلح للمناظرة و إلزام الخصم لأنه قد لا يدعن المقدمة الحدسية بل إنما يمنعها مستندا بأنه إنما يلزم ذلك لو كان مراتب ما بين متناهيها كما في المسافة و أما على تقدير لا تناهيها كما في السلسلة فلا إذ لا ينتهي

إلى ما بين - لا يوجد ما بين آخر أزيد منه و قد تبين الاستلزام بأن المتألف من الأعداد المتناهية - لا يكون إلا متناهيًا و هو ضعيف لأنه إعادة للدعوى بل ما هو أبعد منه و أخفى لأن التألف من نفس الأحاد أقرب إلى التناهي من التألف من الأعداد التي كل منها متناهية الأحاد فالمنع عليه أظهر فإنه إنما يتم لو كانت عدة الأعداد متناهية و هو غير لازم و من هاهنا يذهب الوهم إلى أن هذا استدلال بثبوت الحكم أعني التناهي لكل على ثبوته لكل و هو باطل.

السابع لو وجدت سلسلة بل جملة غير متناهية

سواء كانت من العلل و المعلولات أو غيرها فهي لا محالة تشتمل على الوف فعدة الألوف الموجودة فيها إما أن تكون مساوية لعدة أحادها أو أكثر و كلاهما ظاهر الاستحالة لأن عدة الأحاد يجب أن يكون ألف مرة مثل عدة الألوف لأن معناها أن نأخذ كل ألف من الأحاد واحدا - حتى يكون عدة مائة ألف مائة و إما أن يكون أقل و هو أيضا باطل لأن الأحاد حينئذ يشتمل على جملتين إحداها بقدر عدة الألوف و الأخرى بقدر الزائد و الأولى أعني الجملة التي بقدر عدة الألوف إما أن يكون من جانب المتناهي أو من جانب الغير المتناهي - و على التقديرين يلزم تناهي السلسلة هذا خلف و إن كانت السلسلة غير متناهية من الجانبين يفرض مقطعا فيحصل جانب متناه فيتأتى التردد أما لزوم التناهي على التقدير الأول فلأن عدة الألوف متناهية لكونها محصورة بين حاصرين هما طرف السلسلة و المقطع الذي هو مبدأ الجملة الثانية أعني الزائد على عدة الألوف على ما هو المفروض و إذا تناهت عدة الألوف تناهت السلسلة لكونها عبارة عن مجموع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٥

الأحاد المتألفة من تلك العدة من الألوف و المتألفة من الجمل المتناهية الأعداد - و الأحاد متناه بالضرورة و أما على التقدير الثاني فلأن الجملة التي هي بقدر الزائد على عدة الألوف تقع في جانب المتناهي و تكون متناهية ضرورة انحصارها بين طرف السلسلة و مبدأ عدة الألوف و هي أضعاف عدة الألوف تسعمائة و تسعة و تسعين فحينئذ يلزم تناهي عدة الألوف بالضرورة و يلزم تناهي السلسلة لتناهي أجزائها عدة و أحادها على ما مر. و اعترض عليه و على بعض ما سبق و ما سيأتي منع المنفصلة القائلة بأن هذا مساو لذاك أو أكثر أو أقل بأن التساوي و التفاوت من خواص المتناهي و إن أريد بالتساوي مجرد أن يقع بإزاء كل جزء من هذا جزء من ذاك فلا نسلم استحالته فيما بين العددين كما في الواحد إلى ما لا يتناهي و العشرة إلى ما لا يتناهي و كون أحدهما أضعاف الآخر لا ينافي التساوي بهذا المعنى و لو سلمت فممنوع كون الأقل منقطعاً - فإن السلسلة إذا كانت غير متناهية كانت بعضها الذي من جانب الغير المتناهي أيضا - غير متناه و كذا عدة ألوفها أو مئاتها أو عشراتها و حديث الجملتين و انقطاع أولهما بمبدأ الثانية كاذب.

الثامن برهان الترتيب

و هو أن كل سلسلة من علل و معلولات مترتبة فهي يجب أن يكون لا محالة بحيث إذا فرض انتفاء واحد من أحاد استوجب ذلك انتفاء ما بعد ذلك الواحد من أحاد السلسلة فإذن كل سلسلة موجودة بالفعل قد استوعبتها المعلولية على الترتيب يجب أن يكون فيها علة هي أولى العلل لولاها انتفت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٦

جملة المراتب التي هي معلولاتها و معلولات معلولاتها إلى آخر المراتب و إلا لم يكن المعلولية قد استوعبت آحاد السلسلة بالأسر فإذا فرضنا سلسلة متصاعدة لا إلى علة بعينها لا يكون لها علة لبطلت السلسلة بأسرها و ذلك يصادم استيعاب المعلولية جميع السلسلة بالأسر و الحاصل أن استغراق المعلولية على سبيل الترتب جملة آحاد السلسلة بالتمام مع وضع أن لا يكون هناك علة واحدة للجميع لولاها لانتفت السلسلة بأسرها كلام متناقض فتأمل

التاسع البرهان الأسد الأخضر للفارابي

و هو أنه إذا كان ما من واحد من آحاد السلسلة الذاهبة بالترتيب بالفعل لا إلى نهاية إلا و هو كالواحد في أنه ليس يوجد إلا و يوجد آخر وراءه من قبل كانت الآحاد اللامتناهية بأسرها يصدق عليها أنها لا تدخل في الوجود ما لم يكن شيء من ورائها موجودا من قبل فإذا بداهة العقل قاضية بأنه من أين يوجد في تلك السلسلة شيء حتى يوجد شيء ما بعده.

العاشر

أن السلسلة المفروضة من العلل و المعلولات الغير المتناهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٧

إما أن تكون منقسمة بمتساويين فيكون زوجا أو لا فيكون فردا و كل زوج فهو أقل بواحد من فرد بعده كالأربعة من خمسة و كل فرد فهو أقل بواحد من زوج بعده كالخمس من الستة و كل عدد يكون أقل من عدد آخر يكون متناهيا بالضرورة - كيف لا و هو محصور بين حاصرين هما ابتداءه و ذلك الواحد الذي بعده و رد باننا لا نسلم أن كل ما لا ينقسم بمتساويين فهو فرد و إنما يلزم لو كان متناهيا فإن الزوجية و الفردية من خواص العدد المتناهي و قد يطوي حديث الزوجية و الفردية فيقال كل عدد فهو قابل الزيادة فيكون أقل من عدد فيكون متناهيا و المنع فيه ظاهر.

تبصرة:

اعلم أن البراهين ناهضة على امتناع لا تناهي السلسلة المرتبة في جهة التصاعد و العلية لا في جهة التنازل و المعلولية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٨

و السبب في ذلك أن في سلسلة التصاعد على فرض اللاتناهي ليس توجد علة يتعين في نظر العقل أنها لا محالة تكون موجودة أولا ثم من تلقائها تدخل السلسلة - المترتبة بأسرها في الوجود و أن ذلك منشأ الحكم بالامتناع و الأمر في سلسلة التنازل على خلاف ذلك و ما ذكرناه جار في جميع البراهين الماضية حتى الحثيات و التضاييف و غيرهما و ذلك لأن معيار الحكم بالاستحالة في كل منها استجماع شرطي الترتب و الاجتماع في الوجود بالفعل في جهة اللانهاية فمعيار الفرق كما وقعت الإشارة إليه فيما سبق أن العلل المرتبة للشيء موجودة معه في ظرف الأعيان و تقدمها عليه إنما يكون بضرب من التحليل و في الاعتبار العقلي ففي صورة التصاعد تكون العلل المترتبة الغير المتناهية فرضا موجودة في مرتبة ذات المعلول و مجتمعة الحصول معها فيكون الترتب و الاجتماع جميعا حاصلين للعلل في مرتبة ذات المعلول - و أما في صورة التنازل فالمعلولات المترتبة لا تكون مجتمعة في مرتبة ذات العلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٦٩

فإن المعلول لا يتصحح له وجوده الخاص الناقص المعلولي في مرتبة ذات العلة بوجودها الخاص الكامل العلي و هذا على خلاف الأمر في العلة فإن وجودها واجب في مرتبة هوية المعلول و محيط بها فثبت مما ذكرناه أن وصفي الترتب و الاجتماع - في مرتبة من المراتب القبلية [العقلية] إنما يتحقق في السلسلة المفروضة في جهة هي التصاعد و التراقي لا في جهة خلافها و هي جهة تنازل السلسلة و تسافلها فالبراهين ناهضة على إثبات انقطاعها في تلك الجهة لا على إثبات الانقطاع في هذه الجهة هذا ملخص ما أفاده شيخنا السيد دام ظله العالي

فصل (٥) في الدلالة على تناهي العلل كلها

البراهين المذكورة دلت على أن العلل من الوجوه كلها متناهية

و أن في كل منها مبدأ أول و أن مبدأ الجميع واحد و ذلك لأن الفاعل و الغاية لكل شيء هما أقدم من المادة و الصورة بل الغاية أقدم عن العلل الباقية فيما يكون الفاعل له غير الغاية لأن الغاية علة فاعلية لكون الشيء فاعلا فإذا ثبت تناهي العلل الفاعلية و الغائية ثبت تناهي العلل المادية و الصورية لأنهما أقدم من هاتين على أن الصورة أيضا من العلل الفاعلية باعتبار فهي داخلية في طبقة الفاعل كالغاية فالبيان الدال على تناهي سلسلة الفواعل يصلح أن يجعل بيانا لتناهي جميع طبقات العلل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٠

و إن كان استعمالهم له في العلل الفاعلية.

فلنتعمد إلى بيان تناهي العلل التي هي أجزاء من وجود الشيء و يتقدمه بالزمان و هو المختص باسم العنصر لأنه الجزء الذي يكون الشيء معه بالقوة فاعلم أولا أن الشيء لو حصل بكليته في شيء آخر فلا يقال لذلك الآخر إنه كان عن الأول مثل الإنسان فإنه بتمامه موجود في الكاتب فلا جرم لا يقال إنه كان عن الإنسان كاتب - فإذا متى كان الشيء متقوما بشيء آخر من جميع الوجوه فإنه لا يقال للمتقوم أنه كان عن ذلك المقوم و أيضا لو لم يحصل شيء منه في شيء آخر فإنه لا يقال لذلك الآخر أنه كان من الأول فلا يقال إنه كان من السواد بياض لأنه ليس شيء من السواد موجودا في البياض فإذا متى كان حصول الشيء بعد حصول شيء آخر - من جميع الوجوه فإنه لا يقال للمتأخر إنه كان عن المتقدم فأما إذا حصل بعض أجزاء الشيء في شيء آخر و لم يحصل كل أجزائه فيه فهناك يقال لذلك الآخر إنه كان من الأول مثل ما يقال إنه كان من الماء هواء و ذلك لأن الشيء الذي هو الماء لم يوجد بكليته في الهواء بل وجد جزؤه و كذلك يقال كان عن الأسود أبيض و كان عن الخشب سرير لأن الخشب لا يصير سريرا إلا إذا وقع فيه تغير ما - و يظهر من هذا أن الشيء إنما يقال له إنه كان عن شيء آخر إذا كان متقوما ببعض أجزائه و متأخرا عن بعض أجزائه و لا بد أن يجتمع فيه أمران أحدهما التقوم ببعض منه و الآخر أن لا يجتمع مع بعض آخر فإذا تقرر هذا الاصطلاح فقد ظهر أن مادة الشيء قد يراد به الجزء القابل للصورة و قد يراد به الذي من شأنه أن يصير جزءا قابلا لشيء آخر كالماء إذا صار فيه هواء فإن الجزء القابل للصورة المائية صار قابلا للصورة الهوائية فنقول أما تناهي المواد بالمعنى الأول لأنه لو كان

لكل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧١

قابل قابل آخر إلى لا نهاية لكان أجزاء الماهية الواحدة غير متناهية و ذلك محال و أما بيان تناهي المواد بالمعنى الثاني فلأن مادة الهوائية إذا أمكن أن يقبل صورة المائية فمادة الماء أيضا يصح أن يقبل الصورة الهوائية فإذا يصح انقلاب كل منهما إلى الأخرى و إذا كان كذلك فليس أحد النوعين أولى بأن يكون مادة الأخرى من الآخر بأن يكون مادة الأولى بل ليس و لا واحد منهما مقدما على الآخر في النوعية بل يجوز أن يكون شخص من المائية تقدم بشخصيته على شخص آخر من الهواء و نحن لا نمنع من أن يكون لكل مادة مادة أخرى بهذا المعنى لا إلى السابقة فلو لم تكن للصورة نهاية أي يكون كل شخص فهو إنما يتولد من شخص آخر قبله لأن هذه الأشخاص كأشخاص الحركة القطعية التي لا اجتماع فيها و لا امتناع في عدم انقطاعها و أما تناهي العلل الصورية فهو جهتين أحدهما أن الصورة الأخيرة تكون علة للصورة- نهاية لم تكن للعلل نهاية و ثانيهما أن الصور أجزاء الماهية و يستحيل أن تكون الماهية واحدة أجزاء غير متناهية.

هداية:

اعلم أن المادة أي الذي يحصل فيه إمكان وجود الشيء على قسمين لأن الحامل للإمكان إذا حدثت فيه صفة فحدوثها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٢

إما أن يكون موجبا لزوال شيء كان ثابتا من قبل أو لا فإن لم يوجب له لم يكن هذا الحادث صورة مقومة لأنها لو كان صورة مقومة لكان الحامل قبل حدوثها- محتاجا إلى صورة أخرى مقومة ثم تلك الصورة إما أن يبقى مع هذه الصورة الحادثة- أو لا يبقى فإن بقيت فالحامل متقوم بتلك الصورة فلا حاجة له إلى هذه الحادثة فيكون هذه عرضا لا صورة و أما إن كان حدوث هذه الصفة موجبا لزوال الصورة المتقدمة المقومة كان حدوثها موجبا لزوال شيء و قد فرضنا أنه ليس كذلك فثبت أن كل صفة يحدث في محل و لا يكون مزيلة وصف عنه فهي من باب الأعراض لا الصور- و قد علم أن صفات الشيء إن لم يكن بالقسر و لا بالعرض فهي بالطبع فيكون هناك صورة مقومة للمحل مقتضية لذلك العرض فهي كمال أول و ذلك العرض كمال ثان- و الصور بطباعها متجهة إلى تحصيل كمالاتها من الأعراض اللهم إلا لمانع أو عدم شرط أما الأول فكالأعراض المزيلة و أما الثاني كعدم نشو البذور عند فقدان ضوء الشمس ثم إذا حصلت تلك الكمالات فمن المستحيل أن ينقلب الأمر حتى يتوجه من تلك الكمالات مرة أخرى إلى طرف النقصان لأن الطبيعة الواحدة لا تقتضي توجهها إلى شيء و صرفا عنه فثبت بالبرهان أن كل صفة تحدث في المحل من غير أن يكون حدوثها مزيلة لشيء عن ذلك المحل فإنه بطبعه متحرك إليها و أنه يستحيل عليه بعد وصوله إليها أن يتحرك عنها مثاله أن الصبي يتحرك إلى الرجولية و بعد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٣

صيرورته رجلا يستحيل أن ينتقل إلى المنوية.

عقد و حل:

قد أورد في الشفاء هاهنا إشكالا و هو أن النفس الخالية عن جميع الاعتقادات قد يعتقد في بعض المسائل اعتقادا خطأ

فلا يكون ذلك الاعتقاد استكمالاً فقد انتقض قولكم إن كل صفة حصلت في محل بحيث لا يكون حصولها سبباً لزوال أمر فحصولها استكمال.

أقول بل حصول الاعتقاد الخطأ نوع استكمال لبعض النفوس الساذجة - لكونه صفة وجودية ووجود خير من العدم و إنما شريته لأجل بطلان الاستعداد للكمال الذي يختص بالقوة العاقلة كالكيفية السمية فإنها كمال للعنصر و آفة للصورة الحيوانية بل كل صفة من الصفات المذمومة كالظلم و الحرص و غيرهما كمال لبعض القوى النفسانية و إنما يوجب نقصاناً للقوة العالية [الغالية] عليها و هي العقلية فالجهل المركب لكونه صورة عقلية و صفة وجودية هي كمال للعقل الهولاني المصحوب للهيئة النفسانية التخيلية و الذي لا كمالية فيه أصلاً هو الجهل البسيط و هو ليس بصفة بل عدم صفة و أما القسم الآخر و هو أن يكون حدوث الصفة في المحل موجباً لزوال شيء عنه فذلك الشيء قد يكون صورة مقومة كالهوائية إذا حدثت يوجب زوال المائية عن المحل و قد يكون كيفية كما أن حدوث السواد يوجب زوال البياض و قد يكون كمية و شكلاً و الكل واضح و بالجملة فمن حكم بصحة الانعكاس في هذا القسم لأن المادة إذا انقلبت من المائية إلى الهوائية صح انقلابها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٤

بالعكس مرة أخرى بخلاف القسم الأول لأن ماهية الشيء لا تنقلب و لا تتبدل - فخرج مما بيناه أن كل ما كان من القسم الأول فإن الانقلاب فيه ممتنع و كل ما كان من القسم الثاني فإن الانقلاب فيه واجب و لقائل أن يقول هذا الحصر باطل فإن تكون الكائنات من العناصر ليس من القسم الأول لأن هذا القسم يمتنع انعكاسه و هاهنا يجوز الانعكاس لأن العناصر كما تصير حيواناً و نباتاً فهما أيضاً يصيران عناصر و ليس أيضاً من القسم الثاني فإن من شأن هذا القسم أن يكون الطاري مزيلاً لوصف موجود و هذا ليس كذلك إذ ليس حدوثها سبباً لزوال وصف يضادها.

فالجواب أن العنصر المفرد غير مستعد لقبول الصورة الحيوانية مثلاً بل لا يحصل ذلك الاستعداد إلا عند حدوث كيفية مزاجية و هي مزیلة للكيفيات الصرفة القوية فيكون نسبة المزاجية إلى الصرفة من قبيل القسم الذي يكون بالاستحالة - فلا جرم يصح فيه الانعكاس و إذا حصل المزاج كان قبول الصورة الحيوانية استكمالاً لذلك المزاج و هو مثل الصبي إذا صار رجلاً فلا جرم يتحرك إليه بالطبع و لا يتحرك عنه البتة فإن الحيوانية لا تتحرك قط حتى يصير مجرد مزاج كما لا يتحرك الرجل - حتى يصير صبياً و جنيناً فإذن قد حصل في تكون الحيوان مجموع القسمين المذكورين - فلا يكون خارجاً عنهما قسمة ثانية للمادة أن الحامل للصورة إما أن يكون حاملاً لها بوحدايته أو بمشاركة غيره فالذي لا يكون بمشاركة الغير هو مثل الهيولى الحاملة للصورة الجسمانية و الذي يكون بمشاركة آخر فيكون لا محالة لتلك الأشياء اجتماع و تركيب فإما أن يكون ذلك التركيب مع الاستحالة أو لا معها و الذي بد فيه من الاستحالة فقد ينتهي إلى الغاية باستحالة واحدة و قد ينتهي إلى الغايات باستحالات كثيرة و أما الذي لا يعتبر فيه الاستحالة كحصول هيئة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٥

القياس من اجتماع المقدمات و حصول الهيئة العددية من اجتماع الوحدات ثم قد تكون تلك الأحاد محصورة كهذه الأمثلة و قد لا تكون محصورة كالعسكر.

حكمة مشرقية:

أقول من أمعن في النظر يعلم أن كل مادة لا يقع فيه استحالة - عند حدوث صفة لها فليست لها طبيعة محصلة و أن كل ما لها طبيعة محصلة لا يصير مادة لشيء آخر إلا بعد زوال طبيعته و يعلم من ذلك أن العناصر لا بد و أن يزول صورتها بالقاصر حتى يصير مادة لصورة أخرى معدنية أو نباتية أو حيوانية إذ الشيء لا يتحرك إلى ما يباينه بالطبع و يخالفه إلا ما يتعلق بمجرد الكمال و النقص و القوة و الضعف فلا يتحرك إلا إلى ما يكمله و يقويه فإن النارية تضاد الصورة الحيوانية لأن النارية مما يحرقها و يفسدها و كذا المائية إذا استولت تغرقها و تهلكها و هكذا باقي العناصر فلم يتحرك شيء منها و لا كلها إلى الحيوانية بل المادة المخلاة عنها بيد القوة الفاعلة المحركة إياها نحو الكمال و تلك القوة لا محالة جوهرية ليست كما ظن أنها هي الكيفية المزاجية على ما يظهر من عبارة الشفاء و غيره - إذ العرض لا يفعل فعلا جوهريا و لا يحرك المادة إلى جهة الأعلى نحو الأعداد أو على نحو الآلية - و كلامنا في المحرك الفاعلي و أيضا وجود العرض تابع لوجود أمر جوهري صوري فصور العناصر أحق بأن يفعل فعلا أو تحريكا من كيفياتها لأنها بمنزلة الإله كما عرفت في المثل - و نحن قد أبطلنا كون تلك الصور أو بعضها أمرا محركا للمادة إلى الحيوانية فثبت أن مادة في العناصر صورة من جنسها لا من نوعها يتحرك إلى جانب الكمال الحيواني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٦

بعد طي المعدنية و النباتية إذ الطبيعة لا يتخطى إلى مرتبة من الكمال إلا و يتخطى قبل ذلك إلى ما دونها من المراتب فمن هاهنا يظهر أن الحركة واقعة في مقولة الجوهر و أن الأشياء متوجهة إلى جانب الملكوت الأعلى بطبائعها إذا لم يعقها عائق - و سيأتي زيادة انكشاف لما يتعلق بهذا المقصد في مباحث الغاية إن شاء الله تعالى

فصل (٦) في أن البسيط هل يجوز أن يكون قابلا و فاعلا

المشهور من الحكماء امتناعه مطلقا

في شيء واحد من حيث هو واحد و احترز بقيد وحدة الحثية عن مثل النار تفعل الحرارة بصورتها و يقبلها بمادتها هكذا قيل و فيه ما سيأتي و المتأخرون على جوازه مطلقا.

و التحقيق أن القبول إن كان بمعنى الانفعال و التأثر فالشيء لا يتأثر عن نفسه

و كذا إذا كان المقبول صفة كمالية للقابل فالشيء لا يستكمل بنفسه و أما إذا كان بمجرد الاتصاف بصفة غير كمالية تكون مرتبتها بعد تمام مرتبة الذات الموصوفة فيجوز كون الشيء مقتضيا لما يلزم ذاته و لا ينفك عنه كلوازم الماهيات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٧

سيما البسيطة ففي الجميع ما عنها و ما فيها معنى واحد أي جهة الفاعلية و القابلية فيها كما صرخ الشيخ في مواضع من التعليقات من أن في البسيط عنه و فيه شيء واحد و هذا لا يختص بالبسيط بل المركب أيضا يجوز أن يكون له طبيعة يلزمها شيء لا يلحقها على سبيل الانفعال و الاستكمال و لعل الشيخ إنما أورد ذكر البسيط - ليظهر كونهما لا يوجبان اختلاف الحثية و الحق أن لوازم الوجودات أيضا كلوازم الماهيات في أن فاعلها و قابلها شيء واحد من جهة واحدة كالنار و الحرارة و الماء للرطوبة و الأرض للكثافة و كذا حكم المركبات في خواصها و لوازمها الذاتية و إنما الحاجة

فيها للمادة لأجل حدوث الصفات أو زيادة الكمالات فالنار وإن احتاجت إلى المادة في حقيقتها و صورتها لكن لا يحتاج إليها في كونها حارة بأن يتخلل المادة بين كونها نارا وبين كونها حارة كما لا يتخلل الفاعل أيضا بينها وبين لازمها فلو فرض وجودها من غير فاعل و قابل لكانت حارة أيضا

و الذي وقع التمسك به في امتناع كون الواحد قابلا و فاعلا حجتان -

إحدهما أن القبول و الفعل اثران

فلا يصدران عن واحد.

و اعترض عليه الإمام الرازي بأننا بينا أن المؤثرية و المتأثرية ليستا وصفين وجوديين حتى يفتقر إلى علة و لئن سلمنا فلا نسلم أن الواحد يستحيل عنه صدور أثرين - أقول و كلا البحثين مدفوع أما الأول فالبدهة حاكمة بأن الإفادة و الاستفادة صفتان وجوديتان و المنازع مكابر و الذي استدل به على اعتباريتهما هو أن التأثير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٨

لو كان وجوديا لاحتاج إلى تأثير آخر بينه و بين فاعله و حله كما بيناه في مسألة الوجود و الوحدة و ما يجري مجراهما و أما الثاني فلما سيأتي في تحقيق مسألة الصدور عن الواحد.

و اعترض أيضا بالنقض بأنه لو صح ما ذكرتم لزم أن لا يكون الواحد قابلا لشيء و فاعلا لشيء آخر أيضا فإن أزيل باختلاف الجهة بأن الفاعلية لذاته و القابلية باعتبار تأثره عما يوجد المعلول قلنا فليكن حال القابلية و الفاعلية للشيء الواحد أيضا كذلك.

فإن قيل الشيء لا يتأثر عن نفسه.

قلنا هذا أول المسألة و لم لا يجوز باعتبارين كالمعالج نفسه.

فإن قيل الكلام على تقدير اتحاد الجهة.

قلنا فيكون لغوا إذ لا اتحاد جهة أصلا لأن المفهومات كلها متخالفة المعنى انتهى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٧٩

أقول أما صحة كون الشيء قابلا لشيء و فاعلا لشيء آخر فليس مما جوزة الحكماء في البسيط حتى يرد به نقضا عليهم إذ مادة النقض غير متحققة فإن الذي يتوهم نقضا على القاعدة هو كون العقل متوسطا بين الواجب و سائر الممكنات بأن قبل منه و فعل فيها لكن ليس كون المعلول موجودا بقابليته للوجود أو تأثر المحل به فلا قابلية و لا مقبولية و لا تأثر هاهنا كما مر في مباحث الوجود بل المجمعول هو نفس الوجود لا اتصاف الماهية به و قابليتها له في الواقع نعم ربما يحلل الذهن الموجود الممكن إلى ماهية و وجود فيحكم بأن الماهية قابلة للوجود على الوجه الذي مر ذكره من أخذ الماهية أولا مجردة عن الوجود مطلقا ثم اعتبار لحوق الوجود بها - فعند التجريد لها عن الوجود كيف يكون فاعلا لشيء فظهر أن القابلية - إذا كانت باعتبار الذهن فيقع الكثرة ذهنية لا غير و إذا كانت خارجية كانت الكثرة خارجية بين القابل و المقبول لكن القبول إذا لم يكن بمعنى الانفعال التأثري جاز - أن يكون عين الفعل و أما النقض بمعالجة النفس ذاتها فغير وارد إذ ليس هناك مجرد تغاير الاعتبارين فقط كالعاقلية و المعقولية بل تعدد الاعتبارين المتكثرين للذات

الموصوفة بهما فالنفس بما لها من ملكة العلاج و صورة المعالجة مبدأً فاعلي و بما لها من القوة الاستعدادية البدنية مبدأً قابلي.

الحجة الثانية أن نسبة القابل إلى مقبوله بالإمكان

و نسبة الفاعل إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٠

فعله بالوجوب لأن الفاعل التام للشيء من حيث هو فاعل يستلزمه بل يستصحبه [يستصحبه] ويمكن حصوله فيه فلو كان شيء واحد قابلاً و فاعلاً لشيء لكان نسبته إلى ذلك الشيء ممكنة و واجبة و هما متنافيان و تنافي اللوازم مستلزم لتنافي الملزومين.

أقول و هذا أيضاً إنما يجري في القوابل المستعدة الحاملة لإمكان المقبولات فإنها تباين القوى الفعالة هذا في التركيب الخارجي و كذا يجري في الماهيات الحاملة لإمكان الوجودات فإنها من حيث ذاتها بذاتها تغاير المقتضيات للوجود و الفعلية هذا في التركيب الذهني و أما اتصاف الأشياء بلوازم ماهياتها فليس هناك نسبة إمكانية إلا بالمعنى العام للإمكان فعلى ما حققناه لا يرد نقض الحجة بلوازم الماهيات كما زعمه بعض كالإمام الرازي و صاحب المطارحات و كثير من المتأخرين - حيث جوزوا كون البسيط قابلاً و فاعلاً مستدلين على جوازه بل على وقوعه بأن الماهيات علل للوازمها و متصفاً بها فالفاعل و القابل واحد إما أنها علل لتلك اللوازم - فإن الملزوم لو لم يكن اقتضاؤه لذلك اللازم لنفسه و ماهيته لصح ثبوت الملزوم عارياً عن تلك اللوازم عند فرض زوال عللها فلم يكن اللوازم لوازم هذا خلف و إما أنها متصفة بها فلأن تلك اللوازم حاصلة فيها لا غير فالإمكان حاصل في ماهيات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨١

الممكنات و منها و الزوجية حاصلة من ماهية الأربعة و فيها و تساوي الزوايا لقائمتين حاصل من ماهية المثلث و فيها. لا يقال هذه الماهيات مركبة فلعل منشأ فاعليتها بعض أجزائها و منشأ قابليتها بعض آخر فلا يلزم ما ذكرتموه. لأننا نقول أما أولاً فلأن في كل مركب بسيطاً و لكل واحد من بسائطه شيء من اللوازم و أقلها أنه شيء أو ممكن عام و أما ثانياً فلأن الحقيقة المركبة - لها وحدة طبيعية مخصوصة و اللازم الذي يلزمه عند ذلك الاجتماع ليس علة لزومه أحد أجزاء ذلك المجموع و إلا كان حاصل قبل ذلك الاجتماع و ليس القابل أيضاً أحد أجزاءه فإن السطح وحده لا يمكن أن يكون موصوفاً بتساوي الزوايا لقائمتين - و لا الأضلاع الثلاثة بل القابل هو المجموع من حيث هو ذلك المجموع و الفاعل أيضاً ذلك المجموع فكان الشيء باعتبار واحد قابلاً و فاعلاً و هو المطلوب.

و يدل أيضاً أن للباري عز اسمه صفات انتزاعية كالواجبية و الوحدانية - و ما يجري مجراها عند الكل لأن ما لا يجوز كونه زائداً عليه هي من الصفات الكمالية كالعلم و القدرة و الإرادة لا الانتزاعيات كمفهوم وجوب الوجود و مفهوم العالمية و غيرهما فإذاً ذاته بسيطة و مع بساطته فاعل و قابل لهذا الاعتبار العقلية.

و أيضاً عقله للأشياء عند المعلم الأول و أتباعه كالشيخين أبي نصر و أبي علي - و غيرهما صور مطابقة للأشياء و الصور المطابقة للممكنات مخالفة لذاته تعالى و هي عندهم من لوازم ذاته تعالى و هي أيضاً في ذاته فالفاعل و القابل هناك

واحد.

و من هاهنا وقع الاشتباه على المتأخرين سيما الإمام الرازي في تجويز كون الفاعل و القابل بأي معنى كان واحدا و لم يعرفوا كنه الأمرين في القبيلين فوقعوا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٢

في مغلطة عظيمة من جهة اشتراك الاسم في استعمالات القوم فأغمضوا الأعين عن مقتضى البراهين حتى تورطوا في مهلكة الزيغ في صفات الله الحقيقية و اعتقدوا زيادتها على الذات المقدسة و أن ذاته بذاته من غير عروض صفة لاحقة عاطلة عن كمال الإلهية و الواجبية تعالى عن النقص علوا كبيرا و لم يعلموا أن برهان عينية الصفات الحقيقية الكمالية و إثبات توحيده ليس سبيله هذا السبيل حتى لو لم يجز في اللوازم لكان للقول بزيادة الصفات الكمالية مساعا حاشى الجنب الإلهي عن ذلك.

و ربما يقال إيرادا على البرهان المذكور المبني على تعدد جهتي الإمكان و الوجوب إن معنى قابلية الشيء لأمر أنه لا يمتنع حصوله فيه بمعنى الإمكان العام و هو لا ينافي الوجوب.

و دفعه بأن معنى القابلية و الاستعداد أنه لا يمتنع حصول الشيء و لا عدم حصوله في القابل و هو المعنى الخاص و لو فرضنا الإمكان العام فليس تحقق معناه في أحد نوعيه أعني الوجوب بل يؤخذ معناه و مفهومه الأعم على وجه لا يحتمل إلا الإمكان الخاص فينا في تعيين الوجوب الذي لا يحتمله و بالجملة فكون المادة الحاملة لقوة وجود الشيء و إمكانه غير القوة الفاعلة الموجبة له مما لا يليق الخلاف فيه بين المحصلين - إذ كل من رجع إلى فطرته السليمة عن غشاوة التقليد و عمى التعصب يحكم بأن الشيء الواحد بما هو واحد لا يستفيد الكمال عن نفسه

فصل (٧) في أن التصورات قد يكون مبادي لحدوث الأشياء

إما إجمالا فقد علمت من مباحث القوى و تجدد الطبائع و غير ذلك بالقوة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٣

القريبة من الفعل أن المؤثر في وجود الأجسام و طبائعها يجب أن لا يكون أمرا مفتقرا في قوامه إلى المادة و كل ما لا يدخل المادة في قوامه فهو لا محالة صورة غير مادية فثبت أن مبادي الكائنات أمور صورية بل تصورية. و أما تفصيلا فنقول من شأن النفوس أن يحدث من تصوراتها القوية الجازمة أمور في البدن من غير فعل و انفعال جسماني فيحدث حرارة لا عن حار و برودة لا عن بارد

و الذي يدل عليه أمور

الأول أن القوة المحركة التي في الإنسان بل في الحيوان صالحة للضدين

فيستحيل أن يصدر عنها أحدهما إلا لمرجح و ذلك المرجح ليس إلا تصوره - لكون ذلك الفعل لذيدا أو ناعفا فالمؤثر في ذلك الترجيح هو ذلك التصور و اقتضاؤه لذلك الترجيح إن توقف على آلة جسمانية توقف تأثير ذلك التصور في تلك الآلة الجسمانية على آلة جسمانية أخرى و لزم التسلسل و ذلك محال فإذا تأثر تصورات النفوس في الأجسام لا يتوقف على توسط الآلات الجسمانية فثبت ما ادعيناه.

الثاني سيجيء في مباحث الفلكيات أن مبادي حركاتها هي تصوراتها
و أشواقها-

الثالث أنا نشاهد من نفوسنا أنا إذا أردنا الكتابة و عزمنا فعلنا عند عدم المانع
و مبدأ الإرادة هو التصور و إذا تصورنا أمرا ملذا مفرحا نرجو حصوله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٤

احمر الوجه و تهيجت الأعضاء و إذا تصورنا أمرا مخوفا نظن وقوعه اصفر لون الوجه و اضطرب البدن و إن لم يكن ذلك المرجو أو المخوف داخلين في الوجود و كذا نشاهد من كون الإنسان متمكنا من العد و على جذع يلقي على الطريق ثم إذا كان موضوعا في الجسر و تحته هاوية لم يجترئ أن يمشي عليه إلا بالهونا لأنه يتخيل في نفسه صورة السقوط تخيلا قويا فتطيع قوته المحركة لذلك التصور بحسب غريزتها من الطاعة و الانقياد للتصورات و من هذا القبيل الاحتلام في النوم.

الرابع أن المريض إذا استحكم توهمه للصحة فإنه ربما يصح

و إذا استحكم توهم الصحيح للمرض فإنه يمرض و نفس صاحب العين العانية تؤثر من غير آلة جسمانية و يحكى من حذاق الأطباء المعالجة بأمر نفسانية تصورية كما يحكى أن بعض الملوك أصابه فالج شديد و علم الطبيب أن العلاج الجسماني لا ينفع فيه و ترصد للخلوة حتى وجدها ثم أقبل على الملك بالشم و الفحش و الكلمات الركيكة حتى اضطرب الملك اضطرابا شديدا فثارت حرارته الغريزية فيه و اشتعلت فقويت على دفع المادة و ما كان لها سبب سوى التصورات النفسانية فإذا ثبت هذا الأصل فيسهل عليك التصديق للنبوات فلا يستبعد أن يبلغ النفس إلى مبلغ في الشرف و القوة إلى حيث تبرئ المرضى و تمرض الأشرار و تقلب عنصرا إلى عنصر آخر حتى يجعل غير النار نارا و يحدث بدعائه أمطار و خصب تارة أو زلزلة و خسف تارة و ستعلم أن المادة للعناصر مشتركة فهي قابلة لجميع الصور و نسبة النفوس الجزئية الضعيفة - إلى مواد أبدانها كنسبة النفوس القوية الكلية إلى مواد أخرى كما يصير تصورات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٥

هذه مبادي الأمور الجزئية فجاز أن تكون تصورات تلك النفوس مبادي الأمور العظيمة - و إن كان نادرا أو غريبا و من هذا القبيل الطلسمات و النيرنجات كما قال الشيخ إن للقوى العالية الفعالة و القوى السافلة المنفعلة اجتماعات على غرائب و مما يتعلق بهذا المبحث أن الرأي الكلي لا يكون منشأ لحصول أفعال جزئية و ذلك لأن الكلي مشترك بين جزئياته متساوي النسبة إلى كل واحد واحد من المندرجات فيه فلما كان سببا لوقوع واحد منها مع أن نسبته إليه كنسبته إلى غيره لزم من ذلك وقوع الممكن - بلا سبب و هو محال.

عقدة و حل:

لقائل أن يقول كل ما دخل أو يدخل في الوجود فهو جزئي - و له ماهية كلية

فلا بد أن يكون سبب الوقوع لجزئي من جزئياتها إرادة جزئية لكن الباري سبحانه علمه كلي و إرادته كلية عند الحكماء مع اتفاقهم على أنهما مبدءان لوجود الممكنات و بعبارة أخرى الحكماء جعلوا تصورات المبادي المفارقة عللا لتكون

الأجسام والأعراض في عالمي الإبداع والتكوين و تلك التصورات كلية و هذه الأشياء جزئيات فما هو المتصور عند الأوائل ممتنع الحصول هاهنا و ما هو الحاصل هاهنا غير متصورهم فبطل قول الفلاسفة.

و حله أن الجزئي على ضربين

أحدهما أن يكون له أمثال في الوجود و لنوعه أفراد منتشرة و الثاني أن لا مثل له في الوجود و أن فرضه العقل فما يكون من قبيل الأول فلا تخصص لواحد منها في الوجود إلا بأحوال خارجة عن ماهياتها و لازم ماهياتها و العقل لا يمكن أن يدركه إلا بآلة جسمانية فالإرادة الكلية لا تنال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٦

واحدًا منها دون غيره و ما يكون من قبيل الثاني فيمكن أن يكون تخصص الواحد - من الأفراد الفرضية بالوجود لأمر لازم الماهية للعقل أن يدركه و للإرادة الكلية أن يناله لأن تخصصه بالتشخص ليس بأحوال خارجة عن ذاته و ليست لذاته أمثال لا اختلاف بينها بالذاتيات و لا بما هو من قبل الطبيعة.

فنقول الفيض الكلي و الإرادة الكلية و العناية الأزلية عامة لجميع الموجودات المبدعة و الكائنة إلا أنها قد يتخصص بعضها بالوجود قبل بعض أو دون بعض ذاتا أو زمانا بأسباب ذاتية أو عرضية فالذاتية كالوسائط العقلية و العرضية كالمعدات تخصص القوابل كما أن إرادة الذهاب إلى الحج سبب للخطوات و سبب لكل خطوة معينة بشرط حصول الخطوة المتقدمة التي وصلت إلى ذلك الحد من المسافة و قد عرفت أن العلل المؤثرة إنما يتخصص تأثيرها بواسطة علة معدة مقربة للعلل المؤثرة إلى معلولها بعد ما لم تكن قريبة و إن ذلك بسبب أن قبل كل حادث حادثا هذا إذا كانت أو أمكنت للماهية أشخاص كثيرة و أما إذا لم يمكن لها إلا واحد فيصير الإرادة الكلية سببا لوجود الشخص الجزئي لأن إمكانه الذاتي كاف في قبوله الوجود بخلاف واحد من أفراد نوع فلا يكفي إمكان نوعها لإمكان الشخص بل لا بد من حدوث إمكان زائد على إمكان النوع في مواد شخصيته

فصل (٨) في أن العلة هل هي أقوى من معلولها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٧

البدهاهة حاكمة بأن العلة المؤثرة هي أقوى لذاتها من معلولها

فيما يقع به العلية و في غيرها لا يمكن الجزم بذلك ابتداء و الشيخ الرئيس قد فصل القول في هذه المسألة بأن المعلول إما أن يحتاج إلى العلة لذاته و طبيعته أو بشخصيته و هويته - و الأول يقتضي أن تكون العلة مخالفة له في الماهية و إلا لزم عليه الشيء لنفسه و أما الثاني ككون هذه النار معلولة لتلك النار و الابن معلولا للأب فلا يجوز أن يكون أقوى من العلة في تلك الطبيعة لأن تلك الزيادة معلولة و لا سبب لها و ليست حاصلة للفاعل حتى يقتضيها و لا يمكن أن يسند إلى زيادة استعداد مادية له لأن المادة باستعدادها قابلة لا فاعلة أو مقتضية و أما أنه هل يكون مساويا للعللة فنقول ذلك التساوي إما أن يعتبر في حقيقتهما أو وجوديهما فعلى الأول إما أن يتساوى مادتهما أم لا فإن لم تتساويا فإما أن تتساويا في قبول ذلك الأثر أو تختلفا فالأول كالحال في اتباع سطح النار لسطح فلك القمر في الحركة و أما الثاني فمثل الضوء الحاصل من الشمس في القمر فإن الضوءين مختلفان بالقوة و الضعف و من جعل هذا القدر من الاختلاف مؤثرا في

اختلاف الماهية جعلهما نوعين و من جعل ذلك اختلافا في العوارض جعلهما من نوع واحد و أما إذا كانت المادتان متساويتين - فلا يخلو إما أن تكون مادة المنفعل خالية عما يعاوق ذلك الأثر أو يكون فيها ما يعاوقه الأول هو الاستعداد التام و هو على ثلاثة أقسام فإنه إما أن يكون في المادة ما يعين على ذلك الأثر و يبقى معه مثل تبريد الماء فإن فيه قوة تعين على هذا الأثر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٨

و إما أن يكون فيها ما يعاوق الأثر لكنه يزول عند حدوث ذلك الأثر كالشعر إذا شاب عن سواد و إما أن لا يكون فيها معاوق و لا معاون كالتفه في قبول الطعوم ففي هذه الأقسام يجوز أن يشبه المنفعل بالفاعل تشبها تاما مثل النار يحيل الماء نارا و الملح يحيل العسل ملحا فإن الصور الجوهرية التي لهذه الأمور لا تكون متفاوتة بالشدة و الضعف كما هو المشهور و المادة قابلة لأثار تلك الصور لكونها مماثلة لمادة الفاعل و لا معاوق و لا منازع فيجب حصول تلك الآثار بتمامها و أما إذا كان في المادة ما يعاوق الأثر و هو الاستعداد الناقص كالماء في قبوله للتسخن من النار لأن طبيعته مانعة عن قبول هذا الأثر فهنا المنفعل أضعف من الفاعل على كل حال لأن مادة المنفعل معاوق عن ذلك الأثر و ليس في مادة الفاعل معاوق و الشيء مع العائق لا يكون كالشيء لا معه - و لهذا فغير النار إذا تسخن عن النار لا يكون سخونته كسخونتها.

و أما الإيراد بحال الفلزات المذابة بالنار

و المسبوكات يكون سخونتها أقوى - من سخونة النار حيث يحترق اليد بها بمجرد الملاقاة دون النار. فالجواب بوجوه مذكورة في الشفاء من كونها غليظة لزجة بطيئة ملاقة اليد إياها عسرة الزوال هي عن اليد و كون النار غير صرفة بل ممزوجة لغيرها ذات سطوح كثيرة غير متصلة بل مختلطة بأجرام هوائية و أرضية كاسرة إياها من حاق حرها - فالسخونة المحسوسة من الجواهر الذائبة أقوى من ما يحسن من النار و هذا كله إذا كان النظر إلى حقيقتي العلة و المعلول المشتركين في الماهية و أما إذا كان النظر إلى وجوديهما فيستحيل تساويهما من جهة التقدم و التأخر لأن العلة مفيدة و المعلول مستفيد الوجود فالنار الحاصلة من نار أخرى و إن تساويا في النارية لكن المفيدة أقدم من المستفيدة لا في كونها نارا بل في أنها موجودة و كذا الأب يتقدم على الابن لا في كونه إنسانا بل في كونه موجودا و أما إذا كان المعلول لا يشارك العلة في الماهية و لا في المادة بل في الوجود فالحق أن الوجود في العلة أقوى و أقدم و أغنى و أوجب لكن الشيخ ذكر أن التفاوت بين الوجودين لا يكون بالأشد و الأضعف و الأقوى و الأنقص لأن الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٨٩

من حيث هو وجود لا يقبل ذلك بل الاختلاف بين العلة و المعلول إنما يكون في أمور ثلاثة التقدم و التأخر و الاستغناء و الحاجة و الوجوب و الإمكان أقول لعله أراد بالوجوب هاهنا نفس المعنى العام الذي يقال له الوجود الإثباتي الذي يحمل على الماهيات في الذهن و يعرض للنسبة بينها و بينه كيفية الوجود و الإمكان و الامتناع و لذلك قيد الوجود في عدم قبوله للاختلاف المذكور بقوله من حيث هو وجود و أما الوجود الحقيقي الذي يطرد العدم و ينفيه فلا شبهة للقائلين به أنه مما يتفاوت في الشدة و الضعف و القوة كيف و الشيخ قد صرح في كثير من مواضع كتبه بأن بعض

الموجودات قوية الوجود و بعضها ضعيفة كالزمان و الحركة و أشباهها و أيضا الماهية - قد تكون مشتركة بين الوجود الذهني و الخارجي و التفاوت بينهما بالوجودين و لا شك أن الخارجي أقوى من الذهني لأنه مبدأ الآثار المختصة دون الذهني

فصل (٩) في أنه كيف يصح قولهم بأن العلة التامة للشيء المركب يكون معه

اعلم أنا قد بينا أن ماهية الشيء هي عين صورته و مبدأ فصله الأخير حتى لو وجدت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٠

الصورة مجردة أو وجد الفصل الأخير لكان جميع المعاني الداخلة في ماهية ذلك الشيء أو المقومة لوجوده حاصلة لتلك الصورة لازمة لذلك الفصل فصورة الإنسان مثلاً إذا وجدت قائمة بلا مادة لكانت مبدأ للنطق و الحياة و الإحساس و التغذية و التوليد و التجسم إلا أنها لكماليتها و غنائها عن مزاوله هذه الأفاعيل لا يفعلها كما يفعلها عند النقص و القصور عن درجة التمام و كذا الفصل الناطق يلزمه مفهوم الحيوانية و ما يتضمنه.

إذا عرفت هذا فنقول الأسباب و العلل إنما يحتاج إليها الصورة في نحو وجودها الكوني لأنها الأمر الوجداني الذي له وحدة طبيعية ذاتية و إذا وجدت بوجود عللها و شرائطها لزم في مرتبة وجودها وجود النوع المركب منها و من المادة القريبة من غير استيناف علة أخرى له فبهذا الوجه يقال إن العلة التامة للمركب كانت معه في الوجود فهذا من باب أخذ ما بالعرض مكان ما بالذات فإن المركب كما أنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩١

موجود بالعرض على ما مر كذلك معلول بالعرض و المعلوم بالعرض يجوز أن يكون معاً لما هي علة له بالعرض إذ لا افتقار بالذات له إليها فاعلم هذا فإنه من الحكمة المشرقية

فصل (١٠) في أحكام مشتركة بين العلل الأربع و هي أمور ستة

أحدهما كونها بالذات و بالعرض

فالفاعل بالذات هو الذي لذاته يكون مبدءاً للفعل و الفاعل بالعرض ما لا يكون كذلك و هو على أقسام - الأول أن يكون فعله بالذات إزالة ضد شيء فينسب إليه وجود الضد الآخر - لاقتران حصوله بزوال ذلك الضد مثل السقمونيا للتبريد فإن فعله بالذات إزالة الصفراء و إذا زالت الصفراء حصلت البرودة فتضاف إليها. و الثاني أن يكون الفاعل مزيلاً للمانع و إن لم يفد مع المنع ضداً كمزيل الدعامة فإنه يقال هادم السقف.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٢

و الثالث أن يكون للشيء صفات كثيرة و هو باعتبار بعضها يكون فاعلاً لشيء بالذات فإذا أخذ مع سائر الاعتبارات كان فاعلاً بالعرض كما يقال الكاتب يبني أو الباني يكتب أو الأسود يتحرك.

الرابع الغايات الاتفاقية إذا نسبت إلى الفاعل الطبيعي أو الاختياري كالحجر إذا شج عضواً عند الهبوط و إنما عرض له ذلك لأن فعله بالذات أن يهبط فاتفق أن وقع العضو في مسافته و من هذا القسم حفظ يبوسة الأرض للشكل الغير

الكري.

و الخامس أن يكون المقارن للفاعل لا على سبيل الوجوب يجعل فاعلا و أما المادة بالذات فهي التي بخصوصية ذاتها تكون قابلة للصورة المعينة و التي بالعرض فأمرا - الأول أن يؤخذ القابل مع ضد المقبول فيجعل مادة المقبول كما يجعل الماء مثلا مادة للهواء.

و الثاني أن يؤخذ القابل مع وصف لا يتوقف القابلية عليه فيجعل معه قابلا - كما يقال الطبيب يتعالج فإنه لا يتعالج من حيث هو طبيب بل من حيث هو مريض و أما الصورة بالذات فهي مثل الشكل للكرسي و التي بالعرض كالسواد و البياض - و أما الغاية الذاتية و العرضية فكما ستعرف.

و ثانيها القرب و البعد

فالفاعل القريب هو الذي يباشر الفعل يعني لا واسطة بينه و بين فعله كالوتر لتحريك الأعضاء و البعيد كالنفس و ما قبلها و المتوسط كالقوة المحركة التي للوتر و قبلها القوة الشوقية و قبلها التصديق أو ما في حكمه و المادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٣

القريبة هي التي لا يتوقف قبولها للصورة على انضمام شيء آخر إليها أو حدوث حالة أخرى فيها مثل الأعضاء لصورة البدن و البعيدة ما لا يكون كذلك إما لأنه وحدة ليس بقابل بل هو جزء القابل أو إن كان فلا بد من أحوال ليستفيد بها قبول تلك الصور فالأول مثل الخلط الواحد لصورة العضو و الثاني مثل الغذاء لصورة الخلط - أو النطفة لصورة الحيوان فإن ذلك لا يتم إلا بعد أطوار كثيرة و الصورة القريبة كالتربيع للمربع و البعيدة كذي الزاوية له و الغاية القريبة كالصحة للدواء و البعيدة كالسعادة للدواء -

و ثالثها الخصوص و العموم

فالفاعل الخاص ما يفعل عنه شيء واحد كالنار المحرقة لواحد و العام ما يفعل عنه كثيرون كالنار المحرقة لكثيرين و العام قد يكون فاعلا لكل شيء كالواجب تعالى و قد يكون لبعضها كغيره - و المادة الخاصة ما لا يمكن أن يحلها إلا تلك الصورة مثل جسم الإنسان لصورته - و المادة العامة مثل الخشب لصورة السرير و الكرسي و غيرهما و الهولي الأولى مادة لكل و فرق بين القريب و الخاص فقد يكون قريبا و عاما مثل الخشب للسرير و غيره و الصورة الخاصة فهي حد الشيء و فصله أو خاصته و العامة كأجناس تلك - و الغاية الخاصة فهي التي لا تحصل إلا من طريق واحد و العامة هي التي تحصل من طرق متعددة.

و رابعها الكلي و الجزئي

فالفاعل الجزئي هو العلة الشخصية أو النوعية أو الجنسية لمعلول شخصي أو نوعي أو جنسي كل في مقابل نظيره و الكلي هو أن لا يوازي الشيء بمثله مثل الطبيعة لهذا العلاج أو الصانع للعلاج و في المادة كذلك - و أما في الصورة فلا فرق بين الكلية و الجزئية و بين الخصوص و العموم و أما في الغاية فالجزئي كقبض زيد على فلان الغريم في حركته المخصوصة و أما الكلي فكالانتصاف من الظالم.

و خامسها البسيط و المركب

فالفاعل البسيط هو الشيء الأحدي الذات و أحق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٤

العلل بذلك هو المبدأ الأول و المركب منه ما يكون مؤثرته لاجتماع عدة أمور- إما متفقة النوع كعدة رجال يحركون السفينة أو مختلفة النوع كالجوع الحادث عن القوة الجاذبة و الحساسة و المادة البسيطة كالهيليوم للجسمية و المركبة كالعقاقير للترياق و الصورة البسيطة مثل صورة الماء و النار و الصورة المركبة مثل صورة الإنسان- التي هي عبارة عن المجموع الحاصل من عدة أمور و فيه تأمل و الغاية البسيطة مثل الشبع للأكل و المركبة هي المطلوب المركب من أمور كل واحد منها غير مستقل بالمطلوبة.

و سادسها القوة و الفعل

فالفاعل بالقوة مثل النار بالقياس إلى ما لم يشتعل فيه- و يصح اشتعالها فيه و القوة قد تكون قريبة كقوة الكاتب المتهيء للكتابة عليها- و قد تكون بعيدة كقوة الصبي عليها و الموضوع قد تكون بالقوة مثل النطفة لصورة الإنسان و قد تكون بالفعل كبدن الإنسان لصورته و أما الصورة فقد يكون بالفعل و ذلك عند وجودها و قد تكون بالقوة و هي الإمكان المقارن لعدم الصورة في الموضوع المعين و أما كون الغاية بالقوة أو بالفعل فهو ككون الصورة بالقوة و بالفعل لأن الغاية بالقياس إلى شيء صورة بالقياس إلى صورته كما أن الغاية لشيء فاعل لفاعله من حيث هو فاعل

فصل (١١) في أنه هل يجوز أن يكون للشيء البسيط علة مركبة من أجزاء

قد جوزه كثير من الفضلاء و الحق امتناعه

كما ذكره بعض المحققين مستدلاً عليه بقوله لا يجوز صدور البسيط عن المركب لأنه إن استقل واحد من أجزائه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٥

بالعلة لا يمكن استناد المعلول إلى الباقي و إلا إن كان له تأثير في شيء من المعلول لا في كله لأنه خلاف الفرض كان مركباً لا بسيطاً و إن لم يكن لشيء منها تأثير في شيء منه فإن حصل لها عند الاجتماع أمر زائد هو العلة فإن كان عدمها لم يكن مستقلاً بالتأثير في الوجود و إلا لزم التسلسل في صدوره عن المركب إن كان بسيطاً- و في صدور البسيط عنه إن كان مركباً و إن لم يحصل بقيت مثل ما كانت قبل الاجتماع- فلا يكون الكل مؤثراً قال و يلزم منه أن يكون علة الحادث مركبة لوجوب حدوثها أيضاً و إلا لكان صدور الحادث في وقت دون ما قبله ترجيحاً من غير مرجح- فلو كانت بسيطة توجب لأجل حدوثها حدوث علتها و لأجل بساطتها بساطتها و لزم التسلسل الممتنع لتركيبه من علل و معلولات غير متناهية بخلاف ما لو كانت علة الحادث مركبة خارجية فإنه لا يلزم التسلسل الممتنع لجواز تركيبها من أمرين قديم و حادث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٦

و يكون الحادث منهما شرطاً بعدمه بعد وجوده في وجود الحادث المعلول عن العلة القديمة و الشرط جاز أن يكون عدمياً فلا يجتمع إذن أمور موجودة معاً و لها ترتب العلية و المعلولية إلى غير النهاية قال و يلزم منه أن يكون كل حادث مركباً- و إلا كانت علتة بسيطة بل كل بسيط قديماً و يلزم منه قدم النفس انتهى كلامه و اعترض عليه شارح كتاب

حكمه الإشراق بأن ما ذكره منقوض تفصيلا وإجمالا ومعارض.

أما الأول فلأنه على تقدير أن لا يستقل واحد من أجزائه بالعلية يجوز أن يكون له تأثير في كل المعلول ولا يلزم منه خلاف المفروض لأن المفروض عدم استقلاله بالتأثير لا نفس التأثير بل يجوز أن يكون تأثيره فيه متوقفا على غيره كما سبق أي في كلام الماتن في مثال تحريك جماعة من الناس حجرا واحدا قال ولا نسلم أنه إن لم يحصل للأجزاء عند الاجتماع أمر زائد هو العلة بقيت مثل ما كانت - إذ لا يلزم من انتفاء أمر زائد هو العلة انتفاء أمر زائد هو شرط تأثيرها كالاجتماع فيما نحن فيه وعلى هذا لا يبقى الأجزاء مثل ما كانت ولا الكل غير مؤثر بل يكون مؤثرا لحصول شرط تأثيره.

وأما الثاني فلأنه لو صح ما ذكره لزم التسلسل الممتنع لأن الجزء الصوري من كل حادث مركب حادث لأنه معه بالفعل بل بالزمان وهو إن كان بسيطا فهو المطلوب وإن كان مركبا عاد الكلام ولا يتسلسل لاستحالة لا نهاية أجزاء الشيء - بل ينتهي إلى ما هو بسيط وإذا كان حادث ما بسيطا فلو صح ما ذكره لزم من بساطته بساطة علته ومن حدوثه حدوثها ويلزم التسلسل الممتنع على ما عرفت.

وأما الثالث فبأن نقول ما ذكرتم وإن دل على امتناع صدور البسيط عن المركب فعندنا ما يدل على جوازه لأنه إذا ثبت حادث بسيط بما عرفت من الطريق فنقول لا بد من انتهاء علته إلى ما هو مركب وإلا لزم التسلسل الممتنع لما مر غير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٧

مرة انتهى ما ذكره في ذلك الشرح.

وإني ذكرت في الحواشي التي علقناها على ذلك الكتاب وشرحه بأن كلام هذا القائل قوي جدا في جميع ما ذكره إلا في قدم النفس بما هي نفس ولا يرد عليه شيء من الإيرادات الثلاثة التي أوردها ذلك العلامة أما النقض التفصيلي فالمنع الذي أشار إليه بقوله لجواز أن يؤثر الشيء في كل المعلول ولا يكون مستقلا بالتأثير - بل يكون تأثيره فيه متوقفا على الغير كما في المثال المذكور إلى آخره ساقط لا اتجاه له فإن كل واحد من العشرة إذا كان مؤثرا في كل المعلول البسيط بشرط غيره على الاستقلال على ما جوزه لزم جواز أن يتحقق هناك علل كثيرة مستقلة بالتأثير مجتمعة وذلك واضح البطلان ببيان الملازمة أن العلة إن كانت كل واحدة من الأحاد بشرط التسعة الباقية وكانت الأحاد في درجة واحدة ونسبة واحدة في العلية والتأثير لزم ما ذكرناه وإن كان واحد منها بعينه هو المؤثر بشرط البواقي وذلك مع كونه ترجيحاً بلا مرجح فالعلة الموجبة هي ذلك الواحد بعينه وهو خلاف المفروض - وإن كان الأحاد مع وصف الجمعية هي العلة فوصف الجمعية محض اعتبار العقل إذا لم يكن معها جزء صوري في الخارج والكلام في الجزء الصوري عائد كما ذكره المستدل فالاجتماع الذي ذكره أو ما يجري مجراه إن كان اعتباريا محضاً فلا تأثير له في حصول أمر عيني خارجي ومثال تحريك الثقل بعده رجال يمتنع التحريك ببعضهم مما سيأتي حله وإن كان أمراً موجوداً فيكون حادثاً فيعود الكلام في حدوثه - وأما النقض الإجمالي فجوابه أننا نختار أن الجزء الصوري للمركب مركب وينتهي إلى جزء بسيط لكن لا نسلم أن كل جزء من أجزاء الحادث يجب أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٨

حادثا وجوديا موصوفا بحدوث زائد على هويته التجددية الاتصالية كما في أجزاء الزمان و الحركة حتى يحتاج ذلك الجزء البسيط الحادث بذاته إلى علة حادثة بسيطة- ليلزم منه التسلسل الممتنع و أما المعارضة فمدفوعة لتوقفها على حادث بسيط- يزيد حدوثه على ذاته و هو في محل المنع كما عرفت و ستعلم تحقيق مستند هذا المنع و ما ذكره هذا القائل المذكور من أن علة الحادث مركبة من جزء مستمر و جزء متجدد يكون عدمه بعد وجوده علة لوجود الحادث موافق لما ذكره الحكماء- في ربط الحادث بالقديم على طريقته بواسطة الحركة التي يكون حقيقتها منتظمة- من هوية متجددة عدم كل جزء منها شرط لوجود جزء حادث و مطابق أيضا لما حققناه و برهنا عليه كما سيجيء بيانه في إثبات حدوث العالم بجميع أجزائه من جهة إثبات جوهر متجدد الذات مقتضى الهوية الاتصالية التي كالحركة و هي الطبيعة السارية في الأجسام لأن حقيقتها باقية على نعت التجدد ملتزمة من أجزاء متصلة متكثرة في الوهم وجود كل منها يستلزم عدم الجزء السابق و عدمه يستلزم وجود اللاحق و هذه الحالة ثابتة لها لذاتها من غير جعل جاعل و أما بطلان قوله بقديم النفوس فستعلم بيانه في مباحث النفس إن شاء الله تعالى من أن النفس بما هي نفس أي لها هذا الوجود التعلقى ليست بسيطة كما تصوره حتى تكون قديمة بل هي متعلقة الذات بجرم طبيعي حكمها حكم الطبيعة في انتظام حقيقتها من جهتين إحداهما ما بالفعل و الأخرى ما بالقوة

وهم و تحقيق عرشي:

و مما قيل في هذا المقام إنه يجوز أن يكون للبسيط علة مركبة من أجزاء فإن جزء العلة للشيء الوجداني لا أثر له بنفسه بل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ١٩٩

المجموع له أثر واحد لا أن لكل واحد فيه أثرا فقد لا يكون لكل واحد أثر و لا يلزم أن يكون حكم كل واحد حكما على المجموع لأنه لا يلزم من كون كل واحد- من أجزاء العشرة غير زوج أن لا يكون العشرة زوجا بل المجموع له أثر و هو نفس المعلول الوجداني و كما أن جزء العلة التي هي ذات أجزاء مختلفة لا يستقل باقتضاء المعلول و لا يلزم أن يقتضي جزء المعلول فذلك الأجزاء التي من نوع واحد فإنه إذا حرك ألف من الناس حجرا حركة معينة في زمانها و مسافتها لا يلزم أن يقدر واحد منهم على تحريك ذلك الثقل جزءا من تلك الحركة هو حصة منها بل قد لا يقدر على تحريك أصلا و إذا لم يقدر على تحريكه على الانفراد مع تأثيره عند الانضمام إلى الباقي علم منه أن وجود الواحد الذي هو جزء العلة كعدمه عند الانفراد و ليس كذلك عند الاجتماع.

هذا ما ذكره بعض الأعظم قلت في الجواب تحقيقا للمقام إن المركب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٠٠

لا يخلو إما أن يكون له جزء صوري أو لم يكن و صورة الشيء هي تمامه و جهة وجوده و وحدته و قد مر أن وجود كل شيء هو بعينه وحدته و ما يكون وحدته ضعيفة كالعدد حتى يكون وحدته عين الكثرة و الانقسام كان وجوده أيضا ضعيفا فالكثير بما هو كثير غير موجود بوجود آخر غير وجودات الآحاد و المعدوم بما هو معدوم لا تأثير له و مثل ذلك الوجود أي الذي كالأعداد و المقادير كان تأثيره عين تأثير الآحاد و الأجزاء فعلة كل موجود متاصل له وحدة

حقيقية لا بد أن يكون وحدتها وحدة حقيقية أقوى من وحدة معلولها فكل مركب فرض كونه علة لموجود وحداني فلا بد أن يكون له جزء صوري هو في الحقيقة علة إذا تقرر هذا فقولنا بل المجموع له أثر واحد قلنا المجموع له اعتباران اعتبار أنه مجموع واعتبار أنه آحاد فهو بالاعتبار الأول شيء واحد لكن جهة وحدته إما أن تكون اعتباريا غير حقيقي كوحدة العسكر مثلا وإما أن يكون أمرا حقيقيا كالصور النوعية للمركب العنصري ففي كون المجموع علة للأثر ثلاثة احتمالات أحدها أن يكون جهة التأثير والعلية هي الآحاد والأجزاء فلا بد أن يكون لكل واحد منها أثر ويكون أثر المجموع مجموع أثر الآحاد والأجزاء وإلا فلا يكون للمجموع أثر أصلا إذ ليس المجموع إلا عين الآحاد وصف الاجتماع ليس بأمر زائد له تحقق في الواقع إلا بمحض الاعتبار الذي لا أثر له والاحتمال الثاني أن يكون جهة التأثير - هي الوحدة الجمعية الاعتبارية فالحكم فيه يجري مجرى الأول لأن الوحدة هاهنا ضعيفة تابعة للكثرة فلها أثر ضعيف تابع لأثر الكثرة والعمدة والأصل في المؤثرية هي الآحاد دون المجموع من حيث الوحدة الاجتماعية وأما الاحتمال الثالث فالحكم فيه على عكس ما سبق كتأثير المغناطيس في جذب الحديد وتأثير الترياقات في دفع السموم فحينئذ كان المؤثر في الحقيقة هو شيئا واحدا بما هو واحد لا بما هو ذو أجزاء فثبت أن علة الواحد واحد بالذات وإن كان كثيرا من جهة أخرى وأما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٠١

مثال تحريك جماعة حجرا ثقيلًا أو رسوب السفينة المملوءة من الحنطة في البحر مع أن بعض تلك الجماعة لا يقدر على تحريكه وللحبة الواحدة لها أثر في رسوبها فالحق فيه أن لكل واحد من الآحاد والأجزاء أثرا ضعيفا في ذلك التحريك ولو في الإعداد و تحصيل الاستعداد بإحالة المادة لكن يزول أثره بتخلل الزمان بينه وبين اللاحق الآخر والتأثيرات المتلاحقة من المتفرقات في التأثير يضمحل بتراخي الزمان بينها - فلا يظهر أثر كل منها ولا أثر المجموع لورود مضاد التأثير على كل منها حتى لو فرض أحد كون تأثير كل منها وفعله سواء كان محسوسا أو غير محسوس باقيا في المادة المنفعلة عنها المتحركة بها بأن لا يمحو ذلك الأثر بتراخي الزمان يلزم ترتب الأثر عند الافتراق كترتبه عند الاجتماع من غير فرق لكن قد يزول أثر كل من الآحاد عند لحوق الآخر فإن كل فعل جسماني له زمان معين لا يمكن بقاءه أكثر من ذلك الزمان طويلا كان أو قصيرا كما يمحو أثر النار الضعيفة في تسخين الحديد بلحظة فلو فرض في مثال تحريك الرجال حجرا ثقيلًا بقاء أثر التحريكات - و تلاحق تأثير كل منهم تأثير صاحبه مع افتراقهم في الزمان كان التأثير المذكور المعين حاصلًا عند تحريك الرجل الأخير إياه عند حصول المبلغ المذكور من الآحاد - ولو على التراخي فيرى عند ذلك رجلا واحدا كأنه حرك بقوة نفسه الواحدة حجرا عظيما والحال أنه قد تحرك بمجموع قوى تلك الأشخاص فثبت أن الاجتماع في الزمان الواحد ليس محتاجا إليه لأجل حصول جهة الجمعية الاعتبارية بل لأجل انحفاظ آثار الآحاد لئلا يزول بعضها عند حصول البعض الآخر ولا يمحو أثر كل واحد بانقضاء زمان تأثيره فتأمل في هذا المقام لتعلم حقيقة ما قررناه وأوضحناه - لتنفعك في كثير من المواضع كمسألة كون القوى الجسمانية متناهي الفعل والانفعال وغير ذلك والله ولي العصمة والإلهام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٠٢

فصل (١٣) ماهية الممكن بشرط حضور علتها الكاملة يجب وجودها وبشرط عدمها يمتنع وعند قطع النظر عن الشرطين باقية على إمكانها الأصلي

فمن خواص الممكن صدق قسيميه عليه بالشرائط وليس لغيره من الجهات هذا ولا يجب للعلة مقارنة العدم ولا من شرط تعلق الشيء بالفاعل أن يكون وجوده - بعد العدم وكون الحادث مسبقا وجوده بالعدم من لوازمه المستندة إلى نفس هويته من دون صنع الفاعل فيه فهناك عدم سابق ووجود لاحق وصفة محمولة على الذات وهي كونها بعد العدم فالعدم السابق مستند إلى عدم العلة و الوجود البعد إنما هو من إفاضة العلة و كون الذات بعد العدم ليس من الأوصاف الممكنة للحق - و اللالحق بالذات بما هي تلك الذات حتى يفتقر إلى علة غير الذات ليس إذا فرضناها من الصفات الجوازية التي تلحق الموصوف بعلة أخرى غير الذات أو غير علة الذات فنفس الذات مع قطع النظر عن لحوق صفة الحدوث أي هوية إمكانية مستدعية للتعليق بالعلة فيكون بذاتها من دون أن يكتنفها الحدوث صادرة عن الفاعل - فتحققت غير مخلوطة بالحدوث بل أزلي الوجود لعدم الوساطة فحينئذ فرض لحوق الحدوث بها بعلة أخرى يكون متناقضا أم هي بحسب نفس هويتها خارجة

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عن حد الإمكان إلى أحد القسمين وإنما إمكانها من حيث اتصافها بصفة الحدوث - فيكون الحادث واجب الوجود بذاته أو ممتنع الوجود بذاته وهو فاسد و يلزم أيضا كونه بذاته سرمدى الوجود أو العدم ثم يلحقها حدوث مقابلة بعلة فيعود المحذور السابق على وجه أفحش ثم من البين أنه لو فرض للحادث وجود أزلي لم يكن هو بعينه هذا الكائن بعد العدم فقد امتنع بالنظر إلى هذا الوجود إلا أن يكون بعد العدم فهذا الوصف له بنفسه من دون تأثير مؤثر فلا تأثير للفاعل إلا في نفس الوجود مستمرا كان أو منقطعا فالوجود وإن لم يكن واجب الحصول للحادث لكن حصول هذه الكيفية أعني الحدوث عند حصول الوجود له واجب ولا استبعاد في أن يكون - اتصاف الشيء ببعض الصفات ممكنا إلا أنه متى اتصف به يكون اتصافه بصفة أخرى عند ذلك واجبا والواجب لا علة له ولا يلزم من كون وجوده أو عدمه يمكن أن يكون وأن لا يكون كون وجوده بعد العدم أو عدمه بعد الوجود يمكن أن يكون وأن لا يكون حتى ينسب إلى سبب فلا سبب لكون وجوده بعد العدم وإن كان سبب لوجوده الذي كان بعد العدم.

وربما ظن قوم أن الشيء إنما يحتاج إلى العلة لحدوثه بمعنى أن علة افتقاره إلى الفاعل هي الحدوث فإذا حدث و وجد فقد استغنى عن العلة وهذا أيضا باطل لأننا إذا حللنا الحدوث بالعدم السابق والوجود اللاحق و كون ذلك الوجود

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بعد العدم و تفحصنا عن علة الافتقار إلى الفاعل أي أحد الأمور الثلاثة أم أمر رابع مغاير لها لم يبق من الأقسام شيء إلا القسم الرابع أما العدم السابق فلأنه نفي محض لا يصلح للعلة و أما الوجود فلأنه مفتقر إلى الإيجاد المسبوق بالاحتياج إلى الموجد المتوقف على علة الحاجة إليه فلو جعلنا العلة هي الوجود لزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه بمراتب و أما الحدوث فلافتقاره إلى الوجود لأنه كيفية و صفة له و قد علمت افتقار الوجود إلى علة الافتقار بمراتب فلو كان الحدوث علة الحاجة يتقدم على نفسه بمراتب فعلة الافتقار زائدة على ما ذكرت هذا ما يناسب طريقة القوم

فصل (١٣) في أن البسيط الذي لا تركيب فيه أصلا لا يكون علة لشيئين بينهما معية بالطبع

البسيط إذا كان ذاته بحسب الحقيقة البسيطة علة لشيء كانت ذاته محض علة ذلك الشيء بحيث لا يمكن للعقل تحليلها إلى ذات و علة لتكون عليتها لا بنفسها من حيث هي بل بصفة زائدة أو شرط أو غاية أو وقت أو غير ذلك فلا يكون مبدءا بسيطا بل مركبا فالمراد من المبدأ البسيط أن حقيقته التي بها يتجهر ذاته هي بعينها كونه مبدءا لغيره و ليس ينقسم إلى شيئين يكون أحدهما تجوهر ذاته و بالآخر حصول شيء آخر عنه كما أن لنا شيئين نتجوهر بأحدهما و هو النطق و نكتب بالآخر و هو صفة الكتابة فإذا كان كذلك و صدر عنه أكثر من واحد و لا شك أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٠٥

معنى مصدر كذا غير معنى مصدر غير كذا فتقوم ذاته من معنيين مختلفين - و هو خلاف المفروض فافهم هذا و دع عنك الإطنابات التي ليس فيها كثير فائدة - وإياك أن تفهم من لفظ الصدور و أمثاله الأمر الإضافي الذي لا يتحقق إلا بعد شيئين - لظهور أن الكلام ليس فيها بل كون العلة بحيث يصدر عنها المعلول فإنه لا بد أن تكون للعلة خصوصية بحسبها يصدر عنها المعلول المعين دون غيره و تلك الخصوصية هي المصدر في الحقيقة و هي التي يعبر عنها تارة بالصدور و مرة بالمصدرية - و طورا بكون العلة بحيث يجب عنها المعلول و ذلك لضيق الكلام عما هو المرام - حتى إن الخصوصية أيضا لا يراد بها المفهوم الإضافي بل أمر مخصوص له ارتباط و تعلق بالمعلول المخصوص و لا شك في كونه موجودا و متقدما على المعلول المتقدم على الإضافة العارضة لهما و ذلك قد يكون نفس العلة إذا كانت العلة علة لذاتها و قد يكون زائدا عليها فإذا فرض العلة بما هي به علة بسيطا حقيقيا و يكون معلولة أيضا بسيطا حقيقيا و بعكس النقيض كل ما كان معلوله فوق واحد ليس بعضها بتوسط بعض فهو منقسم الحقيقة إما في ماهيته أو في وجوده

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شك و إزالة:

و من أسخف ما عورض به البرهان المذكور قول بعض المعروفين بالفضل و الذكاء إن المركز نقطة و هي نهاية جميع الخطوط الخارجة عنها إلى المحيط و لم يلزم من تغاير مفهوم كون تلك النقطة نهاية لتلك الخطوط الكثيرة أن تكون النقطة مركبة من أمور غير متناهية و يليه في السخافة و الوهن قوله الوحدة المعينة إذا أخذت مع وحدة أخرى حصلت الأثنو لتلك الجملة إذا أخذت مع وحدة أخرى حصلت الأثنو للجملة الأخرى فيلزم من تغاير المجموعين أن تصير الوحدة المأخوذة فيهما جميعا اثنين و كان هذا القائل - لم يتيسر له فهم كون البسيط الحقيقي مبدءا و لا أمكن له تصور معناه فضلا عن إثباته أو نفسه.

و كتب الشيخ الرئيس إلى بهمنيار لما طلب عنه البرهان على هذا المطلب - لو كان الواحد الحقيقي مصدرا لأمرين كـ أ و ب مثلا كان مصدرا لـ أ و ما ليس الآن ب ليس فيلزم اجتماع النقيضين قال الإمام الرازي نقيض صدور الـ أ صدور الـ ب لا أعني صدور ب كما أن الجسم إذا قبل الحركة و السواد و السواد ليس بحركة فيكون الجسم قد قبل الحركة و ما ليس بحركة و لا يلزم التناقض من ذلك فكذلك فيما قالوه و الشيخ قد نص على هذا في قاطيغورياس الشفاء بقوله و ليس قولنا إن في الخمر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٠٧

رائحة و ليس فيه رائحة هو قولنا فيه رائحة و فيه ما ليس رائحة فإن في الأول القولان لا يجتمعان و في الثاني يجتمعان. قال و مثل هذا الكلام في السقوط اظهر من أن يخفى على ضعفاء العقول - فلا أدري كيف اشتبه على الذين يدعون الكياسة و العجب ممن يفني عمره في تعليم المنطق و تعلمه ليكون له آلة عاصمة لذهنه عن الغلط ثم لما جاء إلى المطلوب الأشرف - أعرض عن استعمال تلك الآلة حتى وقع في الغلط الذي يضحك منه الصبيان.

أقول إن ما ذكره أيضا يدل دلالة واضحة على أن هذا الجليل القدر ما تصور معنى الواحد الحقيقي و كونه مبدءا لشيء و إن مثله كما قال الشيخ فيمن ادعى أنه يتكلم بالمنطق مع قدوة الحكماء أرسطاطاليس و هو واضعه إن هذا الرجل يتمنطق على المشاءين فهو أيضا يتمنطق على مثل الشيخ الرئيس فاضل الفلاسفة أليس ذلك منه غيا و ضلالا و حمقا و سفاهة فإننا قد قررنا أن المصدرية بالمعنى المذكور نفس ماهية العلة البسيطة و الماهية من حيث هي ليست إلا هي فإذا كان البسيط الحقيقي مصدرا لا مثالا و لما ليس ا مثالا كانت مصدريته لما ليس ا غير مصدريته لا التي هي نفس ذاته فتكون ذاته غير ذاته و هذا هو التناقض.

و أما ما ذكره العلامة الدواني في تتميم كلام الشيخ أن صدور لا ليس صدور ا فهو لا صدور ا فما اتصف بصدور لا فقد اتصف بلا صدور ا - فإذا كان له حيثيتان جاز أن يكون متصفا من حيثية بصدور ا و من حيثية أخرى بلا صدوره من غير تناقض أما إذا لم يكن له إلا حيثية واحدة لم يصح أن يتصف بهما للزوم التناقض و تفصيله أن اتصاف الشيء بأمر هو لا اتصافه بآخر فهو من حيث الاتصاف بذلك الشيء لا يتصف بغيره فلا يجوز اجتماعهما من حيثية واحدة. و فيه بحث أما أولا فلأن اجتماع النقيضين في ذات واحدة مستحيل سواء كان من جهتين أو من جهة واحدة و شروط التناقض و وحداته مشهورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٠٨

و لم يشترط أحد في التناقض كون الموضوع واحدا حقيقيا. و أما ثانيا فلأننا نسلم أن اتصاف الشيء بأمر هو بعينه لا تصافه بآخر - غاية الأمر أن لا يصدق عليه اتصافه بآخر و لا يلزم منه أن يصدق عليه لا اتصافه بآخر.

و أما ثالثا فلانتقاضه باجتماع كل مفهومين متخالفين كالوجود و الشيئية في موضوع واحد من جهة واحدة لجريان خلاصة الدليل فيه فيلزم كون الاتصاف بهما تناقضا و لم يقل به أحد. و أما رابعا فلأن نقائص المعاني المصدرية و الروابط من المفهومات التي

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من شأنها الحمل على الذات اشتقاقا لا مواطاة إنما يعتبر بحسب هذا الحمل فنقيض صدور الشيء من العلة رفع صدوره عنها لا لا صدوره كما أن نقيض وجود الشيء أي كونه موجودا عدمه لا لا وجوده و إن كان كل من اللا صدور و اللاوجود نقيضا - لنفس الصدور أو الوجود بحمل على لكن لا خير في اتصاف الموضوع بهما على هذا الوجه لأنهما

ليسا بنقيضين بحسب الحمل المذكور و لا يشتهه عليك أن هذا البحث غير وارد على ما حررنا به الحجة و حققنا الصدور من أنه ليس المراد منه المعنى المصدري الإضافي بل هو عبارة عن نفس الذات في العلة البسيطة كما لا يخفى على البصير المحقق و الزكي المدقق و سنعيد إلى هذا المقام في الربوبيات بزيادة تحقيق و تنقيح

فصل (١٤) في أن المعلول الواحد هل يستند إلى علل كثيرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٠

أما الواحد الشخصي

فمن المستحيل استناده إلى علتين مستقلتين مجتمعتين أو متبادلتين تبادلاً ابتدائياً أو تعاقبياً وجه الاستحالة في الكل أنهما إما أن يكون لخصوصية كل منهما أو أحدهما مدخل في وجود المعلول فيمتنع وجوده بالأخرى بالضرورة بل وجب وجوده بمجموعهما وإما أن لا يكون لشيء من الخصوصيتين مدخل في ذلك فكانت العلة بالحقيقة هي القدر المشترك و الخصوصيات ملغاة فيكون العلة على التقديرين أمراً واحداً و لو بالعموم.

و ما قيل من أن العلة يجب أن يكون أقوى تحصلاً و أشد وحدة من المعلول - فالمراد منها العلة الفاعلية دون الضمائم و الشرائط و المعدات فإن الشيخ الرئيس بعد ما حقق في بحث التلازم بين الهيولى و الصورة في الهيات الشفاء أن الصورة من حيث هي صورة ما شريكة لعله الهيولى لا من حيث إنها صورة معينة قال لقائل أن يقول مجموع تلك العلة و الصورة ليس واحداً بالعدد بل واحد بالمعنى العام و الواحد بالمعنى العام لا يكون علة لواحد بالعدد و لمثل طبيعة المادة فإنها واحدة بالعدد.

فنقول إنا لا نمنع أن يكون الواحد بالمعنى العام المستحفظ وحدة عموميه بواحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١١

بالعدد علة للواحد بالعدد و هناك كذلك فإن الواحد بالنوع مستحفظ بواحد بالعدد و هو المفارق فيكون ذلك الشيء موجباً للمادة و لا يتم إيجابها إلا بأحد أمور مقارنة أيها كانت انتهى.

و بوجه آخر إذا كان كل منهما أو واحد منهما مستقلة بالتأثير كان المعلول معها واجب الوجود و الواجب يستحيل تعلقه بالغير فهو مع كل واحدة منهما يمتنع افتقاره إلى الأخرى فيمتنع افتقاره إليهما مع أنه واجب الافتقار إليهما هذا خلف

و أما الواحد النوعي

فالصحيح جواز استناده إلى المتعدد كالحرارة الواقعة إحدى جزئياتها بالحركة و أخرى بالشعاع و أخرى بالغضب و أخرى بملاقاة النار - و الدليل المذكور غير جار فيه و قد يكون لأشياء كثيرة لازم واحد و اللازم معلول للملزوم كيف و طبائع الأجناس لوازم خارجية للفصول و الجنس إنما يتقوم في الوجود - بالفصل المقسم كما علمت و كذا الإمكان بين الممكنات المختلفة الماهيات - و الزوجية بين الأربعة و الستة و هما نوعان من العدد و كذا غيرهما من مراتب الأزواج كيف و الاختلاف حكم واحد مشترك عرضي بين المختلفات و كل عرضي معلل بمعروضاته و ما ظن أن العلل المختلفة لا بد لها من اشتراك في وصف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٢

عام يكون جهة استناد ذلك المعلول إليها فهو غير مستقيم فإننا ننقل الكلام إلى تلك الجهة المشتركة فإن لزومها إن لم يكن لجهة أخرى مشتركة فذلك هو المطلوب وإلا لزم التسلسل في الجهات الاشتراكية.

فإن قلت المعلول إما أن يفتقر لماهية إلى علة معينة فاستحال استناده إلى غير تلك العلة وإن لم يفتقر إليها لماهيته كان غنيا عنها لذاته و الغني عن شيء لذاته لا يكون معلولا له.

قلت المعلول من حيث إمكانه لذاته يفتقر إلى علة ما لا إلى علة معينة لكن استناده إلى العلة المعنية لأمر يعود إلى العلة لأن ذات العلة لما هي هي مقتضية لذلك المعلول افتقار المطلق من حيز المعلول و تعيين العلة من جانبها

فصل (١٥) في أحكام العلة الفاعلة

قد علمت أن كل علة مقتضية فهي مع معلولها

لكن كثيرا ما يقع الاشتباه من إهمال الحثيات أو عدم الفرق بين ما بالذات و ما بالعرض فما قيل إن الفاعل قد يتقدم على المعلول فليس المراد منه الفاعل بما هو فاعل بل ذاته باعتبار آخر غير الجهة التي بها يكون الفاعل فاعلا

و الفاعل أيضا قد يكون بالذات مثل الطبيب للعلاج و قد يكون بالعرض

إما لأنه مصحوب بما هو فاعل حقيقة كما يقال الكاتب يعالج فإن المعالج بالذات هو من حيث إنه طبيب وإما لأن معلوله بالذات أمر آخر يلزمه شيء نسب إلى ذلك الفاعل بالعرض كال تبريد المنسوب إلى السقمونيا لأنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٣

يبرد بالعرض و فعله بالذات استفراغ الصفراء و يتبعه نقصان الحرارة و من هذا القبيل كون الطبيب فاعلا للصحة و كون مزيل الدعامة علة لسقوط الحائط فإن معطي الصحة مبدأ أجل من الطبيب و مبدأ الانحدار الثقل الطبيعي للسقف و كذا الحكم في إحالة النار ما يجاورها تسخينها و طرح البذر في الأرض و الفكر في المقدمات و سائر ما يشبه هذه الأشياء فإن هذه ليست عللا بالحقيقة و الغلط الذي وقع لهم في عدم وجوب كون العلة مع المعلول حيث وجدوا الابن يبقى بعد الأب و البناء بعد البناء و السخونة بعد النار إنما نشأ من أخذ ما بالعرض مكان ما بالذات فإن البناء حركته علة لحركة لبن ما ثم سكونه علة لسكون ذلك اللبن و انتهاء تلك الحركة علة لسكون ذلك اللبن و انتهاء تلك الحركة علة لاجتماع مادة و ذلك الاجتماع علة لشكل ما ثم انحفاظ ذلك الشكل فمما يوجبه طبيعة اللبن من الثبات - على نحو من الاجتماع و كذا الأب علة لحركة المعنى إلى الرحم و أما تصويره حيوانا و بقاؤه حيوانا فعلته واهب الصور و كذا النار ليست علة للسخونة بل لأن تبطل البرودة المانعة لحصول السخونة و أما حصول السخونة في الماء و استحالتة إلى النار فبالفاعل الذي يكسو العناصر صورها و سنبرهن أن علة كل جسم أمر عقلي بالضرورة و كيف يكون نار علة لوجود نار و لا نار جسمانية أحق بأن تكون مقدمة بالعلة من نار أخرى كذلك و بالجملة فكل نوع إمكاني متفق الأفراد في المعنى النوعي الغير المتفاوت فيها لم يكن لها بد من وجود علة خارجة عن النوع فقد ثبت أن العلل السابقة ليست عللا بالذات فهي معدات و معينات و بالجملة علل بالعرض فالفاعل بالحقيقة مبدأ الوجود و مفيدة كما في عرف الإلهيين و أما ما يطلق عليه الفاعل في الطبيعيات مما لا يفيد وجودا غير التحريك فقد دريت أن مثل هذه العلة تكون معدة و ليست علة بالذات فالجسم لا شتماله على الهيولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٤

التي هي محض القوة و الفاقة لا يكون علة لوجود و كذا الصورة إذ لا وجود لها من دون الهيولى و الإيجاد يتوقف على الوجود فلو كان الجسم أو صورته علة لوجود لكان العدم مفيدا للوجود فلا استقلال لهذه الأشياء في الإيجاد بل الحق أن نسبة الإيجاد إليها لو صحت فهي تكون لإمداد علوي و إنما هي روابط و مصححات للوجود و إذ قد علمت أن وجود المعلول لا يساوي وجود العلة إذ وجودها بنفسها و وجود المعلول من وجودها فيكون للعلة اختصاص وجوب في ذاته و من حيث لم يضاف إلى المعلول - و المعلول ليس يجب إلا إذا كان مضافا إلى العلة فالعلة بهذا أحق من المعلول فتبين من ذلك أن العرض لضعف وجوده لا يكون علة لوجود الجوهر لتأخره في الوجود عن الجوهر و أن الموجودات المركبة لا تكون علة للبسائط لتقدم البسيط على المركب فلا يكون جسم علة لعقل أو نفس و لا محسوس علة لمعقول و لا المتعلق علة للمفارق إذ العلة يجب أن يكون حظها من الوجود أوكد من المعلول.

وهم و تنبيه:

ما أشد في البطلان و أغرز في الهلاك و الفساد من جملة الآراء الخبيثة و العقائد الردية المهلكة لنفوس معتقديها اعتقاد من يتوهم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٥

أن العالم مستقل بذاته مستغن في وجوده عن فيض باريه عليه بالحفظ و الإدامة و الإمساك و الإبقاء فإن هذا الاعتقاد مع بطلانه و فساده كما علمت يضر صاحبه في المعاد و يسيء ظنه بباريه دائما و يوجب أن يكون معرضا عن ربه ناسيا ذكره غافلا عن دعائه مشغولا بما سواه من أغراض دنياه و يمكن له فيها و ملكه بها و أخلده إلى الأرض فهو لا يذكر ربه إلا ناسيا و لا يسأله إلا بطرا و رياء أو مضطرا عند الشدائد و المصائب و الضراء على كره منه و حيرة و ضلال كما نشاهد من أكثر الناس الذين قد وافقوا بطبائعهم هذا الرأي و إن لم يصرحوا به فهم عن ربهم لمحجوبون طول عمرهم و ببارئهم جاهلون لا يعرفونه حق معرفته فهم في عمى و ضلال في هذه الدنيا و في الآخرة أعمى و أضل سبيلا و أما من اعتقد ما يازاء هذا الاعتقاد للموحددين القائلين بأن العالم محدث مخترع مطوي في قبضة بارئه - يحتاج إليه في بقائه و يفتقر إليه في دوامه لا يستغني عنه طرفة عين و امتداد الفيض عليه لحظة ف لحظة أنا فانا بل فيضه أمر واحد متصل لو منع العالم ذلك الفيض و الحفظ و الإمساك طرفة عين لتهافت السماوات و بادت الأفلاك و تساقطت الكواكب و عدمت الأركان و هلك الخلاق و دثر العالم دفعة واحدة بلا زمان كما ذكره في قوله - **إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُمْسِكُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ أَنْ تَزُولَا وَلَئِنْ زَالَتَا إِنْ أَمْسَكَهُمَا مِنْ أَحَدٍ مِنْ بَعْدِهِ** و قوله تعالى **وَالْأَرْضُ جَمِيعًا قَبْضَتُهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ وَالسَّمَاوَاتُ مَطْوِيَّاتٌ بِيَمِينِهِ** فهذا من إحدى الآراء الجيدة و الاعتقادات الصحيحة المنجية للنفوس من عذاب الأبدان المحيية لها من موت الرغبة إلى الرأي يكون دائما متعلق القلب بربه معتصما بحبله متوكلا عليه في جميع أحواله مسندا ظهره إليه في جميع متصرفاته داعيا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٦

له في كل أوقاته سائلا إياه حوائجه مفوضا إليه سائر أموره فيكون له قربة إلى ربه و حياة لنفسه و هدوة لقلبه و نجاة من المهالك.

تمثيل تنبيهي:

فإذن ما أسهل لك أن تتيقن أن وجود العالم عن الباري جل ثناؤه و عظم كبريائه ليس كوجود الدار عن البناء و كوجود الكتابة عن الكاتب الثابت العين المستقل بذاته المستغني عن الكاتب بعد فراغه - لكن كوجود الكلام عن المتكلم إن سكت بطل وجود الكلام بل كوجود ضوء الشمس في الجو المظلم الذات ما دامت الشمس طالعة فإن غابت الشمس بطل وجدان الضوء من الجو لكن شمس الوجود يمتنع عليه العدم لذاته و كما أن الكلام ليس جزء المتكلم بل فعله و عمله أظهر بعد ما لم يكن فعل و كذا النور الذي يرى في الجو ليس هو بجزء للشمس بل هو انبجاس و فيض منها فهكذا المثال و الحكم - في وجود العالم عن الباري جل ثناؤه ليس بجزء من ذاته بل فضل و فيض يفضل به و يفيض و لا ينبغي أن يتوهم متوهم أن وجود العالم عن الباري تعالى يكون طبعا بلا اختيار منه كوجود الضوء من الشمس في الجو طبعا بلا اختيار منها و لم يقدر أن يمنع نورها و فيضها لأنها مطبوعة على ذلك لأن الباري تعالى كما يستوضح في مقامه - مختار في فعاله بنحو من الاختيار أجل و أرفع مما يتصوره العوام مثل المتكلم القادر على الكلام إن شاء تكلم و إن شاء سكت فهذا حكم إيجاد العالم و اختراعه من الباري إن شاء أفاض جوده و فضله و إظهار حكمته و إن شاء أمسك عن الفضل و الجود - كما ذكر في آية إمساك السماوات و الأرض

ذكر و تلويح:

قد اشتهر من الفلاسفة الأقدمين أن المؤثر في الوجود مطلقا هو الواجب تعالى و الفيض كله من عنده و هذه الوسائط كالأعداد و الشروط التي لا بد منها في أن يصدر الكثرة عنه تعالى فلا دخل لها في الإيجاد بل في الإعداد.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٧

و ربما احتج عليه بعضهم بما حاصله أن الذي هو بالقوة سواء كان عقلا أو جسما لا يفيد وجودا أصلا و إلا لكان للعدم الذي هو القوة اشتراط في إخراج الشيء من القوة إلى الفعل فيكون العدم جزء علة الوجود و هو محال قال فلا يصح إفادة الوجود إلا لمن هو بريء من القوة من جميع الوجوه و هو الواجب وجوده لا غير.

و هذه الحجة و إن استحسناها الجمهور لكن يرد عليه أن الإمكان المعبر عنه بالقوة و إن كان أمرا ثابتا للممكن الوجود باعتبار ذاته من حيث هو لكنه غير ثابت له في نفس الأمر بل الثابت له فيها إنما هو الفعلية و الوجوب بتحصيل الفاعل إياه و ذلك الاعتبار أيضا و إن كان في مرتبة من مراتب الواقع لكن لا يوجب اتصاف الموجود به في الواقع لأن الواقع أوسع من تلك المرتبة و السر فيه أن الإمكان أمر عديمي هو سلب ضرورة الطرفين عن نفس الذات الموصوفة بضرورة أحدهما في الواقع و اتصاف الشيء بأمر عديمي في نحو من أنحاء الواقع لا يوجب اتصافه بذلك الأمر في الواقع هذا بخلاف الأمر الوجودي فإن الاتصاف به في مرتبة يوجب الاتصاف به في الواقع فإن زيدا مثلا إذا كان متحركا في مكان من الأمكنة كالسوق مثلا يصدق عليه أنه ساكن باعتبار عدم حركته في البيت بل إذا لم يكن متحركا أصلا نظير هذا ما قالوه من أن تحقق الطبيعة بتحقيق فرد ما و عدمها بعدم جميع الأفراد فحينئذ لم يظهر مما ذكره امتناع كون بعض الممكنات كالعقل مفيدا للوجود و لا يلزم منه شركة العدم و القوة و إفادة الوجود و التحصيل أيضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٨

هب أن الإمكان للممكن صفة ثابتة له في الواقع لكن لا يلزم من ذلك أنه إذا كان فاعلا لشيء يكون فاعلا له بحيثية كونه ممكنا بل الفاعلية له بحيثية وجوده كما أن اللونية للحيوان مثلا لا مدخل لها في تحريكه وإحساسه ولو سلم أن فاعليته لا تحصل إلا بإمكانه لكن لا يلزم كونه جزءا لمفيد الوجود بل ربما يكون شرطا وخارجا كما أن مدخلية الهيولى في تأثير الصورة عند من يجوز أن يكون لها تأثير إنما هي لتعيين وضع الصورة وتخصيص أثرها بها لا لأن تكون المادة هي الفاعلة القريبة كيف ولو لم يكن عندهم مدخلية للإمكان ولو شرطا لانتقضت قاعدتهم في صدور الأفلاك عن العقول بواسطة جهة الإمكان والإمكان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢١٩

عدمي فأين التخلص من وساطة الإمكان ثم الإمكان وإن كان صفة ثابتة للممكن لكن ليس ذات الممكن و حقيقته محض حيثية الإمكان حتى لا يكون لها حيثية أخرى سوى كونه ممكنا و خصوصا عند المشاءين القائلين بأن الوجودات العارضة لها حقائق متخالفة الذوات المشتركة في مفهوم شامل عرضي فكيف يلزم من نفي وساطة الإمكان نفي وساطة الوجود فلا يمكن التمسك في إثبات هذا المطلب الشريف بتلك الحجة الضعيفة.

و أما ذكره صاحب الإشراق في الهياكل بقوله والجواهر العقلية وإن كانت فعالة إلا أنها وسائط جود الأول وهو الفاعل و كما أن النور القوي لا يمكن - النور الضعيف من الاستقلال بالإنارة فالقوة القاهرة الواجبة لا تمكن الوسائط لوفور فيضه و كمال قوته و في حكمة الإشراق بقوله و كماله يتصور استقلال النور الناقص - بتأثير في مشهد نور يقهره دون غلبة التام عليه في نفس ذلك التأثير فنور الأنوار هو الغالب مع كل واسطة و المحصل فعلها و القائم على كل فيض فهو الخلاق المطلق مع الوساطة و دون الوساطة ليس شأنه فهو وإن كان في القوة و المتانة أقوى من الحجة السابقة عند العالم بقواعد حكماء الفرس و الأقدمين - بل يمكن تميمه بقواعد إشراقية لكن بحسب ظاهر الأمر إقناعي لا يجوز الاكتفاء به في أسلوب المباحثة و المناظرة و لنا بفضل الله وإلهامه برهان حكمي على هذا المقصد العالي ستطلع عليه إن شاء الله تعالى.

تعقيب وإشارة:

الفاعل الناقص يحتاج إلى حركة وآلات حتى يصدر ما في نفسه محصلا في المادة و الفاعل الكامل هو الذي يتبع الصورة - الموجودة في ذاته وجود الصورة في مادتها ثم إذا ثبت في الوجود فاعل أول و مبدأ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢٠

أعلى بحيث لا يكون أقدم من وجوده وجود و لا يمكن أن يكون له مادة و لا موضوع صورة و لا فاعل و لا غاية لأن هذه الأشياء تسقط أوليته و تقدمه و علم من هذا أن وجود ما يوجد عنه إنما هو على محض فيض وجوده لوجود ما سواه مع علمه و رضاه - و لا يفيد وجود ما يوجد عنه كمالا أو كرامة أو لذة أو بهجة أو نفعاً أو تخلصاً من مذمة و غير ذلك من المنافع لكونه غنيا عما عداه فلذلك وجوده الذي به تجوهر ذاته هو بعينه وجوده الذي به يحصل منه غيره بل

هما هناك ذات واحدة وحيثية واحدة لا أنه ينقسم إلى شيئين يكون بأحدهما تجوهر ذاته و بالآخر حصول شيء آخر عنه كما أن لنا شيئين نتجوهر و نندوت بأحدهما و هو النطق و نكتب بالآخر و هو صناعة الكتابة و بالجملة لا يحتاج الفاعل الأول في أن يفيض عنه شيء إلى شيء غير ذاته صفة كان أو حركة أو آلة كما يحتاج النار في إحراقه في إحراقه شيء إلى صفة هي الحرارة و الشمس في إضاءتها أطراف الأرض إلى الحركة و البخار في تحت الباب إلى الفاس و لا يمكن أن يكون له في فعله عائق أو شرط منتظر

إفادة تفصيلية: أصناف الفاعل ستة

الأول ما بالطبيعة

و هو الذي يصدر عنه فعل بلا علم منه و لا اختيار و يكون فعله ملائما لطبيعته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢١

و الثاني ما بالقسر

و هو الذي يصدر عنه فعل بلا علم منه به و لا اختيار و يكون فعله على خلاف مقتضى طبيعته.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢٢

و الثالث ما بالجبر

و هو الذي يصدر عنه فعله بلا اختيار بعد أن يكون من شأنه اختيار ذلك الفعل و عدمه و هذه الأقسام الثلاثة مشتركة في كونها غير مختارة في فعلها و في أن فاعليتها على سبيل التسخير و الاستخدام من الغير إياها سواء كان تسخير المسخر القاهر و استخدام المستخدم العالي إياها في الفاعلية أيضا على هذه الطريقة أو على طريقة الإرادة و الاختيار و استخدام النفس الناطقة لبعض القوى الفعالة البدنية في أفاعيلها من قبيل الثاني كالحركات الأينية و غيرها الصادرة عن القوى العضلية بتوسط الجوارح و الأعضاء و هذه القوى في العالم الصغير الإنساني - بمنزلة الأشخاص الحيوانية في العالم الكبير و استخدامها لبعضها من قبيل الأول - كالحركات الصادرة عن القوى الغذائية و المنمية و كحركات النبض الانقباض و الانبساط و الغضب و الشهوة التي موضوعاتها الأجسام اللطيفة من الأخلاط و الأرواح و مبادئها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢٣

القوى المستعلية النفسانية و هذه المبادي في العالم الصغير كالحركات السماوية المسخرة لعالم الأمر في العالم الأعلى فكما أنهم لا يعصون الله ما أمرهم و يفعلون ما يؤمرون فكذلك نظيرتهم في طاعة النفس الناطقة و كما أن أشخاص الناس منهم من عصى ما أمر الله عباده على السنة رسله و في كتبه و منهم من أطاعه فكذلك نظيرتها من القوى في طاعة النفس و عصيانها فيما تأمرها به و تنهيها عنه.

و الرابع ما يكون بالقصد

و هو الذي يصدر عنه الفعل مسبقا بإرادته المسبوقه بعلمه المتعلق بغرضه من ذلك الفعل و يكون نسبة أصل قدرته و قوته من دون انضمام الدواعي و الصوارف إلى فعله و تركه في درجة واحدة.

و الخامس هو الذي يتبع فعله علمه بوجه الخير

فيه بحسب نفس الأمر - و يكون علمه بوجه الخير في الفعل كافيا لصدوره عنه من غير قصد زائد على العلم - و داعية خارجة عن ذلك الفاعل و يقال له الفاعل بالعناية في عرف المشاءين.

و السادس هو الذي يكون علمه بذاته الذي هو عين ذاته سببا لوجود أفاعيله

التي هي عين علومه و معلوماته بوجه أي إضافة عالميته بها هي بعينها نفس إفاضته لها من غير تعدد و لا تفاوت لا في الذات و لا في الاعتبار إلا بحسب اللفظ و التعبير

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و هذه الثلاثة الأخيرة مشتركة في كون كل منها فاعلا بالاختيار و إن كان الأول منها مضطرا في اختياره لأن اختياره حادث فيه بعد ما لم يكن و لكل حادث محدث فيكون اختياره عن سبب مقتض و علة موجبة فإما أن يكون ذلك السبب هو أو غيره فإن كان غيره فثبت المدعى و إن كان هو نفسه فإما أن يكون سببها لاختياره باختياره أو لا فعلى الأول يعود الكلام و ينجر إلى القول بالتسلسل في الاختيارات إلى غير النهاية و على الثاني يكون وجود الاختيار فيه لا بالاختيار فيكون مضطرا و محمولا [مجبولا] على ذلك الاختيار من غيره فينتهي إلى الأسباب الخارجة عنه و ينتهي بالآخرة إلى الاختيار الأزلي الذي أوجب الكل على ما هو عليه - بمحض الاختيار من غير داع زائد و لا قصد مستأنف و غرض عارض.

فإذا علمت أقسام الفاعل فاعلم

أنه ذهب جمع من الطباعية و الدهرية خذلهم الله تعالى إلى أن مبدأ الكل فاعل بالطبع و جمهور الكلاميين إلى أنه فاعل بالقصد و الشيخ الرئيس وفاقا لجمهور المشاءين إلى أن فاعليته للأشياء الخارجية بالعناية و للصور العلمية الحاصلة في ذاته على رأيهم بالرضا و صاحب الإشراف تبعا لحكماء الفرس و الرواقيين إلى أنه فاعل للكل بالمعنى الأخير و سنحقق لك في مستأنف الكلام من الأصول الآتية إن شاء الله تعالى إن فاعل الكل لا يجوز اتصافه بالفاعلية بأحد من الوجوه الثلاثة الأول و إن ذاته أرفع من أن يكون فاعلا بالمعنى الرابع لاستلزامه مع قطع النظر عن الاضطراب التكثر بل التجسم تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا فهو إما فاعل بالعناية أو بالرضا - و على أي الوجهين فهو فاعل بالاختيار بمعنى إن شاء فعل و إن لم يشأ لم يفعل لا بالإيجاب كما توهمه الجماهير من الناس فإن صحة الشرطية غير متعلقة بصدق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢٥

شيء من مقدمها و تاليها بل وجوبه أو كذبه بل امتناعه إلا أن الحق هو الأول منهما - فإن فاعل الكل كما سيجيء يعلم الكل قبل وجودها بعلم هو عين ذاته فيكون علمه بالأشياء الذي هو عين ذاته منشأ لوجودها فيكون فاعلا بالعناية.

تمثيل:

أنصاف الفاعلية المذكورة و انحواها الستة المسفورة متحققة في النفس الآدمية بالقياس إلى أفاعيلها المختلفة فإن فاعليتها بالقياس إلى تصوراتها و توهماتا بالرضا و كذا بالقياس إلى قواها الجزئية المنبعثة - عن ذاتها المستعملة إياها المستخدمة لها كوهما و خيالها فإن النفس تستخدم المتفكرة في تفصيل الصور الجزئية و تركيبها حتى ينتزع الطبائع

من الشخصيات - و يستنبط النتائج من المقدمات و ليس لتلك القوى إدراك ذواتها لكونها جسمية و التجسم من موانع الإدراك كما سيأتي على أن الوهم الذي هو رئيس سائر القوى ينكر نفسها فكيف حال سائر المدارك الجزئية و الاستخدام لا يتم إلا بإدراك جزئي لما يستخدم و ما يستخدم فيه فالنفس تدرك تلك الآلات المنبعثة عنها بنفس ذاتها - المدركة و ذواتها المدركة لا بإدراك تلك القوى لذواتها كما علمت و لا بإدراك آلة أخرى إذ لا آلة للآلة و فاعليتها بالقياس إلى ما يحصل منها بمجرد التصور و التوهم بالعناية - كالسقوط من الجدار المرتفع الحاصل منها من تخيل السقوط و القبض الحاصل من جرم اللسان المعصر للرطوبة من تصورهما للشئ الحامض و فاعليتها بالقياس إلى ما يحصل منها بسبب البواعث الخارجة عنها الداعية لها إلى تحصيل أغراضها و استكمالها لها بها بالقصد كالكتابة و المشي و غيرهما و فاعلية النفس الصالحة الخيرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢٦

لفعل القبائح كفعل الزنا و شهادة الزور و الكذب على الله بالجبر و فاعليتها لحفظ المزاج و إفادة الحرارة الغريزية في البدن و الصحة و سائر ما أشبهها بالطبع و فاعليتها للحرارة الحمائية و المرض و السمن المفرط و الهزال بالقسر

فصل (١٦) في أن المعلول من لوازم ذات الفاعل التام بحيث لا يتصور بينهما الانفكاك

بيانه أن الفاعل إما أن يكون لذاته مؤثرا في المعلول أو لا يكون فإن لم يكن تأثيره في المعلول لذاته بل لا بد من اعتبار قيد آخر مثل وجود شرط أو صفة أو إرادة أو آلة أو مصلحة أو غيرها لم يكن ما فرض فاعلا فاعلا بل الفاعل إنما هو ذلك المجموع ثم الكلام في ذلك المجموع كالكلام في المفروض أولا فاعلا إلى أن ينتهي إلى أمر يكون هو لذاته و جوهره فاعلا - ففاعلية كل فاعل تام الفاعلية بذاته و سنخه و حقيقته لا بأمر عارض له فإذا ثبت أن كل فاعل تام فهو بنفس ذاته فاعل و بهويته مصداق للحكم عليه بالافتضاء و التأثير فثبت أن معلوله من لوازمه الذاتية المنتزعة عنه المنتسبة إليه بسنخه و ذاته - و لقائل أن يقول فيجب على ما ذكرت أن يحصل من العلم بالعلة الفاعلية العلم بالمعلول و يلزم على هذا أنا إذا عرفنا حقيقة شيء من الأشياء أن نعرف لازمه القريب و من لازمه القريب لازمه الثاني و من الثاني الثالث حتى نعرف جميع لوازمه في آن واحد و ما من شيء إلا و له لازم و للازم لازمه لازم و للازم أيضا لازم إلى غير النهاية فيلزم للنفس إدراك الأمور الغير المتناهية دفعة واحدة و ذلك بين الفساد.

و حله من وجوه الأول أنا و إن سلمنا أن العلم بحقيقة شيء يستلزم العلم بلوازمه الذاتية كما هو مقتضى القاعدة المذكورة لكن لا نسلم أن لكل شيء لازما حتى يلزم من إدراك شيء واحد إدراك أمور غير متناهية و نحن لا نعرف من الحقائق إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢٧

صفاتها و لوازمها الأخيرة و آثارها القاصية [الفائضة] دون أنفسها و مبادئها و أسبابها القصوى.

لا يقال إن تلك الصفات كما هي لازمة لتلك الماهيات فتلك الماهيات أيضا لازمة لتلك الصفات فإذا ساعدت على معرفة الصفات لزمكم أن يكون العلم بها مقتضيا للعلم بتلك الماهيات ثم يكون العلم بتلك الماهيات علة للعلم بسائر الصفات.

لأننا نقول من الجائز أن يكون الصفات لازمة للموصوفات بلا عكس كلي - فإن الزوايا الثلاث من المثلث يلزمها أن تكون مساوية لقائمتين و تساوي القائمتين لا يلزمه الزوايا الثلاث من المثلث كالزاويتين اللتين عن جنبي خط مستقيم قام على مثله فإنهما متساويتان لقائمتين مع عدم المثلث و زواياه.

لا يقال إن من المستبين عند الحكماء أن علمنا بنفسنا هو نفس نفسنا فإذا علمنا بحقيقة نفسنا حاضر أبدا فيجب أن نعرف جميع صفات أنفسنا و لوازمها و آثارها - من قواها و شعبها و من جملة لوازمها استغناؤها عن البدن و امتناع قدمها و فسادها - فيجب أن يكون العلم بهذه الأحوال بينا حاصلا من غير نظر و كسب.

لأننا نقول اللوازم على ضربين لوازم اعتبارية و لوازم غير اعتبارية و معنى الاعتبارية هاهنا ما لا يكون لها ثبوت إلا في الذهن و عند اعتبار العقل إياها و هذا مثل كون النفس قائما بذاته غنيا عن الموضوع و كونها ممكنا و حادثا و باقيا بعد خراب البدن فإن بعض هذه الصفات كالغنى و المجرد عبارة عن سلب شيء عنها - و السلوب لو كانت ثابتة لكان لشيء واحد صفات غير متناهية لأجل سلوب غير متناهية عنه لا مرة واحدة بل مرارا غير متناهية فيقتضي عللا غير متناهية كذلك و بعضها كالإمكان و الحدوث و البقاء مما يتكرر نوعه إذا اعتبر كونه ثابتا في الخارج فينجر إلى التسلسل فإن الحدوث لو كان ثابتا لكان له حدوث و هكذا إلى غير النهاية و كذا الحكم في البقاء فعلمنا أن تلك الصفات مما لا وجود لها في الخارج فلا يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢٨

ذات الشيء علة لتحقيقها حتى يلزم من العلم بها العلم بتلك الصفات مطلقا بل إنما يكون علة لتحقيق هذه الصفات عند اعتبار العقل لها لا مطلقا أيضا بل عند اعتبار جملة من الوسطيات و لا شك أن العلم بماهية النفس و بتلك الوسطيات المعتبرة علة للعلم بوجود هذه اللوازم و أما اللوازم الغير الاعتبارية فهي للنفس مثل قدرتها و شوقها و إدراكها و لذتها و ألمها إلى غير ذلك من الوجدانيات الحاصلة للنفس من دون توقفها على الاعتبار و الفرض فلا جرم من عرف ذاته عرف هذه الصفات - و سائر آثارها و شعبها و توابعها الذاتية و خوارمها و جنودها الفطرية لكن أكثر الناس ممن ليس له حضور تام عند نفسه بل كثرة اشتغاله بالأمر الخارجة عنه - و شدة التفاته بما يدركه الحواس و تورطه في الدنيا يلهيه عن الالتفات بذاته و يذهله عن الإقبال إليها و الرجوع إلى حاق حقيقته فلا يدرك ذاته إلا إدراكا ضعيفا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٢٩

و لا يلتفت إليها إلا التفاتا قليلا و لهذا يغفل عن بعض صفاتها الخاصة بها و آثارها المنشعبة عن ذاتها بل وجود النفس الغير الكاملة الشديدة التعلق إلى البدن و مشتاه وجود في غاية الضعف و القصور فإدراكها لذاتها أيضا حيث يكون عين ذاتها يكون في غاية الخفاء و الفتور فتغفل عنها و يجهل لوازمها و خواصها و آثارها و أما النفوس النورية القوية الكاملة المستعلية القاهرة على قواها و جنودها فلا يعزب عن علمها ذاتها و صفاتها و لا قواها و جنودها بل كما شهدت لذاتها شهدت لتوابع ذاتها في مشهد ذاتها فذاتها على كل شيء منسوب إليها شهيد كما سيأتيك بيانه فكن منتظرا

فصل (١٧) في العلة العنصرية و أقسامها

إن العنصر لشيء هو الذي له قوة وجود ذلك الشيء إما بوحدانيته أو بشركة غيره و الأول إما مع تغير ما في نفسه أو لا

معه فالثاني كما للوح بالقياس إلى الكتابة و الأول لا يخلو إما أن يكون التغير في حاله سواء كان بزيادة حال كما للمشعة إلى الصنم و الصبي إلى الرجل حيث يتغير العنصر فيهما في حال من أحواله - بعروض الحركة له في أين أو كم أو غير ذلك أو بنقصانه مثل ما للابيض إلى الأسود - وإما أن يكون مع تغير في جوهره و ذاته إما بالنقصان كما للخشب إلى السرير فإنه ينقص بالنحت شيء من جوهر أو بالزيادة كما للمني إلى الحيوان حيث يزيد عليه كمالات جوهرية حتى يبلغ إلى درجة الحيوانية و إن كان مع انسلخات صورية و أما الثاني فإما مع استحالة ما مثل الهليلج إلى المعجون أو لا مثل الخشب و الحجارة إلى البيت و من هذا الجنس الآحاد للعدد ثم العنصر إما عنصر للكل كالهيلولى الأولى - وإما عنصر لعدة أمور مثل العصير للخل و الخمر و الدبس و قد قلنا من قبل إن العنصر الأول يجب أن لا يكون فيه جهة صورية بل يكون في ذاته قوة محضة و فاقة صرفة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٠

فليس لأحد أن يقول إن أريد بالكل جميع الصور الفلكية و العنصرية فلا يصدق هذا القسم على واحدة من الهيلوليات الأولية لأن هيلولى العناصر غير قابلة لصورة الفلك و هيلولى كل فلك لا يقبل غير صورة خاصة فلكية و إن أريد به جميع الصور العنصرية فلا يصدق على غير الهيلولى المشتركة للعناصر فلا بد أن يخصص بها - لأننا نقول المراد هو الأول و ذات الهيلولى الأولى لا تأبى عن قبول الصور كلها إلا أن التخصيص ببعضها دون بعض إنما يجيء لها من خارج لا من ذاته إذ لا فعلية لها أصلاً يوجب لها التخصيص بحسب ذاتها ببعض دون بعض بل الحق أن العنصر من حيث إنه عنصر في جميع الأقسام المذكورة ليس إلا ما يكون في حد ذاته - فأقدا لصورة شيء و حقيقته و له بهذا الاعتبار إبهام محض من غير تحصل فجهة كون العنصر عنصراً سواء كان في الدرجة الأولى من غير تخصص أو في الدرجة الثانية بسبب انضمام ما يخصه و اعتباره معه ليس إلا العنصر الأول الذي هو بذاته منبع النقص و القصور كما أن الوجود الحقيقي القيومي بذاته منبع الكمال و الفيض و الجود - فكما أن كلما قرب إلى المبدأ الحق يكون أشد صورية و أتم كمالاً و فعلية و كل ما بعد منه يكون أضعف فعلية و أنقص كمالاً و أوفر نقصاناً و قوة فالهيلولى الأولى التي في الحاشية الأخرى للوجود بعكس ذلك و لذلك يعبر عنها في الرموزات النبوية و الإشارات الناموسية بالهاوية و الظلمة و الخلاء و الفضا و أسفل السافلين إلى غير ذلك مما يشير إلى خستها و عدميتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣١

فصل (١٨) في القاب العلة العنصرية

اعلم أن وضع الأسماء للأشياء قد يكون باعتبار ذواتها و ماهياتها و قد يكون باعتبار عوارضها و إضافاتها الأول كالإنسان و الثاني كالكتاب و ربما لم يوضع لنفس ذات الشيء اسم و ذلك كحقيقة النفس الإنسانية حيث لم يوضع لها بحسب جوهر ذاتها اسم بل اسم النفس إنما وضع لها من حيث إضافتها إلى البدن و تحريكها إياه و تدبيرها له فنفسية النفس ليس كإنسانية الإنسان و زيدية زيد إلا أن يراد من النفس معنى آخر هو الذات مطلقاً فيكون اسماً لمفهوم عام عقلي و لا يكون اسماً للماهية مخصوصة فظهر أن بعض الحقائق مما لم يوضع له اسم لخصوص ذاته بل باعتبار أمر عرضي و من هذا القبيل الجوهر العنصري لم يوجد له اسم لخصوص ذاته بل لحشياتها الزائدة عليها فهو من جهة أنه بالقوة يسمى

هيولى و من جهة أنها حاملة بالفعل يسمى موضوعا بالاشتراك اللفظي بينه و بين الذي هو جزء رسم الجوهر و بين الذي هو في مقابلة المحمول و من حيث إنها مشتركة بين الصور يسمى مادة و طينة و من حيث إنه آخر ما ينتهي إليه التحليل يسمى أسطقسا فإن معنى هذه اللفظة هو الأبسط من أجزاء المركب - و من حيث إنه أول ما يبتدى منه التركيب يسمى عنصرا و من حيث إنه أحد المبادي - الداخلة في الجسم المركب يسمى ركنا و ربما يتركون هذه الاصطلاحات في بعض الأوقات فإنهم يطلقون لفظ الهيولى على ما للفلك من الجزء القابل و إن كان ذلك القابل أبدا يكون بالفعل و كذلك يسمونه مادة مع أن مادة كل واحد من الأفلاك مخصوصة به و يمكن الاعتذار عن الأول بأن تلبس الهيولى الفلكية بصورتها ليس باستدعاء من قبل القابل بل من الأسباب الفعالة فكأنها في ذاتها خالية عن الصورة و عن الثاني بأن تعدد المواد الفلكية نوعا و شخصا ليس بحسب أن لها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٢

تحصلات في ذاتها مع قطع النظر عن الصور لأن المادة البسيطة لا تحصل لها في ذاتها - فلها في مرتبة ذاتها ليس إلا إبهام محض و إلا لكان فيها في نفسها مبادي فصول ذاتية - و هو مستحيل كما سيتضح في مباحث الهيولى فالحق أن تعدد المواد الفلكية إنما هو بأسبابها الصورية المحصلة لذاتها موجودة بالفعل و بضرب من اتحادها بتلك الصور - التي هي مباد لفصول حقيقية ذاتية فيكون لها في ذاتها مع قطع النظر عن تلك الصور المقومة نحوا من الوحدة الجنسية باعتبار و الشخصية باعتبار آخر عند أخذها لا بشرط شيء أو بشرط لا شيء

فصل (١٩) في حال شوق الهيولى إلى الصورة

إن هذا مما أثبتته القدماء من الحكماء على ما حكى عنهم و ما ظهر لنا من آثارهم و نتائج أفكارهم يدل دلالة واضحة على أن مبنى رموزهم و أسرارهم ليس على المجازفة و التخمين و لا على مجرد الظن و التخيل من غير يقين بل أمورهم كانت مبنية على المكاشفات النورية و البراهين اليقينية بعد تصفية بواطنهم بالرياضات المصفية للقلوب و تنقية ضمائرهم عن الكدورات المكدرة للعقول حتى صفت أذهانهم و لطفت أسرارهم و تصيقلت مراتهم و احتذت بها شطر الحق و ظهرت لها جليلة الحال ثم أشاروا إلى نبذ منها حسب ما وجدوه مناسبا للنفوس المستعدين له من المقال - على ما هو شأنهم في كثير من نظائر هذا المقام من الأمثال إلا أن من تأخر عنهم - من لدن تحريف الحكمة و تغيير المنهج في اكتسابها و عدم الدخول في البيوت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٣

من أبوابها و مزجها بفنون من الخطابة و الوعظ و شوقها بأغراض النفس و محبته الرئاسة و طلب الدنيا إلى يومنا هذا قدحوا في ذلك و نسبوه إلى مجرد التجوز و التشبيه من غير تأصيل و تحقيق و ذلك لأحد أمرين إما لعدم وثوق هؤلاء القادحين - بنقل هذا المطلب عن أولئك العظماء و إما للجهل بكمال مرتبتهم حيث لم يبلغ أفهامهم و عقولهم مع صفائها و تجردها عن شوائب الدنيا إلى ما بلغت به عقول أكثر المنهمكين في لذات هذا العالم و الطالبين لشهواته و أما الذي ذكروه في القدح فيه - فهو أن هذا الشوق الذي أثبتته القدماء في الهيولى إما أن يكون نفسانيا أو طبيعيا - و الأول ظاهر البطلان و الثاني أيضا باطل لأن الشوق لا يخلو إما أن يكون إلى صورة معينة أو إلى مطلق الصورة و الأول باطل و

إلا لكانت المادة متحركة بطبائعها إلى تلك الصورة فكان ما عداها حاصلة بالقسر هذا خلف و الثاني أيضا باطل لأن المادة لا تخلو من صورة على ما سيأتي و الشوق إنما يكون إلى غير الحاصل قالوا فثبت أن هذا الكلام بعيد عن التحصيل.

تعقيب و تحصيل:

إن هذا القول مما أورده صاحب المباحث المشرقية أخذا عن كلام الشيخ الرئيس في طبيعيات كتاب الشفاء حيث قال و قد يذكر حال شوق الهیولی إلى الصورة و تشبيهها بالأنثى و تشبيه الصورة بالذكر و هذا شيء لست أفهمه أما الشوق النفساني فلا يختلف في سلبه عن الهیولی و أما الشوق التسخيري الطبيعي الذي يكون انبعائه على سبيل الانسباق كما للحجر إلى الأسفل - ليستكمل بعد نقص له في أینه الطبيعي فهذا أيضا بعيد عنها و لقد كان يجوز أن يكون الهیولی مشتاقا إلى الصور لو كان هناك خلو عن الصور كلها أو ملال صورة قارنته [نتها] أو فقدان القناعة بما يحصل له من الصور المكملة إياها نوعا و كان لها أن يتحرك بنفسها إلى اكتسابها الصورة كما للحجر في اكتساب الأين إن كان فيها قوة محركة و ليست خالية عن الصور كلها و لا يليق بها الملل للصورة الحاصلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٤

فتعمل في نقضها و رفضها فإن حصول هذه الصورة إن كان موجبا للملل للنفس حصولها - و جب أن لا يشتاق إليها و إن كان لمدة طالت فيكون الشوق عارضا لها بعد حين لا أمرا في جوهرها و يكون هناك سبب يوجبها و لا يجوز أيضا أن يكون غير قنعة بما يحصل - بل مشتاقا إلى اجتماع الأضداد فيها فإن هذا محال و المحال ربما ظن أنه ينساق إليه الاشتياق النفساني و أما الاشتياق التسخيري فإنما يكون إلى غاية في الطبيعة المكملة و الغايات الطبيعية غير محالة و مع هذا فكيف يجوز أن يتحرك الهیولی إلى الصورة و إنما يأتيها الصورة الطارية من سبب يبطل صورتها الموجودة لا أنها يكتسبها بحركتها و لو لم يجعلوا هذا الشوق إلى الصورة المقومة التي هي كمالات أولى بل إلى الكمالات الثانية اللاحقة لكان تصور معنى هذا الشوق من المتعذر فكيف و قد جعلوا ذلك شوقا لها إلى الصورة المقومة فمن هذه الأشياء تعسر على فهم هذا الكلام الذي هو أشبه بكلام الصوفية منه بكلام الفلاسفة و عسى أن يكون غيري يفهم هذا الكلام حق الفهم فليرجع إليه فيه و لو كان بدل الهیولی بالإطلاق هیولی ما يستكمل بالصورة الطبيعية حتى يحدث من الصورة التي انبعثت نحو استكمالات تلك الصورة مثل الأرض في التسفل و النار في التصعد لكان لهذا الكلام وجه و إن كان مرجع ذلك الشوق إلى الصورة الفاعلة و أما على الإطلاق فمما لست أفهمه هذا تمام كلام الشيخ في هذا المقام.

و إنني لأجل محافظتي على التأدب بالنسبة إلى مشايخي في العلوم و أساتيذ في معرفة الحقائق الذين هم أشباه آبائي الروحانية و أجدادي العقلانية من العقول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٥

القادسة و النفوس العالية لست أجد رخصة من نفسي في كشف الحقيقة فيما اعترف مثل الشيخ الرئيس عظم الله قدره في النشاطين العقلية و المثالية و رفع شأنه في الدرجتين العلمية و العملية بالعجز عن دركه و العسر في معرفته بل كنت رأيت السكوت عما سكت عنه أولى و أحق و الاعتراف بالعجز عما عجز فيه لصعوبته و تعسره أخرى و أليق و إن كان

ذلك الأمر واضحاً عندني منقحاً لدي حتى اقترح علي بعض إخواني في الدين وأصحابي في ابتغاء اليقين أن أوضح بيان الشوق الذي أثبتته - أفأخم القدماء من الحكماء وأكابر العرفاء من الأولياء في الجوهر الهولاني وأكشف قناع الإجماع عما أشاروا إليه وأستخرج كنوز الرموز فيما ستروه وأفصل ما أجملوه وأظهر ما كتموه من التوفيق الطبيعي في القوة المادية فالزمني إسعافه لشدة اقتراحه - والجاني في إنجاح طلبته لقوة ارتياحه.

فأقول ومن الله التأييد والتسديد إنه قد مضت منافي الفصول المتقدمة

أصول - لا بد لتحقيق هذا المقام من تذكرها تمهيداً وتأصيلاً.

فالأول منها ما بيناه من أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة عينية

ليس مجرد مفهوم ذهني ومعقول ثانوي كما زعمه المتأخرون وأن ليس الاختلاف بين أفرادها ومراتبه بتمام الذات والحقيقة أو بأمور فصلية أو عرضية بل بتقدم وتأخر وكمال ونقص وشدة وضعف وأن صفاته الكمالية من العلم والقدرة والإرادة هي عين ذاته لأن حقيقة الوجود وسنخه بنفس تجوهره مبدأ لسائر الكمالات الوجودية فإذا قوي الوجود في شيء من الموجود قوي معه جميع صفاته الكمالية وإذا ضعف ضعف.

والأصل الثاني أن حقيقة كل ماهية هي وجودها الخاص

الذي يوجد به تلك الماهية على الاستتباع وإن المتحقق في الخارج والفائض عن العلة لكل شيء هو نحو وجوده وأما المسمى بالماهية فهي إنما توجد في الواقع وتصدر عن العلة لذاتها - بل لاتحادها مع ما هو الموجود والمفاض بالذات عن السبب والاتحاد بين الماهية والوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٦

على نحو الاتحاد بين الحكاية والمحكي والمرآة والمرئي فإن ماهية كل شيء هي حكاية عقلية عنه وشبح ذهني لرويته في الخارج وظل له كما مر ذكره سابقاً - على الوجه البرهاني اليقيني مطابقاً للشهود العرفاني الذوقي

والأصل الثالث أن الوجود على الإطلاق مؤثر ومعشوق ومتشوق إليه

وأما الآفات والعاهات التي يترأى في بعض الموجودات فهي إما راجعة إلى الأعدام والقصورات وضعف بعض الحقائق عن احتمال النحو الأفضل من الوجود - وإما أنها يرجع إلى التصادم بين نحوين من الوجود في الأشياء الواقعة - في عالم التضايق والتصادم والتعارض والتضاد حيث يستدعي كل من المتضادين عند وجوده من جهة الأسباب الاتفاقية الغلبة على الآخر وهذا التصادم والتضاد بينهما ليس لأجل كونهما أو كون واحد منهما موجوداً بما هو موجود بل لأجل تخصيص وجود كل منهما في نفسه وهويته بمرتبة خاصة ونشأة معينة جزئية يضيق ويقصر عن اشتماله على الآخر أو إحاطته به أو اتحاده معه أو قوله عليه وهذا التضايق والتخالف بين وجودات بعض الأشياء لكونها متعلقة القوام الخارجي بالجسمية والمقدارية التي هي غاية نزول الوجود ونقصه وأن أضيق الأشياء وجوداً هي الأبعاد والمقادير لقصر رداء وجودها عن الفسحة إلا في حد معين وضيقها عن الانبساط والتمادي إلا على مرتبة متناهية لا يتجاوزها لنهوض البراهين الدالة على تناهي الأبعاد والمقادير وسائر المتصلات القارة وغير القارة أيضاً عند أهل التحقيق ولأنها أيضاً من ضعف الوجود بحيث لا يمكن لذاتها الحصول لذاتها ولا لأجزائها أحدية الجمع والحضور بعضها عند بعض بل كل منها يغيب عن الآخر بحسب هويته المقدارية وكميته الاتصالية فمما لزم هذه المرتبة من

الوجود لبعده عن منبع الفيض و الجود هو أن يتفارق كل من أبعاضه المقدارية الاتصالية - عن بعض آخر و لا يجتمع معه في حد واحد فكان هذه الهوية الاتصالية لغاية ضعف وجودها و تبددها يهرب فيها الأجزاء عن الأجزاء و يغيب الكل عن الكل و لهذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٧

يكون التعلق بها يمنع العاقلية و المعقولية و يكون عالمها عالم الجهل و الغفلة - و الموت و الشر إذ العلم عبارة عن حضور شيء عند شيء فما لا حضور عنده لشيء لا علم له بذلك الشيء فبقدر ضعف الوجود يكون قلة العلم و ما يلزمه و زيادة الجهل و ما يصحبه فعالمية المقادريات و المتكلمات على نسبة وجودها ثم أضعف المقادير و المتصلات وجودا غير القار منها كالزمان و الحركة حيث لا يسعها الاجتماع في أن واحد من الزمان كما لا يسع للمقار منها الاجتماع في حد واحد من المكان و هذا كلام وقع في البين ليس هاهنا موضع تبينه و تحقيقه و لعلنا نرجع إليه في مستأنف القول بزيادة توضيح و تتميم إن شاء الله العزيز فالغرض هاهنا أن تذكر أن الوجود من حيث هو وجود مؤثر و معشوق على الإطلاق كما مر سابقا فالوجود لما كان خيرا حقيقيا فإذا صادفه شيء حفظه و أمسكه عشقا و إذا فقدته طلبه شوقا.

و الأصل الرابع أن معنى الشوق هو طلب كمال ما هو حاصل بوجه غير حاصل بوجه

فإن العادم لأمر ما رأسا لا يشتاقه و لا يطلبه إذ الشوق للمععدم المحض و الطلب للمجهول المطلق مستحيل و كذا الواجد لأمر ما لا يشتاقه و لا يطلبه لاستحالة تحصيل الحاصل فالواجب سبحانه إذ هو من فضيلة الوجود في غاية التمام و هو بريء من أنحاء النقص مقدس عن شوائب القصور في الوجود و الذات فمحال أن يلحقه تشوق إلى شيء و يعتريه طلب و حركة إلى تمام و كمال بل لكونه تام الوجود و فوق التمام - يليق به أن يشاق إليه و يعشقه كل من سواه و كذا العقول الفعالة لكونها مفطورة على كمالاتها مجبولة على فضائلها التي يليق بمرتبة كل منها ماثلة بين يدي قيومها مشاهدة لجمال مبدعها و جاعلها مغترفة من بحر الخير و الوجود و منبع الفيض و الجود بقدر حوصلة ذواتها و وعاء وجوداتها و ما يوجد من الخيرات الواردة منها على العالم الأدنى ليس مما يزيد لها فضيلة و كرامة بل هي جوائز و عطايا - و مواهب نازلة منها إلى السوافل و رشحات فائضة منها على الأواني من غير التفات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٨

و غرض و قصد منها إلى إصلاح الكائنات فلا يتصف هي أيضا بالتشوق إلى ما دونها - بل بالالتفات إلى ذواتها لكونها هائمة في جمال الأزل مستغرقة في شهود الوجود الحقيقي و لاتصالها به و دوام استغراقها في المبدأ الأعلى لا يوصف بالشوق بالنسبة إلى العالي أيضا إلا بنحو مندمج في ذواتها الإمكانية بحسب خفاء ماهياتها و ظلمة جواهرها عند اعتبار أنفسها في نحو من أنحاء ملاحظة العقل إياها مجردة عن وجودها الواجب بوجوب وجود بارئها و ذلك لأجل قصور وجوداتها و نقصان هوياتها - عن مشاهدة ما يزيد عليها و إشراق ما يفضل على حدقة إدراكها من الوجود الحقيقي و النور الإحدى فهي من ذلك الوجه من الخفاء و الظلمة و الكدورة اللازمة للماهية - من حيث هي في اعتبار العقل المرتفعة في الواقع الزائلة عند سطوع نور الأول تعالى على ذواتها النورية الوجودية القدوسية و أما غير هاتين المرتبتين

من الوجود- فسواء كانت نفوسا فلكية أو صوراً سماوية أو طبائع نوعية عنصرية أو جواهر امتدادية أو هيولى جسمية فإن جميعها مما يستصحبها قوة و شوق إلى تمام أو كمال- كما سينكشف لك في باب الهيولى إن شاء الله تعالى و قد علم من ذي قبل في مبحث الغايات شوق المتحركات ليتضح أن جميع هذه الأشياء كائنة على اعتراف شوق من هذا البحر الخضم بل على اعتراف بالعبودية لهذا المبدع القديم و إذا تمهدت هذه الأركان و الأصول و تقرررت هذه الدعاوي التي بعضها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٣٩

بينه و بعضها مبينة في سوابق الفصول فنقول

أما إثبات الشوق في الهيولى الأولى

فلأن لها مرتبة من الوجود و حظاً من الكون كما اعترف الشيخ الرئيس و غيره من محصلي اتباع المشاءين و سنقيم البرهان عليه في موضعه و إن كانت مرتبتها في الوجود مرتبة ضعيفة لأنها عبارة عن قوة وجود الأشياء الفائضة عليها المتحدة بها اتحاد المادة بالصورة في الوجود و اتحاد الجنس بالفصل في الماهية و إذا كان لها نحو من الوجود و قد علم بحكم المقدمة الأولى أن سنخ الوجود واحد و متحد مع العلم و الإرادة و القدرة من الكمالات اللازمة للوجود أينما تحقق و كيف ما تحقق- فيكون لها نحو من الشعور بالكمال شعوراً ضعيفاً على قدر ضعف وجودها الذي هو ذاتها و هويتها بحكم المقدمة الثانية فيكون لأجل شعورها بالوجود الناقص لها- طالبة للوجود المطلق الكامل الذي هو مطلوب و مؤثر بالذات للجميع بحكم المقدمة الثالثة و لما كان بحكم المقدمة الرابعة كل ما حصل له بعض من الكمالات و لم يحصل له تمامه- يكون مشتاقاً إلى حصول ما يفقد منه شوقاً بإزاء ما يحاذي ذلك المفقود و يطابقه و طالبا لتتميم ما يوجد فيه بحصول ذلك التمام فيكون الهيولى في غاية الشوق إلى ما يكمله و يتممه- من الصور الطبيعية المحصلة إياها نوعاً خاصاً من الأنواع الطبيعية و لست أقول إن شدة الوجود و زيادة الكمال أو عدمه [عدته] في المشتاق إليه فالشوق في الهيولى و إن لم يتقو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٠

فيها شعوراً حسب ما يشاق إليه من الكمالات كيف و إن لها نحواً ضعيفاً من الشعور بالوجود الذي لها من طبيعة الوجود الذي هو عين الخير و السعادة لكن الفرض بالاعتبار الأول من جهة أن شعورها إنما هو قوة الشعور بالأمور لا فعليتها لكون وجودها قوة وجود الأشياء الصورية لكن يجب أن يكون لها بالاعتبار الثاني غاية الشوق لأنها بإزاء ما يقوى عليها من الصور و الخيارات الغير المتناهية التي باعتبار ما غايات لوجود الهيولى و كمالات لنقصاناتها هذا تقرير الاستقلال على هذا المطلب- و مما يؤكد هذا القول هو أن يقال حسبما ذهبنا إليه أن الهيولى لما كان حاصلة من جهة القصور الإمكاناني في الجواهر المجردة و خصوصاً في الجواهر النفسانية- أن لها قابلية الاستكمالات بجميع الصور الكمالية و إن كانت في أزمنة غير متناهية- لا متنازع اجتماعها في زمان واحد و أن تلك الكمالات لكونها وجودية من سنخ ما حصل لها من الشيء القليل الذي هو مجرد قوة تلك الخيارات الصورية و استعداد حصولها- و إن فقد ما يمكن حصوله من الأمر الكمالي لشيء ما له شعور ضعيف يستدعي شوقاً إلى ذلك الأمر و زيادة الشوق و شدته كما يتبع زيادة الشعور و شدته

من المشتاق كذلك يتبع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤١

و الطبيعية الواقعة في سلسلة البسائط فبالحقيقة هي من جملة قواها الانفعالية التي هي حيثية حركاتها و توجهاتها إلى استكمالها الثانوية ليجبر نقصاناتها الأولية طلبا للرجوع إلى المنبع الذي ابتدت منه فهي إنما يكون حيثية تشوقها إلى الكمال - فالمشتاق وإن كان غير الهیولی لكن من جهة اقترانها بذلك لا بالذات.

و أما الجواب عما ذكره الشيخ و التخلص عما أورده من استدلاله على نفي الشوق عن الهیولی فنقول أما قوله أما الشوق النفساني فلا يختلف في سلبه عن الهیولی فممنوع بل غير صحيح على الإطلاق فإن المادة و إن كانت بحسب اعتبار العقل إياها مجردة عن الصور أمرا عدميا و بحسب اعتباره إياها مطلقة ماهية ناقصة مبهمة في غاية الإبهام لكنها يصلح للتحصل و التعین بحسب ما يحصلها و يعينها من الصور الجمادية و النباتية و الحيوانية التي شأنها تقويم وجود الهیولی محصلة و تحصل نوعيتها متقررة فهي إذن باعتبار تحصيلاتها النفسانية الحيوانية يكون لها أشواق نفسانية إلى كمالات يليق بالنفوس سواء كانت فلكية أو عنصرية مجردة أو منطبعة باعتبار تحسراتها النفسانية النباتية يكون لها أشواق نباتية إلى كمالات نباتية كالتغذي و التوليد و باعتبار تحصيلاتها الطبيعية يكون لها أشواق طبيعية من التحفظ على الأشكال و الأوضاع و التحيز في الأحياز إلى غير ذلك من الخيرات و الكمالات اللائقة بحال الأجسام الطبيعية البسيطة و المركبة.

و أما قوله و أما الشوق التسخييري إلى آخره - فغير صحيح لما ذكرنا من إثبات المقدمة الممنوعة.

و أما قوله و لقد كان يجوز أن يكون الهیولی مشتاقا إلى الصور لو كان هناك خلو عن الصور كلها.

فنقول قد ظهر مما ذكرناه أن للهیولی بحسب استعدادها للأشياء شوقا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٢

إلى الأشياء و ما ادعي أن لها شوقا إلى كافة الصور في كل واحد من الأزمنة و بكل من الاعتبارات حتى يقال إن الشوق ليس إلا لما لم يحصل بعد من الأمور التي يمكن حصولها للهیولی بحسب ذاتها بذاتها لها شوق إلى صورة ما لخلوها في ذاتها عن صورة و إذا تحصلت بصورة فبحسب اعتبار تحصيلها الخارجي بتلك الصورة المكملة - لها نوعا لها و سلوة اطمينان و غنى و عدم تشوق بل الشوق حاصل لها عند تنوعها و تحصيلها بتلك الصورة إلى ما يزيد عليها من الكمالات التي في درجة ثانية عنها فإن كل صورة حصلت للهیولی ليست مما يغنيها عن الافتقار إلى كافة الصور بل إنما كفت حاجتها إلى نفسها فبقيت الهیولی ذات شوق و شهوة إلى سائر الصور كامراة لا تكتفي بالمجموعة مع رجل واحد عن غيره بل لا يزال ذات حكمة و دغدغة إلى رجل بعد رجل ما دامت هي هي كذلك حال الهیولی بالقياس إلى الصور من حيث تشوقها إلى التلبس بها و الاستكمال لورودها فكل صورة حصلت للهیولی لم تخل بعد عن نقص ما و قصور ما و شرية ما يكون في الإمكان بإزائه من الكمالات و الخيرات الغير المتناهية لم يخرج بعد من القوة إلى الفعل إلا قدر متناه و هكذا تترقى في الاستعدادات - بحصول الكمالات الإضافية و فيضان الخيرات النسبية و يكون بحسبها التشوق المناسب لها إلى أن ينتهي إلى الكمال النفسي على مراتبه و الكمال العقلي على مراتبه - إلى أن يصل إلى الكمال الأتم و الخير الأقصى و الصورة بلا شوب مادة و الفعلية بلا قوة و الخير بلا شر و الوجود بلا عدم فيقف عنده الحركات و

يسكن لديه الاضطرابات - و تطمئن به الانزعاجات و ينقطع له الأشواق و يتم فيه الخيرات و أما قوله و لا يليق بها الملل للصور الحاصلة إلى آخره.

فنقول فيه المختار على ما ذكرناه هو الشق الأول و هو كون تشوقها إما لأجل الخلو عن الصور كلها إن أريد الخلو بحسب ذاتها مجردة أو لأجل الخلو عن الصورة التي يفقد عنها و يمكن حصولها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٣

و أما قوله و مع هذا فكيف يجوز أن يكون الهيولى تتحرك إلى الصور و إنما يأتيها الصور الطارئة إلى آخره. ففيه أن جهات الطلب و الحركة إلى الصور فيها مختلفة كما مر و ليست مقصورة على نحو واحد و جهة واحدة فهي من حيث ذاتها تشتاق و تتحرك إلى الصورة أي صورة ما وجدت فإذا وجدت فسيبيلها أن تبقى و تدوم لكن لما كان ما هذه حاله من الموجودات أي يكون مادة الجميع فشانها أن يوجد لها هذه الصورة و ضدها فكان لكل منهما حق و استيهال فالذي لها بحق صورتها أن تبقى على الوجود الذي لها و الذي لها بحق نفس ذات المادة أن يوجد وجوداً آخر مضاداً للوجود الذي لها و إذا كان لا يمكن أن يوفي لها هذان الحقان و الاستيهالان معا في وقت واحد لزم ضرورة توفية هذه إلى مدة و توفية تلك إلى مدة من الواهب الحق تعالى الموفي لكل ذي حق حقه و المعطي لكل قابل مستحقه فيوجد هذه الصورة مدة محفوظة الوجود - ثم يفسد و يوجد ضدها ثم يبقى تلك فإنه ليس وجود إحداهما و بقاؤها أولى من وجود الأخرى و بقائها و بالجملة تشوق المادة و استيهالها باعتبار نفسها مشترك بين الصورتين المتضادتين من غير اختصاص بإحداهما دون الأخرى و لما لم يمكن أن يحصل لها صورتان معا في وقت واحد لزم ضرورة أن يعطى لها و يتصل بها أحيانا هذا الضد و أحيانا ذلك الضد و يعاقب كل منهما الآخر إذ عند كل واحد منهما حق ما عن مادة الآخر و بالعكس فالعدل في ذلك أن يوجد مادة هذا لذاك و مادة ذاك لهذا فهذا حال تشوق الهيولى بحسب ذاتها و اعتبار خلوها في نفسها عن صورة ما - و أما من حيث تحصلها النوعي فتشوقها إنما يكون إلى ما يكمل به الصورة الموجودة فيها الفاقدة لكمالها الأتم و هكذا إلى غاية و كمال و صورة لا أتم منها.

ثم اعلم أن للأشواق الحاصلة في الممكنات القاصرة الذوات الناقصة الوجودات عن الكمال التام و الخير

الأقصى سلسلتين

عرضية و طولية فما ذكرناه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٤

من تشوق الهيولى إلى صورة بعد صورة بحسب البعدية الزمانية فهو تشوقاتها العرضية في الصور المتعاقبة المتضادة و هي التي تكون للشخصيات من الصور المتفاسدة العنصرية و ما ذكرناه ثانيا من تشوقها إلى الصور المترتبة في الكمال المترقية في الخيرية التي يكون كل تالية منها غاية و ثمرة للسابقة فهو تشوقها الطولي في الصور المترتبة ذاتا المتلائمة من غير تضاد و تعاند بينها بل مع تكامل كل منها بلحوق ما يعقبها و هذه السلسلة من العلل و المعلولات إذ بعضها سبب للبعض و بعضها علة غائية للأخرى بخلاف السلسلة الأخرى التي هي المعدات المتعاقبة الغير المجتمعة - فيجوز ذهابها لا إلى حد و لا يلزم من كون كل غاية لها غاية و لغايتها غاية أخرى - عدم الغاية و عدم الشوق الذاتي لما بينا في

مبحث الغاية وجه حله فقد تشعشع و تبين مما ذكرناه حقية ما هو الموروث من القدماء الإلهيين من اشتياق الهيولى إلى الصور الطبيعية التي هي خيرات إضافية ثم اشتياقها إلى ما هو الخير الحقيقي و الجلال الأرفع و الكمال الأتم بل ظهر أن جهة الاشتياق في جميع المشتاقين و المشتاقات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٥

إنما هي المادة التي هي جهة القوة و الاستعداد فإن الوجود إذا لم يكن معه قصور عن درجة الكمال الذي يليق به لم يوجد فيه شوق إلى التمام و الكمال إذ الشوق يتعلق بالمفقود لا بالموجود فحيث لا فقد لا شوق و الفقد إذا لم يكن ممكن الدرك - و الحصول فلا شوق أيضا و جهة القصور المتدارك و الفقد للكمال المنتظر كما علمت مرارا إنما هي الهيولى الأولى في كل شيء كما ادعيناه و هذا مما لم ينكره الشيخ و لا غيره من الراسخين في الحكمة المتعالية كما سيظهر من براهين وجود الهيولى - المباحث المتعلقة بأحكامها و تلازمها مع الصورة.

ثم إن العجب أن الشيخ ممن أثبت في رسالة عملها في العشق حال تشوق الهيولى إلى الصورة بوجه لا يحتاج إلى مزيد عليه فإنه بعد ما أقام برهانا عاما على إثبات العشق الغريزي في جميع الموجودات الحية و غيرها أورد بيانا خاصا بالبسائط الغير الحية في كونها متشوقة فقال إن كل واحدة من الهويات البسيطة الغير الحية قرين عشق غريزي لا يتخلى عنه البتة و هو سبب له في وجودها - فاما الهيولى فلديمومية نزوعها [نزاعها] إلى الصور مفقودة و شوقها لها موجودة - و لذلك تلقاها متى عريت عن صورة ما بادرت إلى الاستبدال منها بصورة إشفاقا عن ملازمة العدم المطلق إذ من الحق أن كل واحد من الهويات نافر بطبعه عن العدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٦

المطلق فالهيولى منفر للعدم المطلق و لا حاجة بنا ها هنا إلى الخوض في لمية ذلك فالهيولى كالمرأة الذميمة المشفقة عن استعلان قبحها فمهما يكشف قناعها غطت ذميمها بالكم فقد تقرر أن في الهيولى عشقا غريزيا هذا كلامه في تلك الرسالة

فصل (٢٠) في العلة الصورية و الفرق بين الطبيعة و الصورة

أما الصورة

فهو الشيء الذي يحصل الشيء به بالفعل سواء كان للعنصر قوام بدونها بحسب مطلق الوجود و هو المختص باسم الموضوع كالجسم للأسود أو لم يكن كذلك و هو المختص باسم المادة و هي على الأول عرض و على الثاني جوهر و صورة باصطلاح آخر كما علمت من أن الصورة ليست علة صورية للمادة لأنها ليست جزء من المادة بل هي علة فاعلية للمادة و علمت أيضا أن للصورة عدة معانٍ آخر و قد نبهناك على أن الكل مما اشتركت في معنى و حيثية واحدة هي جهة الحصول و الفعلية و الوجود كما أن معاني العنصر جميعا اتفقت في معنى القوة و الاستعداد و الشوق و الحاجة

و أما الفرق بين الصورة و الطبيعة

فهو أن اسم الطبيعة واقع بالاشتراك على معانٍ ثلاثة مترتبة بالعموم و الخصوص فالعام ذات و الخاص مقوم الذات و الأخص المقوم الذي هو المبدأ الأول للتحريك و التسكين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٧

لا بالعرض ولا بالقسر فالاسم الطبيعة متناول للمعنى الثالث من الجهات الثالث بالاشتراك الصناعي للإثم والثاني من الجهتين كذلك كلفظ الإمكان وأما الصورة فكما علمت هي الجزء الذي يكون به الشيء بالفعل وهي نفس الطبيعة في البسائط بحسب الذات وغيرها بالاعتبار لأن العنصر البسيط كالماء مثلاً جزؤه الصوري بالقياس إلى تقويم النوع صورة والقياس إلى كونه مبدأً للآثار الملازمة مثل البرودة والرطوبة طبيعة وأما المركبات فإنها لا توجد بالفعل بسبب الطبيعة بالمعنى الثالث بل بسبب صورة أخرى يرد عليها من المبدأ الفياض بحسب فطرة ثانية فلا جرم كانت صورها التركيبية مغايرة لطبائعها.

فإن قلت إذا كان لا بد من الصورة الأخرى للمركب فالمقوم إما أن يكون هو المجموع أو كل منهما أو الواحد لا غير. قلت ظاهر كلام الشيخ في موضع من الشفاء مشعر بالأول فإنه قال الأجسام المركبة لا يحصل هوياتها بالقوة المحركة لها إلى جهة واحدة وإن كان لا بد وأن يكون هي ما هي من تلك القوى فكانت تلك القوة جزء من صورتها يجتمع منه عدة معان فيتحد كالإنسانية فإنها يتضمن القوى الطبيعية والنباتية والنفسانية وهذا الكلام بظاهره غير صحيح لا متناع أن يكون لمجموع أمور غير مقومة تأثير في التقويم وذلك لأننا لو فرضنا عدة صور مقومة للشيء فوق واحدة فإما أن يكون كل واحدة منها مستقلة بالتقويم فيجب أن يستغنى بكل منها أن كل ما هو غيره - فيكون كل واحد مقوماً وغير مقوم وهذا خلف وإما أن يكون المستقل إحداهما - فقط فلا يكون الأخرى صورة وإما أن لا استقلال لإحدهما بل المقوم هو المجموع - من حيث هو مجموع والمجموع بهذا الاعتبار شيء واحد فالصور المقومة شيء واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٨

على أن ذلك يستحيل أيضاً لأن كل واحد من الأجزاء سابق على المجموع وكل واحد منها وحدة عارض للمادة غير مقوم لها فيكون المادة مقومة له فيكون سابقاً عليه فالمادة الواحدة السابقة على كل واحد من تلك الأجزاء التي هي سابقة على المجموع تكون سابقة عليه فلو تقومت المادة بذلك المجموع لزم تقوم كل واحد منها بالآخر وهو محال وإذا بطل القسم الأول فبقي أحد القسمين الآخرين لكن المختار عند الجمهور كما هو المشهور هو القسم الثاني وأن يكون للطبيعة وسائر الصور نصيب في تقويم المركب لكن على التقديم والتأخير والظاهر أن هذا هو المراد بالكلام المنقول من الشيخ وأما نحن فالمختار عندنا هو القسم الثالث أي كون المقوم هو واحد من الصور والباقي بمنزلة فروعها وقواها وشرائط حدوثها أولاً كما حققناه في مباحث الكليات. فإن قلت هذا أيضاً باطل لأن النفس الناطقة من مقومات الإنسان فلو لم يكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٤٩

للقوى الطبيعية والنباتية والحيوانية حظ في التقويم لكأن إعراضاً وهي جواهر - فيلزم أولاً أن يكون الواحد بالنوع جوهرًا وعرضاً وثانياً أن يكون صور البسائط مقومة للعناصر التي هي مواد بدن الإنسان فهي مقومة لمقوم بدن الإنسان مع أنها أعراض فيه على هذا الموضع هذا خلف.

قلت هذا عقدة تحل بالأصول التي سلفت منا فتذكر ليظهر لك جليلة الحال ثم إن من المستحيل كون شيء واحد جوهريا وعرضيا لشيء واحد بعينه ولا استحالة في كونه جوهريا لشيء وعرضيا لآخر مما يجب أن يعلم هاهنا أيضا الفرق بين الجوهر والجوهري وكذا العرض والعرضي فالجوهر جوهر في نفسه ولا يتغير كونه جوهرًا بالمقايضة إلى شيء آخر لأنه ليس من باب المضاف وكذا العرض وأما كون الشيء جوهريا فهو من باب المضاف والأمور النسبية التي لها هويات دون الإضافة مما لا يستنكر اختلاف إضافتها باختلاف ما يقاس إليه - فصور البسائط مقومة للبسائط وخارجة عن حقيقة كل من الموالييد المعدنية والنباتية والحيوانية وإن احتيجت إليها في حفظ كيفية المزاج المتوقف على الامتزاج بينها وكذا الكلام في صورة النبات فإنها مقومة للنبات لكن القوى النباتية من خواص النفس الحيوانية وفروعها الخارجة عن حقيقة النفس وجودها شرط في وجود الحيوان - وليس بمقوم داخلي كما مر تحقيقه مستقصى فتذكره وتذكر أيضا أن كون حد الشيء وشرح ذاته مشتملا على بعض المعاني اللازمة لا يوجب دخول معناه في ماهية المحدود وذاته إذ ربما يكون للحد زيادة على المحدود وسيجيء أيضا الفرق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٠

بين علة وجود الشيء وعلة شئيته والعجب أنهم مع الغفلة عن هذا التحقيق كيف يحكمون بأن كلا من الأجسام الطبيعية المركبة له وحدة طبيعية فهل لهذا الحكم معنى إلا كون طبيعة كل منهما واحدة وهي التي بها يكون الشيء الطبيعي هو هو بالفعل حتى لو فرض زوال كل ما يصحبها من الصور والقوى التي اقترنت معها - كان ذلك الشيء هو هو بعينه بحسب الحقيقة

فصل (٢١) في الغاية وما قيل فيها

أما الغاية فهي ما لأجله يكون الشيء كما علمته سابقا وهي قد يكون نفس الفاعل كالفاعل الأول تعالى وقد يكون شيئا آخر في نفسه غير خارج عنها كالفرح بالغلبة وقد يكون في شيء غير الفاعل سواء كانت في القابل كتمامات الحركات - التي تصدر عن روية أو طبيعة أو في شيء ثالث كمن يفعل شيئا لرضاء فلان فيكون رضا فلان غاية خارجة عن الفاعل والقابل وإن كان الفرح بذلك الرضا أيضا غاية الأخرى وهذا مجمل يحتاج إلى التفصيل

فصل (٢٢) في تفصيل القول في الغاية والاتفاق والعبث والجزاف

قالوا إن الشيء يكون معلولا في شئيته ويكون معلولا في وجوده فالمادة والصورة علتان لشئيته المعلول والفاعل والغاية علتان لوجوده ولا خلاف لأحد في - أن كل مركب له مادة وصورة وفاعل وأما أن لكل معلول فلولجوده علة غائية ففيه شك فإن من المعلول ما هو عبث لا غاية فيه ومنه ما هو اتفاقي ومنه ما هو صادر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥١

عن المختار بلا داع ومرجح ومنه ما يكون لغايته غاية ولغاية غايته غاية وهكذا - فلا يكون له بالحقيقة غاية كما أنه لو كان لكل ابتداء ابتداء لكان الجميع أوساطا فلا ابتداء لها وذلك كالحوادث العنصرية والحركات الفلكية والنتائج المترادفة للقياسات - إذا كانت غير متناهية فلنورد بيان هذه الأمور في مباحث

المبحث الأول في العبث وإثبات غاية ما له

اعلم أن كل حركة إرادية فلها مباد مترتبة فالمبدأ القريب هو القوة المحركة أي المباشرة لها وهي في الحيوان تكون في عضلة العضو والذي قبله هو الإرادة المسماة بالإجماع والذي قبل الإجماع هو الشوق والأبعد من الجميع هو الفكر والتخيل وإذا ارتسمت في الخيال أو العقل صورة ما موافقة حركة القوة الشوقية إلى الإجماع بدون إرادة سابقة بل نفس التصور يفعل الشوق والأمر في صدور الموجودات عن الفاعل الأول على هذا المثال كما سيتضح لك من ذي قبل إن شاء الله تعالى - من أن تصور النظام الأعلى علة لصدور الموجودات من غير حاجة إلى شوق - ولا استعمال آلة ثم إذا تحرك الشوق إلى الإجماع وتحقق الإجماع خدمته القوة المحركة التي في الأعضاء فقد ثبت أن الحركات الإرادية تتم بالأسباب المذكورة فربما كانت الصورة المرتسمة في القوة المدركة هي نفس الغاية التي ينتهي إليه الحركة كالإنسان إذا ضجر عن موضع فتخيل صورة موضع آخر فاشتاق إلى المقام فيه فتحرك نحوه وانتهت حركته إليه وربما كانت غيرها كما يشاق الإنسان إلى مكان ليلقى فيه صديقاً ففي الأول يكون نفس من انتهت إليه الحركة نفس الغاية المتشوقة وفي الثاني لا يكون كذلك بل يكون المتشوق حاصلًا بعد ما انتهت إليه الحركة وربما يكون نفس الحركة غاية المتحرك فقد تبين أن غاية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٢

الحركة في كل حال من حيث كونها غاية الحركة هي غاية حقيقية أولية للمبدأ القريب للحركة التي يكون في عضلة الحيوان لا غاية له غيرها بخلاف المبادي قبله إذ ربما كانت لها غاية غير ما ينتهي إليه الحركة كما علمت فإن اتفق أن يتطابق المبدأ القريب الأقرب والمبدءان اللذان قبله أعني القوة الشوقية مع ما قبلها من التخيل والفكر كانت نهاية الحركة غاية للمبادي كلها فليست عبثاً لأنها غاية إرادية وإذا طابق ما انتهت إليه الحركة المشتاق التخيلي ولم يطابقه الشوق الفكري فهو العبث ثم كل غاية ليست نهاية الحركة وليس مبدؤها تشوق فكري فلا يخلو إما أن يكون التخيل وحده هو مبدأ الشوق أو التخيل مع طبيعة أو مزاج مثل التنفس - وحركة المريض أو التخيل مع خلق وملكة نفسانية داعية إلى ذلك الفعل بلا روية كاللعب باللحية فيسمى الفعل في الأول جزافاً وفي الثاني قصداً ضرورياً أو طبيعياً وفي الثالث عادة و كل غاية لمبدأ من تلك المبادي من حيث إنها غاية له إذا لم توجد يسمى الفعل بالقياس إليها باطلاً وإذا تقررت هذه المقدمات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٣

فقد علم أن العبث غاية القوة الخيالية على التفصيل المذكور والشرائط المبينة - فقول القائل إن العبث من دون غاية البتة أو من دون غاية هي خير أو مظنونة خيراً غير صحيح فإن الفعل لا يجب أن يكون له غاية بالقياس إلى ما ليس مبدءاً له بل بالقياس إلى ما هو مبدءاً له ففي العبث ليس مبدءاً فكري البتة فليست فيه غاية فكرية - وأما المبادي الأخر فقد حصلت لكل منها غاية في فعله يكون تلك الغاية خيراً بالقياس إليه فإن كل فعل نفساني فالشوق مع تخيل وإن لم يكن ذلك التخيل ثابتاً بل يكون زائلاً فلم يبق الشعور به فإن التخيل غير الشعور به ولو كان لكل شعور شعور به لذهب إلى غير النهاية ثم إن لانبعاث الشوق من النائم والساهي - وكذا ممن يلعب بلحيته مثلاً علة لا محالة إما عادة أو ضجر عن هيئة أو إرادة انتقال - إلى هيئة أخرى أو حرص من القوى الحساسة أن يتجدد لها فعل إلى غير ذلك من أسباب جزئية لا

يمكن ضبطها و العادة لذيدة و الانتقال عن المملول لذيد و الحرص على الفعل الجديد لذيد كل ذلك بحسب القوى الحيوانية و اللذة خير حسي أو تخيلي فهي خير حقيقي للحيوان بما هو حيوان و ظني بحسب الخير الإنساني فليس هذا الفعل خاليا عن خير حقيقي بالقياس إلى ما هو مبدأ له و إن لم يكن خيرا حقيقيا عقليا

المبحث الثاني في الاتفاق

زعم ديمقراطيس أن وجود العالم إنما يكون بالاتفاق و ذلك لأن مبادي العالم أجرام صغار لا يتجزى لصلابتها و هي مبنوثة في خلا غير متناه و هي متشاكله الطبائع مختلفة الأشكال دائمة الحركة فاتفق أن تصادمت منها جملة و اجتمعت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٤

على هيئة مخصوصة فتكون منها هذا العالم و لكنه زعم أن تكون الحيوان و النبات ليس بالاتفاق. و أما أنبأذلس فزعم أن تكون الأجرام الأسطوقسية بالاتفاق فما اتفق إن كانت هيئة اجتماعية على وجه يصلح للبقاء و النسل بقي و ما اتفق إن لم يكن كذلك لم يبق و له في ذلك حجج. منها أن الطبيعة لا روية لها فكيف يفعل لأجل غرض.

و منها أن الفساد و الموت و التشويهاة و الزوائد ليست مقصودة للطبيعة مع أن لها نظاما لا يتغير كأضدادها فعلم أن الجميع غير مقصودة للطبيعة فإن نظام الذبول و إن كان على عكس النمو لكن له كعكسه نظام لا يتغير و نهج لا يمهل - و لما كان نظام الذبول ضرورة المادة من دون أن يكون مقصودا للطبيعة فلا جرم نحكم بأن نظام النمو و النمو أيضا بسبب ضرورة المادة بلا قصد و داعية للطبيعة و هذا كالمطر الذي يعلم جزما أنه كائن لضرورة المادة إذ الشمس إذا بخرت الماء فخلص البخار إلى البارد فلما برد صار ماء ثقيلًا فنزل ضرورة فاتفق أن يقع في مصالح فيظن أن الأمطار مقصودة لتلك المصالح و ليس كذلك بل الضرورة المادة.

و منها أن الطبيعة الواحدة تفعل أفعالا مختلفة مثل الحرارة فإنها تحل الشمع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٥

و تعقد الملح و تسود وجه القصار و يبيض وجه الثوب.

فهذه حجج القائلين بالاتفاق و قبل الخوض في الجواب نقدم كلاما فنقول إن الأمور الممكنة منها دائم و منها أكثر و لكل منهما علة و الفرق بينهما أن الدائم لا يعارضه معارض فالأكثر يتم بشرط عدم المعارض سواء كان طبيعيا أو إراديا فإن الإرادة مع التصميم و تهيئة الأعضاء للحركة - و عدم مانع للحركة و ناقض للعزيمة و إمكان الوصول إلى المطلوب فبين أنه يستحيل أن لا يوصل إليه و من الأمور ما يحصل بالتساوي كقعود زيد و قيامه و منها ما يحصل على الأقل كوجود إصبع زائد أما ما يكون على الدوام أو على الأكثر فلا يقال لوجودهما إنه اتفقا و الباقيان قد يكونان باعتبار ما واجبا و ذلك مثل أن يشترط أن المادة في تكون كف الجنين فضلت عن المصروف عنها إلى الأصابع الخمس و القوة الفاعلة صادفت استعدادا تاما في مادة طبيعية فيجب أن يتخلق إصبع زائد فعند هذه الشروط يجب تكون الإصبع الزائد و يكون ذلك من باب الدائم - بالنسبة إلى هذه الطبيعة الجزئية و إن كان نادرا قليلا بالقياس إلى سائر أفراد النوع - فإذا حقق الأمر في تكون الأمر الأقل أنه دائم بشروطه و أسبابه ففي صيرورة

المساوي أكثرها أو دائماً بملاحظة شروطه وأسبابه لم يبق ريبة فالأمور الموجودة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٦

بالاتفاق إنما هي بالاتفاق عند الجاهل بأسبابها وعللها و أما بالقياس إلى مسبب الأسباب و الأسباب المكتنفة بها فلم يكن شيء من الموجودات اتفاقاً كما وقع في السنة الحكماء الأشياء كلها عند الأوائل واجبات فلو أحاط الإنسان بجميع الأسباب و العلل حتى لم يشذ عن علمه شيء لم يكن شيء عنده موجوداً بالاتفاق فإن عثر حافر بئر على كنز فهو بالقياس إلى الجاهل بالأسباب التي ساقته الحافر إلى الكنز اتفاقاً - و أما بالقياس إلى من أحاط بالأسباب المؤدية إليه ليس بالاتفاق بل بالوجوب فقد ثبت أن الأسباب الاتفاقية حيث تكون تكون لأجل شيء إلا أنها أسباب فاعلية بالعرض والغايات غايات بالعرض وربما يتأدى السبب الاتفاقية إلى غايته الذاتية - كالحجر الحابط إذا شج ثم هبط إلى مهبطه الذي هو الغاية الذاتية وربما لا يتأدى إلى غايته الذاتية بل اقتصر على الاتفاقية كالحجر الحابط إذا شج و وقف ففي الأول - يسمى بالقياس إلى الغاية الطبيعية سبباً ذاتياً و بالقياس إلى الغاية العرضية سبباً اتفاقياً و في الثاني يسمى بالقياس إلى الغاية الذاتية باطلاً فإذا تحقق ما قدمناه فقد علم أن الاتفاق غاية عرضية لأمر طبيعي أو إرادي أو قسري ينتهي إلى طبيعة أو إرادة - فيكون الطبيعة و الإرادة أقدم من الاتفاق لذاتيهما فما لم يكن أولاً أمور طبيعية - أو إرادية لم يقع اتفاق فالأمور الطبيعية و الإرادية متوجهة نحو غايات بالذات - و الاتفاق طار عليهما إذا قيس إليهما من حيث إن الأمر الكائن في نفسه غير متوقع عنها إذ ليس دائماً و لا أكثرها لكن يلزم أن يكون من شأنها التأدية إلى ذلك - لا دائماً و لا أكثرها إذ لو لم يكن من شأنها التأدية إليها أصلاً لم يقل في ذلك الأمر - إنه اتفق مثل كسوف الشمس عند قعود زيد فإنه لا يقال إن قعود زيد اتفق إن كان سبباً لكسوف الشمس و إذا قيس إلى أسبابه المؤدية فيكون غاية ذاتية له طبيعية أو إرادية فظهر أن وجود العالم ليس على سبيل الاتفاق و إن كان للاتفاق مدخل بالقياس إلى بعض أفرادها فما نسب إلى أنبأ قللس أو ديمقراطيس كله باطل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٧

و أما الجواب التفصيلي عن الشبه المذكورة ففي الأول أنه ليس إذا عدت الطبيعة الروية و جب أن يحكم بأن الفعل الصادر عنها غير متوجه إلى غاية فإن الروية لا تجعل الفعل ذا غاية بل إنما تميز الفعل الذي يختار و يعينه من بين أفعال يجوز اختيارها ثم يكون لكل فعل من تلك الأفعال غاية مخصوصة يلزم تأدي ذلك الفعل إليها لذاته لا بجعل جاعل حتى لو قدر كون النفس مسلمة عن اختلاف الدواعي و الصوارف لكان يصدر عن الناس فعل متشابه على نهج واحد من غير روية كما في الفلك فإن الأفلاك سليمة عن البواعث و العوارض المختلفة فلا جرم أفاعيلها على نهج واحد من غير روية.

و مما يؤيد ذلك أن نفس الروية فعل ذو غاية و هي لا يحتاج إلى روية أخرى.

و أيضاً أن الصناعات لا شبهة في تحقق غايات لها ثم إذا صارت ملكة لم يحتج في استعمالها إلى الرواية بل ربما تكون مانعة كالكاتب الماهر لا يروي في كل حرف و كذا العواد الماهر لا يتفكر في كل نقرة و إذا روى الكاتب في كتبه حرفاً أو العواد في نقرة يتبدل في صناعته فللطبيعة غايات بلا قصد و روية و قريب من هذا اعتصام الزالق بما يعتصمه و

مبادرة اليد في حك العضو من غير فكر ولا روية و أوضح منه أن القوة النفسانية إذا حركت عضوا ظاهرا فإنما تحركه بواسطة الوتر و النفس لا شعور لها بذلك و في الشبهة الثانية أن الفساد في هذه الكائنات تارة لعدم كمالاتها و تارة لحصول موانع و إرادات خارجة عن مجرى الطبيعة أما الأعدام فليس من شرط كون الطبيعة متوجهة إلى غاية أن تبلغ إليها فالموت و الفساد و الذبول كل ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٨

لقصور الطبيعي عن البلوغ إلى الغاية المقصودة و هاهنا سر ليس هذا المشهد موضع بيانه و أما نظام الذبول فهو أيضا متأد إلى غاية و ذلك لأن له سببين أحدهما بالذات و هو الحرارة و الآخر بالعرض و هو الطبيعة و لكل منهما غاية - فالحرارة غايتها تحليل الرطوبات فتسوق المادة إليه و تفنيها على النظام ذلك للحرارة بالذات و الطبيعة التي في البدن غايتها حفظ البدن ما أمكن بإمداد بعد إمداد و لكن كل مدد تال يكون الاستمداد منه أقل من المدد الأول كما سيأتي في علم النفس فيكون نقصان الإمداد سببا لنظام الذبول بالعرض و التحليل سببا بالذات للذبول و فعل كل واحد منهما متوجه إلى غاية ثم إن الموت و إن لم يكن غاية بالقياس إلى بدن جزئي فهو غاية بالقياس إلى نظام واجب لما أعد للنفس من الحياة السرمدية و كذا ضعف البدن و ذبوله لما يتبعهما من رياضات النفس و كسر قواها البدنية التي بسببها تستعد للآخرة على ما يعرف في علم النفس و أما الزيادات فهي كائنة لغاية ما فإن المادة إذا فضلت أفادها الطبيعة الصورة التي تستحقها و لا يعطلها كما علمت فيكون فعل الطبيعة فيها بالغاية و إن لم يكن غاية للبدن بمجموعه و نحن لم ندع أن كل غاية لطبيعة يجب أن يكون غاية لغيرها و أما ما نقل في المطر فممنوع بل السبب فيه أوضاع سماوية تلحقها قوابل و استعدادات أرضية للنظام الكلي و انفتاح الخيرات و نزول البركات فهي أسباب إلهية لها غاية دائمة أو أكثرية في الطبيعة. و في الشبهة الثالثة أن القوة المحركة لها غاية واحدة هي إحالة المحترق إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٥٩

مشكلة جوهرها و أما سائر الأفاعيل كالعقد و الحل و التسويد و التبييض و غيرها - فإنما هي توابع ضرورية و ستعلم أقسام الضروري الذي هو إحدى الغايات بالعرض - و قد ذكر في كتاب الشفاء إبطال مذهب أنبازقلس ببيانات مبينة على المشاهدات و شواهد موضحة و لذلك حمل بعضهم كلامه في البخت و الاتفاق على أنه من الرموز و التجوزات أو أنه مختلق عليه لدلالة ما تصفحه و وجده من كلامه على قوة سلوكه - و علو قدره في العلوم و من جملة تلك الدلائل الواضحة أن البقعة الواحدة إذا سقط فيها حبة بر و حبة شعير أنبت البر برا و الشعير شعيرا فعلم أن صيرورة جزء من الأرض برا و الآخر شعيرا لأجل أن القوة الفاعلة تحركها إلى تلك الصورة لا لضرورة المادة لتشابهها و لو فرض أجزاء الأرض مختلفة فاختلفاها ليس بالماهية الأرضية - بل لأن قوة في الحبة أفادت تلك الخاصية لذلك الجزء الأرضي فإن كانت إفادة تلك الخاصية لخاصية أخرى سابقة عليها لزم التسلسل و إن لم يكن كذلك كانت القوة - المودعة في البرة لذاتها متوجهة إلى غاية معينة و إلا فلم لا ينبت الزيتون برا و البطيخ شعيرا.

و منها أن الغايات الصادرة عن الطبيعة في حال ما يكون الطبيعة غير معوقة - كلها خيرات و كمالات و لهذا إذا تأدت إلى غايات ضادة كان ذلك في الأقل فهذا يطلب الإنسان لها سببا عارضا فيقول ما ذا أصاب هذا الحيوان حتى مرض و ذبل

و لم لا ينبت البر و الشعير و إذا كان كذلك فالطبيعة متوجهة إلى الخير إن لم يعقها عائق.
و أيضا أنا إذا أحسنا بقصور من الطبيعة أعناها بالصناعة كما يفعل الطبيب - معتقدا أنه إذا زال العائق و اشتدت القوة
توجهت الطبيعة إلى إفادة الصحة و الخير - و هذا يدل على المقصود

المبحث الثالث في غايات الأفعال الاختيارية

إن من المعطلة قوما جعلوا فعل الله تعالى خاليا عن الحكمة و المصلحة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٠

مع أنك قد علمت أن للطبيعة غايات و أن فعل النائم و الساهي لا ينفك عن غاية و مصلحة بعض قواه التي هي في
الحقيقة فاعل لذلك الفعل و إن لم يكن للقوة العقلية أو الفكرية متمسكين بحجج هي أو هن من بيوت العنكبوت.

[حجج القائل بعدم الغاية]

منها التشبث في إبطال الداعي

و المرجح بأمثلة جزئية من طريقي الهارب و رغيفي الجائع و قدحي العطشان و لم يعلموا أن خفاء المرجح عن علمهم
لا يوجب نفيه فإن من جملة المرجحات لأفعالنا في هذا العالم أمور خفية عنا كالأوضاع الفلكية و الأمور العالية الإلهية
و لم يتفطنوا أنه مع إبطال الدواعي في الأفعال - و تمكين الإرادة الجزافية ينسد باب إثبات الصانع فإن الطريق إلى
إثباته - أن الجائز لا يستغني عن المرجح فلو أبطنا هذه القاعدة لم يمكننا إثبات واجب الوجود بل مع ارتكاب القول
بها لم يبق مجال للنظر و البحث و لا اعتماد على اليقينيات لعدم الأمن عن ترتب نقيض النتيجة عليها و ربما يخلق في
الإنسان حالة تريه الأشياء لا كما هي لأجل الإرادة الجزافية التي ينسبون لها إلى الله تعالى فهو لاء القوم في الدورة
الإسلامية كالسوفسطائية في الزمان السابق.

و منها ما مر من أن كون الإرادة مرجحة صفة

نفسية لها و الصفات النفسية و لوازم الذات لا تعلل كما لا يعلل كون العلم علما و القدرة قدرة و هو أيضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦١

كلام لا حاصل له فإن مع تساوي طرفي الفعل كيف يتخصص أحد الجانبين - و الخاصية التي يقولونها هذان فإن تلك
الخاصية كانت حاصلة أيضا لو فرض اختيار الجانب الآخر الذي فرض مساويا لهذا الجانب.

و منها ما سبق أيضا من قولهم بأن الإرادة متحركة قبل الفعل

بلا اختصاص بأحد الأمور ثم تعلقت بأمر دون أمر و هذا كاف في افتضاحهم فإن المرید لا يريد أي شيء اتفق إذ الإرادة
من الصفات الإضافية فلا يتحقق إرادة غير متعلقة بشيء ثم يعرضها التعلق ببعض الأشياء نعم إذا حصل تصور شيء
قبل وجوده و يرجح أحد جانبي إمكانه تحصل إرادة متخصصة بأحدهما فالترجيح متقدم على الإرادة كما مر و أقوى ما
يذكر من قبلهم أمور أوردها صاحب المباحث المشرقية.

الأول أن الفلك جسم متشابه الأجزاء و قد تعين فيه نقطتان للقطبية و دائرة لأن تكون منطقة و خط لأن يكون محورا
دون سائر النقاط و الدوائر و الخطوط - مع أنه كان جائزا بحسب الذات أن يكون القطبان غير تينك النقطتين و كذا

المنطقة و المحور يكون عظمة أخرى و خطا آخر لتشابه المحل.
و الثاني أن لكل فلك حركة خاصة إلى جهة معينة دون غيرها من الجهات - مع جواز وقوع الحركة إلى كل واحدة منها و كذلك لكل حركة حد معين من السرعة و البطء دون غيره مع تساوي النسبة إليهما.
الثالث اختصاص كل كوكب بموضع معين من الفلك مع عدم خصوصية توجد في ذلك الموضع دون غيره لتساوي الجميع في الطبيعة فالعقل يجوز وقوعه في موضع آخر من فلكه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٢

الرابع اختصاص العالم بمقدار خاص دون ما هو أعظم منه أو أصغر مع جوازهما عند العقل.

و الجواب [عن حججهم]

عن الأول أن تلك النقطة توجد بالفعل بواسطة الحركة المعينة فإن الحركة المعينة يوجب تعيين النقطتين و لزم من تعيينهما تعيين المحور الواقع بينهما فإنه لو لا الحركة لم يتعين دائرة للمنطقة المستلزمة لتعين القطب و المحور.
و عن الثاني أن اختلاف الحركات جهة و سرعة لاختلاف مبادئها العقلية - و كونها مقتضية للأفلاك و حركاتها على وجه يتبعها أحسن النظامات.

و يخرج منه الجواب عن الثالث مع أن تعيين موضع ما للكوكب إنما حصل بالكوكب لا قبله و إلا كان مصمما من غير تلك الحفرة و بعد وجوده لا يجوز له التبدل.

و عن الرابع أن لكل جسم من المحدد و غيره طبيعة خاصة تقتضي مقدارا خاصا لذلك الجسم فلا يمكن غيره و التجويز العقلي ربما يخالف الواقع لعدم اطلاع العقل على خصوصية السبب قبل البرهان و لنا رسالة منفردة في حل هذه الإشكالات الفلكية بتمهيد مقدمات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٣

أصولية يزول بها الريب عن القلب من أراد الاطمينان فليراجع إليها فالحاصل أن المختار متى كانت نسبة المعلول إليه إمكانية من دون داع و مقتض لصدوره يكون صدوره عنه ممتنعا لا متناع كون المساوي راجحا فإن تجويز ذلك من العاقل ليس إلا قولاً باللسان دون تصديق بالقلب فذلك الداعي هو غاية الإيجاد و هو قد يكون نفس الفاعل كما في الواجب تعالى لأنه تام الفاعلية فلو احتاج في فعله إلى معنى خارج عن ذاته لكان ناقصا في الفاعلية و ستعلم أنه مسبب الأسباب و كل ما يكون فاعلا أولا لا يكون لفعله غاية أولى غير ذاته إذ الغايات كسائر الأسباب تستند إليه فلو كان لفعله غاية غير ذاته فإن لم يستند وجودها إليه لكان خرق الفرض و إن استند إليه فالكلام عائد فيما هو غاية داعية لصدور تلك الغاية المفروضة كونه غير ذاته تعالى و هكذا حتى ينتهي إلى غاية هي عين ذاته فذاته تعالى غاية للجميع كما هو أنه فاعل لها و بيان ذلك أنه سنقرر لك إن شاء الله تعالى بأن واجب الوجود أعظم مبتهج بذاته و ذاته مصدر لجميع الأشياء و كل من ابتهج بشيء ابتهج بجميع ما يصدر عن ذلك الشيء من حيث كونها صادرة عنه فالواجب تعالى يريد الأشياء لا لأجل ذواتها من حيث ذواتها بل من حيث إنها صادرة عن ذاته تعالى فالغاية له في إيجاد العالم نفس ذاته المقدسة و كل ما كانت فاعليته لشيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٤

على هذا السبيل كان فاعلا و غاية لذلك الشيء حتى إن اللذة فينا لو كانت شاعرة بذاتها- و كانت ذاتها مصدرا للفعل لكانت مريدة لذلك الفعل لذاتها و لأجل كونه صادرا عن ذاتها فكانت حينئذ فاعلا و غاية.

وهم وتنبيه:

ما وجد كثيرا في كلامهم من أن العالي لا يريد السافل و لا يلتفت إليه و إلا لزم كونه مستكملا بذلك السافل لكون وجوده أولى له من عدمه و العلة لا تستكمل بالمعلول لا يضرنا و لا ينافي ما ذكرناه إذ المراد من المحبة و الالتفات المنفيين عن العالي بالنسبة إلى السافل هو ما هو بالذات و على سبيل القصد لا ما هو بالعرض و على سبيل التبعية فلو أحب الواجب تعالى فعله- و أراد له لأجل كونه أثرا من آثار ذاته و رشحا من رشحات فيضه و جوده لا يلزم من إجابته تعالى لذلك الفعل كون وجوده بهجة و خيرا له تعالى بل بهجته إنما هي بما هو محبوبة بالذات و هو ذاته المتعالية التي كل كمال و جمال رشح و فيض من كماله و جماله- قرأ القاري بين يدي الشيخ أبي سعيد بن أبي الخير رحمه الله قوله تعالى **يُحِبُّهُمْ وَيُحِبُّونَهُ** فقال الحق أنه يحبهم لأنه لا يحب إلا نفسه فليس في الوجود إلا هو و ما سواه من صنعه و الصانع إذا مدح صنعه فقد مدح نفسه و من هذا يظهر حقيقة ما قيل لو لا العشق ما يوجد سماء و لا أرض و لا بر و لا بحر و الغرض أن محبة الله تعالى للخلق عائدة إليه فالمحسوب و المراد بالحقيقة نفس ذاته تعالى لذاته- كما أنك إذا أحببت إنسانا فتحب آثاره لكان محبوبك بالحقيقة ذلك الإنسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٥

كما قيل شعرا-

و ما حب الديار شغفن قلبي و لكن حب من سكن الديار

المبحث الرابع في غاية الكائنات المتعاقبة لا إلى نهاية

و لنمهد لبيانها مقدمة هي أن من جملة الغايات بالعرض هو الذي يقال له الضروري و هو على ثلاثة أقسام. أحدها الأمر الذي لا بد من وجوده حتى يوجد الغاية على أن يكون وجوده متقدما على وجود الغاية مثل صلابة الحديد ليتم القطع و هذا يسمى نافعا إما في الحقيقة أو بحسب الظن و من هذا القبيل الموت و أمثاله فإن الموت غاية نافعة لنظام النوع و للنفس أيضا كما أشرنا إليه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٦

الثاني ما يكون لازما لملزوم الغاية فيكون في الوجود مع الغاية مثل أنه لا بد من جسم أدكن للقطع و إنما لم يكن منه بد لا لدكنته بل لأنه لازم للحديد الذي لا بد منه.

الثالث الذي يكون حصوله مترتبا على حصول الغاية إما على طريق اللزوم- كحدوث الحوادث العنصرية عن حركات الأفلاك و غاية الحركة الفلكية ما فوقها- و إما لا على طريق اللزوم كحب الولد التابع للغاية في التزويج و هو التناسل

فهذه الأقسام غايات بالعرض و يقال لها الضروري و وجود الشر في عالمنا من هذا القسم أعني الضروري فإنه لما وجب في العناية الإلهية التي هي الجود وجود كل خير و كان منها مبدأ المركبات من العناصر الأربعة و كان لا يمكن وجود النار مؤديا بسببها النظام إلى الغاية المقصودة الأعلى صفة الإحراق لزم من ذلك أن يفسد بعض المركبات و أما أنها كيف تصل النار إلى ما تفسده فلما توجه حركات الأفلاك التي هي صادرة عن التدبير الإلهي و النظام الواجب فالضرورة بالقياس إلى أفراد الشر ضرورة و بالقياس إلى أمر آخر أو النظام الكلي غاية كما مر في باب الخير و سيأتيك زيادة الإيضاح في باب العناية إن شاء الله تعالى.

فإذا تقرر ذلك فنقول أما القول في الحوادث الكائنة الفاسدة فيجب أن يعلم أن الغاية الذاتية للطبيعة المدبرة للعالم ليس وجود شخص معين من النوع بل الغاية الذاتية أن توجد الماهيات النوعية وجودا دائما فإن أمكن أن يبقى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٧

الشخص الواحد منها فحينئذ لا يحتاج إلى تعاقب الأشخاص فلا جرم لا يوجد منها إلا شخص واحد كما في الشمس و القمر و إن لم يمكن بقاء الشخص الواحد كما في الكائنات الفاسدة فحينئذ يحتاج إلى الأشخاص المتعاقبة لا من حيث إن تلك الكثرة مطلوبة بالذات بل من حيث إن المطلوب بالذات لا يمكن حصوله إلا مع ذلك - فيكون اللانهاية في الأشخاص غاية عرضية لا ذاتية فالغايات الذاتية متناهية فهذا بيان غاية الطبيعة المدبرة للنوع و أما غاية الطبيعة الشخصية فهي بقاء ذلك الشخص المعين و ليس لها غاية غير ذلك و أما الحركة الفلكية المستمرة فالمقصود منها كما ستعرف استخراج الأوضاع الممكنة من القوة إلى الفعل ليحصل لنفوسها التشبه بالكمال و ذلك لما لم يمكن إلا بتعاقب الأوضاع الجزئية لا جرم صارت الأوضاع المتعاقبة غايات عرضية كحصول الكائنات العنصرية كما سمعت و أما المقدمات و النتائج فيجب أن يعلم أن المراد بتناهي العلة الغائية أنه لا يجوز أن يكون للفاعل الواحد في فعل واحد غاية بعد غاية إلى غير النهاية فإما أن يكون للأفعال الكثيرة غايات كثيرة فذلك جائز و هنا لكل قياس غاية معينة و ليس للنفس في ذلك القياس غاية سوى تلك الغاية فلا استحالة فيه

فصل (٢٣) في الفرق بين الغاية و الخير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٨

اعلم أن العلة الغائية إما واقعة تحت الكون أو هي أعلى من الكون فإن كانت واقعة تحت الكون فهي إما أن تكون موجودة في القابل كوجود صورة الدار في الطين و اللبن مثلا للبناء و إما أن تكون موجودة في نفس الفاعل كالاستكنان و في الجميع الغاية بالحقيقة هو السبب الأول لسائر العلل و ذلك لأنه ما لم تكن الغاية متصورة في نفس الفاعل لم يجز أن يكون الفاعل فاعلا و لكنها معلول في الوجود الخارجي لسائر العلل إذا كانت واقعة تحت الكون ففي القسم الأول منها نقول إذا قيس إلى الفاعل من حيث إن تصوره صار محركا له و علة لكونه فاعلا كان غاية و غرضا و إذا قيس إلى الحركة كان نهاية لا غاية لأن الغاية يومها شيء فلا يصح أن يبطل مع وجودها شيء بل يستكمل و الحركة تبطل مع انتهائها و إذا قيس إلى الفاعل من حيث استكمالها به و كان قبل فيه بالقوة فهو خير لأن مزيل القوة مكمل - و العدم شر فالحصول و الوجود بالفعل يكون خيرا و إذا قيس إلى القابل من حيث هو قابل و به صار بالفعل فهو صورة فله نسبة

إلى أمور أربعة و بكل حيثية له اسم خاص و في القسم الثاني إذ هو صورة أو عرض في الفاعل إذا نسب إليه من حيث استكماله به كان خيرا و من جهة أنه مبدأ حركته كان غاية فقد تحقق أن كل غاية فهو باعتبار غاية و باعتبار آخر خير إما حقيقي أو مضمون كبعض الحركات - التي مبدؤها التخيل الصرف دون القصد الفكري و الطبيعة و لك أن تعلم أن غاية الفاعل القريب الملاصق لتحريك المادة صورة في المادة و ما ليست غايته صورة في المادة فهو ليس فاعلا قريبا فإن اتفق أن يكون الذي غايته صورة في المادة و الذي غايته ليست صورة في المادة أمرا واحدا كانت فاعليته مختلفة بالقرب و البعد و المباشرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٦٩

للتحريك و عدمها و الصورة الحاصلة في المادة تكون غاية له بإحدى الجهتين بالذات و بالأخرى بالعرض مثل أن يبني الإنسان بيتا ليسكن فإنه من جهة ما هو طالب السكنى علة لكونه بناء فالمستكن علة أولى للبناء و من جهة ما هو بناء معلول له من جهة ما هو مستكن فهو من حيث كونه بناء علة قريبة فلا جرم غايته بالاعتبار الأول ليست صورة في مادة و بالاعتبار الآخر الذي هو به ملاصق صورة و هيئة في البيت

فصل (٢٤) في الفرق بين الخير و الجود

قد علمت أن الغاية ربما تكون بحسب نحو من الوجود فاعلا للفاعل بما هو فاعل و علة غائية للفعل و بحسب نحو آخر من الوجود معلولا لمعلوله فلها بهذا النحو من الوجود قياس إلى الفاعل المستكمل به و قياس إلى الفاعل الذي يصدر عنه - فهو بالقياس إلى الفاعل الذي لا يكون منفعلا به أو بشيء يتبعه كان وجودا و بالقياس إلى الفاعل المنفعل كان خيرا و الخير بالجملة ما يطلبه كل شيء و هو الوجود أو كمال الوجود و أما الجود فهو إفادة ما ينبغي لا لعوض فالواهب لما لا يليق للموهب له ليس بجواد كمن يهب سكيناً لمن يقتل به مظلوما و كذا من أعطى فائدة ليستعويض منها بدلا سواء كان ذلك البذل شكرا أو ثناء و صيتا أو فرحا بل الجواد من أفاد الغير كمالا في جوهره أو في أحواله من غير أن يكون بإزائه عوض بوجه من الوجوه فكل فاعل يفعل لغرض يؤدي إلى شبه عوض فليس بجواد بل هو معامل مستعويض فيكون ناقصا فقيرا لأنه أعطى شيئا ليتحصل له ما هو أولى به و أطيب - و من كان الأولى به فعل شيء فإذا لم يصدر عنه كان عادم كمال فكان ناقصا في ذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧٠

و إذا توقف كماله على أمر ما فكان فقيرا و إن كان ذلك الأمر إكمال غيره أو نفي الفقر عنه أو إيصال الخير إليه فإن حصول شيء من ذلك لغيره و لا حصول له إن كانا بمنزلة واحدة بالقياس إلى ذلك الفاعل فلا داعي له إلى ذلك الشيء و لا مرجح لحصول ذلك الخير لغيره فصدور الفعل عنه في حد الإمكان لأن الغرض هو المقتضي للفعل و الغير الموجب ليس غرضا و إن لم يكونا بمنزلة واحدة فقد رجع آخر الأمر إلى غرض يتصل بذاته فإن سؤال لم لا يزال يتكرر في الغرض إلى أن يبلغ ذات الفاعل من خير يعود إليه أو شر ينفي عنه فحينئذ يقف السؤال إذ حصول الخير لكل شيء و زوال الشر عنه هو المطلوب بالذات لأن الإرادة و الطلب لمن يعشق ذاته فيطلب كل شيء لمعشوقه أعني ذاته فقد تبين أن كل طالب غرض ناقص - و بالجملة فطالب الغرض يطلب شيئا ليس له هذا تلخيص ما وجدناه في كتبهم.

تعقيب و تحصيل:

اعلم أن النظر في العلة الغائية هو بالحقيقة من الحكمة بل أفضل أجزاء الحكمة و ما ذكروا في الكتب ففيها مساهلات و أشياء غير منقحة لا تنتج إلا بالكلام المتبع و التحقيق البالغ فيجب الخوض في تبينها و توفية الحقوق في التفصي عن الشكوك الواردة عليها بقدر الوسع و الطاقة.

فنقول إنك لو نظرت حق النظر إلى العلة الغائية وجدت أنها في الحقيقة عين العلة الفاعلية دائما إنما التغير بحسب الاعتبار فإن الجائع مثلا إذا أكل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧١

ليشبع فإنما أكل لأنه تخيل الشبع فحاول أن يستكمل وجود الشبع فيصير من حد التخيل إلى حد العين فهو من حيث إنه شعبان تخيلا هو الذي يأكل ليصير شعبان وجودا فالشعبان تخيلا هو العلة الفاعلية لما يجعله فاعلا تاما و الشعبان وجودا هو الغاية المترتبة على الفعل فالأكل صادر من الشبع و مصدر للشبع و لكن باعتبارين مختلفين فهو باعتبار الوجود العلمي فاعل و علة غائية و باعتبار الوجود العيني غاية فاعلم أن العلة الغائية لا تنفك عن الفاعل و الغاية المترتبة على الفعل أيضا سترجع إليه بحسب الاستكمال فظهر أن تقسيمهم الغاية إلى ما يكون في نفس الفاعل كالفرح و إلى ما يكون في القابل و إلى ما يكون في غيرهما كرضا فلان غير مستقيم فإن القسمين الأخيرين في الحقيقة يرجعان إلى القسم الأول و هو ما يكون في نفس الفاعل فإن الباني لا يبني و المحصل لرضا إنسان بفعله لا يحصل إلا لمصلحة تعود إلى نفسه سواء كان المراد من الغاية ما يجعل الفاعل فاعلا أو ما يترتب على الفعل [الفاعل] ترتبا ذاتيا و كذا تقسيمهم الآخر أنه قد يكون الغاية نفس ما ينتهي إليه الحركة و قد يكون غيره كما ذكرناه من طلب مكان للملاحة عن غيره أو للقاء صديق إذ لو لا أولوية أو طلب فرح أو انتفاع يعود إلى النفس لم تتصور الحركة الإرادية و يمكن الاعتذار عن الأخير لا بما ذكره بعضهم من أن المراد من الغاية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧٢

في هذا التقسيم و التقسيم الآخر هي النهاية المترتبة على الفعل إذ قد سبق أن الغاية بهذا المعنى أيضا يجب أن يعود إلى الفاعل و لو بحسب الظن إذا لم يكن عائق بل بأن المراد منه أن الغاية بحسب الماهية إما نفس ما انتهت إليه الحركة أو غيرها ثم اعلم أنه قد وجد في كلامهم أن أفعال الله تعالى غير معللة بالأغراض و الغايات و وجد كثيرا في أسنتهم أنه تعالى غاية الغايات و أنه المبدأ و الغاية و في الكلام الإلهي **أَلَا إِلَى اللَّهِ تَصِيرُ الْأُمُورُ** و **إِنِّي إِلَهُ رَبِّكَ الرَّجْعِي** إلى غير ذلك مما لا يعد و لا يحصى فإن كان المراد من نفي التعليل عن فعله تعالى نفي ذلك عنه بما هي غير ذاته فهو كذلك لما سبق من أن الفاعل الأول يجب أن يكون تاما في فاعليته لا يمكن أن يتوقف على غيره في الفاعلية لكن لا يلزم من ذلك نفي الغاية و الغرض عن فعله مطلقا كما علمت سابقا فلك أن تجعل علمه تعالى بنظام الخير الذي هو عين ذاته تعالى علة غائية و غرضا في الإيجاد.

فإن قلت العلة الغائية كما صرحوا به هي ما يقتضي فاعلية الفاعل فيجب أن يكون غير ذات الفاعل ضرورة مغايرة للمقتضي للمقتضى.

قلت هذه المسامحات في كلامهم كثيرة فإنهم كثيرا ما يطلقون الاقتضاء على المعنى الأعم منه الذي هو مطلق عدم الانفكاك اعتمادا على فهم المتدرب في العلوم كيف و لم يقم برهان و لا ضرورة على أن الفاعل يجب أن يكون غير الغاية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧٣

في الحقيقة فإن الفاعل هو ما يفيد الوجود و الغاية هي ما يفاد لأجله الوجود - سواء كان عين ذات الفاعل أو أعلى منها أ ليس لو فرضنا الغاية أمرا قائما بذاته و كان ذلك الأمر مصدر فعل ذاتي لكان فاعلا و غاية فقد علم أن مراد الحكماء من الغاية - التي نفوها عن فعله تعالى هي ما يكون غير نفس ذاته من كرامة أو محمدا أو ثناء - أو إيصال نفع إلى الغير أو غير ذلك من الأشياء التي تترتب على فعله من دون الالتفات إليها من جانب القدس و أما الغاية بمعنى كون علمه بنظام الخير - الذي هو عين ذاته داعيا له إلى إفادة الخير بوجه الذي ذكرناه أولا فهو مما ساق إليه الفحص و البرهان و شهدت به عقول الفحول و أذهان الأكابر و الأعيان و قد نص عليه الشيخ الرئيس في التعليقات بقوله و لو أن إنسانا عرف الكمال الذي هو واجب الوجود بالذات ثم كان ينظم الأمور التي بعده على مثاله حتى كانت الأمور على غاية النظام لكان غرضه بالحقيقة واجب الوجود بذاته الذي هو الكمال فإن كان واجب الوجود بذاته هو الفاعل فهو أيضا الغاية و الغرض انتهى ثم نقول كما أن المبدأ الأول غاية الأشياء بالمعنى المذكور فهو غاية بمعنى أن جميع الأشياء طالبة لكمالاتها و متشبهة به في تحصيل ذلك الكمال بحسب ما يتصور في حقها فكل منها عشق و شوق إليه إراديا كان أو طبيعيا و الحكماء المتألهون حكموا بسريان نور العشق و الشوق في جميع الموجودات على تفاوت طبقاتهم فالكائنات بأسرها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧٤

كالمبدعات على اغتراف شوق من هذا البحر الخظيم و اعتراف مقر بوحدانية الحق القديم - **فَلِكُلِّ وَجْهَةٍ هُوَ مَوْلِيَّهَا** يحن إليها و يقتبس بنار الشوق نور الوصول لديها و إليها الإشارة في الصحيفة الإلهية بقوله تعالى **وَأَنَّ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِهِ** و بيان ذلك أن كل واحد من الهويات المدبرة و الإنيات الصورية لما كان بطبعه نازعا إلى كماله الذي هو خيرية هويته المستفادة عن ما هو الخير الأول - نافرا عن النقص الخاص به الذي هو شريته المنبعثة من الهيولى و الأعدام تحقق أن لكل واحد منها توقانا طبيعيا و عشقا غريزيا إلى الخير فالخير لذاته معشوق - فلو لا أن الخيرية بذاتها معشوقة لما توخته الطباع و ما اقتصرت الهمم على إثارتها في جميع التصرفات و الخير بالحقيقة مبدأ هذا العشق له و الشوق إليه عند بينوته إن كان مما يباين و التآحد به عند وجوده فإن كل واحد من الموجودات يستحسن ما يلائمه و ينزع إليه مفقودا فالخير عاشق للخير إما الخاص به إذا كان من الخيرات الخالصة الإمكانية أو المطلق و هو الخير الواجبي و الوجود الصرف الذي لا يصحبه شوب شرية و عدم و النور الحقيقي بلا ظلمة و علة العشق هو ما نيل أو سينال من المعشوق و كلما زادت الخيرية و اشتد الوجود زاد استحقاق المعشوقية و زادت العاشقية للخير لكن الموجود المقدس عن شوب القوة و الإمكان إذ هو الغاية في الخيرية فهو الغاية في المعشوقية و الغاية في العاشقية فإذا عشقه له أكمل عشق و أوفاه و الصفات الإلهية على ما ستعلم لما لم يتميز عن الذات فإذا فالعشق هناك صريح الذات و الوجود و سائر الموجودات إما أن يكون وجودها عين عشقها أو متسببا عنه فأعظم الممكنات عشقا هي العقول الفعالة القابلة لتجلي

النور الإلهي بغير وسط و بلا روية و استعانة بحس أو تخيل و هي الفاعلة للأمور المتأخرة السافلة بالمقدمة العالية و للخصيسة بالشريفة ثم النفوس العالية الإلهية بتوسط العقل الفعال - عند إخراجها من القوة إلى الفعل و إعطائها القوة على التصور و التمثل و إمساك

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التمثل فيها و الطمأنينة إليه و بعدها القوى الحيوانية ثم النباتية فكل واحدة منها عبادة إلهية يصلح لها و يليق بها و تشبه بقدر الإمكان بمبدئها الأعلى - و حكاية عن تدبيرها للأشياء فعبادة الموجودات العلوية سيجيء بيانها في موضعه - و أما السفلية فكل منها انقياد للعالي و خضوع و إطاعة لما هو أشرف منها و أقرب إلى العالم الأعلى و رشح خير على السافل فانظر إلى الجواهر المعدنية و قبولها للنقش و الطبع و انقيادها للإذابة و الطرق فهذه إقرارها بالمبدأ و خضوعها و خشوعها فكل ما هو أسرع للقبول و أنور و أحسن الصورة فهو أجل و كلما هو في غفلة عن ذلك - و لا ينتفع به كالصخر و الحجارة فهو أدون ثم إلى القوى النباتية و ما يظهر منها الحركات و ذهابها يمينا و شمالا مع الهواء كما في الفرس -

درخت سرو بباد شمال پنداری همی فشاند دست و همی گذارد کام

فهو ساجد و راکع و مسح و مقدس باصطكاك أوراقه و حركات قضبانه و ما يبدیه من أزهاره و أنواره و تسليم ثمرته إلى الحيوان و العاصي منه ما لا ينتفع به و لا يصلح إلا للنار ثم إلى الحيوان و خدمته للإنسان و ذهابه معه حيث ما ذهب و حملة الأثقال إلى بلد لم تكونوا بالغيه إلا بشق الأنفس و منه عاص و متكبر جاهد لطاعة الإنسان كالسباع و أنواع الوحوش ثم إلى عبادة الإنسان و تشبهه بالمبدأ الأعلى في العلم و العمل و إدراكه للمعلومات و تجرده عن الجسمانيات فعبادته أجل العبادات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧٦

الأرضية و معرفته أعظم المعارف الحيوانية و له فضيلة النطق و شرف القدرة و كمال الخلقة و المنهمك منه في المعصية يكون أخس [أخسر] من الحيوان و النبات و المعادن مردودا إلى أسفل السافلين لأن الجواهر المعدنية قبلت الصورة و هو لم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧٧

يقبلها و الشجرة ساجدة راکعة لربها و هو لم يسجد و الحيوان طائع للإنسان و هو لم يطع لربه و لا عرفه و لا وحده نعوذ بالله من هذه الغفلة و النسيان فتشبهه بالمبدأ بحسب القوة النظرية في إدراك المعقولات و بحسب القوة العملية في تصريفه البدن و قواه كتصريفه القوة الحسية لينتزع من الجزئيات أمورا كلية و باستعانتة بالقوة المتخيلة في تفكره حتى يتوصل بذلك إلى إدراك غرضه في الأمور العقلية و كتكليفه القوة الشهوية المباشرة من غير قصد بالذات إلى اللذة بل بالتشبه بالعلة الأولى في استبقاء الأنواع و خصوصا أفضلها أعني النوع الإنساني و كتكليفه القوة الغضبية - منازعة الأبطال و اعتناق القتال لأجل الذب عن مدينة فاضلة و أمة صالحة و يظهر منه الأفاعيل من صميم قوته النطقية مثل

تصور المعقولات و النزوع إلى الممات و حب الآخرة و جوار الرحمن فافهم ما ذكرناه فهم حق يتلى لا فهم شعر يفترى فإن بعضها وإن كان في صورة الإقناع و الخطابة من البيان لكنها رموز إذا استقصيت قادت إلى البرهان و بالجملة المقصود أن الأشياء جميعا سواء كانت عقولا أو نفوسا أو أجراما فلكية أو عنصرية لها تشبه بالمبدأ الأعلى و عشق طبيعي و شوق غريزي إلى طاعة العلة الأولى و دين فطري و مذهب جبلي في الحركة نحوها و الدوران عليها و قد صرح الشيخ في عدة مواضع من التعليقات بأن القوى الأرضية كالنفوس الفلكية في أن الغاية في أفاعيلها ما فوقها إذ الطبائع و النفوس الأرضية لا تحرك موادها لتحصيل ما تحتها من المزاج و غيره و إن كانت هذه من التوابع اللازمة لها بل الغاية في تحريكها لموادها هي كونها على أفضل ما يمكن لها ليحصل لها التشبه بما فوقها- كما في تحريكات نفوس الأفلاك أجرامها بلا تفاوت انتهى و من هاهنا يتفطن العارف اللبيب بأن غاية جميع المحركات من القوى العالية و السافلة في تحريكاتها هو الفاعل الأول من جهة توجه الأشياء المحركة إليها لا إلى ما تحتها فيكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧٨

غاية بهذا المعنى أيضا و بهذا ظهر سر قولهم لو لا عشق العالي لانطمس السافل ثم لا يخفى عليك أن فاعل التسكين كالطبيعة الأرضية كفاعل التحريك كطبائع الأفلاك- في أن مطلوبه أيضا ليس ما تحته في الوجود كالأين مثلا بل غايته و مطلوبه كونه على أفضل ما يمكن في حقه و يلائم له كما أشار إليه المعلم الثاني أبو نصر في الفصوص بقوله صلت السماء بدورانها و الأرض برجحانها كيف و لا شيء إلا و نجد فيه شوقا إلى محبوب- و تحننا إلى مرغوب طبعاً و إرادة قال بعض العرفاء لعمرى إن السماء بسرعة دورانها و شدة وجدها و الأرض بفرط سكونها لسيان في هذا الشأن و لعمر إلهك لقد اتصل بالسماء و الأرض من لذية ما نالتا من تجلي جمال الأول ما طربت به السماء طرباً و رقصا فهي بعد و في ذلك الرقص و النشاط و غشي به على الأرض لقوة الوارد- فألقيت مطروحة على البساط و سريان لذة التجلي عبدهما و مشاهدة لطف الأزل- هي التي سلبت أفئدتهم كما قيل في الشعر-

فذلك من عميم اللطف شكر و هذا من رحيق الشوق سكر

فإن قلت الغاية و إن كانت بحسب الشيئية متقدمة على الفعل لكن يجب أن تكون بحسب الوجود متأخرة عن الفعل مترتبة عليه فلو كان الواجب تعالى فاعلا و غاية لزم أن يكون متقدما على الوجود الممكنات بالذات متأخرا عنها كذلك فيكون شيء واحد أول الأوائل و آخر الأواخر.

قلت قد مر أن تأخر الغاية عن الفعل وجودا و ترتبها عليه إنما يكون إذا كانت من الكائنات و أما إذا كانت مما هو أرفع من الكون فلا يلزم بل الغاية في المعلولات الإبداعية تتقدم عليها علما و وجودا باعتبارين و في الكائنات تتأخر عنها وجودا و إن تقدمت عليها علما و لك أن تقول إن الواجب تعالى أول الأوائل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٧٩

من جهة كونه علة فاعلية لجميع الأشياء كما سنبهرن عليه و علة غائية و غرضا لها- و هو بعينه آخر الأواخر من جهة كونه غاية و فائدة تقصده الأشياء و تتشوق إليه طبعاً و إرادة لأنه الخير المحض و المعشوق الحقيقي فمصحح الاعتبار

الأول نفس ذاته بذاته و مصحح الاعتبار الثاني صدور الأشياء عنه على وجه يلزمها عشق يقتضي حفظ كمالاتها الأولية و شوق إلى تحصيل ما يفقد عنها من الكمالات الثانوية ليتشبه بمبدئها بقدر الإمكان و قد علمت الفرق بين الغاية الذاتية و الغاية العرضية.

شكوك وإزاحات:

قد تحقق لديك أن كل فاعل يفعل فعلا لغرض غير ذاته فهو فقير مستفيض يحتاج إلى ما يستكمل به فما يستكمل به يجب أن يكون أشرف و أعلى منه فكل فاعل لغرض يجب أن يكون غرضه ما هو فوقه و إن كان بحسب الظن فليس للفاعل غرض حق فيما دونه و لا قصد صادق لأجل معلوله لأن ما يكون لأجله قصد يكون ذلك المقصود أعلى من القصد بالضرورة فلو كان إلى معلول قصد صادق غير مظنون لكان القصد معطيا لوجود ما هو أكمل منه و هو محال فإن اشتباه عليك ذلك بما ترى من تحقق بعض المعلولات على حسب ما يقصده قاصد كحصول الصحة من قصد الطبيب في معالجة شخص و تدبيره إياه لحصول صحته معتقدا أنه قد استفادت الصحة من قصده إياه و كونها غرضا له في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٠

تدبيرها فاعلم أن قصد الطبيب و غرضه ليس مفيد الصحة بل إنما مفيدها مبدءا أجل من الطبيب و قصده و هو واهب الخيرات على المواد حين استعدادها و القصد مطلقا مما يهيء المادة لا غير و المفيد دائما أرفع من القاصد فالقاصد يكون فاعلا بالعرض لا بالذات.

سؤال كثيرا ما يقع القصد إلى ما هو أخس من القاصد.

جواب بلى و لكنه على سبيل الغلط و الخطاء.

سؤال قد تقرر أن الغرض ما يجعل الفاعل فاعلا فالعلاقة الذاتية متحققة بينهما فالفاعل يجب أن يستكمل به بحسب الواقع.

جواب ربما يكون الفاعل بحسب ذاته جوهرًا أشرف رفيعا مما قصده - و بحسب مخالطة المواد و قواها الحسية و الخيالية التي هي في الحقيقة يوجب القصد - إليه يكون أخس منه سؤال إذا لم يكن للواجب غرض في الممكنات و قصد إلى منافعها فكيف حصل منه الوجود على غاية من الإتقان و نهاية من التدبير و الإحكام و ليس لأحد أن ينكر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨١

الآثار العجيبة الحاصلة في تكون أجزاء العالم على وجه يترتب عليها المصالح و الحكم - كما يظهر بالتأمل في آيات الآفاق و الأنفس و منافعها التي بعضها بينة و بعضها مبينة - و قد اشتمل عليها المجلدات كوجود الحاسة للإحساس و مقدم الدماغ للتخيل و وسطه للتفكير و مؤخره للتذكر و الحنجرة للصوت و الخيشوم للاستنشاق و الأسنان للمضغ و الرية للنفس و البدن للنفس و النفس لمعرفة الباري جل كبرياؤه إلى غير ذلك - من منافع حركات الأفلاك و أوضاع مناطقها و منافع الكواكب سيما الشمس و القمر مما لا تفي بذكره الألسنة و الأوراق و لا يسع لضبطه الأفهام و الأذواق. جواب الواجب تعالى و إن لم يكن في فعله غاية غير ذاته و لا لمية مصلحة من المنافع و المصالح التي نعلمه أو لا نعلمه و هو أكثر بكثير مما نعلمه لكن ذاته ذات لا تحصل منه الأشياء إلا على أتم ما ينبغي و أبلغ ما يمكن من المصالح

سواء كانت ضرورية كوجود العقل للإنسان ووجود النبي للأمم أو غير ضرورية ولكنها مستحسنة كإنبات الشعر على الحاجبين و تقعر الأخمص من القدمين و مع ذلك فإنه عالم بكل خفي و جلي لا يعزب عنه مثقال ذرة في السماوات و الأرض كما سيجيء كيف و عناية كل علة لما بعدها كما مر سبيلها هذا السبيل من أنها لا يجوز أن تعمل عملا لما دونها و لا أن تستكمل بمعلولها إلا بالعرض و لا أن تقصد فعلا لأجل المعلول و إن كانت تعلمه و ترضى به فكما أن الأجسام الطبيعية من الماء و النار و الشمس و القمر إنما تفعل أفاعيلها من التبريد و التسخين و التنوير لحفظ كمالاتها - لا لانتفاع الغير منها و لكن يلزمها انتفاع الغير منها من باب الرشح كما قيل و للأرض من كأس الكرام نصيب و كذا مقصود ملكوت السماوات في تحريكاتها - ليس هو نظام العالم الأسفل بل ما هو وراءها من طاعة الله تعالى و التشبه بالخير الأقصى - و لكن يترشح منها نظام ما دونها على ما قيل في الفرس -

عالم بخروش لا إله إلا هو است غافل بگمان كه دشمن است او يا دوست

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٢

دريا بوجود خویش موجي دارد خس پندارد كه اين كشاكش با اوست
فالواجب تعالى يلزم من تعقله لذاته الذي هو مبدأ كل خير و جود حصول الأشياء على الوجه الأتم و النظام الأقوم فهذه اللوازم يا حبيبي من غايات عرضية إن أريد بالغاية ما يقتضي فاعلية الفاعل و ذاتيته و إن أريد بها ما يترتب على الفعل ترتبا ذاتيا لا عرضيا كوجود مبادي الشرور و غيرها في الطبائع الهيولانية.
سؤال هذه اللوازم مع ملزوماتها التي هي كون تلك المبادي على كمالها الأقصى يجب أن تكون متصورة لتلك المبادي إما تصورا بالذات أو بالعرض مع أن المبادي بعضها طبائع جسمانية لا شعور لها أصلا بما يتوجه إليه.
جواب نفي الشعور مطلقا عنها مما لا سبيل لنا إليه بل الفحص و النظر يوجبانه فإن الطبيعة لو لم يكن لها في أفاعيلها مقتضى ذاتي لما فعلته بالذات ضرورة و إذا لم يكن لمقتضيها وجود إلا أخيرا فله نحو من الثبوت أولا المستلزم لنحو من الشعور و إن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٣

لم يكن على سبيل الروية و القصد بل الحق عدمه كما في القرآن المجيد **وَأَنَّ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِهِ وَلَكِنْ لَا تَفْقَهُونَ تَسْبِيحَهُمْ** ثم إنه بناء على قاعدة التوحيد - الذي نحن بصدد تحقيقه إن شاء الله تعالى يجب أن يكون لجميع الأشياء مرتبة من الشعور - كما أن لكل منها مرتبة من الوجود و الظهور لأن الواجب الوجود متصف بالحياة - و العلم و القدرة و الإرادة مستلزم لها بل هذه الصفات عينه تعالى و هو بذاته المتصفة بها مع جميع الأشياء لأنها مظاهر ذاته و مجالي صفاته غاية الأمر أن تلك الصفات في الموجودات متفاوتة ظهورا و خفاء حسب تفاوت مراتبها في الوجود قوة و ضعفا سؤال قد يستدل من جهة أحكام الفعل و إتقانه على روية الفاعل و قصده

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٤

فكيف لا يكون أفاعيل المبادي الذاتية على سبيل القصد و الروية.
جواب هذا استدلال يحسن به مخاطبة الجمهور ممن قصرت أفهامهم - عن إدراك الغايات الحقيقية و مبادئها قد مر أن لكل فعل غاية و ثمرة سواء كان مع الروية أو بدونها.

زيادة تبصرة:

قد استوضح من تضاعيف ما ذكرناه أن المبدأ الأول هو الذي ابتدأ الأمر و إليه ينساق الوجود و انكشف أنه هو الغاية القصوى بالمعنيين كما أنه الفاعل و العلة الغائية لكل و الفرق بين المعنيين بوجهين أحدهما بوجه الذاتية و العرضية و الآخر بحسب الوجود العيني لذاته و التحقق العرفاني لغيره فهو الأول بالإضافة إلى الوجود إذ صدر منه و لأجله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٥

الكل على ترتيبه واحدا بعد واحد و هو الآخر بالإضافة إلى سير المسافرين إليه - فإنهم لا يزالون مترقين من منزل إلى منزل إلى أن يقع الانتهاء إلى تلك الحضرة - فيكون ذلك آخر السفر فهو آخر في المشاهدة و أول في الوجود و الله عز و جل حيث أنبأنا عن غاية وجود العالم بالمعنى الثاني

قال كنت كنزا مخفيا فأحببت أن أعرف فخلقت الخلق لأعرف :

فدلنا على أنه الغاية القصوى لوجود العالم معروفا - كما أنه الفاعل و العلة الغائية له موجودا و دلنا أيضا على بعض الغايات المتوسطة -

بقوله: لولاك لما خلقت الأفلاك

فالغاية الأخيرة بالمعاني الثلاثة لوجود العالم إنما هي وجوده تعالى و لقاء الآخرة و لذلك بني العالم و لأجله نظم النظام و إليه ينساق الوجود ألا إلى الله تصير الأمور.

تذنيب:

قد تبين أن الموجودات العالمية كلها بحسب فطرتها الأصلية - متوجهة نحو غايات حقة و أغراض صحيحة بل الغاية في الجميع شيء واحد هو الخير الأقصى فليعلم إن هاهنا غايات آخر وهمية كما أشرنا إليه زينت لطوائف من الناس فهم سالكون إليها في لبس و عماية من غير بصيرة و دراية و هم أكثر الناس إلا عباد الله المخلصين فهو لاء الطوائف مع ولي الوجود في شقاق فهم ليسوا عباد الله في الحقيقة و لا الله مولاهم و سيدهم و حيث ما يتولونه فله لا محالة ولي الشيطان من الطواغيت فإن شئت سمهم عبدة الهوى - و إن شئت سمهم عبدة الطاغوت فقد نزل بكل ذلك القرآن فمن تولى الله و أحب لقاءه و جرى على ما أجري عليه النظام الحقيقي تولاهم و هو يتولى الصالحين و من تعدى ذلك و طغى و تولى الطواغيت و اتبع الهوى فلكل نوع من الهوى طاغوت فتشخص لكل معبوده و وجه إليه كما في قوله تعالى **أَفَرَأَيْتَ مَنِ اتَّخَذَ إِلَهَهُ هَوَاهُ** و إنك لتعلم أن النظمات الوهمية و الغايات الجزئية تضحل و لا تبقى فكل من كان وليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٦

الطاغوت و الطاغوت من جوهر هذه النشأة الهيولانية فكلما أمعنت هذه النشأة في العدم ازداد الطاغوت اضمحلالا فيذهب به ممعنا في وروده العدم منقلبا به في الدركات حتى يحله دار البوار عصمنا الله وإخواننا في اليقين من متابعة الهوى - و الركون إلى زخارف الدنيا وجعلنا من عبادة الصالحين و الذين يتولاهم برحمته يوم الدين

فصل (٢٥) في تنمة الكلام في العلة و المعلول و إظهار شيء من الخبايا في هذا المقام

قد سبق القول منا في أن التأثير و التأثر بين أمرين قد يكون بالذات و قد يكون بالعرض و المراد مما بالعرض حيث وقع في كلامنا هو أن يكون اتصاف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٧

الموصوف بالحكم المذكور له مجازيا لا حقيقيا إلا أن له علاقة اتحادية أو غيرها مع ما يكون موصوفا به حقيقة كاتصاف الجسم بالمساواة و عدمها بواسطة اتحاده بالمقدار و بالمشابهة و غيرها بواسطة اتحاده بالكيف و كاتصاف جالس السفينة بالحركة بواسطة ارتباطه معها و قد علمت من قبل أن اتصاف الماهية بصفات الوجود من التقدم و التأخر و العلية و المعلولية و غيرها على النحو الذي يخص بالوجود من قبيل الاتصاف العرضي المجازي من جهة علاقة اتحادية بين الماهية و الوجود و انكشف لك في مباحث الجعل أن الجعل لا يتعلق بالماهية أصلا و لا يصلح لأن يكون متعلق الجعل و التأثير و الإفاضة و ما أشبه هذه إلا مرتبة من مراتب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٨

الوجود لا الماهيات فالماهيات على صرافة إمكانها الذاتي و سذاجة قوتها الفطرية و بطونها الجبلي من دون أن يخرج إلى فضاء الفعلية و الوجود و الظهور و القائلون بثبوت المعدومات الممكنة إنما غلطهم لأجل أنهم ذهبوا إلى انفكاك الثبوت من الوجود في تلك الماهيات و قد علمت أن هذا من فاسد القول إذ الماهيات قبل الوجود لا يمكن الحكم عليها بشيء من الأشياء حتى الحكم عليها بثبوت نفسها لها - إذ لا ظهور لها و لا امتياز بينها قبل الوجود إذ الوجود نور يظهر به الماهيات المظلمة الذوات على البصائر و العقول كما يظهر بالنور المحسوس الأشجار و الأحجار - و سائر الأشخاص الكثيفة المظلمة الذوات المحجوبة لذواتها عن شهود الأبصار و العيون فكل مرتبة من الوجود يظهر بها ماهية من الماهيات لاتصافه بها و اتحاده معها فما لم يتحقق هذا النحو من الوجود لا يمكن الحكم على تلك الماهية المنسوبة إليه المتحدة به نحوا من الاتحاد بشيء من الأشياء لكن بسبب ذلك الوجود المعقول أو المحسوس يمكن الحكم عليها أنها هي أو ليست إلا هي فليست هي لذاتها موجودة و لا معدومة و لا ظاهرة و لا باطنة و لا قديمة و لا حادثة بمعنى ثبوت شيء من هذه الأشياء لها و أما إذا أريد ببعض هذه الأشياء سلب بعض آخر فذلك السلب صادق في حقها أزلا و أبدا بأن أريد من العدم سلب الوجود لا ثبوت السلب و من البطون سلب الظهور لا عدم ملكة الظهور بل جميع السلوب صادقة في حقها أزلا و أبدا إذ لا ذات لها حتى يثبت لها شيء من الأشياء و ارتفاع النقيضين إنما يستحيل عن الشيء الموجود من حيث كونه موجودا لا من حيث كونه غير موجود فما لم يعتبر للشيء وجود و إن كان على نحو الانصباع به لا يكونه موجودا لذاته لا يمكن ثبوت شيء له و الحكم به عليه فالحكم على الماهيات و لو كان بأحكامها الذاتية و أوصافها الاعتبارية السابقة الأزلية من الإمكان و البطون و الظلمة و الخفاء و الكمون و أشباهها إنما

يتوقف على انصباغها بصفة الوجود و استنارتها به فقول بعض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٨٩

المحققين من أهل الكشف و اليقين أن الماهيات المعبر عندهم بالأعيان الثابتة - لم يظهر ذواتها و لا يظهر أبدا و إنما يظهر أحكامها و أوصافها و ما شمت و لا تشم رائحة الوجود أصلا معناه ما قررناه فالحكم على الماهية بالوجود و لو في وقت من الأوقات إنما نشأ من غشاوة على البصر و غلط في الحكم من عدم الفرق بين الشيء - و ما يصحبه و يلزمه فكما أن لوازم الماهيات التي هي أمور اعتبارية لا يحتاج ثبوتها و الحكم بها على الماهية إلى جعل جاعل و تأثير علة لا علة الماهية و لا علة غيرها كما ذهب إليه كافة الحكماء و المحققون و دلت عليه صريح عباراتهم و مسطوراتهم و من هذا القبيل تحقق مبادي الشرور و الأعدام عند الفلاسفة حيث لا يكون تحقق مبادي الشرور الذاتية عندهم بجعل و إفاضة من المبدأ الأعلى الخالي عن القصور المقدس - عن النقض في الأفعال تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا فكذلك نقول لما حققنا و بينا أن أثر الجاعل و ما يترتب عليه ليس إلا نحو من انحاء الوجود و مرتبة من مراتب الظهور و لا ماهية من الماهيات بل الماهية يظهر بنور الوجود من دون تعلق جعل و إفاضة بها فالتحقق و الصادر من المبدع الحق و الصانع المطلق إنما هو بالحقيقة الوجود دون الماهية فنسبة المعلولية إلى الماهية بالمجاز الصرف كنسبة الموجودية إليها.

و لا يتوهم أحد أن نسبة الموجودية إلى الماهيات كنسبة الأبيضية إلى الجسم - حيث نحكم حكما صادقا على الجسم بأنه أبيض لأن مناط الحكم بالأبيضية على الجسم قيام وجود البياض بوجود الجسم قياما حقيقيا فالجسم في مرتبة وجوده - و إن لم يتصف بوجود البياض لكن يتصف به في مرتبة وجود البياض لأن وجود شيء لشيء - متأخر من وجود الموصوف و متوقف عليه بخلاف الحكم على الماهية بالموجودية إذ لا قيام للوجود بالماهية و لا وجود أيضا للماهية قبل الوجود و لا أيضا منتزع الوجود في نفس الماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٠

فلا وجه لانتصافها بالموجودية الانتزاعية فضلا عن الوجود الحقيقي بل الماهية ينتزع من الوجود لا الوجود من الماهية فالحكم بأن هذا النحو من الوجود إنسان أولى من الحكم بأن ماهية الإنسان موجودة لأن الإنصاف بالشيء أعم من أن يكون بانضمام الصفة إلى الموصوف في الوجود أو يكون وجود الموصوف بحيث ينتزع العقل منه تلك الصفة و كلا القسمين يستدعي وجود الموصوف في ظرف الإنصاف ضرورة - أن الشيء ما لم يكن موجودا في الخارج مثلا لم يصح انضمام وصف إليه أو انتزاع حكم من الأحكام من نحو وجوده الخاص في الخارج كما بينه بعض أجلة المتأخرين - و الوجود قد دريت أنه الوجود لا الماهية فقد تحققت أن العلة كيف تكون علة بالذات أي بالحقيقة و كيف تكون علة بالعرض أي بالمجاز و لا نزاع لأحد في أن للعلة جعلا و تأثيرا في الممكن فالمجعول إما الوجود أو الماهية أو انضمام الماهية إلى الوجود و اتصاف أحدهما بالآخر و لما بين بطلان القسمين الأخيرين - فلم يبق إلا كون الوجود متعلق بالجعل و الإفاضة دون غيره فقد وضح أن ليس في الخارج إلا الأشخاص الوجودية و قد بينا في مبحث الماهية أن الوجودات الخاصة الإمكانية هي بعينها مبادي الفصول الذاتية للحقائق فالعقل يعتبر و ينتزع - من الأشخاص الوجودية الجنس و الفصل و النوع و الذاتي و العرضي و يحكم بها عليها من جهة ذاتها أو عارضها الذي هو أيضا نحو من الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩١

المعاني الجزئية أو الكلية الذاتية أو العرضية صور متميزة عند العقل يحصلها من الشخص بحسب استعدادات تعرض للعقل و اعتبارات يتعقلها من جزئيات أقل أو أكثر مختلفة في التباين و الاشتراك فيدرك من زيد تارة صورة شخصية لا يشاركه فيها غيره و أخرى صورة يشاركه فيها عمرو و بكر و أخرى صورة يشاركها فيها الفرس و غيره و على هذا القياس فإن قيل هذا إنما يستقيم في النوع البسيط كالسواد لظهور أن ليس في الخارج لونية و في آخر به امتياز السواد عن سائر الألوان و لهذا لا يصح أن يقال جعل لونا فجعل سوادا بل جعل وجوديهما واحد و أما في غيره فالذاتيات المتميزة في العقل - متميزة بحسب الوجود في الخارج و ليس لوجودها جعل واحد كالحيوان فإنه يشارك النبات في كونه جسما و يمتاز عنه بالنفس الحيوانية و جعل وجود الجسم غير جعل وجود النفس حتى إذا زالت عنه النفس بقي وجود ذلك الجسم بعينه كالفرس الذي مات و جسميته باقية الوجود.

قلنا قد سبق أن المأخوذ على وجه كونه مادة غير المأخوذ على وجه كونه جنسا و ليس الكلام في تميز الأول عن الكل بالوجود الخارجي مع قطع النظر من الوجود الذهني و الاعتبار العقلي و إنما كلام في الثاني لأنه الجزء المحمول المسمى بالذاتي و محصل الكلام أن جميع الموجودات عند أهل الحقيقة و الحكمة الإلهية المتعالية عقلا كان أو نفسا أو صورة نوعية من مراتب أضواء النور الحقيقي و تجليات الوجود القيومي الإلهي و حيث سطع نور الحق أظلم و انهدم ما ذهب إليه أو هام المحجوبين من أن للماهيات الممكنة في ذاتها وجودا بل إنما يظهر أحكامها و لوازمها من مراتب الوجودات التي هي أضواء و أظلال للوجود الحقيقي و النور الأحدي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٢

و برهان هذا الأصل من جملة ما آتاه ربي من الحكمة بحسب العناية الأزلية و جعله قسطنطين من العلم بفيض فضله و جوده فحاولت به إكمال الفلسفة و تتميم الحكمة و حيث إن هذا الأصل دقيق غامض صعب المسلك عسير النيل و تحقيق بالغ رفيع السمك بعيد الغور ذهلت عنه جمهور الحكماء و زلت بالذهول عنه أقدم كثير من المحصلين - فضلا عن الأنواع و المقلدين لهم و السائرين معهم فكما وفقني الله تعالى بفضله و رحمته الاطلاع على الهلاك السرمدي و البطلان الأزلي للماهيات الإمكانية و الأعيان الجوازية فكذلك هداني ربي بالبرهان النير العرشي إلى صراط مستقيم من كون الوجود و الوجود منحصر في حقيقة واحدة شخصية لا شريك له في الوجودية الحقيقية - و لا ثاني له في العين و ليس في دار الوجود غيره ديار و كلما يتراءى في عالم الوجود أنه غير الواجب المعبود فإنما هو من ظهورات ذاته و تجليات صفاته التي هي في الحقيقة عين ذاته كما صرح به لسان بعض العرفاء بقوله فالمقول عليه سوى الله أو غيره أو المسمى بالعالم هو بالنسبة إليه تعالى كالظل للشخص فهو ظل الله فهو عين نسبة الوجود إلى العالم فمحله ظهور هذا الظل الإلهي المسمى بالعالم إنما هو أعيان الممكنات عليها امتد هذا الظل فيدرك من هذا الظل بحسب ما امتد عليه من وجود هذه الذات و لكن بنور ذاته وقع الإدراك لأن أعيان الممكنات ليست نيرة لأنها معدومة و إن اتصفت بالثبوت بالعرض لا بالذات إذ الوجود نور و ما سواه مظلم الذات فما يعلم من العالم إلا قدر ما يعلم من الظل و يجهل من الحق

على قدر ما يجهل من الشخص الذي عنه ذلك الظل فمن حيث هو ظل له يعلم ومن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٣

حيث ما يجهل ما في ذات ذلك الظل من صورة شخص من امتد عنه يجهل من الحق **أَلَمْ تَرَ إِلَىٰ رَبِّكَ كَيْفَ مَدَّ الظِّلَّ وَلَوْ شَاءَ لَجَعَلَهُ سَاكِنًا** أي يكون بحيث لا ينشأ منه فيض جوده و ظل وجوده ثم جعلنا الشمس عليه دليلا و هو ذاته باعتبار كونه نورا لنفسه في نفسه و يشهد به العقل و الحس للظلال الممدودة الوجودية- فإن الظلال لا يكون لها عين مع عدم النور **ثُمَّ قَبْضْنَاهُ إِلَيْنَا قَبْضًا يَسِيرًا** و إنما قبضه إليه لأنه ظلله فممنه ظهر و إليه يرجع الأمر كله فكل ما ندركه فهو وجود الحق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٤

في أعيان الممكنات فمن حيث هوية الحق هو وجوده و من حيث اختلاف المعاني و الأحوال المفهومة منها المنتزعة عنها بحسب العقل الفكري و القوة الحسية فهو أعيان الممكنات الباطلة الذوات فكما لا يزول عنه باختلاف الصور و المعاني اسم الظل كذلك لا يزول عنه اسم العالم و ما سوى الحق و إذا كان الأمر على ما ذكرته لك فالعالم متوهم ما له وجود حقيقي فهذا حكاية ما ذهبت إليه العرفاء الإلهيون- و الأولياء المحققون و سيأتيك البرهان الموعود لك على هذا المطلوب العالي الشريف إن شاء الله تعالى

نقل كلام لتقريب مرام:

قال بعض أهل الكشف و اليقين اعلم أن الأمور الكلية و الماهيات الإمكانية و إن لم يكن لها وجود في عينها- فهي معقولة معلومة بلا شك في الذهن فهي باطنة لا يزال عن الوجود العيني و لها الحكم و الأثر في كل ما له وجود عيني بل هو عينها لا غيرها أعني أعيان الموجودات العينية و لم تزل عن كونها معقولة في نفسها فهي الظاهرة من حيث أعيان الموجودات كما هي الباطنة من حيث معقوليتها فاستناد كل موجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٥

عيني بهذه الأمور الكلية التي لا يمكن رفعها عن العقل و لا يمكن وجودها في العين وجودا يزول به عن أن تكون معقولة سواء كان ذلك الموجود العيني موقتا أو غير موقت إذ نسبة الموقت و غير الموقت إلى هذا الأمر الكلي المعقول نسبة واحدة- غير أن هذا الأمر الكلي يرجع إليه حكم من الموجودات العينية بحسب ما يطلبه حقائق تلك الموجودات العينية كنسبة العلم إلى العالم و الحياة إلى الحي- فالحياة حقيقة معقولة و العلم حقيقة معقولة متميزة عن الحياة كما أن الحياة متميزة عنه ثم نقول في الحق تعالى إن له علما و حياة فهو الحي العالم و في الملك إن له حياة و علما فهو الحي العالم و حقيقة العلم واحدة و حقيقة الحياة واحدة و نسبتهما إلى العالم و الحي نسبة واحدة و نقول في علم الحق أنه قديم و في علم الإنسان أنه محدث فانظر ما ذا أحدثته الإضافة من الحكم في هذه الحقيقة المعقولة و انظر إلى هذا الارتباط بين المعقولات و الموجودات العينية فكما حكم العلم على من قام- أن يقال فيه عالم حكم الموصوف به على العلم بأنه حادث في حق الحادث قديم في حق القديم فصار كل واحد محكوما به و محكوما عليه و معلوم أن هذه

الأمر الكلية وإن كانت معقولة فإنها معدومة العين موجودة الحكم كما هي محكوم عليها إذا نسب إلى الموجود العيني فيقبل الحكم في الأعيان الموجودة- ولا يقبل التفصيل ولا التجزي فإن ذلك محال عليها فإنها بذاتها في كل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٦

موصوف بها كالإنسانية في كل شخص شخص من هذا النوع الخاص لم ينفصل ولم يتعدد بتعدد الأشخاص ولا برحت معقولة وإذا كان الارتباط بين من له وجود عيني- وبين من ليس له وجود عيني قد ثبت وهي نسبة عدمية فارتباط الموجودات بعضها ببعض أقرب من أن يعقل لأنه على كل حال بينهما جامع وهو الوجود العيني هناك- وما ثمة جامع وقد وجد الارتباط بعدم الجامع فبالجامع أقوى وأحق هذا كلامه قدس الله روحه العزيز وفيه تأكيد شديد لما نحن بصدد إقامة البرهان عليه إن شاء الله تعالى إذ قد علم منه تصريحاً وتلويحاً أن الماهيات الكلية التي هي غير الموجودات العينية- لا حظ لها من الوجود العيني وإنما حظها من الوجود انتزاعاً بحسب العقل من الوجودات- التي هي الموجودات العينية واتحادها معها فكما أن ذات الواجب تعالى الذي هو الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٧

القيومي بحيث ينتزع منه مفهوم العلم والقدرة والحياة وغيرها من الصفات فكذلك وجود الإنسان بحيث ينتزع منه مفهوم النطق والحياة وقوة الإحساس والتحريك والقدرة على المشي والكتابة وغيرها إلا أن وجود الواجب في غاية الكمال والتمام وهو فوق التمام- حيث يفضل عنه بحسب رشح الخير الدائم وجودات سائر الأشياء فلا يحتاج في انتزاع صفاته وأسمائه إلى وجود غير وجود ذاته حتى يصدق تلك النعوت الكمالية والصفات الجلالية التي هي عنوانات بهائه وتمامه بحسب صرف وجوده وبحث ذاته عليه ويحكم به على وجوده الأقدس بخلاف سائر الوجودات التي هي أيضاً من أشعة كبريائه- وظلال نوره وبهائه فإن الأحكام المتعلقة بها من الأمور الكلية المسمات بالذاتيات- إن كان منتزعة من نفس وجود شيء أو بالعرضيات إن كانت منتزعة من أمر لاحق به متأخر عنه لا يمكن انتزاع تلك الأحكام عنها ولا الحكم بها عليها إلا حين صدورهما عن جاعلها الحق وفيضانها عن قيومها المطلق لأنها بحسب ذواتها من مراتب ظهوراته وتجلياته تعالى واستفيد أيضاً من كلامه أن تشخص الأشياء وتعينها كموجوديتها إنما هو بوجوداتها العينية كما حققناه سابقاً طبق ما ذهب إليه المعلم الثاني.

ومما يفهم أيضاً من كلامه وبسط القول فيه في موضع آخر أن كلا من العين الثابتة والوجود العيني متعاكس الحكم إلى الآخر يعني أن الماهية يتصف ببعض صفات الوجود- والوجود يتصف بالماهية وبعض نعوتها وهذا سر يستفاد منه كثير من الأسرار منها سر القدر الذي هو محل حيرة العقلاء وسر صدور بعض الشرور الواقعة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٨

هذا العالم عن بعض مراتب الوجود مع أن الوجود كله خير ومن فوائد كلامه- أن جهة الربط بين الأشياء هي معنى الوجود لا الماهية فالعلوية والمعلولية بين كل شيئين ليستا بحسب ماهيتهما بل لعلاقة الوجود كما أن جهة الاتحاد بين الشيئين أيضاً في الحقيقة هي الوجود المنسوب إليهما لا غير فإن غلبة أحكام الوحدة من غلبة أحكام الوجود وإلى ذلك

رفعت الإشارة في كلام الشيخ في تفسيره لسورة المعوذتين حيث قال فالتق ظلمة العدم بنور الوجود هو المبدأ الأول الواجب الوجود و ذلك من لوازم خيريته المطلقة في هويته بالقصد الأول و أول الموجودات الصادرة عنه هو قضاؤه و ليس فيه شر أصلاً إلا ما صار مخفياً تحت سطوع النور الأول - و هو الكدورة اللازمة لماهية المنشأة من هويته انتهى فإنه عبر عن وجود العقل - بسطوع نور الأنوار جل ذكره فإن وجود الممكنات بمنزلة لمعات نور جماله و جلاله و سطوعات شمس مجده و كماله و الكدورات اللازمة للماهيات إشارة إلى إمكانها فإن معنى الإمكان سلب ضرورة الوجود و العدم عن الذات المنصبغة بنور الوجود المعبر عنه في القرآن المجيد **صِبْغَةَ اللَّهِ وَ مَنْ أَحْسَنُ مِنْ اللَّهِ صِبْغَةً** و لا شك في أن لا ظلمه أظلم من السلب و أشار في قوله لماهية المنشأة عن هويته إلى أن الصادر عن المبدأ الأول و الموجود بإبداعه إنما هو وجود الشيء الذي هو نفس هويته لا ماهية الكلية بل الماهيات إنما ينتزع من أنحاء الوجودات و تنشأ منها لا تأصل لها في الثبوت بل ينتزعها العقل من الوجود ثم يصفها به و يحمله عليها و لهذا حكم بتقدم الوجود عليها في الخارج و تأخره عنها في الذهن كما مر تحقيقه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٢٩٩

فصل (٢٦) في الكشف عما هو البغية القصوى و الغاية العظمى من المباحث الماضية

اعلم أيها السالك بأقدام النظر و الساعي إلى طاعة الله سبحانه و الانخراط في سلك المهيميين في ملاحظة كبريائه و المستغرقين في بحار عظمتهم و بهائهم أنه كما أن الموجد لشيء بالحقيقة ما يكون بحسب جوهر ذاته و سنخ حقيقته فياضاً بأن يكون ما بحسب تجوهر حقيقته هو بعينه ما بحسب تجوهر فاعليتها فيكون فاعلاً بحتاً - لا أنه شيء آخر يوصف ذلك الشيء بأنه فاعل فكذلك المعلول له هو ما يكون بذاته أثراً و مفاضاً لا شيء آخر غير المسمى معلولاً يكون هو بالذات أثراً حتى يكون هناك أمران و لو بحسب تحليل العقل و اعتباره أحدهما شيء و الآخر أثر فلا يكون عند التحليل المعلول بالذات إلا أحدهما فقط دون الثاني إلا بضرب من التجوز دفعا للدور و التسلسل فالمعلول بالذات أمر بسيط كالعلة بالذات و ذلك عند تجريد الالتفات إليهما فقط فإنما إذا جردنا العلة عن كل ما لا يدخل في عليتها و تأثيرها - أي كونها بما هي علة و مؤثرة و جردنا المعلول عن سائر ما لا يدخل في قوام معلوليتها - ظهر لنا أن كل علة علة بذاتها و حقيقتها و كل معلول معلول بذاته و حقيقته فإذا كان هذا هكذا يتبين و يتحقق أن هذا المسمى بالمعلول ليست لحقيقته هوية مباينة - لحقيقة علة المفيضة إياه حتى يكون للعقل أن يشير إلى هوية ذات المعلول مع قطع النظر عن هوية موجدتها فيكون هويتان مستقلتان في التعقل إحداهما مفيضة و الآخر مفاضاً إذ لو كان كذلك لزم أن يكون للمعلول ذات سوى معنى كونه معلولاً لكونه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٠

متعلقاً من غير تعقل علة و إضافته إليها و المعلول بما هو معلول لا يعقل إلا مضافاً إلى العلة فانفسخ ما أصلناه من الضابط في كون الشيء علة و معلولاً هذا خلف فإذا المعلول بالذات لا حقيقة له بهذا الاعتبار سوى كونه مضافاً و لاحقاً و لا معنى له غير كونه أثراً و تابعا من دون ذات تكون معروضة لهذه المعاني كما أن العلة المفيضة على الإطلاق إنما كونها أصلاً و مبدأ و مسموداً إليه و ملحقاً به و متبوعاً هو عين ذاته فإذا ثبت تناهي سلسلة الوجودات من العلل و

المعلولات إلى ذات بسيطة الحقيقة النورية الوجودية متقدما عن شوب كثرة و نقصان وإمكان وقصور و خفاء بريء الذات عن تعلق بأمر زائد حال أو محل خارج أو داخل و ثبت أنه بذاته فياض - و بحقيقته ساطع و بهويته منور للسموات و الأرض و بوجوده منشأ لعالم الخلق و الأمر تبين و تحقق أن لجميع الموجودات أصلا واحدا أو سنخا فarda هو الحقيقة و الباقي شئونه و هو الذات و غيره و أسماؤه و نعوته و هو الأصل و ما سواه أطواره و شئونه و هو الموجود و ما وراء جهاته و حيثياته و لا يتوهم أحد من هذه العبارات أن نسبة الممكنات إلى ذات القيوم تعالى يكون نسبة الحلول هيئات أن الحالية و المحلية مما يقتضيان الاثنية في الوجود بين الحال و المحل و هاهنا أي عند طلوع شمس التحقيق من أفق العقل الإنساني المتنور بنور الهداية و التوفيق ظهر أن لا ثاني للوجود الواحد الأحد الحق و اضمحلت الكسرة الوهمية و ارتفعت أغاليط الأوهام و الآن حصحص الحق و سطع نوره النافذ في هياكل الممكنات يقذف به على الباطل فيدمغه فإذا هو زاهق و للثنويين الويل مما يصفون إذ قد انكشف أن كل ما يقع اسم الوجود عليه و لو بنحو من الأنحاء فليس إلا شأنا من شئون الواحد القيوم و نعتا من نعوت ذاته و لمعة من لمعات صفاته فما وضعناه أولا أن في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠١

الوجود علة و معلولا بحسب النظر الجليل قد آل آخر الأمر بحسب السلوك العرفاني - إلى كون العلة منهما أمرا حقيقيا و المعلول جهة من جهاته و رجعت عليه المسمى بالعلة و تأثيره للمعلول إلى تطوره بطور و تحيئه بحيثية لا انفصال شيء مبين عنه فأتقن هذا المقام الذي زلت فيه أقدام أولي العقول و الأفهام و أصرف نقد العمر في تحصيله - لعلك تجد رائحة من مبتغاك إن كنت مستحقا لذلك و أهله.

عقدة و فك:

و لقائل أن يقول يلزم على ما قررت أن يكون حقيقة الواجب - داخلة في جنس المضاف

و كذا حقيقة كل معلول لأنك ادعيت أن ما هو العلة بالذات حقيقتها أنها علة و كذا ما هو المعلول بالذات حقيقته أنه معلول و إلا لم يكن شيء منهما علة بالذات و لا معلولا بالذات و إذا كان العلية عين ذات العلة و العلية من باب المضاف لاستحالة انفكاك تعقله عن تعقل ما يضافه - أعني المعلولية و سيجيء أن المضاف جنس من الأجناس العالية و الجنس لا يتقوم إلا بفصل يحصله نوعا فيلزم أن يكون الواجب الوجود مركبا من جنس و فصل و قد ظهرت استحالته.

فنقول في الفك عنه

إن المضاف و غيره من أمهات الأجناس هي من أقسام الماهيات التي هي زائدة على الوجود و لهذا أخذت في تعريفات تلك الأجناس بأن قيل إن مقولة الجوهر مثلا ماهية حكمها كذا و مقولة الكيف ماهية حكمها كذا و على هذا القياس مقولة المضاف و غيره و بالجملة كل مفهوم عقلي لا يمكن تصوره إلا مع تصور مفهوم آخر هو من باب المضاف و الواجب تعالى ليس مفهوما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٢

يمكن وجوده في الذهن وإنما هو محض الوجود العيني و صرف النور و التحصل الخارجي لا يمكن للعقل ملاحظته إلا بحسب ما يقع عليه من أشعة فيضه و يحكم بضرب من الدهشة عقيب المجاهدات البرهانية أن الذات الأحدية يكون تأثيرها- و سببيتها بنفس ذاته المقدسة و وجودها القيومي السطوعي لا بحيثية سوى محض تجوهر ذاته فيلزم الانثلام في وحدته الذاتية و التركيب في أصل حقيقته الوجوبية- من غير أن يسع للعقل أن يحصل في ذهنه صورة مساوية في الماهية كيف و قد وضح أن لا ماهية له غير الإنية الواسعة كوسي نورها السماوات و الأرض فالحاكم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٣

بوحده و قيويمته التي هي عين ذاته ليس هو العقل بل ضرب من البرهان الوارد من عنده و النور القاذف في العقل من تأييده وإنما العقل له الطاعة و التسليم- و الإيمان و الإيقان و الانقياد بل هو البرهان على وحدانيته و الشاهد على فردانيته.

و إذا علمت أن كون هوية شخصية مما يكون بحسب وجوده الخارجي بحيث يلزمها بنفس وجودها الخارجي إضافة إلى شيء لا يوجب كونها واقعة تحت ماهية المضاف انفسخت الإشكالات الواردة في نظائر هذا المقام ككون الباري بذاته عالما و قادرا و مريدا و سميعا و بصيرا و كون الهيولى بذاته مستعدا للأشياء الصورية و كون كل عرض بذاته متعلقا بالموضوع و كون النفس الحيوانية بذاتها مدبرة متصرفة في البدن مع أن شيئا منها ليست واقعة تحت جنس المضاف الحقيقي و إن عرض لها مفهوم المضاف و صارت من المضاف المشهوري و ذلك مما لا فساد فيه إذ الإضافة عارضة لكل موجود سيما الموجود الذي مبدأ كل شيء و كذا اندفع الإشكال الوارد في إضافة التقدم و التأخر بين أجزاء الزمان حيث إن المتضايفين ينبغي أن يكونا معا في الوجود و المعية تنافي التقدم الذي يقابله و ذلك لأن عدم استقرار الأجزاء الزمانية و تقدم بعضها على بعض بالذات إنما يكون بحسب نحو وجودها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٤

الخارجي و الإضافة إنما تعرض لماهية الجزءين من الزمان بحسب وجودها في تصور العقل و الزمان في نحو الوجود العقلي بخصوصه لا يأبى عن الاستقرار و الاجتماع إذ للعقل أن يتصور المتقدم و المتأخر من أجزاء الزمان- و حكم عليهما عند الالتفات إلى حالهما الخارجي بالتقدم و التأخر و هما بحسب ظرف الحكم العقلي و النشأة العلمية مجتمعان في الحصول فإن لاختلاف النشآت و تبدل أنحاء الوجودات أحكاما عجيبة و آثارا غريبة فلا بعد في أن يكون ماهية واحدة كالحركة و الزمان في نحو من الوجود تدريجية الحصول حدوثا و بقاء كالخارج و في نحو آخر تدريجية الحدوث و دفعية البقاء كما في الخيال و في طور آخر دفعية الحدوث و البقاء جميعا كما في عالم العقل و لنا مسلك آخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٥

في دفع هذا الإشكال في أجزاء الزمان سيجيء في موضعه إن شاء الله العليم

تنبية:

إياك أن تزل قدم عقلك في هذا المقام و تقول إذا كانت وجودات الممكنات كلها تعلقية غير مستقلة في ذاتها فيلزم اتصاف الباري جل ذكره بسماء الحدود و قبوله للتغيرات و بالجملة كونه محلا للممكنات بل الحادثات فثبت و تذكر ما لوحناه من قبل و هو أن وجود الأعراض - و الصور الحالة في الموضوعات و المواد هو من أقسام وجود الشيء في نفسه على جهة الارتباط بغيره الذي هو الموصوف فلا بد أن يكون لها إذا أخذت على هذا الوجه - وجود في أنفُسها مغاير لوجود ما يحل هي فيها و هاهنا نقول ليس لما سوى الواحد الحق وجود لا استقلالي و لا تعلقي بل وجوداتها ليس إلا تطورات الحق بأطواره - و تشوّناته بشئونه الذاتية.

و أيضا كل ما يطلق عليه اسم الصفة سواء كان من باب العرض أو الصورة فلا بد أن يكون له مدخلية في كمال الموصوف إما بحسب قوام وجوده و تمام نوعيته و هو الكمال الأول للشيء و الصورة المنوعة له أو بحسب فضيلة ذاته و كمال شخصيته - و هي الكمال الثاني و العرض اللاحق الذي به يحصل الزيادة و النفل على فريضة أصل التقوم و أول التمام فكل ما يتصف بصفة فإنما يتصف بها لتطرق نقصان و خلل و قصور قبل هذه الصفة إما بحسب الفطرة الأولى و أصل فريضة التجوهر و إما بحسب الفطرة الثانية و فضيلة وجوده و الموجود الحق جل اسمه مقدس عن هذين القصورين و عن جميع شوائب النقص لأنه بحسب ذاته تام و فوق التمام و بحسب صفاته الذاتية فاضل - و فوق الفضيلة لأنه غير متناهي القوة و الشدة لا يمكن فرض كمال فوق كماله الذي بحسب أصل ذاته و لا يتصور فضيلة وراء فضيلته التي هي في مرتبة قوامه الأولى - و ما سواه رشحات فيضه و لمعات نوره الحاصلة بعد تمامه و كماله في ذاته الممجدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٦

و صفاته المقدسة فلا يكون ما ينبعث عنه بعد تمامه صورة لذاته و لا ما يترشح عنه بعد مجده و علوه الغير المتناهي صفة و فضيلة لحقيقة صفاته تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا - فثبت أن علوه و عظمته بذاته لا بغيره و كل حلية أو صورة فإنما يكمل به شيء - و ينفع منه محل قابل و لا بد له من مكمل غير ذاته و لا يتصور مثل هذه المعاني في الواجب بالذات إذ لا مكمل له و لا قاهر عليه بل هو القاهر على جميع الأشياء و له السلطنة العظمى و القهر الأتم و من الذي يسلط عليه بالإفاضة و التكميل و يصور ذاته بما يخرج به عن القوة و التعطيل فيكون إله العالم ذا قوة هيولانية قابلة للتغير و التبديل.

و أيضا لو كان له كمال ممكن للحوق به فتعري ذاته عن ذلك الكمال المفروض - و تخليه عنه مع إمكانه الذاتي إما لأجل وجود عائق أو لعدم مقتض إذ كل عدم ثابت لأمر ممكن فهو لأحد هذين الأمرين و شيء منهما لا يتصور في حقه أما وجود العائق - فلأن العائق للشيء عن كماله يجب أن يكون مضادا له معاقبا في موضعه و الواجب لا ضد له و لا موضوع له و أما وجود المقتضي له فالمقتضي إما ذاته و إما غيره فالأول يوجب دوام كماله بدوام ذاته و وجوبه بوجوبها و الثاني إما ممكن الوجود أو واجبة أو ممتنعة و الكل مستحيل.

أما الأول فلأن كل ممكن مرتبته بعد مرتبة الواجب و النقصان إذا كان في مرتبة الذات كما هو المفروض كان الكمال الذي يتصور بإزائه في تلك المرتبة - و ما هو السبب له يجب أن يكون متقدما عليه فيجب أن يكون مرتبة الممكن فوق مرتبة الواجب و هو بين الفساد.

و أما الثاني فلاستحالة التعدد في الواجب بالذات.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٧

و أما الثالث فلأن الممتنع بالذات لا يمكن أن يستند إليه الممكن بالذات - باعتبار جانب الوجود فإن معطي الكمال لا يقصر عنه بل يزيد عليه في الجهة التي يحصل منه في غيره و الممتنع لا حظ له من أصل الثبوت فضلا عن كماله و قد علمت أن لا خبر عنه إلا بحسب مفهوم اللفظ لا غير.

و بهذا يندفع ما أورده بعض أجلة الفضلاء في شرحه للهياكل على البرهان الذي أقامه صاحب حكمة الإشراف على قاعدة إمكان الأشرف المستفاد أصله من معلم الفلاسفة أرسطاطاليس كما يظهر بالمراجعة إلى كلام المبرهن و إيراد المورد عليه - إذ مبناه أن الشيء الممكن الوجود ربما لم يوجد لامتناع علته امتناعا ذاتيا - فلا يلزم أن يكون ما هو الأشرف من الممكنات الإبداعية على تجويز إمكان وجوده واقعا في الخارج إذ ربما لم يقع مع كونه ممكنا لامتناع جهة في الواجب بالذات - أشرف مما هو عليه يكون سببا لذلك الممكن الأشرف هذا فإذا تبين الحال مع ضيق المجال عما يوضح به حق المقال و علو المرام عما يطير إليه طائر العقول - بأجنحة الأفكار و الأفهام علمت أن نسبة الممكنات إلى الواحد الحق ليست نسبة الصفات للموصوفات و لا نسبة حلول الأعراض للموضوعات فما ورد في السنة أرباب الذوق و الشهود و قرع سمعك من كلمات أصحاب العرفان و الكشف أن العالم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٨

أوصاف لجمالته أو نعوت لجلاله يكون المراد ما ذكرناه بلفظ التطور و نظائره - قصور العبارة عن أداء حق المرام من غير لزوم ما يوجب التغير و الانفعال و إلا فشأنهم أرفع من أن لا يتفطنوا بلزوم جهة النقص في الاتصاف بصفة حالة في ذاته أو نعت يعرض لوجوده و يجعله بحال غير ما هو عليه في حقيقة ذاته المتأصلة كيف و هم يفنون الاثنية في حقيقة الوجود و يقولون ليس في دار الوجود إلا الواحد القهار و الحلول مما ينادي بالاثنية فكل ما قيل في تقريب هذه النسبة التي للذات الأحدية بالقياس إلى المراتب الإمكانية هو من باب التمثيلات المقربة من وجهه للأفهام المبعدة من وجهه للأوهام و أشبه التمثيلات في التقريب التمثيل بالواحد و نسبته إلى مراتب الكثرة كما مر الإشعار به في فصل الوحدة و الكثرة فإن الواحد أوجد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٠٩

بتكرره العدد إذ لو لم يتكرر الواحد لم يمكن حصول العدد و ليس في العدد إلا حقيقة الواحد لا بشرط شيء لست أقول بشرط لا شيء و بينهما من الفرق كما بين الوجود المأخوذ لا بشرط أي طبيعة الوجود الذي عمومها باعتبار شموله و انبساطه - لا باعتبار كليته و وجوده الذهني كما علمت من قبل و بين الوجود المأخوذ بشرط لا شيء و هو المرتبة الأحدية عند العرفاء و تمام حقيقة الواجب عند الفلاسفة و الأول هو حقيقة الحق عند العرفاء لإطلاقه المعرى عن التقييد و لو بالتنزيه عن الماهيات الموجب لنوع من الشرط فافهم ثم يفصل العدد مراتب الواحد - مثل الاثنين و الثلاثة و الأربعة و غير ذلك إلى لا نهاية و ليست هذه المراتب أوصافا زائدة على حقيقة العدد كما في الفصول بالقياس إلى

الجنس الذي ينقسم معناه إليها- و يتقوم وجوده بها فإن كل مرتبة من مراتب العدد و إن خالفت الأخرى في النوعية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٠

لكن كل منها نوع بسيط على ما هو التحقيق و لهذا قيل في العدد إن صورته عين مادته و فصله عين جنسه إذ التعيين و الامتياز في أنواعه بصرف حقيقة ما به الاشتراك و الاتفاق فيها فحقيقة الواحد من غير لحوق معنى فصلي أو عرضي صنفى أو شخصي لها في ذاتها شئون متنوعة و أطوار متفاوتة ثم ينبعث من كل مرتبة من مراتبه الكمالية معان ذاتية و أوصاف عقلية ينتزعها العقل كما ينتزع من كل مرتبة من مراتب الهويات الوجودية المتفاوتة الذات معاني ذاتية و أوصاف عقلية هي المسماة بالماهيات عند قوم و بالأعيان الثابتة عند قوم و هي التي قد مر مرارا أنها ليست في الواقع و لا زائدة على الوجودات إلا بنوع من الاعتبار الذهني - فييجاد الواحد بتكراره العدد مثال لإيجاد الحق الخلق بظهوره في آيات الكون- و مراتب الواحد مثال لمراتب الوجود و اتصافها بالخواص و اللوازم كالزوجية و الفردية و العادية و الصمم و المنطقية مثال لاتحاد بعض مراتب الوجود بالماهيات و اتصافه بها على هذا الوجه من الاتصاف المخالف لسائر الاتصافات المستدعية للتغاير بين الموصوف و الصفة في الواقع و تفصيل العدد مراتب الواحد مثال لإظهار الأعيان أحكام الأسماء الإلهية و الصفات الربانية فالارتباط بين الواحد و العدد مثال للارتباط بين الحق و الخلق و كون الواحد نصف الاثنين و ثلث الثلاثة و ربع الأربعة و غير ذلك مثال للنسب اللازمة التي هي الصفات للحق و الغرض أن القول بالصفة و الموصوف في لسان العرفاء على هذا الوجه اللطيف الذي غفل عنه أكثر الفضلاء

إشارة إلى بعض مصطلحات أهل الله في المراتب الكلية:

حقيقة الوجود إذ أخذت بشرط أن لا يكون معها شيء فهي المسماة عند هذه الطائفة بالمرتبة الأحادية المستهلكة فيها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١١

جميع الأسماء و الصفات و يسمى أيضا جمع الجمع و حقيقة الحقائق و العماء- و إذا أخذت بشرط شيء فإما أن يؤخذ بشرط جميع الأشياء اللازمة لها كليها و جزئها المسماة بالأسماء و الصفات فهي المرتبة الإلهية المسماة عندهم بالواحدية- و مقام الجمع و هذه المرتبة باعتبار الإيصال لمظاهر الأسماء التي هي الأعيان و الحقائق إلى كمالاتها المناسبة لاستعداداتها في الخارج يسمى مرتبة الربوبية و إذا أخذت لا بشرط شيء و لا بشرط لا شيء فهي المسماة بالهوية السارية في جميع الموجودات.

إشارة إلى حال الوجوب و الإمكان:

اعلم أن هذا الانقسام إنما هو من حيث الامتياز بين الوجود و الماهية و التغاير بين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٢

جهة ربوبية و العبودية و إما من حيث سنخ الوجود الصرف و الوحدة الحقيقية فلا وجوب بالغير حتى يتصف الموصوف به بالإمكان بحسب الذات إذ كل ما هو واجب بالغير فهو ممكن بالذات و قد أحاطه الإمكان الناشي من امتياز تعيين من تعيينات الوجود عن نفس حقيقته و بالجملة منشأ عروض الإمكان هو نحو من أنحاء الملاحظة العلمية

باعتبار جهة هذه الملاحظة التفصيلية كما قد سبق بيانه.

إشارة إلى حال الجوهر و العرض في هذه الطريقة:

اعلم أنك إذا أمنت النظر في حقائق الأشياء - وجدت بعضها متبوعة مكشفة بالعوارض و بعضها تابعة و المتبوعة هي الجواهر و التابعة هي الأعراض و يجمعهما الوجود إذ هو المتجلي بصورة كل منهما و الجواهر كلها متحدة في عين الجوهر و مفهومه - و في حقيقته و روحه التي هي مثال عقلي هو مبدأ للعقليات التي هي أمثلة للصور النوعية الجوهرية في عالم العقل كما يظهر من رأي أفلاطون في المثل النورية و كل عقل إنما يقع ظل منه في هذا العالم الهولاني كما تقرر و كلما هو أبعد من هذا العالم لكونه في أعلى مراتب قرب الحق يكون الواقع منه في هذا العالم - أخفى جوهرها و انقص ذاتا من غيره فظل العقل الذي هو رب الجوهر المادي بما هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٣

جوهر مادي إنما هو نفس المادة المأخوذة عنها المعنى الجنسي الذي يكون في الذهن جنس الجواهر و كل واحدة من هذه المراتب الثلاث في الجوهرية أي الذهني و العقلي و المادي هي مظهر الذات الإلهية من حيث قيواميتها كما أن الأعراض بحسب مراتبها في العوالم هي مظاهر الصفات التابعة لتلك الحقيقة ألا ترى كما أن الذات الإلهية لا تزال محتجبة بالذات فكذلك جنس الجواهر لا يزال مكتنفا بالعوارض من الفصول و غيرها و كما أن الذات مع اعتبار صفة من صفاتها اسم من الأسماء كلية كانت أو جزئية كذلك الجوهر مع انضمام معنى من المعاني الكلية في الذهن أو مبدأ من مبادئ الخارجية من الصور المتنوعة في الخارج إليه يصير جوهرًا خاصًا يكون على رأيهم مظهرًا لاسم خاص من الأسماء الكلية بل عينه بوجه عندهم و بانضمام معنى من المعاني الجزئية بحسب زمان ما أو مكان ما يصير جوهرًا جزئيًا كالشخص و كما أنه من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٤

اجتماع الأسماء الكلية على نحو له جهة وحدانية يتولد أسماء آخر مركبة المعاني مع حيثية ارتباط و وحدة طبيعية فكذلك من اجتماع الجواهر البسيطة على هيئة وحدانية - يتولد جواهر آخر مركبة منها تركيبًا طبيعيًا له صورة طبيعية و كما أن الأسماء بعضها محيط ببعض كذلك الجواهر بعضها محيط ببعض و كما أن الأمهات من الأسماء منحصرة كذلك أجناس الجواهر و أنواعها منحصرة و كما أن الفروع من الأسماء الإضافية غير متناهية كذلك الأشخاص المادية أيضًا غير متناهية و يسمى هذه الحقيقة الجوهرية الإمكانية في اصطلاح أهل الله بالنفس الرحماني و المادة الكلية و ما تعين منها و صار موجودًا من الموجودات بالكلمات الإلهية و لما كانت التجليات الإلهية و شئونها المظهرة للصفات متكررة بحكم كل يوم هو في شأن صارت الأعراض متكررة غير متناهية و إن كانت الأمهات منها متناهية و هذا التحقيق ينبهك على أن الصفات من حيث مفهوماتها و تعيناتها في عالم الأسماء أي باعتبار مرتبة التفصيل الذهني و ملاحظة التحليل العقلي حقائق متميزة بعضها عن بعض و إن كانت بسيطة الذات وحدانية الوجود و للجميع أيضًا اشتراك في مطلق كونها أسماء غير المسمى بحسب المفهوم كما أن مظاهرها حقائق متميزة بعضها عن بعض مع كونها في الموجودية تابعة لوجود الجوهر و مشتركة في معنى العرضية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٥

الزائدة وجوداتها على وجود الجوهر لأن كل ما في الوجود دليل وآية على ما في الغيب

تثبيت وإحكام:

إياك و أن تظن ببطانتك البتراء أن مقاصد هؤلاء القوم من أكابر العرفاء و اصطلاحاتهم و كلماتهم المرموزة خالية عن البرهان من قبيل المجازفات التخمينية أو التخييلات الشعرية حاشاهم عن ذلك و عدم تطبيق كلامهم على القوانين الصحيحة البرهانية و المقدمات الحقّة الحكمية ناش عن قصور الناظرين و قلة شعورهم بها و ضعف إحاطتهم بتلك القوانين و إلا فمرتبة مكاشفاتهم فوق مرتبة البراهين في إفادة اليقين بل البرهان هو سبيل المشاهدة في الأشياء التي يكون لها سبب إذ السبب برهان على ذي السبب و قد تقرر عندهم أن علم اليقيني بذوات الأسباب لا يحصل إلا من جهة العلم بأسبابها فإذا كان هذا هكذا فكيف يسوغ كون مقتضى البرهان مخالفا لموجب المشاهدة و ما وقع في كلام بعض منهم إن تكذبهم بالبرهان فقد كذبوك بالمشاهدة معناه إن تكذبهم بما سميت برهانا و إلا فالبرهان الحقيقي لا يخالف الشهود الكشفية فهذه المباحث السابقة و إن كان فيها ما يخالف ظاهر الحكمة النظرية لكنها في الحقيقة روحها الظاهرة من أنوار النبوة و مشكاة الولاية العالمة بمراتب الوجود و لوازمها و لذلك لا نتحاشى عن إظهارها و إن كان المتفلسفون و مقلدوهم يأبون عن أمثالها و إن أردت الاطلاع على حقيقة ما ذكرناه و تشوقت أن يبين لك مطابقة دعاويهم مع مقتضى البراهين فاستمع لبيان التوافق في نبذ مما يتوهم أنها يخالف مقتضى البرهان لتقيس عليه غيره و لا يسيء ظنك بآرباب الحقائق.

و اعلم أن الاسم عندهم عبارة عن الذات الإلهية مع اعتبار صفة من الصفات أو تجل من التجليات و الأسماء الملفوظة أسماء الأسماء و كون الصفات عند الحكماء عين ذاته تعالى لا ينافي كونها غير ذاته بوجه عند العرفاء عند التحقيق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٦

فإن معنى عينية الصفات عند محققى الحكماء هو عبارة عن كون وجوده تعالى في مرتبة ذاته مع قطر النظر عن انضمام معنى أو اعتبار كيفية أو حالة غيرها مصداقا- لحمل مفهومات تلك الصفات لا بأن يكون في اتصافه بشيء منها مفتقرا إلى عروض هيئة وجودية كما في حمل الأبيض على الجسم و لا إلى معنى سلبي كحمل الأعمى على الإنسان أو معنى نسبي كحمل الفوقية على السماء أو اعتبار تحقق الذات بصدورها عن الجاعل كما في حمل الذاتيات على الموضوع أو تعلق بالجاعل كما في حمل الوجود على ماهيات الممكنات و هؤلاء العرفاء أيضا قائلون بعينية صفاته لذاته بهذا المعنى لكن لا ريب لأحد أن مفهومات الصفات و معانيها الكلية الانتزاعية- الموجودة في العقل متخالفة بحسب المفهوم و المعنى لا أقول بحسب الهوية و الوجود- و هذا مما لا يقبل النزاع لأحد فيه و من هاهنا يعلم أن كون الاسم عين المسمى أو غيره يرجع إلى هذين الاعتبارين أي اعتبار الهوية و الوجود و اعتبار المفهوم و المعنى- و لا يذهب عليك أنه لا يلزم من كون الأسماء الإلهية بحسب المعنى غير ذاته المقدسة- إمكان تلك الأسماء أو تعدد الواجب أو الجهة الإمكانية فيه أو التركيب في ذاته من جهتي القبول و الفعل تعالى ذاته عن علوق شيء من هذه المعنى علوا كبيرا و ذلك لما علمت مرارا أن الجعل و الإفاضة إنما يجريان بالذات و الأصاله في نحو من أنحاء الوجودات لا في

المفاهيم الكلية كالأسماء والأعيان وكذا اللامجوعية واللامفاضية - إنما يتحققان في حقيقة الوجود لا في المعاني الكلية فهي كما أنها في المجعولية تابعة للوجود أي بالعرض فكذا في اللامجوعية فأسماء الله تعالى غير مجعولة ولا لامجعولة فلا يلزم من تعددها على هذا النحو العقلي لا الإمكان ولا التعدد في الوجود ولا في الوجوب ولا التركيب ولا الانفعال في الذات ولا الكثرة في جهات التأثير ليبطل قاعدتهم في نحو صدور سلسلة الموجودات من العقول إذ سبب تعدد الإيجاد هو تعدد جهات الوجود لا غير وإذ ليس فليس وإن تعددت معاني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٧

الصفات التي مصداقها ذات أحدية بسيطة صرفة بحسب نفس الأمر فقد تحقق بنور البرهان والعيان أن الذات الإلهية مشتركة بين الأسماء الحسنى كلها والتكثر فيها حسب تكثر الصفات وذلك التكثر باعتبار مراتبه الغيبية التي هي مفاتيح الغيب وهي معان معقولة في غيب الوجود الحق تعالى لأنها مع كثرتها العقلية مندمجة فيها على نحو بسيط غاية البساطة لأن الذات الأحدية والهوية الوجودية السابقة على جميع الهويات الوجودية مع بساطتها يتصف عند العقل بصفاتها المتكثرة الكمالية والنسبية يتعين [يتفنن] بها شئون الحق وتجلياته - وقد مر مرارا أنها ليست بموجودات عينية ولا يدخل في الوجود الأحدي أصلا فهي ثابتة في العقل معدومة في العين ولها الأحكام والآثار بوجه عرضي لأننا قد ذكرنا أن الأثر في الحقيقة لا يكون إلا للوجود لكن كثرتها العقلية تؤدي إلى كثرة آثار الوجود في الخارج كثرة ترجع إلى وحدة حقيقة في الكل والتكثر بوجه يرجع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٨

إلى التكثر في العلم الذاتي لأن علمه لذاته أوجب العلم بكمالات ذاتية في مرتبة أحدية ثم الجود الإلهي وفيضه الأقدس اقتضت ظهور الذات لكل منها على انفرادها متعينا في حضرته العلمية ثم العينية على طبقاتها من العوالم فحصل له التكثر بهذا الوجه

فصل (٢٧) في إثبات التكثر في الحقائق الإمكانية

إن أكثر الناظرين في كلام العرفاء الإلهيين حيث لم يصلوا إلى مقامهم ولم يحيطوا بكنه مرامهم ظنوا أنه يلزم من كلامهم في إثبات التوحيد الخاص في حقيقة الوجود والموجود بما هو موجود وحدة شخصية أن هويات الممكنات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣١٩

أمور اعتبارية محضة وحقائقها أوهام وخيالات لا تحصل لها إلا بحسب الاعتبار - حتى أن هؤلاء الناظرين في كلامهم من غير تحصيل مرامهم صرحوا بعدمية الذوات الكريمة القدسية والأشخاص الشريفة الملكوتية كالعقل الأول وسائر الملائكة المقربين وذوات الأنبياء والأولياء والأجرام العظيمة المتعددة المختلفة جهة وقدرًا وآثارها المتفننة وبالجملة النظام المشاهد في هذا العالم المحسوس والعوالم التي فوق هذا العالم مع تخالف أشخاص كل منها نوعا وتشخصا وهوية وعددا والتضاد الواقع بين كثير من الحقائق أيضا ثم إن لكل منها آثارا مخصوصة وأحكاما خاصة ولا نعني بالحقيقة إلا ما يكون مبدء أثر خارجي ولا نعني بالكثرة إلا ما يوجب تعدد الأحكام والآثار فكيف يكون الممكن

لا شيئاً في الخارج ولا موجوداً فيه وما يترأى من ظواهر كلمات الصوفية أن الممكنات أمور اعتبارية أو انتزاعية عقلية ليس معناها ما يفهم منه الجمهور ممن ليس له قدم راسخ في فقه المعارف - وأراد أن يتفطن بأغراضهم ومقاصدهم بمجرد مطالعة كتبهم كمن أراد أن يصير من جملة الشعراء بمجرد تتبع قوانين العروض من غير سليقة تحكم باستقامة الأوزان أو اختلالها عن نهج الوحدة الاعتدالية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٠

فإنك إن كنت ممن له أهلية التفطن بالحقائق العرفانية لأجل مناسبة ذاتية واستحقاق فطري يمكنك أن تتنبه مما أسلفناه من أن كل ممكن من الممكنات يكون ذا جهتين جهة يكون بها موجوداً واجباً لغيره من حيث هو موجود واجب لغيره وهو بهذا الاعتبار يشارك جميع الموجودات في الوجود المطلق من غير تفاوت وجهة أخرى بها يتعين هويتها الوجودية وهو اعتبار كونه في أي درجة من درجات الوجود قوة وضعفاً كاملاً ونقصاناً فإن إمكانية الممكن إنما ينبعث من نزوله عن مرتبة الكمال الواجبي والقوة الغير المتناهية والقهر الأتم والجلال الأرفع - وباعتبار كل درجة من درجات القصور عن الوجود المطلق الذي لا يشوبه قصور - ولا جهة عدمية ولا حيثية إمكانية يحصل للوجود خصائص عقلية وتعينات ذهنية هي المسمات بالماهيات والأعيان الثابتة فكل ممكن زوج تركيبى عند التحليل من جهة مطلق الوجود ومن جهة كونه في مرتبة معينة من القصور فإذن

هاهنا ملاحظات عقلية لها أحكام مختلفة.

الأول ملاحظة ذات الممكن على الوجه المجمع

من غير تحليل إلى تينك الجهتين فهو بهذا الاعتبار موجود ممكن واقع في حد خاص من حدود الموجودات.

و الثاني ملاحظة كونها موجوداً مطلقاً من غير تعين وتخصص بمرتبة من المراتب وحد من الحدود

وهذا حقيقة الواجب عند الصوفية يوجد مع الهوية الواجبية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢١

ومع الهويات الإمكانية لعدم الامتياز بين موجود وموجود بهذا الاعتبار ولعدم تطرق الزوال والقصور والتغير والتجدد في مطلق الوجود بشرط الإطلاق وإن اتصف بها مطلقاً - لا بشرط الإطلاق ولا بشرط الإطلاق ولكونه عين المرتبة الأحادية وما حكم بوحده مع انبساطه وسرايته في جميع الموجودات هو هذا المطلق المأخوذ لا بشرط شيء - الذي ليس شموله وانبساطه على جهة الكلية لكونه جزئياً حقيقياً له مراتب متفاوتة.

و الثالث ملاحظة نفس تعينها المنفكة عن طبيعة الوجود

وهو جهة تعينها الذي هو اعتباري محض وما حكم عليه العرفاء بالعدمية هو هذه المرتبة من الممكنات وهو مما لا غبار عليه لأن عند التحليل لم يبق بعد إفراز سنخ الوجود من الممكن - أمر متحقق في الواقع إلا بمجرد الانتزاع الذهني فالحقائق موجودة متعددة في الخارج لكن منشأ وجودها وملاك تحققها أمر واحد هو حقيقة الوجود المنبسط بنفس ذاته لا بجعل جاعل ومنشأ تعددها تعينات اعتبارية فالمتعدد يصدق عليها أنها موجودات حقيقية لكن اعتبار موجوديتها غير اعتبار تعددها فموجوديتها حقيقية وتعددها اعتباري ولما كانت العبارة قاصرة عن أداء هذا المقصد

لغموضه و دقة مسلكه و بعد غوره يشتهه على الأذهان و يختلط عند العقول و لذا طعنوا في كلام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٢

هؤلاء الأكابر بأنها مما يصادم العقل الصريح و البرهان الصحيح و يبطل به علم الحكمة و خصوصا فن المفارقات الذي ثبت فيه تعدد العقول و النفوس و الصور و الأجرام و أنحاء وجوداتها المتخالفة الماهيات و ما أشد في السخافة قول من اعتذر من قبلهم أن أحكام العقل باطلة عند طور وراء طور العقل كما أن أحكام العقل باطلة عند طور العقل و لم يعلموا أن مقتضى البرهان الصحيح مما ليس إنكاره في جبلة العقل السليم من الأمراض و الأسقام الباطنة نعم ربما يكون بعض المراتب الكمالية مما يقصر عن غورها العقول السليمة لغاية شرفها و علوها عن إدراك العقول لاستيطانها في هذه الدار و عدم مهاجرتها إلى عالم الأسرار لا أن شيئا من المطالب الحققة مما يقدر فيها و يحكم بفسادها العقل السليم و الذهن المستقيم - و قد صرح بعض المحققين منهم بأن العقل حاكم كيف و الأمور الجبلية و اللوازم الطبيعية من غير تعمل و تصرف خارجي و مع عدم عائق و مانع عرضي لا تكون باطلة قطعاً إذ لا باطل و لا معطل في الموجودات الطبيعية الصادرة من محض فيض الحق - دون الصناعات و التعليمات الحاصلة من تصرف المتخيلة و شيطنة الواهمة و جبلة العقل الذي هو كلمة من كلمات الله تعالى التي لا تبديل لها مما يحكم بتعدد الموجودات بحسب فطرتها الأصلية قال الشيخ الفاضل الغزالي اعلم أنه لا يجوز في طور الولاية ما يقضي العقل باستحالته نعم يجوز أن يظهر في طور الولاية ما يقصر العقل عنه بمعنى أنه لا يدرك بمجرد العقل و من لم يفرق بين ما يحيله العقل و بين ما لا يناله العقل فهو أخس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٣

من أن يخاطب فيترك و جهله و قال عين القضاة الهمداني في الزبدة اعلم أن العقل ميزان صحيح و أحكامه صادقة يقينية لا كذب فيها و هو عادل لا يتصور منه جور فقد ظهر من كلام هذين الشيخين أنه لا يجوز العدول عما حكم به العقل الصحيح فكيف حكم أمثال هؤلاء الأكابر المجردين عن جلباب البشرية بعد رياضاتهم و مجاهداتهم بما يقضي الحاكم العادل أي العقل الصحيح باستحالته فالحق أن من له قدم راسخ في التصوف و العرفان - لا ينفي وجود الممكنات رأساً. و من النصوص على اتصاف الموجودات بالكثرة الحقيقية الغير المنافية للوحدة الحقيقية كلام صاحب الإحياء بعد ذكر المراتب الثلاثة في التوحيد حيث قال و المرتبة الرابعة في التوحيد أن لا يرى في الوجود إلا واحداً و هو مشاهدة الصديقين و يسقيه الصوفية الفناء في التوحيد لأنه من حيث لا يرى إلا واحداً لا يرى نفسه أيضاً بمعنى أنه فني عن رؤية نفسه.

فإن قلت كيف يتصور أن لا يشاهد إلا واحداً و هو يشاهد السماء و الأرض و سائر الأجسام المحسوسة و هي كثيرة. فاعلم أن هذا غاية علوم المكاشفات و أن الموجود الحقيقي واحد و أن الكثرة فيه في حق من يفرق نظره و الموحد لا يفرق نظره رؤية السماء و الأرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٤

و سائر الموجودات بل يرى الكل في حكم الشيء الواحد و أسرار علوم المكاشفات لا يسطر في كتاب نعم ذكر ما يكسر سورة استبعادك ممكن و هو أن الشيء قد يكون كثيرا بنوع مشاهدة و اعتبار و يكون بنوع آخر من المشاهدة و الاعتبار واحدا كما أن الإنسان كثير إذا نظر إلى روحه و جسده و سائر أعضائه و هو باعتبار آخر و مشاهدة أخرى واحد إذ نقول إنه إنسان واحد فهو بالإضافة إلى الإنسانية واحد و كم من شخص يشاهد إنسانا و لا يخطر بباله كثرة أجزائه و أعضائه - و تفصيل روحه و جسده و الفرق بينهما و هو في حالة الاستغراق و الاستهتار مستغرق واحد ليس فيه تفرق و كأنه في عين الجمع و الملتفت إلى الكثرة في تفرقة و كذلك كل ما في الوجود له اعتبارات و مشاهدات كثيرة مختلفة و هو باعتبار واحد من الاعتبارات واحد و باعتبار آخر سواه كثير بعضه أشد كثرة من بعض و مثال الإنسان و إن كان لا يطابق الغرض و لكن ينبه في الجملة على كشف الكنز - و تستفيد من هذا الكلام ترك الإنكار و الجحود بمقام لم تبلغه و تؤمن به إيمان تصديق فيكون لك من حيث إنك مؤمن بهذا التوحيد نصيب منه و إن لم يكن ما آمنت به صفتك كما أنك إذا آمنت بالنبوة كان لك نصيب منه و إن لم تكن نبيا و هذه المشاهدة التي لا يظهر فيها إلا الواحد الحق سبحانه تارة يدوم و تارة يطرا كالبرق الخاطف و هو أكثر و الدوام نادر عزيز جدا انتهى كلامه.

و قال في موضع آخر من كتاب الأحياء و أما من قويت بصيرته و لم يضعف نيته فإنه في حال اعتدال أمره لا يرى إلا الله و لا يعرف غيره و يعلم أنه ليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٥

في الوجود إلا الله تعالى و أفعاله أثر من آثار قدرته فهي تابعة له فلا وجود لها بالحقيقة و إنما الوجود للواحد الحق الذي به وجود الأفعال كلها و من هذا حاله فلا ينظر في شيء من الأفعال إلا و يرى فيه الفاعل و يذهل عن الفعل من حيث إنه سماء و أرض و حيوان و شجر بل ينظر فيه من حيث إنه صنع فلا يكون نظره مجاوزا له إلى غيره كمن نظر في شعر إنسان أو خطه أو تصنيفه فرأى فيه الشاعر و المصنف - و رأى آثاره من حيث إنه آثاره لا من حيث إنه حبر و عقص و زاج مرقوم على بياض - فلا يكون قد نظر إلى غير المصنف و كل العالم تصنيف الله فمن نظر إليها من حيث إنها فعل الله و أحبها من حيث إنها فعل الله لم يكن ناظرا إلا في الله - و لا عارفا إلا بالله و لا محبا إلا الله بل لا ينظر إلى نفسه من حيث نفسه بل من حيث إنه عبد الله فهذا الذي يقال إنه فني في التوحيد و أنه فني عن نفسه و إليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٦

الإشارة بقول من قال كنا بنا فغبنا عنا فبقينا بلا نحن فهذه أمور معلومة عند ذوي البصائر أشكلت لضعف الأفهام عن دركها و قصور قدر العلماء بها عن إيضاحها و بيانها بعبارة مفهومة موصلة للغرض إلى الأفهام أو باشتغالهم بأنفسهم و اعتقادهم أن بيان ذلك لغيرهم مما لا يغنيهم انتهى كلامه.

و إنما أوردنا كلام هذا البحر القمقام الموسوم عند الأنام بالإمام و حجة الإسلام ليكون تليينا لقلوب السالكين مسلك أهل الإيمان و دفعا لما يتوهمه بعض منهم أن هذا التوحيد الخاصي مخالف للعقل و الشرع أما العقل فلظهور الكثرة في الممكنات و أما الشرع فلأن مدار التكليف و الوعد و الوعيد على تعدد مراتب الموجودات و تخالف المنشآت و إثبات الأفعال للعباد و معنى التوحيد أن لا موجود إلا الله سبحانه و ذلك لما علمت مما سبق منا و ما نقلنا من كلام هذا التحرير

أن هذه وحده يندرج فيها الكثرات أنها وحدة جمعية إذا نظرت إلى حقيقة الوجود المطلق بما هو موجود مطلق الذي يقال له مرتبة الواحدية وإذا نظرت إلى الوجود الصرف البحث الذي لا يشوبه معنى آخر في ذاته ولا تعين له في حقيقته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٧

أصلا فله أيضا إفاضات بنفسه و رشحات بذاته ينبعث عنها الماهيات و الأحكام الثابتة المطابقة للواقع إلا أن منشأ موجوديتها و تحققها ليس إلا نفس ذلك الوجود المتحقق بذاته و التام الغني عما سواه و ستمتع لهذا زيادة توضيح

فصل (٢٨) في كيفية سريان حقيقة الوجود في الموجودات المتعينة و الحقائق الخاصة

اعلم أن للأشياء في الوجودية ثلاث مراتب

أولها الوجود الصرف الذي لا يتعلق وجوده بغيره

و الوجود الذي لا يتقيد بقيد و هو المسمى عند العرفاء بالهوية الغيبية و الغيب المطلق و الذات الأحدية و هو الذي لا اسم له و لا نعت له و لا يتعلق به معرفة و إدراك إذ كل ما له اسم و رسم كان مفهوما من المفهومات الموجودة في العقل أو الوهم و كل ما يتعلق به معرفة و إدراك - يكون له ارتباط بغيره و تعلق بما سواه و هو ليس كذلك لكونه قبل جميع الأشياء - و هو على ما هو عليه في حد نفسه من غير تغير و لا انتقال فهو الغيب المحض و المجهول المطلق إلا من قبل لوازمه و آثاره فهو بحسب ذاته المقدسة ليس محدودا مقيدا بتعين و لا مطلقا حتى يكون وجوده بشرط القيود و المخصصات كالفصول و الشخصيات و إنما لواحق ذاته شرائط ظهوره لا علل وجوده ليلزم النقص في ذاته تعالى عنه علوا كبيرا و هذا الإطلاق أمر سلبي يستلزم سلب جميع الأوصاف و الأحكام و النعوت عن كنه ذاته و عدم التقيد و التجدد [التحدد] في وصف أو اسم أو تعين أو غير ذلك حتى عن هذه السلوبات باعتبار أنها أمور اعتبارية عقلية.

المرتبة الثانية الموجود المتعلق بغيره

و هو الوجود المقيد بوصف زائد - و المنعوت بأحكام محدودة كالعقول و النفوس و الأفلاك و العناصر و المركبات من الإنسان و الدواب و الشجر و الجماد و سائر الموجودات الخاصة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٨

المرتبة الثالثة هو الوجود المنبسط المطلق

الذي ليس عمومته على سبيل الكلية بل على نحو آخر فإن الوجود محض التحصل و الفعلية و الكلي سواء كان طبيعيا أو عقليا يكون مبهما يحتاج في تحصيله و وجوده إلى انضمام شيء إليه يحصله و يوجد و ليست وحدته عددية أي مبدءا للأعداد فإنه حقيقة منبسطة على هياكل الممكنات و ألواح الماهيات لا ينضبط في وصف خاص و لا ينحصر في حد معين من القدم و الحدوث و التقدم و التأخر و الكمال و النقص و العلية و المعلولية و الجوهرية و العرضية و التجرد و التجسم بل هو بحسب ذاته بلا انضمام شيء آخر يكون متعينا بجميع التعينات الوجودية و التحصلات الخارجية بل الحقائق الخارجية تنبعث من مراتب ذاته و أنحاء تعيناته و تطوراته و هو أصل العالم و فلك الحياة و عرش الرحمن و الحق المخلوق به في عرف الصوفية و حقيقة الحقائق - و هو يتعدد في عين وحدته بتعدد الموجودات المتحدة

بالماهيات فيكون مع القديم قديما و مع الحادث حادثا و مع المعقول معقولا و مع المحسوس محسوسا و بهذا الاعتبار يتوهم أنه كلي و ليس كذلك و العبارات عن بيان انبساطه على الماهيات - و اشتماله على الموجودات قاصرة الإشارات إلا على سبيل التمثيل و التشبيه و بهذا يمتاز عن الوجود الذي لا يدخل تحت التمثيل و الإشارة إلا من قبل آثاره و لوازمه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٢٩

و لهذا قيل نسبة هذا الوجود إلى الموجودات العالمية نسبة الهيولى الأولى إلى الأجسام الشخصية من وجه و نسبة الكلي الطبيعي كجنس الأجناس إلى الأشخاص و الأنواع المندرجة تحته و هذه التمثيلات مقربة من وجه مبعدة من وجوه و اعلم أن هذا الوجود كما ظهر مرارا غير الوجود الانتزاعي الإثباتي العام البديهي و المتصور الذهني الذي علمت أنه من المعقولات الثانية و المفهومات الاعتبارية و هذا مما خفي على أكثر أصحاب البحوث سيما المتأخرين و أما العرفاء ففي كلامهم تصريحات بذلك قال الشيخ المحقق صدر الدين القنوني بعد أن تصور الوجود بالمعنى الثالث و مثله بالمادة بقوله الوجود مادة الممكن و هيئة المتهياة له بحكمة الموجد العليم الحكيم على وفق ما كان في علمه مهياة بهذه العبارة و العرض العام هو الضعف اللاحق به عند تقيده بقبيل الإمكان - و بعده عن حضرة الوجود و أسره في أيدي الكثرة و قد سماه الشيخ العارف الصمداني الرباني محي الدين الأعرابي الحاتمي في مواضع من كتبه نفس الرحمن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٠

و الهباء و العنقاء.

رفع اشتباه:

قد ثبت مما ذكرناه أنه إذا أطلق في عرفهم الوجود المطلق - على الحق الواجب يكون مرادهم الوجود بالمعنى الأول أي الحقيقة بشرط لا شيء لا هذا المعنى الأخير و إلا يلزم عليهم المفسد الشنيعة كما لا يخفى و ما أكثر ما ينشأ لأجل الاشتباه بين هذين المعنيين من الضلالات و العقائد الفاسدة من الإلحاد و الإباحة و الحلول و اتصاف الحق الأول بصفات الممكنات - و صيرورته محل النقائص و الحادثات فعلم أن التنزيه الصرف و التقديس المحض - كما رآه المحققون من الحكماء و جمهور أرباب الشرائع و الفضلاء عن الإسلاميين - باق على الوجه المقرر بلا ريب بعد الفرق بين مراتب الوجود على ما بيناه كما قيل -

من يدر ما قلت لم يخذل بصيرته و ليس يديره إلا من له البصر

و للإشارة إلى هذه المراتب الثلاث و كونها مما ينتزع من كل منها بنفسها الوجود العام العقلي قال علاء الدولة في حواشيه على الفتوحات المكية الوجود الحق هو الله تعالى و الوجود المطلق فعله و الوجود المقيّد أثره و ليس المراد من الوجود المطلق العام الانتزاعي بل الانبساطي.

و ذكر الشيخ العارف صدر الدين القنوني في كتابه المسمى بمفتاح غيب الجمع و التفصيل و من حيث إن الوجود الظاهر المنبسط على أعيان الممكنات ليس سوى جمعية تلك الحقائق يسمى الوجود العام و التجلي الساري في حقيقة الممكنات و هذا من تسمية الشيء بأعم أوصافه و أولها حكما و ظهورا للمدارك تقريبا و تفهيمًا لا أن ذلك اسم مطابق

للأمر في نفسه و ذكر أيضا في تفسيره

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣١

لفاتحة الكتاب إشارة إلى المرتبة الأولى الواجبية بقوله فهو أمر معقول يرى أثره و لا يشهد عينه كما نبه عليه شيخنا رضي الله عنه في بيت له -

و الجمع حال لا وجود لعينه و له التحكم ليس للاحاد

فصل (٢٩) في أول ما ينشأ من الوجود الحق

لما تحققت و تصورت حسبما تيسر لك المراتب الثلاث علمت أن أول ما نشأ من الوجود الواجبي الذي لا وصف له و لا نعت إلا صريح ذاته المندمج فيه جميع الحالات و النعوت الجمالية و الجلالية بأحدثته و فردانيته هو الموجود المنبسط الذي يقال له العماء و مرتبة الجمع و حقيقة الحقائق و حضرة أحدية الجمع و قد يسمى بحضرة الواحدية كما قد يسمى الوجود الحق باعتبار إضافته إلى الأسماء في العقل و إلى الممكنات في الخارج مرتبة الواحدية و حضرة الإلهية و هذه المنشئية ليست العلية لأن العلية من حيث كونها علية تقتضي المباينة بين العلة و المعلول - فهي إنما يتحقق بالقياس إلى الوجودات الخاصة المتعينة من حيث تعيينها و اتصاف كل منها بعينها الثابت و كلامنا في الوجود المطلق و هذا الوجود المطلق له وحدة - بنحو مخالف لسائر الوحدات العددية و النوعية و الجنسية لأنها مصححة جميع الوحدات و التعينات فالوجود الحق الواجبي و من حيث اسم الله المتضمن لسائر الأسماء - منشأ لهذا الوجود الشامل المطلق باعتبار ذاته الجمعية و باعتبار خصوصيات أسمائه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٢

الحسنى المندمجة في اسم الله الموسوم عندهم بالمقدم الجامع و إمام الأئمة مؤثر في الوجودات الخاصة التي لا تزيد على الوجود المطلق فالمناسبة بين الحق و الخلق إنما تثبت بهذا الاعتبار و قول الحكماء إن أول الصوادر هو العقل الأول بناء على أن الواحد لا يصدر عنه إلا الواحد كلام جملي بالقياس إلى الموجودات المتعينة - المتباينة المتخالفة الآثار فالأولية هاهنا بالقياس إلى سائر الصوادر المتباينة الذوات و الوجودات و إلا فعند تحليل الذهن العقل الأول إلى وجود مطلق و ماهية خاصة و نقص و إمكان حكمنا بأن أول ما ينشأ هو الوجود المطلق المنبسط و يلزمه بحسب كل مرتبة ماهية خاصة و تنزل خاص يلحقه إمكان خاص و كما أن الذات الواجبية باعتبار أحدية ذاته مقدس عن الأوصاف و الاعتبارات و يلزمها باعتبار مرتبة الواحدية و مرتبة اسم الله جميع الأسماء و الصفات التي ليست خارجة عن ذاته بل هي مع أحدثتها الوجودية جامعة لمعقوليتها فكذلك الوجود المطلق بحسب اعتبار حقيقته و سنخه غير الماهيات و الأعيان الخاصة إلا أن له في كل مرتبة من المراتب الذاتية ماهية خاصة لها لازم خاص و تلك الماهيات كما علمت مرارا متحدة مع أنحاء الوجود المطلق - و مراتبه من غير جعل و تأثير إنما المجمعول كل مرتبة من مراتب الوجود المطلق - أي نفس الوجود الخاص لا كونه خاصا أي اتحاده بماهيته المخصوصة لما علمت من بطلان الجعل المركب بين الوجود و ماهيته فالأحدية الواجبية منشأ الوجود المطلق و الواحدية الأسماوية إله العالم وجودا و ماهيته فسبحان من ربط الوحدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٣

بالوحدة والكثرة بالكثرة وإلا لم يكن بين المؤثر والمتأثر مناسبة وهو ينافي التأثير والإيجاد.

تنبيه تقديسي:

لما تكررت الإشارة سابقا إلى أن لفظ الوجود يطلق بالاشتراك على معانٍ - منها ذات الشيء و حقيقته و هو الذي يطرد العدم و ينافيه و الوجود بهذا المعنى يطلق عند الحكماء على الواجب تعالى.

و منها المعنى المصدري الذهني فقد تبين أن الوجود بهذا المعنى لا يطلقه أحد من العقلاء على ذات أصلا فضلا عن إطلاقه إلى ذاته تعالى الذي هو أصل الذوات و مبدأ الحقائق و الموجودات و هذا المعنى من الوجود يقال له الكون النسبي و الحصول و الوجود الإثباتي كما في قولك أوميرس موجود شاعر أو زيد هو كاتب - و هذا الوجود النسبي كثير ما يجتمع مع العدم باختلاف الجهة كما تقول زيد موجود في البيت معدوم في السوق بل هو مما يوصف بالعدم إذ لا وجود له في الخارج مع تقيده بالخارج و كما أن إطلاق الوجود عليه تعالى بالمعنى الأول حقيقة عند الحكماء فكذلك عند كثير من المشائخ الموحدين كالشيخين محي الدين الأعرابي و صدر الدين القونوي و صاحب العروة في حواشيه على الفتوحات و كثير ما كان يطلق الشيخ و تلميذه الوجود المطلق على الوجود المنبسط الذي يسمى عندهم بالظل و الهباء و العماء و مرتبة الجمعية لا المرتبة الواجبية و كثيرا ما يطلق صاحب العروة الوجود المطلق على الواجب تعالى و إنني لأظن أن الاختلاف بينه و بين الشيخ العربي إنما ينشأ عن هذا الاشتراك في اللفظ الموجب للاشتباه و المغالطة و ممن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٤

أطلق لفظ الوجود و أراد به الواجب تعالى الشيخ العطار في أشعاره الفارسية حيث قال -

آن خداوندی که هستی ذات او است جملة اشیاء مصحف آیات او است
و قال فردوسي القدوسي في ديباجة كتابه -

جهان را بلندی و پستی توئی ندانم چه هر چه هستی توئی

و قال العارف القيومي مولانا جلال الدين الرومي في مثنويه -

ما عدمهائیم هستیها نما تو وجود مطلقى هستی ما

و أما عند علماء الظاهر و أهل الكلام فلما كان إطلاق الأسماء عليه تعالى بالتوقيف الشرعي فلا شبهة في عدم جواز إطلاق الوجود بل الموجود أيضا عندهم على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٥

ذاته تعالى تسمية و أما إطلاقه توصيفا ففيه خلاف لأجل الخلاف المتحقق بينهم في - أن كل صفة أو فعل لا يوجب نقصا عليه و لا نقضا للواجبية فهل يجوز إطلاقه عليه تعالى أم لا قيل لا و قيل نعم و هو الصواب لاشتراك مفهوم الوجود و الشيئية و غيرهما بين الواجب و الممكنات و أما ما ذكره صاحب العروة من أن الذات الواجبية وراء الوجود و العدم

بل هو محيط بهما فالظاهر أنه لم يرد حقيقة الوجود بل مفهومها الانتزاعي و به يحمل منعه عن إطلاق الوجود عليه تعالى و تكفره الطائفة الوجودية من الحكماء و العرفاء - إذ لا شبهة في أن مفهوم الوجود أمر ذهني ليس عينا للذات الأحدية فلا يصح حمله عليها بهو هو حملا ذاتيا أوليا لكن حمل كلام أولئك الأكابر المحققين على الوجه - الذي حمله و رتب عليه تكفيرهم بعيد عن الصواب كيف و جميع المحققين من أكابر الحكماء و الصوفية متفقون على تنزيه ذاته تعالى عن وصمة النقص و امتناع إدراك ذاته الأحدية بالكنه إلا بطريق خاص عند العرفاء هو إدراك الحق بالحق عند فناء السالك و استهلاكه في التوحيد و من تأمل في كتبهم و زبرهم تأملا شافيا يتضح لديه أنه لا خلاف لأحد من العرفاء و المشائخ و لا مخالفة بينهم في أنه تعالى حقيقة الوجود و يظهر له أن اعتراضات بعض المتأخرين عليهم خصوصا الشيخ علاء الدولة السمناني في حواشيه المتعلقة بالفتوحات على الشيخ العربي و تلميذه صدر الدين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٦

القنوي ترجع إلى مناقشات لفظية مع التوافق في الأصول و المقاصد. فمن جملتها أنه ذكر الشيخ فيها أن الوجود المطلق هو الحق المنعوت بكل نعت فكتب المحشي في حاشية كلامه أن الوجود الحق هو الخالق تعالى لا الوجود المطلق و لا المقيد كما ذكر انتهى و ظاهر أن الشيخ قائل بهذا القول - و المناقشة معه ترجع إلى اللفظ فإما أن يكون مراده من الوجود المطلق هو المنبسط على الماهيات فيصدق عليه أنه المنعوت بكل نعت كما مر سابقا في بيان المرتبة الثالثة من الوجود و يؤيده التعميم بكل نعت إذ من جملته نعوت المحدثات فإنه في تنزيهه تعالى عن صفات المحدثات و سمات الكائنات و إما أن يكون مراده منه الوجود البحت الواجب فإما أن يراد بكل نعت أنه سبحانه منعوت بكل نعت كمالي - أو صفة واجبية هي عين ذاته فإن ذاته تعالى باعتبار ذاته لا بانضمام صفة أو حيشة أخرى غير ذاته مصداق لجميع أوصافه العينية و نعوته الذاتية أو يراد به أنه المنعوت بكل نعت مطلقا أعم من أن يكون بحسب ذاته بذاته أي في المرتبة الأحدية أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٧

باعتبار مظاهر أسمائه و مجالي صفاته التي هي من مراتب تنزلاته و منازل شئونات من جهة سعة رحمته أو نفوذ كرمه و جوده و بسط لطفه و رحمته. و منها ما قال في موضع آخر من كتابه ليس في نفس الأمر إلا الوجود الحق - فكتب المحشي بلى و لكن ظهر من فيض جوده بجوده مظاهره فللفيوض وجود مطلق و للمظاهر وجود مقيد و للمفيض وجود حق. و قال في موضع آخر منه إذ الحق هو الوجود ليس إلا فكتب المحشي بلى هو الوجود الحق و لفعله وجود مطلق و لأثره وجود مقيد.

و قال أيضا فيه بعد تحقيق الوجود المستفاد و عدمية الماهيات الممكنة و لقد نبهتكم على أمر عظيم أن تنبهت له و عقلته فهو عين كل شيء في الظهور ما هو عين الأشياء في ذواتها سبحانه و تعالى بل هو هو و الأشياء أشياء و كتب المحشي في حاشيته بلى أصبت فكن ثابتا على هذا القول إلى غير ذلك من المواخذات التي ترجع كل منها إلى مجرد تخالف الاصطلاحات و تباين العادات في التصريح و التعريض - و كثيرا ما يقع الاشتباه من لفظ الذات و الحقيقة و العين و

الهوية و غيرها إذ قد يطلق و يراد منه صرف وجود الشيء و قد يطلق و يراد منه ماهية و عينه الثابتة و يقع الغلط من إطلاق لفظ الوجود أيضا باعتبار إرادة أحد من معنى الوجود الحق أو المطلق أو المقيد و إلا فمن تأمل في الحواشي التي كتبها هذا المعترض على الفتوحات تيقن عدم الخلاف بينه و بين الشيخ في أصل الوجود و لما كان طور التوحيد الخاصي الذي هو لخواص أهل الله أمرا وراء طور العقول الفكرية قبل أن يكتحل بنور الهداية الربانية يصعب عليهم التعبير عنه بما يوافق مقروعات أسماع أرباب النظر و الفكر الرسمي فهذا يتراءى في ظواهر كلامهم اختلافات و مثل هذه الاختلافات بحسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٨

الظاهر قد وقع في الكتاب الإلهي و الأحاديث النبوية و جعل كل طائفة من المليون - مستند اعتقاده الكتاب و الحديث مع تخالف عقائدهم و تباين آرائهم و لكل جعلنا شرعة و منهاجا.

قال الشيخ عبد الله الأنصاري في كتاب منازل السائرين للإشارة إلى توحيد الخواص و أما التوحيد الثالث فهو توحيد اختصه الله لنفسه و استحقه بقدرة و الأح منه لائحا إلى أسرار طائفة من صفوته و أخرسهم عن نعته و أعجزهم عن ثبته [بته] - فقطعت الإشارة على السنة علماء هذا الطريق و إن زخرفوا له نعتا بعباراتهم - و فصلوه فصولا فإن ذلك التوحيد يزيد العبارة خفاء و الصفة نفورا و البسط صعوبة - و إلى هذا التوحيد شخص أهل الرياضة و أرباب الأحوال و له قصد أهل التعظيم - و إياه عنى المتكلمون في عين الجمع و عليه اصطلحت [اصطلحت] الإشارات ثم لم ينطق عنه لسان و لم يشير إليه عبارة فإن التوحيد وراء ما يشير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٣٩

إليه مكنون و قد أجبت عن توحيد الصوفية بهذه القوافي -

ما وحد الواحد من واحد	إذ كل من وحده جاحد
توحيد من ينطق عن نعته	عارية أبطلها الواحد
توحيده إياه توحيده	و نعت من ينعت لا حد

فصل (٣٠) في التنصيص على عدمية الممكنات بحسب أعيان ماهياتها

كانك قد آمنت من تضاعيف ما قرع سمعك منا بتوحيد الله سبحانه توحيدا خاصيا و أذعنت بأن الوجود حقيقة واحدة هي عين الحق و ليس للماهيات و الأعيان الإمكانية وجود حقيقي إنما موجوديتها بانصبائها بنور الوجود و معقوليتها من نحو من أنحاء ظهور الوجود و طور من أطوار تجليه و أن الظاهر في جميع المظاهر و الماهيات و المشهود في كل الشئون و التعينات ليس إلا حقيقة الوجود - بل الوجود الحق بحسب تفاوت مظاهره و تعدد شئونه و تكثر حيثياته و الماهية الخاصة الممكنة كمعنى الإنسان و الحيوان حالها كحال مفهوم الإمكان و الشيئية - و نظائرها في كونهما مما لا تأصل لها في الوجود عينا و الفرق بين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٠

القبيلتين أن المصداق في حمل شيء من الماهيات الخاصة على ذات هو نفس تلك الذات - بشرط موجوديتها العيني أو الذهني و في حمل تلك العبارات هو مفهومات الأشياء الخاصة من غير شرط و بأنه يوجد بإزاء الماهيات الخاصة أمور عينية هي نفس الموجودات عندنا و لا يوجد بإزاء الممكنية و الشيئية و مفهوم الماهية شيء في الخارج - و الحاصل أن الماهيات الخاصة حكاية للموجودات و تلك المعاني الكلية حكاية لحال الماهيات في أنفسها و القبيلان مشتركان في أنهما ليسا من الذوات العينية التي يتعلق بها الشهود و يتأثر منها العقول و الحواس بل الممكنات باطلة الذوات هالكة الماهيات أزلا و أبدا و الموجود هو ذات الحق دائما و سرمدًا فالتوحيد للوجود و الكثرة و التميز للعلم إذ قد يفهم من نحو واحد من الوجود معاني كثيرة و مفهومات عديدة فللوجود الحق ظهور لذاته في ذاته هو سمي بغيب الغيوب و ظهور بذاته لفعله ينور به سماوات الأرواح و أراضي الأشباح و هو عبارة عن تجليه الوجودي المسمى باسم النور به أحكام الماهيات و الأعيان و بسبب تمايز الماهيات الغير المجعولة - و تخالفها من دون تعلق جعل و تأثير كما مر اتصفت حقيقة الوجود بصفة التعدد - و الكثرة بالعرض لا بالذات فيتعاكس أحكام كل من الماهية و الوجود إلى الآخر - و صار كل منهما مرآة لظهور أحكام الآخر فيه بلا تعدد و تكرار في التجلي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤١

الوجودي كما في قوله تعالى **وَمَا أَمْرُنَا إِلَّا وَاحِدَةٌ كَلَمْحٍ بِالْبَصَرِ** و إنما التعدد و التكرار في المظاهر و المرايا لا في التجلي و الفعل بل فعله نور واحد يظهر به الماهيات بلا جعل و تأثير فيها و بتعدد الماهيات يتكثر ذلك النور كتكثر نور الشمس بتعدد المشبكات و الرواشن فانكشف حقيقة ما اتفق عليه أهل الكشف و الشهود من أن الماهيات الإمكانية أمور عدمية لا بمعنى أن مفهوم السلب المفاد من كلمة لا و أمثالها داخل فيها و لا بمعنى أنها من الاعتبارات الذهنية و المعقولات الثانية بل بمعنى أنها غير موجودة لا في حد أنفسها بحسب ذواتها و لا بحسب الواقع - لأن ما لا يكون وجودا و لا موجودا في حد نفسه لا يمكن أن يصير موجودا بتأثير الغير و إفاضته بل الموجود هو الوجود و أطواره و شؤنه و انحواه و الماهيات موجوديتها إنما هي بالعرض بواسطة تعلقها في العقل بمراتب الوجود و تطوره بأطوارها كما قيل شعرا -

وجود اندر كمال خویش ساری ست تعینها امور اعتباری ست

فحقائق الممكنات باقية على عدميتها أزلا و أبدا و استفادتها للوجود ليس على وجه يصير الوجود الحقيقي صفة لها نعم هي تصوير مظاهر و مرآي للوجود الحقيقي - بسبب اجتماعها من تضاعيف الإمكانات الحاصلة لها من تنزلات الوجود مع بقائها على عدميتها الذاتية -

سیه روئی ز ممکن در دو عالم جدا هرگز نشد و الله أعلم

ترجمة لقوله ع: الفقر سواد الوجه في الدارين

و في كلام المحققين إشارات واضحة بل تصريحات جلية بعدمية الممكنات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٢

أزلا و أبدا و كفاك في هذا الأمر قوله تعالى **كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلَّا وَجْهَهُ** قال الشيخ العالم محمد الغزالي مشيرا إلى تفسير هذه الآية عند كلامه في وصف العارفين بهذه العبارة فأروا بالمشاهدة العيانية أن لا موجود إلا الله و أن كل شيء هالك إلا وجهه لا أنه يصير هالكا في وقت من الأوقات بل هو هالك أزلا و أبدا لا يتصور إلا كذلك فإن كل شيء إذا اعتبر ذاته من حيث هو فهو عدم محض و إذا اعتبر من الوجه الذي يسري إليه الوجود من الأول الحق رأى موجودا لا في ذاته لكن من الوجه الذي يلي موجدة فيكون الوجود وجه الله فقط فلكل شيء وجهان وجه إلى نفسه و وجه إلى ربه فهو باعتبار وجه نفسه عدم و باعتبار وجه ربه موجود فإذا لا موجود إلا الله فإذا كل شيء هالك إلا وجهه أزلا و أبدا و كتب العرفاء كالشيخين العربي و تلميذه صدر الدين القونوي مشحونة بتحقيق عدمية الممكنات و بناء معتقداتهم و مذاهبهم على المشاهدة و العيان و قالوا نحن إذا قابلنا و طبقنا عقائدنا على ميزان القرآن و الحديث وجدنا منطبقة على ظواهر مدلولاتها من غير تأويل فعلمنا أنها الحق بلا شبهة و ريب و لما كانت تأويلات المتكلمين و الظاهريين من العلماء في القرآن و الحديث مخالفة لمكاشفاتنا المتكررة الحق طرحتها و حملنا الآيات و الأحاديث على مدلولاتها الظاهرة و مفهومها الأول كما هو المعتبر عند أئمة الحديث - و علماء الأصول و الفقه لا على وجه يستلزم التشبيه و التجسيم في حقه تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٣

و صفاته الإلهية.

قال بعض العلماء المعتقد إجراء الأخبار على هيئتها من غير تأويل و لا تعطيل و مراده من التأويل حمل الكلام على غير معناه الموضوع له و التعطيل هو التوقف في قبول ذلك المعنى كما في هذا البيت.

هست در وصف او بوقت دليل نطق تشبيه و خامشى تعطيل

و منهم من كفر المأولين في الآيات و الأخبار و أكثر أهل الشرع قائلون بأن ظواهر معاني القرآن و الحديث حق و صدق و إن كانت لها مفهومات و تأويلات أخر - غير ما هو الظاهر منها و يؤيده ما وقع في

كلامه ص: أن للقرآن ظهرا و بطنا - و حدا

و مطالعا

و لو لم يكن الآيات و الأخبار محمولة على ظواهرها و مفهوماتها الأولى من دون تجسيم و تشبيه فلا فائدة في نزولها و ورودها على عموم الخلق و كافة الناس بل يلزم كونها موجبة لتحير الخلق و ضلالهم و

الناس في فهم متشابهات القرآن و الحديث على ثلاث طبقات.

الطبقة الأولى الراسخون في العلم

و هم الذين حملوها على مفهوماتها الأولى - من دون مفسدة يلزم منه نقصا أو نقضا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٤

و الطبقة الثانية و هم أهل النظر العقلي من العلماء و الظاهريون من الحكماء الإسلاميين

و هم يأولون تلك الآيات و الأحاديث على وجه يطابق قوانينهم النظرية و مقدماتهم البحثية حيث لم يرتق عقولهم عن طور البحث و لم يتعد بواطنهم و أسرارهم - إلى ما وراء طور العقل الفكري و العلم النظري.

و الطبقة الثالثة و هم الحنابلة و المجسمة

من أهل اللغة و الحديث و هم الذين توقفت نفوسهم في طور هذا العالم و لم يرتقوا عن هذه الهاوية المظلمة فذهبوا إلى أن إلههم جسم أو جسماني تعالى عما يقولون علوا كبيرا لكن الأتيق بحال أكثر الخلق بل جملة المقتصرين في العلوم على الفروع الشرعية الطريقة الثالثة كما صرح به صاحب الإحياء في كتاب جواهر القرآن و ذكر في كتاب الإحياء ما يدل على هذا المعنى حيث قال كن مشبها مطلقا أو منزها صرفا و مقدسا فحلا كما يقال كن يهوديا صرفا و إلا فلا تلعب بالتوراة و ظاهر أن أكثر الناس لا يمكنهم أن يكونوا منزها صرفا و مقدسا فحلا فبقي أن يكونوا مشبها مطلقا و الحق أن كلا من طريقي الغالي و المقصر أي المؤول و المشبه انحراف عن الاعتدال الذي هو طريق الراسخين في العلم و العرفان فكل منهما ينظر في المظاهر بالعين العوراء - لكن المجسمة باليسرى و المؤولة باليمنى و أما الكامل الراسخ فهو ذو العينين السليمتين يعلم أن كل ممكن زوج تركيبى له وجهان وجه إلى نفسه و وجه إلى ربه كما مر ذكره فبالعين اليمنى ينظر إلى وجه الحق فيعلم أنه الفاضل على كل شيء و الظاهر في كل شيء فيعود إليه كل خير و كمال و فضيلة و جمال و بالعين اليسرى ينظر إلى الخلق و يعلم أن ليس لها حول و لا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم و لا شأن لها إلا قابلية الشئون و التجليات و هي في ذواتها أعدام و نقائص فينتهي إليها كل نقص و آفة و فتور و دثور قائل لسان مقال طبع لسان حاله في خلو ذات الممكن عن نعت الوجود شفيفها عن لون الكون و قبولها إشراق نور الحق عليها و نفوذ لون الوجود في ذاتها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٥

رق الزجاج و رقت الخمر	فتشابها و تشاكل الأمر
فكانه خمر و لا قدح	و كأنه قدح و لا خمر

وهم و تنبيه:

إن بعض الجهلة من المتصوفين المقلدين الذين لم يحصلوا طريق العلماء العرفاء و لم يبلغوا مقام العرفان توهموا لضعف عقولهم و وهن عقيدتهم و غلبة سلطان الوهم على نفوسهم أن لا تحقق بالفعل للذات الأحدية المنعوتة بالسنة العرفاء بمقام الأحدية و غيب الهوية و غيب الغيوب مجردة عن المظاهر و المجالي بل المتحقق هو عالم الصورة و قواها الروحانية و الحسية - و الله هو الظاهر المجموع لا بدونه و هو حقيقة الإنسان الكبير و الكتاب المبين الذي هذا الإنسان الصغير أنموذج و نسخة مختصرة عنه و ذلك القول كفر فضيح و زندقة صرفة - لا يتفوه به من له أدنى مرتبة من العلم و نسبة هذا الأمر إلى أكابر الصوفية و رؤسائهم افتراء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٦

محض وإفك عظيم يتحاشى عنه أسرارهم وضمائرهم ولا يبعد أن يكون سبب ظن الجهلة بهؤلاء الأكابر إطلاق الوجود تارة على ذات الحق وتارة على المطلق الشامل وتارة على المعنى العام العقلي فإنهم كثيرا ما يطلقون الوجود على المعنى الظلي الكوني فيحملونه على مراتب التعينات والوجودات الخاصة فيجري عليه أحكامها فمن هذا القبيل قول الشيخ العربي في التدبيرات الإلهية كل ما دخل في الوجود فهو متناه وما قال القنوني في تفسيره للفاتحة أو الغيبي الخارج عن دائرة الوجود والجعل وما قال في مفتاح الغيب والوجود تجل من تجليات غيب الهوية وحال معين كباقي الأحوال الذهنية وذكر الشيخ علاء الدولة في رسالة الشارد والوارد لأن فوقها يعني فوق الطبيعة عالم العدم المحض وظلمة العدم محيط بنور الوجود المحدث وفيها أي في الظلمات توجد عين الحياة هذا القول منه إشارة إلى ما قال في مدارج المعارج واعلم أن فوق عالم الحياة عالم الوجود وفوق عالم الوجود عالم الملك الودود ولا نهاية لعالمه انتهى فظهر أنه قد يكون مرادهم من العدم ما يقابل هذا النحو من الوجود الظلي وإن لم يكن هذا الإطلاق على سبيل الحقيقة بل على المجاز لأن الوجود في عرفهم ما يكون مبدأ الآثار ومنشأ الأكوان- ويمكن أيضا أن يكون مرادهم من الوجود ما يكون معلوما ومخبرا عنه وكل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٧

ما لا يكون للعقل سبيل إلى معرفة ذاته وكنه هويته فغير موجود بهذا المعنى- فالوحدة الحقيقية بشرط لا وغيب الغيوب حيث لا يكون لأحد من الخلق قدم في شهوده وإدراكه فيصدق عليه أنه غير موجود لغيره على أن الوجود قد يطلق على المأخوذ من الوجدان وهو أيضا مرجعه إلى الوجود الرباطي فيكون مسلوبا عنه تعالى إذ لا يمكن نياله وظهوره لأحد إلا من جهة تعيناته ومظاهره لكن تحققه بذاته وكماله بنفسه وجوده إنما هو بالفعل لا بالقوة وبالوجوب لا بالإمكان فذاته يظهر بذاته على ذاته في مرتبة الأحدية الصرفة المعبر عنه بالكنز المخفي في الحديث المشهور ويظهر بعد هذا الظهور ظهور آخر على غيره بل على ذاته وهو الظهور طورا بعد طور في المظاهر المعبر عنه بالمعروفة وهذا الظهور الثانوي هو مشاهدة الذات القيومية في المرائي العقلية والنفسية بمدارك كل شاهد وعارف- وبمشاعر كل ذكي وبلید وعالم وجاهل على حسب درجات الظهور جلاء وخفاء- وطبقات المدارك كمالات ونقصا والتكثر في الظهورات والتفاوت في الشئون- لا يقدح وحدة الذات ولا ينثلم الكمال الواجبي ولا يتغير به الوجود الثابت الأزلي- عما كان عليه بل الآن كما كان حيث كان ولم يكن معه شيء ولذا قيل-

وما الوجه إلا واحد غير أنه إذا أنت عدت المرايا تعددا

فصل (٣١) في الإشارة إلى نفي جهات الشرور عن الوجود الحقيقي

اعلم أن الشئئية للممكن يكون على وجهين شئئية الوجود وشئئية الماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٨

وهي المعبرة عندهم بالثبوت فالأولى عبارة عن ظهور الممكن في مرتبة من المراتب وعالم من العوالم والثانية عبارة عن نفس معلومية الماهية وظهورها عند العقل بنور الوجود وانتزاعها منه والحكم بها عليه بحسب نفس هوية ذلك

الوجود في أي ظرف كان خارجاً أو ذهنياً من غير تخلل جعل و تأثير في ذلك و من غير انفكاك هذه الشيئية عن نفس الوجود كما زعمته المعتزلة بل على ما هو رأي المحصلين من المشائين و قد علمت أن موجودية الماهيات ليست بأن يصير الوجود صفة لها- بل بأن تصير معقولة من الوجود و متحدة به فالمشهود هو الوجود و المفهوم هو الماهية كما مر ذكره مراراً و بهذه الشيئية يمتاز ماهية الممكن عن الممتنع و تقبل الفيض الربوبي و تستمع أمر كن فيدخل في الوجود بإذن ربها كما أشير إليه في قوله تعالى **إِنَّمَا قَوْلُنَا لِشَيْءٍ إِذَا أَرَدْنَاهُ أَنْ نَقُولَ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ**.

لا يقال إن ماهية كل ممكن على ما قررت هي عين وجوده و فرعه بحسب الخارج فكيف يكون مقدماً عليه قابلاً له. قلنا نعم و لكن الوجودات الخاصة المفصلة لها مرتبة سابقة إجمالية- منشؤها علم الحق الأول بذاته و تعقله لمراتب الهية و شئونه فتلك الوجودات قبل أن تنزلت و تعددت و تفصلت كان لها في تلك المرتبة السابقة أسماء و صفات ذاتية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٤٩

ينبعث عنها الماهيات و الأعيان الثابتة فهي في تلك المرتبة أيضاً تابعة للوجودات الخاصة الموجودة سابقاً باعتبار معلوميتها للحق سبحانه علماً كمالياً هو عين ذاته- كما سيجيء تحقيقه في مباحث العلم إلا أن معلوميتها في الأزل على هذا الوجه- أي باعتبار ثبوتها تبعاً لوجودات الحقائق الإمكانية في علم الحق تعالى منشأ لظهور تلك الوجودات في المراتب المتأخرة على طبق ثبوتها العلمي في ذات الحق سبحانه- على الوجه الذي أشرنا إليه ثم إذا فاضت الوجودات عن الحق تعالى و تميزت و تعددت في الخارج اتحدت مع كل منها بالذات ماهية من الماهيات من غير استيناف جعل بل بنفس فيضان ذلك الوجود كما هو شأن كل ماهية مع وجودها المتميز عن غيره فلم يلزم في شيء من المراتب الواقعة في الخارج تقدم الماهية الخاصة على وجودها المنسوب هي إليه إما في مرتبة علمه تعالى فالأعيان تابعة لوجود الحق تعالى- الذي هو بعينه علمه بوجودات الأشياء إجمالاً و بماهيات الأشياء تفصيلاً من جهة معلوميتها مفصلة عن وجود الحق تعالى إذ العلم بالعلة التامة مستلزم للعلم بمعلولاتها كما سيقرر سمعك برهانه من ذي قبل إن شاء الله تعالى و أما في الخارج فذلك لأن الفائض و المجمعول ليس إلا انحاء الوجودات بالذات و الماهيات تابعة في الفيضان و الجعل بالعرض فظهر صدق ما وقع في السنة العرفاء أن موجودية الأعيان- و قبولها للفيض الوجودي و استماعها للأمر الواجبي بالدخول في دار الوجود عبارة عن ظهور أحكام كل منها بنور الوجود لا اتصافها به كما مر غير مرة و أما الشيئية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٠

المنفية عن الإنسان في قوله تعالى **هَلْ أَتَى عَلَى الْإِنْسَانِ حِينٌ مِّنَ الدَّهْرِ لَمْ يَكُنْ شَيْئاً مَّذْكُوراً** فهي شيئية الوجود المتميز المخصوص باعتبار تميزها و خصوصها- لئلا يلزم التناقض و كذا الشيئية المذكورة

في قوله ع: كان الله و لم يكن معه شيء

و معلوم أن ليس للماهيات الإمكانية عند أهل الله و العارفين إلا الشيئية الثبوتية- لا الشيئية الوجودية إلا على ضرب من المجاز و لأجل ذلك لما سمع شيخ الطائفة الفائزة بالحق أبو القاسم الجنيد البغدادي حديث كان الله و لم يكن معه

شيء قال والآن كما كان وذكر الشيخ علاء الدولة في رسالة فوائد العقائد في صفة أهل الله - وهم الذين يصلون إلى مقام الوحدة من غير شبهة الحلول والاتحاد والمشاهدون جمال ربهم كما كان ولم يكن معه شيء ويعرفون أنه الآن كما كان وقال في هذه الرسالة حكاية عن نفسه وأبصر كل شيء هالك إلا وجهه وأعين كل من عليها فان من غير شك وتخمين وهذا المقام مقام الوحدة.

فإذا تقرر هذه المقدمات فنقول إن الماهيات والأعيان الثابتة وإن لم تكن موجودة برأسها بل مستهلكة في عين الجمع سابقا وفي تفصيل الوجودات لاحقا - لكنها بحسب اعتبار ذاتها من حيث هي بحسب تميزها عن الوجود عند تحليل العقل منشأ الأحكام الكثيرة والإمكان وسائر النقائص والذمائم اللازمة لها من تلك الحيثية ويرجع إليها الشرور والآفات التي هي من لوازم الماهيات من غير جعل فتصير بهذا الاعتبار وقاية للحق عن نسبة النقائص إليه فعدم اعتبار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥١

الأعيان والماهيات أصلا منشأ للضلالة والحيرة والإلحاد و بطلان الحكمة والشرعية إذ باعتبار شيئية الماهيات واستناد لوازمها إليها يندفع كثير من الإشكالات.

منها وقوع الشرور في هذا العالم و صدور المعاصي عن بعض العباد بسبب قصور عينه ونقص جوهره و سوء استعداده و هاهنا سر القدر على أن بعض المحققين من الموحدين عدوا شيئية الأعيان من جملة شئونه باعتبار بطونه و علمه بصور تجلياته الذي هو عين ذاته في مرتبة سابقة على ظهورها لكن الخوض في هذه المسألة يحير العقول الضعيفة و قل من العلماء من لا يكون هذا السر ضرا مضره عليه - و فتنة مضلة لرسوخ علمه و قوة سلوكه و ثبات عقله فلا تزل قدمه عن سنن الحق و صراطه المستقيم و إلى ذلك أشار القونوي بقوله و إن كانت شئونه أيضا من أحكام ذاته الكامنة في وحدته و لكن ثمة فارق يعرفه الكمل و هاهنا بحار لا ساحل لها و لا مخلص منها إلا لمن شاء الله و قال أيضا و مطلق الظهور حكما للأشياء - مطلق الظهور عينا للوجود و تعين الظهور الحكمي بالتميز المشهود و تعين الظهور الوجودي في كل مرتبة من المراتب التي اشتمل عليها العلم بالنسبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٢

إلى الوجود المطلق من وجه مخالف لظهور تعينه في مرتبة أخرى و حكمه أيضا في مرتبة مغاير لحكمه في مرتبة أخرى و أن حصول الاشتراك في الظهورين بأمر جامع غير الذي امتاز به كل منهما عن الآخر فالثابت لشيء في شيء من شيء بشرط أو شروط أو المنتفي عنه لا يثبت له و لا ينتفي عنه بعدم ذلك الشرط و الشروط مرتبة كان الشرط أو حالا أو مكانا أو زمانا أو غير ذلك و أحكام الوجود من حيث كل تعين و بالنسبة إلى كل معين من المراتب و الأحوال و نحو ذلك لا نهاية لها من حيث التفصيل و إن تناهت الأصول انتهى كلامه

فصل (٣٢) فيه يستأنف الكلام من سبيل آخر في كيفية لحوق الشرور والآفات لطبيعة الوجود على وجه لا ينافي خيريتها الذاتية

لعلك قد تظننت مما سلف ذكره بأنه متى تجلّى الوجود الحق الأحدي على ماهية من الماهيات المتباينة بحسب

مفهومها و شئيتها و لوازمها و قد قذف بالحق على الباطل فصارَت موجودة بوجوده أو واجبة به حقا بحقيقته [بحقيقته] ظهر في كل منها بحسبها و تلون بلونها و اتصف في كل مرتبة من مراتب التعينات بصفة خاصة و نعت معين و قد علمت سابقا أن تلك الصفات و النعوت الذاتية المسماة بالماهيات عند الحكماء و بالأعيان عند العرفاء متقدمة على الوجودات الخاصة بحسب الذهن تابعة لها بحسب الخارج لكون المفاض و المجعول إنما يكون هو الوجود لا الماهية فالتخالف بين الماهيات بحسب الذات و بين الوجودات بنفس الشدة و الضعف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٣

التقدم و التأخر و العلو و الدنو و بالجملة الوجود مع وحدة حقيقته الذاتية يظهر في كل شيء بحسبه كالماء الواحد في المواضع المختلفة فمنه عذب فرات و منه ملح أجاج و كشعاع الشمس الملون بلون الزجاجات مع خلوه بحسب الذات عن الألوان.

و قال الشيخ صدر الدين القونوي في رسالة له في شرح بعض الأحاديث كل ما كان في ذاته من حيث ذاته عريا عن الأوصاف المختلفة التقيدية و كان في غاية اللطف فإذن ظهوره و تعينه في حقيقة كل متعين و مرتبة و عالم إنما يكون بحسب قابلية الأمر المتعين و المرتبة المقتضية تعينه و ظهوره انتهى فقد ظهر أن كل ما نسب إلى المظاهر و المجالي من الأفعال و الصفات المخصوصة فهو ثابت لها من وجه و مسلوب عنها من وجه إذ لكل موجود خاص جهة ذات و ماهية و جهة وجود و ظهور - و ليس للحق إلا إفاضة الوجود على الماهيات و له الحمد و الشكر على إفاضة الخير على الأشياء و إذا ثبت كون كل ممكن ذا جهتين ماهية و وجود و حيثيتين إمكان ذاتي و وجوب غيري و صحة إثبات ما ينسب إليه له و سلبه عنه كل منهما بجهة و علمت أيضا أن جهة الاتفاق و الخيرية في الأشياء هو الوجود و جهة التخالف و الشرية هي الماهيات فقد دريت أن التنزيه و التشبيه في كلام الله و كلام أنبيائه ع يرجع إلى هاتين الجهتين و كلاهما محمول على ظاهرهما بلا تناقض و تأويل فالإيجاد و الإفاضة و الفعلية و التكميل و التحصل و البقاء و اللطف و الرحمة من جنب الله و قدرته - و القابلية و القصور و الخلل و الفتور و الفناء و الدثور و التجدد و الزوال و القهر و الغضب - من قبل الخلق و استطاعتهم كما نظمهم بعض الفرس حيث قال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٤

از آن جانب بود ايجاد و تكميل و زين جانب بود هر لحظه تبديل

و التفاوت في القوابل و الحقائق الإمكانية و الماهيات إنما يحصل لها بوجه من نفس ذواتها و بوجه من الفيض الأقدس المسمى بالقضاء الأزلي الذي هو عبارة عن ثبوت الأشياء في علم الله تعالى بالنظام الأليق الأفضل من حيث كونها تابعة لأسماء الحق و صفاته التي هي عين ذاته و وجود تلك الماهيات في الخارج بإفاضة الوجود عليها بحسب أوقاتها المخصوصة و استعداداتها من الحق يسمى عندهم بالفيض المقدس و هو بعينه القدر الخارجي إذ التقدير تابع لعلم الله تعالى و كلاهما في الوجود غير منفك عن ذاته و هذا لا ينافي حدوث الأشياء و تجددتها و زوال بعضها عند حضور بعض آخر كما ستطلع عليه إن شاء الله تعالى عند معرفة الزمان و الدهر و السرمد - و نحو نسبة هذه المعاني إلى مبدع

الكل على وجه مقدس لا يوجب تغيراً لا في ذاته ولا في صفاته ولا في أفعاله من حيث إنها أفعاله وعند بيان إحاطته بالزمانيات والمكانيات على الوجه المقدس الشمولي يتبين كيفية تكلمه تعالى مع ملائكته - ورسله لا على الوجه الذي يقوله الأشاعرة.

والحاصل أن النقائص والذمائم في وجودات الممكنات ترجع إلى خصوصيات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٥

المحال والقوابل لا إلى الوجود بما هو وجود وبذلك يندفع شبهة الثنوية ويرتفع توهم التناقض بين آيتين كريمتين من كتاب الله العزيز إحداهما قوله تعالى - **مَا أَصَابَكَ مِنْ حَسَنَةٍ فَمِنَ اللَّهِ وَمَا أَصَابَكَ مِنْ سَيِّئَةٍ فَمِنْ نَفْسِكَ** و الأخرى قوله تعالى **قُلْ كُلُّ مِّنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ** وما أحسن ما وقع متصلاً بهذه الآية إيماء بلطافة هذه المسألة من قوله تعالى **فَمَا لَهُمْ لَا يُكَادُونَ يَفْقَهُونَ حَدِيثًا** وذلك لأن مسألة العلة والمعلول قد أشكلت على الناس لغموضها وبعد غورها فإن المعلولات إنما هي أستر على وجه العلل وفيها هلك من هلك والأمر ما ترى العلماء حيارى فيها فمنهم من ثبتت الأسباب ومنهم من ينفيها ولذا قيل إن الناس في هذه المسألة بين حيارى وجهال فمن استشفى من هذا الداء العضال والمزلقة التي لا يخلص منها إلا المخلصون أصبح موحداً لا ينافي توحيدة رؤية الأسباب.

و خلاصة تحقيق هذا المقام إن لكل شيء كما مر وجهها خاصاً إلى رب الأرباب ومسبب الأسباب به يسبحه وينزهه ويحمده والتأثير الذي يشاهد من الأسباب إنما هو من اسم من الأسماء الحسنى الذي هذا السبب مظهره وسبح له بلسان الذاكرة في مرتبته لا من نفس ذاته الكائنة فإنها فاسدة باختلاف الحقائق في الموجودات - يرجع بوجه إلى اختلاف الأسماء لكن الشرور والنقائص ترجع إلى خصوصيات القوابل واستعداداتها بحسب المصادمات الواقعة بينها في المراتب المتأخرة عند نزول حقيقة الوجود ولسان جميع الشرائع الحققة ناطق بأن وجود كل كمال وخير وسلامة - يضاف إلى الحق تعالى ولزوم كل شر وآفة وقصور ولو باعتبار من الاعتبارات يضاف إلى الخلق كما في قوله تعالى حكاية عن الخليل على نبينا وعليه السلام **وَإِذَا مَرِضْتُ فَهُوَ يَشْفِينِ** فإنه عليه صلوات الرحمن أضاف المرض إلى نفسه والشفاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٦

إلى ربه وفي قوله تعالى أيضاً **إِنْ تُعَذِّبْهُمْ فَإِنَّهُمْ عِبَادُكَ وَإِنْ تَغْفِرْ لَهُمْ فَإِنَّكَ أَنْتَ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ** إشارة إلى أن العذاب للنفوس الجاهلة الشقية ليس من قبل الحق الأول من جهة الانتقام بل لكون العقوبة من نتائج أعمالها وأفعالها ومن لوازم أخلاقها الردية فكأنها هي حمالة حطب نيرانها يوم الآخرة لخطيئة سابقة كمن أدى نهمته إلى مرض شديد وأن المغفرة والرضوان من لوازم الوجود [الجود] الأول - ورحمته وإفاضة وجوده على الأشياء حسب إمكان قوابلها وكما

في قول سيدنا محمد ص حيث ذكر في دعائه ع: الخير كله بيدك والشر ليس إليك

و في حديث آخر عنه ص: فمن وجد خيراً فليحمد الله ومن وجد غير ذلك فلا يلومن إلا نفسه

فقد ظهر أن ليس للحق إلا حمد وإفاضة الوجود وإخراج الماهيات من العدم إلى الكون والتحصيل ومن القوة إلى الفعل والتكميل ومن البطون إلى الظهور والله الهادي إلى سواء السبيل

فصل (٣٣) في كيفية كون الممكنات مرايا لظهور الحق فيها و مجالي لتجلي الإله عليها

قد أشير فيما سبق أن جميع الماهيات و الممكنات مرآي لوجود الحق تعالى - و مجالي لحقيقته المقدسة و خاصية كل مرآة بما هي مرآة أن تحكي صورة ما تجلى فيها إلا أن المحسوسات لكثرة قشورها و تراكم جهات النقص و الإمكان فيها - لا يمكن لها حكاية الحق الأول إلا في غاية البعد كما ذكره معلم المشاءين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٧

أرسطاطاليس في أثولوجيا و هو كتابه المعروف بمعرفة الربوبية و بيان ذلك أن للحق تجليا واحدا على الأشياء و ظهورا واحدا على الممكنات و هذا الظهور على الأشياء هو بعينه ظهوره الثاني على نفسه في مرتبة الأفعال فإنه سبحانه لغاية تماميته و فرط كمال فضل ذاته من ذاته و فاض ذاته لكونه فوق التمام من ذاته - و هذا الظهور الثانوي لذاته على نفسه لا يمكن أن يكون مثل ظهوره الأولي لاستحالة المثليين و امتناع كون التابع في مرتبة المتبوع في الكمال الوجودي و الشعاع نحو المضيء في النورية فلا محالة نشأت من هذا الظهور الثانوي الذي هو نزول الوجود الواجبي بعبارة و الإفاضة بعبارة أخرى و النفس الرحمانية في اصطلاح قوم - و العلية و التأثير في لسان قوم آخر و المحبة الأفعالية عند أهل الذوق - و التجلي على الغير عند بعض الكثرة و التعدد حسب تكثر الأسماء و الصفات في نحو العلم الإجمالي البسيط المقدس فظهرت الذات الأحدية و الحقيقة الواجبية في كل واحد من مرآي الماهيات بحسبه لا أن لها بحسب ذاتها ظهورات متنوعة و تجليات متعددة كما توهمه بعض و إلا يلزم انثلام الوحدة الحق تعالى عنه علوا كبيرا.

قال الشيخ محي الدين العربي في الباب الثالث و الستين في كتاب الفتوحات المكية إذا أدرك الإنسان صورته في المرأة يعلم قطعا أنه أدرك صورته بوجه و أنه ما أدرك صورته بوجه لما يراه في غاية الصغر لصغر جرم المرأة أو الكبر لعظمه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٨

و لا يقدر أن ينكر أنه رأى صورته و يعلم أنه ليس في المرأة صورته و لا هي بينه و بين المرأة فليس بصادق و لا كاذب في قوله رأى صورته و ما رأى صورته فما تلك الصورة المرئية و أين محلها و ما شأنها فهي منتفية ثابتة موجودة معدومة معلومة مجهولة - أظهر سبحانه هذه الحقيقة لعبده ضرب المثال ليعلم و يتحقق أنه إذا عجز و حار في درك حقيقة هذا و هو من العالم و لم يحصل علما بحقيقته فهو بخالقها إذن أعجز و أجهل و أشد حيرة.

أقول و نبه بذلك على أن تجليات الحق أدق و ألطف من حقيقة هذا الذي حارت العقول فيه و عجزت في إدراكه إلى أن يبلغ عجزها أن يقال هل لهذا المدرك حقيقة أم لا فإن العقول لا يلحقه بالعدم الصرف و قد علمت أنه ليس بلا شيء و لا بالوجود المحض و قد علمت أنه ليس بشيء مباين للمقابل و لا بالإمكان البحث - فالحكمة في خلق المرأة و الحقيقة الظاهرة فيها هداية العبد إلى كيفية سريان نور الحق في الأشياء و تجليه على مرآي الماهيات و ظهوره في كل شيء بحسبه - فإن وجود كل ماهية إمكانية ليس هو نفس ماهيتها بحسب المعنى و الحقيقة و لا عين الذات الواجبية لقصوره و نقصه و إمكانه و لا مفصولا عنها بالكلية لعدم استقلاله في التحقق كما مضى برهانه.

ثم إنه كما ثبت أن تجليه تعالى على الأشياء تجل واحد و إفاضة واحدة إنما حصل تعدده و اختلافه بحسب تعدد الماهيات و اختلافها تحقق و تبين أنه لا تكرار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٥٩

في التجلي باعتبار مظهر واحد و منه يستفاد أن العلم بكل حقيقة لا يكون إلا حضورها لا حصول شبح آخر منها لأن ظهور شبحها ليس هو بعينه ظهورها و إلا لزم التكرار و قد نفاه العرفاء كما قد تبين لك.

و من هاهنا ينكشف لذي البصيرة دقيقة أخرى هي أنه قد اختلف الحكماء في أن إدراك النفس الإنسانية حقائق الأشياء عند تجردها و اتصالها بالمبدأ الفياض أ هو على سبيل الرشح أو على نهج العكس أي من جهة إفاضة صور الأشياء على ذاتها أو على نهج مشاهدتها في ذات المبدأ الفعال و لكل من المذهبين وجوه و دلائل مذكورة في كتب أهل الفن و عند التحقيق يظهر على العارف البصير أنه لا هذا و لا ذاك بل بأن سبب الاتصال التام للنفس بالمبدأ لما كان من جهة فنائها عن ذاتها و اندكاك جبل إنيتها و بقائها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٠

بالحق و استغراقها في مشاهدة ذاته فيرى الأشياء كما هي عليها في الخارج لا أن ما يراها من الحقائق غير ما وقعت في الأعيان و إلا يلزم التكرار في التجلي الإلهي و هو مما قد ثبت بطلانه و مما نفاه العرفاء و الحكماء الرواقيون القائلون بأن وجود الأشياء في الأعيان - و هو بعينه نحو معلوميتها للحق من الحق لا من الأشياء و أن عالمية الحق سبحانه بالأشياء هي بعينها فيضانها عنه بإشراق نوره الوجودي فكل ما أدركه العارف المكاشف من صور الحقائق بواسطة اتصاله بعالم القدس يكون حقائق الأشياء على ما هي عليها في الخارج لا أشباحها و مثالاتها و أما الناقص المحجوب فيرى الحق في مرآة الأشياء و يعتقد على حسب ما يراه فيعرفه على صورة معتقده فإذا تجلى الحق له يوم القيامة في غير الصورة التي يعتقد كذلك ينكره و يتعوذ منه - و من هاهنا ينبعث اختلاف العقائد بين الناس لاختلاف ما يرون الحق فيها من الأشياء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦١

و إليه الإشارة في قوله تعالى

أنا عند ظن عبدي بي

فيقبل كل أحد منه ما يليق بحاله و يناسبه من التجليات الإلهية و ينكر ما لا يعطيه نشأته و السالك الواصل الفاني يشاهد الحق مجردا عن نسبة الخلق إليه فيحجبه ضيق فنائه و قصور ذاته عن الخلق لضيق الفاني عن كل شيء فكما كان قبل الفناء محجوبا بالخلق عن الحق - لضيق وعائه الوجودي فكذلك في ثاني الحال لأجل فنائه عن كل شيء ذاهل عن مراتب الإلهية و تجلياته الذاتية و الأسمائية و أما الكامل العارف للحق في جميع المظاهر و المجالي الراجع إلى التفصيل مستمدا من الإجمال فيشاهد الحق على وجه أسمائه و صفاته فيرى الخلق بالحق فيسير في أرض الحقائق التي أشرقت بنور ربها - فيكون علمه في هذا المقام بالأشياء من جهة العلم بمبدأ الأشياء و مظهر وجوداتها و مظهر أعيانها الثابتة و ماهياتها فيصدق حينئذ أنه يرى الأشياء كما هي في مرآة وجهه الكريم الذي له غيب السماوات و الأرض فثبت أنه كما أن الأشياء - بوجه مرآتي ذات الحق و وجوده فكذلك الحق مرآة حقائق الأشياء لكن مرآية كل واحد من المرآتين بوجه

غير الأخرى و بيان ذلك أن كل واحدة من المرائي التي هي غير ذات الحق كمرائي ماهيات الممكنات لظهور حقيقة الوجود و مرائي القوى الخيالية الكلية التي هي مظاهر عالم المثل و القوة الخيالية الجزئية التي هي مظهر الصور الخيالية و الجليدية و الماء و البلور و الحديد التي كل منها مظهر للصور المبصرة و الحاسة السمعية و الذوقية و الشمية و اللسمية التي هي مظاهر للمحسوسات الأربعة إنما يكون مرآيتها- لأجل خلو ذاتها من حيث هي عما هي مظاهر له من الصور و الكيفيات التي هي مظاهر و مرائي لشهودها لكن لما لم يكن حيثية مرآيتها هي بعينها حيثية ذاتها و وجودها لتقيد لوجودها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٢

ذات كل منها بقيد وجودي لم تكن صادقة من كل الوجوه و إن لم تكن كاذبة أيضا من كل الوجوه فانت إذا نظرت إلى خصوص ذات المرأة و كونها من حديد أو زجاج مثلا- حجبك ذلك عن ملاحظة تلك الصورة التي فيها و لا يكون هي عند ذلك مظهرا لها لتقيدها و حصرها و إذا قطعت النظر عن الحديد أو الزجاج و لم تنظر إليه نظرا استقلاليا بل نظرا ارتباطيا تعلقيا فعند ذلك تنظر إلى الصورة المقابلة و تلك الخصوصية حكمها باق و إن لم يكن ملتفتا إليها فلاجل ذلك لم يكن المشهود بعينه وجود ذلك المرئي في نفسه فيصير خصوصية المرأة حجابا عن وجوده الحقيقي على حسب تلك الخصوصية و لهذا اختلف المرائي صغرا و كبرا و استقامة و اعوجاجا و ظهورا و خفاء لأجل اختلاف خصوصيات المرأة تحديدا و تقعيرا و صقالة و كدورة و إن لم تكن ملحوظة و كذا حكم باقي المرائي الإمكانية. و أما الحق سبحانه فلكون ذاته ذاتا فياضة يفيض عنه صور الأشياء و معقوليتها- يكون ذاته مظهرا يظهر به الأشياء على الوجه الذي هي عليه و بيان ذلك أن ذاته بذاته من غير حيثية أخرى مبدءا للأشياء فكذلك شهود ذاته مبدءا لشهود الأشياء لأن العلم التام بالعلة التامة يوجب علم التام بالمعلول و كما أن شهود ذاته ليس و لا يمكن إلا بنفس ذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٣

بل ذاته و شهود ذاته شيء واحد بعينه بلا اختلاف جهتين و لا تعدد حيثيتين و هما العلتان لوجود الخلق و شهودهم فكذا شهود ذوات الخلق لا يتصور إلا بعين وجودها إذ العلتان واحدة بلا مغايرة فكذا المعلولان واحد بلا تعدد فكما أن وجود الأشياء على ما هي عليها من توابع وجود الحق سبحانه فكذا معقوليتها و شهودها على ما هي عليها من توابع معقولة الحق و مشهوديته فثبت و تحقق أن ذاته تعالى من حيث ذاته مرآة يدرك بها صور الأشياء الكلية و الجزئية على ما هي عليه في نفس الأمر بلا شوب غلط و كذب بخلاف مرائي الممكنات.

تفريع:

قد علم بما ذكر أنه لا يمكن معرفة شيء من الأشياء إلا بمعرفة مبدعه و خالقه كما مر ذكره سابقا إذ وجود كل شيء ليس إلا نحوه واحدا لا يحصل إلا من جهة واحدة لما علمت من امتناع تكرار شيء واحد- و انتفاء الاثنينية في تجلي الحق و انكشف صحة قول الحكماء أن العلم اليقيني بأشياء ذوات الأسباب لا يحصل إلا من جهة العلم بأسبابها فحقق هذا المقام إن كنت من ذوي الأقدام.

تعقيب:

قد وضح لديك مما ذكر كيفية ما قرع سمعك في الفلسفة العامة - أن العلم بالعلة المعينة يوجب العلم بالمعلول المعين و أما العلم بالمعلول المعين فلا يوجب إلا العلم بالعلة المطلقة لا بخصوصيتها و السر في ذلك ليس ما هو مذكور في الكتب المشهورة من أن العلة بخصوصها تقتضي المعلول بخصوصه - و أما المعلول بخصوصه فلا يستدعي إلا علة مطلقة لأنه مجرد دعوى بلا بينة و برهان - بل السر فيه أن المعلول كما حققناه ليس إلا نحوًا خاصًا من تعيينات العلة و مرتبة معينة من تجلياتها فمن عرف حقيقة العلة عرف شئونها و أطوارها بخلاف من عرف المعلول فإنه ما عرف علته إلا بهذا النحو الخاص كمن يرى وجه الإنسان في واحدة من المرآتي المختلفة صغرا و كبرا تحديدا و تعقيرا و استقامة و اعوجاجا و قد حقق الشيخ الجليل محي الدين الأعرابي هذا المطلب تحقيقا بالغًا حيث ذكر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٤

في الفصل الشيثي من فصوص الحكم عند تقسيم العطيات إلى الذاتية و الأسمائية بهذه العبارة - أن التجلي من الذات لا يكون أبداً إلا بصورة استعداد المتجلي له غير ذلك لا يكون - فإذا المتجلي له ما رأى سوى صورته في مرآة الحق و ما رأى الحق و لا يمكن أن تراه مع علمه أنه ما رأى صورته إلا فيه كالمرآة في الشاهد إذا رأيت الصور فيها - لا تراها مع علمك أنك ما رأيت الصور أو صورتك إلا فيها ثم قال و إذا ذقت هذا ذقت الغاية التي ليس فوقها غاية في حق المخلوق فلا تطمع و لا تتعب نفسك في أن تترقى أعلى من هذا الدرج فما هو ثم أصلا و ما بعده إلا العدم المحض فهو مرآتك في رؤيتك نفسك و أنت مرآته في رؤية أسمائه و ظهور أحكامها و ليست سوى عينه انتهى

تعقيب آخر:

ثم انكشف لك مما تلوناه عليك أن اختلاف المذاهب بين الناس - و تخالفهم في باب معرفة الحق يرجع إلى اختلاف أنحاء مشاهداتهم لتجليات الحق و الرد و الإنكار منهم يؤول إلى غلبة أحكام بعض المواطن على بعضهم دون بعض و احتجاب بعض المجالي عن واحد دون آخر فإذا تجلى الحق بالصفات السلبية للعقول القادسة يقبلونه تلك العقول و يسبحونه عن شوائب التشبيه و النقص - و يمجّدونه عن لوازم التجسم و التكثير فهكذا حال كل من كان من جملة العقول المنزهة المسيحة كبعض الحكماء و ينكره كل من لم يكن من المجردين كالوهم و الخيال و النفوس المنطبعة و قواها و هكذا حال من كان في درجة تلك القوى الإدراكية - بحسب ما يكون الغالب فيه كأكثر الظاهريين و المشبهين إذ ليس من شأنهم إدراك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٥

الحق الأول إلا في مقام التشبيه و التجسيم و إذا تجلى بالصفات الثبوتية فتقبله القلوب و النفوس الناطقة لأنها مشبهة من حيث تعلقها بالأجسام و منزهة من حيث تجرد جوهرها و ينكره العقول المجردة الصرفة لعدم إعطاء نشأتها إلا مرتبة البعد عن عالم التجسيم و التحاشي عنه فيقبل كل نشأة من النشآت العقلية و النفسية و الوهمية من التجليات الإلهية ما يناسبها و يليق بحالها و ينكر ما يخالفها و لم يكن يعطيه شأنها و ذلك لأن كل أحد لا يشاهد الحق إلا بتوسط وجوده الخاص و لا يعرفه إلا بوسيلة هويته الخاصة و لا يظهر له من الحق إلا ما يتجلى في مرآة ذاته المخصوصة فكل قوة من القوى محجوبة عن الحق بنفسها لا يرى أفضل من ذاتها كالملائكة التي نازعت في حق آدم و كالعقل و الوهم فإن كلا

منهما يدعي السلطنة على غيره ولا يدعن له فالعقل يدعي أنه محيط بإدراك الحقائق بحسب قوته النظرية وليس كذلك لأنه بحسب قوته الفكرية لا يدرك إلا المفهومات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٦

الذهنية و لوازم الهويات الوجودية دون حقائقها الخارجية و غاية عرفانه ما دام في مقام الفكر و النظر العلم الجملي بأن له ربا منزها عن النقائص و الصفات الكونية - و هو محتجب عن شهود الحق و مشاهدة تجلياته الذاتية و ظهوراته التفصيلية و نفوذ نوره في أقطار العوالم و كذلك الوهم يدعي السلطنة و يكذب العقل في كل ما هو خارج عن طوره من أجل إدراكه المعاني المتعلقة بالجزئيات فلكل من القوى نصيب من الشيطنة [السلطنة] و كذلك لكل واحد من أشخاص الناس ما سوى الإنسان الكامل حصّة من الشرك الخفي أو الجلي لكونه يعبد اسما من أسماء الله - و لا يعبد الله بجميع الأسماء كما أشار إليه في قوله تعالى سبحانه **وَمِنَ النَّاسِ مَنْ يَعْبُدُ اللَّهَ عَلَى حَرْفٍ فَإِنْ أَصَابَهُ خَيْرٌ اطْمَأَنَّ بِهِ وَإِنْ أَصَابَتْهُ فِتْنَةٌ انْقَلَبَ عَلَى وَجْهِهِ** و أما الإنسان الكامل فهو الذي يقبل الحق و يهتدي بنوره في جميع تجلياته و يعبدّه بحسب جميع أسمائه فهو عبد الله في الحقيقة و لهذا سمي بهذا الاسم أكمل أفراد نوع الإنسان لأنه قد شاهد الحق الأول في جميع المظاهر الأمرية و الخلقية من غير تطرق تكثر لا في الذات و لا في التجلي أيضا لما مر من أن تجليه تعالى حقيقة واحدة و التكثر باعتبار تعدد شئونه و حيثياته المسماة بالماهيات و الأعيان الثابتة التي لا وجود لها في ذاتها و لا يتعلق بها جعل و تأثير بل لها مع انحاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٧

الوجودات التي هي إظلال للنور الأحدي و رشحات للوجود القيومي ضرب من الاتحاد - فيصير أحكاما لها و محمولات عليها فالكاملون علموا الحقائق علما لا يطرا عليه ريب و شك فهم عباد الرحمن الذين يمشون على أرض الحقائق هونا و إذا خاطبهم الجاهلون قالوا سلاما و هم العقول الضعيفة القاصرة العاجزة عن إدراك التجليات الإلهية في كل موطن و مقام و أما النفوس الآبية الطاغية فهي غير معظمة لشعائر الله - فهم في الحقيقة في جحيم البعد و مضيق الحرمان عن إدراك الحقائق و الأنوار الإلهية - إذ لا يقبلون إلا ما أعطت ذواتهم و قيل فيهم **إِنَّكُمْ وَمَا تَعْبُدُونَ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ حَصَبُ جَهَنَّمَ** أي جهنم الحرمان عن ملاحظة تجليات الحق و إضافته لأنهم حيث اشتبه عليهم الوجودات التي هي نفس فيضات الحق و انحاء تجلياته بلوازم الماهيات التي هي أمور برأسها و أصنام بحيالها فعبدوها و نسبوا الوجود و الإيجاد في المراتب المتأخرة إليها و لم يعبدوا الحق الأول في جميع المراتب و بحسب كل الأسماء لأنهم لم يعلموا أن الحق هو المتجلي في كل شيء مع أنه المتخلي عن كل شيء فسبحان من تنزه عن الفحشاء و سبحان من لا يجري في ملكه إلا ما يشاء.

ذكر إجمالي:

انظر أيها السالك طريق الحق ما ذا ترى من الوحدة و الكثرة جمعا و فرادى فإن كنت ترى جهة الوحدة فقط فانت مع الحق وحده لا ارتفاع الكثرة اللازمة عن الخلق و إن كنت ترى الكثرة فقط فانت مع الخلق وحده و إن كنت ترى الوحدة في الكثرة محتجبة و الكثرة في الوحدة مستهلكة فقد جمعت بين الكمالين و فزت بمقام الحسنيين و الحمد لله ذي

العظمة والكبرياء وله الأسماء الحسنی

الحكمة المتعالية فی الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٨

فصل (٣٤) فی ذکر نمط آخر من البرهان على أن واجب الوجود فرداني الذات تام الحقيقة لا يخرج من حقيقته شيء من الأشياء

اعلم أن واجب الوجود بسيط الحقيقة غاية البساطة و كل بسيط الحقيقة كذلك فهو كل الأشياء فواجب الوجود كل الأشياء لا يخرج عنه شيء من الأشياء - و برهانه على الإجمال أنه لو خرج عن هوية حقيقته شيء لكان ذاته بذاته مصداق سلب ذلك الشيء و إلا لصدق عليه سلب سلب ذلك الشيء إذ لا مخرج عن النقيضين و سلب السلب مساوق للثبوت فيكون ذلك الشيء ثابتا غير مسلوب عنه و قد فرضناه مسلوبا عنه هذا خلف و إذا صدق سلب ذلك الشيء

الحكمة المتعالية فی الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٦٩

عليه كانت ذاته متحصلة القوام من حقيقة شيء و لا حقيقة شيء فيكون فيه تركيب و لو بحسب العقل بضرب من التحليل و قد فرضناه بسيطا هذا خلف.

و تفصيله أنه إذا قلنا إن الإنسان ليس بفرس فسلب الفرسية عنه لا بد

الحكمة المتعالية فی الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٠

و أن يكون من حيثية أخرى غير حيثية الإنسانية فإنه من حيث هو إنسان إنسان لا غير و ليس هو من حيث هو إنسان لا فرسا و إلا لكان المعقول من الإنسان بعينه - هو المعقول من الالفرس و لزم من تعقل الإنسانية تعقل الالفسية إذ ليست سلبا محضا بل سلب نحو خاص من الوجود و ليس كذلك فإنا كثيرا ما نتعقل ماهية الإنسان و حقيقته مع الغفلة عن معنى الالفسية و مع ذلك يصدق على حقيقة الإنسان - أنها لا فرس في الواقع و إن لم يكن هذا الصدق عليها من جهة معنى الإنسان بما هو معنى الإنسان فإن الإنسان ليس هو من حيث هو إنسان شيئا من الأشياء غير الإنسان و كذا كل ماهية من الماهيات ليست من حيث هي إلا هي و لكن في الواقع غير خال عن طرفي النقيض بحسب كل شيء من الأشياء غير نفسها - فالإنسان في نفس ذاته إما فرس أو ليس بفرس و هو إما فلك أو غير فلك و كذا الفلك إما إنسان أو غير إنسان و هكذا في جميع الأشياء المعينة فإذا لم يصدق على كل منها ثبوت ما هو مباين له يصدق عليه سلب ذلك المباين فيصدق على ذات الإنسان مثلا في الواقع سلب الفرس فتكون ذاته مركبة من حيثية الإنسانية - و حيثية الالفسية و غيرها من سلوب الأشياء فكل مصداق لإيجاب سلب محمول عنه عليه لا بد و أن يكون مركب الحقيقة إذ لك أن تحضر صورته في الذهن و صور ذلك المحمول مواطاة أو اشتقاقا فتقايس بينهما و تسلب أحدهما عن الآخر فما

الحكمة المتعالية فی الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧١

به الشيء هو هو غير ما يصدق عليه أنه ليس هو فإذا قلت ليس بكاتب فلا يكون صورة زيد بما هي صورة زيد ليس بكاتب و إلا لكان زيد من حيث هو زيد عدما بحثا بل لا بد و أن يكون موضوع هذه القضية أي قولنا زيد ليس بكاتب

مركبا من صورة زيد و أمر آخر عديمي يكون به مسلوبا عنه الكتابة من قوة أو استعداد أو إمكان أو نقص أو قصور و أما الفعل المطلق فحيث لا يكون فيه قوة و الكمال المحض ما لا يكون فيه استعداد و الوجوب البحث و التمام الصرف ما لا يكون معه إمكان أو نقص أو توقع فالوجود المطلق ما لا يكون فيه شائبة عدم إلا أن يكون مركبا من فعل و قوة و كمال و نقص و لو بحسب التحليل العقلي بنحو من اللحاظ الذهني و واجب الوجود لما كان مجرد الوجود القائم بذاته من غير شائبة كثرة و إمكان أصلا فلا يسلب عنه شيء من الأشياء إلا سلب السلوب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٢

و الأعدام و النقائص و الإمكانات لأنها أمور عدمية و سلب العدم تحصيل الوجود فهو تمام كل شيء و كمال كل ناقص و جبار كل قصور و آفة و شين فالمسلوب عنه و به ليس إلا نقائص الأشياء و قصوراتها و ضرورها لأنه خيرية الخيرات و تمام الوجودات - و تمام الشيء أحق بذلك الشيء و أكد له من نفسه و إليه الإشارة في قوله تعالى **وَمَا رَمَيْتَ إِذْ رَمَيْتَ وَلَكِنَّ اللَّهَ رَمَىٰ** و قوله تعالى **وَهُوَ مَعَكُمْ أَيْنَ مَا كُنْتُمْ** و قوله تعالى **هُوَ الْأَوَّلُ وَالْآخِرُ وَالظَّاهِرُ وَالْبَاطِنُ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ**

فصل (٣٥) في أن الإمكان و إن كان متقدما على الوجود كما مر و كذا القوة و إن كانت متقدمة على الفعل بالزمان فشيء منهما ليس من الأسباب الذاتية للوجود

فنقول أولا الإمكان أمر عديمي كما مر و الأمور العدمية غير صالحة للسببية و التأثير فلا يصلح الإمكان لأن يكون سببا و لا جزءا من السبب و ذلك لأن سبب الشيء ما يفيد ثبوت شيء و المفيد للثبوت لا بد و أن يكون له تعيين و خصوصية - باعتبارها يتميز بسببية شيء عن غيره و إلا فكونه سببا ليس أولى من كون غيره سببا و كل ما له في ذاته تعيين و خصوصية فهو ثابت فإذن كل سبب فهو ثابت و بعكس النقيض كل ما ليس بثابت فإنه لا يكون سببا و بهذا البيان يتبين أنه لا يمكن أن يكون جزء سبب لأن جزء السبب سبب لسببية السبب و يعود إلى ما ذكرناه أولا فاعتبار الإمكان و لا اعتباره واحد كسائر السلوب الغير المتناهية و إن كانت لازمة لذات المؤثر.

الحجة الثانية أن الإمكانات في الممكنات إما أن يكون تباينها في العدد فقط - أو هي متباينة في الماهية فإن كان تباينها بالعدد فقط استحال أن يكون إمكان شيء علة لوجود شيء لتساوي أفراد طبيعة واحدة في الأحكام الثابتة لبعضها لذاته فلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٣

يكون استناد التأثير إلى بعض الإمكانات أولى من استناده إلى غير ذلك البعض - فيلزم أن يصدر من كل واحد من الإمكانات مثل ذلك المعلول مثلا إذا جعلنا إمكان وجود الفاعل علة لوجود الفلك و جب أن يصدر من إمكان كل موجود فلك و أن لا ينتهي الأفلاك بل يصدر من كل فلك فلك إلى لا نهاية و أما الشق الثاني فهو باطل في نفسه لأنه مقابل للوجوب و هو معنى واحد و نقيض الواحد واحد و لأنه يصح تقسيمه إلى إمكان الجوهر و إمكان العرض ثم إمكان الجوهر يصح تقسيمه إلى إمكان الجسم و إمكان غير الجسم و مورد القسمة لا بد أن يكون مشتركا و لأن المعقول من الإمكان في جميع الأفراد أمر واحد و الاختلاف وقع في أمور خارجة عن مفهومه و هذا يوجب كونه ماهية نوعية لا

يختلف إلا بالخارجيات و لأنه أمر عديمي كما مر و الأعدام لا تمايز بينها بالذات فثبت بالبرهان القاطع أن الإمكان غير مؤثر في وجود شيء سواء كان في وجود موضوعه أو في وجود أمر مغاير لموضوعه.

برهان آخر لو كان الإمكان مؤثرا في شيء لكان مؤثرته إما بمشاركة من موضوعه أو لا فإن لم يكن بمشاركة الموضوع فذلك ممتنع لأن البرهان قام على أن ما كان غنيا في فعله عن شيء كان غنيا في ذاته عن ذلك الشيء فإذا كان كذلك كان الإمكان جوهرًا مفارقًا هذا خلف و إن كانت مؤثرته بمشاركة من موضوعه - فيكون الإمكان جزءًا من المؤثر و جزء المؤثر مؤثر في مؤثرية ذلك المؤثر فذلك التأثير أيضا إما أن يكون بمشاركة الموضوع أو لا بمشاركة و الثاني محال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٤

كما مر و الأول مستلزم لأن يكون ذلك الإمكان جزءًا من هذا المؤثر و ننقل الكلام إليه - و هكذا إلى غير النهاية و هو محال بلا شبهة لأنه تسلسل في العلل المترتبة المجتمعة - فإن قلت فكيف ذهب الحكماء إلى أن إمكان العقل الأول مبدأ صدور الفلك و إمكانات العقول مبادي الأجسام الفلكية فانتهضت الفرصة لأعداء الحكماء من ذلك حتى قال بعضهم في مثل هذا المقام فظهر أن الذي يقال من أن إمكان العقل الأول علة للفلك الأقصى و وجوبه للعقل الثاني هذيان لا يليق بالعوام فضلا عما يدعي التحقيق.

أقول معنى تأثير الإمكان في شيء يرجع إلى مثل قولهم عدم العلة علة لعدم المعلول و كما أن ذلك القول ليس معناه أن لعدم تأثيرا في الواقع بل أنه متى عدمت العلة لم يوجد المعلول فكذلك مرادهم من كون الإمكان سببا للفلك أن العقل لكون وجوده موصوفاً بنقص إمكانه لا يصدر عنه ما يصدر إلا أمراً ناقص الوجود كالجسم فبالحقيقة الوجود سبب الوجود و العدم سبب العدم بالمعنى الذي أومأنا إليه فلم يلزم كون العدمي سببا للأمر الوجودي بالذات بل على هذا الوجه أي بالعرض و كذا الكلام في إمكان الماهية و في الإمكانات الاستعدادية - فإنها ليست مؤثرة في وجودات الأشياء مبدعة كانت أو كائنة أما كون الإمكان غير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٥

مؤثر في شيء فقد مضى بيانه و أما كون القوى الاستعدادية غير مؤثرة في شيء - فلأن تأثيرها إن كان بلا شركة المادة الجسمانية كانت مستغنية في تأثيرها عن المادة فتكون مجردة الوجود عن المادة لما سبق أن الغنى في الفاعلية عن شيء غنى في الوجود عنه لأن الموجودية جزء من الموجدية و المفروض خلافه و هذا محال و إن كانت المادة شريكة لها في التأثير و شأن المادة القبول و الانفعال لا التأثير و الإيجاب و الشيء الواحد لا يمكن أن يكون له نسبة إلى شيء بالوجوب و الإمكان - فالمادة تستحيل أن تكون فاعلة و لا شريكة للفاعل فالقوى الجسمانية على الإطلاق فضلا عن الاستعدادية يمتنع أن تكون مؤثرة في الوجود و أما معنى كون إمكان الماهية سببا لوجودها فمعناه أن كلا من الوجوب و الامتناع يخرج الشيء عن أن يكون قابلا لتأثير المؤثر فيه و الإمكان لا يخرج عن قابلية التأثير - و لا يمنعه عن ذلك فمرجع الإمكان زوال مانع الفاعلية و التأثير في شيء فالإمكان مصحح لكون الماهية قابلة للوجود و العدم بهذا المعنى و أما معنى كون الاستعدادات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٦

و الإمكانات القريبة و البعيدة أسبابا للوجود و هو أن في عالم الاستعدادات توجد صور متضادة متفاسدة و تلبس المادة ببعضها يمنع عن وجود بعض آخر و قبول المادة إياه و هذا المنع في بعضها أقوى و في بعضها أضعف فكون المادة مصورة بالمائية - يبعدها عن قبول الصورة النارية و كونها هواء يقربها من قبول النارية ثم كلما كانت صورتها الهوائية أشد سخونة صارت مناسبتها للنارية أقوى و هكذا إلى أن يصير بحيث يستوي نسبتها إلى الطرفين أي الهوائية و النورية فيكون فيها إمكان لهما فإذا اشتدت السخونة بحيث تزيد سخونتها عن سخونة الهواء صار استعدادها لقبول النارية أقوى من استعدادها لقبول الهوائية فحينئذ قبلت النارية فصارت نارا صرفا فالإمكان الاستعدادي مرجعه زوال المانع و الضد إما بالكلية و هو القوة القريبة أو بالبعض و هو القوة البعيدة ألا ترى أن المزاج مع أنه كيفية وجودية من باب الملموسات يقال له إنه استعداد لوجود الصورة الحيوانية أو النباتية أو الجمادية أي إمكان لها و ذلك لأن تضاد الصور بكيفياتها الصرفة مانع عن قبول صورة كمالية فكلما زال صرافة كيفياتها و انهدم جانب تضادها كان قوة قبول المادة لكمال آخر أقوى حتى إذا تم استعدادها للكمال الأقصى و هو بصيرورتها بحيث كأنها زالت عنها تلك المتضادات قبلت من الكمال ما قبلتها المادة الفلكية الخالية عن الصور و الهيئات المضادة أعني النفس الناطقة لأن المبدأ الأعلى فياض دائما و المادة قد زال عنها المانع فقبلت لا محالة فالإمكانات القريبة و البعيدة مصححات للقابلية لأن معناها يحصل عند ارتفاع الموانع و زوال الأضداد فقد ثبت و تحقق أن الإمكانات و القوى و كذا الأعدام كلها ليست مؤثرات في وجود شيء من الأشياء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٧

أصلا و إنما هي معدات لصلوح القوابل و المواد كما علمت فإن كل كائن في عالمنا هذا لا بد من سبق العدم عليه و جعله من الأسباب معناه تخلية المادة عن الصورة السابقة ليتمكن قبولها اللاحقة و كذا الأمور التدريجية لذواتها كالزمان و الحركة - و ما يستلزمهما لا بد في حدوث كل من أفرادها من زوال ما وجد منها بالفعل و كذا حكم المتصلات القارة و التعليمات في أن حضور كل جزء أو جزئي منها في مكان - يستلزم زوال الآخر و غيبته عن ذلك المكان لنقص وجودها عن قبول الاستيعاب

فصل (٣٦) في أن القوى الجسمانية لا تفعل ما تفعل إلا بمشاركة الوضع

لما ثبت و تحقق أن المفتقر في وجوده إلى شيء مفتقر إليه في فعله فقد ثبت هذا المطلب بالقوة القريبة من الفعل و ذلك لأن المادة وجودها وجود وضعي - و كذلك كل ما يتقوم وجوده بالمادة يكون وجوده وجود أمر ذي وضع و لو بالتبع - فيكون فاعليته أيضا بحسب الوضع أعني فاعلية ذات وضع و لو بالتبع فما لا وضع لفاعل جسماني بالقياس إليه لم يفعل فيه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٨

و إن أردت زيادة شرح فنقول كل قوة تقتضي أثرا و فعلا فلا يخلو إما أن يكون تأثيرها مختصا بمحل معين حتى يكون تأثيرها في غير ذلك المحل مترتبا على تأثيرها في ذلك المحل حتى يكون كلما هو أقرب إليه كان أولى بقبول ذلك

الأثر وإما أن لا يكون كذلك فلا يكون تأثيرها في محل مترتب على تأثيرها في محل آخر مثال الأول القوة النارية فإن تأثيرها مختلف بحسب القرب و البعد لما أثرت فيه بالقياس إلى محلها - فكلما كان أقرب إليه كان وصول السخونة إليه أشد و أقدم فالقوة متى كانت كذلك نعلم أن لها تعلقا بذلك الجسم إما لاحتياجها في ذاتها إلى ذلك الجسم مثل القوة النارية و إما لاحتياجها في فاعليتها إليه لا في ذاتها مثل النفوس فعند ذلك صح القول بأنها تفعل بمشاركة الوضع و أما القوة التي لا يتوقف تأثيرها في فعلها إلا على كون ذلك الفعل ممكن الحدوث في ذاته و يكون إفاضته غير مختصة [مخصصة] بشيء دون شيء من الأجسام و جب أن لا يكون لتلك القوة تعلق بشيء من المواد لا في فعلها و لا في ذاتها بل كانت غنية عن الأجسام من كل الوجوه فيكون من المفارقات العقلية.

و عند هذا التحقيق يظهر أن القوى الجسمانية يمتنع أن يكون لها تأثير في وجود المجردات و لا في صفاتها لأن القرب و البعد ما لا حيز له و لا وضع ممتنع - و إذا ثبت هذا ثبت أن القوة الجسمانية لا تأثير لها في وجود الهيولى و الصورة المقومة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٧٩

فلا يكون لها تأثير في وجود شيء من الأجسام. و ليس لقائل أن يقول فكما لا تأثير للجسماني في المجرد لأنه لا وضع له بالنسبة إليه فكذلك يجب أن لا انفعال و لا تأثير للجسماني عن المجردات إذ لا وضع لها بالنسبة إليها فوجب أن لا ينسبوا الأجرام في وجودها إلى شيء من المفارقات.

لأننا نقول يكفي في تحقق تأثير المجرد في شيء كون الأثر في ذاته ممكنا فمتى تحقق الإمكان الذاتي فاض الأثر عنه سواء كان الأثر في نفسه ذا وضع أو لا و أما مؤثرية القوة الجسمانية فلا يكفي في تحققها كون الأثر ممكنا فقط بل و أن يكون محل الأثر له نسبة وضعية من محل القوة الجسمانية و ذلك مستحيل على المفارق و المادة إذا حدثت فيها صورة أو كمال من الجوهر المفارق كانت هي المنفعلة بنفسها لا المتوسطة بين المنفعل و بين غيره و هناك لم تكن المادة هي الفاعلة بل المتوسطة و بين المعنيين فرق.

فإن رجعت و قلت أليس حدوث البدن عندهم علة لحدوث النفس و هي من المجردات و لا وضع للبدن بالنسبة إليه. قلت إنك ستعرف كيفية حدوث النفس على البدن و أن علة حدوثها أمر مفارق و البدن حامل إمكانها بوجه كما سيجيء بيانه فهو شرط على وجه - لفيضان المعلول عن العلة لا أنه مؤثر في ذلك و هكذا حال كل محل لما يحل فيه - و كذا كل قوة حالة في محل فإنها غير مؤثرة فيه بل هي شرط لقبوله ما يقبل من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨٠

لوازم تلك القوة كما سيعود ذكره إذ لا وضع لكل من المحل و الحال بالقياس إلى صاحبه

فصل (٣٧) في أن الوجود وحده يصلح للعلية و المعلولية

أما الأول فلأن غير الوجود لا يكون ذاته مع قطع النظر عن وجوده الأشياء يتساوى بالنسبة إليه الوجود و العدم فلا يكون في ذاته بحسب ذاته موجودا - فذاته بذاته لا يصلح لأن يكون علة لوجود شيء أصلا لا وجود ذاته و لا وجود شيء

آخر - فكل ما هو سبب لشيء فلا بد أن يكون لوجوده تأثير في وجود ذلك الشيء - فالوجود صالح للمؤثرية فلو فرض مجردا عن الماهية لكان أولى بالتأثير لأن الماهية ليست شأنها إلا الإمكان والحاجة وقد علمت أن لا تأثير للعدميات في شيء - كما أن القوة المادية لو فرضت مجردة عنها لكانت أولى بالتأثير لخلوصها عن شوائب النقائص والأعدام على أن ذلك مطلب آخر والذي نحن فيه أن الوجود صالح للعلية مطلقا.

وأما الشك الذي أورده الإمام الرازي وهو أن الوجودات إما أن يكون تباينها في العدد فقط أو هي متباينة في الماهية فإن كان الأول فاستحال أن يكون وجود شيء علة لوجود شيء آخر إذ لا أولوية في تقدم بعض أفراد طبيعة واحدة على بعض بالذات لأنها متساوية الأقدام في ذلك وإن كان الثاني فهو مستحيل لأن الوجود ينقسم إلى وجود جوهر ووجود عرض ووجود الجوهر ينقسم إلى وجود الجسم ووجود غير الجسم ووجود العرض ينقسم إلى وجودات الأجناس العرضية و مورد التقسيم يجب أن يكون معنى واحدا ولأن المعقول من الوجود أمر بديهي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨١

وهذا الأمر المعقول قدر مشترك بين الوجودات والاختلافات إنما تقع في أمور - خارجة عن هذا المفهوم و كل ما خرج عن هذا المفهوم فهو غير داخل في الوجود بل خارج ولأن الوجودات إن كانت متخالفة الماهيات كانت مركبة من جنس وفصل - فيلزم أن يكون وجود المعلول الأول مركبا فلزم أن يصدر عن العلة الواحدة - أكثر من معلول واحد وهو عندهم باطل.

فأقول إن الأصول السالفة تكفي مثونة إبطال مثل هذه الأنظار الواهية وقد سبق أن حقيقة الوجود أمر واحد بسيط لكنه مشكك بالأشدية والأضعفية والتقدم والتأخر وأما كون الوجود صالحا للمعلولية فلأن الماهيات غير صالحة للمجعولية بذاتها فالذي يصلح لها أما نفس الوجود أو اتصاف الماهية بالوجود لكن الاتصاف كما علمت من المراتب اللاحقة بالماهية وهو متفرع على وجود الماهية الموصوفة - وقد بينا كيفية هذا الاتصاف فبقي أن المعلول بالذات ليس إلا الوجود.

واعترض الإمام الرازي هاهنا بأن الوجود ماهية واحدة فلو كان تأثير العلة فيه - لكانت عليه صالحة لكل معلول بيانه أن الماء إذا سخن بعد أن لم يكن مسخنا فتلك السخونة ماهية من الماهيات وحقيقتها في الوجود الفاض عليها من المبادي المفارقة إما أن يتوقف على شرط أو لا يتوقف فإن لم يتوقف لزم دوام وجودها - لأن الماهية قابلة والفاعل فياض أبدا فوجب دوام الفيض وإن توقفت على شرط فالمتوقف على ذلك الشرط وجود السخونة أو ماهيتها والأول باطل لأن ملاقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨٢

الماء شرط للبرودة ووجود البرودة مساو لوجود السخونة فليكن ملاقاته شرطا لوجود السخونة أيضا لأن ما كان شرطا لشيء كان شرطا لأمثاله ولو كان كذلك لوجب حصول السخونة عند ملاقة الماء لأن الماهية قابلة والفاعل فياض والشرط حاصل فيجب حصول المعلول ويلزم من ذلك حصول كل شيء عند حصول كل شيء فلا اختصاص لشيء من الحوادث بشرط وعلة و كل ذلك باطل يدفعه الحس.

و أما الثاني و هو أن تكون الماهية هي المتوقفة على الشرط فهو يستلزم المطلوب - فإن الماهية إذا توقفت بنفسها على شرط كانت متوقفة على الغير و كل ما يتوقف على غيره يستدعي سببا و علة و لا محالة ينتهي إلى واجب الوجود فظهر أن الماهيات مجعولة بأنفسها لا بوجودها فقط انتهى كلامه.

أقول قد علمت فساده لأن مبناه على أن الوجود ماهية واحدة مقولة على أفرادها بالتواطؤ لا بالتشكيك و مع ذلك يلزم عليه أن لا تأثير لوجوده تعالى في شيء من الأشياء لأن وجوده يساوي لوجود الممكنات عنده كما صرح به مرارا - فكل ما يصدر عن وجوده يجوز أن يصدر عن وجود غيره فلا اختصاص له في تأثير شيء و المؤثر في شيء لا بد و أن يكون له اختصاص بالتأثير و إلا لكان وجوده كعدمه - و ما كان وجوده كعدمه في حصول شيء لم يكن علة له فلم يكن وجود الباري سببا لشيء تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا.

ثم ذكرنا أننا بينا فيما مضى أنه فرق بين اعتبار وجود السواد مثلا من حيث هو ذلك الوجود و بين اعتبار موصوفية ماهية السواد بالوجود و بينا أن الوجود يمتنع - أن يعرض الحاجة من تلك الجهة بل إذا نسبنا ماهية الشيء إلى وجوده فحينئذ يعرض له الإمكان و بسببه يعرض له الحاجة فلا جرم المحتاج هو الماهية في وجودها لا أن المحتاج

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨٣

هو نفس الوجود و أما ما قيل إن الماهيات غير معلولة فقد ذكرنا فيما مضى تأويله. أقول إن هذا الفاضل و من كان في طبقته زعموا أن المعلول في ذاته لا بد أن يكون له هوية قبل التأثير و عرض له حاجة زائدة على ذاته ثم أفاد العلة وجوده و ليست هذه المعاني متحققة للوجود من حيث كونه وجودا بل للماهية لأن نسبتها إلى وجودها نسبة القابل إلى المقبول و المادة إلى الصورة في ظرف التحليل فلهذا حكموا بأن أثر العلة هو اتصاف الماهية بالوجود لا الوجود و لم يفقهوا أنه لو لا الوجود فمن أين نشأت الماهية حتى اتصفت أولا بالإمكان و ثانيا بالحاجة و ثالثا بالوجوب و رابعا بالوجود و قد بينا كيفية هذه الاتصافات فلا حاجة إلى أن نعيدها - و قد علمت أيضا معنى الافتقار في نفس الوجودات و أنها أفقر إلى وجود الجاعل من نفس الماهيات إليه و علمت معنى الحدوث الذاتي للوجود.

و الذي ذكره فيما قبل في معنى كون الماهيات غير مجعولة أن المجعولية ليست مفهومها و ذلك كما يقال في مباحث الماهية إن عوارض الماهية غير ثابتة لها إذا أخذت من حيث هي أي من هذه الحيثية ليست ثابتة لها لا أنها لا يثبت هي للماهية في الواقع فالماهية مجعولة بمعنى أن المجعولية ثابتة لها و غير مجعولة بمعنى أن المجعولية ليست عين ذاتها.

أقول هذا مراده من التأويل و قد علمت من طريقتنا أن الأول من المعنيين يؤدي إلى الثاني كما بيناه

فصل (٣٨) في أنه لا يشترط في الفعل تقدم عدم عليه

هذا المبحث كالذي في الفصل السابق و إن كان لائقا بأن يذكر في مباحث العلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨٤

و المعلول لكنه يناسب أيضا لمباحث التقدم و التأخر و ما يتلوها فنقول إن لهذا المطلب حيث تعصبت طائفة من

الجدليين فيه لا بد من مزيد تأكيد و تقوية فلنذكر فيه

براهين كثيرة.

الأول أن العالم إما أن يكون ممكن الوجود دائما أو ليس إمكانه دائما

الثاني باطل و ذلك لأن إمكانه إن لم يكن دائما لزم كونه ممتنعا بالذات لاستحالة كونه واجب الوجود لذاته و الممتنع لذاته لا ينقلب ممكنا و لأن صيرورته ممكن الوجود إما أن يكون لما هو هو فيلزم أن يكون ممكنا أزلا و أبدا أو لأمر خارج و ذلك الخارج إن كان دائم الهوية فيكون الإمكان دائما أو غير دائم - فالكلام فيه كالكلام في الأول و لأن الامتناع الأزلي إن كان لما هو هو امتنع ارتفاعه لأن لوازم الماهيات يستحيل ارتفاعها و إن كان امتناعه لا لما هو هو فهو لأمر منفصل و ذلك المنفصل إن كان أزليا واجب الثبوت فيلزم امتناع ارتفاع أثره و إن لم يكن واجب الثبوت فالكلام فيه كالكلام في الأول حتى ينتهي بالأخرة إلى واجب لذاته و لزم امتناع ارتفاعه.

فإن قيل ذلك الامتناع و إن استند إلى واجب الوجود لكن تأثيره في ذلك الامتناع يتوقف على شرط فإذا زال الشرط زال ذلك التأثير.

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فنقول ذلك الشرط إن كان واجبا لذاته امتنع ارتفاعه فامتنع ارتفاع الامتناع و إن لم يكن واجبا عاد الكلام و لا يتسلسل بل ينتهي إلى موجود واجب الوجود لذاته فثبت أنه لا يمكن دعوى امتناع حصول الممكنات في الأزل - و هاهنا إشكال و هو أن الحادث إذا اعتبرناه من حيث كونه مسبقا بالعدم فهو مع هذا الشرط لا يمكن أن يقال إن إمكانه متخصص بوقت دون وقت - لما ذكرتموه من الأدلة فإذا إمكانه ثابت دائما ثم لا يلزم من دوام إمكانه خروجه عن الحدوث لأننا حيث أخذناه من حيث كونه مسبقا بالعدم كانت مسبقيته بالعدم جزءا ذاتيا له إذ الذاتي للشيء لا يرتفع و إذا لم يلزم من دوام إمكان الحدوث الحادث - من حيث إنه حادث خروجه عن كونه حادثا بطلت هذه الحجة.

أقول كلامنا ليس في شيء هويته عين التجدد و الحدوث بل في ماهية تعرض لها صفة الحدوث فإن كثيرا من الأشياء كأجزاء الحركة و الزمان يستحيل أن يكون دائمة فهي ضرورية الحدوث و افتقارها إلى المؤثر من حيث إمكانها لكن إمكانها هو إمكان هذا النحو من الوجود إذ الوجود الدائم يستحيل عليها فإمكانها لا يكون إلا إمكان الحدوث و كون الشيء ممكنا إنما معناه جواز مطلق الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨٦

عليه لا جواز كل وجود فإن الجوهر يستحيل عليه وجود العرض و السواد يستحيل عليه وجود البياض فالحركة و أمثالها يتسحيل عليها الوجود البقائي.

برهان آخر المحتاج إلى العدم السابق

إما أن يكون وجود الفعل أو تأثير الفاعل فيه و الأول محال لأن الفعل لو افتقر في وجوده إلى العدم لكان ذلك العدم مقارنا له و العدم المقارن مناف للفعل و منافي الفعل يمتنع أن يكون شرطا له - و الثاني أيضا محال لأن وجود الأثر ينافي عدمه و المنافي لما يجب أن يكون مقارنا - يجب أن يكون منافيا أيضا و المنافي لا يكون شرطا البتة فإذا لا الفعل في

كونه موجودا و لا الفاعل في كونه مؤثرا مفتقرا إلى سبق العدم.

برهان آخر أن الحوادث إذا وجدت و استمرت فهي في حال استمرارها و بقائها

إما أن تكون محتاجة إلى المؤثر أو لا تكون فعلى الأول يكون احتياجه إلى المؤثر أزلا و أبدا لإمكانها و على الثاني إما أن يكون لأجل أنها خرجت عن الإمكان أو يكون مع أنها باقية على إمكانها استغنت عن المؤثر و محال أن يقال إنها خرجت عن الإمكان لأن الممكن لذاته لا ينقلب واجبا لذاته بداهة و لأن إمكان الممكنات إن كان لذاتها فهي دائما ممكنة الوجود و إن كان إمكانها لا لذواتها بل الأمر منفصل فيكون ثبوت الإمكان لها ممكنا فيكون لإمكانها إمكان منفصل و لإمكان إمكانها إمكان ثالث و ذلك يفضي إلى إمكانات منفصلة لا نهاية لها فثبت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨٧

أنها حال بقائها ممكنة فهي حال بقائها محتاجة إلى السبب لأن الإمكان جهة الحاجة.

فإن قيل الشيء إذا دخل في الوجود فقد صار أولى بالوجود.

فنقول تلك الأولوية إما أن تكون من لوازم الوجود أو لا تكون من لوازمه - و الأول يوجب المحال لأنه إذا تحقق الوجود تحققت الأولوية و إذا تحققت الأولوية أغنت عن المؤثر و إذا لم يوجد المؤثر لم يتحقق الوجود فإذا وجوده يؤدي إلى عدمه و ذلك محال و إن لم تكن من اللوازم بل من العوارض المفارقة كان ذلك محالا - لأن تلك الأولوية مفتقرة إلى وجود سبب و الذات مفتقرة إلى الأولوية فالذات مفتقرة إلى وجود سبب الأولوية فلا تكون غنية عن السبب.

برهان آخر افتقار المعلول إلى العلة إما أن يكون لأنه موجود في الحال

أو لأنه كان معدوما أو لأنه مسبوق بالدم و محال أن يكون العدم هو المقتضي لأنه نفي محض لا حاجة له إلى العلة أصلا و محال أن يكون هو كونه مسبوقا بالعدم - لأن كون الوجود مسبوقا بالعدم كيفية تعرض للوجود بعد حصوله على طريق الوجوب فإن حصول الوجود و إن كان على طريق الجواز و الإمكان لكن وقوعه على نعت المسبوقية بالعدم حالة ضرورية لأنه يستحيل أن يقع إلا كذلك و لا يبعد أن يكون الشيء في نفسه جائز الوقوع ثم يعرض له بعد الوقوع أمر ما على طريق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨٨

الوجوب فإن الأربعة ممكنة الوجود إلا أن كونها زوجا أمر واجب لا يعلل فكذلك وجود الحادث ممكن لكن كون وجوده مسبوقا بالعدم واجب و الواجب غني عن المؤثر فإذا افتقر إلى العلة هو الوجود فقط.

برهان آخر للواجب تعالى صفات و لوازم

سواء كانت إضافية أو سلبية - كما هي على رأي الحكماء أو حقيقية وجودية كما هي عند أكثر المتكلمين - أو أحوالا و أعيانا كما هي عند المعتزلة و الصوفية و ليس شيء منها واجب الوجود لامتناع أن يكون الواجب أكثر من واحد فهي ممكنة الثبوت في ذاتها واجبة الثبوت نظرا إلى ذات الأول تعالى فثبت أن التأثير لا يتوقف على سبق العدم و تقدمه فلئن قالوا إن تلك الصفات و الأحكام ليست من قبيل الأفعال و نحن نقول سبق العدم إنما يجب في الأفعال.

فنقول هب إن ما لا يتقدمه العدم لا يسمى فعلا لكن ثبت أن ما هو ممكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٨٩

الثبوت لما هو هو يجوز استناده إلى مؤثر دائم الثبوت مع الأثر وإذا كان هذا معقولا مقبولا فلا يمكن دعوى الامتناع فيه في بعض المواضع اللهم إلا أن يمتنع صاحبه عن إطلاق لفظ الفعل وذلك مما لا يعود إلى فائدة علمية ففي مثل هذه المسائل العظيمة لا يجوز التعويل على مجرد الاصطلاحات و الألفاظ.

برهان آخر لوازم الماهيات معلولات لها

وهي غير متأخرة عنها زمانا بل لوازم الوجودات أيضا غير منفكة عنها لأنها لا نفرض زمانا إلا والأربعة زوج والمثلث ذو الزوايا والنار حارة بل نزيد على هذا ونقول إن الأسباب مقارنة لمسيباتها- مثل الاحتراق يكون مقارنا للإحراق والألم عقيب سوء المزاج أو تفرق الاتصال- بل هاهنا شيء لا ينازعون فيه ليكون أقرب إلى الفرض وهو كون العلم علة للعالمية والقدرة للقادرية وكل ذلك توجد مقارنة لأثارها غير متراخية عنها آثارها فعلم أن مقارنة الأثر والمؤثر لا تبطل جهة الاستناد والحاجة.

برهان آخر أن الشيء حال اعتبار وجوده من حيث هو موجود واجب الوجود

و حال عدمه من حيث إنه معدوم واجب العدم وهذا ضرب من الضرورة الذاتية يقال لها الضرورة بشرط المحمول و في زمانه و الحدوث عبارة عن ترتب هاتين الحالتين- فلو نظرنا إليها وأخذنا الماهية من حيث لها هذه الحالة كانت الماهية على كلتا الصفتين واجبة والوجوب مانع عن الاستناد إلى السبب فالحدوث من حيث هو هو حدوث مانع عن الحاجة فإذا لم يعتبر الماهية من حيث ذاتها لم يرتفع الوجوب عنها أعني وجوب الوجود في زمان الوجود و وجوب العدم في زمان العدم فهي باعتبار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٩٠

ذاتها تحتاج إلى المؤثر فالحدوث من حيث هو حدوث مانع عن الاحتياج فعلمنا أن المحوج هو الإمكان لا غير.

برهان آخر جهة الحاجة لا بد وأن لا تبقى مع المؤثر

وإن كانت قبله وإلا لبقيت الحاجة مع المؤثر إلى مؤثر آخر والحدوث هو مع المؤثر كهو لا معه- فلو كان المحوج هو الحدوث لزم المحال المذكور وأما إذا كان الإمكان جهة الاحتياج فهو عند المؤثر لا يبقى كما كان فإن الماهية مع المؤثر تصوير واجبة في نفس الأثر فعلم أن المحوج إلى المؤثر هو الإمكان لا غير.

فهذه عشرة براهين في أن ماهية الممكن إنما احتاجت إلى السبب لأجل إمكانها وأما افتقار نفس الوجودات المعلولة إلى الجاعل فهو لذواتها لا بأمر عارض لها ونحن مع ذلك قد أقمنا البرهان على أن العالم بجميع ما فيه و معه حادث زمني و كذا كل شيء منه كما سنذكره إن شاء الله تعالى.

و أما المخالفون لذلك الأصل فلهم متمسكات واهية.

منها أن إيجاد الموجود و تحصيل الحاصل محال

فلا بد أن يتحقق الحاجة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٩١

قبل الوجود.

و منها أنه لو فرضنا موجودين قديمين لم يكن احتياج أحدهما إلى الآخر أولى من العكس
إذ لا مزية لأحدهما على الآخر.

و منها قد ثبت أن موجد العالم فاعل مختار

و القصد و الداعي لا يكون و لا يتعلق إلا بالأحداث لأننا نجد من أنفسنا امتناع القصد إلى تكوين الكائن.
و منها أن البناء إذا وجد استغنى عن البناء و الكتابة إذا وجدت استغنت عن الكاتب.
أما الجواب عن الأول فبالنقض و الحل أما النقض فباحتياج القادرية إلى القدرة و الأسودية إلى السواد و غير ذلك و أما
الحل فتحصيل الحاصل بنفس التحصيل ليس بمحال بل واجب إنما المحال إعطاء الوجود للموجود مرة أخرى على أن
ما ذكره مصادرة على المطلوب.
أما عن الثاني فكون الشيء علة ليس لأنه قديم حتى لا يكون قديم بالمؤثرية أولى من قديم آخر كما أن كون الشيء
معلولا ليس لأنه حادث حتى لا يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٩٢

أحد الحادثين أولى بعلية الآخر من الآخر فلا يكون جعل حركة اليد علة لحركة المفتاح أولى من عكسها بل كون العلة
علة لخصوصية ذاته و حقيقته و هي لما هي تقتضي التقدم بالذات و العلية كتقدم الشمس على الضوء فالضوء من
الشمس لا الشمس منه و أما الشبهة بأنه إذا كان الأمران متلازمين فيلزم من ارتفاع كل منهما ارتفاع الآخر فلم يكن
أحدهما بالعلية أولى من الآخر فقد مر وجه اندفاعها.
و أما عن الثالث فنقول ابتداء القصد و الداعي إنما هو إلى ابتداء التكوين - و استمرارهما إلى استمراره لا إلى ابتدائه فلو
استمر القصد و الداعية و استمر تعلقهما فذلك ممكن و دعوى امتناعه مصادرة على المطلوب.
و أما عن الرابع فأمثال هذه الفواعل علل للحركات و الانتقالات للأجسام من موضع إلى موضع و ليست أسبابا لحفظ
الأشكال و ثبات الأوضاع و بقائها و إنما علتها القريبة و البعيدة أمور أخرى كما نذكره في مقامها
فصل (٣٩) في أن حدوث كل حادث زمني يفتقر إلى حركة دورية غير منقطعة
و اعلم أن العلة التامة للشيء لا يمكن أن يتقدمه بالزمان و لا أن يتأخر عنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٩٣

فالحوادث لا بد و أن يكون أسبابها القريبة حادثة إذ لو كانت قديمة لزم من قدم الأسباب لها قدمها فإن كل سبب إذا
وجد مع عدم معلوله كان وجود المعلول عند وجود تلك العلة ممكنا ذاتيا إذ المحال بالذات لا يصير معلولا لشيء
فيكون وجود ذلك المعلول حين ما يوجد مستدعيا لعله زائدة إذ فرض أولا علة قد يعدم معها المعلول و قد يوجد
فنسبتها إلى طرفي الوجود و العدم للمعلول نسبة واحدة فما دامت النسبة إمكانية يحتاج أحد الطرفين إلى ضميمه و
هكذا الكلام مع الضميمة - حتى ينتهي إلى ما يخرج به ماهية المعلول عن الإمكان فيجب وجوده مثلا و تمام التقرير قد

عرفت في باب نفي الأولوية الذاتية و غيره فتبين أن السبب القريب للحوادث أو جزء سببها يكون حادثا معه و الكلام فيه كالكلام في الأول و يلزم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٩٤

التسلسل أو الانتهاء إلى حادث ماهيته أو حقيقته عين الحدوث و التجدد كالحركة أو المتحرك بنفسه كالطبيعة المتجددة بذاتها لكن الطبائع المنقطعة الوجود التي عدمها في زمان سابق و حركة سابقة مسبقة بطبيعة أخرى حافظة لزمانها و تلك الطبيعة الحافظة للزمان لها وجهان وجه عقلي عند الله و هو علمه الأزلي و صورة قضائه و ليس من العالم و لها وجه كوني قدري حادث في خلق جديد كل يوم لكن الفلاسفة التزموا التسلسل لعدم عثورهم على هذا الأصل و قالوا هذا التسلسل إما أن يكون دفعة و إما أن يكون بحيث يتقدم البعض منها على البعض و الأول باطل كما سبق في مباحث العلة و المعلول فتعين الثاني قالوا فتلك إما أن تكون حوادث متفصلة آتية الوجود و تكون زمانية الوجود و الأول يلزم منه تنالي الآتات و هو محال - و على تقدير جواز تنالي الآتات كانت الآتات متفصلة و لا يكون السابق واجب الانتهاء إلى اللاحق فلا يكون علة و قد فرض كذلك هذا خلف و إن كانت زمانية سيالة فهي الحركة و التحقيق في ذلك أنه إذا حدث في مادة أمر لم يكن كصورة إنسانية في مادة منوية فقد حصلت لعل ذلك الأمر إلى تلك المادة نسبة لم تكن و لا بد هاهنا من حركة لتلك المادة توجب قربا بعد بعد كاستحالات في القوة المنوية و انفعالات لها متصلة يقرب بها مناسبتها التي كانت بعيدة لتلك الصورة و لعلتها المؤثرة.

و توضيح هذا المقام أن العلة قد تكون معدة و قد تكون مؤثرة أما العلة المعدة فيجوز تقديمها على المعلول إذ هي غير مؤثرة في المعلول بل يقرب المعلول إلى حيث يمكن صدوره عن العلة المؤثرة و أما المؤثرة فإنها يجب مقارنتها للآثر و مرجع العلة المعدة إلى شيء متجدد الوجود متشابه الحقيقة من الانقضاء و الحصول بحيث يكون حصول شيء منه يمتنع إلا بعد زوال سابقه مثال ذلك من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٩٥

الحركات الطبيعية أن الجسم الثقيل في سقوطه إلى أسفل لا ينتهي إلى حد من حدود المسافة إلا و يصير ذلك الانتهاء سببا لاستعداده لأن يتحرك منه إلى حد آخر و المؤثر في تلك الحركة هو الثقل و لكن لو لا الانتهاء للمتحرك بالحركة السابقة إلى ذلك الحد لاستحال وجود تلك الحركة لأنه قبل الانتهاء إلى ذلك امتنع أن يوجب الثقل تحريكه من هناك و لما تحرك إلى الحد المذكور صار بحيث يمكن له أن يحركه الثقل من ذلك الحد و قد كانت هذه الحركة ممتنعة الصدور عن الثقل و كانت بعيدة عن العلة ثم لما صارت ممكنة الصدور صارت قريبة و هذا القرب بعد البعد إنما حصل بسبب الحركة السابقة فهذا هو المعنى بقولهم الحركة تقرب العلل إلى معلولاتها و مثاله من الحركات الإرادية من أراد أن يمشي في ليلة ظلمانية بسبب ضوء سراج بيده فكلما وطىء بقدمه موزعا من الأرض يراه بنور ذلك السراج وقع النور على موضع بعده فيطأه و هكذا فالعلة المؤثرة لحصول الضوء في كل موضع من تلك المواضع هو نور السراج و العلة المعدة المقربة و المبعدة هي المشي و كذا من أراد أن يمضي إلى الحج فإن تلك الإرادة الكلية تكون سببا أصلا لحدوث إرادات جزئية مترتبة تكون كل واحدة منها مقربا إلى الأخرى فإنه لا ينتهي إلى حد من حدود

المسافة إلا و انتهاه إلى ذلك الحد وسيلة لأن يحدث قصد آخر جزئي إلى أن يتحرك من ذلك الحد إلى الذي يليه و المؤثر في تلك المقاصد الجزئية - المتتالية المؤثرة في الحركات المتوالية هو القصد الكلي و هو مقارن لجميع تلك الحوادث و إذا عرفت هذا عرفت أن للعلة المؤثرة معية واحدة مؤثرة مع جميع خصوصيات الأفراد المتجددة و هي ملاك العلية و الإيجاد و لتلك الخصوصيات هويات متقدمة و متأخرة لذواتها مقتضية للتقدم و التأخر لا بجعل و تأثير بل الجعل و التأثير في نفس هوياتها لا في جعل السابق منها سابقا و اللاحق منها لاحقا فمنازل سقوط الجسم الثقيل في المثال الأول كقالب روحه الثقل و كذا انتقالات الضوء على وجه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٢، ص ٣٩٦

الأرض كقالب روحه نور السراج و غيره و الإرادات الجزئية كشخص روحه الإرادة الواحدة الكلية فكذلك نحن نقول لكل من الطبائع الحادثة أفرادها و جزئياتها سبب قديم أزلي هو الواهب لصورها المتجددة و لكن فيضه في كل فرد مرهون بوقته - موقوف على صيرورة المادة قريبة القوة شديدة الاستعداد لقبول ذي الفيض و حصول ذلك الاستعداد بعد ما لم يكن إنما هو بواسطة الحركات و التغيرات بل بواسطة هويات الصور الجزئية المتعاقبة على المادة لأن يستعد المادة بالسابقة منها للاحقة فإذا لا يمكن أن يوجد شيء من الأشياء إلا بواسطة تجدد أمور سابقة مرتبطة بالحدث - فلا غنى عن وجود أمور متسابقة لا أول لها على الاتصال التجديدي فلا بد من وجود أمر - يحتمل الدوام التجديدي على نعت الاتصال كيلا ينقطع الزمان فلا بد من وجود جسم ذي طبيعة متجددة لا تنقطع و أخرى باقية عند الله و الذي يحتمل الدوام التجديدي - من الجواهر الجسمانية هو الجسم البسيط الإبداعي و الذي يحتمل الدوام من الأعراض الجسمانية هي الحركة الدورية لأن باقي الحركات و الاستحالات منقطعة إلى حد فاصل عن غيرها و ستعلم أن فاعل هذه الحركة أمر غير جسماني دائم الشوق إلى عالم الربوبية من الله مبدؤه و إلى الله مصيره و هو راكب سفينة فلكية بسم الله مجراها و مرساها



الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢

[الجزء السابع]

السفر الثالث

القسم الثاني

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

[تتمة الفن الأول في أحوال المبدأ و صفاته]

الموقف السابع من السفر الثالث في أنه تعالى متكلم و المعارف التي سنخ لنا في تحقيق الكلام و الكتاب و الفرق بينهما حسبما أفاده الله بالإلهام و فيه فصول

الفصل (١) في تحصيل مفهوم التكلم

اعلم أن التكلم مصدر صفة نفسية مؤثرة لأنه مشتق من الكلم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣

و هو الجرح و فائدته الإعلام و الإظهار فمن قال إن الكلام صفة المتكلم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٤

أراد به المتكلمية و من قال إنه قائم بالمتكلم أراد به قيام الفعل بالفاعل - لا قيام العرض بالموضوع و من قال إن المتكلم من أوجد الكلام أراد من الكلام في الشاهد ما يقوم بنفس المتكلم بحركة فاه لا بسكونه و هو الهواء الخارج من جوف المتكلم من حيث هو متكلم لا ما هو مبين له مباينة الكتاب للكاتب و النقش للنقاش و إلا فيكون كتابة و تصويرا لا تكلما و تقريراً.

قال بعض العارفين أول كلام شق أسماع الممكنات كلمة كن و هي كلمة وجودية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥

فما ظهر العالم إلا بالكلام بل العالم كله أقسام الكلام بحسب مقاماته و منازلها الثمانية و العشرين في نفس الرحمن و هو الفيض الوجودي المنبعث عن منبع الإفاضة و الرحمة و الممكنات مراتب تعيينات ذلك الفيض الوجودي و الجواهر العقلية حروف عاليات و هي كلمات الله التامات التي لا تبيد و لا تنقص و الجواهر الجسمانية مركبات اسمية - و فعلية قابلة للتحليل و الفساد و صفاتها و أعراضها اللازمة و المفارقة كالبناء و الإعراب - و الجميع قائمة بالنفس الرحمان الوجودي الذي يسمى في اصطلاحهم بالحق المخلوق به كما أن الحروف و الكلمات قائمة بنفس المتكلم من الإنسان المخلوق على صورة الرحمن بحسب منازلته و مخارجه

الفصل (٢) في تحصيل الغرض من الكلام

اعلم أن الغرض الأول للمتكلم في إرادة الكلام إنشاء أعيان الحروف والكلمات وإيجادها من الضمير في المخارج وهو عين الإعلام وأما ترتب الأثر على الأمر والنهي والإخبار والتمني والنداء والاستفهام وغير ذلك فهو مقصود ثان وغاية ثانية غير الإعلام وهذه المغايرة إنما يتحقق في بعض أقسام الكلام لأن الكلام على ثلاثة أقسام أعلى وأوسط وأدنى فأعلى الأقسام ما يكون عين الكلام مقصوداً أولاً بالذات ولا يكون بعده

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦

مقصود أشرف وأهم منه لكونه غاية لما بعده وهذا مثل إبداعه تعالى عالم أمره بكلمة كن لا غير وهي كلمات الله التامات والإنيات العقلية التي لا تبعد ولا تنقص وسنقيم البرهان على وجودها في مستأنف القول إن شاء الله وليس الغرض من إنشائها منه تعالى سوى أمر الله ولأجل ذلك قال الفيلسوف الأكرم في كتاب أثولوجيا إن ما هو ولم هو في المفارقات شيء واحد يعني ما هو نفس حقيقتها فهو نفس كمالها وغايتها وفيه سر ما لوحناك إليه من قبل.

وأوسطها ما يكون لعين الكلام مقصود آخر غيره إلا أنه يترتب عليه على وجه اللزوم من غير جواز الانفكاك بحسب الواقع وذلك كأمره تعالى للملائكة السماوية والمدبرات العلوية الفلكية أو الكوكبية بما أوجب الله عليهم أن يفعلوا من التديرات والتحريكات والأشواق والعبادات والنسك الإلهية لغايات أخرى عقلية فلا جرم - **لَا يَعْصُونَ اللَّهَ مَا أَمَرَهُمْ وَيَفْعَلُونَ مَا يُؤْمَرُونَ** فينالون نصيبهم من فائدة إنزال الكلام عليهم كما ستعلم وكذلك ملائكة الطبائع الأرضية والأجسام العنصرية من مدبرات الجبال والبحار والمعادن والسحب والرياح والأمطار فإن أمر الله إذا وصل إليهم إما بلا واسطة أو بواسطة أمر آخر لا بواسطة خلق فإنهم يطيعون أمر الله ولا يتمردون وفي قوله تعالى **وَيَفْعَلُونَ مَا يُؤْمَرُونَ*** حيث لم يقل بما يؤمرون إشارة لطيفة إلى هذا القسم من الكلام.

وأدناها ما يكون لعين الكلام مقصود آخر ولكن قد يتخلف عنه وقد لا يتخلف - وفيما لا يتخلف أيضاً إمكان التخلف والتعصي إن لم يكن هناك عاصم من الخطاء والعصيان وهذا كأوامر الله وخطاباته للمكلفين وهم الثقلان الجن والإنس بواسطة إنزال الملك وإرسال الرسول وهما أعني الثقلين مخلوقان في عالم الأحداث والتركيب وعالم الأضداد والأنداد والتعاند والتفاسد ففي هذا القسم من الكلام وهو الأمر بالواسطة يحتمل الطاعة والعصيان فمنهم من أطاع ومنهم من عصى وأما الأمر مع عدم الوسطة أو بواسطة أمر آخر فلا سبيل إلا الطاعة فأعلى ضروب الكلام هو الأمر الإبداعي - **وَمَا أَمْرُنَا إِلَّا وَاحِدَةٌ كَلَمْحٍ بِالْبَصَرِ** وهو عالم القضاء الحتمي **وَقَضَىٰ رَبُّكَ أَلَّا تَعْبُدُوا إِلَّا إِيَّاهُ** والأوسط هو الأمر التكويني وهو عالم القدر **إِنَّا كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقْنَاهُ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧

بِقَدَرٍ والإنزال هو الأمر التشريعي التدويني **شَرَعَ لَكُمْ مِنَ الدِّينِ مَا وَصَّىٰ بِهِ نُوحًا**

تمثيل

إن الإنسان الكامل لكونه خليفة الله مخلوقاً على صورة الرحمن وهو على بينة من ربه - توجد فيه هذه الأقسام الثلاثة من ضروب الكلام والمكالمة وذلك لكمال نشأته الجامعة لما في عالم الخلق والأمر ففيه الإبداع والإنشاء وفيه

التكوين و التخليق و فيه التحريك للآلة و التصريف بالإرادة فأعلى ضروب مكالمته و استماعه هو مكالمته مع الله بتلقي المعارف منه و استفادة العلوم من لدن حكيم عليم و استماعه بسمعه القلبي المعنوي الكلام العقلي و الحديث القدسي من الله و هو إفاضة العلوم الحققة و المعارف الإلهية - و كذلك أيضا يصير متكلمًا بعد أن كان مستمعًا بالكلام الحقيقي إذا خرج جوهر ذاته من حد العقل بالقوة إلى حد العقل بالفعل و هو العقل البسيط الذي شأنه إفاضة العلوم التفصيلية على النفس متى شاء من خزانة ذاته البسيطة فهو بما صار عقلا بسيطا قد صار ناطقا بالعلوم الحققة متكلمًا بالمعارف الحقيقية فليس لكلامه هذا مقصود ثان إلا تصوير الحقائق الغيبية المجملّة بصور العلوم التفصيلية النفسانية و إظهار الضمائر المكنونة على صحيفة النفس و لوح الخيال.

و أوسطها كأمّره و نهيه للقوى و الأعضاء و الأدوات بواسطة تحريك القوى النفسانية للقوى الطبيعية كتحريك الملائكة السماوية للملائكة الأرضية فيجري حكم النفس - و ينفذ أمرها المطاع بإذن الله تعالى على القوى و الآلات و الخوادم في عالم البدن و قد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٨

خلقت سدنة هذا العالم الصغير كلها مجبولة على طاعة الروح و كذا مواضعها و أجسامها - لا تستطيع لها خلافا و لا تمردا و عصيانا فإذا أمرت العين للانفتاح انفتحت و إذا أمرت اللسان للتكلم تكلم و إذا أمرت الرجل للحركة تحركت و إذا أمرت اليد للبطش بطشت فهكذا في سائر الآلات و الأعضاء فتسخر الحواس و القوى و الأعضاء للنفس الإنسانية - يشبه من وجهه تسخر الملائكة و الأجرام العظام الفلكية و العنصرية لله سبحانه حيث جبلوا على الطاعة و فطروا على الخدمة.

و أدناها طلبه لشيء أو استدعاؤه لفعل بواسطة لسان أو جارحة فإن المقصود هاهنا من الكلام سواء كان بعبارة أو إشارة أو كناية أو نحو آخر من أنحاء الإعلام شيء آخر غير الكلام و غير لازمة و لهذا قد يقع و قد لا يقع لثبوت الوسائط العرضية و مع ارتفاع الوسائط العرضية كما في القسمين الأولين لا سبيل للمخاطب بالأمر إلا السمع و الطاعة - و كذا ما لم يقع في الوجود عن أوامر الله تعالى التي هي بالواسطة ليس بقادح في كمال حكمته و قدرته فإن الأمر التشريعي التدويني من الأوامر الإلهية التي أمر بها عباده على السنة رسله و تراجمة وحيه في كتبه هذا شأنه فمنهم من أطاع و منهم من عصى.

استشهاد تأييدي

و مما يؤيد ما ذكرنا أنه قال صاحب الفتوحات المكية إذا كان الحق هو المكلم عبده في سره بارتفاع الوسائط كان الفهم يستصحب كلامه فيكون عين الكلام منه عين الفهم منك لا يتأخر عنه فإن تأخر عنه فليس هو كلام الله و من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩

لم يجد هذا فليس عنده علم بكلام الله عباده فإذا كلمه بالحجاب الصوري بلسان نبي أو من شاء الله من العالم فقد يصحبه الفهم و قد لا يصحبه و يتأخر عنه هذا هو الفرق بينهما و فيه إشارة إلى ضروب حيث قيد في القسم الأخير الواسط بالحجاب الصوري فالكلام الإلهي إما أمري بلا واسطة أو بواسطة حجاب معنوي أو حجاب صوري فليدرك

غوره و ليدعن حسن طوره أقول أيضا و للإشارة إلى هذه الضروب الثلاثة وقع من كلامه سبحانه حيث قال **وَمَا كَانَ لِبَشَرٍ أَنْ يُكَلِّمَهُ اللَّهُ إِلَّا وَحْيًا أَوْ مِنْ وَرَاءِ حِجَابٍ أَوْ يُرْسِلَ رَسُولًا** فالوحي عبارة عن الكلام الحقيقي الأولي الضروري الذي يكون عين الكلام مقصودا أصليا و غاية أولية و الثاني إشارة إلى كلام يكون واردا بواسطة حجاب معنوي و يكون المقصود شيئا آخر يكتفى في حصوله نفس الكلام لكونه من اللوازم غير المنفكة ففي كل من الضربين يكون الفهم غير منفك سواء كان عينا أو لازما و الطاعة لازمة سواء كان الاستماع نفس الطاعة أو مستلزمها و الثالث إشارة إلى أدنى الكلام و هو النازل إلى أسمع الخلائق و آذان الأنام بواسطة الملائكة و الناس من الرسل فيمكن فيه الانفكاك عن الفهم فيتطرق فيه المعصية و الطاعة و الإباء و القبول فافهم يا حبيبي هذا فإنه ذوق أهل الله و إياك أن تظن أن تلقي النبي ص كلام الله بواسطة جبرئيل و سماعه منه كاستماعك من النبي ص أو تقول إن النبي كان مقلدا لجبرئيل كالأمة للنبي ص هيهات - أين هذا من ذاك هما نوعان متباينان كما مر و التقليد لا يكون علما أصيلا و لا سماعا حقيقيا أبدا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٠

الفصل (٣) في الفرق بين الكلام و الكتاب و التكلم و الكتابة

قال بعض المحققين إن كلام الله غير كتابه و الفرق بينهما بأن أحدهما هو الكلام بسيط و الآخر هو الكتاب مركب و بأن أحدهما من عالم الأمر و الآخر من عالم الخلق و الأول دفعي الوجود و الثاني تدريجي الكون لأن عالم الأمر خال عن التضاد و التكثر و التغير لقوله تعالى **وَمَا أَمْرُنَا إِلَّا وَاحِدَةٌ كَلَمْحٍ بِالْبَصَرِ ... أَوْ هُوَ أَقْرَبُ** و أما عالم الخلق فمشتمل على التكثر و التغير و معرض للأضداد لقوله تعالى **وَلَا رَطْبٌ وَلَا يَابِسٌ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ**. أقول و لأحد أن يقول إن الكلام و الكتاب أمر واحد بالذات متغاير بالاعتبار - و هذا إنما ينكشف عليك بمثال في الشاهد و هو الإنسان لكونه على مثال من ربه تعالى عن المثل لا عن المثل فالإنسان إذا تكلم بكلام أو كتب كتابا فإنه يصدق على كلامه أنه كتاب و على كتابه أنه كلام بيان ذلك أنه إذا تكلم و شرع في تصوير الألفاظ أنشأ في الهواء الخارج من جوفه و باطنه بحسب استدعائه الباطني النفساني الذي هو بإزاء النفس الرحماني و الوجود الانبساطي هيأت الأصوات و الحروف و الكلمات حيثما تنفس و انتقش منه ذلك الهواء المسمى بالنفس الإنساني و تصور بصور الحروف الثمانية و العشرين و ما يتركب منها كما ينشأ من غيب الحق الوجود الانبساطي المسمى عندهم بالحق المخلوق به متعينا بتعينات الصور الإمكانية لظهور الشئون الإلهية و مكنونات الأسماء الحسنى و الصفات العليا على مجالي الماهيات و هياكل الممكنات و مظاهر الهويات - و الموجودات بحسب مراتب التنزلات لحقيقة الوجود الحق المطلق و درجات الشدة و الضعف الحاصلة من مراتب القرب و البعد من منبع الوجود المسمى بالهوية الأحدية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١

و غيب الغيوب و قد سبق في السفر الأول الفرق بين الوجود الانبساطي و الوجود المقيد و أنهما غير الوجود الحق الأول.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول صورة هذه الألفاظ و الكلمات لها نسبتان نسبة إلى الفاعل و المصدر و نسبة إلى القابل و المظهر

فالأولى بالوجوب و الثانية بالإمكان فهي بأحد الاعتبارين كلام و بالاعتبار الآخر كتابة فالصور اللفظية القائمة بلوح النفس و صحيفة الهواء الخارج من الباطن إذا نسبت و أضيفت إليه فتلك النسبة إما على سبيل نسبة الصورة إلى القابل فيكون كتابة لأن نسبتها إليه بالإمكان و حينئذ يحتاج إلى فاعل مباين و مصور أو ناقش مغاير إذ القابل شأنه القوة و الاستعداد و التصحح لا الفعل و الإيجاد و الإيجاب - و الشيء لا يمكن وجوده بمجرد الإمكان و القوة و القبول فلا بد له من مخرج إياه من القوة إلى الفعل و الفاعل المباين لصور الألفاظ و الكلمات يسمى كاتباً و مصوراً لا ناطقاً و متكلماً و ذلك الفاعل هو النفس الناطقة في مثالنا فبهذا الاعتبار يكون المنشئ لهذه الحروف و الألفاظ كاتباً و النفس الهوائي بيده لوحاً بسيطاً و هذه الحروف و الألفاظ أرقاماً كتابية و صوراً منقوشة فيه صادرة عن الكاتب و المصور و أما إذا أضيفت إليه إضافة الفعل إلى الفاعل و الوجود إلى الموجد و كانت النسبة إليه بالوجوب لا بالإمكان فكان المأخوذ بهذه الحثية كلاماً و الموصوف به متكلماً و هو المجموع الحاصل من النفس و الهواء و سائر ما يدخل في سببية تلك الصور و الهياكل و كان المجموع المأخوذ على هذا الوجه شخصاً متكلماً لصدق حده عليه و هو الذي قام به الكلام - لاستقلاله بتصور المعاني و ترتيب الحروف و المباني من غير حاجة إلى فاعل ناقش مباين الذات عنه.

فإذا ظهر لك صحة كون صور لفظية بعينها كلاماً و كتاباً باعتبارين و كون الهواء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢

النفسي أيضاً كاتباً و متكلماً من وجهين فقس الحال فيما وراء ذلك التشخص الهوائي - سواء كان فوقه كالنفس و العقل و الباري أو تحته كالقرطاس و التخت و التراب فالنفس المرتسم فيهما الصور العقلية و العلوم النفسانية لوح كتابي بأحد الاعتبارين و جوهر متكلم ناطق بالاعتبار الآخر لأن لها وجهاً إلى مصور عقلي و قلم علوي يصورها تلك العلوم و الصور و لها أيضاً وجه إلى قابل يقبل منه تلك الصور و يسمع منه الكلام و هكذا القياس في سائر المواضع فوضح أن كل كتاب كلام من جهة و كل كلام كتاب من جهة فافهم يا حبيبي ما ذكرته و اعلم قدره فإنه حري بذاك لأنه من الواردات الكشفية المختصة بمدون هذه الأسفار و فيه فوائد كثيرة لا يسمع المجال عدداً جميعاً.

منها أنه يليق بأن يتصالح فيه أهل المذاهب الكلامية في باب الكلام و عمدتهم طائفتان المعتزلة فقالوا إن المتكلم من أوجد الكلام و الأشاعرة فقالوا إنه من قام به الكلام و قد صدق التعريفان عليه بالاعتبارين و منها كيفية حدوث العالم منه تعالى إذ نسبة هذا العالم إلى الباري عند جماعة نسبة الكتاب إلى الكاتب و عند طائفة أخرى نسبة الكلام إلى المتكلم لكن طائفة أخرى رأوا أن النسبة إليه تعالى غير هاتين النسبتين **الْأَلَهُ الْخَلْقُ وَالْأَمْرُ** و منها سر فناء العالم الكوني و زواله و دثوره و منها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٣

سر بعث الأرواح و حشر الأجساد جميعاً كما ستقف عليه في مباحث المعاد إن شاء الله تعالى

الفصل (٤) في وجوه من المناسبة بين الكلام و الكتاب

و لعلك قد تنبّهت بما أشرنا إليك أن عالم الأمر بما فيه أحق بأن يكون عالماً قولياً - و كلاماً إلهياً و نظاماً جملياً و أن عالم الخلق بما فيه أخرى بأن يكون عالماً فعلياً و كتاباً تفصيلياً مطابقاً لذلك المجمل مناسباً إياه فمن وجوه المناسبات أنه

كما أن كلام الله مشتمل على الآيات كقوله تعالى **تِلْكَ آيَاتُ اللَّهِ نَتْلُوهَا عَلَيْكَ بِالْحَقِّ** * فكذلك الكتاب يشتمل عليها أيضا **تِلْكَ آيَاتُ الْكِتَابِ الْمُبِينِ** * وأن الكلام إذا تشخص و تنزل صار كتابا كما أن الأمر إذا نزل صار فعلا **إِنَّمَا أَمْرُهُ إِذَا أَرَادَ شَيْئًا أَنْ يَقُولَ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ** فصحيفة وجود العالم العقلي الفعلي الخلقى هي كتاب الله عز وجل وآياتها أعيان الكائنات الخلقية و صور الموجودات الخارجية لقوله تعالى **إِنْ فِي اخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ وَمَا خَلَقَ اللَّهُ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ لآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْقِلُونَ** وهذه الآيات البينات الخلقية إنما ثبتت و وجدت في عالم الأفاق في صحائف موادها الجسمانية ليتيسر لأولي الألباب من جهة التلاوة لها و التدبر لمعانيها و التنبه لمشاركاتها و مبايناتها أن يتفطنوا بالآيات الأمرية العقلية الثابتة في عالم الأنفس و العقول لينتقلوا من المحسوس إلى المعقول و من عالم الشهادة إلى عالم الغيب و يرتحلوا من الدنيا إلى الآخرة و يحشروا إلى الله مسترجعين راجعين إليه كما قال تعالى **سَنُرِيهِمْ آيَاتِنَا فِي الْأَفَاقِ وَ فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّ اللَّهَ الْحَقُّ**.

قال بعض المحققين إن الإنسان ما دام في مضيق البدن و سجن الدنيا مقيدا بقيود البعد و المكان و سلاسل الحركة و الزمان لا يمكنه مشاهدة الآيات الأفاقية و الأنفسية على وجه التمام و لا يتلوها دفعة واحدة إلا كلمة بعد كلمة و حرفا بعد حرف و يوما بعد يوم و ساعة بعد ساعة فيتلوها آية و يغيب عنه أخرى فيتوارد عليه الأوضاع و يتعاقب له الشئون و الأحوال و هو على مثال من يقرأ طومارا و ينظر إلى سطر عقيب سطر آخر و ذلك لقصور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤

نظره و فتور إدراكه عن الإحاطة بالتمام دفعة واحدة قال تعالى **وَذَكِّرْهُمْ بِأَيَّامِ اللَّهِ إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لآيَاتٍ لِكُلِّ صَبَّارٍ شَكُورٍ** فإذا قويت بصيرته و تكحلت عينه بنور الهداية و التوفيق كما يكون عند قيام الساعة فيتجاوز نظره عن مضيق عالم الخلق و الظلمات إلى فسحة عالم الأمر و النور فيطالع دفعة جميع ما في هذا الكتاب الجامع للآيات من صور الأكوان و الأعيان كمن يطوى عنده السجل الجامع للسطور و الكلمات و إليه الإشارة بقوله تعالى **يَوْمَ نَطْوِي السَّمَاءَ كَطَيِّ السِّجْلِ لِلْكِتَابِ** و قوله تعالى **وَالسَّمَاوَاتُ مَطْوِيَّاتٌ بِيَمِينِهِ** و إنما قال بيمينه لأن أصحاب الشمال و أهل دار النكال ليس لهم نصيب في طي السماء بالقياس إليهم و في حقهم غير مطوية أبدا لتقيد نفوسهم بالأمكنة و الغواشي كما قال تعالى **لَهُمْ مِنْ جَهَنَّمَ مِهَادٌ وَمِنْ فَوْقِهِمْ غَوَاشٍ**

الفصل (٥) في مبدأ الكلام و الكتاب و غايتهما

اعلم أن للكلام و الكتاب لكونهما من الممكنات بداية و نهاية و لما كان الإنسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥

مفطورا على صورة الرحمن فلنعمد إليه أولا و نبين كيفية صدورهما منه و عودهما إليه ليكون هذا ذريعة إلى معرفة كلام الله و كتابه من حيث المبدأ و الغاية و مرقاة إليها - فنقول إن الإنسان إذا حاول أن يتكلم بكلام أو يكتب كتابا فمبدأ هذه الإرادة أولا صورة عقلية حاصلة في قوة نفسه الناطقة على وجه الإجمال و البساطة ثم ينشأ من هذه القوة أثر في النفس الناطقة في مقام التفصيل العقلي و هي القلب المعنوي ثم ينشأ منه أثر في معدن التخيل و هي نفسه الحيوانية المسماة بالصدر المعنوي و نسبته إلى القلب المعنوي نسبة الكرسي إلى العرش و هو مستوى الرحمن و نسبة مظهريهما و هما

القلب الصنوبري الشكل و الدماغ المستدير الشكل كنسبة الفلك الأعلى و فلك الكواكب إلى العرش و الكرسي الحقيقيين لأن هذين مظهرهما و مستويهما ثم يسري منه أثر إلى الدماغ بواسطة الروح الحيواني الذي هو جوهر لطيف جسماني شبيه بالفلك - و حار غريزي سماوي و ذلك الأثر هو الصورة الخيالية للكلام أو الكتاب ثم يظهر منه أثره و هو صورته المحسوسة في الخارج بواسطة الآلات و الأعضاء و الجوارح و الأعضاء - فيوجد صورة الصوت و الحرف في صحيفة الهواء أو في صحيفة القرطاس و هذا غاية نزوله من عرش القلب أو ما هو أعلى منه إلى البسيط الهوائي أو الأرضي ثم يرتفع منه أثر إلى الصماخ و هو عضو غضروفي أو من جهة أخرى إلى العين و هو عضو عصبي و من كل منهما بواسطة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦

العضلات و الأوتار و الأعصاب إلى الأوردة و منها إلى الأرواح الدماغية و منها إلى الروح النفساني و منه إلى معدن التخيل و منه إلى القوة النفسانية ثم إلى العقل النظري و ما بعده على وجه الأشرف فالأشرف و الأعلى فالأعلى كالأول على وجه الأخس فالأخس و الأدنى فالأدنى - فهذا الترتيب الصعودي على عكس النزولي فكانهما قوسان بداية الأولى بعينها نهاية الثانية كما بدأنا أول خلق نعيده فإذا علمت هذا المثال فقس عليه حال مبدأ كلام الله و كتابه فانظر بعين المكاشفة إلى هذا المقام لأن ذلك من عجائب سر الأديمي.

و اعلم أن حقائق آيات الله و بدائع حكمته و جوده و رحمته ثابتة أولاً في علم الله - و غيب غيوبه على وجه لا يعلمها إلا هو ثم في قلم قدرته على وجه بسيط مقدس عن الكثرة و التفصيل و هي أيضا مسطورة في اللوح المحفوظ بل في عقول الملائكة المقربين ثم ترسم منها في نفوس الملائكة المدبرين ثم تنتسخ منها في الكتب و الألواح السماوية القابلة للمحو و الإثبات و هكذا إلى سماء الدنيا ثم تنزل من السماء إلى الأرض نجوما بحسب المصالح و الأوقات و هذا كما أن المتكلم يتفكر أولاً و يخطر بباله و يحضر في خياله - صورة ما يريد أن يتكلم به و يظهره ثم يخرج من حد الضمير بل حدود الضمائر المتفاوتة - و الغيوب المترتبة إلى حد الخارج و عالم الشهادة فكذلك صورة حكمة الله تعالى - و إظهار ما في مكان علمه و مفاتيح غيبه و خزائن رحمته إذا خرجت من عالم الغيب إلى عالم الشهادة حتى نزلت إلى غاية النزول و نهاية تدبير الأمر كما قال تعالى **تَنْزِيلًا مِّمَّنْ خَلَقَ الْأَرْضَ وَ السَّمَاوَاتِ الْعُلَى** و قال **يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ إِلَى الْأَرْضِ ثُمَّ يَعْرُجُ إِلَيْهِ** فعند ذلك أو أن الشروع في الصعود و الخروج إليه كما في قوله تعالى - **إِلَيْهِ يَصْعَدُ الْكَلِمُ الطَّيِّبُ وَ الْعَمَلُ الصَّالِحُ يَرْفَعُهُ** و قوله **إِنْ كُلُّ مَنْ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧

وَ الْأَرْضِ إِلَّا تَتِي الرَّحْمَنُ عَبْدًا لَقَدْ أَحْصَاهُمْ وَ وَعَدَهُمْ عَدًّا وَ كُلُّهُمْ أَتِيهِ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ فَرْدًا و هذا الإتيان إلى الرحمن لا يكون إلا في صورة الإنسان و من سبيل أطواره بل نقول من سبيل النظر في حال الإنسان الكامل و درجاته في الكمال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٨

إن المتأمل منه في خلق السماوات و الأرض إذا نظر إلى هذا العالم و رأى السماء و الأرض - و ما بينهما يظهر صورته في

قلبه حتى أنه لو غمض بصره يرى تلك الصورة في خياله متمثلة بين يديه حاضرة عنده أتم من حضور الصورة الخارجية بين يدي حسه ثم يتأدى من خياله صورة إلى نفسه و منها إن كان ذا عقل بالفعل إلى عقله البسيط المتحد بالعقل الفعال - فيحصل حقائق الموجودات التي دخلت أولا في الحس ثم في الخيال و عالم المثال - و هلم إلى عالم الأمر و العقل الفعال فنسخة عالم الحس موافقة لنسخ تلك العوالم - و هي مطابقة للنسخة الموجودة في اللوح المحفوظ المكتوبة بالقلم الإلهي و هذه النسخ و الكتب مترتبة في الوجود الابتدائي على ترتيب الأشرف فلاشرف و الأقرب من الحق فلاقرب فما في القلم سابق على ما في اللوح المحفوظ و هو سابق على ما في لوح المحو و الإثبات و هو سابق على ما في صحيفة الأكوان المكتوبة بمداد المواد الجسمانية الهيولانية و ترتيبها في الوجود الأعادي على عكس ترتيبها الابتدائي - فيتبع وجودها الحسي وجودها الجسماني المادي ثم يتبعه وجودها المثالي القدري ثم يتبعه وجودها العقلي القضائي التفصيلي و يتبع ذلك وجودها العقلي البسيط القلمي الإجمالي - و يتبع ذلك كله العلم الأزلي فيرجع الأمر إلى ما كان و هو قوله **اللَّهُ يَبْدُو الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يَعِيدُهُ ثُمَّ إِلَيْهِ تُرْجَعُونَ**.

و هذا أيضا من لطائف صنع الله و حكمته في خلق الإنسان الكامل و صيرورته إنسانا كبيرا بعد ما كان عالما صغيرا فكان الوجود كله كشخص واحد دار على نفسه و كأنه كتاب كبير فاتحته عين خاتمته و العالم كله تصنيف الله و ابتداء بالعقل و اختتم بالعقل كما قال تعالى **أَوَلَمْ يَرَوْا كَيْفَ يَبْدِئُ اللَّهُ الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يَعِيدُهُ إِنَّ ذَلِكَ عَلَى اللَّهِ يَسِيرٌ قُلْ سِيرُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ فَانظُرُوا كَيْفَ بَدَأَ الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ اللَّهُ يُنشِئُ النَّشْأَةَ الْآخِرَةَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩

الفصل (٦) في فائدة إنزال الكتب و إرسال الرسل إلى الخلق

اعلم أن الله تعالى لما أراد الإبداع و حاول أن يخلق حقائق الأنواع لظهور أسمائه و صفاته كان عنده علوم جملة من غير مجالي و كلمات كثيرة من غير آلة لبيان و مقال - و كتب عديدة بلا صحائف و لا أوراق لأنها قبل وجود الأنفس و الآفاق فخطب بخطاب كن لمن كمن في علمه و لم يكن في الوجود سواه فأوجد أول ما أوجد حروفا عقلية و كلمات إبداعية قائمة بذاتها من غير مادة و حركاتها و استعداد أداتها و هي عالم القضاء العقلي ثم أخذ في كتابة الكتب و تصوير الكلمات و ترتيب الآيات على ألواح الجواهر و الأبعاد و تصوير البسائط و المركبات بمداد المواد و هو عالم القدر التفصيلي كما قال الله تعالى **اللَّهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَ سَبْعَ سَمَاوَاتٍ وَ مِنَ الْأَرْضِ مِثْلَهُنَّ يَتَنَزَّلُ الْأَمْرُ بَيْنَهُنَّ** و كما قال تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠

فَقَضَاهُنَّ سَبْعَ سَمَاوَاتٍ فِي يَوْمَيْنِ وَأَوْحَى فِي كُلِّ سَمَاءٍ أَمْرَهَا و لما تمت له كتابة الجميع أمرنا بمطالعة هذا الكتاب الحكمي و قراءة هذه الآيات الكلامية و الكتابية و التدبر فيها بقوله **فَأَقْرؤُوا مَا تَيَسَّرَ مِنَ الْقُرْآنِ** و بقوله تعالى **اقْرَأْ بِاسْمِ رَبِّكَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ** و قوله **أَوَلَمْ يَنْظُرُوا فِي مَلَكُوتِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ** و قوله **إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَ اخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لَآيَاتٍ لِّأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ الَّذِينَ يَذْكُرُونَ اللَّهَ قِيَامًا وَقُعُودًا وَعَلَىٰ جُنُوبِهِمْ وَ يَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ رَبَّنَا مَا خَلَقْتَ هَذَا بَاطِلًا** و حيث كنا في الابتداء ضعفاء العقول ضعفاء

الأبصار كما قال تعالى **خُلِقَ الْإِنْسَانُ ضَعِيفًا** فلم يكن تصل قوة أنظارنا إلى أطراف هذه الأرقام و أكتاف هذه الكلمات العظام لتعظم حروفها و تعالي كلماتها و تباعد أطرافها و حافاتهما و قد ورد عن بعض المكاشفين أن كل حرف من كلام الله في اللوح اعظم من جبل قاف و إن الملائكة لو اجتمعوا على أن ينقلوه لما أطاقوه فتضرعنا إليه بلسان احتياجنا و استعدادنا إليها ارحم على قصورنا و لا تؤيسنا عن روحك و رحمتك و اهدنا سبيلا إلى مطالعة كتبك و كلماتك و وصولا إلى مرضاتك و جناتك فتلطف بنا بمقتضى عنايته الشاملة و حكمته الكاملة و رحمته الواسعة و قدرته البالغة فأعطى لنا نسخة مختصرة من أسرار كتبه و أنموذجا و جيزا من معاني كلماته التامات فقال تعالى **وَفِي أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَفَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ** و المراد منها نفوس الكمل من الأنبياء و المرسلين لأن نفس كل واحد منهم كلمة تامة نازلة من عند رب العالمين - **كِتَابٌ مَرْقُومٌ يَشْهَدُهُ الْمُقَرَّبُونَ** مشتمل على آيات الملك و الملكوت و أسرار قدرة الله و الجبروت ثم اصطفى من بينهم كلمة جامعة أوتيت جوامع الكلم و أرسل إلينا رسولا كريما و نورا مبينا و قرآنا حكيما و صراطا مستقيما و تنزيلا من العزيز الرحيم - فجعل نسخة وجوده نجاة الخلق من عذاب الجحيم و كتابه خلاصا من ظلمات الشياطين - و القرآن النازل معه براءة العبد من سلاسل تعلقات النفس و وساوس إبليس اللعين.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج.٧، ص ٢١

تبصرة

فاتفتح بصيرتك يا إنسان بنور معارف القرآن و انظر أولية الرحمن بأخزية الرسول الهادي إلى عالم النور و الرضوان و اعلم أن الباري وحداني الذات في أول الأولين - و خليفة الله فرداني الذات في آخر الآخرين **كَمَا بَدَأَكُمْ تَعُودُونَ** فإلهه سبحانه رب الأرض و السماء و هذه الخليفة مرآة يرى بها كل الأشياء و يتجلى فيها الحق بجميع الأسماء و ينكشف بنور عينه عين المسمى من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه **النَّبِيُّ أَوْلَىٰ بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ مِنْ أَنْفُسِهِمْ** فاعرفه أيها السالك إلى الله حتى تعرف ربك قال تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج.٧، ص ٢٢

مَنْ يُطِعِ الرَّسُولَ فَقَدْ أَطَاعَ اللَّهَ وَ

قال الرسول ص: من رآني فقد رأى الحق

فصح يا مسكين نسبتك إليه لأنه الأصل في الوجود و المؤمنون بالله و اليوم الآخر تابعون له في المقام المحمود و المؤمن من صحت له نسبة التبعية كمرآة وقعت في محاذاة مرآة حادث الشمس فيتحد معه في النور **وَمَنْ لَمْ يَجْعَلِ اللَّهُ لَهُ نُورًا فَمَا لَهُ مِنْ نُّورٍ** فافهم هذا.

و اعلم أن من صفى وجه قلبه عن نقوش الأغيار و نفى عن ذاته غبار التعلقات و صقل مرآة عين عقله عن غشاوة الوسوس و العادات و ماتت نفسه عن نفسه و استغرق سره في بحر جلال الله و عظمتته و حشر إلى مولاه باقيا ببقائه من كان لله كان الله له فإذا رجع إلى الصحو بعد المحو و خرج إلى التفصيل بعد الإجمال و التكميل و إلى الفصل بعد الوصل و التحصيل - لتمكنه في حضرة الأحدية و استقراره في الحد المشترك الجامع بين الحق و الخلق بل بين الأمرية و الخلقية نفذ حكمه و أمره و استجيب دعوته و تكرم بكرامة التكوين و تكلم بكلام رب العالمين **ذَلِكَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ**

يُؤْتِيهِ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَاللَّهُ ذُو الْفَضْلِ الْعَظِيمِ*

الفصل (٧) في كيفية نزول الكلام و هبوط الوحي من عند الله

بواسطة الملك على قلب النبي و فواده ثم إلى خلق الله و عباده لبروزه من الغيب إلى الشهادة اعلم أن هذا القرآن الذي بين أظهرنا كلام الله و كتابه جميعا دون سائر الكتب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣

السماوية النازلة على سائر المرسلين سلام الله عليهم أجمعين فإنها ليست بكلام بل كتب يدرسونها و يكتبون بأيديهم و إن كان كل كتاب كلاما بوجه كما مر لكن الغرض هاهنا كونه كلام الله خاصة و أيضا نقول إن هذا المنزل من الكلام على نبينا ص قرآن و فرقان جميعا و سائر الكتب السماوية فرقان فقط و الفرق بين المعنيين كالفرق بين العقل البسيط و العقل التفصيلي النفساني فالمنزل بما هو كلام الحق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤

نور من أنوار الله المعنوية النازل من عنده على قلب من يشاء من عباده المحبوبين - لا المحبين فقط لقوله تعالى **وَلَكِنْ جَعَلْنَاهُ نَوْراً يُهْدِي بِهِ مَنْ نَشَاءُ مِنْ عِبَادِنَا** و قوله تعالى **نَزَّلَ عَلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ** و قوله تعالى **وَبِالْحَقِّ أَنْزَلْنَاهُ وَبِالْحَقِّ نَزَّلَ** و هو بما هو كتاب إنما هو صور و نقوش و أرقام و فيها آيات أحكام نازلة من السماء نجوما على صحائف قلوب المحبين و الواح نفوس السالكين و غيرهم يكتبونها في صحائفهم و الواحهم - بحيث يقرؤها كل مسلم قار و يتكلم بها كل متكلم و يعمل بأحكامها كل عامل موفق - و بها يهتدون و بما فيه يعملون و يتساوى في هدايتها الأنبياء و الأمم كما في قوله تعالى **وَأَنْزَلَ التَّوْرَةَ وَالْإِنْجِيلَ مِنْ قَبْلِ هَٰذَا لِلنَّاسِ** و قوله تعالى **وَعِنْدَهُمُ التَّوْرَةُ فِيهَا حُكْمُ اللَّهِ** و أما القرآن العظيم الكريم ففيه عظام العلوم الإلهية كأن يتعلم بها رسول الله الخاتم و أهل بيته المكرم س لقوله تعالى **وَعَلَّمَكَ مَا لَمْ تَكُنْ تَعْلَمُ وَكَانَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْكَ عَظِيماً** و فيه كرائم أخلاق الله تخلق بها رسول الله ص لقوله تعالى **إِنَّكَ لَعَلَىٰ خُلُقٍ عَظِيمٍ** إذ كان خلقه القرآن كما روي هذا.

فإذا علمت هذه المقدمات فنقول في كيفية النزول كما سيجيء بيانه مفصلا في مسائل النبوات أن سبب إنزال الكلام و تنزيل الكتاب هو أن الروح الإنساني إذا تجرد عن البدن و خرج عن وثاقه من بيت قلبه و موطن طبعه مهاجرا إلى ربه لمشاهدة آياته الكبرى و تطهر عن درن المعاصي و اللذات و الشهوات و الوسوس العادية و التعلقات - لاح له نور المعرفة و الإيمان بالله و ملكوته الأعلى و هذا النور إذا تأكد و تجوهر كان جوهرًا قدسيا يسمى عند الحكماء في لسان الحكمة النظرية بالعقل الفعال و في لسان الشريعة النبوية بالروح القدسي و بهذا النور الشديد العقلي يتلأأ فيه أسرار ما في الأرض و السماء و يتراءى منه حقائق الأشياء كما يتراءى بالنور الحسي البصري الأشباح المثالية في قوة البصر إذا لم يمنعها حجاب و الحجاب هاهنا هو آثار الطبيعة و شواغل هذا الأدنى و ذلك لأن القلوب و الأرواح بحسب أصل فطرتها صالحة لقبول نور الحكمة - و الإيمان إذا لم يطرأ عليها ظلمة تفسدها كالكفر أو حجاب يحجبها كالمعصية و ما يجري مجراها كما في قوله تعالى **وَطَبَعَ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبِهِمْ فَهُمْ لَا يَفْقَهُونَ** و قوله تعالى **بَلْ رَانَ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥

عَلَى قُلُوبِهِمْ مَا كَانُوا يَكْسِبُونَ فإذا أعرضت النفس عن دواعي الطبيعة و ظلمات الهوى و الاشتغال بما تحتها من الشهوة و الغضب و الحس و التخيل و توجهت و ولت بوجهها شطر الحق و تلقاء عالم الملكوت الأعلى اتصلت بالسعادة القصوى فلاح لها سر الملكوت و انعكس عليها قدس اللاهوت و رأى عجائب آيات الله الكبرى كما قال سبحانه **لَقَدْ رَأَى مِنْ آيَاتِ رَبِّهِ الْكُبْرَى** ثم إن هذه الروح إذا كانت قدسية شديدة القوى قوية الإنارة لما تحتها لقوة اتصالها بما فوقها فلا يشغلها شأن عن شأن و لا يمنعها جهة فوقها عن جهة تحتها فتضبط للطرفين و تسع قوتها الجانبين لشدة تمكنها في الحد المشترك بين الملك و الملكوت لا كالأرواح الضعيفة التي إذا مالت إلى جانب غاب عنها الجانب الآخر و إذا ركنت إلى مشعر من المشاعر ذهلت عن المشعر الآخر.

فإذا توجهت هذه الروح القدسية التي لا يشغلها شأن عن شأن و لا يصرفها نشأة عن نشأة و تلقت المعارف الإلهية بلا تعلم بشري بل من الله يتعدى تأثيرها إلى قواها و يتمثل لروحه البشري صورة ما شاهدها بروحه القدسي و تبرز منها إلى ظاهر الكون فيتمثل للحواس الظاهرة سيما السمع و البصر لكونهما أشرف الحواس الظاهرة فيرى ببصره شخصا محسوسا في غاية الحسن و الصباحة و يسمع بسمعه كلاما منظوما في غاية الجودة و الفصاحة فالشخص هو الملك النازل بإذن الله الحامل للوحي الإلهي و الكلام هو كلام الله تعالى و بيده لوح فيه كتاب هو كتاب الله و هذا الأمر المتمثل بما معه أو فيه ليس مجرد صورة خيالية لا وجود لها في خارج الذهن و التخيل كما يقوله من لا حظ له من علم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦

الباطن و لا قدم له في أسرار الوحي و الكتاب كبعض أتباع المشائين معاذ الله عن هذه العقيدة الناشئة عن الجهل بكيفية الإنزال و التنزيل و تحقيق هذا المقام على بسطة اللائق - و تفسيره الموافق مما سيجيء موعده ذكره في باب النبوات و لكن نزيدك لمعة أخرى

إنارة قلبية وإشارة نورية

عليك أن تعلم يا حبيبي أن للملائكة ذوات حقيقية و لها ذوات إضافية مضافة إلى ما دونها إضافة النفس إلى البدن لا هذا البدن المركب المستحيل المتجدد الذي لا يبقى زمانين كما علمت في مباحث الطبيعة بل كل بدن يضاف إليه شيء من الذوات الملكية - فإنما هو كالبدن المحشور في النشأة الآخرة أما ذواتها الحقيقية فإنما هي أمرية قضائية قولية و أما ذواتها الإضافية فإنما هي خلقية قدرية تنشأ منها الملائكة اللوحية و أعظمهم إسرافيل صاحب الصور الشاخص و سيأتي الإشارة إلى حقيقة صورة في مباحث المعاد و حشر الأجساد فهذه الملائكة اللوحية يأخذون الكلام الإلهي و العلوم الدنية من الملائكة القلمية و يشتونها في صحائف ألواحهم القدرية الكتابية و إنما كان يلاقي النبي ص في معراجهِ الصف الأول من الملائكة و يشاهد روح القدس في اليقظة فإذا اتصلت الروح النبوية بعالمهم عالم الوحي الرباني كان يسمع كلام الله و هو إعلام الحقائق بالمكالمة الحقيقية و هي الإفاضة و الاستفاضة في مقام قاب قوسين أو أدنى و هو مقام

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القرب و مقعد الصدق و معدن الوحي و الإلهام و هو الكلام الحقيقي كما مر و كذلك إذا عاشر النبي ص الملائكة الأعلين يسمع صريف أقلامهم و إلقاء كلامهم و كلامهم كلام الله النازل في محال معرفتهم و هي ذواتهم و عقولهم لكونهم في مقام القرب و قد حكى النبي ص عن نفسه كما روى ليلة المعراج أنه بلغ إلى مقام كان يسمع فيه صريف أقلام الملائكة **ثم** إذا نزل إلى ساحة الملكوت السماوي يتمثل له صورة ما عقلها و شاهدها في لوح نفسه الواقعة في عالم الألواح القدسية السماوية ثم يتعدى منه الأثر إلى الظاهر - و حينئذ يقع للحواس شبه دهش و نوم لما علمت من أن الروح القدسية لضبطها الجانبيين - تستعمل المشاعر الحسية لكن لا في الأعراض الحيوانية بل في سبيل سلوك الرب سبحانه - فهي تشايعها في سبيل معرفة الله و طاعته لا جرم إذا خاطبه الله خطابا من غير حجاب خارجي - سواء كان الخطاب بلا واسطة أو بواسطة الملك و اطلع على الغيب فانطبع في فص نفسه النبوية نقش الملكوت و صورة الجبروت فكان يتشبع له مثال من الوحي و حامله إلى الحس الباطن فينجذب قوة الحس الظاهر إلى فوق و يتمثل لها صورة غير منفكة عن معناها و روحها الحقيقي لا كصورة الأحلام و الخيالات العاطلة عن المعنى فيتمثل لها حقيقة الملك بصورته المحسوسة بحسب ما يحتملها فيرى ملكا من ملائكة الله على غير صورته التي كانت له في عالم الأمر لأن الأمر إذا نزل صار خلقا مقدرًا فيرى على صورته الخلقية القدسية و يسمع كلاما مسموعا بعد ما كان وحيا معقولًا أو يرى لوحا بيده مكتوبا فيكون الموحى إليه يتصل بالملك أولا بروحه العقلي و يتلقى منه المعارف الإلهية و يشاهد ببصره العقلي آيات ربه الكبرى و يسمع بسمعه العقلي كلام رب العالمين من الروح الأعظم.

ثم إذا نزل عن هذا المقام الشامخ الإلهي يتمثل له الملك بصورة محسوسة بحسه - ثم ينحدر إلى حسه الظاهر ثم إلى الهواء و هكذا الكلام في كلامه فيسمع أصواتا و حروفا منظومة مسموعة يختص هو بسماعها دون غيره لأنها نزلت من الغيب إلى الشهادة - و برزت من باطنه إلى ظاهره من غير باعث خارجي فيكون كل من الملك و كلامه و كتابه

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يتأدى من غيبه و باطن سره إلى مشاعره و هذه التأدية ليست من قبيل الانتقال و الحركة - للملك الموحى من موطنه و مقامه إذ كل له مقام معلوم لا يتعداه و لا ينتقل بل مرجع ذلك إلى انبعاث نفس النبي ص من نشأة الغيب إلى نشأة الظهور و لهذا كان يعرض له ص شبه الدهش و الغشي ثم يرى و يسمع ثم يقع منه الإنباء و الإخبار فهذا معنى تنزيل الكتاب و إنزال الكلام من رب العالمين.

و اعلم مما ذكر وجه ما قيل إن الروح القدسية تخاطب الملائكة في اليقظة - و الروح النبوية تعاشرهم في النوم و لكن يجب أن يعلم الفرق بين نوم الأنبياء ع و نوم غيرهم كما أن الفرق ثابت بين يقظتهما فإن نومهم كيقظة الناس و لذا

قال ص: تنام عيني و لا ينام قلبي

و قال علي ع: الناس نيام فإذا ماتوا انتبهوا

و لعلك بما ذكرناه تستطع أن تدعن بأن كل ما كان يراه و يشاهده الروح النبوية في عالم الغيب ليس خارجا عن جنس الكلام و المتكلم و الكتابة و الكاتب فهذا أمر مضبوط واجب الوقوع و ليس باتفاقي فتدبر.

و لأجل ذلك وقع في كثير من مواضع القرآن ذكر تنزيل الكتاب و الآيات مشفوعا - بذكر خلق السماوات و الأرض و ما فيهما كما في قوله تعالى في سورة آل عمران

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إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَخْفَى عَلَيْهِ شَيْءٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَا فِي السَّمَاءِ هُوَ الَّذِي يُصَوِّرُكُمْ فِي الْأَرْحَامِ كَيْفَ يَشَاءُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ هُوَ الَّذِي أَنْزَلَ عَلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ مِنْهُ آيَاتٌ مُحْكَمَاتٌ هُنَّ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ وَأُخَرُ مُتَشَابِهَاتٌ وَقَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى فِيهَا تِلْكَ آيَاتُ اللَّهِ نَتْلُوهَا عَلَيْكَ بِالْحَقِّ وَمَا اللَّهُ يُرِيدُ ظُلْمًا لِلْعَالَمِينَ - وَلِلَّهِ مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَإِلَى اللَّهِ تُرْجَعُ الْأُمُورُ وَقَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى فِيهَا إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لآيَاتٍ لِأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ وَقَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى فِي الْأَنْعَامِ - وَهُوَ اللَّهُ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَفِي الْأَرْضِ يَعْلَمُ سِرَّكُمْ وَجَهْرَكُمْ وَيَعْلَمُ مَا تَكْسِبُونَ وَمَا تَأْتِيهِمْ مِنْ آيَةٍ مِنْ آيَاتِ رَبِّهِمْ إِلَّا كَانُوا عَنْهَا مُعْرِضِينَ وَقَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى فِي هُودٍ كِتَابٌ أَحْكَمْتُ آيَاتِهِ ثُمَّ قُضِلَتْ مِنْ لَدُنْ حَكِيمٍ خَبِيرٍ إِلَى قَوْلِهِ كُلٌّ فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ وَهُوَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ وَقَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى فِي الرِّعْدِ تِلْكَ آيَاتُ الْكِتَابِ وَالَّذِي أُنْزِلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ الْحَقُّ وَلَكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ النَّاسِ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ اللَّهُ الَّذِي رَفَعَ السَّمَاوَاتِ بِغَيْرِ عَمَدٍ تَرَوْنَهَا ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى الْعَرْشِ وَسَخَّرَ الشَّمْسَ وَالْقَمَرَ كُلٌّ يَجْرِي لِأَجَلٍ مُسَمًّى يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ يُفَصِّلُ الْآيَاتِ لَعَلَّكُمْ بَلَقَاءَ رَبِّكُمْ تَوْقِنُونَ وَقَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى فِي سُورَةِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ الرَّ كِتَابٌ أَنْزَلْنَاهُ إِلَيْكَ لِتُخْرِجَ النَّاسَ مِنَ الظُّلُمَاتِ إِلَى النُّورِ بِإِذْنِ رَبِّهِمْ إِلَى صِرَاطٍ الْعَزِيزِ الْحَمِيدِ اللَّهُ الَّذِي لَهُ مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَقَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى فِي يُونُسَ الرَّ تِلْكَ آيَاتُ الْكِتَابِ الْحَكِيمِ إِلَى قَوْلِهِ إِنَّ رَبَّكُمْ اللَّهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ ثُمَّ اسْتَوَى عَلَى الْعَرْشِ يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ وَقَالَ إِنَّ فِي اخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ وَمَا خَلَقَ اللَّهُ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ لآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَتَّقُونَ وَفِي سُورَةِ يُوسُفَ وَكَانَ مِنْ آيَةٍ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ يَمُرُّونَ عَلَيْهَا وَهُمْ عَنْهَا مُعْرِضُونَ وَقَوْلُهُ طه مَا أَنْزَلْنَا عَلَيْكَ الْقُرْآنَ لِتَشْقَى إِلَّا تَذَكُّرٌ لِمَنْ يَخْشَى تَنْزِيلًا مِمَّنْ خَلَقَ الْأَرْضَ وَالسَّمَاوَاتِ الْعُلَى وَقَوْلُهُ حم عسق كَذَلِكَ يُوحِي إِلَيْكَ وَإِلَى الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِكَ اللَّهُ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ لَهُ مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَهُوَ الْعَلِيُّ الْعَظِيمُ وَقَوْلُهُ فِي الزَّخْرَفِ حم وَالْكِتَابِ الْمُبِينِ إِنَّا جَعَلْنَاهُ قُرْآنًا عَرَبِيًّا لَعَلَّكُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ وَإِنَّهُ فِي أُمِّ الْكِتَابِ لَدَيْنَا لَعَلِيَّ حَكِيمٌ إِلَى قَوْلِهِ وَلَئِنْ سَأَلْتَهُمْ مَنْ خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ لَيَقُولُنَّ خَلَقَهُنَّ الْعَزِيزُ الْعَلِيمُ وَقَوْلُهُ فِي الدُّخَانِ حم وَالْكِتَابِ الْمُبِينِ إِنَّا أَنْزَلْنَاهُ فِي لَيْلَةٍ مُبَارَكَةٍ إِنَّا كُنَّا مُنْذِرِينَ إِلَى قَوْلِهِ رَبِّ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا إِنْ كُنْتُمْ مُوقِنِينَ وَقَوْلُهُ فِي

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تَنْزِيلِ الْكِتَابِ مِنْ اللَّهِ الْعَزِيزِ الْحَكِيمِ إِنَّ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ لآيَاتٍ لِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَفِي خَلْقِكُمْ وَمَا يَبْتِثُّ مِنْ دَابَّةٍ آيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يُوقِنُونَ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ وَمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مِنْ رِزْقٍ فَأَحْيَا بِهِ الْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا وَتَصْرِيفِ الرِّيَّاحِ آيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْقِلُونَ تِلْكَ آيَاتُ اللَّهِ نَتْلُوهَا عَلَيْكَ بِالْحَقِّ إِلَى قَوْلِهِ فَبَشِّرْهُ بِعَذَابٍ أَلِيمٍ وَقَوْلُهُ وَسَخَّرَ لَكُم مَّا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ جَمِيعًا مِنْهُ إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لآيَاتٍ لِقَوْمٍ يَتَفَكَّرُونَ وَهَذَا التَّسْخِيرُ تَسْخِيرٌ ذَاتِي إِنَّمَا وَقَعَ لِلْإِنْسَانِ الْكَامِلِ عِنْدَ اتِّصَالِهِ بِعَالَمِ الْأَمْرِ الْمُحِيطِ بِالْكَلِّ وَقَوْلُهُ فِي الْأَحْقَافِ تَنْزِيلِ الْكِتَابِ مِنْ اللَّهِ الْعَزِيزِ الْحَكِيمِ مَا خَلَقْنَا السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا إِلَّا بِالْحَقِّ وَأَجَلٍ مُسَمًّى وَقَوْلُهُ فِي الْجُمُعَةِ يُسَبِّحُ لِلَّهِ

مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ الْمَلِكِ الْقُدُّوسِ الْعَزِيزِ الْحَكِيمِ هُوَ الَّذِي بَعَثَ فِي الْأُمِّيِّينَ إِلَى قَوْلِهِ لَفِي ضَلَالٍ مُبِينٍ إلى غير ذلك من مواضع القرآن والسّر في ذلك أن القرآن والآيات المنزلّة هي بعينها آيات كلامية عقلية في مقام وكتب لوحية في مقام وأكوان خلقية في مقام والأفاز مسموعة بهذه الأسماء الحسية أو نقوش مكتوبة مبصرة في المصاحف بهذه الأبصار الحسية فالحقيقة واحدة والمجالي متعددة والمشاهد مختلفة والمواطن كثيرة

الفصل (٨) في كشف النقاب عن وجه الكتاب ورفع الحجاب عن سر الكلام وروحه لأولي الأبواب

اعلم أيها المسكين أن هذا القرآن أنزل من الحق إلى الخلق مع ألف حجاب لأجل

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ضعفاء عيون القلوب وأخافيش أبصار البصائر فلو فرض أن باء بسم الله مع عظمتها التي كانت له في اللوح نزل إلى العرش لذاب واضمحل الكرسي فكيف إلى السماء الدنيا- وفي قوله **لَوْ أَنزَلْنَاهُ هَذَا الْقُرْآنَ عَلَى جَبَلٍ لَّرَأَيْتَهُ خَاشِعًا مُتَصَدِّعًا مِنْ خَشْيَةِ اللَّهِ** إشارة إلى هذا المعنى قال بعض أئمة الكشف الروحي في هذا المعنى كل حرف في اللوح- أعظم من جبل قاف وهذا اللوح هو اللوح المشار إليه بقوله **بَلْ هُوَ قُرْآنٌ مَّجِيدٌ فِي لَوْحٍ مَّحْفُوظٍ** وهذا القاف رمز إلى قوله **ق وَالْقُرْآنِ الْمَجِيدِ** فإن القرآن وإن كان حقيقة واحدة لكنه ذو مراتب ومواطن كثيرة في النزول وأسماءه بحسبها مختلفة وله بحسب كل موطن ومقام اسم خاص ففي موطن يسمى بالمجيد **بَلْ هُوَ قُرْآنٌ مَّجِيدٌ** وفي مقام اسمه عزيز **وَإِنَّهُ لَكِتَابٌ عَزِيزٌ** وفي آخر اسمه على حكيم **وَإِنَّهُ فِي أُمِّ الْكِتَابِ لَدَيْنَا لَعَلِيَّ حَكِيمٌ** وفي آخر كريم **إِنَّهُ لَقُرْآنٌ كَرِيمٌ فِي كِتَابٍ مَّكْنُونٍ لَا يَمَسُّهُ إِلَّا الْمُطَهَّرُونَ** وفي آخر مبين **وَلَا رَطْبٍ وَلَا يَابِسٍ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ** وفي آخر حكيم **يَس وَالْقُرْآنِ الْحَكِيمِ** وله ألف ألف من الأسماء لا يمكن سماعها بالأذان الظاهرة ولو كنت ذا سمع باطني في عالم العشق الحقيقي والجذبة الباطنية والمحبة الإلهية لكنت ممن يسمع أسماءه ويشاهد أطواره.

واعلم أن اختلاف صور الموجودات وتباين صفاتها وتضاد أحوالها شواهد عظيمة

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لمعرفة بطون القرآن وأنوار جماله وأضواء آياته وأسرار كلماته ولتعلم أسماء الله الحسنى وصفاته العليا لما مرت الإشارة إليه من أن الكتاب الفعلي الكوني بإزاء الكلام القولي العقلي وهو بإزاء الأسماء والصفات الإلهية لكن هناك على وجه الوحدة والإجمال وهاهنا على وجه الكثرة والتفصيل كما قال **كَذَلِكَ نَفْصَلُ الْآيَاتِ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْقِلُونَ** وقوله **كِتَابٌ أَحْكَمَتْ آيَاتُهُ ثُمَّ فُصِّلَتْ مِنْ لَدُنْ حَكِيمٍ خَبِيرٍ** وكما أن صور الكائنات من الأرض والسماوات وما بينهما هي عالم الخلق تفصيل لما في عالم العقل وهو عالم الأمر فكذلك جميع ما في العالمين الأمر والخلق كتاب تفصيلي لما في العالم الإلهي- من الأسماء والصفات قال الله تعالى **وَلِلَّهِ الْأَسْمَاءُ الْحُسْنَىٰ فَادْعُوهُ بِهَا وَذَرُوا الَّذِينَ يُلْحِدُونَ فِي أَسْمَائِهِ** ففي هذه الآية أوجب الله تعالى على الإنسان علم الحكمة والتوحيد- ومعرفة الأمر والخلق ومعرفة الآفاق والأنفس لأن علم الأسماء وهي أرباب صور الأنواع والدعوة لا يحصل إلا بالتدبر في المصنوعات والتأمل في المربوبات من كل ما في الأرض والسماوات ولأجل ذلك وقع الأمر بالتدبر والتفكير فيها وفي أحوالها في كثير من الآيات.

وسبيل هذا الباب من المعرفة مما سلكه العرفاء المحققون والعلماء الإلهيون - وهم القائلون بأن هذه الصور المتنوعة المتخالفة صور أسماء الله تعالى وظلال ومثل لها - ومظاهر ومجال لما في العالم الإلهي والصقع الربوبي وذلك لأن كلما يوجد في عالم من العوالم ففي العالم الأعلى الإلهي الأسماوي يوجد منه ما هو أعلى وأشرف وعلى وجه أبسط - وأقدس **وَمَا عِنْدَ اللَّهِ خَيْرٌ وَأَبْقَى***

الفصل (٩) في تحقيق كلام أمير المؤمنين وإمام الموحدين علي ع

كما ورد:

أن جميع القرآن في باء بسم الله وأنا نقطة تحت الباء

اعلم هداك الله يا حبيبي أن من جملة المقامات التي حصلت للسالكين السائرين - إلى الله تعالى وملكوته بقدم العبودية واليقين أنهم يرون بالمشاهدة العيانة كل القرآن - بل جميع الصحف المنزلة في نقطة تحت باء بسم الله بل يرون جميع الموجودات

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في تلك النقطة الواحدة وقد بينا في هذه الأسفار وفي غيرها بالبرهان الحكمي أن بسيط الحقيقة كل الأشياء وقال معلم حكمة المشائين ومقدمهم في الميم العاشر من كتابه المعروف بأولوجيا الواحد المحض هو علة الأشياء كلها وليس كشيء من الأشياء بل هو بدء الأشياء وليس هو الأشياء بل الأشياء كلها فيه وقد صرح بهذا في غير موضع من مواضع كتابه.

ونحن نمثل لك في هذا المعنى مثالا من المحسوس يقربك إلى فهمه من وجه فإنك إذا قلت لله ما في السموات وما في الأرض فقد جمعت جميع الموجودات في كلمة واحدة وإذا حاولت ذكرها بالتفصيل لافتقرت إلى مجلدات كثيرة ثم قس على نسبة اللفظ إلى اللفظ نسبة المعنى إلى المعنى على أن فسحة عالم المعاني والتفاوت بين أقسامها وأفرادها لا يقاس بفسحة عالم الألفاظ والتفاوت فيها.

ولو اتفق لأحد أن يخرج من هذا الوجود المجازي الحسي إلى أن التحق بالوجود العقلي واتصل بدائرة الملكوت السبحاني حتى يشاهد معنى والله **بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ مُحِيطٌ** ويرى ذاته محاطا بها مقهورة تحت كبريائه فحينئذ يشاهد وجوده تحت نقطة باء السببية لمسبب الأسباب ويعاين عند ذلك تلك الباء التي في بسم الله حيثما تجلت له عظمتها وجلالة قدرها ورفعته سر معناها هيئات نحن وأمثالنا لا نشاهد من القرآن إلا سوادا لكوننا في عالم الظلمة والسواد وما حدث فيه من مد هذا المداد - أعني مادة الأبعاد والأجساد وهيولى الأضداد والأعداد والمدرک لا يدرك شيئا إلا بما في قوة إدراكه وقوة إدراكه دائما يكون من جنس مدرکاته بل هي عينها كما ذهبنا إليه فالحس لا ينال إلا المحسوس ولا الخيال إلا المتخيل ولا العقل إلا المعقول - فلا يدرك النور إلا بالنور **وَمَنْ لَمْ يَجْعَلِ اللَّهُ لَهُ نُورًا فَمَا لَهُ مِنْ نُّورٍ**.

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فنحن بسواد هذا العين لا نشاهد إلا سواد أرقام الكلام ومداد نقوش الكتاب فإذا خرجنا من هذا الوجود المجازي والقرية الظالم أهلها مهاجرا إلى الله ورسوله في قطع المنازل التي بيننا وبين المطلب وأدركنا الموت عن هذه النشآت و

الأطوار التي بعضها صور حسية أو خيالية أو وهمية أو عقلية و قطعنا النظر عن الجميع و محونا بوجودنا في وجود كلام الله ثم أحيانا الله بعد موتنا و أخرجنا من المحو إلى الصحو و من الفناء إلى البقاء و من الموت إلى الحياة حياة ثابتة باقية ببقاء الله فما نرى بعد ذلك من القرآن سوادا أصلا إلا البياض الخالص و النور الصرف الذي لا يشوبه ظلمة و اليقين المحض - الذي لا يعتريه شك و تحققنا بقوله تعالى **وَلَكِنْ جَعَلْنَاهُ نُورًا نَهْدِي بِهِ مَنْ نَشَاءُ مِنْ عِبَادِنَا** و بقوله **وَعَلَّمْنَاهُ مِنْ لَدُنَّا عِلْمًا**.

و عند ذلك نقرأ الآيات من نسخة الأصل و هو الإمام المبين و الذكر الحكيم - و من عنده علم الكتاب و هو أمير المؤمنين علي ع لقوله تعالى **وَإِنَّهُ فِي أُمِّ الْكِتَابِ لَدَيْنَا لَعَلِيَّ حَكِيمٌ** و لهذا نطق بما نطق من قوله

: أنا نقطة تحت الباء

و قوله مشيرا إلى صدره الشريف

: إن هاهنا لعلوما جملة لو وجدت لها حملة

و لعل الكلام في الكلام قد خرج عن طور الأوهام و تعدى عن أسلوب المباحثة و التعليم لكن المثل سائر أن الكلام يجزى الكلام و ليعذرني إخوان الحقيقة إن عشق الحبيب يجزني على عد أوصاف كماله - و نعوت جماله و عد شمائله في ذاته و صفاته و كلامه و كتابه و رسوله و أمره و نهيه و سائر أفعاله كما نحن بصدده إن شاء الله و لنرجع إلى ما كنا فيه

الفصل (١٠) في بيان الفرق بين كتابة المخلوق و كتابة الخالق

هذا أيضا علم ذوقي لا يذعنه إلا صاحب بصيرة قلبية يعرف الفرق بين صورة محسوسة يكون مبدؤها من خارج الحس و بين صورة محسوسة يكون مبدؤها من داخل الحس مع أن كلا منهما محسوس بهذه الحواس الظاهرة و الحس لا يفرق بينهما فقد يقع لبعض الناس عند ظهور سلطان الباطن و قوة بروزه إلى الظاهر كما قال تعالى

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وَبَرَزَتْ الْجَحِيمُ لِمَنْ يَرَى أن يرى المحسوس بغير الحس محسوسا بعين الخيال - فيرى الغيب شهادة في حقه و هذا مما تواتر نقله و تكاثر وقوعه و مما اتفقت روايته من هذه الآية

أن رسول الله ص: خرج يوما و بيده كتابان مطويان قابض بكل يد على كتاب فسأل أصحابه أتدرون ما هذان الكتابان فأخبرهم بأن في الكتاب الذي بيده اليمنى أسماء أهل الجنة و أسماء آبائهم و قبائلهم و عشائهم من أول من خلقه الله إلى يوم القيامة و في الكتاب الآخر الذي بيده اليسرى أسماء أهل النار و أسماء آبائهم و قبائلهم و عشائهم من أول من خلقه الله إلى يوم القيامة الحديث

. فمن هاهنا مع ما تقدم من كيفية نزول الوحي و الكتاب على الأنبياء ع يعلم الفرق بين كتابة الله و كتابة المخلوق إذ لو حاول المخلوق أن يكتب هذه الأسماء على ما هي عليه في ذينك الكتابين لم يقدر عليها و لا يمكن أيضا إذ ما قام بذلك و لم يف به كل ورق في العالم و من هذا القبيل كتاب الجفر و الجامعة الموجود عند الأئمة الطاهرين من أهل البيت سلام الله عليهم أجمعين قد ورثه خلف عن سلف إلى زمان ظهور المهدي ع و ذلك لأن فيه كل حلال و حرام و كل شيء يحدث إلى يوم القيامة و كلما يحتاج إليه الإنسان حتى الأرض في الخدش.

و مما حكي أيضا في هذا الباب عن بعض البله من أهل الحاج أنه لقي رجلا و هو يطوف طواف الوداع فأخذ ذلك الرجل

يمارح هذا الأبله هل أخذت براءتك من النار - فقال الأبله و هل أخذ الناس ذلك قال له نعم فبكى ذلك الأبله و دخل الحجر و تعلق بأستار الكعبة و جعل يبكي و يطلب من الله أن يعطيه كتابه عتقه من النار فجعل الناس و أصحابه يلومونه و يعرفونه أن فلانا مزح معك و هو لا يصدقهم و كان مستمرا على حاله فبينما هو كذلك إذ سقطت عليه ورقة من الجو من جهة الميزاب فيها مكتوب عتقه من النار فسر بها و أوقف الناس عليها و كان من آية ذلك الكتاب أنه يقرأ في كل ناحية على السواء لا يتغير كلما قلبت الورقة انقلبت الكتابة لانقلابها فعلم الناس أنه آية من عند الله و الحكايات و الآثار في هذا الباب كثيرة ذكرها يؤدي إلى الإطناب.

فإن قلت لو كان الفرق بين كتابة الخالق و كتابة المخلوق ما أشرت إليه أنفا من

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أن الأولى مما يبرز من جهة الباطن و الغيب إلى جهة الظاهر و الشهادة فيدرك بين الخيال أولا ثم بعين الحس تبعا بخلاف الثانية فإن الأمر فيها على عكس ذلك من حيث إنها تدرك أولا بعين الحس ثم بعين التخيل لوجب أن يختص بمشاهدة كتابة الخالق من غلب على باطنه سلطان الآخرة دون غيره من أفراد الناس و أهل الحجاب.

قلت لعل حصولها لغيره بحسب التبعية من جهة تأثير نفسه فيهم و سراية حاله منه إليهم لأسباب خفية لا يطلع على تفاصيلها و لا يبعد أن يكون اهتمام نفوس الحاضرين - من جهة استغراقهم في تلك الساعة في التعجب عن حاله و التفكير في ذلك يوجب تعطل حواسهم الظاهرة عن استعمال النفس إياها في المحسوسات الخارجة و رجوعها إلى جانب الباطن و معدن التخيل و عالم الغيب

الفصل (١١) في تحقيق قول النبي ص إن للقرآن ظهرا و بطنا و حدا و مطلقا

اعلم أن القرآن كالإنسان ينقسم إلى سر و علن و لكل منهما أيضا ظهر و بطن - و لبطنه بطن آخر إلى أن يعلمه الله و لا يعلم تأويله إلا الله و قد ورد أيضا في الحديث

أن للقرآن ظهرا و بطنا و لبطنه بطنًا إلى سبعة أبطن

و هو كمراتب باطن الإنسان - من الطبع و النفس و الصدر و القلب و العقل و الروح و السر و الخفي أما ظاهر علته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٧

فهو المصحف المحسوس الملموس و الرقم المنقوش الممسوس و أما باطن علته فهو ما يدركه الحس الباطن و يستشبهه القراء و الموجودون في خزانة مدركاتهم و مخزوناتهم - كالخيال و نحوه و الحس الباطن لا يدرك المعنى صرفا بل خلطا مع غواش جسمانية و عوارض مقدارية إلا أنه يستشبهه بعد زوال مادة المحسوس عن الحضور فهاتان المرتبتان من القرآن دنياويتان مما يدركه كل إنسان بشري و أما باطنه و سره فهما مرتبتان أخراويتان و لكل منهما مراتب و درجات و منازل و مقامات.

فالأولى منهما مما يدركه الإنسان المتمكن من تصور المعاني بحدودها و حقائقها - منقوضة عنها اللواحق الغريبة و الآثار الخارجية المادية مأخوذا كل منهما من المبادي العقلية من حيث يشترك فيه الكثرة و يجتمع عنده الأعداد في الوحدة و يزول عنه التعاند و التضاد و يتصالح فيه الأحاد بل الأضداد لا كحالتها في عالم المواد و الأجساد و مثل هذا

المعنى المشترك فيه لا يدركه الروح الإنساني ما لم يتجرد عن مقام الخلق إلى مقام الأمر - ولم ينفذ عن وجه ذاته تراب قبر البدن وحواسه إذ ليس من شأن المغمور في المادة أن يكون عاقلاً لشيء كما ليس من المنغمس فيها كالمحسوس أن يكون معقولا.

على أنك قد علمت أن كل مرتبة من الإدراك سواء كان إحساساً أو تخيلاً أو توهماً أو تعقلاً لا بد له من ضرب من التجرد وأن مدار المدركة و المدركة على نحو من التجرد عن المادة و الهجرة عن الدنيا و أن درجات التجرد و المفارقة متفاوتة جداً فكذا درجات الوصول إلى درك حقائق الأشياء و القرب من عالم الإلهية و الأخذ منه تعالى. فالروح الإنسانية تارة تتلقى إدراك الأشياء من عالم الحس و ذلك عند نزوله في مرتبة بدنه و حواسه و تارة تتلقى من عالم التخيل و التمثل الجزئي و تارة تتلقى المعارف العقلية بجوهرها العقلي الذي هو من حيز عالم الأمر و تارة تأخذ المعارف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٨

الإلهية من الله بلا حجاب من عقل أو حس فإن تصرف الحس و ما يجري مجراه لما كان فيما هو من عالم الخلق و التقدير و تصرف العقل لما كان فيما هو من عالم الأمر و التدبير فالذي يكون فوق الخلق و الأمر جميعاً فهو محتجب عن الحس و العقل جميعاً فلا يدرك نور الحق إلا بنور الحق و لا ينال إلا بقوة من له الأمر و الخلق كما ورد

عن أبي عبد الله ع - قال قال أمير المؤمنين ع: اعرّفوا الله بالله

و الرسول بالرسالة

و أولي الأمر بالأمر بالمعروف

الحديث.

و للدلالة على تفاوت المقامات قال تعالى في صفة القرآن **إِنَّهُ لَقُرْآنٌ كَرِيمٌ فِي كِتَابٍ مَكْنُونٍ لَا يَمَسُّهُ إِلَّا الْمُطَهَّرُونَ تَنْزِيلٌ مِنْ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ** فذكر له أوصافاً متعددة - بحسب درجاته و مقاماته أولها و أعلاها الكرامة عند الله و أدناها التنزل إلى هذا العالم من عند رب العالمين و لا شك أن كلام الله من حيث هو كلامه قبل النزول إلى عالم الأمر و هو اللوح المحفوظ و قبل نزوله إلى عالم السماء الدنيا و هو لوح المحو و الإثبات - و نزوله إلى عالم الخلق و التقدير له مقام شامخ إلهي و مرتبة رفيعة لا يعلم إلا الله و لا يدركه أحد من الأنبياء ع إلا في مقام الأحدية عند انسلاخه عن القيود الإمكانية و تجرده عن الكونين و خروجه عن الناشئين و تجاوزه عن العالمين الخلق و الأمر و بلوغه

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قاب قوسين أو أدنى كما أخبر خير الأنبياء و أفضل البشر ص عن حاله

: لي مع الله وقت - لا يسعني فيه ملك مقرب و لا نبي مرسل

و للإشارة إلى هذا المقام قوله تعالى **وَمَا يَعْلَمُ تَأْوِيلَهُ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَ الرَّاْسُخُونَ فِي الْعِلْمِ** و قوله تعالى **لَا يَعْلَمُ مَنْ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ الْغَيْبَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ** و قوله **أَفَمَنْ شَرَحَ اللَّهُ صَدْرَهُ لِلْإِسْلَامِ فَهُوَ عَلَى نُورٍ مِنْ رَبِّهِ** و في الحديث

: إن من العلم كهيئة المكنون لا يعلمه إلا العلماء بالله

وللإشارة إلى مقام القلب المعنوي والحس الباطني وقع قوله **إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لَذِكْرٍ لِمَنْ كَانَ لَهُ قَلْبٌ أَوْ أَلْقَى السَّمْعَ وَهُوَ شَهِيدٌ** وقوله حكاية عن الكفار الجاحدين **لَوْ كُنَّا نَسْمَعُ أَوْ نَعْقِلُ مَا كُنَّا فِي أَصْحَابِ السَّعِيرِ** وللإشارة إلى مقام الحس الظاهر من منازل القرآن قوله **فَأَجْرُهُ حَتَّى يَسْمَعَ كَلَامَ اللَّهِ** وللإشارة إلى تفاوت مقامات العلماء في درجات علمهم قال **نَرْفَعُ دَرَجَاتٍ مَنْ نَشَاءُ وَفَوْقَ كُلِّ ذِي عِلْمٍ عَلِيمٌ** وقوله **تِلْكَ الرُّسُلُ فَضَّلْنَا بَعْضَهُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ** وقوله في حق الملائكة **وَمَا مِنَّا إِلَّا لَهُ مَقَامٌ مَعْلُومٌ**

تذكرة تمثيلية

وبالجملة إن للقرآن درجات و منازل كما للإنسان و أدنى مراتب القرآن و هو ما في الجلد و الغلاف كأدنى مراتب الإنسان و هو ما في الإهاب و البشرة - و للقرآن في كل مرتبة و مقام حملة يحفظونه و يكتبونه و لا يمسونه إلا بشرط طهارتهم عن حدثهم أو عن حدودهم و نزاهتهم و انصلاحهم عن مكانهم أو عن إمكانهم و القشر من الإنسان لا يدرك إلا القشور من القرآن و الإنسان القشري من الظاهرية - لا يدرك إلا المفهومات القشرية و النكات البيانية و الأحكام العملية و السياسات الشرعية

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و أما روح القرآن و سره و لبه فلا يدركه إلا أولوا الأبواب و ذو البصائر إذ حقيقة الحكمة لا تنال إلا بموهبة الله و لا يبلغ الإنسان إلى مرتبة يسمى حكيماً إلا بأن يفيض الله عليه من حكمته حكمة و من لدنه علماً لأن العلم و الحكمة من صفاته الكمالية و العليم الحكيم من أسماء الله الحسنى و لا بد في من له نصيب منهما أن يكون ذلك بمجرد موهبة الله إياه له و لذلك قال سبحانه بعد قوله **وَيُعَلِّمُهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَ الْحِكْمَةَ** الآية **ذَلِكَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ يُؤْتِيهِ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَاللَّهُ ذُو الْفَضْلِ الْعَظِيمِ** و سمى الحكمة خيراً كثيراً و قال **وَمَنْ يُؤْتَ الْحِكْمَةَ فَقَدْ أُوتِيَ خَيْرًا كَثِيرًا وَمَا يَذَّكَّرُ إِلَّا أُولُوا الْأَلْبَابِ**

الفصل (١٢) في توضيح ما ذكرناه و تبين ما أجملناه من كون معرفة لب الكتاب مختصة بأهل الله من ذوي البصائر و الأبواب

اعلموا أيها الإخوان السالكون المعتنون بأمر الدين و فهم غرائب الكلام المبين - أن فهم غرائبه و رموزه و عجائبه مما لم يتيسر لأحد من الناس و إن كان من الأكياس إلا لمن دارس علم اليقين و تعلم في مدارس آل ياسين و مكتب أهل التقديس و أهل الذكر الحكيم - و قراءة الآيات من أرقام اللوح العظيم و نسخة الأصل الكريم الذي هو الإمام المبين و كان معلمه **عَلَّمَكَ مَا لَمْ تَكُنْ تَعْلَمُ وَ كَانَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْكَ عَظِيمًا** و مؤدبه

: أدبني ربي فأحسن تأديبي

و كان كاتب لوحه بالقلم و مصور صحيفة نفسه بصورة العلم و الحكم هو **رَبُّكَ الْأَكْرَمُ الَّذِي عَلَّمَ بِالْقَلَمِ عَلَّمَ الْإِنْسَانَ مَا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ** فالله سبحانه معلمه لا سبب آخر من الأسباب كفكر أو تقليد أو قياس أو رواية أو سماع بل بأن يتلقى القرآن من لدن حكيم عليم أو يسمع بسماع باطني في عالم الغيب من عند **مُطَاعٍ ثُمَّ أَمِينٍ**.

رمز قرآني و تلويح كلامي

إن أول ما ينكشف لأولاد روح القدس في مكتب التقديس معنى اللوح و القلم و الكتابة و الرقم و معنى **الم*** و **طه** و

يس وَالْقُرْآنُ الْحَكِيمُ ومعنى ص وَالْقُرْآنُ ذِي الذِّكْرِ

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وَق وَالْقُرْآنُ الْمَجِيدُ وَ ن وَالْقَلَمَ وَمَا يَسْطُرُونَ ومعنى الحروف الجمل وهي الحروف المقطعة القرآنية و الكلمات التامات المفردة و بعدها الكلمات المركبة الفرقانية فإن العناية الربانية لما تعلقت بتربية أطفال الأرواح العالية أفاد لهم رزقهم من ألوان ضروع الملكوت و الجنان و أذاق لهم من لطائف الرحمة و الرضوان أغذية لطيفة روحانية في كسوة الحروف المفردة على طريقة الرمز و الإشارة إلى مقاصد أهل البشارة لئلا يطلع عليها الأغيار و من لم يكن لهم أهلية الوصول إلى عالم الأسرار و معدن الأنوار فكتب الله أولاً في ألواح أرواحهم حروفاً مجملة و مقطعات مفردة لعلهم يذكرون- و بصنائع آبائهم يصنعون و على مثل كتابتهم يكتبون و إلى منازلهم و مقاماتهم يرتقون- و بآيات الله يهتدون و إلى ربهم يرجعون لقد كنا حروفاً عاليات نزلنا في سطور سافلات.

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و هذه الحروف المقطعة يسمى في عالم السر و الخفى بالحروف المجدلة و حروف الجمل- و في ذلك العالم تصير الحروف المتصلة منفصلة و يصير المنفصلات مجملة متصلة لأنه في يوم الفصل و التميز ليميز الله الخبيث من الطيب و يوم الجمع أيضاً بوجه لقوله تعالى - هَذَا يَوْمُ الْفَصْلِ جَمَعْنَاكُمْ وَالْأَوَّلِينَ و قوله لِيَوْمٍ لَا رَيْبَ فِيهِ* فأهل الدنيا لكونهم في مقام التفرقة المعنوية و الجمعية الصورية الاتصالية يرون الحروف المختلفة مجتمعة و المنفصلة متصلة و الحرف الواحد بالمعنى حروفاً متعددة فأول علامة من ارتفع من هذا المنزل أن ينكشف عليه معرفة الحروف المقطعة و كيفية نزولها في لوح الكتاب- ثم في صدور منشرحة لأولي الأبواب كما أشار إليه بقوله وَلَقَدْ وَصَّلْنَا لَهُمُ الْقَوْلَ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَذَكَّرُونَ هذا لقوم و أشار إلى مقام قوم آخرين بقوله تعالى قَدْ فَصَّلْنَا الْآيَاتِ لِقَوْمٍ يَعْلَمُونَ و قوله كِتَابٌ فُصِّلَتْ آيَاتُهُ.

فقد اتضح لك أيها السالك المسكين أن أول ما يرسم في لوح القاري المبتدي حروف التهجي ليستعد بذلك لتلاوة الآيات المكتوبة في الصحيفة القدسية و يطيع الله تعالى في أمره اِقْرَأْ بِاسْمِ رَبِّكَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ و قوله فَأَقْرَأُوا مَا تيسرَ مِنَ الْقُرْآنِ و عند ذلك يسهل عليه التلاوة و الذكر و يتيسر له القراءة وَلَقَدْ يَسَّرْنَا الْقُرْآنَ لِلذِّكْرِ فَهَلْ مِنْ مُدَكِّرٍ* و حينئذ

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يتأتى له المحافظة للقرآن و المداومة على تلاوة آياته بحفظ الله تعالى قلبه عن وساوس الشيطان كما قال وَإِنَّا لَهُ لَحَافِظُونَ و يكون قلبه عند ذلك فلماً محفوظاً عن اختطاف مردة الجن و الشياطين و سماء مزينة بزينة كواكب آيات الكتاب المبين التي بها رجوم أهام المعطلين و أغاليط الموسوسين و استراق المنتحلين كما قال وَحَفِظْنَاهَا مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْطَانٍ رَجِيمٍ إِلَّا مَنْ اسْتَرَقَ السَّمْعَ فَاتَّبَعَهُ شِهَابٌ مُبِينٌ إشعار تنبيهي

وجملة القول أن من لم يظهر عليه سلطان الآخرة ولم يقيم بعد عن قبر هذه النشأة - لم يطلع على معاني الكلام ورموز آيات القرآن و حروفه و كلماته و لم يحدث معه حروفه المقطعة و لم يتجل له وجه قائله و مبدئه و عظمة كاتبه و منشييه فانتبه يا مغرور و قم من مرقدك يا محكور حتى تسافر في سبيل الله مهاجرا إلى الله و رسوله و مشاهدة ملكوته الأعلى و استماع آياته الكبرى و لا تجلس مع أهل الغفلة و البطالة و ذر الذين اتخذوا دينهم هزوا و اشتغلوا بدنياهم لهوا و لعبا و غرتهم الحياة الدنيا ذلك مبلغهم من العلم - و هم الذين ذمهم الله في مواضع من كتابه و وبخهم بقوله **فَمَا لَهُمْ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِالْقُرْآنِ لَوْ كَانُوا يَفْقَهُونَ حَدِيثًا** و شكى إلى الله رسوله عنهم بقوله: **يَا رَبِّ إِنَّ قَوْمِي اتَّخَذُوا هَذَا الْقُرْآنَ مَهْجُورًا** رب رجل أديب أريب عاقل فصيح عارف بعلم اللغة و النحو و البلاغة متكلم قادر على فن المناظرة مع الخصام و الإلزام في علم الكلام لم يسمع حرفا من حروف القرآن - و لا فهم كلمة واحدة من كتاب الله النازل على عبده و لم يرغب بعد إلى ما هو بالحقيقة علم - و نور و فقه و حكمة لإعراضه عن ذلك بما أكب عليه الجمهور مما يعدونه علما و إيمانا و فقها و إيقانا.

فاخرج أيها الغافل من بيت حجابك و عتبة بابك و اخلع عنك لباس أهل الجاهلية - و انطلق عن قيودك الرسمية و رسومك العامة لترى عجائب قدرة الله و عظمتة في إنزال القرآن و تنزيل الكتاب و الفرقان و ترى فتح مقاليد خزائن السماوات و الأرض بمفاتيح علم الغيب المبرى عن وصمة الشك و الريب فإن أدركك الموت في الخروج عن بيت

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نشأتك الأولى إلى الفطرة الثانية و النشأة الآخرة فقد وقع أجرك على الله بل الله مولاك و هو أجرك و جزاك كما قال **وَمَنْ يَخْرُجْ مِنْ بَيْتِهِ مُهَاجِرًا إِلَى اللَّهِ وَ رَسُولِهِ ثُمَّ يَدْرِكْهُ الْمَوْتُ فَقَدْ وَقَعَ أَجْرُهُ عَلَى اللَّهِ**

الفصل (١٣) في نعت القرآن بلسان الرمز و الإشارة

اعلم أيها المتدبر المتأمل أن القرآن إذا كشف نقاب العزة عن وجهه و رفع جلباب العظمة و الكبرياء عن سره يشفي كل عليل داء الجهل و يروي كل غليل طلب الحياة و الحقيقة و يداوي كل مريض القلب بعسل الأخلاق الذميمة و أسقام الجهالات المهلكة - و

عن رسول الله ص: **إن القرآن هو الدواء و إن القرآن غني لا فقر بعده و لا غنى دونه**

و القرآن هو حبل الله المتين النازل إلى هذا العالم النجاة المقيد بسلاسل التعلقات و أغلال الأثقال و الأوزار من حب الأهل و الولد و الجاه و المال و شهوة البطن و الفرج و الذهب و الفضة و الخيل و طول الآمال و هو مع عظمة قدره و مأواه و رفعه سره و معناه مما تلبس بلباس الحروف و الأصوات و اكتسى بكسوة الألفاظ و العبارات رحمة من الله للعباد و شفقة على خلقه و تأنيسا لهم و تقريبا إلى أفهامهم و مداراة معهم و منازلة إلى أذواقهم و إلفا للتراب و رب الأرباب ففي كل حرف من حروفه ألف رمز و إشارة و غنج و دلال و جلب لقلوب العشاق المشتاقين إلى روح الوصال فوق النداء من عالم السماء لتخليص الأسراء من هذا المهوى و سجن الدنيا بقوله **وَذَكَرْ فَإِنَّ الذِّكْرَ تَنْفَعُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ**.

فبسطت شبكة الحروف و الأصوات مع حبوب المعاني لصيد طيور السماوات - و لكل طير رزق خاص يعرف ذلك مبدع الخلاق و منشيها و معيدها و مبدئها و إنما الغرض الأصلي اصطيد نوع خاص من الطيور السماوية برزق

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اغتنى به يفهم منطق الطير كله و هو المقصود من بسط الشبكة في الأرض دون غيره - **سَوَاءٌ عَلَيْهِمْ أُنذِرْتَهُمْ أَمْ لَمْ تُنذِرْهُمْ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ*** و كان بعضهم لقصوره لا يطيق ملاحظة هذا الأمر الذي به قوت القلوب و غذاء الأرواح فألجموا عما لا يطيقون خوض غمرته فألجموا بلجام المنع و قيل لهم اسكتوا فما لهذا خلقتم لا يسأل عما يفعل و هم يسألون ما للعميان و ملاحظة حقائق الألوان.

و أما من امتلأت مشكاة قلبه نارا مقتبسا من نور القرآن فأدرك أسرار الأمور - و الكلمات و الآيات كما هي فليل لهم تأدبوا بأداب الله و رسوله و اسكتوا فسيروا بسير أضعفكم و لا تكشفوا حجاب الشمس لأبصار الخفافيش فيكون ذلك سبب هلاكهم - و انزلوا إلى السماء الدنيا من منتهى علوكم ليأنس بكم ضعفاء الأبصار و يقتبسوا من بقايا أنواركم المشرقة المشرقية من وراء حجب مضروبة بينكم و بينهم و كونوا كما قيل -

شربنا و أهرقنا على الأرض فضله و للأرض من كأس الكرام نصيب

و لذلك يوجد في القرآن ما فيه صلاح كل أحد و ما رزق من الأرزاق المعنوية و الصورية إلا و يوجد في الكتاب قسم منه لأهله **مَتَاعًا لَكُمْ وَ لَأَنْعَامِكُمْ*** و **لَارْطَبِ وَ لَا يَابِسِ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ*** و كما يوجد فيه من حقائق الحكم و طرائف النعم التي فيها غذاء للأرواح و القلوب فكذلك يوجد فيه العلوم الجزئية و الأغذية و الأدوية الصورية من القصص و الأحكام و الموارث و الديات و المناكحات و غيرها مما ينتفع به المتوسطون في المنازل و العوام ففيه الأغذية المعنوية و الصورية معا و الأقسام الأخروية و الدنيوية جميعا فما من شيء إلا و فيه تبيان و لو كان من باطنك طريق إلى ملكوت القرآن و باطنه لتعرف كونه تبياناً لكل شيء.

تنبيه و إشعار

اعلم أن خطابات القرآن كقوله **يَا أَيُّهَا الْإِنْسَانُ* يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا*** مما يختص بأحباء الله المتألهين و أوليائه المقربين لا المبعدين الممكورين و الجاحدين المنكرين - إذ ليس لهم نصيب من رزق معاني هذا الكلام و الكتاب إلا قشور الألفاظ و المباني **إِنَّهُمْ عَنْ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٤٦

السَّمْعِ لَمَعَزُولُونَ وَ لَوْ عَلِمَ اللَّهُ فِيهِمْ خَيْرًا لَأَسْمَعَهُمْ وَ لَوْ أَسْمَعَهُمْ لَتَوَلَّوْا وَ هُمْ مُعْرِضُونَ لأن العناية الإلهية ما سبقت لهم بالحسنى فهكذا كان أول هذا الأمر و آخره و أنت أيضا يا حبيبي لو لم تكن مما قضى الله فيك خيرا و لم تكن أهلا لذلك بحسب ما يسر لك هذا الأمر العسير في التقدير لما وقع منك إلا التقليد كالعميان إن كنت من المسلمين و لم تكن من الجاهدين - و إذا كنت أهلا له و قد أعطاك الله عينا صحيحة غير مكفوفة بحجاب تقليد و لا مثوفة بأفة عصبية فإذا فتحت عينك أبصرت ما هو بين يديك فلا تحتاج إلى قائد يقودك و أما المقلد فهو كالأعمى في المشي يحتاج إلى قائد و لكن ليس كل ما يدرك قائدا و يفعله يمكن للمقلد أن يقلده فيه إنما التقليد يجري في الأمور الناقصة و الأفعال الدنية فالأعمى يمكن أن يقاد و لكن إلى حد ما فإذا ضاق الطريق و صار أحد من السيف و أدق من الشعر قدر

الطائر على أن يطير عليه و لم يقدر على أن يستجيز وراءه أعمى و كذا إذا دق المجال و لطف لطف الماء مثلاً و لم يمكن العبور إلا بالسباحة فقد يقدر الماهر بصنعة السباحة أن يعبر بنفسه و ربما لم يقدر على أن يستجيز وراءه آخر فلو فرض القائد كالطير في طيرانه - أوج عالم الملكوت بجو سماء الجبروت أو كالسباح الماهر في سباحة أبحر الحقائق و المعاني فلا يمكن للأعمى تقليد ذلك القائد في الطيران و لا للزمن المقعد عن أصل السير تقليد هذا في سير البحر. فهذه العلوم التي يشتمل عليها كلام الله و كتابه نسبة التدبر فيها على الحقيقة إلى ما يدركه جماهير الناس و فيه مجال أفكارهم كنسبة المشي على المال إلى المشي على وجه الأرض فالمشي على الأرض يمكن أن يتعلم و أما المشي على الماء فضلاً عن الطيران في الهواء - فلا يكتسب بالتقليد أو بالتعلم بل ينال بقوة اليقين و لذلك

: لما قيل للنبي ص إن عيسى ع يقال إنه يمشي على الماء فقال لو ازداد يقينا لمشي على الهواء

فلأهل القرآن و هم أهل الله خاصة بحمد الله أعين يصرون بها آيات الله و لهم آذان يسمعون بها كلماته - و قلوب يعقلون بها أسرار حكمته و شريعته و أيد يبطشون بها موائد كرمه و رحمته و أرجل يمشون بها في دار كرامته و منزل جوده و رأفته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٤٧

الفصل (١٤) في الإشارة إلى نسخ الكتب و محوها و إثباتها

قد ذكر الشيخ المحقق محيي الدين الأعرابي في الباب السادس عشر ثلاثمائة من كتابه المسمى بالفتوحات المكية أنه قال ص حكاية عن نفسه على طريق التمدح - إنه أسري به حتى ظهر لمستوى يسمع فيه صريف الأقلام و هو قوله **لِنُرِيَهُ مِنْ آيَاتِنَا إِنَّهُ هُوَ السَّمِيعُ الْبَصِيرُ** فالضمير في أنه هو يعود على محمد ص فإنه أسري به فرأى الآيات و سمع صريف الأقلام فكان يرى الآيات و يسمع منها ما حظه السماع و هو الصوت فإنه عبر عنه بالصريف و الصريف الصوت فدل أنه بقي له من الملكوت فوقه قوة ما لم يصل إليه بجسمه من حيث هو راء و لكن من حيث هو سميع فوصل إلى استماع أصوات الأقلام و هي تجري بما يحدث الله في العالم من الأحكام و هذه الأقلام رتبته دون رتبة القلم الأعلى و دون اللوح المحفوظ فإن الذي كتبه القلم الأعلى لا يتبدل و سمي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٤٨

اللوح بالمحفوظ من المحو فلا يمحي ما كتب فيه و هذه الأقلام تكتب في ألواح المحو و الإثبات و هو قوله تعالى **يَمْحُوا اللَّهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُثَبِّتُ** و من هذه الألواح تنزل الشرائع و الصحف و الكتب على الرسل و لهذا يدخل في الشرائع النسخ و في الشرع الواحد النسخ في الحكم و هو عبارة عن انتهاء مدة الحكم لا على البداء. و قال أيضاً و من هذه الكتابة قوله تعالى **ثُمَّ قَضَى أَجَلًا وَأَجَلٌ مُّسَمًّى** و من هذه الألواح وصف نفسه بأنه يتردد في نفسه و في قبضة نسمة المؤمن بالموت و هو قد قضى عليه و من هذه الحقيقة الإلهية التي كني عنها بالتردد الإلهي يكون سريانها في التردد الكوني في الأمور.

ثم قال و هذه الأقلام هذه مرتبتها و الملك الموكل بالمحو ملك كريم على الله - هو الذي يمحو على حسب ما يأمره به الحق تعالى و الإملاء على ذلك الملك و الأقلام من الصفة الإلهية التي كني عنها بالوحي المنزل على رسوله بالتردد و لو

لا هذه الحقيقة الإلهية ما اختلف أمران في العالم ولا حار أحد في أمر ولا تردد فيه وكانت الأمور كلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٤٩

حتما مقضيا كما أن هذا التردد الذي يجده الناس في نفوسهم حتم مقضي وجوده فيهم إذ كان العالم محفوظا بالحقائق. ثم قال فقد أنبأتك بمكانه هذه الأقلام التي سمع صوت كتابتها رسول الله ص - من العلم الإلهي ومن يمدّها وإلى أي حقيقة إلهية مستندّها وما أثرها في العالم العلوي من الأملاك والكواكب والأفلاك وما أثرها في العناصر والمولدات وهو كشف عجيب يحوي على أسرار غريبة ومن أحكام هذه الأقلام تكون جميع التأثيرات في العالم دائما ولا بد لها أن تكتب وتثبت انتشار الكواكب وانحلال هذه الأجرام الفلكية وخراب هذه الدار الدنياوية وانتقال العمارة في حق السعداء إلى الجنان العلية التي أرضها سطح الفلك الثامن وجهن من مقعده إلى أسفل السافلين وهي دار الأشقياء وأما القلم الأعلى فثبت في اللوح المحفوظ كل شيء يجري من هذه الأقلام من محو وإثبات ففي اللوح المحفوظ إثبات المحو في هذه الألواح وإثبات الإثبات ومحو الإثبات عند وقوع الحكم وإنشاء أمر آخر فهو لوح مقدس عن المحو فهو الذي يمدّه القلم الإلهي باختلاف الأمور وعواقبها مفصلة مسطرة كل ذلك على الوجه الثابت وذلك بتقدير العزيز

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥٠

العليم وقلوب الأولياء من طريق الكشف الإلهي الحقيقي في التمثيل من هذه الأقلام كشف صحيح كما مثلت الجنة لرسول الله ص في عرض الحائط انتهى كلامه. وإنما اقتصرنا على نقل كلامه في هذا الباب لأنه كلام محقق عند ذوي البصيرة ولم أتعرض لشرح معانيه وحل رموزه وتطبيق مقاصده على أسلوب البرهان لأن المذكور في مواضع متفرقة من هذا الكتاب يكفي لمن تدبر فيها في ذلك سيما المذكور في مباحث علمه تعالى بالأشياء إجمالا وتفصيلا

الفصل (١٥) في ذكر القاب القرآن ونعوته

لما علمت الفرق بين كلام الله وكتابه وهو بوجه كالفرق بين الأمر والفعل فالفعل زماني متجدد وأمر الله بريء عن التغير والتجدد وكذا علمت الفرق بين كون النازل قرآنا - وكونه فرقانا وأن أحدهما بسيط والآخر مركب فقد حصل هاهنا أربعة ألقاب الكلام والكتاب والقرآن والفرقان.

فاعلم أن من جملة أسمائه ونعوته «النور»

لأنه نور عقلي ينكشف به أحوال المبدأ والمعاد ويتراءى منه حقائق الأشياء ويهتدى به في ظلمات بر الأجسام وبحر النفوس - ويظهر به للسالكين إلى دار الأخرى طريق الجنة وطريق النار قال تعالى **قَدْ جَاءَكُمْ مِنَ اللَّهِ نُورٌ وَكِتَابٌ مُبِينٌ يَهْدِي بِهِ اللَّهُ مَنِ اتَّبَعَ رِضْوَانَهُ سُبُلَ السَّلَامِ وَيُخْرِجُهُم مِّنَ الظُّلُمَاتِ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥١

إِلَى النُّورِ بِإِذْنِهِ وَيَهْدِيهِمْ إِلَى صِرَاطٍ مُسْتَقِيمٍ فقله نور إشارة إلى مرتبة العقل القرآني - البسيط المسمى بالقلم الإلهي وقوله كتاب إشارة إلى مرتبة العلم التفصيلي المثبت - في اللوح المحفوظ وللإشارة إلى هاتين المرتبتين قوله

تعالى **وَآتَيْنَاهُ الْحِكْمَةَ وَفَصَلَ الْخِطَابِ** فالحكمة للقرآن و التفصيل للكتاب و قال **أَوْ مَنْ كَانَ مَيِّتًا فَأَحْيَيْنَاهُ وَجَعَلْنَاهُ نُورًا يَمْشِي بِهِ فِي النَّاسِ كَمَنْ مَثَلُهُ فِي الظُّلُمَاتِ لَيْسَ بِخَارِجٍ مِنْهَا.**

و من أسمائه الحكمة

و هي أفضل علم بأفضل معلوم فلا حكيم بالحقيقة إلا الله و لهذا قيل إنها موهبة ربانية لا تحصل بسعي و اكتساب و لا يوصف بها إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٧، ص ٥٢

المتجردون عن جلباب البشرية و المنسلخون عن لباس هذا الوجود الكوني بالزهد الحقيقي و الفناء عن شوائب الخلقية كما قال **ذَلِكَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ يُؤْتِيهِ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَاللَّهُ ذُو الْفَضْلِ الْعَظِيمِ** بعد قوله **وَيَعْلَمُهُمُ الْكِتَابُ وَالْحِكْمَةُ.**

و من أسمائه الخير

قال **وَمَنْ يُؤْتَ الْحِكْمَةَ فَقَدْ أُوتِيَ خَيْرًا كَثِيرًا.**

و من أسمائه الروح

قوله تعالى **يُلْقِي الرُّوحَ مِنْ أَمْرِهُ عَلَى مَنْ يَشَاءُ مِنْ عِبَادِهِ - لِيُنْذِرَ يَوْمَ التَّلَاقِ**

و منها الحق

لأنه ثابت لا يتغير أبدا من حق الأمر إذا ثبت و لأنه صادق مطابق للواقع لا يعتريه شك و لا ريب قوله **وَيَرَى الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ الَّذِي أُنْزِلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ هُوَ الْحَقُّ** و قوله تعالى **نَزَّلَهُ رُوحُ الْقُدُسِ مِنْ رَبِّكَ بِالْحَقِّ لِيُثَبِّتَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا** و قوله **أَفَمَنْ يَعْلَمُ أَنَّمَا أُنْزِلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ الْحَقُّ كَمَنْ هُوَ أَعْمَى إِنَّمَا يَتَذَكَّرُ أُولُوا الْأَلْبَابِ** و قوله **بَلْ هُوَ الْحَقُّ مِنْ رَبِّكَ لَتُنَذِرَ قَوْمًا مَّا أَتَاهُمْ مِنْ نَذِيرٍ**

و منها الهدى

لأنه لا يهدي إلى الحق و هو الحق باعتبار آخر كما مر قوله تعالى **ذَلِكَ هُدَى اللَّهِ يَهْدِي بِهِ مَنْ يَشَاءُ*** و قوله **هُدًى لِلْمُتَّقِينَ الَّذِينَ يُؤْمِنُونَ بِالْغَيْبِ.**

و منها الذكر

لأنه ما يتذكر به أمور الآخرة و أحوال المبدأ و المعاد قوله تعالى - **إِنَّهُ لَذِكْرٌ لَكَ وَلِقَوْمِكَ وَسَوْفَ تُسْئَلُونَ**

و منها النبا العظيم

لأنه يخبر عن عالم الغيب- و المغيبات و عن أسرار النفوس و ضمائر القلوب **قُلْ هُوَ نَبَأٌ عَظِيمٌ أَنْتُمْ عَنْهُ مُعْرِضُونَ.**

و منها الشفاء

لأنه يقع به الشفاء عن الأمراض النفسانية و الأسقام الباطنية الآلام الأخروية من عذاب الجهل و الحسد و الكبر و العجب و الريا و النفاق و الرعونة و الشهوة و الغضب و حب المال و الرئاسة و سائر الأمراض المهلكة التي إذا استحكمت و تمكنت في القلب أعيت أطباء النفوس عن علاجها قوله تعالى **قُلْ هُوَ لِلَّذِينَ آمَنُوا هُدًى وَ شِفَاءٌ وَالَّذِينَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ فِي آذَانِهِمْ وَقْرٌ وَ هُوَ عَلَيْهِمْ عَمًى أُولَئِكَ يُنَادُونَ مِنْ مَكَانٍ بَعِيدٍ.**

و منها الرحمة

قوله تعالى **وَمَا أَنزَلْنَا عَلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ إِلَّا لِتُبَيِّنَ لَهُمُ الَّذِي اخْتَلَفُوا فِيهِ وَهُدًى وَرَحْمَةً لِّقَوْمٍ يُؤْمِنُونَ** وقوله **وَأَنَّهُ لَهْدًى وَرَحْمَةٌ لِّلْمُؤْمِنِينَ**.

و منها العلي الحكيم

أما كونه عليا فلأن أصل حقيقته من العالم العلوي العقلي و أما كونه حكيما أي ذا حكمة فلأن القرآن كما مر له مقام عقلي قائم بذاته فيه حقائق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥٣

الأشياء على وجه بسيط إجمالي و أن العقل بالفعل كما علمت عاقل و عقل باعتبارين و كذلك القياس في كونه حكيما و حكمة فهو حكمة من حيث كونه بذاته علما بحقائق الموجودات أو حكيما من حيث إنه علم قائم بذاته في المقام العقلي فذاته من غير صفة زائدة عالم بالأشياء كما هي فيكون حكيما لأن صدق المشتق لا يستدعي عروض مبدأ الاشتقاق قوله تعالى **يَسْ وَالْقُرْآنِ الْحَكِيمِ** وقوله تعالى **وَأَنَّهُ فِي أُمِّ الْكِتَابِ لَدَيْنَا لَعَلِّي حَكِيمٌ**.

و منها ذو الذكر

و الفرق بين كونه ذكرا و ذا الذكر اعتباري كما مر في كونه حكمة و حكيما قوله تعالى **ص وَالْقُرْآنِ ذِي الذِّكْرِ**.

و منها التنزيل

لكونه نزل الله من المرتبة العقلية الإجمالية إلى المرتبة النفسية التفصيلية قوله تعالى **تَنْزِيلٌ مِّنَ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ**

و منها المنزل

قوله تعالى **وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا هُمُ الْكِتَابُ يَعْلَمُونَ أَنَّهُ مُنْزَلٌ مِّن رَّبِّكَ بِالْحَقِّ** و الفرق بين كونه تنزيلا و كونه منزلا على قياس ما سبق -

و منها البشير و النذير

قوله تعالى **كِتَابٌ فَصَّلَتْ آيَاتُهُ قُرْآنًا عَرَبِيًّا لِّقَوْمٍ يَعْلَمُونَ بَشِيرًا وَ نَذِيرًا فَأَعْرَضَ أَكْثَرُهُمْ فَهُمْ لَا يَسْمَعُونَ**.

و منها البشري

و الفرق بين البشري و البشير كما مر قوله تعالى **هُدًى وَ بَشِيرٌ لِّلْمُؤْمِنِينَ*** و كذا الحال في كونه هدى و هاديا كما في قوله تعالى **وَيَهْدِي إِلَى صِرَاطٍ الْعَزِيزِ الْحَمِيدِ**.

و منها المجيد

قوله تعالى **ق وَالْقُرْآنِ الْمَجِيدِ**.

و منها العزيز

قوله تعالى **وَأَنَّهُ لَكِتَابٌ عَزِيزٌ**.

و منها العظيم

قوله تعالى **وَلَقَدْ آتَيْنَاكَ سَبْعًا مِّنَ الْمَثَانِي وَالْقُرْآنَ الْعَظِيمَ**.

و منها الموعظة الحسنة

قوله تعالى **ادْعُ إِلَى سَبِيلِ رَبِّكَ بِالْحُكْمَةِ وَالْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ**.

و منها النعمة

لأنه مما يتنعم و يتلذذ به أهل الله فوق ما يتنعم و يتلذذ أهل الدنيا بلذاتهم الحسية و لا نسبة بين نعمة الدنيا و نعمة الآخرة بل هذه اللذائذ الحسية آلام - بالإضافة إلى لذة المعرفة و الحكمة كما سنبين في موضعه قوله تعالى **يَعْرِفُونَ نِعْمَتَ اللَّهِ ثُمَّ يُنْكِرُونَهَا وَأَكْثَرُهُمُ الْكَافِرُونَ** أي يصدقون بحقيقتها مجملا و إلا فلو عرفوها عرفانا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥٤

حقيقيا لفازوا بالنعيم الأبدي و لم يكونوا من أهل الجحود و لذلك وصفهم بالكفر.

و منها الرزق

قوله تعالى **رِزْقُ رَبِّكَ خَيْرٌ وَأَبْقَى**.

و منها المبين

لأنه يتبين به حقائق الموجودات و يظهر به أسرار النشأتين - و أحكام الربوبية و العبودية و أحوال العباد و أقسامهم يوم البعث و المعاد قوله تعالى - **تِلْكَ آيَاتُ الْكِتَابِ وَقُرْآنٍ مُبِينٍ**.

و منها الميزان

لأنه معيار صحيح و مقياس مستقيم يوزن به مثاقيل الأعمال و موازين العلوم و الأفكار فيستعلم به صحيحها من فاسدها و رائجها في سوق القيامة من كاسدها و حقها من باطلها قوله تعالى **لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ** و قوله **وَالسَّمَاءَ رَفَعَهَا وَوَضَعَ الْمِيزَانَ أَلَّا تَطْغَوْا فِي الْمِيزَانِ** إلى غير ذلك من الألقاب و الأسامي و لا شك أن كثرة الأسامي و الأوصاف تدل على عظم شأن المسمى و الموصوف و الله أعلم بجلالة شأن كلامه و كتابه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥٥

الموقف الثامن في العناية الإلهية و الرحمة الواسعة لكل شيء و كيفية دخول الشر و الضر في المقدورات

الكائنة بحسب القضاء الإلهي و التقدير الرباني و فيه فصول

الفصل (١) في القول في العناية

لا شبهة في أن واجب الوجود تام الحقيقة و فوق التمام و كذا لضرب من ملائكته المقربين و العقول القادسين تامة الذوات متصلة الهويات بهوية الواحد الحق فلا يفعلون ما يفعلون لأجل غرض فيما دونهم من أحوال هذا العالم و بالجملة العلل العالية لا يجوز

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥٦

أن يكون صدور الأفعال منها لأغراض و غايات تعود إليها من فعلها و لم تكن حاصلة قبل الفعل و إلا لم تكن تامة كاملة الذات بل ناقصة مستفيدة الكمال من جهة معلولاتها - و هذا ممتنع جدا فثبت أنها لا يهمها في فعلها شيء و لا يدعوها داع و لا يتعرض على ذواتها إثثار طار و لا إرادة زائدة إلا الاقتداء بالخير الأقصى و النور الأتم الأعلى.

و أما الواحد الحق فليس فوقه غاية ينظر إليها في إفاضة الخير و بث الرحمة العامة- و مع ذلك فإننا نشاهد في موجودات هذا العالم و أجزاء النظام و أفراد الأكوان سيما في النبات و الحيوان بل في كليات الأعيان من الأفلاك و الأركان من حسن التدبير و جودة الترتيب و رعاية المصالح و المنافع و إبداع القوى و الأسباب الملائمة للأغراض الدافعة للآفات و المفسدات ما نقضي به آخر العجب و لا يسع لأحد أن ينكر الآثار العجيبة في جزئيات الأكوان فكيف في كلياتها كما سنذكر أنموذجا منها و تلك الجزئيات مثل مصالح و منافع روعيت في بعض النباتات كالنخل و العنب و بعض الحيوانات العجم الحقيرة- كالنحل و العنكبوت مما ليس يصدر ذلك على وجه الاتفاق من غير تدبير سابق و حكم مطابق و مصلحة مرعية و حكمة مرضية.

فإذن يجب أن يعلم أن العناية كما مر هي كون الأول تعالى عالما لذاته بما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥٧

عليه الوجود في النظام الأتم و الخير الأعظم و علة لذاته للخير و الكمال بحسب أقصى ما يمكن و راضيا به على النحو المذكور و هذه المعاني الثلاثة التي يجمعها معنى العناية من العلم و العلية و الرضا كلها عين ذاته بمعنى أن ذاته عين العلم بنظام الخير و عين السبب التام له و عين الرضا به و هو المشية الأزلية فذاته بذاته صورة بنظام الخير على وجه أعلى و أشرف لأنه الوجود الحق الذي لا غاية له و لا حد في الكمال وراءه فإذا كان كذلك فيعقل نظام الخير على الوجه الأبلغ في النظام و الأتم بحسب الإمكان فيفيض عنه ما يعقله نظاما و خيرا على الوجه المذكور الذي عقله فيضانا و صدورا متأديا إلى غاية النظام و صورة التمام على أتم تأدية.

فهذا هو معنى العناية الخالية عن الشين و النقص و من اعتقد غير هذا من القائلين بالاتفاق المنسوب إلى بعض القدماء و القائلين بالإرادة الخالية عن الحكمة- و العناية المنسوبة إلى الشيخ الأشعري و القائلين بالفرض السفلي العائد إلى الخلق فقد ضلوا ضلالا بعيدا حيث جهلوا تنزيه الله تعالى و توحيده و ما قدروا الله حق قدره

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥٨

الفصل (٢) في مباحث الخير و الشر

إن الخير ما يتشوقه كل شيء و يتوخاه و يتم به قسطه من الكمال الممكن في حقه- و يكون كل ذات مولية وجد القصد إلى شطره في ضروريات وجودها و أوائل فطرتها و في مكملات حقيقتها و متممات صفاتها و أفعالها و ثواني فضائلها و لواحقها فالخير المطلق الذي يتشوقه كل الأشياء و يتم به أو بما يفيض منه ذواتها و كمالات ذواتها هو القيوم الواجب بالذات جل ذكره لأنه وجود مطلق لا نقص فيه و نور محض و بهاء محض و تام و فوق التمام فيعشقه و يتشوقه كل ممكن بطباع إمكانه و كل موجود دونه بطباع نقصانه فيخضع له كل معلول بقوام معلوليته و فقره فكل ما سواه لا يخلو من شوب نقص و فقر فلم يكن شيء مع المعلولات خيرا محضا من كل جهة بل فيه شوب شرية بقدر نقصان درجته عن درجة الخير المطلق الذي لا ينتهي خيريته إلى حد و لا يكون فوقه غاية و للشر معنى آخر هو المصطلح عليه و هو فقد ذات الشيء أو فقد كمال من الكمالات التي يخصه من حيث هو ذلك الشيء بعينه- و الشر على كلا المعنيين أمر عديمي و إن كان له حصول في بعض كحصول الأعدام و الإمكانات للأشياء ضربا من الحصول في طرف الاتصاف و

لأجل ذلك قالت الحكماء إن الشر لا ذات له بل هو أمر عديمي إما عدم ذات أو عدم كمال ذات و الدليل عليه أنه لو كان أمرا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٥٩

وجوديا لكان إما شرا لنفسه أو شرا لغيره لا جائز أن يكون شرا لنفسه وإلا لم يوجد لأن وجود الشيء لا يقتضي عدم نفسه ولا عدم شيء من كمالاته ولو اقتضى الشيء عدم بعض ما له - من الكمالات لكان الشر هو ذلك عدم لا هو نفسه ثم كيف يتصور أن يكون الشيء مقتضيا لعدم كمالاته مع كون جميع الأشياء طالبة لكمالاتها اللانقة بها والعناية الإلهية كما أشير إليها لا تقتضي إهمال شيء بل توجب إيصال كل شيء إلى كماله فيكون الأشياء بطبائعها و غرائزها طالبة لكمالاتها و غاياتها لا مقتضية لعدمها ونقصانها ولا جائز أيضا أن يكون الشر على تقدير كونه وجوديا شرا لغيره لأن كونه شرا لغيره إما أن يكون لأنه لعدم ذلك الغير أو بعدم بعض كمالاته أو لأنه لا لعدم شيئا فإن كان كونه شرا لكونه معدما للشيء أو لبعض كمالاته فليس الشر إلا عدم ذلك الشيء أو عدم كماله لا نفس ذلك الأمر الوجودي المعدم وإن لم يكن معدما لشيء أصلا فليس بشر لما فرض أنه شر له - فإن العلم الضروري حاصل بأن كلما لا يوجب عدم شيء ولا عدم كماله فإنه لا يكون شرا لذلك لعدم استضراره به وإذا لم يكن الشر الذي فرضناه أمرا وجوديا شرا لنفسه - ولا شرا لغيره فلا يجوز عده من الشر و صورة هذا القياس على نظمه الطبيعي هكذا لو كان الشر أمرا وجوديا لكان الشر غير شر و التالي باطل فكذا المقدم و بيان اللزوم و بطلان التالي ما مر تقريره فعلم أن الشر أمر عديمي لا ذات له إما عدم ذات أو عدم كمال ذات و أنت إذا تأملت و استقرت معاني الشرور و أحوالها و نسبها وجدت كلما يطلق عليه اسم الشر لا يخرج من أمرين فإنه إما عدم محض أو مؤد إلى عدم فيقال شر لمثل الموت و الجهل البسيط و الفقر و الضعف و التشويه في الخلقة و نقصان العضو و القحط و أمثالها من عدميات محضة و يقال شر لما هو مثل الألم و الحزن و الجهل المركب و غير ذلك من الأمور التي فيها إدراك لمبدأ ما و سبب ما لا فقد لمبدأ ما و سبب ما فقط فإن السبب المضمر المنافي للخير و الكمال الموجب للفقد و الزوال قسمان.

القسم الأول ما كان مواصلا للمضرور به

المثوف من جهة وجوده فيدركه مدرك عدم الصحة و السلامة كمن يتأذى بفقدان اتصال عضو بوجود حرارته ممزقة له قطعة لذاعة فإنه من حيث يدرك فقدان الاتصال و زوال الصحة بقوة شاعرة في مادة ذلك العضو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦٠

و طبيعته يدرك بتلك القوة بعينها السبب المؤذي الحار أيضا فيكون هناك إدراك إدراك أمر عديمي على نحو إدراك سائر الأمور العدمية و إدراك أمر وجودي على نحو إدراك سائر الأمور الوجودية و هذا المدرك الوجودي ليس شرا في نفسه بل بالقياس إلى هذا الشيء و أما المدرك الآخر من عدم الكمال و زوال الاتصال فهو شر في نفسه و ليس شرا بالقياس إليه فقط حتى يتصور له وجود ليس يكون بحسبه شرا بل و ليس نفس وجوده إلا شرا فيه و على نحو كونه شرا - فإن العمى لا يجوز أن يكون إلا في العين و من حيث هو في العين لا يجوز أن يكون إلا شرا - و ليس له جهة أخرى يكون بها غير شر بخلاف ذلك الأمر الوجودي المضمر المؤلم فإن الحرارة المؤذية أو الخلط اللذاع أو السم القاتل يتصور لها

نحو آخر من الوجود لا تكون بحسبه شرا بل خيرا.

و القسم الثاني ما كان غير مواصل للمضرر به

كالسحاب المظل المانع لإشراق الشمس على المحتاج إليه في استكمالته بالتسخين و كالبرد المفسد للثمار و المطر المانع عن تبيض الثياب فإن كان المفتقر إلى الاستكمال دراكاً أدرك فقد كماله و عدم انتفاعه و لكن لم يدرك من حيث إنه يدرك لذلك أن السحاب قد حجب أو المطر قد منع أو البرد قد أفسد ثماره بل من حيث إنه مدرك بقوة أخرى كالبصر أو غيره فإن المفتقر إلى التسخن بشعاع الشمس مثلاً مزاج بدنه بقوة اللمسية و هي بالحقيقة عادته للكمال اللمسي و فاقدة للسلامة و الاعتدال المزاجيين و هي أيضاً مدركة لهذا الشر الحقيقي الذي هو العدم و الفقدان و أما المدرك للمزيل المانع كالسحاب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦١

هاهنا فهو البصر لا قوة للمس فليس هو من حيث إنه مبصر متأدياً عن السحاب و لا متضرراً منه و لا منتقصاً بل من حيث كونه ذا لمس و ذا قوة لمسية و القوة للمسية لا تدرك السحاب المعدم لكمالته بل الذي تدركه هذه القوة هو عدم الصحة و زوال الكيفية الملائمة فالشر بالذات هو العدم و لا كل عدم بل عدم واصل إلى الشيء و لا كل عدم واصل إليه فإن عدم الحلاوة في قوة السمع و البصر ليس بشر لهما بل عدم واصل إليه - يكون عدم مقتضى طبيعته من الكمالات التي تخص لنوعه و طبيعته.

و أما الوجودات فهي كلها خيارات إما مطلقاً أي بالذات و بالقياس جميعاً - أو بالذات و لكن قد يعرضها بالقياس إلى بعض الأشياء أن يؤدي إلى عدمه أو عدم حال من أحواله و يقال لها الشر بالعرض و هو المعدم المزيل أو الحابس المانع للخير عن مستحقه أو المضاد المنافي لكمال يقابله و خير يضاده.

و من هذا القسم الأخلاق المذمومة المانعة للنفوس عن الوصول إلى كمالاتها العقلية كالبخل و الجبن و الإسراف و الكبر و العجب و كذا الأفعال الذميمة كالظلم و القتل عدواناً و كالزنا و السرقة و الغيبة و النميمة و الفحش و ما أشبهها فإن كل واحد من هذه الأشياء في ذاته ليس بشر و إنما هي من الخيرات الوجودية و هي كمالات لأشياء طبيعية بل لقوى حيوانية أو طبيعية موجودة في الإنسان و إنما شريتها بالقياس إلى قوة شريفة عالية شأنها في الكمال أن تكون قاهرة على ما تحتها من القوى غير خاضعة و لا مدعنة إياها.

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فالحر و البرد المولمان للحيوان المفسدان للثمار و لأغذية الإنسان و سائر الأنعام كقيمتان من الكيفيات الفعلية و هما من كمالات الأجسام الطبيعية العنصرية و إنما الشر في فقد الصحة و السلامة و زوال الاعتدال من أمزجة النبات و الحيوان و كذلك الأخلاق الذميمة كلها كمالات للنفوس السبعية و البهيمية و ليست بشروط للقوى الغضبية و الشهوية - و إنما شرية هذه الأخلاق الرذيلة بالقياس إلى النفوس الضعيفة العاجزة عن ضبط قواها عن الإفراط و التفريط و عن سوقها إلى مسلك الطاعة للتدبير الأتم الذي ينوط به السعادة الباقية و كذا شرية هذه الأفعال الذميمة كالزنا و الظلم بالنسبة إلى السياسة البدنية أو المدنية و الظلم إنما هو شر بالنسبة إلى المظلوم على الوجه الذي عرفته و أما بالنسبة إلى الظالم من

حيث هو ظالم فليس بشر إلا بكونه ذا قوة نطقية فيتضرر به أزيد مما يتضرر به المظلوم في أكثر الأمر وكذلك الآلام والأوجاع والغموم والهموم وغيرها فهي من حيث كونها إدراكات لأُمُور ومن حيث وجودها أو صدورها من العلل الفاعلة - لها خيرات كمالية وإنما هي شرور بالقياس إلى متعلقاتها من الأعدام والفقدانات أو المفسدات والمولمات. فإذا تصفحت عن جميع الأشياء الموجودة في هذا العالم المسماة عند الجمهور شرورا لم تجدها في أنفسها شرورا بل هي شرور بالعرض خيرات بالذات كما مر بيانه بالوجه القياسي.

والغرض من ذكر هذه الأمثلة ليس الاستدلال على هذا المطلب من جهة الاستقراء أو التمثيل بل لدفع النقوض بإيرادها ولتوضح الفرق بين الشر بالذات والشر بالعرض ويزول الاشتباه بين الأمرين وينكشف أن الشر في كل ما يعدونه شرا يرجع إلى الأمر العدمي - وإلا فالبرهان هو الذي مر بيانه في أول هذا الفصل وربما يدعى البدهة في هذا المطلوب - والمذكور من الأمثلة للتنبيه والتذكير.

شك و تحقيق

اعلم أن هاهنا إشكالا معضلا لم تنحل عقده إلى هذا الوقت وهي منحلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦٣

بعون الله العزيز.

تقريره أن الألم هو نوع من الإدراك فيكون وجوديا معدودا من الخيرات بالذات وإن كان متعلقة عديميا فيكون شرا بالعرض كما ذكروا فيكون هناك شر واحد بالحقيقة هو عدم كمال ما لكننا نجد بالوجدان أنه يحصل هناك شران أحدهما ذلك الأمر العدمي كقطع العضو مثلا و زوال الصحة والآخر الأمر الوجودي الذي هو نفس الألم وذلك الأمر الوجودي المخصوص شر لذاته وإن كان متعلقة أيضا شرا آخر فإنه لا شك أن تفرق الاتصال شر سواء أدرك أو لم يدرك ثم الألم المترتب عليه شر آخر بين الحصول لا ينكره عاقل حتى لو كان التفرق حاصلًا بدون الألم لم يتحقق هذا الشر الآخر ولو فرض تحقق هذا الألم من غير حصول التفرق لكان الشر بحاله فثبت أن نحوًا من الوجود شر بالذات فبطلت هذه القاعدة الكلية أن كلما هو شر بالذات فهو أمر عدمي فهذا ما ذكره العلامة الدواني في حاشية التجريد و لم يتيسر له دفعه ولذا قال و التحقيق أنهم إن أرادوا أن منشأ الشرية هو العدم فلا يرد هذا النقض عليهم - وإن أرادوا أن الشر بالذات هو العدم و ما عداه إنما يوصف به بالعرض حتى لا يكون بالحقيقة - إلا شرية واحدة هي صفة العدم بالذات و ينسب إلى غيره بالتوسط كما هو شأن الاتصاف بالعرض - فهو وارد فافهم انتهى كلامه.

و أقول في دفعه إن مقصودهم هو الثاني والإيراد مدفوع عنهم بأن الألم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦٤

إدراك للمنافي العدمي كتفرق الاتصال و نحوه بالعلم الحضورى و هو الذي يكون العلم فيه هو المعلوم بعينه لا صورة أخرى حاصلة منه فليس في الألم أمران أحدهما مثل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦٥

التفرق و القطع و فساد المزاج و الثاني صورة حاصلة منه عند المتألم يتألم لأجلها بل حضور ذلك المنافي العدمي هو الألم بعينه فهو وإن كان نوعاً من الإدراك لكنه من أفراد العدم فيكون شراً بالذات و هو وإن كان نحواً من العدم لكن له ثبوت على نحو ثبوت أعدام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦٦

الملكات كالعمى و السكون و الفقر و النقص و الإمكان و القوة و نظائرها. و قد علمت أن وجود كل شيء عين ماهيته فوجود العدم عين ذلك العدم كما أن وجود الإنسان عين الإنسان و وجود الفلك عين الفلك و علمت أيضاً أن العلم بكل شيء عين المعلوم منه بالذات فهناك الوجود عين التفرق أو الانقطاع أو الفساد الذي هو عدمي و الإدراك المتعلق به عين ذلك الوجود الذي هو نفس الأمر العدمي. فقد ثبت أن الألم الذي هو الشر بالذات من أفراد العدم و لا شك أن العدم الذي يقال إنه شر هو العدم الحاصل لشيء لا العدم مطلقاً كما أشير إليه سابقاً فإذن لا يرد نقض على قاعدة الحكماء أن كلما هو شر بالذات فهو من أفراد العدم البتة. و الذي يزيدك إيضاحاً لهذا المقام من أن الآلام و الأوجاع من جملة الأعدام - أن النفس قد أشرنا إلى أن قواها سارية في البدن و أنها هي التي تشعر و تحس بأنواع المحسوسات - فهي بعينها الجوهر اللامس الذائق الشام و هي عين الصورة الطبيعية الاتصالية المزاجية - و كل ما يرد على البدن من الأحوال وجودياً كان أو عدمياً فالنفس تنفعل منه و تناله بالحقيقة و تتأثر منه لأجل قواها السارية في البدن فتفرق الاتصال الوارد على الجسم - لا شك أنه شر للجسم لأنه زوال اتصاله و عدم كماله فلو كان الجسم موجوداً حياً عند انفصاله شاعراً يتفرق اتصاله كان له غاية الشرية التي لا تتصور فوقها شرية الشيء لأنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦٧

يثبت عدمه له عند وجوده فإذا كان كذلك و النفس كما علمت لها ضرب من الاتحاد بالبدن - فكلما يرد على البدن عند تعلق النفس به فكأنما ورد على ذات النفس و لهذا تتأذى و تتألم بالجراحات و الأمراض و سوء المزاج البدني بقدر تعلقها به و اتحادها لكن النفس لما كانت لها مقامات أخرى و نشأت غير هذه النشأة التي وقع لها الأذى بسببها لم يكن أذاها من جراحة عظيمة أو سوء مزاج شديد أو فساد أو موت مثل أذى الحي [الحس] الذي حياته بعينها حياة البدن. فتأمل يا حبيبي لتدرك أن الشر غير لاحق إلا لما في طباعه ما بالقوة و ذلك لأجل المادة الجسمية بسبب أن وجودها وجود ناقص متهيئ لقبول الفساد و الانقسام و التكثر - و حصول الأضداد و الاستحالة و التجدد في الأحوال و الانقلاب في الصور فكلما هو أكثر براءة من المادة فهو أقل شراً و وبالا.

و اعلم أن الشرور تلحق المواد على وجهين

لأنها إما أن تلحقها لأول أمر يعرضها في أول الكون و إما لأمر يطرأ عليها بعد التكون

فالقسم الأول

كما تتمكن في أول وجودها هيئة من الهيئات تمنعها تلك الهيئة استعدادها الخاص للكمال الذي هنت المادة بشر يقابله و يوازيه كالمادة التي تتكون منها صورة إنسان أو فرس أو نبات إذا عرض لها من الهيئات ما جعلها أسوء مزاجاً و أقل

اعتدالا وأعصى جوهرها من قبول تلك الصورة على الوجه الأكمل فلم يقبل التقويم الأحسن و التشكيل الأتم و التخطيط الأليق فتشوهت الخلقة بسببها و لم يوجد المحتاج إليه من كمال الاعتدال في المزاج و تمام الشكل في البيئة لأن الفاعل المعطي قد قصر و ما أجاد فيما أفاد بل لأن المنفعل لم يقبل.

و أما القسم الآخر

فهو أحد أمرين إما مانع و حاجب يحول بين الشيء و مكمله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦٨

و إما مضاد واصل مبطل للكمال ممحق مثال الأول و وقع سحب كثيرة متراكمة أو أظلال جبال شاهقة تمنع تأثير الشمس في الثمار لتبلغ إلى النضج و تنال الكمال و مثال الثاني حصول البرد الشديد للنبات المصيب لكماله في وقته حتى يفسد استعداده الخاص و ما يتبعه من الصورة الكمالية

الفصل (٣) في أقسام الاحتمالات التي للموجود من جهة الخير و الشر

قد جرت عادة الحكماء بأن يقسموا الموجودات الممكنة بالقسمة العقلية في بادئ الاحتمال إلى خمسة أقسام ما هو خير كله لا شر فيه أصلا و ما فيه خير كثير مع شر قليل و ما فيه شر كثير مع خير قليل و ما يتساوى فيه الخير و الشر و ما هو شر مطلق لا خير فيه أصلا و الأقسام الثلاثة الأخيرة غير موجودة في العالم أصلا إنما الموجود من الخمسة المذكورة هو قسمان -

فالقسم الأول الذي كله خير مطلق لا شر فيه أصلا

هي أمور وقعت تامة الوجود - لا يفوتها شيء مما ينبغي أن يكون لها بالإمكان العام إلا و قد حصل لها في فطرتها الأصلية الأولية و لا يخالطها ما لا ينبغي لها لا في أول الوجود و لا بعده لأنها بالفعل من جميع الوجوه - و هي كالعقول المقدسة و كلمات الله التامات التي لا تبيد و لا تنقص و يتلوها من حزبها النفوس السماوية فإنها و إن كان فيها ما بالقوة إلا أنها مستكفية بذاتها و مقوم ذاتها في خروجها من القوة إلى الفعل غير ممنوعة عن البلوغ من حد النقص إلى الكمال الممكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٦٩

و كذلك ضرب من النفوس الكاملة الإنسانية إذا لحقت بالسابقين المقربين فهي أيضا من هذا القسم فيجب وجود هذا القسم من المبدأ الأعلى لأجل كونه خيرا محضا يفعل الخير لا محالة و قد علمت مما سبق من البراهين وجود العالم العقلي و من قاعدة إمكان الأشرف و الأخس وجود الأشرف قبل وجود الأخس.

و القسم الثاني و هو الذي فيه خير كثير يلزمه شر قليل

فيجب وجود هذا القسم أيضا منه لأن تركه لأجل شره القليل ترك الخير الكثير و ترك الخير الكثير شر كثير فلم يجز تركه فيجب إيجاده عن فاعل الخيرات و مبدأ الكمالات و مثال هذا القسم الموجودات الطبيعية التي لا يمكن وجودها على كمالها اللائق بها إلا و قد يعرض لها بحسب المصادمات و المصاكات الاتفاقية منع غيرها عن كمالاتها أو محق الكمالات عن غيرها كالنار التي كمالها في قوة الحرارة و الإحراق و بها تحصل المصالح العظيمة و المنافع الكثيرة لكن

قد يعرض لها إحراق بيت ولي و ثياب نبي و كذا الماء الذي كماله في البرودة و الرطوبة و السيلا و قد يعرض له تغريق بلاد و هلاك عباد و كذلك الأرض و الهواء و المطر و السحاب و غير ذلك.

و هذا القسم من الموجودات الممكنة إنما يكون فيما يمكن فيه الإحالة و الاستحالة - و الكون و الفساد لكن إذا تأملنا حال الشخص المستضر بشيء من هذه العناصر الأربعة - و تأملنا حال انتفائه طول عمره بكل واحد منها لم يكن لذلك القدر اليسير من الضرر نسبة يعتد بها إلى ذلك النفع الكثير و إذا كان الأمر كذلك في الشخص الواحد المستضر فكيف يكون الحال في نسبة ذلك الضرر اليسير إلى انتفاع جميع الأشخاص الإنسانية و الحيوانية و غيرها و كذلك الأدوية و الأغذية النباتية التي قد يتضرر بها في الندرة و كذلك وجود حيوانات في أنفسها خير إلا أنه يعرض لها بسبب مصاكنات اتفاقية تآدى ضررها إلى غيرها من الحيوانات كالحيات و العقارب و السباع الضارية و الجوارح المفترسة و غير ذلك - و كذلك الإنسان المستعد للكمالات النفسانية و العقلية و الخيرات الظنية و الحقيقية قد يعتريه بسبب أمور اتفاقية اعتقادات فاسدة و جهالات مركبة و أخلاق ذميمة و أعمال سيئة و اقتراف خطيئات تضره في المعاد و لكن هذه الشرور إنما تكون في أشخاص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٠

قليلة أقل من أشخاص سالمين عن هذه الشرور و الآفات و في أوقات أقل من أوقات العافية و السلامة عنها

الفصل (٤) في أن جميع أنواع الشرور من القسم المذكور لا توجد إلا في عالم الكون و الفساد بسبب وقوع التضاد فيه

و ذلك لأنك قد علمت أن الشر الذي كلامنا فيه و يقع الاصطلاح عليه هو عدم ذات أو عدم كمال لها و أما كون نوع أدون منزلة من نوع آخر أو أخس درجة منه في حد نفسه - فليس ذلك شرا في حقه فكون العقل أدون من الواجب و كون النفوس أخس منها و الأفلاك أدون من الكواكب و الطبيعة أدون من النفس لا يعد من الشرور فعلى هذا لا يوجد الشر في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧١

عالم الأفلاك و ما فيها و ما فوقها أصلا بل إنما توجد تحت السماء و في عالم الكون و الفساد - و مادة الكائنات العنصرية.

و التي يقع فيها من أنواع الشرور قليلة بالنسبة إلى الخيرات الواقعة فيها و منشأ ذلك الوقوع هو قبولها للتضاد الموجب للكون و الفساد فإنه لو لا التضاد ما صح حدوث الحوادث التي بسبب الاستحالات الباعثة للاستعدادات فما صح وجود نفوس غير متناهية و أشخاص كذلك و النفوس لا تحصل إلا عند حصول الأبدان و استعدادات مادتها لتعلق النفس بها و ذلك لا يحصل إلا بتفاعل الكيفيات المتضادة فالتضاد الحاصل في هذا العالم سبب دوام الفيض فيكون خيرا بالنسبة إلى النظام الكلي و شرا بالنسبة إلى الأشخاص الجزئية على أن التضاد الذي هو سبب الكون و الفساد ليس بجعل جاعل لأن كون الكيفيات كالحرارة و الرطوبة و اليبوسة و أشباهها متضادة إنما هو من لوازم ماهياتها - بحسب وجودها الخارجي المادي و إن لم يكن من لوازم وجودها العقلي كما وقعت الإشارة إليه و لوازم الوجودات كلوازم الماهيات غير

مجمولة بالذات فالمجوعول بالذات في هذه الأنواع نفس وجوداتها لا نقائصها و نقصاناتها الذاتية كما مر ذكره و قبولها للتضاد من النقائص اللازمة لذاتها لا يجعل جاعل و كما لا يمكن أن يجعل الفاعل و الأشكال الكرية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٢

متراصة دون خلل و يمكن ذلك في المربعات و المسدسات و ما ينحل هي إليه كالمثلث المتساوي الأضلاع كذلك لا يمكن للفاعل أن يجعل أصول الكائنات غير متضادة

الفصل (٥) في كيفية دخول الشرور في القضاء الإلهي

قد علمت أنه ليس للماهيات الممكنة في إمكانها و افتقار وجودها إلى موجد علة - و لا لكون وجودها ناقصا عن التمام الواجب و لا لكون مادة الكائنات متضادة الصور سبب - و لا لكون المتضادين متفاسدين سبب و لا لكون النار محرقة و البحر مغرقا سبب و لا لكون المستغرق في شهوات الدنيا و لذاتها محترقا بنار الجحيم محجوبا عن الجنة و النعيم سبب - فهذه هي اللوازم الضرورية التي ليست بجعل جاعل إنما المجعول ملزوماتها التي هي من جملة الخيرات فكثير من الغايات الكمالية لبعض الأشياء مضرّة أو مفسدة لبعض الأشياء - كما أن غاية القوة الغضبية مضرّة بالقوة الناطقة. و قد عرفت فيما تقدم في العلم الكلي من مباحث العلة الغائية الضرورات التي تلزم الغايات الذاتية فهذه الشرور من لوازم الغايات الخيرية كالأمكنات اللازمة للهويات - و النقائص الضرورية للوجودات و النقائص الوجودية عن رتبة الوجود الأول متفاوتة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٣

فإن نقصان الجسم عن درجة الواجب أكثر من نقصان النفس و نقصان الحس عن درجة العقل الأول أكثر من نقصان الخيال فلو كان النقصان في جميع الممكنات متشابها كانت الأنواع كلها نوعا واحدا و ماهياتها ماهية واحدة و كما أن ماهيات الأنواع بحقائقها متفاوتة فكذلك هويات الأشخاص التي تحت نوع واحد متفاوتة. و بالجملة الإبداع يوجب نقصان المبدع عن المبدع و إلا لم يكن أحدهما بكونه مبدعا و الآخر مبدعا أولى من العكس فإذن من الضرورة أن لا يكون ممكن ما خاليا عن نقص و قصور و من الضرورة أن يكون النقص في عالم النفوس أكثر منه في عالم العقول - و في عالم الطبائع أكثر و أوفر مما في عالم النفوس و في عالم العناصر أكثر و أشد مما في عالم الأفلاك و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى مادة مشتركة لا خيرية فيها إلا القوة و الاستعداد لقبول الأشياء و ستعلم أنها و إن بلغت إلى نهاية الخسة و الشرية في ذاتها لكنها وسيلة لحدوث الخيرات كلها و أن الوجود بسببها يعود و يرجع إلى الكمال بعد النقص - و إلى الشرف من الخسة و إلى الصعود من الهبوط و هذه المادة كما أنها قابلة للصورة قابلة للعدم و لا يمكن لها أن يقبل الصور كلها و لا يقبل أعدامها و مقابلاتها.

فإذن نقول إن الشرور التي هي من باب الأعدام و النقائصات و القصورات في الجبلّة فليس ثبوتها لأن فاعلا يفعلها بل لأن الفاعل لم يفعلها و هي التي ليست خيرا بالقياس إلى شيء آخر و أما الشرور التي تلحق بأشياء هي في نفسها خيرات و بالقياس إلى بعض الأشياء شرور كوجود النار و الماء و السيف و السنان و السبع و الحية و غيرها من الذوات و كوجود الغضب و الشهوة و الجريزة و الشيطنة و غيرها من الصفات و كوجود الضرب و الطعن و القتل و غير ذلك

من الأفعال فإنما هي من سببين سبب من جهة المادة لأنها قابلة للصورة والعدم و كان ممتنعاً أن لا تكون قابلة للمقابلات و سبب من جهة الفاعل لأنه وجب أن يفعل فعله الخاص إذا لاقى في مادة لفعله. واستحالة أن يكون للقوى الفعالة لذواتها أفعال متضادة أو يكون قد حصل وجودها و هي لا تفعل فعلها فمن المحال أن تفعل النار الأغراض المقصودة منها و لا تحرق بدن إنسان لاقته أو أن يفعل السيف الأغراض التي لأجلها و لا يقطع عضو إنسان إذا ضرب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٤

به عليه فلم يكن بد من أن يكون الغرض النافع في وجود هذه الأشياء مستتبعا -لآفات يعرض منها في بعض المواد لكن الأمر الأكثرى والأمر الدائم هو الخير المقصود منها في الطبيعة. أما الأكثرى فإن المنتفعين بالنار مثلاً أكثر من المستضرين والمستضرين أيضاً -أوقاتهم التي هم فيها في كنف السلامة من الاحتراق أكثر من زمان استضرارهم. وأما الدائم فلأن أنواعاً كثيرة لا تستحفظ إلا بوجود مثل النار فلم يحسن في الإرادة الأزلية والعناية الأولى أن يترك المنافع الأكثرية والخيرات الدائمة لعوارض شرية أقلية فالحكمة الإلهية اقتضت أن لا يترك الخيرات الفائضة الدائمة النوعية والمنافع الأكثرية لأجل شرور في أمور شخصية غير دائمة و لا أكثرية فالخير مقضي بالذات والشر مقضي بالعرض.

واعلم أن هذا القسم من الشر الوجودي لا يوجد في عالم القضاء الإلهي -الذي هو عبارة عن وجود جميع الأشياء بصورتها العقلية لخلوصها عن المادة ونقائصها- فالنار العقلية لا شر فيها وكذا الماء العقلي والإنسان العقلي والفرس العقلي والأسد العقلي وكذا سائر الصور العقلية لسائر الأشياء لا شرية لها بل كلها خير محض - وإنما يوجد الشرور في عالم القدر الذي هو تفصيل الصور التي في عالم القضاء - وتجسيمها وتقديرها بقدرها المعلوم وهذا الوجود الجسماني لا يخلو من تضاد وتمازج - توجبان التفرقة والتكثير ويعدمان تلك الجمعية والوحدة ومنبع التفرقة هي المادة - كما أن منبع وجود المادة هو الإمكان فإن صدور المواد الجرمانية من العقول الفعالة - إنما هو من جهة إمكاناتها ونقصاناتها لا من جهة وجوب وجوداتها وكمالاتها فالهولوى منبع الشرور والنقص ولا بد من وجودها كما علمت. قال المحقق الطوسي ره في شرح الإشارات عند قول الشيخ لأن كل شيء لازم له بوسط أو بغير وسط يتأدى إليه بعينه قدره الذي هو تفصيل قضائه الأول تأدياً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٥

واجباً إذ كان ما لا يجب لا يكون كما علمت بهذه العبارة أقول في تقريره لما كان جميع صور الموجودات الكلية والجزئية التي لا نهاية لها حاصلة من حيث هي معقولة - في العالم العقلي بإبداع الأول الواجب إياها و كان إيجاد ما يتعلق منها بالمادة في المادة - على سبيل الإبداع ممتنعاً إذ هي غير متهيئة لقبول صورتين معاضلاً عن تلك الكثرة - و كان الجود الإلهي مقتضياً لتكميل المادة بإبداع تلك الصور فيها وإخراج ما فيها بالقوة - من قبول تلك الصور إلى الفعل قدر بلطيف حكمته زماناً غير منقطع في الطرفين - يخرج فيه تلك الأمور من القوة إلى الفعل واحداً بعد واحد فتصير الصور

في جميع ذلك الزمان موجودة في موادها و المادة كاملة بها و إذا تقرر ذلك فاعلم أن القضاء عبارة عن وجود جميع الموجودات في العالم العقلي مجتمعة على سبيل الإبداع و القدر عبارة عن وجودها في موادها الخارجية بعد حصول شرائطها مفصلة واحدا بعد واحد كما جاء في التنزيل **وَأَنَّ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ وَمَا نُنْزِلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَعْلُومٍ** و الجواهر العقلية و ما معها موجودة في القضاء و القدر مرة واحدة باعتبارين و الجسمانية و ما معها موجودة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٦

فيهما مرتين انتهى كلامه و قال الشيخ الإشراقي في التلويحات لو نظرت إلى آثار رحمة الله في هذا العالم لقضيت العجب من أن الرحمة الإلهية لما كان غير جائز أن تقف على حد يبقى وراءها الإمكان غير المتناهي وجدت هيمولى ذات قوة القبول إلى غير النهاية كما للمبادي قوة الفعل إلى غير النهاية و كان لا بد أيضا لتجدد الفيض من تجدد أمر ما فوجدت أشخاص فلكية دائرة الأغراض علوية يتبعها استعداد غير متناه ينضم إلى فاعل غير متناه و قابل كذلك فيفتح باب نزول البركات و رشح الخير الدائم في الآزال و الأباد و يحصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٧

الفيض على كل قابل بحسب استعداده إذ المبدأ الواهب لا تغير فيه و لو كان للنمل استعداد قبول نفس أشرف كما للإنسان لحصل فيها من فيض العقل الفياض. ثم لما كان أشرف ما يتعلق بالهيمولى النفس الناطقة و كان غير جائز خروج الممكن فيها دفعة دون الأبدان و لا مع الأبدان فبحسب الأدوار و الأكوار و الاستعدادات يحصل نفوس من فيض واهبها قرنا بعد قرن راجعة إلى ربها إذا كملت انتهى كلامه.

فقد تبين و اتضح أن اللانهاية في الأشخاص و النفوس التي اقتضتها العناية الأزلية - من ضرورتها وقوع الاستحالة و التضاد في عالم الكون و الفساد و لو لا التضاد لما صح الكون و الفساد و لو لا الكون و الفساد ما أمكن وجود أشخاص غير متناهية و لا التي هي أشرف منها و هي النفوس غير المتناهية الحيوانية و لا التي هي أشرف من القبيلتين و هي النفوس غير المتناهية النطقية و كون الصور و الكيفيات مضادا بعضها لبعض قد علمت أنها ليست بفعل فاعل بل من لوازم وجودها القدري المادي و من ضرورة التفاعل بينها حتى يقع الاعتدال و يحصل به كمال تضادها فصح أنه لو لا التضاد ما صح دوام الفيض من المبدأ الجواد و لوقف الجود و لتعطل العالم العنصري عن قبول الحياة التي بها يحصل نيل المقصود و بقي أكثر ما يمكن في مكمن الإمكان و كتم العدم البحث و لم يمكن للسلاك السفر إلى الله تعالى و الرجوع إليه و قد قال سبحانه **كَمَا بَدَأْنَا أَوَّلَ خَلْقٍ نُعِيدُهُ**.

و من تأمل في أمر الموت الذي يعده الجمهور من أقوى أنحاء الشرور لعلم أن فيه خيرا كثيرا لا نسبة لشريته إليه يصل إلى الميت و إلى غيره أما الواصل إلى غيره فإنه لو ارتفع الموت لاشتد الأمر على الناس و ضاق المكان حتى لا يمكنهم التنفس فضلا عن الحركة و الأكل و الشرب فالمفروض أنه حي عند ذلك أسوأ حالا من الميت و أما الخير الواصل إليه فخلاصة عن هذا الوجود الدنيوي المعرض للآفات و المحن و مآله إلى الرحمة كما سنبينه إن شاء الله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٨

الفصل (٦) في دفع أوهام وقعت للناس في مسألة الخير و الشر

منها أن القسم الثاني الذي الخير فيه غالب على الشر

لم لم يوجد عن البارى على وجه لا يعتريه شر أصلاً حتى يكون الموجودات كلها خيريات محضة. وأجيب بأنه لو كان كذلك لكان الشيء غير نفسه إذ كان هذا غير ممكن في هذا القسم من الوجود وهو ممكن في الوجود المطلق لإمكانه في النمط الأول من الوجود فإنه قد فاض عن المدبر الأول الفياض على الأشياء الصور العقلية المجردة - بالكلية و الصور النفسية المتعلقة نحواً ما من التعلق و الطبائع السماوية المتقدرة الذوات المرتفعة عن المفاسد و المضار و بقي هذا النمط الثاني الذي لا يمكن وجوده إلا بمخالطة القوى و الأعدام و الأضداد. فإذا قلت لم لا توجد النار التي هي أحد أنواع هذا القسم على وجه لا يلزمها شر فكانك قلت لم لم يجعل النار غير النار و من المستحيل أن يجعل النار غير النار و من المستحيل أن يكون النار نارا و تمس ثوب ناسك و لا مانع من الحريق و لا تحرقه.

و منها أنكم زعمتم أن الخير في العالم كثير و الشر قليل

و نحن إذا نظرنا في أنواع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٧٩

الكائنات وجدنا الإنسان أشرف الجميع و إذا نظرنا إلى أكثر أفرادهم وجدنا الغالب عليهم الشرور لوجود أفعال قبيحة و أعمال سيئة و أخلاق و ملكات ردية و اعتقادات باطلة - و بالجملة الغالب عليهم طاعة الشهوة و الغضب بحسب القوة العملية و الجهل المركب بحسب القوة النظرية و هذان الأمران مضران في المعاد مولمان للنفس موجبان للشقاوة في العقبى مانعان عن السعادة الأخروية فيكون الشر غالباً على هذا النوع - الذي هو الثمرة القصوى و الغاية العظمى لوجود هذه الأكوان و بناء عالم العناصر و الأركان - و أما الاستمتاع بالشهوة و اللهو و اللعب الذي هو السعادة الدنيوية التي هي في التحقيق شقاوة فهو مع ذلك حقير جداً بالنسبة إلى ما يحرمونه من السعادة الحقيقية و يكتسبونه من نار الجحيم و العذاب الأليم.

و أجيب عن هذا بأن أحوال الناس في العقبى كأحوالهم في الدنيا و أحوالهم في النشأة الأولى على ثلاثة أقسام. الأول هم البالغون في الحسن و الصحة.

و الثاني المتوسطون فيهما و هم الأكثر على تفاوتهم في درجات التوسط.

و القسم الثالث البالغون في النقصان الممنونون بالقبح و السقم و العاهات - و هؤلاء أقل من المتوسطين و إذا نسبتهم إلى مجموع القسمين الأولين كانوا في غاية ما يكون من القلة و الحقارة بالنسبة إليهم فكذلك أحوال النفوس في الآخرة على ثلاثة أقسام.

الأول الكاملون في القوتين البالغون في تحصيل الكمالات الحكيمة النظرية - و اقتناء الملكات الكريمة العملية.

الثاني المتوسطون في تحصيل ذلك و هم الأكثر و الأغلب على تفاوت مراتبهم في ذلك من القرب إلى الطرف الأشرف و البعد عنه إلى الأرذل.

و الثالث هم البالغون في الجهالات البسيطة و المركبة الممعنون في رداءة أخلاق - فهؤلاء أقل عددا من القسم الثاني بكثير و إذا نسبتهم إلى مجموع القسمين الأولين كانوا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٨٠

في غاية القلة و الحقارة فلاهل الرحمة و السلامة غلبة و افرة في كلتا النشأتين. قال الشيخ الرئيس في الإشارات لا يقعن عندك أن السعادة في الآخرة نوع واحد و لا يقعن عندك بل إنما يهلك الهلاك السرمذ ضرب من الجهل و الرذيلة و إنما يعرض للعذاب ضرب من الرذيلة و حد منه و ذلك في أقل أشخاص الناس و لا تضع إلى من يجعل النجاة وقفا على عدد و مصروفة عن أهل الجهل و الخطايا صرفا إلى الأبد و استوسع رحمة الله انتهى كلامه أقول هذا الكلام و الذي قبله و إن كان منافيا لظواهر بعض النصوص و الروايات إلا أن الإمعان في الأصول الإيمانية و القواعد العقلية يعطي الجزم بأن أكثر الناس في الآخرة و جب أن يكون من أهل السلامة و النجاة و لأهل المعرفة و الكشف نمط آخر من التحقيق في هذا المقام سيجيء ذكره من ذي قبل إن شاء الله. على أن البرهان اللمي قائم على أن خلق كل نوع طبيعي من إفاضة الله - و ترتيبه النظام يجب أن يكون على نهج يبلغ جميع آحاد ذلك النوع أو أكثرها إلى كمالها الخاص بها من غير مانع و لا مزاحم إلا على سبيل الندرة الاتفاقية من غير دوام - لكن يجب أن يعلم أن الذي كلامنا فيه هو الكمال الأول و الثاني لا الذي بعدهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٨١

من الكمالات و أن يعلم أن أفراد الإنسان بما هم إناث ليس مقتضى كمالهم الأول و لا الثاني أن يكونوا حكماء عرفاء بالله و ملكوته و آياته و اليوم الآخر فإن هذا ليس في جملة أكثر الناس بل في طباع طائفة مخصوصة هم في الحقيقة نوع آخر من الناس مخالف لما سواهم فإن الإنسان قد أشرنا إلى أنه من حيث النشأة الأولى نوع واحد و من حيث نشأة الفطرة الثانية من طينة سره و باطنه أنواع كثيرة و لكل نوع منهم كمال يخصه و سعادة لأجله و شقاوة تقابلها كما سيجيء و شرحه في بحث المعاد.

قال الشيخ في الشفا اعلم أن الشر الذي هو بمعنى العدم إما أنه يكون شرا بحسب أمر واجب أو نافع قريب من الواجب و إما أن لا يكون شرا بحسب ذلك بل شرا بحسب الأمر الذي هو ممكن في الأول و لو وجد لكان على سبيل ما هو فضل من الكمالات التي بعد الكمالات الثانية و لا مقتضي له من طباع الممكن فيه و هذا القسم غير الذي نحن فيه و هو الذي استثنيناه هذه و ليس هو شرا بحسب النوع بل بحسب اعتبار زائد على واجب النوع كالجهل بالفلسفة أو بالهندسة أو غير ذلك فإن ذلك ليس شرا من جهة ما نحن ناس بل هو شر بحسب كمال لا صلاح في أن يعم و ستعرف أنه إنما يكون شرا إذا اقتضاه شخص إنسان أو شخص نفسه و إنما يقتضيه الشخص لا لأنه إنسان أو نفس بل لأنه قد ثبت عنده حسن ذلك و اشتاق إليه و استعداد لذلك الاستعدادات و أما قبل ذلك فليس مما ينبعث إليه الشيء في بقاء طبيعة النوع انبعاثه إلى الكمالات الثانية التي تتلو الكمال الأول فإذا لم يكن كان عدما في أمر ما مقتضي له كان في الطباع انتهى عبارته.

و منها أنه إذا كان ما يستتر عن الإنسان من المعاصي أو يتصف به من الرذائل واقعا - بقضاء الله

داخلا في قدره كما اعترفتم به فيجب وقوع تلك المعاصي والآثام منه بالضرورة- شاع الإنسان أو أبى وإذا كان وقوعها واجبا اضطراريا فلا يليق بالواجب جل الذي هو منبع الجود والإحسان عن أن يعاقب بذلك أهل العصيان و يعذب الإنسان الضعيف العاجز على فعل يجب صدوره عنه على سبيل الاضطرار فإن ذلك ينسب إلى خلاف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٧، ص ٨٢

مقتضى العدل والإحسان بل إلى الجور والعدوان وذلك محال على الواجب تعالى - كيف **وإن الله يأمر بالعدل والإحسان وإيتاء ذي القربى وينهى عن الفحشاء والمنكر والبغى**.

والجواب على مقتضى قواعد الحكماء أن الله غني عن العالمين و بريء عن طاعة المحسنين و معصية المسيئين وإنما الوارد على النفس بعد مفارقة الدنيا إنما هو على تقصيرها و تلطيخ جوهرها بالكدورات المؤلمة و الظلمات المؤذية الموحشة لا أن عقابها لمنتقم خارجي يعاقبها و يؤذيها و ينتقم منها في أفعالها كما يتوهم النفوس العامة- مما يرون من العقاب الحاصل في هذا العالم بالأسباب الخارجية و ليست الأمور الأخروية كذلك فإن العقوبات هنالك من لوازم أعمال و أفعال قبيحة و نتائج هيئات ردية و ملكات سيئة فهي حمالة لحطب نيرانها و معها وقود جحيمها فإذا فارقت النفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٧، ص ٨٣

البدنة متلطفة بالملكات المذمومة و الهيئات المردولة و زال الحجاب البدني و فيها مادة الشعلات الجحيمية و كبريت الحرقات الباطنية و النيرانات الكامنة اليوم فشاهدها بعين اليقين و قد أحاطت بها سرادقها و أحذقت بقلبها عقاربها و حياتها و عاينت مرارة شهوات الدنيا و تأذت بموذيات أخلاقها و عاداتها و ردت إليها مساوي أفعالها و نتائج أعمالها كما

قال الصادق ع: إنما هي أعمالكم ترد إليكم

و قال

: رب شهوة ساعة أورث حزنا طويلا

و يكون حال الإنسان المتألم بهذا العقاب بسبب الهيئات الردية كحال الإنسان المنهوم المقصر في الحمية إذا ردت إليه شدة نهمته و قوة شهوته و ضعف معدته أو جاعا و أمراضا مؤلمة فيكون هذا التألم من لوازم ما ساق القدر إليه من الشهوة المؤدية إلى هذا التألم لا لأن الطبيب الذي أمره بالاحتماء ينتقم منه.

و منها و هو من ركب الاعتراضات على الحكماء

أنهم لما لم يقولوا بالحسن و القبح في الأفعال كما ذهب إليه المعتزلة و نفوا في أفعال الواجب تعالى الغرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٧، ص ٨٤

بل قالوا بالإيجاب فإذا خوضهم في هذه المسألة من قبيل الفضول فإن السؤال بلم غير وارد مع القول بالإيجاب في الأفعال أو مع القول بنفي التحسين و التقبيح فيها

و الجواب أما أولا

فإنهم ما نفوا الغاية والغرض عن شيء من أفعاله مطلقا - بل إنما نفوا في فعله المطلق وفي فعله الأول غرضا زائدا على ذاته تعالى و أما ثواني الأفعال والأفعال المخصوصة والمقيدة فثبتوا لكل منها غاية مخصوصة كيف و كتبهم مشحونة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٨٥

بالبحث عن غايات الموجودات و منافعها كما يعلم من مباحث الفلكيات و مباحث الأمزجة و المركبات و علم التشريح و علم الأدوية و غيرها.

و أما ثانيا

فلما علمت غير مرة أن فعله تعالى بعين الإرادة و الرضا المنبعثين عن ذاته بذاته و الإيجاب الحاصل منهما غير الجبر الذي يكون في المبادي الطبيعية - العديمة الشعور و المبادي التسخيرية.

و أما ثالثا

فهب أن الأمر كما زعمه فللحكيم أن يبحث عن كيفية ترتب الأفعال - من مبادئها الذاتية على وجه المناسبة و عدم المنافاة و أن يبحث عن كيفية صدور الشر عما هو خير بالذات فينبه على أن الصادر منه أولا و بالذات هو الخير و أن الشر غير صادر منه بالذات بل صدور الخيرات الكلية أدى إلى شرور جزئية قليلة العدد بالإضافة إلى تلك الخيرات العظيمة فلم يكن الصادر منه تعالى شرا أصلا كيف و بما ذكره يدفع شبهة عظيمة من المجوس القائلين بشرك عظيم من إثبات اثنيية القديم سموهما يزدان فاعل الخير و أهرمن فاعل الشر و كفى شرفا و فضلا لهم في بحث يدفع به ما هي بذر الشبهات كشبهة إبليس اللعين حين اعترض على الملائكة الذين هم من أفاضل عالم السماوات كما أن الحكماء من أفاضل طبقات الجنات بأن الله لم خلقي و قد علم أنني أضل عباده عن الطريق و أغويهم عن الصراط المستقيم فأجيب بالجواب القاطع لسؤاله على وجه الإلزام للمجادل الذي لا يستعد لإدراك النهج البرهاني و قيل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٨٦

لا يسأل عما يفعل و هو أحد الطرق الثلاثة المذكورة في كتاب الله أحدها الحكمة البرهانية للكاملين المقربين.
و الثاني الموعظة الخطابية لأهل السلامة و أصحاب اليمين و الثالث المجادلة لدفع شبهة الضالين من أصحاب الشمال المكذبين بيوم الدين.

و منها أنه إذا جاز عند الفلاسفة

أن يصدر عن الواجب تعالى جوهر شريف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٨٧

لأجل أمر خسيس حيث فعل عالم العقل أولا ثم فعل بتوسطه عالم النفس و خلق من النفس الطبيعة الجسمية و هكذا إلى أن انتهى فعله في الغاية إلى الهيولى التي هي أحسن الأشياء - حسب ما هو مذهبهم في الترتيب فليجز عندهم أن يصدر عن الخير ما هو شر بالذات - و الجواب أن هذا غلط نشأ إما من الاشتباه بين الغاية الحقيقية و الأمر الضروري - و

إما من توهم انعكاس الموجبة الكلية كنفسها و ليس كذلك فليس يلزم من كون كل غاية متأخر بالذات عن الشيء ذي الغاية أن يكون كل متأخر بالذات عن الشيء غاية له حتى يلزم أن يكون الهيولى المشتركة أشرف من السماويات و السماويات أشرف من العقول الفعالة و الغاية بمعنى الذي لأجله الفعل ليست الغاية التي هي نهاية الفعل فإنه يصح أن يقال انتهت سلسلة الأمور الدائمة إلى الهيولى المشتركة أو نحوها و يصح أن يقال للأفعال انتهاء و لا يصح بوجه آخر فإن الجود الإلهي لا غاية له و متى قال الحكماء - إنه تعالى أبداع الأشياء على الترتيب من العقل منتهية إلى الهيولى شبه ما وقع في الكلام الإلهي يدبر الأمر من السماء إلى الأرض فليس المراد أن الهيولى و ما يجري مجراها - غاية الفيض و الجود و لو كان الأمر كما توهموه لم يرجع الوجود منعظاً من هذا المنزل الأدنى و الأرض السفلى إلى غاية الشرف الأقصى على عكس الترتيب الأول كما قال تعالى **ثُمَّ إِلَيْهِ يَرْجِعُونَ** و قوله **كَمَا بَدَأْنَا أَوَّلَ خَلْقٍ نُعِيدُهُ وَعَدًا عَلَيْنَا إِنَّا كُنَّا فَاعِلِينَ**.

و أكثر من يطول حديث الخير و الشر و يستشكل الأمر من يظن أن الأمور العظيمة الإلهية من الأفلاك و ما فيها إنما خلقت لأجل الإنسان و أن الأفعال الإلهية منشؤها إرادة - قصدت بها أشياء و أغراض على نحو إرادتنا و أغراضنا في الأفعال الصادرة عنا بالاختيار - و لو تأمل هذا الجاهل المحجوب عن شهود العارفين أدنى تأمل لدرى أن الأمر لو كان كما توهمه و لم يكن هناك أحكام مضبوطة و علوم حقة الإلهية و ضوابط ضرورية أزلا و أبداً ما كان أحوال أولياء الله في الدنيا على هذا الوجه من المحن الشديدة و تسلط الأعادي و الظلمة و أهل الجور عليهم و ما كان أحوال أعداء الله من الفراعنة و الدجاجلة - على ما وقع من تمكين أديانهم الفاسدة و معتقداتهم الباطلة و آرائهم الخبيثة و سببهم و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٧، ص ٨٨

نهبهم و طغيانهم و عداوتهم لأن الإرادة إذا كانت متجددة جزافية فما المانع من وقوع الأمر على نحو ما يلائم شهوة كل أحد فإن كل ما يجعلونه مانعاً عن وقوع الفعل على ما يوافق مطلوبهم و مآربهم سيما إذا أعدوا أنفسهم من أحياء الله و الصالحين من عباده فيقال لم ما جمع من له هذه الإرادة الجزافية بين دفع المانع و حصول المطلوب - و لم لم يجمع بين السلامة عن الآفة و حصول المثوبة بل يقال لم لم يرفع الكفر و الجور من العالم - حتى يملأ الأرض أزلاً و أبداً قسطاً و عدلاً بل يجعل الأرض غير الأرض كما في الآخرة - و نقية فورانية صافية من أدناس الكفر و الفجور فإن قالوا التقدير الأزلي منعه عن ذلك - فيقال كون التقدير الأزلي عنه واجب أو ممكن فإن كان ممكن الطرفين و اختار أحدهما - فلا بد من مرجح زائد كما هو رأيكم و ترجيح الخير العام كان أولى إذ لا مصلحة للكافر في كفره و للشقي في شقائه و إن كان ذلك التقدير واجبا بحيث ما كان يصح الوجود إلا كما هو عليه فيثبت اللزوم فإن قالوا إنه فعل ما شاء و لا يسأل عن لم فيقال عدم السؤال بالمعنى الذي تصورتموه لأنه يحرق اللسان أو لأن النظر هاهنا حرام أو لأن الحجة لا تنتهي إليه و الأقسام كلها باطلة و إن كان الأمر كما زعمتم بأنه لا يسأل في المعقولات النظرية - فكل ما يراد الحجة عليه حتى كون العالم مفتقراً في تخصيص جهاته إلى المرجح و في صفات الباري نفياً و إثباتاً و غيرها فللخصم أن يقول لا يسأل عن لم.

و من الإشكالات القوية في هذا المقام

أن الله تعالى لما ثبت أنه خير محض - جواد كريم غني عن طاعة المطيعين و معصية المجرمين فما السبب في تعذيب

الكفار - يوم الآخرة في النار أبد الآبدين كما قال تعالى **أُولَئِكَ أَصْحَابُ النَّارِ هُمْ فِيهَا خَالِدُونَ*** وغير ذلك من النصوص الدالة على خلودهم في العذاب وقد أشرنا إلى أن البرهان ناهض في أن مقتضى الطبيعة لكل نوع غير ممنوع عن أفرادها على الدوام وأن كل واحدة من طبائع الأشياء - ما دام كونها على تلك الطبيعة يجب أن تكون غير معوقة عن كمالها الخاص الثانوي دائما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٨٩

و لا ممنوعة عن وصولها إلى ما خلق لأجله منعاً مستمرا بل لا بد وأن تعود إليه عند زوال القاصر كما قال أشرف الخلق ع و الكل ميسر لما خلق له - إذ القسر كما علمت لا يكون دائماً ولا أكثرياً فكل طبيعة لا تتعطل عن كمالها أبداً - فنقول لا يخلو الكفر أو ما يجري مجراه إما أن يخرج الإنسان عن الفطرة الأولى - ويدخله في فطرة أخرى من نوع آخر أو لا و على أي التقديرين يلزم أن لا يكون العذاب أبدياً.

أما على تقدير الخروج فظاهر لأنه صار نوعاً آخر بسبب تكرار أفاعيله الشهوية أو الغضبية فصارت الملكة النفسانية صورة ذاته و جوهر طبعه فيكون تلك الأفعال عند ذلك من كمالات ذاته كالبهيمة كمالها في قضاء الشهوة و السبع كماله في الغلبة و التهجم فلم يكن الشيء معذباً بما يلائم نفسه و طبعه بل مبتهجا به كما نرى من أحوال أكثر الخلق.

و أما على تقدير البقاء على الفطرة التي كانوا عليها فإنه وقع الاحتجاب عنها - بعوارض غير لازمة و لا دائمة فعند زوال العوارض يقع الرجوع إلى الفطرة الأصلية - فينالهم الرحمة الواسعة و الجود الأعم من غير دافع و لا حجاب فإذن لا وجه للخلود في العذاب.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٠

و الجواب عنه ما سينكشف لك في موعده إن شاء الله تعالى عند شرح أحوال النفوس بحسب أقسامها في الآخرة و سنذكر في بعض الفصول الآتية كلاماً من ذلك النمط يستشعر منه عموم فضله تعالى و شمول رحمته لكافة خلقه في الآخرة و الأولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩١

الفصل (٧) في أن وقوع ما يعده الجمهور شروراً في هذا العالم قد تعلقت به الإرادة الأزلية صلاحاً لحال الكائنات

إذ لا شبهة لأحد من أهل التحقيق حسبما يجيء شرحه في أن نظام العالم على هذا الوجه أشرف النظمات الممكنة و أكملها و أفضلها بحيث لا يتصور فوقه نظام آخر - و هذا ثابت محقق عند الكل و الحكيم و المتكلم متفقان فيه سواء في ذلك القائل بالقضاء الأزلي أو القائل بالاختيار التجديدي و القصد الزائد فإن لمن يقول بالاختيار أن يقول لا يمكن أن يوجد العالم أحسن مما هو عليه لأنه لو أمكن ذلك و لم يعلم الصانع المختار أنه يمكن إيجاد ما هو أحسن منه فيتناهى علمه المحيط بالكليات و الجزئيات و إن علم و لم يفعل مع القدرة عليه فهو يناقض جوده الشامل لجميع الموجودات. و هذا مما ذكره الغزالي في بعض كتبه و نقل عنه الشيخ الكامل محي الدين العربي في الفتوحات المكية و استحسنة و

هو كلام برهاني فإن الباري جل شأنه غير متناهي القوة تام الجود والفيض فكل ما لا يكون له مادة ولا يحتاج إلى استعداد خاص ولا أيضا له مضاد ممانع فهو بمجرد إمكانه الذاتي فائض منه تعالى على وجه الإبداع ومجموع النظام له ماهية واحدة كلية وصورة نوعية وحدانية بلا مادة وكل ما لا مادة له نوعه منحصر في شخصه فلا محالة ليس ذاته مرهونة - باستعداد محدود أو زمان موقوف فلا محالة مبدع فلم يمكن أفضل من هذا النظام نوعا ولا شخصا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٢

فإذا كان الأمر على هذا السبيل فأصول الممكنات في هذا النظام أفلاك دائرة وكواكب سائرة لأشواق عالية وعناصر مرتبة على الترتيب وهي متأتية لأن يخلق منها ضروب أخرى من المخلوقات وهذا لا يمكن إلا بالاستحالات والانقلابات المنبعثة في مواد الكائنات من الحركات الوضعية للسماويات ولا يمكن أن يكون الكائن موقوفا مبنيا على الحركات ثم كان مقتضى جميع الحركات فيه واحدا بل يجب أن يكون مقتضى كل حركة غير مقتضى الأخرى فإذا كان مقتضى الأولى موافقا لطبعه كان مقتضى الثانية مخالفا له وأيضا لا يمكن أن يكون مقتضى الحركة الواحدة إذا كان موافقا لطبيعة واحدة - موافقا لطبائع سائر الأشياء نعم يجب أن يراعى حال الأفضل فالأفضل فاستيلاء الحرارة مثلا بواسطة إضاءة الشمس على موضع من الأرض لتحيلها بالتلطيف والتسخير إلى طبيعة أخرى يتكون منها نوع أشرف من الأرض ليس موافقا لطبيعة الأرض بما هي أرض لكن الرحمة الإلهية مقتضية له على أن الأرض لو كانت ذات شعور لعلم أن خروجها عن هذا الكون وإن كان مكروها لها بحسب ما هي عليه الآن لكن تحت هذا الكره والفسر لطف عظيم حيث ينقلب من هذه الصور إلى صورة أشرف وأقرب إلى قبول الحياة والرحمة الإلهية.

وقد أشير إلى هذا المعنى في الكلام الإلهي **اَتْتِيَا طَوْعًا أَوْ كَرْهًا قَالَتَا أَتَيْنَا طَائِعِينَ** فالإتيان إليه سبحانه كما في الموت ونحوه وإن كان مكروها أولا لتعلق الشيء بنشأته الجزئية لكنه إذا انقلب عنها إلى نشأة أخرى يصير المهروب عنه مطلوبًا والمكروه مرغوبا فيه فإذن الموت والفساد ونحوهما من الأمور الضرورية اللازمة للنظام ولهذا وجب أن يكون مثل هذه الأمور المنسوبة إلى الشر موجودة في هذا النظام وما كان يليق في الحكمة أن لا يخلق هذا الخلق الذي يلزمه شر.

على أن التعمق في أسرار الكائنات يعطي الحكم بأن كله خير ونظام وهذا الموت الذي يتوحش منه الناس إذا حقق أمره يعلم أنه ليس معناه وغايته إلا تحويل النفس من نشأة سافلة إلى نشأة عالية وهو يرجع إلى أحد الاستكمالات الطبيعية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٣

وكما أن كل استكمال يقع في الطبيعة يلزمه حصول أمر وزوال أمر دونه كما أن استكمال النطفة بالصورة الحيوانية يلزمه بطلان الصورة النطفية فكذلك استكمال الصور الحيوانية الحسية - بصورة أخروية مثالية أو عقلية يلزمه انخلاع هذه الصورة وانتزاع الروح عن هذا الهيكل الطبيعي والحرارة الغريزية التي هي عند المحققين جوهر سماوي بيد ملك من ملائكة الله النازعة للأرواح الناقلة إياها من نشأة إلى نشأة ليست شأنها بالذات نفس الإذابة والتحليل وإفناء الرطوبات إلى أن يقع الموت وإلا لم يكن أفاضها سبحانه ولم يسلطها على البدن ولا يرضى سبحانه بموت أحد سيما الإنسان إلا لأجل حياة أخرى مستأنفة في عالم المعاد وستعلم أن نفوس الحيوان بل النبات أيضا منتقلة إلى ذلك العالم بل فعل تلك

الحرارة بالذات - تعديل المزاج و تحويل البدن و تحريك مواده بالتسخين إلى مزاج حار يناسب الخفة و اللطافة لأن يبدل مركب النفس و يسوى له مركبا ذلولاً برزخياً مطيعاً للراكب غير جموح لعدم تركبه من الأضداد فيميل تارة إلى جانب و أخرى إلى جانب آخر فهذا التبديل في المراكب يهيئ النفس للخروج و الهجرة إلى الله من هذه الدار فالموت طبيعي بهذا المعنى لا كما قالته الأطباء و غيرهم من الطبيعيين إن ذلك لنفاد الرطوبة و وقوف القوة كما مر ذكره. فإذاً جميع أقسام الموت و الفساد و انفساخ الصور و نحو ذلك مما يقع بالطبع لا بالقسر أو الاتفاق سببه ما ذكرناه فإذاً لا شر و لا ضير في أن يصير صورة أدون فداء للصورة الأشرف و لا أن يكون نوع أنزل و أنقص غذاء للنوع الأكمل الأعلى كما يصير العناصر غذاء المركبات و هي غذاء للنبات و الحيوان و الجميع أغذية للإنسان و بذلك يتم له الشرف و الفضل و له الاستعداد و التهيو للركوب و السفر إلى المحل الأنور و لنرجع إلى نمط آخر من الكلام في شرح أنواع من الخيرات و الشرور النسبية المؤدية إلى الخير الأعظم - على محاذاة ما في بعض كتب السابقين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٤

الفصل (٨) في بيان كمية أنواع الخيرات و الشرور الإضافية

اعلم أن الخير و الشر يقالان على أربعة أوجه -

فمنها ما ينسب إلى السماويات

من سعود الكواكب و نحوسها.

و منها ما ينسب إلى الأمور الطبيعية

من الكون و الفساد و ما يلحق الأمزجة الحيوانية من الآلام و الأوجاع -

و منها ما ينسب إلى ما في طباع الأحياء العنصرية

من التالف و التنافر و التودد و التباض و المحبة و الخصومة على ما في جبلتها من التنازع و التغالب -

و منها ما ينسب إلى النفوس التي تحت الأوامر و النواهي

في أحكام الناموس الإلهي و ما يلحقها من السعادة و الشقاوة الآجلتين و العاجلتين جميعاً.

فنقول الخيرات التي تنسب إلى سعود الفلك

فهي بعناية من الحق الأول و إرادة منه بلا شك و أما الشرور التي تنسب إلى نحس الفلك فهي عارضة لا بالقصد الأول مثال ذلك إشراق الشمس و طلوعها على بعض البقاع تارة و تسخينها لها مدة و تغييبها عنها تارة أخرى كيما يبرد تلك البقاع مدة ما لنشو الحيوان و النبات و هي بعناية الحق الأول - و واجب حكمته لما فيه من الصلاح الكلي و النفع العام كما ذكره الله تعالى **قُلْ أَرَأَيْتُمْ إِنْ جَعَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْكُمُ النَّهَارَ سَرْمَدًا** الآية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٥

و أما الذي يعرض لبعض الحيوانات أو لبعض النبات

من الحر المفرط أو البرد المفرط المهلك لها في بعض البقاع و في بعض الأوقات على سبيل الندرة و الشذوذ فليس ذلك بالقصد الأول.

و أما الخيرات التي تنسب إلى الأمور الطبيعية

من تكون الحيوان و النبات و المعادن و الأسباب المعينة لها على النشوء المبلغ لها إلى أتم حالاتها و أكمل غاياتها فهي كلها برضاء الله و إرادة من الباري القيوم و عناية منه و أما الشرور التي هي الفساد و البلاء التي يلحقها بعد الكون فهي عارضة لا بالقصد الأول بل حصولها بالعرض و الانجرار و التبعية - و ذلك لأن الكائنات لما لم يمكن أن يبقى أشخاصها في الهيولى دائما في هذا العالم تلطفت الحكمة الإلهية و العناية الربانية إلى بقائها بصورها و مبدأ نوعيتها و رب طلسمها الحافظ لديمومة طبيعتها بتعاقب الأفراد و توارد الأمثال على الاتصال و إن كانت الأشخاص في الذوبان و السيلا ن دائما و إنما كان ذلك بواجب في الحكمة و العناية لأن في القوة و الغيب فضائل جمّة و خيرات كثيرة بلا نهاية.

و لا يمكن خروجها من القوة و الخفاء إلى الفعل و الظهور دفعة واحدة في وقت واحد لأن الهيولى الجسمية لا تتسع لقبولها فضائل نوع واحد من الأنواع الطبيعية المندمجة في عقله المدبر له و ملكوته الفياض على عينه الثابتة و أفرادها إلا شيئا بعد شيء على سبيل التدرّج و ممر الأوقات و الدهور دائما فكيف فضائل جميع الأنوار الطبيعية و حالاتها و كيفياتها و لوازمها و آثارها المفصلة المتفننة مثلا لو خلق الله تعالى بني آدم كلهم من مضى منهم و من هو موجود الآن و يجيء من بعد إلى يوم القيامة - في وقت واحد لم تكن تسعهم الأرض برحبها فكيف حيوانهم و نبات غذائهم و امتعتهم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٦

و ما يحتاجون إليه في أيام حياتهم فمن أجل هذا خلقهم الله قرنا بعد قرن و أمة بعد أمة - لأن الأرض لا تسعهم و الهيولى لا تحملهم دفعة واحدة فقد تبين بما ذكرنا أن النقص من جهة الهيولى و قابليتها لا من الصانع فإن القصور في الفعل كما يكون من الفاعل لضعف قوته أو لقلة معرفته فقد يكون أيضا من عدم الأدوات و فتور الآلات التي لا بد وجودها للصانع في أحكام صنعه و إتقان فعله أو من عدم المكان أو الزمان و الحركات و ما شاكلهما و قد يكون من قبل الهيولى مثل عسر قبول الحديد للقتل و تصديره حبلا طويلا كما يفعل الحبال من القنب و الصوف و غيرهما فليس العجز من الحداد بل لقصور الحديد و عسر قبوله القتل و مثل الهواء لا يقبل كتابة الكاتب فيه لسيلان عنصره و مثل النجار لا يمكن أن يعمل سلما يبلغ السماء لعدم الخشب لا لعجز فيه و مثل الرجل الحكيم لا يمكن أن يعلم الطفل لعجز في الطفل لا في الحكيم - و كذا عدم اعتناء بعض أشقياء الأمم بدعوة نبيهم إياهم و إنذاره لهم كما في قوله تعالى **إِنَّكَ لَا تَهْدِي مَنْ أَحْبَبْتَ** ليس لقصور الأنبياء صلوات الله عليهم أجمعين و لا لعجزهم عن الهداية و الإنذار بل لعسر قبول الأنفس الخبيثة ما يقربها إلى الله و ملكوته الأعلى - فعلى هذا يؤخذ القياس في العجز من الهيولى و عسر قبولها للصور لا لعجز في الصانع الحكيم و المدبر العليم.

و السبب الآخر في ذلك أن هذا الكائنات لما كانت يبتدي كونها من أنقص الوجود - و أضعف القوة مترقيا شيئا فشيئا إلى أتم الحالات و أكمل الغايات بأسباب معينة لها على النشو و النمو و مبلغه بها إلى أكمل غاياتها بعناية من الباري جل شأنه سميت تلك الأسباب خيرات و كل سبب عارض يعوقها عن ذلك سمي شرا و هي عارضة لا بالقصد الأول فإنه و إن كان بالقياس إلى هذا الشيء الذي عاقه عن الوصول إلى كماله و غايته شرا لكنه بالقياس إلى شيء آخر يكون من الأسباب المعينة له على البلوغ إلى كماله و تمامه خيرا و لأجل هذا خلق الأول و بالذات لا لأجل ذاك فيكون خيريته

بالذات و شريته بالعرض.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٧

و لما تحققت ما ذكرناه من أن عدم الفعل قد يكون لعجز الهيولى أو عدم المكان أو الزمان أو الحركات أو ما شاكلها علمت فساد ظن كثير من العوام و أهل الكلام الذين لا يعرفون كيفية العجز من الهيولى و لا يتصورونه فينسبون العجز كله إلى الفاعل الحكيم القادر العليم و ذلك لأنهم ربما يتوهمون ذلك على الله تعالى فيقولون إنه لا يقدر على كثير من الأشياء و يعجز عنها مثل قولهم إنه لا يقدر أن يخرج إبليس عن مملكته و لا يتفطنون مع قطع النظر عن المصالح التي روعيت في خلقه أن العجز في عدم الإخراج إنما هو من عدم المملكة التي غير مملكة الله تعالى حتى يتصور إخراجها إليها و ليس من عدم القدرة من الخالق و يقولون إنه لا يقدر أن يدخل السماوات في جوف إبرة و لا يدرون أن العجز من الإبرة و خرمها و يقولون إن الله لا يقدر أن يجمع بين التقيضين و لا يدرون أن العجز منهما فإذا سئلوا عن معنى قوله تعالى **وَاللَّهُ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ** * قالوا هذه الآية مخصصة خلاف ما قال الله تعالى لأنه ذكر على العموم و صرح بإيراد لفظ الكل و لم يعلموا أن هذه الممتنعات التي يتصورونها ليست بأشياء خارجة عن أوهامهم و تصوراتهم - بل الذهن يتصور بعض المفهومات و يجعله عنواناً للمستحيلات و يحكم عليها بأحكام غير بتية بل على سبيل الفرض و التقدير كما في القضايا الحقيقية غير البتية على ما هو مفصل - في بعض مواضع هذا الكتاب.

و أما الخيرات التي توجد في أنفس الحيوانات العنصرية

من المحبة و اللذة و الألفة و الأكل و الشرب و الوقاع فلا شك أنها مستودعة في جبلتها مغروسة في فطرتها بعناية الله تعالى و رضاه بالذات و بالقصد الأول و أما ما يلحقها من التنافر و الوحشة و المبغضة و الجوع و الألم و العطش و الجرح و الأمراض و الأوجاع و الموت و أشباهها فهي واردة عليها على سبيل الضرورة و الانجرار و التبعية واقعة بقدر الله تعالى بالعرض و بالقصد الثاني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٨

فإنه لما جعل البارئ بمقتضى مصلحته و حكمته في جبلة الحيوانات للجوع و العطش و اللذة من الملائم و الأذى من المنافر صارت هي أسباباً لانتهاؤها و دواعي عطب أبدانها - و هلاك هياكلها و شقاوة نفوسها على الضرورة و الاستتباع. أما قصد البارئ الحكيم في إيجادها و صنعه ذلك فهو لأجل بقائها و صلاحها - فإنه تعالى جعل لها الجوع و العطش لكيما يدعوها إلى الأكل و الشرب ليخلف على أبدانها من الكيموس بدلاً مما يتحلل منها ساعة فساعة إذا كانت أجسامها دائماً في الذوبان و السيالان و أما الشهوات فلكيما يدعو بها إلى المأكولات المختلفة الموافقة لأمزجة أبدانها و ما يحتاج إليه طباعها و أما اللذة فكيما تأكل بقدر الحاجة و لا يزيد و لا ينقص و أما الآلام و الأوجاع عند الآفات العارضة لأجسادها لكيما تحرس نفوسها على حفظ أجسادها من الآفات لها إلى أجل معلوم و أما كون بعض الحيوانات آكلة لجيف بعض فلئلا يضيع شيء مما خلق بغير نفع.

و اعلم يا حبيبي أنه قد تحيرت العقول في كون بعض الحيوانات آكلة لبعض - و فيما جعل الله تعالى ذلك في طباعها و هيأ لها الآلات و الأدوات التي يتمكن بها على ذلك كالأنياب و المخالب و الأظافر الحداد التي بها يقدر على القبض و

الضبط و الخرق و النهش و الأكل و الشهوة و اللذة و الجوع و ما شاكل ذلك مع ما يلحق المأكولات منها- من الآلام و الأوجاع و الفزع عند الذبح و القتل فلما تفكروا في ذلك و لم تسنح لهم العلة- و لا الغاية و الحكمة فاختلف عند ذلك بهم الآراء و تفننت بهم المذاهب حتى قال بعضهم إن تسلط الحيوانات بعضها على بعض و أكل بعضها لبعض ليس من فعل حكيم بل فعل شرير قليل الرحمة ظلام للعبيد فلماذا قالوا إن للعالم فاعلين خيرا و شريرا.

و منهم من نسب ذلك إلى النجوم و منهم من قال إن هذا عقوبة لها لما سلف منها من الذنوب و المعاصي في الأدوار السابقة و هؤلاء هم التناسخية و منهم من قال بالعرض- و منهم من قال إن هذا أصلح و منهم من أقر على نفسه بالعجز قال لا أدري ما العلة في أكل الحيوانات بعضها بعضا غير أنه قال إن الباري تعالى لا يفعل إلا الحكمة و كل هذه الأقاويل قالوها في طلبهم العلة و وجه الحكمة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٩٩

و إنما لم يقفوا عليها لأن نظرهم كان جزئيا و بحثهم عن علل الأشياء مخصوصا- و يتمتع أن يعلم أسباب الأشياء الكلية بالأنظار الجزئية لأن أفعال الباري تعالى إنما الغرض منها هو النفع الكلي و الصلاح على العموم و إن كان يعرض من ذلك ضرر جزئي- و مكاره مخصوصة أحيانا و المثل أحكامه في الشريعة الحقة و حدوده فيها و ذلك أنه حكم بالقصاص في القتل و قال **وَلَكُمْ فِي الْقِصَاصِ حَيَاةٌ يَا أُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ** و إن كان موتا و ألما لمن يقتص منه و كذلك قطع يد السارق فيه نفع عمومي و صلاح كلي و إن كان ألما للسارق و ضررا له.

و هكذا خلق الله الشمس و القمر و الأمطار لأجل النفع و المصلحة العامة و إن كان قد يعرض لبعض الناس و الحيوان و النبات من ذلك ضرر و كذلك أيضا قد ينال لا اتباع الأنبياء و الأئمة ع شذائد و آلام في إظهار الدين و إقامة سنن الشريعة في أوائل الأمر لكن لما كان حكمة الباري و غرضه في إظهار الدين و إعلان قواعد الشريعة هو النفع العام و المصلحة الكلية للذين يجيئون من بعدهم إلى يوم القيامة و لا يحصى عددهم و عدد ما يلحق بهم من السعادات و الخيرات سهل في جنب ذلك ما نال النبي و أئمة و أولاده المعصومين صلوات الله عليهم أجمعين من أذية المشركين و جهاد الأعداء المخالفين- و ما لاقوا من الحروب و العداوات و تعب الأسفار ثم ما نال المؤمن من قيام الليل و صيام النهار و أداء الفرائض و ما فيها من الجهد على النفوس و التعب على الأبدان نزر قليل في جنب ما أعد الله لهم من نعيم الجنان و الحور العين و رضوان الله الأكبر و لما كان الأمر يؤول إلى الصلاح الكلي كانت تلك الشذائد من جهته صغيرا جزئيا.

فعلى هذا المثل نقول في وجه الحكمة في أكل بعض الحيوانات بعضا إن قصد الباري جل ثناؤه و غرضه في ألم الحيوانات و ما جبل عليه طباعها من الأوجاع و الآلام التي يلحق نفوسها عند الآفات العارضة ليس عقوبة لها و عذابا كما ظن أهل التناسخ بل حثا لنفوسها على حفظ أجسادها و صيانة لهياكلها من الآفات العارضة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٠٠

لها إذ كانت الأجساد لا تقدر على جر منفعة و دفع مضره فلو لم يكن ذلك لتهاونت النفوس بالأجساد و خذلتها و أسلمتها إلى المهالك قبل فناء أعمارها و تقارب آجالها- و لهلكت كلها دفعة واحدة في أسرع مدة فلهذه العلة جعلت الآلام و الأوجاع للحيوان- دون النبات و جعل فيها جبلة الدفع إما بالحرب و القتال و إما بالهرب و الفرار و التحرز

لحفظ أنفسها من الآلام العارضة إلى وقت معلوم فإذا جاء أجلها فلا ينفعها الهرب والقتال ولا التحرز بل لا بد من التسليم والانقياد وإن كان ينالها بعض الآلام والأوجاع إذ قد ذكرنا هذه المقدمة فنقول الآن إن الباري تعالى لما خلق أجناسا من الحيوانات الأرضية وعلم بأنه لا يدوم بقاؤها أبد الأبدين جعل لكل منها عمرا طبيعيا أكثر ما يمكن ثم يجيئه الموت الطبيعي إن شاء أو أبى وقد علم الله تعالى بأنه يموت كل يوم منها في البر والبحر والسهل والجبل عدد لا يحصى إلا هو سبحانه فجعل بواجب حكمته جثث جيف موتاهم غذاء لأحيائها ومادة لبقائها لئلا يضيع شيء مما خلق بلا نفع وفائدة - وكان هذا منفعة للأحياء ولم يكن فيه ضرر على الموتى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٠١

حكمة أخرى

لو لم يكن الأحياء تأكل جثث الموتى لبقيت تلك الجثث واجتمع منها على ممر الأيام والدهور حتى كان يمتلي بها وجه الأرض وقعر البحار ويفسد الهواء من ريحها فيصير تلك سببا للوباء وهلاكاً للأحياء فأي حكمة أكثر من هذه إذ جعل الباري سبحانه في أكل الحيوانات بعضها بعضاً جر منفعة الأحياء ودفع المضرة عنها كلها وإن كان ينال بعضها الآلام والأوجاع عند الذبح والقتل والقبض وليس قصد القاتل والقاطض إدخال الألم والوجع عليها بل جلب المنفعة منها أو دفع المضرة بها - واعلم أن الباري الحكيم جل ثناؤه لما أبدع الموجودات ورتب المخلوقات - قسمها قسمين أحدهما إبداعي والآخر خلقي ورتب الجميع ونظمها كان بترتيبه للكلية الإبداعية بأن جعل الأشرف علة لوجود الأدنى وسبباً لبقائه وتماماً له ومبلغاً إلى أقصى غاياته وأكمل نهاياته وجعل حكم الجزئيات الخلقية بالعكس منها وذلك أنه رتبها في الوجود من أدون حالاته إلى أشرفها وأكملها وجعل الناقص منها علة للتمام وسبباً لبقاء الكامل والأدون خادماً للأشرف ومعيناً له ومسخره له.

وبين ذلك أن النبات الجزئي لما كان أدون رتبة من الحيوان الجزئي وأخس حالة منه جعل جسم النبات غذاء لجسم الحيوان ومادة لبقائه وجعل النفس النباتية في ذلك خادمة للنفس الحيوانية ومسخرة لها وهكذا أيضاً لما كانت رتبة نفوس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٠٢

الحيوانات أنقص وأدون من رتبة النفس الإنسانية جعلت خادمة ومسخرة للناطقة وعلى هذا الحكم والقياس لما كان في بعض الحيوانات ما هو أتم خلقه وأكمل صورة جعلت النفوس الناقصة منها خادمة ومسخرة للتمام الكاملة منها وجعلت أجسادها مادة وغذاء الأجساد التامة منها وسبباً لبقائها لتبلغ إلى أتم غاياتها وأكمل نهاياتها إذ كان هيولى الأشخاص دائماً في السيلان والذوبان.

فقد تبين بما ذكرنا العلة الموجبة في أكل الحيوانات بعضها بعضاً وأما الحكمة الغائبة فيه فهي أن الباري الحكيم جل ثناؤه لما خلق الأشياء الكونية إما لجر منفعة أو لدفع مضرة عن الحيوانات لم يترك شيئاً بلا نفع ولا فائدة فلو لم يجعل جثث الحيوانات غذاء لهذه الأجساد لكانت تلك الجيف باطلة بلا فائدة ولا عائدة وكان يعرض منها ضرر وهلاك كلي كما ذكر قبل ذلك وأما الآلام والأوجاع التي تعرض عند الذبح والقتل - والقبض فقد مر أن الحكيم عز شأنه لم

يجعل ذلك تعذيباً و عقوبة لنفوسها على ذنوب - سلفت منها كما ظنه التناسخية بل حثاً لنفوسها على حفظ أجسادها من الآفات و عدم تهاونها بالأجساد و تسليمها إلى المهالك إلى أجل معلوم.

فإن قلت ما العلة في محبة الحيوانات الحياة و كراهيتها للممات.

قلنا لعل شتى إحداها أن الحياة تشبه البقاء و الممات الفناء و البقاء محبوب - و الفناء مكروه في طباع الموجودات إذ كان البقاء قرين الوجود و الفناء قرين العدم - و الوجود و العدم متقابلان و البارى عز شأنه لما كان علة الموجودات و هو باق أبداً صارت الموجودات كلها تحب البقاء و تشتاق إليه لأنه صفة لعلتها و المعلول يحب علته و صفاتها و يشتاق إليها و يتشبه بها فمن أجل هذا قال الحكماء بأن الواجب بالذات هو المعشوق الأول المشتاق إليه سائر الخلائق كما ستطلع على بيانه إن شاء الله.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٠٣

و ثانيتهما ما يلحقها من الآلام و الأوجاع و الفزع و الجزع عند مفارقة نفوسها الأبدان - و ثالثتها أن نفوسها لا تدري بأن لها وجوداً خلواً من الأجسام و لك أن تقول لم لا تلهم نفوسها بأن لها وجوداً خلواً من الأجساد فنقول في الجواب لأن هذه المعاني لا تصح لها معرفتها لأنها لو علمت بها لفارقت أجسادها قبل أن تتم و تكمل فإذا فارقت أجسادها قبل التمام و الكمال بقيت فارغة معطلة من دون شغل و عمل و لا معطل في الوجود إذ كل وجود له أثر خاص و ليس من الحكمة إبقاء النفوس فارغة بلا تدبير إذ كان مبدأ الجميع لم يخل لحظة من تدبير العالم و حفظ الأشياء بل كل يوم هو في شأن و لو أمسك طرفه عين عن تدبير العالم و إبقائه و حفظه لتهافت السماوات و تساقطت الكواكب و انطمست الأكوان و انعدمت النفوس و الأبدان.

و اعلم أن النفوس النامة الكاملة إذا فارقت الأجساد أما أن تكون مستغرقة في شهود جمال الأزل مستضيئة بأضواء كبرياء الأول منخرطة في سلك ملائكة الله المهيمين متحيرة في عظمة جلال أول الأولين و أما أن تكون مشغولة بتأييد النفوس الناقصة المتجسدة ليتخلص تلك من حال النقص و تبلغ إلى حال الكمال و يرتقي هذه المؤيدة أيضاً إلى حاله هي أكمل و أشرف حتى تصل إلى الطائفة الأولى السابقين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٠٤

المقربين **وَأَنَّ إِلَىٰ رَبِّكَ الْمُنْتَهَىٰ** و المثال لذلك في هذه الدنيا الأب الشفيق و الأستاذ الرفيق في تعليم التلامذة و الأولاد و إخراجهم إياهم من ظلمات الجهالات إلى فسحة العلوم و المعارف ليتمرن التلامذة و الأولاد و يكمل الآباء و الأستاذون بإخراج ما في قوة نفوسهم من العلوم و المعارف و الصنائع و الحكم إلى الفعل و الظهور اقتداءً بالبارى جل عظمته و كبريائه و تشبهاً به في حكمته إذ هو العلة و السبب في إخراج الموجودات - من القوة إلى الفعل و من الخفاء إلى الظهور فكل نفس علومها أكثر و صناؤها أحكم - و أعمالها أجود و إفاضتها على غيرها أكثر فنسبتها إلى الله أقرب و تشبهاً به أشد و هذه هي رتبة الملائكة الذين **لَا يَعْصُونَ اللَّهَ مَا أَمَرَهُمْ وَيَفْعَلُونَ مَا يُؤْمَرُونَ** فيبتغون إلى ربهم الوسيلة أيهم أقرب و لهذا المعنى قال الحكماء في حد الفلسفة إنها التشبه بالإله بقدر الطاقة البشرية و مفاده أن من يكون علومه حقيقية و صنائعه محكمة و أعماله صالحة و أخلاقه جميلة و آراؤه صحيحة و فيضه على غيره متصلاً

يكون قربه إلى الله و تشبهه به أكثر لأن الله سبحانه كذلك

و أما الخيرات و الشرور المنسوبة إلى النفوس الإنسانية

من جهة دخولها تحت الأوامر و النواهي الدينية و الأحكام و الأفعال الناموسية فجميعها سواء عد من الخيرات كالقيام و الصيام و الحج و العمرة و الزكاة و الأمر بالمعروف و النهي عن المنكر و صلة الرحم - و عيادة المريض و تشييع الجنائزات و زيارة القبور لأولياء الله و غير ذلك من الطاعات - أو عد من الشرور و المعاصي كالزنا و السرقة و النسيئة و القتل و أكل مال اليتيم و الظلم و الجور و الطغيان و أشباهها من المعاصي أمور وجودية و الوجود لا ينفك عن خيرية ما فكل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٠٥

منها كمال و خير للإنسان لا بما هو إنسان أي باعتبار الجزء النطقي له بل باعتبار القوى المتعلقة بحيوانيته المطلقة و أن الذم العقلي أو الشرعي لا يترتب عليها إلا باعتبار تعيينها و نسبتها إلى الجوهر النطقي الذي يكون كمالها في كسر قوتها الشهوية و الغضبية و اكتسابها هيئة استعلائية عليها و يكون نقصها في انقهارها عن البدن و انفعالها عن القوى الجرمانية فإن انفعال النفس عن الأداني و الأسافل من شقاوتها و بعدها عن رحمة الله و عدم مناسبتها إلى ملكوته الأعلى فلو قطع النظر عما يؤدي إليه هذه الأفاعيل المذمومة بحسب العقل و الشرع بالقياس إلى الجزء الأشرف من الإنسان لانقلب الذم مدحا و التقبيح حمدا بحسب الحقيقة و بحسب نسب آخر أكثر من تلك النسبة مثلا الشهوة مذمومة و الزاني و الزنا مذمومان عقلا و شرعا و لا شك أن حقيقة الشهوة و ماهيتها هي قوة جبلية سارية في وجود النفس و لا شك أنها ظل صفة شوقية من صفات الملائكة المقربين المهيمين كما أن الغضب في الإنسان ظل لقاهرية القواهر العلوية فيكون لا محالة محمود في ذاته ألا ترى أن العنة كيف ذمت في نفسها و كذا الزاني باعتبار أنه إنسان - و الزنا باعتبار أنه وقاع فعل كماله لو لم يقدر الإنسان عليه كان ناقصا مذموما فالشهوة باعتبار حقيقتها التي هي الحب و باعتبار تعيينها في الصورة الذكورية و الأنثوية و كونها سبب حفظ النوع و توليد المثل و موجبة للذة كمال محمود بذاته و كذا الزنا باعتبار أن قطع النظر عن العارض المذكور كان محمودا حسنا في نفسه و باعتبار سائر النسب فانقلب الذم حمدا في الجميع و لم يبق توجه الذم و التقبيح إلا إلى عدم طاعة الشهوة للعقل و ترك سياسته لها فكونها مذمومة إنما هو بالإعراض عن حكم العقل و الشرع حتى أدى فعلها إلى انقطاع النسب و الإرث و التربية للأولاد و اختلال النظام لأجل التنازع - و وقوع الهرج و المرج و الفتنة و كلها أمور عدمية راجعة إلى اعتبار التعيين الخلقي - و النقائص الإمكانية و أوصاف الممكنات باعتبار إمكانها و عدميتها و قصورها في الموجدية - و إلا فالوجود و الوجوب و أحكامهما من الفعلية و التمام و الكمال و البقاء و البهجة و العشق و اللذة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٠٦

كلها خير و محمود و مؤثر فالأمر حمد كله و ليس في الوجود ما هو مذموم حقيقة بل اعتبارا فقط و لناخذ في توضيح هذا المقام بالبرهان الأتم و البحث الأقوم

الفصل (٩) في أن العالم المحسوس كالعالم المعقول مخلوق على أجود ما يتصور في حقه و أبلغ ما يمكن

على وجه الإجمال

فنبول قد تحقق و اتضح أن واجب الوجود إله العالم جل ذكره بريء من انحاء النقص و وجوده الذي هو ذاته و حقيقته أفضل انحاء الوجود و أتمها بل هو حقيقة الوجود و ماهيته و ما سواه لمعة و رشح أو ظل له و لذلك قلنا إنه واجب الوجود من كل جهة و إنه كل الوجود إذ كله الوجود و لأجل ذلك لا سبب له و لا أقدم من وجوده وجود فلا فاعل له و لا مادة و لا صورة و لا موضوع و لا غاية بل هو غاية الغايات و مبدأ المبادي و صورة الصور و حقيقة الحقائق و مذوات الذوات و مجوهر الجواهر و مشيئ الأشياء و كل ما هو كذلك فما يصدر عنه و يفعله فإنما يصدر عن حاق ذاته و ينشأ عن صميم هويته من غير داع زائد يدعوه أو غرض يحمله على الفعل و لا يفيد وجود ما يوجد عنه كمالات لم يكن أو كرامة أو بهجة و لذة أو نفعاً أو طلباً لمحمدة أو تخلصاً من مذمة أو غير ذلك من المنافع و الخيرات الظنية أو الحقيقية لأنه بريء من كل نقیصة غني عن العالمين فلذلك وجوده الذي به تجوهر ذاته - هو بعينه وجوده الذي به فاعليته فالذات هناك في كونه ذاتاً و في كونه مبدأ شيء واحد حقيقة و اعتباراً لا كغيره من الفاعلين حيث ينقسم بشيئين بأحدهما يتجوهر بالآخر يفعل كالكاتب منا يتجوهر بأنه ناطق و يكتب بأنه ذو ملكة كتابة و كالشمس في كونها مضيئة للأرض و النار في كونها محرقة لحطب فاعليتهما بغير ما يتحقق به ماهيتهما فتفتقران إلى صفة زائدة بل إلى قابل يقبل تأثيرهما لا كالباري جل اسمه يبدع الأشياء من نفسه لا من قابل لأنه الذي يخلق القابل و المقبول - و المادة و الصورة جميعاً و إذا كان كذلك فكل ما يوجد منه حيث يوجد من أصل حقيقته - يجب أن يكون أشرف الممكنات المفروضة و أجل المجعولات المتصورة بحيث لا أفضل

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منه إلا الجاعل القيوم له.

و إذ قد علمت أنه ذاته تعالى علم بما سواه على أحسن الوجوه لكون الصورة العلمية للأشياء هي عين ذاته تعالى فللأشياء قبل وجودها الكوني صور علمية إلهية لها وجود إلهي قدوسي و كل وجود إلهي بالضرورة يكون في غاية الحسن و البهاء فإذا تحقق مثال تلك الصور في عالم الكون وجب أن يكون أبهى و أشرف ما يمكن في عالم الكون و إذا رتبت الأشياء كان ترتيبها أجود الترتيب و أشرف النظام فيبتي من أشرفها وجوداً كالعقول الفعالة ثم يتلوه ما هو أنقص منه قليلاً كالنفوس الفلكية ثم صورها المنطبعة و هكذا متدرجاً إلى أن ينتهي إلى أنقص الموجودات و أدونها فيقطع سلسلة الأبداع في النزول عنده و لا يتخطى إلى ما دونه لعدم إمكان ذلك فهو نهاية تدبير الأمر المشار إليها بقوله تعالى **يُدَبِّرُ الْأَمْرَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ إِلَى الْأَرْضِ** ثم تفيض عنه بالامتزاج - بين المواد الحسية و وقوع الحركات و الاستحالات الصور النوعية المتعاقبة على تفاوت مراتبها على القوابل بحسب الاستعدادات و إعداد الحركات فلا يزال يترقى الوجود في الصعود إلى قرب المعبود من الأرذل إلى الأفضل حتى ينتهي الأفضل الذي لا أفضل منه في هذه السلسلة الصعودية كما قال سبحانه **إِلَيْهِ يَصْعَدُ الْكَلِمُ الطَّيِّبُ وَ الْعَمَلُ الصَّالِحُ يَرْفَعُهُ** فعنده يقف ترتيب الخير و الجود و به يتصل دائرة الوجود فهذا أحسن وجوه الصنع و الإيجاد حيث يجعل المصنوع بحيث يبلغ إلى غاية ما أراد به الصانع - من الخير المترتب عليه و لا خير في صنعة صانع أفضل من أن يكون الغاية المؤدية إليها ذلك الصنع هي ذات الباري جل ذكره فالعالم كله صار بهذا الترتيب كشخص واحد أوله الحق و آخره الحق و صورته صورة الحق بل تمامه الحق

كدائرة واحدة أولها النقطة و آخرها النقطة بل كلها النقطة السيالة من ذاتها في ذاتها إلى ذاتها فسبحان

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ذاته الأعظم مما يضرب له الأمثال ولا يبلغ إلى وصفه المقال

الفصل (١٠) في بيان أن كل مرتبة من مراتب مجعولاته أفضل ما يمكن وأشرف ما يتصور على الوجه التفصيلي

و فيه منهجان لمي وإني

أما المنهج اللمي ففيه ثلاثة مباحث -

المبحث الأول في بيان أن كل ما وقع في مراتب البدء على أفضل أنحاء الوجود

و ذلك أن كلما وقع في مرتبة من هذه السلسلة لا يتصور ما هو أشرف من شخصه ولا من نوعه من الجهة التي بها يصدر من فاعله.

أما الأول

فلجوب انحصار نوع كل منها في شخصه لأن تكثر الأشخاص لنوع واحد فيما هو قبل الحركات والاتفاقات التي يقع بها تحصل المميزات المكثرة - من العوارض غير اللازمة للنوع فإن اختصاص بعض الأفراد بعارض للماهية مشخص له مميز عن غيره إن كان لأجل وقوعه تحت تلك الماهية أو لازم من لوازمها فالجميع متساوي الاستحقاق له فوقع اختصاصه بالبعض دون آخر ترجيح من غير مرجح - وإن كان لأمر خارج عن الطبيعة لاحق لها من خارج فلا بد من مادة قابلة للتأثيرات الخارجية بحسب اختلاف استعداداتها وانفعالاتها وذلك لم يتصور في عالم الإبداع - فحق كل نوع أن ينحصر في شخصه.

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و أما الثاني

فلما دلت عليه قاعدة إمكان الأشرف التي مر ذكر البرهان عليها من أن الفياض المطلق والجواد الحق لا يقتضي الأخس حيثما يمكن الأشرف بل يلزم من فيض وجوده ومقتضى جوده الأشرف فالأشرف فلا جرم أبدع جل شأنه أولا العقول الفعالة والصور المكرمة والملائكة المهيمة والأنوار القاهرة إذ هي أشرف ما في الإمكان في الواقع وبحسب طبقتهم وأفضل تلك الذوات المقدسة وأنورها وأضواها هو أقدمها وأقربها من نور الأنوار جلت الآؤه ثم سائرهما وما سواه على الترتيب إلى أواخر تلك الطبقة وهي أرباب الأصنام ومثل الأنواع الطبيعية التي أثبتها أفلاطون والأفلاطونيون

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و نحن قد أحينا رسوم المتقدمين في القول بهذا المذهب وتقويمه و ذبنا عنه بقمع الشبه ورفع الشكوك بتوفيق العزيز الحكيم كما سبق و آخر هذه العقول الزواهر هو رب طلسم الأرض و به يقع كدبانوئية الأرض على مصطلح حكماء الفرس في كل ما وردت في هذا العالم من صور الأنواع المركبة وعند انتهاء سلسلة العقول في النزول - يبتدي

سلسلة النفوس من نفس أقصى الأفلاك و هو الفلك المحيط بعالم السماوات ثم نفس أشرف الكواكب و بعدها نفس كل كوكب كوكب و فلك فلك إلى نفس أدون الأفلاك و هو السماء الدنيا و بعد طبقتها طبقة الصور الفلكية و النجومية على أفضل ما يمكن في وجود كل منها و أفضل ترتيب يقع بينها لأن ترتيبها ظل ترتيب العقول كما أن صورة كل منها مثال العقل الذي بحذائها على وجه لا يعترئها فتور و لا قصور و لا إعياء و لا لغوب و أجرامها أفضل الأجرام و أشكالها أفضل الأشكال و حركاتها أفضل الحركات.

أما الأولى فلبساطتها و بساطة كيفيتها الملموسة و مع بساطتها فإن فيها جميع الكيفيات المحسوسة على وجه الطف و أصفى و الذ في تلك الكيفية الواحدة جميع الطعوم اللذيذة و الروائح الطيبة و الألوان الحسنة و النغمات المبهجة. و أما الثانية فلأنها كرية الأشكال و قد بين في موضعه أفضلية الشكل الكروي - على سائر الأشكال. و أما الثالثة فلأن حركاتها عشقية شوقية و محرقاتها عشاق إلهية و ملائكة عقلية و أخرى نفسية فتحريك الأولين تحريك غائي و هو تحريك محرك غير متحرك - كتحريك المعشوق للعاشق و تحريك المعلم بل ماهية العلم للمتعلم و تحريك الثواني تحريك فاعل من فاعل مباشر للفعل بأشواق متجددة كتحريك الشوق للمشتاق و تحريك الفكر للمتفكر و تحريك العلم الحادث للمتعلم و كل من هذه التحريكات تحريك محرك متحرك. و بالجملة حركاتها أفضل الحركات لأن حركاتها عبادة إلهية و نسك عقلية يزعجهم الشوق إلى الله و الوجد و الكل من هذه الأشخاص معشوق عقلي يخصه و محرك خاص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١١

يحرك على سبيل الشوق و التوجه إلى ذلك الإمام و الايتمام به على أن الكل مشتاقون إلى جمال رب العالمين رقا صون لأجل ما ينالون من روح وصال أول الأولين ففي كل لحظة يتجدد لهم بالحركة شوق و طرب آخر يرد على ذواتهم و بسبب ذلك الوارد القدسي - يقع لهم حركة أخرى يؤدي بهم تلك الحركة إلى نيل شوق آخر و لذة أخرى و هكذا إلى ما شاء الله و يترشح منهم من الفضائل و الخيرات التي لهم ما يليق بهذا العالم من الأشعة - و الأضواء المستقيمة و المنعكسة و المنعطفة مما يستعد به الهيولى للصور و الكمالات - التي تفاض عليها من المبدأ الفعال في كل وقت و هكذا إلى أن يرث الله الأرض و من عليها.

المبحث الثاني في بيان أن الموجودات العائدة و الكائنات الواقعة في مراتب الصعود

التي في عالم التركيب في غاية الجودة و أفضل النظام فنقول إن الأمور الواقعة في هذا العالم لما كان نظامها متعلقا بحركات الأفلاك و أوضاعها و نظام الأفلاك ظل لنظام عالم القضاء الإلهي الذي قد علمت أنه في غاية التمام و الكمال و لما تبين و تحقق مرارا أن هذه الموجودات غير صادرة على سبيل البخت و الاتفاق كما نسب إلى ديمقراطيس - و لا على طريقة الإرادة الجزافية كما توهمه الأشاعرة و لا عن إرادة ناقصة و قصد زائد كإرادتنا المحوجة إلى دواع خارجة عن ذاتنا و لا بحسب طبيعة لا شعور لها بذاتها فضلا عن شعور بما يصدر عنها كما ذهب إليه أوساخ الدهرية و الطباعية بل النظام المعقول المسمى عند الحكماء بالعناية مصدر لهذا النظام الموجود فيكون في غاية ما يمكن من الخير و الفضيلة فعلى هذا يلزم أن لا يكون في هذا العالم بالنظر إلى الأسباب و العلل أمر جزافي أو اتفاقي بل كله ضروري فطري بالقياس إلى طباع الكل سواء كان طبيعيا بحسب ذاته كحركة الحجر إلى أسفل أو قسريا كحركته إلى فوق أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١٢

على وجه الأرض إذ كل ما يحدث في عالم الكون فيجب عن سبب إذ الشيء ما لم يجب لم يوجد و يرتقي سلسلة الأسباب إلى مبدأ واحد يتسبب عنه الأشياء على كيفية علمه بها و حكمته و عنايته فليس في الوجود شيء مناف لطبيعة علله و أسبابه المرتقية إلى الواحد الحق إذا المعلول يناسب علته بل فيض منها فالحركات المتنافرة بحسب الظاهر متوافقة منتظمة بالقياس إلى جملة النظام و وجود الإصبع الزائد على جملة هذا الإنسان طبعي في جملة العالم و كذا كل عمر فهو عمر طبعي بالقياس إلى الكل و إن لم يكن طبعيا على الإطلاق و لو تيسر لك أن تعلم كل شيء بأسبابه و علله بأن تخرج بعقلك من هذه الهاوية المظلمة مهاجرا إلى الله و ملكوته و تشاهد عالم الأفلاك و عجائب الترتيب فيها ثم تعرج إلى الملكوت الأعلى لترى عجائب القدرة فيه و تعرف المبدأ الأول حق معرفته ثم تسافر بالحق من الحق إلى الخلق فتعرف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١٣

بنوره نور ما يتلوه من الملائكة العلامة ثم ما يتلوها من الملائكة العمالة بإذن الله ثم ما يباشر تحريكها و تدويرها بالتسخير و ما بيدها أمرها بالتدبير مع لوازم حركاتها و أشواقها و هيئات عباداتها و أنوار طاعاتها و قرباتها من انفعال العنصریات و تركيب ممتزجاتها و ما يترتب عليها من صور الكائنات و نفوس أبدانها المستحيلات لرايت جميع الأشياء حسنا شريفا عندك موافقا لرضاك و لكنك عرفت ما ذكرنا لك بالوجدان كما عرفت الآن بالبرهان و مثلك يكون بالحقيقة من أهل الرضوان الفائز بروح الجنان

المبحث الثالث في أن مجموع العالم من حيث المجموع على أفضل نظام و أكمل تمام

نوعا و شخصا ماهية و حقيقة فنقول أولا إن مجموع العالم من حيث هو - مجموع شخص واحد له وحدة طبيعية و ليست وحدته كوحدة أشياء متغايرة اتفق أن صار بالاجتماع و الانضمام كشيء واحد مثل اجتماع البيت من اللبنة أو اجتماع العسكر من الأفراد و ذلك لأن بين أجزاء العالم علاقة ذاتية لأنها حاصلة على الترتيب العلي و المعلولي و هي مرتبة بالأشرف فالأشرف إلى الأخس فالأخس و من الأعلى فالأعلى إلى الأدنى فالأدنى فكل جمعية تقع على هذا الوجه يكون الوحدة فيها وحدة ذاتية - و ذلك لما علمت أن العلة تمام المعلول و الأشرف تمام الذي دونه في الشرف و الشيء أن يكون مع تمامه هو أولى به أن يكون مع نفسه فيكون واحدا بوحدته.

و بالجملة كون العالم شخصا واحدا برهاني عندنا و قد صرح الحكيم أرسطاطاليس بأن العالم حيوان واحد مطلب ما هو و لم هو فيه واحد فمن علم أنه ما هو علم أنه لم هو فإذا كان كذلك و لا شبهة أن العلة الغائية لجملة العالم المسمى عند العرفاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١٤

بالإنسان الكبير هو الحق الأول جل ذكره فيكون هو الجواب عن السؤال عن مطلب لم هو لهذا الإنسان الكبير و إذا اتحد

مطلبا لم هو أو ما هو فيه فيكون الحق تعالى مقوما لماهيته و مقررا لذاته و حقيقته فإذا لا يمكن أن يتصور حقيقة من الحقائق الإمكانية فوق ما يكون الحق الأول تمام وجوده و كمال حقيقته فثبت و تحقق أن العالم بكليته أفضل ما يمكن و أشرف ما يتصور و لنفصل في بيان هذا فنقول إذا كان العالم بتمامه شخصا واحدا فلا يجوز أن يتصور نظام آخر بدله سواء كان فوقه في الفضيلة أو مثله و ذلك لأن ذلك النظام المفروض لا يخلو إما أن يكون مخالفا لهذا النظام الواقع غير مندرج معه تحت ماهية نوعية أو غير مخالف له و كل من الاحتمالين باطل فتصور نظام آخر مطلقا باطل.

أما [بطلان] الأول

فلما تبين أن جواهر مخالفة لجواهر هذا العالم الموجود و كذا أعراضا مخالفة لأعراضه ممتنع الوجود أما أن العقول و النفوس الكلية و صور الأفلاك و الكواكب و هيولياتها لا يمكن غيرها في مرتبتها مخالفا لها في نوعها فذلك واضح لأن كلا منها صدر عن فاعله بجهة واحدة من الجهات الفاعلة اللازمة التي يقتضيها ذلك الفاعل بلا شركة من أمر آخر كمادة أو غيرها و أما الجسم بما هو جسم فهو غير مختلف الحقيقة و أما الأنواع البسيطة منه فاختلافها في النوع بصور نوعية تصدر من المبادي العقلية بجهاتها اللازمة إما مطلقا و إما بإعانة من الصور السابقة بلا مدخلة الأمور العارضة لأنها قبل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١٥

الحركات و الاستعدادات و أما أعراض تلك البسائط فلأنها تابعة للجواهر متقومة بها- فمع اتفاق الموضوعات و الحثيات الفاعلية و القابلية التي على سبيل اللزوم لا يمكن غيرها فكما علمت هذا في البسائط فقس عليه المركبات و صورها النوعية لأنها تابعة للمواد و أنحاء التركيبات و الاستعدادات التي منشؤها تلك الجواهر و أعراضها اللازمة- كحركات الأفلاك و أوضاعها فإذا لم يمكن تحقق جواهر و لا أعراض سوى هذه التي قد وجدت فلو فرض عالم آخر يكون لا محالة موافقا لهذا العالم في الماهية غير مخالف له في أمر مقوم ذاتي.

و أما بطلان الشق الثاني فلوجوه

منها أن كل ما لا مادة له و لا حركة قبل وجوده فوجوده على سبيل الإبداع و كل ما كان كذلك لا يختلف بالخارجيات فلا يتكثر نوعه بالأشخاص فحق نوعه أن يكون في شخص لأن الذي به يقع التميز ذاته أو لازم ذاته فلا يتعدد. و منها أن الفاعل لوجوده هو ذات الواجب بذاته بلا جهة أخرى و وحدة العلة توجب وحدة المعلول و منها أن تشخصه بذات الباربي جل ذكره المتشخص بنفس حقيقته و كذا تشخص كل معلول بنفس علته الموجودة القريبة فلا يمكن تعدده و منها أن علمه تعالى بنظام الخير الذي هو عين ذاته اقتضى وجود العالم فلا يمكن غيره و منها ما وقعت الإشارة إليه من أن العلة الغائية في وجوده هي ذات المبدأ الأعلى و علة بدئه هي بعينها علة تمامه و كل ما غايته أجل الأشياء فهو أجل الممكنات.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١٦

بحث و تحصيل

و لعلك تقول إذا كان العالم ب كله أعني الإنسان الكبير شخصا واحدا أشرف الممكنات لأجل أن علة بدئه و علة تمامه شيء واحد هو الحق تعالى فنقول هذا الحكم جار في المعلول الأول فيكون مثله في الحقيقة فيلزم أن يصدر من الواحد

الحق أمران في أول الإبداع وهو محال وأيضاً يلزم وجود اثنين من نوع واحد فيما فوق الكون وهذا أيضاً يخالف أصول الحكمة فدفعه بأنه ليس يلزم هناك في الحقيقة تعدد لما حققنا سابقاً أن تمام حقيقة الشيء إنما هو بما يكون بمنزلة فصله الأخير وهي صورته التي بها تقوم سائر معانيه.

وقد علمت أن الشيء بصورته هو ذلك الشيء لا بمادته فالصادر من الحق تعالى شيء واحد هو الإنسان الكبير بشخصه لكن له اعتباران اعتبار إجمال واعتبار تفصيل - وقد مر أن لا تفاوت بين الإجمال والتفصيل إلا بنحوي الإدراك لا بتفاوت في المدرك فإذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١٧

نظرت إلى مجموع العالم بما هو حقيقة واحدة حكمت بأنه صدر عن الواحد الحق صدوراً واحداً وجعلنا بسيطاً وإذا نظرت إلى معانيه المفصلة واحداً واحداً تحكم بأن الصادر منه أولاً هو أشرف أجزائه وأتم مقوماته وهو العقل الأول إذ العقل هو كل أشياء كما مر ذكره ثم باقي الأجزاء واحداً فواحداً على ترتيب الأشرف فالأشرف والأتَم فالأتم وهكذا إلى أدون الوجود وأضعفه فإذن تبين وتحقيق أن الإنسان الكبير والمجوعول الأول شيء واحد بالذات والحقيقة فإذا قلت العقل الأول فكأنك قلت مجموع العالم وإذا قلت مجموع العالم فكأنك قلت العقل الأول بلا اختلاف حيثية تقييدية ولا تعليلية إلا مجرد الإجمال والتفصيل فإن قلت كيف أبدع الباري جل ذكره مجموع العالم بكليته مرة واحدة مع أن بعض أجزائه تدريجية الوجود كالأزمنة والحركات وبعضها دفعية الوجود وبعضها خارج عن القسمين قلنا وحدة العالم وحدة أخرى جامعة للوحدات محيطة بالكل وهذه الحركات والتجددات والأجسام والجسمانيات كلها منظوية تحت تلك الوحدة على ما يعرفه الراسخون في العلم والله أعلم -

و أما المنهج الإني

فلما نشاهد من ارتباط الموجودات بعضها ببعض وارتفاع بعضها عن بعض وتوجه كل ناقص إلى كماله وطلب كل سافل للاتصال إلى العالي توجهها غريزيا وطلباً جبلياً بحسب ما أودع الله في ذاته ونرى عطوفة كل عال لما تحته وعناية كل قوي لما دونه وتدبير كل نفس وعقل لما يقع تحت تدبيره أحكم تدبير وأشد تصوير - وأحسن تقويم والأطف تكميل وتتميم وعلى وجه يبلغ إلى غاية كماله وتاممه الممكن في حقه فالصورة تكمل المادة بالتقدير والتشكيل والتكييف بكل كيفية يناسبها ويفيدها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١٨

التسكين في حيز يخصها إذا كانت فيها والتحريك على أسهل الوجوه وأقصر الطرق - إليه إن كانت خارجة عنه والنفس تكمل طبيعة البدن بإفاضة القوى والآلات عليها وإفادة الأشكال والأعضاء لها على حسب حاجتها إلى كل واحدة منها وتبقيتها شخصها أقصى ما يمكن وتبليغها إلى غاية نشوها بالتغذية والتنمية وتبقيتها نوعها بالتوليد للمثل وحفظ الصحة على مزاج بدنها على وجه يترتب عليها هذه الأفاعيل بحرارة غريزية - شأنها النضج للمادة والطبخ والهضم ودفع الفضول الرديئة وإمساك الأخلاط الدموية - المحمودة التي يقع بها الاعتداء والأخلاق التي بها صلاح البدن من البلغم والصفراء والسوداء وغير ذلك من صور الأعضاء وأشكالها وأقدارها ومواقعها اللائقة وترتيبها على أحسن الترتيب و

غير ذلك مما يطول شرحه و يدل عليه علم الهيئة و التشريح كل ذلك بإذن الله و الهامة إياها كما قال **وَنَفْسٍ وَمَا سَوَّاهَا فَأَلْهَمَهَا فُجُورَهَا وَتَقْوَاهَا** و كذلك العقل يكمل النفس و يقومها و يهذبها و يطهرها عن الأدناس المادية و الأرجاس البدنية بإفادتها العلم و الحكمة و تنويرها بنور المعرفة و الهداية و إخراجها من القوة إلى الفعل و من الظلمات إلى النور و تجريدها من الأغشية البدنية و بعثها من القبور الدائرة و المضاجع البالية المندرسة إلى عالم القيامة و المثل بين يدي الله و شأن الحق الأول مع العقل و النفس و الطبيعة و سائر الأشياء في التقويم و الإيجاد و الهداية و الإرشاد و العناية و اللطف و الرحمة و الجود و الكرم فوق ذلك كله و لناخذ في شرح هذا المطلب على وجه أبسط

الفصل (١١) في نبذ من آثار حكمته تعالى و عنايته في خلق السماوات و الأرض

و اعلم أن أفاضل البشر قاصرون عن إدراك حقائق الأمور السماوية و الأرضية على وجهها و عن الإحاطة بدقائق الصنعة و عجائب الفطرة و آثار العناية و الحكمة التي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١١٩

فيها بل الأكثرون عاجزون عن إدراك حقيقة النفس التي هي ذات الشخص و تفاصيل أحوالها و سريان قوتها في آلات البدن و حواسه و أعضائه و كيفية ترتيب الأعضاء و أشكالها و أوضاعها و أجزائها و منافع كل واحد واحد منها و أحوالها و أفعالها و غاية كل فعل فإن الذي تفتن به المشرحون و لاح لهم بقوة الفكر شيء قليل لا نسبة له إلى ما ذهلوا عنها من الدقائق و العجائب و الحكم في صنع الباري فيها فإذا كانت إحاطة الإنسان بنفسه و بدنه على ما ينبغي متعذرة فكيف يكون الإحاطة بما في العالم الجسماني و الروحاني ممكنة و أكثره لا يمكننا الاطلاع على حقيقة وجوده فضلا عن إدراك حقائق جميع الموجودات إلا أنا مع هذا العجز الموجود في الطبع و نحن في عالم الغربة لا بد أن نتأمل - و نتفكر في عجائب الخلقة و بدائع الفطرة امتثالا لقوله تعالى **أَوْ لَمْ يَتَفَكَّرُوا فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٠

و قوله **أَوْ لَمْ يَنْظُرُوا فِي مَلَكُوتِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ وَ مَا خَلَقَ اللَّهُ مِنْ شَيْءٍ وَ أَنْ عَسَى أَنْ يَكُونَ قَدِ اقْتَرَبَ أَجْلُهُمْ فَبِأَيِّ حَدِيثٍ بَعْدَهُ يُؤْمِنُونَ** و قوله إن في خلق السماوات و الأرض لآيات للمؤمنين و قوله **أَفَلَمْ يَنْظُرُوا إِلَى السَّمَاءِ فَوْقَهُمْ كَيْفَ بَنَيْنَاهَا وَ زَيَّنَّاهَا وَ مَا لَهَا مِنْ فُرُوجٍ وَ الْأَرْضِ مَدَدْنَاهَا وَ الْقَيْنَا فِيهَا رَوَاسِي وَ أَنْبَتْنَا فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ زَوْجٍ بَهِيجٍ تَبْصِرَةً وَ ذِكْرَى لِكُلِّ عَبْدٍ مُنِيبٍ** و لما وقع منه تعالى من مدح المتفكرين فيها فقال - **يَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ الْآيَةِ وَ ذَمِّ الْمَعْرُضِينَ عَنِ النَّظَرِ وَ التَّأَمُّلِ** كما قال تعالى **وَ كَايِنٍ مِنْ آيَةٍ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ يَمُرُّونَ عَلَيْهَا وَ هُمْ عَنْهَا مُعْرِضُونَ** و قال **وَيْلٌ لِكُلِّ أَفَّاكٍ أَثِيمٍ يَسْمَعُ آيَاتِ اللَّهِ تُتْلَى عَلَيْهِ ثُمَّ يَصِرُ مُسْتَكْبِرًا كَأَن لَمْ يَسْمَعْهَا فَبَشِّرْهُ بِعَذَابٍ أَلِيمٍ** فلا بد من ذكر أنموذج من الحكمة الموجودة في العالم الجسماني و تناسب أوضاعه و حسن انتظامه ليستدل بها على عظمة المبدع و سعة رحمته و فخامة جوده و لطف عناية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢١

فنقول انظر أيها الذكي الفهم المتفكر في صنع الله المتدبر في آيات كتابه أن مبدع الأشياء لما كان غير متناهي القوة و

القدرة على إفادة الخير و الرحمة فلم يجز وقوف رحمته - و فضله عند حد لا يتجاوزه فيبقى بعد ذلك الإمكان غير المتناهي من غير أن يخرج من القوة إلى الفعل و من مكن الخفاء إلى مجلى الظهور و ذلك ممتنع جدا و لكن لما امتنع صدور غير المتناهي من الأكوان مجتمعا لا متفرقا و دفعيا لا متدرجا لنهوض البراهين عليه فبالضرورة لا يمكن ذلك إلا على سبيل التعاقب و الافتراق فلا جرم و جب أن يكون من صنع الله وجود جوهر بواسطته يستصح صدور المحدثات و المتجددات عنه تعالى - لتقدسه عن التغير و لا بد أن يكون ذلك الجوهر ذا قوة غير متناهية في الانفعال على وجه الإمداد من الغير كأن الواجب جل ذكره ذو قوة غير متناهية في الفعل على وجه الاستقلال ثم لما كان تجدد الحوادث بتوارد الاستعدادات متوقفا على أمر متجدد بالطبع حادث بالذات ليصير تجدده و حدوثه الذاتيين منشأين لحدوث الحادثات و تغير المتغيرات - و ارتباط الحوادث بالمبدع القديم المرتفع ذاته عن الأزمنة و الحركات فأفاد بفضل جوده أجراما كريمة نورية متجددة الطباع دائمة الحركات النفسانية و الطبيعية و الوضعية لأغراض علوية نفسانية و غايات حكمية عقلية هي العلة لإفاضات أنوار حسية و أضواء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٢

صورية بها يقع استعدادات مادية غير متناهية تلحق من فاعل غير متناهي التأثير إلى قابل غير متناهي القبول ليوجب ذلك إفاضة الخيرات و فتح أبواب البركات على الدوام من غير انقطاع كما في قوله تعالى **وَأِنْ تَعَدُّوا نِعْمَةَ اللَّهِ لَا تُحْصُوهَا** و إذا لم يكن الفاعل القيوم على الغيب بضنين فيحصل الفيض منه على كل قابل مستعد بحسب استعداده حتى أن النمل الصغار و الضب و السوسمار مع حشرات لو كانت مستعدة لقبول نفس ناطقة و جب أن يفاض عليها. و قد علمت أن أشرف ما يتعلق بالهيولى و الأجسام إنما هي النفوس الناطقة التي لا يمكن خروج جميع ما يمكن منها من القوة إلى الفعل دفعة واحدة لا مع الأبدان لاستلزامه لا تناهي الأبعاد و الأجرام و لا بدونها لكونها متعلقة الذوات بها حدوثا فبحسب استعداد الهيولى استعدادات غير متناهية في الأدوار و الأكوار يقبل فيض النفوس من العقل المفارق إلى غير النهاية ثم يرجع منها ما كملت إلى العالم العقلي و الوطن الأصلي و ما لم تكمل تلبث في بعض طبقات البرازخ و المقابر المثالية أزمانا طويلة أو قصيرة - و أحقابا كثيرة أو قليلة بحسب كثافة الحجاب و رفته و بحسب كثرة الجرائم و قلتها.

ثم انظر أيها المتأمل الطالب لمعرفة الله و ملكوته من ملاحظة أحوال العلويات و أوضاعها لانتفاع السفليات من أنها لو كانت كلها نيرات لأفسدت بإحراق أضوائها مواد الكائنات كلها و لو كانت عرية عن النور بالكلية لبقى ما دون الفلك في ظلمة شديدة و ليل مظلم طويل لا أوحش منه و كذا لو ثبت أنوارها أو لازمت دائرة واحدة - لآثرت بإفراط فيما قابلهما و تفريط فيما وراء ذلك و لو لم يكن لها حركة سريعة لفعلت ما يفعله السكون و اللزوم و لو لم يجعل الأنوار الكوكبية ذوات حركة سريعة مشتركة و أخرى بطيئة مختصة و لم يجعل دوائر الحركات البطيئة مائلة عن مدار الحركة السريعة لما مالت إلى النواحي شمالا و جنوبا فلم تنتشر منافعها على بقاع الأرض و لو لا أن حركة الشمس خصوصا على هذا المنوال من تخالف سمتها لسمت الحركة السريعة لما حصلت الفصول الأربعة التي بها يقع الكون و الفساد و يصلح أمرجة البقاع و البلاد و إلى هذا المعنى أشار الكتاب الإلهي **قُلْ أَرَأَيْتُمْ إِنْ جَعَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْكُمُ اللَّيْلَ سَرْمَدًا إِلَى يَوْمِ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٣

الْقِيَامَةُ مِنَ اللَّهِ غَيْرُ اللَّهِ يَأْتِيكُمْ بُضِيَاءُ الآية ثم قال **قُلْ أَرَأَيْتُمْ إِنْ جَعَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْكُمُ النَّهَارَ سَرْمَدًا - إِلَى يَوْمِ الْقِيَامَةِ مِنَ اللَّهِ غَيْرُ اللَّهِ يَأْتِيكُمْ بَلِيلٌ تَسْكُنُونَ فِيهِ أَفَلَا تَبْصُرُونَ.**

و لما كان القمر نائبا للشمس خليفة لها في النضج و التحليل إذا كان قوي النور جعل مجراه يخالف مجراها في الصيف و الشتاء شمالا و جنوبا فالشمس تكون في الشتاء جنوبية و القمر شماليا لئلا ينعدم السببان و في الصيف بعكس ذلك لئلا يجتمع المسخنان- و لما كانت الشمس شمالية الحركة صيفا جنوبيتها شتاء جعل أوجها أعني أبعد إبعادها عن الأرض في الشمال و حضيضها و هو أقرب إبعادها في الجنوب ليخبر قرب الميل ببعد المسافة لئلا يشتد التسخين و التنوير و ينكسر بعد الميل بقربها لئلا يضعف القوة المسخنة عن التأثير فانظر كيف جعل الكواكب مع حركة الكل السريعة حركات أخرى بطيئة- تميل بها إلى شمال و جنوب على مدارات متفاوتة في العظم و الصغر و السرعة و البطء و القرب و البعد من الأرض بحسب أوجائها و حضيضاتها و لأجل اختلاف أحوالها المنفعة الكائنات و غرض النظام قال الله تعالى **وَالشَّمْسُ وَالْقَمَرُ وَالنُّجُومُ مُسَخَّرَاتٌ بِأَمْرِهِ** * أي بما يقتضي حركاتها طالعة و غاربة و شمالية تارة و جنوبية أخرى و كذلك أوجيه مرة و حضيضيه أخرى و غير ذلك من أحوال الكواكب كالرجوع و الإقامة و الاستقامة و كونها في بيوتها التي لها و وبالها و شرفها و هبوطها و كونها بطبيعة كل برج وقعت فيه من الثابتة و المنقلبة و ذوات الجسدين و أمثال ذلك مما هو مذكور في كتب الأحكاميين على الإجمال- و لا يحيط بتفاصيله إلا البارئ جل ذكره و ملائكته المقربين الذي هم الأنوار العقلية و الأشعة الإلهية.

ثم أ ما تأملت أيها الناظر البصير في ملكوت السماوات و ما فيها من خلق أرواح الأفلاك و نفوس الكواكب و قوام جوهرها و إشراق نورها و طاعتها للبارئ و دئوبها في الحركات على الدوام عشقا و شوقا إلى بارئها و مبدعها. ثم من عجائب الحكمة و غرائب اللطف و الرحمة حسن ترتيب العناصر و جعل الأرض في وسط الكل لمناسبة الكثافة و الظلمة للبعد عن أفق النور و لأنها لو كانت مجاورة للأجرام العلوية لاحتقرت بشدة تسخين الحركة الدائمة و لأنها على تقدير بقائها هناك- ما كان يمكن أن يتكون عليها حيوان و لا ينبت منها نبات و جعل النار مجاورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٤

للفلك لمناسبة اللطافة و النورية و لو جاوره غيرها من العناصر تسخن بدوام حركته- فصار نارا و انضم إليها تسخين النار فاحتقرت باقي العناصر و صار الكل نارا فانفسد الجميع و لما كانت العناية الأزلية اقتضت وجود نفوس ناطقة و غير ناطقة احتاجت إلى أبدان حيوانية و نباتية يغلب على أكثرها العنصر اليابس الذي يبسه تتحفظ الصور و الأشكال- و جب أن يكون الأرض باردة يابسة متماسكة الأجزاء ليجاورها الحيوان و النبات الغالب عليهما عنصرها و يجب أيضا لما ذكرنا من الحكمة أن لا يكون الماء محيطا بالأرض إحاطة تامة لاحتياج أكثر الحيوان و النبات لاستنشاق الهواء و جذبه ثم جعل الهواء مجاورا للنار لمناسبتها في الحر و الميعان و جعل الماء متوسطا بين الهواء و الأرض- لمناسبة الهواء في الميعان و مناسبة الأرض في البرد لئلا يبطل العدل.

ثم انظر لو لم يكن طبقات الأجرام التي فوق الأرض من العناصر و الأفلاك شفافة بل ملونة لوقفت أضواء الكواكب على سطوحها أو انعكست إلى ما فوقها و ما وصلت إلى عالم الكون و الفساد فبقي أهل هاوية الهيولى في ظلمة لا أوحش

منها فجعلت الكواكب مضيئة - و الأفلاك و باقي العناصر شفافة و لو كانت العناصر كلها قابلة للنور اشتد الحر فيها و قوي إلى حد - يؤدي إلى إحراق ما في هذا العالم كله

الفصل (١٢) في ذكر أنموذج من آثار عنايته في خلق المركبات

ألم تر يا عارف إلى ربك كيف خلق للعنصرينات حرارة هي محللة ملطفة محرّكة - و برودة مسكنة غاقدة و رطوبة قابلة للتشكل و التقسيم و يبوسة حافظة لما أفيده من التصوير و التقويم و كيف ركب المواليد من امتزاج كيفيات العناصر و أعد لكل كمال مزاجا خاصا و أفاض على كل مستعد ما يستحقه من الكمال و لم يقتصر له على هذا بل زاده من الإفضال ما يهتدي به إلى الثواني من الكمالات و الغايات و بذلك يقع الارتفاع في القوس الصعودي إلى الدرجات و لذلك قال **رَبُّنَا الَّذِي أَعْطَى كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلْقَهُ ثُمَّ هَدَى** فانظر لما كانت أجساد النبات و الحيوان لم يحصل إلا و يلزمها قبول التحليل كيف رتب لها قوة غاذية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٥

متصرفه للغذاء بالهضم و الإحاطة إلى شبيه جوهر المغتذي و لما لم يمكن حصول الحيوانات و النباتات على كمالها المقداري أول مرة كيف أودع فيها قوة نامية موجبة لزيادة أقطار المغتذي في الجوانب على نسبة مضبوطة تليق بها. ثم ابتهج يا عارف و اذكر رحمة ربك و ترمزم في عشق جماله بالتسبيح و التهليل - بأن القسمة لما أوجبت باقيات بالشخص و باقيات لا بالشخص كيف تتم جود الواهب الحق نقصان الديمومة العددية بإعطاء الديمومة النوعية فأوفى لكل منهما قسطه من الوجود و نصيبه من الدوام فصار العالم الطبيعي منتظما بصنفي الثبات و البقاء - فانظر في أحوال ما لا يحصل غالبا من النبات و الحيوان إلا بالتوالد كيف استبقى نوع ما و جب فساد شخصه بقوة مولدة مودعة في أعضاء التوليد قاطعة لفضله من مادة هي مبدأ الشخص الآخر.

ثم انظر كيف خلق لمن كانت أفعاله بالاختيار لا بالطبيعة و الاضطراب شهوة الغذاء و لذة الوقاع كالأجير الذي لا يفعل فعله إلا بالأجرة فهذه الشهوة التي تكون لقوى نفس الحيوان لصدور هذه الأفاعيل التي يتوقف عليها بقاء الشخص و النوع من هذه الأبدان - بمنزلة الأجرة للأجير و الجعالة و الرشوة للخدم و الأعوان كيلا يقع الذهول و الإعراض عن إيقاع هذه الأغراض.

ثم انظر كيف رتب للغاذية خادما من قوى أربع جاذبة تأتياها بما يتصرف فيه - و هاضمة محللة للغذاء معدة إياها لتصرف الغاذية و ماسكة لحفظها مدة لتصرف المتصرف فيها - بالإحالة و الطبخ و دافعة لما لا يقبل المشابهة. ثم انظر كيف رتب للحيوان لكونه أشرف من النبات قوى أخرى من مدرّكة و محرّكة لأن نفسه دراية مختارة في حركاتها البدنية و النفسانية و زاد البدن الإنساني لكون مزاجه أشرف كلمة روحانية إذا أطاعت أمر ربها و كلمت بالعلم و العمل صعدت إلى عالم الملكوت و قربت من مبدأها بقطع علائق الناسوت و شابها الملائكة الأعلى و أهل عالم الجبروت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٦

و لو تدبرت تدبرا شافيا في كيفية تدبير النفس للبدن و حصول الألفة و العلاقة و شوق التصرف و التحريك و عشق

المقارنة و ألم المفارقة بينهما مع أن البدن كالثقل الكثيف - و النفس كالنور اللطيف لقضيت العجب و قلت كيف يتصور الازدواج بين النور و الظلمة و الايتلاف بين المجرد و المادي و بين العلوي الذي قال تعالى تعظيماً لشأنه - **وَرَفَعْنَاهُ مَكَانًا عَلِيًّا** و قال **إِنَّ كِتَابَ الْأَبْرَارِ لَفِي عَلِيٍّ** و السفلي المشار إليه بقوله **إِنَّ كِتَابَ الْفُجَّارِ لَفِي سَجِينٍ** إذ بينهما من المخالفة و المنافرة في الماهية ما لا يخفى على صاحب الروية و جل الخلق بل كلهم إلا النادر منهم غافلون بل منكرون لهذه الارتباط و الاتحاد بينهما حتى أنكر أكثر المنتسبين إلى العلم تجرد النفس و ظن جمهور القائلين تجردها أن إنسانية الإنسان بصورة أخرى نوعية منطبعة في البدن يتحصل منهما حقيقة الإنسان و أما المشار إليه بأننا فهو المسمى بالنفس الناطقة و لها إضافة عارضة شوقية بالقياس إلى البدن لأنه موضوع أفاعيلها الجسمانية و هؤلاء بمعزل عندنا عن معرفة النفس و مقاماتها في الهبوط و الصعود - حسبما قررنا سابقاً من أنها هي الجوهر المغتذي النامي المتحرك الساكن الأكل الشارب اللامس الشام الذائق فانظر في حكمة الصانع كيف كثف اللطيف لا بل لطف الكثيف بحسن تدبير فخلق من زبدة العناصر البدن الكثيف المخلوق من مادة النطفة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٧

و من لطافته و زبدته خلق القلب الصنوبري و من لطافة الدم الخالص و من صفوة الروح البخاري النابع في العضو الرئيس الذي هو في النقاء و الصفاء كالفلك البعيد عن التضاد و لاعتداله و توسطه بين الأضداد مع جامعية لكيفيات الأطراف يشبه السبع الشداد و لنوره و ضيائه كالكواكب اللامعة على الأبصار و لأجل صفائه و صقاله صار مرآة تتلأل فيها الصور العينية و يتجلى فيها المثل المحسوسة التي هي واسطة بين العالمين فهو كأنه موضع للنفس متحد بها عند ما خرج جوهره من قوته النفسية إلى العقل كما أن النفس مادة للعقل و متحدة به عند ما خرج جوهر ذاتها من القوة العلية إلى الفعل فذلك الجوهر مرآة يتجلى فيها النفس و النفس مرآة يتجلى فيها العقل و الإنسان قد تطور في ذاته بهذه الأطوار - و تبدلت عليه هذه النشآت من حد النطفة إلى حد العقل شيئاً فشيئاً على التدرج ففيه الملك و الملكوت و هو جامع الكونين ففيه شيء كالفلك و هو مرآة يدرك بها الصور الجزئية الغائبة و الحاضرة و شيئاً كالملك و هو مرآة يدرك بها الحقائق الكلية الثابتة فانظر إلى القدرة و الحكمة ثم إلى اللطف و الرحمة تبهرك عجائب الحضرة الربوبية و إن أردت زيادة شرح و إيضاح فاستمع

الفصل (١٣) في آيات حكمته و عنايته في خلق الإنسان

الإنسان مخلوق أول خلقه من أحسن الأشياء و أنقص المواد و أضعف الأجساد - لأنه مكون من القوة الهيولانية و هي كالشيء ثم من التراب المظلم و الطين اللازب ثم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٨

من النطفة و أشير في الكتاب الإلهي إلى المرتبة الأولى للإنسان بقوله تعالى **هَلْ أَتَى عَلَى الْإِنْسَانِ حِينٌ مِّنَ الدَّهْرِ لَمْ يَكُنْ شَيْئًا مَّذْكُورًا** و إلى المرتبة الثانية و الثالثة بقوله تعالى **إِنَّا خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ مِّنْ نُّطْفَةٍ أَمْشَاجٍ نَّبْتَلِيهِ** و بقوله **هُوَ الَّذِي خَلَقَكُمْ مِّنْ تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ مِّنْ نُّطْفَةٍ** و بعد هذا المنازل و المراتب يتكون له القوى النباتية و الأعضاء الإلهية لها - ثم يدخلها في باب الحيوانية لقوله **فَجَعَلْنَاهُ سَمِيعًا بَصِيرًا** ثم يتدرج له الكون إلى أن يحدث له الأكوان الحيوانية كلها

التي أولها قوة المس و آخرها قوة الوهم ثم ينشأ فيه خلق آخر كما قال تعالى **ثُمَّ أَنْشَأْنَاهُ خَلْقًا آخَرَ فَتَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ الْخَالِقِينَ**.

فانظر أيها الناظر في علوم آفاق و الأنفس إلى النطفة و هي مائة قدرة لو تركت ساعة لفسد مزاجها كيف أخرجها رب الأرباب من بين الصلب و الترائب و حفظها عن التلاشي و الافتراق ثم جعلها في قرار مكين ثم جعلها و هي بيضاء علقه حمراء ثم جعلها مضغة ثم انظر كيف قسم أجزاء النطفة و هي متشابهة إلى العظام و الأعصاب و العروق و الأوتار و اللحوم و غيرها من الأعضاء البسيطة ثم كيف ركب من هذه الأعضاء البسيطة الأعضاء المركبة من الرأس و اليد و الرجل و غيرها و شكلها بأشكال مختلفة مناسبة لأفعلها كما يستعلم من قواعد علم التشريح و غيره ثم خلق هذا كله في جوف الرحم في ظلمات ثلاث و لو كشف الغطاء عنك و امتد البصر منك إليها لكنت ترى التخطيط و التصاوير يظهر عليها شيئاً فشيئاً و لا ترى آتته فسبحان من مصور فاعل للنقوش و التصاوير لا يرى في تصويره آلة و لا إصبع - ثم إذا بلغ في تدرجه في الاستكمال إلى جذب الغذاء و فعل النماء أفاض عليها صورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٢٩

نباتية لها خوادم من قوى كثيرة توكل عليها ملائكة يتمشى بهم ما يرجع إلى الغذاء و النماء فانظر كيف وكل الله الملائكة بك في انتظام أمورك حتى في أمر غذائك فإن أهل المكاشفة قد رأوا ببصائر قلوبهم أن كل جزء من أعضاء بدنك لا يغتذي إلا بأن يوكل الله به سبعة من الملائكة هذا هو الأقل إلى عشرة إلى مائة إلى ألف أو يزيدون و ذلك لأن معنى التغذي أن يقوم جزء من الغذاء مقام جزء قد تلف و ذلك بعد أن يتغير تغيرات - يصير دماً في آخر الأمر ثم لحماً و عظماً.

ثم إن الغذاء جسم لا يتحرك بطبعه و لا يتغير بنفسه في أطوار الخلقة كما أن البر لا يصير طحيناً ثم منخولاً ثم عجينا ثم خبزاً مستديراً مطبوخاً إلا بصناعة صناع و الصناع في الباطن إذا كانت للصنع غاية حكمية هم الملائكة كما أن الصناع في الظاهر هم أهل المدينة و قد أسبغ الله عليكم نعمه ظاهرة و باطنة و الناس غافلون عن نعمة الباطنة و العارف يعلم أنه لا بد من ملائكة سبعة أحدهم جاذب للغذاء إلى الأعضاء و الآخر ممسك له في جوار العضو و الثالث يخلع عنه صورته السابقة فيخلع صورة الدم و الرابع يكسوه صورة اللحم و العظم و غيرهما و الخامس يدفع الفضل الزائد و السادس يلصق ما اكتسى كسوة اللحم باللحم و ما اكتسى كسوة العظم بالعظم حتى لا يكون منفصلاً و السابع يرعى المقادير و النسب في الإلصاق.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٣٠

فإن قلت فهلا فوضت هذه الأفعال إلى ملك واحد و لم احتيجت إلى سبعة أملاك - و الحنطة أيضاً يحتاج إلى طاحن و نخال ثانياً و صاب للماء إليه ثالثاً و عاجن له رابعاً و إلى قاطع له كرات مدورة خامساً و إلى مرقق له رغفانا عريضة سادساً و إلى من يلصقها بالتنور سابعا فهلا كانت أفعال الملائكة باطنا كأفعال الإنس ظاهراً.

قلنا يجب عليك أن تعلم أن خلقة الملائكة تخالف خلقة الإنس لأن وجودهم وجود صوري بسيط من غير اختلاط تركيب و لا تزاحم بين أفعالهم كما لا تزاحم بين صفاتهم و ذواتهم و لا يكون لكل منهم إلا فعل واحد و إليه الإشارة

بقوله تعالى **وَمَا مِنَّا إِلَّا لَهُ مَقَامٌ مَعْلُومٌ** فلذلك ليس بينهم تناقش و تقاتل و لا تراحم و لا تضاد في فعل أو صفة بل مثالهم في تعيين مرتبة كل منهم و فعله مثال الحواس منا فإن البصر لا يزاحم السمع في فعله و هو إدراك الأصوات و لا الشم يزاحمها في إدراك الروائح و لا هما يزاحمان الشم و لا الذوق و لا غير ذلك يزاحم بعضها بعضا و ليست هي كالأعضاء مثل اليد و الرجل فإن أصابع الرجل قد تبطش بطشا ضعيفا و رأينا إنسانا يكتب بأصابع رجله و آخر يمشي بيديه و قد تضرب غيرك برأسك فيزاحم به اليد التي هي آلة الضرب و لا كالإنسان الواحد الذي - يتولى بنفسه الطحن و العجن و الخبز و هذا نوع من الاعوجاج و العدول عن العدل - سببه اختلاف صفات الإنسان و اختلاف دواعيه فلم يكن وحداني الفعل و لذلك يرى الإنسان يعصي الله مرة و يطيعه أخرى و ذلك غير ممكن في طباع الملائكة لأنهم مجبولون على الطاعة لا مجال للمعصية في حقهم فلا جرم **لَا يَعَصُونَ اللَّهَ مَا أَمَرَهُمْ وَيَفْعَلُونَ مَا يُؤْمَرُونَ** و **يُسَبِّحُونَ اللَّيْلَ وَالنَّهَارَ لَا يَفْتُرُونَ** و الراكع منهم راعع أبدا و الساجد منهم ساجد أبدا و القائم منهم قائم أبدا.

و هاهنا دقيقة يجب التنبيه عليها

و هي أن لأحد أن يقول إذا كان كل ملك من ملائكة الله موكلا على فعل واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٣١

لا يمكنه التعدي منه إلى غيره فيكون ناقص الجبله لقصوره عن فعل الخيرات الكثيرة - و الجواب أن ذات كل ملك متصل بذات ما هو أشرف منه على وجه يقوم به و يحيا بروحه لكن لا على وجه التركيب و التمزيج الذين في الأجسام و كل منهم وحداني الذات وحداني الفعل و إن صدر عنه أنواع كثيرة من الأفعال لأن كثرتها على الترتيب الصدوري على وجه يكون بعضها تحت بعض على نسق و نظام لا يتغير أصلا و قد علمت أن الترتيب يجعل الكثير واحدا فيرتقي الأفعال منهم إلى فعل واحد يتشعب منه الأثر - و كذا الذوات ترجع كثرتها إلى ذات واحدة تتحد بها الذوات و كل ملك من الملائكة - حي عليم بحياة الملك الذي هو دونه و تحت أمره و تسخير و علمه لا كأعضائنا التي لا شعور لها بذاتها و لا بما يصدر عنها و إنما نسبة الملائكة إلى من هي تحت أمره و طاعته - كنسبة قوانا الإدراكية إلى الروح العقلي منا حسبما بيناه من أن كلا من الحواس و صورها الحاضرة عند النفس حية بحياة النفس و مع ذلك لكل حس منها شأن غير شأن الحس الآخرة و لا اختلاط بينها و لا تشويش لأنها من الجنبه العاليه و الجهات الفاعليه لا القابليه كالأعضاء و ما في حكمها.

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و لنرجع إلى ما كنا بصدد فنقول

قد امتاز الإنسان بهذه الصورة النباتية و الأعوان الذين خلقهم الله لإفادة التغذية - و التوليد من الأجساد المعدنية فصار أكمل وجودا من الحجر و البلور و الحديد و النحاس و الذهب و الفضة و غيرها إلا أن صورة النبات مع هذا الكمال ناقص - فإنه ربما لم يصل إليه غذاء ينساق إليه و يماس أصله فجف و يبس إذ لم يمكنه طلب الغذاء - و المشي إليه من الموضع الذي فيه إلى موضع آخر فإن الطلب إنما يكون بشيئين معرفة و قدرة و هما مفقودتان عنه فلو وقف وجود الإنسان في هذه الدرجة لكان ناقصا عاجزا في خلقته و فعله فانظر كيف رفعه الله عن هذا المنزل بصورة أخرى امتاز بها

عن النباتات - وارتفع وجوده عن وجود الهاويات الساكنات و قرب بخطوة أخرى إلى رب الأرباب - و معدن الأنوار عن قعر عالم الظلمات بأن خلق له آلة الإحساس و آلة الحركة الاختيارية - في طلب الغذاء و هما المشار إليهما في الكتاب **فَجَعَلْنَاهُ سَمِيعًا بَصِيرًا إِنَّا هَدَيْنَاهُ السَّبِيلَ إِمَّا شَاكِرًا وَإِمَّا كَفُورًا.**

ثم انظر إلى ترتيب حكمة الله في خلق الحواس الخمس فأولها اللمس و هذا أنقص درجات الحس فإنه الشعور بما يلامس الحيوان و يلاصقه لا بما يبعد منه فإن الشعور بما يبعد منه - يحتاج إلى حاسة أقوى و أتم و هذا يعم الحيوانات كلها و لدناءة بعض الحيوانات القريب المنزلة من النبات كالدود التي في الطين يقتصر على هذا و لا يقدر على طلب الغذاء فلو لم يخلق فيك إلا هذا الحس لكنت ناقصا كالدود فافتقرت إلى حس آخر لإدراك البعيد فخلق لك الشم إلا أنك لا تدري به أن الرائحة من أي ناحية جاءت لتطلب بها ذي الرائحة فتطوف كثيرا حتى تظفر به فأنعم الله عليك بحاسة البصر لكن لا تدرك بها ما يحتجب بجدار أو حائل آخر و أيضا لا تدرك بها إلا ما هو الموجود الحاضر و أما الغائب فلا يمكنك معرفته إلا بكلام و إعلام يدرك بحس السمع فاشتدت حاجتك إليه فانظر كيف أنعم عليك و ميزك بفهم الكلام عن سائر الحيوان و كل ذلك ما يغنيك لو لم يكن لك حس الذوق إذ يصل إليك الغذاء فلا تدرك أنه موافق أو مخالف فتأكله فتهلك كالشجرة ربما يصب في أصلها ما هو سبب جفافها و لا ذوق لها فتجذبه فتجف ثم جميع ذلك لا يكفي في الاستكمال و لا يتم به الحياة الإنسانية لو لم يكن لك إدراك باطني يتأدى

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إليه صور المحسوسات الخمس للتحفظ و التذكر و لإلطال عليك الأمر في معرفة الأشياء المحسوسة لو لم يكن صورتها محفوظة عندك فأنعم الله عليك بمشاعر أخرى باطنة لتحفظ بها صورة ما تحسه و تذكرها متى شئت و تتصرف فيها و هذا كله يشاركك فيه الحيوانات - و لو لم يكن لك إلا هذا لكنت ناقصا لعدم إدراك عواقب الأمور و غاياتها العقلية فميزك الله و فضلك على كثير من خلقه تفضيلا و شرفك تشريفا بقوة أخرى هي قوة العقل تدرك مضرة الضار و منفعة النافع في المال و تدرك الخيرات الحقيقية و الشرور الآجلة فهذا أنموذج في بيان ما أنعم الله عليك في باب الإدراك و أما بيان ما أنعمه عليك من القوى المحركة التي هي طائفة أخرى من جنود الله - و كيفية نظمها و ترتيبها فيك فهو أنه لو خلق المشاعر و المدارك حتى تدرك بها الأمور التي لها مدخل في استكمالك و حفظ بقائك ما دمت في الدنيا من أسباب التغذية و غيرها - حتى تدركها من بعد أو قرب و لم يخلق لك ميل في الطبع و شهوة له و شوق إليه يستحثك على الحركة ثم قدرة في آلات البدن يتحرك إليه لكان الإدراك معطلا فاضطرت إلى أن يكون لك ميل إلى ما يوافقك يسمى شهوة و نفرة عما يخالفك يسمى كراهة فخلق فيك شهوة الغذاء لبقاء شخصك و شهوة النكاح لبقاء نوعك و وكلها بك كالمقاضي يلجئك - إلى تناول الغذاء و غيره.

ثم هذه الشهوة لو لم تسكن إذا حصل مقدار الحاجة من المشتهي و المرغوب فيه لأسرفت و أهلكت نفسك فخلق الله لك الكراهة عند الشبع و نحوه لتترك الفعل كالأكل و نحوه لا كالزرع فإنه لا يزال تجتذب الماء إذا انصب في أسافله حتى يفسد فيحتاج إلى آدمي يقدر غذاءه بقدر الحاجة.

ثم إنك قد علمت أن لك قوة طبيعية بها تشارك النبات و هي منبثة في جميع البدن منبعها الكبد و قوة أخرى تشارك بها الحيوان منبثة في الأعضاء تشارك بها الحيوان كله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٣٤

و منبعها القلب و قوة أخرى نفسانية أخص منها تشارك بها بعض الحيوان منبعها الدماغ - و أخرى أشرف مما سبق كله لا تشارك بها الحيوان بل الملائكة فقط فأعطاك الله بحسب كل منها أخذاً و تركاً للمنافع و المضار فاللذان بحسب القوة الأولى يسميان بال جذب و الدفع و اللذان بحسب القوة الثانية يسميان بالميل و النفرة و اللذان بحسب القوة الثالثة يسميان بالشهوة و الغضب و اللذان بحسب القوة الرابعة يسميان بالإرادة و الكراهة فخلقهما الله فيك مسخرتين تحت إشارة العقل المعرف للعواقب كما خلق الشهوة و الغضب مسخرتين تحت إدراك الحس فتم بهما انتفاعك بالعقل إذ مجرد المعرفة - بأن هذا يضرك و هذا ينفعك لا يكفي في الاحتراز عنه أو في طلبه ما لم يكن لك إرادة بموجب المعرفة أو كراهة و بهذه الإرادة أفردك الله عن البهائم إكراماً و تعظيماً لبني آدم كما أفردك عنها بمعرفة العواقب

الفصل (١٤) في عنايته تعالى في خلق الأرض و ما عليها لينتفع بها الإنسان

قال سبحانه **خَلَقَ لَكُمْ مَا فِي الْأَرْضِ جَمِيعاً** فإذا عرفت العناية الإلهية في نفسك و بدنك فانظر إلى آثار رحمته عليك بما هو خارج عنك و أقرب الخارجيات إليك ما تستقر عليه فانظر إلى صورة الأرض التي هي مقر جسدك و أم بدنك الذي كان في بطنها أولاً ثم تولد منها ثم يعود إلى بطنها تارة أخرى - كما قال تعالى **مِنْهَا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ وَ فِيهَا نُعِيدُكُمْ وَ مِنْهَا نُخْرِجُكُمْ تَارَةً أُخْرَى** ثم انظر إلى منافعها.

منها كونها فراشا و مهادا

لتسكن إليها و تنام عليها و بساطا لتسلك فيها كما قال تعالى **جَعَلَ لَكُمُ الْأَرْضَ فِرَاشاً** و قال **وَاللَّهُ جَعَلَ لَكُمُ الْأَرْضَ بِسَاطًا لَتَسْلُكُوا مِنْهَا سَبِيلًا فِجَاجًا** و ليس من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٣٥

ضروريات الافتراض أن يكون سطحا مستويا بل يسهل الافتراض على سطح الكره إذا عظم جرمها و تباعدت أطرافها و لكن لا يتم الافتراض و لا المشي عليها ما لم تكن ساكنة في حيزها الطبيعي و هو وسط الأفلاك و إليه الإشارة بقوله تعالى **اللَّهُ الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُمُ الْأَرْضَ قَرَارًا** لأن الثقال بالطبع تميل إلى تحت كما أن الخفاف تميل بالطبع إلى فوق و الفوق من جميع الجوانب ما يلي السماء و التحت ما يلي المركز.

و منها ما به من الله علينا

و هو أن لم يجعلها في غاية الصلابة كالحديد و الحجر لكي تنفصل عنها مادة الأغذية و يتأتى حفر الآبار و إجراء الأنهار و لا في غاية اللين و الانغمار كالماء ليسهل النوم و المشي عليها و أمكنت الزراعة و اتخاذ الأبنية منها.

و منها أن لم تخلق في نهاية اللطافة و الشفيف

ليستقر عليها الأنوار و يتسخن منها فيمكن جوازها.

و منها أن جعلها بارزة بعضها من الماء

مع أن طبعها الغوص فيه لتصلح لتعيشنا - و تعيش ما يحتاج إليه من الحيوانات البرية عليها و سبب انكشاف ما يبرز منها و هو قريب من الرابع إن جعلها الله بواسطة هبوب الرياح و جري الأنهار و تموج البحار غير صحيحة الاستدارة بل

جعلها و الماء الذي يجاورها بحيث إذا انجذب الماء بطبعه - إلى المواضع الغائرة و المنخفضة منها بقي شيء منها مكشوفاً و صار مجموع الماء و الأرض بمنزلة كرة واحدة يدل على ذلك فيما بين الخافقتين تقدم طلوع الكواكب و غروبها للمشرقين على طلوعها و غروبها للمغربيين و فيما بين الشمال و الجنوب - ازدياد ارتفاع القطب الظاهر للواغليين في الشمال و بالعكس للواغليين في الجنوب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٣٦

و تتركب الاختلافين للسائرين على سموت تكون بين السمتين إلى غير ذلك من الأعراض المختصة بالاستدارة كأحوال الخسوفات و الكسوفات و اختلاف آتات ابتدائها و انتهائها في الأخذ و الانجلاء بالقياس إلى أهل البقاع فابتداء خسوف معين بالقياس إلى موضع أول الليل و بالقياس إلى آخر بعده بساعة و بالقياس إلى آخر بساعتين و بالقياس إلى آخر ربع الليل أو ثلثه أو نصفه أو غير ذلك على نسبة مضبوطة بحسب تباعد المواضع بعضها عن بعض طولاً و عرضاً و يستوي في ذلك راكب البر و راكب البحر.

و منها الأشياء المتولدة منها

كالمعادن و النبات و الحيوان.

و منها جذبها للماء من السماء

لقوله **وَأَنْزَلْنَا مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً بِقَدَرٍ فَأَسْكَنَاهُ فِي الْأَرْضِ.**

و منها العيون و الأنهار العظام

التي فيها لقوله تعالى **وَالْأَرْضَ مَدَدْنَاهَا*.**

و منها انصداعها بالنبات و غيره

وَالْأَرْضِ ذَاتِ الصَّدْعِ.

و منها حياتها و موتها

ليستدل بها الإنسان على موته و نشره تارة أخرى لقوله **وَأَيَّةٌ لَهُمُ الْأَرْضُ الْمَيِّتَةُ أَحْيَيْنَاهَا** و قوله **فَأَحْيَيْنَا بِهِ الْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا كَذَلِكَ النُّشُورُ** و قوله **فَانظُرْ إِلَى آثَارِ رَحْمَتِ اللَّهِ كَيْفَ يُحْيِي الْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِهَا إِنَّ ذَلِكَ لَمُحْيِي الْمَوْتَى - وَهُوَ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ** و قوله **وَمِنْ آيَاتِهِ أَنْ تَرَى الْأَرْضَ خَاشِعَةً فَإِذَا أَنْزَلْنَا عَلَيْهَا الْمَاءَ اهْتَزَّتْ وَرَبَتْ إِنَّ الَّذِي أَحْيَاهَا لَمُحْيِي الْمَوْتَى إِنَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ.**

و منها تولد الحيوانات المختلفة

وَبَثَّ فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ دَابَّةٍ* بعضها للأكل و **وَالْأَنْعَامَ خَلَقَهَا لَكُمْ فِيهَا دِفْءٌ وَمَنَافِعُ وَمِنْهَا تَأْكُلُونَ** و بعضها للركوب و الزينة و **وَالْخَيْلَ وَ الْبُغَالَ وَ الْحَمِيرَ لِتَرْكَبُوهَا وَ زِينَةً** و بعضها للحمل و **وَتَحْمِلُ أَوْثَالَكُمْ إِلَى بَلَدٍ لَمْ تَكُونُوا بِالْغِيهِ إِلَّا يَشِقُّ الْأَنْفُسُ إِنَّ رَبَّكُمْ لَرْؤُفٌ رَحِيمٌ** و بعضها للتجمل و الراحة و **وَلَكُمْ فِيهَا جَمَالٌ حِينَ تَرِيحُونَ وَ حِينَ تَسْرَحُونَ** و بعضها للنكاح و **وَاللَّهُ جَعَلَ لَكُمْ مِنْ أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَزْوَاجًا** و بعضها للملابس

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و البيت و الأثاث و **جَعَلَ لَكُمْ مِنْ جُلُودِ الْأَنْعَامِ بُيُوتًا تَسْتَخِفُّونَهَا يَوْمَ ظَعْنِكُمْ وَ يَوْمَ إِقَامَتِكُمْ - وَ مِنْ أَصْوَابِهَا وَأَوْبَارِهَا وَأَشْعَارِهَا أَثَاثًا وَ مَتَاعًا إِلَى حِينٍ.**

و منها نشو النباتات المتنوعة

و **أَنْبَتْنَا فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ زَوْجٍ بَهِيجٍ** فاختلاف ألوانها آية و رحمة و اختلاف روائعها هداية و لطف فمنها قوت البشر و منها قوت البهائم - **كُلُوا وَ ارْعَوْا أَنْعَامَكُمْ ... مَتَاعًا لَكُمْ وَ لِأَنْعَامِكُمْ*.**

و منها الطعام و الإدام

و منها الدواء -

و منها الفواكه

يُنَبِّتُ لَكُمْ بِهِ الزَّرْعَ وَ الزَّيْتُونَ - وَ النَّخِيلَ وَ الْأَعْنَابَ وَ مِنْ كُلِّ الثَّمَرَاتِ

و منها الكسوة للإنسان

نباتية كالقطن و الكتان - و حيوانية كالشعر و الصوف و الإبريسم و الجلود

و منها الأحجار المختلفة لونا و صفاء

وَ مِنْ الْجِبَالِ جُدَدٌ بَيَضٌ وَ حُمْرٌ مُخْتَلِفٌ أَلْوَانُهَا وَ غَرَائِبٌ سُودٌ فبعضها للزينة و بعضها للأبنية فانظر إلى الحجر الذي يستخرج منه النار مع كثرته و انظر إلى الياقوت الأحمر مع عزته ثم انظر إلى كثرة النفع بذلك الحقيقير - و قلة النفع بذلك الخطير.

و منها ما أودع فيها من المعادن الشريفة

كالذهب و الفضة ثم تأمل أن البشر استنبطوا - الحرف الدقيقة و الصنائع الجليلة و استخرجوا السمك من قعر البحر و استنزلوا الطير من أوج الهواء لكن عجزوا عن اتخاذ الذهب و الفضة و الحكمة فيه أن معظم فائدتهما يرجع إلى الثمنية و هذه الفائدة لا تحصل إلا عند العزة و الندرة و القدرة على اتخاذهما تبطل الحكمة - فلذلك ضرب الله دونهما بابا مسدودا و لهذا اشتهر في الألسنة أن من طلب المال بالكيمايا أفسس.

و منها أن لها طبع الكرم و السماحة

تأخذ حبة واحدة و ترد سبعمائة كما ذكر في القرآن.

و اختلفوا من طريق النقل في أن السماء أفضل من الأرض أم الأرض من السماء

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فقال بعضهم السماء أفضل لأنها معبد الملائكة و ما فيها بقعة عصي الله فيها لأن أهلها معصومون عن الخطاء و العصيان و لما أتى أبونا آدم بتلك المعصية أهبط من الجنة - و قال تعالى

: لا يسكن في جوارى من عصاني

و قال **وَجَعَلْنَا السَّمَاءَ سَقْفًا مَحْفُوظًا وَ هُمْ عَنْ آيَاتِهَا مُعْرِضُونَ** و قال **تَبَارَكَ الَّذِي جَعَلَ فِي السَّمَاءِ بُرُوجًا وَ** غير ذلك من الآيات الدالة على تعظيمها و تعظيم ما فيها و قال آخرون الأرض أفضل لأنه تعالى وصف بقاعا بالبركة قال تعالى **إِنَّ أَوَّلَ بَيْتٍ وُضِعَ لِلنَّاسِ لَلَّذِي بِبَكَّةَ مُبَارَكًا وَ** قال **سُبْحَانَ الَّذِي أَسْرَى بِعَبْدِهِ لَيْلًا مِنَ الْمَسْجِدِ الْحَرَامِ**

إِلَى الْمَسْجِدِ الْأَقْصَى الَّذِي بَارَكْنَا حَوْلَهُ وقال **مُشَارِقَ الْأَرْضِ وَمَغَارِبَهَا الَّتِي بَارَكْنَا فِيهَا** والمراد بها الشام و وصف جملة الأرض بالبركة - **وَبَارِكْ فِيهَا وَقَدَّرْ فِيهَا أَقْوَاتَهَا** فإن قيل و أي بركة في المفاوز المهلكة قلنا إنها مساكن خلق لا يعلمهم إلا الله فهذه البركات قال **وَفِي الْأَرْضِ آيَاتٌ لِلْمُوقِنِينَ**.

و التحقيق أن زينة السماء بالكواكب و زينة الكواكب بالملائكة الروحانيين - و زينة الأرض بالصور و النفوس الحيوانية و زينتها بالأرواح الإنسية المستخدمة إياها و زينتهم بالمعارف الإلهية التي شاركوا بها الملائكة المقربين و ظاهر السماء أشرف من ظاهر الأرض و باطنهما بالعكس لأن الغاية أشرف العلل كما مر و من منافع الأرض أنها

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كالصدقة و الدرة المودعة فيها آدم و أولاده ثم علم الله أصناف حاجاتهم فقال

: يَا آدَمُ - لَا أُحْجِلُكَ إِلَى شَيْءٍ غَيْرِ هَذِهِ الْأَرْضِ الَّتِي هِيَ لَكَ كَالْأَمِّ

قال **أَنَا صَبَبْنَا الْمَاءَ صَبًّا ثُمَّ شَقَقْنَا الْأَرْضَ شَقًّا** الآية **وَأَنْزَلَ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ مَاءً فَأَخْرَجَ بِهِ مِنَ الثَّمَرَاتِ رِزْقًا لَكُمْ***
: يَا عَبْدِي إِنَّ أَعَزَّ الْأَشْيَاءِ عِنْدَكَ الذَّهَبَ وَ الْفِضَّةَ وَ لَوْ أَنِّي خَلَقْتُ الْأَرْضَ مِنْهُمَا هَلْ كَانَ يَحْصِلُ مِنْهَا هَذِهِ الْمَنَافِعُ ثُمَّ إِنِّي جَعَلْتُ هَذِهِ الْأَشْيَاءَ لِأَجْلِكَ فِي الدُّنْيَا مَعَ أَنَّهَا سَجَنٌ لَكَ فَكَيْفَ الْحَالُ فِي الْجَنَّةِ

الفصل (١٥) في بدائع صنع الله في الأجرام الفلكية و الأنوار الكوكبية

فإذا علمت أنموذجا من منافع الأرض فارفع الآن رأسك إلى السماء و انظر و تفكر في كيفية خلق السماوات و في كواكبها و في دورانها على نسق و انتظام و في طلوعها و غروبها و اختلاف مشارقها و مغاربها و دئوب شمسها و قمرها و مشتريها و زحلها في الحركة على الدوام و سعيها في عشق الله و طلب لقائه من غير فتور و لا تقصير و لا تغيير في المسير بل يجري جميعها في منازل مقدرة بحساب مضبوط و كتاب مرقوم و أجل معلوم كما قال **وَالْقَمَرَ قَدَرْنَاهُ مَنَازِلَ لَا يَزِيدُ عَلَى ذَلِكَ وَ لَا يَنْقُصُ إِلَى أَنْ يَطْوِيَهَا اللَّهُ طَيِّ السَّجَلِ لِلْكَتَبِ**.

فتدبر أيها العارف عدد كواكبها و كثرة دراريها و اختلاف ألوانها ثم انظر كيفية أشكالها مع أن ألوانها ليست من جنس هذه الألوان المستحيلة الفاسدة و أشكالها أرفع نمطا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤٠

من هذه الأشكال و كذا طعومها و روائحها و أصواتها على وجه أعلى و أشرف مما يلينا من هذه المحسوسات لكونها نازلة إلى الأرض منها فهي هناك الطف و أصفى و أبسط و ما من صورة على وجه الأرض إلا و لها المثل الأعلى في السماوات و ما من كوكب إلا و لله حكم كثيرة في خلقه و صورته ثم في مقداره و شكله ثم في وضعه و نسبته إلى كوكب آخر و قربه و بعده من وسط السماء و قس تلك الحكم التي فيها على الحكم التي روعيت في أعضاء بدنك مع حقارته و أمر السماء أعظم و أجل من الإنسان بما لا يحصى - كما قال تعالى **إِنَّكُمْ أَشَدُّ خَلْقًا أَمِ السَّمَاءُ بَنَاهَا**.

بل من جملة ما في عالم الأرض و قس التفاوت فيما بينها من عجائب الترتيب - و حسن النظام و بديع الفطرة على التفاوت فيما بينهما في المقدار و اللطافة.

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أما تأملت يا عارف في ملكوت السماوات وملكها وما فيها من الكواكب وقوام جوهرها وإشراق نورها وطاعتها للباري في الحركات عشقا وشوقا إلى المبدع - أما تسمع كلام الله في تعظيمها وتعظيم النجوم في كتابه فكم من سورة ذكر فيها عظم أمر السماء وجلالة قدرها وكم أقسم بها في القرآن كقوله تعالى **وَالشَّمْسُ وَضُحَاهَا وَالْقَمَرُ إِذَا تَلَاهَا** وقوله **وَالنَّجْمُ إِذَا هَوَىٰ** وقوله **فَلَا أُقْسِمُ بِمَوَاقِعِ النُّجُومِ وَإِنَّهُ لَقَسَمٌ لَّو تَعْلَمُونَ عَظِيمٌ** ثم أثنى على المتفكرين فيها **وَيَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ** و ذم المعرضين عن التدبر فيها **وَهُمْ عَنْ آيَاتِهَا مُعْرِضُونَ** وجعلها **سَقْفًا مَحْفُوظًا** و **رَفَعَ سَمَكَهَا** وحفظها من ولوج الشياطين لكونها معبد الملائكة وموضع القدس والطهارة وأهلها أهل التسبيح والتقديس لا يدخل مسجدهم الحرام أرجاس الكفر وأوساخ الشرك من النفوس الخبيثة الشيطانية كما لا يدخل المشركون الأنجاس مساجد الأرض كما قال **إِنَّمَا الْمُشْرِكُونَ نَجَسٌ فَلَا يَقْرَبُوا الْمَسْجِدَ الْحَرَامَ** فانظر إلى ملكوت السماء لترى عجائب العز والجبروت وأطل فكرك في الملك فعسى أن ينفتح لك أبواب السماء فتدخل الجنة وتخرج إلى عالم النور من هذه الهاوية المظلمة فتجول بقلبك في أقطارها إلى أن تقوم بين يدي عرش الرحمن فعند ذلك نرجو لك أن تبلغ رتبة الأقصى - ولا يكون ذلك إلا بعد مجاوزتك عن مراتب العالم الأدنى

ثم الدلائل الدالة على شرف عالم السماء أكثر من أن تحصى

و كذا منافعتها بالقياس إلى الإنسان.

فمنها ما أشار إليه سبحانه من أن خلقها مشتمل على حكم بليغة وغايات صحيحة

بقوله **رَبَّنَا مَا خَلَقْتَ هَذَا بَاطِلًا** وقوله **وَمَا خَلَقْنَا السَّمَاءَ وَالْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا بَاطِلًا ذَلِكَ ظَنُّ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا**

ومنها أن زينها بالمصابيح

لقوله **وَلَقَدْ زَيَّنَّا السَّمَاءَ الدُّنْيَا بِمَصَابِيحَ** وبالقمر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤٢

وَجَعَلَ الْقَمَرَ فِيهِنَّ نُورًا و بالشمس **وَجَعَلَ الشَّمْسُ سِرَاجًا**.

ومنها أن سماها سقفا محفوزا وسبعا طباقا

و سبعا شدادا.

ومنها أن جعلها مصعد الأعمال

و مرتقى الكلمات الطيبات وهي النفوس الكاملة بالعلم والعمل لقوله **مَثَلًا كَلِمَةً طَيِّبَةً كَشَجَرَةٍ طَيِّبَةٍ أَصْلُهَا ثَابِتٌ وَ**

فَرْعُهَا فِي السَّمَاءِ وقوله **إِلَيْهِ يَصْعَدُ الْكَلِمُ الطَّيِّبُ وَالْعَمَلُ الصَّالِحُ يَرْفَعُهُ**.

ومنها أنها قبلة الدعاء ومحل الضياء

و السناء ومنها أهبط الله الأنوار والألوان - إلى عالم الأرض وجعل ألوانها أحسن الألوان وأشكالها أحسن الأشكال و

أصواتها أحسن الأصوات ونعماتها ألد النعمات وجميع كیفياتها أحسن الكيفيات وأمكنها أعلى الأماكن لارتفاعها عن

الأضداد وأمنها من الفساد ومنافع للعباد.

و منها أن جعلها علامات يهتدى بها في ظلمات البر و البحر

و إن قيض للشمس طلوعاً - فسهل معه التقلب لقضاء الأوطار في الأطراف و غرباً يصلح معه الهدوء و القران في الأكفاف - لتحصيل الراحة و انبعاث القوة الهاضمة و تنفيذ الغذاء إلى الأعضاء و للهرب عن الأعداء - كما قال **وَجَعَلْنَا اللَّيْلَ لِبَاسًا وَ جَعَلْنَا النَّهَارَ مَعَاشًا** و قال **وَجَعَلَ اللَّيْلَ سَكَنًا** و أيضاً لو لا طلوع الشمس لانجمدت المياه و غلبت البرودة و الكثافة و أفضت إلى جمود الحرارة الغريزية و انكسارها و لو لا الغروب لحملت الأرض حتى يحترق كل من عليها من حيوان فهو بمنزلة سراج يوضع لأهل بيت بمقدار حاجتهم ثم يرفع عنهم ليستقروا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤٣

و يستريحوا فصار النور و الظلمة على تضادهما متظاهرين على ما فيه صلاح قطان الأرض. قيل و هاهنا نكتة كان الله يقول لو وقعت الشمس في جانب من السماء جنوبي أو شمالي فالغني قد يرفع بناءه على كوة الفقير فلا يصل النور إليه لكني أدير الفلك و أسيرها حتى يجد الفقير نصيبه كما وجد الغني نصيبه و أما ارتفاع الشمس و انحطاطها فقد جعله الله سبباً لإقامة الفصول الأربعة كما مر ففي الشتاء تغور الحرارة في الشجر و النبات فيتولد منه مواد الأغذية و الثمار و تقوى أبدان الحيوانات بسبب احتقاق الحرارة الغريزية في البواطن و في الربيع يتحرك الطباع و يظهر المواد المتولدة في الشتاء و يتنور الشجر و يورق و يزهر و يهيج الحيوان للفساد - و في الصيف يحتدم الهواء فتنضج الثمار و يتحلل فضول الأبدان و يجف وجه الأرض - و يتهيأ للعمارة و الزراعة و في الخريف يظهر البرد و اليبس فيدرك الثمار و تستعد الأبدان قليلاً قليلاً للشتاء و أما القمر فهو تلو الشمس و خليفته و به يعلم عدد السنين و الحساب و يضبط المواعيت الشرعية للصلاة و الصيام و الحج و منه يحصل النماء و الرواء و قد جعل الله في طلوعه و غيبته و تشكلاته البدرية و الهلالية مصلحة كثيرة لا يعلمها إلا هو.

قال الجاحظ إذا تأملت في هذا العالم الذي نحن الآن فيه وجدته كالبيت المعد فيه كل ما يحتاج إليه فالسما مرفوعة كالسقف و الأرض ممدودة كالسطح و النجوم منضودة كالمصابيح و الإنسان كمالك البيت المتصرف فيه و ضروب النبات مهياة لمنافعه و صنوف الحيوان منصرفة في منافعه.

و إني أقول إذا تأملت في عالم السماء بعظمها و كثرة كواكبها وجدت بيتاً معموراً

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من **بُيُوتِ اٰدَمَ اِنَّ اللهَ اَنْ تَرْفَعُ وَ يَذْكُرَ فِيهَا اسْمَهُ** فيها أصناف العابدين فمنهم سجدوا لا يركعون و منهم ركعوا لا ينتصبون و مسبحون لا يسأمون لا يغشاهم نوم العيون و لا فترة الأبدان و لا غفلة النسيان و ليس من شرط الدار أن لا يكون جسمانيا ذات حياة قال تعالى **وَ اِنَّ الدَّارَ الْاٰخِرَةَ لَهِيَ الْحَيَوَانُ** و ليس من شرط عمارة البيت المعمور - أن يكون بالطين و الحجر و الخشب قال تعالى **اِنَّمَا يَعْمُرُ مَسَاجِدَ اللهِ مَنْ اٰمَنَ بِاللهِ وَ الْيَوْمِ الْاٰخِرِ و اَقَامَ الصَّلَاةَ** بل و لا يشترط أن يكون بيت العبادة جسمانيا فكل ما يقوم فيه العبادة و الذكر و التسبيح و التقديس فهو بيت عبادة.

فانظر إلى صنع الباري جل ذكره كيف بنى السماء و جعلها معبداً للملائكة المسيحين المهللين الذاكرين الله و أمسكها من غير عمد ترونها و من غير حبل أو علاقة يتدلى بها - و العجب ممن لا ينظر و لا يتأمل في صنع بيت تولى الله بنيانه

بقدرته و انفرده بعمارتة و زينه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤٥

بأصناف الزينة و صورته بأنواع التصاوير ناسيا ذكر ربه بسبب نسيان نفسه و عدم حضور قلبه مشتغلا ببطنه و فرجه ليس له هم إلا هم شهوته أو حشمته.

و العجب منه أنه متى دخل بيت غني فيراه مروقاً بالصبغ مموها بالذهب - فلا ينقطع تعجبه و لا يزال يصف حسنه و يثني على من صنعه و صورته و تراه غافلاً عن بيت الله العظيم و عن ملائكته الذين هم سكان سماواته فلا يلتفت إليه بقلبه و لا يعرف من السماء إلا بقدر ما يعرف البهيمة أن فوقها سطحاً أو بقدر ما يعرف النملة من سقف بيته - و لا يعرف من ملائكة السماوات و لا من تصاويرها العجيبة إلا بقدر ما يعرف النملة من نفوس سكان البيت و نقوش تصاويرهم في حيطانه فما هذه الغفلة العريضة و ما هذا النوم الغالب على أكثر الناس و السكر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤٦

العظيم و الجهل المفرط و الشقوة المحيطة بهم فهلهم أيها العارف نسيح و نقدر لربنا - فهلهم يا أخا الحقيقة نقوم بالتهليل و التكبير ندعو قيم العالم و ناظم الملك و الملكوت - و رابط الناسوت باللاهوت و صاحب الكبرياء و الجبروت بقلب كئيب حاضر و لسان ذاك و صدر منشراح بنور الذكر و المعرفة و دمع ساكب فبادر يا عارف بروح شيقة و نفس زكية عاشقة لربها راجعة إليه حتى تنادي ربنا نداء خفياً و نتضرع إليه في ظلم الليالي و ندعوه دعاء المحبين المتأوهين و نداء الخاشعين و نتضرع إليه تضرع المشتاقين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤٧

و خضوع المحتاجين المتذللين سبحانه لا إله إلا أنت خلصنا من عذاب نار الفرقة و ألم القطيعة يا محيي الأموات و باعث الأرواح من القبور الدارسات و معطي الخيرات و منزل البركات - أفض على نفوسنا لواضع بركاتك و على أرواحنا سواطع خيراتك يا من إذا تجلى لشيء خضع له يا من رش من نوره على ذوات مظلمة و هياكل غاسقة في ليال مدلهمة - فنورها و صورها و شوقها إلى جماله و ساقها إلى طلب لقائه يا من قذف بشعلة شوقه على السماوات فهيجهها و رقصها و دورها و كل من فيها بالتعشيق و طوفها أسبوعاً في كل سبعة آلاف سنة حول البيت العتيق خلصنا بنورك عن ظلمات القبور و لا تعذب أرواحنا بعلائق أشباح عالم الزور و معدن الغرور و ثبت أقدامنا على المنهج الأبلج القويم و الصراط الحق المستقيم إنك أنت الجواد الكريم و البر الرحيم.

فهذا أنموذج من دقائق عناية الله و لطفه في المخلوقات الظاهرة فإنه لا مطمع لأحد في معرفة دقائق أسرار اللطف و الرحمة في عالم غيبه و ملكوته الأعلى و لا في استقصاء بدائع الصنع و الحكمة في الموجودات التي تلينا في أعمار طويلة لأن علوم العلماء نزر حقير بالقياس إلى ما عرفه الأنبياء و الأولياء ع و ما عرفوه قليل بالإضافة إلى ما عرفه المقربون من الملائكة و العليون من الإنس عند قيامهم عند الله ثم جميع علوم الملائكة و الجن و الإنس إذا أضيف إلى علم الله لم يستحق أن يسمى علماً بل هو إلى أن يسمى دهشاً و حيرة و عجزاً و قصوراً أقرب من أن يسمى معرفة و

حكمة إذ الحكمة بالحقيقة معرفة الأشياء كما هي عليه و قد سبق أن العلم بكل شيء بالذات هو نحو وجوده و لا يحيط بالأشياء إلا مبدعها و موجدتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤٨

فلا حكيم بالحقيقة إلا الله وحده و إطلاق الحكمة و المعرفة على غيره بضرب من المجاز و التشبيه و لهذا خوطب الكل بقوله تعالى **وَمَا أُوتِيتُمْ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ إِلَّا قَلِيلًا**

الفصل (١٦) في إثبات أن جميع الموجودات عاشقة لله سبحانه مشتاقة إلى لقائه و الوصول إلى دار كرامته

اعلم أن الله سبحانه قد قرر لكل موجود من الموجودات العقلية و النفسية و الحسية و الطبيعية كمالاته و ركزنا في ذاته عشقا و شوقا إلى ذلك الكمال و حركة إلى تتميمه فالعشق المجرد عن الشوق يختص بالمفارقات العقلية التي هي بالفعل من جميع الجهات - و غيرها من أعيان الموجودات التي لا تخلو عن فقد كمال و فيها القوة و الاستعداد عشق و شوق إرادي بحسبه أو طبيعي بحسبه على تفاوت درجات كل منهما ثم حركة تناسب ذلك الميل إما نفسانية أو جسمانية و الجسمانية إما كيفية كما في المركبات الطبيعية أو كمية كما في الحيوان و النبات خاصة أو وضعية كما في الأفلاك أو أيئية كما في العناصر.

و البرهان على ذلك

إنك قد علمت أن الوجود كله خير و مؤثر و لذيق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٤٩

و مقابله و هو العدم شر و كره و مهروب عنه و علمت أن الوجود نوع واحد بسيط في ذاته لا اختلاف فيه إلا أن له حدودا و درجات و هي منشأ اختلاف ماهيات الممكنات و أجناسها و فصولها فالوجود في نفسه لا يتفاوت إلا بالأكمل و الأنقص و الأشد و الأضعف و غاية كماله هو الواجب الحق لكونه غير متناهي الشدة في الكمال و لكل واحد من الموجودات المعلولية نصيب من ذلك الكمال فائض منه و له نقص بحسب حده في المعلولية فإن حقيقة الوجود بما هي حقيقة لا يقتضي النقص و لا التناهي و التجدد إذ لو اقتضت ذلك لما كان واجب الوجود غير متناهي القوة و القدرة فقد ثبت أن النقص و التناهي من لوازم المعلولية إذ المعلول لا يمكن أن يساوي علته في رتبة الوجود و إلا لم يكن أحدهما بالعلية أولى من الآخر.

فإذن كل ما لم يكن معلولا لشيء كالواجب تعالى فلا نقص فيه أصلا لكونه محض حقيقة الوجود و الخير فهو أعظم الأشياء بهجة و محبة لذاته و ما يلزم لذاته من الخيرات من حيث هي خيرات و كل ما كانت المعلولية فيه أكثر و الوسائط بينه و بين الحق المحض أكثر فهو أنقص و كل ما هو أقرب منه تعالى فهو أكمل و أتم فإذا ثبت هذا فلا يخلو شيء من الموجودات عن نصيب من المحبة الإلهية و العشق الإلهي و العناية الربانية و لو خلا عن ذلك لحظة لانطمس و هلك فكل واحد عاشق للوجود طالب لكمال الوجود نافر عن العدم و النقص و كلما هو مطلوب فإنما يمكن حفظه و إدامته بما هو تمامه و كماله فالمعلول لا يدوم إلا بعلته لكونها كماله و تمامه و الحرارة لا تنحفظ و لا تدوم إلا بحرارة

أقوى منها و النور لا يكمل إلا بنور أقوى منه و العلم ناقص الظني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٠

لا يتم حتى يصير يقينا دائما لا يزول إلا ببرهان عقلي فكل وجود ناقص لا يصير كاملا إلا بما هو أقوى منه و هو علته و مديم ذاته و محقق هويته فالهيولى لا يتم إلا بصورتها- و الصورة لا تتم إلا بمصورها و الحس لا يتم إلا بالنفس و النفس لا تتم إلا بالعقل و العقل لا يبقى إلا بواجب الوجود فإذن كل ناقص يتنفر عن نقصه و ينزع منه إلى كماله و يتمسك به عند نيله فيكون كل شيء لا محالة عاشقا لكماله مشتاقا إليه عند فقدته فالعشق حاصل للشيء دائما سواء في حال وجود كماله أو في حال فقد ذلك الكمال.

و أما الاشتياق و الميل فإنما يحصلان للشيء حال فقدان الكمال و لذلك كان العشق ساريا في جميع الموجودات و الشوق غير سار في الجميع بل يختص بما يتصور في حقه الفقد و نحن قد بينا مرارا أن الحياة سارية في جميع الموجودات لسريان الوجود فيها لأننا بينا أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة هي عين العلم و القدرة و الحياة و كما لا يتصور موجود بدون طبيعة الوجود مطلقا فكذا لا يتصور موجود لا يكون له علم و فعل - و كل ما يعلم و يفعل بأي وجه كانا فله حياة فالكل إذن حي عند العرفا إلا أن الجمهور إذا أطلق الحيوان فهموا منه ما له حس ظاهرة و حركة إرادية من مكان إلى مكان.

فإذا ثبت أن كل موجود سواء كان بسيطا أو مركبا فله حياة و شعور فلا محالة له عشق و شوق فإذا نظرت في الموجودات و درجاتها في الوجود و تأملتها وجدتها إما كاملة من كل وجه في نفس الأمر أو ناقصة بوجه من الوجوه و الكامل من كل وجه إما أن يكون كماله بنفسه مع قطع النظر عما هو وراءه حتى يكون نفسه و كماله شيئا واحدا من غير تغاير لا في الذات و لا في الاعتبار أو يكون كماله بما وراءه.

فالأول هو الواجب الوجود و الثاني هو الذوات العقلية فهذا النمط من الموجود الكامل بقسميه غير منفك عن العشق و العشق عين ذاته أما الواجب فهو عاشق لذاته فحسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥١

معشوق لذاته و لما سوى ذاته و أما الذوات العقلية فعاشقة له لا لذواتهم إلا من حيث كونها آثارا له تعالى فعشق ذواتهم لذواتهم مستهلك في عشقهم للأول كما أن نور وجودهم مضمحل - مستهلك تحت نور الأحدية فبالحقيقة هناك عشق واحد متصل ذو مراتب بعضها محيط بالبعض و الله من ورائهم محيط.

و أما القسم الثاني فهو إما مكتف بذاته و بعله ذاته في خروجه من حد نقصه إلى كماله أو ليس كذلك.

و الأول هو النفوس الفلكية فهي واجدة للكمال من وجه فاقدة له من وجه فلها العشق و الشوق على الاتصال فلها لذة المواصله و ألم المفارقة و لما لم يكن لذتها يختص بوقت و ألمها بوقت آخر بل لها ألم ممزوج بلذة و لأنه منبعث عن وجد العشق فيكون ألما لذيذا و لذا شبهت الحكماء حال تلك النفوس في أشواقها إلى كمالاتها العقلية- و معاشيقها الروحانية تشبيها بعيدا بحال من به حكمة و دغدغة.

و الثاني إما أن يكون ناقصا من كل جهة أو من جهة دون أخرى و الثاني من الثاني إما أن يكون كماله في أصل الطبيعة

النوعية للجسم من غير فضيلة زائدة عليها- فهو أخس الأنواع الجسمانية كالعناصر الأربعة المتضادة لنقص جوهرها أو يكون كماله بامر زائد على مجرد الطبيعة الجسمية فالقسم الأول لنقص جوهره يتأتى منها التركيب- أو عند التركيب يزول تضادها و يقبل ضربا آخر من الحياة يصدر بسببها حفظ البنية- عن استيلاء أحد الأضداد عليها مدة يعتد بها فإن وقع لصورتها الحافظة عن إفساد الأضداد- الاقتصار على هذه الكمال فهو الجماد وإن كان لها مع ذلك طلب الكمال الشخصي- في النشو و الدوام النوعي في التوليد فهو النبات إن اقتصرت على هذا وإن زاد عليه بإحضار صورة غير مادية في ذاتها و إدخالها منتزعة عن المواد في آلتها و مشاعرها فهو الحيوان فإن الحيوان يتقوى بالإحساس و التخيل كما يتقوى النبات بالتغذي و النشو.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٢

و ظاهر أن كل واحد من هذه الموجودات الناقصة طالبة للكمال الذي يتم به وجوده فالصورة الحافظة للتركيب كمالها في أن تصير ذات قوة تزيد بها في مقدار شخصه بأن يجذب الغذاء و يحيله إلى جوهره المغذي و يلصقه بأجزائه على نسبة لاثقة- و يزيد بها في إعداد نوعه بالتوليد و إذا حصل هذا الكمال و بحسبه درجة من القرب إلى المبدأ المتعال الذي هو الغاية في الفضيلة من كل وجه حاول كمالا أتم من ذلك- و أقرب إلى الكمال الحقيقي من جميع الوجوه و هو كونه ذا صورة حساسة ثم متخيلة ثم ذاكرة ثم عاقلة للأشياء بالملكة بإدراك الأوليات ثم عاقلة لها بالفعل بإدراك الثواني النظريات ثم صائرة عقلا بسيطا فعالا للمعقولات ثم راجعة إلى الله تعالى راضية مرضية- كل ذلك بأشواق متتالية و أذواق متلاحقة كل عشق سابق علة للوصول إلى معشوق لاحق يكون غاية لذلك العشق السابق و هكذا إلى أن يصل إلى معشوق المعاشيق و غاية اللذات و الرغبات و منتهى الحركات.

و الأول من الثاني و هو ما يكون ناقصا من كل جهة كالهوى الجسمانية فإنها في ذاتها قوة كل شيء لا قوام لها إلا بما تحلها من الصور فحقيقتها عين الحاجة و الافتقار- بل عين التشوق إلى كل صورة كمالية بالفعل و الشيخ الرئيس أنكر في طبيعيات الشفا- كونها مشتاقة إلى الصور كما هو المنقول عن المتقدمين غاية الإنكار ثم إنه قد اعترف بذلك في رسالته التي صنفها في العشق و كيفية سريانه في جميع الموجودات لكنه اقتصر في بيان كيفية عشقها بعدم عريها عن جميع الصور و بكونها دائمة التلبس بشيء من الصور و كذا اقتصر في كيفية عشق سائر البسائط العنصرية و المركبات المعدنية بميلها الطبيعي إلى إحياها و في النباتات بما فيها من قوة التغذية و طلب الزيادة في الأقطار و قصد التوليد من غير أن يثبت لها شعورا و حياة.

و أنت تعلم أن إثبات العشق في شيء بدون الحياة و الشعور فيه كان مجرد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٣

التسمية و نحن قد بينا في السفر الأول في مباحث العلة و المعلول عشق الهوى إلى الصورة بوجه قياسي حكمي لا مزيد عليه و قد مر أيضا إثبات الحياة و الشعور في جميع الموجودات و هو العمدة في هذا الباب و لم يتيسر للشيخ الرئيس تحقيقه و لا لأحد ممن تأخر عنه إلى يومنا هذا إلا لأهل الكشف من الصوفية فإنه لاح لهم بضرب من الوجدان و تتبع أنوار الكتاب و السنة أن جميع الأشياء حي ناطق ذاكر لله مسبح ساجد له كما نطق به القرآن في قوله **وإن من**

شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِهِ وَلَكِنْ لَا تَفْقَهُونَ تَسْبِيحَهُمْ و قوله **وَلِلَّهِ يَسْجُدُ مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ** و نحن بحمد الله عرفنا ذلك بالبرهان و الإيمان جميعا و هذا أمر قد اختص بنا بفضل الله و حسن توفيقه فإن الذي بلغ إليه نظر الشيخ و هو من أعظم الفلاسفة في هذه الدورة الإسلامية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٤

في إثبات العشق في البسائط غير الحية عنده ما ذكره في تلك الرسالة بقوله إن البسائط غير الحية ثلاثة أحدها الهيولى الحقيقية و الثاني الصورة التي لا يمكن لها القوام بانفراد ذاتها الثالث الأعراض و الفرق بينها و بين هذه الصورة أن هذه الصورة مقومة للجوهر - و لذلك استحفظ الأوائل من الإلهيين لأن يجعلوها من أقسام الجواهر لكونها جزءا للجواهر القائمة بذاتها و لم يحرموها سمة الجوهرية لأجل امتناع وجودها بمفرد الذات - إذ الجوهر الهيولاني هذا حاله و مع هذا لا يستنكر اعتداده من جملة الجواهر لكونه في ذاته جزءا للجواهر القائمة بذاتها بل و لها أعني الصورة مزية في الجوهرية على الهيولى - إذ هذه صورة بها يقوم الجوهر بالفعل جوهرًا و مهما وجد أوجب وجود جوهر بالفعل و لأجل ذلك قيل إن الصورة جوهر بنوع فعل و أما الهيولى فهي معدودة مما يقبل الجوهرية - بل قوة إذ لا يلزم بوجود كل هيولى جوهر ما وجوده بالفعل و لأجل ذلك قيل إنها جوهر بنوع قوة فقد تقرر من هذا القول حقيقة الصورة و لا يحمل إطلاق هذه الحقيقة على العرض.

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول إن كل واحد من البسائط غير الحية قرين عشق غريزي لا يتخلى عنه البتة و هو سبب له في وجوده و أما الهيولى فلديمومة نزاعها إلى الصورة مفقودة و تنوعها بها موجودة و لذلك تلقاها متى عريت عن صورة بادرت إلى الاستبدال عنها بصورة إشفاقا عن ملازمة العدم المطلق فالهيولى تنفر للعدم فمهما كانت ذات صورة لم يقيم فيها سوى العدم الإضافي و لولاها للابسها العدم المطلق و لا حاجة بنا هاهنا إلى الخوض في لمية ذلك فالهيولى كالمرأة الدميمة المشفقة عن استعلان قبحها فمهما تكشف قناعها غطت دميمتها بالكم فقد تقرر أن في الهيولى عشقا غريزيا و أما الصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٥

فالعشق الغريزي فيها ظاهر لوجهين أحدهما بالجد في ملازمتها موضوعها و منافاتها انسلاخها عنه و الثاني بالجد في مواضعه الطبيعية متى حصلت فيها و حركتها الشوقية متى باينت كصورة الأجسام البسيطة الخمسة و المركبات عن الأربعة و لا صورة ملازمة غير هذه الستة و أما الأعراض فعشقها ظاهر بالجد في ملازمة الموضوع أيضا و ذلك عند تلاحقها لأضدادها في الاستبدال للموضوع فإذن ليس يعرى شيء من هذه البسائط عن عشق غريزي بطباعه انتهى كلامه.

و لا يخفى على أحد من الأذكياء أن كلامه هذا في غاية الضعف و القصور فإن ما ذكره لا يفيد إثبات معنى العشق في هذه البسائط إلا على ضرب من التشبيه.

أما ما ذكره في عشق الهيولى فمجرد تشبيه و تخييل بلا تحصيل و تبديل بعض الألفاظ إلى لفظ يناسب هذه الدعوى كالنزاع و الإشفاق و المبادرة على أن ما ذكره من مبادرة الهيولى إلى الاستبدال عن صورة بصورة أخرى غير صحيح

أصلاً إذ الهوى جوهر قابل لا فعل لها أصلاً وليس من قبلها اقتضاء و طلب إلا القبول و الطاعة و قد أشرنا سابقاً على المنهج الذي سلكناه في إثبات سريان العشق في جميع الموجودات إلى أن الهوى في ذاتها عبارة عن نفس قوة الشوق و العشق و قبولهما لا أنها مشتاقة أو عاشقه بالفعل إلى شيء و إلا لكانت صورة بالفعل لا هوى.

و أما ما ذكره في عشق الصورة من جدها في ملازمة الموضوع و جدها في ملازمة الموضع الطبيعي متى حصلت فيه و حركتها الشوقية إليه متى باينته فليس في ذلك أيضاً ما يدل هذا المطلوب بحسب البيان العلمي إلا إيراد لفظ الجد و الشوق و هو من قبيل المصادرة على المطلوب فإن مجرد القيام بالموضوع لا يدل على العشق له و كذا السكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٦

في الحيز عند الوقوع فيه و الحركة إليه عند الخروج عنه لا يدل على الشوق إليه إلا إذا ثبت أن للطبيعة الجسمانية شعوراً بذاتها و بفعلها و لم يذكر الشيخ في تلك الرسالة و لا في غيرها ما يثبت ضرباً من الشعور فيها و على هذا القياس حال ما ذكره في عشق العرض للموضوع و ادعى فيه الظهور و هو من أخفى الأشياء و لو كان كل ملازمة شيء لشيء عشقاً له إياه لكان جميع لوازم الماهيات و النسب و الإضافات عشاقاً لموصوفاتها و كذا السطوح و الأطراف لمحالها المقدارية و اللازم بديهي البطلان.

و هاهنا دقيقة يجب التنبيه عليها

و هو أن الإلهيين الذين ذهبوا إلى سريان العشق في جميع الموجودات إنما أثبتوا لكل شيء عشقاً و شوقاً إلى ما هو ذاته أو كمال ذاته - لا إلى ما هو أدون منه و انقص إلا على سبيل التبعية أو بالعرض لا بالذات.

فإذن الذي ذكره الشيخ من عشق الصورة لموضوعها أعني المادة ليس بشيء بل الحق أن كل طبيعة أو نفس أو قوة من القوى إذا فعلت شيئاً فليس مقصودها أولاً و بالذات نفس ما يصدر عنها من الأفعال و لا موضوعات تلك الأفعال بل معشوقها و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٧

مقصودها ما هو أجل و أعلى رتبة من أفعالها و موضوعات أفعالها أعني به نفس الغاية أو نفس كونها على الوجه الأكمل فليس مقصود الطبيعة من تحصيل المادة نفس تلك المادة بل جعلها وسيلة إلى تحصيل كمال آخر إذ الطبيعة نفسها كمال للمادة لا المادة كمال لها فإنما تحصل الطبيعة المادة و تقومها لأن تبلغ بها إلى كمال فوق كماله و كذا النفس لا تدبر البدن و لا تنشئ الآلات البدنية عشقاً للبدن و الآلات و إنما تفعل ذلك عشقاً لذاتها و تشوقاً إلى نيل كمالها.

و بالجملة من سلك مسلك العرفاء الإلهيين في هذا المقام ينبغي له أن يرتب عشق الموجودات على ترتيب و نظام يؤدي و ينساق كل عشق للسافل إلى عشق للعالي على الوجه الأتم الأكمل و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى عشق واجب الوجود حتى يلزم أن جميع الأشياء عاشقة له مشتاقة إلى لقائه و كذا لا بد أن يكون كل عشق للعالي عشقاً للسافل لا على سبيل القصد و الاستكمال بل على سبيل التطفل و الاستجرار و الترشح.

فإذن لما كان تمام الجسم بالطبيعة فلا جرم يعشق تمامه الذي هو الطبيعة و تمام الطبيعة بالنفس المدبرة لها فلا جرم

يعشقها و تمام النفس بالعقل فتعشقه و تمام العقل بل تمام الكل بالواجب تعالى فيعشقه العقل و يتم به الكل بل هو الكل في وحدة و هو مبتهج بذاته لا بغيره إذ لا غير و لا ند و لا شريك له و هو العزيز القهار و هو القاهر فوق عباده و الله من ورائهم محيط فينطوي في عشقه لذاته عشقه لجميع الأشياء كما ينطوي في علمه بذاته علمه بجميع الأشياء و قد مر في مباحث العلم كيفية هذا الانطواء - على وجه لا يؤدي إلى انثلام في وحدته الحقبة فجميع الأجرام العلوية و السفلية منطوية - تحت شوق النفوس إلى ذواتها و إلى ذوات كمالاتها العقلية و كذا شوق النفوس إلى ذواتها و كمالاتها منطو تحت عشق العقول لمبداها الأعلى و عشق العقول لمبداها الأعلى منطو تحت بهاء النور الأول و الخير الأتم و الجمال الأعظم و الجلال الأرفع لأنه مرجع الكل و غاية الكل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٨

الفصل (١٧) في بيان طريق آخر في سريان معنى العشق في كل الأشياء

اعلم أن قدماء الفلاسفة ذكروا وجهاً آخر لمياً عاماً في هذا المطلب فقالوا إن جميع الهويات و الموجودات كما لم يكن وجودها من ذاتها بل من عللها الفياضة - فكذا كمالاتها مستفادة من تلك العلل و لما لم يكن تلك العلل قاصدة لإيجاد شيء من معلولاتها و لشيء من كمالاتها و لا التفات للعالي بالنسبة إلى السافل و لا بالنسبة إلى كماله فوجب في الحكمة الإلهية و العناية الربانية و حسن التدبير و جودة النظام أن يكون في كل موجود عشق ليكون بذلك العشق حافظاً لما حصل له من الكمالات اللاتقة و مشتاقاً إلى تحصيلها عند فقدانها فيكون ذلك سبباً للنظام الكلي و حسن الترتيب في التدبير الجزئي و هذا العشق الموجود في كل واحد من أعيان الموجودات يجب أن يكون لازماً لها غير مفارق عنها إذ لو جازت مفارقتها عنها لافتقرت إلى عشق آخر ليكون حافظاً للعشق الأول الذي - فرض أن به ينحفظ كمال وجودها عند وجوده و مسترداً له عند عدمه و ذلك العشق إن لم يكن لازماً فيحتاج إلى عشق آخر و يتسلسل و إن كان لازماً فيصير أحد العشقين معطلاً و ذلك محال فعلم أن العشق سار في جميع الموجودات و أجزائها.

هذا ما قالوه و هو جيد إلا أن الذي أشرنا إليه أجود و أحكم و اللمية فيه أتم فإننا قد أشرنا إلى أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة في الكل متفاوتة بالآتم و الأنقص و أن المعلوم من سنخ حقيقة العلة و العلة تمام المعلوم و قد ثبت أيضاً أن الوجود خير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٥٩

لذيذ فكل واحد يعشق ذاته و كمال ذاته لكن كمال ذاته يتم بعلته و إذا كان كمال ذاته يتم بما هو بعينه علته و مفيض وجوده فإذا العلة المفيدة و إن لم تكن قاصدة لمعلولها و لا ملتفتة أيضاً لمعلولها لعلو ذاتها عن ذات المعلوم لكنها لا محالة عاشقة لنفسها مريدة لذاتها و ذاتها بعينها هي كمال المعلوم و تمامه و المعلوم من لوازم هذه التمامية التي هي بعينها ذات العلة فلاجل ذلك - ينحفظ كل معلول بعشق علته و ينتظم كل سافل بعشق ما فوقه فلو لم يكن بين العالي و السافل هذا النحو من الارتباط لم ينحفظ الموجودات و لم يبق النظام على هذه النحو من التمام بل يختل النظام و يتطرق الفساد و الهرج و المرج فثبت أنه لم يكف لنظام العالم مجرد عشق كل واحد لذاته و لا أيضاً كفى للنظام عشقه لكمال ذاته لو لم يكن ذلك الكمال بوجود علته حتى يكون عشقه لكمال ذاته و تمامه بعينه عشقاً لعلته المفضضة لذاته و أيضاً الشيء لا يجوز أن يكون حافظاً لنفسه كما لا يجوز أن يكون موجداً لنفسه و إلا لزم تقدمه على نفسه - إذ لا

معنى للحفظ إلا الإدامة و الإبقاء و الشيء الممكن كما يفتقر في حدوثه إلى علة هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٠

غيره كذلك يفتقر في بقاءه إلى علة هي غير ذاته فلا معنى لكون الشيء حافظا لكماله - بل الأمر بالعكس أولى لأن كمال كل شيء بما هو مقوم ذاته و محصل مادته و متنوع جنسه.

فعلم من جميع ذلك أن العشق الحافظ لكل معلول هو عشقه لعلته الذي هو عبارة عن انتساب وجوده إليها و ارتباطه بها فبهذا الانتساب أعني الوجود الانتسابي - ينحفظ هوية المعلول و يتم بقاءه بمفيد وجوده و مكمل ذاته و هذا معنى قولهم لو لا عشق العالي لانطمس السافل.

و علم بما قررنا أن العشق سار في جميع الموجودات على ترتيب وجودها فكما أنه نشأ من كل وجود أقوى وجود أضعف حتى انتهى إلى وجود المواد و الأجسام فكذا ينشأ من كل عشق أسفل عشق أعلى حتى ينتهي إلى عشق واجب الوجود فجميع الموجودات بحسب ما لها من الكمالات اللاتقة طالبة لكمالات واجب الوجود لذاته متشبهة به في تحصيل ذلك الكمال فالباري تقدست أسماؤه هو غاية جميع الموجودات و نهاية مراتبها - فالعشق و الشوق سبب وجود الموجودات على كمالاتها الممكنة لها و سبب دوامها - و لو لا العشق و الشوق ما أمكن حدوث حادث للعالم الجسماني و لا تكون متكون في عالم الكون و الفساد

الفصل (١٨) في بيان أن المعشوق الحقيقي لجميع الموجودات و إن كان شيئاً واحداً في المال

و هو نيل الخير المطلق و الجمال الأكمل إلا أن لكل واحد من أصناف الموجودات معشوقاً خاصاً قريباً يتوسل بعشقه إلى ذلك المعشوق العام قد أوضحنا فيما سبق أن جميع الموجودات متوجهة إلى طلب الحق الأول توجهها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦١

غريزيا على ترتيب و نظام فهي عاشقة للوصول إليه و لنيل ذاته على الترتيب من الأدنى إلى الأعلى و من أخس الأحوال إلى أشرفها و كما أن جميع الموجودات طالبة للخير المطلق عاشقة للموجود الحق على الترتيب فكذلك الخير المطلق و المعشوق الحق متجل لعشاقه إلا عن قبولها لتجليه و نيلها لنور جماله على التفاوت و إن غاية التقرب منه هو قبول تجليه الحقيقي بلا متوسط كمرآة يتجلى فيه صورة الشخص المطلوب - بلا توسط مرآة آخر و هذا حال المعلول الأول و العقل الكلي و أما ما نال غيره من ذلك الجمال - فهو بمنزلة من يرى صورة معشوقه بتوسط مرآة واحدة أو مرآتي متعددة غير مرآة بصره - و لكن مع ذلك ما وقع التجلي إلا لذلك المعشوق الحقيقي لا للمرآة إذ المرآة عدمية لا صورة لها و ليست الصورة إلا للشخص فما وقع التجلي إلا من الشخص و إن تعددت المرآة - إلا أن تعدد المرآة و كثرة الوسائط القابلة يؤثر في خفاء الصورة و قلة ظهورها و ضعف تأثير القابل عن إشراق نورها و هكذا حال الممكنات في قبولها لتجلي الحق الأول - و استفادتها عن نور جمال الله و شروق جلاله إذ ليس لغيره تأثير و لا لشيء عن غيره تأثير و ما أمره إلا واحد و ليس فعله إلا متشابه و لا تجليه إلا تجل واحد لكل قبول البعض لأثر تجليه أقوى من بعض آخر لضرورة الترتيب بين الأشياء في القرب و البعد منه تعالى فالأقرب يستضيء بنور تجليه أقوى و أتم مما يستضيء به الأبعد - قال الشيخ الرئيس في تلك الرسالة العشقية إن كل منفعل ينفع عن فاعله - بتوسط مثال يقع من الفاعل فيه و كل فاعل

إنما يفعل في قابل الانفعال عنه بتوسط مثال واقع منه فيه و بين ذلك بالاستقراء فقال فإن الحرارة النارية إنما تفعل في جرم من الأجرام بأن تضع فيه مثالها و هو السخونة و كذلك سائر القوى من الكيفيات و النفس الناطقة إنما تفعل في نفس ناطقة مثلها بأن تضع فيها مثالها إلى آخر كلامه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٢

أقول و كان الشيخ لم يظفر بالبرهان الذي أشرنا إليه في بيان هذا المطلب - حيث اكتفى في بيانه بالاستقراء ثم قال إن العقل الفعال يقبل التجلي بغير توسط و هو بإدراكه لذاته و لسائر المعقولات فيه عن ذاته بالفعل و الثبات و ذلك أن الأشياء التي تتصور المعقولات بلا رؤية و لا استعانة بحس أو تخيل إنما تعقل الأمور المتأخرة بالمتقدمة و المعلومات بالعلل و الردية بالشريفة ثم يناله النفوس الإلهية بلا توسط أيضا عند النيل و إن كان بتوسط إعانة العقل الفعال عند الإخراج من القوة إلى الفعل و إعطائه القوة على التصور و الإمساك للمتصور و الطمأنينة إليه ثم ينالها القوة الحيوانية ثم النباتية ثم الطبيعية و كل واحدة مما يناله يشوقه ما ناله منه إلى التشبه به بغايته فإن الأجرام الطبيعية إنما يتحرك حركاتها الطبيعية تشبهاً به في غايتها و هي البقاء على بعض الأحوال أعني عند حصولها في المواضع الطبيعية و إن لم تتشبه به في مبادي هذه الغاية و هي الحركة - و كذلك الجواهر الحيوانية و النباتية إنما تفعل أفعالها الخاصة بها تشبهاً به في غايتها - و هو إبقاء نوع أو شخص أو إظهار قوة و مقدرة و ما ضاهاها و إن لم يتشبه به في مبادي هذه الغايات كالجماع و كالتغذي و كذلك النفوس البشرية إنما تفعل أفعالها العقلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٣

و أعمالها الخيرية تشبهاً به في غاياتها و هي كونها عاقلة عادلة و إن لم تكن متشبهة به - في مبادي هذه الغايات كالتعلم و ما شاكله و النفوس الإلهية إنما تحرك تحركاتها - و تفعل أفعالها تشبهاً به أيضا في استبقاء الكون و الفساد و الحرث و النسل و العلة في كون القوى الحيوانية و النباتية متشبهة به في غايات أفعالها دون مباديها لأن مباديها إنما هي أحوال استعدادية قوية و الخير المطلق منزّه عن مخالطة الأحوال الاستعدادية القوية و غاياتها كمالات فعلية و العلة الأولى هو الموصوف بالكمال الفعلي المطلق فجاز أن يتشبه به في الكمالات الغائية و امتنع أن يتشبه به في الاستعدادات المبدئية انتهى كلامه.

تذكرة

إن الحكمة الإلهية و العناية الربانية قد ربطت أطراف الموجودات بعضها ببعض ربطاً حكيماً و نظمها نظماً عقلياً تأخدياً كما أوضحنا سبيله من أن الموجودات لما كان بعضها معلولات و منها أولاً و منها ثواني فارتكزت في جلبة المعلومات نزوع نحو علاتها و اشتياق إليها و جعلت في جلبة علاتها رافة و عطوفة على معلولاتها كما يوجد ذلك في الآباء و الأمهات على الأولاد و من الكبار على الصغار و من الأقوياء على الضعفاء - و ذلك لشدة حاجة الضعفاء إلى معاونة الأقوياء و السر في ذلك ما أشرنا إليه من أن الجنس يحن على الجنس و أن المعلول كأنه جزء من علته و أن العلة كأنها تمام لمعلولها - و هكذا حال كل محتاج و محتاج إليه فالفقير يتشبث بالغني و يشفق إليه و الغني يرحمه و يوجد من فضله عليه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٤

و اعلم أن العشق أقسام و المحبة متشعبة

و المحبوبات كثيرة لا تحصى حسب تكثر الأنواع و الأشخاص.

فمن أنواع المحبة محبة النفوس الحيوانية للنكاح و السفاد

لما فيه من حكمة بقاء النسل و حفظ النوع.

و منها محبة الرؤساء للرئاسات

و حرصهم على طلبها و مراعاتهم لرسومها و محافظتهم عليها كأنها شيء مجبول في طباعهم مركوز في نفوسهم و الحكمة فيها طلب الاستعلاء للنفس على قواها التي تحت تسخيرها فإن الأفعال الاختيارية بمنزلة تقليد الأفعال الطبيعية - و الفاعل بالصناعة يحتذي في صنعته للفاعل بالغريزة و لهذا قيل الصناعة تشبه بالطبيعة - فلو لم يكن محبة العلو و الرفعة مرتكزة في جبلة النفوس لما أحب أكثر الناس كونه رئيسا مطاعا في قومه و لما كان شديد الحرص في ذلك.

و منها محبة التجار و الممولين

لكسب المال و حرصهم على الجمع و الادخار و حفظ النقود و الأمتعة و اختزانها كأنه شيء مجبول في طبائعهم مركوز في نفوسهم لما فيه من الصلاح لغيرهم و من يأتي بعدهم.

و منها محبة العلماء و الحكماء لاستخراج العلوم و تدوينها

في الكتب و نشرها و البحث عن غوامضها و كشف أسرارها و تعليمها للمتعلمين و إظهارها على المستعدين - كأنه شيء مجبول في طباعهم مركوز في نفوسهم لما فيه من إحياء النفوس و بعثها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٥

من موت الجهالة و قبر الطبيعة و تنبيهها من رقدة الغفلة و نوم النسيان.

و منها محبة الصناعات في إظهار صنائعهم

و حرصهم على تميمها و شوقهم إلى تحسينها و تزيينها كأنه شيء غريزي لهم لما فيه من مصلحة الخلق و انتظام أحوالهم.

و اعلم أن النفوس كلما كانت أشرف و أعلى كانت محبوباتها و مرغوباتها الطف و أصفى

و أزين و أبهى و الذي ينبهك على هذا الأمر أن القوى النباتية رؤوسها ثلاثة أحدها قوة التغذية و الثاني قوة التنمية و الثالث قوة التوليد فكذا العشق الخاص بالقوى النباتية على أقسام ثلاثة أحدها يختص بالقوة المغذية و هو مبدأ شوقها إلى حضور الغذاء - عند حاجة المادة إليه و بقائه في المتغذى بعد استحالته إلى طبيعته و الثاني يختص بالقوة المنمية و هو مبدأ شوقها إلى تحصيل الزيادة الطبيعية المتناسبة في أقطار المتغذى - و الثالث يختص بالقوة المولدة و هو مبدأ شوقها إلى تهيئة مبدأ الكائن مثل الذي هو فيه من نوعه.

و من البين أن هذه الأفعال الصادرة عن قوى النفس النباتية ليست صادرة عن مجرد اتفاق أو جزاف بل هي لغايات و

أغراض ملائمة لها وخيرات موافقة لطبائعها وكل من تأمل فيها يعلم أنها صادرة عن ميول وقصود فيها فهي إذن عاشقة لتلك الغايات وهي متممة لمبادئها ومكملة لها ومخرجة إياها عن النقص إلى الكمال وعن القوة إلى الفعل. ثم إذا نظرت إلى قوى الحيوان الذي نفسه أشرف من نفس النبات وجدتها تصدر عن بعض قواها الشهوانية وهي الثلاث النباتية من قوة التغذية وقوة التنمية وقوة التوليد- ما يصدر عن تلك القوى الثلاث التي تكون في النبات لكن على وجه اللطف وأبهى - وذلك لأن القوة الشهوانية الحيوانية أظهر الموجودات عند الجمهور عشقا وشوقا وليس معشوق هذه القوة في عامة الحيوان ما سوى الناطق إلا معشوق القوى النباتية بعينها إلا أن عشق القوة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٦

النباتية لا يصدر عنها الأفاعيل إلا بنوع طبيعي و بنوع أدنى و أدون و أما عشق القوة الحيوانية- فإنما يصدر عنه الأكل و الجماع و التوليد على نحو الإرادة و الاختيار و بنوع أعلى و اللطف و مأخذ أحسن و أفضل و لذة أتم و شوق أكمل و باستعمال من الحس و إعانة من التخيل - و لا شبهة في أن فعل التخيل أفضل من فعل الحس و فعل الحس أفضل من فعل الطبيعة فإن قوة الخيال ينال صورة ما يعيشه مجردة عن هذا العالم الظلماني صافية عن كدوراتها آمنة عن الفساد و العدم ما دام يحفظها الخيال و يلتفت إليها فإذا ذهلت عنها بسبب شاغل من خارج أو داخل غابت و زالت لا على نحو الفساد و كذا قوة الحس تنال صورة المحسوسة المعشوقة لها منتزعة عن المادة إلا أنه يشترط فيها حضور المادة بوضعها و أما الطبيعة فلكونها مستغرقة في بحر الهوى لا يمكنها تجريد معشوقها عن المادة بوجه من الوجوه و إحضاره عند ذاتها إلا مخلوطة بالأغشية الظلمانية و الأعدام الهيولانية المغرقة لذاتها و لذات ما يناله من الأغذية و غيرها.

ثم الحيوان غير الناطق و إن كانت أفاعيله أفضل و أحسن من أفاعيل النبات - و معشوقاته أنور و أشرف من معشوقات النبات مع كونها مشتركة بينهما فيما يتعلق بالشهوة دون الغضب كما علمت إلا أنه لانحطاط رتبته عن رتبة الحيوان العاقل و عدم فوزه بالقوة النطقية التي يقع بها الاطلاع على الأمور الكلية و الغايات العقلية لا يسعد بإدراك الغرض العقلي و الخير الحقيقي و الغاية الكلية في فعل من الأفعال بل شوقه مقصور على نيل الأمور الجزئية و اللذات الفانية لذلك صارت فيه قوته الشهوانية- مشاكلة للقوة النباتية في اقتصاره على هذه الغرض الشخصي و العشق الجزئي.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٧

و أما الذي يترتب على أفعاله و شهواته من تبعية الأشخاص و أداته الأنواع و إصلاح النظام فذلك أمر يصدر من فاعل أجل و أعلى لغاية أرفع و أبهى و ينوط بعناية الله و ملائكته المدبرين لأمور الخلائق على أحكم ترتيب و أجود نظام. و أما إذا انضمت إلى كل واحدة من القوى الحيوانية قوة أعلى منها في الشرف - فازت بانضمام تلك القوة الشريفة إليها بزيادة حسن و بهاء و زينة حتى يصير بذلك أفعالها البارزة عنها أدوم غاية و أحكم منفعة و أرفع منزلة على ما يكون لها بانفرادها و أكثر آثارا إما بالعدد أو بالقوة و الشدة و بحسن الاتفاق و لطف المأخذ و سهولة التوخي في الانتهاء إلى الغرض إذ كل واحد من عاليها لها قوة على تأييد السافل و تقويته و تهذيبه عن الشرور و المفسدات و دفع ضرر المضادات فيقبل الأدنى من الأعلى زيادة كمال و رونق.

و كذلك تصريفات الأعالي للأسافل واستخدامها إياها في وجوه الأغراض مما يفيدها الحسن و السناء و الزينة و البهاء كتأييد القوة الشهوانية من الحيوان القوة النباتية و ذب الغضبية الحيوانية عنها من أن ينقص مادتها دون البلوغ إلى متنهاها في الذبول و الاستضرار و كتوفيق القوة النطقية للحيوانية في مقاصدها و كإفادتها لها اللطافة و البهاء في الاستعانة بها في أغراضها و لأجل ذلك ما توجد القوة الحسية و الشوقية - التي في الإنسان بحيث قد يتعدى طورها في أفعالها عن مسلك البهيمية إلى شبه طور الملائكة العلوية و قد يتعاطى في أفاعيلها أغراضا و دواعي لا يتعاطاها إلا صريح القوة العقلية.

مثال ذلك ما يشاهد من الإنسان أنه قد يصدر عن مفرد نفسه الحيوانية أفعال و انفعالات كالإحساس و التخيل و الأكل و الجماع و المحاربة مع الأعداء كل ذلك بنوع أخس و أدنى إذا لم يقع تحت تدبير النفس الشريفة العقلية كما هو شأن أراذل الناس و أدانيهم الذين هم قريب الشبه بالبهائم و السباع و أما إذا اكتسبت بمجاورة النفس النطقية من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٨

البهاء و النور و اللطف فيصدر عنها هذه الأفاعيل بنوع أحكم و أتم و أشرف و أعلى فيستأثر الإنسان العقلي من المحسوسات ما كان على أشرف مزاج و أعدل تركيب قاصدا بذلك تقوية للبدن في فعل الطاعات الإلهية و إبقاء للشخص في طلب الخيرات و اقتناء الفضائل - و كذلك يتصرف بقوته المتخيلة في أمور لطيفة نافعة في العاقبة حتى يكاد يضاهي بذلك - ما يقتضيه صريح العقل و العرفان و يحتال في استعمال القوة الغضبية حيلة يسهل معها الظفر بالمللوب و الغلبة على العدد.

و قد يظهر أيضا عن جوهر ذاته آثار و أفعال بعضها بحسب اشتراك من النطقية و الحيوانية كتصريف قوته العقلية قوته الفكرية في الاستنباطات الدقيقة و طلب الحدود الوسطى و المبادي البرهانية و الحدية و كتصريفها لقوة الحسية لينتزع من الماديات صورها المحسوسة الجزئية حتى ينتزع بطريقة الاستقراء لتلك الجزئيات الشخصية أمورا كلية و صورها عقلية بالقوة المتخيلة حتى يتوصل من أوائل المعقولات إلى ثوانيتها و ينال غرضه من إدراك الحقائق العقلية و أصول الموجودات الخارجية و المبادي القدسية و عرفان ما هو مبدأ المبادي و مرجع كل شيء و كتكليفه القوة الشهوانية المباشرة و المجامعة لأجل مجرد اللذة و نيل الشهوة الحيوانية - بل للتشبه بالعلة الأولى في استبقاء الحرث و النسل و حفظ الأنواع و خصوصا أفضلها أعني النوع الإنساني الذي هو ثمرة عالم الخلق و التركيب و زبدة المواد و الأجساد - و كتكليفه إياها تناول الأغذية لا كيف اتفق بل على الوجه الأصوب من القصد إلى نيل اللذة و لكن كعلف الدابة المركوبة و إعانة الطبيعة المسخرة للنفس الحاملة لأثقالها - و أحمالها في سفر الآخرة و المهاجرة إلى الله و كتكليفه القوة الغضبية منازعة الأبطال - و مباشرة القتال و مقاومة الرجال لأجل الذب عن مدينة فاضلة و أمة صالحة.

و قد يصدر منه أفاعيل عن صميم قوته العقلية مثل تصور المعقولات و الاتصال - بالملأ الأعلى و حب الموت و الاشتياق إلى الدار الآخرة و قرع باب الرضوان و مجاورة الرحمن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٦٩

الفصل (١٩) في التنبيه على إثبات الصور المفارقة التي هي مثل الأصنام الحيوانية و النباتية و مدبراتها

الكلية من هذا المآخذ

اعلم أنك إذا تدبرت في مراتب الإنسان و ترقياته من حدود النفوس النباتية و الحيوانية - إلى حد النفس النطقية و إلى تفاوت أفراد البشر في أغراضهم حيث إن بعض الناس لا يفعل فعل الشهوة و الغضب و لا غرض له في ذلك إلا لذة الأكل و الشرب و النكاح و لذة الغلبة على العدو و الظفر على مجرد الانتقام و التشفي عن الغيظ و الحقد من غير أن يلحظ في جميع ذلك - مصلحة حكمية و غاية عقلية مع أنه معلوم عند الحكماء بالنظر العقلي و النهج البرهاني - أن الغرض الأصلي من العناية الربانية في خلق هذه القوى النباتية و المشاعر الحيوانية - ليس مقصورا على مجرد ما انتهت إليه حركاتها و حصلت به أغراضها الجزئية بل لتأديتها إلى أغراض أخرى أرفع من تلك الأغراض و هي بقاء الأنواع و حصول النظام على وجه التمام و الانتهاء إلى الخير الأقصى و الملكوت الأعلى كما يقصده الإنسان الكامل لعلو نفسه الناطقة ثم إذا نظرت إلى أفاعيل الطبائع الجمادية و النباتية و جدتها مؤدية - إلى حسن النظام و مصلحة الكل مع عدم شعورها بذلك لكون درجتها أدون من درجة الحيوانات التي ليس قصدها في صدور الأفاعيل منها إلا تحصيل ما يلائم شهواتها الجزئية - فعلم من هذا النظر الدقيق أن لكل من تلك الطبائع الجسمانية مدبرا آخر فوق طبائعها العديمة الشعور بما يترتب على أفاعيلها من مصلحة النظام و فوق النفوس الحيوانية الجزئية التي لا شعور لها إلا بما يلائم هوياتها الجزئية و لذاتها المستحيلة الزائلة فهي لا محالة مدبرات عقلية و محركات قدسية لأغراض علوية ففعل الإنسان الكامل بقوة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٠

نفسه العالية الشريفة في تدبير البدن و تحريك القوى الطبيعية و النفسانية مضاه لفعل تلك المدبرات العقلية في تحريكات تلك الطبائع الجسمانية إلى أماكنها المخصصة عند الخروج عنها و تسكيناتها في تلك الأحياء عند الوقوع فيها و كذلك في سائر أفاعيلها المخصصة من تسخين النار و تبريد الماء و تغذية الأشجار و نشوها و توليدها للأمثال - و ما يجري مجرى هذه الأفعال الصادرة عن الطبائع المؤدية إلى الخيرات العظيمة و المنافع الكلية فكما أن الإنسان إذا ساعده التوفيق يتدرج من أدنى القوى و أغراضها إلى أشرف القوى على الترتيب الطبيعي حيث إذا استوفى كمال كل قوة أدنى بلغ به إلى الفوز بنيل كمال آخر لقوة أعلى **وهكذا** يترقى من قوة إلى قوة و من غرض إلى غرض حتى ينتهي إلى الجوهر العقلي الإلهي الذي فاز بنيل الغرض الكلي و السرور العلوي و البهجة العظمى لإحاطته بأجزاء العالم و مبادئها و غاياتها علما و عملا على حسب طاقته فهكذا حال العالم الكبير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧١

في اشتماله على أجزاء مترتبة بعضها طبيعية على مراتبها و بعضها نفسانية على درجاتها و بعضها عقلية على طبقاتها و كما أنها مترتبة في الذوات و الجواهر بالشرف و الفضيلة - بعضها أشرف و أفضل و بعضها أدون و أخس فكذلك مترتبة في اللذة و البهجة فلذة بعضها عقلية و بعضها حيوانية خيالية و بعضها حيوانية حسية و بعضها من باب الميل الطبيعي - فمحبوبات الجواهر متفننة إلا أنها مترتبة فادناها ما للطبائع السارية في الأجسام و أعلاها ما للملائكة المقربين و العشاق الإلهيين في ملاحظتهم لأنوار جمال الله و جلاله و قد أقمنا البراهين على تجدد الطبائع الجسمانية و حركاتها الجوهرية و

أن جميع هذه الطبائع متحركة نحو المبدأ الأعلى مرتقية من مهبط الجسمية إلى العالم العقلي والمنزل العلوي على التدرج كالإنسان الذي يتدرج في حركته الجوهرية من أدون المنازل إلى أعلاها- ومن حد النطفة إلى حد العقل الكامل في مدة العمر و للعالم عمر طبيعي كما للإنسان و عمره الطبيعي على نحو من خمسين ألف سنة كما نطق به التنزيل من

قوله تعالى **تَعْرُجُ الْمَلَائِكَةُ وَالرُّوحُ إِلَيْهِ فِي يَوْمٍ كَانَ مِقْدَارُهُ خَمْسِينَ أَلْفَ سَنَةٍ**

الفصل (٢٠) في ذكر عشق الظرفاء و الفتیان للأوجه الحسان

اعلم أنه اختلف آراء الحكماء في هذا العشق

و ماهيته و أنه حسن أو قبيح محمود أو مذموم-

فمنهم من ذمه و ذكر أنه رذيلة

و ذكر مساويه و قال إنه من فعل البطالين و المعطلين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٢

و منهم من قال إنه فضيلة نفسانية

و مدحة و ذكر محاسن أهله و شرف غايته-

و منهم من لم يقف على ماهيته

و علله و أسباب معانيه و غايته-

و منهم من زعم

أنه مرض نفساني

و منهم من قال إنه

جنون إلهي.

و الذي يدل عليه النظر الدقيق

و المنهج الأنيق و ملاحظة الأمور عن أسبابها الكلية و مبادئها العالية و غاياتها الحكمية أن هذا العشق أعني الالتذاذ الشديد بحسن الصورة الجميلة و المحبة المفرطة لمن وجد فيه السمائل اللطيفة و تناسب الأعضاء و جودة التركيب لما كان موجودا على نحو وجود الأمور الطبيعية في نفوس أكثر الأمم من غير تكلف و تصنع فهو لا محالة من جملة الأوضاع الإلهية التي يترتب عليها المصالح و الحكم فلا بد أن يكون مستحسنا محمودا سيما و قد وقع من مباد فاضلة لأجل غايات شريفة.

أما المبادي فلأننا نجد أكثر نفوس الأمم التي لها تعليم العلوم و الصنائع اللطيفة- و الآداب و الرياضيات مثل أهل الفارس و أهل العراق و أهل الشام و الروم و كل قوم فيهم العلوم الدقيقة و الصنائع اللطيفة و الآداب الحسنة غير خالية عن هذا العشق اللطيف- الذي منشؤه استحسان سمائل المحبوب و نحن لم نجد أحدا ممن له قلب لطيف و طبع دقيق و ذهن صاف و نفس رحيمة خاليا عن هذه المحبة في أوقات عمره.

و لكن وجدنا سائر النفوس الغليظة و القلوب القاسية و الطبائع الجافية من الأكراد و الأعراب و الترك و الزنج خالية عن هذا النوع من المحبة و إنما اقتصر أكثرهم على محبة الرجال للنساء و محبة النساء للرجال طلبا للنكاح و السفاد كما في

طباع سائر الحيوانات المرتكزة فيها حب الازدواج و السفاد و الغرض منها في الطبيعة إبقاء النسل و حفظ الصور في هيولياتها بالجنس و النوع إذ كانت الأشخاص دائمة السيلا و الاستحالة.

و أما الغاية في هذا العشق الموجود في الظرفاء و ذوي لطافة الطبع - فلما ترتب عليه من تأديب الغلمان و تربية الصبيان و تهذيبهم و تعليمهم العلوم الجزئية - كالنحو و اللغة و البيان و الهندسة و غيرها و الصنائع الدقيقة و الآداب الحميدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٣

و الأشعار اللطيفة الموزونة و النعمات الطيبة و تعليمهم القصص و الأخبار و الحكايات الغريبة و الأحاديث المروية إلى غير ذلك من الكمالات النفسانية فإن الأطفال و الصبيان - إذا استغنوا عن تربية الآباء و الأمهات فهم بعد محتاجون إلى تعليم الأستاذين و المعلمين - و حسن توجههم و التفاتهم إليهم بنظر الإشفاق و التعطف فمن أحل ذلك أوجدت العناية الربانية في نفوس الرجال البالغين رغبة في الصبيان و تعشقا و محبة للغلمان الحسان الوجوه - ليكون ذلك داعيا لهم إلى تأديبهم و تهذيبهم و تكميل نفوسهم الناقصة و تبليغهم إلى الغايات المقصودة في إيجاد نفوسهم و إلا لما خلق الله هذه الرغبة و المحبة في أكثر الظرفاء و العلماء عبثا و هباء فلا بد في ارتكاز هذا العشق النفساني في النفوس اللطيفة و القلوب الرقيقة غير القاسية و لا الجافية من فائدة حكومية و غاية صحيحة.

و نحن نشاهد ترتب هذه الغايات التي ذكرناها فلا محالة يكون وجود هذا العشق في الإنسان معدودا من جملة الفضائل و المحسنات لا من جملة الرذائل و السيئات و لعمرى إن هذا العشق يترك النفس فارغة عن جميع الهموم الدنياوية إلا هم واحد فمن حيث يجعل الهموم هما واحدا هو الاشتياق إلى رؤية جمال إنساني فيه كثر من آثار جمال الله و جلاله حيث أشار إليه بقوله **لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ** و قوله - **ثُمَّ أَنْشَأْنَاهُ خَلْقًا آخَرَ فَتَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ الْخَالِقِينَ** سواء كان المراد من الخلق الآخر - الصور الظاهرة الكاملة أو النفس الناطقة لأن الظاهر عنوان الباطن و الصورة مثال الحقيقة - و البدن بما فيه مطابق للنفس و صفاتها و المجاز قنطرة الحقيقة.

و لأجل ذلك هذا العشق النفساني للشخص الإنساني إذا لم يكن مبدؤه إفراط الشهوة الحيوانية بل استحسان شمائل المعشوق و جودة تركيبه و اعتدال مزاجه و حسن أخلاقه و تناسب حركاته و أفعاله و غنجه و دلالة معدود من جملة الفضائل و هو يرقق القلب و يذكي الذهن و ينبه النفس على إدراك الأمور الشريفة و لأجل ذلك أمر المشايخ مريديهم في الابتداء بالعشق و قيل العشق العفيف أو في سبب في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٤

تلطيف النفس و تنوير القلب و في الأخبار

: إن الله جميل يحب الجمال

و قيل من عشق و عف و كتم و مات مات شهيدا.

و تفصيل المقام أن العشق الإنساني ينقسم إلى حقيقي و مجازي و العشق الحقيقي هو محبة الله و صفاته و أفعاله من حيث هي أفعاله و المجازي ينقسم إلى نفساني و إلى حيواني و النفساني هو الذي يكون مبدؤه مشاكلة نفس العاشق المعشوق في الجوهر و يكون أكثر إعجابه بشمائل المعشوق لأنها آثار صادرة عن نفسه و الحيواني هو الذي يكون

مبدؤه شهوة بدنية و طلب لذة بهيمية و يكون أكثر إعجاب العاشق بظاهر المعشوق و لونه و إشكال أعضائه لأنها أمور بدنية و الأول مما يقتضيه لطافة النفس و صفاتها و الثاني مما يقتضيه النفس الأمانة و يكون في الأكثر مقارنا للفجور و الحرص عليه و فيه استخدام القوة الحيوانية للقوة الناطقة بخلاف الأول فإنه يجعل النفس لينة شيقة ذات وجد و حزن و بكاء و رقة قلب و فكر كأنها تطلب شيئاً باطنياً مختفياً عن الحواس فتقطع عن الشواغل الدنيوية و تعرض عما سوى معشوقها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٥

جاعلة جميع الهموم هما واحداً فلاجل ذلك يكون الإقبال على المعشوق الحقيقي أسهل على صاحبه من غيره فإنه لا يحتاج إلى الانقطاع عن أشياء كثيرة بل يرغب عن واحد إلى واحد.

لكن الذي يجب التنبيه عليه في هذا المقام أن هذا العشق وإن كان معدوداً من جملة الفضائل إلا أنه من الفضائل التي يتوسط الموصوف بها بين العقل المفارق المحض و بين النفس الحيوانية و مثل هذا الفضائل لا تكون محمودة شريفة على الإطلاق في كل وقت - و على كل حال من الأحوال و من كل أحد من الناس بل ينبغي استعمال هذه المحبة في أواسط السلوك العرفاني و في حال ترقيق النفس و تنبيهها عن نوم الغفلة و رقدة الطبيعة و إخراجها عن بحر الشهوات الحيوانية و أما عند استكمال النفس بالعلوم الإلهية و صيرورتها عقلاً بالفعل محيطاً بالعلوم الكلية ذا ملكة الاتصال بعالم القدس فلا ينبغي لها عند ذلك الاشتغال - بعشق هذه الصور المحسنة اللخمية و الشمائل اللطيفة البشرية لأن مقامها صار أرفع من هذا المقام و لهذا قيل المجاز قنطرة الحقيقة و إذا وقع العبور من القنطرة إلى عالم الحقيقة فالرجوع إلى ما وقع العبور منه تارة أخرى يكون قبيحاً معدوداً من الرذائل - و لا يبعد أن يكون اختلاف الأوائل في مدح العشق و ذمه من هذا السبب الذي ذكرناه - أو من جهة أنه يشبهه العشق العفيف النفساني الذي منشؤه لطافة النفس و استحسانها - لتناسب الأعضاء و اعتدال المزاج و حسن الأشكال و جودة التركيب بالشهوة البهيمية - التي تنشأها أفراد القوة الشهوانية.

و أما الذين ذهبوا إلى أن هذا العشق من فعل البطالين

الفارغي الهمم فلائهم لا خبرة لهم بالأمور الخفية و الأسرار اللطيفة و لا يعرفون من الأمور إلا ما تجلى للحواس - و ظهر للمشاعر الظاهرة و لم يعلموا أن الله تعالى لا يخلق شيئاً في جبهة النفوس إلا لحكمة جليلة و غاية عظيمة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٦

و أما الذين قالوا إنه مرض نفساني

أو قالوا إنه جنون إلهي فإنما قالوا ذلك من أجل أنهم رأوا ما يعرض للعشاق من سهر الليل و نحول البدن و ذبول الجسد و تواتر النبض و غور العيون و الأنفاس الصعداء مثل ما يعرض للمرضى فظنوا أن مبدأه فساد المزاج - و استيلاء المرة السوداء و ليس كذلك بل الأمر بالعكس فإن تلك الحالات ابتدأت من النفس أولاً ثم أثرت في البدن فإن من كان دائم الفكر و التأمل في أمر باطني كثير الاهتمام - و الاستغراق فيه انصرفت القوى البدنية إلى جانب الدماغ و ينبعث من كثرة الحركات الدماغية حرارة شديدة تحرق الأخلط الرطبة و تفنى الكيموسات الصالحة فيستولي اليبس و الجفاف على الأعضاء و يستحيل الدم إلى السوداء و ربما يتولد منه المايلخوليا.

و كذا الذين زعموا أنه جنون إلهي فإنما قالوا من أجل أنهم لم يجدوا دواء يعالجون - ولا شربة يسقونها فيبرءون مما هم فيه من المحنة و البلوى إلا الدعاء لله بالصلاة و الصدقة - و الرقى من الرهبانيين و الكهنة و هكذا كان دأب الحكماء و الأطباء اليونانيين فكانوا إذا أعياهم مداواة مريض أو معالجة عليل أو يئسوا منه حملوه إلى هيكل عبادتهم و أمروا بالصلاة و الصدقة و قربوا قربانا و سألوا أهل دعائهم و أحبارهم و رهبانهم أن يدعوا الله بالشفاء فإذا برى المريض سموا ذلك طباً إلهياً و الممرض جنوناً إلهياً.

و منهم من قال إن العشق هواء غالب في النفس

نحو طبع مشاكل في الجسد أو نحو صورة مماثلة في الجنس.

و منهم من قال منشؤه موافقة الطالع عند الولادة

فكل شخصين اتفقا في الطالع و درجته أو كان صاحب الطالعين كوكب واحد أو يكون البرجان متفقين في بعض الأحوال و الأنظار كالمثلثات أو ما شاكل ذلك مما عرفه المنجمون وقع بينهما التعاشق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٧

و منهم من قال إن العشق هو إفراط الشوق إلى الاتحاد

و هذا القول وإن كان حسناً - إلا أنه كلام مجمل يحتاج إلى تفصيل لأن هذا الاتحاد من أي ضروب الاتحاد فإن الاتحاد قد يكون بين الجسمين و ذلك بالامتزاج و الاختلاط و ليس ذلك يتصور في حق النفوس - ثم لو فرض وقوع الاتصال بين بدني العاشق و المعشوق في حالة الغفلة و الذهول أو النوم فعلم يقيناً أن بذلك لم يحصل المقصود لأن العشق كما مر من صفات النفوس لا من صفات الأجرام بل الذي يتصور و يصح من معنى الاتحاد هو الذي بيناه في مباحث العقل و المعقول من اتحاد النفس العاقلة بصورة العقل بالفعل و اتحاد النفس الحساسة بصورة المحسوس بالفعل فعلى هذا المعنى يصح صيرورة النفس العاشقة لشخص متحدة بصورة معشوقها و ذلك بعد تكرار المشاهدات و توارد الأنظار و شدة الفكر و الذكر في أشكاله و شمائله حتى يصير متمثلاً صورته حاضرة متدركة في ذات العاشق و هذا مما أوضحنا سبيله و حققنا طريقه بحيث لم يبق لأحد من الأزكياء مجال الإنكار فيه.

و قد وقع في حكايات العشاق ما يدل على ذلك كما روي أن مجنون العامري كان في بعض الأحيان مستغرقاً في العشق بحيث جاءت حبيبته و نادته يا مجنون أنا ليلي فما التفت إليها و قال لي عنك غنى بعشقتك فإن العشق بالحقيقة هو الصورة الحاصلة - و هي المعشوقة بالذات لا الأمر الخارجي و هو ذو الصورة لا بالعرض كما أن المعلوم بالذات هو نفس الصورة العلمية لا ما خرج عن التصور و إذا تبين و صح اتحاد العاقل بصورة المعقول و اتحاد الجوهر الحاس بصورة المحسوس كل ذلك عند الاستحضار الشديد و المشاهدة القوية كما سبق فقد صح اتحاد نفس العاشق بصورة معشوقه بحيث لم يفتقر بعد ذلك إلى حضور جسمه و الاستفادة من شخصه كما قال شاعر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٨

أنا من أهوى و من أهوى أنا نحن روحان حللنا بدننا

فإذا أبصرتني أبصرته وإذا أبصرته أبصرتنا

ثم لا يخفى أن الاتحاد بين الشئيين لا يتصور إلا كما حققنا و ذلك من خاصية الأمور الروحانية و الأحوال النفسانية و أما الأجسام و الجسمانيات فلا يمكن فيها الاتحاد بوجه بل المجاورة و الممازجة و المماساة لا غير بل التحقيق أن لا يوجد وصال في هذا العالم - و لا يصل ذات إلى ذات في هذه النشأة أبداً و ذلك من جهتين.

إحداهما أن الجسم الواحد المتصل إذا حقق أمره علم أنه مشوب بالغيبة و الفقد - لأن كل جزء منه مفقود عن صاحبه مفارق عنه فهذا الاتصال بين أجزائه عين الانفصال - إلا أنه لما لم يدخل بين تلك الأجزاء جسم مباين و لا فضاء خال و لا حدث سطح في خلالها - قيل إنها متصلة واحدة و ليست وحدتها وحدة خالصة عن الكثرة فإذا كان حال الجسم في حد ذاته كذلك من عدم الحضور و الوحدة فكيف يتحد به شيء آخر أو يقع الوصال بينه و بين شيء.

و الأخرى أنه مع قطع النظر عما ذكرنا لا يمكن الوصلة بين الجسمين إلا بنحو تلاقي السطحين منهما و السطح خارج عن حقيقة الجسم و ذاته فإذاً لا يمكن وصول شيء من المحب إلى ذات الجسم الذي للمعشوق لأن ذلك الشيء إما نفسه أو جسمه أو عرض من عوارض نفسه أو بدنه و الثالث محال لاستحالة انتقال العرض و كذا الثاني لاستحالة التداخل بين الجسمين و التلاقي بالأطراف و النهايات لا يشفي عيلاً طالب الوصال و لا يروي غليله و أما الأول فهو أيضاً محال لأن نفساً من النفوس لو فرض اتصالها في ذاتها ببدن لكانت نفساً لها فيلزم حينئذ أن يصير بدن واحد ذا نفسين و هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٧٩

ممتنع و لأجل ذلك إن العاشق إذا اتفق له ما كانت غاية متمناة و هو الدنو من معشوقه و الحضور في مجلس صحبتته معه فإذا حصل له هذا المتمنى يدعي فوق ذلك و هو تمني الخلوة و المصاحبة معه من غير حضور أحد فإذا سهل ذلك و خلى المجلس عن الأغيار تمنى المعانقة و التقبيل فإن تيسر ذلك تمنى الدخول في لحاف واحد و الالتزام بجميع الجوارح أكثر ما ينبغي و مع ذلك كله الشوق بحاله - و حرقة النفس كما كانت بل ازداد الشوق و الاضطراب كما قال قائلهم.

أعانقها و النفس بعد مشوقة	إليها و هل بعد العناق تداني
و أئتم فاهها كي تزول حرارتي	فيزداد ما ألقى من الهيجان
كان فؤادي ليس يشفي غليله	سوى أن يرى الروحان يتحدان

و السبب اللمي في ذلك أن المحبوب في الحقيقة ليس هو العظم و لا اللحم و لا شيء من البدن بل و لا يوجد في عالم الأجسام ما تشاقه النفس و تهواه بل صورة روحانية موجودة في غير هذا العالم

الفصل (٢١) في أن تفاوت المعشوقات لتفاوت الوجودات

اعلم أن محبوبات النفوس و الطبائع مختلفة و معشوقاتها متفننة حسب اختلاف مراتبها في الوجود و درجاتها في العلوم و المعارف و ذلك أن كل قوة من القوى لا تستكمل - إلا بما يجانسها و يشاكلها و كل حاسة من الحواس لا يلتذ إلا بمحسوسها المختص بها فالقوة الباصرة لا تشاق إلا إلى الألوان و الأضواء لأنها من جنسها و كذا القوة السامعة - لا تشاق إلا إلى الأصوات و النعم و لا يستلذ إلا ما كان على النسبة الفاضلة و على هذا القياس تلتذ الشامة بالروائح و

الذائقة بالطعوم الملائمة للمزاج و اللامسة بالملموسات الملائمة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٨٠

لمزاجها التي يكون في حد الاعتدال بين أطراف المتضادات حتى تستكمل بها و هكذا قياس كل قوة من القوى الباطنة و الظاهرة الطبيعية و النفسانية و العقلية إذ كل قوة من جنس ما يقوى عليه و كذا كل قوة حاسة كما مر هي يكون من نوع محسوسها و كل قوة عاقلة من قبيل معقولاتها فلاجل ذلك تستكمل بها و تخرج لأجلها من القوة إلى الفعل و من النقص إلى الكمال سائرة إياها متحدة بها كما علمت مرارا.

ثم إن الإنسان من جملة المكونات كأنه ذات مجموعة من جميع ما في العالم - من الأنواع و الأجناس على وجه الاستعداد و القوة بمعنى أن كل جنس من أجناس الموجودات - و طبقة من الطبقات و عالم من العوالم العقلية و النفسية و الطبيعية يوجد فيه شيء ناقص في الابتداء مستعد للاستكمال و كل ناقص مشتاق إلى كماله فالإنسان لكونه مشتملا على مجموع نقصانات الأشياء فلا جرم يشاق بكماله إلى ما هو جامع لكل الكمالات بالإمكان العام و لا يوجد كمالات الأشياء كلها على وجه التمام إلا في حق الباري - لما له من الأسماء الحسنى و لهذا أحق الأشياء بأن يكون معشوقا للكمال و العرفاء هو الحق جل ذكره و بعده في استحقاقية عشق الإنسان مجموع العالم بكماله لا شتماله على مظاهر صفات الله تعالى و أسمائه من العرش و الكرسي و السماوات و الشمس و القمر و النجوم و الأرض بما فيها و عليها من أنواع الحيوانات و النباتات و الجواهر المعدنية من الذهب و الفضة و غيرها و البحار و ما فيها من العجائب و ما يتكون في الجو من الرياح و السحب - و الأمطار و الثلوج و البروق و الشهب و غيرها و الحركات العلوية و السفلية و مبادي تلك الحركات و غاياتها من العقول و النفوس الكلية و الجزئية و الطبائع الشريفة و الخسيسة - كل ذلك على أحسن ترتيب و أجود نظام بحيث يتحير الناظر إليه العارف بكيفية وضعها و ترتيبها في حسن كماله و نظامه.

و بعد هذين الأمرين أعني الإله جل ذكره و مظهره الأعظم الذي هو الإنسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٨١

الكبير لا يستحق لأن يكون محبوبا لمن يشتمل على جميع المشاعر و القوى بالقوة أو بالفعل إلا العالم الصغير الجزئي و الإنسان الشخصي فإن الإنسان الكلي في الحقيقة هو العالم الكبير و لأجل ذلك لا يوجد في شيء من المكونات ما يشتد العشق و الوله من الأدمي إليه بحيث يسلب منه القرار و الصبر و يعتريه ما يعتري للعشاق من سهر الليالي و الغم و الحزن و البكاء و غير ذلك إلا من جهة شخص إنساني إذ صادف فيه جميع محبوبات - ما فيه من المشاعر و القوى فيوازي كله بكماله و ليس غير الإنسان كذلك فإن كل واحد من أجزاء العالم ليس فيه إلا مشتهي قوة واحدة لأنه إما معقول فلا يستلذه إلا العقل و إما محسوس صرف فلا يستلذه إلا الحس دون العقل ثم ذلك المحسوس إن كان من باب اللون - و الضوء فلا يستلذه إلا البصر و إن كان من باب الصوت و الحرف فلا يستلذه إلا السمع فأما الإنسان ففيه مفردات الأشياء و مركباتها و جواهرها و أعراضها من المقولات التسع - و الروحانيات كملائكة القوى و الجسمانيات كالجوارح و الأعضاء.

و بالجملة ما في الملك و الملكوت من النعم الظاهرة و الباطنة كما في قوله تعالى - **وَأَسْبَغَ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعَمَهُ ظَاهِرَةً وَ**

باطنةً فمن رأى مثل هذه النشأة الكاملة و المدينة الجامعة - فلا جرم يشقائق إلى لقاءه و يحبه لما رأى فيه من صنعه موحدة و مظهر آثاره و مرآة جماله و جلاله.

قال الشيخ الكامل المحقق محي الدين الأعرابي في الفتوحات المكية اعلم أن العالم خلقه الله في غاية الإحكام و الإتقان كما قال الإمام أبو حامد الغزالي - من أنه لم يبق في الإمكان أبدع من هذا العالم فأخبر أنه تعالى خلق آدم على صورته و الإنسان مجموع العالم و لم يكن علمه بالعالم إلا علمه بنفسه إذ لم يكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٨٢

في الوجود إلا هو و فعله و صفته فلا بد أن يكون على صورته فلما أظهر في عينه كان مجللة فما رأى فيه إلا جماله فأحب الجمال فالعالم جمال الله فهو الجميل المحب للجمال فمن أحب العالم بهذا النظر فقط فما أحب إلا جمال الله فإن جمال الصنعة لا يضاف إلا إلى صانعه لا إلى الصنعة فجمال العالم جمال الله و صورة جماله انتهى.

و قال في موضع آخر اعلم أن كل ما يتصور المتصور فهو عينه لا غيره ليس للعالم أن يتصور الحق إلا بما يظهر عينه و أن الإنسان الذي هو آدم عبارة عن مجموع العالم فإنه الإنسان الصغير و هو المختصر من العالم الكبير و العالم ما في قوة الإنسان - حصره في إدراك الكثرة و العظم و الإنسان صغير الحجم يحيط به الإدراك من حيث صورته و تشريحه و بما يحمله من القوى الروحانية فرتب الله فيه جميع ما خرج عنه مما سوى الله فارتبطت لكل جزء منه حقيقة الاسم الإلهي التي أبرزته و ظهر عنها فارتبطت به الأسماء

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الإلهية كلها لم يشذ عنه منها شيء فخرج آدم على صورة اسم الله إذ كان هذا الاسم يتضمن جميع الأسماء الإلهية كذلك الإنسان و إن صغر جرمه فإنه يتضمن جميع المعاني و لو كان أصغر مما هو فإنه لا يزول عنه اسم الإنسان كما جوزوا دخول الجمل في سم الخياط و إن ذلك ليس من قبيل المحال لأن الصغر و الكبر من العوارض الشخصية التي لا يبطل بها حقيقة الشيء و لا يخرجها عنها و القدرة صالحة أن يخلق جملاً يكون من الصغر بحيث لا يضيق عن ولوجه سم الخياط فكان ذلك رجاء لهم أن يدخلوا الجنة كذلك الإنسان و إن صغر جرمه من جرم العالم يجمع جميع حقائق العالم الكبير و لهذا سمى العقلاء العالم إنساناً كبيراً - و لم يبق في الإمكان معنى إلا و قد ظهر في العالم فقد ظهر في مختصره و العلم تصور المعلوم - و هو من الصفات الذاتية للعالم فعلمه صورته و عليها خلق آدم و آدم خلقه الله على صورته انتهى.

فعلم أن العشق الجامع لكل معشوقات الأشياء على ثلاثة أنحاء الأكبر و الأوسط و الأصغر فالعشق الأكبر عشق الإله جل ذكره و هو لا يكون إلا للمتألهين الكاملين - الذين حصل لهم الفناء الكلي و هؤلاء هم المشار إليه في قوله تعالى **يُحِبُّهُمْ وَيُحِبُّونَهُ** فإنه في الحقيقة ما يجب إلا نفسه لا غيره فالمحب و المحبوب في الطرفين شيء واحد.

و الأوسط عشق العلماء الناظرين في حقائق الموجودات المتفكرين دائماً في خلق السماوات و الأرض كما في قوله تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٨٤

الَّذِينَ يَذْكُرُونَ اللَّهَ قِيَامًا وَقُعُودًا وَعَلَىٰ جُنُوبِهِمْ وَيَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ رَبَّنَا مَا خَلَقْتَ هَذَا بَاطِلًا سُبْحَانَكَ فَقِنَا عَذَابَ النَّارِ وهو عذاب الفرقة والاحتجاب عن رؤية الآثار و جنة الأفعال.

و الأصغر عشق الإنسان الصغير لكونه أيضا أنموذجا مما في عالم الكبير كله و العالم كله كتاب الحق الجامع و تصنيف الله الذي أبرز فيه كمالاته الذاتية و معانيه الإلهية - و كتاب الإنسان مجموعة مختصرة فيه آيات الكتاب المبين فمن تأمل فيه و تدبر في آياته و معانيه بنظر الاعتبار يسهل عليه مطالعة الكتاب الكبير و آياته و معانيه و أسرارها و إذا اتفق و أحكم معاني الكتاب الكبير يسهل معها العروج إلى مطالعة جمال الله و جلال أحديته فيرى الكل منطويا في كبريائه مضمحلا تحت أشعة نوره و ضيائه

الفصل (٢٢) في اختلاف الناس في المحبوبات

اعلم أنه لا يوجد لنوع من أنواع الموجودات مثل الاختلاف الذي يوجد في أفراد البشر و ذلك لأن المادة الإنسانية خلقت على وجه يكون فيها استعداد الانتقال - إلى أي صورة من الصور و الاتصاف بأي صفة من الصفات و فيها قوة الارتقاء من حد البهيمية - إلى أعلى درجات الملائكة المقربين فمنهم من هو في رتبة البهائم و نفسه النفس الشهوية و منهم من هو في رتبة السباع و نفسه النفس الغضبية و منهم من كان في منزل الشياطين و منهم من كان من نوع الملائكة و لكل من هذه الأجناس الأربعة أنواع كثيرة غير محصورة.

و قد علمت أن محبوب كل أحد ما يماثله و يشابهه و أن الله تعالى قد ركز في طباع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٨٥

الموجودات و جبال النفس محبة الكون و البقاء على أتم الحالات التي تخصها و أتم حالات النفس الشهوانية أن تكون موجودة أبدا تتناول شهواتها و تتمتع بلذاتها التي هي مادة وجود أشخاصها من غير عائق و لا منغص فهي أبدا عاشقة للأكل و الجماع لا غير و هكذا من أتم حالات النفس الغضبية أن تكون موجودة رئيسة على غيرها غالبية على عدوها منتقمة ممن يؤذيها من غير عائق و لا منغص فهي أبدا عاشقة للقهر و الانتقام.

و من أتم حالات النفس الشيطانية أن تكون مكاراة محيلة جربزة كذوبة مظهرة للأمور على غير ما هي عليه شأنها التدليس و التلبس بإبراز المقدمات الباطلة في صورة الحق و إظهار الأكاذيب الواهية بهيئة الصدق فهي أبدا عاشقة للمكر و الحيلة و الوسوسة - و المواعيد الكاذبة و الأمانى الباطلة كما قال تعالى في صفة الشيطان **يَعِدُّهُمْ وَيَمْنِيهِمْ وَ مَا يَعِدُهُمُ الشَّيْطَانُ إِلَّا غُرُورًا**.

و من أتم حالات النفس الملكية أن تعرف الحقائق على ما هي عليها و تؤمن بالله و ملائكته و كتبه و رسله و اليوم الآخر و ترهد في الدنيا و ترغب في الخلوة للمناجاة مع الله و تتفكر في صنع الله و ملكوته راضية بقضائه فهي أبدا عاشقة للمعارف الإلهية - و الكون مع الله بلا عائق و حاجب مسرورة بذكره كارهة للكون في الدنيا متمنية للموت و الخروج من هذه النشأة المجازية إلى الدار الآخرة تشوقا إلى جوار الله و مشاهدة لقائه و هذه الخصال لا توجد إلا في خواص الناس من الأخيار الذين هم بمنزلة الملائكة المقربين و الرسل المكرمين و أكثر الناس قصرت أفهامهم عن تصور هذه الخصال لقلّة معرفتهم و كدورة أذهانهم لانغماسها في بحر الهوى ففرضوا بهذه الصور و الأشباح الجسدانية المولفة من

العناصر والأبدان المركبة من اللحم والدم والأخلاق العفنة الظلمانية واطمأنوا بها تمنوا الخلود معها وذلك لنقص جوهرهم ودناءة نفوسهم كما ذكر الله عز وجل **وَرَضُوا بِالْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا وَاطْمَأَنَّنُوا بِهَا وَالَّذِينَ هُمْ عَنْ آيَاتِنَا غَافِلُونَ** وآيات كثيرة من القرآن في هذا المعنى.

ثم لا يخفى عليك أن كل محب لشيء من الأشياء الدنيوية مشتاق إليه هائم به عند فقدان - وأنه متى وصل إليه ونال ما يهواه منه حصل مقصوده وبلغ حاجته من الاستمتاع والتلذذ بقربه فإنه لا بد يوماً أو ساعة أن يفارقه ويملّه أو يتغير عليه ويزهد عنه تلك الحلاوة

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و يتلشى له البشاشة ويخمد لهيب ذلك الاشتياق والهيجان وربما يصير عين ما هو المحبوب وبالا وآفة على المحب و مرضا و علة له كما نشاهد من حدوث الأمراض والعلل من أكل الحلاوات والدسومات ومن كثرة المجامعة ورب معشوق آدمي صار من أعدى الأعداء وأوحش الأشياء عند محبه إلا المحبين لله والمؤمنين بآياته والمشتاقين إلى لقائه من عبادته وأوليائه الصالحين فإن لهم كل يوم من محبوبهم قربة وكلما قربوا منه ازداد شوقهم وقوي عشقهم وكلما ازداد الشوق ازداد القرب وهكذا أبد الآباد كما ذكر الله **وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَشَدُّ حُبًّا لِلَّهِ** وقال **نُورُهُمْ يَسْعَى بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَبِأَيْمَانِهِمْ يَقُولُونَ رَبَّنَا أَتْمِمْ لَنَا نُورَنَا** وأشار إلى حال المحبين سواء بقوله **كَسْرَابٍ بِقَيْعَةٍ يَحْسَبُهُ الظَّمَانُ مَاءً حَتَّى إِذَا جَاءَهُ لَمْ يَجِدْهُ شَيْئًا**.

ثم عطف نحو محبيه فذكر حالهم و كنى عن ذكرهم بوصف حالهم فقال **وَجَدَ اللَّهُ عِنْدَهُ فَوْقَاهُ حِسَابَهُ** وذلك لأن الدنيا وصورها الكونية عند العارف البصير بمنزلة مرآي و مظاهر - للحقائق القدسية والصفات الإلهية و كما أن الناظر في السراب إذا كان عارفاً يعلم أن ما يشاهد فيه هو صورة السماء لا صورة الماء كما بين في موضعه فكذلك العارف المحقق يعلم أن الوجود الذي يترأى في هذه الموجودات العالمية ليس إلا أنحاء تجليات الحق وظهورات كمالاته وأسماؤه في مظاهر الأكوان ومرآي الأعيان.

واعلم أن الغرض الأقصى والحكمة الأسنى من وجود العشق في نفوس الظرفاء - ومحبتها لحسن الأبدان وزينة الأشكال إنما هو لأن تتنبه من نوم الغفلة ورقدة الجهالة وترتاض بها مدة وتخرج من القوة إلى الفعل وترقى من الأمور الجسمانية إلى الأمور النفسانية - ومنها إلى محاسن الأمور الدائمة الكلية وتشوق إلى لقاء الله ولذات الآخرة و لتعرف من هذه الدلالات شرف جوهرها وكمال عنصرها ومحاسن عالمها وصلاح معادها وذلك لأن جميع المحاسن وكل المشتبهات المرغوبة للنفس التي نراها على ظواهر الأجسام و سطوح الأبدان جعلت دلالات على المحاسن الأخروية ومثلاً للصور البهية الروحانية - كيما إذا نظرت إليها النفوس الجزئية حنت إليها وتشوقت نحوها وإذا وصلت إليها - تعمقت في إدراك كنهها وحدها بالنظر والتدبر فيها والاعتناء لأحوالها لينتزع صورها

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خالصة عن الأغيار ورسومها مصفاة عن الملابس والأغشية حتى إذا غابت تلك الأشخاص الجرمانية عن مشاهدة الحواس لما زالت رسومها وصورها عن النفس بل بقيت تلك الرسوم والصور المعشوقة المحبوبة مصورة فيها أعني

النفس الجزئية صوراً روحانية صافية عن المواد.

ثم إذا قويت النفس و صارت إلى مقام العقل انتقلت معها الصور المرسومة في قوة خياله من ذلك المقام إلى ما فوقه فصارت معشوقاتها باقيات صالحات و هي صور كلية دائمة عقلية متحدة بها لا يخاف فراقها و لا دثورها و تغييرها و استحالتها أبد الآبدین.

مثال ذلك أن من ابتلي بعشق أحد في بعض أيام عمره ثم تسلى عنه أو فقدته فإذا وجدته بعد مدة من الدهر و قد تغير عما كان عليه من الحسن و الجمال و تلك الزينة و المحاسن كأن يراها على ظاهر جسمه فنظر إلى تلك الرسوم و الصور التي في خياله للعهد القديم و جدها بحالها لم يتغير و لم يتبدل و رآها برمتها مرتسمة في نفسه من تلك المحاسن و الرسوم و الأصباغ و الأشكال و التخاطيط على ما كانت من قبل و كان يراها بزعمه على الغير من بعيد و يجد اليوم كلها في نفسه منتزعة عن الغير مسلوبة عنه ما كان قبل ذلك يلتمسه عنه خارجاً عن ذاته فعند ذلك يتفطن اللبيب بأن المعشوق بالحقيقة - ليس بأمر خارج عن ذاته لأن تلك الرسوم و الصور الحسان التي كان يراها على ذلك الشخص - و هو اليوم يجدها منقوشة في نفسه مرسومة في ذاته متمثلة بين يدي جوهره مصورة عنده - باقية ثابتة على حالة واحدة لم تتغير.

فإذا فطن العاقل الذكي بما وصفناه انتبهت نفسه من نوم غفلتها و استيقظت من رقدة جهالتها و علمت أن المعشوق بالحقيقة لم يوجد و لا يوجد في الأجسام و المواد الكثيفة و الأبدان اللحمية و الدموية و استراحت نفسه عند ذلك من التعب و العناء و مقاساة صحبة الغير و تحمل المشاق الشديدة و الشقاء الذي لا يزال يعرض لعشاق الأجسام و محبي الأبدان و يقول كما قال القائل -

صحى القلب عن سلمى و أقصر باطله و عرى أفراس الصبى و رواحله

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الفصل (٢٣) في الإشارة إلى المحبة الإلهية المختصة بالعرفاء الكاملين و الأولياء الواصلين

قد مر أن العشق الإنساني على ثلاثة أقسام الأكبر و الأوسط و الأصغر و أن الأكبر هو الاشتياق إلى لقاء الله و الشهوة إلى عرفان ذاته و صفاته و أفعاله من حيث هي أفعاله فهذه الشهوة لم توجد لغير العارف و حال الناس كلهم في أشواقهم و شهواتهم إلى محبوباتهم و مرغوباتهم بالقياس إلى حال العارف كحال الصبيان في التذاذبهم باللعب بالصولجان بالقياس إلى حال الرجال البالغين - في أغراضهم و مستلذاتهم و رئاساتهم فإنه لو خلق فيك شوق إلى الله تعالى و شهوة لمعرفة جماله و جلاله و هو أصدق الشهوات و أحق اللذات لكنت تؤثرها على كل الخيرات - و تختار جنة المعرفة و رياض الحكمة و ثمراتها على الجنة التي فيها قضاء الشهوات الحسية و الخيالية و لكن هذه الشهوة و هذه الإرادة لم تخلق لعوام الناس و لا لأكثر الخاصين الذين يعدون أنفسهم من أهل الفضيلة إلا من يندر وجوده من الراسخين في العلم و كما أن شهوة النكاح و شهوة الرئاسة خلقت فيك و لم تخلق في الصبيان إلا شهوة اللعب بالصولجان و نحوه و أنت تتعجب في عكوفهم على لذة اللعب و خلوهم عن لذة الرئاسة فهكذا العارف يتعجب منك و من نظرائك في عكوفهم على لذة الجاه و الرئاسة فإن الدنيا بحذافيرها عند العارف لهو و لعب.

ولما خلق الله هذا العشق للعارفين كان شوقهم بقدر عشقهم وشهوتهم بقدر معرفتهم - ولا نسبة لاشتياقهم وشهوتهم إلى لذة الشهوات الحسية سواء كانت في الدنيا أو في الآخرة فإن لذاتهم بالمعرفة لذة لا يعتريها الزوال ولا يفترها الملل بل لا يزال يتضاعف ويترادف بزيادة المعرفة - والاستغراق فيها بخلاف سائر الشهوات إلا أن هذا العشق لا يخلق في الإنسان إلا بعد أن يمر عليه نشأت ويتحول بأحوال كثيرة و ينتقل من حد الحيوانية إلى حد الملكية كما ينتقل نطفة الحيوان من حد الجمادية والنباتية إلى حد الحيوانية و كما ينتقل الأدمي من حد الصيبوبة - إلى حد البلوغ الصوري و صار معدودا من الرجال البالغين الكاملين في الشهوة فهكذا مادة العقل

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إذا انتقلت من حد القوة والاستعداد إلى حد العقل بالفعل صار من الرجال البالغين في شهوة المعرفة وغيره من أفراد البشر بالنسبة إليه كالولدان والنسوان في باب لذة المعرفة وشهوة الحكمة فمن لم يخلق فيه هذه الشهوة فهو إما صبي بعد لم يكمل عقله أو عنين أفسد كدورة الدنيا وشهواتها فطرته الأصلية.

فالعارفون لما رزقوا شهوة المعرفة ولذة النظر إلى وجه الله ومطالعة جلاله فهم في مطالعتهم جمال الحضرة الإلهية في جنة عرضها السماوات والأرض بل أكثر وأوسع فهم ينظرون إلى العاكفين في حضيض الشهوات نظر العقلاء إلى الصبيان عند عكوفهم على لذة اللعب بالتمائيل المزخرفة ولذلك تراهم يستوحشون من أكثر الخلق ويؤثرون العزلة والخلوة والذكر وهو أحب الأشياء لهم ويهربون من المال والجاه علما منهم بأنه يشغلهم عن لذة المناجاة مع الله و يتجردون عن أهلهم وأولادهم ترفعا عن الاشتغال بهم عن الله فترى الناس يضحكون عليهم ويستهزئون بهم و يقولون في حق من يرون منهم إنه موسوس مجنون و هم يتعجبون من الناس و يضحكون عليهم بقناعتهم بمتاع الدنيا الفانية ولذاتها المزخرفة و يقولون إن تسخروا منا فإننا نسخر منكم كما تسخرون.

والعارف مشغول بتهيئة سفينة النجاة لنفسه وغيره لعلهم بخطر المعاد إذا جاءت الطامة الكبرى فيضحك على أهل الغفلة عن عذاب الله والسؤال والحساب وعقاب يوم الآخرة وسوء المرجع والمآب عند كشف الغطاء وإظهار البواطن والسرائر وتحصيل ما في الصدور - وإخراج من في القبور وإبراز الجحيم وأشرارها والجنة وأبرارها كما يضحك العاقل على الصبيان واشتغالهم باللهو واللعب عند ما ورد سلطان قاهر على البلد يريد أن يحاسب أهله و يقتل بعضهم و يخلع على بعضهم و يخلد بعضهم محبوسا في سجنه و يرفع بعضهم إلى مجلس قربه.

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فما أشد سخافة عقل من كان مرجعه إلى يوم الآخرة و هو مشغول اليوم بكسب المال والجاه والتفوق على الغير بالذهب والفضة والأنعام والحرث والنسل و بين يديه هذه العقبات و في طريقه الأهوية المهلكات و

الصادق ع يقول: رب شهوة ساعة أورثت حزنا طويلا

و سئل الجنيد عن صفة المحب فقال دائم الفكر كثير الخلوة قليل الخلطة لا يبصر إذا نظر و لا يسمع إذا خوطب و لا يفهم إذا تكلم و لا يحزن إذا أصيب و لا يفرح إذا أصاب ينظر إلى الله في خلواته و يأنس به و يناجيه في سره و جهره و لا ينازع أهل الدنيا في دنياهم تراه حزينا يخشى حرمان ما يرجو و يخاف فوت ما يطلب قد دهش عقله من مطالعة

جلال الله قليل المنام قليل الطعام دائم الأحزان للناس شأن وله شأن إذا خلا حن وإذا تفرد أن وله شربة من كأس الوداد واستيحاش من جميع العباد انتهى كلامه.

أقول ما ذكره هو من أحوال المحبين في مبادي سلوكهم إلى الله وفي أوقات انزعاجهم من خلق إلى الحق وأما عند الوصول وانشراح الصدر بنوره وسعة القلب - لاستوائه فهم من أهش خلق الله وأوسعهم خلقا وأشدهم فرحانا بمطالعة جلال الله ورويته في كل شيء وكذلك كان النبي ص قبل البعثة متوحشا من الخلق متخليا بعبادة ربه في جبل حراء ثم وسع الله قلبه وعظم خلقه فبعثه إلى كافة الخلائق واشتغل بهدايتهم وتعليمهم الكتاب والحكمة وإلى ذلك أشار بقوله تعالى **أَلَمْ نَشْرَحْ لَكَ صَدْرَكَ** إلى آخر السورة وسنرجع إلى تحقيق هذا المقام في موعده إن شاء الله.

قال بعض العلماء ولا تظن أن روح العارف من الانسراح في رياض المعرفة - وبساتينها أقل من روح من يدخل الجنة التي يعرفها ويقضي فيها شهوة البطن والفرج وأنى يتساويان بل لا ينكر أن يكون في العارفين من رغبة في فتح أبواب المعارف لينظر إلى ملكوت السماوات والأرض وجلال خالقها ومديرها أكثر من رغبة الناس في المأكول والمنكوح والملبوس وكيف لا يكون هذه الرغبة أغلب وهي مشاركة للملائكة في الفردوس الأعلى إذ لا حظ للملائكة في المطعم والمشرب والمنكح ولعل تمتع البهائم بهذه الأمور يزيد على تمتع الإنسان فإن كنت ترى مشاركة البهائم في لذاتها أحق بالطلب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩١

من مشاركة الملا الأعلى في فرحهم وسرورهم بمطالعة جمال الحضرة الربوبية فما أشد جهلك وغيك وما أخس همتك وقيمتك على قدر همتك انتهى.

ومما ينبغي أن يعلم أنه كما أن وجود كل شيء من آثار موجد له ولا يوجد شيء في المعلول إلا ويوجد في علته على وجه أعلى وأشرف فهكذا جميع المرغوبات والمستلذات التي توجد في عالم المواد الجسمية والطبائع الكائنة المستحيلة فإنما هي رشحات لما يوجد في عالم النفوس ونشأة الجنان ودار الحيوان كما قال تعالى **وَفِيهَا مَا تَشْتَهِيهِ الْأَنفُسُ وَتَلَذُّ الْأَعْيُنُ وَأَنْتُمْ فِيهَا خَالِدُونَ** وكذلك جميع مستلذات النفوس وتماثيل الجنة وأشجارها وأنهارها وغرفاتها وحورها وقصورها ونغمات طيورها إنما هي آثار ورشحات لما يوجد في الحضرة الإلهية وينالها العاكفون حول جنبه من اللذات والابتهاجات التي تكل الإنسان عن وصفها مما لا عين رأت ولا أذن سمعت ولا خطر على قلب بشر فمن ترك الدنيا وزهد فيها فاز بنعيم الآخرة ولذات الجنة ومن زهد في نعيم الآخرة فاز بنعيم القرب وشرف الوصول والابتهاج بلقاء الله الذي يحقر في جنبه كل نعيم ولذة.

واعلم أنه قبيح بذى عقل أن يكون بهيمة وقد أمكنه أن يكون إنسانا أو إنسانا وقد أمكنه أن يكون ملكا مقربا وقال تعالى **أَيَحْسَبُونَ أَنَّمَا نُمِدُّهُمْ بِهِ مِنْ مَّالٍ وَبَنِينَ - نُسَارِعُ لَهُمْ فِي الْخَيْرَاتِ بَلْ لَا يَشْعُرُونَ** وقال أيضا **قَالَ الَّذِينَ يُرِيدُونَ الْحَيَاةَ الدُّنْيَا - يَا لَيْتَ لَنَا مِثْلَ مَا أُوتِيَ قَارُونُ إِنَّهُ لَذُو حَظٍّ عَظِيمٍ وَقَالَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ وَيَلَكُمْ ثَوَابُ اللَّهِ خَيْرٌ لِمَنْ آمَنَ وَعَمِلَ صَالِحًا** أشار إلى أن من كان من أهل العلم يعلم أن المثوبات الأخروية أجل وأبهى من اللذات الدنيوية لأن تلك أمور حققة باقية وهذه أمور باطلة فانية

وقال أمير المؤمنين ع: **هلك خزان الأموال والعلماء أحياء باقون ما بقي الدهر أعيانهم مفقودة وآثارهم**

في القلوب موجودة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩٢

الموقف التاسع في فيضه تعالى و إبداعه و فعله و تحقيق وجود الصور المفارقة العقلية و فيه فصول الفصل (١) في تمهيد أصول يحتاج إلى معرفتها في تحقيق أول الهويات الصادرة عنه تعالى و أن أي وجود يخصه

و لنمهد لتحقيق هذا المطلب ذكر أصول قد مضى شرحها في السفر الأول الذي في الأمور العامة التي هي ضوابط الأحوال العارضة لطبيعة الموجود بما هو موجود بحسب المفهوم و هي هذه تلخيصا و تذكيرا.

الأصل الأول

أن تقابل السلب و الإيجاب بالذات إنما يكون بين أمرين مفهوم أحدهما بعينه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩٣

يكون رفع الآخر أي لا مفهوم له سوى كونه رفعا له و لأجل ذلك لا يتحقق هذا التقابل إلا بين شيئين و الحصر بينهما لا محالة عقلي لا يسع للعقل تجويز واسطة بينهما- و يقال له تقابل التناقض أيضا و المعتنون و المهتمون بتصحيح الألفاظ لما حاولوا تصحيح مقتضى باب التفاعل في التناقض و هو التكرر من الجانبين فقالوا معنى التناقض كون شيئين يلزم من صدق أحدهما لذاته كذب الآخر و قد قرع أسماعهم من أن نقيض كل شيء رفعه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩٤

فتارة قلبوا القول بأن نقيض كل شيء رفعه إلى القول بأن رفع كل شيء نقيضه- و جعلوا كلا من الطرفين نقيضا للآخر و أما الرفع فهو مختص بجانب السلب دون الثبوت- و تارة ذكروا أن حقيقة التناقض كون المفهومين أحدهما رفعا للآخر و الآخر مرفوعا به- و جعلوه بهذا المعنى من النسب المتكررة من الجانبين و الأولى أن يقال إن صحة تكرر النقيض و الرفع من الجانبين لأجل أن أحد الطرفين نقيض للآخر بالذات و الآخر نقيض له بالعرض لأنه يصدق عليه نقيض النقيض و رفع الرفع فيكون بينهما تناقض متكرر في الطرفين في الجملة و هذا القدر كاف في إجراء صيغة التفاعل و الأمر في ذلك سهل عند طالب الحق و الغاية الآخرة.

و بالجملة لا بد أن يكون مفهوم أحد الطرفين بعينه رفع الآخر و أما الآخر فغير متعين فيه أن يكون أمرا بخصوصه و لا هو مشروط بتخصص معنى إلا عدم كون مفهومه بعينه رفعا لذلك الرفع و لا أيضا مشروط بأن مفهومه المرفوع به بل الواجب أن يكون شيئا متصفا بكونه مرفوعا بذلك الرفع سواء كان هو في نفسه رفعا لشيء آخر أو لا فقد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩٥

اتضح أن في المتقابلين تقابل السلب و الإيجاب لا بد أن يكون أحد الجانبين مفهوم السلب بعينه و يكون الجانب الآخر المقابل للسلب إيجابا إضافيا بالقياس إليه سواء تحقق في فرد الإيجاب الحقيقي أو في غيره من السلوب.

ثم ليعلم أن هذا النحو من التقابل كما يوجد بين القضيتين كذلك يوجد بين مفهومين مفردين إما بحسب حمل على بالقياس إلى موضوع بعينه كما بين الإنسان و اللاإنسان و زيد و لا زيد أو لا إنسان و لا لا زيد و لا لا زيد أو بحسب وجود في بالنسبة إلى موضوع بعينه كما بين السواد في شيء و رفعه عنه أو رفع السواد و رفعه عنه فيمتنع أن يكون شيء من الموضوعات المعينة خاليا عن المتقابلين بحسب حمل على و هو حمل هو هو.

و كذا يستحيل أن يوجد شيء من الموضوعات فارغا عنهما بحسب وجود في و هو حمل الاشتقاق فكما أن كل شيء إما بياض و إما لا بياض على سبيل المنفصلة الحقيقية - فكذلك كل شيء إما أبيض و إما لا أبيض بمعنى أنه إما ذو بياض و إما لا ذو بياض و القبيلان كلاهما تقابل في المفردات أنفسها و إن كان ذلك بحسب نسبتها إلى موضوع.

و كما أن رفع كل مفرد نقيضه بالذات و المرفوع به هو نقيضه بالعرض لأنه مصداق نقيض النقيض و رفع الرفع فكذا سلب كل قضية نقيضها و نقيض السلب بالذات سلب السلب - لكن يلزمه الإيجاب فنقيض كل إنسان حيوان هو ليس كل إنسان بحيوان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩٦

و نقيض لا شيء من الحجر إنسان هو ليس لا شيء من الحجر إنسان لكن لو صدق هذا السلب الاستغراقي المستوعب للجميع فيلزمه الإيجاب في البعض و لأجل ذلك حكم الميزانيون بأن نقيض الإيجاب الكلي سلب جزئي و نقيض السلب الكلي إيجاب جزئي

أصل آخر

لما تذكرت أن لمفهوم واحد نقيضا من طريق حمل هو هو و نقيض من طريق حمل ذو هو فاستيقن أن المتناقضين من طريق حمل الاشتقاق كما استحال اجتماعهما بحسب الجمل الاشتقائي في موضوع واحد فكذلك يستحيل صدقهما مواطاة على موضوع واحد - فلا يصح أن يحمل الحركة و اللاحركة على شيء واحد و أما المتناقضان على نحو الحمل التواطي فإنما المستحيل اجتماعهما من حيث المفهوم بحمل على في موضوع واحد و هو حمل هو هو لا اجتماعهما من حيث التحقق و الوجود في موضوع بعينه فإن ذلك غير ممتنع فالسواد مثلا يوجد مع الحركة في موضوع واحد و كل منهما نقيض الآخر بالمعنى الذي مر ذكره فقد اجتمع النقيضان في موضوع واحد و السر في ذلك أن السواد ليس نقيض الحركة بالذات بل فرد لما هو نقيضه بالعرض بحسب حمل التواطي و كذا الحركة بالقياس إلى السواد فالسواد و اللاسواد نقيضان مواطاة و كذا اشتقاقا أعني ذا السواد و لا ذا السواد و أما ذو السواد و ذو اللاسواد فلا تناقض بينهما إذ الموضوع إذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩٧

وجد فيه سواد و حركة فصدق عليه أنه ذو سواد و صدق عليه أنه ذو حركة فصدق عليه أنه ذو لا سواد إذ الحركة لا سواد بحمل التواطي و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يصدق عليه أنه أسود و أنه لا أسود فإن ذا السواد و إن كان معناه بعينه معنى أسود إلا أن ذا اللاسواد ليس معناه معنى لا أسود نعم لو أريد من اللاسواد نفس هذا المفهوم السلبي لا شيء آخر معروض له أو متحد به في الوجود كالحركة في مثالنا حينئذ يكون التناقض بينهما حاصلا - إذ يكون حينئذ مفاد قولنا هذا ذو اللاسواد

بعينه مفاد قولنا هذا لا أسود فتدبر فيه كي ينفعك فيما نحن بصدده إن شاء الله.

أصل آخر فيه قانون

أنحاء الحثيات وأقسام الجهات التي لا بد من مراعاتها لئلا يقع الإنسان في الغلط حتى يظن الكثيرة واحد والواحد كثير وذلك لجهله بأن أي الاعتبارات المختلفة يوجب كثرة في الذات وأنها لا يوجب كما وقع لطائفة حيث جوز كثير من الناس صدور الكثيرة من الواحد الحقيقي في أول الأمر ولم يشعروا بأن ذلك يخل بوحداية الأول وكذا منع كثير من الناس اتصافه تعالى بصفاته الكمالية - كالعلم والقدرة والإرادة وغيرها في مرتبة ذاته بذاته ولم يشعروا بأن تلك الصفات - مع أنها غير متحدة المفهوم لا توجب كثرة في الموصوف وكذا أحال الكثيرون من العقلاء علمه التفصيلي بالأشياء في مرتبة ذاته وقد علمت لب القول فيه فإذن نقول إن مطلق الحثيات إما تقييدية أو تعليلية والأولى هي التي جعلت كالجاء للتحيث بها كالناطق للإنسان و كالكاتب للمركب الصنفي والثانية هي التي كالخارج

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩٨

منه مثل كون الشيء علة و معلولا وإن كان التقيد والتحيث بها داخلا بشرط أن يكون التقيد بها مأخوذا على أنه تقيد لا على أنه قيد والتحيث تحيثا لا حيثية أي معنى حرفيا غير مستقل بالمفهومية كما علمت في الحصة من الفرق بينها وبين الفرد ثم الحثية التقييدية قد تكون في العنوانات بحسب المعبر به والحكاية دون المعبر عنه والمحكي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ١٩٩

عنه كما تقول الماهية من حيث الإطلاق أو لا بشرط شيء كذا وليس المراد به إلا نفس الماهية المرسله من غير اعتبار حيثية أخرى معها بخلاف ما إذا جعلت الإطلاق واللابشرطية والإرسال قيما للماهية فتقابل حينئذ للماهية المحيثة بشرط شيء أو بشرط لا شيء ولا يصدق المأخوذة مع الإطلاق على شيء منهما لكونها مقابلة لهما كما أنهما متقابلتان و أما المأخوذة على الوجه الأول فيصدق على كل منهما لكونها مطلقة مرسله في الواقع من غير اعتبار الإطلاق والإرسال معها.

ثم نقول إن اختلاف الحثيات التعليلية لا توجب كثرة في نفس الموضوع بل في ما خرج عنه وأما اختلاف الحثيات التقييدية فالمشهور عند الجمهور أنها تقتضي كثرة في ذات الموضوع لكن الفحص والبرهان يحكمان بالفرق بين اختلافها - من جهة المعنى والمفهوم ومن جهة الحقيقة والوجود فكل مفهوم من المفهومات مقتضاه مغايرته مع سائر المفهومات بحسب المفهوم والمعنى ولكن بعضها مما لا يابى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٠

الاتحاد مع بعض ألا ترى أن مفهوم الوجود غير مفهوم الشخص من حيث المعنى وعينه من حيث الحقيقة وكذا مفهوم العاقل والمعقول متغايران معنى ولا ينافي ذلك اجتماعهما من حيثية واحدة في ذات واحدة بسيطة من كل الوجوه فمقتضى التغاير بحسب المفهوم عدم حمل أحدهما على الآخر بالحمل الذاتي الأولي دون عدم حمله على الآخر بالحمل الصناعي الذي مناطه الاتحاد في الوجود لا في المفهوم فقد يصدق معنى على آخر بالحمل الشائع

و يكذب عليه بالحمل الذاتي الذي مفاده الاتحاد في المفهوم - فعلمه تعالى غير قدرته بحسب المعنى و لكن عينها بحسب الوجود الواجب كما سبق ذكره مرارا فاتضح أن الحشيات التقييدية قد تكون متخالفة المعنى فقط و لا يقدر ذلك في بساطة ذات الموضوع و هويته و قد تكون مع ذلك مكثرة لذات الموضوع و هويته **قسمة أخرى** ثم الحشيات المتخالفة المستوجبة لاختلاف ذات الموضوع و تكثرها على قسمين فحرب منها حشيات مختلفة بالذات متغايرة في نفسها لكنها غير متقابلة بنحو من أنحاء التقابل الأربعة أصلا إلا بالعرض كالشكل و المقدار و اللون و الطعم و الرائحة و الحرارة و الحركة و الإضافة و غيرها من أنواع المقولات التسع و ضرب منها حشيات متقابلة بالذات نوعا من أنواع التقابل كالسود و البياض و العلم و الجهل و التقدم و التأخر - بالقياس إلى الشيء الواحد و الوجود و العدم.

أصل آخر جميع الحشيات الذاتية و العرضية مشتركة

في أن مناط الاتصاف بشيء منها ليس بعينه مناط الاتصاف بالآخر أعني بذلك أنه لا يصح للشيء التقييد بحشية منها من حيث التقييد بالحشية الأخرى فليست إنسانية الإنسان من حيث كاتبيتها و لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠١

الناطقية له من حيث حيوانيته و لا المتحركية له من حيث المتشككية و إلا لكان كل حيوان ناطقا و كل إنسان كاتباً بالفعل و كل متشكل متحركاً هذا كله بحسب الوجود و كذا بحسب المفهوم فليس الاتصاف بالعقلية بحسب المفهوم عين الاتصاف بالمعقولية بحسب المفهوم و إلا لكانا لفظين مترادفين لمعنى واحد و القوم لم يفرقوا بين القبيلتين كما سبقت الإشارة إليه فقالوا قولا مطلقا إن ما يلحق الذات بحسب حشية ما أية حشية كانت ليس يصح أن يلحقها بحسب حشية أخرى و أن الحشيات كلها متصادمة كانت أم غير متصادمة يجمعها أنها غير متصححة الحصول إلا بالاستناد إلى حشيات مختلفة سابقة تعليلية و إن لم يكن من حقها مطلقا أن لا تعرض لذات واحدة إلا من بعد حشيات مختلفة تقييدية سابقة مكثرة للذات قبل العروض.

و أما الحشيات المتقابلة بخصوصها فلا بد في طباعها مع ما ذكر أنها لا يوجد في موضوع واحد شيء منها في الواقع إلا بعد خلوة عن المقابل الآخر و لا يكفي في صحة اجتماع المتقابلين في موضوع واحد بوجه من الوجوه كونه ذا كثرة تحليلية عقلية بل لا بد فيه من كثرة وجودية خارجية باختلاف الموضوع بالحشية التقييدية بحسب مرتبة مراتب نفس الأمر كاختلاف أجزاء الماهية النوعية مثل الحيوانية و الناطقية في الإنسان المتميزين بحسب تحليل الذهن لا يستصح به إمكان اجتماع المتقابلين فيه كالعلم و الجهل و السود و البياض - بل لا بد لوجودهما معا في زمان واحد من وجود موضوعين متغايرين وجود.

و أما الحشيات التقييدية المختلفة التي يجوز عند العقل انتفاء بعض منها مع بقاء البعض كالسود و الحركة مثلا فهي و إن كانت جائزة الاجتماع في موضوع واحد طبيعي - لكن بشرط أن يكون بإزائها مباد و جهات مختلفة متغايرة الوجود سواء كانت متلازمة التحقق أم لا و ذلك كالقوى النباتية و الحيوانية لأجل صدور الأفاعيل و الآثار المتفننة عنها.

أصل آخر

إنك تستطيع مما ذكره أن تعلم أن اتصاف الشيء بصفة من الصفات في الواقع ليس يستدعي اتصافه في كل مرتبة من مراتب الواقع و لا أيضا يستوجب اتصافه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٢

بها من جميع الحشيات التي تثبت لهذا الموضوع فإذا قلنا زيد موجود في الواقع فيكفي لنا في صدق هذا الحكم اتصاف زيد بالوجود في الجملة وإن لم يكن موجودا في مرتبة نفس ماهيته مجردة عن تأثير الفاعل فإذا قلنا زيد أسود فلا يلزم أن يكون اتصافه بالسواد - من حيث إنسانيته و لا من حيث كتابته و لا من حيث علمه و قدرته و سخاوته و شجاعته إلى غير ذلك من الصفات و الحشيات التي لا مدخل لها في السوادية فالسواد مسلوب عن زيد - من حيث ثبوت تلك الأمور التي أشرنا إليها و على ذلك لا يضر عدم صدقه من تلك الحشيات صدقه في الواقع و ذلك لأن تحقيق الشيء يقع بتحقق نحو من انحاء الوقوع و ارتفاعه بارتفاع جميع الأنحاء.

فإذا تقرر هذا نقول إذا اتصف موضوع بسيط الذات من جميع الوجوه بصفة من الصفات فيجب أن يتصف بها بجميع الاعتبارات و في كل مرتبة من مراتب نفس الأمر فالذي سبق بيانه من أن المتقابلين بحمل على قد لا يكونان متقابلين بحسب وجود في كالأرائحة و اللون المجتمعين في موضوع مثل التفاحة التي وجدت فيها رائحة و لون و اللون لا رائحة إنما يستقيم ذلك إذا لم يكن الموضوع واحدا صرفا و الحشيات فيه واحدة ففي مثال التفاحة لو كانت حشية الرائحة بعينها هي حشية اللون لكان قولنا فيها رائحة و فيها لا رائحة بمنزلة قولنا الرائحة لا رائحة فيلزم حينئذ أن يكون النقيضان من سبيل حمل على نقيضين من سبيل وجود في فالذي قد سبق ذكره من أن الشيء و نقيضه بحسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٣

حمل على لا يتناقضان من جهة الاقتران بينهما في الثبوت من سبيل وجود في إنما يتصحح ذلك الحكم بحسب تحقق أصل الوجود للموضوع في متن الأعيان و لو من جهة واحدة هي صدوره عن الفاعل و بحسب مطلق الاقتران بينهما فيه لا الاقتران من كل حشية و جهة.

و أما إذا كان اقتران الموضوع بأحد المتقابلين من طريق حمل على كاللون و الحركة بنفس الحشية التي اقترن بحسبها بالآخر حتى كانت الحشية التي من جهتها بخصوصها و بحسب كنه حقيقتها يترتب عليها اللاحركة أعني اللون في موضوع بعينه هي بعينها الحشية التي من جهتها و بحسبها يترتب الحركة في ذلك الموضوع كانت اللاحركة حركة بالضرورة فإذا لم من اجتماع النقيضين من طريق حمل على و هما الحركة و اللاحركة بحسب وجود في من حشية واحدة اجتماعهما بحسب حمل على أيضا و ذلك بديهي الاستحالة على أن العقل السليم المفطور على الاستقامة يحكم قبل الرجوع إلى البرهان أن الحشية التي بها يكون انبعاث الحركة عن شيء ليست بعينها الحشية التي بها يكون انبعاث اللاحركة و إلا لكانت الحركة لا حركة بل كانت تلك الحشية غير تلك الحشية بل كان ذلك الموضوع بعينه لا ذلك الموضوع بعينه و الكل باطل فقد تحقق و تبين أن المتناقضين حسب حمل على كالسواد و الحركة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٤

إنما يصح اجتماعهما في موضوع واحد بحسب وجود في بشرط أن يكون الاقتران بهما من حشيتين مختلفتين تقيديتين لا من حشية واحدة

الفصل (٢) في أن أول ما يصدر عن الحق الأول يجب أن يكون أمرا واحدا

هذه الأصول الممهدة التي قد مر ذكرهما مما يستقل به العقل النظري الذي ليس لعينه غشاوة التقليد ولا لمرآته رين العصبية و ظلمة العناد لإثبات أن الواحد الحق الصرف و كذا الواحد بما هو واحد لا يصدر عنه من تلك الحيثية إلا واحد و أن ليس في طباع الكثرة بما هي كثرة أن تصدر عن الواحد و أن يصدر عنها مبدعان معا بل واحد فواحدا إلى أن يتكثر الجهات و الحيثيات - و يفتح باب الخيرات فلعل هذا الأصل من فطريات الطبع السليم و الذوق المستقيم كما مر ذكره إلا أن المعاندين لأهل الحق جحدوا هذا الأصل أشد جحودا كيلا يفتح على أحد باب الحكمة و لا ينكشف إثبات النور المجرد و الجوهر المفارق و الصورة المفارقة عن المواد و الأجرام و الأبعاد في عالم الإمكان لأنهم لثقل طبائعهم عن الخروج إلى نشأة أخرى - و مجاورة العاكفين حمى حرم الله و كعبة القدس و البيت الحرام قعدوا أول مرة مع القاعدين و لو أرادوا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٥

الخروج لأعدوا له عدة و لكن كره الله انبعاثهم و ثبطهم و قيل اقعدوا مع القاعدين - و يشبه أن يكون أكثر هؤلاء المجادلين خصماء الروحانيين و أعداء الملائكة المقربين ضميرا و قلبا و إن لم يصرحوا بما أضمره لسانا و نطقا كاليهود كما في قوله تعالى **قُلْ مَنْ كَانَ عَدُوًّا لِجِبْرِيلَ فَإِنَّهُ نَزَّلَهُ عَلَى قَلْبِكَ بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ** فلا جرم حاول أهل الحق إثبات هذا المطلب بالحجة القاطعة و دفع الشبه عنه صونا لعقائد الطالبين للحق عن شكوك المضلين المعطلين. فقالوا كما سلف ذكره في السفر الأول في ضوابط العلة و المعلول أنه لو صدر عن الواحد من حيث هو واحد ا و ب مثلا و ا ليس ب فقد صدر عنه من الجهة الواحدة ب و ما ليس ب و ذلك يتضمن اجتماع النقيضين و قد مر ذكر بعض الشكوك على هذا البرهان مع أجوبيتها هناك و قد أوردنا أيضا هناك اعتراض إمام الباحثين المعترضين على الحكمة متمنطقا على رئيس صناعة الميزان مع الإشارة إلى موضع الاشتباه و معرض الخلل و الخبط. و هنا نقول بعد تمهيد هذه الأصول إن من الواضح المنكشف بما سبق أن صدور ما ليس ب بعينه في قوة عدم صدور ب من حيثية صدور ما ليس ب و إلا لكان ما ليس ب هو بعينه ب و إن لم يكن هو في قوة عدم صدور ب بحسب أصل الواقع و أصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٦

الوجود في نفس الأمر فإن ما ليس برائحة في الجسم و إن لم يكن بمنزلة ما ليست فيه رائحة في مطلق التحقق فيمكن اجتماع ما ليس برائحة مع ما هو رائحة في جسم واحد - لكن لا يمكن وجود ما هو رائحة فيه من حيثية التي وجد فيه ما ليس برائحة و إلا لكان ما هو رائحة و ما ليس هو برائحة شيئا واحدا. و الحاصل أن النقيضين بحمل على إنما يجوز اجتماعهما في موضوع واحد بعينه باعتبار حمل الاشتقاق من حيثيتين مختلفتين تعليليتين [تقيديتين] لا من حيثية واحدة و إلا لزم التناقض لا محالة و هذا الأسلوب قريب المأخذ مما سلكناه في دفع شبهة صاحب المباحث من أن الفاعل بنفس ذاته إذا صدر منه ا كانت ذاته بخصوصها مصدرا لا بمعنى أن ذاته بخصوصها مصداق لهذا المفهوم و هو بعينه عنوان لتلك الخصوصية فلو صدرت عنه ب أيضا بحسب تلك

الخصوصية كانت تلك الخصوصية مصداقا لصدور غير ا ولا شبهة في أن صدور ا و صدور ليس ا متخالفان في المفهوم فيلزم أن يكون تلك الخصوصية غير تلك الخصوصية و هو محال.

و يقرب من هذا في إصابة الحق ما ذكره الكاتب في شرح الملخص فإنه بعد ما حرر كلام الماتن و قرر المنع المذكور أعني منع كون صدور لا ا مثلاً مستلزماً لـ لا صدور ا قال قال و إن سلم فلا تناقض بين قولنا صدر عنه ا و لم يصدر عنه ا لأنهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٧

مطلقتان و إن قيدت إحدهما بالدوام كانت كاذبة.

أقول المطلقتان إنما يصدقان لاحتمال وقوع كل منهما في زمان فإذا اتحد الزمان فيهما لم يمكن اجتماعهما في الصدق ثم لا يخفى أنه جعل الحثيات بمنزلة الأزمنة إذ لا معنى لاعتبار الزمان هاهنا و أراد بالمطلقتين ما لم يقيد الحكم بعموم الحثيات و بالدوام ما قيد بعمومها و حينئذ نقول إنما جاز صدق المطلقتين بهذا المعنى لاحتمال اختلاف الحثية أما إذا اتحدت الحثية فلا يمكن صدقهما معا و ذلك ظاهر.

قال و عند هذا يظهر انعكاس تشنيع الإمام الرازي على الشيخ إليه

الفصل (٣) في سياقة أخرى من الكلام لتبيين هذا المرام أورده بهمنيار في كتاب التحصيل تلخيصاً لما قد تكرر ذكره في كلام الشيخ الرئيس سيما في التعليقات

حيث قال و اعلم أن البسيط الذي لا تركيب فيه أصلاً لا يكون علة لشيئين معا معية بالطبع فإنه لا يصدر عنه شيء إلا بعد أن يجب صدوره عنه فإن صدر عن ا ج من حيث يجب صدور ب عنه لم يكن حينئذ واجبا صدور ب عنه فإنه إن صدر عنه ج من حيث يجب صدور ب عنه كان من حيث وجب صدور ب عنه يصدر عنه ما ليس ب فلا يكون إذن صدور ب عنه واجبا فإذن كل بسيط فإن ما يصدر عنه أولاً يكون إحدى الذات انتهى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٨

واعترض عليه الفاضل الدواني في حاشية التجريد بقوله و أنت تعلم أنه يتوجه عليه أنه لا يلزم من المفروض و هو صدور ج من حيث يجب صدور ب أن لا يكون ب واجبا بل أن يكون ب واجبا من حيث وجب ج بعينه و هل الكلام إلا في نفيه.

أقول زيادة قيد الوجوب في هذه السياقة تفيد أن العلة الموجبة للشيء لا بد و أن يكون فيها من الخصوصية بالقياس إلى معلولها بعينه ما لا يكون لها تلك الخصوصية إلى معلولها الآخر لو فرض بعينه كما لا يكون لعلّة أخرى لو فرضت بالقياس إلى هذا المعلول أو معلول آخر فتلك الخصوصية الذاتية مبداً إيجاب المعلول المعين بخصوصه و منشأ انبعائه بما هي هي و ليس المراد بالخصوصية أو الحثية هنا المفهوم المصدري الذي يجوز كسائر المعاني المصدرية أن يتعدد بتعدد ما أضيف إليه بل المبدأ الخاص الذي يكون بجوهر ذاته و حاق تعينه مصداق الحثية المذكورة التي يعبر عنها بصدور كذا و بترتب كذا- و يعبر عن مبدئها أيضاً تارة بالحثية و تارة بالخصوصية.

و بالجملة كل ممكن موجود فإنه متعلق الوجود و الوجوب بوجوب سابق هو وجوب حصوله عن الفاعل فوجوب

حصوله قائم بالفاعل كما مر ذكره في بيان كون كل ممكن محفوظاً بالوجوبين وقد علمت من طريقتان أن هذا الوجوب السابق وإن كان صفة للممكن لكنه يتحصل بالفاعل ولا شبهة في أن وجوب زيد مثلاً كوجوده يباين وجوب عمرو ولا يمكن أن يكون لذاتين متغايرتين وجوب واحد كما لا يمكن لهما وجود واحد وقيام هذا الوجوب السابق بفاعل الشيء كقيام إمكانه وقوة استعداده بقلبه - وكما لا يكون لحادثين إمكان واحد سابق عليهما بالزمان فكذا لا يكون لمعلولين متغايرين - وجوب واحد سابق عليهما بالذات.

فإذن نقول وجوب صدور المعلول عن المبدأ الأول إما لذاته أو لأجل غيره - فإن كان لغيره لم يكن مستنداً إليه بالذات والكلام فيما يستند إليه بالذات لأجل واسطة وإن كان صدوره منه بغير واسطة والمبدأ مبدأ له لذاته وفي ذاته بعينها وجوب وجود ذلك الأثر فإذا كانت ذاته أمراً واحداً حقيقياً فلا يتصور منه حصول شيئين على سبيل الوجوب في درجة واحدة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٠٩

فالذي سبق إلى بعض الأوهام السخيفة أنه من الجائز أن يكون للواحد المحض بنفس ذاته مناسبة ذاتية بالنسبة إلى شيئين مثلاً لا يكون تلك المناسبة له بالقياس إلى غيرهما من سائر الأشياء فهما يتعينان من بين الأشياء لأجل تلك المناسبة - بالصدور عنه في درجة واحدة.

فمن ساقط الاعتبار ومستبين الفساد عند التأمل فإن مطلق الخصوصية والخصوصية الإضافية غير الخصوصية المعينة فهي كسائر المطلقات لا تغني عن الحاجة إلى التعيين.

فنقول إن ذينك الشيئين لا بد لهما من جهة اشتراك في مطلق الخصوصية الإضافية - وجهة خصوصية لكل منهما متميزا بها عن خصوصية صاحبه فإذا منشأ تلك المناسبة الذاتية التي تكون للمبدأ بالقياس إليهما أما إحدى الخصوصيتين بخصوصها فهي بعينها ملاك الصدور ومصحح المعلولية فلم يصح صدور الآخر منهما عن تلك العلة وأما القدر المشترك ومطلق الخصوصية من غير اعتبار شيء من الخصوصيتين في تحقق تلك المناسبة إلا على وجه الاتفاق والتبعية فقد عاد الأمر في صحة الصدور إلى مناسبة العلة للأمر الواحد المشترك فلا يصح صدور شيء من إحدى الهويتين المخصوصتين عنها بتلك المناسبة المشتركة فالمعلول بالحقيقة هو ذلك الأمر الواحد لو كانت وحدته وحدة تحصيلية لا كالوحدات المبهمة المرسلّة التي هي في الوجود والتحصل تفتقر إلى مخصص ذاتي مقوم للوجود وإن لم يكن مقوماً للحد والمفهوم - فإذا انكشف أنه يستحيل صدور معلولين عن علة واحدة بسيطة في درجة واحدة من جهة واحدة

الفصل (٤) وهناك مساق آخر في البرهان على هذا الأصل إفادة الشيخ الرئيس في أكثر كتبه كالشفاء والإشارات والتعليقات وغيرها

وهو أن مفهوم إن كذا في حد ذاته بحيث يصدر عنه ألف غير مفهوم إن كذا في حد ذاته بحيث يصدر عنه ب فالمفهومان المختلفان إما أن يكونا مقومين لتلك

العلة و إما أن يكونا لازمين لها و إما أن يكون أحدهما مقوما و الآخر لازما لها فإن كان المفهومان مقومين لتلك العلة كانت العلة مركبة لا واحدة من كل وجه و إن كان لازمين و اللازم معلول فيعود التقسيم من الرأس في أن مفهوم إنه صدر عنه أحد اللازمين - مغاير لمفهوم إنه صدر عنه اللازم الآخر فإن كان لا ينتهي إلى كثرة في المقوم لزم أن يكون كل لازم لازما بواسطة لازم آخر و هذا الكلام كل مع أنه يلزم منه إثبات لوازم مترتبة غير متناهية و فيه قول بإثبات علل و معلولات غير متناهية يلزم منه نفي اللوازم أصلا لأن تلك الماهية إما أن تقتضي لما هي هي أن يكون لها لازم أو لا تقتضي - فإن اقتضت كان ذلك اللازم لازما لما هي هي فيكون بغير وسط و قد فرض كلها بوسط هذا خلف و إن كانت الماهية لا تقتضي شيئا أصلا فهذا اعتراف بأنه ليس لها شيء من اللوازم.

فقد ظهر أن القول بإثبات اللوازم غير المتناهية يوجب فساد القول بها و أما إن جعل أحد المفهومين مقوما للعلة و الآخر لازما لها فحينئذ لا يكون المفهومان معا في الدرجة - لأن المقوم متقدم و المتقدم ليس ما ليس بمتقدم و يرجع حاصل ذلك إلى أن ذلك اللازم هو المعلول فقط فيكون المعلول واحدا فإنه حينئذ لا يكون حيثية استلزام العلة ذلك اللازم هي بعينها حيثية ذلك المقوم و يلزم أن يكون مبدأ حيثية الاستلزام غير خارج عن ذاته و إلا فعاد الكلام و على الجملة مع جميع التقديرات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١١

يلزم من صدور الاثنين عنه تركيب و تكثر إما في ماهية العلة أو لأنها موجودة بعد كونها شيئا ما أو بعد وجودها بتفريق لها و الأول كما في الجسم بحسب ماهيته الجوهرية من مادة و صورة و من جنس و فصل. و الثاني كما في العقل الأول بحسب التكثر الذي يلزمه عند وجوده من حيث تغاير ماهيته و وجوده. و الثالث كما في الشيء المنقسم إلى أجزائه المقدارية المتأخرة عنه في الوجود أو إلى جزئياته و تلك أنحاء الكثرة قبل الوجود و مع الوجود و بعد الوجود فإذن كل ما يلزم عنه اثنان معا ليس أحدهما بتوسط فهو منقسم الحقيقة أو متكثر الهوية بوجه البتة.

فقد ظهر أن العلة الواحدة بما هي واحدة لا يصدر عنها أكثر من معلول واحد من غير توسط و إنما اشترط أن لا يكون شيء منهما بتوسط لأن الأشياء الكثيرة يصح أن تصدر جميعا عن الواحد الحقيقي و لكن لا في درجة واحدة بل البعض بتوسط بعض

الفصل (٥) في ذكر شكوك أوردت على هذه القاعدة و الإشارة إلى دفعها

قال صاحب التشكيك في المحصل -

مسألة العلة الواحدة يجوز أن يصدر عنها أكثر من معلول واحد عندنا خلافا للفلاسفة و المعتزلة لنا أن الجسمية يقتضي الحصول في المكان و قبول الأعراض احتجوا بأن مفهوم كونه مصدرا لأحد المعلولين غير مفهوم كونه مصدرا للآخر فالمفهومان المتغايران إن كانا داخليين في ماهية المصدر لم يكن المصدر فردا بل كان مركبا و إن كانا خارجيين كانا معلولين فيكون الكلام في كيفية صدورهما عنه - كالكلام في الأول فيفضي إلى التسلسل و إن كان أحدهما داخلا و الآخر خارجا كانت الماهية مركبة لأن الداخل هو جزء الماهية و ما له جزء كان مركبا و كان المعلول أيضا واحدا لأن الداخل لا يكون معلولا.

أقول هذا هو البرهان الذي نقلناه عن الشيخ مع تغيير لفظ المقوم في الشق الثالث بالداخل و بهذا التغيير أفسد صورة البرهان لعدم انحصار الشقوق في الثلاثة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١٢

بل بقي شق رابع و هو أن يكون أحدهما عين المصدر و الآخر خارجا فكان يجب ذكره ثم يشار فيه إلى الخلف بأحد الوجهين أو كليهما من لزوم كون ما فرض معلولا علة و ما فرض اثنين واحدا. ثم قال و الجواب أن مؤثرية الشيء ليست صفة ثبوتية على ما بيناه و إذا كان كذلك بطل أن يقال إنه جزء الماهية أو خارج عنها.

و قال المحقق الطوسي ره في نقده للمحصل أقول الأشعرية قالوا الصفة الواحدة لا تقتضي أكثر من حكم أما الذات الواحدة فلم يقولوا ذلك فيه إذ لم يقول بعلية ما عدا الصفات و المعتزلة و الفلاسفة قالوا بذلك في الذوات أيضا و صاحب الكتاب خالف الكل و الحصول في المكان أمر وجودي و معلول للجسمية من باب التأثير و قبول الأعراض ليس بوجودي عنده و هو و إن كان وجوديا عندهم لكنه من باب التأثير و هم لا يمنعون كون العلة الواحدة مع كونها فاعلة كونها منفعة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١٣

فليس هذا الدليل بصحيح و دليلهم غير مبني على كون المؤثرية ثبوتية بل مفهومه أن مؤثرية المؤثر الواحد في أثر لا يكون من جهة مؤثرته في غير ذلك الأثر ثم الجهتان إما داخلتان أو غير داخلتين إلى آخره. ثم قال صاحب الكتاب و الذي يدل عليه هو أن مفهوم كون النقطة محاذية - لهذه النقطة من الدائرة غير مفهوم كونها محاذية للنقطة الأخرى و لم يلزم من تغاير هذه المفهومات كون النقطة مركبة و كذا مفهوم كون الألف ليس ب مغاير لمفهوم أنه ليس ج و لم يلزم من تغاير هذه السلوب وقوع الكثرة في الماهية فكذا هنا. فقال الناقد المحقق أقول الإضافة و السلب لا يعقلان في شيء واحد و عندهم أن العلة الواحد لا يصدر عنها شيان من حيث إنها واحدة و لا يمنعون صدور شيئين يقبلهما قبالان عنها فلا يتوجه النقض بالإضافة و السلب عليهم انتهى كلام ناقد المحصل بالفاظه و ستعلم منا الكلام في تحقيق الأمر من جهة صدق السلوب عليه تعالى و أنه من أي وجه يصح صدقها على ذات أحدية و الإشارة إلى قصور نظر القوم عن بلوغ الإصابة في ذلك. و اعترض أيضا في بعض كتبه تارة في صورة النقض و تارة في صورة المعارضة بأن الواحد قد يسلب عند أشياء كثيرة كقولنا هذا الشيء ليس بحجر و ليس بشجر و قد يوصف بأشياء كثيرة كقولنا هذا الرجل قائم و قاعد و قد يقبل أشياء كثيرة كالجوهر الواحد يقبل السواد و الحركة و لا شك في أن مفهومات سلب تلك الأشياء عنه و اتصافه بتلك الأشياء و قبوله لتلك الأشياء مختلفة و يعود التقسيم المذكور حتى يلزم أن الواحد لا يسلب عنه إلا واحد و لا يوصف إلا بواحد و لا يقبل إلا واحدا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١٤

و أجاب عنه المحقق الطوسي ره في شرح الإشارات أن سلب الشيء عن الشيء و اتصاف الشيء بالشيء و قبول الشيء للشيء أمور لا يتحقق عند وجود شيء واحد لا غير - فإنها لا تلزم الشيء الواحد من حيث هو واحد بل تستدعي وجود أشياء فوق واحد تتقدمها - حتى يلزم تلك الأمور لتلك الأشياء باعتبارات مختلفة و صدور الأشياء الكثيرة عن الأشياء الكثيرة ليس بمحال بيانه أن السلب يفتقر إلى ثبوت مسلوب و مسلوب عنه يتقدمانه - و لا يكفي فيه ثبوت المسلوب عنه فقط فكذاك الاتصاف يفتقر إلى ثبوت موصوف و صفة - و القابلية إلى ثبوت قابل و مقبول أو إلى قابل و شيء يوجد المقبول فيه و اختلاف المقبول كالسواد و الحركة يفتقر إلى اختلاف القابل فإن الجسم يقبل السواد من حيث ينفع عن غيره و يقبل الحركة من حيث يكون له حال لا تمنع خروجه عنها و أما صدور الشيء عن الشيء فامر يكفي في تحقيقه فرض شيء واحد هو العلة و إلا امتنع استناد جميع المعلومات إلى مبدأ واحد انتهى كلامه.

أقول جميع ما ذكره في هذا الكلام صحيح إلا الذي دفع به النقض بالسلب - فإن لأحد أن يقول سلب الشيء عن الشيء لا يتوقف على ثبوت الشيء المسلوب فالواحد الحق تعالى في أي مرتبة فرض متصف بسلب جميع ما عداه عنه و هذا إشكال قوي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١٥

لا يمكن التفصي عنه إلا بما حققناه فإن حيثية سلب الحجرية عن الإنسان لا يمكن أن يكون بعينها حيثية وجوده من حيث هو وجوده و لا أيضا وجود الحجر و هو ظاهر - فلا بد من تركيب في المسلوب عنه كالإنسان في مثالنا هذا حسب ما مر بيانه في مسألة توحيد الواجب تعالى و في تحقيق أن البسيط يجب أن يكون كل الأشياء

فحق الجواب عن هذا الإشكال

أن صدق تلك السلب كلها لكونها سلب النقص و إعدام الإعدام يرجع إلى إثبات الوجود التام الكامل الذي هو منشأ كل موجود - و تمام كل كائن و غاية كل كمال فلا فقد هناك أصلا إلا فقد الفقد و لا سلب إلا سلب السلب و هو نفس الوجود الواجب الأحد التام.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١٦

و أما الذي تفصى به الفاضل الدواني في حواشي شرح التجريد عن هذا الإشكال - من أن السلب يعتبر على وجهين الأول على وجه السلب المحض و حينئذ لا يكون شيئا منضمًا إلى العلة يتعدد العلة لأجله بل مصداقه أن يوجد ذات العلة و ينتفي غيرها - و حينئذ لا يعقل تعدد العلة و الثاني أن يعتبر له نحو تحقق لينضم إلى العلة و له بهذا الاعتبار نحو من الوجود و لا يحصل إلا بعد صدور الكثرة فلا يتعدد الصادر الأول لأجلها لأن تحققها بعده فتأمل انتهى كلامه فليس مما فيه جدوى لأن الذي استصعب في هذا المقام - أنا نعلم أن سلب أشياء كثيرة صادقة على الأول تعالى بمعنى أن ذاته بذاته بحيث متى لاحظ العقل شيئا من تلك الأشياء حكم بأنها مسلوبة عنه تعالى في بدو الأمر و أزل الأزال قبل وجود هذه الأشياء فلا مدخل لانضمام هذه الأشياء في مصداقية تلك السلب فالسلب المعتبر على الوجه الأول من الوجهين الذين ذكرهما و هو المأخوذ على وجه السلب المحض - و إن لم يحتج إلى انضمام شيء إلى العلة لكن يحتاج صدقه إلى أن يكون بإزائه في الموضوع و فيما يصدق عليه شيء.

وقوله بل مصداقه أن يوجد ذات العلة و ينتفي غيرها موضع خلط فإن مفهوم أن يوجد ذات العلة غير مفهوم أن ينتفي غيرها عنها ولا يجوز أن يكون حيثية الوجود بعينها حيثية الانتفاء ولو فرض بالقياس إلى أمرين كما مر.

وقال بعض أكابر الأعلام دام ظله في هذا المقام لدفع تلك النقوض التي أوردت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١٧

على أصل الحجة إنه لا مساق للاعتراض على هذه الحجة في شيء مما أورده أما الأول فلأن السلب البسيط بما هو سلب بسيط ليس يحوج صدقه إلى علة أو عليّة بل إنما مناطه انتفاء تحقق علة لصدق الإيجاب و أما الأخيران فلأن شيئاً من الاتصاف بالأشياء من الكثيرة و قبول الأشياء الكثيرة بالفعل ليس يتصحح إلا من تلقاء الإسناد إلى حيثيات تعليلية مختلفة فلا نقض و لا معارضة هناك أصلاً و إنما يتوجه شيء منهما لو لم يختلف حيثية مطلقاً انتهى كلامه.

أقول إن السلب البسيط قد يكون وارداً على النسبة الحكمية و يكون مفاده مفاد القضية السالبة فلا حاجة فيها إلى مطابق للحكم كما لا يحتاج إلى وجود موضوع من تلك الجهة و أما إذا صار في طرف الحكم أو جزء المحمول حتى يكون مفاد الحكم به مفاد قضية موجبة سالبة المحمول فلا بد هناك من وجود موضوع مطابق لذلك السلب البسيط و قد ثبت في ضابطة علم الميزان تسويغ رد السوالب إلى الموجبات عند وجود الموضوع فكلما صدق أن ليس كذا بجسم صدق أن كذا ليس بجسم فالسالبة البسيطة و الموجبة السالبة المحمول متلازمان في الصدق و التحقق عند وجود الموضوع - فإذا كان كذلك و لا شبهة في أن مفاد الموجبة هو الحكم باتحاد الطرفين أعني الموضوع و المحمول فلا بد لذلك السلب من نحو من الوجود سيما إذا كان مصداق الحمل نفس ذات الموضوع و كان الحمل حملاً بالذات لا بالعرض.

فإذن لا بد من تحقق تركيب في ذات الموضوع ليصح بحسبه كونه موجوداً كذا - و كونه موجوداً ليس كذا كما تقول الإنسان ليس بفرس ففيه تركيب من أمر به يوجد إنساناً و من أمر به يوجد لا فرساً و ليست حيثية الإنسانية بعينها حيثية اللافرسية كما مضى فلا بد في التخلص عن الإشكال المذكور باعتبار صدق السلوب على ذاته تعالى من المصير إلى ما سلكناه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١٨

و لذلك قال بعض المحققين إن جميع السلوب عن ذاته يرجع إلى سلب واحد - هو سلب الإمكان و مرجعه إلى وجود الوجود و وجه ذلك أن الإمكان معنى سلبي و يندرج تحته جميع النقائص و القصورات و القوى و الأعدام فسلب الإمكان عن شيء يستلزم سلب الكثرة و التركيب و الماهية و الجسمية و الجوهرية و العرضية و غير ذلك عنه فسلب كل منها عن الواجب يرجع إلى سلب الإمكان عنه و سلب الإمكان لكونه سلب ضرورة الوجود من حيث ذات الموجود في نفسها بما هي هي هو بعينه ضرورة الوجود و وجوب الذات من حيث هي هي.

أقول و كذا الإشكال الوارد على الأصل المذكور من جهة اتصافه تعالى بصفات إضافية كثيرة لا يندفع بما ذكره في وجه التفصي من أن تحقق هذه الإضافات إنما هو بعد وجود الأشياء التي يقع الإضافة له تعالى إليها و تكثرها تابع لتكثر تلك الأشياء - فإن لأحد أن يقول إنا نعيد الكلام إلى مبادي هذه الإضافات و موجباتها فإن أكثرها بل كلها مما يحتاج إلى مبدأ و خصوصية ينشأ منه الإضافة كالعلم و القدرة و الإرادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢١٩

و ما يجري مجراها ألا ترى أن علمنا بزيد و قدرتنا عليه و إرادتنا له ليس مجرد نسبة بيننا و بينه بل فينا صفة مستقرة بإزاء إضافتنا إليه و كذا علمنا بزيد و قدرتنا عليه و إرادتنا له - غير علمنا بعمر و قدرتنا عليه و إرادتنا له كيف و القوم قائلون بأنه تعالى يعلم جميع الممكنات في الأزل على الوجه التفصيلي قبل تكونها.

فالحق في الجواب أن يقال إن إضافته إلى الأشياء لا يتكرر بحسب الحقيقة كما أن صفاته الحقيقية لا تتكرر بحسب الحقيقة بل هوية الكل هوية واحدة وجودية فعاليتها تعالى بكل أحد من المعلومات بعينها قادريته عليه و هي بعينها مرديته له و أما تكرر إضافته تعالى إلى الأشياء بالعدد فإنما يكون على ترتيب و نظام لا يقدر في وحدته تعالى فإن إضافته إلى المعلول الأول مبدأ لإضافته إلى المعلول الثاني و هي لإضافته إلى الثالث و هكذا يتكرر الإضافات حسب تكرر المعلومات طولاً و عرضاً في سلسلة الإبداع و التكوين و كما أن الترتيب الواقع في ذوات المجموعات طولاً و عرضاً مما يصح صدور الكثرة عن الواحد الحق فكذا ترتب الإضافات على هذا الوجه يصح اتصافه تعالى بكثرة الإضافات

وهم وتنوير

و ربما توهم متوهم أنه إذا كان صدور المعلول عن العلة بحسب الخصوصية و المناسبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٠

فلا يكون العلة علة لذاتها بل باعتبار تلك الخصوصية و المناسبة فلا يكون واحداً حقيقياً لاشتمالها على أمرين مختلفين هما نفس الذات و اعتبار الخصوصية.

فإذن لا يتصح صدور المعلول الواحد عن العلة الواحدة إذ كل علة تكون لا محالة مركبة متكثرة بهذا الاعتبار فانسد بذلك إثبات أن أول الصوادر يجب أن يكون أمراً وحدانياً لجواز كونه مركباً لتركب ما هو علته فيزاح بأن الخصوصية إنما يراد بها هناك - ما هو مبدأ استيجاب التخصيص لمعلول معين بالصدور عن العلة دون غيره و التعبير بالخصوصية لضيق العبارة.

و بالجملة المراد بها مصداق مفهوم الخصوصية و ملاك صدقها و ذلك الأمر في صورة صدور الواحد عن المبدأ الأول يجب أن يكون عين ذاته و أما في صورة صدور الأشياء المتعددة لو فرض صدورها في درجة واحدة معاً فلا يمكن أن يكون الخصوصية التي بحسبها يصدر بعضها هي بعينها التي بحسبها يصدر البعض الآخر اللهم إلا خصوصية مرسله نسبتها إلى الكل واحدة فيحتاج في صدور كل منها إلى خصوصية أخرى - متميزة عن غيرها مع فرض الاشتراك في خصوصية ما مطلقة ليصح بها صدوره بعينه - فالأشياء إذا تساوت نسبتها بالصدور إلى مبدئها و استوت نسبة مبدئها إليها بالإيجاد - لزم تساويها في جميع ما لها حتى في الوجود و التشخص فلا يتصور هناك أمور متكثرة و موجودات متعددة. قال المحقق في شرح الإشارات لا يقال الصدور أيضاً لا يتحقق إلا بعد تحقق شيء يصدر عنه و شيء صادر لأننا نقول الصدور يطلق على معنيين أحدهما أمر إضافي يعرض للعلة و المعلول من حيث يكونان معاً و كلامنا ليس فيه و الثاني كون العلة بحيث يصدر عنها المعلول و هو بهذا المعنى متقدم على المعلول ثم على الإضافة العارضة لهما و كلامنا فيه

و هو أمر واحد إن كان المعلول واحداً و ذلك الأمر قد يكون ذات العلة بعينها إن كانت العلة علة لذاتها و قد يكون حالة تعرض لها إن كانت علة لا لذاتها بل بحسب حالة أخرى أما إذا كان المعلول فوق واحد فلا محالة يكون ذلك الأمر مختلفاً و يلزم منه التكثر في ذات العلة كما مر انتهت عبارته.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢١

بحث و تحصيل

ذكر أستاذنا السيد الأمجد دام مجده و بقاؤه إيراداً على الجواب المذكور بقوله التفتيش الغائص و الفحص البالغ هو أنه سبحانه بنفس ذاته الأحدية فاعل جوهر الصادر الأول و العلية الصدورية بالمعنى الثاني غير الإضافي الذي ذكره بالنسبة إلى الصادر الأول هو من مراتب الاعتبار السابقة على وجوده و تقررره و هي كون الباري الفعال بذاته بحيث يجب صدور المعلول الأول بخصوصه عنه فهذا المعنى غير الإضافي متقدم على ذات المعلول الأول ثم على العلية الصدورية الإضافية التي هي فرع وجود المتضائفين فهذا المعنى كما أنه متقدم بالمرتبة العقلية على ذات المعلول الأول و مستتبع إياه في الاعتبار العقلي فكذلك هو متأخر عن مرتبة ذات الباري الفعال و لازم له و ليس هو عين ذاته تعالى إنما العلية الصدورية غير الإضافية - التي هي عين ذاته تعالى معناها كونه بحسب مرتبة ذاته بحيث يجب عنه بالذات صدور كل ما هو خير مطلقاً لنظام الوجود على الإطلاق فإذن للعية الصدورية معنيان غير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٢

إضافيين و معنى ثالث إضافي و الذي هو عين ذاته من الأولين هو حيثية إفاضة الخيرات المطلقة على الإطلاق بالذات لا الذي هو بحسب خصوصية ذات معلول خاص بخصوصه - فالذي هو بحسب خصوصية ذات المعلول الأول إنما هو لازم نفس ذاته تعالى لا أنه عين مرتبة ذاته

و البرهان عليه من سبل ثلاثة.

الأول أن اعتبار وجوب صدور المعلول الأول بخصوصه

الذي هو أحد معنيي العلية الحقيقية المتقدمة بالذات على ذات المعلول متأخر بالذات عن مرتبة إمكانه - و متقدم على مرتبة وجوده كما عرفت في ترتيب المراتب العقلية السابقة على مرتبة وجود المعلول فما يكون متأخراً عن مرتبة إمكان المعلول كيف يصح أن يكون عين ذات مبدع الكل.

الثاني أن وحدة المعلول الأول عديدة فكذلك العلة

هي بالنسبة إليه بخصوصه يكون واحدة بالعدد أيضاً و وحدة الحق تعالى و كبرياؤه متقدسة عن الدخول في باب الأعداد.

الثالث أنه إنما يصح أن يكون عين ذاته سبحانه

من الصفات الكمالية ما يكون كمالاً مطلقاً للوجود بما هو وجود و من المستبين أن كونه جل ذكره بحيث يصدر عنه بالفعل هذا المعلول ليس هو من الكمالات المطلقة للوجود بما هو وجود مع عزل النظر عن كل اعتبار سواه و كل خصوصية دونه بل هو من أوصاف المجد و الكبرياء له جل ذكره - بالقياس إلى هذا المعلول بخصوصه و بالجملة علوه

و مجده هو أنه في ذاته بحيث يصدر عنه كل خير و يفيض عنه كل وجود و كل كمال وجود لا أن هذه الذات بخصوصها صنعها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٣

و هذا الوجود بخصوصه فيضه فالأخير كماله و مجده بحسب النسبة إلى خصوصيات الموجودات - و الأول مجده و كماله بحسب ذاته على الإطلاق و كذلك عزه و علاه جل سلطانه هو أن ذاته بحيث يدبر نظام الوجود و يخلق كل ماهية و إنية و يفعل كل ذات و وجود و كل كمال ذات و كمال وجود لا أن نظام الوجود بالفعل صوغه و صيغته و الموجودات بأسرها خلقه و خليقته و لذلك كان كماله في فعاليتها و خلاقته قبل وجود الممكنات و عند وجودها على سنن واحد كما مر نظيره في عالميته تعالى بكل شيء انتهى ما ذكره باختصاره.

أقول و في كلام هذا السيد الأجل موضع أبحاث.

الأول أنه يلزم على ما ذكره

أن يكون الصادر الأول عن الواجب أمرين أحدهما العقل الأول و الآخر تلك الخصوصية الزائدة على ذاته كما نص عليه مرارا في ما ذكره من الكلام و في ذي قبل في فصل آخر و ذلك ممتنع لا يقال لا يلزم مما ذكره كونهما معا في درجة واحدة بل الخصوصية سابقة على جوهر المعلول الأول في الوجود لأننا نقول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٤

فالصادر الأول بالحقيقة هو تلك الخصوصية لا غير فيحتاج صدورها إلى خصوصية أخرى بالقياس إليها و تلك الخصوصية السابقة عليها أيضا زائدة على ذاته حسب ما قرره و الكلام عائد في صدورها فيتسلسل الخصوصيات إلى غير النهاية لا يقال لعل تلك الخصوصية زائدة في اعتبار العقل و تحليله لا في الخارج فيكون من العوارض التحليلية لذاته تعالى.

لأننا نقول ليس الواجب جل ذكره ذا ماهية حتى يجري فيه التحليل العقلي - كما يجري فيما له وحدة خارجية و كثرة عقلية و الواجب منزّه عن أنحاء الكثرة مطلقا - فكما هو بسيط في الخارج بسيط من كل وجه و كما ليس يمكن فيه عارض و معروض بحسب الوجود كذلك لا يمكن بأي اعتبار أخذ.

الثاني أن حيثية كونه تعالى

بحيث يصدر عنه المعلول الأول هي بعينه حيثية كونه سبحانه بحيث يصدر عنه كل خير و يفيض عنه النظام الأتم و الإنسان الكبير فإن نسبة العقل الأول إلى مجموع العالم و جملة النظام كنسبة صورة الشيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٥

ذي الأجزاء إلى أجزاء ذلك الشيء و قد مر أن الشيء شيء بصورته لا بمادته و أن صورة الشيء هي نفسه و تمامه و قد علمت أيضا أن العقل كل الأشياء التي بعده على وجه أشرف و أطف فمتى قلت العقل فكأنك قلت العالم كله فحيثية صدور له لا تغاير حيثية صدور النظام الجملي إلا باعتبار الجمال و التفصيل و قد علم أن المفصل عين المجمل بالحقيقة و

غيره بالاعتبار.

فإذن نقول كما أن كونه تعالى بحيث يفيض عنه الخير كله و يعلم الأشياء كلها عين ذاته المقدسة فكذا كونه بحيث يفيض عنه العقل و يعلمه عين ذاته بلا تغاير حيثية -

الثالث أن كون إيجاب العلة للمعلول بعد مرتبة إمكانه

حين ما كان المنظور إليه حال ماهية ذلك المعلول لا ينافي كونه سابقا في الوجود عليه و لا أيضا عينية الشيء و تحققه في الخارج ينافي كونه من الاعتبارات العقلية لماهية من الماهيات إذا قيس مفهومه إليها فإن المنظور إليه إذا كان حال ماهية الشيء و عوارضها و أحكامها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٦

كان نفسها لنفسها متقدمة على جميع الأغيار حتى موجب وجودها و علة كونها و كان الحكم بنفسها على نفسها مقدما على كل حكم و بعده الحكم عليها بالإمكان ثم بالحاجة في الوجود إلى الغير ثم بإيجاب الغير وجودها و وجوب وجودها به ثم بأنها موجودة مع أن الوجود - الذي به توجد متقدم عندنا عليها في الواقع و كذا إيجاب العلة متقدم على ذلك الوجود - فلا منافاة بين كون خصوصية الإيجاب و ما به ينشأ وجود المعلول عين حقيقة المبدأ - و بين أن نسبتها بحسب المفهوم إلى ماهية المعلول في اعتباراتها العقلية متأخرة عنها و عن إمكانها.

الرابع أن كون وحدة الصادر الأول عددية

على تقدير التسليم لا نسلم أن ما بإزائها من المبدأ يجب أن تكون وحدة عددية و لا يجب انحفاظ نحو الوحدة في جانبي العلة و المعلول و الذي يجب انحفاظه من الجانبين هو أصل الوحدة مع أن وحدة العلة لا بد و أن تكون أقوى و أشرف على أن ما ذكره بعينه جار فيما أخذت خصوصية العلية الصدورية بالقياس إلى مجموع العالم فهل لمجموع العالم وحدة أقوى و أفضل من وحدة المعلول الأول و الوحدة التي من باب الأعداد هي مما يتصور بإزائها و من نوعها أو جنسها وحدات أخرى ذهنا أو خارجا يندرج معها تحت طبيعة واحدة فمتى يسوغ هذا المعنى في العقل من جهة وقوعه في العقل تحت ماهية كلية فكذا يجري في النظام الجملي من جهة وقوعه تحت ماهية كلية عند العقل و كون المركب ذا ماهية أولى من كون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٧

البسيط ذا ماهية على أنك قد علمت أن البسيط لا ماهية له و أن العقل إنية بلا ماهية و المغايرة بينه تعالى و بين الهويات البسيطة و الإنيات المحضة بالتقدم و التأخر و الكمال و النقص.

الخامس أن قوله كونه جل ذكره بحيث يصدر عنه هذا المعلول بالفعل بخصوصه

ليس هو من الكمالات المطلقة للموجود بما هو موجود غير مسلم بل وجود العقل بالفعل مطلقا من الكمالات المطلقة لطبيعة الموجود بما هو موجود فضلا عن وجود الخصوصية المصدرية التي هي مبدؤه و منشؤه و التخصيص الذي ينافي كون الشيء من عوارض الموجود بما هو موجود و من كمالات الوجود المطلق هو ما يصير به الشيء نوعا متخصص الاستعداد كأن يصير أمرا طبيعيا أو تعليميا فكل ما يصح أن يلحق الموجود المطلق من غير أن يكون مشروطا

بتغير أو تقدر أو تكثر أو انفعال فهو من عوارض الوجود المطلق وكمالاته وإن كان بتقدم وتأخر وشدة وضعف و لذلك يبحث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٨

عنه في علم ما فوق الطبيعة معنى و ماهية و في علم الربوبيات وجودا و إنية

إشعار تنبيهي

قد ذكر صاحب روضة الجنان قريبا من الإيراد المذكور بوجه آخر على قولهم يجب أن يكون للعلة خصوصية بالقياس إلى معلول معين - لا يكون لها تلك الخصوصية بالقياس إلى معلول آخر لها فإذا كان المعلول واحدا جاز أن يكون تلك الخصوصية عين الفاعل البسيط و إلا لم يجز بقوله و أيضا الخصوصية التي هي عبارة عن ذات الفاعل الواحد الحقيقي لا يمكن أن تسلب عنها بالقياس إلى غير معلولها فإن ذات الشيء لا يمكن أن يسلب عنه أصلا لكن الخصوصية له بالقياس إلى معلول معين مسلوبه عنه إذا قيس إلى غير ذلك المعلول فهي ليست ذات الفاعل فقط بل هي عبارة عن الفاعل مع مناسبة مخصوصة زائدة عليه و ارتباط خاص ينضم إليه فلا يكون واحدا حقيقيا ثم أجاب عنه بأن معنى كون الخصوصية عين ذات الفاعل - أن بها بنفسها يتعين ذات المعلول من غير انضمام معنى آخر أجنبي إليه أصلا و ليس الذات مع غير هذا المعلول كذلك و لا يلزم منه أن يسلب عن نفسها بمجرد ذلك - فتدبر و جد تجد انتهى كلامه و مراده أن الخصوصية التي بها يصدر المعلول الأول - عن الواجب جل ذكره هي عين ذاته و سائر الخصوصيات التي بها يصدر عنه ما سوى المعلول الأول هي أمور منضمة إليه و التحقيق ما قررناه.

نور مشرق يزاح به ظل وهمي -

قد أورد بعض المتأخرين من الأذكياء نقضا على البرهان المذكور من أنه لو صدر عن الواحد أمران مثل أ و ب فصدور أ ليس صدور ب فاتصف المبدأ بالنقيضين بعد قوله و أجيب بأن نقيض صدور أ لا صدور ب لا ألف و رد بأن صدور ب ليس صدور أ فاتصف بصدور أ و بلا صدور أ فإذا لم يكن الذات واحدا حقيقيا - جاز اتصافه بهما من جهتين و إذا كان واحدا حقيقيا لم يجز اتصافه بهما لعدم التعدد بهذه العبارة أقول لو تم ما ذكره لزم أن لا يصدر عن الواحد واحد أيضا بل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٢٩

لا يكون الواحد موجودا إذ كل موجود متصف بصفتين اعتباريتين و أقلهما الواحدة و الشيئية و المفهومية و الجزئية و غير ذلك فاتصف بالوحدة و بما ليس بوحدة و بالوجود و بما ليس بوجود إلى غير ذلك فحصل كلامهم على هذا التقدير قضية اتفاقية مبنية على عدم إمكان الواحد الحقيقي و يلزم أن لا يصدر عنه اثنان فما ذكره مغلفة سخيفة انتهى. أقول البرهان المذكور في غاية الإحكام و المتانة و لا يمكن القدح في مواده و مقدماته لأنها قضايا ضرورية و مواد برهانية ليست خطابية و لا جدلية و لا شعرية و لا مغالطية و صورتها صورة منتجة لأنه قياس استثنائي يستثني نقيض التالي لينتج نقيض المقدم هكذا متى صدر عن الواحد الحقيقي أمران كـ أ و ب كان متصفا بالنقيضين و هما صدور أ و لا صدور أ لكن التالي باطل فالمقدم كذلك و بيان اللزوم ما مر و يمكن تصويره على صورة قياس شرطي اقتراني كما

يسهل ذلك على من له قدم في فن الميزان فإذا كان القياس برهانيا ثم اشتبه تخلف حكم النتيجة في موضع - فلا يوجب ذلك الاشتغال بالقدح على البرهان الصحيح مادة و صورة كما هو شأن أكثر الناقضين و الجدليين بل ينبغي للعاقل الطالب للحق أن يشتغل بالفحص و التفتيش

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٠

ليتضح عليه جليلة الحال و يرتفع شبهة ما يختلج بالبال.

فنقول في رفع ما ذكره من أن كل موجود يتصف بمفاهيم متعددة كالوجود و الشيئية و الجزئية و غير ذلك إنا قد أشرنا سابقا أن تغاير المفاهيم و اختلافها بحسب المعنى لا يوجب تكثرا في الذات لا في الخارج و لا في العقل بحسب التحليل و هكذا الحال في صفات الواجب تعالى فإن مفاهيمها متغايرة لا محالة إذ ليست العلم و القدرة و الإرادة و الحياة و السمع و البصر ألفاظا مترادفة و لا أن إطلاقها أو إطلاق بعضها عليه تعالى على سبيل المجاز المرسل أو التشبيه تعالى عن الشبه علوا كبيرا.

فهي مع كونها مغايرة المعاني و المفاهيم كلها موجودة بوجود واحد متشخصة بتشخص واحد لا بمعنى أن الوجود زائد على ذاتها و لا أن وجودها شيء غير تشخصها - و لا أن وحدتها غير وجودها بل الوجود الواحد الأحدي بنفس أحديته مصداق لهذه المعاني و مطابق بذاته و فردانيته للحكم بها عليه من غير أن يقتضي صدقها عليه تغاير في الذات و لا في عوارض الذات حتى يصير الموصوف بها مركبا في ذاته من أمرين سواء كان التركيب خارجيا - كالجسم المركب من مادة و صورة في الوجود أو ذهنيا كالماهية المركبة من جنس و فصل كالإنسان المأخوذ في حده ماهية الحيوان و الناطق فإننا إذا وجدنا جسم النار و قد صدق عليها أنها في ذاتها شاغلة للحيز و أنها حارة نحكم بأن حقيقتها مركبة في الخارج من مادة مشتركة و صورة مخصصة لأن اتصافها بأنها شاغلة للحيز من جهة ذاتها أمر يعم الأجسام فهو إذن لأجل جسيميتها التي هي مادة مشتركة بينها و بين غيرها من الأجسام و لهذا تنقلب إلى عنصر آخر فينتقل المادة من صورتها إلى صورة أخرى و اتصافها بأنها حارة في نفسها أمر يخص بها فهو لأجل صورتها فالاتصاف بتينك الصفتين يوجب تركيبا في ذات الموصوف بهما تركيبا خارجيا

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و كذا اتصاف الإنسان بالحياة و النطق يوجب في الموصوف تركيبا عقليا بحسب الماهية.

و إن ناقش في المثال فلنمثل له مثالا آخر من البسائط الخارجية فنقول اتصاف الخط بمطلق المساوات و المفاوطة من جهة مطلق الكمية و هو جنسه البعيد - و اتصافه بأن أجزاءه مجتمع في آن واحد من جهة اتصاله و هو فصله البعيد - و اتصافه بالاستقامة من جهة فصل آخر تحت جنسه المتوسط و اتصافه بالاستقامة - مثلا من جهة فصل آخر قريب فهذه الأمور مما يوجب الاتصاف بها تركيبا في ماهية الخط من معان متعددة و ذاتيات متكثرة بحسب العقل في ظرف التحليل و إن كانت موجودة في الخارج بوجود واحد كما أن اتصافه بكونه ضلعا لزاوية و قطر المربع و سهماء لمخروط و وترا لقوس يوجب كثرة في العوارض و اختلافا في الحثيات التعليلية المؤدي - إلى كثرة العلل و الأسباب و بالجملة اتصافه سبحانه بصفاته الكمالية من العلم و القدرة و غيرها لا يستلزم كثرة لا في الداخل و لا في الخارج لا في الذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٢

ولا في عارض الذات لا في الوجود ولا في الماهية لا في العين ولا في الذهن لا في الحقيقة ولا في الاعتبار وكذلك الصفات الاعتبارية التي يجوز اتصافه تعالى بها كالموجودية والمعلومية والشيئية والعلية والسببية والمبدئية والأولية ليست مما يوجب تكثرا واختلافا في العين ولا في الذهن فإن الاعتباريات التي تستلزم اختلافا بالحيثيات والجهات هي مثل الإمكان والوجوب والقدم والحدوث والتقدم والتأخر ولهذا حكموا بأن كل ممكن زوج تركيبى لاشتماله على الإمكان والوجود وحكموا بأن إمكانه لأجل ماهيته ووجوده لأجل إيجاب علته وكذا عدم حصوله في مرتبة من مراتب الواقع مع حصوله في الواقع مما يستلزم تركبا عقليا في ذاته كما أن عدم حصوله في وقت مع حصوله في وقت آخر مما يستلزم تركيبا خارجيا في ذاته من مادة وصورة فهذه الصفات وإن كانت اعتبارية توجب كثرة في الموصوف. وأما التي ذكرها المعترض نقضا على الحجة المذكورة من الوحدة والشيئية والمفهومية وغيرها فليست مما يقتضي كثرة واختلافا أصلا لا في الذات ولا في حيثية الذات ولا في الصفة ولا في حيثية الصفة إلا مجرد المغايرة في المعاني والمفاهيم وقد مر غير مرة أن اختلاف المفاهيم أنفسها لا يستلزم ضرورة اختلافا في ذات الشيء ولا في صفته ولا في اعتباره هكذا يجب أن يفهم الإنسان الموحد اتصافه تعالى بالصفات الحقيقية - وبالصفات الاعتبارية وبالإضافات والسلوب حسب ما قررناه وأوضحنا سبيله وبيننا دليله - ليصفوا توحيده عن شوب الإشراك والإفقع في ضرب من الإشراك والإلحاد أو التعطيل - كما لأكثر المعطلين الذين جعلوا الله عضين والله ولي الفضل العظيم

حكمة عرشية يبطل بها شبهة فرشية

لعلك ترجع وتقول رادا علينا مناقضا لما قررنا من اتحاد حقيقة العلم والقدرة والإرادة وغيرها من نعوت الكمال و صفات الجمال عينا وعقلا بلا اختلاف حيثية لا في الخارج ولا في الذهن ولو بحسب الاعتبار بأنه لو كان الأمر كما قررت وصورت لكان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٣

كل عالم قادرا وكل قادر مريدا بل يلزم من ذلك كون كل موجود عالما قادرا حيا مريدا - مع أن الواقع ليس كذلك بديهية و اتفاقا فإن كل أحد يعلم أن الأحجار والجمادات ليست علماء قادرين مريدين قلنا لو كنت أيها المناظر المتعرض ذا قلب منور بنور الكشف والعرفان و ذا بصيرة غير محتجبة بحجب الأغشية والأكوان لشاهدت جميع الموجودات التي في الأرض والسموات عقولا كانت أو نفوسا أو صورا أو أجساما أو أعراضا - أحياء عالمين قادرين مريدين لكن على تفاوت وجوداتها فإن هذه الصفات إذا كانت متحدة مع الوجود كانت شدتها وضعفها وكمالها ونقصها وخلوصها وشوبها تابعة لشدة الوجود وضعفه وكماله ونقصه وخلوصه وشوبه فالمادة الجسمية إذا حقق الأمر في نحو وجودها الخارجي ظهر أن وجودها متضمن للعدم وظهورها مندمج في الخفاء وحضورها متحصل بالغيبة وبقاءها منحفظ بالتجدد والزوال واستمرارها منضبط بتوارد الأمثال وذلك من وجهين.

أحدهما من جهة الامتداد والانبساط في المكان وافتراق كل جزء منها عن سائر الأجزاء في الكون الوضعي والوجود التحيزي وقد علمت أن كونها في الوضع والحيز هو بعينه نحو وجودها باختلاف أجزاء الجسم في الوضع والمكان

هو بعينه اختلافها في الوجود و التشخص و كون أجزاء الجسم بحيث حضور كل منها يستصحب عدم سائر الأجزاء هو مقوم ذاته و حقيقة وجوده و محصل ماهيته و هويته الاتصالية فذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٤

متقومة بالأعدام و الاحتجابات فذاته في غشاوة من ذاته لأن ذاته محتجبة عن ذاته بذاته و غائبة عن نفسها بنفسها فضلا عن أن يكون الشيء محتجبا بشيء آخر عن نفسه أو خافيا بنفسه عنه شيء آخر أو غائبا بنفسه عن شيء آخر. **و ثانيهما** من جهة تجدد الطبيعة في الوجود و تبدلها في الكون و سيلانها كالماء الجاري شيئا فشيئا و دثورها أنا فانا و حدوثها في كل حين بنحو آخر فهاتان الجهتان برهانان على أن ليس للصورة الجرمية الهولانية وجود علمي شعوري لا لذاتها و لا لغيرها إلا بواسطة صورة مأخوذة منها مطابقة إياها يكون لها حضور جمعي غير مادي - و لا مخلوط بالأعدام و الظلمات و الحجب و الجهالات فإن كل ما فرض منها علما أو عالما في أي آن مفروض كان غيره في سائر الآنات و الأزمنة و كل ما فرض حياة أو حيا في حين مفروض كان موتا أو فسادا في باقي الأحيان فلم يوجد منها علم مستمر و لا حياة باقية و لا إرادة ثابتة كحال أصل الوجود إذا دقق أحد النظر و حذق البصر فإنه يجد أن نقصان الأجسام و الماديات في الوجود هو بعينه نقصانها في العلم و الحياة و الإرادة فكما أن أصل طبيعة الوجود فيها تشوب بالعدم حتى صار وجودها ضربا من العدم لغاية النزول و الخسة فكذلك صورها التي في الخارج كأنها صورة علمية قد نقصت و ضعفت و تكدرت بدخول النقائص و القصورات في ذاتها فصارت علما كلا علم و حياة كالموت و إرادة كالكرهية و قدرة هي بعينها العجز و سماع هو الصمم و بصرا هو العمى و كلاما هو السكوت.

فما ورد في الكلام الإلهي من قوله جل ذكره **وَأَنَّ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِهِ وَلَكِنْ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٥

لَا تَفْقَهُونَ تَسْبِيحَهُمْ و قوله **وَلِلَّهِ يَسْجُدُ مَنْ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ** و ما حكمت به مكاشفات أئمة الكشف و الوجدان و أصحاب الشهود و العرفان أن جميع ذرات الأكوان من الجماد و النبات فضلا عن الحيوان أحياء ناطقون ساجدون و مسبحون بحمد ربهم فهو إما لأجل أن الوجود و كمالاته من الصفات السبعة متلازمة بعضها لبعض غير منفكة شيء منها عن صاحبه ذاتا و حيثية فكل ما وقع عليه اسم الوجود لا بد و أن يقع عليه أسماء هذه الأئمة السبعة من الصفات إلا أن العرف العام أطلق اسم الوجود على بعض الأجسام دون اسم القدرة و العلم و غيرهما لاحتجابهم عن الاطلاع عليها و إما لأن لكل نوع من الأجسام الطبيعية صورة أخرى مفارقة مدبرة لهذه الصور الطبيعية فياضة عليها بإذن الله مبدع الأمر و الخلق بإيراد الأمثال و تلك الصور المفارقة لكونها مقومة لهذه الصور الطبيعية نسبتها إلى هذه كنسبة الأرواح إلى الأجساد و بين الجسد و الروح نسبة اتحادية كما ستقف عليه فهي حية بحياتها عارفة بعرفانها بالحقيقة لا بالمجاز كما ظنه من لم يعرف الفرق بين الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو مادة و بعينه بالمعنى الذي هو جنس فإنه بالاعتبار الثاني متحد بفصله متحصل بصورته التي هي بإزاء مفهوم فصله كما أشرنا إليه و كلا الوجهين لطيف دقيق غامض شريف و الأول أولى و أشمل و الله ولي التوفيق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٦

فصل (٦) في الإشارة إلى منهج آخر في أن الصادر الأول واحد غير مركب

و هو أن العلة المفيضية لا بد وأن يكون بينها وبين معلولها ملاءمة و مناسبة - لا يكون لها مع غيره تلك الملاءمة كما بين النار و الإحراق و الماء و التبريد و الشمس و الإضاءة و لذلك لا يوجد بين النار و التبريد و الماء و الإحراق و الأرض و الإشراف تلك الملاءمة فلو صدر عن واحد حقيقي اثنان فإما بجهة واحدة أو بجهتين لا سبيل إلى الأول لأن الملاءمة هي المشابهة و المشابهة ضرب من المماثلة في الصفة و هي الاتحاد في الحقيقة إلا أن هذا الاتحاد إذا اعتبر بين الوصفين كان مماثلة و إذا اعتبر بين الموصوفين كان مشابهة فمرجع المشابهة إلى الاتحاد في الحقيقة. ثم إن الواحد الحقيقي من كل وجه هو الذي صفاته لا تزيد على ذاته فلو شابه الواحد لذاته شيئين مختلفين لساوى حقيقته حقيقتين مختلفتين و المساوي للمختلفين بالحقيقة مختلف و المفروض أنه واحد هذا خلف و لا سبيل إلى الثاني و إلا لم يكن العلة علة واحدة حقيقة و هذا قريب المأخذ مما سبق.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٧

و اعترض عليه بعض الأذكياء بقوله و يرد عليه أن الملاءمة المعتبرة في العلة ليست هي الاتفاق في تمام الماهية و المساواة في الحقيقة بل في خصوصية بها يصدر هو عنها دون غيره كما في النار و الإحراق فإن مناسبتها للسخونة ليست لتمام ماهيتها - بل لخصوصية صورتها النارية فلو كانت العلة ملائمة لذاتها لأمرين لم يلزم أن تساويهما في الحقيقة و هو ظاهر.

أقول إذا كانت العلة بسيطة كانت الخصوصية التي بها تلائم المعلول تمام حقيقته و ذاتها بخلاف ما إذا كانت مركبة كالنار و الماء فإن الخصوصية التي بها يصدر عنها الأثر - لا يلزم أن تكون تمام حقيقتها بل يجوز أن تكون داخلية فيها كالصورة النارية للنار في فعل الإحراق أو عارضة لها ككيفية الحرارة العارضة للماء المتسخن بالقسر في فعله للسخونة في جسم آخر.

ثم قال بقي النظر في أنه تعالى واحد حقيقي كما قصدوه إذ ذهبوا إلى أنه تعالى وجود بحت بسيط بريء عن الماهية و شوائب التكثر مطلقا لكنهم قالوا إنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٨

علم باعتبار قدرة من جهة إرادة من حيثية عاقل من وجه معقول من وجه و إذا جاز هذه الاعتبارات في ذاته فليجز أن يكون منشأ لصدور أمور متعددة فلم يتفرع حينئذ ما ذهبوا إليه من أنه تعالى لما كان واحدا حقيقيا لم يصدر عنه إلا أمر بسيط مجرد لتتركب الجسم عن الهيولى و الصورة و احتياج الهيولى إلى الصورة فلا يكون معلولا أولا و الصورة أيضا تحتاج في تشخصها إلى العوارض و إلى الهيولى فلا يكون معلولا أولا و العرض يحتاج إلى الموضوع و ذلك المجرد ليس نفسا لأنها مع البدن و تحدث بحدوثه فهي إذن عقل مجرد و هو المطلوب.

أقول من زعم أن اتصافه تعالى بالعلم و القدرة و غيرهما من الكمالات الوجودية للموجود بما هو موجود مما يوجب اختلاف جهات و حيثيات و وجوه و اعتبارات حتى لا يكون واحدا من جميع الجهات و حيثيات فلا يخلص توحيده

عن الإشراك نعوذ بالله منه و قد أسمعناك أن حيثية كل صفة فيها هي بعينها إذا حققتها حيثية الصفة الأخرى - فعلمه تعالى بعينه قدرته و قدرته تعالى بعينها إرادته ذاتا و اعتبارا و كذا عاقلية بعينها معقولية ذاتا و اعتبارا كما صرح به الشيخ الرئيس في أكثر كتبه بهذه العبارة - كون ذات الباري عاقلا و معقولا لا يوجب اثنية في الذات و لا اثنية في الاعتبار - فالذات واحدة و الاعتبار واحد لكن في العبارة تقديم و تأخير للمعاني.

وإن قلت العاقلية مضائفة للمعقولة و المتضايان لا يجتمعان في موضوع واحد من جهة واحدة لأن التضاييف قسم من التقابل فكيف يصح اجتماع العاقلية و المعقولة في شيء واحد من الجهة الواحدة.

قلت ليس الأمر كما زعمته فإنه لم يقدّم على أن كل متضاييفين متقابلان لأن معنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٣٩

الإضافة وحدها كون أحد المفهومين بحيث يلزم من تعلقه تعقل الآخر و مجرد ذلك الحد لا يستلزم تقابلها في الوجود و لا تغايرها في حيثية نعم قد يكون بعض الإضافات بخصوصها مما يقتضي التقابل و التخالف في الوجود بين المتضاييفين كالتحريك و التحرك و كالأبوة و البنوة و التقدم و التأخر و العظم و الصغر و العلو و السفلى لا أن كل إضافة يوجب ذلك.

فالصحيح أن أحد أقسام التقابل الأربعة هو تقابل التضاييف لا أن أحد أقسامه هو التضاييف كما توهمه الجمهور حسبما رأوا أن الحال في التضاد و غيره على هذا المنوال - و هو وهم فاسد على ما هو التحقيق.

ثم قال أقول على أن في دليلهم هذا أيضا نظر من وجوه منها أن الصورة عندهم جزء من علة وجود الهيولاني البتة على ما يشير إليه تلويحا منهم و يلوح إليه إشاراتهم - فهي في الوجود متقدمة البتة على الهيولى فليجز أن يصدر عن المبدأ أولا معنى الصورة و طبيعتها و بتوسطها يصدر عنه الهيولى على ما ذهبوا إليه في استناد الأفلاك إلى العقول التسعة و استناد هيولى العناصر إلى العقل العاشر و منها أن كون حدوث النفس مع الجسم مطلقا ممنوع غير بين و لا مبين فلم لا يجوز أن يوجد أولا نفسا من النفوس المجردة الفلكية - و يوجد بتوسطها الفلك المتعلقة هي به أو غير ذلك انتهى قوله بعبارة **أقول** كل من اعتراضه في غاية السقوط لا يورده من له أدنى بضاعة في فن الحكمة فالذي ذكره أولا من أن الصورة جزء من علة وجود الهيولى و إن كان صحيحا كما نظر إليه في مباحث التلازم بينهما لكنه ما أخذ كيفية جزئيتها لعلة الهيولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٠

و ما عرف أن الصورة بأي وجه و أية حيثية سبب للهيولى و متقدمة عليها و إلا لما شرع في تسويغ هذا الاحتمال و درى أنه أمر محال فإن التي هي شريكة علة الهيولى هي الصورة المطلقة بوحدتها المرسلّة التي تفتقر في تحصيلها الوجودي و تشخصها الجزئي إلى استعداد خاص و عوارض مخصوصة لا توجد إلا في الهيولى المنفعلة دائما على نعت التجدد - و هذا إنما ينضبط بحركة و زمان و تجدد صورة بعد صورة مستتبع لاستعداد بعد استعداد - فلا يمكن أن يكون الصور الجسمانية أو الطبيعية أول الصوادر و أن يكون وجودها في عالم الإبداع قبل الأكوان المتجددة و ذلك لأن وجودها لا يخلو عن تناء و تشكل و مقدار مخصوص و وضع معين و غير ذلك من الأمور.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤١

وهي إما داخله في قوام شخصيتها أو من الأمارات و اللوازم للهوية التي ترتفع بارتفاعها الهوية الشخصية لها و كل واحد من تلك الأمور لا يمكن أن يكون من لوازمها الحاصلة لذاتها من ذاتها مجردة عن المادة و انفعالاتها و إلا لكانت جميع الجرميات التي من نوعها متفقة في هذه اللوازم الشكلية و المقدارية و الوضعية حتى الأجزاء المفروضة لكل طبيعة جرمية بالقياس إلى كلها فلم يتصور عند ذلك كل و لا جزء و اللازم ضروري الاستحالة فكيف يجوز أن يكون أول الصوادر طبيعة مرسلة غير متحصلة و لا متشخصة ثم يصير قبل تشخصها علة متوسطة لصدور ما يفتقر هي في تشخصها إلى ذلك الصادر بعدها مع أن العلة للشيء الواحد سواء كانت قريباً أو بعيداً أو شرطاً أو جزءاً أو آلة - لا بد أن يكون بشخصيتها و هويتها متقدمة عليه. و أما الذي قرره في مبحث التلازم أن الصورة شريكة علة الهيولى - فهو إنما يتصحح إذا كانت الصورة واقعة في عالم الحركات و الانفعالات حتى تكون جائز التبدل و التعاقب و كونها جائز التبدل و التعاقب و الاتصال و الانفصال و الوحدة و الكثرة و الحدوث و الزوال من ضروريات الصورة الجرمية المشتركة بين الكل و النوعية العنصرية لذاتها و كذلك الصورة النوعية الفلكية و لو من بعض الجهات.

على أنك قد علمت من طريقتنا في حدوث العالم من إثبات التجدد و الكون و الفساد لكل صورة طبيعية فكيف يسع لعقل ذكي أن يحتمل عنده كون صورة مادية أول الصوادر و هي عندنا متدرجة الوجود و في الحكمة المتعارفة ملتزمة الحقيقة من حيثيتين حيثية بها قبل الهيولى و حيثية بها بعد الهيولى فالشيء الذي بحسب الحقيقة منتظم الذات من جهتين جهة فعلية بقائية و جهة انفعالية حدوثية لا يمكن أن يكون سبباً لوجود ما يفتقر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٢

إليه في ذاته و لو من إحدى الجهتين دون الأخرى إلا أن يكون واقعا في عالم الحركات و الاستعدادات التي لا يمكن حصولها إلا بأسباب كثيرة و علل ذاتية و عرضية.

و أيضاً لو فرض أن الذي صدر من الواحد هو الصورة و بتوسطها المادة فتلك الصورة إما صورة واحدة أو صور كثيرة فعلى الثاني يلزم صدور الكثرة منه ابتداء و على الأول يلزم أن يكون بعض الأجسام علة لبعض و هذا مما يبطله البرهان.

ثم قوله على ما ذهبوا إليه من استناد الأفلاك إلى العقول التسعة و استناد هيولى العناصر إلى العاشر.

أقول الخلط فيه ظاهر لأن فيه قياس الواحد المحض من كل جهة إلى الواحد - الذي فيه كثرة من جهة عقلية كما في استناد الفلك إلى العقل أو إلى الواحد الذي هو كثير في الخارج أيضاً بوجه كما في استناد الهيولى إلى العقل فإن في الأول صدر الفلك و هو واحد طبيعي ملتئم الذات من مادة و صورة عن جوهر عقلي واحد قابل للتحليل العقلي إلى جنس و فصل أو وجود و ماهية أو كمال وجودي و نقص عديمي أو غنى و فقر فقد صدر مركب عن مركب إلا أن التركيب في المعلول أشد من التركيب في العلة و الوحدة بالعكس و هكذا الأمر في كل مفيض و مستفيض فإذا كان كذلك فكيف يقاس حال صدور المركب عن البسيط الحقيقي بحال صدوره عن المركب.

و في الثاني نقول صدرت الهيولى المشتركة عن العقل بإعانة الحركة المستمرة الفلكية التي لها في كل آن هوية أخرى

بعد هوية كما للهيولى في كل وقت تهيئوا واستعداد آخر بصورة أخرى لاحقة من جهة اقترانها بصورة أولى سابقة فها هنا بالحقيقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٣

الكثير الخارجي علة للكثير الخارجي وإن كان في ضمن ذلك استناد واحد مبهم مشترك الذات من جهة وحدتها الضعيفة المبهمة إلى واحد عددي من جهة انفراده عن ضمايم الحركات السماوية والاستعدادات الأرضية فكيف يقاس هذا الواحد الذي مع الكثرة إلى الواحد- الذي هو قبل كل كثرة ولا يكون معه في مرتبة وجوده شيء فضلا عن كثرة أشياء.

و أما الوجه الثاني له في الاعتراض فهو أيضا فاسد لأن نفسية النفس هي بعينها نحو وجودها وليست كسائر الإضافات العارضة للأشياء بعد وجودها وتحصلها كالأبوة والإخوة والملك والسلطنة وليس الأمر فيها كما هو المشهور من أن نسبة النفس إلى البدن - كنسبة الملك إلى المدينة ونسبة الربان إلى السفينة لأن ذلك مبرهن البطلان كما حقق فإذن لا يمكن أن يتصور للنفس بحسب وجودها الشخصي مرتبة سابقة على البدن - لا بالزمان ولا بالذات والهوية فلو كانت علة للبدن فلا بد أن تكون متقدمة عليه وهو محال كما بيناه.

و أيضا على طريقة الحكمة المتعارفة نقول النفس هي الجوهر الذي يفتقر في فعله إلى المادة فإن الذي يستغني في فعله وإيجاده عن المادة والإيجاد متقوم بالوجود فلا محالة يستغني في الوجود عن المادة فيكون عقلا لا نفسا فإذا كان الأمر كذلك فلا يمكن صدور ما هو مادة لفعل النفس من النفس ولا مادة أخرى يمكن صدورها عن نفس من النفوس إذ لا يمكن تحقق وضع لمادة تعلقت بها النفس بالقياس إلى مادة أخرى يمكن صدورها عن نفس من النفوس قبل وجودها بل إنما الذي يحتمل تسبب المادة بوضعها الخاص في صدره من النفس - هي الأعراض اللاحقة بالمواد بعد وجودها بل هاهنا قاعدة كلية في أنه لا يمكن صدور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٤

مادة جسمانية مطلقا عن قوة جسمانية أو صورة متعلقة بالمادة سواء كان التعلق بها في أصل الوجود أو في الفعل والإيجاد فسقط إذن احتمال كون الصادر الأول نفسا فلكية - يصدر بسببها فلك من الأفلاك. **على** أن باقي الأفلاك إن كانت في مرتبة وجوده يلزم صدور الكثير معا وإن لم يكن فهو إما حاو فيلزم إمكان الخلاء وإن كان محويا يلزم صدور ما هو في مكان أعلى قبل تجدد أو بعد تجدد فيلزم إمكان الخلاء مع لزوم صدور الأعظم الأشرف عن الأصغر الأخس وهذا كله من مجازفات الأوهام

الفصل (٧) في قاعدة إمكان الأشرف الموروثة من الفيلسوف الأول مما يتشعب عن أصل امتناع صدور الكثرة عن الواحد الحق

قاعدة أخرى هي قاعدة إمكان الأشرف مفادها أن الممكن الأشرف يجب أن يكون أقدم في مراتب الوجود من الممكن الأخس وأنه إذا وجد الممكن الأخس فلا بد أن يكون الممكن الأشرف منه قد وجد قبله وهذا أصل شريف برهاني عظيم جدواه كريم موداه كثير فوائده متوفر منافعه جليل خيراته وبركاته وقد نفعنا الله سبحانه به - نفعاً كثيراً بحمد

الله و حسن توفيقه و قد استعمله معلم المشائين و مفيدهم صناعة الفلسفة - في أثولوجيا كثيرا و في كتاب السماء و العالم حيث قال كما هو المنقول عنه يجب أن يعتقد في العلويات ما هو أكرم و كذا الشيخ الرئيس في الشفاء و التعليقات و عليه بنى في سائر كتبه و رسائله ترتيب نظام الوجود و بيان سلسلتي البدو و العود و أمعن في تأسيسه الشيخ الإشراقي إمعانا شديدا في جميع كتبه كالمطارحات و التلويحات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٥

و كتابه المسمى بحكمة الإشراق حتى في مختصراته كالألواح العمادية و الهياكل النورية و الفارسي المسمى ببرتونامه و الآخر المسمى بيزدان بخش قد استعمل هذه القاعدة في إثبات العقول و إثبات المثل النورية أرباب الأنواع و غير ذلك و قلده محمد الشهرزوري المورخ للحكماء في كتاب الشجرة الإلهية في تحريرها و شرحها شرحا مستوفى فنقول في بيانه على محاذاة ما وجدنا في كتب الشيخ الإشراقي - إن الممكن الأخس إذا وجد عن الباري جل ذكره فيجب أن يكون الممكن الأشرف قد وجد قبله و إلا فاما إن جاز أن يوجد معه فيلزم أن يصدر عن الواجب لذاته في مرتبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٦

واحدة من جهة واحدة شيئا أحدهما الأشرف و الآخر الأخس و هو محال و أما إن جاز وجوده بعد الأخس و بواسطته فيلزم جواز كون المعلول أشرف من علته و أما إن لم يجز صدور الأشرف لا مع الأخس و لا بعده و لا قبله كما هو المفروض مع أنه ممكن و الممكن لا يلزم من فرض تحققه محال فإن لزم فإنما يكون لأسباب خارجة عن ذاته و ذات موجدته - و إلا لم يكن ممكنا و هو خلاف المقدر فإذا فرض وجوده و ليس بصادر فرضا عن الواجب الوجود أولا قبل الأخس و قد استحال وجوده مع الأخس و لا بعده بلا واسطة أو بواسطة معلول آخر من المعلولات فبالضرورة وجوده لكونه ممكنا و لم يكن علته واجب الوجود و لا شيء من معلولاته يستدعي جهة مقتضية له أشرف مما عليه واجب الوجود - حتى يكون عدم حصوله في عالم الوجود لعدم علته من جهة أنه بمرتبة من الفضيلة و الشرف يستدعي فاعلا أكرم و أشرف من فاعل هذا الصادر و فاعل الصادر الأول ليس إلا الباري الواجب تعالى فيلزم أن يكون ذلك الممكن مستدعيا بإمكانه مبدعا يكون أعلى و أشرف من الأول سبحانه و ذلك محال لأن واجب الوجود فوق ما لا يتناهى بما لا يتناهى في الشدة.

و شارح حكمة الإشراق قد قرر هذا البرهان هكذا لو وجد الممكن الأخس و لم يوجد الممكن الأشرف قبله لزم إما خلاف المقدار أو جواز صدور الكثير عن الواحد أو الأشرف عن الأخس أو وجود جهة أشرف مما عليه نور الأنوار لأن وجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٧

الأخس إن كان بواسطته لزم الأول و إن كان بغير واسطة و جاز صدور الأشرف عن الواجب لزم الثاني و إن جاز عن معلوله لزم الثالث و إن لم يجز عنهما لزم الرابع - و إذا بطلت الأقسام كلها على تقدير وجود الأخس مع عدم وجود الأشرف قبل بالذات فذلك التقدير باطل و يلزم من بطلانه صدق الشرطية المذكورة و هي قاعدة إمكان الأشرف - و إذ

لا أشرف من واجب الوجود و لا من اقتضائه فمحال أن يتخلف عن وجوده وجود الممكن الأشرف و يجب أن يكون أقرب إليه و أن يكون الوسائط بينه و بين الأخس هي الأشرف فالأشرف من مراتب العلل و المعلولات من غير أن يصدر عن الأخس الأشرف - بل العكس من ذلك إلى آخر المراتب انتهى كلام هذا الشارح بالفاظه.

تنبيه عرشي

المشهور عند المعتبرين لهذه القاعدة أن يراعى في جريانها شرطان أحدهما استعمالها في متحدي الماهية للشريف و الخسيس دون غيره و الثاني استعمالها فيما فوق الكون و الإبداعات دون ما تحت الكون و ما في عالم الحركات - و لما كان الوجود عندنا حقيقة بسيطة لا يتفاوت أفرادها في ذاتها إلا بالكمال و النقص في نفس حقيقته المشتركة يتكثر بهما الماهيات نوعا أو في عوارضها بأمور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٨

خارجة يتكثر بها أفراد ماهية واحدة شخصا و الثاني لا يكون إلا في عالم الحركات و الاستعدادات فالقاعدة جارية في إثبات الممكن الأشرف إذا وجد الممكن الأخس - و إن لم يكونا جميعا تحت ماهية واحدة نوعية لأن اتحادهما في طبيعة الوجود و هي طبيعة واحدة بسيطة لا اختلاف لها في ذاتها المشتركة يكفي في جريان القاعدة في إثبات أن الأشرف من أفرادها يجب أن يكون أقدم من الأخس و أن كل مرتبة من مراتب الشرف بالإضافة يجب أن تكون صادرة عن الحق الأول جل ذكره و أما الشرط الثاني فيجب مراعاته ضرورة لئلا يرد أن القاعدة لو كانت حقة لزم أن لا يكون بعض الأشخاص ممنوعا عما هو أشرف و أكمل له و ليس الأمر كذلك فإن أكثر الخلق ممنوعون عن كمالاتهم العقلية و الحسية مع أن حصولها لهم أشرف و أكمل من عدم حصولها لهم و ذلك لأن القاعدة إنما تكون مطردة في الأمور الممكنة الثابتة الوجود الدائمة - بدوام عللها الثابتة المرتفعة عن تأثير الحركات الفلكية و الأوضاع السماوية و الأنوار الكوكبية المقتضية لحدوث الحوادث و زوال الممكنات بحسب تضادها في الوجود و تمانعها في المكان و الزمان و ينافيها في المادة و الموضوع كالمركبات العنصرية و الأشخاص المتكونة فإن الحركات السماوية كما أنها مؤثرة في وجودها كذلك مؤثرة في عدمها فإن كثيرا مما في عالم الكون و الفساد يمكن عليها في ذاتها و هويتها أشياء كثيرة كمالية ثم تصير ممنوعة عنها بأسباب أخرى خارجة عن ذاتها فهي ربما تكون محرومة عما هو أكمل و أشرف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٤٩

لممانعة أسباب سماوية و علل طبيعية تابعة لاستعدادات أرضية تابعة للحركات السماوية - بأنوارها و أوضاعها و مطالعها و مغاربها فإذا يجوز أن يعطى الشيء الواحد أمرا شريفا تارة و خسيسا أخرى بسبب اختلاف الاستعدادات له. و أما الأمور الدائمة فإن شرفها و خستها تابعان لشرف الفاعل و خسته لا غير - فلا يختلف الأمور هنالك إلا لاختلاف الفاعل أو لاختلاف جهات الفاعل فيفعل بالأشرف الأشرف و بالأخس الأخس فأتضح الفرق بين ما يطرد فيه إمكان الأشرف و بين ما لا يطرد و اندفع السؤال.

و مما يجب أن يعلم أن الخسيس في الأشياء الكائنة و الفاسدة و إن أمكن أن يكون متقدما على الشريف زمانا و طبعاً بحسب الأعداد كالنطفة تتقدم على الحيوان و البيضة على الدجاج و البذر على الشجر و العنصر على الجماد لكن عند

التأمل يظهر أن الشريف متقدم على الخسيس ذاتا بحسب الإيجاد و أن الفضل و الكمال للمتقدم بالذات في الإيجاد و الخسة و النقيصة للمتأخر بالذات فيه و قد مر سابقا أن ما بالفعل متقدم أبدا على ما بالقوة على الإطلاق و أنك لو تصفحت الأشياء و ترتيبها بالذات لا بالعرض لوجدت أن الشريف متقدم دائما على الخسيس و أن الوجوب متقدم على الإمكان و الجزئي متقدم على الكلي و الفصل متقدم على الجنس و الشخص على النوع و الصورة على المادة و الوحدة على الكثرة و الاتصال على الانفصال و الوجود على العدم و الخير على الشر و الصدق على الكذب.

شك و تحقيق

إن على برهان القاعدة بحثا قويا و شكاً عريضا و هو أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٠

في نظم البرهان خلطا بين الامتناع و الإمكان بالذات و بين الامتناع و الإمكان بالقياس إلى الغير فمن الجائز أن يكون ما هو ممتنع بالذات ممكنا بالقياس إلى الغير لا بالغير لأن الإمكان لا يكون بالغير كما مر و من الجائز أيضا كون الممكن بالذات بحيث يكون الممتنع الذاتي ممكنا لا به بل بالقياس إليه فجهة أشرف مما عليه واجب الوجود و إن كانت ممتنعة بالذات لا محالة لكن لا يمتنع إمكانها بالقياس إلى الممكن الأشرف المستدعي إياها.

قال العلامة الدواني في شرحه للهيكل بعد تحرير البرهان بصورته و مادته إنما يتم إبطال الشق الأخير لو كان إمكان المعلول مستلزما لإمكان العلة - و هو منقوص بأن انتفاء المعلول الأول ممكن مع أن علته و هي انتفاء الواجب مستحيل - و التحقيق أن إمكان المعلول يستلزم إمكان العلة نظرا إلى ذات المعلول بمعنى أنه إذا نظر إلى المعلول لم يوجد فيه ما يوجب استحالة و انتفاء ذلك ممنوع في صورة النزاع كما في صورة السند.

قال و يمكن أن يقرر هكذا ما ليس موجودا قبل الموجود الممكن ليس ممكنا أشرف منه و ينعكس بعكس النقيض إلى قولنا ما هو ممكن أشرف فهو موجود قبله - بيان الأول أنه لو كان ممكنا أشرف فعلى تقدير وجوده إما أن يوجد من الواجب بلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥١

واسطة و قد فرض وجود الأخس منه بلا واسطة فيلزم صدور الكثير عن الواحد أو بواسطة - و تنحصر في الأخس فيلزم كون العلة أخس من المعلول و اللازمان محالان و ما يلزم منه على تقدير وجود محال فهو محال فإمكانه يستلزم كونه محالا.

و فيه أيضا مثل النظر السابق و الحق أنه إن أريد بامتناع الأشرف ما يشمل الامتناع بالغير فهو كذلك و إن أريد الامتناع بالذات فلا يتم كما ذكرنا انتهى قوله بالفاظه - أقول في حله إن الإمكانات كما علمت من طريقتنا تابعة للوجودات بحسب انبعاث الماهيات الممكنة عن مراتبها فالمجوعول بالذات و الصادر من الفاعل هو وجود أي ماهية كانت ثم العقل يحلل الموجود بضرب من التحليل إلى طبيعة الوجود و معنى خاص كلي هو المسمى بالماهية كما مر و تلك الماهية هي المتصفة بالإمكان إذا لوحظت في ذاتها من حيث هي من غير اعتبار الوجود و لا العدم فالماهيات و إمكاناتها تابعة للموجودات و جميع سلسلة الوجودات ينتهي إلى الواجب جل ذكره فلا يتصور ممكن من الممكنات لا يكون وجوده

إذا فرض مستند إلى واجب الوجود أو إلى ما يستند إليه - ولا أن يكون بحيث يستدعي إمكان وجوده علة هي ممتنعة بالذات فإن ذلك من مجازفات الوهم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٢

وأيضا نقول من طريق آخر أن الواجب بالذات يتعالى و يتعاضم عن أن يكون مرتبة من الكمال و الشرف يتصور أن يمتنع عليه بل كل كمال و فضيلة - و كل حيثية فعلية و جهة وجودية يجب أن يتحقق فيه على وجه أعلى و أشرف. فكلما فرضت مرتبة من مراتب الشرف و الفضل أنها فوق ما عليه واجب الوجود - فهي عند الفحص و البرهان يعلم أنها فيه لا محالة إذ لا جهة فيه غير جهة الوجوب بالذات - إذ لو وجدت فيه جهة امتناعية أو إمكانية لم يكن بسيطا كما علم من برهاننا على التوحيد - فكل كمال يستدعي ممكن بالذات له يجب أن يكون موجودا فيه أو فيما يستند إليه - إذ الواجب الوجود بالذات هو الواجب الوجود من جميع الجهات و الحيثيات الوجودية - التي تفرض أو توجد في كل شيء من الأشياء فذاته الأحدية الحققة تامة و فوق التمام من كل جهة كمالية و جميع حيثية وجودية تامة غير متناهية و فوقية غير متناهية لأنه وراء ما لا يتناهى قوة في التأثير الإيجادي بما لا يتناهى قوة في الشدة الذاتية الوجودية - التي لا حظ لأحد منها و لا نصيب لعقل من العقول القدسية من الاطلاع عليها و التشوق إليها و التعشق لها و إنما البرهان يؤدي إلى إثباتها و يحكم بثبوتها فلا يمكن أن يتصور مرتبة من مراتب المجد و الشرف و لا مرتبة من مراتب اللاتناهي بجهة من جهات الشدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٣

و العدة و المدة لا تكون متحققة في ذاته البسيطة الحققة أو لا يكون ثبوتها و تحققها في ذاته على وجه أعلى و أشرف بالوجوب الذاتي لما مر من أن جميع الحيثيات الوجودية - نسبتها إلى ذاته تعالى ليس إلا على وجه الضرورة الذاتية الأولية.

و إذا اتضح هذا فقد انكشف أنه ليس في صنع البرهان المذكور خلط بين الإمكان بالذات و الإمكان بالقياس إلى الغير و لا اشتباه بين الامتناع بالذات و الامتناع بالقياس إلى الغير هذا ثم الذي ذكره هذا الفاضل المشهور بالتحقيق و التدقيق ليس بصحيح في نفسه و الإشكال الذي يرد في المشهور على قولهم الممكن لا يستلزم محالا - بإمكان عدم المعلول الأول و استلزامه لعدم الواجب لا يدفع بما ذكره فإن الإمكان الخاص بالقياس إلى الغير إنما يتصور بين شيئين لا يكون بينهما علاقة ذاتية و نسبة إيجابية عليّة و معلولية و أما اللذان بينهما هذه العلاقة فللعلة وجوب بالقياس إلى معلولها لاحتياجه إليها و للمعلول وجوب بالقياس إلى علته لاقتضاءها إياه فالإشكال المشهور غير مندفع بما قرره و لا البرهان المذكور منقذ بما صورته.

و أما حل الإشكال فقد مر بيانه منا موافقا لطريقتنا من أن المعلول ليس إلا نحوا من الوجود على طريق الاستتباع و الوجوب و أما الإمكان فهو حال الماهية المأخوذة في ذاتها و لا علاقة و لا ارتباط بين الماهية و بين العلة وجودا و لا عدما فإمكانها لا يستلزم شيئا من وجود العلة و عدمها إذ لو استلزمت في ذاتها بذاتها علة لكانت من حيث هي - مرتبطة مجعولة بها و ذلك باطل كما سبق و أما النظر إلى الوجود الذي هي متحدة به فليس له حيثية إلا حيثية الوجوب

بالواجب بالذات والقيام بالقيام الحق وهو الوجوب التعلقي لا غير ولا يمكن فيه فرض اللاوجود لأنه فرض النقيضين مواطاة واشتقاقا جميعا- لما مر أن الوجود موجود في ذاته فالممكن غير مستلزم للمحال والمستلزم للمحال أعني عدم المعلول الأول لعدم الواجب هو غير ممكن في نفسه بل هو في نفسه محال بالغير- الذي هو المحال بالذات ولا جهة فيه غير المحالية فتفطن.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٤

إشكال فكري و انحلال نوري

أنه قد وقع لنا في سالف الزمان إشكال معضل على قاعدة إمكان الأشرف هو أن العقول أنوار محضة متفقة في حقيقة النورية البسيطة متفاوتة بحسب الشدة والضعف- في أصل تلك الماهية النورية على طريقة حكماء الفرس والإشراقيين وهي عندنا وجودات صرفة غير مشوبة بعدم خارجي متفقة في طبيعة الوجود المطلق وهي حقيقة بسيطة خارجية متفاوتة بالشدة والضعف كما مر مرارا.

فيلزم على كل من المنهجين أن يوجد بين كل اثنين واقعين في سلسلتي العلية والمعلولية أفراد بلا نهاية وكذا بين نور الأنوار والمعلول الأول يجب أن يوجد آحاد بلا نهاية لاشتراك النورية الوجودية بينه تعالى وبين سائر الأنوار الصرفة والوجودات المحضة وذلك لأنه ما من مرتبة من الشدة إلا ويتصور بينها وبين ما هو أشد منها مرتبة أخرى بل مراتب غير معدودة يكون هي أشد من تلك المرتبة وأضعف مما فوقها فقاعدة إمكان الأشرف جارية فيها حاكمة بتحقيق وجودها فتكون موجودة لا محالة وكذا تجري وتحكم بوجود مرتبة بينها وبين كل من الطرفين وهكذا إلى ما لا نهاية له فيكون بين كل عقل وعقل ونور ونور وجود عقول وأنوار غير متناهية مجتمعة مترتبة ترتبا ذاتيا وهو ممتنع على أنها محصور بين حاصرين بل يلزم هناك وجود سلاسل غير متناهية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٥

وهذا الإشكال مما عرضته على كثير من فضلاء العصر وما قدر أحد على حله إلى أن نور الله قلبي وهداني ربي إلى صراط مستقيم وفتح على بصيرتي باب ملكوت السماوات والأرض- بمفتاح معرفة نفسي فإن معرفة النفس مفتاح خزائن الملكوت وذلك أني نظرت إلى نفسي فوجدتها إنية صرفة لا يدخل فيها جسد ولا عضو من الأعضاء كقلب أو دماغ أو بخار يسمى عند الأطباء بالروح ولا أيضا يدخل فيها أمر ذهني ولا ماهية عقلية لأن جميعها يغيب عن ذاتي ذاتي لا تغرب عن ذاتي أبدا كما استفاده صاحب التلويحات عن الفيلسوف المعلم للمشائين في الواقعة ثم وجدت ذاتي وإنيتي غير محدودة في حد معين ومرتبة مخصوصة لا يتعدها بل رأيتها مع وحدتها وبساطتها تعقل الأشياء المعقولة بذاتها وتخيّل الصور المتخيلة بذاتها وكذا تدرك الصور المحسوسة بذاتها لا كما توهمه كثير من النظائر أن النفس تدرك المعقولات بذاتها وتدرك غيرها بالآلات عنوانه أن المدرك بالذات للمتخيلات والمحسوسات هي آلة النفس لا النفس وهذا في غاية السخافة والبطلان.

كيف والمستعمل للآلة الجزئية في أمر جزئي محسوس لا بد أن يدركها لا محالة- وإلا لم يكن الآلة آلة طبيعية ولا القوة قوة نفسانية بل حيوانا مباين الذات إلا أنه صار بقوته ومادته ونفسه وجسده عضوا من أعضائنا كالبصر والأذن و

غيرهما و تجويزه خروج عن الغريزة العقلية نعم هذه الآلات استعملاتها مخصصات لحدوث الإدراكات و المدرك بالذات في الجميع هي النفس كما سينكشف لك زيادة في الإيضاح في مباحث علم النفس.

فإذن النفس الإنسانية مع وحدة وجودها و هويتها لها درجات ذاتية من حد العقل - إلى حد طبيعة و الحس فلها مقام في عالم العقل و مقام في عالم المثال و مقام في عالم الطبيعة و كل واحد من هذه المقامات الثلاثة أيضا متفاوت الدرجات قوة و ضعفا و كمالا و نقصا فحس يكون أقوى أشد من حس آخر في باب الحس كالبصر أقوى من السمع و كذا خيال أقوى و أنور من خيال آخر في باب التمثيل و عقل أشرف و أوضح من عقل آخر في باب التعقل فهي مع صرافة وحدتها كثيرة المقامات رفيعة الدرجات فإذا كانت النفس حالها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٦

كذلك فالعقول أولى بهذا الحال فعلى هذا القياس حال كل عقل في وحدته الجمعية المنطوية فيها مراتب و حدود غير متناهية فرضية موجودة بوجود واحد إجمالي أعلاها و أشدها هو ما يلي أدون مراتب ما هو فوقه و أدناها و أنقصها هو ما يليه أعلى مراتب - ما هو تحته و يتلوه في سلسلة الإبداع و إن سألت عن الحق فالعقول القادسة على تفاوت طبقاتها طولا و عرضا كلها من المراتب الإلهية و الشئون الصمدية و السراقات النورية لأنه سبحانه **رَفِيعُ الدَّرَجَاتِ ذُو الْعَرْشِ** و أما تعددها لأجل تعدد آثارها من الأفلاك و غيرها من أنواع البسائط و المركبات - فذلك لا يقدر في وحدتها في الوجود بل إنما يوجب ذلك كثرة الجهات و الحثيات فيها - باعتبار الشدة و الضعف و العلو و الدنو و الكمال و النقص فتفعل بالأشرف الأشرف من الطبائع و بالأخس الأخس منها و بالأعلى الأعلى من طبقات الأجرام كالفلك الأعلى و ما يتلوه و بالأدنى الأسفل منها كالأرض السفلى و ما يعلوها و كذا قدمها و دوامها ببقاء الله تعالى ينفاني حدوث العالم و تغير ما سوى الله جميعا كما اتفق عليه جميع أهل الملل - و أقمنا البرهان القاطع الخالي عن الجدل كما سنوضحه أيضا فيما بعد أشد إيضاح.

و ذلك لما أشرنا إليه مرارا أنها من حيث ذاتها من لوازم الأحدية و الشئون الإلهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٧

و هي لوازم وجهه تعالى و تجليات نوره و أما من حيث نسبتها إلى ما يصدر عنها على التدريج و التجديد من خلق جديد فهي حادثة من هذه الجهة متجددة لأن العلة مع المعلول في الوجود من جهة ما هي علة له فلا محالة يتجدد بتجدها لكن كيفية هذا التجدد من جانب العلة الثابتة الذات و نحو ارتباط المتغير بالثابت الذات مما يصعب إدراكه على أكثر النظر و يسهل على من وفق له من ذوي الأبصار.

تبصرة مشرقية

اعلم أن للوجود المطلق حاشيتين إحدهما واجب الوجود و هو الغاية في الشرف - لأنه غير متناهي الشدة في الكمال و غير متناهي القوة في الفعل و الأخرى الهيولى الأولى و هي الغاية في الخسة لأنها غير متناهية القصور عن الكمال و غير متناهي الإمكان و القوة في الانفعال و لا يتنزل الوجود إليها ما لم يقع له المرور على جميع الأواسط المترتبة - و كذا لم يرتفع الوجود في الاستكمال إلى التقرب إلى الله تعالى ما لم يقع له المرور - على جميع الحدود المتوسطة بينها و

بين الله تعالى على الترتيب الصعودي.

فإذا تقررَت هذه المقدمة بالبرهان كما أشرنا إليه سابقا و سيتضح لك أيضا - لاحقا زيادة إيضاح إن شاء الله ظهر و تبين أنه كما يمكن إثبات الموجودات المتوسطة - بقاعدة إمكان الأشرف يمكن إثبات كثير منها بقاعدة أخرى لنا أن نسميها قاعدة إمكان الأخص و قد استعملناها حسب ما أشار إليه معلم الفلاسفة في كتاب أثولوجيا في كثير من المواضع.

منها أن الأرض و غيرها من بسائط العناصر بعد أن ثبت أن لكل منها مدبرا عقليا و صورة مثالية في عالم المفارقات ثبت أن لها نفسا نباتية و لها أيضا حياة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٨

نفسانية و قوة خيالية موجودة في عالم البرزخ.

و منها أن جسمانية مباشرة للحركة بعد النفس الحيوانية و قبل الميل المستدير - الذي هو من قبيل الأعراض.

و منها أن للنبات طبيعة جوهرية شأنها حفظ التركيب و حفظ الكيفية المزاجية - و هي المزاولة للمادة باستخدام النفس النباتية إياها و ليست هذه القوى أعراضا كما هو المشهور بل جواهر إلا أن وجودها غير مباين لوجود ما هي قوة له إلى غير ذلك من المواضع التي سيقع لك العثور عليها إن كنت من أهله إن شاء الله

الفصل (٨) في نتيجة ما قدمناه من الأصول و ثمرة ما أصلناه في هذه الفصول

فنقول ذاته جلت كبرياؤه في غاية الكمال و الفعلية و الوجوب بحيث لا يتطرق فيه شوب عدم و نقیصة فأول ما يصدر و يترتب عليه يجب أن يكون أشرف الموجودات - التي لا يصفو عن شوب عدم و نقص فيجب أن يكون ذلك من جنس العقول دون النفوس فضلا عما دونها و ذلك لأن

النفوس بما هي نفوس قد شيب فيها ضربان من العدم.

أحدهما العدم التحليلي الذهني

الذي لا عين له في الخارج لأنه مندمج في الوجود فلا يوجب تركيبا خارجيا و لا ذهنيا إلا في ظرف التحليل العقلي حيث يحلل العقل كل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٥٩

موجود دون الحقيقة الصمدية إلى طبيعة أصل الوجود و إلى كونه محدودا بحد معين من الوجود ففيه زيادة اعتبار غير اعتبار طبيعة الوجود بما هو وجود فذاتها كأنها أمر مزدوج الحقيقة من وجود و عدم و كمال و نقص و خير و شر و نور و ظلمة و وجوب و إمكان و ماهية و هوية إلا أن عدمه مضمحل بالوجود و شره بالخير و نقصه مندمج في الكمال و ظلّمته مقهورة تحت شروق النور و إمكانه مطوي في الوجوب و ماهيته في عين الهوية الوجودية فليس له في نفس الأمر عدم و لا شرية و لا نقص و لا ظلمة و لا إمكان و لا ماهية بل في اعتبار من الاعتبارات الذهنية.

و ثانيهما هو العدم الواقعي المستلزم للتركيب

الخارج في الشيء من العدم و الوجود أعني القوة و الفعل فإن النفس أبدا فيها شيء بالقوة و هو كمالها المنتظر و شيء بالفعل و هو وجودها إذ لو لم يكن لها كمال مترقب و لا حالة منتظرة كانت عقلا لا نفسا ففيها نوعان من العدم فلا يصح

أن يكون هي أقرب المفطورات من الحق الواحد وأشرف الدرجات بعد درجة الأول ولا يصح أيضا أن يكون من جنس الطباع والصور المقارنة للمواد لأن مقارنتها مقارنة افتقارية في الحقيقة والفعل جميعا ففيها دخول العدم من ثلاثة أوجه الوجهان المذكوران في النفس الوجه الثالث أن العدم سبب لوجودها والوجود سبب لعدمها والعدم الأول هو قوة وجودها والعدم الثاني عنها هي مادة تكونها وتقدم الأول عليها بالتقدم والطبع وتأخر الثاني عنها تأخر بالذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٠

فذاتها في كل حين محفوفة بالعدمين لأنها تدريجية الحصول وجودا وبقاء - والفرق بين النفس والطبيعة أنها أعني النفس الكلية الفلكية مستمرة الحقيقة الذاتية متجددة الهوية التعلقية فلها في ذاتها الشخصية حيثان إحداها مجردية عقلية باقية والأخرى تعليلية تديرية متبدلة وأما الطبيعة فإنما هي عين الهوية التعلقية - المتجددة في ذاتها الشخصية وإن كان لكل طبيعة نوعية سبب عقلي ذو عناية بها لكنها خارجة من جهة استغراقها في الهيولى عن ذلك المدبر النوري وظاهر أن الصورة المقدارية لتضاعف الأعدام فيها لا يمكن أن يكون أول الصوادر وتلك الأعدام أولها عدم الكمال الأتم اللازم للقصور الإمكاناني والثاني هو فقد الكمال المنتظر والثالث فقد ذاته عن ذاته في كل وقت وزمان والرابع غيبة ذاته عن ذاته في كل حد ومكان وأما الهيولى الأولى فهي القوة الصرفة والإمكان الاستعدادي المحض. وقيل الفرق بينها وبين العدم الذي هو أحد الأسباب الثلاثة للكائنات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦١

مع السببين الآخرين وهما الصورة والهيولى أن العدم معدوم بالذات موجود بالعرض - والهيولى موجودة بالذات معدومة بالعرض.

ومعنى هذا الكلام أن العدم السابق للحادث المتجدد الهوية والذات وإن كان متحدا مع وجود جزئه السابق بالعرض لكنه بالذات عدم لهذا الجزء الحادث وأما الهيولى فإنها موجودة بوجود هذا الحادث بالذات لأنها مستكملة به متحدة معه لكنها قوة استعدادية عدمية بالقياس إلى ما بعده من المتجددات بالتبع وليست قوة بالقياس إلى ما تصورت به بالفعل فهي موجودة بالذات معدومة بالعرض فإن القوة على شيء لم يوجد بعد بالفعل لا بد وأن تكون قوة لشيء موجود بالفعل فهي من حيث إنها قوة على الشيء معدومة ومن حيث إنها قوة من الشيء أو قوة للشيء أو قوة بالشيء موجودة منه أو له أو به.

وأما العرض فبالضرورة متأخر عن وجود الموضوع كتأخر الهيولى عن الصورة وهو أشد تأخرا عن الموضوع من الهيولى عن الصورة لما علمت أن لها ضربا من التقدم على الصورة بخلاف العرض فإنه متأخر عن موضوعه من كل وجه فلا يكون أول الصوادر وقد علمت أن ليس للباري جل ذكره عرض قائم به أو صفة زائدة قديمة أو حادثة كالإرادة القديمة أو الحادثة التي أثبتتها الأشاعرة والكرامية حتى يتوهم متوهم أن أول الموجودات عنه تعالى عرض موضوعه ذاته تعالى فإذن أول ما يوجد بعد الذات الأحدية من كل وجه موجود واحد مستقل الذات والفعل جميعا فلا يكون إلا عقلا محضا لانتفاء الوجود من الهيولى والوحدة من الجسم والاستقلال في الذات من الصورة والعرض وفي الفعل من النفس.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٢

تبصرة تفصيلية

المناهج لإثبات هذا الموجود المفارق القدسي

المتوسطة في الشرف و العلو بينه تعالى و بين عالم الخلق الواسطة لإفاضة الخير و الجود على الدوام كثيرة.

الأول من طريق النبوة و الإلهام

كما أشار إليه سيدنا سيد المرسلين سلام الله عليهم و عليه و على آله أجمعين بقوله

أول ما خلق الله العقل

و قوله

أول ما خلق الله القلم

لأنه واسطة لتصوير الموجودات و ترتيب النظام كالقلم لتصوير الكلام و ترتيب الأرقام و قوله

أول ما خلق الله نوري

و قوله

خلقت أنا و علي من نور واحد

و الثاني من منهج امتناع الكثير عن الواحد

فبالضرورة يجب أن يكون أقرب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٣

الأشياء منه ذاتا واحدة بسيطة متبرئة عن ملابسة العدم الخارجي و القوة الاستعدادية مستغنية في ذاته و في فعله عن غير مبدعه و قيومه ليصح أن يكون واسطة في إفاضة الخير و الجود من المعطي الحق على ما عدها من المخلوقات و رشح الفيض الدائم على سائر المجعولات - فهو لا محالة أمر عقلي و جوهر قدسي لانتفاء هذه النعوت من الجسم و جزئيه و هما المادة و الصورة و كماله و هو النفس فضلا عن العرض.

الثالث من سبيل إمكان الأشرف

و لا شبهة في أن العقل أشرف من سائر الممكنات و هو فرد من أفراد الوجود و مرتبة من مراتبه و الوجود طبيعة واحدة نوعية على الوجه الذي قررناه و إن لم يكن نوعيتها باعتبار عروض الكلية لها في الذهن - كما في الماهيات فيكون الموجود الأشرف ممكنا لا محالة بالإمكان العام فيجب حصوله قبل الأخس فالموجود الأول عنه سبحانه و يجب أن يكون أشرف الذوات العقلية - و الجواهر النورية و أشدها قوة و أكملها هوية و أبدها عن النقيصة و القصور و أقربها إلى مبدأ المبادي و غاية الغايات.

الرابع من مسلك الملاءمة و المناسبة الذاتية بين المقتضي و المقتضى

و العلة التامة و معلولها و الفاعل التام و فعله فيجب أن يكون المناسبة الذاتية الحاصلة للعقل الأول - و المعلول الأقدم أتم و أكمل ما يتصور من المناسبات بالقياس إلى أي ممكن فرض بعده - فإذاً إن هو إلا أكرم العقول القادسة و أبسط

الجواهر العقلية و أنور الذوات النورية بعد نور الأنوار.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٤

الخامس من جهة إخراج ما بالقوة إلى ما بالفعل

للفنوس في باب كمالاتها العلمية والعملية فإن شيئاً من الأشياء إذا كان بالقوة في كمال ثم صار بالفعل في ذلك الكمال - فمخرج ذاته من حد القوة إلى حد الفعل لا يمكن أن يكون ذاته و إلا لكان الأمر الواحد مفيداً و مستفيداً عن نفسه لنفسه.

و أيضاً لو كانت الذات بذاتها مقتضية للخروج من القوة إلى الفعل لما كانت بالقوة أصلاً و أيضاً الخارج من القوة إلى الفعل أشرف و أكمل من حيث الفعل و أخس و أنقص - من حيث القوة و القبول فلو كان خروجه منها إليه من تلقاء ذاته لكانت ذاته أشرف من ذاته و ذاته أنقص من ذاته ليفعل و يقبل و يكمل و يستكمل و بالجملة يلزم أن يكون معطي الكمال قاصراً عنه.

فإذن النفس العاقلة لا تستطيع أن تخرج ذاتها من القوة إلى الفعل و من العقل الهيولاني إلى العقل الصوري بواسطة الاستعداد و التهيو الذي هو العقل بالملكة فلا بد من معلم قدسي و مصور عقلي متوسط بين الفياض الحق تعالى و النفوس المستفيضة - المستكملة بالعقل بالفعل فهو واهب الصور بإذن الله و يجب أن يكون بريئاً من القوة و الانفعال و إلا لاحتاج إلى مكمل آخر يخرج من القوة إلى الكمال و يعود الكلام إليه أيضاً فيتسلسل و هو محال أو ينتهي إلى مكمل لا يكون فيه شوب قوة استعدادية و ليس هو الواجب القيوم بلا واسطة إذ النفوس كثيرة و الواجب واحد محض فلا بد من متوسط عقلي و قد علمت في مباحث العقل و المعقول أن قياس العقل الفائض منه على قابلية النفس و صيرورتها عقلاً بالفعل متحدة به قياس النور الفائض من الشمس بإذن ربها على البصر إذ به يصير البصر بصراً بالفعل بعد ما كان بالقوة في باب الأبصار و به يصير المبصرات مبصرات بالفعل بعد ما كانت مبصرات بالقوة و قوة البصر تتحد بالنور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٥

الذي هو البصر بالفعل و الباصر بالفعل و المبصر بالفعل و به يكون سائر الأمور التي تعلق بها الإبصار مبصرة بالفعل و وزانها وزان الماهيات التي تصير معقولة بهذا العقل الذي اتحدت به لا بأنفسها كما أن الأعيان الثابتة و الماهيات تصير موجودة لا بأنفسها بل بالوجود الذي يتحد بها

السادس من طريق الهيولى و الصورة و كيفية التلازم بينهما

حيث يحتاج وجود الهيولى - إلى واحد بالإيهام من صورة مطلقة غير متخصصة بشيء من أفرادها و واحد بالهوية التحصلية و هو الجوهر العقلي المعقب لكل صورة زائلة عن الهيولى بصورة عاقبة إياها ليستحفظ وحدتها الشخصية الدائمة بوحدة مرسله متبدلة الأفراد و وحدة ثابتة باقية عقلية كما مر بيانه في مبحث التلازم.

السابع من أسلوب الطبيعة المتجددة الهوية عندنا

فإنها لما كانت متجددة الهوية دون الماهية فلا يمكن أن يكون مفيض وجودها ذاتاً أحدية من كل وجه كواجب الوجود و لا أيضاً طبيعة أخرى و إلا لعاد الكلام إلى تجدد هويتها و حاجتها إلى سبب موجب لوجودها فيلزم التسلسل أو الدور

وهما ممتنعان فكذا ما يؤدي إلى أحدهما - ولا النفس فإنها كما علمت حكمها من حيث تعلقها إلى البدن و استكمالاتها اللازمة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٦

لوجودها حكم الطبيعة في الانقضاء و التجدد و التصرم و التبذل و لا الهوى لأنها قوة انفعالية لا صورة فعلية إيجابية فموجب وجودها و مقتضى ذاتها من حيث الثبات المضمن فيه التجدد و الحدوث جوهر عقلي و صورة مجردة و مثال ربوبي و ملك كريم و اسم إلهي.

الثامن من مذهب الأشواق و الأغراض و الشهوات و ميول الأشياء إلى الكمالات

و توجهها إلى الغايات فلا محالة لا بد أن يكون لكل نوع طبيعي غاية كمالية عقلية - ليصح توجه أفرادها بحسب الجبلية و تشوقها بحسب الغريزة إلى ما فوقها و إلا لكان ارتكاز هذا المعنى أعني الميل إلى التمام و التوجه إلى الكمال باطلا و عبثا و هدرًا - و محال أن يكون في الطبيعة باطل أو عبث كما مر في مسائل العلة الغائية من مباحث العلل الأربع نعم ربما عاق لها عما ذكرنا عائق أو اتفق أن منعها عنه قاصر أو مزاحم - و العائق لا يكون دائماً و لا أكثرية و كذا الأمر الاتفاقية فالوصول للأشياء إلى كمالاتها الأخيرة لا بد أن يكون إما مطرداً دائماً أو أكثرية و تلك الكمالات الأخيرة التي لا حركة بعدها ليست نفوساً لأنها بالقوة أيضاً ما دامت نفوساً مشتاقة إلى الكمال الأتم و ليست أيضاً واجب الوجود لأنها متعددة متنوعة و الواجب واحد فهي عقول البتة فقد علم أنه كما لا بد في سلسلة المبادي و ترتيب صدور الأشياء من واسطة عقلية بينه تعالى و بين المجعولات كذلك لا بد في سلسلة الغايات و ترتيب رجوع الموجودات و عودها إلى الكمالات بعد نزولها عنها من واسطة عقلية بينها و بين غاية الغايات و آخر النهايات و هو أول الأوائل و مبدأ المبادي.

التاسع من طريق كفاية الإمكان الذاتي للأنواع المحصلة

التي لا يفتقر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٧

فيضانها نوعاً و لا شخصاً عن المبدأ الواهب إلى إمكان استعدادي غير إمكانها الذاتي فهي لا محالة صادرة عن الواهب مبدعه قبل الزمان و الزمانيات و الأمكنة و المكانية قبلية بالذات في عالم الدهر إذ لا مانع في ذاتها من قبول فيض الوجود و لا ضاد للجواد المطلق - و لا مبطل و لا معطل للمفيض الحق عن وجوده و فعله و صنعه و إبداعه فهي لا محالة فائضة عنه أبداً و أما التي تفتقر في خصوصيات أفرادها الشخصية إلى سبق مكان استعدادي وراء إمكانها الذاتي فهي أيضاً فائضة من حيث طبيعتها المرسله في عالم الصنع و الإبداع - و إن كانت في تعييناتها الشخصية مرهونة الهويات بالمادة و الاستعدادات و الأزمنة و الأوقات - و بالجملة فالإفاضة عليها من جانب المفيض ثابتة دائمة و إن كان المفاض عليه و هي الأنواع بحسب الهويات و الوجودات متجددة دائرة بائدة فإذن جميع الماهيات و صور الأنواع على الدوام فائضة من جانب الله أبد الدهر و إن كان العالم الجسماني بجميع ما فيه و معه و له حادثاً زمانياً مسبقاً بعدم زمانه و لما كانت الأنواع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٨

و الطبايع لا بد في صدورهما عن الواحد الحق من وسائط عقلية مع جهاتها النورية ليصح فيضان هذه الأنواع و الطبايع عنه و المادة و إن تكثرت بتعدد أو تعدد جهاتها الاستعدادية - أشخاص نوع واحد أو أفراد طبيعة واحدة لكن يستحيل أن يتكثر بها أو باستعداداتها - أنواع متخالفة و طبايع متكثرة.

فثبت من هذا المنهج أيضا وجود العالم العقلي و تكثر صورته و ذلك العالم مع كثرة صورته ليس مباينا لذات الحق الأول بل تلك الصور على علوم إلهية قائمة بذاته تعالى واقعة في صقع الربوبية فليست هي من جملة ما سوى الله.

العاشر من سبيل الحركات الفلكية و ذلك من وجوه

أحدها أن لكل متحرك محركا غيره

إذ الشيء لا يحرك نفسه و لا يتحرك عن نفسه و إلا لكان شيء واحد قابلا و فاعلا و لكان المكمل للشيء مستكملا به و ذلك المحرك إن كان متحركا - أيضا يحتاج إلى محرك آخر و هكذا إلى لا نهاية و مع ذلك لكانت بالأسر أوساطا بلا طرف و ما دام حكمها حكم الوساطة لا يكون الحركة متحققة بالفعل على نحو وجودها - فلا بد من الانتهاء إلى محرك لا يتحرك أصلا به يخرج المتحرك من القوة إلى الفعل - و لا محالة هو أمر بالفعل لا يتغير أصلا بالذات و لا بالعرض لا بالطبيعة و لا بالقسر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٦٩

و لا بالتسخير و لا بالإرادة و لا بالمشايعة و تحريكه للفلك إما بإعطاء المبدأ القريب إياه - الذي به التحرك حركة وضعية و إما بأن يكون هو المؤتم به و المعشوق للجوهر المتحرك حركة شوقية تتبعها الحركة الدورية لأنه الموجب له أشواقا متتالية و تخیلات متتابعة

و ثانيها أنا نقول الحركة المستديرة يمتنع أن تكون طبيعية

فهي لا محالة إرادية مستندة إلى نفس دراية و الباعث لها في الحركة إما أمر شهوي أو غضبي أو غاية الحركة فيها جلب ملائم بدني أو رفع منافر بدني و هما متغيان عن الفلك لأنه تام الخلقة لا يفتقر إلى غذاء و ليس له مضاد ليفتقر إلى دفعه فوجود الشهوة و الغضب فيه عبث معطل و الأغراض الحيوانية الحسية منحصرة في هذين الغرضين و ما يرجع إليهما فالغرض للأفلاك في حركاتها الشوقية أمر عقلي جازم غير مظنون و لا موهوم - و إلا لما دامت الحركات لأمر غير مجزوم و ليس الغرض أمرا حقيقيا كنفع السافل أو ما يجري مجراه فحركاتها لأجل كمال عقلي جليل الخطر فهي إما لتحصيل ذات عقلية أو للتشبه إليها و الأول غير ممكن فتعين الثاني و لا يمكن أن يكون التشبه به - المتشوق إليه ذاتا واحدة هي الواجب جل ذكره و إلا لما اختلفت الحركات الفلكية قدرا و جهة فهي للتشبه إلى معشوقات كثيرة و إن صح أن يكون لها اشتراك في طلب المعشوق الأول لاشتراكها في دورية الحركات و اختلاف في طلب المعشوقات الثواني لاختلافها في جهات الحركات و أزمنتها فلكل منها معشوق يخصه هو إمام نفسه و مكمله بالتشويق و الإيتام به و التشبه به في التقرب إلى الحق الأول و التوسل إليه في الاستشراق في أشعة نور الأنوار و الاستقبال لتجليات قدسه و كماله.

و ثالثها من جهة أن حركاتها غير متناهية و لا منقطعة

فلها مبدأ غير متناهي القوة و كل قوة جسمانية سواء كانت نفساً أو صورة منطبعة فهي متناهيّة القوة و الأثر فلا محالة مبدأ حركتها قوة مفارقة غير متناهي التأثير و التحريك و ليس ذلك هو الباري بلا توسيط - لأن الحركات الدائمة كثيرة و الواجب واحد محض فثبت كون العقول موجودة بهذه الوجود الثلاثة من هذا المنهج.

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الحادي عشر من منهج مطابقة الأحكام

الصادقة الحاصلة في هذه الأذهان لما في نفس الأمر و قد تصدى المحقق الطوسي ره لسلوك هذا المنهج و عمل في بيانه رسالة حاصلها أنا لا نشك في كون الأحكام اليقينية التي تحكم بها أذهاننا مطابقة لما في نفس الأمر و لا في أن الأحكام التي بخلافها مما يعتقدها الجهال غير مطابقة لما فيه و نعلم يقيناً أن المطابقة لا تتصور إلا بين شيئين متغيرين بالشخص و متحدين فيما يقع به المطابقة و لا شك في أن الصنفين المذكورين من الأحكام متشاركين في الثبوت الذهني فإذن يجب أن يكون للصنف الأول منهما دون الثاني ثبوت خارج عن أذهاننا يعتبر المطابقة بين ما في أذهاننا و بينه و هو الذي يعبر عنه بنفس الأمر.

فنقول ذلك الثابت الخارج إما أن يكون قائماً بنفسه أو متمثلاً في غيره - و القائم بنفسه إما ذو وضع أو غير ذي وضع و الأول محال لوجوه أحدها أن تلك الأحكام غير متعلقة بجهة من جهات العالم و لا بزمان و كل ذي وضع يتعلق بهما - و ثانيها أن العلم بالمطابقة لا يحصل إلا بعد الشعور بالمتطابقين و نحن لا نشك في المطابقة مع الجهل بذلك الشيء من حيث يكون ذا وضع.

و ثالثها أن الذي في أذهاننا من تلك الأحكام إنما ندركه بعقولنا و أما ذوات الأوضاع فلا ندركها إلا بالحواس من جهة ما هي محسوسات و الثاني و هو أن يكون ذلك القائم بنفسه غير ذي وضع هو أيضاً محال لأنه قول بالمثل الأفلاطونية. و أما أن يكون ذلك الخارج المطابق له متمثلاً في غير منقسم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٧١

فنقول ذلك المتمثل فيه لا يمكن أن يكون بالقوة و إن كان بعض ما في الأذهان بالقوة و ذلك لامتناع المطابقة بين ما بالفعل أو يمكن أن يصير وقتاً ما بالفعل و بين ما بالقوة و أيضاً لا يمكن أن يزول أو يتغير أو يخرج إلى الفعل بعد ما كان ما بالقوة في وقت من الأوقات لأن الأحكام المذكورة واجبة الثبوت أزلاً و أبداً من غير تغير و استحالة و من غير تقييد بوقت و مكان و واجب أن يكون محلها كذلك و إلا فأمكن ثبوت الحال بدون المحل فإذن ثبت وجود قائم بنفسه في الخارج غير ذي وضع مشتمل على جميع المعقولات التي يمكن أن يخرج من القوة إلى الفعل بحيث يستحيل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٧٢

عليه و عليها التغير و الاستحالة و التجدد و الزوال و يكون هو و هي بهذه الصفات أزلاً و أبداً - و إذا ثبت ذلك فنقول لا يمكن أن يكون ذلك الموجود هو أول الأوائل عز شأنه - و ذلك لوجوب اشتغال ذلك الموجود على الكثرة التي لا نهاية

لها بالفعل و أول الأوائل يمتنع عليه أن يكون فيه كثرة و أن يكون مبدأ فاعلا لها و محلا قابلا إياها فإذا ثبت وجود موجود غير الواجب تعالى و لنسميه عقل الكل و هو الذي عبر عنه في القرآن- تارة باللوح المحفوظ و تارة بالكتاب المبين المشتمل على كل رطب و يابس و ذلك ما أردناه انتهى تلخيص ما أفاده.

و اعلم أن القول بالمثل الأفلاطونية حق عندنا كما علمته و مع ذلك لا يضر لنا في إثبات المرام من هذا المنهج و هو وجود صور الأحكام الثابتة في عالم آخر عقلي- سواء كانت حاله في جوهر عقلي أو قائمة بذواتها.

الثاني عشر من مسلك التمام و مقابله

فإن الأشياء بحسب الاحتمال العقلي أربعة أقسام لأنها إما تام أو ناقص و الأول إما فوق التمام أو لا و الثاني إما مستكف بذاته أو بما لا يخرج عن قوام ذاته أو لا ثم إن العنصریات ناقصة محضة و الفلكيات مستكفية- و الواجب عز اسمه فوق التمام فلا بد أن يكون في الوجود موجود تام ليكون متوسطا بين ما هو فوق التمام و بين ما هو ناقص أو مستكف و هو العقل و ذلك لأنه لو صدر منه تعالى ناقص ابتداء و هو فوق التمام لانتفت المناسبة بين المفيض و المفاض عليه. و أيضا يلزم الفرجة و الانفطار في سلسلة الوجود و هو غير جائز و قد بينا من جهة قاعدة إمكان الأخس أنه لا يمكن وجود مرتبة من الشرف لا يترتب عليه جميع ما هو دونه إلى آخر الحاشية الأخرى.

تأييد سماعي

قال مفيد المشائين و معلمهم في أثولوجيا في عاشر ميامره- الواحد المحض هو علة الأشياء كلا و ليس بشيء من الأشياء بل هو بدأ الشيء و ليس هو الأشياء بل الأشياء كلها فيه و ليس هو في شيء من الأشياء و ذلك أن الأشياء كلها- انبجست منه و به ثباتها و قوامها و إليه مرجعها فإن قال قائل كيف يمكن أن يكون الأشياء من الواحد المبسوط الذي لا مثنية فيه و لا كثرة بجهة من الجهات قلنا لأنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٧٣

واحد محض مبسوط ليس فيه شيء من الأشياء فلما كان واحدا محضا انبجست منه الأشياء كلها و ذلك أنه لما لم يكن هوية انبجست منه الهوية.

أقول و اختصر القول أنه لما لم يكن شيئا من الأشياء رأيت الأشياء كلها منه- غير أنه و إن كانت الأشياء انبجست منه فإن الهوية الأولى أعني به هوية العقل هي التي انبجست منه بغير وسط ثم انبجست منه جميع هويات الأشياء التي في العالم الأعلى و العالم الأسفل بتوسط هوية العقل و العالم العقلي و أقول إن الواحد المحض هو فوق التمام و الكمال و أما العالم الحسي فناقص لأنه مبتدع من الشيء التام و هو العقل و إنما صار العقل تاما كاملا لأنه مبتدع من الواحد المحض الحق الذي هو فوق التمام و لم يكن بممكن أن يبدع الشيء- الذي فوق التمام الشيء الناقص بلا توسط و لا يمكن للشيء التام أن يبدع تاما مثله لأن الإبداع نقصان أعني به أن المبدع لا يكون في درجة المبدع بل يكون دونه انتهى كلام الفيلسوف المقدم بعبارة.

و كأنك قد تهيات بما قدمناه إليك من بيان كون البسيط الحق كل الأشياء- لفهم كلام هذا المعلم و تحقيق مراده و لعله أراد بالهوية هاهنا الوجود لا الماهية المرسله كما ظن لأنها غير مجعولة بل أراد به التشخيص المتميز عن سائر الشخصات المباين لها و هذا إنما يتحقق عند هذا الفيلسوف فيما سوى الأول حيث إن لكل منها وجودا محدودا بحد

من الكمال فيكون مباينا لموجود آخر مغايرا له و أما الوجود الواجبي - فهو لكونه غير متناهي القوة و الشدة و لا محدود بحد و غاية فلا هوية له بهذا المعنى لأنه جامع كل حد وجودي و ما فوقه وراءه فلا مباين له في الوجود و لا غير ليكون متميزا عنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٧٤

بكونه مسلوبا عنه و بالعكس فإنه لا يكون عادما لشيء من الأشياء فحيث هو هو كانت الأشياء كلها فيه و حيث يكون شيء من الأشياء كان هو معه كما في قوله - **وَهُوَ الَّذِي فِي السَّمَاءِ إِلَهُ وَ فِي الْأَرْضِ إِلَهُ وَ قَوْلُهُ وَ هُوَ مَعَكُمْ أَيْنَ مَا كُنْتُمْ وَ قَوْلُهُ مَا يَكُونُ مِنْ نَجْوَى ثَلَاثَةٍ إِلَّا هُوَ رَابِعُهُمْ وَ لَا خَمْسَةٍ إِلَّا هُوَ سَادِسُهُمْ** الآية إلى غير ذلك من الآيات القرآنية و السنة النبوية و فيما صحت روايته

عن علي ع أنه قال:

مع كل شيء لا بمقارنة و غير كل شيء لا بمزايلة

حجة قوية على هذا المطلب من طريقة النقل و السماع.

فهذه مناهج إثبات العقل المفارق و عالمه و سياًتي بيان كثرة العقول و تفاصيل ما في عالمها و حسن ترتيبه و جودة نظامه و اشتغال ذلك العالم على جميع الطبائع النوعية - التي في هذا العالم مع ما يزيد عليها على وجه أعلى و أشرف في موضعه حسبما قدمنا ذكره في مباحث الماهية.

و اعلم أن لنا منهجا آخر في إثبات علم العقل و هو من جهة إثبات الخزانة للمعقولات - كما قال عز اسمه **وَإِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ** و قوله **وَلِلَّهِ خَزَائِنُ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ** و بيانه أنا قد نعلم شيئا معقولا ثم ننسى و لا نذكره أصلا بل نحتاج في إدراكه إلى تجشّم تحصيل جديد و كسب مستأنف و ربما نذهل عنه ذهولا ثم نتذكره بعد التوجه و الالتفات - من غير حاجة إلى كسب جديد فعند الذهول و النسيان كليهما لا شك أن الصورة غير حاصلة في قوتنا المدركة و إلا لكانت مدركة بالفعل إذ لا معنى للإدراك إلا حصول صورة الشيء في القوة الدراكة.

لكن يجب الفرق بين حالتي الذهول و النسيان و الفرق بينهما ليس إلا بكون الصورة حالة الذهول و إن لم تكن حاصلة في القوة المدركة لكنها حاصلة في القوة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٧٥

الحافظة لها و ما في حالة النسيان فزال عنهما جميعا أما زوالها عن المدركة فبمحوها عنها و أما زوالها عن الحافظة فبزوال نسبة كونها حافظة لبطلان استعداد النفس و تهيئتها للاتصال بها و قبول الفيض عنها ففي القوى الانطباعية لقبولها التكثير و الانقسام جاز عند العقل أن يكون بعضها مدركا و بعضها حافظا كما هو المشهور من أن موضعا من تجاويف الدماغ فيه محل الإدراك و قبول الصور و موضعا آخر فيه محل الحفظ و الإدامة.

و أما القوة الغير المنطبعة كالعاقلة منا فلا يمكن انقسامها إلى محل الإدراك و محل الحفظ و الاختزان فلا جرم خازن المعقولات جوهر عقلي يختزن فيه صور الأشياء المعقولة - كلما توجهت النفس إليه انتقشت بصورة ما تناسبه و إذا أعرضت عنه إلى ما يلي العالم الحسي و الدار الجسدانية أو إلى صورة أخرى انمحت عنها المتمثلات و غابت كمرآة

تحاذي بها جانب صورة مطلوبة بعد أن صارت مجلوة و أزيلت عنها الغشاوة و الصدى بتجشم اكتساب و تعمل و تكلف فمهما بقيت على وضع المحاذاة كانت الصورة منعكسة فيها أو فائضة عليها على اختلاف الرايين أعني الإشراق و الرشح في الممثل له كما في المثال - و كلاهما غير ما هو المختار عندنا فيهما كما أشرنا إليه و مهما تحولت و انصرفت زالت عنها - فإذن النفس متى كانت مجلوة المرأة متطهرة القلب بقيت على ملكة الاتصال و استعداد الاستشراق و قابلية الارتسام التي اكتسبتها فكان المنمحي عنها مذهولا عنه لا نسيا منسيا و كانت قوية على الاسترجاع و الإعادة من دون تعمل اكتساب جديد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٧٦

و تجشم اقتناص مستأنف لبقاء المعارفة و المناسبة بين المدرك و الحافظ و القابل و الفاعل و المستفيض و المفيض بخلاف ما إذا بطلت صقلاتها و انكدت تارة أخرى بغشاوة مادية و ظلمة طبيعية فيحتاج إلى استيناف اكتساب و تعمل لإزالة الحجاب و حصول المناسبة و بالجملة فقد ثبت وجود جوهر عقلي انحفظت فيه المعقولات كلها و هو المطلوب.

تكميل انحالي لشك إعضالي

إن في هذا المنهج شكاً من جهة السهو و النسيان قد استصعبه المناظرون حتى أنه نقل عن بعض تلامذة المحقق الطوسي أنه لم يقدر على حله و لم يأت بمشبع من الكلام في دفعه قال العلامة الحلبي في شرح تجريد العقائد في مطابقة الأحكام الذهنية الصادقة لما في نفس الأمر بهذه العبارة و قد كان في بعض أوقات استفادتي منه ره جرت هذه النكتة و سألته عن معنى قولهم إن الصادق في الأحكام الذهنية هو اعتبار مطابقتها - لما في نفس الأمر و المعقول في نفس الأمر إما الثبوت الذهني أو الخارجي و قد منع كل منهما - فقال ره المراد بنفس الأمر هو العقل الفعال فكل صورة أو حكم ثابت في الذهن - يطابق الصور المنتقشة في العقل الفعال فهو صادق و إلا فهو كاذب فأوردت عليه أن الحكماء يلزمهم العقول بانتقاش الصور الكاذبة في العقل الفعال لأنهم استدلوا على ثبوته بالفرق بين السهو و النسيان فإن السهو هو زوال الصورة المعقولة عن الجوهر العاقل و ارتسامها في الحافظة لها و النسيان هو زوالها عنهما و هذا يتأتى في الصور المحسوسة أما المعقولة فإن سبب النسيان هو زوال الاستعداد بزوال المفيد للعلم في باب التصورات و التصديقات و هاتان الحالتان قد تعرضان في الأحكام الكاذبة فلم

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يأت بمشبع انتهى كلامه ره.

قال الفاضل الدواني في حله إن شأن العقل الفعال في اختزان المعقولات - مع الصوادر الحفظ و التصديق جميعاً و مع الكوادر الحفظ فقط دون التصديق أي الحفظ على سبيل التصور دون الإذعان لبراءته عن الشرور و الأسواء التي هي من توابع المادة انتهى ما ذكره و فيه ما لا يخفى من الخلل و القصور - أما أولاً فلأن ما في العقل الفعال هو أشد تحصلاً و أقوى ثبوتاً مما في أذهاننا فاقتران الموضوع للمحمول إذا حصل في أذهاننا فربما كان الاقتران بينهما اقتراناً ضعيفاً و ارتباط أحدهما بالآخر ارتباطاً متزلزلاً و ذلك لضعف سببه و كاسبه و دليله حيث

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لم يكن الاقتران بينهما من برهان ذي وسط لمي أو من تحدثس أو حس أو تجربة أو غير ذلك فيكون الحكم منا باقترانها غير قاطع فهو شك أو وهم وربما كان الواقع بخلافه فيكون حكما كاذبا و أما إذا اقترن الموضوع بالمحمول في العقل الفعال فيكون اقتران أحدهما بالآخر اقترانا مؤكدا ضروريا حاصلا من أسباب وجودهما على هذا الوجه - كاقتران أحدهما بالآخر في ظرف الخارج و ليس مصداق الحكم إلا عبارة عن اقتران الموضوع بالمحمول أو اتحادهما في نحو من الوجود في الواقع.

و أما ثانيا فلأن التصور و التصديق كما تقرر و تبين في مقامه إنما هما نوعان - من العلم الانطباعي الحادث في الفطرة الثانية فاما علوم المبادي العالية و علم الحق الأول جل ذكره فليس شيء منهما تصورا و لا تصديقا فإن علوم المبادي كلها

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عبارة عن حضور ذواتها العاقلة و المعقولة بأنفسها و حضور لوازمها الوجودية بنفس حضور ذواتها الثابتة لذواتها من غير جعل و تأثير مستأنف و تحصيل ثان حسبما قرناه كعلمنا بذاتنا و لوازم ذاتنا غير المنسلخة عنا بحسب وجودنا العيني و هويتنا الإدراكية التي هي عين الحياة و الشعور.

و أما حل الإشكال و حق المقال فيه على وجه تطمئن به القلب و تسكن إليه النفس - فهو يستدعي تمهيد مقدمة هي أن كل ملكة راسخة في النفس الإنسانية سواء كانت من باب الكمالات أو الملكات العلمية أو من باب الملكات أو الكمالات العملية كملكة الصناعات التي تحصل بتمرن الأعمال و تكرر الأفعال كالكتابة و التجارة و الحراثة و غيرها فهي إنما تحصل بارتباط خاص من النفس بالعقل الفعال لأجل جهة فعلية من الجهات الموجودة فيه لأن الأنواع المختلفة لا يكفي في تكثرها و وجودها تكثر القوابل أو تكثر جهاتها القابلية - بل يحتاج إما إلى مباد متعددة عقلية كما رآه الأفلاطونيون من أن علل الأنواع المتكثرة - في هذا العالم عقول متكثرة هي أربابها و إما إلى جهات متعددة فاعلية في العقل الأخير - كما هو رأي المشائين.

و بالجملة فجميع الكمالات الوجودية في هذا العالم مبدؤها و منشأها من حيث كونها أمرا وجوديا من ذلك العالم سواء سميت خيرات أو شرورا إذ الشرور الوجودية شريتها راجعة إلى استلزامها لعدم شيء آخر أو زوال حالة وجودية له و هي في حد نفسها و من جهة وجودها تكون معدودة من الخيرات كالزنا و السرقة و نظائرها و منها الجهل المركب و الكذب فكل منهما في نفسه أمر وجودي و صفة نفسانية يعد من الكمالات لمطلق النفوس بما هي حيوانية و إنما يعد شرا بالإضافة إلى النفس الناطقة لمضادتها لليقين العلمي الدائم و لملكة الصدق فإن الأول خير حقيقي و الثاني نافع في تحصيل الحق.

فإذا تمهدت هذه المقدمة فنقول لا يلزم أن يكون ما بإزاء كل ملكة نفسانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٨٠

أو أمر وجودي في العقل الفعال أو في عالم العقل هو بعينه من نوع تلك الملكة أو ذلك الأمر بل الذي لا بد منه هو أن

يكون فيه أمر مناسب لتلك الملكة أو لذلك الأمر فإذن كما أن النفس إذا تكررت ملاحظتها لعلوم صادقة حقة حصلت لها ملكة الاتصال والارتباط - بشأن من شئون العقل الفعال متى شاءت من هذه الجهة فكذلك إذا ارتسمت فيها صورة قضية كاذبة و تكررت ارتسامها أو التفت النفس إليها التفاتا قويا حصلت لها ملكة الاتصال من هذه الجهة بشأن آخر من شئونه متى شاءت ولا يلزم أن يكون ذلك الشأن بعينه قضية ذهنية صادقة ولا هذا قضية كاذبة بل أمرا يناسب ذاك أو أمرا يناسب هذا فهذا معنى اختزان صور الأشياء في عالم العقل واسترجاع النفس إليه.

وقد أشرنا لك مرارا أن ليس معنى حصول صور الموجودات في العقل البسيط

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ارتسامها فيه على وجه الكثرة المتميزة بعضها عن بعض كما أن صورها المحسوسة ترسم في المادة الجسمانية وكذا صورها النفسانية التفصيلية التي ترسم في النفس الخيالية على هذا الوجه - وذلك لضيق هذا العالم وما يتعلق به من المشاعر عن الحضور الجمعي والتمام العقلي - والبراءة عن العدم والغيرية والكثرة والانقسام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٨٢

الموقف العاشر في دوام جود المبدأ الأول وأزلية قدرته

و بيان أنه لم ينقطع ولا ينقطع فيضه عما سواه أبدا ولا يتعطل عن الفعل دائما مع أن العالم متجدد كائن فاسد وإنما الذي لا يبيد ولا ينقص ولا ينفد أبدا هي كلمات الله التامات و علومه الباقيات وهي ليست من جملة العالم وما سوى الحق كما أشرنا إليه مرارا وفيه فصول

الفصل (١) في الإشارة إلى شرف هذه المسألة وأن دوام الفيض والجود لا ينافي حدوث العالم وتجده

في الوجود

اعلم أن هذه المسألة من عظام المهمات الحكمية والدينية التي يجب تقررها في الأذهان والعقول ولا يمكن الوصول إلى معرفة الله وتوحيده وتنزيهه عن الكثرة والنقصان إلا بإتقان هذه المسألة الشريفة على وجه يطابق البراهين الحكمية ويوافق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٨٣

القوانين النبوية وقد يتوهم أكثر ضعفاء العقول والجمهور من المبرسمين أن أقوال الملتزمين للقواعد الحكمية والعلوم العقلية وحججهم وأدلتهم مخالفة للشرائع الإلهية ولما جاءت به الأنبياء وإن أساطين الحكماء الأقدمين يقولون إن العالم قديم بالكلية وإن الأفلاك والكواكب وصورها وهيوالاتها بل هيوالى العناصر و كلياتها قديمة بالهويات الشخصية مستمرة الذوات بوجوداتها وشخصياتها لا دائرة ولا زائلة ولا حادثة ولا فاسدة وهذا قد ذكرنا في مباحث مقولة الجوهر وأقسامها أنه افتراء على أولئك السابقين الأولين قدس الله أنوارهم وأسرارهم عن هذا الظن القبيح المستنكر المخالف لما جاءت به الرسل وأوليائهم ع.

نعم ذهبوا إلى أن جوده دائم و فيضه غير منقطع ولكن العالم يتجدد مع الأنفاس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٨٤

و من هذا الوجه قوله عز ذكره **كُلَّ يَوْمٍ هُوَ فِي شَأْنٍ** و ليست شئونه إلا أفعاله و تجليات أسمائه كما سبق بيانه و لا يمكن حدوث الفعل من المبدأ التام و لا ارتباط المتغير بالثابت القديم إلا بنحو دوام التجدد و الانقضاء و التدرج في الحدوث و البقاء و اتصال التبدل و التصرم في الوجود و الفناء كما هو المشهور عند الجمهور في نفس الحركة - حيث قيل إنها هوية تدريجية توجد في الخارج شيئاً فشيئاً و تعدم شيئاً فشيئاً.

و أما عندنا فالحركة ليست من الهويات الخارجية بل أمر عقلي معناها نفس الخروج من القوة إلى الفعل على التدرج و هو كسائر المفهومات الاعتبارية التي تصلح لأن تكون عنواناً لحقيقة خارجية و الذي ينتزع منه هذا المعنى المصدري هو الذات الخارجية التي يخرج وجودها من القوة إلى الفعل تدرجاً فوجوده لا محالة - تدرجي و حدوثه بعينه يلزم الزوال و انقطاع بعضها عن بعض عين الاتصال و ليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٨٥

هذا الذي ذكرناه صفة الحركة لأنه ليست في الحركة حركة و ليس لها وجود تدرجي - بل هي عبارة عن تدرج وجود شيء آخر و خروجه إلى الفعل يسيراً يسيراً فالحركة عبارة عن متحركة شيء آخر في الحصول لا متحركة نفسها و إلا لتسلسلت الحركات إلى غير نهاية و الذي يتدرج وجوده بالذات هو بعض أنواع المقولات ففي المشهور هي أنواع أربع من المقولات الكم و الكيف و الأين و الوضع و في التحقيق هي أنواع خمس منها و هي الأربع المذكورة مع مقولة الجوهر فإن الطبائع المادية و النفوس المتعلقة بالأبدان الطبيعية كلها متحركة في ذاتها و جوهرها عندنا كما أقمنا البراهين عليه و بينا أن جميع الهويات الجسمانية التي في هذا العالم سواء كانت بسائط أو مركبات و سواء كانت صورا أو مواداً و سواء كانت فلكية أو عنصرية و سواء كانت نفوساً أو طبائع فهي مسبوقة بالعدم الزماني فلها بحسب كل وجود معين مسبوقية بعدم زماني غير منقطع في الأزل ففي الأزل أعدام جميع الأشخاص الجسمانية و الهويات الطبيعية إذ كلها على الاستغراق الشمولي الأفرادي و الجمعي مما يصدق عليها أنها مسبوقة بعدم أزلي فكلها حادثة ليس فيها واحد شخصي مستمر الوجود و لا حقيقة ثابتة الهوية فإن المسمى بالكلية الطبيعي و الماهية لا بشرط ليس لها في ذاتها من حيث ذاتها وجود و لا وحدة و لا كثرة و لا استمرار و ثبات و لا أيضاً انقطاع و حدوث بل هي في جميع هذه الصفات تابعة لأفرادها موجودة بعين وجودها واحدة بوحدتها كثيرة بكثرتها قديمة بقدمها حادثة بحدوثها.

فإذا تحقق و تبين بالبرهان أن جميع أفرادها حادثة فهي لا محالة حادثة في نفس الأمر و إن لم تكن حادثة بحسب اعتبار ذاتها من حيث ذاتها لكنها كما لا تكون حادثة من حيث اعتبار ذاتها بذاتها فكذلك ليست بقديمة من تلك الحيثية و من هاهنا ينكشف و يظهر أن ما اشتهر عن الحكماء و أذعن به أكثر الأذكياء من أن طبائع الأنواع المتعاقبة الأشخاص قديمة و إن كانت أشخاصها كلها حادثة إذ الماهية منحفظة بتعاقب الأشخاص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٨٦

ليس بصحيح أصلاً بل فيه مغالطة بين أخذ الحد مكان المحدود و فيه خلط بين الواحد بالعدد و الواحد بالمفهوم و إن

أكثر الناس زعموا أن معنى كون الماهية واحدة والأفراد متكثرة - هو أن يكون هناك أمر واحد متقيد بقيود مختلفة و يعرضه صفات متقابلة يكون محفوظ الذات مع كل قيد وإذا زال بعض القيود والتعينات لا يزول ذلك الأمر بزواله - بل يبقى مستمرا ثم يلحقه بعض آخر منها وذاته هي هي بعينها كمحل واحد - يطرا عليه صفة بعد أخرى وهو هو بعينه كجسم يبيض تارة ويسود أخرى ويتسخن تارة ويتبرد أخرى وهو بعينه ذلك الجسم الموجود أولا مع تبدل الصفات و تغاير الأحوال.

هذا سهو عظيم عند المحققين فإن الشيخ الرئيس شنع على من زعم أن الكلي الطبيعي في الخارج شيء واحد بالذات متكرر باللواحق موجود في أمكنة متعددة وفي أزمنة متكررة حتى قال إن نسبة المعنى الكلي إلى جزئياته ليست كنسبة أب واحد إلى أبناء كثيرين بل كنسبة آباء إلى أبناء وليس كل واحد من الناس إلى إنسانيته فمجرد نسبته إلى إنسانية تفرض منحاذاة عن الكل بل لكل واحد إنسانية أخرى هي بالعدد غير ما للآخر من الإنسانية و أما المعنى المشترك فيه فهو في الذهن - وقد سلف تحقيق هذا المبحث في مسائل الماهية.

تنبيه تفريعي

و من العجب من أتباع الفلاسفة حيث إن المتكلمين لما حاولوا إثبات البداية والانقطاع للحركة والزمان وما يطابقهما من الحوادث المتعاقبة بإجراء التطبيق والتضاييف وغيرهما فيها قالوا إن هذه المتعاقبات والحوادث لا اجتماع لها في الخارج ولا في الخيال حتى يجري فيها المطابقة والمضاييفة ويحكم عليها بالانقطاع وقد ذهلبوا وغفلوا عن أن تلك الأمور لما لم يكن لمجموعها وجود في

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الخارج لا يمكن الحكم بأزليتها وقدمها كما لا يمكن الحكم بتناهيها وانقطاعها - فكيف يصح القول منهم بأزلية الحركات وقدم الزمان ولا تناهي الحوادث على وجه العدول. بل الحق أن يسلب عنها القدم واللاتناهي بمعنى السلب العدولي وكذا يسلب عن مجموعها الحدوث والتناهي سلبا بسيطا ولكن يثبت لكل واحد واحد من جزئيات الحركة والزمان والحوادث الحدوث ويحكم عليها بالتناهي والانقطاع حكما إيجابيا تحصيليا ولا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون الكل حادثا لأن الحكم على كل واحد قد لا يتعدى إلى الحكم على المجموع كما يلزم من ذلك أيضا أن يكون الكل أي المجموع قديما كما زعم ولا أيضا أن يكون الكلي الطبيعي قديما كما مر بيانه.

وليس لمتوهم أن يتوهم أن الكل إذا لم يكن له نهاية ثبت أنه لا نهاية له وأن الكلي إذا لم يكن في ذاته حادثا كان في حد ذاته قديما لأننا نقول - أما في الأول فبأن ما لا وجود له لا يثبت له شيء أصلا فالحكم الإيجابي يستدعي وجود الموضوع فكيف يثبت لما لا ثبوت له شيء من الأشياء سواء كان ذلك الأمر أمرا وجوديا أو عدميا كالعمى واللابصر واللاكتابة فالمعذور كما يسلب عنه البصر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٨٨

كذلك يسلب عنه اللابصر وقد علمت أن ليس نقيض ثبوت البصر لشيء ثبوت اللابصر له بل نقيضه سلب ثبوت البصر

له على أن يكون قاطعا للنسبة الثبوتية واردا عليها- لا أن يكون النسبة واردة عليه رابطة إياه بالموضوع فالكتابة و اللاكتابة بمعنى العدول كالتأنيب عن المعدوم بمعنى أن ليس شيء منهما ثابتا له لا أن ليسية شيء منهما ثابتة له.

و أما في دفع الثاني أن معنى قولنا إن الكلي الطبيعي غير حادث أن الماهية ليست من حيث هي هي متصفة بالحدوث بمعنى أن حيثية الاتصاف بالحدوث ما نشأت من نفس الذات لا أنها لا توصف بالحدوث في الواقع بل هي متصفة بالحدوث في الحقيقة- لأن اتصاف الفرد بكل صفة هو عين اتصاف الطبيعة لا بشرط شيء بتلك الصفة بعينها. ثم لو سلمنا أن الماهية من حيث نفسها غير متصفة بالحدوث لكن لا يلزم من ذلك اتصافها في نفسها بالقدم أو اللاحدوث لما سبق في مباحث الماهية أنه إذا سئل عن الماهية من حيث هي بطرفي النقيض فالجواب السلب من كل شيء بتقديم السلب على حيثية- و بالجملة هذه الماهيات التي أفرادها متجددة كائنة فاسدة إذا سئل عن كيفية حصولها في الأعيان هل هي حادث أو قديمة فالجواب أنها في نفس الأمر و بحسب الخارج حادث و ليست بقديمة و لا دائمة أصلا إذ لو اتصفت بالأزلية و الدوام في الخارج أو في نفس الأمر لكان لها لا أقل فرد واحد موصوف بالقدم إذ لا وجود لها إلا في الأفراد بل وجودها وجود الأفراد بعينها فلا اتصاف لها بشيء من العوارض إلا بسبب اتصاف فرد منها به و إذ ليس في أفرادها شيء يوصف بالقدم و الدوام فلا يوصف الماهية أيضا بذلك. و إذا سئل عنها بأنها هل هي من حيث ذاتها قديمة أو حادث فالجواب سلب كل من الطرفين- القدم و الحادث و اللابدائية و البدائية و الانقطاع و الانقطاع جميعا لأنها لا توصف بشيء منها من حيث ذاتها لذاتها و إنما توصف بها في الواقع من جهة وجودها الذي هو نفس وجود أفرادها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٨٩

فصل (٢) في بيان حدوث الأجسام بالبرهان من مأخذ آخر مشرقى غير ما سلف في مباحث أحكام الجوهر من العلم الكلي

و هو أن كل شيء يوصف بصفة من الصفات لا بد أن لا يكون بحسب وجود نفسه و مرتبة قابليته و معروضيته موصوفا بما ينافي تلك الصفة و إلا لزم اتصاف أمر واحد بالمتنافيين- سواء كان الاتصاف بحسب العقل في ظرف التحليل أو في الخارج.

و القسم الأول كالماهية في اتصافها بالوجود و عروضه لها فإن الماهية لو كانت بحسب نفسها معدومة لما أمكن عروض الوجود لها بل ينبغي أن لا تكون الماهية من حيث نفسها متعينة بأحد الطرفين أعني الوجود و العدم حتى يتصور عروض شيء منهما لها.

و القسم الثاني كالمقدار الجسماني أو الاتصال الامتدادي العارض للهوى فإنه يجب أن يكون الهوى غير متعينة الذات بالامقدار و لا متجردة في ذاتها عن الامتداد- حتى يمكن قبولها للممتد في ذاته و اتصافها بالمقدار لذاته و كذا الوضع و الحيز إذا عرض لشيء و صار ذلك الشيء بعروضه إياه ذا وضع و حيز يجب أن لا يكون بحسب وجوده في نفسه مجردا عن الأوضاع و الأحياز فإن المفارق عن المقدار في نفسه- و المجرد عن الوضع و الحيز في وجوده و تعينه لا محالة يكون وجوده وجود أمر عقلي- بل يكون بالضرورة عقلا صرفا مفارق الذات عن المقدار و الجسمية و لوازمها

فكيف يسنح له ما يجعله متجسما ذا وضع و يعرض له التلبس بهذه الأمور.

فظهر أن الأمر القابل لمثل هذه الأمور يجب أن يكون حالته بالقياس إليها - حالة إمكانية مبهمة ناقصة نسبة تلك الحالة إلى كل منها نسبة النقص إلى الكمال و نسبة الضعف إلى القوة و لهذا يقال إن الهيولى في ذاتها لا متصلة و لا منفصلة - و لا واحدة و لا كثيرة و لا ذات وضع و حيز و لا غير ذات وضع و حيز

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٠

ثم اعلم أنه فرق بين الأحوال التي هي من ضروريات وجود الشيء و لوازم هويته بحيث لا يمكن خلو الموضوع عنها و عما يستلزمها أو ما يلزمها بحسب الواقع و الأحوال التي ليست من هذا القبيل فيمكن خلو الموضوع عنها في الواقع فالقسم الأول كالمقدار و الوضع و المكان و الزمان للجسم و القسم الثاني كالسواد و الحرارة و الكتابة و أشباهها له ففي القسم الأول لا بد أن يكون محلها و قابلها غير متقوم الذات في وجوده لست أقول في ماهيته و مفهومه إلا بصورة محصلة إياه مفيدة لوجوده و لهذا لا بد أن يكون محل الجسمية و لوازمها من المقدار و الوضع و غيرهما مادة غير متقومة الوجود إلا بالصورة المستلزمة لها بخلاف القسم الثاني فإن محل السواد و إن وجب أن لا يكون متعينا بالسواد و لا بالاسود و بما يضاده بل بحالة إمكانية لا تأتي عن عروض كل من السواد و ما يضاده إلا أن ذلك المحل يمكن أن يتحصل له وجود غير مفتقر في تقومه إلى صورة لونية أو سوادية لأن اتصافه بالسواد ليس نحو وجوده و لا من لوازم هويته في ذاته فيجوز أن يوجد جسم لا لون له و يمكن أن يتصور عنصر لا حار و لا بارد أعني الحرارة و البرودة المحسوستين العارضتين.

فإذا تقرر هذه المقدمات نقول لا شبهة في أن كون الشيء واقعا في الزمان و في مقولة متى سواء كان بالذات أو بالعرض هو نحو وجوده كما أن كون الشيء واقعا في المكان و في مقولة أين سواء كان ذلك الوقوع بالذات أو بالعرض هو نحو وجوده فإن العقل المستقيم يحكم بأن شيئا من الأشياء الزمانية أو المكانية يمتنع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩١

بحسب وجوده العيني و هويته الشخصية أن ينسلخ عن الاقتران بهما و يصير ثابت الوجود بحيث لا يختلف عليه الأوقات و لا يتفاوت بالنسبة إليه الأمكنة و الأحياز و من جوز ذلك فقد كابر مقتضى عقله و عاند ظاهره باطنه و لسانه ضميره.

فإذن كون الجسم بحيث يتغير و يتبدل عليه الأوقات و يتجدد له المضي و الحال و الاستقبال مما يجب أن يكون لأمر صوري داخل في قوام وجوده في ذاته حتى يكون في مرتبة قابليته لهذه التجددات غير متحصلة الوجود في نفس الأمر إلا بصورة التغير و التجدد و لا متقدمة في الوجود على وصف التغير و الانقضاء بل إنما له الاتصاف بإمكان ذلك الوصف و مقابله بحسب مرتبة من مراتب نفس الأمر لا في حاق الواقع و عين الأعيان كما أن الهيولى لها في ذاتها بحسب ذاتها أن لا تكون متجسدة و لا لا متجسدة و لا غير متقدرة و لا متحيزة و لا لا متحيزة و لا ذات وضع و لا ذات عدم وضع حتى يمكن اتصافها بكل من هذه الأمور و مع ذلك فإن الواقع منها في نفس الأمر ليس إلا التجسم و التقدر و لوازمهما من الآين و الوضع و غير ذلك.

وقد علمت الفرق بين عدم الاتصاف بصفة في نفس الواقع وبين عدم الاتصاف بها في مرتبة من مراتب الواقع والأول غير مستلزم للثاني وكذلك الفرق ثابت بين الاتصاف بصفة في الواقع وبين الاتصاف بتلك الصفة في كل مرتبة من مراتب الواقع والأول لا يوجب الثاني فإن الماهية قد تتصف بوجودها في نفس الواقع ولا تتصف به في مرتبة ذاتها من حيث هي هي وكذا الهيولى متصفة بالتجسم والتقدر في نفس الأمر وليست

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٢

متجسمة ولا متقدرة في حد نفسها ومرتبة قابليتها نعم كل ما يثبت لشيء في مرتبة نفسها بما هي هي فهو لا محالة ثابت لها في الواقع دون العكس الكلي وليس الأمر كذلك في جانب السلب كما تكرر بيانه.

فإذن تبين وانكشف أن نعت التغير والتجدد للأجسام ووقوعها في مقولة متى أمر صوري جوهرى مقوم لها أو مقوم لما يلزم وجودها وشخصيتها أو في مرتبة وجودها وشخصيتها وليس من العوارض التي يمكن تجرد الجسم عنها وخلوه في الواقع عن عروضها كالسواد والحرارة ونظائرهما فوجب أن يكون صورة الأجسام صورة متجددة في نفسها وطبيعتها التي بها يكمل ذاتها ويتحصل نوعيتها ويتقوم مادتها أمرا متجددة الهوية متدرجة الكون حادثة الذات كائنة فاسدة لا تزال تتجدد وتنقضي وتستقبل وتمضي وتحضر وتغيب وذلك بحسب الوجود الخارجى والتشخص العيني وإن لم يكن كذلك بحسب الماهية العقلية ولا بحسب مرتبة المادة الهيولانية لها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٣

و **بالجملة** كل ما يوصف به الحركة والزمان بحسب الماهية عند القوم من الانقضاء والحدوث والاستمرار التجديدي والبقاء الحدوثي فذلك مما يوصف به الأجسام الطبيعية بحسب وجودها الطبيعي الشخصي في حد هويتها الخارجية المتقدمة على سائر اللواحق العرضية فجميع الموجودات التي في هذا العالم واقعة لذاتها في الزمان والتغير مندرجة تحت مقولة متى كما أنها واقعة في المكان مندرجة تحت مقولة أين لكن بعضها متأخرة الوجود عن التغير والزمان كأكثر عوارض الوجود كالسواد والحرارة والحركة وغيرها من الأكوان المسبوق بالعدم واللاكون الانفصالي والاستحالات الانفعالية المنقطعة بغيرها وبعضها مع التغير والزمان كطبائع البسائط الفلكية والكوكبية وما يجري مجراها معية ذاتية راجعة إلى الفيئية [العينية].

وليست معية وجود الجسم في ذاته للزمان كمعية الثابت مع المتغير كما ظنه أكثر الناس إلا أنهم يفرقون بين معية العقل للزمان ومعية الجسم له بأن الجسم لا ينفك عن الحركة والسكون وكل منهما متغير أما الحركة فبالذات وأما السكون فبحسب التقدير بمعنى أن الجسم الساكن لو كان بدل سكونه متحركا لكان زمان حركته كذا فالجسم وإن لم يكن متغيرا بل ثابتا في نفسه فلا يكون في الزمان بل مع الزمان كالعقل لكن بحسب وقوعه في الحركة والسكون يكون متغيرا فيكون في الزمان فرجعت معيته للزمان إلى الفيئية [العينية] بواسطة الحركة ولم يعلموا أن الشيء الثابت الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٤

في ذاته وهويته كالعقل المفارق يستحيل أن يكون محلا للتغير قابلا للحركة نعم يمكن أن يكون في حد ماهية الذهنية

أو بحسب مرتبة هيولية غير المتقومة بذاتها غير متحرك ولا ساكن و غير متغير ولا لا متغير حتى يمكن أن يتصف بالتغير و الحركة في الواقع فالجسم إذا كان ثابت الذات و الهوية في حد طبيعة النوعية الخارجية فمحال أن يوصف بالتغير و الحركة و لا أيضا بالسكون لأنه عدم الحركة عما من شأنه أن يقبل الحركة **و اعلم** أن القوم إنما وقعوا في هذا الغلط لعدم تحقيقهم الوجود و الهوية الخارجية و ذهابهم إلى أن الوجود و التشخيص من الاعتبارات الذهنية و المعقولات الثانية التي لا يحاذي لها أمر في الخارج و ذهلوا عن أن الوجود هو نفس الأمر العيني الخارجي فضلا عن أن يحاذي له أمر آخر في العين.

ثم إنهم لما اعتبروا ماهية الجسم و ماهية الحركة و الزمان وجدوا أن ماهية الحركة و مقدارها خارجة عن ماهية الجسم و معناه فحكموا أنها من العوارض اللاحقة له كما حكموا في أصل الوجود بالزيادة على الماهية و أدى بهم ذلك إلى أن أنكروا- كون الوجود متحققا في الخارج و أن يكون له ثبوت للماهية الموجودة و ذلك لأن العارض مسبوق الوجود بوجود المعروض فإذا متى كان الوجود زائدا على الماهية الموصوفة به و كل صفة وجودها فرع وجود موصوفها فيعود الكلام إلى ذلك الوجود السابق فيتسلسل أو يدور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٥

و هما باطلان فاتصاف الماهية به إنما يتحقق في ظرف الذهن.

و قد عرفت أن ذلك غير مجد و لا فرق بين الذهن و الخارج في لزوم التسلسل و الدور على تقدير كون الوجود أمرا مغايرا للماهية زائدا عليها زيادة الأوصاف اللاحقة لموصوفاتها بعد تمامية تحصيلها و فعلية ذاتها بل الأمر فيه كما نور الله به قلب من يشاء من عباده.

و بالجملة القوم لم يفرقوا بين عوارض الماهية و عوارض الوجود و القسم الأول قد يكون متحدا بها في الواقع و العروض للماهية بحسب التحليل الذهني مرجعه كون الشيء بحيث يكون مفهومه خارجا عن الماهية محمولا عليها في الواقع و هذا لا ينافي العينية و الاتحاد في الخارج و الوجود نفسه من هذا القبيل فإنه من عوارض الماهية الموجودة به لا من عوارض وجودها و كذا الفصل للجنس و التشخيص للنوع فإذا كون التدرج في الوجود- زائدا في التصور على ماهية الأجسام لا ينافي عدم زيادته على هوياتها الوجودية الشخصية الخارجية.

تلخيص و توضيح

معروض التغير و التجدد و محل الحركة إما أمر ثابت الذات متساوي النسبة إلى أجزاء الزمان أو متغير أو ليس بمتغير و لا ثابت و القسم الأول محال لاستحالة سنوح التغير الموجب لاختصاص الشيء إلى وقت معين على أمر مفارق في ذاته عن كافة الأزمنة و الأوقات و القسم الثاني لا يخلو إما أن يكون ذلك التغير زائدا على ذاته في الوجود أم لا و الأول يوجب إعادة الكلام في المحل و لزوم التسلسل أو الدور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٦

و الثاني لا يخلو إما أن يكون عين ماهيته أو عين وجوده و الأول باطل لأن الذي يكون التغير عين ماهيته هي الحركة نفسها و محال أن يكون محل الحركة حركة إذ الشيء لا يعرض لنفسه و قد برهن أيضا أن الحركة ليست بمتحركة و لا

يجوز الحركة في الحركة و الثاني هو المطلوب.

و أما القسم الثالث فهو إما صورة الشيء المتغير أو مادته و الأول محال فإن الذي هو في الوجود بالفعل متغير لا يمكن أن يكون صورته التي بها يصير بالفعل غير متغيرة و لا ثابتة و الثاني هو المطلوب فإن المادة في نفسها لما كانت بالقوة من كل وجه - فهي و إن كانت متغيرة في نفس الأمر بالصورة لكنها في ذاتها غير متغيرة و لا ثابتة و لا متحركة و لا ساكنة لا يقال بقي هاهنا قسم آخر و هو أن يكون محل التغير المجموع - المركب من المادة و الصورة لأننا نقول قد علمت مرارا أن تمام الشيء المركب بصورته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٧

لا بمادته فحكم الصورة بعينها حكم المجموع سيما عند من يقول بأن التركيب بينهما اتحادي. فقد ثبت و تحقق أن الأجسام كلها متجددة الوجود في ذاتها و أن صورتها صورة التغير و الاستحالة و كل منها حادث الوجود مسبق بالعدم الزماني كائن فاسد لا استمرار لهوياتها الوجودية و لا لطبائعها المرسله و لا لمفهوماتها الكلية إذ الكلي لا وجود له في الخارج و الطبيعة المرسله وجودها عين وجود شخصياتها و هي متكررة و كل منها حادث و لا جمعية لها في الخارج حتى يوصف بأنها حادث أو قديم فكما أن الكلي لا وجود له إلا بالأفراد فالكل لا وجود له إلا وجودات الأجزاء و الأجزاء كثيرة فكذا حدوثها حدوثات كثيرة و المجموع لو كان له وجود غير وجودات الأجزاء فهو أولى بالحدوث إلا أن الحق أن ليس له وجود إلا باعتبار الوهم حيث يتوهم الجميع كأنها شيء واحد - لكن الوهم أيضا يعجز عن إدراك الأمور غير المتناهية و إحضارها معا.

و الفرق بين الكلي الطبيعي و الكل أن الكلي له وجود في ضمن كل فرد فيوصف بالحدوث كما يوصف بالوجود و أما الكل فلا وجود له في نفسه إذ الوجود يساوق الوحدة بل عينها كما علمت و لا وجود له في الجزء أيضا فلا يوصف بالحدوث و لا بالقدم كما لا يوصف بالوجود.

و أما الكلي العقلي فهو و إن كان عندنا موجودا بوجود الصورة المفارقة الإلهية - كما ذهب إليه أفلاطن الإلهي و من تقدمه من الحكماء الراسخين و الكبراء الشامخين - قدس الله أسرارهم و شرف أنوارهم لكن الصور المفارقة ليست من العالم في شيء و لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٨

هي ما سوى الله تعالى و إنما هي صور علم الله تعالى و كلماته التامات التي لا تبيد و لا تنفذ كما قال سبحانه **مَا عِنْدَكُمْ يَنْفَدُ وَمَا عِنْدَ اللَّهِ بَاقٍ** و قوله **لَوْ كَانَ الْبَحْرُ مِدَادًا لِكَلِمَاتِ رَبِّي لَنَفَذَ الْبَحْرُ قَبْلَ أَنْ تَنْفَدَ كَلِمَاتُ رَبِّي** فإذا كان العالم بجميع أجزائه أفلاكه و كواكبه و بسائطه و مركباته حادثة كائنة فاسدة - كل ما فيه في كل حين موجود آخر و خلق جديد كما قدمنا ذكره في العلم الكلي و ما فوق الطبيعة و الله أعلم

الفصل (٣) في ذكر ملفقات المتكلمين و نبذ من آرائهم و أبحاثهم في هذه المسألة

قد سبق في العلم الكلي أن علة الحاجة إلى المؤثر هي الإمكان في الماهية و النقص - عن التمامية في الوجود لا الحدوث كما توهمه جمع قالت الفلاسفة إن الواجب لذاته إن كان بذاته مقتضيا و مرجحا لوجود الممكنات سواء كان المقتضي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٢٩٩

مع صفة من الصفات على ما هو مذهب المتكلمين أن له صفات واجبة الوجود فهو يتقدم على جميع الممكنات لأنه علتها و مرجحها و المرجح دائم فيدوم الترجيح لأن كل ما لأجله كان الواجب لذاته صانعا للعالم مؤثرا فيه كوجود وقت أو زوال مانع أو وجود شرط أو حصول إرادة أو طبع أو قدرة و بالجملة وجود أي حال كان على ما يفرضه القائلون بالصفات كالاشاعرة و الكرامية و غيرهما من طوائف المتكلمين لا يخلو إما أن يكون أزليا كان لا محالة العالم كذلك أزليا لامتناع تخلف المعلول عن العلة التامة وإن لم يكن أزليا كان حادثا و كل حادث لا بد له من مرجح حادث و إلا لكان الحادث غير حادث ثم يعود الكلام إلى ذلك المرجح الحادث في احتياجه إلى مرجح آخر حادث- و لم يتجدد الآن و لم يتجدد قبله وهكذا إلى غير النهاية فيلزم حصول المطلوب من وجود حوادث لا أول لها. و بالجملة فقد عرفت أن الواجب الوجود واحد من جميع الوجوه غير متغير و لا متبدل و أنه متشابه الأحوال و الأفعال فإن لم يوجد عنه شيء أصلا بل كانت الأحوال كلها على ما كانت عليه و جب استمرار العدم كما كان و إن تجدد حال من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٠

الأحوال المذكورة موجبة لوجود العالم فهو محال لأنه ليس في العدم الصريح حال- يكون الأولى فيه أن يكون العالم موجودا أو بالباري أن يكون موجدا أو يكون فيه حال آخر تقتضي وجوبه لتشابه الحال هذا خلاصة كلامهم في إثبات قدم العالم. أقول هذه المقدمات كلها صادقة حقة اضطرارية لكن مع ذلك لا يلزم منها قدم العالم فإنك قد علمت أن الماهية المتجددة الوجود ثباتها عين التجدد و فعليتها عين القوة الاستعدادية و وجودها مشوب بالعدم و تمامها و كمالها عين النقص و القصور- فهو مستند إلى فاعله التام الفاعلية و موجه الدائم الفيض الثابت العلية من جهة ثباته- و فعليته و وجوده و تمامه و كماله لا من جهة تجدد و قوته و نقصه و قصوره لأنها من لوازم ذاته بلا جعل و تأثير لما علمت أن لوازم الماهية غير مجعولة. و ظاهر أن المعلول لا يلزم أن يكون مثل العلة في نحو الوجود و قوامه و ثباته- بل مدار المعلولية على القصور في الوجود عن درجة وجود العلة الفاعلية و القصور إنما يكون بدخول العدم في هوية المعلول. نعم الحدوث إذا كان وصفا زائدا على وجود الشيء المجعول كان السؤال باللمية واردا على تخصيص ذلك الحدوث بوقت مخصوص دون سائر الأوقات و أما إذا كان الحدوث و التجدد بمنزلة الماهية و لوازمها غير المجعولة فحكمه حكم سائر الماهيات الصادرة عن الفاعل الدائم المتعلقة الوجود بالفاعل الدائم دائما فكما لا يلزم من كون الواجب خالقا للإنسان أن يكون الواجب إنسانا و الإنسان واجبا فكذا لا يلزم من كون المؤثر القديم موجبا للحادث في ذاته أن يكون الحادث قديما أو القديم حادثا لأن الحدوث للموجود المتجدد الهوية بمنزلة الذاتي المقوم للماهيات و الجعل غير متخلل بين الذات و الذاتي فهذا حق الجواب عن شبهة الفلاسفة المنكرين لحدوث العالم بما فيه و معه.

وَأَمَّا مُتَكَلِّمُو أَهْلِ الْمَلَلِ فَهُمْ طَائِفَتَانِ

إِحْدَاهُمَا الْقَائِلُونَ بِنَفْيِ الْعِلْيَةِ وَالْمَعْلُولِيَّةِ

فِي الْمَوْجُودَاتِ وَ بِالْقُدْرَةِ الْجَزَافِيَّةِ - وَ لَيْسَ لِأَهْلِ الْعِلْمِ كَلَامٌ مَعَهُمْ لِأَنِّ بِنَاءَ الْمُبَاحِثِ الْعِلْمِيَّةِ عَلَى الْعِلْيَةِ وَالْمَعْلُولِيَّةِ وَ إِيْجَابِ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠١

المقدمات الحققة لتنتاجها و لو لم يكن الإنتاج للشكل الأول مثلا ضروريا و لا النتيجة لازمة للمقدمتين على الهيئة المخصوصة فلا يحصل يقين في العالم و إذ لا يقين فلا علم - و إذ لا علم فلا اعتماد و لا وثوق على تحقق شيء و لا اطمينان و لا غرض و لا غاية و لا رجوع و لا عود بل يكون الأديان و المذاهب و المساعي كلها هباء و هدر إذ يمكن ترتب الفائدة المنظورة على خلاف هذا الذهاب و السعي أو نقيض الفائدة المنظورة على هذا الذهاب و السعي و لا يسأل عما يفعل و هذا الرأي قريب من آراء السوفسطائية.

و الثَّانِيَةُ الْقَائِلُونَ بِهِمَا الْمَلْتَزِمُونَ لِنَفْيِ التَّرْجِيحِ

بلا مرجح.

فبعضهم أثبت للواجب صفة زائدة على ذاته كالعلم و الإرادة و الحياة و القدرة و غير ذلك إلا أنهم يقولون السبب في إيجاد العالم إنما هو الإرادة فلا بد من مخصص - فبعضهم جعل المخصص مصلحة تعود إلى العالم و قد علمت في أوائل مباحث العلة و المعلول أن ذلك باطل و ما أدري أي مصلحة لأحد في أن لا يكون قبل عدد مخصوص من دورات الفلك دورات أخرى كثيرة وجودها قبل وجود العالم و بعضهم جعل المخصص ذات الوقت و هذا أيضا باطل إذ وجود المخصص مقدم على وجود المخصص به

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٢

فالكلام عائد في ذات ذلك الوقت الذي صار مرجحا لوجود العالم فيه و مخصصا إياه به.

و بعضهم و هم الكرامية جعل الإرادة حادثة قائمة بذاته

فيلزم أن يكون إله العالم محلا للحوادث المتغيرة و ذلك محال لوجهين الأول أنه يلزم أن يكون في ذاته جهة فاعلية و جهة قابلية و هما جهتان مكثرتان لذات الموضوع لهما كما علمت - و الواجب بسيط الحقيقة فهذا ممتنع جدا الثاني لو حلت فيه الحوادث في الحادث الثابت زمانا - في ذاته الباطل بعد ذلك إن كانت علته نفس ذاته و جب أن لا يعدم عنها أبدا و إن كان المبطل له أمرا يضاده فما كان يوجد في ذاته فلا بد لحدوثه من علة و لبطلانه من علة أخرى حادثة و علة الحدوث لا تتخلى عن الحدوث و علة البطلان لا تتخلى عنه و ما هذا شأنه هو الحركة غير المتصرمة عند الفلاسفة و محلها الجرم المستدير الفلكي و عندنا هو الطبيعة في وجودها الخارجي و على أي وجه لا بد أن يكون محله هيولى جسمانية - فمحل هذه الإرادات المتصلة المتجددة إن كان هو ذات الباري جل اسمه يلزم أن يكون إله العالم جسما دائم الحركة متحركا على الدور بل يلزم على ما ذكرنا أن يكون ذاته متجددة الحدوث و الاستحالة فيحتاج إلى إله آخر يديم وجوده التجديدي بتوارد الأمثال تعالى القيوم الواحد عن ظلمات هذه الأوهام المضلة المعطلة لأولي وساوس الوهم و

الخيال و ترك مسلك التصفية و التجريد و الأخذ بالجلال و بناء البحوث على القيل و القال و إن كان محلها غير ذاته تعالى لزم أن يكون ذلك الغير من معلولاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٣

و يكون الواجب لذاته منفعلا عن معلوله المتحرك المتجدد الوجود انفعالا دائما و ذلك محال و بإبطال الإرادة الحادثة في ذات الواجب جل ذكره اندفع قول بعضهم إن للواجب - لذاته إرادات حادثة غير متناهية لا إلى بداية و لم يزل البارئ مؤثرا بتلك الإرادات الحادثة حتى حدثت إرادة خاصة موجبة لحدوث هذا العالم و لا يلزم تسلسل الحوادث إلى غير النهاية و يكون العقول و النفوس و الأجسام كلها حادثة.

و من القائلين بحدوث الإرادة كأبي علي الجبائي و أبي هاشم و القاضي عبد الجبار الهمداني و أتباعهم

فإنهم يقولون بأنها قائمة لا في محل و هو ممتنع فإن الإرادة إذا كانت عرضا فيحتاج إلى محل يقوم به فكيف يقوم بذاته إلا أن يريدوا بالإرادة معنى آخر جوهريا فيكون من جملة العالم فالكلام في حدوثه عائد.

و منهم من جعلها قديمة

و قالوا بأن الإرادة القديمة هي السبب في إيجاد العالم و أنها و إن كانت قديمة إلا أن الله تعالى إنما أراد إحداث العالم في الوقت الذي حدث - و لم يكن إرادته متعلقة بإحداثه في وقت آخر غير الوقت الذي وجد فيه و لا يجوز أن يسأل عن لمية إحداثه و سبب تخصيصه العالم بذلك الوقت دون غيره فإن تلك الإرادة لذاتها و ماهيتها تقتضي التخصيص بذلك الوقت و الإحداث فيه و لوازم الماهيات لا ينبغي أن تعلل بأمر من الأمور غير ماهياتها التي هي ملزومات لها. و أنت فقد عرفت أن الإرادة لا بد فيها من مرجح داع و الأوقات كلها متشابهة و في العدم الصريح لا يتفاوت شيء عن شيء و لا يتميز معدوم عن معدوم و لا يتميز فيه حال يكون الأولى فيه إيجاد العالم و كل ما يفرض قبل العالم مما هو علة لوجوده من حدوث إرادة أو وقت أو زوال مانع أو تعلق علم أو حصول مصلحة أو غير ذلك من الأحوال - فإن الكلام عائد في حدوثه و استدعائه لمرجح حادث كما كان الكلام جاريا في علة حدوث العالم نفسه و ذلك يوجب تسلسل الحوادث إلى غير النهاية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٤

و أما ما ذكره بعض المتكلمين من أن الحكماء

يقولون إن صدور هذا العالم - عن الواجب لذاته في وقت مخصوص ليس أولى من صدوره في وقت آخر غيره قبله أو بعده - فلا يوجد في ذلك الوقت المخصوص فلم يصب في هذا النقل عنهم فإن الحكماء متفقون على أن الواجب تعالى متقدم على جميع الممكنات تقدما ذاتيا و الوقت المذكور من جملة الممكنات فإنه مقدار الحركة الدورية الفلكية عندهم و عندنا مقدار الوجود الطبيعي المتجدد بنفسه فلا يتقدم على جميع الممكنات و كذا الحركة و موضوعها و إلا لزم أن يتقدم الشيء على نفسه و هو محال هذا ما قيل و ستسمع منا كلاما في تقدم البارئ تعالى على جميع الممكنات تقدما زمانيا.

تذكرة و تسجيل

و لا يمكن لأحد أن يقول إن الإرادة القديمة أوجبت وجود العالم في الوقت الذي أوجده فيه و قبل ذلك الوقت لم يكن الإرادة القديمة موجبة لوجوده كما أنا إذا أردنا أن نفعل فعلا مخصوصا بعد سنة فإن الإرادة الموجودة الآن يقتضي وجود ذلك المراد بعد سنة و لا يقتضي وجوده في الحال فإن هذا أيضا محال فإنه ليس قبل جميع الممكنات شيء يوجب حصول المراد كالحال في المراد الذي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٥

يتحصل بعد سنة فإن هناك أحوالا متجددة مانعة من حصول المراد إلا بعد السنة فلو فرض أن هذا المريد كان قادرا على تحصيل مراده الذي أراده فيما بعد السنة في الحال - الذي كان يريده بإحضار ذلك المراد مع وقته الذي كان قدره فيه لكان محضرا إياه مع ذلك الوقت بلا انتظار و لا إمهال و ليس قبل وجود العالم إلا العدم البحت الصريح و هو متشابه الأحوال في جواز تعلق الإرادة به فيستحيل أن يتميز فيه الوقت الذي تعلقت به الإرادة القديمة عن وقت آخر يماثله و كما أمكن تعلق الإرادة بهذا الوقت فتعلقها بالوقت الذي قبل هذا الوقت أيضا ممكن فما الذي أوجب تعلق الإرادة بهذا الوقت الممكن دون غيره و ما الذي ميزه عن غيره من الأوقات في تعلق الإرادة و الشيء لا يتميز عن غيره إلا بمخصص و لا مخصص في العدم الصرف كما عرفته غير مرة. فظهر بما ذكرنا دوام جود الجواد المطلق و أزلية صنع الصانع الحق و إفاضته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٦

على الأشياء أزلا و أبدا على نسق واحد و لكن دوام جود المبدع و إبداعه لا يوجب أزلية الممكنات لا كلها و لا جزؤها و لا كليها و لا جزئها كما سبق و الفلاسفة لو اكتفوا على هذا القدر من إثباتهم أحدية ذات الصانع و كونه تام الفاعلية كامل القوة و القدرة دائم الجود و الرحمة غير ممسك الفيض و العناية و لا مغلول يد الكرم و البسط لحظة - لكان كلامهم حقا صحيحا إلا أن متأخريهم زادوا على ذلك و زعموا أن هذه المعاني تستلزم قدم العالم و دوام الفلك و الكواكب و بسائط الأجرام و صورها و نفوسها نوعا و شخصا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٧

و دوام المركبات و صورها و نفوسها نوعا لا شخصا و قد أقمنا البراهين على بطلان ما ذهبوا إليه من تسرمد المجعولات و قدم شيء من الممكنات عناية من الله و ملكوته الأعلى

الفصل (٤) في بعض احتجاجات المتكلمين و أرباب الملل انقطاع الفيض

استدلوا على مذهبهم بحجج عديدة

الحجة الأولى أن الحوادث لو كانت غير متناهية

و ليكن تلك الحوادث مثلا حركات الأفلاك و دوراتها فيلزم أن يكون كل واحدة من الدورات مسبقة بعدمات لا أول لها - فيكون العدمات كلها مجتمعة في الأزل من غير ترتيب لأن الترتيب إنما يكون في الأمور الوجودية لا في الأمور العدمية و إذا كان جميع العدمات المتقدمة على كل واحدة من هذه الدورات لها اجتماع في الأزل فلا يخلو مجموع

تلك العدميات إما أن يحصل معها في الأزل شيء من الذوات الوجودية أو لا يحصل معها شيء من ذلك و الأول يقتضي أن يكون السابق المتقدم مقارنا للمسبوق المتأخر و ذلك محال و الثاني و هو أن لا يحصل مع تلك العدميات المجتمعة في الأزل شيء من الموجودات فيلزم أن يكون لمجموع الموجودات بداية و ذلك هو المطلوب.

و قد يقررون هذا الوجه بطريق آخر فيقولون إما أن يجوز حصول شيء منها فيه - أو لا فإن جاز حصول شيء منها في الأزل و لم يسبقها غيره فيكون لمجموعها بداية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٨

و هذان الطريقتان لا يبتنيان على قاعدة أن الحكم على الكل هو الحكم على كل واحد - و قد يقررون هذا الوجه بناء على أن الحكم على الكل هو الحكم على كل واحد - فيقولون كل واحد من الحركات و الحوادث مسبوق بالعدم فيكون الكل مسبقاً بالعدم - أو كل واحد منها داخل في الوجود فيكون الكل داخل في الوجود منحصر فيه فلا يكون غير متناه.

و يجاب عن الطريق الأول أنكم إن عنيتم بكون عدم السابق لكل حادث - لا أول له كونه غير مسبق بحادث آخر مطلقاً فذلك ممنوع فإن عدم كل حركة يكون مسبقاً بحادث آخر إلى لا نهاية له و إن عنيتم بكون عدم السابق لكل حادث - لا أول له أن يكون كل من الحوادث مسبقاً بعدم ما و لا يكون مسبقاً بحادث آخر بعينه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٠٩

فلا يلزم من صحة هذا اجتماع الأعدام في الأزل فإن معنى كون الشيء أزلياً كونه غير مسبق بالغير مطلقاً و إذا كان كذلك فلا يلزم من عدم السبق بحادث معين عدم السبق بحادث أصلاً لما عرفت أنه لا يلزم من انتفاء الأخص انتفاء الأعم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٠

و أما الجواب عن الطريق الثاني فبان يقال إن مسمى الحركة و الحوادث و هو القدر المشترك بين جميع الأفراد إما أن يؤخذ داخل في جملة الحركات و الحوادث المذكورة أم لا يؤخذ كذلك فإن أخذ داخل فيها فإذا قيل إما أن يجوز حصول شيء من الحركات و الحوادث في الأزل أو لا يجوز فنختار حينئذ حصول شيء منها في الأزل و ذلك الشيء هو مسمى الحركة و لا يلزم من كونه غير مسبق بغيره أن يكون هو أول الحركات أو الحوادث و إنما يكون ذلك لازماً أن لو كان هو الأول و أما إذا لم يؤخذ ذلك المسمى داخل فيها فنحن نختار عدم حصول شيء من تلك الحركات و الحوادث في الأزل - قولهم لو كان كذلك لزم أن يكون لمجموعها بداية قلنا لا نسلم فإن الحق على ما قررنا - أن كل واحد من الحركات و الحوادث يسبقها مثلها إلى ما لا يتناهى فيكون مسمى الحركة المذكورة محفوظة بواسطة تعاقب الحركات أزلاً و أبداً و فيه نظر فلا تذهل.

و إيجاب عن الوجه الثاني الذي يبتني فيه حكم الكل على حكم كل واحد فقد عرفت فساده إلا أن يقرر كما قررناه و هو منقوض الآن بقولنا كل ممكن ما عدا الحركة يجوز أن يقع كل واحد في الوجود دفعة واحدة و لا كذلك جميع الممكنات التي هي غير الحركة فإنها لا يمكن وقوعها دفعة لأن منها ما لا يقع إلا على الترتيب الزماني و كذلك يصدق

أن كل واحد من الضدين يمكن حصوله في محله واحد في وقت واحد ولا كذلك المجموع.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١١

و يجاب بجواب آخر وهو الأصل في هذا الباب و ذلك أن الحوادث الماضية - لا يمكن أن يكون لها كل مجموعي أبداً ليلزم من ذلك أن يكون ذلك الكل مسبوقاً بالعدم أو غير مسبوق لأن تلك الحوادث معدومة و المعدوم لا كل له أصلاً فلا يصح الحكم عليه بل ليس الموجود من تلك الحوادث في كل وقت إلا واحداً أو متناهيها

الحجة الثانية

لهم في إثبات حدوث العالم أن الحوادث في الأزل لو كانت غير متناهية لزم أن يكون وجود كل واحد منها يتوقف على انقضاء ما لا يتناهي من الحوادث و كلما يتوقف وجوده على انقضاء ما لا يتناهي فوجوده محال ينتج أن الحوادث لو كانت غير متناهية لكان وجود كل منها محالاً و بطلان ذلك ظاهر.

و الجواب أنكم ما ذا تعنون بهذا التوقف إن عنيتم به المفهوم المتعارف و هو الذي يفرض عند كونه معدوماً أنه يتوقف وجوده على كذا فالممتنع من التوقف على غير المتناهي - ما يكون الشيء متوقفاً على ما لا يتناهي و لم يحصل بعد و ظاهر أن الذي لا يكون وجوده - إلا بعد وجود ما لا يتناهي في المستقبل لا يصح وقوعه فاما في الماضي فلم يكن وقت أو حالة كان فيها غير المتناهي الذي يتوقف عليه حادث معدوماً فحصل بعد ذلك و حصل بعده الحادث إذ ما من وقت يفرض إلا و كان مسبوقاً بما لا يتناهي و لا يأتي مما يتوقف على حركات إلا و يتوقف على ما لا يتناهي و إن عنيتم بهذا التوقف أنه لا يقع شيء من الحوادث - إلا بعد ما لا يتناهي فهو نفس محل النزاع فإن الخصم مذهبه أنه لا يقع حادث إلا و تسبقه حوادث لا إلى بداية و لا يصح وقوعه إلا هكذا فكيف يجعل محل النزاع مثبتاً لنفسه - فإن جعل محل النزاع مقدمة مستعملة في إبطال نفسها أو إثبات نفسها من قبيل المصادرة على المطلوب الأول و هو من جملة المغالطات المذكورة في المنطق.

و بالجملة فالتوقف المذكور إن جعل بالمعنى الأول العرفي فالملازمة ممنوعة - و إن عني به المعنى الثاني فالملازمة مسلمة و الاستثناء ممنوع كما ذكرناه.

الحجة الثالثة

أن الحوادث الواقعة في الزمان الماضي لها آخر و كل ما له آخر فهو متناه ينتج أن الحوادث الواقعة في الماضي متناهية أما بيان الصغرى فلأن الآن الحاضر آخر ما مضى و أما بيان الكبرى فظاهر.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٢

و الجواب أنكم ما ذا تعنون بقولكم إن الآن آخر ما مضى إن عنيتم بكونه آخر أنه ليس بعده شيء من الزمان أصلاً منعنا الصغرى فإن مذهب الخصم أن بعده آتات و أزمنة لا تتناهي و إن عنيتم به أنه آخر ما مضى بحسب فرضنا و اعتبارنا فقط فلا يلزم منه أن يكون آخر ليس بعده شيء آخر و أما النهاية المذكورة في الكبرى أن كل ما له آخر فهو متناه إن أريد بتلك النهاية أن يكون في جانب بداية الحوادث منعنا الكبرى - و إن أريد ما يكون في الجانب الآخر منها فيصير صورة النتيجة هكذا الحوادث الواقعة في جانب بداية الحوادث متناهية من جهة آخرها لكن لا يلزم من صحة ذلك تناهيها من

جهة بدايتها و ليس كلامنا في تناهي الحوادث من جهة آخرها بل الكلام إنما هو من جهة أولها و بدايتها فلا يضر ما ذكره.

الحجة الرابعة

مأخوذة من برهان تناهي الأبعاد أنا إذا أخذنا الحركات الماضية من هذه السنة التي نحن فيها إلى الأزل جملة أخرى ثم أخذنا بناقص سنة و هو من العام الماضي على الأزل جملة ثم طبقنا في الوهم الطرف المتناهي من إحدى الجملتين على ما يشبهه - و يقابله من الجملة الثانية فلا يخلو إما أن ينقص الجملة الناقصة في الطرف الآخر أو لا تنقص فإن لم تنقص بل ذهبنا إلى غير النهاية كان الناقص مساويا للزائد و يكون الشيء مع غيره كهو لا مع غيره و كلاهما محالان و إن نقصت إحدى الجملتين عن الأخرى - لزم تناهي الجملة الناقصة من الجملة الأخرى التي في جهة الأول و الجملة الثانية الزائدة على الناقصة بمقدار متناه لا بد أن تكون متناهية فالجملتان من الحركات الماضية و كذا الحوادث المقارنة لها متناهية في جانب الأزل و ذلك هو المطلوب.

و الجواب أن الحركات الماضية التي تألفت منها الجملتان معدومة و الأمور المعدومة لا كل لها فيكون فرض اجتماعهما في الأزل محالا و حينئذ لا يلزم من فرض ذلك الاجتماع المحال انقطاع الحركات في الماضي لما عرفت من عدم اجتماع الحركات المتعاقبة التي لا يمكن وقوعها في الوجود إلا شيئا فشيئا.

الحجة الخامسة

أن الواجب لذاته لو كان علة تامة لوجود العالم و معلوم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٣

أنه يلزم من وجود العلة التامة وجود معلولها و من دوامها دوامه فإذا فرضنا عدم الواجب لذاته لزم منه عدم العالم و بالعكس و يلزم من صحة ذلك التلازم أن يكون العالم مساويا للواجب لذاته و ذلك محال. و الجواب أن ذلك اللزوم الذي ذكره بين العلة و المعلول ليس على وتيرة واحدة من الطرفين فإن ارتفاع العلة التامة لذاتها يوجب ارتفاع المعلول و أما ارتفاع المعلول فلا يوجب لذاته ارتفاع العلة بل ارتفاع المعلول يستدل به على أن العلة قد ارتفعت قبل ذلك لا أن ارتفاع المعلول أوجب ذلك فاتضح الفرق بين اللزومين.

الحجة السادسة

ما ذكره صاحب المطارحات نيابة عن المتكلمين فقال النفوس الناطقة حادثة و باقية بعد البدن على ما اعترفت به فلها اجتماع بعد المفارقة فذلك المجموع إما أن يكون حادثا أو غير حادث و يمتنع أن يكون غير حادث لأنه معلول الآحاد الحادثة على ما ذهبتم إليه و متى كانت العلة حادثة كان المعلول حادثا لا محالة فمجموع النفوس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٤

الناطقية الحاصلة بعد مفارقة الأبدان حادث و إذا ثبت أن مجموعها حادث لزم أن يكون للحوادث بداية فإن الحوادث لو لم تكن متناهية في جهة الماضي كانت النفوس الحادثة بحسب حدوث الأبدان غير متناهية إلى نفس لا يكون قبلها نفس أخرى و حينئذ يلزم أن لا يكون مجموعها حادثا بالضرورة لكن مجموعها في الماضي حادث على ما عرفت -

فالحوادث لا محالة لها بداية و ذلك هو المطلوب.

و أجاب عنه من وجوه - الأول أن ذلك المجموع الذي أخذتموه من النفوس الناطقة في الزمان الماضي و إن كان حادثا لكن لا يلزم من حدوثه أن يكون للحوادث الماضية بداية لأن كل آحاد لها مجموع فإن ذلك المجموع بإضافة واحدة إليه يحصل له مجموع آخر مغاير للمجموع الأول و النفوس الناطقة الحادثة في الماضي و إن كان لها الآن مجموع - إلا أنه دائما في كل وقت يتبدل و يحصل مجموع غير ما كان بسبب حدوث النفوس في كل وقت - و انضمامها إلى كل مجموع يحدث مجموع آخر حدوثا زمانيا و هكذا لا يزال يتبدل ذلك المجموع إلى ما لا يتناهى و ليس الحكم مختصا بالنفوس الناطقة بل حال جميع الموجودات هكذا فإنه إذا أخذ قديما مع حادثها مجموعا فإن ذلك المجموع لا محالة يتبدل في كل وقت بحسب حدوث الحوادث و انضمامها إليه و يحصل مجموع آخر غير المجموع الأول الذي كان قبل الزيادة و هذا لا يدل في النفوس الناطقة على نهايتها و بدايتها بل في كل وقت يحصل مجموع آخر غير ما كان حادثا قبل حدوث الحادث اللاحق - و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون هناك وقت لا يحصل فيه شيء من النفوس الناطقة و لا يدل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٥

على أن لها بداية لا يكون قبلها نفس فاندفع ذلك السؤال.

و الجواب الثاني أن النفوس الباقية بعد المفارقة لا كل لها فلا يكون لها مجموع حقيقي إذ لا ارتباط لبعضها ببعض بحيث يتمكن من عدّها و حصرها فلا يلزم ما ذكره من نهاية الحوادث.

و الجواب الثالث أنا و لئن سلمنا تناهي النفوس الناطقة و حدوثها في الماضي - و لكن لا يلزم من ذلك تناهي الحوادث لجواز أن يكون الحوادث غير متناهية في الماضي مع تناهي النفوس و حدوثها بأن يتشكل الفلك بشكل غريب يحدث فيه نوع من الحيوانات لم يوجد قبل ذلك و لا يوجد بعده و يكون الإنسان من هذا القبيل و حينئذ يكون نوعه حادثا بعد أن لم يكن فلا يلزم من تناهيها تناهي الحوادث و هذا الجواب سيخيف جدا و صدوره عجيب عن باعث حكيم فإن العناية الإلهية كيف تقصر عن إيجاد أشرف الأنواع الطبيعة في أزمنة غير متناهية و لا يحفظ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٦

نوعه بتعاقب الأشخاص و الأمثال مع أنه يديم و يحفظ طبائع أنواع هي أدون و أخس منها - على أن قاعدة الإمكان جارية في كليات الأنواع و إن لم تجر في جزئياتها المتغيرة - و أيضا لكل طبيعة نوعية صورة عقلية في عالم الربوبية يجب أن يكون ذات عناية برقائقها و أطلالها بحفظها و إدامتها في كل وقت و تلك الصورة هي اسم إلهي عند العرفاء - و تجل من تجليات الحق الأول الذي كل يوم هو في شأن.

الحجة السابعة

أن كل عدد سواء كانت آحادها متناهية أو غير متناهية فهي إما زوج بالفعل و كل زوج منقسم بمتساويين و يكون نصفها أقل من كلها و كلما كان الشيء أقل من غيره كان متناهيّا و إذا تنهى النصف تنهى الكل و إن كانت فردا فإذا نقصنا منها واحدا صارت زوجا و الزوج كما عرفت متناه إذا أضفنا ذلك الواحد إلى ذلك الزوج المتناهي صار الكل متناهيّا فعلى كلا التقديرين يكون النفوس الماضية متناهية و يلزم من نهايتها نهاية الحوادث.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٧

و الجواب قال الشيخ المتأله في المطارحات إنا نسلم أن النفوس الناطقة المفارقة للأبدان لها عدد موجود في الأعيان لما عرفت أن العدد أمر اعتباري لا وجود له في الأعيان فلا يوصف بزوجية أو فردية ولا قلة ولا كثرة ولا مساواة ولا تفاوت - فلا كل لها عددي في الأعيان إذ لا ارتباط لبعضها ببعض في نفس الأمر ولا في الأذهان أيضا - فإن الذهن لا يمكنه عددها و تصورهما على سبيل التفصيل والاكتناه وعلى تقدير أن يسلم أن لها عددا فلا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون إما زوجا أو فردا فإن الزوجية والفردية والتساوي والتشارك والتباين والجذرية والمجذورية وغيرها من خواص العدد المتناهي وأقسامه لا من خواص مطلق العدد ثم لئن سلمنا عدم خلوها من الزوجية والفردية فلم قلتم إن كل عدد يكون أقل من غيره يجب أن يكون متناهيا لا تتقاض هذه القاعدة بالمئات غير المتناهية التي هي أقل من الألوف غير المتناهية وكذلك مقدورات الله تعالى عند المتكلمين أقل من معلوماته لدخول الممتنعات في قسم المعلومات دون المدورات مع عدم تناهيها.

أقول في هذا الجواب وجوه من النظر - **منها** أن الحكم بأن العدد غير موجود على إطلاقه غير صحيح وهذا الشيخ إنما حكم باعتبارية العدد لأن الوحدة والوجود والتشخص كالإمكان والشيئية والمعلومية أمور ذهنية اعتبارية عنده ولما كان العدد عبارة عن المؤلف عن الوحدات - وما يتركب عن الاعتباريات فهو لا محالة اعتباري فالعدد اعتباري وأما نحن فقد أقمنا البرهان عن أن الوجود في كل موجود عين حقيقته والماهية به تكون موجودة وعند التحليل يحكم بأن الوجود عيني والماهية المجردة عنه اعتبارية محضة والوحدة هي عين الوجود فتكون موجودة فبطلت هذه الحجة أعني الحكم بأن العدد اعتباري لأنه مؤلف من الاعتباريات.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٨

و منها أنه هب أن العدد أمر اعتباري لكنه ليس من الاعتباريات الكاذبة غير المطابقة لما في نفس الأمر حتى يتفرع عليه أنه غير قابل للقسمة إلى الزوجية والفردية والمساواة واللامساواة كيف وهذه الصفات تعرض أولا وبالذات للعدد و بواسطته للمعدود وهو ظاهر.

و منها أن غير المتناهي على معنيين أحدهما بالقوة وهو غير المتناهي الاليفي - و ثانيهما بالفعل وهو غير المتناهي العددي ومقدورات الله تعالى عند المتكلمين غير متناهية بالمعنى الأول لا بالمعنى الثاني لأنهم منكرون لوجود الغير المتناهي بالفعل - مرتبا كان أو غير مرتب متعاقبا كان أو مجتمعا والتفاوت إنما يجوز في غير المتناهي بالمعنى الأول كقبول الجسم عند الحكماء للانصاف المتداخلة غير المتناهية والأرباع المتداخلة غير المتناهية والثانية نصف الأولى.

تذكرة مشرقية

و اعلم أنا قد أشرنا سابقا إلى أن الوحدة معتبرة في كل شيء كالوجود - وأن الكثرة إذا لم يكن بين آحادها علاقة ذاتية لا يمكن الحكم عليها عند أخذها مجتمعة حكما وجوديا غير أحكام الآحاد فإن آحادها و وحداتها وإن كانت موجودة عندنا إلا أنها ليست موجودة بوجود واحد بل هي موجودات كثيرة لكل منها حكم خاص فإذا تقرر هذا فمن هذا المنهج يصح الجواب عن الحجة المذكورة بأن النفوس المفارقة ليس لها مجموع له وحدة خارجية حتى يحكم عليها

بأنها كذا أو كذا نعم للذهن أن يعتبر جملة منها و كل جملة في اعتبار الذهن فهي متناهية إذ الذهن لا يقدر على الإحاطة التفصيلية بالأمور غير المتناهية و كل مبلغ متناه من النفوس فهو إما زوج أو فرد و لا يلزم منه لا يتناهى ذلك المبلغ و الحوادث التي وجدت معها.

و هاهنا نكتة

و هي أنك ستعلم أن كثيرا من النفوس و هي الكاملة في العلم ستتحد بالعقل الفعال و ضرب منها و هي الناقصة الشقية تهوي إلى الجحيم و لا تصعد إلى عالم النفوس المفارقة و ذهب بعض الحكماء كإسكندر و غيره حتى الشيخ الرئيس أيضا في بعض رسائله إلى أن النفوس الناقصة هالكة لا تبقى بعد البدن و هذا المعنى يستفاد من بعض روايات أصحابنا الإمامية عن أئمتنا و ضروب أخرى منها متفرقة في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣١٩

طبقات النشأة الآخرة و على هذا فلا جمعية لها في مكان يحويها أو زمان يحيط بها أو في رباط عقلي يجمعها

نكتة أخرى

أن الجملتين إذا ترتبتا ترتبا وضعيا كما في المقادير أو عقليا كما في العلل و المعلولات فلكل منهما اتساق و انتظام بين آحادها- فإذا لوحظ الأول من آحاد إحداهما بإزاء الأول من آحاد الأخرى تتطابق بقية الآحاد- من غير أن يحتاج العقل إلى ملاحظة كل من الآحاد مع نظيره ملاحظة تفصيلية بل يكفي الملاحظة الإجمالية و أما في غير المرتبة أو في الأمور الاعتبارية المحضة فلا يكفي إلا تطبيق الجميع واحدا واحدا مع ما يحاذيها على التفصيل و العقل لا يفي به و قد شبه بعضهم الجملتين الأولين بحبلين ممتدين بل بخشبتين ممتدتين إذا طوبق مبدؤهما و الثانية بالحصيات المتفرقة المجتمعة من غير ترتيب فلا يجري البرهان إلا في الأمور الموجودة المترتبة فاندفع ما ذكره من جريان برهان التطبيق و التضاييف و غيرهما تارة من جهة الهدم و النقض و تارة من جهة الإثبات و الإبرام لوجوده أولها في الحوادث على مدرك الفلسفة و ثانيها في مراتب الأعداد و ثالثها في النفوس المفارقة بزعم الفلاسفة و رابعها بأن وجود الفلك من الأزل إلى زمان الطوفان- أقل منه إلى زماننا و نقضا فقط بأن وجوده تعالى من الأزل إلى زمان الطوفان أقل منه إلى زماننا و خامسها نقضا بأن معلومات الله أزيد من مقدوراته لإحاطة الأول- بالمحالات أيضا مع عدم تناهيهما و الدليل يعطي امتناعه و سادسها نقضا باشتمال كل موجود على صفات غير متناهية كلزوم أمر و لزوم لزومه و هكذا و غيره من النسب المتضاعفة- و سابعها بمنع جواز التطبيق بين السلسلتين لامتناع إحاطة العقل بما لا يتناهى.

بحث و تحصيل

قال بعض الأركياء الحق أن العدد غير المتناهي بالفعل مطلقا محال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٠

سواء كان بين الآحاد ترتيب أو لا و ذلك لأنه لو تحقق أمور غير متناهية توقف مجموعها على قدر ما يبقى منه بعد إسقاط واحد و هذا الباقي على ما يبقى منه بعد إسقاط واحد منه و هكذا فيلزم وجود مجموعات غير متناهية يجري فيها التطبيق فإن قلت الموجود في الواقع إنما هو الأمور الكثيرة المتفرقة و لا وجود للمجموع من حيث الوحدة إلا بعد

اعتبار العقل وحدته فلا يلزم الترتيب الواقعي الكافي للتطبيق بين جميع هذه المراتب قلت إذا وجد كثير كالعشرة مثلا فلا شك أنه يوجد فيه التسعة و الثمانية و السبعة و التسعة من حيث إنها تسعة واحدة لها جهة وحدة و إن لم يعتبر العقل و يكفي للتطبيق تدبر انتهى كلامه.

أقول فيه أما أولا فلما علمت أن معنى وجود الكثرة وجودات آحادها لا أن لها وحدة أخرى غير وحدة الآحاد و لهذا قال المحصلون من الحكماء إن وحدة العدد هي نفس كثرته لأنه ماهية ضعيفة الوجود صورتها هي نفس مادتها بعينها كما أن فعلية الهيولى نفس قوتها و استعدادها فليست للكثرة و العدد وحدة إلا بمجرد الاعتبار العقلي - من غير أن يكون لها مطابق خارجي فليس لها توقف على شيء في الواقع إذ ما لا تحقق له في الخارج لا توقف له على غيره.

و أما ثانيا فهب أن للعشرة وجودا و لها توقفا و حاجة إلى ما هو جزء لها فلا تسلم أن لها توقفا على عدد مخصوص مما دونها إذ لا رجحان لتسعة و واحدة على ثمانية و اثنين أو سبعة و ثلاثة أو ستة و أربعة أو خمسة و خمسة فلا اختصاص للتسعة في أن تكون محتاجا إليها أولا دون غيرها بل الحق كما ذكره الشيخ في الهيئات الشفاء أن لا توقف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢١

للعدد إلا على الوحدات لا غير.

و أما ثالثا فهب أن للعشرة توقفا على ماهية التسعة لكن لا توقف لها على تسعة مخصوصة إذ يتصور في كل عشرة عشرة أفراد من التسعة إذ بإسقاط كل واحد معين من آحاد العشرة يبقى تسعة مخصوصة فهناك عشرة تسعات لا رجحان بشيء منها بعينه على البواقي في أن يكون مبدءا لوجود العشرة فيلزم في اعتبار أي واحد منها لمبدئية العشرة الترجيح بلا مرجح و لا بد في الترتيب لجريان التطبيق من تخصيص في كل واحدة - من المراتب كما لا يخفى على المتدبر.

الحجة الثامنة

أن العالم بجميع ما فيه ممكن الوجود و كل ما هو موجود ممكن الوجود لذاته فهو حادث فالعالم حادث و ذلك لأن كل ممكن يحتاج إلى المؤثر - و تأثير المؤثر لا يخلو من أقسام ثلاثة لأنه إما أن يكون في حال وجوده أو في حال عدمه - أو لا في حال وجوده و لا في حال عدمه و الأول محال لأنه من قبيل إيجاد الموجود و تحصيل الحاصل و الثاني أيضا محال لكونه جمعا بين الوجود و العدم و هو محال فتعين أن يكون تأثير المؤثر فيه لا في حال الوجود و لا في حال العدم و ذلك هو حال الحدوث فكل ما له مؤثر فهو حادث فالعالم حادث.

و الأولى أن تقرر هكذا تأثير المؤثر إما حال عدمه أو حال حدوثه أو حال بقاءه و الأولان يفيدان الدعوى و الثالث باطل لأنه يلزم تحصيل الحاصل و هو محال.

و الجواب أنا نختار أن التأثير في حال الوجود و البقاء قوله ذلك إيجاد للموجود أو إبقاء للباقي قلنا ليس الأمر كذلك و إنما كان كذلك لو كان الفاعل يعطيه وجودا ثانيا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٢

و بقاء مستأنفا و ليس كذلك بل الفاعل يوجده بنفس هذا الإيجاد لأن تأثير الفاعل في شيء عبارة عن كونه تابعا له في

الوجود واجب الوجود بعلة ثم الذي يدل على أن التأثير - يجب أن يكون في حال الوجود وجوه - أحدها أنه لو بطل أن يكون التأثير في حال الوجود وجب أن يكون إما في حال العدم ويلزم من ذلك الجمع بين الوجود والعدم وذلك ممتنع أو لا في حال الوجود ولا في حال العدم فيلزم من ذلك ثبوت الوساطة بينهما وذلك أيضا باطل كما عرفت.

و ثانيها أن الإمكان في كل ممكن علة تامة للاحتياج لما يحكم العقل بأنه أمكن - فاحتاج فلو لم يحتج حال البقاء لزم إما الانقلاب في الماهية أو تخلف المعلول عن العلة التامة.

و ثالثها أن من احتج بهذه الحجة جمع من الأشاعرة و عندهم أن صفاته تعالى زائدة على ذاته قديمة موجودة بإيجاد الذات إياها فهي مادة النقض عليهم.

و رابعها أنه لو استغنى الممكن في حال بقائه عن المؤثر فلزم أنه لو فرض انعدام الباري لم ينعدم العالم و لزمهم أيضا أن لا ينعدم شيء من الحوادث و ذلك باطل قبيح شنيع لكن بعضهم التزموه و قالوا في انعدام العالم إنه تعالى يخلق الفناء و الأولى لهم أن يقولوا حيث رأوا أن الزمان مركب من الآتات و أن للجسم أكوانا دفعية - إنه تعالى يحدث في كل آن عالما آخر.

و خامسها أن الدليل منقوض عليهم باحتياج الحوادث في الأعدام الأزلية إلى العلة إذ الممكن كما لا يوجد بنفسه لا ينعدم بذاته فيلزم عليهم إعدام المعدوم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٣

الحجة التاسعة

قررها بعض المتأخرين و هي أن ما سوى الله تعالى إما مجرد و إما جسم أو جسماني و الأول وجوده محال لأنه لو وجد لكان مشاركا له تعالى فوجب أن يمتاز عنه بفصل فيتركب الواجب تعالى هذا محال و أما الثاني فهو حادث لا محالة - لأن كل جسم إما متحرك أو ساكن البتة و كل منهما حادث أما الحركة فلأن ماهيتها تقتضي المسبوقية بغيرها لأنها عبارة عن تغير حال بعد حال و انتقال من حال إلى حال - فلو كانت أزلية لم تكن مسبقة بالغير فاجتمع النقيضان الأزلية و المسبوقية بالغير هذا خلف و لأنه لو كانت قديمة لكانت كل دورة من دورات الفلك مثلا مسبقة بأخرى - يكون كل منها مسبوقا بعدم أزلي فاجتمعت الأعدام في الأزل فلم يوجد في الأزل شيء منها و هو المطلوب و لأنه إما أن يكون في الأزل شيء من هذه الحركات أو لا فعلى الثاني يتحقق عدم سابق على الجميع و هو المطلوب و على الأول يكون الحركة الموجود في الأزل متقدمة على جميع الحركات فلها بداية و أما السكون فلأنه عبارة عن الحصول الثاني في الحيز الأول و ملزوم له و الحصول وجودي و قدمه يمنع عدمه لوجوب استناد القديم إلى الواجب الموجب التام لكنه مما يجوز عدمه لجواز الحركة على كل جسم لأنه إن كان بسيطا تشابهت أجزائه فجاز أن يتلبس كل منها بحيز الآخر - و لا يحصل ذلك إلا بالحركة و إن كان مركبا أمكن الحركة على بسائطه و هي يستلزم الحركة عليه أيضا

و الجواب بوجوه

أحدها أن ما ذكره في نفي المجرد سوى الباري تعالى - يفيد نفي موجود غيره

و اللازم باطل عندهم و عند غيرهم فكذا ما ذكره.

و ثانيها أنه معارض بالدلائل القائمة

على وجود المجردات و الصور العقلية.

و ثالثها أن الوجودات البسيطة قد مر أنها متميزة

بالكمال و النقص في نفس ما به الاشتراك من غير حاجة إلى مميز فصلي و أما ما اشتهر من الدفع بأن التجرد أمر سلبي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٤

و الاشتراك في السلوب لا يوجب التركيب بل الامتياز حاصل بين المشاركات في السلب بنفس ذواتها المتباينة فليس بشيء لأن المجردات لا شبهة في أنها مشتركة في نحو من الوجود مابين لوجود الجسمانيات لكن يعبر عنها بعنوان سلبي كما يعبر عن حقيقة العلم و الإدراك بعدم الغيبة عن الذات و لا شك أن العلم صفة وجودية عبر عنه بعنوان سلبي فالحق ما لوحناك إليه.

و رابعها أن بناء ما ذكره في هذه الحجة

على أن التجرد ذاتي له تعالى إما نوع أو جنس و على التقديرين يلزم كونه تعالى ذا ماهية و هو محال كما برهن عليه - و أما حقيقة الوجود المشترك عندنا فقد بينا في أوائل هذا الكتاب أنه ليست كلياً طبيعياً نوعاً أو جنساً و لا غيره من الكليات الخمسة و أما المفهوم الانتزاعي الذي لا وجود له إلا في العقل فلا شك أنه من الخارجيات دون المقومات.

و خامسها أن غاية ما لزم تركيب الواجب من أجزاء عقلية

و هم لم يقيموا برهاناً على استحالة و هذا الزامي.

و سادسها أن ماهية الحركة و معناها و إن كانت هي المسبوقية بالغير

أو الانتقال من حال إلى آخرى فذلك لا يستلزم كون تلك الماهية مسبوقه بالغير لما علمت مراراً أن ماهية كل شيء لا يلزم أن يكون من أفراد نفسها و حمل الشيء على نفسه ضروري بالحمل الأولى الذاتي لا بالحمل المتعارف الصناعي فتلك الماهية تقتضي أن يكون كل جزئي من جزئياتها مسبوقاً بغيره و أيضاً قد علمت أن مسبوقية الماهية بغيرها لا يوجب أن يكون لها أو لأفرادها بداية لا يحصل قبلها.

و سابعها ما قيل إن ما ذكره

يستدعي حدوث كل انتقال جزئي لا حدوث الحركة التوسطية التي تبقى مع انتقالات الجزئية غير المتناهية.

و ثامنها ما قيل إنه لو سلم ما ذكر

فإنما يدل على حدوث كل شخص من الحركة - لا على حدوث نوعها. أقول في هذين الجوابين نظر بل كلاهما غير صحيح عندي لأن الحركة بمعنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٥

التوسط و إن حكم عليها فيما له مبدأ شخصي و منتهى شخصي و فاعل و قابل شخصيان إلا أنها مع ذلك أمر مبهم الوجود في ذاته لا بقاء له بحسب نفسه و إنما بقاؤها كبقاء الهيولى الأولى المفتقرة إلى المتممات النوعية و الشخصية من الصور و كذا الماهية المتعاقبة الأشخاص لا بقاء لها في نفسها و هذا و إن كان بحثاً على السند لكن الغرض التنبيه على حقيقة الأمر نعم لو ثبت أن التعاقب في الخصوصيات و الأشخاص للحركة على الاستمرار الاتصالي يوجب بقاء

موضوع شخصي مستدير الجرم قار الذات لكان البحث قويا و ذلك كما علمت منا و الحق أن المتكلمين لو أمكنهم أن يقولوا إن كل جسم و جسماني لا يخلو في حد نفسه عن الحوادث و كل ما لا يخلو في حد نفسه عن الحوادث فهو حادث فكل جسم و جسماني حادث لثم البيان و إلا فلا و لعل مقصود قدمائهم الذين كانوا في الصدر الأول لقرب زمانهم بزمان النبوة و الوحي ما ذهبنا إليه مطابقا لكلام أساطين الحكمة الذين اقتبسوا أنوارهم من مشكاة النبوة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٦

و تاسعها أن كون كل دورة مسبقة بالعدم

الأزلي إنما يستدعي اجتماع أعدامها في الأزل بمعنى أنها تجتمع في هذا الحكم لا أنها تتفق في الحصول في وقت معين و أيضا إنا نختار أنه لم يكن في الأزل شيء من هذه الحركات بمعنى أنه ليس شيء منها أزليا - لا بمعنى أن الأزل زمان معين بل الزمان المعين لم يوجد فيه شيء منها و ظاهر أنه لا يفيد المطلوب و أيضا إنا نختار أن في الأزل تحقق شيء من هذه الحركات قوله يكون الحركة الموجودة في الأزل مقدمة على جميع الحركات فلها بداية قلنا نعم بمعنى أن هذه الحركة الأزلية ليست مسبقة بحركة أخرى لا بمعنى أنه يتحقق عدم سابق على الجميع إذ كونها أزلية ينافي ذلك. و لأصحاب الحدوث حجج أخرى لو لا مخافة التطويل لأوردتها مع ما يرد عليها - و الغرض من إيراد ما ذكرنا أن يحيط الناظر في هذه المسألة بأطراف ما قالوا و وجوه الاحتجاجات التي ذكروا من الجانبين ليعلم قدر ما تطفنا به و سلكنا سبيله و لا يحمل كلامنا على مجرد المكاشفة و الذوق أو تقليد الشريعة من غير ممارسة الحجج و البراهين و التزام القوانين فإن مجرد الكشف غير كاف في السلوك من غير برهان كما أن مجرد البحث من غير مكاشفة نقصان عظيم في السير و الله المعين

الفصل (٥) في طريق التوفيق بين الشريعة و الحكمة في دوام فيض الباري و حدوث العالم

قد أشرنا مرارا إلى أن الحكمة غير مخالفة للشرائع الحقبة الإلهية بل المقصود منهما شيء واحد هي معرفة الحق الأول و صفاته و أفعاله و هذه تحصل تارة بطريق الوحي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٧

و الرسالة فتسمى بالنبوة و تارة بطريق السلوك و الكسب فتسمى بالحكمة و الولاية - و إنما يقول بمخالفتها في المقصود من لا معرفة لتطبيق الخطابات الشرعية على البراهين الحكمية و لا يقدر على ذلك إلا مؤيد من عند الله كامل في العلوم الحكمية مطلع على الأسرار النبوية فإنه قد يكون الإنسان بارعا في الحكمة البحثية و لا حظ له من علم الكتاب و الشريعة أو بالعكس فالعقل السليم إذا تأمل تأملا شافيا و تشبث بذيل الإنصاف متبريا عن الميل و الانحراف و العناد و الاعتساف و تدبر أن طائفة من العقول الزكية و النفوس المطهرة الذين لم يتنجس بواطنهم بأرجاس الجاهلية و أدناس النفسانية و لم ينحرفوا عن سبيل التقديس و لم يأتوا بباطل و لا تدليس و كانوا مؤيدين من عند الله بأمور غريبة في العلم و العمل معجزات و خوارق للعادات من غير سحر و حيل و لا غش و لا دغل ثم أصروا على القول بحدوث هذا العالم و خرابه و بواره و انشقاق أسقافه و انهدام طاقاته و تساقط كواكبه و انكدارها و طي سماواته و بيد أرضه و انفجار بحارها و سيران جبالها و نسفها و بالغوا في ذلك و تشددوا في الإنكار على منكبيه مع ظهور أنه لا يضرهم

القول بقدم العالم مع بقاء النفوس بعد الأبدان الشخصية وإثبات الخيرات و الشرور النفسانية في المعاد - ولا يخل بالشرعية في ظاهر الأمر فيجزم لا محالة بأنهم ما نطقوا عن الهوى وما أخبروا عن يقين حق واعتقاد صدق ثم إذا راجعنا إلى البراهين العقلية التي لا شك ولا ريب في مقدماتها اليقينية الاضطرارية وجدناها ناهضة على أن صانع العالم واحد صمد لا يعتريه نقص ولا تغير - ولا انزعاج من حالة إلى حالة ولا فتور في فاعليته ولا إمساك في فيضه ولا بخل في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٨

إحسانه ولا توقف على إرادة سائحة أو حضور وقت مناسب أو قصد إلى تحصيل مصلحة له أو لغيره فإن من قصد في إيجاد شيء تحصيل مصلحة وإن كانت لغيره أو إيصال منفعة - وإن كان إلى غيره فهو ناقص في نفسه محتاج في كماله إلى غيره لأن ذلك التحصيل أو الإيصال إن لم يكن أولى له من عدمه فلم يقصده وإن كان أولى فهو بذلك محصل كمال نفسه من غيره إذ بدونه فاقد ذلك الكمال فعلم أنه تام الفاعلية تام الإرادة ليس في ذاته قصد زائد أو إرادة حادثة فيجب كونه صانعاً فياضاً لم يزل ولا يزال باسطاً يده بالرحمة والعطاء في الآباد والأزل بلا قصور إنما القصور فينا أبناء عالم الدنيا والأجسام - وسكان قرية الهيولي الظالم أهلها وهي دار الزوال والانتقال.

فإذن الجمع بين الحكمة والشرعية في هذه المسألة العظيمة لا يمكن إلا بما هدانا الله إليه وكشف الحجاب عن وجه بصيرتنا لملاحظة الأمر على ما هي عليه من تحقيق تجدد الأكوان الطبيعية الجسمانية وعدم خلوها في ذاتها عن الحوادث فالفيض من عند الله باق دائم والعالم متبدل زائل في كل حين وإنما بقاؤه بتوارد الأمثال كبقاء الأنفاس في مدة حياة كل واحد من الناس والخلق في ليس وذهول عن تشابه الأمثال وتعاقبها على وجه الاتصال.

ذكر تنبيهي

قال بعض العرفاء في كتابه المسمى بزبدة الحقائق وقول القائل العالم قديم بالزمان هوس محض لا طائل تحته إذ يقال له ما الذي تعني بالعالم - فإما أن يقول أعني به الأجسام كلها كالسماوات والأهات أو يقول أعني به كل موجود سوى الله فإن قال أعني به كل موجود ممكن من الأجسام وغيرها كالعقول والنفوس - فعلى هذا يكون أكثر الموجودات المندرجة تحت لفظ العالم غير متوقف الوجود على وجود الزمان بل يكون بالضرورة سابق الوجود عليه فكيف يقال العالم قديم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٢٩

بالزمان وأكثر موجودات العالم سابق الوجود على الزمان وإن قال أعني بالعالم الأجسام كلها فلا يجوز على هذا الوجه أيضاً لأن معنى ذلك أن الأجسام موجودة منذ كان الزمان موجوداً فيكون مشعراً بأن الزمان سابق على الأجسام في الوجود وليس كذلك فإن الأجسام سابقة الوجود على الزمان والزمان متأخر الوجود عنها وإن كان ذلك بالرتبة والذات انتهى كلامه.

أقول لا يخفى ما فيه من النظر فإن المعية الزمانية بين الشيئين لا ينافي التقدم الذاتي لأحدهما على الآخر لكن بعد النظر العميق والبحث الشديد يظهر حقيقة ما ذكره هذا العارف إذ النسبة بين الزمان والجسم كالنسبة بين الهيولي والصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٣٠

بالتلازم و الزمان من جملة المشخصات للجسم كما أن الهيولى باستعدادها من جملة المشخصات للصورة فكما أن النظر في كيفية التلازم بين المادة و الصورة يعطي الحكم بتجدد كل منهما فإن الصورة بحقيقتها يستلزم المادة و تفيدها على وجه الفاعلية فيلزمها المادة لزوم الفعل للفاعل الموجب فيتصورها المادة بها و تستكمل بوجودها.

ثم إن المادة باستعدادها تنهياً لقبول صورة عاقبة لخصوصيتها لتلك السابقة على وجه الإعداد فيلزمها أيضاً مادة أخرى فلا يزال الصورة علة لهيولى بالإيجاب و الفعل - و المادة علة للصورة بالإعداد و القبول فهما متجددتان في الوجود فكذا الحكم في تجدد كل من هويتي الزمان و الجسم فالزمان علة تشخص الجسم و حدوده و الجسم علة بقاء الزمان و استمراره و لأجل ذلك قد نص زيتون الأكبر حسب ما نقلنا من كلامه - في العلم الكلي على تجدد كل من الهيولى و الصورة أنه قال إن الموجودات باقية دائمة أما بقاؤها فيتجدد صورها و أما دثورها فبدثور الصورة الأولى عند تجدد الأخرى - و ذكر أن الدثور قد لزم الصورة و الهيولى معا.

ثم قال صاحب الزبدة فإن زعمت أن الأجسام كانت موجودة مذ كان الحق موجوداً فهو خطأ عظيم و هو اعتقاد أكثر العلماء الذين يزعمون أنهم فاقوا في صدق النظر على الأولين و الآخرين و مما لا بد في هذا المقام أن يعلم أن الأجسام لا يوجد أصلاً حيث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٣١

يوجد الحق الأول لا الآن و لا قبله و لا بعده و من ذهب إلى أن العالم موجود الآن مع وجود الحق فهو مخطيء خطأ عظيماً فحيث الحق لا زمان و لا مكان و محيط بالزمان و المكان و بسائر الموجودات فإن سبق وجوده على شيء كسبقه على غيره فإنه سابق الوجود على وجود العالم كما أنه سابق الوجود على وجود صورة هذه الكلمات المسطورة في هذا الكتاب من غير فرق أصلاً و من فرق بينهما فهو بعد في مضيق الشبه و لم ينزه الحق عن الشبه و لم ينزه الحق عن الزمان كما لم ينزه عن المكان عند العوام الذين يزعمون أنه جسم مكاني كسائر المحسوسات و هذا الإيمان بعيد عن الإيمان الحقيقي الحاصل للعارف في أول سلوكه - و الله عز و جل سابق على الزمن الماضي حيث سبقه على الزمان المستقبل من غير فرق - و هذا يقيني عند العارف و العلماء عاجزون عن إدراكه بالضرورة و لو لم يعجزوا لما قالوا - إن العالم مساو في الوجود لوجود الحق الأول كما لم يقولوا إن صور هذه الحروف مثلاً - يساوي وجود الله المنزه عن هذه الظنون انتهى كلامه.

نقد و تحصيل

اعلم أن القول بأن العالم غير موجود مع الحق في مرتبة وجوده - قول محصل لا شبهة فيه عند العلماء لكن الثابت بالبرهان و المعتضد بالكشف و العيان - أن الحق موجود مع العالم و مع كل جزء من أجزاء العالم و كذا الحال في نسبة كل علة مقتضية بالقياس إلى معلولها فالمعلول لأجل نقصه و إمكانه غير موجود مع العلة في مرتبة ذاتها الكمالية و لكن العلة موجودة مع المعلول في مرتبة وجود المعلول من غير مزايلة عن وجودها الكمالي و من أمعن في تحقيق هذه المسألة أوتي خيراً كثيراً و الدليل على ما ذكرنا قوله سبحانه **هُوَ مَعَكُمْ أَيْنَ مَا كُنْتُمْ** و قوله **وَهُوَ الَّذِي فِي السَّمَاءِ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٧، ص ٣٣٢

إِلَهُ وَفِي الْأَرْضِ إِلَهُ و قوله **فَإَيْنَمَا تُولُوا فَتَمَّ وَجْهُ اللَّهِ** و غير ذلك من الآيات القرآنية و الأحاديث النبوية. فإذا تقرر هذا نرجع و نقول إن الحق المنزه عن الزمان موجود في كل وقت من الأوقات لا على وجه الاختصاص و التعليق و الحق المنزه عن المكان موجود في كل واحد واحد من الأمكنة لا على وجه التقييد و التطبيق كما يقوله المشبهة و لا على وجه المباينة و الفراق كما يقوله المنزهة من العلماء الذين لم يبلغوا في العلم إلى درجة العرفاء ليعرفون أن تنزيههم ضرب من التشبيه و التقييد لجعلهم مبدأ العالم محصور الوجود بالتجرد عن بعض أنحاء الوجود بالمباينة و المغايرة و قد ثبت أن واجب الوجود بالذات واجب الوجود من جميع الجهات و الحثيات و ليست في ذاته المحيطة بالكل جهة إمكانية فهو مع كل موجود بكل جهة من غير تقييد و لا تكثر فهو في كل شيء و ليس في شيء و في كل زمان و ليس في زمان و في كل مكان و ليس في مكان - بل هو كل الأشياء و ليس هو الأشياء



الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢

[الجزء الثامن]

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

السفر الرابع في علم النفس

من مبدأ تكونها من المواد الجسمانية إلى آخر مقاماتها و رجوعها إلى غاياتها القصوى وفيه أبواب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣

الباب الأول في أحكام عامة للنفس

و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في تحديد النفس

اعلم أن عناية الباري جل اسمه لما أفادت جميع ما يمكن إيجادها بالفيض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٤

الاقْدُس على ترتيب الأشرف فالأشرف حتى بلغ إلى أدنى البسائط وأخسها منزلة - ولم يجز في عنايته وقوف الإفادة على حد لا يتجاوزه فبقي إمكان وجود أمور غير متناهية في حد القوة إلى الفعل وكانت المواد الجسمانية وإن تناهت في الأظلام والكثافة والبرودة غير ممتنعة عن قبول الاستكمال بتأثير مبدأ فعال كتأثير أشعة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥

الكواكب سيما الشمس في التلطيف والتعديل لتصير باكتسابها نضجا واعتدالا - مادة للأغذية والأقوات وقوة منفعة لتوليد الكائنات مهية لقبول النشوء والحياة بصور يترتب عليها آثار الحكمة والعناية كالحیوان والنبات بعد إيفاء الطبيعة حقوق ما تقدم عليها من سائر المركبات وقواها وقد مر السبب اللمي في كون الأخس قابلا لما هو أشرف إذ الممكن لم يخلق هباء و عبثا بل لأن يكون عائدا إلى غايته الأصلية - فالعناصر إنما خلقت لقبول الحياة والروح. فأول ما قبلت من آثار الحياة حياة التغذية والنشوء والنماء والتوليد ثم حياة الحس والحركة ثم حياة العلم والتميز وكل من هذه الأنواع من الحياة - صورة كمالية يفيض بها على المادة آثار تلك الحياة بقواها الخادمة إياها تسمى تلك الصورة نفسا أدناها النفس النباتية وأوسطها النفس الحيوانية وأشرفها النفس الناطقة - ولهذه الثلاثة معنى مشترك ذاتي و حد جامع ونحن نريد أن نذكر في هذا الفصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦

البرهان على وجودها مطلقا و الحد لماهيتها نفسا فإن البسيط و إن لم يكن له حد و لا عليه برهان من جهة هوية ذاته البسيطة و لكن من جهة فعله أو انفعاله مما يقبل التحديد و يقام عليه البرهان فهكذا شأن النفوس و الصور بما هي نفوس و صور

أما البرهان على وجودها

فنقول إنا نشاهد أجساما يصدر عنها الآثار لا على وتيرة واحدة من غير إرادة مثل الحس و الحركة و التغذية و النمو و توليد المثل و ليس مبدأ هذه الآثار المادة الأولى لكونها قابلة محضة ليست فيها جهة الفعل و التأثير و لا الصورة الجسمية المشتركة بين جميع الأجسام إذ قد يوجد أجسام تخالف تلك الأجسام في تلك الآثار و هي أيضا قد لا تكون موصوفة بمصدرية هذه الأفعال فإذن في تلك الأجسام مباد غير جسميتها و ليست هي بأجسام فيها و إلا فيعود المحذور فإذن هي قوة متعلقة بتلك الأجسام و قد عرفت في مباحث القوة و الفعل أنا نسمي كل قوة فاعلية يصدر عنها الآثار لا على وتيرة واحدة نفسا و هذه اللفظة اسم لهذه القوة لا بحسب ذاتها البسيطة بل من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧

حيث كونها مبدأ لمثل هذه الأفاعيل المذكورة و لذلك صار البحث عن النفس من جملة العلم الطبيعي.

و أما الحد

فنقول آخذا في بيانه على طبق ما قالته الحكماء إن النفس لها حيثيات متعددة فتسمى بحسبها بأسام مختلفة و هي القوة و الكمال و الصورة فهي لكونها تقوي على الفعل الذي هو التحريك و على الانفعال من صور المحسوسات و المعقولات الذي هو الإدراك تسمى قوة و بالقياس إلى المادة التي تحلها ليجتمع منها جوهر نباتي أو حيواني صورة و بالقياس إلى أن طبيعة الجنس كانت ناقصة قبل اقتران الفصل بها- فإذا انضاف إليها كمل بها النوع كمالات فقالوا تحديد النفس بالكمال أولى من تحديدها بالصورة لوجوه- أما أولا فلأنه أعم من حيث إن الصورة عند الجمهور هي المنطبعة في المادة- و من النفس ما هي غير منطبعة فهي إذن ليست صورة للبدن و لكنها كمال له كما أن الملك كمال للمدينة و الربان كمال للسفينة.

و أما ثانيا فلأن الكمال قياس إلى المعنى الذي هو أقرب من طبيعة الجنس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨

و هو النوع و الصورة قياس إلى الشيء الذي هو أبعد من ذلك و هو المادة فالصورة تقتضي نسبة إلى شيء بعيد من ذات الجوهر الحاصل منها و إلى شيء يكون الجوهر الحاصل بحسبه هو ما هو بالقوة و إلى شيء لا ينسب إليه الأفاعيل بالحقيقة أعني النوع.

و أما ثالثا فلأن الدلالة على المادة مقتترنة في الدلالة على النوع من غير عكس- فتبين من هذا أنا إذا قلنا في تعريف النفس إنها كمال كان أدل على معناها و كان متضمنا لجميع أنواعها من جميع وجوها و لا تخرج النفس المفارقة.

و هو أيضا أولى من القوة لوجوه- أما أولا فلأن للنفس قوة الإدراك و هي انفعالية و قوة التحريك و هي فعلية- و ليس اعتبار أحد المعنيين أولى من الآخر فإن قيل لفظ القوة و اقتصر على أحد وجهين عرض ما قلناه و شيء آخر و هو أن لا

يتضمن الدلالة على ذات النفس من حيث هي نفس بل من جهة دون جهة و قد بين في علم الميزان أن ذلك ليس بجيد و لا صواب فيجب اعتبارهما في حدها و اسم القوة يتناولهما بالاشتراك لأن أحدهما داخل تحت مقولة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩

أن يفعل و الآخر تحت مقولة أن ينفع و الأجناس العالية قد علمت أنها متباينة بتمام ماهياتها و إطلاق اللفظ المشترك مما يجتنب عنه في الحدود بخلاف لفظ الكمال فإن قوله عليهما ليس بالاشتراك فإن النفس من جهة القوة التي يستكمل بها إدراك الحيوان كمال و من جهة القوة التي تصدر عنها أفاعيل الحيوان أيضا كمال. و أما ثانيا فلأن القوة اسم لها من حيث إنها مبدأ للأفعال و الكمال اسم لها من هذه الجهة و من حيث إنها تكمل النوع و ما يعرف الشيء من جميع جهاته أولى مما يعرفه من بعض جهاته فظهر أن الكمال هو الذي يجب أن يوضع في حد النفس مكان الجنس قالوا إنا إذا عرفنا أن النفس كمال لكذا بأي تفصيل يبين تحصيله لم نكن بعد عرفنا حقيقة النفس و ذاتها بل عرفناها من حيث هي نفس و قد عرفت في باب المضاف - أن وجود المضاف بما هو مضاف وجود غير مستقل و لا نعرف من وجود النفس إلا ما يقتضيه تلك الإضافة المحدودة بما هي إضافة محدودة لا تمام وجودها لكون اسم النفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠

غير موضوع إلا لذلك الوجود الإضافي و لم يوضع هذا الاسم لكنه حقيقة الجوهر النفساني بحسب معناه المشترك أو المختص بل من حيث إضافة التدبير و التصرف للأبدان - و وجود المضاف بما هو مضاف وجود تعلق مقيس إلى شيء آخر فالإضافة النفسية مقيسة إلى البدن فلذلك يؤخذ البدن في حد النفس لكونه داخلا في تقوم وجودها التعلق الإضافي كما يدخل وجود البناء في قوام البناء و يؤخذ في حده و لا يؤخذ في حد الإنسان - فإن الحدود بإزاء الوجودات فللإنسان بما هو إنسان وجود و له حد بإزائه يعرف به و لا يدخل في حده الإنسان و لا شيء من الجوهر و جنسه لأنه من مقولة المضاف و الإنسان من مقولة الجوهر و المقولات متباينة بتمامها فشيء منها لا يدخل في حد شيء من الأخرى فالنظر في النفس بما هو نفس نظر في البدن و لهذا عد علم النفس من العلوم الطبيعية النازرة في أحوال المادة و حركاتها فمن أراد أن يعرف حقيقة النفس من حيث ذاتها مع قطع النظر عن هذه الإضافة النفسية يجب أن ينظر إلى ذاتها من مبدأ آخر و يستأنف علما آخر غير هذا العلم الطبيعي و لو كنا عرفنا بهذا ذات النفس لما كان العلم بوقوعها في أي مقولة وقعت فيها مشكلا فإن من عرف حقيقة الشيء و فهم ذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١

فعرض على ذهنه طبيعة أمر ذاتي له لم يصعب عليه وجود ما هو جنس له إذ الذاتي بين الثبوت لما هو ذاتي له كما عرف في فن الميزان.

حكمة مشرقية:

و هاهنا سر شريف يعلم به جواز اشتداد الجوهر في جوهريته و استكمال الحقيقة الإنسانية في هويته و ذاته و يعلم أن

هذا الحد للنفس ليس بحسب الاسم فقط كما في حد البناء و الأب و الابن و ما يجري مجراها و ذلك لأن نفسية النفس ليست كأبوة الأب و بنوة الابن و كاتبية الكاتب و نحوها مما يجوز فيه فرض خلوة عن تلك الإضافة فإن لماهية البناء وجودا و لكونه بناء وجودا آخر و ليس هو من حيث كونه إنسانا هو بعينه من حيث كونه بناء فالأول جوهر و الثاني عرض نسبي و هذا بخلاف النفس فإن نفسية النفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢

نحو وجودها الخاص و ليس لماهية النفس وجود آخر هي بحسبه لا تكون نفسا إلا بعد استكمالات و تحولات ذاتية تقع لها في ذاتها و جوهرها فتصير حينئذ عقلا فعلا بعد ما كانت بالقوة عقلا. و البرهان على أن نفسية النفس في ابتداء نشأتها ليست من العوارض اللاحقة بذاتها لازمة كانت أو مفارقة كالحركة اللاحقة بالفلك أو كالأبوة اللاحقة بذات الأب أنه لو كانت كما زعمه الجمهور من الحكماء لزم كون النفس جوهرًا متحصلا بالفعل من جملة الجواهر العقلية المفارقة لذوات ثم سنع لها أمر الجاهها إلى التعلق بالبدن و مفارقة عالم القدس و مزاوله العنصريات لكن التالي مستحيل لأن ما بالذات لا يزول و الجوهر المفارق لا يسع له شيء لم يكن له في ذاته إذ محل الحوادث المادة الجسمانية و ما يقترنها. و أيضا النفس تمام البدن و يحصل منها و من المادة البدنية نوع كامل جسماني - و لا يمكن أن يحصل من مجرد و مادي نوع طبيعي مادي بالضرورة فإذا بطل التالي فكذا المقدم فلعلم أن اقتران النفس بالبدن و تصرفها فيه أمر ذاتي لها بحسب وجودها الشخصي فهذه الإضافة النفسية لها إلى البدن مقومة لها لكن لا يلزم من ذلك كونها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣

من باب المضاف و لا يخرج به النفس عن حد الجوهرية بل عن حد العقلية فقط فهذه الإضافة كإضافة القابلية للهيولي و إضافة الصورية للصور الطبيعية و إضافة المبدعية و العالمية و القادرية للواجب تعالى و إضافة العرضية للسواد البياض و غيرهما من مقولات العرض فإن أنحاء وجوداتها لا تنفك عن إضافة إلى شيء و لها معانٍ آخر غير الإضافة لست أقول لها وجود غير وجود الإضافة فالسواد مثلا له ماهية مستقلة في معناها و حدها و هي من مقولة الكيف و لكن وجودها في ذاتها هو وجودها في الموضوع أعني عرضيتها فالعروض للموضوع ذاتي لهوية السواد لا لماهيته و هكذا القياس في المادة و الصورة و الطبيعة و النفس من حيث إنه لكل منها ماهية أخرى جوهرية غير الإضافة كما أن للأعراض ماهية أخرى عرضية غير العروض و لكن هوياتها الشخصية هويات إضافية و بهذا يعلم أن الوجود أمر زائد على الماهية فوجود النفس لكونها صورة للمادة يلزمها إضافة البدن كما يلزم لكل صورة إضافة المادة لكن ليس يلزم من ذلك كونها من باب المضاف و لا كونها من الأعراض لأن هذه الإضافة إضافة التقويم و التكميل لا إضافة الحاجة المطلقة كما في العرض فالنفس ما دامت لم تخرج من قوة الوجود الجسماني إلى فعلية العقل المفارق - فهي صورة مادية على تفاوت درجاتها قربا و بعدا من نشأتها العقلية بحسب تفاوت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤

وجوداتها شدة و ضعفا و كمالا و نقصا إذ الوجود مما يقبل الاشتداد و مقابله كما بيناه في العلم الكلي في مباحث القوة و الفعل

و لنرجع إلى ما فرقناه من تحديد النفس

فنقول فهي إذن كمال للجسم لكن الكمال منه أولى و هو الذي يصير به النوع نوعا بالفعل مثل الشكل للسيف و الكرسي - و منه ما هو ثان و هو الذي يتبع نوعية الشيء من أفاعيله و انفعالاته كالقطع للسيف و التمييز - و الروية و الإحساس و الحركة الإرادية للإنسان فإن هذه كمالات ثانوية ليس يحتاج النوع في أن يكون نوعا بالفعل إلى حصول هذه الأمور بل إذا حصل له مبدأ هذه الأشياء بالفعل حتى صار له هذه الأشياء بالقوة القريبة بعد ما لم يكن إلا بقوة بعيدة - فالحيوان حيوان بالفعل و إن لم يتحرك بالإرادة بالفعل و لم يقع له الإحساس بالفعل لشيء و المهندس مهندس بالفعل و إن لم يعمل عمل المساحة و غيرها و الطبيب طبيب بالفعل و إن لم يعالج أحدا فالنفس كمال أول و كون الشيء كمالا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥

أولا لشيء لا ينافي ذلك كونه كمالا ثانيا لشيء آخر.

فلا يرد أن النفس الإنسانية ليست كمالا للحيوان بما هو حيوان و لا النفس مطلقا كمال للجسم بما هو جسم لما عرفت أن تحقق كل طبيعة بتحقيق كل فرد منه - و ارتفاعها بارتفاع جميع الأفراد فإذاً النفس كمال أول للشيء و إن كانت كمالا ثانيا لشيء آخر و الشيء الذي هي كمال أول له لا بد و أن يكون جسما لكن يجب أن يؤخذ الجسم المورد في هذا التعريف هو الذي بالمعنى الجنسي لا الجسم بالمعنى المادي كما علم في صناعة الميزان و قد مر الفرق بينهما في مباحث الماهية أيضا - و ليس هذا الجسم الذي النفس كمال له أعم من الجسم الطبيعي و الصناعي كالسرير و الكرسي و السفينة و المدينة و لو فرض أن نفس الربان كمال للسفينة و نفس الملك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦

كمال للمدينة فليست كماليتها هي النفسية للسفينة و المدينة و لو أخذ المجموع من السفينة و النفس أمرا واحدا حتى تكون النفس كمالا له لم تكن ذلك المفروض مجموعا جسما و لا جوهرًا و لا شيئا من المقولات إذ الماهية تابعة للوجود و الوجود مساوق للوحدة - و ما لا وحدة له لا وجود له.

فظهر أن النفس كمال أول لجسم طبيعي و لا كل جسم طبيعي إذ ليست النفس كمالا للنار و لا للأرض بل النفس التي في هذا العالم كمال لجسم طبيعي يصدر عنه كمالاته الثانية بآلات يستعين بها على أفعال الحياة كالأحساس و الحركة الإرادية.

و دلالة هذا المعنى على حقيقة النفس من جهة أن ما يكون من الصور التي فعلها في المادة من غير توسط قوة أخرى فذاتها متحدة الوجود بالمادة كالصور الأسطوقسية و الجمادية كالنارية و الهوائية و الياقوتية و الذهبية و غيرها فكانها هي مادية محضة منقسمة بانقسامها.

و أما ما يكون من الصور التي فعلها باستخدام قوة أخرى فلا محالة تكون تلك القوة لكونها آلة متوسطة أدون منزلة من

تلك الصورة فتكون تلك الصورة كأنها مرتفعة الذات عن سنخ المادة و هذا الارتفاع عن دنو المادة الجسمية الأولى
شان النفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٧

اذ لها حظ من الملكوت و التجرد و لو قليلا فظهر أن كون الكمال الأول للجسم الطبيعي - مما تفعل بالآلة خاصيته النفسية فكل قوة لجسم طبيعي من شأنها أن تفعل فعلا باستخدام قوة أخرى تحتها فهي عندنا نفس و هذا الحد أعني قولنا كمال أول لجسم طبيعي - آلي جامع لسائر النفوس إذ ليس المراد بالآلة المذكورة في تحديد النفس ما هو كالأعضاء بل ما هو كالقوى مثل الغذائية و النامية و المولدة في النفس النباتية و الخيال و الحس و القوة الشوقية في الحيوان لا مثل المعدة و الكبد و القلب و الدماغ و العصب فيه فعلى هذا القول النفس الفلكية داخله في هذا الحد لصدق مفهوم الآلي عليها بالبرهان و ذلك لأن البرهان قائم عندنا على أن الفلك مع كونه ذا نفس دراية للعلوم فهو أيضا ذو قوة طبيعية مباشرة للتحريك و له أيضا قوة حساسة لا كالتالي في هذه الحيوانات حيث يكون بانفعال يطرأ لآلة الحس و أيضا يكون في بعض مواضع أبدانها قوة الحس و في بعضها قوة أخرى و لا كذلك مادة الفلك لبساطته فالفلك كله خيال و كله طبيعة محركة وضعية من جنس الطبيعة الخامسة و كله حس لكن قوة الحس و الحركة دون قوة الخيال و قوة الإدراك الكلي إن كانت.

و بهذا يندفع الإشكال الذي استصعب المتأخرون حله و هو أن الحد المذكور و لا حد آخر أيضا لا يمكن أن يتناول النفوس الثلاثة أعني النباتية و الحيوانية و الفلكية - فإننا إن أعطيناها اسم النفس لأنها كمال تفعل فعلا ما فقط لزم أن يكون كل قوة نفسا فيكون الطبائع كلها نفوسا و ذلك مخالف لما أطبق عليه المتقدمون من العلماء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨

و إن أعطينا اسم النفس للقوة الفاعلة بالقصد خرجت النفس النباتية و اندرجت الباقيتان - و إن أعطيناه للقوة الفاعلة أفعالا متخالفة خرجت النفس الفلكية و دخلت الأخيرتان - و إن زدنا على هذه المعاني شرطا ازداد تخصيصا فإذا كلما احتيل حيلة يتناول بها اسم النفس الحيوانية و الفلكية يخرج النباتية أو يتناول الحيوانية و النباتية تخرج الفلكية و لا ينبغي أن يغتر العاقل بما يجده من اختلاف حركات الأفلاك طولا و عرضا - حتى يظن أنها أفعال متقابلة فإن لكل واحد من تلك الأفاعيل مبدءا واحدا و جهة واحدة لا يتغير هذا ما ذكره من الإشكال و قد عرفت حله بتفسير معنى الآلة و لا حاجة إلى اعتبار الرأي المحتمل الغير المعلوم في باب الفلكيات حسب ما قاله الشيخ من أن الأجسام السماوية فيها مذهبان - أحدهما مذهب من يرى أن كل فلك ذي كوكب يجتمع من الكواكب و من عدد كرات فيه جسم حيواني قد دبرت له نفس يتم فعلها بعدة أجزاء ذوات حركة فيكون هي كالات و ذلك القول لا يتم في جميع الأفلاك و الكرات.

و ثانيهما مذهب من يرى أن كل كرة فلها في نفسها حياة مفردة فيرى جسما محيطا بالكل واحدا لا كثرة فيه فهو لاء يلزمهم أن يروا أن اسم النفس الواقع على النفس الفلكية و على النفس النباتية إنما يقع بالاشتراك هذا.

ثم اعلم أنه بإدخال لفظ ذي الحياة في حد النفس و إن خرجت النباتية لكن ليس كما زعمه الشيخ من أنه لا يقع على الفلك و الحيوان بمعنى واحد بل بالاشتراك حيث قال إن الحيوانات و الفلك لا تشترك في معنى اسم الحياة و لا اسم

النطق أيضا لأن النطق الذي هاهنا يقع على وجود نفس لها العقلان الهولييان و ليس هذا مما يصح هناك - فإن النطق هناك عقل بالفعل و العقل بالفعل غير مقوم للنفس الكائنة جزءا من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩

حد الناطق و كذلك الحس هاهنا يقع على القوة التي بها يدرك المحسوسات على سبيل قبول أمثلتها و الانفعال منها و ليس هذا مما يصح هناك انتهى و ذلك لأن لفظ ذي الحياة إن أريد به مبدأ الإدراك و التحريك المطلقين يتناول الفلك و الحيوان جميعا - لأن الإدراك أعم من الإحساس و التخيل و التعقل.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠

و أيضا إن أريد بالإدراك المأخوذ في حد الحياة الإحساس فقط يمكن أن يتناول الفلك إذ ليس من شرط معنى الإحساس انفعال الآلة بل لو تحقق إحضار صورة جزئية للقوة الحساسة من غير انفعال وقع لآلة الحس لكان الإحساس حاصلا بالحقيقة كما يقع في الحس المشترك حضور صورة محسوسة في النوم أو في اليقظة كما للمبرسمين فيشاهدونها النفس من غير تأثر الحاسة هناك فعلم أن حقيقة الإحساس هي حضور الصورة الجزئية - لا تأثر الآلة بها و لا انطباع الصورة فيها كيف و نحن ذاهبون إلى أن الإبصار عندنا ليس إلا بإنشاء النفس صورة أخرى غير التي في المادة الخارجية و هي مماثلته إياها معلقة لا في محل و هكذا حال الأفلاك في كونها حساسة من حيث إن حساسيتها بضرب من الفعل - لا بضرب من الانفعال.

لكن مع هذا ليس لقائل أن يقول لم لا يجوز أن يقال إن الحياة بعينها هذا الكمال و هي الأمر الذي يصدر عنه ما ينسبونه إلى النفس فما الحاجة إلى أن يثبتوا نفسا فتكون الحياة هي مبدأ الأفاعيل.

لأننا نقول في دفع ما ذكره إنا أقمنا الحجة على أنه لما تخصص بعض الأجسام - بهذه الآثار دون البعض فليس بد من أن يكون صدور هذه الآثار بقوى أخرى مخصوصة غير الجسمانية المشتركة فالمعني بالحياة إما أن يكون تلك المبادي أو كون الجسم ذا تلك المبادي أو كون الجسم بحيث يصح أن يصدر عنه هذه الآثار.

الأول تسليم لما كنا بصدده فإن سمي أحد هذا المبدأ الذي سميناه نفسا باسم الحياة فلا مناقشة لنا معه إذ لم يكن خالفنا إلا بشيء لا يعتد به و هو اللفظ.

و الثاني باطل لأنه ليس المفهوم من كون الجسم ذا مبدأ هو المفهوم من ذلك المبدأ - و الثالث أيضا غير صحيح فإنه ليس المفهوم من هذا الكون و من النفس أو الحي من حيث هو حي شيئا واحدا و ذلك لأن المفهوم من هذا الكون المذكور لا يأبى أن يسبقه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١

بالذات مبدأ يتم به للجسم هذا الكون مثل كون السفينة بحيث يصدر عنها المنافع المنسوبة إليها فإن ذلك مما يحتاج إلى الربان حتى يتحقق به هذا الكون فهذا الكون يحتاج إلى كون آخر سابق عليه بخلاف المفهوم من الكمال الأول فيما رسمناه فإنه يمتنع أن يسبقه بالذات كمال أول و إلا لم يكن كمالا أولا و قد فرضناه أولا و هذا مثل كون الجسم بحيث

يصدر عنه الإحراق فإن نفس هذا الكون و وجود الحرارة في الجسم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢

شيء واحد و لكن وجود النفس و وجود هذا الكون ليس شيئا واحدا بل نقول كون الأشياء بحيث يصدر عنها أفعال الحياة على ضربين فمن الأشياء ما يجب أن يسبق هذا الكون كون آخر و من الأشياء ما ليس يجب أن يسبقه كون آخر فأما الذي يحتاج في هذا الكون إلى أن يسبقه كون آخر سبقا بالذات فهو الأجسام الحية فإن هذه الأجسام لو كان وجودها هو بعينه كونها بحيث يصدر عنها أفعال الحياة لكان كل جسم حيا و إن كان لها هذا الكون لا بمجرد أنها أجسام ما فقد تخصصت بأمر آخر و ليس لك أن تقول هذا الكون هو الذي يقوم الجسم لأن جوابك أن حياة الجسم هي الكون الذي بعد هذا الكون المفروض مقوما له و كلامنا في الكون الثاني سواء أريد بالجسم هو الذي بمعنى المادة أو الذي بمعنى الجنس إذ لكل منهما تأخر بحسب الكون أو بحسب الماهية المذكورة و أما ما ليس بجسم فلا مانع من أن يكون وجوده هو بعينه كونه بهذه الصفة بل يوجب في أكثر ما ليس بجسم أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣

وجوده حياته كالموجود الأول و ما يتلوه من العقول و النفوس و الحياة ليس ما به يكون الحي بالذات حيا إذ من المحال أن يصير الشيء بهذا الكون ذا هذا الكون بل حياة الشيء نفس حيبته كما أن الوجود ليس ما به يصير الموجود موجودا لاستحالة أن يصير الشيء بهذا الوجود ذا هذا الوجود كما علمت في باب الوجود و المضاف و الأين و العقل و نظائرها فإن المضاف بالذات نفس الإضافة فالأين لا يحتاج إلى أين آخر - و الصورة العقلية وجودها و عقليتها شيء واحد

فصل (٣) في ماهية النفس المطلقة

و إذ قد فرغنا من حد النفس بما هي نفس بحسب المفهوم الإسمي الإضافي - فجدير بنا أن نشتغل بتعريف ماهياتها و نتفحص أنه هل لها حقيقة أخرى غير كونها كمالا للجسم و ذلك لأننا إذا قلنا إنها كمال لم يعلم من ذلك بعد أنها جوهر أو ليست بجوهر فإن معنى الكمال الشيء الذي بوجوده يصير النوع نوعا فالنفس شيء يصير الحيوان حيوانا و النبات نباتا و هذا لا يعلم منه أنها بعد جوهر أو عرض فإن كثيرا من الكمالات هي في موضوع كالسواد و الكتابة و غيرها فإنها كمالات أولية للمركب منها و من الموضوع السواد للأسود بما هو أسود و الكتابة للكاتب بما هو كاتب. فإن قلت أليس هذا الشيء موجودا في المركب و المركب لا في الموضوع فهو موجود لا في موضوع بل فيما لا يستغني ذاته عن ذلك الشيء.

قلنا كون الشيء جزءا لما لا يكون وجوده في موضوع لو فرض أن له وجودا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤

غير وجود الأجزاء لا يمنعه أن يكون في موضوع و كون الجزء فيه لا كشيء موجود في الموضوع لا يجعله جوهرًا و قد علمت في مباحث الجوهر أن جوهرية الشيء لا تختلف بالإضافة حتى يكون الشيء بالقياس إلى ما هو جزء له جوهرًا و بالقياس إلى ما يعرضه عرضا كما في الذاتية و العرضية و ليس كل جوهرى جوهرًا و لا كل عرضي عرضا فالجوهر

جوهر في نفسه و بالقياس إلى كل شيء و كذا العرض عرض في نفسه بالقياس إلى كل شيء نعني أن القياس إلى الأشياء لا يغير جوهرية الشيء بمعنى كونه جوهرًا و لا عرضيته بمعنى كونه عرضًا نعم يغير كونه جوهرًا أو عرضيًا. قال الشيخ إن الشيء إذا تعقلت ذاته و نظرت إليها فإن لم يوجد لها موضوع البتة كانت في نفسها جوهرًا و إن وجدت في ألف شيء لا في موضوع بعد أن توجد في شيء واحد على نحو وجود الشيء في الموضوع فهي في نفسها عرض و ليس إذا لم يكن عرضًا في شيء فهو جوهر فيه فيجوز أن يكون الشيء لا عرضًا في الشيء و لا جوهرًا في الشيء كما أن الشيء يجوز أن لا يكون واحدًا في شيء و لا كثيرًا فيه و لكن في نفسه واحد أو كثير و ليس الجوهري و الجوهر واحدًا و لا العرض بمعنى العرضي في باب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥

إيساغوجي هو العرض الذي في قاطيغورياس و قد بينا هذه الأشياء في صناعة المنطق انتهى فعلم أن كون النفس كمالًا للجسم و الجسم جوهرًا و كونها جزءًا للمركب لا عرضًا قائمًا بالمركب لا يستلزم جوهريتها بل يحتمل أن يكون نفس ما قائمة بالموضوع - و هي مع ذلك يكون جزءًا للمركب و يحتمل أن لا يكون في موضوع فيكون جوهرًا. فلم يتبين بعد من مفهوم كون النفس كمالًا أن ذلك الكمال جوهر أو عرض فيجب لنا أن ننظر إلى ماهية النفس هل هي جوهر أو عرض لكن البرهان قائم على أن النفس جوهر و لا يكفي في هذا المطلب ما فعله المتأخرون من بيان جوهرية ذواتنا الإدراكية - و الاشتغال به من طريق خاص يعرف به كون النفس الناطقة جوهرًا مجردًا عن البدن إذ ذاك لا يفيد جوهرية النفوس على الإطلاق و الأولى في التعليم تقديم الشروع في بيان جوهرية النفس بما هي نفس على الشروع في بيان تجرد بعض أنواعها و كذا تقديم الدلالة على تجرد نفوسنا الإنسانية عن الأبدان العنصرية و الأجسام المادية على تجرد طائفة منها و هي التي بلغت إلى مقام العقل و المعقول بالفعل عن العالمين و مفارقتها عن الدارين. أما بيان كون النفس على الإطلاق جوهرًا فهو أنه قد سبق أن بعض الأجسام في ذاتها و طبائعها مما يصدر عنها أفعال الحياة و الحياة في الحيوانات صفة ذاتية مقومة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦

لجسميتها بحسب الماهية أعني الجسم بالمعنى الجنسي لا بالمعنى الذي يكون موضوعًا أو مادة و مبدأ تلك الحياة مقوم لجسميتها بالمعنى الذي هي به مادة كما علمت في مقامه و جماعة من المتأخرين حتى صاحب حكمة الإشراق حيث لم يفرقوا بين هذين المعنيين في الجسم زعموا أن حياة الحيوانات عارضة لأجسادها عرضًا غريبًا و زعموا أن لا شيء من الأجسام مما هو حي بالذات بل كل جسم في نفسه فهو ميت ظلمياني و ليس كذلك فإن كل حيوان جسم لذاته و الجسم جنسه و الحيوان نوع مخصوص من الجسم المطلق المأخوذ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧

لا بشرط شيء أي الجسم بما هو جسم مطلق و إن لم يكن الإطلاق قيدًا له فبعض الجسم بما هو جسم حيوان و كل حيوان حي بالذات فبعض الجسم حي بالذات و ذلك يناقض قولنا لا شيء من الجسم بحي بالذات فبطل قولهم كل

جسم ميت بالذات نعم الجسم بشرط سلب الزوائد عنه ليس بحي. فإذا تقرر أن نوع الحيوان ماهية حقيقية مندرجة تحت حقيقة الجسم و الحياة ذاتية له و ليست حياة الحيوان بواسطة الطبيعة الجسمية بما هي تلك الطبيعة و إلا لكانت الأجسام كلها حيوانا لاشتراكها في الجسمية فهي بواسطة أمر مقوم لهذا النوع المخصوص من الجسم أعني النوع الإضافي له و مقوم النوع الذاتي للجوهر جوهر لا محالة فمبدأ الحياة في الحيوان صورة جوهرية.

و هكذا نقول في الجسم النباتي إن النمو و التغذية من الصفات الذاتية لذلك الجسم الذي هو من الأنواع المحصلة للجسم الطبيعي و ليست حصولها لأجل الجسمية المشتركة فله لا محالة صورة نوعية محصلة لماهية الجسم الطبيعي المطلق على سبيل الفصل و التنوع و للمادة المخصوصة على سبيل التقويم و الآثار المخصوصة على سبيل الإفادة- فتلك الصورة التي هي مبدأ هذه الأفاعيل و الآثار لكونها محصلة للجوهر تحصيلًا و تنوعًا و تقويمًا هي أولى بأن يكون الجوهر من نفس الجسمية المبهمة الوجود و من الجسمية المادية القابلة لتأثيرات ذلك المبدأ المسمى بالنفس النباتية و قد سبق في مباحث الصور النوعية ما يدل على جوهرية مثل هذه المبادي من القاعدة التي وضعناها في هذا الباب- فليرجع إليها من اختلجت في صدره بعد دغدغة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨

الباب الثاني في ماهية النفس الحيوانية و بيان جوهريتها و تجردها ضربا من التجرد و فيه فصول فصل (١) في جوهريتها

قد علمت فيما سبق ما فيه كفاية و لكن سنزيدك هاهنا إيضاحا و ذلك أن من الناس من ذهب إلى أن النفس هي المزاج و يدل على فساده براهين. الأول أن البدن جوهر أسطقسي مركب من عناصر متنازعة متسارعة بطباعها إلى الانفكاك و الذي يجبرها على الامتزاج و حصول المزاج قوة غيرها سواء قلنا إن العناصر باقية على صورها النوعية كما هو المشهور و عليه الشيخ و غيره من العلماء أو قلنا إنها غير باقية و ذلك لأن الكيفيات العرضية أينما حصلت فهي تابعة للصور- فالنفس سواء كانت متعلقة بمادة مركبة أو بمادة مفردة لا يمكن أن تكون عين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩

الكيفية المزاجية لأن مبدأ الشيء و حافظه لا يكون عين ذلك الشيء و لا أيضا يمكن أن تكون صورة من صور العناصر لأن لكل منها آثارا مختصة ليست آثارا للنفس- فالنفس إذن غير الكيفية المزاجية و غير الصورة الأسطقسية التي لواحد من الأسطقسات

لكن هنا شكوك

منها لعل الأسطقسات في بدن الحيوان مقسورة على الاجتماع و حصول المزاج

لا أن جابرا يجبرها على الالتيام أو حافظا يحفظها أو يحفظ مزاجها و حله أن المقسور من الأسطقسات الممتزجة إنما ينحفظ انحفاظا قسريا إما لعصيان المسلك عن الانشقاق كاحتباس النيران و الأهوية في الأرض قسرا حتى إذا قويت

زلزلت الأرض و خسفتها و إما في زمان حركتها إلى الانفصال مثل الدهن المضروب بالماء و معلوم أنه ليست الأجزاء النارية و لا الهوائية في المنى قد بلغت في القلة إلى حيث تضعف عن الانفصال عن المخالطة و لا هناك من الصلابة و عسر الانشقاق ما يمنع تحلل الجوهر الخفيف عنه - و في المنى أرواح كثيرة هوائية و نارية إنما يحبسان مع الأرضية و المائية بشيء آخر - غير جسمية المنى بدليل أنه إذا فارق الرحم و تعرض للبرد الذي هو أولى بالتجميد رق بسرعة و كذلك إن تعرض للحر أو كان في رحم ذي آفة.

و منها سلمنا أنه ليس سبب الاحتباس هو القاسر فلم لا يجوز أن يكون السبب صغر الأجزاء و شدة الالتحام

و جوابه أن صغر الأجزاء فيما ليس بمغمور في المائع الكثير لا يمنع التفصي كالحال في المنى إذا لم يلتقمه فم الرحم زالت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠

خثورته فإن قلت لو كانت نارية المنى و هوائيه غالبتين على مائته و أرضيته لكان المنى صاعدا بالطبع و ليس كذلك فبطل المقدم و إن كانت الأرضية و المائية غالبتين - جاز أن يحسهما بالقسر. قلنا لو كان سبب الاحتباس ذلك لوجب أن يبقى ما فيه من النارية و الهوائية عند مفارقة الرحم و تعرضه للبرد. فإن قلت لم لا يجوز أن يقال النارية و الهوائية اللتان كانتا في المنى يفسدان بالمائية عند تعرضه للبرد لا أنهما تفارقان عنه و إذا لم يخلصا بالمفارقة لم يلزم ما ادعيتموه. قلنا فإذا لم يلزم أن يبقى مقدار حجم المنى زمانا يعتد به سيما عند عدم القواسر الخارجية كحر الهواء المطيف به المحلل له بسرعة و ليس كذلك.

و منها لم لا يجوز أن يكون سبب اجتماع الماء و الأرض هو النشف

ثم تعلق النار بهما كما يتعلق بالحطب.

و الجواب أن النشف إنما يكون عند إخلاء الهواء للماء مكانه الذي وقف فيه لضرورة الخلا و عدم البدل.

فهب أن العنصرين الثقيلين اجتماعا لا لجامع من خارج بل بمجرد الاتفاق في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣١

الميل إلى جهة واحدة فما السبب في اجتماع النارية و الهوائية و أما تعلق النار بالحطب فليس كما زعمه الناس ممن لا يعرف هذه القوانين فإن النار مما يحدث في الحطب شيئا فشيئا على الاتصال فتزول بانقلابها إلى الهواء على التدريج و ليست هناك نار واحدة متعلقة بالحطب بل النيران المتعلقة بالفتيلة كالماء الجاري على الاتصال.

و منها لم لا يجوز أن يكون سبب اجتماع الأسطقسات تحريك الوالدين أو مزاج الرحم

ثم يبقى ذلك القسر زمانا.

و جوابه أن حركة الوالدين و إن كانت تؤدي إلى اجتماع الأسطقسات التي في المنى لكن لا بد من سبب لانضمام ما ينضم إلى المنى بعد ذلك حتى يتم الأعضاء الحيوانية و لا بد من حافظ لذلك الاجتماع و هذا هو الجواب القوي عن

السؤالين السابقين.

و أيضا لو لم يكن في المني فاعل يفعل المزاج و الأعضاء لكان يجب أن يكون العضو المتخلق أولا هو الظاهر لأن الأجسام إنما تفعل ما تفعل بالجنة لا بالقوة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢

و من جهة المماسمة و الانضمام و الأقرب مكانا أسبق حدوثا من الأبعد و التالي باطل بالاستقراء فكذا المقدم و ذلك لأن أول الأعضاء تكونا هو القلب و أيضا كثير من الحيوانات يحدث لا بالتوالد.

و منها أن هذا الاجتماع قد لا يحتاج إلى سبب حافظ

و الدليل عليه بدن الميت حيث يبقى بعد مفارقة النفس عنه زمانا و ليس هناك حافظ فلو كان الحافظ هو النفس لوجب أن يتفرق الأجزاء عند الموت.

و الجواب أن لأجساد الحيوانات المفارقة عنها نفوسها قدرا من العناصر الكثيفة و شكلا و لونا لا يحتاج إلى حافظ نفسي كما لا يحتاج البناء في انحفاظه و تماسك أجزائه إلى حافظ غير يبوسة العنصر و الذي كانت النفس حافظة إياه ليس هذا الباقي من جسد الحيوان بل قدر آخر و مزاج آخر ما لم يتغير و لم ينفسخ لم يعرض الموت - و النفس ليست من الأسباب القريبة الموجبة لهذا اللون و الشكل الباقيين بل هي كفاعل بعيد يؤدي ضرب من تحريكاته إلى هذا الشكل و اللون كالبنا و الباني ثم الحافظ لذلك سبب آخر قد يوجد في بدن الحيوان و غيره فينحفظ في مدة في مثلها يمكن أن يتحرك العناصر تمام حركات الافتراق و التلاشي سريعة إذا كان الانغمار قليلا أو بطيئة إن كان كثيرا و يسبق إلى الانفصال ما شأنه أن يسبق كالجوهر الناري و الهوائي و يتأخر و يطوى ما شأنه التأخر و البطوء كالأرضي و المائي بل يجب أن يتوسط زمان لحركة الانفصال و لم يجب أن يكون ثبات الميت زمانا قليلا بحسب الحس دليلا على أن اجتماعه وقع بلا جامع على أنك إن حققت لم تجد الشخص و قد فارقت الحياة في أن من الآتات على أمر أو حال كان عليه في حال الحياة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣

و منها أن النفس لا يحدث إلا عند استعداد المادة لها

و ذلك الاستعداد لا يحصل إلا بحدوث المزاج الصالح فإن المزاج من العلل المعدة للنفس و العلة المعدة و إن كانت علة بالعرض لكنها متقدمة بالطبع فإذا كان تكون النفس علة اجتماع العناصر فكيف تتقدم النفس على ما يجب تأخرها عنه أعني اجتماع العناصر الذي يتقدم عليها بالطبع.

و أجيب عن هذا الإشكال بأن الجامع لأجزاء النطفة نفس الأبوين ثم إنه يبقى ذلك المزاج في تدبير نفس الأم إلى أن يستعد لقبول نفس المولود ثم إنها تصير بعد حدوثها حافظة له و جامعة لسائر الأجزاء بطريق إيراد الغذاء.

و اعلم أن المتأخرين قد اضطرب كلامهم في أن الجامع لأجزاء البدن هل هو بعينه الحافظ لها و لمزاجها أم لا و في أنه نفس المولود أم نفس الأبوين فذهب الإمام الرازي إلى أن الجامع نفس الأبوين قبل حدوث نفس المولود و بعد الحدوث تصير هي حافظة له و جامعة لسائر أجزائه بالتغذية كما ذكر و نقل هو أيضا في بعض رسائله المشتملة على

أجوبة مسائل المسعودي أنه لما كتب بهمنيار إلى الشيخ و طالبه بالحجة على أن الجامع للعناصر في بدن الإنسان هو الحافظ لها قال الشيخ كيف أبرهن على ما ليس فإن الجامع لأجزاء بدن الجنين نفس الوالدين و الحافظ لذلك الاجتماع أولاً القوة المصورة لذلك البدن ثم نفسه الناطقة و تلك القوة ليست واحدة في جميع الأحوال بل هي قوى متعاقبة بحسب الاستعدادات المختلفة لمادة الجنين قال و بالجملة فإن تلك المادة تبقى في تصرف المصورة إلى أن يحصل تمام الاستعداد لقبول النفس الناطقة فحينئذ توجد النفس هذا ما ذكره.

و أورد عليه أولاً بأن الحكماء جعلوا المصورة و المولدة و غيرهما قوى للنفس و الآلات لها و النفس حادثة بعد المزاج و تمام صور الأعضاء كما هو مذهب المعلم الأول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤

و المشاءين فالقول بإسناد تصوير الأعضاء و حفظ المزاج إلى المصورة قول بحدوث الآلة قبل ذي الآلة و فعلها بنفسها من غير مستعمل إياها و هو ممتنع جداً

و أما ما ذكر في التفصي عن هذا

تارة بعدم تسليم حدوث النفس لجواز قدمها - كما نقل عن بعض الأقدمين و تارة بحدوثها قبل البدن كما هو رأي بعض المليون و تارة بعدم جعل المصورة من قوى نفس المولود بل بجعلها من قوى النفس النباتية المغايرة لها بالذات كما هو رأي البعض و تارة بتصويرها من قوى نفس الأم فشيء من هذه الوجوه لا يسمن و لا يغني.

و ثانياً بما اعترض به محقق الإشارات في شرحه بأن ما نقل في تلك الرسالة عن الشيخ يخالف ما قاله في الفصل الثالث من المقالة الأولى من علم النفس في الشفاء و هو قوله - فالنفس التي لكل حيوان هي جامعة أسطقسات بدنه و مؤلفها و مركبها على نحو يصلح معه أن يكون بدنا لها و هي حافظة لهذا البدن على النظام الذي ينبغي و بأن تفويض التدبير من قوة بعد مدة إلى قوة أخرى كنفس المولود غير معقول في الأفاعيل و التدابير الطبيعية و إنما يجري أمثال هذا بين فاعلين غير طبيعيين يفعلان بإرادة متجددة.

ثم أجاب عن أصل هذا الإشكال بأن نفس الأبوين تجمع بالقوة الجاذبة أجزاء غذائية ثم تجعلها أخلاطاً و تفرز عنها بالقوة المولدة مادة المني و تجعلها مستعدة لقبول قوة من شأنها إعداد المادة و تصييرها إنساناً بالقوة و تلك القوة صورة حافظة لمزاج المني كالصور المعدنية ثم إنه يتزايد كمالاتها في الرحم بحسب استعدادات تكتسبها هناك إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥

أن يصير مستعداً لقبول نفس أكمل يصدر عنها مع حفظ المادة الأفعال النباتية فيتكامل المادة بتربيتها إياها و هكذا إلى أن يستعد لقبول نفس أكمل يصدر عنها مع ما تقدم الأفعال الحيوانية أيضاً فيتم البدن و يتكامل إلى أن يصير مستعداً لقبول نفس ناطقة يصدر عنها مع جميع ما تقدم النطق و تبقى مدبرة للبدن إلى أن يحل الأجل و قد شبهوا تلك القوى في أفاعيلها من مبدأ حدوثها إلى استكمالها نفساً مجردة بحرارة تحدث في فحم من نار مشتعلة تجاوره ثم تشتد الحرارة النارية في الفحم فيتجمر ثم يشتعل نارا - فمبدأ الحرارة الحادثة في الفحم كذلك الصورة الحافظة و اشتدادها كمبدأ الأفعال النباتية - و تجمرها كمبدأ الأفعال الحيوانية و اشتعالها نارا كالناطقة فجميع هذه القوى كشيء واحد - متوجه من

حد ما من النقصان إلى حد ما من الكمال و اسم النفس واقع منها على الثلاث الأخيرة فهي على اختلاف مراتبها نفس لبدن المولود و يتبين أن الجامع للأجزاء الغذائية الواقعة في المنيين هو نفس الأبوين و هو غير حافظها و الجامع للأجزاء المضافة إليها إلى أن يتم البدن إلى آخر العمر و الحافظ للمزاج هو نفس المولود و قول الشيخ إنهما واحد لهذا الاعتبار و قوله إن الجامع غير الحافظ بالاعتبار الأول انتهى.

أقول ما ذكره كلام متين إلا أن فيه إشكالا لا ينحسم و لا ينتقح إلا بطريقتنا من إثبات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦

الاشتداد في الجوهر فإن ما ذكره يحتمل وجوها - أحدها أن هذه الأفاعيل المتعددة من الحفظ للمزاج و التنمية و التحريك الإرادي - و النطق صادرة من مبدأ واحد بالعدد له قوى متعددة متعاقبة في الوجود فيلزم عنه حدوث النفس الناطقة عند حدوث النطفة و كونها معطلة عما سوى الأفعال الجمادية - و هذا ليس بصحيح على مقتضى القواعد الحكمية و لم يذهب إليه أحد من الحكماء.

و ثانيها أنها تصدر من مباد متعددة متخالفة الذوات متفاضلة في الكمال و هذا يوجب ما ذكره و أبطله من تفويض الفاعل الطبيعي تدبيره في مادة إلى فاعل آخر يخالفه - و إن زعم أن الصورة السابقة تفسد عن المادة و تتكون الصورة اللاحقة بواسطة تكامل المادة فيرد عليه أن فعل القوة السابقة ليس إلا الحفظ و التقويم و التكميل و محال أن تكون القوة الطبيعية التي شأنها تقويم المادة مما يوجب فسادها و إبطالها أو يجعلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧

بحيث تستحق بالإعداد لقبول ما يفسدها و يبطلها بالتضاد فهذا ينافي كون المني بصورته التي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨

فيه بصدد الاستكمال و لو كان كذلك لوجب أن تكون القوى النباتية و الحيوانية و النطقية متضادة و ليست كذلك بل هي متفاوتة متفاضلة في الكمال الوجودي كل سابق منها متوجه إلى اللاحق توجه الشيء إلى كماله و تشبث الفعل إلى غايته و غاية الشيء علة تمامه لا علة بطلانه فلما بطلت الشقوق الثلاثة فثبت أن الجوهر الصوري مما يشتد في وجوده و يتكامل في تجوهر ذاته و يتطور في أطواره و يستوفي الدرجات الطبيعية و النباتية و الحيوانية و البشرية إلى ما شاء الله تعالى و قد علمت من تضاعيف البيان فيما سبق أن الأفاعيل الذاتية متوجهة بالذات إلى ما هو خير و كمال و لا يتوجه شيء من الأشياء في سلوكه الطبيعي نحو شيء مناف له مضاد إياه إلا بقسر قاسر أو قاطع طريق له من خارج بل الكشف و البرهان قد أوجبا أن الأشياء كلها طالبة للخير الأقصى و النور الأعلى جل مجده و لنعد إلى ما كنا فيه

البرهان الثاني على مغايرة النفس للمزاج

أنه لا شك أن النبات و الحيوان - متحركان من تلقاء أنفسهما إلى كمالتهما في الكم و الكيف و لا محالة أن الحركة تقع في أمزجتهم أيضا لأن الأمزجة تابعة للممتزجات فالمزاج يبذل عند الحركة و المحرك باق غير متبدل فالمزاج ليس هو ذلك المحرك و أيضا فلأن البدن الذي يسوء مزاجه بمرض و شبهة قد يعود إلى المزاج الصحيح و لا بد له من معيد و

ليس هو المزاج الصحيح الذي قد بطل و لا المزاج الفاسد فإذن المحرك المعيد غير المزاج و ليس خارجا عن جسم الحيوان - لأنه لو كان مفارقا فهو لا يفعل إلا بواسطة قوة جسمانية كما عرفت و إن لم يكن مفارقا فهو لا يفعل إلا بمشاركة الوضع أو بالجسمية المشتركة و هما باطلان أما الثاني فظاهر كما مر و أما الأول فلما يعرف بأدنى تأمل من أنه ليس اغتذاء الحيوان و نموه و توليده بقسر قاسر فيكون بقوة فيه و هو المطلوب.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩

البرهان الثالث

لو كان المحرك هو المزاج لما حدث الإعياء لأن الإعياء إنما يكون بسبب حركة طارية على الجسم على خلاف ما يقتضيه طبعه و ليس يمكن أن يقال - إن طبائع البسائط تقتضي حركة خلاف ما يقتضيه امتزاجها لأن فعل الطبائع بعد امتزاجها - يجب أن يكون من جنس فعلها حال بساطتها و لا يختلفان إلا بالقوة و الضعف فإنه لو كان مقتضي المزاج مقابلا لمقتضي الطبائع لكانت تلك الطبائع تقتضي أمرين متقابلين و ذلك ممتنع فلو كان محرك الحيوان هو مزاجه لما حدث الإعياء و لما تجاذب مقتضي النفس - و مقتضي الطبيعة عند الرعدة فلذلك قال الشيخ في الإشارات إن الحيوان متحرك بشيء غير مزاجه الذي يمانعه كثيرا حال حركته في جهة حركته بل في نفس حركته قال الشارح المتقدم يريد بقوله حال هذه الحركة البطوء و السرعة كما في الإعياء فإن المزاج يمانع كون الحركة سريعة كالإنسان إذا أراد رفع قدمه فجبهة الحركة الإرادية هي الفوق و عند الإعياء لا يكون الحركة سريعة و يريد بقوله في جهة حركته ممانعة النفس و الطبيعة كما في الرعدة لأن النفس تحركها إلى فوق و المزاج إلى أسفل فيتركب الحركة منهما و يريد بقوله في نفس حركته أن الإعياء ربما ينتهي إلى حيث لا يقوى النفس على التحريك أصلا.

و قال الشارح المحقق المراد بحالة الحركة وقت الحركة و المزاج قد يمانع في جهة الحركة كما إذا صعد الإنسان على جبل فإنه يريد الفوق و مزاج بدنه - لغلبة الثقلين تقتضي السفلى و المراد بقوله في نفس حركته أن المزاج يقتضي السكون على وجه الأرض لمقتضي الثقل المذكور و النفس قد تريد الحركة على وجه الأرض - و رد ما ذكره في باب الرعدة بأنها لا يتركب من هاتين الحركتين فقط بل و من كل حركة في جهة تريدها النفس و من كل حركة في مقابل تلك الجهة تحدث من امتناع العضو عن طاعة النفس فإنه إذا أحدث محرك ميلا إلى جهة و عارضه مانع أحدث ذلك المانع ميلا إلى مقابل تلك الجهة.

البرهان الرابع

أن الإدراك الحسي في هذا العالم لا يكون إلا بتكيف الآلة بكيفية من باب المحسوس فاللمس لا يتحقق إلا مع استحالة مزاج العضو اللامس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٤٠

فالمدرَك لتلك الكيفية إن كان المزاج فذلك إما أن يكون المزاج الذي قد بطل و هو ممتنع أو الذي حدث و هو أيضا ممتنع لأن المزاج الصحيح الأصلي لا يدرك ذاته - فكيف يدرك المزاج الغريب المتجدد ذاته. و بالجملة الإحساس يستدعي الانفعال و الشيء لا ينفع عن نفسه فإذن لا بد في الإحساس من شيء باق عند توارده

الحالتين ليحصل الشعور بذلك التغير و المزاج غير باق.

البرهان الخامس

أن الحيوان قد يتحرك في مزاجه إما عن الاشتداد إلى الضعف - أو عن الضعف إلى الاشتداد و لا شك أن المتحرك غير المتحرك فيه فـالمتحرك في المزاج غير المزاج.

البرهان السادس

من العرشيات قد علمت أن الإدراك عبارة عن وجود المدرك بالفتح للمدرك بالكسر فنقول لو كانت النفس هي المزاج لزم أن يكون العرض موجودا لنفسه و التالي محال فالمقدم مثله و أما بيان الملازمة فلأن النفس تدرك المزاج و المزاج لأنه كيفية ملموسة تكون عرضا فلو كانت النفس هي المزاج فيكون العرض موجودا لذاته و أما بطلان التالي فلأن وجود العرض في نفسه هو وجوده لموضوعه لا لذاته - فليس إذن المدرك هو المزاج بل موضوع آخر و ليس ذلك هو الجسم المطلق لأن ذلك ممتنع و إلا لكان كل جسم دراكا و لا أيضا الجسم العنصري و إلا لكان كل جسم عنصري دراكا و هو خلاف الواقع فإذا القوة التي تدرك المزاج شيء غير المزاج و لا الجسم الذي قام به المزاج بل شيء غيرهما و هو المطلوب.

البرهان السابع

أنا سنقيم البراهين على تجرد النفس الحيوانية و القوة الخيالية عن الأجسام العنصرية و الطبيعية و التجرد فوق الجوهرية فبطل كون النفس مزاجا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١

اعلم أن من الناس من حاول إبطال كون المزاج نفسا بطريق آخر و هو أن مزاج العضو البسيط مشابه لمزاج جزئه فلو كان المشكل مزاجه لكان شكل الكل و شكل الجزء واحدا و التالي باطل فكذا المقدم. و اعترض عليه بعض الفضلاء بأن المشكل عنده هو القوة المصورة و هي قوة سارية في محلها و جزؤها مساو لكلها في الماهية فيعود المحال في القوة المصورة ما ألزم في المزاج و كذلك أيضا يلزمه أن يكون شكل جزء الفلك مساويا لشكل كله.

أقول أما القوة المصورة فهي و إن كانت سارية في العضو لكن فعلها للتصوير ليس بالاستقلال بل طاعة و خدمة للنفس فتفعل التشكيل في الأعضاء بحسب أغراض النفس و حاجاتها و أما فعل القوى البسيطة التي تفعل الكرات فلاجل أن القوة الواحدة - إذا اقتضت في مادة واحدة مقدارا معيناً و أفادت شكلا كان مقتضاها من الأشكال الكروية - فإذا سبق شكل الكروية لكل يمنع ذلك أن يكون للجزء شكل آخر للاتصال الواقع فيها و قال أيضا لو كان المحرك قوة مزاجية تحركت إلى جهة واحدة فإن المزاج

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢

الواحد مقتضاه واحد و اعترض عليه الفاضل المذكور بأن هذا أيضا منقوض بالقوى النباتية - فإن كلا منها واحدة تفعل أفعالا كثيرة كذلك هاهنا.

أقول والجواب بمثل ما مر فإن القوى النباتية تفعل أفعالا مختلفة على حسب أغراض النفس فبهذه البراهين التسعة المذكورة ظهر أن النفس الحيوانية ليست قوة مزاجية كالصور المعدنية مع أن المعدنية أيضا ليست آثارها ولوازمها إلا بصور جوهرية غير أمزجتها

فصل (٢) في بيان تجرد النفس الحيوانية و عليه براهين كثيرة منها أن الحيوان قد يتزايد أجزاؤه تارة و يتناقص أخرى

بالتحليل فإنه ما من بدن حيواني إلا و تستولي عليه الحرارة الغريزية و الأسطقسية الداخلتان و حرارة الحركة و الهواء المطيف به سيما عند اشتداد الصيف بارتفاع الشمس و ذلك الحيوان باق بشخصه في الأحوال كلها فعلمنا أن هويته مغايرة للبنية المحسوسة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣

و منها أن البهائم تدرك هوياتها الإدراكية

و كيف لا و هي تهرب عن المؤلم و تطلب اللذيذ و ليس هربها عن مطلق الألم أما أولا فلأن المشهور أنها لا تدرك الكليات و لو أدركتها لكان ما نحن بصدده الزم و أما ثانيا فلأنها لا تهرب عن ألم غيرها - مع أن ذلك أيضا ألم فهي إذن تهرب عن ألمها فهو يقتضي علمها بأنفسها و ذلك يقتضي تجردها بوجهين.

أحدهما أن العلم يقتضي ثبوت الشيء المدرك بالفتح للشيء المدرك بالكسر - و الصورة التي تحل المادة وجودها للمحل لا لنفسها و كل ما وجوده لنفسه مجرد عن المحل فالمدرك لذاته مجرد عن المحل و ثانيهما أن علم الحيوان بهويته دائم و ليس بمكتسب بالحس و علمه بأعضائه الظاهرة و الباطنة ليس كذلك فهو هويته مغايرة لأعضائه.

أما الصغرى فلأن العلم بوجود النفس لو كان مكتسبا لكان إما بالحس و هو باطل فإن الحس لا يحس بنفسه فكيف بما هو آلة لها و مستعملة إياها - و أيضا ربما يعلم ذاته عند ما لا يحس بشيء أصلا و أما بالفكر فلا بد من دليل - و الدليل إما علة النفس أو معلولها و الأول باطل لأن علة النفوس شيء أجل من أن يحيط به علم الحيوان و أيضا الأكثرون من الناس يعرفون أنفسهم و إن لم يخطر ببالهم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤

علة أنفسهم و الثاني أيضا باطل لأنه إما أن يكون الوسط في الاستدلال هو الفعل المطلق أو فعله المضاف إليه فإن اعتبر الفعل المطلق لزم إثبات فاعل مطلق لا فاعل هو هو و إن اعتبر الفعل المضاف فاعلم بالفعل المضاف إلى الشخص توقف على العلم به - فلو اكتسب العلم به من العلم بالفعل المضاف إليه لزم الدور فثبت أن علم الحيوان بنفسه غير مستفاد من حس أو دليل.

و أما الكبرى فلأن الإنسان لا يعرف أعضاؤه الظاهرة إلا بالحس و لا أعضاؤه الباطنة إلا بالتشريح فكذا الحيوان لا يعرف أعضاؤه إذا عرف إلا بأحدها.

برهان آخر على أن الحيوان ليس هو البنية المحسوسة

فنقول لو فرض الحيوان كأنه خلق دفعة و خلق كاملا و لكنه محجوب الحواس عن مشاهدة الخارجيات - و إنه يهوي

في خلا أو هواء طلق لا يصدمه قوام الهواء ولا يحس بشيء من الكيفيات - و فرقت بين أعضائه حتى لا يتلامس فإنه في هذه الحالة يدرك ذاته و يغفل عن كل أعضائه الظاهرة و الباطنة بل يثبت لذاته و لا يثبت لها مقداراً و لا طولاً و لا عرضاً و لا جهة من الجهات و لو تخيل وضعاً أو جهة أو عضواً من الأعضاء في تلك الحالة لم يتخيله على أنه جزء من ذاته و ظاهر أن المشعور به غير المغفول عنه فإذن هويته مغايرة لجميع الأعضاء

فصل (٣) في دفع ما أورد على جوهرية النفس من الشكوك

قالوا إن القوى النباتية حالة في الأجسام و كذا نفس الحيوان لكونها مدركة للجزئيات و فاعلة للأفعال الجزئية و الجوهر المفارق يستحيل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٤٥

أن يكون مدركا للجزئيات و فاعلا للأفعال الجزئية فإذن تلك النفس قوة جسمانية علة للمجموع المركب من البدن و منها فتلك القوى النباتية و الحيوانية موجودة كل واحد منها في محل غير متقوم بذاته بل بتلك القوة فهي إذن جوهر صوري فمن جوز كون شيء واحد جوهرًا و عرضا باعتبارين قال إن النفس من حيث إنها جزء للنبات أو الحيوان جوهر و من حيث إنها تقوم بمحل مستغن عن الحال في جسميته عرض و كذا من أحال كون القائم بالمحل جوهرًا انكر جوهرية النفس مطلقاً و قد علمت فساد هذين القولين ثم للقائلين بعرضية النفس متمسكات.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٤٦

أحدها أن الحال يمتنع أن يكون سببا لمحلّه لاستحالة الدور فلا يكون جوهرًا. و ثانيها و إن يساعدونا على أن الحال يمكن أن يكون من مقومات المحل - لكن قالوا إن النفس ليست كذلك لأنها إنما تحدث عند حدوث المزاج الصالح - و المتأخر لا يكون علة للمتقدم فالنفس لا تكون علة لحصول المزاج و ثالثها أن النفس لو كانت جوهرًا لكان الجوهر ذاتيًا لها لأنه جنس لما تحته من الأنواع المحصلة فلو كانت النفس جوهرًا لكان العلم بجوهريتها بديهيًا حاصلًا من غير كسب و التالي باطل فكذا المقدم.

و الجواب أما عن الأول فقد مر فيما مضى.

و أما عن الثاني فلما مرت الإشارة إليه من أن المزاج الذي هو علة معدة - لفيضان نفس أو صورة جمادية على المادة المستعدة به غير المزاج الذي تقيمه و تحفظه تلك النفس أو الصورة فاندفع الدور.

و أما عن الثالث فالذي ذكره الشيخ هو أنا لا نعرف من النفس إلا أنها شيء مدبر للبدن فأما ماهية ذلك الشيء فمجهولة و الجوهر ذاتي لتلك الماهية لا لمفهوم أنه شيء ما مدبر للبدن فما هو متقوم بالجوهر غير معلوم لنا و ما هو معلوم لنا غير متقوم بالجوهر فزالت الشبهة.

و اعترض عليه بعض الفضلاء بأن علمي بنفسي غير حاصل بالكسب كما برهن عليه - فلا يخلو إما أن لا أعلم نفسي إلا من حيث إن لها نسبة إلى بدني أو أعلم حقيقتها فالأول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٤٧

باطل لما قد مضى و ثبت أن علمي بنفسي ليس غير نفسي و أنه أبداً حاصل بالفعل و هي جوهر بالحقيقة و ليست من باب المضاف قال و العجب ممن يقول بهذين القولين ثم يغفل عن تناقضهما لا لموجب ثم قال و الجواب الصحيح أن يقال الجوهرية ليست من الأمور الذاتية فلذلك جاز أن يبقى مجهولاً كما بيناه من قبل.

أقول أما كون الجوهر ذاتياً للأنواع الجوهرية فقد صح لنا بالبرهان و أما كونه مجهولاً في النفس مع كونها معلومة الحقيقة لا بالكسب فله وجه آخر لم يحصله هذا الفاضل و أمثاله و هو أن الجوهر ذاتي للماهيات التي يتركب من جنس هو مفهوم الجوهر و فصل محصل له و ليس الجوهر جنساً للوجودات إذ الوجود كما سبق لا جنس له و لا فصل له و العلم بالشيء إذا كان بحصول صورة زائدة حصلت عنه في ذات المدرك فذلك العلم إذا كان بكنهه فلا بد أن يكون بحده المشتمل على جنسه و فصله.

و أما إذا كان العلم به بعينه فهو وجوده المخصوص و هويته الشخصية و الوجود من عوارض الماهية و الماهية أيضاً غير داخل في وجودها و العلم الحسولي صورة كلية و مقوماتها أيضاً أمور كلية و العلم الحسوري هويته شخصية غير محتاج الحصول إلى تقدم معنى جنسي أو فصلي.

فالإنسان متى رجع إلى ذاته و أحضر هويته فربما غفل عن جميع المعاني الكلية حتى معنى كونه جوهرًا أو شخصاً أو مدبراً للبدن فإني لست أرى عند مطالعة ذاتي إلا وجوداً يدرك نفسه على وجه الجزئية و كل ما هو غير الهوية المخصوصة التي أشير إليها بأنها خارج عن ذاتي حتى مفهوم أنا و مفهوم الوجود و مفهوم المدرك نفسه و مفهوم المدبر للبدن أو النفس أو غير ذلك فإن جميعها علوم كلية أشير إلى كل منها بهو و أشير إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨

ذاتي بأنها فالغفلة عن الجوهرية أو الجهل بها لا ينافي كونها من المحمولات الذاتية لماهية الإنسان و كذا الحيوان. و يمكن حمل كلام الشيخ على هذا ليندفع عنه التناقض المذكور فقد تبين و تحقق من تضاعيف الكلام أن النفس النباتية ليست بجسم و ثبت أيضاً أن بعض النفوس مما يصح لها الانفراد بذاتها و هي التي ثبت لها إدراك تخيلي بالفعل أو إدراك لذاتها و هويتها - فلم يقع في جوهريتها شك كالإنسان و غيره من الحيوانات التامة الحواس التي لها القوة الإدراكية الباطنة كالوهم و الحفظ و التخيل.

و أما الحيوانات التي ليس لها إلا قوة اللمس و ما يقرب منها و سائر النباتات - فجوهريتها كما سبق بأن المادة القريبة بوجود هذه الأنفس فيها إنما هي بمزاج خاص و هيئته و المادة إنما تبقى بذلك المزاج ما دامت النفس موجودة لأنها التي تجعلها بذلك المزاج فإن النفس لا محالة علة لتكون مادة النبات و الحيوان على المزاج الذي لها و هي مبدأ التوليد و التربية فالموضوع القريب للنفس يمتنع أن يكون هو ما هو بالفعل إلا بالنفس لا بأن يتحصل أولاً بسبب آخر ثم لحقته النفس لحوقاً ما لا حظ له بعد ذلك في حفظ مزاجه و تقويمه و تركيبه كالحال في الأعراض اللازمة أو غير اللازمة كما زعمه بعض الناس بل أكثرهم أن المني يتحصل أولاً بصورة معدنية ثم يضاف إليها صورة نفسانية و ليس كذلك فإن النفس مقومة لموضوعها القريب موجدة إياه بالفعل و إذا فارقت النفس فسد موضوعها القريب و زالت القوى المتشعبة منها فيه و صير الموضوع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩

البعيد بحالة أخرى إما أن يبطل و يضمحل نوعه و جوهره الذي به كان مادة للنفس أو يخلف النفس فيها صورة يستبقي المادة على طبيعتها و كيفية هذا الاستخلاف لا يخلو عن صعوبة - فإن تلك الصورة لو كانت من فعل النفس فتزول بزوالها و إن لم تكن من فعلها و كانت المادة متحصلة بصورة أخرى غير النفس فلم تكن النفس جوهرًا محصلًا لما فرض مادة لها - و لعلنا بينا وجه تخلف تلك الصورة من النفس كما في العظم و الشعر و الظفر و القرن - و غير ذلك من آثار النفوس الحيوانية و النباتية و لست الآن بصدد الخوض في ذلك - و الذي هو أحوج إلى الحل في هذا الموضوع إشكال آخر يختلج في صدور أكثر المشتغلين بالفكر في أحوال النفوس و هو أن لأحد أن يقول إن سلمنا أن النفس النباتية علة لقوام مادتها القريبة لكونها مفيدة لمزاجها و جامعة لأجزائها و أما النفس الحيوانية فهي تلحق النباتية بعد تقويم المادة بجوهر نفساني هي العلة القريبة لقوام مادتها فيلزمها اتباع هذه النفس الحيوانية فتكون النفس الحيوانية إنما تنطبع في مادة متقومة بالنفس النباتية فتكون الحيوانية تقوم بالموضوع المتحصل قبلها لا بها فيكون وجودها وجود عرض فنقول في الجواب إنه إما أن يعني بالنفس النباتية النفس النوعية التي تختص بالنبات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥٠

دون الحيوان أو المعنى الجنسي العام الذي يعم النفس النباتية و الحيوانية بل الإنسانية أيضا و هو مبدأ التغذية و النمو و التوليد أو يعني بها قوة النفس التي يصدر عنها هذه الآثار الثلاثة النباتية فإن عني به الأول فذلك غير موجود في الحيوان متحصلا بالفعل على وجه التحصيل و التنويع كما ليس السواد الضعيف موجودا في السواد الشديد بالفعل - و إن عني به المعنى الثاني فالمعنى العام يقتضي أثرا عاما فإن الصانع العام ينسب إليه المصنوع العام كالكاتب المطلق ينسب إليه الكتابة المطلقة فليست المادة النباتية مما يتحصل بنفس نباتية جنسية مطلقة فإن الجنس الطبيعي غير موجود على الانفراد و لا الكليات الطبيعية كالنوع الطبيعي و الفصل الطبيعي و العرض العام الطبيعي مما يمكن أن يوجد مجردة عن القيود الوجودية و إذا لم يتحصل المادة بالمعنى العام النباتي فإذا تحصل هذا العام بقوة الحس و الحركة فليست هذه القوة الحيوانية مما يلحق أمرا متحصل القوام بذاته - لحوق العارض للموضوع له و إن عني به المعنى الثالث فليس الأمر كما يظنه من لا يمعن في صناعة الحكمة النظرية من أن القوة النامية تفعل أولا بدنا حيوانيا ثم يأتيها القوة الحيوانية و تتصرف فيها بالاستخدام و يجعلها آلة من آلاتها و قوة من قواها كما يجري مثله في الأفعال الصناعية التي تقع بين القاصدين المختارين بل القوة النباتية هي قوة من نفس لها غير تلك القوة قوى أخرى لا توجد قبل تلك النفس و إلا لكانت آلة الشيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥١

مستعملة قبل وجود ذي الآلة و هذا من المحالات عند المتدرب في صناعة الحكمة - فالقوة النباتية من شعب القوة الحيوانية غير متحصلة إلا بها كما أن الحيوانية حقيقة غير متحصلة فيما له جوهر نطقي إلا بالجوهر النطقي و ستعلم أن لكل بدن منا نفسا واحدة و أن سائر القوى معلولة لها منشعبة منها في الأعضاء هذا على ما اشتهر عند أئمة الحكمة من المتأخرين.

و أما الذي استقر عليه اعتقادنا فهو أن النفس كل القوى و هي مجموعها الوحداني و مبدؤها و غايتها و هكذا الحال في كل قوة عالية بالنسبة إلى ما تحتها من القوى التي تستخدمها و إن كان استخدامها بالتقديم و التأخير فهذه القوى متقدمة بعضها على بعض - و كل ما هو أقدم بالزمان فهو آخر بالرتبة و الشرف فالنفس التي لنا أو لكل حيوان - فهي جامعة لأسطقسات بدنه و مؤلفها و مركبها على وجه يصلح لأن يكون بدنا لها - و هي أيضا التي تغذيه و تنميه و تكمله شخصا بالتغذية و نوعا بالتوليد و تحفظ صحته عليه و تدفع مرضه عنه و ترده على مزاجه الصحيح الذي كان به صلاحه إذا فسد و تديمه على النظام الذي ينبغي فلا يستولي عليه المغيرات الخارجية ما دامت النفس موجودة فيه - و لو لا أن النفس كما أنها مبدأ للأفعال الإدراكية و الحيوانية مبدأ للأفعال النباتية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥٢

و الطبيعية في المادة البدنية لما بقيت على صحتها بل فسدت باستيلاء الأحوال الخارجية عليها و لما كان ما يعرض النفس من القضايا و الاعتقادات المحبوبة أو المؤلمة الواردة على النفس - التي تلذها أو تؤلمها مؤثرة في البدن مفيدة للقوى النامية قوة أو ضعفا و ليس هذا التأثير في البدن من الاعتقاد بما هو اعتقاد ما لم يتبعه انفعال في المواد اللطيفة السارية في البدن من سرور أو غم هما أيضا من الأحوال النفسانية و لكن يتبعها تغيير في أحوال الروح البخاري و مزاجه ثم في أحوال البدن الكثيف و مزاجه بتوسط القوى أما الفرح النطقي فيزيد القوى البدنية كالنامية أو ما هو أدنى منزلة منها شدة و نفاذا و الغم النطقي يفيدها ضعفا و عجزا و فتورا حتى يفسدها فعلها و ينتقص المزاج و ذلك من أقوى الدلالة على أن النفس يسري فعلها و تدبيرها في المادة الأخيرة و القشر الأثخن الأبعد من لباب جوهرها الألفاف الأعلى فقد ثبت أن النفس الحيوانية بل الإنسانية جامعة لهذه القوى الإدراكية و النباتية - و موضوعاتها القريبة و البعيدة فهي إذن كمال لموضوع هو لا يتقوم إلا به و هو أيضا مكمل النوع و صانعه لأن الأشياء المتخالفة بالأنفس متخالفة بالحقيقة النوعية لا بمجرد العوارض الشخصية ليكون الأنفس للأبدان كالهيات اللاحقة للأنواع المحصلة بعد تمامها. و اعلم أيضا أن القوى النباتية الموجودة في النبات مخالفة بالماهية و النوعية - للقوى النباتية الموجودة في الحيوان و هي في الموضوعين ليس بعرض كما توهم بل جوهر أما في النبات فبالفعل و أما في الحيوان فبالقوة و معنى القوة هاهنا غير ما يصحبه الإمكان الاستعدادي بل هذه القوة كما يقال في المعقولات بالقياس إلى العقل البسيط إنها فيه بالقوة الفعلية الإجمالية و هي كائنة عن العقل البسيط تكون الفعل عن الفاعل لا تكون الشيء عن القابل المستعد له

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فصل (٤) في تعدد قوى النفس المنشعبة عنها في البدن

قال الشيخ في الشفا

القوى النفسانية منقسمة بالقسمة الأولية إلى ثلاثة أجناس

أحدها النفس النباتية

و هي كمال أول لجسم طبيعي آلي من جهة ما يتولد و يربو و يولد.

و ثانيها النفس الحيوانية

و هي كما أول لجسم طبيعي آلي من جهة ما يدرك الجزئيات و يتحرك بالإرادة.

و ثالثها النفس الإنسانية

و هي كمال أول لجسم طبيعي آلي من جهة ما يدرك الأمور الكلية و يفعل الأفاعيل الكائنة بالاختيار الفكري و الاستنباط بالرأي و لكل درجات متفاوتة في الكمالية و النقص.

و للنفس النباتية قوى ثلاث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥٤

القوة الغذائية

و هي التي تحيل جسما إلى مشاكلة الجسم الذي هي فيه و تلصقه و تشبهه به بدل ما يتحلل عنه

و القوة المنمية

و هي قوة تزيد في الجسم الذي هي فيه بالجسم المتشبه به زيادة متناسبة في أقطاره طولاً و عرضاً و عمقاً ليلبغ به كماله في النمو.

و القوة المولدة

و هي التي تأخذ من الجسم الذي هي فيه مادة شبيهة به بالقوة فتعمل فيها باستمداد أجسام أخرى يتشبه بها من التخليق و التشكيل ما يصيرها شبيهة به بالفعل.

و النفس الحيوانية لها بالقسمة الأولى قوتان محركة و مدركة.

و المحركة على قسمين

إما محركة بأنها باعثة على الحركة و إما محركة بأنها فاعلة و معنى الباعثة أنها علة غائية و هي أشرف العلل الأربع كما علمت و تلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥٥

الباعثة هي القوة الشوقية و هي متصلة بالقوة الخيالية التي سنذكرها فإذا ارتسمت فيها صورة مطلوبة أو مهروبة عنها حملت القوة المحركة الأخرى على التحريك و لها شعبتان شعبة تسمى قوة شهوانية و هي قوة تنبعث على تحريك يقرب به من الأسباب المتخيلة ضرورية أو نافعة في قوامه طلباً للذة و شعبة تسمى قوة غضبية و هي التي تنبعث على تحريك - يدفع به الشيء المتخيل ضاراً أو مفسداً طلباً للغلبة و أما القوة المحركة على أنها فاعلة فهي قوة تنبعث في الأعصاب و العضلات من شأنها أن تشنج العضلات فتجذب الأوتار و العضلات - و الرباطات المتصلة بالأعضاء إلى نحو جهة المبدأ أو ترخيها أو تمددها طولاً فيصير الأوتار و الرباطات إلى خلاف جهة المبدأ.

و أما القوة المدركة فتقسم إلى قسمين

منها قوة تدرك من خارج و منها قوة تدرك من داخل و المدركة من خارج هي الحواس الخمس أو الشمان ثم أخذ في تعريف كل من هذه الحواس الظاهرة و ساق الكلام إلى اللمس فقال و منها اللمس و هي قوة مرتبة في أعصاب جلد البدن كله و لحمه تدرك ما يماسه و يؤثر فيه بالمضادة المحيلة للمزاج أو المحيلة لهيئة التركيب و يشبه أن

يكون هذه القوة عند قوم لا نوعاً آخر بل جنساً لقوى أربع أو فوقها منبثة معا في الجلد كله واحدها حاكمة في التضاد - الذي هو بين الحار و البارد و الثانية حاكمة في التضاد الذي بين الرطب و اليابس و الثالثة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥٦

حاكمة في التضاد الذي بين الصلب و اللين و الرابعة حاكمة في التضاد الذي بين الخشن و الأملس إلا أن اجتماعها في آلة واحدة يوهم تأحدها بالذات.

ثم شرع في تفصيل القوى الباطنة بعبارة هذا ملخصه تقريبا إلى الأفهام و هو أن القوة المدركة إما أن تكون مدركة للجزئيات أو للكليات و المدركة للجزئيات إما أن تكون من الحواس الظاهرة و قد عرفتتها و إما أن تكون من الحواس الباطنة ثم إن الحس الباطن إما أن يكون مدركا فقط أو مدركا و متصرفا فإن كان مدركا فقط فإما أن يكون مدركا للصور الجزئية أو للمعاني الجزئية و أعني بالصور الجزئية مثل الخيال الحاصل عن زيد و عمرو و أعني بالمعاني الجزئية مثل إدراك أن هذا الشخص صديق و ذلك الآخر عدو فالمدرك للصور الجزئية يسمى حسا مشتركا و هو الذي يجتمع فيه صور المحسوسات الظاهرة كلها و المدرك للمعاني الجزئية يسمى وهما ثم لكل واحدة من هاتين القوتين خزانة فخزانة الحس المشترك هو الخيال و خزانة الواهمة هي الحافظة فهذه قوى أربع.

و أما القوة المتصرفة فهي التي من شأنها أن تتصرف في المدركات المخزونة في الخزانتين بالتركيب و التحليل فتركب إنسانا بصورة طير و جبلا من زمرد و بحرا من زبيب و هذه القوة إن استعملها القوة الوهمية الحيوانية يسمى متخيلة و إن استعملها القوة الناطقة يسمى باسم المفكرة ثم قالوا الحس المشترك و الخيال مسكنها البطن المقدم من الدماغ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥٧

و أما المتخيلة المتصرفة فمسكنها البطن الأوسط من الدماغ.

و أما الوهمية فمسكنها البطن الأوسط من الدماغ.

و أما الحافظة فمسكنها البطن الآخر من الدماغ.

ثم منهم من يجعل النفس الحيوانية عبارة عن مجموع هذه القوى.

و منهم من يجعل النفس هي القوة الوهمية و يجعلون سائر القوى تبعا لها و لكل من المذهبين وجه صحيح كما ستعلم فهذه خلاصة الكلام في تفصيل القوى الحيوانية و حاملها كلها هو الروح البخاري المشاكل لجوهر السماء و أما تفصيل قوى النفس الناطقة فسيأتي ذكر تفاصيلها في موضع آخر و نحن الآن بصدد أن نذكر حجج إثبات هذه القوى و ما يرد عليها و الذب عنها و لكن بعد أن نبين وجوه الاختلاف في أفاعيل النفس كم هي و من الله التأييد

فصل (٥) في قاعدة تستعلم منها تعدد القوى

و اعلم أن الذي يظنه الناس منشأ و موجبا لاختلاف القوى و المبادي خمسة أوجه -

أحدها اختلاف المفهومات

مثل اختلاف الحيوان من جهة المعنى النامي و معنى الحساس فيجعلون الحيوان لأجله مركبا من مادة و صورة هما بدن نباتي و نفس حساسة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥٨

و كذا اختلاف ماهية النبات بحسب معنى التجسم الذي من جهة المادة و معنى النباتية الذي من جهة الصورة و على هذا القياس في كل ما له مادة و صورة.

و ثانيها الاختلاف بالوجود و العدم في الأفاعيل

مثل التحريك و التسكين و العلم و الجهل و اليقين و الشك.

و ثالثها بالأشد و الأضعف

كاليقين و الظن في الاعتقاد أو زيادة الشهوة و نقصها في الأخلاق أو العظم و الصغر في الأبدان.

و رابعها بالسرعة و البطوء

كالتحس و التفكير.

و خامسها اختلاف الآثار بالنوع

إما مع اتحاد الجنس القريب كإبصار السواد و البياض و إدراك الحلاوة و المرارة و إما مع اختلاف الجنس إما القريب كإدراك الألوان و الأصوات و إما القريب و البعيد كالإدراك و التحريك.

إذا تمهد هذا فنقول

القسم الأول

من الاختلاف لا يوجب تعددا في القوة و لا يستدعي اثنيية في الوجود إذ كثيرا ما يكون قوة بسيطة تكون مصداقا للمعاني المتعددة من غير تكثر لا في الذات و لا في حيثة الوجود كالعاقلية و المعقولية في الجوهر المفارق - و كصدق العلم و القدرة و الإرادة و الحياة و سائر النعوت الإلهية على واجب الوجود تعالى.

و القسم الثاني

أيضا لا يستدعي قوتين و لا يوجب كثرة في المبدأ للفعل إذ ربما كان وجود الفعل بوجود القوة و لا يكون عدمه لعدمها بل لعدم شرط من شرائط تأثيرها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٥٩

فوجود الفعل تارة و عدمه أخرى لم يكن دليلا على تعدد القوة.

و القسم الثالث

أيضا لا يقتضي تعدد القوى و إلا لزم أن يكون مراتب القوى بحسب مراتب الشدة و الضعف الغير المتناهية فلزم تتالي القوى في آتات متتالية غير متناهية و اللازم باطل فكذا الملزوم بيان الشرطية أن الاشتداد حركة ما في الكيف و الحركة حالة متصلة يمكن أن يفرض فيها حدود غير متناهية بحسب الوهم كل منها يوجد في آن مفروض - و له فرد خاص من ذلك في مرتبة خاصة من الشدة و الضعف فلو وجب أن يكون لكل حد من الشدة قوة أخرى لزم القوى المتفاصلة الغير المتناهية بالفعل فيلزم منه تركيب الزمان و المسافة من أجزاء لا يتجزى و كون غير المتناهي محصورا بين حاصرين و كون القوة الجسمانية مبدأ لأفاعيل غير متناهية و الكل محال بل لعل السبب فيه قوة القوة الواحدة و ضعفها بحسب

اختلاف الأسباب المستدعية أو من جهة اختلاف القابل - أو الآلة أو اختلالها أو كلالها تارة وحدثها و مضائها أخرى و كذا القول في الاختلاف بالسرعة و البطوء.

و أما القسم الخامس

فرعموا أن الأمور المتخالفة بالجنس قريبا كان أو بعيدا لا تستقل بها قوة واحدة فالقوة الواحدة لا تكون وافية بالإدراك و التحريك بل لا تكون وافية عندهم بالإدراك الباطن و الإدراك الظاهر بل لا تكون وافية بإدراك الألوان و الطعوم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦٠

و الروائح بل لا بد لكل جنس من قوة على حدة هذا هو الذي اختاره الشيخ و من تبعه - وإذا علمت أن منشأ تعدد القوى ليس شيئا من الوجوه المذكورة.

فاعلم أن المركز في مدارك المتأخرين من أهل البحث أن الحجة في تعدد القوى عند الحكماء كالشيخ و غيره أن القوى بسائط و البسيط لا يصدر عنه بالذات إلا فعل واحد - فإذا القوة الواحدة لا يجوز أن يكون مبدأ لأكثر من فعل واحد بالقصد الأول بل يجوز ذلك بالقصد الثاني و بالعرض مثل أن الإبصار إنما هو قوة واحدة على إدراك اللون - ثم ذلك اللون في نفسه قد يكون سوادا و قد يكون بياضا و القوة الخيالية هي التي من شأنها استثبات الصورة المجردة عن المادة تجريدا غير بالغ إلى حد المعقولة ثم يعرض أن تكون تلك الصورة لونا و طعما و رائحة و صوتا و حرارة مثلا و القوة العاقلة هي التي تدرك الأمور البريئة عن المادة و علائقها ثم تارة تكون فلكا و تارة تكون حيوانا أو جمادا أو كيفا أو كما أو وضعا أو آينا أو غير ذلك من المقولات و أجناسها و أنواعها.

و هذا ليس كما زعموه إذ تلك الحجة غير جارية إلا في الواحد الحقيقي الذي هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦١

واحد من كل الوجوه و ليست القوى كذلك لتضاعف الجهات الإمكانية فيها.

و أيضا الدليل الدال على أن الواحد بالنوع أو الجنس لا يصدر عنه إلا واحد بالنوع أو الجنس كذلك دل على أن الواحد بالشخص لا يصدر عنه إلا الواحد بالشخص فيلزم أن تكون القوة الباصرة التي أدركنا بها سوادا غير الباصرة التي أدركنا بها سوادا آخر فإذا جوز كون القوة الشخصية مبدأ لأفعال كثيرة بالعدد فليجز صدور الكثيرة بالنوع عن القوة الواحدة.

فقد علم أن المعول عليه في تعدد القوى ليس القاعدة المذكورة بل

البرهان على تعدد القوى أحد أمرين

أحدهما انفكاك وجود قوة عن قوة أخرى

فدل على تباينهما و ذلك لبطلان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦٢

النامية مع وجود الغذائية في الحيوان بل النبات أيضا فحكم بأن القوة النامية تغاير للقوة الغذائية و كذا قد يفقد المولدة مع وجود النامية

و الثاني تناقض الفعلين

الوجوديين كالجذب و الدفع أو القبول و الحفظ و أما مجرد اختلاف الآثار ماهية و نوعا فلم يستلزم تعدد القوى لجواز أن تكون القوة واحدة- و الاعتبارات و الجهات فيها مختلفة فيصدر عنها بحسب كل حيثية نوع آخر من الفعل - كالعقل الأول يصدر عنه من جهة كمالية الوجود و تأكده جوهر عقلي آخر و من جهة قصوره و ماهيته الممكنة جوهر فلكي لكن الجهات الفاعلية لم يجوز أن تكون منشأ اختلاف الآثار بالعدد لأن اختلاف الأشخاص بالعدد مع اتحادها بالنوع لا يمكن إلا بالمادة القابلة للأحوال الحادثة من جهة الأسباب الاتفاقية من الحركات و غيرها مما لم يوجد في أول الفطرة على سبيل اللزوم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦٣

فإذا تحققت هذه الأصول فليس لقائل أن يقول لم لا يجوز أن تكون النفس - هي التي تفعل هذه الأفعال كلها من غير حاجة إلى إثبات هذه القوى النفسانية و الحيوانية - ثم إن سلمنا تغير النفس الناطقة للقوى الحيوانية لأنها جوهر عقلائي و هذه متعلقة بالأجسام لكن لم لا يجوز أن تكون القوة الحيوانية واحدة و تكون المدركة و المحركة واحدة و إن سلمنا تغيرهما و لكن لم لا يجوز أن تكون المحركة قوة واحدة و الشهوة و الغضب واحد فإن صادف اللذة انفعلت على نحو أو الأذى انفعلت على نحو آخر - و كذلك تكون القوة المدركة للمحسوسات الظاهرة و الباطنة واحدة و إن سلمنا تغيرهما لكن الحس الظاهر قوة واحدة تفعل في آلات مختلفة أفعالا مختلفة.

و أيضا فلم لا يجوز أن تكون القوة النباتية هي الحيوانية و إن سلمنا تغيرهما - فلم لا يجوز أن تكون الغذائية و النامية و المولدة واحدة فهي تورد على الشخص في ابتداء تكونه أكثر مما يتحلل عنه فينمو و يزيد مقداره إلى أن ينتهي إلى كمال النشو في قبال الزيادة و إذا عجز عن ذلك و حرك الغذاء إلى أعضاء ذلك المتحرك ليغذوها به و يفضل عنه فضل غير محتاج إليه في التغذي غير منصرف إلى النمو فتصرف إلى فعل آخر محتاج إليه و هو التوليد ثم لا يزال تورد بدل ما يتحلل إلى أن يعجز فتحل الأجل.

و بما ذكرناه سابقا ظهر اندفاع هذه الاعتراضات و أشباهها و ليس مبني إثبات كثرة القوى على تلك القاعدة المشهورة كما توهم فلا يرد عليهم النقوض المشهورة.

منها أن الحس المشترك يدرك كل المحسوسات الظاهرة فإن كانت هذه

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الإدراكات مختلفة فقد بطل أصل الحجة و إن كانت غير مختلفة فلم لا يجوز صدورها عن قوة واحدة. و منها أن القوة الباصرة لا تقصر إدراكها على نوع واحد فإنها تدرك السواد و البياض و ما يتوسطهما فإذا جاز أن يكون القوة الواحدة وافية بإدراك النوعين المندرجين تحت جنس واحد قريب فلم لا يجوز أن تكون وافية بإدراك المختلفات المندرجة تحت جنس واحد بعيد.

و أيضا القوة الواحدة تدرك الشكل و العظم و إن كان بتبعية إدراك اللون فالقوة الواحدة وافية بإدراك أمور مختلفة في الجنس أيضا كما في النوع.

و منها أن قوة التخيل تدرك أموراً متخالفة بالجنس بل العقل مدرك لجميع الأمور - فبطل قولهم الواحد لا يصدر عنه إلا الواحد إلى غير ذلك من النقوض والإيرادات وذلك لما علمت أن القاعدة المذكورة لا تجري إلا في الفاعل البسيط المجرد عن الشروط والمضافات والآلات فإنه إن توقفت الفاعلية على شروط فيجوز أن يصدر عن الشيء الواحد بحسب انضمام شروط كثيرة إليه أفعال كثيرة ألا ترى أن الطبيعة قوة بسيطة وهي مقتضية للحركة بشرط كون الجسم خارجاً عن حيزه الطبيعي والسكون والاستقرار عند كون الجسم في حيزه الطبيعي بل العقل الفعال الذي هو مدبر هذا العالم العنصري جوهر بسيط مع أنه مبدأ للحوادث التي تحدث في عالمنا هذا عندهم وذلك لأجل اختلاف الشرائط والأسباب المعدة فإن مبنى هذه الإيرادات والنقوض من سوء فهم المتأخرين كأبي البركات البغدادي والإمام الرازي و صاحب كتاب المواقف و شارحه السيد الجرجاني و شارح المقاصد المولى التفتازاني و نظرائهم من أهل التكلم و البحث دون التعمق و الخوض في الأنظار العقلية و الاستغراق في الأبحار الحكيمة.

و من جملة ما يباهي به صاحب الملخص و يبحج في هدم قاعدة الحكمة في تعديد القوى و حسن ترتيب الوجود في كل جمعية طبيعية يترتب عليها آثار مختلفة تستدعي مباد مختلفة تستند إلى وحدة جمعية نفسانية و يظن أنها بذلك تزلزلت و اضطربت تلك القوانين و انهدمت أصولها هو قوله إن لنا مقدمة صادقة يقينية لا يشك فيها عاقل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦٥

و هي أن الحاكم على الشئيين يجب أن يكون مدركاً لهما لأن الحكم عبارة عن التصديق بثبوت أمر لأمر أو سلبه عنه و ذلك لا يتم إلا بتصور الطرفين فلا بد أن يكون الحاكم يتصور لذينك الأمرين الذين حكم على أحدهما بالآخر حتى يمكنه ذلك الحكم إذا ثبت هذا فنقول إذا أدركنا شخصاً من الناس و علمنا أنه فرد من الإنسان الكلي و ليس بفرد من الفرس الكلي فالحاكم على الإنسان الجزئي بكونه جزئياً للإنسان الكلي - و غير جزئي للفرس الكلي لا بد و أن يكون مدركاً لموضوع الحكم و هو جزئي و لمحموله و هو كلي فإذا كان المدرك للجزئيات بعينه هو المدرك للكليات قال فهذه نكتة قاطعة لا يرتاب فيها من له قليل فهم و لا أدري كيف ذهل عنها السابقون مع حذاقتهم هذا كلامه.

أقول سبحانه الله هل وجد آدمي في العالم بلغ إلى حده في وفور البحث و التفتيش - و كثرة التصانيف و الخوض في الفكر ثم بعد عن الحق هذا البعاد و احتجب عن البصيرة هذا الاحتجاب حتى عمي عن ملاحظة نفسه في أفاعيلها المختلفة بعضها من باب التفكير و بعضها من باب الحس و بعضها من باب الحركة و لم يعلم أن النفس هي المدرك العاقل الشام الذائق الماشي النامي المتغذي المشتهي الغضبان و غير ذلك و هي الفاعلة لهذه الأفاعيل الكثيرة بالآلات المختلفة و لها أيضاً أفعال و انفعالات بلا آلة كتصورها لذاتها و تصورها للأوليات و استعمالها للآلات إذ لا آلة بينها و بين استعمالها للآلة فأي مفسدة ترد على الحكماء في أن تفعل أو تدرك النفس بعض الأشياء بذاتها و بعضها بالآلة فتدرك هذا الشخص الإنساني بالحس و تدرك الإنسان المعقول بالذات ثم تحكم على ما أدركته بالحس بما أدركته بالذات فتقول هذا الشخص إنسان و كأنه بطول إمامته و عرض مولويته ظن إدراك الشيء بالآلة معناه أن المدرك حينئذ يكون هي آلة النفس و لا شعور و لا خبر للنفس عن ما تدرك بالآلة و هذا من أسوأ الظنون حيث زعم أحد أن في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦٦

شخص واحد من الإنسان يوجد و يتحقق جماعة كثيرة من أهل الإدراك كل واحد منها يختص بنوع من الإدراك أحدها يسمع والآخر يرى والثالث يذوق والرابع يشم- والخامس يلمس والسادس يتخيل والسابع يتوهم وهكذا في باب الحركة بعضها يتصرف وبعضها يجذب وبعضها يدفع وبعضها يهضم وبعضها يشتهي وبعضها يغضب- وهكذا في سائر القوى وليس للنفس اطلاع على هذه الأفعال والانفعالات إلا إدراك ذاتها وصفاتها الحالة بجوهر ذاتها وهذا خلاف الوجدان والبرهان.

أما الوجدان فلأن كل واحد منا يعلم أنه العاقل المتخيل الشام الذائق الكاتب المتحرك الجالس وأما البرهان فلأن النفس بإرادتها تبصر وترى وتلمس وتستعمل آلاتها الجزئية- عند أغراض كلية أو جزئية أما الأغراض الجزئية فظاهرة كمن يريد الحركة لرؤية فلان وأما الغرض الكلي فكمن يريد الحركة إلى المعلم لأن يتعلم منه علوما عقلية- والمستعمل للآلة الجزئية بالإرادة ولا بد أن يدركها.

وأيضا البرهان قائم على أن المدرك للصور الجزئية الحاصلة في الحواس ليس هو إلا النفس دون الحس ودون الآلة إذ المدرك للشيء لا بد وأن يدرك ذاتها في ضمن ذلك الإدراك كما مر بيانه وليس للجسم ولا قوة يقوم به إدراك ذاته و كل راجع إلى ذاته في إدراكه فهو روحاني البتة فثبت بهذه الوجوه وأمثالها أن النفس الناطقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦٧

في الإنسان هي المدركة للجزئيات والكليات جميعا فلها أن تحكم بالكلية على الجزئي كما بالجزئي على الجزئي. واعلم أنه مما ذكر في كتب الحكمة في بيان إثبات الاختلاف بين القوة الطبيعية والقوة الحيوانية من المسلك الأول من الطريقتين الذين ذكرناهما أنهم قالوا وجدنا عضوا سليما فاعلا للأفعال الطبيعية مختلا عن الأفعال الحسية فعدم الإحساس إما لعدم القوة الحاسة أو لأن العضو لا ينفعل عن القوة فإن كان الأول فقد ثبت أن الحيوانية بشيء غير الطبيعة السارية في العضو لأن الطبيعة قد وجدت مع عدم القوة الحساسة وكانت إحدى القوتين مخالفة للآخرى فأما الثاني فباطل لأن هذه الأجسام قابلة لحصول الحر والبرد والطعم والرائحة فلو كانت القوة الحساسة موجودة في عضو وقد وردت عليه هذه الكيفيات المحسوسة لكان الإدراك حاصلا لوجود القوة الدراكة مع حصول الصورة التي يقع بها الإحساس وبمثل هذا الطريق يمكن أن يثبت تغاير القوى الإدراكية كالسمع والبصر والشم وغيرها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦٨

فإننا نقول لو كانت قوة الذوق مثلا عين قوة الشم لوجب لكل منهما إدراك ما يدركه الأخرى إذ الموضوع لكل منهما قابل لحصول الطعم والرائحة جميعا وحيث لم يدرك شيء منهما ما أدركه الآخر مع حضور ذلك المدرك علم أن القوتين متخالفتان ذاتا وحقيقة.

واعترض عليه صاحب المباحث بأنه لا يلزم من حصول القوة المدركة وحصول المدرك في شيء واحد حصول الإدراك لجواز توقفه على شرط فائت ألا ترى أن العضو اللامس حصلت فيه الكيفية اللامسة مع الكيفية الملموسة مع أن تلك القوة غير مدركة الكيفية وكذلك القوة الباصرة موجودة في الروح الباصر الذي وجد فيه لون ما وهيئة ما ثم إنها لا تبصر بشكل محلها ولا لونه وهيئته فعلمنا أنه لا يلزم من اجتماع القوة المدركة والصور المدركة كيف كان حصول

الإدراك فإذن لا يلزم من عدم حصول فعل وإدراك مخصوص بعضو عن عضو آخر اختلاف القوتين. أقول الشروط و الموانع إما داخلية ذاتية أو عرضية خارجية فالاختلاف في القسم الأول يوجب اختلاف القوى و أما الاختلاف في العرضيات الخارجية فهو مما لا يدوم و لا يمتنع زوالها بل قد ثبت في الحكمة الإلهية أن أفراد كل طبيعة نوعية يجب أن يكون فعلها الخاص لها إما دائمة أو أكثرية و أن طبيعة ما من الطبائع لا يمكن أن تكون ممنوعة عن مقتضى ذاتها أبد الدهر فالقوة الجمادية مثلا لو كانت في طبيعتها إدراك الأمور أو تخيلها و لم تدرك لفقدان شرط فائت أو حصول مانع موجود لزم التعطيل في طبيعته و البرهان قائم على أن لا معطل في الوجود و كذا لو كان للبصر إدراك الروائح و للشَّم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٦٩

إدراك المبصرات مثلا و لم يتحقق لوجود مانع خارجي أو فقدان شرط خارجي لزم المحالات المذكورة و هو التعطيل في الطبائع و القوى.

و أما الذي ذكره من حال القوة اللامسة و الباصرة في عدم إدراك محالها و الكيفيات التي تحل في محالها فذلك الإدراك كما توهمه من المستحيلات الذاتية ليس من باب الممكن الذي يحتاج إلى شرط فإنك قد علمت أن الصورة المادية مما يمتنع تعلق الإدراك بها إذ لا بد في كل صورة مدركة أن تكون مجردة عن المادة ضربا من التجرد إذ لا حضور لمادة و لا مادي عند القوة المدركة كما مر تحقيقه و ليس الأمر في الإدراك كما زعمه هذا الباحث و من يحذو حذوه أن الإدراك بإضافة من القوة المدركة إلى وجود أمر خارجي - و لا أن الإحساس هو عبارة عن حصول الصورة المحسوسة في آلة الإدراك و لا أيضا عبارة عن انفعال العضو عن الأمر المحسوس الذي في الخارج بل ذلك الانفعال من السبب المعد لوقوع الإدراك الإحساسي لأن انفعال كل آلة حيوانية بمشاركة وضع معين لها بالقياس إلى مادة تحمل كيفية خاصة تؤدي إلى تلبسه النفس بصورة محاكية لما في تلك المادة من الكيفيات التي تسمى بالكيفيات المحسوسة و بالجملة ليس الإدراك إلا بحصول صورة الشيء في ذات المدرك لا في المادة و لا في الآلة أصلا و الذي يبين به

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٠

تعدد القوى التي هي في آلات الإدراك أن تلك الآلات من شأن كل منها الانفعال بكيفية ينفع به الأخرى و ليس من شأن بعض منها أن يتسبب في إدراك ما يتسبب في إدراكه البعض الآخر فذلك يوجب تغييرها و تخالفها في الطبائع المسخرة للنفس و من هذه الطريقة أيضا قولهم لو كانت القوة الحيوانية أي قوة الحس و الحركة الإرادية هي بعينها القوة النباتية لكانت النبات متحركا بالإرادة لأن جسمه ممكن الحركة و القوة المحركة بالإرادة موجودة فيه فإذا وجد الفاعل و القابل يجب حصول الفعل فكان يجب أن يتحرك بالإرادة لأن الدواعي حاصلة و هي طلب المنافع و دفع المضار في هذا العالم للأجساد القابلة للأضداد فلما لم يكن تلك الحركة ثبت أن القوة النباتية التي فينا مغايرة للحيوانية.

و اعترض هاهنا بأن القوة الغذائية في كل عضو تخالف الغذائية التي في عضو آخر - بالنوع في الماهية عندهم فمن الواجب أن تكون الغذائية التي في الحيوان مخالفة بالنوع للغذية التي في النبات فإذن لا يلزم من قولنا إن الغذائية التي في الشجر غير قوية على الحركة الإرادية أن تكون الغذائية التي في الحيوان غير قوية على ذلك إذ ليس يلزم من عدم اتصاف

شيء بفقد عدم اتصاف ما يخالفه في النوع.
أقول في الجواب إن القوى الغذائية التي في النباتات و الحيوانات و إن كانت متخالفة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧١

بالنوع لكنها كلها مشتركة في الجنس ليس إطلاق القوة الغذائية عليها بالاشتراك اللفظي - وذلك لأن القوى تعرف بأفاعيلها فإذا اشتركت الأفاعيل في معنى واحد كانت القوى كذلك فحينئذ إذا كانت النفس الغذائية التي في الحيوان مشاركة للنفس الغذائية التي في النبات و قد زادت عليها بفعل الحس و الحركة الإرادية فكانت مشتملة على قوة أخرى كمالية هي مبدأ فصلها المميز لها عن المشاركات النباتية و أما أن هذه القوة الجنسية و الفصلية يمكن أن يوجد بوجود واحد أو لا يمكن بل هي النسبة موجودة بوجودات متعددة أينما كانت فذلك مطلب و سيأتي القول في ذلك و الحق عندنا أن النفس هي المدركة جميع الإدراكات بجميع المدركات و هي المحركة بجميع الحركات الطبيعية و الإرادية - و هذا لا ينافي وجوب توسط هذه القوى المتعددة المتخالفة التي بعضها من باب الإدراك و بعضها من باب التحريك لأن القوة العالية لا تفعل الفعل الدني إلا بتوسط ألا ترى أن المزاول للتحريك المكاني أو الوضعي لا بد و أن يكون قوة سارية في الجسم بخلاف المزاول للتحريك الشهوي بل الانتقال الفكري أرفع قدرا من التجسم و أن المباشر للإدراك مطلقا لا بد و أن يكون قوى مجردة على تفاوت تجردها بحسب تفاوت إدراكاتها فالعقلية أشد ارتفاعا و أعلى مقاما و الحسية سيما اللمسية منها أدون درجة و أشد هبوطا من الجميع فإذا كان كذلك فوجب في صدور هذه الآثار المختلفة إما تعدد القوى المتخالفة أو تحقق درجات متفاوتة لذات واحدة و كل طبقة وجودية حقيقتها و ما يترتب عليها متفقة سواء كانت منفصلة عن غيرها أو متصلة به فالغاذية على اختلاف أنواعها حقيقة واحدة سواء كانت نفسا على حدة أو قوة من قوى نفس أو جزءا من أجزاء نفس و كذا اللامسة على اختلافها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٢

طبيعة واحدة سواء كانت مستقلة كنفس الدود و الخراطين فإن نفسها الحيوانية هي اللامسة بعينها أو قوة وجودية من قوى النفس الحيوانية أو الإنسانية أو جزءا من أجزائها المعنوية و هكذا الحكم في جميع القوى المدركة و المحركة فكما أن قوة الإبصار و إن فرض أنها متخالفة الأنواع في أنواع الحيوان لكنها مشتركة في حقيقة واحدة فكذا قوة السمع و الشم و الذوق و التغذية و التنمية و غيرها من القوى الحيوانية سواء وجدت مجتمعة في قوة جامعة لها أو متفرقة مثال اجتماع القوى في قوة واحدة كاجتماع الحواس الخمس الظاهرة في الحس المشترك المسمى في لغة اليونان بنبطاسيا و كذلك النفس الناطقة التي للإنسان - جامعة مع بساطتها لجميع القوى المدركة و المحركة لا بمعنى أن تلك الآلات هي المبادي للإدراكات و الحركات بالحقيقة دون ذات النفس إلا على وجه التوسيط و الاستخدام - بل النفس هي حس الحواس كلها و المباشرة للمحركات الفكرية و الطبيعية و الاختيارية - لأنها ذات مقامات و عوالم ثلاثة العقل و الخيال و الحس و سيرد عليك إيضاح في مستقبل الكلام.

و ليس لقائل أن يقول إن التغذي و النمو لو كانا من أفعال النفس لكانت النفس شاعرة بما يصدر عنها من الإحالة و الهضم فكان يجب أن تكون النفس عالمة بجميع مراتب الاستحالة للغذاء و جميع الأعضاء على التفصيل علما بديهيها و

التالي باطل - فعلنا أن الفاعل لهذه الأفعال قوة عديمة الشعور بهذه الآثار. لا لما قيل يجوز أن يكون للنفس شعور بهذه الأمور إلا أنه ليس لها شعور بذلك الشعور ما يبقى و يستمر لأجل أن كثرة تغيرات هذه الأفعال سبب لنسيان النفس لها - كما أن الإنسان إذا سمع كلمات كثيرة متوالية سريعة الانقضاء لم يبق في حفظه شيء منها فكذا هاهنا لأن ذلك يؤدي إلى السفسطة فإن جاز كوننا عالمين بجميع الاستحالات - و التغيرات التي تقع للمواد الغذائية و المواد العضوية التي يستحيل إليها الغذاء مع أنا لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٣

نجد الشعور بها من أنفسنا فجاز أن يقال إن العامي عالم بجميع الدقائق و إن كان لا يجد من نفسه ذلك. بل لما أقول و هو يحتاج إلى تمهيد أمور - أحدها أن العلم قد يكون فعليا و قد يكون انفعاليا و العلم الفعلي قد يكون سببا للمعلول و قد يكون عين المعلول حتى يكون وجود المعلول بعينه هو علم العلة به و بالجملة كان الوجود عين الشعور في العلة و في المعلول فهذا أصل. ثم الوجود قد علمت أنه مما يختلف بالشدة و الضعف و غاية ضعف الوجود هو أن يكون من باب الهيولي و الحركة و المقدار و العدد و اسم العلم لا يقع إلا على الوجود الذي هو من باب الصورة لا الذي من باب المادة و ما ينغمر فيها و يستغرق جوهره في غشاوتها و قد علمت منا أيضا أن الجسمية و الامتداد المكاني أو الزماني أمور يتشابه فيها الوجود مع العدم و الوحدة مع الكثرة و الجمعية مع الفرقة و ذلك الاشتباك يمنع عن الحضور الجمعي و الشعور و يكون مناط المجهولية فهذا أصل آخر.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٤

ثم إن الشيء قد يكون علما و لا يكون معلوما و قد يكون معلوما و لا يكون علما. و بعبارة أخرى العلم قد يكون أنقص من المعلوم و المعلوم أقوى و أظهر من العلم به و قد يكون بالعكس بيانه أن الوجود إذا كان في غاية الجلالة و العظمة فلا يمكن تعقله بعلم آخر زائد على ذاته و إن كانت ذاته علما بذاته و معلوما لذاته كالواجب تعالى و ما يقرب منه من العقول الصريحة فالوجود هاهنا علم و لا يكون معلوما لغيره و أن الوجود إذا كان في غاية الخسة و النقص فيمكن حضور صورته عند العالم و لا يمكن حضور ذاته كالهولي الأولى و ما يقرب منها فالصورة هاهنا أقوى من المعلوم في باب العلم بخلاف الأول - و الصورة الحاصلة هاهنا علم و المعلوم ليس بعلم و في الأول المعلوم علم في نفسه - و علمنا به ليس علما به بل بوجه من وجوهه. إذا تقررت هذه الأصول فنقول إن النفس التي لنا إذا فرض كونها مبدأ لجميع الإدراكات و التحريكات الحيوانية و النباتية حتى الجذب و الإحالة و الدفع لا يلزم من ذلك أن تكون عالمة بأفعالها الطبيعية الواقعة منها باستخدام المادة و الطبيعة و قولهم العلم بالعلة يوجب العلم بالمعلول حق و لكن العلم بالعلة إذا كان عين وجودها كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٥

مقتضاه كون العلم بالمعلول عين وجوده و إذا كان وجود المعلول كلا وجوده لغاية النقص و الخسة كان العلم به كلا

علم به و هذا معنى قول الفيلسوف المقدم إن العقل الأول يجهل بأشياء جهلا هو أشرف من العلم بها و ليس جميع أفاعيل النفس

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٦

كالكتابة و المشي و الأكل و الشرب و سائر الأفاعيل الاختيارية التي يتقدمها علم و إرادة زائدتان على النفس فإن تلك الأفعال متى لم يتصور أولا للنفس و لم تصدق النفس بفائدتها تصديقا يقينيا أو ظنيا أو تخيليا أو جهليا لم يصدر عنها فعل شيء من تلك الأفعال و أما الأفاعيل البدنية فليس حصولها من النفس إلا بتبعية شعورها بذاتها الذي هو عين ذاتها بتبعية عشقها لكمال ذاتها المقتضية لشوقها الجبلي لتوابع ذاتها شوقا تابعا للشوق إلى مبدئها الأصلي و هذه المعاني و إن كانت برهانية لكن إدراكها لا يمكن إلا بنور البصيرة و الكشف و لذلك مما خفيت على أكثر المتفكرين فضلا عن المجادلين و المقلدين.

و مما ينبه على ما ذكرناه من أن قوة النفس سارية في جميع الأعضاء بوجوه التصرفات اللائقة بكل مرتبة من المراتب الحيوانية و النباتية و الطبيعية هو أنه لو لم يتعلق اعتناء النفس بتعديل المزاج و حفظ الاتصال لم يتألم بتغير المزاج عند أدنى مغير من حر أو برد أو حركة أو تعب أو هبوب ريح مشوش إلى غير ذلك من الأمور التي ليست من الأمور النفسانية كالمخوفات و المبشرات و الإنذارات و ما يجري مجراها - و كذا ينبغي أن تتأذى النفس من تفرق الاتصال و الجراحات تأذيا جزئيا في الحال و كان يجب أن يكون جميع الآلام و المؤذيات الواقعة على الإنسان من باب خوف العقابة و خطر المال و سوء الآخرة و لم يكن المرض و تفرق الاتصال مؤلما في الحال لكن التوالي باطلة فعلم أن النفس بذاتها موضوعة لهذه الانفعالات و الإدراكات لسراية قوتها إلى معدن الطبيعة فصارت محلا لهذه العاهات و الآلام و عرضة لهذه البليات و الأمراض - بل الموت أيضا وارد عليها من جهة ورودها إلى هذا العالم بقدر الله و ليس بوارد على محل الإيمان و المعرفة بالله و اليوم الآخر و إنما يرد على محل الجهل و الظلمة و الحركة و الاستحالة. و من الشواهد الدالة على أن النفس بذاتها فاعلة لأفاعيل الطبيعية من الجذب

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٧

و الدفع و غيرها أن الإنسان إذا اشتدت حاجته إلى الإحالة و الهضم و الدفع بسبب من الأسباب كما يكون للمريض عند بحرانه فإنه يجد نفسه مقصرة عن سائر الأمور الإدراكية و ما ذلك إلا لاشتغال النفس بهذه الأفعال و استغراقها فيها فلا جرم تنقطع عن سائر الأفاعيل ثم إذا فرغ عن ذلك توجه النفس إلى مقامها الخاص الذي يقع فيه الأفاعيل الإدراكية و الله أعلم

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٨

الباب الثالث في ذكر القوى النباتية و أفعالها و أحوالها و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في أقسام تلك القوى بالوجه الكلي

إن القوى النباتية إما أن تكون مخدومة و إما أن تكون خادمة و أما التي لها درجة الاستخدام فإما أن يكون فعلها و تصرفها

في الغذاء لأجل الشخص أو لأجل النوع أما الأول فهو إما لأجل بقاء الشخص أو لأجل تحصيل كمال ذاته أما القوة التي تفعل لأجل بقاء الشخص فهي الغذائية و حدها أنها قوة تحيل الغذاء إلى مشابهة جوهر المتغذي لتورده بدل ما يتحلل و أما التي تفعل لتحصيل كمال الشخص فهي النامية و هي التي تزيد في أقطار الجسم المتغذي على التناسب الطبيعي - ليبلغ إلى تمام النشوء و إنما يقع هذا الفعل منه بما يورده الغذائية زيادة على البدل عما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٧٩

يتحلل فالغذية تخدم النامية بإيراد الغذاء زائدة على القدر الضروري للبقاء و لكن ليس كل زيادة في الأقطار نموا فإن السمن بعد سن الوقوف ليس نموا و الهزال في سن النمو ليس ذبولا بل النمو هو الزيادة التي تكون على تناسب طبيعي ليبلغ تمام النشوء كما في سن الشباب و مقابلة الذبول و هو النقصان الذي يكون على تناسب طبيعي - كما في سن الشيخوخة.

فإن قلت فالفاعل في السمن و الهزال أي قوة من القوى إذ لا بد لكل فعل و حركة من فاعل و محرك. قلنا الفاعل فيهما أيضا هو تلك القوة لأجل إعداد القاسر لأنهما حركتان قسريتان - و قد مر أن الفاعل في الحركة القسرية أيضا طبيعة ذلك المقسور و قوته لكن اسم الطبيعة إنما يقع على تلك القوة إذا كان تحريكها تحريكا بالذات لا بقسر قاسر فهنا اسم النامية إنما يقع على هذه القوة النباتية إذا كان تحريكها للجسد في تزايد الأقطار تحريكا طبيعيا لا بسبب قاسر من رطوبة زائدة في السمن أو حرارة مفرطة في الهزال. ثم إن فعل الغذائية إنما يتم بأمور ثلاثة الأول تحصيل الخلط الذي هو بالقوة القريبة من الفعل شبيه بالعضو و الثاني تصييره جزءا للعضو و الثالث تشبيهه به في اللون و القوام كالدم و قد تخل بالأول كما في عدم الغذاء و بالثاني كما في استسقاء اللحمي.

و بالثالث كما في البرص و غيره و حكموا بأن غذية كل عضو مخالف لغذية العضو الآخر - إذ لو اتحدت طبائعها لاتحدت أفعالها و هذا صحيح و لا ينافي تعددها و تخالفها وحدة الغذائية التي في شخص واحد بوحدة نفسه المقتضية لهذه القوى و أما اللتان لبقاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٠

النوع فأولاهما المولدة و هي التي تفصل جزءا من فضل الهضم الأخير للمغذي و تودعه قوة من سنخه و ثانيتهما المصورة و هي التي تفيد المنى بعد استحالته صورة تكون معدة لفيضان القوى و الكيفيات بإذن الله تعالى و أما الخادمة فهي قوى أربع تخدم الغذائية - و هي الجاذبة و الماسكة و الهاضمة و الدافعة أما الجاذبة فوجودها في بعض الأعضاء - كالمعدة و الرحم معلوم بالمشاهدة و في غيرها معلوم بالقياس.

أما الأول فالإنسان إذا كان منقلبا حتى يكون رأسه إلى السفلى و رجلاه إلى فوق أمكنه أن يشرب الماء و يزدرد الطعام و حركة الطعام و الشراب لكونهما جسمين ثقلين إلى فوق ليست طبيعية بل قسرية و الحركة القسرية إما بجذب جاذب أو دفع دافع - و الثاني باطل في هذا الوضع فبقي المعدة تجذبها بقوة جاذبة فيها.

و أيضا إنا نجد للمري و المعدة وقت الحاجة الشديدة تجذبان الطعام من الفم - و كذا نجدهما عند تناول الأغذية

اللذيذة تجذبها بسرعة حتى أن الكبد أيضا يجذبها من المعدة للذاتها وقربها من طبيعة القوة وأيضا متى تغذي الإنسان غذاءا و تناول بعده غذاء حلوا واستعمل القيء يجد أن الحلو يخرج أخيرا و ذلك بجذب المعدة إياه إلى قعرها و كذا حال الرحم في جذب المني بل الإحليل عند خلوه عن الفضول و شدة اشتياق المرأة إلى الوقاع و لذلك أن قوما من الفلاسفة سمووا الرحم حيوانا مشتاقا إلى المني و ذلك لشدة جذبه له.

و أما الثاني فنقول إن الدم إذا تكون في الكبد كان مخلوطا بالفضلات الثلاثة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨١

الأخر أعني الصفراء و السوداء و البلغم ثم إن كل واحدة منها يتميز عن الآخر و ينصب إلى عضو معين و لو لا أن في كل من تلك الأعضاء قوة جاذبة لذلك النوع من الرطوبة الخلطية لاستحال أن يتميز تلك الرطوبات بعضها عن بعض بنفسها و لاستحال أن يخص كل عضو منها رطوبة معينة اختصاصا أكثريا فهذا قاطع في إثبات القوة الجاذبة لجملته الأعضاء.

و أما القوة الماسكة فوجودها في المعدة و الرحم مشاهدة بالتشريح و في غيرهما معلوم بالبرهان أما المعدة فإننا إذا أعطينا حيوانا غذاء رطبا أو يابسا ثم شرحنا في ذلك الوقت بطنه وجدنا المعدة محتوية على غذاء لازمة ضامة له من جميع الجوانب و أما الرحم فإذا اجتذب إليه المني يرى منضما إليه انضماما شديدا من جميع الجوانب منطبق الفم بحيث لا يمكن أن يدخل فيه طرف الميل و لو أنك شققت من الحيوان الحامل من أسفل السرة إلى نحو الفرج و كشفت عن الرحم وجدت الرحم كما ذكر.

و أما الحجة على وجود الماسكة في غيرهما من الأعضاء فهو أن الأجسام الغذائية أجسام ثقيلة لغلبة الأرضية و المائية عليها و لا بد في إمساكها في زمان الانهضام فهو حركة استحالية واقعة بعد الجذب إلى مواضع الأعضاء من قوة ممسكة إلى غير طبيعة الغذاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٢

و الشراب لأنها لرطوبتها و ميعانها و رقتها لا يقف بطبعها في تلك المواضع المزقة- و أما الهاضمة فهي التي تحيل ما جذبته الجاذبة و أمسكتها الماسكة إلى قوام مهيا لفعل المغيرة فيه و إلى مزاج صالح للاستحالة إلى العضوية بالفعل و هذه القوة غير الغذائية عند المحققين قيل في بيان الفرق بينهما إن القوة الهاضمة يبتدىء فعلها عند انتهاء فعل الجاذبة- و ابتداء فعل الماسكة فإذا جذبت جاذبة عضو شيئا من الدم و أمسكتها ماسكة ذلك العضو فللدم صورة نوعية و إذا صار شبيها بالعضو فقد بطلت عنه تلك الصورة و حدث له صورة أخرى فيكون كونا للصورة العضوية و فسادا للصورة الدموية و هكذا الكون و الفساد إنما يحصلان بأن يحصل من الطبخ ما لأجله يأخذ استعداد المادة للدموية في النقصان و للعضوية في الاشتداد و هكذا لا يزال الأول في الانتقاص و الثاني في الاشتداد إلى أن يبطل الصورة الدموية و يحدث الصورة العضوية فهانها حالتان سابقة و هي التي تزيد استعداد قبول الصورة العضوية و لاحقة هي حصول الصورة العضوية فالأولى فعل القوة الهاضمة و الثانية فعل القوة الغذائية فهذا ما قيل في الفرق بين هاضمة كل عضو و غاذيته.

و اعترض عليه بوجهين الأول أن الهاضمة محركة للغذاء في الكيف إلى الصورة المشابهة لصورة العضو و كل ما حرك

شيئا إلى شيء فهو الموصل له إلى ما يتحرك إليه - فالهاضمة هي الموصلة للغذاء إلى الصورة العضوية فإذا الفاعل للفعلين قوة واحدة - والكبرى ظاهرة فإن ما حرك شيئا إلى شيء كان المتوجه إليه غاية المحرك والمعنى بكونه غاية أن المقصود الأصلي من الحركة هو ذلك الشيء والثاني أن هاضمة كل عضو لا شك أنها بالطبخ والنضج يفيد المادة زيادة استعداد لقبول الصورة العضوية ولذلك الاستعداد مراتب في القوة والضعف وليس بعض الدرجات بأن ينسب إلى الهاضمة أولى من الآخر فإذا حصل كمال الاستعداد والغاية فاضت تلك الصورة عن واهب الصورة - وإذا تمت هذه الأفعال فقد تمت التغذية فلا فرق إذن بين الهاضمة والغذية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٣

أقول أما الجواب عن الأول فهو أن لكل حركة نفسانية علتين فاعلة وباعثة - ولها أيضا غايتان غاية بمعنى ما انتهت إليه الحركة وغاية بمعنى ما وقعت الحركة لأجله وهما مختلفتان فلا بد لهما من قوتين فالهاضمة هي التي فعلها كفعل النار ليس إلا الطبخ والنضج ومجرد الطبخ والنضج لا يستلزم أن يكون على وجه يكون طريقا إلى استعداد قبول صورة مخصوصة هي الصورة العضوية فالتى تسوق المادة لأجل غرض مخصوص - وغاية مطلوبة غير التي تسوقها لا إلى غرض ألا ترى أن في الحركة الحيوانية قوة فاعلة مباشرة للحركة وهي القوة التي تميل بالعضلة والعضو إلى جهة من الجهات لا لغرض وقوة فوقها تفعل التحريك إلى حيث يصل إلى مشتهى مخصوص أو دفع مؤذ مخصوص وهي الباعثة فالفاعلة القريبة للحركة لها غاية بمعنى الحد الذي هو من ضروريات الحركة - والفاعلة البعيدة المسماة بالباعثة لها غاية أخرى غير نفس الحد المذكور وهي التي يكون المقصود الأصلي من تلك الحركة ويقع الوصول لأجلها وهي غير الوصول وإن لم تنفك عنه فرضا فهكذا الحال فيما نحن فيه فإن المحركة للمادة الغذائية بالطبخ - غير الباعثة لحركتها نحو الصورة العضوية على وجه يصلح للشخص المغتذي في كماله الشخصي والنوعي.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٤

وأما الجواب عن الثاني فنقول إن المبدأ الفياض لجميع صور الكائنات وإن كان أمرا آخر أجل من هذه المبادي الفاعلة والباعثة لكن لتعالیه عن هذه التغيرات والتجددات لا بد في كل فعل جسماني من فاعل مزاو لا امتناع صدور هذه الأفاعيل المتجددة المتغيرة عن فاعل ثابت بريء عن التجدد رفيع عن التغير ولو كفى في صدور هذه التحريكات والتصويرات مجرد الاستعداد للقوابل من غير فاعل مباشر لما احتيج إلى إثبات الطبائع والقوى والنفوس في حرارة النار وبرودة الماء ويبوسة الأرض وحفظ المعادن ونمو النبات وحركات الحيوان بل يكفي انفعالات الهيولى على أن كل انفعال واستعداد في مادة تابع لفعل فاعل لما مر من أن كل قوة وإمكان مسبوق بفعل وإيجاب وكما لا يمكن استناد الانفعالات الكثيرة المختلفة إلى قابل واحد من غير توسط جهات متكررة في الانفعال كذلك لا يمكن استناد الأفاعيل الكثيرة المختلفة إلى فاعل واحد من غير توسط جهات متكررة في الفعل وقد مر في مباحث العلة والمعلول - أن الفعل الكلي يحتاج إلى فاعل كلي والفعل الجزئي يحتاج إلى فاعل جزئي فهذه الكتابة تصدر عن هذا الكاتب وهذا التصوير يصدر عن هذا المصور والفعل المحسوس المشار إليه ينسب إلى فاعل محسوس مشار إليه والفاعل العقلي لم يكن فاعلا بالذات إلا لفعل معقول والله ولي الهداية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٥

فصل (٢) في فعل الهاضمة في الفضلة المندفعة و الإشارة إلى وجود الدافعة و التنبيه على تغاير هذه الأربع و تعيين آلتها من الأعضاء

أما فعل الهاضمة فاعلم أن الغذاء مركب من جوهرين أحدهما صالح لأن يشبهه بالمتغذي و الثاني غير صالح لذلك فلها في كل منهما فعل خاص أما فعلها في الأول فما مضى و أما في الثاني فلا يخلو أن تلك الأجزاء إما غليظة أو رقيقة أو لزجة- و فعل الهاضمة في الأول الترقيق و في الثاني التغليظ و في الثالث التقطيع لا يقال كلما كان الجسم أرق كان أسهل اندفاعا فلما ذا جعلتم التغليظ أحد الأمور المسهلة للدفع- لأننا نقول إن الرقيق قد يتشربه جرم المعدة فيبقى تلك الأجزاء المتشربة فيه و لا يندفع- و أما إذا غلظت لم يتشربها العضو فلا جرم يندفع بالكلية.

و أما الدافعة فيدل على ثبوتها أمران خاصي و عامي- الأول أنك ترى المعدة عند القيء كأنها تنتزع من موضعها إلى فوق حتى يتحرك منها أكثر الأحشاء و ترى عند التبرز مثل ما ذكرناه و معونة الأحشاء على دفع ما فيها سيما عند الزحير حتى أنه قد ينخلع المعاء المستقيم عن موضعه لقوة الحركة الدافعة.

و الثاني أن الدم يرد على سائر الأعضاء مخلوطا بالأخلاط الثلاثة فيأخذ كل عضو ما يلائمه فلو لم يدفع ما ينافيه لبقى المنافي عنده و لم يخلص شيء من الأعضاء عن الأخلاط الفاسدة الممرضة و اللازم باطل فثبت وجود القوة الدافعة فإذا ثبت وجود هذه الأفاعيل الأربعة في البدن أعني الجذب و الإمساك و الإحالة و الدفع فليس لقائل أن ينسب تلك الأمور إلى قوة واحدة بالذات متغايرة بالاعتبار بأن يكون تلك القوة جاذبة عند ازدراد الطعام و ماسكة له بعد الازدراد و مغيرة له عند الإمساك و دافعة للفضل المستغني عنه لا لما قيل إن الواحد لا يصدر عنه إلا الواحد فإنه لا يجري في غير الواحد من جميع الوجوه بل لأن هذه الأفاعيل أمور متخالفة إما متضادة كالجذب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٦

و الدفع و إما ينفك بعضها عن البعض فقد يكون العضو ضعيفا في أحد هذه الأربع- و قويا في غيره و لو لا تغاير هذه المبادي لاستحال ذلك و أما آلات هذه القوى فالقوة الجاذبة آلتها الليف المتطاوول و الماسكة آلتها الليف المورب و الدافعة آلتها في الدفع الليف المستعرض هذا ما قالوه و ظاهر أن المراد منه أن في معظمات هذه الأفاعيل يحتاج إلى تلك الأعصاب فإن جاذبة كل عضو أو ماسكته أو دافعته يحتاج إلى آلة عصبية لا أن جاذبة كل ذرة من العضو يحتاج إلى ليف متطاوول و دافعته إلى ليف مستعرض.

فعلى هذا اندفع ما قيل فيه أما أولا فبأن لحم الكبد ليس فيه ليف مع وجود الجاذبة و الماسكة و الدافعة فيه و أما ثانيا فبأن الرطوبة الجليدية تجذب الغذاء أو تمسكه و تهضمه مع أن الجزم حاصل بأن ليس فيها ليف أصلا.

و أما ثالثا فبأن كلا من شظايا الليف غير مركبة من الليف و إلا لتسلسلت الليفات إلى غير النهاية مع أن فيها هذه القوى. و أما رابعا فبأن الليف المستعرض ليس فيه ليف متطاوول مع أنه يجذب و كذا الليف المتطاوول ليس فيه ليف مستعرض مع أنه يدفع الفضل و ذلك لما سبق من أن الحاجة إلى هذه الآلات في معظمات الجذب و الإمساك و الهضم و الدفع و جلائلها لا في رقائقتها و جزئياتها المنخرطة في سلك المعظمات المندرجة فيها فإن الأصناف الثلاثة من القوى العظيمة

إذا فعلت أفعالها بآلات الثلاث من الليف الحاصلة في الأوردة يفعل كل منها بتلك الآلة بالذات على وجه يسري فيما يجاور آلاتها ولو بالعرض فإذا جذب الوريد الغذاء بليفه المتطاول يرشح منه على جوهر الكبد وعلى هذا القياس في سائر المواضع المذكورة.

فإن قلت ذلك الدم إما أن يترشح من الليف المتطاول على لحم الكبد مع كون لحمه جاذبا لذلك الدم أو لا مع كونه جاذبا له فإن كان الأول فالجذب لا يتوقف على الليف وإن كان الثاني لم يكن في العضو قوة غاذية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٧

قلنا نختار الشق الأول و لم يلزم عدم توقف الجذب على الليف فإن التوقف حاصل عليه سواء كان توقفا قريبا أو بعيدا فلا بد في جاذبة كل عضو من ليف موجود فيه أو بحيله كالكبد و كالرطوبة الجليدية

فصل (٣) في أن هذه القوى في بعض الأعضاء مضاعفة و في حقيقة الغذاء و مراتب الهضم يشبه أن يكون ما قاله بعض الطبيعيين حقا

و هو أن هذه القوى الأربع توجد في المعدة مضاعفة فإن التي تجذب غذاء البدن من الخارج إلى تجويف المعدة غير التي تجذب من جوف المعدة إلى نفسها ما يصلح منه لها و كذا التي تمسكه هناك و هي التي تغيره إلى ما يصلح أن يكون دما و هو الكيلوس و التي تدفعه إلى الكبد غير التي تمسك في جوهر المعدة ما ينجذب إليها من الكبد من الدم الصالح للغذاء بالفعل و التي تغيره إلى أن يصير غذاء و التي تدفع الفضول منها و كذلك الكلام في الكبد لأن التغير إلى الدم غير التغير إلى جوهر الكبد كما أن التغير إلى العصارة غير التغير إلى جوهر المعدة و التحقيق أن هذه القوى الموجودة في جميع الأعضاء على اختلاف جواهرها هي التي تفعل أفعال الغاذية بالذات - و هي المحصلة للغذاء تحصيلًا أوليًا و أما المعدة و الكبد فيوجد فيهما تلك الأربع مع أربع آخر مشبهة بتلك و هي التي تفعل فعلها للإعداد لا لتحصيل الغذاء أولاً و بالذات و لا يبعد أن يوجد مثل هذه الأربع المعدة في غير المعدة و الكبد أيضا كالقلم و المري و الأمعاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٨

و العروق و الطحال و الأنثيين و المرارة من الأعضاء الخادمة. و اعلم أن حقيقة الغذاء ما يقوم بدل ما يتحلل عن الجسم بالاستحالة إلى نوعه - و الغذاء إما أن يكون بالقوة كالحنطة و الخبز و إما أن يكون بالفعل و هو الذي لم يحتج إلى شيء غير الالتصاق و قد يقال له غذاء عند ما صار جزء المغتذي شبيها به بالفعل - و الغذاء بالمعنى الأول هو جوهر جسماني جزئي لا محالة أما الجوهرية فلأن غير الجوهر لا يمكن أن يصير جوهرًا أو جزء جوهر و أما الجسمانية فلأن المجردات لا تنقلب أجساما و أما الجزئية فلأن الكلي من الجسم لا وجود له في الخارج فثبت أن غذاء كل بدن شخصي جسم شخصي و المشهود أن غذاء الحيوانات لا يكون أجساما بسيطة - فلا تغتذي إلا بالمركبات بعد المناسبة في البسيط و قربها في المركب و لا ينتقض هذا بالنبات كما توهم هذا ما ذكره.

و التحقيق يحتاج إلى نمط آخر من الكلام لا يناسب طور ما ألفه أسماع الأنام - و الإشارة إليه أن كل جوهر طبيعي أو

نفساني أمر واحد بالفعل لأنه موجود بالذات - و كل موجود بالذات له وحدة بالفعل و كل واحد بالفعل كثير بالقوة ففعله أيضا واحد بالفعل كثير بالقوة فالأجسام النباتية و الحيوانية كل منها واحد بالفعل فليس وجود العناصر فيها بالفعل بل بالقوة فليس معنى التغذية عندنا مداخله الجسم المسمى بالغذاء للجسم المغتذي بدلا لما يتحلل و لا معنى النمو عندنا ازدياد مقدار الجسم بمداخله الأجسام الخارجة فيه بل مجاورة الأجسام الرطبة المناسبة للجسم الحيواني و النباتي مما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٨٩

يعد لأن يفيض من القوة النفسانية ما يبقى به مقدار الشخص أو يستكمل بقدر الحاجة في كل وقت فالحركة الكمية الحاصلة للأجسام النباتية عبارة عن توارد المقادير على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٠

وجه الاتصال و الاستمرار من القوة الفاعلية على المادة القابلة كما سبق و لو كان التغذي بمداخله جسم غريب لم يكن المغتذي في كل وقت جسما واحدا شخصا باقيا بعده - و كذا لو كان النمو بزيادة مقدار ما يورد المتبدل على مقدار ما يتحلل لزم أن لا يكون موضوع الحركة في النمو شيئا واحدا شخصا و كذا القياس في الذبول بل الأمر كما أومأنا إليه و مما يجب أن يعلم أن استكمال المغتذي بالغذاء كاستكمال المتعلم بالعلم - و العقل بالقوة بالمعقول بالفعل و كما أن المعلوم سواء كان محسوسا أو معقولا قد يكون بالقوة و قد يكون بالفعل و الذي هو كمال للحس هو ما يكون محسوسا بالفعل كالصورة الحاصلة في الحاسة لا التي في المواد الخارجية من الألوان و الأصوات و الطعوم و الروائح - و كذا الذي هو كمال للقوة العاقلة هو ما يكون معقولا بالفعل من الصور العقلية الموجودة للعقل بالفعل لا التي في الخارج من الفلك و الحيوان و النبات و الأرض و غيرها و إذا علمت بالبراهين أن المحسوسات بالفعل هي متحدة بالجواهر الحاس و كذا المعقولات بالفعل لا بد و أن تكون متحدة بالجواهر العاقل فالكمال عين ما يكمل به - و الحساس نفس ما يحس به و العاقل عين ما يكون معقولا له فكذا المغتذي عين الغذاء بالفعل دون الغذاء بالقوة فالحنطة مثلا فيها قوة بعيدة للتغذية و الكيلوس الحاصل منها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩١

في المعدة أقرب منه بحسب القوة ثم الكيموس الحاصل في الكبد ثم الدم الحاصل في العروق أقرب استعدادا للغذائية من كل ما سبق فالذي يتصل بالعضو و يصير لحما أو عظما أو عضوا آخر هو الغذاء بالفعل و هو بعينه العضو المغتذي فالغذاء و المغتذي شيء واحد بعينه لا يتغايران إلا بضرب من التحليل حيث يعتبر العقل ذلك الشخص المغتذي أو العضو المغتذي تارة باعتباره في نفسه عند خلوه عما يرد عليه من الكمال - و تارة باعتبار تمامه و كماله الحاصل في نفسه بحسب سبق أفعال و حركات معدة لذلك الكمال كالحال في استكمال النفس بالصور العلمية الكمالية على ما بيناه و من دقائق ما يقع به الاستبصار في هذا المقام وقوع مراتب الهضم في الاغتذاء على وزان مراتب التجريد في التعقل

فصل (٤) في مراتب الهضم و أن للهضوم أربع مراتب

اعلم لا بد للحيوان و كذا للإنسان ما دام في عالم الدنيا و طبيعة الجسمية من غذاء يشبه المغتذي صورة و مادة و ذلك لأن هذه الأجسام دائمة الاستحالة و الذوبان ثم لكل عضو حصة من الغذاء تناسبه و تشاكلة بعد مراتب النضج و الاستحالات و التصفية عن القشور و الفضول بالقوة الغذائية التي في البدن بمنزلة القوة العاقلة في النفس فمادة الغذاء إذا وردت في البدن و حضرت عند تصرف غاذية النفس فتصرفت فيها أحالتها في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٢

مراتب الهضم بقواها المسخرة لهذا الأمر و صيرتها بصنعة طبيعية يشبه الكيمياء خالصة عن شوائب الغش و الغل مصفاة عن الفضول مقشرة عن القشور في أربع مراتب للهضم و الإحالات إحداها في المعدة و ابتداء هذا الهضم من الفم بدليل أن الحنطة الممضوغة - تفعل في إنضاج الدماويل و الخراجات ما لا يفعله المطبوخ بالماء و تمام هذا الهضم عند ما يرد على المعدة و ينضج بحرارة جهنم المعدة التي إذا قيل لها هل امتلأت فتقول هل من مزيد فيتخلص عن ذنوب الفضلات بيد زبانية القوى المسخرة لهذا التعذيب - و التهذيب للخارج عن طاعة الله البعيد عن الوحدة الجمعية الاعتدالية المنحرف عن صراط الله المستقيم من الطبيعة المدبرة للأجسام على منهج الحكمة الإلهية فتصير شبيها بماء الكشك الثخين و هو المسمى بالكيموس و المرتبة الثانية إذا تم ما فعلت هذه القوى به في هذه الطبقة السفلى و فرغت من أفاعيلها المأمورة بفعلها ارتفع قليلا عن هذه الطبقة الهاوية المظلمة إلى طبقة أخرى هي الكبد فوق بعد ذلك بيد قوى و سدنة أخرى من هذا الصنف فعملت فيه شبه العمل السابق من الطبخ و الإذابة فانهضم في الكبد مرة أخرى و سقط منه بعض ما بقي من الأكدار و الفضول فصار أخلاطا أربعة متميزة بعض تمييز و مخلوطة بعض تخليط خلطوا عملا صالحا و آخر سيئا لخروجها عن تمام التعصي عن الطاعة الإلهية و قربها عن الصلاح و الانقياد لأمر الله ثم إن أصلح هذه الرفقاء الأربعة هو الجوهر المسمى بالدم فوق قسط منها في مسالك العروق المسماة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٣

بماساريقا إلى بيت القلب و سلك سبيل الطاعة للنفس و اشتغل في بيت القلب بالرياضة و المجاهدة و التصفية قدرا صالحا من الزمان حتى صلح لكسوة القبول و خلعة الصورة النفسانية و توزع ما بقي منه نافذا في العروق على الأعضاء فينهضم مرة أخرى و يتشبه بالأعضاء بعد إخراج الفضول الباقية منه و كل قسط من الدم يتشبه بعضو خاص فيتصل به و يحشر إليه كما يحشر ذلك القسط الصالح منه إلى القلب كل إلى شبيهه.

و أقسام الفضول أربعة بعدد أقسام الهضم ففضلة الهضم الأول الذي في المعدة البراز و هو مندفع من المعاء و فضلة الهضم الثاني أكثرها البول و يندفع من المثانة - و باقيه يندفع من الطحال و المرارة و فضلة الهضم الثالث يندفع بالعرق و ما يجري مجراه من الفضول المندفعة من منافذ محسوسة كالأنف و الأذن و العين كما في الدموع - أو غير محسوسة كالمسام و فضلة الهضم الرابع يندفع بعضها بالمني و يخرج بعضها بما ينبت من زوائد البدن كالشعور و الأظفار و الأوساخ و ما يدفعه الطبيعة كالأورام المنفجرة و غيرها

فصل (٥) في تحديد القوة الغاذية و النامية حدا بحسب الحقيقة

قد علمت من طريقتنا أن الحدود قد تكون للماهيات و قد تكون للوجودات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٤

و الفرق بين الماهية و الوجود أمر قد فرغنا من بيانه و الحد للماهية لا يكون إلا بأجزائها - كالجنس و الفصل و الحد بحسب الوجود لا يمكن بالأجزاء إذ الوجود لا جزء له فهو إما بالفاعل و الغاية إن كان تاماً أو بالفعل إن كان ناقصاً لما أشرنا إليه سابقاً أن حد الوجود و برهانه شيء واحد و برهان اللم أقوى من برهان الإن.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول كل قوة من القوى فرد من الوجود لبساطتها و القوى قد يعرف بأفاعيلها فالقوة الغذائية يعرف بما يصدر عنها فيقال هي التي تحيل الغذاء إلى مشابهة المغتذي لتخلف بدل ما يتحلل.

فنقول في بيان هذا الحد إن كل قوة لا محالة مبدأ تغير في هذا العالم فلذلك التغير له صورة و مادة و للفاعل في فعلها غاية فالصورة هاهنا هي الاستحالة إلى مشابهة المغتذي و المادة هاهنا هي الغذاء و الغذائية تخلف البدل للمتحلل فكانا قلنا القوة الغذائية لفعل الفلاني في المحل الفلاني للغاية الفلانية و أما النامية فقد ذكر في حدها أنها الزائدة في أقطار الجسم الطبيعي ليلبغ تمام النشوء على التناسب الطبيعي زيادة في الأجزاء الأصلية فقولنا الزائدة في أقطار الجسم احتراز عن الزيادات الصناعية فإن الصانع إذا أخذ مقداراً من الشمعة فإن زاد على طوله و عرضه نقص من عمقه و بالعكس و قولنا على التناسب الطبيعي احتراز عن الزيادات الغير الطبيعية مثل الاستسقاء و سائر الأورام - و قولنا ليلبغ تمام النشوء احتراز عن السمن و قولنا زيادة في الأجزاء الأصلية تنبيه على العلة الحقيقية للفرق بين السمن و النمو و ذلك لأن النمو حركة في جواهر الأعضاء - فلا جرم القوة المحركة يمدّها و يزيد في جواهرها و أما السمن فإنه زيادة حاصلة - بمداخلة الأجسام الغريبة في الأعضاء كأنها الملتصقة بها.

ثم إن التغذي و النمو يتمان بأمور ثلاثة الأول تحصيل غذاء شبيه بالمغتذي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٥

و النامي في الماهية بالقوة و الثاني إصاقها بهما على ما هو المشهور و الثالث تشبيهها بهما بالفعل ثم إن كان المقدار الوارد على جواهر الأعضاء الأصلية مساوياً لما تحلل منها فذلك فعل الغذائية و إن كان أزيد فذلك فعل النامية و عند هذا لفتل أن يشكك و يقول إن الغذائية و النامية قوة واحدة و لا فرق بينهما إلا أن الغذائية تفعل هذه الأمور بمقدار ما يتحلل و النامية تفعل أزيد مما يتحلل فالتفاوت بينهما بالكمال و النقص فإن القوة إذا كانت قوية على فعل كانت قوية على مثله فإذا كان الجزء الزائد مثلاً للجزء الأصلي و كانت الغذائية قوية على تحصيل الجزء الأصلي و جب أن تكون قوية على تحصيل الجزء الزائد عند ما كانت شديدة القوة فعلى هذه القوة الغذائية هي المنمية إلا أنها في ابتداء الأمر تكون قوية فتكون وافية بإيراد البدل الأصلي و الزيادة جميعاً و بعد ذلك تضعف فلا تورد الزيادة بل يورد الأصلي.

و مما يدل على ذلك أن القوة الغذائية في سن الانحطاط و الذبول تورد أقل مما يتحلل - و قد كانت في سن الوقوف تورد مثل ما يتحلل فيكون إيرادها وقت الوقوف أكثر من إيرادها وقت الذبول فإذا كانت القوة الواحدة جاز أن يختلف إيرادها بالزيادة و النقصان - فهذا شك قوي.

أقول في جوابه إن اختلاف الغايات الطبيعية تدل على اختلاف القوى لكن غاية القوة الغذائية تخالف غاية المنمية فهما قوتان مغايرتان.

بيان ذلك أن غاية فعل الغذائية في إيراد البدل سد الخلل الواقع من التحليل - ألا ترى أن الحيوان لا يطلب الغذاء إلا بعد استيلاء حرارة الجوع على المعدة و البدن على التحليل فعند ذلك يشتهي الطعام و غاية فعل النامية تمديد الأعضاء على نسبة مخصوصة - و ليس أن زيادة إيراد البدل على ما يتحلل في كل وقت توجب زيادة النمو و لا أصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٦

النمو قرب وقت كان إيراد الغذاء أكثر و فعل النمو أقل و رب وقت كان بالعكس - فإننا قد نشاهد كثيرا أن بعض الغلمان و الجوارى في زمان البلوغ اتفق أن كان مريضا مرضا شديدا يعطل الغذائية عن فعلها و مع ذلك ينمو هذا المريض نموا بالغا و يطول قامته طولا متفاوتا بالقياس إلى ما سبق من الزمان فإذن حيث وقع التخالف في مقتضى هاتين القوتين و لو في بعض الأوقات علم أنهما متغايران ذاتا لا بمجرد الشدة و الضعف إذ لو كان التفاوت بمجرد الكمال و النقص لما وقع التخالف إلا بذلك لكن التخالف قد يقع بالعكس من ذلك يعني قد يقوى النمو و ينقص التغذية و قد يقوى التغذية و ينقص النمو فهما متغايران ذاتا لتغايرهما فعلا و غاية فثبت ما ادعيناه.

شك و تبصرة:

إن من الناس من ادعى أن الغذائية نار و احتج عليه بأن الغذائية تغذو و النار تغذو فالغذية نار و هذا مع فساد صورة القياس حيث وقع الاستنتاج من الموجبتين في الشكل الثاني بطل قولهم النار تغذو لأن النار لا تغذو بل تتولد و تتصعد بطبعها و إذا صعدت استولى عليها الهواء البارد فأفسدها فليست هناك نار واحدة مغذية نعم فعل الغذائية يشبه فعل النار في النضج و الإحالة.

و من الناس من ذهب إلى أن في الأعضاء فرجا يملؤها القوة النامية و هو باطل كما وقعت الإشارة إليه فإن ملا الفرج لا يوجب نمو الأعضاء و ليس ما ذكره الشيخ في الشفا و صوبه بعض الفضلاء من أن القوة النامية يفرق اتصال العضو و يدخل في تلك المسام الأجزاء الغذائية و هكذا القول في الاغتذاء مرضيا عندنا و ذلك لأن تفرق الاتصال مؤلم بالذات و يستحيل أن تكون الطبيعة أو النفس تفعل فعلا طبيعيا تقتضي أمرا منافيا بالذات لطبيعة الجسم الذي هي فيه بحيث يوجب دوام الألم لو كانت هناك قوة مدركة - و كان الإدراك به حاصلا بالفعل كما مر ذكره في مبحث أن تفرق الاتصال مؤلم بالذات - و ذلك لأن القوة الواحدة لا تفعل و لا تقتضي أثرين متنافيين بل الحق كما شيدنا أركانه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٧

من أن النمو حركة متصلة في الكم و الحركة معناه خروج الشيء من القوة إلى الفعل - على سبيل التدرج و معنى التدرج هاهنا أن يكون للمتحرك في كل آن فردا آخر من المقولة فليس في حركة النمو مقدار ثابت و مقدار آخر وارد عليه سواء كان بالمداخلة أو بغير المداخلة

فصل (٦) في سبب وقوف القوى كالنامية و الغذائية في ضرورة الموت

و لنذكر أولا ما وقع الاحتجاج به من القوم في هذا الباب ثم نذكر قاعدة كلية - من العلم الإلهي و الفلسفة الكلية التي أفادنا الله ينكشف بها هذا المطلب و نحوه.

فالذي ذكرناه في وقوف النامية

أن الأبدان مخلوقة من الدم والمني فلا محالة يكون كل مولود جسماً رطباً كما هو مشاهد في الأجنة التي في بطون أمهاتها ثم لا يزال يستولي عليه الجفاف يسيراً يسيراً وقد عرفت أن النمو لا يحصل إلا عند تمدد الأعضاء - وذلك بنفوذ الغذاء في المسام كما هو المشهور و ذلك لا يمكن إلا إذا كانت الأعضاء لينّة - فأمّا إذا صلبت وجفت لم يكن ذلك فلا جرم يستمر النمو من أول الولادة إلى آخر الوقت الذي تصلب الأعضاء وجفت فحينئذ تقف النامية هذا ما ذكر في سبب وقوف النامية.

و أما الذي قالوه في وقوف الغذائية و حلول الأجل فوجوه

الأول أن القوة الغذائية قوة جسمانية

فلا يكون أفعالها إلا متناهية وهذا منقوض بالنفوس الفلكية لأنها قوى جسمانية سيما عند أصحاب المعلم الأول القائلين بأن نفوسها قوى منطبعة في أجسامها مع أنها غير متناهية الأفعال عندهم والذي وقع الاعتذار من الشيخ الرئيس عنه هناك أنها وإن كانت جسمانية لكنها لما سنع عليها من نور العقل المفارق - تكون قوية على الأفعال الغير المتناهية فكتب تلميذه بهمنيار إليه فقال إذا جوزت ذلك فلم لا يجوز أن تكون القوى البدنية وإن كانت متناهية إلا أنها تقوى على أفعال غير متناهية لما سنع عليها من أنوار العقل المفارق فأجاب عنه أن ذلك محال لكون البدن مركباً من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٨

الطبائع المتضادة فقد علم من هذا الجواب أن التعويل على مجرد وجوب التناهي في القوى الجسمانية غير صحيح فلننظر إلى حال التعويل على كون البدن مركباً من الأسطقسات ولنحقق ما في هذا الوجه.

فنقول الوجه الثاني

أن الشيخ ذكر في القانون أن الرطوبة الغريزية بعد سن الوقوف لا بد وأن تأخذ في الانتقاص المتأدي إلى الانحلال بالكلية وذلك لاستيلاء الحرارة - على الرطوبة الغريزية بالتحليل ومتى انحلت الرطوبة فلا بد من انطفاء الحرارة الغريزية - فحينئذ يحصل الموت.

و إنما قلنا إن الرطوبة لا بد وأن يأخذ في الانتقاص لأمر ثلاثة - أحدها استيلاء الهواء المحيط بها وهي لحرارتها يفني الرطوبة وثانيها معاونة الحرارة الغريزية من داخل على ذلك وثالثها معاضدة الحركات البدنية والنفسانية.

فإن قيل لم لا يجوز أن تورد الغذائية بدل ما يتحلل من الرطوبات.

قلنا هب أن هذه القوة تورد في سن الكهولة مثل ما كانت تورد في سن الشباب إلا أن المتحلل وقت الكهولة أكثر من المتحلل وقت الشباب وإذا كان كذلك لم يكن ما تورده الغذائية في هذا الوقت مساوياً لما يتحلل بل أقل منه فلا جرم ينتهي إلى النقصان - وذلك يؤدي إلى الفساد والبطلان والحاصل أنه كلما كان السن أكبر كان تأثير المجففات الثلاثة أكثر فكان الجفاف أكثر وكانت الحرارة أقل فكان ضعف الغذائية أكثر - واستمرار ذلك مما يؤدي إلى الانقطاع فيعرض الموت.

و يمكن أن يعود السائل ويقول إن مقدار التحلل كان في زمان الشباب مساوياً لمقدار الوارد في وقت الشباب فإن لم يكن مساوياً له في وقت الكهولة لكان إما لأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٩٩

المحلل صار أقوى فصار التحليل أكثر أو لأن الغاذية صارت أضعف فصار الغذاء الوارد أقل والأول باطل لأن المحلل ليس إلا الأمور الثلاثة المذكورة وهي الحار الداخلي والحار الخارجي والحركات البدنية والنفسانية وهذه الأسباب الثلاثة كان وجودها في زمان الشباب مثل وجودها في زمان الكهولة وإذا لم يزد المحلل استحالة أن يزداد التحلل والثاني أيضا باطل لأن الغاذية لا تصير ضعيفة إلا لنقصان الحرارة ولا ينتقص الحرارة إلا لنقصان الرطوبة فإذا جعلنا انتقاص الرطوبة بسبب ضعف الغاذية لزم الدور وهو محال.

وما قيل من أن المحلل وإن كان وقت الكهولة هي الأمور الثلاثة التي كانت موجودة في زمان الشباب ولكن مدة تأثيرها في زمان الكهولة أطول من مدة تأثيرها في زمان الشباب وذلك لأن الضعيف قد يكون أقوى أثرا من القوي إذا كان أطول مدة من الآخر وإذا كان كذلك فأسباب التجفيف تأثيرها في الكهل أدوم من تأثيرها في الشباب - فالجفاف فيه أكثر منه في الشباب.

فكلام لا حاصل له لأن دوام العمل كما هو حاصل في سبب الجفاف كذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٠

حاصل في السبب المورد للغذاء فكما أن دوام فاعل التجفيف يعطي زيادة الجفاف - فكذلك دوام فاعل التغذية يعطي زيادة الرطوبة الغذائية المزيلة للجفاف.

وقريب من هذا الوجه ما نقل عن سقراط أن فعل الحرارة الغريزية في المني - إذا وقع في الرحم يشبه فعل حرارة التنور في الرغيف الذي يلتصق به فإن حرارته تفعل في ظاهره حتى يحدث أولا شيئا كالقشر ثم يعمل في الباطن من تلك القشرة وتشويه حتى يحصل النضج وكذا الحرارة التي في المني تجعل أولا قشرا ثم تقشو تلك الحرارة بحسب مقدار بدن المولود وتنسبط فيه حسب انبساطه في الطول والعرض والعمق فما كانت الرطوبة في جوهره قليلة استكملت صورته بفعل المصورة في ستة أشهر وما كانت الرطوبة في جوهره وافرة غالبة تمت الصورة في زمان أكثر حتى يبلغ زمان الحمل في الكثرة حسب زيادة الرطوبة إلى ثلاثمائة وأربعة أيام فالمولود يولد والرطوبة غالبة عليه - ولذلك لا يقدر على الانتصاب والانبعاث في الحركات ثم لا يزال الحرارة الغريزية التي جعلها الباربي مركوزة فيه عاملة في تجفيف رطوبات الأعضاء رويدا رويدا فيصير فيه أولا تهيو للقعود فتجلس ثم الانبعاث من غير انتصاب ثم للقيام ثم للمشي على حسب تقليل الرطوبات ومن هذا الباب يتفاوت أوقات المشي في الأطفال وهكذا تفعل الحرارة الغريزية في بدن الحيوان إلى أن تفنى رطوبته بالكلية فتتطفىء الحرارة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠١

لانتفاء ما تقوم به ويحصل الموت فسبب الموت بعينه سبب الحياة وذلك لأنه لو لم تكن الحرارة غالبة على الرطوبة لم تحصل الحياة ثم لزم من غلبة الحرارة على الرطوبة فناء الرطوبة ومن فناء الرطوبة فناء الحرارة وكان تقدير الله سبحانه الحرارة بحيث يستولي على الرطوبة سببا للحياة أولا وللموت ثانيا هذا ما نقل عنه في شرح القانون وقد مر ما فيه فتأمل فإنه موضع تأمل فإنه بعد الاستقصاء يعرف صحته لإرجاعه إلى ما سنحققه

الوجه الثالث

ما وجدناه في كلام المحققين و هو أن السبب الموجب للموت في جميع الحيوانات هو أن البدل الذي تورده الغاذية و إن كان كافيا في قيامه بدلا عن ما يتحلل - و فاضلا على الكفاية بحسب الكمية لكن غير كاف بحسب الكيفية. و بيان ذلك أن الرطوبة الغريزية و الأصلية إنما تخمرت و نضجت في أوعية الغذاء أولا ثم في أوعية المنى ثانيا ثم في الأرحام ثالثا و التي توردها الغاذية لم تتخمر و لم تنضج إلا في الأولى دون الآخرين فلم يكمل امتزاجها و لم تصل إلى مرتبة المبدل عنها فلم تقم مقامها كما يجب بل صارت قوتها أنقص من قوة الأولى - كمن أنقص زيت سراج و أورد بدله ماء فما دامت الكيفية الأولى الأصلية غالبية في الممتزج على الثانية المكتسبة كانت الحرارة الغريزية آخذة في زيادة الاشتعال موردة على الممتزج أكثر مما يتحلل فينمو الممتزج ثم إذا صارت مكسورة السورة بظهور الكيفية الثانية وقفت الحرارة الغريزية و ما قدرت على أن تورده أكثر مما يتحلل - و إذا غلبت الثانية انحط الممتزج و ضعفت الحرارة إلى أن لا تبقى أثر صالح للكيفية الأولى فيقع الموت ضرورة و ظهر من ذلك أن الرطوبة الغريزية الأصلية من أول تكونها آخذة في النقصان بحسب الكيفية و ذلك هو السبب الموجب لفساد الممتزج - و يعلم منه أن الغاذية لو كانت غير متناهية و كانت دائمة الإيراد لبدل ما يتحلل على السواء لا بمقدار واحد بل بمقدار ما يتحلل لما كان البدل تقاوم المبدل من حيث الكيف - و إن قاومه من حيث الكم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٢

أقول هذا الوجه أيضا ضعيف إقناعي لوجوه - الأول أنا لا نسلم أن مزاج المنى أقوى و أشرف من أمزجة المواد الحيوانية التي تكونت بعده إذ لو كان مزاجه أعدل و أشرف لكانت الكمالات النفسانية فائضة عليه في الابتداء فيكون ذا حياة و نطق و اللازم ظاهر البطلان.

الثاني أن مادة المنى غير موجودة في بدن الحيوان بالجزئية حتى يكون الممتزج بعضه على مزاج المنى و بعضه على مزاج الوارد بدلا عما يتحلل حتى يقال إن مزاج المنى أقوى في الكيف و مزاج الوارد عليه أضعف. الثالث أنا لا نسلم أن مبنى جودة النضج و التخمر و قوة المزاج أن يكون حصوله في تلك الأوعية إذ رب مزاج اتفق وجوده في غير تلك المواضع و يكون أحكم و أقوى مما يكون فيها كما يشاهد في الحيوانات التي يحصل بعضها لا بالتوالد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٣

بل بالتولد و مع ذلك يكون مزاج كثير مما يتكون بهذا الوجه أقوى من الذي يتكون بطريق التوالد فعلى هذا يجوز أن يكون مزاج ما يورده القوة الغاذية من البدل أقوى و أحكم من مزاج ما ينقص بالتحليل من المبدل منه فلم يقيم حجة على ضرورة الموت.

فهذه هي وجوه ثلاثة ذكروها في ضرورة الموت مع ما يقدر لها و قد أشار الشيخ إلى هذه الوجوه الثلاثة في كليات القانون بقوله ثم يجب أن يعلم أن الحرارة بعد سن الوقوف يأخذ في الانتقاص لانتشاف الهواء المحيط بمادتها التي هي الرطوبة و معاونة الحرارة الغريزية من داخل و معاضدة الحركات البدنية و النفسانية الضرورية في المعيشة - و عجز

الطبيعة عن مقاومة ذلك دائما فإن جميع القوى الجسمانية متناهية كما برهن عليه في العلم الطبيعي فلا يكون فعلها في الإيراد دائما و لو كانت هذه القوة غير متناهية و كانت دائمة الإيراد لبدل ما يتحلل على السواء لا بمقدار واحد لكن لما كان التحلل ليس بمقدار واحد بل يزداد دائما كل يوم لما كان البدل تقاوم المتحلل و لكان التحلل يفني الرطوبة فكيف و الأمران متظاهران على تهيئة نقصان و التراجع و إذا كان كذلك فواجب ضرورة أن تفنى المادة فتنتطفئ الحرارة و خصوصا إذ يعين على إطفائها بسبب عوز المادة سبب آخر و هي الرطوبة الغريبة التي تحدث دائما لعدم الهضم فتعين على انطفائها من وجهين أحدهما بالخبو و الغمر و الآخر لمضادة الكيفية لأن تلك الكيفية بلغمية باردة و هذا هو الموت الطبيعي انتهى فقله ثم يجب أن يعلم إلى قوله و معاضدة الحركات البدنية و النفسانية الضرورية في المعيشة إشارة إلى الوجه الثاني و قوله و عجز الطبيعة إلى قوله فلا يكون فعلها في الإيراد دائما- إشارة إلى الوجه الأول و قوله و لو كانت هذه القوة إلى قوله و خصوصا إذ يعين على إطفائها إلى آخر الكلام إشارة إلى ثالث الوجوه الثلاثة.

الوجه الرابع

أنه لو بقيت أشخاص الناس بلا نهاية لكان القوم الذين سبقونا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٤

بالوجود قد أفنوا المادة التي منها التكون فلم يبق لنا مادة يمكن أن نوجد و نتكون منها و لو بقيت لنا مادة لم يبق لنا مكان و رزق و إن قلنا نبقي نحن و الذين بعدنا على العدم دائما و يبقى الأولون على الوجود دائما دون اللاحقين فذلك مناف للحكمة إذ ليسوا بدوام الوجود أولى منا بل العدل يقتضي أن يكون لكل حظ من الوجود- فوجب أن يموت السابق بالوجود ليكون لوجود المتأخر مكان و هذا الوجه أيضا إقناعي ضعيف لأنه لا يدل على وجوب الموت لكل أحد.

الوجه الخامس

أنه لو لم يكن الموت واجبا لجاز أن يبقى الظالم المتحكم في الدنيا دائما فيدوم شره و إفساده و لم يطمع المظلوم في إنصافه من ظالمه و ذلك لا محالة مؤد إلى الفساد و هذا الوجه أيضا ضعيف لا يقتضي وجوب الموت لكل من في الدنيا- و وجود الظالم لا يخلو من مصلحة و كما جاز دوام نوع الظالم و ظلمه في هذا العالم- كما نرى و نعلم فليجز دوام شخص أو أشخاص منه و مكافاة المظلوم يمكن بطريق آخر غير موت الظالم.

الوجه السادس

أنه لو لم يكن الموت و المعاد واجبين كان الأتقياء و الأخيار أشقى الناس لأنهم يكونون قد تركوا اللذات في الدنيا من غير عوض و ذلك مما يدعو إلى الفسق و ارتكاب اللذات و الإعراض عما سواها و هو لا محالة شر و فساد- و هذا الوجه أيضا كالوجهين السابقين من الأسباب الغائية للموت و ليس شيء منها سبب فاعلي و لا سبب غائي بالذات و كلامنا في السبب الذاتي الذي يصلح أن يكون وسطا في البرهان و هو إما سبب فاعلي قريب كما في العلم الطبيعي و إما سبب غائي أو فاعلي بعيد كما في العلم الإلهي و الوجوه الثلاثة ليست من الأسباب الفاعلية الطبيعية للموت و لا من الأسباب الغائية الذاتية بل العرضية اللاحقة و العرضي اللاحق لا يصح كونه مبدءا للبرهان بل للخطابة و ما يشبهها و إنما قلنا تلك الأمور من توابع غاية الموت لا عينها لأن غاية الموت بالحقيقة وجود النشأة الباقية و وصول النفوس إلى منازلها الذاتية و درجاتها أو دركاتهما في السعادة أو الشقاوة لا لأجل أن مادة الأرض تبقى- لتكوين الباقين بموت

السابقين و لا لأن المظلوم ينتصف من الظالم و ينتقم منه و لا لأن

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٥

الصلحاء الأتقياء يصل إليهم عوض آلامهم و محنهم فى الدنيا بل هذه من التوابع اللاحقة لغاية الموت فإذا علمت ضعف هذه الوجوه فلنذكر وجها قاطع الدلالة لضرورة الموت و هو أن الموجودات الممكنة بحسب الاحتمال العقلي إما مبدعة أو كائنة و بعبارة أخرى إما تامة أو ناقصة و المبدع لا محالة باق لبقاء سببه الفاعلي و الغائي و أما الكائن فكل كائن فاسد لأن ما هو سببه التام أمر يدخل فيه الحركة و الزمان و كل حركة لا بد من انقضائها و عند انقضاء السبب أو جزئه لا بد و أن ينعدم المعلول المسبب فلا محالة جميع ما هو كائن فاسد و لا شك أن أبدان الحيوانات من الأمور الكائنة المتجددة - فلا محالة أنها فاسدة تعرض لها الموت ثم نقول الموجودات التامة باقية لأنها لم توجد لأن تكون مادة أو وسيلة لموجود آخر و لذلك انحصر نوعها فى شخصها و أما الموجودات الناقصة فهي خلقت بالطبع لأن يتكون عنها موجود آخر فهي أسباب معدة لموجودات أخرى - فلو فرض دوامها لم تكن ناقصة بل تامة و قد فرضت ناقصة هذا خلف و اعلم أن الموت طبيعي

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٦

لا لأجل أن الأجسام لا يحتمل الدوام لما عرفت أنها ممكنة الدوام على سبيل التبدل و الإمداد فوقاني و لا لأجل أن القوة الغذائية لا تورد الغذاء دائما بحسب الكيفية أو الكمية لما عرفت و هن هذه القواعد و أشباهها بل لأن القوى و النفوس دائمة التوجه و الانتقال من مرتبة فى الوجود إلى مرتبة أخرى و قد بين فى العلم الإلهي إثبات الغايات للحركات و الأفعال الطبيعية و قد برهن فى مباحث العلل على أن الغاية الحقيقية التي يترتب على الفعل لا بد و أن يستكمل بها ذات الفاعل بذاته و جوهره - فالغاية بالحقيقة هي راجعة إلى الفاعل و الغاية العرضية هي التي من توابع الغاية الحقيقية - من المنافع المترتبة عليها كحصول الولد للقوة الشهوية و حصول المواليد للقوى الفلكية - و هذه غايات عرضية و الغاية الحقيقية إما لقوى النبات فصيروتها غذاء للحيوان - و إما لقوى الحيوان فلحصول الأغذية و غيرها للإنسان و إما لقوى الإنسان فغاية القوة المحركة البدنية تحصيل مادة الغذاء و النماء للبدن و غاية القوة المدركة تحصيل مادة القوة العاقلة أو القوة النفسانية من المتخيلات و الموهومات و أوائل العقلية فالنفس

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٧

الإنسانية إذا خرجت من القوة إلى الفعل إما فى السعادة العقلية الملكية أو فى الشقاوة الشيطانية أو السبعية أو البهيمية انتقلت عن هذه النشأة إلى نشأة أخرى بالطبع و إذا ارتحلت عن البدن عرض الموت و هذا هو الأجل الطبيعي المشار إليه فى الكتاب الإلهي - **كل نفس ذائقة الموت*** و هو غير الآجال الاخترامية التي تحصل بعروض الأسباب الاتفاقية و القواطع القسرية و بالجملة الموت طبيعي للبدن و معناه مفارقة النفوس إياه مفارقة فطرية و ترك استعمالها للبدن لخروجها من القوة إلى الفعل بحسب نشأة ثانية - و صيروتها إما سعيدة فرحانة مسرورة بذاتها كالملائكة و إما شقية محترقة بنار الله الموقدة التي تطلع على الأفئدة كالشياطين و الأشرار و إما مغفورة بغفران الله سليمة الصدر عن

الأغراض والغشاوات و أما سائر النفوس الحيوانية فهي محترقة بنيران الطبيعة ما دامت السماوات والأرض إلا ما شاء الله فينجو من العذاب و يتخلص من العقاب فمثل الدنيا كالمزرعة و أرحام النسوان كالحرث **نَسَاؤُكُمْ حَرْثُ لَكُمْ** و النطف في الأرحام كالبذور في المزارع و الولادة كالنبت و أيام الشباب كالنشوء و أيام الكهولة كالنضج و أيام الشيخوخة كاليبس و الجفاف و بعد هذه الحالات لا بد من الحصاد و هو الموت و زمان القبر و الصراط كالبيدر فكما أن البیادر يجمع فيها الغلات من كل جنس و تداس و تنقي و ترمي القشور و التبن و الورق من الثمر و الحب و يجعل بعضها علفا للدواب و حطباً للنيران و بعضها لبوبا صالحة فهكذا يجتمع في الآخرة الأمم كلهم من الأولين و الآخرين من كل دين **قُلْ إِنَّ الْأَوَّلِينَ وَالْآخِرِينَ لَمَجْمُوعُونَ إِلَى مِيقَاتٍ يَوْمَ مَعْلُومٍ** و ينكشف الأسرار يوم تبلى السرائر و يميز الله الخبيث من الطيب فيجعل الله الخبيث بعضه على بعض فيركمه جميعاً فيجعله في جهنم و ينجي الله الذين اتقوا بمفازتهم لا يمسهم السوء و لا هم يحزنون و هذا كله مستفاد من قوله تعالى في عدة مواضع من كتابه الكريم

و من قول نبيه ع: الدنيا مزرعة الآخرة

فهذا بيان حكمة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٨

الموت بالبرهان و القرآن و هو رحمة من الله لأوليائه و تحفة للمؤمن فلاجل ذلك يتمنى أولياء الله الموت كما قال تعالى توبخا لمن ظن أنه منهم بغير حق **قُلْ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ هَادُوا إِنْ زَعَمْتُمْ أَنَّكُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ لِلَّهِ مِنْ دُونِ النَّاسِ فَتَمَنَّوْا الْمَوْتَ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ** و حق للنفوس البشرية و غيرها تمنى الموت طبعاً فإنها كالصناع و الأبدان و الأجساد كالدكاكين و الأعضاء و قواها كالآلات و الأدوات و إنما يجتهد الصانع في دكانه لأجل غرض فإذا تم غرضه و بلغ أمنيته ترك دكانه و رمى من يده أدواته و استراح من العمل و هكذا النفوس إذا أحكمت ما يراد منها بكسوتها مع الجسد و خرجت كل فيما خلق من القوة إلى الفعل اشتغلت بذاتها و كان هذا الجسد وبالا عليها و مانعا من الخروج إلى منازلها و معانها فإن لها معادن كمعادن الذهب و الفضة كما ورد في الحديث فإذا من الموت حكمة و رحمة من الله تعالى كما قال تعالى **ثُمَّ يَمِيتُكُمْ ثُمَّ يُحْيِيكُمْ ثُمَّ إِلَيْهِ تُرْجَعُونَ** و قال شيخ الأنبياء إبراهيم الخليل على نبينا و عليه السلام - **وَالَّذِي يَمِيتُنِي ثُمَّ يُحْيِينِي**

فصل (٧) في تحقيق الكلام في القوة المصورة

و لنقدم ما قيل فيها

ثم نعقب ذلك بذكر ما هو الحق و لا نستحي منه.

قال أفضل المتأخرين و المصورة عندي باطلة

لامتناع صدور هذه الأفعال عن قوة عديمة الشعور.

و قد أشرنا إلى كيفية شعور القوى بذاتها و بما يصدر عن ذاتها.

و قال بعض من سبق عليه أن هذه الأفعال و ما يجري مجراها

مما ينسب إلى القوى النباتية صادرة عن الملائكة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٠٩

و سيظهر لك بعد عرفانك بصنوف ملائكة الله و كيفية تأثيرها بإذن ربهم أن طبقاتهم العالية أرفع قدرا من أن يفعلوا مثل هذه الأفاعيل الدنية على سبيل المباشرة بلا استخدام للسدنة و الأعوان و قد بين أن القوى المباشرة للأفاعيل المتغيرة لا محالة جسمانية و التي تدرك المعقولات و الخيرات الحكمية و المنافع الكلية هي المفارقة الذات عن الجسمانيات فالكلام عائد في القوى المباشرة كيف تفعل هذه التصويرات و التشكيلات -

و أكثر المتكلمين نسبوا هذه الأفاعيل كلها إلى الله تعالى من غير واسطة

و لا مخصص كالأشاعرة لتجويزهم ترجيح الفعل من الإرادة بلا مرجح و قد علمت ما فيه.

و منهم من قال بالتوليد كالمعتزلة و هو أيضا خارج عن التوحيد في الأفعال.

و أصل الإشكال هاهنا هو أنه لا يجوز أن يكون خلقة الأعضاء و شكلها - و مقدارها و وضعها و خشونتها و ملاستها و صلابتها و لينتها صادرة عن القوة المصورة - لأن المني متشابه الأجزاء في الحقيقة فالقوة الموجودة فيه تكون سارية في جميع أجزائه و القوة الواحدة لا تفعل في المادة الواحدة إلا فعلا واحدا متشابهها فيجب أن يكون الشكل الذي يفيد المصورة هو الكرة فالمصورة الحيوانية إن كانت قوة واحدة - كان الحيوان كرة واحدة و إن كانت متعددة يفعل كل منها في بعض من مادة متشابهة الأبعاد كان الحيوان جملة كرات متعددة و قد تأكدت هذه الشبهة لما ذهب إليه المعلم الأول و شيعته إلى أن المني متشابهة الأعضاء لانفصاله عن الأنثيين فقط لا عن جملة البدن و كون كل جزء محسوس منه مشاركا لكله في الاسم و الحد و ذهب بقراط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٠

و تابعوه إلى أنه ليس متشابه الأجزاء لأن المني يخرج من كل البدن فيخرج من اللحم شبيه به و يخرج من العظم شبيه به و على هذا من جميع الأجزاء و هذه الأعضاء غير متشابهة لاختلاف حقائقها باختلاف الأعضاء المنفصلة هي عنها و غير متشابهة للكل و هو ظاهر على هذا التقدير فلا يكون الكل متشابه الأجزاء بل متشابه الامتزاج لأن الحس لا يميز بين تلك الأجزاء و إن كان في نفس الأمر متميزا بعضها عن بعض.

أقول التعليل في اختلاف أعضاء الحيوان باختلاف أجزاء المني مما ليست فيه فائدة في دفع الإشكال بل يعود المحذور المهروب عنه مع زيادة محال آخر و هو كون المني حيوانا تام الأعضاء بالفعل و ذلك لأن اختلاف أجزاء المني إن كان بسبب اختلاف ما ينفصل عنه أعني الأعضاء و كان ذلك الاختلاف أيضا لاختلاف أجزاء المني - كان اختلاف أعضاء الحيوان لاختلاف أعضاء الحيوان و هو يستلزم إما الدور أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١١

التسلسل و كلاهما محالان.

و اعلم أن استناد اختلاف الصور و الأشكال مطلقا إلى المادة أو الجزء المادي من سخيף الأقوال

إذ المادة في كل شيء أمر مبهم لا قوام له إلا بالصورة القائمة بها - فاستناد صور الأعضاء و اختلافها في الحيوان إلى النطفة في المحالية كاستناد صور العالم - و اختلافها إلى الهيولى الأولى المشتركة و ليست فيها إلا جهة قبول الأشياء و

إمكانها لا جهة فعليتها و تخصيصها و وجوبها.

و ربما استدل على كون المنى غير متشابه الأجزاء بما استدل به بقراط و تابعوه- كما حكى الشيخ في الفصل الثاني من المقالة الحادي عشر من الشفا بقوله الذي دعاهم إلى هذا الظن ثلاثة أمور

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٢

أحدها عموم اللذة بجميع البدن و لو لا خروج المنى من الجميع لاختصت اللذة بالعضو الخارج منه المنى. و ثانيها المشاكلة الكلية فإنه لو لا أن كل عضو يرسل قسطا لكانت المشابهة بحسب عضو واحد. و ثالثها مشاكلة عضو الولد لعضو ناقص من والديه أو عضو ذي شامة أو زيادة- قالوا و إذا ثبت أن المنى جسم مركب من أجسام مختلفة الطبائع فالذي هو نازل من اللحم يتكون لحما و النازل من العظم يتكون عظما فلا يجب أن يكون الحيوان كالكرة.

و الجواب من وجوه ثلاثة- أحدها ما مرت الإشارة إليه من لزوم الدور أو التسلسل. و الثاني أيضا ما قد أشرنا إليه من أن المادة ما به الشيء بالقوة و هي في كل شيء أمر مجمل في ذاته مبهم في جوهره لا تحصل لها بالفعل إلا بمخصصات خارجية و الكلام ليس إلا في سبب تخصيص المادة الحيوانية باختلاف صور الأعضاء و كون المنى مختلف الأجزاء لا يدفع هذا الإشكال لأننا لو فرضنا المنى مركبا من أجزاء مختلفة- فننقل الكلام إلى سبب اختلاف تلك الأجزاء و أيضا إن كل مركب من أجزاء مختلفة غير متشابهة فلا بد أن يوجد فيه أجزاء بسيطة متشابهة و لا بد أن يكون في كل منها- قوة بسيطة في مادة بسيطة و هي لا تفعل إلا أمرا واحدا متشابهة فيجب أن يكون فعلها كرة حتى يكون المتولد من منى كرات مضمومة بعضها إلى بعض و الوجه الثالث أنه قدح أرسطاطاليس في صحة هذه الأدلة و صحة هذا المذهب و هو كون المنى نازلا من جميع الأعضاء و بين ذلك بوجوه عشرة مذكورة في الشفا منقولة في شرح كليات القانون.

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٣

الأول أن المشاكلة قد تقع في الظفر و ليس يخرج منها شيء- الثاني أن المولود قد يشبه جدا بعيدا و ليس يبقى له زرع و حكي أن واحدة ولدت من حبشي بنتا بيضاء ثم إن تلك ولدت سوداء. الثالث أن الزرع ليس يرسله الأعضاء المركبة من حيث هي آلية و يقع فيها مشاكلة. الرابع لو كان المنى بالصفة الموصوفة لكان حيوانا لأنه فيه من كل عضو جزء- و تلك الأجزاء إن كانت موضوعة وضعها الواجب فالمنى إنسان صغير و إن لم تكن مترتبة فما الذي رتبها. الخامس أن المرأة إذا أنزلت عند إنزال الرجل فيكون في الرحم منيان هما إنسانان. السادس ما المانع من أن تولد المرأة إذا أنزلت وحدها إذا كان في منيها هذه الأعضاء مفصلة. السابع أن الإنسان قد يولد الذكران ثم يتغير فيصير يولد الإناث و ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٤

بسبب استحالة المزاج و تغيره و ليس لأن العضو تارة خرج منه و فيه عضو الذكور- و تارة خرج و فيه عضو الإناث و إذا جاز أن يكون ذلك في الذكورة و الأنوثة جاز أن يكون في سائر الأجزاء بسبب المزاج لا بسبب نقل الجزء.

الثامن أن كثيرا من الحيوانات يتولد من غير جنسه فلا يمكن أن يكون ذلك كما قالوه.

التاسع قد يسفد الحيوان سفادا واحدا فيتولد منه حيوانات أكثر من واحد- و ربما كانوا ذكورا و إناثا.

العاشر الغصن من الشجر الذي لم يثمر بعد و يغرس فيثمر و كان يجب أن لا يثمر لأن الشجرة التي اتخذ منها لم يثمر و الأجزاء المأخوذة منها يجب أن تكون غير مثمرة- اللهم إلا أن يقال أجزاء الثمرة مخلوطة بأجزاء الغصن على ما يقوله أصحاب الخليط- فإن كان هكذا فلا يبعد أن يكون في الحيوان كذلك و على هذا لا يحتاج أن يجيء البذر و المنى من كل جزء بل جزء شيء واحد من البدن يكفي في ذلك إذ فيه جميع الأجزاء- فثبت بهذه الوجوه أن المشابهة ليس سببها الفاعلي اختلاف صور المادة بل القوة المصورة بحسب استعداد المادة الحاصلة من إعداد القوة المغيرة.

فهذه وجوه نقلها الشيخ عن المعلم الأول دالة على أن المنى جوهر متشابه الأجزاء- و للبحث في أكثرها مجال كما فعله العلامة الشيرازي في شرح الكليات و لعل غرض المعلم الأول من تلك الوجوه ليس إيراد الكلام على نمط البراهين على هذا المطلب بل غرضه مقابلة الوجوه المذكورة في عدم تشابه أجزاء المنى بوجوه أخرى مشاركة معها في المأخذ و الطرق على أن المنى متشابه الأجزاء.

أقول و الحق عندنا ما ذهب إليه بالبرهان و البرهان أفاد أزيد من ذلك و هو أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٥

المنى ليس في ذاته جوهر تام الجوهري في تحصله النوعي و في صورته الطبيعية- كسائر الجواهر المعدنية و غيرها و لذلك لا يبقى على ما هو عليه ساعة كسائر الرطوبات الفضلية فحكمه حكم المادة الأولى في قصور تجوهرها عن التمام إلا بما ينضاف إليها من الصور فيصير بها شيئا نوعيا يتحد بها و ينقلب إليها.

و أما ما ذكره الخطيب الرازي في المباحث قائلا أن المنى مختلف الأجزاء بحجة زعم أنها أقوى من الأدلة المذكورة و هي أن المنى لا شك أنه الفضل الهضم الأخير و ذلك إنما يكون عند نضج الدم و صيرورته مستعدا استعدادا تاما لأن يصير جواهر الأعضاء و لذلك كان الضعف الذي يحصل عقيب استفراغ المنى أزيد من الضعف- الذي يحصل من استفراغ عشر مرات من الدم مثله فإنه يورث الضعف في جوهر الأعضاء الأصلية و إذا كان كذلك كان المنى مركبا من أجزاء كل واحد منها قريب الاستعداد من أن يصير عضوا مخصوصا و ذلك يقتضي أن لا يكون المنى متشابه المزاج- بل متشابه الامتزاج انتهى.

أقول و هذه الحجة أيضا ضعيفة من وجوه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٦

أحدها أنك قد علمت أن ما يتغذى بالفعل ليس هي من المطعومات الداخلة في بدن الحيوان و غيره و لا التي وقعت لها الاستحالات و الانهضامات من الأغذية بالقوة- بل لا يغتذي الحيوان بالحقيقة إلا من عند نفسه و لا يتقوى إلا بقوة باطنة و هذه المسماة عند القوم بالأغذية و الأدوية هي أسباب معدة لأن ينفع مادة البدن من مبدأ نفسه بما يناسبه على

قياس ما ذكرناه في المعقول بالفعل والمعقول بالقوة وإن الذي سمي معقولا بالقوة لا يصير معقولا بالفعل أبدا بل يعد لأن تحصل للنفس حالة هي معقولة و عاقلة بالفعل فكذا في الغذاء والنمو وليس كون اللحم لحما والعظم عظما و الرباط رباطا إلا من جهة ما تقتضيه هيئات النفوس وأوصافها وأجزاؤها المعنوية ومقوماتها النفسانية فيظهر آثارها في الأجساد والأبدان فينزل إلى عالم الأشباح الصورية من عالم الأرواح المعنوية بإعداد هذه الحركات والانفعالات و تحريكات مواد الأغذية وغيرها.

و ثانيها أنك هب أن المني هو الحاصل من فضلة الهضم الرابع فمن أين يلزم أن يكون فضلة الشيء لا بد أن يكون مثله أو قريبا منه في الاستعداد فهل سرجين الحيوان مثله أو عرق الإنسان مثل الإنسان و ثالثها هب أن المني عند كونه متصلا بواضع الأعضاء كان مثلها أو قريب الاستعداد فبعد الانفصال عنها والخروج منها إلى مواضع أخرى لا نسلم أنه قد بقي ما كان عليه فمن الحافظ عليه تلك الأجزاء على ترتيبها ووضعها وكيفيةها فإن كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٧

الحافظ نفس الأبوين فالنفس الواحدة كيف يدبر و يحفظ أزيد من بدن واحد تديبرا و حفظا طبيعيا و لا يسري فعل النفس في غير بدن واحد و لو سري فعل النفس في نطفة لم يكن النطفة نطفة بل كان حيوانا ذا نفس و أما حصول الضعف عند إنزال المني في جواهر الأعضاء فذلك لا يدل على كونه مختلف الأجزاء أصلا بل منشأ الضعف أمر نفساني من انفعال يطرأ على النفس بحصول اللذة البدنية فيسري ذلك الوهن و الانكسار في سائر أجزاء البدن كما عند الخوف والخشية و كثير من الأمور النفسانية المورثة اضطرابا في البدن و وهنا في قواه وأعضائه الأصلية وبالجملة المني جوهر قابل للأعضاء - و قابل الشيء لا بد و أن يكون خاليا عن ذلك الشيء و ضده جميعا حتى لا يلزم تحصيل الحاصل أو اجتماع المتضادين و كلاهما محالان.

و أيضا المني رطوبة سيالة و الرطوبة السيالة لا يمكن فيها اختلاف الهيئات و الصفات و الأوضاع على الوجه الذي يمتاز بعضها عن بعض حتى يصلح أن يكون وسيلة لاختلاف الصور والآثار و قد مر أن اختلاف الاستعداد و اللا استعداد من باب القوى و الإمكانيات و النسب التي لا وجود لها إلا على سبيل التبعية دون الاستقلال.

و مما لا بد لك من معرفته قبل الخوض في تحقيق هذا المقام

و إثبات المصورة لأجساد النباتات و الحيوان أن المنسوب إلى المادة و استعدادها لم يجز أن يكون إلا أمورا جزئية شخصية من خصوصيات الأزمنة و الأمكنة و الأوضاع و أما الأمور الدائمة الوقوع و خصائص الأنواع فلا بد أن ينسب إلى أسباب فاعلية على الوجه الكلي - فإذا تقررت هذه الأمور فثبت أن اختلاف أشكال الأعضاء و خلقها و مقاديرها و أوضاعها - و كذلك كون كل عضو من الأعضاء على صورة خاصة ينتفع بها الإنسان و الحيوان من التشكيلات و التصويرات سيما ما في أعضاء الرأس من العين و طبقاتها و الأنف و الفم و الأسنان و اللسان و الشفتين و غيرها و ما في كل منها من المنافع التي بعضها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٨

للضرورة و بعضها للراحة و الفضيلة و الزينة كاشفار العينين و سواد الحاجبين - و تقعير أخمص القدمين لا يمكن أن

تكون منسوبة إلى المادة المنوية لما علمت من الوجوه المذكورة ولا إلى قوة سفلية كالطبائع الجسمانية لأن فعل الطبيعة لا يكون إلا على نمط واحد ونحو غرض واحد أو غرضين ولا يمكن فيها فنون الأغراض و صنف الدواعي والقصود بل لا بد وأن ينسب إلى أمور نفسانية منبعثة من أغراض علوية مؤدية إلى عالم عقلي و سر سبحاني بل نقول من رأس قولنا كليا إن السبب الفاعلي لبدن الحيوان إما أن يكون أمرا عديم العلم والإدراك كالطبائع و ما في حكمها و أما أن يكون أمرا ذا علم وإدراك.

و الأول محال لشهادة كل فطرة سليمة على أن فاعل هذا الترتيب العجيب و النظم المحكم يستحيل أن تكون قوة عديمة الشعور.

و الثاني لا يخلو إما أن يكون هو الباري بلا واسطة أم لا.

و الأول محال بالبراهين القطعية و الأدلة العقلية لأن ذاته تعالى أجل أن يفعل فعلا جزئيا متغيرا مستحيلا كائنا فاسدا و من نسب إليه تعالى هذه الانفعالات و التجددات - فهو من الذين لم يعرفوا حق الربوبية و معنى الإلهية **وَمَا قَدَرُوا اللَّهَ حَقَّ قَدْرِهِ** * أو لم يعرفوا معنى الفاعلية و التأثير و أن وجود كل معلول من فاعله القريب كوجود الضوء من المضيء و الكلام من المتكلم لا كوجود البناء من البناء و لا شك لمن له قدم راسخ في العلم الإلهي و الحكمة التي هي فوق العلوم الطبيعية أن الموجودات كلها من فعل الله بلا زمان و لا مكان و لكن بتسخير القوى و النفوس و الطبائع و هو المحيي و المميت و الرازق و الهادي و المضل و لكن المباشر للإحياء ملك اسمه إسرافيل و للإماتة ملك اسمه عزرائيل يقبض الأرواح من الأبدان و الأبدان من الأغذية و الأعذية من التراب و للرازق ملك اسمه ميكائيل يعلم مقادير الأغذية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١١٩

و مكائيلها و للهداية ملك اسمه جبرئيل و للإضلال دون الملائكة جوهر شيطاني اسمه عزازيل و لكل من هذه الملائكة أعوان و جنود من القوى المسخرة لأوامر الله - و كذا في سائر أفعال الله سبحانه و لو كان هو المباشر لكل فعل دني كان إيجاده للوسائط النازلة بأمره إلى خلقه عبثا و هباء تعالى الله أن يخلق في ملكه عبثا أو معطلا - **وَذَلِكَ ظَنُّ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا**.

و الثاني لا يخلو إما جوهر عقلي من العقول الصريحة و الملائكة الرفيعة أو جوهر نفساني.

و الأول أيضا محال بمثل ما مر من حيث إن فعلها لا يتغير و لا يتكرر كثيرا بالأعداد و الأزمنة فإن تلك الجواهر ليست مباينة الذوات عن ذات الحق الأول - و إنما هي أشعة شمس و أضواء نوره يفنى ذواتهم في ذواته تندرج أنوارهم في نوره.

و الثاني و هو كون فاعل البدن هو النفس لا يخلو إما أن يكون فعلها للبدن فعلا اختياريا مسبقا بقصد و إرادة و علم زائد على ذاتها أو لا يكون.

و الأول باطل فإننا الآن مع كمال علومنا لا نعلم كيفية الأعضاء في أشكالها - و مقاديرها و أوضاعها و طبائعها إلا بعد ممارسة التشريح فكيف يمكن أن يقال إنا كنا عالمين في ابتداء تكوننا لهذه الأمور و قادرين عليها بالقصد و الاختيار فيبقى الشق الأخير و هو أن فاعل البدن و الأعضاء هو النفس و هو أيضا لا يخلو من أحد الأمرين - و هو أن فعلها للبدن على سبيل الاستقلال أو على ضرب من الطاعة و الخدمة لأمر من الله و ملكوته و الأول محال لأن النفس غير مستقلة

في الوجود فكيف في الإيجاد كيف و النفس الإنسانية عند تشكل الأعضاء و حدوث صورها في غاية العجز و النقصان لا يملك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢٠

الإنسان حينئذ لنفسه نفعا و لا ضرا و لا موتا و لا حياة و لا نشورا و فاعل هذه التشكيلات و التصويرات و الترتيبات لا بد أن يكون صانعا حكيما و مدبرا عليما فلم يبق من الشقوق و الاحتمالات إلا أن خالق هذه الأبدان و مشكلها و مصورها و غايتها و منميتها و مولدها هو أمر من أمر الله باستخدام النفس و قواها المطيعة لإرادة الله و حكمته و هذه النفس تتقلب في أطوار الكون كيف يشاء الله بأمره ففي بعض الأطوار شأنها تصوير المواد و الأجسام بصورها المناسبة لاستعدادها كما في الأرحام و في بعض النشآت شأنها - تصوير القوى الحساسة بصورها المناسبة لجوهر الحس من المحسوسات الحاكية لعالم النور في عالم الظلام و في طور آخر شأنها تصوير المدارك الباطنة بصور الخيالات و الأوهام.

و في نشأة أخرى شأنها تصوير الذوات بصور الحقائق و المعاني الإلهية و العلوم الربانية - و على ما ذكرناه يحمل كلام بعض المحققين من اتباع الحكماء في كيفية تكون الجنين و هو أن المادة تستعد لأمر واحد هو النفس و لكن النفس لها آلات و لوازم و قوى متخالفة يتحد نحوا من الاتحاد فوجب أن يكون في المادة استعدادات بالقوة مختلفة يتحد على ضرب من وجوه الوحدة و هي كيفية المزاج كاتحاد أشياء فيها تركيب ثم كل قوة يجب أن يكون تركيبها هيئات هي لوازم لتلك القوى بها تصير فعالة فبسبب هذه الهيئات و الآلات ينقسم عضو واحد إلى أعضاء كثيرة و بسبب اختلاف ترتيبات القوى يختلف أوضاع هذه الأعضاء و هذا كما أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢١

باليئات التي وجدت في الأول و العقول الفعالة أعني المعقولات وجد ما بعدها و كما أنه ينتقش في العقول تلك الصور على اللزوم فكذلك ينتقش في القوة الغاذية مثلا صورة تشكل الإنسان بشركة المادة بوجود هذه القوة في المادة انتهى كلامه و المقصود منه إزالة الاستبعاد من صدور هذه الأفعال عن النفس بتوسط قواها و هيئاتها و سبب ذلك أن جميع الموجودات التي بعد الوجود الأول الواجب يشتمل لوحده على لوازم و هيئات و معاني كثيرة بحسب مقامه و مرتبته في الوجود يحاكي السبب الأول في كونه واحدا و مع وحدته عين جميع الصفات الإلهية و الأسماء الربانية و قد علمت من قبل أن الباري كل الأشياء بلا تكثر و هكذا كل ما هو أقرب إليه أشد وحدة و أكثر جمعا للمعاني حتى أن كل موجود عالم في نفسه يحاكي عالم الربوبية فالنفس الإنسانية يجتمع في ذاتها جميع ما يتفرق في البدن و صور الأعضاء من القوى و الآلات فاختلف أشكال الأعضاء ظلال لاختلاف القوى المدركة - و المحركة المنبثة آلتها في سائر الأعضاء حسب انبثاات الروح المنبعث من القلب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢٢

في الأوردة و الشرايين و تلك القوى أيضا مع اختلافها و تشعبها يجتمع في وجود النفس و تتحد بها النفس كاتحاد

العقل بالمعقولات بالفعل و بالجملة القوى السافلة تتفرع - و تتوزع عند انفصالها و فيضانها عن القوى العالية ثم تفعل أفاعيلها المختلفة على حسب أغراض تلك القوى العالية خدمة و طاعة إياها و إن لم يكن لها شعور بتلك الأغراض و الغايات كما أن القوة الجاذبة و الهاضمة و الدافعة تفعل فعلها لأغراض النفس في تدبيرها للبدن و ليس للجاذبة و الهاضمة شعور بذلك الغرض بالاستقلال و لكن على حسب التبعية و الاتصال بالنفس و كذلك في القوى الإدراكية فإن قوة السمع و قوة البصر يعلان فعلهما لغرض النفس و إدراكهما عين إدراك النفس و للنفس في ذاتها سمع و بصر و شم و ذوق و لمس و لذلك يصدر عنها هذه الإدراكات في النوم عند تعطل هذه الحواس الظاهرة فكل من هذه المشاعر إذا فعل فعله فإنما يفعل خدمة و طاعة للنفس على حسب الجبله فهكذا حكم القوة المصورة في تصوير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢٣

الأعضاء و تشكيلها على حسب أغراض النفس و حاجاتها و مآربها. و ليس لأحد أن يعترض بأن القوة المصورة قوة جسمانية لا شعور لها بهذه الأغراض فكيف تفعل هذه الأفاعيل التي يترتب عليها تلك الأغراض و ما خلقت إلا لتلك الفوائد و الغايات. لأن جوابه أن تلك القوة مما تستخدمها قوة أخرى فوقها هي النفس فإن رجع و قال إنا نعلم أن نفوسنا غير شاعرة بتلك الأغراض و المنافع و المصالح.

قلنا نفسك ما دامت بالقوة و في حد النقصان حكمها حكم تلك القوة المصورة - التي تفعل فعلها بالمباشرة خدمة و طاعة لقوة أخرى فوقها و لو فرضنا نفسك قد خرجت من حد القوة و النقصان إلى حد الفعلية و الكمال لشاهدت بنور البصيرة أنها تستخدم سائر القوى التي هي من جنودها و خدمها لأجل أغراض و مصالح حكمية فيها صلاح شخصها أو نوعها إما بحسب نشأة الطبيعة أو نشأة أخرى فقول القائل المذكور إن المادة تستعد لأمر واحد هو النفس أراد بالمادة المني و بالاستعداد استعدادا بعيدا من شأنه أن يصير قريبا بانفعالات و استحالات كثيرة يطرا عليها شيئا بعد شيء فإن الفائض عليه من آثار النفس ليس إلا صورة حافظة لتركبه من الفساد و الضيعان لكن من شأن تلك الصورة أن تقوى و تتكامل و تشتد حتى تبلغ إلى مرتبة فوقها و هكذا الكلام في تلك المرتبة من الصورة و قوله لكن النفس لها آلات و لوازم و قوى متخالفة تتحد نوعا من الاتحاد أراد به اختلاف درجات النفس و مقاماتها - فكل ما يعد من آلات النفس و قواها كان تلك الآلة و القوة تفعل فعلها قبل حدوث مستعملها على وجه يصلح أن تصير معدة لفيضان صورة أخرى مستعملة إياها قاهرة عليها من غير تمرد و عصيان في جبلتها و هكذا إلى آخر مرتبة من مقامات النفس و هذا هو الدين الإلهي الفطري الذي جبل عليه كل قوة أنها تفعل فعلها على وجه يكون مطلوبها - لا يناقض مطلوب ما هو فوقها بل ينحو نحوه و يؤم قصده و يجري في طريقه.

و بهذا يندفع الإشكال بأن المصورة لو كانت من قوى النفس يلزم أن يفعل الآلة قبل حدوث مستعملها أعني النفس و ذلك لأن تلك القوة قبل فيضان النفس لم تكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢٤

موصوفة بأنها آلة للنفس بل كانت بمنزلة صورة أو كمال أول كسائر القوى الحيوانية أو النباتية التي تحدث قبل النفس

الإنسانية فإن الصورة الحيوانية بل التي قبلها - أي الصورة النباتية إذا حدثت في مادة البدن لا شبهة في أنها تفعل أفاعيلها لا على سبيل التوسيط بل على وجه الاستقلال والرياسة ثم إذا اشتد كماله وقويت ذاته وبلغت إلى مقام الناطقة متحدة معها استحالت ذاتها مقهورة مطيعة لأمر الله وفعلت ما كانت تفعل خدمة وطاعة لهذا الجوهر العالي وهو المراد بقوله يتحد نوعا من الاتحاد - لأن النفس الإنسانية هي بعينها تدرك الكليات والجزئيات وتحس وتحرك وتغذو وتنمو وتولد وتحفظ المزاج وبالجمله تفعل بذاتها جميع ما فعلت الصورة الجمادية - والنفس النباتية والنفس الحيوانية فهي بوحدها كل هذه الجواهر التي توجد في الخارج كل منها نوعا مستقلا تاما في هويته وذاته وقوله فوجب أن يكون في تلك المادة استعدادات مختلفة تتحد معها على ضرب من الوحدة وهي كيفية المزاج لم يرد به أن في المني استعداد فيضان جميع هذه القوى والآلات النفسانية ولوازمها ابتداء في أول الكون حتى يرد عليه أن استعداد النطفة لقبول النفس الناطقة وقواها لا يحصل إلا بعد صيرورتها بدنا إنسانيا وصيرورتها بدنا إنسانيا لا يحصل إلا بعد وجود هذه القوى والآلات واللوازم وقد علمت مما ذكر مرارا أن الإمكانيات والاستعدادات القريبة أبدا تابعة للصور والكيفيات الموجودة بالفعل فما به الاستعداد والقوة شيء غير نفس الاستعداد والقوة وغير المستعد له والمقوي عليه لكن يجب أن يكون مناسبا إياه واقعا في طريقه كأجزاء الحركة كل سابق منها يوجب استعداد اللاحق - فمراده أن المني جوهر من شأنه أن يصير بتوارد الانفعالات والتقلبات أن يطرأ عليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢٥

استعدادات متعاقبة ينتهي آخرها أن يصير بدنا إنسانيا فيه أعضاء مختلفة يرتبط كلها إلى عضو واحد هو القلب نسبته إلى سائر الأعضاء كنسبة النفس إلى سائر القوى وهذه الاستعدادات التي هي بالفعل متكثرة متشعبة في القلب والأعضاء كانت حين كانت بالقوة راجعة إلى استعداد واحد هو مبدأ سائر الاستعدادات على سبيل القبول كما أن جوهر النفس مبدأ سائر الصور والفعليات على سبيل الفعل وهو مزاج النطفة وذلك لأن النطفة يجب أن يكون على مزاج اعتدلت فيه الأطراف ولم يكن فيه قوة جانب دون أخرى - ولا فعلية طرف غير طرف حتى يكون مادة عارية من جميع القوى والكيفيات لتصير قابلة لصورة كمالية يصدر عنها جميع الأطراف والأضداد كالجذب والدفع والشهوة والغضب والمحبة والنفرة والأفاعيل المختلفة التي بعضها من باب الطبع وبعضها من باب الحس والمحسوس وبعضها من باب العقل والمعقول ولو كان في المادة فعلية شيء من الطبائع والصور لم يكن في قوتها قبول الكل ولهذا ترى النطفة الإنسانية - من أضعف الأشياء جوهرية وقوله وكما أن بالهيئات التي وجدت في الأول والعقول الفعالة وجد ما بعدها أراد به ما أشرنا إليه من أن كل قوة فعالة تشتمل بوحدها التامة على حقائق ما يصدر عنها على نحو الكثرة والتفصيل اشتغال البحر على قطرات الأمطار واشتغال الجبل على الحصى والأحجار وقوله وكما أنه ينتقش في العقول تلك الصور على سبيل اللزوم فكذلك ينتقش في القوة الغاذية مثلا صورة تشكل الإنسان بشركة المادة لم يرد به أن أشكال أعضاء الإنسان منتقشة بالفعل في تلك القوة حتى يرد عليه أن تلك القوة اتفقوا على أنها عديمة الشعور والإدراك كيف والنفس التي هي أقوى منها لا علم لها بتلك الأشكال والهيئات إلا بعد ممارسة التشريح - بل أراد به اشتغال تلك القوة على حيثيات وجهات متناسبة لتلك الأشكال والصور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢٦

لأنها كالواسطة و الخليفة في فيضان تلك الأمور من المبادي و لا بد للواسطة أن ينوب مناب المبدأ الأصل في أن يتضمن ما يصدر عنه على وجه أعلى و أشرف و اعلم أنا لم نذهب إلى أن الأول تعالى و لا العقول الفعالة محل لارتسام صور المعقولات بل ذهبنا إلى أن كل عاقل بالفعل يتحد بالمعقولات كما ذهب إليه بعض القدماء و بينا ذلك على وجه الإحكام و الإتقان بما لم يبق فيه مجال ريب و شبهة فثبت من ذلك أن كل قوة عالية توجد فيها جميع ما هو دونها على وجه أعلى و أبسط و الحكماء مع اتفاقهم على أن مبدع الكل ذات واحدة بسيطة غاية الوحدة و البساطة و مع بساطته على هذا الوجه الأكيد الشديد هو خالق الأبدان و الأعضاء الحيوانية و إن شئت فارجع إلى ما ذكره في باب عنايته تعالى بالأشياء و إلى كتاب منافع الأعضاء لجالينوس و إلى كتاب بقراط و أفلاطون و سائر كتب التشريح حتى تعلم أنهم متفقون على أن فاعل الأبدان و الأعضاء هو الله سبحانه و لا ينافي ذلك إثباتهم الوسائط العقلية و القوى النفسانية و الآلات الطبيعية على حسب جريان قضاء الله و قدره إذ ليس من دأب الحكيم مباشرة الكس و دفع الفضولات و مزاوله المزايل بل فعله الخاص هو الحكم و الأمر و الهداية و القضاء و الإنزال و الإرسال دون الحركات و الانفعالات و من عزل الوسائط عن أفعالها فما قدر حق قدر عظمة الله كما قال تعالى **وَمَا قَدَرُوا اللَّهَ حَقَّ قَدْرِهِ إِذْ قَالُوا مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَى بَشَرٍ مِنْ شَيْءٍ** الآية.

زيادة تنوير و تصوير:

و اعلم أن الصور الجزئية الجسمانية حقائق كلية موجودة في عالم أمر الله و قضائه كما قال الله تعالى **وَإِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ وَمَا نُنْزِلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَعْلُومٍ** فالخزائن هي الحقائق الكلية العقلية - و لكل منها رقائق جزئية موجودة بأسباب جزئية قدرية من مادة مخصوصة و وضع مخصوص و زمان و أين كذلك فالحقائق الكلية موجودة عند الله بالأصالة و هذه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢٧

الرقائق الحسية موجودة بحكم التبعية و الاندراج فالحقائق بكلياتها في وجودها العلوي الإلهي لا ينتقل و رقائقها بحكم الاتصال و الإحالة و الشمول لسائر المراتب تنزل و تتمثل في قوالب الأشباح و الأجرام كما مر من معنى نزول الملائكة على الخلق بأمر الله و الرقيقة هي الحقيقة بحكم الاتصال و إنما التفاوت بحسب الشدة و الضعف و الكمال و النقص لا ترى إلى عزرائيل و قيام حقيقته الكلية بين يدي الله و حمله لأحد أركان عرش الله الأعظم و عظم منزلته و حضرته لا يبرح عن مقامه و لا يتزحزح و لكن رقائقه و جنوده بحكم إحاطته و تنزلاته و تصرفاته فيما تحته قائمة بأنفس الخلائق فلكل نفس منفوسة رقيقة من حقيقته الكلية هي المباشرة لقبض تلك النفس و العمالة لأجلها على شاكلة عمله من جذب الأغذية و تجريد العلوم من محسوساتها و تجريد المحسوسات عن موادها الجزئية و هو في مقامه الأصلي بين يدي الله تعالى لا يشغله شأن عن شأن و كذلك الحقيقة الكلية الجبريئية من عالم أمر الله واقفة بين يدي الله و كل من كان في ذلك فهو مضاف إليه تعالى إذ لا يتشرف بتشريف هذه الإضافة إلا من كان من أهل القدس و التجرد و حقيقة جبرئيل من هذا القبيل و لذلك يتلقى من ربه ما ينزل بواسطة رقائقه الممثلة المتصلة بسائر من يتصل به باطنهم من نبي و رسول و حيا كفاه و صراحا أو وارث و ولي إلهاما و تعليما بأنواع التمثيلات و التعليمات كما قال الله تعالى **وَ**

مَا كَانَ لِبَشَرٍ أَنْ يُكَلِّمَهُ اللَّهُ إِلَّا وَحْيًا - أَوْ مِنْ وَرَاءِ حِجَابٍ أَوْ يُرْسِلَ رَسُولًا وَقَالَ عِلْمُهُ شَدِيدُ الْقُوَى فَالشديد القوى إشارة

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إلى جبرئيل و قواه إشارة إلى رقائقه الممثلة للأنبياء كتمثله في صورة دحية الكلبي للنبي ص و كذلك إسرافيل مع عظم وجوده عند الله و حمله العرش على كاهله - و نفخه في الروح الكلبي الفلكي الجامع لتفاصيل أرواح الخلائق يتولى النفخ الروحي التفصيلي بكل روح بواسطة رقائقه المتصلة بالأرواح الجزئية و هو في أفقه الأعلى بين يدي ربه لا يشغله شأن عن شأن لأن عامله الذي فيه نحو وجوده الكلبي فوق عالم التغيرات الزمانية و التجددات المادية و كذلك الميكائيل ع قائم بين يدي ربه يتلقى منه ما صرف فيه من إنزال الغيث و إعطاء الأرزاق في كل وقت و زمان لتنزيل تنوعات ما به يحصل أرزاق الخلائق من حجاب إلى حجاب إلى أن يظهر بواسطة ما صرف فيه من قوى عماله من الأديميين و غيرهم في تصوير أنواع الأرزاق البدنية - فراققه موصلة لذلك و حقيقته الكلية لم يبرح من مقامها و لم يتغير عن حالها و لا يشغله شأن عن شأن و هكذا قياس جميع القوى المدركة و المحركة في أن لكل نوع منها مقامات متعددة متفاوتة في العلو و الدنو و الشرف و الخسة بعضها عقلي صرف و بعضها مثالي و بعضها حسي و بعضها جسماني صرف و أكثر الناس إنما وقعوا في الأغلاط و الشبه العظيمة لعدم مراعاتهم حقوق كل مرتبة و مقام و نظرهم إلى الأشياء بعين العوراء مثال ذلك اختلافهم في فعل المصورة فطائفة نسبوا هذه الأفاعيل إلى قوة جسمانية عديمة الشعور فأبطلوا حق الله و حق ملائكته المقربين فعميت بصرهم اليمنى و نظروا بالعين العوراء إلى عالم الخلق دون عالم الأمر و طائفة أخرى نسبوا أفعال المصورة من التشكيل و التخليق المتغير الفاسد المتجدد و الهابط في مهوى النزول إلى ذات الله فهو لاء أبطلوا حق عباد الله و عزلوا عن الأفعال من نصبهم الله لها فعميت بصيرتهم اليسرى و أرادوا أن ينظروا بالعين العوراء إلى الحق دون الخلق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٢٩

ففات عنهم الحق و الخلق جميعا إذ الخلق طريق إلى الحق فمن أبطل الطريق و ضل عن سواء السبيل فكيف وصل إلى الحق فلا جرم قد حشروا أعمى العينين مطلقا - بعد ما كان لهم قوة البصر و إمكان النظر إذ لم ينظروا في آيات الله و حكمته و لم يتفكروا في صنع الله و عنايته فيكون حالهم يوم القيمة كما حكى الله بقوله **وَنَحْشُرُهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ أَعْمَى قَالَ رَبِّ لِمَ حَشَرْتَنِي أَعْمَى وَقَدْ كُنْتُ بَصِيرًا قَالَ كَذَلِكَ أَتَتْكَ آيَاتُنَا فَنَسِيتَهَا وَكَذَلِكَ الْيَوْمَ تُنْسَى**

فصل (٨) في الإشارة إلى تعديد القوى النفسانية و ما دونها على سبيل التصنيف

و معنى التصنيف هاهنا

أن هذه القوى لا يتميز بعضها عن بعض بفصول ذاتية كما في الأنواع النباتية و الحيوانية بل امتيازها بعوارض إنسانية من تقدم بعضها على بعض و استخدام بعضها قبل بعض و هذه القوى بمنزلة أجزاء النفس الإنسانية قبل أن صدرت و انبسطت عنها و انفصلت في أجزاء البدن كل قوة في موضع يليق بها - فتنقسم النفس أولا إلى أجزاء ثلاثة هي نفوس ثلاثة في مواضع أخرى نفس نباتية موضعها الكبد و نفس حيوانية موضعها القلب و نفس إنسانية سلطانها في الدماغ - و

هذه النفوس متعاقبة في الحدوث و البقاء فالجزء النباتي يحدث أولاً ثم الحيواني ثم الإنساني و الأولان يندمجان بفساد المزاج و بطلان الاستعداد دون الجزء الإنساني - فإنه يبقى في النشأة الآخرة إذ ليس حدوثه بواسطة الاستعداد و تعديل المزاج بل هو أمر رباني و سر سبحاني و نسبته إلى الحق نسبة الضوء إلى المضيء بالذات - فالروح باق ببقاء الله كما ستعلم في مقامه.

و الغرض هاهنا الإشارة إلى تقسيم القوى و ترتيبها.

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فالإنسانية مخدومة القوى

كلها و هي تخدم العقول العالية كالعقل الفعال و الذي قبله و الذي بعده و هو العقل المستفاد و الذي يليه و هو العقل بالفعل و يليه المسمى بالعقل بالملكة

و الحيوانية تخدم الإنسانية

و تستخدم الحيوانية النباتية و لها ثلاث قوى كما مر الغاذية و المنمية و المولدة. و الحيوانية أيضاً لها قوتان قوة محركة و قوة مدركة و المحركة إما باعثة أو فاعلة و المحركة الباعثة هي التي تسمى بالشوقية و لها شعبتان أحدهما شهوانية - و الأخرى غضبية تخدمها المحركة الفاعلة و هي تستخدم الأوتار و الرباطات المتصلة بالأعضاء المستخدمة للأعضاء ففي خدمة الشهوة يجذب الأوتار إلى جانب المبدأ و هو القلب - و في خدمة الغضب ترخيها و يمددها إلى خلاف تلك الجهة للدفع.

و أما المدركة الحيوانية فتتقسم بقسمين قسم يدرك من خارج و قسم يدرك من داخل و المدرك الداخلي أطف و أشرف من المدركات الخارجية و هي بمنزلة القشور و النخالات له و المدرك من داخل أيضاً ينقسم إلى مدرك الصور و إلى مدرك المعاني - فمنها الحس المشترك ثم الخيال و المصورة ثم المتصرف في الطرفين المسمى بالمتخيلة - بالقياس إلى الحيوانية و المتفكرة بالقياس إلى الإنسانية ثم الوهمية ثم الحافظة - ثم الذاكرة و المسترجعة.

و أما النفس الإنسانية

فتتقسم إلى عاملة و عالمة فالعاملة هي التي بها تدبير البدن و كمالها في أن يتسلط على سائر القوى الحيوانية و لا يكون فيها هيئة إذ غايته انقهارية لهذه القوى بل يدبرها على حسب حكم القوة النظرية و أما العالمة فهي القوة النظرية و هي التي بسببها صارت العلاقة بين النفس و بين المفارقات لتنفعل عنها - و تستفيد منها العلوم و الحقائق فالعاملة يجب أن لا تنفعل عن قوى البدن و العالمة يجب أن تكون دائم التأثير عن المفارق دائم المراجعة إلى عالم الذكر الحكيم لتحصل لها ملكة الاتصال بالمبدأ الفعال فصارت نسبة اتصالها إلى المبدأ الفعال و الصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣١

المجردة بالفعل المطلق بعد ما كانت بالقوة المطلقة فكانت هيولانيا ثم بالملكة عند حصول الأوليات ثم بالفعل لكنها ليست تطالعها على اللزوم بل متى شاءت من غير كسب و إذا كانت صائرة إياها متصلة بها مطالعة تلك الصورة في ذاتها أو ذات مبدئها المقوم إياها على الدوام يسمى عقلاً مستفاداً و عنده يتم الجنس الحيواني بحسب كماله الإنساني البالغ -

إلى كل كمال و مرتبة و هو رأس سائر القوى و مخدومها ثم العقل بالفعل و يخدمه العقلان المنفعلان العقل بالملكة و العقل الهولاني ثم العقل العملي يخدم جميع هذه العقول فإن النظري يحدث بعده و به يستعمل و يستكمل و العقل العملي يخدمه الوهم و الوهم يخدمه الذاكرة و جميع ما بعد الوهم مرتبة و ما قبله زمانا من التي يلي البدن يخدم القوة الحافظة و المتخيلة

ثم المتخيلة تخدمها قوتان

محركة و مدركة فالقوة الشوقية يخدمها بالانتمار لها و القوة الخيالية يخدمها بعرضها الصور المخزونة في المصورة المهيأة لقبول التفصيل و التركيب و الحس المشترك يخدم جميع هذه القوى - بقبوله ما يورده الجواسيس من جانب و عرضه إياها على المتصرف ليركبها و يفصلها و على الواهمة لينظر فيها و يدرك معانيها ثم الحس المشترك تخدم الحواس بتأدية ما حضر في كل منها و القوة الشوقية يخدمها قوتان الشهوية و الغضبية و الشهوة و الغضب يستخدمان القوة المحركة في العضل و هي آخر درجات القوى الحيوانية بمعنى أنها مختصة بالحيوان

ثم النباتية تخدم الحيوانية

و أولها المولدة ثم الغذائية و المنمية تخدمان المولدة و الغذائية تخدمهما جميعا ثم القوى الطبيعية أعني الجاذبة و الماسكة و الهاضمة و الدافعة تخدم القوى النباتية لكن الهاضمة يخدمها الماسكة من جهة و الجاذبة من جهة و الدافعة من جهة و الدافعة منها تخدم الجميع ثم الكيفيات الأربع يخدم جميع القوى المذكورة من قبل لكن الحرارة يخدمهما البرودة فإنها إما أن تعد للحرارة مادة - أو يحفظ ما أفاده الحرارة من التحليل و يخدمها جميعا الرطوبة و اليبوسة و هما آخر درجات القوى و بعدها المادة القابلة للكل و هي القوة الانفعالية الجسمانية التي تقوم بالصورة الجرمية المقدرية أولا ثم غيرها إلى الغاية القصوى في الاستكمال كمرتبة العقل الفعال فيبتدىء الوجود من أنزل المراتب النازل إليها من أعلى المراتب فيعود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣٢

متدرجا في الصعود إلى غاية ما هبط منها فالوجود كدائرة تدور على نفسها فينعطف آخره على أوله كما قال تعالى **كَمَا بَدَأَكُمْ تَعُودُونَ** و قال **هُوَ الَّذِي يَبْدَأُ الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُهُ** فإذا شرع في الصعود و أخذ في الارتقاء يتحد بكل صورة يتلبس بها فهذه القوى كلما ارتفعت - يتحد بدنا واحدا له ذات واحدة و هوية نفسانية و هكذا حتى يصير إنسانا كبيرا فيه كل الموجودات بحيث يرى فيه جميع الأشياء كأجزاء ذاته و ينكشف لك هذا المعنى زيادة انكشاف إذا نظرت إلى ذاتك مجردة عن الأغيار فتراها عاقلا مدركا للكميات و الجزئيات - متوهما حساسا سميعا بصيرا ذا شهوة و غضب و محبة و فرح و إرادة و غير ذلك من الصفات التي لا تعد و لا تحصى و قد عرفت أن الصورة قد تكون بسيطة و قد تكون مركبة و أن المادة قد تكون بسيطة و قد تكون مركبة لكن في المركب الموجود لا بد أن يتحد ضربا من الاتحاد إذ ما لا وحدة له لا وجود له فالكثرة معلولة للوحدة لأنها مبدأ الكثرة - و أصلها و مرجعها و غايتها فبالوحدة الإلهية قامت السماوات و الأرضون و بالوحدة النفسانية قامت البنية الحيوانية و نحن إنما توصلنا إلى معرفة النفس و قوتها بالفعل - كما توصلنا إلى إثبات صور العناصر في الهول و الأخلاط في البدن بأننا رأينا كيفيات و كميات في هولي فعلمنا أن صورها غيرها و رأينا آثارا مختلفة في البدن فاثبتنا أخلاطا - فكذا رأينا أفعالا نفسانية في بعض الأجساد فاثبتنا من

جهتها أن لها مبادي أخرى غير الأجسام و عوارضها ثم توصلنا بواسطة تلك المبادي و ارتباط بعضها إلى بعض و احتياج بعضها لبعض إلى أن لتلك المبادي مبدأ جامعاً هو بالحقيقة فاعل تلك الأفعال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣٣

و الآثار و هو أصل حقيقتها و صورة صورها و نفس جميعها و هوية كلها ثم لاح لنا بواسطة أنها تدرك المعقولات و تحضر ذاتها و تدرك هويتها أنها جوهر قدسي لا تقبل الموت و الفساد فهي باقية عند الله محشورة مع الملائكة و النبيين ع إذا استحكمت علاقتها معهم و حسن أولئك رفيقا

فصل (٩) في أن لكل بدن نفساً واحدة و أن القوى التي أحصيناها تنشأ منها بل هي تفاصيل ذاتها و شروح هويتها

و اعلم أن جماعة من القاصرين لما رأوا في الإنسان آثار مباد طبيعية كالحرارة و البرودة و الجذب و الدفع و الإحالة و النضج و غير ذلك مما يصدر مثلها من صور العناصر - و رأوا آثاراً أخرى نباتية كالتغذية و التنمية و التوليد مما يصدر من نفوس النباتات - و رأوا آثاراً كالحس و التخيل و الشهوة و الغضب مما يصدر أمثالها من النفوس الحيوانية - ثم رأوا فيه أفعالا و إدراكات منطقية و حركات فكرية فظنوا أن الإنسان مركب من صورة طبيعية و نفوس ثلاثة أخرى نباتية و حيوانية و إنسانية و من ارتقى من هذه الطائفة و ارتفع عنهم في هذا الباب ارتفاعاً يسيراً رأى أن الإنسان هو النفس العاقلة و سائر المقامات أمور عارضة لها من مبدأ حدوثها إلى آخر دهرها حتى يكون البدن و قواه بالنسبة إليها - كآلات ذوي الصنائع من حيث لا مدخل لها في حقيقتها و نحو وجودها بل في تتميم أفاعيلها - و ليس الأمر كما زعموه. بل الحق أن الإنسان له هوية واحدة ذات نشأة و مقامات و يتبدى وجوده أولاً من أدنى المنازل و يرتفع قليلاً إلى درجة العقل و المعقول كما أشار سبحانه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣٤

هَلْ أَتَى عَلَى الْإِنْسَانِ حِينٌ مِّنَ الدَّهْرِ لَمْ يَكُنْ شَيْئًا مَّذْكُورًا إلى قوله **إِمَّا شَاكِرًا وَإِمَّا كَفُورًا** و لو لم يكن للنفس مع البدن رابطة اتحادية لا كرابطة إضافية شوقية كما زعم أنها كمن يعشق مجاوراً لم يكن سوء مزاج البدن أو تفرق اتصاله مؤلماً للنفس ألماً حسياً كالآلام عقلية أو وهمية فالنفس الإنسانية لكونها جوهرًا قدسياً - من سنخ الملكوت فلها وحدة جمعية هي ظل الوحدة الإلهية و هي بذاتها قوة عاقلة إذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣٥

رجعت إلى موطنها الأصلي و هي متضمنة أيضاً لقوة حيوانية على مراتبها من حد التخيل إلى حد الإحساس اللامي و هو آخر مرتبة الحيوانية في السفالة و هي أيضاً ذات قوة نباتية على مراتبها التي أدناها الغذائية و أعلاها المولدة و هي أيضاً ذات قوة محركة طبيعية قائمة بالبدن كما قال الفيلسوف الأعظم أرسطاطاليس من أن النفس ذات أجزاء ثلاثة نباتية و حيوانية و منطقية لا بمعنى تركيبها عن هذه القوى لأنها بسيطة الوجود بل بمعنى كمال جوهريتها و تمامية وجودها و جامعيتها ذاتها لهذه الحدود الصورية و هذه القوى على كثرتها و تفنن أفاعيلها معانيها موجودة كلها بوجود واحد في

النفس ولكن على وجه بسيط لطيف يليق بلطافة النفس كما أن معاني الأنواع الجسمانية توجد في العقل متحدة صائرة إياها بعد ما ارتفعت عنده من حد المحسوسية إلى حد المعقولية فكما يوجد في العقل جميع الأنواع الطبيعية على وجه أرفع وأعلى فكذا توجد بوجود النفس جميع القوى الطبيعية والنباتية والحيوانية - وجودا نفسانيا أعلى وأرفع من وجوداتها في مواضعها الأخرى وبالجملة النفس الآدمية تنزل من أعلى تجردها إلى مقام الطبيعة ومقام الحاس والمحسوس ودرجتها عند ذلك درجة الطبائع والحواس فيصير عند اللمس مثلاً عين العضو اللمس وعند الشم والذوق عين الشام والذائق وهذه أدنى الحواس وإذا ارتفع إلى مقام الخيال كانت قوة مصورة ولها أن يرتفع عن هذه المنازل إلى مقامات العقول القادسة فيتحد بكل عقل ومعقول وأكثر المتأخرين من الفلاسفة كالشيخ وأتباعه لما لم يحكموا أساس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣٦

علم النفس لذهولهم عن مسألة الوجود وكماله ونقصه ومبادئه وغاياته أنكروا هذا المعنى وزعموا أن الأمر لو كان كذلك لكانت النفس متجزية وكان العقل الفعال منقسماً حسب تعدد النفوس العاقلة وكان كل من نفوسنا يعلم ما يعلمه الأخرى من النفوس وقد مر البرهان النوري الكاشف لحجب هذه المضايق والشكوك بحمد الله عند كلامنا في اتحاد العاقل بالمعقول

فصل (١٠) في أن هذه المراتب من النفس بعضها سابقة في الحدوث على بعض كما مر

فالنفس الآدمية ما دام كون الجنين في الرحم درجتها درجة النفوس النباتية على مراتبها وهي إنما تحصل بعد تخطي الطبيعة درجات القوى الجمادية فالجنين الإنساني نبات بالفعل حيوان بالقوة لا بالفعل إذ لا حس له ولا حركة وكونه حيواناً بالقوة فصله المميز عنه عن سائر النباتات الجاعل له نوعاً مابيناً للأنواع النباتية وإذا خرج الطفل من جوف أمه صارت نفسه في درجة النفوس الحيوانية إلى أوان البلوغ الصوري - والشخص حينئذ حيوان بشري بالفعل إنسان نفساني بالقوة ثم يصير نفسه مدركة للأشياء بالفكر والروية مستعملة للعقل العملي وهكذا إلى أوان البلوغ المعنوي والرشد الباطني باستحكام الملكات والأخلاق الباطنة وذلك في حدود الأربعين غالباً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣٧

فهو في هذه المرتبة إنسان نفساني بالفعل وإنسان ملكي أو شيطاني بالقوة يحشر في القيامة إما مع حزب الملائكة وإما مع حزب الشياطين وجنودهم فإن ساعده التوفيق وسلك مسلك الحق وصراط التوحيد وكمل عقله بالعلم وطهر عقله بالتجرد عن الأجسام يصير ملكاً بالفعل من ملائكة الله الذين هم في صفة العالمين المقربين وإن ضل عن سواء السبيل وسلك مسلك الضلال والجهال يصير من جملة الشياطين أو يحشر في زمرة البهائم والحشرات

فصل (١١) في طور آخر من تعدد القوى الإنسانية على منهج أهل البصيرة

قال بعض أهل العرفان إشارة إلى معنى قوله تعالى **وَمَا يَعْلَمُ جُنُودَ رَبِّكَ إِلَّا هُوَ** إن لله تعالى في القلوب والأرواح وغيرهما من العوالم جنوداً مجندة لا يعرف حقيقتها وتفصيل عددها إلا هو ونحن الآن نشير إلى بعض جنود القلب يعني النفس الناطقة وهو الذي يتعلق بغرضنا وله جندان جند يرى بالأبصار وهي الأعضاء والجوارح - وجند لا يرى

إلا بالبصائر وهي القوى والحواس وجميعها خادمة للقلب و مسخرة له - وهو المتصرف فيها وقد خلقت مجبولة على طاعة القلب لا يستطيع له خلافا ولا عليه تمردا - فإذا أمر العين للانفتاح انفتحت وإذا أمر الرجل للحركة تحركت وإذا أمر اللسان بالكلام وجزم الحكم به تكلم وكذا سائر الأعضاء وتسخر الأعضاء والحواس للقلب يشبه من وجهه تسخر الملائكة لله تعالى فإنهم جبلوا على الطاعة لا يستطيعون له خلافا ولا يعصون الله ما أمرهم ويفعلون ما يؤمرون وإنما افتقر القلب إلى هذه الجنود - من حيث افتقاره إلى المركب والزاد لسفره الذي لأجله خلق وهذا السفر إلى الله و قطع المنازل إلى لقائه فلاجله جبلت القلوب قال تعالى **وَمَا خَلَقْتُ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنْسَ إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُونِ** وإنما مركبه البدن وزاده العلم وإنما الأسباب الموصلة التي توصله إلى الزاد وتمكنه من التزود والعمل الصالح فافتقر أولا إلى تعهد البدن وحفظه من الآفات بأن يجلب إليه ما يوافقه من الغذاء وغيره وبأن يدفع عنه ما ينافيه ويهلكه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣٨

من أسباب الهلاك فافتقر لأجل طلب الغذاء إلى جندين باطن هو قوة الشهوة و ظاهر هو البدن والأعضاء الجالبة للغذاء فخلق في القلب جنود كثيرة من باب الشهوات كلها تحت قوة الشهوة و خلقت الأعضاء التي هي آلات الشهوة و افتقر لأجل دفع المؤذيات والمهلكات إلى جندين باطن هو قوة الغضب الذي به يدفع المهلكات و ينتقم من الأعداء - و ظاهر هو اليد والرجل الذي يعمل به بمقتضى الغضب و كل ذلك بأمور خارجة من البدن كالأسلحة وغيرها ثم المحتاج إلى الغذاء إذا لم يعرف الغذاء الموافق لا ينفعه شهوة الغذاء و آتته فافتقر في المعرفة إلى جندين باطن هو إدراك البصر والسمع والذوق والشم واللمس و ظاهر هو العين والأذن والأنف وغيرها و تفصيل وجه الحاجة إليها و وجه الحكمة فيها مما يطول شرحه ولا يحويها مجلدات كثيرة

فجملته جنود القلب يحصرها ثلاثة أصناف

أحدها باعث مستحث

إما إلى جلب المنافع النافع كالشهوة و إما إلى دفع المضار المنافي كالغضب و قد يعبر عن هذا الباعث بالإرادة.

و الثاني هو المحرك للأعضاء

إلى تحصيل هذه المقاصد يعبر عن هذا الثاني بالقدرة و هي جنود ماثورة في سائر الأعضاء لا سيما بالعضلات منها و الأوتار.

و الثالث و هو المدرك المتصرف

للأشياء كالجواسيس و هي ماثورة في أعضاء معينة فمع كل واحد من هذه الجنود الباطنة جنود ظاهرة هي الأعضاء التي أعدت آلات لهذه الجنود فإن قوة البطش إنما يبطش بالأصابع و قوة البصر إنما تدرك بالعين وكذا سائر القوى و لسنا نتكلم في الجنود الظاهرة التي هي الأعضاء فإنها من عالم الملك و الشهادة و إنما نتكلم الآن فيما أيد به من جنود لم تروها و هذا الصنف الثالث و هو الدراك من هذه الجملة تنقسم إلى ما أسكن المنازل الظاهرة و هي الحواس الخمس و إلى ما أسكن منازل باطنة و هي تجاويف الدماغ و هي أيضا خمسة فهذه أقسام جنود القلب.

و قال أيضا اعلم أن جندي الغضب و الشهوة قد تنقادان للقلب انقيادا تاما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٣٩

فيعيناه على طريقه الذي يسلكه و يحسنان مرافقته في السفر الذي هو بصدده و قد يستعصيان عليه استعصاء بغي و تمرد حتى يملكانه و يستعبدانه و فيه هلاكه و انقطاعه - عن سفره الذي به وصوله إلى سعادة الأبد و للقلب جند آخر و هو العلم و الحكمة و التفكير و حقه أن يستعين بهذا الجند فإنه حزب الله على الجندين الآخرين - فإنهما يلتحقان بحزب الشيطان فإن ترك الاستعانة به و سلط على نفسه الغضب و الشهوة هلك يقينا و خسر خسرا مبينا و ذلك حال أكثر الخلق فإن عقولهم صارت مسخرة لشهواتهم في استنباط الحيل لقضاء الشهوة و يجب أن يكون شهواتهم مسخرة لعقولهم فيما يفتقر إليه انتهى كلامه و لعمرى أنه صدر من عين البصيرة و منبع التحقيق و ربما عبر هو و أتراه عن القوى المدركة بالطيارة و عن القوى المحركة بالسيارة و ذلك لأن القوى المدركة أسرع وصولا إلى مقاصدها و مدركاتها بل ضرب منها أني الوصول إلى المعلوم و ضرب منها محض الإدراك بالفعل بلا قوة منتظرة - و هذا بخلاف القوى المحركة فإنها لا تخلو عن تراخي زمان و تجدد أحوال.

و اعلم أن كون نسبة القوى إلى النفس كنسبة الملائكة إلى الرب مما ذهب إليه كثير من أعظم العلماء منهم صاحب إخوان الصفا حيث ذكر فيه قال الملك لحكيم من الجن - كيف طاعة الملائكة لرب العالمين قال كطاعة الحواس الخمس للنفس الناطقة قال زدني بيانا قال ألا ترى أيها الملك أن الحواس الخمس في إدراك محسوساتها و إيرادها أخبار مدركاتها إلى النفس الناطقة لا يحتاج إلى أمر و نهى و لا وعد و لا وعيد بل كلما همت به النفس الناطقة بأمر محسوس امتثلت الحاسة لما همت به و أدركتها و أوردتها إليها بلا زمان و لا تأخر و لا إبطاء و هكذا طاعة الملائكة لرب العالمين الذين لا يعصون الله ما أمرهم و يفعلون ما يؤمرون لأنه أحكم الحاكمين.

و اعلم أن النفس ما دام كونه متعلقة بالبدن غير واصله إلى النشأة الكاملة العقلية لا تصرف لها إلا في القوى الحيوانية التي علمت أقسامها الثلاثة و ما يتفرع عنها من القوى المبنوثة في الجسم و أما إذا كملت بالعلم و العمل فيطيعها الأكوان العقلية و الروحانية و الحسية كلها طاعتها لملك الملوك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٠

و قال الشيخ العارف صاحب الفتوحات في الباب الحادي و الستون و ثلاثمائة حيث أراد بيان أن الإنسان الكامل خليفة الله مخلوق على صورة الرحمن بعد ما روى الحديث الإلهي لأهل الجنة من أنه ورد في خبر أهل الجنة أنه يأتي إليهم الملك فيقول بعد أن يستأذن عليهم في الدخول فإذا دخل ناولهم كتابا من عند الله بعد أن يسلم عليهم من الله فإذا في الكتاب لكل إنسان يخاطبه من الحي القيوم إلى الحي القيوم أما بعد فإني أقول للشيء كن فيكون و قد جعلتك اليوم تقول للشيء كن فيكون -

فقال ص: فلا يقول أحد من أهل الجنة لشيء كن إلا و يكون بهذه العبارة

فجاء بشيء و هو من أنكر النكرات فعم و غاية الطبيعة تكوين الأجسام و ما يحمله - فليس لها العموم و غاية النفس تكوين الأرواح الجزئية في النشآت الطبيعية و الأرواح من العالم فلم تعم فما أعطى العموم إلا للإنسان الكامل حامل السر الإلهي و كل ما سوى الله جزء من كل الإنسان فاعقل إن كنت تعقل فانظر في كل ما سوى الله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤١

و ما وصفه الحق به و هو قوله **وَإِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يَسْبَحُ بِحَمْدِهِ** و وصف الكل بالسجود و ما جعل لواحد منهم أمرا في العالم و لا نهيا و لا خلافة و لا تكوينا عاما و جعل ذلك للإنسان الكامل فمن أراد أن يعرف كماله فليُنظر في نفسه في أمره و نهيه و تكوينه بلا واسطة لسان و لا جارحة و لا مخلوق غيره فإن صح المضاء في ذلك فهو على بينة من ربه في كماله فإنه عنده شاهد منه أي من نفسه في أمره و نهيه و تكوينه بلا واسطة و هو ما ذكرناه فإن أمر أو نهى أو شرع في التكوين بواسطة جارحة من جوارحه فلم يقع شيء من ذلك أو وقع في شيء دون شيء و لم يعم مع عموم ذلك بترك الواسطة فقد كمل و لا يقدر في كماله ما لم يقع في الوجود عن أمره بالواسطة فإن الصورة الإلهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٢

بهذا ظهرت في الوجود فإنه أمر تعالى عباده على السنة رسله و في كتبه و منهم من أطاع و منهم من عصى و بارتفاع الوسائل لا سبيل إلا لطاعة خاصة لا يصح و لا يمكن إباؤه

قال ص: يد الله مع الجماعة

و قدرته نافذة و لهذا لو اجتمع الإنسان في نفسه حتى صار شيئا واحدا نفذت همته فيما يريد و هذا ذوق أجمع عليه أهل الله قاطبة - فإن يد الله مع الجماعة فإن بالمجموع ظهر العالم و الأعيان ليست إلا هو - انظر في قوله تعالى **مَا يَكُونُ مِنْ نَجْوَى ثَلَاثَةٍ إِلَّا هُوَ رَابِعُهُمْ** انتهت عبارته في توضيح المقام الجمعي و الخلافة الإلهية للإنسان الكامل و الحمد لله الذي أوضح لنا بالبرهان - الكاشف لكل حجاب و لكل شبهة سبيل ما أجمع عليه أذواق أهل الله بالوجدان و أكثر مباحث هذا الكتاب مما يعين في تحقيق هذا المطلب الشريف الغامض و غيره من المقاصد العظيمة الإلهية التي قصرت عنها أفكار أولي الأنظار إلا النادر القليل من الجامعين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٣

لعلوم المتفكرين مع علوم المكاشفين و نحن جمعنا فيه بفضل الله بين الذوق و الوجدان - و بين البحث و البرهان و لنعد إلى حيث ما فارقناه

فصل (١٢) في أن أول عضو يتكون هو ما ذا

اختلفت الأطباء و الطبيعويون في هذا فزعم المشرحون أن التشريح دلهم على أن القلب أول ما يتكون من الأعضاء. و قال بقراط إن أول ما يتكون هو الدماغ و قال محمد بن زكريا إن ذلك هو الكبد و دليل المشرحين المشاهدة إذ لا يمكن إقامة البرهان في مثل هذه المطالب الجزئية و ما ذهب إليه بقراط و محمد بن زكريا لا يقدر في ذلك لأن مبنى ما قاله قياس ضعيف أو فاسد لا بممارسة التشريح فإن ابن زكريا زعم أن حاجة الجنين إلى القوة الغذائية و المنمية أقوى من حاجته إلى القوة الحيوانية و النفسانية و العضو المتولي لهذا الأمر هو الكبد و هو مقدم في التكون و رده الإمام الرازي بأن تكون الأعضاء متقدم على اغتائها و ذلك التكون إنما يتم بالقوة الحيوانية و الحار الغريزي فمنبعهما و هو القلب أولى بالتقديم.

أقول ليس مراد المستدل أن الكبد كان يعطي الغذاء للأعضاء التي لم تتكون بعد بل مراده أن المادة الحيوانية أول ما يوجد

فيها من القوى هي النباتية سيما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٤

الغاذية ثم يوجد فيها بعد طي المراتب النباتية من جهة المبادي القوى الحيوانية على التدرج ثم النفسانية فالقياس يقتضي أن يكون المضغة التي فيها قوة التغذية و التنمية - يتكون منها الكبد أولاً لأنه عندهم مبدأ القوى النباتية و الذي يتكون بعده هو القلب لأنه معدن القوى الحيوانية و الذي يتكون بعدهما من الأعضاء هو الدماغ لأنه منبع قوى الإدراكات التي غاية القوتين الأوليين.

هذا إذا نظرنا إلى الترتب الزمني الطبيعي بحسب الإعداد من طريق استكمالات المواد و هي من الأدنى إلى الأعلى و من الأخس إلى الأشرف.

و أما إذا نظرنا إلى الترتب العلي و المعلولي و التقدم بالشرف و الوجود فالمقدم هو الدماغ كما قاله البقراط ثم القلب ثم الكبد ثم سائر الأعضاء بل المقدم هي الأرواح التي في الثلاثة النفسانية أولاً ثم الحيوانية ثم الطبيعية ثم الأعصاب ثم الأوردة و الشرايين ثم العضلات و الرباطات ثم سائر الأعضاء البسيطة ثم المركبة و من علم تقدم القوى الآلية - على النفوس المستعملة إياها في الزمان و تقدم النفوس على قواها بالذات سيما الناطقة المتقدمة على الكل بالذات و تأخرها عن الكل بالزمان لا على وجه الدور المستحيل - لأن القوة المتقدمة على النفس بالزمان المعدة إياها غير القوة الفائضة منها بالعدد و عينا بالحقيقة لا يتعجب عن تقدم بعض الأعضاء كالکبد بالزمان على بعض متأخر عنه بالطبع كالدماغ. و استدل على تقدم القلب بأنه لا شك أن في المني روحاً كثيرة و فيه الحر و الخثرة بما فيه من كثرة الهواء الحارة و لذلك يشتد بياضه و إذا ضربه البرد الذي هو أولى بالتجميد و التكتيف يزول خثورته و بياضه و يصير رقيقاً و إذا كان كذلك فوجب أن يكون أول متكون منه هو الذي أسهل و الحاجة إليه أمس و لا شك أن الروح أسهل تكونا من العضو فإن انقلاب الأجزاء الهوائية الموجودة في المني المنقذ إلى الرحم إلى الروح أسهل من صيرورتها عضواً و الحاجة إلى تكون الروح لانبعاث القوة المصورة و اشتدادها أمس من الحاجة إلى العضو فثبت أن تكون الروح قبل تكون العضو ثم لا بد أن يكون لذلك الروح مجمع حاصر لأنه يمتنع أن يهمل الطبيعة أمر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٥

هذه الروح حتى يتحرك كيف اتفق و ينمو كيف اتفق فيجب أن يكون الجوهر الروحي أول ما يتكون و هو يجتمع في موضع واحد و يحيط به ما هو أكثف الأجزاء من المني و ليس لبعض الجوانب بأن يكون مجمعا لتلك الأرواح أولوية من الجانب الآخر - فلا بد أن يكون مجموعها هو الوسط و يكون سائر الأجزاء محيطة به كالكرة و ذلك المجمع ليس هو الكبد لأن حاجة الأعضاء إلى الغذاء بعد تكونها كما مر في إبطال مذهب ابن زكريا فإذن ذلك المجمع هو الموضع الذي استحکم مزاجه و هو القلب.

أقول فيه نظر لأننا إن سلمنا أن أول ما يتكون من بخارية الأخلاط هو الروح - و أنه أسهل وجوداً من الأعضاء و أمس حاجة إليه منها إلا أن الروح منه ما هو طبيعي - قريب الشبه مما يوجد في الأجسام النباتية من الأجزاء اللطيفة البخارية و منه ما هو حيواني يختص بالمزاج الحيواني و منه ما هو نفساني قريب الشبه بالأجرام الفلكية - فالذي يتكون منه أولاً

في الحيوان هو الأرواح الطبيعية و المجمع الحاصر لها هو المناسب إياها و هو الكبد ثم يضيف إليها للأجزاء الغذائية بالقوة الغذائية التي فيها- فيغتذي و ينمو و يتكامل فتزيد حاجتها حسب تكاملها في الجوهر و تزايدها في المقدار إلى منزل أعلى و موضع أشرف و أقوى فيضم إلى المجمع الأول في جانبه العالي- الذي فيه قوة الحرارة مجمع آخر روحه أصفى و أقوى و أحر و أقبل للحياة و هو القلب و هكذا يتولد سائر الأعضاء بعضها للرئاسة و بعضها للخدمة إلى أن يتم البدن بجميع ما فيه من القوى و الأعضاء كمدينة عامرة يتزايد أجزاؤها شيئاً فشيئاً فيحتاج إلى سلطان مطاع يخدمه الرعايا و يخدم الرعايا المساكن و المنازل و الدواب و غيرها و ربما كان وجود السلطان آخراً في السعي و العمل و أولاً في الفكر و الغاية

فصل (١٣) في وقت تعلق النفس الناطقة بالبدن

قد أشرنا سابقاً إلى أن النفس الناطقة المدركة للمعقولات بالفعل إنما يحدث لمن يحدث في حدود الأربعين عاماً بحسب الغالب و أما النفس المتميزة عن سائر النفوس الحيوانية- باستعدادها للكمال العقلي و وقت تعلقها فزعم الشيخ الرئيس في ذلك أن مني المرأة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٦

تصير ذات أنفس بنفوذ قوة الذكورية فيه فإن الروح يشبه أن يتكون من نطفة الذكر- و البدن من نطفة الأنثى فإذا صار ذلك ذا نفس تحركت النفس إلى تكميل الأعضاء- و تكون حينئذ النفس غاذية إذ لا فعل لها غير ذلك ثم إذا استقرت فيها القوة الغاذية- أعدت للنفس الحسية فيكون فيها قوة قبول النفس الحسية و إن كانت الحسية في ذوات النطق و النطقية واحدة لأن الأعضاء الحسية يتم معها و كذلك الغاذية و أعضاؤها و أيضاً فاعضاء الحيوان لا يعمها الحس و يعمها الاغتذاء فلا يبعد أن يكون النطفة يحصل فيها الغاذية مستفادة من الأب و الأخرى يحدث من بعد و يجوز أن يكون الغاذية التي جاءت من الأب يبقى إلى أن يستحيل المزاج استحالة ما ثم يتصل به الغاذية الخاصة كان الاستفادة من الأب لا تبلغ من قوتها أن يتم لتدبيرها إلى آخره بل تفي بتدبيرها مدة ثم يحتاج إلى أخرى كان ما يؤخذ من الأب قد تغير عما عليه الواجب فليس من نوع الغاذية التي كانت في الأب و التي في الولد و لكن لم يخرج التغير به أن يعمل عملاً ما مناسباً لذلك العمل و كيفما كان فإذا صار القلب و الدماغ موجودين في الناطق تعلق بهما النفس النطقية و يفيض منها الحسية أما النطقية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٧

فيكون غير مادية و لكنها لا تكون عاقلة بل تكون كما في السكران و المصروع- و إنما تستكمل بأمور من خارج. هذا ما نقله الفخر الرازي عن الشيخ و أني ما وجدت في كتبه هذه العبارة و لا يبعد أن تكون مذكورة في شيء منها و فيه مواضع أنظار حكمية.

الأول أن الاستفادة المادة المنوية قوة غاذية من نفس متعلقة ببدن آخر غير صحيح سيما و كثيراً ما يوجد النطفة باقية بعد فناء الأب و النفس و لا غيرها من القوى المتعلقة بالأجرام لا يفعل فعلاً طبعياً في غير بدنها و مادتها بل النطفة قد فاضت عليها من المبدأ الفعال كمالات متعاقبة جوهرية أولها كالصورة المعدنية و هي الحافظة للتركيب و المفيدة للمزاج

و ثانيها الصور النباتية و بعدها الجوهر الحيواني و هكذا وقع الاشتداد في الوجود الصوري الجوهرى إلى أن تجرد و ارتفع عن المادة ذاتا ثم إدراكا و تدبيرا و فعلا و تأثيرا.

الثاني أن النفس الناطقة لو كانت بكمالها الذاتي الأولي موجودة في أول تكون القلب و الدماغ لكانت ضائعة معطلة عن فعلها و كمالاتها اللائق اللازم لها- من غير عائق خارجي مدة مديدة و هذا مما أقيم البرهان الحكمي على نفيه و ليس ذلك كحال السكران و المصروع لأن السكر و الصرع من الأسباب و الموانع الخارجة عن جبلة النفس و كذا النوم المانع لظهور الكمالات الموجودة بالفعل في ذات النفس- بل النفس إنما تصير ناطقة بحركة جوهرية وقعت في زمان طويل.

الثالث أن في غير الطريقة التي اخترناها يلزم وجود الآلة قبل مستعملها كالغاذية مثلا فإنها لا شك أنها من قوى النفس الناطقة فيما له تلك النفس فإذا كانت موجودة قبل وجود النفس يلزم ما ذكرناه من المحذور و أما على طريقتنا فالجوهر النفساني يتدرج في الاستكمال و يستلزم و يتضمن من القوى و الفروع ما كان يستلزمه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٨

و يتضمنه من قبل مع زوايد أخرى كمية و كيفية و تلك القوى و الفروع متجددة بالعدد حسب تجددتها في الشدة و الكمالية و ما أحسن ما وقع من بعض الحكماء في التمثيل لحال النفس من مبادي تكونها إلى غاية كماليتها و اتصالها بالعقل الفعال- من أن العقل الفعال كنار تأثر عنها فحم بالحرارة و آخر بالتحمر و التجمر و آخر بالإضاءة و الإحراق فيفعل فعل النار و فعل الأولين و كل ما وقع له الاشتداد يصدر عنه ما يصدر مما تقدم عليه فهذا مثال مراتب آثار العقل في النبات و الحيوان و الإنسان- و كما أن النور الشديد يشتمل على مراتب الأنوار التي دونه و ليس اشتماله عليها كاشتمال مركب على بسيط و لا كاشتمال مقدار على أبعاضه الوهمية بل على ضرب آخر فكذلك الوجود القوي جامع لما في الوجودات الضعيفة التي دونه فيترتب عليه ما يترتب عليها و هكذا يزداد الآثار باشتداد القوة و فضيلة الوجود و ربما أخرجه الاشتداد من نشأة دائرة إلى نشأة باقية فيصير ذاته من المفارقات عن الأجسام و علائقها- فيجعل من قبله خليفة متوسطة بينه و بين تدبير الأجسام كما يطول شرحه

فصل (١٤) في اختلاف هذه القوى

قيل غاذية كل عضو مخالفة لغاذية العضو الآخر بالنوع و الماهية و إلا لما اختلف أفعالها نوعا و كذلك القول في النامية و المولدة و الخوادم الأربع و إنما هي متحدة بالجنس.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٤٩

أقول اختلاف الأنواع في الآثار القريبة الصادرة من القوة بلا واسطة- و إن استدعى اختلاف تلك القوة إما عددا أو نوعا و لكن الآثار البعيدة الصادرة عن القوة بواسطة لا يستدعي اختلافها نوعا اختلاف تلك القوة لا نوعا و لا عددا ألا ترى أن المبدأ القريب لكل فلك يخالف نوعا للمبدأ القريب لفلك آخر و لكن آلة كل فلك هو آلة جميع الأفلاك واحد لا نظير له فغاذية كل عضو و إن كانت مخالفة لغاذية العضو الآخر في الفعل و المحل و لكن غاذية الشخص الواحد كزيد مثلا واحدة بالحقيقة و المادة أعني البدن و الغاية و الفاعل أعني النفس دون الآثار و الصوادر و هكذا قياس سائر القوى و الفواعل و الغرض أن تعدد الآثار و المعلولات حقيقة و نوعا لا يستلزم كلية تعدد عللها و مبادئها بل قد تكون الوحدة

و الكثرة من لوازم مقامات الوجود- فالنفس مع وحدتها تتضمن جميع القوى المدركة و المحركة المتخالفة نوعا عند ما ظهرت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٠

في نشأة البدن و هي متحدة عند ما كانت في النفس كاتحاد الحواس الخمس في الحس المشترك و اتحاد المدارك كلها في العقل النظري و كاتحاد القوى المحركة النباتية- كالجذب و الدفع و غيرها في القوة النباتية و اتحاد جميع القوى المحركة المبتوثة في الأعضاء- في القوة الباعثة الحيوانية و العقل العملي في الإنسان

فصل (١٥) في إثبات القوة الحيوانية للإنسان

اعلم أن كل طبيعة لنوع من أنواع الموجودات ما لم يستكمل شرائط النوع الأخس الأنقص الذي دونها و لم يستوف قواه و لوازمها لم تتخط به إلى النوع الأشرف الأتم و هذه قاعدة كلية برهانية ذكرها الشيخ في بعض كتبه و يستفاد من كتب المعلم الأول فالطبيعة التي بلغت إلى حد الإنسانية و النفس الناطقة لا بد من استيفائها- لجميع الشرائط الحيوانية أصولها و فروعها حتى يبلغ إلى مقام الناطقة فإذن لا بد في الإنسان من وجود القوة الحيوانية لكن لا على وجه التفصيل و التحصيل بأن يكون في الإنسان قوة حيوانية بالفعل و قوة أخرى إنسانية بل على الوجه الذي حققناه في الفلك من كون نفسه العقلية هي بعينها نفسه المنطبعة لا تغاير بينهما بالعدد بل بالمعنى و الأثر فالقوة الناطقة فينا بعينها هي القوة الحيوانية التي بلغت حد الناطقة- كما قد كررنا الإشارة إليه و المراد بها القوة التي بها يستعد الأعضاء لقبول قوى الحس و الحركة.

و اعلم أن الشيخ لم يتعرض لهذه القوة في كتبه الحكمية كالشفا و النجاة و غيرهما و لكنها أثبتتها في القانون.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥١

و جمهور الأطباء قائلون بها لا على وجه حققناه بل على أنها قوة منفصلة عن الناطقة- موجودة بالفعل مغايرة إياه. و احتجوا عليه بأن العضو المفلوج فيه قوة نفسانية لأن ما فيه من العناصر المتداعية إلى الانفكاك إنما يبقى مجتمعة بقاهر يجبرها و ذلك القاهر ليس من توابع المزاج لأن تابع الشيء لا يكون حافظا إياه فإذن فيه قوة متقدمة على مزاج العضو- حافظة إياه عن التلاشي و الفساد فالعضو المفلوج فيه قوة نفسانية و هي إما قوة الحس و الحركة الإرادية أو قوة نباتية تفعل التغذية و غيرها أو قوة أخرى غير هذين النوعين- لكن الأول باطل لأن العضو المفلوج ليس فيه قوة حس و لا حركة و كذا الثاني باطل بوجهين أحدهما أن قوة التغذية قد تبطل مع بقاء تلك القوة و ثانيهما أن هذه القوة مفيدة لقبول الحس و الحركة لو لا المانع فلو كانت هذه القوة هي الغذائية و الغذائية موجودة في النبات فيلزم أن يكون في النبات استعداد قبول الحس و الحركة و التالي باطل فالمقدم مثله فإذن هذه القوة نوع آخر مغاير للقوى النفسانية و النباتية.

أقول هذا الاستدلال مع قصوره عن إفادة هذا المطلوب مشتمل على الخلط و الالتباس.

أما بيان القصور فلاحد أن يقول إن القوة الموجودة في العضو المفلوج هي قوة نباتية غذائية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٢

قولهم قد يبطل قوة التغذية مع بقاء تلك القوة - قلنا لا نسلم بطلانها بل نقول قوة التغذية باقية و إلا لسرع التحليل في العضو حتى زال في زمان قليل أكثر مقداره و ليس الأمر كذلك غاية الأمر أن لا يظهر أثر التغذية ظهوراً بينا لمانع. و قولهم قوة التغذية موجودة في النبات و هي غير مفيدة لقبول الحس و الحركة - قلنا الغذائية التي في النبات مخالفة بالماهية للغذية التي في الحيوان كما أن الحيوانية التي في سائر الحيوانات مخالفة بالماهية للحيوانية التي للإنسان و السبب في ذلك على الوجه الكلي أن جهة القوة ينافي جهة الفعلية فالصورة إذا قويت فعليتها و وجودها استكملت المادة بها و تمت ذاتها بتلك الصورة فبطل استعدادها لقبول صورة أخرى لشدة وجود الصورة و أما إذا كانت الصورة ضعيفة الوجود بين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٣

محوضة الفعلية و صرافة القوة لم يمنع المادة عن قبول صورة أخرى فوقها فالأول كما في العناصر حين بساطتها فالنار الصرف لا تقبل صورة النبات و الحيوان و كذا الأرض و الماء و الهواء و أما إذا انكسرت كيفياتها و ضعفت سورة صورتها استعدت المادة لقبول صورة أخرى فعلى هذا القياس القوة الغذائية التي في النبات لشدة فعليتها منعت عن قبول الحيوانية بخلاف الغذائية التي في الحيوان فإنها لضعفها تقبل قوة أخرى فوقها - و كذلك الإنسان لما كان ضعيف الحيوانية كما قال تعالى **خَلَقَ الْإِنْسَانَ ضَعِيفًا** صارت حيوانيته خميرة لفطرة أخرى و مادة قابلة لنشأة ثانية باقية. و أما بيان الخلط و الالتباس فقد علمت أن القوة الحيوانية ليست إلا مبدأ الحس و الحركة فإن الحياة الحيوانية تنوط بمبدأ هذين الأثرين فإذا لم يكن مبدؤهما موجوداً في العضو المفلوج بل قد بطل و انفسخ فكيف يحكم بأن القوة الحيوانية موجودة فيه مع بطلان هاتين القوتين فالحق أن الموجود في العضو المفلوج - من القوى النفسانية هي قوة التغذية و من الأرواح هي الروح الطبيعي الذي يسري من الكبد إلى سائر الأعضاء.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٤

و أما القول بأن الموجود هي قوة الحس و الحركة الإرادية لكن فعل الحس و الحركة الإرادية لم يوجد لمانع منع الفاعل الموجود عن فعله و ذلك المانع هو مادة الفالج لأنها قد منعت عن أفعال قوى الحس و الحركة عنها و لا تكون مبطله لذاتي القوتين.

فليس بشيء لأن هذه القوى جسمانية و المادة داخلية في تعيين وجودها فإذا كانت موجودة و كان وجودها لا محالة في مادة صالحة لقبولها فكيف صلحت تلك المادة لقبول وجودها و منعت عن صدور فعلها.

نعم لو قال أحد بأن النفس الإنسانية ما دامت متعلقة بالبدن و هي تكون مبداء لجميع القوى النطقية و الحيوانية و النباتية و الطبيعية لكن أجزاء البدن متفاوتة في قبول ذلك ففي بعضها يتعلق النفس بأكثر قواها كالدماغ و القلب ففيه القوة الإدراكية و التحريكية الإرادية و النباتية كلها و في بعضها يتعلق ببعض قواها كالطبيعة و شيء ضعيف من النباتية كالأظفار و الأسنان و العظام و لذا يختلف تعلقها بالبدن في الأحوال ففي حالة النوم و السكر الشديد يرتفع بأكثر قواها القريبة من أفقها عن البدن كالشمس إذا غربت في الأفق و خفيت بجوهرها و ذاتها عن عالم الأرض و بقي بعض

أضوائها و أظلالها في وجه الأرض إذ لو انقطعت بتمام قواها عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٥

البدن في النوم لبطل و مات البدن دفعة و لو تعلقت به بكليتها لصدر منها في النوم ما كان يصدر عنها عند اليقظة. فقد علم من هذا أن وجودها لا يقتضي سراية قواها كلها في كل عضو من البدن و لا في كل وقت فالعضو المفلوج من شأنه أن يسري فيه بعض قوى النفس كالطبيعية و النباتية دون الحيوانية فظهر أن استدلالهم على وجود القوة الحيوانية من جهة العضو المفلوج ليس بصحيح فالمصير في ذلك إلى ما أحكمنا بنيانه و أوضحنا تبيانه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٦

الباب الرابع

من علم النفس في أحوال القوى المختصة بالنفوس الحيوانية التي منها مبادي الإدراكات الظاهرة و منها مبادي الإدراكات الباطنة و هي أشد قربا من عالم الملكوت و منها مبادي الحركات الإرادية و هي أنزل درجة من مبادي الإدراكات جملة و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في الإشارة إلى تلك القوى و منفعة كل منها على الإجمال

اعلم أن الله لما خلق من المواد الأرضية جوهر النبات الذي هو أكمل وجودا من العناصر و الحجر و المدر و من الجواهر المعدنية كالحديد و النحاس و غيرهما لأنه خلق فيه قوة تجذب الغذاء من جهة أصله و عروقه التي في الأرض و أعد له آلات و قوى هي خوادم له أما القوى فقد مر ذكرها و أما الآلات فهي العروق الدقيقة- التي تراها في كل ورقة يغلظ أصولها ثم ينشعب و لا يزال يستدق إلى عروق شعرية- تنبسط في أجزاء الورقة حتى تغيب عن البصر لكن لما كان النبات مع هذا الكمال الذي يفوق به على العناصر و المعدنية ناقص الخلقة غير تام الوجود و لا مستقلا في وجوده- فإنه لو أعوزه غذاء يساق إليه و يماس أصله جف و يبس و فسد و لم يمكنه طلب الغذاء من موضع آخر فإن الطلب إنما يكون بمعرفة المطلب و بالانتقال إليه و بقدر الطلب يكون المعرفة و على قدر المعرفة يمكن الانتقال إلى المعروف به و النبات عاجز عن ذلك فلو كانت فيه معرفة المطلب لكان معطلا وجودها فيه و الله سبحانه أجل من أن يخلق أمرا معطلا و البرهان قائم على أن لا معطل في الكون و لو فرض شعور في النبات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٧

لكان شعوره لا يتعدى عما جبل عليه فعناية الله تعالى تعلقت بخلق ما هو أكمل وجودا من النبات فأنعم على الحيوان قوة الإحساس و قوة الحركة في طلب الغذاء فأول مراتب الحواس هي حاسة اللمس لأن الحاجة بها أمس و لهذا يعم الحيوانات كلها و يسري في الأعضاء كلها إلا نادرا لأن الحيوان الأرضي مركب من عناصر متضادة الكيفيات الأولية قد اعتدلت و تصالحت و استقرت على كيفية واحدة بضرب من الوحدة و صلاحه باعتدالها و فساده بانحرافها عن ذلك الاعتدال فلا يتصور حيوان إلا و أن يكون له هذا الحس لأنه وإن لم يحس أصلا فليس بحيوان و أنقص درجات الحس أن يحس بما يلاصقه و يماسه فإن الإحساس بما يبعد منه إحساس أتم و أقوى و هذا الحس تجده في كل حيوان حتى

الدود التي في الطين فإنه إذا غرز فيها إبرة انقبضت للهرب لا كالنبات يقطع فلا ينقبض إذ لا يحس بالقطع إلا أن الحيوان للشمسي كاللدود ناقص الحياة لا يقدر على طلب الغذاء من حيث يبعد عنه فافتقر في كماله إلى حس يدرك ما بعد عنه فأفادت له العناية قوة الشم لكنه يدرك به الرائحة ولا يدري أنها جاءت من أي ناحية فيحتاج إلى أن يطوف كثيرا من الجوانب فربما يعثر على الغذاء الذي شم ريحه وربما لم يعثر فيكون في غاية النقصان أيضا لو لم يخلق فيه غير هذا فخلق له البصر ليدرك ما بعد عنه ويدرك جهته فيقصد تلك الجهة بعينها إلا أنه مع ذلك يكون ناقصا إذ لا يدرك به ما وراء الجدار والحجب فلا يبصر غذاء يحجب عنه ولا يبصر عدوا يحجب عنه وقد لا ينكشف الحجاب إلا بعد قرب العدو فيعجز عن الهرب فخلق له السمع حتى يدرك به الأصوات من وراء الجدران عند جريان الحركات ولأن الإنسان لا يدرك بالبصر إلا شيئا حاضرا وأما الغائب فلا يمكن معرفته إلا بكلام ينظم من حروف وأصوات يدرك بحس السمع فاشتدت الحاجة فينا إليه فخلق لنا ذلك و ميزنا بفهم الكلام عن سائر الحيوانات وكل ذلك ما كان يغنيانا ولا للحيوان لو لم يكن قوة الذوق إذ يصل الغذاء فلا يدرك أنه موافق أو مخالف فيأكله وربما يكون مهلكا كالشجرة يصب في أصلها كل مائع ولا ذوق لها فتجذبه وربما يكون ذلك سبب جفافها ثم كل ذلك لا يكفي لو لم يخلق في مقدم الدماغ إدراك آخر يسمى بالحس المشترك يتأدى إليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٨

المحسوسات الخمس و يجتمع فيه و لولاه لطلال الأمر على الحيوان و يقع في المهالك - فإن بعض الحيوانات كالفرش و غيرها لفقده الحس الباطني ربما يتهافت على النار مرة بعد أخرى و قد تأذى بها و لو كان له تخيل و حفظ لما وقع الإحساس به أولا - لم يكن يعود إلى ما تأذى به مرة ثم مع ذلك ناقص لأنه لم يمكنه الحذر مما لا يدركه بالحس إذ ما لم يتأذى بشيء فلا يدري أنه مما يحذر منه فخلق الله للحيوانات الكاملة كالفرس و غيره قوة يدرك بها معنى جزئيا لا تدخل تحت حس و لا تخيل و تلك القوة هي الواهمة فإن الفرس مثلا يحذر من الأسد إذا رآه أولا من غير أن يتأذى به فلا يكون حذره موقوفا على أن يحس به مرة و يتأذى به و كذا الشاة يرى الذئب أولا فيحذره - و يرى الجمل و البقر و هما أعظم منه شكلا و أهول صورة فلا يحذرهما و إلى الآن يشارك البهائم الإنسان في هذه الإدراكات و بعد هذا يكون الترقى إلى حدود الإنسانية فيدرك عواقب الأمور و الأشياء التي لم يدخل تحت حس و لا تخيل و لا توهم و لا يقع الاقتصار في الحذر و الطلب على العاجلة بل يحذر الشرور الآجلة و يطلب الخيرات الآخرة فميز الله الإنسان من بين الحيوان بقوة أخرى هي أشرف من الكل بها يدرك منافع الأمور و مضارها و خيرات الآخرة و شرورها.

ثم اعلم أن الحيوان لو اقتصر فيه على خلق الحواس و المدارك لإدراك الموافق من الأغذية و الأدوية و غير الموافق و لم يخلق له ميل في الطبع و شوق في النفس إليه - أو إرادة إياه في العقل يستحثه على الحركة إلى الموافق أو مقابلات هذه يستحثه على الحركة عن المخالف لكان البصر و سائر الحواس معطلة في حقه فاضطر أن يكون له ميل إلى ما يوافقه يسمى شهوة و نفرة عما يخالفه يسمى كراهة ليطلب بالشهوة الملائم - و يهرب بالكراهة المنافي ثم هذه المرتبة من الميل و النفرة في جملة القوى المحركة - و إن كفت في كمال وجود الحيوان بما هو حيوان لكن لا يكفي في كمال وجود الإنسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٥٩

الذي هو أشرف أنواع الحيوانات إذ الشهوة والغضب سواء كان بحسب الشخص كشهوة الغذاء الموافق أو بحسب النوع كشهوة الجماع والوقاع والغضب على ما يخالف ذلك لا يدعوان إلا إلى ما ينفع ويضر في الحال أما في المال فلا يكفي هذه الداعية المسماة بالشهوة أو الغضب فخلق الله للإنسان داعية أخرى فوق الشهوة والغضب مسخرة تحت إشارة العقل الهادي بنور الله إلى العواقب الأخروية المعرف لحسن الثواب وقبح العقاب وهذه الداعية هي المسماة بالإرادة وقد يسمى عند بعض علماء الدين باعثا دينيا وهي التي خص الله بني آدم بها وأفردهم بها عن البهائم إكراما وتعظيما كما ميزهم بالعقل العارف بعواقب الأشياء وهذه الإرادة تحت إشارة العقل كما أن الشهوة تحت إدراك الحس هذا ما لخصناه من كلام بعض علماء الإسلام - و حاولنا أن نذكره في هذا الفصل لجودة نظمه و حسن بيانه و لنعد إلى ذكر أحوال الحواس على التفصيل

فصل (٢) في اللمس و أحواله

قد علمت أن الحيوان الأرضي لكونه حامل كيفية اعتدالية يحتاج إلى قوة حافظة إياها مدركة للجسم المحيط به كالهواء و الماء إنه مخالف ليحترز منه حتى لا يكون محرقا إياه بحر أو مجمدا ببردة أو موافق ليطلبه أو يسكن فيه فهو أقدم الحواس - و يشبه أن يكون الحاجة إلى اللمس لدفع المضرة أقوى و إلى الذوق للدلالة على المطعومات التي يستبقي بها الحياة أشد لكن الحاجة إلى دافع المضرة لاستبقاء الأصل أقدم من الحاجة إلى المنفعة لتحصيل الكمال و لأن جلب الغذاء يمكن بسائر الحواس فظهر أن اللمس أول الحواس و أقدمها و أنه يجب أن يكون كل البدن موصوفا بالقوة اللامسة و البرهان على ذلك أن بدن الحيوان من جنس مادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٠

الكيفيات الملموسة و كذا جميع أعضائه و عندنا أن المدرك دائما من جنس المدرك - فالذي يسري في جميع البدن من قوة الحياة و الإدراك لا يمكن أن يكون غير مبدأ الإدراك اللمسي أما غيره فلا يمكن أن يكون ساريا في كل البدن مثلا حامل القوة البصرية لا يمكن أن يكون سائر الأعضاء لكثافتها و ظلمتها لأن مدركات هذه القوة هي الأنوار فمدركها لا بد أن يكون متحدا معها بالماهية كما قررناه و ليست أعضاء البدن أنوارا لا بالفعل و لا بالقوة كالشفاف فاستحال أن يكون نور البصر ساريا في تلك الأعضاء لأنها كثيفة كدرة و كذا قياس السمع و سائر الإدراكات الباطنة كالوهم و الخيال لأن البدن و أعضائه ليست موهومة و لا متخيلة لكونها مادية و لا تدخل هي في عالم الوهم و الخيال بل صورة أخرى مناسبة إياها كما يقع في إدراك الوهمي و الخيالي.

و من هاهنا يعلم أن الواهمة و الخيال و المدارك الباطنة ليست مادية موجودة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦١

في عضو كالدماع كما هو المشهور لما مهدناه من قاعدة اتحاد المدرك و المدرك و أما سائر الحواس الظاهرة غير اللمس كالذوق و السمع و الشم و البصر فهي و إن كانت مادية لكنها ليست كاللمس سارية في جميع البدن لأن بعضها كالسمع و البصر في غاية اللطافة فيجب أن يكون موضعه جزءا لطيفا شفافا أو نحوه مناسبا لما أدركته القوة - و ليس كل عضو

جزءاً لطيفاً وبعضها كالذوق والشم وإن لم يكن بتلك اللطافة لكنها لطيفة أيضاً لأن حامل مدركاتها ليست أجساماً كثيفة صلبة بل إما بخارات وإما أجسام رقيقة وليس كل عضو مناسباً لأن يكون موضوع الرائحة والطعم بل بعض الأعضاء كباطن الخيشوم للمشموم و جرم اللسان للمطعم وهذا بخلاف اللمس فإن جميع الأجسام سواء كانت صلبة أو رخوة كثيفة أو لطيفة قابلة لأن تقوم بها قوة اللمس - و يتعلق بها إدراكه فإن هذا الإدراك إنما يحصل بمماسة السطوح ومساكتها.

و من الناس من زعم أن قوة اللمس أنواع أربعة الحاكمة بين الحار والبارد والحاكمة بين الرطب واليابس والحاكمة بين الصلب واللين والحاكمة بين الأملس والخشن - و زاد بعضهم الحاكمة بين الثقيل والخفيف فيكون خمس أنواع وقد مر وجه الانحلال لما ذكره.

واعلم أن من خواص كل قوة حساسة أن يكون حاملها وإن كان من جنس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٢

ما تدركه خالياً في ذاته عن صورة الكيفيات التي أدركتها القوة حتى ينفعل عن تلك الصورة فإن آلة الإدراك ما لم يتكيف بكيفية المدرك لم يقع إدراك القوة بصورة تلك الكيفية وإن كان الحاصل في الآلة غير الصورة الحاضرة للقوة لأن هذه خارجية مادية و تلك ذهنية إدراكية فإن المدرك للحرارة والبرودة مثلاً يجب أن لا يكون موصوفاً بهما فيرد الإشكال في باب اللمس لأن العضو اللامس غير خالية عن هذه الكيفيات المسمية لكننا نقول هذه القاعدة لا تقتضي أن لا يكون لمحل الإدراك حظ أصلاً من جنس ما يدرك بل يقتضي أن يكون خالياً عن نوع ما يدركه و عن ضده و المعتدل الفاتر الكيفية المتوسطة بين الأطراف لقصورها و ضعفها بمنزلة الخالي عن الأنواع كالماء الفاتر فإنه كاللحار واللابارد و لهذا يقبل كلا من الطرفين بسرعة - فالأقرب إلى الاعتدال أشد إدراكاً.

و لك أن تقول إننا لا نعرف كون البهائم مدركاً للمحسوسات و شاعرة بها إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٣

لأجل طلبها ما يلائمها و هربها عما ينافرها حتى الحيوانات الناقصة كالأسفنجيات و الأصناف فإنها تتحرك حركات انقباض و انبساط بالإرادة و لو لم نشاهد منها هذه الحركة لم نعرف أن لها قوة اللمس فإذا كان الأمر كذلك و قد وجدنا مثل ذلك في العناصر و النباتات فإن الأرض يهرب عن العلو إلى السفلى على طريقة واحدة و النار تهرب من السفلى إلى العلو على طريقة واحدة فإذا حاولت النار الصعود فإن عارضها في صوب حركتها معارض رجعت عنه إلى سمت آخر بل إلى السفلى و صعدت من الجوانب التي لا مانع فيها و كذا النبات لو صادفه مانع عن سمت نموه و حركته انحرف عنه إلى جهة أخرى و يميل أيضاً من جانب الظل إلى جانب ضوء الشمس.

و أيضاً الشجر النبات بقرب النهر يمتد إلى جانب الماء شعباً أصوله ليسهل وصول الماء إليه ليجذبه إلى غير ذلك من الحركات لطلب الملائم و الهرب عن المنافر و كل ذلك يدل على شعورها بالملائم و غير الملائم و أيضاً ما ذكرتم من أن الحيوان لما كان بدنه من مادة مصورة بصورة من باب أوائل الكيفيات و صلاحه باعتدالها و فساده بضدها فلا بد له من قوة حافظة إياها مدركة لما يلائمها و ينافرها حتى يطلب بها الأول و يهرب عن الثاني و هذا الوجه جارٍ في النبات

أيضا بل في الجماد والعناصر لكننا نجيبك بعد تمهيد أن الإدراك عبارة عن وجود صورة حاضرة عند موجود وجوده لنفسه و أن الموجودات المادية السارية فيها لا حضور لها في نفسها فكيف لما يدركها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٤

فنقول أما العناصر الكلية فهي لكونها واقعة تحت التضاد غير باقية الوجود بل متجددة سائلة و شرط بقاء الحياة في شيء خلوه عن الضد و إلا فأصل الجسمية غير مانعة عن قبول صورة وحدانية تقبل الحياة بشرط خلوها عن الضد كالأفلاك - فإنها لخلوها عن التضاد و التفسد قبلت الحياة النطقية و أما النبات فلكون التضاد فيه غير شديد بل سورة المتضادات فيه مكسورة فليس يبعد أن يكون لقوته شعور ضعيف بما يلائمه كيف و عندنا أن الوجود مطلقا عين العلم و الشعور مطلقا و لهذا ذهب العارفون الإلهيون إلى أن الموجودات كلها عارفة بربها ساجدة له كما دل عليه الكتاب الإلهي لكن الوجود إذا خلص عن شوب العدم و الظلمات يكون الإدراك به و له على التمام و وجود الماديات ممزوج بالظلمات و الحجب مغمور في الأعدام و النقائص و بقدر ارتفاعها و ارتباطها بالمبادئ العقلية و النفسية المجردة عن المواد و الأعدام يكون وصولها إلى مقام الحياة و الإدراك و يشبه أن يكون النفوس النباتية - مع كونها صورا منغمرة في المواد هي أقرب مناسبة إلى عالم الملكوت من صور العناصر و المعادن لانكسار هذه الكيفيات المتضادة في النبات دون العناصر و المعادن و لأجل ذلك يظهر في النبات شيء من آثار الحياة دون هذه الأجسام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٥

فصل (٣) في الذوق وفيه مباحث

منها أن الذوق أعم الخمسة بعد اللمس للحيوان

و أشبه القوى بها فهو ثاني اللمس لأنه أيضا شعور بما يلائم البدن ليطلب و لهذا إذا اشتدت الحاجة إلى الغذاء - كان الإدراك أقوى و الذوق أيضا مشروط باللمس لكنه لا يكفي فيه الملاقاة بالسطوح كما مر بل لا بد من نفوذ ذي الطعم في جرم آلة الذوق و هو اللسان إما بذاته أو بواسطة الرطوبة اللعابية المنبعثة عن اللسان يقبل الطعوم و لا بد أن يكون تلك الرطوبة عديمة الطعم لتؤدي الطعوم إلى الآلة بصحة و إن خالطها طعم كما يكون للمرضى لم تؤد بصحة. و الحق أن الآلة أيضا يجب أن تكون إما عديمة الطعم مطلقا أو ضعيفة الطعم جدا حتى يصح لها التكيف بكيفية ما يتأدى إليها من الطعوم و يقع بها الإدراك - و لا يكفي لحصول هذا الإدراك تكيف الرطوبة اللعابية بالطعم و لا ملاقة المطعوم - لأن الخارج عن البدن لا يمكن أن يكون موضع شعور النفس إذ العلاقة الطبيعية غير حاصلة للنفس إلا بالقياس إلى البدن و قواه لا إلى ما يخرج عن تدبير النفس و تصرفها و النفس تتحد بقواها و آلاتها ضربا من الاتحاد و لأجل ذلك كان وجود الشيء فيها بعينه وجوده للنفس و الإدراك عبارة عن وجود الشيء للمدرك فلا جرم يشعر النفس بوجود ما يتكيف به البدن و قواه دون ما خرج عنها.

و منها أن هذه الرطوبة هل يتوسط في إيصال أجزاء ذي الطعم

بأن يختلط معها و تغوص معها في اللسان حتى يحس القوة بالطعم أو يتكيف بتلك الطعوم و تؤديها من غير مخالطة بتلك الأجزاء فعلى الأول لا فائدة فيها إلا كونها بدرقة مسهلة لوصول الطعوم و يكون الحس بملامسة ذي الطعم من

غير واسطة و على الثاني يكون الملاقي المحسوس بلا واسطة هو الرطوبة و كلا الوجهين محتمل و على كل حال لا يبقى بين الحاس و المحسوس متوسط.

و منها يجب أن تعلم أن المذوق في الحقيقة ليس الكيفية الطعمية

التي تقوم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٦

بالجسم المطعوم و لا التي تقوم بالرطوبة اللعابية على القول بتكيفها و لا التي تقوم بجرم اللسان مع وجوب تكيف الآلة بكيفية المحسوس كما مر بيانه بل الصورة الذوقية التي تقوم بقوة الذوق و نسبة تلك القوة إلى صورة المذوق كنسبة المادة إلى الصورة و كنسبة العقل بالقوة إلى العقل بالفعل و هكذا الحال في سائر الحواس من أن المحسوس بالحقيقة هو الصورة الجزئية الحاصلة للنفس بواسطة القوة الحاسة حتى الإبصار كما ستعلم.

و منها أن قوة الذوق واحدة

و قيل ما بال الحكماء القائلين بتعدد قوة اللمس - لتعدد الملموسات حيث لم يجعلوا قوة الذوق متعددة لتعدد المذوقات.

و ربما يجاب بأنهم إنما أوجبوا أن يكون الحاكم على نوع واحد من التضاد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٧

قوة واحدة بها الشعور و التميز و الطعوم و إن كثرت إلا أن فيما بينها مضادة واحدة - و أما الملموسات فليست فيما بينها مضادة واحدة فإن بين الحرارة و البرودة نوعا واحدا من المضادة غير النوع الذي بين الرطوبة و اليبوسة

فصل (٤) في الشم

و هو الطف من الذوق كما أن الذوق الطف من اللمس و هذه الثلاثة أكثف المشاعر و أغلظها و مدركات هذه القوة هي الروائح بملاقات الهواء المتكيف بها للخيشوم فالشم أيضا يحصل بالتماسة فهذه القوة أيضا شبيهة باللامسة فكانها ضرب من اللمس و نسبتها في اللطافة إلى الذوق كنسبته فيها إلى اللمس.

و من مباحث الشم أن الهواء المتوسط هل يتكيف بكيفية ذي الرائحة و تؤدي بها إلى الخيشوم أو يختلط بأجزاء لطيفة من ذي الرائحة فيتصل تلك الأجزاء إلى آلة الشم فيدرك برائحة الأجزاء من غير أن يكون رائحة للهواء و إلى كل من الطريقتين ذاهب.

و احتج الذهاب إلى الثاني بأنه لو لم يكن كذلك لما كانت الحرارة مهيجة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٨

للروائح بسبب الدلك و التبخير و لما كان البرد يخفيها و معلوم بأن التبخير يذكي الروائح و أيضا ترى التفاحة تذبل من كثرة الشم فدل ذلك على تحلل أجزاء ذي الرائحة - و احتج الآخرون بأنه لو كانت الروائح التي تملأ المحافل إنما يكون بسبب تحلل شيء و جب أن يكون الشيء ذو الرائحة ينقص وزنه و يصغر حجمه.

و احتجوا أيضا بأنا نبخر الكافور تبخيرا يأتي على جوهره كله فيكون معه رائحة تنتشر انتشارا إلى حد و يمكن أن تنتشر تلك الرائحة في أضعاف تلك المواضع بالنقل و الوضع في جزء جزء من ذلك المكان بل في أضعافه فيكون مجموع الأبخرة- التي تتحلل منه في جميع تلك البقاع التي تزيد على البقعة المذكورة أضعافا مضاعفة للذي يكون حاصلًا بالتبخير أو مناسبا له فيجب أن يكون النقصان الوارد عليه في ذلك - قريبا من ذلك النقصان أو مناسبا له لكن ليس الأمر كذلك فثبت أن للاستحالة مدخلا في هذا الباب.

و الحق أن كلا المذهبين صحيح محتمل.

و من الناس من زعم أن إدراك الشم يتعلق بالمشموم حيث هو و هذا أبعد الوجوه- و من مباحثه أن الإنسان يكاد أن يكون أبلغ الحيوانات في إدراك لطائف الروائح القريبة إلا أنه أضعفها في إدراك البعيدة منها و في إدراك تفاصيلها المتنوعة- فإن رسوم الروائح في نفس الإنسان غير متحصلة تحصلا تفصيليا كما في الأطعمة و الملموسات و لذلك لا يكون للروائح عنده أسماء إلا من جهتين إحداهما من جهة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٦٩

الموافقة و المخالفة فيقال هذه رائحة طيبة و تلك رائحة كريهة و الأخرى من جهة انتسابها إلى المطعوم أو إلى الموضوع مطلقا فيقال رائحة حلاوة أو حموضة أو رائحة ورد أو مسك.

و قيل يشبه أن يكون حال إدراك الإنسان للروائح كحال إدراك الحيوانات الصلبة العين للمبصرات فإن إدراكها لها يكاد أن يكون كالتخيل الغير المحقق و أما إدراك كثير من هذه الحيوانات للروائح فقوي جدا بحيث لا يحتاج إلى التنشق. و من مباحث الشم أنه نقل عن أفلاطون و فيثاغورث و هرمس و غيرهم من الأقدمين - أن الأفلاك و الكواكب لها قوة الشم و فيها روائح طيبة أطيب مما يوجد في المسك و العنبر و الرياحين بكثير.

و رد عليهم أتباع المشاءين بأن إدراك الروائح مشروط بالهواء و البخار و ليس هنالك هواء و لا بخار و هذا الوجه ضعيف لأن كون الاشتراط به مطلقا ليس عليه برهان عقلي و إنما يشترط ذلك في العالم العنصري.

و من أفاضل المتأخرين من حكى عن نفسه أنه عند اتصاله بذلك العالم في نوم أو يقظة شم منها روائح أطيب من المسك و العنبر بل لا نسبة لما عندنا إلى ما هناك- و لهذا اتفق أرباب العلوم الروحانية على أن لكل كوكب بخورا مخصوصا و لكل روحاني رائحة معروفة تستنشقونها و يتلذذون بها و بروائح الأطعمة المصنوعة لهم- فيفيضون على من ترتب ذلك ما هو مستعد له و سيجيء لك ما يصحح هذا القول و نظائره

فصل (٥) في السمع

و هو عبارة عن إدراك الصوت و قد مر في مباحث المقولات من العلم الكلي عند بحثنا عن أحوال الكيفيات المحسوسة حقيقة الصوت و الذي يناسب هذا الموضوع البحث عما يتعلق بكيفية حصول السمع و فيه أبحاث

[البحث الأول]

أنهم قالوا إن السماع لا يحصل إلا عند تأدي الهواء المنضغط بين

القارع و المقروع إلى تجويف الصماخ عند العصبه المفروشة فيه قالوا و هذا التأدي ظاهر و قد دل عليه أمور - أحدها أن ذلك التجويف إذا سد أو انسد بطل السمع.

و ثانيها أنه إذا كان بين الصائت و السامع جسم كثيف تعذر السماع أو تعسر.

و ثالثها أن من رأى إنسانا يقرع بمطرقة على سندان أو بمقرعة على نقارة - فإن كان قريبا منه يسمع الصوت مع مشاهدة الطرق و القرع و كلما بعد منه حصل سمعه بعد زمان يضاهي طوله بعد المسافة.

و رابعها أن من وضع فمه على طرف أنبوبة و وضع الطرف الآخر من تلك الأنبوبة على أذن إنسان آخر و تكلم فيه فإن ذلك الإنسان يسمع ذلك الكلام دون سائر الحاضرين و ذلك لتأدي الهواء إلى أذنه و امتناع أن يتأدى إلى أذن غيره.

و خامسها أن عند اشتداد هبوب الرياح ربما لا يسمع القريب و يسمع البعيد - لانحراف تلك الأهوية الحاملة لتلك الأصوات بسبب شدة هبوب الرياح من سمع إلى سمع آخر.

و هاهنا إشكال قوي و هو أن أحدا إذا تكلم بكلام من وراء جدار غليظ وجب أن لا يسمع الذي من الجانب الآخر من الجدار ذلك الكلام لعدم الفرج و المنافذ - و لو وجدت هناك منافذ لكنت قليلة ضيقة فوجب أن يتشوش تلك الأمواج و لا يبقى إشكال تلك الحروف كما خرجت عن مطلق المتكلم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٧١

و أيضا فلأن الإنسان إذا تكلم حدث في الهواء ذلك التموج فإن تأدى ذلك بالكلية إلى شخص وجب أن لا يسمع غيره ذلك الكلام إذ ليس هناك إلا ذلك التموج الواحد و إن لم يتأدى إليه بل تأدى إلى سمع كل واحد بعضه وجب أن لا يسمع أحد منهم ذلك الكلام بتمامه.

و قد أجابوا عن الأول بأن الحائل الذي لا منفذ فيه أصلا فإنه يمنع من السماع البتة لأنه كلما كانت المنافذ أقل كان السمع أضعف فوجب إذا لا يوجد المنافذ أصلا - أن لا يوجد السمع.

و عن الثاني بأن الحروف إنما يتكون بإطلاق الهواء بعد حبسه على وجه مخصوص - فيكون التمويج الفاعل للحرف ليس مخصوصا بكل الهواء دون أجزائه بل هو حاصل في واحد واحد من أجزائه فأى جزء وصل حصل الشعور بما يقبله من الصوت هذا ما ذكره.

أقول عندي أن الحال في كيفية التأدية ليس كما حصلوه فإن كون كل جزء من أجزاء الهواء المتوسط بين السامع و ذي الصوت مكيفا بكيفية الحروف و الكلمات - مع بساطة الهواء و تشابه أجزائها في غاية البعد بل إنه غير صحيح و إلا لتكرر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٧٢

الإدراك حسب تكرر وصولات الهواء إلى الصماخ و ليس بل الحق أن النفس يتنبه بواسطة الهواء الواصل إلى آلة السمع المتوسط فيما بين بكيفية القرع الحاصل بين القارع و المقروع أو القلع الحاصل لا أن هواء واحدا يتحمل تلك الكيفية و يبلغ بها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٧٣

إلى الصماخ و لا أن أهوية متعددة متموجة يتأدى كل منها إلى الآخر و هكذا حتى يتكيف الهواء المجاور للصماخ بها و يتأدى بها إلى السمع و هذا لا ينافي ما سبق ذكره منا و هو أن النفس لا يتعلق إدراكها إلا بصورة حاصلة في محال تصرفاتها بالطبع لأن كلامنا هناك في المدرك بالذات للنفس و المدرك بالذات لها هاهنا هو الصور الإدراكية من المسموع الحاصلة في القوة السامعة و إنما الكلام هاهنا في المحسوس بالعرض و هو المسموع الخارجي و منشأ هذه العلاقة العرضية هو الوضع المخصوص لذلك المسموع - بالنسبة إلى السامع مع وجود الجسم اللطيف بينهما الذي يصير بسببه جميع هذه الثلاثة - أعني الآلة و الهواء المتصل و ذي الصوت في حكم آلة واحدة للنفس فيدرك النفس ما فيها على أي وجه يكون و بأي جانب يقع و هذا سر احتياج كل قوة جسمانية في تأثيرها إلى مشاركة الوضع فإن الوضع المخصوص بين موضوع القوة و ما تأثرت فيه أو يتأثر عنها مع تحقق الجسم المتصل اللطيف بينهما يجعل المجموع كأنه مادة واحدة و آلة واحدة للقوة فكما يتأثر مادة القوة بفعالها كذلك يتأثر ذلك الجسم الذي له ذلك الوضع

البحث الثاني

أنهم اختلفوا في أن المسموع هو الصوت القائم بالهواء القارح للصماخ فقط و هو المحسوس أو الصوت القائم بالهواء الخارج عن الأذن أيضا محسوس.

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أقول و عندنا كما مر أن المحسوس هو الصوت القائم بالهواء المنضغط بين القارح و المقروع فقط بدلالة أنا إذا سمعنا الصوت أدركنا مع ذلك جهته و قربه و بعده - و معلوم أن الجهة لا يبقى أثرها في التموج عند بلوغه إلى التجويف فكان يجب أن لا يدرك من الأصوات جهاتها و قربها و بعدها لأنها من حيث أتت دخلت بحركتها تجويف الصماخ فيدركها القوة هناك و لا تميز بين القريب و البعيد كما أن اليد تدرك ملمسها ما تلقاه و لا تشعر به من جهة اللمس إلا حيث ملمسها و لا فرق بين وروده من أبعد بعد و أقرب قرب لأن اليد لا تدرك الملموس من حيث ابتداء أولا في المسافة بل من حيث انتهى و لما كان التميز بين الجهات و القرب و البعد من الأصوات حاصلا علمنا أنا ندرك الأصوات الخارجة حيث هي.

و ليس لك أن تقول إنما يدرك الجهة لأن الهواء القارح إنما توجه من تلك الجهة و إنما يدرك البعيد و القريب لأن الأثر الحادث عن القرع القريب أقوى و عن البعيد أضعف.

لأننا نقول أما الأول فباطل لأن الصوت قد يكون على اليمين من السامع - و يسمع بالأذن الأيسر للانسداد في أذنه الذي يليه و مع ذلك يحصل الشعور بكون الصوت على اليمين و لا يصل التمييز إلى الأذن الأيسر إلا بعد أن ينعطف عن اليمين - فليس هاهنا إدراك الجهة التي جاء منها الصوت بل الجهة التي وقع القرع فيها.

و أما الثاني فهو أيضا باطل و إلا لكانا لم نفرق البعيد القوي من القريب الضعيف - و لكننا إذا سمعنا صوتين متساوي البعد مختلفين بالقوة و الضعف وجب أن يظن أن أحدهما قريب و الآخر بعيد و يشتهه علينا دائما القوة و الضعف بالقرب و البعد و ليس الأمر كذلك.

و اعلم أن جمهور القوم لما لم يذهبوا إلى ما اخترناه حسب ما أوضحنا سبيله - استصعب عليهم الأمر في تعيين السبب

في تحقق الشعور بجهة الصوت فقال بعضهم كصاحب المعتبر إنا قد علمنا أن هذا الإدراك إنما يحصل أولاً بقرع الهواء المتموج

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٧٥

لتجويف الصماخ و لذلك يصل من الأبعد في زمان أطول و لكن بمجرد إدراك الصوت القائم بالهواء القارع للصماخ لا يحصل الشعور بالجهة و القرب و البعد بل إنما يحصل ذلك بتتبع الأثر الوارد من حيث ورد و ما بقي منه في الهواء الذي هو في المسافة التي فيها ورد و الحاصل أنا بعد إدراكنا الصوت عند الصماخ نتبعه بتأملنا فيتأدى إدراكنا من الذي وصل إلينا إلى ما قبله و منه إلى ما قبل ما قبله من جهته و مبدأ وروده فإن بقي منه شيء و أدركناه إلى حيث ينقطع و يفنى و حينئذ ندرك الوارد و مورده و ما بقي منه موجودا و جهته و بعد مورده و قربه و ما بقي من قوة أمواجها و ضعفها فلذلك ندرك البعيد ضعيفا لأنه يضعف تمويجه حتى أن لم يبق في المسافة أمر ينتهي بنا إلى البعيد المبدأ - لم نعلم من قدر البعد إلا بقدر ما بقي فلا نفرق بين الرعد الواصل إلينا من أعالي الجو و بين دوي الرحي الذي هو أقرب منه إلينا هذا منتهى ما حصلوه في هذا الباب.

و فيه ما لا يخفى من الإشكال و هو أن السمع ليس بإدراك بعد إدراك و استعلام بعد استعلام ينتقل النفس من واحد إلى آخر و منه إلى آخر و هكذا بل هاهنا إدراك شيء واحد مع جهته و قربه و بعده ثم إنه بعد أن سلمنا أنه يتتبع الهواء الذي وصل إلى الصماخ منه إلى ما قبله فما قبله و لكن إذا كان إدراك الصوت منفكا عن إدراك الجهة و غيرها كما قرروه من أن الصوت يدرك أولاً ثم بعد التتبع تدرك الجهة و القرب و البعد و القوة و الضعف - حتى يكون هاهنا إدراكات متعددة سابقة و لاحقة فنقول مدرك السمع حينئذ ليس إلا ذلك الصوت فأما الجهة فهي غير مدركة للسمع أصلا و إذا لم تكن الجهة مدركة للسمع لم يكن الصوت الحاصل في الجهة مدركا له فبقي أن يكون مدرك السمع صوتا - لو كان حصوله في جهة أخرى أية جهة كانت لكان هو ذلك الصوت بعينه و هو محال - لأن الصوت الجزئي لا بد أن يكون متخصصا بوضع و جهة و لا يمكن أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٧٦

مدرك الحس أمرا كلياً كما برهن عليه مع أن المدرك للسمع هو الصوت الموجود في الجهة المخصوصة هذا خلف و هذا إنما يلزم على تقدير أن يكون إدراك الجهة غير إدراك الصوت فيها و أن إدراكها قد حصل بتتبع التموجات الهوائية كما ذكروا و أما على الوجه الذي حققناه فلم يلزم محذور لأن المدرك للسمع هو الصوت المعين الواقع في جهة معينة و في موضع مخصوص فإن وجود الأمر المادي لا ينفك عن الوضع و الجهة و ليس أن وجوده شيء و كونه في جهة أو على وضع شيء آخر أو المسمى بالعوارض المشخصة في الحقيقة ليست من عوارض الشخص و إنما عروضاها بالقياس إلى مرتبة ماهية ذلك الشخص كما مر فكل مدرك بإدراك حسي إنما يدرك وجوده في جهة معينة و على وضع معين لا أن الحواس يدرك وجوده فقط أو يدرك وجوده و يدرك معه بإدراك آخر جهته و بإدراك آخر قربه و بعده لأن هذا شأن العقل و ليس شأن الحس إلا إدراك أمر ذي جهة في وضع لما علمت أن وجود المحسوس و كونه في جهة و على وضع شيء واحد بالشخص متعدد في ظرف التحليل العقلي فكما أن المحسوس شيء واحد فكذلك الإدراك

الحسي المتعلق به إدراك واحد هو بعينه إدراك وجوده وإدراك بأنه في جهة كذا وإدراك بأنه في موضع كذا.

البحث الثالث

مما يناسب طريقتنا في السمع أن وجود الهواء بين السامع و ذي الصوت شرط لتحقيق الاتصال بينهما مع عدم حاجز كثيف لا لأجل أن يحمل الهواء كيفية الصوت و يتأدى بها إلى السمع إن القدماء اكتفوا في سماع الفلكيات تماس الأفلاك بعضها بعضا كما نسب إلى أساطين الحكمة كأفلاطون و من قبله إنهم يثبتون للأفلاك أصواتا عجيبة و نغمات غريبة تتحير من سماعها العقل و يتعجب منها النفس - و حكى عن فيثاغورث أنه عرج بنفسه إلى العالم العلوي فسمع بصفاء جوهر نفسه و ذكاء قلبه نغمات الأفلاك و أصوات حركات الكواكب ثم رجع إلى استعمال القوى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٧٧

البدنية و رتب عليها الألحان و النغمات و كمل علم الموسيقى.
و اعلم أن اشتمال الأفلاك و الكواكب على الطعوم و الروائح و الأصوات - و جميع ما يدركه الحواس هاهنا قول صحيح أيده الأذواق الكشفية و البراهين العقلية - و المناسبات الوجودية و ذلك لأن الوجود مع كمالاته و خيراته إنما يفيض من الأوائل على الثواني و من الأعالي على الأدنى و هكذا إلى أدنى الوجود و كل ما يوجد من الصفات الكمالية في المعلولات الأخيرة فهي موجودة في مبادئها القريبة على وجه الطف و أصفى و كل ما توسط في الأسباب القريبة فهي موجودة في العلل القصوى العقلية على وجه مناسب لذلك العالم ألا ترى أن الكيفيات المحسوسة وجودها في موضوعاتها الجسمانية على نحو يلزمها التضاد و الانقسام و الاستحالة و غير ذلك و وجودها في الحواس و المدارك النفسانية على نوع آخر أصفى و الطف لصفاء القابل حيث يزول عنها - كثير من النقائص المصحوبة لها في الخارج و لها أيضا نوع آخر من الوجود في القوة العقلية على نوع أشرف و أعلى و جوهر السماويات في اللطافة دون عالم العقل و فوق عالم العناصر و هي في اللطافة بمنزلة الحواس فإن جوهر الحس للطفاته يقبل رسوم المحسوسات لكن حس الحيوان مختص ببعض المواضع من بدنه و هو الذي يوجد فيه جوهر روحاني من جنس مادة الأشباح المثالية المتوسطة بين العقول و الأجسام - و الفلك لكونه بسيطا متشابه الأجزاء كله كالروح الحاصل في موضع الخيال منا و مما يزيل الاستبعاد في كون عالم الأفلاك مشتملا على الروائح و النغمات - أن هذه الكيفيات من حيث كونها مدركة لنا ليست هي التي تكون في الخارج عن قوانا و مشاعرنا لما علمت مرارا أن المحسوس بما هو محسوس وجوده في نفسه ليس إلا وجوده للجوهر الحاس و معلوم أن وجودها للخيال مناط علمنا بها و انكشافها لدينا و قد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٧٨

ثبت أن الخيال و جميع ما يحصل فيه خارج عن هذا العالم فإذن كما يوجد في قوة من قوانا جميع النغمات و الأصوات و الروائح و المشمومات على وجه المشاهدة - تارة من جهة أمور خارجية معدة لها و تارة من جهة أسباب باطنية كما في المنام - فإننا قد نشاهد صورا عجيبة و أصواتا عظيمة في النوم لا نشك في وجودها فلا استبعاد في وجود الطعوم الشهية و الروائح الطيبة و النغمات العجيبة في عالم الأفلاك إذ ليست أسباب وجودها منحصرة في هذه الأمور المعتادة

فصل (٦) في البصر

قد تقرر في علم التشريح أنه ينبت من الدماغ أزواج سبعة من العصب وأن الزوج الأول مبدؤه من غور البطنين المقدمين من الدماغ عند جوار الزائدين الشبهتين بحلمتي الثدي وهو صغير مجوف يتيامن النابت منهما يسارا و يتياسر النابت منهما يمينا ثم يلتقيان على تقاطع صليبي ثم ينفذ النابت منهما يمينا إلى الحدة اليمنى - و النابت يسارا إلى الحدة اليسرى و قوة الإبصار مودعة في الروح المصبوب في تجويف هذا العصب سيما عند الملتقى.

و اختلفوا في كيفية الإبصار

فالتطبيعون على أنه

بانطباع شبح المرئي في جزء من الرطوبة الجليدية التي يشبه البرد و الجمد فإنها مثل مرآة فإذا قابلها متلون مضيء انطبع مثل صورته فيها كما ينطبع صورة الإنسان في المرآة لا بأن ينفصل من المتلون شيء و يميل إلى العين بل بأن يحدث مثل صورته في المرآة في عين الناظر - و يكون استعداد حصوله بالمقابلة المخصوصة مع توسط الهواء المشف و لما توجه الإيراد عليهم بوجهين.

أحدهما أن المرئي حينئذ يكون صورة الشيء و شبحه لا نفسه و نحن قاطعون بأننا نرى نفس هذا الملون. و ثانيهما أن شبح الشيء مساو له في المقدار و إلا لم يكن صورة له و مثالا

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و حينئذ يلزم أن لا يرى ما هو أعظم من الجليدية لأن امتناع انطباع العظيم في الصغير معلوم بالضرورة. أجابوا عن الأول بأنه إذا كان رؤية الشيء بانطباع شبحه كان المرئي هو الذي انطبع شبحه لا نفس الشبح كما في العلم بالأشياء الخارجية.

و عن الثاني بأن شبح الشيء لا يلزم أن يساويه في المقدار كما يشاهد من صورة الوجه في المرآة الصغيرة إذ المراد به ما يناسب الشيء في الشكل و اللون دون المقدار - غاية الأمر أنا لا نعرف لمية إبصار الشيء العظيم و إدراك البعد بينه و بين الرائي بمجرد انطباع صورة صغيرة منه في الجليدية و تأديها بواسطة الروح المصبوب في العصبين إلى الباصرة.

و الرياضيون

على أن الإبصار بخروج الشعاع من العين على هيئة مخروط رأسه عند العين و قاعدته عند المرئي. ثم اختلفوا هؤلاء في أن ذلك المخروط مصمت أو مؤلف من خطوط مجتمعة في الجانب الذي يلي الرأس متفرقة في الجانب الذي يلي القاعدة و قيل لا على هيئة المخروط بل على استواء لكن ثبت طرفه الذي يلي العين و يضطرب طرفه الآخر على المرئي.

و قيل الشعاع الذي في العين كيف الهواء بكيفيته و يصير الكل آلة في الإبصار.

و ما نسب إلى الإشراقيين و اختاره الشيخ الشهيد شهاب الدين السهروردي - أنه لا شعاع و لا انطباع وإنما الإبصار بمقابلة المستنير للعضو الباصر الذي فيه رطوبة صقيلة و إذا وجدت هذه الشروط مع زوال المانع يقع للنفس علم إشراقي حضوري على المبصر - فيدركه النفس مشاهدة ظاهرة جليلة فهذه ثلاثة مذاهب في الإبصار.

و الحق عندنا غير هذه الثلاثة و هو أن الإبصار بإنشاء صورة مماثلة له بقدرة الله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٠

من عالم الملكوت النفساني مجردة عن المادة الخارجية حاضرة عند النفس المدركة - قائمة بها قيام الفعل بفاعله لا قيام المقبول بقابله.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨١

و البرهان عليه يستفاد مما برهنا به على اتحاد العقل بالمعقول فإنه بعينه جار في جميع الإدراكات الحسية و الوهمية. و قد نبهنا على هذا المطلب في مباحث العقل و المعقول و قلنا إن الإحساس مطلقا - ليس كما هو المشهور من عامة الحكماء أن الحس تجرد صورة المحسوس بعينه من مادته - و يصادفها مع عوارضها المكتنفة و كذا الخيال يجردها تجريدا أكثر لما علم من امتناع انتقال المنطبعات بل الإدراكات مطلقا إنما يحصل بأن يفيض من الواهب صورة أخرى نورية إدراكية يحصل بها الإدراك و الشعور فهي الحاسة بالفعل و المحسوسة بالفعل - و أما وجود صورة في مادة فلا حس و لا محسوس إلا أنها من المعدات لفيضان تلك الصورة مع تحقق الشرائط. و قد نص على ما اخترناه في باب الإبصار الفيلسوف المعظم في كتابه المعروف بأثولوجيا بما نقلنا من كلامه هناك و أيضا ما سوى هذا المذهب المنصور من المذاهب الثلاثة المشهورة يرد على كل منها مفسد شتى أما مذهب الانطباع في الجليدية و مذهب خروج الشعاع فالكتب مشحونة بذكر ما يرد على كل منهما.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٢

و أما الذي اختاره صاحب المطارحات فيرد عليه أيضا أمور. منها أن البرهان قائم على أن الجسم المادي و ما يعرضه من الصفات لا يمكن أن يتعلق به الإدراك إلا بالعرض كما مر ذكره سابقا. و منها أن الأحوال يدرك صورتين فلو كان المدرك هو بعينه الأمر الخارجي لزم أن يدرك ما لا وجود له في الخارج و القول بأن إحداهما في الخارج و الأخرى في الخيال أو في عالم المثال مما لا وجه له. و منها أن الصورة الواحدة الخارجية إذا نظر إليها جماعة كثيرة لزم على هذا الرأي أن تكون مدركة لتلك النفوس كلها و الإدراك ليس إلا حصول صورة الشيء للمدرك و حصول الشيء لأمر لا بد فيه من خصوصية و عليّة و العلة بالذات إنما هي فاعل و غاية و صورة و مادة و الشيء لا يكون حاصلا بالذات إلا لشيء من علله و أسبابه الذاتية فلو حصلت و وجدت تلك الصورة للنفس لكان النفس إحدى العلل الذاتية لوجوده لها لكنها ليست مادة و لا صورة لها و هو ظاهر و لا فاعلة إياها و إلا لزم تكثر العلل الفاعلة لشخص واحد و لا غاية أيضا إذ الشيء الواحد لا يكون له غايات كثيرة. و منها أن تسمية هذه الإضافة من النفس التي بواسطة البدن إلى أمر جسماني - ذي وضع بالإضافة النورية مما لا وجه له إذ الإضافات التي يكون بين الأجسام أو بواسطة الأجسام و ما فيها ليست إلا إضافة وضعية لا غير كالمحاذات و المجاورة و التماس و التداخل و التباين و غير ذلك و جميع هذه النسب و الأوضاع إضافات مادية ظلمانية لما تقرر أن النسبة الوضعية من موانع الإدراك لأنها من لوازم المادية و مدار الإدراك على تجرد الصورة عن الوضع و المقدار المادي و أما العلاقة و النسبة النورية - فهي ما يكون بين الشيء و علة وجوده فإن الوجود عين الظهور و الفاعل و الغاية هما

مبدأ وجود الشيء و المادة و الموضوع هما مبدأ قوة الشيء و إمكانه و قد يكونان مبدأ عدمه و خفائه لقبولهما ضد ذلك الشيء فثبت أن الحري باسم الإضافية الإشراقية - هي النسبة التي بين فاعل الصورة و ذاتها و هي إنما يتحقق على ما قررناه في الإبصار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٣

بين النفس و الصورة الفائضة منه على ذاتها و كأن ما اخترناه كان مذهب الأوائل - و الاسم واقعا عليه فوقع في النقل تحريف لعموض المذهب و قصور فهم الناقل و إذا دل البرهان على أن الرؤية بحضور صورة مجردة عن المادة الخارجية للنفس و بطل القول بالشعاع - و بانطباع الصورة في الجليدية و ما يجري مجراها فثبت و تحقق ما ادعيناه فلنذكر تفاصيل ما يرد على كل من المذهبيين الآخرين المشهورين

فصل (٧) فيما تمسك به أصحاب الانطباع و تعقيبه بما يرد عليهم و ذكر حجة النفاة قد تمسكوا بوجوه

أحدها و هو العمدة أن العين جسم صقيل نوراني

و كل جسم كذلك إذا قابله جسم كثيف ملون انطبع فيه شبحه كالمرآة أما الكبرى فظاهر و أما الصغرى فلما يشاهد من النور في الظلمة إذا حك المتنبه من النوم عينه و كذا عند إمرار اليد على ظهر الهرة السوداء و لأن الإنسان إذا نظر إلى نحو أنفه قد يرى عليه دائرة من الضياء و إذا انتبه من النوم قد يبصر ما قرب منه زمانا ثم يفقده و ذلك لامتلاء العين من النور في ذلك الوقت و إن غمض إحدى العينين يتسع ثقب العين الأخرى و ما ذلك إلا لأن جوهر نورانيا ملاء و لأنه لو لا انصباب الأرواح النورانية من الدماغ إلى العين لما جعلت ثقبنا الأنوار مجوفتين. و هذا بعد تمامه إنما يدل على انطباع الشبح فيه لا كون الإبصار به.

و ثانيها أن سائر الحواس إنما تدرك المحسوس

بأن يأتي صورته إليها لا بأن يخرج منها شيء إلى المحسوس فكذا الإبصار. و أجيب بأنه تمثيل بلا جامع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٤

أقول في سائر الحواس لا إتيان و لا خروج بل لفيضان صورة مناسبة للمحسوس متمثلة عند النفس فالجامع متحقق و لكن لا يلزم مطلوبهم من الانطباع في عضو البصر.

و ثالثها أن من نظر إلى الشمس طويلا ثم أعرض عنها

تبقى صورتها في عينه زمانا.

و دفع بأن الصورة في خياله لا في عينه كما إذا غمض العين.

و رابعها أن الشيء بعينه إذا قرب من الرائي

يرى أكبر مما إذا بعد عنه و ما ذلك إلا لأن الانطباع على هيئة مخروطة من الهواء المشف رأسه متصل بالحدقة و قاعدته سطح المرئي حتى أنه وتر لزواية المخروط و معلوم أن و ترا بعينه كلما قرب من الزاوية - كان الساق أقصر و الزاوية أعظم و كلما بعد فبالعكس و الشبح الذي في الزاوية الكبرى - أعظم من الذي في الصغرى و هذا إنما يستقيم إذا جعلنا

موضع الإبصار هو الزاوية على ما هو رأي الانطباع لا القاعدة على ما هو رأي خروج الشعاع فإنها لا تتفاوت. وأجيب بأننا لا نسلم أنه لا سبب سوى ذلك كيف وأصحاب الشعاع أيضا يثبتون سببه - على أن استلزام عظم الزاوية عظم المرئي و صغرها صغره محل نظر

و خامسها أنه لو لا الإبصار لأجل انطباع الأشباح في الجليدية لكانت خلقة العين على طبقاتها و رطوباتها و شكل كل واحد منها معطلة فإن الفائدة في كون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٥

الجليدية صافية أن يستحيل من الألوان و الفائدة في تفرطحها أنه لو كانت خالصة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٦

الاستدارة لكانت لا تلقى من المحسوس إلا على اليسير فلما عرضت قليلا صارت آخذة منه أجزاء كثيرة و العنابية إنما ثقب وسطها لئلا يمنع وصول المحسوس إلى الرطوبة الجليدية و القرنية إنما لم يثقف لأنها رقيق أبيض صاف فلا جرم لا يمنع الضوء و لا الشبح الذي يؤديه الهواء من النفوذ داخل العين. وأجيب بأن هذه الحجة غير برهانية إذ من الجائز أن يكون لخلقة العين على طبقاتها و أشكالها و رطوباتها فوائد أخرى سوى الانطباع.

و سادسها أن الممرورين قد يبصرون صوراً مخصوصة متميزة

و هي غير موجودة في الخارج و لا بد لها من وجود لامتيازها و تعينها فهي لا محالة موجودة في البصر أو في جزء من أجزائه و إذا ثبت كيفية الإبصار في بعض المواضع و أنها بالانطباع ثبت في غيره أيضا لعدم الفرق. وأجيب بأن ذلك يدل على أن الإبصار في هذا النوع بالانطباع و لا يدل على أن إبصارنا للموجودات الخارجية لأجل انطباع صورها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٧

أقول الحق أن هذه الحجة قوية على إبطال مذهب الشعاع و مذهب من يرى أن الرؤية تتعلق بالصورة الخارجة من غير شعاع لكن لا يضر مذهبنا بل يؤكد.

و سابعها أن شبح المرئي يبقى في الخيال حتى يمكننا تخيله متى شئنا

و إذا كانت القوة الخيالية تأخذ شبح المتخيل فكذلك القوة الباصرة. وأجيب بأنه مجرد تمثيل ثم الفارق أنا إنما أثبتنا الأشباح الخيالية لأنه لما لم يمكن تحصيل صورة في الخارج لم يكن بد من إثباتها في الخيال و أما الإبصار فلتتحقق المبصر في الخارج لم نحتاج إلى إثبات صورة منطبعة في القوة الباصرة بل أمكننا أن نقول إن الإبصار حالة إضافية بين القوة الباصرة و بين المبصرات الموجودة في الخارج.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٨

وَأَمَّا أدلة نفاة الانطباع

فالحجة الأولى

ما ذكره جالينوس وهو الذي عول عليه القوم أن الجسم لا ينطبع فيه من الأشكال إلا ما يساويه فلو كان الإبصار بالانطباع لاستحال منا أن نبصر إلا مقدار نقطة للناظر لكننا نبصر نصف كرة العالم.

واعترضوا على هذه الحجة بوجوه - أحدها أن الجسم الصغير مساو للكبير في قبول الانقسامات بغير نهاية فلم لا يجوز أن يقبل شكله.

و ثانيها هب أن البصر لا ينطبع فيه إلا ما يساويه لكن النفس بالمقايضة يعلم أن ما صورته هذا يكون مقداره بهذه النسبة كما في النقوش المصورة في الجدران وغيرها من الأشياء و ثالثها المعارضة بالصورة المشاهدة في المرأة من نصف كرة العالم فإذا جاز انطباع العظيم في الصغير في المرأة فليجز في البصر.

و رابعها المعارضة بالصور الخيالية فإننا نتخيل بحرا من زيبق و جبلا من ياقوت و هذه الصورة لا محالة موجودة لتمييزها و تعينها و تأثيرها في النفس و ليس وجودها في الخارج فهي لا محالة في محل منا و كذا الصور التي يشاهدها الممرورون - فإنهم قد يشاهدون صورا عظيمة هائلة فلا بد لها من محل فإن كان محلها أمرا جسمانيا من بدننا فحينئذ يكون الشيء العظيم منطبعاً في المحل الصغير فليجز في الإبصار مثله - و إن كان المدرك لذلك النفس فهو غير صحيح. أما أولا فلا أنهم استدلوا على أن المدرك للجزئيات يستحيل أن يكون هو النفس - و أما ثانيا فلا أنه إذا عقل انطباع صور المتخيلات و المبصرات في النفس مع أن لا مقدار لها و لا حجم أصلا فلا أن يعقل انطباع الصور العظيمة في الحجم الصغير كان أقرب.

و أما ثالثا فلا أنه إذا جاز انطباع تلك الصور في النفس فصح القول بالانطباع - و صار النزاع بعد ذلك في محل الانطباع نزاعا آخر.

و الجواب أما الأول فهو ركيك جدا لأن الجسم الصغير كونه موافقا للجسم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٨٩

الكبير في عدد التقسيمات لا يوجب أن يساويه في المقدار و لا في مقدار الأقسام - و أما الثاني فالإبصار أمر دفعي ليس فيه مقايضة و استدلال.

و أما الثالث فالقول بانطباع الصور في المرأة كالقول بانطباعه في الجليدية في البطلان و سبب الروية هناك شيء آخر غير الانطباع كما ستعلم.

و أما الرابع فهذه الصور الخيالية و التي يشاهدها الممرورون ليس في محل عندنا - حتى يلزم أن يكون محلها إما جزءا جسمانيا منا أو نفسا بل هي صور معلقة بقيمها النفس - و يحفظها ما دامت تشاهدها و الذي استدلوا عليه ليس إلا أن محل الصور الجزئية - لا يمكن أن يكون هو النفس و أن القوة العاقلة لا تدرك الجزئيات بذاتها المجردة.

و أما أن كل إدراك فهو بحلول الصورة في جوهر المدرك فلم يقم عليه برهان و لا حجة - و قولهم إن انطباع المقدار العظيم في مقدار الصغير أقرب إلى العقل من انطباع المقدار العظيم فيما لا مقدار له مع أنه مجرد قياس تمثيلي بلا جامع غير وارد هاهنا إذ قد علمت أن المقيس عليه أعني النفس ليست محل الصور الخيالية.

ثم من المعلوم الواضح أن كل مقدارين إما أن يتساويا أو يتفاضلا و متى تفاضلا كانت الفضلة خارجة فيمتنع انطباع المقدار العظيم في المقدار الصغير.

و أما الشيء الذي لا مقدار له ففيه تفصيل ذهل عنه الأكثرون و لهذا اعترض صاحب المباحث على الشيخ و أصحابه بأنهم لما جوزوا أن يكون محل المقادير هو الهيولى التي لا مقدار لها في ذاتها فكيف يسع لهم أن يحتجوا على القول بالانطباع في باب الإبصار بأن الصورة الخيالية قائمة بالخيال أو النفس فإذا جاز انطباعها في النفس - فليجز انطباعها في البصر فإن انطباع العظيم في المحل الصغير أقرب إلى العقل من انطباعه فيما لا مقدار له.

أقول فرق بين أن يكون الشيء متعينا في الخارج بأنه لا مقدار له و ذلك كالنقطة و النفس مطلقا و كالخط و السطح باعتبار و بين أن يكون الشيء في نفسه يمكن له أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٠

يتقدر بشيء و أن لا يتقدر بأن يكون ذاته في ذاته بحيث لا يكون متقدرا و لا لا متقدرا - بل يقبل كلا من الأمرين من خارج و ذلك كالهوى التي نسبتها إلى جميع المقادير على السواء و كذا نسبتها في ذاتها لأن يتكلم و أن لا يتكلم على السواء لأنها مبهمة الذات غير متحصلة و ذلك بخلاف ما إذا تحصل شيء بأنه لا مقدار له كالنقطة أصلا - أو بأن له مقدارا من جهة كالخط أو بأن له مقدارا صغيرا كالخردلة فاستحال للنقطة أن يقبل مقدارا مطلقا و للخط أن يقبل مقدارا سطحيا أو جسميا و للخردلة أن يقبل مقدارا عظيما و ليس بمستحيل للهوى أن يقبل المقادير كلها.

الحجة الثانية

أن الإبصار لو كان بالانطباع لما كنا نفرق بين القريب و البعيد - فإن المبصر إذا كان هو الشبح المنطبع في العين فذلك الشبح لا يختلف حاله بأن يرسم من شيء بعيد أو شيء قريب كما أن الجسمين إذا حضر عند الرائي أحدهما من مكان قريب و الآخر من مكان بعيد فالرائي لا يعرف من حيث الإبصار أن أحدهما من مكان قريب و الآخر من مكان بعيد لكن الإحساس بالقرب و البعد حاصل فيبطل الانطباع.

و الجواب بأنه لم لا يجوز أن ينطبع في الرائي صور المسافات الطويلة و القصيرة - فلا جرم صح منه أن يدركها.

الحجة الثالثة

أن الرطوبة الجليدية إن كانت غير ملونة و جب أن لا يتشبح بالأشكال و الألوان كالهواء و إن كانت ملونة لزم محالان. أحدهما أن يختلط لون المرئي بلونها فلا يحصل الإحساس بلون المرئي. و ثانيهما أن لا يتأدى الشكل و اللون الحاصل في سطحه إلى ما وراءها من ملتقى العصبين كما في الجسم الملون إذا انطبع على سطحه شكل و صورة فإنه لم يتأد إلى ما وراءه.

الحجة الرابعة

أن المبصرات لو انطبعت في الجليدية لكان يمكننا أن نحس تلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩١

الصورة منطبعة فيها كما أن الخضرة متى انعكست عن جسم إلى الجدار أمكننا أن ندركها و لكننا إذا نظرنا إلى الصورة

المنطبعة في الجليدية وجدنا يختلف مواضعها بحسب اختلاف مقامات الناظرين و لو كانت الصورة منطبعة لكان محل انطباعها معينا فما كان يختلف بحسب اختلاف المقامات و حيث اختلفت فعلما أن الصورة غير منطبعة فيها. أقول هاتان الحجتان قويتان على من قال بانطباع صورة المرئي في الجليدية- ونحن لا نقول به بل بأن الصورة متمثلة عند النفس من غير انطباع و لا حلول كما مر.

الحجة الخامسة

زعم جالينوس أنه لو كان يخرج من المبصر شبح إلى الجليدية- لكان قد نقص المبصر أو اضمحل على طول الزمان و هذا في غاية السقوط لأن أصحاب الانطباع لا يقولون بانفصال شيء من المبصر إلى البصر بل بأن مقابلة الجليدية سبب لاستعدادها لأن يحدث فيها من المبدأ صورة مساوية لصورة المرئي فتلك الصورة الحادثة هي الإبصار.

الحجة السادسة

أن الفاعل الجسماني لا يمكنه أن يفعل في الجسم البعيد إلا بعد فعله في الجسم القريب فلو كان المرئي قد فعل اللون و الشكل المخصوص في العين- لكان قد فعلها في الهواء المتوسط و ليس كذلك بشهادة الحس. و جوابه أن ما ذكرتم بعد تسليمه إنما يلزم إذا كان القريب مستعدا لقبول الفعل كالبعيد و ليس في الهواء استعداد أن ينطبع فيه صورة المرئي

فصل (٨) فيما قاله أصحاب الشعاع

و اعلم أن علم المناظر و المرايا فن على حدة اعتنى به كثير من المحققين و بنوا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٢

الكلام فيه على خروج الشعاع بمعنى وقوعه من العين إلى المرئي كما يقع من الشمس و القمر و سائر الأجسام النيرة على ما يقابلها على هيئة شكل مخروط رأسه عند النير- و قاعدته عند ما يقابله فهذا مما يستدعي الظن بأن الرؤية بخروج الشعاع من البصر- و يكون المرئي هو ما يقع عليه الشعاع و لكننا قد أقمنا البرهان على أن المحسوس لكل حاسة هو الصورة الإدراكية المفارقة عن المادة لا التي هي في مادة جسمانية و مع ذلك لا بد في الإبصار من مقابلة البصر لما يقع صورته عند القوة المدركة و البصر كالنقطة- و مقابلة النقطة مع الجسم يوجب أن يتوهم بينهما شكل مخروط و نحن لا ننكر أيضا تحقق الشعاع من البصر إلى المرئي صورته لكن نقول لا بد في الرؤية من حصول صورة المرئي للنفس و جميع ما ذكره أصحاب الشعاع غير مناف لما ذهبنا إليه و إن وافق رأيهم أيضا فإن الموافقة بين المذهبين المتخالفين في كثير من اللوازم غير مستبعد.

كقولهم إن الشيء إذا بعد يرى أصغر مما إذا قرب لأن المخروط يستدق فيضيق زواياه التي عند الباصرة و يضيق لذلك الدائرة التي عند المبصر و كلما ازداد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٣

الشيء بعدا ازدادت الزوايا ضيقا و الدائرة صغرا إلى أن ينتهي في البعد إلى حيث لا يمكن الإبصار. و كقولهم يرى الشيء في الماء أعظم منه في الهواء لأن الشعاع ينفذ في الهواء على استقامة و أما في الماء فينعطف

الشعاع إلى السهم و يتراكم من سطح الماء إلى المرئي فيرى المرئي أعظم لأن الزاوية التي يآزائه في الجليدية بحالها في العظم - و عظم المرئي تابع لعظم تلك الزاوية فبعضه ينفذ مستقيما و بعضه ينعطف على سطح الماء ثم ينفذ إلى المبصر فيرى في الامتداد الشعاعي النافذ مستقيما و منعطفًا معا من غير تمايز و ذلك إذا قرب المرئي من سطح الماء و أما إذا بعد فيرى في الموضعين - لكون رؤيتهما بالامتدادين المتميزين.

و كقولهم إذا غمضنا إحدى العينين و نظرنا إلى القمر نراه قمرين لأن الامتداد الشعاعي الخارج منهما ينحرف عن المحاذاة و يتقاطع سهماهما قبل الوصول إلى المرئي فلا يلتقي طرفاهما على موضع واحد بل في موضعين فيرى المرئي اثنين.

و هكذا في الأحوال و إذا وضعنا السبابة و الوسطى على العين مع اختلاف في الوضع و نظرنا إلى السراج فإننا نراه اثنين و إذا نظرنا إلى إحدى الخشبتين الدقيقتين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٤

المتحاذيتين للبصر مع اختلافهما في القرب و البعد نرى الأخرى اثنين.

و كقولهم إذا نظرنا إلى الماء عند طلوع القمر فإننا نرى في الماء قمرا بالشعاع النافذ فيه و في السماء قمرا بالشعاع المنعكس من سطح الماء.

هكذا نقل بعض العلماء عنهم و فيه ما لا يخفى من النظر و الأولى أن نرى قمرا في السماء بالشعاع النافذ إلى السماء بالاستقامة و نرى قمرا في الماء بالشعاع المنعكس من سطح الماء إلى السماء نعم هاهنا شيء آخر و هو أننا قد نرى في الماء المقتصد في اللون ثلاثة أقمار أحدها في السماء بالشعاع النافذ إليه مستقيما بلا واسطة - و الثاني و الثالث في الماء أحدهما يرى بالشعاع المنعكس إلى القمر من سطح الماء الظاهر - و الآخر يرى بالشعاع النافذ فيه المنعكس من سطحه المقعر إلى القمر و من هذا القبيل رؤية الشيء اثنين عند توسط المرآة على وضع خاص بيننا و بينه أحدهما بالاستقامة - و الأخرى بالشعاع الممتد من الباصرة إلى سطح الجسم الصقيل المنعكس منه إلى جسم آخر وضعه من ذلك الصقيل كوضع الباصرة منه.

و كقولهم إن السبب في رؤية الشجر على شاطئ النهر منكوسا أن الشعاع إذا وقع على سطح الماء ينعكس منه إلى رأس الشجرة من موضع أقرب إلى الرائي - و إلى أسفله من موضع أبعد منه إلى أن يتصل قاعدة الشجرة بقاعدة عكسها و النفس لا تدرك الانعكاس لتعودها برؤية الأشياء على استقامة الشعاع فيحسب الشعاع المنعكس نافذا في الماء فيرى رأس الشجر أكثر نزولا في الماء لكونه أبعد منه و باقي أجزائه على الترتيب إلى قاعدة الشجرة فيراها منكسا و بيان هذه الأمور و نظائرها على التحقيق في علم المناظر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٥

فصل (٩) في سبب الحول و فيما وقع الخلاف بين أصحاب الشعاع و أصحاب الانطباع في سبب الحول

فزعم أصحاب الانطباع أن شبح المبصر أول ما ينطبع في الرطوبة الجليدية - و الإبصار ليس عندها و إلا لكان الواحد يرى الاثنين كما إذا لمس شيء باليدين كان لمسيتين و لكن كما أن الصورة الخارجية يمتد منها في الوهم مخروط يستدق إلى

أن يقع زاويته وراء سطح الجليدية كذلك الشبح الذي في الجليدية يتأذى منه بواسطة الروح المصبوب في العصبتين المجوفتين إلى ملتقاهما على هيئة مخروط فيلتقي المخروطان و يتقاطعان هناك و وراء الملتقى ليس روح مدرك فحينئذ يتحد معهما صورة شبحية واحدة - عند الروح الحامل للقوة الباصرة فإن لم يتأد الشبحان إلى موضع واحد بل ينتهي كل شبح عند جزء آخر من الروح الباصر فحينئذ ينطبع من كل شبح ينفذ عن الجليدية صورة أخرى على حدة فيرى الشيء الواحد شيئين.

و قال أصحاب الشعاع هذا العذر فاسد لأننا إذا تكلفنا الحول و نظرنا إلى الشيء نظر الأحوال نراه أيضا اثنين كما يراه الأحوال و نحن نعلم أن عند تكلفنا الحول لا يبطل تركيب العصبتين في داخل الدماغ فإن التقاءهما ليس على وجه يبطل - و يعود متى شئنا و أيضا لو كان في مقابلنا شيئا أحدهما قريب و الآخر بعيد على سمت واحد لكن لا على وجه يحجب القريب البعيد ثم نظرنا إلى الأقرب إلينا و جمعنا البصر عليه كأننا لا ننظر إلى غيره و إنا نراه واحدا و نرى الأبعد في هذه الحالة شيئين - و لو نظرنا إلى الأبعد كذلك كان الأمر بالعكس من ذلك فلو كان السبب في الحول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٦

ما ذكره من انحراف العصبتين لما تصور أن يرى في حالة واحدة أحد الشيئين واحدا و الآخر اثنين فليس السبب ما ذكره أصحاب الانطباع بل السبب فيه أن النور الممتد من كل عين على هيئة مخروط رأسه عند العين و قاعدته عند المرئي ثم إن قوة هذا النور و سلطنته في سهم المخروط و سميناه خط الشعاع و خطا الشعاع الممتدان من العينين يلتقيان عند الشيء المبصر يتحدان على نقطة هناك و جمع البصر على الشيء - يوجب إيقاع سهمي المخروط عليه فإذا جمعنا البصر على الشيء الأقرب فقد وقع السهمان عليه و في تلك الحالة يقع على الشيء الأبعد من كل مخروط طرفه الوحشي دون السهم و دون طرفه الأنسي و المراد بالطرف الأنسي ما يلي المخروط الآخر و بالوحشي ما يقابله فيرى الأقرب بسبب التقاء السهمين عليه شيئا واحدا و الأبعد اثنين إذ يقع السهمان الخارجان من البصر بعد تقاطعهما في الأقرب إلى جنبه ما يخرج من العين اليمنى إلى جنبه الأيسر و ما يخرج من العين اليسرى إلى جنبه الأيمن و أما إذا جمعنا البصر على الأبعد فقد وقع السهمان عليه في موضع واحد و على الأقرب في موضعين و على جنبه لكن السهم الخارج من العين اليمنى يقع على جنبه الأيمن و الخارج من اليسرى على جنبه الأيسر فيرى الأبعد شيئا واحدا و الأقرب اثنين و هكذا حال الأحوال فإن سهمي مخروط عيني لا يلتقيان على شيء واحد بل يقع كل واحد على ما يليه من القاعدة أو يلتقيان من العينين في الهواء قبل الوصول إلى المرئي و إنهم أبدا يرون الأشياء بطرف المخروط لا بوقوع السهم عليها إلا أن يتكلفوا التقاءهما على شيء واحد لو أمكن و حينئذ يرونه واحدا كما هو.

و اعلم أن أصحاب انطباع الأشباح ذكروا أسبابا أخرى للحول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٧

منها حركة الروح الباصرة يمنة و يسرة فيرسم الشبح في بعض الأجزاء قبل تقاطع المخروطين فيرى شبحين و هو مثل الشبح المرتسم في الماء الساكن مرة و في الماء المتموج مرارا كثيرة.

و منها حركة الروح الذي وراء تقاطع العصبتين إلى قدام و خلف حتى يكون لها حركتان متضادتان واحدة إلى حس

المشترك و أخرى إلى ملتقى العصبتين فيتأدى إليهما صورة المحسوس قبل أن ينمحي ما تأدى إلى الحس المشترك أو الملتقى فحينئذ يحصل في كل واحد منهما صورة أخرى مرئية و الفرق بين هذا السبب و الذي قبله أن هذه الحركة المضطربة إلى قدام و خلف و كانت تلك يمنة و يسرة

فصل (١٠) في أنه لا بد في الإبصار من توسط الجسم الشفاف

و اعلم أن الحجة على ذلك أن تأثير القوى المتعلقة بالأجسام في شيء و تأثرها عنه لا يكون إلا بمشاركة الوضع و منشأ ذلك أن التأثير و التأثر لا يكون إلا بين شيئين بينهما - علاقة عليية و معلولية و هذه العلاقة متحققة بالذات بين القوة و ما يتعلق به من مادة أو موضوع أو بدن لأنها إما علة ذاته أو علة تشخصه أو كماله و متحققة بالعرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٨

بينها و بين ما له نسبة وضعية إلى ذلك المتعلق به فإن العلاقة الوضعية في الأجسام - بمنزلة العلاقة العلية في العقليات إذ الوضع هو بعينه نحو وجود الجسم و تشخصه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ١٩٩

فإذا كان الجسمان بحيث يتجاوران بأن يتصل طرفاهما فكانهما كانا جسما واحدا فإذا وقع تأثير خارجي على أحدهما فيسري ذلك التأثير إلى الآخر كما تسخن بعض جسم بالنار فإنه يتسخن بعضه الآخر أيضا بذلك التسخين و كما استضاء سطح بضوء النير يستضيء سطح آخر وضعه إلى الأول كوضعه إلى ذلك النير و إنما قيدنا التأثير بالخارجي لأن التأثير الباطني الذي لا يكون بحسب الوضع لا يسري فيما يجاور الشيء فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول إن الإحساس كالإبصار و غيره هو عبارة عن تأثر القوى الحاسة من المؤثر الجسماني و هو الأمر المحسوس الخارجي فلا بد هاهنا من علاقة وضعية بين مادة القوة الحاسة و ذلك الأمر المحسوس و تلك العلاقة لا تتحقق بمجرد المحاذاة من غير توسط جسم مادي بينهما إذ لا علاقة بين أمرين لا اتصال بينهما وضعا - و لا نسبة بينهما طبعاً بل العلاقة إما ربط عقلي أو اتصال حسي فلا بد من وجود جسم واصل بينهما و ذلك الجسم إن كان جسماً كثيفاً مظلم الثخن فليس هو في نفسه قابلاً للتأثر النوري فكيف يوجب ارتباط المبصر بالبصر أو ارتباط المنير بالمستنير فإن الرابط بين الشيئين لا بد و أن يكون من قبلهما لا أن يكون منافياً لفعلهما فإذن لا بد أن يكون بينهما جسم مشف غير حاجز و لا مانع لوقوع أحد الأثرين أعني النور من النير إلى المستنير أو من البصر إلى المبصر أو تأدية الشبح من المبصر إلى البصر.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٠

فعلى هذا يظهر فساد قول من قال المتوسط كلما كان أرق كان أولى فلو كان خلاء صرفاً لكان الإبصار أكمل حتى كان يمكن إبصارنا النملة على السماء لا بما ذكره في جوابه بأن هذا باطل فليس إذا أوجب رقة المتوسط زيادة قوة في الإبصار لزم أن يكون عدمه يزيد أيضاً في ذلك فإن الرقة ليست طريقاً إلى عدم الجسم لأن اشتراط الرقة في الجسم المتوسط لو كان لأجل أن لا يمنع نفوذ الشعاع فصح أنه إذا كان رقة الجسم منشأ سهولة النفوذ كان عدم الجسم فيما بين أولى في ذلك و كانت الرقة على هذا التقدير طريقاً إلى العدم بل فساده لأنه لو لم يكن بين الرائي و المرئي أمر وجودي

متوسط موصل رابط لم يكن هناك فعل وانفعال.

فإن قلت إن الشيخ اعترف بأن هذا النوع من الفعل والانفعال لا يحتاج إلى ملاقات الفاعل والمنفعل فلو قدرنا الخلاء بين الحاس والمحسوس فأى محال يلزم من انطباع صورة المحسوس في الحاس بل الخلاء محال في نفسه والملء واجب.

قلنا قد مر سابقاً أن ملاقاتهما وإن لم يكن واجبا لكن يجب مع ذلك إما الملاقاة وإما وجود متوسط جسماني بينهما يكون به مجموع المتوسط والمنفعل في حكم جسم واحد بعضه يقبل التأثير لوجود الاستعداد فيه وبعضه لا يقبل لعدم الاستعداد فلو فرض أن ليس بين النار والجسم المتسخن جسم متوسط لم يتحقق هناك تسخين و تسخن لعدم الرابطة وكذا لو لم يكن بين الشمس والأرض جسم متوسط لم يقبل الأرض ضوءاً ولا سخونة

فصل (١١) في انحصار الحواس في هذه الخمس

الجمهور من الناس زعموا إمكان وجود حاسة سادسة غير هذه الخمس والحكماء أنكروا ذلك واحتجوا عليه كما نبه الشيخ في بعض كتبه من أن الطبيعة لا ينتقل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠١

من نوع أنقص إلى نوع أتم ما لم يستوف جميع كمالات النوع الأنقص فهكذا الطبيعة لم ينتقل من درجة الحيوانية إلى درجة فوقها إلا وقد استكملت جميع ما في تلك المرتبة - فلو كان في الإمكان حس آخر لكان حاصلاً للحيوان فلما لم يكن حاصلاً في الإنسان - الذي هو أكمل من الحيوان بما هو حيوان علمنا أن لا حاسة في الوجود غير هذه

فصل (١٢) في المحسوسات المشتركة بينها

زعم بعض الناس أن المحسوس بالذات ليس إلا الكيفيات المحسوسة وغيرها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٢

محسوسة بالعرض فليس للحواس محسوس مشترك بالذات وليس كذلك لأن المراد من المحسوس بالذات ما يحصل منه أثر في القوة الحاسة والمحسوس بالعرض ما لم يكن كذلك فليس هو محسوساً بالحقيقة ولكنه مقارن لما هو المحسوس بالحقيقة مثل إحساسنا أبا زيد فإن المحسوس بالحقيقة ذلك الشخص لحصول صورة منه في الحس - وأما كونه أبا فليس بمحسوس البتة إذ ليس منه في نفسنا رسم و خيال و شبح بوجه من الوجوه بل العقل يدرك بمقايسته إلى ابنه إضافة الأبوة وهذا بخلاف المقدار والعدد والوضع والحركة والسكون والقرب والبعد والمماس والمباينة فإنها وإن كانت غير محسوسة بانفرادها لكنها محسوسة بشرط الإحساس بشيء آخر كاللون والضوء في الإبصار والحرارة والرطوبة في اللمس وغيرها في غيرهما والشيء الذي يتوقف الإحساس به على الإحساس بشيء آخر لا يخرج عن أن يكون في ذاته محسوساً بل المحسوس بالذات ما لا واسطة له في العروض لا ما لا واسطة له في الثبوت كما حقق ذلك في بيان العوارض الذاتية في علم الميزان.

فالحاصل أن كل ما يقال إنه محسوس فإما أن يكون بحيث يحصل منه عند الحس أثر أو لا يحصل فإن لم يحصل فهو المحسوس بالعرض وإن حصل فلا يخلو إما أن يتوقف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٣

الإحساس به على الإحساس بشيء آخر أو لا يتوقف فالأول هو المحسوس الثاني والثاني هو المحسوس الأول أقول هذا بحسب جليل النظر و أما بحسب النظر الدقيق فالمحسوس بالذات هو الصورة الحاضرة عند النفس لا الأمر الخارجي المطابق لها.

و إذا عرفت ذلك فنقول إن البصر يحس بالعظم و العدد و الشكل و الوضع و الحركة و السكون بتوسط اللون. و قال قوم إن الحركة غير محسوسة و إن السكون غير محسوس.

و احتجوا على الأول بأن الجالس على سفينة جارية لا يحس بحركتها و إن كانت في غاية السرعة. و على الثاني بأن السكون أمر عديم فكيف يحس به.

و اعلم أن معنى كون الحركة و السكون محسوسين أن العقل بإعانة الحس يدركهما - فإن الحس يدرك الجسم تارة قريباً من شيء و تارة بعيداً و هكذا على التدرج فيحكم العقل بأن ذلك الجسم متحرك خارج من القوة إلى الفعل و أما معنى خروج الشيء من القوة إلى الفعل فليس من مدركات الحس لأنه أمر نسبي إضافي و كذا الحس يدرك جسمًا واقفاً في مكانه غير زائل فالعقل يحكم باتصافه بالاستقرار و عدم الانتقال و ليس للحس أن يدرك استقرار الجسم أو غير انتقاله و زواله عن المكان الأول لأن الأول إضافي و الثاني عديم و شيء من الأمور الإضافية و العدمية ليس من مدركات الحس و لذلك راكب السفينة لما لم يدرك حسه باختلاف أوضاع السفينة و قربها و بعدها بالنسبة إلى جسم آخر خارج عنه لم يشعر بالحركة فيشبه أن يكون إدراك الحركة و السكون أمراً ذهنيًا بشركة الحس كالבصر. و أما اللمس فيدرك أيضاً جميع الأمور المعدودة بتوسط إدراك الصلابة و اللين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٤

و الحر و البرد و كذا الذوق يدرك الطعم و بتوسط الطعم يدرك بالعظم - بأن يدرك طعاماً كثيراً و يدرك بالعدد بأن يجد طعاماً مختلفة فإما إدراكه للحركة و السكون فضعيف جداً بل لا يكون إلا بالاستعانة باللمس. و أما الشم فإنه لا يدرك شيئاً من ذلك إلا العدد بإعانة من العقل و هو أن يعلم أن الذي انقطعت رائحته غير الذي حصلت ثانياً.

و أما السمع فإنه لا يدرك العظم و لكنه يدل العقل بشركته بأن الأصوات القوية لا يحصل في غالب الأمر إلا من الجسم العظيم و بالجملة فإدراك البصر لهذه الأشياء المعدودة أقوى و إن كان إدراكه أيضاً بإعانة من العقل و إن سألت الحق فاعلم أن لا شيء من الإدراك الحسي إلا و قوامه بالإدراك الخيالي و لا شيء من التخيل إلا و قوامه بالتعقل كما أن الحس لو جرد عن العقل لم يكن موجوداً و لا أمكن وجوده منحاذاً عن العقل و ليس الحواس بالقياس إلى مستعملها كالألات الصناعية بالقياس إلى مستعملها حيث يتصور للقدوم و المنحت وجود و إن فرض عدم النجار و لا يتصور للسمع و البصر وجود مع قطع النظر عن القوة العقلية في الإنسان و عن النفس الحيوانية في غيره من الحيوان و كذا لا يتصور للنفس وجود إلا بالعقل و لا للعقل وجود إلا بالباري جل ذكره و قد انجر الكلام إلى هذا المطلب و ليس هاهنا محل تحقيقه و كأنه قد مرت الإشارة إليه سابقاً فإذا كان الأمر في الحواس ما ذكرناه فهكذا يجب أن يعلم الحال في

المحسوسات فكل محسوس فهو معقول بمعنى أنه مدرك للعقل بالحقيقة لكن الاصطلاح قد وقع على تسمية هذا الإدراك الجزئي الذي بوساطة الحس بالمحسوس قسيما للمعقول أعني إدراك المجردات الكلية هذا. وربما توهم بعض الناس أنه لا بد للحيوان من حس آخر غير هذه الخمسة لإدراك تلك الأمور المعدودة وهذا باطل لما علمت أن تلك الأمور من المحسوسات المشتركة - التي يدرك بكل واحد من هذه الخمسة فهي غير محتاجة إلى حس سادس بل لو كان في الوجود حس آخر كان معطلا من جهة أن الحواس الخمس بل بعضها وافية بإدراك هذه الأمور و التعطيل مستحيل كما علمت في الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٥

الباب الخامس من علم النفس في الإدراكات الباطنة و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في الحس المشترك و يسمى نبطاسيا أي لوح النفس

و هي قوة مودعة في مقدم الدماغ عند الجمهور و عندنا قوة نفسانية استعداد حصولها في مقدم الدماغ بل في الروح المصبوب فيه يتأدى إليها صور المحسوسات الظاهرة كلها و الحواس بالنسبة إليها كالجواسيس الذين يأتون بأخبار النواحي إلى وزير الملك.

و احتجوا على إثباتها بحجج ثلاث

أحداها أنا نحكم بأن هذا الأبيض حلو أو ليس هذا ذاك

و القاضي على الشئيين يجب أن يحضره المقضي عليهما و هذا القاضي الحاكم ليس هو العقل فقط بلا توسط حاسة أما أولا فلأن إدراكه للمحسوسات لا يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٦

إلا بآلة جزئية و أما ثانيا فلأن هذا الحكم قد يقع من الحيوانات التي لا عقل لها - إذ لو لا ذلك لتعذرت عليها الحياة و لو لم يكن الشم و الشكل دالا لها على الصورة المطلوبة لم تطلبها أو على الصورة المهروب عنها لم تهرب عنها فظهر أن للمحسوسات الظاهرة اجتماعا في قوة جزئية إدراكية و ليس شيء من الحواس الظاهرة كذلك فلا بد من مدرك باطني جزئي و هو المسمى بالحس المشترك.

و هذه الحجة لا يخلو عن ضعف إذ العقل في الإنسان و الوهم في الحيوان - جامع لجميع القوى المدركة و غيرها و هو الحاكم على مدركاتها و المستعمل للجميع - فيكفي للحكم بأن هذا الأبيض هذا الحلو إذا أبصر بياض السكر ببصره و إدراك حلاوته بذوقه و أيضا إذا عقلنا الإنسان الكلي ثم شاهدنا شخصا معينا منه حكمنا بأن هذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٧

الشخص إنسان مع أن الإنسان كلي معقول و الشخص جزئي محسوس فلو كان الحاكم على الشئيين لا بد و أن يدركهما بالذات فلزم أن يكون هاهنا قوة مدركة غير العقل - و غير الحس تدرك للمعقول و المحسوس جميعا لأن إدراك العقل مقصور على الكليات - و إدراك الحس مقصور على الجزئيات فلو وجب للحاكم على الجزئي بالكلي أن يدرك الطرفين

جميعا بلا واسطة قوة أخرى يكون آلة له فيلزم إما استحالة هذا الحكم وإما وجود قوى أخرى لا يكون عقلا ولا حسا و
اللازم بقسميه باطل فكذا الملزوم.

قال بهمنيار و عندي أنه ليس يجب أن يكون الحاكم بأن هذا اللون هو هذا الطعم مدركا للصور المحسوسة كما أنه إذا
أثار الإبصار الشهوة لم يجب أن يكون القوة الشهوانية دراكة بل يصح أن يكون النفس مدركة للطعم بالذوق واللون
بالبصر - ثم يحكم قوة أخرى بأن هذا الطعم لشيء هذا لونه انتهى.

أقول لا غبار على كلامه هذا ولا يرد عليه ما أورده صاحب المباحث بقوله وهذا جهل مفرط ولعله نسي ما حفظه في
أول المنطق من أن كل تصديق لا بد فيه من تصورين فمن لم يكن متصورا للعالم والحادث كيف يمكنه الحكم بثبوت
أحدهما للآخر انتهى وذلك لأن المراد من قوة أخرى في قوله ثم يحكم قوة أخرى إدراكية كالعقل في الإنسان و
الوهم في سائر الحيوانات فمعناه أنه يحكم العقل أو الوهم بعد تنبئه بوسيلة الذوق على الطعم وبوسيلة الإبصار على
اللون بأن هذا الطعم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٨

لما له هذا اللون فمن أين لزم هاهنا حصول التصديق من غير تصور الطرفين و قول الحكماء أن العقل لا يدرك الجزئيات
و الوهم لا يدرك المحسوسات الظاهرة معناه أن العقل لا يدرك الجزئيات بذاته من غير استعانة بآلة إدراكية كالحس و
الوهم وكذا الوهم لا يدرك بذاته المحسوسات من غير توسط الحواس وإلا فلا مدرك بالحقيقة للكيلات - و الجزئيات
في الإنسان إلا القوة العاقلة و في الحيوانات لا مدرك للموهومات و المحسوسات إلا الوهم فهذا الاعتراض إنما نشأ عن
قصور التأمل و سوء الفهم و قلة الممارسة لكل ماتهم.

الثانية أنا نرى قطر النازل خطا مستقيما

و الذيلة المتحركة بالاستدارة على العجلة دائرة و النقطة في الخارج ليس خطا و لا دائرة فإذن تلك الأشباح في الحس و
ليس محلها هو القوة الباصرة.

أما على مذهب أصحاب الشعاع و من يكون المبصر عنده هو الأمر الخارجي فهو بين.

و أما على مذهب من يرى أن الإبصار بحصول شبح المرئي فلأن حضور المادة شرط في الإبصار و في كل إحساس
فالبصر لا يدرك المبصر إلا حيث يكون فبقي أن ذلك الأشباح و التمثيل في قوة أخرى و ليست هي النفس فهي قوة
أخرى جزئية.

و اعترض عليه صاحب المباحث بأنكم استدللتم بهذا على أن الرؤية بالانطباع في البصر و الآن جعلتموه دليلا على
إثبات الانطباع في الحس المشترك و قد سبق الإيراد عليه بهذا و الذي نقوله الآن أنه لم لا يجوز أن يكون محل الانطباع
هو الروح الباصرة و القوة الباصرة فينتطب في الروح الباصرة حين ما كان في حيز ثم قبل انمحاء هذه الصورة - ينطبع فيها
صورة الجسم عند ما يكون في حيز آخر فإذا اجتمعت صورتان في البصر شعرت القوة الباصرة بها فلا جرم أحست
القوة الباصرة بالنقطة على مثال الخط.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٠٩

وأيضا الشيخ الرئيس قد سلم أن البصر يدرك الحركة ويستحيل إدراك الحركة إلا على الوجه المذكور. أقول الحجة على أن الإبصار لا بد فيه من تمثيل شبح المرئي وصورته عند النفس قد مضت من غير الاستعانة بما ذكره و أما تجويز كون بقاء الارتسامات في البصر حتى يدرك النقطة خطأ فليس بجائز لأن الحس الظاهر قوة مادية لا يدرك شيئا إلا بمشاركة الوضع و ما لا وضع له بالقياس إلى موضوعها فلا يتأثر و لا يفعل موضوعها منه فلا يقع الإدراك به إذ لا شبهة في أن القطرة عند حصولها في كل موضع يبطل كونها في الموضع السابق عليه و المنعقد لا وضع له و ما لا وضع له لا يؤثر في قوة جسمانية - فلو كان البصر إدراك صورة النقطة على وضع خاص بعد انمحائها عن ذلك الوضع لزم وجود الشيء بلا سببه و لزم أن يكون الحس الظاهر مدركا للمغيبات و إدراك المغيبات مقصور على الحس الباطن لكونها غير منطبعة في المادة عندنا و كما أن البداة شاهدة - على أن الحواس الظاهرة لا تدرك الأمور الماضية و الأمور المستقبلية فالبصر لا يدرك لونا موجودا في الأمس و الشم لا يدرك رائحة موجودة في الغد فكذلك الحكم هاهنا - و أما أن الشيخ سلم أن البصر تدرك الحركة فقد مر بيانه من أن ذلك بانضمام العقل بضرب من القياس لا أن البصر يدرك بإدراك واحد دفعي أجزاء الحركة فلو ارتسمت أجزاء الحركة دفعة كما في القطرة النازلة و الشعلة الجواله فذلك في الحس المشترك لا في الحس الظاهر.

الحجة الثالثة و هي أقوى الحجج

إن الإنسان يدرك صوراً لا وجود لها في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٠

الخارج مثل ما يعرض للمبرسمين و كما يعرض للنائم في رؤياه فإنه يشاهد صوراً عظيمة محسوسة و أصواتاً مسموعة متميزة عن غيرها و كذلك الذي يشاهدها أصحاب النفوس الشريفة كالأنبياء و الأولياء ع حين سلامة حواسهم من الصور البهية و الأصوات الحسية لا يرتابون فيها و يميزون بينها و بين غيرها و كذلك ضعفاء العقول قد يرون عند الدهشة و الخوف في الحروب و الزلازل و غيرها لانزعاج نفوسهم عن عالم الظاهر صوراً مناسبة لأحوالهم فإذا لتلك الصور وجود فإن العدم المحض يمتنع أن يتميز عن غيره و ليس وجودها في الخارج و إلا لراها كل من كان سليم الحس - فإذا تلك الأمور وجودها لمدرک آخر غير القوة العقلية فإن العقل يمتنع أن يدرك الأجسام و الأبعاد و الأشكال المقدرية و غير الحس الظاهر لأن هذه الصور في الأغلب - يدرك عند ركود الحواس و تعطلها و كذا يدرك في المنام و قد يدرك في اليقظة المبصر عند غموض العينين فبقي أن يكون المدرک لها قوة باطنة غير العقل و ليس الخيال مدرکاً لها لأن الخيال حافظ و إلا لكان كل ما كان مخزوناً فيه متمثلاً مشاهداً و ليس كذلك فبقي أن يكون المدرک لها قوة أخرى و هي الحس المشترك و موضع تعلقها مقدم الدماغ عند التجويف الأول و مظهر إدراكاته هو الروح المصبوب هناك و هذا الروح كالمرآة التي تظهر بسببها لخلوها عن الألوان مع قابليتها صور الألوان من غير أن ينطبع فيها صورة فهكذا تلك الروح لبساطتها و صفائها و اعتدالها يصير سبباً لظهور الأشباح الغيبية على النفس من مثل المحسوسات فيدركها النفس بهذه القوة التي هي آلة لإدراك المحسوسات الغائبة من الحواس و هو المطلوب.

و استدل من نفي هذه القوة بوجهين - الأول أن النائم قد يرى في نومه جبلاً من الياقوت و بحراً من النار و هذه الصور العظيمة يستحيل انطباعها في جرم الدماغ لاستحالة انطباع العظيم في الصغير - فإذن محل هذه الصورة ليس قوة جسمانية

بل جوهر النفس فبطل القول بهذه القوة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١١

الثاني أنا كما علمنا ببداية العقل أنا لا نذوق الطعوم و لا نشم الروائح بالأيدي و الأرجل كذلك علمنا بالضرورة إنا لا نذوق و لا نلمس بالدماع.

أقول أما الأول فلا يرد علينا لأننا لا نقول بانطباع الصور المدركة و حلولها في جرم من الأجرام بل هي قائمة بالنفس قياما غير الحلول و الانطباع و كذا الثاني فإن الدماغ ليس محل الانطباع و لا أيضا إليه حاجة في إدراك النفس للصور بعد حصولها من طريق الحواس و لا في إدراك المغيبات بعد حصول الاستعداد لها إنما الحاجة إليه في كونه محل القوة و الإمكان لحدوث الصورة بسبب الرجحان و حامل استعداد النفس للاتصال بمبدأ التصوير و التمثيل أما كون تلك الصور العظيمة منطبعة في جزء من الدماغ - فنحن ننكره غاية الإنكار إذ قد أقمنا البرهان على كون الصور الخيالية غير موجودة في هذا العالم إذ ليست من ذوات الأوضاع و مع ذلك لا بد من إثبات قوة أخرى غير النفس لمغايرة مدرك الجزئيات لمدرك الكلّيات لأن الجزئي بما هو جزئي تباين في الوجود للكلّي بما هو كلي أي عقلي و المدرك أبدا من نوع المدرك بل عينه كما علمت - فمدرك الجزئي غير مدرك الكلّي

فصل (٣) في الخيال

قوة الخيال و يقال لها المصورة هي قوة يحفظ بها الصورة الموجودة في الباطن.

و استدلوا على مغايرتها للحس المشترك بوجوه ثلاثة

الأول أن الحس المشترك له قوة قبول الصور

و الخيال له قوة حفظها و قوة القبول غير قوة الحفظ بوجهين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٢

أحدهما أن القبول قد يوجد من غير حفظ كما في الماء إذ فيه قوة قبول الأشكال دون حفظها فلو كان أحدهما عين الثاني لم يجز الانفكاك.

و ثانيهما أن القبول منشؤه الإمكان و الاستعداد و الحفظ منشؤه الوجوب و الفعلية فهما حيثيتان متخالفتان مكثرتان لذات الموضوع.

و الاعتراض عليه بأن هذا مبني على قاعدة أن الواحد لا يصدر عنه إلا الواحد نشأ من قلة التدبر و قصور البضاعة في الحكمة كما مر ذكره.

الثاني أن الحس المشترك حاكم على المحسوسات مذعن لها

و الخيال غير حاكم بل حافظ فقط و الشيء الواحد لا يكون حاكما و غير حاكم.

و اعترض بأنه لم لا يجوز أن يكون القوة الواحدة تارة تكون حاكمة و تارة تكون حافظة.

الثالث أن صور المحسوسات قد تكون مشاهدة و قد تكون متخيلة

و المشاهدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٣

غير التخيل فالحس المشترك يشاهد تلك الصور و الخيال يتخيلها فهما قوتان متغايرتان - و اعترض صاحب المباحث المشرقية بأن الصور المعقولة قد لا يكون النفس مشاهدة لها ناظرة إياها بل ذاهلة فتلك الصور في هذا الوقت في أي خزانة تكون - فإن قلت إنه إذا أقبلت النفس إلى المبدأ الفياض فاضت عليه تلك الصورة - وإذا أعرضت انمحت و بطلت لكن النفس متى أحكمت ملكة الاتصال بالعقل فيكون متى تأهبت لإدراك تلك الصور فاضت عليها منه. قلنا فلم لا يجوز أن يكون كذلك في الصور الخيالية حتى أن الحس المشترك متى تأهبت لاستحضار تلك الصور فاضت عليه من المبدأ الفعال.

أقول القوة التي قد حصلت لها ملكة التوجه أو الاتصال بجوهر فعال يفيض عليها الصور من غير تجشم اكتساب جديد بفكر أو إحساس غير القوة التي لم تحصل لها يعد هذه الملكة بل تحتاج في إدراكه إلى كسب كالإحساس كما في الحس المشترك أو الفكر كما في النفس فإن النفس بما هي نفس ليس لها أن تدرك المطالب النظرية متى شاءت من غير طلب و كسب إلا بواسطة ملكة عقلية يحصل لها بعد تعدد الإدراكات و تعاقب الأفكار و ترادف الأنظار و قوة تلك الملكة نور عقلي راسخ الوجود فاض عليها من المبدأ و هو عندنا جوهر فوق النفس و دون العقل الفعال فهكذا نقول في هذا المقام - إن إدراك المحسوسات أولاً غير محتاج إلى ملكة بل إلى شيء كاسب من حس أو شيء آخر و أما حفظها فيحتاج إلى زيادة ملكة و شدة في القوة المدركة حيث يمكنها استحضار ما وقع الذهول عنه من الصور المحسوسة بعد غيبة أسبابها عن الحس و قد سبق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٤

أن القوة المسترجعة لا توجد في الماديات على أن إثبات المغايرة بين الحس المشترك و الخيال ليس عندنا من المهمات التي يختل بإهمالها شيء من الأصول الحكمية فلو كانا قوة واحدة لها جهتا نقص و كمال لم يكن به بأس و العمدة إثبات أنها قوة جوهرية - باطنية غير العقل و غير الحس الظاهر و لها عالم آخر غير عالم العقل و عالم الطبيعة و الحركة و هذه القوة قد أقمنا البرهان على تجردها من البدن و أجزائه و بها يتحقق أحوال القبر و ثوابه و عذابه و أحوال البرزخ و بعث الأجساد و موضع تصرفها كل البدن و سلطاتها في آخر التجويف الأول و آلتها الروح الغريزي الذي هناك

فصل (٣) في المتخيلة و الواهمة و الذاكرة

أما المتخيلة

فتسمى مفكرة أيضاً باعتبار استعمال الناطقة إياها في ترتيب الفكر و مقدماته فقد احتجوا على مغايرتها لسائر القوى المدركة بأن الفعل و العمل غير الإدراك و النظر فإن لنا أن نركب الصور المحسوسة بعضها ببعض و نفصلها بعضها عن بعض لا على النحو الذي شاهدناه من الخارج كحيوان رأسه كراس إنسان و سائر بدنه كبذن فرس و له جناحان و هذا التصرف غير ثابت لسائر القوى فهو إذن لقوة أخرى.

و اعترض بأنه إن كان لهذه القوة إدراك كان الشيء الواحد مدركاً و متصرفاً و إن لم يكن لها إدراك مع أنها متصرف بالتفصيل و التركيب بطل قولهم القاضي على الشيتين - لا بد و أن يحضره المقضي عليها.

و أيضا استخدام الوهم إياها تصرف فيها فإذا الوهم مدرك متصرف معا.
و أجاب المحقق الطوسي عن الأول أن هذه القوة ليست مدركة و تصرفها في شيئين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٥

يقتضي حضورهما لا إدراكهما إذ لا يجب أن يكون كل حاضر متصرف فيه مدركا.
و عن الثاني أن الشيء الواحد يمكن أن يكون مدركا و متصرفا من وجهين مختلفين أحدهما بحسب ذاته و الآخر بحسب آله أو كلاهما بحسب آيتين - و موضع تصرف هذه القوة هو الجزء الأول من التجويف الأوسط و هي قوة للوهم و بتوسطه للعقل.

و أما القوة الوهمية

فقد احتجوا على مغايرتها بأن قالوا إنا نحكم على المحسوسات بأمور لا يحس بها و لا صورة لها في المواد و هي إما أمور ليس من شأنها أن يحس بها كالعداوة التي يدركها الشاة من الذئب و المحبة التي تدركها السخلة من أمها - و إما أمور يمكن أن يحس بها كما إذا رأينا شيئا أصفر حكمنا بأنه عسل و حلو - فإن ذلك لا يؤدي إليه الحس في هذا الوقت فالقوة التي تدرك هذه الأمور هي الوهم لكن يدرك القسم الأول أعني المعاني المتعلقة بالجزئيات بذاته و القسم الثاني أعني الصور الغير الموجودة باستخدام المصورة و لا يجوز أن يكون شيئا من القوى المذكورة - إذ إدراكاتها مقصورة على الصور المحسوسة و هذا يدرك المعاني فهي إذن قوة أخرى و موضع تصرف الوهم الدماغ كله لكن الأخص به هو التجويف الأوسط.

و اعلم أن الوهم عندنا و إن كان غير القوى التي ذكرت إلا أنه ليس له ذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٦

مغايرة للعقل بل هو عبارة عن إضافة الذات العقلية إلى شخص جزئي و تعلقها به و تدبيرها له فالقوة العقلية المتعلقة بالخيال هو الوهم كما أن مدركاته هي المعاني الكلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٧

المضافة إلى صور الشخصيات الخيالية و ليس للوهم في الوجود ذات أخرى غير العقل - كما أن الكلي الطبيعي و الماهية من حيث هي لا حقيقة لها غير الوجود الخارجي أو العقلي.
و الحجة على ما ذكرناه أن القوة الوهمية إذا أدركت عداوة شخص معين فإما أن تكون مدركة للعداوة لا من حيث إنها في الشخص المعين أو لم يدركها إلا من حيث إنها في الشخص المعين فإن كان الأول فالوهم قد أدرك عداوة كلية - فالوهم هو العقل و إن كان الثاني فمن الظاهر المكشوف في العقل أن العداوة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٨

ليست صفة قائمة بهذا الشخص و على تقدير قيامها به كانت محسوسة كوجوده و وحدته - فإن وجود الجسم

الشخصي عين جسميته و وحدته عين اتصاله و كان إدراك عداوته كإدراك وجوده و وحدته فكان إدراكه حينئذ بالحس لا بالوهم و بالجملة كل معنى معقول كلي إذا وجد في الأشخاص الجزئية فوجوده فيها إما باعتبار أن الذهن ينتزع منها ذلك المعنى كالعلية و المعلولية و التقدم و التأخر و سائر الإضافات كالأبوة و البنوة و غيرها و إما باعتبار أن لها صورة في تلك الأشخاص كالسواد و الرائحة و الطعم فإدراك القسم الأول إما بالعقل الصرف و ذلك إذا كان إدراكها مع قطع النظر عن متعلقاتها و إما بالوهم إذا أدركت متعلقة بشخص معين أو أشخاص معينة- و إدراك القسم الثاني بشيء من الحواس أو بالخيال فالعداوة مثلا من قبيل القسم الأول- و إن كانت متعلقة بخصوصية فهي أمر كلي مضاف إلى تلك الخصوصية و ليس لها قيام بالأجسام و إدراكها بالوهم لا بالحس فالوهم يدرك الكلي المقيد بقيد جزئي

و أما القوة الحافظة

فهي خزانة عندهم للوهم اختزنت فيها صور مدركاته كما أن الخيال خزانة للحس المشترك و قد يسمى أيضا ذاكرة و مسترجعة لكونها قوية على استعادتها و هذه الاستعادة تارة تكون من الصورة إلى المعنى و ذلك إذا قبل الوهم مستعينا بالمتخيلة ليستعرض الصور الموجودة في الخيال إلى أن عرضت له الصور التي أدرك معها ذلك المعنى و حينئذ يلوح ذلك المعنى المحفوظ في الخزانة و تارة تكون المصير من المعنى إلى الصورة إما باستعراض المعاني التي في الحافظة إلى أن عرض له المعنى الذي أدرك معه الصورة التي تطلب و إن تعذرت من هذه الجهة لانمحاء الصورة عن الخيال بالنسيان أو لمانع آخر فيحتاج إلى إحساس جديد فحينئذ يورد الحس الظاهر تلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢١٩

الصورة و تصير مستقرة في الخيال فيعود بسببه المعنى المستقر في الحافظة. و اعترض بأن حفظ المعاني مغاير لإدراكها و إدراكها مغاير للتصرف فيها و استعراضها فالاسترجاع لا يتم إلا بحفظ و إدراك و تصرف فالمسترجعة لا تكون قوة واحدة فيزيد عدد القوى الباطنة على الخمسة المذكورة. و الجواب أن الإدراك للوهم و الحفظ للحافظة و التصرف للمتفكرة و بهذه القوى يتم الاسترجاع من غير حاجة إلى قوة أخرى غيرها فوحدة المسترجعة وحدة اعتبارية غير حقيقية و كذا الذاكرة مركب من إدراك و حفظ يتم بالوهم و الحافظة.

و اعلم أن هذه القوى و إن كانت متغايرة الوجود مختلفة الحدوث منفكة بعضها عن بعض فمن الحيوان ما لا يكون له إلا الحس الظاهر و منه ما له خيال و لا وهم له و منه ما لا حفظ له إلا أنها ترجع عند كمالها إلى ذات واحدة لها شئون كثيرة- و سيجيء بيان أن النفس بذاتها مدركة للصور الجزئية و المعاني الكلية في فصل معقود لهذا فكن منتظرا متوقعا لبيانها و إن سبق منا تنبيهات كثيرة يتفطن الذكي اللبيب على هذا المطلب من غير كلفة لكننا نوضحه زيادة إيضاح لأنها مطلب عال و متاع ثمنه غال.

و مما يؤيد ما ذكرناه أن الشيخ قال في الشفا في آخر الفصل الأول من المقالة الرابعة من الكلام في النفس و يشبه أن يكون القوة الوهمية هي بعينها المفكرة و المتخيلة و المتذكرة و هي بعينها الحاكمة فيكون بذاتها حاكمة و بحركاتها و أفعالها متخيلة و متذكرة فتكون متخيلة بما يعمل في الصور و المعاني و متذكرة بما ينتهي إليه عملها و أما الحافظة فهي قوة خزانتها انتهى و لا ينافي هذا ما ذكره قبل هذا الكلام متصلا به بل يؤيده و هو قوله و هذه القوة المركبة بين الصورة

و الصورة- و بين الصورة و المعنى و بين المعنى و المعنى كأنها القوة الوهمية بالموضع لا من حيث تحكم بل من حيث يعمل لتصل إلى الحكم و قد جعل مكانها وسط الدماغ ليكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢٠

لها اتصال بخزائني المعنى و الصورة انتهى فإنه دل على أن مبدأ الذي ينسب إليه التفكير- و التذكر و التخيل و الحفظ هو شيء واحد بالهوية و الذات كما أن مبدأ الجميع في الإنسان هو ذات واحدة يتشعب منه فروع و قوى باعتبار أطواره المختلفة و درجاته المتفاوتة.

و قال أيضا في فصل القوى النفسانية من كتاب القانون و هاهنا موضع نظر فلسفي أنه هل الحافظة و المتذكرة و المسترجعة لما غاب عن الحفظ من مخزونات الوهم قوة واحدة أو قوتان و لكن ليس ذلك مما يلزم الطبيب انتهى. و إنما لم يحكم هاهنا و لم يجزم بأحد الشقين التغير أو الاتحاد لأن الحكم به إما على سبيل المبدئية فليس ذلك مما يبتني عليه قاعدة طبية و لا على أن يكون مطلوبا هناك إذ ليس هذا من المسائل التي يلزم الطبيب أن يعرفها إذ موضع أفعال الوهم و الحفظ عضو واحد أو كالواحد عندهم إذا وقعت فيه آفة تسري في غيره أيضا فما الحاجة لهم إلى معرفتها. و أيضا الحكم النظري مفتقر إلى حجة و بيان و ليس يمكن إثباته بالأدلة الطبية و إثباته بالبراهين اللمية لا يكون إلا في علم آخر فوق الطب و لكن قال في الشفا بهذه العبارة و هذه القوة يعني الحافظة يسمى أيضا متذكرة فتكون حافظة لصيانتها ما فيها و متذكرة لسرعة استعدادها لاستثباتها و التصوير لها مستعدة إياها إذا فقدت- و ذلك إذا أقبل الوهم بقوته المتخيلة فجعل يعرض واحدا واحدا من الصور إلى آخر كلامه.

فهذا يدل على أنهما قوة واحدة و قد مر أن الذكر يتم بفعلين و الاسترجاع بثلاثة أفاعيل- فوحدة كل من الذكر و الاسترجاع اعتبارية و كذا وحدة القوة التي مبدؤه و فوق هذا كلام آخر موعود بيانه و بالجملة لا اضطراب في كلامه أصلا كما ظن بعضهم بل هذه القوى مع تعددها عنده مفتقرة بعضها إلى بعض و كلها آلات للوهم و نسبة الأفاعيل إليها كنسبة الفعل إلى الآلة و الفعل بالحقيقة منسوب إلى ذي الآلة لا إلى الآلة و الوهم أيضا آلة للعقل فيما له عقل و أما أن جميع القوى المدركة و المحركة- مع تعددها و تخالفها عين حقيقة واحدة شخصية لها وحدة جمعية تشمل هذه المعاني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢١

و هوياتها فشيء لم يذهب إليه الشيخ و أتباعه فاستمع لما يتلى عليك من عالم الأسرار- بشرط صونها عن الأغيار

فصل (٤) في بيان أن النفس كل القوى

بمعنى أن المدرك بجميع الإدراكات المنسوبة إلى القوى الإنسانية هي النفس الناطقة و هي أيضا المحركة لجميع التحريكات الصادرة عن القوى المحركة الحيوانية و النباتية و الطبيعية و هذا مطلب شريف و عليه براهين كثيرة بعضها من جهة الإدراك و بعضها من جهة التحريك

و التي من جهة الإدراك نذكر منها ثلاثة

البرهان الأول

من ناحية المعلوم أنه يمكننا أن نحكم على شيء بأحكام المحسوسات - و الموهومات و المعقولات فنقول مثلا إن الذي له لون كذا له طعم كذا و ما له صوت كذا له رائحة كذا و الحاكم بين الشئين لا بد و أن يحضرهما و المصدق لا بد له من تصور الطرفين فلا بد لنا من قوة واحدة ندرك لكل المحسوسات الظاهرة حتى يمكننا الحكم بأن هذا اللون هو هذا المطعوم و أن الذي له الصوت الفلاني له الرائحة الفلانية و كذا إذا تخيلنا صورة ثم أدركناه بالبصر نحكم بأن تلك الصورة هي صورة زيد المحسوس مثلا فلا بد من قوة واحدة مدركة للصورة الخيالية و الصورة المحسوسة حتى يمكننا الحكم بأن هذه الصورة الخيالية مطابقة لهذا المحسوس فإن القاضي بين الشئين - لا بد و أن يحضره المقضي عليهما و كذا إذا أدركنا عداوة زيد و صداقة عمرو فقد اجتمع

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عندنا صورة المحسوس و صورة الموهوم ثم لنا أن نتصرف في الصور الخيالية و المعاني الجزئية المدركة بالتركيب و التفصيل و الجمع و التفريق و نحكم بإضافة بعضها إلى بعض إيجابا أو سلبا و الحكم لا يتم إلا بحضور المحكوم عليه و المحكوم به جميعا - فإذن المتولي لهذا التركيب بين المعاني و الصور أو التفصيل قوة واحدة مدركة للمعاني و الصور ثم نقول إذا أحسنا بزيد أو بعمر و حكمنا بأنه إنسان أو حيوان و ليس بحجر و لا شجر فحكمنا على المحسوس الجزئي بالمعقول الكلي و إذا أدركنا فرسا شخصا حكمنا بأنه حيوان و ليس إنسان فحكمنا بأن هذا المحسوس هو جزئي ذلك المعنى المعقول و ليس جزئي ذلك المعقول الآخر فإذن فينا قوة واحدة مدركة للكماليات المعقولة و للجزئيات المحسوسة فثبت أن النفس قوة واحدة مدركة لجميع أصناف الإدراكات.

ثم نقول الحركات الإنسانية اختيارية فيكون محركها مختارا و كل مختار فمبدأ حركته شعوره بغاية الحركة سواء كانت حركة عقلية أو حسية شهوية أو غضبية - و الإنسان يتحرك أقسام الحركات الاختيارية بعضها للحكم بالعقل و بعضها بالوهم - و بعضها لجلب الملائم الحسي و بعضها لدفع المنافر الحسي فإذن في الإنسان شيء واحد هو المدرك بكل إدراك و هو المحرك بكل حركة نفسانية و هذا هو المطلوب - فإن قلت إدراكاته و تحريكاته بواسطة القوة فبالحقيقة مبادي الإدراكات و التحريكات هي القوى و هي أمور متعددة.

قلنا هو المدرك بالحقيقة و القوى بمنزلة الآلات و قد مر أن نسبة الفعل إلى الآلة مجاز و إلى ذي الآلة حقيقة.

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فإن قلت إذا كانت النفس مدركة للمحسوسات بالحقيقة فتكون قوة حساسة - و إذا كانت مدركة للحقيقة للصور الخيالية كانت قوة خيالية و إذا كانت مدركة للموهومات كانت واهمة فتكون ذات واحدة عقلا و وهما و خيالا و حسا و طبعا و محركا و يكون جوهرها واحدا مجردا و ماديا.

قلنا النفس بالحقيقة موصوفة بهذه الأمور و مبادئها إذ لها درجات و جودية على ترتيب الأشرف فالأشرف و كانت لها حركة في الاستكمال الجوهرية و كلما وصلت إلى مرتبة كمالية جوهرية كانت حيطتها أكثر و شمولها على المرتبة السابقة أتم فإذن النوع الأخصر الأتم يوجد له النوع الأنقص فكما أن نوع الحيوان و طبيعته تمام لنوعية النبات و طبيعته و النبات تمام الطبيعة المركب المعدني و طبيعة المعدن تمام لطبيعة الجسم فكذا طبيعة الإنسان أعني ذاته و نفسه تمام

لجميع ما سبق من الأنواع الحيوانية والنباتية والعنصرية وتمام الشيء هو ذلك الشيء مع ما يزيد عليه فالإنسان بالحقيقة كل هذه الأشياء النوعية وصورته صورة الكل منها.

فإن قلت فعلى ما ذكرت لا حاجة إلى إثبات هذه القوى بل ينسد طريق إثباتها.

قلنا هذا بعينه كمسألة التوحيد في الأفعال فإن قول الحكماء بترتيب الوجود والصدور لا تدفع قول المحققين منهم أن المؤثر في الجميع هو الله تعالى بالحقيقة فهكذا هاهنا فإن النفس لكونها مع وحدتها ذات شئون كثيرة متفاوتة لا بد للحكيم من تعرف شئونها وحفظ مراتبها لئلا يلزم إسناد فعل إلى غير فاعلها من طريق الجهالة - فإن من نسب حس الإنسان أو شهوته إلى جوهر عقله من غير توسط أمر آخر فقد جهل بالعقل وظلم في حقه إذ العقل أجل من أن يكون شهوة وكذا من نسب دفع الفضلات بالبول والبراز إلى القوة العاقلة فقد عظم الإساءة له في باب التحريك فإن تحريكاته ليست على سبيل المباشرة بل على سبيل التشوق إليه شوقا وعشقا عقليا حكيميا وكذلك الأمر فيما زعمه الجمهور من أهل الكلام من نسبة الشرور والأفاعيل الخسيصة إلى الباري

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢٤

جل ذكره من غير توسيط الجهات والقوى العالية والسافلة وهذا من سوء الأدب منهم في حق الباري من حيث لا يشعرون ومعرفة النفس ذاتا وفعلا مرقاة لمعرفة الرب ذاتا وفعلا فمن عرف النفس أنها الجوهر العاقل المتوهم المتخيل الحساس المتحرك - الشام الذائق اللامس النامي أمكنه أن يرتقي إلى معرفة أن لا مؤثر في الوجود إلا الله.

البرهان الثاني

من ناحية العالم أنك لا تشك في أنك تبصر الأشياء وتسمع الأصوات وتدرک المعقولات ولا تشك أنك واحد بالعدد فإن كان المدرك للمعقولات غير المدرك للمحسوسات فجوهر ذاتك الذي هو أنت عند التحقيق لم تدركهما جميعا إذ لو أدركهما لكان المدرك لهما ذاتا واحدة وهو المطلوب وإلا فكنت أنت ذاتين اثنتين لا ذاتا واحدة - وكذا الكلام في الشهوة والغضب فإنك لا تشك أنك المشتبه للنكاح أو شيء آخر وأنك المغضب لعدوك.

فإن قلت القوة الباصرة التي في العين آلة في العين تدرك المبصر ثم يؤدي ما أدركته إلى العلاقة التي بيني وبينها فيحصل لي الشعور بالشيء الذي أدركته القوة الباصرة.

قلنا نعد التأدية إليك هل تدرك أنت الشيء المبصر كما أدركته الآلة أم لا فإن قلت نعم فإدراكك غير وإدراكك الآلة غير فهب أن إدراكك يتوقف على إدراكك التلك - إلا أنك إنما تكون مدركا لأجل أنه حصل لك الإدراك لا لأجل أنه حصل لآلتك الإدراك.

فإن قلت أنا لا أدرك بعد التأدية فإذا ما أبصرت وما سمعت وما وجدت من نفسك ألمك - ولذتك وجوعك وعطشك بل علمت أن العين التي هي آلتك أو القوة الباصرة قد أدركت وأبصرت شيئا وهذا العلم غير وحقيقة الرؤية والإبصار غير فالعلم بأن العين يبصر - والسمع يسمع والرجل يمشي واليد يبطش ليس إبصارا ولا سماعا ولا مشيا ولا بطشا - كما أن العلم بأن غيرنا جائع أو متألم أو ملتذ ليس وجدانا للجوع والألم واللذة - لكن العقلاء ببداهة عقولهم يعلمون أنهم يسمعون و يبصرون و يتألمون و يلتذون و يبطشون و يمشون فإن جاز إنكار هذا العلم جاز إنكار جميع المحسوسات والمشاهدات فعلم أن النفس بها قوة سمعنا وبصرنا و بطشنا و مشينا فيها نسمع و بها نبصر و بها نبطش

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢٥

و بها نمشي فثبت بهذا أن جوهر نفسك الذي أنت به أنت سامع و مبصر و متألم و ملتذ و عاقل و فاهم و باطش و ماش و إن احتاج في كل نوع من هذه الأفعال إلى آلة مخصوصة طبيعية و ذلك مما لا نزاع فيه ما دما في عالم الطبيعة و إن انسلخت النفس عن البدن و استقلت في الوجود صدرت هذه الأفاعيل عنها بدون الآلة كما شاهده أصحاب النفوس الكاملة و دل عليه النوم فإننا نفعل هذه الأفاعيل حالة المنام من غير استعانة بهذه الآلات.

البرهان الثالث

من طرف العلم على أن النفس مدركة للجزئيات لا شك في أن النفس ذات شخصية و هي متعلقة بالبدن تعلق التدبير و التصرف كما ستعلم و معلوم أن النفس المعينة ليست مدبرة للبدن الكلي و إلا لكانت عقلا مفارقا بالكلية و لم يكن تعلقها بالبدن المعين إلا كتعلقها بسائر الأبدان و التالي باطل فالمقدم كذلك فهي إذن مدبرة لبدن جزئي و تدبير الشخص من حيث هو الشخص يستحيل إلا بعد العلم به من حيث هويته الشخصية و ذلك لا يكون إلا بحضور صورته الشخصية عند النفس - و ذلك يستلزم كون النفس مدركة للجزئيات و هي مدركة للكلية ففي الإنسان هوية واحدة ذات أطوار متعددة.

فإن قلت إن نفسي مدبر بدنا كليا ثم إنه يتخصص ذلك التدبير لتخصص القابل. قلت هذا باطل أما أولا فكل عاقل يجد من نفسه أنه لا يحاول تدبير بدن كلي بل مقصوده تدبير بدنه الخاص. و أما ثانيا فتخصص هذا التدبير بسبب القابل إنما يكون معقولا إذا كان بدن الشخص قابلا لتدبير معين لا تقبله سائر الأبدان و ليس الأمر كذلك فإن كل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢٦

تدبير يقبله سائر الأبدان فيستحيل أن يكون تخصص التدبير لتخصص القابل - و أما ثالثا فتخصص البدن و تعيينه إنما يكون بسبب تصرف النفس و تدبيرها لأنها الجامعة لأجزائه و الحافظة لمزاجه فلو كان تخصص التدبير بسبب تخصص البدن لزم الدور فهذه هي الوجوه الكلية في بيان أن النفس كل القوى و ليس في ذلك إبطال القوى كما سبق

و هاهنا وجوه أخرى خاصة

أحدها إنا ندعي أن محل الشهوة و الغضب ليس هو البدن

و لا جسم من الأجسام لأن كل جسم منقسم كما ثبت فلو كان محل الشهوة و النفرة هو الجسم لم يمتنع أن يقوم بأحد طرفيه شهوة و بطرفه الآخر نفرة حتى يكون الشخص الواحد في الحالة الواحدة لشيء واحد مشتتيا و نافرا.

و ثانيها أن القوة الوهمية قوة غير مادية

و إلا لانقسمت العداوة و الصداقة لانقسام محلها و كانت من ذوات الأوضاع فحينئذ يكون للصداقة ربع و ثلث و تكون قابلة للإشارة الحسية بأن هذه العداوة هناك في الفوق أو في التحت أو في السوق أو في البيت و ليس كذلك.

و ثالثها أن الخيال و الحفظ قوة غير جسمانية

و عليه براهين قوية سبق ذكر بعضها في مباحث العقل و المعقولات و الذي نذكر منها هاهنا أنا قد برهنا هناك على أن

الصور التي يشاهدها النائمون و الممرورون أو يتخيلها المتخيلون أمور وجودية يمتنع أن يكون محلها جزء البدن لما بيناه أن البدن ذا وضع و تلك الصور ليست من ذوات الأوضاع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢٧

و لما ثبت أيضا في بداهة العقول من امتناع انطباع العظيم في الصغير فإذا هي موجودة للنفس قائمة بها ضربا آخر من القيام.

طريق آخر أن الصور الخيالية لو كانت منطبعة في الروح الدماغية كما هو المشهور من القوم لكان لا يخلو إما أن يكون لكل صورة موضع معين غير موضع الصورة الأخرى و ذلك محال إذ الإنسان الواحد قد يحفظ المجلدات و يشاهد أكثر الأقاليم و البلدان و عجائبها و يبقى صور تلك الأشياء في حفظه و خياله و من المعلوم بالبداهة أن الروح الدماغية لا يفني بذلك و إما أن ينطبع جميع تلك الصور في محل واحد - فيكون الخيال كاللوح الذي يكتب فيه الخطوط بعضها على البعض و لا يتميز شيء منها - و لكن الخيال ليس كذلك إذ يشاهدها متميزا بعضها عن بعض غير مغشوش فعلمنا أن الصور غير منطبعة على أن من الممتنع أن يتلاقى الأشياء المتحدة في الطبيعة و لا تصير متحدة الوجود و إذا اتحدت فمن الممتنع أن يختص البعض بأن يكون محلا لصورة دون البعض.

وجه آخر أن الروح الخيالي لكونه جسما لا بد أن يكون له مقدار فإذا تخيلنا المقدار فعند ذلك لو حصل فيه المقدار لزم حلول المقدارين في مادة واحدة و هو محال.

الوجه الرابع التمسك بما ذكره الشيخ في كتاب المباحثات على طريق التشكيك

لمنفاته مع كثير من أصوله مثل أن الإدراك للشيء المغاير لا بد فيه من انطباع صورته في المدرك فلو كانت النفس مدركة للصور المقدارية فيلزم كونها محلا للمقدار - و إن الجوهر الواحد لا يمكن أن يكون مجردا و ماديا عاقلا و حساسا و غيرهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢٨

من القواعد و نحن نعتقده برهانا لكونه مطابقا لما اعتقدناها من أصول محققة عندنا يخالف تلك الأصول مثل كون الوجود متحققا في الأعيان دون الماهية و كونه قابلا للشدة و الضعف و مثل تجوز الحركة في الجوهر و تجدد الطبيعة و كاتحاد العاقل بالمعقول و سيرورة النفس متحدة بالعقل بعد كونها متحدة بالحس إلى غير ذلك من أمور كثيرة وقع الخلاف منا مع فيها و الحق أحق بالتابع و هذه عبارته في المباحثات بعينها قال إن المدركات من الصور و المتخيلات لو كان المدرك لها جسما أو جسمانيا فإما أن يكون من شأن ذلك الجسم أن يتفرق بدخول الغذاء عليه أو ليس من شأنه ذلك و الثاني باطل لأن أجسامنا في معرض الانحلال و التزايد بالغذاء.

فإن قيل الطبيعة تستحفظ وضع أجسام ما هي الأصول و يكون ما ينضم إليها - كالدواخل عليها المتصلة بها اتصالا مستمرا و يكون فائدتها كالمعدة للتحلل إذا هجمت المحللات فيبقى الأصل و يكون للأصل بها تزايد غير جوهري.

فنقول هذا باطل لأنه إما أن يتحد الزائد بالأصل المحفوظ أو لا يتحد به فإن يتحد به فلا يخلو إما أن يحصل في كل واحدة من القطعتين صورة خيالية على حدة أو ينسبط عليهما صورة واحدة و الأول يوجب أن يكون المتخيل من كل

شيء واحد اثنين واحد يستند به الأصل و واحد يستند به المضاف إلى الأصل.
و أما الثاني فإذا غاب الزائد بقي الباقي ناقصا فيجب عند التحلل أن لا يبقى المتخيلات تامة بل ناقصة على أن ذلك من الممتنع و إما أن اتحد الزائد بالأصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٢٩

فيكون حكم جميع الأجزاء المفترضة فيه بعد ذلك الاتحاد في التحلل و التبدل واحدا- فحينئذ يكون الأصل في معرض التحلل كما أن الزائد في معرض التحلل فظهر مما قلناه أن محل المتخيلات و المتذكرات جسم يتفرق و يزيد بالاغتذاء و إذا كان كذلك- فمن الممتنع أن يبقى صورة خيالية بعينها لأن الموضوع إذا تبدل و تفرق بعد أن كان متحدا فلا بد و أن يتغير كل ما فيه من الصور ثم إذا زالت الصورة المتخيلة الأولى- فإما أن يتجدد بعد زوالها صورة أخرى تشابهها أو لا يتجدد و باطل أن يتجدد لأنه إذا حدث موضوع آخر كان حاله عند حدوثه كحال الموضوع الأول عند حدوثه و كما أن الموضوع الأول عند حدوثه كان محتاجا إلى اكتساب هذه الصورة من الحس الظاهر- فكذلك هذا الموضوع الذي تجدد ثانيا و جب أن يكون محتاجا إلى اكتساب هذه الصورة و يلزم من ذلك أن لا يبقى شيء من الصور في الحفظ و الذكر لكن الحس تشهد بأن الأمر ليس كذلك فإذن الحفظ و الذكر ليسا جسمانيين بل إنما يوجدان في النفس و النفس إنما يكون لها ملكة الاسترجاع للصور المنمحية عنها بأن يتكرر عليها جميع تلك الصور فيصير استعداد النفس بقبولها لتلك الصور راجحا و يكون للنفس هيئة بها أمكنها أن يسترجع تلك الصورة متى شاءت من المبادي المفارقة و حينئذ يكون الأمر في المتذكرات و المتخيلات على وزن المعقولات من جهة أن النفس إذا اكتسبت ملكة الاتصال بالعقل الفعال فإذا انمحت الصور المستحصلة تمكنت من استرجاعها متى شاءت من العقل الفعال كذا هاهنا إلا أن المشكل أنه كيف ترتسم الأشباح الخيالية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٠

في النفس ثم قال في آخر هذا الفصل و بهذا و بأمثاله يقع في النفس أن نفوس الحيوان غير الناطق أيضا جوهر غير مادي و أنه هو الواحد بعينه المشعور به و أنه هو الشاعر الباقي و أن هذه الأشياء آلات متبدلة عليه فهذا جملة ما يدل على صحة ما ادعيناه

فصل (٥) في دفع ما قيل في النفس لا تدرك الجزئيات

و هي وجوه عامة و وجوه خاصة-

أما الوجوه العامة في أربعة

الأول أن العقلاء ببداهة عقولهم يدركون أن إدراك المبصرات حاصل في البصر لا في غيره

و الإحساس بالأصوات حاصل في الأذن لا في غيره و كما أن البداهة حاكمة- بأن اللسان غير مبصر و العين غير ذائقة كذلك حاكمة بأن اللسان ذائق و العين مبصرة فلو قلنا بأن المدرك بهذه الإدراكات لهذه المدركات هو النفس لزم بطلان هذه الاختصاصات المعلومة.

و ليس لقائل أن يقول القوة المدركة و إن كانت غير موجودة في هذه الأعضاء لكنها آلات لها فإذا وقع للنفس التفات إلى

العين أبصرت أو إلى الأذن سمعت.

لأننا نقول النفس إذا التفت إلى اللسان فاللسان هل يدرك الطعام أو إلى البشرة فالبشرة عند الضرب هل تتألم أم لا فإن أدرك فقد حصل المطلوب وإن لم يدرك فيجب أن لا يكون لذلك الإدراك اختصاص باللسان بل يكون اللسان جاريا مجرى اليد في كونه آلة الذوق.

و الجواب أن أكثر الناس يجدون إدراكاتهم الكلية و تعقلاتهم المجردة من جانب قلبهم و دماغهم فهل يدل على أن محل هذه الإدراكات الكلية هو القلب و الدماغ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣١

و إن كان لا يلزم ذلك فكذلك ما ذكرتموه.

و أيضا العقلاء ببداهة عقولهم يعلمون أنه ليس المبصر هو العين و لا السامع هو الأذن - و لا المتكلم هو الحنجرة بل الإنسان هو السميع البصير المتكلم حتى أن بعضهم اعتقدوا في بادئ نظرهم أن الجملة هي الموصوفة بهذه الصفات ثم لما لاح لهم أن الآحاد لما لم تكن موصوفة بهذه الصفات امتنع أن يكون الجملة كذلك فحينئذ اضطربوا و تشككوا - و الأكياس منهم تنبهوا للنفس فظهر أن ليس العلم بكون العين مبصرة علما بديهيها بل العلم البديهي حاصل أن للعين اعتبارا في حصول الإبصار فأما أنها هي مبصرة أو هي آلة للإبصار فذلك غير معلوم بأول الفطرة.

الثاني أنا نرى أن الآفة إذا حلت عضوا من هذه الأعضاء بطلت الأفعال أو ضعفت

أو تشوشت و ذلك ظاهر في الحواس الخمس الظاهرة و أما الحواس الباطنة فالتجارب الطبية دالة على أن الآفة متى حلت البطن المقدم من الدماغ اختل التخيل و إن حلت البطن الأوسط اختل التفكير و إن حلت البطن المؤخر اختل الذكر و لو لا أن هذه القوى جسمانية لما كان الأمر كذلك.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٢

و الجواب أنه من الجائز أن يكون ذلك لاحتياج القوة الفاعلية لتلك الأفعال إلى تلك الآلات في فاعليتها لتلك الأفعال لا في ذواتها ألا ترى أن صاحب العيون الضعيفة - يحتاجون إلى البلور في الرؤية و لم يلزم من ذلك أن يكون تلك الآلة مدركة - فكذلك في هذه الآلات الطبيعية.

و الثالث أن هذه الإدراكات الجزئية حاصلة لسائر الحيوانات

فيجب أن يكون لها نفس ناطقة مجردة و ذلك بعيد.

و الجواب أنه أي محال يلزم من ذلك و أقول التحقيق أن الحيوانات التامة التي لها قوة الحفظ ذوات نفوس مجردة عن عالم الطبيعة لا عن عالم الصورة المقدارية فليس لها الارتقاء إلى عالم المفارقات العقلية.

و أيضا فإننا لا نقول بأن إدراك الجزئيات يجب أن يكون بقوة مجردة بل ندعي أن نفوسنا تدرك الجزئيات بذاتها ثم لما ثبت إدراكها للكليات و ثبت أن مدرك الكليات أمر مجرد فيحكم بأن قوة واحدة فينا مجردة تدرك الجزئيات و الكليات و أما في سائر الحيوانات فلم نجد فيها هذه الحجة فلا جرم بقي الأمر فيها مشكوكا فيه.

و الرابع أنا إذا أدركنا هذه الكرة فلا بد و أن يرتسم في المدرك صورة الكرة

و من المحال أن يرسم صورة الكرة فيما لا وضع له ولا حيز ولا يكون إليه إشارة. أقول في الجواب أن هذا الإشكال إنما يرد على مذهب من يكون الإدراك عنده بانطباع صورة المدرك في ذات المدرك وليس عندنا كذلك بل بقيام صورته بالمدرك والقيام لا يستلزم الحلول بل المثل فقط.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٣

و أما الجواب بأنكم وإن أنكرتم إدراك النفس للجزئيات فلا تنكرون إدراكها للكلية فإذا أدركت الكرة الكلية فلا بد أن يرسم فيها صورة الكرة فيعود الإشكال الذي ذكرتم بأن ما لا وضع له كيف ينطبع فيه ذو وضع. فباطل لأنك قد علمت في مباحث الوجود الذهني أن المعقول من الكرة يحمل عليه الكرة بالحمل الأولي لا بالحمل المتعارف وأن مثل هذه الأشياء إذا حصلت صورها عند العقل يصدق عليها نقائضها فالكرة العقلية الكلية ليس كرة ولا ذات مقدار بخلاف صورة جزئية خيالية منها فإنها كرة ذات مقدار شخصي لكن ليس لها وضع في جهات هذا العالم - و قد مر هذا في مباحث مقولة الوضع.

و أما الوجوه الخاصة

فقد احتجوا على أن الإدراكات الظاهرة جسمانية بأن قالوا - لو كان المدرك للمحسوسات هو النفس وجب أن لا يتوقف إحساسنا على حضورها و كان يجب أن يكون إدراكها للقريب و البعيد و الحاضر و الغائب واحدا لأن النفس جوهر غير جسماني فيمتنع أن يكون لها قرب و بعد من الأجسام. لا يقال إنما تدرك هذه المحسوسات بمعاونة هذه الآلات التي يصح عليها القرب و البعد. لأننا نقول العين إذا لم يكن فيها قوة باصرة لم يكن القرب و البعد بالنسبة إلى الرائي - بل بالنسبة إلى غيره فيكون ذلك مثل حضور المرئي عند زيد فإنه لا يكفي ذلك في حصول الإبصار لعمرو. و الجواب أن النفس وإن كانت هي المدركة للمحسوسات لكن إدراكها لها موقوف على شرائط - منها كون الآلة سليمة و المحسوس حاضرا عند الآلة على نسبة مخصوصة و إذا كان إدراكها للمبصرات موقوفا على حضورها عند هذه الآلات لا جرم اختلف الحال بالغيبة و الحضور و البعد و القرب.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٤

أقول التحقيق أن النفس ذات نشئات ثلاثة عقلية و خيالية و حسية و لها اتحاد بالعقل و الخيال و الحس فالنفس عند إدراكها للمحسوسات تصير عين الحواس - و الحس آلة وضعية تأثرها بمشاركة الوضع فعند الإحساس يحصل أمران تأثر الحاسة و إدراك النفس و الحاجة إلى الحضور الوضعي إنما يكون من حيث التأثر الحسي و هو الانفعال لا من حيث الإدراك النفساني و هو حصول الصورة

و احتجوا أيضا على أن التخيل بقوة جسمانية بحجج ثلاث

أولها و هي أقوى الأدلة المذكورة في هذا الباب

أننا إذا تخيلنا مربعا مجنحا - بمربعين متساويين لكل منهما جهة معينة فلا شك في تميز كل من المربعين الطرفين عن الآخر في الخيال فذلك الامتياز إما لذاتهما أو لوازم ذاتهما أو لأمر غير لازم و القسمان الأولان باطلان لأن المربعين

الطرفين متساويان في الماهية.

و أما القسم الثالث فغير اللازم المميز إما أن يتوقف حصوله لأحدهما على فرض فارض و اعتبار معتبر و هذا باطل.
أما أولا فلأننا لا نحتاج في تخيل أحد المربعين يمينا و الآخر شمالا إلى فرض اختصاصه بعارض و إلا لكان يمكننا أن
نعمل بالمربع الأيمن عملا ليصير بعينه المربع الأيسر و ذلك ظاهر الفساد.
و أما ثانيا فلأن الفارض لا يمكنه أن يخصصه بذلك العارض إلا بعد امتيازته عن غيره فلو كان امتيازته عن غيره بسبب
ذلك العروض يلزم الدور و إما أن لا يتوقف ذلك الاختصاص على فرض فارض فوجب أن يكون ذلك بسبب الحامل و
ذلك إما أن يكون هو الحامل الأول أي المادة الخارجية أو الحامل الثاني و هو الذهن و الأول باطل.
أما أولا فلأن كثيرا ما يتخيل ما ليس له في الخارج وجود مع أنه لا يمكن حصول النسبة إلى العدم الصرف.
و أما ثانيا فلأنه لو كان محل المربعين الخياليين واحدا لم يكن انتساب أحدهما - إلى أحد المربعين الخارجيين أولى من
انتسابه إلى الآخر فإذن هذا الامتياز بسبب القابل الثاني و هو الذهن فإن محل أحد المربعين غير محل المربع الآخر و إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٥

لامتنع أن يختص أحدهما بعارض مميز دون الآخر و هذا لا يعقل إلا إذا كان محل التخيلات جسما.
فإن قيل أليس يمكننا أن نعقل مربعا كليا و نقرن به كونه يمينا أو يسارا - و يتميز في العقل حينئذ بين المربع الأيمن و
المربع الأيسر.
فنقول المربع الكلي أمر يقرن به العقل حد التيامن و التياسر فيكون ذلك بفرضه حتى أنه يتمكن من تغيير ذلك الفرض و
أما في التخيل فالامتياز غير حاصل بالفرض لأن المربع المعين الذي على الأيمن لا يمكننا أن نفرض عارضا حتى يغير
هو في نفسه في الخيال مربعا أيسر فظهر الفرق.

و ثانيها أن الصور الخيالية مع تساويها في النوع قد يتفاوت في المقدار

فيكون البعض أصغر و البعض أكبر و ذلك التفاوت إما للمأخوذ منه أو للأخذ و الأول باطل لأننا قد نتخيل ما ليس
بموجود في الخارج فنعين الثاني و هو أن الصورة تارة يرتسم في جزء أكبر و تارة في جزء أصغر.

و ثالثها أنه ليس يمكننا أن نتخيل السواد و البياض في شبح خيالي واحد

و يمكننا ذلك في جزءين و لو كان ذلك الجزآن لا يتميزان في الوضع لكان لا فرق بين المعتذر و الممكن فإذن الجزآن
متميزان في الوضع.

و الجواب عن الحجة الأولى بوجهين النقض و الحل - أما الأول فأننا نتخيل الأمور العظيمة فإذا انطبع في الروح الخيالي
من الصورة الخيالية ما يساويه فالذي يفضل عليه إما أن ينطبع في الروح الخيالي أو لا ينطبع - فإن لم ينطبع فيه فقد بطل
قولهم إن التخيل لأجل هذا الانطباع فإن انطبع فيه فقد انطبع فيه ما يساويه و انطبع فيه ما يفضل عليه و يكون محل ما
يساويه و محل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٦

ما يفضل عليه شيئا واحدا مع أننا نميز بين القدر المساوي و القدر الفاضل و ذلك يدل على أن الصورتين الخياليتين و إن

حصلا لشيء واحد فإنه يمكننا أن نميز بينهما- وإذا كان كذلك فلا يلزم من حصول صورتَي المربعين الطرفين في النفس أن لا يميز في الخيال أحدهما عن الآخر وعلى الجملة فالإنسان ربما طاف العالم و شاهد البلدان- و يكون مع ذلك حافظا للمجلدات فإن كان صورة كل من تلك الأمور في جزء من الدماغ متميزا عن الجزء الذي لم يرتسم فيه صورة الشيء الآخر فمن المعلوم أن القدر القليل منه لا يفي بذلك وإن لم يجب أن يكون لكل صورة خيالية محل على حدة بل يجوز أن يكون في محل واحد صور كثيرة و مع ذلك يكون البعض متميزا عن البعض- فحينئذ لا يلزم من ارتسام جميع الصور في النفس أن لا يتميز بعضها عن البعض.

و أما وجه الحل فهو أن تلك الصور ليست مما كانت النفس قابلة لها بل النفس فاعلة و هوية كل من المربعين بأمر لازم لهويته المجعولة للنفس و ليست هوية المربع الخيالي كهوية المربع الخارجي حتى يكون لها مادة جسمانية قابلة للتشكلات المختلفة لأجل أسباب خارجة بل هي أمر بسيط صوري لا مادة له وإنما المخصص لهويته من جهة الفاعل المتخيل حتى أن الوهم إذا توهم القسمة و الانفكاك في مقدار موجود في الوهم إلى قسمين لم يلزم منه وجود مادة مشتركة بين ذلك المقدار و بين ذينك القسمين كما يلزم في التقسيم الخارجي لأن ذينك القسمين يحصلان بمجرد إنشاء الوهم من غير أن يكونا من سنخ ذلك المقدار الأول فجميع ما يتصوره الخيال أو الوهم بتوسطه و يوجد في الذهن من قبيل الإنشاء و الإبداع من الجهات الفاعلية دون التكوين و التخليق من المخصصات القابلة و هي كصدور الأفلاك من المبادي العالية من حيث إن منشأ صدورهما و تخصيصهما تصورات تلك المبادي و الفرق أن تصورات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٧

المبادي من لوازم ذاتها و غير مأخوذة من سبب خارجي و أما هاهنا فليس كذلك بل للمحسوسات الخارجة أثر في إنشاء هذه الصور في عالم الخيال بالإعداد و التخصيص- فنقول إذا أدرك الحس صورا خارجية كمربع مجنح بمربعين على نسبة مخصوصة مثلا في الخارج و ذلك الشكل و هو لا يكون موجودا في الخارج إلا بعوارض مفارقة خارجية مادية زائدة على ماهية المربع جعللا و وجودا لكونه موجودا في مادة قابلة للانقسام فللخيال أن يفعل بإزائها صورا مثلها أو مخالفة لها جعللا واحدا بسيطا و إن كان على الوجه المعهود من الخارج في الجهات و الأوضاع و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون الخيال ذا جهة و وضع إذ صورة الجهة و الوضع لا يلزم أن يكون ذات وضع و جهة.

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول قول المعترض إن تخصص هذا المربع الخيالي ليس بفرض فاض و اعتبار معتبر. قلنا لا نسلم بل تخصصه بمجرد اعتبار المعتبر و تصوره و جعله جعللا بسيطا قوله و إلا لا يمكننا أن نعمل بالمربع الأيمن عملا به يصير المربع الأيمن الأيسر قلنا تخصص الفاعل للأمر الصوري الذي لا مادة له ليس إلا جعل هويته الصورية لا إفادة صفة أو عرض على مادة و ليس في المربع الخيالي إلا صورة المربع الخاص بعينه الحاصل من الجاعل النفساني اختراعا بسيطا.

و بالجملة إذا أرادت النفس أن يجعل هذا المربع الخيالي مربعا آخرا و هذا المقدار مقدارا آخرا و أرادت تقسيم مقدار بعينه إلى قسمين لا يمكن لها ذلك إذ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٨

ليس لتلك الأمور تركيب من مادة قابلة و صورة غيرها حتى يكون هناك مجعول و مجعول إليه بل كل واحد من تلك الأمور صورة فقط بلا مادة قابلة و تلك الصور عين تصور النفس و مشيتها و إرادتها فإذا انقسم مقدار خيالي إلى قسمين كان ذلك في الحقيقة إنشاءً هما ابتداء لا من شيء سواء عدم المقدار الأول أو لا و إذا عدم فلم يعد إلى شيء ليلزم وجود مادة قابلة هناك و يحتاج إلى مخصص من خارج كما هو شأن الخارجيات المادية أما الجواب عن الحجة الثانية و هي أن الصور الخيالية فقد يتفاوت في المقدار مع اتحادها في النوع فنقول هذا التفاوت ليس للمأخوذ منه و لا للأخذ بأن يكون مادة قابلة لها بل حاصل للمأخوذ بفعل الأخذ و إنشائه دون قبوله و اتصافه.

و أما عن الحجة الثالثة فنقول إنا لا ننكر تغاير الأشباح و تعدد مقاديرها و اختلافها في الإشارة الخيالية لكن لا يلزم من ذلك كون النفس جوهرًا ماديًا أو كونها غير مدركة للجزئيات و الخيالات.

و اعلم أن الامتياز في الإشارة الخيالية لا يوجب كون الصور المقدارية - الموجودة في عالم الخيال و المثال ذوات أوضاع حسية موجودة في جهة من جهات هذا العالم المادي المستحيل المتجدد الزماني ليلزم المنافاة بين تجرد النفس و تصورهما للصور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٣٩

المقدارية و الأشباح المثالية و سيأتي تحقيق هذه المسألة في مباحث المعاد و حشر الأجساد.

و احتجوا على أن الوهم قوة جسمانية

بأنه لما ثبت كون الخيال جسمانيًا و جب أن يكون الوهم الذي لا يدرك إلا ما يكون متعلقًا بصورة جسمانية كذلك.

و توضيحه أن مدرك الوهم إما أن يكون الصداقة المطلقة أو صداقة هذا الشخص - أما الأول فباطل لأنه أمر كلي إدراكه بالعقل و كلامنا في الإدراكات الجزئية - فيبقى الثاني لكن المدرك لصداقة هذا الشخص و جب أن يكون مدركًا لهذا الشخص - لأن إدراك المركب أو التصديق بثبوت أحدهما للآخر لا يمكن إلا بتصور الطرفين - فإذا كان الوهم مدركًا لهذه الصورة الشخصية لكن قد ثبت أن مدرك الصورة الجزئية قوة جسمانية فالوهم إذا جسماني.

و الجواب عن هذه الحجة أنا قد بينا أن مدرك الصور الخيالية الجزئية غير قوة بدنية و لا مادية فالوهم أولى بكونه غير مادي.

و التحقيق أن وجود الوهم كوجود مدركاته أمر غير مستقل الذات و الهوية - و نسبة مدركاته إلى مدركات العقل كنسبة الحصة من النوع إلى الطبيعة الكلية النوعية - فإن الحصة طبيعة مقيدة بقيد شخصي على أن يكون القيد خارجًا عنها و الإضافة إليه داخلًا فيها على أنها إضافة لا على أنها مضاف إليه و على أنها نسبة و تقييد لا على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٠

أنها ضمنية و قيد فالعداوة المطلقة يدركها العقل الخالص و العداوة المنسوبة إلى الصورة الشخصية يدركها العقل المتعلق بالخيال و العداوة المنظمة إلى الصورة الشخصية يدركها العقل المشوب بالخيال فالعقل الخالص مجرد عن الكونين ذاتا و فعلا و الوهم مجرد عن هذا العالم ذاتا و تعلقا و عن الصورة الخيالية ذاتا لا تعلقا و الخيال مجرد عن هذا العالم ذاتا لا تعلقا و نسبة الإرادة أي القوة الإجماعية إلى الشهوية الحيوانية في باب التحريك كنسبة الوهم إلى الخيال

في باب الإدراك و كل واحدة منهما عندنا قوة مجردة عن المادة لكن لم نجد في كلام أحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤١

ما يدل على أن المحركة الشوقية جسمانية و التي لا خلاف لأحد و لا شبهة في كونها جسمانية هي المحركة الفاعلة القريبة لا الباعثة و هي المسماة بالقدرة لأنها عبارة عن قوة قائمة بالأعصاب و العضلات المميلة لها بالقبض و البسط و الجذب و الدفع - و كذا حكم الطبيعة المحركة للأجسام البسيطة و المركبة بالمباشرة بحركاتها الطبيعية و القسرية النفسانية لأن القسرية راجعة إلى الطبيعة و النفسانية أيضا لا يمكن إلا باستخدام الطبيعة و الله ولي الجود و الحكمة

فصل (٦) في تعدد مذاهب القدماء في أمر النفس ذكرها الشيخ في الشفاء و نقضها و نحن نحمل كلامهم على الرموز و ناولها تاويلات حسية بقدر ما يمكن إن شاء الله تعالى
قال قد اختلف أقوالهم في ذلك لاختلاف المسالك إليه.

فمنهم من سلك إلى علم النفس من جهة الحركة.

و منهم من سلك إليه من جهة الإدراك.

و منهم من جمع المسلكين.

و منهم من سلك طريق الحياة غير مفصلة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٢

فمن سلك منهم طريق الحركة فقد كان يخيل عنده أن التحريك لا يصدر إلا عن متحرك و أن المحرك الأول يكون لا محالة متحركا بذاته و كانت النفس محركة أولية إليها يتراعى التحريك من الأعضاء بالعضل و الأعصاب فجعل النفس متحركة بذاتها و جعل لذلك جوهرها غير مايت معتقدا أن ما يتحرك لذاته لا يجوز أن يموت - قال و لذلك الأجسام السماوية ليست تفسد و السبب فيه دوام حركتها.

فمنهم من منع أن يكون النفس جسما فجعلها جوهرها غير جسم محركا لذاته - و منهم من جعلها جسما و طلب الجسم المتحرك لذاته.

و منهم من جعلها ما كان من الأجرام التي لا تتجزى كريا ليسهل دوام حركته و زعم أن الحيوان يستنشق ذلك بالتنفس و أن النفس غذاء النفس يستبقي النفس بإدخال بدل ما يخرج من ذلك الجنس من الهباء التي هي الأجرام التي لا تتجزى التي هي المبادي و أنها متحركة بذاتها كما ترى من حركة الهباء دائما في الجو - و لذلك صلحت لأن يحرك غيرها.

و منهم من قال إنها ليست هي النفس بل إن محركها هو النفس و هي فيها و تدخل البدن بدخولها.

و منهم من جعل النفس نارا و رأى أن النار دائم الحركة.

و أما من سلك طريق الإدراك فمنهم من رأى أن الشيء إنما يدرك ما سواه لأنه متقدم عليه و مبدأ له فوجب أن يكون النفس مبدأ فجعلها من الجنس الذي كان يراه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٣

مبدأ إما نارا أو هواء أو أرضا أو ماء و مال بعضهم إلى القول بالماء لشدة رطوبة النطفة التي هي مبدأ الأشياء و بعضهم جعلها جسما بخاريا إذ كان يرى البخار مبدأ الأشياء و كل هؤلاء كان يقول إن النفس إنما تعرف الأشياء كلها لأنها من جوهر المبدأ لجميعها و كذلك من رأى أن المبادي هي الأعداد جعل النفس عددا. و منهم من رأى أن الشيء إنما يدرك ما هو شبيهه و أن المدرك بالفعل شبيه للمدرك بالفعل فجعل النفس مركبا من الأشياء التي يراها عناصر و هذا هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٤

قول انبادقلس فإنه جعل النفس مركبة من العناصر الأربعة و من الغلبة و المحبة - و قال إنما يدرك النفس كل شيء يشبهه فيها و أما الذين جمعوا الأمرين فكالذين قالوا - إن النفس عدد محرك لذاته فهي عدد لأنها مدركة و هي محرك لذاتها لأنها محرك أولية و أما الذين اعتبروا أمر الحياة غير مفصلة. فمنهم من قال إن النفس حرارة غريزية لأن الحياة بها. و منهم من قال بل برودة و إن النفس مشتق من النفس و النفس هو الشيء المبرد و لهذا ما يتبرد بالاستنشاق ليحفظ جوهر النفس.

و منهم من قال بل النفس هو الدم لأنه إذا سفح الدم بطلت الحياة. و منهم من قال بل النفس مزاج لأن المزاج ما دام ثابتا لم يتغير صحت الحياة. و منهم من قال بل النفس تأليف و نسبة بين العناصر و ذلك لأننا نعلم أن تأليفا ما يحتاج إليه حتى يكون من العناصر حيوان و لأن النفس تأليف فلذلك يميل إلى المؤلفات من النعم و الأرييح و الطعوم و يلتذ بها. و من الناس من ظن أن النفس هو الإله تعالى عما يقول الظالمون علوا كبيرا - و أنه يكون في كل شيء بحسبه فيكون في شيء طبعاً و في شيء نفساً و في شيء عقلاً سبحانه تعالى عما يشركون قال و هذه هي المذاهب المنسوبة إلى القدماء و الأقدمين في أمر النفس و كلها باطل ثم شرع في نقض ما قالوه و إبطالها و تزييفها.

أقول نقض ظواهر هذه الأقوال و إبطالها في غاية السهولة

بعد أن ثبت أن النفس جوهر مفارق الذات عن الأجسام و كل من له أدنى بضاعة في الحكمة يعلم أن النفس جوهر شريف ليس من نوع الأجسام الدنية كالنار و الهواء و الماء و الأرض و لا من باب النسب و التأليفات كيف يذهب على الحكماء السابقين كانبادقلس و غيره أن يجهلوا ما يعلمه من له أدنى معرفة في علم النفس و أحوالها فإذن التأويل و التعديل لكلامهم أولى من النقض و الجرح. فنقول و من الله الاستعانة -

أما قولهم إن النفس متحركة لكونها محركة أولية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٥

فكلام صحيح مبرهن عليه و لا يلزم منه كون النفس جرما من الأجرام أما حركاتها في ذاتها بحسب الشدة فقد ثبت بيانها بالبرهان و تقدم ذكرها تصريحاً و تلميحاً من أن لها تطورات جوهرية و تحولات ذاتية من حد الإحساس إلى

حد التعقل فتارة تتحد بالحس وذلك في أوائل حدوثها و تكونها و طورا تبلغ إلى حد التخيل فتتحد بالخيال و إذا بلغ إلى مقام تحضر عندها المعقولات مشاهدة تصير عقلا مفارقا متبري الذات عن الأجرام و الجرميات و ما أسخف القول بأن النفس عند كونها صورة الطفل بل الجنين إلى حد كونها عقلا بالفعل مستحضرة للمعقولات مجاورة للملا الأعلى عند المقربين جوهر واحد بلا تفاوت في ذاته إنما التفاوت في إضافاته و أعراضه اللاحقة حتى أن النفس البلة و الصبيان و نفوس الأنبياء مع متحدة بالحقيقة و الماهية و إنما الاختلاف و التفاضل بينهم بضمائم خارجة بعضها من باب السلوب و الإضافات و بعضها من باب الانفعالات- و بعضها من باب الكيفيات فإذا كان كذلك كان فضيلة أفراد الإنسان بعضها على بعض بشيء خارج عن الإنسانية فإذا الفضيلة بالذات لذلك الشيء لا للإنسان- فإذا قيل النبي ص أشرف أفراد الإنسان كان معناه أن شيئا خارجا من حقيقته و حقيقة أمته كالعلم و القدرة هو أشرف منهم فلا فضيلة له في ذاته من حيث هويته و ماهيته على سائر الأفراد و هذا قبيح فاسد عندنا فإن جوهر نفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٦

النبي ص بحسب هويته التامة أشرف جواهر النفوس الآدمية و أشدها قوة و كمالا- و أنورها و أقواها تجوهرها و ذاتا و هوية بل ذاته بذاته بحيث بلغت إلى غاية مرتبة كل نفس و عقل

كما قال: لي مع الله وقت لا يسعني فيه ملك مقرب و لا نبي مرسل

و إن كان مماثلا لها في الماهية الإنسانية من حيث وجوده الطبيعي البشري كما في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٧

قوله تعالى **إِنَّمَا أَنَا بَشَرٌ مِّثْلُكُمْ** فظهر أن للنفس الإنسانية تطورات و شئون ذاتية و استكمالات جوهرية و هي دائمة التحول من حال إلى حال و من راجع إلى ذاته- يجد أن له في كل وقت و آن شأنا من الشئون المتجددة.

و أما قولهم إن المحرك الأول يكون لا محالة متحركا بذاته

فهو أيضا صحيح لأن مرادهم من المحرك الأول هو الفاعل المباشر للتحرير و هو إما الطبيعة أو النفس فيما له نفس و قد مر بيان هذا المطلب في مباحث القوة و مباحث الحركة أي بيان أن العلة القريبة للحركة الطبيعية العرضية كالكمية و الكيفية و الأينية و الوضعية لا بد أن تكون جوهرها متبدل الهوية و الوجود و إن كانت ثابت الماهية و المراد من الحركة الطبيعية في قولنا هذا ما يشمل الحركة النفسانية الوضعية التي في الأفلاك لأنها أيضا صادرة من طبيعة الفلك التي هي نفسه باعتبار أن لها الإدراك و الإرادة و الحركة النفسانية الكمية التي في النبات و الحيوان لأن هذه الحركات طبيعية بوجه و نفسانية أيضا.

و بالجملة فما من حركة ذاتية إلا و مباشرها طبيعة سارية في الجسم و هذه الطبيعة قد ثبت تجددتها و تبدلها بحسب الهوية الوجودية كما علمت بالبرهان و لا ينفك جسم طبيعي من هذا الجوهر إلا أن هذا الجوهر في الفلك و الحيوان و النبات لا ينفك عن النفس بمعنى أن النفس كمال هذا الجوهر و تمامه لا أن الطبيعة في ما له نفس شيء له وجود و النفس فيه جوهر آخر له وجود آخر حتى يكون في شخص واحد جوهران متباينان في الوجود أحدهما طبيعة و الآخر نفس فإن ذلك ممتنع جدا بل كل شخص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٨

طبيعي له ذات واحدة و صورة واحدة و هي وجوده و بها هويته و شخصيته فمن حيث كونها مبدأ الحركات و الانفعالات المادية طبيعة و من حيث إدراكها و تدبيرها نفس.

و أيضا قد علمت في الفصل السابق أن النفس التي فينا هي بعينها مبدأ الحس و الحركة و التخيل و الوهم و التعقل كل ذلك بالبرهان فقد ثبت و تحقق حقيقة كلام الأقدمين أن المحرك الأول للحركات الذاتية أمر متحرك لذاته يعني بهويته و وجوده- و أن النفس هي المحركة الأولية فيما له نفس إليها يتراعى التحريك من الأعضاء بالعضل و الأعصاب و ذلك من حيث كونها عين الطبيعة المتجددة الهوية لذاتها و بها يقع جميع الحركات و الاستحالات حتى القسرية و الاتفاقية و الإرادية لما مر أن مرجعها إلى الطبيعة و النفس

و أما قولهم إن ما يتحرك لذاته فهو لا يموت

فكلام حق لأن مرادهم منه أن ما ينبعث حركته من ذاته و مقوم صورته لا من غير لا يموت فالأجسام بما هي أجسام مائة لأن مبدأ حركاتها أمر خارج عن جسيميتها أعني الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو مادة- و كل ما ينبعث الحركة من ذاته فهو لا محالة متوجه إلى الكمال الذاتي الجوهرى- و كل ما يتوجه نحو الكمال بحسب الفطرة الأولى فهو لا يموت بل يتحول من نشأة إلى نشأة أخرى و من دار إلى دار أعلى و الحركة المنبعثة عن الذات ليست

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٤٩

إلا نفسانية و أما هذه الحركات الطبيعية التي للبسائط العنصرية من مكان إلى مكان- فليست منبعثة عن ذات المحرك إذ شرط انبعاثها عن الطبيعة خروجها عن أحيائها الطبيعية- فهي بسبب أمر خارج عن ذات المتحرك و أما حركات المركبات المعدنية و النباتية فهي أيضا مفتقرة في انبعاثها إلى أمور خارجة كحرارة طابخة أو برودة جماعة أو رطوبة مسهلة- لقبول الأشكال و التحولات و غير ذلك و أما الحركة الذاتية التي في الطبيعة فهي و إن كانت منبعثة عن الذات لكن الطبائع العنصرية البسيطة لتضادها متفاسدة غير باقية بالعدد- و أما جواهر النفوس الحيوانية و طبائع الأجرام الفلكية التي هي عين نفوسها فهي حية ب حياة ذاتية لأنها دائمة التشوق إلى منزل البقاء و حركتها إلى الكمال أمر ذاتي لها و تلك النفوس إن كانت عقلية كالنفوس الفلكية و الكاملين في العلم من النفوس الإنسانية فلها حشر إلى الله تعالى في دار المفارقات العقلية و إن لم تكن عقلية بل وهمية أو خيالية فلها أيضا حشر إلى عالم النفوس على طبقاتها في الشرف و الدنو و السعادة و الشقاوة فإن الشقاوة في المعاد لا ينافي الاستكمال في الوجود النفساني بحسب الجربة الشيطانية أو الشهوة البهيمية أو الغلبة السبعية فإنها كمالات لسائر النفوس و رذائل للنفس الإنسانية.

و أما من جعل النفس جسما

أراد بالنفس النفس الخيالية الحيوانية و لم يرد بالجسم هذه الأجسام الطبيعية الواقعة تحت الحركات و الانفعالات بل شبها برزخيا صوريا أخرويا له أعضاء حيوانية و تلك النفس صورة حيوانية حية بذاتها ليست حياتها بأمر عارض عليها كهذه الأجسام و بوساطتها يتصرف النفس الناطقة في هذا البدن الطبيعي و يدرك الجزئيات و الحسيات كما اتفق عليه جميع السلاك و المكاشفين و ذلك الجسم هو الصورة التي يراها الإنسان في المنام حيث يجد نفسه مشكلا مصورا

بجوارح وأعضاء وإنه يرى شخصه في المنام يدرك إدراكات جزئية ويعمل أعمالاً حيوانية - فيسمع بأذنه و يرى بعينه و يشم بأنفه و يذوق بلسانه و يلمس ببشرته و يبطش بيده و يمشي برجليه و هذه كلها أعضاء روحانية غير هذه الأعضاء الطبيعية.

و أما قول من قال إنها هي من الأجرام التي لا تتجزى
فأراد بها الأجرام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٠

المثالية التي لا مادة لها و قد مر بيان أنها لا تقبل القسمة الوهمية فضلا عن الخارجية إذ لا مادة لها فقسمتها بالوهم يرجع إلى إيجاد الوهم فردين آخرين منها ابتداء لا يجعل جسم معين جسمين و كذا وصل الجسمين الخياليين جسما واحدا عبارة عن إيجاد جسم آخر من كتم العدم.

و أما نسبة الكروية إلى النفس

فلأنها أبسط الأشكال و لهذا كانت الأفلاك كرية فالنفس إذا تصورت و تشكلت و وقعت في عالم الطبيعة كانت كرة كالأفلاك لكونها أسهل حركة كما قالوا إذ بالحركة يخرج كمالات النفوس من القوة إلى الفعل ثم التركيب الاتحادي بين النفس و البدن ثابت عندنا كما ذهب إليه أيضا بعض المتأخرين - فاتصاف النفس بصفات الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو جنس متحقق لكونها مبدأ فصله و تمام ذاته و إن لم يتصف بما هو مادة و هي صورة و معلوم أن اعتبار الجنس و الفصل غير اعتبار المادة و الصورة و في الاعتبار الأول كما يتصف الأجسام بصفات النفوس كذا يتصف النفوس بصفات الأجسام و لذلك تشير إلى نفسك بأنني كاتب جالس فكون النفس الفلكية كرة من هذا القبيل.

و أما قولهم إن الحيوان يستنشق النفس بالنفس

فالمراد أن في الحيوان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥١

روحا بخاريا من قبيل الأجرام الفلكية في الصفا و اللطافة و هو خليفة النفس في البدن الطبيعي و بالنفس يبقى اعتداله و يتغذى بالهواء المعتدل جوهره و لما كان هذا الجوهر - حاملا لقوة الحس و الحركة النفسانية و مفاضاً من النفس على الدوام في هذا البدن الطبيعي فاطلقوا عليه اسم النفس و قد ذكره الشيخ في بعض رسائله بلغة الفرس بهذه العبارة روح بخارى را جان گویند و نفس ناطقه را روان.

و أما من قال إنها ليست هي النفس

بل إن محركها هو النفس و هي فيها و تدخل البدن بدخولها فكلام حق لا غبار عليه و يرجع إلى ما أولنا به الكلام السابق عليه فيتوافقان من غير تناقض.

و أما من قال إن النفس نار

و إن هذه النار دائمة الحركة فلم يرد بها هذه النار الأسطوقسية بل في الوجود نار أخرى هي حرارة جوهرية يتصرف في الأجسام بالإحالة و التحليل و هي الطبيعة و فوقها نار النفس الأمارة بالشهوة و الغضب و هي التي تطلع على الأفئدة كما

أشير إليها في الكتاب الإلهي وإذا كسرت سورتها بفعل الطاعات و الرياضات صارت النار نورا و النفس الأمانة مطمئنة.

و أما السالكون مسلك الإدراك

فقولهم إن الشيء إنما يدرك ما سواه لأنه متقدم عليه في غاية القوة و الاستقامة فإن المعلوم بالذات هو الصورة الحاضرة عند المدرك و قد علمت أن إدراك الشيء هو وجوده للمدرك و وجود شيء لشيء لا يكون إلا بعلاقة ذاتية بينهما و ليست العلاقة الذاتية إلا العلية و المعلولية و لكن نسبة الصورة المدركة إلى الذات العالمية نسبة المجهول إلى الجاعل لا نسبة الحلول و الانطباع كما علمت ذلك في مباحث الوجود الذهني و في مباحث الإبصار و غيرهما.

و أما جعل بعضهم النفس من الجنس

الذي كان يراه المبدأ إما نارا أو هواء أو أرضا أو ماء فلعله أراد من المبدأ المبدأ القريب لتدبير الأجسام و تصريفها فمن جعلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٢

نارا أراد بها ما مر ذكره - و من جعلها هواء فلعله أراد به الشوق و المحبة فإن النفس عين المحبة ثم التعبير عن المبدأ الأول بالعشق مما شاع في كلام العرفاء و للناس فيما يعشقون مذاهب و من جعلها ماء فأراد به عين ماء الحياة الذي به حياة كل شيء ذي نفس - كما قال تعالى **وَجَعَلْنَا مِنَ الْمَاءِ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ حَيٍّ** و النفس حياة الجسم كما أن العقل حياة النفس و لهذا عبر بعض الأوائل عن العقل الكل بالعنصر الأول و جعله ماء و ربما كان المراد بالعنصر الأول الوجود الفائض منه تعالى على الموجودات كلها على الترتيب - و من سماها أرضا فلكونها في ذاتها قابلة للعلوم و الصور الإدراكية الفائضة عليها من سماء العقل فالنفس القابلة للصور العلمية أرض الحقائق في مرتبة كونها عقلا هيولانيا - فيفاض عليها المعارف العلمية النازلة من سماوات العقول الفعالة كما تنزل الأمطار التي بها يحيى الأرض بعد موتها و قد ورد في الحديث

:إن القلوب يحيى بالعلم كما يحيى الأرض بوابل السماء

. و من رأى أن المبادي هي الأعداد

و جعل النفس عددا أراد من العدد كما أراد أصحاب فيثاغورث و تأويل كلامهم أن المبدأ الأول واحد حقيقي و هو مبدأ الأشياء كما أن الواحد العددي مبدأ الأعداد لكن المبدئية و الثانوية و الثالثة و العشرية في هذه الأعداد الجسمانية الكمية ليست ذاتية لهذه الوحدات فكل ما صار أولا يمكن له أن يصير ثانيا و الثاني منها يجوز أن يكون أولا بخلاف المبدأ الأول تعالى فمبدئيته و أوليته عين ذاته و كذا ثانوية العقل الأول عين ذاته لا يتبدل و كذا مرتبة النفوس بعد مرتبة العقول فإطلاق العدد على المبادي العقلية و النفسية من جهة ترتيبها في الوجود ترتيبا لا يمكن تبدله فالعددية فيها ذاتية و في غيرها عرضية فهي الأعداد بالحقيقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٣

كما أن الوحدة و الأولية ذاتية للحق الأول و فيما سواه إضافية فهو الواحد الحق - و ما سواه زوج تركيبى.

و أما من رأى منهم أن الشيء إنما يدرك شبيهه

وأن المدرك بالفعل شبيه بالمدرك فقله حق و صواب و قد تكرر منا في هذا الكتاب أن المدرك دائما من جنس المدرك فاللمس يدرك الملموسات و هو من جنسه و كذا الذوق يدرك المذوقات و هو من جنسه و النور البصري يدرك المبصرات و الخيال يدرك المتخيلات و الوهم يدرك الوهميات و العقل للعقليات و بالجملة كل قوة إدراكية إذا تصور بصورة المدرك - يخرج ذاته من القوة إلى الفعل و لا شبهة في أن القوة القريبة و الاستعداد القريب من الشيء من جنس صورة ذلك الشيء و فعليته ثم إنك قد علمت بالبرهان القطعي - اتحاد العقل بالمعقولات و الحس بالمحسوسات و الاتحاد أشد من الشبه و علمت أن النفس إذا صارت عقلا تصير كل الأشياء و هي أيضا الآن تتحد بكل من الأشياء التي تستحضرها في ذاتها أعني صور تلك الأشياء لا أعيانها الخارجة عنها و لا يلزم من ذلك تركيب النفس من تلك الأمور الخارجية و لا من صورها أيضا بل كلما صارت النفس أكمل صارت أكثر جمعا للأشياء و أشد بساطة إذ البسيط الحقيقي كل الأشياء كما مر برهانه.

و أما قول الجامعين بين الأمرين الإدراك و الحركة فإذا صح تأويل الكلام في كل واحد منهما صح في المجموع.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٤

و أما المعتبرون أمر الحياة في سلوك معرفة النفس فمن قال إن النفس حرارة غريزية فالحرار الغريزي قد ثبت أنها جوهر سماوي منبعث في البدن عن النفس و تفعل النفس به الأفعال الطبيعية و النباتية و الحيوانية و هذا الجوهر الحر هو الروح الحيواني - و هو عندنا بسيط غير مركب من الأسطقسات و قد مر أنه خليفة النفس و متصل بها.

و من قال إنها برودة

فلعله تجوز بها عن كيفية حالها و علمها اليقيني أو راحة البدن بها و سلامته عن الآفات ما دامت النفس حافظة للمزاج.

و أما من قال إنها الدم

فالدّم لكونه مركب الروح البخاري و هو يجري في كل البدن و بتوسطه تسري الحياة في الأعضاء فاطلق اسم النفس عليه إما من باب الاشتراك أو التجوز و إطلاق النفس على الدم شائع في هذا الزمان أيضا.

و أما من قال إن النفس تأليف

أراد به المؤلف بالكسر لأنها يؤلف بين عناصر البدن و أجزاءها على نسبة و فقية فيها أحدية الجمع أو أراد به المؤلف بالفتح لأن جوهرها مؤلف من معان و صفات على نسبة معنوية شريفة نورية ينشأ منها النسبة الاعتدالية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٥

المزاجية في البدن و هذه كأنها ظل لها و حكاية عنها فإن جميع ما يوجد في العالم الأدنى الطبيعي من الصور و أشكالها و أحوالها توجد نظائرها في العالم الأعلى على وجه أشرف و أعلى.

و أما قول من قال إنها هو الإله

فلعله أراد به الفناء في التوحيد الذي نقل عن أكابر الصوفية لا المعنى الذي ادعاه الفراعنة و الملاحدة تعالى عما يقوله الملحدون.

و أما من قال إنه تعالى في كل شيء بحسبه

و يكون في شيء طبعاً و في شيء عقلاً فلست أصحح كلامه حذراً عن سوء الأدب لكنني أقول النفس الإنسانية في شيء طبع و في شيء حس و في شيء خيال و في شيء عقل فهي الجوهر العاقل المتخيل السميع البصير الشام الذائق اللامس الغازي النامي المولد و هي مع ذلك جوهر بسيط غير منقسم جعلها الله مثالا له ذاتا و صفة و خليفة له في هذا العالم ثم في العالم الأعلى و جعل معرفتها سببا لمعرفته تعالى فهذا ما تيسر لنا في تأويل رموزهم - و إظهار كنوزهم.

ثم إن في ما ذكره الشيخ في مناقضة كلامهم بعض مناقشات

و أبحاث نريد أن نشير إليها.

الأول في قوله أما الذين تعلقوا بالحركة

فأول ما يلزمهم من المحال أنهم نسبوا السكون إلى النفس فإن كان تحركها علة للتحريك فلم يخل تسكينها إما أن يصدر عنها و هي متحركة بحالها فيكون نسبة تحركها بذاتها إلى التحريك و التسكين واحدة إلى آخره فإننا نقول التحريك البدني الذي ينسب إلى تحريك النفس ليس المراد به هذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٦

التحريك المكاني الإرادي الذي ينبعث من النفس بواسطة دواع خارجية و أمور لاحقة - و أسباب معدة للحركة الإرادية من مكان إلى مكان جلبا للنفع أو الملائم و دفعا للضرر أو المولم إنما المراد بذلك التحريك ما يقع به حركات الاستحالية الطبيعية التي يقع بها التغذية و التنمية و النضج و الإحالة و غيرها مما لا يخلو بدن الحيوان عنها لحظة - و هي حركة الحياة و مقابلها سكون الموت عند انقطاع تعلق النفس عن البدن - ففاعلية النفس لهذه الحركة اللازمة للحياة الحيوانية ذاتية و أما فاعليتها للحركات الإرادية فهي أمر عرضي بمشاركة الأسباب الخارجية و نسبة هذه إلى تلك كنسبة الكتابة إلى تصوير الأعضاء و كنسبة طبخ الطعام في القدر إلى هضم الغذاء في المعدة - و بالجملة هذا التحريك لازم لا ينقطع من النفس ما دام البدن حيا و لا ينتهي إلى تسكين ما دامت النفس نفسا و البدن بدنا.

و الثاني في قوله فقد عرفت بما سلف أنه لا متحرك إلا من محرك

و أنه ليس شيء متحركا من ذاته.

أقول حق أن كل متحرك يحتاج إلى محرك غيره لكن قد مر أن كل ما يتحرك في مقولة من المقولات الأربع العرضية يحتاج إلى محرك يفيد لها الحركة - و كل ما يتحرك في مقولة الجوهر كالطبيعة المتجددة الوجود فيحتاج إلى جاعل يجعلها متحركاً و قد مر الفرق بين عوارض الوجود و عوارض الماهية و كذا بين اختلاف الجهتين في الخارج كما في القوة و الفعل و بين اختلافها بحسب التحليل الذهني كما في الوجود و الماهية و الحركة فيما يتحرك لذاته هي نحو وجوده و المحتاج في الوجود إلى الجاعل يحتاج إلى جاعل يفيد ذاته لا إلى جاعل يصفه بالوجود إذ الوجود ليس وصفا زائدا على الماهية خارجا بل ذهنا و على أي الوجهين فحاجة كل متحرك إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٧

محرك غيره ثابت و كذا انتهاء المتحركات إلى محرك غير متحرك.

الثالث أن قوله هذه الحركة لا يخلو إما أن يكون مكانية أو كمية أو كيفية

أو غير ذلك إلى آخره.

مدفوع بأن هذه الحركة خارجة عن الأقسام المذكورة لأنها حركة جوهرية اشتدادية و لم يقم برهان في نفى الاشتداد الجوهري و ما ذكره الشيخ في إبطاله قد مر بيان ضعفه و وهنه.

الرابع أن قوله و أما الحركة على سبيل الاستحالة

فإنما أن تكون حركة عن كونها نفسا فيكون إذا تحركت لا تكون نفسا و إما حركة في عرض من الأعراض - فأول ذلك أن لا يكون تحركها من نحو تحريكها إلى آخره.

أقول فيه إن الشيخ قد خلط في كل موضع أراد إبطال الاستحالة في الجوهر بين الوجود و الماهية و جعل الحركة الكونية عبارة عن خروج الشيء في كل أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٨

إلى ماهية أخرى بالفعل و ليس الأمر كذلك فإن الأشد و الأضعف و إن كانا متباينين في النوعية لكن تباينهما بالماهية عند ما كان الوجود حاصلًا لهما بالفعل و أما عند الحركة الاشتدادية للكل وجود واحد شخصي زمني له ماهية واحدة لها في كل أن مفروض حد من الوجود بالقوة القريبة من الفعل كما مر بيانه فالحركة في الأكوان الحيوانية مثلا لا يستلزم إلا خروج المتحرك من كون حيواني إلى كون آخر حيواني لا خروج الحيواني من الحيوانية إلى غيرها كالفلكية مثلا إذ كل ما يقبل الأشد و الأضعف يجوز فيه الاشتداد و التضعيف و مقولة الجوهر عندنا كمقولة الكيف في أنه يقبلهما فجاز لبعض أنواعه المتعلقة بالمواد حركات الاستحالة الجوهرية فكما أن الاشتداد لا يخرج السواد إلى غير السواد بل يخرج من نوع منه إلى نوع آخر أو من شخص فقط إلى شخص آخر إما بالقوة كما في أوساط الحركة أو بالفعل كما في انتهاء الحركة فكذا لا يخرج الجوهر إلى مقولة أخرى و لا إلى جنس آخر غير ما كان إلا في حركات كثيرة يؤدي بالمتحرك إلى غير جنسه كالسواد في تضعفه حتى يخرج من جنسه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٥٩

إلى غير جنسه و كالإنسان في استكمالاته نفسه حتى يصير ملكا من الملائكة أو في اعوجاجاته و تنقصاته حتى يصير شيطانا أو بهيمة ثم إن نفسية النفس و إن كانت إضافة وجودية لها إلى البدن فلا يلزم من حركتها على الإطلاق لا كونها نفسا.

و أما ما ذكر أن حركة النفس إذا كانت في عرض من الأعراض يلزم أن لا يكون تحركها من نحو تحريكها فلاحد أن يقول إنهم لم يدعوا إلا أن المحرك للشيء المنفعل القابل للحركة لا بد و أن يتحرك في ذاته و ذلك لا يستلزم أن يكون حركة المتحرك من نحو حركة المحرك و لم يدعه أحد و في كثير من الأشياء التي يحرك شيئا - بأن يتحرك نرى الأمر على خلاف ما ذكره فالتحريكات السماوية الصادرة من نفوسها في أجرامها وضعية و هي تابعة لحركاتها النفسانية الإرادية كما اعترف به الشيخ في التعليقات و غيرها فأي محال يلزم في أن يكون تحريكات من النفس في البدن بالإحالة و غيرها و هي تابعة لحركاتها الوجودية أو الإرادية.

الخامس أن قوله ثم من المحال ما قالوه من أن الشيء يجب أن يكون مبدأ حتى يعلم ما وراه

فإننا نعلم و ندرك بأنفسنا أشياء لسنا بمباد لها إلخ.

أقول فيه إن المراد من المعلوم هو الصورة الحاضرة عند المدرك القائمة المحفوظة بحفظه إياها و لا شك أن النفس مبدأ فاعلي للصور الموجودة في قواها و مداركها و أما الصور العقلية المدركة للنفس فإن النفس في الابتداء عند كونها عقلا هيولانيا مبدأ قابلي لها و إذا صارت متصلة بالعقل الفعال كانت فاعلة حافظة إياها و الشيخ قد ذكر في كتاب المبدأ و المعاد في فصل ذكر فيه أن العقل الهيولاني بالقوة عالم عقلي أن القوة العقلية تجرد الصورة عن المادة فتكون خالقة و فاعلة للصور المعقولة و قابلة لها معا و قال في فصل آخر منه إن القوة العقلية تعمل في المحسوس عملا تجعله معقولا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٠

الباب السادس في بيان تجرد النفس الناطقة الإنسانية تجردا تاما عقليا و كيفية حدوثها و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في أن النفس الناطقة ليست بجسم و لا مقدار و لا منطبعة في مقدار و فيه حجج

الأولى أن لها أن تدرك الكليات و الطبائع الكلية

من حيث عمومها و كليتها و الكلي بما هو كلي أي طبيعة عامة لا يمكن أن يحل جسما و لا أن ينطبع في طرف منقسم أو غير منقسم منه أما أنه لا يمكن أن يوجد في طرف غير منقسم منه - فلأن النقطة يمتنع أن يكون محلا لصورة عقلية فلأنها لا تخلو إما أن يكون لها تميز - عن الشيء الذي هي نهايته أو لا يكون فإن لم يكن امتنع حصول الصورة المعقولة فيها - دون المحل الذي هي طرفه بل كما أن النقطة طرف ذاتي له فكذلك إنما يجوز أن يحل فيها طرف شيء حال في ذلك المقدار و يكون كما أن الحال يتقدر بذلك المقدار بالعرض فكذلك تناهيه بطرفه بتناهي المحل بها بالعرض و إن كان لها تميز عن ذلك المقدار في الوجود فهو محال و إلا لكانت النقطة منقسمة كما بين في موضعه.

و اعترض هاهنا بأن عدم التميز في النقطة عن المحل و إن كان مسلما لكن لا نسلم أنه لا يحل فيها إلا نهاية ما يحل في ذلك المقدار فإن ما ذكرتم منقوض بالألوان - و الأضواء الحاصلة في السطوح دون الأعماق و كذا حال المماساة و الملافاة.

و الجواب أن السطح له اعتباران اعتبار أنه نهاية للجسم و اعتبار أنه مقدار منقسم في جهتين فقبوله الألوان و الأضواء و غيرهما من جهة أنه عبارة عن امتداد الجسم - لا من جهة أنه نهاية له.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦١

و أيضا لا بد في قابلية الشيء أن يكون للقابل استعداد خاص أو مزاج حتى يقبل كيفية أو صفة و ليس للنهاية بما هي نهاية اختلاف قوة أو حالة استعدادية في القابلية - فلو كان للنقطة مثلا إمكان أن يقبل صورة عقلية لكانت دائمة القبول لها لعدم تجدد حالة فيها فرضا فكان المقبول حاصلا فيها أبدا إذ المبدأ دائم الفيض فلا يتراخى فيضه إلا لعدم صلوح القابل و المفروض أن الصلوح و الاستعداد حاصل لها من حيث ذاتها فلزم من ذلك أن يكون جميع الأجسام ذوات النقطة عاقلة و وجب أن يكون العاقل عند موته عاقلا - لوجود قابل العاقلية فيه فالتالي باطل فالمقدم كذلك و أما أنه يمتنع أن تحل الصورة المعقولة من الجسم شيئا منقسما فهو أن كل مقدار منقسم أبدا و الحال في المنقسم منقسم - فيلزم أن يكون الصورة العقلية منقسمة أبدا لا يقف إلى حد ينتهي القسمة إليه

و ذلك [كون الصورة العقلية منقسمة أبدا] محال بوجوده
أحدها أنها لو انقسمت لكان انقسامها إلى جزئين متشابهين أو جزئين مختلفين
 و الأول محال.

أما أولا فلأن كل واحد من الجزئين يجب أن يكون مخالفا بوجه لكله لامتناع كون الكل مساويا لجزئه من جميع الوجوه و تلك المخالفة ليست بحسب الحقيقة و لوازمها- و إلا لم يكن الانقسام إلى جزئين متشابهين فإذن المخالفة بشيء من العوارض المادية مثل المقدار و الشكل فلا يكون الصورة المعقولة مجردة هذا خلف.

و أما ثانيا فلأن ذلك الانقسام إما أن يكون شرطا لكون الصورة معقولة أو لا يكون- فعلى الأول وجب أن يكون الجزآن متخالفين للكل لوجوب مباينة الكل للجزء.

و أيضا فقبل ورود القسمة وجب أن لا تكون معقولة لفقدان الشرط.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٢

و أيضا الشيء الذي هذا حاله يجب أن يكون منقسما و ليس كل معقول كذلك- و إن لم يكن ذلك الانقسام شرطا فيكون تلك الصورة العقلية عند فرض الانقسام مغشاة بعوارض غريبة من جمع و تفريق و يكون في أقل من ذلك المحل كفاية لماهية تلك الصورة- لأن جزء تلك الماهية مساوية لكلها في الماهية و محل الجزء جزء المحل فيكون كل الصورة ممكن الحلول في بعض محلها فيكون حلولها في ذلك المحل عارضا غريبا و الكلام في الصورة المجردة هذا خلف.

فإن قلت أليست الصورة العقلية قد تنقسم إلى أقسام متشابهة بإضافة زوائد كلية- مثل المعنى الجنسي كالحَيوان فإنه تنقسم إلى حصص كحصّة الإنسان و حصّة الفرس منه- و الحصتان غير مختلفتين بالماهية فإن حيوانية الفرس بشرط التجريد عن الصهالية مساوية لحيوانية الإنسان بشرط التجريد عن الناطقية في النوع و الحقيقة فقد وقع انقسام الكلي إلى أقسام متشابهة مع أن تلك الأجزاء ليست ذوات المقادير و الأشكال الجزئية- فيقال هذا غير ذلك و هذا جائز لأنه بإلحاق كلي بكلي بل هذا تركيب و ذاك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٣

تجزية مثلا إلحاق الناطق بالحيوان الذي هو حصّة الإنسان يجعله مخالفا للحيوان الذي هو حصّة الفرس و قسمة الكل إلى الجزء يوجب مساواتهما فلو كان أجزاء الصورة العقلية كأفرادها و جزئياتها لزم أن يكون كلية تلك الصورة مخالفة لكل واحد من أجزائها فلم تكن القسمة مقدارية و المفروض أنها مقدارية هذا خلف و بالجملة فانقسام الحيوان إلى الإنسان و الفرس و غيرهما قسمة الكلي إلى الجزئيات و هي عبارة عن ضم قيود متخالفة إلى المقسم و القسمة المفروضة في الصورة العقلية قسمة الكل إلى الأجزاء و بينهما فرق ظاهر و أما أنه يمتنع انقسام هذه الصورة إلى جزئين مختلفين فذلك لأنها لو انقسمت إلى أجزاء مختلفة المعاني لكانت تلك الأجزاء لا محالة هي الأجناس و الفصول- لكن الأجزاء المفروضة في الصورة العقلية بحسب الأجزاء التي يمكن فرضها في الجسم غير متناهية فيلزم أن تكون تلك الأجزاء المقومة التي هي الأجناس و الفصول لتلك الصورة غير متناهية و هو محال.

وأيضا فلأن كل كثرة فإن الواحد و المتناهي فيها موجود فلو كان هناك أجزاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٤

غير متناهية لكان لكل واحد منها ماهية بسيطة فلا يكون ذلك الجزء البسيط ممكن الانقسام إلى جزءين مختلفي الماهية و أيضا فبتقدير أن تكون تلك الصورة مركبة من مقومات غير متناهية و لكل واحد منها محل من الجسم غير ما حله الآخر فيلزم أن يكون للجسم أجزاء غير متناهية بالفعل و ذلك أيضا محال.

و أيضا إذا فرضنا قسمة فوق الفصل في جانب و الجنس في جانب ثم إذا فرضنا القسمة على نحو آخر فلا يخلو إما أن يقع في كل جانب نصف فصل و نصف جنس فيكون ذلك انقسامًا إلى جزءين متشابهين و قد مر إبطاله أو يوجب انتقال الجنس و الفصل - إلى القسمين المفروضين ثانيا فيلزم أن يكون مجرد الفرض يوجب تغير مكان أجزاء الصورة العقلية و يكون محالها و مواضعها بحسب إرادات المريدين و فرض الفرضين.

الوجه الثاني في امتناع القسمة على الصورة العقلية

أن نقول لكل شيء حقيقة هو بها هو و تلك الحقيقة لا محالة واحدة و هي غير قابلة للقسمة أصلا فإن القابلة للقسمة يجب أن تبقى مع القسمة و العشرة من حيث إنها عشرة لا تبقى مع الانقسام فإن الخمسة ليست جزءا للعشرة بما هي نوع من الأنواع العددية بل هي جزء من كثرة الوحدات - و ليست للعشرة بما هي حقيقة واحدة جزءا فإذا انقسمت العشرة و حصلت الخمستان فهما جزءان للعشرة بما هي كثيرة لا بما هي واحدة و الكثرة فيها بالنسبة إلى المعدود لا بالنسبة إلى نفسها فإن العشرة من الناس كثرة للواحد من الناس و وحدة لنفسها فلها صورة واحدة غير قابلة للقسمة إذا ثبت ذلك فنقول العلم المتعلق بهذه الماهيات المجردة إن كان حالا في محل منقسم يلزم من انقسام محله انقسامه و من انقسامه انقسام ما هو صورته لكن المعلوم غير منقسم أو مأخوذ بما هو غير منقسم هذا خلف.

أقول هذا تقرير هذا البرهان على الوجهين المذكورين في كتب القوم و عندهم أنه من أقوى البراهين الدالة على تجرد النفوس المدركة للمعاني الكلية و هي جميع النفوس البشرية و قد سبق منا أن التجرد العقلي غير حاصل لجميع النفوس البشرية و عندي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٥

أن هذا البرهان غير جار في كل نفس بل إنما يدل على تجرد العاقلة للصورة التي هي معقولة بالفعل في نفس الأمر سواء كانت بحسب ذاتها المقتضية للتجرد أو بحسب تجريد مجرد و نزع منزع ينزع معقولها من محسوسها و تلك النفس هي التي خرجت من حد العقل بالقوة و العقل الاستعدادي إلى حد العقل بالفعل و المعقول بالفعل و هذا العقل يوجد في بعض أفراد الناس دون الجميع و ذلك لأن الذي يدركه أكثر الناس من الطبائع الكلية وجودها في أذهانهم يجري مجرى وجود الكليات الطبيعية في الخارج في جزئياتها المادية كالحيوان بما هو حيوان فإن ماهيته موجودة في الخارج بعين وجود الأشخاص و لها اعتبار لا يكون بذلك الاعتبار متخصصا بمكان معين و وضع خاص و لا أيضا من حيث ماهيته المشتركة بقابل للقسمة المقدارية الجزئية و كذلك إذا وجدت ماهيته في ذهن أكثر الناس - فإنها توجد تلك الماهية بعين وجود صورة متخيلة لكن للذهن أن يعتبرها بوجوه من الاعتبار فهي من حيث كونها صورة شخصية

موجودة في قوة إدراكية جزئية تكون جزئية متخيلة و من حيث اعتبارها بما هي هي أي بما هي حيوان بلا اشتراط قيد آخر لا يكون متخيلة و لا محسوسة و لا معقولة أيضا لأنها بهذا الاعتبار أمر مبهم الوجود و إن كانت موجودة في الواقع بوجود ما تتحد به من الصورة و من حيث اعتبارها مشتركة بين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٦

كثيرين تكون معقولة مجردة فحينئذ نقول إن الحاصل في الذهن من طبيعة الحيوان- ليس بالفعل صورة مجردة وجودها في نفسها وجود تجريدي كوجود المفارقات حتى يلزم أن يكون محلها أيضا مجردا بل الموجود منها في الذهن شيء له اعتبارات يكون بحسب بعضها جزئيا و بحسب بعضها كليا و بحسب بعضها مطلقا و كذلك الصورة الخارجية من تلك الماهية و نحن لا نسلم أن كل واحد من أفراد الناس يمكنه ملاحظة هذه الاعتبارات- أو يمكن لنفسه أو يتصور أمرا ذهنيًا من الجهة التي هو بها كلي مشترك بين كثيرين- مجرد عن الخصوصيات و القيود الجزئية و كذلك نقول إيرادا على الوجه الثاني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٧

لا نسلم أن لكل شيء وحدة تقابل الانقسام من كل جهة حتى يلزم أن يكون صورتها أيضا كذلك فإن كثيرا من الأشياء وحدتها بالفعل عين قبول القسمة بالفعل كالعدد- أو عين قبول القسمة بالقوة كالأجسام و المقادير فإن العشرة و إن كانت حقيقة واحدة- لكن تلك الوحدة عين كثرة الآحاد التي يتألف منها العشرة و هذه الكثرة غير مقابلة لها و إنما يقابلها كثرة أخرى هي كثرة العشرة أعني العشرات تقابل وحدة العشرة التي هي عين كثرة الأجزاء أي الأعشار فوحدة العشرة مع كونها تقابل كثرة العشرة هي عين كثرة الأعشار و كذا وحدة الخمسة هي عين كثرة الأحماس و قد مر أن العدد من الأشياء الضعيفة الوجود لكونه ضعيف الوحدة.

أيضا حيث إن وحدته عين الكثرة و كذلك الأجسام و المقادير و سائر المتصلات- وحدتها عين قبول الكثرة الوهمية أو الخارجية لأن وحدتها نفس متصليتها و امتدادها عبارة عن قبولها الكثرة المقدارية قوة أو فعلا فأنى توجد في مثل هذه الأشياء نحو من الوحدة التي لا تتضمن اعتبارها اعتبار الكثرة بوجه من الوجوه نعم حيثية وحدتها تغاير حيثية الكثرة التي تقابل تلك الوحدة و لا تغاير حيثية الكثرة التي يتضمنها تلك الوحدة فافهم هذا المعنى فإنه قد ذهّل عنه كثير من العلماء حتى الشيخ في الشفا حيث أراد أن يستدل على مغايرة الوحدة للوجود فقال إن الكثير من حيث هو كثير موجود و الكثير من حيث هو كثير ليس بواحد و قد مر ما فيه من القول.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٨

و لهم في هذا المسلك وجه آخر و هو أن نفرض الكلام في الأمور التي يستحيل عليها القسمة عقلا مثل الباري سبحانه و الوحدة و أيضا مثل البسائط التي يتألف منها المركبات- فإن الحقائق إذا كانت مركبة فلا بد فيها من البسائط ضرورة أن كل كثرة فالواحد فيها موجود و حينئذ يقال العلم المتعلق بها إن انقسم فإما أن يكون كل واحد من أجزائه علما أو لا يكون فإن لم يكن أجزاؤه علوما لم يكن العلم هو مجموع تلك الأجزاء بل الهيئة الحاصلة عند اجتماع تلك الأجزاء

فكلما في تلك الهيئة و هو أنها لو انقسمت لكان لها أجزاء - فإن كان أجزاء العلم علوما فلها متعلق فلا يخلو إما أن يكون متعلق كل واحد من تلك الأجزاء - كل ذلك المعلوم أو أجزاءه فإن كان كله لزم أن يكون جزء الشيء مساويا لكليه من جميع الوجوه و ذلك محال و إن كان بعض ذلك المعلوم فقد بينا أن هذه الحقائق لا بعض لها و لا جزء قالوا هذا الوجه أحسن الوجوه المذكورة أقول لا نسلم أن كل واحدة من النفوس البشرية أمكنها أن يتصور حقيقة هذه البسائط و أكثر الناس إنما يرتسم في أذهانهم إذا حاولوا إدراك هذه الأمور أشباح خيالية و حكايات متقدرة و أنى لهم معرفة الباري جل ذكره و الجواهر البسيطة العقلية نعم الحجة المذكورة أصح البراهين على تجرد النفوس العارفة بالله و الصور المفارقة - و تلك النفوس قليلة العدد جدا و أما سائر النفوس فهي مجردة عن الأجسام الطبيعية - لا عن الصور الخيالية.

و أما اعتراضات بعض المتأخرين على هذه الحجة فهي مدفوعة.

منها أن النقطة حلت من الجسم شيئا منقسما أو غير منقسم فعلى الأول لزم حلول غير منقسم في منقسم و على الثاني يلزم الجزء الذي لا يتجزى.

و منها النقض بالوحدة فإنها مع كونها من أبعد الأشياء من طباع الكثرة حالة في الجسم.

و منها النقض بالإضافة فإن الأبوة مع أنها غير قابلة للانقسام حالة في الأب.

و منها أن القوة الوهمية قوة جسمانية و العداوة التي تدركها أمر غير منقسم - لامتناع ورود القسمة على هذه العداوة إذ لا نصف لها و لا ربع و كذا الصداقة و غيرها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٦٩

أقول أما اندفاع الأول فالتحقيق أن النقطة غير قائمة بنفس ذات الجسم بما هي ذات منقسمة بل قيامها للجسم باعتبار تناهي امتداده و انقطاعه فمحلها الجسم من حيث اتصافه بالتناهي و لهذا قيل الأطراف عدمية لأن محلها من حيث إنه محلها مشتمل على معنى عديمي و هو النفاذ و الانقطاع بخلاف العلم فإنه كمال للذات الموصوفة به.

و أما اندفاع النقض بالوحدة فقد علمت مرارا أن وحدة الجسم تقبل الانقسام - لأنها نفس اتصاله و امتداده و كذا وجوده فإنه عين جسميته و العجب أن وحدة الجسم تنقسم بعين انقسام الجسم بالذات لا بالعرض كسائر العوارض التي تنقسم بانقسام المحل بالعرض لا بالذات كالسواد مثلا لأن وحدة الجسم نفس وجوده و عين هويته الشخصية.

و أما اندفاع الثالث فالإضافات لا نسلم أن جميعها غير منقسمة بالتبع بل التي تعرض الأجسام على ضربين منها ما يعرض للجسم بما هو جسم كالمحاذاة و المماساة و غيرها - فهي منقسمة بانقسام المحل فإن محاذاة نصف الجسم نصف محاذاة كل الجسم - و محاذاة ربعه ربع محاذاة كله و منها ما يعرض للجسم لا من حيث جسميته بل من حيث معنى آخر تنضاف إليه فهي لا يلزم أن تكون منقسمة بانقسام محله كأبوة زيد مثلا - فإنها غير عارضة له من حيث جسميته و مقداريته بل من جهة أخرى كقوة فاعلية نفسانية مقتضية للتوليد.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٠

و أما اندفاع الرابع فقد سبق أن القوة الوهمية مجردة عن المادة لا عن إضافتها - و كذلك حكم مدرقاتها.

الحجة الثانية و هي التي عول عليها الشيخ في كتاب المباحثات

واعتقد أنها أجل ما عنده في هذا الباب ثم إن تلامذته أكثروا من الاعتراضات عليها و الشيخ أجاب عنها و تلك الأسئلة و الأجوبة رأيها متفرقة في مجموعة مشتملة على مراسلات وقعت بين الشيخ و تلامذته فنورد هاهنا على الترتيب مع زوائد سائحة لنا في الإتمام - فالحجة أنا يمكننا أن نعقل ذواتنا و كل من عقل ذاتا فله ماهية تلك الذات فإذا لنا ماهية ذاتنا فلا يخلو إما أن يكون تعقلنا لذاتنا لأن صورة أخرى مساوية لذاتنا حصلت في ذاتنا - وإما أن يكون نفس ذاتنا حاضرة لذاتنا و الأول محال لأنه جمع بين المثليين فتعين الثاني فكل ما ذاته حاصلة لذاته كان قائما بذاته فإذا النفس جوهر قائم بذاته - و كل جسم و جسماني غير قائم بذاته فالنفس جوهر غير جسماني.

قال السائل إنا لا نسلم أن إدراكنا لذاتنا يقتضي أن تكون حقيقة ذاتنا حاصلة لنا لم لا يجوز أن يكون هو أثرا ما حصل لنا من ذاتنا فلا يكون ذلك هو حقيقة ذاتنا - فعلى هذا يكون لنا حقيقة يحصل منها أثر فينا فنشعر بذلك الأثر فلا يكون ذلك الأثر هو الحقيقة فلا يكون قد حصل لنا ذاتنا مرتين.

قال المجيب قد سبق أن الإدراك ليس إلا بثبوت حقيقة الشيء فقوله إنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧١

يحصل لنا أثر منه فنشعر بذلك الأثر إما أن يجعل الشعور نفس الأثر أو أمرا مغايرا لذلك الأثر تابعا له فإن كان نفس ذلك الأثر فقوله فنشعر بذلك الأثر لا معنى له بل هو مرادف لقوله يحصل لنا أثر و إن كان الشعور تبعه فإما أن يكون ذلك الشعور - هو حصول ماهية الشيء أو حصول ماهية غيره فإن كان غيره فيكون الشعور هو تحصيل ما ليس ماهية الشيء و معناه و إن كان هو هو فيكون ماهية الذات تحتاج في أن يحصل لها ماهية الذات إلى ذلك الأثر فيكون ماهية الذات غير موجودة إلى أن حصلها ذلك الأثر فلا يكون تلك الماهية متأثرة بل متكونة هذا خلف و إن كانت ماهية الذات لنا بحال أخرى من التجريد و التجديد أو نزع بعض ما يقارنها من العوارض فيكون المعقول هو ذلك المتجدد المتجرد و كلامنا فيما إذا كان المعقول هو جوهر نفسنا الثابت في الحالين.

قال السائل سلمنا أن نعقل ذواتنا و لكن لم قلتم بأن من عقل ذاتا فله ماهية تلك الذات و إلا لكننا إذا عقلنا الإله و العقول الفعالة و جب أن يحصل لنا حقائقها.

قال المجيب الحاصل فينا من العقل إن أمكننا أن نعقله هو العقل الفعال من جهة النوع و الطبيعة لا من جهة الشخص لأن أحدهما بحال ليس الآخر بتلك الحال - و المعقول من حقيقتك لا يفارق حقيقتك في النوع و الماهية و لا بالعوارض أصلا و لا تفارقه بالشخص فيكون هو هو بالشخص كما هو هو بالنوع و أما العقل الفعال و ما يعقل منه فهو هو في المعنى و ليس هو هو في الشخص أقول الحق أن الطبيعة النوعية التي للعقل الفعال لا يمكن تعدد أشخاصها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٢

لا في الخارج و لا في الذهن إذ البرهان قائم على أن نوع كل واحد من الجواهر المفارقة - منحصر في تشخص العقول من لوازم نوعياتها و لو تعددت أفراد ماهية واحدة لكان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٣

امتياز كل من تلك الأفراد بعرض غير لازم للطبيعة و العرض الغير اللازم للنوع يحتاج عروضه إلى فاعل منفصل الذات و قابل ذي تجدد و انفعال فلم يكن المفارق مفارقا هذا خلف فالأولى في الجواب أن يقال الحاصل في نفوسنا من تلك الحقائق البسيطة - ليس كنه حقيقتها بل مفهومات عامة كمفهوم الجوهر المفارق و مفهوم العقل أو غير ذلك.

قال السائل فإذا ارتسم في عقلنا صورة مساوية لماهية الإله فيكون ماهية الإله تعالى مقولة على كثيرين في الخارج.

قال المجيب البرهان إنما قام على أن تلك الماهية غير مقولة على كثيرين في الخارج فأما على كثيرين في الذهن فلم يقيم.

أقول حاشا الجنب الإلهي أن يكون له ماهية محتملة للشركة بين كثيرين لا في الخارج و لا في الذهن كيف و ذاته صرف الوجود القائم بذاته التام الذي لا أتم منه و لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٤

مكافئ له إذ كل ما له ماهية كلية يكون تشخصه زائدا عليه و كذا الوجود لكونه عين التشخص فكل ماهية أو ذي ماهية فهو ممكن الوجود فالحق في الجواب أن يقال نحن لا نعرف حقيقة الباري بكنهه بل نعرف بخواص و لوازم إضافية أو سلبية.

قال السائل سلمنا أن من عقل ذاتا فإنه يحصل له ماهية المعقول لكن لم لا يجوز أن يحصل ذاتي في قوتي الوهمية فتشعر قوتي الوهمية بها كما أن القوة العاقلة تشعر بالوهمية فعلى هذا لا يكون القوة العاقلة مقارنة لذاتها بل للقوة الوهمية كما أنكم تقولون القوة الوهمية غير مقارنة لذاتها بل للقوة العاقلة.

قال المجيب شعورك بهويتك ليس بشيء من قواك و إلا لم يكن المشعور بها هو الشاعر و أنت مع شعورك بذاتك تشعر أنك إنما تشعر بنفسك و أنك أنت الشاعر و المشعور به.

و أيضا فإن كان الشاعر بنفسك قوة أخرى فهي إما قائمة بنفسك فنفسك الثابتة للقوة الثابتة لنفسك ثابتة لنفسك و هو المطلوب و إن كانت غير قائمة بنفسك بل بجسم - فنفسك إما أن تكون قائمة بذلك الجسم أو لا تكون فإن لم تكن وجب أن لا يكون هناك شعور بذاتك بوجه و لا إدراك لذاتك بخصوصها بل يكون جسم ما يحس بشيء غيره كما تحس بيدك و رجلك و إن كانت نفسك قائمة بذلك الجسم فذلك الجسم حصلت فيه نفسك و حصلت فيه تلك القوة الشاعرة بنفسك فتلك النفس و تلك القوة وجودهما لغيرهما و لا تكون النفس بتلك القوة تدرك ذاتها لأن ماهية القوة و النفس معا لغيرهما - و هو ذلك الجسم.

قال السائل تقريراً لهذا البحث لم لا يجوز أن يكون إدراكي لذاتي بحصول ذاتي في شيء نسبته إلى ذاتي كنسبة المرأة إلى البصر.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٥

قال المجيب الذي يتوسط فيه المرأة إن سلم أنه مصور في المرأة فيحتاج مرة ثانية أن يتصور في الحدة فكذلك هاهنا لا بد و أن ينطبع صورة ذاتنا مرة أخرى في ذاتنا.

قال السائل لم لا يجوز أن يكون إدراكي لذاتي بحصول صورة أخرى في ذاتي - بيانه أنني حال ما أعقل نفس زيد إما أن لا أعقل نفسي و هو محال لأن العاقل للشيء - عاقل بالقوة القريبة من الفعل بكونه عاقلاً و في ضمنه كونه عاقلاً لذاته و

إما أن أعقل نفسي في ذلك الوقت وحينئذ لا يخلو إما أن يكون الحاصل في نفسي من نفسي - و من زيد صورتان أو صورة واحدة فإن كانت واحدة فحينئذ أنا غيري و غيري أنا - إذ الصورة الواحدة من النفس مرة واحدة يكتنفها أعراضي و مرة أخرى يكتنفها أعراض زيد و إما أن كان الحاصل صورتين فهو المطلوب.

قال المجيب أنت إذا عقلت النفس فقد عقلت جزء ذاتك و إذا عقلت إنسانية زيد - فقد أضفت إلى ذاتك شيئا آخر و قرنته به فلا يتكرر الإنسانية فيك مرتين بل يتعدد بالاعتبار و اعلم أن الفرق حاصل بين الإنسانية المطلقة المعتبرة بذاتها و بين الإنسانية - من حيث إنها كلية مشترك فيها بين كثيرين فإن الأول جزء ذاتي و أما الإنسانية العامة فهي الإنسانية مع قيد العموم فلا يكون جزء ذاتي قال السائل إن القسم الذي أخرجتموه أيضا باطل بيانه أنا إذا قلنا موجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٦

لذاته يفهم منه معان ثلاثة - أحدها أن ذاته لا تتعلق في وجوده بغيره. الثاني أن ذاته ليست حالة في غيره مثل البياض في الجسم و هذان القسمان باطلان لأنهما سلبيتان و المدركية أمر ثبوتي و هو عبارة عن حصول صورة المعلوم للعالم. و الثالث أن ذاته مضافة إلى ذاته و ذلك أيضا محال لأن الإضافة تقتضي الاثنينية - و الوحدة تنافيا لا يقال إن المضاف و المضاف إليه أعم مما إذا كان كل واحد هو الآخر أو غيره و لا يمكن نفي العام بنفي الخاص فإن هذه مغالطة لفظية كما إذا قيل المؤثر يستدعي أثرا و ذلك أعم من أن يكون المؤثر هو الأثر أو غيره فيلزم منه صحة أن يكون الشيء مؤثرا في نفسه فكما أن ذلك باطل فكذا هاهنا.

قال المجيب حقيقة الذات شيء و تعينها غير و الجملة التي هي الأصل و التعين شيء آخر و هذا لا يختلف سواء كان التعين من لوازم الماهية كما في الإله و العقول الفعالة أو لا يكون كذلك كما في الأنواع المتكثرة بأشخاصها في الوجود و هذا القدر من الغيرية يكفي في صحة الإضافة و لهذا التحقيق صح منك أن تقول ذاتي و ذاتك. أقول هذا الجواب ضعيف فإن البسيط الحقيقي المتشخص بذاته ليس فيه اعتباران متغايران الذات و التعين و قد سبق حل هذا الشك الواقع في علم البسيط بذاته في مبحث تحقيق المضاف و تحقيق مسألة العلم. قال السائل هذه الحجة منقوضة بإدراك الحيوانات أنفسها مع أن أنفسها غير مجردة و لا يلتفت إلى قول من ينكر إدراكها لذواتها لأنها تطلب الملائم و تهرب عن المنافر و ليس طلبها لمطلق الملائم و إلا لكان طلبها لملائم غيرها كطلبها و أيضا لو كانت طالبة للملائم المطلق لكانت طالبة للملائم من حيث هو ملائم و ذلك كلي فتكون البهيمة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٧

مدركة للكليات و ليست كذلك فإذا البهيمة تطلب ما يلائم لنفسها و إدراكها له يستلزم إدراكها لنفسها المخصوصة فإن العلم بإضافة أمر إلى أمر يقتضي العلم بكلا المتضايين. قال المجيب إن نفس الإنسان تشعر بذاتها و نفوس الحيوانات الأخر لا تشعر بذواتها بل بأوهامها في آلات أوهامها كما تشعر بأشياء آخر بحواسها و أوهامها في آلات تلك الحواس و الأوهام فالشيء الذي يدرك المعنى الجزئي الذي لا يحس و له علاقة بالمحسوس هو الوهم في الحيوانات و هو الذي تدرك به أنفس الحيوانات ذواتها لكن ذلك

الإدراك لا يكون بذواتها ولا في آلة ذواتها التي هي القلب بل في آلة الوهم بالوهم - كما أنها تدرك بالوهم وبآلة معان آخر فعلى هذا ذوات الحيوانات مرة في آلة ذواتها وهي القلب و مرة في آلة وهمها وهي مدركة من حيث هي في آلة الوهم.

قال السائل فما البرهان على أن شعورنا بذواتنا ليس كشعور الحيوانات.

قال المجيب لأن القوة المدركة للكليات يمكنها أن يدرك ماهية ذاتها مجردة عن جميع اللواحق الغريبة فإذا شعرنا بذاتنا الجزئية المخلوطة بغيرنا شعرنا بواحد مركب من أمور نحن شاعرون بكل واحد منها من حيث يتميز عن الآخر وأعني بتلك الأمور حقيقة ذاتنا والأمور المخالطة لها ويجوز أن يتمثل لنا حقيقة ذاتنا وإن كانت سائر الأمور غائبة عنا وإدراك الحيوانات لذواتها ليس على هذا الوجه فظهر الفرق.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٨

أقول هذا في الحقيقة رجوع عن هذه الحجة إلى الحجة الأولى و الحق أن نفوس الحيوانات مدركة لذواتها بنفس ذواتها إدراكا خياليا لا بآلة الخيال بل بهوياتها الإدراكية و ذلك يقتضي تجردها عن أبدانها الطبيعية دون الصور الخيالية و قد مر منا البرهان على تجرد النفوس الخيالية عن هذا العالم و الفرق بين نفوسها و نفوس خواص الإنسان أن هذه النفوس تدرك ذاتها مجردة عن جميع الأبعاد و الصور و الأشكال و غيرها.

قال السائل ليس إذا أمكننا أن نميز ذواتنا عما يخالطها في الذهن و جب أن يصح ذلك في الخارج يعني هذا التفصيل شيء نفعله و نفرضه في أذهاننا و أن ما عليه الوجود بخلاف ذلك و هذا غير مختص بما إذا أدركنا ذواتنا كلية أو جزئية مخلوطة.

ثم [بل] التحقيق أن كل ما يدرك شيئا فله ذلك المدرك كليا كان أو جزئيا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٧٩

و الحمار إذا أدرك ذاته المخلوطة فله ذاته المخلوطة فإذن على كل الأحوال الحمار ذاته موجودة له و ليس ذلك إلا قوة واحدة فذاته مجردة له.

و مما يبطل قولكم أن المدرك لذات الحمار قوة غير ذاته أن نقول المدرك لذاته إن لم يكن هو ذاته بل قوة أخرى فإن كانت تلك القوة في الحمار فذات الحمار في الحمار و إن كانت في غيره لم يكن الشاعر هو المشعور به فلم يكن الحمار مدركا لذاته - و قد أبطلناه أولا.

و أيضا لو سلمنا أن الحمار يدرك ذاته لا بذاته بل بجزء من ذاته فذلك الجزء له صورة ذاته فذلك الجزء مجرد.

و أيضا فإذا حصلت نفس الحمار في آلة قوته الوهمية مع كونها مخلوطة و جب أن يكون آلة التوهم حية بتلك النفس كما أن آلة النفس حية بها.

و أجابوا عن هذا الآخر بأن قالوا حصول تلك الصور في الوهم يشبه الخضرة الحاصلة من الانعكاس و حصولها في آلتها الخاصة كحصول الخضرة الأصلية من الطبيعة هذا تمام ما قيل في هذا المقام و التحقيق ما لوحناه إليك من الكلام

الحجة الثالثة و هي قريبة المأخذ من الأولى

أن نفوسنا يمكنها أن تدرك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٠

الإنسان الكلي الذي يكون مشتركا بين الأشخاص الإنسانية كلها و لا محالة يكون ذلك المعقول مجردا عن وضع معين و شكل معين و إلا لما كان مشتركا بين الأشخاص - ذوات الأوضاع المختلفة و الأشكال المختلفة و ظاهر أن هذه الصورة المجردة أمر موجود - و قد ثبت أن الكليات لا وجود لها في الخارج فوجودها في الذهن فمحلها إما أن يكون جسما أو لا يكون و الأول محال و إلا لكان له كم معين و وضع معين بتبعية محله - و حينئذ يخرج عن كونه مجردا و هو محال فإذا محل تلك الصورة ليس جسما فهو إذن جوهر مجرد.

و لقاتل أن يقول الصورة الكلية المعقولة من الإنسان هل لها وجود أم لا فإن لم يكن لها وجود فكيف يمكن أن يقال إن محلها يجب أن يكون كذا و إن كان لها وجود فلا محالة هي صورة شخصية حالة في نفس إنسانية شخصية لاستحالة أن توجد المطلقات في الأعيان و هي من حيث إنها صورة شخصية قائمة بنفس شخصية غير مشترك فيها بين الأشخاص أما أولا فلأن الأمر الشخصي لا يكون مشتركا فيه و أما ثانيا فلأن الصورة عرض قائم بالنفس و الأشخاص جواهر مستقلة بذواتها فكيف يمكن أن يقال إن حقيقة الجواهر القائمة بذاتها عرض قائم بالغير. فإن قالوا إن المعني بكون تلك الصورة كلية أن أي شخص من الأشخاص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨١

الإنسانية سبق إلى النفس كان تأثيره في النفس ذلك التأثير و لو أن السابق إليها هو الفرس لما كان أثره فيها ذلك الأثر بل أثر آخر.

فنقول إذا كان المعني بكون الصورة كلية ذلك فلم لا يجوز أن يحصل هذه الصورة - على هذا الوجه في محل جسماني فيرتسم مثلا في الدماغ من مشاهدة إنسان معين صورة - بحيث لو كان المرئي بدل ذلك الشخص أي إنسان شئت لكانت الصورة الحاصلة منه في الدماغ تلك الصورة.

فإن قالوا لأن تلك الصورة لو حصلت في الجسم لكان لها بسبب الجسم مقدار معين و شكل معين و ذلك يمنع من كونها كلية.

قلنا و كذلك الصورة الحاصلة في نفس الشخص تكون صورة شخصية و تكون عرضا قائما بمحل معين و ذلك يمنع عن كونها كلية فإن كان ما يحصل للصورة - بسبب حلولها في الجسم من الشكل و المقدار بالعرض مانعا من كونها كلية فكذلك ما يحصل للصورة بسبب حلولها في النفس من الوحدة الشخصية و العرضية و جب أن يكون مانعا من الكلية و إن أمكن أن يؤخذ الصورة القائمة بالنفس باعتبار آخر حتى تصير كلية بذلك الاعتبار و إن كان اعتبار وحدتها و شخصيتها و حلولها في النفس الشخصية مانعا من كون الصورة كلية جاز أيضا أن يؤخذ الصورة القائمة بمادة جسمانية كالدماغ و غيره باعتبار يكون هي بذلك الاعتبار كلية و إن كان باعتبار مقدارها و شكلها و وضعها جزئية و بالجملة فالصورة سواء كانت في النفس أو في الجسم فهي لا يكون مشتركا فيها من كل الوجوه - لأن وحدتها الشخصية مانعة من العموم و الكلية ثم إنها مع ذلك يكون مشتركا فيها باعتبار آخر.

أقول هذا إشكال صعب الانحلال مذكور في مبحث الماهيات في العلم الكلي - و مباحث الكليات في علم الميزان و قد تفصينا عنه بأن مناط الكلية و الاشتراك بين كثيرين هو نحو الوجود العقلي فالصورة و إن كانت واحدة معينة ذات هوية شخصية لكن الهوية العقلية و التعين الذهني و التشخص العقلي لا ينافي كون الصورة متساوي النسبة إلى كثيرين و لا يمنع التشخص العقلي الكلية و إنما المانع عن العموم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٢

و الاشتراك هو الوجود المادي و التشخص الجسماني الذي يلزمه وضع خاص و أين خاص و مقدار خاص فتختلف نسبة هذا الشخص إلى غيره من الأشخاص الجسمانية - و الهويات المادية ذوات الأوضاع المختلفة و ليس عندنا اعتبار كون الصورة العقلية كلية مشتركا فيها غير و اعتبار كونها موجودة متشخصة بتشخص غير لأن ذلك الوجود نحو آخر من الوجود أشد و أوسع من أن ينحصر في حد جزئي و يقصر رداؤه عن الانسحاب على كثيرين متوافقين في سنخ ذلك المعنى المحمول و جميع المعاني و الماهيات في أنفسها و بحسب حد معناها مما لا يابى عنه الحمل على كثيرين. و كذلك إذا وجدت بوجود عقلي غير مقيد بوضع خاص و مقدار خاص إذ الوجود العقلي نسبتها إلى جميع الأوضاع و المقادير و الأمكنة نسبة واحدة فالصورة العقلية لماهية الإنسان من حيث وجودها مشترك فيها بين كثيرين من نوعها و من حيث ماهيتها و معناها محمولة على كثيرين.

ثم إنك قد علمت من طريقتنا في العقل و المعقولات أن التعقل ليس بحلول الصورة المعقولة في الجوهر العاقل حتى يكون صورة الجوهر عرضيا و يلزم الإشكالات المذكورة في الوجود الذهني و هاهنا و مباحث علم الباري بل الصورة العقلية للجواهر جواهر قائمة بذواتها و بمبدعها و هي في باب الوجود و التجوهر أقوى من ما هي صورتها من الصور الخارجية المادية لكونها مفتقرة الوجود إلى المواد المتجددة الانفعالات و الاستحالات. و أما الكلام في صحة هذا البرهان و دلالتها على تجرد النفوس.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٣

فأقول إن هذا البرهان برهان قاطع لكن على تجرد بعض النفوس الإنسانية - لا النفوس العامة إنما يدل على تجرد نفس تعقل الصور العقلية و يشاهدها من حيث عقليتها و نحو وجودها العقلي المشترك فيه بين الأعداد الذي لا يحصل إلا بعد تجريد المعنى الواحد عن القيود و الزوائد و الخصوصيات و بالجملة كل من يمكن له أن يلاحظ صورة الحيوان مثلا بنحو من الوجود لا يكون لها بحسبه مقدار خاص و مكان خاص و وضع خاص و زمان خاص و كذا تعقل صورة الإنسان العقلي المجرد عن العوارض المادية بأن يكون إنسانا بحثا يخرج منه جميع ما هو غير الإنسانية من الوضع الخاص و الكم الخاص و الأين الخاص و مع ذلك لا يحذف عنه شيء من مقوماته و قواه و أعضائه حتى إنه يعقله ذا رأس و وجه و عين و يد و رجل و بطن و كل ذلك على الوجه العقلي المشترك فيه بين الأعداد الكثيرة لأن ذلك معنى إدراك الماهية الكلية لشيء كما قال المعلم الأول في أثولوجيا الإنسان العقلي روحاني و جميع أعضائه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٤

روحانية ليس موضع العين غير موضع اليد ولا مواضع الأعضاء مختلفة وكذا يمكنه أن يعقل الأرض العقلية والماء العقلي والسماء العقلية ويحضر في ذهنه صورة كل طبيعة من الطبائع بنحو وجودها العقلي على الوجه الذي مر ذكره لأن ذلك في الحقيقة معنى إدراكه الكليات وقل من الناس من أمكن له الإدراك على ذلك الوجه - والذي يتيسر لأكثر الناس أن يرتسم في خياله صورة إنسان مثلاً فإذا أحس بفرد آخر منه يتنبه بأن هذا مثل ذاك ويدرك جهة الاتحاد بينهما وأنها غير جهة الاختلاف إدراكاً خيالياً كما يدرك جهة الاتحاد بين أجزاء الماء مثلاً بحسب الحس ويعلم أن جميع أجزاء الماء ماء وكما يدرك أن جميع أجزاء الماء ماء مع اختلافها في المقدار والجهة كذا يدرك أن أفرادها المنفصلة ماء إدراكاً خيالياً

الحجة الرابعة أن القوة العاقلة تقوى على أفعال غير متناهية

ولا شيء من القوى الجسمانية تقوى على أفعال غير متناهية فلا شيء من القوى العاقلة جسمانية أما الصغرى فإننا نقوى على إدراك الأعداد ولا نهاية لمراتبها مع أنها أحد الأنواع المدركة للقوة العاقلة وأما بيان الكبرى فقد سبق قال صاحب المباحث إن إثبات كون القوى الجسمانية متناهية الفعل يحتاج إلى أن نبين أنها منقسمة بانقسام محلها فيرد النقوض الموردة على الحجة الأولى أعني النقض بالنقطة والوحدة والإضافة ومدرجات الوهم وغيرها. أقول قد مر اندفاع تلك النقوض بحمد الله ثم قال ثم على هذه الحجة أسئلة زائدة تخصها. أولها أنا لا نسلم أن القوة الناطقة تقوى على إدراك أمور غير متناهية دفعة بل إدراكاً لا ينتهي إلى حد إلا ويقوى بعد ذلك على إدراك شيء آخر ولكن لا يلزم من ذلك كونها قوية على إدراكات غير متناهية كما أن الجسم لا ينتهي في الانقسام إلى حد يقف عنده ولكن يستحيل أن يحصل له تقسيمات غير متناهية بالفعل فكذلك هاهنا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٥

و بالجملة فالحال في فاعلية تلك القوة كالحال في منفعليته. الثاني سلمنا أنها قوية على أمور غير متناهية ولكن لم قلتم إنها قوية على أفعال غير متناهية وذلك لأن الإدراك ليس فعلاً بل هو انفعال وأنتم تجوزون أن يكون الأمر الجسماني قوياً على انفعالات غير متناهية والدليل عليه أنكم تثبتون هيولى أولية قد تواردت عليها صور غير متناهية. الثالث النقض بالنفوس الفلكية فإنها عندكم قوى جسمانية مع أن أفعالها وهي الحركة الدورية غير متناهية. والجواب أما عن الأول فلا شك أن القوة الناطقة لا تنتهي إلى حد إلا وتقوى على إدراك أمور آخر وقد قام البرهان على أن القوى الجسمانية لا يمكن أن يكون كذلك فقد حصل الغرض. ولقائل أن يقول القوة الجسمانية إما أن يقال إنها تنتهي إلى وقت لا يبقى لها إمكان الوجود وبعد ذلك يصير ممتنع الوجود أو لا ينتهي إلى هذه الحالة البتة والأول باطل لأن الممكن لذاته لا يصير ممتنعاً لذاته. وأما الثاني فنقول إذا كانت القوة الجسمانية لا يجب انتهاؤها إلى حيث يزول عنه إمكان الوجود فهي إذاً أبداً في ذاتها ممكنة الوجود ولا ينتهي إلى أن يستحيل بقاؤها أبداً ومتى كانت باقية أبداً كانت مؤثرة وتجويز ذلك يبطل أصل الحجة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٦

أقول إن الإمكان الذاتي و مقابله من عوارض الماهيات من حيث هي إذا قيست إلى الوجود و القوى عبارة عن موجودات متشخصة و الموجود بما هو موجود أمر شخصي - و يكون الزمان الخاص من مشخصاته فوجوب نحو خاص من الوجود و امتناع نحو آخر منه بخصوصه لا يخرج الماهية المشتركة بينها عن الإمكان الذي هو حالها من حيث هي هي و البرهان قائم على امتناع لا تناهي الأفعال لواحد شخصي من الجسم لا على امتناع ذلك لواحد نوعي و الوحدة العددية حكمها غير الوحدة النوعية.

و أما عن السؤال الثاني فهب أن الإدراك نفسه انفعال و لكن فعل النفس في تركيب المقدمات و تحليلها و ذلك كاف في غرضنا.

أقول إن جهة انفعالات القوى غير منفكة عن جهة أفاعليها و إن كانت الجهتان مختلفتين فإن الشيء ما لم يكن له وجود لا ينفعل عن شيء آخر فالقوة الجسمانية كما لا تقوى على أفعال غير متناهية كذلك لا تقوى على انفعالات غير متناهية و أما النقص بالهيولى فهو مندفع بأن الهيولى في ذاتها ليست هوية باقية بالعدد لأنها ضعيفة الوحدة مبهمة الوجود وحدتها على نحو الوحدة الجنسية و هي بحسب تحولاتها الصورية - متبدلة متجددة كما مر بيانه.

فإن قلت أ لستم قد بينتم الفرق بين الحس المشترك و بين المفكرة بأن أحدهما مدرك و الآخر متصرف و القوة الواحدة لا تكون مبدأ للإدراك و التصرف فكيف تنسون ذلك و تحكمون بأن النفس قوة على الفعل و هو التصرف في المقدمات و تركيبها - و الانفعال و هو التصور و قبول الصور.

قلت إن النفس لها قوتان عملية و علمية و تفعل بأحدهما و تنفعل بالأخرى - و أما عن الثالث فقل إن النفوس الفلكية و إن كانت جسمانية إلا أنها غير مستقلة في أفعالها من التحريكات فهي في ذاتها و إن كانت متناهية القوة إلا أنها بما يسنح عليها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٧

من أنوار العقل صارت غير متناهية.

و اعترض عليه بأن القوة العقلية إذا حركت الفلك إما أن يفيد الحركة أو قوة بها يكون الحركة فإن أفادت القوة المحركة و هي جسمانية فالقوة الفاعلة للأفعال الغير المتناهية جسمانية و إن كانت القوة العقلية مفيدة للحركة لم تكن القوة الجسمانية مبدأ لتلك الحركة فلا تكون الحركة حركة و أيضا يلزم أن يكون الجسم بما هو جسم - قابلا لتأثير العقل المفارق من غير أن يكون فيه قوة جسمانية و هو محال.

أقول هذا إنما يلزم لو كان الوسط في التأثير قوة واحدة بالعدد أو ضميمة واحدة بالعدد و أما إذا كانت الواردات من العقل المفارق على مادة الفلك قوى متجددة كما رأينا أو كيفيات مستحيلة فلا يلزم شيء من المحذورين و قد مر نظير هذا الكلام فيما سبق.

و لكن بقي الكلام هاهنا بأنه إذا جاز ذلك في القوى الفلكية مع كونها جسمانية - فلم لا يجوز أن تكون القوة الناطقة جسمانية لكنها بما يسنح عليها من نور العقل الفعال - تقوى على الأفعال الغير المتناهية.

و أقول و يؤيد هذا البحث أن قوة التخيل مع كونها غير عقلية أيضا تقوى على تصورات غير متناهية لا تقف عند حدود

ذلك لأنها مستمدة من عالم العقل.

الحجة الخامسة لو كانت القوة العاقلة منطبعة في جسم

كقلب أو دماغ لكانت إما دائمة التعقل لذلك الجسم أو غير عاقلة له مطلقا و التالي باطل فالقول بأنها منطبعة في جسم باطل.

أما بيان الملازمة فنقول إن تعقلها لذلك الجسم إما لأجل أن صورته الموجودة في الخارج حاضرة عند العقل كافية في تعقله أو لأجل أن صورة أخرى من تلك الآلة - تحصل للقوة العاقلة فإن كان الأول وجب أن تكون دائمة التعقل لتلك الآلة وإن كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٨

الثاني فيلزم اجتماع المثلين في محل واحد الصورة المنطبعة العاقلة و الصورة المنطبعة المعقولة فيلزم امتناع التعقل و أيضا ليست إحداها أولى بأن تكون عاقلة و الأخرى بأن تكون معقولة. فإن قيل الصورة الثانية حالة في الأولى لا في مادتها فهي لكونها حالة في الصورة الأولى أولى بأن تكون معقولة و الأولى عاقلة دون العكس.

نقول يعود الكلام في كون إحداها أولى بالحالية من الأخرى دون العكس - فثبت أن إدراك ذلك الجسم إن كان بصورة أخرى فيمتنع إدراك تلك القوة له و أما بطلان التالي أي المفهوم المردد بين القسمين فثبت ما هو مقابل للمعنى المردد بينهما لأن تارة نعقل ذلك العضو و تارة لا نعقله فصورة هذه الحجة استثنائية مركبة من متصلة مؤلفة من حملية و منفصلة و هي قولنا لو كانت القوة العاقلة منطبعة في جسم لكانت إما دائمة التعقل لذلك الجسم أو غير متعلقة له أصلا و الملازمة إنما تتبين بإبطال قسم آخر - على تقدير المقدم حتى يصير به المنفصلة حقيقية ثم يتبين بحقية ذلك القسم في الواقع استثناء نقيض التالي ليثبت نقيض المقدم و هو المطلوب و ذلك يتوقف على مقدمات أربع.

أولها أن الإدراك إنما يكون بمقارنة صورة المدرك للمدرك.

و الثانية أن المدرك إن كان مدركا بذاته كانت المقارنة بحصول الصورة في ذاته - وإن كان مدركا بآلة كانت لحصولها في آله.

و الثالثة أن الأمور الجسمانية إنما تفعل أفعالها بواسطة أجسامها التي هي موضوعاتها فإذا تلك الأجسام آلتها في أفعالها.

و الرابعة أن الأمور المتحدة بالماهية النوعية لا تتغير إلا بسبب اقترانها بأمور متغيرة مادية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٨٩

أقول إن المقدمة الثانية ممنوعة عندنا لأنك قد علمت أن القوة الباصرة - تدرك المبصرات لا بارتسام صورها في العين و كذا قوة الخيال تدرك الصور الأشباح الجسمانية لا بانطباعها في الدماغ فهذه الحجة مقدوحة لأجل اختلال تلك المقدمة.

و صاحب المباحث قدح في المقدمة الأولى كما فعله مرارا بأن العلم بالشيء ليس بمقارنة صورة المدرك بل العلم و

الشعور حالة إضافية قد يكون مع اقتران صورة و قد لا يكون وليس العلم في جميع الأحوال إلا نفس تلك الإضافة المخصوصة فلم لا يجوز أن يكون الناطقة حالة في جسم فمتى حصل بينها وبين الجسم تلك الإضافة المخصوصة - حصل الإدراك و إلا فلا.

أقول قد مر بطلان كون العلم و الإدراك إضافة محضة مرارا و قد علمت أن كل إضافة لا تتحقق إلا بتحقيق أمر به تقع الإضافة و بينا معنى كونها غير مستقلة الوجود في الخارج.

و قال أيضا في رد تلك المقدمة إن المعقول من السماء ليس بمساو للسماء الموجودة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٠

في الخارج في تمام الماهية و إلا لجاز أن يكون السواد مثل البياض في تمام الماهية لأن المناسبة بين السواد و البياض لاشتراكهما في كونهما عرضين حالين في محل محسوس أتم من المناسبة بين المعقول من السماء الذي هو عرض غير محسوس حال في محل كذلك - و بين السماء الموجودة التي هي جوهر موجود محسوس في الخارج محيط بالأرض.

و الجواب أن المعقول من الشيء هو ماهيته التي هو بها هو موجودة بوجود غير جسماني ذي وضع و إشارة فقول القائل إن المعقول من السماء ليس بمساو للسماء الموجودة إن أراد به أن أحدهما معقول و الآخر محسوس كان صادقا و إن أراد به أن المعقول من السماء ليس ماهية السماء فهو كاذب و إن أراد به أن أحدهما جوهر - و الآخر عرض فليس كذلك كما مر.

و اعلم أن المحقق الطوسي ره سلم في الجواب الذي ذكره عن هذا البحث في شرح الإشارات كون السماء المعقولة عرضا في محل مجرد و بين الفرق بين نسبة المعقول من السماء إلى محسوسها و بين مناسبة السواد و البياض بأن الفرق بين الأولين فرق بين الطبيعة المحصلة تارة مع عوارض و تارة مع مقابلتها و الفرق بين السواد و البياض فرق طبيعة الجنسية المحصلة تارة مع فصل يقومها نوعا و تارة مع فصل آخر يقومها نوعا مضادا للأول.

أقول أن التجريد عن العوارض المقارنة للماهية ليس من شرائط معقولية تلك الماهية إذ للعقل أن يتصور ماهية الإنسان مثلا مع جميع عوارضه و صفاته و نعوته - من كنهه و كيفه و أينه و وضعه و متاه و كذا بشكله و أعضائه و جوارحه كل ذلك على الوجه العقلي الكلي كما ثبت في باب علم الباري بالجزئيات و الشخصيات على وجه عقلي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩١

بل شرط الإدراك العقلي للشيء الخارجي أن يجرد حقيقته عن نحو الوجود الجسماني إلى نحو الوجود العقلي فالفرق بين السماء المعقولة و السماء المحسوسة ليس بشيء إلا بنحو الوجود و كل ما وجوده ذلك الوجود النوري الواحد الحقيقي الغير القابل للاحتجاب و الكثرة و الافتراق فهو معقول الذات في نفسه و كل ما وجوده هذا الوجود الجسماني المادي فهو مجهول غائب عن نفسه فضلا عن غيره إلا بلمعة يسيرة تقع عليه من القوى الفائضة عليه من ذلك الوجود.

و اعترض أيضا بأنه لا يلزم من كون العاقلة متعلقة لمحلها بصورة مساوية لمحلها - اجتماع صورتين متمثلتين في محل لأن إحداها حالة في العاقلة و الأخرى محل لها.

و الجواب عنه كما في شرح الإشارات أن العاقلة لو كانت محلا للصورة من غير أن يحل تلك الصورة في محلها كانت

القوة الجسمانية ذات فعل من غير مشاركة المحل - و لما كان كل فاعل جسماني فاعلا بمشاركة الجسم فكل فاعل من غير مشاركة الجسم فهو غير جسماني فكانت العاقلة غير جسماني هذا خلف و لو كانت محلا لصورة حملت في محلها عاد المحال المذكور.

فإن قيل الفرق بينهما باق لأن إحداهما حالة في العاقلة و محلها و الأخرى حالة في محلها فقط قلنا هذا النوع من الحلول اقتران و اقتران الشيء بأحد الشيئين المتقاربين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٢

دون الآخر غير معقول و مع ذلك فالمحال باق بحاله للقول بحلول صورتين متحدتي الماهية في محل واحد. و قال أيضا الجسم قد يحل فيه أعراض كثيرة و لا شك أن وجوداتها الزائدة على ماهياتها متماثلة و حالة في الجسم و يلزم من ذلك اجتماع المثليين. و الجواب عنه أن وجود كل ماهية عين تلك الماهية في الأعيان و مغايرته إياها بحسب الذهن و ماهيات الأعراض متخالفات فوجوداتها كذلك. و قال أيضا هذه الحجة بعينها تقتضي إما كون النفس عاقلة بصفاتها و لوازمها أبداً أو غير عاقلة بشيء منها في وقت من الأوقات بالبيان المذكور الذي ذكرتم. و أيضا تقتضي دوام علمها بجميع عوارضها ما دامت تلك العوارض حاصلة و إلا لكان علمها بعارضها لأجل صورة مساوية لعارضها فيها فيلزم اجتماع المثليين. و أجاب عنه المحقق للإشارات أن الصفات و اللوازم منقسمة إلى ما يجب للنفس لذاتها ككونها مدركة لذاتها و إلى ما يجب لها بعد مقايستها بالأشياء المغايرة لها ككونها مجردة عن المادة و غير موجودة في الموضوع و النفس مدركة للصفة الأولى دائما كما كانت مدركة لذاتها دائما و ليست مدركة للصفة الثانية إلا حالة المقايسة لفقدان الشرط في غير تلك الحالة. أقول ما ذكره غير واف بحل الإشكال على التقرير الثاني و يمكن أن يجاب عنه بأن عوارض النفس ليست إلا علومه و إدراكاته و ما يلزمها و تلك العلوم ما دامت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٣

حاضرة كانت مدركة لها بنفس صورتها الحاضرة و ما دامت النفس ذاهلة عنها فهي زائلة عنها و كذا لوازم تلك العلوم من الانفعالات التي تلحقها بمشاركة البدن كالغضب و الشهوة و الخجل و الوجل و غيرهما.

الحجة السادسة لو كانت القوة العاقلة جسدية

لضعف في زمان الشيخوخة دائما - لكنها لا تضعف في ذلك الزمان دائما فهي غير جسدية و تصحيح نقيض التالي بقياس من الشكل الثالث هكذا ما يعقل به الشيخ الأشياء فهو قوة عاقلة و ليس كلما يعقل به الشيخ فإنه تكل عند الشيخوخة فليس كل قوة عاقلة تكل عند الشيخوخة و ليس يحتاج صحة هذا المطلب أن لا يكل عقل شيخ أصلا بل إذا كان عقل ما لم يكل عندها - يكفي في صحة ما ذكرناه لأن هذا الكلام في قوة قياس استثنائي تاليه متصلة كلية موجبة

استثني فيه نقيض التالي و هو سالبة جزئية لينتج نقيض المقدم صورتها هكذا- لو كانت الناطقة جسدانية تعقل بالآلة لكان كلما عرض للبدن آفة أو مرض أو كلاله تعرض لها في التعقل فتور و ليس كذلك كليا ينتج أن تعقلها ليس بآلة بدنية فلا يرد عليه أن كثيرا ما يعرض الاختلال في التعقل عند اختلال قوى البدن لأن هذا بمنزلة استثناء لعين التالي فلا ينتج شيئا و سبب ذلك أن القوة الجسدانية ربما يحتاج إليها ابتداء- لئتم للقوة العاقلة ما يعقله و يجوز أن يكون اشتغالها بتدبير البدن يعوقها عن سائر أفعالها و ذلك مثل ما يعرض الراكب للسفر إلى بلده فرسا ردي الحركة فإنه يصير اشتغاله بمراعاة مركبة عائقا له من أفعاله الخاصة به ليس صدورها عنه بشركة الفرس- و كذلك للشيخ إذا انصرف عن المعقولات فإنه اشتغل عن أفعاله العقلية إلى تدبير بدنه أو عرض لآلته آفة ربما احتاج إليها في الابتداء لضعف نفسه و عدم رسوخ ملكته في التعقل.

فإن قيل لعل استمراره في أفعال عقله على صحته لأن عقله يتم بعضو من البدن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٤

يتأخر عنه الفساد و الاستحالة و إن ظهرت الآفة في سائر القوى و الأفعال.
فيجاب بأن الأعضاء الطرفية إنما يلحقها الضعف و الفساد لضعف يسبق إلى المبادي- و لو كانت المبادي صحيحة لانحفظت الأطراف و لم يسقط قواها و معلوم أن ليس كبد الشيخ و لا دماغه و لا قلبه على الحال الصحيحة و القريبة من الصحة و لذلك تجد في نبضه و بوله و أفعال دماغه تفاوتاً عظيماً و معلوم أن عقل الإنسان لا يحتاج في تمامه إلى يده و رجليه و جلده و ما يجري مجراه.
أقول تفاوت الأحوال الحاصلة للإنسان بحسب الشيخوخة تابعة أيضاً لتفاوت يقع في أحوال النفس لأن المبدأ للمزاج و المشكل للأعضاء كما علمت هي النفس و منشأ كلال البدن و قواه انصراف النفس عن تدبير هذه النشأة إلى تدبير نشأة ثانية بحسب الجبلية و في ذلك حكمة كون الموت طبيعياً و لميته لا كما ذكره الأطباء و غيرهم.
فإن رجعت و قلت لعل مزاج الشيخ أوفق لأفعال القوة العقلية فلهذا يقوى فيه هذه القوة.
قلنا كلا فإن مزاج الشيخ إما بارد يابس و إما واهن ضعيف و كل منها يوجد في غير المشايخ و لا يكون لصاحبه مزيد استعداد و ليس كل شيخ أقوى من الشاب على أن ضعف البنية ليس يلائم لما يقوم بالبنية بل لعله يلائم ما لا يقوم بالبنية هذا.

حكمة عرشية:

اعلم أن هذا البرهان أيضاً غير دال على أن لكل إنسان جوهرًا مفارقاً عقلياً بل يدل على أن القوة العاقلة غير بدنية و هو كما يدل على أن القوة العاقلة ليست بدنية يدل على أن القوة الخيالية و الوهمية أيضاً ليست بدنية فإن بعض المشايخ و المرضى قد يكون تخيله و تصوره للمعاني الجزئية بحاله و لو كانت القوة الخيالية طبيعية قائمة بهذا البدن الطبيعي لكان كلما عرضت له آفة أو مرض وقع الاختلال في تخيله و تصوره و ليس كذلك إذ قد يكون غير مختلة في فعلها و القضية السالبة الجزئية تكفي لاستثناء نقيض التالي كما علمت و القوم لعدم اطلاعهم على مجرد الخيال تكلفوا تمحلات شديدة في دفع بقاء التخیل و التذكر- عند الشيخوخة و اختلال البدن.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٥

الحجة السابعة وهي قريبة المأخذ مما تقدم

أن كثرة الأفكار و التعمق في إدراك المعقولات سبب لتجفيف الدماغ و ذبول البدن لأجل ثوران الحرارة المجففة و سبب لاستكمال النفس بخروجها في تعقلاتها من القوة إلى الفعل و معلوم أن الشيء الواحد - لا يكون سببا لكمال شيء و نقصانه فلو كان موت البدن يقتضي موت النفس لكانت الأفكار التي هي سبب لنقصان البدن أو موته سببا لنقصان النفس أو موتها مع أنها مكملة لجوهر النفس فعلمنا أن النفس غير قائمة بالبدن.

و لقائل أن يقول إن الممتنع كون شيء واحد سببا لكمال شيء واحد و نقصانه من جهة واحدة و في وقت واحد و أما أن يكون ذلك في وقتين و بحسب اعتبارين فغير ممتنع.

الحجة الثامنة أن النفس غنية في فعلها عن البدن

و كل غني في فعله عن المحل فهو غني في ذاته عنه فالنفس غنية عن المحل أما أنها غنية في فعلها عنه فلو جوه ثلاثة - أحدها أنه يدرك ذاتها و من المستحيل أن يكون بينها و بين ذاتها آلة فهي في إدراكها ذاتها غنية عن الآلة و ثانيها أنها تدرك إدراكها لنفسها و ليس ذلك بالآلة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٦

و الثالث أنها تدرك آلتها و ليست بينها و بين آلتها آلة أخرى فثبت أن النفس غنية في فعلها عن الآلة و المحل و كل ما كان كذلك فهو في ذاته أيضا غني عن المحل و ذلك لأن كون الشيء فاعلا متقوم بكونه موجودا فلو كان الوجود متقوما بالمحل لكان الفعل متقوما أيضا به لأن الإيجاد فرع الوجود و الفعل بعد الذات فحاجة الذات و الوجود إلى شيء - يستلزم حاجة الإيجاد و الفعل إليه من غير عكس و لهذا لا يفعل شيء من القوى الجسمانية - إلا بمشاركة الجسم و لأجل كون الحواس و غيرها من القوى الجسمانية الوجود - لا تدرك ذاتها و لا إدراكها لذاتها و لا إدراكها لآلتها فلو كانت النفس جسمانية لتعذر عليها ذلك و قد ثبت أنها ليس كذلك فثبت أنها غير جسمية.

أقول هذا البرهان دال على تجرد النفس عن البدن سواء كانت قوة عاقلة بالفعل أو كانت متخيلة إذ للخيال أيضا أن يتخيل ذاتها و آلتها و يفعل فعلها من غير مشاركة البدن - و لهذا يتخيل أشياء خارجة عن هذا العالم الطبيعي مما لا يكون بينها و بينه علاقة وضعية بالقرب و البعد فعلم أن فعلها ليس بالآلة بدنية و إن كان محتاجا إلى البدن في الابتداء - كحاجة العقل إليه أيضا من جهة الإعداد و تخصيص الاستعداد.

و اعترض صاحب المباحث على مقدمة هذا البرهان بوجهين الأول بأن الصور و الأعراض محتاجة إلى محالها و ليس احتياجها إلى محالها إلا بمجرد ذواتها ثم لا يلزم من استقلالها بهذا الحكم استغناؤها في ذاتها عن تلك المحال.

الثاني أن جميع الآثار الصادرة من الأجسام مباديها قوى و أعراض في تلك الأجسام - و ليس لمحال تلك القوى مدخل في اقتضاءها تلك الآثار و الأجسام بما هي أجسام - يستحيل أن يكون لها أثر في هذه الأحكام المخصوصة فعلمنا أن المستقل في اقتضاء تلك الأحكام هي تلك الأعراض و القوى الحالة وحدها ثم لا يلزم من استقلالها و انفرادها - في تلك الأحكام استغناؤها عن محالها في الوجود.

أقول في الجواب أما عن الأول فإن الاحتياج و الإمكان و ما أشبههما أمور عقلية و أحكام ذهنية تعرض الماهيات بحسب

ملاحظة الذهن إياها من حيث هي و الكلام في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٧

الأفعال و الأحكام الخارجية و الصور الحالة و الأعراض حاجتها إلى الموارد و الموضوعات ليست أمرا زائدا على وجوداتها و وجوداتها متقومة بالمحل فكيف تكون مستغنية عن المحل بنفس ما به الحاجة إلى المحل أعني الوجود الحلولي و أما عن الثاني فإننا لا نسلم أن محال القوى و الأعراض لا دخل لها في التأثير كيف و التأثير يحتاج إلى وضع خاص و نسبة معينة للمؤثر بالقياس إلى المتأثر و الوضع لا يقوم إلا بالجسم و الذي يذكر في الطبيعيات - أن الجسم بما هو جسم لا يكون سببا لفعل خاص كحرارة أو برودة أو شكل أو حركة - و إلا لكان جميع الأجسام متشاركة فيه لا ينافي هذا الحكم إذ المراد بنفي السببية عن الأجسام نفي سببيتها بالاستقلال لا نفي سببيتها مطلقا و إن كانت بالجزئية و الدخول - حتى لو فرض الحرارة مجردة عن الأجسام لكانت فاعلة لهذه السخونة و السواد لو فرض تجرده عن الأجسام لكانت أيضا قابضا للبصر كيف و المسألة أعني كون تأثير القوى - الحالة في محل بمشاركته برهانية قطعية لا يتطرق في مقدماتها شك أصلا.

الحجة التاسعة القوى البدنية تكل بكثرة الأفعال

و لا يقوى على القوي بعد الضعيف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٨

و علة ذلك أن القوى الجسمانية المادية موادها قابلة للتبدل و الاستحالة و الذبول و بسبب ذلك يعرض لها تبدل الأحوال أما كلالها و ضعفها فلتحلل المادة و ذبولها و أما عدم تمكنها من الفعل الضعيف أثر القوي فالسر فيه أن القوى يناسب الأفاعيل و أن هذه القوى لما كان من شأنها الاشتداد و التضعيف و التبدل بالاستحالة كما علمت فهي متفاوتة الحدود حسب تفاوت الاستعداد فإذا استعملت الآلة الجسمانية في إدراك قوي أو فعل قوي فلا بد هناك من قوة قوية فيفيض من المبدأ القوة القوية على تلك الآلة ثم إذا استعملت أثر ذلك الفعل في فعل آخر ضعيف يعسر ذلك على تلك القوة لأنها لا تناسبه و إنما المناسب لهذا الفعل الضعيف قوة ضعيفة و القوة إنما تحدث تدريجا لا دفعة كما علمت فيما سبق و لأجل ذلك لا يمكن للقوة القوية الفعل الضعيف كما لا يمكن للقوة الضعيفة الفعل القوي ألا ترى أن القوة المحركة التي في الحجر العظيم لا يمكن لها التحريك البطيء لذلك الحجر في هوية و لا للحرارة الشديدة التسخين الضعيف لما يلاقيه - و أما القوى الغير الجسمانية فلكونها متساوية النسبة إلى جميع القوابل و غير متناهية القوة فلا جرم يجوز أن يصدر منها القوي و الضعيف من الأفعال بعضها عقيب بعض من جهة اختلاف الأسباب المخصصة فلاجل ذلك لا يضعف بكثرة الأفعال و يقوى على القوي بعد الضعيف و على الضعيف بعد القوي.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٢٩٩

فإذا تقرر هذه المقدمة فنقول القوة العاقلة لما كانت هكذا لأنها تدرك المعقولات القوية و الضعيفة بعضها عقيب بعض فهي ليست جسمانية كسائر القوى البدنية التي شأنها ما ذكرناه.

و هذا البرهان أيضا يدل على كون القوة الخيالية غير جسمانية فإنها تقوى على تخيل الأشياء العظيمة مع تخيلها للأشياء الحقيرة مثلا يمكنها أن يتخيل فلك الأفلاك مع الخردلة و أن يتخيل ضوء الشمس و حرارة النار مع ضوء الشرارة و حرارة الهواء المعتدلة و أن يتخيل صوت الرعد مع الهمس و هذا مما أشكل الأمر - على من لم يتفطن بتجرد الخيال عن المواد المستحيلة الكائنة الفاسدة فجعل يتكلف في دفع الإشكال عن نفسه بأن قوة الإدراك غير قوة المدرك فالشمس و القمر و السماء مدركات قوية و نحن إذا تخيلناها فإدراكنا لها لا يلزم أن يكون قويا و لأجل ذلك لا يمنع إدراكنا لها عن إدراك المدركات الضعيفة و أما إذا قوي تخيلنا لها بحيث صرنا مستغرقين في ذلك التخيّل امتنع علينا و الحال هذه تخيل الشيء الحقير.

أقول الإدراك لا يخلو إما أن يكون هو الصورة الحاصلة من الشيء أو الإضافة التي بين المدرك و المدرك كما هو مذهب هذا القائل فعلى الأول لا معنى لقوة الإدراك و ضعفه إلا قوة المدرك و ضعفه لأنهما أمر واحد لأن المدرك في الحقيقة هو الصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠٠

لا الأمر الخارجي الذي ربما لا يوجد في الخارج عند وجود الصورة ثم لا يخفى أن صورة السماء التي في الخيال أقوى من صورة الخردلة فيه و أما على الثاني فالإضافة من الأمور - التي لا توصف بقوة و لا ضعف و لا عظم و لا حقارة إلا باعتبار ما أضيف إليه ثم قوله و أما إذا قوي تخيلنا امتنع علينا و الحال هذه تخيل الشيء الحقير يناقض ما ذكره حيث وصف الشيء المتخيل بالحقارة دون الخيال و أيضا الاستغراق في إدراك الشيء في الحقيقة يرجع إلى ضعف الإدراك بالنسبة إلى وجود المدرك و غلبة وجود المدرك و استيلائه على القوة الإدراكية فيقهرها عن الإحاطة به و الاكتناه فليس الاستغراق في إدراك الشيء عبارة عن تسلط الإدراك على المدرك بل تسلط المدرك على الإدراك له.

و أيضا ما ذكره مشترك بين الإدراك العقلي و الإدراك الخيالي فإنما متى استغرقنا في تعقل شيء عظيم قوي الوجود عالي المرتبة رفيع السمك انقطعنا عن تعقل غيره - و من استغرق في جلال الله و عظمته امتنع عليه الالتفات إلى ذاته فضلا عن تعقل معقولات أخرى.

الحجة العاشرة قد سبق أن المدرك بجميع أصناف الإدراكات لجميع المدركات شيء واحد في الإنسان فنقول هذا المدرك إما أن يكون جسما من الأجسام بما هو جسم و إما أن يكون قوة أو صفة قائمة بالجسم صورة أو عرضا و إما أن يكون أمرا مفارقا عن الجسم غير قائم به و الأول ظاهر البطلان لأن الجسم من حيث هو جسم لا يمكن أن يكون مدركا لشيء كما بيناه مرارا من أنه ليس للجسم وجود وحداني و حضور جمعي يوجد له شيء أو يوجد هو لشيء.

و أيضا لو كان الجسم بما هو جسم مدركا لكان جميع الأجسام مدركة و الثاني أيضا محال لأن تلك القوة إما أن تكون قائمة بجميع أجزاء البدن أو قائمة ببعض أعضاء البدن دون بعض و الأول باطل و إلا لكان كل جزء من أجزاء البدن مبصرا سامعا متخيلا متفكرا عاقلا و ليس كذلك بالبدهة فإن البصر لا يسمع و اليد لا يتخيل و الرجل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠١

لا يتفكر و باطل أيضا أن يقال بعض الأعضاء قامت به القوة المدركة لجميع هذه الإدراكات لأنه يلزم أن يكون في البدن

عضو واحد سامع مبصر متخيل متفكر عاقل فهم ولسنا نعلمه و لا نجد أي عضو هو.
و به يظهر فساد قول القائل لعل القوة المدركة لجميع هذه الإدراكات أمر قائم بجسم لطيف محصور في بعض الأعضاء.
فإننا نقول لو كان كذلك لكننا نجد من أبداننا موضعا مشتملا على جسم موصوف - بكونه سامعا مبصرا عاقلا فاهما.
فإن قلت هب أنكم لا تعرفون ذلك الموضوع لكن عدم علمكم بذلك لا يدل على عدمه.
قلنا نحن نعرف ذواتنا و نعرف أنا نحن السامعون المبصرون و المتخيلون العاقلون - فلو كان بعض الأجسام سواء كان جزءا من البدن أو كان محصورا في جزء من البدن - يكون موصوفا بتلك القوة المدركة بجميع الإدراكات لجميع المدركات لم تكن حقيقتنا و هويتنا إلا ذلك الجسم الموصوف بتلك القوة المنعوتة بجميع هذه الإدراكات و إذا كان كذلك ثم لا نعرفه فلم نكن عارفين بحقيقة ذاتنا.
و أيضا قد علمت فيما سبق أن المدرك و الحاس من جنس المدرك و المحسوس و إذا كان كذلك فيستحيل أن يكون جسم واحد بقوة واحدة آلة للسمع و البصر و الذوق و التخيل و التعقل.
فإن قلت هذا يرد عليكم حيث جعلتم قوة واحدة مجردة سمیعة بصيرة لامسة متخيلة عاقلة.
قلت هذه القوى فروع و معاليل للقوة العقلية و هي تمام هذه القوى و فاعلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠٢

و التام و الفاعل يقوى على كل ما يقوى عليه الناقص و المفعول من الأفعال دون العكس - لأن معلول معلول الشيء معلول لذلك الشيء و أما معلول علة الشيء فلا يكون معلولا له و إلا لزم كون الشيء معلولا لنفسه فثبت أن الموصوف بجميع الإدراكات لجميع المدركات قوة واحدة غير جسمانية و هو المطلوب.

الحجة الحادي عشر أن كل صورة أو صفة حصلت في الجسم بسبب من الأسباب

فإذا زالت عنه و بقي فارغا عنها فيحتاج في استرجاعها إلى استيناف سبب أو سببية - كالماء إذا تسخن بسبب كالنار مثلا ثم إذا زالت عنه السخونة لا يمكن عودها إليه إلا بسبب جديد و هذا بخلاف النفس في إدراكاتها فإننا كثيرا ما يحدث فينا صورة علمية - بسبب فكر أو تعليم معلم ثم يزول عنها تلك الصورة عند الذهول أمكنها استرجاع تلك الصورة لذاتها عن غير استيناف ذلك السبب و بالجملة النفس من شأنها أن تكون مكتفية بذاتها في كمالاتها و لا شيء من الجسم مكتف بذاته فالنفس تعالت عن أن تكون جرمية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠٣

لا يقال الجسم أيضا قد يعود إليه صفته التي كانت فيه بعد زوالها من غير استيناف سبب جديد كالماء إذا زالت عنه البرودة بورود السخونة التي هي ضدها ثم يستعيد طبعه البرودة التي كانت له.
لأننا نقول كلامنا في الصفة الطارية للشيء لأجل سبب خارج عن ذات الموصوف - و برودة الماء صفة ذاتية علتها طبيعة الماء بشرط عدم القاصر ثم إذا عادت البرودة إليه - ما عادت إلا مع سببها أعني مجموع الطبيعة و عدم المانع فهذه عشر براهين موقعة لليقين بأن النفس الإنسانية مجردة عن المادة و لواحقها سواء كانت بالغة إلى حد العقل بالفعل أم لا فإن النفس المتخيلة بالفعل أيضا يشارك العقل في تجرد ذاتها و فعلها عن هذا العالم لكن العقل مجرد عن الكونين و الخيال

غير مجرد إلا عن إحداهما

فصل (٢) في شواهد سمعية في هذا الباب

أكثر الناس انتفاعهم بالسمعيات أكثر من العقليات ولا يصدقون بالأشياء إلا بمكافحة الحس للمحسوس ولا يذعنون بالعقليات ما لم يقترن معها انتهاء نقلها إلى محسوس - فلنذكر أدلة سمعية لهذا المطلب حتى يعلم أن الشرع والعقل متطابقان في هذه المسألة كما في سائر الحكميات وحاشى الشريعة الحقبة الإلهية البيضاء أن تكون أحكامها مصادمة للمعارف اليقينية الضرورية و تبا لفلسفة تكون قوانينها غير مطابقة للكتاب والسنة.

أما الآيات المشيرة إلى تجرد النفس

فمنها قوله تعالى في حق آدم وأولاده

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠٤

وَنَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِي* وفي حق عيسى **ع وَكَلَّمْتُهُ الْقَاهَا إِلَى مَرْيَمَ وَرُوحٌ مِنْهُ** وهذه الإضافة تنادي على شرف الروح و كونها عرية عن عالم الأجسام وفي حق شيخ الأنبياء إبراهيم الخليل **ع وَكَذَلِكَ نُرِي إِبْرَاهِيمَ مَلَكُوتَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ - وَ لِيَكُونَ مِنَ الْمُوقِنِينَ** وقوله حكاية عنه **وَجَّهْتُ وَجْهِيَ لِلَّذِي فَطَرَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ حَنِيفًا** ومعلوم أن الجسم وقواه ليس شيء منها بهذه الصفات السنية من رؤية عالم الملكوت والإيقان والتوجه بوجه الذات لفاطر السماوات والحنيفية أي الطهارة والقدس.

ومنها قوله تعالى **ثُمَّ أَنشَأْنَاهُ خَلْقًا آخَرَ فَتَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ الْخَالِقِينَ.**

ومنها قوله تعالى **سُبْحَانَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ الْأَزْوَاجَ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠٥

كُلُّهَا مِمَّا تُنْبِتُ الْأَرْضُ وَمِنْ أَنْفُسِهِمْ وَمِمَّا لَا يَعْلَمُونَ وقوله **إِلَيْهِ يَصْعَدُ الْكَلِمُ الطَّيِّبُ** وقوله **لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ** وقوله **يَا أَيَّتُهَا النَّفْسُ الْمُطْمَئِنَّةُ ارْجِعِي إِلَىٰ رَبِّكِ رَاضِيَةً مَرْضِيَّةً** وفي الحقيقة جميع هذه الآيات المشيرة إلى المعاد وأحوال العباد في النشأة الثانية دالة على تجرد النفس لاستحالة إعادة المعدوم وانتقال العرض وما في حكمه من القوى المنطبعة.

و أما الأحاديث النبوية

فمثل

قوله ص: من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه

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و قوله: أعرفكم بنفسي أعرفكم بربه

و قوله: من رآني فقد رأى الحق

و قوله:

أنا النذير العريان

و قوله: لي مع الله وقت لا يسعني فيه ملك مقرب و لا نبي مرسل

و قوله: أبیت عند ربي يطعمني و يسقيني

فهذه الأخبار و أمثالها تدل على شرف النفس و قربها من الباري إذا كملت

و كذا قوله: رب أرني الأشياء كما هي

و معلوم أن دعاء النبي ص مستجاب و العلم بالأشياء ذوات السبب كما هي لا يحصل إلا من جهة العلم بسببها و جاعلها

كما برهن في مقامه و المراد بالرؤية هو العلم الشهودي و كذلك دعاء الخليل ع كما حكى الله عنه في قوله **رَبِّ ارْنِي**

كَيْفَ تَحْيِي الْمَوْتَى و رؤية الفعل لا تنفك عن رؤية الفاعل و ليس في حد الجسم و مشاعره أن يرى رب الأرباب و

مسبب الأسباب

و قوله ص: قلب المؤمن عرش الله

و

قوله قلب المؤمن بين إصبعين من أصابع الرحمن

و معلوم أن ليس المراد هذا اللحم الصنوبري و لا أيضا إصبع الله جارحة جسمانية بل القلب الحقيقي هو الجوهر النطقي

من الإنسان و الإصبعان هما العقل و النفس الكليان أو القوتان العقلية و النفسية

و قوله ص: المؤمن أعظم قدرا عند الله من العرش

و معلوم أن هذه الأعظمية ليست بجسمية و لا لقوة محصورة في عضو من أعضائه

و قوله ص: خلق الله الأرواح قبل الأجساد بألفي عام

و قول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠٧

أمير المؤمنين و إمام الموحدين ع: حين سئل عنه خبر من الأخبار هل رأيت ربك حين عبدته فقال ع ويلك

ما كنت أعبد ربا لم أره قال و كيف رأيته أو كيف الرؤية - فقال ويلك لا تدركه العيون في مشاهدة الأبصار

و لكن رأته القلوب بحقائق الإيمان

و الرؤية العقلية لا يمكن بقوة جسمانية

و قوله ع: في الجواب حين سئل عنه كيف قلعت باب خبير قلعته بقوة ربانية لا بقوة جسمانية

و عنه ع أنه قال: الروح ملك من ملائكة الله له سبعون ألف وجه

الحديث

و قال روح الله المسيح بالنور الشارق من سرادق الملكوت: لن يلج ملكوت السماوات من لم يولد مرتين

و قوله:

لا يصعد إلى السماء إلا من نزل منها

و أما كلمات الأوائل

فقد قال معلم الحكمة العتيقة أرسطاطاليس

في كتابه - المعروف بأثولوجيا على لسان اليونانيين بمعنى معرفة الربوبية و هو علم المفارقات إني ربما خلوت بنفسي و خلعت بدني جانبا و صرت كأني جوهر مجرد بلا بدن فأكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٠٨

داخلا في ذاتي خارجا من سائر الأشياء فأرى في ذاتي من الحسن و البهاء ما أبقي له متعجبا بهتا فاعلم أني جزء من أجزاء العالم الشريف الإلهي ذو حياة فعالة فلما أيقنت بذلك - رقيت بذهني من ذلك العالم إلى العلة الإلهية فصرت كأني موضوع فيها متعلق بها - فأكون فوق العالم العقلي كله في كلام طويل و قال أيضا من حرص على ذلك العالم - و ارتقى إليه جوزي هناك أحسن الجزاء اضطارا فلا ينبغي لأحد أن يفتر عن الطلب - و الحرص و الاهتمام في الارتفاع إلى ذلك العالم و إن تعب و نصب فإن أمامه راحة لا تعب بعدها أبدا و ما يدل على هذا المطلب رسالته المعروفة بتفاحة و هي مشتملة على كلماته التي تكلم بها حين حضرته الوفاة و ما احتج به على فضل الفلسفة و أن الفيلسوف يجازى على فلسفته بعد مفارقة نفسه عن جسده.

و قال أيضا ليست النفس في البدن بل البدن فيها لأنها أوسع منه.

و قال أنبأذقلس

إن النفس إنما كانت في المكان العالي الشريف فلما أخطأت سقطت إلى هذا العالم فرارا من سخط الله فلما انحدرت صارت غيائا للأنفس التي قد انخلطت عقولها و كان يدعو الناس بأعلى صوته و يأمرهم أن يرفضوا هذا العالم و يصيروا إلى عالمهم الأول الشريف و وافق هذا الفيلسوف أغاثاذيمون في دعائه الناس إلى رفض هذا العالم إلا أنه تكلم بالأمثال و الرموز.

و أما فيثاغورث صاحب العدد

فكلامه في الرسالة المعروفة بالذهبية ناص على هذا الرأي و الرسالة أيضا موجودة عندنا و قال في آخر وصيته لديوجانس إنك إذا فارقت هذا البدن تصير عند ذاك مخلى في الجو العالي تكون حينئذ سائحا غير عائد إلى الإنسية - و لا قابلا للموت

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و أما أفلاطون الشريف الإلهي

فروي عنه في كتاب أثولوجيا أنه قد أحسن في صفة النفس حيث وصفها بأوصاف كثيرة صرنا بها كأننا نشاهدها عيانا غير أنه قد اختلفت صفاته في النفس لأنه لم يستعمل الحس في صفات النفس و لا رفضه في جميع المواضع و ذم و ازدرى اتصالها بالبدن فقال إن النفس إنما هي في البدن كأنها محصورة كظيمة جدا لا نطق بها - ثم قال إن البدن للنفس إنما هو كالغار و قد وافقه أنبأذقلس غير أنه سمى البدن بالصدى و إنما عنى بالصدى هذا العالم.

أقول و يوافق في هذا الكلام الإلهي **و طبع على قلوبهم بل أن على قلوبهم ما كانوا يكسبون.**

ثم قال إن إطلاق النفس من وثاقها هو خروجها من مغار هذا العالم و الترقى إلى عالمها العقلي.

أقول و سبب اختلاف صفات النفس في كلامه ما علمت من طريقتنا من اختلاف النفوس في التجسم و التروح بل اختلاف نفس واحد فيهما بحسب وقتين أو في وقت واحد من جهتين.

و قال في كتابه الذي يدعى فاذن إن علة هبوط النفس إلى هذا العالم إنما هو سقوط ريشها فإذا ارتأشت ارتفعت إلى عالمها الأول و قال في بعض كتبه إن علة هبوط النفس إلى هذا العالم أمور شتى و ذلك أن منها أنها تهبط لخطيئة أخطأها- و منها أنها هبطت لعدة أخرى غير أنه اختصر قوله بأن ذم هبوط النفس و سكنها في هذه الأجسام وإنما ذكر هذا في كتابه الذي يدعى طيمائوس ثم ذكر هذا العالم و مدحه فقال إنه جوهر شريف سعيد و إن النفس إنما صارت في هذا العالم من فعل

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الباري الخير ليكون هذا العالم حيا ذا عقل لأنه لم يكن من الواجب إذا كان هذا العالم متقنا في غاية الإتقان أن يكون غير ذي عقل و لم يكن ممكنا أن يكون للعالم عقل و ليست له نفس فلهذه العلة أرسل الباري النفس إلى هذا العالم و أسكنها فيه- ثم أرسل نفوسنا فسكنت في أبداننا ليكون هذا العالم تاما كاملا و ثلثا يكون دون ذلك العالم في التمام و الكمال لأنه كان ينبغي أن يكون في العالم الحسي من أجناس الحيوان ما في العالم العقلي.

و أما الآثار

فقد تكلم المتمسكون بهذه الشريعة الحققة في ماهية الروح فقوم منهم بطريق الاستدلال و النظر و قوم منهم بطريق الذوق و الوجدان لا باستعمال الفكر حتى تكلم في ذلك مشايخ الصوفية مع أنهم تأدبوا بأداب رسول الله ص و لم يكشفوا عن سر الروح إلا على سبيل الرمز و الإشارة و نحن أيضا لا نتكلم إلا عن بعض مقامات الروح الإلهي و قواه و منازل النفسية و العقلية لا عن كنهه لامتناع ذلك.

فقد قال الجنيد ره-

الروح شيء استأثره الله بعلمه و لا يجوز العبارة عنه بأكثر من موجود و لعله أراد أنه موجود بحت و وجود صرف كسائر الهويات البسيطة العقلية- التي هي إنيات محضة متفاوتة بالأشد و الأضعف ليست لها ماهيات متقومة من جنس و فصل.

و قال أبو يزيد البسطامي رض-

طلبت ذاتي في الكونين فما وجدتها في ذاته فوق

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عالم الطبيعة و عالم المثال فيكون من المفارقات العقلية.

و قال أيضا انسلخت من جلدي فرائيت من أنفاسي البدن قشرا و جلدا و هذا تصريح بأن هوية الإنسان و إنيته شيء غير الجسد.

و قال أيضا لو أن العرش و ما حواه وقعت في زاوية من زوايا قلب أبي يزيد لما أحس بها و ظاهر أن هذه السعة ليس لبدنه و لا لجسم آخر.

و قال ابن عطا-

خلق الله الأرواح قبل الأجساد لقوله تعالى **وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَاكُمْ** يعني الأرواح **ثُمَّ صَوَّرْنَاكُمْ**

و قال بعضهم الروح لطيف قائم في كثيف

و في هذا نظر و له وجه صحيح.

و قال بعضهم الروح عبارة

و القائم بالأشياء هو الحي و فيه أيضا نظر إلا أن يحمل على معنى الإحياء و مع ذلك يدل قوله على أن الروح حي بذاته لا بحياة الجسم

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و قال بعض المفسرين

في قوله تعالى **قُلِ الرُّوحُ مِنْ أَمْرِ رَبِّي** أمره كلامه فصار الحي حيا بقوله كن حيا فعلى هذا لا يكون الروح في الجسد. و اعلم أن أهل الشريعة اختلفوا في الروح الذي سئل رسول الله ص عنه - فمن الأقوال المنقولة عنهم ما يدل على أن قائله يعتقد بقدوم الروح.

و منها ما يدل على أنه يعتقد حدوثة.

و أيضا قال قوم إن الروح هو جبرئيل ع

و هذا القول يشبه قول من قال - باتحاد النفس بالعقل الفعال عند استكمالها و يقرب منه الحديث المنقول أنفا

عن أمير المؤمنين ع: الروح ملك من ملائكة الله له سبعون ألف وجه

. و روي عن ابن عباس:

إن الروح خلق من خلق الله صورهم على صور بني آدم - و ما نزل من السماء ملك إلا و معه واحد من الروح

. و قال أبو صالح-

الروح كهيئة الإنسان و ليسوا بناس.

و قال مجاهد

الروح على صور بني آدم لهم أيد و أرجل و رءوس يأكلون الطعام و ليسوا بملائكة.

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أقول المراد من إثبات هذه الأعضاء في الروح حيثما وقع في كلام هؤلاء القوم - ليس إثبات الجوارح الجسمانية بل أجزاء روحانية و قوى معنوية كما يليق بلطافة الروح - نظير ما ذكره قول المعلم الأول للمشاءين حيث قال في كتاب أثولوجيا إن الإنسان الحسي إنما هو صنم للإنسان العقلي و الإنسان العقلي روحاني و جميع أعضائه روحانية - و ليس موضع اليد غير موضع الرجل و لا مواضع الأعضاء كلها مختلفة لكننا في موضع واحد

و قال سعيد بن جبير

لم يخلق الله خلقاً أعظم من الروح غير العرش و لو شاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣١٤

أن يبلغ السماوات السبع و الأرضين في لقمة لفعل صورة خلقه على صورة الملائكة- و صورة وجهه على صورة الآدميين يقوم يوم القيمة عن يمين العرش و الملائكة معه في صف واحد و هو ممن يشفع لأهل التوحيد و لو لا أن بينه و بين السماوات ستراً من نور- لاحترق أهل السماوات من نوره فهذه الأقاويل لا يكون منهم إلا نقلاً و سماعاً بلغهم عن رسول الله ص كذلك.

و قال بعضهم الروح لم يخرج من كن

لأنه لو خرج من كن كان عليه الذل- قيل فمن أي شيء خرج قال من بين جماله و جلاله سبحانه بملاحظة الإشارة خصها بسلامه و حياها بكلامه فهي معتقة من ذل كن. أقول أراد أنه ليس من الموجودات الطبيعية الكائنة لأن كل كائن فاسد و قد برهننا على أن الأرواح العقلية من سرادقات الإلهية و شئون الصمدية و إمكاناتها أمور

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ذهنية غير واقعة في نفس الأمر بل باعتبار بعض الملاحظات.

و قال بعضهم الروح لطيفة تسري من الله

إلى أماكن معروفة لا يعبر عنه بأكثر من موجود بإيجاد غيره أقول و قد مر تأويله بأن المراد أنه محض الوجود المجهول بالإبداع لا بالتخليق من شيء آخر كموضوع أو مادة.

و سئل أبو سعيد الخراز عن الروح

أهي مخلوقة قال نعم لو لا ذلك ما أقرت بالربوبية حيث قالت بلى قال و الروح هي التي قام بها البدن و استحقق بها اسم الحياة- و بالروح ثبت العقل و بالروح قامت الحجة و لو لم يكن الروح كان العقل معطلا لا حجة عليه و لا له.

و قال بعضهم إنها جوهر مخلوق

و لكنها لطف المخلوقات و أصفى الجواهر و أنورها- و بها يرى المغيبات و بها يكون الكشف لأهل الحقائق و إذا حجب الروح عن مراعات السر أساءت الجوارح الأدب.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣١٦

و قال الآخر

الدنيا و الآخرة سواء عند الروح.

و قال بعضهم الأرواح تجول في البرزخ

و تبصر أحوال الدنيا و الملائكة يتحدثون في السماء عن أحوال الآدميين فأرواح تحت العرش و أرواح طيارة إلى الجنان و إلى حيث شاءت على أقدارهم من السعي إلى الله أيام الحياة.

و روى سعيد بن مسيب عن سلمان رض-

قال أرواح المؤمنين تذهب في برزخ من الأرض حيث شئت بين الأرض والسماء حتى يردّها إلى جسدها. وقيل إذا ورد على الأرواح ميت من الأحياء التقوا و تحدثوا و تساءلوا و وكل الله بها ملائكة تعرض عليها أعمال الأحياء حتى إذا عرض على الأموات ما يعاقب عليه الأحياء في الدنيا من أجل الذنوب كان عذرا ظاهرا عند الأموات فإنه لا أحد أحب إليه العذر من الله تعالى.

و من هذا القبيل ما رواه الشيخ أبو جعفر محمد بن الحسن الطوسي ره: أنه سأل أبو بصير أبا عبد الله جعفر بن محمد الصادق ع عن أرواح المؤمنين فقال في الجنة على صور أبدانهم لو رأيته لقلت فلان . و روى أيضا محمد بن يعقوب الكليني ره في أواخر كتاب الجنائز من الكافي عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣١٧

جعفر الصادق ع: أن الأرواح في صفة الأجساد في شجر في الجنة تتعارف و تتساعل فإذا قدمت الروح على تلك الأرواح تقول دعوها فإنه قد أقبلت من هول عظيم ثم يسألونها ما فعل فلان و ما فعل فلان فإن قالت لهم تركته حيا ارتجوه و إن قالت لهم قد هلك قالوا قد هوى بهوى . و في الكافي عنه ع: إن أرواح المؤمنين في حجرات في الجنة يأكلون من طعامها و يشربون من شرابها و يقولون ربنا أقم لنا الساعة و أنجز لنا ما وعدتنا و ألحق آخرا بأولنا . و روى في أرواح الكفار بضد ذلك.

و روى أيضا محمد بن الحسن الطوسي ره في التهذيب عن الإمام أبي عبد الله ع: أنه قال ليونس بن زبيان ما يقول الناس في أرواح المؤمنين فقال يونس يقولون في حواصل طير خضر في قناديل تحت العرش فقال ع سبحان الله المؤمن أكرم على الله من ذلك أن يجعل روحه في حوصلة طائر أخضر يا يونس المؤمن إذا قبضه الله تعالى - صير روحه في قالب كقالبه في الدنيا فيأكلون و يشربون فإذا قدم عليهم القادم عرفوه بتلك الصورة التي كانت في الدنيا

و الأخبار المنقولة عن أئمتنا أهل بيت رسول الله ص - أكثر من أن تحصى و لا تظن أن اتصاف الأرواح بتلك الصفات من الشكل و الهيئة - و التحدث و الأكل و الشرب و غيرها مما تنافي تجردها عن هذا العالم الطبيعي بل يؤكد أنه لأن الروح يتشكل و يتصور و يتجسم في غير هذا العالم فإن لله عوالم كثيرة غير هذا العالم بعضها الطف من بعض كلها مفارق عن هذا العالم و عن المواد الكونية و الاستعدادية و ستعلم في مباحث المعاد كيفية تمثل الأرواح بصور الأجساد مع تجردها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣١٨

و مفارقتها عن الأبعاد و الأجرام ذاتا و وجودا لا فعلا و مثالا. سئل الواسطي لأي علة كان رسول الله ص أحكم الخلق قال لأنه خلق روحه أولا فوقع له صحبة التمكين و الاستقرار ألا تراه كيف يقول كنت نبيا و آدم بين الماء و الطين و في رواية العوارف بين الروح و الجسد أي لم يكن روحا و لا جسدا

انتهى كلامه

و قال بعضهم الروح خلق من نور العزة

و إبليس خلق من نار العزة و لهذا قال خلقتني من نار و لم يدر أن النور خير من النار.

و قال بعضهم قرن الله العلم بالروح

فهي للطافتها تنمو بالعلم كما أن البدن تنمو بالغذاء.

و المختار عند أكثر المتكلمين

أن الإنسانية و الحيوانية عرضان خلقا في الإنسان - و الموت يعدمهما و أن الروح هي الحياة بعينها صار البدن بوجودها حيا و بالإعادة إليه في القيامة يصير حيا.

أقول هذا الكلام مما له وجه صحة و تحقيق لو صدر عن ذي بصيرة و كشف - و كذا ما ذهب إليه بعض المتكلمين من أنه جسم لطيف اشتبك بالأجسام الكثيفة اشتباك الماء بالعود الأخضر و هو اختيار أبي المعالي الجويني أستاذ الشيخ أبي حامد الغزالي - و ذلك لأن ذلك الجسم البرزخي أيضا من مظاهر الروح و كينونته في هذا البدن ليس بتداخل و اشتباك لكن يشبههما.

و أصر بعض متأخريهم على أنه عرض مع ما سمعوا من الأخبار الواردة فيه الدالة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣١٩

على استقلاله و جوهريته من العروج و الهبوط و التردد في البرازخ و أما قول ابن عباس حين سئل و قيل له أين تذهب الأرواح عند مفارقة الأبدان - فقال أين تذهب ضوء المصباح عند فناء الأدهان فغرضه أن ذهاب الروح إلى المقام الذي جاء منه فممن علم كيفية مجيء الروح من ذلك المقام العقلي من غير لزوم حركة و تجسم يمكنه أن يعلم ذهابه إلى ذلك العالم من غير زيادة مكان أو تغير أو تكثر هناك و قيل له أين يذهب الجسوم إذا بليت قال أين يذهب لحمها إذا مرضت.

و قال أبو طالب المكي

في قوة القلوب ما يميل إلى أن الأرواح أعيان في الجسد و كذا النفوس لأنه يذكر أن الروح يتحرك و من حركتها يظهر نور في القلب يراه الملك فيلهم الخير عند ذلك و أن النفس تتحرك و من حركتها يظهر ظلمة في القلب - فيرى الشيطان الظلمة فيقبل بالإغواء.

أقول مراده من هذه الحركات الحركات الفكرية التي قد تكون برهانية عقلية - يستدعي فيضان الصورة العقلية النورية على النفس و قد تكون قياسا سفسطيا وهميا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٠

مؤديا إلى تصور النفس بصورة فاسدة مظلمة و نتيجة باطلة و هو من فعل الشيطان - و هذه الحركات لا تنافي تجرد النفوس.

و قال الشيخ الغزالي

إن الروح إذا فارقت الأبدان تحمل معها القوة الوهمية بتوسط النطقية فتكون حينئذ مطالعة للمعاني المحسوسة لأن

تجردها من هيئة البدن غير ممكن و هي عند الموت شاعرة بالموت و بعد الموت متخيلة نفسها مقبورة و يتصور جميع ما كانت تعتقده حال الحياة و تحس بالثواب و العقاب في القبر و هذا كلام صحيح برهاني - يؤيد ما ذهبنا إليه من تجرد القوة الخيالية و ما يصحبها و سيرد زيادة تحقيق و إيضاح له.

و قال صاحب العوارف و المعارف

ما وجدناه أيضا في كتاب الطواسين و اليواسين - و هو أن الروح العلوي السماوي من عالم الأمر و الروح الحيواني البشري من عالم الخلق و هو محل الروح العلوي و مورده و هذا الروح الحيواني جسماني لطيف - حامل لقوة الحس و الحركة و هذا الروح لسائر الحيوانات و منه يفيض قوى الحواس - و هو الذي قواه الغذاء و يتصرف فيه بعلم الطب و به اعتدال مزاج الأخلاط و لورود الروح الإنساني على هذا الروح تجنس و باين أرواح الحيوانات و اكتسب صفة أخرى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢١

فصارت نفسا محلا للنطق و الإلهام قال تعالى **وَنَفْسٍ وَمَا سَوَّاهَا فَأَلْهَمَهَا فُجُورَهَا وَتَقْوَاهَا** فتسويتها بورود الروح الإنساني عليها و اقتطاعها عن جنس أرواح الحيوانات فتكونت النفس بتكوين الله من الروح العلوي في عالم الأمر و صار تكونها منه في عالم الأمر - كتكون حواء من آدم ع في عالم الخلق و صار بينهما من التأليف و التعاشق كما بين آدم و حواء و صار كل واحد منهما يذوق الموت بمفارقة صاحبه قال الله تعالى - **وَجَعَلَ مِنْهَا زَوْجَهَا لِيَسْكُنَ إِلَيْهَا** فسكن آدم إلى حواء و سكن الروح العلوي إلى الروح الحيواني و صيره نفسا و يتكون من سكن الروح إلى النفس القلب و أعني بهذا القلب اللطيفة التي محلها المضغة اللحمية فالمضغة اللحمية من عالم الخلق و هذه اللطيفة من عالم الأمر و كان تكون القلب من الروح و النفس في عالم الأمر كتكون الذرية من آدم و حواء في عالم الخلق و لولا المساكنة بين الزوجين الذين أحدهما الروح و الآخر النفس - ما تكون القلب فمن القلب متطلع إلى الأب الذي هو الروح العلوي ميال إليه و هو القلب المؤيد الذي ذكره رسول الله ص فيما رواه حذيفة

قال ص: القلوب أربعة قلب أجرد فيه سراج يزهر

فذلك قلب المؤمن و قلب أسود منكوس فذلك قلب الكافر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٢

و قلب مربوط على علاقة فذلك قلب المنافق و قلب مصفح فيه إيمان و نفاق

فمثل الإيمان فيه مثل البقلة يمدّها الماء الطيب و مثل النفاق فيه كمثل القرحة يمدّها القيح و الصديد - فأي المدين غلبت عليه حكم له بها و القلب المنكوس ميال إلى الأم التي هي النفس الأمارّة بالسوء و من القلوب قلب مترددة في ميله إليهما و بحسب غلبة ميل القلب يكون حكمه من السعادة و الشقاوة و العقل جوهر الروح العلوي و لسانه الدال عليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٣

و تدبيره للقلب المؤيد و النفس الزكية المطمئنة تدبير الوالد للولد البار و الزوجة الصالحة - و تدبيره للقلب المنكوس و

النفس الأمارة بالسوء تدبير الوالد للولد العاق والزوجة السيئة - فمنكر لهما من وجه و منجذب إلى تدبيرهما من وجه
إذ لا بد له منهما فالروح العلوي يهيم بالارتقاء إلى مولاه تشوقاً و حنواً و تنزهاً عن الأكوان و من الأكوان القلب و النفس
فإذا ارتقى الروح يحنو القلب حنو الولد الحسن البار إلى الوالد و يحنو النفس إلى القلب حنو الوالدة الحنية إلى ولدها و
إذا حنت النفس ارتقت من الأرض - و انزوت عروقها الضاربة في العالم السفلي و انكوى هواها و انجسمت مادتها و
زهدت في الدنيا و تجافت من دار الغرور و أنابت إلى دار الخلود و قد تخلد النفس التي هي الأم إلى الأرض بوضعها
الجبلي لكونها من الروح الحيواني المجنس و مستندة في تكوينها إلى الطبائع التي هي أركان العالم السفلي قال تعالى **وَلَوْ شِئْنَا لَرَفَعْنَاهُ بِهَا وَلَكِنَّهُ أَخْلَدَ إِلَى الْأَرْضِ وَاتَّبَعَ هَوَاهُ** فإذا سكنت النفس التي هي الأم إلى الأرض انجذب
إليها القلب المنكوس انجذاب الولد الميال إلى الوالدة المعوجة الناقصة دون الوالد الكامل المستقيم و ينجذب الروح إلى
الولد الذي هو القلب لما جبل عليه من انجذاب الوالد إلى ولده فعند ذلك يتخلف عن حقيقة القيام بحق مولاه و في
هذين الانجذابين يظهر حكم السعادة و الشقاوة ذلك تقدير العزيز العليم

و قال أبو سعيد القرشي

الروح روحان روح الحياة و روح المماة فإذا اجتمع عقل الجسم و روح الممات هي التي إذا خرجت من الجسد يصير
الحي ميتاً و روح الحياة ما به مجاري الأنفاس و قوة الأكل و الشرب و غيرهما.

و قال بعضهم النفس لطيفة مودعة في القالب

منها الأخلاق و الصفات المذمومة كما أن الروح لطيفة مودعة منها الأخلاق و الصفات المحمودة و كما أن العين محل
الرؤية - و السمع محل الأذن و الأنف محل الشم و الفم محل الذوق فهكذا النفس محل الأوصاف الذميمة و الروح محل
الأوصاف المحمودة و جميع أخلاق النفس و صفاتها من أصلين الطيش و الشره و طيشها من جهلها و شرها من
حرصها و شبهت النفس في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٤

طيشها بكرة مستديرة على مكان أملس لا تزال متحركة بجلبتها و شبهت في حرصها بالفراش - الذي يلقي نفسه على
ضوء المصباح و لا تقنع بالضوء اليسير دون الهجوم على جرم الضوء الذي فيه هلاكه فهذه جملة من أقوال علماء
الشرعية و إشارات مشايخ الطريقة دالة على أن في الإنسان جوهر روحاني و جميع ما نقلناه منهم مما له وجه و جيه و إن
كان ظواهر بعضها مواضع إیرادات و أنظار لكن عند البصير العارف بأسرار الشريعة الإلهية لها محامل صحيحة و معاني
لطيفة مشيرة إلى أسرار غامضة شريفة لأنهم في أقوالهم تتبعوا أحاديث الرسول ص و الأئمة ع و أكثر ما ذكروه مما
يوجد في عبارات الأحاديث المنقولة عمن لا ينطق بالهوى إن هو إلا وحي يوحى علمه شديد القوى و لو لا مخافة
الإطباب لشرحنا كلامهم و أوضحنا مرامهم على وجه يطابق البراهين القطعية و القوانين الحكمية من غير شائبة شك و
ريب و شائنة نقص و عيب و الله ولي الرحمة و الإحسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٥

الباب السابع في نبذ من أحوال النفس الناطقة من حيث نسبتها إلى عالم الطبيعة و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في كيفية تعلق النفس بالبدن

اعلم أن تعلق الشيء بالشيء و حاجته إليه متفاوتة بحسب القوة

فأقوى التعلقات و أشدها هو التعلق بحسب الماهية

و المعنى ذهنا و خارجا كتعلق الماهية بالوجود.

و الثاني ما بحسب الذات و الحقيقة

بأن يتعلق ذات الشيء و هويته بذات المتعلق به- و هويته كتعلق الممكن بالواجب.

و الثالث ما بحسب الذات و النوعية جميعا

بذات المتعلق به و نوعيته كتعلق العرض كالسواد بالموضوع كالجسم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٦

و الرابع ما بحسب الوجود و التشخص حدوثا و بقاء

بطبيعة المتعلق به- و نوعيته كتعلق الصورة بالمادة فإن حاجة الصورة في تشخصها ليست إلا بمادة لا بعينها- بل بوحدة منها بالعموم كتعلق السقف المستحفظ بالدعامات على سبيل البدل بوحدة منها لا بعينها و كحاجة الجسم الطبيعي في وجوده إلى مكان ما لا بعينه و لهذا يسهل حركته- عن كل واحد من الأمكنة إلى مكان آخر.

و الخامس ما بحسب الوجود و التشخص حدوثا لا بقاء

كتعلق النفس بالبدن عندنا حيث إن النفس بحسب أوائل تكونها و حدوثها حكمها حكم الطبائع المادية التي تفتقر إلى مادة مبهمه الوجود فهي أيضا تتعلق بمادة بدنية مبهمه الوجود حيث يتبدل هويته بتوارد الاستحالات و تلاحق المقادير فالشخص الإنساني و إن كان من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٧

حيث هويته النفسية شخصا واحدا و لكن من حيث جسميته أي التي بمعنى المادة أو الموضوع- لا التي بمعنى الجنس أو النوع ليس واحدا بالشخص و قد سبق تحقيق كون موضوع الحركة الكمية أمرا نوعيا بحسب الجسمية شخصا بحسب الطبيعة أو النفس

و السادس ما يكون التعلق بحسب الاستكمال و اكتساب الفضيلة للوجود

لا بحسب أصل الوجود كتعلق النفس بالبدن عند الجمهور من الفلاسفة مطلقا و تعلقها به بعد البلوغ الصوري الذي عند صيرورتها نفسا ذات قوة متفكرة و عقل عملي بالفعل قبل أن يخرج عقله النظري من القوة إلى الفعل عندنا و هذا أضعف التعلقات المذكورة و هو كتعلق الصانع بالآلة إلا أن هذا التعلق بهذه الآلات البدنية تعلق طبيعي ذاتي و تعلق النجار مثلا بالآلة عرضي خارجي و ذلك لأن النفوس كلها خالية في مبادي تكونها عن الكمالات و الصفات الوجودية سواء كانت بحسب الحيوانية مطلقا أو بحسب الإنسانية خاصة و لم يكن لها تحصيل هذه الكمالات إلا بحسب استعمال الآلات و كان من الواجب أن تكون تلك الآلات مختلفة بعضها من باب الحركات و بعضها من باب الإدراكات- و التي من باب الحركات بعضها بحسب الحيوانية من باب الشهوة و بعضها من باب الغضب- و التي من باب الإدراكات

بعضها من باب اللمس و بعضها من باب الشم و بعضها من باب الذوق - و بعضها من باب الإبصار و بعضها من باب السماع و هكذا غيرها و لو لم يكن آلات النفس مختلفة - حتى يفعل بكل آلة فعلا خاصا لازدحمت عليها الأفعال و واجتمعت الإدراكات كلها على النفس و كانت حينئذ يختلط بعضها على بعض و لم يحصل منها شيء على الكمال و التمام و لأن صور الأشياء إنما تحصل للنفس أولا في حسها ثم في خيالها ثم في عقلها النظري و لهذا قيل من فقد حسا فقد علما و لا شيء من المحسوسات بحيث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٨

يكون جامعا لذاته بحسب وجود واحد لجميع الكيفيات و الصفات التي يقع الإحساس بها فإن المبصر غير المسموع و الرائحة غير الطعم فهكذا يجب أن يكون مدارك هذه الكيفيات و الكمالات و مشاعرها الجزئية مختلفة و هذا بخلاف وجود الأشياء في العقل - حيث يجوز أن يكون هناك شيء واحد بحسب وجود واحد عقلي شمس و ذوقا و رائحة و صوتا و لونا و حرارة و برودة و غير ذلك من الصفات على وجه أعلى و أشرف كما بينه الفيلسوف العظيم في كتابه فثبت أن من الواجب أن يكون إدراك المحسوسات بما هي محسوسات - لا يمكن إلا بالآلات مختلفة حسب اختلاف أجناسها كيلا يختلط على النفس و يتشوش إدراكاتها - و لما اختلفت الآلات فلا جرم النفس إذا حاولت الإبصار التفتت إلى العين فيقوى على الإبصار التام و إذا حاولت السماع التفتت إلى الأذن فقويت على السماع التام و كذلك القول في سائر الأفعال بسائر القوى و إذا تكررت منها هذه الأفعال باستعانة هذه الآلات وقعت لها ملكة و اقتدار على تحصيل تلك الأمور التي لم يمكن حصول حضورها إلا باستعانة الآلات من غير الاستعانة بشيء منها بل تستحضرها و تتصرف فيها كما تشاء بذاتها و في عالمها - فعلم من هاهنا أن النفس في أول تكونها كالهَيُولَى الأولى خالية عن كل كمال صوري - و صورة محسوسة أو متخيلة أو معقولة ثم تصير بحيث تكون فعالة للصورة المجردة عن المواد جزئية كانت أو كلية و لا محالة تلك الصور أشرف و أعلى من هذه الصور الكائنة الفاسدة فما أشد سخافة رأي من زعم أن النفس بحسب جوهرها و ذاتها شيء واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٢٩

من أول تعلقها بالبدن إلى آخر بقائها و قد علمت أنها في أول الكون لا شيء محض كما في الصحيفة الإلهية **هَلْ أَتَى عَلَى الْإِنْسَانِ حِينٌ مِّنَ الدَّهْرِ لَمْ يَكُنْ شَيْئًا مَّذْكُورًا** و عند استكمالها تصير عقلا فعلا.

فإن قلت قد ثبت أن النفس كمال أول لجسم طبيعي و الكمال و الصورة شيء واحد بالذات متغاير بالاعتبار فكيف يحكم بأن النفس في أول الفطرة معراة عن كل صورة.

قلنا الصورة صورتان إحداها صورة مادية وجودها وجود أمر منقسم متحيز ذي جهة و وحدتها عين قبول الكثرة و ثباتها عين التجدد و الانقضاء و فعلها عين قوة الأشياء فكونها صورة مصحوب بكونها مادة و الثانية صورة غير مخلوطة بالمادة سواء كانت مشروطة بوجود المادة على وضع خاص بالقياس إلى أنها أم لا و هذه بقسميها هي الحرية باسم الصورة دون الأولى لأن الأول ضعيفة الوحدة ضعيفة الوجود - **كَسْرَابٍ بِقِيَعَةٍ يَحْسَبُهُ الظَّمَانُ مَاءً حَتَّى إِذَا جَاءَهُ لَمْ يَجِدْهُ شَيْئًا** و لذلك لم يكن لها وجود إدراكي فلا يكون بوجودها الخارجي محسوسة و لا متخيلة و لا معقولة و الثانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٠

وجود إدراكي صوري بلا مادة فتكون إما محسوسة إذا احتاجت في وجودها إلى نسبة وضعية لمظهرها و مرآة حضورها بالقياس إلى مادة و إما متخيلة أو معقولة إن لم يكن كذلك - فإذا تحقق ما ذكرناه و تبين و ظهر أن النفس في أول الفطرة ليست شيئاً من الأشياء الصورية بالمعنى الثاني و لا أيضاً كانت مما قد حصل لها شيء من الصور الحسية أو الخيالية أو العقلية - إذ وجود الشيء للشيء فرع على وجود ذلك الشيء في نفسه بنحو ذلك الوجود إن خارجاً فخرجاً و إن حسياً فحسياً و إن خيالياً فخيالياً و إن عقلاً فعقلاً فهي حين حدوثها نهاية الصور الماديات و بداية الصور الإدراكيات و وجودها حينئذ آخر القشور الجسمانية و أول اللبواب الروحانية

فصل (٢) في تحقيق حدوث النفوس البشرية

ما مر من الكلام يكفي لإثبات أن هذه النفوس حادثة بحدوث الأبدان إذ قد ظهر أنها متجددة مستحيلة من أدنى الحالات الجوهرية إلى أعلاها و لو كانت في ذاتها قديمة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣١

لكانت كاملة الجوهر فطرة و ذاتاً فلا يلحقها نقص و قصور و لو لم يكن في ذاتها ناقصة الوجود - لم يكن مفتقرة إلى آلات و قوى بعضها نباتية و بعضها حيوانية. و أيضاً لو كانت قديمة لكانت منحصرة النوع في شخصها و لم يكن يسنح لها في عالم الإبداع الانقسام و التكثر لأن تكثر الأفراد مع الاتحاد النوعي إنما هو من خواص الأجسام و الجسمانيات المادية و الذي وجوده ليس بالاستعداد و الحركة و المادة و الانفعال - فحق نوعه أن يكون في شخص واحد و النفوس الإنسانية متكثرة الأعداد متحدة النوع في هذا العالم كما سيبيح فيستحيل القول بأن لهذه النفوس الجزئية وجوداً قبل البدن فضلاً أن تكون قديمة.

و اعلم أن المنقول من بعض القدماء كأفلاطون القول بقدم النفوس

الإنسانية - و يؤيده الحديث المشهور

كنت نبيا و آدم بين الماء و الطين :

و قوله ص:

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٢

الأرواح جنود مجندة فما تعارف منها ائتلف و ما تناكر منها اختلف

و لعله ليس المراد أن النفوس البشرية بحسب هذه التعيينات الجزئية كانت موجودة قبل البدن و إلا لزم المحالات المذكورة و تعطيل قواها عن الأفعال إذ ليس النفس بما هي نفس إلا صورة متعلقة بتدبير البدن لها قوى و مدارك بعضها حيوانية و بعضها نباتية بل المراد أن لها كينونة أخرى لمبادي وجودها في عالم علم الله من الصور المفارقة العقلية و هي المثل الإلهية التي أثبتها أفلاطون و من قبله للنفوس الكاملة من نوع الإنسان أنحاء من الكون بعضها عند

الطبيعة و بعضها قبل الطبيعة و بعضها ما بعد الطبيعة على ما عرفه الراسخون في الحكمة المتعالية و ذلك مبني على ثبوت الأشد و الأضعف في الجوهر- و على وقوع الحركة الاشتدادية في الجواهر المادية و على تحقيق المبادي و الغايات فإن نهايات الأشياء هي بداياتها.

و أما أرسطاطاليس و من تأخر عنه من المشاءين و الاتباع فقد اتفقوا على حدوث هذه النفوس
و هذه إحدى المسائل التي اشتهر أنه وقع الخلاف فيها بين هذين الحكيمين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٣

و نحن وجهنا قوليهما في قدم النفوس و حدوثها على وجه يتوافق مغزاهما و يتحد معناهما كما اشرنا إليه.

أما حجة كل من الفريقين

فالمتعصبون لمذهب أفلاطون احتجوا عليه بثلاث حجج-

الأولى أن كل ما يحدث فإنه لا بد له من مادة مخصصة

تكون باستعدادها- سببا لأن يصير أولى بالوجود بعد أن لم يكن فلو كانت النفوس حادثة لكانت مادية- و التالي باطل فالمقدم كذلك.

و الثانية أن النفوس لو كانت حادثة لكان حدوثها بحدوث الأبدان

لكن الأبدان الماضية غير متناهية فالنفوس الماضية التي بإزائها غير متناهية لكن النفوس بالاتفاق باقية بعد مفارقة الأبدان فالنفوس الحاصلة في هذا الوقت غير متناهية لكن ذلك أي وجود نفوس غير متناهية موجودة بالفعل معا محال لكونها تقبل الزيادة و النقصان مع أن كل ما كان كذلك فهو متناه فإذن ثبت أن النفوس الموجودة بالفعل متناهية فإذن ليس حدوث الأبدان سببا لحدوث النفوس فإذن حدوث النفوس عن عللها لا يتوقف على حدوث البدن و استعداد المادة فهي قديمة.

الثالثة أنها لو كانت حادثة كانت غير دائمة

إذ كل كائن فاسد و كل ما هو أبدي فهو أزلي و قد ثبت أنها باقية أبدية كما سيجيء بيانه فهي إذن أزلية.

أما الجواب عن الأول فلما سيأتي تحقيقه على مذهبنا من كون النفس جسمانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٤

الحدوث روحانية البقاء و على مذهب القوم من أن النفس حادثة مع المادة لا في المادة.

و أما عن الثاني فبان النفوس المفارقة و إن كانت غير متناهية لكنها ليست مرتبة لا ترتبها طبيعيا و لا وضعيا و البرهان الدال على استحالة اللاتناهي في الأعداد- إنما ينهض لو كانت مترتبة مجتمعة و إلا فلم يقدّم على استحالة برهان. و أما عن الثالث فالنفس الإنسانية من حيث ذاتها المجردة غير كائنة و لا فاسدة- و أما من جهة ما يقع تحت الكون فهي فاسدة أيضا كما أنها كائنة.

و أما حجج القائلين بحدوث النفوس

فمنها أنها لو كانت موجودة قبل الأبدان

فإما أن كانت واحدة أو كثيرة فإن كانت واحدة فإما أن تتكرر عند التعلق أو لا تتكرر فإن لم تتكرر كانت النفس الواحدة نفساً لكل بدن و لو كان كذلك لكان ما علمه إنسان علمه كل إنسان و ما جهله إنسان جهله كل إنسان و ذلك محال و إن تكثر فما لا مادة له - لا يقبل الانقسام و التجزئة و إن كانت قبل البدن متكررة فلا بد و أن يمتاز كل واحد منها عن صاحبه إما بالماهية أو لوازمها أو عوارضها و الأول و الثاني محالان لأن النفوس الإنسانية متحدة بالنوع فيتساوى جميع أفرادها في جميع الذاتيات و لوازمها - فلا يمكن وقوع الامتياز بها و أما العوارض اللاحقة فحدوثها إنما يكون بسبب المادة و ما فيها و مادة النفس بوجه هي البدن و قبل البدن لا مادة فلا يمكن أن يكون هناك عوارض مختلفة فثبت أنه يتمتع وجود النفس قبل البدن لا على نعت الاتحاد و لا على نعت الكثرة - فإذن القول بقدمها باطل

و اعترض صاحب الملخص على هذه الحجة بوجود

أحدها أنه لم لا يجوز أن يقال إنها كانت قبل الأبدان واحدة ثم تكثر

و ليس لقائل أن يقول كل ما كان واحداً و كان مع ذلك قابلاً للانقسام فكانت وحدته اتصالية فكانت جسماً لأننا نقول ممنوع أن كل ما وحدته اتصالية فإنه قابل للانقسام و ليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٥

بمسلم أن كل قابل للانقسام فوحدته اتصالية لأن الموجبة الكلية لا تنعكس كنفسها.

الثاني سلمنا أن النفوس كانت متكررة قبل الأبدان

لكن لم قلتم بأنه لا بد و أن يختص كل منها بصفة مميزة لأنه لو كان التميز لأجل الاختصاص بأمر ما لكان ذلك الأمر أيضاً متميزاً عن غيره فإما أن يكون تميزه عن غيره بما به تميزه عن غيره فيلزم الدور أو بشيء ثالث فيلزم التسلسل و لأن المميز لا يختص بشيء بعينه إلا بعد تميزه عن غيره فلو كان تميز الشيء عن غيره باختصاصه بشيء لزم الدور.

الثالث سلمنا أنه لا بد في الأمور المتكررة من مميز

فلم لا يجوز أن يكون المميز صفة ذاتية و بيانه بما بيناه من اختلاف النفوس بالنوع.

الرابع سلمنا أنه لا يتميز النفوس بشيء من المقولات

فلم لا يجوز أن يتميز بشيء من العوارض قولكم العوارض بسبب المادة و المادة هي البدن و قبل البدن لا بدن فنقول لم لا يجوز أن يكون النفس المتعلقة ببدن كانت قبل البدن متعلقة ببدن آخر - و كذلك قبل كل بدن ببدن آخر لا إلى نهاية و لا ينقطع هذه المطالبة إلا بإبطال التناسخ فإذن الحجة المذكورة في إثبات حدوث الأرواح مبنية على إبطال التناسخ - لكن الحكماء الذين أبطلوا التناسخ بنوا إبطالها على حدوث الأرواح حيث قالوا - لو جاز انتقال النفس من بدن إلى آخر لكان لبدن واحد نفسان لأن النفوس لا يحدث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٦

عن المبادي إلا بسبب استعداد البدن فإذا حدث بدن باستعداده فلا بد أن يحدث عن المبادي نفس متعلقة به فلو تعلقت به نفس أخرى مستنسخة أيضاً يلزم أن يجتمع لبدن واحد نفسان و هو محال فهذه حجتهن و هي مبنية على حدوث النفس و حدوثها مبتن على إبطال التناسخ فيلزم الدور و لأجل ذلك تعجب صاحب المعتبر أبو البركات البغدادي لما

ذكر هذا السؤال من ذهول المتقدمين و غفلتهم في مثل هذا المهم العظيم.

الخامس سلمنا أن النفوس لا تتناسخ

لكن لم لا يجوز أن تكون قبل الأبدان - موصوفة بعوارض تميز بعضها عن بعض ثم يكون عوارض بسبب عارض آخر قبله - لا إلى نهاية.

السادس المعارضة و هي أن النفوس بعد المفارقة لا يكون تمايزها بالماهية و لوازمها

و إنما يكون بالعوارض لكن النفوس الهولانية التي لم يكتسب شيئاً من العوارض إذا فارقت الأبدان لا يكون فيها شيء من العوارض إلا مجرد ذاتها التي كانت قبل ذلك - متعلقة بأبدان متغيرة فإن كفى هذا القدر في وقوع التمايز فكفى أيضاً كونها بحيث يحدث لها بعد ذلك التعلق بأبدان متميزة.

و ليس لأحد أن يقول ما قاله الشيخ جواباً عن ذلك من أنها و إن لم تكتسب شيئاً من الكمالات إلا أن لكل منها شعوراً بهويته الخاصة و ذلك الشعور غير حاصل للنفس الأخرى.

لأننا نقول شعور الشيء بذاته هو نفس ذاته على ما ثبت في باب العلم فلو اختلفا في الشعور بذاتيهما لكانا مختلفين بذاتيهما و ذلك يبطل أصل الحجة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٧

و أيضاً لو ثبت هذا القدر في حصول الامتياز فلم لا يجوز أن يحصل الامتياز بهذا القدر قبل التعلق بالأبدان.

و الجواب أما عن الأول

فكل ذات واحدة شخصية موجودة إذا انقسمت و تكثرت بعد وحدتها فوجب أن يكون جزؤه مخالفاً لكله ضرورة أن الشيء مع غيره ليس هو بعينه ذلك الشيء لا مع غيره فتلك المخالفة في الوجود إن كانت بالماهية و لوازمها أي منشأ تعددها في الوجود تخالفها بالماهية فيلزم أن يكون تلك الأجزاء متميزة دائماً - لا في وقت دون وقت فيكون ما فرضناه واحداً من هذه الأمور المتعلقة بالأبدان متكررة حينئذ و إن كانت مخالفتها لا بالماهية و لا بلوازمها فيكون تعددها بعد اتفاقها النوعي - بالجزئية و الكلية تخالفاً في المقدار فإن الجزئية و الكلية إذا لم يكونا بحسب المعنى و المفهوم كانتا لا محالة بحسب عظم المقدار و صغره و إلا لم يكن إحداهما أولى بالكلية - و الآخر بالجزئية دون العكس.

و أيضاً أجزاء الشيء إذا كانت من جزئيات ماهيته كان ذلك الشيء مقداراً أو ذا مقدار فيلزم أن تكون النفس مقداراً أو متقدراً و هو باطل.

و أيضاً لو سلمنا كون الذات المجردة يمكن أن تنقسم بعد وحدتها بأجزاء مماثلة لها بالماهية أو مخالفة لها فيكون كل واحدة من تعينات تلك الأجزاء إنما يحدث بعد التعلق بالأبدان فيكون كل واحدة من تلك النفوس من حيث هي هي حادثة و ذلك هو المطلوب.

أقول بقي الكلام في أن هذه النفوس المتعينة بهذه التعينات الحادثة الجوهرية - هل لها كينونة أخرى عقلية قبل وجود البدن كما أن لها عند استكمالها بالعقل بالفعل - كينونة أخرى عقلية تخالف كينونة النفوس الإنسانية المتفقة النوع أم ليس لها قبل البدن نحو من الوجود أصلاً فهذه مسألة يحتاج تحقيقها إلى استئناف بحث على نمط آخر - و ليس كل أحد مما يتسع ذوقه لإدراك هذا المشرب بل يشمئز عنه أكثر الطبائع اشمئزاز

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٨

المزكوم لرائحة الورد.

و أما الجواب عن الثاني

فنقول إنه إشكال برأسه في باب التميز بالعوارض قد أورده هذا المورد مع عظم شأنه في غير هذا المقام و ما قدر على حله ثم حاول دفعه عن هذا المقام فقال هب أن الأمر كما قلتموه إلا أنا نعرف بالبداهة أن كل نوع من أنواع النفوس فإنها مقولة على أشخاص عديدة لأننا بالضرورة نعلم أن كل إنسان لا يجب أن يكون مخالفا لجميع الناس في الماهية و إذا وجد شخصان من نوع من النفوس فقد تمت الحجة.

أقول مفاد ما يدريك لعل هذه المعرفة من بداهة الوهم بعد أن أقيمت الحجة القوية عندك على أن الامتياز بالعوارض دون الذاتيات غير ممكن ثم لا يخفى ما في كلامه حيث جزم بالبداهة أولا أن كل نوع من أنواع النفوس مقولة على أشخاص عديدة و علل هذا الجزم بقوله لا يجب أن يكون كل إنسان مخالفا لجميع الناس في الماهية. و الذي صح أن يقال في دفع هذا الإشكال هو أن المميز قد يكون ذاتيا للمتميز به عرضيا للأمر المشترك فيه و مثل هذا العروض ليس بحسب الوجود بل بحسب الماهية كعروض الفصل لماهية الجنس و عروض الوجود و التشخص لماهية النوع فإن امتياز الإنسان عن الفرس مثلا بعد اشتراكهما في الحيوانية و لوازمها بالناطق و الناطق من عوارض ماهية الحيوان ليس من ذاتياتها ثم عروضه لها لو كان بعد وجودها لكان متوقفا على تميزها و تحصلها بفصل آخر فيلزم التسلسل أو الدور لكن هذا العروض - إنما يكون في ظرف التحليل العقلي دون ظرف الوجود الخارجي الذي يتحد فيه الجنس و الفصل بوجود واحد فلا يلزم أن يكون تميز المميز الفصلي للنوع الذي يتميز

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٣٩

به عن سائر الأنواع المشاركة له في ماهية الجنس متوقفا على تميز هذا النوع في نفسه أولا لأن الفصل محصل للجنس مقدم عليه وجودا و إن تأخر عنه ماهية كالحال بين الوجود و الماهية و هكذا الأمر في المميزات الشخصية لأفراد النوع الواحد إذ التشخص عندنا بنحو الوجود و الوجود متقدم على الماهية في العين نحواً آخر من التقدم و زيادته عليها إنما هي بحسب التصور كما بين مرارا

و أما الجواب عن الثالث

فسنبين أن النفوس البشرية متحدة نوعا من حيث وجودها التعلقي الطبيعي قبل خروج عقولها الهيولانية من القوة إلى الفعل و البرهان قائم - على أن القوى المتعلقة بالأجسام الكائنة الفاسدة لا يمكن أن يكون نوعها منحصر في فرد لقصور جوهرها عن التمام و عدم احتمال واحد شخصي منها البقاء الأبدي لما مر أن القوى الجسمانية متناهية الأفعال و الانفعالات.

و أما عن الرابع

فلما سيظهر لك بطلان التناسخ لا بوجه يتوقف بيانه على حدوث النفوس بل من جهة إثبات الغايات.

و أما عن الخامس

فلان العوارض المتسابقة في الزمان المتواردة على ذات واحدة- لا يمكن أن يكون ورودها إلا بأسباب عائدة إلى القابل من جهة حركاته الاستعدادية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٠

التي لا تكون إلا في مادة جسمانية و قبل الأبدان لا يكون للنفوس استعدادات جسمانية يقبل بها صفات متعاقبة يتخصص بسبب سابقها بلحقها وهكذا لا إلى بداية.

و أما عن السادس

فلان النفوس الهيولانية يتميز بعضها عن بعض بلواحق حاصلة لها بسبب المادة لأن النفوس جسمانية الحدوث حكمها حكم الصور و الطبائع المادية المتكثرة بسبب مميزات جسمانية ثم يلزم تعيين كل منها بوجودها الخاص و هو عين شعورها بذاتها و ذلك الذي يستمر استمرارا ثانيا مع ضرب من التجدد الوجودي- فلا جرم يبقى الامتياز بينها دائما و إن حصل لكل منها تفاوت وجودي بحسب تجوهرها من أول تكونها إلى غاية كمالها الجوهرى فالحاصل أن الامتياز في أفراد نوع واحد- لا بد و أن يكون أولا بشيء خارج عن الماهية و لوازمها و ذلك لا يكون إلا من عوارض المادة فالنفوس التي بعد الأبدان يتصور بينها التكثر و الامتياز الحاصل لها حين تلبسها بالأبدان ثم يستصحب حكم ذلك فيها بعد الأبدان لبقاء أثر التميز فيها و لو بالتبع- و أما النفوس التي قبل الأبدان فلا يمكن فيها ذلك التميز لا بالذات و لا بالعرض بحسب التبعية و قد ثبت أن قبل عالم الحركات و الاتفاقات لا يمكن عروض مخصص خارجي و مميز عرضي مفارق فليس هناك امتياز بالعوارض بعد اتفاق في الماهية و الحقيقة فهذا ما يمكن أن يتكلف في تقرير هذه الحجة.

حجة أخرى على حدوث النفس

ذكرها أبو البركات فقال لو كانت النفس موجودة قبل البدن لكانت إما متعلقة بأبدان أخرى أو غير متعلقة بأبدان أخرى و باطل أن تكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤١

متعلقة بها لأن ذلك قول بالتناسخ ثم إنه أبطل التناسخ بحجة ذكرها المتكلمون من أن أنفسنا لو كانت في بدن آخر لكنا نعلم الآن شيئا من تلك الأحوال التي مضت علينا- و نتذكر أنا كنا في بدن آخر و على حالة أخرى فلما لم نتذكر شيئا منها علمنا أنا ما كنا موجودين في بدن آخر و باطل أن لا يكون متعلقة ببدن آخر لأنها حينئذ تكون معطلة و لا تعطل في الطبيعة

و هذه الحجة ضعيفة بوجوه

الأول أن الحجة التي أوردها في بطلان التناسخ

الذي هو مبنى هذا الدليل ضعيفة- لجواز أن لا يكون شيء من الأحوال و العلوم السابقة محفوظة في الذاكرة بل تكون منمحية بانمحاء المدارك و تبدل القوى و المشاعر اللهم إلا أن تكون الآثار الباقية- من باب أمور استعدادية و لهذا تتفاوت النفوس في الاستعدادات و تتخالف في الذكاء و البلادة و قبول التعاليم و اكتساب الملكات و غيرها.

الثاني أن التعطيل إنما يلزم إن كانت النفوس موجودة قبل الأبدان

بما هي نفوس و ليست متعلقة بالأبدان و أما إذا كانت لها نشأة أخرى و نحو آخر من الوجود فوق كونها نفسا كالعقل أو دون النفسية كالطبيعة و ما يجري مجراها فلم يلزم تعطيل.

الثالث أنها يجوز أن تكون موجودة

قبل هذه الأبدان في عالم آخر متعلقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٢

بأبدان آخر غير الأجساد الطبيعية عنصرية كانت أو فلكية فإن استحالة التناسخ - إنما يقام عليها البرهان إذا كان عبارة عن تردد النفوس و الأرواح في هذا العالم من بدن مادي آخر على سبيل الاستعداد و تهيو المواد كما يظهر من برهان استحالاته حسب ما أصلناه كما سيجيء ذكره إن شاء الله تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٣

فصل (٣) في إيضاح القول في هذه المسألة المهمة و تعقيب ما ذكره و هدم ما أصلوه

اعلم أن هذه المسألة دقيقة المسلك بعيدة الغور

و لذلك وقع الاختلاف بين الفلاسفة السابقين في بابها و وجه ذلك أن النفس الإنسانية ليس لها مقام معلوم في الهوية و لا لها درجة معينة في الوجود كسائر الموجودات الطبيعية و النفسية و العقلية التي كل له مقام معلوم بل النفس الإنسانية ذات مقامات و درجات متفاوتة و لها نشأة سابقة و لاحقة - و لها في كل مقام و عالم صورة أخرى كما قيل

لقد صار قلبي قابلا كل صورة فمرعى لغزلان و ديرا لرهبان

و ما هذا شأنه صعب إدراك حقيقته و عسر فهم هويته و الذي أدركه القوم من حقيقة النفس ليس إلا ما لزم وجودها من جهة البدن و عوارض الإدراكية و التحريكية و لم يتفطنوا من أحوالها إلا من جهة ما يلحقها من الإدراك و التحريك و هذان الأمران مما اشترك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٤

فيهما جميع الحيوانات و أما ما أدرك منها أزيد من ذلك و هو تجردها و بقاؤها بعد انقطاع تصرفها عن هذا البدن فإنما عرف ذلك من كونها محل العلوم و أن العلم لا ينقسم و محل غير المنقسم غير منقسم فالنفس بسيطة الذات و كل بسيطة الذات غير قابل للفناء - و إلا لزم تركبه من قوة الوجود و العدم و فعلية الوجود و العدم هذا خلف هذا غاية عرفانهم بالنفس أو ما يقرب من هذا و من ظن أنه بهذا القدر عرف حقيقة النفس فقد استسمن ذا ورم - و من اقتصر في معرفة النفس على هذا القدر فيرد عليه إشكالات كثيرة لا يمكنها التفصي عنها - منها أن كونها بسيطة الذات ينافي حدوثها.

و منها أن كونها روحانية الحقيقة عقلية يناقض تعلقها بالبدن و انفعالاتها البدنية - كالصحة و المرض و اللذة و الألم الجسمانيين.

ومنها أن بساطتها و تجردها عن المادة ينافي تكثرها بالعدد حسب تكثر الأبدان - و مما يلزم هؤلاء القوم المنكرين لكون النفس متطورة في الأطوار منقلبة في الشئون الحسية و الخيالية و العقلية أن كل نفس من لدن أول تعلقها بالبدن و حدوثها إلى أقصى مراتب تجردها و عاقليتها و معقوليتها شيء واحد و جوهر واحد واقع تحت ماهية نوعية إنسانية - كوقوع الإنسان تحت ماهية جنسية حيوانية.

و أقول هاهنا دقيقة أخرى فيما يلزم هؤلاء القوم و هو أنهم معترفون بأن النفس فصل اشتقاقي مقوم لماهية النوع المركب منها و من الجسد في الخارج كالحساسة للحيوان - و الناطقة للإنسان و قائلون بأن الجنس و الفصل بإزاء المادة و الصورة في المركبات الطبيعية و قائلون أيضا إن الفصل المحصل لماهية النوع محصل لوجود جنسه و إن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٥

كون الجنس عرضا بالقياس إلى الفصل المقسم ليس معناه أنه من عوارضه الخارجية له - التي يمكن تصور انفكاكه عنها بحسب الواقع بل إنما معناه كونه من العوارض التحليلية - التي لا يتصور الانفكاك بين العارض و المعروض في هذا النحو من العروض إلا بضرب من الاعتبار الذهني فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول لو لم يكن للجوهر النفساني الإنسي حركة جوهرية و استحالة ذاتية لزم كونه دائما متحد الوجود بالجسم النامي الحساس لأن النفس مبدأ فصل النوع الإنساني أعني مفهوم الناطق الذي هو من الفصول المنطقية و كذا الحساس للحيوان بإزاء النفس الحساسة التي هي من الفصول الاشتقاقية بعينها هي الصور النوعية للأجسام الطبيعية و تلك الصور كالناطقة و الفصول الاشتقاقية بما هي فصول لا بما هي صور يحمل عليها الجسم بما هو جنس و إن لم يحمل عليها بما هو مادة فعلى رأيهم يلزم كون النفس جسما بأحد الوجهين المذكورين مع أنهم قائلون بتجرد الناطقة حدوثا و بقاء لا كما ذهبنا إليه من كونها جسمانية الحدوث روحانية البقاء فهذا أحد البراهين - على ثبوت الاشتداد في مقولة الجوهر كما في مقولة الكيف و الكم و به ينحل كثير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٦

من الإشكالات الواردة في حدوث النفس و بقائها بعد الطبيعة و الجمهور لعدم تفتنهم بهذا الأصل الذي بيناه في هذا الموضوع و قبل هذا بوجوه قطعية أخرى تراهم تحيروا في أحوال النفس و حدوثها و بقائها و تعلقها حتى أنكروا بعضهم تجردها - و بعضهم بقاءها بعد البدن و بعضهم قال بتناسخ الأرواح و أما الراسخون في العلم - الجامعون بين النظر و البرهان و بين الكشف و الوجدان فعندهم إن للنفس شئونا و أطوارا كثيرة و لها مع بساطتها أكوان وجودية بعضها قبل الطبيعة و بعضها مع الطبيعة و بعضها بعد الطبيعة و رأوا أن النفوس الإنسانية موجودة قبل الأبدان بحسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٧

كمال علتها و سببها و السبب الكامل يلزم المسبب معها فالنفس موجودة مع سببها لأن سببها كامل الذات تام الإفادة و ما هو كذلك لا ينفك عنه مسببه لكن تصرفها في البدن - موقوف على استعداد مخصوص و شروط معينة و معلوم أن النفس حادثة عند تمام استعداد البدن و باقية بعد البدن إذا استكملت و ليس ذلك إلا لأن سببها يبقى أبد الدهر فإذا حصل لك علم يقيني بوجود سببها قبل البدن و علمت معنى السببية و المسببية و أن السبب الذاتي هو تمام المسبب و

غايته حصل لك علم بكونها موجودة قبل البدن بحسب كمال وجودها وغنائها والذي يتوقف على البدن هو بعض نشأتها ويكون استعداد البدن شرطا لوجود هذه النشأة الدنية والطبيعة الكونية وهي جهة فقرها وحاجتها وإمكانها ونقصها لا جهة وجوبها وغنائها وتامها ولو كان البدن شرطا لكمال هويتها وتام وجودها كما في سائر الحيوانات والنباتات كان زوال البدن موجبا لزوالها- كما يلزم أن ينعدم بعدم الآلة وفساد المزاج البدني تصرف الصانع وعمله المحتاج إلى الآلة كسائر القوى المادية الدائرة الفاسدة المتجددة الزائلة والبرهان قائم على أن للنفس قوة عقلية تتصرف في العقليات بذاتها لا باستعمال آلة وهي كمالها الذاتي وجهة غنائها عن البدن وسائر الأجسام فهي بكمالها السببي خارجة عن عالم الأكوان المتجددة.

فالحق أن النفس الإنسانية جسمانية الحدوث و التصرف روحانية البقاء و التعقل

فتصرفها في الأجسام جسماني و تعقلها لذاتها وذات جاعلها روحاني و أما العقول المفارقة- فهي روحانية الذات و الفعل جميعا والطباع جسمانية الذات و الفعل جميعا فلكل من تلك الجواهر مقام معلوم بخلاف النفس الإنسانية و لهذا حكمنا بتطورها في الأطوار- إذ ليس تصرفها في البدن كتصرف المفارقات في الأجسام لأنها بذاتها مباشرة للتحريك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٨

الجزئي و الإدراكات الجزئية على سبيل الانفعال و الاستكمال لا على وجه الإفاضة و الإبداع.

و لنرجع إلى تنمة أقوال القوم و متمسكاتهم في باب حدوث النفس الإنسانية و قدمها

و تزييف ما قالوه و هدم ما أصلوه أما احتجاجاتهم الباقية على الحدوث-

فمنها ما ذكره صاحب الكتاب المسمى بحكمة الإشراف

من قوله و ليس هذا النور أي النفس الإنسانية قبل البدن فإن لكل شخص إنساني ذاتا تعلم نفسها و أحوالها الخفية على غيرها فليست الأنوار المدبرة الإنسانية واحدة- و إلا ما علم واحد كان معلوما للجميع و ليس كذلك فقبل البدن إن كانت هذه الأنوار موجودة لا يتصور وحدتها فإنها لا تنقسم بعد ذلك إذ هي غير متقدرة و لا برزخية أي جسمانية حتى يمكن عليها الانقسام و لا يتصور تكثرها فإن هذه الأنوار المجردة قبل الصياصي لا يمتاز بشدة و ضعف إذ كل مرتبة من الشدة و الضعف ما لا يحصى و لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٤٩

عارض غريب فإنها ليست في عالم الحركات حينئذ فلما لم يكن كثرتها و لا وحدتها قبل تصرف الأبدان فلا يمكن وجودها.

أقول فيه نظر من وجوه

الأول أنه يرد على إبطال الشق الثاني

أنا لا نسلم أنها متحدة نوعا بمعنى أنها أفراد لنوع واحد متميزة في الوجود بل هي بأجزاء شيء واحد وحدة عقلية أشبه منها بأفراد ماهية واحدة وحدة نوعية و المستند أن الجواهر العقلية- عند بعض الفلاسفة الكاملين وجودات محضة بلا

ماهية و تلك الوجودات متفاوتة بالأشد و الأضعف و معنى الأشد هو كون الوجود بحيث كأنه يشتمل على أمثال ما في الأضعف و يترتب عليه أضعاف ما يترتب على الفرد الضعيف فهذه النفوس قبل نزولها في الأبدان متميزة بجهات و حيثيات عقلية متقدمة على أكوانها الطبيعية بالذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٠

لا بعوارض قابلية لاحقة لماهياتها و إليه الإشارة

بقوله ص: نحن السابقون اللاحقون

و قوله ص: كنت نبيا و آدم بين الماء و الطين

. و الثاني أنه يرد على إبطال الشق الأول

أنا لا نسلم لزوم ما ذكرتم إن أريد بالإدراكات الإدراكات المتوقفة على الآلات و إن أريد بها الإدراكات الغير المتوقفة على الآلات فلزومه مسلم و لا نسلم عدم اشتراك الكل فيها ألا ترى أنها اشتركت في العلم بذواتها و في إدراك كثير من الأوليات الغير المتوقفة على الآلات.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥١

و لعلك تقول إذا اتحدت النفوس كان جميع الآلات لذات واحدة فتكون تلك الذات مدركة لجميع المدركات بجميع الآلات فكان كل أحد منا يدرك ما يدركه الآخر فيدرك الكل أقول كلامنا في اتحاد النفوس قبل الأبدان لا في اتحادها عند التعلق بالأبدان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٢

و الاتحاد بحسب كل نشأة يخالف الاتحاد بحسب نشأة أخرى و لا شبهة لأحد في أن نشأة التعلق بالبدن غير نشأة التجرد عنه كيف و النفوس في هذه النشأة البدنية صارت بحيث ترتبط و يتأحد كل واحدة منها بالبدن اتحادا طبيعيا يحصل منهما نوع طبيعي حيواني و في النشأة العقلية يكون عند استكمالها متحدة بالعقل المفارق كما عليه أفضل الأقدمين فكيف يقاس اتحاد النفوس في عالم العقل و الجمعية باتحادها في عالم الأبدان - و عالم التفرقة في الجواز و عدمه و لو جاز اتحاد النفوس في عالم الأبدان لجاز اتحاد الأبدان بعضها ببعض لأن البدن لا يتشخص إلا بالنفس و الحاصل أن إدراك الشيء بآلة متقوم بتلك الآلة فإدراكات النفوس لما كانت بالآلات كانت مدركة من حيث تلك الآلات فلا يلزم أن يكون مدركاتها من حيث حصولها بآلات أخرى مدركة لذاتها من حيث ذاتها و لا لذاتها من حيث لها آلات أخرى غير الآلات التي بها أدركت تلك الإدراكات و المدركات.

الثالث أن قوله لا يتصور وحدتها

لأنها لا تنقسم بعد ذلك فيه أن الوحدة تكون على وجوه شتى كالعقلية و النوعية و العددية و المقدارية و لكل وحدة كثرة تقابلها - و ليس كل وحدة تقابلها كل كثرة فإن موضوع الوحدة العقلية قد يكون بعينه موضوع الكثرة العددية و كذا موضوع الواحد بالطبع قد يكون كثيرا بالأجزاء و قد علمت أيضا فيما سبق أن العقل البسيط كل الأشياء المعقولة

فكذلك فيما نحن فيه فإن النزول من نشأة العقل إلى نشأة الأبدان يقتضي تكثير الواحد و الصعود من هذه النشأة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٣

إلى نشأة العقل يقتضي توحيد الكثير و ليس تكثير الواحد و لا توحيد الكثير منحصرًا فيما يتعلق بالمقادير و الأجرام كما ذكره حتى يلزم كون النفوس متقدرة جرمية.

و منها أيضا ما ذكره في ذلك الكتاب

و هو أنها لو كانت موجودة قبل الأبدان فلم يمنعها حجاب و لا شاغل عن عالم النور المحض و لا اتفاق و لا تغير في ذلك العالم فتكون كاملة فتصرفها في البدن يقع ضائعا ثم لا أولوية لتخصيص بعضها ببدن و الاتفاقات إنما هي في عالم الأجسام و ليس في عالم النور المحض اتفاق يخص ذلك الطرف و ما يقال إن المتصرفات في الأبدان يسنح لها حال موجب لسقوطها عن مراتبها كلام باطل إذ لا تجدد فيما ليس في عالم الحركات و العلاقات.

أقول قد ذكرنا في تعاليقنا على حكمة الإشراق جوابا عن هذه الحجة أن للنفوس كينونة في عالم العقل و كينونة في عالم الطبيعة و الحس و كينونتها هناك تخالف كينونتها هاهنا و هي و إن كانت هناك صافية نقية غير محتجة و لا ممنوعة عن كمالها العقلي النوعي و لكن قد بقي لها كثير من الخيارات التي لا يمكن تحصيلها إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٤

بالهبوط إلى الأبدان و الآلات بحسب الأزمنة و الأوقات و فنون الاستعدادات فتصرفها في الأبدان الجزئية بعد كينونتها في المقامات الكلية لا يقع ضائعا كما زعمه بل لحكمة جليلة لا يعلمها إلا الله و الراسخون في العلم. ثم العجب أن هذا الشيخ و كثيرا ممن يسلك طريقه قائلون بارتقاء بعض النفوس في هذا العالم إلى عالم النور المحض و العقل الصرف من غير استلزام تجدد و إيجاب- و استيجاب سنوح حالة تجددية في ذلك العالم كما هو الأمر المحقق عند العارف فكيف ينكر هبوطها من ذلك العالم إلى هذا العالم من غير لزوم تجدد و تغير هناك- و حال إعادة كحال الابتداء من غير فرق في صعوبة الدرك و غموض الفهم و دقة المسلك- و من هان عليه التصديق باتصال بعض المتصرفات في الأبدان بعالم العقل البريء عن السنوح و التجدد فليسهل عليه الإذعان بانفصالها عن ذلك العالم و اتصالها بالأبدان و كل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٥

ما يصحح أحد الأمرين من البدو و الإعادة يصحح الأخرى و لهذا كثيرا ما وقع في الكتاب الإلهي إثبات الإعادة بثبوت البداية كقوله تعالى **كَمَا بَدَأْنَا أَوَّلَ خَلْقٍ نُعِيدُهُ**.

و اعلم أن حكاية هبوط النفس الأدمية من عالم القدس موطن أبيها المقدس إلى هذا العالم موطن الطبيعة الجسمانية التي كالمهد و موطن النفس الحيوانية التي هي بمنزلة أمها مما كثرت في الصحف المنزلة من السماء و مرموزات الأنبياء و إشارات الأولياء و الحكماء الكبراء ففي القرآن العزيز ذكر هبوط النفس و صعودها في آيات كثيرة كقوله تعالى **لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ ثُمَّ رَدَدْنَاهُ أَسْفَلَ سَافِلِينَ إِلَّا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ** و كقوله تعالى

في حكاية آدم و هبوطه من عالم الجنان **قُلْنَا اهْبِطُوا مِنْهَا جَمِيعًا فَإِمَّا يَأْتِيَنَّكُمْ مِنِّي هُدًى فَمَنْ تَبَعَ هُدَايَ فَلَا خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ** و قوله تعالى **قَالَ اهْبِطُوا بَعْضُكُمْ لِبَعْضٍ عَدُوٌّ وَلَكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ مُسْتَقَرٌّ وَمَتَاعٌ إِلَىٰ حِينٍ** و قوله تعالى **الْهَاجِمُ التَّكَاثُرُ حَتَّىٰ زُرْتُمُ الْمَقَابِرَ** إلى قوله **ثُمَّ لَتَسْتَلْنَ يَوْمَئِذٍ عَنِ النَّعِيمِ** و قوله تعالى **إِنْ مِنْكُمْ إِلَّا وَارِدُهَا كَانَ عَلَىٰ رَبِّكَ حَتْمًا مَقْضِيًّا ثُمَّ نُنْجِي الَّذِينَ اتَّقَوْا وَ نَذَرُ الظَّالِمِينَ فِيهَا جِثْيًا** و قوله تعالى **كَمَا بَدَأَكُمْ تَعُودُونَ فَرِيقًا هَدَىٰ وَ فَرِيقًا حَقَّ عَلَيْهِمُ الضَّلَالَةُ**

و في الحديث النبوي: الناس معادن كمعادن الذهب و الفضة

إشارة إلى تقدم وجودها في معادن ذواتها من العقول المفارقة التي هي خزائن علم الله و كيفية هذا التقدم في الوجود كما حققناه و وجهناه من أن للنفوس كينونة عقلية تجردية كما أن لها كينونة تعلقية و كما أن للأشياء الخارجية الجزئية ثبوتاً في القضاء السابق الإلهي - و هي هناك مصنونة عن التغير و المحو و الإثبات و هاهنا واقعة في الكون و الفساد و المحو و الإثبات لقوله تعالى **يَمْحُوا اللَّهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُثَبِّتُ وَ عِنْدَهُ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ** يعني اللوح المحفوظ عن التغير و التبديل.

و في كلام أمير المؤمنين ع: رحم الله امرأ عرف من أين و في أين و إلى أين
 . فالأولى إشارة إلى حال النفس قبل الكون و الوسط إلى ما مع الكون و الآخر إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٦

ما بعد الكون

و في كلامه ع أيضاً: و ليحضر عقله و ليكن من أبناء الآخرة فإنه منها قدم و إليها ينقلب

و روي عنه ع أيضاً في ماهية النفس و مبدئها و معادها

: اعلم أن الصورة الإنسانية هي أكبر

حجة الله على خلقه و هي الكتاب الذي كتبه بيده - و هي مجموع صورة العالمين و هي المختصر من اللوح المحفوظ و هي الشاهد على كل غائب - و هي الطريق المستقيم إلى كل خير و الصراط الممدود بين الجنة و النار

. و قال معلم الفلاسفة أرسطاطاليس في كتاب أثولوجيا في فائدة هبوط النفس إلى هذا العالم ما معناه أنها لم يضرها هبوطها إلى هذا العالم شيء بل انتفعت به و ذلك أنها استفادت من هذا العالم معرفة الشيء و علمت ما طبيعته بعد أن أفرغت عليه قواها - و تراءت أعمالها و أفاعيلها الشريفة الساكنة التي كانت فيها و هي في العالم العقلي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٧

فلو لا أنها ظهرت أفاعيلها و أفرغت قواها و صيرتها واقعة تحت الإبصار لكانت تلك القوى و الأفاعيل فيها باطلا و لكانت النفس تنسى الفضائل و الأفعال المحكمة المتقنة إذا كانت خفية لا تظهر و لو كان هذا هكذا لما عرفت قوة النفس و لا شرفها و ذلك أن الفعل إنما هو إعلان القوة الخفية بظهورها و لو خفيت قوة النفس و لم يظهر لفسدت و لكانت كأنها لم تكن انتهى كلامه و في أقوال الحكماء الأقدمين إشارات لطيفة و رموز شريفة إلى هبوط النفس من ذلك

العالم و صعودها و حكايات مرشدة إلى ذلك منها قصة سلامان و أبسال و منها قصة الحمامة المطوقة المذكورة في كتاب كليله و دمنه - و منها حكاية حي بن يقظان" و للشيخ الرئيس "قصيدة في السؤال عن علة هبوط النفس أولها هبطت إليك من المحل الأرفع و رقاء ذات تعزز و تمنع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٨

كل ذلك يفيد أن للنفس كينونة قبل البدن و وجودا في العالم الشامخ الإلهي - و أن لها عودا و رجوعا إلى ما هبطت منه و طلوعا لشمس حقيقتها و كواكب قواها من مغربها إما مشرقة مستقيمة و إما منكسفة منكوسة مكدره و قوله قدس سره و ما يقال إن المتصرفات في الأبدان يسنح لها حال موجب لسقوطها عن مراتبها إلى آخره قلت في الحواشي إن سقوط النفس عبارة عن صدورها عن سببها الأصلي و نزولها عن أيبها المقدس العقلي و الحال التي توجب سقوطها عن ذلك العالم شئون فاعلمها و جهات علتها و حيثياتها و قد وقع التنبيه سابقا على أن المعلومات النازلة الصادرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٥٩

عن فواعلها إنما صدرت عنها بجهاتها و لوازمها الإمكانية و نقائصها و إمكاناتها و فقر ذواتها إلى جاعلها التام القيومي و يعبر عن بعض تلك النقائص بالخطيئة المنسوبة إلى أبينا آدم و عن صدور النفوس عنها بالفرار من سخط الله و ذلك ليس إلا ما يقتضيه الحكمة في ترتيب الوجود فإن النور الأنقص لا تمكن له في مشهد النور الأشد ألا ترى أنك إذا أردت أن تنظر في مسألة إلهية شديدة الغموض لم تحكمها بعد و توغلت فيها توغلا قويا يكل ذهنك قبل أن يحصل لك ملكة الرجوع إليها و يكون سريع الانصراف منها إلى شغل آخر من الأمور الدنية فرارا من أن يحترق دماغك من استيلاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٠

ظهورها العقلي كما يستولي نور الشمس على أعين الأخافيش

و إليه الإشارة في الحديث النبوي: إن لله سبعين حجابا من نور لو كشفها لأحرقت سبحات وجهه كل ما انتهى إليه بصره

و الحكماء ذكروا وجوها عديدة على طريق الرمز و الإشارة تشير إلى علة هبوط النفس. فمن أقوال الفلاسفة المتقدمين ما ذكره أنبأقلس و هو أن النفس كانت في المكان العالي الشريف فلما أخطأت سقطت إلى هذا العالم و إنما صارت إلى هذا العالم فرارا من سخط الله إلا أنها لما انحدرت إلى هذا العالم صارت غياثا للنفوس التي قد اختلطت عقولها. و منها قال أفلاطون الرباني في كتابه فاذن علة هبوط النفس إلى هذا العالم سقوط ريشها فإذا ارتأشت ارتفعت إلى عالمها الأول.

و منها ما قال هو أيضا في كتابه الذي يدعى طيماوس إن علة هبوط النفس إلى هذا العالم أمور شتى و ذلك أن منها ما

أهبطت لخطيئة أخطأتها وإنما هبطت إلى هذا العالم لتعاقب و تجازى على خطاياها و منها ما أهبطت لعلّة أخرى غير أنه اختصر في قوله و ذم هبوط النفس و سكنها في هذه الأجسام.

و قال في موضع آخر من كتاب طيماوس إن النفس جوهر شريف سعيد وإنما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦١

صارت في هذا العالم من فعل البارى الخير فإن البارى لما خلق هذا العالم أرسل إليه النفس و صيرها فيه ليكون العالم ذا عقل لأنه لم يكن من الواجب إذا كان هذا العالم متقنا في غاية الإتقان أن يكون غير ذي عقل و لم يكن ممكنا أن يكون العالم ذا عقل و ليست له نفس فلهذه العلة أرسل البارى تعالى النفس إلى هذا العالم و أسكنها فيه ثم أرسل نفوسنا و أسكنها في أبداننا ليكون هذا العالم تاما كاملا و لئلا يكون دون ذلك العالم في التمام و الكمال فينبغي أن يكون في العالم الحسى من أجناس الحيوان ما في هذا العالم العقلى.

و منها ما قاله أرسطاطاليس في مواضع كثيرة من كتابه في معرفة الربوبية من ذلك قوله الطبيعة ضربان عقلية و حسية و النفس إذا كانت في العالم العقلى كانت أفضل و أشرف و إذا كانت في العالم الحسى كانت أخس و أدنى من أجل الجسم الذى صارت فيه و النفس و إن كانت عقلية و من العالم الأعلى العقلى فلا بد أن ينال من العالم الحسى شيئا و تصير فيه لأن طبيعتها متلاحمة للعالم العقلى و العالم الحسى و لا ينبغي أن تدم النفس أو تلام على ترك العالم العقلى و كينونتها في هذا العالم لأنها موضوعة بين العالمين جميعا و إنما صارت النفس على هذه الحال لأنها آخر تلك الجواهر الشريفة الإلهية - و أول الجواهر الطبيعية الحسية و لما صارت مجاورة للعالم الحسى لم تمسك عنه فضائلها بل فاضت عليه قواها و زينته بغاية الزينة و ربما نالت من خساستها ذلك إلا أن يحذر و يحترز. و من ذلك قوله في موضع آخر إن النفس الشريفة و إن تركت عالمها العالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٢

و هبطت إلى هذا العالم السفلى فإنها فعلت ذلك بنوع استطاعتها و قوتها العالية ليتصور الإنية التي بعدها و لتدبرها و إن هي أفلتت من هذا العالم بعد تصويرها و تدبيرها إياه - و صارت إلى عالمها سريعا لم يضرها هبوطها إلى هذا العالم شيء بل انتفعت به و ذلك أنها استفادت من هذا العالم معرفة الشيء و علمت ما طبيعته. و منه قوله في موضع آخر إذا فارقت النفس العقل و أبت أن يتصل به و أن يكون هي و هو واحدا اشتاقت إلى أن تنفرد بنفسها و أن يكون و العقل اثنين ثم اطلعت إلى هذا العالم و ألقت بصرها على شيء من الأشياء دون العقل استعادت الذكر حينئذ و صارت ذات ذكر فإن ذكرت الأشياء التي هناك لم ينحط إلى هاهنا و إن ذكرت إلى هذا العالم السفلى انحطت من ذلك العالم الشريف.

و منه قوله في موضع آخر فإن قال قائل إن كانت النفس تتوهم هذا العالم قبل أن ترده فلا يخلو أنها تتوهمه أيضا بعد خروجها منه و ورودها إلى العالم الأعلى فإن كانت تتوهمه فإنها لا محالة تذكره و قد قلت إنها إذا كانت في العالم الأعلى لا تتذكر شيئا من هذا العالم البتة قلنا إن النفس و إن كانت تتوهم هذا العالم قبل أن تصير فيه و لكنه تتوهمه بتوهم عقلى.

و مما يدل أيضا من كلامه على أن النفس كان لها وجود في عالم العقل و وجود في عالم الطبيعة و أن كلا من الوجودين غير الآخر قول هذا الفيلسوف في الميمر الثاني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٣

فنريد الآن أن نذكر العلة التي بها وقعت الأسامي المختلفة على النفس و لزمها ما يلزم الشيء المتجزى المنقسم الذات فينبغي أن يعلم هل تتجزى النفس أم لا تتجزى - فإن كانت تتجزى فهل تتجزى بذاتها أم بعرض و إذا كانت لا تتجزى بذاتها لا تتجزى أم بعرض فنقول إن النفس تتجزى بعرض و ذلك أنها إذا كانت في الجسم فقبلت التجزئة بتجزى الجسم كقولك إن الجزء المتفكر غير الجزء البهيمي و جزؤها الشهواني غير جزئها الغضبي فالنفس إنما تقبل التجزئة بعرض لا بذاتها و إذا قلنا إن النفس لا تتجزى - فإنما نقول ذلك بقول مرسل ذاتي و إذا قلنا إنها تقبل التجزئة فإنما نقول ذلك بقول مضاف عرضي و ذلك أنا إذا رأينا طبيعة الأجسام تحتاج إلى النفس لتكون حية - و الجسم يحتاج إلى النفس لتكون منبثة في جميع أجزائه انتهى هذا الكلام. و قد تبين منه أن النفس لها وجود لا يتجزى لا بالذات و لا بالعرض و هو وجودها العقلي و لها وجود يتجزى بالعرض بوجود الطبيعة و ظاهر أن الوجود الذي يتجزى و لو بالعرض غير الوجود العقلي الذي لا يتجزى أصلا بذاته لا بالذات و لا بالعرض.

٣٦٣ و قال في موضع آخر منه إن العقل إذا كان في عالمه العقلي لم يلق بصره على شيء من الأشياء التي دونه إلا على ذاته و إذا كان في غير عالمه أي في العالم الحسي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٤

فإنه يلقى بصره مرة على الأشياء و مرة على ذاته فقط و إنما صارت ذلك حال البدن - الذي صار فيه بتوسط النفس فإذا كان مشوبا بالبدن جدا ألقى بصره على الأشياء - و إذا تخلص قليلا ألقى بصره على ذاته فقط و العقل لا يستحيل و لا يميل من حال إلى حال إلا بالجهة التي قلنا و أما النفس فإنها تستحيل إذا أرادت علم الأشياء إلى آخر هذا الكلام و غير ذلك من كلماته الشريفة تصريحاً و تلويحاً إلى أن للنفس كينونة قبل هذه النشأة و بعدها في عالم العقل يظهر لك بالمراجعة إليها و التأمل فيها.

ثم لا يخفى أن عادة الأقدمين من الحكماء تأسيا بالأنبياء أن يبنوا كلامهم على الرموز و التجوزات لحكمة رأوها و مصلحة راعوها مداراة مع العقول الضعيفة و تروفا عليهم و حذرا عن النفوس المعوجة العسوفة و سوء فهمهم فما وقع في كلامهم أن النفس أخطأت و هبطت فرارا من غضب الله عليها فهم و أمثالهم يعلمون أن في عالم القدس لا يتصور سنوح خطيئة أو اقتراف معصية و لا يتطرق إليه مستحذات آثار الحركات - بل عنوا بخطيئة النفس ما أشرنا إليه من جهة إمكانها و حصولها عن مبدئها و نقصها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٥

الموجب لتعلقها بالبدن أو كونها بالقوة فجريمتها الطبيعية نقص جوهرها و هبوطها صدورها عن المفارق بالعلاقة البدنية و كونها عقلا بالقوة و أنها لا تتسع القوة النظرية متمكنة عما من شأنها أن يصدر عنها إلا بعد حين يستعمل القوة العملية

في أفاعيلها الحيوانية و النفسانية فالنفس منصرفة الوجه عن أبيها المقدس بعلاقة و تلك العلاقة نحو من أنحاء وجودها و الفرار من سخط الله هذا الشوق الطبيعي إلى تدبير البدن لعشقها بكمال ذاتها ليزول عنها هذا النقص الجوهرى بكمال وجودها الجوهرى التجردى.

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٦

و كذا ما نقل عن بعض المشرقيين الفارسيين أن الظلمة حاصرت النور و حبسته مدة ثم أمدته و أيدته الملائكة فاستظهر على أهر من الذي هو الظلمة فقهر الظلمة إلا أنه أمهلها إلى أجل مضروب و أن الظلمة حصلت من النور لفكرة ردية فهذا الحديث أيضا كان عن النفس فإنها جوهرة نورانية من جهة كونها عقلا بالفعل كما برهن عليه - و الظلمة هي القوة الحيوانية و الطبيعية و انحصارها تسلط القوى عليها و انجذابها إلى العالم السفلي و إمداد الملائكة مصادفة توفيق القدر بهداية النفس لإشراق عقلي و خروجها إلى الفعل و الإمهال إلى أجل مضروب بقاء القوى إلى حين الموت أو قطع العلاقة و الفكرة الردية التفتات النفس إلى الأمور المادية.

و من الاحتجاجات على بطلان تقدم الأرواح الإنسية على أبدانها

قول صاحب حكمة الإشراق و التلويحات في كتابه المذكور أن الأنوار المدبرة إن كانت قبل البدن فنقول إن كان منها ما لا يتصرف أصلا أي في بدن فليس بمدبر و وجوده معطل و إن لم يكن منها ما لا يتصرف كان ضروريا وقوع وقت وقع فيه الكل و ما بقي نور مدبر.

أقول قد ذكرت في الحواشي إيرادا عليه أن لنا أن نختار الشق الأول و نقول إن الوجود المفارقة للنفوس غير الوجود التعلقي لها و من ذهب من الأقدمين إلى أن للنفوس وجودا في عالم العقل قبل الأبدان لم يرد به أن النفس بما هي نفس لها وجود عقلي بل مراده أن لها نحو آخر من الوجود غير وجودها الذي لها من حيث هي نفس مدبرة فعلى هذا لا يلزم من كونها غير متصرفة في الأبدان تعطيل و إنما يلزم التعطيل - لو لم يكن النفس بما هي نفس متصرفة في البدن و حينئذ يقع وجودها ضائعا معطلا - و لا يلزم التعطيل لو لم يكن وجودها العقلي غير متصرفة في جسم بل هي بما هي عقل لا اشتغال لها بالجسم أصلا و هي بما هي نفس لا تنفك عن تدبير و مباشرة أصلا.

و لنا أيضا أن نختار الشق الأخير فإن حقية هذا الشق لا يوجب أن يجيء وقت وقع فيه الكل و ما بقي وجود نفس مدبرة في العالم كما ذكره و ذلك لأنه إن أراد بالوقت في قوله وقت وقع فيه الكل وقتا محدودا معيناً و من لفظة الكل الجميع فذلك غير

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٧

لازم مما ذكره و إن أراد به كل وقت أو أعم من ذلك و من لفظة الكل الأفرادى - فلا محذور فيه و ذلك لأن الزمان غير متناهي الأوقات فعلى تقدير عدم تناهي النفوس - و وجود كل في وقت لا يلزم إلا وجود الجميع في أوقات غير متناهية و ذلك غير ممتنع لا وجود الكل في وقت معين فاللازم غير محذور و المحذور غير لازم.

ثم نقول إن المبدأ العقلي الذي وجدت و انتشرت منه النفوس إلى هذا العالم - غير متناهي القوى و الجهات و الحثيات الوجودية و كلما انفصلت منه النفوس بقيت فيه القوة الغير المتناهية كما كانت على حالها لا تبديد و لا تنفذ لأنه مبدع

من مبدأ الكل - وليس وجود النفوس الغير المتناهية في العالم العقلي على نعت الكثرة العددية ولا أنها ذات ترتيب ذاتي أو وضعي حتى يرد التردد الذي ذكره في كل واحدة واحدة منها- و يلزم حينئذ ما ذكره من مجيء وقت لم يبق فيه واحد من النفوس.

وإياك أن تتوهم مما ذكرناه أن وجود النفوس في المبدأ العقلي وجود شيء في شيء بالقوة كوجود الصور الغير المتناهية في المبدأ القابلي أعني الهيولي الأولى وذلك لأن وجود الشيء في الفاعل ليس كوجوده في القابل فإن وجوده في الفاعل أشد تحصيلًا- وأتم فعلية من وجوده عند نفسه و وجوده في القابل قد يكون انقص وأخس من وجوده في نفسه و بحسب ماهيته لأن وجوده في القابل المستعد بالقوة الشبيهة بالعدم و وجوده

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٨

عند نفسه أن يكون وأن لا يكون وله في الفاعل وجود بالوجوب و وجود النفوس عند مبدئها العقلي و أبيها المقدس وجود شريف مبسوط غير متجز و لا متفرق وهذا مما يحتاج دركه إلى ارتفاع بصيرة القلب عن حد علم اليقين إلى حد عين اليقين فإن قلت ما ذكرته هو قول بانقلاب الحقيقة و هو ممتنع.

قلت هذا ليس من انقلاب الحقيقة في شيء و ذلك لأن انقلاب الشيء عبارة عن أن ينقلب ماهية شيء من حيث هي إلى ماهية شيء آخر بحسب المعنى و المفهوم- وهذا ممتنع لأن الماهية من حيث هي ليست إلا هي و كذا يمتنع أن ينقلب وجود ماهية إلى وجود ماهية أخرى من غير مادة مشتركة يتبدل عليها الصور بحسب الانفعالات المتواردة عليها أو ينقلب حقيقة بسيطة إلى حقيقة بسيطة أخرى و أما اشتداد الوجود في كماليته و استكمال صورة جوهرية في نفسه حتى يصير متقوما بأوصاف ذاتية أخرى- غير ما كانت أولا فليس ذلك بممتنع لأن الوجود متقدم على الماهية و هو أصل و الماهيات تبعه له ألا ترى أن الصور الطبيعية تتكامل و تشتد إلى أن تتجرد عن المادة و تنقلب صورة عقلية موجودة في العالم الأعلى العقلي على وصف الوحدة و التجرد- و كذلك النفوس بعكس ذلك كانت في عالم العقل شيئا واحدا جوهرًا مبسوطًا متحدًا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٦٩

عقليًا فتكثرت و تنزلت في هذا العالم و صارت لضعف تجوهرها متشبثة بأبدان طبيعية ساكنة في منازل سفلية فليس في هذين الأمرين انقلاب في الحقيقة على الوجه المستحيل فإن للأشياء النوعية و المفاهيم المحدودة كالإنسان و الفلك و الأرض و الماء و غيرها أنحاء من الوجود و أطوارا من الكون بعضها طبيعية و بعضها نفسية و بعضها عقلية و بعضها إلهية أسمائية فإنك إذا تعقلت أو تخيلت أرضا أو سماء فقد حصلت في عقلك سماء عقلية- و في خيالك سماء خيالية كل واحدة من الصورتين سماء بالحقيقة لا بالمجاز كما أن التي في الخارج عنك سماء بل الصورتان الأوليان أحق باسم السماء و أولى من التي في الخارج لأن التي في الخارج مموهة مغشوشة بغواشي زائدة و أمور خارجة عن ذاتها- و أعدام و ظلمات و أمور زائلة سائلة متجددة و كذا الحال في كل نوع من الأنواع الطبيعية- فالكل في قضاء الله السابق على وجه مقدس عقلي فأي مفسدة في أن يكون للنفوس- التي هي صور بعض الأنواع الطبيعية كينونة على نحو آخر في العالم العقلي و من زعم أن كون معنى واحد موجودا بوجودات متعددة متخالفة النشآت يوجب قلب الماهية و

بطلان الحقيقة فليمتنع عنده العلم بحقيقة شيء من الأشياء فإن العلم بالأشياء الغائبة عبارة عن وجود صورتها المطابقة لها عند العالم و تلك الصورة للشيء قد تكون عقلية و قد تكون خيالية و قد تكون حسية حسب درجات قوة العالم بها فالعالم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧٠

إذا كان عقلا بسيطا كان علمه بالأشياء صورة بسيطة عقلية تطابق أعدادا بل أنواعا كثيرة في الخارج و تلك الأعداد مع كونها متكررة المواد الخارجية مختلفة الهويات الطبيعية - فهي مما يحمل عليها معنى واحد نوعي متحد بها إذا أخذ ذلك المعنى مرسلا من غير شرط و قيد من وحدة أو كثرة عددية و كذا إذا كان العالم قوة خيالية كالذوات النفسانية - الموجودة في عالم الأشباح و الأمثال يكون صورتها العلمية صورة متخيلة مطابقة لصورة محسوسة في الحس أو موجودة في المادة بحسب الماهية و الحد مخالفة لها في نشأة الوجود و الهوية و كذا القياس في غير ما ذكرناه من المواطن الإدراكية فقد علم أن لحقيقة واحدة نشأة وجودية بعضها أشد تجردا و أكثر ارتفاعا عن التكثر و الانقسام و عن الوقوع في الحركات و مواد الأجسام و إذا جاز أن يكون صورة واحدة عقلية في غاية التجرد صورة مطابقة لأعداد كثيرة من صور جسمانية بحيث يتحد بها فليجز كون صورة واحدة عقلية هي المسماة بروح القدس صورة مطابقة لنفوس كثيرة إنسية تكون هويتها تمام تلك الهويات النفسانية و ما نقل عن فيثاغورث أنه قال إن ذاتا روحانية أقت إلى المعارف فقلت من أنت قال أنا طباعك التام يؤيد هذا المطلب و أنت يا حبيبي لو تيسر لك الارتقاء إلى طبقات وجودك لرأيت هويات متعددة متخالفة الوجود كل منها تمام هويتك لا يعوزها شيء منك تشير إلى كل واحدة منها بأننا و هذا كما في المثل المشهور أنت أنا فمن أنا.

حجة أخرى ذكرها أيضا في كتاب حكمة الإشراق

بقوله إذا علمت لا نهاية الحوادث - و استحالة النقل إلى الناسوت فلو كانت النفوس غير حادثة لكانت غير متناهية فاستدعت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧١

جهات غير متناهية في المفارقات و هو محال. أقول قد أشرنا إلى أن وجود النفوس في عالم العقل ليس كوجودها في عالم الحس متكررة ذات ترتيب زمني أو وضعي أو غير ذلك و الذي يلزم من كون النفوس - الغير المتناهية في هذا العالم ذات صورة عقلية يكون بها نحو وجودها العقلي أن يكون تلك الصورة ذات قوة غير متناهية في التأثير و الفعل أعني بحسب الشدة و قد سبق الفرق بين اللاتناهي في الشدة و اللاتناهي في العدة أو المدة و ذلك ليس بمحال إنما المحال تحقيق جهات غير متناهية في المبادي العقلية بحسب الكثرة و العدة و حيثية الإمكان - فإن جهات الخير و الوجوب غير متناهية شدة و جهات النقص و الإمكان متناهية شدة - و كذا عدة إلا بالقوة في أوقات و أدوار مختلفة كما يعرفه الحكماء ثم العجب من هذا الشيخ قدس سره حيث ذهب إلى أن لكل نوع جسماني - نورا مدبرا في عالم المفارقات و أن للنفوس البشرية نورا مدبرا عقليا و ذهب إلى أن النفوس أنوار ضعيفة بالقياس إلى النور المفارق و أنها بالنسبة إليه كالأشعة بالقياس إلى نور الشمس و أن

النور كله من سنخ واحد و نوع واحد بسيط لا اختلاف في أفراده

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧٢

إلا بالكمال و النقص فإذا كانت نسبة النفوس إلى مبدئها العقلي هذه النسبة فلزم أن يكون وجود ذلك المبدأ العقلي هو تمام وجودات هذه النفوس و نوره كمال هذه الأنوار.

و حاصل هذا البحث أن وجود النفوس مجردة عن تعلقات الأبدان في عالم المفارقات - عبارة عن اتحادها مع جوهرها العقلي الفعالي كما أن وجودها في عالم الأجسام عبارة عن تكثرها و تعددها أفرادا أو أبعاضا حتى أن جزء النفس المتعلق بعضو القلب غير جزئها المتعلق بعضو الدماغ و غير ذلك من الأعضاء كما أن جزءها الفكري غير جزئها الشهوي و جزءها الشهوي غير جزئها الغضبي إلا أن هذه التجزئة بنحو آخر غير تلك التجزئة و للنفس أنحاء من التشريح و التفصيل يعرفها الكاملون و هي غير تشريح البدن و الأعضاء الذي بينه الأطباء و المشرحون و هكذا وجودها في عالم البرزخ المتوسط بين العالمين العقلي و الحسي له تشريح و تفصيل بنحو آخر و وجودها هناك عبارة عن وجود جوهر مثالي إدراكي مجرد عن الأجسام الحسية دون الخيالية إلا أن ذلك الوجود أيضا عين الحياة و الإدراك و قد علمت أن الخيال عندنا جوهر مجرد عن الدماغ و سائر الأجسام الطبيعية و هي حيوان تام متشخص سائر في دار الحيوان و نشأة الجنان.

ذكر تنبيهي:

و اعلم أن شارح كتاب حكمة الإشراق العلامة الشيرازي زيف هذه الحجج المذكورة من هذا الشيخ قدس سره في نفي قدم النفوس و تقدمها على الأبدان و نسبها إلى الإقناع بأن كلها مبتنية على إبطال التناسخ و زعم أن القول بالتناسخ مذهب قوي بل حق ذهب إليه الأقدمون من الحكماء المعظمين كأفلاطون و غيره و نحن مع أنا قد رأينا بطلان التناسخ و ألهمنا ببرهان لطيف على استحالته و فساده و حملنا كلام أفلاطون و الأقدمين على غير ما فهمه القوم

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و حملوه و وجهناه إلى غير ما وجهوه كما سيجيء لك بيانه في مباحث نفي التناسخ ذكرنا وجوه الخلل في أبحاث هذا الشيخ التحرير في الحواشي بما يؤدي ذكره هاهنا إلى التطويل فارجع إلى الحواشي إن اشتهيت أن تسمعها ثم قال بعد ذلك و ذهب أفلاطون إلى قدم النفوس و هو الحق الذي لا يأتيه الباطل من بين يديه و لا من خلفه

لقله ع:

الأرواح جنود مجندة فما تعارف

الحديث

و قوله ص: خلق الله الأرواح قبل الأجساد بألفي عام

و إنما قيده بألفي عام تقريبا إلى أفهام العوام و إلا فليست قبلية النفس على البدن متقدرة و محدودة بل هي غير متناهية لقدمها و حدوثة انتهى قوله.

أقول لو كان مراد أفلاطون بقدم النفوس قدمها بما هي نفوس متكررة كما توهمه - لزم منه محالات قوية منها تعطيل

النفوس مدة غير متناهية عن تصرفها في البدن و تدبيرها- وقد علمت أن الإضافة النفسية ليست كإضافة الأبوة و البنوة العارضة و كإضافة الربان إلى السفينة و كإضافة رب الدار إلى الدار حتى يجوز أن يزول و يعود تلك الإضافة النفسية و الشخص بحاله بل النفسية كالمادية و الصورية و غيرها من الحقائق اللازمة للإضافات التي نحو وجودها الخاص مما لزمته الإضافة و كالمبدعية و الإلهية لصانع العالم حيث ذاته بذاته موصوفة بها فالنفس ما دام كونها نفسا لها وجود تعلقي فإذا استكملت في وجودها و صارت عقلا مفارقا يتبدل عليها نحو الوجود و يصير وجودها وجودا أخرويا و ينقلب إلى أهله مسرورا فلو فرضت وجودها النفسي قديما لزم التعطيل بالضرورة و التعطيل محال.

و منها لزوم كثرة في أفراد نوع واحد

من غير مادة قابلة للانفعال و لا مميزات عرضية و هو محال.

و منها وجود جهات غير متناهية بالفعل في المبدأ العقلي

ينتلم بها وحدة المبدأ الأعلى- إلى غير ذلك من المحالات اللازمة على القول بلا تناهي النفوس المفارقة في الأزل و على القول بتناهي النفوس القديمة يلزم التناسخ و كثير من المفاسد المذكورة.

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و بالجملة نسبة القول بقدم النفوس بما هي نفوس إلى ذلك العظيم و غيره من أعظم المتقدمين مختلق كذب كيف و هم قائلون بحدوث هذا العالم و تجدد الطبيعة و دثورها- و سيلان الأجسام كلها و زوالها و اضمحلالها كما أوضحنا طريقه و نقلنا أقوالهم فيه.

و إن كان مراده بذلك أن لها نشأة عقلية سابقة على نشأتها التعلقية فلا يستلزم ذلك قدم النفوس بما هي نفوس و لا تناسخ الأرواح و ترددها في الأبدان لأنهما باطل كما مر- ثم إن الآيات و الأخبار الدالة على تقدم النفوس على الأبدان يجب أن يحمل على ما حملناه.

ثم قال و قد تمسك أفلاطون عليه بأن علة وجود النفس إن كانت موجودة بتمامها- قبل البدن الصالح لتدبيرها فوجدت قبله لاستحالة تخلف المعلول عن العلة التامة و إن لم تكن موجودة بتمامها بل به يتم توقف وجودها عليه لكونه على هذا التقدير جزء علة وجودها أو شرطها لكنها لا تتوقف و إلا وجب بطلانها ببطلانه لكنها لا تبطل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧٥

ببطلانه للبراهين الدالة على بقائها ببقاء علتها الفياضة و أخصرها أنها غير منطبعة في الجسم بل ذات آلة به فإذا خرج الجسم بالموت عن صلاحية أن يكون آلة لها فلا يضر خروجه عن ذلك جوهرها بل لا تزال باقية ببقاء العقل المفيد لوجودها الذي هو ممتنع التغير فضلا عن العدم كما عرفت و إذا كان كذلك فيجب وجودها قبل البدن الصالح لتدبيرها و على هذا لا يكون البدن شرطا لوجودها بل لتصرفها فيه فيكون البدن كفتيلة- استعدت لاشتعال من نار عظيمة فتتنجذب النفس إليه بالخاصية أو البدن إليها كالمغناطيس و الحديد و ليس من شرط جذب المغناطيس للحديد أن يكونا موجودين معا انتهى أقول إنا سنبين كيفية حدوث النفس و تعلقها بالبدن و ما ذكره إشكال ستقف على حله و هو احتجاج صحيح على قدم كل بسيط الحقيقة و يلزم منه قدم المفارق- و كذا النفوس بحسب وجودها البسيط العقلي

الذي هو صورة من صور ما في علم الله - و شأن من الشؤون الإلهية و قد علمت أن وجود النفس و نفسيته شيء واحد و هي بحسب هذا الوجود صورة مضافة إلى البدن متصرفه فيه لا أن إضافتها إليه و تصرفها فيه من العوارض اللاحقة التي هي بعد وجودها حتى يزول و يعود كإضافة التي بين المغناطيس و الحديد كما زعمه فالذي يحوج إلى البدن هو وجودها التعلقي و جهة نفسيته و تصرفها فيه و استكمالها به و هذا النحو من الوجود ذاتي لها حادث بحدوث البدن و كما تحدث بحدوثه تبطل ببطلانه بمعنى أنها تبطل النفس بما هي نفس ذات طبيعة بدنية و ينقلب بجوهرها إلى نحو آخر من الوجود بحسب استكمالاتها الجوهرية المتوجهة إلى الغايات - و فناء الشيء إلى غايته الذاتية و مبدئه أشرف و أولى له فقوله و إلا وجب بطلانها ببطلانه مسلم و حق و قوله لكنها لا تبطل ببطلانه للبراهين الدالة على بقائها إلى آخره - إن أراد به بقاء النفس بما هي نفس معينة فشيء من البراهين التي وجدناها لا يدل إلا على أن ما يكون موجودا بسيط الحقيقة لا يمكن أن يبطل و أما النفس بما هي نفس - و كذا كل صورة و طبيعة مادية محصلة للجسم فليست بسيطة الهوية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧٦

فإن قال قائل إنه يلزم مما ذكرت أن كل نفس لم تبلغ في وجودها إلى مقام العقل البسيط فهي هالكة بهلاك البدن و دثوره فعلى ما ذكرت لم يبق من النفوس بعد الأبدان - إلا نادرا قليلا في غاية الندرة. فنقول إن للنفوس بعد هذه النشأة الطبيعية نشأتان أخريان إحداها النشأة الحيوانية المتوسطة بين العقل و الطبيعة و الأخرى النشأة العقلية فالأولى للمتوسطين و الناقصين و الأخيرة للكاملين المقربين.

إيضاح و تأكيد:

قوله و على هذا لا يكون البدن شرطا لوجودها بل لتصرفها إلى آخره اعلم أن هذا كلام من يفرق بين التصرف الذاتي الطبيعي و بين التصرف الصناعي العرضي فوقع في هذا الإشكال الذي بيناه الاشتباه بين أخذ ما بالذات مكان ما بالعرض و ذلك لأن حقيقة النفس و ماهيتها ليست كما تصورها من أن لها في نفسها لنفسها وجودا تاما و قد عرض لها بعد تمام وجودها التي يخصها - أن تتصرف في جسم من الأجسام و تدبره و تحركه و تنميه و تكمله و تطعمه و تسقيه - كمن تصرف في بناء أو غرس شجرة يقوم بتكميله و تعميره بإدخال أجسام أخرى كالتراب و الماء إليه حتى يبلغ إلى كماله فيكمله و يستكمل هو أيضا تكميلا و استكمالا عرضيين خارجيين عن هوية ذاته هيئات إن النفس ما دامت هي نفسا لها وجود ذاتي تعلقي هي مفتقرة في هذا الوجود الذاتي إلى البدن متقومة بحسب بعض قواها الحسية و الطبيعية به متعلقة به ضربا من التعلق.

و بالجملة تصرف النفس في البدن تصرف ذاتي و هو نحو موجودية النفس كما أن تكميل الصورة للمادة تعلق ذاتي لها و هو نحو وجودها و كما أن حلول العرض كالبياض في الجسم هو نحو وجوده و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون النفس و لا الصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧٧

و لا العرض واقعة تحت مقولة المضاف لما علمت سابقا فزوال التصرف في البدن من النفس - هو بعينه زوال وجودها

في نفسها أو مساوق له إلا أن يستحيل إلى مقام صار وجودها بعينه هو وجودها لذاتها أو لعقلها المفارق و حينئذ لم يكن نفسا بل شيئا أرفع وجودا منها كما أنها قبل بلوغ الصورة الطبيعية و هي كمال أول لجسم طبيعي إلى مقام النفسية كان شيئا أخس وجودا و أدون مرتبة من النفس.

و أما ما ذكره بعض الفضلاء في استحالة تقدم النفس على البدن

من أنها لو تقدمت على البدن لكان شيء واحد مفارقا و مخالطا للمادة و محال أن يكون الشيء الواحد مفارقا و مخالطا فمحال تقدم النفس على البدن فغير صحيح على هذا الوجه لا لما ذكره جماعة من أهل العلم منهم الشيخ المقتول في كتاب المشارع و المطارحات من أن النفس ليست بمخالطة للمادة فلا يجري فيه ذلك الكلام بل يتوجه ذلك على الصور و الأعراض و لا لما قيل إن المخالطة ليست إلا لعلاقة البدنية فلا يلزم مما ذكره القائل إلا كون شيء واحد مجردا عن العلاقة و ذا علاقة و هذا على هذا الوجه إنما يمتنع إذا كان التجرد و العلاقة وقعا معا فيستحيل اجتماعهما أما العلاقة في وقت و التجرد وقت آخر فهو غير محال بل واقع كما للنفس قبل الموت و بعده أما بطلان الأول فلما علمت أن النفس في أول حدودها صورة مادية ثم تصير مجردة فثبت كون شيء واحد مخالطا و مفارقا فليجز في عكسه و أما بطلان الثاني فلأن نفسية النفس و علاقتها بالبدن هذه العلاقة أمر ذاتي لها و هو نحو من انحاء وجود الشيء بالذات و لهذا قسموا الجوهر إلى أقسام هي أنواع محصلة لمقولة الجوهر و عدوا من تلك الأنواع النفس نوعا قسيما للعقل فعلم أن النفس ليست ذاتا شخصية تامة مفارقة الذات ثم قد عرضت لها التعلق بالبدن كتعلق صاحب الدكان بدكانه - بإضافة زائدة عليه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧٨

فالحل و التحقيق كما ذهبنا إليه من أن كون الشيء مفارقا عن المادة و مخالطا لها إنما يستحيل فيما لا يتبدل انحاء وجوداته و نشأته فالنفس قبل التعلق بالبدن لها نحو من الوجود و مع التعلق نحو آخر و بعد التعلق نحو آخر و ليس بين هذه الوجودات الثلاثة مباينة تامة لأن بينها عليا و معلولية و وجود العلة لا يغير وجود المعلول - إلا بالكمال و النقص و لا وجوده يغير وجودها إلا بالنقص و الكمال فتأمل.

و بالجملة فللنفس الإنسانية نشأت بعضها سابقة و بعضها لاحقة فالنشآت السابقة على الإنسانية كالحيوانية و النباتية و الجمادية و الطبيعية العنصرية و النشآت اللاحقة كالعقل المنفعل و الذي بعده العقل بالفعل و بعده العقل الفعال و ما فوقه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٧٩

نقل كلام لتشبيد مرام:

قد تمسك بعض الأفاضل على قدم النفس بأنها لو كانت حادثة - لافتقرت إلى علة بها يجب وجودها و هذه العلة إما أن تكون موجودة قبل حدوث النفس أو لا يكون كذلك و الأول يقتضي أن تكون النفس موجودة قبل وجودها لاستحالة تخلف المعلول عن علته التامة و هو محال و الثاني لا يخلو إما أن تكون تلك العلة بسيطة أو مركبة لا جائز أن تكون بسيطة و إلا لافتقرت من حيث إنها حادثة إلى علة أخرى حادثة و من حيث إنها بسيطة إلى أن تكون علتها بسيطة - أما

الأول فلائه لو لم يكن للحادث علة حادثة لكان إما أن لا يفتقر إلى علة أصلا و هو ظاهر البطلان أو تكون مفتقرة إلى علة دائمة و حينئذ يكون وجوده في بعض الأحوال دون بعض ترجيحا من غير مرجح و بطلانه ظاهر أيضا و أما الثاني فلائه لو كان للبسيط علة مركبة فإن استقل كل واحد من أجزائها بالتأثير فيه فلا يمكن استناد المعلول إلى الباقي و إلا إن كان له تأثير في شيء من المعلول و للباقي تأثير في باقيه كان المعلول مركبا و إن لم يكن لشيء منها تأثير فيه فإن حصل لها عند الاجتماع أمر زائد هو العلة - فإن كان عدما لم يكن مستقلا بالتأثير في الوجود و إن كان وجوديا لزم التسلسل في صدوره عن المركب إن كان بسيطا و في صدور البسيط عنه إن كان مركبا و إن لم يحصل بقيت مثل ما كانت قبل الاجتماع فلا يكون الكل مؤثرا و قد فرض مؤثرا هذا خلف - لا جائز أن تكون تلك العلة مركبة لما تقدم أن كلما علتها التامة مركبة فهو مركب - لكن النفس يستحيل أن تكون مركبة فلا تكون علتها كذلك انتهى كلامه.

قال العلامة الشيرازي معترضا عليه لا يخفى أن كلامه مبني على امتناع صدور البسيط عن المركب و قد علمت ما عليه في أواخر المنطق عند الكلام على قاعدة يجوز أن يكون للشيء البسيط علة مركبة.

أقول قد علمت منا في كلامنا على القاعدة المذكورة أجوبة جميع ما ذكره هو و غيره - و حل ما عقده في تجويز تلك القاعدة و تصحيحها من النقض الإجمالي على حجة فسادها - و المناقضة و المعارضة في مباحث العلة و المعلول من هذا الكتاب فارجع إلى النظر فيها إن انتهيت حتى يظهر لك حقية أن المعلول البسيط لا يمكن أن يكون له علة مركبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٠

و مع ذلك لا يلزم من ذلك قدم النفس بما هي نفس لأنها غير بسيطة الحقيقة و كذا كل ما يوجد في الزمان و الحركة كالطبائع الصورية و غيرها و الله ولي الإنعام

فصل (٤) في أن النفس لا تفسد بفساد البدن

استدللت الحكماء عليه

كما قرره الشيخ و غيره بأن النفس يجب حدوثها عند حدوث البدن فلا يخلو إما أن يكونا معا في الوجود أو لأحدهما تقدم على الآخر - فإن كانا معا فلا يخلو إما أن يكونا معا في الماهية أو لا في الماهية و الأول باطل - و إلا لكانت النفس و البدن مضافين لكنهما جوهران هذا خلف و إن كانت المعية في الوجود فقط من غير أن يكون لأحدهما حاجة إلى الآخر فعدم كل منهما يوجب عدم تلك المعية لها و لا يوجب عدم الآخر و إما أن يكون لأحدهما حاجة إلى الآخر في الوجود فلا يخلو إما أن يكون المتقدم هو النفس أو البدن فإن كان المتقدم في الوجود هو النفس فذلك التقدم إما أن يكون زمانيا أو ذاتيا و الأول باطل لما ثبت أن النفس ليست موجودة قبل البدن و أما الثاني فباطل أيضا لأن كل موجود يكون وجوده معلول شيء كان عدمه معلول عدم ذلك الشيء إذ لو انعدم ذلك المعلول مع بقاء العلة لم تكن العلة كافية في إيجابه فلم تكن العلة علة بل جزءا من العلة هذا خلف فإذا لو كان البدن معلولا للنفس لامتنع عدم البدن إلا لعدم النفس و التالي باطل لأن البدن قد ينعدم لأسباب أخر مثل سوء المزاج أو سوء التركيب أو تفرق الاتصال فبطل أن يكون النفس علة للبدن و باطل أيضا أن يكون البدن علة للنفس لأن العلل أربع و محال أن يكون فاعلا لها فإنه لا يخلو إما أن يكون علة فاعلية لوجود النفس بمجرد جسميته أو لأمر زائد على جسميته و الأول باطل و إلا لكان كل جسم كذلك و الثاني أيضا باطل أما أولا فلما ثبت أن الصورة المادية إنما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨١

تفعل ما تفعل بواسطة الوضع و كلما لا يوجد إلا بواسطة الوضع استحال أن يفعل فعلا مجردا عن الوضع و الحيز و أما ثانيا فلأن الصورة المادية أضعف من المجرد القائم بنفسه و الأضعف لا يكون سببا للأقوى و محال أن يكون علة قابلية لما ثبت أن النفس مجردة و مستغنية عن المادة و محال أن يكون البدن علة صورية للنفس أو غائية فإن الأمر أولى أن يكون بالعكس فإذاً ليس بين البدن و النفس علاقة واجبة الثبوت أصلا فلا يكون عدم أحدهما علة لعدم الآخر. فإن قيل أستم جعلتم البدن علة لحدوث النفس و الحدوث هو الوجود المسبوق بعدم فإذا كان البدن شرطا لوجود النفس فليكن عدمه علة لعدمها.

فقالوا إنا قد بينا أن الفاعل إذا كان منزها عن التغير ثم صدر الفعل عنه بعد أن كان غير صادر فلا بد و أن يكون وجوده في ذلك الوقت لأجل أن شرط الحدوث قد حصل في ذلك الوقت دون ما قبله ثم إن ذلك الشرط لما كان شرطا للحدوث و كان غنيا في وجوده عن ذلك الشرط استحال أن يكون عدم الشرط مؤثرا في عدم ذلك الشيء ثم لما اتفق أن يكون ذلك الشرط مستعدا لأن يكون آلة للنفس في تحصيل كمالاتها و النفس لذاتها مشتاقة إلى الكمال لا جرم حصل لها شوق طبيعي إلى التصرف في ذلك البدن و التدبير فيه على الوجه الأصح و مثل ذلك لا يمكن أن يكون عدمه علة لعدم الحادث هذا صورة ما قرره المتأخرون كالشيخ الرئيس و من في طبقتهم.

أقول و فيه مساهلات و مواضع أنظار

أما في الاستدلال فنقول إن القول بأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٢

الصحابة بين النفس و البدن مجرد معية اتفاقية ليس بينهما علاقة ذاتية قول باطل و معتقد سخيف كيف و هم قد صرحوا بأن النفس صورة كمالية للبدن و قد عرفوه بأنها كمال أول لجسم طبيعي آلي ذي حياة و حكموا بحصول نوع طبيعي له حد نوعي من جنس و فصل ذاتيين كالإنسان و الفلك و غيره و مثل ذلك التركيب يمتنع أن يكون يحصل من أمرين ليس بينهما علاقة العلية و المعلولية.

فالحق أن بينهما علاقة لزومية لا كمعية المتضايفين و لا كمعية معلولي علة واحدة في الوجود لا يكون بينهما ربط و تعلق بل كمعية شيئين متلازمين بوجه كالمادة و الصورة و التلازم الذي بينهما كما علمت في مبحث التلازم بين الهيولى الأولى و الصورة الجرمية فلكل منها حاجة إلى الآخر على وجه غير دائر دورا مستحيلا فالبدن محتاج في تحقيقه إلى النفس لا بخصوصها بل إلى مطلقها و النفس مفتقرة إلى البدن لا من حيث حقيقتها المطلقة العقلية بل من حيث وجود تعيينها الشخصية و حدوث هويتها النفسية.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول قولهم فإن كان المتقدم في الوجود هو النفس فذلك التقدم إما زمني أو ذاتي.

قلنا إن تقدمها على البدن ذاتي.

قولهم لو كان كذلك لامتنع عدمه إلا بعدمها.

قلنا الأمر هكذا فإن البدن بما هو بدن مستعد امتنع عدمه مع وجود النفس - و لا وجوده مع عدمها و الذي يبقى بعد

النفس و ما يجري مجراها في نوعها على الإطلاق - ليس ببدن أصلا بل جسم من نوع آخر بل البدن بما هو بدن مشروط بتعلق النفس - و النفس شريكة علة البدن.

فليس لأحد أن يقول لو كانت النفس علة للبدن لم تكن في فعلها مفتقرة إلى البدن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٣

لأن توسيط المادة بوضعها في تأثير الفاعل في تلك المادة غير معقول فإذا لم تكن النفس في فعلها و لا في ذاتها مفتقرة إلى المادة لم تكن نفسا بل عقلا.

لأننا نقول النفس و كل صورة سواء كانت مادية الوجود أو مادية الفعل فإنما يؤثر في نفس تلك المادة و حالاتها لا على وجه الاستقلال أو بخصوصها بل على وجه الشركة مع الأمر المفارق بحسب طبيعتها المطلقة فالنفس بما هي طبيعة نفسانية مطلقة مع انحفاظ وحدتها المتبدلة بواحد عقلي ثابت علة مقيمة للبدن و هي بحسب كل خصوصية لها مفتقرة إلى البدن افتقار الصورة في أحوالها المشخصة إلى المادة القابلة.

و قولهم و الثاني أي كون البدن علة للنفس باطل لأن العلل أربع إلخ.

قلنا نختار أن البدن علة مادية للنفس بما هي لها وجود نفساني و قد سبق أن نفسية النفس أي كونها بحيث تتصرف في البدن و تستكمل أمر ذاتي لها و وجود حقيقي لها و ليست النفسية لهذا الوجود كالعوارض التي تلحق الشيء بعد تمام ذاتها و هويتها - بل كونها نفسا ككون الصورة صورة و المادة مادة من حيث إن المسمى و المفهوم الإضافي - موجود بوجود واحد و ككون الواجب صانع العالم و كما أن عالمية الباري بالأشياء - و قدرته على الكل ليست بأمر زائد على ذاته فكذا نفسية النفس ما دام وجودها هذا الوجود التدبيري ليست بأمر زائد في الوجود على وجود النفس بل زيادتها بحسب المفهوم و الماهية.

فقولهم في نفي كون البدن علة مادية إن النفس مجردة و المجرد مستغن عن المادة - فنقول المجرد و هو الذي يكون عقلا بالفعل لا تعلق له بالأجسام أصلا و ليست النفس كذلك فالدليل المذكور إن أقيم على أن الذات العقلية التي وجودها وجود عقلي لذاتها و لا تعلق لها بالأجسام لا يفسد بفساد البدن فذلك بين واضح و لكن كون الشيء عقلا مفارقا ينافي كونه نفسا مدبرا للبدن الجزئي المعين على وجه ينفع و يستكمل به ضربا من الانفعال و الاستكمال و قد علمت أن ليس بين النفس و البدن مجرد معية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٤

كالحجر الموضوع بجانب الإنسان بل هي صورة كمالية للبدن و نفس له و يتركب منهما نوع طبيعي و مثل هذا الأمر كيف يكون مفارقا عن الأجسام و المفارق ليس وجوده هذا الوجود التعلقي و ليس كون البدن آلة لها ككون المنحت و المنشار آلة للنجار - حتى يستعملها تارة و يتركها أخرى و الذات المستعملة هي كما هي من قبل و من بعد و لا كونها في البدن ككون الرمان في السفينة و صاحب الدار في الدار تدخل فيها و تخرج عنها و السفينة بحالها و الدار بحالها فالدليل المذكور لم يدل على بقاء النفس ما دام وجودها النفساني بعد البدن نعم قد دل على أن الجوهر المفارق العقلي - غير فاسد بفساد البدن.

بقي النظر في أن النفوس بعضها أو كلها هل يستحيل وجودها إلى وجود جوهر - لا تعلق له بالجسم ولا حاجة إلى استعماله والاستكمال به و بقي الكلام في كيفية هذا التحول و الانقلاب الجوهرى و طرو حالة بها يصير الجوهر المتعلق الوجود بالمادة جوهرًا مفارقا عنها و ستعلم كيفية هذا عن قريب.

و أما الذي ذكره من أن الفاعل إذا كان منزها عن التغير كان صدور الفعل عنه في وقت دون ما قبله موقوفا على شرط و شرط الحدوث لأمر غني في وجوده عن ذلك الشرط استحالة أن يكون عدمه مستلزما لعدم ذلك الفعل أو مؤثرا فيه كلام لا فائدة فيه فإن حدوث الشيء ليس إلا وجوده الخاص به و ليس حدوث الوجود صفة زائدة على الوجود عارضة له حتى يكون شرطها غير شرط الوجود بل شرط الحدوث و شرط الوجود واحد فإذا عدم الشرط عدم المشروط.

و أيضا لا معنى لكون أمر مادي استعدادا أو شرطا لوجود جوهر مفارق الذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٥

غني الوجود عن المواد و أحوالها كما هو عندهم و بالجملة استعداد المادة لا يكون إلا لما يكون حالا من أحوالها و لا معنى لكون الشيء مستعدا لأمر مباين الذات عنه - فكن مترقبا لما يتلى عليك إن شاء الله تعالى

فصل (٥) في أن الفساد على النفس محال

ذكروا في بيانه حجتين

إحدهما أن النفس ممكنة الوجود و كل ممكن فله سبب في وجوده

للنفس سبب و السبب ما دام يبقى موجودا مع جميع الجهات التي باعتبارها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٦

كان سببا استحالة انعدام المسبب كما سبق ذكره في مباحث العلة و المعلول فالنفس لو انعدمت لكان انعدامها بسبب انعدام سببها أو شيء من أجزاء سببها التام و الأسباب أربعة - و يستحيل انعدامها لانعدام سببها الفاعلي لأن السبب الفاعلي لها كما سنبين جوهر عقلي مفارق الذات من جميع الوجوه عن المادة فيمتنع عدمه لأن الكلام فيه كالكلام في النفس و محال أن يكون انعدامها لانعدام السبب المادي لأننا قد بينا أن النفس ليست مادية بل مجردة و محال أن يكون لعدم السبب الصوري لأن صورة النفس بعينها ذاتها - و لأن الكلام في عدم ذلك السبب الصوري كالكلام في عدم النفس فإن كان لعدم صورة أخرى لزم التسلسل و محال أن يكون لعدم السبب التامى لهذا الوجه أيضا فيمتنع عدم النفس مطلقا و أما الصور و الأعراض التي يصح عليها ذلك عدم فذلك لصحة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٧

العدم على أحد أسبابها حتى الفاعلية لكون فاعلها القريب جائز العدم لأن حدوثها لأجل أمزجة مختلفة يفيد استعدادات مختلفة و قد سبق أن الأمر هاهنا ليس كذلك.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٨

و ثانيتهما أن كل متجدد فإنه قبل تجده ممكن الوجود

المتجدد و إلا لكان ممتنعاً و الممتنع غير موجود فإذن المتجدد غير المتجدد هذا خلف و نعني بهذا الإمكان الاستعداد التام على ما عرفت و ذلك الاستعداد التام يستدعي محلاً لأن الذي يوجد فيه إمكان وجود الشيء هو الذي حصلت فيه قوة وجود ذلك الشيء أي استعداده القريب.

إذا ثبت ذلك فنقول النفس لو صح عليها العدم لوجب أن يكون هناك شيء - يوجد فيه إمكان ذلك الفساد و ذلك الشيء ليس هو ذات النفس فإن النفس لا تبقى ذاتها مع الفساد و الذي فيه إمكان الفساد يجب أن يبقى مع الفساد فإذن ذلك الشيء مادة النفس فيكون للنفس مادة فننقل الكلام إلى تلك المادة فإن صح عليها الفساد احتاجت إلى مادة أخرى و لزم التسلسل و هو محال و إذا انقطع التسلسل فذلك السخن الباقي مما لا يجوز عليه الفساد و العدم و هو جزء النفس و لا يكون جزؤها الباقي ذات وضع و إلا لكانت النفس منافية لمقارنة الصور العقلية و لكانت ذات وضع و حيز و هو محال كما بين و إذا كان ذلك الشيء الذي ثبت بقاؤه مجرداً عن الوضع و الحيز قابلة للصور العقلية كان ذلك الجزء هو النفس بعينها إذ لا نعني بالنفس إلا جوهرها مجرداً قابلاً للصور العقلية فالنفس لا يصح عليها العدم.

فإن قيل أليست لها مادة توجد فيها قوة حدوثها فلم لا يجوز أن يحصل في تلك المادة قوة فسادها. فنقول الفرق ثابت لأن الذي فيه قوة الحدوث هو البدن و ذلك مما يصح أن يبقى مع الحدوث أما الذي يوجد فيه قوة الفساد لو كان هو البدن لكان البدن باقياً مع فساد النفس و بالاتفاق البدن لا يبقى مع عدم النفس فظهر الفرق بين البابين هذا ما في مسفورات القوم و الحجتان إنما تنهضان دليلاً على امتناع الفساد على جوهر بسيط - مبين الوجود عن المادة و لواحقها لا على امتناع فساد ما وجوده هذا الوجود الارتباطي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٨٩

التعلقي و مثل ذلك الوجود كما يمتنع فساده بفساد البدن كذلك يمتنع عدمه السابق عليه و حدوثه بحدوث البدن بل لا تجدد له أصلاً فإن كل ما هو كائن فاسد و كل ما لا فساد له لا كون له و بالجملة الموجود بوجود واحد بالعدد يمتنع أن يكون حادثاً و مفارقاً عن المادة إلا بأن تقع له الحركة الجوهرية الاشتدادية و صيرورته مجرداً بعد ما كان متعلقاً.

بقي الإشكال في أن وجوده التجريدي كيف حدث و المجرد لا تعلق له بمادة و لا له استعداد وجود.

و الجواب عنه كما سيجيء حسب ما وعدناه لك و أنموذج ذلك الجواب أن صيرورة النفس مجردة ليست عبارة عن حدوث وجود أمر مجرد لها بل عبارة عن قطع وجودها التعلقي و رجوعها إلى مبدئها الأصلي فبالحقيقة حدوث الأمر المجرد لشيء - عبارة عن حدوث رابطة بينهما كما قيل في حدوث الحافظة للنفس و هي خزانة معقولاتها - و أما الذي ذكر هاهنا من بيان الفرق بين حامل قوة الحدوث و حامل قوة الفساد و أن البدن فيه قوة حدوث النفس لأنه يبقى معها و ليس فيه قوة الفساد إذ لا يبقى معها.

ففيه مغالطة مبناها اشتراك لفظ القبول و إطلاقه تارة بمعنى القوة الاستعدادية و تارة بمعنى الانفعال و الاتصاف أو عدم الفرق بين ما بالذات و ما بالعرض فإن حامل قوة الحدوث للنفس ليس هو البدن الحي بل شيء آخر كالنطفة و ما يجري مجراها - و هو غير باق عند حدوث الصورة النفسانية و البدن الباقي مع النفس هو قابل النفس بمعنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٠

المستكمل بها الاستكمال الجزء المادي بالجزء الصوري من المركب و يجوز أن يكون هو بعينه قابل قوة الفساد لها و الذي يقبل الفساد شيء آخر هو باق مع الفساد ففي قابل كل من الطرفين أي الكون و الفساد اعتباران متغيران اعتبار ما منه الشيء و اعتبار ما فيه الشيء و إهمال الفرق بينهما مغلط فكن متيقظا فاستمع ما سيقرع سمعك يوم يناد المناد من مكان قريب

فصل (٦) في ذكر ميعاد مشرقى

اعلم أن المحقق الفاضل أفضل المتأخرين نصير الدين محمد الطوسي ره قد بعث رسالة إلى بعض معاصريه من العلماء هو العالم النحرير شمس الدين الخسرو شاهي و سأل عنه بعض المسائل المعضلة طالبا للكشف عن وجوه إعصاليها و حل عقد إشكالها فلم يأت ذلك المعاصر بجواب و كانت مسألة بقاء النفس بعد البدن إحدى تلك المسائل غير المجابة و قد قررها بقوله ما بال القائلين بأن ما لا حامل لإمكان وجوده و عدمه فإنه لا يمكن أن يوجد بعد العدم أو يعدم بعد الوجود حكموا بحدوث النفس الإنسانية و امتنعوا عن تجويز فنائها- فإن جعلوا حامل إمكان وجودها البدن فهلا جعلوه حامل إمكان عدمها أيضا و إن جعلوها لأجل تجردها عما يحل فيه عادم حامل لإمكان العدم كيلا يجوز عدمها بعد الوجود فهلا جعلوها لأجل ذلك بعينه عادم حامل لإمكان الوجود فيمتنع وجودها بعد العدم في الأصل- و كيف ساغ لهم أن جعلوا جسما ماديا حاملا لإمكان وجود جوهر مفارق مباين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩١

الذات إياه فإن جعلوها من حيث كونها مبدأ لصورة نوعية لذلك الجسم ذات حامل- لإمكان الوجود فهلا جعلوها من تلك الحثية بعينها ذات حامل لإمكان العدم و بالجملة ما الفرق بين الأمرين في تساوي النسبتين هذا ما ذكره بعبارة المنقحة الواضحة الدالة على أن ما أجيب عن هذا الإشكال في الكتب حتى في شرحه للإشارات غير مشبع و لا تام عنده.

و نحن قد أجبنا عن هذا السؤال في سالف الزمان بأن البدن الإنساني- استدعى باستعداده الخاص من واهب الصور على القوابل صورة مدبرة متصرفه فيه تصرفا يحفظ به شخصه و نوعه فوجب صدورها عن الواهب الفياض لكن وجود صورة يكون مصدرا للتدابير البشرية و الأفاعيل الإنسانية الحافظة لهذا المزاج الاعتدالي لا يمكن إلا بقوة روحانية ذات إدراك و عقل و فكر و تميز فلا محالة تفيض من المبدأ الفياض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٢

الذي لا بخل و لا منع فيه جوهر النفس و حقيقتها فإذن وجود البدن بإمكانه الاستعدادي- ما يستدعي إلا صورة مقارنة له متصرفه فيه بما هي صورة مقارنة و لكن جود المبدأ الفياض- اقتضى صورة متصرفه ذات حقيقة مفارقة أو ذات مبدأ مفارق و كما أن الشيء الواحد- يجوز أن يكون جوهرًا من جهة و عرضًا من جهة أخرى كالصورة الجوهرية الحاصلة في الذهن لما تقرر عندهم أنها جوهر مستغن عن الموضوع بحسب الماهية و عرض مفتقر إليه بحسب هذا الوجود الذهني العلمي بل كيف نفساني عندهم و كذا يجوز أن يكون شيء واحد مجعولا من جهة غير مجعول من جهة أخرى

كالوجود و الماهية لشيء واحد فكذلك يجوز أن يكون شيء واحد كالنفس الإنسانية مجردا من حيث كونه ذاتا عقلية أو له ذات عقلية ماديا من حيث كونه متصرفا في البدن أو له قوة متصرفة في البدن فإذا كانت النفس مجردة من حيث الذات و مادية من حيث الفعل فهي من حيث الفعل مسبقة باستعداد البدن حادثة بحدوثه زائلة بزواله و أما من حيث حقيقتها الأصلية أو مبدأ حقيقتها فغير مسبقة باستعداد البدن إلا بالعرض و لا فاسدة بفساده و لا يلحقها شيء من نقائص الماديات إلا بالعرض فتدبر.

هذا ما سنح لنا في سالف الزمان على طريقة أهل النظر مع فضل تنقيح و أما الذي نراه الآن أن نذكر في دفع هذا السؤال و حل الإعضال فهو أن للنفس الإنسانية مقامات و نشأت ذاتية بعضها من عالم الأمر و التدبير **قُلِ الرُّوحُ مِنْ أَمْرِ رَبِّي** و بعضها من عالم الخلق و التصوير **مِنْهَا خَلَقْنَاكُمْ وَ فِيهَا نُعِيدُكُمْ وَ مِنْهَا نُخْرِجُكُمْ** فالحدوث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٣

و التجدد إنما يطرأ ان لبعض نشأتها فنقول لما كانت للنفس الإنسانية ترقيات و تحولات من نشأة أولى إلى نشأة أخرى كما أشير إليه بقوله تعالى **وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَاكُمْ ثُمَّ صَوَّرْنَاكُمْ - ثُمَّ قُلْنَا لِلْمَلَائِكَةِ اسْجُدُوا لِآدَمَ** فإذا ترقى و تحولت و بعثت من عالم الخلق إلى عالم الأمر يصير وجوده وجودا مفارقا عقليا لا يحتاج حينئذ إلى البدن و أحواله و استعداداته - فزوال استعداد البدن إياها يضرها ذاتا و بقاء بل تعلقا و تصرفا إذ ليس وجودها الحدوثي هو وجودها البقائي لأن ذلك مادي و هذا مفارق عن المادة فليس حالها عند حدوثها كحالها عند استكمالها و مصيرها إلى المبدأ الفعال فهي بالحقيقة جسمانية الحدوث روحانية البقاء و مثالها كمثل الطفل و حاجته إلى الرحم أولا و استغنائه عنه أخيرا لتبدل الوجود عليه و كمثل الصيد و الحاجة في اصطیاده إلى الشبكة أولا - و الاستغناء في بقاءه عند الصيد أخيرا ففساد الرحم و الشبكة لا ينافي بقاء المولود و الصيد و لا يضره و أيضا حاجة الشيء إلى أمر ما لا يستلزم حاجة لوازمه الذاتية إليه كحاجة الوجود المعلولي إلى جاعل دون ماهيته لأنها غير مجعولة كما مر مع أنه من لوازم الوجود و ككون وجود المثلث معلولا و عدم كونه ذا الزوايا الثلاث معلولا.

ثم اعلم أن العلة المعدة علة بالعرض عند التحقيق و ليست عليتها كعلية العلل الموجبة حتى يقتضي زوالها زوال المعلول و ما ذكره من قولهم كل ما لا حامل لإمكان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٤

وجوده أو عدمه فإنه لا يمكن أن يوجد بعد عدم أو بعدم بعد الوجود لا يستلزم القول بأن ما لا حامل لإمكان وجوده و عدمه لا يمكن أن يوجد بعد الوجود إذ ربما يكون وجوده السابق من غير حامل كافيا في رجحان وجوده اللاحق و ذلك إذا كان وجوده اللاحق طورا آخر من الوجود بأن يكون كمالا و تماما لوجوده السابق و من نظر في مراتب الأكوان الاشتدادية لموجود كوني كالسواد في اشتداده و كحرارة الفحم في اشتدادها وجد أن حامل إمكان كل فرد ضعيف و قوته يزول عنه ذلك الإمكان و لا يزول حقيقة ذلك الفرد بل يشتد و إنما يزول نقصه و ضعفه فلا يلزم في الحركات الاستكمالية أن يكون زوال إمكان الشيء و استعداداته منشأ لزوال وجوده بل لتبدل وجوده و تبدل وجود الشيء قد يكون إلى عدمه و قد يكون إلى وجود أقوى و أكمل من وجوده المتقدم و من هذا القبيل بطلان استعداد البدن للنفس لا

يستدعي إلا زوال وجودها البدني المفتقر إلى مادة البدن و زوال وجودها الأولى و تبدله لا يلزم أن يكون بطريان العدم عليه بل بطريان الوجود الأقوى لها فالقاعدة المذكورة أي كون ما هو حامل لإمكان وجود الشيء فزواله أو زوال استعداده يستدعي زوال ذلك الوجود بعينه حقة لا شبهة فيه لكن زوال كل وجود خاص بخصوصه لا يلزم إلى عدم مطلق له بل ربما يكون تبدله إلى نحو آخر من الوجود كما في الاستحالات.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٥

فإن قلت ننقل الكلام إلى حدوث ذلك الوجود المفارقي للنفس كيف حدث لها و كل حادث يفتقر إلى مادة و المجرد لا مادة له.

قلت الحادث هاهنا ليس في الحقيقة إلا اتصال النفس بذلك المفارق و انقلابها إليه - لا نفس وجود ذلك المفارق و ذلك الاتصال أو الوجود الرابطي أو ما شئت فسمه حدوثه مسبوق بالاستعداد و حامل هذا الاستعداد هو النفس ما دامت متعلقة بالبدن و حامل فعلية ذلك الاتصال هو النفس عند اتحادها بالعقل و قد مر أن حامل قوة الشيء غير حامل وجوده و إن وجب أن لا يكون مابيننا صرفا أيضا.

ثم إن الحكماء الإلهيين قد أثبتوا للطبائع حركة جبلية إلى غايات ذاتية كما مر غير مرة و أثبتوا لكل ناقص ميلا أو شوقا غريزيا إلى كماله و كل ناقص إذا وصل إلى كماله أو بلغ إلى إنيته اتحد به و صار وجوده وجودا آخر و هذه الحركة الجبلية - في طبيعة هذا النوع الإنساني إلى جانب القدس معلوم مشاهد لصاحب البصيرة فإذا بلغت النفس في استكمالاتها و توجهاتها إلى مقام العقل و تحولت عقلا محضا اتحدت بالعقل الفعال و صارت عقلا فعلا بل ما كانت عقلا منفعلا أي نفسا و خيالا فزالت عن المادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٦

و سلبت عنها القوة و الإمكان و صارت باقية بقاء الله سبحانه.

و بالجملة تحقيق هذا المبحث و تنقيحه لا يتيسر إلا من عرف كيفية اتحاد النفس بالعقل الفعال و مصير الأشياء في المبدأ المتعال و ذلك ميسر لما خلق له و اعلم أن نشأة الوجود متلاحقة متفاضلة و مع تفاوتها متصلة بعضها ببعض و نهاية كل مرتبة بداية مرتبة أخرى و آخر درجات هذه النشأة التعلقية أول درجات النشأة التجردية و عالم التجرد المحض ليس فيه حدوث و تغير و سنوح حالة فلا يتغير ذلك العالم بدخول النفس إليه كما لا يتغير بصورها منه كما علمت في الفصل السابق فورود النفس إلى ذلك العالم بنحو صدورها منه بلا استحالة و تجدد فعليك بالتأمل الصادق و التفطن اللائق كي تدرك ما ذكرناه متنورا بيت قلبك بإشراق نور المعرفة على أرجائه من عالم الإفاضة و الإلهام - و الله يدعو إلى دار السلام

فصل (٧) في أن سبب النفس الناطقة أمر مفارق عقلي

قد سبق فيما مضى أن علة النفوس لا يجوز أن يكون هي الجسم بما هو جسم - و إلا لكان كل جسم كذلك و لا أيضا يجوز أن يكون قوة جسمانية لأن تلك القوة - لا يخلو إما أن يحتاج في وجوده إلى ذلك الجسم أو لا يحتاج إليه في وجوده بل في تأثيره فقط و كلا الشقين ممتنع فتأثيرها في وجود النفس ممتنع و قد فرضت مؤثرة هذا خلف أما بطلان

الأول فلو جوه.

أما أولا فلأن الصورة الجسمانية إذا فعلت في شيء كان فعلها لمشاركة القابل - و القابل هو الجسم و الجسم ممتنع أن يكون جزءا من المؤثر كما مضى تحقيق هذا الوجه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٧

و أما ثانيا فلأن الصورة الجسمانية إنما تؤثر بواسطة الوضع و حيثيته لأن حيثية الوضع داخله في قوام وجوده الجسمي و يمتنع حصول الوضع بالقياس إلى ما لا وضع له.

و أما ثالثا فلأن العلة أتم و أقوى من المعلول و الجسماني أضعف وجودا من المجرد - لأن وجوده قائم بالمادة و وجود المجرد مستغن عنه فإذاً المؤثر في النفس يمتنع أن يكون محتاجا إلى الجسم في وجوده.

و أما بطلان الثاني و هو أن يكون تلك القوة الموحدة للنفس غير محتاجة إلى الجسم في وجودها بل في موجديتها فلأن الذي يحتاج في فاعليته إلى الجسم هو الذي يفعل فعلا يمكن أن يكون ذلك الجسم آلة متوسطة بينه و بين معلوله و توسيط الجسم لا يتصور إلا من جهة وضعه و مقداره إذ جسمية الجسم بالوضع و المقدار فلا محالة يختلف نسبته بالقرب و البعد إلى ما يؤثر فيه و بحسبهما يختلف تأثيره فتأثيره في شيء يتوقف على أن يكون ذلك الشيء قريبا منه ضربا من القرب إذ لو لم يتوقف على القرب و لم يتفاوت تأثيره بتفاوت درجات القرب و جب أن يكون تأثيره في القريب كتأثيره في البعيد - فلا يكون لذلك الجسم دخلا في التأثير لأن وجود الجسم و نحو تشخصه إنما يكون بوضع خاص له فإن كان التأثير في القريب من ذلك الجسم قبل تأثيره في البعيد عنه - و جب أن يكون ذلك الفعل مما يصح عليه القرب و البعد فلا يكون أمرا مجردا روحانيا فإذاً كلما يفعل بمشاركة الجسم و بواسطته فهو ذو وضع و ينعكس انعكاس النقيض إن ما لا يكون ذا وضع امتنع أن يكون بواسطة الجسم و النفس مما لا وضع له - فإذاً لا يمكن أن يوجد بواسطة الجسم فإذاً فاعل النفس غني في ذاته و فاعليته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٨

عن المادة فالفاعل للنفس الناطقة أمر قدسي مفارق عن المادة و علائقها سواء كان صورة أو نفسا أخرى و ذلك الأمر المفارق هو المسمى بالعقل الفعال عند الحكماء - و عند الأوائل و عظماء الفرس سمي روان بخش بلغتهم و وجه التسمية بالعقل أنه صورة مجردة معقولة لذاته بذاته فإن كل مجرد عن المادة كما مر في مباحث العقل و المعقول - يجب أن يكون عاقلا لذاته و أن عقله لذاته نفس وجود ذاته لا لأجل حضور صورة أخرى فذاته عقل و عاقل و معقول و إنما سمي بالفعال لوجوه ثلاثة - أحدها أنه موجد أنفسنا و مخرجها من حد العقل بالقوة إلى حد العقل بالفعل - و ثانيها أنه بالفعل من جميع الوجوه ليس فيه شيء بالقوة و هو كل المعقولات - بل كل الموجودات بوجودها العقلي فأطلقوا عليه فعال مبالغة في الفعل فعلى هذا كل عقل فعال.

و ثالثها أنه الموجد لهذا العالم و مبدأ صورها الفائضة منه على موادها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٨، ص ٣٩٩

وأما بيان أن ذلك الأمر ليس هو إله العالم واجب الوجود فهو لأنه آخر المفارقات العقلية الذي فيه شوب كثرة و الباري واحد حق في غاية العظمة و الجلال - و النفوس كثيرة.

فإن قلت لم لا يجوز أن يكون بعض النفوس علة لبعض كنفس الوالد في نفس المولود - قلنا قد مر فيما سبق أن تأثير النفس في شيء بمشاركة الوضع فلا تأثير لها فيما لا وضع له بالقياس إليها و هذا أولى مما ذكره الشيخ في كتاب المباحثات من أن النفوس متحدة بالنوع فلو جعلنا النفس علة لوجود نفس فلا يخلو إما أن تكون واحدة - أو أكثر من واحدة فإن كانت واحدة فإما أن تكون معينة أو غير معينة و الأول محال لأنه ليس أحد المتفقين في النوع أولى بأن يكون علة للآخر دون العكس و الثاني أيضا محال لأن المعلول المعين يستدعي علة معينة و أما إن كانت كثيرة فهو باطل أيضا لأنه ليس عدد أولى من عدد فكان يجب أن يكون المؤثر في النفس الواحد جميع النفوس المفارقة و ذلك محال لأن الأقل من المجموع الحاصل في زماننا مستقل بالتأثير لأن المجموع الذي قبل زماننا أقل من هذا المجموع و كان كافيا و بعض آحاد المجموع إذا كان كافيا - لم يكن ذلك المجموع مؤثرا لما علمت من امتناع توارد علتين المستقلتين على معلول واحد فإذن لا يمكن تعليل النفس بمجموع السابقة و لا ببعض آحادها دون بعض - فإذن يمتنع استناد وجود النفس إلى شيء من ذلك و هو المطلوب لأن هذه الحجة مبتنية على اتحاد النفوس في الماهية و هي عندنا كما سيجيء من أحوالها متخالفة الأنواع - بسبب رسوخ ملكاتها و أخلاقها الملكية أو الشيطانية أو البهيمية أو السبعية و إن كانت

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متحدة النوع في أول نشأتها و سزاجة ذاتها القابلة للهيئات و العلوم فلو كانت بعض النفوس - بعد خروجها في شيء من الملكات من القوة إلى الفعل علة لبعض لم يلزم ما ذكره



الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢

[الجزء السادس]

السفر الثالث

[القسم الأول] في العلم الإلهي

[مقدمة المؤلف]

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم و به نستعين - الحمد لله الذي أنار بوجوب وجوده وجود الكائنات و أشرق بنور ذاته ذوات الآيات و هوية الممكنات أبدع الجواهر العقلية الثابتة عن شعاع ذاته - و أنشأ نفوس السماوات عن تجلي إشراقات صفاته و خلق صفحات الأجرام العلوية و السفلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣

لكتابة كلماته و كون أسباب الحركات و أدوار الكائنات لترادف رحماته و تجدد شئون آلائه و خيراته و جعل جوهر النفس الإنسانية من بين صور الكائنات مستعدا لتحمل أماناته و رسالاته و مظهرها لعجائب أسرار مبدعاته و غرائب آثار مصنوعاته و حاملا لمصحف آياته و قارئا لكتابة المنزل محكماته و مشابهاته أشكره على سوابغ جوده و إنعامه و مواهب حكمه و إلهامه و شمول إحسانه و سطوع برهانه - و أصلي على محمد ص عبده المنذر المعلم و نبيه المبشر الذي أوتي جوامع الكلم بعثه بالحق بشيرا و نذيرا و جعله داعيا إلى الله بإذنه و سراجا منيرا - و آله المصطفون الأعلون خزنة أسرار الوحي و اليقين و حملة كتاب الحق المبين و أبواب الوصول إلى جوار رب العالمين.

و بعد فهذا شروع في طور آخر من الحكمة و المعرفة و هو تجريد النظر إلى ذوات الموجودات و تحقيق وجود المفارقات و الإلهيات المسمى بمعرفة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤

الربوبية و الحكمة الإلهية و لما كان أفضل نعم الله الفائضة على خلقه و أشرف عطياته التي آتاها من لدنه عبدا من عباده هو الذي سماه الله في كتابه المنير بالخير الكثير أعني الحكمة الإلهية و المعرفة الربوبية و لا شك أنها السعادة العظمى و البهجة الكبرى - و بتحصيلها ينال الشرف الكبير و السيادة العليا التي تفوق سائر الدرجات الرفيعة و الكمالات المنيعة و كل من آتاه الله نعمة يجب بحسبه عليه شكرا و إحسانا فيجب على من آتاه الله رحمة من عنده و علمه من لدنه علما و أفاده قوة في هذا العلم يمشي به في أرض الحقائق و نورا يهتدي به في ظلمات البرازخ السفلية و جناحا يطير به إلى أوج العوالم العلوية و بصيرة أراه بها ملكوت السماوات و الأرض كما قال تعالى - **وَكَذَلِكَ نُرِي إِبْرَاهِيمَ مَلَكُوتَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ وَ لِيَكُونَ مِنَ الْمُوقِنِينَ** أن يسارع إلى شكر نعمة الله و جوده و يبادر إلى إظهار كرمه و رحمته امتثالا لقوله تعالى - **وَأَمَّا بِنِعْمَةِ رَبِّكَ فَحَدِّثْ** و استجلالا بالمزيد إحسانه كما ذكره **لَنَنْ شُكْرْتُمْ لِأَزِيدَكُمْ** من إيضاح

هذه المطالب المهمة و كشف هذه المقاصد العلية لينتفع بها العباد و يترتب عليها صلاح المعاد.
ففي هذا العلم يظهر مقامات الرجال و درجات الأحوال في المال فإن تيسر لأحد فقد حصل له الخير الأتم و الكمال الأعم و إن سطره في كتاب ففيه الأجر الجزيل و الذكر الجميل فيوشك أن يجعل من ورثة جنة المتقين و أن يكون له لسان صدق في الآخرين و ذلك لأن إرشاد أبناء الجنس من الطالبين من أعظم القربات إلى رب العالمين و هو من شعار الأنبياء المرسلين سلام الله على نبينا و آله و عليهم أجمعين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥

فقد جاءت في الكتب السماوية كلمات كثيرة دالة على شرف العلم و التعليم
ففي ما أوحى الله إلى أبينا آدم ع: أن المستنبطين للعلوم عندي أفضل من عمار الأرض بالصنائع و من استنبط علما و دونه في كتاب فهو بمنزلة آدم الصفي
قوله ص لمعاد: لأن يهدي الله بك رجلا واحدا خير لك من الدنيا و ما فيها

و أمثال ذلك كثيرة يطول الكلام بذكرها و نحن بعون الله و توفيقه قررنا قوانين هذا العلم و شيدنا مبانيه و أوضحنا سبيله و بيننا دليله و أحينا رسومه بعد ما اندرس و أحكمنا بنيانه بعد ما انطمس و حققنا من آراء الفلاسفة ما كان حقا و أبطلنا ما كان باطلا و إن كان قدما و هم لكونهم على مسلك الأنبياء قلما أخطئوا في المباني و الأصول المهمة و ما اشتهر منهم من القول بقدوم العالم و نفي القدرة عن الباري و عدم العلم منه بالجزئيات و إنكار الحشر الجسماني كل ذلك افتراء عليهم و أفك عظيم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦

و أما المتأخرون منهم كتواب المشائين و سائر المحدثين فقد وقع لهم سهو عظيم و أغلاط كثيرة في الإلهيات و كثير من الطبيعيات من المطالب التي لا يعذر الخطأ و النسيان فيها من الإنسان و لا ينجو من عذاب الجهل فيها أبدا إذا كان فيه استعداد و قوة سلوك نحو المعاد و قد ضل و غوي و انحرف عن طريق المسرى و المأوى و الرجل الحكيم لا يلتفت إلى المشهور و لا يبالي إذا أصاب الحق من مخالفة الجمهور و لا يتوجه في كل باب إلى من قال بل إلى ما قيل
كما نقل عن مولانا إمام الموحدين و أمير المؤمنين ع أنه قال: لا يعرف الحق بالرجال و لكن اعرف الحق تعرف أهله

و نحن لم نقصد في تحقيق كل مسألة و تنقيح كل مطلوب إلا التقرب إلى الله و ملكوته الأعلى - في إرشاد طالب زكي أو تهذيب خاطر نقي فإن وافق ذلك نظر أبناء البحث و التدقيق - فهو الذي أومأناه و إن لم يوافق فمعلوم أن الحق لا يوافق عقول قوم فسدت قرائحهم - بأمراض باطنية أعيت أطباء النفوس عن علاجهم حتى خوطب النبي الهادي ع بقوله تعالى **إِنَّكَ لَا تَهْدِي مَنْ أَحْبَبْتَ** لا جرم لما شرعوا في تحصيل الحكمة على غير ما ينبغي ما زادهم إلا نفورا و استكبارا في الأرض حيث لم يظفروا منها بطائل و لم يصلوا إلى حاصل وفاتهم مع هذا الحرمان العظيم مكنه استعدادهم للاقتداء بالأمثال السمعية و المناهج الشرعية فصاروا راجعين بخفي حنين متلبسين بالعار و الشين و ذلك هو الخسران العظيم و الحرمان الأليم و ليس للحكيم الرباني مع أمثال هؤلاء كلام و كتاب و لا مع أشباههم نداء و خطاب كما قال تعالى **وَلَنْ**

آتَيْتَ الَّذِينَ أَوْتُوا الْكِتَابَ بِكُلِّ آيَةٍ مَا تَبِعُوا قِبْلَتَكَ وقال أيضا **وَأَنْ يَرَوْا كُلَّ آيَةٍ لَا يُؤْمِنُوا بِهَا*** وكيف يؤمنون بالغيب و يقرون به ولا استعداد لهم فإن لقبول الحكمة و نور المعرفة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧

شروطا و أسبابا كانشراح الصدر و سلامة الفطرة و حسن الخلق و جودة الرأي و حدة الذهن و سرعة الفهم مع ذوق كسفي و يجب مع ذلك كله أن يكون في القلب المعنوي نور من الله يوقد به دائما كالقنديل و هو المرشد إلى الحكمة كما يكون المصباح مرشدا إلى ما في البيت و من لم يكن فيه هذه الأمور فضلا عن النور فلا يتعب نفسه في طلب الحكمة و من كان له فهم و إدراك و لم يكن له حدس كسفي و لا في قلبه نور يسعى بين أيديهم و بأيمانهم فلا يتم له الحكمة أيضا و إن سدد من أطرافها شيئا و أحكم من مقدماتها شطرا **وَمَنْ لَمْ يَجْعَلِ اللَّهُ لَهُ نُورًا فَمَا لَهُ مِنْ نُّورٍ**. ثم اعلم أن هذا القسم من الحكمة التي حاولنا الشروع فيه هو أفضل أجزائها و هو الإيمان الحقيقي بالله و آياته و اليوم الآخر المشار إليه في قوله تعالى **وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨

كُلُّ أَمِنْ بِاللَّهِ وَ مَلَائِكَتِهِ وَ كُتُبِهِ وَ رُسُلِهِ و قوله **وَمَنْ يَكْفُرْ بِاللَّهِ وَ مَلَائِكَتِهِ وَ كُتُبِهِ وَ رُسُلِهِ وَ الْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ فَقَدْ ضَلَّ ضَلَالًا بَعِيدًا** و هو مشتمل على علمين شريفيين أحدهما العلم بالمبدأ و ثانيهما العلم بالمعاد و يندرج في العلم بالمبدأ معرفة الله و صفاته و أفعاله و آثاره و في العلم بالمعاد معرفة النفس و القيامة و علم النبوات و قد مدح الله الناظرين المتفكرين فيهما فقال جل ثناؤه في مدح الناظرين في خلق العالم و ما فيه من عجائب الخلقة و بدائع الفطرة الدالة على عظمة المبدع و توحيدة **وَيَتَفَكَّرُونَ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ رَبَّنَا مَا خَلَقْتَ هَذَا بَاطِلًا** و قال في مدح الناظر في أمر نفسه و المزكى لها عن الأغشية المادية **وَنَفْسٍ وَ مَا سَوَّاهَا فَالَهُمَا فُجُورَهَا وَ تَقْوَاهَا قَدْ أَفْلَحَ مَنْ زَكَّاهَا وَ قَدْ خَابَ مَنْ دَسَّاهَا** و ذم الله المعرضين عن التأمل في حكمة الله و آياته و التفكير و التدبر في عجائب مصنوعاته و الذكر في كثير من مواضع كتابه العزيز كقوله **وَلَنْ سَأَلْتَهُمْ مَنْ خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضَ لَيَقُولُنَّ اللَّهُ*** ذمهم لأنهم لم يحصلوا ذلك علما و تفكرا بل أخذوه تقليدا و تلقيا و كقوله **وَكَأَيِّنْ مِنْ آيَةٍ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ يَمُرُّونَ عَلَيْهَا وَ هُمْ عَنْهَا مُعْرِضُونَ** فذمهم الله لإعراضهم عن الحكمة و وبخهم لرفضهم البحث عن حقائق الأمور و خفيات الأسرار المكنونة في عالم الخلق و الأمر و قال **مَا أَشْهَدَتْهُمْ خَلْقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ وَ لَا خَلْقَ أَنْفُسِهِمْ - وَ مَا كُنْتُ مَتَّخِذَ الْمُضِلِّينَ عَصَدًا** إشارة إلى نفي هذين العلمين عنهم و أنهم مضلون لأجل ذلك و أن المضلين ليسوا على شيء من الحق و ما ضلوا و أضلوا إلا بعد أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩

جهلوا و عدلوا عن طريق العلم و استكبروا استكبارا **وَ مَا كَانَ اللَّهُ لِيُظْلِمَهُمْ** و **لَكِنْ كَانُوا هُمُ الظَّالِمِينَ**. فإذا البرهان و القرآن اتفقا جميعا على أن تعلم الحكمة الإلهية و معرفة النفس الإنسانية أعني العلم بالمبدأ و المعاد هو الفوز بالبقاء الأبدي و رفضه منشأ الخسران السرمدي.

وإنّا قد قدمنا إليكم يا إخواني في الطريق من أنوار الحكم و لطائف الكلم - مبادي عقليات و ضوابط كليات و قوانين ميزانية و أحكاما ذهنية هي مقدمات ذوات فضائل جمة و درجات للمسير إلى الله بقدم الفكر و ألهمه و هي معارج للارتقاء إلى معرفة الإلهية و الاعتلاء إلى شهود جمال الأحدية و صفاته الواجبية و مجاورة المقدسين و منادمة أهل الملكوت و العليين من مقاصد أصحاب الوحي و التنزيل - و محكمات أسرار أهل التأويل الآخذين علومهم عن الملائكة المقربين و الحفظة الكرام الكاتبين.

فإن هذه المقاصد العلية الشريفة ابتداؤها ليس إلا من عند الله حيث أودعها أولا في القلم العظيم و اللوح الكريم و قرأها من علمه الله بالقلم ما لم يكن يعلم و كلمه بكلماته و ألهمه محكم آياته و هداه بنوره فاصطفاه و جعله خليفة في عالم أرضه - ثم جعله أهلا لعالمه العلوي و خليفة لملكوته السماوي فهذا العلم يجعل الإنسان ذا ملك كبير لأنه الأكسير الأعظم الموجب للغنى الكلي و السعادة الكبرى و البقاء على أفضل الأحوال و التشبه بالخير الأقصى و التخلق بأخلاق الله تعالى و لذلك

ورد في بعض الصحف المنزلة من الكتب السماوية أنه قال سبحانه: يا بن آدم خلقتك للبقاء - و أنا حي لا أموت أطعني فيما أمرتك و أنته عما نهيتك أجعلك مثلي حيا لا تموت
و ورد أيضا عن صاحب شريعتنا ص في صفة أهل الجنة أنه: يأتي إليهم الملك فإذا دخل عليهم ناولهم كتابا من عند الله بعد أن يسلم عليهم من الله فإذا في الكتاب من الحي القيوم الذي لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠

يموت إلى الحي القيوم الذي لا يموت أما بعد فإني أقول للشيء كن فيكون و قد جعلتك اليوم تقول للشيء كن فيكون

فهذا مقام من المقامات التي يصل إليها الإنسان بالحكمة و العرفان - و هو يسمى عند أهل التصوف بمقام كن كما ينقل عن رسول الله ص في غزوة تبوك فقال كن أبا ذر فكان أبا ذر و له مقام فوق هذا يسمى بمقام الفناء في التوحيد - المشار إليه بقوله تعالى في الحديث القدسي فإذا أحببته كنت سمعه الذي به يسمع و بصره الذي به يبصر الحديث و سينكشف لك في هذا السفر بيان هذا المطلب بالبرهان و يلقي إليك معرفة العلم الذي من أجله يستوجب من علمه و عمل بموجبه تلك البهجة الكبرى و المنزلة العظمى فافهم و اغتنم به و كن به سعيدا و لا تلقه إلا إلى أهله العامل بمقتضاه و موجبه و العمل به هو الزهد في الدنيا و الزاد للآخرة من التقوى - و كنا بمنزلة من سهل طريقا و عرا فزال الشوك و الحجارة و سهل حزونها ليهتدي فيها من يشاء من عباده و الله ولي الفضل و الهداية و بيده مفاتيح الخير و الحكمة و عنده خزائن الجود و الرحمة.

و يشتمل هذا القسم على فنون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١

الفن الأول فيما يتعلق بأحوال المبدأ و صفاته و فيه مواقف
الموقف الأول في الإشارة إلى واجب الوجود و أن أي وجود يليق به و أنه في غاية الوحدة و التمامية و

فيه فصول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢

الفصل (١) في إثبات وجوده و الوصول إلى معرفة ذاته

و اعلم أن الطرق إلى الله كثيرة

لأنه ذو فضائل و جهات كثيرة **و لكل وجهة**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣

هو موليها لكن بعضها أوثق و أشرف و أنور من بعض -

و أسد البراهين و أشرفها إليه هو الذي لا يكون الوسط في البرهان غيره بالحقيقة

فيكون الطريق إلى المقصود هو عين المقصود و هو سبيل الصديقين الذين يستشهدون به تعالى عليه ثم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤

يستشهدون بذاته على صفاته و بصفاته على أفعاله واحدا بعد واحد و غير هؤلاء كالمتكلمين و الطبيعيين و غيرهم يتوسلون إلى معرفته تعالى و صفاته بواسطة اعتبار أمر آخر غيره كالإمكان للماهية و الحدوث للخلق و الحركة للجسم أو غير ذلك و هي أيضا دلائل على ذاته و شواهد على صفاته لكن هذا المنهج أحكم و أشرف.

و قد أشير في الكتاب الإلهي إلى تلك الطرق بقوله تعالى **سَنُرِيهِمْ آيَاتِنَا فِي الْأَفَاقِ وَ فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّهُ الْحَقُّ** و إلى هذه الطريقة بقوله تعالى - **أَوَلَمْ يَكْفِ بِرَبِّكَ أَنَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ شَهِيدٌ** و ذلك لأن الرابانيين ينظرون إلى الوجود- و يحققونه و يعلمون أنه أصل كل شيء ثم يصلون بالنظر إليه إلى أنه بحسب أصل حقيقته واجب الوجود و أما الإمكان و الحاجة و المعلولية و غير ذلك فإنما يلحقه لا لأجل حقيقته بما هي حقيقته بل لأجل نقائص و أعدام خارجة عن أصل حقيقته.

ثم بالنظر في ما يلزم الوجوب أو الإمكان يصلون إلى توحيد ذاته و صفاته- و من صفاته إلى كيفية أفعاله و آثاره و هذه طريقة الأنبياء كما في قوله تعالى - **قُلْ هَذِهِ سَبِيلِي أَدْعُو إِلَى اللَّهِ عَلَى بَصِيرَةٍ**. و تقريره أن الوجود كما مر حقيقة عينية واحدة بسيطة لا اختلاف بين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥

أفرادها لذاتها إلا بالكمال و النقص و الشدة و الضعف أو بأمور زائدة كما في أفراد ماهية نوعية و غاية كمالها ما لا أتم منه و هو الذي لا يكون متعلقا بغيره و لا يتصور ما هو أتم منه- إذ كل ناقص متعلق بغيره مفتقر إلى تمامه و قد تبين فيما سبق أن التمام قبل النقص و الفعل قبل القوة و الوجود قبل العدم و بين أيضا أن تمام الشيء هو الشيء و ما يفضل عليه- فإذن الوجود إما مستغن عن غيره و إما مفتقر لذاته إلى غيره.

و الأول هو واجب الوجود و هو صرف الوجود الذي لا أتم منه و لا يشوبه عدم و لا نقص.

و الثاني هو ما سواه من أفعاله و آثاره و لا قوام لما سواه إلا به لما مر أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦

حقيقة الوجود لا نقص لها و إنما يلحقه النقص لأجل المعلولية و ذلك لأن المعلول - لا يمكن أن يكون في فضيلة الوجود مساويا لعلته فلو لم يكن الوجود مجعولا ذا قاهر - يوجد و يحصله كما يقتضيه لا يتصور أن يكون له نحو من القصور لأن حقيقة الوجود كما علمت بسيطة لا حد لها و لا تعين إلا محض الفعلية و الحصول و إلا لكان فيه تركيب أو له ماهية غير الموجودة.

و قد مر أيضا أن الوجود إذا كان معلولا كان مجعولا بنفسه جعلا بسيطا و كان ذاته بذاته مفتقرا إلى جاعل و هو متعلق الجوهر و الذات بجاعله فإذا ثبت و اتضح أن الوجود إما تام الحقيقة واجب الهوية و إما مفتقر الذات إليه متعلق الجوهرية و على أي القسمين يثبت و يتبين أن وجود واجب الوجود غني الهوية عما سواه و هذا هو ما أردناه. و اعلم أن هذه الحجة في غاية المتانة و القوة يقرب مأخذها من مأخذ طريقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧

الإشراقين التي تبني على قاعدة النور لكن الباحثين من المتأخرين - لذهولهم عن بعض مقدمات هذا البرهان أو ضعف عقولهم عن إدراك معنى الأشد و الأضعف - في حقيقة الوجود ربما يقع بينهم الاعتراض على هذا المنهج تارة بأنه لا معنى لكون حقيقة واحدة مختلفة بالكمال و النقص بحسب أصل تلك الحقيقة حتى يكون ما به الاتفاق و ما به الاختلاف معنى واحدا و تارة بعد تسليمه بأن لا نسلم أن الكمال مقتضى أصل الحقيقة و أن القصور يقتضي المعلولية و الافتقار إلى ما هو الكامل فإن لأحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨

أن يقول لو اقتضى ذات الوجود و حقيقته الواجبية لكان كل وجود واجبا و لو اقتضى الإمكان و الفقر لكان الكل ممكنا و لو لم يقتض شيئا من الوجوب و الإمكان لكان كل منهما معللا بالغير فكان الواجب مفتقرا إلى علة و هو محال و بطلان التوالي بأسرها مستلزم لبطلان المقدم بأقسامه فكون الوجود حقيقة واحدة متفاوتة بالكمال و النقص أمر محال. أقول مبني هذا الإيراد كما أشرنا إليه على قصور الإدراك عن البلوغ إلى فهم المراد فإن كون الوجود حقيقة واحدة ليس ككون الإنسان ماهية واحدة - لأن الوحدة في الماهيات ليست مثل الوحدة في الوجود لأن تلك الوحدة ذهنية عارضة للكلية زائدة على ذاتها عارضة لها بعد حذف مشخصاتها فالتقسيم جار بعد عروض الوحدة إياها لأنه عبارة عن ضم قيود متخالفة بالمقسم الواحد بأن تلك الماهية الواحدة إما كذا و إما كذا و أما الوجود فليس ماهية كلية واحدة في الجميع - حتى يجري فيها ما ذكره من التقسيم كسائر الطبائع الكلية التي يجوز أن توجد في الذهن و يعرضها العموم و الاشتراك حتى يرد عليه التقسيم المعتبر فيه الوحدة للمقسم من جنس وحدة الأقسام إن جنسا فجنسا و إن نوعا فنوعا و إن شخصا فشخصا و قد مر أن الوجود ليس بجنس و لا نوع و لا شخص تحت نوع أو جنس و وحدة هذه الحقيقة و اشتراكها بين الأفراد و الآحاد ضرب آخر من الوحدة و الاتحاد فهذا السؤال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩

و الاعتراض ساقط بالكلية لأن موضعه ما إذا كان المقسم طبيعة كلية.
فإن أورد هذا الكلام في مفهوم الوجود المشترك العام بأنه إن اقتضى الواجبية كان جميع أفرادها واجبا وإلا لم يكن في الوجود ما هو واجب بالذات.

نجيب بأن لفظ الوجود إن كان المراد به الحكاية عن حقيقة الوجود فالأمر كما قلنا وإن كان المراد هذا المفهوم المصدري فلا يقتضي شيئا وهو كسائر الصفات من العوارض المفتقرة إلى غيرها وليس شيء منها واجب الوجود بل ولا من الموجودات الخارجية لأنه اعتبار عقلي نعم ربما يقال بأنه عين في الواجب زائد في الممكن - بمعنى أن ذاته تعالى بذاته مع قطع النظر عن غيره مصداق للحكم بأنه موجود - بخلاف الممكن إذ ليس كذلك إلا إذا لوحظ معه غيره.

تنقيح و تهذيب:

إن صاحب الإشراق أورد مثل ذلك الإيراد على نفسه في طريقته المبتنية على قاعدة النور و الظلمة.
و أجاب عنه بما ملخصه أن الماهية المشتركة بين تلك المراتب الكاملة - و المتوسطة و الناقصة معنى كلي موجود في الذهن و ليس بمشترك في الخارج بينها فإن ما في الخارج ليس مركبا من أصل الماهية و كمالها حتى يجب أن يحصل ما هو لمرتبة مخصوصة منها لمرتبة أخرى بل المراتب و الأفراد المختلفة متباينة في الخارج - فإن ذات الكامل مباينة لذات الناقص و المتوسط فيجوز أن يختلف تلك الأفراد في اللوازم و الآثار فلاشتباه إنما نشأ من أخذ ما في الذهن مكان ما في الخارج هذا حاصل ما أفاده في دفع ذلك الإشكال.
أقول و أنت تعلم أن الحق أن الكلي الطبيعي موجود في الخارج سيما عند من ذهب إلى أن الوجود اعتبار عقلي لا صورة له في الأعيان و ما في الأعيان هو ماهيات الأشياء دون وجوداتها كما هو مذهب هذا العظيم فالواقع في الخارج هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠

الماهية لا بشرط شيء أعني الكلي الطبيعي الذي يعرضه الكلية و العموم في الذهن و إن لم يكن في الخارج بهذه الصفة إلا بالقوة ففي الخارج أمر من شأنه أن يحصل في الذهن و يعرض له الاشتراك بين كثيرين.
فنقول الأمر المشترك موجود في الخارج و إن كان ظرف عروض الاشتراك إنما هو الذهن فهذا الأمر المشترك معنى واحد ذاتي لأفراده المختلفة بالكمال و النقص و غيرهما من التعينات كما هو مذهبه فإذن للعقل أن ينظر إليه من حيث هو - لأنه أمر عقلي سواء اعتبر معه الوحدة العقلية أو لم تعتبر فيجدها إما مقتضية لشيء من خصوصيات الأقسام و مراتبها من الكمال و النقص فيحكم بأن ما عدا تلك الخصوصية أو تلك المرتبة ليس من أفرادها الذاتية و إما غير مقتضية لشيء منها فيكون كل من المراتب و الخصوصيات بسبب أمر زائد على طبيعتها المشتركة فالقول بأن ما به الاختلاف بالكمال و النقص بعين ما به الاتفاق فيما له ماهية مشتركة كلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١

قول فاسد غير صحيح لأن تلك الماهية لعمومها و اشتراكها من شأنها أن توجد في كل فرد فرد و حصة حصة و مع ذلك

يكون لها حد جامع صادق على كل فرد ذاتي أو عرضي لها فتلك الطبيعة المتحققة في كل فرد فرد و حصة حصة إن كانت مقتضية للكمال و الشدة كانت جميعها كاملة شديدة و إن كانت مقتضية للنقص كانت جميعها ناقصة ضعيفة و إن لم تكن مقتضية لشيء لكان كل منها مفتقرا إلى مخصص زائد على ماهية تلك الطبيعة المشتركة. فعلم و تحقق أن شيئا من الماهيات غير قابل للأكمل و الأنقص و الأشد و الأضعف إلا بأمور زائدة عليها و مثل هذا الإشكال غير وارد على حقيقة الوجود إذا كانت متفاوتة الدرجات إذ ليس للوجود طبيعة كلية ذهنية يكون لها أنحاء من الحصولات كماهية الإنسان أو الفرس أو غيرهما حيث إن لها حدا واحدا و معنى معينا مشتركا بين الكثيرين متشخصا بتشخصات موجودا بوجودات زائدة تلك التشخصات و الهويات - على ذلك المعنى بحيث إذا جرده العقل عن واحد واحد منها حصل فيه من كل منها أمر واحد و إذا فرض تلبسه بأي تشخص كان صار عين ذلك التشخص لأن حقيقة الوجود ليست إلا نفس التشخصات و الهويات كما علمت فإذا كان مشككا متفاوتة المراتب - شدة و ضعفا أو تقدما و تأخرا لا يمكن تحليله إلى طبيعة مشتركة و تخصيص زائد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢

فالمرتبة الكاملة منه ليست بقابلية للتحليل إلى أصل مشترك و أمر زائد لأنها بسيطة الهوية و كذا المرتبة الناقصة منه ليست إلا مجرد الوجود و أما القصور فعدمي - فإذا حقيقة الوجود في كل موجود بحسبه و أما الوحدة التي تجمع الكل فهي ليست نوعية و لا جنسية بل ضربا آخر من الوحدة لا يعرفه إلا الكاملون.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣

و الحاصل أن صاحب الإشراقين لو كان قصد بماهية النور الذي هو عنده بسيط - متفاوت بالكمال و النقص حقيقة الوجود بعينها صح ما ذهب إليه و إن أراد به مفهوما من المفهومات التي من شأنها الكلية و الاشتراك بين الكثيرين فلا يمكن تصحيحه و الذي قاله أتباع المشائين إن الأشد و الأضعف من السواد و الحرارة و النور و غيرها - راجعان إلى تفاوت الحصولات بحسب خصوصيات الأفراد لا من جهة المفهوم المشترك قريب مما ذكرناه.

تذكرة إجمالية:

قد بزغ نور الحق من أفق هذا البيان الذي قرع سمعك - أيها الطالب من أن حقيقة الوجود لكونها أمرا بسيطا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤

غير ذي ماهية و لا ذي مقوم أو محدد هي عين الواجب المقتضية للكمال الأتم - الذي لا نهاية له شدة إذ كل مرتبة أخرى منها دون تلك المرتبة في الشدة ليست صرف حقيقة الوجود بل هي مع قصوره و قصور كل شيء هو غير ذلك الشيء بالضرورة - و قصور الوجود ليس هو الوجود بل عدمه و هذا العدم إنما يلزم الوجود لا لأصل الوجود بل لوقوعه في المرتبة التالية و ما بعدها فالقصورات و الأعدام إنما طرأت للثنائي من حيث كونها ثنائي فالأول على كماله الأتم الذي لا حد له و لا يتصور ما هو أتم منه و القصور و الافتقار ينشآن من الإفاضة و الجعل و يتممان به أيضا لأن هويات الثواني متعلقة بالأول فينجبر قصورها بتمامه و افتقارها بغناه.

فقد ثبت وجود الواجب بهذا البرهان و يثبت به أيضا توحيده لأن الوجود حقيقة واحدة لا يعترئها نقص بحسب سنخه و ذاته و لا تعدد يتصور في لا تناهيه و يثبت أيضا علمه بذاته و بما سواه و حياته إذ العلم ليس إلا الوجود و يثبت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥

قدرته و إرادته لكونهما تابعين للحياة و العلم و يثبت أيضا قيومية وجوده لأن الوجود الشديد فياض فعال لما دونه فهو العليم القدير المريد الحي القيوم الدراك الفعال و لكونه مستتبعا للمراتب التي تليه الأشد فالأشد و الأشرف فالأشرف - ثبت صنعه و إبداعه و أمره و خلقه و ملكوته و ملكه فهذا المنهج الذي سلكناه أسد المناهج و أشرفها و أبسطها حيث لا يحتاج السالك إياه في معرفة ذاته تعالى و صفاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦

و أفعاله إلى توسط شيء من غيره و لا إلى الاستعانة بإبطال الدور و التسلسل فبذاته تعالى يعرف ذاته و وحدانيته **شَهِدَ اللَّهُ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ** و يعرف غيره **أَوْ لَمْ يَكْفِ رَبِّكَ أَنَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ شَهِيدٌ**. فهذا المسلك كاف لأهل الكمال في طلب الحق و آياته و أفعاله لكن ليس لكل أحد قوة استنباط الأحكام الكثيرة من أصل واحد فلا بد في التعليم من بيان سائر الطرق الموصلة إلى الحق و إن لم يكن بهذه المثابة من الإيصال

الفصل (٢) في الإشارة إلى مناهج أخرى للوصول إلى هذه الوجهة الكبرى فمنها ما أشرنا إليه في العلم الكلي و الفلسفة الأولى

لأننا بينا خواص واجب الوجود و وحدته حيث ذكرنا أن الموجود ينقسم بحسب المفهوم إلى واجب و ممكن - و الممكن لذاته لا يترجح وجوده على عدمه فلا بد له من مرجح من خارج و إلا ترجح بذاته فكان ترجحه واجبا لذاته فكان واجب الوجود بذاته و قد فرض ممكنا و كذا في جانب العدم فكان ممتنعا و قد فرض ممكنا هذا خلف فواجب الوجود لا بد من وجوده فإن الموجودات حاصلة فإن كان شيء منها واجبا - فقد وقع الاعتراف بالواجب و إلا فوقع الانتهاء إليه لبطلان ذهاب السلسلة إلى غير نهاية كما مر بيانه و الدور مستلزم للتسلسل فهو محال أيضا مع أنه يوجب تقدم الشيء على نفسه و ذلك ضروري البطلان و لا يدفع بطلانه اختلاف الحثية التعليلية - لأنها غير مكثرة للذات الموضوعة لهما فالدور مع أنه يستلزم التسلسل يستلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه و هذا المسلك أقرب المسالك إلى منهج الصديقين و ليس بذلك كما زعم لأن هناك يكون النظر إلى حقيقة الوجود و هاهنا يكون النظر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧

في مفهوم الموجود.

و حاصله أن النظر في مفهوم الموجود و الموجودية يعطي أنه لا يمكن تحقيقه إلا بالواجب إذ لو انحصر الموجود في الممكن لم يتحقق موجود أصلا لأنه على هذا التقدير تحقق الممكن إما بنفسه بدون علة و هو محال بديهية أو بغيره و ذلك الغير أيضا ممكن على هذا التقدير فإما أن يتسلسل الآحاد أو يدور أو يؤدي إلى الواجب و الشقان الأولان باطلان و كذا الثالث لأنه خلاف المقدر و إن كان حقا لازما لأن نقيضه - و هو خلو الممكن عنه باطل فهذا ما وصفه الشيخ في

الإشارات بأنه طريقة الصديقين و تبعه المتأخرون فيه.

قيل عليهم أستم قد أخذتم في الدليل وجود الممكن لما يشاهد من عدمه بعد وجوده أو قبله.

فأجابوا بأن هذا البرهان غير متوقف إلا على وجود موجود ما فإن كان واجبا فهو المرام وإن كان ممكنا فلا بد أن يستند إلى الواجب بالبيان المذكور- ثم استشكلوا في كون البيان برهانا بأن الاحتجاج منحصر في الإني واللمي والواجب تعالى ليس معلولا لشيء أصلا بل هو علة لجميع ما عداه فكل ما يستدل به على وجوده يكون دليلا إنيا وهو لا يعطي اليقين فأجابوا عنه بأن الاستدلال بحال مفهوم الموجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨

على أن بعضه واجب لا على وجود ذات الواجب في نفسه الذي هو علة كل شيء- فكون مفهوم الموجود مشتملا على فرد هو الواجب حال من أحواله التي اقتضاها- فالاستدلال بحال تلك الطبيعة المشتركة على أخرى معلولة للحال الأولى وربما قرروا الجواب بأنه ليس الاستدلال على وجود الواجب في نفسه- بل على انتسابه إلى هذا المفهوم و ثبوته له على نحو ما ذكره الشيخ في الاستدلال بوجود المؤلف على وجود ذي المؤلف فوجود الواجب في نفسه علة لغيره مطلقا و انتسابه إلى هذا المفهوم معلول له و قد يكون الشيء في نفسه علة لشيء و في وجوده عند آخر معلولا كما حقق في موضعه هذا خلاصة ما أفاده بعض المحققين من أهل البحث.

و فيه ما لا يخفى من التكلف و الحق كما سبق أن الواجب لا برهان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩

عليه بالذات بل بالعرض و هناك برهان شبيه باللمي.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠

و من الطرائق التي استحسناها طريقة زعموا أنها يتم من غير الاستعانة- بإبطال التسلسل و الدور أوردتها صاحب المطارحات-

و هي أن الوجود إذا انحصر في الممكنات الصرفة سواء ذهبت سلسلتها إلى غير نهاية أو لم يذهب بانها دارت على نفسها فجميع الممكنات في حكم ممكن واحد في أنه يفتقر إلى علة فعلتها إما نفسها أو جزء من آحادها أو خارج عنها.

و الأول يوجب تقدم الشيء على نفسه و الثاني يوجب تقدمه على نفسه و على علة و الثالث يوجب المطلوب لأن الخارج عن جميع الممكنات لا يكون إلا واجب الوجود و لا يذهب عليك أن هذا البيان مقدوح فيه عندنا لأن الوجود يسارق الوحدة بل عينها و قد علمت أن الكثير بما هو كثير ليس له وجود إلا وجودات الآحاد فالمجموع من زيد و عمرو ليس إلا اثنين و لا يتحقق منهما شيء ثالث في الوجود إلا بمحض الاعتبار فإذاً أحد أن يقول إن جميع الممكنات ليست لها علة أخرى غير علل الآحاد فعلة مجموعها عبارة عن مجموع علل أفرادها فليست بخارجة عن ذواتها الممكنة التي بعضها علة للبعض فلا يلزم الانتهاء إلى الواجب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١

إلا أن يستعان ببطلان التسلسل فلم يكن هذا طريقاً آخر.
ثم العجب أنهم حين ورد عليهم الإشكال على هذا المسلك بأنه يجوز أن يكون الشيء علة لنفسه مستنداً بأن مجموع الموجودات من الواجب والممكن ممكن لاحتياجه إلى الآحاد ولا علة له سوى نفسه لأن علة إما جزؤه وهو محال لاحتياجه إلى بقية الأجزاء وإما خارج عنه ولا خارج عنه فتعين أن يكون نفسه التزموا في الجواب صحة كون العلة التامة للشيء عينه قالوا إن أردتم بالعلة العلة التامة بمعنى جميع الآحاد التي يتوقف المجموع على كل منها فهي عينه ولا محذور فيه لأن توقف ذلك المجموع على كل واحد من الآحاد لا يستلزم توقفه على المجموع - حتى يلزم توقف الشيء على نفسه وإن أردتم بها العلة الفاعلية فهي جزؤه أعني الواجب أو ما فوق المعلول الأخير المنتهي إلى الواجب فإن آحاده مستندة إلى الواجب فلا تأثير في المجموع باعتبار بقية الأجزاء التي هي الممكنات إلا وهو مستند إليه إما ابتداءً أو بواسطة هذا ولم يتفطنوا بأن هذا الالتزام يهدم الدليل المذكور - ولا يدفع الاعتراض لأن مبناه على تجويز كون الشيء علة تامة لنفسه وكون الجزء علة فاعلية.
والمجيب يقول نعم الأمر كما قلت فإن كون مجموع الشيء علة تامة لنفسه جائز وكون الجزء فاعلاً لكل جائز أيضاً وهل هذا إلا تسليم السؤال وهدم بناء الاستدلال.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢

وإنما وقعوا في هذا كله لما زعموا أن المجموع من الأمرين أو الأمور له وجود غير وجود كل من الأفراد ولما حكموا بأن المجموع من الواجب والمعلول الأول - موجود ممكن محتاج إلى علة حكموا بأن علة التامة هي نفسه وأنه لا يلزم أن يكون العلة التامة سابقة على معلولها وذهلوا عن أن هذا الالتزام غير معقول في نفسه - فإن كل ممكن موجود يحتاج إلى علة فاعلية تامة التأثير والإيجاد وكون جميع أجزاء الشيء عينه إنما يتصور في الأعداد والكميات التي يعتبرها الذهن ويعتبر لها وحدة اجتماعية بمجرد الفرض كالعسكر والعدد وغيرهما مما لا صورة لها في الأعيان غير كل واحد من الآحاد.

وبعض أهل التحقيق منهم أجاب عن الإشكال المذكور في المجموع من الواجب والمعلول الأول بأن المتعدد قد يؤخذ مجملاً وهو بهذا الاعتبار واحد - واللفظ الدال عليه بهذا الاعتبار هو مثل المجموع وقد يؤخذ مفصلاً واللفظ الدال عليه بهذا الوجه هو مثل هذا وذاك وهو بهذا الوجه يكون كثيراً وقد يختلفان في الحكم فإن مجموع القوم معاً لا يسعهم دار ضيق وهم لا معاً يسعهم إذا علم ذلك فنختار أن مرجح وجودهما معاً هو مأخوذين لا معاً لاحتياجه إلى كل واحد من جزئيه - وكفيان في وجوده فيكون هذا وذاك علتين يترجح وجود مجموعهما بهما فإن نقل الكلام إليهما لا معاً بل مفصلاً فإنه أيضاً ممكن يحتاج إلى مرجح فالجواب أنا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣

لا نسلم أنهما مأخوذين على هذا الوجه ممكن بل هو بهذا الوجه اثنان واجب موجود - وممكن موجود ودفع معاصره هذا الجواب بأن الموجود في هذه الصورة هو الواجب ومعلوله - فإذا فرض على وجه الإجمال كان واحداً وإذا أخذ

على التفصيل كان متعددا كما ذكره- ولا شك أنه كما أن كلا منهما موجود فهما موجود أيضا ضرورة أن انتفاء الكل أنما يكون بانتفاء أحد من آحاده والآحاد بأسرها موجودة فيها وأن الممكن الموجود لا بد له من علة سواء كان واحدا أو متعددا و سواء اعتبر مجملا أو مفصلا إذ الإجمال و التفصيل أنما يوجبان اختلاف الملاحظة و لا يوجبان اختلافًا في نفس الأمر فإذا اعتبر الواجب مع المعلول الأول فلا شك أن مجموعهما سواء لوحظ مجملا أو مفصلا موجود إذا المراد بالمجموع هنا معروض الهيئة الاجتماعية بدون الوصف أعني ذات الاثنين و هو موجود لا محالة وإن لم يكن الهيئة الاجتماعية و الاثنينية موجودة كما أن الواحد موجود وإن لم يكن وصف الوحدة موجودا وإذا كان معروض الاثنينية موجودا و هو ممكن لاحتياجه إلى الآحاد فلا بد له من علة و ليس هناك شيء آخر يصلح علة له فلا ينحسم مادة الإشكال بما ذكره.

على أنا نقول ليس التفاوت في المثال المذكور من حيث الإجمال و التفصيل بل التفاوت فيه بالمحمول فإن الكل المجموعي سواء أخذ مجملا أو مفصلا متصف بأن الدار تسعهم على التعاقب و لا يتصف بأنها تسعهم مجتمعين فتأمل انتهى.

أقول كلام كل منهما بمعزل عن التحقيق لأن مبناه على الاحتجاب عن معرفة أصل الوجود و أنه ليس من الانتزاعات الاعتبارية و عن أن وجود الشيء عين تعينه و وحدته و أن الكثرة لا وجود لها في نفس الأمر و أن الوهم إذا أخذ الشئيين شيئا واحدا- لا يوجب ذلك أن يكون لهما ذات أحدية لها حكم غير حكم هذا و ذاك فالماخوذ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤

من الإنسان و الحجر معا ليس بإنسان و لا حجر و لا شيء آخر و كذا المأخوذ من الجوهر و العرض ليس بجوهر و لا عرض و لا غيرهما و كذا المركب من الواجب و الممكن- ليس واجبا و لا ممكنا و كون العدد موجودا في الخارج معناه أن آحاده موجودات فيه و للعقل أن يعتبر الكثرة معا و بهذا الاعتبار لها ضرب من الوجود العقلي. أما الذي ذهب على الأول فأمور- منها زعمه أن موضوع العلية و المعلولية يجوز أن يكون واحدا بالذات متغيرا بالاعتبار و ذلك باطل لأن العلية و المعلولية من أقسام التقابل- فلا يمكن اجتماعهما في ذات واحدة و لو باعتبارين.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٥

و منها أن المركب من الواجب و الصادر الأول لو كان موجودا ممكنا كان الصادر من الواجب في أول المراتب شيئين ذلك الصادر و ذلك المجموع لا أمرا واحدا و هو خلاف ما تقرر من مذهبهم. و منها أن هذا الموجود المركب عندهم ليس أحد أقسام الوجود لأنه ليس واجبا و لا عقلا و لا نفسا و لا جسما و لا عرضا و كل موجود في الواقع يجب أن يكون أحد هذه الأقسام. و منها أن الحق جرى على لسانه في آخر كلامه حيث ذكر أنهما مأخوذان بهذا الاعتبار اثنان واجب و ممكن و لم يتفطن بأنه محط الجواب و لا حاجة إلى اعتبارهما معا شيئا واحدا حتى يرد الإشكال إذ لا ضرورة و لا برهان يدعو إلى كونهما معا موجودا واحدا في الخارج كيف و المعية تؤذن بالاثينية. و أما الذي ذهب على معاصره فبعض هذه المذكورات مع شيء آخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦

و هو استدلاله على كون المتعدد موجودا بأن آحاده موجودة و بأنه لو انتفى كان انتفاؤه بانتفاء شيء من آحاده و شيء منها غير منتف و كلا الوجهين مغلطة فإن كون الآحاد موجودة معناه أنها موجودة بوجودات متعددة مختلفة بالوجوب و الإمكان و الجوهرية و العرضية مثلا فكذا حكم المتعدد في كونه موجودا معناه أنه موجود بوجودات مختلفة لها أحكام مختلفة و أما قوله انتفاء المتعدد أنما يكون بانتفاء أحد من آحاده فليس فيه دلالة على ما هو بصدده إذ مقصود القوم من هذا الكلام أن كل مركب له تحقق في الخارج أو من شأنه أن يتحقق و ذلك بأن يكون له صورة وحدانية طبيعية - فانتفاؤه بانتفاء شيء من أجزائه و ليس يلزم منه أن يكون لكل مجموع من الآحاد المتعددة الموجود في الخارج بأي وجه كانت وجود حقيقي غير وجودات الآحاد - و أيضا يلزم على ما تصوره و صورته بطلان الحصر في التقسيمات فإذا قلت الشيء إما واجب أو ممكن أو الجوهر إما مجرد أو مادي أو الكلمة إما اسم أو فعل أو حرف لم يظهر الحصر المقصود إلا إذا امتنع لاثنتين منها نحو من الوجود الحقيقي -

و من المناهج غير المبتنية على بطلان الدور و التسلسل لهذا المطلب ما يبتني على الإمكان.

و تقريره بعد أن يمهد أن الشيء الممكن ما لم يجب وجوده لم يوجد و أن الممكن كما لا يقتضي وجوده لا يقتضي أولوية وجوده لذاته و إلا لكان كافيا لذاته في حصول وجوده و كان واجبا بالذات لا ممكنا كما سبق ذكره هو أن الممكن سواء كان واحدا أو متعددا مترتبا أو متكافئا لا يصح أن يقتضي وجوب وجود شيء إذ المقتضي لوجوب وجود الشيء لا بد أن يجعل جميع أنحاء عدمه ممتنعا و ليس هذا من شأن الممكن لجواز طريان عدمه على مجموع العلة و المعلول الممكنين و إن لم يجز طريانه للمعلول فقد دون العلة كما في لوازم الموجودات الممكنة فإذن الممكنات سواء كانت متناهية أو غير متناهية في حكم ممكن واحد في أنه لا يطرد عدمه بها عن ذات المعلول بحيث يصير ممتنعا أنحاؤه حتى يصير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧

واجبا بها ليكون موجودا فلا بد في كون الممكن موجودا أن يكون علتها غير خارجة عن حقيقة واجب الوجود لذاته و هو المطلوب و إليه الإشارة في كلام الفارابي حيث قال لو حصلت سلسلة الوجود بلا وجوب و يكون مبدؤها ممكنا حاصلا بنفسه لزم إما إيجاد الشيء لنفسه و ذلك فاحش و إما صحة عدمه بنفسه و هو أفحش انتهى.

و معناه أن هذا الممكن إن أفاد وجوب الوجود و امتناع عدمه لزم كون الشيء علة لنفسه مقتضيا له و هو باطل لاستلزامه تقدم الشيء على نفسه و إن لم يفد الوجوب و لم يمنع عدمه فيلزم صحة عدمه بنفسه و هو أفحش بطلانا و ذلك لأن المحذور الأول لازم هنا أيضا من كون الشيء سببا لنفسه بأي وجه كان مع محذور آخر - و هو أنه إذا صح له ورود عدم بعد الوجود فكيف صار موجودا ابتداء حيث إن عروض عدمه له ابتداء أولى من عروضه بعد الوجود فكان وجوده بلا سبب موجب له ممتنع الحصول

الفصل (٣) في الإشارة إلى وجوه من الدلائل ذكرها بعض المحققين من أهل فارس و ظن أنها برهانية و إلى ما فيها من الاختلال

قال و من البراهين التي ظهرت لي في هذا المطلب

و ناسب أهل البحث أن يقال على تقدير كون الموجودات منحصرة في الممكنات لزم الدور إذ تحقق موجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨

ما يتوقف على هذا التقدير على إيجاد ما لأن وجود الممكنات إنما يتحقق بالإيجاد و تحقق إيجاد ما يتوقف أيضا على تحقق موجود ما لأن الشيء ما لم يوجد لم يوجد.

و منها أن ليس للموجود المطلق من حيث هو موجود مبدأ و إلا لزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه و بذلك ثبت وجود واجب الوجود بالذات كما لا يخفى بادنى تأمل و هذا حقيق بأن يكون طريقة الصديقين الذين يستشهدون بالحق عليه و بعبارة أخرى - مجموع الموجودات من حيث هو موجود ليس له مبدأ بالذات و بذلك يثبت وجود واجب الوجود و بعبارة أخرى مجموع الموجودات من حيث هو موجود يمتنع أن يصير لا شيئا محضا و مجموع الممكنات ليس يمتنع أن يصير لا شيئا محضا و بذلك ثبت وجود الواجب بالذات انتهى قوله.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٩

أقول في كل من هذه الوجوه نوع خلل -

أما الوجه الأول

فليس يلزم على التقدير المذكور دور باطل فإن الدور المصطلح عليه عند العلماء هو الذي يكون طرفاه واحدا بالعدد لا كحكم توقف النطفة على الحيوان و الحيوان على النطفة مما يتقدم طبيعة مرسله على طبيعة مرسله أخرى - و هي تتقدم أيضا عليها في صورته التسلسل فالمغالطة نشأت هاهنا من أخذ الكلي مكان الجزئي و الوحدة النوعية مكان الوحدة الشخصية و مثل هذه المغالطة وقع لمحمد الشهرستاني في كتابه المسمى بمصارع الفلاسفة - حيث قال اعلم أنه لو لم يكن للعالم بدء زمني يلزم الدور فإن الدور في النطفة و الإنسان و البيض و الدجاج إنما ينقطع إذا عنيت الابتداء من أحد طرفي الدور و إلا لتوقف وجود أحدهما على الآخر و لم يكن لتحصيل أحدهما دون الآخر أولوية و ذلك يؤدي إلى أن لا يحصل أصلا و قد حصل فلا بد من قطع الدور بأحدهما و البدء في الأشخاص الإنسانية بالأكمل أولى قال المحقق الطوسي قدس سره في الجواب أحسنت يا علامة في ما يسأل عنه العوام و الصبيان فإنه ليس بدور هاهنا إلا في اللفظ لأن الشيء إذا توقف وجوده على ما يحتاج في وجوده إلى مثل ذلك الشيء لا يكون دورا يؤدي إلى أن لا يحصل بل ربما يتسلسلان و التسلسل إن كان مستحيلا و جب أن يكون له مبدأ فهاهنا اشتبه الدور بالتسلسل على المصارع انتهى.

و أما الوجه الثاني منها

فهو أيضا مغالطة نشأت من إهمال أحد شروط التناقض - و هو وحدة الموضوع بالشخص فإن تقدم الشيء على نفسه إنما يستلزم التناقض إذا كان الشيء واحدا بالشخص و أما الواحد بالعموم فلا تناقض فيه إذا تقدم و تأخر و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠

قد مر في أوائل السفر الأول أن مبادي الموجودات التي يبحث عنها في الفلسفة الأولى التي موضوعها الموجود المطلق هي من عوارضه أيضا ولا محذور فيه كما نص عليه الشيخ في إلهيات الشفاء.

و أما الوجه الثالث

فقله مجموع الموجودات إن أراد به كل واحد واحد فلا نسلم أنه ليس لها مبدأ بل لكل منها مبدأ على التقدير المذكور وإن أراد به المجموع بما هو مجموع فنقول كما مر أنه ليس لها مجموع موجود وجوده غير وجودات الآحاد على نعت الكثرة فكما ليس هناك وجود غير وجودات الآحاد كذلك ليست هناك حاجة إلى علة غير علل الآحاد.

و أما الوجه الرابع

فالذي يلزم منه أن يكون حيثية الوجود غير حيثية الإمكان واعتبار كون الشيء موجودا غير اعتبار كونه ممكنا وهو كذلك لأن الموجود بما هو موجود يستحيل أن يصير معدوما محضا لأن فيه ضرورة بشرط المحمول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١

بخلاف الموجود بما هو ممكن إذا لم يعتبر تقيده بالوجود فيصح أن يصير معدوما محضا بحسب ذاته ولا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون للموجود فرد حاصل لا يكون هو ممكنا.

فالحاصل أن حيثية الوجود يخالف حيثية الإمكان ولا يلزم منه اختلافهما في الموضوع فالمطلوب غير لازم واللازم غير مطلوب فالأولى الاستعانة في هذه الوجوه بإبطال التسلسل ليتم الكلام والإلا فغير تمام إذا ثبت أن جميع الممكنات في حكم ممكن واحد في كونه مفتقرا إلى علة خارجة عن ذاته وهو متوقف على أن يكون للجميع صورة وحدانية و حقيقة ذاتية غير صور الأعداد وحقائق الآحاد - وقد علمت ما فيه

الفصل (٤) في الإشارة إلى طرائق أخرى لأقوام

أما الإلهيون

فلهم مسلك آخر وذلك لأن لهم في إثبات الوجود الواجبي طريقين - طريقة يتبين بها وجوده ثم بعد ذلك يثبت بها وحدته و طريقة يثبت بها أولا أن واجب الوجود يجب أن يكون واحدا ثم بعد ذلك يثبتون أن الأجسام وصورها و أعراضها كثيرة فليس شيء منها واجب الوجود فتعين إمكانها واحتياجها إلى مرجح.

فمن الطريق الثاني إثبات إمكان العالم الجسماني فإن الأجسام المحصلة النوعية التركيب فيها ظاهر لأن كلا منها مركب من أصل الجسمية المشتركة و من أمر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٢

مخصص له بنوع من الأنواع إذ المبهم لا وجود له سواء كان المتفكر معترفا بهيولى هي أبسط من الجسم بما هو جسم أولا و سواء أثبت صورة جوهرية مخصصة متنوعة كما يراه المحصلون من المشائين أم لا إذ الهيئات المخصصة في مذهب غيرهم بمنزلة الصور - داخلية في الأنواع و لا أقل في الأشخاص إذ الجسم ما لم يتخصص لم يوجد فيقال لا شك أن الأجسام لتركبها ممكنة و الصور و الأعراض لحاجتها إلى المواد و الموضوعات ممكنة فعلى جميع القواعد الأجسام معلولة مفتقرة إلى المخصصات و المخصصات معلولة مفتقرة إلى المحال و النفوس أيضا مفتقرة إلى الأبدان و ليس كل

منهما مرجحاً للآخر وإلا لزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه ولا يوجد جسم من جسم لما مر من أن التأثير الجسماني بمشاركة الوضع والوضع بين المؤثر والمتأثر لا يتحقق إلا بعد وجودهما - ولأن الأجسام لا يذهب إلى غير النهاية لبراهين تناهي الأبعاد فيجب أن يكون علة الجميع أمراً غير جسم ولا جسماني وهو المطلوب.

و أما الطبيعيون

فلهم مناهج أخرى مأخوذة من جهة التغير والاستحالة.
أحدها طريقة الحركة نفسها وهو الاستدلال من الحركات وقد علمت من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣

قبل أن المتحرك لا يوجب حركة بل يحتاج إلى محرك غيره والمحركات لا محالة تنتهي إلى محرك غير متحرك أصلاً دفعا للدور والتسلسل وهو لعدم تغيره وبراءته عن القوة والحدوث واجب الوجود أو وجه من وجوهه كما مر ذكره في مباحث حدوث العالم وأيضا الأجسام الفلكية تبين عند الطبيعيين أن حركاتها نفسانية لا طبيعية والمباشر للحركات نفس فاعله بالإرادة فلها في فعلها غاية فهي قاصدة للخير لا تحرك لأجل شهوة أو غضب أو التفات إلى نفع يصل إلى ما دونها إذ لا وقع له عندها ولا الغاية حال بعضها لبعض وإلا لتشابهت الحركات ولم ينته عدد الأجسام إلى آخر فإذا لم يكن غايتها شهوانية ولا حال بعضها مع بعض ولا الأجسام التي تحتها أو فوقها ولا نفوس ما تحتها أو ما فوقها على ما بين في موضعه فتعين أن تكون لأمر غير جسماني ولا نفساني فإن وجب وجوده فهو المراد وإلا استلزمه وهذه طريقة الخليل ص.

و يقرب من هذا الطريق أن الأمور الزائلة إمكانها وحدوثها ظاهر وانفعال العنصرية عن السماويات معلوم وليست السماويات بعضها علة للبعض أما المحوي للحاوي فهو ظاهر لكونه أقصر وأحق وأما الحاوي للمحوي فلاستلزامه لإمكان الخلاء والكواكب أشرف من غيرها والشمس أشرف الجميع فهي أولى بهذا الوهم - ومع ذلك متغير متجدد الأحوال من الطلوع والأفول فيحتاج إلى محرك غير ذاتها فما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤

وقع في أوهام القاصرين من الصابئين وغيرهم ليس إلا من جهة الغلط في السماويات وبهذه الطريقة يبطل كونها الغاية القصوى وثبت ما وراءها ما هو أكمل وهو محركها لا على سبيل مباشرة وتغير بل على سبيل تشويق عقلي وإمداد نوري وهو واجب الوجود فاطر الكل وكمال هذه الطريقة بما حققناه وأحكمناه من إثبات الحركة الجوهرية في جميع الطبائع الجسمانية فلكية كانت أو عنصرية فالأفول والذثور كما يلحقها من جهة الصفات - والهيئات من الأوضاع وغيرها كذلك يلزمها من جهة الجوهر والذات فمحول ذواتها ومبقيها على سبيل تجدد الأمثال هو الذي ليس بجسم ولا جسماني وعلى هذا المعنى يحمل حكاية الخليل ع حيث نظر في أفول الكواكب وغيرها بحسب تجدد جواهرها في كل آن مع ما رأى من بقاء ملكوتها وصورها العقلية عند الله باقية بقاءه - حيث قال تعالى **وَكَذَلِكَ نُرِي إِبْرَاهِيمَ مَلَكُوتَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَلِيَكُونَ مِنَ الْمُوقِنِينَ** فسافر بعقله من هذا العالم لذثوره وزواله إلى عالم الربوبية فقال - **لَا أَحِبُّ الْآفَلِينَ ... إِنِّي وَجْهْتُ وَجْهِيَ لِلَّذِي فَطَرَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ حَنِيفًا وَ مَا أَنَا مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ**

و للطبيين مسلك آخر

يبتني على معرفة النفس و هو شريف جدا لكنه دون مسلك الصديقين الذي مر ذكره و وجه ذلك أن السالك هاهنا عين الطريق و في الأول المسلك إليه عين السبيل فهو أشرف.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٥

تقريره أن النفس الإنسانية مجردة عن الأجسام حادثة بما هي نفس مع حدوث البدن لامتناع التمايز أولا بدون الأبدان و استحالة التناسخ كما سيجيء - فهي ممكنة مفتقرة في وجودها إلى سبب غير جسم و لا جسماني أما الجسم بما هو جسم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٦

فلا علية له للنفس و إلا لكانت الأجسام كلها ذوات نفوس كذلك و أما القوة الجسمانية سواء كانت نفسا أخرى أو صورة جسمية أو عرضا جسمانيا فاستحال كونها علة لنفس لأن تأثيراتها بتوسط الوضع فلا وضع لها بالقياس إلى ما لا وضع له.

و أيضا الشيء لا يوجد لما هو أشرف منه و لا شك أن النفس أقوى تجوهرًا - و أشرف وجودا من سائر القوى الجرمانية فموجودها لا محالة شيء مقدس عن المواد و الأجرام فهو الواجب جل ذكره إما بلا واسطة أو بواسطة شيء من عالم أمره و كلمته.

وهاهنا إشكالان

أحدهما أن قولهم إن القوى الجسمانية لا تفعل و لا تنفعل إلا بتوسط الوضع مستلزم لأن لا ينفعل و لا يوجد جسم و لا صفة له من المبادي المفارقة - إذ لا يتصور وضع بين المادي و المفارق. و ثانيهما أنه يلزم أن لا يؤثر البدن و أحواله في النفس لتجردها عنه. و الجواب عن الأول أن الأجسام و المواد نفسها هي الموجودة المنفصلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٧

عن المبادي لا المنفصلة عنها بتوسط أوضاعها فالمحال غير لازم و اللازم غير محال. و أما عن الثاني فالنفس عندنا غير متأثرة عن البدن من حيث تجردها عنه بل من حيث تعلقها به و تمام هذا البحث يطلب من كتابنا المسمى بالمبدأ و المعاد.

و أما المتكلمون فطريقتهم تقرب من طريقة الطبيعيين المبتنية على الحركة لأن طريقتهم تبتني على الحدوث قالوا إن الأجسام لا تخلو عن الحركة و السكون و هما حادثان و ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث فالأجسام كلها حادثة و كل حادث مفتقر إلى محدث فمحدثها غير جسم و لا جسماني و هو الباري جل ذكره دفعا للدور و التسلسل.

و هذا أيضا مسلك حسن لأننا قد بينا أن تجدد الحركات يرجع إلى تجدد في ذوات المتحركات و أن حامل قوة الحدوث لا بد أن يكون أمرا مبهم الوجود - متجدد الصور الجوهرية و الأعراض تابعة في تجدها و ثباتها للجوهر فالعالم

الجسماني بجميع ما فيه زائلة دائرة في كل آن فيحتاج إلى غيرها وهذا بعينه يرجع إلى الطريقة المذكورة والمنع المشهور الذي كان متوجها إلى كلية الكبرى في دليلهم من عدم تسليم أن كل ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث مدفوع بما قررنا وكذا البحث المشهور من أنه يمكن حدوث كل فرد من الحركة أو المتحرك مع استمرار الطبيعة النوعية ساقط لأن الكلي الطبيعي غير موجود عندهم أصلا وغير موجود عندنا بالذات إذ لا وجود للماهية مفهوما ومعنى إلا من جهة الوجود والتشخيص - وليس لشيء من الحركات والمتحركات وجود وتشخيص على نعت البقاء والاستمرار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٨

الفصل (٥) في أن واجب الوجود إنيته ماهيته

استدل عليه

بأن كل ماهية يعرض لها الوجود ففي اتصافها بالوجود وكونها مصداقا للموجود يحتاج إلى جاعل يجعلها كذلك فإن كل عرضي معلل إما بالمعروض أو بغيره لكن يمتنع تأثير الماهية في وجودها أو كونها بحيث يلزمها الوجود لأن المؤثر في وجود شيء أو المستلزم لوجوده لا بد أن يكون له تقدم بالوجود عليه فلو كانت الماهية سببا لوجودها لكانت متقدمة بالوجود على وجودها - وكانت موجودة قبل أن تكون موجودة وهو محال وهذا بخلاف استلزامها لبعض صفاتها التي هي غير الوجود كاستلزام المثلث لزاويه واستلزام الأربعة للزوجية - فإن هناك لا يلزم تقدمها بالوجود فإذن لو كان وجود الواجب زائدا على ماهيته يلزم أن يكون مفتقرا إلى سبب خارج عن ذاته وهو ممتنع وهذه الحجة غير تامة عندنا - لأنها منقوضة بالماهية الموجودة التي كانت للممكنات إذ كما أن فاعل الشيء يجب تقدمه عليه فكذلك قابل الشيء.

فإن أجيب بأن هناك ليست قابلية ولا مقبولية بل معنى كون الماهية غير الوجود أن للعقل أن يلاحظها من غير ملاحظة الوجود ثم يصفها به فلا مغايرة بينهما في نفس الأمر إنما المغايرة بينهما بحسب المفهوم والمعنى عند التحليل.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٩

فيجاب بمثله إذا كان الواجب ذا ماهية وأيضا قد علمت أن الموجود عندنا في ذوات الوجود ليس إلا وجودها وهو الأصل في الموجودية دون الماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٠

سواء كان الوجود مجعولا لغيره أو واجبا فكما أن وجود الشيء إذا كان مجعولا - كانت ماهيته مجعولة بالعرض تابعة لمجعولية الوجود فكذلك إذا كان الوجود لا مجعولا كانت الماهية لا مجعولة بلا مجعولية ذلك الوجود وبالجمله وقع الاشتباه في هذه الحجة بين عارض الماهية وعارض الوجود وليس معنى عروض الوجود للماهية - إلا المغايرة بينهما في المفهوم مع كونهما أمرا واحدا في الواقع.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥١

و ربما تقرر الحجة على بطلان كون الواجب ذا ماهية هكذا و هو أنه لو كان وجوده زائدا عليه حتى يكون ألفا موجودا مثلا لم يكن في حد ذاته مع قطع النظر عن العارض موجودا و لا معدوما كما حقق في مبحث الماهية و كلما كان كذلك فهو ممكن لأن اتصافه بالوجود إما بسبب ذاته و هو محال إذ الشيء ما لم يوجد لم يوجد فيلزم تقدمه بالوجود على نفسه هذا خلف و إما بسبب غيره فيكون معلولا فلا يكون واجبا بل ممكنا.

أقول و لأحد أن يختار شقا آخر

غير الشقين المذكورين بحسب الاحتمال و هو كون اتصافه بالوجود بسبب الوجود كاتصاف الهيولى بالصورة فإن الصورة منشأ حصول الهيولى و منشأ اتصاف الهيولى بها أيضا ذاتها لا شيء آخر فلا يلزم كون الوجود معلولا و كون كل صفة مفتقرة إلى موصوفها غير مسلم في الأوصاف التي بحسب التحليل العقلي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٢

و أيضا لباحث على أسلوب القوم أن يقول إن المحوج إلى العلة هو الإمكان كما هو المشهور فاتصاف الشيء بأمر إذا كان ممكنا و كان ذلك الشيء بحيث يجوز أن يتصف به و أن لا يتصف به لم يكن بد هناك من علة تجعل ذلك الشيء متصفا بهذا الأمر كحال الجسم مع البياض و أما إذا لم يكن اتصاف الشيء بأمر ممكنا بل واجبا أو ممتنعا فلا حاجة هناك إلى علة فإذن نقول اتصاف الواجب بوجوده ضروري فلا حاجة إلى سبب و منشأ هذه الضرورة هو الوجود دون الماهية و ما يقال من أن الواجب يقتضي ذاته وجوده فمعناه أن ذاته لا يجوز أن لا يتصف بالوجود لا أن هناك اقتضاء و تأثيرا و لهذا قال بعض أهل التحقيق صفات الواجب لا تكون آثارا له و قد يقال إن الوجوب عندنا عبارة عن اقتضاء الوجود فإذا كان ذات الواجب مقتضيا لوجوده كان واجبا فلا يحتاج إلى علة لأن الحاجة فرع الإمكان فلا يلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه.

و الذي أفاده بعض المتأخرين في دفعه أنه لا فرق بين العلية و الاقتضاء إلا في العبارة فإذا كان مقتضيا لوجوده كان علة لنفسه قال فإن قلت معنى الاقتضاء أنه لا يمكن أن لا يكون موجودا لا أن يكون هناك تأثير و تأثر قلت عدم الإمكان إما بالنظر إلى الماهية أو إلى غيرها و على الأول يكون الذات علة إذ لا معنى للعلة إلا ما يكون امتناع العدم بالنظر إليه و على الثاني يلزم احتياجه إلى ذلك الغير فلا يكون واجبا انتهى.

أقول لأحد أن يقول لعل عدم الإمكان بالنظر إلى وجوده بأن وجوده يقتضي أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٣

يكون له ماهية متصفة به كما في اتصاف الجنس بالفصل فإن معنى الحيوان مثلا و إن كان زائدا عليه معنى الناطق بل معنى الإنسان فإذا نظرنا إلى معنى الحيوان من حيث هو هو أمكن أن يتصف بالناطق و بالإنسان و أن لا يتصف و أما إذا نظرنا إلى معنى الإنسان ماهية و إلى معنى الناطق وجودا كان الاتصاف بالحيوان واجبا و كون الإنسان مقتضيا للحيوان لا معنى له إلا كونه في ذاته ما دامت ذاته مصداقا للحيوانية و كذا كون وجود الناطق مقتضيا للحيوان لا يوجب أن يكون هناك اثنية في الوجود- و تأثير و جعل متخلل بينهما بل كون الناطق موجودا هو بعينه كون الحيوان موجودا بلا تقدم

و تأخر إذ الجنس و الفصل متحدان في الوجود و بينهما مغايرة في المفهوم - نعم إذا أخذ الحيوان مجردا عن الناطق و غيره و أخذ الناطق مجردا عن الحيوان و فرض وجودهما على هذا الوجه لكانا متغايري الوجود لكن ذلك أمر يخترعه العقل بلا مطابقة للواقع.

و بالجملة ما ذكره لو تم فإنما يتم على أسلوب أصحاب الاعتبار حيث إنهم ذهبوا إلى اعتبارية الوجود و أن موجودية الأشياء إنما هي في ذوات الماهيات - بكون ماهياتها واقعة في الأعيان بحيث يكون الوجود منتزعا منها فيكون الأصل في الموجودية في كل ما له ماهية هو الماهية دون الوجود فكون الوجود زائدا في الممكن - أن ماهيته في ذاته ليست بحيث ينتزع عنها الموجودية إلا بحسب أمر آخر و كونه عينا في الواجب أن ذاته بحيث لو حصلت في الذهن لانتزع منه الموجودية كما صرح به المحقق الدواني في قوله - هذا المعنى العام المشترك فيه من المعقولات الثانية و هو ليس عينا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٤

لشيء منها حقيقة نعم مصداق حملة على الواجب ذاته بذاته و مصداق حملة على غيره ذاته من حيث هو مجعول الغير فالمحمول في الجميع زائد بحسب الذهن إلا أن الأمر الذي هو مبدأ انتزاع المحمول في الممكنات ذاتها من حيثية مكتسبة من الفاعل و في الواجب ذاته بذاته فإنه وجود قائم بذاته فهو في ذاته بحيث إذا لاحظ العقل انتزع منه الوجود المطلق بخلاف غيره انتهى.

فظهر من أسلوبهم أن كون الوجود عينا في الواجب مجرد اصطلاح وقع منهم من غير أن يكون هناك فرد حقيقي من المسمى بالوجود و الذي ذكره - إنما يصح في هذا المفهوم العام المصدري دون حقيقة الوجود الذي به حقيقة كل شيء - و يتعدد بتعدد الأشياء ذاتا و هوية و يختلف باختلافه معنى و ماهية.

و أما على ما ذهبنا إليه حسب ما أقيم عليه البرهان من كون الوجود لكل شيء هو الموجود في الواقع فقولهم إن الوجود زائد في الممكن عين في الواجب - معناه أن ذات الممكن و هويته ليست بحيث إذا قطع النظر عن موحدة و مقومة يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٥

موجودا و واقعا في الأعيان لأن الهويات المعلولة كما مر فاقرات الذوات إلى وجود جاعلها و موجدتها فوجود الممكن حاصل بالجعل البسيط فوجود الجاعل مقوم للوجود المجعول فلو قطع النظر إلى وجوده عن وجود جاعله لم يكن وجوده متحققا كما علمت بخلاف الواجب جل ذكره فإنه موجود بذاته لا بغيره فالممكن لا يتم له وجود إلا بالواجب فوجود الواجب تمام لوجود غيره و هو غني الذات عن وجود ما سواه فثبت أن الوجود زائد في الممكن عين في الواجب تأمل فيه فإنه حقيق بالتصديق.

و يمكن أن يقال في معنى كلامهم إن الممكن ذو ماهية و إن الواجب لا ماهية له وجه آخر و هو أن كل ما سوى واجب الوجود يتصور مرتبته من مراتب نفس الأمر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٦

لم يكن هو في تلك المرتبة موجودا بوجوده الذي يخصه فيكون بإزائه هناك- ماهية غير موجودة و صورة معلومة فإن الجسم بما هو جسم ليس له وجود في مرتبة النفس- و لا النفس من حيث هي نفس موجودة في عالم العقل و كذا كل مجعول ليس له وجود في مرتبة وجود جاعله فيمكن أن يتصور له ماهية في تلك المرتبة غير موجودة بعد بهذا الوجود الخاص كيف و للأشياء صور معلومة للمبادئ قبل وجودها و ليس هكذا واجب الوجود لأنه كما يوجد في حد ذاته يوجد في جميع المقامات الوجودية لا بمعنى أنه يصير مرة كذا و مرة كذا بل بمعنى أن لا شيء من نشئات الكون إلا و يصدق بحسبه أن الباري موجود و لا شأن من الشئون الوجودية الأولية فيه شأن.

و هاهنا مسلك آخر في نفي الماهية عن الواجب

و هو قريب المأخذ مما ذكرها صاحب المطارحات هو أن الوجود إذا كان زائدا على الماهية يقع الماهية تحت مقولة من المقولات و تكون لا محالة من مقولة الجوهر دون مقولات الأعراض- سواء انحصرت المقولات في عدد معين مشهور أو غير مشهور أو تزيد عليه لأن مقولات الأعراض قيامها بغيرها فإذا كانت تحت مقولة الجوهر فلا بد أن تتخصص بفصل بعد اشتراكها مع غيرها من الأنواع فتحتاج إلى المخصص و أيضا لا شبهة في حاجة بعض الأنواع الجوهرية إلى المخصص و المرجح و إذا صح الإمكان على ما تحت الجنس من الأنواع صح على الجنس بما هو هو إذ لو امتنع الإمكان على طبيعة الجنس امتنع على طبيعة كل نوع منه فكان لا يتصور ممكن من ذلك النوع فإن الحيوانية مثلا لما امتنع عليها الحجرية يستحيل على الأنواع التي تحتها فالممتنع على الجنس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٧

و الواجب عليه إذا كان لذاته لا لعروض شيء يتعدى إلى الأنواع فإذا احتاجت أنواع مقولة إلى غيرها لزم الإمكان على الجنس فلو دخل واجب الوجود تحت المقولة للزم فيه جهة إمكانية باعتبار الجنس فما كان واجبا بل ممكنا و هو محال فإذا استحال كون الواجب تحت مقولة فلم يجز أن يكون ذا ماهية فكان وجودا بحثا و هو المطلوب

الفصل (٦) في توحيده أي أنه لا شريك له في وجوب الوجود

قد سبق منا طريق خاص عرشي في هذا الباب

لم يتفطن به أحد من قبلي ذكرته في القسم الأول الذي في العلم الكلي و ضوابط أحكام الوجود و سنشير هاهنا إلى مسلك شريف آخر قريب المأخذ من ذلك.

و الذي استدل به في المشهور على هذا المقصد هو أنه لو تعدد الواجب لذاته- فلا بد من امتياز كل منهما عن الآخر فإما أن يكون امتياز كل منهما عن الآخر بذاته فيكون مفهوم واجب الوجود محمولا عليهما بالحمل العرضي و كل عارض معلول للمعروض فرجع إلى كون كل منهما علة لوجوب وجوده و قد بان بطلانه و إما أن يكون الامتياز بالأمر الزائد على ذاتيهما فذلك الزائد إما أن يكون معلولا لذاتيهما و هو مستحيل لأن الذاتين إن كانتا واحدة كان التعيين أيضا واحدا مشتركا فلا تعدد لا ذاتا و لا تعيينا و المفروض خلافه هذا خلف و إن كانتا متعددة كان وجوب الوجود أعني الوجود المتأكد عارضا لهما و قد تبين فيما سبق بطلانه من أن وجود الواجب لا يزيد على ذاته و إما أن يكون معلولا لغيرهما فيلزم الافتقار إلى الغير في التعيين و كل مفقور إلى غيره في تعيينه يكون مفقورا إليه في وجوده فيكون ممكنا لا

واجبا.

و يرد عليه

أن معنى قولكم وجوب الوجود عين ذاته إن أردتم به أن هذا المفهوم المعلوم لكل أحد عين ذاته فهذا مما لا يتفوه به رجل عاقل وإن أردتم كون ذات الواجب بحيث يكون بذاته مبدأ انتزاع الوجود بخلاف الممكنات إذ ذاتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٨

بذاتها غير كافية في كونها مبدأ هذا الانتزاع بل بسبب تأثير الفاعل فيها فلم لا يجوز أن يكون في الوجود شيئان كل منهما بذاته مصداق هذا المفهوم و منشأ انتزاعه.

فإن قيل قد ثبت أن الذي يكون بذاته مبدأ انتزاع الوجود المشترك لا بد أن يكون وجوده الخاص و تعيينه الذي هو عين ذلك الوجود غير زائد على ذاته فالوجود الخاص الواجب عين هويته الشخصية فلا يمكن اشتراكه و تعدده فيرد عليه الشبهة المشهورة المنسوبة إلى ابن كمونة بأن العقل لا يأبى بأول نظره أن يكون هناك هويتان بسيطتان لا يمكن للعقل تحليل شيء منهما إلى ماهية و وجود بل يكون كل منهما موجودا بسيطا مستغنيا عن العلة و لذلك قيل إن في كلام الحكماء في هذا المقام مغالطة نشأت من الاشتباه بين المفهوم و الفرد فإنهم حيث ذكروا أن وجوده تعالى عين ذاته أرادوا به الأمر الحقيقي القائم بذاته حتى يجوز أن يكون عين ذاته و حيث برهنوا على التوحيد بأن وجوده عين ذاته فلا يمكن اشتراكه أرادوا به المفهوم إذ لو أرادوا به الوجود الخاص القائم بذاته لم يتم برهان التوحيد لجواز أن يكون وجودان خاصان قائمان بذاتيهما و يكون امتيازهما بذاتيهما فيكون كل منهما وجودا خاصة متعينا بذاته و يكون هوية كل منهما و وجوده الخاص عين ذاته على نحو ما يقولون على تقدير الوحدة. أقول هذه الشبهة شديدة الورود على أسلوب المتأخرين القائلين باعتبارية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٥٩

الوجود حيث إن الأمر المشترك بين الموجودات ليس عندهم إلا هذا الأمر العام الانتزاعي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٠

و ليس للوجود المشترك فرد حقيقي عندهم لا في الواجب و لا في الممكن و إطلاق الوجود الخاص على الواجب عندهم ليس إلا بضرب من الاصطلاح حيث أطلقوا هذا اللفظ على أمر مجهول الكنه و أما على ما حققناه من أن هذا المفهوم الانتزاعي له أفراد حقيقية نسبته إليها نسبة العرض العام إلى الأفراد و الأنواع فليست قوية الورود بل يمكن دفعها بأدنى تأمل و هو أن هذا المفهوم و إن كان منتزعا من الماهية بسبب عارض - لكنه منتزع من كل وجود خاص حقيقي بحسب ذاته بذاته فإذن نسبته إلى الوجودات الخاصة نسبة المعاني المصدرية الذاتية إلى الماهيات كالإنسانية من الإنسان و الحيوانية من الحيوان حيث ثبت أن اشتراكها معنى تابع لاشتراك ما ينتزع هي منه - و كذلك تعددها فيه تابع لتعدد ما ينتزع منه فإن الإنسانية مثلا مفهوم واحد ينتزع من ذات كل إنسان و لا يمكن انتزاعها من ماهية فرس أو بقر أو غير ذلك - فاتحادها في المعنى مستلزم لاتحاد جميع ما صدق هي عليها بحسب ذاتها معنى - سواء كان ذلك

المعنى جنسا أو نوعا فإذن لو كان في الوجود واجبان لذاتيهما - كان الوجود الانتزاعي مشتركا بينهما كما هو مسلم عند الخصم و كان ما بإزائه من الوجود الحقيقي الذي هو مبدأ انتزاع الموجدية المصدرية مشتركا أيضا بوجه ما - فلا بد من امتياز أحدهما عن الآخر بحسب أصل الذات إذ جهة الاتفاق بين الشئيين إذا كانت ذاتية لا بد وأن يكون جهة الامتياز والتعين أيضا ذاتيا فلم يكن ذات كل منهما بسيطة و التركيب ينافي الوجوب كما علم

بقي في المقام شيء آخر

و هو أن ما به الامتياز قد يكون بنفس ما به الاتفاق - كما في التفاوت بالشدة و الضعف على ما رأينا في باب حقيقة الوجود فلاحظ أن يقول امتياز أحد الواجبين عن الآخر لعله حصل بكون أحدهما أكمل وجودا وأقوى من الآخر بحسب ذاته البسيطة و لا نسلم في أول النظر امتناع كون الواجب أنقص من واجب آخر و إن سلم امتناع قصوره عن ممكن آخر.

لكن هذا مدفوع بما أشرنا إليه سابقا من أن القصور يستلزم المعلولية إذ الحقيقة الوجودية لا يمكن أن يكون ذاتها بذاتها من غير علة مستلزمة للقصور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦١

إذ القصور معناه غير معنى الوجود لأن القصور عديمي و الشيء لا يستلزم عدمه بخلاف الكمال فإن كمال الشيء تأكيد فيه فالخط الأطول من خط آخر صح أن يقال كماله بنفس طبيعة الخطية و أما الخط الأقصر فلا يصح أن يقال قصره بطبيعة الخطية - بل بعدم مرتبة من تلك الطبيعة فكل خط غير متناه صح أن يقال إنه ليس فيه شيء غير طبيعة الخطية و أما الخط المتناهي ففيه خط و شيء آخر لا يقتضيه الخطية أعني النهاية و الحد فإذن كل وجود متناهي الشدة لا بد أن يكون له علة محددة غير نفس وجوده الخاص عينت و حصلت تلك العلة مرتبة من الطبيعة الوجودية و المعلولية تنافي وجوب الوجود أي كون الشيء موجودا بالضرورة الأزلية فاستحال تعدد الواجب - و هذا البيان في التوحيد غير جار بهذا الوجه على مسلك أهل الاعتبار.

لكن يمكن أن يقال إذا ثبت كون الوجود بالمعنى الانتزاعي أمرا مشتركا معنويا بين الموجودات إلا أن منشأ انتزاعه في الممكنات المتخالفة الماهيات ليس ذاتها بذاتها بل هي بحسب ارتباطها إلى الجاعل القيوم و منشأ انتزاعها في الواجب ذاته بذاته فبالحقيقة المنتزعة منه الوجود في الجميع هو ذات الباري و إن كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٢

المحمول عليه بالحمل الاشتقاقي مختلفا فإذن لو تعدد الواجب القيوم تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا كان كل منهما بحسب ذاته بذاته مصداقا لهذا المعنى الواحد المشترك - و مبدأ لانتزاعه و مطابقا للحكم به فإذن البديهة حاکمة بأن المعنى الواحد المصدري - لا يمكن أن يكون حيثية الاتصاف به و مناط الحكم به ذوات متخالفة من حيث تخالفها - من غير جهة جامعة فيها فإذن يلزم على التقدير المذكور أن يكون بين الواجبين اتفاق في أمر ذاتي غير خارج عن حقيقة كل منهما و الاتفاق بينهما في ذاتي يوجب - أن يكون الامتياز و التعدد بجهة أخرى في الذات أيضا كفصل إن كان ما به الاتفاق جنسا أو تشخص إن كان نوعا فيلزم التركيب المنافي للوجوب الذاتي فهذا وجه تصحيح كلام القوم في

براهينهم المذكورة في كتبهم.

منها قول الشيخ أبي علي في التعليقات وجود الواجب عين هويته فكونه موجودا عين كونه هو فلا يوجد وجود الواجب لذاته لغيره ولا يرد عليه بناء على ما حققناه أنه لو أراد بقوله كونه موجودا عين كونه هو أن وجوده الخاص هو هو فلم لا يجوز أن يكون هناك أمران كل واحد منهما وجوده الخاص عين هويته فيكون في كل منهما كونه هو و كونه موجودا شيئا واحدا وإن أراد به أن كونه موجودا مطلقا عين كونه هو فهو غير مسلم وذلك لما علمت أن الاشتراك المعنوي لمفهوم الوجود- يستدعي اتحاد جهة الوجودية و حقيقة الوجود.

و منها لو تعدد الواجب فإما أن يتحد الماهية في ذلك المتعدد أو تختلف- و على الأول لا يكون حملها على كثيرين لذاتها وإلا لما كانت ماهيتها بواحدة- فيلزم تحقق الكثير بدون الواحد و على الثاني يكون وجوب الوجود عارضا لهما و كل عارض معلول إما لمعروضه فقط أو بمداخلة غيره و القسمان باطلان أما الأول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٣

فلاستيجاب كونه علة لوجود نفسه و أما الثاني فأفحش و لا يرد عليه بناء على تلك المقدمة الشبهة المشهورة. و منها قول الفارابي في الفصوص وجوب الوجود لا ينقسم بالحمل على كثيرين مختلفين بالعدد و إلا لكان معلولا انتهى و هذا مجمل تفصيله ما سبق من البيان و هو برهان مختصر لا يتأتى عليه تلك الشبهة حسبما حقق المقام لأن مبنى تطرق تلك الشبهة على كون الوجود مجرد مفهوم عام كما ذهب صاحب الإشراف و متابعوه في ذلك من كافة المتأخرين إلا نادرا و الشبهة مما أوردها هو أولا في المطارحات تصريحاً و في التلويحات تلميحاً ثم ذكرها ابن كمونة و هو من شراح كلامه في بعض مصنفاته و اشتهرت باسمه و لإصراره على اعتبارية الوجود و أنه لا عين له في الخارج تبعا لهذا الشيخ الإشرافي قال في بعض كتبه أن البراهين التي ذكروها إنما تدل على امتناع تعدد الواجب مع اتحاد الماهية و أما إذا اختلفت فلا بد من برهان آخر و لم أظفر به إلى الآن

الفصل (٧) في تعقيب هذا الكلام بذكر ما أفاده بعض المحققين و ما يرد عليه

اعلم أن العلامة الدواني قال في بعض رسائله و في شرحه للهيكل النورية إنا نمهد مقدمتين

إحداهما أن الحقائق الحكمية لا تقتنص من الإطلاقات العرفية

بل ربما يطلق لفظ في العرف على معنى من المعاني خلاف ما يساعده البرهان كلفظ العلم حيث يفهم منه في اللغة معنى يعبر عنه بدانش و دانستن و مرادفاتهما من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٤

النسب و الإضافات ثم النظر الحكمي اقتضى أن حقيقة الصورة المجردة ربما يكون جوهرها كما في العلم بالجواهر بل قائما بذاته كما في علم المجردات بذواتها- بل واجبا بالذات كما في علم واجب الوجود بذاته و كما أن الفصول الجوهرية يعبر عنها بالفاظ يوهم أنها إضافات عارضة لذلك الجوهر كالناطق في فصل الإنسان و كالحساس و المتحرك بالإرادة في فصل الحيوان و التحقيق أنها ليست من النسب و الإضافات في شيء لأن جزء الجوهر لا يكون إلا جوهر.

و ثانيتهما أن صدق المشتق على شيء

لا يقتضي قيام مبدأ الاشتقاق به وإن كان العرف يوهمه وذلك لأن صدق الحداد على زيد و صدق الشمس على ماء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٥

متسخن ليس إلا لأجل كون الحديد موضوع صناعة زيد و أن الماء منسوب إلى الشمس بتسخنه بمقابلتها ثم قال و بعد تمهيدهما نقول يجوز أن يكون الوجود الذي هو مبدأ اشتقاق الموجود أمراً قائماً بذاته هو حقيقة الواجب تعالى و وجود غيره عبارة عن انتساب ذلك الغير إليه فيكون الموجود أعم من تلك الحقيقة و من غيره المنتسب إليه و ذلك المفهوم العام أمر اعتباري عد من المعقولات الثانية و جعل أول البديهيات.

فإن قلت كيف يتصور كون تلك الحقيقة موجودة و هي عين الوجود- و كيف يعقل كون الموجود أعم من تلك الحقيقة و غيرها.

قلت ليس الموجود ما يتبادر إلى الفهم و يوهمه العرف من أن يكون أمراً مغايراً للوجود بل معناه ما يعبر عنه في الفارسية بهست و مرادفاته فإذا فرض الوجود مجرداً عن غيره قائماً بذاته كان وجوداً لنفسه فيكون موجوداً و وجوداً قائماً بذاته- كما أن الصور المجردة إذا قامت بذاتها كانت علماً بنفسها فيكون علماً و عالماً و معلوماً و كما لو فرض تجرد الحرارة عن النار كانت حارة و حرارة و قد صرح بذلك بهمنيار في كتابه البهجة و السعادة بأنه لو تجردت الصورة المحسوسة عن الحس و كانت قائمة بذاتها كانت حاسة و محسوسة و كذلك ذكروا أنه لا يعلم كون الوجود زائداً على الموجود إلا ببيان مثل أن يعلم أن بعض الأشياء قد يكون موجوداً و قد يكون معدوماً فيعلم أنه ليس عين الوجود إذ يعلم أن ما هو عين الوجود يكون واجباً بالذات و من الوجودات ما لا يكون واجباً فيزيد الوجود عليه. فإن قلت كيف يتصور هذا المعنى الأعم.

قلت يمكن أن يكون المعنى العام أحد الأمرين من الوجود و ما هو منتسب إليه انتساباً مخصوصاً و معيار ذلك أن يكون مبدأ الآثار و يمكن أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٦

هذا المعنى العام لهما هو ما قام به الوجود أعم من أن يكون وجوداً قائماً بنفسه فيكون قيام الوجود به قيام الشيء بنفسه و من أن يكون من قبيل قيام الأمور المنتزعة العقلية بمعروضاتها كالكلية و الجزئية و نظائرها و لا يلزم من كون إطلاق القيام على هذا المعنى مجازاً أن يكون إطلاق الموجود مجازاً.

فيتلخص من هذا أن الوجود الذي هو مبدأ اشتقاق الموجود أمر واحد موجود في نفسه و هو حقيقة خارجية و الموجود أعم منه و مما ينتسب إليه و إذا حمل كلام الحكماء على ذلك لم يتوجه أن المعقول من الوجود أمر اعتباري هو أول الأوائل التصورية فإطلاقه على تلك الحقيقة القائمة بذاتها إنما يكون بالمجاز أو بوضع آخر- فلا يكون عين حقيقة الواجب و يندفع الهرج و المرج الذي يعرض للناظرين بحيث يتشوش الذهن و يتبلد الطبع.

فإن قلت ما ذكرته من أنه يمكن حمل كلامهم على ذلك لا يكفي بل لا بد من الدليل على أن الأمر كذلك في الواقع.

قلت لما دل البرهان على أن وجود الواجب عينه و من البين أن المفهوم البديهي المشترك لا يصلح لذلك.

فإن قلت لم لا يجوز أن يكون هويتان يكون كل منهما واجباً بذاته و يكون مفهوم واجب الوجود مقولاً عليهما قولاً

عرضيا.

قلت يكفي في دفع هذا الوهم تذكر المقدمات السابقة و تفتن المقدمات اللاحقة إذ قد علمت أنه لو كان كذلك لكان عروض هذا المفهوم لهما إما معلولا لذاته فيلزم تقدمه بالوجود على نفسه أو بغيره فيكون أفحش و قد تحقق و تقرر أن ما يعرضه الوجوب أو الوجود فهو ممكن فإذن واجب الوجود هو نفس الوجود المتأكد القائم بذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٧

و إذا قلنا واجب الوجود موجود فالمراد به ما ذكرناه لا أنه أمر يعرضه الوجود و بهذا صرح المعلم الثاني و الشيخ بأن إطلاق الموجود على الواجب كما يوهمه اللغة مجاز.

فإذا تمهد هذا ظهر أنه لا يجوز أن يكون هويتان

كل منهما وجود قائم بذاته واجب لذاته إذ حينئذ يكون وجوب الوجود عارضا مشتركا بينهما بل نقول لو نظرنا في نفس الوجود المعلوم بوجه ما فإدانا البحث و النظر إلى أنه أمر قائم بذاته هو الواجب و محصله أنا إذا نظرنا في الوجود المشترك بين الموجودات فعلمنا - أن اشتراكه ليس اشتراكا من حيث العروض بل من حيث النسبة إلى أمر فظهر أن الوجود الذي ينسب إليه جميع الماهيات أمر قائم بذاته غير عارض لغيره واجب لذاته - كما أنا لو نظرنا إلى مفهوم الحداد و الشمسس توهمنا في بادئ النظر أن الحديد و الشمس مشتركان بين أفرادهما ثم تفتنا أنهما ليسا مشتركين بحسب العروض بل بحسب النسبة إليهما.

فظهر أن توهم العروض باطل و أن ما حسبناه عارضا مشتركا فهو في الواقع غير عارض بل أمر قائم بذاته و لتلك الأفراد نسبة إليه و ليس هناك شمسان و لا حديدان و أنت خبير بأن كون الوجود عارضا للماهيات على ما هو المشهور الذي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٨

ينساق إليه النظر الأول لا يصفو عن الكدورات المشوشة للأذهان السليمة لا سيما على ما تقرر عند المتأخرين من أن ثبوت شيء لشيء و عروضه له فرع ثبوت المثبت له في نفسه إذ الكلام في الوجود المطلق و ليس للماهية قبل الوجود المطلق وجود حتى يكون الاتصاف به فرعاً على ذلك الوجود و ما قاله بعضهم من أن الاتصاف بالوجود - إنما هو في الذهن لا يجديهم نفعاً لأنه إذا نقل الكلام إلى الاتصاف بالوجود الذهني - لم يبق لهم مهرب و استثناء الوجود من المقدمة القائلة بالفرعية تحكم على أن مشاهيرهم قدحوا في هذا الاستثناء.

ثم قال إن من البين أنه إذا كان الوجود وصفا للماهية و كان أثر الفاعل هو اتصاف الماهية بالوجود على ما تقرر و اشتهر بينهم لزم أن يكون الصادر عن الفاعل - هو ذلك الأمر النسبي و ظاهر أن النسبة فرع للمنتسبين فلا يصح كونها أول الصوارد إلى غير ذلك من الظلمات التي تعرض من القول بعروض الوجود للماهيات و على ما ذكرناه لا يتوجه شيء من الشبهات هذا نظري في حقيقة ما ذهب إليه الحكماء.

[وجوه من البحث يرد عليه]

أقول هذا التحرير و إن بالغ في بسط الكلام لتقرير المرام بحيث يقبله بل يستحسنه أكثر الأناس ممن أتى بعده لكن عندي أن هذا الكلام بطوله و بسطه لا يشفي العليل و لا يروي الغليل و لا يجدي مع صحة مقدماته نفعاً في مسألة التوحيد كما

سيظهر لك إن شاء الله تعالى و ذلك لوجوه من البحث يرد عليه -

الأول أنا لا نسلم أن مأخذ الاشتقاق في الحداد هو الحديد

كيف و هو أمر جامد غير صالح لأن يشتق منه شيء و كذا الشمس.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٦٩

الثاني أن صدق المشتق على شيء و إن لم يستلزم قيام مبدأ الاشتقاق به

كما مهده لكن يستلزم كون المبدأ متحققا فيه لا أقل و ما ذكره من مثال الحداد و الشمس مما لا تعويل عليه لجواز أن يكون هذه الإطلاقات مجازية من باب التوسع - لجواز أن يكون مبدأ الاشتقاق مثل التحدد و الشمس أو الحديدية و الشمسية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٠

لأن النسبة إليهما تكون مبدأ الاشتقاق بل هما بادعاء أن للحديد نحواً من الحصول في الصانع له كان المواظبة على استعمال الحديد و التشغل به صير الرجل ذا حصة من الحديد كيف و صورة الحديد قائمة بذهنه و الحديد و إن كان ممتنع القيام بغيره - في الوجود الخارجي لكن صورته مما تقوم بالذهن و كذا يجوز أن يكون إطلاق الشمس على الماء المتسخن من باب التوسع و بتخيل أن فيه حصة من الشمس كما صورناه و بالجملة لا تقتنص الحقائق من هذه الإطلاقات كما أفاده فكيف يعول عليها

الثالث أن المشتق كما أنه مفهوم كلي

بلا شك لأحد في ذلك كذلك مبدأ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧١

الاشتقاق سواء كان جزءه أو عينه يجب أن يكون مفهوماً كلياً فإن جزء المفهوم الكلي أو نفسه لا يمكن أن يكون شخصاً جزئياً فقولُه يجوز أن يكون مبدأ اشتقاق الموجود أمراً قائماً بذاته غير صحيح.

الرابع أن أهل اللغة أو العرف ما لم يعلموا مفهوم مبدأ اشتقاق كيف يشتقون منه صيغة الفاعل و المفعول و غيرهما

و لا شك أن حقيقة الواجب تعالى غير معلوم للعلماء بالكنه و لا لغيرهم بوجه من الوجوه مع أن عامة الناس يطلقون لفظ الموجود و ما يرادفه في سائر اللغات هست و أمثاله و يعرفون معناه من غير أن يتصوروا معنى الحقيقة المقدسة و لا معنى الانتساب إليها و ما ذكره من أنه قد يطلق لفظ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٢

في العرف على معنى يحكم العقل بخلافه على تقدير صحته لا يلزم أن يكون ما نحن فيه من هذا القبيل كيف و مفهوم الموجود و الوجود أجلى البديهيات و أعرف من كل متصور كما أطبقوا عليه و على ما ذكره يلزم أن يكون من أغمض

النظريات فإن ذاته تعالى غير معلوم لأحد و كذا الانتساب إلى المجهول مجهول البتة.

الخامس أن مبدأ اشتقاق كل مشتق لا بد أن يكون معنى واحدا

لأنه يكون هناك مشتق واحد له مبدءان مرة اشتق من هذا و مرة اشتق من ذلك و هذا مما لم يسمع من أحد من أهل اللغة و لا من غيرهم فكون الموجود إذا أطلق على ذات الباري كان معناه الوجود و إذا أطلق على غيره كان معناه المنتسب إليه مما لا يتصور له وجه صحة سيما و قد اعترف بأنه مشترك معنوي و ليس هذا نظير الأسود إذا أطلق تارة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٣

على السواد المجرد و تارة على الشيء الأسود إذ معناه في الجميع واحد و هو ما ثبت له السواد و إن كان مصداقه في أحد الموضعين نفس السواد و في الآخر مع شيء آخر - فملاك الأسودية تحقق السواد مطلقا أعم من أن يكون مجردا عن غيره أو مقرونا به - و ليس مفهوم الوجود على ما زعمه كذلك.

السادس أنه بأي طريق عرف أن ذاته تعالى وجود بحت

بعد ما أنكر أن للوجود حقيقة في الخارج عند الحكماء و زعم أنهم ذهبوا إلى أنه من المعقولات الثانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٤

التي لا مصداق لها في الخارج فمن أين حصل له أن حقيقة الواجب تعالى فرد للوجود - فإن رأى ذلك لأنهم أطلقوا عليه لفظ الوجود و لم يجز أن يكون المراد به ما قام به الوجود لاستيجابه للتركيب و الإمكان فيكون المراد نفس الوجود يلزم عليه أن يكون إطلاق اللفظ كاسبا للعلم و اليقين و هو متحاش عن ذلك حيث قال الحقائق لا تقتنص من الإطلاقات العرفية و العجب أنه بالغ في إثبات شيء ليس فيه كثير اهتمام و هو إطلاق المشتق و إرادة المبدأ و أهمل فيما هو المهم هاهنا و هو أن الباري محض حقيقة الوجود أو الموجود إذ لا طريق يؤدي إلى إثبات التوحيد إلا بأن يثبت بالبرهان أن مفهوم الوجود المشترك بين الموجودات كلها حقيقة بسيطة و هو إنكاره أن يكون للوجود حقيقة في الخارج بعيد عن ذلك بمراحل و الإيراد الذي أورده على نفسه و أجاب عنه بقوله فإن قلت كيف يتصور كون تلك الحقيقة موجودة إلى قوله فيكون موجودا قائما بذاته من باب التسعير في أثناء المخاصمة و إنما يصح ما ذكره من الجواب لو كان أصل الإشكال عليه أن ذاته تعالى إذا كان عين الوجود كيف يكون موجودا كما قرره و أما إذا قرر الإشكال بأن حقيقته تعالى كيف يكون موجودا في الخارج عندك مع أن الوجود من المعقولات الثانية لم يجز ذلك الجواب و الذي يمكن أن يقال حينئذ هو أن كون الوجود اعتباريا لا ينافي إطلاق الموجود عليه تعالى فيكون الباري عين الموجود لا عين الوجود و هو عكس مذهبه كما اختاره السيد المعاصر له أن ذاته تعالى عين مفهوم الوجود و قد علمت ما فيه أيضا - فإن الحق أن ذاته عين حقيقة الموجود لأنه الوجود البحت بمعنى أن ذاته بذاته مصداق حمل ذلك المفهوم المشتق.

السابع أن قوله فإذا فرض الوجود مجردا عن غيره كان وجودا لنفسه

إلى قوله و الحرارة على تقدير تجردها كذلك صريح في أن للوجود معنى مشتركا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٥

يجوز قيام بعض أفرادہ بنفسه و بعضها بغيره و هذا أنما يتصور و يصح إذا كان له حقيقة مشتركة بين القسمين غير الأمر الانتزاعي المصدري كما ذهبنا إليه حسبما رآه المحققون إذ لا مجال للعقل أن يجوز كون هذا المعنى النسبي المصدري - أمراً قائماً بذاته

الثامن أن قوله إن الوجود الذي هو مبدأ اشتقاق الوجود أمر واحد

غير مبين مما ذكره إذ بعد تسليم أن الوجود أعم من قسمين من حقيقة قائمة بذاته و من أشياء منسوبة إليها لم يظهر كون القسم الأول حقيقة واحدة إذ ليس كون تلك الحقيقة وجوداً قائماً بذاته معناه أن لهذا المفهوم المصدري فرداً بالحقيقة و ليس لهذا المفهوم المشترك فرد عنده و لا له مصداق في الخارج عنده و غاية ما له أن يقول - إن الحقيقة الواجبية لما كان بذاتها موجودة متحصلة في الخارج من غير فاعل يفعلها - أو قابل يقبلها يطلق عليها لفظ الوجود فلاحد أن يتوهم أن يكون هناك حقيقتان بالصفة المذكورة.

التاسع أن قوله كون الوجود عارضاً للماهيات لا يصفو عن الكدورات

إلى آخره على تقدير صحته لا يوجب أن يكون موجودة الممكنات عبارة عن الانتساب إلى الوجود لاحتمال أن يكون موجوديتها بنحو آخر من التعلق إما بكونها عين خصوصيات طبيعة الوجود المتفاوتة بالشدة و الضعف و التقدم و التأخر أو بكونها عين مفهوم الوجود كما رآه بعضهم على أن أكثر المفاسد التي ترد على اتصاف الماهيات بالوجود أنما يرد بناء على أن الاتصاف بها كاتصاف الموضوع بالعرض أو بناء على عدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٦

الفرق بين نحوي العروض و العارض فإن عارض الشيء بحسب وجوده غير عارضة بحسب ماهيته فعارض الوجود يستدعي للمعروض وجوداً غير وجود العارض و أما عارض الماهية فلا يستدعي إلا وجود الماهية و إن كان متحداً وجودها بوجود عارضها - و الوجود على تقدير حصوله في الخارج لا يلزم أن يكون عارضاً للماهية إذ هو نفس وجود الماهية و موجوديتها و على تقدير عروضه كان عارضاً لنفس الماهية الموجودة بهذا الوجود لا عارضاً لوجودها و بالجملة نحن بتوفيق الله قد سهلنا طريقة و أزلنا الشكوك عنها و هذبنا مشرب تحقيقه عن الشوائب و المكدرات.

العاشر أنه لا معنى لكون موجودة الممكنات بالانتساب إلى حقيقة الوجود الشخصي

لأن النسبة وجودها و تحققها فرع وجود المنسوب و المنسوب إليه و العجب أنه نفى كون أثر الفاعل اتصاف الماهية بالوجود محتجاً عليه بأن الاتصاف نسبة و النسبة فرع المنتسبين و حكم هاهنا بأن موجودة الأشياء عبارة عن انتسابها إلى تلك الحقيقة - و هل هذا إلا التناقض.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٧

[وجه ذكر هذا الكلام]

و اعلم أنا إنما تعرضنا لكلام هذا العلامة التحرير في هذا الموضوع بالجرح و التوهين لما أكب عليه أكثر الناظرين و تلقوه بالقبول و التحسين زعماً منه و منهم أن فيه إثباتاً للتوحيد الخاصي الذي أدركه العرفاء الشامخون فضلاً عن توحيد

الواجب الذي اعتقده المسلمون و لم يدروا أن ذهابهم إلى اعتبارية الوجود - فرع باب التعطيل و سد طريق الوصول و التحصيل لأن طريقته مشاهدة سريان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٨

نور الوجود في جميع الموجودات و العلم بأن موجودية كل موجود باتحاده مع حد - و تلبسه بمرتبة من الوجود لا أن موجوديتها بخلوها و عريها عنه و إلا فلم يكن بين الموجود و المعدوم فرق يعتد به فهذا المسلك منهم بعينه ضد لمسلكننا الذي سلكناه بحمد الله و الكل ميسر لما خلق له.

تعقيب آخر فيه تثريب

ثم إن العجب أن هذا المحقق الجليل زاد في البيان و قال و يمكن الاستدلال على التوحيد بأنه لو تعدد الواجب لكان الاثنان منه أعني معروض الاثنينية بدون العارض إما واجبا أو ممكنا و الأول باطل لافتقار هذا المعروض إلى كل واحد من الأحاد و الافتقار ينافي الوجوب و كذلك الثاني لأن الممكن لا بد له من علة فاعلية تامة فتلك العلة إما نفس هذا المعروض فيلزم كون الشيء فاعلا لنفسه و مقدما عليه و إما واحد منهما و هو باطل لافتقار المجموع إلى الواحد الآخر و ليس الترديد في العلة التامة حتى يختار أنه عينه بناء على المشهور من أن العلة التامة لا يجب تقدمها على المعلول فلا مانع من أن يكون عينه كما في المجموع الواجب و المعلول الأول انتهى.

أقول قد علم فيما سبق ما يظهر به بطلان هذا الاستدلال فإنك قد علمت أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٧٩

لا موجودية في مركب ليس له جزء صوري و لا جهة وحدة إلا موجودية واحد واحد من آحاده و أما احتجاجة عليه بأن انتفاء المتعدد إنما يكون بانتفاء واحد من آحاده - و الآحاد هاهنا بالأسر موجودة فقد علمت أنه مغالطة فككنا عقدتها ثم استدلل أيضا هاهنا عليه بأنه تقرر في موضعه أنه يمكن أن يصدر عن الواجب شيء و عن المعلول الأول شيء آخر و عن مجموعهما شيء ثالث حتى يكون في المرتبة الثانية شيان في درجة واحدة و هكذا كما قرروه في صدور الكثير عن الواحد الحقيقي - بدون الاستعانة بالاعتبارات التي يشتمل عليها المعلول الأول على ما هو المشهور فلو لم يكن سوى كل واحد شيء لم يجز أن يصدر عن مجموع الواجب و معلوله شيء ثالث.

أقول إن هذه الطريقة في صدور الكثير عن الواحد مما أفاده الشيخ المقتول في أكثر كتبه و تبعه المحقق الطوسي في شرح الإشارات و في رسالة له في هذا الباب لكنها غير صحيحة عندنا كما بيناه و المتبع هو البرهان و أما كيفية صدور الكثرة عن الواحد الحقيقي فلها طريق عندنا غير هذه الطريقة و غير ما يستعان فيه بالاعتبارات الذهنية كما سيأتي بيانه من ذي قبل إن شاء الله.

و اعلم أن من سخائف البيان أيضا في هذه المسألة قول بعض المتفلسفين أنه لو تعدد الواجب بالذات فإما أن يكون بينهما تلازم في الوجود أو لا و على الأول يلزم معلوليتهما أو معلولية أحدهما كما هو شأن التلازم و على الثاني يلزم جواز تحقق أحدهما مع عدم الآخر فيلزم إمكان عدم الواجب و هذا البيان بالسفسطة أشبه منه بالفلسفة - و إلى المغالطة أقرب منه إلى البرهان فإن مبناه على الاشتباه بين الإمكان الذاتي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٠

و الإمكان بالقياس إلى الغير و من هذا القبيل قولهم التكثر إما أنه يجب بالنظر إلى طباع الوجوب بالذات فيلزم أن يتحقق الكثير من دون الواحد أو أنه يمكن بالنظر إليه فيجوز ارتفاعه و فيه جواز ارتفاع الواجب بالذات أو أنه يمتنع بالنسبة إليه و هو الحق المطلوب إذ فيه أيضا تدليس بين الإمكان الذاتي و الإمكان الغيري.

تعقيب آخر

اعلم أن السيد الصدر الشيرازي قرر هذه المسألة على وجه آخر فقال ما حاصله أن الموجود قد يكون شيئا موجودا كالف موجود أو باء موجود- و قد يكون موجودا بحثا لا أنه شيء موجود كسماء موجودة أو إنسان موجود مثلا- و الواجب بالذات هو الموجود البحث و الممكن هو الشيء الموجود بمعنى أنه قابل- لأن يحلله الذهن إلى ماهية و موجود محمول عليه و كذا مفهوم الواجب عين الواجب بالذات لأنه ليس بقابل لهذا التحليل و لو قبل القسمة و كان ألفا واجبا مثلا يحكم العقل بأن مفهوم الواجب لما لم يكن عين مفهوم الألف و لا جزؤه لم يكن الألف في حد ذاته واجبا لما تقرر أن كل عرضي معلول و من ثم ذهب الحكماء إلى أن كل ماهية معلولة و إلى أن الواجب لذاته لا ماهية له و إلى أن وجوده مجرد عن الماهية و ليس وجود الممكنات مجردا عنها.

ثم قال بعد تمهيد هذه المقدمة لا يجوز تعدد الواجب بالذات و إلا فالتعين الذي به الامتياز إن كان نفس ذاتهما بأن يكون هذا شيئا واجبا و الآخر شيئا آخر واجبا- لزم كون الواجب ذا ماهية و ذلك باطل كما مر و إن كان التعيين بغير الذات فتخصص أحد التعيينين بأحدهما لا بد له من علة مخصصة و لا يجوز أن يكون تلك العلة ماهية الواجب لأنه بريء منها و لا أن يكون شخصه لامتناع أن يكون الشخص علة لتعيينه و لا الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨١

أو الوجوب و نظائرها من الأمور المشتركة بينهما لأن المشترك لا يكون علة التخصص و لا أمر آخر و إلا لزم أن يكون شخص الواجب معلولا و لا يرد على هذا المسلك الشبهة المشهورة كما لا يخفى انتهى كلامه ملخصا و لعمري إنه قريب المنهج من منهج الحق لو بدل مفهوم الموجود أو الواجب بحقيقة الموجود بما هو موجود- و ذلك بأن يدعى بأن للوجود حقيقة هي عين أفرادها و له في كل موجود فرد هو بذاته موجود سواء كان معه ماهية أخرى أو لم يكن كما أن للبياض حقيقة خارجية هي بذاتها أبيض و غيره بانضمامه أبيض و قد علمت كيفية اتصاف الماهية بالوجود على وجه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٢

يصفو عن كل شبهة و شك فإذن الواجب تعالى كما أنه عين الوجود فهو عين حقيقة الموجود بما هو موجود لا أنه عين هذا المفهوم الكلي الذهني.

و على هذا لا يرد عليه اعتراضات معاصره العلامة الدواني

منها أنه على ما ذهب إليه من أنه الموجود البحث

إن كان ذاته عين هذا المفهوم الاعتباري فهو ظاهر البطلان و كيف يكون ذات الواجب أمرا اعتباريا من المعقولات الثانية و إن كان فردا من أفراد ورد عليه أن موجوديته بذاته أو لكونه فردا من أفراد هذا المفهوم سواء كان لازما أو عارضا فإن كان بذاته و لا شك أنه فرد من هذا المفهوم فيلزم أن يكون موجودا مرتين مرة بذاته و مرة بكونه فردا من هذا المفهوم و إن كانت موجوديته لكونه فردا من أفراد هذا المفهوم لم يكن في ذاته موجودا فلا فرق بينه و بين الممكنات.

و منها أنه على التقدير الأول أيضا يلزم أن يكون معروضا للمفهوم المشترك فيه

فلا فرق بينه و بين غيره من هذه الحيثية بل لا يبقى لنفي التحليل إلى الوجود و الماهية معنى أصلا إذ حينئذ يثبت فرد خاص معروض للمفهوم المشترك فيه و ذلك هو التحليل فإن قال المراد من نفي التحليل أنه لا يمكن تحليله إلى الموجود الخاص و الماهية و هاهنا قد حلل إلى نفس الموجود الخاص و الموجود المطلق قلنا إن الإنسان الموجود ينحل إلى الإنسان الذي هو ذاته و الموجود المطلق الذي يصدق عليه صدقا عرضيا كذلك ينحل ما زعمتم أنه ذات الباري إلى ما سميتموه الموجود البحث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٣

و الموجود المطلق الصادق عليه صدقا عرضيا فلا فرق بين الصورتين في ذلك فإن كان تحليل الإنسان إلى الوجود الخاص العارض و ماهيته بناء على أن العارض حصة من مفهوم المطلق كان هناك كذلك فإن العارض له أيضا حصة منه

و منها أن ما حرره من أن الواجب لا ماهية له أصلا

إن أراد أنه لا ذات له فهو ظاهر البطلان و إن أراد أن له ذاتا لكن لا تسمى ماهية بحسب الاصطلاح فهو بحث لفظي فإن من يقول إن حقيقته و ماهيته هو الوجود القائم بذاته إنما يريد به المعنى الذي يريد به من الذات فلا يبقى المباحثة إلا في اللفظ و أنت إذا تأملت أدنى تأمل علمت أن ما ذكره من أن ذاته موجود خاص كلام خال عن التحصيل لأن ذاته أمر خارج عن إدراكنا يحمل عليه الموجود بالحمل العرضي فلا رجحان له على الممكنات من هذه الحيثية و أما على ما ذكرنا فالرجحان ظاهر لأن ذاته وجود خاص - هو مبدأ لانتزاع هذا المفهوم بذاته لأنه وجود بذاته و غيره أنما يصير كذلك بواسطته بالتبع هذا تحصيل تمام ما أورده هذا المورد المعاصر له على كلامه.

أقول يمكن دفع هذه الإيرادات على أسلوبنا

أما عن الأول

فنختار في التردد الذي ذكره أن ذاته تعالى عين الوجود الخاص و كونه فردا للموجود المطلق - لا يستلزم أن يكون موجودا بالوجودين و لا أن يكون قابلا للتحليل إلى أمرين - و ذلك لأن موجوديته ليس إلا بذاته لا بعروض حصة من هذا المفهوم كما أن كون هذا الإنسان إنسانا لا يقتضي أن يكون فيه إنسانيتان خاصة و عامة لأن الإنسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٤

الخاص كزيد هو في ذاته مصداق لمفهوم الإنسان المطلق و معنى تحليل الشيء إلى أمرين و مفاده هو أن يحصل منه أمران اعتبار كل منهما و حيثيته غير اعتبار الآخر و حيثيته كتحويل الإنسان الموجود إلى حيثية الإنسانية و حيثية الموجودية لا كتحويل وجوده إلى وجوده و مطلق الوجود فإن كل وجود خاص هو بنفسه مما يحمل عليه الوجود لا

بعروض شيء آخر و كذا الموجود البحث إذا حمل عليه مفهوم الموجود لم يلزم أن يكون هناك شيان متغايران بل ذلك المفهوم الغرض منه حكاية ذلك الخاص لا غير.

و أما عن الثاني

فنقول الفرق بين الواجب و الممكن أن الواجب لا تركب فيه من جهتين متغايرتين تغايرا يوجب تكثرا في الموضوع إما في الخارج أو في الذهن بخلاف الممكن و ليس معنى قولنا لا تركب فيه أنه ليس يصدق عليه مفهومات و معان كثيرة كيف و هو منبع جميع الصفات الكمالية بنفس ذاته فقولنا الواجب تعالى غير قابل للتحليل إلى أمرين و الممكن قابل له معناه أن ذاته تعالى لا توجد له حيثة لا تكون تلك الحيثة بعينها حيثة واجب الوجود بخلاف الممكن فإن الإنسان مثلا حيثة كونه إنسانا غير حيثة كونه واجبا و موجودا- لأن الإنسان من حيث هو إنسان ليس شيئا آخر إذ قد يتصور إنسان غير موجود و يتصور موجود غير إنسان فهما اعتباران مختلفان بخلاف كون الواجب هذا الواجب- و كونه واجبا على الإطلاق لأن مرجعهما إلى واحد حقيقي.

و عن الثالث

أن المراد كما حققناه أن الواجب ليس له غير الهوية الشخصية- التي عبر عنها تارة بالوجود الصرف و تارة بالموجود البحث أو الوجود أو التشخص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٥

أو الواجب البحث ماهية كلية فإن الماهية للشيء هي التي يتصورها الذهن بعد تجريدها عن الوجود و التشخص و يعرض لها الكلية و الاشتراك و حقيقة الوجود هي عين الهوية الشخصية لا يمكن تصورهما و لا يمكن العلم بها إلا بنحو الشهود الحضورى- فهذا معنى قولهم لا ماهية له و ليس هذا مجرد اصطلاح لفظي بل تحقيق حكمي و بحث معنوي. و ظهر مما ذكرنا أن القول بأن ذات الباري موجود خاص كلام محصل لا غبار عليه بشرط أن يتفطن قائله بأن المراد منه ليس أن ذاته عين هذا المفهوم الكلي أو عين فرد من أفراد الذاتية حتى تكون نسبته إلى ذلك الفرد كنسبة الذاتي إلى الذات لأنك قد علمت أن مفهوم الوجود و الموجود و كذا مفهوم التشخص و المتشخص و الجزئي الحقيقي و الهوية و أمثالها ليست لها أفراد ذاتية كما للأجناس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٦

و الأنواع و إنما هي عنوانات ذهنية و حكايات لآحاد و أفراد لا وجود لها في الذهن- حتى يعرضها العموم و الاشتراك لكن لما كان مفهوم الوجود و الموجود قد يصدق على أمور خارجية بالذات بلا اعتبار قيد آخر و قد يصدق على أمور أخرى لا بالذات- بل بواسطة قيد آخر يقال للقسم الأول إنه وجود و موجود بذاته و يقال للقسم الثاني إنه موجود لا بذاته بل بالعرض و لما كانت الوجودات الخاصة مشتركة في هذا المفهوم الانتزاعي العقلي الذي يكون حكاية عنها فلا بد أن يكون للجميع اتفاق في سنخ الوجود الحقيقي و لا بد مع ذلك من امتياز بينها إما بالكمال و النقص و الغنى و الفقر أو التقدم و التأخر أو بأوصاف زائدة و بذلك يتوسل إلى نفي تعدد الواجب بالذات فبهذا يمكن دفع الاعتراضات عن كلام هذا السيد العظيم لو ساعدنا في أن معنى كونه تعالى موجودا بحثا هو ما قررنا لكن بعض كلماته و آثاره ينافي

ذلك.

ولهذا قد تصدى ولده الذي هو سر أبيه المقدس و هو غياث أعظم السادات والعلماء- المنصور المويّد من عالم الملكوت لدفع هذه الاعتراضات بنحو آخر فقال أما الأول فجوابه أنا نختار أنه عين مفهوم الموجود وكيف لا يكون عينه و هو محمول عليه و الحمل هو الحكم باتحاد الطرفين كما أن كل ممكن موجود عين ذلك المفهوم- ولا يلزم من ذلك كون ذلك المفهوم ماهية شيء منها و أما قوله هذا المفهوم أمر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٧

اعتباري فظاهر الفساد فإن كون الموجود موجودا ضروري ألا ترى أن القوم ذهبوا إلى أن موضوع العلم الإلهي هو الموجود المطلق ثم حكموا أن وجود موضوعه غني عن الإثبات لأنه بين الثبوت فظهر أن الواجب عين مفهوم الموجود بحسب الخارج- فإن مفهوم الموجود موجود في الخارج بأفراده و هو بحسب هذا النحو من الوجود- يجوز أن يكون عين الواجب و قوله ورد عليه أن موجوديته بذاته إلى آخره غير مسلم و تحقيقه على ما قرره أي السيد المذكور في حواشي التجريد يقتضي تمهيد مقدمة هي أن العوارض المحمولة على الشيء مواطاة عين ذلك الشيء و متحد معه في الخارج و مغاير له زائد عليه في الذهن فإن سئل عن ذلك الشيء من حيث هو في الخارج- هل هو عين العارض أو غيره فالجواب أنه عينه و إن سئل عنه من حيث إنه في الذهن- فالجواب أنه غيره فالاتحاد بينهما في الوجود الخارجي و التغير في الوجود الذهني- و لا خفاء في أن النسبة بينهما لا يكون حيث يكونان متحدين و إنما يتصور حيث هما متغايران و لا في أن ما لا يكون له جهة التغير بأن لا يكون له الوجود الذهني لا يكون له نسبة إلى العارض المذكور وإذا تمهد هذا فنقول إذا لم يكن للذات الذي هو واجب الوجود وجود ذهني لم يكن له مع مفهوم الموجود جهة التغير فلا يكون بينه و بين مفهوم الموجود نسبة حتى يستقيم أن يقال مقتضى هذه النسبة ذاته أو شيء آخر بخلاف الممكن- و بهذا يظهر الفرق بينه و بين الممكن و يندفع إيراد الثاني و يسقط الترددات البعيدة- التي يمجها الطبيعة السليمة و الحاصل أن الممكن يمكن أن يحصل لذاته وجود ذهني- يتكرر بحسبه و ذلك في الواجب لذاته ممتنع و الجواب عن الثالث أن الماهية و هي جواب ما هو عبارة عن الذات المجردة عن العوارض في اعتبار العقل فإذا تجردت عنها عند العقل تميز أحدهما عن الآخر عنده و حينئذ يجد الذات في نفسها عارية عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٨

العوارض المحمولة و في نفس الأمر مخلوطة متحدة بها فيطلب سببا في ذلك- و يستند لا محالة إلى أمر ما هو إما الذات و إما غيرها و لما لم يجز استناد مفهوم الموجود إلى الذات لأن الشيء ما لم يوجد لم يوجد فحكموا بأن كل ذي ماهية معلول انتهى.

أقول فيما ذكره وجوه من الخلط و الغلط- الأول أن ما ذكره من أن مفهوم الموجود موجود لأنه محمول عليه مغالطة- نشأت من سوء اعتبار نحوي الحمل و الخلط بين الحمل الذاتي الأولي و الحمل الشائع المتعارف فإن كل مفهوم يحمل على نفسه بالمعنى الأول و كثير من المفهومات غير محمولة على نفسها بالمعنى الثاني فلم يلزم من كون مفهوم الموجود نفس معناه أن يكون فردا لنفسه حتى يكون موجودا في الخارج.

الثاني أن قول الحكماء إن موضوع العلم الكلي هو الموجود المطلق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٨٩

لم يريدوا به نفس هذا المفهوم الكلي بل إنما أرادوا به الموجود بما هو موجود في نفس الأمر من غير تخصيص بطبيعة خاصة أو بكمية فإن الإنسان كما يصدق عليه أنه موجود جسماني طبيعي كذا يصدق عليه أنه موجود مطلق لا بقيد الإطلاق ولا بقيد التخصيص أيضا فالبحث عن الشيء بما هو مصداق للموجود المطلق حري بأن يذكر في الفلسفة الأولى والذي هو مستغن عن الإثبات لأنه بديهى الثبوت هو فرد الموجود المطلق بما هو فرد له مطلقا لما يشاهد من الموجودات لا نفس هذا المفهوم الكلي الذي لا يوجد إلا في الذهن.

الثالث أن الذي تصوره وصوره في الفرق بين الواجب لذاته والممكن لذاته مما لا تعويل عليه فإن كون ذات الباري مما لا يمكن تعقله ولا له وجود ذهني مبني على أنه عين الوجود البحث لا أن كونه كذلك يبتني على كونه غير متعقل. و أيضا يكفي في كون الشيء قابلا للتحليل كونه بحيث لو حصل في العقل كان للعقل أن يحلله وإن امتنع حصوله في العقل فإذن الفرق بين الواجب والممكن في كون الموجود المطلق عين أحدهما وزائدا على الآخر ليس كما تصوره بل الحق في الفرق بينهما أن يقال إن الممكن قابل للتحليل إلى حثيتين حثية كونه موجودا- و حثية كونه أمرا آخر يخالف الموجودية بخلاف الواجب فإن جميع حثياته هي بعينها حثية الموجود البحث إذ لا جهة نقص فيه و كل ممكن يوجد فيه جهة نقص أو جهات نقائص هي غير جهة الوجود والوجوب مثلا الفلك ليس محض الوجود إذ حثية كونه ناقص الوجود مفتقرا إلى مكان أو حيز محتاجا إلى سبب و محرك و كذا حثية حمل كثير من السلوب و الأعدام فيه التي بإزاء الكمالات والملكات ليست بعينها حثية كونه موجودا و أما الواجب فهو محض حقيقة الوجود الخاص الذي يحمل عليه هذا العنوان و كثير من العنوانات الكمالية التي مصداقها كلها حثية الوجود الخاص و موجوديته بنفس هويته العينية لا بذلك المفهوم المطلق فهو موجود بنفسه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٠

سواء حمل عليه الموجود المطلق أم لا لكن يلزم أن يكون ذاته بذاته بحيث يكون في نفسه مصداقا لهذا المفهوم و صدقه على ذاته لا يوجب أن يوجد فيه حثيتان متغايرتان- فإن كونه هذا الموجود و كونه موجودا مطلقا شيء واحد لا فرق إلا بالتعين والإبهام- كما أن كون زيد هذا الموجود و كونه موجودا لا بعينه لا يوجب التركيب فيه والذي يوجب ذلك فيه كونه موجودا و كونه قابلا للعدم والنقص والشر و كذا كونه بالفعل إنسانا و كونه بالقوة كاتباً أو عالماً يوجب التكثر في ذاته و الحكماء إنما حكموا بكون كل ذي ماهية معلولا لأن حثية الماهية والإمكان يخالف حثية الفعلية و الوجود فبالحثية الأولى يستدعى علة و يفتقر إليها و بالحثية الثانية قد يستغنى عنها كما في الواجب لذاته جل ذكره.

تذييل و تسجيل

و بالجملة فالقول بأن ذاته تعالى هو الموجود البحث صحيح- إذا أريد به حقيقة الوجود فإن للوجود حقيقة و هو بنفسه موجود و غيره به موجود- كما أن للبياض حقيقة و هو بنفسه أبيض و غيره به أبيض و أما إذا أريد بالموجود أو الوجود نفس هذا المفهوم و الحكاية دون المحكي عنه بهما فلا شك في بطلانه.

فإن قلت كيف يكون ذات الباري عين حقيقة الوجود و الوجود بديهي التصور و ذات الباري مجهول الكنه. قلت قد مر سابقا أن شدة الظهور و تأكد الوجود هناك مع قصور قوة الإدراك - و ضعف الوجود هاهنا صارا منشأين لاحتجابه تعالى عنا و إلا فذاته تعالى في غاية الإشراف و الإنارة فإن رجعت و قلت إن كان ذات الباري نفس الوجود فلا يخلو إما أن يكون الوجود حقيقة الذات كما هو المتبادر أو يكون صادقا عليها صدقا عرضيا كما يصدق عليه مفهوم الشيء و على الأول إما أن يكون المراد به هذا المعنى العام البديهي التصور المنتزع من الموجودات أو معنى آخر و الأول ظاهر الفساد و الثاني يقتضي أن يكون حقيقته غير ما يفهم من لفظ الوجود كسائر الماهيات غير أنك سميت تلك الحقيقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩١

بالوجود كما إذا سمي إنسان بالوجود و من البين أنه لا أثر لهذه التسمية في الأحكام - و إن هذا القسم راجع إلى أن الواجب ليس الوجود الذي الكلام فيه و يلزم أن يكون الواجب ذا ماهية و قد مر أن كل ذي ماهية معلول و على الثاني و هو أن يصدق عليه صدقا عرضيا فلا يخفى أن ذلك لا يغنيه عن السبب بل لا يستدعي أن يكون موجودا - و لذلك ذهب جمهور المتأخرين من الحكماء إلى أن الوجود معدوم.

أقول منشأ هذا الإشكال الذهول عن حقيقة الوجود و آحاده و أعداده و عن معنى عرضية المفهوم العام الانتزاعي للهويات الوجودية فإن كون هذا العام المشترك عرضيا ليس معناه أن للمعروض وجودية و للعارض وجودية أخرى كالماشي بالقياس إلى الحيوان و الضاحك بالقياس إلى الإنسان بل هذا المفهوم عنوان و حكاية للوجودات العينية و نسبته إليها نسبة الإنسانية إلى الإنسان و الحيوانية إلى الحيوان فكما أن مفهوم الإنسانية صح أن يقال إنها عين الإنسان لأنها مرآة لملاحظته و حكاية عن ماهيته و صح أن يقال إنها غيره لأنها أمر نسبي و الإنسان ماهية جوهرية.

و بالجملة الوجود ليس كالإمكان حتى لا يكون بإزائه شيء يكون المعنى المصدري حكاية عنه بل كالسواد الذي قد يراد به نفس المعنى النسبي أعني الأسودية و قد يراد ما يكون به الشيء أسود أعني الكيفية المخصوصة فكما أن السواد إذا فرض قيامه بذاته صح أن يقال ذاته عين الأسودية و إذا فرض جسم متصف به لم يجز أن يقال إن ذاته عين الأسودية مع أن هذا الأمر العام لكونه اعتبارا ذهنيا زائد على الجميع.

إذا تقرر هذا فلنا في الجواب أن نختار في الترديد الأول الشق الأول و هو أن الوجود حقيقة الذات قولك في الترديد الثاني إما أن يكون ذلك الوجود ما يفهم من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٢

لفظ الوجود إلى آخره قلنا نختار منه ما بإزاء ما يفهم من هذا اللفظ أعني حقيقة الوجود الخارجي الذي هذا المفهوم البديهي حكاية عنه فإن للوجود حقيقة عندنا في كل موجود كما أن للسواد حقيقة في كل أسود لكن في بعض الموجودات مخلوط بالنقائص و الأعدام و في بعضها ليس كذلك و كما أن السوادات متفاوتة في السوادية بعضها أقوى و أشد و بعضها أضعف و أنقص كذلك الموجودات بل الوجودات متفاوتة في الموجودية كمالاتها و نقصا.

و لنا أيضا أن نختار الشق الثاني من شقي الترديد الأول إلا أن هذا المفهوم الكلي و إن كان عرضيا بمعنى أنه ليس بحسب

كونه مفهوماً عنوانياً له وجود في الخارج حتى يكون عيناً لشيء لكنه حكاية عن نفس حقيقة الوجود القائم بذاته وصادق عليه بحيث يكون منشأ صدقه وصادق حمله عليها نفس تلك الحقيقة لا شيء آخر يقوم به كسائر العرضيات في صدقها على الأشياء فصدق هذا المفهوم على الوجود الخاص يشبه صدق الذاتيات من هذه الجهة فعلى هذا لا يرد علينا قولك فصدق الوجود عليه لا يغنيه عن السبب لأنه إنما لم يكن يغنيه عن السبب لو كان موجوديته بسبب عروض هذا المعنى أو قيام حصة من الوجود و ليس كذلك بل ذلك الوجود الخاص بذاته موجود كما أنه بذاته وجود سواء حمل عليه مفهوم الوجود و الموجود أو لم يحمل - و الذي ذهب جمهور الحكماء إلى أنه معدوم ليس هو الوجودات الخاصة بل هذا الأمر العام الذهني الذي يصدق على الآيات و الخصوصيات الوجودية

الفصل (٨) في أن واجب الوجود لا شريك له في الإلهية و أن إله العالم واحد

البراهين الماضية دلت على أن واجب الوجود بالذات واحد لا شريك له في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٣

وجوب الوجود و الآن نريد أن نبين أن إله العالم واحد لا شريك له في الإلهية إذ مجرد وحدة الواجب بالذات لا يوجب في أول النظر كون الإله واحداً.

فنقول لما تبين أن واجب الوجود واحد و كل ما سواه ممكن بذاته و وجوداتها متعلقة به و به صار واجباً و موجوداً فوجوب استناد كل الموجودات و ارتفاعها إليه يلزم أن يكون وجودات الأمور كلها مستفادة من أمر واحد هو الواجب الوجود لذاته فالأشياء كلها محدثة عنه و نسبته إلى ما سواه نسبة ضوء الشمس لو كان قائماً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٤

بذاته إلى الأجسام المستضيئة منه المظلمة بحسب ذواتها فإنه بذاته مضيء و بسببه يضيء كل شيء و أنت إذا شاهدت إشراق الشمس على موضع و إنارته بنورها ثم حصول نور آخر من ذلك النور حكمت بأن النور الثاني من الشمس و أسندته إليها و كذا الثالث و الرابع و هكذا إلى أضعف الأنوار فعلى هذا المنوال وجودات الأشياء متفاوتة في القرب و البعد من الواحد الحق فالكل من عند الله.

طريق آخر أشير إليه في الكتاب الإلهي سلكه معلم المشائين أرسطاطاليس و هو الاستدلال بوحدة العالم على وحدة الإله تقريره أنه قد برهن على امتناع وجود عالم آخر غير هذا العالم بجميع أجزائه سواء كانت فيه سماوات و أرضون و أسطقسات موافقة لما في هذا العالم بالنوع أولاً بأن يقال لو فرض عالم آخر - لكان شكله الطبيعي هو الكرة و الكرتان إذا لم يكن إحداهما محيطة بالأخرى لزم الخلاء بينهما و الخلاء ممتنع كما مر فالقول بوجود عالم آخر مبائن لهذا العالم محال أيضاً فهذا هو البيان المجمل لامتناع وجود عالمين.

و أما البيان المختص بواحد واحد من الاحتمالين المذكورين على التفصيل فلنشر إليه إما على الاحتمال الأول و هو أن يكونا متمثلين في الأجزاء و يكون كل منهما كالآخر في السماء و الأرض و غيرهما فما نقل عن أرسطاطاليس - من أنه إذا كانت أسطقسات العوالم الكثيرة و سماواته غير متخالفة في الطبيعة - و الأشياء المتفقة في الطبيعة متفقة في الأحياء و الحركات و الجهات التي يتحرك إليها فالأسطقسات في العوالم الكثيرة متفقة في المواضع مختلفة فوق واحدة فهي

ساكنة بالفسر و الذي بالفسر بعد الذي بالطبع بالذات فعلم أنها كانت مجتمعة متحدة ثم افترقت بعد ذلك فهي إذن متباعدة أبدا و ليست بمتباعدة أبدا و هذا خلف.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٥

و أيضا الذي بالفسر من الضرورة أن يزول و يعود إلى ما كان أولا عليه بالذات فتلك العوالم ستجمع ثانية فهي مجتمعة و غير مجتمعة أبدا انتهى كلامه.

فإن قيل إن الأرضين مثلا و إن كانت كثيرة بالعدد إلا أنها مشتركة في الأرضية - و أمكنتها أيضا مشتركة في كونها وسط الكل فالأرض المطلقة تقتضي الوسط المطلق - و الأرض المعينة تقتضي الوسط المعين من العالم المعين. فيقال في دفعه إن الأجسام الكثيرة بالعدد المتحدة بالنوع و الحقيقة و إن لم يشك أن أمكنتها كثيرة بالعدد لكن يجب أن يكون كثرة أمكنتها على نحو لو اجتمع كل الأجسام متمكنا واحدا يصير تلك الأمكنة مكانا واحدا مع أن ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٦

محال بالضرورة إذ اختلاف الأمكنة ضروري و أما الاجتماع المذكور فمما لا مانع عنه في طبيعة تلك الأجسام لوحدها فرضا إذ لو اقتضت طبيعتها الافتراق و التباين لما وجد واحد متصل منها و هذا خلف و أما الوجه الذي يختص بالاحتمال الثاني فما أشار إليه الشيخ الرئيس في بعض رسائله بقوله يمكن أن يكون جسم مخالفا لهذه الأجسام في الحركات و الكيفيات أما الحركات فهي بالقسمة العقلية الضرورية إما مستقيمة و إما مستديرة و المستقيمة إما من المركز إلى المحيط أو من المحيط إلى المركز و إما مارة على المركز بالاستقامة و هي الأخذ من الطرفين أو غير آخذة منهما بل على محاذاتهما لكن الذي بالطبع من المستقيم لا يجوز أن يكون إلا من نهايات إلى نهايات متضادة بالطبع لا بالإضافة و بيان ذلك في كتاب أرسطاطاليس خاصة في المقالة الخامسة من الكتاب الموسوم بالسمع الطبيعي - و تفاسير المفسرين فمن هذا يعلم أن الحركات الطبيعية في جميع الأجسام إما من المركز أو إليه بالدليل العقلي و أما الكيفيات المحسوسة فلا يمكن أن يكون فوق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٧

تسعة عشر و قد بينه الفيلسوف في المقالة الثانية من كتاب النفس و شرح المفسرون - كئاسطيوس و الإسكندر و لولا مخافة التطويل لبسط القول فيه لكنني أخوض في طرف يسير منه فأقول الطبيعة ما لم توف على النوع الأتم شرائط النوع الأنقص الأول بكماله - لم تدخله في النوع الثاني و المرتبة الثانية مثال ذلك أن ذات النوع الأخس و هو الجسمية ما لم تعطها الطبيعة جميع خصائص الكيفيات الجسمية الموجودة في الأجسام بما هي أجسام لم تخط به إلى النوع الثاني الأشرف بالإضافة و هو النبات و ما لم تحصل جميع خصائص النباتية كالقوة الغذائية و النامية و المولدة في النوع الأخس - لم تجاوز به إلى النوع الثاني كمرتبة الحيوانية و مرتبة الحيوانية مشتملة على الحس و الحركة مع سائر القوى النباتية و الجسمية فما لم يحصل للنوع الأخس الأدنى الأول - جميع الحواس المدركة لجميع المحسوسات فمن الواجب أيضا أن لا يتعدى الطبيعة بالنوع الحيواني إلى النوع النطقي و لكن الطبيعة قد حصلت في المواليد جوهرنا ناطقا

فمن الضرورة أوفت جميع القوى الحسية بكمالها فاتبعته إفادة القوة النطقية - فإذن كان للنوع الناطق جميع القوى المدركة للمحسوسات فإذن النوع الناطق يدرك جميع المحسوسات التي أدركها كل حيوان فإذن لا محسوس ما خلا ما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٨

يدركه الناطق فإذن لا كيفيات ما خلا ستة عشر المحسوسة بالذات و الثلاثة المحسوسة بالعرض كالحركة و السكون و الشكل فإذن لا جسم وكيف بكيفية ما خلا هذه المعدودة - فإذن لا عالم مخالف لهذا العالم بكيفيات محسوسة فإذن إن فرضت عوالم متعددة فهي متفقة بالطبع كثيرة بالعدد انتهى كلامه.

فإذا بطل تعدد العالم سواء كان التعدد بالطبع أو بالشخص فقد ثبت أن العالم واحد شخصي فحينئذ نقول تشخص العالم تشخص طبيعي أي له وحدة طبيعية لا أنها تأليفية و ذلك لتحقيق التلازم بين أجزائه الأولية فإن بين الأجسام العظام التي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٩٩

فيه تلازما و كذا بين تلك الأجسام و أعراضها بل بين أكثر المحال و أعراضها فإن استحالة الخلاء و امتناع خلو الأجسام المستقيمة الحركات عما يحدد جهات حركاتها - يدل على التلازم بين الأرض و السماء و امتناع قيام العرض بذاته و خلو الجوهر عن الأعراض يوجب التلازم بينهما.

و قد علمت أن اللزوم و التلازم يوجب الانتهاء إلى علة واحدة فالمؤثر في عالمنا هذا لا يكون إلا واحدا فكل جسم و جسماني ينتهي في وجوده إلى ذلك المبدأ الواحد الذي دل انتظام أحوال السماوات و الأرض و ما بينهما على وجوده - و العقول و النفوس التي أثبتها الحكماء إما علل متوسطة لهذه الأجسام أو صور مدبرة لها متصرفة فيها و إثبات مجردات لا تكون عللا و لا مدبرات لهذا العالم غير معلومة الوجود بل غير موجودة كما سيلوح وجهه فكل جسم و جسماني و نفس و عقل - منته إلى مبدأ واحد هو القيوم الواجب بالذات كما دل عليه قوله تعالى - **لَوْ كَانَ فِيهِمَا آلِهَةٌ إِلَّا اللَّهُ لَفَسَدَتَا** و لعل مرجع ضمير التثنية مجموع السماويات حتى عقولها و نفوسها و مجموع الأرضيات حتى ملكوتها و أربابها و لا يبعد أن يراد بالفساد الانتفاء رأسا و وجه الدلالة أن المراد أنه لو تعدد الإله تعالى عن ذلك لزم أن يكون العالم الجسماني و ما ينوط به متعددا و اللازم باطل كما مر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٠

فالملزوم مثله كما وضح من قوله **إِذَا لَذَهَبَ كُلُّ إِلَهٍ بِمَا خَلَقَ وَلَعَلَّ بَعْضُهُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ**

الفصل (٩) في أنه تعالى بسيط الحقيقة من كل جهة

ليس مؤتلفة الذات من أجزاء وجودية عينية أو ذهنية كالمادة و الصورة الخارجيتين أو الذهنتين و لا من أجزاء حدية حملية و لا من الأجزاء المقدارية

[الطريق الأول]

و ذلك لأن كل ما هو مركب كان للعقل إذا نظر إليه و إلى جزئه و قايس بينهما في نسبة الوجود وجد نسبة الوجود إلى جزئه أقدم من نسبته إلى الكل تقدما بالطبع و إن كان معه بالزمان أو ما يجري مجراه فيكون بحسب جوهر ذاته مفتقرا

إلى جزئه متحققا بتحقيقه وإن لم يكن أثرا صادرا عنه و كل ما هو كذلك لم يكن واجب الوجود لذاته بل لغيره فيكون ممكنا لذاته هذا محال و هذا البيان يجري فيما سوى الأجزاء المقدارية لأن تلك الأجزاء ليست في الحقيقة متقدمة بل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠١

نسبة الجزئية إليها بالمسامحة و التشبيه فلا بد في نفي تلك الأجزاء عنه تعالى من بيان آخر و القوم طولوا الكلام في تجرد الواجب عنها و عن التجسم و احتاجوا في البيان إلى برهان تناهي الأبعاد. و لنا في بيانه طريق واضح يتوقف على مقدمة قد أشرنا إليها مرارا من أن كل متصل بذاته أو بغيره قار كالمكانيات أو غير قار كالزمانيات فهو ضعيف الوجود - متشابه الوجود بالعدم و الحضور بالغيبة و الواجب جل ذكره قوي الوجود و غايته في الشدة بلا شوب نقص و قصور و أيضا قد تقرر أن الأجزاء المقدارية متحدة الحقيقة هي و الجميع فنقول لو كان للواجب جزء مقداري كما يقوله المشبهة فهو إما ممكن فيلزم أن يخالف الجزء المقداري كله في الحقيقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٢

و إما واجب فيكون الواجب بالذات غير موجود بالفعل بل بالقوة و كلا شقي التالي محال فكذا المقدم فتعالى عن أوهام المجسمين و المعطلين علوا كبيرا.

طريق آخر

لو تركب ذات الواجب من أجزاء فلا يخلو إما أن يكون كل واحد من تلك الأجزاء أو بعضها واجب الوجود أو ليست الأجزاء و لا شيء منها بواجب الوجود بل جميعها ممكنات الوجود و الأقسام الثلاثة بأسرها مستحيلة.

أما بطلان الأول

و هو أن يكون الأجزاء كلها واجبات الوجود فيلزم خرق الفرض لأن المفروض أن هناك شيئا واحدا وحدة حقيقية ذا أجزاء إذ كل ما لا وحدة له لا وجود له كما بينا مرارا فإذن كل حقيقة وحدانية فرضت أنها ذات أجزاء - فلا بد أن يكون لبعض أجزائها إلى بعض افتقار ذاتي و تعلق طبيعي و ارتباط لزومي إذ لا يتصور تأليف حقيقة نوعية أو شخصية من أمور متفصلة الذوات مستغنية الحقائق و الهويات بعضها عن بعض فلو تركب حقيقة الواجب من الواجبين لزم تحقق التلازم بينهما و قد مر أن التلازم بين الواجبين محال بأي نحو من أنحاء التلازم فإذن قد رجع الفرض إلى تعدد واجبات كل منها موجود بسيط على حدة.

و أما بطلان الثاني

فلأن ذلك الجزء الذي هو الواجب كان مستغني القوام عن الجزء الآخر و عن غيره و الجزء الآخر لا مكانه مفتقر إلى ذلك الواجب فكان المفروض واجبا متأخر الوجود عن غيره مفتقر الذات إلى ممكن و بتوسطه إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٣

واجب آخر و الافتقار إلى الغير و إن كان إلى واجب آخر و كذا التأخر عنه ينافي الوجوب بالذات

و أما بطلان الثالث

فهو أوضح إذ كيف يتصور حصول مجموع واجبي من ممكنات صرفة و جميع الممكنات ممكن لا محالة لو فرض موجودا و في الشقين الأخيرين يلزم الدور إذ العقل إذا قاس الممكن و الواجب إلى الوجود يجد الواجب أقدم في الوجود - و يحكم بأنه وجد فوجد الممكن و إذا قاس الجزء و الكل إليه يجد الجزء أقدم فيه من الكل و يحكم بأنه وجد الجزء فوجد الكل فيلزم تقدم كل من الكل و الجزء هاهنا على نفسه.

طريق آخر قد علمت أن الواجب حقيقته إنية محضة فلا ماهية له و كل ما لا ماهية له لا جزء له ذهنا و لا خارجا و لنفصل هذا البيان فنقول الواجب تعالى مسلوب عنه الأجزاء العقلية و ما تسلب عنه الأجزاء العقلية يسلب عنه الأجزاء الخارجية - إذ كل بسيط في العقل بسيط في الخارج دون العكس و إنما نقيت عنه الأجزاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٤

العقلية إذ لو كان له جنس و فصل لكان جنسه مفتقرا إلى الفصل لا في مفهومه و معناه بل في أن يوجد و يحصل بالفعل فحينئذ نقول ذلك الجنس لا يخلو إما أن يكون وجودا محضا أو ماهية غير الوجود فعلى الأول يلزم أن يكون ما فرضناه فصلا لم يكن فصلا - إذ الفصل ما به يوجد الجنس و هذا إنما يتصور إذا لم يكن حقيقة الجنس حقيقة الوجود - و على الثاني يلزم أن يكون الواجب ذا ماهية و قد مر أنه نفس الوجود و حقيقته بلا شوب - و أيضا لو كان للواجب جنس كان مندرجا تحت مقولة الجوهر و كان أحد الأنواع الجوهرية فيكون مشاركا لسائر الأنواع الجوهرية في الجنس العالي و قد برهن على إمكانها و قد مر أن إمكان النوع يستلزم إمكان الجنس المستلزم لإمكان كل واحد من أفراد ذلك الجنس من حيث كونه مصداقا له إذ لو امتنع الوجود على الجنس من حيث هو جنس أي مطلقا لكان ممتنعا على كل فرد فإذاً يلزم من ذلك إمكان الواجب تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا.

تلخيص عرشي لو كان للواجب أجزاء حدية عقلية فلا يخلو إما أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٥

جميعها أو بعض منها حقيقة الوجود أو ليس كذلك و على التقادير يمتنع الحمل و ذلك خرق الفرض
الفصل (١٠) في أن الواجب الوجود لا فصل لحقيقته المقدسة على أنه مقسم نوعي أو مقسم صنفى أو شخصي

[الطريق الأول]

فإن شيئا من هذه الأمور لا ينافي كون المقسم بسيطا غير ذي جزء كالجنس البسيط أو النوع البسيط و ذلك لما علمت أن الواجب غير ذي ماهية و كل ما له فصل مقسم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٦

أو خاصة مصنف أو مشخص فهو لا محالة ماهية كلية فما لا ماهية له لا يكون جنسا و لا نوعا فالواجب متحصل بنفسه بلا فصل متشخص بذاته بلا مشخص.

طريق آخر

قد أشرنا سابقا في مباحث الوجود أن الوجود لا فصل مقسم له ولا مشخص له فإن مدخلية هذه الأمور ليست في تقرير معنى الجنس بما هو جنس أو معنى النوع بما هو نوع بل لها مدخلية في أن يكون الجنس موجودا محصلا أو النوع موجودا مشارا إليه بالحس أو العقل فلو كان للوجود فصل أو محصل شخصي - لكان شيء منهما مقرا للمعنى و التجوهر فكذلك واجب الوجود إذ هو أعلى مراتب الوجود و أكدّه فيتعاظم عن أن يكون مبهم الوجود كالجنس بالقياس إلى تحصيلات أنواعه - أو كالنوع بالقياس إلى تشخصات أعداده و هويات أفرادهِ فما أضل منهج بعض جهال المتصوفة حيث زعموا أن الحق تعالى كلي طبيعي جنسي و الموجودات أفرادهِ و أنواعهِ و لم يتفطنوا بأن واجب الوجود لو انقسمت حقيقته البسيطة إلى أنواع و أعداد فلا يخلو إما أن يتكثر سواء كان بالأنواع أو بالأشخاص بنفس ذاته أو بغير ذاته فإن تكثر بمقتضى ذاته فيلزم أن لا يوجد في الكون نوع واحد و لا شخص واحد إذ ذلك الفرد على طباع الأمر المقتضي للكثرة بنفس ذاته بل هو عينه فيتكثر بذاته و هذا الكلام في آحاد هذه الكثرة فلا واحد و إذ لا واحد فلا كثير - لأن الواحد مبدا الكثير فإذا انتفى المبدأ انتفى ذو المبدأ فإذا كثرناه بنفسه فقد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٧

أبطلنا نفسه و إن تكثر لا بذاته بل بغيره ففيه قوة قبول الوجود و هي غير حيثة الوجود و الوجوب بالذات فيتركب ذاته من جزئين أحدهما يجري مجرى المادة - و الآخر يجري مجرى الصورة و هو ممتنع

الفصل (١١) في أن واجب الوجود لا مشارك له في أي مفهوم كان

لأن المشاركة بين شيئين في أي معنى كان يرجع إلى وحدة ما و قد علمت أن الوحدة على أنحاء شتى و إن منها حقيقية و منها غير حقيقية و الحقيقية قد تكون عين الذات الواحدة و هي الوحدة الحقّة الواجبية و قد تكون زائدة على الذات كوحدة الماهيات الممكنة و غير الحقيقية ما يكون معروضها أمورا متكررة في الواقع و هي بحسب الشركة في أمر ما و قد مر تفصيلها في مباحث الوحدة و الكثرة من السفر الأول - إذا تقرر هذا فنقول واجب الوجود لا يوصف بشيء من أنحاء الوحدة غير الحقيقية فلا شريك له في شيء من المعاني و المفهومات بالحقيقة فلا مجانس له إذ لا جنس له و لا مماثل له إذ لا نوع له و لا مشابه له إذ لا كيف له كما سيظهر لك من نفي الصفات الزائدة عنه فلا مساوي له إذ لا يوصف بكم و لا مطابق له إذ لا يوصف بوضع و لا محاذي له إذ لا يوصف بأين و لا مناسب له و إن وصف بالصفات الإضافية - و ذلك لأن جميع صفاته الإضافية ترجع إلى إضافة واحدة هي القيومية كما ستعلم - و إذ لا مؤثر و لا موجد سواه كما سيظهر في توحيد الأفعال فلا مشارك له في صفة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٨

القيومية و إذ لا محل له فليست له نسبة الحلول كما يقوله النصارى و إذ هو بذاته واجب و ما سواه ممكن فليست له نسبة الاتحاد كما يقوله جهال المتصوفة و إذ لا مناسب له فالمناسبات التي أثبتتها بعض المتصوفة في حقه تعالى كلها أوهام مضلة و ما أبعد من الصواب قول من توهم من هؤلاء أن نسبته تعالى إلى جميع العالم كنسبة النفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٠٩

إلى البدن هيئات نسبة النفس إلى البدن نسبة الصانع إلى الدكان وآلاته لا نسبة العلة إلى معلولها و كل ما لا يفعل إلا بالإله فلا يمكن أن يوجد الإله و لو كانت النفس خالقة بدنها لم تكن نفسا فليست نسبة المبدع إلى مبدعه نسبة النفسية - لتعالیه عن الحاجة في شيء.

وأيضا النفس الناطقة من حيث إنها نفس مجردة بالقوة مادية بالفعل كسائر القوى و هي جسمانية الحدوث و إن كانت روحانية البقاء و هي أيضا جسمانية التأثير و إن كانت روحانية التأثير و ذلك لأن الإيجاد متقوم بالوجود و المستغني عن المادة في الإيجاد لا بد و أن يكون مستغنيا عنها في الوجود أيضا و لو لم يكن النفس جسمانية التأثير لكانت عقلا محضا هذا خلف و إله العالم جل اسمه مقدس بالكلية عن الحاجة و الحدوث.

وأيضا النفس يحصل منها و من البدن نوع طبيعي و بينهما تركيب اتحادي - و كل ما يتركب منه و من غيره شيء فيبينهما تعلق و ارتباط يوجب تأثر كل منهما عن صاحبه و انفعاله عنه و المنفعل عن الشيء لا بد له من قصور يفتقر إلى ضميمته تكمله و تحضله و الواجب تام الوجود فوق التمام فيتعاضد عن أن يتممه شيء فثبت أن لا مناسب له تعالى مع أن النسبة أبعد أوصاف الشيء عن ذاته فهو بريء الذات عن الأشياء ذاتا و صفة و نسبة مع أنه لا يخلو عنه ذرة من الذرات و لا يعزب عنه شيء في الأرض و السماوات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٠

الفصل (١٢) في أن واجب الوجود تمام الأشياء و كل الموجودات و إليه يرجع الأمور كلها

هذا من الغوامض الإلهية التي يستصعب إدراكه إلا على من آتاه الله من لدنه علما و حكمة لكن البرهان قائم على أن كل بسيط الحقيقة كل الأشياء الوجودية إلا ما يتعلق بالنقائص و الأعدام و الواجب تعالى بسيط الحقيقة واحد من جميع الوجوه فهو كل الوجود كما أن كله الوجود..

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١١

أما بيان الكبرى فهو أن الهوية البسيطة الإلهية لو لم يكن كل الأشياء لكانت ذاته متحصلة القوام من كون شيء و لا كون شيء آخر فيتتركب ذاته و لو بحسب اعتبار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٢

العقل و تحليله من حيثيتين مختلفتين و قد فرض و ثبت أنه بسيط الحقيقة هذا خلف فالمفروض أنه بسيط إذا كان شيئا دون شيء آخر كأن يكون ألفا دون ب - فحيثية كونه ألفا ليست بعينها حيثية ليس ب و إلا لكان مفهوم ألف و مفهوم ليس ب شيئا واحدا و اللازم باطل لاستحالة كون الوجود و العدم أمرا واحدا فالملزوم مثله فثبت أن البسيط كل الأشياء.

و تفصيله أنا إذا قلنا الإنسان مثلا مسلوب عنه الفرسية أو أنه لا فرس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٣

فحيثية أنه ليس بفرس لا يخلو إما أن يكون عين حيثية كونه إنسانا أو غيرها فإن كان الشق الأول حتى يكون الإنسان بما

هو إنسان لا فرسا فيلزم من ذلك أنا متى عقلنا ماهية الإنسان عقلنا معنى اللافرس وليس الأمر كذلك إذ ليس كل من يعقل الإنسان يعقل أنه ليس بفرس فضلا عن أن يكون تعقل الإنسان و تعقل ليس بفرس شيئا واحدا كيف و هذا السلب ليس سلبا مطلقا و لا سلبا بحثا بل سلب نحو من الوجود و الوجود بما هو وجود ليس بعدم و لا بقوة و إمكان شيء - إلا أن يكون فيه تركيب فكل موضوع هو مصداق لإيجاب سلب محمول مواطاة أو اشتقاقا فهو مركب فإنك إذا أحضرت في ذهنك صورته و صورة ذلك المحمول السلبي مواطاة أو اشتقاقا و قايست بينهما بأن تسلب أحدهما عن الآخر أو توجب سلبيه عليه فتجد أن ما به يصدق على الموضوع أنه كذا غير ما به يصدق عليه أنه ليس هو كذا سواء كانت المغايرة بحسب الخارج فيلزم التركيب الخارجي من مادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٤

و صورة أو بحسب العقل فيلزم التركيب العقلي من جنس و فصل أو ماهية و وجود فإذا قلت مثلا زيد ليس بكاتب فلا يكون صورة زيد في عقلك هي بعينها صورة ليس بكاتب و إلا لكان زيد من حيث هو زيد عدما بحثا بل لا بد أن يكون موضوع مثل هذه القضية مركبا من صورة زيد و أمر آخر به يكون مسلوبا عنه الكتابة من قوة أو استعداد فإن الفعل المطلق ليس بعينه عدم شيء آخر إلا أن يكون فيه تركيب - من فعل بجهة و قوة بجهة أخرى و هذا التركيب بالحقيقة منشؤه نقص الوجود فإن كل ناقص حيثية نقصانه غير حيثية وجوده و فعليته فكل بسيط الحقيقة يجب أن يكون تمام كل شيء فواجب الوجود لكونه بسيط الحقيقة فهو تمام كل الأشياء على وجه أشرف و الطف و لا يسلب عنه شيء إلا النقائص و الإمكانيات و الأعدام و الملكات و إذ هو تمام كل شيء و تمام الشيء أحق بذلك الشيء من نفسه فهو أحق من كل حقيقة بأن يكون هو هي بعينها من نفس تلك الحقيقة بأن يصدق على نفسها فأتقن ذلك و كن من الشاكرين **فإن قلت** ليس للواجب تعالى صفات سلبية ككونه ليس بجسم و لا بجوهر - و لا بعرض و لا بكم و لا بكيف.

قلنا كل ذلك يرجع إلى سلب الأعدام و النقائص و سلب السلب وجود و سلب النقصان كمال وجود و ليعلم أن هذه الماهيات الممكنة ليس لشيء منها وجود مطلق بل لكل منها وجود مقيد و نعني بالمطلق ما لا يكون معه قيد عديمي - و بالمقيد ما يقابله.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٥

و توضيح ذلك أنك إذا حددت نوعا محصلا كماهية الإنسان مثلا بأنه حيوان ناطق يجب عليك أن تحضر معانيه و تضبطه و تقصد من قولك الشارح لماهيته أنه لا يزيد عليه شيء و لم يبق شيء من معاني ذاته و أجزاء ماهيته إلا و قد ذكر في هذا القول الوجيز أو غير الوجيز و إلا لم يكن هذا الحد حدا تاما له فيشترط في ماهية الإنسان و حده - أن لا يكون شيء آخر غير ما ذكر من الحيوان و الناطق فلو فرض أن في الوجود نوعا محصلا جامعا بحسب الماهية مع هذه المعاني المذكورة في ماهية الإنسان معاني أخرى كالفرسية و الفلكية و غير ذلك لم يكن ذلك النوع إنسانا بل شيئا آخر أتم وجودا منه و إنما أردنا بقولنا نوعا محصلا ما تحصل وجوده لا ما تحصل حده و معناه فقط فإن الأنواع الإضافية كالحيوان مثلا أو الجسم النامي مثلا و إن كان لكل منها حد تام بحسب المفهوم إلا أنه ليس بحيث إذا أضيف إلى ذلك

المعنى معنى آخر كمالى لم يحمل على المجموع اسم ذلك النوع الإضافي ومعناه ولهذا إذا أضيف إلى الجسم النامي الحساس يحمل على المجموع الذي هو الحيوان الجسم النامي وكذا يحمل على الإنسان الحيوان وهذا بخلاف النبات إذ قد تمت نوعيته الوجودية وتحصلت كما تمت ماهيته الحدية فإذن وجد نوع حيواني لم يحمل عليه النبات وإن حمل عليه الجسم النامي وكذا لم يحمل على النبات أنه حجر أو معدن - وإن حمل أنه جسم ذو قوة حافظة للتركيب و كلامنا في الوجود الناقص إذا تم لا في المعاني المطلقة إذا ضم إليها معنى آخر فالأول غير محمول على شيء آخر فرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٦

أنه أتم وجوداً منه بخلاف الثاني كالجنس المحمول على نوعه.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول إن العرفاء قد اصطالحوا في إطلاق الوجود المطلق - والوجود المقيد على غير ما اشتهر بين أهل النظر فإن الوجود المطلق عند العرفاء عبارة عما لا يكون محصوراً في أمر معين محدوداً بحد خاص والوجود المقيد بخلافه كالإنسان والفلك والنفس والعقل وذلك الوجود المطلق هو كل الأشياء على وجه أبسط وذلك لأنه فاعل كل وجود مقيد و كماله ومبدأ كل فضيلة أولى بتلك الفضيلة من ذي المبدأ فمبدأ كل الأشياء و فياضها يجب أن يكون هو كل الأشياء على وجه أرفع وأعلى فكما أن السواد الشديد يوجد فيه جميع الحدود الضعيفة السوداء - التي مراتبها دون مرتبة ذلك الشديد على وجه أبسط وكذا المقدار العظيم يوجد فيه كل المقادير التي دونه من حيث حقيقة مقداريتها لا من حيث تعييناتها العدمية من النهايات والأطراف فالخط الواحد الذي هو عشرة أذرع مثلاً يشمل الذراع من الخط و الذراعين منه و تسعة أذرع منه على وجه الجمعية الاتصالية وإن لم يشتمل على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٧

أطرافها العدمية التي يكون لها عند الانفصال عن ذلك الوجود الجمعي و تلك الأطراف العدمية ليست داخلية في الحقيقة الخطية التي هي طول مطلق حتى لو فرض وجود خط غير متناه لكان أولى واليق بأن يكون خطأ من هذه الخطوط المحدودة - وإنما هي داخلية في ماهية هذه المحدودات الناقصة لا من جهة حقيقتها الخطية - بل من جهة ما لحقها من النقائص والقصورات وكذا الحال في السواد الشديد - و اشتماله على السوداء التي هي دونه وفي الحرارة الشديدة و اشتمالها على الحرارة الضعيفة فهكذا حال أصل الوجود و قياس إحاطة الوجود الجمعي الواجبي الذي لا أتم منه بالوجودات المقيدة المحدودة بحدود يدخل فيها أعدام و نقائص خارجة عن حقيقة الوجود المطلق داخلية في الوجود المقيد وإليه الإشارة في الكتاب الإلهي - **أَنَّ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ كَانَتَا رَتْقًا فَفَتَقْنَاهُمَا** و الرتق إشارة إلى وحدة حقيقة الوجود الواحد البسيط و الفتق تفصيلها سماء و أرضاً و عقلاً و نفساً و فلماً و ملكاً و قوله تعالى **وَجَعَلْنَا مِنَ الْمَاءِ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ حَيٍّ** و هل الماء الحقيقي إلا رحمته التي وسعت كل شيء - و فيض جوده المار على كل موجود و كما أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة سارية في جميع الموجودات على التفاوت والتشكيك بالكمال والنقص فكذا صفاته الحقيقية التي هي العلم والقدرة والإرادة والحياة سارية في الكل سريان الوجود على وجه يعلمه الراسخون فجميع الموجودات حتى الجمادات حية عالمة ناطقة بالتسبيح شاهدة لوجود ربها عارفة بخالقها ومبدعها كما مر تحقيقه في أوائل السفر الأول وإليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٨

الإشارة بقوله **وَأَنَّ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِهِ وَلَكِنْ لَا تَفْقَهُونَ تَسْبِيحَهُمْ** لأن هذا الفقه و هو العلم بالعلم لا يمكن حصوله إلا للمجردين عن غواشي الجسمية و الوضع و المكان

الموقف الثاني في البحث عن صفاته تعالى على وجه العموم و الإطلاق و فيه فصول

الفصل (١) في الإشارة إلى أقسام الصفات

الصفة إما إيجابية ثبوتية و إما سلبية تقديسية - و قد عبر الكتاب عن هاتين بقوله **تَبَارَكَ اسْمُ رَبِّكَ ذِي الْجَلَالِ وَالْإِكْرَامِ** فصفة الجلال ما جلت ذاته عن مشابهة الغير و صفة الإكرام ما تكرمت ذاته بها و تجملت - و الأولى سلوب عن النقائص و الأعدام و جميعها يرجع إلى سلب واحد هو سلب الإمكان عنه تعالى و الثانية تنقسم إلى حقيقية كالعلم و الحياة و إضافية كالخالقية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١١٩

و الرازقية و التقدم و العلية و جميع الحقیقیات ترجع إلى وجوب الوجود - أعني الوجود المتأكد و جميع الإضافيات ترجع إلى إضافة واحدة هي إضافة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٠

القيومية هكذا حقق المقام و إلا فيؤدي إلى انثلام الوحدة و تطرق الكثرة إلى ذاته الأحدية تعالى الله عن ذلك علوا كبيرا. بيان تفصيلي واجب الوجود و إن وصف بالعلم و القدرة و الإرادة و غيرها كما سنبين لكن ليس وجود هذه الصفات فيه إلا وجود ذاته بذاته فهي و إن تغايرت مفهوماتها - لكنها في حقه تعالى موجودة بوجود واحد كما قال الشيخ في التعليقات من أن الأول تعالى لا يتكرر لأجل تكثر صفاته لأن كل واحدة من صفاته إذا حققت - تكون الصفة الأخرى بالقياس إليه فيكون قدرته حياته و حياته قدرته و تكونان واحدة فهو حي من حيث هو قادر و قادر من حيث هو حي و كذا في سائر صفاته.

و قال أبو طالب المكي مشيئة تعالى قدرته و ما يدركه بصفة يدركه بجميع الصفات إذ لا اختلاف هناك و سيأتي زيادة توضيح لهذا المقام بوجه يظهر لك مزلة بعض الأقدام و كما أن صفاته الحقيقية كلها حقيقة واحدة لا تزيد على ذاته تعالى و إن تغايرت مفهوماتها و إلا لكانت ألفاظها مترادفة فكذا صفاته الإضافية و إن كانت زائدة على ذاته متغايرة بحسب المفهوم لكن كلها إضافة واحدة متأخرة عن الذات - و لا يخل بوحديته كونها زائدة عليه فإن الواجب تعالى ليس علوه و مجده بنفس هذه الصفات الإضافية المتأخرة عنه و عما أضيف بها إليه و إنما علوه و مجده و تجمله - و بهاءه بمبادئ هذه الصفات التي هي عين ذاته الأحدية أي يكون ذاته تعالى في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢١

ذاته بحيث ينشأ منه هذه الصفات و ينبعث عنه هذه الإضافات و كما أن ذاته بذاته مع كمال فردانيته و أحديته يستحق

هذه الأسماء من العلم والقدرة والحياة من غير أن يتكرر ويتعدد حقيقة أو اعتباراً وحيثية لأن حيثية الذات بعينها حيثية هذه الصفات - كما قال أبو نصر الفارابي وجود كله وجوب كله علم كله قدرة كله حياة كله لا أن شيئاً منه علم و شيئاً آخر منه قدرة ليلزم التركيب في ذاته ولا أن شيئاً فيه علم و شيئاً آخر فيه قدرة ليلزم التكرر في صفاته الحقيقية فكذا صفاته الإضافية لا يتكرر معناها ولا يختلف مقتضاها وإن كانت زائدة على ذاته فمبدئيتها بعينها رازقيته وبالعكس و هما بعينهما جوده و كرمه و بالعكس و هكذا في العفو والمغفرة والرضا وغيرها إذ لو اختلف جهاتها و تكثرت حيثياتها لأدى تكثرها إلى تكثر مبادئها - وقد علمت أنها عين ذاته تعالى.

قال الشيخ المتأله شهاب الدين المقتول في بعض كتبه و مما يجب أن نعلمه ونحققه أنه لا يجوز أن يلحق الواجب إضافات مختلفة توجب أخلاف حيثيات فيه بل له إضافة واحدة هي المبدئية تصحح جميع الإضافات كالرازقية و المصورية و نحوهما و لا سلوب فيه كذلك بل له سلب واحد يتبعه جميعها و هو سلب الإمكان - فإنه يدخل تحته سلب الجسمية و العرضية و غيرهما كما يدخل تحت سلب الجمادية - عن الإنسان سلب الحجرية و المدرية عنه و إن كانت السلوب لا يتكرر على كل حال انتهى كلامه و هو كلام في غاية الجودة إلا أن في قوله و إن كانت السلوب لا تتكرر محل بحث كما مرت الإشارة إليه من أن سلوب الوجودات بما هي وجودات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٢

مما يوجب تكثراً في المسلوب عنه و الذي من السلوب لا يوجب تكثر حيثية في الموصوف به هو سلب السلب كسلب الإمكان عن واجب الوجود و يندرج تحته سلب الجوهرية و العرضية و الجسمية و الكيفية و الكمية و غيرها و أما سلب الوجود الأكمل عن الوجود النقص كسلب مرتبة العقل عن النفس مثلاً و سلب مرتبة الواجب عن العقل فذلك لا محالة يوجب تكثراً و كذلك سلب المساوي عن المساوي في الدرجة - كسلب الفرسية عن البقر.

قال بعض المحققين في شرح قوله كما يدخل تحت سلب الجمادية عن الإنسان سلب الحجرية و المدرية إن غرضه من ذلك أن السلوب قد يحتاج إلى حيثيات ذاتية مختلفة كسلب الجمادية عن الإنسان فإنه من حيث كونه نامياً و سلب الشجرية عنه فإنه من حيث كونه حساساً متحركاً بالإرادة و سلب الفرسية عنه فإنه من حيث كونه ناطقاً و تلك حيثيات ذاتية متعددة و لا كذلك الحال في واجب الوجود فإن جميع السلوب مستندة إلى ذاته الأحادية مرة واحدة لأن ذاته مقتضية لسلب الإمكان - المستلزم لسلب النقائص فافهم انتهى.

أقول لا يخفى عليك ما فيه بعد الاطلاع على ما ذكرنا فإن حيثية الناطقية في الإنسان تكفي لأن تكون مصححة لسلب الجمادية و الشجرية و الفرسية كما أن العقل الفعال مع بساطته يسلب عنه جميع الممكنات التي دونه في الرتبة من غير حاجة إلى حيثيات ذاتية مختلفة فيه فعلم أن القاعدة الكلية في تصحيح سلوب النقائص عن شيء هو كماله الوجودي و في تصحيح سلوب الكمالات عن شيء هو نقصاناته و جهاته العدمية فكلما يسلب عنه شيء وجودي بما هو وجودي فهو لا محالة مركب خارجي أو ذهني كالإنسان يسلب عنه الملكية و العقل يسلب عنه الواجبية فهو لا محالة مركب الذات من هاتين حيثيتين أحدهما وجودية و الأخرى عدمية و أما الإنسان إذا سلب عنه الجمادية و الشجرية و غير ذلك فلا يحتاج في ذلك إلى حيثية أخرى غير حيثية ذاته النفسية النطقية فعليك بالتثبت في هذا المقام حتى لا تزل قدمك عن سبيله و لا يزعجك عما ذكرنا سابقاً أن البسيط الذات هو كل الموجودات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٣

الفصل (٢) في قسمة أخرى رباعية للصفات الثبوتية حتى يعلم أن أيتها لائقة للذات الواجبية الصفات إما محسوسة وإما معقولة

و كل منهما إما عين الموصوف أو غيره فهذه أربعة الأول كالم متصل للجسم و الثاني كالأسود له و الثالث كالعالم للعقل و الرابع كالعالم للإنسان البشري فنقول صفات الباري ليست من قبيل المحسوسات - إذ هو أجل من أن يناله حس فما أضل المجسمة و المشبهة و لا من قبيل الصفات الزائدة - لازمة كانت كما يقوله الأشاعرة أو مفارقة كما يقوله الكرامية تعالى عن أوهم الجاهلين المضلين علوا كبيرا إذ لو كان كذلك يلزم أن يكون عارية في مرتبة ذاته بذاته عما هو صفة الكمال كالعلم و القدرة و الحياة و غيرها فيكون تجمله بغير ذاته فيكون للغير تأثير في كماله و تمامه و يؤدي إلى الدور المستحيل فيلزم أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٤

يكون ذاته أكمل من ذاته و على قاعدة الإشراق يلزم أن يكون ذاته أنور من ذاته إذا تنور بأنوار صفاته و الكل مستحيل و لأن الفطرة حاكمة بأن ذاتا يكون كمالها بنفس ذاتها أشرف و أكمل من ذات استكملت بأمر زائد على ذاته - و على الجملة ليس في ذاته لكونه مبدءا سلسلة الخيرات الوجودية و الإضافات النورية شيء بالقوة أصلا و لا في ذاته جهة إمكانية بل كله وجود بلا عدم و كمال بلا نقص و فعل بلا قوة و وجوب بلا إمكان و خير بلا شر لأنه غير متناهي الشدة الوجودية - أبى ذاته عن القصور و الانفعال فصفاته الجمالية كلها عين ذاته أي وجودها بعينه وجود الواجب فهي كلها واجبة الوجود من غير لزوم تعدد الواجب و إليه الإشارة بقول الشيخ أبي نصر الفارابي يجب أن يكون في الوجود وجود بالذات - و في العلم علم بالذات و في القدرة قدرة بالذات و في الإرادة إرادة بالذات حتى تكون هذه الأمور في غيره لا بالذات أقول و هكذا في كل صفة كمالية للموجود بما هو موجود.

تنوير عرشي

و هذا يرشدك إلى أن حقائق الأشياء يجوز أن يكون لها وجود بسيط جمعي و إلى أنه قد يكون لحقيقة واحدة أنحاء من الوجود بعضها مادي و بعضها مجرد بعضها ممكن و بعضها واجب كأصل الوجود فإنه حقيقة واحدة بعضها جوهر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٥

و بعضها عرض منها واجب و منها ممكن و ذلك لأن هذه الصفات مما يقع الاشتراك فيها - بحسب المعنى و المفهوم بين الواجب و الممكن و هي في الواجب عين ذاته فتكون واجبة لأن وجوده عين العلم و القدرة و الإرادة و غيرها و العلم في علم العقل بذاته عقل - و في علم النفس بذاتها نفس و قد يكون عرضا من مقوله الكيف و هو كيفية نفسانية غير القدرة و الإرادة اللتين هما أيضا كفتان نفسانيتان متغايرتان و متغايرتان للعلم فهي هاهنا مختلفة في الوجود لكل منها أثر خاص و هي كلها هناك شيء واحد وجودا و عينا و كذا فعلا و تأثيرا فإن أثر العلم هناك بعينه أثر القدرة و الإرادة و الحياة فكما أن المعلول معلومه تعالى فكذا مقدوره و مراده و حي بحياته و مجعوله بجعله بالذات - من غير

اختلاف جهات إلا بحسب الأسماء و مفهوماتها هكذا يجب أن يحقق الأمر في عينية الصفات للواجب لا كما فهمه المتأخرون الذاهبون إلى اعتبارية الوجود- فجعلوا معنى عينية الصفات في الباري تعالى أن مفهوماتها مفهوم واحد وأنه يترتب على ذاته بذاته ما يترتب على تلك الصفات في غيره وهذا بناء على غفلتهم عن سر الوجود و درجاته المتفاوتة و نزيدك إيضاحا لهذا المرام

الفصل (٣) في حال ما ذكره المتأخرون في أن صفاته تعالى يجب أن يكون نفس ذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٦

قالوا كلما هو صفة لشيء فيفتقر إلى ما يقوم به فكلما قيامه بشيء فوجوب وجوده متعلق به و كلما وجوب وجوده متعلق بغيره فهو ليس بواجب لذاته فيكون ممكنا في نفسه فالصفات كلها سواء كانت للواجب أو للممكن ممكنة في أنفسها- و كيف يكون الصفة و صاحبها واجبي الوجود و قد تبين نفي تعدد الواجب في الوجود- و أما أنه هل يجوز عليه تعالى صفة ممكنة فنقول يمتنع عليه الصفة المتقررة في ذاته لأنه لو تقرر في ذاته صفة ممكنة ففاعلها و مرجحها لا بد أن يكون ذاته إذ لا واجب سواه و لا ينفع أيضا عن مجعولاته و هو بين و حينئذ يلزم أن يكون الذات الأحدية فاعلة و منفعة و هو محال لأن كل ذات فعلت و قبلت فيكون فعلها بجهة و قبولها بأخرى لوجوه- **الأول** أن الفعل للفاعل قد يكون في غيره و القبول للقابل لا يكون في غيره فجبهة الفعل غير جهة القبول و قد ثبت بساطته تعالى. **الثاني** أنهما لو كانتا جهة واحدة لكان كلما فعل بنفسه قبل و كلما قبل بنفسه فعل و الوجود يكذبه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٧

الثالث أن الفاعل هو الذي يقتضي وجود المعلول و يجعله واجب الحصول و يوجد و أن توقف وجود المعلول على غيره من بواقي العلل و القابل لا يقتضي المعلول و لا يجعله واجب الحصول و ليس له إلا الصحة و التهيؤ و الاستحقاق لوجود المقبول- فنسبة الفاعل إلى مفعوله بالوجوب و نسبة القابل إلى مقبوله بالإمكان و الوجوب مبطل للقوة و لا يبطل الشيء لذاته ما اقتضاه لذاته فهما جهتان مختلفتان فثبت أن الواجب تعالى لو اتصف بصفة متقررة في ذاته لزم اختلاف جهتين في ذاته و هاتان الحيتان **إما** أن تكونا لازمتين له أو مقومتين له أو الواحدة منهما مقومة و الأخرى زائدة و على التقادير يلزم تركيب الذات في الواحد الحقيقي أما على الشقين الأخيرين فواضح. و أما على الشق الأول فنعيد الكلام إلى صدورهما بأن نقول إنهما لا يصدران إلا بجهتين مختلفتين أيضا فإما أن يتسلسل الأمر لا إلى نهاية أو ينتهي إلى جهتين مقومتين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٨

لذاته تعالى عنه علوا كبيرا هذا ما ذكره في عينية صفاته تعالى الحقيقية و فيه بحث من وجوه **الأول** أنا نقول إن هاهنا اشتباها من باب أخذ القبول بمعنى الانفعال الاستعدادي مكان القبول بمعنى مطلق الاتصاف و البرهان لا يساعد إلا على نفي الأول دون الثاني فلنقال أن يقول صفاته تعالى لوازم ذاته و لوازم الذات لا تستدعي جعلها مستقلا بل جعلها تابع لجعل الذات وجودا و عدما فإن كانت الذات مجعولة- كانت لوازمها مجعولة بذلك الجعل و إن كانت غير مجعولة

كانت لوازمها غير مجعولة باللاجعل الثابت للذات و لا يبعد أن يكون هذا قول من ذهب من المتكلمين إلى أن صفاته تعالى واجبة الوجود بوجوب الذات.

و الثاني أن الدليل منقوض بالصفات الإضافية له تعالى كالمبدئية و السببية و غيرهما لجريان الدليل بجميع مقدماته فيها فيلزم إما عدم اتصافه بتلك الصفات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٢٩

أو عدم كونها زائدة على الذات و كلا القولين باطل و يرد على الوجه الأخير من الوجوه الثلاثة مفسد - **أحدها** انتقاضه ببعض الصفات الحقيقية له تعالى حيث يلزم على ما ذكر اختلاف جهاتها فإن علمه تعالى بعينه قدرة باعتبار وإرادة باعتبار و القدرة بحسبها إمكان صدور الفعل و الإرادة تقتضي وجوبه فعلمه تعالى من حيث إنه قدرة يصح منه الصدور و اللاصدور و من حيث إنه إرادة يجب عنه الصدور فلو كان جهة هذا الإمكان غير جهة الوجوب يلزم أن يكون ذاته ذا حيثيات مختلفة مع أن حيثية ذاته بعينها حيثية جميع صفاته الحقيقية الكمالية و كذا حيثية كل صفة كمالية له هي بعينها حيثية سائر الصفات الكمالية و سيأتي تحقيق هذا المقام.

و ثانيها المنع بأن لا نسلم أن نسبة القابل إلى المقبول بالإمكان الخاص - المنافي للوجوب لم لا يجوز أن يكون بالإمكان العام و هو غير مناف للوجوب - و ربما يجاب عنه بأننا نعلم بديهية أن القابل بما هو قابل يجوز كونه متصفا بالمقبول - و يجوز أن لا يكون متصفا به فلا تصاف بالفعل ليس من حيثية القابلية بل من حيثية أخرى و لك أن تدفعه بمنع الكلية فإن ما ذكر غير جار في اتصاف الماهيات بلوازمها إذ لا يمكن أن يقال إن الأربعة يجوز أن يكون زوجا و يجوز أن لا يكون زوجا بل هي واجبة الزوجية.

و ثالثها أن التنافي بين الوجوب و الإمكان فيما نحن فيه ممنوع إذ الإيجاد إيجاب وجود المعلول في حد نفسه و القبول إمكان حصول المقبول في القابل فالإمكان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٠

إمكان وجود لغيره و الوجوب وجوب وجود لنفسه فلا تنافي بينهما و أيضا الفاعل يوجب وجود المعلول و القابل لا يسلب هذا الوجوب و الإيجاب بل هو يصح وجود المعلول بالحصول فيه فالتنافي بينهما غير مسلم.

و قد يجاب عن الأول بأن المعلول في نفسه كما أنه لا مكانه محتاج إلى علة - و موجب فكذلك وجوده في غيره أيضا لا مكانه محتاج إلى العلة و الموجب و لا شك أن القابل من حيث هو قابل لا يوجب وجود المقبول فموجب وجوده في القابل أيضا هو الفاعل فكما أن الفاعل يوجب وجود الشيء في نفسه فكذلك يوجب وجوده في غيره و أيضا نحو وجود الشيء الواحد لا يختلف فالذي نحو وجوده إنه صفة لغيره فوجوده في نفسه عبارة عن وجوده لغيره ألا ترى أن وجود الأعراض في أنفسها هي وجودها لموضوعاتها بلا اختلاف جهتين فوجود المقبول في نفسه هو بعينه وجوده للقابل.

و عن الثاني بأن التنافي بين الإيجاب و اللاإيجاب و الضرورة و اللاضرورة في ذات واحدة من جهة واحدة بين لا يخفى على المتأمل فمنعه مستندا بأن الفاعل يوجب المعلول و القابل لا يسلب هذا الوجوب مكابرة فإن القابل و إن لم يسلب

الإيجاب الناشي من الفاعل لكنه متصف بسلب الإيجاب الناشي عن ذاته فلا يمكن أن يكون شيء واحد قابلا و فاعلا من جهة واحدة و لا يذهب عليك أن هذا ليس بحثنا على السند

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣١

الأخص بل هو بيان للمقدمة الممنوعة على وجه يدفع عنها السند.

أقول لا يخفى عليك أن هذا الكلام وإن دفع هذا الاعتراض عن الدليل المذكور لكن لا يجدي نفعا لأصل المقصود من عينية الصفات له لأن الدليل المذكور - وإن أثبت تعدد جهتي الفعل والقبول بمعنى الإمكان والقوة الاستعدادية و أما جهتا الفعل والقبول بمعنى مطلق الموصوفية بأمر زائد على ذات الموصوف فلم يقدّم دليل على اختلافهما على وجه يوجب الكثرة ولأجل هذا قال الشيخ أبو علي في التعليقات - إن كانت الصفات عارضة لذاته تعالى فوجود تلك الصفات إما عن سبب من خارج يكون واجب الوجود قابلا له ولا يصح أن يكون واجب الوجود قابلا لشيء فإن القبول لما فيه معنى ما بالقوة وإما أن يكون تلك العوارض توجد فيه عن ذاته فيكون إذن قابلا كما هو فاعل - اللهم إلا أن يكون الصفات والعوارض لوازم ذاته فإنه حينئذ لا يكون ذاته موضوعة لتلك الصفات لأنها موجودة فيه بل لأنها عنه و فرق بين أن يوصف جسم بأنه أبيض لأن الأبيض يوجد فيه من خارج و بين أن يوصف بأنه أبيض لأن البياض من لوازمه وإذا أخذت حقيقة الأول على هذا الوجه و لوازمه على هذه الجهة استمر هذا المعنى فيه وهو أن لا كثرة فيه و ليس هناك قابل و فاعل بل من حيث هو قابل فاعل وهذا الحكم مطرد في جميع البسائط فإن حقائقها هي أنها يلزم عنها اللوازم و في ذاتها تلك اللوازم على أنها من حيث هي قابلة فاعله فإن البسيط عنه و فيه شيء واحد انتهى كلامه ملخصا.

فقد علم أن حيثية القبول والفعل ليست مما يوجب اثنيية في الذات ولا في الجهات الثابتة للذات إلا إذا كان القبول بمعنى الانفعال والتأثر وليس من شرط قيام شيء بشيء تأثره عنه بل قد يكون قيام بلا تأثر كلوازم البسائط **فإن قيل** لا نسلم وجود لازم للماهية البسيطة بل الماهيات التي هي علل للوازم إنما هي مركبات فيمكن أن يكون فاعليتها بجهة و قابليتها بجهة أخرى فلا يلزم أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٢

يكون هناك شيء واحد قابلا و فاعلا بجهة واحدة.

قلنا أولا إن في كل مركب يتحقق أمر بسيط و لكل واحد من البسائط شيء من اللوازم و لا أقل من كونه واحدا أو ممكنا عاما أو مفهوما و ثانيا إن الحقيقة المركبة أيضا لها وحدة مخصوصة حتى العشرة في عشريتها والخمسة في خمسياتها و لها لازم - و اللازم الذي يلزمها من هذه الحيثية ليس علة لزومه أحد أجزاء ذلك المجتمع و إلا لكان حاصلا قبل ذلك الاجتماع و ليس القابل له أيضا أحد أجزائه فإن السطح وحده في المثلث لا يمكن أن يكون موصوفا بتساوي الزوايا لقائمتين و لا الأضلاع الثلاث فقط بل القابل هو المجموع من حيث ذلك المجموع و كذا الموجب المقتضي - فكان الشيء الواحد باعتبار واحد قابلا و فاعلا و لذلك ترى الشيخ و أتباعه تبعا للمعلم الأول والمشائين لم يبالوا في إثبات الصور العلمية الزائدة على ذاته لذاته و لم يحذروا عن لزوم كونه فاعلا و قابلا بهذا المعنى كما سيحيى ذكره و تحقيق

الأمر في ذلك.

ذكر و تحصيل قال بعض أعلام المتأخرين في هذا المقام إيجاب الفاعل للمفعول مقدم على فعله بالذات وإمكان حصول المقبول في القابل مقدم على قبوله - فلو كان الواحد الحقيقي الذي لا تعدد فيه بوجه من الوجوه فاعلا لشيء و قابلا له - لكان قبل الفعل و القبول جهتان جهة بها يوجب و يقتضيه و جهة بها يستحقه و يمكن حصوله فيه.

أقول العمدة هنا إثبات تكثر الجهة لأجل الاتصاف سواء كان قبل الفعل و القبول أو حين الفعل و القبول فإن الكلام في تعدد جهة يحصل منها الإيجاب و جهة يحصل منها الاستحقاق و وحدتهما كالكلام في تعدد جهتي الفعل و القبول و وحدتهما بلا تفاوت فلو تم لم الاستدلال و إلا فلا و قد استدلوا لإثبات هذه الدعوى بوجوه عديدة أخرى يجري مجرى ما ذكرناه فلها طويلا ذكرها و تركنا نقلها لأن شيئا منها لا يسمن و لا يغني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٣

الفصل (٤) في تحقيق القول بعينية الصفات الكمالية للذات الأحدية

فأقول الوجه عندي أن يستدل على هذا المطلب العظيم بوجوه أخرى سديدة

الأول أن هذه الصفات الكمالية كالعلم و القدرة

و غيرهما لو كانت زائدة على وجود ذاته لم يكن ذاته في مرتبة وجود ذاته مصداقا لصدق هذه الصفات الكمالية فيكون ذاته بنفس ذاته عارية عن معاني هذه النعوت فلم يكن مثلا في حد ذاته بذاته عالما بالأشياء قادرا على ما يشاء و التالي باطل لأن ذاته مبدءا كل الخيرات و الكمالات فكيف يكون ناقصا بذاته مستكملا بغيره فيكون للغير فيه تأثير فيكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٤

منفعلا من غيره و إنه فاعل لما سواه فيلزم تعدد جهتي الفعل و الانفعال و هو محال فكذا المقدم و أما لوازم الماهيات فهي ليست أمورا كمالية حتى يلزم من لزومها للماهية - أن يستفيد الماهية منها كمالاتا فيلزم الإفادة و الاستفادة الموجبتان لتكثر الجهتين في الذات الواحدة بل هي أمور اعتبارية من توابع الماهية.

الثاني أن تلك الصفات لو كانت زائدة على ذاته يلزم أن يستدعي فيضانها من ذاته على ذاته

لجهة أشرف مما عليه واجب الوجود فيكون ذاته أشرف من ذاته - إذ لو كفت جهة ذاته في أن يكون موجبا لإفاضة العلم مثلا لكان ذاته بذاته ذا علم ليفيض من علمه علم آخر كما في أصل الوجود و كذا في سائر الصفات الكمالية للوجود و التالي محال لأن جهة النقص و الخسة تخالف جهة الكمال و الشرف فكذا المقدم و لا مجال لتوهم فيضانها من غيره عليه و إلا يلزم أن يكون معلوله أشرف منه - و هذا أشد استحالة من الأول.

الثالث ما أشرنا إليه سابقا من أن بديهة العقل حاكمة بأن

ذاتا ما إذا كان لها من الكمال ما هو بحسب نفس ذاتها فهي أفضل و أكمل من ذات لها كمال زائد على ذاتها لأن تجمل الأولى بذاتها و تجمل الثانية بصفاتها و ما تجمل بذاته أشرف مما يتجمل بغير ذاته و إن كان ذلك الغير صفاته و واجب الوجود يجب أن يكون في أعلى ما يتصور من البهاء و الشرف و الجمال لأن ذاته مبدءا لسلسلة الوجودات و واهب كل الخيرات و الكمالات و الواهب المفيض لا محالة أكرم و أمجد من الموهوب - المفاض عليه فلو لم يكن

كماله و مجده و بهائوه بنفس حقيقته المقدسة بل مع اللواحق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٥

لكان المجموع من الذات و اللواحق أشرف من الذات المجردة و المجموع معلول - فيلزم أن يكون المعلول أشرف و أكمل من علته و هو محال بين الاستحالة فإذن كل واحد من الوجود و كمالات الوجود و كمالات الوجود بما هو موجود يجب أن ينتهي إلى ما هو وجود قائم بذاته علم قائم بذاته قدرة قائمة بذاتها و إرادة قائمة بذاتها و حياة قائمة بذاتها و هكذا في جميع صفاته الكمالية و يجب أن يكون جميعها واجبة الوجود و أن يكون جميعها أمرا واحدا لاستحالة تعدد الواجب كما بين سابقا.

و قد وقع في كلام مولانا و إمامنا مولى العارفين و إمام الموحدين ما يدل على نفي زيادة الصفات لله تعالى

بأبلغ وجه و آكده حيث قال في خطبة من خطبه المشهورة-

: أول الدين معرفته و كمال معرفته التصديق به و كمال التصديق به توحيده و كمال توحيده الإخلاص له و كمال الإخلاص له نفي الصفات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٦

عنه لشهادة كل صفة أنها غير الموصوف و شهادة كل موصوف أنه غير الصفة - فمن وصف الله سبحانه فقد قرنه و من قرنه فقد ثناه و من ثناه فقد جزأه و من جزأه فقد جهله و من جهله فقد أشار إليه و من أشار إليه

فقد حده و من حده فقد عده و من قال فيم فقد ضمنه و من قال على م فقد أخلى منه

انتهى كلامه المقدس على نبينا و عليه و آله السلام و الإكرام.

و هذا الكلام الشريف مع و جازته متضمن لأكثر المسائل الإلهية ببراهينها - و لنشر إلى نبذ من بيان أسرار و أنموذج من كنوز أنواره.

شرح

قوله ع: أول الدين معرفته

إشارة إلى أن معرفة الله تعالى و لو بوجه ابتداء الإيمان و اليقين فإن ما لم يتصور شيء لا يمكن التصديق بوجوده و لهذا قيل مطلب ما الشارحة مقدم على مطلب هل كتقدم البسيط على المركب.

قوله ع: و كمال معرفته التصديق به

و ذلك لأن من عرف معنى واجب الوجود أنه الوجود المتأكد الذي لا أتم منه الذي يفتقر إليه الممكنات و الوجودات - الناقصة الذوات المصحوبة للنقائص و الأعدام و القصورات فقد عرف أن لا بد أن يكون في الوجود موجود واجب الوجود و إلا لم يوجد موجود في العالم أصلا - و اللازم باطل بالضرورة فكذا الملزوم فحقيقة الوجود إذا عرفت على وجه الكمال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٧

هو أن يكون معلوما بالعلم الحضورى الشهودي إذ قد ثبت فيما سبق أن الصورة العلمية في الوجود لا بد وأن يكون نفس حقيقته المعلومة بخلاف سائر الماهيات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٨

فإنها قد يكون العلم بها غير وجودها العيني فلا يمكن أن يعرف حقيقة كل وجود إلا بعينه الخارجى إذ ليس للوجود وجود ذهني كالماهيات الكلية فكل من عرف حقيقة الوجود لأي موجود كان على وجه الكمال فلا بد أن يعرف كنه ذاته - و كنه مقوماته إن كان له مقومات كالوجودات المجعولة وعلى أي تقدير لا بد أن يعرف - أن حقيقة الوجود و مبدأه و كماله موجودة لأن ما هو و هل هو في نفس الوجود أمر واحد بلا تغاير بينهما فمن عرف الوجود أي وجود كان بحقيقته عرف أنه موجود لأن ماهية الوجود إنيته كما أشرنا إليه فثبت أن كمال معرفته أي معرفة الوجود المتأكد الواجب عين التصديق به.

قوله ع: و كمال التصديق به توحيده

إشارة إلى البرهان على نفي تعدد الواجب من جهة النظر في نفس حقيقة الواجب الذي هو الوجود الصرف الذي لا يشوبه عموم و لا تشخص فإن من تأمل أن الواجب نفس حقيقة الوجود و كل موجود غيره مشوب بغير حقيقة الوجود من تحديد أو تخصيص أو تعميم أو نقص أو فتور أو قوة أو قصور يعلم أنه لا تعدد فيه إذ لو فرض تعدد أفراد الواجب يلزم أن يكون الحقيقة الواحدة حقيقتين و هذا من المستحيلات التي لا يمكن تصويره فضلا عن تجويز وقوعه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٣٩

كما مر تحقيقه فثبت أن معرفة ذاته التي هي عين التصديق بوجوده شاهدة على فردانيته - و وحدانيته كما قال تعالى **شَهِدَ اللَّهُ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ** فذاته شاهدة على وحدانيته - و أما وجه عطف قوله **وَالْمَلَائِكَةُ وَأُولُوا الْعِلْمِ** على كلمة الله الدال على شهادتهم أيضا على وحدانيته فيبانه كما مرت الإشارة إليه من أن وجود كل موجود سواء متقوم بوجوده تعالى بحيث لا يمكن معرفة شيء من هذه الوجودات بكماله - إلا بحضور هويته و شهوده و هو مستلزم لحضور ما يتقوم به أعني الوجود الحق بقدر ما يمكن حضور المفيض للمفاض عليه و قد علمت أن حقيقة الحق شاهدة على توحيده فكذلك وجود غيره و إنما عبر عنه بالملائكة و أولي العلم لأن جميع ما سواه من الموجودات من أولي العلم لما وقعت إليه الإشارة من أن الوجود على تفاوت درجاته عين العلم و القدرة و الإرادة و سائر الصفات الوجودية لكن الوجود في بعض الأشياء في غاية الضعف فلا يظهر منه هذه الصفات لغاية قصورها و مخالطتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤٠

بالأعدام و الظلمات و إلى ذلك أشار تعالى بقوله **وَأِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِهِ - وَلَكِنْ لَا تَفْقَهُونَ تَسْبِيحَهُمْ**

و قوله ع: و كمال توحيده الإخلاص له

يعني الزوائد والثواني إذ لو كان في الوجود غيره سواء كان صفة أو شيئا آخر لم يكن بسيطا حقيقيا لما مر سابقا أن بسيط الحقيقة لا يسلب عن ذاته ما هو كمال وجودي إلا النقائص والأعدام إذ جهة سلب الوجود غير جهة ثبوت الوجود فلو سلبت عن ذاته حقيقة وجودية يلزم التركيب في ذاته مع أنه بسيط الذات هذا خلف.

قوله ع: وكمال الإخلاص له نفي الصفات عنه

أراد به نفي الصفات التي وجودها غير وجود الذات وإلا فذاته بذاته مصداق لجميع النعوت الكمالية والأوصاف الإلهية من دون قيام أمر زائد بذاته تعالى فرض أنه صفة كمالية له فعلمه وقدرته وإرادته وحياته وسمعه وبصره كلها موجودة بوجود ذاته الأحدية مع أن مفهوماتها متغايرة ومعانيها متخالفة فإن كمال الحقيقة الوجودية في جامعيتها للمعاني الكثيرة الكمالية مع وحدة الوجود.

قوله ع: لشهادة كل صفة أنها غير الموصوف وشهادة كل موصوف أنه غير الصفة

إشارة إلى برهان نفي الصفات العارضة سواء فرضت قديمة كما يقوله الأشاعرة أو حادثة فإن الصفة إذا كانت عارضة كانت مغايرة للموصوف بها و كل متغايرين في الوجود فكل منهما متميز عن صاحبه بشيء و مشارك له بشيء آخر و ذلك لاشتراكهما في الوجود و محال أن يكون جهة الامتياز عين جهة الاشتراك وإلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤١

لكان الواحد بما هو واحد كثيرا بل الوحدة بما هي وحدة بعينها كثرة هذا محال - فإذن لا بد أن يكون كل منهما مركبا من جزء به الاشتراك و جزء به الامتياز فيلزم التركيب في ذات الواجب و قد ثبت أنه بسيط الحقيقة هذا خلف وإليه الإشارة بقوله

: فمن وصفه فقد قرنه

إلى قوله فقد جهله أي من وصفه بصفة زائدة فقد قرنه بغيره في الوجود وإذا قرنه بغيره فقد جعل له ثانيا في الوجود و كلما فرضه ثاني اثنين فقد جعله مركبا ذا جزئين بأحدهما يشاركه في الوجود و بالآخر يباينه - فكلامه ع إذ هو منبع علوم المكاشفة و مصدر أنوار المعرفة نص على غاية تنزيهه تعالى عن شوب الإمكان و التركيب فيلزم من هذا التنزيه و التقديس أن لا موجود بالحقيقة سواء و هذه الممكنات من لوازم نوره و عكوس أضوائه و قد مرت الإشارة إلى أن غاية التوحيد توجب أن يكون الواحد الحقيقي كل الأشياء فهو الكل في وحدته و لهذا عقب هذا الكلام الذي في نفي الصفات

: بقوله ع و من أشار إليه فقد حده

إلى آخره أي من أشار إليه بأي إشارة كانت حسية أو عقلية بأن قال ها هنا أو هناك أو كذا و كذلك فقد جعله محدودا بحد خاص و من حده بحد معين فقد حده أي جعله واحدا بالعدد لا بالحقيقة و قد ثبت أن وحدته الحققة ليست مبدء الأعداد و واحد الأفراد و الآحاد و هو محال.

و على هذا يجب أن لا يكون محصورا في شيء و لا يخلو عنه شيء فلا يكون في أرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤٢

و لا في سماء و لا يخلو عنه أرض و لا سماء كما ورد في الحديث

: لو دليتم بحبل على الأرض السفلى لهبط على الله

و لهذا قال ع

: و من قال فيم فقد ضمنه و من قال على م فقد أخلى منه

تصديقا لقوله تعالى **هُوَ مَعَكُمْ أَيْنَ مَا كُنْتُمْ** و قوله **مَا يَكُونُ مِنْ نَجْوَى ثَلَاثَةٍ إِلَّا هُوَ رَابِعُهُمْ وَ لَا خَمْسَةٍ إِلَّا هُوَ سَادِسُهُمْ** و قوله تعالى **وَنَحْنُ أَقْرَبُ إِلَيْهِ مِنْ حَبْلِ الْوَرِيدِ** و قوله في الحديث القدسي

: كنت سمعه و بصره و يده

و قول النبي ص: إنه فوق كل شيء و تحت كل شيء قد ملأ كل شيء عظمته فلم تخل منه أرض و لا سماء و

لا بر و لا بحر و لا هواء

و قد روي أنه قال موسى: أقریب أنت فأناجيك أم بعيد أنت فأناذك فإني أحس حسن صوتك و لا أراك فأين

أنت فقال الله أنا خلفك و أمامك و عن يمينك و شمالك أنا جليس عند من يذكرني و أنا معه إذ دعاني

و أمثال هذا في الآيات و الأحاديث كثيرة لا تحصى.

تتمة و تبصرة

و مما يجب التنبيه عليه أنه ليس معنى نفي الصفات عنه تعالى - أنها غير متحققة في حقه تعالى ليلزم التعطيل كيف و هو منعوت بجميع النعوت الإلهية و الأسماء الحسنى في مرتبة وجوده الواجبي و جل جناب الحق عن فقد و عدم لصفة كمالية بل المراد أن أوصافه و نعوته كلها موجودة بوجود واحد هو وجود الذات كما أن ذاتيات الماهية لنا موجودة بوجود واحد شخصي لكن الواجب لا ماهية له إذ لا جهة إمكانية فيه فالعالم الربوبي عظيم جدا و هو الكل في وحدة فتلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤٣

الصفات الإلهية كثيرة بالمعنى و المفهوم واحدة بالهوية و الوجود بل للحق سبحانه بحسب كل نوع من أنواع الممكنات صفة إلهية هي رب ذلك النوع و مبدؤه و معاده - و له بحسب كل يوم شأن من شئون ذاتية و تجليات في مقامات إلهية و مراتب صمدية و له بحسب تلك الشئون صفات و أسماء كما يكشفه العرفاء الكاملون - و لهذا قالوا أول كثرة وقعت في الوجود و برزخ بين الحضرة الأحدية الذاتية و بين كثرة الممكنات و المظاهر الخلقية للصفات هي كثرة الأوصاف و الأسماء الإلهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤٤

و هي غير مجعولة بل متحققة بنفس تحقق الذات الواجبة اللامجعولة لا كما يقوله المعتزلة من أنها ثابتة منفكة عن الوجود إذ قد علمت أن القول بشيئية المعدومات باطل جدا بل كما وقع التنبيه عليه من أنها معان متكثرة معقولة في غيب الوجود - الحق تعالى متحدة في الوجود واجبة غير مجعولة و مع ذلك يصدق عليها أنها بحسب أعيانها ما شمت رائحة الوجود لما ثبت و تبين أن الموجود بالذات هو الوجود - فهي ليست بما هي هي موجودة و لا معدومة و هذا من

العجائب التي يحتاج إليها إلى تلتطف شديد للسريرة

تنبيه آخر

قد مر أن كل كمال يلحق الأشياء بواسطة الوجود فهو لمبدأ الوجود لذاته و لغيره بسببه فهو تعالى الحي القيوم العليم القدير المريد بذاته لا بالصفات الزائدة و إلا يلزم الاحتياج في إفاضة هذه الكمالات على شيء إلى حياة و قدرة و علم و إرادة أخرى إذ لا يمكن إفاضة إلا من الموصوف بها و إذا علمت هذا علمت معنى ما قيل إن صفاته تعالى عين ذاته و لاح لك أن معناه ليس كما سبق إلى الأوهام - أن هذه الحياة و العلم و القدرة الفائضة على الأشياء عين ذاته و لا أيضا ما توهمه كثير من المنتسبين إلى العلم أن هذه المعاني الكلية متحدة مع الذات في المعنى و المفهوم كما هو مناط الحمل الذاتي كيف و ذاته تعالى مجهولة الكنه لغيره - و هذه الصفات معلومات متغيرة المعنى بل هذا الوجود بما هو وجود مفني التعينات - و المفهومات كلها فلم يبق فيه صفة و لا موصوف و لا اسم و لا مسمى و لا ماهية و لا مفهوم إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤٥

الذات فقط و لكن كونها عين الذات عبارة عن كونها بحيث يصدق عليها لذاتها هذه المعاني المتكثرة من دون قيام صفة به و في هذا الاعتبار يتحقق صفة و موصوف و علم و عالم و قدرة و قادر و كذا وجود و موجود و يقال لهذا الاعتبار مرتبة الإلهية كما يقال لاعتبار الوجود مرتبة الأحدية و الهوية الغيبية فيتحد العلم و القدرة و الإرادة - و غيرها من الصفات في هذه المرتبة كاتحاد الصفة و الموصوف فيها أيضا و الحكم بالمغايرة بينها مع كونها واحدة في نفس الأمر كحكم العقل بالمغايرة بين الجنس و الفصل في العقل البسيط مع اتحادهما في نفس الأمر و ليست في الوجود إلا الذات الأحدية كما أنهما في الخارج شيء واحد هو العقل و في الاعتبار الآخر يتميز كل منهما عن صاحبه فيتكثر الصفات و الأسماء و لوازمها غاية التكثر فاتقن ذلك لأن لا تقع في التعطيل و لا في التشبيه

الفصل (٥) في إيضاح القول بأن صفات الله الحقيقية كلها ذات واحدة لكنها مفهومات كثيرة

و اعلم أن كثيرا من العقلاء المدققين ظنوا أن معنى كون صفاته تعالى عين ذاته - هو أن معانيها و مفهوماتها ليست متغيرة بل كلها ترجع إلى معنى واحد و هذا ظن فاسد و وهم كاسد و إلا لكانت ألفاظ العلم و القدرة و الإرادة و الحياة و غيرها في حقه ألفاظا مترادفة يفهم من كل منها ما يفهم من الآخر فلا فائدة في إطلاق شيء منها بعد إطلاق أحدها و هذا ظاهر الفساد و مؤد إلى التعطيل و الإلحاد بل الحق في معنى كون صفاته تعالى عين ذاته أن هذه الصفات المتكثرة الكمالية كلها موجودة بوجود الذات الأحدية بمعنى أنه ليس في الوجود ذاته تعالى متميزا عن صفته بحيث يكون كل منها شخصا على حدة و لا صفة منه متميزة عن صفة أخرى له بالحيثية المذكورة - بل هو قادر بنفس ذاته و عالم بعين ذاته أي يعلم هو نفس ذاته المنكشفة عنده بذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤٦

و مريد بإرادة هي نفس ذاته بل نفس علمه المتعلق بنظام الوجود و سلسلة الأكوان - من حيث إنها ينبغي أن توجد على ما سيجيء ذكره.

و تنبعث من كل من هذه الصفات صفات أخرى مثل كونه حكيما غفورا خالقا رازقا رءوفا رحيمًا مبدئا معيدا مصورا

منشأ محييا مميتا إلى غير ذلك فإنها من فروع كونه قادرا على جميع المقدورات بحيث لا يدخل ذرة من ذرات الممكنات و المعاني في الوجود بأية حيثية كانت من الحثيات إلا بقدرته وإفاضته بوسط أو بغير وسط و مثل كونه سميعا و بصيرا و مدركا و خبيرا و غير ذلك مما يتفرع و يتشعب من كونه عليما و هكذا قياس سائر الأسماء و الصفات غير المتناهية - الحاصلة من تركيب هذه الأسماء و الصفات كتركيب الأنواع و الأصناف و الأشخاص من معاني ذاتيه كالأناس و الفصول الداخلية أو عرضية كاللوازم و الأعراض العامة و الخاصة الخارجية فإن من الأسماء و الصفات ما هي جنسية و منها ما هي فصلية و نوعية و منها ما هي شخصية كخالقية زيد و عالمية عمرو و كل من هذه الأسماء و الصفات تستدعي مظاهر و مجالي مناسبة إياها بها يظهر أثر ذلك الاسم و الصفة فيه فكل صفة من صفات الله العظمى و اسم من أسمائه العليا يقتضي إيجاد مخلوق من المخلوقات يدل ذلك المخلوق على ذلك الاسم كما يدل الأشباح على الأرواح - و الأظلال على الأشخاص و المظاهر على المباطن و المرايا على الحقائق فالعالم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤٧

الربوبي من جهة كثرة المعاني الأسمائية و الصفات عالم عظيم جدا مع أن كل ما فيه موجود بوجود واحد بسيط من كل وجه و هذا من العجائب التي يختص بدركها الراسخون في العلم فلذلك أوجد الباري جل ذكره ما سواه ليكون مظاهر لأسمائه الحسنى و مجالي لصفاته العليا فلما كان قهارا أوجد المظاهر القهرية التي يترتب عليها أثر القهر من الجحيم و دركاتهما و عقاربها و حياتها و عقوباتها و أصحاب سلاسلها و أغلالها من الشياطين و الكفار و سائر الأشرار و لما كان رحيمًا غفورا أوجد مجالي الرحمة و الغفران كالعرش و ما حواه من ملائكة الرحمة و كالجنة و أصحابها من المقربين و السعداء و الأخيار و هكذا القياس في سائر الأسماء و مظاهرها - و مشاهدها و الصفات و مجاليها و محاكيها. و اعتبر من أحوال نفسك الناطقة المفطورة على صورة الرحمن و هي حجة الله على الخلق فاعرف أن كل ما يصدر عنك من الأقوال و الأحوال و الحركات و السكنات و الأفكار و التخيلات هي مظاهر ما كمن في ذاتك من الصفات و الأسماء فإنك إذا أحببت أحدا و واليته دعتك تلك المحبة إلى أن يظهر منك ما يدل على محبتك إياه من المدح و التعظيم - و التبسيط و التكريم و الدعاء له و إظهار الفرح و النشاط و التبسم و المطابقة و لو لم تكن أحببته لما ظهر منك شيء من هذه الأمور فهذه الآثار و النتائج مظاهر لصفة المحبة التي فيك و إذا عاديت أحدا ظهر منك من الأقوال و الحركات و الآثار ما يدل على معاداتك إياه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٤٨

كالشتم و الضرب و الذم و إظهار الوحشة و الكراهة عنه و تمنى زواله و تشهي نكاله فهذه الآثار مظاهر لصفة العداوة التي فيك و قس على ذلك نظائره فهذه الأسماء و الصفات - و إن كانت متحدة مع ذاته تعالى بحسب الوجود و الهوية فهي متغايرة بحسب المعنى و المفهوم.

و من هاهنا يثبت و يتحقق بطلان ما ذهب إليه أكثر المتأخرين من اعتبارية الوجود - و كونه أمرا انتزاعيا لا هوية له في الخارج و لا حقيقة له كسائر المفهومات المصدرية - كالأمكن و الشيئية و الكلية و الجزئية و لا يكون متكثرا إلا بتكثر ما نسب إليها من المعاني و الماهيات فيلزم عليهم كون صفاته موجودات متعددة متكثرة حسب تكثر معانيها و هذا فاسد

قبيح جدا و لأجل هذا الإلزام ذهبوا إلى أن مفادها ومعناها أمر واحد وكلها يرجع إلى مفهوم واحد و كادوا أن يقولوا بأن الفاظها مترادفة في حقه تعالى - فقد علمت فساده أنفا بل التحقيق كما مر مرارا أن الوجود هو الأصل في الموجدية و هو مما يتفاوت كمالاته و نقصا و شدة و ضعفا و كلما كان الوجود أكمل و أقوى كان مصداقا لمعان و نعوت كمالية أكثر و مبدأ لآثار و أفاعيل أكثر بل كلما كان أكمل و أشرف كان مع أكثرية صفاته و نعوته أشد بساطة و فردانية و كلما كان أنقص و أضعف كان أقل نعوتا و أوصافا و كان أقرب إلى قبول التكثر و التضاد حتى إنه يصير تغاير المعاني المتكثرة - التي يكون في الوجود القوي الشديد موجبا لتضاد تلك المعاني في حق هذا الوجود الضعيف فتغاير الأسماء المتقابلة له كالهادي و المضل و المحيي و المميت و القابض و الباسط - و الأول و الآخر و الغفار و القهار سبب لتضاد الموجودات و تعاند المكونات التي

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هي آثارها و مظاهرها كالهداية و الضلالة بل كالملك و الشيطان و الحياة و الموت بل كالأرواح و الأبدان

الموقف الثالث في علمه تعالى و فيه فصول

الفصل (١) في ذكر أصول و مقدمات ينتفع بها في هذا المطلب

منها أنه قد ثبت أن للأشياء وجودا في الخارج و وجودا في القوة المدركة

و مرادنا من الخارج هاهنا عالم الأجسام المادية ذوات الجهات الوضعية و الحكماء لما حاولوا إثبات أن للأشياء الخارجية نحو آخر من الوجود و ربما يقال له الوجود الذهني قالوا بعد ما أحالوا اتصاف معدوم مطلق بحكم ثبوتي إنا نحكم كثيرا ما على أشياء معدومة في الخارج بأحكام وجودية و ثبوت الشيء للشيء متوقف على وجود ذلك الشيء و إذ ليست تلك الأشياء في الخارج فلها نحو آخر من الوجود و هو الوجود العلمي سواء أطلق لفظ العلم على ذلك الوجود أو على الإضافة التي تقع بسببه بين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٠

العالم و المعلوم.

و منها أن العلم كالوجود يطلق تارة على الأمر الحقيقي و تارة على المعنى الانتزاعي النسبي المصدري

أعني العالمية و هو الذي يشتق منه العالم و المعلوم و سائر تصاريفه إذ العلم ضرب من الوجود و لو سئلت عن الحق فالعلم و الوجود شيء واحد لكن الوجود إذا ضعف بحيث يتشابه مع العدم و يصحبه النقائص و القصورات - كالأجسام الوضعية و عوارضها المادية احتجب ذلك الوجود عن المدارك و المشاعر - و كما احتجبت هذه الأجسام و عوارضها بعضها عن بعض و غاب كل جزء منها عن صاحبه إذ ليس لها وجود جمعي و لا صورة حضورية في نفسها فكذلك احتجبت و غابت عن غيرها من القوى الإدراكية إذ حضور شيء عند شيء متفرع على حضوره في نفسه فليس لهذه الأجسام و أحوالها وجود علمي و لهذا لا يطلق عليها اسم العلم و المعلوم و لا لموضوعاتها اسم العالم مع أنه يطلق عليها اسم الوجود لأن اسم الوجود أعم تناولا للأشياء من اسم العلم و غيره من صفات الكمال كالقدرة و الإرادة و العشق و نظائرها و إن كانت كلها من أحوال الوجود و الموجود بما هو موجود و ذلك لأن في مفهوم كل منها زيادة

إضافة على مفهوم الوجود مثلا العلم عبارة عن وجود شيء لشيء آخر مستقل الوجود لا كوجود الصور والأعراض للهولي كيف و لو كان الشيء علما و معلوما لأنه موجود في ذاته لكان كل موجود في ذاته معلوما لكل أحد و فساد

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اللازم يوجب فساد الملزوم.

ومنها أن الذي يطلق عليه اسم المعلوم قسمان

أحدهما هو الذي وجوده في نفسه هو وجوده لمدركه و صورته العينية هي بعينها صورته العلمية و يقال له المعلوم بالذات.

و ثانيهما هو الذي وجوده في نفسه غير وجوده لمدركه و صورته العينية ليست هي بعينها صورته العلمية و هو المعلوم بالعرض فإذا قيل العلم عبارة عن الصورة الحاصلة من الشيء عند المدرك أريد بالمعلوم به الأمر الخارج من القوة المدركة - كالسماء و الأرض و البيت و الحجر و الشجر و الفرس و الإنسان و سائر الماديات و أحوالها - و إذا قيل العلم عبارة عن حضور صورة شيء للمدرک عني به العلم الذي هو نفس المعلوم لا شيء غيره و في كل من القسمين المعلوم بالحقيقة و المكشوف بالذات هو الصورة التي وجودها وجود نوري إدراكي خالص عن الغواشي المادية غير مخلوط بالأعدام و الظلمات.

فقد علم مما ذكرنا أن الوجود على ضربين وجود إدراكي و وجود غير إدراكي - و أن العالم عالمان عالم الغيب و عالم الشهادة و هما الآخرة و الأولى و تسمية الآخرة بالغيب و الدنيا بالشهادة إنما هي بالقياس إلى ضعف نظرنا لا بالقياس إلى الأمر نفسه لأن الغيبة من لوازم هذا الوجود الدنيوي و الحضور و الشهود من لوازم الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٢

الأخروي مع تفاوت درجاته و طبقات الجنان في ذلك فكل طبقة هي أشد براءة عن هذا العالم و أكثر تجردا و ارتفاعا عن المادة فهي أشد ظهورا و أكثر حضورا و جمعية.

اعلم أن أكثر القوم زعموا أن المانع عن المعلوماتية هو كون الشيء مقارنا - لأمر زائدة على ذاته مؤثرة فيه كمقارنة اللون و الوضع و الشكل و غيرها لأن العلم عبارة عند كثير منهم عن امتياز الشيء عن غيره بوجه كلي فكل ما هو مخلوط بغيره ما دام كونه مخلوطا به لا يكون معلوما بل يكون مجهولا فقالوا المعلوم إما مجرد عما سواه أو مخالطة به مخالطة مؤثرة من الأغشية و الملابس فالأول يسمى معقولا كالإنسانية المطلقة المطابقة لأفرادها المتفاوتة في العظم و الصغر المختلفة في الوضع و الأين و المتى و لو لم تكن مجردة عن مقدار خاص و وضع خاص و زمان خاص لما طابقت المختلفين و لما صح حمل الحيوانية المطلقة على البق و الفيل و سائر المختلفات في هذه العوارض الغريبة.

و الثاني يسمى محسوسا سواء كان مبصرا أو مسموعا أو مشموما أو مذوقا أو ملموسا أو متخيلا أو موهوما و أما المقارنة غير المؤثرة فهي غير مانعة عن المعقولية كمقارنة السواد للحركة فإن وجود أحدهما للآخر أو عدمه عنه لا يتغير به نحو وجود الآخر - بخلاف مقارنة الوضع و المقدار و غيرهما لزيد مثلا فإنها إذا زالت عنه زال وجوده الشخصي فلاجل ذلك مدار المعقولية عندهم بالانفراد و التخلص بالكلية عن العوارض الغريبة و كذا مدار المدركة على شيء ما من التجرد

فالمتجرد عن أصل المادة دون عوارضه هو المحسوس بشرط تحقق نسبة ما وضعية لمحل الصورة الإدراكية لمادتها الخارجية و المتجرد عن المادة و عوارضها إلا المقدار هو المتخيل و المتجرد عن الجميع إلا نسبة غير وضعية هو الموهوم و المتجرد بالكلية المساوي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٣

نسبته إلى الأفراد كلها هو المعقول هذا حاصل ما أفاده و فيه قصور ناش من قلة البضاعة في صناعة الحكمة و عدم الاطلاع على تفاوت أنحاء الوجودات قوة و ضعفا و كمالات و نقصا فإن المانع من كون زيد معقولا ليس مقارنته للشكل و الوضع و اللون و الأعضاء كالرأس و اليد و الرجل فإن جميع ما ذكره كما يمكن وجودها مع زيد في الخارج يمكن وجودها معه في العقل بل هذه الأنواع الطبيعية المركبة من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٤

هذه الأبعاد و الأعضاء المختلفة و صفاتها اللازمة إذا فرض سلبها عنها لم يكن ماهياتها هي هي فإن الحيوان كالأسد مثلا إذا انسلخ عن المقدار و الشكل و الرأس و العين و اليد و الرجل و البطن لم يكن أسدا و لا حيوانا و أيضا كما يمكن للعقل أن يتصور الإنسان فكذا يمكن له تصور مقداره و شكله و وضعه و لونه و أينه و غير ذلك فرادى و جمعي فالقول بأن مدار العاقلية على تجريد ماهية المعلوم عن المقدار و الشكل و غيرهما قول زور مختلق كيف و هذه الأمور بعضها مقومات للماهية و بعضها كمالات و متممات لها و الكلام في تعقل كل منهما كالكلام في تعقل تلك الماهية فالحق الحري بالتصديق و التحقيق هو أن مدار العلم و الجهل و كذا النور و الظلمة و الظهور و الخفاء و الحضور و الغيبة على تأكد الوجود و ضعفه - فالوجود كلما كان أقوى تحصلا و أشد فعلية و أتم هوية كان أقوى انكشافا و أشد ظهورا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٥

و أكثر حيلة و جمعا للأشياء و كلما كان أضعف و أنقص كان أكثر خفاء و ظلمة و أقل حصولا و أنقص ظهورا. ثم أقوى الموجودات هو الوجود الواجبي المبرىء بالكلية عن جهات الإمكانيات و الأعدام و الشرور و عن جهة النقص و القصور و هو عالم الإلهية الذي فيه وجود جميع الأشياء كلها على وجه الوجوب الذاتي من غير شائبة كثرة و إمكان و أضعف الموجودات هو الأجسام الطبيعية و أحوالها و هو عالم الحدوث و الدثور و التجدد و الزوال و الأول منبع ماء الحياة و الظهور و مبدأ أنوار العلوم و المعلومات و الآخر معدن الموت و الظلمات و ما بين هذين الطرفين طبقات كثيرة كل ما هو أقرب إلى المبدأ الأعلى كان في باب الظهور و العلم أقوى و كل ما هو أبعد منه كان أخفى و أضعف ظهورا و معلومية لكن جميع ما سوى هذا العالم الأسفل مشتركة في أن وجودها وجود صوري إدراكي غير منفك عن الحياة و الإدراك بخلاف ما في هذا العالم و هو الأجسام الطبيعية إذا أخذت بذاتها مع قطع النظر عن مبادئها النفسية و العقلية و مقوماتها الباطنية فإن جميعها خارجة عن حدود هذا العالم و إن كانت محيطة بهذه الأجسام إذ لا قوام للسافل إلا بالعالِي و لو لا العالِي لانطمس السافل و أنت قد عرفت الفرق بين الجسم الطبيعي بالمعنى الذي هو مادة و بينه بالمعنى الذي

هو جنس و الحياة و الإدراك خارجان عن حدود الأجسام الحيوانية التي في هذا العالم بالمعنى الأول - غير خارجين عنها بالمعنى الثاني فأبدان الحيوانات و جثتها هي من هذا العالم و نفوسها و أرواحها من عالم آخر.

و منها أنه قد مر أن العلم قد يكون نفس المعلوم الخارجي

و قد يكون غيره فهاهنا نقول كما أن العلم بالشيء قد يكون صورة ذهنية كما في علمنا بالأشياء الخارجة عنا علما عقليا و ذلك العلم لا محالة أمر كلي و إن تخصصت بالف تخصص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٦

فكذلك قد يكون أمرا عينيا و صورة خارجية كما في علمنا بنفسنا و بصفاتنا اللازمة - فإننا ندرك ذاتنا بعين صورتنا التي نحن بها لا بصورة زائدة عليها فإن كل إنسان يدرك ذاته - على الوجه الذي يمتنع فيه الشركة و لو كان هذا الإدراك بصورة حاصلة في نفسنا - فهي تكون كلية و إن كانت مجموع كليات جملتها تختص بذات واحدة إذ مع ذلك لا يخرج نفس تصوره عن احتمال الصدق على كثيرين و أيضا كل مفهوم كلي و صورة ذهنية و لو كان أمرا قائما بذاتنا فنحن نشير إليه بهو و نشير إلى ذاتنا بأننا فعلنا بذاتنا عين وجود ذاتنا و هويتنا الشخصية.

و اعلم أن هاهنا دقيقة شريفة يجب التنبيه عليها و هي أن لقائل أن يقول - النفس الإنساني جوهر متحصل لا محالة و كل جوهر لا محالة يقع تحت مقولة الجوهر بالذات فيكون الجوهر جنسا له و كل ما له جنس يكون له فصل لا محالة - فالنفس مركبة من جنس طبيعي و فصل طبيعي و هما أعني الطبيعتين مفهومان كليان - و كل ما هو مركب من المفهومات الكلية لا يمكن الإشارة إليه إلا بهو لا بأنا.

فإن قلت الجنس و الفصل جزءان لنوع النفس فلا بد من انضمام أمر جزئي إليهما حتى يتم قوامها الشخصي و المتقوم من المعنى النوعي مع التشخص لا يحتمل الصدق على كثيرين.

قلت هب أن المركب من عدة معان مع أمر آخر شخصي بذاته كالوجود و نحوه و إن امتنع صدقه على كثرة لكن لا بد في تعقل ذلك المركب من تعقل مقوماته الكلية - بعلم كلي و صورة ذهنية و كلما هو كذلك فهو بالنسبة إلينا هو و لا يمكن الإشارة إليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٧

بأننا و نحن نعلم بوجودنا أنا عند إدراكنا لذاتنا قد نغفل عن جميع المفهومات و العنوانات الكلية فضلا عن مفهوم الجوهر أو الناطق أو غير ذلك و كلما ندركه من هذه الأمور لا نشير إليه بأننا فعلنا من هذا أن الكل غائب عنا إلا هويتنا البسيطة - فلا بد أن تكون هذه الهوية البسيطة وجودا لا غير إذ كلما هو غيره فلا محالة تحت إحدى المقولات فيكون مركبا من أمور كلية و الوجود ليس كذلك لما قد مر مرارا أنه غير داخل تحت معنى كلي و إن صدق عليه كثير من تلك المعاني.

و من هاهنا اندفع إيراد بعضهم على القوم عند ما أثبتوا تجرد النفس - بأننا نغفل عن البدن و سائر الأجسام و عوارضها و لا نغفل عن ذاتنا فذاتنا جوهر مجرد غير شيء من الأجسام و عوارضها حيث يقول على سبيل المعارضة إنا كثيرا ما ندرك ذاتنا و لا يخطر ببالنا أصلا معنى الجوهر المجرد فكيف يكون ذاتنا عين الجوهر المجرد

و منها أن النفس كما تدرك ذاتها بنفس صورة ذاتها

لا بصورة أخرى كذلك تدرك كثيرا من قواها المدركة و المحركة لا بصورة أخرى ذهنية و بيان ذلك من وجوه-

الأول أن النفس تتصرف في بدنها الخاص الشخصي

و تستعمل قواها الشخصية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٨

الموجودة في الأعيان فإنها تستعمل مثلا قوتها المتفكرة و تستخدمها في تفصيل الجزئيات و تركيبها و ترتيب الحدود الوسطى و هي لا محالة صور جزئية موجودة في مشهد النفس حاضرة عندها متمثلة بين يديها تقلبها كيف تشاء و تتصرف فيها بالتقدم و التأخير و الجمع و التفريق و قابل هذه التصريفات و التقلبات ليس إلا صورا شخصية عينية لا أمورا كلية ذهنية مبهمة الوجود و كذا الإله التي بها يقع التصرف و الترتيب- أعني القوة المتفكرة و كذلك تدرك النفس قواها الخيالية و الجسمية و تتصرف فيها و تحفظها و تحفظ بها الصور الموجودة فيها و تشاهدها بأعيانها لا بواسطة صور أخرى غيرها لئلا يلزم تضاعف الصور و ذهابها إلى غير النهاية فالنفس إذن تشاهد تلك الأمور- مبصرة إياها ببصر ذاتها لا ببصرة أخرى.

الثاني أن إدراك هذه الأمور لو كان بصورة ذهنية

مأخوذة عنها لأدركناها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٥٩

على الوجه الكلي و اللازم باطل لأننا نجد من أنفسنا أننا ندرك كثيرا من هذه الصور الإدراكية على الوجه الجزئي هذا حال جمهور الناس و أهل الكمال منهم يدركون مع ذلك بالمشاهدة الحضورية حوامل تلك الصور و حفظتها و كتبه الأعمال و صريف أقلامها و كيفية كتابتها و بطلان اللازم يستلزم بطلان الملزوم و إذا بطل الملزوم كان نقيضه حقا و هو المطلوب.

الثالث أنا نتألم بمرض أو تفرق اتصال يقع في بدننا

و الألم هو الشعور بالمنافي- و ليس هذا الألم بأن يحصل لتفرق الاتصال أو للخلط الموزي أو الكيفية الموزية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٠

صورة أخرى في ذلك العضو جزئية أو في النفس كلية أو في غيرهما بل المدرك في هذا الألم نفس تفرق الاتصال أو كيفية قائمة بالعضو نعم ربما يحصل من إدراك هذا المنافي بصورة أخرى ألم آخر غير هذا الألم الحسي فإذا ثبت أن من الأشياء- ما يكفي في إدراكها مجرد حضور ذاتها للنفس أو لأمر له تعلق حضوري بها.

الرابع أن من أدرك شيئا خارجا عن ذاته و ذوات قواه فإنما يدركه بصورة حاصلة منه عند نفسه

مطابقة إياه و أما تلك الصورة فإنما يدركها بعين تلك الصورة- لا بصورة أخرى مطابقة و إلا لزم أن يجتمع في محل واحد صور متساوية في الماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦١

مختلفة بالعدد و هو محال

الخامس من العرشيات أن النفس في مبدأ فطرتها خالية عن العلوم

التصورية و التصديقية و لا شك أن استعمال الآلات كالحواس فعل اختياري ليس فعلا طبيعيا فيتوقف لا محالة على العلم بتلك الآلات فلو كان كل علم بارتسام صورة من المعلوم لزم توقفه على استعمال الآلة المتوقف على العلم بتلك الآلة و هكذا يعود الكلام فيما أن يدور أو يتسلسل و هما محالان فبالضرورة أول علوم النفس هو علمها بذاتها ثم علمها بقواها و آلتها التي هي الحواس الظاهرة و الباطنة - و هذان العلمان من العلوم الحضورية ثم بعد هذين العلمين ينبعث من ذات النفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٢

لذاتها استعمال الآلات بدون تصور هذا الفعل الذي هو استعمال الآلات و التصديق بفائدته كما في سائر الأفعال الاختيارية الصادرة عنا في خارج البدن فإن هذا ضرب آخر من الإرادة ليس بالقصد و الروية و إن كان غير منفك عن العلم به لكن الإرادة هاهنا عين العلم و في غيره من الأفعال الاختيارية الصادرة عن النفس مسبقة بالعلم بها و التصديق بفائدتها و أما الفعل الذي هو استعمال النفس القوى و الحواس و نحوها فإنما ينبعث عن ذاتها لا عن رويتها فذاتها بذاتها موجبة لاستعمال الآلات لا بإرادة زائدة و علم زائد بل النفس لما كانت في أول الفطرة عالمة بذاتها عاشقة لها و لفعلها عشقا ناشئا من الذات اضطرت إلى استعمال الآلات التي لا قدرة لها إلا عليه فاحتفظ بهذا فإنه علق بنفسه.

و من الشواهد الدالة على هذا المطلب

أن صورة ما قد تحصل في آلة إدراكية - و النفس لا تشعر بها كما إذا استغرقت في فكر أو في غضب أو شهوة أو فيما تؤديه حاسة أخرى فلا بد من التفات النفس إلى تلك الصورة فالإدراك ليس إلا التفات النفس - و مشاهدتها للمدرك و المشاهدة ليست بصورة كلية بل بصورة جزئية فلا بد أن يكون للنفس علم إشراقي حضوري ليس بصورة زائدة فقد ثبت و تحقق بهذه الوجوه - أن الإدراك مطلقا إنما يحتاج إلى صورة حاصلة و أما الاحتياج إلى صورة ذهنية - زائدة على ذات المدرك فإنما يكون حيث لا يكون وجود المدرك وجودا إدراكيا - نوريا كالأجسام المادية و عوارضها أو لا يكون المدرك بوجوده حاضرا عند

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٣

القوة الدراكة و عدم الحضور إما لعدم وجود المدرك أصلا أو لعدم وجود إدراكي له أو لعدم وجوده الإدراكي عند قوة دراية فإن كل واحد من الموجودات ليس حاصلا لكل أحد و لا كل واحدة من الصور العلمية حاصلة لكل من له صلاحية العالمية - و إلا لكان كل عالم عالما بكل شيء و ليس كذلك كما لا يخفى بل لا بد في تحقق العالمية و المعلوماتية بين الشئيين من علاقة ذاتية بينهما بحسب الوجود فيكون كل شئيين تحقق بينهما علاقة اتحادية و ارتباط وجودي أحدهما عالما بالآخر إلا لمانع من كون أحدهما ناقص الوجود أو مشوبا بالأعدام محتجبا بالغواشي الظلمانية -

فإن تلك العلاقة مستلزمة لحصول أحدهما للآخر و انكشافه عليه و هي قد تقع بين نفس ذات المعلوم بحسب وجوده العيني و ذات العالم كما في علم النفس بذاتها و صفاتها و قواها و الصور الثابتة في ألواح مشاعرها و قد تكون بين صورة حاصلة من المعلوم زائدة على ذاته و ذات العالم كما في علم النفس بما خرج عن ذاتها و ذات قواها و مشاعرها- و يقال له العلم الحسولي و العلم الحادث و المدرك بالحقيقة هاهنا أيضا هو نفس الصورة الحاضرة لا ما خرج عنها و إذا قيل للخارج إنه معلوم فذلك بقصد ثان- كما أن الموجود قد يطلق على نفس الوجود و قد يطلق على الماهية الموجودة و الموجود بالحقيقة هو القسم الأول و هو المتعين المتميز في الواقع دون الماهية لأنها في ذاتها أمر مبهم غير متعينة الذات فإذا أطلق عليها لفظ الموجود فإنما هو بقصد ثان من جهة ارتباطها بالوجود و قد أشرنا مرارا إلى أن العلم ضرب من الوجود بل عينه فوزان العلم وزان الوجود- فكلما وجد لنفسه فهو معلوم لنفسه و كلما وجد لشيء آخر فهو معلوم لذلك الآخر لكن الهيولى وجودها بالقوة فهي غير موجودة لذاتها فهي غير عالمة بذاتها و لا الصورة الجسمية و النوعية موجودة لذاتها فلا تكون معلومة لذاتها و لا الهيولى عالمة بها كما عرفت فإذا العلم بالشيء بالحقيقة هو حضور ذاته عند العالم و هو أتم قسمي العلم بالشيء لا بحصول صورة هي غير ذات الشيء المعلوم إذ لا علاقة بين العالم و بين الذات التي هي غير الصورة العلمية فمن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٤

ذهب إلى أن العلم بالغير منحصر في ارتسام صورة منه لا غير فقد أخطأ و أنكر أتم قسمي العلم نعم لو قيل إن العلم بالأنشاء التي ليس وجودها الخارجي وجودا إدراكيا- كالأجسام الطبيعية و حركاتها و أحوالها منحصر في حصول صورة أخرى مطابقة إياها- لكان حقا لكن أكثر الأقسام ذاهلون عما حققناه من أن لا حضور لهذه الماديات و الظلمات عند أحد و لا انكشاف لها عند مبادئها إلا بوسيلة أنوار علمية متصلة بها- هي بالحقيقة تمام ماهياتها الموجودة بها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٥

و منها أنه يجب أن يعلم أن المعقول بما هو معقول و هو المعقول بالحقيقة و الذات وجوده في نفسه
و وجوده لعاقله و معقوليته شيء واحد بلا اختلاف جهة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٦

و كذا المحسوس بما هو محسوس و هو المحسوس بالذات أعني الصورة الحسية المتمثلة عند الجوهر الحساس وجوده في نفسه و وجوده للحاس و محسوسيته شيء واحد بلا اختلاف جهة فما وجوده لغيره لم يكن معقولا لذاته و لا محسوسا لها كالصور الطبيعية و الجمادية و غيرها و كالبصر و السمع و سائر الحواس و لهذا لم تكن تحس بذواتها- فالبصر لا يحس البصر و لا السمع يدرك السمع بل النفس تدرك البصر و ما يبصر به و الأبصار جميعا و تدرك السمع و المسموع و السماع جميعا لأنها موجودة لا لذواتها.

فإذا ثبت هذا فنقول لو كانت الصورة المعقولة قائمة بذاتها لكانت موجودة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٧

لذاتها و صارت معقولة لذاتها فكانت عقلا و عاقلا و معقولا و كذا لو فرضنا الصورة المحسوسة أمرا مجردا قائما بذاته كان محسوسا لذاته و كان وجوده لذاته نفس محسوسيته لذاته فصار حسا و حاسا و محسوسا كما صرح به بعض توابع المشائين من أن الطعم لو فرض قائما بذاته لكان طعما لنفسه و بهذا التحقيق اندفع ما أورده شيخ أتباع المشرقين من أنه لو كان العلم هو عين الحصول لكان كل جماد عالما بذاته و بالأعراض القائمة به إذ ما من جماد إلا و قد حصل له ماهية و حصل له بعض الصفات و ذلك لما قد مر ذكره من أن الصور الجمادية و ما يجري مجراها لما كانت حاصلة للمواد لم يحصل ذواتها لها لأن القائم بغيره كانت إنيته له بعينها إنيته لمحلها فلو حصل له شيء صورة كان أو عرضا يكون حصوله في الحقيقة لمحل ذلك لا له فإن ما ليس له حصول لنفسه سواء كان له حصول في نفسه أو لا كيف يحصل له شيء.

و أيضا قد لاح لك منا أن هذه الأجسام الطبيعية و أحوالها وجودها مشوب بالأعدام و الحجب الظلمانية في أنفسها فضلا عما تحتف به من الغواشي الخارجية - فالمانع من المعلومية عندنا في الجماد و غيره لذواتها ليس مجرد كونها ذات محل و مادة أو كونها ذات ملابس و غواشي لاحقة لذاتها بل نحو وجودها في نفسها مانع عن تعلق العلم بها عقليا كان أو حسيا و قد أشرنا إلى ما في الوجه الثاني من الخلل و القصور.

وهم و تنبيه

و اعلم أن بعض الناس زعموا أن الحكماء استدلوا على كون كل مجرد عاقلا بالاستنتاج من موجبتين كليتين في الشكل الثاني حيث إنهم استنتجوا من قولهم كل صورة غير جسمية ذات مجردة عن المادة و كل صورة معقولة بالفعل من الشيء ذات مجردة عن المادة قولهم إن كل صورة غير جسمية معقولة بالفعل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٨

و الحال أن الموجبتين في الثاني لا تنتجان و ذلك وهم فاسد بل إنهم قالوا كل ما هو موجود مستقل الوجود مجرد عن المادة فصورة ذاته موجودة لذاته لا لغيره - فيكون معقولا لذاته و عاقلا لذاته أو قالوا إن كلما هو مجرد عن المواد إما أن يصح أن يعقل أو لا يصح و محال أن لا يصح أن يعقل إذ كل موجود يمكن أن يعقل بوجه - فصحة معقوليته إما بأن لا يتغير فيه شيء حتى يصير معقولا بالفعل أو بأن يتغير فيه شيء - كالحال في المعقولات بالقوة من الأجسام و غيرها التي تحتاج في معقوليتها إلى نزع و تجريد مجرد ينتزعها و يجردها عن المادة و عن غواشيتها حتى تصير معقولة بالفعل بعد ما كانت معقولة بالقوة لكن الشق الثاني لا يصح في المجرد بالفعل إذ كل ما له من الصفات و الأحوال بالإمكان العام فهو له بالوجوب إذ لا انفعال و لا تغير له فلا يسنح له شيء لم يكن فكلما يجوز له يجب له فلما جاز كون كل مجرد معقولا فوجب أن يكون معقولا بالفعل دائما فوجب أن يكون معقولا لذاته مع قطع النظر عن غيره - فهو عاقل لذاته فإن لم يكن عاقلا لذاته بالفعل لكان معقولا لذاته بالقوة و قد فرضناه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٦٩

معقولا بالفعل هذا خلف

وهاهنا شكوك يجب إزالتها.

الأول أن كون الشيء عالما بنفسه ينكشف له المعلومات

حال خارجي مغاير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٠

لنفس حقيقته من حيث هي فلا يكون العلم نفس حقيقة العالم وحدها من غير انضمام صفة زائدة وإلا لكانت ذاته من حيث هي هي مصداقا لصدق مفهوم العالم فإن كل شيء في نفسه هو هو و كل ماهية من حيث نفسها ليست هي إلا هي فلا بد في كون الشيء عالما بنفسه مثلا من أمر آخر غير نفس ذاته يكون بحسبه مصداقا لعالميته و معلوميته - فكيف يكون علم المجرد بذاته عين ذاته.

أقول هذه مغالطة منشؤها الخلط بين الوجود و الماهية فإن لفظ الذات قد يطلق و يراد به الهوية الشخصية و قد يطلق و يراد به الماهية النوعية و العلم في الجوهر القائم بذاته هو عين وجوده لا أنه لو فرض له ماهية كلية كان معنى تلك الماهية عين معنى العلم فذات المجرد بذاته و هويته مصداق لصفة العلم بلا انضمام شيء آخر إليها و قد علمت مرارا أن صدق المفهومات المتغايرة على شيء لا يستدعي تغاير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧١

جهات الصدق أصلا و لا يقدح كثرتها في وحدة الذات الموصوفة بها إلا أن يوجب تغاير الحيثيات.

الثاني اعترض صاحب المباحث المشرقية على الحكماء في حكمهم أن علم كل مجرد بذاته غير زائد على ذاته

بقوله إنه لو كان كذلك لكان كل من عقل مجردا - عقل كونه عاقلا لذاته و ليس كذلك إذ إثبات كون المجردات عاقلة لذواتها يحتاج إلى تجشم برهان مستأنف إذ بيان إثبات عاقليتها غير بيان إثبات وجودها ألا ترى أن من أثبت وجود الباري جل ذكره بنحو من البرهان لم يكتف به في إثبات علمه بل يلزمه إقامة الحجة الأخرى له. و الجواب بوجه عرشي بعد ما مر من أن عقل المجرد لذاته عين وجوده الخاص القائم بذاته لا بغيره فهذا النحو من الوجود لا يمكن أن يحصل لغيره مطلقا فضلا عن من يحاول البرهان على وجوده و الذي يحصل له عند إقامة البرهان صورة علمية - مطابقة لمعنى كونه موجودا فهاهنا قد حصلت ماهية موجودة لشيء آخر هو نفس ذلك المبرهن أو عقله فيكون في هذا النحو من الوجود حاصل له لا حاصل لذاته فيكون هذه الصورة معقولة له لا معقولة لذاتها لما ثبت أن كلما وجوده لغيره لم يكن حاصلًا إلا لذلك الغير - لا لذاته فذلك الغير عاقل له فقط لا هو عاقل لنفسه في هذا الوجود بل في وجود آخر له عند ما يقوم بنفسه فعلى هذا لا يلزم من كون وجود المجردات القائمة بأنفسها - عين معقوليتها لذواتها أن يكون وجودها القائم بغيرها عين معقوليتها لذاتها بل هو عين معقوليتها لذلك الغير فلم يلزم أن من عقل ذاتها عقلها عاقلة لذاتها اللهم إلا أن يعلم أحد ذاتها بالعلم الحضورى الإشراقي كما يقع لبعض السالكين من أصحاب المعارج عند فنائهم عن بشريتهم و عروجهم إلى السماوات العلى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٢

الثالث أن كثيرا من المنتسبين إلى العلم والفضل زعموا أنه عند كون الشيء عالما بذاته ومعلوما لذاته يلزم اختلاف الحثيتين

و أن موضوع العالمية غير موضوع المعلوماتية بالاعتبار و صاحب حواشي التجريد قايس ذلك على معالجة الشخص نفسه إذ لا شك أنه من حيث كونه معالجا غيره من حيث كونه مستعلجا فالمؤثر النفس من حيث ما لها من ملكة المعالجة و المتأثر هي من حيث ما لها من استعداد قبول العلاج و العجب أنه قايس بين اختلاف أمرين لا يوجب تكثر أصلا لا في الخارج و لا في الذهن و لا في الذات و لا في الاعتبار كالعالمية و المعلوماتية و بين اختلاف أمرين لا بد فيه من التكثر في الخارج و العين دون الذهن و الاعتبار فإن التأثير التجديدي و التأثر التجديدي و هما جنسان عالبيان لا يشتركان في ذاتي أعني مقولتي أن يفعل و أن يفعل فالقوة الانفعالية لا بد لها من مادة جسمانية فعند انفعال النفس بحصول حالة نفسانية جديدة لا بد لها من مادة بدنية حاملة لقوة الانفعال حتى ينتقل النفس بها من حالة إلى حالة أخرى حتى لو فرضنا النفس غير متعلقة ببدن مادي - لا يمكن لها عند ذلك استكمال بكمال مجدد و لا انفعال بصفة حادثة لها فبالحقيقة المعالج يعني المداوي المفيد للشفاء و الدواء هو قوة أجل و أرفع من النفس الطبيعية فضلا عن المريضة و المستعلاج يعني المريض الممنو بالآفة و النقص و هو الأمر المتعلق بما هو منبع الآفة و الشر و هو المادة أو ما يتصل بها من جهة اتصاله بها سواء كان صورة طبيعية أو نفسانية فالموضوع فيهما مختلف ذاتا و اعتبارا و أما موضوع العالمية و المعلوماتية فهو لا يستدعي اختلافا في الذات و لا في اعتبار الذهن كما صرح به الشيخ في كثير من كتبه

الرابع أن جمهور المتأخرين زعموا أن التضاييف مطلقا من أقسام التقابل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٣

و أن كل متضاييفين متقابلان لما سمعوا أن القوم ذكروا في بحث التقابل أن من أقسامه الأربعة تقابل التضاييف و لأجل ذلك حكموا بأن إضافة العالمية مغايرة أي مقابلة لإضافة المعلوماتية فإذا ورد عليهم الإشكال في كون الذات الواحدة عالمة و معلومة في علم الشيء بنفسه من أنه يلزم اجتماع المتقابلين تفصوا عنه بأن التغاير بين موضوع العالمية و المعلوماتية هناك أمر اعتباري و لم يتفطنوا بأن التغاير الاعتباري في الموضوع غير كاف في صحة اجتماع المتقابلين ثم لو ذهبوا إلى أن إضافة العالمية في البسيط أمر اعتباري ذهني لا تحصل له في الخارج و كذا المعلوماتية فذلك من أشنع الكلام و أقبح القول و هو مصادم للبرهان و لأجل هذه الشبهة الركيكة أنكر قوم من القدماء علمه تعالى بذاته فالذي تحسم به مادة هذه الشبهة أنه ليس وجود كل مفهومين متضاييفين مما يقتضي تغايرا بينهما بوجه من الوجوه فضلا عن التقابل - فإن مفهوم العالمية مثلا لا يقتضي أن يكون وجودها بعينها غير وجود المعلوماتية بوجه من الوجوه أصلا بل و لا شيء من المفهومات المتباينة الوجود أيضا بمجرد مقتضي ذلك إلا ببيان و برهان لجواز صدق مفهومات كثيرة على ذات أحدية فبعض المتضاييفات يحكم العقل بتقابلها كالعالية و المعلولية و التحريك و التحرك و المستعد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٤

و المستعد له و التقدم و التأخر لحصول التنافي بين طرفيها في الوجود لا في مجرد المفهوم كما أشرنا إليه و بعضها ليس

كذلك كالعالمية و المعلوماتية و ما يجري مجراهما كالمحب و المحبوب و العاشق و المعشوق و غير ذلك فالذي يكون من أقسام التقابل من المضاف هو ما يكون من الضرب الأول لا ما هو من الضرب الثاني.

فإذا تمهدت هذه المقدمات فلنشرع في تحقيق علمه بذاته و بما سواه و كيفية علمه بالأشياء المبدعة و الكائنة و مراتب علمه تعالى بها كالعناية و القضاء و القدر - و الكتاب في عدة فصول أخرى

الفصل (٢) في إثبات علمه بذاته

كانك بعد تذكر ما أسلفناه من الأصول لا تحتاج إلى مزيد بيان لهذا المطلب فنقول زيادة في التوضيح أن حقيقة العلم لما كان مرجعها إلى حقيقة الوجود بشرط سلب النقائص العدمية و عدم احتجاب الملابس الظلمانية و ثبت أن كل ذات مستقلة الوجود مجردة عما يلابسها فهي حاصلة لذاتها فتكون معقولة لذاتها و عقلها لذاتها هو وجود ذاتها لا غير و هذا الحصول أو الحضور لا يستدعي تغيرا بين الحاصل و المحصول له و الحاضر و الذي حضر عنده - لا في الخارج و لا في الذهن فكل ما هو أقوى وجودا و أشد تحصلا و أرفع ذاتا من النقائص و القصورات فيكون أتم عقلا و معقولا و أشد عاقلية لذاته فواجب الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٥

لما كان مبدأ سلسلة الوجودات المترتبة في الشدة و الضعف و الشرف و الخسة من العقليات و الحسيات و المبدعات و المكونات فيكون في أعلى مراتب شدة الوجود و تجرده و يكون غير متناه في كمال شدته و غيره من الموجودات و إن فرض كونها غير متناهية في القوة بحسب العدة و المدة لكنها ليست بحيث لا يمكن تحقق مرتبة أخرى في الشدة هي فوقها فواجب الوجود لكونه فوق ما لا يتناهي بما لا يتناهي كان وزان عاقليته لذاته على هذا الوزان فنسبة عاقليته في التأكد إلى عاقلية الذوات المجردة لذواتها كنسبة وجوده في التأكد إلى وجودها فعلم الموجود الحق بذاته أتم العلوم و أشدها نورية و جلاء و ظهورا بل لا نسبة لعلمه بذاته إلى علوم ما سواه بذواتها كما لا نسبة بين وجوده و وجودات الأشياء و كما أن وجودات الممكنات - منطقية مستهلكة في وجوده على ما مضى بيانه بالبرهان فكذلك علوم الممكنات - منطقية في علمه بذاته تعالى و قد علمت أيضا أن وجوده حقيقة الوجود التي لا يخرج عنها شيء من الوجودات فكذلك علمه بذاته حقيقة العلم التي لا يعزب عنها شيء من العلوم و المعلومات.

تذكرة

قد قرع سمعك فيما مضى في الفلسفة الأولى و العلم الكلي أن كلما حكم به العقل أنه كمال لموجود ما من حيث هو موجود و لا يوجب تخصصا بشيء أدنى و لا تغيرا و لا تجسما أو تركبا ثم تحقق في موجود من الموجودات كان ممكن التحقق في الموجود الحق بالإمكان العام فيجب وجوده له لا محالة و إلا لكان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٦

فيه تعالى جهة إمكانية مقابلة للوجوب الذاتي و قد مر أن واجب الوجود لذاته - واجب الوجود من جميع الحثيات و لا شك أن العلم صفة كمالية للموجود بما هو موجود و لا يقتضي تجسما و لا تغيرا و لا إمكانا خاصا و قد تحقق في كثير من الموجودات كالذوات العاقلة فيجب حصوله لذاته تعالى على سبيل الوجوب بالذات.

وأيضا كيف يسوغ عند ذي فطرة عقلية أن يكون واهب كمال ما و مفيضة قاصرا عن ذلك الكمال فيكون المستوهب أشرف من الواهب و المستفيد أكرم من المفيد- و حيث ثبت استناد جميع الممكنات إلى ذاته تعالى التي هي وجوب صرف و فعلية محضة و من جملة ما يستند إليه هي الذوات العالمة و الصور العلمية و المفيض لكل شيء أوفى بكل كمال غير مكثرا لثلا يقصر معطي الكمال عنه فكان الواجب عالما- و علمه غير زائد على ذاته كما مر

الفصل (٣) في علمه تعالى بما سواه

قد مضى في العلم الكلي أن العلم التام بالعلة التامة أو بجهة كونها علة يقتضي العلم التام بمعلولها وإياك أن تفهم من قولنا جهة العلية أو حيثية كون الشيء علة نفس المعنى الإضافي من العلية المتأخر حصوله عن العلة و المعلوم جميعا- بل الأمر المتقدم على المعلوم الذي به كانت العلة علة و به حصل وجود المعلوم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٧

و لا شك أن قوام كل معلول بأمر مقوم له محصل إياه بذاته بلا توقف على غيره و إلا لكان هو مع ذلك الغير مقتضيا للمعلول و الكلام فيما يتوقف عليه وجود المعلوم بالاستقلال فلا بد في كل علة مستقلة لمعلول أن يكون المعلوم من لوازمها فكل معلول من لوازم ذات علته المقتضية إياه فكلما حصلت تلك العلة بخصوصها سواء كان حصولها في ذهن أو خارج حصل ذلك المعلوم بخصوصه لما ظهر أنه من لوازم ذاتها و ليس كذلك حال العكس فإن المعلوم لا يقتضي العلة بخصوصها و إلا لكانت العلة معلولة لمعلولها بل إنما يقتضي بإمكانه و افتقاره علة ما فإينما تحققت علة ما بخصوصها تحقق المعلوم بخصوصه و أينما تحقق المعلوم تحققت علة ما لا بخصوصها فحصول العلة برهان قاطع على وجود المعلوم بخصوصه و حصول المعلوم برهان قاطع على وجود علة ما و هو دليل ظني على وجود العلة بخصوصها و إنما عد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٨

الاستدلال من المعلوم على العلة قسما من البرهان و هو المسمى بالإنفي بالاعتبار الأول لا بالاعتبار الثاني فثبت و تحقق أن العلم بالعلة التامة أو بجهتها المقتضية يوجب العلم بالمعلوم بل ثبت أن العلم بذوي السبب لا يحصل إلا من جهة العلم بسببه.

فإذا تمهد هذا الأصل الكلي فنقول لما ثبت كون الواجب تعالى عالما بذاته و لا شك أن ذاته علة مقتضية لما سواه على ترتيب و نظام فإنه مقتضى بذاته للصادر الأول و بتوسطه للثاني و بتوسطهما للثالث و هكذا إلى آخر الموجودات فيلزم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٧٩

كونه تعالى عالما بجميع الأشياء على النظام الأتم فكان علمه بجميع ما عداه لازما لعلمه بذاته كما أن وجود ما عداه تابع لوجود ذاته و أما كيفية هذا العلم بالأشياء- على وجه لا يلزم منه تكثر في ذاته و لا في صفاته الحقيقية و لا كونه فاعلا و قابلا و لا أيضا يلزم منه الإيجاب من جهة هذا العلم بالأشياء هل هو قبل الأشياء أو بعد الأشياء أو مع الأشياء بأن لا يعلم الأشياء إلا حين وجودها فيكون للأشياء فيه تأثير و يكون بسبب الأشياء بحال لم يكن من قبل على ذلك الحال فلا

يكون واجب الوجود بالذات - واجب الوجود من جميع الجهات فاعلم أن الاهتداء بها من أعلى طبقات الكمال الإنساني و الفوز بمعرفتها يجعل الإنسان مضاهيا للمقدس بل من حزب الملائكة المقربين و لصعوبة دركها و غموضه زلت أقدام كثير من العلماء حتى الشيخ الرئيس و من تبعه في إثبات علم زائد على ذات الواجب و ذوات الممكنات و حتى شيخ أتباع الرواقيين و من تبعه في نفي العلم السابق على الإيجاد فإذا كان حال هذين الرجلين مع فرط ذكائهما و شدة براعتهما و كثرة خوضهما في هذا الفن هذا الحال فكيف حال من دون هؤلاء من أهل الأهواء و البدع و أصحاب الجدل في الكلام و البحث مع الخصام.

و لأجل ما ذكرناه من الصعوبة و الإشكال أنكر بعض الأقدمين من الفلاسفة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٠

علمه تعالى بشيء من الموجودات غير ذاته و صفاته التي هي عين ذاته كما أن منهم من نفى علمه بشيء أصلا بناء على أن العلم عندهم إضافة بين العالم و المعلوم و لا إضافة بين الشيء و نفسه أو صورة زائدة على ذات المعلوم مساوية له فيلزم تعدد الواجب و إذا لم يعلم ذاته لم يعلم غيره إذ علم الشيء بغيره بعد علمه بذاته فقد ضلوا ضلالا بعيدا و خسروا خسارانا مبينا فما أشنع و أقبح أن يدعي مخلوق لنفسه الإحاطة العلمية بجلال الملك و دقائق الملكوت و يسمى نفسه فيلسوفا حكيما ثم يرجع و يسلب العلم بشيء من الأشياء من خالقه الحكيم العليم الذي أفاض ذوات العلماء و نور قلوبهم بمعرفة الأشياء اللهم إلا أن يكون لكلام أولئك الفلاسفة الأقدمين معنى آخر قصدوه غير المدلول الظاهر أو كان المراد المصطلح من لفظ العلم عندهم شيئا آخر بأن قصدوا من لفظ العلم حيث نفوا عنه تعالى العلم الانفعالي و الصورة الذهنية المنقسمة - إلى التصور و التصديق عند الناس أو ما يجري مجراها و الله أعلم بأسرار عباد

الفصل (٤) في تفصيل مذاهب الناس في علمه تعالى بالأشياء

أحدها مذهب توابع المشائين

منهم الشيخان أبو نصر و أبو علي و بهمنيار و أبو العباس اللوكري و كثير من المتأخرين و هو القول بارتسام صور الممكنات في ذاته تعالى و حصولها فيه حصولا ذهنيا على الوجه الكلي.

الثاني القول بكون وجود صور الأشياء في الخارج

سواء كانت مجردات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨١

أو ماديات مركبات أو بسائط مناطا لعالميته تعالى بها و هو مذهب شيخ أتباع الرواقية شهاب الدين المقتول و من يحذو حذوه كالمحقق الطوسي و ابن كمونة - و العلامة الشيرازي و محمد الشهرزوري صاحب كتاب الشجرة الإلهية.

الثالث القول باتحاده تعالى مع الصور المعقولة

و هو المنسوب إلى فرفوريوس مقدم المشائين من أعظم تلامذة المعلم الأول.

الرابع ما ذهب إليه أفلاطن الإلهي من إثبات الصور المفارقة و المثل العقلية

و أنها علوم إلهية بها يعلم الله الموجودات كلها.

الخامس مذهب القائلين بثبوت المعدومات الممكنة قبل وجودها وهم المعتزلة

فعلم الباري تعالى عندهم بثبوت هذه الممكنات في الأزل و يقرب من هذا ما ذهب إليه الصوفية لأنهم قائلون بثبوت الأشياء قبل وجودها ثبوتاً علمياً لا عينياً كما قالته المعتزلة.

السادس مذهب القائلين بأن ذاته تعالى علم إجمالي بجميع الممكنات

فإذا علم ذاته علم بعلم واحد كل الأشياء و هو قول أكثر المتأخرين قالوا للواجب علماً بالأشياء علم إجمالي مقدم عليها و علم تفصيلي مقارن لها.

السابع القول بأن ذاته علم تفصيلي بالمعلول الأول

و إجمالي بما سواه و ذات المعلول الأول علم تفصيلي بالمعلول الثاني و إجمالي بما سواه و هكذا إلى أواخر الموجودات فهذا تفصيل المذاهب المشهورة بين الناس و ربما قيل في وجه الضبط - إن من أثبت علمه تعالى بالموجودات فهو إما أن يقول إنه منفصل عن ذاته أو لا - و القائل بانفصاله إما أن يقول بثبوت المعدومات سواء نسبها إلى الخارج كالمعتزلة - أو إلى الذهن كبعض مشايخ الصوفية مثل الشيخ العارف المحقق محيي الدين العربي - و الشيخ الكامل صدر الدين القونوي كما يستفاد من كتبهما المشهورة أم لا - و على الثاني إما أن يقول بأن علمه تعالى بالأشياء الخارجية صور قائمة بذواتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٢

منفصلة عنه و عن الأشياء و هي المثل الأفلاطونية و الصور المفارقة أو يقول بأن علمه بالأشياء الخارجية نفس تلك الأشياء فهي علوم باعتبار و معلومات باعتبار آخر - لأنها من حيث حضورها جميعاً عند الباري و وجودها له و ارتباطها إليه علوم و من حيث وجوداتها في أنفسها و لمادتها المتجددة المتعاقبة الغائبة بعضها عن بعض المتقدمة بعضها على بعض بحسب الزمان و المكان معلومات فلا تغير في علمه تعالى بل في معلوماته و هذا ما اختاره شيخ الإشراق و متابعوه و القائل بعدم انفصاله إما أن يقول إنه غير ذاته و هو مذهب الشيخين الفارابي و أبي علي أو يقول إنه عين ذاته فحينئذ إما أن يقول إن ذاته متحدة بالصورة العقلية كفرفوروريوس و أتباعه من المشائين أو يقول إن ذاته بذاته علم إجمالي بجميع ما عداه أو بما سوى المعلول الأول على الوجه الذي أشرنا إليه فهذه ثمانية احتمالات ذهب إلى كل منها ذاهب - فنحن نتكلم في كل منها جرحاً و تعديلاً و نقضاً و إبراماً و نصلح ما أفسدوه بقدر الإمكان - ثم أعين ما هو أقرب إلى الصواب بل الحق الوارد من عند الله العزيز الوهاب

الفصل (٥) في الإشارة إلى بطلان مذهب الاعتزال و مذهب ينسب إلى أهل التصوف

و أما مذهب المعتزلة

القائلين بأن المعدوم شيء و أن المعدومات في حال عدمها منفكة عن الوجود متميزة بعضها عن بعض و أنه مناط علم الله تعالى بالحوادث في الأزل فهو عند العقلاء من سخييف القول و باطل الرأي و الكتب الكلامية و الحكمية متكفلة بإبطال شيئية المعدوم و ما يجري مجراه من هوساتهم

و أما ما نقل عن هؤلاء الأعلام من الصوفية

فيرد على ظاهره ما يرد على مذهب المعتزلة فإن ثبوت المعدوم مجرداً عن الوجود أمر واضح الفساد سواء نسب إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٣

الأذهان و سواء كان معدوما مطلقا أو صار موجودا بعد عدم ما في وقت من الأوقات و التفرقة تحكم محض لكن لحسن ظننا بهذه الأكابر لما نظرنا في كتبهم و وجدنا منهم تحقيقات شريفة و مكاشفات لطيفة و علوما غامضة مطابقة لما أفاضه الله على قلوبنا و ألهمنا به مما لا نشك فيه و نشك في وجود الشمس في رابعة النهار حملنا ما قالوه و وجهنا ما ذكروه حملا صحيحا و وجهها وجيها في غاية الشرف و الأحكام كما سنشير إليه إن شاء الله تعالى مع أن ظواهر أقوالهم بحسب النظر الجليل ليست في السخافة و البطلان و نبو العقل عنها بأقل من كلام المعتزلة فيهما.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٤

و من جملة ما ذكره صاحب كتاب الفتوحات المكية في الباب السابع و الخمسين و ثلاثمائة منه و هو قوله إن أعيان الممكنات في حال عدمها رائية مرئية - و سامعة مسموعة بروية ثبوتية و سمع ثبوتي فعين الحق سبحانه ما شاء من تلك الأعيان فوجه عليه دون غيره من أمثال قوله المعبر عنه في اللسان العربي المترجم بكن فأسمعه أمره فبادر المأمور فيكون عن كلمته بل كان عين كلمته و لم يزل الممكنات في حال عدمها الأزلي لها تعرف الواجب الوجود لذاته و تسبحه و تمجده بتسبيح أزلي و تمجيد قديم ذاتي و لا عين لها موجود انتهى و قال في الفصوص إن العلم تابع للمعلوم فمن كان مؤمنا في ثبوت عينه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٥

و حال عدمه ظهر بتلك الصورة في حال وجوده و قد علم الله ذلك منه أنه هكذا يكون - فلذلك قال **وَهُوَ أَعْلَمُ بِالْمُهْتَدِينَ*** فلما قال هذا قال أيضا **مَا يُبَدِّلُ الْقَوْلُ لَدَيَّ** لأن قولي على حد علمي في خلقي **وَمَا أَنَا بِظَلَامٍ لِلْعَبِيدِ** أي ما قدرت عليهم الكفر الذي يشقيهم ثم طلبتهم بما ليس في وسعهم أن يأتوا به بل ما علمناهم إلا بحسب ما علمناهم و ما علمناهم إلا بما أعطونا من نفوسهم مما هم عليه - فإن كان ظلما فهم الظالمون و لذلك قال **وَمَا ظَلَمْنَاهُمْ وَلَكِنْ كَانُوا أَنْفُسَهُمْ يَظْلِمُونَ** فما ظلمهم الله كذلك ما قلنا لهم إلا ما أعطته ذاتنا أن نقول لهم و ذاتنا معلومة لنا بما هي عليه من أن تقول كذا و لا نقول كذا فما قلنا إلا ما علمنا أن نقول قلنا القول منا و لهم الامتثال و عدم الامتثال مع السماع منهم انتهى.

و قال في موضع آخر فليس للحق إلا إفاضة الوجود على حسب مقتضى الأعيان.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٦

أقول هذه الكلمات و أشباهها دالة بحسب المفهوم الظاهر على ثبوت الماهيات - عندهم منفكة عن الوجود في الأعيان فلا فرق بين مذهبيهم و مذهب المعتزلة فرقا يعتد به كما مر فإن البرهان ناهض على استحالة تقدم الماهية على الوجود تقدما و لو بحسب الذات فضلا عن التقدم بحسب العين سواء سمي تقدمها مجردا عن الوجود ثبوتا علميا - أو ثبوتا

خارجيا لكن يجب أن يعلم أن الأشياء الكثيرة قد تكون موجودة بوجود واحد على وجه بسيط وقد توجد بوجودات متعددة متكررة حسب تكررها بحسب المفهوم المحصل النوعي وإذا قيل كذا موجود في الخارج أو في الذهن أريد به الوجود التفصيلي لأنه الوجود الذي يخصه تلك الماهية ولا يتحد معها فيه غيرها فإذا قيل وجود الفرس أريد به الوجود الذي يكون الفرس به بالفعل فرسا متميزا عن الإنسان والفيل والبقر وغيرها فأما الوجود البسيط الإجمالي الذي فرض أنه يصدق عليه مفهومات هذه الأنواع كلها متحدة بعضها مع بعض في ذلك الوجود مع تغيرها في المفهوم فذلك الوجود غير منسوب إلى شيء من تلك المعاني والحقائق - بأنه وجود له إذا العرف جار بأنه إذا قيل وجود كذا يفهم منه وجوده المفصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٧

الذي لا يشاركه فيه غيره دون الوجود البسيط العقلي الذي يجتمع فيه مع ذلك الشيء أشياء كثيرة. فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول إن الذي أقيم البرهان على استحالة هو ثبوت الماهية مجردة عن الوجود أصلا سواء كان وجودا تفصيليا أو وجودا إجماليا وأما ثبوتها قبل هذا الوجود الخاص الذي به تصوير أمرا متحصلا بالفعل متميزا عن ما سواها فلا استحالة فيه بل الفحص البالغ والكشف الصحيح يوجبانه كما ستعلم فهؤلاء العرفاء إذا قالوا إن الأعيان الثابتة في حال عدميتها اقتضت كذا أو حكمها كذا فأرادوا بعدمها - العدم المضاف إلى وجودها الخاص المنفصل في الخارج عن وجود آخر لغيرها لا العدم المطلق لأن وجود الحق تعالى ينسحبها كلها لأن تلك الأعيان من لوازم أسماء الله تعالى ولا شك أن أسماءه تعالى وصفاته كلها مع كثرتها و عدم إحصائها - موجودة بوجود واحد بسيط فلم يكن هي بالحقيقة معدومات مطلقة قبل وجوداتها العينية بل المسلوب عنها في الأزل هذا النحو الحادث من الوجود وبهذا يحصل فرق تام و بون بعيد بين مسلك التصوف و مسلك الاعتزال و قد أسلفنا لك في مباحث تقاسيمهم صفات الله و أسماءه أنموذجا من هذا الباب و تلميحا إلى معرفة عالم الأسماء - و أن ذلك العالم عظيم جدا و سينكشف لك أن هذا المنهج قريب المنهج من مذهب من رأى من الأقدمين أن علم الباري بالأشياء قبل وجودها عبارة عن عقل بسيط أزلي و مع بساطته و أزليته و وجوبه الذاتي هو كل الأشياء على وجه أعلى و أرفع و أشرف و أقدر إذ كما أن للأشياء وجودا طبيعيا في هذا العالم و وجودا مثاليا إدراكيا جزئيا في عالم آخر و وجودا عقليا كليا في عالم فوق الكونين فذلك لها وجود أسمائي إلهي في صقع ربوبي يقال له في عرف المصوفية عالم الأسماء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٨

الفصل (٦) في حال ما ذهب إليه الأفلاطونيون القائلون بالمثل العقلية و الصور الإلهية و حال ما ينسب إلى فروريوس و أتباعه من اتحاد العاقل و المعقول

أما مذهب القائلين بالمثل فهو و إن كان مذهبا منصورا عندنا حيث ذبنا عنه و برهنا عليه و أحكمنا برهانه و شيدنا أركانه و رفعنا بنيانه كما سبق القول فيه في العلم الكلي المذكور في السفر الأول من هذا الكتاب لكن في جعل تلك الصور - مناطا للعلم الأزلي الكمالي الإلهي السابق على كل ما سواه موضع بحث و محل قدح - لأن علمه تعالى قديم واجب بالذات و هذه الصور متأخرة الوجود عنه تعالى - و عن علمه بذواتها فكيف يكون هي بعينها علمه بالأشياء في أزل

الأزال.

وأيضا هذه الصور المفارقة لكونها موجودات عينية لا ذهنية ننقل الكلام إلى كيفية علمه بها قبل الصدور فيلزم إما التسلسل أو القول بأن الواجب تعالى - لا يعلم كثيرا من الأشياء قبل تلك الأشياء بل استفاد علمه بها منها وإنه لو لا تلك الأشياء لم يكن هو عالما بحال و الأصول الماضية الحقبة المتكررة تبطل هذا و أمثاله و أما المنسوب إلى فرفوريوس فقد بالغ الشيخ الرئيس و من تأخر عنه إلى يومنا هذا في الرد عليه و تزييفه و تسفيه عقل قائله كما يظهر لمن تصفح كتب الشيخ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٨٩

كالشفاء و النجاة و الإشارات و كتب الشيخ الإشراقي كالمطارحات و حكمة الإشراق و التلويحات و كذلك كتب غيرهما ككتاب بهمنيار المسمى بالتحصيل - و كتب المحقق الطوسي و الإمام الرازي و غير هؤلاء من اللاحقين و قد تكلمنا في هذا المقام في مباحث اتحاد العقل و المعقول من الفن الكلي بما لا مزيد عليه - و من أراد الاطلاع على كيفية هذا المذهب و حقيقته و دقته و لطافته فليراجع إلى ما هناك - حتى يظهر له علو مرتبة قائله في الحكمة و رسوخه في العلم و صفاء ضميره بشرط أن يكون ممن له قوة خوض في العلوم و شدة غور في التفكير و ذلك فضل الله يؤتيه من يشاء

الفصل (٧) في حال القول بارتسام صور الأشياء في ذاته تعالى

فتقريره على ما يستفاد من كلام الشيخ في أكثر كتبه هو أن الصور المعقولة قد تستفاد عن الصور الموجودة في الخارج كما تستفاد من السماء و هيئتها و أشكالها الخارجية بالحس و الرصد صورتها العقلية و قد لا يكون الصورة المعقولة مأخوذة عن المحسوسة - بل ربما يكون الأمر بالعكس كصورة بيت أنشأها البناء أولا في ذهنه بقوة خيالية - ثم تصوير تلك الصورة محرركة لأعضائه إلى أن يوجد لها في الخارج فليست تلك الصورة وجودها العلمي مأخوذا من وجودها الخارجي بل وجودها الخارجي تابع لوجودها العلمي و قد مر في مباحث الكيفيات النفسانية من الفلسفة الأولى أن جنس العلم الذي من جملة أقسامها و أجناسها منقسم إلى فعلي و انفعالي و الفعلي منه ما يكون سببا لوجود المعلوم في الخارج و الانفعالي بعكس ذلك سواء كانت السببية سببية تامة استقلالية أو لا - فعلم صانع البيت بالبيت الذي يريد بناءه من قبيل القسم الأول لكنه ليس سببا موجبا تاما بل يفتقر في ذلك إلى قابل و آلة و وضع خاص و زمان خاص و شرائط أخرى.

فنقول نسبة جميع الأمور في هذا العالم إليه تعالى نسبة صنع الصانع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٠

المختار إلى نفسه الصانعة و نسبة تصنيف الكتاب الحكمي إلى نفس مصنفه العليم الحكيم لو كانت تامة الفاعلية بأن يكون مجرد تصويره كافيا لحصول صنعه أو تصنيفه في الخارج فصدور الأشياء عن الباري جل اسمه في الخارج بأنها عقلت أولا فصدرت و تعقله تعالى إياها ليست بأنها وجدت أولا فعقلت لأن صدورها عن عقله لا عقله من صدورها فقياس عقل واجب الوجود للأشياء قياس أفكارنا التي نستنبطها أولا ثم نوجدتها من جهة أن المعقول منها سبب للموجود في الجملة مع وجوه من الفرق كثيرة فإننا لكوننا ناقصين في الفاعلية نحتاج في أفاعيلنا الاختيارية إلى انبعاث

شوق حاصل بعد تصور الفعل و تخيله و إلى استخدام قوة محرّكة و استعمال آلة تحريكية طبيعية - كالعضلات و الرباطات و الأيدي و الأرجل و خارجية غير طبيعية كالنفّاس و المنحت و القلم و المداد و انقياد مادة صالحة لقبول تلك الصورة و الأول تعالى لكونه تام الإيجاد و الفاعلية كما أنه تام الوجود و التحصل إنما أمره إذا أراد شيئاً أن يقول له كن فيكون فقله و كلامه الذي هو تابع لإراداته الذاتية هو تعقله للأشياء - فكينونية الأشياء في الخارج تابعة لمعقولها الذي هو عبارة عن قوله و تلك الصور العقلية هي كلمات الله التامات التي لا تنفذ فالكتاب الإلهي المنور نبه على هذا المقصود بأبلغ وجه و أحسنه حيث رتب وجود الأكوان الخارجية على قول الله و كلامه العقلي المطابق لها - المترتب على إرادته الأزلية الذاتية و سنحقق معنى الكلام و الكتاب فيما بعد بوجه مشرقى إن شاء الله.

و ربما يستدل على كون علمه تعالى بالأشياء بالصور الحاصلة في ذاته

بأنه يعلم ذاته و ذاته سبب للأشياء و العلم بالسبب التام للشيء يوجب العلم بذلك الشيء فذاته يعلم جميع الأشياء في الأزل لكن الأشياء كلها غير موجودة في الأزل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩١

بوجود أصيل فلو لم يكن أيضاً موجودة بوجود علمي غير أصيل لم يتحقق العلم بها إذ العلم يستدعي تعلقاً بين العالم و المعلوم سواء كان نفس التعلق و الإضافة أو صورة موجبة لها و التعلق بين ذات العالم أو صفته و بين المعلوم الصرف ممتنع - لاستيجاب النسبة تحقق الطرفين معا بوجه من الوجوه و لما امتنع تحقق العالم بأجزائه في الأزل و إلا لزم قدم الحوادث فبقي كونها موجودة بالوجود العقلي الصوري عند الباري قبل وجودها الخارجي فذلك إما بأن تكون منفصلة عن الواجب تعالى - فيلزم المثل الأفلاطونية و إما بأن يكون أجزاء لذاته فيلزم التركيب في ذاته و كلا الشقين محالان أو بأن تكون زائدة على ذاته لكنها متصلة بها مرتسمة فيها و هو المطلوب.

و أورد عليه أنه منقوض بالقدرة الإلهية الأزلية لأنها أيضاً صفة ذات تعلق بالمقدورات و لا شك أن قدرة الله تعالى شاملة لجميع الأشياء مبدعها و كائنها - إذ الكل صادرة عنه إما بوسط أو بغير وسط فلا بد أن يكون للمكونات وجود في الأزل بأعيانها لا بصورها العلمية لأن ذواتها العينية مقدورة له لا صورها العقلية فقط لكن وجود الحوادث في الأزل محال فظهر النقض لجريان الدليل و تخلف المدلول.

و أجاب بعض الأركياء عن هذا النقض بأن مثل هذه النسبة لا يقتضي وجود الطرفين تحقيقاً بل يكفي فيها الوجود التقديري إذ النسبة نفسها تقديرية الوجود - ثم لما استشعر انهدام أصل الاستدلال بما ذكره قال فالوجه أن يقال إن النسبة و إن لم تقتض تحقق الطرفين بالفعل لكن تحقق العلم يقتضيه لأن العلم يستلزم انكشاف المعلوم عند

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٢

المعلوم و تميزه و المعلوم الصرف لا انكشاف له و لا تميز أقول أما أصل الاستدلال فسنرجع إليه و أما النقض بالقدرة فيمكن دفعه بأن القدرة و إن سلم جريان الدليل فيها و إن حكمها حكم العلم في اقتضاء الطرفين لكن لا نسلم تخلف الحكم في القدرة الأزلية إذ كما في العلم لا يلزم وجود المعلوم بعينه الخارجي بل يكفي وجوده بصورته كذلك لا يلزم وجود المقدور بعينه الخارجي بل يكفي وجوده بصورته و ذلك الوجود الصوري كما أنه معلوم له كذلك مقدور صادر

عنه كما صرح به الشيخ وغيره من القائلين بارتسام صور الأشياء في ذاته بأن تلك الصور كما أنها حاصلة فيه تعالى كذلك صادرة عنه و أما الجواب الذي ذكره ذلك المجيب ففي غاية الركاقة من وجوه أولها حكمه بأن النسب و الإضافات لا وجود لها إلا بمجرد الفرض و التقدير - و ليس كذلك كما علمت في مباحث مقوله الإضافة من أن لها حظا من الوجود الخارجي - و إن لم يفرضه فافرض و ثانيها أنها و إن لم يكن من الموجودات العينية لكنها من الانتزاعات التي تستدعي وجود الطرفين و ثالثها حكمه بالفرق بين العلم الأزلي و القدرة الأزلية بكون أحدهما يستدعي التعلق دون الآخر تحكم بحث لما سبق من أن صفاته الحقيقية كلها حقيقة واحدة و لها وجود واحد و لا يجوز قياس قدرته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٣

تعالى على قدرة الإنسان فإن القدرة فينا عين القوة و الاستعداد للفاعلية و فيه تعالى نفس الإيجاب و التحصيل فوزان علمه و قدرته في تعلقهما بالممكنات واحد - من غير تفاوت.

تنبيه وإشارة

إن خلاصة ما ذكره الشيخ في إلهيات الشفاء أن الواجب تعالى يعقل الأشياء و لا يجوز عليه أن يعقل الأشياء من الأشياء و إلا فذاته إما متقومة بما يعقل من الأشياء فيلزم التركيب في ذاته و هو محال و إما عارضة لها أن يعقل الأشياء فلا يكون واجب الوجود من كل جهة و هو أيضا محال و يكون لو لا أمور من خارج لم يكن هو بحال و يكون له حال لا يلزم عن ذاته بل عن غيره فيكون لغيره فيه تأثير و الأصول السالفة تبطل هذا و ما أشبهه إذ قد سبق أن كل ما يعرض له أمر من خارج فلا بد فيه من قوة انفعالية فيلزم فيه التركيب الخارجي من شيئين شيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٤

هو به موجود بالفعل و شيء هو به بالقوة و كلما هو كذلك لم يكن واجب الوجود بالذات لأنه بسيط الحقيقة من كل جهة.

و أيضا كل ما يعرض له شيء لا من ذاته بل من غيره و يكون فيه معنى ما بالقوة فهو لا محالة جسم أو جسماني و الواجب ليس كذلك فبطل من هذه الأصول كون عاقلته مستفادة من غيره أو حاصلة بعد ما لم يكن و من وجه آخر لا يجوز أن يكون عاقلا لهذه المتغيرات مع تغيرها من حيث تغيرها عقلا زمانيا مشخصا فيكون لكل واحدة منها صورة أخرى على حدة و لا شك أنها متضادة متفاسدة غير باقية بعضها مع بعض فيكون ذات الباري محلا للمتغيرات و المتضادات فيكون إله العالم مادة جسمانية تعالى عما يقول الظالمون علوا كبيرا.

و أيضا من وجه آخر هذه الفاسدات إذا أدركت بصورها الكونية أو بما يطابقها من جهة شخصيتها و جزئيتها و تغيرها و تكثرها لم يكن إدراكها على هذا الوجه تعقلا بل إحساسا أو تخيلا فتكون القوة المدركة لها قوة حساسة أو قوة خيالية إذ قد ثبت في موضعه أن المدرك في درجة الوجود كالمدر ك فالصور المحسوسة و المتخيلة لكونها شخصية متجزية لا بد أن تدرك بالة جسمانية متجزية فلا بد أن يدرك الواجب تعالى هذه الأشياء على نحو آخر غير الإحساس و التخيل و نحوهما كالعقل المتغير و كما أن إثبات كثير من الأفاعيل له تعالى بلا وسط نقص كذلك إثبات كثير من التعقلات بل الواجب الوجود يعقل كل شيء على نحو كلي و مع ذلك فلا يعزب عنه شيء شخصي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٥

فلا يعزب عنه مثقال ذرة في السماوات ولا في الأرض وهذا من العجائب التي يحتاج تصورها إلى لطف قريحة. **وأما** كيفية ذلك فلأنه إذا عقل ذاته وعقل أنه مبدأ كل موجود عقل أوائل الموجودات عنه وما يتولد عنها ولا شيء من الأشياء يوجد إلا وقد صار من جهة ما يكون واجبا بسببه وقد بينا هذا فيكون هذه الأسباب تتأدى بمصادماتها إلى أن يوجد عنها الأمور الجزئية فالأول تعالى يعلم الأسباب ومطابقتها ويعلم ضرورة ما تتأدى إليها وما بينها من الأزمنة وما لها من العودات لأنه ليس يمكن أن يعلم تلك ولا يعلم هذه فيكون مدركا للأمور الجزئية من حيث هي كلية وقال أيضا ولا يظن أنه لو كانت للمعقولات عنده صور وكثرة كانت كثرة الصور التي يعقلها أجزاء لذاته كيف وهي تكون بعد ذاته لأن عقله لذاته ذاته ومنه يعقل ما بعده فعقله ما بعد ذاته معلول عقله لذاته على أن المعقولات والصور التي له بعد ذاته إنما هي معقولة على نحو المعقولات العقلية لا النفسانية وإنما له إليها إضافة المبدأ الذي يكون عنه لا فيه بل إضافات على الترتيب بعضها قبل بعض وإن كانت معا لا تتقدم ولا تتأخر في الزمان فلا يكون هناك انتقال في المعقولات قال فيكون العالم الربوبي محيطا بالوجود الحاصل والممكن وتكون لذاته إضافة إليها من حيث هي معقولة لا من حيث لها وجود في الأعيان فبقي لك النظر في حال وجودها معقولة أنها تكون موجودة في ذات الأول كاللوازم التي تلحقه ويكون لها وجود مفارق لذاته وذوات غيره كصور مفارقة على ترتيب موضوعه في صقع الربوبية أو من حيث هي موجودة في عقل أو نفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٦

إذا عقل الأول هذه الصور ارتسمت في أيها كانت فيكون ذلك العقل أو النفس كالموضوعة - لتلك الصور المعقولة وتكون معقولة له على أنها فيه ومعقولة للأول على أنها عنه ويعقل الأول تعالى من ذاته أنه مبدأ لها فيكون من جملة تلك المعقولات ما المعقول منه أن المبدأ الأول مبدأ له بلا واسطة بل يفيض عنه وجوده أولا وما المعقول منه أنه مبدأ له بتوسط فهو يفيض عنه ثانيا وكذلك يكون الحال في وجود تلك المعقولات وإن كان ارتسامها في شيء واحد لكن بعضها قبل وبعضها بعد على الترتيب السببي والمسببي وإذا كانت تلك الأشياء المرترسة في ذلك الشيء من معلولات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٧

الأول فيدخل في جملة ما الأول يعقل ذاته مبدأ له فيكون صدورها عنه ليس على ما قلناه من أنه إذا عقل خيرا وجد لأنها نفس عقله للخير أو يتسلسل الأمر - لأنه يحتاج إلى أن يعقل أنها عقلت وكذلك إلى ما لا نهاية له وذلك محال فهي نفس عقله للخير فإذا قلنا لما عقلها وجدت ولم يكن معها عقل آخر ولم يكن وجودها إلا أنها تعقلات فإنما يكون كأننا قلنا لأنه عقلها عقلها أو لأنها وجدت عنه وجدت عنه فإن جعلت هذه المعقولات أجزاء ذاته عرض تكثر وإن جعلتها لواحق ذاته عرض لذاته أن لا يكون من جهتها واجب الوجود لملاصقته ممكن الوجود وإن جعلتها أمورا مفارقة لكل ذات عرضت الصور الأفلاطونية وإن جعلتها موجودة في عقل ما عرض أيضا ما ذكرناه قبل هذا من المحال فينبغي لك

أن تجتهد جهداً في التخلص من هذه الشبهة و تحفظ أن لا تتكرر ذاته و لا تبالي بأن يكون ذاته مأخوذة مع إضافة ما ممكنة الوجود فإنها من حيث هي علة لوجود زيد ليست بواجبة الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٨

بل من حيث ذاتها و تعلم أن العالم الربوبي عظيم جدا و تعلم أنه فرق بين أن تفيض عن الشيء صورة من شأنها أن تعقل و أن تفيض عن الشيء صورة معقولة من حيث هي معقولة بلا زيادة و هو يعقل ذاته مبدأً لفيضان كل معقول من حيث هو معقول معلول - كما هو مبدأً لفيضان كل موجود من حيث هو موجود معلول ثم تجتهد في تأمل الأصول المعطاة و المستقبلية ليتضح لك ما ينبغي أن يتضح انتهى ما ذكر.

و فيه أمور مستقيمة شريفة و أمور متزلزلة و كلما يستقيم فيه و يصح من المقدمات - التي يستنتج منها كون الأول عاقلاً للأشياء قبل وجودها و أن الموجودات حاصلة عنده تعالى بصورها العقلية قبل وجودها فهي مشتركة بين إثبات الصور المفارقة الأفلاطونية و بين إثبات الصور الموجودة عنده في ذات الأول من كون عقله تعالى لذاته علة عقله لها و أن كثرتها كثرة بعد الذات الأحدية و أنها صادرة عنه على الترتيب السببي و المسببي و إن حيثية كونها معقولة له تعالى بعينها حيثية - صدورها عنه بلا اختلاف جهة و أنها ليست مما عقلت فوجدت أو وجدت فعقلت - بل وجدت معقولة و عقلت موجودة و أن كمال الأول و مجده في أن ذاته بحيث يصدر عنه هذه الأشياء لا في نفس حصولها له فعلوه و مجده بذاته لا بتلك الصور العقلية إلى غير ذلك و كلما يسلك بها طريق الارتسام فهي متزلزلة كما ستعلم فيما بعد.

ثم من العجب أن الذين جاءوا بعد الشيخ و حاولوا القدح في هذا المذهب

لم يقدروا عليه و لم يأتوا بشيء إلا و قد نشأ من قلة تدبرهم في كلامه أو من قصور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ١٩٩

قرائحهم و أذهانهم أو من عدم خوضهم في الأصول الحكيمة كما ينبغي.

فمنهم أبو البركات البغدادي

حيث ذكر في كتابه المسمى بالمعتبر قوله لو كان علمه مستفاداً من الأشياء لكان للغير مدخل في تتميم ذاته منقوض بكونه تعالى فاعلاً للأشياء فإن فاعليته لا تتم إلا بصدور الفعل عنه فيجب أن يكون لفعله - مدخل في تتميم ذاته و ذلك باطل فيلزم نفي كونه فاعلاً للأشياء فكما أن هذا الكلام باطل فكذا ما قاله أقول وجه اندفاعه كما أشير إليه أن الفاعلية كالعلم و القدرة و نحوهما قد تطلق و يراد بها نفس الإضافة المتأخرة عن وجود الطرفين بلا شك و قد تطلق و يراد بمبادي تلك الإضافات فهي متقدمة عليها و ليست تلك المعاني من الصفات الكمالية له تعالى إلا باعتبار مباديها المتقدمة على الإضافة فكما أن فاعليته الحقيقية لا يتوقف على وجود الفعل لأن وجود الفعل يتوقف عليها و إلا لزم الدور فوزان ذلك في علمه أن يجعل المعلوم تبعاً للعلم لا العلم تبعاً للمعلوم.

و من القادحين في هذا المذهب أشد قدح شيخ أتباع المشرقيين

المحيي رسوم حكماء الفرس في قواعد النور و الظلمة حيث قال في المشرع السابع من إلهيات كتابه المسمى بالمطارحات قولهم إن ذاته محل لأعراض كثيرة و لكن لا ينفع عنها إنما ذكروه ليظن الجاهل أن فيه معنى فإنه يوهم

أن الانفعال لا يقال إلا عند تجدد كما يفهم من مقوله أن ينفع ولا يغنيهم فإنه وإن لم يلزم الانفعال التجديدي من وجود عرض ولكن يلزم بالضرورة تعدد جهتي الاقتضاء والقبول كما سبق أن الفعل بجهة والقبول بأخرى ثم كيف يصدق عاقل بأن ذاتا تكون محلا لأعراض ولا يتصف بها وقد تقرر فيها وهل كان اتصاف الماهيات بصفات فيها إلا لأنها كانت محلا لها انتهى كلامه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٠

أقول ما ذكره حق وصدق من عدم تكثر الحيثية واختلافها إلا في اجتماع الفعل والقبول بمعنى الانفعال التجديدي الاستعدادي دون اجتماع الإيجاب ومطلق القبول فإن المعلول الصادر بإيجاب العلة واقتضاها إذا كان وجوده في نفسه بعينه وجوده العرضي كما هو شأن الأعراض فحيثية صدور مثل هذا المعلول هي بعينها حيثية عروضه لموجبه التام ومقتضيه لأنه لم يوجب إلا معلولا وجوده هذا الوجود فلو لم يقم به لم يكن مقتضيا ذلك الوجود الارتباطي فإذن لو كان خلل - في كون أوائل الصوادر عنه أعراضا لكان من سبيل آخر لا من محالية اجتماع الفعل والقبول ثم العجب منه كيف استقام عنده حال لوازم الماهيات البسيطة مع أنه قد حقق القول فيها بأنها غير مستندة إلا إلى تلك الماهيات التي هي جاعلها فهل هي إلا فاعلة لها وقابلة بجهة واحدة.

ثم قوله كيف يصدق عاقل إلى آخره تعريض بيهمنياري حيث قال في التحصيل ذاته تعالى وإن كانت محلا لأعراض كثيرة ولكن لا ينفع عنها ولا يتصف بها ومراده أنه لا يتأثر فإن أكثر ما يطلق لفظ الاتصاف إنما هو في الأعراض التي يتأثر منها الموضوع ويصير بحال لم يكن هو في ذاته عليها كالجسم في اتصافه باللون والطعم وسائر الأعراض كالنفس في اتصافها بالعلم والقدرة وغيرهما وليس كذلك حال العقل الفعال مثلا في حصول الأفعال والأحوال والآثار الصادرة عنه من جهة الفاعلية والإيجاب وكذا الإضافات العارضة له إلى المعلولات المتأخرة عنه فإن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠١

أريد من الاتصاف مطلق المعروضية والملحوقية فلا مضايقة في اللفظ بعد وضوح المقصود لكن لا فساد في تحقيقه هاهنا وإن أريد ما يصير الموضوع بسببه بحال لم يكن عليه في ذاته فليس بل لازم فاللازم غير محذور والمحذور غير لازم.

وقال فيه أيضا وإن لم يكن تعقله تعالى زائدا على ذاته وليس ذاته إلا ذاته و سلب المادة كما يعترفون به فيكون مبدءا الصورة في ذاته إما أن يكون على ما يقال - إنه إذا علم ذاته يجب أن يعلم لازم ذاته فيكون العلم تابعا لكونه لازما عن ماهيته فيقدم اللزوم على العلم باللزوم فعلمه بلازمه متوقف على لزوم لازم فبطل قولهم إن علمه بالأشياء سبب لحصول الأشياء بل علمه على هذا الوضع إنما هو معلول للزوم اللازم عنه انتهى.

أقول هذا المذكور أيضا يشبه المواخذات اللفظية بعد ظهور المعنى فإن قولهم - علمه تعالى بذاته علة لعلمه بلازمه ليس يقتضي أن يكون له لازم متحقق قبل العلم به ثم ينشأ العلم بذلك اللازم من العلم بالذات حتى ينافي ما ذكره من قولهم إن وجود الأشياء تابع لعلمه بها ويلزم تقدم اللزوم على العلم باللزوم بل مرادهم أن علمه بذاته الذي هو عين ذاته علة لعلمه بما يلزم ذاته في الواقع وإن كان لزومه بتوسط هذا العلم فإن لازم اللازم أيضا لازم والحاصل أن الصور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٢

في ذاته من لوازم ذاته التي هي علمه بذاته و الأشياء الخارجية من لوازم علمه بتلك الأشياء فتكون هي من لوازم لوازمه تعالى بل هي عين لوازمه بوجه فإن العلم الصوري و المعلوم الخارجي متحدان في الماهية و الحقيقة مختلفان في نحوي الوجود الذهني و العيني فلا تناقض في قولهم علمه بذاته علة لعلمه بلوازم ذاته أعني اللوازم الخارجية و قولهم حصول اللوازم تابع للعلم بها.

ثم إنه لما استشعر بهذا الدفع قال و إما أن يقال إن حصول الصور في ذاته - متقدمة على لزوم ما يلزم بالعلية بحيث لو لا تلك الصور المقارنة ما يوجد اللازم المبين - فحينئذ ليست ذات الواجب على تجردها مفيدة للوازم المبينة بل هي مع صورته.

أقول هم يلتزمون ذلك و لا ينسد بذلك باب إثبات العقل من حيث إن مبناه على أنه تعالى واحد من جميع الجهات فالصادر الأول لا بد أن يكون واحدا و ليس كذلك إلا العقل إذ نقول أولا إن البرهان على إثبات العقل ليس منحصرًا في هذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٣

المسلك بل المسالك إلى إثباته و إثبات كثرته متعددة و ثانياً إن هذه الجهات الكثيرة اللاحقة لذاته إنما هي صور الأشياء الخارجية و ليس كل واحدة من تلك الجهات تصلح لأن تكون جهة لصدور أي معلول كان بل كل واحدة منها جهة لصدور ما يطابقها و يماثلها على الترتيب و ثالثاً إنه إذا دل البرهان على حصول صور المعلومات قبل إيجادها في ذاته تعالى فلا بد من أن يكون وجودها في العين على طبق وجودها في العلم و كذا هيئاتها و كفاءتها الخارجية على وفق هيئاتها و كفاءتها الصورية و إلا لم يكن العلم الأزلي مطابقاً للمعلوم فيكون جهلاً و هو ممتنع بالضرورة ثم قال إن الصورة الأولى سواء تقدمت على اللازم المبين أو كانت غير متقدمة و لا متأخرة لما حصلت في ذاته فتستدعي جهتين في ذاته و لا يصح أن يكون سلب المادة سبباً لخروج واجب الوجود إلى الفعل من الإمكان غير المرجح لحصول صورة فيه حتى يكون قابل الصورة ذاته و فاعلها السلب وحده أو السلب مع ذاته - فإنه يلزم أن يكون السلب أشرف من ذاته إذا كان الذات ليس لها إلا القبول و السلب يرجح الحصول و الفعل و محال أن يكون الجهة السلبية أشرف من الذات الواجبية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٤

أقول أما قوله ثم إن الصورة الأولى إلى قوله يستدعي جهتين في ذاته إعادة لما سبق منه أنه يلزم من حصول صورة في ذاته تعالى اختلاف جهتي الفعل و القبول - و أما قوله و لا يصح إلى آخره فهو جواب اخترعه من نفسه نيابة عنهم ليعترض عليهم أو وجده في كلام بعض أتباعهم و مقلديهم و مبناه على ما توهم كثير من لزوم الإمكان في كل ما يتأخر عنه شيء لاحق به سواء كان المتأخر لازماً أم لا و سواء كان المتقدم مقتضياً موجباً له أو لا و ليس ذلك كما توهموه

حيث لم يعلموا أن المقتضي للشيء و المفيض عليه ليس فاقدا له خاليا عنه بالحقيقة حتى طرأ عليه وجدان شيء بعد فقدانه عنه بعدية ذاتية أو زمانية يلزم عليه الإمكان الذاتي أو القوة الاستعدادية - بل الشيء من حيث موجودة أتم و أكمل منه من حيث نفسه كما حققناه سابقا و هذا أصل شريف لم يظفر به إلا قليل من الأصفياء.

ثم قال و أيضا الصورة الأولى إذا كانت مع ذات الأول علة لحصول المباين - الذي هي صورته و علة أيضا لحصول صورة أخرى في ذاته المتعال فيلزم أن يكون الأول باعتباره صورة واحدة و جهة واحدة يفعل فعلين مختلفين.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٥

أقول أولا إن ما ذكره منقوض بكون العقل الأول سببا لحصول العقل الثاني و الفلك الأقصى فيكون ذات الأول باعتبار صورة واحدة و جهة واحدة - يفعل فعلين مختلفين و كل ما وقع الاعتذار به هناك يعتذر به هاهنا.

و ثانيا بالحل و هو أن الصورة الأولى كالصادر الأول ليس واحدا حقيقيا كالواجب تعالى و إلا لكان المعلول مثل العلة فإذن كل ما سوى الأول لا يخلو من جهتي كمال و نقص فبكل جهة يلزم منه شيء آخر الأشرف من الأشرف و الأخس من الأخس.

ثم قال ثم يكون الواجب منفعلا عن الصورة الأولى و هي علة للاستكمال بحصول صورة ثانية و إن اعتذروا بأنها و إن كانت في ذاته فليست كمالا له فيلزمهم الاعتراف بأنها في ذاتها ممكنة الوجود في ذاته لا يكون حصولها بالفعل و انتفاء القوة عنه بوجودها يكون كمالا له كيف و عندهم ليست الصورة موجبة لنقص فيه و إذا لم يكن وجودها نقصا فلو كانت منتفية كان كونها بالقوة نقصا و مزيل للنقص مكمل و كل مكمل من جهة ما هو مكمل أشرف من المستكمل من حيث هو مستكمل.

أقول قد علمت أن هذه الصور عندهم ليست كمالات لذاته و العلم الذي هو من كمالاته و نعوته هو ما يكون عين ذاته و لا فرق بين صدور هذه الصورة عنه تعالى - و صدور سائر الأشياء الخارجية في كونها مترشحة عن ذاته متأخرة بوجودها و وجوبها عنه و نسبتها إليه ليست إلا بالوجوب و الفعلية لا بالإمكان و القوة و لا منافاة بين أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٦

وجود الشيء بالقياس إلى ماهيته ممكنا و بالقياس إلى موجدته واجبا فكل من تلك الصور و إن كان وجودها في نفسها بعينه وجودها للواجب لكن لا يلزم من ذلك إمكان وجودها له فإن معنى كون الوجود ممكنا أن له ماهية زائدة عليه كان حاله بالقياس إليها الإمكان لا غير و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون حاله أي حال ذلك الوجود في نفسه أو بحسب الواقع أو بالقياس إلى موجدته و إن كان غير منفصل عن موجدته - ذلك الحال أعني الإمكان و بالجملة وجود تلك الصور ليس مزيلا لقوة و نقص عن الواجب كما أن عدمها عنه ليس قصورا له و فقدانا عنه بل كماله و مجده أنما هو بكونه على وجه يصدر عنه تلك الصور و ليس كماله و مجده بوجودها له كما ليس بوجودها في نفسها فإذن كماله و مجده بذاته لا بشيء آخر و هذا المعنى مصرح به في كتب الشيخ غير مرة منها قوله في التعليقات لو فرضنا أن الأول يعقل ذاته مبدأ لها ثم يكون تلك الموجودات موجودة فيه فإما أن يكون وجودها فيه مؤثرا في تعقله لها أو لا يكون مؤثرا فإن كان مؤثرا كان علة لأن يعقلها الأول لكن علة وجودها هو أن الأول عقلها فيكون لأنها عقلها الأول عقلها أو لأنها وجدت عنه

وجدت عنه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٧

تعليق آخر إن كان وجود تلك المعقولات علة لأن يعقلها الأول ثم نقول إن عقل الأول لها هو علة لوجودها كان كأنه يقال لأنها وجدت عنه ووجدت عنه - وإن كان تعقل الأول علة لوجودها ثم يصير وجودها علة لأن يعقلها كان كأنه يقال - لما عقلها عقلها و كلا الوجهين محال و حقيقة الأمر أن نفس معقوليتها له هو نفس وجودها عنه.

تعليق آخر الأول تعالى لا يستفيد علم الموجودات من وجودها فإنه يفيدها الوجود فهو يعقلها فائضة عنه فعقله لذاته عقل لها إذ هي لازمة له و هو يوجدها معقولة لا أنه يوجدها و يكون من شأنها أن تعقل.

تعليق آخر فإن قال قائل إنه يعلمها قبل وجودها حتى يلزم من ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٨

إما أن يعلمها و هي في حال عدمها أو يلزم أن يعلمها عند حال وجودها حتى يكون يعلمها من وجودها فإن قوله ذلك محال لأن علمه بها هو نفس وجودها و نفس كون هذه الموجودات معقولة له هي نفس كونها موجودة و هو يعلم الأشياء لا بأن تحصل فيه فيعلمها كما نحن نعلم الأشياء من حصولها بل حصولها له هو علمه بها و علمه بسيط.

ثم قال و في الجملة إثبات الصور في واجب الوجود قول فاسد و معتقد رديء و يوجب أن يكون الذي يفيد الصور ليست ذاته بل شيء أشرف من ذاته و هو ممتنع - و إن التزموا بأن ذاتا واحدة بجهة واحدة يجوز أن يقبل و يفعل فينهدم بذلك قواعد كثيرة مهمة لهم و يكون التزاما لمحالات كثيرة انتهى ما ذكره.

أقول قد علمت أن واجب الوجود مبدء كل الأشياء و مبدء وجوب وجودها - و إذا صدر عنه شيء بواسطة سبب متوسط فذلك السبب المتوسط أيضا ناش منه فالجهات الفعلية كلها منبعثة عنه فكل شرف رشح و فيض من شرفه فلا يفيد شيء شيئا أصلا كيف و وجود الأشياء عنه أو له ليس يزيد كمالا لم يكن حاصلًا له في ذاته بذاته و علمت أيضا أن اتحاد جهتي الصدور و العروض ليس بممتنع كما في لوازم الماهيات و إطلاق القبول هاهنا ليس بمعنى الانفعال و التأثير و لا يلزم من ذلك هدم قاعدة أصلا نعم لو التزم أحد تجويز أن يكون ذات واحدة فاعلة و قابلة من جهة واحدة يلزم منه انهدام كثير من القواعد مثل إثبات تعدد القوى النفسانية و الطبيعية - كتعدد قوتي الحس المشترك و الخيال و كذا الوهم و الحافظة فإن شأن الحاس القبول و الانفعال و شأن الحافظ الفعل و كتعدد قوتي الرطوبة و اليبوسة و قوتي التحريك و التحريك و كذا الإحساس و التحريك و مثل قاعدة تركيب الجسم بما هو جسم من الهيولى و الصورة من جهة اشتماله على أمر هو بالفعل و هو كونه جوهرًا ذا بعد و على أمر هو به بالقوة و هو قابليته لأشياء أخرى.

و أما إثبات عينية الصفات الإلهية لذاته فطريقه غير منحصر في أنها لو كانت زائدة لزم كون شيء واحد قابلا و فاعلا لما علمت حاله في بحث الصفات بل لما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٠٩

سلكناه و قررناه هناك ألا ترى أن له تعالى إضافات كثيرة إلى الأشياء على الترتيب و لا يلزم من ذلك تعدد جهتي الفعل

و القبول و بالجملة ليس و لم يظهر في إثبات الصور لواجب الوجود فساد في القول و لا رداة في الاعتقاد بما أورده المنكرون له القادحون فيه إلى زماننا هذا مع طول المدة و شدة الإنكار إلا ما سنذكره بقوة العزيز الحكيم.

و من القادحين المصريين في الإنكار لهذه الصور بعده المحقق الطوسي ره

في شرح الإشارات مع أنه قد شرط في أول قسمي الطبيعي و الإلهي أن لا يخالف الشيخ في اعتقاداته و ليته لم يخالفه هاهنا أيضا و سلك ذلك الشرط إذ كان أنفع له إلى أن يفتح الله على قلبه ما هو الحق و الصواب قال متصديا لتبيين مفاسد القول بإثبات الصور في ذاته أنه لا شك في أن القول بتقرير لوازم الأول في ذاته قول بكون الشيء الواحد فاعلا و قابلا معا و قول بكون الأول موصوفا بصفات غير إضافية و لا سلبية و قول بكونه محلا لمعلولاته الممكنة المتكثرة تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا و قول بأن المعلول الأول غير مباين لذاته تعالى و بأنه لا يوجد شيئا مما يباينه بذاته بل بتوسط الأمور الحالة فيه إلى غير ذلك مما يخالف الظاهر من مذاهب الحكماء و القدماء القائلين بنفي العلم عنه تعالى و أفلاطون القائل بقيام الصور المعقولة بذاتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٠

و المشاءون القائلون باتحاد العاقل و المعقول و المعتزلة القائلون بثبوت المعدومات - إنما ارتكبوا تلك المحالات حذرا من التزام هذه المعاني.

أقول أما إلزامه المفسدة الأولى من كون ذات الباري على التقدير المذكور فاعلا و قابلا إن أراد بالقبول مطلق العروض للزومي فلا يظهر فساد و لم يقدّم دليل على بطلان كون البسيط فاعلا و قابلا إلا أن يراد به الانفعال التجديدي أو كون العارض مما يزيد المعروف كاملا و فضيلة في عروضه فيكون المفيد أشرف من ذاته و أنور و أفضل و إن أراد به غير ذلك فعليه إثباته بالحجة حتى ينظر فيه فإن لزومه غير بين و لا مبين و العجب أن الشيخ ممن ذكر في مواضع كثيرة من كتاب التعليقات بعبارات مختلفة أن جهتي الفعل و القبول في لوازم الأشياء غير مختلفة و لا متعددة.

منها قوله و لا يصح أن يكون واجب الوجود لذاته قابلا لشيء فإن القبول لما فيه معنى ما بالقوة و لا أن يكون تلك الصفات و العوارض توجد فيه عن ذاته فيكون إذن قابلا كما أنه فاعل اللهم إلا أن يكون تلك الصفات و العوارض من لوازم ذاته فإنه حينئذ لا يكون ذاته موصوفة بتلك الصفات لأن تلك الصفات موجودة فيه لأنها عنه و فرق بين أن يوصف جسم بأنه أبيض لأن البياض يوجد فيه من خارج و بين أن يوصف بأنه أبيض لأن البياض من لوازمه و إنما وجد فيه لأنه عنه لو كان يجوز ذلك في الجسم و إذا أخذت حقيقة الأول على هذا الوجه و لوازمه على هذه الجهة استمر هذا المعنى فيه و هو أنه لا كثرة فيه و ليس هناك قابل و فاعل بل هو من حيث هو قابل فاعل و هذا الحكم مطرد في جميع البسائط فإن حقائقها هي أنها يلزم عنها اللوازم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١١

و في ذاتها تلك اللوازم على أنها من حيث هي قابلة فاعلة فإن البسيط ما عنه و ما فيه شيء واحد إذ لا كثرة فيه و لا يصح فيه غير ذلك و المركب يكون ما عنه غير ما فيه إذ هناك كثرة و قال كل اللوازم هذا حكمها. و منها قوله أن البسائط ليس فيها استعداد فإن الاستعداد هو أن يوجد في الشيء شيء عن شيء لم يكن و كان استعداداه

لقبول ذلك الشيء مقدما على قبوله بالطبع.

و منها قوله النفس الإنسانية لا يصح أن تكون فاعلة للمعقولات قابلة لها بعد أن لم تكن فإن مثل ذلك يجب أن يسبقه معنى ما بالقوة وفيه استعداد فأما الشيء الذي حقيقته أن يلزمه المعقولات دائما فلا يجب أن يكون في معنى ما بالقوة. و منها قوله الذي يقبل المعقولات لا يصح أن يكون فاعلا لها لأنه لا يصح أن يكون الشيء الواحد فاعلا و قابلا بعد أن لم يكن فاعلا و قابلا فإنه يسبقه معنى ما بالقوة.

أقول قد ظهر من هذه البيانات الواضحة الخفية على أكثر الناس أن منشأ التركيب في شيء من جهة عروض عارض له ليس إلا سبق معنى القوة سبقا زمانيا أو سبق معنى الإمكان سبقا ذاتيا و الأول يوجب التركيب الخارجي و التعدد في الوجود كعروض البياض للجسم و الحركة للمتحرك فالفاعل هو الصورة و ما يجري مجراها و الفعل من جهتها و القابل هو الهيولى و ما يجري مجراها و الانفعال من جهتها و الثاني يوجب التركيب العقلي و التعدد في المعنى كعروض الوجود للماهية فالفعالية من جهة الوجود و الإمكان من جهة الماهية و أما اللوازم الذاتية فليست الذات ذات اللوازم من جهة لوازمها- بل من جهة نفسها فليس لها من جهة ذاتها إمكان تلك اللوازم بل إيجابها و وجوبها- فلا تكثر فيها من جهتي الإمكان و الوجوب كما لا تكثر فيها من جهتي الفعل و الانفعال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٢

و أما إلزامه المفسدة الثانية من اتصافه تعالى بصفات حقيقية فهو غير لازم- وإنما تلزم لو كانت تلك الصور العقلية مما يكمل به ذاته أو يزيد في وجوده وجودا- بل وجوده تعالى غير متناهي الشدة و وجودات تلك اللوازم من رشحات فيضه و تنزلات وجوده و إليه الإشارة بقولهم إن ذاته تعالى و إن كان محلا لتلك الصور لكن لا يتصف بها و لا يكون هي كمالات لذاته و ليس علو الأول و مجده بعقله للأشياء بل بأن يفيض عنه الأشياء معقولة فيكون علوه و مجده بذاته لا بلوازمه التي هي المعقولات. و ذكر بهمنيار هذا المعنى بقوله و اللوازم التي هي معقولاته تعالى و إن كانت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٣

إعراضا موجودة فيه فليس مما يتصف بها أو ينفعل عنها فإن كونه واجب الوجود بذاته- هو بعينه كونه مبدءا للوازم أي معقولاته بل ما يصدر عنه إنما يصدر عنه بعد وجوده وجودا تاما و إنما يمتنع أن يكون ذاته محلا لأعراض ينفعل عنها أو يستكمل بها أو يتصف بها بل كماله في أنه بحيث يصدر عنه هذه اللوازم لا لأنه محلها انتهى. و الحاصل أن الواجب بحسب ذاته بذاته ذو تلك اللوازم لا أنه بسبب تلك اللوازم ذو تلك اللوازم فعاقليته للأشياء لم يحصل له بسبب الأشياء و لا أيضا بسبب صورها العقلية بل بسبب ذاته فقط بمعنى أنه متى فرضت ذاته بذاته في أي مرتبة كانت بلا ملاحظة شيء آخر معه لكانت ذاته عاقلة للأشياء لكن عاقليته للأشياء مما لا تنفك عن حصول صور الأشياء له معقولة و هذا مما فيه غموض و لطافة يقصر عن دركه أكثر الأذهان- كيف و من أدرك هذا هان عليه إدراك العلم المقدم على الإيجاد سواء كانت معقولاته التفصيلية صوراً ذهنية كما هو رأي المشائين أو خارجية كما هو رأي الأفلاطونيين- و من لم يذق هذا الشهد لا يمكنه التخلص عن لزوم جهة الإمكان في واجب الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٤

على كلا المذهبين كما يظهر بالتأمل و مما يشير إلى هذا المعنى كلمات الشيخ في التعليقات - منها قوله نفس تعقله لذاته هو وجود هذه الأشياء عنه و نفس وجود هذه الأشياء نفس معقوليتها له و قوله وجود هذه الموجودات عنه وجود معقول لا وجود موجود من شأنه أن يعقل أو يحتاج أن يعقل و قوله إضافة هذه المعقولات إليه - إضافة محضة عقلية أي إضافة المعقول إلى العاقل فقط لا إضافة كيف ما وجدت - أي ليس من حيث وجودها في الأعيان أو من حيث هي موجودة في عقل أو نفس - أو إضافة صورة إلى مادة أو عرض إلى موضوع بل إضافة معقولة مجردة بلا زيادة - و هو أنه يعقلها فحسب.

أقول و العجب من الشيخ و تحقيقه المقام على هذا الوجه كيف بالغ في الرد و الإنكار على ما ينسب إلى فرفوريوس من القول باتحاد العاقل بالمعقولات - مع أن هذا التحقيق الذي ذكره هاهنا و في مواضع أخرى مما يقتضي صحة القول بالاتحاد فإن وجود هذه المعقولات لما كان بعينه نفس معقوليتها و يكون إضافتها إليه تعالى إضافة بسيطة لا إضافة شيء له وجود غير كونه مضافا فذلك مما يوجب أن لا يتصور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٥

بين العاقل و مثل هذه المعقولات تغاير في الوجود و لا انفصال فضلا عن إمكان المغايرة و الانفصال فلا بد من أن يكون بينهما ضرب من الاتصال و الاتحاد و إن كان في تعقل هذا الاتصال و كفيته صعوبة على غير المكاشف. تعليق آخر كون هذه الصور موجودة عنه هو نفس علمه بها و علمه بأنه يلزم عنه وجودها هو مبدأ لوجودها عنه و ليس يحتاج إلى علم آخر يعلم به أنه مبدأ لوجودها عنه.

تعليق آخر وجود هذه الصور التي عنده عنه هو نفس علمه بأنه مبدأ لها فهذه المعقولية هي نفس هذا الوجود و هذا الوجود هو نفس هذه المعقولية.

تعليق آخر لو كان يعقل ذاته أولا ثم يعقلها مبدأ للموجودات لكان عقل ذاته مرتين.

تعليق آخر الأول تعالى يعقل ذاته على ما هي عليه لذاته و هو أنه مبدأ للموجودات و أنها لازمة له عقلا بسيطا فليس يعقل ذاته أولا و يعقل أنه مبدأ للموجودات ثانيا فيكون عقل ذاته مرتين بل نفس عقله لها هو نفس وجودها عنه و ليس اعتبار تعقل الأول كاعتبار تعقلنا نحن فإننا نعرف العلة و المعلول من لوازم كل واحد منهما - بقياس و اعتبار فنعقل أولا أنه موجود و نعقل أيضا أنه مبدأ للموجودات بقياس و نظر - و نعقل أيضا أننا عقلنا و ذلك بعقل آخر و ليس في التعقل الأول هذه الحال.

تعليق آخر لا محالة أنه تعالى يعقل ذاته و يعقلها مبدأ للموجودات فالموجودات معقولات له و هي غير خارجة عن ذاته لأن ذاته مبدأ لها فهو العاقل و المعقول - و لا يصح هذا الحكم فيما سواه فإنه يعقل ما هو خارج عن ذاته إلى غير ذلك من تحقیقاته و إفاداته.

تعليق آخر ليس علو الأول و مجده هو أن يعقل الأشياء بل علوه و مجده بأن يفيض عنه الأشياء معقولة فيكون بالحقبة علوه و مجده بذاته لا بلوازمه التي هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٦

المعقولات و كذلك الأمر في الخلق فإن علوه و مجده بأنه يخلق لا بأن الأشياء مخلوقة له فعلوه و مجده إذن بذاته انتهى و أما لزوم المفسدة الثالثة من لزوم تحقق الكثرة في ذاته فتلك الكثرة لما كانت بعد الذات على ترتيب الأول و الثاني و الثالث و هكذا إلى أقصاها لم يقدح في وحدة الذات و لم ينثلم بها الأحدية الذاتية كالوحدة في كونها مبدأ للكثرات التي بعدها و قد أشار الشيخ إلى دفع هذا المحذور بقوله في مواضع من كتاب التعليقات بما حاصله أن هذه الكثرة إنما هي بعد الذات بترتيب سببي و مسببي لا زمني فلا ينثلم بها وحدة الذات ألا ترى أن صدور الموجودات المتكثرة عنه تعالى لا يقدح في بساطته الحق لكونها صادرة عنه على الترتيب العلي و المعلولي فكذلك معقولاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٧

المفصلة الكثيرة إنما هي ترتبت عنه على وجه ترتقي إليه و تجتمع في واحد محض - فهي مع كثرتها اشتملت عليها أحدية الذات إذ الترتيب يجمع الكثرة في واحد كما أشار إليه المعلم الثاني بقوله واجب الوجود مبدأ كل فيض و هو ظاهر على كل ذاته بذاته فله الكل من حيث لا كثرة فيه فهو ينال الكل من ذاته فعلمه بالكل بعد ذاته و علمه بذاته نفس ذاته و يتحد الكل بالنسبة إلى ذاته فهو الكل في وحدة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٨

و أما لزوم المفسدة الرابعة من كون المعلول الأول غير مباين لذاته إن أراد بعدم المباينة الحلول و القيام فهو عين محل النزاع فلا يكون حجة على القائلين - بكون علمه تعالى إنما هو بالصور القائمة بذاته مع مغايرتها له و إن أراد به كون صورة المعلول الأول متحدة بالواجب تعالى بناء على أن صدور كل معلول عنه مسبوق بالعلم به فلو لم يكن صورة المعلول الأول عين الواجب لتقدمت عليها صورة أخرى و الكلام عائد فيها أيضا و هكذا يلزم مع خلاف الفرض التسلسل في الصور المترتبة فجوابه ما هو مذكور في كتب الشيخين أبي نصر و أبي علي و كتب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢١٩

اتباعهما كتحصيل بهمنيار بما حاصله أن صدور كل موجود خارجي لم يكن وجوده في نفسه عين معقوليته فذلك مسبوق بعلمه و أما صدور ما وجوده عنه نفس معقوليته له فلا يحتاج صدوره إلى أن يكون مسبوقا بعلم آخر لأن وجوده عقل فلم يفتقر إلى عقل آخر.

قال الشيخ في التعليقات كل ما يصدر عن واجب الوجود فإنما يصدر بواسطة عقله له و هذه الصور المعقولة له يكون نفس وجودها نفس عقله لها لا تمايز بين الحالين و لا ترتب لأحدهما على الآخر فيكون عقله لها ممايزا لوجودها عنه - فليس معقوليتها له غير نفس وجودها عنه فإذاً هي من حيث هي موجودة معقولة و من حيث هي معقولة موجودة كما أن وجود الباري ليس إلا نفس معقوليته لذاته - فالصور المعقولة له يجب أن يكون نفس وجودها عنه نفس عقليته لها و إلا إن كانت معقولات أخرى علة لوجود تلك الصور كان الكلام في تلك المعقولات كالكلام في تلك الصور و يتسلسل

إلى غير النهاية فإنه يجب أن تكون قد عقلت أولاً حتى وجدت أو تكون أنها عقلت لأنها وجدت فيكون علة معقوليتها وجودها و علة وجودها معقوليتها- فيلزم أن يكون علة معقوليتها معقوليتها و علة وجودها وجودها. تعليق آخر لو كان صدور وجود هذه اللوازم بعد عقليته لها يجب أن تكون موجودة عند عقليته لها فإن المعقول يجب أن يكون موجودا وإذا كانت موجودة يجب أن يتقدم وجودها أيضا على عقليته لها فيتسلسل ذلك إلى غير النهاية فيجب إذن أن يكون نفس عقليته لها نفس وجودها عنه. تعليق آخر الصور المعقولة إما أن توجد عنه بعد أن تكون معقولة فيكون قبل وجودها عنه موجودة لأنها إن لم تكن موجودة لم تكن معقولة فإن ما هو غير موجود لا يعقل فيلزم إذا كانت موجودة أن يتقدمها عقليته لها و كذلك إلى غير النهاية إذ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٠

الكلام في ذلك كالكلام في هذا لأنها كانت معقولة له و هي أيضا من لوازمه فتكون قد عقلت هذه أيضا بواسطة صورة معقولة أخرى و الكلام فيها كالكلام في هذه فيتسلسل الأمر تعليق آخر إذا قيل إنما وجدت هذه اللوازم لأنها قد عقلت و عقلته لها التي هي سبب وجودها هي أيضا من اللوازم لزم السؤال فيقال لم وجدت و بواسطة أي شيء فيقال إنما وجدت لأنها عقلت فيتسلسل الأمر. تعليق آخر هذه الصور المعقولة من لوازم ذاته و إذا تبع وجودها عقلية لها- كانت عقلته لها من لوازم ذاته أيضا فيكون وجود العقلية من عقلته لها فيكون تعقل بعد تعقل إلى ما لا نهاية. و أما لزوم المفسدة الأخيرة من أنه تعالى لا يوجد شيئا مما يباينه بذاته بل بتوسط الأمور الحالة فيه فهذا مجرد استبعاد فهل هذا إلا كقول من ينكر- وجود عالم المعقولات الصرفة قبل وجود هذا العالم الجسماني أو وجود عالم الأمر قبل وجود عالم الخلق ثم يقول يلزم على ذلك أن لا يوجد تعالى شيئا من هذه الجسمانيات بذاته بل بتوسط الأمور العقلية و لا يخلق شيئا من الخلق إلا بواسطة الأمر فيقال له أولا إن البرهان هو المتبع لا غير و ثانيا إن ذلك العالم أشرف بالتقدم و أنسب فكذلك نقول الصور الإلهية لكونها من لوازم وجوده الباقية ببقائه لا بإبقائه الموجودة بوجوده لا بإيجاده الواجبة بوجوبه فضلا عن إيجابه فهي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢١

أشرف و أقدس من الموجودات المنفصلة عنه فيكون أقدم تحققا و أقرب منزلة منه تعالى- فهي لا محالة أخرى بأن يكون واسطة في الإيجاد لهذه المباينات الخارجية.

ثم من القادحين في إثبات الصور الإلهية المنكرين لمذهب الصور من المتأخرين العلامة الخفري

حيث نقل في بعض مؤلفاته كلام أنكسيمانوس الملطي من أنه قال كل مبدع ظهرت صورته في حد الإبداع فقد كانت صورته في علم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٢

مبدعه الأول و الصور عنده غير متناهية ثم قال و لا يجوز في الرأي إلا أحد قولين إما أن نقول أبدع ما في علمه و إما أن نقول أبدع أشياء لا يعلمها و هذا من القول المستشنع و إن قلنا أبدع ما في علمه فالصور أزلية بأزليته و ليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٣

يتكثر ذاته بتكثر المعلومات و لا يتغير بتغيرها انتهى.

و اعترض عليه بوجهين أحدهما أنه لم يتعرض لكيفية فيضان هذه الصور من الذات من كونه بالعلم المقدم أو لا و على الأول يرد عليه أن العلم المقدم الذي هو عين الذات كاف في العلم بالموجودات العينية فما الدليل على فيضان الصور العلمية - قبل الإيجاد العيني و على الثاني يرد عليه أن هذا قول بأن الله تعالى أبدع أشياء لا يعلمها و هذا قول مستشنع كما ذكره ذلك الفيلسوف.

و ثانيهما أنه يرد عليه أن هذه الصور إما جواهر أو أعراض فإن كان الأول لزم أن يكون موجودات عينية لا بد لها من صور آخر للعلم بها و الكلام في ذلك كالكلام في أصل الصور و إن كان الثاني لزم أن يكون واجب الوجود بالذات - محلا و فاعلا لها و القول بكون الواجب بالذات فاعلا لها لا محلا لها لكونه غير متأثر عنها قول بكونها جواهر كباقي الممكنات و لا خفاء أيضا في أن علم الواجب الوجود باعتبار هذه الصور ليس علما كماليا ذاتيا لكونه تابعا لفيضان تلك الصور - فعلى تقدير انحصار العلم المقدم في فيضان الصور المنكشفة لزم أن لا يكون للذات علم كمالي ذاتي غير تابع للتأثير و الحق تحققه كما مر انتهى.

أقول في كلامه مواضع أنظار أما قوله إن العلم المقدم الذي هو عين الذات كاف إلى آخره ففيه أن هذا العلم عندهم مستلزم لفيضان الصور العقلية التي هي من لوازم ذاته و هو غير كاف في إيجاد الأشياء المبينة الذوات لذات المبدأ تعالى لأن علمه بالأشياء الخارجية ليس وجود تلك الأشياء في أنفسها و لا الإضافة الإيجابية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٤

منه إليها عين الإضافة العقلية إذ ليس وجودها في ذاتها عنه عين معقوليتها له و إلا لكانت من اللوازم المتصلة لا من المبينات المنفصلة و قد علمت فيما سبق أن علمه تعالى بتلك الصور القائمة بذاته عين إيجاده لها و أن العلم إذا كان عين الإيجاد و المعلوم عين الموجود المعلول لم يحتج في صدوره عن الفاعل بعلم و إرادة و مشية إلى علم سابق تفصيلي فلا يتأتى قوله و هذا قول بأن الله أبدع أشياء لا يعلمها على أن الحق عندنا في هذا المنهج أن لا جعل و لا تأثير في حصول مثل هذه الصور لأنها من اللوازم و لا تأثير - للملزوم بالقياس إلى لوازمه فإن كون الذات ذاتا بعينه كونها ذات هذه اللوازم و أما قوله هذه الصور إما جواهر أو أعراض إلى آخره فغير متوجه و لا موجه - إذ مبناه على الخلط بين الجوهر الذهني و الجوهر الخارجي أو على توهم المنافاة - بين الجوهر الذهني و العرض الخارجي و الترديد أنما يستقيم و يفيد في المنفصلة أو مانعة الجمع فنقول هذه الصور جواهرها جواهر علمية بحسب الماهية و أعراض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٥

خارجية بحسب الوجود فلا يستدعي العلم بها صورة أخرى و الكل باعتبار الوجود العيني أعراض قائمة بذاته لكن ذاته

لا يتأثر عنها ولا يفعل بها كما سبق تقريره.
و أما قوله استدلالا على أن علم الباري تعالى بتلك الصور ليس علما كماليا - لكونه تابعا لفيضان تلك الصور غير صحيح لما سبق مرارا أن علمه تعالى بتلك الصور عين فيضانها عنه لأنه تابع لفيضانها وإن أراد أن نفس تلك الصور ليست كمالاته تعالى فنقول من الذي أنكر هذا ومن الذي جعل اللوازم المتأخرة الناشئة بعد الذات التامة الواجبية كمالاته فإن هؤلاء الفلاسفة المبتدئين لهذه الصور الإلهية يصرحون بأن كماله و علوه ليس بوجود هذه الصور بل كماله و علوه يكون ذاته ذاتا يفيض عنه هذه الأشياء معقولة و أن عقله لذاته مستتب لعقله إياها ثم لا يخفى أن عقله لهذه الصور هو بعينه عقله للخارجيات المنفصلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٦

و إن كان وجودها غير وجود هذه الصور إذ العلم بالخارجيات عندهم ليس إلا بصور أخرى وجودها وجود علمي إدراكي بخلاف ما ذهب إليه المتأخرون و بعض أتباع الرواقيين كصاحب كتاب حكمة الإشراق و المحقق الطوسي ره حيث جعلوا الأمور الخارجية كالأجسام و غيرها صالحة للإضافة العقلية و كأنهم ذهلوا عن القاعدة المشهورة أن وجود المعقول بالذات في نفسه و معقوليته و وجوده للعقل شيء واحد بلا اختلاف و كذا وجود ما هو محسوس في نفسه و محسوسيته و وجوده عند الحاس شيء واحد بلا اختلاف ثم لا شبهة في أن هذه الماديات ذوات الأوضاع المكانية - ليست وجوداتها الخارجية وجودا عقليا و لا حسيا كما هو التحقيق عندنا فكيف يصح و يجوز كون هذه الصور المادية في أنفسها قبل تجريدتها و انتزاعها علما و معلوما و عقلا و معقولا.
و أما قوله فعلى تقدير انحصار العلم المقدم في فيضان الصور المنكشفة لزم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٧

أن لا يكون للذات علم هو كمال ذاتي ليس بوارد عليهم إذ لا ينحصر علمه تعالى عندهم في هذه الصور المتأخرة عن الذات ألا ترى إلى قول الشيخ في أول الفصل - المعقود في بيان نسبة المعقولات إليه تعالى من فصول إلهيات الشفاء يجب أن يعلم أنه إذا قيل للأول تعالى عقل قيل على المعنى البسيط الذي عرفته في كتاب النفس و أنه ليس فيه اختلاف صور مترتبة متخالفة كما يكون في النفس - على المعنى الذي مضى في كتاب النفس فهو لذلك يعقل الأشياء دفعة واحدة من غير أن يتكرر بها في جوهره أو يتصور في حقيقة ذاته بصورها بل تفيض عنه صورها معقولة و هو أولى بأن يكون عقلا من تلك الصور الفائضة عن عقلية و لأنه يعقل ذاته و أنها مبدأ كل شيء فيعقل من ذاته كل شيء انتهى فقله إذا قيل للأول عقل قيل على المعنى البسيط و قوله و هو أولى بأن يكون عقلا من تلك الصور - و قوله فيعقل من ذاته كل شيء كلها تصريحات و تنبيهات على العلم الإجمالي الكمالي - و العقل البسيط لكن معرفة هذا العقل البسيط في غاية الصعوبة فإن ظني بل يقيني أنه لم يتيسر فهمه على وجهه لأحد من هؤلاء المشهورين بالفضل و البراعة مع ادعائهم لإثباته كما سنشير إليه إن شاء الله تعالى فهذه جملة من أقوال القادحين في تقرير صور المعقولات في ذاته مع ما سنح لنا من الدفع و الإتمام و النقض و الإبرام

الفصل (٨) في تحقيق الحق في هذا المقام و في إظهار ما نجده قادحا في مذهب القائلين بارتسام الصور

في ذاته تعالى

و ليعلم أولاً أن لا خلاف لنا معهم في جميع ما ذكروه في إثباتها من الأصول و المقدمات

و لا في وجوب أن يكون تلك الصور المعقولة لوازم ذاته و لا في كونها قائمة بذاته غير مبانة عن ذاته إنما المخالفة لنا معهم في جعل تلك الصور أعراضاً و في أن وجودها وجود ذهني و لو لا تصريحاتهم بأنها أعراض لا يمكن لنا حمل مذهبهم على ما هو الحق عندنا و هو أنها مثل عقلية و جواهر نورية كما هو رأي الأفلاطون و لا يبعد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٨

أن يكون القول بعرضيتها من تصرفات المتأخرين حيث إن كلمات قدماء الفلاسفة القائلين بالصور كانكسيمانوس و غيره خالية عن ذكر العرضية كما يظهر لمن تتبع مآثورات أقوالهم.

إذا تقرر هذا فاعلم أن الذي نعتقد في إبطال هذا الرأي أمور -

الأول أن لوازم الأشياء على ثلاثة أقسام

لازم ذهني كالنوعية لمفهوم الإنسان - و الذاتية لمعنى الحيوان و لازم خارجي كالحرارة للنار و الحركة للفلك و لازم للماهية ثم يجب أن يعلم أن لازم الماهية كما أنه تابع لها في أصل الماهية كذلك تابع لها في نحوي الوجود الذهني للذهني و الخارجي للخارجي فإذا امتنع أن يكون لأحدهما وجود خارجي و للآخر وجود ذهني و بالعكس **إذا تمهد هذا فنقول** إن لوازم الأول تعالى إن كانت من قبيل اللازم الخارجي فلا بد أن يكون كملزومها موجودة خارجية و كذا لو فرض أنها من لوازم الماهية فإن ماهية الأول عين إنيتته سواء قلنا إن لا ماهية له أصلاً أو قلنا إن ماهيته عين إنيتته و وجوده على اختلاف الاصطلاحين فإذا هذه اللوازم يجب أن يكون بوجوداتها العينية لازمة له فجواهرها لا محالة يجب أن لا يكون أعراضاً و لا جواهر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٢٩

ذهنية بل جواهر خارجية فإذا بطل القول بارتسام الصور الذهنية في ذات الأول تعالى بقي الكلام في تحقيق الأمر هاهنا بأن الذوات القائمة بأنفسها كيف أمكن أن يكون من اللوازم للشيء التي لا يتصور انفصالها عنه مع قيام البرهان على ذلك.

الثاني أن قولهم العلم التام بالعلة يوجب العلم التام بمعلولها

و قولهم إن العلم بذى السبب لا يحصل إلا من جهة العلم بسببه ليس المراد من العلم التام بالعلة العلم بماهية العلة إلا فيما يكون مجرد الماهية سبباً للمعلوم كما في لوازم الماهيات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٠

بمعنى الكليات الطبيعية و لا المراد منه العلم بوجه من وجوهها و هو ظاهر و لا العلم بمفهوم كونها علة و لا العلم بإضافة العلية لأنه على هذين الوجهين يكون العلمان - أي العلم بالعلة و العلم بالمعلول حاصلين معاً لا تقدم لأحدهما على الآخر و عمدة الغرض من هذه القاعدة إثبات علم الباري تعالى بما سواه من جهة علمه بذاته فإذا المراد من العلم

المذكور أنما هو العلم بالخصوصية التي يكون العلة بها علة و ليس هي إلا نحواً خاصاً من الوجود و قد بين فيما سلف من الكلام أن الجاعلية و المجعولية أنما هي بين الوجودات لا الماهيات و بين أيضاً أن العلم بأنحاء الوجودات لا يمكن أن يحصل إلا بحضورها و شهودها بأعيانها لا بصورها و أشباهها و ذلك غير ممكن إلا من جهة الاتحاد أو من جهة العلية و الإحاطة الوجودية.

فإذا تقرر هذه المقدمات فنقول لما كان ذاته تعالى من جهة وجوده - الذي هو عين ذاته علة لما بعده على الترتيب و أن مجعولاته الصادرة عنه أنما هي أنحاء الوجودات العينية فالعلم الواجب بذاته الذي هو نفس ذاته يقتضي العلم الواجب بتلك الوجودات الذي لا بد أن يكون عين تلك الوجودات فمجعولاته بعينها معلوماته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣١

فهي بعينها علومه التفصيلية لا محالة فهي تابعة للعلم الكمال و العقل البسيط بالمعنى الذي علمته في باب العقل و المعقول و في علم النفس و إنما سمينا هذه الوجودات علماً له - باعتبار أنها من لوازم علمه بذاته و إن اصطلاح أحد بأن يسمى تلك الأشياء الصادرة عنه تعالى علوماً له باعتبار وجوداتها و مجعولات له باعتبار ماهياتها المتغايرة للوجود لكان حسناً للمحافظة على الفرق بين ما هو علم الباري و ما هو فعل له فإن العلة الفاعلية عرفوها في مباحث العلل بما يؤثر في غيره بما هو غيره و الماهيات الممكنة كلها مباينة لحقيقة الواجب تعالى و أما الوجودات فقد علمت من طريقتنا أنها من لمعات ذاته و شوارق شمس.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٢

الثالث

قد تقرر عند الحكماء كلهم من غير خلاف بين الفريقين و ثبت أيضاً بالبرهان ما يسمى بقاعدة إمكان الأشرف و هو أن كلما هو أقدم صدوراً من المبدأ الأول فهو أشرف ذاتاً و أقوى وجوداً و على مسلك إثبات الصور المرتسمة في ذاته تعالى يلزم هدم تلك القاعدة الحقّة إذ لا شبهة في أن الأعراض أياً ما كانت هي أخس و أدون منزلة من الجوهر أي جوهر كان و القائلون بإثبات هذه الصور - جعلوها وسائط في الإيجاد مع تصريحهم بأنها أعراض قائمة بذاته تعالى فما أشد سخافة اعتقاد من اعتقد كون الموجودات الواقعة في العالم الربوبي و الصقع الإلهي خسيصة ضعيفة الوجود و التي يطابقها و يوازيها من العالم الإمكانى حذو النعل بالنعل و القذ بالقذ تكون أشرف وجوداً و أعلى مرتبة و هذا مما يحكم به الوجدان قبل إقامة البرهان

ذكر و تنبيه

و أما الذي أفاده المحقق الطوسي ره في شرح الإشارات - بعد ما أورد البحوث و التشنيعات على الشيخ و ذكر أن التعقل لا يلزم أن يكون بصورة زائدة على ذات المعلوم من أنه لما كان وجوده علة لوجود ما سواه و علمه بذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٣

علة لعلمه بما سواه و قد حكمت بأن ذاته و علمه بذاته و هما العلتان واحد بلا خلاف و اختلاف فاحكم بأن الصادر منه

وعلمه بذلك الصادر و هما المعلولان واحد بلا اختلاف فيه أن هذا الكلام لا يخلو عن إقناع إذ لأحد أن يمنع حقيقة هذا الحكم - إذ ربما يكون في المعلول لكونه أنقص وجودا من علته شائبة كثرة لا يكون مثلها في العلة ألا ترى أن العقل يصدر عنه الفلك من جهة ماهيته و يصدر عنه عقل آخر من جهة وجوب وجوده و العلتان هاهنا شيء واحد في الخارج و المعلولان متعددان تعددا خارجيا و أيضا الواجب تعالى واحد بسيط من كل وجه و العقل الصادر منه أولا فيه جهتان بحسب الاعتبار و بالجملة فليس من شرط العلة و المعلول الموافقة في الوحدة و الكثرة نعم المستحيل أن يكون المعلول أقوى توحيدها من علته الموحدة.

ثم لا يخفى على من تتبع كتب الشيخ الإلهي شهاب الدين السهروردي أن جميع ما ذكره الشارح المحقق لمقاصد الإشارات في هذا المطلب موافق لما ذكره فيها فكأنه مأخوذ منها مع تلخيص و تهذيب إلا أن الشيخ المذكور أجرى القاعدة في الأجسام و الجسمانيات من أن حضور ذواتها كافية في أن يعلم بالإضافة الإشراقية من دون الافتقار إلى الصور الزائدة و هذا المحقق لم يكتف بذلك بل جعل مناط علمه تعالى بها ارتسام صورها في المبادي العقلية أو النفسية و لكل من الرايين وجه - و سينكشف لك حق المقال في إدراك الحق الأول لهذه الجزئيات المادية على وجه لم يتيسر لأحد و لم يثبت في غير هذا الكتاب.

حكمة مشرقية

لعلك لو تأملت فيما تلوناه حق التأمل و أمعنت النظر في ما حققناه - و قررناه من كيفية وجود الصور الإلهية و أنها ليست موجودات ذهنية و لا أعراضا خارجية - بل هي وجودات بسيطة متفاوتة لا يعترىها الإمكان و في كيفية لزومها لزوما لا على وجه العروض و لا على وجه الصدور بل على ضرب آخر غيرهما لعلمت لو كنت نقى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٤

الذهن نقى الجوهر لطيف السر أن تلك الصور الإلهية ليست من جملة العالم و مما سوى الله و ليس وجودها وجودا مباينا لوجود الحق سبحانه و لا هي موجودات بنفسها لنفسها بل إنما هي من مراتب الإلهية و مقامات الربوبية و هي موجودة بوجود واحد باقية بقاء واحد و العالم إنما هو ما سواه و ليس إلا الأجسام بصورها و طبائعها و أعراضها و موادها و الكل مما ثبت حدوثها و تجددتها بالبرهان كما مر في مباحث الجواهر الجسمانية فلا قديم في العالم إنما القديم هو الله سبحانه و قضاؤه و علمه و أمره و كلمته التامة فافهم و اغتنم و اشكر ربك فيما هداك من التوحيد.

تصالح اتفاقي

لعل كلا من الأرسطاطاليسيين و الأفلاطونيين لو نظروا حق النظر و أمعنوا حق الإمعان في مذهب الآخرين لوجدوه راجعا إلى مذهبهم كما حققناه - و أما قبل الإمعان فكل من المذهبيين في علم الله مما يظهر فيه خلل و قصور ليس في الآخر أما الخلل في مذهب أتباع أرسطو فهو كون تلك الصور الإلهية أعراضا ضعيفة الوجود و كون متعلقاتها التابعة لها في الوجود أقوى تحصلا و أشد وجودا و تجورها منها و قد علمت فسادها فإذا تم هذا القصور و سد هذا الخلل بجعلها موجودات عينية لا ذهنية تصير كالصور الأفلاطونية في هذا المعنى و أما الخلل في مذهب الأفلاطونيين - فهو كون علمه أشياء خارجة عن ذاته و كلما هو من الموجودات الخارجية فوجودها عنه إنما يصدر عنه بعلم سابق فإن كانت مما عقلت أولا فوجدت فيعود الكلام إلى كيفية معقوليتها السابقة فهي إما بوجودات و صور منفصلة خارجية أو

بوجودات و صور إلهية متصلة هي لوازم الأول غير الصادرة بل الموجودة بوجوده تعالى ففي الشق الأول يلزم التسلسل في الصور الخارجية و هو محال و على الشق الثاني يلزم الاكتفاء في علم الواجب تعالى بتلك اللوازم المتصلة فما الحاجة إلى إثبات غيرها.

ثم لا يخفى أن علمه لا بد أن يكون أمراً إلهياً غير مشوب بصفة الإمكان و العدم السابق أصلاً فعلمه و كلامه و أمره و قضاؤه و قلمه الأعلى ينبغي أن يكون غير داخل في أجزاء العالم فإذا رجع الأمر و عاد الفكر في الصور الأفلاطونية إلى أنها يجب أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٥

لا تكون أمورا خارجة عن صقع الربوبية كما ظنه الأتباع و المقلدون فهذا المذهب كما هو المشهور إذا أزيل عنه هذا الخلل و القصور يعود إلى ما قررنا فالظن بأولئك الكبراء المتقدمين أن رأي أفلاطون و أرسطاطاليس في باب العلم شيء واحد و الخلل في كل منهما نشأ من تحريفات الناقلين و المفسرين أو من سوء فهم الناظرين في كلامهما أو قصور الفكر عن البلوغ إلى درك ما أدركاه و تعقل ما تعقلناه لأن المطلب بعيد السمك عظيم الرفعة شديد اللطافة تكل الأذهان عن فهمه و تدهش القلوب عن سماعه و تخفش العيون عن ضوئه.

ثم اعلم أن أبا نصر الفارابي قد حاول الجمع بين هذين المذهبين في كتابه المسمى باتفاق رأي الحكيمين فجمعهما بما ليس ببعيد عن الصواب بل هو قريب مما قررناه فقال ما ملخصه أنه لما كان الباري جل ثناؤه بإنيته و ذاته مبينا لجميع ما سواه و ذلك بمعنى أشرف و أفضل و أعلى بحيث لا يناسبه في إنيته و لا يشاكله - و لا يشبهه شيء حقيقة و لا مجازا ثم مع ذلك لم يكن بد من وصفه و إطلاق لفظة فيه من هذه الألفاظ المتواطئة عليه فإن من الواجب الضروري أن يعلم أن معنى كل لفظة نقولها في شيء من أوصافه بذاته بعيد عن المعنى الذي تنصوره من تلك اللفظة و ذلك كما قلنا بمعنى أشرف و أعلى حتى إذا قلنا إنه موجود علمنا مع ذلك أن وجوده ليس كوجود سائر ما هو دونه و إذا قلنا إنه حي علمنا أنه حي بمعنى أشرف مما نعلمه من الحي الذي هو دونه و كذلك الأمر في سائرهما و مهما استحكم هذا المعنى و تمكن في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٦

ذهن المتعلم للفلسفة التي بعد الطبيعيات سهل عليه تصور ما يقوله أفلاطون و أرسطاطاليس و من سلك سبيلهما فلنرجع الآن إلى حيث فارقناه.

فنقول لما كان الباري تعالى و تقدس حيا مريدا لهذا العالم بجميع ما فيه فواجب أن يكون عنده صور ما يريد إيجادها في ذاته جل الإله عن الأشباح و أيضا فإن ذاته لما كانت باقية و لا يجوز عليه التبدل و التغير فما هو من حيزه أيضا كذلك باق غير دائر و لا متغير و لو لم يكن للموجودات صور و آثار في ذات الموجد الحي المريد فما الذي كان يوجده و على أي مثال ينحو ما يفعله أو يبدعه أ ما علمت أن من نفي هذا المعنى عن الفاعل الحي المريد لزمه القول بأن ما يوجده إنما يوجده جزافا و على غير قصد و لا ينحو نحو غرض مقصود بإرادته و هذا من أشنع الشناعات فعلى هذا المعنى ينبغي أن يعرف و يتصور أقاويل أولئك الحكماء فيما أثبتوه من الصور الإلهية لا على أنها أشباح قائمة في أماكن

خارجة عن هذا العالم فإنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٧

متى تصورت على هذا السبيل يلزم القول بوجود عوالم غير متناهية كلها على مثال هذا العالم وقد بين الحكيم أرسطاطاليس ما يلزم القائلين بوجود العوالم الكثيرة في كتبه في الطبيعيات و شرح المفسرون أقاويله بغاية الإيضاح و ينبغي أن يتدبر هذا الطريق الذي ذكرناه مرارا كثيرة في الأقاويل الإلهية فإنه عظيم النفع و عليه المعول في جميع ذلك و في إهماله ضرر شديد انتهى كلامه و لا يخفى أنه مؤيد لما بيناه و قررناه ضربا من التأييد و لنرجع إلى بيان سائر الطرق في علمه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٨

الفصل (٩) في حال مذهب القائلين بأن علمه تعالى بما سواه علم واحد إجمالي يعلم به الأشياء كلها قبل إيجادها على وجه الإجمال و هذا مذهب أكثر المتأخرين و قد بينوا ذلك بأن

الواجب تعالى لما كان عالما بذاته و ذاته مبدءا لصدور جميع الأشياء فيجب أن يكون عالما بجميعها - علما متحققا في مرتبة ذاته مقدما على صدور الأشياء لا في مرتبة صدورها و إلا لم يكن عالما بالأشياء باعتبار ذاته بل باعتبار ذوات الأشياء فلا يكون له علم بغيره هو صفة كمالية أي حقه و هو محال فزعموا أن علمه بمجوعولاته عبارة عن كونه مبدءا مجعولاته فلمتميزة في الخارج و مبدءا تميز الشيء يكون علما به إذا العلم ليس إلا مبدءا التميز - فإذا ذاته علم بما سواه.

و يرد عليه أنه مبني على انعكاس الموجبة الكلية كنفسها

و ربما قالوا علمه بالأشياء منطوق في علمه بذاته فإذا كان علمه بذاته ذاته و ذاته علة لوجود ما عداه و علمه بما عداه منطوق في ذاته فكان علمه بما عداه علة لما عداه فيكون علمه علما فعليا لكن إذا سئل عنهم ما معنى هذا الانطواء لم يقدروا على بيانه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٣٩

و اعلم أن كون ذاته عقلا بسيطا هو كل الأشياء أمر حق لطيف غامض لكن لغموضه لم يتيسر لأحد من فلاسفة الإسلام و غيرهم حتى الشيخ الرئيس تحصيله و إتقانه على ما هو عليه إذ تحصيل مثله لا يمكن إلا بقوة المكاشفة مع قوة البحث الشديد و الباحث إذا لم يكن له ذوق تام و كشف صحيح لم يمكنه الوصول إلى ملاحظة أحوال الحقائق الوجودية و أكثر هؤلاء القوم مدار بحثهم و تفتيشهم على أحكام المفهومات الكلية و هي موضوعات علومهم دون الآليات الوجودية - و لهذا إذا وصلت نوبة بحثهم إلى مثل هذا المقام ظهر منهم القصور و التلجلج و التمجج في الكلام فيرد عليهم الاعتراض فيما ذكروه من أنه كيف يكون شيء واحد بسيط - غاية الوحدة و البساطة صورة علمية لأشياء مختلفة كثيرة فقد انثلم قاعد تكلم أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٠

العلم بالشيء يجب أن يكون صورة مساوية له متحدة الماهية مع المعلوم و الواجب تعالى لا ماهية له فضلا عن ماهيات كثيرة.

و أيضا كيف يتميز الأشياء بمجرد هذا العلم و إنها لم توجد تلك الماهيات بعد أصلا و هل هذا إلا كتمايز المعدومات الصرفة.

و ربما يجاب عن الأول بأنه كما أن بالصورة العلمية المخصوصة بشيء يتميز ذلك الشيء كذلك بالمقتضي لخصوصية شيء يتميز ذلك الشيء لأن المقتضي باقتضائه يميز ذات المقتضى و صفاته بحيث لا يشاركه غيره و كما أن الصورة التي بها يتميز الشيء إذا حصلت عند المدرك كانت علما به كذلك المقتضي الذي به يتميز الشيء - إذا حصل عند المدرك كان علما به و لما كان المقتضي لجميع العالم على ما هو عليه في الواقع أمرا واحدا يتميز باقتضائه كل ذرة من ذرات الوجود عما عداها فلا استبعاد في أن يكون ذلك الأمر الواحد إذا حصل عند المدرك كان علما له بكل واحد منها فحينئذ يكون جميع الأشياء معلومة بهذا الأمر و يكون جميعها في هذا المشهد الذي هو بمنزلة الوجود الذهني أمرا واحدا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤١

و يرد عليه ما أورده بعض المتأخرين بأنه لما كانت العلة مباينة للمعلول مغايرة له في الوجود فلا يكون حضورها حضوره و ما لم يحضر الشيء عند المدرك لا يكون مشعورا به بمجرد كونه مبدا امتيازه على أن قياس العلة على الصورة و إزالة الاستبعاد بذلك مستبعد جدا إذ الصورة عين ماهية المعلوم على ما هو التحقيق أو شبح و مثال له على المذهب المرجوح المصادم للتحقيق و ليست العلة حقيقة المعلول و لا مثالا له محاكيا عنه فقياسها على الصورة قياس فقهي مع ظهور الفارق.

و عن الثاني بأن ذاته علم إجمالي بالأشياء بمعنى أنه يعلم الأشياء بخصوصياتها - لا على وجه التميز فإن العلم شيء و التميز شيء آخر و الأول لا يوجب الثاني - و قيل عليه إنا نعلم بديهته أنه لا يمكن أن يعلم معلومات متباينة الحقائق بخصوصياتها لحقيقة واحدة مباينة لجميعها و إن فرضنا أنه لم يتميز بعضها عن بعض في نظر العالم.

و اعلم أن الموروث من القدماء في تقرير هذا المطلب

أعني كيفية تعقله للأشياء في مرتبة ذاته هو ما ذكرناه من انطواء العلم بالكل في علمه بذاته كانطواء العلم بلوازم الإنسانية في العلم بالإنسانية و هذا أيضا كلام في غاية الإجمال و إن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٢

كان مما فيه رائحة التحقيق الذي قررناه و سنرجع إلى توضيحه في مستأنف القول إن شاء الله و ربما أوردوا مثالا تفصيليا و قسموا حال الإنسان في علمه بثلاثة أقسام - أحدها أن تكون علومه و صورته العقلية تفصيلية زمانية على سبيل الانتقال من معقول إلى معقول على سبيل التدريج و لا يخلو حينئذ من مشاركة الخيال بل يكون تعقله مع حكاية خيالية بحيث يتحد الإدراك نحو من الاتحاد كما إذا أبصرنا شيئا و حصل أيضا منه في الحس المشترك صورة اتحد الإدراك

و لا يتميز لنا ما يحصل في آلة البصر و ما يحصل في الحس المشترك إلا بوسط و دليل.
و ثانيها أن تكون له ملكة تحصل من ممارسة العلوم و الإدراكات يقدر و يتمكن بسبب حصول تلك الملكة على استحضر الصور العقلية التي كان اكتسبها من قبل متى شاء بلا تجشم كسب جديد و إن كان تلك العلوم و الإدراكات غائبة عنه - غير حاضرة في نفسه إذ النفس ما دامت نفسا مدبرة لهذا البدن الطبيعي ليس في وسعها أن تعقل الأشياء معا لما أشرنا إليه من مشاركة الخيال فليس يحضر عندها جميع ما كسبتها من المعقولات لكن لها ملكة الاستحضار لأيها شاءت متى شاءت من غير تعب و كلفة و هذه حالة بسيطة ساذجة لها نسبة إلى كل صورة يمكن حضورها لصاحب هذه الملكة نسبة القوة الاستعدادية إلى ما لم يحصل بعد لا نسبة القوة الإيجابية إلى المعلول فليس الإنسان في هذه الحالة عالما بالفعل و لا الصور المكسوبة لها من قبل حاضرة عنده و لكن بالقوة القريبة منه إذ له قدرة الاستحضار فيكون عالما بالقوة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٣

و ثالثها كونه بحيث يورد عليه مسائل كثيرة دفعة فيحصل له علم إجمالي بجواب الكل ثم يأخذ بعده في التفصيل شيئا فشيئا حتى يمتلىء منه الأسماع و الأوراق - فهو في هذه الحالة يعلم من نفسه يقينا أنه يحيط بالجواب جملة و لم يفصل في ذهنه ترتيب الجواب ثم يخوض في الجواب مستمدا من الأمر البسيط الكلي الذي كان يدركه من نفسه فهذا العلم الواحد البسيط فعال للتفاصيل و هو أشرف منها.

فقالوا قياس علم واجب الوجود بالأشياء الصادرة و انطواء الكل في علمه على هذا المنهاج و الفرق بأن هذه الحالة البسيطة الخلاقة للمعقولات المفصلة ملكة و صفة زائدة في النفس و في الواجب تعالى ذاته بذاته و حين أورد عليهم بعد ما بينوا الوجوه الثلاثة أن ذلك أي العلم بالشئ على الوجه الثالث أيضا علم بالقوة إلا أنه قوة قريبة من الفعل أجابوا بأن لصاحبه يقينا بالفعل بأن هذا حاصل أي علمه بأجوبة هذه المسائل حاصل عنده إذا شاء فصله فهذا إشارة إلى شيء معلوم و من المحال أن يتيقن بالفعل حال الشيء إلا و هو معلوم من جهة ما يتيقنه فإذا كانت الإشارة يتناول المعلوم بالفعل و ليس من المعلوم المتيقن بالفعل إلا ما كان مخزونا عنده فهذه المسائل بهذا النوع البسيط معلوم له قد يريد أن يجعلها معلومة بنحو آخر فهذا العلم البسيط هيئة تحصل للنفس لا بذاتها بل من لدن مبدأ مخرج إياها من العقل بالقوة إلى العقل بالفعل بحسبها يلزم النفس التصور الفكري و العلم التفصيلي فالأول هو القوة العقلية المشاكلة للعقول الفعالة و أما التفصيل فهو للنفس من حيث هي نفس هذا كلامهم.

و يرد عليهم أن ما يستفاد من ظاهر هذا الكلام ليس إلا أن المجيب في تلك الحالة عالم بالفعل بأن له قدرة على شيء دافع لهذا السؤال أما حقيقة ذلك الشيء فهو غير عالم به فإن لذلك الجواب حقيقة و ماهية و له لازم و هو كونه دافعا لذلك السؤال فالحقيقة مجهولة و اللازم معلوم فهي حالة بين الفعل المحض الذي هو العلم بالمعلومات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٤

مفصلة متميزة بعضها عن بعض و بين القوة المحضة التي هي حالة اختزان المعلومات المفصلة - و حصول الأمر المسمى بالملكة فهي حالة بين الحالتين و كيف يتصور كون شيء واحد - لا سيما إذا كان في غاية الوحدة و البساطة

كذات البارئ عز اسمه علما بأمور مختلفة الذوات متباينة الماهيات بخصوصها فإنه لا يمكن أن يكون تلك الأمور معلومة بالذات - وإلا يلزم تمايز المعدومات كما مر اللهم إلا أن تكون معلومة بالعرض فالمعلوم بالذات ذلك الأمر الواحد البسيط والمعلوم بالعرض ما يلزمه من المعقولات المنبعثة عنه كالعلم بأفراد الإنسان من العلم بوصفه العنواني والعلم بالفروع من العلم بالأصل لا كالعلم بأجزاء الحد من العلم بالمحدود فإن الحد والمحدود متحدان ذاتا مختلفان اعتبارا - كما علمت في مباحث الماهية فإن التفاوت بالإجمال والتفصيل هاهنا إنما يكون بنحوي الإدراك لا بأمر في المدرك ولئن سلم هذا في العلم الإجمالي الذي مثلوا به - في المبحث المذكور في المثال الأخير فكيف يسلم كون الذات المقدسة الواجبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٥

بالنسبة إلى معلوماته وهي ماهيات الممكنات كالمحدود بالقياس إلى الحد وفي هذا سر عظيم فانتظره متفحصا

الفصل (١٠)

و أما قول من زعم كون علمه بحسب مرتبة ذاته علما تفصيليا ببعض الممكنات وهو العقل الأول و علما إجماليا بما سوى المعلول الأول من الممكنات - و يكون علمه بكل معلول علما تفصيليا سابقا على إيجاده عن علمه بنفس ما هو سابق عليه و هكذا يعلم كل لاحق بالعلم بسابقة إلى آخر المعلولات و لا يجب أن يكون علمه التفصيلي بجميع الممكنات في مرتبة واحدة بل في مراتب متفاوتة متلاحقة كل سابق علم تفصيلي بلا حقه إجمالي بما عده من المتأخرات فعلى هذا علمه بكل معلول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٦

متقدم على إيجاده فيكون علمه فعليا فاعترض عليه بعد ما يرد عليه شبه ما تقدم بوجوه أخرى أحدها أنه يجب احتياج الواجب في العلم التفصيلي بأكثر الأشياء إلى ما سواه - و ثانيها أنه يلزم عليه التجدد في علمه و الانتقال من معلوم إلى معلوم كما هو شأن العلوم النفسانية و ثالثها أنه يلزم عليه فقدان العلم بأكثر الأشياء في كثير من مراتب نفس الأمر و خفاء كثير من المعلومات عليه في أكثر المقامات الوجودية و هذا ممتنع بالضرورة البرهانية و ربما يجاب عن الأول بأن توقف العلم التفصيلي الذي هو أمر مبين لذاته - بشيء على شيء آخر يستند إلى ذاته ليس محذورا كما أن صدور الموجودات عنه - بعضه متوقف على بعض آخر و ذلك البعض على بعض آخر حتى ينتهي سلسلة الافتقار إلى ما يفتقر إلى ذاته و ليس هذا يستلزم افتقاره إلى شيء بل هذا في الحقيقة افتقار الكل إليه لا إلى غيره.

و عن الثاني بأن هذا ليس انتقالا زمانيا بل ترتبا عقليا و الانتقال من معلوم إلى معلوم إذا لم يكن زمانيا بل تقدما و تأخرا ذاتيا فهو ليس بممتنع عليه كما في طريقة القائلين بارتسام صور الأشياء في ذاته على الترتيب العلي و المعلولي و كما في طريقة بعض المتكلمين و أبي البركات و قريب من هذا الرأي رأي من زعم من متأخري الحكماء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٧

بأن علمه بذاته عين ذاته و علمه بالأشياء الممكنة عبارة عن وجود العقل الأول مع الصور القائمة به هربا من مفسد

تلزمهم من القول بكون علمه تعالى بالأشياء - صوراً كثيرة قائمة بذاته تعالى وهذا وإن أمكن تصحيحه عند من له قدم راسخ في الحكمة المتعالية لكن لا يصح على قواعدهم المشهورة لأن العقل بما فيه حادث ذاتي و حقيقة علمه تعالى قديمة لأنها عين ذاته فكيف يمكن أن يكون هو هو ولا تصح إلى قول من يقول بعض علمه قديم و بعض علمه حادث - فإنه بمنزلة قول من قال إن بعض قدرته قديمة و بعضها حادث أو قال بعض ذاته قديمة و بعضها حادث بل يجب أن يكون حقيقة علمه واحدة و مع وحدتها تكون علماً بكل شيء كما أشرنا إليه في أوائل هذا السفر الربوبي.

و يرد عليه أيضاً أن وجود العقل مسبوق بعلم الحق به لأن ما لا يعلم لا يمكن إيجاده و إعطاء الوجود له فالعلم به حاصل قبل وجوده ضرورة فهو غيره لا محالة و ماهيته مغايرة لحقيقة العلم بالضرورة لأن حقيقة العلم كما قررنا تكون واجبة الوجود لذاتها - لأن حقيقتها حقيقة الوجود و إن لحقها في بعض المراتب من جهة اقتران الماهية لها إمكان عقلي أو خارجي و لا شيء من الماهيات واجب الوجود لذاته فكيف يكون ماهية المعلول الأول علماً لواجب الوجود.

فظهر و تبين من تضاعيف أقوالنا أن الحق الأول يعلم الأشياء كلها بما يعلم به ذاته لا بأمر آخر و أيضاً العقل الأول عندهم جوهر و جوهريته أنه ماهية لها وجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٨

انتزاعي و هو عرض زائد على ماهيته و العلم سيما علم الله ليس كذلك لأنه كالوجود ليس بجوهر و لا عرض و جوهرية العقل عند هؤلاء الراسخين إنما هي لسريان الهوية الواجبية فيها فيصلح عندهم أن يكون علمه تعالى بالأشياء و لا يصلح عند غيرهم - و أيضاً القول بأن العقل الأول بما فيه عين علمه بالأشياء يبطل العناية الإلهية السابقة على وجود الأشياء كلها و ليست عبارة عن حضور العقل عنده لأن الحضور صفة الحاضر و هو العقل و علمه تعالى صفة له فهو غيره و أيضاً الحضور متأخر عن الحاضر لأنه صفة له و هو متأخر عن الواجب لأنه معلول له و علمه تعالى مع جميع كمالاته متقدم بالذات على جميع الموجودات فلا يفسر علمه بالحضور.

إشراق تعليمي و تنبيه تفريعي -

و الحق أن من أنصف من نفسه يعلم أن الذي أبدع الأشياء و أفادها و اقتضاها اقتضاء بالذات و أوجدها بذلك الاقتضاء من العدم إلى الوجود سواء كان العدم زمانياً أو ذاتياً يعلم تلك الأشياء بحقائقها و لوازمها قبل إيجاده سيما و قد كانت على ترتيب و نظام و نظامها أشرف النظامات و ترتيبها أحسن التقويم و إلا لما أمكن إعطاء الوجود لها فالعلم بها لا محالة غيرها و مقدم عليها و اعلم أن كل من تشبث في إثبات علمه تعالى بالأشياء بشيء من مجعولاته كعقل أو نفس أو يقول علمه التفصيلي متأخر عن ذاته فذلك لقصور نظره و ضعف عقله و الراسخ في الحكمة عندنا من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٤٩

أثبت علمه بجميع الأشياء مع كثرتها و تفصيلها في مرتبة ذاته السابقة على جميع اللوازم و الخوارج من غير أن يلزم اختلاف حيثية في ذاته و ذلك فضل الله يؤتيه من يشاء من عباده و الله ذو الفضل العظيم

الفصل (١١) في حال مذهب من كان يرى أن علمه تعالى بالأشياء هو بالإضافة الإشرافية

[مقدمة]

اعلم أن صاحب الإشراق أثبت علمه على قاعدة الإشراق و كان لي اقتداء به فيها فيما سلف من الزمان إلى أن جاء الحق و أراني ربي برهانه و مبني تلك القاعدة - على أن علمه بذاته هو كونه نورا لذاته و علمه بالأشياء الصادرة عنه هو كونهها ظاهرة له لإشراقه عليها إما بذواتها كالجواهر و الأعراض الخارجية أو بمتعلقاتها التي هي مواضع الشعور للأشياء مستمرة كانت كما في المدبرات العلوية الفلكية - عقولها أو نفوسها أو غير مستمرة كما في القوى الحيوانية النطقية و الخيالية و الحسية - فعلمه تعالى عنده محض إضافة إشراقية فواجب الوجود مستغن في علمه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٠

بالأشياء عن الصور و له الإشراق و التسلط المطلق فلا يحجب شيء عن شيء و علمه و بصره واحد إذ علمه يرجع إلى بصره لا أن بصره يرجع إلى علمه كما في غير هذه القاعدة و نوريته أيضا نفس قدرته فإن النور فياض لذاته فعلمه بالأشياء نفس إيجاده لها - كما أن وجود الأشياء عنه نفس حضورها لديه فله إضافة الفعالية إلى جميع الأشياء - بها يصحح جميع الإضافات اللانقطة به كالعالمية و المريدية و غيرهما إذ كلها واحدة على التحقيق كما سبق ذكره فهذا مذهبه في علم الله تعالى فعلمه عنده ليس بالصور مطلقا بل بالمشاهدة الحضورية و مدار الإدراك للغير أيضا عنده على التسلط النوري للمدرك و الحضور الاستناري للمدرك فإدراك النفس لبدنها و وهمها و خيالها و حسها و كل ما لها تصرف فيه من أجزاء البدن و قواه فهو أنما يكون بالإضافة القهرية الإشراقية فبقدر تسلطها و إشراقها على شيء منها يكون قوة إدراكها له و ليس إدراكها لشيء بصورة زائدة عليه و لو كان إدراكها لوهمها و خيالها و غيرهما بصورة أخرى مرتسمة في ذاتها و كل صورة ترتسم في ذات النفس - فهي كلية و إن تخصصت ألف تخصص فإن ذلك لا يخرجها عن العموم و احتمال الشركة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥١

فيها للكثرة فيلزم أن يكون النفس محركة لبدن كلي و مستعملة لقوى كلية و ليس لها إدراك بدنها الخاص و قواها و لا التصرفات و التدابير الجزئية و هو ليس كذلك بالضرورة الوجدانية فإنه ما من إنسان إلا و يدرك بدنه الجزئي و قواه الجزئية و النفس تستخدم المفكرة في تفصيل الصور الجزئية و تركيبها حتى ينتزع الكليات من الشخصيات و تستنبط النتائج من المقدمات و حيث لم يكن للقوة الجزئية سبيل إلى مشاهدة ذاتها لعدم حضورها عند نفسها فإن المنطبع في محل وجوده في نفسه هو بعينه وجوده لمحله فوجودها لغيرها لا لنفسها كما سبق ذكره كيف و الوهم ينكر نفسه - و ينكر القوى الباطنة و إن لم يجحد آثارها فإذا لم يكن للوهم و هو رئيس سائر القوى الجرمانية سبيل إلى إدراك نفسه و إدراك القوى الباطنة و كذلك سائر المدارك الجزئية - فالمدرك لهذه القوى الجزئية و الجزئيات المرتسمة فيها و الكليات المنتزعة عن تلك الجزئيات أنما هي النفس الناطقة بنفس تلك الأمور و ذلك لإشراقها و تسلطها على هذه الأمور مع كونها في ذاتها نورا لذاتها و كلما هو نور لنفسه و له تسلط على غيره كان مدركا لذاته و لذلك الغير إما إدراكه لذاته فبمحض كونه نورا إذ النور يلزمه الظهور بل هو عين الظهور و إما إدراكه لذلك الغير فبمجرد إضافته إليه و كلما كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٢

الشيء أشد نورية وأقوى تسلطا على الغير كان إدراكه لذاته ولغيره أشد وأقوى وأشد الذوات نورية هو الحق جل ذكره وأقوى أنحاء التسلط هو الإبداع المطلق والتأيس بلا شركة وليس للنفس بالقياس إلى هذا البدن الطبيعي وقواه إلا التحريك - و ضرب من الفاعلية غير التامة كما بين في موضعه و لو كان تسلطها عليه و عليها بالإبداع - لكان إدراكها له و لما فيه في الغاية و ليس كذلك لما ذكرناه و مع ذلك تتفاوت النفوس في النورية و التسلط و كلما كان نوريتها أشد و تسلطها على البدن أقوى كان إدراكها أقوى إذ كان حضور البدن لها أتم و لو كانت ذات تسلط على غير بدنها - كتسلطها على بدننا لأدركته أيضا بمجرد الإضافة الإشراقية القهرية من دون الافتقار إلى قبولها الصورة و انفعالها عنه فالقبول جهة النقص و القهر جهة الكمال و الشرف - و نحن إنما احتجنا إلى الصورة في بعض الأشياء كالسما و الكواكب و غيرهما مما نعلمه باعتبار و قياس لأن ذواتها كانت غائبة عنا فاستحضرنا صورها و تلك الصور هي معلومنا بالحقيقة لكونها مقهورة لنا و لو كانت هي أيضا حاضرة لنا كحضور آلاتنا و ما فيها لما احتجنا في إدراكها إلى صورة.

فإذن ثبت و تحقق أن النفس غير غائبة عن ذاتها و لا قواها و لا الصور المتمثلة في قواها محجوبة عنها و لا بدنها الجرمي مختلف عليها لكونها نورا لذاتها و لها ضرب من التأثير في هذه الأمور فالنور المجرد الواجب و هو في أعلى مرتبة شدة النورية - و له إضافة الإبداع إلى ما سواه الذي هو أعلى ضروب التأثير و الإيجاد و له السلطنة العظمى و القهر الأتم لا جرم يعلم ذاته و يعلم ما سواه من العقول و الأجرام و قواها و ما يتمثل لها أو ينطبع فيها بمجرد إضافة المبدئية فكما أن علمه بذاته لا يزيد على ذاته كذلك علمه بالأشياء لا يزيد على إضافته إلى الأشياء.

و أيضا قد سبق أن كل ما هو كمال مطلق للموجود من حيث هو موجود فيجب له و إذا تحقق شيء منه في معلولة فتحققه له أولى و كلما هو أولى فهو واجب له بالضرورة و إذا صح العلم الإشراقي للنفس ففي واجب الوجود أولى فيدرك ذاته لا بأمر زائد و يدرك ما سواه بمجرد إضافة الإشراق إليها و لو كان مدركا لذاته بنور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٣

زائد لكان ذاته أنور من ذاته و لو كان مدركا للأشياء بصور مرتسمة في ذاته لكان قابلا و فاعلا فيلزم ما يلزم القول به من الشناعات.

قال و مما يدل على أن هذا القدر كاف في العلم أن الأبصار إنما هو بمجرد إضافة ظهور الشيء الخارجي للبصر عند عدم الحجاب فإن من لم يكن الرؤية عنده - بانطباع أشباح المقادير في الجليدية و لا بخروج الشعاع عنها يلزمه أن يعترف بأن الأبصار بمجرد مقابلة المستنير للعضو الباصر فيقع به إضافة إشراقية للنفس إليه لا غير فإذا إضافته تعالى لكل ظاهر أبصار و إدراك و تعدد الإضافات لا يوجب كثرا في ذاته و لا تجدد لها يوجب تغيرا في ذاته كما بين في موضعه - فلا **يَعَزَبُ عَنْهُ مِثْقَالُ ذَرَّةٍ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَلَا فِي الْأَرْضِ** فهذه طريقة هذا الشيخ الجليل في هذه المسألة و تبعه العلامة الطوسي ره و غيره و حكم بصحتها كل من أتى بعده فإن العلامة الطوسي شارح كتاب الإشارات لما رأى في إثبات الصور لذاته تعالى ورود كثر من الإشكالات و لم يقدر على حلها و التفصي عنها حاول طريقة أخرى لتصحيح مسألة العلم فقال العاقل كما لا يفتقر في إدراك ذاته إلى صورة غير ذاته التي هو بها هو كذلك لا يفتقر في إدراكه لما يصدر عن ذاته لذاته إلى صورة غير صورة ذلك الصادر التي بها هو هو و اعتبر من نفسك أنك تعقل شيئا بصورة تتصورها أو تستحضرها فهي صادرة عنك لا بانفرادك مطلقا بل بمشاركة ما من غيرك و مع ذلك فانت تعقلها بذاتها لا بصورة

أخرى لا تمتنع تضاعف الصور إلى غير النهاية - فإذا كان حالك مع ما يصدر عنك بمشاركة غيرك هذه الحال فما ظنك بحال العاقل مع ما يصدر عنه لذاته من غير مداخله غيره فيه و ليس من شرط كل ما يعقل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٤

أن يكون المدرك محلاً للصورة المعقولة فإنك تعقل ذاتك مع أنك لست بمحل لها بل كونك محلاً لها من شروط حصولها لك الذي هو مناط عقلك إياها فإن حصلت هي لك على جهة أخرى سوى الحلول فيك لعقلتها من غير حلول فيك فإذن المعلومات الذاتية للعاقل الفاعل لذاته حاصلة له من غير أن يحل فيه فهو عاقل إياها بانفسها بلا حلولها فيه

فإذا عرفت هذه المقدمة فاعلم

أن الواجب لذاته لما لم يكن بين ذاته و بين عقله لذاته مغايرة بل كان عقله لذاته هو نفس ذاته فكذلك لا مغايرة بين وجود المعلول الأول و بين تعقل الواجب له إذ عقله لذاته علة عقله لمعلوله الأول كما أن ذاته علة ذات المعلول الأول فإذا حكمت باتحاد علتين فاحكم باتحاد المعلولين - فإذن وجود المعلول الأول هو نفس تعقل الواجب لذاته له من غير استيناف صورة تحل في ذات الأول تعالى عن ذلك علواً كبيراً وقد عرفت أن كل مجرد يعقل ذاته و غيره من المجردات فالجواهر العقلية لما كانت تعقل ما ليست بمعلومات لها بحصول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٥

صورها فيها و هي تعقل الواجب الوجود أيضاً و لا موجود إلا و هو معلول للواجب تعالى كانت صور جميع الموجودات الكلية و الجزئية على ما هي عليه حاصلة فيها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٦

و الأول الواجب يعقل تلك الجواهر مع تلك الصور لا بصور غيرها بل بأعيان تلك الجواهر و الصور و بهذا الطريق يعقل الوجود على ما هو عليه فإذن **لَا يَعْزَبُ عَنْهُ مِثْقَالُ ذَرَّةٍ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ لَا فِي الْأَرْضِ** من غير لزوم شيء من المحالات المذكورة قال إذا تحققت هذا الأصل و بسطته ظهرت لك كيفية إحاطته بجميع الموجودات الكلية و الجزئية و ذلك فضل الله يؤتيه من يشاء فهذا ما ذكره هذا العلامة - و إذا تأملت فيه وجدته بعينه طريقة الشيخ الإشراقي بأدنى تفاوت و هي التي ارتضاها كل من نظر فيها و لم يقدح فيها أحد و هي مقدوحة عندي بوجوه من القدح و قد مضى بعضها و بقي البعض و لا بأس بإعادتها مع ما بقي لما في التذكير من زيادة التوضيح و الكشف. فنقول يرد عليها أمور -

الأول أنها تبطل العناية الإلهية السابقة على جميع الممكنات

الدال عليها النظام العجيب و الترتيب الفاضل و لا يكفي في الاعتذار ما ذكره مجيباً عن ذلك بأن جودة النظام و حسن الترتيب الأنيق في هذا العالم إنما هي ظلال و لوازم للنسب الشريفة - و الترتيب الأنيق الواقع بين المفارقات فإن للعقول المفارقة كثرة و افره عنده و لها سلاسل طويلة و عرضية و هيئات عقلية و نسب معنوية فذوات هذه الأصنام تابعة لذوات أربابها و هيئاتها لهيئاتها و نسبها لنسبها و ذلك لأننا نقول هب أن هذا النظام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٧

تابع لنظام ذلك العالم فما السبب الباعث لنظام ذلك العالم لو لم يكن ذاته بحسب صقعه الإلهي مشتملا على أفضل نظام وأحسن جمعية لا نظام أفضل منه ولا أحسن وأكرم دفعا للدور والتسلسل ولقد بين المعلم الأول في اثولوجيا هذا المقصد بما لا مزيد عليه.

الثاني أن كون العلم إضافة محضة غير صحيح

سواء سميت إشراقية أم لا إذ من العلم ما يكون مطابقا للواقع ومنه غير مطابق له فيسمى بالجهل وأيضا من العلم ما هو تصور ومنه ما هو تصديق والإضافة لا يمكن تقسيمها إلى هذه الأقسام وقوله و تقسيمهم العلم في أوائل المنطق إلى التصور والتصديق إنما هو في العلوم التي هي غير علم المجردات بذواتها وغير العلم بالأشياء التي يكفي في العلم بها مجرد الإضافة الحضورية غير مستقيم لأن مطلق العلم معنى واحد وحقيقة واحدة لا يمكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٨

أن يكون بعض أفراد إضافة وبعضها صورة إذ كل مورد قسمة ليس انقسامه إلى الأفراد إلا بقيود متخالفة تضم إليه و يحصل منه مع كل ضميمه قسم واحد فال مورد مشترك بين الأقسام ولا يجوز مثل هذا الاشتراك لأمر بين الإضافة وغيرها لأنها غير مستقلة المعنى وهذا مما يظهر بأدنى تأمل

و الثالث أن العلم كما بين في موضعه إما بالتعقل أو التخيل أو التوهم أو الإحساس

وليس من العلم شيء خارج عن هذه الأقسام ويلزم على مذهبه أما كون الباري والمجردات العقلية في إدراكها للأجسام والصور الخارجية وكذا في إدراكها للمثل الإدراكية المرتسمة في المدارك الجزئية حساسة وإما أن يوجد قسم من العلم خارجا عن الأقسام المذكورة وهذا غير وارد على القائلين بأن العلم مطلقا هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٥٩

بالصور في إدراك الباري أو المفارق للخارجيات والجزئيات فإن هذا التقسيم للعلم إنما هو باعتبار ما يكون معلوما بالذات لا بالعرض فإن هذا القيد معتبر في التقسيمات كلها وإن لم يذكر فإذن إدراك هذه الأمور المادية عن كل مدرك إنما هو بتبعية صورها الإدراكية مطلقا على ما ذهبنا إليه وإدراك المفارق إياها بتبعية الصور المعقولة فإن لكل صورة مادية كائنة فاسدة صورة إدراكية ذات حياة وتعقل وتلك الصورة أيضا صورة عقلية وهي وجهها الثابت عند الله وهي المعقولة بالذات وما دونها أيضا معقولة له لكن بتبعية تلك الصورة فاحتفظ بهذا التحقيق فإنه نافع جدا.

و الرابع أن الإضافة متأخرة الوجود عن وجود الطرفين

فيلزم الحاجة له في أشرف صفاته إلى مخلوقاته.

الخامس أنا قد بينا في كثير من مواضع هذا الكتاب بالبرهان

أن شيئا من الأجسام الطبيعية و صورها المادية و هيئاتها لا يمكن أن يكون مدركا بالذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٠

و ليس لها أيضا حضور جمعي عند شيء إلا بأمثلتها الحسية أو العقلية و لأجل ذلك كان إدراكها عند الحكماء بصورة منتزعة منها لا بنفسها فكيف ذهب هذا الشيخ العظيم و العلامة الطوسي ره و من وافقهما إلى الاكتفاء بغير الصور الإدراكية في إدراك هذه الأكوان المادية.

و السادس أن قوله و من لم يكن الأبصار عنده بانطباع أشباح المقادير في الجليدية

و لا بخروج الشعاع عنها يلزمه الاعتراف بأن الأبصار بمجرد مقابلة المستنير للعضو الباصر منظور فيه إذ ذلك الاعتراف غير لازم بل اللازم أنما هو غير و هو ما ذهبنا إليه و قررناه بأن النفس أصبحت عند تلك المقابلة مخترعة للصور المبصرة في غير هذا العالم نسبتها إلى النفس بالقيام الاتصالي كنسبة الصور العقلية القائمة بذاته تعالى لا بالحلول تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا.

السابع أنه ذهب إلى أن التخيل ليس بحصول الصور الخيالية في شيء من أجزاء الدماغ

بل بمطالعة النفس لما في عالم المثال و التي هناك من الصور ليس شيء منها عنده من معلومات النفس حتى يكون لها القهر و السلطنة عليها فبطل ما قرره من القاعدة المذكورة من أن إدراك الشيء لذاته بكونه نورا و إدراكه لغيره بكونه قاهرا عليه و مراده من القهر ليس إلا العلية بنحو فلا قهر لما ليس بعلة و لا قهر على ما ليس بمعلول فانفسخت قاعدته في إدراك النفس للخياليات.

و الثامن أنه يلزم عليه أن لا يعلم الباري جل ذكره شيئا مما سواه

في مرتبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦١

ذاته لا على وجه التفصيل و لا على وجه الإجمال لأن العلم الإجمالي له بالأشياء باطل عنده كما ذكره في كتاب المطارحات و زيف القول به و اللازم باطل و كيف يجوز صاحب بصيرة أن الذي أوجد الأشياء و اقتضاها بذاته لا يكون فيه علم بها مع أن الحكماء قد أثبتوا للطبائع المحركة للمواد غايات ذاتية في أفاعيلها و العلة الغائية متأخرة عن الفعل وجودا متقدمة عليه قصدا فيلزمهم القول بضرب من الإدراك فيها لغايات أفاعيلها فما ظنك بمبدع الكل هل جاز أن يوجد الأشياء جزافا فهذه وجوه من القدح في هذا الرأي.

و أما تحاشيه و تحاشي من تبعه من القول بالصور الإلهية لظنهم أنه يلزم حلول الأشياء في ذاته و في علمه الذي هو عين ذاته فقد علمت أن ذلك غير لازم إلا عند المحجوبين عن الحق الزاعمين أنها كانت غيره تعالى و كانت أعراضا حالة فيه و أما إذا كانت عينه من حيث الحقيقة و الوجود و غيره من حيث التعيين و التقيد - فبالحقيقة ليس هناك حال و لا محل بل شيء واحد متفاوت الوجود بالكمال و النقص - و البطون و الظهور و نفس الأمر عند التحقيق عبارة عن هذا العلم الإلهي الحاوي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٢

لصور الأشياء كلها كليها و جزئها قديمها و حادثها فإنه يصدق عليه أنه وجود الأشياء على ما هي عليها فإن الأشياء

موجودة بهذا الوجود الإلهي الحاوي لكل شيء إذ الأشياء كما أن لها وجودا طبيعيا ووجودا مثاليا ووجودا عقليا فكذا
لها وجود إلهي عند العرفاء وهذا الوجود أولى بأن يكون عبارة عن نفس الأمر ولا يلزم من ذلك ثبوت المعدومات إذ
ثبوت المعدوم الذي حكم عليه أنه محال عبارة عن انفكاك الشيئية عن الوجود مطلقا لا انفكاكها عن الثبوت الخارجي
مع تحققها بالوجود الرباني وظهورها فيه وسيأتيك زيادة إيضاح لهذا المطلب.
فإن قلت العلم تابع للمعلوم فكيف يكون هذا العلم الذي هو الذات الإلهية تابعا للأشياء.
قلنا هذا العلم الإلهي لكونه كالقدرة والإرادة ونظائرها من الصفات الإضافية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٣

أي من الحقائق المضافة إلى الأشياء فله اعتباران أحدهما اعتبار عدم مغايرته للذات الأحدية وهي بهذا الاعتبار من
صفات الله وغير تابعة لشيء بل الأشياء تابعة له إذ به صدرت وجودات الأشياء في الخارج ولهذه الجهة قيل علمه
تعالى فعلي و ثانيهما اعتبار إضافته إلى الأشياء وهو بهذا الاعتبار تابع للأشياء متكرر بتكررها و سنشبع القول في
تحقيق هذا المقام عند بيان كيفية علمه بالأشياء على طريقة أصحاب المكاشفة الذوقية ونحن قد جعلنا مكاشفاتهم
الذوقية مطابقة للقوانين البرهانية والكلام في كون علمه تابعا للمعلوم أو المعلوم تابعا له الأليق بذكره أن يكون هناك
من هاهنا

الفصل (١٢) في ذكر صريح الحق و خالص اليقين و مخ القول في علمه تعالى السابق على كل شيء
حتى على الصور العلمية القائمة بذاته التي هي بوجه عين الذات و بوجه غيرها كما بيناه
و هذه المرتبة من العلم هي المسماة بالغيب

المشار إليه بقوله تعالى **وَعِنْدَهُ مَفَاتِحُ الْغَيْبِ لَا يَعْلَمُهَا إِلَّا هُوَ** فالمفاتيح هي الصور التفصيلية والغيب هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٤

مرتبة الذات البحتة المتقدمة على تلك التفاصيل و المقصود في هذا الفصل بيان شهوده تعالى للأشياء كلها في هذه
المرتبة الأحدية التي هي غيب كل غيب و أبسط من كل بسيط.

و هذا المطلب يمكن بيانه بوجهين

أحدهما من جهة كونه تعالى عقلا بسيطا و هي طريقة قدماء الحكماء و ثانيهما و هو منهج الصوفية المحققين من جهة
اتصافه بمدلولات الأسماء و الصفات في مرتبة ذاته و أنها ليست من قبيل اللوازم المتأخرة بل حالها كحال الماهية
بالقياس إلى وجودها مع أن الواجب ليس ذا ماهية - و كلا الوجهين دقيق غامض يحتاج دركه عند تعلمه و استفادته من
المعلم البشري و سماعه منه إلى لطف قريحة و صفاء ضمير فكيف في استنباطه و استفادته من الملكوت.

أما المنهج الأول

فلنمهد لبيانه أصولا

أحدها أن كل هوية وجودية هي مصداق بعض المعاني الكلية في مرتبة وجودها

و هويتها و هي المسماة في غير الواجب بالماهية عند الحكماء و بالعين الثابت عند الصوفية و ذلك البعض قد يكون

متعددا وقد يكون واحدا و يقال له الماهية البسيطة و المعاني المتعددة قد تكون موجودة بوجود واحد و يقال لها البسيط الخارجي كالسواد مثلا و قد تكون موجودة بوجودات متعددة و يقال لها المركب الخارجي كماهية الحيوان المأخوذ جنسه من مادته و هو الجسم النامي و فصله من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٥

صورته و هو الحساس ثم لا بد أن يكون لمادته و صورته ضرب من الاتحاد في الوجود- حتى لا تكونا بمنزلة الحجر الموضوع بجانب الإنسان و إلا فلم تكن الماهية ماهية واحدة و جهة الوحدة إنما توجد في جانب الصورة لا في ناحية المادة لأن الصورة هي أقوى تحسلا من المادة لأنها مفيدة المادة كما بين في موضعه و كونها جهة الوحدة- عبارة عن كون الصورة كالحساس مثلا مصداقا بنفس ذاته لحمل جميع المعاني- التي بعضها بإزاء المادة كمفهوم الجسم النامي لا بأن يكون ذلك المعنى جزء للماهية و إلا لكان المفروض فصلا نوعا و المفروض جنسا لنوع جنسا لفصله و المفروض فصلا مقسما فصلا مقوما و لا بأن يكون عارضا لازما له إذ المبدأ الفصلي في مرتبة هويته و ذاته مصداق للمعنى الجنسي و ما قيل في المشهور أن الجنس عرض أو عرضي للفصل- ليس المراد منه عارض الوجود كالضاحك و الكاتب بالقوة بالنسبة إلى الإنسان المتأخر وجوده عن وجود المعروف بل المعنى بذلك العروض أن المعنى الجنسي ليس- داخلا في ماهية الفصل الاشتقاقي إذ لا ماهية له و السر في ذلك أن كلا من الفصول الاشتقاقية التي هي مطابقة للفصول المحمولة و المنطقية باصطلاح آخر غير الذي يذكر في المنطق هو نحو خاص من الوجود الخارجي و الوجود لا حد له و لا ماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٦

فاتصاف ذلك النحو من الوجود أي الوجود الفصلي بالمعنى الجنسي ليس كاتصاف المعروف بالعارض اللازم اتصافا خارجيا من حيث إن للمعروض وجودا و للعارض وجودا آخر إذ وجود الفصل الاشتقاقي و هو الصورة النوعية في الخارج مضمن فيه المعنى الجنسي بل إنما يكون المغايرة و الاتصاف في ظرف التحليل و هذا معنى قولهم الجنس عرض للفصل أي مفهوم الجنس غير مفهوم الفصل و هما معا موجودان بوجود واحد هو وجود الفصل الاشتقاقي و المقصود أن المعاني المختلفة الموجودة بوجودات متعددة قد تكون موجودة بوجود واحد كالفصل الأخير للإنسان و هو الناطق- بل النفس الإنسانية من حيث إن مفهوم الجوهر و مفهوم القابل و مفهوم الجسم الطبيعي- و مفهوم النامي و مفهوم الحساس كلها موجودة بوجود الناطق في هذا النوع الإنساني- و بعض هذه المفاهيم موجود بغير هذا الوجود في نوع آخر غير الإنسان مثلا طائفة منها موجودة بوجود واحد آخر في الحيوان غير الناطق و هي من الجوهر إلى الحساس و طائفة أخرى و هي بعض تلك الطائفة موجودة بوجود واحد آخر في النبات و طائفة أخرى في الجماد و بعضها كالجوهر القابل للأبعاد ذي الطبيعة الجسمية في الجسم العنصري و بعضها و هو الجوهر ذو الأبعاد يوجد في الجسم المقداري الجوهري و أما مفهوم الجوهر فقد فهو بإزاء وجود الهيولى فعلم من هذا أن الأشياء الكثيرة المتكثرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٧

الوجود توجد بوجود واحد.

الأصل الثاني أنه كلما كان الموجود أقوى وجوداً وأتم تحصلاً كان مع بساطته أكثر

حيطة بالمعاني و أجمع اشتمالاً على الكمالات المتفرقة في سائر الأشياء غيره كما يظهر من حال المراتب الاستكمالية المتدرجة في الكمال من صورة إلى صورة متعاقبة على المادة بحسب تكامل استعداداتها لقبول صورة بعد صورة - إلى أن تبلغ متروية إلى صورة أخيرة تصدر منها جميع ما يصدر من السوابق الصورية - لاشتغالها من جهة قوة الوجود على مبادي تلك الأفاعيل بأجمعها مع أحدثها

الأصل الثالث أنه ليس يلزم من تحقق كل معنى نوعي في موجود

و صدقه عليه أن يكون وجوده وجود ذلك المعنى لأن وجود الشيء الخاص به هو ما يكون بحسب ذلك الوجود متميزاً عن غيره من المعاني الخارجي عن ماهيته وحده - فوجود الإنسان مثلاً ليس وجود الحيوان بما هو حيوان وإن اشتمل على حده ومعناه ولا وجود الحيوان هو وجود النبات وإن اشتمل على حده ومعناه وهكذا - ولا تظن أنه كما يوجد في الإنسان فصل كماله زائد على الحيوانية المطلقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٨

فكذلك يلزم أن يتحقق في كل نوع من الحيوان كمال آخر وجودي زائد في وجوده على مطلق الحيوانية ولا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون الفصول فيما وراء الإنسان أمورا عديمة إذ ربما كان تأكد وجود المعنى الجنسي وفعليته مانعاً من قبول الموضوع لكمال آخر وجودي إذ المعنى الواحد الجنسي كما سبق في مباحث الماهية صالح للنوعية كما هو صالح للجنسية وليس هذا التفاوت بمجرد أخذه لا بشرط شيء حتى يكون جنساً وأخذه بشرط لا شيء حتى يصير نوعاً كما ذكره وإن كان المذكور صحيحاً من جهة مراعاة أحكام المعاني و الماهيات لكن منشأ ذلك و مبناه على أحكام الوجودات و أنحائها من الشدة والضعف فقد يكون لأمر واحد وجود ضعيف و وجود آخر قوي و ضعف الوجود يستدعي الاستهلاك بوجوده في وجود آخر و الانتقال من وجوده إلى وجود ما هو أكمل و أقوى فالوجود النباتي للمعنى النوعي الذي هو عبارة عن الجسم النامي متى كان قويا في باب التغذية و التنمية و التوليد كالأشجار - يكون تاماً بالفعل في باب نوعه فلا يمكن انتقاله إلى كمال نوع آخر و قوة أخرى كمبدأ الحس و هذا بخلاف الجسم النامي الموجود بوجود اللطف و المواد الحيوانية - فإنه صالح لأن ينتقل من نوعه إلى نوع أكمل منه فيصير المعنى النوعي المحصل في باب النبات معنى جنسياً مبهم الوجود غير محصل في باب الحيوان فظهر أن الوجود المحصل الخاص بالجسم النامي هو الذي وجدت به الأشجار و النباتات لا الذي يوجد به الحيوان و كذا القياس في الحيوان بالنسبة إلى الإنسان و كل جنس بالنسبة إلى نوع تحته من الأجناس و الأنواع المترتبة فظهر و تبين مما قرناه أنه يجوز أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٦٩

يكون تمام حقيقة شيء بعض حقيقة شيء آخر.

الأصل الرابع أن كلما تحقق شيء من الكمالات الوجودية في موجود من الموجودات

فلا بد أن يوجد أصل ذلك الكمال في علته على وجه أعلى و أكمل - و هذا مما يفهم من كلام معلم المشائين في كثير

من مواضع كتابه في الربوبيات - المسمى بأثولوجيا و يعضده البرهان و يوافقه الذوق السليم و الوجدان فإن الجهات الوجودية للمعلول كلها مستندة إلى علته الموجدة و هكذا إلى علة العلل - ففيه جميع الخيرات كلها و لكن سلبت عنها القصورات و النقائص و الأعدام اللازمة للمعلولية بحسب مراتب نزولها.

فإذا تمهدت هذه الأصول فنقول

الواجب تعالى هو المبدأ الفياض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٠

لجميع الحقائق و الماهيات فيجب أن يكون ذاته تعالى مع بساطته و أحديته كل الأشياء و نحن قد أقمنا البرهان في مباحث العقل و المعقول على أن البسيط الحقيقي من الوجود يجب أن يكون كل الأشياء و إن أردت الاطلاع على ذلك البرهان فارجع إلى هناك فإذن لما كان وجوده تعالى وجود كل الأشياء فمن عقل ذلك الوجود عقل جميع الأشياء و ذلك الوجود هو بعينه عقل لذاته و عاقل فواجب الوجود عاقل لذاته بذاته فعقله لذاته عقل لجميع ما سواه و عقله لذاته مقدم على وجود جميع ما سواه فعقله لجميع ما سواه سابق على جميع ما سواه فثبت أن علمه تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧١

بجميع الأشياء حاصل في مرتبة ذاته بذاته قبل وجود ما عداه سواء كانت صوراً عقليه قائمة بذاته أو خارجة منفصلة عنها فهذا هو العلم الكمالي التفصيلي بوجه و الإجمالي بوجه و ذلك لأن المعلومات على كثرتها و تفصيلها بحسب المعنى موجودة بوجود واحد بسيط ففي هذا المشهد الإلهي و المجلي الأزلي ينكشف و ينجلي الكل من حيث لا كثرة فيها فهو الكل في وحدة.

فإن قلت فيلزم أن يكون واجب الوجود ذا ماهية فلا يكون وجوداً بحتاً و قد تقرر بالبرهان أنه تعالى وجود بحت بلا ماهية لأن كل ذي ماهية معلول.

قلت قد سبقت منا الإشارة إلى دفع هذا الإيراد بأن المراد من الماهية هي المحدودة بحد خاص جامع مانع يخرج عنها أشياء كثيرة و ذلك لقصور وجودها عن الحیطة التامة و المراد من كون الشيء ذا ماهية أو كونه ذا وجود زائد على ماهيته - هو كون الشيء بحيث يفتقر في اتصافه بوجوده إلى شيء آخر و لا يكون أيضاً متحقق الوجود في جميع المراتب الوجودية فلا محالة يتحقق قبل وجوده الخاص مرتبة من مراتب نفس الأمر لم يكن هو موجوداً في تلك المرتبة مع تحقق إمكان الوجود لماهيته في تلك المرتبة ففي تلك المرتبة انفكت الماهية عن وجودها الخاص بها و ما من ممكن إلا و في نفس الأمر له مرتبة لا يكون وجوده الخاص المقيد به في تلك المرتبة - فهذا معنى كون الممكن ذا ماهية و كون الوجود زائداً على ماهيته.

و أما الواجب جل ذكره فليس له حد محدود في الوجود و لا له ماهية محدودة بحد خاص فاقد لأشياء كثيرة و لا أيضاً يوجد مرتبة في الواقع لم يكن هو موجوداً في تلك المرتبة و معنى كونه وجوداً بحتاً صرفاً أنه ليس يوجد له ماهية أخرى غير الوجود و تأكده فجميع حيثياته حيثية واحدة هي حيثية وجوب الوجود إذ لا حد له و لا نهاية لوجوده لكونه غير متناه في مراتب الشدة و الكمال كل مرتبة منها غير متناه في عدة الآثار و الأفعال فلا يخلو عنه أرض و لا سماء و لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٢

ولا فرش و لو كان لوجوده نهاية كان بإزائها جهة و بإزاء الوجود جهة أخرى فلم يكن واحدا حقيقيا و كان ذا ماهية مخصوصة فكل واحد حقيقي يجب أن يكون غير متناهي الشدة و يجب أن يكون كل الأشياء **أَلَا إِلَى اللَّهِ تَصِيرُ الْأُمُورُ**

إيضاح تفريعي

فعلمه تعالى بالأشياء في مرتبة ذاته ليس بصور زائدة مغايرة لذاته بل هي معان كثيرة غير محدودة انسحب عليها حكم الوجود الواجبي من غير أن يصير وجودا لكل من تلك المعاني و لا لشيء منها كما أشرنا إليه في الأصول بل كان مظهرا لكل منها و فرق بين كون الوجود مظهرا و مجلى لماهية من الماهيات و بين كونه وجودا لها إذ وجود كل ماهية هو ما يخص بها و يميزها عن غيرها- كما مر في مثال الإنسان أعني الصورة الإنسانية النفسية و اشتغالها مع وحدتها في الوجود لكثير من ماهيات الأنواع من غير أن يصير تلك الماهيات متصفة بهذا الوجود- على النحو الذي توجد في الخارج بل بأن يكون هذا الوجود مظهرا لها و مجلى لأحكامها.

مثال آخر

أن مراتب الشدة و الضعف في الكيف كمراتب السوادات و الحرارة أنوع متخالفة كما هو المقرر عند الحكماء فإذن يتحقق في الاشتداد الكيفي و هو حركة متصلة واحدة لها حدود غير متناهية بحسب إدراك الوهم أنوع غير متناهية لذلك الكيف كالسواد و له في كل حد نوع آخر من جنسه و الأنوع المتباينة متباينة في الوجود بالضرورة مع أنه ليس هاهنا إلا وجود واحد لا اتصال الحركة و نقول أيضا ينتهي الحركة الاشتدادية فيه إلى مرتبة كاملة تشتمل على المراتب الضعيفة منه كما أن كل مرتبة كاملة من المقدار كالخط الطويل يشتمل على جميع المقادير الخطية التي هي أقصر منه مع وحدة وجوده بل السواد الشديد مثلا- سواء حصل بالاشتداد أم حدث ابتداء يشتمل على ماهية السوادات الضعيفة التي هي دونها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٣

مع وحدة الوجود فالسبب في جميع ذلك و ما أشبهه أن الوجود المختص بشيء غير الوجود الذي يظهر فيه أو يصدق عليه ذلك فتلك الأنوع السوادية التي يتضمنها السواد الشديد و الحركة الاشتدادية لكل منها وجود خاص يتميز به عما عداه و كذلك الحال في اشتغال الحقيقة الإنسانية على كثير من الماهيات و ليس هذا من باب كون الشيء موجودا بالقوة كما توهم فإن تلك المعاني ثابتة بالفعل على وجه أعلى و أتم من وجودها الخاص و معنى كون الشيء بالقوة هو أن لا يكون موجودا بوجوده الخاص به- و لا بوجود ما هو تمامه و كماله بالفعل بل المادة قابلة له بواسطة هيئة قائمة بها مناسبة لوجوده مقربة لها إلى فاعله فكذلك حال المعلومات الإلهية في كونها ثابتة بالفعل لا بالقوة بالوجود الإلهي الأحدي.

فنقول التحقيق أن هذه الأنوع الممكنة إنما تباينت و تخالفت إذا صارت موجودة بالفعل بوجوداتها الخاصة بواحد واحد منها على وجه يصدق عليها أحكامها و يترتب عليها آثارها و أما قبل ذلك فلها الوجود الجمعي و هذا الوجود

الجمعي نحو آخر من الوجود أرفع وأشرف من كل وجود عقلي أو مثالي أو خارجي وليس هناك أمر بالقوة ولو استعمل لفظ القوة في هذا المقام لم يكن المراد به ما هو من باب الإمكانيات والاستعدادات قريبة كانت أو بعيدة بل المراد من كونها بالقوة أنها غير موجودة بوجوداتها الخاصة بل بوجود جمعي هو وجود مبدئها وتمامها ولا يلزم من ذلك ثبوت المعدومات و انفكك الشيئية عن الوجود لأن ذلك كما أشرنا إليه عبارة عن انفككها عن وجودها وعن وجود ما هو مبدؤها و تمامها.

فإن قلت فإذا ثبت كون الأشياء كلها معقولة له تعالى كما هي عليها بعقل واحد بسيط فما الحاجة في علمه إلى إثبات الصور العقلية الزائدة مقارنة كانت أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٤

مباينة و أيضا إذا كان ذاته بحيث ينكشف له الحقائق المتخالفة في وجودها الخارجي - فما الحجة على إثبات العقل من طريق أحدية المبدأ الأعلى إذ مبناه على أنه واحد من كل وجه بلا اختلاف حيثية و أنتم أثبتتم في ذاته معاني كثيرة. قلت أما إثبات الصور فهو لازم من تعقله لذاته المستلزم لتعقل ما هو معلوله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٥

القريب و من تعقل معلوله القريب تعقل معلول معلوله و منه تعقل معلوله الثالث و هكذا الرابع و الخامس إلى آخر المعلولات على الترتيب العلي و المعلولي فإن ذاته لما كان علة للأشياء بحسب وجودها و العلم بالعلة يستلزم العلم بمعلولها على الوجه الذي هو معلولها فتعقلها من هذه الجهة لا بد أن يكون على ترتيب صدورها واحدا بعد واحد و هذا غير تعقلها على وجه لا يكون هي بحسب معلولة و أما وجوب كون المعلول الأول واحدا لا متعددا بسيطا لا مركبا مع كون المبدأ الأعلى مصداقا - و مظهرها لماهيات الممكنات كلها فذلك لأجل أن تكثر العنوانات لا يقدح في أحدية ذات الموضوع فإن الحيثيات المختلفة التي توجب كثرة في الذات هي الحيثيات التي اختلافها بحسب الوجود لا التي تعددها و اختلافها بحسب الآثار فمثال الأول كالاختلاف - في القوة و الفعل و التقدم و التأخر و العلية و المعلولية و التحريك و التحرك و مثال القسم الثاني كالعلم و القدرة و كالعقلية و المعقولية و كالوجود و التشخص و كالوحدة و الوجود إلى غير ذلك من الحيثيات التي يجوز أن يكون ذات واحدة من جهة واحدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٦

مصداقا لصدقها و الحكم بها من غير ملاحظة أمر غيرها و الواجب تعالى لا جهة فيه تخالف جهة وجوب الوجود فكل ما يصح الحكم به عليه يصح من جهة وجوب الوجود - لا من جهة أخرى يخالفه كالإمكان و التركيب و القصور و المعلولية و التأخر و العجز و غير ذلك فإن قلت فلم حكموا بالتركيب و لو عقلا فيما يشتمل ذاته أو حده على الجنس و الفصل كالحيوان و الناطق في الإنسان و كاللون و قابض البصر في السواد قلت لأن الاختلاف بالمعنى الجنسي و المعنى الفصلي في مثل هذه الموجودات الطبيعية يرجع إلى اختلاف في أنحاء الوجودات فإن الحيوانية الطبيعية المطلقة قد توجد في نحو ناقص من الوجود يستحيل أن يقتزن معها النطق بل الموضوع الواحد قد يتصف وقتا بنحو من أنحاء

وجود الحيوانية يمتنع أن يكون حينئذ و بحسب ذلك الوجود ناطقا ثم إذا تحول من ذلك الوجود و انتقل إلى وجود آخر أقوى و أكمل يصير ناطقا فاختلاف أحوال الوجود و انحائها و انفكاك بعضها عن بعض مما يقتضي التركيب في الذات الموصوفة بها و التعدد في قواها و من هذا الوجه أثبت الحكماء الطبيعيون تعدد القوى الحيوانية - و غيرها في النفس أو من جهة تضاد الحثيات و تقابلها.

و من الأمور الواجبة إدراكها

و تحقيقها لمن أراد أن يكون رجلا عارفا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٧

بالحكمة الإلهية أن يعلم أن للموجودات مراتب في الوجودية و للوجود نشأت متفاوتة بعضها أتم و أشرف و بعضها أنقص و أخس كالنشاء الإلهية و العقلية و النفسية و الطبيعية و لكل نشأة أحكام و لوازم تناسب تلك النشاء و يعلم أيضا أن النشاء الوجودية كلما كانت أرفع و أقوى كانت الموجودات فيها إلى الوحدة و الجمعية أقرب و كلما كانت أنزل و أضعف كانت إلى التكثر و التفرقة و التضاد أميل - فأكثر الماهيات المتضادة في هذا العالم الطبيعي و هو أنزل العوالم غير متضادة في العالم النفساني كالسواد و البياض و كالحرارة و البرودة فإن كل طرفين من هذه الأطراف متضادان في هذا الوجود الطبيعي غير مجتمعين في جسم واحد لقصورهما عن الجمعية و قصور الجسم الطبيعي عن قبولهما معا في زمان واحد و هما معا موجودان في خيال واحد و كذا المختلفات في عالم النفس متفقة الوجود في عالم العقل كما قال معلم الفلاسفة في أثولوجيا إن الإنسان الحسي صنم للإنسان العقلي و الإنسان العقلي روحاني و جميع أعضائه روحانية ليس موضع العين فيه غير موضع اليد - و لا مواضع الأعضاء كلها مختلفة لكنها كلها في موضع واحد انتهى فإذا كان هذا هكذا فما ظنك بالعالم الربوبي و النشاء الإلهية في الجمعية و التآحد فجميع الأشياء هناك واحد و هو كل الأشياء بوحدته من غير ما يوجب اختلاف حيثية.

و يؤيد هذا المطلب ما قاله فيه أيضا و أما العقل فإن الفضائل فيه جميعا دائما لا حيناً موجودة و حيناً غير موجودة بل فيه أبداً و هي و إن كانت دائمة فإنها فيه مستفادة من أجل أن العقل إنما يفيدها من العلة الأولى و أما العلة الأولى فإن الفضائل فيها بنوع أعلى لا أنها بمنزلة الوعاء للفضائل لكنها هي الفضائل كلها - غير أن الفضائل تنبع منها من غير أن تنقسم و لا تتحرك و لا تسكن في مكان ما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٨

بل هي آنية تنبجس منها الآنيات و الفضائل فإنها موجودة في كل الآنيات على نحو قوة الآنية و ذلك أن العقل يقبلها أكثر من قبول النفس و النفس تقبلها أكثر من قبول الأجرام السماوية و الأجرام السماوية تقبلها أكثر من قبول الأجرام الواقعة تحت الكون و الفساد و ذلك أن المعلول كلما بعد عن العلة الأولى و كانت المتوسطات أكثر كان من العلة الأولى أقل قبولاً.

و قال في موضع آخر منه الواحد المحض هو علة الأشياء كلها و ليس كشيء من الأشياء بل هو بدء الأشياء و ليس هو الأشياء بل الأشياء كلها فيه و ليس هو في شيء من الأشياء و ذلك أن الأشياء كلها إنما انبجست منه و به ثباتها و قوامها

وإليه مرجعها فإن قال قائل كيف يمكن أن يكون الأشياء من الواحد المبسوط الذي ليس فيه ثنوية ولا كثرة بجهة من الجهات قلت لأنه واحد محض مبسوط ليس فيه شيء من الأشياء فلما كان واحدا محضا انبجست منه الأشياء كلها و ذلك أنه لما لم يكن له هوية انبجست منه الهويات.

قال و أقول و أختصر القول أنه لما لم يكن شيئا من الأشياء رأيت الأشياء كلها منه غير أنه و إن كانت الأشياء كلها إنما انبجست منه فإن الهوية الأولى أعني به هوية العقل هي التي انبجست منه أولا بغير وسط ثم انبجست منه هويات جميع الأشياء التي في العالم الأعلى و العالم الأسفل بتوسط هوية العقل و العالم العقلي انتهى كلامه.

و قال أيضا إن في العقل الأول جميع الأشياء و ذلك لأن الفاعل الأول أول فعل فعله هو العقل فعله ذا صور كثيرة و جعل في كل صورة منها جميع الأشياء التي تلائم تلك الصورة و إنما فعل الصورة و حالاتها معا لا شيئا بعد شيء بل كلها معا و في دفعة واحدة و ذلك أنه أبدع الإنسان العقلي و فيه جميع صفاته الملائمة له و لم يبدع بعض صفاته أولا و بعضها آخر كما يكون في الإنسان الحسي لكنه أبدعها كلها معا في دفعة واحدة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٧٩

و قال أيضا إن الأشياء الطبيعية بعضها متعلق ببعض و إذا فسد بعضها صار إلى صاحبه علوا إلى أن يأتي الأجرام السماوية ثم النفس ثم العقل فالأشياء كلها ثابتة في العقل و العقل ثابت بالعلة الأولى و العلة الأولى بدء لجميع الأشياء و منتهاها و منه مبدؤها و إليه مرجعها كما قلنا ذلك مرارا.

و قال إن الأشياء كلها من العقل و العقل هو الأشياء كلها فإذا كان العقل كانت الأشياء و إذا لم يكن الأشياء لم يكن العقل و إنما صار العقل هو جميع الأشياء لأن فيه جميع صفات الأشياء و ليس فيه صفة إلا و هي تفعل شيئا مما يليق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٠

بها و ذلك أنه ليس في العقل شيء إلا و هو مطابق لكون شيء آخر انتهى فهذه العبارات صريحة في أن الواجب جل ذكره فيه جميع الأشياء كلها - على وجه لا يقدح في أحديته و أما قوله ليس هو في شيء من الأشياء فليس هو مما ينافي ما ادعيناه و صرح به في كلام هذا المعلم مرارا لأن المسلوب عنه هو الشيء بحسب وجوده الذي به يمتاز عن سائر الأشياء و هو وجوده الخاص به دون غيره و المثبت له هو الشيء بحسب هذا الوجود الجمعي الإلهي الذي هو تمام كل شيء و مبدؤه و منتهاه - و الشيء مع تمامه في شئنيته أولى به من نقصانه كما سبق ذكره كما أن ماهية الحيوان - كونها موجودة بالوجود الإنساني النطقي أولى في باب الحيوانية من كونها موجودة لا مع الناطق و كذلك الإنسان العقلي أولى بالإنسانية من الإنسان الحسي لكونه تمامه و كماله و كذلك الإنسان الإلهي أعني الإنسان المشهود في النشأة الإلهية و كذلك سائر الأشياء أولى بأنفسها هناك من أنفسها إذا لم يكن هناك لأن ذلك الوجود تمام كل موجود من حيث وجوده كما أن مطلق الوجود تمام كل ماهية من حيث هي ماهية.

فهذا غاية تحقيق هذا المقام و لعله لم يثبت في شيء من الكتب إلى الآن إلا في هذا الكتاب فاعرف أيها المتأمل فيه قدره و انظم هذه الفريدة في سلك نظائرها من الفرائد المنثورة فيه.

و أما المنهج الثاني أعني منهج الصوفية

الكاملين فهو قريب المأخذ من منهج الحكماء الراسخين و بيانه أن لوجوده أسماء و صفات هي لوازم ذاته - و ليس المراد من الأسماء هاهنا هي الفاظ العالم و القادر و غيرهما و إنما هي أسماء الأسماء في اصطلاحهم و لا أيضا المراد بالصفات ما هي أعراض زائدة على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨١

الذات بل المراد المفهومات الكلية كمعاني الماهيات و كثيرا ما يطلق الصفة في كلام الحكماء و يراد بها ما يشمل الماهية أيضا كما يذكر في المنطق الوصف العنواني و يراد به المفهوم الكلي الصادق على الموضوع بحسب عقد الوضع سواء كان ذاتيا كقولنا الإنسان كذا أو عرضيا كقولنا الكاتب كذا و كذا ما ذكره في كتاب اثولوجيا من قوله في العقل يوجد صفات جميع الأشياء إنما المراد بها ما يشمل الماهيات و يقابل الوجودات فالصفة و الذات في هذا الاصطلاح كالماهية و الوجود و كذا المراد باللازم ما يشمل الذاتي و الفرق بين الاسم و الصفة في عرفهم كالفرق في تعاليم الحكماء بين قولنا الواحد بمعنى الشيء الواحد كالخط الواحد و قولنا الواحد بمعنى نفس الواحد فقط فهذا كالفرق بين البسيط و المركب من حيث الاعتبار.

فنقول ما من موجود متأصل إلا و هو بحسب هويته الوجودية مصداق محمولات كثيرة مع قطع النظر عما يعرضه و يلحقه من العوارض اللازمة و المفارقة فإن المحمولات التي يحمل عليه بحسب هذه الأمور ليس مصداقها و المحكي بها عنه هو نفس الهوية الوجودية له ثم لا يخفى أن المحمولات الذاتية متكررة و الوجود واحد - و هي طبائع كلية و الوجود هوية شخصية و لا يخفى أيضا على من له بصيرة أن الوجود كلما كان أكمل و أشد كان فضائله الذاتية أكثر و المحمولات المحاكية عنها أوفر - إذ له بحسب كل درجة في الكمال آثار مخصوصة هي مبدؤها لذاته فيصدق عليه معنى معقول من تلك الحيثية الذاتية و كلما يصدق من المعقولات على شيء بحسب حيثية في ذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٢

كان حكمه حكم الماهية و الذاتيات في كونها متحدة في الوجود موجودة بوجود الذات فمن عرف تلك الهوية الوجودية كما هي عليه عرف معها جميع تلك المحمولات المتعددة بنفس ذلك العرفان لا بعرفان مستأنف فإذن لما كان ذاته مستجمع جميع الفضائل و الخيرات بنفس ذاته البسيطة و ذاته مبدأ كل فعل و منشأ كل خير و فضيلة - فله بحسب كل فضيلة أو مبدئية فضيلة توجد في شيء آخر من مجعولاته محمول عقلي فلا يبعد أن يصدق محمولات عقلية كثيرة متغايرة المعنى مع اتحاد الذات - فالذات المأخوذة مع كل منها يقال لها الاسم في عرفهم و نفس ذلك المحمول العقلي هو الصفة عندهم و كلها ثابتة في مرتبة الذات قبل صدور شيء عنه قبلية كقبلية الذات لكن بالعرض كما أنها موجودة بوجود الذات بالعرض - و كذا حكم ما يلزم الأسماء و الصفات من النسب و التعلقات بمظاهرها و مربوباتها و هي الأعيان الثابتة التي قالوا إنها ما شمت رائحة الوجود أبدا و معنى قولهم هذا أنها ليست موجودة من حيث أنفسها و لا الوجود صفة عارضة لها و لا قائمة بها و لا هي عارضة له و لا قائمة به و لا أيضا مجعولة للوجود معلولة له بل هي ثابتة في الأزل بالاجعل الواقع للوجود الأحدي كما أن الماهية ثابتة في الممكن بالاجعل المتعلق بوجوده - لا بماهيته لأنها غير مجعولة بالذات و لا أيضا لا مجعولة أي قديمة بالذات و ليست أيضا تابعة للوجود بالحقيقة لأن معنى التبعية أن

يكون للتابع وجود آخر و ليست لها في ذاتها وجود بل إنما هي في نفسها هي لا غير فإذن تلك الأسماء و الصفات و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٣

متعلقتهما كلها أعيان ثابتة في الأزل بلا جعل و هي و إن لم تكن في الأزل موجودة بوجوداتها الخاصة إلا أنها كلها متحدة بالوجود الواجبي و بهذا القدر خرجت عن كونها معدومة في الأزل و لم يلزم شيئية المعدوم كما زعمته المعتزلة كما مرت الإشارة إليه.

فإذا تقرر ذلك فنقول لما كان علمه بذاته هو نفس وجوده و كانت تلك الأعيان موجودة بوجود ذاتها فكانت هي أيضا معقولة بعقل واحد هو عقل الذات فهي مع كثرتها معقولة بعقل واحد كما أنها مع كثرتها موجودة بوجود واحد إذ العقل و الوجود هناك واحد فإذن قد ثبت علمه تعالى بالأشياء كلها في مرتبة ذاته قبل وجودها- فعلمه بالأشياء الممكنة علم فعلي سبب لوجودها في الخارج لما علمت أن علمه بذاته هو وجود ذاته و ذلك الوجود بعينه علم بالأشياء و هو بعينه سبب لوجوداتها في الخارج التي هي صور عقلية تتبعها صور طبيعية تتبعها المواد الخارجية و هي أخيرة المراتب الوجودية فالحق بوجود واحد يعقلها أولا قبل إيجادها و يعقلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٤

ثانيا بعد إيجادها فبعقل واحد كان يعقلها سابقا و لاحقا و بعين واحدة كان يراها في الأزل واحدة و بعد الأزل متكثرة فهذا تقرير مذهبهم على الوجه الصحيح- المطابق للقوانين الحكيمية البحثية لكنهم لاستغراقهم بما هم عليه من الرياضات و المجاهدات و عدم تمرنهم في التعاليم البحثية و المناظرات العلمية ربما لم يقدروا على تبين مقاصدهم و تقرير مكاشفاتهم على وجه التعليم أو تساهلوا و لم يبالوا عدم المحافظة- على أسلوب البراهين لاشتغالهم بما هو أهم لهم من ذلك و لهذا قل من عباراتهم ما خلت عن مواضع النقوض و الإيرادات و لا يمكن إصلاحها و تهذيبها إلا لمن وقف على مقاصدهم بقوة البرهان و قدم المجاهدة

ذكر و تصريح

قد مر في مباحث الصفات أن المراد بكون صفاته تعالى عين ذاته ما هو و أن ذاته من حيث وجوده و هويته مما يفني الصفات و التعينات و المفهومات حتى مفهوم الذات و مفهوم الوجود و الهوية فلا إشارة إليه و لا اسم و لا رسم- لأن هذه الأمور كلها طبائع كلية و الذات هوية شخصية صرفة لا خبر عنها و يقال لها مرتبة الأحدية و غيب الغيوب و باعتبار هذه المدلولات التي هي أيضا بوجه عين الذات و يقال لها مرتبة الإلهية و الواحدية فجاءت الكثرة كم شئت إذ في هذه المرتبة تتميز الصفة عن الذات و تتميز الصفات بعضها عن بعض فيتميز العلم عن القدرة و هي عن الإرادة فيتكثر الصفات و بتكثرها يتكثر الأسماء و يتكثر مظاهرها و يتميز الحقائق الإلهية الموجودة بوجود واحد إلهي بعضها عن بعض بالماهية كما يتميز الصور العقلية و الحقائق الأفلاطونية التي هي بإزائها و مربوباتها بعضها عن بعض بالوجود- فهناك مقام الجمع و مرتبة الهوية الأحدية مقام جمع الجمع و هاهنا مقام الفرق و إذا أنزلت الحقائق من هذا العالم إلى مرتبة الصور النفسانية صارت إلى مقام فرق الفرق و على هذا المنوال إلى أن يصل إلى مقام من الكون يكون وجودها عين استعداد العدم و كونها عين قوة الفساد و بقاؤها عين التجدد و الانقضاء و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٥

اتصالها عين قبول الانفصال و وحدتها عين الكثرة كالعدد و عين قوة الكثرة كالمقدار.
و بالجملة الحقائق المتأصلة كالإنسان و الفرس و الدواب و الشجر و الحجر و الذهب و الفضة و الأرض و الهواء و النار و السماء و الشمس و القمر و غيرها من الأنواع - لكل منها أنحاء من الكون و درجات و مقامات في الوجود و نشأت في الكمال - كلما هو أرفع و أشرف كان الوجود فيه أقدم و وحدته أقوى و إحاطته بما سواه أكثر و جمعيته أشد و نوريته أظهر و آثاره أوفر حتى يبلغ إلى مقام يزول عنه النقائص كلها حتى الإمكان ففي ذلك المقام وقع التصالح بين المتفاسدات و التعانق بين المتضادات و التآحد بين الكثرات فكانت موجودة بوجود واحد معلومة بعلم واحد كما عبر عن هذا المقام لسان

الرسول الختمي ص: لي مع الله وقت لا يسعني فيه ملك مقرب و لا نبي مرسل

و إنما قال وقت و لم يقل مقام للفرق بين مرتبة الرسالة و مرتبة الولاية لأن دعوى الرسالة لا يلائم دعوى المقام هناك و إنما يلائم دعوى الوقتية.

تنبيه تعليمي

و مما ينبه على كون حقيقة واحدة لها درجات في الوجود بعضها طبيعي و بعضها نفساني و بعضها عقلي و بعضها إلهي أنه لا شك أن العلم بمعنى الصورة الحاصلة حقيقة واحدة و هي قد تكون عرضا كعلم النفس غيرها و قد تكون جوهرًا نفسانيًا كعلم النفس بذاتها و قد تكون جوهرًا عقليًا كعلم العقل بذاته و قد لا تكون جوهرًا و لا عرضًا بل أمرًا خارجًا عنهما و هو واجب الوجود كما في علم الله بذاته و بالأشياء و كذلك القدرة قد تكون عرضًا من الكيفيات النفسانية كما في الحيوانات و قد تكون جوهرًا كما في العقول فإن القدرة فيها هي عين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٦

وجودها و إن لم تكن عين ماهياتها إذ ليست ماهية شيء منها عين معنى القدرة و وجود الجوهر كما علمت جوهر فيكون القدرة فيها جوهرًا و قد تكون واجبة كقدرة الله تعالى على كل شيء فإذا تحقق عندك أن ماهية واحدة كالعلم و القدرة و نظائرها ذات درجات و مقامات في الوجود و بعضها أقوى و أشرف حتى ينتهي في جانبي النزول و الصعود إلى العرضية و الواجبية فقس على هذا جميع الحقائق الوجودية - فإن للإنسان مثلاً وجوداً عرضياً كوجود ماهيته في الذهن عند تصور النفس لها و له وجود جوهرى طبيعى و هو ظاهر و له أيضاً وجود جوهرى نفسانى مع أعضاء نفسانية - كما في عالم الآخرة على ما سنبينه في مباحث المعاد الجسماني إن شاء الله تعالى و له وجود عقلي كما أثبتته أفلاطون و قد أوضحنا سبيله و له أيضاً وجود إلهي و هو ما في علم الله تعالى و كذا غيره من الحقائق.

و من هاهنا أيضاً ظهر فساد ما اشتهر من المشائين

و صرح به بعض أتباعهم كبهمنيار في تحصيله من أن الصور العلمية الحاصلة له أعراض حالة في ذاته - فكان الإنسان الموجود هناك عرضاً و كذا السماء و الأرض و الكواكب و العناصر و المواليد أعراض و لا شك أن وجود الأعراض أخس مراتب الوجود و أنزله و الإنسان العرضي أخس الأناس و كذا الحيوان العرضي أنزل الحيوانات فكيف جوز هؤلاء

المشتهرون بالفضل أن يكون ذاته موضوعا و محلا لهذه الأشياء على أحسن أنحائها في الوجود و أنزل مراتبها في الكون و لا شك أن مجاور الشيء العالي الشريف يجب أن يكون مناسبا له في العلو و الشرف فما أبعد هؤلاء في هذه المسألة عن إصابة الحق و درك الصدق.

نقل كلام لتأييد مرام

قال العارف المحقق محيي الدين العربي في الباب السابع و السبعين و ثلاثمائة من الفتوحات المكية اعلم أيديك الله إنه من المحال أن يكون في المعلومات أمر لا يكون له حكم ذلك الحكم ما هو عين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٧

ذاته بل هو معقول آخر فلا واحد في نفس الأمر في عينه لا يكون واحدا للكثرة - فما ثم إلا مركب أدنى نسبة التركيب إليه أن يكون عينه و ما يحكم به على عينه - فالوحدة التي لا كثرة فيها محال و اعلم أن التركيب الذاتي الواجب للمركب - الواجب الوجود لذاته لا يقدح فيه القدح الذي يتوهمه النظر فإن ذلك في التركيب الإمكانية في الممكنات بالنظر إلى اختلاف التركيبات الإمكانية فيطلب التركيب الخاص في هذا المركب مخصصا بخلاف الأمر الذي يستحقه الشيء لنفسه كما تقول في الشيء - الذي يقبل الشكل المعين دون غيره من الأشكال أن ذلك لا بد له من مخصص غير ذات القابل و التركيب الذاتي لواجب الوجود خارج عن هذا الحكم و ما وجدنا عقلا يقيم دليلا قط على أنه لا يحكم عليه بأمر فغاية من غاص في النظر العقلي و اشتهر من العلماء أنه عقل صرف لا حظ له في الإيمان أنه حكم عليه بأنه علة فما خلص توحيده له في ذاته حين حكم عليه بالعلية و أما غيرهم من النظر فحكموا عليه بالنسب و إن ثم أمرا يسمى بالعالمية و القادرية بهما حكم عليه بأنه عالم قادر و أما غير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٨

هؤلاء من النظر فحكموا عليه بأن له صفات زائدة تسمى حياة و علما و قدرة - و إرادة و كلاما و سمعا و بصرا بها يقال إنه حي عالم قادر مريد متكلم سميع بصير و جميع الأسماء من حيث معانيها أعني الأسماء الإلهية تندرج تحت هذه الصفات الأزلية انتهى كلامه و الغرض من نقله أن هذا الشيخ العارف انكشف له بنور المكاشفة أن التركيب في المعاني و المحمولات العقلية لا ينافي أحدية الوجود و لا يوجب اختلاف المفهومات بالحمل الذاتي الأولي اختلافها بالحمل المتعارف الشائع الصناعي إذ رب مختلف بحسب ذلك الحمل يكون متحدا في هذا الحمل فلا يقدح كثرة المحمولات الذاتية في الوحدة التامة و قوله فإن ذلك في التركيب الإمكانية إشارة إلى ما حققناه آنفا من أن الأشياء الموجودة بالوجود الواجبي من غير تركيب في الوجود قد يكون إذا وجدت بغير هذا الوجود بالوجود الإمكانية اقتضت تركيبا خارجيا أو عقليا كما في الجنس و الفصل

و قال في موضع آخر

في معنى قوله تعالى **وَاتَيْنَاهُ الْحِكْمَةَ وَفَصَّلَ الْخِطَابَ** إن الممكنات متميزة في ذاتها في حال عدمها و يعلمها الله سبحانه على ما هي عليها في نفسها و يراها و يأمرها بالتكوين و هو الوجود الخارجي فتكون عن أمره فما عند الله إجمال كما أنه ليس في أعيان الممكنات إجمال بل الأمر كله في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٨٩

نفسه و في علم الله مفصل و إنما وقع الإجمال عندنا و في حقنا و فينا ظهر فمن كشف التفصيل في عين الإجمال علما أو عينا أو حقا فذلك الذي أعطاه الحكمة و فصل الخطاب و ليس إلا الأنبياء و الرسل و الورثة خاصة و أما الفلاسفة فإن الحكمة عندهم عارية فإنهم لا يعلمون التفصيل في عين الإجمال انتهت عبارته.

أقول يظهر من كلامه أن معرفة الإنسان أن الواجب بحيث يوجد في مرتبة ذاته تفاصيل حقائق الممكنات أمر عظيم لا يعرفه إلا الكمل الراسخون في العلم - الحمد لله الذي هدانا لهذا و ما كنا لنهتدي لو لا أن هدانا الله و لا يبعد أن يكون قوله تعالى **كِتَابٌ أَحْكَمَتْ آيَاتُهُ ثُمَّ فُصِّلَتْ مِنْ لَدُنْ حَكِيمٍ خَبِيرٍ** إشارة إلى هاتين المرتبتين من العلم كما في قوله **وَآتَيْنَاهُ الْحِكْمَةَ وَفَصَّلَ الْخِطَابَ** فالحكمة للآيات يعني وجود الممكنات التي هي آيات دالة على ذاته هي عبارة عن وجودها الجمعي و كونه كتابا لاجتماع المعاني فيه و تفصيلها عبارة عن وجودها الإمكاناني الافتراقي و إنما سمي الكتاب كتابا لضم حروفه و كلماته بعضها إلى بعض مأخوذا من كتيبة الجيش و هي الطائفة من الجيش مجتمعة و لأجل هاتين المرتبتين من العلم سمي كتاب الله قرآنا و فرقانا باعتبارين فالقرآن هو الحكمة و هو العقل البسيط و العلم الإجمالي في عرف الحكماء و الفرقان هو تفصيل الكتاب و فصل الخطاب - و هو العقل التفصيلي و العلم النفساني المنتقل من صورة إلى أخرى.

و اعلم أن سائر الكتب النازلة على الأنبياء ع ليست تسمى قرآنا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٠

كما ليست تسمى كلام الله لأجل هذه الدقيقة فإن علومهم مأخوذة من صحائف الملكوت السماوية حسب مقاماتهم في تلك الطبقات و أما الرسول الخاتم فعلمه في بعض الأوقات كان مأخوذا من الله في مقام لي مع الله بلا واسطة جبرئيل ع - و لا غيره من ملك مقرب و الله أعلم

الفصل (١٣) في مراتب علمه بالأشياء

و هي العناية و القضاء و يقال له أم الكتاب و القدر و يقال له كتاب المحو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩١

و الإثبات كما أشار إليه بقوله **يَمْحُوا اللَّهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُثَبِّتُ وَعِنْدَهُ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ** و محلها اللوح و القلم أحدهما على سبيل القبول و الانفعال و هو اللوح بقسميه و الآخر القلم على سبيل الفعل و الحفظ -

و أما العناية

فقد أنكرها أتباع الإشراقيين و أثبتها أتباع المشائين كالشيخ الرئيس و من يحذو حذوه لكنها عندهم صور زائدة على ذاته على وجه العروض و قد علمت ما فيه و الحق أنها علمه بالأشياء في مرتبة ذاته علما مقدسا عن شوب - الإمكان و التركيب فهي عبارة عن وجوده بحيث ينكشف له الموجودات الواقعة في عالم الإمكان على نظام أتم مؤديا إلى وجودها في الخارج مطابقا له أتم تأدية لا على وجه القصد و الروية. و هي علم بسيط واجب لذاته قائم بذاته خلاق للعلوم

التفصيلية العقلية و النفسية على أنها عنه لا على أنها فيه

و اما القضاء

فهي عندهم عبارة عن وجود الصور العقلية لجميع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٢

الموجودات، فائضة عنه (تعالى) على سبيل الإبداع دفعة بلا زمان، لكونها عندهم من جملة العالم و من أفعال الله المبائنة ذواتها لذاته. و عندنا علمية لازمة لذاته بلا جعل و تأثير و تأثر، و ليست من أجزاء العالم، اذ ليست لها حيثية عدمية و لا إمكانات واقعية فالقضاء الربانية (و هي صورة علم الله) قديمة بالذات ببقاء الله كما مر بيانه.

و أما القدر

فهو عبارة عن وجود صور الموجودات في العالم النفسي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٣

السمائي على الوجه الجزئي مطابقة لما في موادها الخارجية الشخصية مستندة إلى أسبابها و عللها واجبة بها لازمة لأوقاتها المعينة و أمكنتها المخصوصة و يشملها القضاء شمول العناية للقضاء.

و أما اللوح و القلم

فبيان القول فيهما أن الباري جلت كبريائه أول ما برز من ذاته و نشأ هو جوهر قدسي في غاية النور و الضياء و السناء بعد الأول تعالى و نشأ بتوسطه جواهر أخرى قدسية مترتبة في الشرف و الكمال و شدة النورية على حسب ترتبها في القرب منه تعالى ثم حصلت منها بواسطة جهات فقرها و نقصها في الوجود- و ضعف نوريتها موجودات نفسانية و أخرى طبيعية و هي النفوس السماوية و الأجرام الفلكية و ما معها من العناصر و المركبات و هذه كلها متجددة الوجود زمانية كالمكتوب من الكلمات المعقولة و أما تلك الجواهر و الأنوار القاهرة فهي مقدسة عن الزمان- منزهة عن التجدد و الحدثان بل كلها مع تفاوت مراتبها في الشرف و النورية كانت لشدة اتصال بعضها ببعض كأنها موجودة واحدة و الحق أنها واحدة كثيرة كما قررناه في موضعه بالبرهان و لهذا قد يعبر عنها بلفظ واحد كالقلم في قوله تعالى - **ن وَالْقَلَمِ وَمَا يَسْطُرُونَ** و أتى بصيغة جمع العقلاء مع وحدته إشارة إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٤

وحدته الجمعي و قوله تعالى **اقْرَأْ وَ رَبُّكَ الْأَكْرَمُ الَّذِي عَلَّمَ بِالْقَلَمِ** و كالروح في قوله تعالى **قُلِ الرُّوحُ مِنْ أَمْرِ رَبِّي** و قوله تعالى **وَكَلِمَتُهُ أَلْقَاهَا إِلَى مَرْيَمَ وَ رُوحٌ مِنْهُ** و كالأمر في قوله تعالى **وَمَا أَمْرُنَا إِلَّا وَاحِدَةٌ** و كالكلمة كما مر و قد يعبر عنها بالفاظ متعددة كالكلمات

في قوله ع: أعوذ بكلمات الله التامات كلها من شر ما خلق و ذراً

و كالمفاتيح في قوله تعالى **وَعِنْدَهُ مَفَاتِحُ الْغَيْبِ لَا يَعْلَمُهَا إِلَّا هُوَ** و كالخزائن في قوله تعالى **وَإِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ** فهي تسمى بأسامي مختلفة باعتبارات متعددة فباعتبار كونها مصورة لصور المعلومات - ناقشة في قوابل

النفوس والأجرام على وجه التجدد والتقضي تسمى بالقلم - كما أنها باعتبار تأثيرها في ما تحتها تأثير الكلام الأمري الإعلامي في المخاطب تسمى بالأمر وهي أنوار القاهرة مؤثرة فيما تحتها بتأثير الله تعالى - كما أن ذاتها موجودة بوجوده لفنائها في التوحيد وكذلك حكم تأثيراتها - فقاهريتها التي تأثيرها ظل لقاهريته تعالى كما أن نوريتها التي لا تزيد على ذاتها - لمعة من لمعات وجهه وجماله و تقع منها ظلال ممدودة امتداد الزمان والمكان في الخارج مع كونها كما علمت معرة عن الزمان والمكان وقد أشار إليه بقوله تعالى **أَلَمْ تَرَ إِلَىٰ رَبِّكَ كَيْفَ مَدَّ الظِّلَّ** وكما تفيض منها صور الأشياء وحقائقها بإفاضة الحق سبحانه فكذلك تفيض منها صفاتها وكمالاتها الثانوية التي بها يجبر نقصاناتها - فهذا الاعتبار أو باعتبار أنها تجبرها على كمالاتها والتوجه إليها عند فقدانها وحفظها عند حصولها تسمى عالم الجبروت وهي صورة صفة جبرية الله وهي قضاء الله وأمره و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٥

كلام الله و كلماته التامات ومفاتيح رحمته وخزائن علمه وجوده وأعينه الناضرة في قوله تعالى **وَاصْنَعِ الْفُلْكَ بِأَعْيُنِنَا** و **وَحِينًا** فهذه الكلمات كلها صفات القلم الإلهي وحيثياته.

و أما اللوح المحفوظ

فهو عبارة عن النفس الكلية الفلكية سيما الفلك الأقصى - إذ كلما جرى في العالم أو سيجري مكتوب مثبت في النفوس الفلكية فإنها عالمة بلوازم حركاتها كما بيناه في مباحث الأجسام وسنعيد ذكره عند البحث عن المبادي والغايات فكما ينتسخ بالقلم في اللوح الحسي النقوش الحسية كذلك ارتسمت من عالم العقل الفعال صور معلومة مضبوطة لعللها وأسبابها على وجه كلي فتلك الصور محلها النفس الكلية التي قلب العالم والإنسان الكبير عند الصوفية وكونها لوحا محفوظا باعتبار انحفاظ صورها الفائضة عليها على الدوام في خزائن الله تعالى على وجه بسيط عقلي أو باعتبار اتحادها بالعقل الفعال لا باعتبار هويتها النفسانية لما علمت من طريقتنا أنه كلما تعلقت بالأجرام الطبيعية من النفوس والطباع والقوى فهي متجددة الوجود حادثة غير باقية ما دامت موجودة بهذا الوجود التكويني ثم ينتقش في النفوس المنطبعة الفلكية صور جزئية متشخصة بأشكال وهيئات مقدرة مقارنة لأوقات معينة على مثال ما يظهر في المادة الخارجية وهذه الصور لجزئيتها وشخصيتها متبدلة متجددة بعضها خلاف بعض في التعينات والتشخيصات بخلاف ما في اللوح المحفوظ فإنها مضبوطة مستمرة على نسق واحد كالكبريات الكلية فهذه النفوس هي ألواح قدرية فيها المحو والإثبات وعالمها عالم الخيال الكلي وعالم المثال وكل منهما كتاب مبين كما قال تعالى **وَلَا حَبَّةٌ فِي ظِلْمَاتٍ الْأَرْضِ وَلَا رَطْبٍ وَلَا يَابِسٍ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُّبِينٍ** إلا أن الأول لوح محفوظ ما فيه من التغير يسمى بأم الكتاب والثاني كتاب المحو والإثبات على ما قال تعالى **يَمْحُوا اللَّهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُثَبِّتُ وَعِنْدَهُ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ** وأما وجود هذه الأكوان المادية في موادها الهيولانية الظلمانية المشار إليه بقوله - **وَمَا نُنْزِلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدْرِ مَعْلُومٍ** أي بواسطة صورها القدرية المعلومة لأجل ارتسامها في القوى الإدراكية فهل هي أيضا من مراتب العلم كما يظن أم لا فالحق أن ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٦

ظن فاسد وهم باطل فإن هذا الوجود ليس وجودا إدراكيا كما أقمنا البرهان عليه ومرت الإشارة إليه في مواضع من هذا

الكتاب فما أسخف قول من حكم بأن وجود تلك الصور الجزئية في موادها الخارجية أخيرة مراتب علمه تعالى وسمي المادة الكلية المشتعلة عليها دفتر الوجود و كأنه سهى و نسي ما قرأه في الكتب الحكمية أن كل علم و إدراك فهو بضرب من التجريد عن المادة و هذه الصور مغمورة في المادة مشوبة بالأعدام و الظلمات و هي متبدلة الذات في كل آن نعم لو قيل إنها معلومة بالعرض - بواسطة الصور الإدراكية المطابقة لها لكان موجهها فلا بد في إدراكها من وجود صور أخرى متعلقة بها ضربا من التعلق الاتحادي.

تكميل

فهذه العوالم العالية كتب إلهية و صحف ربانية كتبها أولا يد الرحمن بقلم نوراني في لوح محفوظ أرقاما عقلية لا يمسها و لا يدرك أسرارها إلا أهل الطهارة و التقديس عن الحجب الظلمانية و الكثائف الجسمانية كما قال تعالى في وصف القرآن - **إِنَّهُ لَقُرْآنٌ كَرِيمٌ فِي كِتَابٍ مَكْنُونٍ لَا يَمَسُّهُ إِلَّا الْمُطَهَّرُونَ تَنْزِيلٌ مِنْ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ** ثم كتبها كرام الكاتبين **فِي صُحُفٍ مُكَرَّمَةٍ مَرْفُوعَةٍ مُطَهَّرَةٍ بِأَيْدِي سَفَرَةٍ كِرَامٍ بَرَرَةٍ** و هذه الكتب المذكورة إنما هي أصول الكتب الإلهية و أما فروعها فكل ما في الوجود من موضع شعور كالنفوس و القوى الحيوانية الوهمية و الخيالية و غيرها من المدارك و المشاعر و الإنسان الكامل كتاب جامع لهذه الكتب المذكورة لأنه نسخة العالم الكبير فمن حيث روحه و عقله كتاب عقلي و من حيث قلبه و هو نفسه الناطقة كتاب اللوح المحفوظ و من حيث نفسه الحيوانية أعني القوة الخيالية - كتاب المحو و الإثبات و قد أشار إلى ذلك أمير المؤمنين ع في قول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٧

و أنت الكتاب المبين الذي بآياته يظهر المضمهر

و اعلم أن النفس الإنسانية إذا كملت و بلغت غايتها في الاستكمال و تجردت بعد ترقياتها و تحولاتها و تبدل نشأتها إلى أن تصل بالعالم العلوي صارت كتابا علويا إلهيا - كما أشير إليه بقوله تعالى **إِنَّ كِتَابَ الْأَبْرَارِ لَفِي عِلِّيَّينَ** الآية و إذا ضلت عن الطريق و اتبعت الهوى و الجهالات و احترقت بنار الشهوات صارت بقوته الوهمية كتابا شيطانيا مشحونا بأنواع الكذب و المغالطة و الهذيان و كل كتاب هذا شأنه من حقه أن يطرح في النار فمن حق هذه الصحيفة الشيطانية أن تقع في نار السعير - كما أشار إليه بقوله تعالى **إِنَّ كِتَابَ الْفُجَّارِ لَفِي سَجِّينَ** و كما أن القوى الشاعرة التي لسائر الحيوانات و هي كتابها و صحيفة أعمالها تحترق بنار الطبيعة في هذا العالم فإن الطبيعة المستولية على الأجسام الطبيعية سيما على النبات و الحيوان الفاعلة فيها للإحالة و الإذابة و الهضم عند أهل البصيرة نار محرقة تذيب الأجسام و تحيلها بالتلطيف و التصعيد إلى القوى و الأرواح كفعل هذه النار المحسوسة في المركبات بالإحالة و الإذابة و التبديل فكذلك نار الآخرة توقد في القلوب القاسية و النفوس العاصية و تحرقها و تعذبها بشعلاتها و حرقاتها المنبعثة من الغضب و الحسد و الحقد و العداوة و البغضاء فإن هذه كلها عند أهل الكشف الأخروي و يقال له كشف الصور نيرانات و شعلات كامنة الآن تعلقت بنفوس الأشقياء و الفجار محرقة لها معذبة إياها ماحية لما يرتسم في كتابها من الاعتقادات الباطلة و الآراء المذمومة فعلى هذا المثل و ما يشبهه يجب أن يحمل كون كتاب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٨

النفوس في النار لا ما يفهمه الظاهرية العاكفة على باب الحس في جميع الأمثال قال الله تعالى **وَتِلْكَ الْأَمْثَالُ نَضْرِبُهَا لِلنَّاسِ وَمَا يَعْقِلُهَا إِلَّا الْعَالِمُونَ** فإياك يا أخا الحقيقة و سألَكَ طريق الحق أن تفهم من قلم الله و لوحه ما يفهمه المشبهة من كون القلم آلة جمادية متخذاً من القصب أو الحديد و اللوح ذا صفحة ملساء متخذاً من خشب أو زمرد قياساً على قلم الآدمي و لوحه بل كما لا يقاس و لا يشبه ذات الله و صفاته ذات الخلق و صفاتهم كذلك لا يشبه قلمه و لوحه و كتابه قلمهم و لوحهم و كتابتهم على أنك لو نظرت في مدلولات هذه الألفاظ و جردتها عن الزوائد غير الداخلة في أصل مفهومها و روح معناها وجدت أن هذه الخصوصيات ككونها قصباً أو خشباً أو مداداً خارجة عن أصل ماهيتها و روح حقيقتها فإن معنى الكتابة تصوير الحقائق على أية صورة كانت و معنى اللوح الجوهر القابل لذلك التصوير سواء كانت جسماً محسوساً أو جسماً غير محسوس كما إذا رأيت في المنام أنك تكتب على لوح أو كان غير جسم كروح أو نفس فإذا علمت هذا فحمل هذه الأمور على ما يناسب الإلهية أولى - من حملها على ما يناسب الخلق فاستقم و اتبع الهدى و لا تتبع الهوى.

تمثيل

أن الفطرة الإنسانية الكاملة لكونها مخلوقة على صورة الرحمن - مشتملة على مراتب العلم على مثال مراتبه التي للواجب و ذلك لأن للأفعال الصادرة عن الإنسان من لدن ظهورها من بواطنها و بروزها من مكامن غيبها إلى مظاهر شهاداتها أربع مراتب لكونها أولاً في مكنن عقله البسيط الذي هو غيب غيوبه في غاية الخفاء كأنها غير مشعور بها ثم تنزل إلى حيز قلبه و مرتبة نفسه عند استحضارها بالفكر و إخطارها بالبال كلية و في هذه المرتبة تحصل للإنسان التصورات الكلية و كبريات القياس عند الطلب للأمر الجزئي المنبعث عنه العزم على الفعل ثم تنزل إلى مخزن خياله متشخصة جزئية و هو موطن التصورات الجزئية و صغريات القياس ليحصل بانضمامها إلى تلك الكبريات رأي جزئي ينبعث عنه القصد الجازم للفعل ثم تتحرك أعضاؤه عند إرادته إظهاره فيظهر في الخارج كذلك فيما يحدث في هذا العالم الطبيعي من الصور و الأعراض فالمرتبة الأولى بمثابة العلم الإجمالي و الثانية بمثابة صورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٢٩٩

القضاء و محلها لوح النفس الناطقة و كاتبها العقل البسيط و الثالثة بمثابة الصور في السماء و محلها القوة الخيالية و الرابعة بمثابة الصور الحادثة في المواد العنصرية - و لا شك أن نزول الأول لا يكون إلا بإرادة كلية و علم كلي و نزول الثاني بإرادة جزئية و علم جزئي ينضم إلى الإرادة الكلية فينبعث بحسب الملائمة و المنافرة رأي جزئي يستلزم عزمًا داعياً لإظهار الفعل فيتحرك الأعضاء و الأدوات فيحدث الفعل - و حركة الأعضاء بواسطة أعصابها بمنزلة حركة السماء و سلطان العقل الإنساني في الدماغ كسلطان الروح الكلية في العرش و ظهور قلبه المعنوي في القلب الصنوبري - كظهور النفس الكلية في فلك الشمس إذ هو من العالم بمنزلة القلب الصنوبري من الإنسان كما أن العرش بمنزلة الدماغ و الله بكل شيء محيط و هذه المراتب الأربع ثلاث منها علمية و هي الثلاث الأولى لأن وجودها وجود صوري و أما المرتبة الأخيرة فليست من مراتب العلم كما توهم لكنها معلومة بالعرض كما أن وجودها أيضاً بتبعية ما هو معلوم بالذات و قد مرت الإشارة إليه فاحتفظ به.

ختم فيه زيادة كشف و توضيح -

اعلم

**أنه ورد في الحديث: أن لله تعالى سبعين ألف حجاب من نور و ظلمة - لو كشفها لأحرقت سبحات وجهه
كلما انتهى إليه بصره**

و إنما وقع الإحراق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٠

و القهر لأن المراد بهذه الحجب هاهنا هي المعلولات المرتبة المتوسطة بين الواجب و بين هذا العالم و لا شك أن المعلول البعيد يختص بنحو ضعيف من الوجود فإذا فرض وقوعه بهويته الضعيفة الوجود في مرتبة المعلول القريب لبطلت ذاته و اضمحلت هويته فإذا أراد أحد أن ينظر إلى وجهه الكريم لا من جهة هذه الحجب أو قبل أن تبدل ذاته من نشأة إلى نشأة أخرى و هكذا إلى أن قطع الحجب كلها أو بعضها و صارت في مرتبة الحجاب الأول أو قريبا منه لكان حاله كما وقع لجبل موسى ع و لهذا قال جبرئيل حين سأله الرسول ص عن عدم تجاوزه عن مقامه المعلوم - لو دنوت أنملة لأحترقت. و اعلم أن المراد من الحجب النورية هي العقول المجردة المترتبة في الوجود المتفاوتة في النورية و هي مع ذلك أنوار خالصة لا يشوبها ظلمة العدم لأنها ليست زمانية بخلاف غيرها كالنفوس و الطبائع و هي المرادة من الحجب الظلمانية لأنها زمانية و كلما هو زمني فللعدم دخول في نحو وجوده و ليست نوريته خالصة عن الظلمة - لكن كلها من مراتب علم الله التفصيلية و إنما أوجدها الله مع أن ذاته في غاية التمام - و النورية غنيا عن العالمين تكميلا لوجود لوازم الأسماء و الصفات أعني أعيان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠١

الممكنات و ماهياتها فإن لها نحوين من الوجود كما وقع التنبيه عليه أحدهما النحو الإجمالي الواجبي و هذا بالحقيقة ليس وجودا لشيء منها و لا لجميعها بل لجمعيتها و مسماها و إنما هو مظهر لها و ثانيهما النحو التفصيلي الخاص بواحد واحد منها - فأراد الله تعالى بعنايته الشاملة و رحمته الواسعة أن يفيض عليها وجوداتها المختصة - و أن يكمل وجودها العلمي بوجودها العيني و الغاية و الغرض في هذه الإرادة ليس أمرا غير نفسه إذ هي كلها راجعة إلى صفاته و صفاته عين ذاته و لذلك

**قال لبعض أنبيائه ع: و قد سأله لم خلقت الخلق يا رب بقوله كنت كنزا مخفيا لم أعرف فخلقت الخلق
لأعرف**

فهذه المعرفة التفصيلية للعارف بالله و أسمائه و صفاته لم تحصل على الكمال إلا بهذا الوجود التفصيلي فكملت مراتب العلم بالله لا أن الله يكمل بهذا الوجود أو بهذا العلم فتجلى الحق سبحانه و تعالى بنفسه لنفسه بأنوار السبحات الوجيهية فظهرت الأرواح المهمة في الغيب المستور الذي لا يمكن كشفه لأحد و إنما يقال لهم المهيمون لأن كل واحد منهم لا يعرف أن ثمة موجودا غير الحق لفنائهم بالحق في الحق عن نفسه إذ لا نفس له سوى الموجودة بالحق لاستيلاء سلطان الأحدية على وجودهم فمن لا وجود له منفصلا عن الحق فلا معرفة له إلا للحق بالحق - فلا يعرفون سواه إذ

المعرفة فرع الوجود ثم أوجد الحق تعالى دون هؤلاء الأرواح بتجل آخر ليس الأول و بالجملة أول ما أوجد الله تعالى من عالم العقول القادسة جوهر بسيط كلي و مع بساطته هو جميع العقول كما أن فلك الأفلاك عند بعض عبارة عن مجموع الأفلاك و هو الحق عندنا أثبتناه بالبرهان فله وجوه كثيرة لا يتكرر في ذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٢

بتعددتها و له افتقار ذاتي وجودي لموجده كما مر بيانه في أوائل الكتاب و سماه الله تعالى حقا و قلما و أمرا و روحا و في الحديث عقلا و قد ذكرنا أكثرها قال الله تعالى - **وَمَا خَلَقْنَا السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا إِلَّا بِالْحَقِّ** و هو الخازن الحفيظ علام الغيوب بعلم موجدته فعلم نفسه من حيث علم موجدته كما علم غيره من حيث علم نفسه

و هذا قوله ص: من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه

و هو عرش الله الأعظم الذي استوى عليه ذاته و بعده اللوح المحفوظ و هو كما مر النفس الكلية لجميع النفوس الجزئية و القوى الإدراكية أوجدها الله تعالى في المرتبة الثانية و في العالم و هي من الملائكة الكرام و رسل الله إلى الخلق بخلاف الطبقة الأولى فإنها لم تبرح عن صقع الربوبية و لم تنزل إلى عالم الإمكان لما علمت أن عالم الإمكان منحصر عندنا في عالم الخلق دون الأمر و هي المشار إليها بقوله تعالى **وَكَتَبْنَا لَهُ فِي الْأَلْوَابِ مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ مَوْعِظَةً وَ تَفْصِيلًا لِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ** و هي موضع تنزيل الكتب و هي أول كتاب سطره العقل أرقاما تفصيلية و حروفا زمانية فأمر الله القلم أن يجري على هذا اللوح - جريا إلى يوم القيامة بما قدره و قضاء فهذا اللوح محل لإلقاء القلم و هو العقل إليه بطريق التفصيل ما يحمله من الله بطريق الإجمال لأن النفس محل التفصيل لأنها زمانية.

و ذكر بعض المكاشفين الذين يقع لهم مكاشفة الحقائق في كسوة الأمثلة أن لهذا القلم ثلاثمائة و ستين سنا من حيث ما هو قلم و له ثلاثمائة و ستون وجها من حيث ما هو روح و ثلاثمائة و ستون لسانا من حيث ما هو عقل و له ثلاثمائة و ستون نهرا من حيث ما هو علم و هو ماء الحياة و عين الحيوان تستمد هذه الأنهار من ثلاثمائة و ستين بحرا من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٣

بحار العلوم و هي إجمال كلمات الله التي لا تنفذ كما جاء المثل منها في القرآن **وَلَوْ أَنَّ مَا فِي الْأَرْضِ مِنْ شَجَرَةٍ أَقْلَامٌ وَالْبَحْرُ يَمُدُّهُ مِنْ بَعْدِهِ سَبْعَةُ أَبْحُرٍ مَا نَفِدَتْ كَلِمَاتُ اللَّهِ** و هذا الملك الكريم الذي هو لوح لما فوقه هو أيضا قلم لما دونه و هكذا كل فاعل و منفعل من القوى الإدراكية لوح و قلم باعتبارين فتولدت الأقلام و الألواح بعد هذين الملكين الكريمين الذين أحدهما و هو القلم بمنزلة آدم و الآخر و هو اللوح بمنزلة حوا تولد الأولاد البنين و البنات منهما و كان القلم الأعلى واهب الأرواح فيها و هو فيض ذاتي له و إرادي لله كما أن صدور الفعل عنا بالإرادة إرادي لنا و ذاتي لإرادتنا و لهذه النفس نسبتان نسبة نورانية و هي مما يلي العقل الكريم و نسبة ظلمانية و هي مما يلي الهيولى - فبتلك الرابطة تأخذ من العقل صورا عقلية ثابتة و بهذه الرابطة ترسم في الهيولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٤

صورا طبيعية كائنة متجددة و هي في نفسها خضراء لامتزاجها من النور و الظلمة و هي كتاب الزمردة ثم أنشأ الله بعدها

الفلك الكلي والعرش الجسماني واستوى عليه باسم الرحمن استواء يليق برحمته على خلقه وهو دون الاستواء بين السابقين اللاتقيين بذاته وصفاته وهو بحركته الدورية الدائمة صورة شوق النفس الكلية إلى الله تعالى ووجدتها كل أن منه تعالى شيئاً غير ما وجدته في آن آخر فينشأ الزمان منها والمكان من صورتها لما يقبله من الشكل المستدبر وهو أفضل الأشكال وحركته أسرع الحركات - وبهذه الحركة يتحرك الأفلاك كلها اقتداء بها ولكل منها حركة خاصة من محرك نفساني خاص تشبها بمعشوق خاص تقرباً إليه طاعة لله تعالى هو الذي أدار رحاها و **بِسْمِ اللَّهِ مَجْرَاهَا وَ مُرْسَاهَا** وإليه منتهاها وهذا الفلك الكلي للطفته كأنه حد مشترك بين عالم الصور الإدراكية وهو عالم النفوس وعالم الآخرة وبين عالم الأجسام المادية وهو عالم الطبيعة والدنيا فهو أرض الآخرة وسماها الدنيا وقيل الموصوف بكونه سقف جهنم من حيث سطحه المقعر وأرض الجنة من حيث محدبه هو فلك الكواكب المسمى بالكرسي كما

ورد عن النبي ص: أرض الجنة الكرسي وسقفها عرش الرحمن

ولعل المراد من الكرسي الوارد في لسان الشريعة هو هذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٥

الفلك الأقصى الجسماني المذكور ومن عرش الرحمن هو ما يحاذيه من عالم المثال - وهو الفلك الكلي المثالي والعلم عند الله وبالجملة كلما يفتح الله من رحمته لخلق في هذا العالم يدخل عليهم من باب السماء العليا ومن أبواب السماوات وكل من دخل الجنة أو عرج إلى الله لا بد أن يلج ملكوت السماوات وينفذ من أقطارها حتى ينتهي إلى سدرة المنتهى ويخرج من بابها إلى ذلك العالم. واعلم أن الكلمات النازلة من الحق تنزل إلى هذا المنتهى أحدية غير منقسمة - فتقسم بعد هذا المنزل قسمة خارجية إلى الغيب والشهادة والصورة والمعنى والدنيا والآخرة ولهذا يقال للكرسي موضع القدمين المتدليين أحدهما إلى عالم الجنان وهي المشار إليها بقوله تعالى **أَنَّ لَهُمْ قَدَمَ صِدْقٍ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ** والأخرى قدم الجبار المشار إليها

بقوله ص: حتى يضع الجبار قدمه فيها فتقول قطني يا رب

فأحدي القدمين تعطي ثبوت أهل الجنات في جناتهم وهي قدم الصدق والأخرى تعطي ثبوت أهل الجحيم في جحيمهم وهي قدم الجبروت وإلى هذا المنتهى ينتهي صحائف أعمال بني آدم وأما صحائف علومهم فقد يتجاوز منه وينتهي إلى الله كما قال تعالى - **إِلَيْهِ يَصْعَدُ الْكَلِمُ الطَّيِّبُ وَالْعَمَلُ الصَّالِحُ يَرْفَعُهُ**.

ثم اعلم أن الله أنشأ الأفلاك الباقية بعضها فوق بعض إلى العناصر ورتبها ترتيب مدبراتها العلوية في اللطافة والكثافة فالعالم كله كجوهرة واحدة ذات طبقات متدرجة في اللطافة والنورية فكل ما هو أعلى فهو أطف وأنور وكل ما هو أدنى فهو أكثف وأكدر - حتى ينتهي في أحد الجانبين إلى نور الأنوار وفي الجانب الآخر إلى أسفل السافلين - والكل منازل ومراحل إلى الله وبوجه آخر مراتب علمه وبوجه مظاهر صفاته وآيات جماله وجلاله وبوجه أنوار وجهه وأشعة كماله وظلال قهره.

دقيقة إشراقية

واعلم أن عالم الشهادة كالقشر بالإضافة إلى عالم الملكوت والقلوب بالقياس إلى الروح والظلمة بالنسبة إلى النور وهكذا كل طبقة من الملكوت الأعلى والأسفل بالنسبة إلى فوقها على هذا المثال وكما أن الأنوار المحسوسة السماوية

التي تقتبس منها الأنوار الأرضية قد يكون لها ترتب بحيث يقتبس بعضها من بعض فالأقرب من المنبع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٦

يكون أولى باسم النور لأنه أشد وأقوى في الظهور كما يفرض ضوء داخل من القمر في كوة بيت واقعا على مرآة منصوبة على حائط و منعكسا منها على حائط آخر في مقابلته ثم منه إلى الأرض فانت تعلم أن ما في الأرض من النور تابع لما في الحائط و هو لما في المرآة و هو لما في القمر و هو تابع لما في الشمس إذ نور القمر مستفاد منها و هذه الأنوار الأربعة مترتبة في النورية بعضها أكمل من بعض - و لكل منها مقام معلوم لترتيبها في الوجود فكذلك قد انكشف لأرباب البصائر بالبرهان و الكشف معا أن الأنوار الملكوتية عقلية كانت أو نفسية إنما وجدت من نور الأنوار على ترتيب كذلك و أن الأقوى هو النور الأقرب إلى النور الأقصى الذي لا نهاية له في الشدة و كل ما هو أشد قربا منه فهو أكمل نورا و أقوى معرفة بنفسه و بربه - و كلما هو أبعد فهو أنقص نورا و أقل علما و أضعف وجودا حتى ينتهي إلى عالم الإظلال - ثم إلى الظلمات و تلك الأنوار كلها مراتب علمه بذاته و منازل لطفه و رحمته فافهم إن شاء الله تعالى.

تفريع

مهما عرفت أن النور هو الوجود لأنه يلزمه الظهور و له مراتب و مراتبه مراتب الوجود بعينها فاعلم أنه لا ظلمة أشد من كتم العدم لأن المظلم إنما سمي في العرف مظلما لأنه ليس للأبصار إليه سبيل إذ ليس موجودا للبصر و إن كان موجودا في نفسه فالذي ليس بموجود لا غيره و لا لنفسه فهو أولى بأن يسمى مظلما لأنه الغاية في الظلمة فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول ليس في الوجود ما هو مظلم بالحقيقة و إلا لكان معدوما صرفا بل الذي يمكن تحقيقه هو المركب الممتزج نوره الوجودي بظلمات إمكاناته و جهاته العدمية و ذلك كالأجسام و أحوالها لأنها زمانية الوجود و مكانيته - فكلما وجدت في حد منهما عدمت عن سائر الحدود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٧

الموقف الرابع في قدرته تعالى و فيه فصول

الفصل (١) في تفسير معنى القدرة

إن للقدرة تعريفين مشهورين

أحدهما صحة الفعل و مقابله أعني الترك - و ثانيهما كون الفاعل في ذاته بحيث إن شاء فعل و إن لم يشأ لم يفعل و التفسير الأول للمتكلمين و الثاني للفلاسفة و من أفاضل المتأخرين من ذهب إلى أن المعنيين - متلازمان بحسب المفهوم و التحقق و أن من أثبت المعنى الثاني يلزمه إثبات المعنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٨

الأول قطعاً و ذلك لأن الفاعل إذا كان بحسب نفس ذاته بحيث إن شاء فعل و إن لم يشأ لم يفعل كان لا محالة من حيث ذاته مع عزل النظر عن المشية و اللامشية يصح منه الفعل و الترك و إن كان يجب منه الفعل إذا وجب المشية و الترك إذا وجب اللامشية - فدوام الفعل و وجوبه من تلقاء دوام المشية و وجوبها لا ينافي صحة الترك على تقدير اللامشية و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٠٩

أقول في ما ذكره خلط و خبط فإن الصحة و الجواز في الفعل و مقابله مرجعهما الإمكاناني الذاتي و قد استحال عند الحكماء أن يتحقق في واجب الوجود و لا منه جهة إمكانية لأن هناك وجودا بلا عدم و وجوبا بلا إمكان و فعلية بلا قوة و إنما يجوز هذه النقائص عند من يجعل صفاته زائدة على ذاته كالاشاعة أو يجعل الدواعي على صنعه و إيجاده أمرا مبينا فيكون ذاته بذاته مع قطع النظر عن هذه الزوائد صفة كانت أو داعيا جائز المشية و اللامشية صحيح الفاعلية و اللافاعلية و أما عند من وحده و قدسه عن شوائب الكثرة و الإمكان فالمشية المتعلقة بالوجود و الإفاضة عين ذاته بذاته بلا تغاير بين الذات و المشية لا في الواقع و لا في الذهن - فالذات هي المشية و المشية هي الذات بلا اختلاف حيثية تقييدية أو تعليلية فصدق القضية الشرطية القائلة إن شاء فعل لا ينافي وجوب المقدم و ضرورة العقد الحملي له ضرورة أزلية دائمة و كذا الشرطية القائلة إن لم يشأ لم يفعل لا تنافي استحالة المقدم امتناعا ذاتيا و ضرورة نقيضه ضرورة أزلية فعلم أن التفسير الثاني صادق عند الحكماء دون التفسير الأول و لا يمكن التلازم بين التفسيرين إلا في القادر الذي يكون إرادته زائدة على ذاته - و أما الواجب جل اسمه فلكونه في ذاته تاما و فوق التمام فبذاته البسيطة الحققة يفعل ما يفعل لا بمشية زائدة و لا بهمة عارضة لازمة أو مفارقة فهو بمشيته و علمه و رضاه و حكمته التي هي عين ذاته يفيض الخير و وجود النظام و يصنع الحكمة و هذا أتم أنحاء القدرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٠

و أفضل ضروب الصنع و الإفاضة و ليس يلزم من ذلك جبر عليه كفعل النار في إحراقها و فعل الماء في تبريده و فعل الشمس في إضاءتها حيث لا يكون لمصدر هذه الأفعال شعور و لا مشية و لا استقلال من فواعلها لأنها مسخرات بأمره سبحانه و كذلك حال سائر المختارين غير الله في أفعالهم فإن كلا منهم في إرادته مقهور مجبور - من أجل الدواعي و المرجحات مضطر في الإرادات المنبعثة عن الأغراض مستكمل بها.

ثم إنه زعم الفخر الرازي أنه لا خلاف بين الفلاسفة و المتكلمين في معنى القدرة المنسوبة إليه

بل النزاع بينهما لفظي إذ الخلاف بين التفسيرين المذكورين - إنما يرجع إلى العبارة و اللفظ دون المعنى و المفهوم كما ذكر إنما النزاع بينهما في قدم العالم و حدوثه لأن المتكلمين جوزوا أن يكون العالم على تقدير كونه أزليا معلولا لعلة أزلية لكنهم نفوا القول بالعللة و المعلول الأزليين لا بهذا الدليل بل بما دل على وجوب كون المؤثر في وجود العالم قادرا و أما الفلاسفة فقد اتفقوا على أن الأزلي يستحيل أن يكون فعلا لفاعل مختار فإذن حصل الاتفاق على أن كون الشيء أزليا ينافي افتقاره إلى الفاعل المختار و لا ينافي افتقاره إلى العلة الموجبة و إذا كان الأمر كذلك ظهر أن لا خلاف في هذه المسألة انتهى قول الرازي في شرحه للإشارات.

و نعم ما قال الشارح المحقق الطوسي العلامة إن هذا صلح من غير تراضي الخصمين و ذلك لأن المتكلمين بأسرهم صدروا كتبهم بالاستدلال على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١١

وجوب كون العالم محدثا من غير تعرض لفاعله فضلا عن أن يكون مختارا أولا ثم ذكروا بعد إثبات حدوثه أنه محتاج إلى محدث وأن محدثه يجب أن يكون مختارا - لأنه لو كان موجبا لكان العالم قديما وهو باطل بما ذكره أولا فظهر أنهم ما بنوا حدوث العالم على القول بالاختيار بل بنوا القول بالاختيار على الحدوث وأما القول بنفي العلة والمعلول فليس بمتفق عليه عندهم لأن مثبتي الأحوال من المعتزلة - قائلون بذلك صريحا وأيضا أصحاب هذا الفاضل أعني الأشاعرة يثبتون مع المبدأ الأول قدماء ثمانية سموها صفات المبدأ الأول فهم بين أن يجعلوا الواجب تسعة وبين أن يجعلوها معلولات لذات واجبية هي علتها وهذا شيء إن احترزوا عن التصريح به لفظا فلا محيص لهم عن ذلك معنى فظهر أنهم غير متفقين بنفي العلة والمعلول على القول بالحدوث وأما الفلاسفة فلم يذهبوا إلى أن الأزلي يستحيل أن يكون فعلا لفاعل مختار بل ذهبوا إلى أن الفعل الأزلي يستحيل أن يصدر إلا عن فاعل أزلي تام في الفاعلية وأن الفاعل الأزلي التام في الفاعلية يستحيل أن يكون فعله غير أزلي ولما كان العالم عندهم فعلا أزليا أسندوه إلى فاعل أزلي تام في الفاعلية وذلك في علومهم الطبيعية وأيضا لما كان المبدأ الأول عندهم أزليا تاما في الفاعلية حكموا بكون العالم الذي هو فعله أزليا وذلك في علومهم الإلهية ولم يذهبوا أيضا إلى أنه ليس بقادر مختار بل ذهبوا إلى أن قدرته واختياره لا يوجبان كثرة في ذاته وأن فاعليته ليست كفاعلية المختارين من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٢

الحيوانات ولا كفاعلية المجبورين من ذوي الطبائع الجسمانية انتهى كلامه أعلى الله مقامه

الفصل (٢) في أن القدرة فينا عين القوة والإمكان وفي الواجب تعالى عين الفعلية والوجوب

اعلم أن النفس فينا وفي سائر الحيوانات مضطرة في أفعالها وحركاتها - لأن أفعالها وحركاتها تسخيرية كفعل الطبيعة وحركاتها لأنها لا تتحقق ولا توجد - لا بحسب أغراض ودواع خارجية فالنفس منا كالطبيعة مسخرة في الأفعال والحركات - لكن الفرق بينهما أن النفس شاعرة بأغراضها ودواعيها والطبيعة لا تشعر بالدواعي - والفعل الاختياري لا يتحقق ولا يصح بالحقيقة إلا في واجب الوجود وحده وغيره من المختارين لا يكونون إلا مضطرين في صورة المختارين فإن نفوس الأفلاك تفعل حركاتها من جهة دواع ومعشوقات قاهرة عليها كما ستعلم وحركات الأفلاك والكواكب تسخيرية إلا أنها ليست بطبيعية فإن الحركات الطبيعية تكون على اللزوم من غير إرادة وشعور ورضى وما يلزم شيئا كذلك ليس يلزم نقيضه أيضا في حالة واحدة - والمحرك الفلكي يحرك من وضع إلى ذلك الوضع بعينه فالنفس فيها قاصدة لوضع تتركه بعينه ولهذا بيان واضح سياطيك في مقامه وكذا نفوس الحيوانات الأرضية إنما تفعل ما تفعل وتتحرك فيما تتحرك لا بمجرد القدرة بل لأجل الأغراض والدواعي فكل مختار غير الواجب الأول مضطر في اختياره مجبور في أفعاله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٣

فالقدرة في نفوسنا عين القوة على الفعل والاستعداد والتهيؤ له فلا فعل بالاختيار إلا من الحق تعالى. قال الشيخ الرئيس في التعليقات عند المعتزلة أن الاختيار يكون بداع أو بسبب والاختيار بالداعي يكون اضطرارا و

اختيار الباري تعالى و فعله ليس بداع انتهى.

و قال في موضع آخر معنى واجب الوجود بالذات أنه نفس الواجبية - وأن وجوده بالذات و كل صفة من صفاته بالفعل ليس فيها قوة و لا إمكان و لا استعداد - فإذا قلنا إنه مختار و إنه قادر فإنما نعني به أنه بالفعل كذلك لم يزل و لا يزال - و لا نعني به ما يتعارفه الناس منهما فإن المختار في العرف هو ما يكون بالقوة و إنه محتاج إلى مرجح يخرج اختياره من القوة إلى الفعل إما داع يدعو إلى ذلك من ذاته أو من خارج فيكون المختار منا مختارا في حكم المضطر و الأول تعالى في اختياره لم يدعه داع إلى ذلك غير ذاته و خيريته لم يكن مختارا بالقوة ثم صار مختارا بالفعل - بل لم يزل كان مختارا بالفعل و معناه أنه لم يجبر على ما فعله و إنما فعله لذاته و خيرية ذاته لا لداع آخر و لم يكن هناك قوتان متنازعتان كما فينا تطاول إحدهما ثم صار اختياره إلى الفعل بها و كذلك معنى قولنا إنه قادر أنه بالفعل كذلك لم يزل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٤

و لا يزال و لا نعني به ما يتعارفه الجمهور في القادر منا فإن القدرة فينا قوة فإنه لا يمكن أن يصدر عن قدرتنا شيء ما لم يترجح بمرجح و أن لنا قدرة على الضدين - فلو كان يصح صدور الفعل عن قدرة لصح صدور فعلين متضادين معا عن إنسان واحد في حالة واحدة فالقدرة فينا بالقوة و الأول بريء من القوة و إذا وصف بالقدرة فإنه يوصف بالفعل دائما و نحن إذا حققنا معنى القدرة كان معناها أنا متى شئنا و لم يكن مانع فعلنا لكن قولنا متى شئنا ليس هو أيضا بالفعل فإننا أيضا قادرون على المشية على الوجه الذي ذكرنا فيكون المشية فينا أيضا بالقوة و يكون القدرة فينا أيضا تارة تكون في النفس و تارة في الأعضاء و القدرة في النفس هي على المشية و في الأعضاء على التحريك فلو وصف الأول بالقدرة على الوجه المتعارف لوجب أن يكون فعله بالقوة و لكان بقي هناك شيء لم يخرج من القوة إلى الفعل فلم يكن تاما و بالجملة فإن القوة و الإمكان تكونان في الماديات و الأول فعل على الإطلاق فكيف يكون قوة و العقول الفعالة هي مثل الأول في الاختيار و القدرة لأنها ليست تطلب خيرا مظنونا بل خيرا حقيقيا و لا ينافي هذا الطلب فيها طلبا آخر كما فينا - إذ ليس فيها قوتان و يكون من وجه التنازع من قبلهما ففعلوا الأول و مجده أنه بحيث يصدر عنه الأفعال و مجد هذه العقول أن يتوخى أن تكون أفعالها مثل فعل الأول انتهى كلامه.

فإن قلت إذا حققت القدرة على هذا الوجه في الباري جل ذكره يلزم قدم العالم و يستحيل زواله و دثوره قلنا من رجع إلى ما ذكرناه في كيفية وجود الطبائع الكونية و نحو حصولها و حصول كل ما يتعلق وجوده بمادة جسمانية من صور الأفلاك و العناصر و نفوسها و قواها مع صفاء الذهن و إمعان النظر و ترك الجحود و العصبية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٥

يعلم علما يقينيا أن القدرة الحققة أزلية ثابتة و المقدورات حادثة متجددة الحصول - و لا منافاة بين أن يكون الإيجاد قديما و الوجود الذي أثره حادثا في إيجاد ما لا يكون نحو وجوده إلا على نحو التجدد و الانقضاء و التبدل و التصرم و هو جميع ما في عالم الطبيعة كما بيناه و أما الصور المفارقة التي هي صور أسمائه تعالى و عالم قضائه الأزلي فليست هي من الأفعال الخارجية بل من الصفات الإلهية و الحجب النورية و السراقات الجلالية و لا يطلق عليها اسم العالم و سوى الله و سيجيء لهذا المطلب بسط و توضيح.

تسجيل و تكميل

إن الحق الحري بالتحقيق و التحصيل لمن رفض العصبية و ترك التقليد و طرد الطاغوت و رجع إلى درك الحكمة و انخرط في حزب الملكوت - و أولياء الحقيقة أن يعلم أن الفرق بين القادر المختار و بين الفاعل الموجب ليس على سبيل ما كان لاجا عليه أكثر المحتجبين عن إدراك الحقائق بأغشية التقليد للآباء و المشايخ - لأن الله سبحانه إذا كان هو الفاعل لما يشاء كانت إرادته واجبة الوجود كذاته لأنها عين ذاته الأحدية و قد مر أن واجب الوجود بالذات واجب الوجود من جميع الجهات فلم تكن تلك الإرادة قصدا إلى التكوين سيما التكوين المطلق أو التكوين الأول لأقرب المجعولات إليه و أشرف الكوائن منه لأن القصد إلى الشيء يمتنع بقاؤه بعد حصول ذلك الشيء المقصود فثبت أن إرادة الله سبحانه ليست عبارة عن القصد بل الحق في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٦

معنى كونه مريدا أنه سبحانه و تعالى يعقل ذاته و يعقل نظام الخير الموجود في الكل من ذاته و أنه كيف يكون و ذلك النظام يكون لا محالة كائنا و مستفيضا و هو غير مناف لذات المبدأ الأول جل اسمه لأن ذاته كل الخيرات الوجودية كما مر مرارا أن البسيط الحق كل الأشياء الوجودية فالنظام الأكمل الكوني الإمكانى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٧

تابع للنظام الأشرف الواجبى الحقي و هو عين العلم و الإرادة فعلم المبدأ بفيضان الأشياء عنه و أنه غير مناف لذاته هو إرادته لذلك و رضاه فهذه هي الإرادة الخالية عن النقص و الإمكان و هي تنافي تفسير القدرة بصحة الفعل و الترك لا كما توهمه بعض من لا إمعان له في الحكمة و العرفان. ثم إنك إذا حققت حكمت بأن الفرق بين المرید و غير المرید سواء كان في حقنا أو في حق الباري هو ما أشرنا إليه فإن إرادتك ما دامت متساوية النسبة - إلى وجود المراد و عدمه لم تكن صالحة لرجحان أحد ذينك الطرفين على الآخر - و إذا صارت إلى حد الوجوب لزم منه الوقوع فإذن الإرادة الجازمة حقا أنما يتحقق عند الله و هناك قد صارت موجبة للفعل وجوبا ذاتيا أزليا و أما في غيره فلا يخلو عن شوب الإمكان و القصور و الفتور و لا ضرورة فيه إلا ضرورة بالغير و ما دام الذات أو الوصف لا الضرورة الأزلية فإذن ما يقال من أن الفرق بين الموجب و المختار أن المختار ما يمكنه أن يفعل و أن لا يفعل و الموجب ما لا يمكنه أن لا يفعل كلام باطل - لأنك قد علمت أن الإرادة متى كانت متساوية لم تكن جازمة و هناك يمتنع حدوث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٨

المراد إلا عند من نفى العلية و المعلولية بين الأشياء كالأشاعرة و متى ترجح أحد طرفيها على الآخر صارت موجبة للفعل و لا يبقى حينئذ بينها و بين سائر الموجبات فرق من هذه الجهة بل الفرق ما ذكرناه أن المرید هو الذي يكون عالما بصدور الفعل غير المنافي عنه و غير المرید هو الذي لا يكون عالما بما يصدر عنه كالقوى الطبيعية و إن كان الشعور حاصلًا لكن الفعل لا يكون ملائما بل منافرا مثل الملجأ على الفعل فإن الفعل لا يكون مرادا له. و مما يدل على ما ذكرناه من أنه ليس من شرط كون الذات مريدا و قادرا إمكان أن لا يفعل أن الله إذا علم أنه يفعل الفعل

الفلاني في الوقت الفلاني فذلك الفعل لو لم يقع لكان علمه جهلا و ذلك محال و المؤدي إلى المحال محال فعدم وقوع ذلك الفعل محال فوقوعه واجب لاستحالة خروجه من طرفي النقيض مع أن الله يريد له و قادر عليه فظهر و تبين أن إمكان اللاكون و صحة الترك ليس شرطا - لكون الفعل مقدورا عليه أو مرادا و ظهر أوضح الظهور أن مدار القادرية على كون المشية سببا لصدور الفعل أو الترك و أن القادر هو الذي إن شاء فعل و إن لم يشأ لم يفعل و إن وجبت المشية وجوبا ذاتيا أو غيريا و امتنعت اللامشية امتناعا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣١٩

ذاتيا أو غيريا و من توهم أنه لا بد في كون الفاعل قادرا أن يقع منه اللامشية وقتا ما - أو صح وقوعها خطأ و خلط و لم يعلم بأن الفاعل إنما يكون فاعلا بالفعل حال صدور الفعل عنه و في تلك الحالة يستحيل أن يصدق عليه أنه شاء أن لا يفعل فلم يفعل فعلم أن صحة وصفه بالفاعلية ليست لأجل صدق هذه الحملية بل لصدق تلك الشرطية و الواجب سبحانه يصدق عليه أنه لو شاء أن لا يفعل فإنه لا يفعل - و إن كان ذلك المفروض محالا و تلك الحملية كاذبة كما في قولك لو لم يكن الصانع موجودا لم يكن العالم موجودا لما بينا أن مشية الله عين ذاته فإذن كما ليس يضر صدق تلك الشرطية عدم وقوع المقدم فكذا ليس يضره عدم إمكان وقوعه فليس لأحد أن يقول إنا لا نعتبر في كون الفاعل قادرا مشية أن لا يفعل بل نعتبر فيه كونه بحيث يمكن في حقه مشية أن لا يفعل و الفاعل حال كونه فاعلا و إن كذب عليه أنه شاء أن لا يفعل لكنه لا يكذب أنه من شأنه أن لا يفعل دائما و إنما اعتبرنا هذا القيد حتى يتميز عن العلل الموجبة لأننا نقول قد سبق أن الجهات التي بها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٠

يصير الفاعل فاعلا بالفاعلية التامة يستحيل أن يحصل و لا يترتب عليه الفعل فإذن الفاعل عند ما يستجمع الجهات التي باعتبارها يكون مؤثرا في الفعل لا يصدق عليه أنه من شأنه أن لا يفعل بل يكذب عليه ذلك و أما سبيل التمييز بين المختار و الموجب فليس كما توهموه بل كما مر من مدخلية العلم و المشية في الفاعلية و التأثير و عدم مدخليتهما فهذا نصاب التحصيل و التدقيق و ستعلم أن ما سوى الله من المختارين مضطر في اختياره مجبور في إرادته

الفصل (٣) في دفع ما ذكره بعض الناس

إن من القائلين بصحة تفسير قدرته بصحة الفعل و الترك من تفصى من لزوم جهة إمكانية هي صحة الطرفين و إمكان الجانبين بأن هذه الصحة ترجع إلى ذات المعلول المقدور عليه لإمكانه الذاتي و هذا من سخيף القول فإن ما ذكره لو كان حقا لكان كل فاعل موجب قادرا فلم يبق فرق بين الموجب و المختار إذ ما من معلول إلا و هو ممكن الوجود و العدم نظرا إلى مرتبة ماهيته من حيث هي هي و إن لم يرد بهذا الإمكان الإمكان الذاتي الذي هو مناط الحدوث الذاتي بل الإمكان الواقعي أو القوة الاستعدادية المستعدية للحدوث الزماني فقد علمت بطلانه في الفاعل التام الفاعلية. و أما جمهور المتكلمين من أصحاب أبي الحسن الأشعري فمبنى ما ذهبوا إليه و اعتمدوا عليه فيما ادعوه من تفسير قدرة الله هو إنكارهم للعلة و المعلول و عدم تسليمهم بتحقيق الوجوب بالإيجاب في شيء من مراتب الفاعلية و الإيجاد بل مجرد الأولوية غير البالغة حد الوجوب يكفي لصدور الفعل من المختار و أن نفس الإرادة من غير داع و

مقتضى يكفي لصدور الفعل و لا حاجة في ذلك إلى مرجع غير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢١

الإرادة لأن شأن الإرادة التعلق بأي واحد من الطرفين و إن ترجح إرادة على إرادة من دون مرجح زائد عليها و قد علمت أن الاعتقاد بهذا المذهب القبيح المستنكر يخرج الإنسان عن الجزم بشيء من الأحكام اليقينية و يجوز عنده تخلف النتيجة عن القياس البرهاني ضروري المقدمات الاقتراني على هيئة الشكل الأول- و قد مر فيما سبق أن إمكان الماهيات الجوازية هو العلة المقتضية لافتقارها إلى العلة لأن انتفاءه هو العلة التامة لانتفائه لأن الوجوب و الامتناع موجبان للاستغناء عن العلة- فإذا لا ضرورة شيء من الطرفين في الماهية يوجب الاحتياج إلى المؤثر لا غير ذلك- كالحادث أو سبق العدم أو نحوه. فقد ظهر أن صنع العلة في المعلول هو الإيجاب لا غير و أن الشيء من لم يجب لم يوجد فما دام الشيء على حالة إمكانه يستحيل فرض وقوعه أو لا وقوعه و إنما يتعين له أحد الطرفين بالوجوب من تلقاء العلة المقتضية و أما الأولوية الغير البالغة حد الوجوب سواء كانت ذاتية أو حاصلة من السبب كما زعمه هؤلاء فغير مجدية في قطع النسبة الإمكانية و لا محصلة للوقوع بالفعل بل يجب أن يجب المعلول بعلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٢

المقتضية التامة فلا ينقطع سؤال اللم للسائل عن سبب الحصول و سبب رجحان الحصول على اللاحصول إلا بالانتهاء إلى السبب التام الموجب و العلة التامة المقتضية- و أما إذا لم ينته إليه فالسؤال مستمر البقاء و الاستمرار في الجانبين مشترك الورود بين الطرفين فيؤدي إلى لزوم التسلسل في سبب الأولوية و أولوية الأولوية و هكذا إلى غير النهاية فذلك محال لترتبتها و اجتماعها.

على أنه إذا لوحظت تلك الأولويات بأسرها ملاحظة جمعية إجمالية فهي كالأولوية الأولى في أن مع وقوعها يجوز وقوع مقابلها إذ لو امتنع ذلك لكان هذا الطرف بالغاً حد الوجوب و قد فرض أنها لم يبلغ هذا خلف و السر فيما ذكرنا من جهة- أن الفرق متحقق بين الوجوبات و بين الأولويات لإمكان الانتهاء في تلك إلى الوجوب الأول الذاتي الذي هو منبع الوجوبات و الوجودات و عدم إمكان الانتهاء في هذه- إلى الأولوية الأولى الذاتية التي يتبعها جميع الأولويات لأن ما فرض أولاً هاهنا لا يصلح لأصل الوقوع فكيف لكونه ينبوعاً و مبدأً لغيرها من الأولويات- فبرز نور الحق و أراح ظلمة الباطل و تبين أن النسبة الإمكانية مطلقاً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٣

مناط الحاجة و الافتقار للشيء إلى السبب التام الموجب و لا يغنيه من جوع إمكانه- إلا الفاعل الحق دون غيره مما يحصل به الأولوية غير البالغة نصاب الوجوب

الفصل (٤) في بيان مأخذ آخر في إبطال رأي من زعم أن شأن الإرادة الواحدة أن يتعلق بأي طرف من طرفي الممكن و بأي ممكن من الممكنات

اعلم أن نسبة الإرادة إلى المراد كنسبة العلم إلى المعلوم بل كنسبة الوجود إلى الشيء الموجود فيمتنع استواء نسبتها إلى

الضدين والمتنافيين بل بها يجب أحدهما و يمتنع الآخر فكيف يستوي نسبتها إليهما و هل هذا إلا كما يقال - إن وجود السواد بعينه يصلح أن يكون وجود البياض أو كما يقال إن الصورة الإنسانية في الذهن بعينها هي الصورة الفرسية في العلوم التفصيلية و كذا حكم التشخص و أمثاله فكما لا شبهة لأحد في أن وجود زيد بعينه لا يمكن أن يكون وجود عمرو بعينه و لا العلم بأحدهما هو العلم بالآخر لأن تشخص العلم بزيد و هذيته و هويته متعلقة به لا محالة فلو تعلق هذا العلم بغيره لانقلب شخصه و بطلت هذيته - كذلك حكم الإرادة فإنها تتعين بتعين المراد و تشخص بتشخصه محققا كان أو مقدرا مجملا كان أو مفصلا فإرادة كل فعل كالعلم به إنما تعينت و تشخصت بتعلقها بذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٤

الفعل حتى لو فرض تعلقها بغير ذلك الفعل كان ذلك فرضا لانقلاب الحقيقة كفرض الإنسان غير الإنسان و ذلك محال فظهر بطلان هذا المذهب.

و اعلم أن ما ذكرنا من أن الإرادة كالعلم و نظائره التي كلها ترجع إلى الوجود - تتعين و تشخص حسب تعيين المراد و تشخصه لا ينافي قولنا بصحة كون إرادته تعالى التي هي عين ذاته الحققة الأحدية متعلقة بجميع الممكنات الواقعة في الوجود كما أن علمه البسيط علم بجميع الأشياء الكلية و الجزئية التي وقعت أو ستقع - و ذلك للفرق بين الإرادة التفصيلية العددية التي يقع تعلقها بجزئي من أعداد طبيعة واحدة أو بكل واحد من طرفي المقدور كما في القادرين من الحيوانات و بين الإرادة البسيطة الحققة الإلهية التي يكل عن إدراكها عقول أكثر الحكماء فضلا عن غيرهم و الكلام هاهنا مع هؤلاء الزاعمين أن إرادة الله أمر واحد بالعدد يصلح أن يتعلق بشيء و مقابله على أن ما ادعيانه من كون كل إرادة متحدة الهوية بالمراد من حيث هو مراد باق على عمومته في باب الأول تعالى و غيره من أولى الإرادة الإمكانية و كذا كل علم متحد الهوية مع المعلوم بما هو معلوم و كذا كل وجود هو عين ما يوجد به - من الماهيات من حيث هي موجودة بل الإرادة هي المرادة بالذات كما أن العلم هو المعلوم بالذات و الوجود هو الموجود بالحقيقة لا غير إلا بالعرض و تحت هذا سر عظيم لأهله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٥

الفصل (٥) في حكاية مذهب المتكلمين في المرجح و الداعي لإرادة خلق العالم

قال محقق مقاصد الإشارات إن المتكلمين من الذاهبين إلى حدوث العالم - افترقوا إلى ثلاث فرق فرقة اعترفوا بتخصيص ذلك الوقت بالحدوث و بوجود علة لذلك التخصيص غير الفاعل و هم جمهور قدماء المعتزلة من المتكلمين و من يجري مجراهم و هؤلاء إنما يقولون بتخصيصه على سبيل الأولوية دون الوجوب و يجعلون علة التخصيص مصلحة تعود إلى العالم و فرقة بتخصيصه لذات الوقت على سبيل الوجوب - و جعلوا حدوث العالم في غير ذلك الوقت ممتنعا لأنه لا وقت قبل ذلك الوقت و هو قول أبي القاسم البلخي المعروف بالكعبي و من تبعه منهم و فرقة لم يعترفوا بالتخصيص خوفا عن التعليل بل ذهبوا إلى أن وجود العالم لا يتعلق بوقت و لا بشيء آخر غير الفاعل و هو لا يسأل عما يفعل أو اعترفوا بالتخصيص و أنكروا وجوب استناده إلى علة غير الفاعل بل ذهبوا إلى أن للفاعل المختار أن يختار أحد مقدوريه على الآخر من غير مخصص و تمثلوا في ذلك بعطشان يحضره الماء في إثناءين متساويي النسبة

إليه من جميع الوجوه فإنه يختار أحدهما لا محالة و بغير ذلك من الأمثلة المشهورة و هم أصحاب أبي الحسن الأشعري و من يحذو حذوه و غيرهم من المتكلمين المتأخرين انتهى كلامه.

و أنت بما قدمنا عليك من الأصول القطعية الحقّة متمكن من إبطال هذه الآراء - الخبيثة المؤدية إلى التعطيل في حقه بل التجسيم و التركيب في ذاته تعالى عما يقول المقصرون الجاهلون في حقه علوا كبيرا.

أما القول بالمخصص و الداعي لفعله على سبيل الأولوية دون الوجوب سواء كان أمرا مبينا لذاته و صفاته كما قالتها قدماء المعتزلة أو غير مبين له كما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٦

قالت الأشاعرة من كون نفس الإرادة مخصصة للفعل لا على سبيل البت و الوجوب فقد علمت فساده من أن طبيعة الإمكان يقتضي الافتقار إلى المرجح الإيجابي و أما القول بالمخصص الإيجابي المبين لذات الفاعل سواء كان مصلحة تعود إلى العالم أو شيئا آخر كذات الوقت عند الكعبي فهو أيضا بين الفساد - أما المصلحة العائدة إلى غير الفاعل الذي يفعل الفعل بقدرته الإمكانية المتساوية النسبة إلى طرفي المقدور فلا تصلح أن تكون مخصصة لأحد الجانبين و داعية للفاعل عليه و ذلك لأننا نقول سائلا عنك هل كان تحصيل هذه المصلحة للعالم أو إيصال هذه المنفعة للمستأهل لها أولى لذات القادر القاصد لهذا الفعل من عدم ذلك التحصيل أو الإيصال أو لم يكن فإن لم يكن شيء من الطرفين أولى له من الآخر و لا أرجح عنده - فكيف يريد أحدهما و يترك الآخر مع تساوي نسبتها إليه و إن كان تحصيل هذه المصلحة أولى له من لا تحصيلها فالقادر القاصد لذلك الفعل إنما يستفيد بفعله أولوية - و يستكمل ذاته بتلك الفائدة العائدة و الله سبحانه أجل و أعلى من أن يكتسب كمالات من غيره و أن يكون له داع و غرض غير ذاته بذاته التي هي آخر الغايات و أفضل النهايات.

و أما القول بعدم المخصص أو نفي التعليل في فعله تعالى متمسكا بقوله **لَا يَسْتَلْ عَمَّا يَفْعَلُ** ففي ذلك مغالطة يدق حلها على أكثر الباحثين بل الفاضلين.

و اعلم أن هناك فرقا بين طلب اللمية لفعله بمعنى السؤال عن سبب به يصير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٧

الفاعل فاعلا و بين طلبها بمعنى سبب فعله و ما به يصير هذا الفعل متعينا في الصدور - و موجودا على الخصوص دون غيره في هذه المرتبة فالسؤال على الوجه الأول باطل في حقه جل اسمه إذ الذاتى للشيء لا يكون معللا بشيء و لا شك لأحد من الحكماء الموحدين و العرفاء الشامخين أن فاعلية الواجب سبحانه بنفس ذاته لا بأمر زائد على ذاته و كذا الداعي له في إيجاد العالم هو علمه بوجه النظام الأتم الذي هو عين ذاته - فذاته كما أنه فاعل فهو علة غائية و غاية لوجود العالم فقد تبين و تحقق أن اللمية ثابتة لأفاعيل الله سبحانه بمعنى المجعولات أو بمعنى صدوراتها و إن لم يثبت في جاعليته تعالى بمعنى كون جاعليته بسبب و علة غائية غير ذاته و مع ذلك أي مع كونه جل اسمه تام الفاعلية في ذاته من غير إرادة زائدة أو داع منتظر و مرجح مترقب - لا يلزم قدم العالم و تسرمد ما سواه من عالم الطبيعة و الأجرام فلكية كانت أو عنصرية صورة كانت أو مادة نفسا كانت أو جسما كما سبق ذكره في السفر الأول و سنعيد القول

فيه إن شاء الله لأنه مسلك دقيق و منهج أنيق لا يسبقنا أحد من حكماء الإسلام و المتكلمين و لا حصل أيضا للصوفية الإسلامية بطريق الكشف و الذوق بل بمجرد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٨

متابعة الشرائع و التسليم لأحكام الصادقين سلام الله عليهم أجمعين الحمد لله الذي فضلنا على كثير من خلقه تفضيلا

الفصل (٦) في دفع بعض الأوهام عن هذا المقام

و لعلك تقول إذا كانت الضرورة الإلهية ضرورة أزلية كان لا صدور العالم ممتنعا بالذات فيلزم أن يكون صدوره واجبا بالذات و ذلك ينافي إمكان وجوده بالذات فيقال لك حسب ما حققناه في مسألة الوجود من أن كلا من الآليات البسيطة و الوجودات المجعولة التابعة للوجود التام الإلهي و الآنية الأشدية الواجبية و إن كانت ضرورية الوجود لأن وجودها عين هويتها لكن ضرورتها تابعة للضرورة الأزلية الإلهية لأن ضرورتها ما دام الجعل و الإفاضة لا في أنفسها مع قطع النظر عن ارتباطها بالوجود التام الإلهي و قد ثبت الفرق في علم الميزان بين الضرورة الدائمة الأزلية و الضرورة الذاتية التي لا تدوم إلا ما دامت الذات موجودة.

و أما ما ذكره بعض الأماجد دام مجده و بقاؤه في دفع هذا الإعضال من أن صدور شيء عن الغير أو حصوله عنه أو وجوده له غير تقرر و وجوده في نفسه لأن الأول مضاف معقول بالقياس إلى غيره و لا يمكن لنا تعقله مع ذهولنا عن ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٢٩

بخلاف الثاني فإذا كان إمكان وجود العالم في نفسه لا ينافي وجوب صدوره عن الحق. فيرد عليه أن التحقيق كما ذهب إليه كثير من الأفاضل البارعين أن وجود المعلول في نفسه هو بعينه وجوده لفاعله و هو بعينه صدوره عنه بلا اختلاف حيثية أصلا فإذا كانت الضرورة ثابتة له بأحد الاعتبارين كانت ثابتة له بالاعتبار الآخر إذ لا فرق بينهما إلا بحسب العنوان دون المصادق و أما ما ذكره من الفرق بأن أحدهما معقول بالقياس إلى الغير دون الآخر فغير مسلم فيما هو المجعول - و الصادر بالذات أعني الوجود لأن هويته هوية تعلقية لا كالماهية كما مر تحقيقه و أما الإشكال بأن الذي يكون ذاته معقولة بالقياس إلى الغير فهو من جنس المضاف - فيلزم أن يكون كل معلول واقعا تحت المضاف فقد مر دفعه ثم العجب من هذا الماجد العظيم دام ظله أنه بعد ما اختاره من تصويب تفسير القدرة الإلهية بصحة الصدور أراد أن يذب عنه و يتفصى عن لزوم جهة إمكانية في الذات الأحدية الوجوبية - فقال إن قلت إذا كان صدور النظام الأكمل واجبا بالنظر إلى ذاته بحسب علمه و إراداته و علمه و إرادته كسائر صفاته الكمالية راجعة إلى حيثية ذاته الحققة الوجوبية المقدسة عن الكثرة قبل الذات و مع الذات و بعد الذات فلا يمكن أن يتكثر بحيثية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٠

و حيثية و اعتبار و اعتبار من الجهات فمرتبة ذاته بعينه مرتبة علمه و إرادته في الوجوب الذاتي فكيف يصح الصدور و اللاصدور المعبرة في حد حقيقة القدرة بالنظر إلى نفس ذات القادر قلت و ليكن من المعلوم عندك أن صحة الصدور و

اللاصدور - المعبرة في حد حقيقة القدرة بالقياس إلى ذات القادر أعم من أن يكون بحسب الجهة الإمكانية في ذات القادر كما في قدرة الإنسان مثلاً على مقدوراته وذلك من نقص جوهر الذات و كونه في حد ذاته بالقوة بالقياس إلى كمالاته أو يكون بحسب طباع الإمكان الذاتي في المقدور كما في قدرة القدير الحق الأول على جميع المقدورات - وذلك لتقدسه عن جهات النقص و سمات الإمكان من جميع الجهات فالمقدور الجائز الذات بإمكانه الذاتي صحيح الصدور و اللاصدور عن جاعله القدير بالذات و إن كان واجب الصدور عنه بحسب علمه وإرادته في مرتبة ذاته و هذا أتم أنحاء القدرة و مراتبها انتهى ما أفاده تلخيصاً.

أقول قد علمت ما فيه فإن الإمكان الذاتي للمعلول في نفسه لا يوجب كون العلة قادراً فإن معلول العلة غير المختارة كالنار للسخونة ممكن في ذاته و لا يستلزم إمكانه في نفسه كون فاعله مختاراً و إلا لكان جميع العلل و الأسباب للأشياء - مختارات في أفعالها ثم أقول غاية ما يمكن أن يقول من فسر قدرته سبحانه بصحة الصدور و اللاصدور في دفع ذلك الأعضاء و هو لزوم اختلاف الحيثية في ذاته جل ذكره من جهة صفتي القدرة و الإرادة أن نسبة القدرة إلى الإرادة نسبة الضعف إلى الشدة و نسبة النقص إلى الكمال و قد يندرج و ينطوي الأول في الثاني بحيث لا يوجب اعتبار أحدهما مع الآخر اختلاف الحيثيتين المكثرتين للشيء كما أن الوجود الشديد إذا قيس إلى الوجود الضعيف يحكم العقل بضرب من التحليل و لو بحسب تعمل الوهم أو بحسب كثرة الآثار المرتبة على الأول دون الثاني أن الأول كأنه أضعاف الثاني أو كأنه هو و ما زاد عليه و هذا ضرب من التحليل لا ينافي بساطته هذا غاية ما يمكن أن يقال من قبله و مع ذلك لا يصفو عن شوب كدورة عند من يعرف جلال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣١

أحدية الحق الذي كله فعلية بلا قوة و وجوب بلا إمكان و كمال بلا نقص.

قال العلامة الطوسي ره في شرح رسالة العلم مسألة إن تكثر العلم و القدرة إنما حصل في الموجودات الممكنة فقااست العقول مبدأها الأول عليها و وصفه بالعلم و القدرة و التنزيه أن يقال **سُبْحَانَ رَبِّكَ رَبِّ الْعِزَّةِ عَمَّا يَصِفُونَ** ثم قال بياناً لمذهب الحكماء في إرادة الله سبحانه أنها العلم بنظام الكل على الوجه الأتم و إذا كان القدرة و العلم شيئاً واحداً مقتضياً لوجود الممكنات على النظام الأكمل كانت القدرة و العلم و الإرادة شيئاً واحداً في ذاته مختلفاً بالاعتبارات العقلية المذكورة - ثم قال في موضع آخر منه في بيان الجبر و الاختيار أنه لا شك عند الأسباب يجب الفعل و عند فقدانها يمتنع فالذي ينظر إلى الأسباب الأول و يعلم أنه ليست بقدرة الفاعل و لا بإرادته يحكم بالجبر و هو غير صحيح مطلقاً لأن السبب القريب للفعل هو قدرته و إرادته و الذي ينظر إلى السبب القريب يحكم بالاختيار و هو أيضاً ليس بصحيح مطلقاً لأن الفعل لم يحصل بأسباب كلها مقدورة و مراده و الحق ما قاله بعضهم لا جبر و لا تفويض و لكن أمر بين أمرين و أما في حق الله فإن أثبت له إرادة و قدرة متباينتان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٢

لزم ما يلزم هاهنا من غير إمكان تفصيص لكن صدور أفعاله ليس موقوفاً على كثرة - إنما هو سبب وجود الكثرة فلا يتصور هناك اختيار و لا إيجاب انتهى كلامه يعني بالإيجاب الموجبية بفتح الجيم يعني به الجبر فعلم مما ذكره أن قدرته كعلمه

وإرادته في أن بحسبها يجب صدور النظام الأتم لا أن بها يمكن و يصح صدوره لأن الإمكانيات من لوازم الماهيات الممكنة ولا صنع للقدرة الواجبية فيها.

فإذن قد تلخص و تمحض بما ذكره أنه إذا كان مبدأ التأثير في شيء علم الفاعل وإرادته سواء كان العلم والإرادة أمراً واحداً أو أموراً متعددة و سواء كانا عين ذات الفاعل كما في الباري أو غيرها كما في غيره كان الفاعل مختاراً و كان صدور الفعل عنه بإرادته و علمه و رضاه و لا يقال لمثل هذا الفاعل في العرف العلمي و لا الخاصي - أنه فاعل غير مختار و إن فعله صدر عنه بالجبر مع أنه وجب صدور الفعل عنه بالإرادة و العلم و إذ قد ثبت و تقرر أن قيوم الكل و إله العالم إنما يفعل النظام الأتم و الخير الأفضل عن علم هو نفس ذاته العليم الحكيم الذي هو أشرف أنحاء العلوم بكل معقول أو محسوس فإذن هو فاعل بالعلم و الإرادة على أكمل الوجوه و أتمها على سبيل البت و الوجوب فالوجوب بالإرادة لا ينافي الإرادة بل يؤكد لها لأن أتم الأسباب ما يجب به المسبب فإتم الإرادات ما يجب به المراد فذاته بذاته فياض الخير و فعال النظام الأتم على الإطلاق و لما كانت ذاته البسيطة علماً بكيفية النظام الأتم - لما علمت في مباحث العلم الإلهي أن ذاته بذاته كل الأشياء الموجودة على الوجه الأشرف الأقدس لأنها موجودة بوجود إلهي واجبي و متصورة بصورة ربانية رحمانية فيتبع ذاته العقلية الواجبية فيضان الموجودات عنه على النظام التام المعقول عنده من معقولة ذاته لا على أن يتبعه كاتباع الضوء للمضي و الإسخان للمسخن تعالى عن ذلك علواً كبيراً بل حسب ما حققه صاحب الشفا من أنه عالم بكيفية نظام الخير في الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٣

وإنه واجب الفيضان عنه و عالم بأن هذه العالمية يوجب أن يفيض عنها الوجود على الترتيب الذي يعقله خيراً و نظاماً و فيضان الخير و النظام عنه غير مناف لذاته الفياضة بل إنه مناسب له و تابع لخيرية ذاته الفياضة و لازم جوده التام الذي هو نفس ذاته فإذن مجعولاته مرادة له و نظامه الصادر عنه مرضي لذاته - لا على سبيل أن يعلمها ثم يرضى بها بل على سبيل أن نفس علمه بها نفس رضاه بها و اختياره إياها.

فإذن قد انصرح و اتضح أن كونه عالماً و مريداً أمر واحد من غير تغاير لا في الذات و لا في الاعتبار فإذن إرادته بعينها هي علمه بالنظام الأتم و هو بعينه هو الداعي و الغاية في هذا الاختيار لا أمر آخر من العالم الإمكاناني و قد مر في مباحث العلة الغائية أن العالي لا يفعل شيئاً لأجل السافل و لا غرض للقوى العالية في ما دونها - حتى يفعل لأجل صلاح ما دونها شيئاً فالنفس مثلاً لا تدبر البدن لأجل البدن - بل لغرض آخر فوق البدن و النفس جميعاً و هو تحصيل الكمال و الوصول و التقرب إلى المبدأ الفعال و كذا القوة الغذائية لا تورد الغذاء و تهضمها و تلصقها و تشبهها بالمغتذى لأجل صلاح حال الغذاء أو نفع المغتذى بل لأجل المحافظة على كمالها و الاقتداء بما فوقها و كذا النار لا تحرق الحطب لأجل تحصيل الرماد أو الفحم أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٤

ما يجري مجراه بل لإدامة ذاتها و محافظة صورتها فإذا كان فاعل ذاتي و كل قوة فعالة عالية أو سافلة يتمتع إن يكون لها غرض أو باعث أو داع فيما دونها فكيف الأمر في القوة القاهرة الإلهية التي هي فوق الكل و وراء الجميع و ليس فيه

تعالى شوب نقص و قصور و غيره من القوى الفعالة لا يخلو عن شوائب النقائص إلا أن كلا منها ينجبر نقصه بما فوقه إما بحسب الفطرة الأولى كالعقول القادسة أو بحسب الفطرة الثانية كالنفوس الفلكية و ما بعدها

الفصل (٧) في تفسير الإرادة و الكراهة

و قد أشرنا في مواضع من كتابنا أنه قد يكون لماهية واحدة أنحاء من الكون و أطوار من الحصول و أنه قد يكون الأمور المتغايرة في المفهوم و المعنى موجودة بوجود واحد متشخصة بتشخص واحد كالمعاني الذاتية للماهية الإنسانية من أجناسها القريبة و البعيدة و فصولها المترتبة التي قد تحصلت في شخص واحد منها كزيد مثلاً موجودة بوجود واحد و تشخصت بتشخص واحد و تذوت ذاتاً واحدة مشاراً إليها بهذا و أنت و نظائرها بل كل هذه المعاني مجتمعة في نفسه البسيطة التي هي ذاته و هي مبدأ الجميع و صورة الكل و هي بحذاء الفصل الأخير لماهيته المحصلة لتلك المعاني تقوموا و تجوهرا المفيدة لما بإزائها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٥

من القوى و الآلات وجوداً و فعلية و لموادها استكمالاً و تماماً و لآثارها تعيناً و تحصلاً - و أيضاً قد يكون أمور مختلفة المعاني و المفهومات موجودات بوجودات متباينة حاصلة في مواد متفرقة بل متضادة في عالم من العوالم و نشأة من النشآت ثم تلك الأمور بأعيان معانيها و مفهوماتها قد تحصل في عالم آخر و نشأة أخرى موجودة بوجود واحد بسيط على وجه لطيف شريف فاضل من غير تضاد بينها و لا تزاحم و لا مباينة في تحصلها كما أشرنا إليه في إثبات الوجود الذهني و في مواضع أخرى من هذا الكتاب إذا تقرر هذا فنقول إنه لما كان الباري جل ثناؤه موجوداً ثابتاً حقاً - و له صفات كمالية مباينة لصفات جميع ما سواه كما أن وجوده مباين لوجود جميع الموجودات لأن وجوده واجب بذاته لذاته و وجود غيره واجب به لا بذاته - و ذاته مستغنية عن جميع ما سواه و جميع ما سواه فاقرة إليه مستفيدة منه بل متقومة به متعلقة الذات بذاته فإذا لا يماثله و لا يشابهه شيء من الأشياء لا في ذاته و لا في صفاته أي لا في وجوده و لا في كمالاته وجوده من العلم و القدرة و الإرادة و غيرها من الصفات الكمالية و مع ذلك فإن الوجود مشترك معنوي بينها و بينه و كذا العلم و القدرة و غيرها من عوارض الموجود بما هو موجود فكما أن أصل الوجود حقيقة واحدة كما تحقق في أوائل هذا الكتاب و هي في الواجب واجب بالذات و في الممكن ممكن و في الجوهر جوهر و في العرض عرض فكذلك قياس سائر الصفات الكمالية للموجود المطلق فإن العلم حقيقة واحدة و هي في الواجب واجب و في الممكن ممكن على وزان حقيقة الوجود لأن مرجع العلم و الإرادة و غيرهما إلى الوجود كما أشرنا إليه إلا أن عقول الجماهير من الأذكىاء - فضلاً عن غيرهم عاجزة قاصرة عن فهم سراية العلم و القدرة و الإرادة في جميع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٦

الموجودات حتى الأحجار و الجمادات كسراية الوجود فيها و لكننا بفضل الله و النور الذي أنزل إلينا من رحمته نهتدي إلى مشاهدة العلم و الإرادة و القدرة في جميع ما نشاهد فيه الوجود على حسبه و وزانه و قدره. و إذا تمهدت هذه الأصول و المقدمات فنقول الإرادة و الكراهة في الحيوان و فينا بما نحن حيوان كيفية نفسانية كسائر الكيفيات النفسانية و هي من الأمور الوجدانية كسائر الوجدانيات مثل اللذة و الألم بحيث يسهل معرفة جزئياتها لكون

العلم بها نفس حقيقتها الحاضرة عند كل مريد و مكروه ولكن يعسر العلم بماهيتها الكلية و ذلك كالعلم فإن العلم بإنية العلم حاصل لكل ذي نفس لحضوره بهويته الوجدانية عند النفس و يعسر العلم بماهيتها الكلية لأنه كالوجود لا ماهية له بل هو عين الوجود هوية و غيره عنوانا و مفهوما و الوجود كما مر لا ماهية له و لذلك صعب على الناس تحديد هذه الصفات الوجدانية و ترسيمها و لاقتراح إدراك جزئيات كل منها بإدراك جزئيات أموراً أخرى من الكيفيات النفسانية بحيث يشته أحد الإدراكين بالآخر فيعسر على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٧

النفس تجريد إدراك معنى بعض من هذه الأمور الوجدانية كالإرادة فيما نحن فيه عن غيرها ليتمكن أن يؤخذ عنها ما لها في حد ذاتها و نفس مفهومها من ذاتياتها في الحد إن كان لها حدا و لوازمها المساوية لها إن لم يكن لها حد و لأجل ذلك وقع الخلاف بين المتكلمين في معنى الإرادة و الكراهة.

فالأشاعرة فسروا الإرادة بأنها صفة مخصصة لأحد المقدورين

و هي مغايرة للعلم و القدرة لأن خاصية القدرة صحة الإيجاد و اللاإيجاد و ذلك بالنسبة إلى جميع الأوقات و إلى طرفي الفعل و الترك على السواء و لأن العلم بالوقوع تبع الوقوع فلو كان الوقوع تبعا للعلم لزم الدور و ظاهر أنها مغايرة للحياة و الكلام و السمع و البصر أقول و قد علمت ما فيه و كذا ما في قولهم العلم بالوقوع تبع للوقوع لأنهم إن أرادوا به العموم و الكلية فهو ممنوع فإن من المعلوم ما يتبعه الوقوع كما مر.

و ذهب أكثر المعتزلة إلى أن كلا منهما من جنس الإدراك

ففسروا الإرادة باعتقاد النفع و الكراهة باعتقاد الضرر لأن نسبة القدرة إلى طرفي الفعل و الترك بالسوية فإذا حصل في القلب اعتقاد النفع لأحد الطرفين يرجح بسببه ذلك الطرف و صار الفاعل مؤثرا مختارا و أورد عليه أنا كثيرا ما نعتقد النفع في كثير من الأفعال و لا نفعلها و لا نريدها و لا نعتقد النفع في كثير منها بل نعتقد ضررها و نريدها و لذا ذهب بعض آخر منهم إلى أنها ميل يتبع اعتقاد النفع و هو الشوق المفسر بتوقان النفس إلى تحصيل شيء و يرد عليه كما ذكره بعض الفضلاء أن كثيرا ما يوجد هذا الميل و الشوق بدون الإرادة كما في المحرمات و قيل هي شوق متأكد إلى حصول المراد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٨

و فيه أنه قد يوجد الفعل بدون الشوق المتأكد كما في الأفعال العادية من تحريك الأعضاء و فرقة الأصابع و كثير من الأفعال العبثية و الجزافية و كما في تناول الأدوية البشعة و غيرها و قد يتحقق الشوق المتأكد و لا يوجد الفعل لعدم الإرادة كما في المحرمات و المشتبهات للرجل المتقي الكثير الشهوة و لأجل ذلك قيل إنها مغايرة للشوق فإن الإرادة هي الإجماع و تصميم العزم و هو ميل اختياري و الشوق ميل طبيعي و لهذا يعاقب المكلف بإرادة المعاصي لا باشتهائها و يرد على قوله و هو ميل اختياري إنه لو كان القصد و الإرادة من الأفعال الاختيارية لاحتاج إلى قصد و إرادة أخرى و لزم التسلسل و أجيب بأنه إنما يلزم التسلسل لو أريد أن الإرادة فعل اختياري دائما و ليس كذلك بل قد توجد بالاختيار و قد توجد بالاضطرار - و سيأتي تحقيق هذا المقام

قال بعض أهل التحصيل

إن الإرادة ربما تحصل للحيوان بقدرته بإرادة سابقة منه كالمتروك في طلب أصلح الوجوه فإنه بعد علمه بالوجوه يقصد إلى فرض وقوع واحد واحد منها بفكره الذي هو باختياره لينكشف له الصلاح والفساد فيها - فيحصل له الإرادة بما يراه أصلح وهي مكتسبة له أما أسباب كسبها فهي القدرة على الفكر وإرادته والعلوم السابقة فبعضها يحصل أيضا بقدرته وإرادته لكنها لا تتسلسل - بل تقف عند أسباب لا تحصل بقدرته وإرادته انتهى.

و يرد عليه أنه كما أن الإرادة قد تكون بالاختيار فكذا الشوق قد يحصل بالاختيار بأن يلاحظ بالاختيار وجوه النفع والشهوة في أمر معين و يكرر عرضها على النفس حتى يشتاق إليه و يحرص عليه و مقصود القائل تحصيل الفرق بين الإرادة والشوق و لم يحصل بما ذكره.

وقال بعض الأذكياء في بيان الفرق بينهما

لعل الإرادة فينا كيفية نفسانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٣٩

موجبة للفعل مغايرة للشوق الذي هو توقان النفس إلى حصول المطلوب أما أولا فلأن الشوق إلى الفعل لا يوجد الفعل البتة وإن بلغ الشوق إلى كماله كما في الزاهد - المجتنب عن الشهوات المحرمة إذا غلبه الشوق إلى نيل لذة محرمة و ربما يوجد الفعل مع شوق ضعيف و أما ثانيا فلأن الشوق قد يتعلق بالضدين كما يشتاق النفس إلى الحركة إلى جهتين مختلفتين إحداهما للقاء محبوبه و الثانية للغلبة على عدوه - و لا يتعلق الإرادة بضدين حتى قيل إن إرادة أحد الضدين عين كراهة الضد الآخر و أما ثالثا فلأننا نحكم بثبوت الإرادة بديهية في مواضع مع الشك في ثبوت الشوق كما إذا شاهدنا من يتناول الدواء المر البشع فإننا نعلم ضرورة أنه مريد له و لا نعلم ضرورة أن له شوقا إليه و إن أثبتنا له شوقا فإنما يكون بالتأمل و الفكر فهما متغايران انتهى ما ذكره.

أقول لعلك لو أخذت الفطنة بيدك و أحطت علما بما سبق من الكلام علمت ما في كلام هؤلاء الأذكياء الأعلام من وجوه الخلل و الخبط و مبناها في الأكثر على أنهم زعموا أن الإرادة في كل ذي إرادة بمعنى واحد متواط كما فهموا الوجود أيضا هكذا و ليس الأمر كما زعموه بل الإرادة في الأشياء تابعة لوجودها و كما أن حقيقة الوجود مختلفة بالوجوب و الإمكان و الغنى و الحاجة و البساطة و التركيب - و الصفا و الكدورة و التجرد و التجرم و الخلو عن شوائب الأعدام و الجهالات و الامتزاج بها و يكون بعضها خيرا محضا لا يتصور فيه شربة أصلا و بعضها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤٠

ملزومة للشرور الكامنة في خيرياتها و هي بحسب اعتبار عقلي و مرتبة من مراتب الواقع لا في أصل الواقع و بعضها مستلزمة للشرور الثابتة لها في متن الواقع و حاق الأعيان كالإمكانات و الاستعدادات المنفكة في الأعيان الخارجة عن الفعليات و التحصلات - على تفاوتها بحسب تلك الشرور التي هي الأعدام للملكات و القوى للفعليات إلى أن يهوي الشيء في النزول إلى حاشية الوجود و السقوط إلى هاوية الكثرة و الشربة - حيث يكون الفعلية فعلية القوة و الوحدة وحدة الكثرة و التحصل تحصل اللاتحصل و التعيين تعيين الإبهام على أن مفهوم الوجود العام معنى واحد في الجميع -

فكذا حكم الإرادة والمحبة فإنها رفيق الوجود والوجود في كل شيء محبوب لذيد والزيادة عليه أيضا لذيدة ومطلوبة فالكامل من جميع الوجوه محبوب لذاته - ومريد لذاته بالذات ولما يتبع ذاته من الخيرات اللازمة بالعرض وهي محبوبة له لا بالذات ولكن بالتبعية والعرض وأما الناقص بوجه فهو أيضا محبوب لذاته لاشتغالها على ضرب من الوجود ومريد لما يكمل ذاته بالذات وأما لما يتبع ذاته فحالها كما مر من أنه مريد له بالعرض فثبت أن هذا المسمى بالإرادة أو المحبة أو العشق - أو الميل أو غير ذلك سار كالوجود في جميع الأشياء لكن ربما لا يسمى في بعضها بهذا الاسم لجريان العادة والاصطلاح على غيره أو لخفاء معناه هناك عند الجمهور أو عدم ظهور الآثار المطلوبة منه عليهم هناك كما أن الصورة الجرمية عندنا إحدى مراتب العلم والإدراك ولكن لا تسمى بالعلم إلا صورة مجردة عن ممازجة الأعدام - والظلمات المقتضية للجهالات الغفلات إذا تقرر هذا فنقول الإرادة والمحبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤١

معنى واحد كالعلم وهي في الواجب تعالى عين ذاته وهي بعينها عين الداعي وفي غيره ربما تكون صفة زائدة عليه وتكون غير القدرة وغير الداعي كما في الإنسان - فإنها كثيرا ما تنفك عن قدرته التي هي بمعنى صحة الفعل كالمشي والكتابة وغيرهما وتركه وهي أيضا غير الداعي الذي يدعوه إلى فعله كالنفع المتوقع من فعل الكتابة مثلا أو على تركه كالضرر المترتب على فعلها فهذه الثلاثة أعني القدرة والإرادة والداعي متعددة في الإنسان بالقياس إلى بعض أفعاله متحدة في حق البارئ سبحانه - وكلها فيه عين الذات الأحدية وفي الإنسان صفات زائدة عليه وإنما خصصنا تعدد هذه الثلاثة فيه بالقياس إلى بعض أفعاله لأنها قد تكون بالقياس إلى ضرب من أفعاله الباطنية شيئا واحدا كالتدابير الطبيعية والتحريكات الذاتية مثل التغذية والتنمية والتوليد وغير ذلك كما لا يخفى عند البصير المتأمل في حكمة الله في هذا العالم الصغير وكيفية الترتيب البديع والصنع المنيع والنظام الشريف الذي روعي فيه وأودع في قواه.

ثم نرجع ونقول

إن الإنسان لكونه مخلوقا على صورة الرحمن لا يصدر عنه فعل خارجي أو حركة خارجية بالقصد إلا وينشأ مبدؤه من ذاته ويقع له المرور على سائر مراتبه وقواه المتوسطة بين النفس وبين مظهر أفعالها وآلة تحريكاتها وتلك القوى ومواضعها - من الأرواح البخارية والأعضاء بمنزلة عالمي الملك والملوكوت في الإنسان الكبير - وهذا الملوكوت كنظيره في أن بعضه أعلى كالعقل العملي والوهم والمتخيلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤٢

وبعضها أسفل كالخيال والحس المشترك وقوتي الشهوة الغضب وما يتلوها من القوى - المحركة المباشرة للتحريك المميلة للأعضاء وكذا هذا الملك كنظيره في أن بعضه أحكم والطف كالأرواح الدخانية على طبقاتها في الشفيف والنورانية بمنزلة الأفلاك المتفاوتة في الصفاء واللطافة وهي مواضع الصور النورية الكوكبية كما أن هذه الأرواح محال القوى الحيوانية والطبيعية وأن بعضه بخلاف ذلك كالأعضاء المفردة والمركبة التي هي بمنزلة العناصر وما يتركب منها على ما يطول شرحه وليس هذا المقام مقام تفصيله والغرض أن الإنسان إذا قصد إلى إحداث فعل أو حركة منه - فلا بد له من علم وهو تصور ذلك الفعل والتصديق بفائدته ثم لا بد له من إرادة وعزم له ثم لا بد له من شوق إليه ثم

لا بد له من ميل في أعضائه إلى تحصيله فبالحقيقة هذه الأمور الأربعة - أعني العلم والإرادة والشوق والميل معني واحد يوجد في عوالم أربعة يظهر في كل موطن بصورة خاصة تناسب ذلك الموطن فالمحبة إذا وجدت في عالم العقل كانت عين القضية والحكم كعالم القضاء الإلهي وإذا وجدت في عالم النفس كانت عين الشوق وإذا وجدت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤٣

في عالم الطبيعة كانت عين الميل فإذا تبين و تحقق عندك ما ذكرناه انكشف لديك ما في كلام هؤلاء المحجوبين عن درك الحقائق من الصحة والصواب بوجه و الفساد والخطاء بوجه أو وجوه فمن فسر الإرادة باعتقاد النفع صح كلامه من حيث لا يشعر وبوجه دون وجه و من فسرهما كالاشاعرة بأنها صفة مخصصة لأحد المقدورين - وهي غير العلم و القدرة صح ما ذكره من جهة دون أخرى و في موضوع دون آخر - و من قال إنها شوق متأكد إلى حصول المراد صح إن لم يرد الكلية والعموم و من ذهب إلى أنها ميل يتبع اعتقاد النفع صح أيضا في مرتبة دون أخرى و انفكك بعض هذه المعاني عن بعض في حق الإنسان لا ينافي اتحادها في حق الله و كون القدرة في حقنا عين القوة الإمكانية والاستعداد البعيد لا ينافي كونها في حق الله عين الفعلية و الإيجاب فالقدرة هاهنا إمكان و في الباري وجوب بالذات لأنها عين العلم بالنظام الأتم و الحكمة المقتضية و القضاء الحتمي فافهم و اغتنم و استقم يا حبيبي و اتبع الحق - و لا تتبع الهوى فيضلك عن سبيل الله و الله ولي التوفيق

الفصل (٨) في دفع ما أورد على اتحاد هذه الأمور في حقه تعالى و في كون الإرادة القديمة سببا لإيجاد الحادث

فمن الشكوك الموردة أن إرادة الله تعالى لا يصح أن تكون عين علمه

لأنه يعلم كل شيء و لا يريد كل شيء إذ لا يريد شرا و لا ظلما و لا كفرا و لا شيئا من القبائح والآثام فعلمه متعلق بكل شيء و لا كذلك إرادته فعلمه غير إرادته و علمه عين ذاته - إرادته صفة زائدة على ذاته تعالى فهذه شبهة قد استوثقها و احتج بها بعض مشائخنا الإمامية رضي الله عنهم على إثبات أن الإرادة زائدة على ذاته تعالى. و الجواب أن فيضه وجوده يتعلق بكل ما يعلمه خيرا في نظام الوجود

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فليس في العالم الإمكانى شيء مناف لذاته و لا لعلمه الذي هو عين ذاته و لا أمر غير مرضي به فذاته بذاته كما أنه علم تام بكل خير موجود فهو أيضا إرادة و رضاء لكل خير إلا أن أصناف الخيرات متفاوتة و جميعها مراده له تعالى مرضي بها له - فضررب منها خيرات محضة لا يشوبها شرية واقعية إلا بحسب إمكاناتها الاعتبارية - المختفية تحت سطوع النور الإلهي الوجوبي على تفاوت مراتبها في شدة النورية الوجودية و ضعفها و ضرب منها خيرات يلزمها شرية واقعية لكن الخير فيها غالب مستول و الشر مغلوب مقهور و هذا القسم أيضا مراد لا محالة واجب الصدور عن الجواد المحض و المختار لكل ما هو خير لأن في تركه شرا كثيرا و الحكيم لا يترك الخير الكثير لأجل الشر القليل و أما الشر المحض و الشر المستولي و الشر المكافئ للخير فلا حصول لأحد من هذه الثلاثة في هذا العالم فلم يرد الله شيئا منها و لم يأذن له في قول كن للدخول في حريم الكون و الوجود فالخيرات كلها مرادة بالذات و الشرور القليلة اللازمة للخيرات

الكثيرة أيضا إنما يريد بها هي لوازم تلك الخيرات لا بما هي شرور فالشرور الطفيفة النادرة داخله في قضاء الله بالعرض وهي مرضي بها كذلك.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤٥

فقله تعالى **وَلَا يَرْضَىٰ لِعِبَادِهِ الْكُفْرَ** وما يجري مجراه من الآيات معناه أن الكفر وغيره من القبائح غير مرضي بها له في أنفسها وبما هي شرور ولا ينافي ذلك كونها مرضيا بها بالتبعية والاستجزار أو نقول من سبيل آخر إن وزان الإرادة بالقياس إلى العلم وزان السمع والبصر بالقياس إليه و كوزان الكلام بالنسبة إلى القدرة - فالعلم المتعلق بالخيرات إرادة كما أن المتعلق منه بالمسموعات سمع و بالمبصرات بصر و كما أن القدرة المتعلقة بالأصوات و الحروف على وجه تكلم و هذا لا ينافي كون الإرادة عين العلم فذاته تعالى علم بكل شيء ممكن وإرادة لكل خير ممكن - كما أنه سمع لكل مسموع و بصر بالنسبة إلى كل مبصر و قدرة على كل شيء - و بالقياس إلى نوع من الأصوات و الحروف تكلم أو كتابه فهذا طريق آخر في حل هذه الشبهة و الأول أولى.

و منها أن الله تعالى أوجد ما أوجد من الحوادث في وقت معين لا قبله و لا بعده

فلا بد لهذا التخصيص من مخصص و ليس هو القدرة لتساوي نسبتها إلى جميع الأوقات - و لا العلم لما ذكرنا فهذا المخصص هو الإرادة لا القدرة و العلم فثبت أن الإرادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤٦

مغايرة لتينك الصفتين.

و الجواب إما بالنقض و إما بالحل أما الأول فلأن نعيد الكلام إلى تخصيص نفس الإرادة بالوقوع من اللاوقوع و بالوقوع في هذا الوقت دون غيره من الأوقات - و بالجملة هذه الإرادة إن كانت قديمة لزم تخلف المراد عنها و إن كانت حادثة يرد الكلام في علة تخصصها بهذا الوقت دون آخر و يجري الكلام في مخصص المخصص - و هكذا إلى لا نهاية و أما الثاني فلأن نقول الإرادة صفة واحدة كالقدرة و العلم - تتعلق بالأشياء على ترتيب سببي و مسببي و كلما يصح صدور المقدورات الكثيرة المختلفة بحسب الحقائق و بحسب الأعداد و الأوقات عن فاعل واحد أحدي الذات أحدي الصفة فهو يصح صدور المرادات الكثيرة المتخالفة ذاتا و عددا و وقتا عن إرادة واحدة بسيطة و قد بين كيفية ذلك الصدور في موضعه و تصدى لذلك الموحدون المعتنون بالمحافظة على اعتقاد التوحيد و حراسة القلوب عن الوقوع في الإلحاد و التشريك.

و أما ما قيل في دفع الوجه الأول لعل شأن الإرادة تخصيص كل حادث - بالوقت الذي حدث فيه و ليست لها صلاحية تخصيصه بوقت آخر فيستغني عن مرجح آخر فهو مردود بأن مثل هذا يجري في القدرة أيضا و أيضا إذا وجب له أن يريد في هذا الوقت إيجاد الممكن و امتنع له التغير في الإرادة كان موجبا لا مختارا و أيضا إذا كان لهذا الوقت خاصية هي أن إرادة الله لا تصلح إلا لتخصيص الحادث فيه فليجز مثل ذلك في القدرة و ليجز أن يكون هذا الوقت مؤثرا في تخصيص الحادث.

لا يقال إن الأوقات لما تساوت في الحقيقة لتشابهها في أجزائها لم يترجح بعضها لصلاحية التخصيص للإيجاد على

بعض إلا لتضمنه حكمة و مصلحة مختصة و الفعل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤٧

الذي يتبع الحكمة و المصلحة إنما يكون بالإرادة لأننا نقول الكلام عائد في كون بعض أجزاء الزمان متضمننا لحكمة الإيجاد دون غيره مع تساويها في الحقيقة و أيضا حكمة الله لا تتبع تخصيص جزء الزمان لو فرض تخصيصه بل تخصيصه بأمر و كذا تخصيص سائر الأشياء بخواصها و لوازمها يتبع حكمة الله و علمه و إرادته التي هي عين علمه و لا استبعاد في كون العلم نفسه سببا لصدور الأشياء و وجودها كالماشي على جدار دقيق العرض إذا تصور السقوط يسقط بتصوره و عد من هذا القبيل تأثير بعض النفوس بالهمة و الوهم و كذا إصابة العين التي علم تأثيرها بأخبار الوحي و السنة من قوله تعالى **وَإِنْ يَكَادُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا لِيُزْلِقُونَكَ بِأَبْصَارِهِمْ لَمَّا سَمِعُوا الذِّكْرَ**

و من قوله ص:

العين تدخل الرجل القبر و الجمل القدر

و إذا جاز أن يكون العلم الضعيف البشري مؤثرا في وجود المعلوم فالأولى أن يجوز ذلك في العلم الأزلي الذي لمنشئ العالم من عدم الصرف.

قال بعض المتأخرين كما أن العلم العقلي البسيط فينا يصير مبدءا لتفصيل الصور العلمية الكلية في نفوسنا و لتفصيل الصور الجزئية في خيالنا فإن الملكة الحاصلة في أنفسنا من مزاولة العلوم و تكرار المسائل يصير سببا لحضور تلك المسائل - و وجودها بالتفصيل في نفوسنا و أذهاننا و إنما تبقى موجودة حاضرة بالثفات النفس إليها حتى لو ذهلت النفس عنها طرفة عين غابت و انعدمت كما حقق في موضعه - فكذلك العلم البسيط الأزلي للباري تعالى بالممكنات الذي هو عين ذاته المقدسة سبب لوجود الممكنات مفصلة في الخارج حاضرة عنده غير غائبة فإن وجودها عنه في الخارج عين حضورها عنده فيه فذوات الممكنات بالحقيقة صور علمية للباري تعالى متحققة بالروابط العلمية التي لها معه بحيث لو انقطعت هذه الروابط و لو طرفة عين لم يبق للمكنات عين و لا أثر و قد علمت من طريقتنا من كون الموجود هو الوجود و كون الوجود عين العلم فالروابط الوجودية للأشياء إليه تعالى هي بعينها الروابط العلمية إليه و العلم فيه سبحانه عين الإرادة - فتلك الأشياء كما أنها وجودات و موجودات صادرة منه كذلك علوم و معلومات له

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤٨

تعالى و كذلك إرادات و مرادات حاصلة من الوجود الواجبي و العلم الأزلي و الإرادة السرمدية على ترتيب و نظام به يصح صدور الكثير كما في حصول مراتب الأعداد و الكثرات من الوحدة على ترتيب و نظام لو لم يكن لم يمكن حصول الكثرة منها فإن الوحدة أبعد الأشياء عن الكثرة و مع ذلك تنشأ منها و تحصل عن تكررها فتأمل فيه و تدبر.

و منها أن الباري لو كان مريدا لخلق العالم

فإما أن يريد خلقه في جميع الأوقات فيلزم قدم العالم بل قدم كل حادث و أهل الحق قائلون بحدوث العالم بجميع أجزائه على أنه لو كان قديما امتنع القصد إلى إيجاده لأن قصد إيجاد الموجود ممتنع و إما أن يريد تخصص خلق العالم بوقت معين فذلك الوقت لم يوجد في الأزل و إلا عاد إلى القسم الأول فهو حادث بعد أن لم يكن بإرادته فإما أنه أراد

خلقه أزلا وأبدا فيلزم قدمه أو في وقت معين و ننقل الكلام إليه - فيلزم اشتراط كل وقت بوقت آخر و يلزم التسلسل. و الجواب أنه تعالى أراد بإرادته القديمة إيجاد نفس الوقت المعين بعد العدم لا أنه أراد إيجاده في وقت معين حتى يلزم التسلسل و بالجملة أنه أراد بالإرادة القديمة إيجاد كل العالم و أجزائه و جزئيات أجزائه في أماكنها و أوقاتها المخصصة و أراد إيجاد الأوقات بهوياتها المخصصة لا في أوقات أخرى و كذا أراد إيجاد الأماكن بهوياتها المخصصة لا في أماكن أخرى و ذلك لأن تخصيص الحادث بوقت خاص يفتقر إلى ذلك الوقت و لا يفتقر ذلك الوقت في تخصصه إلى شيء آخر غير الإرادة القديمة لأن التخصص الحدوثي فيه عين ذاته و هويته و الذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٤٩

لشيء غير معلل بأمر و لا يفتقر إلا إلى الجاعل له جعلاً بسيطاً و هكذا حكم الأمكنة في تخصصاتها المكانية و أما قوله لو كان قديماً امتنع القصد إلى إيجاده ففيه ما لا يخفى من المنع إلا أن يريد بالقصد ما يجري في العادة لا ما هو معنى الإرادة القديمة عند أهل التحقيق.

و منها أنه تعالى لو كان مريداً لإيجاد العالم في وقت فأما بإرادة قديمة أو حادثة

فعلى الأول يمتنع لا وقوع العالم حين وجد فيه لاستناده إلى إرادة قديمة ممتنعة الزوال فيكون الباري موجبا لا مختارا حيث يمتنع عليه الترك و أيضا بعد وجود العالم إما أن يبقى الإرادة متعلقة بإيجاده أو لا و على الأول يلزم القصد إلى إيجاد الموجود و على الثاني يلزم زوال القديم و على الثاني يلزم التسلسل أو الدور. و يجاب عنه بأن إرادته قديمة و يمتنع لا وقوع المراد و لا يلزم الإيجاب إذ الموجب ما لا يكون لإرادته مدخل في الفعل على ما مر غير مرة و الحاصل أن الموجب المقابل للمختار ما يجب عليه الفعل لا ما يجب عنه الفعل و لذا قيل الوجوب بالاختيار لا ينافي الاختيار بل يؤكد و نقول أيضا إن بقاء إرادة وجود العالم ليس بأن يريد الله تعالى إخرجه من العدم مرة أخرى حتى يلزم إيجاد الموجود و إرادة المراد بل كما مر ذكره في حاجة الممكن في بقائه إلى الموجد الحافظ فالممكن لما كان الإمكان و الافتقار لازمين لذاته أبدا فهو في كل آن يفتقر إلى موجد قديم بل إلى محدث في كل آن على ما هو طريقتنا في هذا العالم الزماني الكوني المتجدد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٥٠

الحدوث المتدرج الكون و قد برهن على أن المحدث المقيم للعالم هو الباري القيوم القديم العليم جل ذكره.

و منها أن لقائل أن يرجع و يقول إن إرادته بإحداث حادث إما أزلية أو حادثة

و على الأول فإما أن يبقى تلك الإرادة بعد زوال ذلك الحادث بعينها أو لا - و مع البقاء فإما أن يتعلق بوجوده حال انعدامه فلزم تخلف المراد عن إرادته و أن لا يكون انعدام ذلك الحادث بإرادته و إما أن يتعلق بوجوده حين وجد و هو غير معقول إذ لا يعقل تعلق الإرادة في الحال بوجود المراد أمس و مع زوالها يلزم زوال القديم و هو محال على أن إرادة الله سبحانه عين ذاته و على الثاني احتاجت الإرادة إلى إرادة أخرى و يلزم التسلسل و أيضا يلزم كونه محلا للحوادث و موردا لتعاقب الصفات و أن يستحيل من صفة إلى صفة و ما هذا شأنه فهو مادة جسمانية - فيكون إله العالمين جسما تعالى عما يقوله الظالمون الملحدون من الذين زعموه محلا للإرادات المتعاقبة علوا كبيرا.

فَنَقُولُ إِنَّ هَذِهِ الشَّبَهَةَ وَنَظَائِرَهَا أُنْمَا نَشَأَتْ مِنْ قِيَاسِ إِرَادَتِهِ إِلَى إِرَادَتِنَا - وَتَوْهَمُ كَوْنَهَا عَزْمًا وَاجْمَاعًا عَلَى الْإِبْجَادِ وَ مِنْ تَوْهَمِ أَنَّ الزَّمَانِيَّاتِ مُتَصَفَةٌ بِالْحُضُورِ بَعْدَ الْغَيْبَةِ وَ بِالْوُجُودِ بَعْدَ الْعَدَمِ بِالْقِيَاسِ إِلَى ذَاتِهِ وَ عِلْمِهِ وَ إِرَادَاتِهِ وَ لَيْسَ الْأَمْرُ كَذَلِكَ فَإِنَّهُ سَبْحَانَهُ لَمَّا عَلِمَ أَزْلًا سِلْسِلَةَ الْوُجُودِ وَ جَمْلَةَ النِّظَامِ الْأَتَمِّ وَ رَوَابِطَ بَعْضِهَا إِلَى بَعْضٍ مِنْ بَدْوِ وَجُودَاتِهَا إِلَى غَايَاتِهَا وَ مِنْ مَقْدَمِهَا إِلَى سَاقَتِهَا وَ عَلِمَ أَنَّ وَجُودَهَا عَلَى هَذِهِ الْهَيْئَةِ الْمَعِينَةِ مِمَّا يَنْبَغِي أَنْ يَصْدُرَ عَنْهُ وَ يَقَعُ فِي الْكَوْنِ بَعَثَةٌ هَذَا الْعِلْمِ الْقَدِيمِ - الَّذِي هُوَ عَيْنُ ذَاتِهِ الْمُرِيدَةِ إِلَى إِبْجَادِ كُلِّ مَا وَجَدَ وَ إِبْدَاعِ كُلِّ مَا أَبْدَعَ وَ إِفَاضَةِ نُورِ الْوُجُودِ عَلَى أَعْيَانِهَا وَ إِيْخْرَاجِهَا جَمْلَةً مِنْ حُدِّ الْعَدَمِ وَ مَكْمَنِ الْإِخْتِفَاءِ إِلَى حَرِيمِ الْوُجُودِ وَ مَنْصَةِ الظُّهُورِ وَ هَذَا الْعِلْمُ كَهَذِهِ الْإِرَادَةُ شَيْءٌ وَاحِدٌ سَرْمَدِيٌّ ثَابِتٌ الْوُجُودِ وَ الْوُجُوبُ لَهُ أَزْلًا وَ أَبَدًا مِنْ غَيْرِ تَغْيِيرٍ وَ تَعَاقُبٍ لَا فِي ذَاتِ الْعِلْمِ وَ الْإِرَادَةِ وَ لَا فِي تَعَلُّقِهِمَا كَمَا تَوْهَمُهُ الْمُتَكَلِّمُونَ لِأَنَّهُمَا عَيْنُ ذَاتِهِ وَ مَبْدَأُ الصِّفَةِ الْإِضَافِيَّةِ إِذَا ثَبَتَ كَانَتْ الْإِضَافَاتُ وَ التَّعَلُّقَاتُ أَيْضًا ثَابِتَةً.

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و منها أن إرادته مما يجب به الفعل

إِذْ لَوْ لَمْ يَجِبْ بِهَا لَمْ يَوْجَدْ بِهَا كَمَا عَلِمْتَ ثُمَّ إِنَّهُ بَعْدَ تَعَلُّقِ الْإِرَادَةِ لَا يَبْقَى فِي صِرَافَةِ الْإِمْكَانِ لَامْتِنَاعِ تَخَلُّفِ الْمَرَادِ عَنْ إِرَادَتِهِ وَ إِرَادَتِهِ عَلَى مَا هُوَ التَّحْقِيقُ عَيْنُ ذَاتِهِ فَبِالنَّظَرِ إِلَى ذَاتِهِ يَجِبُ أَنْ يَوْجَدْ الْعَالَمَ فَيَكُونُ الْعَالَمُ مِنْ لَوَازِمِ ذَاتِهِ فَنَسْبَةُ الْعَالَمِ إِلَيْهِ نَسْبَةُ الْحَرَارَةِ إِلَى النَّارِ وَ نَسْبَةُ الضَّوِّ إِلَى الشَّمْسِ عَلَى مَا يَرَى ظَاهِرًا بَلْ كَنَسْبَةُ الزَّوْجِيَّةِ إِلَى الْأَرْبَعَةِ وَ إِذَا كَانَ كَذَلِكَ كَانَ الْبَارِي مُوجِبًا لَا مُخْتَارًا إِذْ لَا مَعْنَى لِلْمُوجِبِ إِلَّا مَا يَجِبُ الْفِعْلُ وَ الْإِبْجَادُ نَظَرًا إِلَى ذَاتِهِ وَ يَكُونُ الْقَوْلُ بِكَوْنِهِ مُرِيدًا مُجَرَّدَ تَسْمِيَةٍ وَ إِطْلَاقِ لَفْظٍ مِنْ غَيْرِ تَحَقُّقِ الْمَعْنَى الْمُسَمًى بِهِ.

وَ يَدْفَعُ بِمَا قَدْ تَكَرَّرَتْ الْإِشَارَةُ إِلَيْهِ مِنْ أَنَّ ذَاتَهُ تَعَالَى عَيْنُ الْإِرَادَةِ وَ الرِّضَا فَبِالْحَقِيقَةِ يَكُونُ الْإِرَادَةُ مَبْدَأَ صُدُورِ الْفِعْلِ وَ هَذَا أَجَلَ ضُرُوبِ كَوْنِ الْعَفَلِ حَاصِلًا بِالْإِرَادَةِ وَ مِنْ أَنَّهُ فَرْقٌ بَيْنَ الْوُجُوبِ عَنْهُ وَ الْوُجُوبِ عَلَيْهِ وَ مِنْ أَنَّ ذَاتَهُ وَ إِنْ كَانَ أَمْرًا بَسِيطًا هُوَ عَيْنُ إِرَادَتِهِ لَكِنْ ذَاتَهُ ذَاتٌ يَعْتَبَرُ فِيهَا رَوَابِطُ وَ مَنَاسِبَاتٌ مَعَ هَوِيَّاتِ الْمُمْكِنَاتِ وَ لَهُ بِحَسَبِ مَعَانِي صِفَاتِهِ وَ أَسْمَائِهِ نَسَبٌ وَ إِضَافَاتٌ مَعَ أَعْيَانِ الْمَاهِيَّاتِ الثَّابِتَةِ فِي الْأَزْلِ فِي حُدِّ عِلْمِهِ الْإِجْمَالِيِّ وَ عَقْلِهِ الْبَسِيطِ بِوَجْهِهِ وَ الْمَفْصَلِ بِوَجْهِهِ أَمَّا الْبَسَاطَةُ وَ الْإِجْمَالُ فَبِالنَّظَرِ إِلَى هَوِيَّتِهِ الْوُجُودِيَّةِ الَّتِي لَا تَرْكِيبَ فِيهَا أَصْلًا بِوَجْهِهِ مِنَ الْوُجُوهِ - لَا عَقْلًا وَ ذَهْنًا بِحَسَبِ التَّحْلِيلِ الْعَقْلِيِّ وَ لَا عَيْنًا وَ خَارِجًا بِحَسَبِ التَّعَدُّدِ الْخَارِجِيِّ - فَالْأَوَّلُ كَالْمَرْكَبِ الْعَقْلِيِّ مِنَ الْجِنْسِ وَ الْفَصْلِ أَوْ الْمَاهِيَّةِ وَ الْوُجُودِ وَ الثَّانِي كَالْمَرْكَبِ مِنَ الْمَادَّةِ وَ الصُّورَةِ أَوْ مَا يَجْرِي مَجْرَاهُمَا وَ بِالنَّظَرِ إِلَى مَعَانِي صِفَاتِهِ وَ مَفْهُومَاتِ أَسْمَائِهِ كَانَ الْعَالَمُ الرَّبُّوبِيُّ وَ الصَّقْعُ الْإِلَهِيُّ كَثِيرًا جَدًّا بِحَيْثُ لَا تَنْتَلِمُ بِتِلْكَ الْكَثْرَةِ أَحَدِيَّةُ الْحَقِّ وَ بَسَاطَتُهُ وَ هَذَا أَمْرٌ عَجِيبٌ جَدًّا إِلَّا أَنَا أَوْضَحْنَا سَبِيلَهُ مِنَ الْأَصُولِ الَّتِي قَرَرْنَا بِنَيَانِهَا وَ أَحْكَمْنَا بِرَهَانِهَا فَنَقُولُ إِذَا أَخَذْتَ ذَاتَهُ بِاعْتِبَارِ انْضِمَامِ هَذِهِ الرَوَابِطِ - وَ الْمَخْصَصَاتِ الَّتِي يَعْبُرُ عَنْهَا بِالْخَزَائِنِ كَمَا فِي قَوْلِهِ **وَ إِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ**

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وَمَا نُنَزِّلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَعْلُومٍ وَ جَبَّ لَهَا الْإِبْجَادُ وَ كَانَ مُرِيدًا لَوَاحِدَةً وَاحِدَةً مِنْ حَقَائِقِ الْمُمْكِنَاتِ وَ لَوَاحِدٌ وَاحِدٌ مِنْ أَعْدَادِهَا وَ أَشْخَاصِهَا الزَّمَانِيَّةِ وَ الْمَكَانِيَّةِ - كُلٌّ فِي وَقْتِهِ وَ مَكَانِهِ وَ إِذَا أَخَذْتَ ذَاتَهُ بِذَاتِهِ مِنْ غَيْرِ اعْتِبَارِ هَذِهِ الرَوَابِطِ الْمَخْصَصَةِ - الَّتِي قَدْ يَعْبُرُ عَنْهَا بِالْإِرَادَاتِ أَوْ التَّعَلُّقَاتِ أَوْ التَّوْجُّهَاتِ فَذَاتُهُ بَدُونِ اعْتِبَارِهَا لَمْ يَتَخَصَّصْ بِهَا مَخْلُوقٌ عَنْ

مخلوق و لم يتميز ممكن عن ممكن فلا يجب عند ذلك صدور الفعل عنه فلم يلزم كونه موجبا إلا مع اعتبار تلك الروابط فصدق أن ذاته يفعل الأشياء بالإرادات المنضمة إليه فذاته بحيث يصدر عنه بحسب كل إرادة خاصة- ممكن معين و مخلوق خاص.

و منها أنه قد وقع في بعض أحاديث أئمتنا

المطهرين المعصومين عن نسبة الخطأ و النقص سلام الله عليهم و على آبائهم حسب ما نقله عنهم أساطين الرواية و الحديث كالشيخ الأجل محمد بن يعقوب الكليني في الكافي و الصدوق ابن بابويه القمي في كتاب التوحيد و عيون الرضا ضاعف الله قدرهما من حدوث الإرادة و المشية و أنهما من صفات الفعل لا من صفات الذات و هذا بظاهره ينافي كون الإرادة منه تعالى عين ذاته و أجاب عنه شيخنا و أستاذنا سيد أعظم المجددين دام ظله العالي إن الإرادة قد يطلق و يراد به الأمر المصدري

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النسبي أعني الإحداث و الإيجاد و قد يراد به الحاصل أعني الفعل الحادث المتجدد- و كما أن لعلمه بالأشياء مراتب و أخيرة مراتبه وجود الموجودات الخارجية و صدورها عنه منكشفة غير محتجة فهي بذواتها و هوياتها المرتبطة إليه علوم له بوجه و معلومات له باعتبار فمعلوماتها له عين ذواتها لا عالميته إياها عين ذواتها و إنما هي عين ذاته المقدسة فالعلم بمعنى العالمية عين ذاته و هو قديم و بمعنى المعلوماتية

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عين هذه الممكنات و هو حادث فكذا لا إرادته سبحانه مراتب و أخيرة المراتب هي بعينها ذوات الموجودات المتقررة بالفعل و إنما هي عين الإرادة بمعنى مراديتها له لا بمعنى مريدته إياها و ما به فعلية الإرادة و الرضا و مبدئية التخصيص هو عين ذاته الحق و هذا أقوى في الاختيار مما يكون انبعاث الإرادة و الرضا بالفعل عن أمر زائد على نفس ذات الفاعل انتهى حاصل ما أفاده دام علوه و مجده.

و أقول و هاهنا سر عظيم من الأسرار الإلهية نشير إليه إشارة ما و هو أنه يمكن للعارف البصير أن يحكم بأن وجود هذه الأشياء الخارجية من مراتب علمه و إرادته- بمعنى عالميته و مريدته لا بمعنى معلوماته و مراديته فقط و هذا مما يمكن تحصيله للواقف بالأصول السالفة ذكره

الفصل (٩) في اعتضاد ما ذكرنا من الفرق بين إرادة الله سبحانه و بين إرادتنا من طريق الرواية و النقل

و قد مضى أن شاكلتنا فيما أردنا فعله أو هممنا نحو تحصيله أنا نتصوره أولا و نصدق بفائدته العائدة إلينا تصديقا ظنيا أو جهليا خاليا أو علميا بأن فيه منفعة ما أو خيرا ما من الخيرات الحقيقية أو الظنية عينا كان أو صيتا أو ثناء و محمدا عائدا إلى جوهر ذاتنا أو إلى قوة من قوانا فينبعث من ذلك العلم التصوري و ذلك الحكم التصديقي شوق إليه فإذا قوي الشوق النفساني و اشتد اهترت القوة الإرادية و حصلت الإرادة المسماة بالإجماع و هذه الإرادة في الإنسان من قوة هي فوق القوة الشوقية الحيوانية- التي تتشعب إلى الشهوة و الغضب و هي العقل العملي و في غيره اشتداد حال تلك

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القوة كما وقع التنبيه عليه من قبل و بالجملة فينبعث منهما جميعا القوة المحركة التي في العضلات فتحركها بسطا أو قبضا و يتحرك بحركتها الأعصاب و الأعضاء فيحصل المراد فهذه المبادي فينا متعددة في أفعالنا الخارجية فأما القيوم جل ذكره فذاته أجل من الكثرة و الداعية الخارجية و الانفعال و الابتهاج بما وراء ذاته لأنه نهاية المآرب و المطالب و ليس له شوق حاشاه عن ذلك و لا محبة بما سواه و لا قصد إلى تحصيل شيء عادم له كما علمت مرارا بل هو مبتهج بذاته لذاته و يلزم من هذا الابتهاج و يترشح منه حصول سائر الخيرات و الابتهاجات على سبيل الفعل - و الإبداع و الإفاضة لا على شاكلة الانفعال و الاتصاف و الاستحصال -

و الآيات القرآنية في هذا الباب كثيرة

للمتدبرين فيها المتأملين في معانيها مثل قوله تعالى **وَاللَّهُ الْغَنِيُّ وَأَنْتُمُ الْفُقَرَاءُ** فهو الغني من كل جهة عما سواه و ما سواه مفتقر إليه من كل جهة بحسب ذاتها و صفاتها و أفعالها فلو كان له في فعله و جوده قصد زائد - أو غرض أو شوق أو طلب طاعة أو ثناء أو مدح لم يكن غنيا من كل جهة عما سواه و مثل قوله تعالى **وَالِيَهُ يَرْجِعُ الْأَمْرُ كُلُّهُ** و قوله **إِلَى اللَّهِ تَصِيرُ الْأُمُورُ** و أشباه ذلك من الآيات الكثيرة جدا فهذه الآيات تدل على أنه غاية كل شيء فليس في فعله غاية و غرض سوى ذاته المقدسة فلو كان له إرادة زائدة أو داع و مرجح من خارج له على فعله لم يكن ذاته المقدسة غاية الموجودات و مصير كل الأشياء فعلم من هذه الآيات و نظائرها أن إرادته للأشياء عين علمه بها و هما عين ذاته.

و أما الحديث

فمن الأحاديث المروية عن أئمتنا و ساداتنا

في الكافي وغيره في باب الإرادة ما ذكر في الصحيح عن صفوان بن يحيى: قال قلت لأبي الحسن ع أخبرني عن الإرادة من الله و من الخلق قال فقال الإرادة من الخلق الضمير و ما يبدو لهم بعد ذلك من الفعل و أما من الله فإرادته إحداثه لا غير ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٥٦

لأنه لا يروي و لا يهم و لا يتفكر و هذه الصفات منفية عنه و هي صفات الخلق فإرادة الله الفعل لا غير ذلك يقول له كن فيكون بلا لفظ و لا نطق بلسان و لا همة و لا تفكر و لا كيف لذلك كما أنه لا كيف له

و لعل المراد من الضمير تصور الفعل و ما يبدو بعد ذلك من اعتقاد النفع فيه ثم انبعث الشوق من القوة الشوقية ثم تأكده و اشتداده إلى حيثية يحصل الإجماع المسمى بالإرادة فتلك مبادي الأفعال الإرادية القصدية فينا و الله سبحانه مقدس عن ذلك كله فالفعل الصادر عنا بالاختيار يتوسط بين جوهر ذاتنا و بينه أمور كثيرة انفعالية بعضها من باب الإدراك و بعضها من باب الحركة الفكرية و بعضها من باب الشهوة و الغضب و بعضها من باب الفعل التحريكي كالجذب و الدفع و أما الجنب الربوبي ففعله مترتب على نفس ذاته بلا توسط متوسط بينه و بين فعله من الصفات و الأحوال العارضة و السوانح الطارئة من الأغراض و الأشواق - و الهمم و القصود و غيرها من الانفعالات و التغيرات نعم أفعاله يترتب بعضها على بعض - لصدور الموجودات عنه على ترتيب الأشرف فالأشرف.

و عن هشام بن الحكم: في حديث الزنديق الذي سئل أبا عبد الله ع فكان من سؤاله أن قال له فله رضاء و

سخط فقال أبو عبد الله ع نعم ولكن ليس ذلك على ما يوجد من المخلوقين وذلك أن الرضاء حال تدخل عليه فتنقله من حال إلى حال - لأن المخلوق أجوف معتمل مركب للأشياء فيه مدخل و خالقنا لا مدخل للأشياء فيه لأنه واحد وأحد الذات وأحد المعنى فرضاه ثوابه و سخطه عقابه من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٥٧

غير شيء يتداخله فيهيجه و ينقله من حال إلى حال لأن ذلك من صفة المخلوقين العاجزين المحتاجين

و روي مثل ذلك

أبو جعفر محمد بن علي بن بابويه القمي في كتاب التوحيد وفيه أن الرضا والغضب دخال تدخل عليه - و خالقنا لا مدخل للأشياء فيه لأنه واحد وأحد الذات وأحد المعنى

. أقول نعت المخلوق بالأجوف تشبيهه في غاية الحسن و البلاغة في الكلام - و هو في مقابلة نعت الله بالصمد و ذلك لأن كل ممكن مركب من ماهية و وجود - و الماهية كالعدم في أنها لا تحصل لها في ذاتها لكن الوجود قد حصلها و عينها فكأنه أحاط بها كإحاطة الكرة المجوفة بالفضاء الذي لا تعين له إلا بالمحدد و أيضا الهويات الوجودية التي للممكنات قد علمت أن كلا منها مستصحب للأعدام و النقائص - فلها تجاوير بحسب تلك الأعدام و النقائص و كلما نزل الوجود و بعد عن منبع الخير و الجود تضاعف فيه العدم و النقصان فكأنه صار أكثر جوا و أقل سمكا و أرق قواما ثم إن الموجودات الطبيعية مركبة من مادة هي ما به الشيء بالقوة و صورة هي ما به الشيء بالفعل و الصورة كأنها محيطه بالمادة لأنها تحصل المادة و تعينها لأنها مبهمة الذات عدمية الهوية فكل شيء طبيعي مادي كأنه أجوف. و إذا تقرر هذا فاعلم أن سبب كون الشيء بحيث يلحقه الأمور الخارجية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٥٨

و يدخل عليه اللواحق العارضية هو لاشتماله على ما بالقوة و الإمكان و على الأعدام أو القصورات فيفتقر إلى ما يستكمل به و يخرج به ذاته من العدم إلى الوجود و من القوة إلى الفعل و من النقص إلى الكمال و لأجل ذلك أودع الله في كل مخلوق - توجهها إلى الكمال و طلبا للتمام الذي يناسبه تقربا إلى الله إما بعشق عقلي كما للمقربين و إما بشوق نفساني كما للنفوس العالية من المشتاقين و إما بشوق حيواني شهوي كما للنفوس السافلة أو بحركة وضعية أو كمية أو كيفية أو آينية كما للطبائع الفلكية و العنصرية و بالجملة لا يخلو ما سوى الحق من قصور أو فقد محوج له إلى متمم و مكمل له و محصل لوجوده فهو أجوف بهذا المعنى فإذا الذي لا جوف له بوجه من الوجوه و لا تركيب فيه أصلا من جهتي نقص و تمام هو الله الواحد الأحد الصمد.

[أقوال الفلاسفة في ذلك]

و اعلم أن الأحاديث المنقول من أئمتنا المعصومين صلوات الله عليهم أجمعين في هذا الباب كثيرة اكتفينا بهذا لثلا يؤدي ذكرها جميعا إلى الإطناب و لتيسر الرجوع إلى كتب الحديث لمن أراد الوقوف عليها و أما المنقول من غيرهم من أهل العلم و التوحيد فلقد

قال الشيخ أبو علي في تعليقاته على الشفا

في بيان إرادته تعالى أن هذه الموجودات كلها صادرة عن ذاته و هي مقتضى ذاته فهي غير منافية له و لأنه يعشق ذاته فهذه الأشياء كلها مراده لأجل ذاته فكونها مراده له ليس لأجل غرض وراء ذاته بل لأجل ذاته لأنها مقتضى ذاته فليس هذه الموجودات مراده لأنها هي بل لأجل ذاته و لأنها مقتضى ذاته مثلا لو كنت تعشق شيئا لكان جميع ما يصدر عنه معشوقا لك لأجل ذلك الشيء و نحن إنما نريد الشيء لأجل شهوة أو لذة لا لأجل ذات الشيء المراد و لو كانت الشهوة و اللذة و غيرهما من الأشياء شاعرة بذاتها و كان مصدر الأفعال عنها ذاتها لكانت مريدة لتلك الأشياء لذاتها لأنها صادرة من ذاتها و الإرادة لا تكون إلا لشاعر بذاته - ثم قال و قد بينا أن واجب الوجود تام بل فوق التمام فلا يصح أن يكون فعله لغرض فلا يصح أن يعلم أن شيئا هو موافق له فيشتاقه ثم يحصله فإذاً إرادته من جهة العلم أن يعلم - أن ذلك الشيء في نفسه خير و حسن و وجود ذلك يجب أن يكون على الوجه الفلاني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٥٩

حتى يكون وجودا فاضلا و كون ذلك الشيء خيرا لا من كونه فلا يحتاج بعد هذا العلم إلى إرادة أخرى ليكون الشيء موجودا بل نفس علمه بنظام الأشياء الممكنة - على الترتيب الفاضل هو سبب موجب لوجود تلك الأشياء على النظام الموجود و الترتيب الفاضل و بالجملة فلوازم ذاته أعني المعلومات لم يكن يعلمها ثم يرضى بها بل لما كان صدورها عنه عن مقتضى ذاته كان نفس صدورها عنه نفس رضاه بها فإذاً لم يكن صدورها عنه منافيا لذاته بل مناسبا لذات الفاعل و كل ما كان غير مناف و مع ذلك يعلم الفاعل أنه فاعله فهو مراده لأنه مناسب له فنقول هذه الموجودات صدرت عن مقتضى ذات واجب الوجود بذاته المعشوقة له مع علم منه بأنه فاعلها و علتها و كل ما يصدر عن شيء على هذه الصفة فهو غير مناف لذلك الفاعل و كل فعل يصدر عن فاعل و هو غير مناف له فهو مراده فإذاً الأشياء كلها مراده لواجب الوجود و هذا المراد هو المراد الخالي عن الغرض لأن الغرض في رضاه بصدور تلك الأشياء أنه مقتضى ذاته المعشوقة فيكون رضاه بصدور الأشياء لأجل ذاته فيكون الغاية في فعله ذاته و مثال هذا أنك إذا أحببت شيئا لأجل إنسان كان المحبوب بالحقيقة ذلك الإنسان فكذلك المعشوق المطلق هو ذاته و مثال الإرادة فينا أنا نريد شيئا و نشتاقه لأننا محتاجون إليه و واجب الوجود يريد على الوجه الذي ذكرنا و لكنه لا يشتاق إليه لأنه غني عنه فالغرض لا يكون إلا مع الشوق فإنه يقال لم طلب هذا فيقال لأنه اشتهاه و حيث لا يكون الشوق لا يكون الغرض فليس هناك غرض في تحصيل المقصود و لا غرض فيما يتبع تحصيله إذ تحصيل الشيء غرض و ما يتبع ذلك التحصيل من النفع غرض أيضا و الغاية قد تكون نفس الفعل و قد يكون نفعا تابعا للفعل مثلا كالمشي قد يكون غاية و قد يكون الارتياض غاية و كذلك البناء قد يكون غرضا و قد يكون الاستكنان به غرضا و لو أن إنسانا عرف الكمال الذي هو حقيقة واجب الوجود ثم كان ينظم الأمور التي بعده على مثاله - حتى كانت الأمور على غاية النظام لكان الغرض بالحقيقة واجب الوجود بذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٠

الذي هو الكمال فإن كان واجب الوجود بذاته هو الفاعل فهو أيضا الغاية و الغرض - و كذلك لو عرفنا الكمال في بناء بيت بنينه ثم رتبنا أمور ذلك البناء على مقتضى ذلك الكمال كان الغرض ذلك الكمال فإذاً كان ذلك الكمال هو الفاعل

كان الفاعل والغرض واحداً ومثال هذه الإرادة فينا إذا أنا تصورنا شيئاً وعرفنا أنه نافع أو صواب حرك هذا الاعتقاد والتصور القوة الشهوانية ما لم يكن هناك مرجح ولم يكن هناك مانع فلا يكون بين التصور والاعتقاد المذكورين وبين حركة القوة الشهوانية إرادة أخرى إلا نفس هذا الاعتقاد فكذلك إرادة واجب الوجود فإن نفس معقولية الأشياء له على الوجه الذي أومأنا إليه هي علة وجود الأشياء إذ ليس يحتاج إلى شوق إلى ما يفعله وطلب لحصوله ونحن إنما نحتاج إلى القوة الشوقية ونحتاج في الإرادة إلى الشوق لنطلب بالآلات ما هو موافق لنا فإن فعل الآلات يتبع شوقاً يتقدمه وهناك ليس يحتاج إلى هذا الشوق واستعمال الآلات فليس هناك إلا العلم المطلق بنظام الموجودات - وعلمه بأفضل الوجوه التي يجب أن يكون عليها الموجودات وعلمه بخير الترتيبات وهذا هو العناية بعينها فإننا لو رتبنا أمراً موجوداً لكننا نعقل أولاً النظام الفاضل ثم نرتب الموجودات التي كنا نريد إيجادها بحسب ذلك النظام الأفضل وبمقتضاه فإذا كان النظام والكمال نفس الفاعل ثم كان يصدر الموجودات عن مقتضاه كانت العناية حاصلة هناك وهي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦١

نفس الإرادة والإرادة نفس العلم والسبب في ذلك أن الفاعل والغاية شيء واحد - والعناية هي أن يعقل واجب الوجود بذاته أن الإنسان كيف يجب أن يكون أعضاؤه وأن السماء كيف يجب أن يكون حركتها ليكونا فاضلين ويكون نظام الخير فيهما موجوداً من دون أن يتبع هذا العلم شوق وطلب أو غرض آخر سوى علمه بما ذكرنا من موافقة معلوم لذاته المعشوقة له فإن الغرض وبالجملته النظر إلى أسفل أعني لو خلق الخلق طلباً لغرض أعني أن يكون الغرض الخلق أو الكمالات الموجودة في الخلق أعني ما يتبع الخلق طلب كمال لم يكن لو لم يخلق - وهذا لا يليق بما هو واجب الوجود من جميع جهاته ثم قال فقد عرفت إرادة الواجب الوجود بذاته وأنها بعينها علمه وهي بعينها عنايته وأن هذه الإرادة غير حادثة - وبينا أن لنا إرادة على هذا الوجه وقال أيضاً في تعليق آخر كما أن الباري الأول إذا تمثل تبع ذلك التمثل الوجود كذلك إذا تمثلنا تبعه الشوق وإذا اشتقنا يتبعه لتحصيل الشيء حركة الأعضاء وأعلم أن القدرة هي أن يكون الفعل متعلقاً بمشيئة من غير أن يعتبر معها شيء آخر والقدرة فيه عندنا علمه فإنه إذا علم وتمثل فقد وجب وجود الشيء والقدرة فينا عند المبدأ المحرك وهو القوة المحركة لا القوة العالمية والقدرة فيه خالية عن الإمكان وهو صدور الفعل عنه بإرادة فحسب من غير أن يعتبر معها وجوب استثناء أحد الجزئين لا أنه أراد ولا أنه لم يرد وليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٢

هو مثل القدرة فينا فإن القدرة فينا هي بعينها القوة وهي فيه الفعل فقط فإنه إن لم يعتبر على هذا الوجه كان فيه إمكان واجب الوجود منزّه عن ذلك وكذلك إن لم يعتبر أن قدرته بعينها إرادته وعلمه كان في صفاته تكثر فيجب أن يكون مرجعها إلى العلم كما كان مرجع إرادته إلى علمه والإرادة فينا تابعة لغرض ولم يكن فيه لغرض البتة غير ذاته. ثم قال وصدور الأشياء عن ذاته لا لغرض فهو رضاه لا أنها تصدر عنه ثم يرضى بصدورها عنه والقدرة فيه يستحيل أن تكون بالإمكان فهو إذا فعل فقد شاء وإذا لم يفعل فإنه لم يشأ ليتم الفعل والقدرة وقال أيضاً الحكمة معرفة الوجود الواجب وهو الأول ولا يعرفه عقل كما يعرف هو ذاته فالحكيم بالحقيقة هو الأول والحكمة عند الحكماء تقع على العلم التام والعلم التام في باب التصور أن يكون التصور بالحد وفي باب التصديق أن يعلم الشيء بأسبابه إن كان له

سبب و أما ما لا سبب له فإنه يتصور بذاته و يعرف بذاته كواجب الوجود فإنه لا حد له و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٣

يتصور بذاته إذ لا يحتاج في تصوره إلى شيء إذ هو أولي التصور و يعرف بذاته إذ لا سبب له و تقع على الفعل المحكم و الفعل المحكم هو أن يكون قد أعطي الشيء جميع ما يحتاج إليه ضرورة في وجوده و في حفظ وجوده بحسب الإمكان إن كان ذلك الإمكان في مادة فبحسب الاستعداد الذي فيها و إن لم يكن في مادة فبحسب إمكان الأمر في نفسه كالعقول الفعالة و بالتفاوت في الإمكانيات يختلف درجات الموجودات في الكمالات و النقائص فإن كان تفاوت الإمكانيات في النوع كان الاختلاف في النوع و إن كان ذلك في الأشخاص فاختلاف الكمال و النقصان يكون في الأشخاص فالكمال المطلق حيث يكون الوجوب بلا إمكان و الوجود بلا عدم و الفعل بلا قوة و الحق بلا باطل ثم كل تال فإنه يكون أنقص من الأول إذ كل ما سواه فإنه ممكن في ذاته ثم الاختلاف بين التوالي في الأشخاص و الأنواع يكون بحسب الاستعداد و الإمكان فكل واحد من العقول الفعالة أشرف مما يليه و جميع العقول الفعالة أشرف من الأمور المادية ثم السماويات من جملة الماديات أشرف من عالم الطبيعة العنصرية و نريد بالأشرف ما هو أقدم في ذاته و لا يصح وجود تاليه إلا بعد وجوده.

و هذا أعني الإمكانيات أسباب الشر فهذا لا يخلو أمر من الأمور الممكنة من مخالطة الشر إذ الشر هو العدم كما أن الخير هو الوجود و حيث يكون الإمكان أكثر كان الشر أكثر انتهى كلامه.

و ممن اتقن هذه المسألة من علمائنا الإمامية و حققها غاية التحقيق العلامة الطوسي في نقد المحصل

حيث قال صاحب المحصل و هو أشعري المذهب مسألة لا يجوز أن يفعل الله شيئاً لغرض خلافاً للمعتزلة و لأكثر الفقهاء لنا أن كل من كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٤

كذلك كان مستكملاً بفعل ذلك الشيء و المستكمل بغيره ناقص لذاته و لأن كل غرض يفرض فهو من الممكنات فيكون الله قادراً على إيجاد ابتداء فيكون توسيط ذلك الفعل عبثاً لا يقال لا يمكن تحصيله إلا بتلك الوساطة لأننا نقول الذي يصلح أن يكون غرضاً ما ليس إلا إيصال اللذة إلى العبد و هو مقدور لله من غير شيء من الوسائط احتجوا بأن ما يفعل لا لغرض فهو عبث و العبث على الحكيم غير جائز - قلنا إن أردت بالعبث الخالي عن الغرض فهذا استدلال بالشيء على نفسه و إن أردت شيئاً آخر غيره فبينه.

فقال الناقد المحقق أقول المعتزلة يقولون فعل الحكيم لا يخلو عن غرض هو الداعي إلى ذلك الفعل و إلزام ترجيح من غير مرجح و الفقهاء يقولون - الحكم بالقصاص إنما ورد من الشارع لينزجر الناس عن القتل فهذا هو الغرض منه - ثم إن المجتهدين يفرعون على ذلك الإذن و المنع فيما لم يصرح الشارع حكمه فيه على وجه يوافق الغرض أو لا يوافق و بعض القائلين بالأغراض يقولون المراد سوق الأشياء الناقصة إلى كمالاتها فمن الكمالات ما لا يحصل إلا بذلك السوق - كما أن الجسم لا يمكن إيصاله من مكان إلى مكان إلا بتحريكه و هو الغرض من تحريكه فتحصيل بعض الأغراض من غير توسيط الأفعال الخاصة محال - و المحال غير مقدور عليه و قوله الصالح لكونه غرضاً ليس إلا إيصال

اللذة إلى العبد و هو مقدور من غير واسطة فليس بحكم كلي فإن لذة أخذ أجره الكسب - من غير الكسب غير مقدور عليه و العبد ليس هو الفعل الخالي عن الغرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٥

مطلقا بل يجب أن يزداد فيه بشرط أن يكون من شأن ذلك الفعل أن يصدر عن فاعله المختار لغرض و أما قوله الفاعل لغرض مستكمل بالغرض حكم أخذه من الحكماء و استعمله في غير موضعه فإنهم لا ينفون سوق الأشياء إلى كمالاتها و إلا لبطل علم منافع الأعضاء و قواعد العلوم الحكيمة من الطبيعيات و علم الهيئة و غيرها - و سقطت العلل الغائية بأسرها من الاعتبار بل يقولون إضافة الموجودات عن مبدئها - يكون على أكمل ما يمكن لا بأن يخلق ناقصا ثم يكمله بقصد ثان بل يخلقه مشتاقا إلى كماله لا باستيناف تدبير و يعنون بالغرض استيناف ذلك التدبير في الإكمال بالقصد الثاني و أما أهل السنة فيقولون إنه فعال لما يريد ليس من شأن فعله أن يوصف بحسن أو قبح فكثير من الناقصين يعدمهم قبل استكمالهم و كثير من المتحركين يحركهم إلى غير غايات حركاتهم و لا يسأل في أفعاله بلم و كيف انتهى كلام ناقد المحصل.

تتميم و تحصيل

النزاع بين الحكماء و الأشاعرة في إثبات العلل و الغايات للأشياء و عدمه فكل فعل و حركة له غاية و سبب عند الحكماء و ليس كذلك عند هؤلاء لأنهم ينكرون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٦

العلة و المعلول و ينكرون الإيجاب و الاستلزام في الفاعل مطلقا سواء كان واجب الوجود أو غيره و ذلك لإثباتهم القدرة بالمعنى المذكور من غير مرجح و داع فهم بهذا المذهب المشهور عنهم أبعد خلق الله عن منهج الحكمة و المعرفة إلا أن يكون مراد شيخهم و متقدمهم شيئا آخر و هو نفي اللمية الزائدة على ذاته عنه في فعله المطلق - و أما النزاع بين الحكماء و المعتزلة فإنما هو في نفي الغاية الزائدة عن ذاته في فعله المطلق و إثباتها فيه فإن الحكماء ذهبوا إلى أن فعله سبحانه مطلقا لا يكون لغرض سواء من إصال خير بممكن أو نفع أو ثواب أو غير ذلك لكن يترتب على أفعاله هذه الغايات و الأغراض و المعتزلة أثبتوا لفعله الغرض العائد إلى العباد و أما الأفعال الخاصة فلكل منها سبب غائي و غرض لفاعله فيه عندهم يستكمل فاعل ذلك الفعل به سواء كان يلحق به لحوقا زمانيا كما في الفواعل التي تحت الكون أو لحوقا غير زمني كما في ما فوق الكون.

و اعلم أن العلة الغائية كما مر في مباحث العلل هي العلة الفاعلية بحقيقتها و ماهيتها لفاعلية الفاعل فهي بالحقيقة الفاعل الأول أي فاعل الفعل بما هو فاعل بالفعل و هي أيضا غرض بما هو ملحوظ الفاعل في فعله و هما متحدان بالذات متغايران بالاعتبار فهناك شيء واحد يسمى بالعلة الغائية و الغرض و كذلك الفائدة المترتبة على الفعل و الغاية المنتهي إليها الفعل متحدان ذاتا متغايران بالاعتبار - فالخيرية و التمامية اللازمة لوجود الفعل في الخارج من حيث يترتب على الفعل فائدة و من حيث ينساق إليه الفعل غاية و أفعال الفاعل المختار يكون فيها الأمور الأربعة و يترتب الأغراض و الغايات مترتبة متسلسلة إلى الغرض الأخير الذي هو مبدؤها جميعا و منتهاها و هو الغرض بالحقيقة و الغاية عند

التفتيش وقد علمت في تلك المباحث أن هذه المعاني الأربعة أعني العلة الغائية و الفائدة و الغاية و الغرض - كلها في فعل الله سبحانه شيء واحد هو ذاته الأحدية و مرجعها إلى العناية التي هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٧

العلم التام بوجه الخير للنظام و الإرادة الحققة لفعل الخير بالذات مطلقا فإذن العالم الأكبر و هو الإنسان الكامل الأعظم فاعله و غايته أولا و آخره و مبداً و مصيرا هو الله سبحانه بحسب نفس ذاته فاما كل جزء من أجزاء نظام الوجود فالغرض القريب - و الغاية القريبة منه بحسب الخصوصية شيء غير ذاته كما أن فاعله القريب بحسب الخصوصية شيء غير الحق الأول كما أن الغاية و الفاعل في نظام الشخص الجزئي الإنساني بجميع أجزائه و طبائعه و قواه هما نفسه المتعلقة بجملة بدنه و أما الفاعل و الغاية القريبان لكل فعل مخصوص من أفعال الأعضاء فقوة مخصوصة من قوى نفسه - كالجاذبة و الدافعة و الغازية و المنمية و المولدة و غيرها إلى ألف ألف قوة و فعل و مرجعها و أفعالها كلها إلى النفس أولا و آخره و باطنا فقد ظهر و تبين أن الفاعل المختار إذا كان ممكن الوجود ناقص الذات كان غرضه من الفعل شيئا زائدا على ذاته هو كمال ذاته و تمامها الذي به يستكمل في الفعل و يتم و إذا كان واجب الوجود - فلكونه كامل الذات تام الكمال بل فوق التمام لم يكن له في فعله غرض و غاية الأنفس ذاته لا شيء وراءه و ليس معنى هذا الكلام أن فعله المطلق لا غاية و لا غرض له بل إن غايته و غرضه ذاته المقدسة و الإرجع الأمر إلى مذهب الأشعرية تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا.

فقد استبان و ظهر أن الحكماء إنما ينفون عن فعل الله سبحانه المطلق - غرضا و غاية أخيرة غير ذاته و يقولون ذاته غرض الأغراض و غاية الغايات و نهاية الطلبات و الرغبات و الأشواق لكونه علة العلل و سبب الأسباب و مسببها و معللها و لا ينفون الغرض و الغاية و العلة الغائية بل يشبّهون أغراضا و غايات و كمالات مترتبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٨

منتهية إليه سبحانه بخلاف الأشاعرة فإنهم يسدون باب التعليل مطلقا و بخلاف المعتزلة أيضا فإنهم يشبّهون في فعله المطلق غرضا غير ذاته و كلا القولين زيغ عن الصواب - و فيما ذهبت إليه الحكماء يثبت سر التوحيد في الوجود حسب ما عرفه و أفاده العارفون - و قد أقمنا البرهان عليه من سبيل المبدئية و الفاعلية و هاهنا يقام عليه من سبيل الآخرة و الغائية لأن كمال كل شيء هو نفسه و هكذا كمال الكمال و تمام التمام إلى آخر الكمالات الذاتية و تمام التمامات الوجودية دفعا للدور و التسلسل فكل شيء هالك إلا وجهه و به يتحقق سر القيامة الكبرى و سر قوله تعالى **لِمَنِ الْمُلْكُ الْيَوْمَ لِلَّهِ الْوَاحِدِ الْقَهَّارِ** و ما ادعاه العارف المحقق من الفناء و البقاء و ما ذهب إليه فرفوروريوس من اتحاد العاقل بالعقل الفعال و ما

روي عن خير البشر ص من قوله:

لي مع الله وقت لا يسعني فيه ملك مقرب و لا نبي مرسل

و أنه ص من جملة الأنبياء المرسلين سلام الله عليهم أجمعين

الفصل (١٠) في حكمته تعالى و عنايته و هدايته و جوده

قد علمت أن الحكمة هي أفضل علم بالمعلومات و أحكم فعل في المصنوعات و واجب الوجود يعلم من ذاته كل شيء من الأشياء بعلمه و أسبابه و يفعل النظام الأتم لغاية حقيقية يلزمه فهو بهذا المعنى حكيم في علمه [عمله] محكم في صنعه و فعله - فهو الحكيم المطلق و قد علمت أن هذا العلم بعينه سبب وجود الأشياء و إرادة إيجادها - من غير أن يكون المنظور إليه في الإيجاد شيء سافل و غرض غير حاصل في ذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٦٩

الفاعل فهذا معنى العناية.

و الهداية هي ما يسوق الشيء إلى كماله الثاني الذي لا يحتاج إليه في أصل وجوده و بقائه و قد أعطى سبحانه كل شيء كمال وجوده و هو ما يحتاج إليه في وجوده و بقائه و زاده أيضا كمالا ثانيا و هو ما لا يحتاج إليه فيهما و إليه الإشارة في القرآن بقوله تعالى **رَبَّنَا الَّذِي أَعْطَى كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلْقَهُ تُمَّ هَدَى** فالخلق هو إعطاء الكمال الأول و الهداية هي إفادة الكمال الثاني و بقوله أيضا **الَّذِي خَلَقَنِي فَهُوَ يَهْدِينِ**.

و أما الجود فهو إفادة الخير بلا عوض فإن الإفادة على وجهين أحدهما معاملة و الآخر جود فالمعاملة أن تعطي شيئا و تأخذ بدله سواء كان البذل عينا - أو ذكرا حسنا أو فرحا أو دعاء أو حصول صفة كمالية أو إزالة رذيلة نفسانية. و بالجملة ما يكون للمعطي فيه رغبة أو غرض لا يحصل إلا بذلك الإعطاء فإنه المعاملة بالحقيقة و إن كان الجمهور يزعمون المعاملة حيث يكون معاوضة عينية و لا يسمون غيره معاملة و لكن العقلاء يعرفون أن الجود بالحقيقة حيث لا يكون فيه عوض و لا غرض و أن كل ما فيه غرض أو فائدة فهو معاملة فالجود بالحقيقة لمريد و فاعل لا يكون لفعله غرض و ما ذلك إلا لواجب الوجود فإذن لا جواد إلا واجب الوجود على أن كل جود و كرم لا يحصل إلا من جهته

الفصل (١١) في شمول إرادته لجميع الأفعال

هذه المسألة أيضا من جملة المسائل الغامضة الشريفة قل من اهتدى إلى مغزاها و سلك سبيل جدواها و اختلفت فيه الآراء و تشعبت فيه المذاهب و الأهواء - و تحيرت فيه الأفهام و اضطربت فيه آراء الأنام

فذهبت جماعة كالمعتزلة و من يحذو حذوهم

إلى أن الله تعالى أوجد العباد و أقدروهم على تلك الأفعال و فوض إليهم الاختيار - فهم مستقلون بإيجاد تلك الأفعال على وفق مشيئتهم و طبق قدرتهم و قالوا إنه أراد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٠

منهم الإيمان و الطاعة و كره منهم الكفر و المعصية و قالوا و على هذا يظهر أمور الأول فائدة التكليف بالأوامر و النواهي و فائدة الوعد و الوعيد الثاني استحقاق الثواب و العقاب الثالث تنزيه الله سبحانه عن إيجاد القبائح و الشرور من أنواع الكفر و المعاصي و المساوي و عن إرادتها لكنهم غفلوا عما يلزمهم فيما ذهبوا إليه من إثبات الشركاء لله بالحقيقة و قد علمت أن الوجود مجعول له على الإطلاق و لا شبهة في أن مذهب من جعل أفراد الناس كلهم خالقين لأفعالهم مستقلين في إيجادها أشنع من مذهب من جعل الأصنام أو الكواكب شفعاء عند الله و أيضا يلزمهم أن ما أراد ملك الملوك لا يوجد في ملكه و أن ما كرهه يكون موجودا فيه و ذلك نقصان شنيع و قصور شديد - في السلطنة و الملكوت تعالى

القيوم عن ذلك علوا كبيرا.

و ذهب جماعة أخرى كالأشاعرة و من يحذو حذوهم

إلى أن كل ما يدخل في الوجود فهو بإرادته تعالى من غير واسطة سواء كان من الأمور القائمة بذاتها أو من الصفات التابعة لغيرها من أفعال العباد وإراداتها وأشواقها وحركاتها وطاعاتها ومعاصيها وغيرها ويقولون إن إرادة الله متعلقة بكل كائن غير متعلقة بما ليس بكائن على ما اشتهر بين الناس أن كل ما يقع في العالم فهو بقضاء الله تعالى وقدره و ما

روي عن النبي ص: أن ما شاء الله كان و ما لم يشأ لم يكن

فلا موجد و لا مؤثر في الوجود و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧١

الإيجاد إلا الله المتعال عن الشريك في الخلق والإيجاد فيفعل ما يشاء و يحكم ما يريد - لا علة لفعله و لا راد لقضائه **لَا يُسْئَلُ عَمَّا يَفْعَلُ وَ هُمْ يُسْئَلُونَ** و لا مجال للعقل في تحسين الأفعال و تقييحها بالنسبة إليه بل يحسن صدور كلها عنه و الأسباب المشاهدة كالأفلاك و الكواكب و أوضاعها لصدور الحوادث الأرضية و أشخاص الإنسان و الحيوان لصدور أفعالها و حركاتها هي مما ارتبط بها وجود الأشياء بحسب الظاهر - لا بحسب حقيقة الأمر في نفسه لأنها ليست أسبابا بالحقيقة و لا مدخل لها في وجود شيء من الأشياء لكنه أجرى عادته بأنه يوجد تلك الأسباب أولا ثم يوجد عقيبها تلك المسببات و التحقيق أن المسببات صادرة عنه ابتداء و قالوا في ذلك تعظيم لقدرة الله و تقديس لها عن شوائب النقصان و القصور في التأثير حيث يحتاج في تأثيره في شيء إلى واسطة شيء آخر و تشاجر بين هاتين الطائفتين المناقضات و الاحتجاجات و الاستدلالات بأمور متعارضة حتى الآيات القرآنية و الأحاديث النبوية فإنها متعارضة الظواهر في هذا الباب.

و ذهبت طائفة أخرى و هم الحكماء و خواص أصحابنا الإمامية

رضوان الله عليهم إلى أن الأشياء في قبول الوجود من المبدأ المتعالي متفاوتة فبعضها لا يقبل الوجود إلا بعد وجود الآخر كالعرض الذي لا يمكن وجوده إلا بعد وجود الجوهر - فقدوته على غاية الكمال يفيض الوجود على الممكنات على ترتيب و نظام و بحسب قابلياتها متفاوتة بحسب الإمكانيات فبعضها صادرة عنه بلا سبب و بعضها بسبب واحد أو أسباب كثيرة فلا يدخل مثل ذلك في الوجود إلا بعد سبق أمور هي أسباب وجوده و هو مسبب الأسباب من غير سبب و ليس ذلك لنقصان في القدرة بل النقصان في القابلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٢

و كيف يتوهم النقصان و الاحتياج مع أن السبب المتوسط أيضا صادرة عنه فالله سبحانه غير محتاج في إيجاد شيء من الأشياء إلى أحد غيره و قالوا لا ريب في وجود موجود - على أكمل وجه في الخير و الجود و لا في أن صدور الموجودات عنه يجب أن يكون على أبلغ النظام فالصادر عنه إما خير محض كالملائكة و من ضاهاها و إما ما يكون الخير فيه غالبا على الشر كغيرهم من الجن و الإنس فيكون الخيرات داخلية في قدرة الله بالأصالة و الشرور اللازمة

للخيرات داخله فيها بالتبع و من ثم قيل إن الله يريد الكفر و المعاصي الصادرة عن العباد لكن لا يرضى بها على قياس من لسعت الحية إصبعة - و كانت سلامته موقوفة على قطع إصبعة فإنه يختار قطعها بإرادته لكن بتبعية إرادة السلامة و لولاها لم يرد القطع أصلاً فيقال هو يريد السلامة و يرضى بها و يريد القطع - و لا يرضى به إشارة إلى الفرق الدقيق و أنت تعلم أن هذا المذهب أحسن من الأولين و أسلم من الآفات و أصبح عند ذوي البصائر النافذة في حقائق المعارف فإنه متوسط بين الجبر و التفويض و خير الأمور أوسطها.

و ذهبت طائفة أخرى و هم الراسخون في العلم

و هم أهل الله خاصة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٣

إلى أن الموجودات على تباينها في الذوات و الصفات و الأفعال و ترتبها في القرب و البعد من الحق الأول و الذات الأحدية يجمعها حقيقة واحدة إلهية جامعة لجميع حقائقها و طبقاتها لا بمعنى أن المركب من المجموع شيء واحد هو الحق سبحانه - حاشا الجنب الإلهي عن وصمة الكثرة و التركيب بل بمعنى أن تلك الحقيقة الإلهية مع أنها في غاية البساطة و الأحدية ينفذ نوره في أقطار السماوات و الأرضين و لا ذرة من ذرات الأكوان الوجودية إلا و نور الأنوار محيط بها قاهر عليها و هو قائم على كل نفس بما كسبت و هو مع كل شيء لا بمقارنة و غير كل شيء لا بمزايلة **وَهُوَ الَّذِي فِي السَّمَاءِ إِلَهُ وَ فِي الْأَرْضِ إِلَهُ** و هذا المطلب الشريف الغامض اللطيف مما وجدوه - و حصلوه بالكشف و الشهود عقيب رياضاتهم و خلواتهم و هو مما أقمنا عليه البرهان - مطابقاً للكشف و الوجدان فإذن كما أنه ليس في الوجود شأن إلا و هو شأنه كذلك ليس في الوجود فعل إلا و هو فعله لا بمعنى أن فعل زيد مثلاً ليس صادراً عنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٤

بل بمعنى أن فعل زيد مع أنه فعله بالحقيقة دون المجاز فهو فعل الله بالحقيقة فلا حكم إلا لله و لا حول و لا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم يعني كل حول فهو حوله و كل قوة فهي قوته فهو مع غاية عظمته و علوه ينزل منازل الأشياء و يفعل فعلها - كما أنه مع غاية تجرده و تقدسه لا يخلو منه أرض و لا سماء كما في قوله تعالى **وَهُوَ مَعَكُمْ أَيْنَ مَا كُنْتُمْ**. فإذا تحقق هذا المقام ظهر أن نسبة الفعل و الإيجاد إلى العبد صحيح كنسبة الوجود و السمع و البصر و سائر الحواس و صفاتها و أفعالها و انفعالاتها من الوجه الذي بعينه ينسب إليه فكما أن وجود زيد بعينه أمر متحقق في الواقع منسوب إلى زيد بالحقيقة لا بالمجاز و هو مع ذلك شأن من شئون الحق الأول فكذلك علمه و إرادته و حركته و سكونه و جميع ما يصدر عنه منسوبة إليه بالحقيقة لا بالمجاز و الكذب - فالإنسان فاعل لما يصدر عنه و مع ذلك ففعله أحد أفاعيل الحق على الوجه الأعلى الأشرف اللائق بأحدية ذاته بلا شوب انفعال و نقص و تشبيه و مخالطة بالأجسام و الأرجاس و الأنجاس تعالى عن ذلك علواً كبيراً.

فالتنزيه و التقديس يرجع إلى مقام الأحدية التي يستهلك فيه كل شيء و هو الواحد القهار الذي ليس أحد غيره في الدار و التشبيه راجع إلى مقامات الكثرة و المعلولية و المحامد كلها راجعة إلى وجهه الإحدى و له عواقب الاثنية و المدائح و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٥

التقاديس و ذلك لأن شأنه إفاضة الوجود على كل موجود و الوجود كله خير محض - كما علمت و هو المجعول و المفاض و الشرور و الأعدام غير مجعولة و كذا الماهيات ما شمت رائحة الوجود كما مر مرارا فعين الكلب نجس و الوجود الفاض عليه بما هو وجود طاهر العين و كذا الكافر نجس العين من حيث ماهيته و عينه الثابت لا من حيث وجوده لأنه طاهر الأصل و إنما اختلطت الوجودات بالأعدام و الظلمات - لبعدها عن منبع الجود و النور كالنور الشمسي الواقع على القاذورات و الأرجاس - و المواضع الكثيفة فإنه لا يخرج من النورية و الصفا بوقوعه عليها و لا يتصف بصفتها - من الرائحة الكريهة و غيرها إلا بالعرض فكذلك كل وجود من حيث كونه وجودا أو أثر وجود خير و حسن ليس فيه شرية و لا قبح و لكن الشرية و القبح من حيث نقصه عن التمام و من حيث منافاته لخير آخر و كل من هذين يرجع إلى نحو عدم و العدم غير مجعول لأحد و الحمد لله العلي الكبير.

فهذا حاصل الكلام في تقرير هذا المذهب و معرفة النفس و قواها أشد معين على فهم هذا المطلب فإن فعل الحواس و القوى الحيوانية و الطبيعية كلها فعل النفس كما هو التحقيق مع أنها فعل تلك القوى أيضا بالحقيقة لا بمعنى الشركة بين الفاعلين في فعل واحد كما يوجد في أفعال الفاعلين الصناعيين أنه قد يقع الشركة بين اثنين منهم في فعل واحد كالخياطة و نحوه و لا شبهة في أن المذهب الرابع عظيم الجدوى شديد المنزلة لو تيسر الوصول إليه لأحد ينال الغبطة الكبرى و الشرف الأتم و به يندفع جميع الشبه الواردة على خلق الأعمال و به يتحقق معنى ما ورد من كلام إمام الموحدين

علي ع: لا جبر و لا تفويض بل أمر بين الأمرين

إذ ليس المراد منه - أن في فعل العبد تركيبا من الجبر و التفويض و لا أيضا معناه أن فيه خلوا عنهما و لا أنه اختيار من جهة و اضطرار من جهة أخرى و لا أنه مضطر في صورة الاختيار كما وقع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٦

في عبارة الشيخ رئيس الصناعة و لا أن العبد له اختيار ناقص و جبر ناقص بل معناه أنه مختار من حيث إنه مجبور و مجبور من الوجه الذي هو مختار و أن اختياره بعينه اضطراره و قول القائل خير الأمور أوسطها يتحقق في هذا المذهب فإن التوسط بين الضدين قد يكون بمعنى الممتزج عن مكسور طرفيهما كالماء الفاتر الذي يقال لا حار و لا بارد مع أنه ليس بخارج عن جنسهما فهذا معنى قولهم أن التوسط بين الأضداد بمنزلة الخلو عنها و قد يكون الجامع لها بوجه أعلى و أبسط من غير تضاد و تراحم بينهما - و هذا في مثال الحرارة و البرودة كجوهر الفلك عند التحقيق فإنه مع بساطته يوجد فيه هذه الكيفيات الأربع على وجه أعلى و أبسط مما يوجد في هذا العالم لأن التي توجد منها إنما يفرض منها و بواسطتها فالتوسط بهذا المعنى خير من التوسط بالمعنى الأول فمثال المذهب الأول كالحرارة النارية و المذهب الثاني كالبرودة المائية و الثالث كالكيفية التي في الماء الفاتر و الرابع كحال الفلك عند التحقيق حيث ليست حرارتها ضد برودتها مع شدتهما جميعا فأنت أيها الراغب في معرفة الأشياء بالتحقيق الساعي بسلوكه إلى نيل عالم التقديس لا تكن ممن اتصف بأنوثة التشبيه المحض و لا بفحولة التنزيه الصرف و لا بخنوثة الجمع بينهما كمن هو ذو الوجهين بل كن في الاعتقاد كسكان صوامع الملكوت الذين هم من العالين ليست لهم شهوة أنوثة التشبيه و لا غضب ذكورة التنزيه و لا

خنوثة الخلط بين الأمرين المتضادين وإنما هم من أهل الوحدة الجمعية الإلهية فإنه سبحانه عال في دنوه دان في علوه واسع برحمته كل شيء لا يخلو من ذاته شيء من الذوات ولا من فعله شيء من الأفعال ولا من شأنه شيء من الشئون ولا من إرادته ومشيته شيء من الإرادات والمشيات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٧

ولأجل ذلك قال تعالى **كُلُّ يَوْمٍ هُوَ فِي شَأْنٍ** وقال **مَا يَكُونُ مِنْ نَجْوَى ثَلَاثَةٍ إِلَّا هُوَ رَابِعُهُمْ - وَ لَا خَمْسَةٍ إِلَّا هُوَ سَادِسُهُمْ** وبذلك يظهر سر قوله **وَمَا رَمَيْتَ إِذْ رَمَيْتَ وَلَكِنَّ اللَّهَ رَمَى** ففيه السلب والإثبات من جهة واحدة لأنه سلب الرمي عنه ص من حيث أثبت له - وكذا قوله **قَاتِلُوهُمْ يُعَذِّبُهُمُ اللَّهُ بِأَيْدِيكُمْ** فنسب القتل إليهم والتعذيب إلى الله بأيديهم - والتعذيب هناك عين القتل فهذا ما عندي من مسألة خلق الأعمال التي اضطربت فيها أفهام الرجال والله ولي التوفيق والهداية وبه زمام التحقيق والدراية.

تمثيل فيه تحصيل

ما أشد إعانة وتيسيرا في هذا الباب مطالعة كتاب النفس الإنسانية فإنه نسخة مختصرة - مطابقة لكتاب العالم الكبير الذي كتبه أيدي الرحمن الذي كتب على نفسه الرحمة - وكتب في قلوبكم الإيمان فعليك أن تتدبر في كتاب النفس وتأمل في الأفعال الصادرة عن قواها حتى يظهر لك أن الأفعال الصادرة عن العباد هي بعينها فعل الحق لا كما يقوله الجبري ولا كما يقوله القدري ولا أيضا كما يقوله الفيلسوف فانظر إلى أفعال المشاعر والقوى التي للنفس الإنسانية حيث خلقها الله تعالى مثلا ذاتا و صفة و فعلا لذاته و صفاته و أفعاله - و اتل قوله تعالى **وَفِي أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَفَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ** و

قول رسول الله ص: من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه

فإن التحقيق عند النظر العميق أن فعل كل حاسة وقوة من حيث هو فعل تلك القوة هو فعل النفس فالأبصار مثلا فعل الباصرة بلا شك لأنه إحضار الصورة المبصرة أو انفعال البصر بها وكذلك السماع فعل السمع لأنه إحضار الهيئة المسموعة أو انفعال السمع بها فلا يمكن شيء منهما إلا بانفعال جسماني وكل منهما فعل النفس بلا شك لأنها السميعة البصيرة بالحقيقة لا كما اشتهر في الحكمة الرسمية - أن النفس تستخدم القوى فقط كمن يستخدم كاتب أو نقاشا إلا أن الاستخدام هاهنا طبيعي وهناك صناعي وفي المشهور زيف وقصور فإن مستخدم صانع فعل لا يكون بمجرد صانعا لذلك الفعل فمستخدم البناء لا يلزم أن يكون بناء وكذا مستخدم الكاتب لا يلزم كونه كاتباً فكذا مستخدم القوة السامعة والباصرة لا يجب أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٨

سميعا وبصيرا مع أنا نعلم إذا راجعنا إلى وجداننا أن نفوسنا هي بعينها المدرك الشاعر - في كل إدراك جزئي وشعور حسي وهي بعينها المتحرك بكل حركة حيوانية أو طبيعية منسوبة إلى قوانا سيما القريبة من أفق عالم النفس و سنحقق في مستأنف الكلام من مباحث النفس إن شاء الله العظيم في إيضاح القول بأن النفس بعينها في العين قوة باصرة - وفي الأذن قوة سامعة وفي اليد قوة باطشة وفي الرجل قوة ماشية وهكذا الأمر في سائر القوى التي في الأعضاء فبها تبصر العين و تسمع الأذن و تبطش اليد و تمشي الرجل شبه ما ورد في الكلام القدسي

: كنت سمعه الذي به يسمع و بصره الذي به يبصر و يده التي بها يبسط [و رجله التي بها يمشي]

فالنفس مع وحدتها و تجردها عن البدن و قواه و أعضائه لا يخلو منها عضو من الأعضاء عالياً كان أو سافلاً لطيفاً أو كثيفاً- و لا تباينها قوة من القوى مدركة كانت أو محرّكة حيوانية كانت أو طبيعية بمعنى أن لا هويته للقوى غير هوية النفس لأن وحدة النفس ضرب آخر من الوحدة يعرفه الكاشفون و هو يتهاطل للهوية الإلهية فلها هوية أحدية جامعة لهويات القوى و المشاعر و الأعضاء فيستهلك هويات سائر القوى و الأعضاء في هويتها و يضمحل إنياتها في إنيته عند ظهور هويتها التامة و عند قيام ساعة الموت التي هي القيامة الصغرى على جميع الخلائق الموجودة في العالم الصغير و في هذه النشأة الأدمية الشخصية ثم ينشأ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٧٩

النشأة الآخرة بالنفخة الثانية فإذا هم قيام ينظرون و أشرفت أرض البدن الآخروي حينئذ بنور النفس كالحال في القيامة الكبرى حذو القذة بالقذة و ذلك لأن النفس محيطة بقواها قاهرة عليها منها مبتدوها و إليها مرجعها و منتهاها كما أن النفس من الله مشرقها و إلى الله مغربها و كذلك جميع الموجودات كما بين منه يتبدى و إليه يصير **إِلَّا إِلَى اللَّهِ تَصِيرُ الْأُمُورُ**

الفصل (١٢) في حل بقية الشبه الواردة على الإرادة القديمة و بعض الشبه الواردة على الإرادة الحادثة

فمنها أنه يلزم قدم العالم و تخلف المراد

إذا كانت إرادة الله على الوجه الذي بينه الحكماء و المحققون من الإسلاميين من كونها عين ذاته و عين الداعي الذي هو العلم بالنظام الأتم و الجواب حسبما أشرنا إليه في مباحث حدوث الأجسام و الطبائع الجسمية و كيفية ارتباط الحوادث بالهوية الإلهية

و منها أنه ورد في كلامه تعالى

لَا يُسْئَلُ عَمَّا يَفْعَلُ فلو كان لشيء من أفعاله علة غائية أو داع لكان السؤال بلم عن فعله جائزاً معقولاً فلما ذا وقع النهي عن السؤال و المنع عن طلب اللمية في الكتاب و السنة و الجواب أنه ليس المراد بما وقع فيهما نفي التعليل و سلب الغاية عن فعله مطلقاً كما حسبه الأشاعرة و من يقتضي أثرهم بل المراد كما مرت الإشارة و التصريح عليه نفي مطلب لم في فعله المطلق و في أفعاله الخاصة بحسب الغاية الأخيرة- لا بحسب الغايات القريبة و المتوسطة ككون الطواحن من الأسنان عريضة لغاية هي جودة المضغ و هي أيضاً لغاية هي جودة الهضم الأول و هي لجودة الهضم الثاني و هلم إلى غاية هي تعذية بدن الإنسان على وجه موافق لمزاجه و هي لغاية هي حصول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٠

المزاج الكامل و هو لغاية هي فيضان الكمال النفسي و غايته حصول العقل بالملكة ثم بالفعل ثم العقل الفعال و غايته الباري المتعالي و في العلوم مثلاً كون علم اللغة و النحو لغاية هي علم المنطق و غايته أن يكون آلة للعلوم النظرية غير الآلية- و تلك العلوم غير الآلية إذا أخذت على الإطلاق فغايتها نفسها لأنها الغاية الأخيرة لغيرها من العلوم الآلية و إذا تميزت و انفصل بعضها عن بعض فلا يبعد أن يكون بعضها غاية و بعضها ذا غاية فإن مباحث الطبيعة و الحركة و

الكون و الفساد غايتها مسائل ما بعد الطبيعة.

ثم مسائل العلم الكلي من ما بعد الطبيعة غايتها علم المفارقات و الربوبيات مطلقاً- و غايتها علم التوحيد و علم الإلهية و أحوال المبدأ و المعاد و هذا العلم غايته من حيث العلم نفسه و غايته من حيث الوجود هي الوصول إلى جوار الله و القرب منه- و غايته الفناء في التوحيد و غايته البقاء بعد الفناء و لا غاية له و هو غاية الغايات و نهاية المقامات فإذن لا لمية لشيء من أفعاله من حيث كونه فعلاً له على الإطلاق و من حيث كونه آخر الأفعال و لكن لا فاعلية المخصوصة البعيدة منه أو المتوسطة أغراض و غايات و لميات مترتبة منتهية كلها إلى من هو غرض الأغراض و غاية الأشواق و الحركات بنفس ذاته الأحادية الحققة من كل جهة.

و منها أنه لو كان الكل بإرادة الله و قضائه لوجب الرضا بالقضاء عقلاً و شرعاً

و لذلك قد ورد في الحديث الإلهي

: من لم يرض بقضائي و لم يصبر على بلائي و لم يشكر على نعمائي فليخرج من أرضي و سمائي و ليطلب ربا سواي

على أن الرضا بالكفر و الفسق كفر و فسق و

قد ورد و صح عن الأئمة ع: أن الرضا بالكفر كفر

و قال تعالى **وَلَا يَرْضَى لِعِبَادِهِ الْكُفْرَ** و أجاب عنه الشيخ الغزالي و غيره كالإمام الرازي بأن الكفر مقضي لا قضاء لأنه متعلق القضاء فلا يكون نفس القضاء فنحن نرضى بالقضاء لا بالمقضي و استصوبه جماعة من الصوفية كصاحب العوارف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨١

و المولى الرومي و زيف هذا الجواب جماعة من البارعين في العلم منهم المحقق الطوسي في نقد المحصل حيث قال و جوابه بأن الكفر ليس نفس القضاء و إنما هو المقضي ليس بشيء فإن قول القائل رضيت بقضاء الله لا يعني به رضاه بصفة من صفات الله إنما يريد به رضاه بما يقتضي تلك الصفة و هو المقضي و الجواب الصحيح أن الرضا بالكفر من حيث هو قضاء الله طاعة و لا من هذه الحيثية كفر و قال أستاذنا السيد الأكرم دام عمره و مجده الفرق بين القضاء و المقضي هناك لا يرجع إلى طائل - ليس اعتبار المقضي بما هو مقضي راجعاً إلى اعتبار القضاء و لا من هذه الحيثية ليس هو اعتباراً للمقضي فإذن إنما الجواب الصحيح على ما هو تحقيقه أن الرضا بالقضاء بما هو قضاء بالذات أو بالمقضي بما هو مقضي بالذات واجب و الكفر ليس هو بمقضي بالذات - و لم يتعلق به القضاء بالذات بل إنما تعلق به القضاء بالعرض فكان مقضياً من حيث هو لازم للخيرات الكثيرة لا من حيث هو كفر فإذن إنما يجب الرضا به من تلك الحيثية لا من حيث هو كفر و إنما الكفر الرضا بالكفر بما هو كفر لا بما هو لازم خيرات كثيرة لنظام الوجود - انتهى كلامه زيد إكرامه أقول القضاء كالحكم قد يراد به نفس النسبة الحكمية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٢

الإيجابية أو السلبية و لا شبهة أنها من باب الإضافات و قد يراد به صورة علمية يلزمها تلك النسبة و هكذا العلم و القدرة

و الإرادة و أشباهها فعلى الأول كون القضاء مرضيا به يوجب كون المقضي مرضيا به من غير فرق لأن المعاني النسبية تابعة لمتعلقاتها فإذا قيل هذا القاضي أو الحاكم قضى أو حكم قضاء شرا أو حكما باطلا فالمراد منه المقضي و لا معنى لكون القضاء بهذا المعنى خيرا و المقضي شرا و أما على المعنى الثاني فقضاء الله تعالى عبارة عن وجود صور الأشياء الموجودة- في هذا العالم الأدنى جميعا في عالم علم الله على وجه مقدس عقلي شريف إلهي خال عن النقائص و الشرور و الأعدام و الإمكانيات و لا شبهة في أن لكل موجود في هذا العالم الكوني ما بإزائه في ذلك العالم الإلهي من جهة وجودية هي علة صدوره و مبدأ تكونه و هو لكونه في عالم الإلهية خير محض لا يشوبه شرية لأن عالم الأمر كله خير و الشر لا يوجد إلا في عالم الخلق لمخالطة الوجود بالأعدام و الظلمات و لذلك قال تعالى **قُلْ أَعُوذُ بِرَبِّ الْفَلَقِ مِنْ شَرِّ مَا خَلَقَ** حيث جعل الشر في ناحية الخلق.

فإذا تقرر هذا فصح الفرق بين القضاء و المقضي و استقام قول من قال إن الرضا بالقضاء واجب لا بالمقضي و أما ما ذكره ناقد المحصل أن قول القائل رضيت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٣

بقضاء الله لا يعني به رضاه بصفة من الصفات ففيه أن القضاء الإلهي ليس من قبيل النعوت و الأعراض بل هي أصول الذوات و الجواهر و لا نسلم أن معنى قول القائل رضيت بقضاء الله ليس بمعنى رضاه بما سبق في علمه و أيضا قوله الرضا بالكفر من حيث هو قضاء الله طاعة و لا من هذه الحيثية كفر ففيه أن علمه لما كان فعليا فكل جهة وجودية في شيء من هذا العالم فهي بعينها هي حيثية معلوميته له فكما أن ذاته تعالى و علمه بالأشياء شيء واحد بلا تغاير في الذات و لا في الاعتبار فكذا حيثية كون الأشياء موجودة في أنفسها و حيثية كونها معلومة له مرتبطة به شيء واحد من غير تغاير هذا.

و مما يؤكد ما ذكرناه و ينور ما قرناه أنك إذا حكمت بكفر أحد أو بسواد وجهه فحصل في نفسك صورة الكفر و صورة السواد فلا تكفر به و لا يسود به وجه قلبك لأن صورة الكفر في الذهن ليس بكفر مذموم و لا صورة السواد فيه سواد كسواد الخارج- فكذلك الأمر في هذا المقام فائقن و لا تقع في مزال الأقدام. و مما يدل أيضا على أن مبادئ الأشياء الشرية و الأمور المؤتفة و المستقبحة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٤

التي توجد في عالم المواد و الأجرام لا يلزم أن يكون فيها شرية أو نقص أو آفة- ما حققه العرفاء العالمون بعلم الأسماء من أن الأسماء الجلالية القهرية له كالمنتقم و الجبار و القهار هي أسباب وجود هذه الأشرار و الشرور كالكفرة و الشياطين و الفسقة- و طبقات الجحيم و أهلها كما أن الأسماء الجمالية اللطيفة كالرحمن الرحيم الرؤف اللطيف هي مبادئ وجود الأخيار و الخيرات كالأنبياء و الأولياء ع و المؤمنين و طبقات الجنان و أهلها حتى قالوا إن الشيطان اللعين مخلوق من اسمه المضل لقوله تعالى حكاية عنه فيما أضلني و قوله **فَبِمَا أَغْوَيْتَنِي** فالمتضادات و المتعاندات و المتخاصمات في عالم التفرقة و الشر و التضاد متوافقات متصالحات في عالم الوحدة الجمعية الخيرية و منها أن فعل العبد أن علم الله وجوده و تعلقته به إرادته و قضاؤه فهو واجب الصدور

وإن لم يعلم وجوده و لم تتعلق به إرادته و قضاؤه فهو ممتنع الصدور فكيف يكون فعل العبد مقدورا له و أجيب عنه بالنقض و الحل أما النقض - فلجريان مثله في حق الله في إرادته للأكوان الحادثة سيما عند من أثبت له إرادة متجددة و أما الحل فقال صاحب المحصل و من يحذو حذوه من أتباع الشيخ الأشعري أن الجواب عن هذا الإشكال الوارد على الكل أن الله لا يسأل عما يفعل و قد سبق حال ما ذكره و قال العلامة الطوسي ره في نقده لو كان ذلك مبطلا لقدره العبد و اختياره في فعله لكان أيضا مبطلا لقدرة الرب و اختياره تعالى في فعله فإنه كان في الأزل عالما بما سيفعله فيما لا يزال ففعله فيما لا يزال إما واجب أو ممتنع و الجواب عنه أن العلم تابع للمعلوم و حينئذ لا يكون مقتضيا للوجوب و الامتناع في المعلوم و هذا الجواب بظاهره غير صحيح لأن القول بتابعة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٥

العلم للمعلوم لا يجري إلا في العلوم الانفعالية الحادثة لا في العلم القضائي الرباني لأنه سبب وجود الأشياء و السبب لا يكون تابعا للمسبب و لعل ذلك المحقق الناقد إنما ذكر ذلك الجواب نيابة عن المعتزلة القائلين بثبوت الأشياء بحسب شيئيتها في الأزل.

فالحق في الجواب أن يقال إن علمه و إن كان سببا مقتضيا لوجود الفعل من العبد لكنه إنما اقتضى وجوده و صدوره المسبوق بقدرة العبد و اختياره لكونها من جملة أسباب الفعل و علله و الوجوب بالاختيار لا ينافي الاختيار بل يحققه فكما أن ذاته تعالى علة فاعلة لوجود كل موجود و وجوبه و ذلك لا يبطل توسيط العلل و الشرائط و ربط الأسباب بالمسببات فكذلك في علمه التام بكل شيء الذي هو عين ذاته كما في العلم البسيط و العقل الواحد أو لازم ذاته كما في العلم المفصل و العقول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٦

الكثيرة و العجب من إمام الباحثين المناظرين كيف جرى الحق على لسانه و رجع عن إصراره على نصرته مذهب الأشعري من إبطال القول بالعلة و المعلول فقال في المباحث المشرقية و اعلم أنك متى حققت علمت أن النكتة في مسألة القدم و الحدوث - و الجبر و القدر شيء واحد و هو أن الشيء متى كانت فاعليته في درجة الإمكان و الجواز استحال أن يصدر عنه الفعل إلا بسبب آخر فهذه المقدمة هي العمدة في المسألتين ثم إن فاعلية الباري لما استحال أن يكون وجوبها بسبب منفصل و جب أن يكون وجوبها لذاته و متى كانت فاعليته لذاته و جب دوام الفعل و أما فاعلية العبد فلما استحال أن يكون وجوبها لذات العبد لعدم دوام ذاته و لعدم دوام فاعليته لا جرم و جب استنادها إلى ذات الله و حينئذ فيكون فعل العبد بقضاء الله و قدره فإن قيل إذا كان الكل بقدره فما الفائدة في الأمر و النهي و الثواب و العقاب و أيضا إذا كان الكل بقضاء الله و قدره كان الفعل الذي اقتضى القضاء وجوده واجبا و الذي اقتضى القضاء عدمه ممتنعا و معلوم أن القدرة لا تتعلق بالواجب و الممتنع فكان يجب أن لا يكون الحيوان فاعلا للفعل و الترك بالقدرة لكننا نعلم ببديهة العقل كوننا قادرين على الأفعال فبطل ما ذكرتموه فالجواب أما الأمر و النهي فوقوعهما أيضا من القضاء و القدر و أما الثواب و العقاب فهما من لوازم الأفعال الواقعة بالقضاء فإن الأغذية الردية كما أنها أسباب الأمراض الجسمانية كذلك العقائد الفاسدة و الأعمال الباطلة - أسباب الأمراض النفسانية و كذلك القول في جانب الثواب و أما حديث

القدرة- فوجوب الفعل لا ينافي كونه مقدورا لأن وجوب الفعل معلول وجوب القدرة و المعلوم لا ينافي العلة بل متى كان وجوبه لا لأجل القدرة فحينئذ يستحيل أن يكون مقدورا بالقدرة و الذي يدل على صحة ما ذكرناه أن أصحاب هذا القول يقولون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٧

انه يجب على الله إعطاء الثواب و العوض للآلام في الآخرة و الإخلال بالواجب يدل إما على الجهل و إما على الحاجة و هما محالان على الله و المؤدي إلى المحال محال فيستحيل من الله أن لا يعطي الثواب و العوض و إذا استحال عدم الإعطاء لزم وجوب الإعطاء فإذا صدر هذا الفعل عنه واجب مع أنه مقدور له فعلم أن كون الفعل واجبا بالتفسير الذي ذكرناه لا يمنع كونه مقدورا انتهى كلامه بالفاظه و هو أقرب إلى نيل الحق من سائر ما أورده في كتبه و مؤلفاته و ليس في هذه المرتبة ما ذكره في كتاب المحصل من قوله مسألة الإرادات تنتهي إلى إرادة ضرورية دفعا للتسلسل و ذلك يوجب الاعتراف بإسناد الكل إلى قضاء الله و قدره فقال الناقد المحقق أقول قبل استناد الكل إلى قضاء الله إما أن يكون بلا توسط في الإيجاد للشيء أو يكون بتوسط و الأول لا يقتضي انتهاء الإرادات إلى إرادته و الثاني لا يناقض القول بالاختيار فإن الاختيار هو الإيجاد بتوسط القدرة و الإرادة سواء كانت تلك القدرة و الإرادة من فعل الله بلا توسط أو بتوسط شيء آخر فإذا من قضاء الله و قدره وقوع بعض الأفعال تابعا لاختيار فاعله و لا يندفع هذا إلا بإقامة البرهان على أن لا مؤثر في الوجود إلا الله انتهى.

أقول الفرق متحقق بين قولنا لا موجود إلا و الحق مؤثر فيه و علة قريبة لإيجاده بلا توسط و بين قولنا لا مؤثر فيه إلا الله و الأول هو الصحيح دون الثاني لما مضى في الفصل السابق أن حيثية نسبة الفعل إلى العبد هي بعينها حيثية نسبته إلى الرب و أن الفعل صادر من العبد من الوجه الذي هو صادر من الرب. و بالجملة تحقيق هذه المسألة الشريفة و هي توحيد الأفعال من عظام المسائل الإلهية و لم يتيسر لأحد من الحكماء و غيرهم مع ادعاء أكثر الحكماء بل كلهم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٨

لذلك كما نقله العلامة الطوسي في شرح الإشارات من أن الكل متفقون على أن الوجود معلول له على الإطلاق إلا لمن انكشف و تبين له بالبرهان القطعي و النور القدسي مسألة توحيد الذات و أنى ذلك لأحد من عرفناه و نظرنا إلى كتبه و كلامه - متصفحين مفتشين.

و منها أن الإرادة الإنسانية إذا كانت واردة عليه من خارج بأسباب و علل منتبهة إلى الإرادة القديمة

فكانت واجبة التحقق سواء أرادها العبد أم لم يرد فكان العبد ملجئا مضطرا في إرادته أجاته إليها المشية الواجبة الإلهية - **وَمَا تَشَاوُنْ إِلَّا أَنْ يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ** * فالإنسان كيف يكون فعله بإرادته حيث لا يكون إرادته بإرادته و إلا لترتب الإرادات متسلسلة إلى غير نهاية و الجواب كما علمت من كون المختار ما يكون فعله بإرادته لا ما يكون إرادته بإرادته و إلا لزم أن لا يكون إرادته عين ذاته و القادر ما يكون بحيث إن أراد الفعل صدر عنه الفعل و إلا فلا ما يكون - إن أراد الإرادة للفعل فعل و إلا لم يفعل على أن لأحد أن يقول إن إرادة الإرادة كالعلم بالعلم و كوجود الوجود و لزوم الزوم من الأمور

صحيحة الانتزاع و يتضاعف فيه جواز الاعتبار لا إلى حد لكن ينقطع السلسلة بانقطاع الاعتبار من الذاهن الفارض لعدم التوقف العلي هناك في الخارج.

و أما ما ذكره في الجواب سيدنا المفخم و أستاذنا الأكرم دام ظله العالي من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٨٩

قوله هذا الشك مما لم يبلغني عن أحد من السابقين و اللاحقين شيء في دفاعه و الوجه في ذلك أنه إذا انسأقت العلل و الأسباب المترتبة المتأدية بالإنسان إلى أن يتصور فعلا- و يعتقد فيه خيرا ما انبعث له تشوق إليه لا محالة فإذا تأكد هيجان الشوق و استتم نصاب إجماعه تم قوام الإرادة المستوجبة اهتزاز العضلات و الأعضاء الأدوية فإن تلك الهيئة الإرادية حالة شوقية إجمالية للنفس بحيث إذا ما قيست إلى الفعل نفسه و كان هو الملتفت إليه بالذات كانت هي شوقا إليه و إرادة له و إذا قيست إلى إرادة الفعل و كان الملتفت إليه هي نفسها لا نفس الفعل كانت هي شوقا و إرادة بالنسبة إلى الإرادة من غير شوق آخر و إرادة أخرى جديدة و كذلك الأمر في إرادته الإرادة و إرادة إرادة الإرادة- إلى سائر المراتب التي في استطاعة العقل أن يلتفت إليها بالذات و يلاحظها على التفصيل فكل من تلك الإرادات المفصلة يكون بالإرادة و هي بأسرها مضمنة في تلك الحالة الشوقية الإرادية و الترتب بينها بالتقدم و التأخر عند التفصيل ليس يصادم اتحادها في تلك الحالة الإجمالية بهيئتها الوجدانية فإن ذلك أنما يمتنع في الكمية الاتصالية و الهوية الامتدادية لا غير فلذلك بان أن المسافة الأينية يستحيل أن تنحل إلى متقدمات و متأخرات بالذات هي أجزاء تلك المسافة و أبعاضها بل إنما يصح تحليلها- إلى أجزائها و أبعاضها المتقدمة و المتأخرة بالمكان.

فأقول فيه أولا إن التحليل العقلي للشيء الموجب بحكم العقل بأن الخارج بالتحليل متقدم على ذلك الشيء أنما يجري في أمور لها جهة تعدد بحسب مرتبة من مراتب نفس الأمر و جهة وحدة في الواقع كأجزاء الحد من الجنس و الفصل- في الماهية البسيطة الوجود كالسواد مثلا فإن للعقل أن يعتبر له بحسب ماهيته جزءا جنسيا كاللونية و جزءا فصليا كالقابضية للبصر فيحكم بعد التحليل بتقدمهما في ظرف التحليل على الماهية المحدودة بها ثم بتقدم فصله على جنسه مع أن الكل موجود بوجود واحد و أما في غيرها فالحكم بتعدد و تفصيله إلى ما يجري مجرى الأجزاء له ليس إلا مما يخترعه العقل من غير حالة باعثة إياه بحسب الأمر في نفسه.

و أما ثانيا فيلزم عند التحليل و التفصيل لها و بحسبهما اجتماع المثليين بل الأمثال

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في موضوع واحد و هو ممتنع إذ لا امتياز لها في الماهية و لا في اللوازم و لا في العوارض المفارقة و لا في الموضوع و أيضا قد تقرر أن أفراد ماهية واحدة لا يكون بعضها علة لبعض إذ لا أولوية لبعض في ذاتها.

و أما ثالثا فإن لنا أن نأخذ جميع الإرادات بحيث لا يشذ عنها شيء منها و نطلب أن علتها أي شيء هي فإن كانت إرادة أخرى لزم كون شيء واحد خارجا و داخلا- بالنسبة إلى شيء واحد بعينه هو مجموع الإرادات و ذلك محال و إن كان شيئا آخر لزم الجبر في الإرادة و هذا هو الحق فليعمل عليه في دفع الإشكال كما مر.

و مما يؤيد هذا و يوضحه تحقيقا و يزيد تأكيدا ما قاله المعلم أبو نصر الفارابي في الفصوص فإن ظن ظان أنه يفعل ما

يريد و يختار ما يشاء استكشف عن اختياره هل هو حادث فيه بعد ما لم يكن أو غير حادث فإن كان غير حادث فيه لزم أن يصحبه ذلك الاختيار منذ أول وجوده و لزم أن يكون مطبوعاً على ذلك الاختيار لا ينفك عنه و لزم القول بأن اختياره يفيض فيه من غيره و إن كان حادثاً و لكل حادث محدث - فيكون اختياره عن سبب اقتضاه و محدث أحدثه فإما أن يكون هو أو غيره فإن كان هو نفسه فإما أن يكون إيجاده للاختيار بالاختيار و هذا يتسلسل إلى غير النهاية أو يكون وجود الاختيار فيه لا بالاختيار فيكون مجبوراً على ذلك الاختيار من غيره و ينتهي إلى الأسباب الخارجة عنه التي ليست باختياره فينتهي إلى الاختيار الأزلي الذي أوجب الكل على ما هو عليه فإنه إن انتهى الكلام إلى اختيار حادث عاد الكلام من الرأس فبين من هذا أن كل كائن من خير و شر يستند إلى الأسباب المنبثقة عن الإرادة الأزلية انتهى بالفاظه و قال الشيخ الرئيس في الفن الثالث من طبيعيات الشفاء و جميع

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الأحوال الأرضية منوطة بالحركات السماوية و حتى الاختيارات و الإرادات فإنها لا محالة أمور تحدث بعد ما لم تكن و لكل حادث بعد ما لم يكن علة و سبب حادث - و ينتهي ذلك إلى الحركة و من الحركات إلى الحركة المستديرة فقد فرغ من إيضاح هذا - فاختياراتنا أيضاً تابعة للحركات السماوية و الحركات و السكونات الأرضية المتوافقة - على اطراد متسق يكون دواعي إلى القصد و بواعث عليه و يكون هذا هو القدر الذي أوجبه القضاء و القضاء هو العقل الأول الإلهي الواحد المستعلي على الكل الذي منه يتشعب المقدرات انتهى كلامه و قال في أول العاشرة من الهيئات الشفاء إن مبادئ جميع هذه الأمور تنتهي إلى الطبيعة و الإرادة و الاتفاق و الطبيعة مبدؤها من هناك و الإرادات التي لنا كائنة بعد ما لم يكن و كل كائن بعد ما لم يكن فله علة فكل إرادة لنا فلها علة و علة تلك الإرادة - ليست إرادة متسلسلة في ذلك إلى غير النهاية بل أمور تعرض من خارج أرضية و سماوية - و الأرضية تنتهي إلى السماوية و اجتماع ذلك كله يوجب وجود الإرادة و أما الاتفاق فهو حادث من مصادمات هذه فإذا حللت الأمور كلها استندت إلى مبادئ إيجابها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٩٢

منزل من عند الله و القضاء من الله هو الوضع الأول البسيط و التقدير هو ما يتوجه إليه القضاء على التدرج كأنه موجب اجتماعات من الأمور البسيطة التي تنسب من حيث هي بسيطة إلى القضاء و الأمر الإلهي الأول انتهى كلامه.

و منها أن الكل إذا كان بعلم الله و إرادته و قضائه

كان كل جزء من أجزاء النظام و كل ذرة من ذرات الكون واجب التحقق بالقياس إلى الإرادة القديمة - حتمي الثبوت في علمه مجزوماً به في قضائه فما معنى التردد المنسوب إليه في قوله -

: ما ترددت في شيء أنا فاعله كتردي في قبض روح عبدي المؤمن

و هذا من غوامض المشكلات على من التزم من أهل النظر الجمع بين القوانين العقلية و الأحكام الشرعية - و لم يأت أحد من العلماء بشيء يشع و يغني في هذا المقام إلا أن أستاذنا دام ظلّه العالي ذكر وجهاً قريباً أن التردد في أمر يكون بسبب تعارض الداعي المرجح في الطرفين - فأطلق المسبب هناك و أريد السبب و مغزى الكلام أن قبض روح المؤمن بالموت - خير بالقياس إلى نظام الوجود و شر من حيث مساءته و بعبارة أخرى وقوع الفعل - بين طرفي الخيرية

بالذات و لزومه للخيرات الكثيرة و الشرية بالعرض و بالإضافة إلى طائفة من الموجودات هو المعبر عنه بالتردد إذ الخيرية يدعو إلى فعل الفعل و الشرية إلى تركه ففي ذلك انسياق إلى تردد ما فإذن المعنى ما وجدت شرية في شيء من الشرور بالعرض اللازمة لخيرات كثيرة في أفاعيلي مثل شرية مساء عبدي المؤمن من جهة الموت و هو من الخيرات الواجبة في الحكمة البالغة الإلهية انتهى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٩٣

أقول ما ذكره لم يدفع به الإشكال بل صار أقوى إذ لم يزد في بيانه إلا أن أثبت في نفس الفعل تعارضا بين طرفي وجوده و عدمه و جانبي إيجاده و تركه بحسب الداعي فها هنا إن لم يترجح أحد الجانبين على الآخر فيلزم الترجيح من غير مرجح و إن ترجح و الله عالم بذلك الرجحان فيجب صدوره عن علمه فلا تردد إذ الحكم برجحانه وقع على القطع و كان صدوره حتما مقضيا و الذي سنح لهذا الراقم المسكين أن وجود هذا الأشياء الطبيعية الكونية وجود تجديدي لما مر بيانه من تجدد الطبيعة الجوهرية و كل أمر تدريجي الوجود يكون كل جزء من أجزائه المفروضة مسبقا بإمكان استعدادي سابق على تحققه و ذلك الإمكان هو نفس الجزء السابق عليه إذ الإمكان ذاتيا كان أو استعداديا معناه لا ضرورة الطرفين المساوق لتساويهما إما بحسب نفس مرتبة الماهية السابقة على وجودها سبقا ذاتيا من جهة الماهية كما في الإمكان الذاتي أو بواسطة وجود أمر في مادة الشيء سابقا عليه بحسب الزمان فكل جزء من أجزاء الأمر المتجدد الحصول في ذاته المتدرج الوجود كالحركة عند الجمهور و الطبيعة الجسمانية عندنا إمكان للجزء اللاحق به منها فأجزاؤه كلها إمكانات و قوى لأنه ضعيف الوجود يتشابه الوجود و العدم في هذا النحو من الكون و هو مع ذلك واجب الفعلية و الحصول من السبب المقتضي لحصوله إلا أن وجوبه وجوب الإمكان و فعلية فعلية القوة.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول لما تقرر أن وجود الأشياء الواقعة في هذا العالم من مراتب علمه التفصيلي فهي علوم له بوجه و معلومات له بوجه فكل منهما بما هو علم تردد في العلم و بما هو معلوم إمكان للوجود ثم إن النفوس الإنسانية سيما نفس المؤمن يقع فيها هذه الإمكانيات و الترددات أكثر أنواعا و أعدادا لكونها ذات أكوان و أنحاء كثيرة في الوجود بحسب الأكوان الجمادية و النباتية و الحيوانية و الأطوار التي بعدها إلى أن يخلص من الاستحالات و التقلبات الوجودية إلى جانب القدس و عالم البقاء و الثبات بقوة إلهية قابضة للأرواح و النفوس عن أبدانها جاذبة بخوادمها و أعوانها للطبائع و الصور عن موادها فكما ينتزع العقل بقوته الفكرية صورة شيء

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عن مادتها فتصير معقولة مجردة بعد ما كانت محسوسة مادية فهكذا شأن ملك الموت - و هو ملك مقرب إلهي في نزع الأرواح و النفوس و شأن أعوانه و سدنته في جذب الطبائع و الصور و هذه الاستحالات و التكوينات كما أنها تقع في عالم المواد الكونية كذلك تقع في عالم النفوس المنطبعة السماوية التي هي كتاب المحو و الإثبات لأن كل ما ثبت من أرقام الصور العلمية الجزئية في ألواح تلك النفوس فهي قابلة للمحو غير محفوظة عن النسخ و التبديل كام الكتاب لقوله تعالى **يَمْحُوا اللَّهُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُثَبِّتُ وَ عِنْدَهُ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ** و هو الإمام المبين و اللوح المحفوظ عن المحو و التغيير و فيه جميع الأشياء المتخالفة الذوات في الخارج المتضادة الصور في الكون على وجه عقلي نوراني مقدس عن

التخالف و التضاد كما قال تعالى **وَلَا حَبَّةٌ فِي ظِلْمَاتِ الْأَرْضِ وَلَا رَطْبٌ وَلَا يَابِسٌ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ** فظهر أن هذه التغيرات و التجددات و العوارض و النقائص بحسب أنحاء الهويات الجزئية و الطبائع الكونية- لا تقدر في ارتباطها إلى الحق الأول و عالم الأحدية و في إثبات الإرادة القديمة الإلهية- المصونة عن الإمكان و العلم القديم الحق المنزه عن وصمة الظن و التردد و القضاء المبرم الحتم الذي لا يبدل و لا يغير و لا يكثر لأنها واقعة في مراتب تنزلات العلم و الإرادة قال الشيخ أبو نصر في رسالة الفصوص أنفذ إلى الأحدية تدهش إلى الأبدية و إذا سألت عنها فهي قريب أظلت الأحدية فكان قلما أظلت الكلية- فكان لوحا جرى القلم على اللوح بالخلق و قال أيضا علمه الأول لذاته لا ينقسم- و علمه الثاني عن ذاته إذا تكثر لم تكن الكثرة في ذاته بل بعد ذاته **وَمَا تَسْقُطُ مِنْ وَرَقَةٍ إِلَّا يَعْلَمُهَا مَنْ** هناك يجري القلم في اللوح جريا متناهيا إلى القيامة و قال أيضا لحظت الأحدية نفسها فلحظت القدرة فلزم العلم الثاني

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٩٥

المشتمل على الكثرة و هناك أفق عالم الربوبية يليها عالم الأمر يجري به القلم على اللوح فيتكثر الوحدة حيث يغشى السدرة ما يغشى و سنزيدك إيضاحا فاستمع

الفصل (١٣) في تصحيح القول بنسبة التردد و الابتلاء و أشباههما إليه

كما ورد في الكتاب و السنة و كذا القول بالبداة حسبما نقل من أئمتنا المعصومين ع و صحت الرواية فيه عنهم و ما نيط بذلك من استجابة الدعوات و إغاثة الملهوفين مقارنة لاقتراحهم من غير مصادفة أسباب طبيعية [الأصل الأول]

اعلم أن للإلهية مراتب و للأسماء الحسنی مظاهر و مجالي و كانا قد بينا طرفا من هذا المقصد في بعض المراحل الماضية في السفر الأول فنقول إن لله في طبقات السماوات عبادا ملكوتين مرتبتهم مرتبة النفوس دون مرتبة السابقين المقربين- و هم عالم الأمر المبرىء عن التجدد و التغير و هؤلاء الملكوتيون و إن كانت مرتبتهم دون مرتبة السابقين الأولين إلا أن أفعالهم كلها طاعة له سبحانه و بأمره يفعلون ما يفعلون و لا يعصون الله في شيء من أفعالهم و إراداتهم و خطرات أوهامهم و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٩٦

شهوات قلوبهم و دواعي نفوسهم و كل من كان كذلك كان فعله فعل الحق و قوله قول الصدق إذ لا داعية في نفسه تخالف داعي الحق بل يستهلك إرادته في إرادة الحق و مشيته في مشية الحق و مثال طاعتهم لله سبحانه و لأمره- مثال طاعة الحواس فينا للنفس حيث لا تستطيع خلافا لها فيما شاءت النفس و لا حاجة في طاعتها للنفس إلى أمر و نهى أو ترغيب و زجر بل كلما همت الناطقة بأمر محسوس- امتثلت الحاسة لما همت به و قصدته دفعه مع أن هذه الحواس واقعة في عالم آخر- غير عالم الجوهر العقلي منا لأنها نازلة عنه في الملكوت الأسفل فكذا طاعة الملائكة- الواقعة في ملكوت السماوات لله سبحانه لأنهم المطيعون بذواتهم لأمره المستمعون بأسماعهم الباطنة لوجيه المستشعرون بقلوبهم النورية لعظمته الوالهيون في ملاحظة جماله و جلاله و حيث إنهم لا يستطيعون خلافا و لا تمردا و **لَا يَعْصُونَ** **اللَّهُ مَا أَمَرَهُمْ وَيَفْعَلُونَ مَا يُؤْمَرُونَ** يأترون بأمره و ينتهون بنهييه بل يفعلون حسبما يفعلوه و يتركون حسبما يتركه

فهؤلاء العباد المكرمون يكون حركاتهم و سكناتهم و تدبراتهم و تصوراتهم كلها بالحق و من الحق فهذا أصل.

[الأصل الثاني]

و اعلم أيضا أن الشيء كما يحدث في القابل من جهة أسباب قابلية و مباد خارجية و أوضاع جسمانية كما تحدث السخونة في جسم قابل من مصادفة مسخن خارجي كالنار مثلا كذلك قد تحدث فيه لا من استعداد مادي و جهات قابلية بل من سبب فاعلي و أمر علوي و مبدأ باطني كما تحدث السخونة في بدن الإنسان من جهة نفسه عند تصورهما لأمر هائل أو انبعاث إرادة غضب منها فيسخن البدن عند ذلك غاية السخونة - من غير حضور مسخن خارجي و كما يحدث برودة في أعضاء البدن ليس سببها أمرا طبيعيا و لا قاسرا خارجيا بل من جهة خوف و نحوه في النفس و كذلك تخيل الأمر الشهواني يحرك الأعضاء و يحدث رطوبة و إن لم يكن ذلك عن امتلاء طبيعي و أسباب معدة طبيعية فهكذا حال مادة العالم و بدن الإنسان الكبير بالقياس إلى نفسه المدبرة له - في وقوع الأمور النادرة منها و جريانها في هذا العالم لا على المجرى الطبيعي و لا من جهة سبق الأسباب الطبيعية المعدة إياها بل مع كون الأسباب السابقة مخالفة إياها

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مناسبة لأضدادها و لذلك يكون من العجائب النادرة الوقوع فهذا أصل أيضا

إذا تقرر هذان الأصلان

فنقول إن كل كتابة تكون في الألواح السماوية و الصحف القدريّة فهو أيضا مكتوب الحق الأول بعد قضائه السابق المكتوب بالقلم الأعلى في اللوح المحفوظ عن المحو و الإثبات و هذه الصحف السماوية و الألواح القدريّة - أعني قلوب الملائكة العمالة و نفوس المدبرات العلوية كلها كتاب المحو و الإثبات و يجوز في نقوشها المنقوشة في صدورهم و قلوبهم أي طبائعهم و نفوسهم أن تزول و تتبدل - لأن مرتبتها لا تأبى ذلك كما بينا في مباحث حدوث العالم و تجدد الطبائع و النفوس و سائر القوى المتعلقة بالأجرام و الذي فيه يستحيل التغير و التبديل إنما هو ذات الله و صفاته الحقيقية و عالم أمره و قضائه السابق و علمه الأزلي فمن هذه الألواح القدريّة و أقلامها الكاتبة - و الناقشة لصورها وصف الله نفسه بالتردد كما في قوله ما ترددت في شيء أنا فاعله الحديث - و بالابتلاء كما في قوله تعالى **وَبَلَوْنَاهُمْ بِالْحَسَنَاتِ وَالسَّيِّئَاتِ** و قوله **وَنَبْلُوا أَخْبَارَكُمْ** و قوله تعالى **حَتَّى نَعْلَمَ الْمُجَاهِدِينَ مِنْكُمْ وَالصَّابِرِينَ** و الملك الموكل لهذا التصوير الكاتب لهذه الأرقام الإلهية القدريّة ملك كريم كما قال تعالى **كَرَامًا كَاتِبِينَ** و الله تعالى هو المملي عليه على وجه يليق بعنايته المبراة عن التغير و الحدوث و لو لم يكن الأمر كذلك من توسط هذه النفوس القابلة لتوارد الصور الإرادية و تجدد الأرقام العلمية و نسخ الكتب السماوية لكانت الأمور كلها حتما مقضيا و كان الفيض الإلهي مقصورا على عدد معين غير متجاوز من حدود الإبداع

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فما حدث حادث في العالم و لا تكون كائن و كان قد انسد طريق الاهتداء للسالكين - من المنزل الأدنى إلى الأعلى و لا الاستنارة بنور القرب من الحق الأول بعد الانظام بظلمة البعد منه.

و بالجملة قد كان قد امتنعت و استحالت مراتب سلسلة الرجوع إلى الله بأفرادها و آحادها و الأصول البرهانية مما يبطل هذا و العناية الإلهية تباها فظهر أن التجدد في العلوم و الأحوال لضرب من الملائكة و هم الكرام الكاتبون سائغ غير ممتنع - و لا مستبعد فإذا اتصلت بها نفس النبي أو الولي ع و قرىء فيها من الوحي مما أوحى الله به إليهم و كتب في قلوبهم فله أن يخبر بما رآه بعين قلبه و ما سمع بإذن قلبه من صرير أقلام أولئك الكرام فإذا أخبر به للناس كان قوله حقا و صدقا لا كقول المنجم و الكاهن فيما يقولانه لا عن شهود كسفي يقيني بل بتجربة أو ظن و نحو ذلك ثم إذا اتصلت نفسه بها تارة أخرى رأى في تلك الألواح غير ما رآه أولا و غير ما ناسبته الصور السابقة و الأسباب الطبيعية الموجودة في الطبقات العلوية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٣٩٩

و السفلية بل مخالفا لسوابق الصور و الأسباب السماوية و الأرضية فيقال لمثل هذا الأمر النسخ و البداء و ما أشبههما و لا يمكن العلم به لأحد من النفوس العلوية و السفلية - إلا من جهة الله المختصة به لأنه مما استأثره لأنه ليس في الأسباب الطبيعية ما يوجهه - و لا في الصور الإدراكية و النقوش اللوحية ما يتدبره من قبل و لأجل ذلك ورد في أحاديث أصحابنا الإماميين

عن أبي عبد الله ع: أن لله علمين علم مكنون مخزون لا يعلمه إلا هو من ذلك يكون البدا و علم علمه ملائكته و رسله و أنبياءه فنحن نعلمه

و عن أبي جعفر ع أنه قال: العلم علمان فعلم عند الله مخزون لم يطلع عليه أحد من خلقه و علم علمه ملائكته و رسله فما علمه ملائكته و رسله - فإنه سيكون لا يكذب نفسه و لا ملائكته و لا رسله و علم عنده مخزون يقدم منه ما يشاء و يؤخر منه ما يشاء و يثبت منه ما يشاء

. قال الشيخ في كتاب المبدأ و المعاد في فصل من المقالة الثانية معقود في مبدأ التدبير للكائنات الأرضية و الأنواع غير المحفوظة بهذه العبارة فمعلوم أن العناية بها ليست عن الأول و لا عن العقول الصريحة فيجب أن يكون لمبدأ بعدها و هو إما نفس منبثة متعلقة بعالم الكون و الفساد و إما نفس سماوية و يشبه أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠٠

رأي الأكثر أنه نفس متولدة عن العقول و الأنفس السماوية و خصوصا نفس الشمس أو الفلك المائل و أنه مدبر لما تحت فلك القمر بمعاوضة الأجسام السماوية و بسطوع نور العقل الفعال و يجب على كل حال أن يكون هذا المعتنى بهذه الحوادث مدركا للجزئيات فلهذا السبب أظن أن الأشبه أن يكون هذه نفسا سماوية حتى يكون لها بجرمها أن تتخيل و تحس الحوادث إحساسا يليق بها فإذا حدث حادث عقل الكمال - الذي يكون له و الطريق الذي يؤدي إليه فحينئذ يلزم ذلك المعقول وجود تلك الصورة في تلك المادة و يقال إن النفس المغيثة للداعين و غير ذلك هذه و يشبه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠١

أن يكون ذلك حقا فإنه إن كان دعاء مستجاب فيكون سببه مثل هذا الجوهر و ذلك لأنه كلما يشاهد تغيرات المادة فيعقل

صورة نظام الخير والكمال الذي يجب هناك - فيكون ما يعقل وكذلك يجوز أن يشاهد به لتغيرات الأحوال في سكان هذا العالم يحدث فيه منها تعقل للواجب الذي يدفع به ذلك النقص والشرية ويجلب الخير فيتبع ذلك التعقل وجود الشيء المتعقل فإن عناية مثل هذا الجوهر يجب أن تكون بكل نقص وشر يدخل في هذا العالم وأجزائه ليتبع تلك العناية ما يزيلهما من الخير والنظام فلا يجب أن يختص ذلك بشيء دون شيء فإن كان دعاء لا يستجاب أو شر لا يدفع فهناك شر لا نطلع عليه وعسى العناية لا توجهه ومعنى العناية ما أوضحناه. وقال في فصل آخر يليه معقود لبيان وجود أمورنا نادرة عن هذه النفس حتى مغيرة للطبيعة ولما كان تعقل مثل هذا الجوهر يتبعه الصور المادية في المادة فلا يبعد أن يهلك به شرير أو يتعيش به خير أو يحدث نار أو زلزلة أو سبب من الأسباب غير المعتادة لأن المواد الطبيعية يحدث فيها ما يعقله هذا الجوهر فيجوز أن يبرد حارها ويسخن باردها ويحرك ساكنها ويسكن متحركها فحينئذ تحدث أمور لا عن أسباب طبيعية ماضية بل دفعة عن هذا السبب الطبيعي الحادث كما أن أصنافا من الحيوان أو النبات التي من شأنها أن تتكون بالتوالد تتكون لا على سبيل التوالد - عن أسباب طبيعية مشابهة لها بل على سبيل التولد ويحدث فيها صور حادثة جديدة - لم تكن في مبادئها ويكون ذلك عن تعقل هذا الجوهر ولا يجب أن ينكر من أحوال التدبير أمور غير معهودة فهاهنا نوادر وعجائب أسبابها مثل هذا الذي وصفنا.

ثم قال في فصل آخر بعد كلام من هذا الباب وسمعت أن طبيبا حضر مجلس ملك من السامانيين وبلغ من قبوله له أن أهله لمواكلته على المائدة التي توضع له في دار الحرم ولا يدخلها من الذكور داخل وإنما يتولى الخدمة بعض الجواري - فبينا جارية تقدم الخوان وتضعه إذ قوستها ريح ومنعتها الانتصاب وكانت خطيبة عند

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠٢

الملك فقال للطبيب عالجها في الحال على كل حال فلم يكن عند الطبيب تدبير طبيعي في ذلك الباب يشفي بلا مهلة ففزع إلى التدبير النفساني وأمر أن يكشف شعرها فما أغني ثم أمر أن يكشف بطنها فما أثر ثم أمر أن يكشف عورتها فلما حاولت الجواري ذلك نهضت فيها حرارة قوية أتت على الريح الحادثة تحليلا فانزعجت مستقيمة سليمة - انتهت عباراته بالفاظه

الفصل (١٤) في استيناف القول في استجابة الدعوات بوجه تفصيلي ودفع الإشكال المورد فيها

لما استبان لبصيرتك استناد الموجودات كلها إلى إرادة الله وقدرته وعنايته التي هي علمه بوجه الخير في النظام وارتباط أجزاء النظام ببعضها ببعض وترتب المسببات على الأسباب فمن جملة أسباب الكون وعلله وجود الداعي ودعائه فكما أن من أسباب حصول الفعل وجود زيد مثلا وعلمه وقدرته وإرادته واختياره فكذلك الدعاء والطلب من الله والإلحاح والتضرع من جملة أسباب الإنجاح وحصول المراد والمقترح بإذن الله وملكوته وإن الدعاء ربما يقرع باب الملكوت ويؤثر في إسماع الملكوتين كما مر ذكره في الفصل السابق من وجود جوهر نفساني في عالم السماوات متأثر مؤثر في عالم الأرض بتسخين بارد وتبريد حار وتحريك ساكن وتسكين متحرك وتبديل عنصر بعنصر - بإمداد له من فوق وإعانة له من أشعة الجواهر العقلية منفعل مما يشاهد من أحوال هذا العالم من تطرق الآفات والعاهات لو لم ينجر بما يؤدي إلى الخير والصلاح فيحدث في ذاته وعقله المنفعل معقول الأمر الذي به يدفع الشر ويحصل الخير فذلك الجوهر كما مر ليس عقلا فعلا محضا حتى لا يؤثر فيه شيء ولا منفعلا محضا حتى لا يؤثر في

شيء و لو بإمداد وإعانة مما فوقه بل فاعل فيما دونه بوجه و منفعل أيضا مما دونه بوجه فلا يبعد أن يتأثر من دعوات المضطرين و استغاثة الملهوفين فيجيب دعاءهم بإذن الله و يقضي حاجاتهم و ينجح طلباتهم و قد أشرنا سابقا إلى أن الذي يمتنع

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عليه التغير و الانفعال من كل وجه هو عالم الأمر الكلي العقلي و كذا الذي ثبت و تحقق عند القوم أن العالي لا يلتفت إلى السافل إنما يراود به العالي من كل وجه أو العالي من جهة علوه و أما الجوهر النفساني و إن كان من السماويات فيمكن أن ينفعل عن أحوال بعض الأرضيات سيما النفوس الناطقة الشريفة منها فيلتفت إلى إنجاح طلبتها و إجابة دعواتها و هذا لا ينافي كونه عاليا عليها من جهة أو جهات أخرى - فما ورد في كلام الشيخ في التعليقات حيث قال و قد يتوهم أن السماويات تنفعل عن الأرضيات و ذلك أنا ندعوها فتستجيب لنا و نحن معلولها و هي علتنا - و المعلول لا يفعل في العلة البتة و إنما سبب الدعاء من هناك أيضا لأنها تبعثنا على الدعاء و هما معلولا علة واحدة فمنظور فيه كما أشرنا إليه فلا تكن من حزب المقلدين الذين لا يعرفون الحق إلا بالرجال.

و أما الإشكال بأن ما يرام بالدعاء و الطلب و السؤال و الإلحاح لإنجاح نيله و إعطاء فعله إن كان مما جرى قلم القضاء الأزلي بتقدير وجوده و ارتسم لوح القدر الإلهي بتصوير ثبوته فما الحاجة إلى تكلف الطلب فيه و تجشم السؤال له و إن لم يجر به القلم و لم ينطبع به اللوح فلم الدعاء و ما فائدة الطلب لما يمتنع فيه حصول المدعى و نيل المبتغى فمندفع بأن الطلب و الدعاء أيضا مما جرى به قلم القضاء و انسطر به لوح القدر من حيث إنهما من العلل و الشرائط لحصول المطلوب المقضي المقدر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠٤

و بالجملة فكلما قضى و قدر حصول أمر من الأمور فقد قضى و قدر حصول أسبابه و شرائطه و إلا فلا إذا أراد الله شيئا هيا أسبابه و من جملة الأسباب لحصول الشيء المدعو له دعاء الداعي و تضرعه و استكانته بل نسبة الأدعية و التضرعات إلى حصول المطالب و نيل المآرب في الأعيان كنسبة الأفكار و التأملات إلى حصول النتائج و العلوم في العقول و الأذهان فثبت أن الأدعية و الأذكار جدول من جداول بحار القضاء و ساقية من سواقي أنهار القدر قال الشيخ في تعليقاته - سبب إجابة الدعاء توافي الأسباب معاً للحكمة الإلهية و هي أن يتوافي سبب دعاء رجل مثلاً فيما يدعو فيه و سبب وجود ذلك الشيء معاً عن الباري تعالى فإن قيل فهل كان يصح وجود ذلك الشيء من دون الدعاء و موافاته لذلك الدعاء قلنا لا - لأن علتها واحدة و هو الباري و هو الذي جعل سبب وجود ذلك الشيء الدعاء كما جعل سبب صحة هذا المريض شرب الدواء و ما لم يشرب الدواء لم يصح فكذلك الحال في الدعاء و موافاة ذلك الشيء له فلحكمة ما توافيا معاً على حسب ما قدر و قضى فالدعاء واجب و توقع الإجابة واجب فإن انبعثنا للدعاء يكون سببه من هناك - و يصير دعاؤنا سبباً للإجابة و موافاة الدعاء لحدوث الأمر المدعو لأجله و هما معلولا علة واحدة و ربما يكون أحدهما بواسطة الآخر.

و قال أيضاً إذا لم يستجب الدعاء لذلك الرجل و إن كان يرى أن الغاية التي يدعو لأجلها نافعة فالسبب فيه أن الغاية

النافعة إنما تكون بحسب نظام الكل لا بحسب مراد ذلك الرجل وربما لا يكون الغاية بحسب مراده نافعة فلذلك لا يصح استجابة دعائه.

و قال أيضا و النفس الزكية عند الدعاء قد يفيض عليها من الأول قوة تصير بها مؤثرة في العناصر فتطاولها العناصر متصرفة على إرادتها فيكون ذلك إجابة الدعاء فإن العناصر موضوعة لفعل النفس فيها و اعتبار ذلك في أبداننا صحيح فإننا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠٥

ربما تخيلنا شيئا فيتغير أبداننا بحسب ما يقتضيه أحوال نفوسنا و تخيلاتنا.

و قال أيضا و قد يمكن أن يؤثر النفس في غير بدننا كما تؤثر في بدننا و قد تؤثر النفس في نفس غيرها كما يحكى عن الأوهام التي تكون لأهل الهند إن صحت الحكاية و قد يكون المبادئ الأول تستجيب لتلك النفس إذا دعت فيما تدعو فيها إذا كانت الغاية التي تدعو فيها نافعة بحسب نظام الكل.

و قال أيضا كل دعاء فإنه لا يمتنع أن يستجاب و وجه اللامتناهية أنه يكون معلوما للأول و إن كان بواسطة الداعي و كلما يكون معلوما له فإنه كان إذا لم يكن هناك معلوم آخر يمانعه و معنى ممانعة المعلوم الآخر الذي يمانعه هو مثلا أن يكون داع يدعو على إنسان بالبوار و بواره يتم بفساد مزاجه و يكون معلوما له أيضا من جانب آخر أن ذلك المزاج يجب أن يكون صحيحا فلا يصح أن يكون الدعاء مستجابا.

و قوله من جانب آخر أي من أسباب ذلك المزاج و إن علم من أسبابه أنه لا يجب أن يكون صحيحا كان الدعاء مستجابا فلا يكون هناك ممانعة معلوم آخر - و لذلك يجب أن لا يدعو أحد على أحد فإنه لا محالة قد علم في سابق علمه أن هذا الداعي يدعو فإذا دعا دل على أنه كان معلوما له و كل ما كان معلوما له فلا يمتنع وجوده.

و قال أيضا الأول هو سبب في لزوم المعلومات له و وجوبها عنه لكن على ترتيب و هو ترتيب السبب و المسبب فإنه مسبب الأسباب و هو سبب معلوماته - فيكون بعض الشيء مقدما علميته له على بعض فيكون بعض الشيء مقدما علمه له على بعض فيكون بوجه ما علة لأن عرف الأول معلولها و بالحقيقة فإنه علة كل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠٦

معلوم و سبب لأن علم كل شيء و مثال ذلك أنه علة لأن عرف العقل الأول ثم إن العقل الأول هو علة لأن عرف لازم العقل الأول فهو و إن كان سببا لأن عرف العقل الأول و لوازمه فوجه صار العقل الأول علة لأن عرف الأول لوازم ذلك العقل الأول و الأمر في الدعاء كذلك فإنه بالحقيقة هو السبب في دعاء الداعي و سبب الداعي ثم إن الداعي هو سبب لأن عرف دعاءه فإنه بواسطته يكون الدعاء معلوما له فيكون الداعي بوجه ما سببا لأن عرف الأول دعاءه و ليس يؤثر الداعي بالحقيقة في الأول بل هو بالحقيقة المؤثر لا الداعي انتهى كلامه في التعليقات.

و ستعلم من ذي قبل حيث يحين حينه حسبما ذهب إليه الحكماء أن نفوس الأفلاك و ما فيها عالمة بلوازم حركاتها و أغراضها و أشواقها و دواعيها و أن كل ما يوجد في هذا العالم من الجواهر و الأعراض و الصور و المواد مقدر بهيئته و شكله و مقداره في عالم آخر متوسط بين العالمين عالم العقول المحضة و الصور العقلية و عالم الأجسام الطبيعية و

الصور المادية و قد بين الشيخ في سائر كتبه كالشفاء و الإشارات أن النفوس السماوية و ما فوقها عالمة بالجزئيات و أن التصورات و الإرادات المتجددة في هذا العالم لها أسباب سماوية و أرضية تتوافى فتتأدى إليها و توجهها و كذلك الأمور الطبيعية غير الراهنة الكائنة بعد ما لم تكن و كذلك القسريات و أن لازدحام هذه العلل و تصادمها و استمرارها نظاما ينجر تحت الحركة السماوية - فإذا علمت السماويات الأوائل منها بما هي أوائل و بهيئة انجرارها إلى الثواني علمت الثواني لا محالة و أن التصورات السماوية ما كان منها أولى و أخلق في نظام الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠٧

و أخرى و أصلح يفيضه الباري الأول و يوجد.

قال قد اتضح لك أن لنفوس الأجرام السماوية ضربا من التصرف في المعاني الجزئية على سبيل إدراك غير عقلي محض و أن لمثلها أن يتوصل إلى إدراك الحادثات الجزئية و ذلك يمكن بسبب إدراك تفاريق أسبابها الفاعلة و القابلة الحاصلة من حيث هي أسباب و ما تتأدى إليه و أنها دائما تنتهي إلى طبيعية أو إرادية موجبة - ليست إرادية فاترة غير حاتمة و لا جازمة و لا تنتهي إلى القسر فإن القسر إما قسر عن طبيعة و إما قسر عن إرادة و إليها ينتهي التحليل في القسريات أجمع ثم إن الإرادات كلها كائنة بعد ما لم تكن فلها أسباب تتوافى فتوجهها فليس توجد إرادة بإرادة و إلا لذهب إلى غير النهاية و لا عن طبيعة للمريد و إلا للزمت الإرادة ما دامت الطبيعة - بل الإرادات تحدث بحدوث علل هي الموجبات و الدواعي يستند إلى أرضيات و سماويات و تكون موجبة ضرورة لتلك الإرادات و أما الطبيعة فإنها إن كانت راهنة فهي أصل و إن كانت قد حدثت فلا محالة أنها تستند إلى أمور سماوية و أرضية عرفت جميع هذا و أن لازدحام هذه العلل و تصادمها و استمرارها نظاما ينجر تحت الحركة السماوية فإذا علمت الأوائل و هيئة انجرارها إلى الثواني علمت الثواني ضرورة فمن هذه الأشياء علمت أن النفوس السماوية و ما فوقها عالمة بالجزئيات و أما ما فوقها فعلمها بالجزئيات على نحو كلي و أما هي فعلى نحو جزئي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠٨

كالمباشر أو كالتأدي إلى المباشر أو المشاهد بالحواس فلا محالة أنها تعلم ما يكون و لا محالة أنها تعلم في كثير منها الوجه الذي هو أصوب و الذي هو أصلح و أقرب من الخير المطلق من الأمرين الممكنين و قد بينا أن التصورات التي لتلك العلل مباد لوجودات تلك الصور هاهنا إذا كانت ممكنة و لم تكن هناك أسباب سماوية تكون أقوى من تلك التصورات و إذا كان الأمر كذلك وجب أن يحصل ذلك الأمر الممكن موجودا لا عن سبب أرضي و لا عن سبب طبيعي في السماء - بل عن تأثير بوجه ما لهذه الأمور في الأمور السماوية و ليس هذا بالحقيقة تأثيرا بل التأثير لمبادئ وجود ذلك الأمر من الأمور السماوية فإنها إذا عقلت الأوائل عقلت ذلك الأمر و إذا عقلت ذلك الأمر عقلت ما هو الأولى بأن يكون و إذا عقلت ذلك كان إذ لا مانع فيه إلا عدم علة طبيعية أرضية أو وجود علة طبيعية أرضية و أما عدم العلة الطبيعية الأرضية مثلا أن يكون ذلك الشيء هو أن يوجد حرارة فلا يكون قوة مسخنة طبيعية أرضية فتلك السخونة تحدث للتصور السماوي بوجه كون الخير فيه كما أنها تحدث في أبدان الناس عن أسباب من تصورات الناس و على ما عرفته فيما سلف و أما مثال الثاني فإن يكون ليس المانع عدم سبب التسخين فقط بل وجود المبرد فالتصور السماوي للخير في

وجود ضد ما يوجبه المبرد في ذلك أيضا يقسر المبرد كما يقسر تصورنا المغضب السبب المبرد فينا فيكون الحر فيكون أصناف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٠٩

هذا القسم إحالات لا أمورا طبيعية أو إلهامات تتصل بالمستدعي أو بغيره أو اختلاطا من ذلك يؤدي واحد منها أو جملة مجتمعة إلى الغاية النافعة و نسبة التضرع إلى استدعاء هذه القوة نسبة التفكير إلى استدعاء البيان و كل يفيض من فوق و ليس هذا هو منبع التصورات السماوية بل الأول الحق يعلم جميع ذلك على الوجه الذي قلنا إنه يليق به و من عنده يبتدىء كون ما يكون و لكن بالتوسط و على ذلك علمه فبسبب هذه الأمور ما ينتفع بالدعوات و القرايين و خصوصا في أمر الاستسقاء و في أمور أخرى - و لهذا ما يجب أن يخاف المكافاة على الشر و يتوقع المكافاة على الخير فإن في ثبوت حقية ذلك مزجرة عن الشر و ثبوت حقية ذلك يكون بظهور آياته و آياته هي وجود جزئياته و هذه الحال معقولة عند المبادي فيجب أن يكون لها وجود فإن لم يوجد فهناك شر لا ندركه أو سبب آخر يعاوقه و ذلك أولى بالوجود من هذا و وجود ذلك و وجود هذا معا من المحال.

ثم قال و إذا شئت أن تعلم أن الأمور التي عقلت نافعة مؤدية إلى المصالح - قد أوجدت في الطبيعة على النحو من الإيجاد الذي علمته و تحققته فتأمل حال منافع الأعضاء في الحيوانات و النباتات و أن كل واحد كيف خلق و ليس هناك سبب طبيعي بل مبدؤه لا محالة من العناية على الوجه الذي علمت فكذلك فصدق بوجود هذه المعاني فإنها متعلقة بالعناية على الوجه الذي علمت العناية تعلق تلك.

ثم قال و اعلم أن السبب في الدعاء منا و الصدقة و غير ذلك و كذلك حدوث الظلم و الإثم إنما يكون من هناك فإن مبادئ جميع هذه الأمور تنتهي إلى الطبيعة و الإرادة و الاتفاق و الطبيعة مبدؤها من هناك و الإرادات التي لنا كائنة بعد ما لم تكن و كل كائن بعد ما لم يكن فله علة فكل إرادة لنا فلها علة و علة تلك الإرادة - ليست إرادة متسلسلة في ذلك إلى غير نهاية بل أمور تعرض من خارج أرضية و سماوية و الأرضية تنتهي إلى السماوية و اجتماع ذلك كله يوجب وجود الإرادة - و أما الاتفاق فهو حادث من مصادمات هذه فإذا حللت الأمور كلها استندت إلى مبادئ إيجابها منزل من عند الله و القضاء من الله سبحانه و تعالى هو الوضع الأول البسيط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٠

و التقدير هو ما يتوجه إليه القضاء على التدرج كأنه موجب اجتماعات من الأمور البسيطة التي تنسب من حيث هي بسيطة إلى القضاء و الأمر الإلهي الأول انتهت عبارته.

أقول قد تتبعنا كلمات الشيخ و عباراته لما فيها من فوائد جملة في كيفية ربط الأشياء الكائنة و المتجددة بإرادة الله و علمه و عنايته المبراة عن وصمة التغير و الانفعال و عن نقيصة الغرض و الالتفات إلى السوافل و إن كان المذكور من كلماته - مما لا يغني عن المزيد عليه و المتمم له من وجهين الأول أن في كلامه تحاشيا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١١

عن أن يفعل كل ما في السماويات عن شيء مما في الأرضيات ونحن كثيرا ما حكى لنا وشاهدنا نزول الغيث و حدوث مثل الزلزلة والخسف ونظائرهما من الرحمت الإلهية والعقوبات القهارية مقارنة لأدعية أهل الدعوات و اقتراح أبواب الحاجات و أمثال ما يحكى عن الأنبياء والأولياء مما يجزم العقل بأن في طبقة من المبادئ السماوية و ضرب من ملائكة الله إرادة حادثة و انفعالا من بعض أحوال النازلين في عالم الأرض و استماعا لدعوتهم و التفاتا إلى إجابتهم كما دل عليه كثير من الآيات القرآنية دلالة صريحة غير قابلة للتأويل مثل قوله تعالى مخاطبا لنوح ع **أَنْ اصْنَعِ الْفُلَ بِأَعْيُنِنَا وَ وَحِينَا** و لموسى و هارون ع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٢

لَا تَخَافَا إِنِّي مَعَكُمْ أَسْمَعُ وَ أَرَى و للخاتم ع **فَإِذَا قَرَأْتَهُ فَاتَّبِعْ قُرْآنَهُ ثُمَّ إِنَّ عَلَيْنَا بَيَانَهُ**.

و الثاني أن الشيخ لم يذهب إلى أن موجودات هذا العالم بحقائقها و ماهياتها موجودة في عالم أعلى من هذا العالم وجودا صوريا مجردا عن المواد و نقائصها - و إمكاناتها و ضرورها و أعدامها و ظلماتها بل أنكر على الذاهبين إلى إثبات تلك الصور المفارقة كأفلاطن و سقراط و من قبلهما من أساطين العلم و الحكمة و قد سبق منا إثباتها بالبيان الحكمي و الحجة البرهانية فكان عليه أن يحقق الأمر في هذا المقام و يعلم السر في ارتباط هذه الأمور الكائنة بما في عالم القدر و مطابقتها إياه و محاذاتها له تطابق النعل بالنعل و حذو القذ بالقذ و كذا القياس في ارتباط ما في عالم القدر لما في عالم القضاء البسيط و محاذاته إياه و اتحاده فيه و لم يتيسر له ذلك أصلا لإنكاره اتحاد العاقل البسيط بجميع المعقولات و ذهوله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٣

عن كون البسيط الحقيقي يجب أن يكون كل الأشياء لا يعزب عنه شيء في الأرض و لا في السماء و لهذا كان عنده علم الباري بالأشياء عبارة عن أعراض و رسوم متكررة قائمة بذاته و كان يعتذر عن ذلك بأن تلك العلوم و إن كانت أعراضا قائمة به لكن ذاته لا يفعل منها و لا يستكمل بها لأنها لوازم متأخرة وجودها عن وجود الذات - بل كماله و مجده في أن يصدر هي عنه لا في أن يوجد هي له و قد علمت بما في ذلك من القصور و الخلل و الله ولي الجود و الفضل

الموقف الخامس في كونه تعالى حيا

الحياة التي تكون عندنا في هذا العالم تتم بإدراك و فعل و الإدراك في حق

أكثر الحيوانات لا يكون غير الإحساس و كذا الفعل لا يكون إلا التحريك المكاني المنبعث عن الشوق و هذان الأثران منبعثان عن قوتين مختلفتين إحداهما مدركة و الأخرى محركة فمن كان إدراكه أشرف من الإحساس كالتعقل و نحوه - و كان فعله أرفع من مباشرة التحريك كالإبداع و شبهه لكان أولى بإطلاق اسم الحياة عليه بحسب المعنى ثم إذ كان نفس ما هو مبدأ إدراكه بعينه نفس ما هو مبدأ فعله من غير تغاير حتى يكون إدراكه بعينه فعله و إبداعه لكان أيضا أحق بهذا الاسم لبراءته عن التركيب إذ التركيب مستلزم للإمكان و الافتقار لاحتياج المركب في قوام وجوده إلى غيره و الإمكان ضرب من العدم المقابل للوجود و الموت المقابل للحياة و الدثور المقابل للبقاء فالحي الحقيقي ما لا يكون فيه تركيب قوي - و قد صح أن واجب الوجود بسيط الحقيقة أحدي الذات و الصفة فرداني القوة و القدرة و أن نفس تعقله

للأشياء نفس صدورها عنه و أن معنى واحدا بسيطا منه عقل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٤

للكل و منشأ لكل فهو أحق و أليق باسم الحياة من جميع الأحياء كيف و هو محيي الأشياء و معطي الوجود و كمال الوجود كالعلم و القدرة لكل ذي وجود و علم و قدرة.

و اعلم أن الصورة الإدراكية التي تحدث فينا فتصير سببا للصورة الموجودة الصناعية لو كانت نفس وجودها كافية لأن تتكون منها الصورة الصناعية بأن يكون الصورة الإدراكية هي بالفعل مبدأ لما هي صورة له لكان الإدراك فينا بعينه هو القدرة فكنا قادرين من حيث إنا عالمون و كان معلومنا و مقدورنا ذاتا واحدة بلا تغاير و اختلاف و لكن ليس كذلك بل كثيرا ما ندرك أشياء و نشاقها و لا قدرة لنا على تحصيلها- و الذي يمكننا تحصيله أيضا كالكتابة مثلا لا يكفي في تحصيلنا إياه في العين نفس إدراكنا له و لكن يفتقر مع ذلك إلى إرادة متجددة منبعثة من قوة شوقية تتحرك و تنبعث منهما مع القوة المحركة المزاولة فتتحرك هذه القوة الفاعلة المزاولة الأعصاب- و الآلات العضوية ثم تحرك تلك الآلات الطبيعية الآلات الخارجية ثم تحرك المادة الموضوعية لصناعتنا كالقرباس أو اللوح في هذا المثال فلا جرم لم يكن نفس وجود الصور العلمية قدرة و لا إرادة بل كان القدرة فينا عند المبدأ المحرك بل و ليست الإرادة أيضا قدرة و لا القدرة أيضا فعلا بل إمكان فعل و قوة تحصيل و تلك الصورة محركة للشوق و الإرادة و هما محركان للقدرة و هي محركة للآلة المحركة للقابل المتحرك فتكون محركة لمحرك المحرك للشيء المتحرك و كل من هذه المحركات أيضا لا يحرك غيره إلا و يتحرك بعينه لكون الجميع مشوبا بالقصور و النقيصة و العدم و لو فرض واحد منها تاما قويا في بابه لاكتفي عن غيره في باب الفعل و الإيجاد فالتصور الإدراكي مثلا لو كان شديد الوجود قوي الحصول لكان بعينه مرجحا و داعيا للفعل و موجبا لإفاضته في العين و كان بعينه إرادة و قدرة و قد سبق القول بأن علمه بالنظام الأتم هو بعينه الإرادة التي له و تحقق أيضا أن القدرة التي له هي كون ذاته عاقلة لكل عقلا هو مبدأ الكل لا مأخوذا عن الكل و عقلا هو وجود ذاته و عين إنيته لا أمر زائد على وجوده و هويته- و أن هذا العقل الأول هو بعينه الإرادة الأزلية الخالية عن شوب غرض و لمية سوى نفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٥

تلك الإرادة التي يتبعها وجود الموجودات كما يتبع عشق شيء عشق لوازمه و آثاره- فمن أحب شخصا مثلا أحب جميع لوازمه و آثاره و أفعاله على سبيل التبعية- فإله يحب كل شيء مجعول منه تبعا لمحبة ذاته فهذه هي إرادته الخالية عن الشين و من اعتقد غير ذلك في حق إرادة الله فقد عدل عن منهج الصواب و الحد في صفاته و أسمائه فهكذا يجب أن يحقق معنى الحي في حقه أعني الدراك الفعال فالإدراك كما علمت و الفعل كما علمت و كلاهما شيء واحد مبدءا و إضافة و أثرا و قد سبق أن الصفات الأولية للواجب كما أنها كلها موجودة بوجود واحد يستحق هذه الأسماء من جهة صدق معانيها عليه فكذا الإضافة كلها ترجع إلى إضافة واحدة يستحق الأسماء الإضافية لصدق معانيها عليها فكما أن وجودا واحدا في حقه علم و قدرة و حياة فكذا ذلك الوجود إلى المجعولات عالمية و خالقية و رازقية و صانعية و إرادة وجود و غير ذلك فإنك إذا تفتنت بما مر من الأصول و حققت الصفات الواجبة

علمت أن الصفة الأولى لواجب الوجود هي أنه إن و موجود بحث لا يشوبه ماهية و لا نقص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٦

و إمكان بوجه من الوجوه و أما الصفات الأخرى فبعضها يكون المعنى فيها هذا الوجود مع إضافة و بعضها هذا الوجود مع سلب و شيء منها لا يوجب كثرة في ذاته البتة فاللواتي تخالط السلب كقول القائل إنه أحد لم يرد منه إلا هذا الوجود نفسه مع ملاحظة أنه مسلوب عنه القسمة بوجه من الوجوه لا إلى الأجزاء الكمية و لا إلى الأجزاء الوجودية كالمادة و الصورة العينية أو الذهنية و لا إلى الأجزاء القولية كالجنس و الفصل و كما إذا قلنا إنه واحد فرد لم نعن إلا هذا الوجود مسلوبا عنه المشارك في الجنس أو في وجوب الوجود كما إذا قلنا إنه عقل و عاقل و معقول - لم نعن إلا أن هذا الوجود مسلوب عنه جواز مخالطة المادة و علائقها مع اعتبار إضافة ما هكذا في الشفاء.

و الحق عندنا أن هذا المعنى السلبي غير داخل في مفهوم التعقل و الإدراك و إن لزمه في الواقع بل الإدراك عبارة عن وجود شيء لشيء و حضوره له و المادة و الماديات لا حضور لها في نفسها و لا شيء بحسب ذلك الوجود فلاجل عينيتها و عدم وجودها الجمعي يكون مجهولا دائما إلا بواسطة صورة أخرى لها وجود حضوري و كلما كان الوجود أقوى كان الإدراك أقوى فالوجود الأقوى هو الصور العقلية على درجاتها في القوة ثم المثل الخيالية ثم المثل الحسية و إذا انتهى في الضعف إلى أن يكون صورة مادية فيغيب عن الإدراك و لا يقبل النيل و المثل و أما اللواتي تخالط الإضافة فمثل قول القائل الأول لا يعني به إلا إضافة هذا الوجود إلى الكل - إضافة الفاعلية أو نحوها و كقوله الآخر لا يعني به إلا إضافة هذا الوجود إليها إضافة الغائية أو شبهها و كما إذا قيل إنه قادر لا يعني به إلا أنه واجب الوجود مضافا إلى أن وجود غيره يجب عنه و يتحقق به و إذا قيل إنه حي لم يعن به إلا هذا الوجود العقلي - مأخوذا مع الإضافة إلى صورة الكل المعقولة أيضا بالقصد الثاني كما سبق إذ الحي هو الدراك الفعال و هكذا القياس في سائر الصفات الإلهية و قد سبق بيان اتحادها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٧

في الوجود في حقه و كيفية كون الحقيقيات منها نفس الذات الأحدية.

تبصره فيها إشارة

و اعلم أن حياة كل حي أنما هي نحو وجوده إذ الحياة هي كون الشيء بحيث يصدر عنه الأفعال الصادرة عن الأحياء من آثار العلم و القدرة لكن من الأشياء الحية ما يجب فيه أن يسبق هذا الكون كون آخر و منها ما ليس يجب فيه أن يسبقه كون آخر -

فالقسم الأول كالأجسام الحية

فإن كونها ذات حياة أنما يطرا عليها بعد كون آخر له يسبق هذا الكون الحيواني لأن هذه الأجسام لو كان وجودها في نفسها هو بعينه كونها بحيث يصدر عنها أفعال الحياة لكان كل جسم حيا و إن لم يكن كذلك بل طرا عليها هذا الوجود لا لأنها أجسام بل لأمر آخر تخصصت به فهو المطلوب و ليس لك أن تقول إن هذا الكون أي كون الشيء بحيث يصدر عنه فعل الحياة هو الذي يقوم الجسم لأننا نقول إن الذي ذكرت أنما يصح و يتصور في الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو باعتباره

جنس لا بالمعنى الذي هو باعتباره مادة و كلامنا في الثاني أي في ماهية الجسم مجردة عن الزوائد فإن الوجود المختص بماهية الجسم - لا تعلق له بالكون الحيواني فهذا الكون أمر زائد على وجود الجسم بما هو جسم.

و أما القسم الثاني

فهو فيما يخرج عن الأجسام فإن ما ليس بجسم لا يتمتع فيه أن يكون وجوده بعينه هو كونه بالصفة المذكورة بل يوجب في أكثر ما ليس بجسم أن يكون وجوده هذا الوجود فإن الجواهر المفارقة و الصور المجردة هذه صفتها أي كون وجودها بعينه هو حياتها و ذلك لعدم تركيبها من مادة و صورة - لأن وجودها وجود صوري لا يتعلق بأمر بالقوة فالحياة فيها ليست ما به يكون الشيء حيا بل نفس حيوته إذ من المحال أن يصير الشيء بهذا الوجود ذا هذا الوجود فيلزم توقف الشيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٨

على نفسه أو بوجود آخر و فيه خرق الفرض حيث فرضناه وجودا مفارقا عن المادة - القابلة لكون بعد كون و أيضا ننقل الكلام إلى ذلك الوجود و يتسلسل بل الأمر في الحياة و نظائرها كما علمت في باب أصل الوجود و المضاف و الأين و المتصل و نظائرها و واجب الوجود أولى بأن يكون حياته عين وجوده لكونه بسيط الحقيقة. و اعلم أن مفهوم الحياة غير مفهومي العلم و القدرة فهي كأنها مبدأ لهما و أكثر المتأخرين لما لم يعلموا الفرق بين المعنى و الهوية اختلفوا في أن الحياة في حقه هل هي صفة زائدة على الإدراك و الفعل أم لا ثم عولوا في إثباتها في حقه على أن الشريعة الحققة قد وردت في إطلاقها عليه فلا بد من إثباتها له و عدها من الصفات الحقيقية. و الحق أن حكم الحياة كحكم غيرها من الصفات الكمالية في أنها من كمالات الموجود بما هو موجود و كلما هو كمال للموجود المطلق أو للموجود من حيث هو موجود من غير تخصص بأمر طبيعي أو مقداري أو عددي فلا بد من ثبوته لمبدأ الوجود و فاعله إذ الفاعل المعطي للوجود و كماله أولى بذلك الكمال - ثم لا شبهة في أن مفهوم الحياة غير مفهوم العلم و القدرة إذ يمكن أن يتصور ذو حياة - لا يعلم وقتا من الأوقات شيئا بالفعل و لا يصدر أيضا حركة و لا صنع منه في بعض الأحيان فلا يخرج عن كونه حيا فالحياة في حقنا هو الكون الذي يكون مصدر الإدراك و الفعل فقوة الإدراك و قوة الفعل كأنهما آتان للكون المذكور و هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤١٩

مبدأ لهما إلا أن هذا لا يمكن في حقه لتعالیه عن اختلاف القوى و الآلات النفسانية فالحياة كسائر صفاته من العلم و القدرة و الإرادة كلها في درجة واحدة من الوجود و لكل هوية واحدة و تشخص واحد و مع ذلك فمفهوم الحياة غير مفهوم العلم و هما غير مفهوم القدرة و هي غير مفهوم الإرادة كما مر مرارا فالبرهان قائم على إثبات هذا المعنى الكمالي له على وجه أعلى و أشرف كما أنه قائم على إثبات العلم و القدرة و الإرادة على وجه أعلى و أشرف.

تنبيه

و أما الذي ذكره نصير المحققين قدس سره في رسالة مسألة العلم بقوله المستند في إثبات الحياة هو أن العقلاء قصدوا وصفه بالطرف الأشرف من طرفي النقيض و لما وصفوه بالعلم و القدرة و وجدوا كل ما لا حياة له ممتنع الاتصاف بهما

وصفوه بها لا سيما وهي أشرف من الموت الذي هو ضدها انتهى فهو لا يخلو عن خلل و قصور فإن المستند الذي ذكره في غاية الضعف إذ ليس كلما هو أشرف من طرفي النقيض على مقابله مما يصح إثباته له فإن الصلابة أشرف من الرخاوة- و الحركة أشرف من السكون و الكروية أشرف الأشكال بل الشرط في اتصافه بالأمر الكمالي الذي هو أشرف من نقيضه أن يكون ذلك الأمر من العوارض الذاتية للموجود بما هو موجود و إلا فيستحيل اتصافه به فالحكيم الإلهي الباحث عن صفاته- لا بد له في إثبات صفة الحياة له أن يحصل أولا معنى الحياة على وجه يصح أن يكون عارضا لمطلق الوجود كمالاته و لا يستدعي عروضها لشيء على ذلك الوجه أن يكون له استعداد خاص أو تخصص بنوع من أنواع الموجود المطلق و لا أيضا يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٢٠

مما يستلزم عروضها كذلك له تكثرا أو تغيرا أو افتقارا إلى شيء ثم إذا حصلها على ذلك الوجه فيثبتها لواجب الوجود لأنه مبدأ سائر الموجودات و كمالاتها و معطي الكمال المطلق أولى بذلك الكمال من غيره و أما الحديث الذي نقله **عن عالم من أهل بيت النبوة ع: من أنه هل سمي عالما و قادرا إلا أنه وهب العلم للعلماء و القدرة للقادرين و كلما ميزتموه بأوهامكم في أدق معانيه فهو مخلوق مثلكم مردود إليكم و الباري تعالى واهب الحياة و مقدر الموت و لعل النمل الصغار توهم أن لله زبانيين كما لها فإنها تتصور أن عدمهما نقصان لمن لا يكونان له و هكذا حال العقلاء في ما يصفون الله فيما أحسب و إلى الله المفزع**

فالحديث في غاية الشرف و الحقية و فيه إشارة إلى المسلك الذي ذكرناه في باب إثبات الصفات الكمالية له سبحانه من أنه واهب العلم و القدرة و الحياة و هذه صفات كمالية لمطلق الموجود بما هو موجود و الصفة الكمالية للموجود إذا وجدت في المعلول فلا بد من وجودها للعللة على وجه أعلى و أشرف و أما الذي أشار إليه من قصور أفهام العقلاء- فيما يصفون الله به عن درجة البلوغ إلى معرفة حقائق الصفات فهو أيضا مما لا خصوصية له بشيء من الصفات كالحياة مثلا بل هو جار في سائر صفاته فإن الصفات الحقيقية كلها وزانها وزان صفة الوجود و الوجوب فكما أن من الوجود ما هو واجب بالذات- مع كون مفهومه مشتركا بين الموجودات فكذلك من العلم ما هو واجب الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٢١

بالذات مع اشتراك مفهومه بين العلم القديم و العلم الحادث و كذلك من القدرة ما هي قدرة قديمة واجبة و من الإرادة ما هي إرادة قائمة بالذات مع الاشتراك المذكور و كذا الحكم في جميع الصفات الحقيقية المشتركة المعنى بين الواجب و الممكن- لكن طائفة من العقلاء و هم الذين عرفوا الحق بالحق و صفاته بصفاته لا بغيره من الممكنات لخروجهم عن هذه النشأة النفسانية و فنأهم عن ذواتهم و هوياتهم و قيام القيامة في حقهم فهم يرون ما لا يراه سائر العقلاء و يشاهدون ما لا يشاهده غيرهم

الموقف السادس في كونه تعالى سميعا بصيرا

قد وردت في شريعتنا الحقبة بل من ضروريات هذا الدين المبين المعلومة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٢٢

بالقرآن و الحديث المتواتر و الإجماع من الأمة أن الباري سميع بصير و اختلفوا في اندراجهما تحت مطلق العلم و رجوعهما إلى العلم بالمسموعات و المبصرات أو كونهما صفتين زائدتين على مطلق العلم فبعض المتكلمين كأشياخنا الإمامية و منهم - المحقق الطوسي ره و كالشيخ الأشعري و متابعيه وفاقا لجمهور الفلاسفة النافين لعلمه بالجزئيات و بما سوى ذاته من الهويات على الوجه المخصوص الوجودي الشهودي ارجعوهما إلى مطلق العلم فأولوا السمع إلى نفس العلم بالمسموعات - و البصر إلى نفس العلم بالمبصرات و بعضهم جعلهما إدراكين حسيين إما بناء على اعتقاد التجسم أو مباشرة الأجسام في حقه تعالى عما يقول الظالمون علوا كبيرا - أو اعتقاد أن الإحساس في حقه لبراءته عن القصور و الافتقار إلى الإله يحصل بغير آلة - و إن لم يحصل فينا لقصورنا إلا بالآلة و هذا الكلام مجمل إن صدر عن عالم راسخ في الحكمة يحتمل وجهها صحيحا إلا أن كثيرا من أرباب التكلم و أهل الجدل لم يتفطنوا أن الإحساس بعينه نفس القصور في المدرك و المدرك جميعا و الحاصل أن السمع و البصر له إما نفس الإحساس بالمعنى الذي عرفه الناس أو مطلق العلم بالمسموعات و المبصرات.

و التحقيق أن السمع و البصر مفهومهما غير مفهوم العلم و أنهما علمان مخصوصان زائدان على مطلق العلم و هما أيضا إذا حصل مفهومهما مما يصح عند العقل عروضه لمطلق الموجود بما هو موجود بحيث لا يستلزمان تجسما و لا تغيرا و لا انفعالا في معروضهما فلا بد من إثباتهما له فإنك بعد ما علمت أن مناط الجزئية و الشخصية ليس مجرد الإحساس حتى لا يتشخص شيء إلا عند الحس بل مناطها هو نحو الوجود الخاص - و أن الوجود و التشخص شيء واحد بالحقيقة متغاير بالمفهوم و أنك قد علمت أن الحق يعلم الهويات الخارجية بشخصياتها على وجه يكون وجودها في نفسها هو حضورها عنده و معلوميتها له و هذا الشهود الإشرافي المتعلق بالمسموعات و المبصرات زائد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٢٣

على مطلق العلم بهما و لو على وجه كلي كما في العلم الارتسامي الكلي فشهود المسموعات سمع و شهود المبصرات بصر فقد علمت مما ذكرنا أن سمعه و بصره ليسا بحيث يرجعان إلى مطلق العلم بل لو قال قائل عكس ذلك فيهما لكان أولى و أقرب إلى الحق بأن قال كما قال صاحب الإشراق إن علمه راجع إلى بصره لا أن بصره يرجع إلى علمه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٢٤

إيضاح عرشي

اعلم أن حقيقة الأبصار ليست كما هو المشهور و فهمه الجمهور أنه إما بانطباع شيخ المرئي في العضو الجليدي و انفعاله عنه كما قاله الطبيعيون و لا بخروج الشعاع على هيئة مخروط بين العين و المرئي سواء كان الشعاع جسما موجودا في الخارج أو شيئا آخر و لا كما اختاره الشيخ المقتول من أن للنفس بواسطة البدن و وضعه بالقياس إلى الصورة المادية يقع علم حضوري لتلك الصورة المادية إذ الكل باطل عندنا كما فصل في مقامه بل حقيقة الأبصار عندنا هي إنشاء النفس صورة مثالية حاضرة عندها في عالم التمثل مجردة عن المادة الطبيعية و نسبة النفس إليها نسبة الفاعل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٢٥

المنشئ للفعل إلى ذلك الفعل لا نسبة القابل المستكمل بكمال إلى ذلك الكمال - وإنما الحاجة في الأبصار إلى وجود هذه الإله العضوية وإلى وجود الصورة الطبيعية و وضع مخصوص بينهما و عدم أمر حاجز بينهما و غير ذلك من الشرائط ليست لأن مطلق الأبصار لا يتحقق إلا بهذه الشرائط و إلا لما يتحقق الأبصار في حالة النوم أو نحوه بل تلك لأجل أن النفس في أوائل الفطرة ضعيفة الوجود غير مستغنية القوام في وجودها عن مادة بدنية و كذا في إدراكاتها فكما أن وجودها غير وجود البدن و إن افتقرت إليه في الوجود فكذلك إدراكها البصري ليس بهذا العضو و إن افتقرت إليه في الأبصار و كما أن لها أن تستغني عن هذا البدن الطبيعي عند استكمالها ضربا من الاستكمال فكذلك لها أيضا في أن تدرك الأشياء إدراكا جزئيا بصريا أو نحوه أن تستغني عن هذه الأعضاء و انفعالاتها.

و بالجملة قد أوضحنا هذه المسألة حق إيضاحها كما سيجيء ذكرها في مباحث علم النفس بحيث لم يبق ريب لمن كان منصفًا ذا قلب ذكي أن الأبصار يتحقق بدون الإله و انفعالاتها و بدون انفعال النفس أيضا لكونها فاعلة للصور المبصرة لا قابلة إياها.

فإذا ثبت ذلك من أن النفس المجردة عن عالم الطبيعة تدرك الصور الجزئية المبصرة ببصرها الخاص الذي هو عين ذاتها فعلم أن مطلق الأبصار من عوارض الموجود بما هو موجود و لا يوجب تجسما و لا انفعالا و تغيرا و هو كمال و فقدانه نقص - فالواجب جل ذكره أولى بذلك الكمال كما علمت و كذا الكلام في السمع فإن الذي اشتهر بين الناس أن السمع إنما يحصل بقرع أو قلع عنيفين و لا بد فيه من تموج الهواء الواصل إلى عضو غضروفي في باطنه عصب مفروش يؤثر فيه وصول الهواء المتموج - فتفعل منه النفس فتتنبه بالأصوات و الحروف و الكلمات و تدركها ليس كما قررناه و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٦، ص ٤٢٦

أثبتوه و خالفهم في ذلك طائفة من أكابر الحكماء القائلين بأن للأفلاك في حركاتها أصوات لذيذة و نغمات شريفة و أن فيثاغورث صاعد إليها بنفسه و سمع بلطيف ذهنه نغماتها اللذيذة ثم دون بعد ذلك علم الموسيقى و مما ينبه أن مطلق السمع لا يفتقر فيه إلى آلة طبيعية أو حركة هوائية أن الإنسان ربما يسمع في حالة النوم صوتا شديدا - كصوت الرعد و نحوه و يؤثر فيه تأثيرا عظيما ليس بأقل من تأثير الصوت الواقع في الخارج و حالة النوم حالة اتصال النفس بعالم آخر و سينكشف لك في مباحث الكلام حقيقة هذا المطلب إن شاء الله تعالى و الحمد لله أولا و آخرا و الصلاة على سيدنا محمد و آله الطاهرين

Ibn 'Arabî – Time and Cosmology

Mohamed Haj Yousef



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Ibn ‘Arabî – Time and Cosmology

Time is one of the most important issues in physics, cosmology, philosophy and theology. Many books and articles have been published in this interdisciplinary field before, but none of those studies have fully described Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique view which is central to understanding, for example, his controversial theory of the ‘oneness of being’.

This book is the first comprehensive attempt to explain Ibn ‘Arabî’s distinctive view of time and its role in the process of creating the cosmos and its relation with the Creator. By comparing this original view with modern theories of physics and cosmology, Mohamed Haj Yousef constructs a new cosmological model that may deepen and extend our understanding of the world, while potentially solving some of the drawbacks in the current models such as the historical Zeno’s paradoxes of motion and the recent Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox (EPR) that underlines the discrepancies between Quantum Mechanics and Relativity.

Ibn ‘Arabî – Time and Cosmology is an important contribution to the fields of philosophy, cosmology, physics and theology.

Mohamed Haj Yousef is lecturer in the Department of Physics, United Arab Emirates University.

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Ibn ‘Arabî – Time and Cosmology

Mohamed Haj Yousef

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**To the Spirit of al-Shaykh al-Akbar Muhyi ed-Din Ibn al-‘Arabî, may
Allah’s Mercy be upon him,**

To the Spirits of my parents, may Allah’s Mercy be upon them,

To my dearest wife who supported me all the times,

To my two sons Abdullah and Yousef, and my daughter Fatima,

To my brothers and sisters, in Islam, and in humankind,

To all I dedicate this humble work.

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Foreword

Students of the world's religious traditions, together with specialists in the history of premodern science and philosophy, are well aware of the centrality within the scriptures and theologies of the major world religions, over many centuries, of detailed symbolic accounts of cosmology and metaphysics (including the intricate problematics of creation) – and of the crucial role played within each of those religious traditions by corresponding philosophical and scientific schemas of astronomy and cosmology that often provided a common language and framework of understanding shared by their educated elites. In premodern times, this key interpretative function was particularly important in the case of that complex of Hellenistic philosophic and cosmological disciplines largely shared by educated proponents of each of the three Abrahamic faiths. Given today's widespread journalistic stereotypes about the supposed 'opposition' of science and religion, this book is a salutary reminder – and an extraordinarily rich and detailed illustration – of the complex interpenetration of philosophical and scriptural elements throughout the central traditions of later Islamic thought, prior to the recent scientific revolutions. At the same time, Dr Haj Yousef's training and expertise as a modern physicist allow him to suggest, in his provocative final chapter, intriguing ways in which the earlier cosmological and theological speculations of Ibn 'Arabî carefully outlined in this study may also parallel very recent developments and insights in the cosmological theories (especially String Theory) of modern physics. In that sense, this study provides a more demanding, Islamic parallel to such recent popular works such as F. Capra's *Tao of Physics*.

While the prolific Andalusian Sufi writer Ibn 'Arabî (1165–1240) is most widely known today as a mystic and spiritual teacher, his voluminous writings – and particularly his immense magnum opus, the *Meccan Illuminations*, which is the primary source for this study – constantly refer to the insights, theories, and cosmological schemas of earlier Muslim philosophers and scientists, such as Avicenna and the popular spiritual treatises of the 'Brethren of Purity' (*Ikhwân al-Safâ*). For that reason, this book begins with a helpful survey of the standard theories of cosmology and time found in earlier Hellenistic thinkers, which were largely taken over into the succeeding traditions of Islamic philosophy and science. However, the most creative and unfamiliar

aspects of Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmological ideas – especially his distinctive conception of the ever-renewed, ongoing and instantaneous nature of the cosmic process of creation (*tajdid al-khalq*) – are carefully woven together from what have always been profoundly mysterious, problematic, and complexly interwoven symbolic formulations in the Qur’an. Thus the main focus and novel scholarly contribution of the central chapters of this volume lie in the author’s careful unfolding and clarification of the intended meanings and references of this dense Qur’anic cosmological symbolism of time and creation, as that multi-dimensional world-view is systematically expounded in elaborate accounts scattered throughout several of Ibn ‘Arabî’s major works. Every reader who engages with this demanding discussion will come away, at the very least, with a heightened appreciation of the symbolic richness and challenging intellectual dilemmas posed by this unduly neglected – yet arguably quite central and unavoidable – dimension of the Qur’an and its metaphysical teachings.

In the penultimate chapter of this study, before taking up possible analogies to Ibn ‘Arabî’s ideas in modern physics, the author turns to the language of ontology and to a subject – the paradoxical relations of the divine One and the many – far more familiar to students of Ibn ‘Arabî, or of comparable forms of thought in earlier Neoplatonism and the metaphysics of other world religions. Despite the initial unfamiliarity (for non-specialists) of some of Ibn ‘Arabî’s Qur’anic symbolism and technical terminology here, his approach to conceiving and intellectually explaining the mysterious relationship between the divine Source and its infinite manifestations clearly mirrors Plato’s classical dialectical enumeration of the alternative ontological hypothesis outlined in his *Parmenides*. Today, of course, no one is used to thinking of those recurrent metaphysical problems in terms of the theological language of creation. But by this point Dr Haj Yousef has outlined just how Ibn ‘Arabî, by carefully elaborating the complex literal indications of the Qur’an itself, is able to illuminate both the temporal and the ontological dimensions of the divine cosmogonic Origination of all things.

The fascinating ‘phenomenology’ of the human psychological and experiential dimensions of this cosmic creative process, we might add, is also the subject of even more fascinating discussions in Ibn ‘Arabî and later Islamic philosophers (as well as earlier Sufis and mystical thinkers). But the elaboration of that closely related topic would require another, equally wide-ranging and original study. So the author has prudently set that related issue aside while focusing on those dimensions of ontology and time most directly connected with the analogous approaches of modern theoretical physics that he outlines in his concluding, more speculative chapter.

This constantly challenging and thought-provoking study is clearly the fruit of years of research on one of the most difficult subjects to be found in the writings of one of Islam’s most seminal, creative, inspired, and notoriously difficult thinkers. So even those who may find Ibn ‘Arabî’s language and speculations difficult to follow will surely come away from their reading with a heightened

appreciation of the relative poverty, thoughtlessness and lack of sophistication in today's dominant public discourse about religion and science, and in our prevailing ways of conceiving and approaching these fundamental human issues of cosmology, ontology and theology.

James W. Morris, Boston College

Preface

Ibn ‘Arabî is one of the most prominent figures in Islamic history, especially in relation to Sufism and Islamic philosophy and theology. In this book, we want to explore his cosmology and in particular his view of time in that cosmological context, comparing his approaches to the relevant conclusions and principles of modern physics whenever possible. We shall see that Ibn ‘Arabî had a unique and comprehensive view of time which has never been discussed by any other philosopher or scientist, before or even after Ibn ‘Arabî. In the final two chapters, in which we shall discuss some of the ways his novel view of time and cosmology may be used to build a complete model of the cosmos that may deepen and extend our understanding of the world, while potentially solving some of the drawbacks and paradoxes in the current cosmological models of modern physics.

As we discuss in the opening chapter, there is no doubt that time is one of the most important issues in physics, cosmology, philosophy and theology, and hundreds of books and articles have been published in these fields. However, none of these studies had fully developed Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique view of time in its cosmological dimensions, although his conception of time is indeed central to understanding, for example, his controversial theory of the ‘oneness of being’. One possible reason for this relative neglect is the difficult symbolic language he usually used. Also, he did not discuss this subject at length in any single place in his extant works – not even in chapters 59, 291 and 390 of the *Futûhât* whose titles relate directly to time – so we must piece together his overall cosmological understanding of time from his scattered treatments in many works and different contexts within his magnum opus, the *Futûhât*, and other books. Therefore this book may be considered the first comprehensive attempt to set forth all the relevant dimensions of time in Ibn ‘Arabî’s wider cosmology and cosmogony.

In Chapter 2, after briefly discussing the different physical theories and models of the cosmos, we start by describing Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmos in some detail. Then we also give an extensive review of the different philosophical views of time and its properties from the philosophical and scientific point of view to show the importance of the subject and relate it to Ibn ‘Arabî’s model. Then, in Chapter 2, we begin to introduce Ibn ‘Arabî’s general concepts of time and ‘days’, which are then developed in greater detail in each of the succeeding chapters.

To start with, Ibn ‘Arabî considers time to be a product of our human ‘imagination’, without any real, separately existing entity. Nevertheless, he still considers it to be one of the four main constituents of existence. We need this imagined conception of ‘time’ to chronologically arrange events and what for us are the practically defining motions of the celestial orbs and other physical objects, but for Ibn ‘Arabî real existence is attributable only to the actually existing thing that moves, not to motion nor to time (or space) in which this motion is observed. Thus Ibn ‘Arabî distinguishes between two kinds of time – natural and para-natural – and he explains that they both originate from the two forces of the soul: the active force and the intellectual force, respectively. Then he explains that this imaginary time is cyclical, circular, relative, discrete and inhomogeneous. Ibn ‘Arabî also gives a precise definition – drawing on the specific usage of the Qur’an and earlier Arab conceptions of time – of the day, daytime and night, showing how these definitions are related to the relative motions of the celestial orbs (including the Earth), where every orb has its own ‘day’, and those days are normally measured by our normal observable day that we count on the Earth.

In Chapter 3 (and also in Chapter 6), we explain the central significance, in Ibn ‘Arabî’s notion of time and cosmology, of the divine ‘Week’ of creation, and we begin to develop some of its interesting consequences. To begin with, Ibn ‘Arabî considers the cosmic, divine Week, rather than the day or any other time unit, as the main primitive time cycle. Thus he explains how the world is created in seven (cosmic, divine) ‘Days’, what happens on each Day, and the underlying ontological relation between the Week’s Days of creation and the seven fundamental divine Names of Allah. Ibn ‘Arabî also shows that all the Days of this cosmic Week, including the last Day (Saturday), all actually occur in Saturday, the ‘Day of eternity’. This complex understanding of the ever-renewed divine creation in fact underlies his conception of the genuine unification of space and time, where the world is created ‘in six Days’ (from Sunday to Friday) as space, and then is displayed or manifested on Saturday in the process that we perceive as time. However, we perceive this complicated process of creation in Six Days and the subsequent appearance of the world on the seventh Day, we perceive all this only as one single moment of our normal time. In fact, on the basis of Qur’anic indications and the corresponding experiential confirmations of the mystical ‘knowers’ (*‘urafâ*) (later explained in Chapter 5), Ibn ‘Arabî insists that the entire created world ceases to exist immediately and intrinsically right after its creation, and that then it is re-created again and again. For him, this process of divine re-creation happens gradually (in series), not at once: i.e. it always takes six divine ‘Days’ to be prepared and the last Day to manifest. However, we – the creatures – do not witness this re-creation in six Days, since we witness the created world only in the seventh Day (Saturday, which he calls ‘the Day of eternity’). So the creation of the world in six Days actually happens every moment, perpetually and recurrently. Therefore, those first six divine Days are actually the creative origin of space and not time, which is only the seventh Day. In this novel conception, for the first time in history, the ‘Week’, as the

basic unit of space-time, will have a specific and quite essential meaning in physics and cosmology.

Even more important in Ibn 'Arabî's conception of time, however, is his understanding of the 'Day' of creation as a minimum indivisible Day, a kind of 'instant of time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) that also includes (since it includes all of creation) the instants of that normal day itself which we live in and divide into hours, minutes, seconds and so on. In order to explain this initially paradoxical notion, Ibn 'Arabî introduces – again initially mysterious Qur'anic on the basis of indications – the different nature and roles of three very different kinds of compounded days (the 'circulated' days, the 'taken-out' days and the 'inter-twined' days), which highlight the fact that the actual flow of time is not as uniform and smooth as we feel and imagine. The key concept underlying these complex developments is that Ibn 'Arabî emphasizes, following the Qur'an, that only one creative 'event' should be happening on every Day (of the actual cosmic, divine Days of creation), and not the many different (temporal and spatial) events that we observe. To reconcile this apparent contradiction between the unitary Act (and 'instant') of Creation and the apparent phenomena of spatial and temporal multiplicity, he reconstructs the normal, observable days that we actually perceive in a special manner that is complexly grounded in the different divine 'Days' of the actual flow of time. We shall explain his complex conception of these very different types of days in detail in Chapter 4.

The principle of perpetual re-creation, one of the more famous elements of Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology and cosmogony, is fully explained in Chapter 5, where we also take up the related question of Ibn 'Arabî's controversial theory of the 'oneness of being'. This theory can be easily understood once we have grasped his underlying conception of the eternally renewed creation in time. This comprehensive cosmological vision, when added to his understanding of the actual flow of time based on the three kinds of days described in Chapter 4, can be used to build a new unique model of the cosmos. This cosmological model, which we shall call 'the Single Monad model', is explained in Chapter 6. We shall see in this chapter that, according to this distinctive perspective on creation, the manifest world works exactly like a super-computer which – despite its tremendous speed – can do only one job at a time, where the display on the computer monitor is analogous to the manifest world: though we appear to see a complex, continually changing picture on the screen, that complex image is actually built one pixel at a time by one single electron-beam. This particular illustration helps us to grasp the actual functioning of Ibn 'Arabî's central conception of the ultimate oneness of being, despite the undeniable visible multiplicity of the world.

Finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to discussing some of the implications of the Single Monad model for various related principles of modern physics and cosmology, including the possibilities of testing such a cosmological model. We shall discuss in particular some of the known time-related paradoxes in current models of physics and cosmology, and how they may be resolved according to this novel view. It can be fairly said that Ibn 'Arabî's view of time and the cosmos is a fruitful concept that potentially bridges the gap between traditional

theological metaphysical views of the world and the contemporary scientific views that are based on experimental procedures and logic. In addition to explaining the ‘oneness of being’ and ‘creation in six Days’, other important results of Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique concept of time include the ways it helps to resolve the famous EPR paradox, thus potentially reconciling the two great theories of Quantum Mechanics and Relativity in modern physics, how it offers a new understanding of the historical Zeno’s paradoxes, and how it potentially explains the reason behind quantization, how quantities are either discrete or continuous.

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Abbreviations

This book is mainly based on Ibn ‘Arabî’s major comprehensive work *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkiyya*. Because we refer to this book often, we shall use a short reference style: each quotation from the *Futûhât* is followed by a reference in brackets: [X.000.00] which means: [volume.page.line]. When the line number is omitted – in rare cases – this means that the reference is in the entire page; in a few cases a range of a few pages is indicated as [II.229–231]. We have mainly used the standard edition of the *Futûhât* issued by many publishers based on a reproduction of the old edition of Bulaq 1329/1911 which comprises four volumes each about 600–700 pages of 35 lines; the page size is 20 by 27 cm (see the Bibliography). You should notice, however, that newer reset editions may be different although some of them are also in four volumes.

In addition to the *Futûhât*, we use short form of references to many other books by Ibn ‘Arabî (for example *Ayyâm Al-Sha’n* and *Al-Masâ’il*) and other related famous works (such as William Chittick’s two important works: *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* [SPK] and *The Self-disclosure of God* [SDG]) as explained in the Bibliography. In most of these cases we put the short form of the reference followed by the page number, with only two exceptions: for Osman Yahya’s classification of Ibn ‘Arabî’s books and for Ibn ‘Arabî’s *Al-Masâ’il*, where we refer to the listed item number instead of the page number.

All references to the Holy Qur’an are given also in the text and not in notes; after each verse quoted or meaning indicated in the text we add a reference (xx: y) where xx refers to the number of the Sura (chapter) and yy is the number of the Aya (verse). For the prophetic narrations we have mainly used *Kanz al-‘Ummâl* (*The Treasure of the Workers*) which includes most of the known *hadith* books, indexed and numbered according to the subject. We give the number of the *hadith* as [Kanz: 0000]. The table below shows the abbreviated references in the book.

Abbreviation*Kanz**Futûhât**Fusûs**Dîwân**Ayyâm Al-Sha'n**'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz**Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir**Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya**Al-Durraṭ Al-Baydâ'**Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya**Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya**Kitâb Al-Azal**Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi***Original book***Al-Muttaqî Al-Hindî* (1989) *Kanz Al-'Ummâl* (*The Treasure of the Workers*), Beirut:

Mu'assasat Al-Risâla

Ibn 'Arabî (n.d.) *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkîyya*, Vols 1–4, Beirut: n.p. (see above)*Ibn 'Arabî* (1946) *Fusûs Al-Hikam*, Cairo: n.p.; critical edition by Abu 'Alâ 'Affîfî*Ibn 'Arabî* (1996) *Dîwân Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyya, ed. Ahmad Hasan BasajTreatise number 5 in *Ibn 'Arabî* (n.d.) *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Ihyâ' Al-Turath Al-'Arabî; reprint of Hyderabad ed.*Ibn 'Arabî* (1919) *'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*, including *Kitâb Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir* and *Kitâb Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya fî Islâh Al-Mamlaka Al-Insâniyya*, Leiden: Brill, in *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-'Arabî*, ed. H. S. Nyberg*Ibn 'Arabî*, *Kitâb Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir*, in *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-'Arabî*, ed. H. S. Nyberg*Ibn 'Arabî*, *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya fî Islâh Al-Mamlaka Al-Insâniyya*, in *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-'Arabî*, ed. H. S. Nyberg*Ibn 'Arabî* (2002–04) *Risâlat Al-Durraṭ Al-Baydâ'* in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Mu'assasat Al-Intishâr Al-'Arabî, ed. Sa'id 'Abd Al-Fattâh, vol. II: 131–145*Ibn 'Arabî* (2000) *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya fî Al-Ahkâm Al-Ilâhiyya* in *Majmû'at Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Mahajjat Al-Baydâ', vol. II: 5–66*Ibn 'Arabî* (2000) *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya fî Asrâr Al-Taharât Wa-l-Salawât Wa-l-Ayyâm Al-Asliyya* in *Majmû'at Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Mahajjat Al-Baydâ', vol. II: 67–314Book 11 in volume I of *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Ihyâ' Al-Turâth Al-'Arabî, n.d.), which is a photographic reprint of the same famous collection published by the Dâ'irat Al-Ma'ârif Al-'Uthmâniyya (Hyderabad, 1948)Al-Hakîm, S. (1981) *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi: Al-Hikma fî Hudûd Al-Kalima* (*The Sufi Dictionary: The Wisdom in the Word*), Beirut: Dandarah

<i>SPK</i>	Chittick, W. C. (1989) <i>The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn Al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination</i> , Albany, NY: SUNY Press
<i>SDG</i>	Chittick, W. C. (1998) <i>The Self-disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn Al-Arabi's Cosmology</i> , Albany, NY: SUNY Press
<i>OY</i>	Yahya, O. (1964), <i>Histoire et classification de l'œuvre d'Ibn Arabi</i> , 2 vols, Damascus: Institut Français
<i>EP</i>	<i>The Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> , ed. by Paul Edwards (1967), 8 vols, New York: Macmillan Publishing
<i>EP²</i>	Bianquis, Th., Bosworth, C. E., Vandonzel E. J. and Heinrichs, W. P. (eds) (1987) <i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , 9 vols, Leiden: Brill

1 Cosmology and time

Cosmology is the science that studies the universe, the cosmos. *Cosmos* is a word used in earlier Greek metaphysical thought that means ‘harmony’ or ‘order’, as opposed to *chaos*. In one Greek theory of creation, *chaos* is the formless matter from which the *cosmos*, or harmonious order, was created (*EP*: ‘Cosmology’, II: 237–244; ‘Chaos and Cosmos’, II: 80–81). And time is one of the most fundamental issues in philosophy and cosmology, since the whole of existence is nothing but consecutive series of events in time. Everybody feels time, but most people do not question it because it is commonly experienced every day in many things and is so familiar. However, it is far more difficult to understand the philosophical nature of time and its characteristics.

Throughout the history of philosophy, many opposing views have emerged to discuss and describe the different aspects of time, and some novel hypotheses have eventually emerged in modern cosmology. However, it is still the dream of every physicist to unveil the reality of time, especially since all modern theories have come to the conclusion that time is the key.

1.1 A brief overview of early cosmological models

Beginning in the twelfth century, Arab scholars, scribes and various translators gradually introduced Europe to the science of astronomy as it had developed in Islamic civilization, based on earlier Hellenistic models (primarily Ptolemy and Aristotle). But once the Catholic Church had decided to adopt the Ptolemaic or Aristotelian geocentric¹ cosmological model as a theological principle, it considered scientists who criticized this model as heretics. Therefore, the Polish scientist Nicolai Copernicus (AD 1473–1544) circulated his heliocentric model anonymously, and his book *De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium* (‘On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Orbs’), was not published until 1543, just one year before his death. In this model, Copernicus postulated that the Sun and the stars are stationary and the Earth and the planets circulated around the Sun in circular orbits.²

It was not until 1609, when Galileo invented the telescope, that Aristotle’s and Ptolemy’s geocentric model of the universe was completely discarded by knowledgeable researchers, and replaced by the heliocentric model (Drake 1990:

145–163). At around the same date (1609–19), the scientist Johannes Kepler formulated three mathematical statements that accurately described the revolution of the planets around the Sun. In 1687, in his major book *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, Isaac Newton provided his famous theory of gravity, which supported the Copernican model and explained how bodies more generally move in space and time (Hall 1992: 202).

Newton's mechanics were good enough to be applied to the solar system, but as a cosmological theory it was completely false in so far as he still considered, like Aristotle, the stars to be fixed and the universe outside the solar system to be static. Although a dynamic universe could easily be predicted according to Newton's theory of gravity, the belief in the Aristotelian static universe was so deep and strong that it persisted for some three centuries after Newton (Seeds 1990: 86–107).

In 1718, Edmund Halley compared the positions of stars recorded by the Babylonians and other ancient astronomers with the latest observations and realized that the positions of some of the stars were not the same as they had been thousands of years earlier. Some of the stars were in fact slightly displaced from the rest by a small but noticeable amount. This is called 'proper motion', which is the apparent motion of the star (perpendicular to the line of sight) in relation to the background stars that are very far away. In 1783, William Herschel discovered the solar motion, the Sun's motion relative to the stars in its galactic neighbourhood. Herschel also showed that the Sun and other stars are arranged like the 'grains of abrasive in a grindstone' (Ferguson 1999: 162–165), which is now called the Milky Way galaxy. More than a century later, in 1924, Hubble was able to measure distances to some stars (based on the 'redshift'),³ and he showed that some bright dots that we see in the sky are actually other galaxies like ours, although they look so small because they are very far away (Hartmann 1990: 373–375).

The Aristotelian theory of a static universe (i.e. of all the stars) had to be reviewed after Hubble's discovery of the redshift of light coming from all distant stars, which indicated that everything in the universe is actually moving; just as Ibn 'Arabi had said many centuries before. In his bestselling book of the 1980s, Stephen Hawking says:

Even Einstein, when he formulated the general theory of Relativity in 1915, was so sure that the universe had to be static that he modified his theory to make this possible, introducing a so-called cosmological constant into his equations.

(Hawking 1998: 42)

This of course was soon proved to be wrong, and everybody now knows that the cosmos is in continuous motion. Einstein himself later considered this to be one of his greatest mistakes. Ibn 'Arabi, however, declared plainly that the stars cannot be fixed at all, and he even gave numbers and units to the speed of their proper motion [III.548.28, II.441.33], which are consistent with the latest accurate measurements.

After these developments, and with the advent of new technologies employed in making even more accurate observations, in addition to accelerated research in physics and astronomy, a whole new view of the cosmos finally replaced the ancient short-sighted ones. However, we cannot ever claim that all the questions have been answered and that we have drawn a fully correct picture of the cosmos. On the contrary, new sets of even more profound questions are still a riddle, such as dark matter and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox (see section 6.6).

Along with the vast amount of data collected by telescopes and space shuttles in recent decades, many new theories have arisen to try to explain those observations. The mere concepts of ‘time’ and ‘space’ were in focus especially after the strange and courageous ideas of Einstein about relative and curved space-time were proved by Eddington through the observation of the total eclipse of the Sun in 1918 in South Africa. Since then, other theories including Quantum Mechanics, the Field Theory, the Superstrings Theory, and Quantum Gravity Theory, have tried to discover and describe the actual relation between material objects and energy on one hand, and between space and time on the other hand. Yet no fully convincing view has ever been achieved.

1.2 Modern cosmology

Since Copernicus’ time, our view of the cosmos has grown both larger and more accurate. It is not our purpose here to explain the modern complicated theories of cosmology, but simply to summarize the present picture of the cosmos as seen by scientists. Our modern picture of the cosmos dates back only to 1924, when Edwin Hubble showed that our galaxy is not the only one in space; many of the faint spots of light that we see in the sky are in fact other galaxies as large as our own, but we see them so small only because they are extremely far deep in space.

Owing to the force of gravity, everything in the sky is moving or orbiting around some point in space. The Moon orbits around the Earth, and the Earth and other planets orbit around the Sun, which also orbits – along with other hundreds of thousands of millions of stars – around the centre of the Milky Way galaxy, which is in turn one of thousands of millions of galaxies all flying through the vast distances of space.

In order to give a clear spatial view of this immense universe, it is better to use big units of distance instead of using big numbers. The best accepted units of distance in cosmology are the ‘light year’ (9,500,000,000,000 metres), which is the distance travelled by light in one year, and the ‘parsec’, which equals 3.26 light years. Light travelling at 300,000 km/sec can go seven times around the Earth (which has a circumference of approximately 44,000 km) in one second, but it takes 8.33 minutes to reach us from the Sun (150,000,000 km). Proxima Centauri, the nearest star to us apart from the Sun, is about 4.24 light years away. Our galaxy, like most other galaxies, is a collection of about 200 billion stars plus thousands of clusters and nebulae that form together a disk of more than 100,000 light years in diameter, and that is about 15,000 light years

thick. The nearest galaxy to us lies in the Andromeda constellation, and it is about 2.9 million light years away. Then galaxies are grouped in somewhat irregular clusters that greatly differ in size from millions to hundreds of millions of light years. The most distant objects discovered so far are about 13 billion light years away. These numbers are simply approximate, just to give an idea of where we are (Hartmann 1990: 413).

It is now also well established that everything in the world is moving: nearby stars have proper motion, because they are pulled towards the centre of the galaxy, and galaxies are moving away from us, because the universe is expanding. On the other hand, and despite these various motions, the universe does not have a centre or edges. It is hard to imagine, but the universe is contained or curved around itself so that if you fly straight in one direction and keep moving in a straight line you will one day, if you live long enough, come back from the opposite direction to the same point (supposing no gravitational fluctuations), just as it would happen to a person travelling around the Earth.

The stars that we see in the sky are, just like our Sun, huge nuclear fusion reactors that are constantly converting hydrogen into heavier elements and hence producing heat and light. But not all stars are the same: some are big and some are small; some are young and some are old; some are bright and some are faint. Also, many stars are dying and many others are born all the time in a process of very complicated evolution (Seeds 1990: 134–281).

So how is all this explained according to the new cosmological theories? We can not discuss here all the different theories in physics and cosmology, but we want to make a quick summary of the basic principles of the different models of the cosmos so that we can understand the potential importance of the ‘Single Monad model’ which we are going to propose in the last chapter of this book, based on Ibn ‘Arabi’s unique understanding of time and his famous theory of the oneness of being.

1.3 Summary of modern theories of cosmology

After the amazing discoveries and the enormous amount of data obtained by telescopes and space shuttles, and with the success of the theories of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, scientists tried to build new cosmological models to explain the structure and origin of the universe on the basis of the new information. We shall give here a very short summary of the major theories of cosmology that have developed recently.

Scientists up to the beginning of the twentieth century believed in a stationary universe outside the solar system, but this was soon proved to be wrong. Actually the same theory that Einstein first tried to make fit a steady universe and fixed stars later proved that the universe is expanding. This implied that the universe had started at one moment, about 15 billion years ago, from a very small point, but with very high density, and then it expanded to its present state. This was called the ‘Big Bang’, and many cosmological models were developed on the basis of this view (Narlikar 1993: ch. 2, ch. 5).

The 'Steady State' theory tried to explain the expansion of the universe by supposing a continuous creation of matter that filled the space produced by the expansion, but the discovery of cosmic microwave background radiation in 1965 by Penzias and Wilson caused the Steady State model to be completely discarded. The background radiation was interpreted as the faint afterglow of the intense radiation of a 'Hot Big Bang', which had been predicted by Alpher and Hermann back in 1949, although some people also attribute it to Gamov back in 1946 (Dolgov *et al.* 1990: 11).

The problem with the background radiation was that all measurements showed it to be very uniform in all directions. This isotropy of the background radiation was a riddle because with homogeneity no stars or galaxies could be produced (Tayler 1993: 194). It was only in 1992 that NASA's Cosmic Background Explorer satellite (COBE) detected the first anisotropies in this background radiation: one part in a hundred thousand, which may indicate the seeds from which galaxies formed (Schewe and Stein 1992).

The Big Bang model was very good in explaining many of the observations, yet on the other hand there were many contradictions (Linde 1990: 4). Many of these theoretical contradictions were resolved by the 'inflationary scenario' devised by Alan Guth in 1979. Guth looked at a very early stage in the development of the universe from about 10^{-32} to 10^{-43} of a second after the initial creation. During this period matter was in very highly excited states, causing the most extreme conditions of high density and pressure which made the cosmos expand exponentially, filling the universe with an intense dense fire of particles and photons (Linde 1990: 42).

In classical (Newtonian) mechanics, one could predict the behaviour of a system if one exactly knew its initial state. But in Quantum Mechanics, we can only calculate the probability of how the system will evolve (White 1966: 29). In either case, however, the main problem in cosmology is to determine the initial state that the laws should be applied to. One successful approach to get round this problem is to work backwards by using the observed properties of the universe to deduce what it was like in an earlier state.

The problem with the inflationary theory is that, in order for inflation to have occurred, the universe must have been formed containing some matter in a highly excited state, but the next question is why this matter was in such an excited state. To overcome this, some scientists tried to apply Quantum Mechanics to the whole universe, and the result was the theory of Quantum Cosmology.⁴ This may sound absurd, because typically large systems (such as the universe) obey classical, not quantum, laws. Einstein's theory of General Relativity is a classical theory that accurately describes the evolution of the universe from the first fraction of a second of its existence up to now. However it is known that General Relativity is inconsistent with the principles of Quantum Theory, and is therefore not an appropriate description of the physical processes that occur at very small length scales or over very short times. To describe such processes we require the theory of Quantum Gravity.

In non-gravitational physics, the approach to Quantum Theory that has proved

most successful involves mathematical objects known as ‘Path Integrals’ that were introduced by the Nobel Prize winner Richard Feynman. In the Path Integral approach, the probability that a system in an initial state *A* will evolve to a final state *B* is given by adding up a contribution from every possible history of the system that starts in *A* and ends in *B*. For large systems, contributions from similar histories cancel each other in the sum and only one history is important. This history is the history that classical physics would predict. At any moment, the universe is described by the geometry of the three spatial dimensions as well as by any matter fields that may be present. Given this data, one can in principle use the Path Integral to calculate the probability of evolving to any other prescribed state at a later time. However, this still requires knowledge of the initial state.

Quantum Cosmology is a possible solution to this problem. In 1983, Stephen Hawking and James Hartle developed a theory of Quantum Cosmology which has become known as the ‘No Boundary Proposal’. In practice, calculating probabilities in Quantum Cosmology using the full Path Integral is formidably difficult and an approximation has to be used. This is known as the ‘semi-classical approximation’, because its validity lies somewhere between that of classical and quantum physics. In the semi-classical approximation, one argues that most of the four-dimensional (space-time) geometries occurring in the Path Integral will give very small contributions to the Path Integral and hence these can be neglected, so we can deal only with three dimensions (space). The Path Integral can be calculated by considering just a few geometries that give a particularly large contribution. These are known as ‘Instantons’ (from ‘the instant’, because it aims at omitting time, so it is like a snapshot that takes into account only the three co-ordinates of space), which describe the spontaneous appearance of a universe from literally nothing. In this way we do not have to think about the cosmos as something that takes place inside some bigger space-time arena. Once the universe exists, Quantum Cosmology can be approximated by General Relativity, so time appears.

Research in these areas is still ongoing, but one of the many outstanding problems in trying to construct a Quantum Field theory of gravitation concerns the appropriate interpretation of quantum states for configurations that make no overt reference to ‘time’. We shall see by the end of this book that Ibn ‘Arabî’s understanding of time could be a key to eliminating these peculiarities, because he simply views the world as an eternal existence that is perpetually being re-created. He also unified space and time in a manner that has apparently never been thought of before or since.

1.4 Preliminary outline of Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology

Ibn ‘Arabî (AH 560–638/AD 1165–1240) was a great Sufi thinker of the Middle Ages and one of the most influential authors in Islamic history, whose writings have deeply influenced Islamic civilization for centuries, and have more recently attracted wide interest in the West. The full name of Ibn al-‘Arabî (more com-

monly referred to in English without the definite article) is Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muhammad Ibn al-‘Arabī al-Hâtimī al-Tâ’î. He was born in Murcia (in eastern Andalusia), into a very pious and cultured family. When he was seven they moved to Seville, and at the age of 16 he ‘entered on the path’ (of Sufism). Then he travelled throughout and between Andalusia and Morocco for some years before a vision compelled him to go to the East. In 1201 he travelled to Cairo, al-Quds (Jerusalem), and finally to Mecca for pilgrimage. His many works eventually brought him fame, and sometimes notoriety, so that he was eventually sought out by Seljuq and Ayyubid princes and accompanied by a group of disciples. Later on he came to be popularly called *Muhyī al-Dīn* (‘Reviver of Religion’) and *al-Shaykh al-Akbar* (‘the Greatest Master’). He continued travelling throughout the Middle East until he settled in 1224 in Damascus, where he remained until his death in 1240.⁵

Ibn ‘Arabī’s two most famous and influential works are *Al-Futūhāt Al-Makkiyya* (*The Meccan Illuminations*), an encyclopaedic discussion of Islamic wisdom (Nasr 1964: 92–98), and the shorter *Fusūs al-Hikam* (*The Bezels of Wisdom*), which comprises chapters named after prophets who characterize different spiritual types. But Ibn ‘Arabī also wrote many other lesser known works, many of them now available in print, such as the *Kitāb Al-Tajalliyyāt*, *Tarjumān Al-Ashwāq*, *Mashāhid Al-Asrār Al-Qudsiyya*, *Mawāqī‘ Al-Nujūm*, *‘Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*, *Inshā’ Al-Dawā’ir* and *Al-Tadbīrāt Al-Ilāhiyya*, in addition to 29 shorter treatises published in the Hyderabad collection commonly known as the *Rasā’il Ibn ‘Arabī*, and many other shorter books and treatises. In one of his treatises, Ibn ‘Arabī himself listed 289 titles, which increase to 317 confirmed works when added to other titles he mentioned throughout his various books. More than 850 books have been attributed to him.⁶

Ibn ‘Arabī was not an astronomer, and was never interested in astronomy as a science. But as a Sufi and mystical theologian constantly inspired by the cosmological teachings and symbolism developed throughout the Qur’an and in a number of related Hadith (Prophetic sayings), he talks about planets and orbs and their motion as a structure Allah created on His Image (see section 3.2) and relates them to the divine Names. He uses cosmology to refer to the ways we acquire more knowledge of Allah. Apart from a few short treatises where he talks about some astronomical subjects mixed with philosophy and theology, Ibn ‘Arabī did not devote any special book to describing the heavens. Nevertheless, in his major book *al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya* (henceforth referred to as ‘the *Futūhāt*’), for example, we find many paragraphs that can be used to illustrate his profound view of the cosmos.

It can surely be said that Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of the cosmos is truly challenging, even as compared to the latest modern theories. For example, he clearly declared that the stars are not fixed at all, more than seven centuries before this was scientifically known, and he explained why we do not see their motion. Moreover, he gave numbers to the average velocities of the proper motion of stars as 100 years per arc degree, which is quite consistent with the measurements taken only few decades ago [III.548.28, II.441.33]; indeed he even used exactly the same unit of

measurement now being used (Smart 1977: 249) at a time when no such measurements were possible at all. He also explained the observed 'retrograde motion' of some planets and the formation of the planets in the solar system in a similar manner to what is widely accepted today [II.443.24, III.203.21]. But most important in this regard is that his view of the world is heliocentric, similar to what Copernicus suggested many centuries afterwards. He also clearly affirmed that the Earth is spherical, moving and rotating, and he also explained why people do not realize the motion of the Earth around its centre [I.123.17, II.441.33, III.548.21].

Ibn 'Arabî's unique understanding of the process and reality of ongoing creation has been discussed by many scholars in some details. Ibn 'Arabî himself mentioned in particular a number of key cosmological developments in chapter 371 and in the very detailed chapter 198 of the *Futûhât*, as well as in other cosmological books such as *Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir*, *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya* and *'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*. William Chittick has devoted an immense volume called *The Self-disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-'Arabî's Cosmology* (this will be abbreviated as *SDG*) specifically to Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology and ontology, in addition to some chapters of other books like *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabî's Metaphysics of Imagination* (this will be abbreviated as *SPK*), and also Henry Corbin discussed some aspects in his pioneering study, now entitled in English *Alone with the Alone. Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabî* (Corbin 1969: 184). Here we want to give a very short summary of Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology, in a way somewhat different from the approach followed by Chittick and Corbin. We only want to give a general description of his cosmological views, without too much further analysis and explanation, so that we can concentrate on the central subject of time in the rest of the book. Also we will leave the discussion of the ontological aspects of his cosmology to the following chapters (see in particular section 3.3). Here in the following we shall use the same figures Ibn 'Arabî drew in chapter 371 of the *Futûhât*, and the following broad cosmological account is mainly drawn from that chapter [III.416–448], along with a few paragraphs taken from the long chapter 198 [II.390–478] of the same work.

Ibn 'Arabî's universe comprises both the material and the abstract, spiritual or noetic ('*aqlî*') worlds. He says that the main reason for creating the cosmos is 'Love'. In explaining this underlying principle he often refers to a famous divine saying (the 'Hadith of the Hidden Treasure')⁷ which states that Allah 'loved' to be known in order to grant the creatures the privilege of coming to know Him. Thus Allah's love to be known is a Mercy (*rahma*) from Him that He wanted to grant to all His creatures. This Mercy is the first state of the presence of Allah with regard to the world to be created, and hence it formed the abstract place (or 'space') in which creations would appear. Following indications in another Prophetic Hadith, Ibn 'Arabî calls this abstract place *al-'amâ* ('the Cloud').⁸ According to his account, the reality of *al-'amâ* accepted the forms of the 'Roaming Spirits' (*al-arwâh al-muhayyama*) that Allah created directly, without any intermediaries. This direct creation caused these angelic Spirits to roam in the presence of Allah, knowing nothing but Him. They did not even know about

themselves (i.e. they had no self-consciousness). Allah appointed one of these spirits and granted him a special epiphany of divine Knowledge (*tajallī 'ilmī*) that engraved in him all that Allah wants to create in this entire cosmos until the Last Day. The other primal Spirits could not know about that. This initial epiphany caused this Spirit – which is then called the ‘Universal Intellect’ (*al-'aql al-kullī*) or the ‘First Intellect’ (*al-'aql al-awwal*) or also, using a central Qur'anic symbol, the ‘Higher Pen’ (*al-qalam al-a'ālā*) – to become aware both of himself and of the other Spirits, while they did not know about him.

Through this epiphany, the First Intellect saw himself composed of himself and of his further ability to realize or ‘intelligize’. He also saw that he has an ontic ‘shadow’ caused by the Light of that special epiphany, which was realized through the divine Name ‘the Light’ (*al-nūr*). This shadow is his ‘soul’, which is called the ‘Universal Soul’ (*al-naḥs al-kullīyya*) or the ‘First Soul’ (*al-naḥs al-ūlā*), or also the ‘Highest/Protected Tablet’ (*al-lawḥ al-a'ālā/al-mahfūz*), in which he is going to write what he knows is going to happen until the Last Day. The entire universe, then, is – to use a central Qur'anic symbolism – the ‘letters’ and ‘words’ of Allah that are produced through ‘the Breath of the All-Merciful’. We shall see in section 5.8 that the fundamental ‘blocks’ in the universe are ‘strings’ or vibrations (‘sounds’ or ‘notes’), which is similar to Ibn ‘Arabī’s notion of the hierarchy of the ‘men of breaths’ (*rijāl al-anfās*). Therefore it is not only a symbolism to say that the entire universe is the ‘letters’ and ‘words’ of Allah,⁹ and those words are continuously being written by the Highest Pen (the First Intellect) in the Highest Tablet (the Universal Soul). Figure 1.1 shows this Cloud and its contents down to the ‘establishing Throne’ (*'Arsh al-Istiḥwā*), which is different from the usual cosmological meaning of the divine (normal or usual) ‘Throne’. The ‘establishing throne’ is the throne on which ‘Allah established His authority’, alluding to the verse ‘*ar-Rahmān 'ala al-'arsh istawā*’ (20:5).

According to this account in chapter 371, the universe appeared in the Universal Soul through the Universal Intellect as the result of what Ibn ‘Arabī calls an ‘abstract (or ‘spiritual’) marriage’ (*nikāḥ ma'nawī*). This is because everything that happens as a result of to a particular cause is like a ‘son’ of this cause who is considered its ‘father’, and its ‘mother’ is the object where this ‘son’ appears or happens. Just as we are all (in our outer bodily dimension) the ‘children’ of Adam and Eve, all other things in the universe can be considered the ‘children’ of the Universal Intellect and the Universal Soul.

The Universal Soul has two forces mentioned in Figure 1.1: the ‘intellective force’ (*quwwa 'ilmiyya*) by which it perceives knowledge, and the ‘active force’ (*quwwa 'amaliyya*) by which it preserves its existence through motion. The first thing the Universal Soul gives rise to, as indicated in the same figure, is twofold: ‘the level of Nature’¹⁰ and the ‘Chaos’ (*al-habā'*: literally ‘the Dust’) or ‘the Prime Matter’ (*al-hayūlā al-ūlā*) [I.140.14]. From here on, Ibn ‘Arabī uses the symbolic conjugal imagery of the ‘wedding’ of generative elements and of ‘birth’ at each successive level of creation or manifestation. Thus the Universal Soul first begets Nature and then Prime Matter or Dust. Then Nature and Dust in




Figure 1.1 ‘The Cloud’ and what it contains, down to the ‘establishing Throne’.

Note

This diagram is translated from Ibn ‘Arabi’s drawing in chapter 371 [III.421].

turn beget their first ‘son’, which is called the ‘Universal Body’ (*al-jism al-kull*). This symbolic process of cosmic ‘births’ continues in a long and defined series of causes and results until it reaches the ‘soil’ (*turâb*) [I.140.17] which refers to physical matter in general. So the physical world appeared ‘after’ this Universal Body, while before that all was only spiritual.

As in Figure 1.3, the Universal Body seems to contain everything beneath it including the zodiac (with all the stars and galaxies). Alternatively, we can consider that the physical world is formed by (not ‘in’) the Universal Body because, like the Universal Intellect and Soul, this Body can be called the First Body because it was the first body to be created. In addition to that, the world both as material and spiritual is formed by the Single Monad through the continuous manifestations of this Monad. If we then consider that the First Body was the first ‘elementary particle’ to be formed by the Single Monad then the physical world is formed ‘by’ this First Body. The other possibility is that the Universal Body is

some sort of a huge cloud of matter in primary form, which then developed into stars and galaxies, in which case we could say that the physical world is formed 'in' the Universal Body. The first thing which was formed in (or by) the Universal Body was the 'Throne' (*al-'Arsh*) on which Allah established his authority (*istiwâ*)¹¹ from His Name 'the All-Merciful' (*al-Rahmân*), which means that all creatures beneath the Throne are to be granted the creative Mercy of their existence from Him. Therefore the first thing that the Highest Pen or First Intellect wrote in the Higher Tablet (the Universal Soul) was this 'Throne' in which the entire creation (the cosmos) is to appear. All this is shown in Figure 1.2.

Inside (or 'beneath') the divine Throne there appeared the 'Pedestal' (*al-Kursî*), whose relative dimensions and plenitude, in comparison to the infinitely vast noetic or spiritual dimension of the 'Throne', Ibn 'Arabî compares here to 'a tiny ring in a vast desert'. And within this 'Pedestal' is the 'Isotropic Orb' (*al-falak al-atlas*), which is shown to contain the sphere of the divisions of the




Figure 1.2 The establishing Throne and what it contains down to the Pedestal.

Note

This diagram is translated from Ibn 'Arabî's drawing in chapter 371 [III.422]. We give the title as it is in the original text, though the diagram shows the Prime Matter and the Universal Body, in addition to the Throne down to the Pedestal.

zodiac (*falak al-burûj*) and the sphere of the stars (*al-falak al-mukawkab*), including beneath them the separate orbs of the five planets, Sun, Moon, and the Earth. All this is shown in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4.

The Isotropic Orb or sphere is so called because it contains no stars nor yet any distinguishing feature; it is homogeneous in all directions. The sphere of the zodiac was the first orb to be created inside the Isotropic Orb, and its surface was divided by human convention into the 12 equal parts that are traditionally assigned to the various zodiacal signs. According to the diagram in Figure 1.3 and Ibn ‘Arabî’s comments on it in chapter 371 of the *Futûhât*, it is evident that he was ware of the large distances between the galaxies because the fixed stars are in our galaxy while the zodiac signs are other galaxies placed very far away. In this fast space Allah created the seven paradisiacal ‘Gardens’ (*al-jinân*, s. *janna*) named in the Qur’an, with their different states and levels marking the symbolic ‘meeting-place’ between the purely spiritual realities of the divine





Figure 1.3 The (divine) Pedestal and what it contains down to the constellations.

Note

This diagram is translated from Ibn ‘Arabî’s drawing in chapter 371 [III.423].



The semi spherical skies that seem to be supported on the seven earths are to show the spiritual relation between heaven and earth. Otherwise, Ibn Arabî is fully aware of the spherical shape of earth. The Pillar also has a spiritual meaning, it is the Perfect Man.

Figure 1.4 The orb of the constellations and what it contains down to the Earth.

Note

This diagram is translated from Ibn 'Arabî's drawing in chapter 371 [III.424].

Throne and the 'sensible' realities in the realm of the Pedestal. The specific names of each of the seven Gardens are taken from related verses in the Qur'an and Hadith, and they are different from the Seven Heavens or Skies (*samawât*) which are, for Ibn 'Arabî, the same seven celestial spheres where the five known planets plus the Moon and the Sun are, as shown in Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.3. The word '*al-Wasîla*' that twice crosses all the seven Gardens (in Figure 1.3) corresponds to 'the highest level in (the highest Garden of) Eden, and it belongs (specifically) to the Messenger (Muhammad) of Allah' [I.319.14, also see I.658.30]. It is also known as '*al-maqâm al-mahmûd*' ('the commendable station'), and it was called '*al-Wasîla*' ('the Intermediary', or 'the Way (of Approach to Allah)') because 'through It Allah may be approached' [II.87.9].

Then beneath the seven Gardens comes the orb of the (apparently) fixed stars, the constellations, and the 'houses' or 'mansions' (*manâzil*) of the Moon.

However, Ibn 'Arabî maintained that those stars are not fixed at all, but that our human time-scale is too short to notice their motion [II.441.33].

The orb of the fixed stars is (also conventionally) divided into 28 constellations or 'houses' through which the Moon appears to pass. Then inside this sphere of the stars, Allah created the 'seven (visible) heavens' (*al-samawât*) and the Earth. And here Ibn 'Arabî again points out that in relation to the divine 'Pedestal' (*Kursî*), the dimensions of our Earth together with the seven visible heavens are like a ring in a vast desert – just as the Pedestal stands in that same relation to the immensity of the divine Throne.

Then Ibn 'Arabî speaks at length (chapter 371 of the *Futûhât*) on the states and levels of the Gardens and Gehenna and other descriptions of the other world (*al-âkhira*). Here, however, we shall restrict ourselves to this very short summary of a few general relevant cosmological points, because of our focus on the concept of time.

First, we should note that Ibn 'Arabî, following normal Arabic usage, also calls the Sun and the Moon 'planets'. But at the same time he clearly distinguishes between the nature of the planets (including the Moon) and the Sun itself, observing that the Sun alone 'is responsible for illuminating all other planets above and below' [II.170.22]. As is normal in Arabic writings (including astronomical ones), he also calls the stars by the same term as 'planets' (s. *kawkab*), yet he also knows that those stars are like the Sun in that they emit their own light [I.217.18].

A first quick reading of Ibn 'Arabî's texts about the world might reveal the same traditional Aristotelian (geocentric) cosmological world-view because, like most other ancient cosmologies (and apparently the Qur'an and Hadith), he talks about 'seven (celestial) heavens' around or above the Earth, each inhabited by a planet (including the Sun and the Moon, as shown in Figure 1.4). But Ibn 'Arabî stresses in many places [III.548.21, I.123.17, II.441.33] that this is only the apparent view for a person who is sitting on the Earth, thus distinguishing between this apparent earthly view and the actual motion of the planets and stars themselves. So, for Ibn 'Arabî, Aristotle's view is a view of the world 'as we see it . . . while in itself it cannot be described like that' [III.548.31]. He stresses the central position of the Sun which he considers to be in the 'heart' (centre) of the seven heavens, and he emphasizes the superiority of the Sun over other planets that are even above it with relation to the Earth: 'So the elevation of this place (the Sun's orb) comes from its being the heart of orbs, so it is a high place for its status and the orbs that are above it in distance with relation to our heads, are still below it in status' [III.441.33]. His actual view of the (local) world is therefore in some sense 'heliocentric', at least in relation to the unique central status or 'rank' (*makâna*) of the Sun.

As for those areas of the sphere of the fixed stars and the visible constellations normally specified by the 12 signs of the zodiac or the 28 houses of the Moon, Ibn 'Arabî considers them as a mere convention, which do not necessarily relate to the actual positions of those particular stars. He says: 'The zodiac (constellations) are approximate positions, and they are houses for the moving

planets' [III.37.27]. And for the Moon he says that 'those stars are called "houses" because planets move through them, but otherwise there is no difference between them and other stars that are not houses. . . . They are only assumptions and proportions in this body (of the sky)' [III.436.30].

On the other hand, we cannot strictly separate the material world from the abstract or spiritual world, as they are really overlapped – or rather, all of the material worlds (of the 'Pedestal' and the visible heavens and Earth below) are effectively contained within the immaterial divine 'Throne'. This is why Ibn 'Arabî sometimes mixes the two views: for example he drew a pillar to refer to the Perfect Human Being, whom he considers to be the 'image of the Real' (i.e. of God) in the cosmos, so that without him the cosmos would collapse. He also speaks, following scriptural symbolism, about the seven heavens as being 'supported' on the seven (levels or regions of the) earths. But Ibn 'Arabî does not consider that to be the actual physical picture of things, because he clearly states that the Earth is spherical and that it rotates around its centre: 'but the motion of the Earth is not apparent for us, and its motion is around the middle (centre) because it is a sphere' [I.123.17]. He even nicely explains why we do not feel the motion of the Earth and the cosmos in general (stars). For example he says that people and most other creatures do not feel the motion of the cosmos because it is all moving so the witnessed dimensions don't change, and that is why they imagine that the Earth is stationary around the centre [II.677.21].

1.5 Time in philosophy and science, introduction

Everybody feels time, and most people do not question it because they experience every day and it is so familiar (Fraser 1987: 17–22). But if we want to understand the nature of time we have to answer many basic questions such as:

- What really is time?
- Can we stop it?
- Can we reverse it?
- Is the flow of time universal or is it related to the observer?
- When was the beginning of time, and does it have an end?
- Does time exist objectively, or is it only a construct of our imagination?
- What is the relationship between time and space?
- What is the structure of time?
- Is time continuous or discrete?
- What does the word 'now' or 'moment' mean?
- Why does time move into the past?
- What is the reality of the future?

These and many other similar questions have been the subject of philosophy, physics and cosmology for many centuries, with little progress in finding convincing answers. The question: 'What is time?' is more like the question: 'What is love?', because it is something that everybody can feel it, but no one can give

an exact definition of it. If you ask this question to many people, you will certainly get as many answers. St Augustine, in his *Confessions*, asks, 'What is time?' When no one asks him, he knows; when someone asks him, however, he doesn't know (*EP*, 'Time', VIII, 126).

The understanding of time was very important for early people both from the practical view, where they needed to anticipate major events such as floods and harvest time, and from the philosophical view, which is based on sheer curiosity and love of knowledge. Many religions and ancient philosophies, therefore, have tried to answer some questions about time. Some of these religions and philosophies consider time as circular with no beginning or end, some consider it as linear with infinite extension in the past and in the future, and others consider it as imaginary, while real existence is for motion or moving bodies only.

The concept of time is necessary when we ask about the chronological order of things and the duration of events. And because our life is full of events of all types, so time has its signature in all aspects of life. Some examples are: the ageing process in biology, timekeeping in mechanics, the arrow of time and entropy in thermodynamics, and the radically varying psychical time that one feels when waiting for something or in other circumstances. Therefore, in order to understand the reality of time, one needs to explore many closely related fields like physics, biology, psychology and cosmology.

In recent centuries, with the revolutionary new concepts in physics and cosmology in addition to modern technology, increasing accuracy of timekeeping became very important because it is the reference for the extremely complicated motions – of the different parts of a machine for example – that have to work together in coherence. The critical importance of timing events both on Earth and in space was enhanced by precise timekeeping machines like electronic clocks, atomic clocks, and pulsars which are fast-rotating stars that emit short radio pulses at regular intervals with extremely high precision. But despite the new abstract concepts about time like 'time travel' and the 'curvature of time' brought about by the theory of Relativity, our modern concept of time has usually remained quite practical because everything has to be done according to the clock. In fact, the modern theories of physics and cosmology have added more questions and paradoxes about time than they answered (Grünbaum 1971: 195–230).

In general we can detect two major opposing views in the philosophy of time:

- 1 the rational (realistic) view based on the physical understanding of the world
- 2 the idealistic (perhaps apparently 'irrational') view based on metaphysics.

Rationalists believe that the mind is the most powerful force of humankind and is able to understand everything in the world, while the irrationalists consider the world, including time, as something beyond the capabilities of our minds. For the idealist, nothing, including time, exists independently of the mind. Therefore the idealist believes that time is a construct of our mind and does not have a separate existence.

1.6 Time in Greek philosophy

Since the age of Homer, the Greek word *chronos* has been used to refer to time. Chronos was a Greek god who feared that his sons would take over his kingdom, so he ate them one after the other – just like time, which brings things into existence and then overtakes them.

We can already detect two clearly opposing views about time in the contrast between Plato's and Aristotle's schools of thought. Plato considers time to be created with the world, while Aristotle believes that the world was created in time, which is an infinite and continuous extension. Plato says: 'Be that as it may, Time came into being together with the Heaven, in order that, as they were brought into being together, so they may be dissolved together, if ever their dissolution should come to pass' (Cornford 1997: 99).

Aristotle, however, believes that Plato's proposition requires a point in time that is the beginning of time and has no time before it. This notion is inconceivable for Aristotle, who adopts Democritus' notion of uncreated time and says: 'If time is eternal motion must also be eternal, because time is a number of motion. Everyone except Plato has asserted the eternity of time. Time cannot have a limit (beginning or end) for such a limit is a moment, and any moment is the beginning of a future time and the end of past time' (Lettinck 1994: 562).

Thus time for Aristotle is a continuum, and it is always associated with motion; as such, it can not have a beginning (Lettinck 1994: 241–259, 361). Plato, on the other hand, considers time as the circular motion of the heavens (Cornford 2004: 103), while Aristotle said that it is not motion, but rather the measure of motion (Lettinck 1994: 351, 382, 390). Aristotle clearly relates rational time and motion, but the problem that arises here is that time is uniform, while some motions are fast and some slow. So we measure motion by time because it is uniform – otherwise it cannot be used as a measure. To overcome this objection, Aristotle takes the motion of the heavenly spheres as a reference, and all other motions, as well as time, are measured according to this motion (Badawî 1965: 90). On the other hand, Aristotle considers time as imaginary because it is either past or future, and both do not exist, while the present is not part of time because it has no extension (Lettinck 1994: 348).

We shall see in Chapter 2 that Ibn 'Arabî shares with Aristotle the idea of a circular endless time and that it is a measure of motion, but he does not consider it as continuum. On the other hand, Ibn 'Arabî agrees with Plato that time is created with the world. In fact Plato was right when he considered time to be created, but Aristotle refused this because he could not conceive of a starting point to the world nor to time. Only after the theory of General Relativity in 1915, which introduced the idea of 'curved time', could we envisage a finite but curved time that has a beginning. By this we could combine Plato's and Aristotle's opposing views. However, Ibn 'Arabî did that seven centuries before, and he also explicitly spoke about curved time a long time before Einstein.

1.7 Time in earlier Islamic philosophy

Muslim philosophers were in general greatly influenced by their Hellenistic predecessors, and therefore tried to apply their theories of time in relation to the related issues raised by the Qur'an and Prophetic Hadith. Many Muslim philosophers prior to Ibn 'Arabî, such as al-Kindî, al-Fârâbî, al-Râzî, al-Ghazâlî, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna), analysed and criticized or adapted the differing conceptions of time in the schools of Greek philosophy represented by Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus (Badawî 1965).

For example, al-Ghazâlî,¹² in his famous *Refutation of the Philosophers* (*Tahâfut al-Falâsifa*),¹³ dealt with most of the standard philosophical and logical arguments regarding time and creation, and his criticism was also thoroughly discussed in Ibn Rushd's famous philosophical rebuttal, the *Tahâfut al-Tahâfut*.¹⁴ However, one of the most influential Muslim philosophers who had many original views about time is Ibn Sînâ, who devoted long chapters in several works to discussing time and related issues according to the views of kalam theology and of previous philosophical schools.¹⁵

Ibn Sînâ¹⁶ started by summarizing the metaphysical positions of all previous (Islamic and other) philosophers¹⁷ and then criticizing their different ontological views. Although Ibn Sînâ, like Aristotle, closely relates time and motion, he stressed that motion is not the amount of time. He based his argument on the fact that different distances can be cut in the same time, or that the same distance can be done in different times, either owing to the difference in velocity or owing to stops on the way.¹⁸ But ultimately he does define time by motion, though he adds distance to overcome Aristotle's difficulty regarding periodicity (see previous section). He says that time 'is the number of motion when it separates into before and after, not in time but in distance, otherwise it would have to be periodical' (Nasr 1978: 224–226).

On the other hand, although Avicenna doubted the existence of physical time, arguing that time 'exists' in the mind only as a result of memory and expectation, he also showed that time is also real in the sense that it exists through motion which relates to physical matter; time is real, but it does not have a stand-alone essence, since it exists only through the motion of matter.¹⁹ On the issue of the structure of time, Ibn Sînâ affirms that it is a continuous quantity, since he (like Aristotle) considers time to be the amount of circular motion which is continuous, and thus time is divided only by our mind's illusion into 'moments' or 'instants' (*ânât*).²⁰

On the other hand, the proponents of kalam theology, particularly the Ash'arites,²¹ on the basis of their atomist view, consider time to be discrete, and they also talked about the re-creation of the world in time. Ibn 'Arabî acknowledges the positive insights in their position, but he also criticized their view as being incomplete (SPK: 97). We shall discuss Ibn 'Arabî's own view in detail in sections 2.8 and 5.6 below.

At the earliest stage of Islamic philosophy, the philosopher and mathematician al-Kindî²² was generally affected by Aristotle and adopted his view that

time is the number of motion.²³ However, arguing from the general Qur'anic principle that Allah is the One Who created the world, he asserted that the material world cannot exist *ad infinitum* because of the impossibility of an actual infinite. Therefore, he argued, the world requires an initial 'generator' (*muhdith*) who could generate it *ex nihilo*.

The famous Muslim physician and Neoplatonist al-Râzî,²⁴ on the other hand, seems to have adopted Plato's notion (in the *Timaeus*) that time is 'the moving form of eternity', as well as Plotinus' notion that time is eternal; therefore he refused Aristotle's view of the unreality of time.

The influential philosopher al-Fârâbî,²⁵ on his part, focused on the metaphysical aspects of time. He also adopted Aristotle's view when he said: 'only the circular motion is continuous and time is related to this motion' ('Abdul-Muta'âl 2003: 113). But similarly to Ibn 'Arabî, al-Fârâbî apparently also believed that the world is contingent or 'possible to exist' before its actual existence. Otherwise, if it were 'impossible' it would not exist, or if it were 'necessary', it would have always been. Then he stresses that the world *as a whole* is in continuous formation (*takwîn*) and corruption (*fāsād*) 'in no time', while the parts of the world are forming and deforming in time ('Abdul-Muta'âl 2003: 115). This outlook is also similar to Ibn 'Arabî's view (see section 2.3). To explain this important point we give the following illustration. If a young physicist was asked to describe the general state of a mountain, he or she might end up with some equations without any reference to time, because the mountain is rigid. But if we ask him or her to include in his study the fact that the mountain is part of the Earth which is rotating around its axis and orbiting around the Sun, and also the fact that the atoms in the rocks never rest, or even the motion of the insects and other animals that might be living there, as well as the motions of the wind, waters ... etc. – then in that case the physicist might need to invent some new mathematics in order to be able to include the time parameter properly in his or her equations, even after making many approximations. So because we live 'inside' the world we feel time, but the entire world itself is out of time.

Many other schools of Islamic thought have speculated on the issue of time. It is good to notice, however, that in the Qur'an itself Allah never makes any direct reference to the usual Arabic word for 'time' (*zamân* or *zaman*), although many other time-related terms later explored by Ibn 'Arabî – such as the year (*sana* and *'âm*), month (*shahr*), day (*yawm/nahâr*) and night (*layl*) – were mentioned very often in the Qur'an, in addition to some divine Names that are related to time such as the First (*al-awwal*), the Last (*al-âkhir*) and the Age (*al-dahr*).

As already noted in our Introduction, with all the hundreds of books and recent studies that have been written about time in Islamic philosophy, both in Arabic and in other languages, it is very strange almost none has ever focused on Ibn 'Arabî. Many scholars have studied and compared the different theological, philosophical and physical views of time and existence, so briefly summarized above. However, none of these studies has ever, to the best of our knowledge,

treated Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique concept of time, although – as we shall discover – it is actually the key to understanding his controversial theory of the oneness of being. The reason for this strange neglect could be not only his difficult and symbolic Sufi language but also the fact that his concepts are intentionally dispersed throughout his many writings and not plainly stated in one place, as most other authors do. In fact, Ibn ‘Arabî mentions in the *Futûhât* [I.141.13] that he wrote a treatise with the title of ‘*al-zamân*’ (‘time’) where we would expect to read at least an extensive summary of his view of time. However, apparently this precious work has been lost, although *al-Futûhât al-Makkiyya* seems to include most of his doctrine regarding time and other related cosmological issues.

1.8 Time in Western philosophy

Aristotle’s notion of circular time, based on an eternal (uncreated) universe, could not generally be accepted by most theologians of the three Abrahamic religions – Islam, Christianity and Judaism – in so far as they considered time to be linear, with a definite created beginning and end. St Augustine, and later Thomas Aquinas, objected to Aristotle’s belief that time is circular, insisting instead that human experience is a one-way journey from Genesis to Judgement, regardless of any recurring patterns or cycles in nature. This latter view was later adopted by Newton in 1687, when he represented time mathematically by using a line rather than a circle.

As we noted above, there was already an earlier debate in Greek philosophy as to whether time exists objectively, or is just constructed by our minds. Puzzled about time, St Augustine concludes that time is nothing in reality, but it exists only in the mind’s apprehension of that reality (*EP*, ‘Time’, VIII: 126). On the other hand, Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome both said that time exists in reality as a mind-independent continuum, but is distinguished into earlier and later parts only by the mind. Isaac Newton considered time (and space) as an independent quantity that exists and flows regardless of matter or mind, a view which Leibniz strongly criticized. Leibniz argued that if space is distinct from everything in it, it would have to be completely uniform and homogeneous; thus he reached the conclusion that it is unreal and relative, in anticipation of Einstein’s Relativity, though he never put that insight into the form of mathematical equations (Ross 1984: 47).

Newton also rejected Aristotle’s linkage between time and motion, when he said that time is something which exists independently of motion and which existed even before God’s creation. He argued that time, and space are an infinitely large ‘container’ for all events, and that the container exists with or without the events: this is called the ‘absolute’ theory of time. Leibniz, who adopted the relational view, objected to that and argued that time is not an entity existing independently of events.

In the eighteenth century, Kant said that our mind structures our perceptions so that space always has a Euclidean geometry, and that time has the structure of

the infinite mathematical line (Kant 1998: 158–176). This view, however, lost its mathematical support with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries in the 1820s.²⁶ In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant presented, in the first antinomy, two equally plausible arguments that at the end lead to opposing conclusions: the first shows that the world had a beginning in time, while the other shows that the world had no beginning in time. For the second proposition, if we suppose that the world had no beginning in time, then this means that, at any particular moment of time, an infinite number of events have passed – but infinity may never be completed. On the other hand, if the world had a beginning in time, then all previous times before that beginning have been blank, and there is no any specific reason why the world should have begun at this time in particular. (The same argument was earlier used by Leibniz in support of his relational theory of time.) We shall see in section 2.3 how Ibn Arabî gets out of these riddles by criticizing the questions themselves and asserting instead that Allah created (and is continuously and recurrently creating, see section 5.6) the world and time together (Kant 1998: 462–463, 470–476, 490–495, 525–528, 536–538).

In a famous article in *Mind*, McTaggart also argued about the unreality of time. Events, for McTaggart, are capable of being ordered in two ways: either as past-present-future, which he calls A-series, or as ‘earlier than’-‘later than’, which he calls B-series. He then argues that A-series is contradictory, and that B-series does not give all that is essential to time, because time also involves change. The A-series view of time is contradictory because, as McTaggart argues, it will lead to the fact that each event can be described (at different times) by future, present and past, because events are always flowing from the future to the past through the present, so at some times an event may be future then it becomes present and then past; while in the B-series it is always before other events or after other events, no matter whether those events are future, present or past (Dyke 2002: 137–152).

On the other hand, there has also been a great debate as to whether time is continuous or a discrete quantity. Most Western philosophers think of time as a continuous quantity, but after the advent of Quantum Mechanics the idea of quantum time was revived, although Quantum Theory itself does not consider time to be ‘quantized’ (Mehlberg 1971: 16–71).

1.9 Time in modern science

Quantum Field Theory and General Relativity are the most well-established modern fundamental theories of physics. According to these theories, space-time is a collection of points called ‘space-time locations’ where physical events occur. Space-time is a four-dimensional continuum, with physical time being a distinguished, one-dimensional sub-space of this continuum, but no longer a separate entity nor space: space and time are always taken together as one entity.

In 1908, the mathematician Hermann Minkowski, Einstein’s teacher, was the first person to realize that space-time is more fundamental than time or than space alone. As he put it:

The views of space and time which I wish to lay before you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics, and therein lies their strength. They are radical. Henceforth space by itself and time by itself are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality.

(Pais 1982: 152)

The metaphysical assumption behind Minkowski's remark is that what is independently real is what does not vary from one reference frame to another. It follows that the division of events into the past ones, the present ones and the future ones is also not independently real.

In contrary to the classical Newtonian view, time intervals depend greatly on the observer's frame of reference. In classical mechanics, and on the basis of common sense, if the time interval between two lightning flashes is 100 seconds on someone's clock, then the interval also is 100 seconds on your clock, even if you are flying by at an incredible speed. Einstein rejected this piece of common sense in his 1905 special theory of Relativity when he declared that the time interval (and the distance) between two events depends on the observer's reference frame. He says that every reference-body has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event (Einstein 1920: ch. 9). Thus each reference frame (or reference-body) divides space-time differently into its time part and its space part.

1.9.1 Curved time and the Big Bang

In 1922, the Russian physicist Alexander Friedmann predicted from General Relativity that the universe should be expanding. In 1929, Hubble's measurements of the redshift confirmed this prediction. Eventually astronomers concluded that about 12 to 15 billion years ago the universe was in a state of infinite density and zero size; this is the Big Bang theory referred to earlier in this chapter. So we might ask the simple question 'What was there before the Big Bang?' Astronomers, however, showed that the entire universe, including time and space, was created in the Big Bang, and because of the extremely high density of matter at that instant, the gravitational force was immense and the space-time was curved, or encapsulated around the point from which the Big Bang was ignited.

In physics and modern philosophy, descriptions of the Big Bang often assume that a first event is also a first instant of time and that space-time did not exist outside the Big Bang. But it is not clear if it is correct to call the Big Bang an 'event', because events must have space and time co-ordinates, but space-time started with the Big Bang itself. However, for the first time in science there is a mathematical description of the ontological relation between time and the universe. We shall see that this description is in good agreement with Ibn 'Arabî's own views on time (section 2.3).

However, there are serious difficulties in defending the Big Bang's implications about the universe's beginning. Current theories do not have any claims as to what might have happened before the Planck era (10^{-43} seconds after the Big Bang). It is expected that the theory of Quantum Gravity might provide information about that, and it may even allow physicists to speculate on what caused the Big Bang. But until now this area remains solely in the domain of theological and metaphysical speculation.

1.9.2 *The arrow of time*

Unlike physical space, physical time is inherently directional: it flows in one direction, from the future to the past; this is a necessary truth. In thermodynamics the arrow of time for the world is expressed through what is called the 'entropy', which is a description of the degree of order of a system; a highly ordered system is said to have smaller entropy, and vice versa. The world's entropy is always increasing (i.e. its order is decreasing): this is a free 'one-way ticket', and one has to pay dearly for the return. For example, the process of mixing hot water into cold water to get warm water is never reversed, though in principle we may think of some complicated machine that can do the reverse. The arrow of an irreversible physical process is the way it normally goes, the way it normally unfolds through time.

The problem with the arrow of time is that the variable time is symmetric in most equations of physical laws. This means that, if the variable t is replaced by its negative $-t$ in those laws, the result is still a law; the basic equations are unchanged. Some scientists theorize that the cosmological arrow of time will one day reverse direction when the force of gravity will halt the further expansion of the universe and start a collapse to its initial state, just like a movie played backwards (Price 2002: 19–56).

1.9.3 *Time travel*

One of the most fascinating consequences of the theory of Relativity is that it allows travel through time, just as one travels through distance. This has been employed by science fiction to produce many interesting films and science fiction stories.

Although reversing the direction of the 'arrow of time' still seems to be experimentally impossible, this happens quite often in dreams and in remembering past events. However, philosophers have been more interested in travel in physical time than in psychological time. On the other hand, we can also 'really' look at the past any time: by looking at the stars, where we actually see how they have been thousands and millions of years ago when the light that we see now was actually emitted by them. But this is still not like travel in physical time, which is conceivable now only in theoretical cosmology.

Although travel in time is possible and allowed according to the equations of Relativity, in many cases it violates logic and causes obvious paradoxes. There

are, however, different types of time travel, some of which are trivial. If you get on a plane on the Earth's surface and travel west, you will cross a time zone and instantly go back an hour, but all you have done is to change your reference frame. Also, if your body were quick-frozen in the year 2000 and thawed in 2050, then you would travel forward 50 years in clock time but only a few seconds of your biological time. This is, however, just a case of biological time travel, not a case of physical time travel.

One possible, and more genuine, way to travel through time is to fly at enormous speeds close to the speed of light. Einstein showed that travel forward in physical time is possible relative to the time of those who move more slowly than you. With this kind of relativistic time travel, you cannot return to the old present, but you can conceivably be present at the birth of your great-grandchildren. Travel backward in physical time is also possible only if nothing that has happened gets changed. For example, you cannot go back in time and prevent your parents from having any children (Arntzenius and Maudlin 2002: 169–200).

Another kind of time travel is caused by the curvature of time due to extreme gravity. If you fell into a black hole, then you would travel to a time after the end of the universe, as measured in a reference frame tied to Earth. Unlike the time travel in science fiction movies, this kind of relativistic time travel to the future is continuous, not abrupt. That is, as you travel to the future, you exist at all intervening times according to the stationary Earth clock. You do not suddenly 'poof' into existence in the year 4500; you existed during their year 4499, but your spaceship had not yet landed.

Going back to the past is probably possible, but there are significant difficulties yet to be overcome before we can be sure. In recent decades, mathematicians and theoretical physicists have described time machines, or at least universes containing backward time travel, that are consistent with Einstein's equations of general relativity. However, Stephen Hawking believes that all these time machines are ruled out by the laws of General Relativity.

For Ibn 'Arabî, time travel is possible and easily attainable without any paradoxical consequences. Such time travel, however, has no physical or biological effects on the traveller – see the discussion in section 2.7 below.

1.9.4 Quantum time

Regarding the question of 'instants' of time, time being a linear continuum implies that there is a non-denumerable infinity of them. This means that between any two instants there is a third; time is continuous. However, for times shorter than about 10^{-43} seconds, the so-called Planck time, science has no experimental support that time holds its continuousness. But physicists agree that General Relativity must fail for durations shorter than the Planck time,²⁷ though they do not know exactly how and what is the substitute.

The idea that space or time (space-time) could be discrete has been recurring in scientific literature recently, but its origins go back to ancient philosophies.

The new concepts brought about by Quantum Mechanics (e.g. the concept of indeterminacy or the uncertainty principle) suggested that space-time could be also quantized like energy. This was reinforced by the discovery of ultraviolet divergences in Quantum Field Theory (Zee 2003: 145–151), though many of the strange quantum concepts soon became acceptable aspects of continuum physics. In the 1980s, powerful computers inspired some new discrete thinking in physics. Complicated mathematical simulations performed on these super-computers paved the way for lattice theories to be applied to Quantum Mechanics, and included Quantum Gravity. In Quantum Gravity, Planck's length is a minimum size beyond which no accurate measurements can be performed.

Hawking, however, sees no reason to abandon the continuum theories that have been so successful. But it may be possible to invent a discrete structure of space-time without abandoning the continuum theories if the discrete-continuum duality can be resolved, just as the wave-particle duality has been resolved by Quantum Mechanics.²⁸

The practical methods of the quantization of time in modern scientific theories are based on some complicated mathematics such as lattice theories and cellular automata that are beyond the scope of this introduction (Wolfram 2002: 771). But it is good to note here that Ibn 'Arabî's quantization of time, as we shall see in section 2.8, is unique and is based on a broader cosmological view (of the oneness of being) such that discreteness and continuousness are special cases of it (see also section 7.5).

1.10 Introducing Ibn 'Arabî's view of time

As we shall see in Chapter 2, Ibn 'Arabî considers time to be imaginary and without real existence; it is only a tool used by the mind to chronologically arrange events and the motion of the heavenly spheres and physical objects. Ibn 'Arabî then distinguishes between two kinds of time: 'natural time' and 'paranatural time'. He also explains that the origin of this ultimately imaginary time is from the two forces of the soul: the active force and the intellective force.

Despite time being imaginary, Ibn 'Arabî considers it as one of the four main constituents of nature: *time*, *space*, the *monad* (*al-jawhar*), and the *form* (*al-'arad*). Like some modern theories, Ibn 'Arabî also considers time to be cyclic, relative and inhomogeneous.

Ibn 'Arabî then gives a precise definition of the 'day', the 'daytime' and the 'night' and generalizes that, in relation to all (real and imaginary) orbs or spheres, every orb has its own 'day' and those days are measured by our normal day that we count on the Earth.

On the other hand, Ibn 'Arabî gives special importance to the cosmic 'Week', and says that the seven cosmic week-Days are unique and not alike. Saturday (*al-sabt*) in particular has a special importance, because he considers it to be the 'Day of eternity', so that the observable week days, including Saturday itself, are therefore happening in Saturday! This initially may look rather confusing, but it should become easier to understand, especially after we explain Ibn 'Arabî's

view of the re-creation principle and his theory of the oneness of being which we discuss in detail in Chapter 5.

Finally, what is very important and unique about his view of time is that Ibn ‘Arabî considers time to be discrete: there is a minimum indivisible ‘day’ or ‘time’ – and thus, surprisingly, this ‘day’ is equal to the normal day itself which we live and divide into hours, minutes, seconds and much less than that! This conception at first looks very strange and ambiguous, but, in order to explain this, Ibn ‘Arabî introduces three kinds of days, depending on the actual flow of time that is not so uniform and smooth as we ordinarily imagine. The key point here is that Ibn ‘Arabî stresses that, according to the Qur’an, *only one ‘event’* should be happening every ‘day’ (of the actual days), and not many different events as we observe. To achieve his deeper understanding of this key Qur’anic expression, he reconstructs the underlying reality of the normal days in a special way from the different days of the actual flow of time, as we shall discuss further in Chapter 4.

Also on the basis of a number of key verses in the Qur’an, Ibn ‘Arabî says that the world ceases to exist instantly and intrinsically the next moment right after its creation, and then it is re-created again and again. We shall see that Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of time and how it flows is precise and unique; it has never been suggested or discussed by any other philosopher or scientist. This distinctive cosmic vision of ‘ever-renewed creation’, when added to the understanding of the actual flow of time based on the three kinds of days alluded to above, can be used to build a new unique model of the cosmos which we shall discuss in Chapter 6 and we shall discuss some of the consequences of this model in Chapter 7.

2 General aspects of Ibn ‘Arabî’s concept of time and days

*Time, if you investigate what it comes down to, is something verifiable;
Yet it is known (only) through (human) imaginations (awhâm),
Its power is like Nature in its effects,
Though the essence of both is non-existing.¹
Through it all things are determined,
While it itself has no existing essence by which it could be judged.*

[I.291.1–7]

We have seen in the previous chapter that time is one of the most important perennial problems in physics and cosmological philosophy. For the same reason, we find that Ibn ‘Arabî considers that a good understanding of time is the prime key to human spiritual realization. In this chapter we shall look at the various relevant aspects of Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of time. We want to give here some general descriptions of his ideas on time, and we shall focus on the important issues in the following chapters. For this reason there are many cross-references to following chapters where these ideas are explained in more detail.

2.1 What is time?

To start with, Ibn ‘Arabî declares that time is an imagined attribute that does not exist on its own; it has no separate physical or non-physical entity. He argues that ‘time in relation to us is like eternity in relation to Allah, and since eternity is a negative attribute² that does not exist on its own, so time in relation to the contingent world or the entire cosmos is (also) an imagined attribute that does not exist’ [I.291.28].

In his major book *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkiyya*, he says: ‘we showed in this book and in our book *The Time (al-zamân)* (OY, no. 838) that time is something that has no (real) existence’ [I.490.17]. Although this last book is not found today, Ibn ‘Arabî’s concept of time is developed in quite detailed fashion in the *Futûhât*, though it is scattered all around the book and not placed in specific parts, including even those chapters 59, 291 and 390 whose titles relate directly to time.

The concept of time is needed to compare the sequence of events or motion, but real existence is attributed only to the thing that actually moves, not to the abstractions of motion, time or space in which motion is observed:

And time and space are also a consequence of natural bodies, but time is something imagined that does not exist (in itself), but is introduced by the motion of orbs and localized things when we ask about them 'when'. So time and space do not exist in reality, but existence is to the things that move and still.

[II.458.1]

This is not only to say that 'motion', 'space' and 'time' do not have real physical existence, but they do not even exist separately in an abstract way: their existence is a mere illusion; it is only a projection of the human imagination (*wahm*).

It is not very easy to deny the existence of time, space and motion, since they are widely encountered in our experience of everyday life. However, Ibn 'Arabi is not the first one to propose this. We shall see below that Aristotle gives a very simple proof that time is not real. The real existence of motion and space, however, are far more unusual and intricate to disprove. Perhaps only Zeno (b. c. 488 BC) was brave enough to postulate the illusion of motion, and he composed many related riddles that are still logically unsolvable. The main idea behind Ibn 'Arabi's mysterious conceptions here is his controversial theory of the oneness of being, which we shall discuss throughout this book, especially in Chapter 5. But, clearly, if we suppose that the 'real' existence in the world is uniquely one, there would be no meaning to motion, and hence to time and space; or at least they would have to be redefined. We shall discuss in Chapter 7 that Zeno's paradoxes can be easily resolved according to Ibn 'Arabi's profound view of time under his theory of the oneness of being.

Coming back to time, we can say that it can be very easily shown that it is in fact imaginary. Aristotle says in his *Physics* that 'time consists of two parts, one of which has existed (and gone, i.e. the past), the other does not yet exist (i.e. the future), so how can something exists which is composed of what does not exist?' (Letting 1994: 348)

So if there is a *real* existence to time it will be in the *present* (the 'now'), not the past or the future. Aristotle then gives another argument that also the 'now' is not time. The present is not time, but it is rather a point in imaginary time, like a point on the line; although the line is composed of points, still each point is not a line.³ Likewise time is the sum of all present moments that exist only one by one, and each one present moment (alone) is not time. Time therefore is the mind's projection on the continuous presence from the future to the past through the present.

Similarly, Ibn 'Arabi gives a straightforwardly profound meaning of time. In the title of chapter 390 of the *Futûhât*, he says: 'the time of a thing is its presence' [III.546.16]. Then he explains that the time of the Lord is the 'servant' and the time of the servant is the Lord (*al-rabb*) [III.547.31], because the Lord

deserves to be given this name by the servant, since He would not be called 'Lord' if there are no servants to worship Him; likewise the servant deserves his name by (his relation to) the Lord. In the same way, when we say for example: 'Amr is the son of Zaid', this means, according to Ibn 'Arabî, that the time of the fatherhood of 'Amr is the sonhood of Zaid, and vice versa. Or in Ibn 'Arabî's own words: 'the time of the father is the son, and the time of the son is the father' [III.547.36]. That is why Ibn 'Arabî gave this chapter (390) the title 'The time of a thing is its presence, but I am out of time and You are out of time, so I am Your time and You are my time'. This means: 'I am Your presence and You are my presence.'

'Time' in the usual common sense is actually a tool used by our perception to classify the events or motion of objects chronologically; it would not have any meaning without motion or change. This is why we do not feel time while we are asleep; we have to look for some kind of a standard reference motion (the Sun, the Moon, the stars or a watch) in order to realize how much of time has elapsed since we went into deep sleep. Time, therefore, has no real absolute meaning; it is only used relative to something in order to describe its state of existence. This is why Ibn 'Arabî sometimes uses the words 'time' and 'state' as synonyms, as when he says: 'as you like (you can) say from the time of its existence, or the state (*hâl*) of its existence' [II.281.11].

So the real meaning of time is reduced to the existence of the world in the 'present moment', which has no duration or extension, because the future and the past are mere imagination. If we know that, Ibn 'Arabî declares, there is no problem to go along with people and say that 'time' is the daytime and night, or that it is a duration taken by the motion of objects, or it is comparing an event to another when someone asks about it by 'when?', because these definitions have been widely used and they are correct in relation to time, in the common sense [III.548.7]. As Ibn 'Arabî says in chapter 59 of the *Futûhât*, which is titled 'On knowing existing and assumed time', people have used the word 'time' (*zamân*)⁴ in many different ways: most philosophers, for example, use it as the duration taken by the motion of orbs. Muslim theological scholars, on the other hand, use it to order events sequentially. But generally *zamân* in Arabic means the night-time (*layl*), and the daytime (*nahâr*). Also Ibn 'Arabî himself sometimes uses the word *zamân* to mean the daytime and night [I.141.5]. But this is more than just a convention, because, as we shall see below and in the following chapter, the (divine) 'day' (*yawm*) is for him the main indivisible unit of time. So if time has any real existence it exists as the divine 'days' (of each real instant), not as the hours or seconds we conventionally use. It is also worth mentioning here that, unlike the day (*yawm*) or daytime (*nahâr*) and the night (*layl*), the word 'time' (*zamân* or *zaman*) was never used in the Qur'an.

Despite the fact that he considers time to be imagined and having no real existence, Ibn 'Arabî stresses that it is one of the four 'mothers (fundamental principles) of existence': the formable monad (*al-jawhar al-suwarî*),⁵ the accidental form (*al-'arad*),⁶ time (*al-zamân*) and space (*al-makân*).⁷ Everything else in the manifest world is combined of these four parameters [III.404.22]. He also

argues that those four parameters – together with another six categories that are derived from them: *fā'il*, *munfa'il*, *idāfa*, *wad'*, *'adad*, *kayf* – are enough to describe the state of everything in the world. Together these make up the familiar ten Aristotelian categories: i.e. substance (*jawhar*), quantity (*kamm*), quality (*kayf*), relation (*idāfa*), time (*matā*), place (*ayna*), situation or position (*wad'*), possession (*lahu*), or state (*jidda*), passion (*yanfa'il*) and action (*yaf'al*) – although the meaning of *jawhar* here is of course radically different from its usual Aristotelian usage, reflecting in this case the kalam inspiration of Ibn 'Arabi's terminology (*EP*, VI: 203, 'Al-Makûlât', and: *EP*, II: 46, 'Categories'). Yet those four 'mothers of existence', including the formable monad, in Ibn 'Arabi's distinctive conception of the oneness of being, are nothing but imaginary forms or reflections of the unique 'Single Monad' (*al-jawhar al-fard*) which is the only thing that can be described as having a real existence: all other things in the world are different forms of this Single Monad, including 'vision and the visible, hearing and the heard, imagination and the imaginable, thinking and the thinkable, . . . etc.' [III.404.12]. This latter concept reflects Ibn 'Arabi's controversial theory of the oneness of being.

The importance of understanding the reality of time is, therefore, to provide the link between the *actual* unity of this Single Monad and the *apparent* multiplicity of the witnessed world. That is why Ibn 'Arabi says that:

the knowing of time is a noble knowing through which eternity (*al-azal*) is truly known. . . . But only the Solitary Sages⁸ among 'the True Men' know it (eternity). This (reality) is known as 'the First Age' (*al-dahr al-awwal*) or 'the Age of ages' (*dahr al-duhûr*). From this eternity (*al-azal*), time comes into existence.

[I.156.34–157.1]

Therefore, we may summarize that time as we ordinarily experience it is defined by motion, and motion is defined by the different positions of the formable monads, and those monads are different states (times or instances) or forms of the Single Monad, which alone has a real existence.

2.2 Physical time and spiritual time

Ibn 'Arabi distinguishes between two kinds of time: physical or 'natural time' (*zaman tabi'i*) and spiritual or 'para-natural time' (*zaman fawq-tabi'i*). The first is used to compare the motion of bodies and orbs, while the latter is used to compare the changes in spiritual states, such as realizing and knowing. He explains that the existence of time does not necessarily require the existence of matter [IV.337.5], because there is time that is associated with material motion that is under the effect of Nature, and time that is associated with immaterial motion that is above the effect of Nature: i.e. in the spiritual world. Thus he says that 'you should know that some of time is above Nature and some of it is below Nature' [I.377.12], and he explains further by saying that the time that is under

Nature 'is defined by the motion of orbs . . . and the time that is beyond Nature is defined by (spiritual) states' [I.477.12]. So when Ibn 'Arabî says: 'and the origin of the existence of time is Nature, whose state is below the Universal Soul and above the Universal Dust' [III.548.19], this actually refers to natural time which is used to compare the motion of bodies and orbs – while spiritual time is used to compare the change of spiritual states, and its origin preceded the existence of the physical world.

We can fairly say that Ibn 'Arabî's conception of natural time is the time known in physics and cosmology, and that his spiritual time resembles what is called by many modern philosophers 'psychological time'. The psychological time is our feeling of time's passage even when everything around us is standing still, including ourselves: we feel this time because our inner state is continuously being updated through changes in our consciousness, unless we fall into deep sleep, as happened for example with the 'people of the cave' (*ahl al-kahf*) who stayed over three hundred years in deep sleep, yet when they awoke they thought it was like a day or part of a day (Qur'an 18:9–25, see also [II.9.21]).

Physical time seems to flow uniformly and continuously (at least locally), while psychological time depends greatly on the mood, as Ibn al-Fârid suggested nicely in one of his poems:

With her for me a year is like a glimpse,
and an hour of parting for me is like a year.
(Mahmûd 1995: 344)

Also Ibn 'Arabî says that 'minutes are years while sleeping' [IV.337.1], and we shall discuss this relative aspect of 'para-natural', psychic time in section 2.7.

2.3 The origin of the world

Many people ask questions like 'what is the age of the universe?' or 'when did the world begin?' And many cosmologists go along with these questions and give estimates for the age of the physical universe (today, usually about 15 billion years). Any answers to such questions will quickly lead to a modern version of the still-ongoing debate between Plato's and Aristotle's schools already mentioned in Chapter 1: i.e. whether time was created in or before the world, or vice versa; or whether they are both eternal. Many riddles and paradoxes quickly emerge out of this debate. For example, one may ask: if the world started at a certain point of time, why God chose that time in particular? Could the world have been created ten minutes before or after that designated time? And what was God doing or what was happening before the beginning of the world?

Ibn 'Arabî, however, shows that such questions are meaningless, because the world is created out of time, and time itself is part of that created world. Allah did not create the world in time, because nothing existed 'before' the world apart from Him Who is also out of time, and therefore the creation of the world can

not be compared to other events in time. The existence of the Creator precedes the existence of the world *logically*, and not chronologically, so it is like when we say 'the day starts when the Sun rises': there is no duration of time that separates sunrise from the start of the day [I.100.26, *Al-Masâ'il*, no. 25], but logically the day would not start if the Sun did not rise. The existence of Allah, Who is Pre-Existent (*Qadim* or *Azali*) and Self-Existent (*Qayyûm*), is a precondition – not a cause – for the existence of the world. Therefore, because the world was created out of time (not 'in' time), the above questions are invalid. All such questions use time phrases that have no meaning outside of that time which appeared in or with the world and not before it.

Ibn 'Arabi showed this clearly by explaining that:

The fact of the matter is that the existence of the Real is not determined (temporally or causally) by the existence of the world: not temporally before, with, or after, because temporal or spatial precedence with relation to Allah is confronted by the realities confronting whoever speaks about it factually – unless they say something by the way of illumination, as had been said by the Messenger, peace be upon him, or it was expressed in the (divine) Book. For not everyone is able to experience the unveiling of these realities. We can only say that the Exalted Real exists by Himself and for Himself; His existence is absolute, is not confined by any other than Him, and is not caused by something nor is He the cause of anything – But He is the Creator of causes and results, *the King, the Most-Holy One* (59:23), Who always is and has been.

The world exists *through Allah*, not by itself or for itself. Therefore the existence of the Real Who exists by Himself is a determining condition for the existence of the world, which would not exist at all without the existence of the Real. And since time can not exist without the existence of the Real and the (divine) Source (*mabda'*) of the world, therefore the world comes to exist 'in other-than-time'. So actually we can not say, in the true reality of things, that Allah existed before the world – because it has been established that 'before' is a time phrase, and there was no 'time' (before the existence of the world). Nor can we say that the world existed after the existence of the Real, since there is nothing (other than the Real) 'after' or 'with' the existence of the Real, because He caused (everything else) to exist and is making it and originating it (in the words of a famous hadith) 'while there was no thing (with Him)'.

So as we said, the Real exists by Himself and the world exists *through* the Real. But if someone governed by his imagination (*wahm*) should ask 'When was the world (created) after the Real?' we would say that 'when' is a time-question. But time belongs to the realm of relations (*nisab*, see: *SDK*: 35) and (as such) is created by Allah, but not like the creation of existence, because the realm of relations is created by (our human) 'estimation' (or consideration: *taqdîr*), not by the creation of what exists ... Therefore this question is not valid. So you should be careful how you ask, and do not be

veiled by the tools of (conventional human) expression from actually realizing and fully comprehending these realities in yourself.

So the only thing left is: (1) a pure and absolute Existence – not (one coming into existence) after non-existence – and that is the existence of the Real, may He be exalted! And (2) an existence (that only comes to be) after the non-existence of the essence of that existent thing itself – and that is the existence of the world. So there is not any comparability or (co-extensive) extension between those two existences, apart from that imagined, presumed one that is removed by (true) knowledge. So nothing is left of that (falsely supposed comparability of God and the world) but absolute Existence (of God) and determined existence (of the world), Active Existence (of God) and passive existence (of the world). This is what is given by the realities, and peace (i.e. that's all!).

[I.90.9, see also *Al-Masâ'il*, no. 90]

'The world' for Ibn 'Arabî is both spiritual and material, and as we have seen above there are two corresponding kinds of time, spiritual and physical. The spiritual world preceded the creation of the material universe (nature) as we know it (stars and planets), so there was spiritual time before the creation of the physical world. He indicates that spiritual time is necessary to describe the relation between spirits and the divine Names before the creating of the physical world. So in this respect Ibn 'Arabî does respond to the above-mentioned questioning about what was 'before' the creation of the physical world,⁹ but he still considers such questioning invalid beyond these two created realms of the world. In fact Ibn 'Arabî explains that the world has three distinctive ontological 'levels': '*alam al-mulk* or '*alam al-shahâda*, which is the visible world; '*alam al-malakût*, which is the realm of meanings; and '*alam al-jabarût*, which is the all-encompassing realm of the divine 'Imagination' (*barzakh*) [I.54.15, II.129.16]. But here and elsewhere he sometimes adapts the simplified reference (drawn from the Qur'an) to the two domains as the 'visible' and 'invisible' (see *SPK*: 14, 93, 129, 218, 223, 342, 360–361, 376, and also *Al-Masâ'il*, no. 150).

Actually, Ibn 'Arabî considers the age of the world (as spiritual and material together) to be infinite from both directions: i.e. it has always been and it will always be; it is eternal without beginning and eternal without end. However, this is not saying that the material (and even the spiritual) world is eternal, but the world has some sort of pre-existence in the foreknowledge of Allah, and Allah's knowledge is eternal in both directions. In addition, Ibn 'Arabî also considers those two ends to coincide with each other, so time as a whole is like a circle that can not be described to have a beginning or an end, but when we set a point (the present) and a direction (to the past or future) on this circle we define a beginning and an end [I.387.32, III.546.30]. We shall discuss the concept of circular and cyclical time in section 2.10.

Ibn 'Arabî – following Ibn Sînâ's familiar theological categories (Nasr 1964: 173–274) – divides all things, in terms of their type of existence, into three inclusive categories: necessary, possible (or 'contingent': *mumkin*), and impossible

[II.293.1, II.575–576]. Only Allah's existence is described as 'Necessary' or Self-Existent, while absolute non-existence is impossible. The world, on the other hand, is called 'possible' because it is *possible* to exist, but in order to actually come into existence it needs a determining cause (*murajjih*) who has to be pre-existent and self-existent, or none other than Allah.¹⁰ Therefore, the world (the possible) is originally non-existence (but not absolute non-existence, only a non-existence that is possible to exist) and it is always in need of Allah in order to bring it into existence. Thus it can be said – as in the long quotation above – that it exists *by* or *through* Allah, and not through itself. The difference between absolute non-existence and possible non-existence is that the latter exists (even before it comes into real existence) in Allah's Knowledge, and this foreknowledge is eternal because His knowledge is not other than Himself [I.300.32, II.114.15] (see also section 2.7).

So the world, spatial and temporal, eternally existed or was determined in Allah's knowledge, but it is continuously brought into real existence *ad infinitum*:

So when Allah brought the entities (into existence), He brought them for them not for Him. But (for Him) they are still as they were on their spatial and temporal states, with their different time and space (co-ordinates). So He reveals to them their entities and states little by little infinitely and successively. So the issue for Allah is one, as He said: *and Our Command is but one, as the twinkling of an eye* (54:50), and multiplicity is (only) for the countables themselves.

[I.162.22]

However, despite this pre-existence, we can not say that the world is eternal and only developed from one state to another. It is not exactly clear how Henry Corbin concluded that 'there is no place in Ibn 'Arabi's thinking for creation ex nihilo, an absolute beginning preceded by nothing' (Corbin 1969: 200), when Ibn 'Arabi started the *Futûhât* by saying: 'Praise be to Allah Who created things after (its being) non-existence' [I.2.3]. In *Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'* he also declares that 'the dependent existence (the possible) may only be after non-existence, otherwise it would not be a "possible" whereas it is possible, and it would not be an existence by the Self-Existent, while it is in fact an existence by the Self-Existent Who caused it to exist' (*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 133).

If Corbin means what we explained in the previous paragraph – i.e. that everything existed in the foreknowledge of Allah even before it really existed in the world – then we have to stress the difference between the essence or entity ('*ayn*) of a thing in God's Knowledge and its actual existence. William Chittick devoted a full chapter in his book *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* to explaining this important concept in Ibn 'Arabi's ontology (*SPK*: 77–143). The entities of the world are in Allah's foreknowledge eternally, but they are brought into existence – after they were not existing – one after the other. This is a very important distinction. Ibn 'Arabi continues by explaining that:

Everything is in need of Allah, the Exalted, for the *existence* of its essence (or entity: *'ayn*), not for its essence, because its immutable essence (*'aynuhu al-thâbita*, most widely translated as 'permanent archetype', see *SPK*: 83) is not determined in its immutability; it is not determined by a determiner, for there is no determination in eternity . . . so the existence of the possible may only be after non-existence, which means it was not, and then it is.

(*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 133, see also *Al-Masâ'il*, no. 143)

Actually we shall see later in section 5.6 that this intrinsic need by the 'possible' – i.e. of all the realms of creation – for Allah to bring it into existence continues to be necessary at every single moment, because the world is continuously brought into existence in ever-renewed forms (i.e. it is constantly '*re-created*').

However, it is still not easy for the human mind to imagine the existence of the created world (*al-muhdath*) and the eternal existence of Allah, the Eternal or Pre-existent (*al-qadîm*) without a reflection of some time separation. And even for Ibn 'Arabî the issue is not yet closed. As he suggested in the long passage quoted above, somehow understanding this mysterious point seems to be beyond normal human perception and requires a divinely inspired knowledge accessible only to rare individuals with the very highest spiritual attainments. This same difficulty caused many Muslim philosophers and other theologians to continue to speculate on many theories that Ibn 'Arabî disagrees with (*Kitâb Al-Azâl*: 8).

Ibn 'Arabî explains further the relation between the existence of God and the existence of the world in chapter 59 of the *Futûhât*, which is the same chapter in which he talks specifically about the topic of time. Ibn 'Arabî's argument presented at the beginning of this chapter is extremely complicated and very difficult to understand, even in its original language. However, because of its importance, we are obliged to translate it here, with some necessary explanations in parentheses.

At the beginning of chapter 59, after the opening poem quoted at the very beginning of this chapter, Ibn 'Arabî says:

You should know first that Allah, the Exalted, is *the First* (*al-awwal*), and there is no firstness (*awwaliyya*) to anything before Him nor to anything else – whether that exists through Him or independent of Him – with Him: but He is *the One* (i.e. the Unique; *al-wâhid*), Glory be to Him, in His Firstness. So there is nothing that is self-existent apart from Him, because He is *the All-Sufficient* (*al-ghanî*) in Himself, absolutely, and Independent of all other beings. He said: *and Allah is Self-Sufficient with respect to all the worlds* (3:97), and this is true according to both the intellect and revelation.

Therefore, the existence of the world came about by Allah either for Himself or for 'other' than Himself. Because if this 'other' was Himself it would not be 'other', and also if this 'other' was Himself He would be necessarily composed in Himself and the firstness would be to this 'other'; therefore this would violate our previous statement that there is no firstness to anything with or before Allah.

So if this 'other' is not Himself, then it would be either existence or non-existence. But it is impossible to be non-existence, because non-existence can not bring the world (from its non-existence) into existence because there is no any priority to any one of them (i.e. the world and this 'other' that is non-existence) to come into existence, since both of them are non-existence, and non-existence has no effect because it is null.

On the other hand, this 'other' can not be existence, because then it either exists by itself or not (i.e. through something else). And it is impossible that this 'other' exists by itself, since it has already been proved that there can not be two self-existent beings.

So it remains that this 'other' exists by something else, and the meaning of the possibility of the world is nothing but that it exists by something else. Therefore this 'other' is the world or (some part) of the world.

Also, if the existence of the world by Allah is due to 'something' without which the world would not exist – whether this 'something' is called 'will' (*irāda*), 'wish' (*mashī'a*), 'knowledge' (*ilm*) or anything you want which is required by the 'possible' in order to exist – then the Real would not (be able to) do anything without this 'something'. But that implies nothing but needfulness, which is impossible for Allah, because Allah is absolutely Self-Sufficient, since He is, as He said: *Self-sufficient* (Independent) *with respect to all the worlds* (3:97). And if it is claimed that this 'something' is the Essence Himself, then we say that it is impossible for anything to be 'in need of' itself, and since He is Self-sufficient in Himself, then this (false supposition) would lead to the same contradiction – i.e. being Self-sufficient and yet needful in Himself at the same time – and all this is impossible.

Therefore, since we have already disproved the existence of any 'other' (determining cause of the existence of the world), we conclude that the existence of the world, inasmuch as it exists through something else, is (causally) related to the Necessarily Self-Existent (*wājib al-wujūd li-nafsihi*: i.e. Allah or the Real), and that the essence ('*ayn*) of the 'possible' itself is the locus for the effect of the Necessarily Self-Existent's bringing the possible into existence. It can only be properly comprehended like this.

Hence (such intrinsic distinctions as God's) 'Wish' (*mashī'a*), 'Will' (*irāda*), 'Knowledge' (*ilm*) and 'Ability' (*qudra*) are (all) Himself – may He be exalted far above any multiplicity within Himself! Indeed His is *absolute* Unicity, and [in the words of the famous Sura 112, *al-Ikhlās*] He '*is the One* (*al-Wāhid*), *the Unique* (*al-Ahad*), *Allah the one on Whom all depend* (*al-Samad*); *He did not give birth* – for then He would be a preceding (cause); *nor is He born* – since He would then be a result; *nor is there any "other" equivalent* (*kuf*) *to Him*' – for in that case the existence of the world would be the result of *two* preceding causes, the Real and Its 'equivalent' – may Allah be exalted (above that)! So this is how He described Himself in His Book when the Prophet, peace be upon him, was asked to describe his Lord: then He sent down the Sura *al-Ikhlās* (just quoted here)

(according to the circumstances described in a hadith: *Kanz*, 4734) to get rid of all (supposed) sharing (*shirk*) with other than Allah, by those high qualities and descriptions. So there is nothing Allah negates in this Sura or approves, but those negations or approbations are some people's opinions about Allah.

[I.291.8]

The importance of this long paragraph comes from the fact that it shows the basis of Ibn 'Arabî's distinctive view of creation, the distinctive – and extremely controversial – view that many scholars have traditionally called 'the oneness of being (*wahdat al-wujûd*)', but which has been widely misunderstood. Ibn 'Arabî himself could not describe it plainly, simply because it is a reality whose direct perception depends not on logic, but – as Ibn 'Arabî stressed in the passage quoted at the end of section 2.1 – on a rare inspired experiential 'tasting' restricted to the spiritual elite of the 'Solitary Ones'. As soon as it is spoken, it is likely to be misunderstood. What Ibn 'Arabî tries to prove in the passages just quoted, as in many chapters of the *Futûhât* and other books, is that the existence of the world is solely dependent on the existence of the Real, Who is One and Unique – and that this ultimate dependence of the world on the Real is an essential property that accompanies everything in the world at all times. On the other hand, nothing was added to Allah through His creating the world, as for Him (in His Knowledge) the world is as if it is always there. We shall come back to this important issue of the oneness of being (especially in Chapter 5) as we continue our exploration of Ibn 'Arabî's view of time, because it is truly the key to understanding his cosmology and theology.

2.4 The origin of time?

If we can not speak about the origin of the world in time, we can still ask about the origin of time in the world. As Ibn 'Arabî pointed out, we can not ask when time began, because the word 'when' requires time to be defined beforehand. But we can ask *how* did time begin?

In response to this cosmological question, Ibn 'Arabî argues that both the natural and para-natural types of time have originated in the Universal Soul which has two forces: the active and intellective (*quwwa 'amaliyya* and *quwwa 'ilmiyya*). The active force is in charge of moving bodies and objects,¹¹ while the intellective force is capable of perceiving knowledge, or updating the soul's spiritual state. So physical time (i.e. that associated with physical objects) is that in which bodies keep moving to preserve their existence, and spiritual time is that in which human beings' Heart perceive knowledge from their Lord [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. Physical time, therefore, is originated from the active force of the Universal Soul, while spiritual time originates from its intellective force [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 7].

On the other hand, since natural (or physical) time is a consequence of material motion in Nature, it is originated with the isotropic orb which is the first orb

in Nature in which the first body was created (see section 1.4). When this isotropic orb (*al-falak al-atlas*), was created and started to move, its motion defined natural time. But because this orb is isotropic – the same in all directions – it is not possible to measure time in this orb alone, because there was nothing to compare its motion to it. And when Allah created the second orb that includes the farthest stars (galaxies) that are appropriately called fixed stars, the (apparent) motion of those stars in this orb defined the day as the complete revolution of this orb: ‘When Allah caused the higher orbs to move and He created days in the first orb (the isotropic orb) and defined it (the day) in the second orb which is the orb of the apparently fixed stars’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6].

However, as Ibn 'Arabî says, the motion of the isotropic orb was actually determined from above; it started when the first degree of Gemini was matching the divine ‘Foot’ on the ‘Pedestal’ (*kursî*)¹² above the isotropic orb, and after one complete revolution, the first cosmic ‘Day’ of creation was done, and that was Sunday. Then the process of divine creation continued through Monday, Tuesday, and so on until its initial completion on Saturday – and then it started over again [II.437.34]. Because this creative ‘Day’ was determined from above, it was not possible to know its duration [II.437.27]. It is true that we divide this day into 24 hours, but this is a mere convention. It is actually not possible to determine the length of this day because there is nothing else (in Nature) to compare its motion to, so we use this day to measure other relative ‘days’ of other orbs that are below the orb of fixed stars, and also the ‘days’ of the spiritual (and divine) orbs that are above this physical isotropic orb too. We shall devote Chapter 3 to explaining in more detail the seven Days of the cosmic ‘Week’ and how they are caused.

2.5 Space-time and the speed of light

Although time does not appear to be like space, in the theory of Relativity it is treated as a real dimension just like any one of the other three dimensions of space (length, width, depth: x, y, z). In Relativity, as we explained in the preceding chapter, any point in the universe can be expressed in terms of its four-dimensional space-time co-ordinates (x, y, z, t); we do not have time alone or space alone, but a single field called space-time.¹³

Likewise, Ibn 'Arabî describes the physical universe as something that ‘is confined in time and space’ [I.121.22]. Furthermore, one of the most important results of Ibn 'Arabî's view of time is that he considers that we are living in ‘Saturday’, while the other six cosmic ‘Days’ from Sunday to Friday account for the creation of the world – which is now continuously being re-created by Allah (see also section 5.6) – in space. Allah creates the three-dimensional world (actually six-dimensional/directional if we consider the two directions of each dimension) in six ‘Days’ from Sunday to Friday, but we human beings witness only Saturday because in the other six days of the week we (along with the rest of creation) are still being created. Ibn 'Arabî insists that this divine creative process is repeated every single moment, as we shall explain in the following chapters.

However, the result of what we have just said is that time ('Saturday'), though it is special, is still just like any one of the other six Days that correspond to the six (or three) spatial dimensions. So indeed the world, for Ibn 'Arabî, is confined in those seven 'dimensions' of space-time (6 plus 1) that are similar – since all are 'days'. This is the ultimate meaning of the many verses in the Qur'an specifying that Allah created the heavens and the Earth '*in six Days*' (corresponding to space) and that '*then He mounted* [i.e. on Saturday, in time] *on the Throne*' (Qur'an 7:45, 10:3, 11:7, 25:59, 32:4, 50:38 and 57:4). This could also be easily comprehended if we recall that the actual meaning of time is reduced to the existence of the world in the present moment, not the past or the future. Thus manifest existence is confined in space and time, so both space and time refer to existence, and they have no meaning when taken by themselves, without the things or events that happen in them. This new concept will add another aspect to the theory of Relativity that considers time as one dimension of the four dimensions of space-time, especially since Ibn 'Arabî gives exciting details about how those seven Days of the cosmic Week are interconnected, as we shall see in the following two chapters.

However, there are still many obvious and hidden differences between space and time. At the beginning of chapter 59 and in the long chapter 559 (which summarizes the key contributions of each of the preceding chapters of the *Futûhât*), Ibn 'Arabî points out the similarities and differences between space and time. 'Time', he says, 'is just like space, an extension that has no (outer) limit' [I.291.6]. Then he adds:

Space is an attribute of something that exists, but time is an attribute of something that is confined but does not necessarily exist. Space is defined by who sits in it, and time is counted by breaths. The (ontological status of) 'contingent possibility' (*imkân*) affects both time and space. Time has an (ontological) foundation that it refers back to and is based upon, which is the divine Name 'the Age' (*al-dahr*). Space emerged by the 'establishment' (*istiwâ*) (of the All-Merciful on the Throne, 20:5), and time emerged by the 'descending down (of the Lord) to the (lowest) heaven' (referring to the hadith: 'Our Lord, may He be Praised, descends every night, in the last third of the night, to the lowest sky . . .' [Kanz: 3351, 3355, 3388], see also section 2.14). But there was time in the Dust ('*amâ*') even before the 'establishment'. . . . Time is a circumstance for an event just like meanings for letters, and space is not like a circumstance, so it is not like the letter. Time is confined through division by 'now' and does not necessarily require the existence of objects, but space can not be comprehended without objects (that occupy it), so it is a kind of (ontological) 'home' (for what is created in it).

[IV.337.5]

On the other hand, the concept of using time to measure distance was already used by the ancient Arabs who used to measure distance by how it took them to

travel through it, usually by camel. But Ibn 'Arabî uses this concept in a more abstract way that can be compared with the form of measurement that is now widely used in astronomy: the light year. In many places he repeatedly says that the distance between this particular celestial orb and that orb is a particular number of 'years', without specifying what speed or form of motion might be involved. For example, he says that the distance between the top and bottom of Gehenna is 'seventy-five hundred years' [I.297.15]. And in other places he says that Gehenna is (or 'will be' [I.297.17]) in the entire space situated from the Earth to just below the orb of fixed stars (the constellations of the Moon mansions) [I.303.9, III.440–441].

Now according to modern astronomy, the distance from the Earth and our solar system to either extreme of the width of our Milky Way galaxy roughly equals the distance travelled by light in 7,500 years. So in effect one could argue that Ibn 'Arabî actually used the unit of a kind of 'light year' to measure distance, more than seven centuries before modern astronomers, and that he gave a very accurate value of the width of what is now known as the Milky Way galaxy.

Regarding the speed of light, Ibn 'Arabî declares that 'nothing is faster than sight (*basar*) among the (human) senses; the time of opening the sight is the time of its seeing the fixed planets (stars) or what is above them or between them despite the large distance that could not be reached for thousands of years by foot' [IV.431.34; see also I.702.20, II.402.30].

Furthermore, in chapter 8 of the *Futûhât* Ibn 'Arabî mentions many extraordinary and mysterious facts about another 'earth of Reality' (*ard al-haqîqa*) – another world existing in the *barzakh* or 'divine Imagination', and accessible to spiritual travellers – which is

an earth so spacious that the Throne and what it includes, the Pedestal, the heavens, the earths, what is beneath the soil, all the Gardens and Gehenna, would all be just like a ring in (comparison to the vast extent of) the desert of this 'earth'.

[I.126.30].

He then talks about his and other Sufis' (spiritual) visits to this Earth and that the life there is so extraordinary that many of the logically impossible things for us would normally exist there. One of the things that he mentioned about this Earth is that 'the speed of their (people's) travel on ground or by sea is faster than the perception of sight when it sees things' [I.128.26].

It is perhaps relevant to mention here that one of the consequences of modern theories of high-energy elementary particles is that each particle (such as electrons, protons and neutrons) has an anti-particle which, upon meeting with its counterpart, would annihilate and convert together into light or electromagnetic waves (Trefil 1938: 53–67). Likewise matter (atoms) has anti-matter that may exist somewhere under extreme circumstances, such as in the core of hot stars and galaxies, though it has also been made in laboratories (Schewe and Stein

1999). Some scientists say that, like matter and anti-matter, there should be an anti-universe. In this anti-universe all the laws of physics would behave strangely. For example the speed of light in our universe is a maximum terminal as we have seen above (the theory of Relativity), but in the anti-universe it would be a minimum terminal. Such a case, therefore, is predictable in Ibn 'Arabī's cosmology, as he mentions in regard to this mysterious 'earth of Reality'.

2.6 Motion

Time, therefore, is necessary to describe motion. But the answer to the question 'what is motion?' may not be as obvious as it might at first appear. Matter is in continuous motion, and objects require a cause to move; this is undisputable philosophical fact. But the basic issue in the philosophy of motion is whether the matter-in-motion can be itself the cause of its motion. The dialectical explanation considers that matter is the most primary source of the development of completion, and therefore it can be itself the cause and subject of motion. Metaphysical philosophy, on the other hand, insists on differentiating between that which moves and the mover. This is because motion is a gradual development and completion of a deficient thing, which can not by itself develop and complete gradually – and therefore can not be the cause of completion.

Osman Yahya listed a book with the name '*kitāb al-haraka*' ('the book of motion') (OY: no. 223), but as in the case of '*kitāb al-zamān*' this book is not found. However, Ibn 'Arabī talks about motion in some detail in the long chapter 198. There [II.456–458] he affirms that: 'everything in the world that moves and rests does not move and rest by itself, but by a mover and a rester', but he adds that: 'this mover either moves the object by itself or by its will to move it; so those who believe the mover moves the object by itself say that motion is "created" in the object, so motion by itself – when it is in the object – causes it to move'. And the same can be said regarding rest. 'But if the mover moves the object by its will, it will do that either by an (intermediate) means or without a means.' Then he adds that, if the mover is the object itself, then it has to have a will 'like the motion of the human being who moves under his will in the (six physical) directions'.

Ibn 'Arabī then differentiates between the regular circular motion of the orb (*al-falak*, the celestial sphere of each planetary heaven) and the motion of objects, where 'the motions of the orb are tidy and in a sequential manner like the motion of the millstone; so each part does not depart from its neighbouring (part), while the motion of (the four sub-lunar) elements is different'. Then he explains that 'the motion of the elements is entwined, where the part departs from the neighbouring part and occupies new places different from the ones it was in'. He also adds that

the motion of the orb – for us (the Sufis) – is like the motion of the human being in the directions ... the orb moves by (its) 'will' in order to give

out what is (inspired) in its heaven by the divine Command which causes the things (to occur) in the (earthly) elements ('*anâsir*) and the generators (of earthly changes, the *muwallidât*); so as a result of this (orbs') motion, time emerges. So time has no effect in its (the orbs') appearance, but rather it affects (only) what is below it. Time does not affect the appearance of the orb, because it is itself the appearance (the result in the lower elemental realms) – whereas the things that happen and appear in the orbs, the heavens, and the higher world have causes other than time.

[II.456–458]

We have to admit that physicists habitually accept a very naive concept of motion, usually expressed by the formula 'velocity is distance per time' ($v = s/t$), which is usually used for a simple uniform motion on a straight line though other complicated motions have more complicated equations that are all based on this simple concept of distance per time. Such a simplified concept of motion has been working nicely for many centuries and, although modern theories slightly corrected these classical (Newtonian) equations, they did not address the more philosophical question about the nature of motion itself. To answer this question, one has to verify whether space and time are discrete or continuous, an issue that (as we saw in Chapter 1) still persists and is unsettled even in the latest theories. However, we find some philosophers, like Zeno, who argued that – whether we consider this way or the other – we shall inevitably end up with some irresolvable paradoxes (see section 7.4).

Ibn 'Arabi, on the basis of his theory of the oneness of being and the principle of continual re-creation (see section 5.6), gives a clear and far more extensive definition of 'motion' (*Haraka*: Ibn 'Arabi's wider definition here reflects the fact that this Arabic philosophical term refers not just to physical motion but far more extensively to all kinds of 'change' in general) which is utterly different from the simple notion of just a distance in time. In the same chapter (198) that we just quoted above, he says:

Then you have to know that the truth about motion and rest is that they are two states of the natural embodied (*mutahayyiz*) things ... And that is because the embodied thing will necessarily need a volume (*hayyiz*) to occupy by itself in the time of its existence. So it may either be in the same place (*hayyiz*) in the next time, or times, which is called 'rest', or it is in the next place in the next time and in the following place in the third time. So its appearing in and occupying these places one after another can happen only by 'changing' from one place to another, and this may only be due to a cause. So it would be fine to call this change 'motion', although we know there is nothing but the embodied thing itself, the place, and the fact that it occupied a place next to that which it occupied before. But those who claim that there is some (real) thing called 'motion', which got into the embodied thing and caused it to change from one place to another, they have to prove it!

[II.457.27]

With the above definition of motion, Ibn 'Arabî has in mind his basic principle of the 'ever-renewed creation', which suggests that the entire world is continuously being re-created every single moment of time, which we shall discuss in detail in Chapter 5. Therefore there is no real motion like that which we habitually perceive in the human 'common sense' or 'estimative' faculty (*wahm*); in reality there is only a 'change of place': i.e. the thing that is the subject of motion is being re-created in different places (not moved between them), so we imagine motion. At the end of his short book *Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'* (*The White Pearl*) (*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 142), Ibn 'Arabî wonders how (the general) people (not to mention physicists and philosophers) do not so easily realize the delusion of motion and space. He says that 'everything that moves does not move in occupied space (*malâ'*), but it moves in a void (*khalâ'*)'. Then he explains that the thing may not move into a new place until this new place is emptied. So by simple logic, this (false) assumption would lead to the conclusion that the result of an action would occur before the action itself. For example when you fill a cup with water, the air already in the cup will have to be gradually evacuated as water pours in. At any instance (the smallest duration of time), before the water (the cause) can replace the air, the air has to be displaced (the result). So the result happens before the cause. One may argue that in this case both the cause and the result could happen at the same time. This, however, is also prohibited according to Ibn 'Arabî who asserts that the entities of the world can be created only in series one after the other (see sections 5.6 and 7.3). Thus this radically different conception meticulously challenges Newton's law of action/reaction – which practically speaking always holds true, but which seems to be philosophically deceiving. So the mere concept of motion apparently violates causality, the most fundamental principle of physics, and common sense. Actually, Ibn 'Arabî (following earlier radical theories in kalam theology) even questions causality itself – as we shall see again in Chapter 7 – where he affirms that Allah says: 'I create the things next to the causes and not by them' [II.204.13]. Though this does not deny causality itself (i.e. the appearances of regular 'natural' causes), it does suggest a radically new type of *strictly divine* causality.

Ibn 'Arabî concludes, therefore, that motion is only a new creation in different neighbouring places; there is no actual 'path' of the object between its start and the destination points when taken on the smallest scale of time (i.e. when time itself is quantized). On the basis of this novel definition of motion, we shall be able to resolve Zeno's famous paradoxes that are discussed in Chapter 7. But this is also what happens, according to modern physics, in the atom where the electrons 'jump' between the energy levels (which have different distance from the nucleus) without any possible existence in between. The reason for this is that the energy of the atom is quantized, and when this energy changes, either by absorbing or emitting photons, the distance of some of its electrons from the nucleus will change correspondingly. So because the energy is quantized, this distance has to be quantized too; the electron therefore may not stay in between the orbits at all, or even smoothly jump between them; it may exist only in this orb or in the other orbit that is at a discrete distance from the first (Wehr *et al.*

1984: 72). In the Qur'an, it is also said that this is what happened to the throne of the Queen of Sheba when it refers to the unnamed man '*who has knowledge from the (divine) Book*' moving her throne from Sheba to Solomon's court '*in a blink of the eye*' (see section 7.2).

2.7 Relative and curved time

In the literature of Sufism and Islamic spirituality, we read a lot of fantastic stories that apparently look 'imaginary' even to physicists who are familiar with the theory of Relativity and the concepts such as time travel that we have seen in section 1.9. Ibn 'Arabî refers to the relativity of time in many direct and indirect ways. He explicitly says: 'minutes are years while sleeping' [IV.337.1]. But 'sleeping' here does not necessarily mean usual sleep, it could be any state of imagination or realization that momentarily isolates Sufis from witnessing the visible world while their spirit are occupied with other dimensions of being. For example, he speaks in chapter 73 of the *Futûhât* about the 300 spiritual knowers (s. '*ârif*') 'whose hearts are like the heart of Adam'. There he says that:

If a knower (of those three hundred) is taken (to witness) one scene of the Lord's scenes (*al-mashâhid al-rubûbiyya*), they receive in one of its 'days' (i.e. 'the Lord's Day', which equals a thousand earthly years, 22:47) at that moment (when they are taken to the Lord's scene) divine knowledge (equivalent to) what others get in the world of (normal) senses in one thousand normal years with hard work and preparation. So this is how the divine knowledge that anyone from among those three hundred achieves when they are taken out of their own (carnal) soul and is confined in one Lord's Day. The person who can appreciate what we have said is only whoever has tasted that, when (normal) time was folded up (*tayy*) for them in that moment, just as distance and other quantities are folded up for the eyesight whenever someone opens their eye and looks at the orb of fixed stars: at the same time when he opens their eye, the rays (of his eyesight) are connected with the bodies of these stars. So look how big is this distance and this velocity (of our normal eyesight, in that case)!

[II.9.23]

On the other hand, one of the main consequences of the modern general theory of Relativity is the curvature of space and time, and this conception is explicitly referred to by Ibn 'Arabî when he says in poetry: 'the age has curved on us and bent (*hadaba al-dahr 'alaynâ wa inhana*)' [I.202.7]. It is important to notice here that he used the word 'the age' (or eternal, 'divine time'), instead of time, because in modern cosmology the curvature of time is apparent only at very large scales, and we shall see below (section 2.19) that for Ibn 'Arabî 'the age' includes not only time but also space.

Also regarding time travel, which is widely known in science fiction and theoretically allowable in the theory of Relativity (see section 1.9), many Sufis

and similar figures across many other religious traditions have of course frequently referred to their experiences of various forms of 'travel' across normal boundaries of time. Ibn 'Arabî, for example, mentions the story of al-Jawhari who went to take a bath in the Nile and when he was in the water he saw, like a vision, that he was in Baghdad and he got married and lived with his wife for six years and had children. 'And then he was returned to himself (from this momentary vision). . . . And after few months this woman, whom he saw in the vision that he had married, came looking for his house (in Egypt), and when he met her he knew her and knew the children' [II.82.22].

So according to this story, al-Jawhari travelled to another far-away place and lived there six years, all in a moment of his actual time at his first location in Egypt. Ibn 'Arabî's original readers would of course immediately connect this experience of the 'folding of time' (as the Sufis called it) with the narratives of the Mi'râj or ascension of the Prophet through and beyond all the heavens in a single night-journey (*isrâ*).

In addition to this famous Mi'râj in which the Prophet Muhammad travelled vast distances in a very short time,¹⁴ Ibn 'Arabî himself spoke in detail in chapter 367 of the *Futûhât* about his own numerous ascensions, although he affirms that his experiences were only spiritual, while the Prophet's ascension was both physical and spiritual [III.342.32].¹⁵

According to his accounts of this type of spiritual ascent in chapter 367, the physical elements of the Sufi's body dissociate and return to their corresponding natural place – earth to earth, water to water, air to air and fire to fire – and after that their spiritual self enters the celestial spheres to meet the spirits of the prophets inhabiting each sphere and to learn from them. Then one may even ascend further to the highest spiritual dimensions, as Ibn 'Arabî also describes in greater detail in his highly autobiographical *Kitâb Al-Isrâ' ilâ Al-Maqâm Al-Asrâ*.¹⁶

Just as is specified in the theory of Relativity, a person who undergoes time travel will encounter many more events than those who stay in their place. The big difference, however, is that Relativity anticipates that time travellers will encounter much longer (real) times, and that they will realize after they come back to their starting point that many generations have passed away. This has led to many strange paradoxes like the 'twin paradox' (D'Inverno 1992: 38). For Ibn 'Arabî, however, the issue is far more simple and realistic: the only difference between the spiritual 'time traveller' and others is that travellers will acquire much more knowledge or spiritual realization, because they encounter more events in a (outwardly) short period of time. For Ibn 'Arabî, time, after all, is imaginary, so more time means more events and more events means more knowledge. The Prophet Muhammad (and others like Ibn 'Arabî in their purely spiritual 'ascensions') encountered in the night of the ascension a multitude of events that normally need many years.¹⁷ Likewise, in the illustrative cases of al-Jawhari and the three hundred spiritual knowers mentioned above, other people around them did not feel any noticeable change. This subject is very close to the case of sleep and dreams except that the Sufi in the ascension is the one who is awake because Ibn 'Arabî affirmed that the Prophet Muhammad said: 'people

are asleep, and when they die they wake up' (this hadith is not found in standard hadith collections, but is widely quoted by Sufis and especially Ibn 'Arabî [I.313.11, II.379.33, IV.404.16]), which means that our perception of this world is like a dream and those who are 'awake' (the spiritually realized people) will experience time in a different way. So a person in deep sleep will not feel the time as those who are awake next to him or her experience it. Similarly, the student who pays attention to the teacher will acquire more knowledge than those who are absentminded.¹⁸

In the same way, the 'Unique (spiritual) Pole' (*al-qutb al-fard*) is called *sâhib al-waqt* ('the master of time', see chapter 336 of the *Futûhât* [III.135], and also *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 678–683), because he is always in full attention to what Allah wants of him every single moment. The true master of time witnesses everything in the world (since all that is a kind of reflection of his own spirit, or even part of it) all the time: that is to say, he witnesses the created world throughout space and time. This high state of attention, however, is only attainable by *Al-Qutb* ('the Pole' or 'Axis' of the spiritual universe) who is at the top of the hierarchy of the saints [II.6.28]. This Qutb, like Ibn 'Arabî himself, is a man whose heart is like the heart of the Prophet Muhammad [I.151.6], 'and the one who is on the heart of Muhammad, peace and prayers be upon him, has the corner of the Black Stone (in the Kaaba), and that is for us thanks to Allah' [I.160.24, see also section 6.2].

The spiritual 'Pole' therefore is witnessing 'out of time' – which again means that he is witnessing everything in the world, spatially and temporally. Other Friends of God (the *awliyâ'*) may attain this high state of awareness to a relative extent, 'though this is very rare amongst the (special) people of Allah, and it is (only) for a few of them, the people of attention, those who never overlook Allah's rule in things' [II.539.27]. This also explains how some divinely illuminated people, like the prophets, encountered with Allah things that would not normally occur to normal people. For example, Allah's direct speech to Moses can be explained only, according to Ibn 'Arabî, when we consider that Moses was out of time when Allah spoke to him – since otherwise Allah would be confined to time, and this is not possible. Ibn 'Arabî explained this in some details in his short *Book of Eternity*, that is one of 29 short treatises published together in the famous book known as *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*.

We actually always live in a relative time, but, although we encounter a relative number of events, time itself has no reality. Because we measure time by other standard events, like the clock's ticks or the Sun's motion, we do not feel the relativity of time. But if we measure it by our own internal activities (or what is known as psychological time), we shall always be travelling through time.

However, real travelling to the past is not possible at all, since time itself does not go back: once a form is created and goes into the past it never comes back again, although it is possible to remember past events: 'The past that has gone never comes back, but the similar (form) may come back; so when it comes back it causes (someone) through itself to remember that which was like it and has gone and is past' [II.186.27].

However, Ibn 'Arabî is well aware that it is quite possible to interact with the spirits of the dead (who are 'dead' only to this world, not in their vast spiritual realm of the *barzakh*) because they may become visibly embodied in a spiritual form in this world [I.755.10], as frequently happens in various spiritual experiences. For example, Ibn 'Arabî mentions his personal encounter with Ahmad al-Sabtî, the son of the Abbasid caliph Harûn al-Rashîd, whom he met while circumambulating the Kaaba. When Ibn 'Arabî first saw him he doubted his case, because he saw him not pushing nor being pushed, and going through between the two men without separating any space between them. So he realized he must be a visibly embodied spirit, and he went to him and spoke with him and asked him why he was called al-Sabtî (see his answer in section 3.6) [I.638.32].

Travelling to the future and meeting people who are not born yet is also possible, though it may also be a kind of simulation or personification of their spirits, and Ibn 'Arabî also mentioned similar things:

And I have seen all the messengers and the prophets, witnessing them all by direct vision. And I talked to *Hûd*, brother of '*Âd*', in particular from their group (Hirtenstein 1999: 84–86). And I have seen all the people of faith, also by direct eye-witnessing, all those who have been among them and those who will come to be, until the Day of the Rising: the Real showed them to me on a single plane on two different occasions. And I accompanied (for spiritual learning) a group from among the Messengers, in addition to Muhammad – may God bless him. (For example), I recited the Qur'an to Abraham *al-Khalîl*; and I returned (to God) by the hands of Jesus; and Moses bestowed on me the (inspired) knowing of (spiritual) unveiling and clarification, and the knowing of (the spiritual meaning of) the alternation of '*the daytime and the night*' (2:164, 3:190, etc.). So when I had assimilated that knowing, the night-time disappeared and the daytime (*nahâr*) remained all the day long, so the Sun never (again) set for me nor did it rise – and this unveiling was a notification from Allah that I would have no part of suffering in the hereafter.

[IV.77.27]

2.8 The discrete nature of time

The most important and distinctive of Ibn 'Arabî's ideas about time is that he considers it to be quantized. Thus Ibn 'Arabî declared in the *Futûhât* and other books that 'the smallest time is the single time that does not accept division' [II.384.31].

There has been a great deal of debate in the history of philosophy and science as to whether time (and space) is discrete or continuous, though most philosophers and scientists deal with time as an infinitely divisible quantity. However, the Ash'arite theologians' distinctive physical theory (of the *jawhar*, or 'indivisible atom') is entirely built on the discreteness of space and time, and Ibn 'Arabî

himself acknowledges his debt to them for this understanding. For example, al-Bâqillânî, one of the famous Ash'arite theologians, suggested an atomic nature of time, according to which in each 'atom' of time the entire world annihilates and is re-created in a slightly different form (MacDonald 1927: 326–344). This perspective is at least verbally and conceptually very much in accord with Ibn 'Arabî's fundamental principle of the ongoing re-creation of all things (see section 5.6) – although the Ash'arite theologians did not make any reference to the key experiential basis of this spiritual insight which is so central to Ibn 'Arabî's discussion of the 'ever-renewed creation'. What is also new and distinctive here about Ibn 'Arabî's understanding of this conception of time is that he argues that the actual 'quantum' of time equals our normal earthly day itself [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. It is not easy to bridge the gap between this metaphysical hypothesis and our everyday familiar experience of indefinitely divisible time: of the year into months, the month into weeks, the week into days, the day into hours, hour into minutes, minutes into seconds, and so on apparently infinitely. Ibn 'Arabî, however, explains plainly why time has to be discrete according to his understanding (or 'according to his Day'), and we shall devote Chapter 4 to discussing this difficult issue in more detail. Here we can give only a general preview.

For Ibn 'Arabî, time itself does not have a separate existence, but is reduced to motion or, more precisely, to the ongoing creative acts of God, or cosmic 'events' (each discrete divine 'Task' or *sha'n*) of each 'Day'. And according to the Qur'anic description of God, *each Day He is upon some (one single) task (sha'n)* (55:29). And since, as Ibn 'Arabî explains [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 10], Allah specified in this verse that He is every Day in 'one' task, and not many as we perceive in our illusion, which witnesses a multitude of events every day because of the intertwining between these Divine Days and our normal days. This means that this 'Day' has to be indivisible, because only one divine action or event should be happening in it [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. As we have seen, Ibn 'Arabî uses the same Qur'anic term and therefore calls this fundamental quantum of time 'the Day of Task' or divine event (*yawm al-sha'n*), or – using an expression taken from the physical theory of Ash'arite theology – 'the singular (unique) time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) [I.292.16, II.82.6]. Therefore the single 'Day of task' in reality equals our normal day; or more precisely, a full revolution of the celestial sphere as viewed from the Earth. Ibn 'Arabî helps to clarify this counter-intuitive understanding of the foundational divine 'Event' by introducing some related new concepts that are also based on certain Qur'anic verses.

The first related concept is that the world is surely re-created every singular day over and over again [II.208.26, II.385.4]. So we (our souls), as part of this world, live or ordinarily experience only our very limited portion from this singular day; a single instantaneous 'moment' of time that equals the global '24 hours' taking place within the entire world at that particular instant, but as divided up (in actual perception) by the total number of perceiving entities and their perceptions in the world. During this divine creative 'glance' (*lamha*), we

perceive a still picture of our limited perception of the world, after which we intrinsically cease to exist. Then in the second 'Day' (actually in the second 'Week'!), we live another moment to perceive a different still picture, owing to the ever-new creation created by Allah in this singular day. Thus, through a succession of these instantaneously re-created new 'pictures' of the whole, we observe what appears to be motion, just as with the illusion of cinematic projection. We said 'in the second Week' because Ibn 'Arabî showed that we are indeed only living in 'Saturday', since the other 'Days' (of Creation) of the Divine Week, from Sunday to Friday of the Days of tasks, are for space not for time, because at every moment in our life the world is re-created in six Days (for space), and it is then displayed on Saturday, but we do not witness the process of creating the world: we only witness it as created. So our life as a time is a collection of Saturdays, and each moment that we live is indeed a Week; six Days for creating the world in space, and Saturday for displaying it in time. We shall come to this important and novel concept in section 3.5.

The other related concept is that the moments that we feel flowing as day-times and night-times are actually a *collection* (of discrete time-space quanta), and not a straightforward combination of the actual flow of the single divine 'Days'. The normal days that we encounter are 'intertwined' (*mutawâlija*, v. *yûlîju*) – another key Qur'anic expression – with the actually existing cosmic 'Days of tasks' in a special way that we shall explore in Chapter 4. As a result of this intertwining, we see the appearance of a multitude number of events in our normal days.

In addition to that, Ibn 'Arabî also reminds us that at every moment there is a full day around the globe: evening somewhere, morning somewhere else, and noon in other places [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. Therefore, at every *moment* for us, which is a full day when viewed globally, Allah creates a single event in the world; and then He re-creates the world in ever-new events at each succeeding moment. The day that we perceive and experience is therefore a collection of successive 'snapshots' of the actual 'Days of events' which are the actual existing basis for our experience of the flow of time.

As we said above, the idea of discrete time (and space) is not new in the history of philosophy and physics, though it had been completely discarded after the advent of classical Newtonian mechanics. However, many philosophers (such as Kant, Russell and Leibniz) have opposed Newton's hypothesis that space and time have a separate linear and continuous entity, as we showed in section 1.8. With the advent of Quantum Mechanics, Field Theory, the Theory of Quantum Gravity and the Superstrings Theory, the idea of a quantized time (and space) was revived again, and much work has recently been done in this respect as we mentioned in section 1.9.

The human mind naturally thinks of quantities as either discrete or continuous; there is no other way. A closer examination of Ibn 'Arabî's view of time, however, shows that it is indeed neither discrete nor continuous. We must remember that he considers time as imaginary after all, as well as most other quantities such as space and even mass (see section 7.9). As we indicated previ-

ously, such seemingly strange conclusions result directly from Ibn 'Arabî's fundamental theory of the oneness of being: i.e. that the apparent 'parts' of existence are merely manifestations of *a single real existence* that is One and Unique, neither multiple nor divisible. The notion of either discreteness or continuousness is indispensable when we imagine multitudes, but with absolute Unity there would be no meaning to such conceptions. Therefore, Ibn 'Arabî's concept of time is that it would be discrete if we approach it on the (ultimately imaginary) plane of apparent multiplicity, but in reality there is no such reality as 'time' at all. The same perspective can be applied to space.

2.9 The 'chest' of time

Ibn 'Arabî asserts that

You should know that everything has a 'chest' (*sadr*), and knowing it in this path (of mysticism) is one of the noble sciences and knowledge. This is because the world and every kind (in it) is created according to the image of the Human Being (*insân*), who is the last existent, and the Human Being alone is created according to the divine Image, both its inner and outer dimensions, and Allah created them with a chest. So between the Real, to Whom is the firstness, and the Human Being, to whom is the lastness, there are 'chests' whose number no one knows other than Allah.

[II.652.23]

The 'chest' of a thing is its front, the first thing to appear, which is why it is so important to know it. Ibn 'Arabî here applies and generalizes the verse in the Qur'an that says: *'And whomsoever Allah wants to guide, He expands his chest for "surrender" (islâm), and whomsoever He wants to leave astray, He makes his chest narrow and constricted as if he were engaged climbing up into the sky'* (6:125).

But Ibn 'Arabî adds that 'the chest is in the second state of each form' [II.652.27], since the first state is the essence (the 'heart') of the form itself and the chest is *its first appearance or effect*. Then he lists many things and their corresponding 'chests', and he says that 'the chest of time is the time (instant) of the Dust's acceptance of the form' and 'the chest of days is Monday' [II.652.27].

Thus Ibn 'Arabî adds that:

For every 'chest' there is a 'heart' (*qalb*), so as far as the heart remains in the chest, the person will be blind because the chest is a veil over him. So when Allah wants to make him or her truly seeing, he goes out of his chest and sees. So the causes are the 'chests' of the existing things, and the existing things are like the hearts; as far as the existing (thing or person) is looking at the cause that it originated from, they will be blinded from witnessing Allah Who (actually, ultimately) created them. Thus when Allah wants to make (the person) truly seeing, they stop (or He causes them to

stop) looking at the cause that Allah created them 'with' (*'indahu*: i.e. as opposed to 'through', *bihi*) and looks (instead) at the 'special Face' that is (uniquely) between their Lord and them.

[II.652.35]

We are, therefore, normally 'imprisoned' in the chest of time, just as the heart of the person lacking faith is imprisoned in or 'veiled by' his or her chest. To overcome time (and space), we therefore have to break out and perceive the reality of existence through the 'heart', and in particular the special inner relation or aspect between the 'heart' and the Real.

2.10 Circular time and cyclical time

Ibn 'Arabi repeatedly describes time as a 'circle' (*dâ'ira*), [I.387.33], which does not have a beginning or an end, but when we specify a point on this circle (the present; the point in time in which we exist now) and look in one direction, whether to the past or future, we do set a relative beginning and an end. So the present (now) joins together the two ends of time in a circle [I.387.32, III.546.30].

It is very difficult to imagine this, as it was very difficult to convince people that the Earth is spherical when this idea was first introduced, precisely because most everyday activities show us only a small portion of the Earth's surface which appears flat to us. Yet time is not like space. In the case of the Earth it was relatively easy to prove that it is round because we can view its curvature – from space, or from a great height – all at once. But the problem with time is that we can normally witness only the present moment of it, not the future nor the past; we can only imagine them. Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of 'circular' time, we have to imagine that the whole of all existence (what we perceive as future, present and past) exists all at once. This whole existence is then like a circle: i.e. a curve that does not have a visible beginning or an end when we look at it from outside. When we sit on the circumference of this circle and look in one direction, we set a beginning and an end. In the same way: the present moment in which we exist is a point on the circle of the whole existence, this point defines the future and the past and it also defines an imaginary beginning and an imaginary end of time: imaginary because the whole circle of existence (of 'the Age', *al-dahr*) is infinite. The imaginary beginning is the eternity *a parte ante* (*al-azal*) and the imaginary end is the eternity *a parte post* (*al-abad*) [IV.266.3].

Circular time has yet another important meaning which is not possible to explain fully at this point, because it needs additional premises that we shall discuss in the following chapters, so we can refer to it only briefly here. As described above, Ibn 'Arabi views the world as being continuously re-created, and time is reduced to the present moment because the past and the future are only imaginary. Therefore time, or the present moment, goes in ever repeated circular motion with the re-creation of the world. In other words, the presence,

which is time, goes round the world continuously and repeatedly to create it and re-create it again; so it is circular (and cyclic) in this distinctly metaphysical respect.

Moreover, this cosmic notion of 'circular time' is quite different from 'cyclical time', and the two ideas should not be confused in Ibn 'Arabî's writings. 'Cyclical' or periodic (*dawrî*) time, such as the day, the week, the month and the year, is a duration of time in which the same kind of events should be happening in the different repeating cycles of time. For example, the Sun sets every evening to start a new day (because the 'day' for the Arabs was considered to start from sunset, not from sunrise), and the Moon is born approximately every four weeks to start a new lunar month. We should again note, however, that in reality, according to Ibn 'Arabî, there is never any repetition at all [II.432.12, III.282.21]. Those cycles of time are 'similar' to each other but never identical, as the terms 'period' or 'cycle' mean in modern physics. For Ibn 'Arabî, the cycles of time are similar because they are ruled by the same divine Names, which is why we expect to see similar events. But the reason why we do not see identical events or true repetition is because of the interaction between different cycles of different divine Names [III.201.14]. For example he says that 'the motion of Sunday appeared from the (divine) attribute "the All-Hearing" (*al-sam'*) . . . , and the motion of Monday appeared from the (divine) attribute "the Living" (*al-hayât*)' [II.438.9].

Therefore the cycle of Sunday is different from the cycle of Monday, although they are both days in which the Sun rises and sets in the same way. On the other hand, and on the basis of the same statement above, Sunday from this week should be identical with Sunday from the previous week, because they both appeared from the same divine Attribute. But they are not, because they do not have the same position in the month or the year, or in other cycles that are ruled by other divine Names and Attributes, so there is never any repetition. Ibn 'Arabî nicely refers to this fact in his prayers *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya*, a short text found at the end of *Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qâhira, n.d.), when he says: '(He, i.e. the Prophet Muhammad, is) the Dust (*hayûlâ*) of forms which does not manifest in one form to any two (persons), nor in any one form to anyone twice' [also in I.679.7, II.77.27, II.616.3].

We shall devote Chapter 3 to the significance of the 'Week' in Ibn 'Arabî's view, where we shall see that the week is the primary *cycle* of time, not the day. We shall also see that Ibn 'Arabî's fundamental notion of 'no repetition' forms the basis of a unique view of time and the cosmos, which will be discussed in the following chapters. However, if we accept the approximation that different cycles of time are defined by similar events, we then find that Ibn 'Arabî defines many important cycles other than the usual day, week, month, the seasons and the year. In general, every divine Name of Allah has Its own 'day' (cycle), which is a cycle of time that has a corresponding daytime and a night in the world below it (see Table 2.1 below).

A correlation can also be made here between Ibn 'Arabî's view of cyclic time and astrology. Knowing these cycles and their lengths and the specific Names that rule them may give us some insight into what kind of events may happen in

Table 2.1 Days of some orbs and divine names

<i>The day of . . .</i>	<i>Its length in terms of normal Earth days</i>
The Moon	28 days
The Sun	360 days = 1 year
Mercury	~30 years
<i>al-rabb</i> (the Lord)	1,000 years
<i>al-mithl</i> (the Like)	7,000 years
<i>al-ma‘ârij</i> (the ascending ways)	50,000 years
Zodiac	12,000 years
Longest planet (star) day	36,000 years

Note

The numbers have been collected from different books of Ibn ‘Arabî. We should add that – as noted in our table here – Ibn ‘Arabî actually considers the year to be 360 days rather than 365.25 days; see also section 3.2 for more details

the future, but it is not easy to tell exactly what is going to happen. The issue is more like weather forecasting; by studying all the parameters we can tell with a good probability how the weather may be in the near future.

2.11 The two cycles of life

According to the well-known hadith ‘Time has returned the same as it was when Allah created the heavens and the Earth’ [*Kanz*: 12357], Ibn ‘Arabî argues that the cosmos has completed one cycle from the beginning of creation until the point where the spirit of the Prophet Muhammad is attached to his body, and he notes that this cycle is 78,000 years. As he explains:

Time started in Libra for spiritual justice by the name the Hidden (*al-bâtin*) of Muhammad – may God bless him – as he said: ‘I was prophet when Adam was still between water and clay’ [*Kanz*: 2017]. Then it (time) circled around after one (full) time cycle, which is 78,000 years, to start another cycle of time by the name ‘the Manifest’ (*al-zâhir*) when the body of Muhammad – may God bless him – appeared.

[I.146.18]

In the beginning of the *Futûhât* [I.121–124], Ibn ‘Arabî also states clearly the *order* of creation in time during this cosmic time cycle, for major events of the kinds created by Allah. The numbers that he gives clearly do not agree with modern cosmology and geology, and can not be explained or understood in those terms (as we showed in section 2.3 above).

2.12 ‘Days’

So we have seen in this chapter that time is in fact imaginary and exists only as the Creator’s ‘Days’ and indeed indivisible moments, while all other divisions of




Figure 2.1 The Cycle of Life.

Note

The number of years are extracted from chapter 7 of the *Futûhât* [I.121–126].

time are conventional. For this reason we find that in the Qur'an the word 'time' is never used, while a great deal of attention is given there to mentioning different sorts of 'daytimes' and 'nights' and the relations between them. Likewise, we find that Ibn 'Arabî pays considerable attention to describing the actual meaning of the days and the relation between their different types.

As usual, the terms 'daytime' (*nahâr*) and 'night' (*layl*) are used by Ibn 'Arabî to measure time, where the daytime extends from sunrise to sunset, while the night (*layl*) is from sunset to sunrise: both of those together – always *beginning* with the night-time – are called a 'day' (*yawm*), which is conventionally divided into 24 hours. We must notice, however, that the above conventional definitions are only approximate for our practical use here on Earth, since considerable differences appear as soon as we begin to measure the length of the day, for example, with relation to the Sun or to distant stars.

In the following passage Ibn 'Arabî gives a precise definition of various units of time such as the day, the daytime, the night, the month and the year. Some of these definitions are, however, simply for practical use for the purpose of determining prayer times. More accurate variations will be discussed below and in section 3.2. At the very beginning of the extremely long chapter 69, in which Ibn 'Arabî talks about 'the secret meanings of prayer (*salât*)', he devoted a full section to detailed explanations about timing. For the purpose of demonstration and simplification, Ibn 'Arabî employs a hypothetical observer who is considered as a frame of reference. He says there:

'Timing' (*al-waqt*) is an expression for (our approximate) estimation concerning a thing that does not accept the actual reality ('*ayn*) of what is estimated. So it is an (approximate) supposition, just like we suppose and estimate a beginning, middle and an end in a spherical shape which in itself

and in its actual reality does not accept a beginning, middle or end. So we construe all of this in it (only) by what we construe through the effect of our supposition and estimation concerning it.

Likewise, timing (*waqt*) is an estimated supposition with regard to time (*al-zamân*), since time is circular, as Allah created it in its beginning, so it is like a circle. The Prophet Muhammad, may Allah have peace and mercy upon him, said: '*time has circulated* [i.e. has come back to the same point] *like its form was on the day when Allah created it*' [Kanz: 12357]. So he mentioned that Allah created it circular (see section 2.10), and timings are (only) estimated with regard to it.

So when Allah created the Isotropic Orb and it moved, the 'day' was not specifically determined and no (temporally defining) reality had (yet) appeared in (that Orb). It was like the water of the pitcher when it is (still) in the river, before it comes into the pitcher. Then when the 12 (equal zodiacal regions) were supposed in it (i.e. in the Isotropic Orb, and subsequently appeared in the second orb of the fixed stars, which has in it the zodiacal constellations), it was given specific timings, and He called them the '(zodiacal) constellations' in that (isotropic) orb – which is Allah's saying: '*by the heaven*' – (swearing by it) because of its loftiness above us – '*that has the constellations (burūj)*' (85:1). So they are these suppositions for timing.

So (when) a person stands (on the Earth) and this orb rotates around him, and this person has been given sight to look at these (spatial) suppositions, through the distinguishing signs (of the zodiacal constellations) that were determined in (the outermost sphere), then (that person) can distinguish some of its parts from others, by these distinguishing signs that are made to be references pointing to it. So (this person) fixes their eye on one supposed (area) of it, I mean on the distinguishing sign (of this or that constellation), and then the (zodiacal) orb rotates with this supposed distinguishing sign that this observer has fixed their eye on, until it disappears (from his sight). This continues, as long as they continue standing in their place, until (eventually) this sign comes back to them (in the same position). Then at that point they know that this (zodiacal) orb had completed one cycle with respect to this observer – not with respect to the orb itself (because the orbs' real motion takes much longer time than a day, see section 1.4). Then we called this cycle a 'day' (*yawm*, defined here according to the far-away sphere of the zodiacal stars and not according to the Sun, which is the day known in astronomy as the 'sidereal day').

Then after that, Allah created in the fourth Heaven (celestial sphere) of the seven Heavens a lighted planet that has a huge body, and it was called in the Arabic tongue '*Shams*' [i.e. the Sun; but the Arabs used to call both the planets (*kawākib*) and the stars (*nujūm*) *kawākib*, 'planets' (s. *kawkab*), but Ibn 'Arabī clearly distinguishes between them]. Then it rose in the sight (of this observer) from behind the veil (or horizon) of the Earth where this observer stands, so they called this place of rising 'the shining-place' (or 'east/orient': *mashriq*), and they called the rising a 'shining-forth'

(*shurûq*), because this bright planet rose up from it and lighted up the atmosphere where this observer is.

So the sight of this observer kept following the motion of that planet (the Sun) until it was opposite them (in the middle of the sky), so he called this (state of) opposition 'the meridian' (*al-istiwâ*). Then the planet began to descend from its meridian with respect to this observer, seeking the right side of them – not with respect to the planet itself. So they called the beginning of this descending from its meridian a 'decline' (*zawâl*) and disposition (*dulûk*). Then the sight of this observer kept following it until the body of this planet went down, so they called its going down 'setting' (*ghurûb*), and they called the place where their sight saw that it went down its 'setting-place' (or 'west': *maghrib*).

Then the atmosphere became dark for him, so he called the duration of the lightning of the atmosphere, from the rising of this planet till its setting, a 'daytime' (*nahâr*). (This name is) derived from '*al-nahr*' (the river), because the spreading out of the light in (that daytime) is like the spreading out of water in the bed of the river.

So this observer remained in the dark until that planet that is called the Sun (again) rose from the place that they called the orient, in the sight of this observer – (but) from another (different) place, close to this place that it rose from yesterday, (by a distance) which is called a 'degree' (*daraja*). So they called the duration of the darkness in which they were from the time of the setting of the Sun till its rising a night (*layl*). So the day (*yawm*, the conventional rotational day and not the sidereal day) is the sum of the daytime (*nahâr*) and the night (*layl*). And he called the positions where this planet rises everyday 'degrees' (*darajât*).

Then they saw that this bright planet, which is called the Sun, moves between those estimated suppositions (marked by the different zodiacal signs) in the (Isotropic) circumferential orb, one degree after another, until it cuts through that (first supposed position) through these risings called days, such that when it completes cutting through one supposed (position), it starts cutting through another supposition, until it completes (going through all) the 12 suppositions by cutting (them). Then it starts another cycle by cutting through these supposed positions (again). So they called (the time) from the beginning of cutting each supposed position till the end of cutting that (particular zodiacal) supposed position a 'month' (*shahr*); and they called (the Sun's) cutting through all those (12 zodiacal) suppositions a 'year' (*sana*).

Thus it has become clear to you that the night, daytime, day, month and year, are called 'timings' (*awqât*), and (also) it gets shorter till what is called hours and less – that all that does not have (real) existence in its essence, but that they are only relations and relative connections (*nisab/idâfat*). But what is (actually) existing is (only) the essence of the orb and the planet, not the essence of the timing and time, since they, I mean the times, are only suppositions within it. So thus you see now that 'time' is (only) an expression for something (humanly) imagined, in which these 'timings' are only supposed.

So the day (*yawm*) for Ibn 'Arabî is like our usual day: i.e. the full revolution of the heavens as we see it from the Earth, which is conventionally measured according to the motion of the Sun. This definition of the day works perfectly for practical issues, such as determining prayer times. But if we want to be more accurate, the day indeed is the full revolution of the orb of the fixed stars [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6] – which is in reality (i.e. as we know today), a single full cycle of the motion of the Earth around itself with relation to far-away stars, *not* with relation to the Sun. That is why Ibn 'Arabî affirms that the 'day' (*yawm*) actually existed even before the creation of the seven planets including the Sun and the Earth, while the earthly daytime and night-time (*nahâr* and *layl*) were defined only after the creation of the Earth and the Sun. He says that

When Allah caused these higher orbs to rotate, He created 'days' in the first orb (that is the isotropic orb, because it is the first orb to be created in Nature) and defined it in relation to the second orb (that is the orb of fixed-stars or the zodiacal constellations) which has the apparently fixed planets (stars). . . . Then He created also the Sun, so the daytime and night are caused by the creation of the Sun (that appears) in the day. But the 'day' [i.e. the sidereal day; defined by the rotation of the highest sphere(s)] existed before (the Sun's creation) . . . so when the orb of the zodiac rotates one cycle, it is called the 'day' in which '*Allah created the heavens and the Earth (in six days)*'.

[I.140.30]

As we also showed in the previous chapter, Ibn 'Arabî showed on many occasions that all the stars are moving at very high speeds. He also showed that the stars that form the zodiac signs are, like other stars, very far away, which is why we do not realize their motion. So practically we consider these stars as fixed and therefore as a reference, but in fact the reference should be the Isotropic Orb, because it is the one that encompasses all other (material) orbs. However, because this orb has no any distinguishing sign, it can not be used as a reference. Therefore, to be more accurate, we have to measure the day not relative to the Sun but relative to stars, the constellations 'from *Nath* to *Nath*, from *Butayn* to *Butayn* or from *Thurayya* to *Thurayya*'¹⁹ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6] – since it is not possible to measure it relative to the Isotropic Orb which does not have any distinguishing feature. In astronomy, this is called the 'sidereal day', which is about four minutes longer than the normal (rotational) day. The difference is due to the Earth's rotation around the Sun at the same time it spins around its axis, which causes the sidereal day to become slightly longer. Although Ibn 'Arabî accepts the usual concept of the day that is our normal day (from sunrise to sunrise) for daily needs, such as knowing the time of prayers [I.388.14], he clearly distinguishes between the sidereal day and the normal day when it comes to critical issues such as the 'intertwined days' and the 'taken-out days' that we shall explain in Chapter 4.

The real meaning of 'day' comes from the fact that in this day Allah creates

the whole manifest world – i.e. the whole 360 degrees of the orb or the outermost celestial sphere, the ‘Pedestal’ – in it. This does not at all contradict the many verses in the Qur’an and other holy Books stating that Allah created the Heavens and the Earth ‘*in six days*’ (‘*and then*’ – on the seventh day – ‘*He mounted on the Throne*’) (see the Qur’an: 7:54, 10:3, 11:7, 25:59, 32:4, 50:38 and 57:4) because we only witness the last day (‘Saturday’, *al-sabt*) out of these seven days, while the other six days of creation are actually included in it as space (see section 3.6). Therefore, unlike some other Muslim theologians, Ibn ‘Arabî does not find any difficulty in explaining those verses in the Qur’an that talk about Allah’s creating the Heavens and the Earth in six days. Most religious scholars suggested that Allah meant ‘assumed days’, such that if days had actually existed then, then the time of this creation would have been six days, because they could not conceive of days before the creation of the Sun and the Earth. But Ibn ‘Arabî affirms that the creation of the Sun only divided the day (*yawm*) into daytime and night-time. So he gives a dramatically different cosmological meaning to the process of creation in a ‘Week’ (six days plus Saturday) – as the creation of space-time at every moment – and not the commonly understood meaning that it took Allah a current earthly week to finish the creation.

However, as already noted, Ibn ‘Arabî did observe that there was a difference between the Arabs and some non-Arab (‘*ajam*’) groups in their conventional definitions of the ‘day’, in that the Arabs considered the day to extend from sunset to sunset, while others considered it to extend from sunrise to sunrise. So for the Arabs, the night precedes daytime, while for non-Arabs it is the reverse. This matter has no effect on the length of the whole day itself, but its implications do have an effect on the actual unit of day and especially on its spiritual and symbolic meanings, because

For the Arabs and the Arabic timing, it has been traditionally agreed that the night precedes daytime, since originally the Creator of time, Allah the Exalted, says: ‘*and a token unto them is night; We strip the day out of it . . .*’ (36:37). So He made the night as the origin and took the day out of it, just as the skin is stripped off the sheep. So the (initial) appearance is to the night, and the day was hidden in it, just as the skin of the sheep appears and covers the sheep until it is stripped off. So the witnessed world (‘*âlam al-shahâda*’) was stripped off the unseen realm (*al-ghayb*), and our existence was stripped off the non-existence. So the knowledge of the Arabs advanced that of the non-Arabs, because the (i.e. the non-Arab) calculations are solar-based: they consider that the daytime precedes the night, and they have some right (to maintain that) in this (same Qur’anic) verse, which continues . . . ‘*then they are in darkness*’, for ‘then’ here refers to the present time or the future time, and the thing will not be in darkness until the coming of the night, in this verse. So (from their perspective), the daytime was like a cover on the night and then it was taken out or removed, so ‘*they are in darkness*’; so the night appeared which causes darkness, so the people are in darkness.

[I.716.9, also in *Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*, 7]

2.13 Days of other orbs and divine names

Ibn 'Arabî then extends the meaning of the normal 'day' as described above to the spheres of all planets (and stars) and even to symbolic 'spheres' (i.e. the orbs of spirits and divine Names), where he calls the period – i.e. full revolution of each particular orb – the 'day' that corresponds to this specific orb. In this way there are shorter days and longer days, depending on the relevant orb:

and when Allah caused the isotropic orb to rotate . . . and made its full cycle a complete day (i.e. the normal day) without daytime and night . . . So 'Days' are different: some Days are a half-cycle, some Days a full cycle, some Days 28 cycles (days); and some are more than that, (all the way up) until the 'Day of ascending ways' (*yawm dhû-al-ma'ârij*, of 50,000 years, described in the Qur'an, 70:4), or less than that (all the way down) until the 'Day of event'; so the degrees of Days change between these two (extremes of the) Days.

[III.433.35]

There is no maximum limit to the 'Day' that one can count [I.292.17], but there is a minimum limit. The maximum limit is the Age (*al-dahr*), which is one unique day that does not repeat and has no daytime and night [III.202.5]. But this Age is infinite, whereas the smallest Day is the 'singular day' (*al-yawm al-fard*) or the 'Day of event' (*yawm al-sha'n*) [I.292.16], which is that Day in which Allah is upon one task (55:29). From the meaning of the 'singular day' as the time in which Allah creates by one single act every entity in the world, we can generalize to all other days: the 'Day' of every orb is the time in which that orb affects every entity in the world (i.e. by making a full revolution).

But again we should not confuse – as we have seen above – the revolution of a planet (such as the Earth) around its axis in respect to its Sun, and in respect to distant stars (which are appropriately considered fixed). In astronomy, the first revolution is called a 'rotational' day, while the other is called the 'sidereal' day. The sidereal day is the time the Earth takes to rotate 360 degrees, in relation to distant stars. This equals, in modern calculations, 23 hours, 56 minutes, 4.09 seconds, while the mean solar day is 24 hours. The Earth actually rotates 360.98 degrees in 24 hours; the difference is caused by the Earth's orbital motion (around the Sun). Similarly all other planets or orbs have their own respective sidereal and orbital 'days'. Also, the Moon completes a cycle around the Earth once every 27.3 days, with reference to distant stars, so this is the *sidereal* lunar month. The normal lunar month used in Islamic calendar calculations, though, is the time interval between new moons as observed from Earth, which equals 29.5 days; this is called the 'synodic' lunar month. Therefore, the Moon's 'Day', if calculated by Ibn 'Arabî's approach to the Earth's sidereal day, should be the sidereal lunar month. But we shall see in section 3.2 that Ibn 'Arabî insists that the lunar month equals 28 days exactly.

Ibn 'Arabî made it clear in several places in his *Futûhât* [I.141.17, III.549.3] and other books that the fixed stars are not actually fixed at all, but that we can not notice their motion from Earth owing to the large distance, because our age

is too short to notice their motion despite their very high speed (an observation well confirmed by modern cosmology). Therefore when we say 'the day is the period of motion of fixed stars', we now know today that this apparent motion is caused by the motion of the Earth and not the stars, but since we move with the Earth, we think that the stars are moving. Indeed the actual motions of the orbs of stars have much longer periods, as is well known in modern astronomy. Actually, Ibn 'Arabî, following the accepted cosmological theories of his day, differentiates between two kinds of motion of the celestial orbs: natural or intrinsic motion, and forced or extrinsic motion:

The smallest Day is that which we count as the motion of the circumferential orb in whose day (*yawm*) the night (*layl*) and daytime (*nahâr*) appear. So that is the shortest day for the Arabs (i.e. in their language), and it corresponds to the largest orb, because it rules everything inside it. The motion of everything inside this orb in the daytime and night is a forced motion by this orb, through which it forces (a movement of) all the orbs that it surrounds. And each one of these orbs also has a natural (inherent) motion. So every orb below the surrounding orb has two motions at the same time: a natural motion and a forced motion. And each natural motion in every orb has a specific day which is measured in terms of the days of the surrounding orb.

[I.121.25]

So, for example – according to modern astronomy – the Moon naturally rotates around the Earth in about 28 days while at the same time it is forced to move with the Earth around the Sun. Likewise with most other orbs of the planets, in terms of the astronomy of Ibn 'Arabî's time: the intrinsic motion of those orbs defines a specific 'day' for every one, which equals the time needed to make full revolution around the Earth. In general, however, the day is the revolution of the specific orb, so it may have many possible lengths or measurements depending on the reference point (i.e. whether it is observed from the Earth or from other orbs or planets), but here we only consider the days of the orbs with relation to the Earth.

The relation between Days and orbs is that – in general – the longer Day corresponds to the larger orb. But this is not true for the isotropic orb, which is the first and largest (material) orb. The Day of this orb is the smallest Day, which is the day that we count, i.e. 24 hours. This is because the motion of this orb is a natural motion, whereas the motions of other orbs are a combination of this first natural motion (which is a forced motion on those other orbs) and another natural motion which is intrinsic to every orb. But if we consider the motion of the isotropic orb as expressing in reality the motion of the Earth around itself, as in modern astronomy, we can then generalize and say that the larger the orb, the bigger its Day. However, still another factor that affects the length of the Day is the speed of motion of the relevant orb. Therefore, the day that we count – i.e. the 24 hours – is actually the shortest Day, though Ibn 'Arabî sometimes mentions that a day could be a half cycle of the prime cycle of the Isotropic Orb, which is the 24-hour day [III.434.2], which is equal to the daytime (*nahâr*), but

otherwise the day itself as the revolution of the Isotropic Orb is the smallest day. Then comes the Day of the Moon, which is 28 Earth days (which is a little less than the actual day of the Moon that we call the lunar month; we shall give a more detailed discussion of this point in section 3.2), and so on [II.441.29].

As in the case of the material orbs of stars and planets, Ibn 'Arabî adds that every spirit and every divine Name of Allah has its own 'Day'. That is because every spirit and divine Name has effects on the world beneath it. So when they complete a full revolution around the world (i.e. without material motion but with regard to their effects on every entity), this is their 'Day'.

On the basis of particular references in the Qur'an and Hadith, Ibn 'Arabî assigns Days with specific length to some divine Names. In addition to 'the Lord's day' which equals '*one thousand years of what you count*' (32:5), and 'the day of the ascending ways' (*dhû al-ma'ârij*), which equals fifty thousand years according to the Qur'an (70:4), Ibn 'Arabî also mentions 'the day of *Mithl*' ('the Like', i.e. the cosmic 'Likeness' of the divine, referring to the famous Qur'anic verse 42:11 – the 'Perfect Human Being' (*al-insân al-kâmil*), who is created, according to a famous hadith, 'on the Image of the All-Merciful', see *SPK*: 27–30: 276) which equals seven thousand years [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 18], and another day which equals 6,454.54545 years, though he does not mention the relevant Name [I.121.23]. He also mentions yet another day which equals three thousand years, but says that he does not know the corresponding Name [III.238.13]. All this is summarized in Table 2.1 which shows the length of some other days, in addition to those just mentioned above.

2.14 The daytime and night-time

Ibn 'Arabî not only extends the concept of the known day to the orbs and divine Names, as we have seen above, but also he gives a very broad meaning of daytime and night (*nahâr* and *layl*), suggesting that every orb and divine Name has a corresponding daytime and night like our normal daytime and night. Just as our daytime and night are caused by the apparent motion of the Sun, these other infinitely varied daytimes and nights are all caused through the manifestation of the primary divine Name '*the Light*' [III.201.35], which brings into manifest existence in the world all the transient images or 'likenesses' of the infinite divine Names:

so when the divine Name '*the Light*' is considered (from the perspective of) the existence of the exalted shadow imaged forth (in the cosmos: i.e. the First Intellect or 'Perfect Human Being') and (from the perspective of) its rising upon those who are in the world, then the world (i.e. the creatures) which are in this image will call this rising, until the time it sets for them, a 'daytime', and from the time it sets for them, they call it a 'night'. But that (divine) Light is still present for this shadow, just as the Sun is still present in respect to the Earth both in its rising and in its setting (though it is visible to us only in its rising) . . . so in reality (that appearance of night) it is (only) a *shadow*, although they call it 'darkness'. . . . So know this!

Then Allah made these days which we know, that are caused by the motion of the isotropic orb, and the daytime and night that are caused by the heart (of the cosmos) – I mean the Sun – in order to determine through them the effects of the *divine* Days that belong to the Names.

[III.202.6]

Thus, as we have just seen, every divine Name has a specific Day (with its corresponding daytime and night), and, when the Day of one divine Name appears to be over, a Day of another Name starts, and so on; and all these are included in the eternal Day of the divine Name 'the Age':

And every divine Name, known or unknown, has a (specific) Day in the Age, and these are the 'Days of Allah' – and all, in reality, are the Days of Allah, but most people do not know that. So if we descend from the divine Names to the Day of the First Intellect, we find that its effect in the Universal Soul divided it into daytime and night: its 'night' in respect to the Soul is when the Intellect turns away from her when he approaches his Lord to benefit (by receiving knowledge from Him), and its daytime in respect to this Soul is when he approaches her to benefit her, so this is her daytime. And through this effect Allah made in the Soul two forces: the intellectual force, which is her 'night' in the world below her; and the active force, which is her daytime in the world below her – and that (contrast of these two universal powers) is called unseen and seen, letter and meaning, abstract and sensed. So this causes in the Soul a Day that has no daytime and night, while in the world it has (what we perceive as) daytime and night. The same applies to the Day of the 'Universal Matter' (*al-hayûlâ al-kull*): its daytime is its essence, and its night is its form, while it is in itself a Day with no daytime and night.

[III.202.20]

This (i.e. the relation between the two forces of the Soul and the two phases of the day, the daytime and the night-time) leads to a very important conclusion that we (physically) *move* in the world in the 'daytime' (*nahâr*) of the Soul, and that we (psychically or spiritually) *perceive* the world in the 'night-time' of the Soul – a key symbolism of the Qur'an and Hadith that Ibn 'Arabî develops at length throughout the *Futûhât* and other works. This motion-perception that happens in the 'day' (*yawm*) of the Soul is a cyclic unit action that repeats every day (in fact, every *moment* for us). In other words: we either move or perceive, but not at the same time.

Likewise, the Day in every orb is a Day with no daytime and night for that orb, but with the appearance of a daytime and night for (some of) the world below it. Ibn 'Arabî even gives an excellent example, using a detailed scientific explanation about something that we are familiar with nowadays, the phenomena of daytime and night on the Earth:

And Allah caused the (normal) daytime and night by creating the Sun and its (apparent) rising and setting on the Earth – whereas in the sky it is all light, with no daytime and night. The outlet of the night from the sphere of the Earth where the Sun sets is cone-shaped.

[III.203.22]

This is exactly what everybody admits now as a fact of science, shown in Figure 2.2 for more clarification.

So with regard to us, we are necessarily either under the effect of the day-times of particular divine Names of Allah or under the effect of their nights, depending on Allah's manifestation for each one of us and in everything else. But these Names in themselves have no daytime and night, but rather are all light. Ibn 'Arabi explains this differing influence of the different divine Names further by saying:

So its night is the 'unseen' (*ghayb*), which is what is hidden away from us but at the same time affects the high Spirits which are above Nature and also the roaming Spirits; and its daytime is the 'seen', which is its effect in natural bodies down to the last elementary body.

[III.201.15]

Ibn 'Arabi also gives more details about the different manifestations of God to different kinds of bodies and spirits, by dividing the daytime and night each into three thirds:

and when Allah divided His Days like that, He made its night three parts and its daytime three parts; so He, the Exalted, descends down to His servants in the last third of the night of His Days [*Kanz*: 3355, 3388], and that is when He is manifested to the natural spirits (*al-arwâh al-tabî'iyya*) that manage the material bodies; and in the middle third He manifests to the subjected spirits (*al-arwâh al-musakhkhara*, or the angels of each heavenly sphere), and in the first third He manifests to the 'dominating spirits' (*al-arwâh al-muḥaymina*).

And He divided the day of these days into three parts, and in every part He is manifested to the world of bodies – for they are always praising Allah. So in the first third He is manifested to the subtle bodies (*al-ajsâm al-latîfa*)




Figure 2.2 The daytime and night in the sky.

Note

Night is only in some regions below the corresponding orb, whereas in the orb itself it is all day. And in the case of the normal day on the Earth, the outlet of the night is extended in space as a cone.

which are unseen by sight, in the middle third He is manifested to the transparent materials (*al-aqsâm al-shaffâfa*), and in the last third He is manifested to the dense materials (*al-aqsâm al-kathîfa*). Without this manifestation, they would not be able to know Whom they are praising.

[III.201.24]

2.15 The 'single day'

As we have seen above, Ibn 'Arabî declares that there is an indivisible duration of time [IV.425.8] that is the smallest possible time or Day. Ibn 'Arabî calls this Day 'the single Day or time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) or 'the Day of task or event' (*yawm al-sha'n*). Another translation of *sha'n* is possibly 'concern', which could also convey the general meaning of the underlying Qur'anic verse, repeatedly cited by Ibn 'Arabî and it forms the basis of his unique view of the discrete nature of time: *kulla yawm Huwa fî sha'n* (55:29). But we prefer to use the words 'event' or 'task' in order to stress the meaning that in each such momentary 'Day', Allah acts in the world by creating the totality of all events. Ibn 'Arabî himself stressed this meaning: '(The *sha'n*) is nothing but the (single universal creative divine) Act, which is what He creates in each day of the smallest Days, which is the single time that is indivisible' [IV.425.11].

In every 'Day of event', Allah re-creates the world in a new image that is similar to the previous one, but with slight changes. Or in other words, in every 'Day of event' Allah causes one unique, singular Act in the world, because Allah is One and His Command (*amr*) is one (*Al-Masâ'il*, no. 26). However, this same single Act will have different results on the different entities in the world, depending on the capabilities and characteristics of each individual creature. For example, when Allah inspires the Universal Soul (*al-nafs al-kullîyya*) to move the element of fire (*unsûr al-nâr*) in order to heat the world, the effects of this single Act depend greatly on the individual creatures, so those who are ready to burn will burn, and those who accept heat will be heated, and so on [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 11]: Also he says in the *Futûhât* that 'the task in relation to the Real is one from Him – but in relation to the recipients (*qawâbil*) of the whole world, it is many tasks (events) that – were it not (all) confined by existence – we could call infinite (because everything that physically exists is necessarily finite)' [II.82.6].

The 'Day of event' is a single and indivisible duration of time that equals the entire earthly global day at each instant, but because the Universal Intellect scans in this 'Day' *N* number of states (that is $N/2$ for bodies in its 'day' and $N/2$ for spirits in its 'night'), it appears to the observer, who is one of these states, as infinitely divisible, because it is extremely small: $24 \times 60 \times 60/N$ seconds, and *N* is surely unimaginably huge. This is simply because the observer exists only for this infinitesimal amount of time during every 'Day of event'. This infinitesimal amount of time is what we call 'now' (*al-ân*), the 'moment' (see the following section) or the 'presence' – and this is the only *real* part of the imaginary time (see also section 6.8).

We must note that the isotropic orb, which is the first orb beneath the divine 'Pedestal', is not material. Therefore we can not differentiate between its 'parts', since there are no distinguishing features in this orb – which indeed is why it is called 'isotropic' (*atlas*), or the same in all directions. Therefore we can not measure the length of our normal day which is actually the 'day' of this isotropic orb (as we explained above in the previous section), and which also equals the Day of event. But rather we use this perceptible earthly day as a measure of other days, even though in itself it is an unknown duration of time. Although we divide it into 24 hours, each of which has 60 minutes of 60 seconds, all this is mere convention. We can not measure anything by its parts, so in order to measure this day, which is the period of the first orb, we need to compare it to other days 'before' it. But since it is the first day, we can not actually measure it: 'and when Allah created this first orb, it rotated a cycle which is unknown to other than Allah, the most Exalted, because there are no finite bodies above it, since it is the first transparent body' [I.122.29].

Moreover, Ibn 'Arabî also observes that since the isotropic orb has only one cycle, it can not be described as having an end, although we assume in it a beginning and an end [III.548.29].

In many cases Ibn 'Arabî calls this smallest, singular day 'the day of Breath' [II.520.33, III.127.335], and he even gives a measure of this day through the Breath: 'and the day is the magnitude of the breath of the Breather in the single time' [II.171.23]. This is because in this instantaneous 'Day' the divine creative 'Breath' emerges and returns to its Source, with its manifestation being the realm of all the divine 'letters', 'Words', or 'sounds' repeatedly produced by this Breath. As we shall see in section 7.8, Ibn 'Arabî visualizes the divine 'Word' as essentially composed of vibrations or sounds that are the 'letters' that form all the manifest objects and entities of the cosmos, just as letters form the words in human language. All words are composed of letters, and all letters are composed of the letter or initial out-breathing vowel sound *alif*, the first letter of the Arabic alphabet [I.78.22]. So in each single Day, this creative divine sound is produced by the divine Breath, and the manifest world is in reality the succession of these sounds or breaths. We shall explore this important issue in section 7.8 below. Also in section 6.8 we shall explain the creation scenario according to the Single Monad model of the cosmos.

2.16 Moments

In addition to the common Arabic words used for 'time' – *zaman* and *zamân* – *al-waqt* is also widely used, which means the state 'you are always described by, so you are always under the rule of the moment' [II.538.32]. We have already mentioned above the difference between *zaman* and *zamân*, and shown that Ibn 'Arabî uses them basically in the same context, although he tends to use *zaman* for fixed and short times, such as the Single Time. *Al-waqt*, however, sometimes has a different meaning and technical usage for Ibn 'Arabî. He notes that:

(this technical meaning of *al-waqt*) is in fact – by the convention of the Folk (the Sufis) – the state in which you are in the time being. So it is a thing that exists (now) between two non-existents (the past and the present; not as time but as things that have passed or are yet to come). And also it has been said that *al-waqt* is what comes upon them from the Real by (the Real's) managing (*tasrîf*) them, not by what they choose for themselves.

[II.538.35]

Ibn 'Arabi elsewhere gives many equivalent meanings of *al-waqt*. For example he defines *al-waqt* in his short dictionary of Sufi terms (*Isstîlâhât Al-Sûfiyya*: 8) by saying that: '*al-waqt* is your state in the time being, without any relation to the past or to the future'. But at the end he says that

the divine (ontological) basis of *al-waqt* is His, the most Exalted, describing Himself as being *each day upon one task* (50:29): so *al-waqt* is what *He* is in – in the root – but it appears in the offspring that is the cosmos. So the 'tasks' (*shu'ûn*) of the Real appear in the entities of the world (the contingent things). So *al-waqt* in fact is what you are in, and what you are in is your aptitude itself. So what appears in you of the tasks of the Real that *He* is in, is only what your aptitude demands: so the task is already designated, because the aptitude of the possible with its possibility led the task of the Real to bring it into existence. Do not you see that the non-existent does not accept the existence (or the task of the Real), because it has no aptitude for that. So the (outward, manifest) origin of *al-waqt* is from the cosmos, not from the Real, and it is a kind of supposition (*taqdîr*) and supposition has no effect (*hukm*) on other than the creation (i.e. it has no rule on the Real).

[II.539.2]

In this way *al-waqt* is the current moment of time; it is *our* portion of the single Day; so the single Day with regard to the whole world is the global reality encompassing all of manifest existence – including all on Earth – at any instant. But with regard to each entity in the world, it is a moment, since the time of each entity in the world is its *waqt*. This is why the Sufi was said to be 'the son of his moment (*ibn waqtihi*)', as indicated by Gerhard Böwering in his study of 'Ibn al-'Arabi's Concept of Time'. In this paper, Böwering also showed that 'In Ibn al-'Arabi's view there is an infinite cluster of moments, conceived as time atoms without duration, but they are mere instances of preparedness in which are actualized those possibilities that God has ordained to be affected in a human being' (Böwering 1992: 81).

However, the issue of whether the moment has a duration or not is extremely delicate. If we choose to say it has not, then how can the extent of the entire perceived day be composed of zero-length moments? We must keep in mind that the number of entities in the world (*N*), though very big, is finite. Therefore the single Day equals *N* multiplied by the duration of the moment. But if we choose to assert the actual duration of the 'moment', it would lead to questions already

encountered in earlier philosophers' paradoxes about time, such as 'What exactly happens *during* the moment?' and 'Does the event that takes a moment *pop up* at once or gradually?' For if at once, then 'Why does it take a duration?' and if gradually, then 'What are the sub-events, and how many are they?'

Ibn 'Arabî did not give any direct insight about this subtle and highly important cosmological issue. However, in his cosmological treatise *'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*, he spoke briefly about the Greatest Element (*al-'unsûr al-a'zam*) whom Allah created at once, and we shall show in section 6.4 that the Single Monad, though it is an indivisible unit, is composed of or made by (or from different manifestations of) this Greatest Element. Therefore, the moment (that corresponds in fact to the creation of the Single Monad) should also be composed of 'sub-moments' (that correspond to the creation of the Greatest Element). We can now affirm, according to Ibn 'Arabî, that those sub-moments are utterly indivisible because he said that Allah creates the Greatest Element 'at once'. The questions of 'Do those sub-moments have non-zero durations?' and 'How many sub-moments are in the moment?' remain open, though a first speculation is that the process is similar to the normal day where the Sun rises and sets to define the daytime and the night. There is some support for this in the comparison Ibn 'Arabî usually makes between the creation of the Perfect Human Being (that is the Single Monad) and the creation of the world, and more specifically the motion of the Sun during the day. We shall talk about this comparison in section 6.7. Therefore, the Day of the Single Monad (that is the moment) may look smooth and composed of a continuous flow of time. But it is quite possible that the same sets of questions may be repeated and similar quantization takes place at smaller scales.

When the Single Monad (that is the Universal Intellect) faces his Lord, this is the 'night' for the Universal Soul; and when the Intellect (*'aql*, masculine in Arabic) faces the Universal Soul (*nafs*, a feminine noun) this is her daytime [III.202.22], so this is the single Day of the Single Monad that is the Universal Intellect, and therefore the moments that are the days of the sub-entities of the world (which are the sub-intellects) should be also in the same way. But we have not seen any reference in Ibn 'Arabî's writings with any detail about the exact relation between the Single Monad and the Greatest Element, and hence about the moment and its possible constituents. On the contrary, Ibn 'Arabî affirms that this is a divine secret and that he was sworn not to disclose it (*'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*: 38).

2.17 The future, the present and the past

We have already said that the future and the past do not exist; the real time is only the present, the now (*al-'ân*) or the current state (*al-hâl*). Also, we explained that the Age is an endless circle that does not have a beginning or an end for itself; it is all an 'eternally ongoing present' which is called *al-ân al-dâ'im* or – as Ibn 'Arabî calls it elsewhere – 'the continuous existence' (*al-wujûd al-mustamirr*) [II.69.13, IV.362.32]. However, we live in time at the present now, and we feel the past and the future, so how can they be non-existence?

As we noted earlier, Ibn 'Arabî often explains that the essential realities [*a'yân*: the essences or entities] of the manifest world have always been existing in the Knowledge of Allah, though not actual real existence [II.309.25, I.538.32]. When Allah creates the world, it appears in real existence in the same reality as it is determined in Allah's knowledge. Allah does not create all the successive states of the world at once, but in a series process; so the creations are brought into existence one by one. Of course this is true in relation to us, but with relation to Allah, Who is out of time, the word 'series' would be meaningless because it is confined to time. For Allah nothing was changed because the creation existed in His knowledge eternally. So because we are sub-entities in this whole creation, we encounter time as past, present and future, but in fact only the present exists. The past is 'a relegation of an actualized non-existence', and the future is 'a pure non-existence' [II.69.13], whereas the present now (*al-ân*) or state (*hâl*) is 'what makes the distinction between them' [II.56.11], 'so without the (current) state (*hâl*) there would be no distinction between the past non-existence and the future non-existence, so the now (*al-ân*) is like a partition (*barzakh*)' [III.108.16]. 'Therefore the present state (*al-hâl*) is described by the continuous existence and it is the constant and immutable rule, and anything other than the present state is non-existence and could not be a firm (absolute) existence' [IV.362.33].

2.18 Eternity

As we have already noted, the English word 'eternity' has two different Arabic synonyms: '*azal*' and '*abad*'. *Azal* is eternity without beginning (*a parte ante*), and *abad* is eternity without end (*a parte post*). Ibn 'Arabî showed in his short treatise *The Book of Eternity* (*Kitâb Al-Azal*) that 'there is nothing called eternity at all' (*Kitâb Al-Azal*: 8–9). Eternity is in fact the *negation* of a beginning (or end), not endless extension: that is why Ibn 'Arabî says that eternity is a negative attribute. In this way there is no meaning to asking whether there has been any extension of time between the existence of Allah and the existence of the world, because Allah creates the world out of time, as discussed in section 2.3 above.

There has been a long debate amongst Islamic philosophers and theologians about the meaning of eternity and time with relation to Allah. Some philosophers say, for example, that Allah was talking in eternity in His eternal Speech, and that therefore He said in eternity '*take off thy shoes*' (20:12) to Moses, and '*worship thy Lord until certainty comes unto thee*' (15:99) to Muhammad, peace be upon them, and so on. They say that because clearly we can not say that Allah uttered these words at the time of Moses or Muhammad, therefore it must be an eternal speech. Ibn 'Arabî, however, showed in his *Kitâb Al-Azal* that all these interpretations are not proper, and that they end up confining Allah to time, which is a serious error: 'It is more proper to say that Moses heard out of time, because the Speaker spoke out of time. To let Moses become holy is better than letting *al-Bâri*' (the Creator) be compared to us' (*Kitâb Al-Azal*: 5, see also *al-Masâ'il*, no. 131).

So if we take the correct meaning of the word 'eternity', which is the negation of any beginning (*azal*), we may ask: was there anyone in eternity with the Creator or not? There has also been a long philosophical and theological debate about that, which Ibn 'Arabî summarizes by saying:

One group said: 'the primordials (*qudamâ*) are four: the Creator, the Intellect, the Soul and the Dust (*al-haba'*)'.

Another group said: 'the primordials are eight (pre-existents): the Essence and the seven descriptions' (i.e. the seven primordial descriptions or attributes of Allah, drawn from earlier kalam theology: 'Life, Knowledge, Ability, Will, Hearing, Seeing and Speaking' [I.525.32]).

Another group said: 'nothing is primordial but One, and He is the exalted Real, and He is One in all aspects, but to His Essence (there is) an aspect by which He is called Able, and so on for whatever they have made a description'.

Another group took this (last) opinion, but they added to it a (new) concept. And this concept is called 'the Reality of Realities', which is neither existing nor non-existing, but it is primordial with the primordial and created with the created; it can be imagined, but it does not exist by itself, like universality ('*âlamîyya*) and so on.

(*Kitâb Al-Azal*: 8–9)

Clearly, the Sufis are among the last group, and Ibn 'Arabî in particular relates the beginning of creation to 'the Reality of Realities' (*haqîqat al-haqâ'iq*), and sometimes he calls it 'the Universal Reality' (*al-haqîqa al-kullîyya*) or 'the Muhammadan Reality' (*al-haqîqa al-muhammadiyya*). He stated in chapter 6 of the *Futûhât* that the beginning of the spiritual creation is the 'Dust', and that the first existent within it was the 'Muhammadan Reality of (divine) Mercy' (*al-haqîqa al-muhammadiyya al-rahmâniyya*) that is not confined to space, and that it is created from the 'Known Reality' (*al-haqîqat al-ma'lûma*) that can not be described by either existence or non-existence [I.118.5]. Ibn 'Arabî claims that only the Sufis have introduced the concept of 'the Reality of Realities' (*haqîqat al-haqâ'iq*), although he admits that the Mu'tazilites drew attention to something similar to this notion when they tried to escape the accusation that their understanding of the divine Attributes postulated the real existence of additional realities other than the Essence of the Real [II.433.14, *SPK*: 134–139].

2.19 The age

So the days are repeated cycles of different 'orbs', whether celestial or divine: every orb has its own day. These days overlap with each other, so the day of the Sun, for example, takes 360 days of our days that we count on the Earth; the day of the Moon takes 28 normal Earth days, and so on. In one Sun day, many Moon days pass; and in one Moon day, many normal Earth days pass – just as in one 'Lord-day', one thousand Sun days (Earth years) pass. Likewise, *all* the possible days of *all* orbs and divine Names happen and repeat themselves in the 'Day of

the Age' that 'is one Day that never repeats, and it has no daytime (*nahâr*) or night' [III.202.5]. The Day of the Age is *all* a 'daytime': it does not have a night, because there is no orb above it; it is the truly all-encompassing orb that includes all material and spiritual orbs.

Ibn 'Arabî, like other Sufis, consider that 'the Age' (*al-dahr*) is one of the divine Names of Allah, according to a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad says: 'Do not damn the Age, for Allah is the Age' [*Kanz*: 8137]. In another divine saying (*Hadith qudsî*), Allah says: 'the son of Adam hurts Me: he damns the Age, and I *am* the Age, the command in My Hand, I circulate the daytime and the night' [*Kanz*: 8139].

Also in the Qur'an, Allah says: '*and they say: What is there but our life in this world? We shall die and we live, and nothing but the Age can destroy us. But of that they have no knowledge: they merely conjecture*' (45:24).

In his comments on this last verse, Ibn 'Arabî affirms that they (the disbelievers) are quite right in their claim that nothing but the Age can destroy them, because Allah *is* the Age – though they did not mean that, but rather meant simply time, and not 'the Age' as a name of Allah [IV.265.29].

We have seen above that 'the time of a thing is its presence': this is why Allah is named as 'the Age', because the realities of everything exist in Him. So He is 'the Age' because the whole world (hidden and manifest), including all space and time, from eternity without beginning (*al-azal*) to eternity without end (*al-abad*): all this is a manifestation of Allah's divine Names – so the Age is the all-encompassing orb of all Names [IV.266.11]. Ibn 'Arabî explains this by saying:

Do not you see in Allah's words (the Qur'an) when He told us about things in the past, He then used the past tense, and He used the future tense for things to come, and He used the present tense for the now-happening things, . . . and if we seek for all that something that has a real existence and these things are occurring in it – which is for them like a container – we shall find nothing, neither by mind nor by sense, except that we find it as an imaginary container, which is itself contained by another imaginary container, and so on, nothing but endless illusion. So if you think rationally, you will find that there is nothing (i.e. no 'containing' reality of space or time) that can be comprehended by imagination or by the mind, nor by the senses, nothing but the Real Existence on which our existence is based.

For this reason He named Himself to us as 'the Age', so that the reference can be only to Him, not to 'time' as imagined, because there is no Ruler (*hâkim*) other than Allah, and in Him appeared the realities of things and their properties. So He is the everlasting existence, and the realities of things with their properties appeared from behind the veil of His existence, but because of His subtleness (*latâfa*), we see the realities of things, which are ourselves, from behind the veil of His existence without seeing Him, just like we see the stars from behind the veil of the heavens (the orbs) and yet we do not see the heavens.

Moreover, given the above definition of the Age, it is not possible to imagine a plural form of this word in this meaning. Yet Ibn 'Arabî himself sometimes uses it as plural, when he speaks about the 'first age' or the 'age of ages' from which time appeared: 'from that (eternity) is the Prophet's saying: "Allah is/was, and none with Him" (*Kanz*: 29850), and this is a rare knowing known only by the "Solitary Sages" (*al-afrâd*) among men. That is what is called "the first age" and "the age of ages": and from this eternity (*azal*), time emerged' [I.156.35].

This could be slightly confusing, but there are some references in Ibn 'Arabî's writing that seem to parallel what is known in modern cosmology as the 'bubbles' model of the universe, where the universe is full of black holes that cause a large curvature in space-time in such a way that each can be considered as a separate space-time similar to – and as large as – our own; except that each is only a single point in our space-time. Thus Ibn 'Arabî affirms that 'each part of the world can be a cause for another world similar to it' [I.259.25]. Also Ibn 'Arabî considers that the origin of the world that we live in is the Universal Intellect, who is originally only one of an unknown number of roaming Spirits whom Allah created directly without any intermediaries [III.430.5]. Any one of these primordial Spirits is, therefore, capable of making another universe, just like the Universal Intellect that made our universe. Also we may recall that Allah in the Qur'an is repeatedly called the 'the Lord of the worlds', in the indefinite *plural*, and not only of this world. However, the Arabic word for 'the age' has also been conventionally used sometimes for other related meanings such as eternity without beginning (*azal*) and eternity without end (*abad*); so Ibn 'Arabî showed that the plural form 'ages' (*duhûr*) could also be used to include or refer to all these terms, since they all are essentially the Age [IV.266.5].

On the other hand, the Age is not only time, but it is also space. Because the Age is the totally 'encompassing orb', it must include everything inside it, spatial as well as temporal. As we shall show in section 3.6, the world as both space and time is created in the seven days of the divine Week (six Days for space, plus Saturday for time). And the Age is not more than those divine seven Days [II.438.5]. Thus in Ibn 'Arabî's conception, space and time have the same meaning as days, and both are unified as space-time, where the divine Week is its basic unit, and the Age is in fact this Single Week.

2.20 Other expressions of time

In addition to the common words such as time (*zaman*, *zamân*), moment (*waqt*), day (*yawm*), daytime (*nahâr*) night (*layl*), eternity (*azal/abad*) and the age (*dahr*), which we have discussed above, along with the related terms for week (*usbû'*), month (*shahr*) and year (*sana*), which we shall discuss in Chapter 3, there are other time expressions occasionally used by Ibn 'Arabî with slightly different and more specific technical meanings than in their usage by other Muslim scholars and theologians. We want to end this chapter by looking at some of these other temporal terms for the purpose of completeness, although we may not need to refer to these technical terms in the rest of this book. In

particular, some of these expressions became important in later forms of Islamic thought which tried to elaborate and integrate Ibn 'Arabî's ideas, in various ways, with the conceptual schemas of both kalam theology and Avicennan philosophy.

- *Al-sarmad*: this is another word for eternity, other than *al-azal*, *al-abad* and *al-dahr*. Unlike kalam theologians, Ibn 'Arabî does not use this word often. *Sarmad* means 'absolute eternity', i.e. it includes both eternity without beginning (*azal*) and without end (*abad*). It is most widely used as an adjective, *sarmadî*, meaning 'everlasting', and this is how it is used in a very pertinent discussion of time in the Qur'an (28:71–72). Ibn 'Arabî normally used it [I.164.2, I.169.26, II.675.14, IV.29.27] in a similar manner.
- *Matâ*: literally this word means 'when?', and refers to the relation of a thing or event to time, or to other events. It is used to inquire about the time or occurrence of an event in relation to others. Ibn 'Arabî affirms that the thought of time comes about due to this kind of inquiry: 'So for example if one asks: when (*matâ*) did Zayd come? Then the answer may be "(he came) when (*hîna*) the Sun rose"' [III.546.28].
- *Al-hîn*: this is a (relatively short) duration of time [II.201.36, II.263.25]; it is also commonly used to refer to a specific future or past time [II.201.36], usually in answer to 'when', as in the previous example: '(he came) when (*hîna*) the Sun rose' [III.546.28].

3 The significance of the divine week and its seven days

*The elements are four mothers,
and they are the daughters of the world of (the heavenly) orbs.
We are born out of them, so our (ultimate, spiritual) being
is in the world of (spiritual) principles (arkân) and (spiritual) rulers.
The God has made our sustenance from the ears of grain (sanâbil),¹
from the influence of Sunbula (Virgo),² without sharing.³
And He also multiplied our reward by 'the seven ears of grain',
as it was said in a saying (2:261) by One Who does not lie.⁴
So our time (zamân) is seven thousands (of years),
that come through the recurrence of (moments) of radiance and intense darkness.
So see, with your intellect, seven in seven,
from seven that are not kings.*

[I.292.31–293.3]

As Ibn ‘Arabî suggests in this cryptic opening poem of his key cosmological chapter 60 of the *Futûhât* (explained at the end of section 3.1), although we encounter many visible, apparent ‘days’ due to the rotation of the Earth around its axis, which all appear to be similar to each other, ultimately we can reduce them to only seven distinctive Days⁵ depending on the kinds of events that happen in them. Ibn ‘Arabî argues that in each Day of the seven Days of the (actual, cosmic) ‘Week’, Allah orders the heavenly orbs to act in a special unique manner that causes unique events and motions to appear in the entire cosmos. However, the seven Days of these divine, creative ‘events’ or ‘tasks’ (*shu’ûn*) are intertwined with our normal days of the apparent earthly week in a special manner that we shall explain in the coming chapter – and that is why we see multiple events appearing every day.

In various sections of the *Futûhât*, Ibn ‘Arabî goes on to explain the importance of the divine ‘Week’ (*usbû’*) and the different meanings of the seven Days of that Week, which are rooted in the meanings of the Arabic terms for each of those Days, running from ‘the First’ (*al-ahad*, corresponding to Sunday) to ‘the Day of rest’ (*al-sabt*, corresponding to Saturday). He also shows that Saturday is therefore the ‘Day of eternity’ (*yawm al-abad*) and that all the Days of the Week of creation, including Saturday itself, are actually occurring on this ‘last’ Day of

eternity (*al-sabt*). These distinctive conceptions can only be fully understood after investigating Ibn 'Arabî's view of the actual flow of time, which we shall explain in the following chapter; but in this chapter we shall first explain the origin and the meaning of these seven Days of the divine creative Week, why they have to be seven and not more or fewer, and what is the significance of each Day.

Also in this chapter we shall explain Ibn 'Arabî's unique understanding of the process of creation of the world by Allah '*in six Days*', from Sunday to Friday. He explains that the creation of the world in this Week corresponds to the creation of the 'six directions' of space (in six Days, from Sunday to Friday) and then the appearance of this creation *in time* on Saturday (the Day of eternity). In this way the Week is indeed the unit of the space-time container of the world – or also 'the Age' as we explained in section 2.19. This distinctive conception of the unification of space and time, symbolically expressed in Ibn 'Arabî's understanding of the seven Days of creation, adds an essential dimension to Relativity's concept of space and time; as a result, for the first time in astronomy, the 'Week' will itself have a clear and essential cosmological significance.

3.1 The significance of the week in theology and astronomy

In most Islamic books that talk about cosmology, we find many diagrams and tables that associate each day of the seven days of the week with specific letters of the alphabet and specific divine Names of Allah, in addition to certain planets and constellations or zodiacal signs. For example, Ibn 'Arabî explained in the long chapter 198 of the *Futûhât* [II.390–478] the creation of the world by Allah and the role of His divine Names on the different parts of Heavens and Earth, and then he relates each divine Name and the thing He creates to a letter from the Arabic alphabet, a mansion from the 28 lunar mansions (constellations), a day of the seven days of the week, and one of the seven circulating heavenly bodies (five planets, Sun and Moon). This type of symbolic association based on the days of the astronomical week is also found in many other cosmological books of other religions and cultures dealing with astrology and related mythology.

The Egyptians once divided their 30-day months into three ten-day weeks, in the same manner as Greeks of the same period (Goudsmit 1966: 24), but later they changed it back to seven days.⁶ More recently, the French (during the Revolution, in 1792) tried to make their week ten days instead of seven; and the Russians also tried (in 1929) five-day and (in 1932) six-day weekly systems, although they all later restored the seven-day week (Goudsmit and Claiborne 1974: 24).

So what is the importance of the week, and why does it apparently have to be seven days in particular, while most other attempted systems making the week three, five, six or ten days did not persist, with few exceptions such as the Maya who used weeks/months of 20 days (Aveni 1990: 101, 185–252)? Even some micro-organisms clearly adopt a seven-day biological cycle (Aveni 1990: 100,

and Coveny and Highfield 1990: 220–259). And yet, unlike the day, the year and the month, there is no any apparent *astronomical* significance to the week; nothing cosmic happens in the heavens in seven days.

The Babylonians and the ancient Egyptians believed that each hour of the day was ruled by one of the five then-known planets plus the Sun and the Moon, and they named the days of the week after the names of these seven circulating planets, as they are now used in both the Latin and Anglo-Saxon languages and cultures (Aveni 1990: 102–106). They considered that the planet that ruled the first hour of the day governed the entire day, so they gave the name of this planet to the corresponding day. The same doctrine was also part of earlier Persian cosmology and theology (Bickerman 1968: 59). Ibn ‘Arabî also refers to the same hypothesis [III.203.31].

It is interesting to note that these celestial bodies, in the same sequence, were also used to name the days of the week in ancient India, Tibet and Burma (Parise 1982: 172). This is also true for the names of Japanese (who used the Chinese sexagenary cycles) (Parise 1982: 215–218) days of the week, but the custom there has been traced back only 1,000 years. Adherents of the cult of Sin at Harran, who were known as Harranians or ‘Sabeans’ by Arabic and Syrian authors, also named their days after the same solar system members (Langdon 1964: 154). Like Ibn ‘Arabî, the Babylonians, the Chinese, ancient Egyptians and most ancient civilizations considered the day named after Saturn to be the seventh day, so they began their week with a day named after the Sun (Sunday), a practice which was affirmed in the Bible⁷ and later by the Prophet Muhammad.⁸

In the Arabic linguistic usages followed in Islam, however, the names of the days of the week do not relate to the names of any pagan gods or celestial bodies. Before Islam, different names were used in Arabic, which were mostly derived from certain actions people usually performed on those particular days of the week, though some of those Arabic names might also have been derived from the names of the planets (Al-Marzûqî 2002: 238–244). But in the later standardized Islamic usage, apart from the day-names *Jum’a* (Friday) which means ‘gathering’ and *Sabt* (Saturday) which means ‘rest’, the names of the days are merely numbered from one (*al-ahad* which means ‘the first’ or ‘the one’, for Sunday) to five (*al-khamis* which means ‘the fifth’ for Thursday). These names, however, clearly suggest that Sunday (*al-ahad*) is the first day of the week, as was the case with the earlier Babylonians and Egyptians – a fact which Ibn ‘Arabî and some other Muslim authors normally take for granted, based on many related prophetic narrations, as we shall see further below (section 3.5).

Given their centrality in Qur’anic accounts of the creation, the seven days of the week (and their standard Arabic names) play an essential role in Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology. His cosmological understanding of the week clearly has its basis in the scriptural accounts of divine creation, but also assumes throughout that there must be some kind of corresponding deeper effects of that (i.e. the divine creation of the seven Days of the Week) in the wider cosmos.

Finally, although there are many similarities between Ibn ‘Arabî’s doctrine about the origin of the divine creative Week and its Days, and the cosmological

perspectives and understandings of earlier ancient (mostly pagan) cultures, he also takes great pains to stress that this cosmological schema should not be understood as a deviation from the fundamental monotheistic teachings of Islam, and to indicate the ways that conception is rooted in indications in both the Qur'an and many hadith. Although Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology, for example, relates the seven days of the week and the orbs of the seven moving planets, as in many ancient cosmologies, he carefully emphasizes that he does not consider these planets as 'gods' at all. Thus he goes on to explain, in his explanation of the poem (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) opening chapter 60 of the *Futûhât*, that the planets and/or the angelic spirits associated with them 'are servants, and the servant does not deserve the name "ruler" (or "king": *malik*). And the "seven" mentioned (there) are the seven planets in the seven orbs that appeared by the seven Days of the Week' [I.293.4].

Following repeated indications in the Qur'an and Hadith, Ibn 'Arabî understands that those planets, along with other constellations associated with signs of the zodiac and lunar mansions, are associated with or inhabited by certain spirits (*rûhâniyyât*) or angels whom Allah appointed and organized in a specific hierarchy to look after the whole cosmos beneath them, including the Earth [III.433–434]. This is different from earlier cosmological doctrines, because the pagan astrologers believed that these spirits were deities and gods, while Ibn 'Arabî stresses that they are nothing but servants created and appointed by Allah.⁹

3.2 The four main time cycles

Ibn 'Arabî stresses that 'everything in the world has to be based on (specific) divine Attributes' [I.293.5]. Although some Muslim scholars, following a famous hadith [*Kanz*: 1933, 1937], believe that the basic divine Names or Attributes of Allah can be limited to 99, Ibn 'Arabî considers them to be countless [III.146.35], while the 99 Names that are referred to in some prophetic narrations are simply the main most Beautiful Names (*al-asmâ' al-husnâ*) of Allah. Of these many divine Names, there are four fundamental Attributes – Life (*hayât*), Knowledge (*'ilm*), Ability (*qudra*) and Will (*irâda*) – that are necessary and sufficient for Allah to be described as God. Therefore those are considered to be the ultimate sources or 'mothers' (*ummahât*) of all other divine Attributes [I.469.25]. In relation to creation, however, three more Attributes are also necessary for Allah to be Creator: Hearing (*sam'*), Seeing (*basar*) and Speaking (*kalâm*). Together, that makes the principal divine Attributes of Allah to be 'seven mother attributes. . . : Life, Knowledge, Ability, Will, Hearing, Seeing and Speaking' [I.525.32].

Because Allah created (the perfect) Human Being 'according to His Image' [I.163.20], these same divine Attributes are potentially manifest in every fully human person (such as Adam and the prophets). Also, as Ibn 'Arabî says, Allah created the world and everything in it in the image of (the Perfect) Human Being [II.652.25], and so the world with the Human Being is 'on the Image of the Real'

– but without the Human Being it would not have this perfection [III.343.25]. So these same attributes should be available and essential in the world as well. That is why, he explains, the numbers four and seven play a central role in the world: the four elements in nature (earth, water, air and fire, already mentioned in his poem opening this chapter), the four time cycles, the seven heavens, the seven days, and so on. The two cosmologically fundamental four fold groups that emerged out of the four ‘mother’ Attributes (Life, Ability, Will and Power) that are the four aspects of the divine Presence of the Essence (*al-Dhât*) are the four earthly elements (earth, water, air and fire) and the primordial cosmological principles of the Intellect, Soul, Dust and Nature, as in Figure 3.1.

This quadratic cosmological rule was also reflected in relation to time. Therefore, Ibn ‘Arabî points out, there are four main time cycles within the domain of manifest nature: the day, the week, the month and the year. These four *natural* time cycles have their origin in the effects of those four elements of Nature (fire, air, water, earth) that are originally derived from the above-mentioned four principal divine Names (‘the mothers’). As Ibn ‘Arabî says:




Figure 3.1 The Divine Quadratic Rule.

Note

This figure is translated from the *Futûhât* [1.260].

time is restricted to the year, month, week and day. Time is divided into four divisions because the natural seasons are four, because the origin of the existence of time is Nature, whose level is below the (universal) Soul and above the ‘Dust’ (*habāʾ*) that philosophers call the Universal Matter (*hayūlā*). The influence of this (principal) quaternity (*tarbīʾ*) in Nature is from the influence of the (same principle of) quaternity in the divine influences from (the fundamental Names) Life, Knowledge, Ability and Will. For by these four (Names), godship is confirmed for the God.

So the quaternity (first) became manifest in Nature. Then the (divine) Command descended until the (principle of quaternity) appeared in the ‘biggest time’ (cycle), which is the year, so that it was divided into the four seasons: spring, summer, autumn and winter. This was brought about by the motion of the Sun through *the stations* (of the zodiac), which have been divided by Nature into their (seasonal) divisions according to the (natural) elements that are the ‘basic principles’ (of fire, air, water and earth).

[chapter 390, III.548.17]

3.2.1 *The day*

We have already discussed Ibn ‘Arabī’s concept of the ‘day’ in Chapter 2, where we showed that he defines the ‘day’ as all that is included within the revolution of the Isotropic Orb, which encompasses all of material existence. This day is astronomically defined by the rotation of the Earth and it is conventionally divided into smaller units such as hours, minutes and seconds (see also section 4.6). The divine Day, however, is the corresponding effects (manifestations) of each of the seven fundamental divine Names on the entire cosmos, as we shall see further below (section 3.4). This unique divine Day is in fact the smallest indivisible unit of time, though it equals in length the normal day as we discussed in section 2.15.

3.2.2 *The week*

The second time cycle is the week, which Ibn ‘Arabī – following the detailed Qur’anic indications – considers to be the main cycle of Creation. The week (which is seven days) has its origin in the seven main Attributes of Allah, but until now it does not seem to have any particular astronomical significance. However, Ibn ‘Arabī’s unique view, as explained below, gives a profound and essential significance to the Week in terms of astronomy/cosmology as well as the theology of creation. This will be the main focus throughout this chapter (see in particular section 3.3 below).

3.2.3 *The month*

Ibn ‘Arabī distinguishes between the witnessed lunar month, which is from new moon to another new moon, and the ‘divine Month’ which is the time needed for

the Moon to perform one full revolution in the orb of the zodiac: that is, as Ibn 'Arabî says, 28 days [III.548.28]. He also recognizes the solar 'month' as the Sun's observed motion throughout the zodiac, where the zodiac is conventionally divided into 12 parts, each corresponding to one month [I.388.20], though he does not give any details about the length of solar months in terms of their days.¹⁰

3.2.4 The year

The year, for Ibn 'Arabî, is the time needed for the Sun to perform one full revolution in the orb of the zodiac [III.548.28], as witnessed from the Earth. Like the Babylonians,¹¹ Ibn 'Arabî considers the year to be 360 days [III.434.9], and not like our calendar year of 365.25 days.

Ibn 'Arabî regards our solar year and the solar (and lunar) month as conventions set up by human observers, while the 360-day year, the 28-day month, the (seven-day) week/Week, and the (sidereal) day/Day are divine periods of time set up by Allah when He created the heavenly orbs and made them move [III.548.27]. It is noteworthy in this regard that the 360-day year does not equal 12 of the 28-day months. These four time cycles that Ibn 'Arabî talks about are not meant for calendar purposes; they are said to be the actual measures of time set up by Allah when He created the world. Moreover, Ibn 'Arabî shows that this non-integer ratio is preordained and essential for the vastness of creation, because the creation is built upon the act of generation (*takwîn*), and with complete ratios no generation could happen; so there have to be integers and fractions [II.440.7].

The differences between the witnessed lunar month (synodic lunar month = 29.53 days) and the divine lunar month (of 28 days), and between the witnessed year (365.25 days) and the 360-day year, might be because of the interference of the different motions of the Sun, the Earth and the Moon. As the Earth spins around its axis it also rotates around the Sun, and as the Moon rotates around the Earth it also moves with the Earth around the Sun. These interfering motions may account for the difference. For example, if we measure the period of the Moon relative to those stars that are apparently fixed (this is called the sidereal lunar month), we get only 27.32 days (and not the usual 29.53 days, the observed lunar month). The divine lunar month for Ibn 'Arabî is 28 days because he measures that period in relation to the zodiac (far-away galaxies) or actually the Isotropic Orb, and not the orb of the Sun or the constellations [I.656.13], because those constellations are not actually fixed [III.549.3]. Also we have to know that the length of the observed earthly day varies from one place to another on the Earth and from summer to winter throughout the year, and that the normal solar year and the normal lunar month slightly vary from time to time owing to the influence of gravitation of other planets and stars that change their positions inside and relative to the solar system, respectively. Thus the mean solar day in the year 2000 is about 1.7 milliseconds longer than it was in 1900, and is slowly getting longer. There is a possible allusion in the Qur'an to such long-term

changes in the length of the year and the month, where Allah says: '*The quantity of months with Allah is 12 months (in a year) by Allah's ordinance in the day that (when) He created the Heavens and the Earth*' (9:36): in other words, it could be that the year started as 12 months each of 28 days, but that this then changed with time as the motion of the Earth slowed down and as the solar year became longer, and also as the lunar month became longer than 28 days.

In this regard, we should also notice that in Arabic there are two names for the year which do not appear to have identical meanings: *sana* and '*âm*. Although both terms are currently used to refer to the year, it seems from the etymological meaning of those two names and from Ibn 'Arabî's and Qur'anic usage that the word *sana* means the original 360-day year, while '*am* – which literally means 'entire' or 'full' – is the time needed for the Earth to make a full revolution around the Sun, which is the slowly lengthening conventional year now observed on Earth. In the Qur'an, Allah distinguishes between these two Arabic words in one verse that declares the time that Prophet Noah stayed with his folk: '*And verily We sent Noah unto his folk, and he continued with them for a thousand years (sana) save fifty years ('âm); and the flood engulfed them, for they were wrong doers*' (29:14).

3.3 The week as the primary time cycle

While Ibn 'Arabî considers the Week (of Creation) to be the primary time cycle, only the week among these four cycles does not seem to have any apparent astronomical significance. We can say only that the week is one-quarter of the divine lunar month ($28 = 4 \times 7$). From the observed astronomical point of view, the day should be the primary time cycle, because it is the smallest standard period of time as far as the solar system and the Earth are concerned, and all other three cycles (as defined by Ibn 'Arabî) are integer multiples of the day, while the year is not an integer multiple of the week. However, we shall see that Ibn 'Arabî does not consider the day to be the primary cycle because the Days of the divine Week are not similar to each other, as they might appear to us. Since each Day of the Week is based on one of the seven fundamental divine Attributes of Allah, so these Days are not identical because those seven divine Attributes are not identical. Therefore the Week, rather than the day, is the primary cycle of divine time, and each day of the seven Days of that Week is ruled by one of the seven fundamental divine Attributes.

However, in keeping with Ibn 'Arabî's essential understanding of the 'ever-new creation', this does not mean that any particular day of this week is *identical* to that of another week. They are only 'similar' to each other because they are originated from the same divine Attribute. Ibn 'Arabî says:

Nothing is actually repeated, because of divine vastness (*ittisâ'*); so (everything) is in ever-new, not renewed, existence. Thus if we call the new (thing) 'renewed', that is because it is extremely similar (but not identical) to its counterpart, so that they can not be distinguished from each other ... and

the daytime and night are called ‘the two-new’ (*al-jadīdān*), and not ‘the two-renewed’ (*al-mutajaddidān*), because Saturday is not Sunday and it is not Saturday from the other week, or from another month or from another year.

[III.127.23]

This is clearly evident in modern astronomy, because whatever periodical motions we see locally in our solar system are actually part of a more global motion that, in the end, never repeats itself in the same way, because everything is moving (see sections 1.1 and 1.4). In fact, Ibn ‘Arabī always stresses that there can not be any two identical forms in the world, and that this is because ‘Allah never manifests in the same form twice, nor in the same form to any two persons’ [III.127.33].

Therefore Ibn ‘Arabī maintains that ‘although there are many days, the real order of events reduces them into seven days’ [*Ayyām Al-Sha’n*: 6], which are the seven days of the week; and then these days iterate in months and years. And as we showed, this is due to the fact that ‘(the main) divine Attributes are seven, not more, which made the Age not more than seven (distinctive) Days’ [II.437.30].

However, the observed, earthly week and its days that we witness and live through do not seem to be distinctive in any natural way; as noted earlier, they appear to be purely conventional. The reason for that is the ‘intertwining’ between the underlying divine seven ‘Days’ of creation and the days that we live. This intertwining of the two kinds of days is a complicated concept that Ibn ‘Arabī explained partially in his short book *Ayyām Al-Sha’n*, and in a few passages in the *Futūḥāt*. We shall devote Chapter 4 to explaining the real flow of time as viewed by Ibn ‘Arabī, by defining three different types of days: the normal days, and the ‘taken-out’ days and the ‘intertwined’ days.

3.4 The divine origin of the seven days of the week

Therefore, Ibn ‘Arabī concludes, each Day of the seven Days of the divine Week has to be based on one of these seven basic divine Attributes:

So because Allah (Who is described by the seven fundamental Attributes) created the world according to His own Image [II.395.25], ... the Days had to be seven due to these (seven) Attributes and their rules, so the world appeared living, knowing, able, willing, hearing, seeing and speaking.

[II.438.19]

We have already shown in section 2.1 that ‘time’ for Ibn ‘Arabī is an imaginary attribute that is used to compare the chronological order of moving things. The day is actually a measure of the motion of the orb of the Sun, or more precisely the Isotropic Orb. And since motion is created by Allah, by creating events in the world, there are seven fundamental creative motions, or ‘Days of events’,

each of which is originated from or ruled by one of these seven divine Attributes, and further associated with specific astronomical or astrological positions and figures apparently involved in the cosmological manifestations of those divine influences (see also the detailed outline of these associated symbols in Table 3.1 below):

(the motion of) the Day of Sunday was from the (divine) Attribute of Hearing,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Monday was from the Attribute of Living,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Tuesday was from the Attribute of Seeing,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Wednesday was from the Attribute of Willing,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Thursday was from the Attribute of Ability,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Friday was from the Attribute of Knowledge,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Saturday was from the Attribute of Speaking.

[II.438.7]

This relation between the seven Days and the seven main divine Attributes is not arbitrary. We notice that Sunday, which is the first day of the week (and in the creation, as we shall see in section 3.5), was from the Attribute of Hearing. This is because Allah started the creation on this day, and the first thing that is needed for the thing to be created is hearing, in order to hear Allah's creative command 'Be' [II.401.28]. Ibn 'Arabî states that everything can hear before it actually appears in the world, because everything has some sort of existence or determination in the foreknowledge of Allah before He actually creates it [II.400.7, see also section 2.3 above and section 3.6 below]. By hearing the command of Allah, the manifest world or cosmos starts to gain real existence after it had been existing in the foreknowledge of Allah. Therefore the world appears in existence as hearing, living, seeing, willing, able, knowing, and speaking; but it gains these attributes one by one in a special sequence that starts by hearing and ends by speaking – but not necessarily in the same order, owing to the 'intertwining' of those divine influences that will be explained in the next chapter.

As Ibn 'Arabî points out, we can also notice a similar sequence in the first stages of the development of the foetus and child's life: s/he acquires the first six attributes before birth, while speaking is acquired afterwards (see also section 3.6 below for more comparisons between the macrocosm of the world and microcosm of the true human being). This can be compared to the creation of the world by Allah '*Who created the Heavens and the Earth and all that is between them in six Days*' [from Sunday to Friday, per IV.11.30], '*then He mounted on the Throne*' [on Saturday, per IV.11.31] (25:59), with Saturday being associated with the divine Speaking. As Ibn 'Arabî indicates in this regard [III.108–109], Allah also says: '*The All-Merciful, (He) taught the Qur'an, (then He) created the*

Human Being, (then He) taught him speaking out (59:1–4), which indicates again that speaking came last. On the other hand, Ibn ‘Arabî affirms that the baby who is born after six lunar months may live to be quite healthy, and those six months are six lunar ‘days’.

So for Ibn ‘Arabî, the creation of the world, like that of the foetus, is completed in six Days: these correspond to the six directions: (up, down, right, left, front, back), and then on the Seventh Day (Saturday) it – both the world and the human being – continues living, changing from one state to another. That is why Ibn ‘Arabî calls Saturday the ‘Day of eternity’ as we shall see further below (end of section 3.5). So like the genesis of each human being, although we do not clearly recognize it, the world – with all what it includes – ‘appeared living, knowing, able, willing, hearing, seeing and speaking’ [II.438.19] in seven divine Days.

Like the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians, Ibn ‘Arabî also assigns a specific divine Day to each planet of the seven moving planets in the seven heavens [I.154–156]. In addition to that, he also assigns to each of these planets – following the detailed indications in certain hadith – the spiritual reality (*rûhâniyya*) of one particular prophet (Chittick 2002: 201–230). Furthermore, each one of these seven prophets always has a representative on Earth as one of the seven ‘Substitutes’ (*abdâl*) of the spiritual hierarchy, each one located in one region (*iqîlîm*) of the seven basic geographical regions of the Earth.¹² Ibn ‘Arabî always affirms that whatever happens on the Earth is preordained in the heavens day by day and hour by hour – through these spirits of the prophets and other angels who reside in the heavens – and received by their agents (*nuwwab*, s. *nâ’ib*) on the Earth, though he also affirms that there are always other unpredictable actions or events due to the direct relation between Allah and every entity in the world, which is distinct from those relations mediated through the First Intellect or the Soul [II.434.8].

Thus he explains that

He (*the prophet Idrîs*)¹³ told his friends that there are seven (spiritually perfect) Men called (the ‘Substitutes’ (*al-âbdâl*, s. *badal*) by whom Allah keeps the seven geographical regions (*aqâlîm*); to each Substitute (is assigned) a region. They are looked after by the spirits of the seven Heavens, and each person of those (Substitutes) has power from the spirits of prophets residing in these Heavens. They (i.e. the prophets in the seven heavens) are Abraham (*al-Khalîl*, in the highest, seventh heaven of Saturn) then (in descending order) Moses, then Aaron, then Idrîs, then Joseph, then Jesus, then Adam, may Allah’s peace be upon them all. As for John (the Baptist), he alternates between (the heavens of) Jesus and Aaron. So (the divine knowledge) descends upon the hearts of those seven Substitutes from the realities of those prophets – peace be upon them!; and they are looked after by the seven planets by what Allah, the Exalted, entrusted (in those planets) through their rolling in their orbs and by what Allah entrusted in the motions of these seven heavens of secrets, knowings, and higher and lower

effects. Allah said: ‘*and He inspired in each heaven its mandate*’ (41:12). So they have in their hearts in each hour and in each day what the possessor of this hour and the ruler of this day give away (to them).

[I.154.34]

Ibn ‘Arabî also shows elsewhere that the seven Days are ‘created’ by the corresponding seven divine Names, and those are not the same as the fundamental Names or Attributes that initiated their motion [II.442.5]. Each one of those seven creating Names also created the corresponding heaven, the prophet who is in it, as well as the planet within that orb, a specific letter from the Arabic alphabet, and one specific constellation where ‘the specific planet of this orb is first created by Allah and started moving in this constellation’ [II.445.5]. The relation between each heaven and the corresponding letter of the alphabet is that ‘this heaven has some (special) effect in the existence of these letters’ [II.445.3]. All this is summarized in Table 3.1, which is arranged from the First Day (Sunday) to the Seventh Day (Saturday).

The information brought together in this Table 3.1 provides essential keys to Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology, astrological symbolism, and understanding of the spiritual hierarchy. However here we are mainly concerned with the seven Days of the Week. It is particularly important to notice the ‘irregular’ relationship between the order of the days as we witness them (Sunday, Monday and so on) and the corresponding order of the seven heavens and the seven related regions on the Earth. The week starts with Sunday, from the middle (fourth, solar) orb, which is the heart of all orbs [II.275.31], then Monday in the orb of the Moon (the first, lowest heaven), then the fifth heaven, and so on. However, the corresponding order of Earth regions (‘climes’) goes from the fourth, seventh, third, and so on as in Table 3.1. Thus we can see that there is always a difference (separation) of three days between one heaven and the other that is directly above it. As we shall see in the coming chapter, Ibn ‘Arabî therefore distinguishes between the witnessed order of the days of the week and their actual flow in the heavens, and he calls this separation *Salkh* or ‘taking-out’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7], a rare expression taken from the Qur’an (36:37). In interpreting that Qur’anic verse, Ibn ‘Arabî explains that there are three nights’ and three daytimes’ difference between the actual daytime and its own night that it was taken out of. This process of taking the daytimes out of the nights and vice versa is, in Ibn ‘Arabî’s view, the ultimate reason underlying the creation itself: for without it the world would not appear in existence in six dimensions [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 8–9]. This will be explained further in the following chapter with diagrams and illustrations.

3.5 The significance of each day of the divine week

Because of the importance of the Days of the Week of divine creation in Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology, he writes about them at length in the *Futûhât* and other books. In his mysterious book *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya* (*The Spiritual*

Table 3.1 The correspondences between the seven days of the divine week and the seven heavens, seven earthly regions, divine names, lunar mansions and letters of the Arabic alphabet

Day number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Arabic Day Names	<i>al-ahad</i>	<i>al-ithnayn</i>	<i>al-thulāthā'</i>	<i>al-arba'a</i>	<i>al-khamīs</i>	<i>al-jum'a</i>	<i>al-sabt</i>
English Day Names	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Divine Attributes	Hearing	Living	Seeing	Willing	Ability	Knowing	Speaking
Prophets' Names	Idrīs	Adam	Aaron	Jesus	Moses	Joseph	Abraham
Arabic 'Planet' Names	<i>al-shams</i>	<i>al-qamar</i>	<i>al-marrikh</i>	<i>al-kātib</i>	<i>al-mushtarī</i>	<i>al-zuhara</i>	<i>kaywān</i>
English Planet Names	Sun	Moon	Mars	Mercury	Jupiter	Venus	Saturn
Creating divine Name	<i>al-Nūr</i>	<i>al-Mubīn</i>	<i>al-Qāhir</i>	<i>al-Muḥsi</i>	<i>al-'Alīm</i>	<i>al-Musawwir</i>	<i>al-Rabb</i>
Prayer	<i>Imām</i>	<i>Ma'mūm</i>	<i>'Ishā</i>	<i>'Asr</i>	<i>Zuhr</i>	<i>Maghrib</i>	<i>Subh</i>
Constellation–Arabic	<i>Simāk</i>	<i>Ikklīl</i>	<i>'Awwa</i>	<i>Zabana</i>	<i>Sirfa</i>	<i>Ghafr</i>	<i>Khirtan</i>
Constellation–English	Arcturus	Corona	Bootes	Librae	Virginis	Cover	Mane
The Heaven	fourth	first	fifth	second	sixth	third	seventh
Earthly Region/Level	fourth	seventh	third	sixth	second	fifth	first
Arabic Letter	<i>Nūn</i> (ن)	<i>Dāl</i> (د)	<i>Lām</i> (ل)	<i>Tā'</i> (ط)	<i>Dād</i> (ض)	<i>Rā'</i> (ر)	<i>Yā'</i> (ي)

Note

The information in this table is extracted from chapter 198 of the *Futūḥār* [II.456–458] and *Al-Tanazzulāt Al-Mawsiliyya*

Inspirations at Mosul, Concerning the Secrets of Prayers and the Original Days), he devoted the last ten chapters to these divine Days and their relations with the heavenly orbs and the seven planets. However, it is not easy at all to extract a lot of information from this book because he intentionally used a very difficult language full of signs and secrets. However, some of his sayings there provide very useful information when we compare them to his statements in other books. For example, right in the full title of that book, we are led to understand that there are ‘original’ Days, as opposed to the normal witnessed days on Earth. We shall discuss in more detail the different types of days that Ibn ‘Arabî introduces and talks about there in the following Chapter 4, but what we shall now outline in the remainder of this chapter relates mostly to the ‘original’ Days of divine creation, which are ‘the Days of (divine) Events’, and not our normal witnessed days of the week.

To begin with, because each Day of the divine Week is ruled by a specific divine Name, it has to have a special significance related to this Name. This distinctive significance is not so apparent in the normal, ‘circulated’ days as it is for the original Days of Events as they were created by Allah. We shall first outline here the divine significance of each Day of the Week in the process of creating the macrocosm of the heavens and the Earth – and also the microcosm of the theomorphic human being (*insân*).

In addition to those general verses in Qur’an in which Allah states that He ‘*created the Heavens and Earth in six days and then He mounted on the Throne*’ (7:54, 10:3, 11:7, 25:59, 32:4, 50:38, 57:4) there are some details about what He created each Day in the verses at the beginning of the Sura *Fussilat* (41:9–12). These verses were explained further in one hadith where the Prophet Muhammad said:

Allah, the cherished and the glorified, created the first Day (event) in Sunday; and the earth was created on Sunday and Monday; and on Tuesday and Wednesday the mountains were created, the rivers were cleft, fruits were planted and in each earth its food was determined, *then turned He to the heaven when it was smoke, and said unto it and unto the Earth: Come both of you, willingly or unwillingly. They said: We come, obedient.* So He completed them seven heavens in two Days and inspired in each heaven its mandate (41:11–12), on Thursday and Friday; and the last of creation was in the last hours of Friday, and when it was Saturday there was no creation in it.

[*Kanz*: 15120]

So here we will briefly outline what Ibn ‘Arabî has to say about the significance – in the creation of both the world and the human being – of each Day of the original Days of the divine Week of creation:

3.5.1 'The first day' of creation (*al-ahad*, Sunday)

The Arabic name for Sunday, *al-ahad*, is also a Qur'anic name of Allah (112:1, etc.) which means 'the One', 'the Unique', the indivisible Unit. It is the first Day in which Allah started the Creation, so it is the first Day in the world [IV.11.31]. As we explained in section 2.3, the entities of the world were already eternally determined in Allah's foreknowledge, and by this state of pre-existence they gained the first fundamental divine attribute of 'hearing'. So the motion of 'Sunday was created from the Attribute of Hearing; that is why everything in the world hears the divine Command (Be! *Kun*) (even) in its state of non-existence' [II.438.8]. Allah said in the Qur'an: '*But His Command, when He intendeth a thing, is only that He saith unto it: Be, and (then) it is*' (36:82). Therefore Allah creates by saying the command 'Be' unto the things even before their actual existence. Ibn 'Arabî, however, carefully distinguishes between the divine 'Saying' (*qawl*) and 'Speaking' (*kalâm*): 'By "Saying" the non-existent hears. (This is) like His saying "*and our Command when We intend a thing is to say unto it 'Be'*" (16:40). And by "Speaking" the existent hears, as in His saying "*and Allah spoke to Moses, speaking*" (4:164)' [II.400.7].

As we have already explained in earlier chapters, Ibn 'Arabî affirms that the motion of the Isotropic Orb determines only one Day, which is one cycle starting from when the first degree of Gemini is matching the Foot in the Pedestal (see section 2.4). So because the divine Pedestal is above the Isotropic Orb, which has no distinguishing signs, the length of the day cannot be known [II.437.34]. Although we on Earth normally measure the day by hours and minutes or by the time of the Earth's motion around itself, this is a mere convention – while the actual length of the day/Day is known only to Allah [I.122.28].

Ibn 'Arabî elsewhere explains that the Sun and its heavenly orb were created on Sunday [I.155.6, I.466.6, II.445.15]. This is because the Sun resembles the spirit [I.55.8, I.275.26], and the absolute Spirit (i.e. 'the real through whom creation takes place': *SDK*: 132–134) is the first appearance of the divine Real (in the Creation), so with the initial creative motion of this First Day, the 'point' (*nukta*) or zero-dimension (0-D, as we shall discuss the dimensions in detail in section 7.10) was defined. The Sun is in the central, fourth heaven from the Earth, and this heaven was created by the self-disclosure (*SDK*: 91, 103, also *SDG*: 47–57) of the divine Name 'the Light' (*al-Nûr*). Hence:

(the Sun) is the heart of the world and the heart of the (seven) heavens. Allah created it on Sunday, and He made it a place for the Pole of human spirits, Idrîs, peace be upon him. And Allah called this heaven '*a high place*' (19:57) because it is a heart, although the heaven that is above it is higher (in physical place). But Allah meant the highness of status (*makâna*), so the place (*makân*) (of the fourth, central heaven) is high because of its status, and Allah created it in *al-simâk* (which is the central, fourteenth station of the 28 stations or 'mansions' of the Moon), and created its planet (the Sun) and its orb, and created the letter *nûn* (ن) out of it.

[II.445.15]

Ibn ‘Arabî then explains the relation and correspondence between the fourth heaven (celestial sphere) of this Day and the particular geographical clime on the Earth that was appointed to the corresponding figure from among the seven Substitutes (*abdâl*), and what are the particular ‘affairs’ that happen on – i.e. through the higher influences associated with – this Day:

Every affair of knowledge in the First Day is from the matter of Idrîs, peace be upon him! And every higher (celestial) effect on that Day in the elements of air and fire is from the orbiting of the Sun and its supervision which is entrusted to it by Allah, the Exalted. As for what comes from the effect on the elements of water and earth on that Day, (it) is from the motion of the fourth orb (containing the Sun). The (earthly) place of the (spiritual) person (*badal*) who upholds that influence among the climes is the fourth clime. So what is acquired, among the (divinely inspired) knowings, by this particular person among the *abdâl* (residing) in this region is the knowing of the secrets of the spiritual entities (*rûhâniyyât*: i.e. directing the heavenly spheres), the knowing of light and radiance, the knowing of the lightning and the rays (of light), and the knowing of every luminous material body – why it becomes illuminated, what is the (distinctive) constitution that gave it this receptivity (to luminosity).

[I.155.6]

Also in chapter 46 of *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*, Ibn ‘Arabî mentioned many mysterious details about this Day and his visit to the Pole of all spirits, the prophet Idrîs, in the orb of the Sun. This chapter (46) of the *Tanazzulât* – together with its following few chapters, and taken in conjunction with related passages from chapters 15 and 198 of the *Futûhât* – deserves a separate specialized study which is beyond the scope of this book. I have just mentioned some related passages for the ‘First Day’ above as an illustration of those mysterious allusions in the *Tanazzulât*, but in the shorter summaries from the *Futûhât* below will have to pass over Ibn ‘Arabî’s corresponding remarks for the other Days.

3.5.2 ‘The second day’ of creation (*al-ithnayn, Monday*)

Ibn ‘Arabî says that ‘the motion of Monday was created from the (divine) Attribute of “*The Living One*” (*al-Hayy*), and through it life was in the world, so everything in the world is living (i.e. starts to become living, on Monday)’ [II.438.9]. Then he explains that the Moon, which corresponds to the ‘Second Day’ of Creation, is in the first celestial sphere above the Earth:

And the divine Name ‘*The Clarifying One*’ (*al-Mubîn*) was intent on bringing into existence this lowest heaven and its planet (the Moon) on the Second Day, in the (lunar mansion) of *Iklîl* (‘the Crown’, which is the seventeenth station of the 28 lunar stations), and the letter *dâl* (د) is from the motion of this orb.

[II.445.30]

The Moon is the fastest moving planet in the heavens, moving through one lunar mansion every day, so it goes through all 28 lunar mansions in its day, which equals 28 Earth days (according to Ibn ‘Arabî, as explained in section 3.2). Ibn ‘Arabî explains that from this motion the 28 letters of the alphabet are created, regardless of how they are written or spoken in different languages [II.448.4] (i.e. the sounds). Allah made this first (lowest) heaven the place for the first prophet Adam, since he is the (first manifestation or exemplar of) the Perfect Human Being.

The Moon – in keeping with its association with Adam (the emblematic human being) – resembles the soul [I.499.5], and it is the second state of the appearance of the Single Monad, after the creation of the spirits (angels), which are purely spiritual creatures. That is why Adam himself lectured Ibn ‘Arabî about the directions when he visited him in the orb of the Moon (*Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*: 261) – because through the creation of his Day (Monday) the space and the six directions started to form.

3.5.3 ‘The third day’ of creation (*al-thulâthâ*, Tuesday)

And for the motion of Tuesday Ibn ‘Arabî says that it was created from the divine Attribute ‘Seeing’ (*basar*): so there is no part of the world but that it is witnessing its Creator – i.e. in relation to its own individual essence, not the Essence of its Creator [II.438.10], because the Essence of Allah, the Creator, may not be seen, He may be seen only through the manifestation of His Attributes (Names) throughout the Creation as we shall discuss in more detail in section 5.5. Ibn ‘Arabî then adds that

The divine Name ‘the All-Prevailing’ (*al-Qâhir*) was intent on bringing into being the third heaven (the fifth from Earth); so He caused its (distinctive spiritual) reality to appear, along with its planet (Mars, *al-marrikkh*) and its sphere, and He made it the dwelling for Aaron. . . . The existence of this planet and the motion of its sphere were in the lunar mansion ‘*Awwa*’ (which is the thirteenth station of the 28 Moon stations) on Tuesday. . . . And from the motion of this sphere appeared the letter ‘*lâm*’ (ل).

[II.445.8]

3.5.4 ‘The fourth day’ of creation (*al-arba‘â*, Wednesday)

For Wednesday he says that ‘the motion of the Fourth Day came into existence from the (divine) Attribute of Willing (*al-irâda*), so there is no part of the world but that it is seeking to glorify the One Who gives it existence [II.438.11].

Mercury is in the sixth sphere from the Earth, and this heaven was created through the (self-disclosure of the) divine Name ‘the Enumerator’ (*al-Muhsi*). Allah created this heaven, its planet (Mercury), the Fourth Day (Wednesday), and letter *tâ*’ (ط) in the lunar mansion of the constellation *Zabana* (which is the sixteenth station of the 28 Moon stations), and He caused Jesus to dwell there [paraphrasing II.445.26].

3.5.5 'The fifth day' of creation (*al-khamis, Thursday*)

And the motion of the Fifth Day (Thursday) came into existence from the (divine) Attribute of Ability (or 'Power', *al-qudra*), so there is no part of existence but that it has been enabled to praise the One Who gives it existence [II.438.16].

Jupiter (*al-mushtarî*) is in the sixth heaven from the Earth, and it and its sphere were brought into existence through the self-disclosure of divine Name 'the All-Knowing' (*al-'Alîm*). Allah created this heaven, its planet, the Fifth Day and the letter *dâd* (ض) in the lunar mansion of the constellation *Sirfa* (which is the twelfth station of the 28 Moon stations), and He made it a dwelling place for the prophet Moses [paraphrasing II.444.25].

3.5.6 The sixth 'day of gathering' (*al-jum'a, Friday*) and its special hour

Friday holds a special importance for Muslims and especially for Ibn 'Arabî, who says that in this Day our Tablet (i.e. the souls) received its secrets from its Lord, through the pens (i.e. the intellects). Ibn 'Arabî then says that 'the motion of the Day of Gathering (Friday) came into being through the (divine) Attribute of Knowledge: so there is no part of the world but that it knows the One Who gives it existence, with regard to its own essence, not the Essence of the One Who gives it existence' [II.438.13].

Venus is in the second sphere of the heavens from the Earth and this heaven was brought into existence by the self-disclosure of the divine Name 'the Shaper' (*al-Musawwir*, the One Who gives form). Allah created this heaven, its planet (Venus), the Day of Gathering (Friday), and the letter *râ'* (ر) in the lunar mansion of the constellation *Gafr* (which is the fifteenth station of the 28 stations of the Moon), and He made it a dwelling place for the prophet Joseph [II.445.23].

Before the advent of Islam, the Arabs called Friday *'Urûba* ('the day of beauty and adornment') [I.645.25], because it was a distinguished day in which people meet. But in Islam Friday is called *al-jum'a* ('the Day of Gathering') because that is the day people gather in prayer in one mosque. Ibn 'Arabî, however, gives another explanation of the deeper ontological meaning for *Jum'a*. On this Day Allah created the Human Being (Adam) in His Image, so on this Day Allah 'gathered together' (Arabic verb *jama'a*) the form of the Truly Real (*al-Haqq*) and the form of all creation in the theomorphic human being (*insân*), so that is why this Day is called *Jum'a* [I.643.27]. And this special divine 'gathering' of the theomorphic human being has occurred on a specific hour of this Day, which made this whole Day holy, noble and the best of all Days.

Ibn 'Arabî affirms that Allah created humanity (Adam) on Friday [I.466.15], following a well-known hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad said: 'The best Day the Sun rises on is Friday: Adam was created in it, he entered into Paradise in it, he was taken out of Paradise in it, and the Hour (of the Resurrection) will only come on Friday' [*Kanz*: 21050].

Ibn ‘Arabi goes on to explain, on the basis of another hadith [Kanz: 21063], that some people argued about the best day of the week to celebrate or commemorate God in, and that the people of the three major religions each followed a different way, especially since Allah did not specify which day is best, but left it for them to discover:

So the Christians said the best of days – and Allah knows best – is the First Day (Sunday), because it is the day of the Sun and it is the First Day in which Allah created the heavens and the Earth and what is between them. He started the Creation in it due to its pride over the rest of the days. So they took it as a festival. . . . And the Jews said: ‘But it is Saturday, because Allah completed the Creation on Friday and He rested on Saturday.’ . . .

Then for this community (of Islam) Gabriel came to Muhammad, may Allah have peace and mercy on him, with the Day of *Jum’a* in the form of a polished mirror in which there is a spot (*nukta*), and he said unto him: ‘this is the Day of *Jum’a* and this spot is an hour in which no Muslim servant happens to be praying (when it comes to pass), but Allah shall forgive him’ [Kanz: 21063]. So the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah’s peace and mercy be upon him, said: ‘So Allah guided us to what the people of the Book disagree about, which is the divine explanation with the mirror’ – and he assigned the guidance to Allah. And the reason behind its superiority is that it is the Day in which Allah created this human kind, for whom He created the creatures from Sunday to Thursday, so it has to be the best of times. And the creation (of human kind) was in this Hour which appeared as a spot in the mirror. . . . And this Hour in the Day of *Jum’a* is like the night of destiny [*laylat al-qadr*, which according to Qur’an, *is better than a thousand months* (97:3)] in the year.

[I.466.6]

So, he concludes, that is why Allah chose this Day over the other Days:

As He, the Exalted, did with all the existents, He has chosen as the best one thing from each kind. He has chosen as the best from the Beautiful Names the Name ‘*Allāh*’; He has chosen as the best from the people the prophets; He has chosen as the best from His servants the angels; He has chosen as the best from the heavenly spheres the (divine) Throne; He has chosen as the best from the elements water; He has chosen as the best from the months Ramadan; He has chosen as the best from worshipping fasting; He has chosen as the best from the centuries the century of the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah have peace and mercy upon him; He has chosen as best from the Days the Day of Gathering (*al-jum’a*); He has chosen as best from the nights the Night of Destiny; He has chosen as best from (good) deeds the prescribed deeds (*al-farâ’id*); He has chosen as best from the numbers the number 99 (in the hadith on the 99 ‘Most Beautiful Names’ as mentioned above).

[II.169.5]

Then Ibn ‘Arabî goes on to explain why Allah has chosen as best these particular things in each kind. With regard to the Day of Gathering, he says:

As for (the reason) for His choosing Friday as best from the Days (of the divine creative Week), that is because in it the Two Forms appeared [i.e. of the cosmos and of the theomorphic human being, in their final perfected state]. Allah made that Day (of the Gathering) for the form . . . , and it is (uniquely) a feminine Day, for which is the beautiful adornment and the completion of the creation (through Adam).

And [alluding to the hadith just cited above] Allah has chosen an Hour of its hours that is like a spot in the mirror. That is the place (of manifestation for) the form of the one [i.e. Adam, as the emblematic fully human being and divine vice-gerent] who is disclosed in the mirror of this Day. Thus He/ he sees in it/him H/himself.¹⁴ And through that Form [of all human being] that appears *between* the mirror (of creation) and the One Who looks in it, there takes place the (divine) Addressing (of each human soul) and the imposition of responsibility (*taklîf*: on each human being).

[II.173.15]

So this Hour is the most precious hour, because in it the divine Form of the Real (*al-Haqq*) and the form of the theomorphic human being meet together (*yajtami’ân* from the same Arabic root as *al-jum’a*), and by this ‘gathering’ the Real is manifested – and at last perceived – in the Creation in the most perfect form, which is the form of the perfect human being. In another passage, Ibn ‘Arabî explains this further:

And there is no Day among the Days (of Creation) more perfect than the Day of *Jum’a*, because in it there is made manifest the Wisdom of (God’s) Capability, through His creating on that Day the human being whom Allah created on His Image. So there remained no (more) perfection for the divine Capability to create, since nothing is more perfect than the Image of the Real (*sûrat al-Haqq*). . . .

Now since God specially distinguished (this Day) by that ‘Hour’ which does not belong to any other Day – and time (*zamân*) is nothing but those Days – therefore this Hour does not pertain to any other times but to the Day of *Jum’a*. It is one part of the 24 parts of the Day, and it is in the half of the Day which is called daytime (*nahâr*). So it is in the manifest dimension (*zâhir*) of that Day, and in the inner dimension (*bâtin*) of human being, because the outer dimension of human being corresponds to the inner dimension (night-time) of the Day, while the inner dimension of human being corresponds to the outer dimension (daytime) of the Day.

[I.645.26]

Ibn ‘Arabî also comments on the imperative question of whether this Hour is fixed, or is floating all over the Day, so that each Week it comes at a different

time, since the original hadith above [Kanz: 21063] did not give any explicit indication of its exact location 'in' the Day of Gathering. Ibn 'Arabî, in any case, does not rule either possibility. He suggests that, if we have to take the strict sensational meaning of the analogy between the Day and the mirror and the forms that appear in them, then that specially chosen Hour would be fixed. But, if we want to take it as an abstract meaning in the imagination, without moving it into the world of senses – which is quite plausible in this context – then we could say that it may be floating all over the Day of Gathering. So he affirms that both possibilities are plausible and that the issue may not be resolved without a further divine specification [I.466.17]. However, because it denotes the creation of the Human Being as the Image of the Real, this Hour must be fixed (on the Day of Gathering) among the original (divine) Days that are the 'Days of events', although it might be floating in the normal 'circulated days' that we actually experience, because they are 'intertwined' with the 'Days of events'.

3.5.7 The seventh 'day of rest' (*al-sabt, Saturday*) as the 'day of eternity'

As for the last day, Ibn 'Arabî says that 'the motion of Saturday was created from the (divine) Attribute of Speaking (*kalâm*), so everything in the existence glorifies in thanks of its Creator, but we do not understand their glorification' [II.438.16]. Obviously Ibn 'Arabî is referring here to the verse '*the seven heavens and the Earth, and all beings therein, declare His glory: there is not a thing but celebrates His praise; and yet ye understand not how they declare His glory! Verily He is Oft-Forbearing, Most Forgiving!*' (17:44). We shall also see in section 7.8 that the world essentially is the 'words' (i.e. the vibrations) generated by its entities on the smallest scale. This is true for whatever we hear, see, smell, taste and everything physical – all are the 'words' spoken by the entities of the world. This seems to cope very well in accordance with the recent theory of Superstrings.

Elsewhere Ibn 'Arabî says:

Saturn (*Kaywân*) is in the seventh sphere from the Earth, and this heaven was created by the (self-disclosure of the) divine Name 'the Lord' (*al-Rabb*). Allah created this heaven, its planet and the 'Day of Rest' (*al-sabt, Saturday*) in the lunar mansion of the constellation *Khirtân* (also called *al-Zabra*, and it is the eleventh mansion of the 28 Moon mansions), and He made it a dwelling place for the prophet Abraham.

[paraphrasing II.442.21]

Saturday bears a very important and unique meaning for Ibn 'Arabî, since he considers it to be the Day of eternity. This concept is initially mysterious, but extremely important, since Ibn 'Arabî mentions it many times in the *Futûhât* and other books and considers it as an undisputable fact.

In his *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*, he asserts that: 'Saturday passes through the existent things like number does in the countable things, permanence in the

permanent things, and standing in the standing things; it is not non-existing nor existing, and not present nor absent' (*Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*: 339).

This description is also like the strange properties of the 'Universal Reality' (*haqîqat al-haqâ'iq*, 'the Reality of Realities') that he introduces to connect the divine properties of the Real with the properties of the Creation. By way of clarification, he then goes on to explain that

The whole world (as kinds and species, including metals, elements, plants, animals, angels, jinn and humans) from its beginning to its end was formed in six Days, from the beginning of (the night) of the First Day until the end of the Day of Gathering (Friday), and there only remains Saturday for changing from one state to another and from one rank to another, and for transmutation from one being to another, constantly. . . . That is why the 'rulers' (in terms of higher astrological or cosmological influences) on this Day are cold and dryness (so that they will be able to hold the picture in imagination in order to feel the continuous presence, as will be discussed in section 5.6), and among the planets: Saturn. So this Day alone was a circumferential orb whoever moves in it will know the Identity, the Attributes, the Actions and the Effects.

[I.61.13]

This alludes to the three types of divine Names: the Names of Essence (*asmâ' al-dhât*), the Names of Descriptions or the Attributes (*asmâ' al-sifât*) and the Names of Actions (*asmâ' al-af'âl*) [I.423.20, I.67.28; *K. al-Masâ'il*: 97] and the 'Effects' here are the entire Creation. So Ibn 'Arabî says that the one who moves with the orb of Saturday will know the Real and the Creation. This is in fact the description of the spiritual 'Pole' – like Ibn 'Arabî himself – who is therefore 'out of time' (see also section 2.7), because he already knows that he witnesses the real Day of Saturday.

Ibn 'Arabî even explicitly calls Saturday the 'Day of Eternity' (*yawm al-abad*: *al-abad* being eternity considered as extending eternally 'into the future', as opposed to *al-azal* or 'beginningless eternity') quite often in his writing. For example, in the *Futûhât* he says:

And so the Day of Eternity starts which is Saturday (*al-sabt*), and *al-sabt* means 'rest'; it is the seventh Day, and it has no end. No sense of weariness touched the Creator in creating what He did. So Saturday was the Day of being finished with the creation of the levels of the world, but there still remains for Allah the creation of what this world requires of the states (for every individual creature), which are eternally endless and without limit.

[III.192.20]

He also named chapter 53 of *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya* 'On the Inner (Spiritual) Knowing that Saturday is the Day of Eternity, and it is the Day of Transmutations'. Saturday, therefore is the 'Day of Rest' (as its name in Arabic, *al-sabt*,

also indicates), because Allah has finished the creation (of all the cosmos and human being) on Friday, so that there remained nothing new to be created – except for the endlessly changing states of all the creatures in time.

Thus Ibn ‘Arabî affirms that

Allah created the world in six Days; He started on Sunday and finished by Friday, and no sense of any exhaustion touched Him; nor did He get weary from creating the creatures. So when it was the seventh Day of the week and He had finished creating the world, He looked like someone who is taking a rest from weariness. So He reclined and put one leg over the other and said: ‘I am the King’, as narrated in the prophetic sayings, so this Day is called *al-sabt*, which means ‘the Day of Rest’. It is the Day of Eternity, because in this Day the individuals of every species are formed in the world and in the hereafter.

There are only seven Days, and each Day has a ruler (*wâli*) designated by Allah. So when the matter/Command ended up on Saturday, Allah assigned it to a ruler with the ability to stabilize and fix, so he can stabilize the forms (of all the creatures) in the ‘*Dust*’ (*al-habâ*’, of the *barzakh* or divine Imagination). So the daytime (*nahâr*) of this Day – i.e. the Day of Eternity – is for the people of the Gardens, and its night-time is for the people of the Fire: so there is no evening (end) for its daytime, and its night-time has no morning.

[IV.11.30]

Then Ibn ‘Arabî mentions the story of his encounter with the (spirit of) *al-Sabtî* (lit.: ‘the Saturday man’) who is Muhammad, son of the famous Abbasid caliph Harûn al-Rashîd, whom he met in Mecca one Friday while circumambulating the Kaaba, and asked him: ‘I knew that you were called *al-Sabtî* because you worked every Saturday for what you ate during the rest of the week . . . so why did you choose Saturday from the rest of the days of the week?’ Al-Sabtî replied:

This is a very good question. I knew that Allah started creating the world on Sunday and finished on Friday, and on Saturday He reclined and put one leg over the other and said: ‘I am the King’; that is what I heard in narrations when I was in this world. So I swore to work like that.

[IV.11.35, see also *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*: 340]

So he worked on Saturday and rested (to devote himself to worship Allah) in the other six days. So Allah’s work of the creation was done in the six Days from Sunday to Friday, and the ‘Day of Eternity’ is for us to work and develop through the path leading to our ultimate destination.

On the other hand, the fact that the seventh Day was created through the divine Attribute of Speaking reminds us that the very First Day was created through the divine Attribute of Hearing. Ibn ‘Arabî typically points out that this all together is like a circle: since the world is created through divine Speaking

(the Command ‘Be’), so the creatures first needed hearing in order to hear that existentiating Command. Because human beings are – at least potentially – uniquely created in the fully theomorphic Image of Allah, He granted them something of the Attribute by which He creates things, so they in turn can create through ‘speaking’: these are, for example, the meanings one creates in the soul of the hearer when one speaks. And because creation is in the end a divine act, the Prophet Muhammad says that ‘Allah is by the tongue of every speaker’ [*Kanz*: 7842; see also IV.187.19, IV.292.32]. So this brings us back to the initial receptive state of ‘Hearing’, because everything in the world is at the end perceived through vibrations, even the visible and other things. Therefore, the creation takes place always, at every moment in time and in every point of space. In terms of the same divine creative cycle of the seven Days explained above, the world is re-created every moment in six Days (from Sunday to Friday) and displayed on the seventh Day (Saturday). Indeed in terms of Ibn ‘Arabî’s famous theory of the oneness of being, the speaker is in fact Allah, and the hearer is also nothing other than Allah [II.367.16]. Ibn ‘Arabî frequently expresses this paradoxical reality in language referring to the forms of the ritual prayer, as when he says: ‘Thus Allah says by the tongue of his servant (as he says during the prayer) ‘Allah hears who praised Him’; and then the servant says ‘Our Lord, to Thee is the Praise!’, not to me’ [II.367.14]. Also he concludes: ‘You praise Yourself (on the tongue of every speaker), and You hear Your words. Because *the Praise is only for Allah and by Allah* [I.112.32, alluding to Qur’an 1:1].

One final aspect of Saturday is that Ibn ‘Arabî also describes it as ‘the fruitless Day’ (*al-yawm al-‘aqîm*; 22:55), which is a result of its being the Day of Eternity:

Now the fruitless is that from which nothing is born, so it does not have a birth of its kind. So (Saturday) is called ‘fruitless’ because at the end there is no Day after it, and this refers to Saturday from the (divine creative) Week, which is the Day of eternity. Its daytime is all light for the people of the Gardens eternally, and its night-time is all darkness for the people of Gehenna, also eternally.

[III.564.22]

3.6 Space-time and creation in six days

So this means that we – along with all of manifest creation, at all times – are now living in this ‘Seventh Day’, but the riddle is how we can at the same time still be viewing the other Days of the week, including Saturday itself. Ibn ‘Arabî himself remarks that ‘it is rather amazing that the Days, among which is Saturday, are (all) happening in Saturday; because it is one of these Days and they are appearing in it’ [II.444.7]. But he says that this is ultimately plausible, and he gives the striking example from the famous divine saying describing Adam when Allah showed him his progeny, including himself, in His Hand – while at the same time he was outside looking on at that [II.444.14; *Kanz*: 15123].

The fact that Saturday is the ‘Day of eternity’ suggests that the *time* that we

live is only Saturday, so that the other six Days (of events) of the (original) Week could account for space, and not time; this is also supported by the observation that the usual word for 'day' in Arabic (*yawm*) also bears the meaning of 'direction'.¹⁵ If we add this to what we have just said above about the oneness of being, and that the act of creation 'in one Week' actually takes place at every moment of time, then we can easily come to a very important conclusion that the actual Week and its seven distinctive Days make up a unit of space-time, and not time alone. In the first six Days, space is created with its six directions (three dimensions) and then it is displayed ('in time') on Saturday. We do not feel the creation in the six Days because we are being created but not yet, and we only feel ourselves created on Saturday, which is why it is the Day of eternity. As Allah said in the Qur'an: '*I called them not to witness the creation of Heavens and the Earth*' (18:51), which He created in six Days, from Sunday to Friday. But when this initial stage of creation is over and Allah the All-Merciful '*mounted on the Throne*', changing the creation from one state into another, then and only then, on Saturday, do we realize ourselves and also realize the world (of space) that was created in those preceding six Days.

Ibn 'Arabi declares in many passages that the world is constantly being re-created on every single 'Day of event' (see section 5.6). And the Days of events are seven, based on the central divine Attributes of Allah. So the creation of the world by Allah is a seven-step process: in each Day of those seven Days of events the world gains the qualities and manifestations of the corresponding divine Attribute. Thus on the First Day, the world (which had already been determined eternally in the foreknowledge of Allah) hears Allah's command: 'Be', so it moves from the 'absolute Unseen' into the first step of existence which has no dimension yet (0-D), like the geometrical point (*nuqta*); it is the first real Image of the Real (*al-Haqq*), Allah, the Exalted, and thus it is called '*the real through whom creation takes place*' (*SDK*: 132), and this is the 'Greatest Element' (see sections V6.2 and 6.5). So 'the Real' is a name of Allah and this Greatest Element. Then, on the Second Day, the world becomes living, and by that the creation of angels from the divine Light takes place (1-D), as will be discussed in more detail in section 7.10. Then on the Third Day it can witness its Creator (with respect to its being His creation), while on the Fourth Day it becomes willing to magnify¹⁶ its Creator (and by that the creation of the jinn takes place), and on the Fifth Day it is able to do so. Finally, on Friday – or by the 'last three hours' of Friday, when the Human Being is created¹⁷ – the world will actually know its Creator (again with respect to His act of creation, not in Himself): and this happens only by creating the Human Being (Adam), who is in respect to the world the Spirit is for the true Human Being [I.118.8, III.363.3].

By these six Days the world is completely created as a Single Monad who is also the 'Complete Human Being', including heavens and Earth, mind and soul, spirit and body. Then on the seventh Day this picture of the complete world will be held in the imagination of the human being, because it is an imaginal form that will intrinsically cease to exist right in the second moment ('Day') after its creation, to be instantly re-created in a new form. That is why, Ibn 'Arabi

explains, Allah appointed as the 'rulers' on Saturday the essential qualities of coldness and dryness, so that this cosmic image may appear to be continuous [I.61.15]. So our imagination holds a new picture of the world, every 'Day' (moment), and by comparing between those succeeding pictures, the imagination perceives the motion or change in space and time, since Allah never manifests in the same form twice or to two perceivers [I.679.7, II.77.27, II.616.3]. This is also the meaning of the verse: '*each Day He is in a (different) task*' (55:29), which Ibn 'Arabî uses more frequently than any others from the Qur'an to corroborate this particular ontological view.

It has to be noticed however, that, in every Week of Creation, only one 'point' of space-time is created, and that is the point where the observer is – or rather, the observer himself is also created at that point in space-time. The observer perceives other points of space and time because they have been held somehow within the 'Dust' (*habâ'*) of the divine cosmic Imagination (*barzakh, khayâl*, etc.).

Therefore, Ibn 'Arabî explains the verse in Qur'an: '*Your Lord is Allah Who created the heavens and the Earth in six Days, then He mounted on the Throne; He draweth the night as a veil over the Day*, (7:54, see also other similar verses in Qur'an: 10:3, 11:7, 25:59, 32:4, 50:38 and 57:4) as indicating that the creation has been completed in six Days, from Sunday to Friday, by creating Adam (the cosmic Human Being) on Friday; and then '*He established Himself on the Throne*' on Saturday when nothing new is to be created, but only changing the states of the creatures – until the Day of Judgement, and after that either in the Gardens or in Gehenna – so this is the Day of eternity. Yet the heavens and the Earth are constantly being *re-created* every moment: therefore the same Week and Days of creation, including Saturday, are continually reiterating throughout Saturday, at every moment.

So if we think of the whole of manifest creation (the cosmos or 'world') throughout all places and times, throughout 'the Age' (*al-Dahr*), it is only seven Days: six Days for the creation, and the seventh Day (Saturday) for the realization. But if we think of ourselves as points in this space-time of the Age, because of the eternally renewed re-creation we observe succeeding Days and Weeks (as moments); yet all those Days (including Saturday) are happening in the Saturday of the single, unique Week of 'the Age'.

Ibn 'Arabî draws interesting symbolic parallels and extrapolations from this concept of creation just explained. Just like this momentary creation in the Week, our own human age (life) is also seven days (or periods): six in this world and Saturday for the hereafter, which we have either as all-day in Paradise or as all-night in Gehenna. Similarly also, the age of human civilization on Earth is seven days and we are now living in Friday, indeed in the last few hours of it. This is because, as Ibn 'Arabî observes:

We (the true followers of the Prophet) are, thanks to Allah, the Day of *Jum'a*, and Muhammad – may Allah have peace and mercy upon him – is this very '*Hour*' itself, by which the Day of *Jum'a* takes precedence over all other Days.

[I.646.15]

This is because Muhammad is the Perfect Human Being who is the most perfect Image of the Real. Ibn 'Arabî explains this well-known central conception in his thought in more detail in chapter 346 of the *Futûhât*, where he observes that Muhammad, in relation to the whole world (cosmos), like the spirit (*al-nafs al-nâtîqa*) for each human being, while other prophets are like other spiritual faculties [III.186.31] (see also Table 3.1). Then he indicates that the world before the appearance of the Prophet Muhammad was like a foetus in the womb of the mother [III.187.6], and that after the passing away of Muhammad the world is like a sleeping – not dead – person [III.187.1], until, in the next world, all the world shall 'live' (have real life and awakening) through the full appearance of Muhammad in his complete composition [III.187.8]. Thus he goes on to note that people in the Gardens and Gehenna are like the different (spiritual and material) parts of the earthly human being, where the people of Gehenna are like the relatively lifeless (yet not completely dead) hair and nails [III.187.10]. So in this way the world is a like an 'immense human being' (*insân kabîr*), while the fully human being is like a microcosm (*âlam saghîr*).¹⁸

Many earlier Muslim theologians have tried to explain that Allah did not mean by the Qur'anic references to the 'Days' of creation those same earthly days that we live in, because they claimed that the sort of days that we know could not be existing yet, prior to the completion of creation. In contrast, Ibn 'Arabî stresses that those 'Days' of creation in reality coincide with these same observed and experienced days. At the same time, he also acknowledged that this (cosmic) 'Day' existed before the creation of the heavens and the Earth, while the (earthly, observed alternation of) daytime and night-time were only determined afterwards by the creation of the Sun.

On another level, Ibn 'Arabî's complex, unique interpretation of those many verses in the Qur'an (and the Bible) that talk about the creation in six Days is promising in terms of modern astronomy and cosmology, because it suggests the first real unification between space and time, as well as a sense in which the 'Week' may have a very important, and not simply conventional, real significance.

However, there are still some further issues that need to be settled in order to understand the meaning of the Week, its movement through the signs of the zodiac and its detailed role in the process or stages of creation. We shall devote Chapter 4 to explaining Ibn 'Arabî's complicated theory of the 'Actual Flow of Time' and Chapter 6 to outlining a complete model of the cosmos based on Ibn 'Arabî's unique view of time and his theory of the oneness of being, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

4 The actual flow of time

As we already explained, Ibn ‘Arabî showed that the creation of the world by Allah is a ‘series’ process. That is, He creates only one event at a time (or indeed in each Day), as Allah says: *each Day He is upon some (one) task* (55:29). Yet we observe multitudes of different events happening apparently at once. According to Ibn ‘Arabî, the way to understand this apparent paradox is to correct our view of the flow of time.

Ibn ‘Arabî shows that the actual flow of time (the divine creative ‘Week’ as the basic unit of space-time) is not the witnessed flow from Sunday to Monday and so on to Saturday. These normal days of the week that we witness are the ‘*circulated*’ days, and not the actual divine Days (the ‘Days of Event’) in which only one single event should be happening each and every single Day. In order to define or construct the actual cosmic ‘Days of events’, we need first to attach each night-time to its own daytime, for again the underlying metaphysical connection is not as we observe: i.e. the (‘real’) night-time of each daytime is not the observed night-time that precedes or follows this daytime, but rather it is ‘*taken out*’ and separated from its own daytime by three daytimes and three night-times. This extraordinary connection, Ibn ‘Arabî explains, is symbolically related to our three-dimensional structure as human beings. Finally, he also affirms (according to Qur’anic indications), that the actual Days of events are ‘*intertwined*’ with the observable, ‘circulated’ days in a specific manner that he details in his book *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n* (*The Book of the Days of Task*).

So we shall first explain in this chapter the meanings and the relations between those three metaphysically distinct types of days: the ‘circulated’ days (*ayyâm al-takwîr*), the taken-out days (*ayyâm al-salkh*) and the intertwined days (*ayyâm al-ilâj*). There we shall see that, on the basis of the hypothesis of ‘intertwining’, Ibn ‘Arabî introduces a unique new concept of time (and space) that has apparently not been discussed before. Finally, we turn to explaining the distinctive motion of each Day in the zodiac and the kinds of effects that are caused in the world in these Days. And at the end of this chapter we shall see the divine origin of dividing the normal days into hours, minutes and seconds.

4.1 The original days of event

We have explained in sections 2.15–16 that there is a minimum ‘Day’ which is that indivisible duration of time called ‘the Single Day’ (*al-yawm al-fard*). And we showed that this Day – when taken globally, or indeed universally (since it encompasses all of manifest creation) – actually includes our normal day, though we encounter it in fact just as a moment. In each one of these moments/Days there is only one global cosmic ‘event’ happening in each part of the entire cosmos. These Single Days are the original cosmic Days which are called the divine ‘Days of event’ (*ayyâm-ul-sha’n*), as discussed in the preceding chapter and Chapter 2. For in each Day of event (or divine ‘task’) Allah creates a single event actually encompassing every entity and phenomenon of the whole manifest world. As He said in the Qur’an: ‘each Day He is upon a (single) task’ (55:29).

Ibn ‘Arabî points out that ‘in each day of our normal days, that is from sunset to sunset or from sunrise to sunrise, there is the end of 360 days’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 6] (assuming the circle is 360 degrees).¹ That is because in every moment of the normal day that there is the end (or the beginning) of a day in one place, there is a corresponding beginning (or end) of another day in another place.

To explain this further, let us divide the circumference of the Earth into 360 longitudinal lines and the day into 360 degrees of longitude. Therefore, any whole day that we encounter in any specific place is a combination or the sum of the ends (last degrees) of 360 days from other places on the Earth; or in the same way, it is the sum of the first degrees of 360 days around the Earth. For example let us suppose that we are on the first longitudinal line at the first degree of the day, then the second degree of this day on this first longitudinal line is the first degree of the day beginning on the second line, and so on. In another way we can also say that the 360 degrees of the ‘day’ on the first line are the collection of the last degrees of the lines 360, 359, 358 and so on up to line number 1. Therefore in every moment there is one full day around the Earth: now, for example, it is morning somewhere, noon somewhere else and evening and midnight in other places; but all in total is a single full day (see also section 2.15 above).

So the flow of these original Days marks the actual sequence of events that spans space and time. But, because we live in and can only observe a tiny point of the whole space of the globe, we encounter linear time as our normal observed days of the week (i.e. the ‘circulated days’ described in the next section). Therefore, these original ‘Days of event’ are intertwined with our normal observed days.

4.2 The ‘circulated’ days (*ayyâm al-takwîr*)

Then if we stick to one place and watch the flow of time, we see that the Sun sets, for example, at the beginning of ‘Sunday night’ (i.e. the night that begins before Sunday daytime);² and then it rises on Sunday morning, and so on until it completes a full week on the following Sunday night. This is the witnessed

week, and its days are the normal days, or the witnessed days. Ibn ‘Arabî calls them the ‘circulated days’ (*ayyâm-ul-takwîr*),³ because they (daytimes and nights), seem to run after each other in a circle, as Allah says in the Qur’an:

He created the Heavens and the Earth through the real. He causes the night-time to encircle (v. *yukawwiru*) the daytime, and the daytime to encircle the night-time. He has subjected the Sun and the Moon: each one follows a (designated) course for a time appointed. Is He not the All-Mighty, the All-Forgiving?

(39:5)

So we can also say that the daytimes are circulated around the nights, and the nights are circulated around the daytimes, because the daytime and the night are like hemispheres surrounding the Earth all the time, but running after each other as if they were seeking each other, as Allah said in THE Qur’an: ‘*Lo! Your Lord is Allah Who created the Heavens and the Earth in six Days then mounted He on the Throne. He covers (yugshî) the night-time with the daytime, which is in haste to seek it*’ (7:54).

The Arabic word *yugshî* in this verse not only means ‘to cover’ but also ‘to embrace’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7], and it is particularly used for marriage. Thus Ibn ‘Arabî suggests that it is as if the daytime and the night are seeking each other because they want to ‘marry’ each other, to produce children – since we and everything else in the world are all the ‘progeny’ of the daytimes and nights [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7]. This ‘abstract marriage’, is a basic concept in Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmological teachings, and we shall come back to it shortly.

We conclude that in every normal day (i.e. circulated day) as we observe it in one specific place on the Earth, a vast number of ‘Days of events’ happen, as many as there are indivisible moments in this day. In other words, in every moment that we encounter on the Earth, there is a Day of event happening that encompasses the whole world or cosmos (all of creation). Yet each Day of event is also composed of the seven distinctive Days of creation, the divine creative ‘Week’ described in detail in the previous chapter.

4.3 The ‘taken-out’ days

Allah said in the Qur’an: ‘*A token unto them is the night-time: We take the daytime out of it, and lo, they are in darkness*’ (36:37). Ibn ‘Arabî points out that this seems to indicate that night is the origin, and that daytime was somehow ‘hidden’ in it and then was taken out of it [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 9, II.647.20]. In other words, as Ibn ‘Arabî explains [I.716.15], the night is like a dress or a skin over the daytime, and then Allah takes the daytime out of the night so that the world – which was in the absolute darkness of the divine ‘Unseen’ (*al-ghayb*) – is created (i.e. so that it appears in the light of actual existence).

Ibn ‘Arabî, however, argues that Allah did not specify in this verse which daytime was taken out of which night, and so this has to be clarified. For it is

not, as we might think, that each daytime (that we witness) was taken out of its own night. We have to seek the *true* relation between each daytime and its night, and this relation, Ibn ‘Arabî says [II.445.32, III.203.30], is based on the first hour of the daytime and the night-time, because each hour of the daytime and the night-time has a ruler; one of the five planets, the Sun, or the Moon (corresponding to one of the seven principal divine Attributes: see section 3.4); so each day is named after the planet that rules the first hour of it. For example: the first hour of Sunday is ruled by the Sun, and that is why it is so named (in English and many other languages); likewise Monday is the day of the Moon, and so on. In Arabic, however, the names of the days of the week do not have direct relations with the names of the planets that rule these days, but this connection still forms a basic principle in Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of time.

But before we discuss this further and assign each night to its actual daytime, we should understand the exact meaning of ‘taking out’ the daytime from the night, or the night from the daytime. Ibn ‘Arabî regards the different daytimes and night-times as ‘parents’ to what Allah creates in them: so everything that happens in the daytime is like a ‘son’ whose father is the night and whose mother is the daytime; and everything that happens in the night is like a son whose father is the daytime and whose mother is the night [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7; II.445.18]. As Allah said in the Qur’an: ‘*He merges (yûliju) the night into the daytime, and He merges the daytime into the night*’ (57:6). So there is a kind of abstract, generative ‘marriage’ between daytimes and nights, but where nights and daytimes exchange their parental roles from being fathers to being mothers, and vice versa. That is why they are ‘intertwined’, as we shall see further below. Now Ibn ‘Arabî explains that when the daytime turns from being father into being mother or vice versa, this is what is meant by the Qur’anic reference to its respective ‘stripping-out’ or ‘taking-out’ (*salkh*). So when we say that this daytime (*nahâr*) is taken out of that night-time (*layl*), it means that this daytime and night exchange their generative ‘parental’ roles, although together they are always like a couple, i.e. a single ‘day’ (*yawm*).

Ibn ‘Arabî adds that Allah did not explicitly mention that night is also taken out of the daytime, since it is readily understood from the same Qur’anic verse [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 8; I.141.6, I.716.11]. On the other hand, Ibn ‘Arabî indicates that the first hour of the daytime and that of its own night (which was taken out of it) should be ruled by the same planet [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 10]. For in order to consider the daytime and the night-time as one unitary day, they have to be ruled by the same (cosmological, planetary) ‘ruler’. This applies only to the first hour of the daytime and the night, because each of the other hours (of the observable, earthly days) is coming from other cosmic ‘Days’ as a result of their overall ‘intertwining’:

Now when these planets moved in their orbs, Allah made for each planet a (specific) Day among the Days of the zodiac-orb motion. . . . So He defined for each Day (*yawm*) a daytime (*nahâr*) and a night-time (*layl*), and He distinguished between each night and its daytime by the rule of the (particular) planet for that Day in which the daytime and night appeared.

So when you look to which planet the first hour of the daytime belongs, then this planet is the ruler of that daytime. And when you look in the nights for the night whose first hour belongs to this same planet which ruled the first hour of the daytime, then this night belongs to this daytime.

[III.203.26]

Now that we have understood the meaning of the ‘taken-out’ days, let us see which daytime was taken out of which night. As we pointed out above, Ibn ‘Arabî argues that there are three other daytimes and three other nights between the daytime and the night from which it was taken out. That is because – as he explains – the structure of the world is six-directional: three nights corresponding to the directions down, left and back; and three daytimes corresponding to up, right and front [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7]. Table 4.1 shows the resulting daytimes of the week and the nights from which those respective daytimes were taken out.

Therefore, as we can see, there are three days between each daytime and its partner night. Of course normally the observable earthly week will run starting from the beginning of Sunday night, then Sunday daytime, then Monday night, then Monday daytime, and so on. These are the normal ‘circulated’ days. The ‘taken-out’ days, however, as we see from this table above and in Figure 4.1, run also starting from the beginning of Sunday night but leaving out three daytimes and three nights jumping to Wednesday daytime (of the circulated days) and so on.

Therefore the flow of time for the taken-out days is different from the normal circulated days. In order to understand the flow of the taken-out days let us show the above relation graphically as in Figure 4.1. It is better to imagine this graph in three dimensions because, as Ibn ‘Arabî indicated, the reason behind this interference between the taken-out days and the circulated days is the three-dimensional structure of the world that we live in [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7].

But what is the significance of conceiving the ‘taking-out’ daytimes and nights in this way? In his book *Ayyâm Al-Sha’n* Ibn ‘Arabî explains that the reason why there are three daytimes and three nights in the taken-out days is the three-dimensional (or six-directional) structure of the space in which we exist. In other books he (or rather, his later interpreter al-Qâshânî)⁴ points out that the

Table 4.1 The taken-out days

	<i>The daytime of . . .</i>	<i>was taken out of the night of . . .</i>	
4	Wednesday	Sunday	1
5	Thursday	Monday	2
6	Friday	Tuesday	3
7	Saturday	Wednesday	4
1	Sunday	Thursday	5
2	Monday	Friday	6
3	Tuesday	Saturday	7

Note
There are three daytimes and three nights between the daytime and the night that is taken out of it. This table is summarized from *Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*, pages 6–7




Figure 4.1 The taken-out days.

Note

It helps to imagine the resulting loop in three dimensions (x, y, z) as indicated graphically below.

word 'day' also means direction. So it appears to us as if our three-dimensional world is built up as a unit in seven Days (a Week). Therefore the Week with its seven Days is the unit of space-time, and not only time.

In chapter 302 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî explains how the process of taking the daytime out of the night is identical to taking the world out of non-existence into the 'light' of existence:

Now we have mentioned that the world was hidden in the (absolute) Unseen (*ghayb*) of Allah, and that this Unseen was like the shadow of a person. So if something were taken out from the entirety of that shadow, it would come out in the image of that shade – just as that shadow is itself in the image of that of which it is a shadow. So the result of what is taken out of that shadow is in the image of the person. Do not you see that light is what appears when the daytime is taken out of the night-time?

So those things which were hidden in the night (of the divine 'Unseen') appear by the light of the daytime. Therefore the daytime does not resemble the night, but rather resembles the light, by the appearance of those things through it. So the night was the shadow of the (divine existentiating) Light, and the daytime, when it is taken out of the night, comes out on the image

of the Light. Likewise, the world, in its coming out of the Unseen, comes out in the image of the world (already present in) the Unseen, as we said.

[III.12.1]

So the process of creating the world out of non-existence is exactly like the Qur'anic image of 'taking the daytime out of the night', because time in the end is reduced to the instantaneous presence (or the events that happen in it). As summarized in the passage just quoted, Ibn 'Arabî says that the world already exists in the all-encompassing foreknowledge of Allah, in the absolute Unseen (*al-ghayb al-mutlaq*). Thus its emergence into manifest existence is like the daytime: both of its states are 'Light', first hidden in the 'shadow' of the absolute Unseen, and then when Allah takes the world out of that non-existence, just as He 'takes the daytime out of the night'. And because Allah had determined that the manifest world would be three-dimensional, He created it 'in six Days' (or directions). He could have created it in many ways, but Ibn 'Arabî affirms that the divine Ability does not overrule His Determination or destiny (*qadar*); it only accomplishes what He has already determined (the *maqdûr*) [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. Therefore, in order for the daytime (of the manifest world) to appear in existence, there have to be three daytimes and three nights between this daytime and the night that it was 'taken out' of [I.716; *Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 7]. Thus in each Day Allah creates a direction, and in the six Days of creation (from Sunday to Friday) Allah creates the world in (three-dimensional) space, while Saturday accounts for the 'Day of event' or time wherein this world is displayed.

4.4 The 'intertwined' days

As we have mentioned before (section 2.15), Allah said in the Holy Qur'an: '*each Day He is upon some (one) task*' (55:29). Since Allah did not say 'tasks' but rather a single task or event, Ibn 'Arabî argues that the whole Day should be under the effect of one single divine task. This, however, is not the case for our normal, 'circulated' days and is clearly not the case for the 'taken-out' days we have just described above, because we know that many different events are happening in each observable 'circulated' day.

Ibn 'Arabî argues that the original Days of events in which Allah described Himself as being '*each Day upon some task*' are *intertwined* (or 'entered into each other': *mutawâlîja*, from the verb *yûlîju*: 'to enter into') with the circulated days in a specific manner, which he explains by dividing the day into 24 hours. However, Ibn 'Arabî emphasizes that this example is only for approximation, since one could also explain this 'intertwining' on a smaller scale than hours (e.g. minutes and seconds, or even smaller). The matter as he describes it is already very complicated for 24 hours, although this may be possible to calculate now using sophisticated computer programs.

Starting with the night of Sunday – because its name *al-ahad* ('the First', 'the Unique') is a Name of Allah, it is the first day, and also it is the day of the Sun that is the heart or centre of the manifest world [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 11] – Ibn

‘Arabî reconstructs the Days of events from the hours of the circulated days, starting with the first hour of the night of Thursday, then the eighth hour, and so on with seven-hour intervals until the full 12 hours of the night of Sunday are completed. Then he moves on to ‘deconstruct’ the daytime of Sunday in the same way, as illustrated in the Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2.

Then he moves on to analyse the night of (the circulated day of) Monday in the same way, but starting from the daytime of Friday, and so on for the full seven Days, as indicated in the following Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2.

4.4.1 Demonstrating the intertwined days

As can be readily seen from Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the flow of time for the ‘intertwined’ days is even more complicated than that of the taken-out days. This

Table 4.2 The intertwined days (example of Sunday alone).

<i>Normal week days</i>							
	<i>SUN</i>	<i>MON</i>	<i>TUE</i>	<i>WED</i>	<i>THU</i>	<i>FRI</i>	<i>SAT</i>
<i>Hours of night</i>							
1	—	—	—	—	SUN	—	—
2	—	—	—	—	—	—	SUN
3	—	SUN	—	—	—	—	—
4	—	—	—	SUN	—	—	—
5	—	—	—	—	—	SUN	—
6	SUN	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	—	—	SUN	—	—	—	—
8	—	—	—	—	SUN	—	—
9	—	—	—	—	—	—	SUN
10	—	SUN	—	—	—	—	—
11	—	—	—	SUN	—	—	—
12	—	—	—	—	—	SUN	—
<i>Hours of daytime</i>							
1	SUN	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	—	—	SUN	—	—	—	—
3	—	—	—	—	SUN	—	—
4	—	—	—	—	—	—	SUN
5	—	SUN	—	—	—	—	—
6	—	—	—	SUN	—	—	—
7	—	—	—	—	—	SUN	—
8	SUN	—	—	—	—	—	—
9	—	—	SUN	—	—	—	—
10	—	—	—	—	SUN	—	—
11	—	—	—	—	—	—	SUN
12	—	SUN	—	—	—	—	—

Note

The shaded background indicates the nights of the normal days, and bold font indicates the night-time hours of the intertwined days. The data in this table are extracted from *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*, pp. 11–12.




Figure 4.2 The intertwined days, and their relation with the circulated days.

Note

The information in this figure is extracted from *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*, pp. 11–16.

complex relationship is shown graphically in Figure 4.2. Again, it would be more accurate to imagine this graph in three dimensions, but the graphic depiction is already very complicated in two dimensions. (A more accurate approach to what Ibn 'Arabî is actually describing would be to simulate this on the computer, taking into account smaller time-scales than hours.)

Figure 4.2 demonstrates how the 24 hours of each day of the normal circulated days are distributed over the seven Days of events. The 24 hours of the Day of Sunday for example (the 24-fold zigzag circle in the front) are distributed over the normal week days, starting from the first hour of Thursday night and moving with the seven-hour intervals already described.

Table 4.3 The intertwined days (all days)

<i>Normal week days</i>							
	<i>SUN</i>	<i>MON</i>	<i>TUE</i>	<i>WED</i>	<i>THU</i>	<i>FRI</i>	<i>SAT</i>
<i>Hours of nights</i>							
1	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE
2	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
3	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI
4	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED
5	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON
6	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
7	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU
8	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE
9	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
10	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI
11	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED
12	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON
<i>Hours of daytimes</i>							
1	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
2	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU
3	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE
4	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
5	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI
6	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED
7	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON
8	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
9	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU
10	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE
11	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
12	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI

Note

The shaded background indicates the nights of the normal days, and bold font indicates night hours of the intertwined days. The data in this table are extracted from *Kitāb Ayyām Al-Sha'n*, pp. 11–16

4.4.2 The significance of the intertwined days

The flow of time according to the intertwined days is the real flow, because it indicates the manifest, outward order of events. The reason why there is a constant seven-hour step, as in the Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and Figure 4.3, is that the order of creation proceeds according to the seven main divine Names (and divine ‘Days’ of creation). For example, on Sunday (of the original Days of creation) the world starts ‘hearing’ the divine Command, which initiates the first dimension in creation. Then once the Sunday cycle (i.e. of the divine Attribute ‘the All-Hearing’) is over, the Monday cycle starts granting the world the attribute of ‘the Living’, and so on (see Table 3.1). Thus the manifest world gains the qualities of these fundamental divine Attributes one after the other.

4.5 The motion of the seven days in the zodiac

The orb of the ‘fixed stars’, including the constellations of the zodiac and the lunar mansions, is the second orb after the outermost Isotropic Orb, but it is the first material orb, because the Isotropic Orb does not have any distinguishing features (no stars or planets). We have already noted that Ibn ‘Arabî shows that ‘Allah created the Day in the first orb, and then defined it in the second orb, which is the orb of the fixed stars (the zodiac)’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 6]. That is because the motion of the Isotropic Orb can not be defined for the world beneath it, because there is no reference point to assign a beginning or an end to this motion. However, in the zodiac orb there is such a reference point: the 12 Signs or constellations. So we can say that the days were first defined in the zodiac orb, and each day represents a full cycle of this orb as observed from the Earth [III.548.31; see also section 2.12 above]. Ibn ‘Arabî clearly showed that this orb does not actually move as we observe it [II.441.33, I.141.17, III.549.3], but that we see it as moving because of the motion of the Earth around its centre [I.123.17, II.677.21, III.548.31] (see also section 1.4).

Ibn ‘Arabî takes the first degree in Gemini as the reference point to start counting the cosmic ‘Days’ of creation, and he claims that this initial motion of time in creation started when this point was matching the divine ‘Foot’ in the ‘Pedestal’ above the Isotropic Orb. It is very interesting to note that the first degree of Gemini coincides with the galactic equator.⁵ Moreover, recent studies and some historical or archaeological records (Sitchin 1976: 197) show that this point was used by ancient Sumerians as early as 11000 BC as a starting point for the zodiacal calendar. He says:

And let it be known to you that this Name (‘the All-Sufficient’, *al-ghanî*) made this orb isotropic with no planets in it: all its parts are the same, and it has a circular shape where you can not distinguish a beginning or an end to its motion, and it has no edge. By the existence of this orb the seven days came into being, and so months and years; but these (particular durations of) times were not determined in it until Allah created, inside this orb, other signs (galaxies, stars and planets) which determined these times.

This orb determined only one Day, which is a single cycle (of this orb) beginning at the place of the (divine) ‘Foot’ in the Pedestal. So it was determined from above. The duration of this cycle is called a Day. But nobody except Allah knows (the actual length of) this Day, because of the fact that all the parts of this orb are the same, so (nobody knows) the beginning of its motion. And the beginning of its motion was when the first degree of Gemini, which is an orb (whose influence is associated with the lower material element) of air, was matching this Foot.

Hence the first Day that appeared in the world was by the first degree of Gemini, and this Day is called *al-ahad* (Sunday). So when this specific point of this orb, which is known only to Allah, returned to match this Foot of the Pedestal, a full cycle – that is, of the total orb (and its contents) – was com-

pleted and all the parts of this (isotropic) orb matched with the (initial) place of the Foot from the Pedestal. So this motion came over every degree, minute, second, and less than that of this orb. So the places came into being and the existence of the single indivisible localized monad (of all manifest creation) was determined from the motion of this orb.

[II.437.29]

That was the motion of the initial Day of the Sun (Sunday).

Then, at the end (of this initial Day), there began another motion, also from the middle,⁶ until that (second motion) reached its end/aim (*ghâya*), like the first motion – together with the entirety of what (that sphere) contains of the (smallest) parts (*ajzâ'*) and the individual entities that are composed of those parts, because (that sphere) is quantitative. This second motion is called Monday. And so on till it completed seven periodical motions everyone is determined by a divine Attribute. And the (main) divine Attributes are seven, not more, which made the Age not more than seven (distinctive) Days.

[II.438.3]

This is shown better in Figure 4.3.

Thus the orb of the zodiac (fixed starts) executes only seven distinctive cycles, which are then repeated that over and over again. Each Day of these seven Days of the divine creative Week is called a 'Day of event', in which only one single event happens, because it is ruled by one primary divine Name of Allah. So there are seven Days of events, each related to one particular divine Name from the seven fundamental Names mentioned in section 3.4.

4.6 The kinds of events

Now in each 'Day of event' that is intertwined with the outwardly observable (normal earthly) 'circulated days' as described above, Ibn 'Arabî explains that Allah constantly inspires the Universal Soul to act upon the orbs below it – encompassing and giving rise to all the manifest, material cosmos – so that they move in a specific manner that will cause one particular kind of event in the cosmos. But the *effects* of this complex composite motion of the orbs will be different, depending on the capabilities and characteristics of individual creatures [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 11–12]. For example, when Allah inspires the Soul to move the element of fire in order to heat the world, the effects of this single event depends greatly on the individual creatures: those which are ready to burn will burn, and those which accept heat will be heated, and so on [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6], and he explains further in the *Futûhât* that:

the (divine creative) "Event", in relation to the Real (i.e., God/*al-haqq*), is one from Him; but with relation to the acceptors of the world it is many events that we would call infinite, were they not confined by (their shared quality of) existence.

[II.82.6]




Figure 4.3 The Zodiac and the motion of the days in it.

Note

Notice that this refers to the apparent rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars, while the actual astronomical motion is due to the revolution of the Earth. The 12 zodiacal signs are divided into four groups whose influences are related to the four material elements (earth, water, air and fire), as described in the preceding chapter; each group contains three signs of the same nature. The motion of each cosmic Day starts at the first degree of Gemini.

Ibn ‘Arabî describes in his *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n* the different kinds of events that are particularly associated with each Day of the seven Days of the original divine ‘Week’ of event. There he also gives a ratio of ‘contribution’ by each one of the seven heavens. These mysterious symbolic data and concepts are not very easy to understand. However, we will summarize his remarks in Table 4.4 for reference, although any attempt to interpret them would require a separate extensive study.

The data in Table 4.4 are extracted from *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 11–16. The contributions are stated to be increments of one-fourth, probably alluding to the equal role of the four basic elements of material Nature (fire, air, water and earth). The —/— sign means that the corresponding data are not given in the text. For Wednesday, Ibn ‘Arabî does not give detailed numbers, but simply says (p. 14) that ‘God ordered the spiritual realities to help the Soul according to their corresponding strength’. The ‘↓’ indicates that the contribution is done only by way of descent. Some of the data in this table are incomplete or not certain, as the meaning of the original text is often unclear.⁷

Table 4.4 The action of the soul (on the world) in each day of the seven days of events and the ratio of contribution by the seven heavens

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
<i>The actions of the Universal Soul in each Day of event</i>						
moving the fire element to heat the world	giving the element of liquids to the generators	showing the absurd passions	mixing wet vapour with dry vapour	liquefying and decomposing	distilling the wet vapour	holding the forms of the world and forming them
<i>The ratio of contribution by the seven celestial spheres (orbs)/s</i>						
7	2/4	2/4	—/—	0/4	2/4	4/4
6	2/4	2/4	—/—	4/4	2/4	0/4
5	4/4	0/4	—/—	2/4	0/4	2/4
4	4/4	4/4	—/—	2/4	0/4	2/4
3	0/4	0/4	—/—	2/4	4/4	2/4
2	1/4	—/—	—/—	2/4	2/4	2/4
1	0/4	0/4	—/—	2/4	4/4	2/4
<i>The Results</i>						
the spirits flow in spiritual beings, and motion in the things that move	bodies grow; rainy winds blow; motions are weak	anger and conflicts amongst people	—/—	good for lovers	the events result through the divine Command, not as the result of trying and direct action	—/—

4.7 Hours, minutes and seconds

According to what we have now discussed in this and preceding chapters, the day as we normally experience or observe it is the minimum period of time defined by the apparent full revolution of the Heavens around the Earth (see sections 2.12 and 3.2). The original divine creative Days are single indivisible divine 'Acts', but in the observed time that we experience, we live only one moment out of each original Day (see section 2.15). Therefore, the normal day as we know it is a collection of the moments from the different divine Days of the creative Week, after the processes of 'intertwining' and 'taking-out' detailed above. For this reason, the normal day can be conventionally subdivided apparently infinitely, and smaller units of time can be conceived and measured.

Thus, the day is conventionally divided into 24 hours, and the hour is conventionally divided into 60 minutes, which are also conventionally divided into 60 seconds each. This conventional hexadecimal system can be traced back to the time of the Babylonians; it was used by many ancient civilizations and then transferred by the Arabs to the West. In recent centuries, some more scientifically measurable definitions of these conventional units of time have been introduced, specifically for the second.⁸ So this hexadecimal system is now internationally used, but after the second, smaller units of time are decimally subdivided into 0.1, 0.01 etc., or 10^{-x} seconds, where x could be in principle any number no matter how large (for infinitely shorter times).⁹

Ibn 'Arabî referred to these further conventional subdivisions of observed time in chapter 59 of the *Futûhât*, which is entitled 'On the Inner Knowing of the (actually) Existent and Conventional Time'. Here the original divine cosmic 'Days of event' are the actually Existent Time (*al-zamân al-mawjûd*) while the other time-distinctions days, years, months, hours, minutes and seconds are only conventional or 'estimated' (*muqaddar*). There he explains:

The (observable) 'days' are many: some are long, and some are short. The shortest day is the 'monad of time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) in which '*He is in a task*' (55:29), so that (indivisible shortest) monad of time is called a 'day' because the (divine) 'task' happens in it: it is the shortest and tiniest time, and there is no maximum term to the longest. Between them there are intermediate 'days', the first of which is the conventional 'day' familiar in customary usage, which is divided into hours, the hours into degrees, the degrees into minutes, and so on. That goes on indefinitely, for those people who also divide the minutes into seconds. Since it is ruled by (the principle of) countability, (for them time) is like numbers; and numbers are infinite, so this division is also infinite.

But some people say that (time) is finite, and they take this matter from the perspective of what can (actually) be counted or 'numbered': those are (the people) who advocate that time is an existing essence (because it is countable), and all that exists must undoubtedly be finite. But the opposing (group) say that the countable, simply by the fact that it can be counted, does not

(therefore necessarily) enter into existence, so it is not described as finite, because number is not describable as being finite. This is how those who argue against the ‘single monad’ (or ‘indivisible atom’: *al-jawhar al-fard* proposed by the kalam theologians) contend, (maintaining instead) that according to the intellect body is divisible indefinitely. This topic of controversy among the people of intellectual inquiry (i.e. kalam theologians and the philosophers) happened as a result of their lack of good judgement and their inquiring (only) about the meanings of words (instead of what is actually real).

[I.292.3]

However, for Ibn ‘Arabî this conventional division of time also has its divine origin. He first affirms that the celestial orbs were divided into 360 degrees due to the fact that the Universal Intellect (or the ‘Higher Pen’) was taught by the ‘Greatest Element’ (see sections 6.2 and 6.5) exactly 360 kinds of comprehensive divisions of knowledge (*‘ulûm al-ijmâl*), under each of which there are 360 further divisions of detailed knowledge (*‘ulûm al-tafsîl*), that is 360 times 360:

So each degree (of the 360 total degrees of the outermost, all-encompassing celestial sphere) includes all that it comprises of the details of minutes, seconds, tertiary divisions, and so on, as Allah – the Exalted – wills to make manifest (of that detailed Knowledge) in His Creation till the day of the Rising.

[I.295.12]

After that, in the same passage, Ibn ‘Arabî shows that Allah appointed 12 ‘rulers’ (*wulât*, s. *wâli*), one in each of the 12 zodiac signs, which correspond to the 12 months in the conventional year. Also there are 28 ‘chamberlains’ (*hujjâb*, s. *hâjib*) in the orb of the constellations (i.e. the 28 houses of the Moon) which correspond to the 28 days in the (divine) month (see section 3.2). Finally, in the same passage he also says that Allah ordered those rulers to appoint seven ‘chiefs’ (*nuqabâ’*, s. *naqîb*) in the seven Heavens, one ‘chief’ in each celestial sphere – i.e. the seven orbs which correspond to the seven Days of the cosmic Week. Ibn ‘Arabî then adds that each one of those groups of spirits that are associated with the celestial spheres has a living human ‘deputy’ or ‘agent’ among us on Earth [I.296.27].

Ibn ‘Arabî even suggests a certain divine importance for the conventional division of the day into 24 hours, in the following passage discussing the different groups of the spiritual hierarchy of the ‘Friends of God’ (*awliyâ’*) in chapter 73 of the *Futûhât* [II.2.39]:

And among them (the *awliyâ’*), may Allah be pleased with them, (are a group of) 24 souls at any time, no more and no less. They are called the ‘Men of (Spiritual) Opening’ (*rijâl al-fateh*): through them Allah opens for the people of Allah whatever He opens of (divine) knowledge and secrets. And Allah made them according to the number of hours, one of them for each hour.

[II.13.7]

Regarding the hours of the day and the two parts of it (the daytime and the night), and their observable variations across the year and from one place to another, Ibn ‘Arabî says:

Then Allah caused the (observable, earthly) daytime (*nahâr*) and the night-time by the existence of the Sun – not the (true divine) Days (*ayyâm*). And as for what happens of (the observable) increase and decrease in the (length of the) daytime and night – not in the hours, for they are (always) 24 hours – that is because of the motion of the Sun in the zodiac region which is tilted with regard to us, so the day becomes longer where it is in the high houses, and when it comes to the low houses the day becomes shorter where it (i.e. the Sun) is. We said ‘where it is’, because when the night becomes longer for us the day becomes longer for others, so the Sun is in the high houses for them and in the low houses for us. So when the day becomes shorter for us, the night becomes longer for them as we said. But the day (*al-yawm*) itself is 24 hours: it does not increase or decrease, nor does it become longer nor shorter in the equinox place.

[I.140.33]

5 Unicity and multiplicity

*Examine the origin of existence, and think it through:
you will see the same (divine) Generosity, both eternal and created.
And the (created) thing is like the (eternal) thing,
except that He made it appear in the actual reality of the worlds as created.
So if the viewer swears that his existence is eternal (in the Unity),
he is honest and truthful, not lying;
But if the viewer swears that its existence (emerges) after its non-existence,
(that is) more appropriate – and then its [existence] is threefold.*

[I.5.31]

In order to understand these novel concepts of time that we have explained in previous chapters, we need to shed more light on Ibn ‘Arabī’s controversial understanding of the oneness of being (*wahdat al-wujūd*), because it is the key to understanding his various views of time. Although he had never employed this famous term directly, it is quite evident that this characteristic understanding of the oneness of being strongly dominates Ibn Arabī’s many writings: he explains almost everything on the basis of the concept of ultimate unicity and oneness. More specifically, the metaphysical structure of the world, how it comes into existence, how it is maintained and its ontological relation with the Creator can be explained only on the basis of the oneness of being.

In the light of the centuries of later polemics surrounding this conception, it must be stressed that Ibn ‘Arabī’s conception of the oneness of being is completely different from such views such as pantheism or monism. Ibn ‘Arabī never denies the basic distinction between the Creator and creations, and certainly never contradicts the basic tenent of monotheism. Likewise, he strictly affirms the Muhammadan revelation (*sharī‘a*) and accepts all the observed multiplicity on the usual planes of manifest existence. Instead, his focus in applying the oneness of being is on understanding the cosmos and how it works. It is these particular cosmological aspects that we shall be interested in throughout this chapter, so that we can explain Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of the creation in order to understand his unique concepts of time and eventually to situate all those conceptions within the comprehensive cosmological model outlined in Chapter 6 below.

5.1 The contrasting approaches of Sufism and philosophy

We want to start this chapter by quoting Ibn ‘Arabî’s famous story of his first encounter with the great Aristotelian philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, already mentioned in section 1.7) when Ibn ‘Arabî was still relatively young, but already famous for his immense knowledge and unique views. According to that account, Ibn Rushd arranged with his friend – Ibn ‘Arabî’s father – to meet the young mystic in order to hear what he had to say about (his Aristotelian) philosophy. As Ibn ‘Arabî recounts this story in the *Futûhât*:

And I entered one day in Cordoba into (the house of) the judge Abû al-Walîd Ibn Rushd, as he wished to meet me after he had heard about what Allah opened up for me in my spiritual retreat, for he had been expressing his admiration of (or ‘amazement at’) what he had heard. Then my father – because he was one of (Averroes’) friends – sent me to him for something on purpose in order (for him) to meet me. I was still young; my face had not yet put forth a beard, and my moustache had not yet grown.¹

When I entered to see him he stood up for me out of love and respect, embraced me and said (exclaiming): ‘Yes’! I replied: ‘Yes’. So his joy was magnified because I understood him. Then I realized what made him feel happy, and I said: ‘For Allah’s sake, No!’ Then he turned sad, his colour changed and he doubted his philosophy.

Then he asked: ‘So how did you find it in unveiling (*kashf*) and divine effusion (*faḡd ilâhî*)? Is it the same as what thought had led us (philosophers) to?’ I replied: ‘Yes ... No, and between the “yes” and the “no”, spirits fly away from their (bodily) matter and necks from their bodies.’

So his (face) colour turned pale, he began to tremble and sat down reciting the *hawqala* [that is to say: *lâ hawla wa lâ quwwata illâ bi Allah* (‘there is no power and no strength but in Allah’)], and he knew what I alluded to (in responding) to him.

[I.153.33]

This mysterious exchange of these few words and gestures between these two pillars of Islamic thought, a Sufi and a philosopher, is an attempt to express in symbolic language what is very difficult to explain in more explicit language. Ibn ‘Arabî alludes here to an essential realization that is beyond normal human comprehension, something that is apparently against our everyday experience or otherwise very difficult to believe. Yet on the other hand, it is something that can be ultimately summarized in only two words: ‘Yes’ and ‘No’, or even ‘Yes’ alone, because ‘No’ is ‘not Yes’.² In fact, Ibn ‘Arabî’s ‘digital’ answer here: ‘Yes/No’ (or ‘1/0’, ‘True/False’, which ultimately amounts to existence/non-existence) is the best and shortest expression of the creation – summarizing the essence of the paradoxical metaphysical insights alluded to in the initial poem of the *Futûhât* translated at the beginning of this chapter.

The difficulty of expressing this universal Reality in simple words comes

from the fact that we live in a diverse world of infinite multiplicity, while at the same time the truth or reality behind this world is literally too simple to be believed [*Al-Masâ'il*: 163]. The ultimate Real is Allah, and Allah is uniquely One, while the world is apparently many – so the metaphysical challenge is how to link the (imaginary) multiplicity of the world to the Real One, through some unseen intermediaries.

Philosophers and scientists in general try to understand the world through observations, while the methods of Ibn 'Arabî and other Sufis rely upon modes of perception that jump directly into the unseen in order to approach the Real directly. As Ibn 'Arabî often points out, observations are subject to many mistakes, owing to the inaccuracy of the tools employed, whether human senses or technical equipment, while *true* visions – as opposed to our sometimes problematic interpretations of them – are always correct [I.307.12, III.7.21].³ On the other hand, philosophers and scientists use logic and experiments to deduce their theories and explain their observations, while Sufis in general often describe their visions without paying too much attention to explaining them in a logical manner, especially when some of their visions, though real and true, may be outwardly or apparently illogical.⁴ As a result, certain Sufis like Ibn 'Arabî may attain a very high state of knowledge of reality more quickly and more accurately than philosophers (as Ibn 'Arabî certainly implies in his account of his meeting with Ibn Rushd), but they find it very difficult to explain their views to others who have not '*tasted*' it their way. So when they try to explain their insights, not many people will understand what they say.

The problem with the current laws and theories of physics and cosmology is that so far, although they have proved to be quite accurate and powerful in application, they have admittedly failed to unveil the ultimate reality behind the world. All scientific theories are descriptive rather than determinative. We have seen in section 1.3 that the reason why science was not able to determine the reality of the world is that all cosmological models need a boundary condition: i.e. an exact description of what was the initial state when the world started, something which seems to be impossible to achieve by the intellect alone. That is why scientists work backwards: i.e. they try to find out the initial state of the cosmos by extrapolating in various ways from the current observations. As a result, all physics theories and known cosmological models, though they have achieved higher levels of understanding, have also brought new contradictions and paradoxes. They have succeeded in providing approximate possible creation scenarios, but failed to describe the reality itself. Although Ibn 'Arabî considers the intellect unbounded or unlimited as a *receptive* tool, it is quite limited as a ratiocinative thinking tool because it relies on limited senses [I.288.27]. Therefore, the intellect alone – as a thinking tool – cannot describe the origin of the world because it is necessarily a part of it. Ibn 'Arabî affirmed this when he said that the limit of the observations of the philosophers (or astronomers) is up to the Isotropic Orb which is the first (outermost, and first created) material orb [II.677.1]; they can not see or detect anything beyond that. That is why the Sufis

rely on the 'heart' (the locus of spiritual 'tasting' and inspiration, in the language of the Qur'an) rather than the discursive intellect.

On the other hand, Sufis have sometimes claimed to have achieved a high state of realization and even to have visualized the metaphysical structure and origin of the world (i.e. what physicists call the initial/boundary condition). Most of them, however, did not give proper attention to explaining the observable universe and relating it to that initial cosmological state. Even Ibn 'Arabî himself did not care too much about that: instead he declared that his aims were not to explain the world, but rather to acquire more knowledge of the world as a structure created according to the Image of Allah, so that he might acquire more knowledge of Allah Himself. All the same, however, throughout the *Futûhât* and other shorter books Ibn 'Arabî often gives a great many cosmological explanations and sometimes logical analyses of his metaphysical visions. This is why it is very important to study Ibn 'Arabî's writings, since they may provide a real link between philosophy and science, on the one hand, and mysticism and theology.

5.2 Unicity versus multiplicity

Ibn 'Arabî cited the story of his meeting with Ibn Rushd in the context of explaining the words of the central spiritual Pole Idrîs (*mudâwî al-kulûm*) who – as Ibn 'Arabî said – knows very well about the natural world and the effects of the higher world on it. Thus this Pole explained that 'the world exists between the circumference and the point' [I.154.22]. The 'point' here refers to the Real (the 'Necessary Being') whose existence is self-existence, while the 'circumference' is the circle of creations (the 'possible' or contingent entities) whose existence depends on the Real. Beyond this circumference is the 'sea' of non-existence (the impossible of existence). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5.1.

With regard to this image, Ibn 'Arabî explained in chapter 47 of the *Futûhât* [I.260.1] that the (divine creative Source-) point in the centre of a circle meets any point in its circumference with its whole entity, without division or multiplicity. Similarly, multiplicity (i.e. all of creation) appears or emerges out of the Unicity of the Real; the manyness of the world appears out of the One Creator, without affecting His unique Oneness or Unicity. Ibn 'Arabî was well aware that this paradoxical relation between the Creator and all manifestation is in clear apparent contradiction with the widely accepted philosophical maxim – a central assumption in the prevailing contemporary philosophical cosmology of Ibn Sina and his followers – that 'from the One only one may emerge (or proceed)' (*la yasdur 'an al-wâhid illâ wâhid*).⁵

Given the assumption of this maxim, an obvious problem encountered by philosophers and theologians when they want to explain how Allah created the world is that Allah is One while the world is many. So logically it is not possible to imagine a relation between the One and the many without affecting the unique Oneness (*ahadiyya*) of the One.




Figure 5.1 The Real, the 'Possible' exists, and the 'Impossible'

Note

This figure is taken from chapter 360 of the *Futūhāt* [III.275].

However, Ibn 'Arabî's analogy between the pure mathematical symbol of the circle and its centre and the cosmological process of creation by the One Creator is not fully justifiable without further explanations. Among other problems, mathematics and geometry work with infinitely small (or dimensionless) points, while our contemporary science of physics and cosmology deals with corporeal worlds that have dimensions. But we shall see below that Ibn 'Arabî's unique understanding of time provides here the essential link between physics and mathematics, or between reality and imagination, in the same way as it does provide the necessary link between unicity and multiplicity.

Ibn 'Arabî quotes the above-mentioned emanationist philosophical maxim quite often [I.42.14, I.260.5, II.31.14]. Although he disagrees with this general proposition [I.260.5, I.715.12, II.434.20, and see also *Al-Durratū Al-Baydā'*: 140], he sometimes explains further that this notion can be held true for physical beings but not for Allah Himself, because Allah, the unique One, can obviously create multiple creations as we can clearly see:

So without their dependence (for actual existence) on the existing-entity ('*ayn*') of the servant, there would be no rulership for those two Names ('the First' and 'the Last'). Because there (in eternity), the (divine) Essential-entity (*al-'ayn*) is (uniquely) One, not united (from different parts: *mutta-hida*). But in the servant, (the existing-entity) is united (of different parts) and not (uniquely) one, because Oneness (*al-ahadiyya*) is for Allah (alone), and unification (*ittiḥād*, the unification of the servant's parts, senses, faculties etc., and not the unification of the servant with his Lord because this is

not possible in Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine) – and not the (divine) Oneness – is for the servant. This is because the servant can only be understood in relation to another (Who is his ‘Lord’ or his Creator), and not by himself: so he has no trace of (the absolute divine) Oneness at all. But as for the Real, Oneness may be understood (as applying) to Him (taken by Himself), or it may be understood (as applying to Him) with relation (to others), since everything belongs to Him, and indeed He is actually the Essence of everything. (This unique divine Oneness refers) not to the wholeness uniting a collection (of different entities: *kullīyyat jam’*), but rather to the (unique) Reality of Unicity (*ḥaqīqat ahadiyya*) on which (all) multiplicity depends – and this (unique Oneness) can only apply specifically to the (divine) Real.

So according to the determination of the (human) intellect, only one thing can ever emerge from the One. But the Unicity of the Real does not fall under that rule. How could He, Who created that rule, fall under it?! And the (true) Ruler – *there is no god but Him, the Almighty, the All-Wise* (3:6, 3:18).

[II.31.11]

So now we can see how multiplicity may come out of the Oneness of the Real. Yet we need to explain how this multiplicity of the creation appears from the One Creator. We need to explain how the pure geometrical analogy of the circle and its centre could be applied to the creation of the worlds by Allah.

Ibn ‘Arabi solves this riddle in part by inserting ‘time’, a true understanding of time. Hence he says:

and He (the Real) has a special face (*wajh khâss*) towards everything that exists, because He is the cause of everything. Now every (single) thing is one, it cannot be two; and He is One. So from Him there appeared only one, because He is in the oneness (*ahadiyya*) of every one (existing thing).

So if multiplicity exists, it would (only) be with regard to the *oneness of time* that is the container (of that apparent multiplicity). For the existence of the Real in this multiplicity is in the oneness of every one (existent). So there appeared from Him only one. Therefore this is the real meaning of ‘from the One only one may emerge’: even if the entirety of the world appeared from Him, there would only appear from Him one (created reality), because He is ‘*with*’⁶ every one (of the creatures) with respect to its oneness.

Now this is something that can be perceived only by the (truly enlightened) ‘people of Allah’,⁷ whereas the philosophers mean this [i.e. that from one (cause) only one (effect) can emerge] in an entirely different sense, and this is something about which they were mistaken.

[II.434.18]

Because of the rarity of the underlying spiritual perception of this reality restricted, as Ibn ‘Arabi stresses, to the fully enlightened ‘people of Allah’, this

passage just quoted above is not readily understood. Perhaps it is because of its great importance and central role in Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology that the famous 'Abd-al-Qâdir al-Jazâ'irî,⁸ the editor of the original Bulaq edition of the *Futûhât* that is the basis for all modern versions, added a rare long footnote comment at this point in the *Futûhât* [II.434–435] to explain it in terms of the oneness of being. Because his comments here are very helpful in this regard, we shall analyse them at length in what follows.

Here he explains that this passage refers to two related issues: 'the one-ness of every being' (*wahdat kull mawjûd*) and 'the unicity of Being (*ahadiyyat al-wujûd*)'. He begins by pointing out that everyone and every thing has a unique 'face' or individual reality that makes it distinctive; thus there are no two persons or entities with the same reality, since otherwise they would be one (the same), and not two. So this means that there appears from the One Creator only one (reality) because this unique 'special face' is never repeated (see also section 2.8).

This explanation, however, is not entirely satisfactory (for our purposes, at least), because the negation of repetition does not imply the negation of multiplicity, which is clearly witnessed in the world.

'Abd al-Qâdir then goes on to explain that we can reconcile the apparent multiplicity with the actual oneness of creation by correcting our view of time and space. He says that our imagination pictures time as a container which contains the things in the existence (as Newton later imagined time, but the theory of Relativity superseded his view, as we mentioned in section 1.3) so we see things arranged in time (and space), and then we imagine multiplicity. But if we imagine ourselves 'out of time', and look at the whole existence in time and space, we shall see a single existence without a beginning and without an end, and without any relation to a self-subsistent distinct time and space as we usually imagine them. For example, every person is one despite having arms and legs and many visible and invisible parts.

But again this explanation is not entirely satisfactory, since it shows the unity of all being (*wâhidiyya*), but not its unique metaphysical 'unicity' (*ahadiyya*). It shows that the whole of existence is 'one' when we look at it as a single whole, or from outside space and time. But still, since we actually perceive (or imagine) ourselves as existing inside this space-time whole as partial entities, we also see many other entities – or in other words, manifest multiplicity. So we still need to explain how this multiplicity appears from the unique Oneness of the Real.

'Abd al-Qâdir then goes on to explain that if the philosophers meant by saying 'from the one there only emerges one' that Allah created only the First Intellect (which is the way this maxim was understood by Ibn Sina and most Islamic philosophers), then this Intellect (alone) gave rise to the world. In one sense this may be true for Ibn 'Arabî, but he adds – as we have just seen at the beginning of this section – that Allah has a unique Face specifically turned to every single entity in the world, through Which its existence is preserved [II.434.18]. But in that case the philosophers are contradicting – or at least failing to illustrate the relevance of – their own proposition (Ibn 'Arabî also discussed these views in *al-Durrat Al-Baydâ*: 142–143), because again the world is

many and the First Intellect is one; so we still need then to explain how this multiplicity of the world appeared out of the First Intellect.

In Ibn 'Arabî's view, however, every individual entity in the world always has a direct creative relation with Allah, and that is how its existence exists and is maintained. If Allah did not maintain this creative 'special face' between Himself and each entity, it would cease to exist instantly (*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 133). In order to solve the problem of unicity–multiplicity relation, Ibn 'Arabî actually asserts that this interface between the One and all the many existent things does not happen all at once. Rather, at any instant, as we have just seen, there is in reality a single relation or interface – a unique divine 'with-ness', as he calls it (following the Qur'an) – between the One and each 'one' of the entities of the world. But what happens at this particular instant with the other entities in the world, since their existence is also preserved only through this unique creative relation between them and their Creator, the unique One? The answer is: they do cease to exist, and then they are (immediately) *re-created* again and again [II.385.4]. We shall discuss this central metaphysical principle of the 'ever-renewed creation' in section 5.6.

Therefore, in order to understand the relation between the unique Oneness of the Real and the multiplicity of the creatures, Ibn 'Arabî adds time to the previous philosophical statement, which can be then reformulated as: 'from the One there can emerge only one *at a time*'. This re-statement is indeed the key to understanding Ibn 'Arabî's unique views of time and the oneness of being and to solving the mystery of the relation between the Real and His creation. In this way the world is created by Allah 'in series' (*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 139), and not just one single time, just as the repeated images of a movie are displayed on the television or computer screen.

Ibn 'Arabî, moreover, affirms that this particular mode of creation was chosen by Allah to be like that, although in fact He might have done it in any other way, so it is not an (external) restriction over Him:

So this is not necessarily implied by the Existence of the Real: i.e. that for example only one can emerge out from Him, and that this is impossible (otherwise). But He willed that and He wished it, and if He had wished that the world should exist all at once, and that nothing were dependent on anything (else), it would not be difficult for Allah [to make it like that, and in this case – if Allah had wished that the world should exist all at once – then we would be living in a different logic, but because Allah created it in this way as it is now (ruled by the laws of causality: see also section 7.7), we observe that from the one nothing might emerge except one at a time, since otherwise this would violate the oneness of the Real according to our current logic].

(*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 139)

The meaning of this principle is in fact derived directly from the well-known verse in the Qur'an that we have already discussed in many earlier contexts:

each Day He is upon some (one, single) task (55:29). Ibn 'Arabî quotes this verse most frequently in his discussion on time, and it is the basis of his unique 'quantization' of time. So since Allah is One, He does only one single creative task each 'Day' – of course not this normal observable day that we encounter, in which an almost infinite number of tasks or events are happening.

5.3 The unicity of God and His names

According to Ibn 'Arabî and to Islam, and also some other religions, Allah is both One (*Wâhid*) and 'Unique' (*al-Ahad*, 'the Unit').⁹ The first attribute means that He is one God (not many) and the second attribute means that He is not divisible into other entities. Moreover, as is indicated by the more metaphysically problematic second attribute of 'Unicity' (*ahadiyya*), we can not describe Him as a single entity (like other entities) with specific dimensions that are placed somewhere in space or began at a point of time. Allah is simply uniquely different from whatever we may know or imagine. We can not achieve full knowledge or awareness of the Essence (*Dhât*) of Allah because this is beyond our perception. It is, however, possible to describe Him and speak about His Attributes and divine Names, for example as they are mentioned in the Qur'an and the Sunna. We may attain knowledge about the divine Names and descriptions of Allah, but not about His Essence (*Dhât*) Himself. As Chittick has pointed out, for Ibn 'Arabî: 'God is known through the relations, attributions and correlations between Him and the cosmos. But the Essence is unknown, since nothing is related to It' (*SDK*: 62). Whatever the human being may know about Allah is therefore in the end partial and incomplete. No one can ever achieve full knowledge or awareness of Him; the maximum knowledge one might achieve of the Essence of Allah is to know that He is different from anything [IV.301.17]. Ibn 'Arabî expressed this nicely in his prayers: 'it is enough for me that You know my ignorance. You are as I know, and beyond what I know to a degree that I do not know' (Beneito and Hirtenstein 2000: 131–132)¹⁰ This is because we may know Him only through His manifestations in us and in the world, but His manifestations are never exactly repeated.

Human Being, however, is the creature most capable of knowing Allah, the Exalted, because when He created Adam (the Perfect Human Being), He *taught him all the Names* (2:31)¹¹ and ordered the angels to prostrate before Adam out of respect and acknowledgement (2:34, 7:11, 17:61, 18:50, 20:116, II.46.33). But knowing Allah is an infinite process for us, because Allah Himself is not finite, in the sense that He never manifests in the same form twice [I.266.10], and also because His manifestations reveal some of his attributes and descriptions, but do not fully reveal His ultimate Essence or Identity. Ibn 'Arabî summarizes this by saying, in one of his many elaborations of the famous Divine Saying of the 'Hidden Treasure', that:

Allah, the Exalted, 'loved to be known' in order to grant the world the privilege of knowing Him, the most Exalted. But He knew that His Identity

(Essence) can not be (completely) known and nobody can ever know Him as He knows Himself. The best knowledge that can be achieved about Him, His Highness, in the world is that the knowers know that they do not know. And this (human inability to know the Essence) is (also) called knowledge, as the Righteous (Abû Bakr al-Siddîq) said: 'The incapacity to attain realization is a realization.'¹²

[III.429.7]

As Ibn 'Arabî notes elsewhere, the Prophet Muhammad has also clearly expressed this same recognition by saying: 'I can not enumerate the ways of praising Thee: Thou art as Thou has praised Thyself' [*Kanz*: 2131, 3652, I.126.15, I.271.5, etc.], and Allah also said: '*but they do not encompass Him with knowledge*' (20:110).

Of course the Prophet Muhammad also said: 'Allah has 99 Names, one hundred less one: whoever enumerates them is going to enter the Garden' [*Kanz*: 1933, 1934 and 1938]. However, this does not *restrict* the divine Names to 99, as some Muslims misunderstand it. In fact Ibn 'Arabî says that the divine Names of Allah are countless and that everything in the cosmos is a divine Name. But the 99 enumerated Names are the principal Names [IV.288.2] that have been mentioned in Qur'an and Sunna. Moreover, although each Name of the divine Names is different from others, Ibn 'Arabî repeatedly cautions his readers that all that Names are intrinsically implicit in each one of them, which is to say that each Name can be described by all the other Names [I.101.5]. However, despite the multiplicity of these Names, they all refer to the same One Absolute Essence of Allah, while conveying different Attributes of Him due to His manifestations and relations [I.48.23]. Multiplicity is not an intrinsic property of Allah Himself, since Allah has many different Names only when considered with relation to His creations:

The Names of the Real do not become plural and multiple except in manifestation. But with respect to Him, the property of number does not rule over them, not even its (the number's) root, which is (the number) one. So His Names, in respect to Him, may not be (exclusively or restrictively) described by unity or multiplicity.

[II.122.19, see also *Al-Masâ'il*: 109]

So in fact even the Names 'the One', 'the Unique' and the like are not descriptions of Allah with respect to Himself, but with respect to his creation. If we suppose that there is no creation, there would be no need to describe Him by the One or any other Name. Ibn 'Arabî frequently points out that this is just like the fact that the meaning of the number one is only introduced with regard to its relation to the other numbers.

So Allah may be known only through His divine Names. And because these Names are countless, our knowledge of Allah may never be complete. It is these knowable divine Names that are actively engaged and manifested in the creation.

That is why we see multiplicity and diversity in the cosmos.¹³ In fact Ibn ‘Arabî maintains that everything in the world is in essence a divine Name, simply because everything is a cause that we need, and Allah says: ‘*you are in need of Allah*’ (35:15) (III.208.7; see also section 7.7). Also He said that ‘*He is the First and the Last and the Manifest and the Hidden*’ (57:3). He manifests in all things, so the things are not other than Him; but also the things are not (identical with) Him, as we shall explain shortly.

However, we should take all these descriptions and names as mere approximations, because they are words spoken in our own language: the names (words) that we know are actually *the names of the Names*, and not the Names themselves [II.56.33]. Although we may know about Allah by knowing His Attributes and Names, those outward verbal Names are words in our language so that we may, for example, look up their meanings in the dictionary, or even use them to name and describe people and things. So although those same familiar words are Names of Allah, their actual meanings are quite distinct when Allah is called by them. For this reason Allah is named as *al-fard* (‘the Singular’), because He is distinct (or ‘singled-out’: *mutafarrid*) from the creation [IV.276.33]. Also, all His Names are described by their ‘singular uniqueness’ (*al-tafarrud*). As Chittick has pointed out, those words that are revealed to us (through the Qur’an and Sunna) are the outward forms (*sûra*), while Allah’s own knowledge of Himself is the reality or inner meaning (*ma’nâ*) (SDK: 34). Similarly the Names that are revealed to us in everything in the cosmos are the outward forms, while the inner meaning of those forms is Allah’s own knowledge of Himself. Ibn ‘Arabî showed that:

Allah says: ‘*Call upon Allah or call upon the All-Merciful: whoever you call upon, to Him belong the most beautiful Names*’ (17:110). So here He made the most beautiful Names belong to Allah as they (also) belong to the All-Merciful.

But here there is a subtle point: since every Name has a meaning (*ma’nâ*) and a form (*sûra*), ‘Allah’ is called by the Name’s *meaning*, while the ‘All-Merciful’ is called by the Name’s *form*. This is because the (divine) Breath is ascribed to the All-Merciful,¹⁴ and through this (creative) Breath the divine words become manifest within the levels of the Void (*khalâ*) where the cosmos becomes manifest. So we call Him only by the form of the Names (and only He Himself knows the real meaning of these names).

[II.396.30]

Therefore whatever knowledge we may acquire about Allah actually belongs to His Name ‘the All-Merciful’, and the difference between the two Names is like the difference between the form and the meaning. According to Ibn ‘Arabî, this relation is a direct implication of the verse in Qur’an: ‘*the All-Merciful mounted on the Throne*’ (20:5). In the first chapter of *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya* (p. 89), which talks about the Universal Spirit (*al-Rûh al-Kullî*) – which is the ‘Greatest Element/Single Monad’, as we shall see in sections 6.2–6 – Ibn ‘Arabî makes a comparison between the Names Allah and the All-Merciful. Under a section

called: ‘a secret for the special (people of Allah)’, Ibn ‘Arabî says that the difference between those two Names is like the difference between this Universal Spirit on which Allah mounted (or established His authority) and the Throne on which the All-Merciful mounted (or established His authority). We shall see in section 6.6 that the same comparison can be made between the Single Monad and the Greatest Element. Just as the divine Throne encompasses all the cosmos, everything in the cosmos is related to the Name ‘the All-Merciful’ [II.467.21].

5.4 The metaphysical triplicity (‘trinity’) of the cosmos

According to Ibn ‘Arabî, as we have already mentioned in section 3.6, the divine Names can be grouped into three categories: the Names of Essence (*asmâ’ al-dhât*), Names of Descriptions or Attributes (*asmâ’ al-sifât*) and Names of Actions (*asmâ’ al-af’âl*) [I.423.20, I.67.28, see also *Inshâ’ al-Dawâ’ir*: 22]. Therefore the Universal Intellect or Adamic ‘Perfect Human Being’, who is created ‘according to the Image of the All-Merciful’ [*Kanz*: 1146, 1148, 1149], came out with three faces because he is based on these three unique divine dimensions [I.446.19, II.434.16], although he is in essence one indivisible entity.

That is why Ibn ‘Arabî asserts that (everything in) the cosmos is built on a kind of metaphysical triplicity [III.126.21], and he later explains this further by saying:

So the body is (composed of at least) eight points, just as the knowable (aspects) of the Real are the Essence and the seven Attributes: They are not Him, and They are not other than Him. (Likewise) the body is not other than the points, and the points are not other than the body. Now we only said that eight points are the minimum (required to compose) bodies because the name ‘line’ is for two points or more. And the origin of the plane is from two lines or more, so the plane is from (at least) four points. And the origin of the body is from two planes or more, so the body is from eight points.

Therefore the name (attribute) of ‘length’ is applicable to the body from the line (included in it); the name ‘width’ is applicable to it from the plane; and the name ‘depth’ is applicable to it from the combination of two planes. Thus the body is built on a triplicity (of dimensions: *tathlith*), just as the formation of proofs (in syllogistic logic) is based on a threefold structure, and just as the Source of existence – that is, the Real – only becomes manifest through the bestowing of existence through three realities: His Entity, His willing intention (*tawajjuh*) and His Speaking (the Command ‘Be’). Thus the world became manifest ‘according to the Form’ of the One Who gives it existence, both in sensation (i.e. the visible world) and in (its spiritual dimensions of) meaning.

[III.276.1]

For this reason – i.e. the threefold structures underlying all generative processes – Ibn ‘Arabî emphasizes that we need two elements (subject and object) in order

to produce a result (act) [I.278.14], because ‘from the one alone nothing may be produced’ [III.126.1].

In fact the metaphysical triplicity of subject, object and resulting act is fundamental throughout Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology. Thus he summarizes the process of creation by saying that the Universal Intellect (subject or symbolic ‘father’) is writing down in the Universal Soul (the object or ‘mother’) all that Allah wants to create till the Last Day (i.e. the result or ‘son’) [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7–8] (see section 4.3). Indeed Ibn ‘Arabî even wrote a separate treatise dedicated to explaining certain threefold structures of expression and meaning in the Qur’an.¹⁵ It is noteworthy in this regard that the metaphysical concept of triplicity is also fundamental in many other ancient religions and philosophies, including the Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian, Roman, Japanese and Indian.¹⁶

For this reason, Ibn ‘Arabî regards the number three as the first ‘single’ (or odd: *fardî*) number, because he consistently considers that one is not a number (since the Arabic word for ‘number’, *‘adad*, implies multiplicity), while two is the first number. But since the number two is even, nothing may be formed without a third, intermediate principle to link or interface between the one and the two:

So no contingent entity (*mumkin*) has come to exist through one (alone), but only through a plurality (or ‘conjunction’ of elements: *jam’*), and the least of plurals is three.¹⁷ So since the (divine) Name ‘the Singular’ (*al-fard*) is threefold in its effects, He gives to the contingent entity that He brings into existence those three things (i.e. Essence, Will and the creative Command) that He must unavoidably consider, and (only then) He brings (the contingent thing) into existence.

... Therefore this (metaphysical principle of) triplicity runs inwardly through the totality of all things, because it exists in the (divine creative) Source.

[III.126.5]

Now the Universal Intellect is the intermediary reality (also called *barzakh* or ‘connector’) between Allah and the world, and therefore It has two interfaces: It faces Allah from the side of His unity, and It faces the world from the side of His threefold creative dimensions. When It faces Allah (in order to perceive knowledge), It turns away from us (the world), and this is our ‘night’; and when It faces the world, this is our ‘daytime’ or manifest existence. The Perfect Human Being or First Intellect is – according to the famous hadith already discussed above – the ‘Image’ or ‘Form’ of the Real, and likewise the world is the subsequent image of this Perfect Human Being. Hence the manifest world, like the Perfect Human Being, is ‘according to the Image’ of the Real Himself – although without the Perfect Human Being it could not participate in this perfection (see section 3.1). So if we consider the manifest images of the world, we can potentially discover the face of the Perfect Human Being reflected in it, and if we come to know the Perfect Human Being, then we also come to know Allah.

So this is the fundamental ontological triplicity of 'Allah-Human Being-world' or 'Allah-Intellect-world' [I.125–126].

According to Ibn 'Arabî, this fundamental triplicity of Allah-Human Being-world is manifested again within each human being as in our threefold nature as spirit-heart-body. The spirit is the single immaterial and mysterious divine reality that is the principle underlying life and creation, while the body is the place where this creation occurs in many different ways, so it is composed of many different material parts (multiplicity). And the heart is the link between the body and the spirit through which the spirit exerts its effects on the multiplicity of the body. On the other hand, the sensations collected by the body are eventually raised up to the spirit as spiritual (immaterial) meanings and realities.

Another favourite symbolic triplicity for Ibn 'Arabî, deeply rooted in the symbolism of the Qur'an and certain key hadith, is the astronomical triplicity of the Sun–Moon–Earth.¹⁸ The Earth gains its life from the Sun, and when the Sun does not face the Earth from a specific direction, the Moon takes part and reflects the light of the Sun with a degree that is small or large according to its relative place in space. In fact, if one wants to look at the Sun, one is instead obliged to look at the Moon when it is full, because the Sun can not be seen unveiled at all, since it will burn up everything that its direct light falls on. This symbolism is directly connected, for Ibn 'Arabî, with the famous 'hadith of the veils', according to which Allah has 70,000 veils of light and darkness, such that if He removed those veils His light would burn everyone who tried to see Him directly [Kanz: 29846, 39210].

Indeed the trinity of Sun–Moon–Earth particularly well illustrates Ibn 'Arabî's view of the creation and its relation to the Creator. Although the creation by Allah is done 'through' the Universal Intellect, Ibn 'Arabî also emphasizes that Allah also has a *direct*, 'individual face' turned toward every single entity in the world. Similarly the Sun does not only give its light indirectly through the Moon, but also much more directly to the Earth, so everything on Earth is connected with the Sun in the course of the day with different degrees and at different times.

5.5 The oneness of being

The 'oneness of being' (*wahdata al-wujûd*) is one of Ibn 'Arabî's most controversial doctrines which many later Muslim scholars attributed to him, usually with very different (and often more polemic than philosophical) meanings and interpretations. Although Ibn 'Arabî himself never mentioned the precise term '*wahdata al-wujûd*' in his writings,¹⁹ it is quite evident that Ibn 'Arabî's books are full of statements that develop notions related to the oneness of being in one way or another, in many places quite explicitly and rigorously. This is especially the case in his most controversial book, *Fusûs al-Hikam*, for which he was widely criticized, but related discussions are also to be found throughout the *Futûhât* and his other shorter works. Indeed the possible misunderstandings of this conception clearly underpin Ibn 'Arabî's distinctive multi-layered,

intentionally 'scattered' rhetoric and writing style throughout the *Futûhât* and other works, as he explained quite clearly in the key Introduction to the *Futûhât* itself.

The basic ontological issue for Ibn 'Arabî is very clear and simple: in many places throughout his writings, such as the long chapter 198 of the *Futûhât* [II.390–478] he follows the established Avicennan distinction, familiar to all students of Islamic theology and philosophy by his time, in dividing all conceivable things, in terms of existence, into three basic categories (see also section 2.3). There he says:

Know that the matter (of the nature of the reality) is the Real (*al-haqq*) and the creation (*al-khalq*): that is the absolute Existence that has always been and always is (existing); and absolute (contingent) possibility (*imkân*) that has always been and always is (possible to exist); and absolute non-existence that has always been and always is (non-existing). Now the absolute Existence does not accept non-existence, (and that applies) eternally and perpetually. The absolute non-existence does not accept existence, (and likewise that applies) eternally and perpetually. But the absolutely possible does accept existence through an (ontologically determining) cause, and it also accepts non-existence through a cause – and (that contingent ontological status also applies) eternally and perpetually.

So the absolute Existence is Allah, nothing other than Him. The absolute non-existence is the impossible-to-exist, nothing other than it. And the absolutely possible (of existence) is the world, nothing other than it: its (ontological) level is between *the* absolute Existence and absolute non-existence. So in so far as some of it faces non-existence, it accepts non-existence; and in so far as some of it faces Existence, it accepts existence. So some of it is darkness, and that is the Nature. And some of it is light, and that is the 'Breath of the All-Merciful' [that is the 'real-through-whom-creation-takes-place' (*al-haqq al-makhlûq bihi*), see sections 6.3 and 6.5] which bestows existence upon this possible (realm of created beings).²⁰

[II.426.26]

After that Ibn 'Arabî explains the different types of Creation according to this creative Spirit – or the divine Name 'Light', which he often uses as synonymous with the divine creative and existentiating power – is attached to the 'dark', contingent form of the creatures. Then he goes on to give the crucial analysis which clearly explains his profound view of the oneness of being in the most explicit and direct way, based on evident verses in the Qur'an. He says:

So the possible (contingent) existence became manifest between light and darkness, nature and spirit, the unseen and the visible, and the 'veiled' and unveiled. Therefore that which is close to (*waliya*) absolute Existence, from among all that (contingent realm) we have mentioned is light and spirit, and all of what we have mentioned which is close to absolute non-existence is

'shadow' and body – and from the totality (of those different kinds of contingent existent) form (*sûra*: of the whole of creation) comes to be. So when you consider the world from the side of the Breath of the All-Merciful, you say: 'It is nothing but Allah'. But when you consider the world with regard to its being equally balanced and well-proportioned (i.e. between existence and non-existence), then you say these are creations (*makhluqât*). So [in the famous Qur'anic expression of this fundamental ontological reality, addressed to the Prophet]: '*you (Muhammad) did not throw*', inasmuch as you are a creation [so that it is God who was really acting], '*when you did throw*', inasmuch as you are real (*haqq^{am}*), '*but Allah threw*' (8:17), because He is the Real (*al-Haqq*).

For it is through the (divine creative) Breath that the whole world is 'breathing' (animated with life), and the Breath made it appear. So (this creative divine Breath) is inner dimension (*bâtin*) for the Real, and the manifest dimension (*zâhir*) for creation: thus the inner dimension of the Real is the manifest dimension for creation, and the inner dimension of creation is the manifest aspect of the Real – and through their combination the generated existence (*al-kawn*) is actualized, since without that combination it would (only) be said to be Real and creation. Thus the Real is for the absolute Existence, and creation is for the absolutely possible. So what becomes non-existent of the world and its form that disappears is through what is close to the side of non-existence; and what remains of it and does not allow for non-existence is through what is close to the side of Existence. Hence these two things (Existence and non-existence) are continually ruling over the world, so the creation is always new with every Breath, both in this world and in the hereafter.

Therefore the Breath of the All-Merciful is continually directed (toward the Act of creation), and Nature is continually taking on existence as the forms for this Breath, so that the divine Command does not become inactive, because inactivity is not appropriate (for It). So constantly forms are newly appearing and becoming manifest, according to their states of readiness to accept the (divine creative) Breath. And this is the clearest possible (description) of the (divine) origination (*ibdâ'*) of the world. *And Allah says the truth and He shows the way* (33:4).

[II.427.17]

To summarize, therefore, this expression implies that the world can be conceived symbolically as a mixture of light and 'darkness'. For Ibn 'Arabî, this darkness is quite literally nothing: it is simply the absence of light.²¹ Light, on the other hand, is ultimately the Real (via the divine Name 'The Light', *al-nûr*), and the Real is One. So all existence is in essence one. Multiplicity appears through creation as a result of mixing the oneness of light with the darkness of non-existence. In other words, we can say – since darkness is nothing – that the creation is the constantly repeating relative appearance (manifestation) of the Real. The Real manifests most perfectly in the Perfect Human Being, and relatively in

other creatures, and these manifestations happen through the Universal Intellect. So in real existence there is only the Real Who is Allah and this Universal Intellect who is the Messenger of Allah. So there is in fact no ontologically self-subsistent 'evil', since the creation is all good – an aspect of this cosmological conception which, taken out of context, could easily give rise to obvious religious and ethical objections. Hence what we perceive as evil is in reality the absence of good, just as darkness is the absence of light.²²

Thus this is the basic principle, but in order to understand it we need to explain how the mixing between light and darkness is done, which is again to say: 'how is the world created?' – which raises the question of time yet again. Ibn 'Arabî's understanding of this process of creation or cosmogony will be developed further below and in sections 9.7–8.

Given the possible confusions and misunderstandings surrounding this understanding of creation, it is clear why Ibn 'Arabî never declared these ideas in overly simplistic terms in his books, but rather scattered them throughout his writings – as he explains quite explicitly at the very beginning of his *Futûhât* [I.38.25] – so that the common people would not misunderstand them (as indeed happened in later times) and so that only those properly 'prepared' would be able to discover their profound intended meanings.

Moreover, we have to admit that Ibn 'Arabî takes it a courageous step further: although the Universal Intellect, and hence the entire manifest world, is created by Allah, Ibn 'Arabî emphasizes that it also is not 'other than Allah' (*SDK*: 113), because ultimately only Allah has real absolute and necessary (independent) existence [I.194.8], and the world exists by and through Him not by itself. As Chittick has summarized this perspective (*SDK*: 81), if Ibn 'Arabî was asked the question: 'Are the things the same as God?', his answer would be: 'Yes and No'. That is to say, they are, in his own words, 'He/not He' (*Huwa lâ huwa*);²³ or equally, one could say: 'they are not Him, and they are not other than Him' (*Lâ hiya huwa wa lâ hiya ghayruh*).²⁴ For if we say 'Yes' (alone), then this would require us confining Allah, the most Exalted, in objects, which is an obvious misconception. And if we say 'No' (alone), then this would require the assertion of other separate and self-subsistent) existents, and this – for Ibn 'Arabî – is also wrong. So the ultimate truth requires combining both ontological views and saying that the things are in essence 'not other than Allah' – although in the forms that we see, they also are not (identical with) Allah. These forms do not have real independent existence, since otherwise Allah would not be 'the One (alone)' (*al-wâhid*) – but He is the One (alone), and the created things exist by and through Him, not by themselves. For Ibn 'Arabî, this is in fact 'the secret of sincerity' (*sirr al-ikhhlâs*), which is also 'the secret of destiny' (*sirr al-qadar*) that makes clear the fundamental distinction between the Creator and the creation, the Eternal and the created – and this secret, he explains, has been hidden from most people [III.182.11].

Chittick goes on to show that, for Ibn 'Arabî, everything in the world is a divine name of Allah (*SDK*: 94); or rather, the things are the manifestations of the Names. From the general Qur'anic verse *O people, you are truly in need of*

Allah (35:15), Ibn ‘Arabî easily concludes that everything (that is a cause, and everything is a cause) is a divine Name, because we are in need of these causes, so they may not be other than Him [I.288.16]. Again we can not say that these secondary and intermediate causes (*asbâb*) are Him – though in their most ultimate essence and Source they are all one, and this one is not other than Him. But of course someone simply hearing such an expression will initially think that they mean that the particular shape or body of the created objects that are the causes: that is why we can not simply stop at saying (as many later Sufi poets sometimes did) that ‘all things are Allah’. Ibn ‘Arabî explained these key ontological distinctions most clearly and extensively in his *Fusûs al-Hikam*, especially in chapter 3 ‘on the wisdom of transcendence (*al-hikma al-subûhiyya*) in the word of Noah’;²⁵ but he also took up this same subject at many places throughout the *Futûhât* [I.90.17, and the extensive references cited in the previous paragraph].

In a similar manner, Ibn ‘Arabî often describes the world of all creation as a kind of ‘mirror’ on which Allah’s Image is reflected [IV.430.1]. If someone looks at the world from the real side of actual existence, then he will see the Image of the Real, Allah the most Glorious; but if he considers the world only from the side of its non-existence (if we suppose this is possible), then he will see an image of the unreal:

Therefore the reason why this (ontological) ‘isthmus’ (*al-barzakh*) – which is the possible (realm of contingent existence) between (pure) non-existence and Existence – is the occasion (*sabab*) for its being attributed both permanence and non-existence, is because it corresponds to both those things by its essence. That is because the absolute non-existence stood up like a mirror for the Absolute Existence, so the (divine) Existence saw His Image in it, so that this Image is the essential reality (‘*ayn*’) of the possible. That is why this ‘possible’ (as the Perfect Human Being or First Intellect) had a permanent individual-essence (‘*ayn thâbita*’) and state of (definable) ‘thingness’ already in the state of its non-existence. And that is why it emerged (in its contingent, created existence) according to the Image of the Absolute Existence. This is also that is why it was also describable as non-finite, so it is referred to as infinite.

But the Absolute Existence is also like a mirror for the absolute non-existence. So the absolute non-existence saw itself in the mirror of the Real, but the image that it saw was itself the essential reality (‘*ayn*’) of non-existence by which this possible (existence) is described. Therefore it is also described as infinite, just as the absolute non-existence is infinite – hence the possible is described as (inherently) non-existing (*ma’dûm*). So it is like the image that appears between the mirror and the person looking in the mirror: that image is not that very person himself, but it is not other than him. Likewise the possible, with respect to as its (very limited kind of) permanence, is not the very essence of the Real Himself; yet it is not other than Him. Similarly, with respect to its (only relative) non-existence, it is not the

same thing as of the (absolutely) impossible, yet it is not entirely other than it. So it is as though it is something relative (depending on how it is viewed).

[III.47.32]

He also says:

If the unreal (non-existence) had a tongue (to speak), it would tell you: 'you are according to my image', because it sees in you nothing but its own shadow, just as the Existence has speech and has said: 'you are (created) according to My Image' [*Kanz*: 1141–1150, and 15129], because He saw in you His own Image.

[IV.154.23]

So the world may not have a constant real (self-subsistent) existence, because only Allah may be described by that; and at the same time the world is not in constant non-existence, or it would not be there at all. Instead it is perpetually fluctuating, at every instant of creation, between existence and non-existence. And in fact, Ibn 'Arabī points out [II.303–304], this is the real meaning of the Qur'anic symbols of the 'daytime' and the 'night': when the Universal Intellect (Allah's Messenger) faces the Real, this would be a kind of 'night' for us, but when the Intellect/Messenger faces us – in each divine Act of creation – this is our manifest day (*shahāda*: what is 'seen' or manifest – see also the related discussions in sections 2.14 and 6.8 [Spreading the Shadows]). What makes sense of this distinction, of course, is Ibn 'Arabī's assertion of the central cosmogonic principle of perpetual re-creation, which we shall discuss next. From that perspective, the world is actually continually created 'in series', bit by bit, one entity at a time; so no two entities may gain real existence at the same time, because they gain their existence only through their constant re-creation by the Real who is One.

For Ibn 'Arabī, this rule or principle of serial creation and re-creation is in fact a direct implication of the verse '*each day He is upon some task*' (55:29); at the same time, it is for him the actual underlying meaning of the familiar philosophical maxim 'from the one there might proceed only', which we discussed in section 5.2. We have seen, however, that for Ibn 'Arabī this creative procedure is not therefore imposed on the Real; rather, it remains His choice which He makes when He creates the world.

We also must remember that this divine oneness manifest in the Act of creation that we can know and observe – which grounds our own experience of reality and the cosmos – is clearly rooted in the Single Monad. Yet this Single Monad (the First Intellect, 'Muhammadan Reality', etc.) is itself but one of an unknown number of divinely 'originated' (*ibdā'*) 'Roaming Spirits' (see section 1.4), so there is indeed some kind of (for us) further unknowable multiplicity on this higher ontological level. However, it would appear that again we can apply the same judgement to those Roaming Spirits, according to our own human

logic, that they may not be ‘other than’ Allah, nor the same as Him (since He originated them): so they also are in this ontological status of ‘He/not He’, which again indicates an ultimate Oneness on the highest divine level.

We have actually already summarized the basic themes of this section right at the end of section 2.1, when we recalled Ibn ‘Arabī’s conclusion that ‘time is defined by motion, and motion is defined by the different positions of the formable monads, and those monads are different states (times or instances) or forms of the Single Monad, that alone has a real existence’. Therefore, ‘there is no god but Allah’ and this highest created entity (i.e. ‘the Single Monad’) is the (all-encompassing) Messenger of Allah. Allah sent this Messenger ‘*to take us* (and the whole created world) *from the darkness*’ of non-existence ‘*into the light*’ of existence (Qur’an 57:9). But although this Single Monad is not Allah, he is not other than Allah: he is some sort of fundamental manifestation of Allah, and it is through this primordial manifestation that Allah can accurately and meaningfully be described, in the famous Qur’anic expression, as ‘*the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden*’ (57:3).

5.6 The principle of ever-renewed creation

Ibn ‘Arabī’s conception of time is profoundly rooted in one of the most famous and distinctive – and uniquely and problematically experiential – features of his world-view, the principle of the ‘ever-renewed creation’ of all the manifest worlds at every instant. Thus he affirms, in a more abstract statement of this perception:

There is no doubt that the ‘accidents’ [i.e. the particular forms taken by creation in all the different levels of existence at each moment] become non-existent in the second instant-of-time after the instant of their coming into existence. So the Real is continuously watching over the world of bodies and the higher and lower (spiritual and imaginal) substances, such that whenever a (particular) form through which they exist becomes nonexistent, He creates at that same instant another form like it or opposed to it, which (new creation) preserves it from non-existence at every instant. So He is continuously creating, and the world is continuously in need of Him.

[II.208.27]

He also makes it clear that this continuously renewed ‘return to non-existence’ is an intrinsic condition of all the created forms, and not due to any external force [II.385.4]. Typically Ibn ‘Arabī relates this fundamental insight to the Qur’anic verse: ‘*but they are unaware of the new creation (khalq jadīd)*’ (50:15), which he frequently quotes²⁶ – along with the famous verse concerning the ‘Day of the divine Task’ (55:29) that he cites in relation to his intimately related concept of the quantization of time.

Therefore the existence of things in the world is not continuous, as we imagine and observe, because Allah is continuously and perpetually creating

every thing whatsoever – at every level and domain of existence – at every instant, or in every single ‘Day of event’ [II.454.21, II.384.30]. This means that, just as time (for Ibn ‘Arabî) may exist only at one atomic instant at a time, so also space (and whatever it may contain) also exists only one instant at a time. In fact there is no difference between space and time: they are both containers for events (see section 2.1 and 3.6).

We have already seen in previous chapters that, according to this principle of ever-renewed creation, Ibn ‘Arabî explains motion (section 2.6) in a new unique and unprecedented manner, and he also explains the ‘intertwining’ of days (section 4.4) as well as some other related philosophical and theological concepts. Indeed this hypothetical (though Ibn ‘Arabî affirmed it through unveiling) principle forms the basis of Ibn ‘Arabî’s overall view of the world, and we shall use it as one of three key hypotheses in the following chapter in which we explain his Single Monad model of the cosmos.

Of course this re-creation must be happening at extraordinarily high ‘rates of refreshment’, but Ibn ‘Arabî has no difficulty in finding scriptural allusions and theological and other arguments supporting this distinctive conception, in addition to the direct experiential evidence of the spiritual ‘knowers’ (*‘urafâ*). He says:

The form becomes non-existent in the next instant-of-time after the time of its coming into existence, so the Real is always Creator, and the monad (substance, *jawhar*) is always in need (of the Creator for its existence). For if the form would remain (for two instants of time or longer), those two principles would not hold. But this is impossible [at least theologically speaking, since otherwise the creatures would be independent of Allah, whereas only Allah maybe described as (completely) Self-sufficient (*al-Ghanî*), while everything created has the essential intrinsic quality of ontological ‘poverty’ (*faqr*) or need of the Creator for its very existence], so it is impossible for the (created) form to remain for two instants of time (or longer).

(*Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya*: 55)

So from the theological point of view, neither the forms nor the essences of the created world may remain (constant) for more than one moment because if they do they would be independent of the Creator – whereas both the essence and the ‘accidents’ or form of the creatures are always in need of their Creator. The essence needs ever-renewed forms because it exists only when it wears a form; and the form does not stay the same, because, if it did so, the Real would not be Perpetually-Creating (*Khallâq*), and the individual form would be at least partly independent of the Real.

In addition, Ibn ‘Arabî argues in similar theological terms that there are never any two truly identical forms, since otherwise Allah will not be described as ‘the Infinitely Vast’ (*al-Wâsi’*). But because of this unique divine Vastness (*al-ittisâ’ al-ilâhî*) [I.266.8], the monad will never wear two identical forms: i.e. it never wears exactly the same form for more than one instant; nothing is ever truly

repeated [I.721.22]. The new forms, he admits, are often ‘similar’ to the previous ones but they are not the ‘same’ [II.372.21, III.127.24]. Ibn ‘Arabî summarized this argument as follows:

The world at every instant of time (*zamân fard*) is re-formed (*takawwun*) and disintegrated. So the individual entity of the substance of the world (*‘ayn jawhar al-‘âlam*) has no persistence (in existence) except through its receiving of this formation (*takwîn*) within it. Therefore the world is in a state of needfulness perpetually: either the forms are in need (of a creator) to bring them forth from non-existence into existence; or else the substance [*jawhar*: i.e. the substrate for the created ‘forms’ or ‘accidents’] is in need to preserve its existence, because unavoidably a condition for its existence is the existence of the formation of those (newly re-created forms) for which it is a substrate.

[II.454.19]

Elsewhere Ibn ‘Arabî gives a very short statement of this general ontological argument which is rather difficult to follow. There he says:

The doer (*al-fâ’il*) may not do nothing (although we use this expression widely in our daily language, but it is logical nonsense to say ‘do nothing’), and the thing may not become non-existent (simply) by its opposite, because (the thing and its opposite) may not meet, and (also) because the opposite does not exist (at that same time) . . . So that is why we said that (the form) becomes non-existent by itself (not through an external force or action) and is impossible to remain (in existence for two moments or longer).

(*Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya*: 55, see also I.39.8)

Ibn ‘Arabî also made the same basic arguments near the beginning of the *Futûhât*, through the tongue of a mysterious ‘western Imâm’ who summarizes in an extremely condensed form – usually using rhymed prose and the language and terminology of kalam theology – a series of challenging ontological premises subscribed to by those who have moved beyond the simple creed of the common believers, which forms the second of the four levels of faith that Ibn ‘Arabî explained at the beginning of the *Futûhât*, and the mysterious speaker’s remarks in this section are roughly based on al-Ghazâlî’s intentionally popular kalam treatise *Al-Iqtisâd fî Al-‘I’tiqâd*:

(4) Then he said: ‘Whatever individual entity (is said to) appear, but which does not give rise to any (distinctive) quality, then its existence is obviously impossible, since it does not give rise to any knowledge (as would be the case with anything that actually exists).’

(5) Then he said: ‘And it is impossible for it to fill different places, because its travelling (from one place to another) would be in the second instant of time of the time of its existence in itself, but it does not continue

to reside (over two instants). And if it were possible for it to move by itself, then it would be self-subsistent and would have no need of place. Nor does (the advent of) its opposite make it cease to exist, because it (the opposite) does not exist (at the same time in the same place). Nor does (another) doer ('make it into nothing'), because although people do use the expression 'doing nothing', no intelligent person maintains that (is possible).

[I.39.7]

These statements are based on two issues: (1) the forms in the worlds of manifestation may not remain longer than a single instant of time, since otherwise they would be independent and self-subsistent; and (2) the created forms intrinsically return to non-existence after every instant. Otherwise they would either be brought into non-existence by the existence of their opposite (which can not exist at the same time and place, and therefore itself has to be newly created), or by another doer who 'makes them non-existent', which is also not logical, because it is nonsense to take literally the expression 'do nothing', where the result of an action is pure non-existence.

Something verbally resembling this notion of the 're-creation' or the perpetual 'recurrence of creation' had earlier been employed by the kalam scholars (MacEy 1994: 47, MacDonald 1927: 326–344) and particularly the Ash'arites who, like Ibn 'Arabī, maintained that the world is composed of substances and accidents (Corbin 1969: 203, Wolfson 1976: 466–517), or monads (substances: *jawhar*) and their forms or 'accidents' ('*arad*'). Ibn 'Arabī acknowledged their contribution – and certainly borrowed much of their theological language, giving it his own distinctive meanings – but he also took it a very important step further by saying that even those existing monads are only copies or reflections of the Single Monad or Substance that alone has a real existence [III.404.25, *Al-Masā'il*: 32]. Therefore, all the forms and monads in all the worlds are continuously and perpetually created and re-created by this Single Monad. Understanding the world therefore requires us to explain and understand how this Single Monad creates the monads and the forms, or in other words how to link the unique oneness of the Creator and the observable multiplicity of the world.

We shall also see in section 7.6 that with the re-creation principle one can easily resolve the standard EPR criticism of the (apparent) inconsistency between Quantum Theory and the theory of Relativity, which arises from our inadequate understanding of the nature of time.

6 The Single Monad model of the cosmos

The cosmos is only imagined, though it is – in reality – real.

And the only one who understands this fact has surely accomplished all the secrets of the path.

(*Fusûs*: 157)

*The knowings of the Real are not hidden from anyone,
except for someone who does not know the One/one.¹*

[IV.181.31]

For Ibn ‘Arabî, a true understanding of time is the key to realizing and understanding the origin and structure of the world, by providing the link between its ultimate unity and apparent multiplicity. In this chapter we shall outline an integrated cosmological model based on Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of the oneness of being explained in Chapter 5, together with his understanding of the flow of time as explained in Chapter 4 and his unique view of creation in the Week as explained in Chapter 3. We shall call this model the ‘Single Monad model’. Under this model, Ibn ‘Arabî views the entire created world, both spiritual and manifest, as imaginal forms perpetually re-created by the Single Monad (*al-jawhar al-fard*) (*Al-Mu’jam Al-Sûfi*: 297), which alone has real existence. This Monad continuously and perpetually appears in different forms creating the phenomena of the visible and invisible worlds.

6.1 The three hypotheses

The Single Monad model can be summarized in the following three hypotheses – although, to be sure, Ibn ‘Arabî himself presents these concepts primarily not as the subjects of philosophical or theological arguments, but rather as the symbolic expression of the actual metaphysical realities directly perceived by himself and many other realized ‘Knowers’ (‘*urafâ*’, *muhaqqiqûn*, *ahl Allâh* and so on) through the processes of inspired ‘unveiling’

6.1.1 The Single Monad

There is only one *Single Monad* that can be said to have a real existence at any given time. This Monad creates other monads by manifesting different forms ('imaging Itself') to make a comprehensive 'still picture' of the entire cosmos. This still picture is created in one full Week of the original creative Days (of events), but this creative process is equivalent only to one single moment (the 'atom of time') for an observer inside the cosmos. Thus the observed cosmos is the eternally renewed succession of these still pictures made up by the Single Monad. The Monad – discussed in detail in the following sections – is an indivisible reality, but it is still itself a compound made up by the 'Greatest Element' that is the only real ultimate substance in existence.

6.1.2 The re-creation principle

The forms of manifestation cease to exist intrinsically right after the instant of their creation, and then they are re-created again by the Single Monad in every original creative 'Week' (i.e. at every moment). As discussed in sections 3.6 and 5.6, this perpetual re-creation happens in the 'six Days' of creation from Sunday to Friday, which accounts for the three dimensions of space. But we do not witness this creation process as such; instead we witness only the created world on the 'last Day' of Saturday. So the seven Days of the divine Week are in all one point of space-time (Days 6 to 1) which then – by repeating manifestations – manifests the space-time container (i.e. 'the Age', as discussed in section 2.19) which encompasses the world both spatially and temporally.

6.1.3 The actual flow of time

Since the world takes seven Days to be created by the Single Monad, which manifests the forms of the monads one by one in specific order, any observer would have to wait – somehow out of existence – six Days (from Sunday to Friday) in order to witness the next moment of creation (i.e. the next 'still picture') on the following Saturday. But of course we do not perceive all this, but rather experience it as a single infinitesimal moment. In each Day of these Days of creation, a corresponding dimension of the world is created. Therefore, the real flow of the actual created time does not go linearly, but rather is intertwined with the observable, normal earthly days in the special – and admittedly rather mystifying – manner that we have summarized in section 4.4, along with Ibn 'Arabi's account of the way in which the observable earthly daytimes and nights are 'taken out' of each other and separated by three daytimes and three nights in order to form the three-dimensional space that we experience.

6.2 The Single Monad

Borrowing his language from the atomist physical theories of earlier kalam theology, Ibn 'Arabi sometimes refers to the created world as being made up of

monads and *forms*, or in his technical language, of ‘substances’ (*jawâhir*, s. *jawhar*) and various changing ‘accidents’ (*ʿarâd*, s. *ʿarad*) that inhere in and qualify those substances. In the process of manifestation, the substances appear to remain relatively constant, while the accidents do not stay for more than one moment. In this terminology, the ‘monad’ or substance (*al-jawhar*) is – as will be discussed shortly – a physical or metaphysical entity that exists by itself, whereas the ‘form’ or accident (*al-ʿarad*) exists only through or by some particular monad. The monad, however, may appear in existence only by ‘wearing’ some form or another [II.179.26], so we do not see the monads but rather only the forms. Also Ibn ʿArabî asserts that the monad exists by itself and its existence is constant and invariable, while the form exists only in the monad and its existence is temporal; it exists only at the time and then it vanishes instantly and intrinsically, and the same never comes back to existence again [II.677.30, III.452.24].

Generally *jawhar* signifies everything that exists in reality. Literally it originally meant ‘jewel’, but, in this technical sense borrowed from the physical theory of kalam theology, it means ‘substance’. In a very different philosophical context, the same Arabic word was used to translate the first of the ten Aristotelian categories already discussed in section 2.1. In English, the word ‘monad’ – which we will regularly use here for *jawhar* – is derived from the Greek *monados*, and it means ‘ultimate, indivisible unit’. It was used very early by the Greek philosophers of the doctrines of Pythagoras, and it was also used later, in a very different way, by the Neoplatonists to signify the One: thus God is described as the ‘Monad of monads’.²

Like the Neoplatonists, Ibn ʿArabî sometimes uses the term *al-jawhar* (monad) in this higher theological sense to refer to ‘the one’, ‘the essence’, ‘the real’ (not ‘the Real’ as a divine Name of God, but ‘the real-through-whom-creation-takes-place’, as discussed further below) and the origin of everything in the world. However, in such cases he does not seem to refer directly to the highest, transcendent dimension of ‘God’, but rather to the ‘Universal/First Intellect’ or the ‘Pen’ [II.675.6], who is also the ‘Perfect Human Being’.

On the other hand, although in this theological or cosmological sense the term *al-jawhar* ordinarily refers to the one real essence of the world (of all creation), Ibn ʿArabî also sometimes uses the same term in the plural form (*jawâhir*) to refer to the essences or souls/spirits (*al-nufûs al-nâtiqa*) – or more precisely, to the ‘partial intellects’ (*al-ʿuqûl al-juzʿiyya*, in contrast with the Universal Intellect, *al-ʿaql al-kullî*, that is their origin) – of human beings who are the perceivers of the world. Even more generally, he sometimes uses it to refer to any entity (even inanimate ones) in the creation, whether angels, jinn, humans, animals, plants or metals. In this latter more generic sense he considers that everything in creation has a substance which is its monad (*jawhar*) and a particular form (*ʿarad*) which is its appearance.

These very different dimensions and usages of the term ‘monad’/*jawhar*, however, are also intrinsically linked in Ibn ʿArabî’s cosmology, since he argues that all the monads of the world are created by, and are therefore the ‘images’ (reflections, shadows etc.) of the one Single Monad. Thus in that larger perspec-

tive of creation, they are nothing but different images of this one Single Monad that in reality may alone be described as having real existence [III.452.24].

6.3 The different names of the Single Monad

As we mentioned above, this Single Monad (*al-jawhar al-fard*) is the Universal Intellect itself and also the Pen. It also has different names or descriptions as Ibn ‘Arabî summarized in his book *Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ (The White Pearl)* in which he discussed many names and descriptions of the First Intellect and the title of the book itself is one interesting variant. Also Ibn ‘Arabî spent much of the first chapter in his book *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya* on explaining the different names and properties of this Universal Intellect that is the true Caliph (*Khalîfa*). There is, however, some confusion between the Greatest Element that we shall talk about shortly and the Single Monad; sometimes it is not very clear for some of these many variant names whether they are really for the Single Monad or the Greatest Element.

One of these names is ‘the real through whom creation takes place’ and William Chittick devoted a full section in *SPK* to talk about it (*SPK*: 132). This real-through-whom-creation-takes-place is the most perfect image of the Real Allah, the Creator of the world. That is why he is also called ‘the Perfect Human Being’. We do not want to repeat here what Chittick said in *SPK*, but we just want to stress that we should not mix the Real and the real-through-whom-creation-takes-place because they may be confused in Ibn ‘Arabî’s writings. In this book ‘the Real’, with capital, is used for the divine Name of Allah (*al-haqq*), while ‘the real’, with small letter, is used for the real-through-whom-creation-takes-place. But this name actually describes the Greatest Element rather than the Single Monad, because the latter is compound while the Greatest Element is the most elementary ‘block’ in the world as we shall see shortly. Everything in the Creation at the end is rooted in the real, just as the leaves (and the fruits etc.) of a tree are rooted in the stalk. The leaves were also ‘determined’ in the seed that gave this tree even before it was planted. So the Single Monad is like the seed for *the tree of the cosmos*,³ while the real-through-whom-creation-takes-place (i.e. the Greatest Element) is what makes up the seed down to the cells, atoms and subatomic particles inside it.

In chapter 364 of the *Futûhât* Ibn ‘Arabî talks about how the entities heard the divine Command in their state of pre-existence and he affirms again what we have mentioned in section 2.3 that for Allah nothing was introduced after His creating the world; only the world moved from determination into existence and from immutable hearing (*sam’ thubûti*) into actual hearing (*sam’ wujûdi*). But most importantly, he shows in the following passage that there is in fact only one single entity that has a necessary immutable essence and that is the Perfect Human Being:

For Allah everything of His servants is still with Him in effect (*bil-fî’l*), nothing is with Him in reality (*bil-quwwa*). So the divine designation came

to him (the servant) with regard to the acts and the states that Allah has with him so that he shall remember with his intelligence what he has already witnessed of his Lord when he was still non-existing – since he had the immutability which made him accept the divine disposition in him, and this state of immutability made him obey the Real's Command regarding the existence because the Command may come only on that who is described by hearing.

So the divine Saying (Command) is still (as It is) and the immutable hearing is still (as it was), but what occurred is only the actual hearing that is like a branch of the immutable hearing. So the state changed on the essence of hearing but the (essence of) hearing did not change, because the essences do not change from one state to another, but the states give them rules so they wear them. But that who has no knowledge imagines that the essence changed. But (the fact is that) the states seek the divine Names and not that the essences are described by seeking. And the essences gain names and descriptions according to the rules of (those) states that change over them. And without the states, the essences would not be distinguished because (in reality) there is only one essence that was distinguished with its entity from the Necessarily Existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) just as it was described like Him with necessary immutability. So He, the Exalted, has the Necessary Existence and Immutability, and to this essence (only) the necessary immutability. So the states for this essence are like the divine Names for the Real. So just as the Names of the Essence do not multiply the Named nor make Him many, so the states for this essence do not make him multiple or many, despite the rationality of the multiplicity and manyness of the Names and the states. And by this (similarity) it was true for this essence to be described as being on the (divine) Image.

[III.313.35–314.10]

Therefore, in reality, there is only this entity that is the essence of the Perfect Human Being, and the world is the different states of this single entity. As we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (and also in section 2.1 when we introduced Ibn 'Arabī's view of time, and also at the end of section 5.5 when we discussed the oneness of being), this single entity is the Single Monad, and the essences (i.e. the monads) of the world are different reflections of this Single Monad.

Another important name of the Single Monad is the Universal Spirit (*al-rūh al-kullī*), and Ibn 'Arabī shows that he deserves this name because he goes (v. *rāha*, *yarūh*) in the states of the world:

And this name is to him from two aspects: the first is for his being a spirit, i.e. in ease, happiness and rest (*rāha* p.p. of *yastarīh*; to rest or to relieve) owing to his knowledge of his Lord and his witnessing Him. And the second is that he went (*rāha* past tense of *yarūh*; to go) through the capacious orbs of the knowledge of his Creator, by a special force. And he went through the

states of the cosmos to give out to them what Allah entrusted him. And he went through his knowing himself by his need to his Lord and his Creator.

So he has three goings (*rawahât*),⁴ so he may be called ‘Universal (*kullî*)’ Spirit because there is no fourth state other than those to go through. So it is like the imperative (tense) of ‘*râha*’ (رَاحَ: went), ‘*yarûhu*’ (يَرُوحُ: the past participle, to go) and the imperative is ‘*ruh*’ (رُوح: go!); and when it was transformed from the imperative to the noun, the ‘*wâw*’ was returned to it as also the ‘*alif*’ and ‘*lâm*’ (the definitive article) was added, because the omitting of ‘*wâw*’ from it was due to the meeting of the two consonants.⁵ So it is like: he was sought from one direction then it is said that he has gone (*râha*), as we said.

(*Al-Durraṭ Al-Bayḍâ*: 135)

Yet another interesting name of this Single Monad is ‘Everything (*kulla shay*)’!⁶ This name is interesting because Ibn ‘Arabî says in *Al-Masâ’il* that ‘in everything there is everything (*kulla shay’in fihi kullu shay*)’, even if you do not recognize that’ [*Al-Masâ’il*: 58]. This is on the one hand another expression of his Single Monad theory because it renders into: ‘the Single Monad is in everything’. But also it might mean that the internal structure of the Single Monad is as complicated as the world itself because it means: ‘in everything (even the Single Monad) there is everything (even the world)!’ This last statement is plausible since both the Single Monad (i.e. the Perfect Human Being) and the world are on the divine Image as we have seen before (section 3.2). This reminds us in mathematics with fractals such as the Mandelbrot set, Julia set and Sierpinski triangle, where the structure keeps repeating itself on any larger or smaller scale (Mandelbrot and Frame 2002: 37, Stewart *et al.* 2004: 60). This deserves a separate study, but we just want to mention here that this might answer the question we put forward in section 2.16 about the structure of the moment and whether it is divided into sub-moments. We said there that the moment could be indeed identical to the day where the Sun rises, moves gradually in the sky and then sets to rise again on the next day; as the Single Monad might be identical with the world, the moment might be identical with the day. It just depends on the scale we are using; if we were inside the Single Monad we might see creations such as the Sun, planets and the stars, but because we are outside we see it as a point. Also if we suppose we go outside the world, we shall see it as a point; that is – as the Single Monad – indivisible but compound. This also has its example in modern cosmology as the black hole which occupies a single point in our space but itself is considered a complete world.⁷

6.4 The structure of the monad

At the beginning of the first chapter of *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya*, Ibn ‘Arabî says: ‘The first existent originated by Allah is a simple spiritual Single Monad, embodied according to some doctrines and not-embodied according to others’ (*Tadbîrât*: 87).

As this remark indicates, Ibn ‘Arabî was well aware that there has long been a debate amongst philosophers whether the monad is a physical or metaphysical entity, or whether it is embodied or not [see also I.47.22]. Although he mostly prefers the second choice (*Al-Durraṭ Al-Baydâ’*: 134), Ibn ‘Arabî sometimes does not rule out either case, perhaps because the argument should be meaningless – i.e. the reality must necessarily encompass all manifestations of creation, both spiritual and manifest – if we recall that there is in reality only one Single Monad. Many times, though, he affirms that the Single Monad is embodied and indivisible, especially when the manifest world is concerned [II.438.2]. On the other hand, the essences of the spirits and souls are not likely to be embodied [II.309.25], though both (the manifest and spiritual) are only reflections of the Single Monad that itself can be described neither as (solely) physical nor as metaphysical, because it is necessarily the whole of creation. In the very long chapter 198 of the *Futûḥât*, in which Ibn ‘Arabî talks in detail about the various aspects of divine creation, he summarizes the various divisions or types of physical and metaphysical entities. He also states the difference between the essences (monads) and their accidents (forms). This is shown in the following long passage in which Ibn ‘Arabî also shows the basis of the Single Monad model, while pointing out the difference between the approaches of the Sufis and of the philosophers that we discussed at the beginning of Chapter 5. There he says:

Now you must know that every knowable thing that may be classified must unavoidably enter into (the category of) what exists in thought (*wujûd dhihnî*). But this thing that exists in thought may belong either to what can receive real existence (*wujûd ‘aynî*); or to what may not receive real existence, like the things that are impossible (*al-muhâl*). And that which can receive real existence either subsists by itself, which is called ‘not-in-a-substrate’ (*lâ-fî-mawḍû’*) or else it does not (subsist by itself). And that which subsists by itself is either embodied (or more strictly speaking, ‘localized in a place’, *mutahayyiz*), or not embodied.

As for that (self-subsistent reality) which is classified as not-in-a-substrate and not embodied, it must necessarily be either what necessarily exists by its own essence (*wâjib al-wujûd li-dhâtihî*), and He is Allah the Exalted; or what necessarily exists through (the determination by) something other than itself, and that is what is contingent (*al-mumkin*: i.e. the whole created world). And this (category of what is) contingent is either embodied (in-a-place), or not embodied. As for the division among the contingent things of what is self-subsistent, that is either not embodied – like the rational souls (*al-nufûs al-nâtiqa al-mudabbira*) that govern the substance of the (spiritual) world of Light, the natural world, and the elemental world, or else (the self-subsistent contingent things) that are embodied are either compound with parts, or without parts. So if it has no parts, it is the (simplest) ‘Single Monad’;⁸ and, if it has parts, it is a (natural, elemental) body (*jism*).

As for the category (of knowable things) that are in a substrate which are not self-subsistent and embodied – except by way of being dependent (on

their substrate), members of this category are either necessary concomitants of their substrate, or they are not (necessary concomitants). Or rather, that is how it seems to ordinary vision, since in the fact of the matter nothing that does not subsist by itself (i.e. everything but the Creator) actually continues (in existence) for more than the instant of its existence; it may either be followed by (new creations that are) similar (*amthâl*), or by that which is not similar to it. As for what is followed by (new creations that are) similar, that is what are imagined to be the 'necessary concomitants' of a thing, like the yellowness of gold or the blackness of ebony. As for (those characteristics) which are not followed by similars, they are called 'accidents' (*al-'arâd*), while the necessary concomitant is called an (inherent) attribute (*sifa*).

So the knowable things that have actual existence are not more than those we have mentioned.

Now you must know that the world is one in substance and many in form (appearance). So since it is one in substance, it does not transmute (from one thing into another entirely different one: *lâ yastahîl*). And also the form itself is not transmuted, since otherwise this would lead to 'reversing the realities' (*qalb al-haqâ'iq*) – for heat may not (at the same time) be coldness, dryness may not be wetness, whiteness may not be blackness, and the triangle may not be square. But something that is hot can come to exist as cold, though *not* at the same time when it is hot; and also what is cold can come to exist as hot, but not in the same time when it is cold. Likewise what is white may become black, and the triangle may become a square.

So there is no transmutation (*lâ istihâla*), but the earth, water, air, the (celestial) orbs (*al-aflâk*) and all the generated existents (of the sublunar world: *al-muwalladât*) are (only) forms in the (Single) Monad. So (certain) forms are bestowed upon it and that (process of bestowing forms) is called, with respect to their specific shape (*hay'a*) 'generation' (*kawn*). Or (certain) forms are taken off of so that a (particular) name (i.e. attribute or property) is removed, and that is (called) 'corruption' (*fasâd*). So in fact there is no transmutation, in the sense that the actual entity of a thing changes into another (entirely different) actual entity, but it is only (by an entirely new re-creation) as we have explained.

So the world is continually being generated and corrupted (destroyed) at every single instant of time (*zamân fard*). And there would be no persistence for the actual entity of the substance (Monad) of the world, were it not for its receptivity to this 'creative formation' (*takwîn*) in itself. So the world is always continually in need (*faqr*: of the divine creative force). As for the forms, they are in need (of Allah's creation) in order to come out from non-existence into existence. And as for the Monad, it (is in need) of preserving its existence through that (creative Act), because its existence is unavoidably conditioned upon the existence of the creative formation of that (i.e. the infinite forms) for which it is a substrate.

Likewise (with the dependency on the Creator) of the (purely spiritual) self-subsistent contingent (existent) that is not embodied: it is (still) the

substrate for the spiritual attributes and perceptions that it supports, so that its own individual reality may not continue without them. But those spiritual attributes and perceptions are continually renewed in that (spiritual existent) just like the accidents (forms) are continually renewed in the bodies.

In the same way the contingent that exists by itself and is not embodied is the substrate of what it carries of spiritual descriptions and perceptions (that is the bearer of meanings) that its essence may not remain without them. And they are renewed on it just like the renewal (i.e. re-creation) of the forms in the bodies; the image of the body is a form in the monad but the terms (*hudūd*: by which the object is described) are related to the images (of the body, not to the body itself). So the images are the ones which are termed (*mahdūda*), and one of these terms is the monad in which these images appear. That is why they (the philosophers) call the images monad(s) because they take the monad in the term of the image.

This is possibly the main barrier that prevents us from witnessing the reality of the world; we always try to assign an image to every concept, and then we discuss the terms of this image such as its shape, colour, size . . . etc. The Single Monad, however, may not be captured into image, not to mention the Real Himself. Therefore, approaching these matters in any way other than the path of (experiential) divine unveiling will not lead one to the truth of the matter as it really is. No wonder that they (those who rely on their own unaided theorizing) never cease to be in disagreement (about this). That is why the group of the blessed, who are supported by the Holy Spirit, turned to purifying themselves from their own thinking, and to liberating themselves from the bonds of their (natural, animal) forces, so that they became connected with the Greatest Light and saw for themselves (the reality of) the matter as it really is in itself! Because the Real – may He be cherished and glorified – *is* their vision [*Kanz*: 21327], so all what they see is the Real (Chittick 2002: 116–124). As the righteous one (Abū Bakr al-Siddīq) said: ‘I have seen nothing but I have seen Allah before it.’ So he sees the Real, then he sees His effect in the world; that is to witness how the world emerged as if he witnessed the possible things in their determination state when (Allah) threw what He has thrown on them from His greatest light so they became described by existence after they were described by non-existence [*Kanz*: 548, 1314]. So this (person), who has got this state, the veil of blindness and misleading has been removed for him: ‘*now We removed thy veil, and sharp is thy sight this day!*’ (50:22), ‘*Lo! therein verily is a reminder for him who hath a heart*’ (not only an intellect, see also section 5.1), ‘*or gives an ear and he is witnessing (the truth)*’ (50:37). So (Allah) made knowledge available in witnessing, because the judge judges based on his best guess while the witness witnesses with knowledge not by guessing.

[II.454.1]

According to this passage, Figure 6.1 summarizes the different types of things in existence.




Figure 6.1 Summary of the different types of knowable things.

Also in his *Inshâ' al-Dawâ'ir* (*Constructing the Circles*), Ibn 'Arabi explains the different categories or types of existence in the same way, which he represents schematically in Figure 6.2.

6.5 The greatest element

As we have seen above, although for Ibn 'Arabi the monad or atom (*jawhar fard*) is an indivisible physical unit, it is understood to be composed of even more elementary constituents. This means that there are smaller – but not necessarily physical – 'constituents' that somehow underlie and help manifest the atoms or monads, even though the monad itself is not physically divisible into those metaphysical constituents, but can only exist in manifestation as a substance created through those underlying constituents. So what are these ultimate constituents of the Single Monad?

In his book *'Uqlat al-Mustawfiz* (*The Bolt for the Restless*), Ibn 'Arabi speaks about the 'Greatest Element' (*al-'unsûr al-a'zam*) from which Allah has created the 'Absolute Unseen' which may not be disclosed to any creature, and he indicates there that the creation or 'origination' of this Greatest Element is all at once, without any intermediate or associated causes, as we have seen in section 2.16 (see also *'Uqlat al-Mustawfiz*: 38). So this original, metaphysical 'Greatest Element' that is in some mysterious way the substrate of all subsequent manifest creation – whether purely spiritual, imaginal or physical – is the only thing that in some way underlies, constitutes, or gives rise to the physical monads. The individual monad or atom, however, remains the basic indivisible structure in the physically manifest world.




Figure 6.2 The Different Divisions of Existence (source: from *Inshâ' al-Dawâ'ir*, page 19).

Note

The numbers 0 and 1 in the inside circle describe whether the corresponding division is localized (1) or not localized (0); and (second number) whether it is self-subsistent (1) or not self-subsistent (0). The spirit is self-subsistent but not localized, while colour is localized and not self-subsistent.

In the *'Uqlat al-Mustawfiz*, Ibn 'Arabî also mentions that there are 46,656,000 subtle luminous links (*raqâ'iq nûraniyya*) between the First Intellect and the Greatest Element that is their origin (*'Uqlat al-Mustawfiz*: 40). That number is in fact the cubic power of 360 ($360^3 = 46,656,000$), which is no doubt symbolically associated with the traditional division of the circle (and the divine year, see section 3.2) into 360 degrees and the historical sexagenary system attributed to the Babylonians (see also section 4.7).

Now the resulting relation between the manifest world, the Single Monad (First Intellect) and the Greatest Element can be conceived by analogy to the relation between a building, the bricks and the clay: i.e. the building is made up of similar unit bricks, but the brick itself is made from fine clay. Ibn 'Arabî also says:

the noble Greatest Element is in relation to the sphere of the world like the (indivisible) point, and the Pen is like its circumference, while the Tablet (i.e. the world-Soul) is what is in between (the point and the circumference). So just as the point meets the circumference with its (whole) entity, so does this Greatest Element meet with its (whole) entity all the aspects of the Intellect, which are the subtle links (the 46,665,000 *raqâ'iq*) that we mentioned before. They are unique 'one' in the Greatest Element, but in the Intellect they become multiple and manifold, because of the manifold receptivity (of the Intellect for knowledge) from the Greatest Element. So there is (only) one 'close attention' (*iltifâta*) for the (Greatest) Element, but there are many faces of receptivity for the Intellect, that is why this (Greatest) Element is more realized in the unity of Its Creator.⁹

Ibn 'Arabî affirms that this Greatest Element is the most perfect thing in existence and that everything other than Allah (including, as we can see, the First Intellect) is somehow derived from it. However, he does not give much information about It, and he even says that he would explain the reality of this Element if he was not sworn not to disclose it. However, does explain, as we have just seen, that this Greatest Element has a special attention (*iltifâta*, like the divine 'special Face' discussed in section 5.2) to the metaphysical 'world of writing and recording' (*'âlam al-tadwîn wal-tastîr*), when the (manifest, including physical) world was still not yet existing in reality (but only in Allah's foreknowledge), and that Allah created the First Intellect (that is the Single Monad) through this special attention (*'Uqlat al-Mustawfîz*: 39).

In the summary cosmological chapter 60 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî alludes more symbolically, in a metaphysical exegesis of Qur'an 68:1 (*'Nûn and the Pen, and what they are recording ...*), to the 'Greatest Element' when he speaks of the mysterious figure of '*Nûn*' whom Allah appointed as the divine 'chamberlain' (*al-hâjib*) and gave all His Knowledge of His creation, so that Allah – with regard to His Name 'the All-Knower' – never hides from the *Nûn*. And Allah appointed another angel, the Pen – who is the Single Monad/First Intellect/Perfect Human Being – as the 'scribe' for the *Nûn*, 'writing out' all of the divine Knowledge of His creation [I.294.33].

6.6 Analogies in the macrocosms

For Ibn 'Arabî, of course, the mysterious metaphysical relations between the ultimate macrocosmic constituents of creation are repeatedly mirrored in many different 'microcosmic' dimensions of our own life. In each of these different symbolic domains, the initial creation of this higher world and the relation between its elements, such as the First Intellect and the Greatest Element, is subsequently reflected on many different lower planes of existence.

6.6.1 *The Black Stone and the Kaaba*

The most visible example of Ibn ‘Arabî’s development of this cosmological symbolism in the *Futûhât* involves the Kaaba, the ‘house of Allah’ to which millions of Muslims now go on pilgrimage every year. For Ibn ‘Arabî, those circumambulating the Kaaba are mirroring the circles of higher angels surrounding the divine Throne [I.50.30]. In that symbolic context, the angels also represent the determining forces of the universal Nature (*Al-Durratu Al-Baydâ’*: 138; we shall come back to this later in section 7.10) and the four Archangels who carry the Throne of Allah are the four main sustaining forces of that Nature.

This centrality of the symbolism of the Kaaba is of course rooted in the fact that Ibn ‘Arabî started the first chapter of his *Futûhât* by mentioning his encounter with the Spirit from whom he took all that he wrote in this book, a Spirit whom he met while circumambulating the Kaaba. There Ibn ‘Arabî establishes a symbolic correlation the seven circles of *tawâf* that the pilgrim is obliged to perform around the Kaaba during the pilgrimage and the seven main divine Names, in the manner already mentioned in Chapter 3: i.e. each one of these seven Names is responsible for one specific Day of the divine Week of creation. Then he says that his Lord told him: ‘the Kaaba, in relation to the all-encompassing (divine) Throne, is like your heart with relation to your body’ [I.50.29]. So in fact the Kaaba on the Earth is symbolically like the Single Monad in the cosmos. This analogy also applies to many related details, because the cubic shape of the Kaaba is in fact the simplest structure which constitutes a body that occupies the three spatial dimensions. As Ibn ‘Arabî mentioned [III.276.4; see explanations in section 5.4 above], the body is composed of at least eight points, corresponding to the corners of the cube.

But more importantly for Ibn ‘Arabî, one corner of the Kaaba holds the mysterious ‘Black Stone’ (*al-hajar al-aswad*) which, according to tradition, the angel Gabriel brought down from Paradise and gave to Abraham to put it in that corner of the Kaaba. For Ibn ‘Arabî, this Black Stone symbolically represents the foundational role in the process of creation or manifestation of the ‘Greatest Element’. In other words, circumambulating the Kaaba starts from the south-eastern corner in which this Black Stone resides, and the pilgrim is supposed to make seven rounds (counterclockwise) around the Kaaba: this corresponds symbolically to the way the Greatest Element first gives rise to or communicates to the Single Monad or First Intellect, after which the Intellect brings forth the world of manifest creation in the seven divine Days. According to tradition, the Prophet Muhammad said that this Black Stone resembles ‘Allah’s right hand on Earth’ [*Kanz*: 34729]. As is well known, Ibn ‘Arabî holds that the ‘Universal Reality’ – which is also another name for the Greatest Element, because it is the origin of the Single Monad [I.119.10] – is identical to the Spirit of Muhammad himself, as that Spirit is also, according to a number of widely known hadith, ‘the first thing to be created’ [*Kanz*: 31917].¹⁰

Thus, at the very beginning of the opening chapter of the *Futûhât*, when Ibn ‘Arabî begins to speak about the underlying metaphysical reality – i.e. the

‘Greatest Element’ and first creation – symbolized by the Black Stone that resembles Allah’s right hand, he says in poetry:

*People are ignorant of its Essence, so some say it is dense, while others say
it is subtle.*

He (the Spirit) said to me, when I asked why they do not know It:

‘Only the noble may truly know (recognize) the noble!’

[I.47.22]

Ibn ‘Arabi then proceeds in these opening pages to give many mysterious symbolic details about what Allah creates in the Human Being (i.e. the Single Monad or First Intellect) and in the world with each round of the seven circumambulations around the Kaaba, and he relates that metaphysical teaching to the seven main Attributes of Allah which are responsible for the seven Days of the divine creative Week [I.49.32].

As shown in Figure 6.4, just the Greatest Element makes the Single Monad which scans the states of the world in seven Days, the pilgrim in Hajj has to make seven rounds around the Kaaba anti-clockwise. This circumambulation starts from the eastern corner where the Black Stone resides and moves towards the Shami corner. This clearly supports the analogy between the Greatest




Figure 6.3 The Kaaba, with people on the Hajj circumambulating it. The Black Stone appears in the front corner, near the door.




Figure 6.4 How circumambulating the Kaaba is similar to the Greatest Element's creation of the Single Monad. Circumambulation starts – anticlockwise – from the eastern corner where the Black Stone is, and that corner is for the Pole.

Element and the mysterious Black Stone, especially, since we have said above that the Black Stone resembles ‘Allah’s right Hand on Earth’ [*Kanz*: 34729].

6.6.2 *The spiritual hierarchy*

Another important example of the symbolic analogy between the metaphysical process and figures of the ‘macrocosm’ and more human realities is the hierarchy of the spirits of the prophets and saints (*awliya*) – a central theme that runs throughout the *Futūḥāt*. To summarize the cosmological aspect of that theme, Ibn ‘Arabī presents the lower realms of the cosmos as being ruled by a complex spiritual hierarchy – largely ‘invisible’ to most human beings, though not to the spiritual ‘knowers’ – consisting, among others, of the spiritual ‘Pole’ (*al-qutb*), the two Imams, the four Pillars (*awtād*), the seven Substitutes (*abdāl*), the eight Nobles (*mujabā’*), the 12 Chiefs (*nuqabā’*), in addition to other lesser-known groups.¹¹ Each of these groups and figures has a special corresponding spiritual responsibility, some of which are have to do with maintaining the wider cosmic order. Those pure spirits have also have an ongoing series of living human ‘representatives’ or ‘agents’ (*s. nā’ib*) amongst us [II.6.6].

Some of these members of the celestial spiritual hierarchy, as Ibn ‘Arabī presents them in scattered passages of the *Futūḥāt*, are assigned cosmological functions symbolically related, for example, to the 12 zodiacal signs, the seven heavens, and the seven ‘climes’ or geographical regions, the four cardinal points,

or even the four corners of the Kaaba [II.13]. In particular, the highest level of the 'Pole', in this hierarchy, is the figure who apparently corresponds to the lofty metaphysical position of the Single Monad – which Ibn 'Arabî often pointedly refers to simply as 'the Reality of Muhammad' (*Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 158).

6.6.3 The world of letters

Also yet another important symbolic analogy between the metaphysical macrocosm and more familiar human realities, which again runs throughout the *Futûhât*, is the 'world of letters'. Ibn 'Arabî considers the letters of the Arabic alphabet – given their central place in the culminating divine revelation of the Qur'an – to constitute in themselves 'a real world like us', since they are servants of Allah just like ourselves [I.58.13]. He begins his detailed explanation of their symbolic metaphysical and cosmological functions in a long section in the opening chapter of the *Futûhât*. As he explains there, the Arabic letters also have symbolic hierarchy similar to the spiritual hierarchy of the prophets and the saints. Thus they also have Pole, which is the letter *alif* (ا), the first letter of Arabic alphabet; two *imâms* (Leaders), which are the two other vowel letters *wâw* (و) and *yâ'* (ي); four *awtâd* (Pillars), which are the letters *alif* (ا), *wâw* (و), *yâ'* (ي) and *nûn* (ن), that together provide the essential Arabic grammatical indications ('*alâmat al-i'râb*'); and seven *abdâl* (Substitutes), which are the letters *alif* (ا), *wâw* (و), *yâ'* (ي), *nûn* (ن), and the three key pronoun markers *tâ'* (ت), *kâf* (ك) and *hâ'* (هـ) [I.78.18]. But the important facts about the metaphysical relations between the world, the Single Monad and the Greatest Element are particularly clearly developed in Ibn 'Arabî's teaching here regarding the metaphysical dimension of this world of letters. Thus he clearly states that:

For the totality of the letters (like the world) may be deconstructed into the *alif* (corresponding to the Pole and the Single Monad) and put together from it (the letter or sound) *alif*, but it can not be deconstructed into (any of) them. However it too can be deconstructed – in our symbolic estimation – into its spiritual principle (*rûhâniyya*), which is the (primordial) 'Point' (of Greatest Element) – although (in fact) the one can not be (further) deconstructed.¹²

[I.78.23]

Here again the 'Greatest Element' is assumed to be the underlying principle or substrate of all creation and manifestation.

As we have mentioned on several earlier occasions, Ibn 'Arabî often attributes his source for some of the most important metaphysical knowledge about the world to the spiritual Pole Idrîs ('*mudâwi al-kulûm*'). In describing the relation between the originary 'Point' of the 'Greatest Element' and all the manifest cosmos, in chapter 15 of the *Futûhât*, this Pole tells him:

The world (physical cosmos) exists between the circumference and the point (of the Earth at its centre), arranged according to the levels (of its orbs) and

the smallness and greatness of the orbs. And (he said) that the sphere that is closer to the circumference is wider than that which is inside, so its day is longer, its space is larger, its tongue is more fluent and it is closer to realizing strength and purity. And what goes down to the (material, earthly) elements is less than this (high) level, on down to the sphere of the Earth. But each part in every circumference matches what is below it and what is above it with its (whole) entity: no one is greater than the other, despite the fact that one is larger and one is smaller! . . . And all match the point with their entities – and that Point, despite its smallness, matches the parts of the circumference with its (whole) essential reality (‘*ayn*).

[I.154.22]

It is worth mentioning here, as a modern analogy to this earlier symbolism, that one of the most compelling consequences of Quantum Mechanics is that everything in the physical world of ‘particles’ can also be expressed as waves that have different wavelengths. Electrons for example – though they are particles – have a wavelength. Even the Earth has a distinctive wavelength. When the mass of the body or particle becomes larger its wavelength becomes smaller. So the wavelength becomes even larger for massless particles such as photons (light).

6.6.4 *The hierarchy of divine names*

We have already discussed the unique Unity of Allah and the diversity of His divine Names in section 5.3. In Ibn ‘Arabî’s wider metaphysical perspective, the divine Names – just like the spiritual world of the angels, prophets and saints – are also arranged in a corresponding specific metaphysical hierarchy. In section 3.1, we have already encountered the four and seven fundamental divine Names – which correspond to the four *awtâd* and the seven *abdâl* respectively. But Ibn ‘Arabî talks about this hierarchy of the divine Names in more detail early on in chapter 4 of the *Futûhât*. Here we want only to draw the attention to his explanation there of the difference between the two key divine Names ‘Allah’ and ‘the All-Merciful’ (*al-Rahmân*).

Already in his *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya*, Ibn ‘Arabî compares the relation between those two Names with the cosmological or metaphysical relation between the Throne and the Single Monad, as we explained in section 4.6 above (see also *Tadbîrât*: 89). Because the Single Monad is itself also called ‘the Throne’, Ibn ‘Arabî says that – in cosmological language – Allah mounted on the Throne of the Single Monad, while ‘the All-Merciful mounted on the Throne’ (following the literal Qur’anic verses that we discussed earlier in section 1.4. So the relation between these two Names is like the relation between the two divine ‘Thrones’. It is to be noted here that the Name ‘the All-Merciful’ is more specifically described by all the multiplicity of the divine Names, just like the Name Allah. For as Allah said in the Qur’an: ‘*Call upon Allah or call upon the All-Merciful, Whoever you call upon, to Him belong the most beautiful Names*’ (17:110). So the Name Allah is also described by all the divine Names, but the

Name ‘the All-Merciful’ is closer to the multiplicity of the world through those diverse divine Names. Likewise, the Throne that encompasses the heavens and Earth is a place of manifest multiplicity, whereas the Single Monad, in its mysterious intrinsic ‘hiddenness’, is more described by the transcendent divine qualities of unity and oneness.

6.7 Spreading the shadows

In discussing the divine Name ‘the Subtle’ (*al-latîf*),¹³ Ibn ‘Arabî says that there is great *subtle* knowledge in ‘the withdrawing of the shadow and its spreading’ (alluding to 25:45–46), and that is why Allah made that symbolic image a guide to Him [IV.238.2]. As we pointed out before, Ibn ‘Arabî views the world as a structure made ‘according to the image or form’ of the Real (see section 3.1). In the same way, he considers the manifest world as the ‘shadow’ of the Real, or of the Universal Intellect (and ultimately the ‘Greatest Element’). He bases these arguments on the following two verses from the Qur’an: ‘*Hast thou not seen how thy Lord hath spread the shadow – and if He wished, He could have made it still? Then We have made the Sun a guide unto it. Then We withdrew it into Us, with a diminutive withdrawal*’ (25:45–46), and we have already drawn attention to this basic relation between the divine Image and its ‘shadow’ in section 3.1. In many places [III.12.3, III.106.7, III.281.32] Ibn ‘Arabî emphasizes that the shadow of anything is on its own image; therefore:

Know that the Human Being (*Insân*),¹⁴ since he is the ‘likeness’ of the divine Form, is like the shadow of a person, which does not ever leave him, although sometimes it appears to the senses and sometimes it is hidden. So when the shadow is hidden, it is still implicit (*ma’qûl*: ‘present-to-the-intellect’) in that person; but when it is manifest, then it is visible to the eyesight – (at least) for whoever (actually) sees it. So (likewise) the Perfect Human Being (*al-insân al-kâmil*) is implicit in the Real (*al-Haqq*), like the shadow when it is hidden by direct sunlight so that it does not appear. For (the Perfect) Human Being always continues to be, eternally and perpetually. That is why (the Perfect Human Being) is always witnessed by the Real, since He is described (in the Qur’an) as having Sight (*al-basîr*: 17:1, 40:20, etc.).

Therefore when ‘*He spread His shadow*’, it appeared according to His Form: ‘*Hast thou not seen how thy Lord hath spread the shadow – and if He wished, He could have made it still?*’ (25:45) – i.e. stably remaining with Whom is His shadow. But if He does not spread His Shadow, no individual reality (*‘ayn*) of It will be manifest in sensible existence, except to Allah alone (in His Foreknowledge). So His ‘Shadow’ (i.e. the Perfect Human Being/Single Monad) has always been with Allah and will always be with Allah, for he continues Allah’s continuing, while everything other than the Perfect Human Being (Single Monad) only continues (in existence) through Allah’s causing them to continue.

[III.187.15; see also I.458.33 and II.607.14]

Therefore, the Single Monad or Perfect Human Being is the primordial Shadow of the Real, and the manifest world is in turn the shadow(s) of the Single Monad. The world appears in existence, after being hidden in the 'Unseen' (of the divine Foreknowledge), through Allah's 'spreading the shadow' of the Single Monad in the eternally renewed act of Creation. For if God so wished, He could have left His Shadow unmanifest, which means that the created world would have stayed as it was in Allah's eternal Knowledge, instead of coming out into real existence spread over space and time.

However, the 'shadow' of the Single Monad is one like him: that is why Allah withdrew his shadow 'with a diminutive withdrawal' – like the withdrawal of the shadow that normally occurs at sunset (see I.459.5) – so that it disappears in order to appear again in a different outward form, just as the sunlight disappears in order to eventually make another day. So at every 'Day' (instant) the Single Monad makes a new shadow in all creation. So the world is the ongoing collection of those instantaneous shadows, as explained in sections 3.6 and 4.3.

When the shadow is spread (before and after noon) it is itself a guide to the Sun, just as the Sun was an actual guide to it by its effect which caused the shadow itself [I.459.9 and also IV 238.29]. Likewise our shadow-like existence (our actual individual entity) should guide us to realize the Real manifested in ourselves – being His shadows – by looking at His shadow (i.e. the Single Monad or Perfect Human Being) who makes manifest the shadow of our creation – and by proceeding then from the Perfect Human Being to the Real Himself, the divine 'Light' or Sun Who ultimately caused this shadow (that is our existence). The seeker of the Real (*murīd*), therefore, keeps seeking the Real in these shadows and in the Shadow (of the Perfect Human Being) that is their Source, until he comes to realize that Source more fully and directly. So when he achieves that high state of realization, he himself – being one of these shadows – will be extinguished or 'drowned' (n. *fanā*) or united (n. *ittihād*) with the Real – because the shadow can not see itself and the Real at the same time – except perhaps for an instant of time, comparable to the case of noontime at the equator, where the shadow of the object disappears for a single moment.

But Ibn 'Arabī always clearly points out that after the 'enlightened' shadow-subject witnesses the Real, and continues to watch Him, then he will realize that he is as he was before and after his direct witnessing – except that before that witnessing he did not realize that what he was witnessing was the Real – just as the Sun is the Sun before and after the noontime disappearance of the shadow.¹⁵ However, in fact the shadow at noon hides in the object and not in the Sun, so in fact the realized knower indeed does not witness the Real Himself (the Essence), but witnesses only the 'real-through-whom-creation-takes-place' (*al-haqq al-makhlūq bihi*), which is the Perfect Human Being (the Single Monad, or at most the Greatest Element). So the Knower may at most realize his or her essential unity with *this* reality, which is only the higher 'Shadow' of the Real.

It is here, Ibn 'Arabī implies, that many of the Sufis' ecstatic expressions (or poetic metaphors) have sometimes been misunderstood. For example, Ibn al-Fārid in his famous poem, the *Tā'īyya*, speaks about 'unification' (*ittihād*) in

various forms (Mahmûd 1995: 241, 248, 252 and 276). Of course Ibn ‘Arabî himself has sometimes been accused of believing in *ittihâd* and *hulûl*, but he was always very careful not to mention these words and directly denied such doctrines [III.298.30, IV.81.23].¹⁶ That is why in his prayers Ibn ‘Arabî asks to unite with the Prophet Muhammad’s spiritual essence (*dhât*), who is the Perfect Human Being. For example he says in his book of prayers, *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya*:

O God, pray for him (Prophet Muhammad) a prayer by which my branch may connect with my root, and my part with my whole, until my essence is unified with his essence and my attributes with his attributes, and the eye is satisfied with the eye, and disunity flees away from disunity.¹⁷

In yet another of his prayers, he very clearly expresses what we have just observed in his remarks about the divine ‘shadow’:

Oh God, no god but You, it is You Whom we worship and You Whom we witness; ever returning to You, nothing but You. I ask of You, by You, You Yourself, Yourself, Yourself, You Who (have) no ‘he’ other than ‘Hû’ (the divine Essence), (I ask of you) to withdraw from me the shadow of (my natural bodily) formation, so that I may witness my (true) self bare from any description that is a veil which prevents me from witnessing You as ‘I’,¹⁸ and purify me from any attribute or influence that makes me see any (purely personal) share (in existence): ‘for *everything is perishable but its [or ‘His’] face*’¹⁹ (28:88), ‘*but to Allah all things are returned*’ (42:53). Oh my God, pray for Your messenger, our master Muhammad, who is apportioned with this perfect abolishment (*mahw*), and complete integration (*jam’*) that is beyond perfect wisdom.²⁰

For Ibn ‘Arabî, these symbolic analogies between the shadows and creation are indeed very important existentially because Allah made them as guides for us, in all the ways we have just reviewed. But what is particularly important here, in terms of Ibn ‘Arabî’s actual cosmology and understanding of time, is that the created entities of the world that are the evanescent ‘shadows’ of the Single Monad are continuously re-created, by one instantaneous act of creation after another, in a process similar to the spreading of the shadows by the Sun in the course of the day. In the following section, we turn to some further illustrations and implications of that cosmic process of creation.

6.8 Creation scenario: the world as a movie

Later Muslim writers, especially the great masters of mystical poetry in Persian and other eastern Islamic languages, developed a great range of familiar symbolic forms intended to elaborate and communicate the basic Qur’anic imagery for the cosmological processes and their symbolic expression that we have discovered in the writings of Ibn ‘Arabî. One of the most powerful and

multi-faceted of those images was Ibn 'Arabî's famous account – reminiscent of the Sun-Line-Cave section of Plato's *Republic* – of the universe as a vast 'shadow-theatre', a true 'divine Comedy' (Morris 1993: 50–69). Thus in contemporary terms, based on the concept of perpetual cosmic re-creation that we have explained above, we may envisage the world as like a movie being displayed on a computer monitor. It is quite fascinating to discover that this analogy is quite accurate in most of the details, even regarding what happens inside the computer, since the Universal Intellect/Perfect Human Being/Pen can be considered as a kind of 'supercomputer' which creates, organizes the world and displays it in the 'Universal Tablet' (of the world-Soul). Ibn 'Arabî has already asserted that the world appears as 'living, hearing, seeing, knowing, willing, able and speaking' with the same seven fundamental Attributes of the Real. This is because the world is His divine work, and as Allah said: '*Say: "everyone works according to his own type"*' (17:84) [II.438.19]. This is also equivalent to what we have repeatedly noted: that the Perfect Human Being and the world (including its human beings) are all created 'according to the Form or Image' of the Real, and that they are also the second-level shadows of the Real (see for example [I.163.20, II.652.25, III.343.25], and also [Kanz: 1142, 1148]).

Likewise the computer today is certainly created as a certain kind of 'image' of some specific aspects of the human mind, and certainly the way the computer works resembles the human mind in many respects. However the shadow or the image in the mirror (or photocopier) resembles at best only one facet of the original. Likewise human beings, for example, do not fully resemble the Real, just as computers do not (and cannot) fully resemble humans in many other respects.

As we have seen, Ibn 'Arabî repeatedly showed that in many respects both the world and the essential (spiritual) human being work in the same way. That is why he generally considers the world as a great human being (*al-insân al-kabîr*) and the human being as microcosm (*'âlam saghîr*) [III.11.18]. Just as our own world is essentially constituted by the meanings, images and states that are reflected in our spirit, soul and intellect, so the world also reflects the divine 'meanings' brought into creation by the Universal Intellect, so that the phenomena that we perceive are the doubly reflected forms of these original meanings. However, Ibn 'Arabî also repeatedly asserts that the world would not exist if the observing 'eye' or 'I' of the viewer was not also always there.²¹ So because of the underlying reality of the created world as essentially 'imaginal' forms or multiple 'reflections' or shadows, we can only understand the cosmos if we understand how we perceive it, since for Ibn 'Arabî it is all ultimately, and quite literally 'in the mind' – albeit a different kind of 'Mind' at each level of manifestation.

It is known that the movie which is displayed on the cinema screen is composed of a large number of succeeding still pictures that pass rapidly before the eye at very short intervals, so that the human mind observes only smooth changes between those rapidly successive pictures. By running this movie at the proper speed we feel (by illusion) as if a normal motion of objects and images is happening on the screen. So if we suppose that the screen has no visible edges,

and especially with the new technology of three-dimensional (laser holography) movies, it would be very hard initially to distinguish this illusion from reality.

Now if we examine how the picture is displayed on the screen of the computer monitor, we realize that it is even more closely similar to Ibn 'Arabî's view of creation. In this way the whole cosmos is a combination and rapid succession of imaginal forms (images, reflections or 'shadows') that are created by or through the Single Monad in a similar manner to the single electron beam which is creating the picture on the computer screen one pixel at a time.

As Ibn 'Arabî has pointed out, the Single Monad is continuously and perpetually 'wearing' new forms which make us see and otherwise experience motion. When we open our eyes we see a picture of many things around us, and if we keep on watching we see things moving. Each mental picture is also created in series and not all at once, as we have noted before (sections 5.5 and 5.6). In every single instance and at each single point of space there exists a monad with a specific unique form, and we have explained before (sections 3.15 and 4.1) that it takes the Monad a full divine 'Week' of creation to appear in this form, but this divine Week for us is like a single instant. This same monad, still in the same instant of time – for us, but a full divine 'Week' for the Monad itself, since we only exist for one moment in this Week: see section 3.6 – takes another form but in another point of space, and so on. So in one single instant the picture that we see is a combination of a huge number of reflected forms of the same Single Monad. He or It scans the whole of space at no time (for us) and without real motion (on the part of the Single Monad), because space itself is what we subjectively experience as a consequence of the succession of forms within this monad, and motion is meaningless when we talk about one single all-encompassing entity. It takes the monad a full 'Week' of creation (i.e. seven 'Days of event': one for each direction of space – up, down, right, left, front and back, and one for the observer – time) to scan all the states in the cosmos, but since each one of us is one single state – as observers, not as bodies – we live a single moment in each full 'Week of event', in which we observe the other states around and within us as the traces or memory of the forms left over by the Monad after it has created those states. Ibn 'Arabî succinctly referred to this cosmological fact, in a favourite image of the later mystical poets, right in his Forward (*khutba*) to the *Futûhât*, when he said:

Then He released the Breath, so the water waved because of its vibration and foamed . . . Then the water diffidently withdrew and returned back heading for the middle, and it left over its foam on the shore that it produced. So it (the world) is the churning of this water that contains most things.

[I.4.7]

The 'water' here refers to the Single Monad itself (or the Greatest Element: *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 812–817, 826–828) because (in the famous expression of the Qur'an) 'every thing was created from the Water', and the 'foam' is the created forms (or their images) left over by the Single Monad after it has 'scanned' into existence the created world (in six divine Days) and then returned back to the

middle to start over a new picture [II.438.3] on Saturday. That is why Ibn 'Arabi also affirms that the cosmological 'ruler' of the last Day of time (Saturday) has the ability of holding and fixing (i.e. memory), in order to hold the cosmic picture and integrate it with what follows (see also section 3.5, Saturday as the Day of Eternity).

When this perpetual creative process is conceptually 'stopped' and taken in isolation, all this will form a kind of 'still picture' of things around us, including ourselves both as bodies (matter) and as spirits or states of realization (meanings). Within this conception, the dynamic manifest world, then, is the instantaneous, continuously renewed succession of these slightly changing still pictures. As we showed in section 2.6, motion is observed because things successively appear in different places, but indeed there is no actual motion: for the observed objects are always at rest in the different positions that they appear in. Allah is constantly re-creating the cosmos in ever-renewed forms.

Now what we have just mentioned is exactly like what happens on the screen of the computer monitor: when we look at the screen at any instant of time, we see a still picture that is composed of an array of dots (pixels) in the two dimensions of the plane of the screen (for example 800 horizontal by 600 vertical pixels). This still picture is made by a single electron beam that scans the screen over and over again, one pixel at a time. It starts from the bottom left corner of the screen and scans horizontally all the 800 pixels (one line), then it switches back to the left to make the second line, and so on till all the screen is scanned, ending up by the upper right corner; then it switches back to start a new picture from the bottom left corner again in the same way. Because this process is performed at very high speed or refresh rate (around 100 million times per second), we only see a continuous picture in the two dimensions; we never see the pixels being drawn one by one. By watching the succession of pictures, we observe motion. While the beam creates them, each pixel on the screen wears a specific form of a different colour and intensity that (slightly) changes from one still picture and instant to the other. This momentary form that the pixels wear every time they are scanned lasts only during the very short time that the beam is in its place. Once the beam leaves the pixel for the next one, the form vanishes intrinsically; we only see the traces of these forms for a short time till they are scanned again to wear a new form.

In terms of Ibn 'Arabi's understanding of the cosmogonic process, the electron beam here is like the Single Monad/Pen/Intellect; the screen is like both our imagination and, outwardly or objectively, the effective 'substrate' of creation that Ibn 'Arabi calls 'the Dust': *al-'amâ*); while the cosmos is like the series of pictures on the screen, which are printed on our imagination and in the Universal Tablet. Ibn 'Arabi's description of the world is identical to this example of the computer monitor, even the names that he gives to the Single Monad as the 'Higher Pen' and to the cosmic Soul as the 'Higher Tablet', indicate that the process of creation is similar to the process of a pen's writing on a tablet, which is also similar to the electron-beam writing on the screen. To take yet another of Ibn 'Arabi's most favoured cosmological images, we creatures are the 'letters'

and the ‘words’ that are spoken by the Creator (through the creative, existentiating ‘Breath of the All-Merciful’), after having been written down by the Higher Pen on the Higher Tablet (see section 7.8).

With a closer examination of this example, we can now realize the meaning of the intertwined days and the taken-out days, and also the significance of the (normal) week and Saturday – as the Day of Eternity – that we explained in Chapters 3 and 4. If an observer was in one point of the computer screen (as we are individually in one specific place in the world), a week for him or her would be a combination of 800 by 600 instances of 800 by 600 ‘Weeks of events’, because each point will be present (created) only while the electron beam is on it, so it stays only one part of the 800 by 600 pixels ‘created’ during each run (original Week/Day). Similarly, each entity in the world lives only one ‘instant’ (which equals an outwardly observable day over the entirety of entities in the world) in each ‘Week’ of creation: i.e. only the time when the Single Monad creates it or appears in its form. Therefore, a week for this point would be a combination of different instants of many other Weeks of the original Weeks of events. Also, because Saturday is the divine Day of manifest creation when each entity realizes itself – and it does not realize itself (or the world) while being created in the other six Days (see section 3.6) – we, as entities living in the world, realize only the Saturdays’ instances, those that are manifest in time. Therefore, all our life (as time) is Saturday, while the world as space is the other six Days. In other words: the motion of the electron beam horizontally and vertically on the screen creates the space in which the picture is viewed. This is identical to the cosmic Week-Days of creation from Sunday to Friday, while the motion when the electron beam returns from the right-top to the lower-left corner is identical to Saturday or the manifest instant of time, because time is the motion by which we observe the succession of the pictures.

In section 7.10, we shall talk about dimensions in more detail, but it is good to remember here what we have already said in section 2.11 about the two cycles of life (see in particular Figure 2.1). The screen of the computer monitor is of course two-dimensional (2-D). So the starting of the scanning of the screen from the lower-left corner resembles the starting of the world by creating the Real (0-D) as the pixel itself, and then the angels in 1-D. This in the real world, according to Ibn ‘Arabî’s account of the astrological cycle of life, takes 11,000 years; but for the case of the computer monitor it takes a very short but also fixed time, in which a fixed number of motions or jumps happen – 800 pixels for example. Then after finishing the first line and by starting the second one, this scanning or creating process moves us into two dimensions, to start the world of jinn, while the 1-D world of angels continues. The scanning of the 2-D screen continues until it is finished after a short but fixed time. There is no third dimension in normal computer monitors, but there is in the outside world: there, according to Ibn ‘Arabî, when this manifest stage of creation starts after 54,000 years, it marks the creation of *dunyâ* (‘this lower world’). Then the after-world starts in yet another dimension (4-D) – according to Ibn ‘Arabî after 9,000 more years, although we have not moved yet into it (see section 7.10).

It is fascinating to notice that this analogy between the world and the computer applies to many of the details – not only with regard to the visible manifest world, but also to the spiritual world that is analogous to the processor, the memory, the hard disk and the software running inside the computer. It is enough to notice that the processor of the computer – no matter how fast it may be and how many jobs it may do very quickly – can do only one elementary job at a time. So from outside we see multiple jobs and multiple images, running and interacting, but from inside only one thing is manipulating all that, one by one, in series, one single bit at a time. For example when we say that the speed of the computer central processing unit is 3.4 GHz, this means that it can manipulate 3.4 billion bits every second, and the bit is the smallest piece of information, which is the digital state of either 1 or 0, yes or no. This is indeed a huge speed, yet surely the speed of the Single Monad creating the world is much larger, as Allah plainly said: ‘*and He is the fastest of all calculators*’ (6:62) – although this is normally interpreted with regard to the Judgement Day.

7 The Single Monad model and its implications for modern physics

*This existence that we know in practice,
is not like the existence that we know by unveiling.
The mind does not know it, and thinking does not recognize it,
but remembrance (dhikr) will show it, while the secret will hide it
from the minds that are veiled by habits:
that is why they do not recognize what the secrets¹ understand.
(Dīwān: 229)*

As with most cosmological hypotheses, past and present, testing Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmological model and his understanding of time is not easy. Although a preliminary test is simply its ability to resolve some of the standard paradoxes surrounding time, as we shall shortly see below, more credible tests may not be very easy to perform, and incontrovertible tests may be inaccessible – since Ibn ‘Arabī frequently reiterates, beginning with the very Introduction to the *Futūhāt*, that his most distinctive cosmological insights are ultimately based on forms of inspiration, ‘unveiling’, and divine knowledge that are beyond the level of the ordinary human intelligence.

So in this final chapter we shall discuss some of the consequences and possible methods to test the Single Monad model that we outlined in Chapter 6. Some persisting paradoxes in current models will be discussed, such as the historical Zeno’s paradoxes and the recent EPR paradox (sections 7.4 and 7.6). We shall then go on to discuss some of the apparent consequences of Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmological model for various principles of physics, cosmology and philosophy. We have already seen that, in this model, space and time are truly unified, and that there is a drastically different conception of motion. Most other basic properties of matter, like mass, density, softness and transparency, will be also affected, suggesting the eventual possibility of conceiving a kind of ‘science’ dealing with certain phenomena of mysticism and the supernatural. In addition to that, in this cosmological model, causality itself will have a different sense, which would enable new perspectives for reconciling cosmology and theology.

7.1 Testing possibilities

One of the main consequences – and principles – of this model of cosmogony and creation, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is that the creation is being continuously refreshed, like a kind of computer screen. A first possibility could be, therefore, to measure the ‘refresh rate’ of creation, which is also the smallest quantum of time, or the length of the moment (*al-zaman al-fard*). As we have noted, this could be expected to be equal to 24 hours (or $24 \times 60 \times 60$ seconds) divided by the whole number of states or entities in the world. With such an extremely small quantity of time, there is no possible device that could measure it.² If we think, for example, of using high-speed cameras and then replaying their images in slow motion in order to see the flickering,³ we shall find that this is not possible even in theory, no matter how fast the camera might be. Since the camera, no matter how fast, is itself part of the world whose re-creation it is supposed to observe, it will not be able to see its state of non-existence because then it will not be existing itself. Similarly, we ordinarily do not notice the re-creation of the world because we are part of it. However, a specially detailed study of the memory and other human internal and external senses would be necessary to judge how the actual process of perception of the world is happening with the re-creation principle in mind, both in our ‘normal’ state and in those specially enlightened perceptions of the ‘knowers’ which Ibn ‘Arabî points to as the ultimate root of his cosmological thesis of ‘perpetual re-creation’.

On the other hand, other promising domains for testing and examining this model would involve the properties of light particles (photons) and other elementary particles. The peculiar properties of photons that are normally treated as electromagnetic waves can be a starting point to test the model above. The photon, being a wave, has a probability of existence anywhere in space and at any time as long as it is still undetected; it takes fixed space-time co-ordinates only after it is detected either by the eye or by a device. We can therefore say that the photon of light, being the fastest in nature, does not undergo any re-creation, and that is why it is the fastest, because creation or re-creation is a process that takes the smallest quantum of time. Therefore one key to test the Single Monad model experimentally could be in the emission and absorption of light by different known processes, or in the process of converting light into mass (and vice versa) through electron–positron annihilation and pair production (see further below).

The best and easiest potential domain of investigation in this regard is to look at the electron orbits around the nucleus, where it is known that the electron jumps between the orbits when it absorbs or emits a photon of light. Because this process is quantized, the electron may not exist between the orbits; it is therefore re-created in the new orbit (see also the following section). We can therefore say that the re-creation time (i.e. the moment) equals the time the electron takes to move between the orbits (i.e. actually re-appears in the new orbit). This time-gap, however, is different from one atom to another, or even from one orbit to another inside the atom, because it depends on the kind of atoms and on

temperature, etc. It is not possible here to discuss this subject in detail, but it is certainly a good point which may constitute a new subject of research.

We may also look in the annihilation of particles and anti-particles into light and vice versa ('pair production'). For example, when an electron meets with a positron (each has a mass of 9.1×10^{-31} kg) they are both annihilated into a massless photon (energy) according to the famous equation $E = mc^2$. One electron alone can not annihilate, and one positron alone can not annihilate. But it is possible to convert energy into particles, as when two sufficiently strong photons meet; they convert into an electron (negative charge e^-) and a positron (positive charge e^+). It is worth mentioning here that Ibn 'Arabî has apparently referred to phenomena that have only been known scientifically after the discovery of elementary particles at the beginning of last century. For example, he says:

When two monads or atoms (*jawharân*) [like two photons] are joined, it is as though they are two bodies. That is to say, when they are joined with each other, each one of them can be called a body (*jism*) so that in this respect they are two bodies, as He said: '*and of every thing, We created two pairs*' (51:49). He actually created one pair – masculine and feminine, for example. But He called it 'two pairs' for this reason that we just mentioned, because each one of them alone without the other is not a pair, but when another is added to it then each one of them may be called pair (*zawj*), so they are two pairs.

[I.721.18]

In other places he says that the body is composed of at least eight points, like a unit cube which is similar in shape to the Kaaba [III.276.6] (see also section 6.6). We have already seen in Chapter 6 that, in Ibn 'Arabî's cosmological symbolism, the Kaaba represents the Single Monad. Therefore, we may look at the possibilities of how mass emerges out of massless photons in annihilation and pair production and see if this phenomenon can be related to the cosmogonic conceptions of the 'Week' of creation explained in Chapter 3 and the 'intertwining of days' explained in Chapter 4.

Yet another related and handier possibility of investigation involves the refraction of light in transparent materials. As is well known, light slows down when moving in transparent materials such as air, water and glass; usually the denser the material, the more slowing light suffers, which is indicated as a higher refraction index. The reason why this is the case is because light is absorbed by atoms along the path and then is emitted again by almost every atom along its path. Any absorption and emission of light can be related to the phenomenon of re-creation, so the re-creation hypothesis can be investigated via the phenomena underlying different refraction indexes. The refraction indexes of hundreds of minerals and their density and other properties are already widely available.⁴ So it may be possible, by comparing these data, to find some correlation between the refraction indexes and the underlying refresh rate of re-creation.

Testing this model could also be done by computer simulation, especially

since Ibn ‘Arabî himself (in *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 11–16) invited people who can do more accurate calculations to calculate the intertwining of Days on a smaller scale than hours (for example, minutes and seconds), as we pointed out in section 4.4. This simulation would have to take into account that, as we mentioned in section 3.6, Ibn ‘Arabî’s theory means that the world is created in six comic ‘Days’ as space and then displayed on the last Day of creation (Saturday) as time.

In general, the possibilities of testing these hypotheses in physics are diverse and worth trying, but here we are more interested in the theological and philosophical consequences developed in the following sections.

7.2 Timeless motion

To start investigating some of the consequences of the cosmological principle of continual re-creation, we can consider the case of the throne of Bilqîs, which Ibn ‘Arabî (and his later commentators) have discussed in his *Fusûs Al-Hikam* and elsewhere. In most accepted understandings, motion is always associated with time, because, no matter how fast objects move, they need a time greater than zero to reach any point other than their original place. For example, it is well known in physics that the photon of light is the fastest particle in the physical world and that it travels at 300,000 km per second, so it can circle around the Earth seven times in one second. However, this huge velocity is limited and not instantaneous, so apparently physical motions always need time.

In the Qur’an, however, we read the story of the Prophet Solomon and Bilqîs, the Queen of Sheba, when Solomon said to his men:

‘Which of you can bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?’ [Then] a stalwart of the jinn said: “I will bring it to you before you can rise from your place, and I verily am strong and trusty for such work”
(27:39)

But even this really quick action takes time, though very little, so

said the one who has knowledge of the Book:⁵ ‘I will bring it to you before your gaze returns unto you!’ [i.e. in less than the blink of the eye, actually immediately]. Then when he (Solomon) saw it placed steadily before him, he said: ‘This is by the Grace of my Lord to test me whether I am grateful or ungrateful!’

(27:38–40)

In this mysterious story it is clear that al-Khidr brought the throne of Bilqîs from Yemen to al-Quds in no time. Because of its great importance in his view of time and the cosmos, Ibn ‘Arabî devotes much of chapter 16 in his famous book *the Bezels of Wisdom* to talk about this distinctive phenomenon of timeless motion often associated with the extraordinary actions and manifestations of the

saints (*awliyā'*) (Corbin 1969: 224–226). Ibn 'Arabî, however, declares that in reality this is not motion, but, rather, the throne was annihilated or extincted from its original place and instantly re-created in front of Solomon, in no time, based on the affirmation in those verses that Solomon saw the throne placed 'steadily' before him *before 'he returns his gaze'* (i.e. her throne was not shaking, as one would expect when an object moves quickly and then stops suddenly, owing to the deceleration). So indeed there was no motion, but rather – as al-Qâshânî and Bâlî Effendî mentioned in their commentaries on this chapter – all al-Khidr did was to switch the throne from its original location to the new place in front of Solomon.⁶

From this perspective this kind of phenomenon is easily explained, on the basis of the re-creation principle, since, as Ibn 'Arabî frequently affirms, such apparent 'miracles' do not break the divine laws underlying the phenomena of nature, but only break our 'habits' of perception and expectation [II.374.27]. In fact everything that happens in Nature must be explainable under some divine laws, and is in principle possible to be repeated [II.374.11].

In terms of modern physics, this story actually corresponds to the pervasive phenomena that happen in the atom whenever an electron moves from one orbit to another, when it emits or absorbs a photon of light. It is well known in physics that when the electron absorbs or emits a photon its distance from the nucleus in the centre of the atom changes. This change of the distance, however, is abrupt: i.e. it does not travel through between the two places, but rather it disappears from its original orbit and reappears in the new orbit. Usually such kind of instantaneous motion is scarcely explained according to the novel equations of Quantum Mechanics, and it is not explainable at all with the classical Newton's equations (see section 1.3). Indeed such inexplicable electron behaviour was the driving force behind the discovery of the successful theory of Quantum Mechanics.

If we recall Ibn 'Arabî's definition of motion discussed in section 2.6, we can easily account for this type of timeless motion. Such motion, according to Ibn 'Arabî, is not an infinitely gradual change of positions from the start to the destination, but rather a new creation in the second place. However, if we want to be very accurate, the motion of the throne of Bilqîs, like the motion of electrons between orbits and indeed any elementary motion, takes a single 'Day of event' which is equivalent to a single 'atom of time' of what we may count. Measuring the time that the electron needs to switch between two successive orbs might be the key to testing Ibn 'Arabî's cosmological model and developing it in terms of modern scientific theory. This smallest instant of time is the quantum (*al-zaman al-fard*) of the quantized time that we have discussed in sections 2.8, 4.1 and 6.5.

In normal cases, of course the distance travelled in this smallest moment is also very short, which causes us to see gradual changes; but in principle the distance involved could be anything; as Allah wills, since, whether the change in positions is small or large, the same process of re-creation is taking place. Therefore, what we call the laws of physics or mechanics, are – in terms of Ibn 'Arabî's cosmological conceptions – just a qualitative 'description' of the normally observed order of re-creation, not a real description of the actual

process of perpetual re-creation. We shall see further below that this conception has a great impact on our understanding of causality the most fundamental principle in physics.

7.3 Simultaneity

We have seen in section 1.3 that many classical theories considered time as an absolute quantity. This coped very well with the common concept of simultaneity, where events which occur simultaneously in one frame of reference were considered to have occurred simultaneously also in all other frames. With the advent of the Special Theory of Relativity, the idea that light travels at a finite speed in all directions and in all frames of reference changed this piece of common sense. According to this new theory, simultaneous events in one frame of reference are not necessarily considered simultaneous with regard to another frame of reference moving at a relatively high speed with regard to the first.

According to Ibn ‘Arabi’s view of time and his model of the cosmos that we have described above, the concept of simultaneity will have an even more relative aspect. With regard to us – i.e. considered as partial monads present on the level of multiplicity – it is possible to have simultaneous events. The reason is simply because normally we exist only for at one single location of the whole momentary ‘Day of event’ (as we explained in section 2.16). For us, at every single moment of re-creation there is a still picture (which contains infinitely many events) displayed in the world. So from this perspective the concept of simultaneity appears like the classical definition.

But according to the re-creation principle and the oneness of being discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 – in addition to the concept of the single Day of event discussed in section 2.8 – there can be no two cosmic ‘events’ (englobing all of creation) actually happening at the same time, because *‘each Day He is upon some (one, single) task’* (55:29). Therefore, in reality there is no such thing as ‘simultaneity’ – with regard to the Single Monad who is creating the real flow of time (see also Chapter 4) – because It wears only one created form at each instant of time. Simultaneity, and therefore multiplicity, thus appear to occur only because of the re-creation. But in reality there are not any two separate (all-encompassing) ‘events’ happening at the same created instant of time. We shall see the importance of this conclusion more clearly when we discuss the EPR paradox below.

7.4 Zeno’s paradoxes

Motion, as a manifestation of causality, is the main concern behind all the theories of physics, from the pre-Socratics through Newton’s theory of gravity to the most recent theories of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Gravity. Yet there are a number of famous philosophers who have doubted that there could be any motion at all, despite our daily experience. As is well known, those philosophers expressed perspectives similar to Ibn ‘Arabi’s. Most notably, Parmenides of Elea (b. 510BC) affirmed cosmological conceptions remarkably similar to Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of

the oneness of being: he held 'the One' unchanging existence to be alone true, while multitude and change were said to be an appearance without reality. This doctrine was defended by his pupil Zeno (b. c. 488BC), whose philosophy of monism claimed that the many things which appear to exist are merely a single eternal reality which he called Being (a term Ibn 'Arabi also applies to the Single Monad). The complex and rigorous adaptation of Parmenides' hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides* – constantly elaborated by the later Neoplatonists – offers even closer analogies to Ibn 'Arabi's overall ontological system. Zeno wrote a book containing forty paradoxes, and, although his book was lost, four of those paradoxes were discussed by Aristotle in his *Physics*: the Dichotomy, the Achilles, the Arrow and the Stadium. Each of those four paradoxes challenges all claims that there is real motion (Heath 1981: 273–283; Sorensen 2003: 44–57; Darling 2004: 351; Leiber 1993: 77; Erickson 1998: 218–220).

The Dichotomy paradox concludes that there is no motion because that which is moved must arrive at the middle of its course before it arrives at the end. In order to traverse a line segment it is necessary to reach its midpoint. To do this, one must reach the one-fourth point; to do this, one must reach the one-eighth point, and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence motion can never begin, because the sum $1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + \dots$ equals one, but only after an infinite number of additions, and therefore it actually approaches one but never reaches it. Even more perplexing to the human mind is the attempt to sum $1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + \dots$ backwards: for we can never get started, since we are trying to build up this infinite sum from the wrong end!

The paradox of Achilles attempts to show that, even though Achilles runs faster than the tortoise, he will never catch her! Let us suppose that Achilles runs at ten metres per second and the tortoise at only one metre per second, and that when the race started the tortoise was ten metres ahead. After one second Achilles would arrive at the point where the tortoise was when the race started, but the tortoise would have moved one metre further – so that by the time Achilles covers this one metre, the tortoise would have advanced again 0.1 metre, and so on. Thus Achilles can never catch the tortoise.

Zeno bases the above two arguments on the fact that once a thing is divisible, then it is infinitely divisible. One could counter the above two paradoxes by postulating an atomic theory in which matter (or space) is composed of many small indivisible elements. However the remaining two paradoxes cause problems only if we consider that space is made up of indivisible elements that may be cut in indivisible durations of time.

Turning to the third paradox of the Arrow: if we consider the path of an arrow in flight, at each instant of its path the arrow occupies some position in space; this is what it means to say that space is discrete. But to occupy some position in space is to be at rest in this position. So throughout the entire path of the arrow through space, it is in fact at rest! Or if in an indivisible instant of time the arrow moved, then indeed this instant of time would be divisible (for example, in a smaller instant of time the arrow would have moved half that distance).

The fourth paradox of the Stadium is a little more complicated, but it leads to

the same result as the above – i.e. that time and space can not be discrete – while, on the contrary, we have seen that the first two paradoxes may be resolved only if we assume that time and space are not continuous

The above four paradoxes challenge not only all scientific theories of motion but also our everyday experience. For this reason they have often been dismissed as logical nonsense. Many attempts, however, have also been made to dispose of them by means of mathematical theorems, such as the theory of convergent series or the theory of sets. Aristotle did not fully appreciate the significance of Zeno's arguments, since he called them 'fallacies', without actually being able to refute them. Many modern scientists like to believe that axiomatic mathematics has dispelled Zeno's paradoxes, where now it is possible to talk about limits and infinity without reaching any mathematical contradiction and it can be proved that the sum of an infinite number of halving intervals is finite. But some recent philosophers such as Bertrand Russell persisted with such arguments, and recently similar puzzling phenomena (called the 'quantum Zeno effect') have been observed in radioactive atoms (Misra and Sudarshan 1977: 756; Grossing and Zeilinger 1991: 321–326).

With Ibn 'Arabî's re-creation principle, we would have no difficulty at all in resolving Zeno's paradoxes and reconciling his conclusion that there is no motion with our daily perceptions. So although there is no real motion in the sense that the object gradually leaves its position to a new one, but rather it is re-created in ever new positions so that we imagine it moving between these places. For example, when we watch a 'movie' on the television, we have no doubt that nothing really moves on the screen, but it is only a succession of different frames. According to Ibn 'Arabî's cosmological perspective, the whole world is exactly like that (see section 6.8). As we noted in section 2.6, Ibn 'Arabî plainly stated that the object that we see moving actually is re-created in the distinct places between its start and destination one after another and does not really 'move' between them [II.457.31], so there is never any real motion in such a way that the object 'gradually moves' along its path. Thus Ibn 'Arabî, like Zeno and Parmenides, believes that the whole world is a manifestation of a single entity which alone can be described to have a real existence. But Ibn 'Arabî's distinctive contribution is to show how the multiplicity of the world emerges from or within the Single Monad.

7.5 Discreteness and continuousness

There is no doubt that Zeno has presented a deep problem which, despite centuries of efforts to resolve it, still seems to lack a truly satisfactory solution. As Frankel wrote:

The human mind, when trying to give itself an accurate account of motion, finds itself confronted with two aspects of the phenomenon. Both are inevitable but at the same time they are mutually exclusive. Either we look at the continuous flow of motion; then it will be impossible for us to think of the object in any particular position. Or we think of the object as occupying any of the positions through which its course is leading it; and while fixing our

thought on that particular position we can not help fixing the object itself and putting it at rest for one short instant.

(Frankel 1942: 1–25, 193–206)

This basic dilemma of discreteness and continuousness has kept coming up in various guises, but most clearly in the long historical debate on the nature of light: whether it is particles or waves. With the success of the wave theory in the nineteenth century, the continuum seemed to have won. But in 1899, when Max Planck solved the ‘black body problem’⁷ by postulating that atoms could absorb or emit energy only in discrete amounts, the age of Quantum Theory began. Soon after that, Bohr used the concept of quantization to construct the first successful atomic model, and Einstein was able to analyse the photoelectric effect only by adopting the quantum nature of light. However, Quantum Theory was not able to solve the question of motion and change, where the continuous theory of Relativity was more successful.

So the human mind is accustomed to classifying quantities as either countable or uncountable, or either discrete or continuous; there is no other way. This is inevitable on the level of multiplicity. But on the level of oneness (i.e. of all-inclusive *ahadiyya* or ‘unicity’) there would be no meaning for such terms. A first look at Ibn ‘Arabî’s model could conclude that, on the level of multiplicity, the world should be certainly discrete, and therefore that Ibn ‘Arabî might easily adopt the atomist view. But the issue this raises is quite similar to what we have discussed earlier in Chapter 2 about the length of the moment and whether it is composed of discrete sub-moments, or whether it has a length at all. We have seen that it is not easy to decide for either case. Similarly, it is not easy to judge – even on the multiplicity level – whether the world is ultimately continuous or discrete. Although there are discrete events happening in discrete times, still the change from one event to another looks continuous, just like the flow of normal days; there is no abrupt change. Although we can easily divide events over days and classify them according to the date, actually the relation between any two consecutive events that happened during the day is not different from those which happened also consecutively but on different days – for example, right before and after morning or evening. In other words, the motion of the Earth around its axis, though generating the appearance of different distinct days, it is itself a continuous process. Likewise, the all-creative ‘motion’ of the Single Monad is also a continuous process in everlasting alteration between ‘daytimes’ and ‘night-times’, manifestation and being hidden, material and spiritual – yet there is no point of separation or abrupt transformation between any two periods or states. That is why Ibn ‘Arabî calls the terms of discreteness and continuousness ‘disconnected’ (*munfasil*) and ‘connected’ (*muttasil*), because for him the actual process of change (re-creation) is like a one-dimensional flow of divine manifestation. So if there is an apparent continuity or discontinuity, that would only be in our imagination or abstract consideration, but not in reality [III.324.35–325.18].

7.6 The EPR paradox

Physics theories, which are mainly based on explaining motion and its relation to time, have worked fine for centuries, so that people have been able to send spaceships to the Moon and other planets with great timing accuracy. Dismissing Zeno's paradoxes, therefore, had no negative consequences for applied physics. However, no single theory up to now has been able to explain all observations, especially when it comes to the microcosms of subatomic particles, where new paradoxes are still arising.

One of the most pertinent tests of Ibn 'Arabī's cosmological model is that through its principles the prominent Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paradox could be so easily and readily understood. The EPR paradox demonstrates the discrepancy between the two principal theories of physics: Quantum Theory and Relativity. Quantum Theory is one of the most successful theories of science. It explained the structure of atoms, the properties of materials, elementary particles and stars. Although it was generally consistent with the results of many decades of experimenting, the basic conceptual foundations of Quantum Mechanics can lead to some puzzling paradoxes and strange unacceptable features. The EPR paradox is possibly one of the most compelling of these apparently peculiarly unacceptable features.

In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen – in their famous article titled: 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?' (Einstein *et al.* 1935: 777) – developed a thought experiment to demonstrate what they felt was a lack of completeness in Quantum Mechanics. This so-called 'EPR paradox' has led to much subsequent and still ongoing research. The purpose of the EPR thought experiment was to expose the profound peculiarities of the quantum description of a physical system extended over a large region of space. It seemed that, under certain conditions, a quantum system of two entangled particles could in theory exchange information instantaneously or, at least, faster than the speed of light. This clearly contradicts the principle of 'locality' in Einstein's theory of Relativity, which supposes that the speed of light is a maximum terminal velocity. The phenomena of entanglement also lead to the violation of Heisenberg's sacred 'uncertainty principle', which declares that not all the classical physical observables (e.g. position and momentum) of a system can be simultaneously known with unlimited precision, even in principle.

On the basis of these contradictions, EPR refused this deterministic nature of Quantum Mechanics and postulated that the existence of 'hidden variables', some thus far unknown properties of the system, should account for the paradoxical discrepancy. Niels Bohr, on the other hand, favoured the view put together in the 'Copenhagen interpretation' of Quantum Theory and refused the idea of hidden variables (Bohr 1935: 696).

In 1964 John Bell proposed a mechanism to test for the existence of these hidden variables, and he developed his 'inequality principle' as the basis for such a test (Bell 1966: 447). This was followed by many experiments to verify this principle. The most successful of these experiments was performed by Alain

Aspect and his colleagues in 1982 (Aspect 1982a: 1804; Aspect 1982b: 91). Their experiment consisted of light polarization measurements made on pairs of photons, moving in opposite directions, emitted simultaneously in single transitions by calcium atoms, then measured by sensitive detectors on each side. The results of the experiment clearly violate Bell's inequalities, eliminating the need for the existence of hidden variables and thus supporting the predictions of non-local Quantum Mechanics (which violate Einstein's locality principle and even common sense). The results showed that apparently the left-hand detecting apparatus was sending some kind of message to the right-hand photon informing it as to how the left-hand one was set up, so that the right-hand photon could interact in the appropriate way with the right-hand apparatus. But as a matter of fact there is no communication at all between the left and the right photons, and, if we suppose there is, then the signal would have to travel faster than the speed of light.

Many even more accurate experiments have been performed after that, and all show that it is as if time 'stops' between the pair of entangled particles and they interact instantaneously despite the large distance between them. Although this experimental outcome supports the fundamental concepts of the theory of Quantum Mechanics and contradicts Einstein's locality principle, but there is no adequate theoretical explanation for it, so far.

Now one of the striking consequences of Ibn 'Arabî's principle of re-creation by the Single Monad is that such strange instantaneous behaviour between the two entangled particles would be natural and very easily explained. According to his cosmological theories the constant creation of the manifest world proceeds like a movie composed of succeeding still pictures. Each momentary 'picture' of the world is like a closed system, where any change in one part of this picture would require another synchronizing change or changes in other part(s), so that the whole does not change because there is no external interaction, only 'internal' changes. We have also explained that all 'parts' of the world are created in series by the Single Monad that constantly creates ('puts on') ever new forms, one total individual form at each instant of time – such that each created form then ceases to exist (intrinsically, not through any other force) the next moment after its existence.

Now if we take that theory of cosmic re-creation into account, we can simply say that the two entangled particles in these experiments, like any two entities in the world, never existed together at the same. Rather, the Single Monad first wears the form of the first particle – i.e. causes this particle to exist (under special conditions); then this unique Single Monad itself wears other forms in a specific sequence (see section 5.6), until it comes to wear or create the form of the second particle – regardless of where it is in space. But by the moment of this second state of creation, the first particle is out of existence, and therefore it encountered no time. Now, because the two particles are 'entangled' (in a closed system), any change on the first form that corresponds to the first particle will be kept in the 'memory' of the Single Monad, so that when it comes to wear the form of the second particle it does so in a way that keeps the total state of the

system of the two particles unchanged (according to the Quantum Mechanical laws, because it is a closed system). This process is instantaneous; no matter how far apart the two particles are, because only one particle really exists at a time, and during the interval between creating the two particles they were both out of existence, encountering no time. This hypothesis corresponds to Ibn ‘Arabî’s account of ‘the real flow of time’ that we explained in Chapter 4.

In fact what we have just said applies to any (large or small) system and not simply the system of those two entangled particles, but in normal cases the effect of the ongoing process of cosmic re-creation is not noticeable because of the many possible changes that could happen in any part of the complex system and the corresponding distraction of our limited means of attention and perception. In other words: any change in any part of the world will cause synchronization changes in all other parts, because the world as a whole is a closed system. This last statement is in fact another and more precise depiction of the whole cosmic process of existentiating causality. This conception also provides a hypothetical explanation for certain ‘para-psychological’ phenomena.

7.7 Causality and induction

As Ibn ‘Arabî often pointed out in his analyses of our unconscious reliance on our ‘habitual’ forms of perception (*‘âda*), the main obstacle that prevents us from discovering the reality of creation is our deep trust in causality and induction. It is true that we live by causes and results, but indeed this is only a limited and superficial perspective with regard to the underlying realities. The fact of the matter is that what we refer to as ‘cause’ and ‘result’ – i.e. what Ibn ‘Arabî normally calls the *asbâb* (s. *sabab*), or intermediate or ‘apparent’ causes – are chronologically arranged, but ontologically unrelated. This is quite evident in terms of the re-creation principle discussed above, but Ibn ‘Arabî also clearly declares that ‘Allah creates things “next to” (*‘inda*) the causes and not “through” (*bi*) them’ [II.204.13, *Tadbîrât*: 312]. As we’ve already seen above and in section 2.6 that motion is only a new creation in a different place, so there is no deeper, inherent ontological relation between the two created states before and after motion.

Also – as a result of the readily observed systematic causes and effects – we normally rely upon induction in drawing most of our conclusions about causality. But in chapter 56 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn ‘Arabî argues that ‘in reality induction (*al-istiqrâ’*) does not give any (true divine) knowledge’ [I.285.3]. The reason why he concludes that is simply because nothing is ever truly repeated [I.285.28], as we have also shown above in discussing the re-creation principle. Induction ultimately means that we expect something to occur in a specific definitive way, based on previous observations of similar circumstances and regularities.

For these reasons, according to Ibn ‘Arabî, the basic observational and logical principles that the scientists and philosophers of his time relied upon in seeking the truth are indeed not firm, so that their practical success deceives us with

regard to their limitations and restricted spheres of application. For this reason Ibn 'Arabî's answer to Ibn Rushd (see section 5.1) was first 'yes', but then he immediately added again 'no', to highlight the limitations of the philosophers' methods, in comparison to his own reliance on divine inspiration and 'unveiling'.

Ibn 'Arabî, however, does not deny the phenomenological relevance of the apparent, intermediate 'causes' (*asbâb*): on the contrary he affirms that they are intentionally established by Allah, so they are unavoidable [II.653.11], and we must rely on such causes to reach our goals. So those observable secondary or apparent causes may not be removed:

And we already informed you that apparent-causes (*asbâb*) are divine veils, so that removing them is not possible except through them (i.e. by other secondary causes). So the very removing of causes is in fact fixing them; and the reality of abolishing them is (actually) affirming them.

[II.553.31; see also I.382.26, III.340.9, IV.275.23 and III.235.28]

So since they are veils, we have to look *through* them to see the Real, Who continually creates the causes and the results and arranges them in this specific 'habitual' dependency. As Ibn 'Arabî explains, Allah creates simply by the Command 'Be', and therefore He does not need the secondary causes; but He establishes these apparent causes for us to unveil them [II.413.35], though we would never be able to unveil the causes completely and permanently, especially since our own unenlightened mentality itself is the main veil [II.553.6].

In the short chapter 252 of the *Futûhât* Ibn 'Arabî analyses the known spiritual state of 'abolishment' (*al-mahw*), in which the spiritually realized person is freed from the unconscious limitations of habitual perception ('*âda*), so that the rule of apparent 'causality' is removed for him and he can directly perceive the universal reality of ever-renewed creation. There he says:

For the person in the state of 'abolishment' (of the 'habitual' perception of causality), relying on causes is removed, but *not* the causes. For Allah never deactivates the rule of (divine) wisdom with regard to the (created) things, and the apparent-causes are (like all other creations) divine 'veils' established.

The greatest of those veils may not be removed, which is your own individual self ('*ayn*: also, 'eye'). For your individual self is also the cause (still *sabab*) behind the existence of (the possibility of our) knowing and recognizing Allah – since knowing Allah may not come to exist except through your individual self!

So it is not possible for you (i.e. the veil of your ego-self) to be 'removed' with Allah's wanting to be known (by you). So He abolishes you from (witnessing) yourself, so you no longer stop with (witnessing) yourself, even though your individual self still exists, since the manifestation (of His transforming) influence is from Him. This is just as (in the famous incident at Badr alluded to in verse 8:17) He 'abolished' (the normal causal role of) the Messenger of Allah, may Allah have peace and mercy upon him, with

regard to his throwing, despite the (actual) existence of throwing by Him: so He said '*and you threw not*', so he abolished him; '*when you threw*', so He affirmed the apparent-cause; '*but Allah threw*' (8:17), and He only threw by the hand of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah have peace and mercy upon him.

[II.553.5]

The apparent-causes are indeed manifestations of the influences of His Names, which is why we see the effects following from those causes, but indeed the effect – like all of creation – is also only (ultimately) caused by Allah Himself. This means, as Ibn 'Arabî affirms, that the names of causes are in fact Names of God:

Then you have to know that the contingent things (creatures) are by essence in need (of being given existence), so that need always accompanies them because their essence (as contingent, 'needy' things) is forever. So He established for them the apparent-causes (*asbâb*) through the presence of which they receive what they need. So they are in need of the apparent-causes, therefore Allah made the individual-reality ('*ayn*') of those apparent-causes Names for Him. So the names of the causes are from (the influence of) His Names, may He be Exalted, so that (the contingent thing) should only need Him, because this is the correct knowledge (of the nature of things).

So there is no difference, for the people of unveiling, between the names that are said to be the Names of Allah according to (religious) custom and the revelation, and the names of the apparent-causes, so far as their (all) being Names of Allah, because He said: '*you all are in need of Allah*' (35:15). For we see in reality the need for the apparent-causes, so the names of the apparent-causes must be Names of Allah, the Exalted. So we call out in prayer to those names (of the apparent-causes) by (the needfulness of our actual) state, not through outward words (of prayer).

Thus when we are touched by hunger we rush to seek the food that may remove the pain of hunger. So we are in need of it, and it has no need of us – although we (in fact) are only in need of Allah. So that (food) is one of His Names: I mean the form of this food descends to take the place of the spoken or written word of the (corresponding) divine Name. That is why He ordered to be thankful to the apparent-causes (31:14), because He ordered us to be thankful to Him – that is, to thank Him through them.

[III.208.7]

But seeing through the apparent causes (to the One real Cause or Creator) is not easy, and ultimately the meditations and path of ascension of the spiritual seeker are all directed toward that. At the end of this path, the seeker will see only the Image of the Real (rather than his ego-self), and that is why 'whoever knows himself knows his Lord'.

However it is very important to notice that at the highest steps of this ascension, as the seeker advances, he gradually loses the awareness of his limited

physical composition, so that what remains at the end is the pure receptivity of 'hearing', just as 'hearing' (*samâ*, or *sam'*) was the first condition of all things created. Thus Ibn 'Arabî says:

He said: '*and Our word unto a thing, when We intend it, is only that We say unto it "Be!", and it is*' (16:40), but He deafened us from perceiving this word except by the way of faith, and He blinded us from seeing His intention (*tawajjuh*) on creating the things, by the apparent-causes that He established. thus He sends the rain down, and it falls; and He makes fertile the land, the seeds sprout; then He sends out the sunlight, so the plants rise, and (the seeds) harvested, ground up, kneaded, baked and chewed by the teeth; then they were swallowed, ripened in the stomach, taken by the liver and made into blood, sent into the vessels and distributed over the body until the (life-giving) vapour rises out of them, so the life of this body is for the sake of that breath (that we breathe).

So these are the primary apparent-causes (for life), along with (His) moving the celestial spheres and the motions of their planets, casting the rays on the places (illuminated by) the (celestial) lights – (all that) under the supervision of the Universal Soul, with Allah's permission, and the support of the (First) Intellect for (the Universal Soul). All these are veils, established as the fundamental (apparent-causes), in addition to the other, lesser apparent-causes. So the (human receptivity or) 'hearing' needs to break through all those veils until it hears the (creative divine) word 'Be!'. Therefore He created in the person of faith the power of faith, so that it flows into his hearing until he realizes the word 'Be', and it flows into his sight until he witnesses the One Who gives existence to the apparent-causes. And He has done all that through the 'Breath of the All-Merciful'.

[II.413.35]

So – despite their ultimately being ontologically unrelated – one cannot deny the effect of the apparent-causes. Therefore, we have to look at other prospects for redefining the principle of causality. We have seen before (section 3.5) that Ibn 'Arabî affirmed that after all the forms in the world have been created in the six Days from Sunday to Friday (which is space), nothing remained to be created on Saturday, that is the 'Day of eternity' or the instant of time that we live in at each now. What remains is only continual creative changing the states of things 'from (one) state to (another) state and from (one) station to (another) station' [I.61.14]. Therefore the system of the world, as a still picture created in the Week, is a 'closed system' in the meaning that all changes in it are necessarily internal changes.

Therefore, whatever change happens in one part of this world will require another change in other part(s), so that the total state does not change. This last statement seems to articulate a new, more adequate form of the causality principle, and indeed this is exactly one of the principles of Quantum Mechanics which has proved to be successful over the last century (see section 1.3). This is

in fact a very important conclusion and it could be the key to a new understanding of the reality of motion. This also might explain the types of what science tends to view as inexplicable ‘para psychological’ phenomena, such as the telekinetic effects and telepathy which are widely known as *karâmât* (acts of grace). The world in all its directions of space and time, past and future, here and there, is already encoded (via the divine Foreknowledge) in the Single Monad, so whoever has any access to that Source should be able to predict what is in or affects other parts of the world. If we want to study this issue further we have to look at the divine Attributes of Power and Will, and their image in the human being and the world, and relate them to time and space, as Ibn ‘Arabî discussed at the end of his short treatise *Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ*.

7.8 Superstrings and the science of letters

In the standard model of elementary particle physics, particles are considered to be points (or spheres) moving through the four dimensions of space-time. Extra abstract dimensions are needed to take into account the different properties such as mass, charge and spin.⁸ This standard model eventually led to obvious discrepancies between Einstein’s theory of General Relativity and the Quantum Field Theory that is essentially based on the wave properties of matter (see section 1.3, and also section 7.6).

Around 1985, the new String Theory suggested that all elementary particles can be represented by fundamental building blocks called ‘strings’ that can be closed, like loops, or open, like a hair. The different vibrational modes (or ‘notes’) of the string represent the different particle types, since different modes are seen as different masses or spins. One mode of vibration makes the string appear as an electron, another as a photon. But one of the most remarkable predictions of String Theory is that space-time has ten dimensions rather than four. However, six of these dimensions are curled up very tightly, which is why we may never be normally aware of their existence. Other subsequent extensions of the String Theory anticipate even higher dimensions.

There are deep and exciting similarities between the principles of the String Theory and Ibn ‘Arabî’s views. We have already mentioned in section 2.1 that he says that there are four ‘fundamental principles of existence’ that are – in addition to ‘another six derived from them’ – enough to describe the state of everything in the world [III.404.22]. But what is most exciting in this regard is Ibn ‘Arabî’s concept of the mysterious ‘science of letters’ (*‘ilm al-hurûf*) or what he calls the ‘world of Breaths’ (*‘âlam al-anfâs*).

We’ve already mentioned above (section 6.6) the complex symbolic cosmological analogies that Ibn ‘Arabî elaborates, beginning in the long second chapter of the *Futûhât*, between the cosmos, the Single Monad and the Greatest Element on the one hand, and the world of letters on the other hand. Ibn ‘Arabî adds that ‘the world of letters is a nation like other nations . . . and those who know that are only the people of unveiling in our path, . . . and they (the nation of letters) are grouped into groups like the normal world that we know’ [I.58.12].

These 'groups' refer to the groups of the spiritual hierarchy that we have mentioned above, which Ibn 'Arabî explained in detail in chapter 73 of the *Futûhât*.

Ibn 'Arabî also mentioned at the end of chapter 1 of the *Futûhât* that 'the first line that I read (from the hidden knowledge of the Spirit from whom he took everything that he wrote in the *Futûhât*), and the first secret of this line that I knew, is what I am going to mention in this second chapter' [I.51.30]. Then he wrote about 40 extremely dense pages on the cosmological dimensions and significance of the science of letters in chapter 2.⁹ In this chapter and other parts of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî mentioned many mysterious facts about the letters and their world and cosmological meaning. For example, Ibn 'Arabî explained there the relation between the characters of the word *azal*, as written in Arabic, and the meaning of time (*zamân*) by tracing the mysterious relation between the letters in both words, as he mentioned in his *Kitâb Al-Azal*.

This is in fact a very broad and complicated subject, and we cannot go into details here. What we do want to summarize is that Ibn 'Arabî considers the entire cosmos as the words of the Real spoken through the 'Breath of the All-Merciful' [I.366.1, II.403.21, 459.6; see also *Al-Masâ'il* 105], just like the meanings that we create through the words that we speak which are also composed of letters (or sounds) that are essentially the vibrations of our vocal strings under the influence of our breath. In chapter 2 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî gives details about the cosmological significance of each letter, how it is produced, what kind of vibrations it carries, and also the different orbs that contribute to produce it. Then in the long chapter 198 [II.390–478], which is titled 'On Knowing the Breath', Ibn 'Arabî mentioned remarkable facts about these cosmic meanings of the letters and sounds, and he explained the role of each divine Name of Allah in creating the different parts of the world and the different letters of the alphabet.

As one small illustration, we refer here to the letter (and sound) *alif* (ا), the first letter in the Arabic alphabet (and many other languages), which Ibn 'Arabî treats as symbolically identical to the Single Monad we have mentioned above (section 6.6) – not only because it is first but because it represents the closest thing to the pure creative, foundational divine 'Breath' itself. First Ibn 'Arabî asserts that '*alif* is not from (other) letters' [I.65.23], but he stresses that 'all letters (like the world) may be broken down into and built up from it, while it does not break down into them' [I.78.22], so this letter *alif* is present in every letter or word, just like the Single Monad that is also present in everything in the world. Indeed any sound that we produce starts by the sound of letter *alif* because it is simply the beginning of the blowing of the breath through the larynx.

So since the cosmos is the words of the Real and those words are composed of letters or sounds produced through the Breath of the All-Merciful, these letters are the strings that constitute everything in the cosmos, just as the meanings that we create when we speak are also composed of the letters of the alphabet. Even the written shape and curvature of the Arabic characters, for Ibn 'Arabî, have deep hidden meanings that relate to the cosmos in many mysterious ways: in that

sense, those shapes, just like the strings in the Strings Theory, are essentially either open like letter *alif* (ا), or closed like letters *mîm* (م) and *wâw* (و).

The science of letters and of their equivalent numbers (*‘ilm al-jifr*) was not Ibn ‘Arabî’s own invention, but was widely known in various ‘esoteric sciences’, for example those that deal with magic and talismans, where they replace each letter by its equivalent numbers and make certain calculations and tables that are said to have secret magical effects, or may tell hidden facts. In her famous book *Mystical Dimensions of Islâm*, Annemarie Schimmel devoted a separate appendix to the wider theme of letter symbolism in Sufi literature (Schimmel 1975: 411–425). In fact this kind of mythology dates back to the time of Pythagoras of Samos (582–504 BC), who visualized the world as perfect harmony, like musical notes, which depends on the system of numbers (which were written with the same letters of the alphabet in both Greek and later in Arabic).

As we said, these letters are arranged in a symbolic cosmological hierarchy parallel to the spiritual hierarchy of the saints that Ibn ‘Arabî explained in chapter 73 of the *Futûhât*. In fact it is noteworthy that Ibn ‘Arabî calls the members (*awliyâ*) of the spiritual hierarchy ‘the world of Breaths’ [II.6.21], or ‘the Men of the world of Breaths’ [II.11.9]. Also that is why sometimes Ibn ‘Arabî calls the single Days of each singular instant ‘the Days of Breaths’ [III.127.34], because in this Day the creative divine Breath is taken which is the string or the vibration that appears in existence. Hence in each single Day the string (or the Single Monad, or the ‘real-through-whom-creation-takes-place’) is vibrating to produce the letter (or sound) *alif*; and the world therefore is the words that are composed of these *alifs* that are produced in the succeeding Days. The Single Monad is the ultimate elementary String, but there are also other elementary strings: just as letter *alif* forms other letters (both in writing and speaking) the Single Monad also forms other monads that are the entities of everything in the world.

For Ibn ‘Arabî, this cosmological analogy applies both to speaking (sounds) and to writing (characters), because the ‘Higher Pen’ (that is the Single Monad) is creating the cosmos by *literally* writing the words of the Real in the ‘Higher Tablet’ of the Universal Soul. This process of writing produces the ‘Pen-sounds’ (*sarîf al-aqlâm*), which are the vibrations that are referred to in the hadith recounting the ascension of the Prophet Muhammad [III.61.9].

So we say that the First Intellect that is the first-created (or first-originated: *awwal mubda’*), and he is the Higher Pen. There was nothing else originated before (*muhdath*) him, but he was influenced by what Allah newly originated in him by raising up through him the ‘Protected Tablet’ (of the World-Soul), like the raising up of Eve from Adam in the world of material-bodies, so that this Tablet is going to be the substrate and place for what this divine Higher Pen writes (through the ‘words’ of creation). Now the delineation of the letters is designed to indicate what the Real made as signs pointing to Him.

So the Protected Tablet was the first existent raised up (from another: *mawjûd inbi’âthî*). And it is reported in the revelation (of the Prophet) that

‘the first of what Allah created was the Pen; then He created the Tablet and said unto the Pen: “write!”, so the Pen said: “what to write?” Then Allah said unto him: “you write and I shall dictate you”’ [Kanz: 15116]. So the Pen writes in the Tablet what Allah dictates to him, which is His Knowledge regarding His creation that He shall create till the resurrection Day.

[I.139.23]

Ibn ‘Arabî also divides the letters of the alphabet between four existents: the real (through whom creation takes place), the angels, the jinn and the Humans [I.53.1], which we may render into vibrations in 0-D, 1-D, 2-D and 3-D as we shall explain in the following section. This, he explains, is because hearing (*sam‘*) is based on four realities [II.367.24], and that is why in the science of music and notes there are four main notes: the *Bum* (the thick string), the *Zîr* (the highest string), *Muthannâ* (duo), and *Muthallath* (trio): each moves the soul in a special way, causing the emotions of happiness and sadness [II.367.26].

But as Ibn ‘Arabî explains in a chapter (182) entirely devoted to ‘hearing’ – i.e. metaphysical ‘receptivity’ in all its forms:

So ‘Hearing’, in this sense, is divided into three kinds: divine hearing, spiritual hearing and natural hearing. The divine hearing is that of the (divine) secrets (*asrâr*) and it is hearing from everything, in everything and through everything, because all of the world, for them (the true divine ‘knowers’), is the words of Allah, and ‘*His words are never exhausted*’ (18:109, 31:27). Therefore they have, corresponding to those (divine creative) words, ‘hearings’ that never end . . .

And the spiritual hearing is connected to the sounds (*sarîf*) of the divine pens on the Tablet of what exists, (which is) ‘Protected’ from changes and substitutions because the whole of existence is ‘*a spread parchment*’ (*riqq manshûr*, 52:3) and the world in relation to it is an ‘*inscribed book*’ (*kitâb mastûr*, 52:2): so the Pens speak out, and the ears of the minds hear, and the words are engraved (in manifest existence) so they are witnessed.

[II.367.7–9, 18–19]

So these words *are* the spiritual and material world that we live in, which is therefore the succession of the vibrations (letters) produced by the divine creative Breath through the Single Monad that is the Universal Intellect, and displayed in the Universal Tablet. This subject is indeed very diverse and important, and it is worth a separate study. Ibn ‘Arabî himself spent a good part of the *Futûhât* on this subject, as illustrated in the long chapters 2 [I.51–91] and 198 [II.390–478].

7.9 The properties of matter

In apparent disagreement with physics, and also with common sense, Ibn ‘Arabî paradoxically declares that most common properties of matter like weight,

density, transparency and softness are related to the perceiver and not to the objects themselves [II.458.14]. There are only two exceptions, the colour and the shape, where Ibn 'Arabî accepts that they can be related to something in the object itself, though they may also be dependent on the perceiver like other properties.

At a first glance this might be difficult to accept, especially since it clearly contradicts our daily experience. However, we have already seen in section 2.6 that Ibn 'Arabî's unique understanding of motion may be understood only on the basis of the oneness of being and the re-creation principle that we explained in section 5.6. Similarly, if we accept that objects and the whole world are continuously created and re-created by the Single Monad, then we have to revise our view about the structure of matter: for there actually exist (in this view) only the individual substances or monads and their forms, so that other properties are consequences and not intrinsic.

Regarding the structure of the cosmos, Ibn 'Arabî also mentions that the structure of the higher world (i.e. the planets, spheres and stars) 'is different from what the cosmologists say, although what they say is based on (observational) proof(s); and it would have been possible for Allah to have it arranged that way (as they say) – but He did not' [II.670.7].

This statement – which might allude to such prevalent current astronomical theories as the model of 'epicycles', or the assertion of a unique distinctive 'element' ('quintessence') constituting the higher spheres and planets – means that he regards the models of the Cosmos devised by scientists and philosophers as logically possible, but not true, solutions to the results given by astronomical observations.

7.10 Dimensions of the unseen world

One of the most obvious differences between science and theology is that the first speaks only about physical phenomena (including energy), while the latter assumes the existence of spiritual or non-material beings, such as the jinn and angels, and of various spiritual worlds, including those dimensions associated with the Hereafter. Therefore one of the possibilities in order to bridge that gap is to extrapolate modern laws of physics and cosmology to those unseen worlds. Some recent scientific attempts have been made in this regard, and most postulate that the reason why we do not normally see those supra-natural worlds is that they have higher dimensions (e.g. nine or ten dimensions).¹⁰ However, there are indications that Ibn 'Arabî sometimes suggests that angels and jinn are 'physical' or 'natural' creatures less advanced than humans. In that case, angels and jinn have lower dimensions – one-dimensional (1-D) and two-dimensional (2-D) respectively – while we humans, are three-dimensional (3-D) creatures, who in the Hereafter (or perhaps even before) may be developed into four dimensions. Here we are speaking about *spatial* dimensions alone.

Since we are now ordinarily 3-D creatures, we can not in general see jinn and angels because our ordinary sensory tools are used to detect only 3-D phenom-

ena. In contrary to that, jinn and angels can see us – not because their senses are capable of perceiving 3-D phenomena but because they rather perceive and interact with our souls and intellects which are of their own nature (of 2-D and 1-D respectively). Likewise jinn and humans can not in general see the angels. However, it is possible for humans to cross over to the jinn and angel worlds by transforming into 2-D and 1-D [I.168.20] and this is what happens to the seeker at the beginning of his or her path and in the spiritual ascension, which is why advanced human beings are able to speak and interact with spirits easily [III.332.11], until they ultimately witnesses the Real Himself. But in order to reach this final stage, the spiritual seeker must be ‘annihilated’ into 0-D, because the Real can only be witnessed by His secret (‘the real through whom creation takes place’) which He has implemented in everything [I.168.22, see also III.540.33].

Dimensions play a very important role in modern cosmology and mathematics. There are real dimensions and abstract dimensions. In principle, we can – mathematically – assign a dimension to any parameter of a specific function. For example the weather at any point on the Earth is a function of many parameters such as time, place, the nuclear reactions on the Sun, the amount of cloud in the area, the direction of winds etc. Each one of these parameters can be considered as an abstract dimension for the sake of simplifying the mathematical study of the dependency of weather on these parameters or dimensions. Real dimensions, on the other hand, are only those three dimensions of space (i.e. length, width, depth; or x , y , z), and no more. Although time is considered as a real dimension in Relativity, it is not a spatial dimension and so we shall not consider it as real in this regard (see also section 2.5).

So here we shall speak only about the three real dimensions of space. In fact those three dimensions make six (as Ibn ‘Arabî often points out), if we take into account that each dimension has two directions. Those six dimensions or directions are: (up, down), (right, left), (front, back); or $(-x, +x)$, $(-y, +y)$, $(-z, +z)$.

I have to mention, however, that Ibn ‘Arabî never arranged the creations in terms of dimensions as we are suggesting in this section; but this possibility is quite evident from his various texts, and many of his ideas can be easily understood on this basis, as we shall see shortly.

With regard to dimensions, existence can be divided into five categories, as we shall explain in the remainder of this chapter:

7.10.1 The real

He is the Being of ‘zero dimension’ (0-D): i.e. of no dimensions, which means He is independent of space and time. That is why Ibn ‘Arabî sometimes symbolically indicates God as a dot or a point [III.275], for example as the centre of the circle of creation as we have seen in the cosmogonic diagram in Figure 7.1; also, the dot that is used in many characters of the Arabic alphabet, especially the letters *bâ’* (ب) and *nûn* (ن). However, ‘the Real’ here may refer to Allah Himself or also to the Greatest Element who is the Image of Real, or the ‘real through




Figure 7.1 0-D, a point. It actually has no length, width or breadth. This is what is called a geometrical point.

whom creation takes place' (*al-haqq al-makhlûq bihi*), and he is the true 'Image of God', as we have discussed in the two preceding chapters. So when we speak about the Real with regard to the creation and spatial dimensions, we usually mean the Greatest Element rather than Allah, since Allah Himself, His Essence, is beyond all descriptions including dimensions.

As we have seen in an earlier diagram in Figure 5.1, Ibn 'Arabî symbolically represents the world as a 'circle' whose centre is always the Real or real. The abstract point in the centre is one unit: i.e. it can not be divided or fragmented, nor can it be even described because it has no dimensions. However, this point faces the infinite multiplicity of the points in the circumference of the circle. Moreover, each point of the circle is similar to or an image of the central point. This is identical to the meaning of the hadith that Allah created the Human Being (and the world, according to Ibn 'Arabî) 'on His own Image' (see section 3.1). Also each point in the circumference can be a centre to a new circle [III.275], just as everyone or everything has his or her own world, in his or her imagination. Also, any point of the circumference can be considered the beginning of it and also the end [I.259.24], so '*He is the First and the Last and Hidden (centre point) and Manifest (circumference)*'. And each line that goes out of the central point reaches a point on the circumference. This means that everything originated from the Real (in the centre) and it returns to Him (on the circumference) [II.538.26], which can be understood as the cosmogonic meaning of the verse: '*to Him you return*' (2:28) and to '*Him everything returns*' (11:123). Finally, because all the points are in essence a manifestation of the Real, therefore 'the worm and the First Intellect are equal with respect to the essence, but the difference appeared in the form' [III.452.33]. Similarly, as Ibn 'Arabî points out:

Since the lines (the radii) that go out from the Point in the centre of the circle to the circumference that comes to exist through that Point are *equal* to all parts of the circumference, so likewise the (creative, existentiating) relation of the Real, the Exalted, to the totality of all existents is the same: there is no change in that relation at all. So all things are looking to Him and accepting from Him that (existence) which He bestows on them, just as the parts of the circumference are facing the Point (in the centre).

[I.125.23]

Moreover, any object is composed of a number of points which are similar but have different attributes; the object is the sum of those points. But we can not say that the object is (nothing but) the (particular) point, nor we can say that it is not the point. Similarly, the world is the sum of the manifestations of all the divine Names of Allah, the Real, but we can not say that the world is the Real, nor can we say that the world is not Him [III.275.32].

For Ibn ‘Arabî, the Real is creating the world by continuously and endlessly manifesting Himself in different forms and forming the cosmos point by point (in series as we explained above), including the perceived, perception and the perceiver [II.484.22]. Therefore at any single instant of time (the ‘now’, or the real existence, *hâl*) there exists only Him. This is not like saying that the things are Allah, ‘because He is He, and the things are the things’ [II.484.28], but they are the manifestations of the Names of Allah. In this sense, as we have just seen, ‘every name in the world is His Name, not a name of other than Him; for it is the Name of the Manifest in the locus of manifestation’ [II.122.14].

The identity or essence of each one of us (i.e. the individual soul) is a point in the circle of Creation, and so is the identity of everything in the world. So we can here clearly see the meaning of the verse: ‘*We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and within themselves until it becomes clear to them that it/He is the Real*’ (41:53),¹¹ which can be then considered the most obvious Qur’anic basis of Ibn ‘Arabî’s understanding of the ‘oneness of being’. Also, since each point of the circle is similar to the central point, ‘whoever knows himself knows his Lord’ [I.328.31, II.298.30].

7.10.2 Angels

The angels are beings of one dimension (1-D) and they are made of light (*Inshâ’ al-Dawâ’ir*: 27). Angels are the first creatures: the Pen himself is an angel, and he is the first creature and everything else is ‘written’ by him in the Soul (the Protected Tablet), which is two-dimensional as we shall see further below: so their relationship is just like a normal pen and writing-board, in that they are one- and two-dimensional respectively. Angels occur by the repeated manifestations of the Real (at least two subsequent manifestations); just as the line is composed of at least two points [III.276.3]. Ibn ‘Arabî says:

The reality of the angel does not accept deviation, because he is the origin of the straight line connecting the two nines (of the divine Source and its human receptacles).¹² For bending (from that straight connection) is deviation, and he (the angel) does not have any bending, but he goes back and forth between the straight (creative) motion and the reverse motion (returning from the creature to God). So he is precisely the subtle thread (*raqîqa*: connecting the Source and the creatures) itself.

[I.54.21]

On the other hand, there is strong evidence in Ibn ‘Arabî’s texts that some angels indeed function as, among other things, forces of Nature: ‘They are called angels

(*malâ'ika*) because they are links, conductors that link the godly rules and divine effects by material worlds because "*al-malak*" (the angel) in (Arabic) language means the "force" and the "intensity" (*Inshâ' al-Dawâ'ir*: 27).

And he also says: 'There is no place in heaven or Earth but that there is an angel in it. And the Real continues to create angels from the (creative divine) Breaths of the worlds, as long as they are still breathing' [I.123.2].

It is also known in physics that there are four fundamental forces in nature, which are: the force of gravity, the electromagnetic force, the weak nuclear force, and the strong nuclear force. Nature is built upon these four forces. Those four forces can be conceived as manifestations of the four prime Archangels – *Mâlik*, *Jibrâ'il* (Gabriel), *Mikhâ'il* (Michael) and *Isrâfîl* (Seraphiel) – because Ibn 'Arabî affirms that those four angels are the ones who bear the Throne (*al-'arsh*). Although it is mentioned in Qur'an that '*eight shall, in that Day (of resurrection), bear above them the Throne of thy Lord*' (69:17), he asserts that when this verse was recited before Muhammad, he said 'and they are today (in this world) four' [I.148.2, III.184.28, and also '*Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*: 43–44], 'and tomorrow (in the Hereafter) they are going to be eight' [I.149.29]. Ibn 'Arabî also explains that *al-'arsh* (usually translated as 'the throne') in the Arabic tongue refers to 'the Kingdom' in addition to 'the Throne' [I.147.33], so, if this verse refers to the divine Kingdom, then its bearers or holders are those who are in charge of its affairs, and these are like the four supports (*awtâd*) who hold up the house. For this reason we find that Ibn 'Arabî also affirms that the four *awtâd* (spiritual Pillars) by whom Allah sustains the Earth get their power from the spirituality of these four angels [I.160.25, II.7.1], though he mentions here '*Azrâ'il* (the angel of death) instead of *Mâlik* (the master of Gehenna). In the Hereafter, he explains elsewhere, the three prophets Adam, Muhammad and Ibrahim (Abraham) in addition to angel *Ridwân* (the Warehouse of Paradise) shall also contribute, so those eight will be the holders or bearers of the Throne or Kingdom in the Hereafter [I.148.11]. We shall see further below that this helps explain why the Hereafter could be considered as four-dimensional (4-D).

Here Ibn 'Arabî also shows that the Throne *is* the Kingdom, and that it is confined in four things: body, spirit, food and state. So those eight sustainers of the Throne are assigned the various duties as follows: 'Adam and Seraphiel for forms (for bodies), Gabriel and Muhammad for spirits, Michael and Abraham for subsistence, and *Mâlik* and *Ridwân* are for threat and promise (i.e. the states in Gehenna or Paradise)' [I.148.3].

Therefore, if we want to compare those four angels who hold up the divine Kingdom and the four elementary forces which operate in Nature, we can clearly see, for example, a correspondence between gravity and Seraphiel, since both operate upon the forms, the bodies. We can also see clear relations between the electromagnetic force and Michael, because both are responsible for subsistence and food, when we remember that all the food that we eat is in the end produced by light and heat which are electromagnetic waves (forces) emitted by the Sun. It is, however, not easy to establish the relation between Gabriel and *Mâlik* on the one hand and the weak and strong nuclear forces on the other hand, but we

can mention that Gehenna is said in the Qur'an to be '*fuelled by stones*' (2:24, 66:6), and this could mean the nuclear energy that is available inside the atoms for which those two nuclear forces are responsible.

On the other hand there are so many types of angels who also have different states or levels (37:164) and different structures. Some of those various types are mentioned in the Qur'an (37:1-3, 51:1-4, 77:1-5, 79:1-5 etc.), and Ibn 'Arabî talks about them in some detail very often in his writings [III.445.35-446.6, and also *Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir*: 27]. And it is quite clear by studying these types that they are assigned specific duties, just like the different forces in Nature (including the elementary and other forces).

Therefore, our suggestion that angels are beings of 1-D appears justified because such natural forces always operate in one dimension (they are also represented as vectors ' $\rightarrow$ ' in physics and mathematics), though their effects might appear in two or three dimensions as well.

Notice also that, just as the real (the Greatest Element) is 0-D and can be represented by a dot, the Single Monad is 1-D and can be represented by a line. In letters, the letter *alif* is made by the flow (*sayalân*) of the dot. So also the Single Monad is made by the flow (the repeated creative manifestation) of the Greatest Element (see Figure 7.2).

7.10.3 The jinn

The jinn are beings of two dimensions (2-D) or four directions, and according to traditional sources they are made of fire. Ibn 'Arabî affirms that

The fire jinn got the four (of letters) because of the facts they are based on that caused them to say as the Real, the Exalted, told: '*then I will approach them from between their hands, from behind them, from their right side and from their left side*' (7:17), and then their facts are over, they have no further fifth fact to seek through it further level, and you should be aware not to think that this is possible for them that to have the height (up) and its counterpart (down) by which the six directions are complete, because the (their) reality does not permit that as we affirmed in the book *Al-Mabâdî wal-Ghâyât*.

[I.53.8]

It is evident, therefore, that jinn can move only in four directions: the plane or the surface. They have no sense of height, so their space is a sub-space of ours,




Figure 7.2 1-D, a line segment. It has a length, and it is created by moving a point.




Figure 7.3 2-D, a unit square. It has length and width, and it is created by moving the line segment in a direction perpendicular to the line on which the segment lies.

and that is why we do not see them, they are too thin and tenuous, just like the surface of a heat wave or flame. It is also noteworthy in this regard here that Allah said in the Qur'an that the angels say: '*to Him (to Allah) belongs what is between our hands and what is behind us and what is between that*' (19:64); so He did not mention the sides as in the case of jinn. This therefore supports what we said above about the angels being only 1-D.

In fact, just as the structure of angels is like our spirits, the jinn's structure is similar to the structure of our souls, as Ibn 'Arabî affirms: 'the inner (*bâtin*) of the human being is in fact jinn' [I.85.6], and also it is possible that the inner of jinn is angels and the inner of angels is the real, which is again another form to express the oneness of being.

7.10.4 *Humans*

Humans of course are beings of three dimensions (3-D) and they are made of earth or clay. As we said above, humans can decompose into 2-D and 1-D so that they may interact with jinn and angels, and they may also decompose into 0-D so that they may witness the Real, but they may not of course become like the Real as God though they may become like the 'real through whom creation takes place' who is the perfect Image of God, or the Perfect Human Being. And as we've said that this is the aim of the Sufi; to decompose into 0-D, which means to purify one's self and get rid of all the earthly (3-D) attachments.




Figure 7.4 3-D, a unit cube. It has length, width and depth. It is created by moving the square in a direction perpendicular to the plane. Notice that seven motions are needed to make up the cube.

7.10.5 The hereafter

We can not talk too much about the Hereafter, because it has been mentioned that it is different from what we may imagine [*Kanz*: 39236, 39241], but as we have mentioned above that the holders of the Throne or Kingdom are now four and in the Hereafter they shall be eight. So it is possible that the Hereafter will be four dimensional (4-D) because doubling the number of forces requires new dimensions for the new forces to operate.

Moreover, we notice that our major senses relate to dimensions in the following manner. Hearing requires only 1-D, because the propagation of sound waves is received by the ear one bit at a time. Seeing, on the other hand, requires 2-D because at any instance we may perceive a picture that occupies a surface. To conceive 3-D, however, we need imagination because the 3-D space that we conceive is built up as a result of the integration of 2-D pictures that we perceive through the flow of time. We perceive 1-D only by hearing, and 2-D by seeing, and we conceive 3-D, by imagination. So our thoughts, or imaginations, that we have in our memory are indeed mostly 2-D pictures (but also 1-D sounds) but by integrating them over time we conceive the volume. Thus, it is possible, and plausible, that in the Hereafter we shall gain new faculty, more advanced than imagination, that allow us to conceive of 4-D. In this case our thoughts will be 3-D as confirmed by Ibn ‘Arabî and many hadith that describe the Paradise. For example Ibn ‘Arabî confirms that people in Paradise shall have the power of creating through the command ‘be’, just as Allah does in this world [*Al-Masâ’il*: 126, I.84.21, II.157.26, II.440.35, II.441.26, III.295.17], and he also affirms that this is also attainable (by some people) in this world [*Al-Masâ’il*: 126, III.295.14]. This is also called *al-fi’l bil-himma* (doing by intention or determination) [I.259.33].

On the other hand, and since we have seen that the Real is 0-D and that the angels are the first repeated manifestation of the Real and so on, the jinn are manifestations of the second order (in 2-D). Thus humans are more advanced and complex than jinn because they are created by the manifestations of the Real in the third order. Likewise, it is expected that the Hereafter will be the fourth-order manifestation.

The Creation is done through the Pen who is writing the words of the All-Merciful. This Pen started by writing the dot (absolute Spirits, including the real; 0-D) and then the angels by making a line (1-D), and he continued until a certain term where he started another line, thus making a plane (2-D) and that is the creation of jinn. After that and at the certain term also, he started making new planes, thus forming the volume (3-D) that we are in now. And eventually the Pen will start, at a certain term (*ajal*), a new dimension to open the life in the Hereafter (4-D). This ‘term’ is either the time of our death (*al-ajal*) or possibly the time of spiritual realization (*al-fateh*) which is also a kind of voluntary death [IV.354.19] (Chittick 2002: 105–107). We have already seen in section 2.11 that Ibn ‘Arabî specified the starting times between those different terms (see Figure 2.1).

It is also possible in Paradise that the Creation will continue, endlessly, into higher dimensions (n -D, where n is any integer number), more than four. Maybe that is what it means when Ibn 'Arabî says: 'seeking (*al-sulûk*; into Allah) is always requested in this life and also in the Hereafter. For if there was a destiny, it would have been possible to achieve (but there is no destiny)' [*Al-Masâ'il*: 203]. It is probably here where abstract mathematics – which can deal with any number of dimensions and different types of topological spaces – has anticipated this hypothetical structure of the world, whereas physicists up till now can not conceive of more than three dimensions.

Finally, we must add that conceiving the world in this way according to the dimensions will greatly help in any possible future computer simulations to test the Single Monad model, because in this way we should be able to see whether the current structure of stars and galaxies could have happened starting from the initial conditions and rules that we described above and in Chapter 4 when we discussed the actual flow of time.

Notes

1 Cosmology and time

- 1 The geocentric view considers the Earth to be in the centre of the universe, while the heliocentric view considers the Sun to be in the centre. Modern cosmology, however, asserts that the universe, being a closed space-time arena, does not have a centre; any point may be considered a centre, just as any point on the surface of the Earth may be considered a centre (with regard to the surface, not to the volume). So whether the Earth or the Sun is in the centre of the universe is a valid question only with regard to the solar system which was the known universe in early cosmology, but it is no longer valid after discovering the galaxies and the huge distances between stars outside the solar system. It is worth mentioning here that Ibn 'Arabî clearly asserted that the universe does not have a centre [II.677.19].
- 2 For more information about this subject see: Bieńkowski (1972).
- 3 The redshift is the displacement (towards the red side) of the spectral lines of the light emitted by stars when it is received on the Earth, and this is due to the high speed of the motion of stars away from us. The amount of the shift towards the red is directly proportional to the distance of the star away from us, and this is how distances to far away stars and galaxies are calculated with a high degree of accuracy.
- 4 For more information about the principles of Quantum Cosmology see Linde (1990), chapter 3.
- 5 For more information about Ibn 'Arabî's life and intellectual background see Addas (1993) and Hirtenstein (1999).
- 6 For a full list of books and manuscripts attributed to Ibn 'Arabî see: Yahya (1964). In this book Othman Yahya mentions over nine hundred books (with about 1,395 titles) attributed to Ibn 'Arabî. Most of them however, as Yahya shows, are not really by him, and also many of his genuine books are lost or not available. For a list of Ibn 'Arabî's printed works see appendix 1 in Hirtenstein (1999). See also the list of his Arabic and translated works in the Bibliography.
- 7 In this hadith Allah says: 'I was a hidden Treasure, so I loved to be known; so I created the creatures/creation so that I might be known.' This famous hadith qudsî ('divine saying') is not found in standard hadith collections, but is widely quoted by Sufis and especially Ibn 'Arabî [II.112.20, II.232.11, II.310.20, II.322.29, II.330.21, II.339.30, III.267.10, IV.428.7]. Some scholars of hadith therefore consider it a fabrication, but, as William Chittick pointed out, Ibn 'Arabî believes that this hadith 'is sound on the basis of unveiling, but not established by way of transmission (*naql*)' [II.399.28]. See also *SPK*: 391: 250–252, and *SDG*: 21, 22, 70, 211, 329.
- 8 In this hadith the Prophet Muhammad was asked: 'Where was our Lord before He created the creatures?' He answered: 'He was in a Cloud (*'amâ'*)' [*Kanz*: 1185, 29851]. See also *SPK*: 125, and *SDG*: 118, 153, 360. Ibn 'Arabî discusses this hadith

- very often in the *Futūhāt*: [I.148.17, I.215.33, II.62.36, II.150.21, II.310.3, II.391.28, III.304.5, III.506.5].
- 9 See: 'The Language of the angels', by Pierre Lory, from 'The Breath of the All-Merciful' symposium held at Berkeley, 1998 (available as audio tape from the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabī Society, Oxford).
 - 10 Nature here actually means 'the level of Nature' (*martabat al-tabī'a*) (i.e. the four foundational elements) and not nature in the physical sense, which is the material world. Ibn 'Arabī explains that the level of Nature does not have a separate physical existence: 'So (God) the Exalted estimated the level of nature that if it has (real) existence it would be below the Soul, so even though it does not really exist, it is witnessed by the Real there. That is why He distinguished it and determined its level. It is with regard to natural beings just like in regard to the divine Names: they can be known and imagined, and their effects can appear and cannot be ignored, while in general they do not have any (separate) essence. Likewise, (the level of) Nature gives what is in its potential of sensible forms that are assigned to it and that have real existence, while it does not have real separate existence. So how strange is its state and how high its effect!' [II.430.8].
 - 11 From the Qur'anic verse 'the All-Merciful mounted (established His authority) on the Throne' (20:5) and other similar verses such as 'He created the Heavens and the Earth in six days and then He mounted on the Throne' (7:54, and the same meaning in other verses: 2:29, 10:3, 25:59, 32:4, 57:4). We shall see in Chapter 3 that, according to Ibn 'Arabī, the six directions of space were created by the process of God's 'mounting' (*istiwā'*) on the Throne in six days from Sunday to Friday.
 - 12 Abū Hāmid Muhammad B. Muhammad al-Tūsī Al-Ghazālī (AH 450–505/AD 1058–1111) outstanding Muslim theologian, jurist, thinker, mystic and religious reformer who later pursued and systematically defended the path of Sufism. See also *EP*, 'Al-Ghazālī', II: 1038.
 - 13 Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut Al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers)* (1927), ed. M. Bouyges with a summary in Latin, Beirut: n.p.. This is a controversial work of the theological refutation where al-Ghazālī enumerated twenty maxims of the philosophers that he found that they could not incontrovertibly demonstrate, as they had claimed.
 - 14 Abū al-Walīd Ibn Rushd (AH 520–595/AD 1126–1198) was the chief judge of Seville and a great philosopher known in the West as Averroes. There was no one higher than him in the matter of legal ruling (*fatwa*) for crucial issues. He was a top figure in the history of both Islamic and Western philosophy and theology. He defended philosophy against the Ash'arite theologians (*Mutakallimūn*) led by al-Ghazālī, against whom he wrote his *Tahāfut Al-Tahāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, translated from the Arabic with introduction and notes by Simon van den Bergh (Gibb Memorial Trust, 1978). See also *EP*, 'Ibn Rushd', III: 909.
 - 15 Muslim theology is the theology that is derived from the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions. Kalam (lit.: speaking) is the Islamic tradition of seeking theological principles through dialectic. The original scholars of kalam were recruited by the House of Wisdom under the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad in the ninth century AD, but soon many opposing kalam schools emerged such as Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites.
 - 16 Abū 'Alī al-Husayn ibn Abdullāh Ibn Sīnā (AH 369–428/AD 980–1037), known in the West as Avicenna, was an important Muslim physician, scientist, mathematician and philosopher. See also *EP*, 'Ibn Sīnā', III: 941.
 - 17 Ibn Sīnā (1983): 68. See also 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Abdul-Muta'al (2003): 131.
 - 18 Ibn Sīnā (1983): 72. See also Al-'Atī (1993): 110.
 - 19 Ibn Sīnā (1983): 74.
 - 20 Ibn Sīnā (1938) *Al-Najāt*, ed. Muhyī al-Dīn S. al-Kurdī, 2nd ed., Cairo: n.p.: 117.
 - 21 Named after its founding figure Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī, this Sunni theological school had its origin in the reaction against what they viewed as the excessive ration-

- alism of the Mu'tazila (a movement founded by Wâsil Ibn 'Atâ' in the second century AH/eighth century AD. The Ash'arites insisted that reason must be subordinate to the literal data of revelation. They accepted some of the cosmology of the Mu'tazilites, but put forward a nuanced rejection of their theological principles. See also *EP*, 'Al-Ash'arî, Abu 'L-Hasan', I: 694; 'Ash'ariyya', I: 696; 'Mu'tazila', VII: 783.
- 22 Abû Yûsuf Ya'qûb Ibn Ishâq al-Kindî (AH 185–256/AD 805–873) is considered the historical 'father' of Islamic philosophy. He was also a scientist of high calibre, a gifted mathematician, astronomer, physician and a geographer, as well as a talented musician. See also *EP*, 'Al-Kindî', V: 122.
- 23 Al-Kindî (1950): 117.
- 24 Mohammed Ibn Zakariyya al-Râzî (AH 251–313/AD 865–925). See also *EP*, 'Al-Râzî', VIII: 474.
- 25 Abû Nasr al-Fârâbî (AH 259–339/AD 870–950) was one of the foremost Islamic philosophers and logicians. See also *EP*, 'Al-Fârâbî', II: 778.
- 26 Euclidean geometry is based on the ideas of Euclid (c. 300 BC), who stated in his book *The Elements* five postulates on which he based all his theorems. According to these postulates, space is homogeneous like that which we feel on the Earth. In modern cosmology and with the high intensity gravity found near giant stars and galaxies, space can no longer be treated as homogeneous, and therefore a new branch of geometry (non-Euclidean geometry) has been introduced to take into account the curvature of space-time. For information about Euclidean geometry, see Patrick (1986).
- 27 This is because of the 'uncertainty (Heisenberg) principle' which states that not all of the physical parameters (e.g. position $[x]$ and momentum $[p]$) of a system can be fully determined at the same time. It is mathematically expressed as: $\Delta x \cdot \Delta p > h$ where h is Planck's constant, which is in the order of 6×10^{-34} erg-seconds.
- 28 Before the advent of Quantum Mechanics there was a long debate about the nature of light, whether it is particles or waves. Some experiments (and theories) confirmed that it is particles, while others confirmed that it is waves. Quantum Mechanics solved this contradiction by suggesting that particles have wave properties and waves have particle properties. See Baierlein (1992).

2 General aspects of Ibn 'Arabî's concept of time and days

- 1 See note 10 in chapter I.
- 2 In the language of kalam theology, a 'negative attribute' (*sifa salbiyya*) is an attribute that is not a real description, but simply a negation of a purported description. See also *The Book of Eternity (Kitâb Al-Azal)* for Ibn 'Arabî.
- 3 For more details about the 'line-point' and 'time-now' analogy, see Hasnaoui (1977): 50. See also Ibn 'Arabî's treatise of 'Risâla fî Asrâr al-Dhât al-Ilâhiyya' in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Intishâr al-Arabî, 2002–04), ed. Sa'id 'Abd al-Fattah, Vol. I: 193–206 [201].
- 4 There are two closely related words in Arabic commonly used for the everyday senses of 'time': *zamân* and *zaman*. They are basically used in the same contexts, and usually Arabic dictionaries (such as *Lisân al-'Arab* (Beirut: Dâr Sâdir, n.d.), XIII: 200) do not distinguish between them. Ibn 'Arabî also seems to use these two words interchangeably in many places, although we can detect a unique pattern of use in the *Futûhât*: in many places he uses *zamân* for the *general* meaning of time that has a span or duration, while he uses *zaman* to mean the *current time* or a *specific* time that is usually short and defined, such as in the technical expression 'the single time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) [I.318.22, II.82.22, IV.267], which is explained later in this chapter.
- 5 *Al-jawhar* literally means 'the jewel' but technically it means 'the essence'. Ibn 'Arabî took this technical usage from kalam theology. We will translate it as 'the monad', which is the indivisible substance that is thought to constitute matter. We will devote a full section to the monad in section 6.2.

- 6 *Al-‘arad* – in this technical sense drawn from the usage of the kalam theologians – is the actual appearance or the form of *al-jawhar*, or the form each monad wears in order to appear in existence. The atomists, especially the Ash‘arite theologians, asserted that the world is composed of substances and accidents (*jawāhir* and *‘arād*) and that substances remain while accidents always change. Ibn ‘Arabī, however, employs the term more strictly than the Ash‘arites, since he says that everything that we see *always* and constantly changes, though it may change into ‘similar’ or ‘likenesses’ (s. *mithl*), which is why we think that certain things are not changing [III.452.24]. He also asserts that this monad (*al-jawhar*) is not visible by itself, but only appears wearing this form or the other. See also *SPK*: 97.
- 7 There are two different words in Arabic habitually used for the meaning of space: *al-makān* and *al-hayyiz*. *Al-hayyiz* is more accurately used to refer to the abstraction of three-dimensional space, while *al-makān* in fact refers to ‘the place’ rather than space. Ibn ‘Arabī himself sometimes uses both of these two words to mean space, but in one passage he clearly defines them: ‘*al-makān* is what the objects rest on, and not *in*, it; for if they were in it, these would be *al-ahyāz* (s. *hayyiz*, space), not *al-makān* (place)’ [II.458.3].
- 8 *Al-Afrād min al-rijāl*: al-afrād (‘the Solitary Ones’) are a group of the highest spiritual Sages who are outside the circle of the spiritual Pole (*al-Qutb*); *al-Khadr* (lit. ‘the green man’) is one of them [II.19.9]; and ‘they are not governed by the circle of the Pole and he has no rule over them, but rather they are as complete as himself’ [III.137.12]. In Ibn ‘Arabī’s technical usage, *al-rijāl* (‘the True Men’) refers not at all to a gender but to the fully accomplished spiritual sages or ‘true Knowers’ (‘*urafā*’). See also *Al-Mu‘jam Al-Sūfi*: 515–521.
- 9 See chapter 371 of the *Futūhāt* [III.416] for a detailed account of the creation scenario of both the physical and intelligible worlds as seen by Ibn ‘Arabī. Also in chapter 7 of the *Futūhāt* [I.121] Ibn ‘Arabī gives many details about the different stages of creating the natural or physical world in time; however the numbers that he gives there fall far short of the modern well-established scientific results.
- 10 Ibn ‘Arabī explains this in detail at the beginning of the *Futūhāt*, as he was discussing the ‘special people of Allah’. He discusses this doctrine there under many issues (*masā’il*) in which he summarizes the relations between the Real, the world and non-existence. See his introduction in the *Futūhāt* [I.41–47]. Ibn ‘Arabī also wrote these issues and much more in *Kitāb Al-Masā’il* which is also known as ‘*Aqīdat ahl al-ikhtisās*, ‘the doctrine of the special people (of Allah)’, see the Bibliography.
- 11 When Ibn ‘Arabī uses this term ‘in charge of moving’ to describe the active force here, he has in mind his famous concept that the world (where bodies and objects move) is like a super-human (*insān kabīr*) [III.11.19], where all physical motions are due to this active force of the Universal Soul, and all noetic changes are due to its intellectual force.
- 12 On the basis of the hadith ‘the Pedestal (*al-kursī*) is the place of the two feet’ [*Kanz*: 1683], Ibn ‘Arabī asserts that the ‘foot’ in question is the divine ‘constancy’ (*thubūt*) and the ‘two feet’ that are ascribed to the All-Merciful, the most Glorious, refer to ‘the foot of compulsion’ (*qadam al-jabr*) and ‘the foot of choice’ (*qadam al-ikhtiyār*) [III.432.23]. Ibn ‘Arabī showed that Allah’s, the All-Merciful’s, Word (in the Throne) is One (all mercy), but by the swinging (*tadallī*) of these two feet of compulsion and choice on the Pedestal, the Word divided into two, [II.438.27], and this distinction between compulsion and choice caused the emergence of the world of command (‘*ālam al-amr*’) and the world of creation (‘*ālam al-khalq*’), of the (divine) ban and the order, obedience and the disobedience, and the Garden and the Fire (Gehenna), but all this is from the same single divine root of Mercy that is the attribute of the All-Merciful Who ‘mounted on the Throne’ (*al-rahmān ‘alā al-‘arsh istawā*, 20:5) [IV 274.25]. Then Ibn ‘Arabī also relates this same distinction to the symbolism of the daytime and night, where he says that, because the Word above the Pedestal is one, it

is all daytime (light) there, but below the Pedestal it is daytime and night [III.202.31]. See also section 2.13.

- 13 For more detail about this subject, see Minkowski (1923) and Hinton and Rucker (1980).
- 14 See Muhyî ad-Dîn al-Tu'aymî (ed.) (1994) *Mawsû'at Al-Isrâ' wa'l-Mi'râj*, Beirut: Dâr al-Hilâl. This book contains six important treatises written by prominent early and classical Muslim scholars, such as Ibn 'Abbâs, al-Qushayrî and al-Suyûti, about the occasion of the Prophet's *Isrâ'* and *Mi'râj*.
- 15 For a full translation and study of related passages see 'Ibn 'Arabî's Spiritual Ascension' in Chittick (2002): 201–230.
- 16 This book has been published many times but the most notable critical edition is published by Su'âd al-Hakîm in 1988 (Beirut: Dandarah).
- 17 Abû Ishâq al-Nu'mânî al-Shâfi'î, *Al-Sirâj Al-Wahhâj fi Haqâ'iq Al-Isrâ' wa'l-Mi'râj*, in *Mawsû'at Al-Isrâ' wa'l-Mi'râj* (note 14 above): 53–114 (p. 58).
- 18 See the short chapters 244 and 245 of the *Futûhât* [II.543–544], where Ibn 'Arabî explains these notions of spiritual 'absence' (*ghayba*) and 'presence' (*hudûr*).
- 19 *Nath* (or *al-shartayn*: the two signs of Aries), *Butayn* (the belly of Aries) and *Thurayya* (Pleiades) are houses of the Moon.

3 The significance of the divine week and its seven days

- 1 *Sanâbil*, *sunbulât* (s. *sunbula*), the term used in the Qur'anic account of Pharaoh's dream interpreted by Joseph (12:43), and also in the promised reward of charity (*zakât*) (1:261).
- 2 This is one of the 12 zodiacal signs, also called *al-'Azrâ* (the Virgin).
- 3 He asserts later in this same chapter that 'when the orbs rotated . . . and when the (celestial) rule went back to Virgo, the human composition appeared "by the specific determination of the All-Mighty, the All-Knower (*taqdîr al-'Azîz al-'Alîm* 41:12 [also: 6:96, 36:38])"' [chapter 60, I.294.8]. Ibn 'Arabî then explains [chapter 60, I.294.10] that the time of the ruling of Virgo is 7,000 years, after which the ruling task is handed over to Libra ('the Balance', representing the eschatological time of divine justice at the final Rising). In this chapter, however, he first takes pains to explain that those ruling spirits are only angelic servants (of God) doing their jobs, and not separate deities as the pagans had believed; so the command is all to Allah and there is no 'sharing' with Him.
- 4 This is because Virgo, as Ibn 'Arabî goes on to explain, has the number 'seven', but also has its multiples: seven, 70, 700:

That is why Allah – since He created us in Virgo – multiplied our reward as He said: *'The likeness of those who spend their wealth in Allah's way is as the likeness of a grain which growth seven ears, in every ear a hundred grains. Allah gives increase manifold to whom He will'* (2:261) – but always multiples of seven. [I.294.15]

- 5 To remove any confusion, 'Day(s)' and 'Week' (with capitals) are used to refer to the actual 'cosmic' or 'divine' Days and Week (of Creation) – not to the many relative, astronomical days and weeks defined by the different relative motions of different heavenly bodies. We have already mentioned the meaning of these divine 'Days' in section 2.15, but the different types of cosmic Days will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
- 6 See *Herodotus: The Histories*, ed. Walter Blanco, Jennifer T. Roperts, trans. Walter Blanco (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 2.82 (fifth century BC).
- 7 Sunday is the first day of the week according to the Jewish method of reckoning, but for Christians it began to take the place of the Jewish Sabbath in Apostolic times.
- 8 In one hadith [*Kanz*: 15120] which we shall translate below, the Prophet Muhammad clearly specified that Allah started the Creation on Sunday.

- 9 See also Ibn 'Arabî's book *Al-Asfâr (the Journeys)* in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî* (Beirut: Dar Ihyâ' al-Turath al-'Arabî, n.d.). pp. 12–15. This book was edited and translated into French by Denis Gril (1994).
- 10 See also the long passage translated in section 2.12 where Ibn 'Arabî defines the different timing periods including the solar month and year.
- 11 The Babylonians originally used a combination solar-lunar calendar like the one Muslims use nowadays (i.e. the Hijrî Calendar with varying 29/30-day months), though they made adjustments from time to time to make it fit with motion of the Sun. Later (during the reign of the Chaldean king Nabonassar, 747–734 BC), the Babylonian astronomers switched to the 30-day, 12-month calendar, again making adjustments for the actual 365-day year (Parise 1982: 5).
- 12 For details about the concepts of sainthood (*walâya*) and prophethood (*nubuwwa*) and the hierarchy of *awliyâ* see Chodkiewicz (1993b).
- 13 *Mudâwi Al-Kulûm* is the name of the Single Pole that is the spirit of the Prophet Muhammad even before creating humankind when Adam was still 'between water and soil', and to this spirit different manifestations in the world where the 'Pole of Time' is his perfect manifestation, but he is also manifested in the 'Solitary Ones (*al-Afrâd*)' and in the 'Seal of Sainthood', both the Muhammadan Sainthood (who is Ibn 'Arabî himself) and General Sainthood (who is Jesus) [I.151.26]. And he was called *Mudâwi Al-Kulûm* because he is so kind and polite with his friends; when he wants to draw the attention of one of them to a specific issue, he kindly hides that from others in guard for him just as Jacob asked Joseph to keep his vision secret and not to tell it to his brothers [I.153.19].
- 14 The ambiguities in the translation here are quite intentional: God sees Himself reflected in (both mirrors of) creation and Adam; Adam sees himself/God in the mirror(s) of himself and creation; and finally God (as Spirit) sees what Adam sees. See chapter 1 of the *Fusûs Al-Hikam* for the full elaboration of the teaching summarized here in a single short Arabic phrase.
- 15 See A. Kâshânî's well-known *Tafsîr Ibn 'Arabî*, published by many publishers, for example Beirut: Dar Sâdir, 2002, vol. I: 245, vol. II: 571.
- 16 This English word here fits very well in this meaning for the Arabic word '*yusabbihu*' (n. *tasbîh*: magnification) and probably conveys the meaning here more clearly than the more abstract Arabic word, because at the end the process of creation, according to Ibn 'Arabî's view, is a 'multiplication' of the Oneness of Allah, and a 'magnification' (manifestation) of His 'absolute Unseen' dimension (*al-ghayb al-mutlaq*). This magnification started with the creation of Angels, and then proceeded with the creation of the jinn who were given extra privilege and duties, because they are commissioned servants, while the perfection (of the theomorphic Image) was only given fully to the (perfect) Human Being (*insân*) who is the *Khalîfa* (the 'vice-gerent' of Allah).
- 17 This was mentioned in one long hadith which describes the sequence of creation according to week days (see *al-Mustadrak 'ala al-Sahîhayn* by Mohamed al-Nisabûri (Dar Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyya: Beirut, n.d.), vol. II: 593, no. 3996/7). See also section 7.10.
- 18 Ibn 'Arabî indicates in many places that both the world and the Perfect Human Being work in the same way, which is why he calls the world the 'Great Human Being' (*al-insân al-kabîr*) and the Human Being the 'microcosm' (*al-'âlam al-saghîr*) [III.11.18]. See also *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sîfi*: 168–170, and *SPK*: pp. 4, 16, 30, 107, 136, 276, 282, 297, and also *SDG*: 6, 8, 28, 35, 37, 175, 189, 259, 264, 274, 288, 332, 339, 348, 360–363. See also section 3.2 for more analogies between the creation of the world and embryology.

4 The actual flow of time

- 1 Mathematically we can divide the circle into 360 degrees, 400 grads, 2π radians or indeed to any number of units. Ibn 'Arabî, however, affirms that the 360-degree system

has a divine origin, which is the total number of prime divine forms of knowing ('ilm) that the Universal Intellect (the 'Higher Pen') was taught by the 'Greatest Element' (Nûn) [I.295.8, alluding to the standard cosmological interpretation of the Qur'anic symbols at 68:1]. Also in *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya fî Al-Ahkâm Al-Ilâhiyya*, he mentioned on page 35 that the Intellect has 360 faces towards the divine Presence (*Al-Hadra Al-Ilâhiyya*).

- 2 For the Arabs, whom Ibn 'Arabî follows on this point, the night-time of a particular day is that which *precedes* the daytime of that day, and not the night that follows that daytime. See *Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 4. See also section 2.14.
- 3 In appendix A in their study of Ibn 'Arabî's book: *Ayyâm Al-Sha'n, The Seven Days of the Heart* (p. 149), Pablo Beneito and Steven Hirtenstein translated *ayyâm al-takwîr* as 'the cyclical days' and translated the Qur'anic verb *yukawwiru* as '(He) wraps'. However, I prefer to use the term 'circulate' to emphasize the meaning that the day-times and the night-times go around each other in a circle, and that they both (together) encircle the Earth. This type of day (the circulated day) is also the normal, observable type of day that 'circulated' amongst us, to differentiate from the other two types that we shall see below.
- 4 This is mentioned in *Tafsîr Ibn 'Arabî*, vol. I: 245, and vol. II: 571. This book is attributed to Ibn 'Arabî by its modern publisher, but most scholars agree that it was written by the later Iranian philosopher Al-Qâshânî.
- 5 The galactic equator is the intersection of the plane of the Milky Way with the celestial sphere.
- 6 It is not very clear here what does he mean by 'the middle', and he also used the same expression in the same context right in his introduction to the *Futûhât*.
- 7 See also *The Seven Days of the Heart*: 157–159, where Pablo Beneito and Steven Hirtenstein gave in appendix A and B a good study of *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*. They found that the number of contribution for all of the seven Days from all the seven heavens should sum up to 24, which they interpreted as the 24 hours of the day. Therefore, because not all the data are found in the source, they had to deduce the missing slots on the basis of this assumption.
- 8 As of 1956, the length of a second has been freed from the vagaries of the Earth's motion, and is now defined by the *Système International d'Unités* as equal to 'the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the cesium-133 atom in zero magnetic field'. This means that the values for these conventional units of time are no longer tied to the motion of the Earth, and instead are tied to innate measurable properties of matter. Thus the minute, hour, day and even the average 'tropical' year are defined as exactly 60; 3,600; 86,400; and 31,556,925.9747 seconds respectively.
- 9 In mathematics: 10^{-x} denotes $1/10^x$. For example 10^{-3} is $1/10^3$ or $1/1000$, or one-thousandth. As we have seen in section 1.9, there are some speculations that the shortest possible time is in fact 10^{-43} seconds, which is called Planck's time. The debate is still going on, and the issue of the quantization of time is not yet finally settled.

5 Unicity and multiplicity

- 1 It is believed that Ibn 'Arabî entered the spiritual path well before the age of 20. He mentioned in the *Futûhât* [II.425.13] that he entered 'this path' in the year AH580 (AD1184), and he was born in AH560 (AD1165) (Austin 1971: 23). Other scholars argue that this was in AD1182 or even earlier (Hirtenstein 1999: 51–60).
- 2 It can be argued that the words 'no' or 'not yes' do not have a stand-alone significance, especially when we think about existence. 'No' only indicates the opposite of 'Yes', because 'No' in this sense means 'non-existence' which is nothing; it is only the absence or negation of existence. This also has its parallels in digital electronics

where the signal has two states; either there is a signal or not, which is translated as Yes and No or 1 and 0 respectively. But because the '0' is 'nothing', we are left with only the '1'; this '1' either exists or not.

- 3 In his short book *Ma la Yu'awwal 'Alayhi* (*What can not be relied upon*) (in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, vol. I, treatise 16: 2) and in his famous chapter 63 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî repeatedly affirms that true visions ('visionary unveiling', *kashf suwarî*) are always correct, while mistakes actually may come from the individual's false interpretation, not from the vision itself. There are, however three kinds of spiritual visions: the 'good vision' is from Allah; 'psychological reflections' from the soul; and 'nightmares' from Shaytan. See also chapter 188 of the *Futûhât*, as well as our study of the Sura of Joseph: Yusef (1999): 227–232.
- 4 Right at the first page of the Introduction to the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî divides knowledge into three categories: (1) Logical (ratiocinative) knowledge ('*ilm al-'aql*); (2) the knowledge of inner experiential states ('*ilm al-ahwâl*); and (3) the ('inspired) knowledge of (spiritual) secrets' ('*ilm al-'asrâr*). The knowledge of states is obtained only through direct experiential 'taste' (*dhawq*), while the knowledge of secrets is generally beyond the grasp of the intellect, though some of it becomes logical after being explained, but the intellect alone could not attain it [I.31.9].
- 5 Ibn 'Arabî quotes this expression and comments on it very often in his books, and he ascribes it to *al-hakîm* ('the philosopher-sage') [II.458.20]. Though it is not very clear who he exactly means by *al-hakîm*, it is possible that he refers to Plotinus, who was known in several Arabic translations of his writings as 'the Greek sage' (*al-hakîm al-yunânî*). On the basis of Davidson (1992), William Chittick asserts that this maxim was apparently first used by Avicenna (*SDG*: 17). This maxim is certainly the basis of Avicenna's cosmological schema of emanationism (*ḥayd*) [see: *EP*, 'Emanationism', I: 473–474, and also *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1995, ed. Robert Audi): 258, 604–606, 714], and it was possibly used by early Christians as the basis of the concept of the holy Trinity. Ibn 'Arabî generally disagrees with this proposition especially when speaking about Allah as the One Who created the manifoldness of the world.
- 6 Ibn 'Arabî uses two distinct term with regards to the existence of creatures with relation to God; 'witness' (*ma'aiyya*) and 'at-ness' ('*indiyya*). The first refers to the presence of God with all things after they are created (57:4, 58:7), while the first indicates all things were ('determined') with God even before they come into real existence. See also *SDG*: 35, 37, 45, 88, 137, 170, 171, 179, 180, 297, *SPK*: 72, 76, 125, 181, 183, 216, 249, 302, 313, 327, 364–366, 380.
- 7 Ibn 'Arabî often elaborates on the lofty rank of the 'people of God' (*ahl Allâh*) who are the 'true knowers' (*al-muhaqqiqûn*), also sometimes referred to as the 'the people of Qur'an' alluding to a famous hadith [*Kanz*: 2277, 2278, 2279, 2342, 4038, etc.] which Ibn 'Arabî often quotes or paraphrases [II.299.18, I.352.27, I.372.14, I.510.12, III.103.34, III.121.35].
- 8 In the original printed text (followed in the standard later Cairo and Beirut reprintings used here), this rare long comment is described as 'a note by Sîdî 'Abd al-Qâdir [al-Jazâ'irî], transcribed from his own handwriting'.
- 9 For details about the differences between the divine Names *al-Wâhid* and *al-Ahad* see *Al-Masâ'il*: 139. And also see Ibn 'Arabî's descriptions of these Attributes and all other divine Attributes in the long chapter 558 [IV.196–326; see in particular IV.293–294]. Ibn 'Arabî also wrote a dedicated book called *Kitâb Al-Ahadiyya*; see the Bibliography. See also *SDK*: 25, 36, 58, 90, 235, 237, 244–245, 278, 349, 364.
- 10 See also *Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qâhira, n.d.): 17. This small book includes also the prayer *Al-Dawr Al-'Alâ* or *Hizb al-Wiqâyah li man Arada al-Walâya* and a few other short treatises, including *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya*.
- 11 See also the *Futûhât* [I.109.3, I.125.28, I.216.13, I.228.13, I.263.19, I.313.29, I.643.33, III.74.2, III.398.15, etc.].

- 12 This famous saying (*al-'ajz 'an dark al-idrâki idrâk*) is often quoted by Sufi authors in support of what we have just explained, especially by Ibn 'Arabî [I.51.7, I.92.1, I.95.2, I.126.14, I.271.6, I.290.2, II.170.8, II.619.35, II.641.12, III.132.35, III.371.21, III.555.17, IV.43.5, IV.283.16], and it is usually attributed to Abû Bakr al-Siddîq.
- 13 In his book *Al-Masâ'il (The Issues)*, which contains over 230 philosophical issues, Ibn 'Arabî showed that the divine Names and Attributes are the first multiplicity that occurred in the Existence. See issue (*Mas'ala*) no. 94 in this book.
- 14 Ibn 'Arabî's profound view of creation is essentially based on the concept of 'the Breath of the All-Merciful'; he explains the world and everything in it through this concept. He mentioned and explained it in the *Futûhât* and other books more often than anything else. See in the *Futûhât* [I.97.22, I.152.13, I.168.15, I.185.16, I.263-270, I.272-274, II.172.5, II.181.12, II.293.30, II.310.21, II.390.18] and throughout the long chapter 198 [II.390-478], as well as [III.269.22, III.279.18, III.429.34, III.443.12, III.459.21, III.465.27, III.505.9, III.524.25, IV.65.32, IV.200.11, IV.211.27, IV.256.24, IV.330.22], to mention some examples. We shall see below (section 7.8) that this concept of the Breath of the All-Merciful is indeed the theological and cosmological equivalent of the modern physics theory of Superstrings introduced in the 1980s.
- 15 This book (OY no. 515; listed in Ibn 'Arabî's own lists of his writings) is called *Al-Muthallathât Al-Wârîda fî Al-Qur'ân Al-Karîm*.
- 16 See for example: Lyman Abbott, *A Dictionary of Religious Knowledge*, 1875: 944. See also Hopkins (1930), chapter XX: The Christian Trinity, chapter XVII: The Triad, chapter XVIII: The Hindu Trinity, chapter XIX: The Buddhistic Trinity.
- 17 In Arabic grammatical language, any group of two is called *muthanna* (dual), while the term 'plural' is reserved for groups of at least three members.
- 18 Ibn 'Arabî often makes such symbolic analogies (*mudahât*) between the internal (psychological) and external (cosmological) realities. Thus he calls the cosmos the 'Great Human Being' (*al-Insân al-Kabîr*) and the human being the 'micro-cosmos' (*al-'Âlam al-Saghîr*) [II.150.26, III.11.17]. He also says that this knowledge that the world is a Great Human Being and that the human being is its 'Summary' form was given by Idrîs (*Mudâwî al-Kulûm*) [I.153.21]. See also Ibn 'Arabî's *al-Tadbîrât al-Ilâhiyya*, where he explains these symbolic analogies at length. In another highly symbolic early book, the *Anqâ' Mughrib*, he makes similar analogies between Human Being and the divine Names. For a full translation and critical study see Elmore (2000).
- 19 It is most likely that this term was first used by Ibn Taymiyya himself, although he criticized Ibn 'Arabî for that. See Madhkûr (1969): 365-380 [370]. See also *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 1145-1155, and *SDK*: 79.
- 20 Ibn 'Arabî alludes here, among other things, to the Qur'anic accounts of the inbreathing of the Spirit into Adam: 'So, when I have made him and breathed into him of My Spirit' (15:29, 38:72).
- 21 This is also evident in physics, where it is known that the difference between colours is due to the shorter or longer wavelength of the electromagnetic waves that constitute light. The red colour has a specific wavelength, and the blue colour for example has another distinctive (range of) wavelength(s). Although we call it a colour, there is no wavelength for a colour that is called 'black' or 'dark': it is simply the absence of any light-waves.
- 22 For more details about this subject see Ormsby (1984).
- 23 See Ibn 'Arabî's discussions of this conception in the *Futûhât* [II.168.23, II.343.28, II.379.9, II.444.16, II.501.4, III.343.23, III.471.13].
- 24 See Ibn 'Arabî's discussions in the *Futûhât* [I.42.21, I.204.12, I.284.32, I.680.7, III.275.32, IV.46.6, IV.129.31, IV.228.12, IV.236.15].
- 25 See *The Wisdom of the Prophets (Fusûs Al-Hikam)*, translated from Arabic into French with notes by Titus Burckhardt; translated from French into English by Angela Culme-Seymour (TAJ Company: New Delhi, revised edition 1984): 32.

- 26 See for example in the *Futûhât* [I.79.5, I.461.25, I.735.17, II.356.26, II.372.23, II.451.33, II.471.32, II.554.18, III.105.27, III.199.11, III.288.16, III.362.16, IV.9.9, IV.320.5, IV.343.16, IV.367.18, IV.379.1, IV.397.22, IV.418.20].

6 The Single Monad model of the cosmos

- 1 The 'one' at the end of the sentence refers to the Single Monad (*al-jawhar al-fard*), and not likely to the divine Name *al-Ahad* ('The One/Unique'), because this Name is never manifested on the level of multiplicity where knowledge normally is actualized. Ibn 'Arabî always shows that multiplicity is ultimately related to the Name *al-Wâhid* (the Alone, the Only One) and not to *al-Ahad*, because with *al-Ahad* no other entity may exist in order to know Him.
- 2 See *EP*, 'Monad and Monadology', vol. 5: 361–363.
- 3 See *Shajarat Al-Kawn* (Dar al-Mahabba: Damascus, 2003), ed. 'Abd al-Rahîm Mardini: 39.
- 4 This important note can be used to give more details and extensions about the 'the Single Monad model of the Cosmos' that we discuss in this chapter. Ibn 'Arabî is describing the three main jobs or motions of the Intellect in creating the world including himself and also his acceptance of knowledge from his Lord.
- 5 In Arabic grammar when two consonant characters meet, one of them is omitted, usually the vowel-like 'incomplete letters'. In this case the imperative of رَوْحُ (*yarûhu*) is رُوحُ (*rûh*) so because both the *wâw* and the *hâ* are consonants, the *wâw* that is a vowel is omitted and the result is رُوحُ (*ruh*).
- 6 Ibn 'Arabî quotes this name after Abu al-Hakîm Bin Barrajân (d. 536/1141) in *Al-Tadbirât Al-Ilâhiyya*: 90.
- 7 See Hawking (1994).
- 8 Here Ibn 'Arabî is using the term *al-jawhar al-fard* in its original sense in the physics of kalam, to refer to the 'atom' or the simplest physical substance, whose compounds form natural bodies (*jism*). This is the opposite extreme from the all-encompassing creative Single Monad.
- 9 It has to be noticed, however, that, for Ibn 'Arabî, this '*al-haqq al-makhlûq bihi*' is not other than the Real, Allah, but he is also not Allah; he is the most perfect manifestation of Allah. See also Chapter 5 (especially section 5.3). See *'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*: 59. See also *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 828.
- 10 See also Chittick, *SDK*: 134 [The Universal Reality]. In other related hadith some other realities are said to be the 'first-created' such as the Intellect [*Kanz*: 7057], the Pen [*Kanz*: 597, 15116] or 'the Muhammadan Light', etc. There is no contradiction in these hadith because those are just different names of the same reality as we discussed in section 6.3.
- 11 See chapter 73 of the *Futûhât* [II.2–39] where Ibn 'Arabî explains and lists the different groups of saints, and especially the extensive summary and analysis of that long chapter and related materials found in Chodkiewicz (1993).
- 12 As we have seen in section 5.3, Ibn 'Arabî argues that number one is the primordial basis of all other numbers, just as alif is the foundation of all the letters. See also [II.122.19, and *Al-Masâ'il*: 109].
- 13 This divine Name is usually taken in the meaning of 'the Most-Kind', which is a possible meaning in relation to His Creation: 'He is the Most-Kind with His servants' (42:19). Ibn 'Arabî here, however, emphasizes the general meaning of *latâfa* which means fineness.
- 14 *Insân*: i.e. here and throughout this book, the immortal spiritual reality and dimension of people – which is the reflection of the cosmic First Intellect, or 'Perfect Human Being'; and not their passing material, mortal-animal 'nature' (*bashar*).
- 15 Ibn 'Arabî spends a good deal of the first chapter of the *Futûhât* trying to explain this mysterious point regarding the subjective experience and the actual reality of *fanâ*'.

He explains that, in making the circle, the compass returns to the starting point [I.48.33], until he concludes: 'if they (the seekers of the Real) knew (the goal of their search) they would not have moved from their place' [I.49.1], and 'so he (the seeker) would be sad on arriving at what he has (earlier) left behind – but he would be happy for the secrets that he gained on the way!' [I.49.14]

16 See also Yousef (2006): 422.

17 See *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya*, published together with some other short treatises and prayers, for example in *Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf* (Maktabat al-Qâhira: Cairo, n.d.).

18 I.e. as my ultimate identity which is as the Perfect Human Being, not as You (the transcendent Real), because this is impossible as we said above. This is the state of spiritual 'abolishment' (*mahw*) of the ego, like the momentary disappearance of the shadow at noontime, as we have seen above.

19 The pronoun here (translated as 'its') is usually interpreted by many scholars so that it refers to Allah. Ibn 'Arabî, however, affirms that it indeed refers to the thing in 'everything' [II.110.25, II.313.16, III.255.22]. However, both cases are plausible [IV.417.18], if we take into account what we have mentioned in Chapter 5 that the things are not other than Him, and that the 'face' of a thing is its essential reality [as Ibn 'Arabî argues at I.181.19, I.306.12, I.433.36, II.182.17, II.632.34, IV.417.18]. So the things in reality are not other than Allah, but the forms that we see are all perishable, and at the end there remains only His Face in everything. So this verse is indeed another clear expression of the oneness of being.

20 See *Tawajjuhât al-Hurûf*: 26.

21 Like the English pun, Ibn 'Arabî frequently plays with the fact that the same Arabic word ('*ayn*') refers at once to the observing 'eye', the concrete individual entity (of the observer), and to their ultimate Source. See also *Kitâb Al-Azal*: 9.

7 The Single Monad model and its implications for modern physics

1 *Al-sirr* literally means 'the secret', but Sufis use it to refer to the innermost spiritual core of the heart (*qalb*), the 'heart of the heart'. It was said that the *sirr* also has a *sirr*, and so on down to seven levels. For Ibn 'Arabî, the Spirit (*rûh*) is the third level after the heart and the *sirr*, but also the Spirit has its 'secret' dimension, and this *sirr* also has a *sirr* which is called *sirr al-sirr* ('the secret of the secret') [I.117.8]. Ultimately it is this final *Sirr* that is directly connected with the Real (the *wajh al-khâss* discussed in several passages in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).

2 In 1999 Ahmed Zewail was awarded the Nobel Prize 'for showing that it is possible with rapid laser technique to see how atoms in a molecule move during a chemical reaction' (see Press Release, The 1999 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 12 October 1999). This discovery is known as femtochemistry, where molecules are watched over a very short time-scale with Femto-second resolution. The Femto-second resolution ($1 \text{ fs} = 10^{-15} \text{ s}$) is the ultimate achievement to date for studies of the dynamics of the chemical bond at the atomic level. On this time-scale, matter wave packets (particle-type) can be created and their coherent evolution as a single-molecule trajectory can be observed (Zewail 1990: 40–46).

3 The flickering is the variation (and discontinuity) in light intensity which is normally seen on some computer monitors. As we have all observed in watching monitor screens shown on television emissions, that flickering becomes more apparent when we video-record what appears on the screen. That effect happens because of the difference in the frequency (refresh rate) of the filmed monitor and that of the observing video camera. If the refresh rate of the camera is much higher than that of the monitor, then at some times the camera will record blank screens that we normally do not see with our naked eye. This concept can be used to measure high-frequency motions. This is the same phenomenon that causes us to see fast-moving wheel spokes or a

propeller appear to be moving backward (or forward) in slower motion, or even motionless, when in fact moving at a very high speed. The illusion happens because of the human eye's limit for the tracking and retention of images, which is usually about one-fifteenth of a second.

- 4 See for example Gaines (1997).
- 5 Ibn 'Arabî asserts that this person was Asif bin Barkhya, who is known as *al-Khadir*. Al-Khadir literally means 'the Green One', a legendary figure endowed with immortal life. He represents freshness of spirit and eternal liveliness. The stories surrounding al-Khadir are usually associated with *Sûrat al-Kahf* in the Qur'an [18:60–82], where Allah described the journey of Moses and his servant to the 'meeting of the two seas' to meet al-Khadir and learn from him. Ibn 'Arabî himself mentioned that he had met him several times [I.186], and he considers him a divine Messenger and one of four 'Pillars' in the spiritual hierarchy [II.5.31].
- 6 See *Fusûs Al-Hikam*, with commentary by 'Abd al-Razzâq al-Qâshânî and Bâlî Effendî (Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turâth, 1997): 321–324.
- 7 The black body problem was raised by the observation that certain materials (especially black bodies) can absorb all frequencies or wavelengths of light. So when heated they should then radiate all frequencies of light equally – at least theoretically. But the distribution of energy radiated in real-life experiments never matched up with the predictions of classical physics.
- 8 The spin is the motion of the particle around its axis just like the daily motion of the Earth.
- 9 For more details about the hierarchy of letters according to Ibn 'Arabî see the related English translations by Denis Gril (2004) in *The Meccan Revelations*, vol. II, NY: Pir Press: 107–220.
- 10 Wim van den Dungen, 'On Being and the Majesty of the Worlds', Reg. No.51, in *SofiaTopiaNet*; Sophia Society for philosophy, [www.sofiatopia.org/equiaeon/being.htm#dim].
- 11 Ibn 'Arabî makes various comments on this verse in the *Futûhât* [I.156.15, I.238.13, I.279.16, II.16.32, II.150.34, II.209.9, II.225.6, II.296.6, II.298.33, II.556.32, III.275.33, III.315.6, III.344.30, IV.28.28, IV.93.3].
- 12 Ibn 'Arabî explained before this text that angels correspond cosmologically to eighteen characters of the alphabet, which are produced as a result of the meeting between the nine divine donating (*ilqâ'*) orbs and the nine human accepting (*talaqqî*) orbs [I.54.12].

Bibliography

The bibliography is arranged into four categories:

- A Ibn 'Arabî's printed works (in Arabic)
- B Arabic works on Ibn 'Arabî and related subjects
- C English translations and studies on Ibn 'Arabî and related subjects
- D Cited books and articles on philosophy, cosmology and time

A: Ibn 'Arabî's printed works (in Arabic)

The following is a list of Ibn 'Arabî's printed books and treatises that are available in Arabic. This list is arranged alphabetically according to the title, not including initial article *Al-*, *Kitâb* or *Risâla*. The 'OY no.' column on the right gives the corresponding bibliographical classification of the original manuscripts by Osman Yahya. The names of editors have been cited whenever given in the printed text. The numbers given in parentheses immediately after the names of some individual treatises also refer to Yahya's classification.

Ibn 'Arabî (1994) <i>Al-'Abâdila</i> , Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qâhira, 2nd ed., ed. 'Abd Al-Qâdir A. 'Atâ	OY# 2
— (1999) <i>'Ajâ'ib Al-'Irfân fî Tafsîr I'jâz Al-Bayân fî Al-Tarjama 'an Al-Qur'an</i> , Cairo: Al-Sharika Al-Muttahida, ed. Muhammad I. M. Sâlim	732
— (1999) <i>Kitâb 'Anqâ' Mughrib</i> , Cairo: n.p., ed. Muhammad I. M. Sâlim	30
— (n.d.) <i>'Aqida fî Al-Tawhîd</i> , or <i>'Aqîdat ahl Al-Islâm</i> , Egypt: n.p.	34
— (1919) <i>'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz</i> , including <i>Kitâb Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir</i> and <i>Kitâb Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya fî Islâh Al-Mamlaka Al-Insâniyya</i> , Leiden: Brill; in <i>Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-'Arabî</i> , ed. H. S. Nyberg	802 289 716
— (1954) <i>Kitâb Al-Bâ'</i> , Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qâhira, also includes: <i>Kitâb Al-Yâ'</i> (OY no. 205), <i>Kitâb Al-Jalâla</i> (169), <i>Kitâb Al-Alif</i> (25), <i>Kitâb Al-Sha'n</i> (26)	71
— (1968) <i>Dhakhâ'ir al A'lâq</i> , Cairo: n.p.	116
— (1855) <i>Dîwân Ibn 'Arabî</i> , Bulaq	102
— (1996) <i>Dîwân Ibn 'Arabî</i> , Beirut: Dâr Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyya, ed. Ahmad Hasan Basaj	102
— (1923) <i>Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'</i> , Beirut: n.p.	178
— (1946) <i>Fusûs Al-Hikam</i> , Cairo: n.p.; critical edition by A. 'Affifi	150

- (1997) *Fusûs Al-Hikam* with commentary by ‘Abd Al-Razzâq Al-Qâshânî and Bâli Effendi, Cairo: Al-Maktabat Al-Azhariyya li-l-Turâth 150
- (n.d.) *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkîyya*, Vols 1–4, Beirut: n.p.; this is a photographic reprint of the old edition of Bulaq 1329/1911 which comprises four volumes each about 700 pages of 35 lines; the page size is 20 by 27 cm. This is the standard version used in citations throughout this book. 135
- (1970) *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkîyya*, Vols. 1–14, ed. Osman Yahya, Cairo: The General Egyptian Book Organization; this is the critical edition by Osman Yahya. This version was not completed, and the 14 volumes correspond to only volume I of the standard Bulaq/Beirut edition. 135
- (AH 1326) *Hilyat Al-Abdâl*, Istanbul: n.p. 237
- (1907) *Kitâb Al-Hujub*, Cairo: n.p. 247
- (2004) *Kitâb Al-Hujub*, Cairo: Maktabat Al-Thaqâfa Al-Dîniyya, ed. As‘ad ‘Abd Al-Fattâh 247
- (1988) *Kitâb Al-Isrâ ilâ Al-Maqâm Al-Asrâ* or *Kitâb Al-Mi‘râj*, Beirut: Dandarâh; critical edition, ed. Su‘ad Al-Hakîm. 313
- (n.d.) *Istilâhât Al-Sûfiyya*, Cairo: ‘âlam Al-Fikr 315
- (1996) *Kalimat Allah* or *Kitâb Al-Jalâla*, Damascus: Al-Hikma, ed. Riyâd M. Al-‘Abdullâh 169
- (1987) *Kitâb Al-Khalwat Al-Mutlaqa*, Cairo: n.p. 255
- (1967) *Kitâb Kunh mâ lâ Budd li-l-Murîd Minhu*, Cairo: M. A. Subaih 352
- (1970) *Kitâb Al-Mabâdî wa-l-Ghâyât*, Damascus: n.p. 380
- (1949) *Majmû‘at Sâ‘at Al-Khabar*, Cairo: Mustafa Al-Halabî 642
- (1999) *Al-Masâ‘il li-Idâh Al-Masâ‘il*, Amman: Azmina, ed. Qâsim M. Abbâs 433
- (1907) *Mawâqî‘ Al-Nujûm*, Cairo: n.p. 443
- (n.d.) *Mir‘ât Al-Ma‘ânî*, photocopy of a book in Al-Maktaba Al-Zâhiriyya, Damascus: n.p. 230
- (AH 1369) *Mishkât Al-Anwâr*, Cairo: n.p. 480
- (n.d.) *Muhâdarat Al-Abrâr wa Musâmarat Al-Akhyâr*, Vols 1 & 2, Beirut: Dâr Sâdir 493
- (1978) *Al-Nûr Al-Asnâ bi-Munajât Allah bi Asmâ‘ihi Al-Husnâ*, Cairo: M. A. Subayh 502
- (1994) *Kitâb Al-Qasam Al-Ilâhi bil-Isim Al-Rabbânî*, Cairo: n.p. 565
- (n.d.) *Radd Al-Muhkam ila Al-Mutashâbih*, Cairo: ‘Âlam Al-Fikr, ed. ‘Abd Al-Rahmân Hasan Mahmûd 588
- (n.d.) *Rasâ‘il Ibn ‘Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Ihyâ‘ Al-Turâth Al-‘Arabî; this is a photographic reprint, in a single volume, of the same famous collection published by the Dâ‘irat Al-Ma‘ârif Al-‘Uthmâniyya (Hyderabad, 1948), based on a manuscript in the Ayasofia library (Istanbul), no. 376, containing 29 short works. Many of these works have been published also separately or in other groups of collected treatises. These are the books and pamphlets contained in this collection, in the same order:
- Part I
1. *Kitâb Al-Fanâ‘ fî Al-Mushâhada* 125
 2. *Kitâb Al-Jalâl wa-l-Jamâl* 168
 3. *Kitâb Al-Alif wa huwa Kitâb Al-Ahadiyya* 25
 4. *Kitâb Al-Jalâla wa huwa Kalimat Allâh* 169
 5. *Kitâb Al-Sha‘n* 67
 6. *Kitâb (Maqâm) Al-Qurba* 414

	7. <i>Kitâb Al-I'lâm bi-Ishârât Ahl Al-Ilhâm</i>	281
	8. <i>Kitâb Al-Mîm wa-l-Wâw wa-l-Nun</i>	462
	9. <i>Risâlat Al-Qasam Al-Ilâhî</i>	565
	10. <i>Kitâb Al-Yâ'</i>	205
	11. <i>Kitâb Al-Azal</i>	68
	12. <i>Risâlat Al-Anwâr</i>	33
	13. <i>Kitâb Al-Isrâ ilâ Al-Maqâm Al-Asrâ</i>	313
	14. <i>Risâla fi Su'al Ismâ'il bin Sawdakîn</i>	182
	15. <i>Risâlat Al-Shaykh ilâ Al-Imâm Al-Râzi</i>	612
	16. <i>Risâlat La Yu'awwal 'Alayhi</i>	532
	17. <i>Kitâb Al-Shâhid</i>	668
Part II	18. <i>Kitâb Al-Tarâjim</i>	737
	19. <i>Kitâb Manzil Al-Qutb wa Maqâmuhu wa Hâluhu</i>	585
	20. <i>Risâlat Al-Intisâr</i>	294
	21. <i>Kitâb Al-Kutub</i>	354
	22. <i>Kitâb Al-Masâ'il</i>	433
	23. <i>Kitâb Al-Tajalliyât</i>	738
	24. <i>Kitâb Al-Isfâr 'an Natâ'ij Al-Asfâr</i>	307
	25. <i>Kitâb Al-Wasâyâ</i>	817
	26. <i>Kitâb Hilyat Al-Abdâl</i>	237
	27. <i>Kitâb Naqsh Al-Fusûs</i>	528
	28. <i>Kitâb Al-Wasiyya</i>	820
	29. <i>Kitâb Istilâh Al-Sûfiyya</i>	315

— (2002–04) *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Mu'assasat Al-Intishâr Al-'Arabî, ed. Sa'id 'Abd Al-Fattâh; four volumes in this series of collected treatises have been published so far. Most of their contents are available in separate books from other earlier publishers (including many of those listed separately here), but the editor has given some critical notes and comparisons between different manuscripts. A number of the treatises included in this collection are clearly apocryphal works. These are the books and pamphlets contained in these four volumes, in the same order (with page nos):

Part I	31–70	<i>Fihras Mu'allafât Ibn 'Arabî</i>	142
	71–118	<i>Kitâb Al-'Azama</i>	70
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	131–146	<i>Kitâb Al-Hurûf Al-Thalâtha</i>	462
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	157–192	<i>Kitâb Manzil Al-Manâzil Al-Fahwâniyya</i>	412
	193–206	<i>Risâla fi Asrâr Al-Dhât Al-Ilâhiyya</i>	
	207–232	<i>Kitâb Al-Qutb wa-l-Imâmayn wa-l-Mudlijîn</i>	585
	233–246	<i>Kitâb Maqâm Al-Qurba</i>	414
	247–264	<i>Kitâb Al-Madkhal ilâ Al-Maqсад Al-Asmâ fi Al-Ishârât</i>	
	265–278	<i>Kitâb Nuskhat Al-Haqq</i>	551
	279–347	<i>Kitâb Shâqq Al-Jayb bi-'Ilm Al-Ghayb</i>	671
Part II	18–61	<i>Kitâb Al-Qutb Wa-l-Nuqabâ'</i>	548
	62–131	<i>'Uqlat Al-Mustawfîz</i>	802
	131–145	<i>Risâlat Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'</i>	178
	146–231	<i>Risâlat Al-Anwâr fi mâ Yumnahu Sâhibu Al-Khalwa min Al-Asrâr</i>	33

	233–287	<i>Tāj Al-Rasâ'il wa Minhāj Al-Wasâ'il</i>	736
	288–406	<i>Kitâb Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya fî Islâh Al-Mamlakat Al-Insâniyya</i>	289
Part III		<i>Al-Kawkab Al-Durrî fî Manâqib dhî-l-Nûn Al-Masrî</i>	
Part IV	19–76	<i>Kitâb Al-Yaqîn</i>	834
	79–162	<i>Kitâb 'Anqâ' Mughrib</i>	30
	165–311	<i>Kitâb Al-Ma'rifa</i>	433

— *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî; Kashf Al-Sitr* (Amman: Azmina, 2004), ed. Qâsim M. Abbâs.
Includes the following treatises (several apparently apocryphal):

	69–90	<i>Kashf Al-Sitr li Ahl Al-Sirr</i>	340
	91–97	<i>Risâlat Al-Waqt wa-l-Ân</i>	
	95–111	<i>Kitâb Marâtib 'Ulûm Al-Wahb</i>	423
	113–131	<i>Kitâb Al-Huwa</i>	205
	133–143	<i>Risâlat Al-Ma'lûm min 'Aqâ'id Ahl Al-Rusûm</i>	402
	145–167	<i>Kitâb Al-Ittihâd Al-Kawnî fî Hadhrat Al-Ishhâd Al-'Aynî</i>	

— (2000) *Majmû'at Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Mahajjat Al-Baydâ; most of the contents of these three volumes, as in no. 64 above, are brought together from previously published separate books or collections, but the reprinted versions in this volume are newly type in a clearer modern font. Three volumes containing a collection of treatises as follows:

Part I	7–74	<i>Tahdhib Al-Akhlâq</i>	745
	75–94	<i>Al-Maw'iza Al-Hasana</i>	448
	95–230	<i>Risâlat Rûh Al-Quds</i>	639
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	259–290	<i>(Risâlat) Al-Anwâr</i>	33
	291–308	<i>'Aqida fî Al-Tawhid aw 'Aqidat Ahl Al-Islâm</i>	34
	309–358	<i>Shajarat Al-Kawn</i>	666
	359–372	<i>Al-Nûr Al-Asnâ bi-Munajât Allâh bi Asmâ'ihî Al-Husnâ</i>	502
	373–422	<i>Tanbihât 'Alâ 'Uluww Al-Haqîqat Al-Muhammadiyya</i>	763
	423–454	<i>Al-Khalwat Al-Mutlaqa</i>	255
	455–520	<i>Kitâb Al-Bâ'</i>	71
	521–546	<i>Kitâb Kunh mâ lâ Budd li-l-Murîd Minhu</i>	352
	547–574	<i>Istilâhât Al-Sûfiyya</i>	315
	575–602	<i>Al-Hikma Al-Hâtimiyya</i>	233
	603–622	<i>Risâlat Al-Shaykh ilâ Al-Imâm Al-Râzi</i>	612
	623–662	<i>Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf</i> [including: <i>Al-Salawât Al-Mutalsama</i> , <i>Al-Salawât Al-Akbariyya</i> (OY no. 705), <i>Al-Salawât Faydiyya</i> (702), <i>Al-Dawr Al-A'la</i> (244) and <i>Al-Salât Al-Nâriyya</i>]	244
Part II	5–66	<i>Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya fî Al-Ahkâm Al-Ilâhiyya</i>	761
	67–314	<i>Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya fî Asrâr Al-Taharât Wa-l-Salawât Wa-l-Ayyâm Al-Asliyya</i>	762
	315–504	<i>Radd Al-Mutashâbih ilâ Al-Muhkam min Al-Ayât wa-l-Ahâdîth</i>	588
Part III	5–60	<i>'Anqâ' Mughrib fî Khatm Al-Awliyâ wa Shams Al-Maghrib</i>	30
	61–250	<i>Al-'Abâdila</i>	2
	251–374	<i>Mawâqî' Al-Nujûm wa Matâli' Ahillat Al-Asrâr wa-l-'Ulûm</i>	443
	375–484	<i>Majmû'at Sâ'at Al-Khabar</i>	642

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1	<i>'Ayn Al-A'yân</i>	
2	<i>Khurûj Al-Shukhûs min Burûj Al-Khusûs</i>	262
3	<i>Inkhirâq Al-Junûd ilâ Al-Julûd</i>	288
4	<i>Bahr Al-Shukr fî Nahr Al-Nukr</i>	
5	<i>Sharh Muftada' Al-Tûfân</i>	685
6	<i>Al-Miqdâr fî Nuzûl Al-Jabbâr</i>	472
7	<i>Nashr Al-Bayâd fî Rawdat Al-Riyâd</i>	
8	<i>Khâtimat Nuzûl Al-Jabbâr</i>	
9	<i>Al-Radd 'alâ Al-Yahûd</i>	80
10	<i>Khatimat Al-Radd 'alâ Al-Yahûd</i>	256
11	<i>Baqiyyat Khâtimat Al-Radd 'alâ Al-Yahûd</i>	
12	<i>Kashf Sirr Al-Wa'd wa Bayân 'Alâmat Al-Wajd</i>	342

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Ibn 'Arabî – Time and Cosmology

Mohamed Haj Yousef



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Ibn ‘Arabî – Time and Cosmology

Time is one of the most important issues in physics, cosmology, philosophy and theology. Many books and articles have been published in this interdisciplinary field before, but none of those studies have fully described Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique view which is central to understanding, for example, his controversial theory of the ‘oneness of being’.

This book is the first comprehensive attempt to explain Ibn ‘Arabî’s distinctive view of time and its role in the process of creating the cosmos and its relation with the Creator. By comparing this original view with modern theories of physics and cosmology, Mohamed Haj Yousef constructs a new cosmological model that may deepen and extend our understanding of the world, while potentially solving some of the drawbacks in the current models such as the historical Zeno’s paradoxes of motion and the recent Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox (EPR) that underlines the discrepancies between Quantum Mechanics and Relativity.

Ibn ‘Arabî – Time and Cosmology is an important contribution to the fields of philosophy, cosmology, physics and theology.

Mohamed Haj Yousef is lecturer in the Department of Physics, United Arab Emirates University.

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Mohamed Haj Yousef

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**To the Spirit of al-Shaykh al-Akbar Muhyi ed-Din Ibn al-‘Arabî, may
Allah’s Mercy be upon him,**

To the Spirits of my parents, may Allah’s Mercy be upon them,

To my dearest wife who supported me all the times,

To my two sons Abdullah and Yousef, and my daughter Fatima,

To my brothers and sisters, in Islam, and in humankind,

To all I dedicate this humble work.

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Foreword

Students of the world's religious traditions, together with specialists in the history of premodern science and philosophy, are well aware of the centrality within the scriptures and theologies of the major world religions, over many centuries, of detailed symbolic accounts of cosmology and metaphysics (including the intricate problematics of creation) – and of the crucial role played within each of those religious traditions by corresponding philosophical and scientific schemas of astronomy and cosmology that often provided a common language and framework of understanding shared by their educated elites. In premodern times, this key interpretative function was particularly important in the case of that complex of Hellenistic philosophic and cosmological disciplines largely shared by educated proponents of each of the three Abrahamic faiths. Given today's widespread journalistic stereotypes about the supposed 'opposition' of science and religion, this book is a salutary reminder – and an extraordinarily rich and detailed illustration – of the complex interpenetration of philosophical and scriptural elements throughout the central traditions of later Islamic thought, prior to the recent scientific revolutions. At the same time, Dr Haj Yousef's training and expertise as a modern physicist allow him to suggest, in his provocative final chapter, intriguing ways in which the earlier cosmological and theological speculations of Ibn 'Arabî carefully outlined in this study may also parallel very recent developments and insights in the cosmological theories (especially String Theory) of modern physics. In that sense, this study provides a more demanding, Islamic parallel to such recent popular works such as F. Capra's *Tao of Physics*.

While the prolific Andalusian Sufi writer Ibn 'Arabî (1165–1240) is most widely known today as a mystic and spiritual teacher, his voluminous writings – and particularly his immense magnum opus, the *Meccan Illuminations*, which is the primary source for this study – constantly refer to the insights, theories, and cosmological schemas of earlier Muslim philosophers and scientists, such as Avicenna and the popular spiritual treatises of the 'Brethren of Purity' (*Ikhwân al-Safâ*). For that reason, this book begins with a helpful survey of the standard theories of cosmology and time found in earlier Hellenistic thinkers, which were largely taken over into the succeeding traditions of Islamic philosophy and science. However, the most creative and unfamiliar

aspects of Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmological ideas – especially his distinctive conception of the ever-renewed, ongoing and instantaneous nature of the cosmic process of creation (*tajdid al-khalq*) – are carefully woven together from what have always been profoundly mysterious, problematic, and complexly interwoven symbolic formulations in the Qur’an. Thus the main focus and novel scholarly contribution of the central chapters of this volume lie in the author’s careful unfolding and clarification of the intended meanings and references of this dense Qur’anic cosmological symbolism of time and creation, as that multi-dimensional world-view is systematically expounded in elaborate accounts scattered throughout several of Ibn ‘Arabî’s major works. Every reader who engages with this demanding discussion will come away, at the very least, with a heightened appreciation of the symbolic richness and challenging intellectual dilemmas posed by this unduly neglected – yet arguably quite central and unavoidable – dimension of the Qur’an and its metaphysical teachings.

In the penultimate chapter of this study, before taking up possible analogies to Ibn ‘Arabî’s ideas in modern physics, the author turns to the language of ontology and to a subject – the paradoxical relations of the divine One and the many – far more familiar to students of Ibn ‘Arabî, or of comparable forms of thought in earlier Neoplatonism and the metaphysics of other world religions. Despite the initial unfamiliarity (for non-specialists) of some of Ibn ‘Arabî’s Qur’anic symbolism and technical terminology here, his approach to conceiving and intellectually explaining the mysterious relationship between the divine Source and its infinite manifestations clearly mirrors Plato’s classical dialectical enumeration of the alternative ontological hypothesis outlined in his *Parmenides*. Today, of course, no one is used to thinking of those recurrent metaphysical problems in terms of the theological language of creation. But by this point Dr Haj Yousef has outlined just how Ibn ‘Arabî, by carefully elaborating the complex literal indications of the Qur’an itself, is able to illuminate both the temporal and the ontological dimensions of the divine cosmogonic Origination of all things.

The fascinating ‘phenomenology’ of the human psychological and experiential dimensions of this cosmic creative process, we might add, is also the subject of even more fascinating discussions in Ibn ‘Arabî and later Islamic philosophers (as well as earlier Sufis and mystical thinkers). But the elaboration of that closely related topic would require another, equally wide-ranging and original study. So the author has prudently set that related issue aside while focusing on those dimensions of ontology and time most directly connected with the analogous approaches of modern theoretical physics that he outlines in his concluding, more speculative chapter.

This constantly challenging and thought-provoking study is clearly the fruit of years of research on one of the most difficult subjects to be found in the writings of one of Islam’s most seminal, creative, inspired, and notoriously difficult thinkers. So even those who may find Ibn ‘Arabî’s language and speculations difficult to follow will surely come away from their reading with a heightened

appreciation of the relative poverty, thoughtlessness and lack of sophistication in today's dominant public discourse about religion and science, and in our prevailing ways of conceiving and approaching these fundamental human issues of cosmology, ontology and theology.

James W. Morris, Boston College

Preface

Ibn ‘Arabî is one of the most prominent figures in Islamic history, especially in relation to Sufism and Islamic philosophy and theology. In this book, we want to explore his cosmology and in particular his view of time in that cosmological context, comparing his approaches to the relevant conclusions and principles of modern physics whenever possible. We shall see that Ibn ‘Arabî had a unique and comprehensive view of time which has never been discussed by any other philosopher or scientist, before or even after Ibn ‘Arabî. In the final two chapters, in which we shall discuss some of the ways his novel view of time and cosmology may be used to build a complete model of the cosmos that may deepen and extend our understanding of the world, while potentially solving some of the drawbacks and paradoxes in the current cosmological models of modern physics.

As we discuss in the opening chapter, there is no doubt that time is one of the most important issues in physics, cosmology, philosophy and theology, and hundreds of books and articles have been published in these fields. However, none of these studies had fully developed Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique view of time in its cosmological dimensions, although his conception of time is indeed central to understanding, for example, his controversial theory of the ‘oneness of being’. One possible reason for this relative neglect is the difficult symbolic language he usually used. Also, he did not discuss this subject at length in any single place in his extant works – not even in chapters 59, 291 and 390 of the *Futûhât* whose titles relate directly to time – so we must piece together his overall cosmological understanding of time from his scattered treatments in many works and different contexts within his magnum opus, the *Futûhât*, and other books. Therefore this book may be considered the first comprehensive attempt to set forth all the relevant dimensions of time in Ibn ‘Arabî’s wider cosmology and cosmogony.

In Chapter 2, after briefly discussing the different physical theories and models of the cosmos, we start by describing Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmos in some detail. Then we also give an extensive review of the different philosophical views of time and its properties from the philosophical and scientific point of view to show the importance of the subject and relate it to Ibn ‘Arabî’s model. Then, in Chapter 2, we begin to introduce Ibn ‘Arabî’s general concepts of time and ‘days’, which are then developed in greater detail in each of the succeeding chapters.

To start with, Ibn ‘Arabî considers time to be a product of our human ‘imagination’, without any real, separately existing entity. Nevertheless, he still considers it to be one of the four main constituents of existence. We need this imagined conception of ‘time’ to chronologically arrange events and what for us are the practically defining motions of the celestial orbs and other physical objects, but for Ibn ‘Arabî real existence is attributable only to the actually existing thing that moves, not to motion nor to time (or space) in which this motion is observed. Thus Ibn ‘Arabî distinguishes between two kinds of time – natural and para-natural – and he explains that they both originate from the two forces of the soul: the active force and the intellectual force, respectively. Then he explains that this imaginary time is cyclical, circular, relative, discrete and inhomogeneous. Ibn ‘Arabî also gives a precise definition – drawing on the specific usage of the Qur’an and earlier Arab conceptions of time – of the day, daytime and night, showing how these definitions are related to the relative motions of the celestial orbs (including the Earth), where every orb has its own ‘day’, and those days are normally measured by our normal observable day that we count on the Earth.

In Chapter 3 (and also in Chapter 6), we explain the central significance, in Ibn ‘Arabî’s notion of time and cosmology, of the divine ‘Week’ of creation, and we begin to develop some of its interesting consequences. To begin with, Ibn ‘Arabî considers the cosmic, divine Week, rather than the day or any other time unit, as the main primitive time cycle. Thus he explains how the world is created in seven (cosmic, divine) ‘Days’, what happens on each Day, and the underlying ontological relation between the Week’s Days of creation and the seven fundamental divine Names of Allah. Ibn ‘Arabî also shows that all the Days of this cosmic Week, including the last Day (Saturday), all actually occur in Saturday, the ‘Day of eternity’. This complex understanding of the ever-renewed divine creation in fact underlies his conception of the genuine unification of space and time, where the world is created ‘in six Days’ (from Sunday to Friday) as space, and then is displayed or manifested on Saturday in the process that we perceive as time. However, we perceive this complicated process of creation in Six Days and the subsequent appearance of the world on the seventh Day, we perceive all this only as one single moment of our normal time. In fact, on the basis of Qur’anic indications and the corresponding experiential confirmations of the mystical ‘knowers’ (*‘urafâ*) (later explained in Chapter 5), Ibn ‘Arabî insists that the entire created world ceases to exist immediately and intrinsically right after its creation, and that then it is re-created again and again. For him, this process of divine re-creation happens gradually (in series), not at once: i.e. it always takes six divine ‘Days’ to be prepared and the last Day to manifest. However, we – the creatures – do not witness this re-creation in six Days, since we witness the created world only in the seventh Day (Saturday, which he calls ‘the Day of eternity’). So the creation of the world in six Days actually happens every moment, perpetually and recurrently. Therefore, those first six divine Days are actually the creative origin of space and not time, which is only the seventh Day. In this novel conception, for the first time in history, the ‘Week’, as the

basic unit of space-time, will have a specific and quite essential meaning in physics and cosmology.

Even more important in Ibn 'Arabî's conception of time, however, is his understanding of the 'Day' of creation as a minimum indivisible Day, a kind of 'instant of time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) that also includes (since it includes all of creation) the instants of that normal day itself which we live in and divide into hours, minutes, seconds and so on. In order to explain this initially paradoxical notion, Ibn 'Arabî introduces – again initially mysterious Qur'anic on the basis of indications – the different nature and roles of three very different kinds of compounded days (the 'circulated' days, the 'taken-out' days and the 'inter-twined' days), which highlight the fact that the actual flow of time is not as uniform and smooth as we feel and imagine. The key concept underlying these complex developments is that Ibn 'Arabî emphasizes, following the Qur'an, that only one creative 'event' should be happening on every Day (of the actual cosmic, divine Days of creation), and not the many different (temporal and spatial) events that we observe. To reconcile this apparent contradiction between the unitary Act (and 'instant') of Creation and the apparent phenomena of spatial and temporal multiplicity, he reconstructs the normal, observable days that we actually perceive in a special manner that is complexly grounded in the different divine 'Days' of the actual flow of time. We shall explain his complex conception of these very different types of days in detail in Chapter 4.

The principle of perpetual re-creation, one of the more famous elements of Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology and cosmogony, is fully explained in Chapter 5, where we also take up the related question of Ibn 'Arabî's controversial theory of the 'oneness of being'. This theory can be easily understood once we have grasped his underlying conception of the eternally renewed creation in time. This comprehensive cosmological vision, when added to his understanding of the actual flow of time based on the three kinds of days described in Chapter 4, can be used to build a new unique model of the cosmos. This cosmological model, which we shall call 'the Single Monad model', is explained in Chapter 6. We shall see in this chapter that, according to this distinctive perspective on creation, the manifest world works exactly like a super-computer which – despite its tremendous speed – can do only one job at a time, where the display on the computer monitor is analogous to the manifest world: though we appear to see a complex, continually changing picture on the screen, that complex image is actually built one pixel at a time by one single electron-beam. This particular illustration helps us to grasp the actual functioning of Ibn 'Arabî's central conception of the ultimate oneness of being, despite the undeniable visible multiplicity of the world.

Finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to discussing some of the implications of the Single Monad model for various related principles of modern physics and cosmology, including the possibilities of testing such a cosmological model. We shall discuss in particular some of the known time-related paradoxes in current models of physics and cosmology, and how they may be resolved according to this novel view. It can be fairly said that Ibn 'Arabî's view of time and the cosmos is a fruitful concept that potentially bridges the gap between traditional

theological metaphysical views of the world and the contemporary scientific views that are based on experimental procedures and logic. In addition to explaining the ‘oneness of being’ and ‘creation in six Days’, other important results of Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique concept of time include the ways it helps to resolve the famous EPR paradox, thus potentially reconciling the two great theories of Quantum Mechanics and Relativity in modern physics, how it offers a new understanding of the historical Zeno’s paradoxes, and how it potentially explains the reason behind quantization, how quantities are either discrete or continuous.

Acknowledgement

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Abbreviations

This book is mainly based on Ibn ‘Arabî’s major comprehensive work *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkiyya*. Because we refer to this book often, we shall use a short reference style: each quotation from the *Futûhât* is followed by a reference in brackets: [X.000.00] which means: [volume.page.line]. When the line number is omitted – in rare cases – this means that the reference is in the entire page; in a few cases a range of a few pages is indicated as [II.229–231]. We have mainly used the standard edition of the *Futûhât* issued by many publishers based on a reproduction of the old edition of Bulaq 1329/1911 which comprises four volumes each about 600–700 pages of 35 lines; the page size is 20 by 27 cm (see the Bibliography). You should notice, however, that newer reset editions may be different although some of them are also in four volumes.

In addition to the *Futûhât*, we use short form of references to many other books by Ibn ‘Arabî (for example *Ayyâm Al-Sha’n* and *Al-Masâ’il*) and other related famous works (such as William Chittick’s two important works: *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* [SPK] and *The Self-disclosure of God* [SDG]) as explained in the Bibliography. In most of these cases we put the short form of the reference followed by the page number, with only two exceptions: for Osman Yahya’s classification of Ibn ‘Arabî’s books and for Ibn ‘Arabî’s *Al-Masâ’il*, where we refer to the listed item number instead of the page number.

All references to the Holy Qur’an are given also in the text and not in notes; after each verse quoted or meaning indicated in the text we add a reference (xx: y) where xx refers to the number of the Sura (chapter) and yy is the number of the Aya (verse). For the prophetic narrations we have mainly used *Kanz al-‘Ummâl* (*The Treasure of the Workers*) which includes most of the known *hadith* books, indexed and numbered according to the subject. We give the number of the *hadith* as [Kanz: 0000]. The table below shows the abbreviated references in the book.

Abbreviation*Kanz**Futûhât**Fusûs**Dîwân**Ayyâm Al-Sha'n**'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz**Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir**Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya**Al-Durraṭ Al-Baydâ'**Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya**Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya**Kitâb Al-Azal**Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi***Original book***Al-Muttaqî Al-Hindî* (1989) *Kanz Al-'Ummâl* (*The Treasure of the Workers*), Beirut:

Mu'assasat Al-Risâla

Ibn 'Arabî (n.d.) *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkîyya*, Vols 1–4, Beirut: n.p. (see above)*Ibn 'Arabî* (1946) *Fusûs Al-Hikam*, Cairo: n.p.; critical edition by Abu 'Alâ 'Affîfî*Ibn 'Arabî* (1996) *Dîwân Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyya, ed. Ahmad Hasan BasajTreatise number 5 in *Ibn 'Arabî* (n.d.) *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Ihyâ' Al-Turath Al-'Arabî; reprint of Hyderabad ed.*Ibn 'Arabî* (1919) *'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*, including *Kitâb Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir* and *Kitâb Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya fî Islâh Al-Mamlaka Al-Insâniyya*, Leiden: Brill, in *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-'Arabî*, ed. H. S. Nyberg*Ibn 'Arabî*, *Kitâb Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir*, in *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-'Arabî*, ed. H. S. Nyberg*Ibn 'Arabî*, *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya fî Islâh Al-Mamlaka Al-Insâniyya*, in *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-'Arabî*, ed. H. S. Nyberg*Ibn 'Arabî* (2002–04) *Risâlat Al-Durraṭ Al-Baydâ'* in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Mu'assasat Al-Intishâr Al-'Arabî, ed. Sa'id 'Abd Al-Fattâh, vol. II: 131–145*Ibn 'Arabî* (2000) *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya fî Al-Ahkâm Al-Ilâhiyya* in *Majmû'at Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Mahajjat Al-Baydâ', vol. II: 5–66*Ibn 'Arabî* (2000) *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya fî Asrâr Al-Taharât Wa-l-Salawât Wa-l-Ayyâm Al-Asliyya* in *Majmû'at Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Mahajjat Al-Baydâ', vol. II: 67–314Book 11 in volume I of *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Ihyâ' Al-Turâth Al-'Arabî, n.d.), which is a photographic reprint of the same famous collection published by the Dâ'irat Al-Ma'ârif Al-'Uthmâniyya (Hyderabad, 1948)Al-Hakîm, S. (1981) *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi: Al-Hikma fî Hudûd Al-Kalima* (*The Sufi Dictionary: The Wisdom in the Word*), Beirut: Dandarah

<i>SPK</i>	Chittick, W. C. (1989) <i>The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn Al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination</i> , Albany, NY: SUNY Press
<i>SDG</i>	Chittick, W. C. (1998) <i>The Self-disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn Al-Arabi's Cosmology</i> , Albany, NY: SUNY Press
<i>OY</i>	Yahya, O. (1964), <i>Histoire et classification de l'œuvre d'Ibn Arabi</i> , 2 vols, Damascus: Institut Français
<i>EP</i>	<i>The Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> , ed. by Paul Edwards (1967), 8 vols, New York: Macmillan Publishing
<i>EP²</i>	Bianquis, Th., Bosworth, C. E., Vandonzel E. J. and Heinrichs, W. P. (eds) (1987) <i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , 9 vols, Leiden: Brill

1 Cosmology and time

Cosmology is the science that studies the universe, the cosmos. *Cosmos* is a word used in earlier Greek metaphysical thought that means ‘harmony’ or ‘order’, as opposed to *chaos*. In one Greek theory of creation, *chaos* is the formless matter from which the *cosmos*, or harmonious order, was created (*EP*: ‘Cosmology’, II: 237–244; ‘Chaos and Cosmos’, II: 80–81). And time is one of the most fundamental issues in philosophy and cosmology, since the whole of existence is nothing but consecutive series of events in time. Everybody feels time, but most people do not question it because it is commonly experienced every day in many things and is so familiar. However, it is far more difficult to understand the philosophical nature of time and its characteristics.

Throughout the history of philosophy, many opposing views have emerged to discuss and describe the different aspects of time, and some novel hypotheses have eventually emerged in modern cosmology. However, it is still the dream of every physicist to unveil the reality of time, especially since all modern theories have come to the conclusion that time is the key.

1.1 A brief overview of early cosmological models

Beginning in the twelfth century, Arab scholars, scribes and various translators gradually introduced Europe to the science of astronomy as it had developed in Islamic civilization, based on earlier Hellenistic models (primarily Ptolemy and Aristotle). But once the Catholic Church had decided to adopt the Ptolemaic or Aristotelian geocentric¹ cosmological model as a theological principle, it considered scientists who criticized this model as heretics. Therefore, the Polish scientist Nicolai Copernicus (AD 1473–1544) circulated his heliocentric model anonymously, and his book *De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium* (‘On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Orbs’), was not published until 1543, just one year before his death. In this model, Copernicus postulated that the Sun and the stars are stationary and the Earth and the planets circulated around the Sun in circular orbits.²

It was not until 1609, when Galileo invented the telescope, that Aristotle’s and Ptolemy’s geocentric model of the universe was completely discarded by knowledgeable researchers, and replaced by the heliocentric model (Drake 1990:

145–163). At around the same date (1609–19), the scientist Johannes Kepler formulated three mathematical statements that accurately described the revolution of the planets around the Sun. In 1687, in his major book *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, Isaac Newton provided his famous theory of gravity, which supported the Copernican model and explained how bodies more generally move in space and time (Hall 1992: 202).

Newton's mechanics were good enough to be applied to the solar system, but as a cosmological theory it was completely false in so far as he still considered, like Aristotle, the stars to be fixed and the universe outside the solar system to be static. Although a dynamic universe could easily be predicted according to Newton's theory of gravity, the belief in the Aristotelian static universe was so deep and strong that it persisted for some three centuries after Newton (Seeds 1990: 86–107).

In 1718, Edmund Halley compared the positions of stars recorded by the Babylonians and other ancient astronomers with the latest observations and realized that the positions of some of the stars were not the same as they had been thousands of years earlier. Some of the stars were in fact slightly displaced from the rest by a small but noticeable amount. This is called 'proper motion', which is the apparent motion of the star (perpendicular to the line of sight) in relation to the background stars that are very far away. In 1783, William Herschel discovered the solar motion, the Sun's motion relative to the stars in its galactic neighbourhood. Herschel also showed that the Sun and other stars are arranged like the 'grains of abrasive in a grindstone' (Ferguson 1999: 162–165), which is now called the Milky Way galaxy. More than a century later, in 1924, Hubble was able to measure distances to some stars (based on the 'redshift'),³ and he showed that some bright dots that we see in the sky are actually other galaxies like ours, although they look so small because they are very far away (Hartmann 1990: 373–375).

The Aristotelian theory of a static universe (i.e. of all the stars) had to be reviewed after Hubble's discovery of the redshift of light coming from all distant stars, which indicated that everything in the universe is actually moving; just as Ibn 'Arabi had said many centuries before. In his bestselling book of the 1980s, Stephen Hawking says:

Even Einstein, when he formulated the general theory of Relativity in 1915, was so sure that the universe had to be static that he modified his theory to make this possible, introducing a so-called cosmological constant into his equations.

(Hawking 1998: 42)

This of course was soon proved to be wrong, and everybody now knows that the cosmos is in continuous motion. Einstein himself later considered this to be one of his greatest mistakes. Ibn 'Arabi, however, declared plainly that the stars cannot be fixed at all, and he even gave numbers and units to the speed of their proper motion [III.548.28, II.441.33], which are consistent with the latest accurate measurements.

After these developments, and with the advent of new technologies employed in making even more accurate observations, in addition to accelerated research in physics and astronomy, a whole new view of the cosmos finally replaced the ancient short-sighted ones. However, we cannot ever claim that all the questions have been answered and that we have drawn a fully correct picture of the cosmos. On the contrary, new sets of even more profound questions are still a riddle, such as dark matter and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox (see section 6.6).

Along with the vast amount of data collected by telescopes and space shuttles in recent decades, many new theories have arisen to try to explain those observations. The mere concepts of ‘time’ and ‘space’ were in focus especially after the strange and courageous ideas of Einstein about relative and curved space-time were proved by Eddington through the observation of the total eclipse of the Sun in 1918 in South Africa. Since then, other theories including Quantum Mechanics, the Field Theory, the Superstrings Theory, and Quantum Gravity Theory, have tried to discover and describe the actual relation between material objects and energy on one hand, and between space and time on the other hand. Yet no fully convincing view has ever been achieved.

1.2 Modern cosmology

Since Copernicus’ time, our view of the cosmos has grown both larger and more accurate. It is not our purpose here to explain the modern complicated theories of cosmology, but simply to summarize the present picture of the cosmos as seen by scientists. Our modern picture of the cosmos dates back only to 1924, when Edwin Hubble showed that our galaxy is not the only one in space; many of the faint spots of light that we see in the sky are in fact other galaxies as large as our own, but we see them so small only because they are extremely far deep in space.

Owing to the force of gravity, everything in the sky is moving or orbiting around some point in space. The Moon orbits around the Earth, and the Earth and other planets orbit around the Sun, which also orbits – along with other hundreds of thousands of millions of stars – around the centre of the Milky Way galaxy, which is in turn one of thousands of millions of galaxies all flying through the vast distances of space.

In order to give a clear spatial view of this immense universe, it is better to use big units of distance instead of using big numbers. The best accepted units of distance in cosmology are the ‘light year’ (9,500,000,000,000 metres), which is the distance travelled by light in one year, and the ‘parsec’, which equals 3.26 light years. Light travelling at 300,000 km/sec can go seven times around the Earth (which has a circumference of approximately 44,000 km) in one second, but it takes 8.33 minutes to reach us from the Sun (150,000,000 km). Proxima Centauri, the nearest star to us apart from the Sun, is about 4.24 light years away. Our galaxy, like most other galaxies, is a collection of about 200 billion stars plus thousands of clusters and nebulae that form together a disk of more than 100,000 light years in diameter, and that is about 15,000 light years

thick. The nearest galaxy to us lies in the Andromeda constellation, and it is about 2.9 million light years away. Then galaxies are grouped in somewhat irregular clusters that greatly differ in size from millions to hundreds of millions of light years. The most distant objects discovered so far are about 13 billion light years away. These numbers are simply approximate, just to give an idea of where we are (Hartmann 1990: 413).

It is now also well established that everything in the world is moving: nearby stars have proper motion, because they are pulled towards the centre of the galaxy, and galaxies are moving away from us, because the universe is expanding. On the other hand, and despite these various motions, the universe does not have a centre or edges. It is hard to imagine, but the universe is contained or curved around itself so that if you fly straight in one direction and keep moving in a straight line you will one day, if you live long enough, come back from the opposite direction to the same point (supposing no gravitational fluctuations), just as it would happen to a person travelling around the Earth.

The stars that we see in the sky are, just like our Sun, huge nuclear fusion reactors that are constantly converting hydrogen into heavier elements and hence producing heat and light. But not all stars are the same: some are big and some are small; some are young and some are old; some are bright and some are faint. Also, many stars are dying and many others are born all the time in a process of very complicated evolution (Seeds 1990: 134–281).

So how is all this explained according to the new cosmological theories? We can not discuss here all the different theories in physics and cosmology, but we want to make a quick summary of the basic principles of the different models of the cosmos so that we can understand the potential importance of the ‘Single Monad model’ which we are going to propose in the last chapter of this book, based on Ibn ‘Arabi’s unique understanding of time and his famous theory of the oneness of being.

1.3 Summary of modern theories of cosmology

After the amazing discoveries and the enormous amount of data obtained by telescopes and space shuttles, and with the success of the theories of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, scientists tried to build new cosmological models to explain the structure and origin of the universe on the basis of the new information. We shall give here a very short summary of the major theories of cosmology that have developed recently.

Scientists up to the beginning of the twentieth century believed in a stationary universe outside the solar system, but this was soon proved to be wrong. Actually the same theory that Einstein first tried to make fit a steady universe and fixed stars later proved that the universe is expanding. This implied that the universe had started at one moment, about 15 billion years ago, from a very small point, but with very high density, and then it expanded to its present state. This was called the ‘Big Bang’, and many cosmological models were developed on the basis of this view (Narlikar 1993: ch. 2, ch. 5).

The 'Steady State' theory tried to explain the expansion of the universe by supposing a continuous creation of matter that filled the space produced by the expansion, but the discovery of cosmic microwave background radiation in 1965 by Penzias and Wilson caused the Steady State model to be completely discarded. The background radiation was interpreted as the faint afterglow of the intense radiation of a 'Hot Big Bang', which had been predicted by Alpher and Hermann back in 1949, although some people also attribute it to Gamov back in 1946 (Dolgov *et al.* 1990: 11).

The problem with the background radiation was that all measurements showed it to be very uniform in all directions. This isotropy of the background radiation was a riddle because with homogeneity no stars or galaxies could be produced (Tayler 1993: 194). It was only in 1992 that NASA's Cosmic Background Explorer satellite (COBE) detected the first anisotropies in this background radiation: one part in a hundred thousand, which may indicate the seeds from which galaxies formed (Schewe and Stein 1992).

The Big Bang model was very good in explaining many of the observations, yet on the other hand there were many contradictions (Linde 1990: 4). Many of these theoretical contradictions were resolved by the 'inflationary scenario' devised by Alan Guth in 1979. Guth looked at a very early stage in the development of the universe from about 10^{-32} to 10^{-43} of a second after the initial creation. During this period matter was in very highly excited states, causing the most extreme conditions of high density and pressure which made the cosmos expand exponentially, filling the universe with an intense dense fire of particles and photons (Linde 1990: 42).

In classical (Newtonian) mechanics, one could predict the behaviour of a system if one exactly knew its initial state. But in Quantum Mechanics, we can only calculate the probability of how the system will evolve (White 1966: 29). In either case, however, the main problem in cosmology is to determine the initial state that the laws should be applied to. One successful approach to get round this problem is to work backwards by using the observed properties of the universe to deduce what it was like in an earlier state.

The problem with the inflationary theory is that, in order for inflation to have occurred, the universe must have been formed containing some matter in a highly excited state, but the next question is why this matter was in such an excited state. To overcome this, some scientists tried to apply Quantum Mechanics to the whole universe, and the result was the theory of Quantum Cosmology.⁴ This may sound absurd, because typically large systems (such as the universe) obey classical, not quantum, laws. Einstein's theory of General Relativity is a classical theory that accurately describes the evolution of the universe from the first fraction of a second of its existence up to now. However it is known that General Relativity is inconsistent with the principles of Quantum Theory, and is therefore not an appropriate description of the physical processes that occur at very small length scales or over very short times. To describe such processes we require the theory of Quantum Gravity.

In non-gravitational physics, the approach to Quantum Theory that has proved

most successful involves mathematical objects known as ‘Path Integrals’ that were introduced by the Nobel Prize winner Richard Feynman. In the Path Integral approach, the probability that a system in an initial state *A* will evolve to a final state *B* is given by adding up a contribution from every possible history of the system that starts in *A* and ends in *B*. For large systems, contributions from similar histories cancel each other in the sum and only one history is important. This history is the history that classical physics would predict. At any moment, the universe is described by the geometry of the three spatial dimensions as well as by any matter fields that may be present. Given this data, one can in principle use the Path Integral to calculate the probability of evolving to any other prescribed state at a later time. However, this still requires knowledge of the initial state.

Quantum Cosmology is a possible solution to this problem. In 1983, Stephen Hawking and James Hartle developed a theory of Quantum Cosmology which has become known as the ‘No Boundary Proposal’. In practice, calculating probabilities in Quantum Cosmology using the full Path Integral is formidably difficult and an approximation has to be used. This is known as the ‘semi-classical approximation’, because its validity lies somewhere between that of classical and quantum physics. In the semi-classical approximation, one argues that most of the four-dimensional (space-time) geometries occurring in the Path Integral will give very small contributions to the Path Integral and hence these can be neglected, so we can deal only with three dimensions (space). The Path Integral can be calculated by considering just a few geometries that give a particularly large contribution. These are known as ‘Instantons’ (from ‘the instant’, because it aims at omitting time, so it is like a snapshot that takes into account only the three co-ordinates of space), which describe the spontaneous appearance of a universe from literally nothing. In this way we do not have to think about the cosmos as something that takes place inside some bigger space-time arena. Once the universe exists, Quantum Cosmology can be approximated by General Relativity, so time appears.

Research in these areas is still ongoing, but one of the many outstanding problems in trying to construct a Quantum Field theory of gravitation concerns the appropriate interpretation of quantum states for configurations that make no overt reference to ‘time’. We shall see by the end of this book that Ibn ‘Arabî’s understanding of time could be a key to eliminating these peculiarities, because he simply views the world as an eternal existence that is perpetually being re-created. He also unified space and time in a manner that has apparently never been thought of before or since.

1.4 Preliminary outline of Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology

Ibn ‘Arabî (AH 560–638/AD 1165–1240) was a great Sufi thinker of the Middle Ages and one of the most influential authors in Islamic history, whose writings have deeply influenced Islamic civilization for centuries, and have more recently attracted wide interest in the West. The full name of Ibn al-‘Arabî (more com-

monly referred to in English without the definite article) is Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muhammad Ibn al-‘Arabī al-Hâtimī al-Tâ’î. He was born in Murcia (in eastern Andalusia), into a very pious and cultured family. When he was seven they moved to Seville, and at the age of 16 he ‘entered on the path’ (of Sufism). Then he travelled throughout and between Andalusia and Morocco for some years before a vision compelled him to go to the East. In 1201 he travelled to Cairo, al-Quds (Jerusalem), and finally to Mecca for pilgrimage. His many works eventually brought him fame, and sometimes notoriety, so that he was eventually sought out by Seljuq and Ayyubid princes and accompanied by a group of disciples. Later on he came to be popularly called *Muhyī al-Dīn* (‘Reviver of Religion’) and *al-Shaykh al-Akbar* (‘the Greatest Master’). He continued travelling throughout the Middle East until he settled in 1224 in Damascus, where he remained until his death in 1240.⁵

Ibn ‘Arabī’s two most famous and influential works are *Al-Futūhāt Al-Makkiyya* (*The Meccan Illuminations*), an encyclopaedic discussion of Islamic wisdom (Nasr 1964: 92–98), and the shorter *Fusūs al-Hikam* (*The Bezels of Wisdom*), which comprises chapters named after prophets who characterize different spiritual types. But Ibn ‘Arabī also wrote many other lesser known works, many of them now available in print, such as the *Kitāb Al-Tajalliyyāt*, *Tarjumān Al-Ashwāq*, *Mashāhid Al-Asrār Al-Qudsiyya*, *Mawāqī‘ Al-Nujūm*, *‘Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*, *Inshā’ Al-Dawā’ir* and *Al-Tadbīrāt Al-Ilāhiyya*, in addition to 29 shorter treatises published in the Hyderabad collection commonly known as the *Rasā’il Ibn ‘Arabī*, and many other shorter books and treatises. In one of his treatises, Ibn ‘Arabī himself listed 289 titles, which increase to 317 confirmed works when added to other titles he mentioned throughout his various books. More than 850 books have been attributed to him.⁶

Ibn ‘Arabī was not an astronomer, and was never interested in astronomy as a science. But as a Sufi and mystical theologian constantly inspired by the cosmological teachings and symbolism developed throughout the Qur’an and in a number of related Hadith (Prophetic sayings), he talks about planets and orbs and their motion as a structure Allah created on His Image (see section 3.2) and relates them to the divine Names. He uses cosmology to refer to the ways we acquire more knowledge of Allah. Apart from a few short treatises where he talks about some astronomical subjects mixed with philosophy and theology, Ibn ‘Arabī did not devote any special book to describing the heavens. Nevertheless, in his major book *al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya* (henceforth referred to as ‘the *Futūhāt*’), for example, we find many paragraphs that can be used to illustrate his profound view of the cosmos.

It can surely be said that Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of the cosmos is truly challenging, even as compared to the latest modern theories. For example, he clearly declared that the stars are not fixed at all, more than seven centuries before this was scientifically known, and he explained why we do not see their motion. Moreover, he gave numbers to the average velocities of the proper motion of stars as 100 years per arc degree, which is quite consistent with the measurements taken only few decades ago [III.548.28, II.441.33]; indeed he even used exactly the same unit of

measurement now being used (Smart 1977: 249) at a time when no such measurements were possible at all. He also explained the observed 'retrograde motion' of some planets and the formation of the planets in the solar system in a similar manner to what is widely accepted today [II.443.24, III.203.21]. But most important in this regard is that his view of the world is heliocentric, similar to what Copernicus suggested many centuries afterwards. He also clearly affirmed that the Earth is spherical, moving and rotating, and he also explained why people do not realize the motion of the Earth around its centre [I.123.17, II.441.33, III.548.21].

Ibn 'Arabî's unique understanding of the process and reality of ongoing creation has been discussed by many scholars in some details. Ibn 'Arabî himself mentioned in particular a number of key cosmological developments in chapter 371 and in the very detailed chapter 198 of the *Futûhât*, as well as in other cosmological books such as *Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir*, *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya* and *'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*. William Chittick has devoted an immense volume called *The Self-disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-'Arabî's Cosmology* (this will be abbreviated as *SDG*) specifically to Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology and ontology, in addition to some chapters of other books like *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabî's Metaphysics of Imagination* (this will be abbreviated as *SPK*), and also Henry Corbin discussed some aspects in his pioneering study, now entitled in English *Alone with the Alone. Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabî* (Corbin 1969: 184). Here we want to give a very short summary of Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology, in a way somewhat different from the approach followed by Chittick and Corbin. We only want to give a general description of his cosmological views, without too much further analysis and explanation, so that we can concentrate on the central subject of time in the rest of the book. Also we will leave the discussion of the ontological aspects of his cosmology to the following chapters (see in particular section 3.3). Here in the following we shall use the same figures Ibn 'Arabî drew in chapter 371 of the *Futûhât*, and the following broad cosmological account is mainly drawn from that chapter [III.416–448], along with a few paragraphs taken from the long chapter 198 [II.390–478] of the same work.

Ibn 'Arabî's universe comprises both the material and the abstract, spiritual or noetic ('*aqlî*') worlds. He says that the main reason for creating the cosmos is 'Love'. In explaining this underlying principle he often refers to a famous divine saying (the 'Hadith of the Hidden Treasure')⁷ which states that Allah 'loved' to be known in order to grant the creatures the privilege of coming to know Him. Thus Allah's love to be known is a Mercy (*rahma*) from Him that He wanted to grant to all His creatures. This Mercy is the first state of the presence of Allah with regard to the world to be created, and hence it formed the abstract place (or 'space') in which creations would appear. Following indications in another Prophetic Hadith, Ibn 'Arabî calls this abstract place *al-'amâ* ('the Cloud').⁸ According to his account, the reality of *al-'amâ* accepted the forms of the 'Roaming Spirits' (*al-arwâh al-muhayyama*) that Allah created directly, without any intermediaries. This direct creation caused these angelic Spirits to roam in the presence of Allah, knowing nothing but Him. They did not even know about

themselves (i.e. they had no self-consciousness). Allah appointed one of these spirits and granted him a special epiphany of divine Knowledge (*tajallī 'ilmī*) that engraved in him all that Allah wants to create in this entire cosmos until the Last Day. The other primal Spirits could not know about that. This initial epiphany caused this Spirit – which is then called the ‘Universal Intellect’ (*al-'aql al-kullī*) or the ‘First Intellect’ (*al-'aql al-awwal*) or also, using a central Qur'anic symbol, the ‘Higher Pen’ (*al-qalam al-a'ālā*) – to become aware both of himself and of the other Spirits, while they did not know about him.

Through this epiphany, the First Intellect saw himself composed of himself and of his further ability to realize or ‘intelligize’. He also saw that he has an ontic ‘shadow’ caused by the Light of that special epiphany, which was realized through the divine Name ‘the Light’ (*al-nūr*). This shadow is his ‘soul’, which is called the ‘Universal Soul’ (*al-naḥs al-kullīyya*) or the ‘First Soul’ (*al-naḥs al-ūlā*), or also the ‘Highest/Protected Tablet’ (*al-lawḥ al-a'ālā/al-mahfūz*), in which he is going to write what he knows is going to happen until the Last Day. The entire universe, then, is – to use a central Qur'anic symbolism – the ‘letters’ and ‘words’ of Allah that are produced through ‘the Breath of the All-Merciful’. We shall see in section 5.8 that the fundamental ‘blocks’ in the universe are ‘strings’ or vibrations (‘sounds’ or ‘notes’), which is similar to Ibn ‘Arabī’s notion of the hierarchy of the ‘men of breaths’ (*rijāl al-anfās*). Therefore it is not only a symbolism to say that the entire universe is the ‘letters’ and ‘words’ of Allah,⁹ and those words are continuously being written by the Highest Pen (the First Intellect) in the Highest Tablet (the Universal Soul). Figure 1.1 shows this Cloud and its contents down to the ‘establishing Throne’ (*'Arsh al-Istiwā*), which is different from the usual cosmological meaning of the divine (normal or usual) ‘Throne’. The ‘establishing throne’ is the throne on which ‘Allah established His authority’, alluding to the verse ‘*ar-Rahmān 'ala al-'arsh istawā*’ (20:5).

According to this account in chapter 371, the universe appeared in the Universal Soul through the Universal Intellect as the result of what Ibn ‘Arabī calls an ‘abstract (or ‘spiritual’) marriage’ (*nikāḥ ma'nawī*). This is because everything that happens as a result of to a particular cause is like a ‘son’ of this cause who is considered its ‘father’, and its ‘mother’ is the object where this ‘son’ appears or happens. Just as we are all (in our outer bodily dimension) the ‘children’ of Adam and Eve, all other things in the universe can be considered the ‘children’ of the Universal Intellect and the Universal Soul.

The Universal Soul has two forces mentioned in Figure 1.1: the ‘intellective force’ (*quwwa 'ilmiyya*) by which it perceives knowledge, and the ‘active force’ (*quwwa 'amaliyya*) by which it preserves its existence through motion. The first thing the Universal Soul gives rise to, as indicated in the same figure, is twofold: ‘the level of Nature’¹⁰ and the ‘Chaos’ (*al-habā'*: literally ‘the Dust’) or ‘the Prime Matter’ (*al-hayūlā al-ūlā*) [I.140.14]. From here on, Ibn ‘Arabī uses the symbolic conjugal imagery of the ‘wedding’ of generative elements and of ‘birth’ at each successive level of creation or manifestation. Thus the Universal Soul first begets Nature and then Prime Matter or Dust. Then Nature and Dust in




Figure 1.1 ‘The Cloud’ and what it contains, down to the ‘establishing Throne’.

Note

This diagram is translated from Ibn ‘Arabi’s drawing in chapter 371 [III.421].

turn beget their first ‘son’, which is called the ‘Universal Body’ (*al-jism al-kull*). This symbolic process of cosmic ‘births’ continues in a long and defined series of causes and results until it reaches the ‘soil’ (*turâb*) [I.140.17] which refers to physical matter in general. So the physical world appeared ‘after’ this Universal Body, while before that all was only spiritual.

As in Figure 1.3, the Universal Body seems to contain everything beneath it including the zodiac (with all the stars and galaxies). Alternatively, we can consider that the physical world is formed by (not ‘in’) the Universal Body because, like the Universal Intellect and Soul, this Body can be called the First Body because it was the first body to be created. In addition to that, the world both as material and spiritual is formed by the Single Monad through the continuous manifestations of this Monad. If we then consider that the First Body was the first ‘elementary particle’ to be formed by the Single Monad then the physical world is formed ‘by’ this First Body. The other possibility is that the Universal Body is

some sort of a huge cloud of matter in primary form, which then developed into stars and galaxies, in which case we could say that the physical world is formed 'in' the Universal Body. The first thing which was formed in (or by) the Universal Body was the 'Throne' (*al-'Arsh*) on which Allah established his authority (*istiwâ*)¹¹ from His Name 'the All-Merciful' (*al-Rahmân*), which means that all creatures beneath the Throne are to be granted the creative Mercy of their existence from Him. Therefore the first thing that the Highest Pen or First Intellect wrote in the Higher Tablet (the Universal Soul) was this 'Throne' in which the entire creation (the cosmos) is to appear. All this is shown in Figure 1.2.

Inside (or 'beneath') the divine Throne there appeared the 'Pedestal' (*al-Kursî*), whose relative dimensions and plenitude, in comparison to the infinitely vast noetic or spiritual dimension of the 'Throne', Ibn 'Arabî compares here to 'a tiny ring in a vast desert'. And within this 'Pedestal' is the 'Isotropic Orb' (*al-falak al-atlas*), which is shown to contain the sphere of the divisions of the




Figure 1.2 The establishing Throne and what it contains down to the Pedestal.

Note

This diagram is translated from Ibn 'Arabî's drawing in chapter 371 [III.422]. We give the title as it is in the original text, though the diagram shows the Prime Matter and the Universal Body, in addition to the Throne down to the Pedestal.

zodiac (*falak al-burûj*) and the sphere of the stars (*al-falak al-mukawkab*), including beneath them the separate orbs of the five planets, Sun, Moon, and the Earth. All this is shown in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4.

The Isotropic Orb or sphere is so called because it contains no stars nor yet any distinguishing feature; it is homogeneous in all directions. The sphere of the zodiac was the first orb to be created inside the Isotropic Orb, and its surface was divided by human convention into the 12 equal parts that are traditionally assigned to the various zodiacal signs. According to the diagram in Figure 1.3 and Ibn ‘Arabî’s comments on it in chapter 371 of the *Futûhât*, it is evident that he was ware of the large distances between the galaxies because the fixed stars are in our galaxy while the zodiac signs are other galaxies placed very far away. In this fast space Allah created the seven paradisiacal ‘Gardens’ (*al-jinân*, s. *janna*) named in the Qur’an, with their different states and levels marking the symbolic ‘meeting-place’ between the purely spiritual realities of the divine




Figure 1.3 The (divine) Pedestal and what it contains down to the constellations.

Note

This diagram is translated from Ibn ‘Arabî’s drawing in chapter 371 [III.423].




Figure 1.4 The orb of the constellations and what it contains down to the Earth.

Note

This diagram is translated from Ibn 'Arabi's drawing in chapter 371 [III.424].

Throne and the 'sensible' realities in the realm of the Pedestal. The specific names of each of the seven Gardens are taken from related verses in the Qur'an and Hadith, and they are different from the Seven Heavens or Skies (*samawât*) which are, for Ibn 'Arabi, the same seven celestial spheres where the five known planets plus the Moon and the Sun are, as shown in Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.3. The word '*al-Wasila*' that twice crosses all the seven Gardens (in Figure 1.3) corresponds to 'the highest level in (the highest Garden of) Eden, and it belongs (specifically) to the Messenger (Muhammad) of Allah' [I.319.14, also see I.658.30]. It is also known as '*al-maqâm al-mahmûd*' ('the commendable station'), and it was called '*al-Wasila*' ('the Intermediary', or 'the Way (of Approach to Allah)') because 'through It Allah may be approached' [II.87.9].

Then beneath the seven Gardens comes the orb of the (apparently) fixed stars, the constellations, and the 'houses' or 'mansions' (*manâzil*) of the Moon.

However, Ibn 'Arabî maintained that those stars are not fixed at all, but that our human time-scale is too short to notice their motion [II.441.33].

The orb of the fixed stars is (also conventionally) divided into 28 constellations or 'houses' through which the Moon appears to pass. Then inside this sphere of the stars, Allah created the 'seven (visible) heavens' (*al-samawât*) and the Earth. And here Ibn 'Arabî again points out that in relation to the divine 'Pedestal' (*Kursî*), the dimensions of our Earth together with the seven visible heavens are like a ring in a vast desert – just as the Pedestal stands in that same relation to the immensity of the divine Throne.

Then Ibn 'Arabî speaks at length (chapter 371 of the *Futûhât*) on the states and levels of the Gardens and Gehenna and other descriptions of the other world (*al-âkhira*). Here, however, we shall restrict ourselves to this very short summary of a few general relevant cosmological points, because of our focus on the concept of time.

First, we should note that Ibn 'Arabî, following normal Arabic usage, also calls the Sun and the Moon 'planets'. But at the same time he clearly distinguishes between the nature of the planets (including the Moon) and the Sun itself, observing that the Sun alone 'is responsible for illuminating all other planets above and below' [II.170.22]. As is normal in Arabic writings (including astronomical ones), he also calls the stars by the same term as 'planets' (s. *kawkab*), yet he also knows that those stars are like the Sun in that they emit their own light [I.217.18].

A first quick reading of Ibn 'Arabî's texts about the world might reveal the same traditional Aristotelian (geocentric) cosmological world-view because, like most other ancient cosmologies (and apparently the Qur'an and Hadith), he talks about 'seven (celestial) heavens' around or above the Earth, each inhabited by a planet (including the Sun and the Moon, as shown in Figure 1.4). But Ibn 'Arabî stresses in many places [III.548.21, I.123.17, II.441.33] that this is only the apparent view for a person who is sitting on the Earth, thus distinguishing between this apparent earthly view and the actual motion of the planets and stars themselves. So, for Ibn 'Arabî, Aristotle's view is a view of the world 'as we see it . . . while in itself it cannot be described like that' [III.548.31]. He stresses the central position of the Sun which he considers to be in the 'heart' (centre) of the seven heavens, and he emphasizes the superiority of the Sun over other planets that are even above it with relation to the Earth: 'So the elevation of this place (the Sun's orb) comes from its being the heart of orbs, so it is a high place for its status and the orbs that are above it in distance with relation to our heads, are still below it in status' [III.441.33]. His actual view of the (local) world is therefore in some sense 'heliocentric', at least in relation to the unique central status or 'rank' (*makâna*) of the Sun.

As for those areas of the sphere of the fixed stars and the visible constellations normally specified by the 12 signs of the zodiac or the 28 houses of the Moon, Ibn 'Arabî considers them as a mere convention, which do not necessarily relate to the actual positions of those particular stars. He says: 'The zodiac (constellations) are approximate positions, and they are houses for the moving

planets' [III.37.27]. And for the Moon he says that 'those stars are called "houses" because planets move through them, but otherwise there is no difference between them and other stars that are not houses. . . . They are only assumptions and proportions in this body (of the sky)' [III.436.30].

On the other hand, we cannot strictly separate the material world from the abstract or spiritual world, as they are really overlapped – or rather, all of the material worlds (of the 'Pedestal' and the visible heavens and Earth below) are effectively contained within the immaterial divine 'Throne'. This is why Ibn 'Arabî sometimes mixes the two views: for example he drew a pillar to refer to the Perfect Human Being, whom he considers to be the 'image of the Real' (i.e. of God) in the cosmos, so that without him the cosmos would collapse. He also speaks, following scriptural symbolism, about the seven heavens as being 'supported' on the seven (levels or regions of the) earths. But Ibn 'Arabî does not consider that to be the actual physical picture of things, because he clearly states that the Earth is spherical and that it rotates around its centre: 'but the motion of the Earth is not apparent for us, and its motion is around the middle (centre) because it is a sphere' [I.123.17]. He even nicely explains why we do not feel the motion of the Earth and the cosmos in general (stars). For example he says that people and most other creatures do not feel the motion of the cosmos because it is all moving so the witnessed dimensions don't change, and that is why they imagine that the Earth is stationary around the centre [II.677.21].

1.5 Time in philosophy and science, introduction

Everybody feels time, and most people do not question it because they experience every day and it is so familiar (Fraser 1987: 17–22). But if we want to understand the nature of time we have to answer many basic questions such as:

- What really is time?
- Can we stop it?
- Can we reverse it?
- Is the flow of time universal or is it related to the observer?
- When was the beginning of time, and does it have an end?
- Does time exist objectively, or is it only a construct of our imagination?
- What is the relationship between time and space?
- What is the structure of time?
- Is time continuous or discrete?
- What does the word 'now' or 'moment' mean?
- Why does time move into the past?
- What is the reality of the future?

These and many other similar questions have been the subject of philosophy, physics and cosmology for many centuries, with little progress in finding convincing answers. The question: 'What is time?' is more like the question: 'What is love?', because it is something that everybody can feel it, but no one can give

an exact definition of it. If you ask this question to many people, you will certainly get as many answers. St Augustine, in his *Confessions*, asks, 'What is time?' When no one asks him, he knows; when someone asks him, however, he doesn't know (*EP*, 'Time', VIII, 126).

The understanding of time was very important for early people both from the practical view, where they needed to anticipate major events such as floods and harvest time, and from the philosophical view, which is based on sheer curiosity and love of knowledge. Many religions and ancient philosophies, therefore, have tried to answer some questions about time. Some of these religions and philosophies consider time as circular with no beginning or end, some consider it as linear with infinite extension in the past and in the future, and others consider it as imaginary, while real existence is for motion or moving bodies only.

The concept of time is necessary when we ask about the chronological order of things and the duration of events. And because our life is full of events of all types, so time has its signature in all aspects of life. Some examples are: the ageing process in biology, timekeeping in mechanics, the arrow of time and entropy in thermodynamics, and the radically varying psychical time that one feels when waiting for something or in other circumstances. Therefore, in order to understand the reality of time, one needs to explore many closely related fields like physics, biology, psychology and cosmology.

In recent centuries, with the revolutionary new concepts in physics and cosmology in addition to modern technology, increasing accuracy of timekeeping became very important because it is the reference for the extremely complicated motions – of the different parts of a machine for example – that have to work together in coherence. The critical importance of timing events both on Earth and in space was enhanced by precise timekeeping machines like electronic clocks, atomic clocks, and pulsars which are fast-rotating stars that emit short radio pulses at regular intervals with extremely high precision. But despite the new abstract concepts about time like 'time travel' and the 'curvature of time' brought about by the theory of Relativity, our modern concept of time has usually remained quite practical because everything has to be done according to the clock. In fact, the modern theories of physics and cosmology have added more questions and paradoxes about time than they answered (Grünbaum 1971: 195–230).

In general we can detect two major opposing views in the philosophy of time:

- 1 the rational (realistic) view based on the physical understanding of the world
- 2 the idealistic (perhaps apparently 'irrational') view based on metaphysics.

Rationalists believe that the mind is the most powerful force of humankind and is able to understand everything in the world, while the irrationalists consider the world, including time, as something beyond the capabilities of our minds. For the idealist, nothing, including time, exists independently of the mind. Therefore the idealist believes that time is a construct of our mind and does not have a separate existence.

1.6 Time in Greek philosophy

Since the age of Homer, the Greek word *chronos* has been used to refer to time. Chronos was a Greek god who feared that his sons would take over his kingdom, so he ate them one after the other – just like time, which brings things into existence and then overtakes them.

We can already detect two clearly opposing views about time in the contrast between Plato's and Aristotle's schools of thought. Plato considers time to be created with the world, while Aristotle believes that the world was created in time, which is an infinite and continuous extension. Plato says: 'Be that as it may, Time came into being together with the Heaven, in order that, as they were brought into being together, so they may be dissolved together, if ever their dissolution should come to pass' (Cornford 1997: 99).

Aristotle, however, believes that Plato's proposition requires a point in time that is the beginning of time and has no time before it. This notion is inconceivable for Aristotle, who adopts Democritus' notion of uncreated time and says: 'If time is eternal motion must also be eternal, because time is a number of motion. Everyone except Plato has asserted the eternity of time. Time cannot have a limit (beginning or end) for such a limit is a moment, and any moment is the beginning of a future time and the end of past time' (Lettinck 1994: 562).

Thus time for Aristotle is a continuum, and it is always associated with motion; as such, it can not have a beginning (Lettinck 1994: 241–259, 361). Plato, on the other hand, considers time as the circular motion of the heavens (Cornford 2004: 103), while Aristotle said that it is not motion, but rather the measure of motion (Lettinck 1994: 351, 382, 390). Aristotle clearly relates rational time and motion, but the problem that arises here is that time is uniform, while some motions are fast and some slow. So we measure motion by time because it is uniform – otherwise it cannot be used as a measure. To overcome this objection, Aristotle takes the motion of the heavenly spheres as a reference, and all other motions, as well as time, are measured according to this motion (Badawî 1965: 90). On the other hand, Aristotle considers time as imaginary because it is either past or future, and both do not exist, while the present is not part of time because it has no extension (Lettinck 1994: 348).

We shall see in Chapter 2 that Ibn 'Arabî shares with Aristotle the idea of a circular endless time and that it is a measure of motion, but he does not consider it as continuum. On the other hand, Ibn 'Arabî agrees with Plato that time is created with the world. In fact Plato was right when he considered time to be created, but Aristotle refused this because he could not conceive of a starting point to the world nor to time. Only after the theory of General Relativity in 1915, which introduced the idea of 'curved time', could we envisage a finite but curved time that has a beginning. By this we could combine Plato's and Aristotle's opposing views. However, Ibn 'Arabî did that seven centuries before, and he also explicitly spoke about curved time a long time before Einstein.

1.7 Time in earlier Islamic philosophy

Muslim philosophers were in general greatly influenced by their Hellenistic predecessors, and therefore tried to apply their theories of time in relation to the related issues raised by the Qur'an and Prophetic Hadith. Many Muslim philosophers prior to Ibn 'Arabî, such as al-Kindî, al-Fârâbî, al-Râzî, al-Ghazâlî, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Ibn Sînâ (Avicenna), analysed and criticized or adapted the differing conceptions of time in the schools of Greek philosophy represented by Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus (Badawî 1965).

For example, al-Ghazâlî,¹² in his famous *Refutation of the Philosophers* (*Tahâfut al-Falâsifa*),¹³ dealt with most of the standard philosophical and logical arguments regarding time and creation, and his criticism was also thoroughly discussed in Ibn Rushd's famous philosophical rebuttal, the *Tahâfut al-Tahâfut*.¹⁴ However, one of the most influential Muslim philosophers who had many original views about time is Ibn Sînâ, who devoted long chapters in several works to discussing time and related issues according to the views of kalam theology and of previous philosophical schools.¹⁵

Ibn Sînâ¹⁶ started by summarizing the metaphysical positions of all previous (Islamic and other) philosophers¹⁷ and then criticizing their different ontological views. Although Ibn Sînâ, like Aristotle, closely relates time and motion, he stressed that motion is not the amount of time. He based his argument on the fact that different distances can be cut in the same time, or that the same distance can be done in different times, either owing to the difference in velocity or owing to stops on the way.¹⁸ But ultimately he does define time by motion, though he adds distance to overcome Aristotle's difficulty regarding periodicity (see previous section). He says that time 'is the number of motion when it separates into before and after, not in time but in distance, otherwise it would have to be periodical' (Nasr 1978: 224–226).

On the other hand, although Avicenna doubted the existence of physical time, arguing that time 'exists' in the mind only as a result of memory and expectation, he also showed that time is also real in the sense that it exists through motion which relates to physical matter; time is real, but it does not have a stand-alone essence, since it exists only through the motion of matter.¹⁹ On the issue of the structure of time, Ibn Sînâ affirms that it is a continuous quantity, since he (like Aristotle) considers time to be the amount of circular motion which is continuous, and thus time is divided only by our mind's illusion into 'moments' or 'instants' (*ânât*).²⁰

On the other hand, the proponents of kalam theology, particularly the Ash'arites,²¹ on the basis of their atomist view, consider time to be discrete, and they also talked about the re-creation of the world in time. Ibn 'Arabî acknowledges the positive insights in their position, but he also criticized their view as being incomplete (SPK: 97). We shall discuss Ibn 'Arabî's own view in detail in sections 2.8 and 5.6 below.

At the earliest stage of Islamic philosophy, the philosopher and mathematician al-Kindî²² was generally affected by Aristotle and adopted his view that

time is the number of motion.²³ However, arguing from the general Qur'anic principle that Allah is the One Who created the world, he asserted that the material world cannot exist *ad infinitum* because of the impossibility of an actual infinite. Therefore, he argued, the world requires an initial 'generator' (*muhdith*) who could generate it *ex nihilo*.

The famous Muslim physician and Neoplatonist al-Râzî,²⁴ on the other hand, seems to have adopted Plato's notion (in the *Timaeus*) that time is 'the moving form of eternity', as well as Plotinus' notion that time is eternal; therefore he refused Aristotle's view of the unreality of time.

The influential philosopher al-Fârâbî,²⁵ on his part, focused on the metaphysical aspects of time. He also adopted Aristotle's view when he said: 'only the circular motion is continuous and time is related to this motion' ('Abdul-Muta'âl 2003: 113). But similarly to Ibn 'Arabî, al-Fârâbî apparently also believed that the world is contingent or 'possible to exist' before its actual existence. Otherwise, if it were 'impossible' it would not exist, or if it were 'necessary', it would have always been. Then he stresses that the world *as a whole* is in continuous formation (*takwîn*) and corruption (*fāsād*) 'in no time', while the parts of the world are forming and deforming in time ('Abdul-Muta'âl 2003: 115). This outlook is also similar to Ibn 'Arabî's view (see section 2.3). To explain this important point we give the following illustration. If a young physicist was asked to describe the general state of a mountain, he or she might end up with some equations without any reference to time, because the mountain is rigid. But if we ask him or her to include in his study the fact that the mountain is part of the Earth which is rotating around its axis and orbiting around the Sun, and also the fact that the atoms in the rocks never rest, or even the motion of the insects and other animals that might be living there, as well as the motions of the wind, waters ... etc. – then in that case the physicist might need to invent some new mathematics in order to be able to include the time parameter properly in his or her equations, even after making many approximations. So because we live 'inside' the world we feel time, but the entire world itself is out of time.

Many other schools of Islamic thought have speculated on the issue of time. It is good to notice, however, that in the Qur'an itself Allah never makes any direct reference to the usual Arabic word for 'time' (*zamân* or *zaman*), although many other time-related terms later explored by Ibn 'Arabî – such as the year (*sana* and *'âm*), month (*shahr*), day (*yawm/nahâr*) and night (*layl*) – were mentioned very often in the Qur'an, in addition to some divine Names that are related to time such as the First (*al-awwal*), the Last (*al-âkhir*) and the Age (*al-dahr*).

As already noted in our Introduction, with all the hundreds of books and recent studies that have been written about time in Islamic philosophy, both in Arabic and in other languages, it is very strange almost none has ever focused on Ibn 'Arabî. Many scholars have studied and compared the different theological, philosophical and physical views of time and existence, so briefly summarized above. However, none of these studies has ever, to the best of our knowledge,

treated Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique concept of time, although – as we shall discover – it is actually the key to understanding his controversial theory of the oneness of being. The reason for this strange neglect could be not only his difficult and symbolic Sufi language but also the fact that his concepts are intentionally dispersed throughout his many writings and not plainly stated in one place, as most other authors do. In fact, Ibn ‘Arabî mentions in the *Futûhât* [I.141.13] that he wrote a treatise with the title of ‘*al-zamân*’ (‘time’) where we would expect to read at least an extensive summary of his view of time. However, apparently this precious work has been lost, although *al-Futûhât al-Makkiyya* seems to include most of his doctrine regarding time and other related cosmological issues.

1.8 Time in Western philosophy

Aristotle’s notion of circular time, based on an eternal (uncreated) universe, could not generally be accepted by most theologians of the three Abrahamic religions – Islam, Christianity and Judaism – in so far as they considered time to be linear, with a definite created beginning and end. St Augustine, and later Thomas Aquinas, objected to Aristotle’s belief that time is circular, insisting instead that human experience is a one-way journey from Genesis to Judgement, regardless of any recurring patterns or cycles in nature. This latter view was later adopted by Newton in 1687, when he represented time mathematically by using a line rather than a circle.

As we noted above, there was already an earlier debate in Greek philosophy as to whether time exists objectively, or is just constructed by our minds. Puzzled about time, St Augustine concludes that time is nothing in reality, but it exists only in the mind’s apprehension of that reality (*EP*, ‘Time’, VIII: 126). On the other hand, Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome both said that time exists in reality as a mind-independent continuum, but is distinguished into earlier and later parts only by the mind. Isaac Newton considered time (and space) as an independent quantity that exists and flows regardless of matter or mind, a view which Leibniz strongly criticized. Leibniz argued that if space is distinct from everything in it, it would have to be completely uniform and homogeneous; thus he reached the conclusion that it is unreal and relative, in anticipation of Einstein’s Relativity, though he never put that insight into the form of mathematical equations (Ross 1984: 47).

Newton also rejected Aristotle’s linkage between time and motion, when he said that time is something which exists independently of motion and which existed even before God’s creation. He argued that time, and space are an infinitely large ‘container’ for all events, and that the container exists with or without the events: this is called the ‘absolute’ theory of time. Leibniz, who adopted the relational view, objected to that and argued that time is not an entity existing independently of events.

In the eighteenth century, Kant said that our mind structures our perceptions so that space always has a Euclidean geometry, and that time has the structure of

the infinite mathematical line (Kant 1998: 158–176). This view, however, lost its mathematical support with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries in the 1820s.²⁶ In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant presented, in the first antinomy, two equally plausible arguments that at the end lead to opposing conclusions: the first shows that the world had a beginning in time, while the other shows that the world had no beginning in time. For the second proposition, if we suppose that the world had no beginning in time, then this means that, at any particular moment of time, an infinite number of events have passed – but infinity may never be completed. On the other hand, if the world had a beginning in time, then all previous times before that beginning have been blank, and there is no any specific reason why the world should have begun at this time in particular. (The same argument was earlier used by Leibniz in support of his relational theory of time.) We shall see in section 2.3 how Ibn Arabî gets out of these riddles by criticizing the questions themselves and asserting instead that Allah created (and is continuously and recurrently creating, see section 5.6) the world and time together (Kant 1998: 462–463, 470–476, 490–495, 525–528, 536–538).

In a famous article in *Mind*, McTaggart also argued about the unreality of time. Events, for McTaggart, are capable of being ordered in two ways: either as past-present-future, which he calls A-series, or as ‘earlier than’-‘later than’, which he calls B-series. He then argues that A-series is contradictory, and that B-series does not give all that is essential to time, because time also involves change. The A-series view of time is contradictory because, as McTaggart argues, it will lead to the fact that each event can be described (at different times) by future, present and past, because events are always flowing from the future to the past through the present, so at some times an event may be future then it becomes present and then past; while in the B-series it is always before other events or after other events, no matter whether those events are future, present or past (Dyke 2002: 137–152).

On the other hand, there has also been a great debate as to whether time is continuous or a discrete quantity. Most Western philosophers think of time as a continuous quantity, but after the advent of Quantum Mechanics the idea of quantum time was revived, although Quantum Theory itself does not consider time to be ‘quantized’ (Mehlberg 1971: 16–71).

1.9 Time in modern science

Quantum Field Theory and General Relativity are the most well-established modern fundamental theories of physics. According to these theories, space-time is a collection of points called ‘space-time locations’ where physical events occur. Space-time is a four-dimensional continuum, with physical time being a distinguished, one-dimensional sub-space of this continuum, but no longer a separate entity nor space: space and time are always taken together as one entity.

In 1908, the mathematician Hermann Minkowski, Einstein’s teacher, was the first person to realize that space-time is more fundamental than time or than space alone. As he put it:

The views of space and time which I wish to lay before you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics, and therein lies their strength. They are radical. Henceforth space by itself and time by itself are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality.

(Pais 1982: 152)

The metaphysical assumption behind Minkowski's remark is that what is independently real is what does not vary from one reference frame to another. It follows that the division of events into the past ones, the present ones and the future ones is also not independently real.

In contrary to the classical Newtonian view, time intervals depend greatly on the observer's frame of reference. In classical mechanics, and on the basis of common sense, if the time interval between two lightning flashes is 100 seconds on someone's clock, then the interval also is 100 seconds on your clock, even if you are flying by at an incredible speed. Einstein rejected this piece of common sense in his 1905 special theory of Relativity when he declared that the time interval (and the distance) between two events depends on the observer's reference frame. He says that every reference-body has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event (Einstein 1920: ch. 9). Thus each reference frame (or reference-body) divides space-time differently into its time part and its space part.

1.9.1 Curved time and the Big Bang

In 1922, the Russian physicist Alexander Friedmann predicted from General Relativity that the universe should be expanding. In 1929, Hubble's measurements of the redshift confirmed this prediction. Eventually astronomers concluded that about 12 to 15 billion years ago the universe was in a state of infinite density and zero size; this is the Big Bang theory referred to earlier in this chapter. So we might ask the simple question 'What was there before the Big Bang?' Astronomers, however, showed that the entire universe, including time and space, was created in the Big Bang, and because of the extremely high density of matter at that instant, the gravitational force was immense and the space-time was curved, or encapsulated around the point from which the Big Bang was ignited.

In physics and modern philosophy, descriptions of the Big Bang often assume that a first event is also a first instant of time and that space-time did not exist outside the Big Bang. But it is not clear if it is correct to call the Big Bang an 'event', because events must have space and time co-ordinates, but space-time started with the Big Bang itself. However, for the first time in science there is a mathematical description of the ontological relation between time and the universe. We shall see that this description is in good agreement with Ibn 'Arabî's own views on time (section 2.3).

However, there are serious difficulties in defending the Big Bang's implications about the universe's beginning. Current theories do not have any claims as to what might have happened before the Planck era (10^{-43} seconds after the Big Bang). It is expected that the theory of Quantum Gravity might provide information about that, and it may even allow physicists to speculate on what caused the Big Bang. But until now this area remains solely in the domain of theological and metaphysical speculation.

1.9.2 *The arrow of time*

Unlike physical space, physical time is inherently directional: it flows in one direction, from the future to the past; this is a necessary truth. In thermodynamics the arrow of time for the world is expressed through what is called the 'entropy', which is a description of the degree of order of a system; a highly ordered system is said to have smaller entropy, and vice versa. The world's entropy is always increasing (i.e. its order is decreasing): this is a free 'one-way ticket', and one has to pay dearly for the return. For example, the process of mixing hot water into cold water to get warm water is never reversed, though in principle we may think of some complicated machine that can do the reverse. The arrow of an irreversible physical process is the way it normally goes, the way it normally unfolds through time.

The problem with the arrow of time is that the variable time is symmetric in most equations of physical laws. This means that, if the variable t is replaced by its negative $-t$ in those laws, the result is still a law; the basic equations are unchanged. Some scientists theorize that the cosmological arrow of time will one day reverse direction when the force of gravity will halt the further expansion of the universe and start a collapse to its initial state, just like a movie played backwards (Price 2002: 19–56).

1.9.3 *Time travel*

One of the most fascinating consequences of the theory of Relativity is that it allows travel through time, just as one travels through distance. This has been employed by science fiction to produce many interesting films and science fiction stories.

Although reversing the direction of the 'arrow of time' still seems to be experimentally impossible, this happens quite often in dreams and in remembering past events. However, philosophers have been more interested in travel in physical time than in psychological time. On the other hand, we can also 'really' look at the past any time: by looking at the stars, where we actually see how they have been thousands and millions of years ago when the light that we see now was actually emitted by them. But this is still not like travel in physical time, which is conceivable now only in theoretical cosmology.

Although travel in time is possible and allowed according to the equations of Relativity, in many cases it violates logic and causes obvious paradoxes. There

are, however, different types of time travel, some of which are trivial. If you get on a plane on the Earth's surface and travel west, you will cross a time zone and instantly go back an hour, but all you have done is to change your reference frame. Also, if your body were quick-frozen in the year 2000 and thawed in 2050, then you would travel forward 50 years in clock time but only a few seconds of your biological time. This is, however, just a case of biological time travel, not a case of physical time travel.

One possible, and more genuine, way to travel through time is to fly at enormous speeds close to the speed of light. Einstein showed that travel forward in physical time is possible relative to the time of those who move more slowly than you. With this kind of relativistic time travel, you cannot return to the old present, but you can conceivably be present at the birth of your great-grandchildren. Travel backward in physical time is also possible only if nothing that has happened gets changed. For example, you cannot go back in time and prevent your parents from having any children (Arntzenius and Maudlin 2002: 169–200).

Another kind of time travel is caused by the curvature of time due to extreme gravity. If you fell into a black hole, then you would travel to a time after the end of the universe, as measured in a reference frame tied to Earth. Unlike the time travel in science fiction movies, this kind of relativistic time travel to the future is continuous, not abrupt. That is, as you travel to the future, you exist at all intervening times according to the stationary Earth clock. You do not suddenly 'poof' into existence in the year 4500; you existed during their year 4499, but your spaceship had not yet landed.

Going back to the past is probably possible, but there are significant difficulties yet to be overcome before we can be sure. In recent decades, mathematicians and theoretical physicists have described time machines, or at least universes containing backward time travel, that are consistent with Einstein's equations of general relativity. However, Stephen Hawking believes that all these time machines are ruled out by the laws of General Relativity.

For Ibn 'Arabî, time travel is possible and easily attainable without any paradoxical consequences. Such time travel, however, has no physical or biological effects on the traveller – see the discussion in section 2.7 below.

1.9.4 Quantum time

Regarding the question of 'instants' of time, time being a linear continuum implies that there is a non-denumerable infinity of them. This means that between any two instants there is a third; time is continuous. However, for times shorter than about 10^{-43} seconds, the so-called Planck time, science has no experimental support that time holds its continuousness. But physicists agree that General Relativity must fail for durations shorter than the Planck time,²⁷ though they do not know exactly how and what is the substitute.

The idea that space or time (space-time) could be discrete has been recurring in scientific literature recently, but its origins go back to ancient philosophies.

The new concepts brought about by Quantum Mechanics (e.g. the concept of indeterminacy or the uncertainty principle) suggested that space-time could be also quantized like energy. This was reinforced by the discovery of ultraviolet divergences in Quantum Field Theory (Zee 2003: 145–151), though many of the strange quantum concepts soon became acceptable aspects of continuum physics. In the 1980s, powerful computers inspired some new discrete thinking in physics. Complicated mathematical simulations performed on these super-computers paved the way for lattice theories to be applied to Quantum Mechanics, and included Quantum Gravity. In Quantum Gravity, Planck's length is a minimum size beyond which no accurate measurements can be performed.

Hawking, however, sees no reason to abandon the continuum theories that have been so successful. But it may be possible to invent a discrete structure of space-time without abandoning the continuum theories if the discrete-continuum duality can be resolved, just as the wave-particle duality has been resolved by Quantum Mechanics.²⁸

The practical methods of the quantization of time in modern scientific theories are based on some complicated mathematics such as lattice theories and cellular automata that are beyond the scope of this introduction (Wolfram 2002: 771). But it is good to note here that Ibn 'Arabî's quantization of time, as we shall see in section 2.8, is unique and is based on a broader cosmological view (of the oneness of being) such that discreteness and continuousness are special cases of it (see also section 7.5).

1.10 Introducing Ibn 'Arabî's view of time

As we shall see in Chapter 2, Ibn 'Arabî considers time to be imaginary and without real existence; it is only a tool used by the mind to chronologically arrange events and the motion of the heavenly spheres and physical objects. Ibn 'Arabî then distinguishes between two kinds of time: 'natural time' and 'paranatural time'. He also explains that the origin of this ultimately imaginary time is from the two forces of the soul: the active force and the intellective force.

Despite time being imaginary, Ibn 'Arabî considers it as one of the four main constituents of nature: *time*, *space*, the *monad* (*al-jawhar*), and the *form* (*al-'arad*). Like some modern theories, Ibn 'Arabî also considers time to be cyclic, relative and inhomogeneous.

Ibn 'Arabî then gives a precise definition of the 'day', the 'daytime' and the 'night' and generalizes that, in relation to all (real and imaginary) orbs or spheres, every orb has its own 'day' and those days are measured by our normal day that we count on the Earth.

On the other hand, Ibn 'Arabî gives special importance to the cosmic 'Week', and says that the seven cosmic week-Days are unique and not alike. Saturday (*al-sabt*) in particular has a special importance, because he considers it to be the 'Day of eternity', so that the observable week days, including Saturday itself, are therefore happening in Saturday! This initially may look rather confusing, but it should become easier to understand, especially after we explain Ibn 'Arabî's

view of the re-creation principle and his theory of the oneness of being which we discuss in detail in Chapter 5.

Finally, what is very important and unique about his view of time is that Ibn ‘Arabî considers time to be discrete: there is a minimum indivisible ‘day’ or ‘time’ – and thus, surprisingly, this ‘day’ is equal to the normal day itself which we live and divide into hours, minutes, seconds and much less than that! This conception at first looks very strange and ambiguous, but, in order to explain this, Ibn ‘Arabî introduces three kinds of days, depending on the actual flow of time that is not so uniform and smooth as we ordinarily imagine. The key point here is that Ibn ‘Arabî stresses that, according to the Qur’an, *only one ‘event’* should be happening every ‘day’ (of the actual days), and not many different events as we observe. To achieve his deeper understanding of this key Qur’anic expression, he reconstructs the underlying reality of the normal days in a special way from the different days of the actual flow of time, as we shall discuss further in Chapter 4.

Also on the basis of a number of key verses in the Qur’an, Ibn ‘Arabî says that the world ceases to exist instantly and intrinsically the next moment right after its creation, and then it is re-created again and again. We shall see that Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of time and how it flows is precise and unique; it has never been suggested or discussed by any other philosopher or scientist. This distinctive cosmic vision of ‘ever-renewed creation’, when added to the understanding of the actual flow of time based on the three kinds of days alluded to above, can be used to build a new unique model of the cosmos which we shall discuss in Chapter 6 and we shall discuss some of the consequences of this model in Chapter 7.

2 General aspects of Ibn ‘Arabî’s concept of time and days

*Time, if you investigate what it comes down to, is something verifiable;
Yet it is known (only) through (human) imaginations (awhâm),
Its power is like Nature in its effects,
Though the essence of both is non-existing.¹
Through it all things are determined,
While it itself has no existing essence by which it could be judged.*
[I.291.1–7]

We have seen in the previous chapter that time is one of the most important perennial problems in physics and cosmological philosophy. For the same reason, we find that Ibn ‘Arabî considers that a good understanding of time is the prime key to human spiritual realization. In this chapter we shall look at the various relevant aspects of Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of time. We want to give here some general descriptions of his ideas on time, and we shall focus on the important issues in the following chapters. For this reason there are many cross-references to following chapters where these ideas are explained in more detail.

2.1 What is time?

To start with, Ibn ‘Arabî declares that time is an imagined attribute that does not exist on its own; it has no separate physical or non-physical entity. He argues that ‘time in relation to us is like eternity in relation to Allah, and since eternity is a negative attribute² that does not exist on its own, so time in relation to the contingent world or the entire cosmos is (also) an imagined attribute that does not exist’ [I.291.28].

In his major book *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkiyya*, he says: ‘we showed in this book and in our book *The Time (al-zamân)* (OY, no. 838) that time is something that has no (real) existence’ [I.490.17]. Although this last book is not found today, Ibn ‘Arabî’s concept of time is developed in quite detailed fashion in the *Futûhât*, though it is scattered all around the book and not placed in specific parts, including even those chapters 59, 291 and 390 whose titles relate directly to time.

The concept of time is needed to compare the sequence of events or motion, but real existence is attributed only to the thing that actually moves, not to the abstractions of motion, time or space in which motion is observed:

And time and space are also a consequence of natural bodies, but time is something imagined that does not exist (in itself), but is introduced by the motion of orbs and localized things when we ask about them 'when'. So time and space do not exist in reality, but existence is to the things that move and still.

[II.458.1]

This is not only to say that 'motion', 'space' and 'time' do not have real physical existence, but they do not even exist separately in an abstract way: their existence is a mere illusion; it is only a projection of the human imagination (*wahm*).

It is not very easy to deny the existence of time, space and motion, since they are widely encountered in our experience of everyday life. However, Ibn 'Arabi is not the first one to propose this. We shall see below that Aristotle gives a very simple proof that time is not real. The real existence of motion and space, however, are far more unusual and intricate to disprove. Perhaps only Zeno (b. c. 488 BC) was brave enough to postulate the illusion of motion, and he composed many related riddles that are still logically unsolvable. The main idea behind Ibn 'Arabi's mysterious conceptions here is his controversial theory of the oneness of being, which we shall discuss throughout this book, especially in Chapter 5. But, clearly, if we suppose that the 'real' existence in the world is uniquely one, there would be no meaning to motion, and hence to time and space; or at least they would have to be redefined. We shall discuss in Chapter 7 that Zeno's paradoxes can be easily resolved according to Ibn 'Arabi's profound view of time under his theory of the oneness of being.

Coming back to time, we can say that it can be very easily shown that it is in fact imaginary. Aristotle says in his *Physics* that 'time consists of two parts, one of which has existed (and gone, i.e. the past), the other does not yet exist (i.e. the future), so how can something exists which is composed of what does not exist?' (Letting 1994: 348)

So if there is a *real* existence to time it will be in the *present* (the 'now'), not the past or the future. Aristotle then gives another argument that also the 'now' is not time. The present is not time, but it is rather a point in imaginary time, like a point on the line; although the line is composed of points, still each point is not a line.³ Likewise time is the sum of all present moments that exist only one by one, and each one present moment (alone) is not time. Time therefore is the mind's projection on the continuous presence from the future to the past through the present.

Similarly, Ibn 'Arabi gives a straightforwardly profound meaning of time. In the title of chapter 390 of the *Futûhât*, he says: 'the time of a thing is its presence' [III.546.16]. Then he explains that the time of the Lord is the 'servant' and the time of the servant is the Lord (*al-rabb*) [III.547.31], because the Lord

deserves to be given this name by the servant, since He would not be called 'Lord' if there are no servants to worship Him; likewise the servant deserves his name by (his relation to) the Lord. In the same way, when we say for example: 'Amr is the son of Zaid', this means, according to Ibn 'Arabî, that the time of the fatherhood of 'Amr is the sonhood of Zaid, and vice versa. Or in Ibn 'Arabî's own words: 'the time of the father is the son, and the time of the son is the father' [III.547.36]. That is why Ibn 'Arabî gave this chapter (390) the title 'The time of a thing is its presence, but I am out of time and You are out of time, so I am Your time and You are my time'. This means: 'I am Your presence and You are my presence.'

'Time' in the usual common sense is actually a tool used by our perception to classify the events or motion of objects chronologically; it would not have any meaning without motion or change. This is why we do not feel time while we are asleep; we have to look for some kind of a standard reference motion (the Sun, the Moon, the stars or a watch) in order to realize how much of time has elapsed since we went into deep sleep. Time, therefore, has no real absolute meaning; it is only used relative to something in order to describe its state of existence. This is why Ibn 'Arabî sometimes uses the words 'time' and 'state' as synonyms, as when he says: 'as you like (you can) say from the time of its existence, or the state (*hâl*) of its existence' [II.281.11].

So the real meaning of time is reduced to the existence of the world in the 'present moment', which has no duration or extension, because the future and the past are mere imagination. If we know that, Ibn 'Arabî declares, there is no problem to go along with people and say that 'time' is the daytime and night, or that it is a duration taken by the motion of objects, or it is comparing an event to another when someone asks about it by 'when?', because these definitions have been widely used and they are correct in relation to time, in the common sense [III.548.7]. As Ibn 'Arabî says in chapter 59 of the *Futûhât*, which is titled 'On knowing existing and assumed time', people have used the word 'time' (*zamân*)⁴ in many different ways: most philosophers, for example, use it as the duration taken by the motion of orbs. Muslim theological scholars, on the other hand, use it to order events sequentially. But generally *zamân* in Arabic means the night-time (*layl*), and the daytime (*nahâr*). Also Ibn 'Arabî himself sometimes uses the word *zamân* to mean the daytime and night [I.141.5]. But this is more than just a convention, because, as we shall see below and in the following chapter, the (divine) 'day' (*yawm*) is for him the main indivisible unit of time. So if time has any real existence it exists as the divine 'days' (of each real instant), not as the hours or seconds we conventionally use. It is also worth mentioning here that, unlike the day (*yawm*) or daytime (*nahâr*) and the night (*layl*), the word 'time' (*zamân* or *zaman*) was never used in the Qur'an.

Despite the fact that he considers time to be imagined and having no real existence, Ibn 'Arabî stresses that it is one of the four 'mothers (fundamental principles) of existence': the formable monad (*al-jawhar al-suwarî*),⁵ the accidental form (*al-'arad*),⁶ time (*al-zamân*) and space (*al-makân*).⁷ Everything else in the manifest world is combined of these four parameters [III.404.22]. He also

argues that those four parameters – together with another six categories that are derived from them: *fā'il*, *munfa'il*, *idāfa*, *wad'*, *'adad*, *kayf* – are enough to describe the state of everything in the world. Together these make up the familiar ten Aristotelian categories: i.e. substance (*jawhar*), quantity (*kamm*), quality (*kayf*), relation (*idāfa*), time (*matā*), place (*ayna*), situation or position (*wad'*), possession (*lahu*), or state (*jidda*), passion (*yanfa'il*) and action (*yaf'al*) – although the meaning of *jawhar* here is of course radically different from its usual Aristotelian usage, reflecting in this case the kalam inspiration of Ibn 'Arabi's terminology (*EP*, VI: 203, 'Al-Makûlât', and: *EP*, II: 46, 'Categories'). Yet those four 'mothers of existence', including the formable monad, in Ibn 'Arabi's distinctive conception of the oneness of being, are nothing but imaginary forms or reflections of the unique 'Single Monad' (*al-jawhar al-fard*) which is the only thing that can be described as having a real existence: all other things in the world are different forms of this Single Monad, including 'vision and the visible, hearing and the heard, imagination and the imaginable, thinking and the thinkable, . . . etc.' [III.404.12]. This latter concept reflects Ibn 'Arabi's controversial theory of the oneness of being.

The importance of understanding the reality of time is, therefore, to provide the link between the *actual* unity of this Single Monad and the *apparent* multiplicity of the witnessed world. That is why Ibn 'Arabi says that:

the knowing of time is a noble knowing through which eternity (*al-azal*) is truly known. . . . But only the Solitary Sages⁸ among 'the True Men' know it (eternity). This (reality) is known as 'the First Age' (*al-dahr al-awwal*) or 'the Age of ages' (*dahr al-duhûr*). From this eternity (*al-azal*), time comes into existence.

[I.156.34–157.1]

Therefore, we may summarize that time as we ordinarily experience it is defined by motion, and motion is defined by the different positions of the formable monads, and those monads are different states (times or instances) or forms of the Single Monad, which alone has a real existence.

2.2 Physical time and spiritual time

Ibn 'Arabi distinguishes between two kinds of time: physical or 'natural time' (*zaman tabi'i*) and spiritual or 'para-natural time' (*zaman fawq-tabî'i*). The first is used to compare the motion of bodies and orbs, while the latter is used to compare the changes in spiritual states, such as realizing and knowing. He explains that the existence of time does not necessarily require the existence of matter [IV.337.5], because there is time that is associated with material motion that is under the effect of Nature, and time that is associated with immaterial motion that is above the effect of Nature: i.e. in the spiritual world. Thus he says that 'you should know that some of time is above Nature and some of it is below Nature' [I.377.12], and he explains further by saying that the time that is under

Nature 'is defined by the motion of orbs . . . and the time that is beyond Nature is defined by (spiritual) states' [I.477.12]. So when Ibn 'Arabî says: 'and the origin of the existence of time is Nature, whose state is below the Universal Soul and above the Universal Dust' [III.548.19], this actually refers to natural time which is used to compare the motion of bodies and orbs – while spiritual time is used to compare the change of spiritual states, and its origin preceded the existence of the physical world.

We can fairly say that Ibn 'Arabî's conception of natural time is the time known in physics and cosmology, and that his spiritual time resembles what is called by many modern philosophers 'psychological time'. The psychological time is our feeling of time's passage even when everything around us is standing still, including ourselves: we feel this time because our inner state is continuously being updated through changes in our consciousness, unless we fall into deep sleep, as happened for example with the 'people of the cave' (*ahl al-kahf*) who stayed over three hundred years in deep sleep, yet when they awoke they thought it was like a day or part of a day (Qur'an 18:9–25, see also [II.9.21]).

Physical time seems to flow uniformly and continuously (at least locally), while psychological time depends greatly on the mood, as Ibn al-Fârid suggested nicely in one of his poems:

With her for me a year is like a glimpse,
and an hour of parting for me is like a year.
(Mahmûd 1995: 344)

Also Ibn 'Arabî says that 'minutes are years while sleeping' [IV.337.1], and we shall discuss this relative aspect of 'para-natural', psychic time in section 2.7.

2.3 The origin of the world

Many people ask questions like 'what is the age of the universe?' or 'when did the world begin?' And many cosmologists go along with these questions and give estimates for the age of the physical universe (today, usually about 15 billion years). Any answers to such questions will quickly lead to a modern version of the still-ongoing debate between Plato's and Aristotle's schools already mentioned in Chapter 1: i.e. whether time was created in or before the world, or vice versa; or whether they are both eternal. Many riddles and paradoxes quickly emerge out of this debate. For example, one may ask: if the world started at a certain point of time, why God chose that time in particular? Could the world have been created ten minutes before or after that designated time? And what was God doing or what was happening before the beginning of the world?

Ibn 'Arabî, however, shows that such questions are meaningless, because the world is created out of time, and time itself is part of that created world. Allah did not create the world in time, because nothing existed 'before' the world apart from Him Who is also out of time, and therefore the creation of the world can

not be compared to other events in time. The existence of the Creator precedes the existence of the world *logically*, and not chronologically, so it is like when we say 'the day starts when the Sun rises': there is no duration of time that separates sunrise from the start of the day [I.100.26, *Al-Masâ'il*, no. 25], but logically the day would not start if the Sun did not rise. The existence of Allah, Who is Pre-Existent (*Qadîm* or *Azâlî*) and Self-Existent (*Qayyûm*), is a precondition – not a cause – for the existence of the world. Therefore, because the world was created out of time (not 'in' time), the above questions are invalid. All such questions use time phrases that have no meaning outside of that time which appeared in or with the world and not before it.

Ibn 'Arabi showed this clearly by explaining that:

The fact of the matter is that the existence of the Real is not determined (temporally or causally) by the existence of the world: not temporally before, with, or after, because temporal or spatial precedence with relation to Allah is confronted by the realities confronting whoever speaks about it factually – unless they say something by the way of illumination, as had been said by the Messenger, peace be upon him, or it was expressed in the (divine) Book. For not everyone is able to experience the unveiling of these realities. We can only say that the Exalted Real exists by Himself and for Himself; His existence is absolute, is not confined by any other than Him, and is not caused by something nor is He the cause of anything – But He is the Creator of causes and results, *the King, the Most-Holy One* (59:23), Who always is and has been.

The world exists *through Allah*, not by itself or for itself. Therefore the existence of the Real Who exists by Himself is a determining condition for the existence of the world, which would not exist at all without the existence of the Real. And since time can not exist without the existence of the Real and the (divine) Source (*mabda'*) of the world, therefore the world comes to exist 'in other-than-time'. So actually we can not say, in the true reality of things, that Allah existed before the world – because it has been established that 'before' is a time phrase, and there was no 'time' (before the existence of the world). Nor can we say that the world existed after the existence of the Real, since there is nothing (other than the Real) 'after' or 'with' the existence of the Real, because He caused (everything else) to exist and is making it and originating it (in the words of a famous hadîth) 'while there was no thing (with Him)'.

So as we said, the Real exists by Himself and the world exists *through* the Real. But if someone governed by his imagination (*wahm*) should ask 'When was the world (created) after the Real?' we would say that 'when' is a time-question. But time belongs to the realm of relations (*nisab*, see: *SDK*: 35) and (as such) is created by Allah, but not like the creation of existence, because the realm of relations is created by (our human) 'estimation' (or consideration: *taqdîr*), not by the creation of what exists . . . Therefore this question is not valid. So you should be careful how you ask, and do not be

veiled by the tools of (conventional human) expression from actually realizing and fully comprehending these realities in yourself.

So the only thing left is: (1) a pure and absolute Existence – not (one coming into existence) after non-existence – and that is the existence of the Real, may He be exalted! And (2) an existence (that only comes to be) after the non-existence of the essence of that existent thing itself – and that is the existence of the world. So there is not any comparability or (co-extensive) extension between those two existences, apart from that imagined, presumed one that is removed by (true) knowledge. So nothing is left of that (falsely supposed comparability of God and the world) but absolute Existence (of God) and determined existence (of the world), Active Existence (of God) and passive existence (of the world). This is what is given by the realities, and peace (i.e. that's all!).

[I.90.9, see also *Al-Masâ'il*, no. 90]

'The world' for Ibn 'Arabî is both spiritual and material, and as we have seen above there are two corresponding kinds of time, spiritual and physical. The spiritual world preceded the creation of the material universe (nature) as we know it (stars and planets), so there was spiritual time before the creation of the physical world. He indicates that spiritual time is necessary to describe the relation between spirits and the divine Names before the creating of the physical world. So in this respect Ibn 'Arabî does respond to the above-mentioned questioning about what was 'before' the creation of the physical world,⁹ but he still considers such questioning invalid beyond these two created realms of the world. In fact Ibn 'Arabî explains that the world has three distinctive ontological 'levels': '*alam al-mulk* or '*alam al-shahâda*, which is the visible world; '*alam al-malakût*, which is the realm of meanings; and '*alam al-jabarût*, which is the all-encompassing realm of the divine 'Imagination' (*barzakh*) [I.54.15, II.129.16]. But here and elsewhere he sometimes adapts the simplified reference (drawn from the Qur'an) to the two domains as the 'visible' and 'invisible' (see *SPK*: 14, 93, 129, 218, 223, 342, 360–361, 376, and also *Al-Masâ'il*, no. 150).

Actually, Ibn 'Arabî considers the age of the world (as spiritual and material together) to be infinite from both directions: i.e. it has always been and it will always be; it is eternal without beginning and eternal without end. However, this is not saying that the material (and even the spiritual) world is eternal, but the world has some sort of pre-existence in the foreknowledge of Allah, and Allah's knowledge is eternal in both directions. In addition, Ibn 'Arabî also considers those two ends to coincide with each other, so time as a whole is like a circle that can not be described to have a beginning or an end, but when we set a point (the present) and a direction (to the past or future) on this circle we define a beginning and an end [I.387.32, III.546.30]. We shall discuss the concept of circular and cyclical time in section 2.10.

Ibn 'Arabî – following Ibn Sînâ's familiar theological categories (Nasr 1964: 173–274) – divides all things, in terms of their type of existence, into three inclusive categories: necessary, possible (or 'contingent': *mumkin*), and impossible

[II.293.1, II.575–576]. Only Allah's existence is described as 'Necessary' or Self-Existent, while absolute non-existence is impossible. The world, on the other hand, is called 'possible' because it is *possible* to exist, but in order to actually come into existence it needs a determining cause (*murajjih*) who has to be pre-existent and self-existent, or none other than Allah.¹⁰ Therefore, the world (the possible) is originally non-existence (but not absolute non-existence, only a non-existence that is possible to exist) and it is always in need of Allah in order to bring it into existence. Thus it can be said – as in the long quotation above – that it exists *by* or *through* Allah, and not through itself. The difference between absolute non-existence and possible non-existence is that the latter exists (even before it comes into real existence) in Allah's Knowledge, and this foreknowledge is eternal because His knowledge is not other than Himself [I.300.32, II.114.15] (see also section 2.7).

So the world, spatial and temporal, eternally existed or was determined in Allah's knowledge, but it is continuously brought into real existence *ad infinitum*:

So when Allah brought the entities (into existence), He brought them for them not for Him. But (for Him) they are still as they were on their spatial and temporal states, with their different time and space (co-ordinates). So He reveals to them their entities and states little by little infinitely and successively. So the issue for Allah is one, as He said: *and Our Command is but one, as the twinkling of an eye* (54:50), and multiplicity is (only) for the countables themselves.

[I.162.22]

However, despite this pre-existence, we can not say that the world is eternal and only developed from one state to another. It is not exactly clear how Henry Corbin concluded that 'there is no place in Ibn 'Arabi's thinking for creation ex nihilo, an absolute beginning preceded by nothing' (Corbin 1969: 200), when Ibn 'Arabi started the *Futûhât* by saying: 'Praise be to Allah Who created things after (its being) non-existence' [I.2.3]. In *Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'* he also declares that 'the dependent existence (the possible) may only be after non-existence, otherwise it would not be a "possible" whereas it is possible, and it would not be an existence by the Self-Existent, while it is in fact an existence by the Self-Existent Who caused it to exist' (*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 133).

If Corbin means what we explained in the previous paragraph – i.e. that everything existed in the foreknowledge of Allah even before it really existed in the world – then we have to stress the difference between the essence or entity ('*ayn*) of a thing in God's Knowledge and its actual existence. William Chittick devoted a full chapter in his book *The Sufi Path of Knowledge* to explaining this important concept in Ibn 'Arabi's ontology (*SPK*: 77–143). The entities of the world are in Allah's foreknowledge eternally, but they are brought into existence – after they were not existing – one after the other. This is a very important distinction. Ibn 'Arabi continues by explaining that:

Everything is in need of Allah, the Exalted, for the *existence* of its essence (or entity: *'ayn*), not for its essence, because its immutable essence (*'aynuhu al-thâbita*, most widely translated as 'permanent archetype', see *SPK*: 83) is not determined in its immutability; it is not determined by a determiner, for there is no determination in eternity . . . so the existence of the possible may only be after non-existence, which means it was not, and then it is.

(*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 133, see also *Al-Masâ'il*, no. 143)

Actually we shall see later in section 5.6 that this intrinsic need by the 'possible' – i.e. of all the realms of creation – for Allah to bring it into existence continues to be necessary at every single moment, because the world is continuously brought into existence in ever-renewed forms (i.e. it is constantly '*re-created*').

However, it is still not easy for the human mind to imagine the existence of the created world (*al-muhdath*) and the eternal existence of Allah, the Eternal or Pre-existent (*al-qadîm*) without a reflection of some time separation. And even for Ibn 'Arabî the issue is not yet closed. As he suggested in the long passage quoted above, somehow understanding this mysterious point seems to be beyond normal human perception and requires a divinely inspired knowledge accessible only to rare individuals with the very highest spiritual attainments. This same difficulty caused many Muslim philosophers and other theologians to continue to speculate on many theories that Ibn 'Arabî disagrees with (*Kitâb Al-Azâl*: 8).

Ibn 'Arabî explains further the relation between the existence of God and the existence of the world in chapter 59 of the *Futûhât*, which is the same chapter in which he talks specifically about the topic of time. Ibn 'Arabî's argument presented at the beginning of this chapter is extremely complicated and very difficult to understand, even in its original language. However, because of its importance, we are obliged to translate it here, with some necessary explanations in parentheses.

At the beginning of chapter 59, after the opening poem quoted at the very beginning of this chapter, Ibn 'Arabî says:

You should know first that Allah, the Exalted, is *the First* (*al-awwal*), and there is no firstness (*awwaliyya*) to anything before Him nor to anything else – whether that exists through Him or independent of Him – with Him: but He is *the One* (i.e. the Unique; *al-wâhid*), Glory be to Him, in His Firstness. So there is nothing that is self-existent apart from Him, because He is *the All-Sufficient* (*al-ghanî*) in Himself, absolutely, and Independent of all other beings. He said: *and Allah is Self-Sufficient with respect to all the worlds* (3:97), and this is true according to both the intellect and revelation.

Therefore, the existence of the world came about by Allah either for Himself or for 'other' than Himself. Because if this 'other' was Himself it would not be 'other', and also if this 'other' was Himself He would be necessarily composed in Himself and the firstness would be to this 'other'; therefore this would violate our previous statement that there is no firstness to anything with or before Allah.

So if this 'other' is not Himself, then it would be either existence or non-existence. But it is impossible to be non-existence, because non-existence can not bring the world (from its non-existence) into existence because there is no any priority to any one of them (i.e. the world and this 'other' that is non-existence) to come into existence, since both of them are non-existence, and non-existence has no effect because it is null.

On the other hand, this 'other' can not be existence, because then it either exists by itself or not (i.e. through something else). And it is impossible that this 'other' exists by itself, since it has already been proved that there can not be two self-existent beings.

So it remains that this 'other' exists by something else, and the meaning of the possibility of the world is nothing but that it exists by something else. Therefore this 'other' is the world or (some part) of the world.

Also, if the existence of the world by Allah is due to 'something' without which the world would not exist – whether this 'something' is called 'will' (*irāda*), 'wish' (*mashī'a*), 'knowledge' (*ilm*) or anything you want which is required by the 'possible' in order to exist – then the Real would not (be able to) do anything without this 'something'. But that implies nothing but needfulness, which is impossible for Allah, because Allah is absolutely Self-Sufficient, since He is, as He said: *Self-sufficient* (Independent) *with respect to all the worlds* (3:97). And if it is claimed that this 'something' is the Essence Himself, then we say that it is impossible for anything to be 'in need of' itself, and since He is Self-sufficient in Himself, then this (false supposition) would lead to the same contradiction – i.e. being Self-sufficient and yet needful in Himself at the same time – and all this is impossible.

Therefore, since we have already disproved the existence of any 'other' (determining cause of the existence of the world), we conclude that the existence of the world, inasmuch as it exists through something else, is (causally) related to the Necessarily Self-Existent (*wājib al-wujūd li-nafsihi*: i.e. Allah or the Real), and that the essence ('*ayn*') of the 'possible' itself is the locus for the effect of the Necessarily Self-Existent's bringing the possible into existence. It can only be properly comprehended like this.

Hence (such intrinsic distinctions as God's) 'Wish' (*mashī'a*), 'Will' (*irāda*), 'Knowledge' (*ilm*) and 'Ability' (*qudra*) are (all) Himself – may He be exalted far above any multiplicity within Himself! Indeed His is *absolute* Unicity, and [in the words of the famous Sura 112, *al-Ikhlās*] He '*is the One* (*al-Wāhid*), *the Unique* (*al-Ahad*), *Allah the one on Whom all depend* (*al-Samad*); *He did not give birth* – for then He would be a preceding (cause); *nor is He born* – since He would then be a result; *nor is there any "other" equivalent* (*kuf*) *to Him*' – for in that case the existence of the world would be the result of *two* preceding causes, the Real and Its 'equivalent' – may Allah be exalted (above that)! So this is how He described Himself in His Book when the Prophet, peace be upon him, was asked to describe his Lord: then He sent down the Sura *al-Ikhlās* (just quoted here)

(according to the circumstances described in a hadith: *Kanz*, 4734) to get rid of all (supposed) sharing (*shirk*) with other than Allah, by those high qualities and descriptions. So there is nothing Allah negates in this Sura or approves, but those negations or approbations are some people's opinions about Allah.

[I.291.8]

The importance of this long paragraph comes from the fact that it shows the basis of Ibn 'Arabî's distinctive view of creation, the distinctive – and extremely controversial – view that many scholars have traditionally called 'the oneness of being (*wahdat al-wujûd*)', but which has been widely misunderstood. Ibn 'Arabî himself could not describe it plainly, simply because it is a reality whose direct perception depends not on logic, but – as Ibn 'Arabî stressed in the passage quoted at the end of section 2.1 – on a rare inspired experiential 'tasting' restricted to the spiritual elite of the 'Solitary Ones'. As soon as it is spoken, it is likely to be misunderstood. What Ibn 'Arabî tries to prove in the passages just quoted, as in many chapters of the *Futûhât* and other books, is that the existence of the world is solely dependent on the existence of the Real, Who is One and Unique – and that this ultimate dependence of the world on the Real is an essential property that accompanies everything in the world at all times. On the other hand, nothing was added to Allah through His creating the world, as for Him (in His Knowledge) the world is as if it is always there. We shall come back to this important issue of the oneness of being (especially in Chapter 5) as we continue our exploration of Ibn 'Arabî's view of time, because it is truly the key to understanding his cosmology and theology.

2.4 The origin of time?

If we can not speak about the origin of the world in time, we can still ask about the origin of time in the world. As Ibn 'Arabî pointed out, we can not ask when time began, because the word 'when' requires time to be defined beforehand. But we can ask *how* did time begin?

In response to this cosmological question, Ibn 'Arabî argues that both the natural and para-natural types of time have originated in the Universal Soul which has two forces: the active and intellective (*quwwa 'amaliyya* and *quwwa 'ilmiyya*). The active force is in charge of moving bodies and objects,¹¹ while the intellective force is capable of perceiving knowledge, or updating the soul's spiritual state. So physical time (i.e. that associated with physical objects) is that in which bodies keep moving to preserve their existence, and spiritual time is that in which human beings' Heart perceive knowledge from their Lord [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. Physical time, therefore, is originated from the active force of the Universal Soul, while spiritual time originates from its intellective force [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 7].

On the other hand, since natural (or physical) time is a consequence of material motion in Nature, it is originated with the isotropic orb which is the first orb

in Nature in which the first body was created (see section 1.4). When this isotropic orb (*al-falak al-atlas*), was created and started to move, its motion defined natural time. But because this orb is isotropic – the same in all directions – it is not possible to measure time in this orb alone, because there was nothing to compare its motion to it. And when Allah created the second orb that includes the farthest stars (galaxies) that are appropriately called fixed stars, the (apparent) motion of those stars in this orb defined the day as the complete revolution of this orb: ‘When Allah caused the higher orbs to move and He created days in the first orb (the isotropic orb) and defined it (the day) in the second orb which is the orb of the apparently fixed stars’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6].

However, as Ibn 'Arabî says, the motion of the isotropic orb was actually determined from above; it started when the first degree of Gemini was matching the divine ‘Foot’ on the ‘Pedestal’ (*kursî*)¹² above the isotropic orb, and after one complete revolution, the first cosmic ‘Day’ of creation was done, and that was Sunday. Then the process of divine creation continued through Monday, Tuesday, and so on until its initial completion on Saturday – and then it started over again [II.437.34]. Because this creative ‘Day’ was determined from above, it was not possible to know its duration [II.437.27]. It is true that we divide this day into 24 hours, but this is a mere convention. It is actually not possible to determine the length of this day because there is nothing else (in Nature) to compare its motion to, so we use this day to measure other relative ‘days’ of other orbs that are below the orb of fixed stars, and also the ‘days’ of the spiritual (and divine) orbs that are above this physical isotropic orb too. We shall devote Chapter 3 to explaining in more detail the seven Days of the cosmic ‘Week’ and how they are caused.

2.5 Space-time and the speed of light

Although time does not appear to be like space, in the theory of Relativity it is treated as a real dimension just like any one of the other three dimensions of space (length, width, depth: x, y, z). In Relativity, as we explained in the preceding chapter, any point in the universe can be expressed in terms of its four-dimensional space-time co-ordinates (x, y, z, t); we do not have time alone or space alone, but a single field called space-time.¹³

Likewise, Ibn 'Arabî describes the physical universe as something that ‘is confined in time and space’ [I.121.22]. Furthermore, one of the most important results of Ibn 'Arabî's view of time is that he considers that we are living in ‘Saturday’, while the other six cosmic ‘Days’ from Sunday to Friday account for the creation of the world – which is now continuously being re-created by Allah (see also section 5.6) – in space. Allah creates the three-dimensional world (actually six-dimensional/directional if we consider the two directions of each dimension) in six ‘Days’ from Sunday to Friday, but we human beings witness only Saturday because in the other six days of the week we (along with the rest of creation) are still being created. Ibn 'Arabî insists that this divine creative process is repeated every single moment, as we shall explain in the following chapters.

However, the result of what we have just said is that time ('Saturday'), though it is special, is still just like any one of the other six Days that correspond to the six (or three) spatial dimensions. So indeed the world, for Ibn 'Arabî, is confined in those seven 'dimensions' of space-time (6 plus 1) that are similar – since all are 'days'. This is the ultimate meaning of the many verses in the Qur'an specifying that Allah created the heavens and the Earth '*in six Days*' (corresponding to space) and that '*then He mounted* [i.e. on Saturday, in time] *on the Throne*' (Qur'an 7:45, 10:3, 11:7, 25:59, 32:4, 50:38 and 57:4). This could also be easily comprehended if we recall that the actual meaning of time is reduced to the existence of the world in the present moment, not the past or the future. Thus manifest existence is confined in space and time, so both space and time refer to existence, and they have no meaning when taken by themselves, without the things or events that happen in them. This new concept will add another aspect to the theory of Relativity that considers time as one dimension of the four dimensions of space-time, especially since Ibn 'Arabî gives exciting details about how those seven Days of the cosmic Week are interconnected, as we shall see in the following two chapters.

However, there are still many obvious and hidden differences between space and time. At the beginning of chapter 59 and in the long chapter 559 (which summarizes the key contributions of each of the preceding chapters of the *Futûhât*), Ibn 'Arabî points out the similarities and differences between space and time. 'Time', he says, 'is just like space, an extension that has no (outer) limit' [I.291.6]. Then he adds:

Space is an attribute of something that exists, but time is an attribute of something that is confined but does not necessarily exist. Space is defined by who sits in it, and time is counted by breaths. The (ontological status of) 'contingent possibility' (*imkân*) affects both time and space. Time has an (ontological) foundation that it refers back to and is based upon, which is the divine Name 'the Age' (*al-dahr*). Space emerged by the 'establishment' (*istiwâ*) (of the All-Merciful on the Throne, 20:5), and time emerged by the 'descending down (of the Lord) to the (lowest) heaven' (referring to the hadith: 'Our Lord, may He be Praised, descends every night, in the last third of the night, to the lowest sky . . .' [*Kanz*: 3351, 3355, 3388], see also section 2.14). But there was time in the Dust ('*amâ*') even before the 'establishment'. . . . Time is a circumstance for an event just like meanings for letters, and space is not like a circumstance, so it is not like the letter. Time is confined through division by 'now' and does not necessarily require the existence of objects, but space can not be comprehended without objects (that occupy it), so it is a kind of (ontological) 'home' (for what is created in it).

[IV.337.5]

On the other hand, the concept of using time to measure distance was already used by the ancient Arabs who used to measure distance by how it took them to

travel through it, usually by camel. But Ibn 'Arabî uses this concept in a more abstract way that can be compared with the form of measurement that is now widely used in astronomy: the light year. In many places he repeatedly says that the distance between this particular celestial orb and that orb is a particular number of 'years', without specifying what speed or form of motion might be involved. For example, he says that the distance between the top and bottom of Gehenna is 'seventy-five hundred years' [I.297.15]. And in other places he says that Gehenna is (or 'will be' [I.297.17]) in the entire space situated from the Earth to just below the orb of fixed stars (the constellations of the Moon mansions) [I.303.9, III.440–441].

Now according to modern astronomy, the distance from the Earth and our solar system to either extreme of the width of our Milky Way galaxy roughly equals the distance travelled by light in 7,500 years. So in effect one could argue that Ibn 'Arabî actually used the unit of a kind of 'light year' to measure distance, more than seven centuries before modern astronomers, and that he gave a very accurate value of the width of what is now known as the Milky Way galaxy.

Regarding the speed of light, Ibn 'Arabî declares that 'nothing is faster than sight (*basar*) among the (human) senses; the time of opening the sight is the time of its seeing the fixed planets (stars) or what is above them or between them despite the large distance that could not be reached for thousands of years by foot' [IV.431.34; see also I.702.20, II.402.30].

Furthermore, in chapter 8 of the *Futûhât* Ibn 'Arabî mentions many extraordinary and mysterious facts about another 'earth of Reality' (*ard al-haqîqa*) – another world existing in the *barzakh* or 'divine Imagination', and accessible to spiritual travellers – which is

an earth so spacious that the Throne and what it includes, the Pedestal, the heavens, the earths, what is beneath the soil, all the Gardens and Gehenna, would all be just like a ring in (comparison to the vast extent of) the desert of this 'earth'.

[I.126.30].

He then talks about his and other Sufis' (spiritual) visits to this Earth and that the life there is so extraordinary that many of the logically impossible things for us would normally exist there. One of the things that he mentioned about this Earth is that 'the speed of their (people's) travel on ground or by sea is faster than the perception of sight when it sees things' [I.128.26].

It is perhaps relevant to mention here that one of the consequences of modern theories of high-energy elementary particles is that each particle (such as electrons, protons and neutrons) has an anti-particle which, upon meeting with its counterpart, would annihilate and convert together into light or electromagnetic waves (Trefil 1938: 53–67). Likewise matter (atoms) has anti-matter that may exist somewhere under extreme circumstances, such as in the core of hot stars and galaxies, though it has also been made in laboratories (Schewe and Stein

1999). Some scientists say that, like matter and anti-matter, there should be an anti-universe. In this anti-universe all the laws of physics would behave strangely. For example the speed of light in our universe is a maximum terminal as we have seen above (the theory of Relativity), but in the anti-universe it would be a minimum terminal. Such a case, therefore, is predictable in Ibn 'Arabī's cosmology, as he mentions in regard to this mysterious 'earth of Reality'.

2.6 Motion

Time, therefore, is necessary to describe motion. But the answer to the question 'what is motion?' may not be as obvious as it might at first appear. Matter is in continuous motion, and objects require a cause to move; this is undisputable philosophical fact. But the basic issue in the philosophy of motion is whether the matter-in-motion can be itself the cause of its motion. The dialectical explanation considers that matter is the most primary source of the development of completion, and therefore it can be itself the cause and subject of motion. Metaphysical philosophy, on the other hand, insists on differentiating between that which moves and the mover. This is because motion is a gradual development and completion of a deficient thing, which can not by itself develop and complete gradually – and therefore can not be the cause of completion.

Osman Yahya listed a book with the name '*kitāb al-haraka*' ('the book of motion') (OY: no. 223), but as in the case of '*kitāb al-zamān*' this book is not found. However, Ibn 'Arabī talks about motion in some detail in the long chapter 198. There [II.456–458] he affirms that: 'everything in the world that moves and rests does not move and rest by itself, but by a mover and a rester', but he adds that: 'this mover either moves the object by itself or by its will to move it; so those who believe the mover moves the object by itself say that motion is "created" in the object, so motion by itself – when it is in the object – causes it to move'. And the same can be said regarding rest. 'But if the mover moves the object by its will, it will do that either by an (intermediate) means or without a means.' Then he adds that, if the mover is the object itself, then it has to have a will 'like the motion of the human being who moves under his will in the (six physical) directions'.

Ibn 'Arabī then differentiates between the regular circular motion of the orb (*al-falak*, the celestial sphere of each planetary heaven) and the motion of objects, where 'the motions of the orb are tidy and in a sequential manner like the motion of the millstone; so each part does not depart from its neighbouring (part), while the motion of (the four sub-lunar) elements is different'. Then he explains that 'the motion of the elements is entwined, where the part departs from the neighbouring part and occupies new places different from the ones it was in'. He also adds that

the motion of the orb – for us (the Sufis) – is like the motion of the human being in the directions ... the orb moves by (its) 'will' in order to give

out what is (inspired) in its heaven by the divine Command which causes the things (to occur) in the (earthly) elements ('*anâsir*) and the generators (of earthly changes, the *muwallidât*); so as a result of this (orbs') motion, time emerges. So time has no effect in its (the orbs') appearance, but rather it affects (only) what is below it. Time does not affect the appearance of the orb, because it is itself the appearance (the result in the lower elemental realms) – whereas the things that happen and appear in the orbs, the heavens, and the higher world have causes other than time.

[II.456–458]

We have to admit that physicists habitually accept a very naive concept of motion, usually expressed by the formula 'velocity is distance per time' ($v = s/t$), which is usually used for a simple uniform motion on a straight line though other complicated motions have more complicated equations that are all based on this simple concept of distance per time. Such a simplified concept of motion has been working nicely for many centuries and, although modern theories slightly corrected these classical (Newtonian) equations, they did not address the more philosophical question about the nature of motion itself. To answer this question, one has to verify whether space and time are discrete or continuous, an issue that (as we saw in Chapter 1) still persists and is unsettled even in the latest theories. However, we find some philosophers, like Zeno, who argued that – whether we consider this way or the other – we shall inevitably end up with some irresolvable paradoxes (see section 7.4).

Ibn 'Arabi, on the basis of his theory of the oneness of being and the principle of continual re-creation (see section 5.6), gives a clear and far more extensive definition of 'motion' (*Haraka*: Ibn 'Arabi's wider definition here reflects the fact that this Arabic philosophical term refers not just to physical motion but far more extensively to all kinds of 'change' in general) which is utterly different from the simple notion of just a distance in time. In the same chapter (198) that we just quoted above, he says:

Then you have to know that the truth about motion and rest is that they are two states of the natural embodied (*mutahayyiz*) things ... And that is because the embodied thing will necessarily need a volume (*hayyiz*) to occupy by itself in the time of its existence. So it may either be in the same place (*hayyiz*) in the next time, or times, which is called 'rest', or it is in the next place in the next time and in the following place in the third time. So its appearing in and occupying these places one after another can happen only by 'changing' from one place to another, and this may only be due to a cause. So it would be fine to call this change 'motion', although we know there is nothing but the embodied thing itself, the place, and the fact that it occupied a place next to that which it occupied before. But those who claim that there is some (real) thing called 'motion', which got into the embodied thing and caused it to change from one place to another, they have to prove it!

[II.457.27]

With the above definition of motion, Ibn 'Arabî has in mind his basic principle of the 'ever-renewed creation', which suggests that the entire world is continuously being re-created every single moment of time, which we shall discuss in detail in Chapter 5. Therefore there is no real motion like that which we habitually perceive in the human 'common sense' or 'estimative' faculty (*wahm*); in reality there is only a 'change of place': i.e. the thing that is the subject of motion is being re-created in different places (not moved between them), so we imagine motion. At the end of his short book *Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'* (*The White Pearl*) (*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 142), Ibn 'Arabî wonders how (the general) people (not to mention physicists and philosophers) do not so easily realize the delusion of motion and space. He says that 'everything that moves does not move in occupied space (*malâ'*), but it moves in a void (*khalâ'*)'. Then he explains that the thing may not move into a new place until this new place is emptied. So by simple logic, this (false) assumption would lead to the conclusion that the result of an action would occur before the action itself. For example when you fill a cup with water, the air already in the cup will have to be gradually evacuated as water pours in. At any instance (the smallest duration of time), before the water (the cause) can replace the air, the air has to be displaced (the result). So the result happens before the cause. One may argue that in this case both the cause and the result could happen at the same time. This, however, is also prohibited according to Ibn 'Arabî who asserts that the entities of the world can be created only in series one after the other (see sections 5.6 and 7.3). Thus this radically different conception meticulously challenges Newton's law of action/reaction – which practically speaking always holds true, but which seems to be philosophically deceiving. So the mere concept of motion apparently violates causality, the most fundamental principle of physics, and common sense. Actually, Ibn 'Arabî (following earlier radical theories in kalam theology) even questions causality itself – as we shall see again in Chapter 7 – where he affirms that Allah says: 'I create the things next to the causes and not by them' [II.204.13]. Though this does not deny causality itself (i.e. the appearances of regular 'natural' causes), it does suggest a radically new type of *strictly divine* causality.

Ibn 'Arabî concludes, therefore, that motion is only a new creation in different neighbouring places; there is no actual 'path' of the object between its start and the destination points when taken on the smallest scale of time (i.e. when time itself is quantized). On the basis of this novel definition of motion, we shall be able to resolve Zeno's famous paradoxes that are discussed in Chapter 7. But this is also what happens, according to modern physics, in the atom where the electrons 'jump' between the energy levels (which have different distance from the nucleus) without any possible existence in between. The reason for this is that the energy of the atom is quantized, and when this energy changes, either by absorbing or emitting photons, the distance of some of its electrons from the nucleus will change correspondingly. So because the energy is quantized, this distance has to be quantized too; the electron therefore may not stay in between the orbits at all, or even smoothly jump between them; it may exist only in this orb or in the other orbit that is at a discrete distance from the first (Wehr *et al.*

1984: 72). In the Qur'an, it is also said that this is what happened to the throne of the Queen of Sheba when it refers to the unnamed man '*who has knowledge from the (divine) Book*' moving her throne from Sheba to Solomon's court '*in a blink of the eye*' (see section 7.2).

2.7 Relative and curved time

In the literature of Sufism and Islamic spirituality, we read a lot of fantastic stories that apparently look 'imaginary' even to physicists who are familiar with the theory of Relativity and the concepts such as time travel that we have seen in section 1.9. Ibn 'Arabî refers to the relativity of time in many direct and indirect ways. He explicitly says: 'minutes are years while sleeping' [IV.337.1]. But 'sleeping' here does not necessarily mean usual sleep, it could be any state of imagination or realization that momentarily isolates Sufis from witnessing the visible world while their spirit are occupied with other dimensions of being. For example, he speaks in chapter 73 of the *Futûhât* about the 300 spiritual knowers (s. '*ârif*') 'whose hearts are like the heart of Adam'. There he says that:

If a knower (of those three hundred) is taken (to witness) one scene of the Lord's scenes (*al-mashâhid al-rubûbiyya*), they receive in one of its 'days' (i.e. 'the Lord's Day', which equals a thousand earthly years, 22:47) at that moment (when they are taken to the Lord's scene) divine knowledge (equivalent to) what others get in the world of (normal) senses in one thousand normal years with hard work and preparation. So this is how the divine knowledge that anyone from among those three hundred achieves when they are taken out of their own (carnal) soul and is confined in one Lord's Day. The person who can appreciate what we have said is only whoever has tasted that, when (normal) time was folded up (*tayy*) for them in that moment, just as distance and other quantities are folded up for the eyesight whenever someone opens their eye and looks at the orb of fixed stars: at the same time when he opens their eye, the rays (of his eyesight) are connected with the bodies of these stars. So look how big is this distance and this velocity (of our normal eyesight, in that case)!

[II.9.23]

On the other hand, one of the main consequences of the modern general theory of Relativity is the curvature of space and time, and this conception is explicitly referred to by Ibn 'Arabî when he says in poetry: 'the age has curved on us and bent (*hadaba al-dahr 'alaynâ wa inhana*)' [I.202.7]. It is important to notice here that he used the word 'the age' (or eternal, 'divine time'), instead of time, because in modern cosmology the curvature of time is apparent only at very large scales, and we shall see below (section 2.19) that for Ibn 'Arabî 'the age' includes not only time but also space.

Also regarding time travel, which is widely known in science fiction and theoretically allowable in the theory of Relativity (see section 1.9), many Sufis

and similar figures across many other religious traditions have of course frequently referred to their experiences of various forms of 'travel' across normal boundaries of time. Ibn 'Arabî, for example, mentions the story of al-Jawhari who went to take a bath in the Nile and when he was in the water he saw, like a vision, that he was in Baghdad and he got married and lived with his wife for six years and had children. 'And then he was returned to himself (from this momentary vision). . . . And after few months this woman, whom he saw in the vision that he had married, came looking for his house (in Egypt), and when he met her he knew her and knew the children' [II.82.22].

So according to this story, al-Jawhari travelled to another far-away place and lived there six years, all in a moment of his actual time at his first location in Egypt. Ibn 'Arabî's original readers would of course immediately connect this experience of the 'folding of time' (as the Sufis called it) with the narratives of the Mi'râj or ascension of the Prophet through and beyond all the heavens in a single night-journey (*isrâ*).

In addition to this famous Mi'râj in which the Prophet Muhammad travelled vast distances in a very short time,¹⁴ Ibn 'Arabî himself spoke in detail in chapter 367 of the *Futûhât* about his own numerous ascensions, although he affirms that his experiences were only spiritual, while the Prophet's ascension was both physical and spiritual [III.342.32].¹⁵

According to his accounts of this type of spiritual ascent in chapter 367, the physical elements of the Sufi's body dissociate and return to their corresponding natural place – earth to earth, water to water, air to air and fire to fire – and after that their spiritual self enters the celestial spheres to meet the spirits of the prophets inhabiting each sphere and to learn from them. Then one may even ascend further to the highest spiritual dimensions, as Ibn 'Arabî also describes in greater detail in his highly autobiographical *Kitâb Al-Isrâ' ilâ Al-Maqâm Al-Asrâ*.¹⁶

Just as is specified in the theory of Relativity, a person who undergoes time travel will encounter many more events than those who stay in their place. The big difference, however, is that Relativity anticipates that time travellers will encounter much longer (real) times, and that they will realize after they come back to their starting point that many generations have passed away. This has led to many strange paradoxes like the 'twin paradox' (D'Inverno 1992: 38). For Ibn 'Arabî, however, the issue is far more simple and realistic: the only difference between the spiritual 'time traveller' and others is that travellers will acquire much more knowledge or spiritual realization, because they encounter more events in a (outwardly) short period of time. For Ibn 'Arabî, time, after all, is imaginary, so more time means more events and more events means more knowledge. The Prophet Muhammad (and others like Ibn 'Arabî in their purely spiritual 'ascensions') encountered in the night of the ascension a multitude of events that normally need many years.¹⁷ Likewise, in the illustrative cases of al-Jawhari and the three hundred spiritual knowers mentioned above, other people around them did not feel any noticeable change. This subject is very close to the case of sleep and dreams except that the Sufi in the ascension is the one who is awake because Ibn 'Arabî affirmed that the Prophet Muhammad said: 'people

are asleep, and when they die they wake up' (this hadith is not found in standard hadith collections, but is widely quoted by Sufis and especially Ibn 'Arabî [I.313.11, II.379.33, IV.404.16]), which means that our perception of this world is like a dream and those who are 'awake' (the spiritually realized people) will experience time in a different way. So a person in deep sleep will not feel the time as those who are awake next to him or her experience it. Similarly, the student who pays attention to the teacher will acquire more knowledge than those who are absentminded.¹⁸

In the same way, the 'Unique (spiritual) Pole' (*al-qutb al-fard*) is called *sâhib al-waqt* ('the master of time', see chapter 336 of the *Futûhât* [III.135], and also *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 678–683), because he is always in full attention to what Allah wants of him every single moment. The true master of time witnesses everything in the world (since all that is a kind of reflection of his own spirit, or even part of it) all the time: that is to say, he witnesses the created world throughout space and time. This high state of attention, however, is only attainable by *Al-Qutb* ('the Pole' or 'Axis' of the spiritual universe) who is at the top of the hierarchy of the saints [II.6.28]. This Qutb, like Ibn 'Arabî himself, is a man whose heart is like the heart of the Prophet Muhammad [I.151.6], 'and the one who is on the heart of Muhammad, peace and prayers be upon him, has the corner of the Black Stone (in the Kaaba), and that is for us thanks to Allah' [I.160.24, see also section 6.2].

The spiritual 'Pole' therefore is witnessing 'out of time' – which again means that he is witnessing everything in the world, spatially and temporally. Other Friends of God (the *awliyâ'*) may attain this high state of awareness to a relative extent, 'though this is very rare amongst the (special) people of Allah, and it is (only) for a few of them, the people of attention, those who never overlook Allah's rule in things' [II.539.27]. This also explains how some divinely illuminated people, like the prophets, encountered with Allah things that would not normally occur to normal people. For example, Allah's direct speech to Moses can be explained only, according to Ibn 'Arabî, when we consider that Moses was out of time when Allah spoke to him – since otherwise Allah would be confined to time, and this is not possible. Ibn 'Arabî explained this in some details in his short *Book of Eternity*, that is one of 29 short treatises published together in the famous book known as *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*.

We actually always live in a relative time, but, although we encounter a relative number of events, time itself has no reality. Because we measure time by other standard events, like the clock's ticks or the Sun's motion, we do not feel the relativity of time. But if we measure it by our own internal activities (or what is known as psychological time), we shall always be travelling through time.

However, real travelling to the past is not possible at all, since time itself does not go back: once a form is created and goes into the past it never comes back again, although it is possible to remember past events: 'The past that has gone never comes back, but the similar (form) may come back; so when it comes back it causes (someone) through itself to remember that which was like it and has gone and is past' [II.186.27].

However, Ibn 'Arabî is well aware that it is quite possible to interact with the spirits of the dead (who are 'dead' only to this world, not in their vast spiritual realm of the *barzakh*) because they may become visibly embodied in a spiritual form in this world [I.755.10], as frequently happens in various spiritual experiences. For example, Ibn 'Arabî mentions his personal encounter with Ahmad al-Sabtî, the son of the Abbasid caliph Harûn al-Rashîd, whom he met while circumambulating the Kaaba. When Ibn 'Arabî first saw him he doubted his case, because he saw him not pushing nor being pushed, and going through between the two men without separating any space between them. So he realized he must be a visibly embodied spirit, and he went to him and spoke with him and asked him why he was called al-Sabtî (see his answer in section 3.6) [I.638.32].

Travelling to the future and meeting people who are not born yet is also possible, though it may also be a kind of simulation or personification of their spirits, and Ibn 'Arabî also mentioned similar things:

And I have seen all the messengers and the prophets, witnessing them all by direct vision. And I talked to *Hûd*, brother of '*Âd*', in particular from their group (Hirtenstein 1999: 84–86). And I have seen all the people of faith, also by direct eye-witnessing, all those who have been among them and those who will come to be, until the Day of the Rising: the Real showed them to me on a single plane on two different occasions. And I accompanied (for spiritual learning) a group from among the Messengers, in addition to Muhammad – may God bless him. (For example), I recited the Qur'an to Abraham *al-Khalîl*; and I returned (to God) by the hands of Jesus; and Moses bestowed on me the (inspired) knowing of (spiritual) unveiling and clarification, and the knowing of (the spiritual meaning of) the alternation of '*the daytime and the night*' (2:164, 3:190, etc.). So when I had assimilated that knowing, the night-time disappeared and the daytime (*nahâr*) remained all the day long, so the Sun never (again) set for me nor did it rise – and this unveiling was a notification from Allah that I would have no part of suffering in the hereafter.

[IV.77.27]

2.8 The discrete nature of time

The most important and distinctive of Ibn 'Arabî's ideas about time is that he considers it to be quantized. Thus Ibn 'Arabî declared in the *Futûhât* and other books that 'the smallest time is the single time that does not accept division' [II.384.31].

There has been a great deal of debate in the history of philosophy and science as to whether time (and space) is discrete or continuous, though most philosophers and scientists deal with time as an infinitely divisible quantity. However, the Ash'arite theologians' distinctive physical theory (of the *jawhar*, or 'indivisible atom') is entirely built on the discreteness of space and time, and Ibn 'Arabî

himself acknowledges his debt to them for this understanding. For example, al-Bâqillânî, one of the famous Ash'arite theologians, suggested an atomic nature of time, according to which in each 'atom' of time the entire world annihilates and is re-created in a slightly different form (MacDonald 1927: 326–344). This perspective is at least verbally and conceptually very much in accord with Ibn 'Arabî's fundamental principle of the ongoing re-creation of all things (see section 5.6) – although the Ash'arite theologians did not make any reference to the key experiential basis of this spiritual insight which is so central to Ibn 'Arabî's discussion of the 'ever-renewed creation'. What is also new and distinctive here about Ibn 'Arabî's understanding of this conception of time is that he argues that the actual 'quantum' of time equals our normal earthly day itself [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. It is not easy to bridge the gap between this metaphysical hypothesis and our everyday familiar experience of indefinitely divisible time: of the year into months, the month into weeks, the week into days, the day into hours, hour into minutes, minutes into seconds, and so on apparently infinitely. Ibn 'Arabî, however, explains plainly why time has to be discrete according to his understanding (or 'according to his Day'), and we shall devote Chapter 4 to discussing this difficult issue in more detail. Here we can give only a general preview.

For Ibn 'Arabî, time itself does not have a separate existence, but is reduced to motion or, more precisely, to the ongoing creative acts of God, or cosmic 'events' (each discrete divine 'Task' or *sha'n*) of each 'Day'. And according to the Qur'anic description of God, *each Day He is upon some (one single) task (sha'n)* (55:29). And since, as Ibn 'Arabî explains [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 10], Allah specified in this verse that He is every Day in 'one' task, and not many as we perceive in our illusion, which witnesses a multitude of events every day because of the intertwining between these Divine Days and our normal days. This means that this 'Day' has to be indivisible, because only one divine action or event should be happening in it [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. As we have seen, Ibn 'Arabî uses the same Qur'anic term and therefore calls this fundamental quantum of time 'the Day of Task' or divine event (*yawm al-sha'n*), or – using an expression taken from the physical theory of Ash'arite theology – 'the singular (unique) time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) [I.292.16, II.82.6]. Therefore the single 'Day of task' in reality equals our normal day; or more precisely, a full revolution of the celestial sphere as viewed from the Earth. Ibn 'Arabî helps to clarify this counter-intuitive understanding of the foundational divine 'Event' by introducing some related new concepts that are also based on certain Qur'anic verses.

The first related concept is that the world is surely re-created every singular day over and over again [II.208.26, II.385.4]. So we (our souls), as part of this world, live or ordinarily experience only our very limited portion from this singular day; a single instantaneous 'moment' of time that equals the global '24 hours' taking place within the entire world at that particular instant, but as divided up (in actual perception) by the total number of perceiving entities and their perceptions in the world. During this divine creative 'glance' (*lamha*), we

perceive a still picture of our limited perception of the world, after which we intrinsically cease to exist. Then in the second 'Day' (actually in the second 'Week'!), we live another moment to perceive a different still picture, owing to the ever-new creation created by Allah in this singular day. Thus, through a succession of these instantaneously re-created new 'pictures' of the whole, we observe what appears to be motion, just as with the illusion of cinematic projection. We said 'in the second Week' because Ibn 'Arabî showed that we are indeed only living in 'Saturday', since the other 'Days' (of Creation) of the Divine Week, from Sunday to Friday of the Days of tasks, are for space not for time, because at every moment in our life the world is re-created in six Days (for space), and it is then displayed on Saturday, but we do not witness the process of creating the world: we only witness it as created. So our life as a time is a collection of Saturdays, and each moment that we live is indeed a Week; six Days for creating the world in space, and Saturday for displaying it in time. We shall come to this important and novel concept in section 3.5.

The other related concept is that the moments that we feel flowing as day-times and night-times are actually a *collection* (of discrete time-space quanta), and not a straightforward combination of the actual flow of the single divine 'Days'. The normal days that we encounter are 'intertwined' (*mutawâlija*, v. *yûlîju*) – another key Qur'anic expression – with the actually existing cosmic 'Days of tasks' in a special way that we shall explore in Chapter 4. As a result of this intertwining, we see the appearance of a multitude number of events in our normal days.

In addition to that, Ibn 'Arabî also reminds us that at every moment there is a full day around the globe: evening somewhere, morning somewhere else, and noon in other places [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. Therefore, at every *moment* for us, which is a full day when viewed globally, Allah creates a single event in the world; and then He re-creates the world in ever-new events at each succeeding moment. The day that we perceive and experience is therefore a collection of successive 'snapshots' of the actual 'Days of events' which are the actual existing basis for our experience of the flow of time.

As we said above, the idea of discrete time (and space) is not new in the history of philosophy and physics, though it had been completely discarded after the advent of classical Newtonian mechanics. However, many philosophers (such as Kant, Russell and Leibniz) have opposed Newton's hypothesis that space and time have a separate linear and continuous entity, as we showed in section 1.8. With the advent of Quantum Mechanics, Field Theory, the Theory of Quantum Gravity and the Superstrings Theory, the idea of a quantized time (and space) was revived again, and much work has recently been done in this respect as we mentioned in section 1.9.

The human mind naturally thinks of quantities as either discrete or continuous; there is no other way. A closer examination of Ibn 'Arabî's view of time, however, shows that it is indeed neither discrete nor continuous. We must remember that he considers time as imaginary after all, as well as most other quantities such as space and even mass (see section 7.9). As we indicated previ-

ously, such seemingly strange conclusions result directly from Ibn 'Arabî's fundamental theory of the oneness of being: i.e. that the apparent 'parts' of existence are merely manifestations of *a single real existence* that is One and Unique, neither multiple nor divisible. The notion of either discreteness or continuousness is indispensable when we imagine multitudes, but with absolute Unity there would be no meaning to such conceptions. Therefore, Ibn 'Arabî's concept of time is that it would be discrete if we approach it on the (ultimately imaginary) plane of apparent multiplicity, but in reality there is no such reality as 'time' at all. The same perspective can be applied to space.

2.9 The 'chest' of time

Ibn 'Arabî asserts that

You should know that everything has a 'chest' (*sadr*), and knowing it in this path (of mysticism) is one of the noble sciences and knowledge. This is because the world and every kind (in it) is created according to the image of the Human Being (*insân*), who is the last existent, and the Human Being alone is created according to the divine Image, both its inner and outer dimensions, and Allah created them with a chest. So between the Real, to Whom is the firstness, and the Human Being, to whom is the lastness, there are 'chests' whose number no one knows other than Allah.

[II.652.23]

The 'chest' of a thing is its front, the first thing to appear, which is why it is so important to know it. Ibn 'Arabî here applies and generalizes the verse in the Qur'an that says: *'And whomsoever Allah wants to guide, He expands his chest for "surrender" (islâm), and whomsoever He wants to leave astray, He makes his chest narrow and constricted as if he were engaged climbing up into the sky'* (6:125).

But Ibn 'Arabî adds that 'the chest is in the second state of each form' [II.652.27], since the first state is the essence (the 'heart') of the form itself and the chest is *its first appearance or effect*. Then he lists many things and their corresponding 'chests', and he says that 'the chest of time is the time (instant) of the Dust's acceptance of the form' and 'the chest of days is Monday' [II.652.27].

Thus Ibn 'Arabî adds that:

For every 'chest' there is a 'heart' (*qalb*), so as far as the heart remains in the chest, the person will be blind because the chest is a veil over him. So when Allah wants to make him or her truly seeing, he goes out of his chest and sees. So the causes are the 'chests' of the existing things, and the existing things are like the hearts; as far as the existing (thing or person) is looking at the cause that it originated from, they will be blinded from witnessing Allah Who (actually, ultimately) created them. Thus when Allah wants to make (the person) truly seeing, they stop (or He causes them to

stop) looking at the cause that Allah created them 'with' ('*indahu*: i.e. as opposed to 'through', *bihi*) and looks (instead) at the 'special Face' that is (uniquely) between their Lord and them.

[II.652.35]

We are, therefore, normally 'imprisoned' in the chest of time, just as the heart of the person lacking faith is imprisoned in or 'veiled by' his or her chest. To overcome time (and space), we therefore have to break out and perceive the reality of existence through the 'heart', and in particular the special inner relation or aspect between the 'heart' and the Real.

2.10 Circular time and cyclical time

Ibn 'Arabi repeatedly describes time as a 'circle' (*dâ'ira*), [I.387.33], which does not have a beginning or an end, but when we specify a point on this circle (the present; the point in time in which we exist now) and look in one direction, whether to the past or future, we do set a relative beginning and an end. So the present (now) joins together the two ends of time in a circle [I.387.32, III.546.30].

It is very difficult to imagine this, as it was very difficult to convince people that the Earth is spherical when this idea was first introduced, precisely because most everyday activities show us only a small portion of the Earth's surface which appears flat to us. Yet time is not like space. In the case of the Earth it was relatively easy to prove that it is round because we can view its curvature – from space, or from a great height – all at once. But the problem with time is that we can normally witness only the present moment of it, not the future nor the past; we can only imagine them. Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of 'circular' time, we have to imagine that the whole of all existence (what we perceive as future, present and past) exists all at once. This whole existence is then like a circle: i.e. a curve that does not have a visible beginning or an end when we look at it from outside. When we sit on the circumference of this circle and look in one direction, we set a beginning and an end. In the same way: the present moment in which we exist is a point on the circle of the whole existence, this point defines the future and the past and it also defines an imaginary beginning and an imaginary end of time: imaginary because the whole circle of existence (of 'the Age', *al-dahr*) is infinite. The imaginary beginning is the eternity *a parte ante* (*al-azal*) and the imaginary end is the eternity *a parte post* (*al-abad*) [IV.266.3].

Circular time has yet another important meaning which is not possible to explain fully at this point, because it needs additional premises that we shall discuss in the following chapters, so we can refer to it only briefly here. As described above, Ibn 'Arabi views the world as being continuously re-created, and time is reduced to the present moment because the past and the future are only imaginary. Therefore time, or the present moment, goes in ever repeated circular motion with the re-creation of the world. In other words, the presence,

which is time, goes round the world continuously and repeatedly to create it and re-create it again; so it is circular (and cyclic) in this distinctly metaphysical respect.

Moreover, this cosmic notion of 'circular time' is quite different from 'cyclical time', and the two ideas should not be confused in Ibn 'Arabî's writings. 'Cyclical' or periodic (*dawrî*) time, such as the day, the week, the month and the year, is a duration of time in which the same kind of events should be happening in the different repeating cycles of time. For example, the Sun sets every evening to start a new day (because the 'day' for the Arabs was considered to start from sunset, not from sunrise), and the Moon is born approximately every four weeks to start a new lunar month. We should again note, however, that in reality, according to Ibn 'Arabî, there is never any repetition at all [II.432.12, III.282.21]. Those cycles of time are 'similar' to each other but never identical, as the terms 'period' or 'cycle' mean in modern physics. For Ibn 'Arabî, the cycles of time are similar because they are ruled by the same divine Names, which is why we expect to see similar events. But the reason why we do not see identical events or true repetition is because of the interaction between different cycles of different divine Names [III.201.14]. For example he says that 'the motion of Sunday appeared from the (divine) attribute "the All-Hearing" (*al-sam'*) . . . , and the motion of Monday appeared from the (divine) attribute "the Living" (*al-hayât*)' [II.438.9].

Therefore the cycle of Sunday is different from the cycle of Monday, although they are both days in which the Sun rises and sets in the same way. On the other hand, and on the basis of the same statement above, Sunday from this week should be identical with Sunday from the previous week, because they both appeared from the same divine Attribute. But they are not, because they do not have the same position in the month or the year, or in other cycles that are ruled by other divine Names and Attributes, so there is never any repetition. Ibn 'Arabî nicely refers to this fact in his prayers *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya*, a short text found at the end of *Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qâhira, n.d.), when he says: '(He, i.e. the Prophet Muhammad, is) the Dust (*hayûlâ*) of forms which does not manifest in one form to any two (persons), nor in any one form to anyone twice' [also in I.679.7, II.77.27, II.616.3].

We shall devote Chapter 3 to the significance of the 'Week' in Ibn 'Arabî's view, where we shall see that the week is the primary *cycle* of time, not the day. We shall also see that Ibn 'Arabî's fundamental notion of 'no repetition' forms the basis of a unique view of time and the cosmos, which will be discussed in the following chapters. However, if we accept the approximation that different cycles of time are defined by similar events, we then find that Ibn 'Arabî defines many important cycles other than the usual day, week, month, the seasons and the year. In general, every divine Name of Allah has Its own 'day' (cycle), which is a cycle of time that has a corresponding daytime and a night in the world below it (see Table 2.1 below).

A correlation can also be made here between Ibn 'Arabî's view of cyclic time and astrology. Knowing these cycles and their lengths and the specific Names that rule them may give us some insight into what kind of events may happen in

Table 2.1 Days of some orbs and divine names

<i>The day of . . .</i>	<i>Its length in terms of normal Earth days</i>
The Moon	28 days
The Sun	360 days = 1 year
Mercury	~30 years
<i>al-rabb</i> (the Lord)	1,000 years
<i>al-mithl</i> (the Like)	7,000 years
<i>al-ma’ârij</i> (the ascending ways)	50,000 years
Zodiac	12,000 years
Longest planet (star) day	36,000 years

Note

The numbers have been collected from different books of Ibn ‘Arabî. We should add that – as noted in our table here – Ibn ‘Arabî actually considers the year to be 360 days rather than 365.25 days; see also section 3.2 for more details

the future, but it is not easy to tell exactly what is going to happen. The issue is more like weather forecasting; by studying all the parameters we can tell with a good probability how the weather may be in the near future.

2.11 The two cycles of life

According to the well-known hadith ‘Time has returned the same as it was when Allah created the heavens and the Earth’ [*Kanz*: 12357], Ibn ‘Arabî argues that the cosmos has completed one cycle from the beginning of creation until the point where the spirit of the Prophet Muhammad is attached to his body, and he notes that this cycle is 78,000 years. As he explains:

Time started in Libra for spiritual justice by the name the Hidden (*al-bâtin*) of Muhammad – may God bless him – as he said: ‘I was prophet when Adam was still between water and clay’ [*Kanz*: 2017]. Then it (time) circled around after one (full) time cycle, which is 78,000 years, to start another cycle of time by the name ‘the Manifest’ (*al-zâhir*) when the body of Muhammad – may God bless him – appeared.

[I.146.18]

In the beginning of the *Futûhât* [I.121–124], Ibn ‘Arabî also states clearly the *order* of creation in time during this cosmic time cycle, for major events of the kinds created by Allah. The numbers that he gives clearly do not agree with modern cosmology and geology, and can not be explained or understood in those terms (as we showed in section 2.3 above).

2.12 ‘Days’

So we have seen in this chapter that time is in fact imaginary and exists only as the Creator’s ‘Days’ and indeed indivisible moments, while all other divisions of




Figure 2.1 The Cycle of Life.

Note

The number of years are extracted from chapter 7 of the *Futûhât* [I.121–126].

time are conventional. For this reason we find that in the Qur'an the word 'time' is never used, while a great deal of attention is given there to mentioning different sorts of 'daytimes' and 'nights' and the relations between them. Likewise, we find that Ibn 'Arabî pays considerable attention to describing the actual meaning of the days and the relation between their different types.

As usual, the terms 'daytime' (*nahâr*) and 'night' (*layl*) are used by Ibn 'Arabî to measure time, where the daytime extends from sunrise to sunset, while the night (*layl*) is from sunset to sunrise: both of those together – always *beginning* with the night-time – are called a 'day' (*yawm*), which is conventionally divided into 24 hours. We must notice, however, that the above conventional definitions are only approximate for our practical use here on Earth, since considerable differences appear as soon as we begin to measure the length of the day, for example, with relation to the Sun or to distant stars.

In the following passage Ibn 'Arabî gives a precise definition of various units of time such as the day, the daytime, the night, the month and the year. Some of these definitions are, however, simply for practical use for the purpose of determining prayer times. More accurate variations will be discussed below and in section 3.2. At the very beginning of the extremely long chapter 69, in which Ibn 'Arabî talks about 'the secret meanings of prayer (*salât*)', he devoted a full section to detailed explanations about timing. For the purpose of demonstration and simplification, Ibn 'Arabî employs a hypothetical observer who is considered as a frame of reference. He says there:

'Timing' (*al-waqt*) is an expression for (our approximate) estimation concerning a thing that does not accept the actual reality ('*ayn*) of what is estimated. So it is an (approximate) supposition, just like we suppose and estimate a beginning, middle and an end in a spherical shape which in itself

and in its actual reality does not accept a beginning, middle or end. So we construe all of this in it (only) by what we construe through the effect of our supposition and estimation concerning it.

Likewise, timing (*waqt*) is an estimated supposition with regard to time (*al-zamân*), since time is circular, as Allah created it in its beginning, so it is like a circle. The Prophet Muhammad, may Allah have peace and mercy upon him, said: '*time has circulated* [i.e. has come back to the same point] *like its form was on the day when Allah created it*' [Kanz: 12357]. So he mentioned that Allah created it circular (see section 2.10), and timings are (only) estimated with regard to it.

So when Allah created the Isotropic Orb and it moved, the 'day' was not specifically determined and no (temporally defining) reality had (yet) appeared in (that Orb). It was like the water of the pitcher when it is (still) in the river, before it comes into the pitcher. Then when the 12 (equal zodiacal regions) were supposed in it (i.e. in the Isotropic Orb, and subsequently appeared in the second orb of the fixed stars, which has in it the zodiacal constellations), it was given specific timings, and He called them the '(zodiacal) constellations' in that (isotropic) orb – which is Allah's saying: '*by the heaven*' – (swearing by it) because of its loftiness above us – '*that has the constellations (burūj)*' (85:1). So they are these suppositions for timing.

So (when) a person stands (on the Earth) and this orb rotates around him, and this person has been given sight to look at these (spatial) suppositions, through the distinguishing signs (of the zodiacal constellations) that were determined in (the outermost sphere), then (that person) can distinguish some of its parts from others, by these distinguishing signs that are made to be references pointing to it. So (this person) fixes their eye on one supposed (area) of it, I mean on the distinguishing sign (of this or that constellation), and then the (zodiacal) orb rotates with this supposed distinguishing sign that this observer has fixed their eye on, until it disappears (from his sight). This continues, as long as they continue standing in their place, until (eventually) this sign comes back to them (in the same position). Then at that point they know that this (zodiacal) orb had completed one cycle with respect to this observer – not with respect to the orb itself (because the orbs' real motion takes much longer time than a day, see section 1.4). Then we called this cycle a 'day' (*yawm*, defined here according to the far-away sphere of the zodiacal stars and not according to the Sun, which is the day known in astronomy as the 'sidereal day').

Then after that, Allah created in the fourth Heaven (celestial sphere) of the seven Heavens a lighted planet that has a huge body, and it was called in the Arabic tongue '*Shams*' [i.e. the Sun; but the Arabs used to call both the planets (*kawâkib*) and the stars (*nujûm*) *kawâkib*, 'planets' (s. *kawkab*), but Ibn 'Arabī clearly distinguishes between them]. Then it rose in the sight (of this observer) from behind the veil (or horizon) of the Earth where this observer stands, so they called this place of rising 'the shining-place' (or 'east/orient': *mashriq*), and they called the rising a 'shining-forth'

(*shurûq*), because this bright planet rose up from it and lighted up the atmosphere where this observer is.

So the sight of this observer kept following the motion of that planet (the Sun) until it was opposite them (in the middle of the sky), so he called this (state of) opposition 'the meridian' (*al-istiwâ*). Then the planet began to descend from its meridian with respect to this observer, seeking the right side of them – not with respect to the planet itself. So they called the beginning of this descending from its meridian a 'decline' (*zawâl*) and disposition (*dulûk*). Then the sight of this observer kept following it until the body of this planet went down, so they called its going down 'setting' (*ghurûb*), and they called the place where their sight saw that it went down its 'setting-place' (or 'west': *maghrib*).

Then the atmosphere became dark for him, so he called the duration of the lightning of the atmosphere, from the rising of this planet till its setting, a 'daytime' (*nahâr*). (This name is) derived from '*al-nahr*' (the river), because the spreading out of the light in (that daytime) is like the spreading out of water in the bed of the river.

So this observer remained in the dark until that planet that is called the Sun (again) rose from the place that they called the orient, in the sight of this observer – (but) from another (different) place, close to this place that it rose from yesterday, (by a distance) which is called a 'degree' (*daraja*). So they called the duration of the darkness in which they were from the time of the setting of the Sun till its rising a night (*layl*). So the day (*yawm*, the conventional rotational day and not the sidereal day) is the sum of the daytime (*nahâr*) and the night (*layl*). And he called the positions where this planet rises everyday 'degrees' (*darajât*).

Then they saw that this bright planet, which is called the Sun, moves between those estimated suppositions (marked by the different zodiacal signs) in the (Isotropic) circumferential orb, one degree after another, until it cuts through that (first supposed position) through these risings called days, such that when it completes cutting through one supposed (position), it starts cutting through another supposition, until it completes (going through all) the 12 suppositions by cutting (them). Then it starts another cycle by cutting through these supposed positions (again). So they called (the time) from the beginning of cutting each supposed position till the end of cutting that (particular zodiacal) supposed position a 'month' (*shahr*); and they called (the Sun's) cutting through all those (12 zodiacal) suppositions a 'year' (*sana*).

Thus it has become clear to you that the night, daytime, day, month and year, are called 'timings' (*awqât*), and (also) it gets shorter till what is called hours and less – that all that does not have (real) existence in its essence, but that they are only relations and relative connections (*nisab/idâfat*). But what is (actually) existing is (only) the essence of the orb and the planet, not the essence of the timing and time, since they, I mean the times, are only suppositions within it. So thus you see now that 'time' is (only) an expression for something (humanly) imagined, in which these 'timings' are only supposed.

So the day (*yawm*) for Ibn 'Arabî is like our usual day: i.e. the full revolution of the heavens as we see it from the Earth, which is conventionally measured according to the motion of the Sun. This definition of the day works perfectly for practical issues, such as determining prayer times. But if we want to be more accurate, the day indeed is the full revolution of the orb of the fixed stars [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6] – which is in reality (i.e. as we know today), a single full cycle of the motion of the Earth around itself with relation to far-away stars, *not* with relation to the Sun. That is why Ibn 'Arabî affirms that the 'day' (*yawm*) actually existed even before the creation of the seven planets including the Sun and the Earth, while the earthly daytime and night-time (*nahâr* and *layl*) were defined only after the creation of the Earth and the Sun. He says that

When Allah caused these higher orbs to rotate, He created 'days' in the first orb (that is the isotropic orb, because it is the first orb to be created in Nature) and defined it in relation to the second orb (that is the orb of fixed-stars or the zodiacal constellations) which has the apparently fixed planets (stars). . . . Then He created also the Sun, so the daytime and night are caused by the creation of the Sun (that appears) in the day. But the 'day' [i.e. the sidereal day; defined by the rotation of the highest sphere(s)] existed before (the Sun's creation) . . . so when the orb of the zodiac rotates one cycle, it is called the 'day' in which '*Allah created the heavens and the Earth (in six days)*'.

[I.140.30]

As we also showed in the previous chapter, Ibn 'Arabî showed on many occasions that all the stars are moving at very high speeds. He also showed that the stars that form the zodiac signs are, like other stars, very far away, which is why we do not realize their motion. So practically we consider these stars as fixed and therefore as a reference, but in fact the reference should be the Isotropic Orb, because it is the one that encompasses all other (material) orbs. However, because this orb has no any distinguishing sign, it can not be used as a reference. Therefore, to be more accurate, we have to measure the day not relative to the Sun but relative to stars, the constellations 'from *Nath* to *Nath*, from *Butayn* to *Butayn* or from *Thurayya* to *Thurayya*'¹⁹ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6] – since it is not possible to measure it relative to the Isotropic Orb which does not have any distinguishing feature. In astronomy, this is called the 'sidereal day', which is about four minutes longer than the normal (rotational) day. The difference is due to the Earth's rotation around the Sun at the same time it spins around its axis, which causes the sidereal day to become slightly longer. Although Ibn 'Arabî accepts the usual concept of the day that is our normal day (from sunrise to sunrise) for daily needs, such as knowing the time of prayers [I.388.14], he clearly distinguishes between the sidereal day and the normal day when it comes to critical issues such as the 'intertwined days' and the 'taken-out days' that we shall explain in Chapter 4.

The real meaning of 'day' comes from the fact that in this day Allah creates

the whole manifest world – i.e. the whole 360 degrees of the orb or the outermost celestial sphere, the ‘Pedestal’ – in it. This does not at all contradict the many verses in the Qur’an and other holy Books stating that Allah created the Heavens and the Earth ‘*in six days*’ (‘*and then*’ – on the seventh day – ‘*He mounted on the Throne*’) (see the Qur’an: 7:54, 10:3, 11:7, 25:59, 32:4, 50:38 and 57:4) because we only witness the last day (‘Saturday’, *al-sabt*) out of these seven days, while the other six days of creation are actually included in it as space (see section 3.6). Therefore, unlike some other Muslim theologians, Ibn ‘Arabî does not find any difficulty in explaining those verses in the Qur’an that talk about Allah’s creating the Heavens and the Earth in six days. Most religious scholars suggested that Allah meant ‘assumed days’, such that if days had actually existed then, then the time of this creation would have been six days, because they could not conceive of days before the creation of the Sun and the Earth. But Ibn ‘Arabî affirms that the creation of the Sun only divided the day (*yawm*) into daytime and night-time. So he gives a dramatically different cosmological meaning to the process of creation in a ‘Week’ (six days plus Saturday) – as the creation of space-time at every moment – and not the commonly understood meaning that it took Allah a current earthly week to finish the creation.

However, as already noted, Ibn ‘Arabî did observe that there was a difference between the Arabs and some non-Arab (‘*ajam*’) groups in their conventional definitions of the ‘day’, in that the Arabs considered the day to extend from sunset to sunset, while others considered it to extend from sunrise to sunrise. So for the Arabs, the night precedes daytime, while for non-Arabs it is the reverse. This matter has no effect on the length of the whole day itself, but its implications do have an effect on the actual unit of day and especially on its spiritual and symbolic meanings, because

For the Arabs and the Arabic timing, it has been traditionally agreed that the night precedes daytime, since originally the Creator of time, Allah the Exalted, says: ‘*and a token unto them is night; We strip the day out of it . . .*’ (36:37). So He made the night as the origin and took the day out of it, just as the skin is stripped off the sheep. So the (initial) appearance is to the night, and the day was hidden in it, just as the skin of the sheep appears and covers the sheep until it is stripped off. So the witnessed world (‘*âlam al-shahâda*’) was stripped off the unseen realm (*al-ghayb*), and our existence was stripped off the non-existence. So the knowledge of the Arabs advanced that of the non-Arabs, because the (i.e. the non-Arab) calculations are solar-based: they consider that the daytime precedes the night, and they have some right (to maintain that) in this (same Qur’anic) verse, which continues . . . ‘*then they are in darkness*’, for ‘then’ here refers to the present time or the future time, and the thing will not be in darkness until the coming of the night, in this verse. So (from their perspective), the daytime was like a cover on the night and then it was taken out or removed, so ‘*they are in darkness*’; so the night appeared which causes darkness, so the people are in darkness.

[I.716.9, also in *Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*, 7]

2.13 Days of other orbs and divine names

Ibn 'Arabî then extends the meaning of the normal 'day' as described above to the spheres of all planets (and stars) and even to symbolic 'spheres' (i.e. the orbs of spirits and divine Names), where he calls the period – i.e. full revolution of each particular orb – the 'day' that corresponds to this specific orb. In this way there are shorter days and longer days, depending on the relevant orb:

and when Allah caused the isotropic orb to rotate . . . and made its full cycle a complete day (i.e. the normal day) without daytime and night . . . So 'Days' are different: some Days are a half-cycle, some Days a full cycle, some Days 28 cycles (days); and some are more than that, (all the way up) until the 'Day of ascending ways' (*yawm dhû-al-ma'ârij*, of 50,000 years, described in the Qur'an, 70:4), or less than that (all the way down) until the 'Day of event'; so the degrees of Days change between these two (extremes of the) Days.

[III.433.35]

There is no maximum limit to the 'Day' that one can count [I.292.17], but there is a minimum limit. The maximum limit is the Age (*al-dahr*), which is one unique day that does not repeat and has no daytime and night [III.202.5]. But this Age is infinite, whereas the smallest Day is the 'singular day' (*al-yawm al-fard*) or the 'Day of event' (*yawm al-sha'n*) [I.292.16], which is that Day in which Allah is upon one task (55:29). From the meaning of the 'singular day' as the time in which Allah creates by one single act every entity in the world, we can generalize to all other days: the 'Day' of every orb is the time in which that orb affects every entity in the world (i.e. by making a full revolution).

But again we should not confuse – as we have seen above – the revolution of a planet (such as the Earth) around its axis in respect to its Sun, and in respect to distant stars (which are appropriately considered fixed). In astronomy, the first revolution is called a 'rotational' day, while the other is called the 'sidereal' day. The sidereal day is the time the Earth takes to rotate 360 degrees, in relation to distant stars. This equals, in modern calculations, 23 hours, 56 minutes, 4.09 seconds, while the mean solar day is 24 hours. The Earth actually rotates 360.98 degrees in 24 hours; the difference is caused by the Earth's orbital motion (around the Sun). Similarly all other planets or orbs have their own respective sidereal and orbital 'days'. Also, the Moon completes a cycle around the Earth once every 27.3 days, with reference to distant stars, so this is the *sidereal* lunar month. The normal lunar month used in Islamic calendar calculations, though, is the time interval between new moons as observed from Earth, which equals 29.5 days; this is called the 'synodic' lunar month. Therefore, the Moon's 'Day', if calculated by Ibn 'Arabî's approach to the Earth's sidereal day, should be the sidereal lunar month. But we shall see in section 3.2 that Ibn 'Arabî insists that the lunar month equals 28 days exactly.

Ibn 'Arabî made it clear in several places in his *Futûhât* [I.141.17, III.549.3] and other books that the fixed stars are not actually fixed at all, but that we can not notice their motion from Earth owing to the large distance, because our age

is too short to notice their motion despite their very high speed (an observation well confirmed by modern cosmology). Therefore when we say 'the day is the period of motion of fixed stars', we now know today that this apparent motion is caused by the motion of the Earth and not the stars, but since we move with the Earth, we think that the stars are moving. Indeed the actual motions of the orbs of stars have much longer periods, as is well known in modern astronomy. Actually, Ibn 'Arabi, following the accepted cosmological theories of his day, differentiates between two kinds of motion of the celestial orbs: natural or intrinsic motion, and forced or extrinsic motion:

The smallest Day is that which we count as the motion of the circumferential orb in whose day (*yawm*) the night (*layl*) and daytime (*nahâr*) appear. So that is the shortest day for the Arabs (i.e. in their language), and it corresponds to the largest orb, because it rules everything inside it. The motion of everything inside this orb in the daytime and night is a forced motion by this orb, through which it forces (a movement of) all the orbs that it surrounds. And each one of these orbs also has a natural (inherent) motion. So every orb below the surrounding orb has two motions at the same time: a natural motion and a forced motion. And each natural motion in every orb has a specific day which is measured in terms of the days of the surrounding orb.

[I.121.25]

So, for example – according to modern astronomy – the Moon naturally rotates around the Earth in about 28 days while at the same time it is forced to move with the Earth around the Sun. Likewise with most other orbs of the planets, in terms of the astronomy of Ibn 'Arabi's time: the intrinsic motion of those orbs defines a specific 'day' for every one, which equals the time needed to make full revolution around the Earth. In general, however, the day is the revolution of the specific orb, so it may have many possible lengths or measurements depending on the reference point (i.e. whether it is observed from the Earth or from other orbs or planets), but here we only consider the days of the orbs with relation to the Earth.

The relation between Days and orbs is that – in general – the longer Day corresponds to the larger orb. But this is not true for the isotropic orb, which is the first and largest (material) orb. The Day of this orb is the smallest Day, which is the day that we count, i.e. 24 hours. This is because the motion of this orb is a natural motion, whereas the motions of other orbs are a combination of this first natural motion (which is a forced motion on those other orbs) and another natural motion which is intrinsic to every orb. But if we consider the motion of the isotropic orb as expressing in reality the motion of the Earth around itself, as in modern astronomy, we can then generalize and say that the larger the orb, the bigger its Day. However, still another factor that affects the length of the Day is the speed of motion of the relevant orb. Therefore, the day that we count – i.e. the 24 hours – is actually the shortest Day, though Ibn 'Arabi sometimes mentions that a day could be a half cycle of the prime cycle of the Isotropic Orb, which is the 24-hour day [III.434.2], which is equal to the daytime (*nahâr*), but

otherwise the day itself as the revolution of the Isotropic Orb is the smallest day. Then comes the Day of the Moon, which is 28 Earth days (which is a little less than the actual day of the Moon that we call the lunar month; we shall give a more detailed discussion of this point in section 3.2), and so on [II.441.29].

As in the case of the material orbs of stars and planets, Ibn 'Arabî adds that every spirit and every divine Name of Allah has its own 'Day'. That is because every spirit and divine Name has effects on the world beneath it. So when they complete a full revolution around the world (i.e. without material motion but with regard to their effects on every entity), this is their 'Day'.

On the basis of particular references in the Qur'an and Hadith, Ibn 'Arabî assigns Days with specific length to some divine Names. In addition to 'the Lord's day' which equals '*one thousand years of what you count*' (32:5), and 'the day of the ascending ways' (*dhû al-ma'ârij*), which equals fifty thousand years according to the Qur'an (70:4), Ibn 'Arabî also mentions 'the day of *Mithl*' ('the Like', i.e. the cosmic 'Likeness' of the divine, referring to the famous Qur'anic verse 42:11 – the 'Perfect Human Being' (*al-insân al-kâmil*), who is created, according to a famous hadith, 'on the Image of the All-Merciful', see *SPK*: 27–30: 276) which equals seven thousand years [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 18], and another day which equals 6,454.54545 years, though he does not mention the relevant Name [I.121.23]. He also mentions yet another day which equals three thousand years, but says that he does not know the corresponding Name [III.238.13]. All this is summarized in Table 2.1 which shows the length of some other days, in addition to those just mentioned above.

2.14 The daytime and night-time

Ibn 'Arabî not only extends the concept of the known day to the orbs and divine Names, as we have seen above, but also he gives a very broad meaning of daytime and night (*nahâr* and *layl*), suggesting that every orb and divine Name has a corresponding daytime and night like our normal daytime and night. Just as our daytime and night are caused by the apparent motion of the Sun, these other infinitely varied daytimes and nights are all caused through the manifestation of the primary divine Name '*the Light*' [III.201.35], which brings into manifest existence in the world all the transient images or 'likenesses' of the infinite divine Names:

so when the divine Name '*the Light*' is considered (from the perspective of) the existence of the exalted shadow imaged forth (in the cosmos: i.e. the First Intellect or 'Perfect Human Being') and (from the perspective of) its rising upon those who are in the world, then the world (i.e. the creatures) which are in this image will call this rising, until the time it sets for them, a 'daytime', and from the time it sets for them, they call it a 'night'. But that (divine) Light is still present for this shadow, just as the Sun is still present in respect to the Earth both in its rising and in its setting (though it is visible to us only in its rising) . . . so in reality (that appearance of night) it is (only) a *shadow*, although they call it 'darkness'. . . . So know this!

Then Allah made these days which we know, that are caused by the motion of the isotropic orb, and the daytime and night that are caused by the heart (of the cosmos) – I mean the Sun – in order to determine through them the effects of the *divine* Days that belong to the Names.

[III.202.6]

Thus, as we have just seen, every divine Name has a specific Day (with its corresponding daytime and night), and, when the Day of one divine Name appears to be over, a Day of another Name starts, and so on; and all these are included in the eternal Day of the divine Name 'the Age':

And every divine Name, known or unknown, has a (specific) Day in the Age, and these are the 'Days of Allah' – and all, in reality, are the Days of Allah, but most people do not know that. So if we descend from the divine Names to the Day of the First Intellect, we find that its effect in the Universal Soul divided it into daytime and night: its 'night' in respect to the Soul is when the Intellect turns away from her when he approaches his Lord to benefit (by receiving knowledge from Him), and its daytime in respect to this Soul is when he approaches her to benefit her, so this is her daytime. And through this effect Allah made in the Soul two forces: the intellectual force, which is her 'night' in the world below her; and the active force, which is her daytime in the world below her – and that (contrast of these two universal powers) is called unseen and seen, letter and meaning, abstract and sensed. So this causes in the Soul a Day that has no daytime and night, while in the world it has (what we perceive as) daytime and night. The same applies to the Day of the 'Universal Matter' (*al-hayûlâ al-kull*): its daytime is its essence, and its night is its form, while it is in itself a Day with no daytime and night.

[III.202.20]

This (i.e. the relation between the two forces of the Soul and the two phases of the day, the daytime and the night-time) leads to a very important conclusion that we (physically) *move* in the world in the 'daytime' (*nahâr*) of the Soul, and that we (psychically or spiritually) *perceive* the world in the 'night-time' of the Soul – a key symbolism of the Qur'an and Hadith that Ibn 'Arabî develops at length throughout the *Futûhât* and other works. This motion-perception that happens in the 'day' (*yawm*) of the Soul is a cyclic unit action that repeats every day (in fact, every *moment* for us). In other words: we either move or perceive, but not at the same time.

Likewise, the Day in every orb is a Day with no daytime and night for that orb, but with the appearance of a daytime and night for (some of) the world below it. Ibn 'Arabî even gives an excellent example, using a detailed scientific explanation about something that we are familiar with nowadays, the phenomena of daytime and night on the Earth:

And Allah caused the (normal) daytime and night by creating the Sun and its (apparent) rising and setting on the Earth – whereas in the sky it is all light, with no daytime and night. The outlet of the night from the sphere of the Earth where the Sun sets is cone-shaped.

[III.203.22]

This is exactly what everybody admits now as a fact of science, shown in Figure 2.2 for more clarification.

So with regard to us, we are necessarily either under the effect of the day-times of particular divine Names of Allah or under the effect of their nights, depending on Allah's manifestation for each one of us and in everything else. But these Names in themselves have no daytime and night, but rather are all light. Ibn 'Arabi explains this differing influence of the different divine Names further by saying:

So its night is the 'unseen' (*ghayb*), which is what is hidden away from us but at the same time affects the high Spirits which are above Nature and also the roaming Spirits; and its daytime is the 'seen', which is its effect in natural bodies down to the last elementary body.

[III.201.15]

Ibn 'Arabi also gives more details about the different manifestations of God to different kinds of bodies and spirits, by dividing the daytime and night each into three thirds:

and when Allah divided His Days like that, He made its night three parts and its daytime three parts; so He, the Exalted, descends down to His servants in the last third of the night of His Days [*Kanz*: 3355, 3388], and that is when He is manifested to the natural spirits (*al-arwâh al-tabi'iyya*) that manage the material bodies; and in the middle third He manifests to the subjected spirits (*al-arwâh al-musakhkhara*, or the angels of each heavenly sphere), and in the first third He manifests to the 'dominating spirits' (*al-arwâh al-muḥaymina*).

And He divided the day of these days into three parts, and in every part He is manifested to the world of bodies – for they are always praising Allah. So in the first third He is manifested to the subtle bodies (*al-ajsâm al-latîfa*)




Figure 2.2 The daytime and night in the sky.

Note

Night is only in some regions below the corresponding orb, whereas in the orb itself it is all day. And in the case of the normal day on the Earth, the outlet of the night is extended in space as a cone.

which are unseen by sight, in the middle third He is manifested to the transparent materials (*al-aqsâm al-shaffâfa*), and in the last third He is manifested to the dense materials (*al-aqsâm al-kathîfa*). Without this manifestation, they would not be able to know Whom they are praising.

[III.201.24]

2.15 The 'single day'

As we have seen above, Ibn 'Arabî declares that there is an indivisible duration of time [IV.425.8] that is the smallest possible time or Day. Ibn 'Arabî calls this Day 'the single Day or time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) or 'the Day of task or event' (*yawm al-sha'n*). Another translation of *sha'n* is possibly 'concern', which could also convey the general meaning of the underlying Qur'anic verse, repeatedly cited by Ibn 'Arabî and it forms the basis of his unique view of the discrete nature of time: *kulla yawm Huwa fî sha'n* (55:29). But we prefer to use the words 'event' or 'task' in order to stress the meaning that in each such momentary 'Day', Allah acts in the world by creating the totality of all events. Ibn 'Arabî himself stressed this meaning: '(The *sha'n*) is nothing but the (single universal creative divine) Act, which is what He creates in each day of the smallest Days, which is the single time that is indivisible' [IV.425.11].

In every 'Day of event', Allah re-creates the world in a new image that is similar to the previous one, but with slight changes. Or in other words, in every 'Day of event' Allah causes one unique, singular Act in the world, because Allah is One and His Command (*amr*) is one (*Al-Masâ'il*, no. 26). However, this same single Act will have different results on the different entities in the world, depending on the capabilities and characteristics of each individual creature. For example, when Allah inspires the Universal Soul (*al-nafs al-kullîyya*) to move the element of fire (*unsûr al-nâr*) in order to heat the world, the effects of this single Act depend greatly on the individual creatures, so those who are ready to burn will burn, and those who accept heat will be heated, and so on [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 11]: Also he says in the *Futûhât* that 'the task in relation to the Real is one from Him – but in relation to the recipients (*qawâbil*) of the whole world, it is many tasks (events) that – were it not (all) confined by existence – we could call infinite (because everything that physically exists is necessarily finite)' [II.82.6].

The 'Day of event' is a single and indivisible duration of time that equals the entire earthly global day at each instant, but because the Universal Intellect scans in this 'Day' *N* number of states (that is $N/2$ for bodies in its 'day' and $N/2$ for spirits in its 'night'), it appears to the observer, who is one of these states, as infinitely divisible, because it is extremely small: $24 \times 60 \times 60/N$ seconds, and *N* is surely unimaginably huge. This is simply because the observer exists only for this infinitesimal amount of time during every 'Day of event'. This infinitesimal amount of time is what we call 'now' (*al-ân*), the 'moment' (see the following section) or the 'presence' – and this is the only *real* part of the imaginary time (see also section 6.8).

We must note that the isotropic orb, which is the first orb beneath the divine 'Pedestal', is not material. Therefore we can not differentiate between its 'parts', since there are no distinguishing features in this orb – which indeed is why it is called 'isotropic' (*atlas*), or the same in all directions. Therefore we can not measure the length of our normal day which is actually the 'day' of this isotropic orb (as we explained above in the previous section), and which also equals the Day of event. But rather we use this perceptible earthly day as a measure of other days, even though in itself it is an unknown duration of time. Although we divide it into 24 hours, each of which has 60 minutes of 60 seconds, all this is mere convention. We can not measure anything by its parts, so in order to measure this day, which is the period of the first orb, we need to compare it to other days 'before' it. But since it is the first day, we can not actually measure it: 'and when Allah created this first orb, it rotated a cycle which is unknown to other than Allah, the most Exalted, because there are no finite bodies above it, since it is the first transparent body' [I.122.29].

Moreover, Ibn 'Arabî also observes that since the isotropic orb has only one cycle, it can not be described as having an end, although we assume in it a beginning and an end [III.548.29].

In many cases Ibn 'Arabî calls this smallest, singular day 'the day of Breath' [II.520.33, III.127.335], and he even gives a measure of this day through the Breath: 'and the day is the magnitude of the breath of the Breather in the single time' [II.171.23]. This is because in this instantaneous 'Day' the divine creative 'Breath' emerges and returns to its Source, with its manifestation being the realm of all the divine 'letters', 'Words', or 'sounds' repeatedly produced by this Breath. As we shall see in section 7.8, Ibn 'Arabî visualizes the divine 'Word' as essentially composed of vibrations or sounds that are the 'letters' that form all the manifest objects and entities of the cosmos, just as letters form the words in human language. All words are composed of letters, and all letters are composed of the letter or initial out-breathing vowel sound *alif*, the first letter of the Arabic alphabet [I.78.22]. So in each single Day, this creative divine sound is produced by the divine Breath, and the manifest world is in reality the succession of these sounds or breaths. We shall explore this important issue in section 7.8 below. Also in section 6.8 we shall explain the creation scenario according to the Single Monad model of the cosmos.

2.16 Moments

In addition to the common Arabic words used for 'time' – *zaman* and *zamân* – *al-waqt* is also widely used, which means the state 'you are always described by, so you are always under the rule of the moment' [II.538.32]. We have already mentioned above the difference between *zaman* and *zamân*, and shown that Ibn 'Arabî uses them basically in the same context, although he tends to use *zaman* for fixed and short times, such as the Single Time. *Al-waqt*, however, sometimes has a different meaning and technical usage for Ibn 'Arabî. He notes that:

(this technical meaning of *al-waqt*) is in fact – by the convention of the Folk (the Sufis) – the state in which you are in the time being. So it is a thing that exists (now) between two non-existents (the past and the present; not as time but as things that have passed or are yet to come). And also it has been said that *al-waqt* is what comes upon them from the Real by (the Real's) managing (*tasrîf*) them, not by what they choose for themselves.

[II.538.35]

Ibn 'Arabi elsewhere gives many equivalent meanings of *al-waqt*. For example he defines *al-waqt* in his short dictionary of Sufi terms (*Isstîlâhât Al-Sûfiyya*: 8) by saying that: '*al-waqt* is your state in the time being, without any relation to the past or to the future'. But at the end he says that

the divine (ontological) basis of *al-waqt* is His, the most Exalted, describing Himself as being *each day upon one task* (50:29): so *al-waqt* is what *He* is in – in the root – but it appears in the offspring that is the cosmos. So the 'tasks' (*shu'ûn*) of the Real appear in the entities of the world (the contingent things). So *al-waqt* in fact is what you are in, and what you are in is your aptitude itself. So what appears in you of the tasks of the Real that He is in, is only what your aptitude demands: so the task is already designated, because the aptitude of the possible with its possibility led the task of the Real to bring it into existence. Do not you see that the non-existent does not accept the existence (or the task of the Real), because it has no aptitude for that. So the (outward, manifest) origin of *al-waqt* is from the cosmos, not from the Real, and it is a kind of supposition (*taqdîr*) and supposition has no effect (*hukm*) on other than the creation (i.e. it has no rule on the Real).

[II.539.2]

In this way *al-waqt* is the current moment of time; it is *our* portion of the single Day; so the single Day with regard to the whole world is the global reality encompassing all of manifest existence – including all on Earth – at any instant. But with regard to each entity in the world, it is a moment, since the time of each entity in the world is its *waqt*. This is why the Sufi was said to be 'the son of his moment (*ibn waqtihi*)', as indicated by Gerhard Böwering in his study of 'Ibn al-'Arabi's Concept of Time'. In this paper, Böwering also showed that 'In Ibn al-'Arabi's view there is an infinite cluster of moments, conceived as time atoms without duration, but they are mere instances of preparedness in which are actualized those possibilities that God has ordained to be affected in a human being' (Böwering 1992: 81).

However, the issue of whether the moment has a duration or not is extremely delicate. If we choose to say it has not, then how can the extent of the entire perceived day be composed of zero-length moments? We must keep in mind that the number of entities in the world (*N*), though very big, is finite. Therefore the single Day equals *N* multiplied by the duration of the moment. But if we choose to assert the actual duration of the 'moment', it would lead to questions already

encountered in earlier philosophers' paradoxes about time, such as 'What exactly happens *during* the moment?' and 'Does the event that takes a moment *pop up* at once or gradually?' For if at once, then 'Why does it take a duration?' and if gradually, then 'What are the sub-events, and how many are they?'

Ibn 'Arabî did not give any direct insight about this subtle and highly important cosmological issue. However, in his cosmological treatise *'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*, he spoke briefly about the Greatest Element (*al-'unsûr al-a'zam*) whom Allah created at once, and we shall show in section 6.4 that the Single Monad, though it is an indivisible unit, is composed of or made by (or from different manifestations of) this Greatest Element. Therefore, the moment (that corresponds in fact to the creation of the Single Monad) should also be composed of 'sub-moments' (that correspond to the creation of the Greatest Element). We can now affirm, according to Ibn 'Arabî, that those sub-moments are utterly indivisible because he said that Allah creates the Greatest Element 'at once'. The questions of 'Do those sub-moments have non-zero durations?' and 'How many sub-moments are in the moment?' remain open, though a first speculation is that the process is similar to the normal day where the Sun rises and sets to define the daytime and the night. There is some support for this in the comparison Ibn 'Arabî usually makes between the creation of the Perfect Human Being (that is the Single Monad) and the creation of the world, and more specifically the motion of the Sun during the day. We shall talk about this comparison in section 6.7. Therefore, the Day of the Single Monad (that is the moment) may look smooth and composed of a continuous flow of time. But it is quite possible that the same sets of questions may be repeated and similar quantization takes place at smaller scales.

When the Single Monad (that is the Universal Intellect) faces his Lord, this is the 'night' for the Universal Soul; and when the Intellect (*'aql*, masculine in Arabic) faces the Universal Soul (*nafs*, a feminine noun) this is her daytime [III.202.22], so this is the single Day of the Single Monad that is the Universal Intellect, and therefore the moments that are the days of the sub-entities of the world (which are the sub-intellects) should be also in the same way. But we have not seen any reference in Ibn 'Arabî's writings with any detail about the exact relation between the Single Monad and the Greatest Element, and hence about the moment and its possible constituents. On the contrary, Ibn 'Arabî affirms that this is a divine secret and that he was sworn not to disclose it (*'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*: 38).

2.17 The future, the present and the past

We have already said that the future and the past do not exist; the real time is only the present, the now (*al-'ân*) or the current state (*al-hâl*). Also, we explained that the Age is an endless circle that does not have a beginning or an end for itself; it is all an 'eternally ongoing present' which is called *al-ân al-dâ'im* or – as Ibn 'Arabî calls it elsewhere – 'the continuous existence' (*al-wujûd al-mustamirr*) [II.69.13, IV.362.32]. However, we live in time at the present now, and we feel the past and the future, so how can they be non-existence?

As we noted earlier, Ibn 'Arabî often explains that the essential realities [*a'yân*: the essences or entities] of the manifest world have always been existing in the Knowledge of Allah, though not actual real existence [II.309.25, I.538.32]. When Allah creates the world, it appears in real existence in the same reality as it is determined in Allah's knowledge. Allah does not create all the successive states of the world at once, but in a series process; so the creations are brought into existence one by one. Of course this is true in relation to us, but with relation to Allah, Who is out of time, the word 'series' would be meaningless because it is confined to time. For Allah nothing was changed because the creation existed in His knowledge eternally. So because we are sub-entities in this whole creation, we encounter time as past, present and future, but in fact only the present exists. The past is 'a relegation of an actualized non-existence', and the future is 'a pure non-existence' [II.69.13], whereas the present now (*al-ân*) or state (*hâl*) is 'what makes the distinction between them' [II.56.11], 'so without the (current) state (*hâl*) there would be no distinction between the past non-existence and the future non-existence, so the now (*al-ân*) is like a partition (*barzakh*)' [III.108.16]. 'Therefore the present state (*al-hâl*) is described by the continuous existence and it is the constant and immutable rule, and anything other than the present state is non-existence and could not be a firm (absolute) existence' [IV.362.33].

2.18 Eternity

As we have already noted, the English word 'eternity' has two different Arabic synonyms: '*azal*' and '*abad*'. *Azal* is eternity without beginning (*a parte ante*), and *abad* is eternity without end (*a parte post*). Ibn 'Arabî showed in his short treatise *The Book of Eternity* (*Kitâb Al-Azal*) that 'there is nothing called eternity at all' (*Kitâb Al-Azal*: 8–9). Eternity is in fact the *negation* of a beginning (or end), not endless extension: that is why Ibn 'Arabî says that eternity is a negative attribute. In this way there is no meaning to asking whether there has been any extension of time between the existence of Allah and the existence of the world, because Allah creates the world out of time, as discussed in section 2.3 above.

There has been a long debate amongst Islamic philosophers and theologians about the meaning of eternity and time with relation to Allah. Some philosophers say, for example, that Allah was talking in eternity in His eternal Speech, and that therefore He said in eternity '*take off thy shoes*' (20:12) to Moses, and '*worship thy Lord until certainty comes unto thee*' (15:99) to Muhammad, peace be upon them, and so on. They say that because clearly we can not say that Allah uttered these words at the time of Moses or Muhammad, therefore it must be an eternal speech. Ibn 'Arabî, however, showed in his *Kitâb Al-Azal* that all these interpretations are not proper, and that they end up confining Allah to time, which is a serious error: 'It is more proper to say that Moses heard out of time, because the Speaker spoke out of time. To let Moses become holy is better than letting *al-Bâri*' (the Creator) be compared to us' (*Kitâb Al-Azal*: 5, see also *al-Masâ'il*, no. 131).

So if we take the correct meaning of the word 'eternity', which is the negation of any beginning (*azal*), we may ask: was there anyone in eternity with the Creator or not? There has also been a long philosophical and theological debate about that, which Ibn 'Arabî summarizes by saying:

One group said: 'the primordials (*qudamâ*) are four: the Creator, the Intellect, the Soul and the Dust (*al-haba'*)'.

Another group said: 'the primordials are eight (pre-existents): the Essence and the seven descriptions' (i.e. the seven primordial descriptions or attributes of Allah, drawn from earlier kalam theology: 'Life, Knowledge, Ability, Will, Hearing, Seeing and Speaking' [I.525.32]).

Another group said: 'nothing is primordial but One, and He is the exalted Real, and He is One in all aspects, but to His Essence (there is) an aspect by which He is called Able, and so on for whatever they have made a description'.

Another group took this (last) opinion, but they added to it a (new) concept. And this concept is called 'the Reality of Realities', which is neither existing nor non-existing, but it is primordial with the primordial and created with the created; it can be imagined, but it does not exist by itself, like universality ('*âlamîyya*) and so on.

(*Kitâb Al-Azal*: 8–9)

Clearly, the Sufis are among the last group, and Ibn 'Arabî in particular relates the beginning of creation to 'the Reality of Realities' (*haqîqat al-haqâ'iq*), and sometimes he calls it 'the Universal Reality' (*al-haqîqa al-kullîyya*) or 'the Muhammadan Reality' (*al-haqîqa al-muhammadiyya*). He stated in chapter 6 of the *Futûhât* that the beginning of the spiritual creation is the 'Dust', and that the first existent within it was the 'Muhammadan Reality of (divine) Mercy' (*al-haqîqa al-muhammadiyya al-rahmâniyya*) that is not confined to space, and that it is created from the 'Known Reality' (*al-haqîqat al-ma'lûma*) that can not be described by either existence or non-existence [I.118.5]. Ibn 'Arabî claims that only the Sufis have introduced the concept of 'the Reality of Realities' (*haqîqat al-haqâ'iq*), although he admits that the Mu'tazilites drew attention to something similar to this notion when they tried to escape the accusation that their understanding of the divine Attributes postulated the real existence of additional realities other than the Essence of the Real [II.433.14, *SPK*: 134–139].

2.19 The age

So the days are repeated cycles of different 'orbs', whether celestial or divine: every orb has its own day. These days overlap with each other, so the day of the Sun, for example, takes 360 days of our days that we count on the Earth; the day of the Moon takes 28 normal Earth days, and so on. In one Sun day, many Moon days pass; and in one Moon day, many normal Earth days pass – just as in one 'Lord-day', one thousand Sun days (Earth years) pass. Likewise, *all* the possible days of *all* orbs and divine Names happen and repeat themselves in the 'Day of

the Age' that 'is one Day that never repeats, and it has no daytime (*nahâr*) or night' [III.202.5]. The Day of the Age is *all* a 'daytime': it does not have a night, because there is no orb above it; it is the truly all-encompassing orb that includes all material and spiritual orbs.

Ibn 'Arabî, like other Sufis, consider that 'the Age' (*al-dahr*) is one of the divine Names of Allah, according to a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad says: 'Do not damn the Age, for Allah is the Age' [*Kanz*: 8137]. In another divine saying (*Hadith qudsî*), Allah says: 'the son of Adam hurts Me: he damns the Age, and I *am* the Age, the command in My Hand, I circulate the daytime and the night' [*Kanz*: 8139].

Also in the Qur'an, Allah says: '*and they say: What is there but our life in this world? We shall die and we live, and nothing but the Age can destroy us. But of that they have no knowledge: they merely conjecture*' (45:24).

In his comments on this last verse, Ibn 'Arabî affirms that they (the disbelievers) are quite right in their claim that nothing but the Age can destroy them, because Allah *is* the Age – though they did not mean that, but rather meant simply time, and not 'the Age' as a name of Allah [IV.265.29].

We have seen above that 'the time of a thing is its presence': this is why Allah is named as 'the Age', because the realities of everything exist in Him. So He is 'the Age' because the whole world (hidden and manifest), including all space and time, from eternity without beginning (*al-azal*) to eternity without end (*al-abad*): all this is a manifestation of Allah's divine Names – so the Age is the all-encompassing orb of all Names [IV.266.11]. Ibn 'Arabî explains this by saying:

Do not you see in Allah's words (the Qur'an) when He told us about things in the past, He then used the past tense, and He used the future tense for things to come, and He used the present tense for the now-happening things, . . . and if we seek for all that something that has a real existence and these things are occurring in it – which is for them like a container – we shall find nothing, neither by mind nor by sense, except that we find it as an imaginary container, which is itself contained by another imaginary container, and so on, nothing but endless illusion. So if you think rationally, you will find that there is nothing (i.e. no 'containing' reality of space or time) that can be comprehended by imagination or by the mind, nor by the senses, nothing but the Real Existence on which our existence is based.

For this reason He named Himself to us as 'the Age', so that the reference can be only to Him, not to 'time' as imagined, because there is no Ruler (*hâkim*) other than Allah, and in Him appeared the realities of things and their properties. So He is the everlasting existence, and the realities of things with their properties appeared from behind the veil of His existence, but because of His subtleness (*latâfa*), we see the realities of things, which are ourselves, from behind the veil of His existence without seeing Him, just like we see the stars from behind the veil of the heavens (the orbs) and yet we do not see the heavens.

Moreover, given the above definition of the Age, it is not possible to imagine a plural form of this word in this meaning. Yet Ibn 'Arabî himself sometimes uses it as plural, when he speaks about the 'first age' or the 'age of ages' from which time appeared: 'from that (eternity) is the Prophet's saying: "Allah is/was, and none with Him" (*Kanz*: 29850), and this is a rare knowing known only by the "Solitary Sages" (*al-afrâd*) among men. That is what is called "the first age" and "the age of ages": and from this eternity (*azal*), time emerged' [I.156.35].

This could be slightly confusing, but there are some references in Ibn 'Arabî's writing that seem to parallel what is known in modern cosmology as the 'bubbles' model of the universe, where the universe is full of black holes that cause a large curvature in space-time in such a way that each can be considered as a separate space-time similar to – and as large as – our own; except that each is only a single point in our space-time. Thus Ibn 'Arabî affirms that 'each part of the world can be a cause for another world similar to it' [I.259.25]. Also Ibn 'Arabî considers that the origin of the world that we live in is the Universal Intellect, who is originally only one of an unknown number of roaming Spirits whom Allah created directly without any intermediaries [III.430.5]. Any one of these primordial Spirits is, therefore, capable of making another universe, just like the Universal Intellect that made our universe. Also we may recall that Allah in the Qur'an is repeatedly called the 'the Lord of the worlds', in the indefinite *plural*, and not only of this world. However, the Arabic word for 'the age' has also been conventionally used sometimes for other related meanings such as eternity without beginning (*azal*) and eternity without end (*abad*); so Ibn 'Arabî showed that the plural form 'ages' (*duhûr*) could also be used to include or refer to all these terms, since they all are essentially the Age [IV.266.5].

On the other hand, the Age is not only time, but it is also space. Because the Age is the totally 'encompassing orb', it must include everything inside it, spatial as well as temporal. As we shall show in section 3.6, the world as both space and time is created in the seven days of the divine Week (six Days for space, plus Saturday for time). And the Age is not more than those divine seven Days [II.438.5]. Thus in Ibn 'Arabî's conception, space and time have the same meaning as days, and both are unified as space-time, where the divine Week is its basic unit, and the Age is in fact this Single Week.

2.20 Other expressions of time

In addition to the common words such as time (*zaman*, *zamân*), moment (*waqt*), day (*yawm*), daytime (*nahâr*) night (*layl*), eternity (*azal/abad*) and the age (*dahr*), which we have discussed above, along with the related terms for week (*usbû'*), month (*shahr*) and year (*sana*), which we shall discuss in Chapter 3, there are other time expressions occasionally used by Ibn 'Arabî with slightly different and more specific technical meanings than in their usage by other Muslim scholars and theologians. We want to end this chapter by looking at some of these other temporal terms for the purpose of completeness, although we may not need to refer to these technical terms in the rest of this book. In

particular, some of these expressions became important in later forms of Islamic thought which tried to elaborate and integrate Ibn 'Arabî's ideas, in various ways, with the conceptual schemas of both kalam theology and Avicennan philosophy.

- *Al-sarmad*: this is another word for eternity, other than *al-azal*, *al-abad* and *al-dahr*. Unlike kalam theologians, Ibn 'Arabî does not use this word often. *Sarmad* means 'absolute eternity', i.e. it includes both eternity without beginning (*azal*) and without end (*abad*). It is most widely used as an adjective, *sarmadî*, meaning 'everlasting', and this is how it is used in a very pertinent discussion of time in the Qur'an (28:71–72). Ibn 'Arabî normally used it [I.164.2, I.169.26, II.675.14, IV.29.27] in a similar manner.
- *Matâ*: literally this word means 'when?', and refers to the relation of a thing or event to time, or to other events. It is used to inquire about the time or occurrence of an event in relation to others. Ibn 'Arabî affirms that the thought of time comes about due to this kind of inquiry: 'So for example if one asks: when (*matâ*) did Zayd come? Then the answer may be "(he came) when (*hîna*) the Sun rose"' [III.546.28].
- *Al-hîn*: this is a (relatively short) duration of time [II.201.36, II.263.25]; it is also commonly used to refer to a specific future or past time [II.201.36], usually in answer to 'when', as in the previous example: '(he came) when (*hîna*) the Sun rose' [III.546.28].

3 The significance of the divine week and its seven days

*The elements are four mothers,
and they are the daughters of the world of (the heavenly) orbs.
We are born out of them, so our (ultimate, spiritual) being
is in the world of (spiritual) principles (arkân) and (spiritual) rulers.
The God has made our sustenance from the ears of grain (sanâbil),¹
from the influence of Sunbula (Virgo),² without sharing.³
And He also multiplied our reward by 'the seven ears of grain',
as it was said in a saying (2:261) by One Who does not lie.⁴
So our time (zamân) is seven thousands (of years),
that come through the recurrence of (moments) of radiance and intense darkness.
So see, with your intellect, seven in seven,
from seven that are not kings.*

[I.292.31–293.3]

As Ibn ‘Arabî suggests in this cryptic opening poem of his key cosmological chapter 60 of the *Futûhât* (explained at the end of section 3.1), although we encounter many visible, apparent ‘days’ due to the rotation of the Earth around its axis, which all appear to be similar to each other, ultimately we can reduce them to only seven distinctive Days⁵ depending on the kinds of events that happen in them. Ibn ‘Arabî argues that in each Day of the seven Days of the (actual, cosmic) ‘Week’, Allah orders the heavenly orbs to act in a special unique manner that causes unique events and motions to appear in the entire cosmos. However, the seven Days of these divine, creative ‘events’ or ‘tasks’ (*shu’ûn*) are intertwined with our normal days of the apparent earthly week in a special manner that we shall explain in the coming chapter – and that is why we see multiple events appearing every day.

In various sections of the *Futûhât*, Ibn ‘Arabî goes on to explain the importance of the divine ‘Week’ (*usbû’*) and the different meanings of the seven Days of that Week, which are rooted in the meanings of the Arabic terms for each of those Days, running from ‘the First’ (*al-ahad*, corresponding to Sunday) to ‘the Day of rest’ (*al-sabt*, corresponding to Saturday). He also shows that Saturday is therefore the ‘Day of eternity’ (*yawm al-abad*) and that all the Days of the Week of creation, including Saturday itself, are actually occurring on this ‘last’ Day of

eternity (*al-sabt*). These distinctive conceptions can only be fully understood after investigating Ibn 'Arabî's view of the actual flow of time, which we shall explain in the following chapter; but in this chapter we shall first explain the origin and the meaning of these seven Days of the divine creative Week, why they have to be seven and not more or fewer, and what is the significance of each Day.

Also in this chapter we shall explain Ibn 'Arabî's unique understanding of the process of creation of the world by Allah '*in six Days*', from Sunday to Friday. He explains that the creation of the world in this Week corresponds to the creation of the 'six directions' of space (in six Days, from Sunday to Friday) and then the appearance of this creation *in time* on Saturday (the Day of eternity). In this way the Week is indeed the unit of the space-time container of the world – or also 'the Age' as we explained in section 2.19. This distinctive conception of the unification of space and time, symbolically expressed in Ibn 'Arabî's understanding of the seven Days of creation, adds an essential dimension to Relativity's concept of space and time; as a result, for the first time in astronomy, the 'Week' will itself have a clear and essential cosmological significance.

3.1 The significance of the week in theology and astronomy

In most Islamic books that talk about cosmology, we find many diagrams and tables that associate each day of the seven days of the week with specific letters of the alphabet and specific divine Names of Allah, in addition to certain planets and constellations or zodiacal signs. For example, Ibn 'Arabî explained in the long chapter 198 of the *Futûhât* [II.390–478] the creation of the world by Allah and the role of His divine Names on the different parts of Heavens and Earth, and then he relates each divine Name and the thing He creates to a letter from the Arabic alphabet, a mansion from the 28 lunar mansions (constellations), a day of the seven days of the week, and one of the seven circulating heavenly bodies (five planets, Sun and Moon). This type of symbolic association based on the days of the astronomical week is also found in many other cosmological books of other religions and cultures dealing with astrology and related mythology.

The Egyptians once divided their 30-day months into three ten-day weeks, in the same manner as Greeks of the same period (Goudsmit 1966: 24), but later they changed it back to seven days.⁶ More recently, the French (during the Revolution, in 1792) tried to make their week ten days instead of seven; and the Russians also tried (in 1929) five-day and (in 1932) six-day weekly systems, although they all later restored the seven-day week (Goudsmit and Claiborne 1974: 24).

So what is the importance of the week, and why does it apparently have to be seven days in particular, while most other attempted systems making the week three, five, six or ten days did not persist, with few exceptions such as the Maya who used weeks/months of 20 days (Aveni 1990: 101, 185–252)? Even some micro-organisms clearly adopt a seven-day biological cycle (Aveni 1990: 100,

and Coveny and Highfield 1990: 220–259). And yet, unlike the day, the year and the month, there is no any apparent *astronomical* significance to the week; nothing cosmic happens in the heavens in seven days.

The Babylonians and the ancient Egyptians believed that each hour of the day was ruled by one of the five then-known planets plus the Sun and the Moon, and they named the days of the week after the names of these seven circulating planets, as they are now used in both the Latin and Anglo-Saxon languages and cultures (Aveni 1990: 102–106). They considered that the planet that ruled the first hour of the day governed the entire day, so they gave the name of this planet to the corresponding day. The same doctrine was also part of earlier Persian cosmology and theology (Bickerman 1968: 59). Ibn ‘Arabî also refers to the same hypothesis [III.203.31].

It is interesting to note that these celestial bodies, in the same sequence, were also used to name the days of the week in ancient India, Tibet and Burma (Parise 1982: 172). This is also true for the names of Japanese (who used the Chinese sexagenary cycles) (Parise 1982: 215–218) days of the week, but the custom there has been traced back only 1,000 years. Adherents of the cult of Sin at Harran, who were known as Harranians or ‘Sabeans’ by Arabic and Syrian authors, also named their days after the same solar system members (Langdon 1964: 154). Like Ibn ‘Arabî, the Babylonians, the Chinese, ancient Egyptians and most ancient civilizations considered the day named after Saturn to be the seventh day, so they began their week with a day named after the Sun (Sunday), a practice which was affirmed in the Bible⁷ and later by the Prophet Muhammad.⁸

In the Arabic linguistic usages followed in Islam, however, the names of the days of the week do not relate to the names of any pagan gods or celestial bodies. Before Islam, different names were used in Arabic, which were mostly derived from certain actions people usually performed on those particular days of the week, though some of those Arabic names might also have been derived from the names of the planets (Al-Marzûqî 2002: 238–244). But in the later standardized Islamic usage, apart from the day-names *Jum’a* (Friday) which means ‘gathering’ and *Sabt* (Saturday) which means ‘rest’, the names of the days are merely numbered from one (*al-ahad* which means ‘the first’ or ‘the one’, for Sunday) to five (*al-khamis* which means ‘the fifth’ for Thursday). These names, however, clearly suggest that Sunday (*al-ahad*) is the first day of the week, as was the case with the earlier Babylonians and Egyptians – a fact which Ibn ‘Arabî and some other Muslim authors normally take for granted, based on many related prophetic narrations, as we shall see further below (section 3.5).

Given their centrality in Qur’anic accounts of the creation, the seven days of the week (and their standard Arabic names) play an essential role in Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology. His cosmological understanding of the week clearly has its basis in the scriptural accounts of divine creation, but also assumes throughout that there must be some kind of corresponding deeper effects of that (i.e. the divine creation of the seven Days of the Week) in the wider cosmos.

Finally, although there are many similarities between Ibn ‘Arabî’s doctrine about the origin of the divine creative Week and its Days, and the cosmological

perspectives and understandings of earlier ancient (mostly pagan) cultures, he also takes great pains to stress that this cosmological schema should not be understood as a deviation from the fundamental monotheistic teachings of Islam, and to indicate the ways that conception is rooted in indications in both the Qur'an and many hadith. Although Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology, for example, relates the seven days of the week and the orbs of the seven moving planets, as in many ancient cosmologies, he carefully emphasizes that he does not consider these planets as 'gods' at all. Thus he goes on to explain, in his explanation of the poem (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) opening chapter 60 of the *Futûhât*, that the planets and/or the angelic spirits associated with them 'are servants, and the servant does not deserve the name "ruler" (or "king": *malik*). And the "seven" mentioned (there) are the seven planets in the seven orbs that appeared by the seven Days of the Week' [I.293.4].

Following repeated indications in the Qur'an and Hadith, Ibn 'Arabî understands that those planets, along with other constellations associated with signs of the zodiac and lunar mansions, are associated with or inhabited by certain spirits (*rûhâniyyât*) or angels whom Allah appointed and organized in a specific hierarchy to look after the whole cosmos beneath them, including the Earth [III.433–434]. This is different from earlier cosmological doctrines, because the pagan astrologers believed that these spirits were deities and gods, while Ibn 'Arabî stresses that they are nothing but servants created and appointed by Allah.⁹

3.2 The four main time cycles

Ibn 'Arabî stresses that 'everything in the world has to be based on (specific) divine Attributes' [I.293.5]. Although some Muslim scholars, following a famous hadith [*Kanz*: 1933, 1937], believe that the basic divine Names or Attributes of Allah can be limited to 99, Ibn 'Arabî considers them to be countless [III.146.35], while the 99 Names that are referred to in some prophetic narrations are simply the main most Beautiful Names (*al-asmâ' al-husnâ*) of Allah. Of these many divine Names, there are four fundamental Attributes – Life (*hayât*), Knowledge (*'ilm*), Ability (*qudra*) and Will (*irâda*) – that are necessary and sufficient for Allah to be described as God. Therefore those are considered to be the ultimate sources or 'mothers' (*ummahât*) of all other divine Attributes [I.469.25]. In relation to creation, however, three more Attributes are also necessary for Allah to be Creator: Hearing (*sam'*), Seeing (*basar*) and Speaking (*kalâm*). Together, that makes the principal divine Attributes of Allah to be 'seven mother attributes. . . : Life, Knowledge, Ability, Will, Hearing, Seeing and Speaking' [I.525.32].

Because Allah created (the perfect) Human Being 'according to His Image' [I.163.20], these same divine Attributes are potentially manifest in every fully human person (such as Adam and the prophets). Also, as Ibn 'Arabî says, Allah created the world and everything in it in the image of (the Perfect) Human Being [II.652.25], and so the world with the Human Being is 'on the Image of the Real'

– but without the Human Being it would not have this perfection [III.343.25]. So these same attributes should be available and essential in the world as well. That is why, he explains, the numbers four and seven play a central role in the world: the four elements in nature (earth, water, air and fire, already mentioned in his poem opening this chapter), the four time cycles, the seven heavens, the seven days, and so on. The two cosmologically fundamental four fold groups that emerged out of the four ‘mother’ Attributes (Life, Ability, Will and Power) that are the four aspects of the divine Presence of the Essence (*al-Dhât*) are the four earthly elements (earth, water, air and fire) and the primordial cosmological principles of the Intellect, Soul, Dust and Nature, as in Figure 3.1.

This quadratic cosmological rule was also reflected in relation to time. Therefore, Ibn ‘Arabî points out, there are four main time cycles within the domain of manifest nature: the day, the week, the month and the year. These four *natural* time cycles have their origin in the effects of those four elements of Nature (fire, air, water, earth) that are originally derived from the above-mentioned four principal divine Names (‘the mothers’). As Ibn ‘Arabî says:




Figure 3.1 The Divine Quadratic Rule.

Note

This figure is translated from the *Futûhât* [1.260].

time is restricted to the year, month, week and day. Time is divided into four divisions because the natural seasons are four, because the origin of the existence of time is Nature, whose level is below the (universal) Soul and above the ‘Dust’ (*habā*) that philosophers call the Universal Matter (*hayūlā*). The influence of this (principal) quaternity (*tarbī*) in Nature is from the influence of the (same principle of) quaternity in the divine influences from (the fundamental Names) Life, Knowledge, Ability and Will. For by these four (Names), godship is confirmed for the God.

So the quaternity (first) became manifest in Nature. Then the (divine) Command descended until the (principle of quaternity) appeared in the ‘biggest time’ (cycle), which is the year, so that it was divided into the four seasons: spring, summer, autumn and winter. This was brought about by the motion of the Sun through *the stations* (of the zodiac), which have been divided by Nature into their (seasonal) divisions according to the (natural) elements that are the ‘basic principles’ (of fire, air, water and earth).

[chapter 390, III.548.17]

3.2.1 *The day*

We have already discussed Ibn ‘Arabī’s concept of the ‘day’ in Chapter 2, where we showed that he defines the ‘day’ as all that is included within the revolution of the Isotropic Orb, which encompasses all of material existence. This day is astronomically defined by the rotation of the Earth and it is conventionally divided into smaller units such as hours, minutes and seconds (see also section 4.6). The divine Day, however, is the corresponding effects (manifestations) of each of the seven fundamental divine Names on the entire cosmos, as we shall see further below (section 3.4). This unique divine Day is in fact the smallest indivisible unit of time, though it equals in length the normal day as we discussed in section 2.15.

3.2.2 *The week*

The second time cycle is the week, which Ibn ‘Arabī – following the detailed Qur’anic indications – considers to be the main cycle of Creation. The week (which is seven days) has its origin in the seven main Attributes of Allah, but until now it does not seem to have any particular astronomical significance. However, Ibn ‘Arabī’s unique view, as explained below, gives a profound and essential significance to the Week in terms of astronomy/cosmology as well as the theology of creation. This will be the main focus throughout this chapter (see in particular section 3.3 below).

3.2.3 *The month*

Ibn ‘Arabī distinguishes between the witnessed lunar month, which is from new moon to another new moon, and the ‘divine Month’ which is the time needed for

the Moon to perform one full revolution in the orb of the zodiac: that is, as Ibn 'Arabî says, 28 days [III.548.28]. He also recognizes the solar 'month' as the Sun's observed motion throughout the zodiac, where the zodiac is conventionally divided into 12 parts, each corresponding to one month [I.388.20], though he does not give any details about the length of solar months in terms of their days.¹⁰

3.2.4 The year

The year, for Ibn 'Arabî, is the time needed for the Sun to perform one full revolution in the orb of the zodiac [III.548.28], as witnessed from the Earth. Like the Babylonians,¹¹ Ibn 'Arabî considers the year to be 360 days [III.434.9], and not like our calendar year of 365.25 days.

Ibn 'Arabî regards our solar year and the solar (and lunar) month as conventions set up by human observers, while the 360-day year, the 28-day month, the (seven-day) week/Week, and the (sidereal) day/Day are divine periods of time set up by Allah when He created the heavenly orbs and made them move [III.548.27]. It is noteworthy in this regard that the 360-day year does not equal 12 of the 28-day months. These four time cycles that Ibn 'Arabî talks about are not meant for calendar purposes; they are said to be the actual measures of time set up by Allah when He created the world. Moreover, Ibn 'Arabî shows that this non-integer ratio is preordained and essential for the vastness of creation, because the creation is built upon the act of generation (*takwîn*), and with complete ratios no generation could happen; so there have to be integers and fractions [II.440.7].

The differences between the witnessed lunar month (synodic lunar month = 29.53 days) and the divine lunar month (of 28 days), and between the witnessed year (365.25 days) and the 360-day year, might be because of the interference of the different motions of the Sun, the Earth and the Moon. As the Earth spins around its axis it also rotates around the Sun, and as the Moon rotates around the Earth it also moves with the Earth around the Sun. These interfering motions may account for the difference. For example, if we measure the period of the Moon relative to those stars that are apparently fixed (this is called the sidereal lunar month), we get only 27.32 days (and not the usual 29.53 days, the observed lunar month). The divine lunar month for Ibn 'Arabî is 28 days because he measures that period in relation to the zodiac (far-away galaxies) or actually the Isotropic Orb, and not the orb of the Sun or the constellations [I.656.13], because those constellations are not actually fixed [III.549.3]. Also we have to know that the length of the observed earthly day varies from one place to another on the Earth and from summer to winter throughout the year, and that the normal solar year and the normal lunar month slightly vary from time to time owing to the influence of gravitation of other planets and stars that change their positions inside and relative to the solar system, respectively. Thus the mean solar day in the year 2000 is about 1.7 milliseconds longer than it was in 1900, and is slowly getting longer. There is a possible allusion in the Qur'an to such long-term

changes in the length of the year and the month, where Allah says: '*The quantity of months with Allah is 12 months (in a year) by Allah's ordinance in the day that (when) He created the Heavens and the Earth*' (9:36): in other words, it could be that the year started as 12 months each of 28 days, but that this then changed with time as the motion of the Earth slowed down and as the solar year became longer, and also as the lunar month became longer than 28 days.

In this regard, we should also notice that in Arabic there are two names for the year which do not appear to have identical meanings: *sana* and '*âm*. Although both terms are currently used to refer to the year, it seems from the etymological meaning of those two names and from Ibn 'Arabî's and Qur'anic usage that the word *sana* means the original 360-day year, while '*am* – which literally means 'entire' or 'full' – is the time needed for the Earth to make a full revolution around the Sun, which is the slowly lengthening conventional year now observed on Earth. In the Qur'an, Allah distinguishes between these two Arabic words in one verse that declares the time that Prophet Noah stayed with his folk: '*And verily We sent Noah unto his folk, and he continued with them for a thousand years (sana) save fifty years ('âm); and the flood engulfed them, for they were wrong doers*' (29:14).

3.3 The week as the primary time cycle

While Ibn 'Arabî considers the Week (of Creation) to be the primary time cycle, only the week among these four cycles does not seem to have any apparent astronomical significance. We can say only that the week is one-quarter of the divine lunar month ($28 = 4 \times 7$). From the observed astronomical point of view, the day should be the primary time cycle, because it is the smallest standard period of time as far as the solar system and the Earth are concerned, and all other three cycles (as defined by Ibn 'Arabî) are integer multiples of the day, while the year is not an integer multiple of the week. However, we shall see that Ibn 'Arabî does not consider the day to be the primary cycle because the Days of the divine Week are not similar to each other, as they might appear to us. Since each Day of the Week is based on one of the seven fundamental divine Attributes of Allah, so these Days are not identical because those seven divine Attributes are not identical. Therefore the Week, rather than the day, is the primary cycle of divine time, and each day of the seven Days of that Week is ruled by one of the seven fundamental divine Attributes.

However, in keeping with Ibn 'Arabî's essential understanding of the 'ever-new creation', this does not mean that any particular day of this week is *identical* to that of another week. They are only 'similar' to each other because they are originated from the same divine Attribute. Ibn 'Arabî says:

Nothing is actually repeated, because of divine vastness (*ittisâ'*); so (everything) is in ever-new, not renewed, existence. Thus if we call the new (thing) 'renewed', that is because it is extremely similar (but not identical) to its counterpart, so that they can not be distinguished from each other ... and

the daytime and night are called ‘the two-new’ (*al-jadīdān*), and not ‘the two-renewed’ (*al-mutajaddidān*), because Saturday is not Sunday and it is not Saturday from the other week, or from another month or from another year.

[III.127.23]

This is clearly evident in modern astronomy, because whatever periodical motions we see locally in our solar system are actually part of a more global motion that, in the end, never repeats itself in the same way, because everything is moving (see sections 1.1 and 1.4). In fact, Ibn ‘Arabī always stresses that there can not be any two identical forms in the world, and that this is because ‘Allah never manifests in the same form twice, nor in the same form to any two persons’ [III.127.33].

Therefore Ibn ‘Arabī maintains that ‘although there are many days, the real order of events reduces them into seven days’ [*Ayyām Al-Sha’n*: 6], which are the seven days of the week; and then these days iterate in months and years. And as we showed, this is due to the fact that ‘(the main) divine Attributes are seven, not more, which made the Age not more than seven (distinctive) Days’ [II.437.30].

However, the observed, earthly week and its days that we witness and live through do not seem to be distinctive in any natural way; as noted earlier, they appear to be purely conventional. The reason for that is the ‘intertwining’ between the underlying divine seven ‘Days’ of creation and the days that we live. This intertwining of the two kinds of days is a complicated concept that Ibn ‘Arabī explained partially in his short book *Ayyām Al-Sha’n*, and in a few passages in the *Futūḥāt*. We shall devote Chapter 4 to explaining the real flow of time as viewed by Ibn ‘Arabī, by defining three different types of days: the normal days, and the ‘taken-out’ days and the ‘intertwined’ days.

3.4 The divine origin of the seven days of the week

Therefore, Ibn ‘Arabī concludes, each Day of the seven Days of the divine Week has to be based on one of these seven basic divine Attributes:

So because Allah (Who is described by the seven fundamental Attributes) created the world according to His own Image [II.395.25], ... the Days had to be seven due to these (seven) Attributes and their rules, so the world appeared living, knowing, able, willing, hearing, seeing and speaking.

[II.438.19]

We have already shown in section 2.1 that ‘time’ for Ibn ‘Arabī is an imaginary attribute that is used to compare the chronological order of moving things. The day is actually a measure of the motion of the orb of the Sun, or more precisely the Isotropic Orb. And since motion is created by Allah, by creating events in the world, there are seven fundamental creative motions, or ‘Days of events’,

each of which is originated from or ruled by one of these seven divine Attributes, and further associated with specific astronomical or astrological positions and figures apparently involved in the cosmological manifestations of those divine influences (see also the detailed outline of these associated symbols in Table 3.1 below):

(the motion of) the Day of Sunday was from the (divine) Attribute of Hearing,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Monday was from the Attribute of Living,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Tuesday was from the Attribute of Seeing,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Wednesday was from the Attribute of Willing,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Thursday was from the Attribute of Ability,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Friday was from the Attribute of Knowledge,
 ... and the motion of the Day of Saturday was from the Attribute of Speaking.

[II.438.7]

This relation between the seven Days and the seven main divine Attributes is not arbitrary. We notice that Sunday, which is the first day of the week (and in the creation, as we shall see in section 3.5), was from the Attribute of Hearing. This is because Allah started the creation on this day, and the first thing that is needed for the thing to be created is hearing, in order to hear Allah's creative command 'Be' [II.401.28]. Ibn 'Arabî states that everything can hear before it actually appears in the world, because everything has some sort of existence or determination in the foreknowledge of Allah before He actually creates it [II.400.7, see also section 2.3 above and section 3.6 below]. By hearing the command of Allah, the manifest world or cosmos starts to gain real existence after it had been existing in the foreknowledge of Allah. Therefore the world appears in existence as hearing, living, seeing, willing, able, knowing, and speaking; but it gains these attributes one by one in a special sequence that starts by hearing and ends by speaking – but not necessarily in the same order, owing to the 'intertwining' of those divine influences that will be explained in the next chapter.

As Ibn 'Arabî points out, we can also notice a similar sequence in the first stages of the development of the foetus and child's life: s/he acquires the first six attributes before birth, while speaking is acquired afterwards (see also section 3.6 below for more comparisons between the macrocosm of the world and microcosm of the true human being). This can be compared to the creation of the world by Allah '*Who created the Heavens and the Earth and all that is between them in six Days*' [from Sunday to Friday, per IV.11.30], '*then He mounted on the Throne*' [on Saturday, per IV.11.31] (25:59), with Saturday being associated with the divine Speaking. As Ibn 'Arabî indicates in this regard [III.108–109], Allah also says: '*The All-Merciful, (He) taught the Qur'an, (then He) created the*

Human Being, (then He) taught him speaking out (59:1–4), which indicates again that speaking came last. On the other hand, Ibn ‘Arabî affirms that the baby who is born after six lunar months may live to be quite healthy, and those six months are six lunar ‘days’.

So for Ibn ‘Arabî, the creation of the world, like that of the foetus, is completed in six Days: these correspond to the six directions: (up, down, right, left, front, back), and then on the Seventh Day (Saturday) it – both the world and the human being – continues living, changing from one state to another. That is why Ibn ‘Arabî calls Saturday the ‘Day of eternity’ as we shall see further below (end of section 3.5). So like the genesis of each human being, although we do not clearly recognize it, the world – with all what it includes – ‘appeared living, knowing, able, willing, hearing, seeing and speaking’ [II.438.19] in seven divine Days.

Like the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians, Ibn ‘Arabî also assigns a specific divine Day to each planet of the seven moving planets in the seven heavens [I.154–156]. In addition to that, he also assigns to each of these planets – following the detailed indications in certain hadith – the spiritual reality (*rûhâniyya*) of one particular prophet (Chittick 2002: 201–230). Furthermore, each one of these seven prophets always has a representative on Earth as one of the seven ‘Substitutes’ (*abdâl*) of the spiritual hierarchy, each one located in one region (*iqîlîm*) of the seven basic geographical regions of the Earth.¹² Ibn ‘Arabî always affirms that whatever happens on the Earth is preordained in the heavens day by day and hour by hour – through these spirits of the prophets and other angels who reside in the heavens – and received by their agents (*nuwwab*, s. *nâ’ib*) on the Earth, though he also affirms that there are always other unpredictable actions or events due to the direct relation between Allah and every entity in the world, which is distinct from those relations mediated through the First Intellect or the Soul [II.434.8].

Thus he explains that

He (*the prophet Idrîs*)¹³ told his friends that there are seven (spiritually perfect) Men called (the ‘Substitutes’ (*al-abdâl*, s. *badal*) by whom Allah keeps the seven geographical regions (*aqâlîm*); to each Substitute (is assigned) a region. They are looked after by the spirits of the seven Heavens, and each person of those (Substitutes) has power from the spirits of prophets residing in these Heavens. They (i.e. the prophets in the seven heavens) are Abraham (*al-Khalîl*, in the highest, seventh heaven of Saturn) then (in descending order) Moses, then Aaron, then Idrîs, then Joseph, then Jesus, then Adam, may Allah’s peace be upon them all. As for John (the Baptist), he alternates between (the heavens of) Jesus and Aaron. So (the divine knowledge) descends upon the hearts of those seven Substitutes from the realities of those prophets – peace be upon them!; and they are looked after by the seven planets by what Allah, the Exalted, entrusted (in those planets) through their rolling in their orbs and by what Allah entrusted in the motions of these seven heavens of secrets, knowings, and higher and lower

effects. Allah said: ‘and He inspired in each heaven its mandate’ (41:12). So they have in their hearts in each hour and in each day what the possessor of this hour and the ruler of this day give away (to them).

[I.154.34]

Ibn ‘Arabî also shows elsewhere that the seven Days are ‘created’ by the corresponding seven divine Names, and those are not the same as the fundamental Names or Attributes that initiated their motion [II.442.5]. Each one of those seven creating Names also created the corresponding heaven, the prophet who is in it, as well as the planet within that orb, a specific letter from the Arabic alphabet, and one specific constellation where ‘the specific planet of this orb is first created by Allah and started moving in this constellation’ [II.445.5]. The relation between each heaven and the corresponding letter of the alphabet is that ‘this heaven has some (special) effect in the existence of these letters’ [II.445.3]. All this is summarized in Table 3.1, which is arranged from the First Day (Sunday) to the Seventh Day (Saturday).

The information brought together in this Table 3.1 provides essential keys to Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology, astrological symbolism, and understanding of the spiritual hierarchy. However here we are mainly concerned with the seven Days of the Week. It is particularly important to notice the ‘irregular’ relationship between the order of the days as we witness them (Sunday, Monday and so on) and the corresponding order of the seven heavens and the seven related regions on the Earth. The week starts with Sunday, from the middle (fourth, solar) orb, which is the heart of all orbs [II.275.31], then Monday in the orb of the Moon (the first, lowest heaven), then the fifth heaven, and so on. However, the corresponding order of Earth regions (‘climes’) goes from the fourth, seventh, third, and so on as in Table 3.1. Thus we can see that there is always a difference (separation) of three days between one heaven and the other that is directly above it. As we shall see in the coming chapter, Ibn ‘Arabî therefore distinguishes between the witnessed order of the days of the week and their actual flow in the heavens, and he calls this separation *Salkh* or ‘taking-out’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7], a rare expression taken from the Qur’an (36:37). In interpreting that Qur’anic verse, Ibn ‘Arabî explains that there are three nights’ and three daytimes’ difference between the actual daytime and its own night that it was taken out of. This process of taking the daytimes out of the nights and vice versa is, in Ibn ‘Arabî’s view, the ultimate reason underlying the creation itself: for without it the world would not appear in existence in six dimensions [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 8–9]. This will be explained further in the following chapter with diagrams and illustrations.

3.5 The significance of each day of the divine week

Because of the importance of the Days of the Week of divine creation in Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology, he writes about them at length in the *Futûhât* and other books. In his mysterious book *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya* (*The Spiritual*

Table 3.1 The correspondences between the seven days of the divine week and the seven heavens, seven earthly regions, divine names, lunar mansions and letters of the Arabic alphabet

Day number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Arabic Day Names	<i>al-ahad</i>	<i>al-ithnayn</i>	<i>al-thulāthā'</i>	<i>al-arba'a</i>	<i>al-khamīs</i>	<i>al-jum'a</i>	<i>al-sabt</i>
English Day Names	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
Divine Attributes	Hearing	Living	Seeing	Willing	Ability	Knowing	Speaking
Prophets' Names	Idrīs	Adam	Aaron	Jesus	Moses	Joseph	Abraham
Arabic 'Planet' Names	<i>al-shams</i>	<i>al-qamar</i>	<i>al-marrikh</i>	<i>al-kātib</i>	<i>al-mushtarī</i>	<i>al-zuhara</i>	<i>kaywān</i>
English Planet Names	Sun	Moon	Mars	Mercury	Jupiter	Venus	Saturn
Creating divine Name	<i>al-Nūr</i>	<i>al-Mubīn</i>	<i>al-Qāhir</i>	<i>al-Muḥsi</i>	<i>al-'Alīm</i>	<i>al-Musawwir</i>	<i>al-Rabb</i>
Prayer	<i>Imām</i>	<i>Ma'mūm</i>	<i>'Ishā</i>	<i>'Asr</i>	<i>Zuhr</i>	<i>Maghrib</i>	<i>Subh</i>
Constellation–Arabic	<i>Simāk</i>	<i>Ikklīl</i>	<i>'Awwa</i>	<i>Zabana</i>	<i>Sirfa</i>	<i>Ghafr</i>	<i>Khirtan</i>
Constellation–English	Arcturus	Corona	Bootes	Librae	Virginis	Cover	Mane
The Heaven	fourth	first	fifth	second	sixth	third	seventh
Earthly Region/Level	fourth	seventh	third	sixth	second	fifth	first
Arabic Letter	<i>Nūn</i> (ن)	<i>Dāl</i> (د)	<i>Lām</i> (ل)	<i>Tā'</i> (ط)	<i>Dād</i> (ض)	<i>Rā'</i> (ر)	<i>Yā'</i> (ي)

Note

The information in this table is extracted from chapter 198 of the *Futūḥār* [II.456–458] and *Al-Tanazzulāt Al-Mawsiliyya*

Inspirations at Mosul, Concerning the Secrets of Prayers and the Original Days), he devoted the last ten chapters to these divine Days and their relations with the heavenly orbs and the seven planets. However, it is not easy at all to extract a lot of information from this book because he intentionally used a very difficult language full of signs and secrets. However, some of his sayings there provide very useful information when we compare them to his statements in other books. For example, right in the full title of that book, we are led to understand that there are ‘original’ Days, as opposed to the normal witnessed days on Earth. We shall discuss in more detail the different types of days that Ibn ‘Arabî introduces and talks about there in the following Chapter 4, but what we shall now outline in the remainder of this chapter relates mostly to the ‘original’ Days of divine creation, which are ‘the Days of (divine) Events’, and not our normal witnessed days of the week.

To begin with, because each Day of the divine Week is ruled by a specific divine Name, it has to have a special significance related to this Name. This distinctive significance is not so apparent in the normal, ‘circulated’ days as it is for the original Days of Events as they were created by Allah. We shall first outline here the divine significance of each Day of the Week in the process of creating the macrocosm of the heavens and the Earth – and also the microcosm of the theomorphic human being (*insân*).

In addition to those general verses in Qur’an in which Allah states that He ‘*created the Heavens and Earth in six days and then He mounted on the Throne*’ (7:54, 10:3, 11:7, 25:59, 32:4, 50:38, 57:4) there are some details about what He created each Day in the verses at the beginning of the Sura *Fussilat* (41:9–12). These verses were explained further in one hadith where the Prophet Muhammad said:

Allah, the cherished and the glorified, created the first Day (event) in Sunday; and the earth was created on Sunday and Monday; and on Tuesday and Wednesday the mountains were created, the rivers were cleft, fruits were planted and in each earth its food was determined, *then turned He to the heaven when it was smoke, and said unto it and unto the Earth: Come both of you, willingly or unwillingly. They said: We come, obedient.* So He completed them seven heavens in two Days and inspired in each heaven its mandate (41:11–12), on Thursday and Friday; and the last of creation was in the last hours of Friday, and when it was Saturday there was no creation in it.

[*Kanz*: 15120]

So here we will briefly outline what Ibn ‘Arabî has to say about the significance – in the creation of both the world and the human being – of each Day of the original Days of the divine Week of creation:

3.5.1 'The first day' of creation (*al-ahad*, Sunday)

The Arabic name for Sunday, *al-ahad*, is also a Qur'anic name of Allah (112:1, etc.) which means 'the One', 'the Unique', the indivisible Unit. It is the first Day in which Allah started the Creation, so it is the first Day in the world [IV.11.31]. As we explained in section 2.3, the entities of the world were already eternally determined in Allah's foreknowledge, and by this state of pre-existence they gained the first fundamental divine attribute of 'hearing'. So the motion of 'Sunday was created from the Attribute of Hearing; that is why everything in the world hears the divine Command (Be! *Kun*) (even) in its state of non-existence' [II.438.8]. Allah said in the Qur'an: '*But His Command, when He intendeth a thing, is only that He saith unto it: Be, and (then) it is*' (36:82). Therefore Allah creates by saying the command 'Be' unto the things even before their actual existence. Ibn 'Arabî, however, carefully distinguishes between the divine 'Saying' (*qawl*) and 'Speaking' (*kalâm*): 'By "Saying" the non-existent hears. (This is) like His saying "*and our Command when We intend a thing is to say unto it 'Be'*" (16:40). And by "Speaking" the existent hears, as in His saying "*and Allah spoke to Moses, speaking*" (4:164)' [II.400.7].

As we have already explained in earlier chapters, Ibn 'Arabî affirms that the motion of the Isotropic Orb determines only one Day, which is one cycle starting from when the first degree of Gemini is matching the Foot in the Pedestal (see section 2.4). So because the divine Pedestal is above the Isotropic Orb, which has no distinguishing signs, the length of the day cannot be known [II.437.34]. Although we on Earth normally measure the day by hours and minutes or by the time of the Earth's motion around itself, this is a mere convention – while the actual length of the day/Day is known only to Allah [I.122.28].

Ibn 'Arabî elsewhere explains that the Sun and its heavenly orb were created on Sunday [I.155.6, I.466.6, II.445.15]. This is because the Sun resembles the spirit [I.55.8, I.275.26], and the absolute Spirit (i.e. 'the real through whom creation takes place': *SDK*: 132–134) is the first appearance of the divine Real (in the Creation), so with the initial creative motion of this First Day, the 'point' (*nukta*) or zero-dimension (0-D, as we shall discuss the dimensions in detail in section 7.10) was defined. The Sun is in the central, fourth heaven from the Earth, and this heaven was created by the self-disclosure (*SDK*: 91, 103, also *SDG*: 47–57) of the divine Name 'the Light' (*al-Nûr*). Hence:

(the Sun) is the heart of the world and the heart of the (seven) heavens. Allah created it on Sunday, and He made it a place for the Pole of human spirits, Idrîs, peace be upon him. And Allah called this heaven '*a high place*' (19:57) because it is a heart, although the heaven that is above it is higher (in physical place). But Allah meant the highness of status (*makâna*), so the place (*makân*) (of the fourth, central heaven) is high because of its status, and Allah created it in *al-simâk* (which is the central, fourteenth station of the 28 stations or 'mansions' of the Moon), and created its planet (the Sun) and its orb, and created the letter *nûn* (ن) out of it.

[II.445.15]

Ibn ‘Arabî then explains the relation and correspondence between the fourth heaven (celestial sphere) of this Day and the particular geographical clime on the Earth that was appointed to the corresponding figure from among the seven Substitutes (*abdâl*), and what are the particular ‘affairs’ that happen on – i.e. through the higher influences associated with – this Day:

Every affair of knowledge in the First Day is from the matter of Idrîs, peace be upon him! And every higher (celestial) effect on that Day in the elements of air and fire is from the orbiting of the Sun and its supervision which is entrusted to it by Allah, the Exalted. As for what comes from the effect on the elements of water and earth on that Day, (it) is from the motion of the fourth orb (containing the Sun). The (earthly) place of the (spiritual) person (*badal*) who upholds that influence among the climes is the fourth clime. So what is acquired, among the (divinely inspired) knowings, by this particular person among the *abdâl* (residing) in this region is the knowing of the secrets of the spiritual entities (*rûhâniyyât*: i.e. directing the heavenly spheres), the knowing of light and radiance, the knowing of the lightning and the rays (of light), and the knowing of every luminous material body – why it becomes illuminated, what is the (distinctive) constitution that gave it this receptivity (to luminosity).

[I.155.6]

Also in chapter 46 of *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*, Ibn ‘Arabî mentioned many mysterious details about this Day and his visit to the Pole of all spirits, the prophet Idrîs, in the orb of the Sun. This chapter (46) of the *Tanazzulât* – together with its following few chapters, and taken in conjunction with related passages from chapters 15 and 198 of the *Futûhât* – deserves a separate specialized study which is beyond the scope of this book. I have just mentioned some related passages for the ‘First Day’ above as an illustration of those mysterious allusions in the *Tanazzulât*, but in the shorter summaries from the *Futûhât* below will have to pass over Ibn ‘Arabî’s corresponding remarks for the other Days.

3.5.2 ‘The second day’ of creation (*al-ithnayn, Monday*)

Ibn ‘Arabî says that ‘the motion of Monday was created from the (divine) Attribute of “*The Living One*” (*al-Hayy*), and through it life was in the world, so everything in the world is living (i.e. starts to become living, on Monday)’ [II.438.9]. Then he explains that the Moon, which corresponds to the ‘Second Day’ of Creation, is in the first celestial sphere above the Earth:

And the divine Name ‘*The Clarifying One*’ (*al-Mubîn*) was intent on bringing into existence this lowest heaven and its planet (the Moon) on the Second Day, in the (lunar mansion) of *Iklîl* (‘the Crown’, which is the seventeenth station of the 28 lunar stations), and the letter *dâl* (د) is from the motion of this orb.

[II.445.30]

The Moon is the fastest moving planet in the heavens, moving through one lunar mansion every day, so it goes through all 28 lunar mansions in its day, which equals 28 Earth days (according to Ibn ‘Arabî, as explained in section 3.2). Ibn ‘Arabî explains that from this motion the 28 letters of the alphabet are created, regardless of how they are written or spoken in different languages [II.448.4] (i.e. the sounds). Allah made this first (lowest) heaven the place for the first prophet Adam, since he is the (first manifestation or exemplar of) the Perfect Human Being.

The Moon – in keeping with its association with Adam (the emblematic human being) – resembles the soul [I.499.5], and it is the second state of the appearance of the Single Monad, after the creation of the spirits (angels), which are purely spiritual creatures. That is why Adam himself lectured Ibn ‘Arabî about the directions when he visited him in the orb of the Moon (*Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*: 261) – because through the creation of his Day (Monday) the space and the six directions started to form.

3.5.3 ‘The third day’ of creation (*al-thulâthâ*, Tuesday)

And for the motion of Tuesday Ibn ‘Arabî says that it was created from the divine Attribute ‘Seeing’ (*basar*): so there is no part of the world but that it is witnessing its Creator – i.e. in relation to its own individual essence, not the Essence of its Creator [II.438.10], because the Essence of Allah, the Creator, may not be seen, He may be seen only through the manifestation of His Attributes (Names) throughout the Creation as we shall discuss in more detail in section 5.5. Ibn ‘Arabî then adds that

The divine Name ‘the All-Prevailing’ (*al-Qâhir*) was intent on bringing into being the third heaven (the fifth from Earth); so He caused its (distinctive spiritual) reality to appear, along with its planet (Mars, *al-marrikkh*) and its sphere, and He made it the dwelling for Aaron. . . . The existence of this planet and the motion of its sphere were in the lunar mansion ‘*Awwa*’ (which is the thirteenth station of the 28 Moon stations) on Tuesday. . . . And from the motion of this sphere appeared the letter ‘*lâm*’ (ل).

[II.445.8]

3.5.4 ‘The fourth day’ of creation (*al-arba‘â*, Wednesday)

For Wednesday he says that ‘the motion of the Fourth Day came into existence from the (divine) Attribute of Willing (*al-irâda*), so there is no part of the world but that it is seeking to glorify the One Who gives it existence [II.438.11].

Mercury is in the sixth sphere from the Earth, and this heaven was created through the (self-disclosure of the) divine Name ‘the Enumerator’ (*al-Muhsi*). Allah created this heaven, its planet (Mercury), the Fourth Day (Wednesday), and letter *tâ*’ (ط) in the lunar mansion of the constellation *Zabana* (which is the sixteenth station of the 28 Moon stations), and He caused Jesus to dwell there [paraphrasing II.445.26].

3.5.5 'The fifth day' of creation (*al-khamīs, Thursday*)

And the motion of the Fifth Day (Thursday) came into existence from the (divine) Attribute of Ability (or 'Power', *al-quḍra*), so there is no part of existence but that it has been enabled to praise the One Who gives it existence [II.438.16].

Jupiter (*al-mushtarī*) is in the sixth heaven from the Earth, and it and its sphere were brought into existence through the self-disclosure of divine Name 'the All-Knowing' (*al-ʿAlīm*). Allah created this heaven, its planet, the Fifth Day and the letter *dād* (ض) in the lunar mansion of the constellation *Sirfa* (which is the twelfth station of the 28 Moon stations), and He made it a dwelling place for the prophet Moses [paraphrasing II.444.25].

3.5.6 The sixth 'day of gathering' (*al-jumʿa, Friday*) and its special hour

Friday holds a special importance for Muslims and especially for Ibn ʿArabī, who says that in this Day our Tablet (i.e. the souls) received its secrets from its Lord, through the pens (i.e. the intellects). Ibn ʿArabī then says that 'the motion of the Day of Gathering (Friday) came into being through the (divine) Attribute of Knowledge: so there is no part of the world but that it knows the One Who gives it existence, with regard to its own essence, not the Essence of the One Who gives it existence' [II.438.13].

Venus is in the second sphere of the heavens from the Earth and this heaven was brought into existence by the self-disclosure of the divine Name 'the Shaper' (*al-Musawwir*, the One Who gives form). Allah created this heaven, its planet (Venus), the Day of Gathering (Friday), and the letter *rāʾ* (ر) in the lunar mansion of the constellation *Gafr* (which is the fifteenth station of the 28 stations of the Moon), and He made it a dwelling place for the prophet Joseph [II.445.23].

Before the advent of Islam, the Arabs called Friday *ʿUrūba* ('the day of beauty and adornment') [I.645.25], because it was a distinguished day in which people meet. But in Islam Friday is called *al-jumʿa* ('the Day of Gathering') because that is the day people gather in prayer in one mosque. Ibn ʿArabī, however, gives another explanation of the deeper ontological meaning for *Jumʿa*. On this Day Allah created the Human Being (Adam) in His Image, so on this Day Allah 'gathered together' (Arabic verb *jamaʿa*) the form of the Truly Real (*al-Haqq*) and the form of all creation in the theomorphic human being (*insān*), so that is why this Day is called *Jumʿa* [I.643.27]. And this special divine 'gathering' of the theomorphic human being has occurred on a specific hour of this Day, which made this whole Day holy, noble and the best of all Days.

Ibn ʿArabī affirms that Allah created humanity (Adam) on Friday [I.466.15], following a well-known hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad said: 'The best Day the Sun rises on is Friday: Adam was created in it, he entered into Paradise in it, he was taken out of Paradise in it, and the Hour (of the Resurrection) will only come on Friday' [*Kanz*: 21050].

Ibn 'Arabi goes on to explain, on the basis of another hadith [*Kanz*: 21063], that some people argued about the best day of the week to celebrate or commemorate God in, and that the people of the three major religions each followed a different way, especially since Allah did not specify which day is best, but left it for them to discover:

So the Christians said the best of days – and Allah knows best – is the First Day (Sunday), because it is the day of the Sun and it is the First Day in which Allah created the heavens and the Earth and what is between them. He started the Creation in it due to its pride over the rest of the days. So they took it as a festival. . . . And the Jews said: 'But it is Saturday, because Allah completed the Creation on Friday and He rested on Saturday.' . . .

Then for this community (of Islam) Gabriel came to Muhammad, may Allah have peace and mercy on him, with the Day of *Jum'a* in the form of a polished mirror in which there is a spot (*nukta*), and he said unto him: 'this is the Day of *Jum'a* and this spot is an hour in which no Muslim servant happens to be praying (when it comes to pass), but Allah shall forgive him' [*Kanz*: 21063]. So the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah's peace and mercy be upon him, said: 'So Allah guided us to what the people of the Book disagree about, which is the divine explanation with the mirror' – and he assigned the guidance to Allah. And the reason behind its superiority is that it is the Day in which Allah created this human kind, for whom He created the creatures from Sunday to Thursday, so it has to be the best of times. And the creation (of human kind) was in this Hour which appeared as a spot in the mirror. . . . And this Hour in the Day of *Jum'a* is like the night of destiny [*laylat al-qadr*, which according to Qur'an, is better than a thousand months (97:3)] in the year.

[I.466.6]

So, he concludes, that is why Allah chose this Day over the other Days:

As He, the Exalted, did with all the existents, He has chosen as the best one thing from each kind. He has chosen as the best from the Beautiful Names the Name '*Allāh*'; He has chosen as the best from the people the prophets; He has chosen as the best from His servants the angels; He has chosen as the best from the heavenly spheres the (divine) Throne; He has chosen as the best from the elements water; He has chosen as the best from the months Ramadan; He has chosen as the best from worshipping fasting; He has chosen as the best from the centuries the century of the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah have peace and mercy upon him; He has chosen as best from the Days the Day of Gathering (*al-jum'a*); He has chosen as best from the nights the Night of Destiny; He has chosen as best from (good) deeds the prescribed deeds (*al-farā'id*); He has chosen as best from the numbers the number 99 (in the hadith on the 99 'Most Beautiful Names' as mentioned above).

[II.169.5]

Then Ibn ‘Arabî goes on to explain why Allah has chosen as best these particular things in each kind. With regard to the Day of Gathering, he says:

As for (the reason) for His choosing Friday as best from the Days (of the divine creative Week), that is because in it the Two Forms appeared [i.e. of the cosmos and of the theomorphic human being, in their final perfected state]. Allah made that Day (of the Gathering) for the form . . . , and it is (uniquely) a feminine Day, for which is the beautiful adornment and the completion of the creation (through Adam).

And [alluding to the hadith just cited above] Allah has chosen an Hour of its hours that is like a spot in the mirror. That is the place (of manifestation for) the form of the one [i.e. Adam, as the emblematic fully human being and divine vice-gerent] who is disclosed in the mirror of this Day. Thus He/ he sees in it/him H/himself.¹⁴ And through that Form [of all human being] that appears *between* the mirror (of creation) and the One Who looks in it, there takes place the (divine) Addressing (of each human soul) and the imposition of responsibility (*taklîf*: on each human being).

[II.173.15]

So this Hour is the most precious hour, because in it the divine Form of the Real (*al-Haqq*) and the form of the theomorphic human being meet together (*yajtami’ân* from the same Arabic root as *al-jum’a*), and by this ‘gathering’ the Real is manifested – and at last perceived – in the Creation in the most perfect form, which is the form of the perfect human being. In another passage, Ibn ‘Arabî explains this further:

And there is no Day among the Days (of Creation) more perfect than the Day of *Jum’a*, because in it there is made manifest the Wisdom of (God’s) Capability, through His creating on that Day the human being whom Allah created on His Image. So there remained no (more) perfection for the divine Capability to create, since nothing is more perfect than the Image of the Real (*sûrat al-Haqq*). . . .

Now since God specially distinguished (this Day) by that ‘Hour’ which does not belong to any other Day – and time (*zamân*) is nothing but those Days – therefore this Hour does not pertain to any other times but to the Day of *Jum’a*. It is one part of the 24 parts of the Day, and it is in the half of the Day which is called daytime (*nahâr*). So it is in the manifest dimension (*zâhir*) of that Day, and in the inner dimension (*bâtin*) of human being, because the outer dimension of human being corresponds to the inner dimension (night-time) of the Day, while the inner dimension of human being corresponds to the outer dimension (daytime) of the Day.

[I.645.26]

Ibn ‘Arabî also comments on the imperative question of whether this Hour is fixed, or is floating all over the Day, so that each Week it comes at a different

time, since the original hadith above [Kanz: 21063] did not give any explicit indication of its exact location 'in' the Day of Gathering. Ibn 'Arabî, in any case, does not rule either possibility. He suggests that, if we have to take the strict sensational meaning of the analogy between the Day and the mirror and the forms that appear in them, then that specially chosen Hour would be fixed. But, if we want to take it as an abstract meaning in the imagination, without moving it into the world of senses – which is quite plausible in this context – then we could say that it may be floating all over the Day of Gathering. So he affirms that both possibilities are plausible and that the issue may not be resolved without a further divine specification [I.466.17]. However, because it denotes the creation of the Human Being as the Image of the Real, this Hour must be fixed (on the Day of Gathering) among the original (divine) Days that are the 'Days of events', although it might be floating in the normal 'circulated days' that we actually experience, because they are 'intertwined' with the 'Days of events'.

3.5.7 The seventh 'day of rest' (*al-sabt, Saturday*) as the 'day of eternity'

As for the last day, Ibn 'Arabî says that 'the motion of Saturday was created from the (divine) Attribute of Speaking (*kalâm*), so everything in the existence glorifies in thanks of its Creator, but we do not understand their glorification' [II.438.16]. Obviously Ibn 'Arabî is referring here to the verse '*the seven heavens and the Earth, and all beings therein, declare His glory: there is not a thing but celebrates His praise; and yet ye understand not how they declare His glory! Verily He is Oft-Forbearing, Most Forgiving!*' (17:44). We shall also see in section 7.8 that the world essentially is the 'words' (i.e. the vibrations) generated by its entities on the smallest scale. This is true for whatever we hear, see, smell, taste and everything physical – all are the 'words' spoken by the entities of the world. This seems to cope very well in accordance with the recent theory of Superstrings.

Elsewhere Ibn 'Arabî says:

Saturn (*Kaywân*) is in the seventh sphere from the Earth, and this heaven was created by the (self-disclosure of the) divine Name 'the Lord' (*al-Rabb*). Allah created this heaven, its planet and the 'Day of Rest' (*al-sabt, Saturday*) in the lunar mansion of the constellation *Khirtân* (also called *al-Zabra*, and it is the eleventh mansion of the 28 Moon mansions), and He made it a dwelling place for the prophet Abraham.

[paraphrasing II.442.21]

Saturday bears a very important and unique meaning for Ibn 'Arabî, since he considers it to be the Day of eternity. This concept is initially mysterious, but extremely important, since Ibn 'Arabî mentions it many times in the *Futûhât* and other books and considers it as an undisputable fact.

In his *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*, he asserts that: 'Saturday passes through the existent things like number does in the countable things, permanence in the

permanent things, and standing in the standing things; it is not non-existing nor existing, and not present nor absent' (*Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*: 339).

This description is also like the strange properties of the 'Universal Reality' (*haqîqat al-haqâ'iq*, 'the Reality of Realities') that he introduces to connect the divine properties of the Real with the properties of the Creation. By way of clarification, he then goes on to explain that

The whole world (as kinds and species, including metals, elements, plants, animals, angels, jinn and humans) from its beginning to its end was formed in six Days, from the beginning of (the night) of the First Day until the end of the Day of Gathering (Friday), and there only remains Saturday for changing from one state to another and from one rank to another, and for transmutation from one being to another, constantly. . . . That is why the 'rulers' (in terms of higher astrological or cosmological influences) on this Day are cold and dryness (so that they will be able to hold the picture in imagination in order to feel the continuous presence, as will be discussed in section 5.6), and among the planets: Saturn. So this Day alone was a circumferential orb whoever moves in it will know the Identity, the Attributes, the Actions and the Effects.

[I.61.13]

This alludes to the three types of divine Names: the Names of Essence (*asmâ' al-dhât*), the Names of Descriptions or the Attributes (*asmâ' al-sifât*) and the Names of Actions (*asmâ' al-af'âl*) [I.423.20, I.67.28; *K. al-Masâ'il*: 97] and the 'Effects' here are the entire Creation. So Ibn 'Arabî says that the one who moves with the orb of Saturday will know the Real and the Creation. This is in fact the description of the spiritual 'Pole' – like Ibn 'Arabî himself – who is therefore 'out of time' (see also section 2.7), because he already knows that he witnesses the real Day of Saturday.

Ibn 'Arabî even explicitly calls Saturday the 'Day of Eternity' (*yawm al-abad*: *al-abad* being eternity considered as extending eternally 'into the future', as opposed to *al-azal* or 'beginningless eternity') quite often in his writing. For example, in the *Futûhât* he says:

And so the Day of Eternity starts which is Saturday (*al-sabt*), and *al-sabt* means 'rest'; it is the seventh Day, and it has no end. No sense of weariness touched the Creator in creating what He did. So Saturday was the Day of being finished with the creation of the levels of the world, but there still remains for Allah the creation of what this world requires of the states (for every individual creature), which are eternally endless and without limit.

[III.192.20]

He also named chapter 53 of *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya* 'On the Inner (Spiritual) Knowing that Saturday is the Day of Eternity, and it is the Day of Transmutations'. Saturday, therefore is the 'Day of Rest' (as its name in Arabic, *al-sabt*,

also indicates), because Allah has finished the creation (of all the cosmos and human being) on Friday, so that there remained nothing new to be created – except for the endlessly changing states of all the creatures in time.

Thus Ibn ‘Arabî affirms that

Allah created the world in six Days; He started on Sunday and finished by Friday, and no sense of any exhaustion touched Him; nor did He get weary from creating the creatures. So when it was the seventh Day of the week and He had finished creating the world, He looked like someone who is taking a rest from weariness. So He reclined and put one leg over the other and said: ‘I am the King’, as narrated in the prophetic sayings, so this Day is called *al-sabt*, which means ‘the Day of Rest’. It is the Day of Eternity, because in this Day the individuals of every species are formed in the world and in the hereafter.

There are only seven Days, and each Day has a ruler (*wâli*) designated by Allah. So when the matter/Command ended up on Saturday, Allah assigned it to a ruler with the ability to stabilize and fix, so he can stabilize the forms (of all the creatures) in the ‘*Dust*’ (*al-habâ*’, of the *barzakh* or divine Imagination). So the daytime (*nahâr*) of this Day – i.e. the Day of Eternity – is for the people of the Gardens, and its night-time is for the people of the Fire: so there is no evening (end) for its daytime, and its night-time has no morning.

[IV.11.30]

Then Ibn ‘Arabî mentions the story of his encounter with the (spirit of) *al-Sabtî* (lit.: ‘the Saturday man’) who is Muhammad, son of the famous Abbasid caliph Harûn al-Rashîd, whom he met in Mecca one Friday while circumambulating the Kaaba, and asked him: ‘I knew that you were called *al-Sabtî* because you worked every Saturday for what you ate during the rest of the week . . . so why did you choose Saturday from the rest of the days of the week?’ Al-Sabtî replied:

This is a very good question. I knew that Allah started creating the world on Sunday and finished on Friday, and on Saturday He reclined and put one leg over the other and said: ‘I am the King’; that is what I heard in narrations when I was in this world. So I swore to work like that.

[IV.11.35, see also *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya*: 340]

So he worked on Saturday and rested (to devote himself to worship Allah) in the other six days. So Allah’s work of the creation was done in the six Days from Sunday to Friday, and the ‘Day of Eternity’ is for us to work and develop through the path leading to our ultimate destination.

On the other hand, the fact that the seventh Day was created through the divine Attribute of Speaking reminds us that the very First Day was created through the divine Attribute of Hearing. Ibn ‘Arabî typically points out that this all together is like a circle: since the world is created through divine Speaking

(the Command 'Be'), so the creatures first needed hearing in order to hear that existentiating Command. Because human beings are – at least potentially – uniquely created in the fully theomorphic Image of Allah, He granted them something of the Attribute by which He creates things, so they in turn can create through 'speaking': these are, for example, the meanings one creates in the soul of the hearer when one speaks. And because creation is in the end a divine act, the Prophet Muhammad says that 'Allah is by the tongue of every speaker' [*Kanz*: 7842; see also IV.187.19, IV.292.32]. So this brings us back to the initial receptive state of 'Hearing', because everything in the world is at the end perceived through vibrations, even the visible and other things. Therefore, the creation takes place always, at every moment in time and in every point of space. In terms of the same divine creative cycle of the seven Days explained above, the world is re-created every moment in six Days (from Sunday to Friday) and displayed on the seventh Day (Saturday). Indeed in terms of Ibn 'Arabî's famous theory of the oneness of being, the speaker is in fact Allah, and the hearer is also nothing other than Allah [II.367.16]. Ibn 'Arabî frequently expresses this paradoxical reality in language referring to the forms of the ritual prayer, as when he says: 'Thus Allah says by the tongue of his servant (as he says during the prayer) 'Allah hears who praised Him'; and then the servant says 'Our Lord, to Thee is the Praise!', not to me' [II.367.14]. Also he concludes: 'You praise Yourself (on the tongue of every speaker), and You hear Your words. Because *the Praise is only for Allah and by Allah* [I.112.32, alluding to Qur'an 1:1].

One final aspect of Saturday is that Ibn 'Arabî also describes it as 'the fruitless Day' (*al-yawm al-'aqîm*; 22:55), which is a result of its being the Day of Eternity:

Now the fruitless is that from which nothing is born, so it does not have a birth of its kind. So (Saturday) is called 'fruitless' because at the end there is no Day after it, and this refers to Saturday from the (divine creative) Week, which is the Day of eternity. Its daytime is all light for the people of the Gardens eternally, and its night-time is all darkness for the people of Gehenna, also eternally.

[III.564.22]

3.6 Space-time and creation in six days

So this means that we – along with all of manifest creation, at all times – are now living in this 'Seventh Day', but the riddle is how we can at the same time still be viewing the other Days of the week, including Saturday itself. Ibn 'Arabî himself remarks that 'it is rather amazing that the Days, among which is Saturday, are (all) happening in Saturday; because it is one of these Days and they are appearing in it' [II.444.7]. But he says that this is ultimately plausible, and he gives the striking example from the famous divine saying describing Adam when Allah showed him his progeny, including himself, in His Hand – while at the same time he was outside looking on at that [II.444.14; *Kanz*: 15123].

The fact that Saturday is the 'Day of eternity' suggests that the *time* that we

live is only Saturday, so that the other six Days (of events) of the (original) Week could account for space, and not time; this is also supported by the observation that the usual word for 'day' in Arabic (*yawm*) also bears the meaning of 'direction'.¹⁵ If we add this to what we have just said above about the oneness of being, and that the act of creation 'in one Week' actually takes place at every moment of time, then we can easily come to a very important conclusion that the actual Week and its seven distinctive Days make up a unit of space-time, and not time alone. In the first six Days, space is created with its six directions (three dimensions) and then it is displayed ('in time') on Saturday. We do not feel the creation in the six Days because we are being created but not yet, and we only feel ourselves created on Saturday, which is why it is the Day of eternity. As Allah said in the Qur'an: '*I called them not to witness the creation of Heavens and the Earth*' (18:51), which He created in six Days, from Sunday to Friday. But when this initial stage of creation is over and Allah the All-Merciful '*mounted on the Throne*', changing the creation from one state into another, then and only then, on Saturday, do we realize ourselves and also realize the world (of space) that was created in those preceding six Days.

Ibn 'Arabi declares in many passages that the world is constantly being re-created on every single 'Day of event' (see section 5.6). And the Days of events are seven, based on the central divine Attributes of Allah. So the creation of the world by Allah is a seven-step process: in each Day of those seven Days of events the world gains the qualities and manifestations of the corresponding divine Attribute. Thus on the First Day, the world (which had already been determined eternally in the foreknowledge of Allah) hears Allah's command: 'Be', so it moves from the 'absolute Unseen' into the first step of existence which has no dimension yet (0-D), like the geometrical point (*nuqta*); it is the first real Image of the Real (*al-Haqq*), Allah, the Exalted, and thus it is called '*the real through whom creation takes place*' (*SDK*: 132), and this is the 'Greatest Element' (see sections V6.2 and 6.5). So 'the Real' is a name of Allah and this Greatest Element. Then, on the Second Day, the world becomes living, and by that the creation of angels from the divine Light takes place (1-D), as will be discussed in more detail in section 7.10. Then on the Third Day it can witness its Creator (with respect to its being His creation), while on the Fourth Day it becomes willing to magnify¹⁶ its Creator (and by that the creation of the jinn takes place), and on the Fifth Day it is able to do so. Finally, on Friday – or by the 'last three hours' of Friday, when the Human Being is created¹⁷ – the world will actually know its Creator (again with respect to His act of creation, not in Himself): and this happens only by creating the Human Being (Adam), who is in respect to the world the Spirit is for the true Human Being [I.118.8, III.363.3].

By these six Days the world is completely created as a Single Monad who is also the 'Complete Human Being', including heavens and Earth, mind and soul, spirit and body. Then on the seventh Day this picture of the complete world will be held in the imagination of the human being, because it is an imaginal form that will intrinsically cease to exist right in the second moment ('Day') after its creation, to be instantly re-created in a new form. That is why, Ibn 'Arabi

explains, Allah appointed as the 'rulers' on Saturday the essential qualities of coldness and dryness, so that this cosmic image may appear to be continuous [I.61.15]. So our imagination holds a new picture of the world, every 'Day' (moment), and by comparing between those succeeding pictures, the imagination perceives the motion or change in space and time, since Allah never manifests in the same form twice or to two perceivers [I.679.7, II.77.27, II.616.3]. This is also the meaning of the verse: '*each Day He is in a (different) task*' (55:29), which Ibn 'Arabî uses more frequently than any others from the Qur'an to corroborate this particular ontological view.

It has to be noticed however, that, in every Week of Creation, only one 'point' of space-time is created, and that is the point where the observer is – or rather, the observer himself is also created at that point in space-time. The observer perceives other points of space and time because they have been held somehow within the 'Dust' (*habâ'*) of the divine cosmic Imagination (*barzakh, khayâl*, etc.).

Therefore, Ibn 'Arabî explains the verse in Qur'an: '*Your Lord is Allah Who created the heavens and the Earth in six Days, then He mounted on the Throne; He draweth the night as a veil over the Day*, (7:54, see also other similar verses in Qur'an: 10:3, 11:7, 25:59, 32:4, 50:38 and 57:4) as indicating that the creation has been completed in six Days, from Sunday to Friday, by creating Adam (the cosmic Human Being) on Friday; and then '*He established Himself on the Throne*' on Saturday when nothing new is to be created, but only changing the states of the creatures – until the Day of Judgement, and after that either in the Gardens or in Gehenna – so this is the Day of eternity. Yet the heavens and the Earth are constantly being *re-created* every moment: therefore the same Week and Days of creation, including Saturday, are continually reiterating throughout Saturday, at every moment.

So if we think of the whole of manifest creation (the cosmos or 'world') throughout all places and times, throughout 'the Age' (*al-Dahr*), it is only seven Days: six Days for the creation, and the seventh Day (Saturday) for the realization. But if we think of ourselves as points in this space-time of the Age, because of the eternally renewed re-creation we observe succeeding Days and Weeks (as moments); yet all those Days (including Saturday) are happening in the Saturday of the single, unique Week of 'the Age'.

Ibn 'Arabî draws interesting symbolic parallels and extrapolations from this concept of creation just explained. Just like this momentary creation in the Week, our own human age (life) is also seven days (or periods): six in this world and Saturday for the hereafter, which we have either as all-day in Paradise or as all-night in Gehenna. Similarly also, the age of human civilization on Earth is seven days and we are now living in Friday, indeed in the last few hours of it. This is because, as Ibn 'Arabî observes:

We (the true followers of the Prophet) are, thanks to Allah, the Day of *Jum'a*, and Muhammad – may Allah have peace and mercy upon him – is this very '*Hour*' itself, by which the Day of *Jum'a* takes precedence over all other Days.

[I.646.15]

This is because Muhammad is the Perfect Human Being who is the most perfect Image of the Real. Ibn ‘Arabî explains this well-known central conception in his thought in more detail in chapter 346 of the *Futûhât*, where he observes that Muhammad, in relation to the whole world (cosmos), like the spirit (*al-nafs al-nâtîqa*) for each human being, while other prophets are like other spiritual faculties [III.186.31] (see also Table 3.1). Then he indicates that the world before the appearance of the Prophet Muhammad was like a foetus in the womb of the mother [III.187.6], and that after the passing away of Muhammad the world is like a sleeping – not dead – person [III.187.1], until, in the next world, all the world shall ‘live’ (have real life and awakening) through the full appearance of Muhammad in his complete composition [III.187.8]. Thus he goes on to note that people in the Gardens and Gehenna are like the different (spiritual and material) parts of the earthly human being, where the people of Gehenna are like the relatively lifeless (yet not completely dead) hair and nails [III.187.10]. So in this way the world is a like an ‘immense human being’ (*insân kabîr*), while the fully human being is like a microcosm (*âlam saghîr*).¹⁸

Many earlier Muslim theologians have tried to explain that Allah did not mean by the Qur’anic references to the ‘Days’ of creation those same earthly days that we live in, because they claimed that the sort of days that we know could not be existing yet, prior to the completion of creation. In contrast, Ibn ‘Arabî stresses that those ‘Days’ of creation in reality coincide with these same observed and experienced days. At the same time, he also acknowledged that this (cosmic) ‘Day’ existed before the creation of the heavens and the Earth, while the (earthly, observed alternation of) daytime and night-time were only determined afterwards by the creation of the Sun.

On another level, Ibn ‘Arabî’s complex, unique interpretation of those many verses in the Qur’an (and the Bible) that talk about the creation in six Days is promising in terms of modern astronomy and cosmology, because it suggests the first real unification between space and time, as well as a sense in which the ‘Week’ may have a very important, and not simply conventional, real significance.

However, there are still some further issues that need to be settled in order to understand the meaning of the Week, its movement through the signs of the zodiac and its detailed role in the process or stages of creation. We shall devote Chapter 4 to explaining Ibn ‘Arabî’s complicated theory of the ‘Actual Flow of Time’ and Chapter 6 to outlining a complete model of the cosmos based on Ibn ‘Arabî’s unique view of time and his theory of the oneness of being, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

4 The actual flow of time

As we already explained, Ibn 'Arabî showed that the creation of the world by Allah is a 'series' process. That is, He creates only one event at a time (or indeed in each Day), as Allah says: *each Day He is upon some (one) task* (55:29). Yet we observe multitudes of different events happening apparently at once. According to Ibn 'Arabî, the way to understand this apparent paradox is to correct our view of the flow of time.

Ibn 'Arabî shows that the actual flow of time (the divine creative 'Week' as the basic unit of space-time) is not the witnessed flow from Sunday to Monday and so on to Saturday. These normal days of the week that we witness are the 'circulated' days, and not the actual divine Days (the 'Days of Event') in which only one single event should be happening each and every single Day. In order to define or construct the actual cosmic 'Days of events', we need first to attach each night-time to its own daytime, for again the underlying metaphysical connection is not as we observe: i.e. the ('real') night-time of each daytime is not the observed night-time that precedes or follows this daytime, but rather it is 'taken out' and separated from its own daytime by three daytimes and three night-times. This extraordinary connection, Ibn 'Arabî explains, is symbolically related to our three-dimensional structure as human beings. Finally, he also affirms (according to Qur'anic indications), that the actual Days of events are 'intertwined' with the observable, 'circulated' days in a specific manner that he details in his book *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha'n* (*The Book of the Days of Task*).

So we shall first explain in this chapter the meanings and the relations between those three metaphysically distinct types of days: the 'circulated' days (*ayyâm al-takwîr*), the taken-out days (*ayyâm al-salkh*) and the intertwined days (*ayyâm al-ilâj*). There we shall see that, on the basis of the hypothesis of 'intertwining', Ibn 'Arabî introduces a unique new concept of time (and space) that has apparently not been discussed before. Finally, we turn to explaining the distinctive motion of each Day in the zodiac and the kinds of effects that are caused in the world in these Days. And at the end of this chapter we shall see the divine origin of dividing the normal days into hours, minutes and seconds.

4.1 The original days of event

We have explained in sections 2.15–16 that there is a minimum ‘Day’ which is that indivisible duration of time called ‘the Single Day’ (*al-yawm al-fard*). And we showed that this Day – when taken globally, or indeed universally (since it encompasses all of manifest creation) – actually includes our normal day, though we encounter it in fact just as a moment. In each one of these moments/Days there is only one global cosmic ‘event’ happening in each part of the entire cosmos. These Single Days are the original cosmic Days which are called the divine ‘Days of event’ (*ayyâm-ul-sha’n*), as discussed in the preceding chapter and Chapter 2. For in each Day of event (or divine ‘task’) Allah creates a single event actually encompassing every entity and phenomenon of the whole manifest world. As He said in the Qur’an: ‘each Day He is upon a (single) task’ (55:29).

Ibn ‘Arabî points out that ‘in each day of our normal days, that is from sunset to sunset or from sunrise to sunrise, there is the end of 360 days’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 6] (assuming the circle is 360 degrees).¹ That is because in every moment of the normal day that there is the end (or the beginning) of a day in one place, there is a corresponding beginning (or end) of another day in another place.

To explain this further, let us divide the circumference of the Earth into 360 longitudinal lines and the day into 360 degrees of longitude. Therefore, any whole day that we encounter in any specific place is a combination or the sum of the ends (last degrees) of 360 days from other places on the Earth; or in the same way, it is the sum of the first degrees of 360 days around the Earth. For example let us suppose that we are on the first longitudinal line at the first degree of the day, then the second degree of this day on this first longitudinal line is the first degree of the day beginning on the second line, and so on. In another way we can also say that the 360 degrees of the ‘day’ on the first line are the collection of the last degrees of the lines 360, 359, 358 and so on up to line number 1. Therefore in every moment there is one full day around the Earth: now, for example, it is morning somewhere, noon somewhere else and evening and midnight in other places; but all in total is a single full day (see also section 2.15 above).

So the flow of these original Days marks the actual sequence of events that spans space and time. But, because we live in and can only observe a tiny point of the whole space of the globe, we encounter linear time as our normal observed days of the week (i.e. the ‘circulated days’ described in the next section). Therefore, these original ‘Days of event’ are intertwined with our normal observed days.

4.2 The ‘circulated’ days (*ayyâm al-takwîr*)

Then if we stick to one place and watch the flow of time, we see that the Sun sets, for example, at the beginning of ‘Sunday night’ (i.e. the night that begins before Sunday daytime);² and then it rises on Sunday morning, and so on until it completes a full week on the following Sunday night. This is the witnessed

week, and its days are the normal days, or the witnessed days. Ibn ‘Arabî calls them the ‘circulated days’ (*ayyâm-ul-takwîr*),³ because they (daytimes and nights), seem to run after each other in a circle, as Allah says in the Qur’an:

He created the Heavens and the Earth through the real. He causes the night-time to encircle (v. *yukawwiru*) the daytime, and the daytime to encircle the night-time. He has subjected the Sun and the Moon: each one follows a (designated) course for a time appointed. Is He not the All-Mighty, the All-Forgiving?

(39:5)

So we can also say that the daytimes are circulated around the nights, and the nights are circulated around the daytimes, because the daytime and the night are like hemispheres surrounding the Earth all the time, but running after each other as if they were seeking each other, as Allah said in THE Qur’an: ‘*Lo! Your Lord is Allah Who created the Heavens and the Earth in six Days then mounted He on the Throne. He covers (yugshî) the night-time with the daytime, which is in haste to seek it*’ (7:54).

The Arabic word *yugshî* in this verse not only means ‘to cover’ but also ‘to embrace’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7], and it is particularly used for marriage. Thus Ibn ‘Arabî suggests that it is as if the daytime and the night are seeking each other because they want to ‘marry’ each other, to produce children – since we and everything else in the world are all the ‘progeny’ of the daytimes and nights [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7]. This ‘abstract marriage’, is a basic concept in Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmological teachings, and we shall come back to it shortly.

We conclude that in every normal day (i.e. circulated day) as we observe it in one specific place on the Earth, a vast number of ‘Days of events’ happen, as many as there are indivisible moments in this day. In other words, in every moment that we encounter on the Earth, there is a Day of event happening that encompasses the whole world or cosmos (all of creation). Yet each Day of event is also composed of the seven distinctive Days of creation, the divine creative ‘Week’ described in detail in the previous chapter.

4.3 The ‘taken-out’ days

Allah said in the Qur’an: ‘*A token unto them is the night-time: We take the daytime out of it, and lo, they are in darkness*’ (36:37). Ibn ‘Arabî points out that this seems to indicate that night is the origin, and that daytime was somehow ‘hidden’ in it and then was taken out of it [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 9, II.647.20]. In other words, as Ibn ‘Arabî explains [I.716.15], the night is like a dress or a skin over the daytime, and then Allah takes the daytime out of the night so that the world – which was in the absolute darkness of the divine ‘Unseen’ (*al-ghayb*) – is created (i.e. so that it appears in the light of actual existence).

Ibn ‘Arabî, however, argues that Allah did not specify in this verse which daytime was taken out of which night, and so this has to be clarified. For it is

not, as we might think, that each daytime (that we witness) was taken out of its own night. We have to seek the *true* relation between each daytime and its night, and this relation, Ibn ‘Arabî says [II.445.32, III.203.30], is based on the first hour of the daytime and the night-time, because each hour of the daytime and the night-time has a ruler; one of the five planets, the Sun, or the Moon (corresponding to one of the seven principal divine Attributes: see section 3.4); so each day is named after the planet that rules the first hour of it. For example: the first hour of Sunday is ruled by the Sun, and that is why it is so named (in English and many other languages); likewise Monday is the day of the Moon, and so on. In Arabic, however, the names of the days of the week do not have direct relations with the names of the planets that rule these days, but this connection still forms a basic principle in Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of time.

But before we discuss this further and assign each night to its actual daytime, we should understand the exact meaning of ‘taking out’ the daytime from the night, or the night from the daytime. Ibn ‘Arabî regards the different daytimes and night-times as ‘parents’ to what Allah creates in them: so everything that happens in the daytime is like a ‘son’ whose father is the night and whose mother is the daytime; and everything that happens in the night is like a son whose father is the daytime and whose mother is the night [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7; II.445.18]. As Allah said in the Qur’an: ‘*He merges (yûlîju) the night into the daytime, and He merges the daytime into the night*’ (57:6). So there is a kind of abstract, generative ‘marriage’ between daytimes and nights, but where nights and daytimes exchange their parental roles from being fathers to being mothers, and vice versa. That is why they are ‘intertwined’, as we shall see further below. Now Ibn ‘Arabî explains that when the daytime turns from being father into being mother or vice versa, this is what is meant by the Qur’anic reference to its respective ‘stripping-out’ or ‘taking-out’ (*salkh*). So when we say that this daytime (*nahâr*) is taken out of that night-time (*layl*), it means that this daytime and night exchange their generative ‘parental’ roles, although together they are always like a couple, i.e. a single ‘day’ (*yawm*).

Ibn ‘Arabî adds that Allah did not explicitly mention that night is also taken out of the daytime, since it is readily understood from the same Qur’anic verse [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 8; I.141.6, I.716.11]. On the other hand, Ibn ‘Arabî indicates that the first hour of the daytime and that of its own night (which was taken out of it) should be ruled by the same planet [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 10]. For in order to consider the daytime and the night-time as one unitary day, they have to be ruled by the same (cosmological, planetary) ‘ruler’. This applies only to the first hour of the daytime and the night, because each of the other hours (of the observable, earthly days) is coming from other cosmic ‘Days’ as a result of their overall ‘intertwining’:

Now when these planets moved in their orbs, Allah made for each planet a (specific) Day among the Days of the zodiac-orb motion. . . . So He defined for each Day (*yawm*) a daytime (*nahâr*) and a night-time (*layl*), and He distinguished between each night and its daytime by the rule of the (particular) planet for that Day in which the daytime and night appeared.

So when you look to which planet the first hour of the daytime belongs, then this planet is the ruler of that daytime. And when you look in the nights for the night whose first hour belongs to this same planet which ruled the first hour of the daytime, then this night belongs to this daytime.

[III.203.26]

Now that we have understood the meaning of the ‘taken-out’ days, let us see which daytime was taken out of which night. As we pointed out above, Ibn ‘Arabî argues that there are three other daytimes and three other nights between the daytime and the night from which it was taken out. That is because – as he explains – the structure of the world is six-directional: three nights corresponding to the directions down, left and back; and three daytimes corresponding to up, right and front [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7]. Table 4.1 shows the resulting daytimes of the week and the nights from which those respective daytimes were taken out.

Therefore, as we can see, there are three days between each daytime and its partner night. Of course normally the observable earthly week will run starting from the beginning of Sunday night, then Sunday daytime, then Monday night, then Monday daytime, and so on. These are the normal ‘circulated’ days. The ‘taken-out’ days, however, as we see from this table above and in Figure 4.1, run also starting from the beginning of Sunday night but leaving out three daytimes and three nights jumping to Wednesday daytime (of the circulated days) and so on.

Therefore the flow of time for the taken-out days is different from the normal circulated days. In order to understand the flow of the taken-out days let us show the above relation graphically as in Figure 4.1. It is better to imagine this graph in three dimensions because, as Ibn ‘Arabî indicated, the reason behind this interference between the taken-out days and the circulated days is the three-dimensional structure of the world that we live in [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7].

But what is the significance of conceiving the ‘taking-out’ daytimes and nights in this way? In his book *Ayyâm Al-Sha’n* Ibn ‘Arabî explains that the reason why there are three daytimes and three nights in the taken-out days is the three-dimensional (or six-directional) structure of the space in which we exist. In other books he (or rather, his later interpreter al-Qâshânî)⁴ points out that the

Table 4.1 The taken-out days

	<i>The daytime of . . .</i>	<i>was taken out of the night of . . .</i>	
4	Wednesday	Sunday	1
5	Thursday	Monday	2
6	Friday	Tuesday	3
7	Saturday	Wednesday	4
1	Sunday	Thursday	5
2	Monday	Friday	6
3	Tuesday	Saturday	7

Note
There are three daytimes and three nights between the daytime and the night that is taken out of it. This table is summarized from *Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*, pages 6–7




Figure 4.1 The taken-out days.

Note

It helps to imagine the resulting loop in three dimensions (x, y, z) as indicated graphically below.

word ‘day’ also means direction. So it appears to us as if our three-dimensional world is built up as a unit in seven Days (a Week). Therefore the Week with its seven Days is the unit of space-time, and not only time.

In chapter 302 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn ‘Arabî explains how the process of taking the daytime out of the night is identical to taking the world out of non-existence into the ‘light’ of existence:

Now we have mentioned that the world was hidden in the (absolute) Unseen (*ghayb*) of Allah, and that this Unseen was like the shadow of a person. So if something were taken out from the entirety of that shadow, it would come out in the image of that shade – just as that shadow is itself in the image of that of which it is a shadow. So the result of what is taken out of that shadow is in the image of the person. Do not you see that light is what appears when the daytime is taken out of the night-time?

So those things which were hidden in the night (of the divine ‘Unseen’) appear by the light of the daytime. Therefore the daytime does not resemble the night, but rather resembles the light, by the appearance of those things through it. So the night was the shadow of the (divine existentiating) Light, and the daytime, when it is taken out of the night, comes out on the image

of the Light. Likewise, the world, in its coming out of the Unseen, comes out in the image of the world (already present in) the Unseen, as we said.

[III.12.1]

So the process of creating the world out of non-existence is exactly like the Qur'anic image of 'taking the daytime out of the night', because time in the end is reduced to the instantaneous presence (or the events that happen in it). As summarized in the passage just quoted, Ibn 'Arabî says that the world already exists in the all-encompassing foreknowledge of Allah, in the absolute Unseen (*al-ghayb al-mutlaq*). Thus its emergence into manifest existence is like the daytime: both of its states are 'Light', first hidden in the 'shadow' of the absolute Unseen, and then when Allah takes the world out of that non-existence, just as He 'takes the daytime out of the night'. And because Allah had determined that the manifest world would be three-dimensional, He created it 'in six Days' (or directions). He could have created it in many ways, but Ibn 'Arabî affirms that the divine Ability does not overrule His Determination or destiny (*qadar*); it only accomplishes what He has already determined (the *maqdûr*) [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6]. Therefore, in order for the daytime (of the manifest world) to appear in existence, there have to be three daytimes and three nights between this daytime and the night that it was 'taken out' of [I.716; *Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 7]. Thus in each Day Allah creates a direction, and in the six Days of creation (from Sunday to Friday) Allah creates the world in (three-dimensional) space, while Saturday accounts for the 'Day of event' or time wherein this world is displayed.

4.4 The 'intertwined' days

As we have mentioned before (section 2.15), Allah said in the Holy Qur'an: '*each Day He is upon some (one) task*' (55:29). Since Allah did not say 'tasks' but rather a single task or event, Ibn 'Arabî argues that the whole Day should be under the effect of one single divine task. This, however, is not the case for our normal, 'circulated' days and is clearly not the case for the 'taken-out' days we have just described above, because we know that many different events are happening in each observable 'circulated' day.

Ibn 'Arabî argues that the original Days of events in which Allah described Himself as being '*each Day upon some task*' are *intertwined* (or 'entered into each other': *mutawâlîja*, from the verb *yûlîju*: 'to enter into') with the circulated days in a specific manner, which he explains by dividing the day into 24 hours. However, Ibn 'Arabî emphasizes that this example is only for approximation, since one could also explain this 'intertwining' on a smaller scale than hours (e.g. minutes and seconds, or even smaller). The matter as he describes it is already very complicated for 24 hours, although this may be possible to calculate now using sophisticated computer programs.

Starting with the night of Sunday – because its name *al-ahad* ('the First', 'the Unique') is a Name of Allah, it is the first day, and also it is the day of the Sun that is the heart or centre of the manifest world [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 11] – Ibn

‘Arabî reconstructs the Days of events from the hours of the circulated days, starting with the first hour of the night of Thursday, then the eighth hour, and so on with seven-hour intervals until the full 12 hours of the night of Sunday are completed. Then he moves on to ‘deconstruct’ the daytime of Sunday in the same way, as illustrated in the Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2.

Then he moves on to analyse the night of (the circulated day of) Monday in the same way, but starting from the daytime of Friday, and so on for the full seven Days, as indicated in the following Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2.

4.4.1 Demonstrating the intertwined days

As can be readily seen from Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the flow of time for the ‘intertwined’ days is even more complicated than that of the taken-out days. This

Table 4.2 The intertwined days (example of Sunday alone).

<i>Normal week days</i>							
	<i>SUN</i>	<i>MON</i>	<i>TUE</i>	<i>WED</i>	<i>THU</i>	<i>FRI</i>	<i>SAT</i>
<i>Hours of night</i>							
1	—	—	—	—	SUN	—	—
2	—	—	—	—	—	—	SUN
3	—	SUN	—	—	—	—	—
4	—	—	—	SUN	—	—	—
5	—	—	—	—	—	SUN	—
6	SUN	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	—	—	SUN	—	—	—	—
8	—	—	—	—	SUN	—	—
9	—	—	—	—	—	—	SUN
10	—	SUN	—	—	—	—	—
11	—	—	—	SUN	—	—	—
12	—	—	—	—	—	SUN	—
<i>Hours of daytime</i>							
1	SUN	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	—	—	SUN	—	—	—	—
3	—	—	—	—	SUN	—	—
4	—	—	—	—	—	—	SUN
5	—	SUN	—	—	—	—	—
6	—	—	—	SUN	—	—	—
7	—	—	—	—	—	SUN	—
8	SUN	—	—	—	—	—	—
9	—	—	SUN	—	—	—	—
10	—	—	—	—	SUN	—	—
11	—	—	—	—	—	—	SUN
12	—	SUN	—	—	—	—	—

Note

The shaded background indicates the nights of the normal days, and bold font indicates the night-time hours of the intertwined days. The data in this table are extracted from *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*, pp. 11–12.




Figure 4.2 The intertwined days, and their relation with the circulated days.

Note

The information in this figure is extracted from *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*, pp. 11–16.

complex relationship is shown graphically in Figure 4.2. Again, it would be more accurate to imagine this graph in three dimensions, but the graphic depiction is already very complicated in two dimensions. (A more accurate approach to what Ibn 'Arabî is actually describing would be to simulate this on the computer, taking into account smaller time-scales than hours.)

Figure 4.2 demonstrates how the 24 hours of each day of the normal circulated days are distributed over the seven Days of events. The 24 hours of the Day of Sunday for example (the 24-fold zigzag circle in the front) are distributed over the normal week days, starting from the first hour of Thursday night and moving with the seven-hour intervals already described.

Table 4.3 The intertwined days (all days)

<i>Normal week days</i>							
	<i>SUN</i>	<i>MON</i>	<i>TUE</i>	<i>WED</i>	<i>THU</i>	<i>FRI</i>	<i>SAT</i>
<i>Hours of nights</i>							
1	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE
2	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
3	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI
4	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED
5	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON
6	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
7	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU
8	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE
9	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
10	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI
11	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED
12	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON
<i>Hours of daytimes</i>							
1	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
2	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU
3	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE
4	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
5	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI
6	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED
7	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON
8	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
9	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU
10	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE
11	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	SUN
12	SAT	SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI

Note

The shaded background indicates the nights of the normal days, and bold font indicates night hours of the intertwined days. The data in this table are extracted from *Kitāb Ayyām Al-Sha'n*, pp. 11–16

4.4.2 The significance of the intertwined days

The flow of time according to the intertwined days is the real flow, because it indicates the manifest, outward order of events. The reason why there is a constant seven-hour step, as in the Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and Figure 4.3, is that the order of creation proceeds according to the seven main divine Names (and divine ‘Days’ of creation). For example, on Sunday (of the original Days of creation) the world starts ‘hearing’ the divine Command, which initiates the first dimension in creation. Then once the Sunday cycle (i.e. of the divine Attribute ‘the All-Hearing’) is over, the Monday cycle starts granting the world the attribute of ‘the Living’, and so on (see Table 3.1). Thus the manifest world gains the qualities of these fundamental divine Attributes one after the other.

4.5 The motion of the seven days in the zodiac

The orb of the ‘fixed stars’, including the constellations of the zodiac and the lunar mansions, is the second orb after the outermost Isotropic Orb, but it is the first material orb, because the Isotropic Orb does not have any distinguishing features (no stars or planets). We have already noted that Ibn ‘Arabî shows that ‘Allah created the Day in the first orb, and then defined it in the second orb, which is the orb of the fixed stars (the zodiac)’ [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 6]. That is because the motion of the Isotropic Orb can not be defined for the world beneath it, because there is no reference point to assign a beginning or an end to this motion. However, in the zodiac orb there is such a reference point: the 12 Signs or constellations. So we can say that the days were first defined in the zodiac orb, and each day represents a full cycle of this orb as observed from the Earth [III.548.31; see also section 2.12 above]. Ibn ‘Arabî clearly showed that this orb does not actually move as we observe it [II.441.33, I.141.17, III.549.3], but that we see it as moving because of the motion of the Earth around its centre [I.123.17, II.677.21, III.548.31] (see also section 1.4).

Ibn ‘Arabî takes the first degree in Gemini as the reference point to start counting the cosmic ‘Days’ of creation, and he claims that this initial motion of time in creation started when this point was matching the divine ‘Foot’ in the ‘Pedestal’ above the Isotropic Orb. It is very interesting to note that the first degree of Gemini coincides with the galactic equator.⁵ Moreover, recent studies and some historical or archaeological records (Sitchin 1976: 197) show that this point was used by ancient Sumerians as early as 11000 BC as a starting point for the zodiacal calendar. He says:

And let it be known to you that this Name (‘the All-Sufficient’, *al-ghanî*) made this orb isotropic with no planets in it: all its parts are the same, and it has a circular shape where you can not distinguish a beginning or an end to its motion, and it has no edge. By the existence of this orb the seven days came into being, and so months and years; but these (particular durations of) times were not determined in it until Allah created, inside this orb, other signs (galaxies, stars and planets) which determined these times.

This orb determined only one Day, which is a single cycle (of this orb) beginning at the place of the (divine) ‘Foot’ in the Pedestal. So it was determined from above. The duration of this cycle is called a Day. But nobody except Allah knows (the actual length of) this Day, because of the fact that all the parts of this orb are the same, so (nobody knows) the beginning of its motion. And the beginning of its motion was when the first degree of Gemini, which is an orb (whose influence is associated with the lower material element) of air, was matching this Foot.

Hence the first Day that appeared in the world was by the first degree of Gemini, and this Day is called *al-ahad* (Sunday). So when this specific point of this orb, which is known only to Allah, returned to match this Foot of the Pedestal, a full cycle – that is, of the total orb (and its contents) – was com-

pleted and all the parts of this (isotropic) orb matched with the (initial) place of the Foot from the Pedestal. So this motion came over every degree, minute, second, and less than that of this orb. So the places came into being and the existence of the single indivisible localized monad (of all manifest creation) was determined from the motion of this orb.

[II.437.29]

That was the motion of the initial Day of the Sun (Sunday).

Then, at the end (of this initial Day), there began another motion, also from the middle,⁶ until that (second motion) reached its end/aim (*ghâya*), like the first motion – together with the entirety of what (that sphere) contains of the (smallest) parts (*ajzâ'*) and the individual entities that are composed of those parts, because (that sphere) is quantitative. This second motion is called Monday. And so on till it completed seven periodical motions everyone is determined by a divine Attribute. And the (main) divine Attributes are seven, not more, which made the Age not more than seven (distinctive) Days.

[II.438.3]

This is shown better in Figure 4.3.

Thus the orb of the zodiac (fixed starts) executes only seven distinctive cycles, which are then repeated that over and over again. Each Day of these seven Days of the divine creative Week is called a 'Day of event', in which only one single event happens, because it is ruled by one primary divine Name of Allah. So there are seven Days of events, each related to one particular divine Name from the seven fundamental Names mentioned in section 3.4.

4.6 The kinds of events

Now in each 'Day of event' that is intertwined with the outwardly observable (normal earthly) 'circulated days' as described above, Ibn 'Arabî explains that Allah constantly inspires the Universal Soul to act upon the orbs below it – encompassing and giving rise to all the manifest, material cosmos – so that they move in a specific manner that will cause one particular kind of event in the cosmos. But the *effects* of this complex composite motion of the orbs will be different, depending on the capabilities and characteristics of individual creatures [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 11–12]. For example, when Allah inspires the Soul to move the element of fire in order to heat the world, the effects of this single event depends greatly on the individual creatures: those which are ready to burn will burn, and those which accept heat will be heated, and so on [*Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 6], and he explains further in the *Futûhât* that:

the (divine creative) "Event", in relation to the Real (i.e., God/*al-haqq*), is one from Him; but with relation to the acceptors of the world it is many events that we would call infinite, were they not confined by (their shared quality of) existence.

[II.82.6]




Figure 4.3 The Zodiac and the motion of the days in it.

Note

Notice that this refers to the apparent rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars, while the actual astronomical motion is due to the revolution of the Earth. The 12 zodiacal signs are divided into four groups whose influences are related to the four material elements (earth, water, air and fire), as described in the preceding chapter; each group contains three signs of the same nature. The motion of each cosmic Day starts at the first degree of Gemini.

Ibn ‘Arabî describes in his *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n* the different kinds of events that are particularly associated with each Day of the seven Days of the original divine ‘Week’ of event. There he also gives a ratio of ‘contribution’ by each one of the seven heavens. These mysterious symbolic data and concepts are not very easy to understand. However, we will summarize his remarks in Table 4.4 for reference, although any attempt to interpret them would require a separate extensive study.

The data in Table 4.4 are extracted from *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 11–16. The contributions are stated to be increments of one-fourth, probably alluding to the equal role of the four basic elements of material Nature (fire, air, water and earth). The —/— sign means that the corresponding data are not given in the text. For Wednesday, Ibn ‘Arabî does not give detailed numbers, but simply says (p. 14) that ‘God ordered the spiritual realities to help the Soul according to their corresponding strength’. The ‘↓’ indicates that the contribution is done only by way of descent. Some of the data in this table are incomplete or not certain, as the meaning of the original text is often unclear.⁷

Table 4.4 The action of the soul (on the world) in each day of the seven days of events and the ratio of contribution by the seven heavens

SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT
<i>The actions of the Universal Soul in each Day of event</i>						
moving the fire element to heat the world	giving the element of liquids to the generators	showing the absurd passions	mixing wet vapour with dry vapour	liquefying and decomposing	distilling the wet vapour	holding the forms of the world and forming them
<i>The ratio of contribution by the seven celestial spheres (orbs)/s</i>						
7	2/4	2/4	—/—	0/4	2/4	4/4
6	2/4	2/4	—/—	4/4	2/4	0/4
5	4/4	0/4	—/—	2/4	0/4	2/4
4	4/4	4/4	—/—	2/4	0/4	2/4
3	0/4	0/4	—/—	2/4	4/4	2/4
2	1/4	1/4+1/4	—/—	2/4	2/4	2/4
1	0/4	0/4	—/—	2/4	4/4	2/4
<i>The Results</i>						
the spirits flow in spiritual beings, and motion in the things that move	bodies grow; rainy winds blow; motions are weak	anger and conflicts amongst people	—/—	good for lovers	the events result through the divine Command, not as the result of trying and direct action	—/—

4.7 Hours, minutes and seconds

According to what we have now discussed in this and preceding chapters, the day as we normally experience or observe it is the minimum period of time defined by the apparent full revolution of the Heavens around the Earth (see sections 2.12 and 3.2). The original divine creative Days are single indivisible divine 'Acts', but in the observed time that we experience, we live only one moment out of each original Day (see section 2.15). Therefore, the normal day as we know it is a collection of the moments from the different divine Days of the creative Week, after the processes of 'intertwining' and 'taking-out' detailed above. For this reason, the normal day can be conventionally subdivided apparently infinitely, and smaller units of time can be conceived and measured.

Thus, the day is conventionally divided into 24 hours, and the hour is conventionally divided into 60 minutes, which are also conventionally divided into 60 seconds each. This conventional hexadecimal system can be traced back to the time of the Babylonians; it was used by many ancient civilizations and then transferred by the Arabs to the West. In recent centuries, some more scientifically measurable definitions of these conventional units of time have been introduced, specifically for the second.⁸ So this hexadecimal system is now internationally used, but after the second, smaller units of time are decimally subdivided into 0.1, 0.01 etc., or 10^{-x} seconds, where x could be in principle any number no matter how large (for infinitely shorter times).⁹

Ibn 'Arabî referred to these further conventional subdivisions of observed time in chapter 59 of the *Futûhât*, which is entitled 'On the Inner Knowing of the (actually) Existent and Conventional Time'. Here the original divine cosmic 'Days of event' are the actually Existent Time (*al-zamân al-mawjûd*) while the other time-distinctions days, years, months, hours, minutes and seconds are only conventional or 'estimated' (*muqaddar*). There he explains:

The (observable) 'days' are many: some are long, and some are short. The shortest day is the 'monad of time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) in which '*He is in a task*' (55:29), so that (indivisible shortest) monad of time is called a 'day' because the (divine) 'task' happens in it: it is the shortest and tiniest time, and there is no maximum term to the longest. Between them there are intermediate 'days', the first of which is the conventional 'day' familiar in customary usage, which is divided into hours, the hours into degrees, the degrees into minutes, and so on. That goes on indefinitely, for those people who also divide the minutes into seconds. Since it is ruled by (the principle of) countability, (for them time) is like numbers; and numbers are infinite, so this division is also infinite.

But some people say that (time) is finite, and they take this matter from the perspective of what can (actually) be counted or 'numbered': those are (the people) who advocate that time is an existing essence (because it is countable), and all that exists must undoubtedly be finite. But the opposing (group) say that the countable, simply by the fact that it can be counted, does not

(therefore necessarily) enter into existence, so it is not described as finite, because number is not describable as being finite. This is how those who argue against the ‘single monad’ (or ‘indivisible atom’: *al-jawhar al-fard* proposed by the kalam theologians) contend, (maintaining instead) that according to the intellect body is divisible indefinitely. This topic of controversy among the people of intellectual inquiry (i.e. kalam theologians and the philosophers) happened as a result of their lack of good judgement and their inquiring (only) about the meanings of words (instead of what is actually real).

[I.292.3]

However, for Ibn ‘Arabî this conventional division of time also has its divine origin. He first affirms that the celestial orbs were divided into 360 degrees due to the fact that the Universal Intellect (or the ‘Higher Pen’) was taught by the ‘Greatest Element’ (see sections 6.2 and 6.5) exactly 360 kinds of comprehensive divisions of knowledge (*‘ulûm al-ijmâl*), under each of which there are 360 further divisions of detailed knowledge (*‘ulûm al-tafsîl*), that is 360 times 360:

So each degree (of the 360 total degrees of the outermost, all-encompassing celestial sphere) includes all that it comprises of the details of minutes, seconds, tertiary divisions, and so on, as Allah – the Exalted – wills to make manifest (of that detailed Knowledge) in His Creation till the day of the Rising.

[I.295.12]

After that, in the same passage, Ibn ‘Arabî shows that Allah appointed 12 ‘rulers’ (*wulât*, s. *wâli*), one in each of the 12 zodiac signs, which correspond to the 12 months in the conventional year. Also there are 28 ‘chamberlains’ (*hujjâb*, s. *hâjib*) in the orb of the constellations (i.e. the 28 houses of the Moon) which correspond to the 28 days in the (divine) month (see section 3.2). Finally, in the same passage he also says that Allah ordered those rulers to appoint seven ‘chiefs’ (*nuqabâ’*, s. *naqîb*) in the seven Heavens, one ‘chief’ in each celestial sphere – i.e. the seven orbs which correspond to the seven Days of the cosmic Week. Ibn ‘Arabî then adds that each one of those groups of spirits that are associated with the celestial spheres has a living human ‘deputy’ or ‘agent’ among us on Earth [I.296.27].

Ibn ‘Arabî even suggests a certain divine importance for the conventional division of the day into 24 hours, in the following passage discussing the different groups of the spiritual hierarchy of the ‘Friends of God’ (*awliyâ’*) in chapter 73 of the *Futûhât* [II.2.39]:

And among them (the *awliyâ’*), may Allah be pleased with them, (are a group of) 24 souls at any time, no more and no less. They are called the ‘Men of (Spiritual) Opening’ (*rijâl al-fateh*): through them Allah opens for the people of Allah whatever He opens of (divine) knowledge and secrets. And Allah made them according to the number of hours, one of them for each hour.

[II.13.7]

Regarding the hours of the day and the two parts of it (the daytime and the night), and their observable variations across the year and from one place to another, Ibn ‘Arabî says:

Then Allah caused the (observable, earthly) daytime (*nahâr*) and the nighttime by the existence of the Sun – not the (true divine) Days (*ayyâm*). And as for what happens of (the observable) increase and decrease in the (length of the) daytime and night – not in the hours, for they are (always) 24 hours – that is because of the motion of the Sun in the zodiac region which is tilted with regard to us, so the day becomes longer where it is in the high houses, and when it comes to the low houses the day becomes shorter where it (i.e. the Sun) is. We said ‘where it is’, because when the night becomes longer for us the day becomes longer for others, so the Sun is in the high houses for them and in the low houses for us. So when the day becomes shorter for us, the night becomes longer for them as we said. But the day (*al-yawm*) itself is 24 hours: it does not increase or decrease, nor does it become longer nor shorter in the equinox place.

[I.140.33]

5 Unicity and multiplicity

*Examine the origin of existence, and think it through:
you will see the same (divine) Generosity, both eternal and created.
And the (created) thing is like the (eternal) thing,
except that He made it appear in the actual reality of the worlds as created.
So if the viewer swears that his existence is eternal (in the Unity),
he is honest and truthful, not lying;
But if the viewer swears that its existence (emerges) after its non-existence,
(that is) more appropriate – and then its [existence] is threefold.*

[I.5.31]

In order to understand these novel concepts of time that we have explained in previous chapters, we need to shed more light on Ibn ‘Arabī’s controversial understanding of the oneness of being (*wahdat al-wujūd*), because it is the key to understanding his various views of time. Although he had never employed this famous term directly, it is quite evident that this characteristic understanding of the oneness of being strongly dominates Ibn Arabī’s many writings: he explains almost everything on the basis of the concept of ultimate unicity and oneness. More specifically, the metaphysical structure of the world, how it comes into existence, how it is maintained and its ontological relation with the Creator can be explained only on the basis of the oneness of being.

In the light of the centuries of later polemics surrounding this conception, it must be stressed that Ibn ‘Arabī’s conception of the oneness of being is completely different from such views such as pantheism or monism. Ibn ‘Arabī never denies the basic distinction between the Creator and creations, and certainly never contradicts the basic tenet of monotheism. Likewise, he strictly affirms the Muhammadan revelation (*sharī‘a*) and accepts all the observed multiplicity on the usual planes of manifest existence. Instead, his focus in applying the oneness of being is on understanding the cosmos and how it works. It is these particular cosmological aspects that we shall be interested in throughout this chapter, so that we can explain Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of the creation in order to understand his unique concepts of time and eventually to situate all those conceptions within the comprehensive cosmological model outlined in Chapter 6 below.

5.1 The contrasting approaches of Sufism and philosophy

We want to start this chapter by quoting Ibn ‘Arabî’s famous story of his first encounter with the great Aristotelian philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, already mentioned in section 1.7) when Ibn ‘Arabî was still relatively young, but already famous for his immense knowledge and unique views. According to that account, Ibn Rushd arranged with his friend – Ibn ‘Arabî’s father – to meet the young mystic in order to hear what he had to say about (his Aristotelian) philosophy. As Ibn ‘Arabî recounts this story in the *Futûhât*:

And I entered one day in Cordoba into (the house of) the judge Abû al-Walîd Ibn Rushd, as he wished to meet me after he had heard about what Allah opened up for me in my spiritual retreat, for he had been expressing his admiration of (or ‘amazement at’) what he had heard. Then my father – because he was one of (Averroes’) friends – sent me to him for something on purpose in order (for him) to meet me. I was still young; my face had not yet put forth a beard, and my moustache had not yet grown.¹

When I entered to see him he stood up for me out of love and respect, embraced me and said (exclaiming): ‘Yes’! I replied: ‘Yes’. So his joy was magnified because I understood him. Then I realized what made him feel happy, and I said: ‘For Allah’s sake, No!’ Then he turned sad, his colour changed and he doubted his philosophy.

Then he asked: ‘So how did you find it in unveiling (*kashf*) and divine effusion (*faḡd ilâhî*)? Is it the same as what thought had led us (philosophers) to?’ I replied: ‘Yes ... No, and between the “yes” and the “no”, spirits fly away from their (bodily) matter and necks from their bodies.’

So his (face) colour turned pale, he began to tremble and sat down reciting the *hawqala* [that is to say: *lâ hawla wa lâ quwwata illâ bi Allah* (‘there is no power and no strength but in Allah’)], and he knew what I alluded to (in responding) to him.

[I.153.33]

This mysterious exchange of these few words and gestures between these two pillars of Islamic thought, a Sufi and a philosopher, is an attempt to express in symbolic language what is very difficult to explain in more explicit language. Ibn ‘Arabî alludes here to an essential realization that is beyond normal human comprehension, something that is apparently against our everyday experience or otherwise very difficult to believe. Yet on the other hand, it is something that can be ultimately summarized in only two words: ‘Yes’ and ‘No’, or even ‘Yes’ alone, because ‘No’ is ‘not Yes’.² In fact, Ibn ‘Arabî’s ‘digital’ answer here: ‘Yes/No’ (or ‘1/0’, ‘True/False’, which ultimately amounts to existence/non-existence) is the best and shortest expression of the creation – summarizing the essence of the paradoxical metaphysical insights alluded to in the initial poem of the *Futûhât* translated at the beginning of this chapter.

The difficulty of expressing this universal Reality in simple words comes

from the fact that we live in a diverse world of infinite multiplicity, while at the same time the truth or reality behind this world is literally too simple to be believed [*Al-Masâ'il*: 163]. The ultimate Real is Allah, and Allah is uniquely One, while the world is apparently many – so the metaphysical challenge is how to link the (imaginary) multiplicity of the world to the Real One, through some unseen intermediaries.

Philosophers and scientists in general try to understand the world through observations, while the methods of Ibn 'Arabî and other Sufis rely upon modes of perception that jump directly into the unseen in order to approach the Real directly. As Ibn 'Arabî often points out, observations are subject to many mistakes, owing to the inaccuracy of the tools employed, whether human senses or technical equipment, while *true* visions – as opposed to our sometimes problematic interpretations of them – are always correct [I.307.12, III.7.21].³ On the other hand, philosophers and scientists use logic and experiments to deduce their theories and explain their observations, while Sufis in general often describe their visions without paying too much attention to explaining them in a logical manner, especially when some of their visions, though real and true, may be outwardly or apparently illogical.⁴ As a result, certain Sufis like Ibn 'Arabî may attain a very high state of knowledge of reality more quickly and more accurately than philosophers (as Ibn 'Arabî certainly implies in his account of his meeting with Ibn Rushd), but they find it very difficult to explain their views to others who have not '*tasted*' it their way. So when they try to explain their insights, not many people will understand what they say.

The problem with the current laws and theories of physics and cosmology is that so far, although they have proved to be quite accurate and powerful in application, they have admittedly failed to unveil the ultimate reality behind the world. All scientific theories are descriptive rather than determinative. We have seen in section 1.3 that the reason why science was not able to determine the reality of the world is that all cosmological models need a boundary condition: i.e. an exact description of what was the initial state when the world started, something which seems to be impossible to achieve by the intellect alone. That is why scientists work backwards: i.e. they try to find out the initial state of the cosmos by extrapolating in various ways from the current observations. As a result, all physics theories and known cosmological models, though they have achieved higher levels of understanding, have also brought new contradictions and paradoxes. They have succeeded in providing approximate possible creation scenarios, but failed to describe the reality itself. Although Ibn 'Arabî considers the intellect unbounded or unlimited as a *receptive* tool, it is quite limited as a ratiocinative thinking tool because it relies on limited senses [I.288.27]. Therefore, the intellect alone – as a thinking tool – cannot describe the origin of the world because it is necessarily a part of it. Ibn 'Arabî affirmed this when he said that the limit of the observations of the philosophers (or astronomers) is up to the Isotropic Orb which is the first (outermost, and first created) material orb [II.677.1]; they can not see or detect anything beyond that. That is why the Sufis

rely on the 'heart' (the locus of spiritual 'tasting' and inspiration, in the language of the Qur'an) rather than the discursive intellect.

On the other hand, Sufis have sometimes claimed to have achieved a high state of realization and even to have visualized the metaphysical structure and origin of the world (i.e. what physicists call the initial/boundary condition). Most of them, however, did not give proper attention to explaining the observable universe and relating it to that initial cosmological state. Even Ibn 'Arabî himself did not care too much about that: instead he declared that his aims were not to explain the world, but rather to acquire more knowledge of the world as a structure created according to the Image of Allah, so that he might acquire more knowledge of Allah Himself. All the same, however, throughout the *Futûhât* and other shorter books Ibn 'Arabî often gives a great many cosmological explanations and sometimes logical analyses of his metaphysical visions. This is why it is very important to study Ibn 'Arabî's writings, since they may provide a real link between philosophy and science, on the one hand, and mysticism and theology.

5.2 Unicity versus multiplicity

Ibn 'Arabî cited the story of his meeting with Ibn Rushd in the context of explaining the words of the central spiritual Pole Idrîs (*mudâwî al-kulûm*) who – as Ibn 'Arabî said – knows very well about the natural world and the effects of the higher world on it. Thus this Pole explained that 'the world exists between the circumference and the point' [I.154.22]. The 'point' here refers to the Real (the 'Necessary Being') whose existence is self-existence, while the 'circumference' is the circle of creations (the 'possible' or contingent entities) whose existence depends on the Real. Beyond this circumference is the 'sea' of non-existence (the impossible of existence). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5.1.

With regard to this image, Ibn 'Arabî explained in chapter 47 of the *Futûhât* [I.260.1] that the (divine creative Source-) point in the centre of a circle meets any point in its circumference with its whole entity, without division or multiplicity. Similarly, multiplicity (i.e. all of creation) appears or emerges out of the Unicity of the Real; the manyness of the world appears out of the One Creator, without affecting His unique Oneness or Unicity. Ibn 'Arabî was well aware that this paradoxical relation between the Creator and all manifestation is in clear apparent contradiction with the widely accepted philosophical maxim – a central assumption in the prevailing contemporary philosophical cosmology of Ibn Sina and his followers – that 'from the One only one may emerge (or proceed)' (*la yasdur 'an al-wâhid illâ wâhid*).⁵

Given the assumption of this maxim, an obvious problem encountered by philosophers and theologians when they want to explain how Allah created the world is that Allah is One while the world is many. So logically it is not possible to imagine a relation between the One and the many without affecting the unique Oneness (*ahadiyya*) of the One.




Figure 5.1 The Real, the 'Possible' exists, and the 'Impossible'

Note

This figure is taken from chapter 360 of the *Futūhāt* [III.275].

However, Ibn 'Arabî's analogy between the pure mathematical symbol of the circle and its centre and the cosmological process of creation by the One Creator is not fully justifiable without further explanations. Among other problems, mathematics and geometry work with infinitely small (or dimensionless) points, while our contemporary science of physics and cosmology deals with corporeal worlds that have dimensions. But we shall see below that Ibn 'Arabî's unique understanding of time provides here the essential link between physics and mathematics, or between reality and imagination, in the same way as it does provide the necessary link between unicity and multiplicity.

Ibn 'Arabî quotes the above-mentioned emanationist philosophical maxim quite often [I.42.14, I.260.5, II.31.14]. Although he disagrees with this general proposition [I.260.5, I.715.12, II.434.20, and see also *Al-Durratū Al-Baydā'*: 140], he sometimes explains further that this notion can be held true for physical beings but not for Allah Himself, because Allah, the unique One, can obviously create multiple creations as we can clearly see:

So without their dependence (for actual existence) on the existing-entity ('*ayn*') of the servant, there would be no rulership for those two Names ('the First' and 'the Last'). Because there (in eternity), the (divine) Essential-entity (*al-'ayn*) is (uniquely) One, not united (from different parts: *mutta-hida*). But in the servant, (the existing-entity) is united (of different parts) and not (uniquely) one, because Oneness (*al-ahadiyya*) is for Allah (alone), and unification (*ittiḥād*, the unification of the servant's parts, senses, faculties etc., and not the unification of the servant with his Lord because this is

not possible in Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine) – and not the (divine) Oneness – is for the servant. This is because the servant can only be understood in relation to another (Who is his ‘Lord’ or his Creator), and not by himself: so he has no trace of (the absolute divine) Oneness at all. But as for the Real, Oneness may be understood (as applying) to Him (taken by Himself), or it may be understood (as applying to Him) with relation (to others), since everything belongs to Him, and indeed He is actually the Essence of everything. (This unique divine Oneness refers) not to the wholeness uniting a collection (of different entities: *kullīyyat jam’*), but rather to the (unique) Reality of Unicity (*ḥaqīqat ahadiyya*) on which (all) multiplicity depends – and this (unique Oneness) can only apply specifically to the (divine) Real.

So according to the determination of the (human) intellect, only one thing can ever emerge from the One. But the Unicity of the Real does not fall under that rule. How could He, Who created that rule, fall under it?! And the (true) Ruler – *there is no god but Him, the Almighty, the All-Wise* (3:6, 3:18).

[II.31.11]

So now we can see how multiplicity may come out of the Oneness of the Real. Yet we need to explain how this multiplicity of the creation appears from the One Creator. We need to explain how the pure geometrical analogy of the circle and its centre could be applied to the creation of the worlds by Allah.

Ibn ‘Arabi solves this riddle in part by inserting ‘time’, a true understanding of time. Hence he says:

and He (the Real) has a special face (*wajh khâss*) towards everything that exists, because He is the cause of everything. Now every (single) thing is one, it cannot be two; and He is One. So from Him there appeared only one, because He is in the oneness (*ahadiyya*) of every one (existing thing).

So if multiplicity exists, it would (only) be with regard to the *oneness of time* that is the container (of that apparent multiplicity). For the existence of the Real in this multiplicity is in the oneness of every one (existent). So there appeared from Him only one. Therefore this is the real meaning of ‘from the One only one may emerge’: even if the entirety of the world appeared from Him, there would only appear from Him one (created reality), because He is ‘*with*’⁶ every one (of the creatures) with respect to its oneness.

Now this is something that can be perceived only by the (truly enlightened) ‘people of Allah’,⁷ whereas the philosophers mean this [i.e. that from one (cause) only one (effect) can emerge] in an entirely different sense, and this is something about which they were mistaken.

[II.434.18]

Because of the rarity of the underlying spiritual perception of this reality restricted, as Ibn ‘Arabi stresses, to the fully enlightened ‘people of Allah’, this

passage just quoted above is not readily understood. Perhaps it is because of its great importance and central role in Ibn 'Arabî's cosmology that the famous 'Abd-al-Qâdir al-Jazâ'irî,⁸ the editor of the original Bulaq edition of the *Futûhât* that is the basis for all modern versions, added a rare long footnote comment at this point in the *Futûhât* [II.434–435] to explain it in terms of the oneness of being. Because his comments here are very helpful in this regard, we shall analyse them at length in what follows.

Here he explains that this passage refers to two related issues: 'the one-ness of every being' (*wahdat kull mawjûd*) and 'the unicity of Being (*ahadiyyat al-wujûd*)'. He begins by pointing out that everyone and every thing has a unique 'face' or individual reality that makes it distinctive; thus there are no two persons or entities with the same reality, since otherwise they would be one (the same), and not two. So this means that there appears from the One Creator only one (reality) because this unique 'special face' is never repeated (see also section 2.8).

This explanation, however, is not entirely satisfactory (for our purposes, at least), because the negation of repetition does not imply the negation of multiplicity, which is clearly witnessed in the world.

'Abd al-Qâdir then goes on to explain that we can reconcile the apparent multiplicity with the actual oneness of creation by correcting our view of time and space. He says that our imagination pictures time as a container which contains the things in the existence (as Newton later imagined time, but the theory of Relativity superseded his view, as we mentioned in section 1.3) so we see things arranged in time (and space), and then we imagine multiplicity. But if we imagine ourselves 'out of time', and look at the whole existence in time and space, we shall see a single existence without a beginning and without an end, and without any relation to a self-subsistent distinct time and space as we usually imagine them. For example, every person is one despite having arms and legs and many visible and invisible parts.

But again this explanation is not entirely satisfactory, since it shows the unity of all being (*wâhidiyya*), but not its unique metaphysical 'unicity' (*ahadiyya*). It shows that the whole of existence is 'one' when we look at it as a single whole, or from outside space and time. But still, since we actually perceive (or imagine) ourselves as existing inside this space-time whole as partial entities, we also see many other entities – or in other words, manifest multiplicity. So we still need to explain how this multiplicity appears from the unique Oneness of the Real.

'Abd al-Qâdir then goes on to explain that if the philosophers meant by saying 'from the one there only emerges one' that Allah created only the First Intellect (which is the way this maxim was understood by Ibn Sina and most Islamic philosophers), then this Intellect (alone) gave rise to the world. In one sense this may be true for Ibn 'Arabî, but he adds – as we have just seen at the beginning of this section – that Allah has a unique Face specifically turned to every single entity in the world, through Which its existence is preserved [II.434.18]. But in that case the philosophers are contradicting – or at least failing to illustrate the relevance of – their own proposition (Ibn 'Arabî also discussed these views in *al-Durrat Al-Baydâ*: 142–143), because again the world is

many and the First Intellect is one; so we still need then to explain how this multiplicity of the world appeared out of the First Intellect.

In Ibn 'Arabî's view, however, every individual entity in the world always has a direct creative relation with Allah, and that is how its existence exists and is maintained. If Allah did not maintain this creative 'special face' between Himself and each entity, it would cease to exist instantly (*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 133). In order to solve the problem of unicity–multiplicity relation, Ibn 'Arabî actually asserts that this interface between the One and all the many existent things does not happen all at once. Rather, at any instant, as we have just seen, there is in reality a single relation or interface – a unique divine 'with-ness', as he calls it (following the Qur'an) – between the One and each 'one' of the entities of the world. But what happens at this particular instant with the other entities in the world, since their existence is also preserved only through this unique creative relation between them and their Creator, the unique One? The answer is: they do cease to exist, and then they are (immediately) *re-created* again and again [II.385.4]. We shall discuss this central metaphysical principle of the 'ever-renewed creation' in section 5.6.

Therefore, in order to understand the relation between the unique Oneness of the Real and the multiplicity of the creatures, Ibn 'Arabî adds time to the previous philosophical statement, which can be then reformulated as: 'from the One there can emerge only one *at a time*'. This re-statement is indeed the key to understanding Ibn 'Arabî's unique views of time and the oneness of being and to solving the mystery of the relation between the Real and His creation. In this way the world is created by Allah 'in series' (*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 139), and not just one single time, just as the repeated images of a movie are displayed on the television or computer screen.

Ibn 'Arabî, moreover, affirms that this particular mode of creation was chosen by Allah to be like that, although in fact He might have done it in any other way, so it is not an (external) restriction over Him:

So this is not necessarily implied by the Existence of the Real: i.e. that for example only one can emerge out from Him, and that this is impossible (otherwise). But He willed that and He wished it, and if He had wished that the world should exist all at once, and that nothing were dependent on anything (else), it would not be difficult for Allah [to make it like that, and in this case – if Allah had wished that the world should exist all at once – then we would be living in a different logic, but because Allah created it in this way as it is now (ruled by the laws of causality: see also section 7.7), we observe that from the one nothing might emerge except one at a time, since otherwise this would violate the oneness of the Real according to our current logic].

(*Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'*: 139)

The meaning of this principle is in fact derived directly from the well-known verse in the Qur'an that we have already discussed in many earlier contexts:

each Day He is upon some (one, single) task (55:29). Ibn 'Arabî quotes this verse most frequently in his discussion on time, and it is the basis of his unique 'quantization' of time. So since Allah is One, He does only one single creative task each 'Day' – of course not this normal observable day that we encounter, in which an almost infinite number of tasks or events are happening.

5.3 The unicity of God and His names

According to Ibn 'Arabî and to Islam, and also some other religions, Allah is both One (*Wâhid*) and 'Unique' (*al-Ahad*, 'the Unit').⁹ The first attribute means that He is one God (not many) and the second attribute means that He is not divisible into other entities. Moreover, as is indicated by the more metaphysically problematic second attribute of 'Unicity' (*ahadiyya*), we can not describe Him as a single entity (like other entities) with specific dimensions that are placed somewhere in space or began at a point of time. Allah is simply uniquely different from whatever we may know or imagine. We can not achieve full knowledge or awareness of the Essence (*Dhât*) of Allah because this is beyond our perception. It is, however, possible to describe Him and speak about His Attributes and divine Names, for example as they are mentioned in the Qur'an and the Sunna. We may attain knowledge about the divine Names and descriptions of Allah, but not about His Essence (*Dhât*) Himself. As Chittick has pointed out, for Ibn 'Arabî: 'God is known through the relations, attributions and correlations between Him and the cosmos. But the Essence is unknown, since nothing is related to It' (*SDK*: 62). Whatever the human being may know about Allah is therefore in the end partial and incomplete. No one can ever achieve full knowledge or awareness of Him; the maximum knowledge one might achieve of the Essence of Allah is to know that He is different from anything [IV.301.17]. Ibn 'Arabî expressed this nicely in his prayers: 'it is enough for me that You know my ignorance. You are as I know, and beyond what I know to a degree that I do not know' (Beneito and Hirtenstein 2000: 131–132)¹⁰ This is because we may know Him only through His manifestations in us and in the world, but His manifestations are never exactly repeated.

Human Being, however, is the creature most capable of knowing Allah, the Exalted, because when He created Adam (the Perfect Human Being), He *taught him all the Names* (2:31)¹¹ and ordered the angels to prostrate before Adam out of respect and acknowledgement (2:34, 7:11, 17:61, 18:50, 20:116, II.46.33). But knowing Allah is an infinite process for us, because Allah Himself is not finite, in the sense that He never manifests in the same form twice [I.266.10], and also because His manifestations reveal some of his attributes and descriptions, but do not fully reveal His ultimate Essence or Identity. Ibn 'Arabî summarizes this by saying, in one of his many elaborations of the famous Divine Saying of the 'Hidden Treasure', that:

Allah, the Exalted, 'loved to be known' in order to grant the world the privilege of knowing Him, the most Exalted. But He knew that His Identity

(Essence) can not be (completely) known and nobody can ever know Him as He knows Himself. The best knowledge that can be achieved about Him, His Highness, in the world is that the knowers know that they do not know. And this (human inability to know the Essence) is (also) called knowledge, as the Righteous (Abû Bakr al-Siddîq) said: 'The incapacity to attain realization is a realization.'¹²

[III.429.7]

As Ibn 'Arabî notes elsewhere, the Prophet Muhammad has also clearly expressed this same recognition by saying: 'I can not enumerate the ways of praising Thee: Thou art as Thou has praised Thyself' [*Kanz*: 2131, 3652, I.126.15, I.271.5, etc.], and Allah also said: '*but they do not encompass Him with knowledge*' (20:110).

Of course the Prophet Muhammad also said: 'Allah has 99 Names, one hundred less one: whoever enumerates them is going to enter the Garden' [*Kanz*: 1933, 1934 and 1938]. However, this does not *restrict* the divine Names to 99, as some Muslims misunderstand it. In fact Ibn 'Arabî says that the divine Names of Allah are countless and that everything in the cosmos is a divine Name. But the 99 enumerated Names are the principal Names [IV.288.2] that have been mentioned in Qur'an and Sunna. Moreover, although each Name of the divine Names is different from others, Ibn 'Arabî repeatedly cautions his readers that all that Names are intrinsically implicit in each one of them, which is to say that each Name can be described by all the other Names [I.101.5]. However, despite the multiplicity of these Names, they all refer to the same One Absolute Essence of Allah, while conveying different Attributes of Him due to His manifestations and relations [I.48.23]. Multiplicity is not an intrinsic property of Allah Himself, since Allah has many different Names only when considered with relation to His creations:

The Names of the Real do not become plural and multiple except in manifestation. But with respect to Him, the property of number does not rule over them, not even its (the number's) root, which is (the number) one. So His Names, in respect to Him, may not be (exclusively or restrictively) described by unity or multiplicity.

[II.122.19, see also *Al-Masâ'il*: 109]

So in fact even the Names 'the One', 'the Unique' and the like are not descriptions of Allah with respect to Himself, but with respect to his creation. If we suppose that there is no creation, there would be no need to describe Him by the One or any other Name. Ibn 'Arabî frequently points out that this is just like the fact that the meaning of the number one is only introduced with regard to its relation to the other numbers.

So Allah may be known only through His divine Names. And because these Names are countless, our knowledge of Allah may never be complete. It is these knowable divine Names that are actively engaged and manifested in the creation.

That is why we see multiplicity and diversity in the cosmos.¹³ In fact Ibn ‘Arabî maintains that everything in the world is in essence a divine Name, simply because everything is a cause that we need, and Allah says: ‘*you are in need of Allah*’ (35:15) (III.208.7; see also section 7.7). Also He said that ‘*He is the First and the Last and the Manifest and the Hidden*’ (57:3). He manifests in all things, so the things are not other than Him; but also the things are not (identical with) Him, as we shall explain shortly.

However, we should take all these descriptions and names as mere approximations, because they are words spoken in our own language: the names (words) that we know are actually *the names of the Names*, and not the Names themselves [II.56.33]. Although we may know about Allah by knowing His Attributes and Names, those outward verbal Names are words in our language so that we may, for example, look up their meanings in the dictionary, or even use them to name and describe people and things. So although those same familiar words are Names of Allah, their actual meanings are quite distinct when Allah is called by them. For this reason Allah is named as *al-fard* (‘the Singular’), because He is distinct (or ‘singled-out’: *mutafarrid*) from the creation [IV.276.33]. Also, all His Names are described by their ‘singular uniqueness’ (*al-tafarrud*). As Chittick has pointed out, those words that are revealed to us (through the Qur’an and Sunna) are the outward forms (*sûra*), while Allah’s own knowledge of Himself is the reality or inner meaning (*ma’nâ*) (SDK: 34). Similarly the Names that are revealed to us in everything in the cosmos are the outward forms, while the inner meaning of those forms is Allah’s own knowledge of Himself. Ibn ‘Arabî showed that:

Allah says: ‘*Call upon Allah or call upon the All-Merciful: whoever you call upon, to Him belong the most beautiful Names*’ (17:110). So here He made the most beautiful Names belong to Allah as they (also) belong to the All-Merciful.

But here there is a subtle point: since every Name has a meaning (*ma’nâ*) and a form (*sûra*), ‘Allah’ is called by the Name’s *meaning*, while the ‘All-Merciful’ is called by the Name’s *form*. This is because the (divine) Breath is ascribed to the All-Merciful,¹⁴ and through this (creative) Breath the divine words become manifest within the levels of the Void (*khalâ*) where the cosmos becomes manifest. So we call Him only by the form of the Names (and only He Himself knows the real meaning of these names).

[II.396.30]

Therefore whatever knowledge we may acquire about Allah actually belongs to His Name ‘the All-Merciful’, and the difference between the two Names is like the difference between the form and the meaning. According to Ibn ‘Arabî, this relation is a direct implication of the verse in Qur’an: ‘*the All-Merciful mounted on the Throne*’ (20:5). In the first chapter of *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya* (p. 89), which talks about the Universal Spirit (*al-Rûh al-Kullî*) – which is the ‘Greatest Element/Single Monad’, as we shall see in sections 6.2–6 – Ibn ‘Arabî makes a comparison between the Names Allah and the All-Merciful. Under a section

called: ‘a secret for the special (people of Allah)’, Ibn ‘Arabî says that the difference between those two Names is like the difference between this Universal Spirit on which Allah mounted (or established His authority) and the Throne on which the All-Merciful mounted (or established His authority). We shall see in section 6.6 that the same comparison can be made between the Single Monad and the Greatest Element. Just as the divine Throne encompasses all the cosmos, everything in the cosmos is related to the Name ‘the All-Merciful’ [II.467.21].

5.4 The metaphysical triplicity (‘trinity’) of the cosmos

According to Ibn ‘Arabî, as we have already mentioned in section 3.6, the divine Names can be grouped into three categories: the Names of Essence (*asmâ’ al-dhât*), Names of Descriptions or Attributes (*asmâ’ al-sifât*) and Names of Actions (*asmâ’ al-af’âl*) [I.423.20, I.67.28, see also *Inshâ’ al-Dawâ’ir*: 22]. Therefore the Universal Intellect or Adamic ‘Perfect Human Being’, who is created ‘according to the Image of the All-Merciful’ [*Kanz*: 1146, 1148, 1149], came out with three faces because he is based on these three unique divine dimensions [I.446.19, II.434.16], although he is in essence one indivisible entity.

That is why Ibn ‘Arabî asserts that (everything in) the cosmos is built on a kind of metaphysical triplicity [III.126.21], and he later explains this further by saying:

So the body is (composed of at least) eight points, just as the knowable (aspects) of the Real are the Essence and the seven Attributes: They are not Him, and They are not other than Him. (Likewise) the body is not other than the points, and the points are not other than the body. Now we only said that eight points are the minimum (required to compose) bodies because the name ‘line’ is for two points or more. And the origin of the plane is from two lines or more, so the plane is from (at least) four points. And the origin of the body is from two planes or more, so the body is from eight points.

Therefore the name (attribute) of ‘length’ is applicable to the body from the line (included in it); the name ‘width’ is applicable to it from the plane; and the name ‘depth’ is applicable to it from the combination of two planes. Thus the body is built on a triplicity (of dimensions: *tathlith*), just as the formation of proofs (in syllogistic logic) is based on a threefold structure, and just as the Source of existence – that is, the Real – only becomes manifest through the bestowing of existence through three realities: His Entity, His willing intention (*tawajjuh*) and His Speaking (the Command ‘Be’). Thus the world became manifest ‘according to the Form’ of the One Who gives it existence, both in sensation (i.e. the visible world) and in (its spiritual dimensions of) meaning.

[III.276.1]

For this reason – i.e. the threefold structures underlying all generative processes – Ibn ‘Arabî emphasizes that we need two elements (subject and object) in order

to produce a result (act) [I.278.14], because ‘from the one alone nothing may be produced’ [III.126.1].

In fact the metaphysical triplicity of subject, object and resulting act is fundamental throughout Ibn ‘Arabî’s cosmology. Thus he summarizes the process of creation by saying that the Universal Intellect (subject or symbolic ‘father’) is writing down in the Universal Soul (the object or ‘mother’) all that Allah wants to create till the Last Day (i.e. the result or ‘son’) [*Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 7–8] (see section 4.3). Indeed Ibn ‘Arabî even wrote a separate treatise dedicated to explaining certain threefold structures of expression and meaning in the Qur’an.¹⁵ It is noteworthy in this regard that the metaphysical concept of triplicity is also fundamental in many other ancient religions and philosophies, including the Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian, Roman, Japanese and Indian.¹⁶

For this reason, Ibn ‘Arabî regards the number three as the first ‘single’ (or odd: *fardî*) number, because he consistently considers that one is not a number (since the Arabic word for ‘number’, *‘adad*, implies multiplicity), while two is the first number. But since the number two is even, nothing may be formed without a third, intermediate principle to link or interface between the one and the two:

So no contingent entity (*mumkin*) has come to exist through one (alone), but only through a plurality (or ‘conjunction’ of elements: *jam’*), and the least of plurals is three.¹⁷ So since the (divine) Name ‘the Singular’ (*al-fard*) is threefold in its effects, He gives to the contingent entity that He brings into existence those three things (i.e. Essence, Will and the creative Command) that He must unavoidably consider, and (only then) He brings (the contingent thing) into existence.

... Therefore this (metaphysical principle of) triplicity runs inwardly through the totality of all things, because it exists in the (divine creative) Source.

[III.126.5]

Now the Universal Intellect is the intermediary reality (also called *barzakh* or ‘connector’) between Allah and the world, and therefore It has two interfaces: It faces Allah from the side of His unity, and It faces the world from the side of His threefold creative dimensions. When It faces Allah (in order to perceive knowledge), It turns away from us (the world), and this is our ‘night’; and when It faces the world, this is our ‘daytime’ or manifest existence. The Perfect Human Being or First Intellect is – according to the famous hadith already discussed above – the ‘Image’ or ‘Form’ of the Real, and likewise the world is the subsequent image of this Perfect Human Being. Hence the manifest world, like the Perfect Human Being, is ‘according to the Image’ of the Real Himself – although without the Perfect Human Being it could not participate in this perfection (see section 3.1). So if we consider the manifest images of the world, we can potentially discover the face of the Perfect Human Being reflected in it, and if we come to know the Perfect Human Being, then we also come to know Allah.

So this is the fundamental ontological triplicity of 'Allah-Human Being-world' or 'Allah-Intellect-world' [I.125–126].

According to Ibn 'Arabî, this fundamental triplicity of Allah-Human Being-world is manifested again within each human being as in our threefold nature as spirit-heart-body. The spirit is the single immaterial and mysterious divine reality that is the principle underlying life and creation, while the body is the place where this creation occurs in many different ways, so it is composed of many different material parts (multiplicity). And the heart is the link between the body and the spirit through which the spirit exerts its effects on the multiplicity of the body. On the other hand, the sensations collected by the body are eventually raised up to the spirit as spiritual (immaterial) meanings and realities.

Another favourite symbolic triplicity for Ibn 'Arabî, deeply rooted in the symbolism of the Qur'an and certain key hadith, is the astronomical triplicity of the Sun–Moon–Earth.¹⁸ The Earth gains its life from the Sun, and when the Sun does not face the Earth from a specific direction, the Moon takes part and reflects the light of the Sun with a degree that is small or large according to its relative place in space. In fact, if one wants to look at the Sun, one is instead obliged to look at the Moon when it is full, because the Sun can not be seen unveiled at all, since it will burn up everything that its direct light falls on. This symbolism is directly connected, for Ibn 'Arabî, with the famous 'hadith of the veils', according to which Allah has 70,000 veils of light and darkness, such that if He removed those veils His light would burn everyone who tried to see Him directly [Kanz: 29846, 39210].

Indeed the trinity of Sun–Moon–Earth particularly well illustrates Ibn 'Arabî's view of the creation and its relation to the Creator. Although the creation by Allah is done 'through' the Universal Intellect, Ibn 'Arabî also emphasizes that Allah also has a *direct*, 'individual face' turned toward every single entity in the world. Similarly the Sun does not only give its light indirectly through the Moon, but also much more directly to the Earth, so everything on Earth is connected with the Sun in the course of the day with different degrees and at different times.

5.5 The oneness of being

The 'oneness of being' (*wahdata al-wujûd*) is one of Ibn 'Arabî's most controversial doctrines which many later Muslim scholars attributed to him, usually with very different (and often more polemic than philosophical) meanings and interpretations. Although Ibn 'Arabî himself never mentioned the precise term '*wahdata al-wujûd*' in his writings,¹⁹ it is quite evident that Ibn 'Arabî's books are full of statements that develop notions related to the oneness of being in one way or another, in many places quite explicitly and rigorously. This is especially the case in his most controversial book, *Fusûs al-Hikam*, for which he was widely criticized, but related discussions are also to be found throughout the *Futûhât* and his other shorter works. Indeed the possible misunderstandings of this conception clearly underpin Ibn 'Arabî's distinctive multi-layered,

intentionally 'scattered' rhetoric and writing style throughout the *Futûhât* and other works, as he explained quite clearly in the key Introduction to the *Futûhât* itself.

The basic ontological issue for Ibn 'Arabî is very clear and simple: in many places throughout his writings, such as the long chapter 198 of the *Futûhât* [II.390–478] he follows the established Avicennan distinction, familiar to all students of Islamic theology and philosophy by his time, in dividing all conceivable things, in terms of existence, into three basic categories (see also section 2.3). There he says:

Know that the matter (of the nature of the reality) is the Real (*al-haqq*) and the creation (*al-khalq*): that is the absolute Existence that has always been and always is (existing); and absolute (contingent) possibility (*imkân*) that has always been and always is (possible to exist); and absolute non-existence that has always been and always is (non-existing). Now the absolute Existence does not accept non-existence, (and that applies) eternally and perpetually. The absolute non-existence does not accept existence, (and likewise that applies) eternally and perpetually. But the absolutely possible does accept existence through an (ontologically determining) cause, and it also accepts non-existence through a cause – and (that contingent ontological status also applies) eternally and perpetually.

So the absolute Existence is Allah, nothing other than Him. The absolute non-existence is the impossible-to-exist, nothing other than it. And the absolutely possible (of existence) is the world, nothing other than it: its (ontological) level is between *the* absolute Existence and absolute non-existence. So in so far as some of it faces non-existence, it accepts non-existence; and in so far as some of it faces Existence, it accepts existence. So some of it is darkness, and that is the Nature. And some of it is light, and that is the 'Breath of the All-Merciful' [that is the 'real-through-whom-creation-takes-place' (*al-haqq al-makhlûq bihi*), see sections 6.3 and 6.5] which bestows existence upon this possible (realm of created beings).²⁰

[II.426.26]

After that Ibn 'Arabî explains the different types of Creation according to this creative Spirit – or the divine Name 'Light', which he often uses as synonymous with the divine creative and existentiating power – is attached to the 'dark', contingent form of the creatures. Then he goes on to give the crucial analysis which clearly explains his profound view of the oneness of being in the most explicit and direct way, based on evident verses in the Qur'an. He says:

So the possible (contingent) existence became manifest between light and darkness, nature and spirit, the unseen and the visible, and the 'veiled' and unveiled. Therefore that which is close to (*waliya*) absolute Existence, from among all that (contingent realm) we have mentioned is light and spirit, and all of what we have mentioned which is close to absolute non-existence is

'shadow' and body – and from the totality (of those different kinds of contingent existent) form (*sûra*: of the whole of creation) comes to be. So when you consider the world from the side of the Breath of the All-Merciful, you say: 'It is nothing but Allah'. But when you consider the world with regard to its being equally balanced and well-proportioned (i.e. between existence and non-existence), then you say these are creations (*makhluqât*). So [in the famous Qur'anic expression of this fundamental ontological reality, addressed to the Prophet]: '*you (Muhammad) did not throw*', inasmuch as you are a creation [so that it is God who was really acting], '*when you did throw*', inasmuch as you are real (*haqq^{am}*), '*but Allah threw*' (8:17), because He is the Real (*al-Haqq*).

For it is through the (divine creative) Breath that the whole world is 'breathing' (animated with life), and the Breath made it appear. So (this creative divine Breath) is inner dimension (*bâtin*) for the Real, and the manifest dimension (*zâhir*) for creation: thus the inner dimension of the Real is the manifest dimension for creation, and the inner dimension of creation is the manifest aspect of the Real – and through their combination the generated existence (*al-kawn*) is actualized, since without that combination it would (only) be said to be Real and creation. Thus the Real is for the absolute Existence, and creation is for the absolutely possible. So what becomes non-existent of the world and its form that disappears is through what is close to the side of non-existence; and what remains of it and does not allow for non-existence is through what is close to the side of Existence. Hence these two things (Existence and non-existence) are continually ruling over the world, so the creation is always new with every Breath, both in this world and in the hereafter.

Therefore the Breath of the All-Merciful is continually directed (toward the Act of creation), and Nature is continually taking on existence as the forms for this Breath, so that the divine Command does not become inactive, because inactivity is not appropriate (for It). So constantly forms are newly appearing and becoming manifest, according to their states of readiness to accept the (divine creative) Breath. And this is the clearest possible (description) of the (divine) origination (*ibdâ'*) of the world. *And Allah says the truth and He shows the way* (33:4).

[II.427.17]

To summarize, therefore, this expression implies that the world can be conceived symbolically as a mixture of light and 'darkness'. For Ibn 'Arabî, this darkness is quite literally nothing: it is simply the absence of light.²¹ Light, on the other hand, is ultimately the Real (via the divine Name 'The Light', *al-nûr*), and the Real is One. So all existence is in essence one. Multiplicity appears through creation as a result of mixing the oneness of light with the darkness of non-existence. In other words, we can say – since darkness is nothing – that the creation is the constantly repeating relative appearance (manifestation) of the Real. The Real manifests most perfectly in the Perfect Human Being, and relatively in

other creatures, and these manifestations happen through the Universal Intellect. So in real existence there is only the Real Who is Allah and this Universal Intellect who is the Messenger of Allah. So there is in fact no ontologically self-subsistent 'evil', since the creation is all good – an aspect of this cosmological conception which, taken out of context, could easily give rise to obvious religious and ethical objections. Hence what we perceive as evil is in reality the absence of good, just as darkness is the absence of light.²²

Thus this is the basic principle, but in order to understand it we need to explain how the mixing between light and darkness is done, which is again to say: 'how is the world created?' – which raises the question of time yet again. Ibn 'Arabî's understanding of this process of creation or cosmogony will be developed further below and in sections 9.7–8.

Given the possible confusions and misunderstandings surrounding this understanding of creation, it is clear why Ibn 'Arabî never declared these ideas in overly simplistic terms in his books, but rather scattered them throughout his writings – as he explains quite explicitly at the very beginning of his *Futûhât* [I.38.25] – so that the common people would not misunderstand them (as indeed happened in later times) and so that only those properly 'prepared' would be able to discover their profound intended meanings.

Moreover, we have to admit that Ibn 'Arabî takes it a courageous step further: although the Universal Intellect, and hence the entire manifest world, is created by Allah, Ibn 'Arabî emphasizes that it also is not 'other than Allah' (*SDK*: 113), because ultimately only Allah has real absolute and necessary (independent) existence [I.194.8], and the world exists by and through Him not by itself. As Chittick has summarized this perspective (*SDK*: 81), if Ibn 'Arabî was asked the question: 'Are the things the same as God?', his answer would be: 'Yes and No'. That is to say, they are, in his own words, 'He/not He' (*Huwa lâ huwa*);²³ or equally, one could say: 'they are not Him, and they are not other than Him' (*Lâ hiya huwa wa lâ hiya ghayruh*).²⁴ For if we say 'Yes' (alone), then this would require us confining Allah, the most Exalted, in objects, which is an obvious misconception. And if we say 'No' (alone), then this would require the assertion of other separate and self-subsistent existents, and this – for Ibn 'Arabî – is also wrong. So the ultimate truth requires combining both ontological views and saying that the things are in essence 'not other than Allah' – although in the forms that we see, they also are not (identical with) Allah. These forms do not have real independent existence, since otherwise Allah would not be 'the One (alone)' (*al-wâhid*) – but He is the One (alone), and the created things exist by and through Him, not by themselves. For Ibn 'Arabî, this is in fact 'the secret of sincerity' (*sirr al-ikhhlâs*), which is also 'the secret of destiny' (*sirr al-qadar*) that makes clear the fundamental distinction between the Creator and the creation, the Eternal and the created – and this secret, he explains, has been hidden from most people [III.182.11].

Chittick goes on to show that, for Ibn 'Arabî, everything in the world is a divine name of Allah (*SDK*: 94); or rather, the things are the manifestations of the Names. From the general Qur'anic verse *O people, you are truly in need of*

Allah (35:15), Ibn ‘Arabî easily concludes that everything (that is a cause, and everything is a cause) is a divine Name, because we are in need of these causes, so they may not be other than Him [I.288.16]. Again we can not say that these secondary and intermediate causes (*asbâb*) are Him – though in their most ultimate essence and Source they are all one, and this one is not other than Him. But of course someone simply hearing such an expression will initially think that they mean that the particular shape or body of the created objects that are the causes: that is why we can not simply stop at saying (as many later Sufi poets sometimes did) that ‘all things are Allah’. Ibn ‘Arabî explained these key ontological distinctions most clearly and extensively in his *Fusûs al-Hikam*, especially in chapter 3 ‘on the wisdom of transcendence (*al-hikma al-subûhiyya*) in the word of Noah’;²⁵ but he also took up this same subject at many places throughout the *Futûhât* [I.90.17, and the extensive references cited in the previous paragraph].

In a similar manner, Ibn ‘Arabî often describes the world of all creation as a kind of ‘mirror’ on which Allah’s Image is reflected [IV.430.1]. If someone looks at the world from the real side of actual existence, then he will see the Image of the Real, Allah the most Glorious; but if he considers the world only from the side of its non-existence (if we suppose this is possible), then he will see an image of the unreal:

Therefore the reason why this (ontological) ‘isthmus’ (*al-barzakh*) – which is the possible (realm of contingent existence) between (pure) non-existence and Existence – is the occasion (*sabab*) for its being attributed both permanence and non-existence, is because it corresponds to both those things by its essence. That is because the absolute non-existence stood up like a mirror for the Absolute Existence, so the (divine) Existence saw His Image in it, so that this Image is the essential reality (‘*ayn*’) of the possible. That is why this ‘possible’ (as the Perfect Human Being or First Intellect) had a permanent individual-essence (‘*ayn thâbita*’) and state of (definable) ‘thingness’ already in the state of its non-existence. And that is why it emerged (in its contingent, created existence) according to the Image of the Absolute Existence. This is also that is why it was also describable as non-finite, so it is referred to as infinite.

But the Absolute Existence is also like a mirror for the absolute non-existence. So the absolute non-existence saw itself in the mirror of the Real, but the image that it saw was itself the essential reality (‘*ayn*’) of non-existence by which this possible (existence) is described. Therefore it is also described as infinite, just as the absolute non-existence is infinite – hence the possible is described as (inherently) non-existing (*ma’dûm*). So it is like the image that appears between the mirror and the person looking in the mirror: that image is not that very person himself, but it is not other than him. Likewise the possible, with respect to as its (very limited kind of) permanence, is not the very essence of the Real Himself; yet it is not other than Him. Similarly, with respect to its (only relative) non-existence, it is not the

same thing as of the (absolutely) impossible, yet it is not entirely other than it. So it is as though it is something relative (depending on how it is viewed).

[III.47.32]

He also says:

If the unreal (non-existence) had a tongue (to speak), it would tell you: 'you are according to my image', because it sees in you nothing but its own shadow, just as the Existence has speech and has said: 'you are (created) according to My Image' [*Kanz*: 1141–1150, and 15129], because He saw in you His own Image.

[IV.154.23]

So the world may not have a constant real (self-subsistent) existence, because only Allah may be described by that; and at the same time the world is not in constant non-existence, or it would not be there at all. Instead it is perpetually fluctuating, at every instant of creation, between existence and non-existence. And in fact, Ibn 'Arabī points out [II.303–304], this is the real meaning of the Qur'anic symbols of the 'daytime' and the 'night': when the Universal Intellect (Allah's Messenger) faces the Real, this would be a kind of 'night' for us, but when the Intellect/Messenger faces us – in each divine Act of creation – this is our manifest day (*shahāda*: what is 'seen' or manifest – see also the related discussions in sections 2.14 and 6.8 [Spreading the Shadows]). What makes sense of this distinction, of course, is Ibn 'Arabī's assertion of the central cosmogonic principle of perpetual re-creation, which we shall discuss next. From that perspective, the world is actually continually created 'in series', bit by bit, one entity at a time; so no two entities may gain real existence at the same time, because they gain their existence only through their constant re-creation by the Real who is One.

For Ibn 'Arabī, this rule or principle of serial creation and re-creation is in fact a direct implication of the verse '*each day He is upon some task*' (55:29); at the same time, it is for him the actual underlying meaning of the familiar philosophical maxim 'from the one there might proceed only', which we discussed in section 5.2. We have seen, however, that for Ibn 'Arabī this creative procedure is not therefore imposed on the Real; rather, it remains His choice which He makes when He creates the world.

We also must remember that this divine oneness manifest in the Act of creation that we can know and observe – which grounds our own experience of reality and the cosmos – is clearly rooted in the Single Monad. Yet this Single Monad (the First Intellect, 'Muhammadan Reality', etc.) is itself but one of an unknown number of divinely 'originated' (*ibdā'*) 'Roaming Spirits' (see section 1.4), so there is indeed some kind of (for us) further unknowable multiplicity on this higher ontological level. However, it would appear that again we can apply the same judgement to those Roaming Spirits, according to our own human

logic, that they may not be ‘other than’ Allah, nor the same as Him (since He originated them): so they also are in this ontological status of ‘He/not He’, which again indicates an ultimate Oneness on the highest divine level.

We have actually already summarized the basic themes of this section right at the end of section 2.1, when we recalled Ibn ‘Arabī’s conclusion that ‘time is defined by motion, and motion is defined by the different positions of the formable monads, and those monads are different states (times or instances) or forms of the Single Monad, that alone has a real existence’. Therefore, ‘there is no god but Allah’ and this highest created entity (i.e. ‘the Single Monad’) is the (all-encompassing) Messenger of Allah. Allah sent this Messenger ‘*to take us* (and the whole created world) *from the darkness*’ of non-existence ‘*into the light*’ of existence (Qur’an 57:9). But although this Single Monad is not Allah, he is not other than Allah: he is some sort of fundamental manifestation of Allah, and it is through this primordial manifestation that Allah can accurately and meaningfully be described, in the famous Qur’anic expression, as ‘*the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden*’ (57:3).

5.6 The principle of ever-renewed creation

Ibn ‘Arabī’s conception of time is profoundly rooted in one of the most famous and distinctive – and uniquely and problematically experiential – features of his world-view, the principle of the ‘ever-renewed creation’ of all the manifest worlds at every instant. Thus he affirms, in a more abstract statement of this perception:

There is no doubt that the ‘accidents’ [i.e. the particular forms taken by creation in all the different levels of existence at each moment] become non-existent in the second instant-of-time after the instant of their coming into existence. So the Real is continuously watching over the world of bodies and the higher and lower (spiritual and imaginal) substances, such that whenever a (particular) form through which they exist becomes nonexistent, He creates at that same instant another form like it or opposed to it, which (new creation) preserves it from non-existence at every instant. So He is continuously creating, and the world is continuously in need of Him.

[II.208.27]

He also makes it clear that this continuously renewed ‘return to non-existence’ is an intrinsic condition of all the created forms, and not due to any external force [II.385.4]. Typically Ibn ‘Arabī relates this fundamental insight to the Qur’anic verse: ‘*but they are unaware of the new creation (khalq jadīd)*’ (50:15), which he frequently quotes²⁶ – along with the famous verse concerning the ‘Day of the divine Task’ (55:29) that he cites in relation to his intimately related concept of the quantization of time.

Therefore the existence of things in the world is not continuous, as we imagine and observe, because Allah is continuously and perpetually creating

every thing whatsoever – at every level and domain of existence – at every instant, or in every single ‘Day of event’ [II.454.21, II.384.30]. This means that, just as time (for Ibn ‘Arabî) may exist only at one atomic instant at a time, so also space (and whatever it may contain) also exists only one instant at a time. In fact there is no difference between space and time: they are both containers for events (see section 2.1 and 3.6).

We have already seen in previous chapters that, according to this principle of ever-renewed creation, Ibn ‘Arabî explains motion (section 2.6) in a new unique and unprecedented manner, and he also explains the ‘intertwining’ of days (section 4.4) as well as some other related philosophical and theological concepts. Indeed this hypothetical (though Ibn ‘Arabî affirmed it through unveiling) principle forms the basis of Ibn ‘Arabî’s overall view of the world, and we shall use it as one of three key hypotheses in the following chapter in which we explain his Single Monad model of the cosmos.

Of course this re-creation must be happening at extraordinarily high ‘rates of refreshment’, but Ibn ‘Arabî has no difficulty in finding scriptural allusions and theological and other arguments supporting this distinctive conception, in addition to the direct experiential evidence of the spiritual ‘knowers’ (*‘urafâ*). He says:

The form becomes non-existent in the next instant-of-time after the time of its coming into existence, so the Real is always Creator, and the monad (substance, *jawhar*) is always in need (of the Creator for its existence). For if the form would remain (for two instants of time or longer), those two principles would not hold. But this is impossible [at least theologically speaking, since otherwise the creatures would be independent of Allah, whereas only Allah maybe described as (completely) Self-sufficient (*al-Ghanî*), while everything created has the essential intrinsic quality of ontological ‘poverty’ (*faqr*) or need of the Creator for its very existence], so it is impossible for the (created) form to remain for two instants of time (or longer).

(*Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya*: 55)

So from the theological point of view, neither the forms nor the essences of the created world may remain (constant) for more than one moment because if they do they would be independent of the Creator – whereas both the essence and the ‘accidents’ or form of the creatures are always in need of their Creator. The essence needs ever-renewed forms because it exists only when it wears a form; and the form does not stay the same, because, if it did so, the Real would not be Perpetually-Creating (*Khallâq*), and the individual form would be at least partly independent of the Real.

In addition, Ibn ‘Arabî argues in similar theological terms that there are never any two truly identical forms, since otherwise Allah will not be described as ‘the Infinitely Vast’ (*al-Wâsi’*). But because of this unique divine Vastness (*al-ittisâ’ al-ilâhî*) [I.266.8], the monad will never wear two identical forms: i.e. it never wears exactly the same form for more than one instant; nothing is ever truly

repeated [I.721.22]. The new forms, he admits, are often ‘similar’ to the previous ones but they are not the ‘same’ [II.372.21, III.127.24]. Ibn ‘Arabî summarized this argument as follows:

The world at every instant of time (*zamân fard*) is re-formed (*takawwun*) and disintegrated. So the individual entity of the substance of the world (*‘ayn jawhar al-‘alam*) has no persistence (in existence) except through its receiving of this formation (*takwîn*) within it. Therefore the world is in a state of needfulness perpetually: either the forms are in need (of a creator) to bring them forth from non-existence into existence; or else the substance [*jawhar*: i.e. the substrate for the created ‘forms’ or ‘accidents’] is in need to preserve its existence, because unavoidably a condition for its existence is the existence of the formation of those (newly re-created forms) for which it is a substrate.

[II.454.19]

Elsewhere Ibn ‘Arabî gives a very short statement of this general ontological argument which is rather difficult to follow. There he says:

The doer (*al-fâ’il*) may not do nothing (although we use this expression widely in our daily language, but it is logical nonsense to say ‘do nothing’), and the thing may not become non-existent (simply) by its opposite, because (the thing and its opposite) may not meet, and (also) because the opposite does not exist (at that same time) . . . So that is why we said that (the form) becomes non-existent by itself (not through an external force or action) and is impossible to remain (in existence for two moments or longer).

(*Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya*: 55, see also I.39.8)

Ibn ‘Arabî also made the same basic arguments near the beginning of the *Futûhât*, through the tongue of a mysterious ‘western Imâm’ who summarizes in an extremely condensed form – usually using rhymed prose and the language and terminology of kalam theology – a series of challenging ontological premises subscribed to by those who have moved beyond the simple creed of the common believers, which forms the second of the four levels of faith that Ibn ‘Arabî explained at the beginning of the *Futûhât*, and the mysterious speaker’s remarks in this section are roughly based on al-Ghazâlî’s intentionally popular kalam treatise *Al-Iqtisâd fî Al-‘Itiqâd*:

(4) Then he said: ‘Whatever individual entity (is said to) appear, but which does not give rise to any (distinctive) quality, then its existence is obviously impossible, since it does not give rise to any knowledge (as would be the case with anything that actually exists).’

(5) Then he said: ‘And it is impossible for it to fill different places, because its travelling (from one place to another) would be in the second instant of time of the time of its existence in itself, but it does not continue

to reside (over two instants). And if it were possible for it to move by itself, then it would be self-subsistent and would have no need of place. Nor does (the advent of) its opposite make it cease to exist, because it (the opposite) does not exist (at the same time in the same place). Nor does (another) doer ('make it into nothing'), because although people do use the expression 'doing nothing', no intelligent person maintains that (is possible).

[I.39.7]

These statements are based on two issues: (1) the forms in the worlds of manifestation may not remain longer than a single instant of time, since otherwise they would be independent and self-subsistent; and (2) the created forms intrinsically return to non-existence after every instant. Otherwise they would either be brought into non-existence by the existence of their opposite (which can not exist at the same time and place, and therefore itself has to be newly created), or by another doer who 'makes them non-existent', which is also not logical, because it is nonsense to take literally the expression 'do nothing', where the result of an action is pure non-existence.

Something verbally resembling this notion of the 're-creation' or the perpetual 'recurrence of creation' had earlier been employed by the kalam scholars (MacEy 1994: 47, MacDonald 1927: 326–344) and particularly the Ash'arites who, like Ibn 'Arabī, maintained that the world is composed of substances and accidents (Corbin 1969: 203, Wolfson 1976: 466–517), or monads (substances: *jawhar*) and their forms or 'accidents' ('*arad*'). Ibn 'Arabī acknowledged their contribution – and certainly borrowed much of their theological language, giving it his own distinctive meanings – but he also took it a very important step further by saying that even those existing monads are only copies or reflections of the Single Monad or Substance that alone has a real existence [III.404.25, *Al-Masā'il*: 32]. Therefore, all the forms and monads in all the worlds are continuously and perpetually created and re-created by this Single Monad. Understanding the world therefore requires us to explain and understand how this Single Monad creates the monads and the forms, or in other words how to link the unique oneness of the Creator and the observable multiplicity of the world.

We shall also see in section 7.6 that with the re-creation principle one can easily resolve the standard EPR criticism of the (apparent) inconsistency between Quantum Theory and the theory of Relativity, which arises from our inadequate understanding of the nature of time.

6 The Single Monad model of the cosmos

The cosmos is only imagined, though it is – in reality – real.

And the only one who understands this fact has surely accomplished all the secrets of the path.

(*Fusûs*: 157)

*The knowings of the Real are not hidden from anyone,
except for someone who does not know the One/one.¹*

[IV.181.31]

For Ibn ‘Arabî, a true understanding of time is the key to realizing and understanding the origin and structure of the world, by providing the link between its ultimate unity and apparent multiplicity. In this chapter we shall outline an integrated cosmological model based on Ibn ‘Arabî’s view of the oneness of being explained in Chapter 5, together with his understanding of the flow of time as explained in Chapter 4 and his unique view of creation in the Week as explained in Chapter 3. We shall call this model the ‘Single Monad model’. Under this model, Ibn ‘Arabî views the entire created world, both spiritual and manifest, as imaginal forms perpetually re-created by the Single Monad (*al-jawhar al-fard*) (*Al-Mu’jam Al-Sûfi*: 297), which alone has real existence. This Monad continuously and perpetually appears in different forms creating the phenomena of the visible and invisible worlds.

6.1 The three hypotheses

The Single Monad model can be summarized in the following three hypotheses – although, to be sure, Ibn ‘Arabî himself presents these concepts primarily not as the subjects of philosophical or theological arguments, but rather as the symbolic expression of the actual metaphysical realities directly perceived by himself and many other realized ‘Knowers’ (‘*urafâ*’, *muhaqqiqûn*, *ahl Allâh* and so on) through the processes of inspired ‘unveiling’

6.1.1 The Single Monad

There is only one *Single Monad* that can be said to have a real existence at any given time. This Monad creates other monads by manifesting different forms ('imaging Itself') to make a comprehensive 'still picture' of the entire cosmos. This still picture is created in one full Week of the original creative Days (of events), but this creative process is equivalent only to one single moment (the 'atom of time') for an observer inside the cosmos. Thus the observed cosmos is the eternally renewed succession of these still pictures made up by the Single Monad. The Monad – discussed in detail in the following sections – is an indivisible reality, but it is still itself a compound made up by the 'Greatest Element' that is the only real ultimate substance in existence.

6.1.2 The re-creation principle

The forms of manifestation cease to exist intrinsically right after the instant of their creation, and then they are re-created again by the Single Monad in every original creative 'Week' (i.e. at every moment). As discussed in sections 3.6 and 5.6, this perpetual re-creation happens in the 'six Days' of creation from Sunday to Friday, which accounts for the three dimensions of space. But we do not witness this creation process as such; instead we witness only the created world on the 'last Day' of Saturday. So the seven Days of the divine Week are in all one point of space-time (Days 6 to 1) which then – by repeating manifestations – manifests the space-time container (i.e. 'the Age', as discussed in section 2.19) which encompasses the world both spatially and temporally.

6.1.3 The actual flow of time

Since the world takes seven Days to be created by the Single Monad, which manifests the forms of the monads one by one in specific order, any observer would have to wait – somehow out of existence – six Days (from Sunday to Friday) in order to witness the next moment of creation (i.e. the next 'still picture') on the following Saturday. But of course we do not perceive all this, but rather experience it as a single infinitesimal moment. In each Day of these Days of creation, a corresponding dimension of the world is created. Therefore, the real flow of the actual created time does not go linearly, but rather is intertwined with the observable, normal earthly days in the special – and admittedly rather mystifying – manner that we have summarized in section 4.4, along with Ibn 'Arabi's account of the way in which the observable earthly daytimes and nights are 'taken out' of each other and separated by three daytimes and three nights in order to form the three-dimensional space that we experience.

6.2 The Single Monad

Borrowing his language from the atomist physical theories of earlier kalam theology, Ibn 'Arabi sometimes refers to the created world as being made up of

monads and *forms*, or in his technical language, of ‘substances’ (*jawâhir*, s. *jawhar*) and various changing ‘accidents’ (*ʿarâd*, s. *ʿarad*) that inhere in and qualify those substances. In the process of manifestation, the substances appear to remain relatively constant, while the accidents do not stay for more than one moment. In this terminology, the ‘monad’ or substance (*al-jawhar*) is – as will be discussed shortly – a physical or metaphysical entity that exists by itself, whereas the ‘form’ or accident (*al-ʿarad*) exists only through or by some particular monad. The monad, however, may appear in existence only by ‘wearing’ some form or another [II.179.26], so we do not see the monads but rather only the forms. Also Ibn ʿArabî asserts that the monad exists by itself and its existence is constant and invariable, while the form exists only in the monad and its existence is temporal; it exists only at the time and then it vanishes instantly and intrinsically, and the same never comes back to existence again [II.677.30, III.452.24].

Generally *jawhar* signifies everything that exists in reality. Literally it originally meant ‘jewel’, but, in this technical sense borrowed from the physical theory of kalam theology, it means ‘substance’. In a very different philosophical context, the same Arabic word was used to translate the first of the ten Aristotelian categories already discussed in section 2.1. In English, the word ‘monad’ – which we will regularly use here for *jawhar* – is derived from the Greek *monados*, and it means ‘ultimate, indivisible unit’. It was used very early by the Greek philosophers of the doctrines of Pythagoras, and it was also used later, in a very different way, by the Neoplatonists to signify the One: thus God is described as the ‘Monad of monads’.²

Like the Neoplatonists, Ibn ʿArabî sometimes uses the term *al-jawhar* (monad) in this higher theological sense to refer to ‘the one’, ‘the essence’, ‘the real’ (not ‘the Real’ as a divine Name of God, but ‘the real-through-whom-creation-takes-place’, as discussed further below) and the origin of everything in the world. However, in such cases he does not seem to refer directly to the highest, transcendent dimension of ‘God’, but rather to the ‘Universal/First Intellect’ or the ‘Pen’ [II.675.6], who is also the ‘Perfect Human Being’.

On the other hand, although in this theological or cosmological sense the term *al-jawhar* ordinarily refers to the one real essence of the world (of all creation), Ibn ʿArabî also sometimes uses the same term in the plural form (*jawâhir*) to refer to the essences or souls/spirits (*al-nufûs al-nâtiqa*) – or more precisely, to the ‘partial intellects’ (*al-ʿuqûl al-juzʿiyya*, in contrast with the Universal Intellect, *al-ʿaql al-kullî*, that is their origin) – of human beings who are the perceivers of the world. Even more generally, he sometimes uses it to refer to any entity (even inanimate ones) in the creation, whether angels, jinn, humans, animals, plants or metals. In this latter more generic sense he considers that everything in creation has a substance which is its monad (*jawhar*) and a particular form (*ʿarad*) which is its appearance.

These very different dimensions and usages of the term ‘monad’/*jawhar*, however, are also intrinsically linked in Ibn ʿArabî’s cosmology, since he argues that all the monads of the world are created by, and are therefore the ‘images’ (reflections, shadows etc.) of the one Single Monad. Thus in that larger perspec-

tive of creation, they are nothing but different images of this one Single Monad that in reality may alone be described as having real existence [III.452.24].

6.3 The different names of the Single Monad

As we mentioned above, this Single Monad (*al-jawhar al-fard*) is the Universal Intellect itself and also the Pen. It also has different names or descriptions as Ibn ‘Arabî summarized in his book *Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ (The White Pearl)* in which he discussed many names and descriptions of the First Intellect and the title of the book itself is one interesting variant. Also Ibn ‘Arabî spent much of the first chapter in his book *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya* on explaining the different names and properties of this Universal Intellect that is the true Caliph (*Khalîfa*). There is, however, some confusion between the Greatest Element that we shall talk about shortly and the Single Monad; sometimes it is not very clear for some of these many variant names whether they are really for the Single Monad or the Greatest Element.

One of these names is ‘the real through whom creation takes place’ and William Chittick devoted a full section in *SPK* to talk about it (*SPK*: 132). This real-through-whom-creation-takes-place is the most perfect image of the Real Allah, the Creator of the world. That is why he is also called ‘the Perfect Human Being’. We do not want to repeat here what Chittick said in *SPK*, but we just want to stress that we should not mix the Real and the real-through-whom-creation-takes-place because they may be confused in Ibn ‘Arabî’s writings. In this book ‘the Real’, with capital, is used for the divine Name of Allah (*al-haqq*), while ‘the real’, with small letter, is used for the real-through-whom-creation-takes-place. But this name actually describes the Greatest Element rather than the Single Monad, because the latter is compound while the Greatest Element is the most elementary ‘block’ in the world as we shall see shortly. Everything in the Creation at the end is rooted in the real, just as the leaves (and the fruits etc.) of a tree are rooted in the stalk. The leaves were also ‘determined’ in the seed that gave this tree even before it was planted. So the Single Monad is like the seed for *the tree of the cosmos*,³ while the real-through-whom-creation-takes-place (i.e. the Greatest Element) is what makes up the seed down to the cells, atoms and subatomic particles inside it.

In chapter 364 of the *Futûhât* Ibn ‘Arabî talks about how the entities heard the divine Command in their state of pre-existence and he affirms again what we have mentioned in section 2.3 that for Allah nothing was introduced after His creating the world; only the world moved from determination into existence and from immutable hearing (*sam’ thubûti*) into actual hearing (*sam’ wujûdi*). But most importantly, he shows in the following passage that there is in fact only one single entity that has a necessary immutable essence and that is the Perfect Human Being:

For Allah everything of His servants is still with Him in effect (*bil-fî’l*), nothing is with Him in reality (*bil-quwwa*). So the divine designation came

to him (the servant) with regard to the acts and the states that Allah has with him so that he shall remember with his intelligence what he has already witnessed of his Lord when he was still non-existing – since he had the immutability which made him accept the divine disposition in him, and this state of immutability made him obey the Real's Command regarding the existence because the Command may come only on that who is described by hearing.

So the divine Saying (Command) is still (as It is) and the immutable hearing is still (as it was), but what occurred is only the actual hearing that is like a branch of the immutable hearing. So the state changed on the essence of hearing but the (essence of) hearing did not change, because the essences do not change from one state to another, but the states give them rules so they wear them. But that who has no knowledge imagines that the essence changed. But (the fact is that) the states seek the divine Names and not that the essences are described by seeking. And the essences gain names and descriptions according to the rules of (those) states that change over them. And without the states, the essences would not be distinguished because (in reality) there is only one essence that was distinguished with its entity from the Necessarily Existent (*wājib al-wujūd*) just as it was described like Him with necessary immutability. So He, the Exalted, has the Necessary Existence and Immutability, and to this essence (only) the necessary immutability. So the states for this essence are like the divine Names for the Real. So just as the Names of the Essence do not multiply the Named nor make Him many, so the states for this essence do not make him multiple or many, despite the rationality of the multiplicity and manyness of the Names and the states. And by this (similarity) it was true for this essence to be described as being on the (divine) Image.

[III.313.35–314.10]

Therefore, in reality, there is only this entity that is the essence of the Perfect Human Being, and the world is the different states of this single entity. As we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (and also in section 2.1 when we introduced Ibn 'Arabī's view of time, and also at the end of section 5.5 when we discussed the oneness of being), this single entity is the Single Monad, and the essences (i.e. the monads) of the world are different reflections of this Single Monad.

Another important name of the Single Monad is the Universal Spirit (*al-rūh al-kullī*), and Ibn 'Arabī shows that he deserves this name because he goes (v. *rāha*, *yarūh*) in the states of the world:

And this name is to him from two aspects: the first is for his being a spirit, i.e. in ease, happiness and rest (*rāha* p.p. of *yastarīh*; to rest or to relieve) owing to his knowledge of his Lord and his witnessing Him. And the second is that he went (*rāha* past tense of *yarūh*; to go) through the capacious orbs of the knowledge of his Creator, by a special force. And he went through the

states of the cosmos to give out to them what Allah entrusted him. And he went through his knowing himself by his need to his Lord and his Creator.

So he has three goings (*rawahât*),⁴ so he may be called ‘Universal (*kullî*)’ Spirit because there is no fourth state other than those to go through. So it is like the imperative (tense) of ‘*râha*’ (رَاحَ: went), ‘*yarûhu*’ (يَرُوحُ: the past participle, to go) and the imperative is ‘*ruh*’ (رُوح: go!); and when it was transformed from the imperative to the noun, the ‘*wâw*’ was returned to it as also the ‘*alif*’ and ‘*lâm*’ (the definitive article) was added, because the omitting of ‘*wâw*’ from it was due to the meeting of the two consonants.⁵ So it is like: he was sought from one direction then it is said that he has gone (*râha*), as we said.

(*Al-Durraṭ Al-Bayḍâ*: 135)

Yet another interesting name of this Single Monad is ‘Everything (*kulla shay*)’!⁶ This name is interesting because Ibn ‘Arabî says in *Al-Masâ’il* that ‘in everything there is everything (*kulla shay’in fihi kullu shay*)’, even if you do not recognize that’ [*Al-Masâ’il*: 58]. This is on the one hand another expression of his Single Monad theory because it renders into: ‘the Single Monad is in everything’. But also it might mean that the internal structure of the Single Monad is as complicated as the world itself because it means: ‘in everything (even the Single Monad) there is everything (even the world)!’ This last statement is plausible since both the Single Monad (i.e. the Perfect Human Being) and the world are on the divine Image as we have seen before (section 3.2). This reminds us in mathematics with fractals such as the Mandelbrot set, Julia set and Sierpinski triangle, where the structure keeps repeating itself on any larger or smaller scale (Mandelbrot and Frame 2002: 37, Stewart *et al.* 2004: 60). This deserves a separate study, but we just want to mention here that this might answer the question we put forward in section 2.16 about the structure of the moment and whether it is divided into sub-moments. We said there that the moment could be indeed identical to the day where the Sun rises, moves gradually in the sky and then sets to rise again on the next day; as the Single Monad might be identical with the world, the moment might be identical with the day. It just depends on the scale we are using; if we were inside the Single Monad we might see creations such as the Sun, planets and the stars, but because we are outside we see it as a point. Also if we suppose we go outside the world, we shall see it as a point; that is – as the Single Monad – indivisible but compound. This also has its example in modern cosmology as the black hole which occupies a single point in our space but itself is considered a complete world.⁷

6.4 The structure of the monad

At the beginning of the first chapter of *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya*, Ibn ‘Arabî says: ‘The first existent originated by Allah is a simple spiritual Single Monad, embodied according to some doctrines and not-embodied according to others’ (*Tadbîrât*: 87).

As this remark indicates, Ibn ‘Arabî was well aware that there has long been a debate amongst philosophers whether the monad is a physical or metaphysical entity, or whether it is embodied or not [see also I.47.22]. Although he mostly prefers the second choice (*Al-Durraṭ Al-Baydâ’*: 134), Ibn ‘Arabî sometimes does not rule out either case, perhaps because the argument should be meaningless – i.e. the reality must necessarily encompass all manifestations of creation, both spiritual and manifest – if we recall that there is in reality only one Single Monad. Many times, though, he affirms that the Single Monad is embodied and indivisible, especially when the manifest world is concerned [II.438.2]. On the other hand, the essences of the spirits and souls are not likely to be embodied [II.309.25], though both (the manifest and spiritual) are only reflections of the Single Monad that itself can be described neither as (solely) physical nor as metaphysical, because it is necessarily the whole of creation. In the very long chapter 198 of the *Futûḥât*, in which Ibn ‘Arabî talks in detail about the various aspects of divine creation, he summarizes the various divisions or types of physical and metaphysical entities. He also states the difference between the essences (monads) and their accidents (forms). This is shown in the following long passage in which Ibn ‘Arabî also shows the basis of the Single Monad model, while pointing out the difference between the approaches of the Sufis and of the philosophers that we discussed at the beginning of Chapter 5. There he says:

Now you must know that every knowable thing that may be classified must unavoidably enter into (the category of) what exists in thought (*wujûd dhiḥnî*). But this thing that exists in thought may belong either to what can receive real existence (*wujûd ‘aynî*); or to what may not receive real existence, like the things that are impossible (*al-muhâl*). And that which can receive real existence either subsists by itself, which is called ‘not-in-a-substrate’ (*lâ-fî-mawḏû’*) or else it does not (subsist by itself). And that which subsists by itself is either embodied (or more strictly speaking, ‘localized in a place’, *mutahayyiz*), or not embodied.

As for that (self-subsistent reality) which is classified as not-in-a-substrate and not embodied, it must necessarily be either what necessarily exists by its own essence (*wâjib al-wujûd li-dhâtihî*), and He is Allah the Exalted; or what necessarily exists through (the determination by) something other than itself, and that is what is contingent (*al-mumkin*: i.e. the whole created world). And this (category of what is) contingent is either embodied (in-a-place), or not embodied. As for the division among the contingent things of what is self-subsistent, that is either not embodied – like the rational souls (*al-nufûs al-nâtiqa al-mudabbira*) that govern the substance of the (spiritual) world of Light, the natural world, and the elemental world, or else (the self-subsistent contingent things) that are embodied are either compound with parts, or without parts. So if it has no parts, it is the (simplest) ‘Single Monad’;⁸ and, if it has parts, it is a (natural, elemental) body (*jism*).

As for the category (of knowable things) that are in a substrate which are not self-subsistent and embodied – except by way of being dependent (on

their substrate), members of this category are either necessary concomitants of their substrate, or they are not (necessary concomitants). Or rather, that is how it seems to ordinary vision, since in the fact of the matter nothing that does not subsist by itself (i.e. everything but the Creator) actually continues (in existence) for more than the instant of its existence; it may either be followed by (new creations that are) similar (*amthâl*), or by that which is not similar to it. As for what is followed by (new creations that are) similar, that is what are imagined to be the 'necessary concomitants' of a thing, like the yellowness of gold or the blackness of ebony. As for (those characteristics) which are not followed by similars, they are called 'accidents' (*al-'arâd*), while the necessary concomitant is called an (inherent) attribute (*sifa*).

So the knowable things that have actual existence are not more than those we have mentioned.

Now you must know that the world is one in substance and many in form (appearance). So since it is one in substance, it does not transmute (from one thing into another entirely different one: *lâ yastahîl*). And also the form itself is not transmuted, since otherwise this would lead to 'reversing the realities' (*qalb al-haqâ'iq*) – for heat may not (at the same time) be coldness, dryness may not be wetness, whiteness may not be blackness, and the triangle may not be square. But something that is hot can come to exist as cold, though *not* at the same time when it is hot; and also what is cold can come to exist as hot, but not in the same time when it is cold. Likewise what is white may become black, and the triangle may become a square.

So there is no transmutation (*lâ istihâla*), but the earth, water, air, the (celestial) orbs (*al-aflâk*) and all the generated existents (of the sublunar world: *al-muwalladât*) are (only) forms in the (Single) Monad. So (certain) forms are bestowed upon it and that (process of bestowing forms) is called, with respect to their specific shape (*hay'a*) 'generation' (*kawn*). Or (certain) forms are taken off of so that a (particular) name (i.e. attribute or property) is removed, and that is (called) 'corruption' (*fasâd*). So in fact there is no transmutation, in the sense that the actual entity of a thing changes into another (entirely different) actual entity, but it is only (by an entirely new re-creation) as we have explained.

So the world is continually being generated and corrupted (destroyed) at every single instant of time (*zamân fard*). And there would be no persistence for the actual entity of the substance (Monad) of the world, were it not for its receptivity to this 'creative formation' (*takwîn*) in itself. So the world is always continually in need (*faqr*: of the divine creative force). As for the forms, they are in need (of Allah's creation) in order to come out from non-existence into existence. And as for the Monad, it (is in need) of preserving its existence through that (creative Act), because its existence is unavoidably conditioned upon the existence of the creative formation of that (i.e. the infinite forms) for which it is a substrate.

Likewise (with the dependency on the Creator) of the (purely spiritual) self-subsistent contingent (existent) that is not embodied: it is (still) the

substrate for the spiritual attributes and perceptions that it supports, so that its own individual reality may not continue without them. But those spiritual attributes and perceptions are continually renewed in that (spiritual existent) just like the accidents (forms) are continually renewed in the bodies.

In the same way the contingent that exists by itself and is not embodied is the substrate of what it carries of spiritual descriptions and perceptions (that is the bearer of meanings) that its essence may not remain without them. And they are renewed on it just like the renewal (i.e. re-creation) of the forms in the bodies; the image of the body is a form in the monad but the terms (*hudūd*: by which the object is described) are related to the images (of the body, not to the body itself). So the images are the ones which are termed (*mahdūda*), and one of these terms is the monad in which these images appear. That is why they (the philosophers) call the images monad(s) because they take the monad in the term of the image.

This is possibly the main barrier that prevents us from witnessing the reality of the world; we always try to assign an image to every concept, and then we discuss the terms of this image such as its shape, colour, size . . . etc. The Single Monad, however, may not be captured into image, not to mention the Real Himself. Therefore, approaching these matters in any way other than the path of (experiential) divine unveiling will not lead one to the truth of the matter as it really is. No wonder that they (those who rely on their own unaided theorizing) never cease to be in disagreement (about this). That is why the group of the blessed, who are supported by the Holy Spirit, turned to purifying themselves from their own thinking, and to liberating themselves from the bonds of their (natural, animal) forces, so that they became connected with the Greatest Light and saw for themselves (the reality of) the matter as it really is in itself! Because the Real – may He be cherished and glorified – *is* their vision [*Kanz*: 21327], so all what they see is the Real (Chittick 2002: 116–124). As the righteous one (Abū Bakr al-Siddīq) said: ‘I have seen nothing but I have seen Allah before it.’ So he sees the Real, then he sees His effect in the world; that is to witness how the world emerged as if he witnessed the possible things in their determination state when (Allah) threw what He has thrown on them from His greatest light so they became described by existence after they were described by non-existence [*Kanz*: 548, 1314]. So this (person), who has got this state, the veil of blindness and misleading has been removed for him: ‘*now We removed thy veil, and sharp is thy sight this day!*’ (50:22), ‘*Lo! therein verily is a reminder for him who hath a heart*’ (not only an intellect, see also section 5.1), ‘*or gives an ear and he is witnessing (the truth)*’ (50:37). So (Allah) made knowledge available in witnessing, because the judge judges based on his best guess while the witness witnesses with knowledge not by guessing.

[II.454.1]

According to this passage, Figure 6.1 summarizes the different types of things in existence.




Figure 6.1 Summary of the different types of knowable things.

Also in his *Inshâ' al-Dawâ'ir* (*Constructing the Circles*), Ibn 'Arabi explains the different categories or types of existence in the same way, which he represents schematically in Figure 6.2.

6.5 The greatest element

As we have seen above, although for Ibn 'Arabi the monad or atom (*jawhar fard*) is an indivisible physical unit, it is understood to be composed of even more elementary constituents. This means that there are smaller – but not necessarily physical – 'constituents' that somehow underlie and help manifest the atoms or monads, even though the monad itself is not physically divisible into those metaphysical constituents, but can only exist in manifestation as a substance created through those underlying constituents. So what are these ultimate constituents of the Single Monad?

In his book *'Uqlat al-Mustawfiz* (*The Bolt for the Restless*), Ibn 'Arabi speaks about the 'Greatest Element' (*al-'unsûr al-a'zam*) from which Allah has created the 'Absolute Unseen' which may not be disclosed to any creature, and he indicates there that the creation or 'origination' of this Greatest Element is all at once, without any intermediate or associated causes, as we have seen in section 2.16 (see also *'Uqlat al-Mustawfiz*: 38). So this original, metaphysical 'Greatest Element' that is in some mysterious way the substrate of all subsequent manifest creation – whether purely spiritual, imaginal or physical – is the only thing that in some way underlies, constitutes, or gives rise to the physical monads. The individual monad or atom, however, remains the basic indivisible structure in the physically manifest world.




Figure 6.2 The Different Divisions of Existence (source: from *Inshâ' al-Dawâ'ir*, page 19).

Note

The numbers 0 and 1 in the inside circle describe whether the corresponding division is localized (1) or not localized (0); and (second number) whether it is self-subsistent (1) or not self-subsistent (0). The spirit is self-subsistent but not localized, while colour is localized and not self-subsistent.

In the *'Uqlat al-Mustawfiz*, Ibn 'Arabî also mentions that there are 46,656,000 subtle luminous links (*raqâ'iq nûraniyya*) between the First Intellect and the Greatest Element that is their origin (*'Uqlat al-Mustawfiz*: 40). That number is in fact the cubic power of 360 ($360^3 = 46,656,000$), which is no doubt symbolically associated with the traditional division of the circle (and the divine year, see section 3.2) into 360 degrees and the historical sexagenary system attributed to the Babylonians (see also section 4.7).

Now the resulting relation between the manifest world, the Single Monad (First Intellect) and the Greatest Element can be conceived by analogy to the relation between a building, the bricks and the clay: i.e. the building is made up of similar unit bricks, but the brick itself is made from fine clay. Ibn 'Arabî also says:

the noble Greatest Element is in relation to the sphere of the world like the (indivisible) point, and the Pen is like its circumference, while the Tablet (i.e. the world-Soul) is what is in between (the point and the circumference). So just as the point meets the circumference with its (whole) entity, so does this Greatest Element meet with its (whole) entity all the aspects of the Intellect, which are the subtle links (the 46,665,000 *raqâ'iq*) that we mentioned before. They are unique 'one' in the Greatest Element, but in the Intellect they become multiple and manifold, because of the manifold receptivity (of the Intellect for knowledge) from the Greatest Element. So there is (only) one 'close attention' (*iltifâta*) for the (Greatest) Element, but there are many faces of receptivity for the Intellect, that is why this (Greatest) Element is more realized in the unity of Its Creator.⁹

Ibn 'Arabî affirms that this Greatest Element is the most perfect thing in existence and that everything other than Allah (including, as we can see, the First Intellect) is somehow derived from it. However, he does not give much information about It, and he even says that he would explain the reality of this Element if he was not sworn not to disclose it. However, does explain, as we have just seen, that this Greatest Element has a special attention (*iltifâta*, like the divine 'special Face' discussed in section 5.2) to the metaphysical 'world of writing and recording' (*'âlam al-tadwîn wal-tastîr*), when the (manifest, including physical) world was still not yet existing in reality (but only in Allah's foreknowledge), and that Allah created the First Intellect (that is the Single Monad) through this special attention (*'Uqlat al-Mustawfîz*: 39).

In the summary cosmological chapter 60 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî alludes more symbolically, in a metaphysical exegesis of Qur'an 68:1 (*'Nûn and the Pen, and what they are recording ...*), to the 'Greatest Element' when he speaks of the mysterious figure of '*Nûn*' whom Allah appointed as the divine 'chamberlain' (*al-hâjib*) and gave all His Knowledge of His creation, so that Allah – with regard to His Name 'the All-Knower' – never hides from the *Nûn*. And Allah appointed another angel, the Pen – who is the Single Monad/First Intellect/Perfect Human Being – as the 'scribe' for the *Nûn*, 'writing out' all of the divine Knowledge of His creation [I.294.33].

6.6 Analogies in the macrocosms

For Ibn 'Arabî, of course, the mysterious metaphysical relations between the ultimate macrocosmic constituents of creation are repeatedly mirrored in many different 'microcosmic' dimensions of our own life. In each of these different symbolic domains, the initial creation of this higher world and the relation between its elements, such as the First Intellect and the Greatest Element, is subsequently reflected on many different lower planes of existence.

6.6.1 *The Black Stone and the Kaaba*

The most visible example of Ibn ‘Arabî’s development of this cosmological symbolism in the *Futûhât* involves the Kaaba, the ‘house of Allah’ to which millions of Muslims now go on pilgrimage every year. For Ibn ‘Arabî, those circumambulating the Kaaba are mirroring the circles of higher angels surrounding the divine Throne [I.50.30]. In that symbolic context, the angels also represent the determining forces of the universal Nature (*Al-Durratu Al-Baydâ’*: 138; we shall come back to this later in section 7.10) and the four Archangels who carry the Throne of Allah are the four main sustaining forces of that Nature.

This centrality of the symbolism of the Kaaba is of course rooted in the fact that Ibn ‘Arabî started the first chapter of his *Futûhât* by mentioning his encounter with the Spirit from whom he took all that he wrote in this book, a Spirit whom he met while circumambulating the Kaaba. There Ibn ‘Arabî establishes a symbolic correlation the seven circles of *tawâf* that the pilgrim is obliged to perform around the Kaaba during the pilgrimage and the seven main divine Names, in the manner already mentioned in Chapter 3: i.e. each one of these seven Names is responsible for one specific Day of the divine Week of creation. Then he says that his Lord told him: ‘the Kaaba, in relation to the all-encompassing (divine) Throne, is like your heart with relation to your body’ [I.50.29]. So in fact the Kaaba on the Earth is symbolically like the Single Monad in the cosmos. This analogy also applies to many related details, because the cubic shape of the Kaaba is in fact the simplest structure which constitutes a body that occupies the three spatial dimensions. As Ibn ‘Arabî mentioned [III.276.4; see explanations in section 5.4 above], the body is composed of at least eight points, corresponding to the corners of the cube.

But more importantly for Ibn ‘Arabî, one corner of the Kaaba holds the mysterious ‘Black Stone’ (*al-hajar al-aswad*) which, according to tradition, the angel Gabriel brought down from Paradise and gave to Abraham to put it in that corner of the Kaaba. For Ibn ‘Arabî, this Black Stone symbolically represents the foundational role in the process of creation or manifestation of the ‘Greatest Element’. In other words, circumambulating the Kaaba starts from the south-eastern corner in which this Black Stone resides, and the pilgrim is supposed to make seven rounds (counterclockwise) around the Kaaba: this corresponds symbolically to the way the Greatest Element first gives rise to or communicates to the Single Monad or First Intellect, after which the Intellect brings forth the world of manifest creation in the seven divine Days. According to tradition, the Prophet Muhammad said that this Black Stone resembles ‘Allah’s right hand on Earth’ [*Kanz*: 34729]. As is well known, Ibn ‘Arabî holds that the ‘Universal Reality’ – which is also another name for the Greatest Element, because it is the origin of the Single Monad [I.119.10] – is identical to the Spirit of Muhammad himself, as that Spirit is also, according to a number of widely known hadith, ‘the first thing to be created’ [*Kanz*: 31917].¹⁰

Thus, at the very beginning of the opening chapter of the *Futûhât*, when Ibn ‘Arabî begins to speak about the underlying metaphysical reality – i.e. the

‘Greatest Element’ and first creation – symbolized by the Black Stone that resembles Allah’s right hand, he says in poetry:

*People are ignorant of its Essence, so some say it is dense, while others say
it is subtle.*

He (the Spirit) said to me, when I asked why they do not know It:

‘Only the noble may truly know (recognize) the noble!’

[I.47.22]

Ibn ‘Arabi then proceeds in these opening pages to give many mysterious symbolic details about what Allah creates in the Human Being (i.e. the Single Monad or First Intellect) and in the world with each round of the seven circumambulations around the Kaaba, and he relates that metaphysical teaching to the seven main Attributes of Allah which are responsible for the seven Days of the divine creative Week [I.49.32].

As shown in Figure 6.4, just the Greatest Element makes the Single Monad which scans the states of the world in seven Days, the pilgrim in Hajj has to make seven rounds around the Kaaba anti-clockwise. This circumambulation starts from the eastern corner where the Black Stone resides and moves towards the Shami corner. This clearly supports the analogy between the Greatest




Figure 6.3 The Kaaba, with people on the Hajj circumambulating it. The Black Stone appears in the front corner, near the door.




Figure 6.4 How circumambulating the Kaaba is similar to the Greatest Element's creation of the Single Monad. Circumambulation starts – anticlockwise – from the eastern corner where the Black Stone is, and that corner is for the Pole.

Element and the mysterious Black Stone, especially, since we have said above that the Black Stone resembles ‘Allah’s right Hand on Earth’ [*Kanz*: 34729].

6.6.2 *The spiritual hierarchy*

Another important example of the symbolic analogy between the metaphysical process and figures of the ‘macrocosm’ and more human realities is the hierarchy of the spirits of the prophets and saints (*awliya*) – a central theme that runs throughout the *Futūḥāt*. To summarize the cosmological aspect of that theme, Ibn ‘Arabī presents the lower realms of the cosmos as being ruled by a complex spiritual hierarchy – largely ‘invisible’ to most human beings, though not to the spiritual ‘knowers’ – consisting, among others, of the spiritual ‘Pole’ (*al-qutb*), the two Imams, the four Pillars (*awtād*), the seven Substitutes (*abdāl*), the eight Nobles (*mujabā’*), the 12 Chiefs (*nuqabā’*), in addition to other lesser-known groups.¹¹ Each of these groups and figures has a special corresponding spiritual responsibility, some of which are have to do with maintaining the wider cosmic order. Those pure spirits have also have an ongoing series of living human ‘representatives’ or ‘agents’ (*s. nā’ib*) amongst us [II.6.6].

Some of these members of the celestial spiritual hierarchy, as Ibn ‘Arabī presents them in scattered passages of the *Futūḥāt*, are assigned cosmological functions symbolically related, for example, to the 12 zodiacal signs, the seven heavens, and the seven ‘climes’ or geographical regions, the four cardinal points,

or even the four corners of the Kaaba [II.13]. In particular, the highest level of the 'Pole', in this hierarchy, is the figure who apparently corresponds to the lofty metaphysical position of the Single Monad – which Ibn 'Arabî often pointedly refers to simply as 'the Reality of Muhammad' (*Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 158).

6.6.3 The world of letters

Also yet another important symbolic analogy between the metaphysical macrocosm and more familiar human realities, which again runs throughout the *Futûhât*, is the 'world of letters'. Ibn 'Arabî considers the letters of the Arabic alphabet – given their central place in the culminating divine revelation of the Qur'an – to constitute in themselves 'a real world like us', since they are servants of Allah just like ourselves [I.58.13]. He begins his detailed explanation of their symbolic metaphysical and cosmological functions in a long section in the opening chapter of the *Futûhât*. As he explains there, the Arabic letters also have symbolic hierarchy similar to the spiritual hierarchy of the prophets and the saints. Thus they also have Pole, which is the letter *alif* (ا), the first letter of Arabic alphabet; two *imâms* (Leaders), which are the two other vowel letters *wâw* (و) and *yâ'* (ي); four *awtâd* (Pillars), which are the letters *alif* (ا), *wâw* (و), *yâ'* (ي) and *nûn* (ن), that together provide the essential Arabic grammatical indications ('*alâmat al-i'râb*'); and seven *abdâl* (Substitutes), which are the letters *alif* (ا), *wâw* (و), *yâ'* (ي), *nûn* (ن), and the three key pronoun markers *tâ'* (ت), *kâf* (ك) and *hâ'* (هـ) [I.78.18]. But the important facts about the metaphysical relations between the world, the Single Monad and the Greatest Element are particularly clearly developed in Ibn 'Arabî's teaching here regarding the metaphysical dimension of this world of letters. Thus he clearly states that:

For the totality of the letters (like the world) may be deconstructed into the *alif* (corresponding to the Pole and the Single Monad) and put together from it (the letter or sound) *alif*, but it can not be deconstructed into (any of) them. However it too can be deconstructed – in our symbolic estimation – into its spiritual principle (*rûhâniyya*), which is the (primordial) 'Point' (of Greatest Element) – although (in fact) the one can not be (further) deconstructed.¹²

[I.78.23]

Here again the 'Greatest Element' is assumed to be the underlying principle or substrate of all creation and manifestation.

As we have mentioned on several earlier occasions, Ibn 'Arabî often attributes his source for some of the most important metaphysical knowledge about the world to the spiritual Pole Idrîs ('*mudâwi al-kulûm*'). In describing the relation between the originary 'Point' of the 'Greatest Element' and all the manifest cosmos, in chapter 15 of the *Futûhât*, this Pole tells him:

The world (physical cosmos) exists between the circumference and the point (of the Earth at its centre), arranged according to the levels (of its orbs) and

the smallness and greatness of the orbs. And (he said) that the sphere that is closer to the circumference is wider than that which is inside, so its day is longer, its space is larger, its tongue is more fluent and it is closer to realizing strength and purity. And what goes down to the (material, earthly) elements is less than this (high) level, on down to the sphere of the Earth. But each part in every circumference matches what is below it and what is above it with its (whole) entity: no one is greater than the other, despite the fact that one is larger and one is smaller! . . . And all match the point with their entities – and that Point, despite its smallness, matches the parts of the circumference with its (whole) essential reality (‘*ayn*).

[I.154.22]

It is worth mentioning here, as a modern analogy to this earlier symbolism, that one of the most compelling consequences of Quantum Mechanics is that everything in the physical world of ‘particles’ can also be expressed as waves that have different wavelengths. Electrons for example – though they are particles – have a wavelength. Even the Earth has a distinctive wavelength. When the mass of the body or particle becomes larger its wavelength becomes smaller. So the wavelength becomes even larger for massless particles such as photons (light).

6.6.4 *The hierarchy of divine names*

We have already discussed the unique Unity of Allah and the diversity of His divine Names in section 5.3. In Ibn ‘Arabî’s wider metaphysical perspective, the divine Names – just like the spiritual world of the angels, prophets and saints – are also arranged in a corresponding specific metaphysical hierarchy. In section 3.1, we have already encountered the four and seven fundamental divine Names – which correspond to the four *awtâd* and the seven *abdâl* respectively. But Ibn ‘Arabî talks about this hierarchy of the divine Names in more detail early on in chapter 4 of the *Futûhât*. Here we want only to draw the attention to his explanation there of the difference between the two key divine Names ‘Allah’ and ‘the All-Merciful’ (*al-Rahmân*).

Already in his *Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya*, Ibn ‘Arabî compares the relation between those two Names with the cosmological or metaphysical relation between the Throne and the Single Monad, as we explained in section 4.6 above (see also *Tadbîrât*: 89). Because the Single Monad is itself also called ‘the Throne’, Ibn ‘Arabî says that – in cosmological language – Allah mounted on the Throne of the Single Monad, while ‘the All-Merciful mounted on the Throne’ (following the literal Qur’anic verses that we discussed earlier in section 1.4. So the relation between these two Names is like the relation between the two divine ‘Thrones’. It is to be noted here that the Name ‘the All-Merciful’ is more specifically described by all the multiplicity of the divine Names, just like the Name Allah. For as Allah said in the Qur’an: ‘*Call upon Allah or call upon the All-Merciful, Whoever you call upon, to Him belong the most beautiful Names*’ (17:110). So the Name Allah is also described by all the divine Names, but the

Name ‘the All-Merciful’ is closer to the multiplicity of the world through those diverse divine Names. Likewise, the Throne that encompasses the heavens and Earth is a place of manifest multiplicity, whereas the Single Monad, in its mysterious intrinsic ‘hiddenness’, is more described by the transcendent divine qualities of unity and oneness.

6.7 Spreading the shadows

In discussing the divine Name ‘the Subtle’ (*al-latîf*),¹³ Ibn ‘Arabî says that there is great *subtle* knowledge in ‘the withdrawing of the shadow and its spreading’ (alluding to 25:45–46), and that is why Allah made that symbolic image a guide to Him [IV.238.2]. As we pointed out before, Ibn ‘Arabî views the world as a structure made ‘according to the image or form’ of the Real (see section 3.1). In the same way, he considers the manifest world as the ‘shadow’ of the Real, or of the Universal Intellect (and ultimately the ‘Greatest Element’). He bases these arguments on the following two verses from the Qur’an: ‘*Hast thou not seen how thy Lord hath spread the shadow – and if He wished, He could have made it still? Then We have made the Sun a guide unto it. Then We withdrew it into Us, with a diminutive withdrawal*’ (25:45–46), and we have already drawn attention to this basic relation between the divine Image and its ‘shadow’ in section 3.1. In many places [III.12.3, III.106.7, III.281.32] Ibn ‘Arabî emphasizes that the shadow of anything is on its own image; therefore:

Know that the Human Being (*Insân*),¹⁴ since he is the ‘likeness’ of the divine Form, is like the shadow of a person, which does not ever leave him, although sometimes it appears to the senses and sometimes it is hidden. So when the shadow is hidden, it is still implicit (*ma’qûl*: ‘present-to-the-intellect’) in that person; but when it is manifest, then it is visible to the eyesight – (at least) for whoever (actually) sees it. So (likewise) the Perfect Human Being (*al-insân al-kâmil*) is implicit in the Real (*al-Haqq*), like the shadow when it is hidden by direct sunlight so that it does not appear. For (the Perfect) Human Being always continues to be, eternally and perpetually. That is why (the Perfect Human Being) is always witnessed by the Real, since He is described (in the Qur’an) as having Sight (*al-basîr*: 17:1, 40:20, etc.).

Therefore when ‘*He spread His shadow*’, it appeared according to His Form: ‘*Hast thou not seen how thy Lord hath spread the shadow – and if He wished, He could have made it still?*’ (25:45) – i.e. stably remaining with Whom is His shadow. But if He does not spread His Shadow, no individual reality (*‘ayn*) of It will be manifest in sensible existence, except to Allah alone (in His Foreknowledge). So His ‘Shadow’ (i.e. the Perfect Human Being/Single Monad) has always been with Allah and will always be with Allah, for he continues Allah’s continuing, while everything other than the Perfect Human Being (Single Monad) only continues (in existence) through Allah’s causing them to continue.

[III.187.15; see also I.458.33 and II.607.14]

Therefore, the Single Monad or Perfect Human Being is the primordial Shadow of the Real, and the manifest world is in turn the shadow(s) of the Single Monad. The world appears in existence, after being hidden in the 'Unseen' (of the divine Foreknowledge), through Allah's 'spreading the shadow' of the Single Monad in the eternally renewed act of Creation. For if God so wished, He could have left His Shadow unmanifest, which means that the created world would have stayed as it was in Allah's eternal Knowledge, instead of coming out into real existence spread over space and time.

However, the 'shadow' of the Single Monad is one like him: that is why Allah withdrew his shadow 'with a diminutive withdrawal' – like the withdrawal of the shadow that normally occurs at sunset (see I.459.5) – so that it disappears in order to appear again in a different outward form, just as the sunlight disappears in order to eventually make another day. So at every 'Day' (instant) the Single Monad makes a new shadow in all creation. So the world is the ongoing collection of those instantaneous shadows, as explained in sections 3.6 and 4.3.

When the shadow is spread (before and after noon) it is itself a guide to the Sun, just as the Sun was an actual guide to it by its effect which caused the shadow itself [I.459.9 and also IV 238.29]. Likewise our shadow-like existence (our actual individual entity) should guide us to realize the Real manifested in ourselves – being His shadows – by looking at His shadow (i.e. the Single Monad or Perfect Human Being) who makes manifest the shadow of our creation – and by proceeding then from the Perfect Human Being to the Real Himself, the divine 'Light' or Sun Who ultimately caused this shadow (that is our existence). The seeker of the Real (*murīd*), therefore, keeps seeking the Real in these shadows and in the Shadow (of the Perfect Human Being) that is their Source, until he comes to realize that Source more fully and directly. So when he achieves that high state of realization, he himself – being one of these shadows – will be extinguished or 'drowned' (n. *fanā*) or united (n. *ittihād*) with the Real – because the shadow can not see itself and the Real at the same time – except perhaps for an instant of time, comparable to the case of noontime at the equator, where the shadow of the object disappears for a single moment.

But Ibn 'Arabī always clearly points out that after the 'enlightened' shadow-subject witnesses the Real, and continues to watch Him, then he will realize that he is as he was before and after his direct witnessing – except that before that witnessing he did not realize that what he was witnessing was the Real – just as the Sun is the Sun before and after the noontime disappearance of the shadow.¹⁵ However, in fact the shadow at noon hides in the object and not in the Sun, so in fact the realized knower indeed does not witness the Real Himself (the Essence), but witnesses only the 'real-through-whom-creation-takes-place' (*al-haqq al-makhlūq bihi*), which is the Perfect Human Being (the Single Monad, or at most the Greatest Element). So the Knower may at most realize his or her essential unity with *this* reality, which is only the higher 'Shadow' of the Real.

It is here, Ibn 'Arabī implies, that many of the Sufis' ecstatic expressions (or poetic metaphors) have sometimes been misunderstood. For example, Ibn al-Fārid in his famous poem, the *Tā'īyya*, speaks about 'unification' (*ittihād*) in

various forms (Mahmûd 1995: 241, 248, 252 and 276). Of course Ibn ‘Arabî himself has sometimes been accused of believing in *ittihâd* and *hulûl*, but he was always very careful not to mention these words and directly denied such doctrines [III.298.30, IV.81.23].¹⁶ That is why in his prayers Ibn ‘Arabî asks to unite with the Prophet Muhammad’s spiritual essence (*dhât*), who is the Perfect Human Being. For example he says in his book of prayers, *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya*:

O God, pray for him (Prophet Muhammad) a prayer by which my branch may connect with my root, and my part with my whole, until my essence is unified with his essence and my attributes with his attributes, and the eye is satisfied with the eye, and disunity flees away from disunity.¹⁷

In yet another of his prayers, he very clearly expresses what we have just observed in his remarks about the divine ‘shadow’:

Oh God, no god but You, it is You Whom we worship and You Whom we witness; ever returning to You, nothing but You. I ask of You, by You, You Yourself, Yourself, Yourself, You Who (have) no ‘he’ other than ‘Hû’ (the divine Essence), (I ask of you) to withdraw from me the shadow of (my natural bodily) formation, so that I may witness my (true) self bare from any description that is a veil which prevents me from witnessing You as ‘I’,¹⁸ and purify me from any attribute or influence that makes me see any (purely personal) share (in existence): ‘for *everything is perishable but its [or ‘His’] face*’¹⁹ (28:88), ‘*but to Allah all things are returned*’ (42:53). Oh my God, pray for Your messenger, our master Muhammad, who is apportioned with this perfect abolishment (*mahw*), and complete integration (*jam’*) that is beyond perfect wisdom.²⁰

For Ibn ‘Arabî, these symbolic analogies between the shadows and creation are indeed very important existentially because Allah made them as guides for us, in all the ways we have just reviewed. But what is particularly important here, in terms of Ibn ‘Arabî’s actual cosmology and understanding of time, is that the created entities of the world that are the evanescent ‘shadows’ of the Single Monad are continuously re-created, by one instantaneous act of creation after another, in a process similar to the spreading of the shadows by the Sun in the course of the day. In the following section, we turn to some further illustrations and implications of that cosmic process of creation.

6.8 Creation scenario: the world as a movie

Later Muslim writers, especially the great masters of mystical poetry in Persian and other eastern Islamic languages, developed a great range of familiar symbolic forms intended to elaborate and communicate the basic Qur’anic imagery for the cosmological processes and their symbolic expression that we have discovered in the writings of Ibn ‘Arabî. One of the most powerful and

multi-faceted of those images was Ibn 'Arabî's famous account – reminiscent of the Sun-Line-Cave section of Plato's *Republic* – of the universe as a vast 'shadow-theatre', a true 'divine Comedy' (Morris 1993: 50–69). Thus in contemporary terms, based on the concept of perpetual cosmic re-creation that we have explained above, we may envisage the world as like a movie being displayed on a computer monitor. It is quite fascinating to discover that this analogy is quite accurate in most of the details, even regarding what happens inside the computer, since the Universal Intellect/Perfect Human Being/Pen can be considered as a kind of 'supercomputer' which creates, organizes the world and displays it in the 'Universal Tablet' (of the world-Soul). Ibn 'Arabî has already asserted that the world appears as 'living, hearing, seeing, knowing, willing, able and speaking' with the same seven fundamental Attributes of the Real. This is because the world is His divine work, and as Allah said: '*Say: "everyone works according to his own type"*' (17:84) [II.438.19]. This is also equivalent to what we have repeatedly noted: that the Perfect Human Being and the world (including its human beings) are all created 'according to the Form or Image' of the Real, and that they are also the second-level shadows of the Real (see for example [I.163.20, II.652.25, III.343.25], and also [Kanz: 1142, 1148]).

Likewise the computer today is certainly created as a certain kind of 'image' of some specific aspects of the human mind, and certainly the way the computer works resembles the human mind in many respects. However the shadow or the image in the mirror (or photocopier) resembles at best only one facet of the original. Likewise human beings, for example, do not fully resemble the Real, just as computers do not (and cannot) fully resemble humans in many other respects.

As we have seen, Ibn 'Arabî repeatedly showed that in many respects both the world and the essential (spiritual) human being work in the same way. That is why he generally considers the world as a great human being (*al-insân al-kabîr*) and the human being as microcosm (*'âlam saghîr*) [III.11.18]. Just as our own world is essentially constituted by the meanings, images and states that are reflected in our spirit, soul and intellect, so the world also reflects the divine 'meanings' brought into creation by the Universal Intellect, so that the phenomena that we perceive are the doubly reflected forms of these original meanings. However, Ibn 'Arabî also repeatedly asserts that the world would not exist if the observing 'eye' or 'I' of the viewer was not also always there.²¹ So because of the underlying reality of the created world as essentially 'imaginal' forms or multiple 'reflections' or shadows, we can only understand the cosmos if we understand how we perceive it, since for Ibn 'Arabî it is all ultimately, and quite literally 'in the mind' – albeit a different kind of 'Mind' at each level of manifestation.

It is known that the movie which is displayed on the cinema screen is composed of a large number of succeeding still pictures that pass rapidly before the eye at very short intervals, so that the human mind observes only smooth changes between those rapidly successive pictures. By running this movie at the proper speed we feel (by illusion) as if a normal motion of objects and images is happening on the screen. So if we suppose that the screen has no visible edges,

and especially with the new technology of three-dimensional (laser holography) movies, it would be very hard initially to distinguish this illusion from reality.

Now if we examine how the picture is displayed on the screen of the computer monitor, we realize that it is even more closely similar to Ibn 'Arabî's view of creation. In this way the whole cosmos is a combination and rapid succession of imaginal forms (images, reflections or 'shadows') that are created by or through the Single Monad in a similar manner to the single electron beam which is creating the picture on the computer screen one pixel at a time.

As Ibn 'Arabî has pointed out, the Single Monad is continuously and perpetually 'wearing' new forms which make us see and otherwise experience motion. When we open our eyes we see a picture of many things around us, and if we keep on watching we see things moving. Each mental picture is also created in series and not all at once, as we have noted before (sections 5.5 and 5.6). In every single instance and at each single point of space there exists a monad with a specific unique form, and we have explained before (sections 3.15 and 4.1) that it takes the Monad a full divine 'Week' of creation to appear in this form, but this divine Week for us is like a single instant. This same monad, still in the same instant of time – for us, but a full divine 'Week' for the Monad itself, since we only exist for one moment in this Week: see section 3.6 – takes another form but in another point of space, and so on. So in one single instant the picture that we see is a combination of a huge number of reflected forms of the same Single Monad. He or It scans the whole of space at no time (for us) and without real motion (on the part of the Single Monad), because space itself is what we subjectively experience as a consequence of the succession of forms within this monad, and motion is meaningless when we talk about one single all-encompassing entity. It takes the monad a full 'Week' of creation (i.e. seven 'Days of event': one for each direction of space – up, down, right, left, front and back, and one for the observer – time) to scan all the states in the cosmos, but since each one of us is one single state – as observers, not as bodies – we live a single moment in each full 'Week of event', in which we observe the other states around and within us as the traces or memory of the forms left over by the Monad after it has created those states. Ibn 'Arabî succinctly referred to this cosmological fact, in a favourite image of the later mystical poets, right in his Forward (*khutba*) to the *Futûhât*, when he said:

Then He released the Breath, so the water waved because of its vibration and foamed . . . Then the water diffidently withdrew and returned back heading for the middle, and it left over its foam on the shore that it produced. So it (the world) is the churning of this water that contains most things.

[I.4.7]

The 'water' here refers to the Single Monad itself (or the Greatest Element: *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 812–817, 826–828) because (in the famous expression of the Qur'an) 'every thing was created from the Water', and the 'foam' is the created forms (or their images) left over by the Single Monad after it has 'scanned' into existence the created world (in six divine Days) and then returned back to the

middle to start over a new picture [II.438.3] on Saturday. That is why Ibn 'Arabi also affirms that the cosmological 'ruler' of the last Day of time (Saturday) has the ability of holding and fixing (i.e. memory), in order to hold the cosmic picture and integrate it with what follows (see also section 3.5, Saturday as the Day of Eternity).

When this perpetual creative process is conceptually 'stopped' and taken in isolation, all this will form a kind of 'still picture' of things around us, including ourselves both as bodies (matter) and as spirits or states of realization (meanings). Within this conception, the dynamic manifest world, then, is the instantaneous, continuously renewed succession of these slightly changing still pictures. As we showed in section 2.6, motion is observed because things successively appear in different places, but indeed there is no actual motion: for the observed objects are always at rest in the different positions that they appear in. Allah is constantly re-creating the cosmos in ever-renewed forms.

Now what we have just mentioned is exactly like what happens on the screen of the computer monitor: when we look at the screen at any instant of time, we see a still picture that is composed of an array of dots (pixels) in the two dimensions of the plane of the screen (for example 800 horizontal by 600 vertical pixels). This still picture is made by a single electron beam that scans the screen over and over again, one pixel at a time. It starts from the bottom left corner of the screen and scans horizontally all the 800 pixels (one line), then it switches back to the left to make the second line, and so on till all the screen is scanned, ending up by the upper right corner; then it switches back to start a new picture from the bottom left corner again in the same way. Because this process is performed at very high speed or refresh rate (around 100 million times per second), we only see a continuous picture in the two dimensions; we never see the pixels being drawn one by one. By watching the succession of pictures, we observe motion. While the beam creates them, each pixel on the screen wears a specific form of a different colour and intensity that (slightly) changes from one still picture and instant to the other. This momentary form that the pixels wear every time they are scanned lasts only during the very short time that the beam is in its place. Once the beam leaves the pixel for the next one, the form vanishes intrinsically; we only see the traces of these forms for a short time till they are scanned again to wear a new form.

In terms of Ibn 'Arabi's understanding of the cosmogonic process, the electron beam here is like the Single Monad/Pen/Intellect; the screen is like both our imagination and, outwardly or objectively, the effective 'substrate' of creation that Ibn 'Arabi calls 'the Dust': *al-'amâ*); while the cosmos is like the series of pictures on the screen, which are printed on our imagination and in the Universal Tablet. Ibn 'Arabi's description of the world is identical to this example of the computer monitor, even the names that he gives to the Single Monad as the 'Higher Pen' and to the cosmic Soul as the 'Higher Tablet', indicate that the process of creation is similar to the process of a pen's writing on a tablet, which is also similar to the electron-beam writing on the screen. To take yet another of Ibn 'Arabi's most favoured cosmological images, we creatures are the 'letters'

and the 'words' that are spoken by the Creator (through the creative, existentiating 'Breath of the All-Merciful'), after having been written down by the Higher Pen on the Higher Tablet (see section 7.8).

With a closer examination of this example, we can now realize the meaning of the intertwined days and the taken-out days, and also the significance of the (normal) week and Saturday – as the Day of Eternity – that we explained in Chapters 3 and 4. If an observer was in one point of the computer screen (as we are individually in one specific place in the world), a week for him or her would be a combination of 800 by 600 instances of 800 by 600 'Weeks of events', because each point will be present (created) only while the electron beam is on it, so it stays only one part of the 800 by 600 pixels 'created' during each run (original Week/Day). Similarly, each entity in the world lives only one 'instant' (which equals an outwardly observable day over the entirety of entities in the world) in each 'Week' of creation: i.e. only the time when the Single Monad creates it or appears in its form. Therefore, a week for this point would be a combination of different instants of many other Weeks of the original Weeks of events. Also, because Saturday is the divine Day of manifest creation when each entity realizes itself – and it does not realize itself (or the world) while being created in the other six Days (see section 3.6) – we, as entities living in the world, realize only the Saturdays' instances, those that are manifest in time. Therefore, all our life (as time) is Saturday, while the world as space is the other six Days. In other words: the motion of the electron beam horizontally and vertically on the screen creates the space in which the picture is viewed. This is identical to the cosmic Week-Days of creation from Sunday to Friday, while the motion when the electron beam returns from the right-top to the lower-left corner is identical to Saturday or the manifest instant of time, because time is the motion by which we observe the succession of the pictures.

In section 7.10, we shall talk about dimensions in more detail, but it is good to remember here what we have already said in section 2.11 about the two cycles of life (see in particular Figure 2.1). The screen of the computer monitor is of course two-dimensional (2-D). So the starting of the scanning of the screen from the lower-left corner resembles the starting of the world by creating the Real (0-D) as the pixel itself, and then the angels in 1-D. This in the real world, according to Ibn 'Arabî's account of the astrological cycle of life, takes 11,000 years; but for the case of the computer monitor it takes a very short but also fixed time, in which a fixed number of motions or jumps happen – 800 pixels for example. Then after finishing the first line and by starting the second one, this scanning or creating process moves us into two dimensions, to start the world of jinn, while the 1-D world of angels continues. The scanning of the 2-D screen continues until it is finished after a short but fixed time. There is no third dimension in normal computer monitors, but there is in the outside world: there, according to Ibn 'Arabî, when this manifest stage of creation starts after 54,000 years, it marks the creation of *dunyâ* ('this lower world'). Then the after-world starts in yet another dimension (4-D) – according to Ibn 'Arabî after 9,000 more years, although we have not moved yet into it (see section 7.10).

It is fascinating to notice that this analogy between the world and the computer applies to many of the details – not only with regard to the visible manifest world, but also to the spiritual world that is analogous to the processor, the memory, the hard disk and the software running inside the computer. It is enough to notice that the processor of the computer – no matter how fast it may be and how many jobs it may do very quickly – can do only one elementary job at a time. So from outside we see multiple jobs and multiple images, running and interacting, but from inside only one thing is manipulating all that, one by one, in series, one single bit at a time. For example when we say that the speed of the computer central processing unit is 3.4 GHz, this means that it can manipulate 3.4 billion bits every second, and the bit is the smallest piece of information, which is the digital state of either 1 or 0, yes or no. This is indeed a huge speed, yet surely the speed of the Single Monad creating the world is much larger, as Allah plainly said: ‘*and He is the fastest of all calculators*’ (6:62) – although this is normally interpreted with regard to the Judgement Day.

7 The Single Monad model and its implications for modern physics

*This existence that we know in practice,
is not like the existence that we know by unveiling.
The mind does not know it, and thinking does not recognize it,
but remembrance (dhikr) will show it, while the secret will hide it
from the minds that are veiled by habits:
that is why they do not recognize what the secrets¹ understand.
(Dīwān: 229)*

As with most cosmological hypotheses, past and present, testing Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmological model and his understanding of time is not easy. Although a preliminary test is simply its ability to resolve some of the standard paradoxes surrounding time, as we shall shortly see below, more credible tests may not be very easy to perform, and incontrovertible tests may be inaccessible – since Ibn ‘Arabī frequently reiterates, beginning with the very Introduction to the *Futūhāt*, that his most distinctive cosmological insights are ultimately based on forms of inspiration, ‘unveiling’, and divine knowledge that are beyond the level of the ordinary human intelligence.

So in this final chapter we shall discuss some of the consequences and possible methods to test the Single Monad model that we outlined in Chapter 6. Some persisting paradoxes in current models will be discussed, such as the historical Zeno’s paradoxes and the recent EPR paradox (sections 7.4 and 7.6). We shall then go on to discuss some of the apparent consequences of Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmological model for various principles of physics, cosmology and philosophy. We have already seen that, in this model, space and time are truly unified, and that there is a drastically different conception of motion. Most other basic properties of matter, like mass, density, softness and transparency, will be also affected, suggesting the eventual possibility of conceiving a kind of ‘science’ dealing with certain phenomena of mysticism and the supernatural. In addition to that, in this cosmological model, causality itself will have a different sense, which would enable new perspectives for reconciling cosmology and theology.

7.1 Testing possibilities

One of the main consequences – and principles – of this model of cosmogony and creation, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is that the creation is being continuously refreshed, like a kind of computer screen. A first possibility could be, therefore, to measure the ‘refresh rate’ of creation, which is also the smallest quantum of time, or the length of the moment (*al-zaman al-fard*). As we have noted, this could be expected to be equal to 24 hours (or $24 \times 60 \times 60$ seconds) divided by the whole number of states or entities in the world. With such an extremely small quantity of time, there is no possible device that could measure it.² If we think, for example, of using high-speed cameras and then replaying their images in slow motion in order to see the flickering,³ we shall find that this is not possible even in theory, no matter how fast the camera might be. Since the camera, no matter how fast, is itself part of the world whose re-creation it is supposed to observe, it will not be able to see its state of non-existence because then it will not be existing itself. Similarly, we ordinarily do not notice the re-creation of the world because we are part of it. However, a specially detailed study of the memory and other human internal and external senses would be necessary to judge how the actual process of perception of the world is happening with the re-creation principle in mind, both in our ‘normal’ state and in those specially enlightened perceptions of the ‘knowers’ which Ibn ‘Arabî points to as the ultimate root of his cosmological thesis of ‘perpetual re-creation’.

On the other hand, other promising domains for testing and examining this model would involve the properties of light particles (photons) and other elementary particles. The peculiar properties of photons that are normally treated as electromagnetic waves can be a starting point to test the model above. The photon, being a wave, has a probability of existence anywhere in space and at any time as long as it is still undetected; it takes fixed space-time co-ordinates only after it is detected either by the eye or by a device. We can therefore say that the photon of light, being the fastest in nature, does not undergo any re-creation, and that is why it is the fastest, because creation or re-creation is a process that takes the smallest quantum of time. Therefore one key to test the Single Monad model experimentally could be in the emission and absorption of light by different known processes, or in the process of converting light into mass (and vice versa) through electron–positron annihilation and pair production (see further below).

The best and easiest potential domain of investigation in this regard is to look at the electron orbits around the nucleus, where it is known that the electron jumps between the orbits when it absorbs or emits a photon of light. Because this process is quantized, the electron may not exist between the orbits; it is therefore re-created in the new orbit (see also the following section). We can therefore say that the re-creation time (i.e. the moment) equals the time the electron takes to move between the orbits (i.e. actually re-appears in the new orbit). This time-gap, however, is different from one atom to another, or even from one orbit to another inside the atom, because it depends on the kind of atoms and on

temperature, etc. It is not possible here to discuss this subject in detail, but it is certainly a good point which may constitute a new subject of research.

We may also look in the annihilation of particles and anti-particles into light and vice versa ('pair production'). For example, when an electron meets with a positron (each has a mass of 9.1×10^{-31} kg) they are both annihilated into a massless photon (energy) according to the famous equation $E = mc^2$. One electron alone can not annihilate, and one positron alone can not annihilate. But it is possible to convert energy into particles, as when two sufficiently strong photons meet; they convert into an electron (negative charge e^-) and a positron (positive charge e^+). It is worth mentioning here that Ibn 'Arabî has apparently referred to phenomena that have only been known scientifically after the discovery of elementary particles at the beginning of last century. For example, he says:

When two monads or atoms (*jawharân*) [like two photons] are joined, it is as though they are two bodies. That is to say, when they are joined with each other, each one of them can be called a body (*jism*) so that in this respect they are two bodies, as He said: '*and of every thing, We created two pairs*' (51:49). He actually created one pair – masculine and feminine, for example. But He called it 'two pairs' for this reason that we just mentioned, because each one of them alone without the other is not a pair, but when another is added to it then each one of them may be called pair (*zawj*), so they are two pairs.

[I.721.18]

In other places he says that the body is composed of at least eight points, like a unit cube which is similar in shape to the Kaaba [III.276.6] (see also section 6.6). We have already seen in Chapter 6 that, in Ibn 'Arabî's cosmological symbolism, the Kaaba represents the Single Monad. Therefore, we may look at the possibilities of how mass emerges out of massless photons in annihilation and pair production and see if this phenomenon can be related to the cosmogonic conceptions of the 'Week' of creation explained in Chapter 3 and the 'intertwining of days' explained in Chapter 4.

Yet another related and handier possibility of investigation involves the refraction of light in transparent materials. As is well known, light slows down when moving in transparent materials such as air, water and glass; usually the denser the material, the more slowing light suffers, which is indicated as a higher refraction index. The reason why this is the case is because light is absorbed by atoms along the path and then is emitted again by almost every atom along its path. Any absorption and emission of light can be related to the phenomenon of re-creation, so the re-creation hypothesis can be investigated via the phenomena underlying different refraction indexes. The refraction indexes of hundreds of minerals and their density and other properties are already widely available.⁴ So it may be possible, by comparing these data, to find some correlation between the refraction indexes and the underlying refresh rate of re-creation.

Testing this model could also be done by computer simulation, especially

since Ibn ‘Arabî himself (in *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha’n*: 11–16) invited people who can do more accurate calculations to calculate the intertwining of Days on a smaller scale than hours (for example, minutes and seconds), as we pointed out in section 4.4. This simulation would have to take into account that, as we mentioned in section 3.6, Ibn ‘Arabî’s theory means that the world is created in six comic ‘Days’ as space and then displayed on the last Day of creation (Saturday) as time.

In general, the possibilities of testing these hypotheses in physics are diverse and worth trying, but here we are more interested in the theological and philosophical consequences developed in the following sections.

7.2 Timeless motion

To start investigating some of the consequences of the cosmological principle of continual re-creation, we can consider the case of the throne of Bilqîs, which Ibn ‘Arabî (and his later commentators) have discussed in his *Fusûs Al-Hikam* and elsewhere. In most accepted understandings, motion is always associated with time, because, no matter how fast objects move, they need a time greater than zero to reach any point other than their original place. For example, it is well known in physics that the photon of light is the fastest particle in the physical world and that it travels at 300,000 km per second, so it can circle around the Earth seven times in one second. However, this huge velocity is limited and not instantaneous, so apparently physical motions always need time.

In the Qur’an, however, we read the story of the Prophet Solomon and Bilqîs, the Queen of Sheba, when Solomon said to his men:

‘Which of you can bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?’ [Then] a stalwart of the jinn said: “I will bring it to you before you can rise from your place, and I verily am strong and trusty for such work”
(27:39)

But even this really quick action takes time, though very little, so

said the one who has knowledge of the Book:⁵ ‘I will bring it to you before your gaze returns unto you!’ [i.e. in less than the blink of the eye, actually immediately]. Then when he (Solomon) saw it placed steadily before him, he said: ‘This is by the Grace of my Lord to test me whether I am grateful or ungrateful!’

(27:38–40)

In this mysterious story it is clear that al-Khidr brought the throne of Bilqîs from Yemen to al-Quds in no time. Because of its great importance in his view of time and the cosmos, Ibn ‘Arabî devotes much of chapter 16 in his famous book *the Bezels of Wisdom* to talk about this distinctive phenomenon of timeless motion often associated with the extraordinary actions and manifestations of the

saints (*awliyā'*) (Corbin 1969: 224–226). Ibn 'Arabî, however, declares that in reality this is not motion, but, rather, the throne was annihilated or extincted from its original place and instantly re-created in front of Solomon, in no time, based on the affirmation in those verses that Solomon saw the throne placed 'steadily' before him *before 'he returns his gaze'* (i.e. her throne was not shaking, as one would expect when an object moves quickly and then stops suddenly, owing to the deceleration). So indeed there was no motion, but rather – as al-Qâshânî and Bâlî Effendî mentioned in their commentaries on this chapter – all al-Khidr did was to switch the throne from its original location to the new place in front of Solomon.⁶

From this perspective this kind of phenomenon is easily explained, on the basis of the re-creation principle, since, as Ibn 'Arabî frequently affirms, such apparent 'miracles' do not break the divine laws underlying the phenomena of nature, but only break our 'habits' of perception and expectation [II.374.27]. In fact everything that happens in Nature must be explainable under some divine laws, and is in principle possible to be repeated [II.374.11].

In terms of modern physics, this story actually corresponds to the pervasive phenomena that happen in the atom whenever an electron moves from one orbit to another, when it emits or absorbs a photon of light. It is well known in physics that when the electron absorbs or emits a photon its distance from the nucleus in the centre of the atom changes. This change of the distance, however, is abrupt: i.e. it does not travel through between the two places, but rather it disappears from its original orbit and reappears in the new orbit. Usually such kind of instantaneous motion is scarcely explained according to the novel equations of Quantum Mechanics, and it is not explainable at all with the classical Newton's equations (see section 1.3). Indeed such inexplicable electron behaviour was the driving force behind the discovery of the successful theory of Quantum Mechanics.

If we recall Ibn 'Arabî's definition of motion discussed in section 2.6, we can easily account for this type of timeless motion. Such motion, according to Ibn 'Arabî, is not an infinitely gradual change of positions from the start to the destination, but rather a new creation in the second place. However, if we want to be very accurate, the motion of the throne of Bilqîs, like the motion of electrons between orbits and indeed any elementary motion, takes a single 'Day of event' which is equivalent to a single 'atom of time' of what we may count. Measuring the time that the electron needs to switch between two successive orbs might be the key to testing Ibn 'Arabî's cosmological model and developing it in terms of modern scientific theory. This smallest instant of time is the quantum (*al-zaman al-fard*) of the quantized time that we have discussed in sections 2.8, 4.1 and 6.5.

In normal cases, of course the distance travelled in this smallest moment is also very short, which causes us to see gradual changes; but in principle the distance involved could be anything; as Allah wills, since, whether the change in positions is small or large, the same process of re-creation is taking place. Therefore, what we call the laws of physics or mechanics, are – in terms of Ibn 'Arabî's cosmological conceptions – just a qualitative 'description' of the normally observed order of re-creation, not a real description of the actual

process of perpetual re-creation. We shall see further below that this conception has a great impact on our understanding of causality the most fundamental principle in physics.

7.3 Simultaneity

We have seen in section 1.3 that many classical theories considered time as an absolute quantity. This coped very well with the common concept of simultaneity, where events which occur simultaneously in one frame of reference were considered to have occurred simultaneously also in all other frames. With the advent of the Special Theory of Relativity, the idea that light travels at a finite speed in all directions and in all frames of reference changed this piece of common sense. According to this new theory, simultaneous events in one frame of reference are not necessarily considered simultaneous with regard to another frame of reference moving at a relatively high speed with regard to the first.

According to Ibn ‘Arabi’s view of time and his model of the cosmos that we have described above, the concept of simultaneity will have an even more relative aspect. With regard to us – i.e. considered as partial monads present on the level of multiplicity – it is possible to have simultaneous events. The reason is simply because normally we exist only for at one single location of the whole momentary ‘Day of event’ (as we explained in section 2.16). For us, at every single moment of re-creation there is a still picture (which contains infinitely many events) displayed in the world. So from this perspective the concept of simultaneity appears like the classical definition.

But according to the re-creation principle and the oneness of being discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 – in addition to the concept of the single Day of event discussed in section 2.8 – there can be no two cosmic ‘events’ (englobing all of creation) actually happening at the same time, because ‘*each Day He is upon some (one, single) task*’ (55:29). Therefore, in reality there is no such thing as ‘simultaneity’ – with regard to the Single Monad who is creating the real flow of time (see also Chapter 4) – because It wears only one created form at each instant of time. Simultaneity, and therefore multiplicity, thus appear to occur only because of the re-creation. But in reality there are not any two separate (all-encompassing) ‘events’ happening at the same created instant of time. We shall see the importance of this conclusion more clearly when we discuss the EPR paradox below.

7.4 Zeno’s paradoxes

Motion, as a manifestation of causality, is the main concern behind all the theories of physics, from the pre-Socratics through Newton’s theory of gravity to the most recent theories of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Gravity. Yet there are a number of famous philosophers who have doubted that there could be any motion at all, despite our daily experience. As is well known, those philosophers expressed perspectives similar to Ibn ‘Arabi’s. Most notably, Parmenides of Elea (b. 510BC) affirmed cosmological conceptions remarkably similar to Ibn ‘Arabi’s doctrine of

the oneness of being: he held 'the One' unchanging existence to be alone true, while multitude and change were said to be an appearance without reality. This doctrine was defended by his pupil Zeno (b. c. 488BC), whose philosophy of monism claimed that the many things which appear to exist are merely a single eternal reality which he called Being (a term Ibn 'Arabi also applies to the Single Monad). The complex and rigorous adaptation of Parmenides' hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides* – constantly elaborated by the later Neoplatonists – offers even closer analogies to Ibn 'Arabi's overall ontological system. Zeno wrote a book containing forty paradoxes, and, although his book was lost, four of those paradoxes were discussed by Aristotle in his *Physics*: the Dichotomy, the Achilles, the Arrow and the Stadium. Each of those four paradoxes challenges all claims that there is real motion (Heath 1981: 273–283; Sorensen 2003: 44–57; Darling 2004: 351; Leiber 1993: 77; Erickson 1998: 218–220).

The Dichotomy paradox concludes that there is no motion because that which is moved must arrive at the middle of its course before it arrives at the end. In order to traverse a line segment it is necessary to reach its midpoint. To do this, one must reach the one-fourth point; to do this, one must reach the one-eighth point, and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence motion can never begin, because the sum $1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + \dots$ equals one, but only after an infinite number of additions, and therefore it actually approaches one but never reaches it. Even more perplexing to the human mind is the attempt to sum $1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + \dots$ backwards: for we can never get started, since we are trying to build up this infinite sum from the wrong end!

The paradox of Achilles attempts to show that, even though Achilles runs faster than the tortoise, he will never catch her! Let us suppose that Achilles runs at ten metres per second and the tortoise at only one metre per second, and that when the race started the tortoise was ten metres ahead. After one second Achilles would arrive at the point where the tortoise was when the race started, but the tortoise would have moved one metre further – so that by the time Achilles covers this one metre, the tortoise would have advanced again 0.1 metre, and so on. Thus Achilles can never catch the tortoise.

Zeno bases the above two arguments on the fact that once a thing is divisible, then it is infinitely divisible. One could counter the above two paradoxes by postulating an atomic theory in which matter (or space) is composed of many small indivisible elements. However the remaining two paradoxes cause problems only if we consider that space is made up of indivisible elements that may be cut in indivisible durations of time.

Turning to the third paradox of the Arrow: if we consider the path of an arrow in flight, at each instant of its path the arrow occupies some position in space; this is what it means to say that space is discrete. But to occupy some position in space is to be at rest in this position. So throughout the entire path of the arrow through space, it is in fact at rest! Or if in an indivisible instant of time the arrow moved, then indeed this instant of time would be divisible (for example, in a smaller instant of time the arrow would have moved half that distance).

The fourth paradox of the Stadium is a little more complicated, but it leads to

the same result as the above – i.e. that time and space can not be discrete – while, on the contrary, we have seen that the first two paradoxes may be resolved only if we assume that time and space are not continuous

The above four paradoxes challenge not only all scientific theories of motion but also our everyday experience. For this reason they have often been dismissed as logical nonsense. Many attempts, however, have also been made to dispose of them by means of mathematical theorems, such as the theory of convergent series or the theory of sets. Aristotle did not fully appreciate the significance of Zeno's arguments, since he called them 'fallacies', without actually being able to refute them. Many modern scientists like to believe that axiomatic mathematics has dispelled Zeno's paradoxes, where now it is possible to talk about limits and infinity without reaching any mathematical contradiction and it can be proved that the sum of an infinite number of halving intervals is finite. But some recent philosophers such as Bertrand Russell persisted with such arguments, and recently similar puzzling phenomena (called the 'quantum Zeno effect') have been observed in radioactive atoms (Misra and Sudarshan 1977: 756; Grossing and Zeilinger 1991: 321–326).

With Ibn 'Arabî's re-creation principle, we would have no difficulty at all in resolving Zeno's paradoxes and reconciling his conclusion that there is no motion with our daily perceptions. So although there is no real motion in the sense that the object gradually leaves its position to a new one, but rather it is re-created in ever new positions so that we imagine it moving between these places. For example, when we watch a 'movie' on the television, we have no doubt that nothing really moves on the screen, but it is only a succession of different frames. According to Ibn 'Arabî's cosmological perspective, the whole world is exactly like that (see section 6.8). As we noted in section 2.6, Ibn 'Arabî plainly stated that the object that we see moving actually is re-created in the distinct places between its start and destination one after another and does not really 'move' between them [II.457.31], so there is never any real motion in such a way that the object 'gradually moves' along its path. Thus Ibn 'Arabî, like Zeno and Parmenides, believes that the whole world is a manifestation of a single entity which alone can be described to have a real existence. But Ibn 'Arabî's distinctive contribution is to show how the multiplicity of the world emerges from or within the Single Monad.

7.5 Discreteness and continuousness

There is no doubt that Zeno has presented a deep problem which, despite centuries of efforts to resolve it, still seems to lack a truly satisfactory solution. As Frankel wrote:

The human mind, when trying to give itself an accurate account of motion, finds itself confronted with two aspects of the phenomenon. Both are inevitable but at the same time they are mutually exclusive. Either we look at the continuous flow of motion; then it will be impossible for us to think of the object in any particular position. Or we think of the object as occupying any of the positions through which its course is leading it; and while fixing our

thought on that particular position we can not help fixing the object itself and putting it at rest for one short instant.

(Frankel 1942: 1–25, 193–206)

This basic dilemma of discreteness and continuousness has kept coming up in various guises, but most clearly in the long historical debate on the nature of light: whether it is particles or waves. With the success of the wave theory in the nineteenth century, the continuum seemed to have won. But in 1899, when Max Planck solved the ‘black body problem’⁷ by postulating that atoms could absorb or emit energy only in discrete amounts, the age of Quantum Theory began. Soon after that, Bohr used the concept of quantization to construct the first successful atomic model, and Einstein was able to analyse the photoelectric effect only by adopting the quantum nature of light. However, Quantum Theory was not able to solve the question of motion and change, where the continuous theory of Relativity was more successful.

So the human mind is accustomed to classifying quantities as either countable or uncountable, or either discrete or continuous; there is no other way. This is inevitable on the level of multiplicity. But on the level of oneness (i.e. of all-inclusive *ahadiyya* or ‘unicity’) there would be no meaning for such terms. A first look at Ibn ‘Arabî’s model could conclude that, on the level of multiplicity, the world should be certainly discrete, and therefore that Ibn ‘Arabî might easily adopt the atomist view. But the issue this raises is quite similar to what we have discussed earlier in Chapter 2 about the length of the moment and whether it is composed of discrete sub-moments, or whether it has a length at all. We have seen that it is not easy to decide for either case. Similarly, it is not easy to judge – even on the multiplicity level – whether the world is ultimately continuous or discrete. Although there are discrete events happening in discrete times, still the change from one event to another looks continuous, just like the flow of normal days; there is no abrupt change. Although we can easily divide events over days and classify them according to the date, actually the relation between any two consecutive events that happened during the day is not different from those which happened also consecutively but on different days – for example, right before and after morning or evening. In other words, the motion of the Earth around its axis, though generating the appearance of different distinct days, it is itself a continuous process. Likewise, the all-creative ‘motion’ of the Single Monad is also a continuous process in everlasting alteration between ‘daytimes’ and ‘night-times’, manifestation and being hidden, material and spiritual – yet there is no point of separation or abrupt transformation between any two periods or states. That is why Ibn ‘Arabî calls the terms of discreteness and continuousness ‘disconnected’ (*munfasil*) and ‘connected’ (*muttasil*), because for him the actual process of change (re-creation) is like a one-dimensional flow of divine manifestation. So if there is an apparent continuity or discontinuity, that would only be in our imagination or abstract consideration, but not in reality [III.324.35–325.18].

7.6 The EPR paradox

Physics theories, which are mainly based on explaining motion and its relation to time, have worked fine for centuries, so that people have been able to send spaceships to the Moon and other planets with great timing accuracy. Dismissing Zeno's paradoxes, therefore, had no negative consequences for applied physics. However, no single theory up to now has been able to explain all observations, especially when it comes to the microcosms of subatomic particles, where new paradoxes are still arising.

One of the most pertinent tests of Ibn 'Arabī's cosmological model is that through its principles the prominent Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paradox could be so easily and readily understood. The EPR paradox demonstrates the discrepancy between the two principal theories of physics: Quantum Theory and Relativity. Quantum Theory is one of the most successful theories of science. It explained the structure of atoms, the properties of materials, elementary particles and stars. Although it was generally consistent with the results of many decades of experimenting, the basic conceptual foundations of Quantum Mechanics can lead to some puzzling paradoxes and strange unacceptable features. The EPR paradox is possibly one of the most compelling of these apparently peculiarly unacceptable features.

In 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen – in their famous article titled: 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?' (Einstein *et al.* 1935: 777) – developed a thought experiment to demonstrate what they felt was a lack of completeness in Quantum Mechanics. This so-called 'EPR paradox' has led to much subsequent and still ongoing research. The purpose of the EPR thought experiment was to expose the profound peculiarities of the quantum description of a physical system extended over a large region of space. It seemed that, under certain conditions, a quantum system of two entangled particles could in theory exchange information instantaneously or, at least, faster than the speed of light. This clearly contradicts the principle of 'locality' in Einstein's theory of Relativity, which supposes that the speed of light is a maximum terminal velocity. The phenomena of entanglement also lead to the violation of Heisenberg's sacred 'uncertainty principle', which declares that not all the classical physical observables (e.g. position and momentum) of a system can be simultaneously known with unlimited precision, even in principle.

On the basis of these contradictions, EPR refused this deterministic nature of Quantum Mechanics and postulated that the existence of 'hidden variables', some thus far unknown properties of the system, should account for the paradoxical discrepancy. Niels Bohr, on the other hand, favoured the view put together in the 'Copenhagen interpretation' of Quantum Theory and refused the idea of hidden variables (Bohr 1935: 696).

In 1964 John Bell proposed a mechanism to test for the existence of these hidden variables, and he developed his 'inequality principle' as the basis for such a test (Bell 1966: 447). This was followed by many experiments to verify this principle. The most successful of these experiments was performed by Alain

Aspect and his colleagues in 1982 (Aspect 1982a: 1804; Aspect 1982b: 91). Their experiment consisted of light polarization measurements made on pairs of photons, moving in opposite directions, emitted simultaneously in single transitions by calcium atoms, then measured by sensitive detectors on each side. The results of the experiment clearly violate Bell's inequalities, eliminating the need for the existence of hidden variables and thus supporting the predictions of non-local Quantum Mechanics (which violate Einstein's locality principle and even common sense). The results showed that apparently the left-hand detecting apparatus was sending some kind of message to the right-hand photon informing it as to how the left-hand one was set up, so that the right-hand photon could interact in the appropriate way with the right-hand apparatus. But as a matter of fact there is no communication at all between the left and the right photons, and, if we suppose there is, then the signal would have to travel faster than the speed of light.

Many even more accurate experiments have been performed after that, and all show that it is as if time 'stops' between the pair of entangled particles and they interact instantaneously despite the large distance between them. Although this experimental outcome supports the fundamental concepts of the theory of Quantum Mechanics and contradicts Einstein's locality principle, but there is no adequate theoretical explanation for it, so far.

Now one of the striking consequences of Ibn 'Arabî's principle of re-creation by the Single Monad is that such strange instantaneous behaviour between the two entangled particles would be natural and very easily explained. According to his cosmological theories the constant creation of the manifest world proceeds like a movie composed of succeeding still pictures. Each momentary 'picture' of the world is like a closed system, where any change in one part of this picture would require another synchronizing change or changes in other part(s), so that the whole does not change because there is no external interaction, only 'internal' changes. We have also explained that all 'parts' of the world are created in series by the Single Monad that constantly creates ('puts on') ever new forms, one total individual form at each instant of time – such that each created form then ceases to exist (intrinsically, not through any other force) the next moment after its existence.

Now if we take that theory of cosmic re-creation into account, we can simply say that the two entangled particles in these experiments, like any two entities in the world, never existed together at the same. Rather, the Single Monad first wears the form of the first particle – i.e. causes this particle to exist (under special conditions); then this unique Single Monad itself wears other forms in a specific sequence (see section 5.6), until it comes to wear or create the form of the second particle – regardless of where it is in space. But by the moment of this second state of creation, the first particle is out of existence, and therefore it encountered no time. Now, because the two particles are 'entangled' (in a closed system), any change on the first form that corresponds to the first particle will be kept in the 'memory' of the Single Monad, so that when it comes to wear the form of the second particle it does so in a way that keeps the total state of the

system of the two particles unchanged (according to the Quantum Mechanical laws, because it is a closed system). This process is instantaneous; no matter how far apart the two particles are, because only one particle really exists at a time, and during the interval between creating the two particles they were both out of existence, encountering no time. This hypothesis corresponds to Ibn ‘Arabî’s account of ‘the real flow of time’ that we explained in Chapter 4.

In fact what we have just said applies to any (large or small) system and not simply the system of those two entangled particles, but in normal cases the effect of the ongoing process of cosmic re-creation is not noticeable because of the many possible changes that could happen in any part of the complex system and the corresponding distraction of our limited means of attention and perception. In other words: any change in any part of the world will cause synchronization changes in all other parts, because the world as a whole is a closed system. This last statement is in fact another and more precise depiction of the whole cosmic process of existentiating causality. This conception also provides a hypothetical explanation for certain ‘para-psychological’ phenomena.

7.7 Causality and induction

As Ibn ‘Arabî often pointed out in his analyses of our unconscious reliance on our ‘habitual’ forms of perception (*‘âda*), the main obstacle that prevents us from discovering the reality of creation is our deep trust in causality and induction. It is true that we live by causes and results, but indeed this is only a limited and superficial perspective with regard to the underlying realities. The fact of the matter is that what we refer to as ‘cause’ and ‘result’ – i.e. what Ibn ‘Arabî normally calls the *asbâb* (s. *sabab*), or intermediate or ‘apparent’ causes – are chronologically arranged, but ontologically unrelated. This is quite evident in terms of the re-creation principle discussed above, but Ibn ‘Arabî also clearly declares that ‘Allah creates things “next to” (*‘inda*) the causes and not “through” (*bi*) them’ [II.204.13, *Tadbîrât*: 312]. As we’ve already seen above and in section 2.6 that motion is only a new creation in a different place, so there is no deeper, inherent ontological relation between the two created states before and after motion.

Also – as a result of the readily observed systematic causes and effects – we normally rely upon induction in drawing most of our conclusions about causality. But in chapter 56 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn ‘Arabî argues that ‘in reality induction (*al-istiqrâ’*) does not give any (true divine) knowledge’ [I.285.3]. The reason why he concludes that is simply because nothing is ever truly repeated [I.285.28], as we have also shown above in discussing the re-creation principle. Induction ultimately means that we expect something to occur in a specific definitive way, based on previous observations of similar circumstances and regularities.

For these reasons, according to Ibn ‘Arabî, the basic observational and logical principles that the scientists and philosophers of his time relied upon in seeking the truth are indeed not firm, so that their practical success deceives us with

regard to their limitations and restricted spheres of application. For this reason Ibn 'Arabî's answer to Ibn Rushd (see section 5.1) was first 'yes', but then he immediately added again 'no', to highlight the limitations of the philosophers' methods, in comparison to his own reliance on divine inspiration and 'unveiling'.

Ibn 'Arabî, however, does not deny the phenomenological relevance of the apparent, intermediate 'causes' (*asbâb*): on the contrary he affirms that they are intentionally established by Allah, so they are unavoidable [II.653.11], and we must rely on such causes to reach our goals. So those observable secondary or apparent causes may not be removed:

And we already informed you that apparent-causes (*asbâb*) are divine veils, so that removing them is not possible except through them (i.e. by other secondary causes). So the very removing of causes is in fact fixing them; and the reality of abolishing them is (actually) affirming them.

[II.553.31; see also I.382.26, III.340.9, IV.275.23 and III.235.28]

So since they are veils, we have to look *through* them to see the Real, Who continually creates the causes and the results and arranges them in this specific 'habitual' dependency. As Ibn 'Arabî explains, Allah creates simply by the Command 'Be', and therefore He does not need the secondary causes; but He establishes these apparent causes for us to unveil them [II.413.35], though we would never be able to unveil the causes completely and permanently, especially since our own unenlightened mentality itself is the main veil [II.553.6].

In the short chapter 252 of the *Futûhât* Ibn 'Arabî analyses the known spiritual state of 'abolishment' (*al-mahw*), in which the spiritually realized person is freed from the unconscious limitations of habitual perception ('*âda*), so that the rule of apparent 'causality' is removed for him and he can directly perceive the universal reality of ever-renewed creation. There he says:

For the person in the state of 'abolishment' (of the 'habitual' perception of causality), relying on causes is removed, but *not* the causes. For Allah never deactivates the rule of (divine) wisdom with regard to the (created) things, and the apparent-causes are (like all other creations) divine 'veils' established.

The greatest of those veils may not be removed, which is your own individual self ('*ayn*: also, 'eye'). For your individual self is also the cause (still *sabab*) behind the existence of (the possibility of our) knowing and recognizing Allah – since knowing Allah may not come to exist except through your individual self!

So it is not possible for you (i.e. the veil of your ego-self) to be 'removed' with Allah's wanting to be known (by you). So He abolishes you from (witnessing) yourself, so you no longer stop with (witnessing) yourself, even though your individual self still exists, since the manifestation (of His transforming) influence is from Him. This is just as (in the famous incident at Badr alluded to in verse 8:17) He 'abolished' (the normal causal role of) the Messenger of Allah, may Allah have peace and mercy upon him, with

regard to his throwing, despite the (actual) existence of throwing by Him: so He said '*and you threw not*', so he abolished him; '*when you threw*', so He affirmed the apparent-cause; '*but Allah threw*' (8:17), and He only threw by the hand of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah have peace and mercy upon him.

[II.553.5]

The apparent-causes are indeed manifestations of the influences of His Names, which is why we see the effects following from those causes, but indeed the effect – like all of creation – is also only (ultimately) caused by Allah Himself. This means, as Ibn 'Arabî affirms, that the names of causes are in fact Names of God:

Then you have to know that the contingent things (creatures) are by essence in need (of being given existence), so that need always accompanies them because their essence (as contingent, 'needy' things) is forever. So He established for them the apparent-causes (*asbâb*) through the presence of which they receive what they need. So they are in need of the apparent-causes, therefore Allah made the individual-reality ('*ayn*) of those apparent-causes Names for Him. So the names of the causes are from (the influence of) His Names, may He be Exalted, so that (the contingent thing) should only need Him, because this is the correct knowledge (of the nature of things).

So there is no difference, for the people of unveiling, between the names that are said to be the Names of Allah according to (religious) custom and the revelation, and the names of the apparent-causes, so far as their (all) being Names of Allah, because He said: '*you all are in need of Allah*' (35:15). For we see in reality the need for the apparent-causes, so the names of the apparent-causes must be Names of Allah, the Exalted. So we call out in prayer to those names (of the apparent-causes) by (the needfulness of our actual) state, not through outward words (of prayer).

Thus when we are touched by hunger we rush to seek the food that may remove the pain of hunger. So we are in need of it, and it has no need of us – although we (in fact) are only in need of Allah. So that (food) is one of His Names: I mean the form of this food descends to take the place of the spoken or written word of the (corresponding) divine Name. That is why He ordered to be thankful to the apparent-causes (31:14), because He ordered us to be thankful to Him – that is, to thank Him through them.

[III.208.7]

But seeing through the apparent causes (to the One real Cause or Creator) is not easy, and ultimately the meditations and path of ascension of the spiritual seeker are all directed toward that. At the end of this path, the seeker will see only the Image of the Real (rather than his ego-self), and that is why 'whoever knows himself knows his Lord'.

However it is very important to notice that at the highest steps of this ascension, as the seeker advances, he gradually loses the awareness of his limited

physical composition, so that what remains at the end is the pure receptivity of 'hearing', just as 'hearing' (*samâ*, or *sam'*) was the first condition of all things created. Thus Ibn 'Arabî says:

He said: '*and Our word unto a thing, when We intend it, is only that We say unto it "Be!", and it is*' (16:40), but He deafened us from perceiving this word except by the way of faith, and He blinded us from seeing His intention (*tawajjuh*) on creating the things, by the apparent-causes that He established. thus He sends the rain down, and it falls; and He makes fertile the land, the seeds sprout; then He sends out the sunlight, so the plants rise, and (the seeds) harvested, ground up, kneaded, baked and chewed by the teeth; then they were swallowed, ripened in the stomach, taken by the liver and made into blood, sent into the vessels and distributed over the body until the (life-giving) vapour rises out of them, so the life of this body is for the sake of that breath (that we breathe).

So these are the primary apparent-causes (for life), along with (His) moving the celestial spheres and the motions of their planets, casting the rays on the places (illuminated by) the (celestial) lights – (all that) under the supervision of the Universal Soul, with Allah's permission, and the support of the (First) Intellect for (the Universal Soul). All these are veils, established as the fundamental (apparent-causes), in addition to the other, lesser apparent-causes. So the (human receptivity or) 'hearing' needs to break through all those veils until it hears the (creative divine) word 'Be!'. Therefore He created in the person of faith the power of faith, so that it flows into his hearing until he realizes the word 'Be', and it flows into his sight until he witnesses the One Who gives existence to the apparent-causes. And He has done all that through the 'Breath of the All-Merciful'.

[II.413.35]

So – despite their ultimately being ontologically unrelated – one cannot deny the effect of the apparent-causes. Therefore, we have to look at other prospects for redefining the principle of causality. We have seen before (section 3.5) that Ibn 'Arabî affirmed that after all the forms in the world have been created in the six Days from Sunday to Friday (which is space), nothing remained to be created on Saturday, that is the 'Day of eternity' or the instant of time that we live in at each now. What remains is only continual creative changing the states of things 'from (one) state to (another) state and from (one) station to (another) station' [I.61.14]. Therefore the system of the world, as a still picture created in the Week, is a 'closed system' in the meaning that all changes in it are necessarily internal changes.

Therefore, whatever change happens in one part of this world will require another change in other part(s), so that the total state does not change. This last statement seems to articulate a new, more adequate form of the causality principle, and indeed this is exactly one of the principles of Quantum Mechanics which has proved to be successful over the last century (see section 1.3). This is

in fact a very important conclusion and it could be the key to a new understanding of the reality of motion. This also might explain the types of what science tends to view as inexplicable ‘para psychological’ phenomena, such as the telekinetic effects and telepathy which are widely known as *karâmât* (acts of grace). The world in all its directions of space and time, past and future, here and there, is already encoded (via the divine Foreknowledge) in the Single Monad, so whoever has any access to that Source should be able to predict what is in or affects other parts of the world. If we want to study this issue further we have to look at the divine Attributes of Power and Will, and their image in the human being and the world, and relate them to time and space, as Ibn ‘Arabî discussed at the end of his short treatise *Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ*.

7.8 Superstrings and the science of letters

In the standard model of elementary particle physics, particles are considered to be points (or spheres) moving through the four dimensions of space-time. Extra abstract dimensions are needed to take into account the different properties such as mass, charge and spin.⁸ This standard model eventually led to obvious discrepancies between Einstein’s theory of General Relativity and the Quantum Field Theory that is essentially based on the wave properties of matter (see section 1.3, and also section 7.6).

Around 1985, the new String Theory suggested that all elementary particles can be represented by fundamental building blocks called ‘strings’ that can be closed, like loops, or open, like a hair. The different vibrational modes (or ‘notes’) of the string represent the different particle types, since different modes are seen as different masses or spins. One mode of vibration makes the string appear as an electron, another as a photon. But one of the most remarkable predictions of String Theory is that space-time has ten dimensions rather than four. However, six of these dimensions are curled up very tightly, which is why we may never be normally aware of their existence. Other subsequent extensions of the String Theory anticipate even higher dimensions.

There are deep and exciting similarities between the principles of the String Theory and Ibn ‘Arabî’s views. We have already mentioned in section 2.1 that he says that there are four ‘fundamental principles of existence’ that are – in addition to ‘another six derived from them’ – enough to describe the state of everything in the world [III.404.22]. But what is most exciting in this regard is Ibn ‘Arabî’s concept of the mysterious ‘science of letters’ (*‘ilm al-hurûf*) or what he calls the ‘world of Breaths’ (*‘âlam al-anfâs*).

We’ve already mentioned above (section 6.6) the complex symbolic cosmological analogies that Ibn ‘Arabî elaborates, beginning in the long second chapter of the *Futûhât*, between the cosmos, the Single Monad and the Greatest Element on the one hand, and the world of letters on the other hand. Ibn ‘Arabî adds that ‘the world of letters is a nation like other nations . . . and those who know that are only the people of unveiling in our path, . . . and they (the nation of letters) are grouped into groups like the normal world that we know’ [I.58.12].

These 'groups' refer to the groups of the spiritual hierarchy that we have mentioned above, which Ibn 'Arabî explained in detail in chapter 73 of the *Futûhât*.

Ibn 'Arabî also mentioned at the end of chapter 1 of the *Futûhât* that 'the first line that I read (from the hidden knowledge of the Spirit from whom he took everything that he wrote in the *Futûhât*), and the first secret of this line that I knew, is what I am going to mention in this second chapter' [I.51.30]. Then he wrote about 40 extremely dense pages on the cosmological dimensions and significance of the science of letters in chapter 2.⁹ In this chapter and other parts of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî mentioned many mysterious facts about the letters and their world and cosmological meaning. For example, Ibn 'Arabî explained there the relation between the characters of the word *azal*, as written in Arabic, and the meaning of time (*zamân*) by tracing the mysterious relation between the letters in both words, as he mentioned in his *Kitâb Al-Azal*.

This is in fact a very broad and complicated subject, and we cannot go into details here. What we do want to summarize is that Ibn 'Arabî considers the entire cosmos as the words of the Real spoken through the 'Breath of the All-Merciful' [I.366.1, II.403.21, 459.6; see also *Al-Masâ'il* 105], just like the meanings that we create through the words that we speak which are also composed of letters (or sounds) that are essentially the vibrations of our vocal strings under the influence of our breath. In chapter 2 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî gives details about the cosmological significance of each letter, how it is produced, what kind of vibrations it carries, and also the different orbs that contribute to produce it. Then in the long chapter 198 [II.390–478], which is titled 'On Knowing the Breath', Ibn 'Arabî mentioned remarkable facts about these cosmic meanings of the letters and sounds, and he explained the role of each divine Name of Allah in creating the different parts of the world and the different letters of the alphabet.

As one small illustration, we refer here to the letter (and sound) *alif* (ا), the first letter in the Arabic alphabet (and many other languages), which Ibn 'Arabî treats as symbolically identical to the Single Monad we have mentioned above (section 6.6) – not only because it is first but because it represents the closest thing to the pure creative, foundational divine 'Breath' itself. First Ibn 'Arabî asserts that '*alif* is not from (other) letters' [I.65.23], but he stresses that 'all letters (like the world) may be broken down into and built up from it, while it does not break down into them' [I.78.22], so this letter *alif* is present in every letter or word, just like the Single Monad that is also present in everything in the world. Indeed any sound that we produce starts by the sound of letter *alif* because it is simply the beginning of the blowing of the breath through the larynx.

So since the cosmos is the words of the Real and those words are composed of letters or sounds produced through the Breath of the All-Merciful, these letters are the strings that constitute everything in the cosmos, just as the meanings that we create when we speak are also composed of the letters of the alphabet. Even the written shape and curvature of the Arabic characters, for Ibn 'Arabî, have deep hidden meanings that relate to the cosmos in many mysterious ways: in that

sense, those shapes, just like the strings in the Strings Theory, are essentially either open like letter *alif* (ا), or closed like letters *mîm* (م) and *wâw* (و).

The science of letters and of their equivalent numbers (*‘ilm al-jifr*) was not Ibn ‘Arabî’s own invention, but was widely known in various ‘esoteric sciences’, for example those that deal with magic and talismans, where they replace each letter by its equivalent numbers and make certain calculations and tables that are said to have secret magical effects, or may tell hidden facts. In her famous book *Mystical Dimensions of Islâm*, Annemarie Schimmel devoted a separate appendix to the wider theme of letter symbolism in Sufi literature (Schimmel 1975: 411–425). In fact this kind of mythology dates back to the time of Pythagoras of Samos (582–504 BC), who visualized the world as perfect harmony, like musical notes, which depends on the system of numbers (which were written with the same letters of the alphabet in both Greek and later in Arabic).

As we said, these letters are arranged in a symbolic cosmological hierarchy parallel to the spiritual hierarchy of the saints that Ibn ‘Arabî explained in chapter 73 of the *Futûhât*. In fact it is noteworthy that Ibn ‘Arabî calls the members (*awliyâ*) of the spiritual hierarchy ‘the world of Breaths’ [II.6.21], or ‘the Men of the world of Breaths’ [II.11.9]. Also that is why sometimes Ibn ‘Arabî calls the single Days of each singular instant ‘the Days of Breaths’ [III.127.34], because in this Day the creative divine Breath is taken which is the string or the vibration that appears in existence. Hence in each single Day the string (or the Single Monad, or the ‘real-through-whom-creation-takes-place’) is vibrating to produce the letter (or sound) *alif*; and the world therefore is the words that are composed of these *alifs* that are produced in the succeeding Days. The Single Monad is the ultimate elementary String, but there are also other elementary strings: just as letter *alif* forms other letters (both in writing and speaking) the Single Monad also forms other monads that are the entities of everything in the world.

For Ibn ‘Arabî, this cosmological analogy applies both to speaking (sounds) and to writing (characters), because the ‘Higher Pen’ (that is the Single Monad) is creating the cosmos by *literally* writing the words of the Real in the ‘Higher Tablet’ of the Universal Soul. This process of writing produces the ‘Pen-sounds’ (*sarîf al-aqlâm*), which are the vibrations that are referred to in the hadith recounting the ascension of the Prophet Muhammad [III.61.9].

So we say that the First Intellect that is the first-created (or first-originated: *awwal mubda’*), and he is the Higher Pen. There was nothing else originated before (*muhdath*) him, but he was influenced by what Allah newly originated in him by raising up through him the ‘Protected Tablet’ (of the World-Soul), like the raising up of Eve from Adam in the world of material-bodies, so that this Tablet is going to be the substrate and place for what this divine Higher Pen writes (through the ‘words’ of creation). Now the delineation of the letters is designed to indicate what the Real made as signs pointing to Him.

So the Protected Tablet was the first existent raised up (from another: *mawjûd inbi’âthî*). And it is reported in the revelation (of the Prophet) that

‘the first of what Allah created was the Pen; then He created the Tablet and said unto the Pen: “write!”, so the Pen said: “what to write?” Then Allah said unto him: “you write and I shall dictate you”’ [Kanz: 15116]. So the Pen writes in the Tablet what Allah dictates to him, which is His Knowledge regarding His creation that He shall create till the resurrection Day.

[I.139.23]

Ibn ‘Arabî also divides the letters of the alphabet between four existents: the real (through whom creation takes place), the angels, the jinn and the Humans [I.53.1], which we may render into vibrations in 0-D, 1-D, 2-D and 3-D as we shall explain in the following section. This, he explains, is because hearing (*sam‘*) is based on four realities [II.367.24], and that is why in the science of music and notes there are four main notes: the *Bum* (the thick string), the *Zîr* (the highest string), *Muthannâ* (duo), and *Muthallath* (trio): each moves the soul in a special way, causing the emotions of happiness and sadness [II.367.26].

But as Ibn ‘Arabî explains in a chapter (182) entirely devoted to ‘hearing’ – i.e. metaphysical ‘receptivity’ in all its forms:

So ‘Hearing’, in this sense, is divided into three kinds: divine hearing, spiritual hearing and natural hearing. The divine hearing is that of the (divine) secrets (*asrâr*) and it is hearing from everything, in everything and through everything, because all of the world, for them (the true divine ‘knowers’), is the words of Allah, and ‘*His words are never exhausted*’ (18:109, 31:27). Therefore they have, corresponding to those (divine creative) words, ‘hearings’ that never end . . .

And the spiritual hearing is connected to the sounds (*sarîf*) of the divine pens on the Tablet of what exists, (which is) ‘Protected’ from changes and substitutions because the whole of existence is ‘*a spread parchment*’ (*riqq manshûr*, 52:3) and the world in relation to it is an ‘*inscribed book*’ (*kitâb mastûr*, 52:2): so the Pens speak out, and the ears of the minds hear, and the words are engraved (in manifest existence) so they are witnessed.

[II.367.7–9, 18–19]

So these words *are* the spiritual and material world that we live in, which is therefore the succession of the vibrations (letters) produced by the divine creative Breath through the Single Monad that is the Universal Intellect, and displayed in the Universal Tablet. This subject is indeed very diverse and important, and it is worth a separate study. Ibn ‘Arabî himself spent a good part of the *Futûhât* on this subject, as illustrated in the long chapters 2 [I.51–91] and 198 [II.390–478].

7.9 The properties of matter

In apparent disagreement with physics, and also with common sense, Ibn ‘Arabî paradoxically declares that most common properties of matter like weight,

density, transparency and softness are related to the perceiver and not to the objects themselves [II.458.14]. There are only two exceptions, the colour and the shape, where Ibn 'Arabî accepts that they can be related to something in the object itself, though they may also be dependent on the perceiver like other properties.

At a first glance this might be difficult to accept, especially since it clearly contradicts our daily experience. However, we have already seen in section 2.6 that Ibn 'Arabî's unique understanding of motion may be understood only on the basis of the oneness of being and the re-creation principle that we explained in section 5.6. Similarly, if we accept that objects and the whole world are continuously created and re-created by the Single Monad, then we have to revise our view about the structure of matter: for there actually exist (in this view) only the individual substances or monads and their forms, so that other properties are consequences and not intrinsic.

Regarding the structure of the cosmos, Ibn 'Arabî also mentions that the structure of the higher world (i.e. the planets, spheres and stars) 'is different from what the cosmologists say, although what they say is based on (observational) proof(s); and it would have been possible for Allah to have it arranged that way (as they say) – but He did not' [II.670.7].

This statement – which might allude to such prevalent current astronomical theories as the model of 'epicycles', or the assertion of a unique distinctive 'element' ('quintessence') constituting the higher spheres and planets – means that he regards the models of the Cosmos devised by scientists and philosophers as logically possible, but not true, solutions to the results given by astronomical observations.

7.10 Dimensions of the unseen world

One of the most obvious differences between science and theology is that the first speaks only about physical phenomena (including energy), while the latter assumes the existence of spiritual or non-material beings, such as the jinn and angels, and of various spiritual worlds, including those dimensions associated with the Hereafter. Therefore one of the possibilities in order to bridge that gap is to extrapolate modern laws of physics and cosmology to those unseen worlds. Some recent scientific attempts have been made in this regard, and most postulate that the reason why we do not normally see those supra-natural worlds is that they have higher dimensions (e.g. nine or ten dimensions).¹⁰ However, there are indications that Ibn 'Arabî sometimes suggests that angels and jinn are 'physical' or 'natural' creatures less advanced than humans. In that case, angels and jinn have lower dimensions – one-dimensional (1-D) and two-dimensional (2-D) respectively – while we humans, are three-dimensional (3-D) creatures, who in the Hereafter (or perhaps even before) may be developed into four dimensions. Here we are speaking about *spatial* dimensions alone.

Since we are now ordinarily 3-D creatures, we can not in general see jinn and angels because our ordinary sensory tools are used to detect only 3-D phenom-

ena. In contrary to that, jinn and angels can see us – not because their senses are capable of perceiving 3-D phenomena but because they rather perceive and interact with our souls and intellects which are of their own nature (of 2-D and 1-D respectively). Likewise jinn and humans can not in general see the angels. However, it is possible for humans to cross over to the jinn and angel worlds by transforming into 2-D and 1-D [I.168.20] and this is what happens to the seeker at the beginning of his or her path and in the spiritual ascension, which is why advanced human beings are able to speak and interact with spirits easily [III.332.11], until they ultimately witnesses the Real Himself. But in order to reach this final stage, the spiritual seeker must be ‘annihilated’ into 0-D, because the Real can only be witnessed by His secret (‘the real through whom creation takes place’) which He has implemented in everything [I.168.22, see also III.540.33].

Dimensions play a very important role in modern cosmology and mathematics. There are real dimensions and abstract dimensions. In principle, we can – mathematically – assign a dimension to any parameter of a specific function. For example the weather at any point on the Earth is a function of many parameters such as time, place, the nuclear reactions on the Sun, the amount of cloud in the area, the direction of winds etc. Each one of these parameters can be considered as an abstract dimension for the sake of simplifying the mathematical study of the dependency of weather on these parameters or dimensions. Real dimensions, on the other hand, are only those three dimensions of space (i.e. length, width, depth; or x, y, z), and no more. Although time is considered as a real dimension in Relativity, it is not a spatial dimension and so we shall not consider it as real in this regard (see also section 2.5).

So here we shall speak only about the three real dimensions of space. In fact those three dimensions make six (as Ibn ‘Arabî often points out), if we take into account that each dimension has two directions. Those six dimensions or directions are: (up, down), (right, left), (front, back); or $(-x, +x)$, $(-y, +y)$, $(-z, +z)$.

I have to mention, however, that Ibn ‘Arabî never arranged the creations in terms of dimensions as we are suggesting in this section; but this possibility is quite evident from his various texts, and many of his ideas can be easily understood on this basis, as we shall see shortly.

With regard to dimensions, existence can be divided into five categories, as we shall explain in the remainder of this chapter:

7.10.1 The real

He is the Being of ‘zero dimension’ (0-D): i.e. of no dimensions, which means He is independent of space and time. That is why Ibn ‘Arabî sometimes symbolically indicates God as a dot or a point [III.275], for example as the centre of the circle of creation as we have seen in the cosmogonic diagram in Figure 7.1; also, the dot that is used in many characters of the Arabic alphabet, especially the letters *bâ’* (ب) and *nûn* (ن). However, ‘the Real’ here may refer to Allah Himself or also to the Greatest Element who is the Image of Real, or the ‘real through




Figure 7.1 0-D, a point. It actually has no length, width or breadth. This is what is called a geometrical point.

whom creation takes place' (*al-haqq al-makhlûq bihi*), and he is the true 'Image of God', as we have discussed in the two preceding chapters. So when we speak about the Real with regard to the creation and spatial dimensions, we usually mean the Greatest Element rather than Allah, since Allah Himself, His Essence, is beyond all descriptions including dimensions.

As we have seen in an earlier diagram in Figure 5.1, Ibn 'Arabî symbolically represents the world as a 'circle' whose centre is always the Real or real. The abstract point in the centre is one unit: i.e. it can not be divided or fragmented, nor can it be even described because it has no dimensions. However, this point faces the infinite multiplicity of the points in the circumference of the circle. Moreover, each point of the circle is similar to or an image of the central point. This is identical to the meaning of the hadith that Allah created the Human Being (and the world, according to Ibn 'Arabî) 'on His own Image' (see section 3.1). Also each point in the circumference can be a centre to a new circle [III.275], just as everyone or everything has his or her own world, in his or her imagination. Also, any point of the circumference can be considered the beginning of it and also the end [I.259.24], so '*He is the First and the Last and Hidden (centre point) and Manifest (circumference)*'. And each line that goes out of the central point reaches a point on the circumference. This means that everything originated from the Real (in the centre) and it returns to Him (on the circumference) [II.538.26], which can be understood as the cosmogonic meaning of the verse: '*to Him you return*' (2:28) and to '*Him everything returns*' (11:123). Finally, because all the points are in essence a manifestation of the Real, therefore 'the worm and the First Intellect are equal with respect to the essence, but the difference appeared in the form' [III.452.33]. Similarly, as Ibn 'Arabî points out:

Since the lines (the radii) that go out from the Point in the centre of the circle to the circumference that comes to exist through that Point are *equal* to all parts of the circumference, so likewise the (creative, existentiating) relation of the Real, the Exalted, to the totality of all existents is the same: there is no change in that relation at all. So all things are looking to Him and accepting from Him that (existence) which He bestows on them, just as the parts of the circumference are facing the Point (in the centre).

[I.125.23]

Moreover, any object is composed of a number of points which are similar but have different attributes; the object is the sum of those points. But we can not say that the object is (nothing but) the (particular) point, nor we can say that it is not the point. Similarly, the world is the sum of the manifestations of all the divine Names of Allah, the Real, but we can not say that the world is the Real, nor can we say that the world is not Him [III.275.32].

For Ibn ‘Arabî, the Real is creating the world by continuously and endlessly manifesting Himself in different forms and forming the cosmos point by point (in series as we explained above), including the perceived, perception and the perceiver [II.484.22]. Therefore at any single instant of time (the ‘now’, or the real existence, *hâl*) there exists only Him. This is not like saying that the things are Allah, ‘because He is He, and the things are the things’ [II.484.28], but they are the manifestations of the Names of Allah. In this sense, as we have just seen, ‘every name in the world is His Name, not a name of other than Him; for it is the Name of the Manifest in the locus of manifestation’ [II.122.14].

The identity or essence of each one of us (i.e. the individual soul) is a point in the circle of Creation, and so is the identity of everything in the world. So we can here clearly see the meaning of the verse: ‘*We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and within themselves until it becomes clear to them that it/He is the Real*’ (41:53),¹¹ which can be then considered the most obvious Qur’anic basis of Ibn ‘Arabî’s understanding of the ‘oneness of being’. Also, since each point of the circle is similar to the central point, ‘whoever knows himself knows his Lord’ [I.328.31, II.298.30].

7.10.2 Angels

The angels are beings of one dimension (1-D) and they are made of light (*Inshâ’ al-Dawâ’ir*: 27). Angels are the first creatures: the Pen himself is an angel, and he is the first creature and everything else is ‘written’ by him in the Soul (the Protected Tablet), which is two-dimensional as we shall see further below: so their relationship is just like a normal pen and writing-board, in that they are one- and two-dimensional respectively. Angels occur by the repeated manifestations of the Real (at least two subsequent manifestations); just as the line is composed of at least two points [III.276.3]. Ibn ‘Arabî says:

The reality of the angel does not accept deviation, because he is the origin of the straight line connecting the two nines (of the divine Source and its human receptacles).¹² For bending (from that straight connection) is deviation, and he (the angel) does not have any bending, but he goes back and forth between the straight (creative) motion and the reverse motion (returning from the creature to God). So he is precisely the subtle thread (*raqîqa*: connecting the Source and the creatures) itself.

[I.54.21]

On the other hand, there is strong evidence in Ibn ‘Arabî’s texts that some angels indeed function as, among other things, forces of Nature: ‘They are called angels

(*malâ'ika*) because they are links, conductors that link the godly rules and divine effects by material worlds because "*al-malak*" (the angel) in (Arabic) language means the "force" and the "intensity" (*Inshâ' al-Dawâ'ir*: 27).

And he also says: 'There is no place in heaven or Earth but that there is an angel in it. And the Real continues to create angels from the (creative divine) Breaths of the worlds, as long as they are still breathing' [I.123.2].

It is also known in physics that there are four fundamental forces in nature, which are: the force of gravity, the electromagnetic force, the weak nuclear force, and the strong nuclear force. Nature is built upon these four forces. Those four forces can be conceived as manifestations of the four prime Archangels – *Mâlik*, *Jibrâ'il* (Gabriel), *Mikhâ'il* (Michael) and *Isrâ'îl* (Seraphiel) – because Ibn 'Arabî affirms that those four angels are the ones who bear the Throne (*al-'arsh*). Although it is mentioned in Qur'an that '*eight shall, in that Day (of resurrection), bear above them the Throne of thy Lord*' (69:17), he asserts that when this verse was recited before Muhammad, he said 'and they are today (in this world) four' [I.148.2, III.184.28, and also '*Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*: 43–44], 'and tomorrow (in the Hereafter) they are going to be eight' [I.149.29]. Ibn 'Arabî also explains that *al-'arsh* (usually translated as 'the throne') in the Arabic tongue refers to 'the Kingdom' in addition to 'the Throne' [I.147.33], so, if this verse refers to the divine Kingdom, then its bearers or holders are those who are in charge of its affairs, and these are like the four supports (*awtâd*) who hold up the house. For this reason we find that Ibn 'Arabî also affirms that the four *awtâd* (spiritual Pillars) by whom Allah sustains the Earth get their power from the spirituality of these four angels [I.160.25, II.7.1], though he mentions here '*Azrâ'il* (the angel of death) instead of *Mâlik* (the master of Gehenna). In the Hereafter, he explains elsewhere, the three prophets Adam, Muhammad and Ibrahim (Abraham) in addition to angel *Ridwân* (the Warehouse of Paradise) shall also contribute, so those eight will be the holders or bearers of the Throne or Kingdom in the Hereafter [I.148.11]. We shall see further below that this helps explain why the Hereafter could be considered as four-dimensional (4-D).

Here Ibn 'Arabî also shows that the Throne *is* the Kingdom, and that it is confined in four things: body, spirit, food and state. So those eight sustainers of the Throne are assigned the various duties as follows: 'Adam and Seraphiel for forms (for bodies), Gabriel and Muhammad for spirits, Michael and Abraham for subsistence, and *Mâlik* and *Ridwân* are for threat and promise (i.e. the states in Gehenna or Paradise)' [I.148.3].

Therefore, if we want to compare those four angels who hold up the divine Kingdom and the four elementary forces which operate in Nature, we can clearly see, for example, a correspondence between gravity and Seraphiel, since both operate upon the forms, the bodies. We can also see clear relations between the electromagnetic force and Michael, because both are responsible for subsistence and food, when we remember that all the food that we eat is in the end produced by light and heat which are electromagnetic waves (forces) emitted by the Sun. It is, however, not easy to establish the relation between Gabriel and *Mâlik* on the one hand and the weak and strong nuclear forces on the other hand, but we

can mention that Gehenna is said in the Qur'an to be '*fuelled by stones*' (2:24, 66:6), and this could mean the nuclear energy that is available inside the atoms for which those two nuclear forces are responsible.

On the other hand there are so many types of angels who also have different states or levels (37:164) and different structures. Some of those various types are mentioned in the Qur'an (37:1-3, 51:1-4, 77:1-5, 79:1-5 etc.), and Ibn 'Arabî talks about them in some detail very often in his writings [III.445.35-446.6, and also *Inshâ' Al-Dawâ'ir*: 27]. And it is quite clear by studying these types that they are assigned specific duties, just like the different forces in Nature (including the elementary and other forces).

Therefore, our suggestion that angels are beings of 1-D appears justified because such natural forces always operate in one dimension (they are also represented as vectors ' $\rightarrow$ ' in physics and mathematics), though their effects might appear in two or three dimensions as well.

Notice also that, just as the real (the Greatest Element) is 0-D and can be represented by a dot, the Single Monad is 1-D and can be represented by a line. In letters, the letter *alif* is made by the flow (*sayalân*) of the dot. So also the Single Monad is made by the flow (the repeated creative manifestation) of the Greatest Element (see Figure 7.2).

7.10.3 The jinn

The jinn are beings of two dimensions (2-D) or four directions, and according to traditional sources they are made of fire. Ibn 'Arabî affirms that

The fire jinn got the four (of letters) because of the facts they are based on that caused them to say as the Real, the Exalted, told: '*then I will approach them from between their hands, from behind them, from their right side and from their left side*' (7:17), and then their facts are over, they have no further fifth fact to seek through it further level, and you should be aware not to think that this is possible for them that to have the height (up) and its counterpart (down) by which the six directions are complete, because the (their) reality does not permit that as we affirmed in the book *Al-Mabâdî wal-Ghâyât*.

[I.53.8]

It is evident, therefore, that jinn can move only in four directions: the plane or the surface. They have no sense of height, so their space is a sub-space of ours,




Figure 7.2 1-D, a line segment. It has a length, and it is created by moving a point.




Figure 7.3 2-D, a unit square. It has length and width, and it is created by moving the line segment in a direction perpendicular to the line on which the segment lies.

and that is why we do not see them, they are too thin and tenuous, just like the surface of a heat wave or flame. It is also noteworthy in this regard here that Allah said in the Qur'an that the angels say: '*to Him (to Allah) belongs what is between our hands and what is behind us and what is between that*' (19:64); so He did not mention the sides as in the case of jinn. This therefore supports what we said above about the angels being only 1-D.

In fact, just as the structure of angels is like our spirits, the jinn's structure is similar to the structure of our souls, as Ibn 'Arabî affirms: 'the inner (*bâtin*) of the human being is in fact jinn' [I.85.6], and also it is possible that the inner of jinn is angels and the inner of angels is the real, which is again another form to express the oneness of being.

7.10.4 *Humans*

Humans of course are beings of three dimensions (3-D) and they are made of earth or clay. As we said above, humans can decompose into 2-D and 1-D so that they may interact with jinn and angels, and they may also decompose into 0-D so that they may witness the Real, but they may not of course become like the Real as God though they may become like the 'real through whom creation takes place' who is the perfect Image of God, or the Perfect Human Being. And as we've said that this is the aim of the Sufi; to decompose into 0-D, which means to purify one's self and get rid of all the earthly (3-D) attachments.




Figure 7.4 3-D, a unit cube. It has length, width and depth. It is created by moving the square in a direction perpendicular to the plane. Notice that seven motions are needed to make up the cube.

7.10.5 The hereafter

We can not talk too much about the Hereafter, because it has been mentioned that it is different from what we may imagine [*Kanz*: 39236, 39241], but as we have mentioned above that the holders of the Throne or Kingdom are now four and in the Hereafter they shall be eight. So it is possible that the Hereafter will be four dimensional (4-D) because doubling the number of forces requires new dimensions for the new forces to operate.

Moreover, we notice that our major senses relate to dimensions in the following manner. Hearing requires only 1-D, because the propagation of sound waves is received by the ear one bit at a time. Seeing, on the other hand, requires 2-D because at any instance we may perceive a picture that occupies a surface. To conceive 3-D, however, we need imagination because the 3-D space that we conceive is built up as a result of the integration of 2-D pictures that we perceive through the flow of time. We perceive 1-D only by hearing, and 2-D by seeing, and we conceive 3-D, by imagination. So our thoughts, or imaginations, that we have in our memory are indeed mostly 2-D pictures (but also 1-D sounds) but by integrating them over time we conceive the volume. Thus, it is possible, and plausible, that in the Hereafter we shall gain new faculty, more advanced than imagination, that allow us to conceive of 4-D. In this case our thoughts will be 3-D as confirmed by Ibn ‘Arabî and many hadith that describe the Paradise. For example Ibn ‘Arabî confirms that people in Paradise shall have the power of creating through the command ‘be’, just as Allah does in this world [*Al-Masâ’il*: 126, I.84.21, II.157.26, II.440.35, II.441.26, III.295.17], and he also affirms that this is also attainable (by some people) in this world [*Al-Masâ’il*: 126, III.295.14]. This is also called *al-fi’l bil-himma* (doing by intention or determination) [I.259.33].

On the other hand, and since we have seen that the Real is 0-D and that the angels are the first repeated manifestation of the Real and so on, the jinn are manifestations of the second order (in 2-D). Thus humans are more advanced and complex than jinn because they are created by the manifestations of the Real in the third order. Likewise, it is expected that the Hereafter will be the fourth-order manifestation.

The Creation is done through the Pen who is writing the words of the All-Merciful. This Pen started by writing the dot (absolute Spirits, including the real; 0-D) and then the angels by making a line (1-D), and he continued until a certain term where he started another line, thus making a plane (2-D) and that is the creation of jinn. After that and at the certain term also, he started making new planes, thus forming the volume (3-D) that we are in now. And eventually the Pen will start, at a certain term (*ajal*), a new dimension to open the life in the Hereafter (4-D). This ‘term’ is either the time of our death (*al-ajal*) or possibly the time of spiritual realization (*al-fateh*) which is also a kind of voluntary death [IV.354.19] (Chittick 2002: 105–107). We have already seen in section 2.11 that Ibn ‘Arabî specified the starting times between those different terms (see Figure 2.1).

It is also possible in Paradise that the Creation will continue, endlessly, into higher dimensions (n -D, where n is any integer number), more than four. Maybe that is what it means when Ibn 'Arabî says: 'seeking (*al-sulûk*; into Allah) is always requested in this life and also in the Hereafter. For if there was a destiny, it would have been possible to achieve (but there is no destiny)' [*Al-Masâ'il*: 203]. It is probably here where abstract mathematics – which can deal with any number of dimensions and different types of topological spaces – has anticipated this hypothetical structure of the world, whereas physicists up till now can not conceive of more than three dimensions.

Finally, we must add that conceiving the world in this way according to the dimensions will greatly help in any possible future computer simulations to test the Single Monad model, because in this way we should be able to see whether the current structure of stars and galaxies could have happened starting from the initial conditions and rules that we described above and in Chapter 4 when we discussed the actual flow of time.

Notes

1 Cosmology and time

- 1 The geocentric view considers the Earth to be in the centre of the universe, while the heliocentric view considers the Sun to be in the centre. Modern cosmology, however, asserts that the universe, being a closed space-time arena, does not have a centre; any point may be considered a centre, just as any point on the surface of the Earth may be considered a centre (with regard to the surface, not to the volume). So whether the Earth or the Sun is in the centre of the universe is a valid question only with regard to the solar system which was the known universe in early cosmology, but it is no longer valid after discovering the galaxies and the huge distances between stars outside the solar system. It is worth mentioning here that Ibn 'Arabî clearly asserted that the universe does not have a centre [II.677.19].
- 2 For more information about this subject see: Bieńkowski (1972).
- 3 The redshift is the displacement (towards the red side) of the spectral lines of the light emitted by stars when it is received on the Earth, and this is due to the high speed of the motion of stars away from us. The amount of the shift towards the red is directly proportional to the distance of the star away from us, and this is how distances to far away stars and galaxies are calculated with a high degree of accuracy.
- 4 For more information about the principles of Quantum Cosmology see Linde (1990), chapter 3.
- 5 For more information about Ibn 'Arabî's life and intellectual background see Addas (1993) and Hirtenstein (1999).
- 6 For a full list of books and manuscripts attributed to Ibn 'Arabî see: Yahya (1964). In this book Othman Yahya mentions over nine hundred books (with about 1,395 titles) attributed to Ibn 'Arabî. Most of them however, as Yahya shows, are not really by him, and also many of his genuine books are lost or not available. For a list of Ibn 'Arabî's printed works see appendix 1 in Hirtenstein (1999). See also the list of his Arabic and translated works in the Bibliography.
- 7 In this hadith Allah says: 'I was a hidden Treasure, so I loved to be known; so I created the creatures/creation so that I might be known.' This famous hadith qudsî ('divine saying') is not found in standard hadith collections, but is widely quoted by Sufis and especially Ibn 'Arabî [II.112.20, II.232.11, II.310.20, II.322.29, II.330.21, II.339.30, III.267.10, IV.428.7]. Some scholars of hadith therefore consider it a fabrication, but, as William Chittick pointed out, Ibn 'Arabî believes that this hadith 'is sound on the basis of unveiling, but not established by way of transmission (*naql*)' [II.399.28]. See also *SPK*: 391: 250–252, and *SDG*: 21, 22, 70, 211, 329.
- 8 In this hadith the Prophet Muhammad was asked: 'Where was our Lord before He created the creatures?' He answered: 'He was in a Cloud (*'amâ'*)' [*Kanz*: 1185, 29851]. See also *SPK*: 125, and *SDG*: 118, 153, 360. Ibn 'Arabî discusses this hadith

- very often in the *Futūhāt*: [I.148.17, I.215.33, II.62.36, II.150.21, II.310.3, II.391.28, III.304.5, III.506.5].
- 9 See: 'The Language of the angels', by Pierre Lory, from 'The Breath of the All-Merciful' symposium held at Berkeley, 1998 (available as audio tape from the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabī Society, Oxford).
 - 10 Nature here actually means 'the level of Nature' (*martabat al-tabī'a*) (i.e. the four foundational elements) and not nature in the physical sense, which is the material world. Ibn 'Arabī explains that the level of Nature does not have a separate physical existence: 'So (God) the Exalted estimated the level of nature that if it has (real) existence it would be below the Soul, so even though it does not really exist, it is witnessed by the Real there. That is why He distinguished it and determined its level. It is with regard to natural beings just like in regard to the divine Names: they can be known and imagined, and their effects can appear and cannot be ignored, while in general they do not have any (separate) essence. Likewise, (the level of) Nature gives what is in its potential of sensible forms that are assigned to it and that have real existence, while it does not have real separate existence. So how strange is its state and how high its effect!' [II.430.8].
 - 11 From the Qur'anic verse 'the All-Merciful mounted (established His authority) on the Throne' (20:5) and other similar verses such as 'He created the Heavens and the Earth in six days and then He mounted on the Throne' (7:54, and the same meaning in other verses: 2:29, 10:3, 25:59, 32:4, 57:4). We shall see in Chapter 3 that, according to Ibn 'Arabī, the six directions of space were created by the process of God's 'mounting' (*istiwā'*) on the Throne in six days from Sunday to Friday.
 - 12 Abū Hāmid Muhammad B. Muhammad al-Tūsī Al-Ghazālī (AH 450–505/AD 1058–1111) outstanding Muslim theologian, jurist, thinker, mystic and religious reformer who later pursued and systematically defended the path of Sufism. See also *EP*, 'Al-Ghazālī', II: 1038.
 - 13 Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut Al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers)* (1927), ed. M. Bouyges with a summary in Latin, Beirut: n.p.. This is a controversial work of the theological refutation where al-Ghazālī enumerated twenty maxims of the philosophers that he found that they could not incontrovertibly demonstrate, as they had claimed.
 - 14 Abū al-Walīd Ibn Rushd (AH 520–595/AD 1126–1198) was the chief judge of Seville and a great philosopher known in the West as Averroes. There was no one higher than him in the matter of legal ruling (*fatwa*) for crucial issues. He was a top figure in the history of both Islamic and Western philosophy and theology. He defended philosophy against the Ash'arite theologians (*Mutakallimūn*) led by al-Ghazālī, against whom he wrote his *Tahāfut Al-Tahāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, translated from the Arabic with introduction and notes by Simon van den Bergh (Gibb Memorial Trust, 1978). See also *EP*, 'Ibn Rushd', III: 909.
 - 15 Muslim theology is the theology that is derived from the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions. Kalam (lit.: speaking) is the Islamic tradition of seeking theological principles through dialectic. The original scholars of kalam were recruited by the House of Wisdom under the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad in the ninth century AD, but soon many opposing kalam schools emerged such as Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites.
 - 16 Abū 'Alī al-Husayn ibn Abdullāh Ibn Sīnā (AH 369–428/AD 980–1037), known in the West as Avicenna, was an important Muslim physician, scientist, mathematician and philosopher. See also *EP*, 'Ibn Sīnā', III: 941.
 - 17 Ibn Sīnā (1983): 68. See also 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Abdul-Muta'al (2003): 131.
 - 18 Ibn Sīnā (1983): 72. See also Al-'Atī (1993): 110.
 - 19 Ibn Sīnā (1983): 74.
 - 20 Ibn Sīnā (1938) *Al-Najāt*, ed. Muhyī al-Dīn S. al-Kurdī, 2nd ed., Cairo: n.p.: 117.
 - 21 Named after its founding figure Abū al-Hasan al-Ash'arī, this Sunni theological school had its origin in the reaction against what they viewed as the excessive ration-

- alism of the Mu'tazila (a movement founded by Wâsil Ibn 'Atâ' in the second century AH/eighth century AD. The Ash'arites insisted that reason must be subordinate to the literal data of revelation. They accepted some of the cosmology of the Mu'tazilites, but put forward a nuanced rejection of their theological principles. See also *EP*, 'Al-Ash'arî, Abu 'L-Hasan', I: 694; 'Ash'ariyya', I: 696; 'Mu'tazila', VII: 783.
- 22 Abû Yûsuf Ya'qûb Ibn Ishâq al-Kindî (AH 185–256/AD 805–873) is considered the historical 'father' of Islamic philosophy. He was also a scientist of high calibre, a gifted mathematician, astronomer, physician and a geographer, as well as a talented musician. See also *EP*, 'Al-Kindî', V: 122.
- 23 Al-Kindî (1950): 117.
- 24 Mohammed Ibn Zakariyya al-Râzî (AH 251–313/AD 865–925). See also *EP*, 'Al-Râzî', VIII: 474.
- 25 Abû Nasr al-Fârâbî (AH 259–339/AD 870–950) was one of the foremost Islamic philosophers and logicians. See also *EP*, 'Al-Fârâbî', II: 778.
- 26 Euclidean geometry is based on the ideas of Euclid (c. 300 BC), who stated in his book *The Elements* five postulates on which he based all his theorems. According to these postulates, space is homogeneous like that which we feel on the Earth. In modern cosmology and with the high intensity gravity found near giant stars and galaxies, space can no longer be treated as homogeneous, and therefore a new branch of geometry (non-Euclidean geometry) has been introduced to take into account the curvature of space-time. For information about Euclidean geometry, see Patrick (1986).
- 27 This is because of the 'uncertainty (Heisenberg) principle' which states that not all of the physical parameters (e.g. position $[x]$ and momentum $[p]$) of a system can be fully determined at the same time. It is mathematically expressed as: $\Delta x \cdot \Delta p > h$ where h is Planck's constant, which is in the order of 6×10^{-34} erg-seconds.
- 28 Before the advent of Quantum Mechanics there was a long debate about the nature of light, whether it is particles or waves. Some experiments (and theories) confirmed that it is particles, while others confirmed that it is waves. Quantum Mechanics solved this contradiction by suggesting that particles have wave properties and waves have particle properties. See Baierlein (1992).

2 General aspects of Ibn 'Arabî's concept of time and days

- 1 See note 10 in chapter I.
- 2 In the language of kalam theology, a 'negative attribute' (*sifa salbiyya*) is an attribute that is not a real description, but simply a negation of a purported description. See also *The Book of Eternity (Kitâb Al-Azâl)* for Ibn 'Arabî.
- 3 For more details about the 'line-point' and 'time-now' analogy, see Hasnaoui (1977): 50. See also Ibn 'Arabî's treatise of 'Risâla fî Asrâr al-Dhât al-Ilâhiyya' in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Intishâr al-Arabî, 2002–04), ed. Sa'id 'Abd al-Fattah, Vol. I: 193–206 [201].
- 4 There are two closely related words in Arabic commonly used for the everyday senses of 'time': *zamân* and *zaman*. They are basically used in the same contexts, and usually Arabic dictionaries (such as *Lisân al-'Arab* (Beirut: Dâr Sâdir, n.d.), XIII: 200) do not distinguish between them. Ibn 'Arabî also seems to use these two words interchangeably in many places, although we can detect a unique pattern of use in the *Futûhât*: in many places he uses *zamân* for the *general* meaning of time that has a span or duration, while he uses *zaman* to mean the *current time* or a *specific* time that is usually short and defined, such as in the technical expression 'the single time' (*al-zaman al-fard*) [I.318.22, II.82.22, IV.267], which is explained later in this chapter.
- 5 *Al-jawhar* literally means 'the jewel' but technically it means 'the essence'. Ibn 'Arabî took this technical usage from kalam theology. We will translate it as 'the monad', which is the indivisible substance that is thought to constitute matter. We will devote a full section to the monad in section 6.2.

- 6 *Al-‘arad* – in this technical sense drawn from the usage of the kalam theologians – is the actual appearance or the form of *al-jawhar*, or the form each monad wears in order to appear in existence. The atomists, especially the Ash‘arite theologians, asserted that the world is composed of substances and accidents (*jawāhir* and *‘arād*) and that substances remain while accidents always change. Ibn ‘Arabī, however, employs the term more strictly than the Ash‘arites, since he says that everything that we see *always* and constantly changes, though it may change into ‘similar’ or ‘likenesses’ (s. *mithl*), which is why we think that certain things are not changing [III.452.24]. He also asserts that this monad (*al-jawhar*) is not visible by itself, but only appears wearing this form or the other. See also *SPK*: 97.
- 7 There are two different words in Arabic habitually used for the meaning of space: *al-makān* and *al-hayyiz*. *Al-hayyiz* is more accurately used to refer to the abstraction of three-dimensional space, while *al-makān* in fact refers to ‘the place’ rather than space. Ibn ‘Arabī himself sometimes uses both of these two words to mean space, but in one passage he clearly defines them: ‘*al-makān* is what the objects rest on, and not *in*, it; for if they were in it, these would be *al-ahyāz* (s. *hayyiz*, space), not *al-makān* (place)’ [II.458.3].
- 8 *Al-Afrād min al-rijāl*: al-afrād (‘the Solitary Ones’) are a group of the highest spiritual Sages who are outside the circle of the spiritual Pole (*al-Qutb*); *al-Khadir* (lit. ‘the green man’) is one of them [II.19.9]; and ‘they are not governed by the circle of the Pole and he has no rule over them, but rather they are as complete as himself’ [III.137.12]. In Ibn ‘Arabī’s technical usage, *al-rijāl* (‘the True Men’) refers not at all to a gender but to the fully accomplished spiritual sages or ‘true Knowers’ (‘*urafā’*). See also *Al-Mu‘jam Al-Sūfi*: 515–521.
- 9 See chapter 371 of the *Futūhāt* [III.416] for a detailed account of the creation scenario of both the physical and intelligible worlds as seen by Ibn ‘Arabī. Also in chapter 7 of the *Futūhāt* [I.121] Ibn ‘Arabī gives many details about the different stages of creating the natural or physical world in time; however the numbers that he gives there fall far short of the modern well-established scientific results.
- 10 Ibn ‘Arabī explains this in detail at the beginning of the *Futūhāt*, as he was discussing the ‘special people of Allah’. He discusses this doctrine there under many issues (*masā’il*) in which he summarizes the relations between the Real, the world and non-existence. See his introduction in the *Futūhāt* [I.41–47]. Ibn ‘Arabī also wrote these issues and much more in *Kitāb Al-Masā’il* which is also known as ‘*Aqīdat ahl al-ikhtisās*, ‘the doctrine of the special people (of Allah)’, see the Bibliography.
- 11 When Ibn ‘Arabī uses this term ‘in charge of moving’ to describe the active force here, he has in mind his famous concept that the world (where bodies and objects move) is like a super-human (*insān kabīr*) [III.11.19], where all physical motions are due to this active force of the Universal Soul, and all noetic changes are due to its intellectual force.
- 12 On the basis of the hadith ‘the Pedestal (*al-kursī*) is the place of the two feet’ [*Kanz*: 1683], Ibn ‘Arabī asserts that the ‘foot’ in question is the divine ‘constancy’ (*thubūt*) and the ‘two feet’ that are ascribed to the All-Merciful, the most Glorious, refer to ‘the foot of compulsion’ (*qadam al-jabr*) and ‘the foot of choice’ (*qadam al-ikhtiyār*) [III.432.23]. Ibn ‘Arabī showed that Allah’s, the All-Merciful’s, Word (in the Throne) is One (all mercy), but by the swinging (*tadallī*) of these two feet of compulsion and choice on the Pedestal, the Word divided into two, [II.438.27], and this distinction between compulsion and choice caused the emergence of the world of command (‘*‘ālam al-amr*’) and the world of creation (‘*‘ālam al-khalq*’), of the (divine) ban and the order, obedience and the disobedience, and the Garden and the Fire (Gehenna), but all this is from the same single divine root of Mercy that is the attribute of the All-Merciful Who ‘mounted on the Throne’ (*al-rahmān ‘alā al-‘arsh istawā*, 20:5) [IV 274.25]. Then Ibn ‘Arabī also relates this same distinction to the symbolism of the daytime and night, where he says that, because the Word above the Pedestal is one, it

is all daytime (light) there, but below the Pedestal it is daytime and night [III.202.31]. See also section 2.13.

- 13 For more detail about this subject, see Minkowski (1923) and Hinton and Rucker (1980).
- 14 See Muhyî ad-Dîn al-Tu'aymî (ed.) (1994) *Mawsû'at Al-Isrâ' wa'l-Mi'râj*, Beirut: Dâr al-Hilâl. This book contains six important treatises written by prominent early and classical Muslim scholars, such as Ibn 'Abbâs, al-Qushayrî and al-Suyûti, about the occasion of the Prophet's *Isrâ'* and *Mi'râj*.
- 15 For a full translation and study of related passages see 'Ibn 'Arabî's Spiritual Ascension' in Chittick (2002): 201–230.
- 16 This book has been published many times but the most notable critical edition is published by Su'âd al-Hakîm in 1988 (Beirut: Dandarah).
- 17 Abû Ishâq al-Nu'mânî al-Shâfi'î, *Al-Sirâj Al-Wahhâj fi Haqâ'iq Al-Isrâ' wa'l-Mi'râj*, in *Mawsû'at Al-Isrâ' wa'l-Mi'râj* (note 14 above): 53–114 (p. 58).
- 18 See the short chapters 244 and 245 of the *Futûhât* [II.543–544], where Ibn 'Arabî explains these notions of spiritual 'absence' (*ghayba*) and 'presence' (*hudûr*).
- 19 *Nath* (or *al-shartayn*: the two signs of Aries), *Butayn* (the belly of Aries) and *Thurayya* (Pleiades) are houses of the Moon.

3 The significance of the divine week and its seven days

- 1 *Sanâbil*, *sunbulât* (s. *sunbula*), the term used in the Qur'anic account of Pharaoh's dream interpreted by Joseph (12:43), and also in the promised reward of charity (*zakât*) (1:261).
- 2 This is one of the 12 zodiacal signs, also called *al-'Azrâ* (the Virgin).
- 3 He asserts later in this same chapter that 'when the orbs rotated . . . and when the (celestial) rule went back to Virgo, the human composition appeared "by the specific determination of the All-Mighty, the All-Knower (*taqdîr al-'Azîz al-'Alîm* 41:12 [also: 6:96, 36:38])"' [chapter 60, I.294.8]. Ibn 'Arabî then explains [chapter 60, I.294.10] that the time of the ruling of Virgo is 7,000 years, after which the ruling task is handed over to Libra ('the Balance', representing the eschatological time of divine justice at the final Rising). In this chapter, however, he first takes pains to explain that those ruling spirits are only angelic servants (of God) doing their jobs, and not separate deities as the pagans had believed; so the command is all to Allah and there is no 'sharing' with Him.
- 4 This is because Virgo, as Ibn 'Arabî goes on to explain, has the number 'seven', but also has its multiples: seven, 70, 700:

That is why Allah – since He created us in Virgo – multiplied our reward as He said: *'The likeness of those who spend their wealth in Allah's way is as the likeness of a grain which growth seven ears, in every ear a hundred grains. Allah gives increase manifold to whom He will'* (2:261) – but always multiples of seven. [I.294.15]

- 5 To remove any confusion, 'Day(s)' and 'Week' (with capitals) are used to refer to the actual 'cosmic' or 'divine' Days and Week (of Creation) – not to the many relative, astronomical days and weeks defined by the different relative motions of different heavenly bodies. We have already mentioned the meaning of these divine 'Days' in section 2.15, but the different types of cosmic Days will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
- 6 See *Herodotus: The Histories*, ed. Walter Blanco, Jennifer T. Roperts, trans. Walter Blanco (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 2.82 (fifth century BC).
- 7 Sunday is the first day of the week according to the Jewish method of reckoning, but for Christians it began to take the place of the Jewish Sabbath in Apostolic times.
- 8 In one hadith [*Kanz*: 15120] which we shall translate below, the Prophet Muhammad clearly specified that Allah started the Creation on Sunday.

- 9 See also Ibn 'Arabî's book *Al-Asfâr (the Journeys)* in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî* (Beirut: Dar Ihyâ' al-Turath al-'Arabî, n.d.). pp. 12–15. This book was edited and translated into French by Denis Gril (1994).
- 10 See also the long passage translated in section 2.12 where Ibn 'Arabî defines the different timing periods including the solar month and year.
- 11 The Babylonians originally used a combination solar-lunar calendar like the one Muslims use nowadays (i.e. the Hijrî Calendar with varying 29/30-day months), though they made adjustments from time to time to make it fit with motion of the Sun. Later (during the reign of the Chaldean king Nabonassar, 747–734 BC), the Babylonian astronomers switched to the 30-day, 12-month calendar, again making adjustments for the actual 365-day year (Parise 1982: 5).
- 12 For details about the concepts of sainthood (*walâya*) and prophethood (*nubuwwa*) and the hierarchy of *awliyâ* see Chodkiewicz (1993b).
- 13 *Mudâwî Al-Kulûm* is the name of the Single Pole that is the spirit of the Prophet Muhammad even before creating humankind when Adam was still 'between water and soil', and to this spirit different manifestations in the world where the 'Pole of Time' is his perfect manifestation, but he is also manifested in the 'Solitary Ones (*al-Afrâd*)' and in the 'Seal of Sainthood', both the Muhammadan Sainthood (who is Ibn 'Arabî himself) and General Sainthood (who is Jesus) [I.151.26]. And he was called *Mudâwî Al-Kulûm* because he is so kind and polite with his friends; when he wants to draw the attention of one of them to a specific issue, he kindly hides that from others in guard for him just as Jacob asked Joseph to keep his vision secret and not to tell it to his brothers [I.153.19].
- 14 The ambiguities in the translation here are quite intentional: God sees Himself reflected in (both mirrors of) creation and Adam; Adam sees himself/God in the mirror(s) of himself and creation; and finally God (as Spirit) sees what Adam sees. See chapter 1 of the *Fusûs Al-Hikam* for the full elaboration of the teaching summarized here in a single short Arabic phrase.
- 15 See A. Kâshânî's well-known *Tafsîr Ibn 'Arabî*, published by many publishers, for example Beirut: Dar Sâdir, 2002, vol. I: 245, vol. II: 571.
- 16 This English word here fits very well in this meaning for the Arabic word '*yusabbihu*' (n. *tasbîh*: magnification) and probably conveys the meaning here more clearly than the more abstract Arabic word, because at the end the process of creation, according to Ibn 'Arabî's view, is a 'multiplication' of the Oneness of Allah, and a 'magnification' (manifestation) of His 'absolute Unseen' dimension (*al-ghayb al-mutlaq*). This magnification started with the creation of Angels, and then proceeded with the creation of the jinn who were given extra privilege and duties, because they are commissioned servants, while the perfection (of the theomorphic Image) was only given fully to the (perfect) Human Being (*insân*) who is the *Khalîfa* (the 'vice-gerent' of Allah).
- 17 This was mentioned in one long hadith which describes the sequence of creation according to week days (see *al-Mustadrak 'ala al-Sahîhayn* by Mohamed al-Nisabûrî (Dar Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyya: Beirut, n.d.), vol. II: 593, no. 3996/7). See also section 7.10.
- 18 Ibn 'Arabî indicates in many places that both the world and the Perfect Human Being work in the same way, which is why he calls the world the 'Great Human Being' (*al-insân al-kabîr*) and the Human Being the 'microcosm' (*al-'âlam al-saghîr*) [III.11.18]. See also *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sîfi*: 168–170, and *SPK*: pp. 4, 16, 30, 107, 136, 276, 282, 297, and also *SDG*: 6, 8, 28, 35, 37, 175, 189, 259, 264, 274, 288, 332, 339, 348, 360–363. See also section 3.2 for more analogies between the creation of the world and embryology.

4 The actual flow of time

- 1 Mathematically we can divide the circle into 360 degrees, 400 grads, 2π radians or indeed to any number of units. Ibn 'Arabî, however, affirms that the 360-degree system

has a divine origin, which is the total number of prime divine forms of knowing ('ilm) that the Universal Intellect (the 'Higher Pen') was taught by the 'Greatest Element' (Nûn) [I.295.8, alluding to the standard cosmological interpretation of the Qur'anic symbols at 68:1]. Also in *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya fî Al-Ahkâm Al-Ilâhiyya*, he mentioned on page 35 that the Intellect has 360 faces towards the divine Presence (*Al-Hadra Al-Ilâhiyya*).

- 2 For the Arabs, whom Ibn 'Arabî follows on this point, the night-time of a particular day is that which *precedes* the daytime of that day, and not the night that follows that daytime. See *Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*: 4. See also section 2.14.
- 3 In appendix A in their study of Ibn 'Arabî's book: *Ayyâm Al-Sha'n, The Seven Days of the Heart* (p. 149), Pablo Beneito and Steven Hirtenstein translated *ayyâm al-takwîr* as 'the cyclical days' and translated the Qur'anic verb *yukawwiru* as '(He) wraps'. However, I prefer to use the term 'circulate' to emphasize the meaning that the day-times and the night-times go around each other in a circle, and that they both (together) encircle the Earth. This type of day (the circulated day) is also the normal, observable type of day that 'circulated' amongst us, to differentiate from the other two types that we shall see below.
- 4 This is mentioned in *Tafsîr Ibn 'Arabî*, vol. I: 245, and vol. II: 571. This book is attributed to Ibn 'Arabî by its modern publisher, but most scholars agree that it was written by the later Iranian philosopher Al-Qâshânî.
- 5 The galactic equator is the intersection of the plane of the Milky Way with the celestial sphere.
- 6 It is not very clear here what does he mean by 'the middle', and he also used the same expression in the same context right in his introduction to the *Futûhât*.
- 7 See also *The Seven Days of the Heart*: 157–159, where Pablo Beneito and Steven Hirtenstein gave in appendix A and B a good study of *Kitâb Ayyâm Al-Sha'n*. They found that the number of contribution for all of the seven Days from all the seven heavens should sum up to 24, which they interpreted as the 24 hours of the day. Therefore, because not all the data are found in the source, they had to deduce the missing slots on the basis of this assumption.
- 8 As of 1956, the length of a second has been freed from the vagaries of the Earth's motion, and is now defined by the *Système International d'Unités* as equal to 'the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the cesium-133 atom in zero magnetic field'. This means that the values for these conventional units of time are no longer tied to the motion of the Earth, and instead are tied to innate measurable properties of matter. Thus the minute, hour, day and even the average 'tropical' year are defined as exactly 60; 3,600; 86,400; and 31,556,925.9747 seconds respectively.
- 9 In mathematics: 10^{-x} denotes $1/10^x$. For example 10^{-3} is $1/10^3$ or $1/1000$, or one-thousandth. As we have seen in section 1.9, there are some speculations that the shortest possible time is in fact 10^{-43} seconds, which is called Planck's time. The debate is still going on, and the issue of the quantization of time is not yet finally settled.

5 Unicity and multiplicity

- 1 It is believed that Ibn 'Arabî entered the spiritual path well before the age of 20. He mentioned in the *Futûhât* [II.425.13] that he entered 'this path' in the year AH580 (AD1184), and he was born in AH560 (AD1165) (Austin 1971: 23). Other scholars argue that this was in AD1182 or even earlier (Hirtenstein 1999: 51–60).
- 2 It can be argued that the words 'no' or 'not yes' do not have a stand-alone significance, especially when we think about existence. 'No' only indicates the opposite of 'Yes', because 'No' in this sense means 'non-existence' which is nothing; it is only the absence or negation of existence. This also has its parallels in digital electronics

where the signal has two states; either there is a signal or not, which is translated as Yes and No or 1 and 0 respectively. But because the '0' is 'nothing', we are left with only the '1'; this '1' either exists or not.

- 3 In his short book *Ma la Yu'awwal 'Alayhi* (*What can not be relied upon*) (in *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, vol. I, treatise 16: 2) and in his famous chapter 63 of the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî repeatedly affirms that true visions ('visionary unveiling', *kashf suwarî*) are always correct, while mistakes actually may come from the individual's false interpretation, not from the vision itself. There are, however three kinds of spiritual visions: the 'good vision' is from Allah; 'psychological reflections' from the soul; and 'nightmares' from Shaytan. See also chapter 188 of the *Futûhât*, as well as our study of the Sura of Joseph: Yusef (1999): 227–232.
- 4 Right at the first page of the Introduction to the *Futûhât*, Ibn 'Arabî divides knowledge into three categories: (1) Logical (ratiocinative) knowledge ('*ilm al-'aql*); (2) the knowledge of inner experiential states ('*ilm al-ahwâl*); and (3) the ('inspired) knowledge of (spiritual) secrets' ('*ilm al-'asrâr*). The knowledge of states is obtained only through direct experiential 'taste' (*dhawq*), while the knowledge of secrets is generally beyond the grasp of the intellect, though some of it becomes logical after being explained, but the intellect alone could not attain it [I.31.9].
- 5 Ibn 'Arabî quotes this expression and comments on it very often in his books, and he ascribes it to *al-hakîm* ('the philosopher-sage') [II.458.20]. Though it is not very clear who he exactly means by *al-hakîm*, it is possible that he refers to Plotinus, who was known in several Arabic translations of his writings as 'the Greek sage' (*al-hakîm al-yunânî*). On the basis of Davidson (1992), William Chittick asserts that this maxim was apparently first used by Avicenna (*SDG*: 17). This maxim is certainly the basis of Avicenna's cosmological schema of emanationism (*ḥayd*) [see: *EP*, 'Emanationism', I: 473–474, and also *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1995, ed. Robert Audi): 258, 604–606, 714], and it was possibly used by early Christians as the basis of the concept of the holy Trinity. Ibn 'Arabî generally disagrees with this proposition especially when speaking about Allah as the One Who created the manifoldness of the world.
- 6 Ibn 'Arabî uses two distinct term with regards to the existence of creatures with relation to God; 'witness' (*ma'aiyya*) and 'at-ness' ('*indiyya*). The first refers to the presence of God with all things after they are created (57:4, 58:7), while the first indicates all things were ('determined') with God even before they come into real existence. See also *SDG*: 35, 37, 45, 88, 137, 170, 171, 179, 180, 297, *SPK*: 72, 76, 125, 181, 183, 216, 249, 302, 313, 327, 364–366, 380.
- 7 Ibn 'Arabî often elaborates on the lofty rank of the 'people of God' (*ahl Allâh*) who are the 'true knowers' (*al-muhaqqiqûn*), also sometimes referred to as the 'the people of Qur'an' alluding to a famous hadith [*Kanz*: 2277, 2278, 2279, 2342, 4038, etc.] which Ibn 'Arabî often quotes or paraphrases [II.299.18, I.352.27, I.372.14, I.510.12, III.103.34, III.121.35].
- 8 In the original printed text (followed in the standard later Cairo and Beirut reprintings used here), this rare long comment is described as 'a note by Sîdî 'Abd al-Qâdir [al-Jazâ'irî], transcribed from his own handwriting'.
- 9 For details about the differences between the divine Names *al-Wâhid* and *al-Ahad* see *Al-Masâ'il*: 139. And also see Ibn 'Arabî's descriptions of these Attributes and all other divine Attributes in the long chapter 558 [IV.196–326; see in particular IV.293–294]. Ibn 'Arabî also wrote a dedicated book called *Kitâb Al-Ahadiyya*; see the Bibliography. See also *SDK*: 25, 36, 58, 90, 235, 237, 244–245, 278, 349, 364.
- 10 See also *Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qâhira, n.d.): 17. This small book includes also the prayer *Al-Dawr Al-'Alâ* or *Hizb al-Wiqâyah li man Arada al-Walâya* and a few other short treatises, including *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya*.
- 11 See also the *Futûhât* [I.109.3, I.125.28, I.216.13, I.228.13, I.263.19, I.313.29, I.643.33, III.74.2, III.398.15, etc.].

- 12 This famous saying (*al-'ajz 'an dark al-idrâki idrâk*) is often quoted by Sufi authors in support of what we have just explained, especially by Ibn 'Arabî [I.51.7, I.92.1, I.95.2, I.126.14, I.271.6, I.290.2, II.170.8, II.619.35, II.641.12, III.132.35, III.371.21, III.555.17, IV.43.5, IV.283.16], and it is usually attributed to Abû Bakr al-Siddîq.
- 13 In his book *Al-Masâ'il (The Issues)*, which contains over 230 philosophical issues, Ibn 'Arabî showed that the divine Names and Attributes are the first multiplicity that occurred in the Existence. See issue (*Mas'ala*) no. 94 in this book.
- 14 Ibn 'Arabî's profound view of creation is essentially based on the concept of 'the Breath of the All-Merciful'; he explains the world and everything in it through this concept. He mentioned and explained it in the *Futûhât* and other books more often than anything else. See in the *Futûhât* [I.97.22, I.152.13, I.168.15, I.185.16, I.263-270, I.272-274, II.172.5, II.181.12, II.293.30, II.310.21, II.390.18] and throughout the long chapter 198 [II.390-478], as well as [III.269.22, III.279.18, III.429.34, III.443.12, III.459.21, III.465.27, III.505.9, III.524.25, IV.65.32, IV.200.11, IV.211.27, IV.256.24, IV.330.22], to mention some examples. We shall see below (section 7.8) that this concept of the Breath of the All-Merciful is indeed the theological and cosmological equivalent of the modern physics theory of Superstrings introduced in the 1980s.
- 15 This book (OY no. 515; listed in Ibn 'Arabî's own lists of his writings) is called *Al-Muthallathât Al-Wârîda fî Al-Qur'ân Al-Karîm*.
- 16 See for example: Lyman Abbott, *A Dictionary of Religious Knowledge*, 1875: 944. See also Hopkins (1930), chapter XX: The Christian Trinity, chapter XVII: The Triad, chapter XVIII: The Hindu Trinity, chapter XIX: The Buddhistic Trinity.
- 17 In Arabic grammatical language, any group of two is called *muthanna* (dual), while the term 'plural' is reserved for groups of at least three members.
- 18 Ibn 'Arabî often makes such symbolic analogies (*mudahât*) between the internal (psychological) and external (cosmological) realities. Thus he calls the cosmos the 'Great Human Being' (*al-Insân al-Kabîr*) and the human being the 'micro-cosmos' (*al-'Âlam al-Saghîr*) [II.150.26, III.11.17]. He also says that this knowledge that the world is a Great Human Being and that the human being is its 'Summary' form was given by Idrîs (*Mudâwî al-Kulûm*) [I.153.21]. See also Ibn 'Arabî's *al-Tadbîrât al-Ilâhiyya*, where he explains these symbolic analogies at length. In another highly symbolic early book, the *Anqâ' Mughrib*, he makes similar analogies between Human Being and the divine Names. For a full translation and critical study see Elmore (2000).
- 19 It is most likely that this term was first used by Ibn Taymiyya himself, although he criticized Ibn 'Arabî for that. See Madhkûr (1969): 365-380 [370]. See also *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 1145-1155, and *SDK*: 79.
- 20 Ibn 'Arabî alludes here, among other things, to the Qur'anic accounts of the inbreathing of the Spirit into Adam: 'So, when I have made him and breathed into him of My Spirit' (15:29, 38:72).
- 21 This is also evident in physics, where it is known that the difference between colours is due to the shorter or longer wavelength of the electromagnetic waves that constitute light. The red colour has a specific wavelength, and the blue colour for example has another distinctive (range of) wavelength(s). Although we call it a colour, there is no wavelength for a colour that is called 'black' or 'dark': it is simply the absence of any light-waves.
- 22 For more details about this subject see Ormsby (1984).
- 23 See Ibn 'Arabî's discussions of this conception in the *Futûhât* [II.168.23, II.343.28, II.379.9, II.444.16, II.501.4, III.343.23, III.471.13].
- 24 See Ibn 'Arabî's discussions in the *Futûhât* [I.42.21, I.204.12, I.284.32, I.680.7, III.275.32, IV.46.6, IV.129.31, IV.228.12, IV.236.15].
- 25 See *The Wisdom of the Prophets (Fusûs Al-Hikam)*, translated from Arabic into French with notes by Titus Burckhardt; translated from French into English by Angela Culme-Seymour (TAJ Company: New Delhi, revised edition 1984): 32.

- 26 See for example in the *Futûhât* [I.79.5, I.461.25, I.735.17, II.356.26, II.372.23, II.451.33, II.471.32, II.554.18, III.105.27, III.199.11, III.288.16, III.362.16, IV.9.9, IV.320.5, IV.343.16, IV.367.18, IV.379.1, IV.397.22, IV.418.20].

6 The Single Monad model of the cosmos

- 1 The 'one' at the end of the sentence refers to the Single Monad (*al-jawhar al-fard*), and not likely to the divine Name *al-Ahad* ('The One/Unique'), because this Name is never manifested on the level of multiplicity where knowledge normally is actualized. Ibn 'Arabî always shows that multiplicity is ultimately related to the Name *al-Wâhid* (the Alone, the Only One) and not to *al-Ahad*, because with *al-Ahad* no other entity may exist in order to know Him.
- 2 See *EP*, 'Monad and Monadology', vol. 5: 361–363.
- 3 See *Shajarat Al-Kawn* (Dar al-Mahabba: Damascus, 2003), ed. 'Abd al-Rahîm Mardini: 39.
- 4 This important note can be used to give more details and extensions about the 'the Single Monad model of the Cosmos' that we discuss in this chapter. Ibn 'Arabî is describing the three main jobs or motions of the Intellect in creating the world including himself and also his acceptance of knowledge from his Lord.
- 5 In Arabic grammar when two consonant characters meet, one of them is omitted, usually the vowel-like 'incomplete letters'. In this case the imperative of رَوْحُ (*yarûhu*) is رُوحُ (*rûh*) so because both the *wâw* and the *hâ* are consonants, the *wâw* that is a vowel is omitted and the result is رُوحُ (*ruh*).
- 6 Ibn 'Arabî quotes this name after Abu al-Hakîm Bin Barrajân (d. 536/1141) in *Al-Tadbirât Al-Ilâhiyya*: 90.
- 7 See Hawking (1994).
- 8 Here Ibn 'Arabî is using the term *al-jawhar al-fard* in its original sense in the physics of kalam, to refer to the 'atom' or the simplest physical substance, whose compounds form natural bodies (*jism*). This is the opposite extreme from the all-encompassing creative Single Monad.
- 9 It has to be noticed, however, that, for Ibn 'Arabî, this '*al-haqq al-makhlûq bihi*' is not other than the Real, Allah, but he is also not Allah; he is the most perfect manifestation of Allah. See also Chapter 5 (especially section 5.3). See *'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz*: 59. See also *Al-Mu'jam Al-Sûfi*: 828.
- 10 See also Chittick, *SDK*: 134 [The Universal Reality]. In other related hadith some other realities are said to be the 'first-created' such as the Intellect [*Kanz*: 7057], the Pen [*Kanz*: 597, 15116] or 'the Muhammadan Light', etc. There is no contradiction in these hadith because those are just different names of the same reality as we discussed in section 6.3.
- 11 See chapter 73 of the *Futûhât* [II.2–39] where Ibn 'Arabî explains and lists the different groups of saints, and especially the extensive summary and analysis of that long chapter and related materials found in Chodkiewicz (1993).
- 12 As we have seen in section 5.3, Ibn 'Arabî argues that number one is the primordial basis of all other numbers, just as alif is the foundation of all the letters. See also [II.122.19, and *Al-Masâ'il*: 109].
- 13 This divine Name is usually taken in the meaning of 'the Most-Kind', which is a possible meaning in relation to His Creation: 'He is the Most-Kind with His servants' (42:19). Ibn 'Arabî here, however, emphasizes the general meaning of *latâfa* which means fineness.
- 14 *Insân*: i.e. here and throughout this book, the immortal spiritual reality and dimension of people – which is the reflection of the cosmic First Intellect, or 'Perfect Human Being'; and not their passing material, mortal-animal 'nature' (*bashar*).
- 15 Ibn 'Arabî spends a good deal of the first chapter of the *Futûhât* trying to explain this mysterious point regarding the subjective experience and the actual reality of *fanâ*'.

He explains that, in making the circle, the compass returns to the starting point [I.48.33], until he concludes: 'if they (the seekers of the Real) knew (the goal of their search) they would not have moved from their place' [I.49.1], and 'so he (the seeker) would be sad on arriving at what he has (earlier) left behind – but he would be happy for the secrets that he gained on the way!' [I.49.14]

16 See also Yousef (2006): 422.

17 See *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya*, published together with some other short treatises and prayers, for example in *Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf* (Maktabat al-Qâhira: Cairo, n.d.).

18 I.e. as my ultimate identity which is as the Perfect Human Being, not as You (the transcendent Real), because this is impossible as we said above. This is the state of spiritual 'abolishment' (*mahw*) of the ego, like the momentary disappearance of the shadow at noontime, as we have seen above.

19 The pronoun here (translated as 'its') is usually interpreted by many scholars so that it refers to Allah. Ibn 'Arabî, however, affirms that it indeed refers to the thing in 'everything' [II.110.25, II.313.16, III.255.22]. However, both cases are plausible [IV.417.18], if we take into account what we have mentioned in Chapter 5 that the things are not other than Him, and that the 'face' of a thing is its essential reality [as Ibn 'Arabî argues at I.181.19, I.306.12, I.433.36, II.182.17, II.632.34, IV.417.18]. So the things in reality are not other than Allah, but the forms that we see are all perishable, and at the end there remains only His Face in everything. So this verse is indeed another clear expression of the oneness of being.

20 See *Tawajjuhât al-Hurûf*: 26.

21 Like the English pun, Ibn 'Arabî frequently plays with the fact that the same Arabic word ('*ayn*') refers at once to the observing 'eye', the concrete individual entity (of the observer), and to their ultimate Source. See also *Kitâb Al-Azal*: 9.

7 The Single Monad model and its implications for modern physics

1 *Al-sirr* literally means 'the secret', but Sufis use it to refer to the innermost spiritual core of the heart (*qalb*), the 'heart of the heart'. It was said that the *sirr* also has a *sirr*, and so on down to seven levels. For Ibn 'Arabî, the Spirit (*rûh*) is the third level after the heart and the *sirr*, but also the Spirit has its 'secret' dimension, and this *sirr* also has a *sirr* which is called *sirr al-sirr* ('the secret of the secret') [I.117.8]. Ultimately it is this final *Sirr* that is directly connected with the Real (the *wajh al-khâss* discussed in several passages in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).

2 In 1999 Ahmed Zewail was awarded the Nobel Prize 'for showing that it is possible with rapid laser technique to see how atoms in a molecule move during a chemical reaction' (see Press Release, The 1999 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, Kungl. Vetenskapsakademien, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 12 October 1999). This discovery is known as femtochemistry, where molecules are watched over a very short time-scale with Femto-second resolution. The Femto-second resolution ($1 \text{ fs} = 10^{-15} \text{ s}$) is the ultimate achievement to date for studies of the dynamics of the chemical bond at the atomic level. On this time-scale, matter wave packets (particle-type) can be created and their coherent evolution as a single-molecule trajectory can be observed (Zewail 1990: 40–46).

3 The flickering is the variation (and discontinuity) in light intensity which is normally seen on some computer monitors. As we have all observed in watching monitor screens shown on television emissions, that flickering becomes more apparent when we video-record what appears on the screen. That effect happens because of the difference in the frequency (refresh rate) of the filmed monitor and that of the observing video camera. If the refresh rate of the camera is much higher than that of the monitor, then at some times the camera will record blank screens that we normally do not see with our naked eye. This concept can be used to measure high-frequency motions. This is the same phenomenon that causes us to see fast-moving wheel spokes or a

propeller appear to be moving backward (or forward) in slower motion, or even motionless, when in fact moving at a very high speed. The illusion happens because of the human eye's limit for the tracking and retention of images, which is usually about one-fifteenth of a second.

- 4 See for example Gaines (1997).
- 5 Ibn 'Arabî asserts that this person was Asif bin Barkhya, who is known as *al-Khadir*. Al-Khadir literally means 'the Green One', a legendary figure endowed with immortal life. He represents freshness of spirit and eternal liveliness. The stories surrounding al-Khadir are usually associated with *Sûrat al-Kahf* in the Qur'an [18:60–82], where Allah described the journey of Moses and his servant to the 'meeting of the two seas' to meet al-Khadir and learn from him. Ibn 'Arabî himself mentioned that he had met him several times [I.186], and he considers him a divine Messenger and one of four 'Pillars' in the spiritual hierarchy [II.5.31].
- 6 See *Fusûs Al-Hikam*, with commentary by 'Abd al-Razzâq al-Qâshânî and Bâlî Effendî (Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turâth, 1997): 321–324.
- 7 The black body problem was raised by the observation that certain materials (especially black bodies) can absorb all frequencies or wavelengths of light. So when heated they should then radiate all frequencies of light equally – at least theoretically. But the distribution of energy radiated in real-life experiments never matched up with the predictions of classical physics.
- 8 The spin is the motion of the particle around its axis just like the daily motion of the Earth.
- 9 For more details about the hierarchy of letters according to Ibn 'Arabî see the related English translations by Denis Gril (2004) in *The Meccan Revelations*, vol. II, NY: Pir Press: 107–220.
- 10 Wim van den Dungen, 'On Being and the Majesty of the Worlds', Reg. No.51, in *SofiaTopiaNet*; Sophia Society for philosophy, [www.sofiatopia.org/equiaeon/being.htm#dim].
- 11 Ibn 'Arabî makes various comments on this verse in the *Futûhât* [I.156.15, I.238.13, I.279.16, II.16.32, II.150.34, II.209.9, II.225.6, II.296.6, II.298.33, II.556.32, III.275.33, III.315.6, III.344.30, IV.28.28, IV.93.3].
- 12 Ibn 'Arabî explained before this text that angels correspond cosmologically to eighteen characters of the alphabet, which are produced as a result of the meeting between the nine divine donating (*ilqâ'*) orbs and the nine human accepting (*talaqqî*) orbs [I.54.12].

Bibliography

The bibliography is arranged into four categories:

- A Ibn ‘Arabî’s printed works (in Arabic)
- B Arabic works on Ibn ‘Arabî and related subjects
- C English translations and studies on Ibn ‘Arabî and related subjects
- D Cited books and articles on philosophy, cosmology and time

A: Ibn ‘Arabî’s printed works (in Arabic)

The following is a list of Ibn ‘Arabî’s printed books and treatises that are available in Arabic. This list is arranged alphabetically according to the title, not including initial article *Al-*, *Kitâb* or *Risâla*. The ‘OY no.’ column on the right gives the corresponding bibliographical classification of the original manuscripts by Osman Yahya. The names of editors have been cited whenever given in the printed text. The numbers given in parentheses immediately after the names of some individual treatises also refer to Yahya’s classification.

Ibn ‘Arabî (1994) <i>Al-‘Abâdila</i> , Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qâhira, 2nd ed., ed. ‘Abd Al-Qâdir A. ‘Atâ	OY# 2
— (1999) <i>‘Ajâ’ib Al-‘Irfân fî Tafsîr I’jâz Al-Bayân fî Al-Tarjama ‘an Al-Qur’an</i> , Cairo: Al-Sharika Al-Muttahida, ed. Muhammad I. M. Sâlim	732
— (1999) <i>Kitâb ‘Anqâ’ Mughrib</i> , Cairo: n.p., ed. Muhammad I. M. Sâlim	30
— (n.d.) <i>‘Aqida fî Al-Tawhîd</i> , or <i>‘Aqîdat ahl Al-Islâm</i> , Egypt: n.p.	34
— (1919) <i>‘Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz</i> , including <i>Kitâb Inshâ’ Al-Dawâ’ir</i> and <i>Kitâb Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya fî Islâh Al-Mamlaka Al-Insâniyya</i> , Leiden: Brill; in <i>Kleinere Schriften des Ibn Al-‘Arabî</i> , ed. H. S. Nyberg	802 289 716
— (1954) <i>Kitâb Al-Bâ’</i> , Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qâhira, also includes: <i>Kitâb Al-Yâ’</i> (OY no. 205), <i>Kitâb Al-Jalâla</i> (169), <i>Kitâb Al-Alif</i> (25), <i>Kitâb Al-Sha’n</i> (26)	71
— (1968) <i>Dhakhâ’ir al A’lâq</i> , Cairo: n.p.	116
— (1855) <i>Dîwân Ibn ‘Arabî</i> , Bulaq	102
— (1996) <i>Dîwân Ibn ‘Arabî</i> , Beirut: Dâr Al-Kutub Al-‘Ilmiyya, ed. Ahmad Hasan Basaj	102
— (1923) <i>Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ’</i> , Beirut: n.p.	178
— (1946) <i>Fusûs Al-Hikam</i> , Cairo: n.p.; critical edition by A. ‘Affifi	150

- (1997) *Fusûs Al-Hikam* with commentary by ‘Abd Al-Razzâq Al-Qâshânî and Bâli Effendi, Cairo: Al-Maktabat Al-Azhariyya li-l-Turâth 150
- (n.d.) *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkîyya*, Vols 1–4, Beirut: n.p.; this is a photographic reprint of the old edition of Bulaq 1329/1911 which comprises four volumes each about 700 pages of 35 lines; the page size is 20 by 27 cm. This is the standard version used in citations throughout this book. 135
- (1970) *Al-Futûhât Al-Makkîyya*, Vols. 1–14, ed. Osman Yahya, Cairo: The General Egyptian Book Organization; this is the critical edition by Osman Yahya. This version was not completed, and the 14 volumes correspond to only volume I of the standard Bulaq/Beirut edition. 135
- (AH 1326) *Hilyat Al-Abdâl*, Istanbul: n.p. 237
- (1907) *Kitâb Al-Hujub*, Cairo: n.p. 247
- (2004) *Kitâb Al-Hujub*, Cairo: Maktabat Al-Thaqâfa Al-Dîniyya, ed. As‘ad ‘Abd Al-Fattâh 247
- (1988) *Kitâb Al-Isrâ ilâ Al-Maqâm Al-Asrâ* or *Kitâb Al-Mi‘râj*, Beirut: Dandarâh; critical edition, ed. Su‘ad Al-Hakîm. 313
- (n.d.) *Istîlâhât Al-Sûfiyya*, Cairo: ‘âlam Al-Fikr 315
- (1996) *Kalimat Allah* or *Kitâb Al-Jalâla*, Damascus: Al-Hikma, ed. Riyâd M. Al-‘Abdullâh 169
- (1987) *Kitâb Al-Khalwat Al-Mutlaqa*, Cairo: n.p. 255
- (1967) *Kitâb Kunh mâ lâ Budd li-l-Murîd Minhu*, Cairo: M. A. Subaih 352
- (1970) *Kitâb Al-Mabâdî wa-l-Ghâyât*, Damascus: n.p. 380
- (1949) *Majmû‘at Sâ‘at Al-Khabar*, Cairo: Mustafa Al-Halabî 642
- (1999) *Al-Masâ‘il li-Idâh Al-Masâ‘il*, Amman: Azmina, ed. Qâsim M. Abbâs 433
- (1907) *Mawâqî‘ Al-Nujûm*, Cairo: n.p. 443
- (n.d.) *Mir‘ât Al-Ma‘ânî*, photocopy of a book in Al-Maktaba Al-Zâhiriyya, Damascus: n.p. 230
- (AH 1369) *Mishkât Al-Anwâr*, Cairo: n.p. 480
- (n.d.) *Muhâdarat Al-Abrâr wa Musâmarat Al-Akhyâr*, Vols 1 & 2, Beirut: Dâr Sâdir 493
- (1978) *Al-Nûr Al-Asnâ bi-Munajât Allah bi Asmâ‘ihi Al-Husnâ*, Cairo: M. A. Subayh 502
- (1994) *Kitâb Al-Qasam Al-Ilâhi bil-Isim Al-Rabbânî*, Cairo: n.p. 565
- (n.d.) *Radd Al-Muhkam ila Al-Mutashâbih*, Cairo: ‘Âlam Al-Fikr, ed. ‘Abd Al-Rahmân Hasan Mahmûd 588
- (n.d.) *Rasâ‘il Ibn ‘Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Ihyâ‘ Al-Turâth Al-‘Arabî; this is a photographic reprint, in a single volume, of the same famous collection published by the Dâ‘irat Al-Ma‘ârif Al-‘Uthmâniyya (Hyderabad, 1948), based on a manuscript in the Ayasofia library (Istanbul), no. 376, containing 29 short works. Many of these works have been published also separately or in other groups of collected treatises. These are the books and pamphlets contained in this collection, in the same order:
- Part I
1. *Kitâb Al-Fanâ‘ fî Al-Mushâhada* 125
 2. *Kitâb Al-Jalâl wa-l-Jamâl* 168
 3. *Kitâb Al-Alif wa huwa Kitâb Al-Ahadiyya* 25
 4. *Kitâb Al-Jalâla wa huwa Kalimat Allâh* 169
 5. *Kitâb Al-Sha‘n* 67
 6. *Kitâb (Maqâm) Al-Qurba* 414

	7. <i>Kitâb Al-I'lâm bi-Ishârât Ahl Al-Ilhâm</i>	281
	8. <i>Kitâb Al-Mîm wa-l-Wâw wa-l-Nun</i>	462
	9. <i>Risâlat Al-Qasam Al-Ilâhî</i>	565
	10. <i>Kitâb Al-Yâ'</i>	205
	11. <i>Kitâb Al-Azal</i>	68
	12. <i>Risâlat Al-Anwâr</i>	33
	13. <i>Kitâb Al-Isrâ ilâ Al-Maqâm Al-Asrâ</i>	313
	14. <i>Risâla fi Su'al Ismâ'il bin Sawdakîn</i>	182
	15. <i>Risâlat Al-Shaykh ilâ Al-Imâm Al-Râzi</i>	612
	16. <i>Risâlat La Yu'awwal 'Alayhi</i>	532
	17. <i>Kitâb Al-Shâhid</i>	668
Part II	18. <i>Kitâb Al-Tarâjim</i>	737
	19. <i>Kitâb Manzil Al-Qutb wa Maqâmuhu wa Hâluhu</i>	585
	20. <i>Risâlat Al-Intisâr</i>	294
	21. <i>Kitâb Al-Kutub</i>	354
	22. <i>Kitâb Al-Masâ'il</i>	433
	23. <i>Kitâb Al-Tajalliyât</i>	738
	24. <i>Kitâb Al-Isfâr 'an Natâ'ij Al-Asfâr</i>	307
	25. <i>Kitâb Al-Wasâyâ</i>	817
	26. <i>Kitâb Hilyat Al-Abdâl</i>	237
	27. <i>Kitâb Naqsh Al-Fusûs</i>	528
	28. <i>Kitâb Al-Wasiyya</i>	820
	29. <i>Kitâb Istilâh Al-Sûfiyya</i>	315

— (2002–04) *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Mu'assasat Al-Intishâr Al-'Arabî, ed. Sa'id 'Abd Al-Fattâh; four volumes in this series of collected treatises have been published so far. Most of their contents are available in separate books from other earlier publishers (including many of those listed separately here), but the editor has given some critical notes and comparisons between different manuscripts. A number of the treatises included in this collection are clearly apocryphal works. These are the books and pamphlets contained in these four volumes, in the same order (with page nos):

Part I	31–70	<i>Fihras Mu'allafât Ibn 'Arabî</i>	142
	71–118	<i>Kitâb Al-'Azama</i>	70
	119–130	<i>Kitâb Marâtib 'Ulûm Al-Wahb</i>	423
	131–146	<i>Kitâb Al-Hurûf Al-Thalâtha</i>	462
	147–156	<i>Kitâb Al-Lum'a</i>	372
	157–192	<i>Kitâb Manzil Al-Manâzil Al-Fahwâniyya</i>	412
	193–206	<i>Risâla fi Asrâr Al-Dhât Al-Ilâhiyya</i>	
	207–232	<i>Kitâb Al-Qutb wa-l-Imâmayn wa-l-Mudlijîn</i>	585
	233–246	<i>Kitâb Maqâm Al-Qurba</i>	414
	247–264	<i>Kitâb Al-Madkhal ilâ Al-Maqсад Al-Asmâ fi Al-Ishârât</i>	
	265–278	<i>Kitâb Nuskhat Al-Haqq</i>	551
	279–347	<i>Kitâb Shaqq Al-Jayb bi-'Ilm Al-Ghayb</i>	671
Part II	18–61	<i>Kitâb Al-Qutb Wa-l-Nuqabâ'</i>	548
	62–131	<i>'Uqlat Al-Mustawfiz</i>	802
	131–145	<i>Risâlat Al-Durrat Al-Baydâ'</i>	178
	146–231	<i>Risâlat Al-Anwâr fi mâ Yumnahu Sâhibu Al-Khalwa min Al-Asrâr</i>	33

	233–287	<i>Tāj Al-Rasâ'il wa Minhāj Al-Wasâ'il</i>	736
	288–406	<i>Kitâb Al-Tadbîrât Al-Ilâhiyya fî Islâh Al-Mamlakat Al-Insâniyya</i>	289
Part III		<i>Al-Kawkab Al-Durrî fî Manâqib dhî-l-Nûn Al-Masrî</i>	
Part IV	19–76	<i>Kitâb Al-Yaqîn</i>	834
	79–162	<i>Kitâb 'Anqâ' Mughrib</i>	30
	165–311	<i>Kitâb Al-Ma'rifa</i>	433

— *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî; Kashf Al-Sitr* (Amman: Azmina, 2004), ed. Qâsim M. Abbâs.
Includes the following treatises (several apparently apocryphal):

	69–90	<i>Kashf Al-Sitr li Ahl Al-Sirr</i>	340
	91–97	<i>Risâlat Al-Waqt wa-l-Ân</i>	
	95–111	<i>Kitâb Marâtib 'Ulûm Al-Wahb</i>	423
	113–131	<i>Kitâb Al-Huwa</i>	205
	133–143	<i>Risâlat Al-Ma'lûm min 'Aqâ'id Ahl Al-Rusûm</i>	402
	145–167	<i>Kitâb Al-Ittihâd Al-Kawnî fî Hadhrat Al-Ishhâd Al-'Aynî</i>	

— (2000) *Majmû'at Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Mahajjat Al-Baydâ; most of the contents of these three volumes, as in no. 64 above, are brought together from previously published separate books or collections, but the reprinted versions in this volume are newly type in a clearer modern font. Three volumes containing a collection of treatises as follows:

Part I	7–74	<i>Tahdhib Al-Akhlâq</i>	745
	75–94	<i>Al-Maw'iza Al-Hasana</i>	448
	95–230	<i>Risâlat Rûh Al-Quds</i>	639
	231–258	<i>Al-'Ujâla</i>	772
	259–290	<i>(Risâlat) Al-Anwâr</i>	33
	291–308	<i>'Aqida fî Al-Tawhid aw 'Aqidat Ahl Al-Islâm</i>	34
	309–358	<i>Shajarat Al-Kawn</i>	666
	359–372	<i>Al-Nûr Al-Asnâ bi-Munajât Allâh bi Asmâ'ihî Al-Husnâ</i>	502
	373–422	<i>Tanbihât 'Alâ 'Uluww Al-Haqîqat Al-Muhammadiyya</i>	763
	423–454	<i>Al-Khalwat Al-Mutlaqa</i>	255
	455–520	<i>Kitâb Al-Bâ'</i>	71
	521–546	<i>Kitâb Kunh mâ lâ Budd li-l-Murîd Minhu</i>	352
	547–574	<i>Istilâhât Al-Sûfiyya</i>	315
	575–602	<i>Al-Hikma Al-Hâtimiyya</i>	233
	603–622	<i>Risâlat Al-Shaykh ilâ Al-Imâm Al-Râzi</i>	612
	623–662	<i>Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf</i> [including: <i>Al-Salawât Al-Mutalsama</i> , <i>Al-Salawât Al-Akbariyya</i> (OY no. 705), <i>Al-Salawât Faydiyya</i> (702), <i>Al-Dawr Al-A'la</i> (244) and <i>Al-Salât Al-Nâriyya</i>]	244
Part II	5–66	<i>Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya fî Al-Ahkâm Al-Ilâhiyya</i>	761
	67–314	<i>Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya fî Asrâr Al-Taharât Wa-l-Salawât Wa-l-Ayyâm Al-Asliyya</i>	762
	315–504	<i>Radd Al-Mutashâbih ilâ Al-Muhkam min Al-Ayât wa-l-Ahâdîth</i>	588
Part III	5–60	<i>'Anqâ' Mughrib fî Khatm Al-Awliyâ wa Shams Al-Maghrib</i>	30
	61–250	<i>Al-'Abâdila</i>	2
	251–374	<i>Mawâqî' Al-Nujûm wa Matâli' Ahillat Al-Asrâr wa-l-'Ulûm</i>	443
	375–484	<i>Majmû'at Sâ'at Al-Khabar</i>	642

— (1998) *Rasâ'il Ibn 'Arabî: Sharh Muftada' Al-Tûfân wa Rasâ'il Ukhra'*, Abu Dhabi: Cultural Foundation, eds Qâsim M. Abbâs and Husayn M. 'Ujayl; this book contains 12 probably apocryphal treatises which are based on a manuscript in the Museum of Iraq (Baghdad no. 597), listed by its publishers as an autograph dated AH 635. The editors claim that those works were written by Ibn 'Arabî between AH 636 and 638 in apparent contradiction with the earlier date they assign to their manuscript:

1	<i>'Ayn Al-A'yân</i>	
2	<i>Khurûj Al-Shukhûs min Burûj Al-Khusûs</i>	262
3	<i>Inkhirâq Al-Junûd ilâ Al-Julûd</i>	288
4	<i>Bahr Al-Shukr fî Nahr Al-Nukr</i>	
5	<i>Sharh Muftada' Al-Tûfân</i>	685
6	<i>Al-Miqdâr fî Nuzûl Al-Jabbâr</i>	472
7	<i>Nashr Al-Bayâd fî Rawdat Al-Riyâd</i>	
8	<i>Khâtimat Nuzûl Al-Jabbâr</i>	
9	<i>Al-Radd 'alâ Al-Yahûd</i>	80
10	<i>Khatimat Al-Radd 'alâ Al-Yahûd</i>	256
11	<i>Baqiyyat Khâtimat Al-Radd 'alâ Al-Yahûd</i>	
12	<i>Kashf Sirr Al-Wa'd wa Bayân 'Alâmat Al-Wajd</i>	342

- (n.d.) *Al-Risâla Al-Wujûdiyya (The Treatise on Being)*, Cairo: n.p. 13
- (1970) *Kitâb Rûh Al-Quds*, Damascus: n.p. 639
- (1964) *Risâlat Rûh Al-Quds fî Muhâsabat Al-Nafs*, Damascus: Matba'at Al-'Ilm 639
- (1996) *Al-Shajara Al-Nu'mâniyya*, Cairo: n.p. 665
- (2003) *Shajarat Al-Kawn*, Damascus: Dâr Al-Mahabba, ed. 'Abd Al-Rahîm Mardini 666
- (2002) *Sharh Asmâ' Allâh Al-Husnâ or Kashf Al-Ma'nâ 'an Asmâ' Allâh Al-Husnâ*, Cairo: Al-Maktaba Al-Azhariyya li-l-Turâth, ed. M. I. M. Sâlim 338
- (1999) *Shujûn Al-Masjûn wa Funûn Al-Maftûn*, Damascus: Sa'd Al-Dîn, ed. Dr 'Alî I. Kurdi 692
- (2002) *Tafsîr Ibn 'Arabî*, Vols. 1 & 2, Beirut: Dâr Sâdir; Osman Yahya lists this work in his classification of Ibn 'Arabî's works, on the basis of one manuscript, but he and all other commentators agree that it is actually by the later figure Abd al-Razzâq al-Qâshânî, a famous commentator on Ibn 'Arabî's *Fusûs al-Hikam*. 732
- (1988) *Al-Tajalliyât Al-Ilâhiyya*, Tehran: Dânishgâh-i Tehran; critical edition by Osman Yahya, with the anonymous commentary *Kashf Al-Ghâyât* and Ibn Sawdakîn's notes 738
- (1987) *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Layliyya fî Al-Ahkâm Al-Ilâhiyya*, together with *Risâla fî Nasab Al-Khirqa* (OY no. 530), Cairo: 'Âlam Al-Fikr, ed. 'Abd Al-Rahmân Hasan Mahmûd 761
- (1986) *Al-Tanazzulât Al-Mawsiliyya fî Asrâr Al-Taharât Wa-l-Salawât Wa-l-Ayyâm Al-Asliyya or Tanazzul Al-Amlâk fî 'Âlam Al-Aflâk*, Cairo: 'Âlam Al-Fikr, ed. 'Abd Al-Rahmân Hasan Mahmûd 762
- (1966) *Tarjumân Al-Ashwâq*, Beirut: Dâr Sâdir; this volume is in fact the *Kitâb Al-Dhakhâ'ir wa-l-A'lâq*, which is Ibn 'Arabî's own commentary on his *Tarjumân Al-Ashwâq* (OY no. 767). 116 767
- (n.d.) *Tawajjuhât Al-Hurûf*, Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qâhira; includes *Al-Dawr Al-A'alâ* or *Hizb Al-Wiqâyah li man 'Arada Al-Wilâya* (244) and a few short works or prayers upon the Prophet including *Al-Salawât Al-Faydiyya* (702). 244

B: Arabic works on Ibn 'Arabî and related subjects

- 'Abdul-Muta'âl, A. (2003) *Tasawwur Ibn Sinâ li-l-Zamân wa Usûlûh Al-Yunâniyya (Ibn Sinâ's Concept of Time and Its Greek Origins)* Alexandria: Dâr Al-Wafâ'
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- (1999) *Marâtib Al-Wujûd (The Levels of Existence)*, Cairo: Maktabat Al-Qâhira
- Al-Kindî (1950) *Rasâ'il Al-Kindî Al-Falsafîyya, Risâla fî Al-Falsafa Al-Ûlâ (Al-Kindî's Philosophical Treatises, a Treatise on the First Philosophy)*, ed. Muhammed A. Abû Ridâ, Cairo: n.p.
- Al-Marzûqî (2002) *Al-Azmina wa'l-Amkina (The Times and the Places)*, ed. Muhammad N. Al-Daylami, Beirut: 'Alâma li-l-Kutub
- Al-Muttaqî Al-Hindî (1989) *Kanz Al-'Ummâl (The Treasure of the Workers)*, Beirut: Mu'assasat Al-Risâla
- Al-Nisabûrî, M., *Al Mustadrak 'ala Sahîhayn* (n.d.) Beirut: Dar Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyya.
- Al-Shâfî'î, A. (1980) *Al-Sirâj Al-Wahhâj fî Haqâ'iq Al-Isrâ' wa'l-Mi'râj*, in *Mawsû'at Al-Isrâ wa'l-Mi'râj*, Cairo: Maktabat Al-Il-'tisâm
- Al-Sha'rânî, A. (1959) *Al-Yawâqût wa'l-Jawâhir fî Bayân Aqâ'id Al-Akâbir*, Cairo: Mustafâ Al-Bâbî Al-Halabî; including: *Al-Kibrît Al-Ahmar fî Bayân 'Ulûm Al-Shaykh Al-Akbar*
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- Al-Tu'aymî, M., ed. (1994) *Mawsû'at Al-Isrâ wa'l-Mi'râj*, Beirut: Dâr Al-Hilâl
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الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١

[الجزء الأول]

مقدمة المؤلف

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم الحمد لله فاعل كل محسوس و معقول و غاية كل مطلوب و مسئول و الصلاة على صفوة عبادِه و هداة الخلق إلى مبدئه و معاده سيما سيد المصطفين محمد المبعوث إلى كافة الثقلين اللهم فصل عليه و على الأرواح الطاهرة من أهل بيته و أولاده و الأشباح الزاهرة من أوليائه و أحفاده.

و بعد فيقول الفقير إلى رحمة ربه الغني محمد المشتهر بصدر الدين الشيرازي - إن السعادة ربما يظن بها أنها الفوز بالدرجات الحسية و الوصول إلى الرئاسات الخيالية - و ما أبين لمن تحقق الأمور و تفتن بالمعارف أن السعادات العاجلية و اللذات الحسية الفورية ليس شيء منها سعادة حقيقية و لا ينالها بهجة عقلية لما يرى كلا من متعاطيها منهمكا فيما انقطعت السكينات الإلهية عن حوالبه و امتنعت المعارف الربوبية عن الحلول فيه و تعذر عليه إخلاص النية الإلهية الصادرة عن حاق الجوهر النطقي من غير معاوقة همة دنيوية أو مضادة طلبية عاجلية التي يرجى بها نيل السعادة الحقيقية و تعاطيها و الاتصال بالفيض العلوي الذي يزال به الكمه عن حدقة نفسه الموجود فيها بسبب انحصارها في عالم الغربة و وجودها في دار الجسد - و احتباسها عن ملاحظة جمال الأبد و معاينة الجلال السرمدي و لا شك أن أقصى غاية يتأتى لأحد الموجودات الوصول إليها هو الكمال المختص به و الملائم المنسوب إليه و كلما انحط عنه فهو نقصان بالحقيقة فيه و إن كان كمالاته بالإضافة إلى ما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢

في رتبة الوجود تاليه و ما من دابة فما دونها إلا و من شأنها البلوغ إلى أقصى ما لها في ذاتها ما لم يعقها عائق و لنوع الإنسان كمال خاص لجوهر ذاته و حاق حقيقته - لا يفوقها فيه فائق و لا يسبق به عليها سابق و هو الاتصال بالمعقولات و مجاورة الباري - و التجرد عن الماديات و إن كانت له مشاركة بحسب كل قوة توجد فيه لما يساويه من تلك الجهة أو يليه فلسائر الأجسام في حصوله في الحيز و الفضاء و للنبات في الاغتذاء و النماء و للعجم من الحيوان في حياته بأنفاسه و حركته بإرادته و إحساسه - و تلك الخاصية إنما تحصل بالعلوم و المعارف مع انقطاع عن التعلق بالخارف.

ثم لما كانت العلوم متشعبة و فنون الإدراكات متكثرة و الإحاطة بجملتها متعذرة أو متعسرة و لذلك تشعبت فيه الهمم كما تفتنت في الصنائع قدم أهل العالم - فافتقرت العلماء زمرا و تقطعوا أمرهم بينهم زبرا بين معقول و منقول و فروع و أصول فهمة نحو نحو و صرف و أحكام و همة نحو فقه و رجال و كلام.

فالواجب على العاقل أن يتوجه بشرائره إلى الاشتغال بالأهم و الحزم له أن يكب طول عمره على ما الاختصاص لتكميل ذاته فيه أتم بعد ما حصل له من سائر العلوم و المعارف بقدر الحاجة إليها في المعاش و المعاد و الخلاص عما يعوقه

عن الوصول إلى منزل الرشاد و يوم الميعاد و ذلك هو ما يختص من العلوم بتكميل إحدى قوته اللتين هما جهة ذاته و وجهه إلى الحق و جهة إضافته و وجهه إلى الخلق و تلك هي النظرية التي بحسب حاق جوهر ذاته من دون شركة الإضافة إلى الجسم و انفعالاته و ما من علم غير الحكمة الإلهية و المعارف الربانية إلا و الاحتياج إليه بمدخلية الجسم و قواه - و مزاوله البدن و هواه و ليس من العلوم ما يتكفل بتكميل جوهر الذات الإنسانية - و إزالة مثالبها و مساوئها حين انقطاعها عن الدنيا و ما فيها و الرجوع إلى حاق حقيقتها - و الإقبال بالكلية إلى بارئها و منشئها و موجدتها و معطيها إلا العلوم العقلية المحضة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣

و هي العلم بالله و صفاته و ملائكته و كتبه و رسله و كيفية صدور الأشياء منه على الوجه الأكمل و النظام الأفضل و كيفية عنايته و علمه بها و تدبيره إياها بلا خلل و قصور و آفة و فتور و علم النفس و طريقها إلى الآخرة و اتصالها بالمال الأعلى و افتراقها عن وثاقها و بعدها عن الهيولى إذ بها يتم لها الانطلاق عن مضائق الإمكان و النجاة عن طوارق الحدثان و الانغماس في بحار الملكوت و الانتظام في سلك سكان الجبروت - فيتخلص عن أسر الشهوات و التقلب في خبط العشوات و الانفعال عن آثار الحركات - و قبول تحكم دورات السماوات.

و أما ما وراءها فإن كان وسيلة إليها فهو نافع لأجلها و إن لم يكن وسيلة إليها - كالتحوي و اللغة و الشعر و أنواع العلوم فهي حرف و صناعات كباقي الحرف و الملكات.

و أما الحاجة إلى العمل و العبادة القلبية و البدنية فلتطهارة النفس و زكائها - بالأوضاع الشرعية و الرياضات البدنية لئلا تتمكن للنفس بسبب اشتغالها بالبدن - و نزوعها إلى شهواته و شوقها إلى مقتضياته هيئة انقهارية للبدن و هواه فترسخ لها ملكة انقيادية لمشتته و تمنعها إذا مات البدن عن لذاتها الخاصة بها من مجاورة المقربين - و مشاهدة الأمور الجميلة و أنوار القدسين و لا يكون معها البدن فيلهيها كما كان قبل البدن ينسيها فصدر من الرحمة الإلهية و الشريعة الرحمانية الأمر بتطويع القوى الإمارة للنفس المطمئنة بالشرائع الدينية و السياسات الإلهية رياضة للجسد و هواه - و مجاهدة للنفس الأدمية مع أعداء من قواه لينخرط معها في سلك التوجه إلى جناب الحق من عالم الزور و معدن الغرور و لا يعاوقها بل يشايعها في مطالبها و يرافقها في مآربها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤

ثم إنني قد صرفت قوتي في سالف الزمان منذ أول الحداثة و الريعان في الفلسفة الإلهية بمقدار ما أوتيت من المقدور و بلغ إليه قسطني من السعي الموفور - و اقتفيت آثار الحكماء السابقين و الفضلاء اللاحقين مقتبسا من نتائج خواطيرهم و أنظارهم مستفيدا من أبكار ضمايرهم و أسرارهم و حصلت ما وجدته في كتب اليونانيين و الرؤساء المعلمين تحصيلًا يختار اللباب من كل باب و يجتاز عن التطويل و الإطناب مجتنبًا في ذلك طول الأمل مع قصر العمل معرضًا من إسهاب الجدل مع اقتراب الساعة و الأجل طلبًا للجاه الوهمي و تشوقًا إلى الترويس الخيالي من غير أن يظفر من الحكمة بطائل أو يرجع البحث إلى حاصل كما يرى من أكثر أبناء الزمان من مزاولي كتب العلم و العرفان من حيث كونهم منكبين أولاً بتمام الجد على مصنفات العلماء منصبين بكمال الجهد إلى مؤلفات الفضلاء ثم عن قليل يشبعون عن كل فن بسرعة و

يقنعون عن كل دن بجرعة لعدم وجدانهم فيها ما حداهم إليها شهواتهم شهوات العنين - و دواعيهم دواعي الجنين و لهذا لم ينالوا من العلم نصيبا كثيرا و لا الشقي الغوي منهم يصير سعيدا بصيرا بل ترى من المشتغلين ما يرجي طول عمره في البحث و التكرار آناء الليل و أطراف النهار ثم يرجع بخفي حنين و يصير مطرحا للعار و الشين و هم المذكورون في قوله تعالى **قُلْ هَلْ نُنَبِّئُكُمْ بِالْأَخْسَرِينَ أَعْمَالًا الَّذِينَ ضَلَّ سَعْيُهُمْ فِي الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا وَ هُمْ**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥

يَحْسِبُونَ أَنَّهُمْ يُحْسِنُونَ صُنْعًا أعادنا الله من هذه الورطة المدهشة و الظلمة الموحشة و إنني لقد صادفت أصدافا علمية في بحر الحكمة الزاخرة مدعمة بدعائم البراهين الباهرة مشحونة بدرر من نكات فاخرة مكنونة فيها لآلىء دقائق زاهرة - و كنت برهة من الزمان أجيل رأيي أردد قداحي و أوامر نفسي و أنزع سري حديبا على أهل الطلب و من له في تحقيق الحق أرب في أن أشق تلك الأصداف السمينية و أستخرج منها دررها الثمينية و أروق بمصفاة الفكر صفافها من كدرها و أنخل بمنخل الطبيعة لبابها عن قشورها و أصنف كتابا جامعا لشتات ما وجدته في كتب الأقدمين مشتملا على خلاصة أقوال المشائين و نقاوة أذواق أهل الإشراف من الحكماء الروافيين مع زوائد لم توجد في كتب أهل الفن من حكماء الإعصار و فرائد لم يجد بها طبع أحد من علماء الأدوار و لم يسمح بمثله دورات السماوات و لم يشاهد شبهه في عالم الحركات و لكن العوائق كانت تمنع من المراد و عوادي الأيام تضرب دون بلوغ الغرض بالأسداد فأقعديني الأيام عن القيام و حجبني الدهر عن الاتصال إلى المرام لما رأيت من معادات الدهر بتربية الجهلة و الأرذال و شعشة نيران الجهالة و الضلال و رثاثة الحال و ركافة الرجال - و قد ابتلينا بجماعة غاربي الفهم تعمش عيونهم عن أنوار الحكمة و أسرارها تكل بصائرهم كأبصار الخفافيش عن أضواء المعرفة و آثارها يرون التعمق في الأمور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦

الربانية و التدبر في الآيات السبحانية بدعة و مخالفة أوضاع جماهير الخلق من الهمج الرعاع ضلالة و خدعة كأنهم الحنابلة من كتب الحديث المتشابه عندهم الواجب و الممكن و القديم و الحديث لم يتعد نظرهم عن طور الأجسام و مساميرها - و لم يرتق فكرهم عن هذه الهياكل المظلمة و دياجيرها فحرموا لمعاداتهم العلم و العرفان و رفضهم بالكلية طريق الحكمة و الإيقان عن العلوم المقدسة الإلهية و الأسرار الشريفة الربانية التي رمزت الأنبياء و الأولياء عليها و أشارت الحكماء و العرفاء إليها - فأصبح الجهل باهر الرايات ظاهر الآيات فأعدموا العلم و فضله و استرذلوا العرفان و أهله و انصرفوا عن الحكمة زاهدين و منعوها معاندين ينفرون الطباع عن الحكماء و يطرحون العلماء العرفاء و الأصفياء و كل من كان في بحر الجهل و الحمق أولج و عن ضياء المعقول و المنقول أسرج كان إلى أوج القبول و الإقبال أوصل و عند أرباب الزمان أعلم و أفضل -

كم عالم لم يلج بالقرع باب منى و جاهل قبل قرع الباب قد ولجا

و كيف و رؤسائهم قوم أعزل من صلاح الفضل و السداد عارية مناكبهم عن لباس العقل و الرشاد صدورهم عن حلي الآداب أعطال و وجوههم عن سمات الخير أغفال فلما رأيت الحال على هذا المنوال من خلو الديار عمن يعرف قدر الأسرار - و علوم الأحرار و أنه قد اندرس العلم و أسرارها و انطمس الحق و أنواره و ضاعت السير العادلة و شاعت الآراء

الباطلة ولقد أصبح عين ماء الحيوان غائرة وظلت تجارة أهلها باثرة وآبت وجوههم بعد نضارتها باسرة وآلت حال صفقتهم خائبة خاسرة- ضربت عن أبناء الزمان صفحا وطويت عنهم كشحا فالجاني خمود الفطنة وجمود الطبيعة لمعاداة الزمان وعدم مساعدة الدوران إلى أن انزويت في بعض نواحي الديار واستترت بالخموم والانكسار منقطع الآمال منكسر البال متوفرا على فرض أوديه و تفريط في جنب الله أسعى في تلافيه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧

لا على درس أقيه أو تأليف أتصرف فيه إذ أتصرف في العلوم والصناعات وإفادة المباحث ودفع المعضلات وتبيين المقاصد ورفع المشكلات مما يحتاج إلى تصفية الفكر وتهذيب الخيال عما يوجب الملل والاختلال واستقامة الأوضاع والأحوال مع فراغ البال ومن أين يحصل للإنسان مع هذه المكاه التي يسمع ويرى من أهل الزمان ويشاهد مما يكتب عليه الناس في هذا الأوان من قلة الإنصاف وكثرة الاعتساف- وخفض الأعالي والأفاضل ورفع الأداني والأراذل وظهور الجاهل الشرير والعامي النكير على صورة العالم التحرير وهيئة الحبر الخبير إلى غير ذلك من القبائح والمفاسد الفاشية اللازمة والمتعدية مجال المخاطبة في المقال وتقرير الجواب عن السؤال- فضلا عن حل المعضلات وتبيين المشكلات كما نظمها بعض إخواني في الفرس.

قفل گوهر ساز یاقوت زمرد پوش را

از سخن پر در مکن همچون صدف هر گوش را

چشم بینا عذر میخواهد لب خاموش را

در جواب هر سوالی حاجت گفتار نیست

فكنت أولا كما قال سيدي ومولاي ومعتدي أول الأئمة والأوصياء وأبو الأئمة الشهداء الأولياء قسيم الجنة والنار آخذا بالتقية ومدارة مع الأشرار مخلا عن مورد الخلافة قليل الأنصار مطلق الدنيا مؤثر الآخرة على الأولى مولى كل من كان له رسول الله مولى وأخوه وابن عمه ومساهمه في طمه ورمه طفقت أرثني بين أن أصول بيد جذاء أو أصبر على طخية عمياء يهرم فيها الكبير ويشيب فيها الصغير ويكدح فيها مؤمن حتى يلقي ربه فصرت ثانيا عنان الاقتداء بسيرته عاطفا وجه الاهتداء بسنته- فرأيت أن الصبر على هاتي أحجى فصبرت وفي العين قذى وفي الحلق شجى فأمسكت عناني عن الاشتغال بالناس ومخالطتهم وآيست عن مرافقتهم وموانستهم وسهلت علي معاداة الدوران ومعاندة أبناء الزمان وخلصت عن إنكارهم وإقرارهم وتساوى عندي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٨

إعزازهم وإضرارهم فتوجهت توجها غريزيا نحو مسبب الأسباب وتضرعت تضرعا جبليا إلى مسهل الأمور الصعاب فلما بقيت على هذا الحال من الاستتار والإنزواء والخمول والاعتزال زمانا مديدا وأما بعيدا اشتعلت نفسي لطول المجاهدات اشتعالا نوريا- والتهب قلبي لكثرة الرياضات التهايا قويا ففاضت عليها أنوار الملكوت وحلت بها خبايا الجبروت ولحقتها الأضواء الأحدية وتداركتها الألفاظ الإلهية فاطلعت على أسرار لم أكن أطلع عليها إلى الآن و انكشفت لي رموز لم تكن منكشفة هذا الانكشاف من البرهان بل كل ما علمته من قبل بالبرهان عينته مع زوائد بالشهود والعيان من الأسرار الإلهية والحقائق الربانية والودائع اللاهوتية والخبايا الصمدانية فاستروح العقل من أنوار الحق بكرة وعشيا وقرب بها منه وخلص إليه نجيا فركا بظواهر جوارحه فإذا هو ماء ثجاج وزوى بباطن تعقلاته

للطالبين فإذا هو بحر موج أودية الفهوم سالت من فيضه بقدرها و جداول العقول فاضت من رشحه بنهرها فأبرزت الأوادي على سواحل الأسماع جواهر ثاقبة و دررا و أنبتت الجداول على الشواطئ زواهر ناضرة و ثمرها و حيث كان من دأب الرحمة الإلهية و شريعة العناية الربانية أن لا يهمل أمرا ضروريا يحتاج إليه الأشخاص بحسب الاستعداد و لا ييخل بشيء نافع في مصالح العباد فاقترضت رحمته أن لا يختفي في البطون و الأستار هذه المعاني المنكشفة لي من مفيض عالم الأسرار و لا يبقى في الكتمان و الاحتجاب الأنوار الفائضة علي من نور الأنوار فالهمني الله الإفاضة مما شربنا جرعة للعطاش الطالبين و الإلاحه مما وجدنا لعمه لقلوب السالكين ليحيا من شرب منه جرعة و يتنور قلب من وجد منه لعمه فبلغ الكتاب أجله و أراد الله تقديمه و قد كان أجله فأظهره في الوقت الذي قدره و أبرزه على من له يسره فرأيت إخراجهم من القوة إلى الفعل و التكميل و إبرازهم من الخفاء إلى الوجود و التحصيل فأعملت فيه فكري و جمعت على ضم شوارده أمري و سألت الله تعالى أن يشد أزرى و يحط بكرمه وزري و يشرح لإتمامه صدرى فنهضت عزيمتي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩

بعد ما كانت قاعدة و هبت همتي غب ما كانت راكدة و اهتز الخامد من نشايطي و تموج الجامد من انبساطي و قلت لنفسي هذا أوان الاهتمام و الشروع و ذكر أصول يستنبط منها الفروع و تحلية الأسماع بجواهر المعاني الفائقة و إبراز الحق في صورته المعجبة الرائقة فصنفت كتابا إلهيا للسالكين المشتغلين بتحصيل الكمال و أبرزت حكمة ربانية للطالبين لأسرار حضرة ذي الجمال و الجلال كاد أن يتجلى الحق فيه بالنور الموجب للظهور و قرب أن ينكشف بها كل مرموز و مستور و قد أطلعني الله فيه على المعاني المتساطعة أنوارها في معارف ذاته و صفاته مع تجوال عقول العقلاء حول جنباه- و ترجاعهم حاسرين و ألهمني بنصره المؤيد به من يشاء من عباده الحقائق المتعالية أسرارها في استكشاف مبدئه و معاده مع تطواف فهوم الفضلاء حريم حماه و تردادهم خاسرين فجاء بحمد الله كلاما لا عوج فيه و لا ارتياب و لا لجلجة و لا اضطراب يعتريه حافظا للأوضاع رامزا مشبعا في مقام الرمز و الإشباع قريبا من الأفهام في نهاية علوه رفيعا عاليا في المقام مع غاية دنوه إذ قد اندمجت فيه العلوم التأهيلية- في الحكمة البحثية و تدرعت فيه الحقائق الكشفية بالبيانات التعليمية و تسربت الأسرار الربانية بالعبارات المأنوسة للطباع و استعملت المعاني الغامضة في الألفاظ القريبة من الأسماع فالبراهين تتبختر اتضاحا و شبه الجاهلين للحق تتضاءل افتضاحا- انظر بعين عقلك إلى معانيه هل تنظر فيه من قصور **ثُمَّ ارْجِعِ الْبَصَرَ كَرَّتَيْنِ** إلى الفاظه- **هَلْ تَرَى فِيهِ مِنْ فُطُورٍ** و قد أشرت في رموزه إلى كنوز من الحقائق لا يهتدي إلى معناها إلا من عنى نفسه بالمجاهدات العقلية حتى يعرف المطالب و نبهت في فصوله إلى أصول لا يطلع على مغزاها إلا من أتعب بدنه في الرياضات الدينية لكيلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠

يذوق المشرب و قد صنفته لإخواني في الدين و رفقائي في طريق الكشف و اليقين لأنه لا ينتفع بها كثير الانتفاع إلا من أحاط بأكثر كلام العقلاء و وقف على مضمون مصنفات الحكماء غير محتجب بمعلومه و لا منكرا لما وراء مفهومه فإن الحق لا ينحصر بحسب فهم كل ذي فهم و لا يتقدر بقدر كل عقل و وهم فإن وجدته أيها الناظر مخالفا لما اعتقدته أو

فهيمته بالذوق السليم فلا تنكره **وَفَوْقَ كُلِّ ذِي عِلْمٍ عَلِيمٌ** فافقهن أن من احتجب بمعلومه و أنكر ما وراء مفهومه فهو موقوف على حد علمه و عرفانه محجوب عن خبايا أسرار ربه و ديانته.

و إني أيضا لا أزعم أنني قد بلغت الغاية فيما أوردته كلا فإن وجوه الفهم لا تنحصر فيما فهمت و لا تحصى و معارف الحق لا تتقيد بما رسمت و لا تحوى لأن الحق أوسع من أن يحيط به عقل و حد و أعظم من أن يحصره عقد دون عقد فإن أحللت بالعناية الربانية مشكلها و فتحت بالهداية الإلهية معضلها فاشكر ربك على قدر ما هداك من الحكم و أحمدته على ما أسبغ عليك من النعم و اقتد بقول سيد الكونين و مرآة العالمين عليه و على آله من الصلوات أنماها و من التسليمات أزكاها- لا تؤتوا الحكمة غير أهلها فتضلوها و لا تمنعوا أهلها فتظلموها فعليك بتقديسها عن الجلود الميتة و إياك و استيداعها إلا للأنفس الحية كما قرره و أوصى به الحكماء الكبار أولي الأيدي و الأبصار.

و اعلم أنني ربما تجاوزت عن الاختصار على ما هو الحق عندي و اعتمد عليه اعتقادي إلى ذكر طرائق القوم و ما يتوجه إليها و ما يرد عليها ثم نهت عليه في أثناء النقد و التزييف و الهدم و الترسيف و الذب عنها بقدر الوسع و الإمكان و ذلك لتشحيذ الخواطر بها و تقوية الأذهان من حيث اشتغالها على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١

تصورات غريبة لطيفة و تصرفات مليحة شريفة تعد نفوس الطالبين للحق ملكة لاستخراج المسائل المعضلة و تفيد أذهان المشتغلين بالبحث اطلاعا على المباحث المشكلة و الحق أن أكثر المباحث المثبتة في الدفاتر المكتوبة في بطون الأوراق إنما الفائدة فيه مجرد الانتباه- و الإحاطة بأفكار أولي الدارية و الأنظار لحصول الشوق إلى الوصول لا الاكتفاء بانتقاش النفوس بنقوش المعقول أو المنقول فإن مجرد ذلك مما لا يحصل به اطمينان القلب- و سكون النفس و راحة البال و طيب المذاق بل هي مما يعد الطالب لسبيل المعرفة و الوصول إلى الأسرار إن كان مقتديا بطريقة الأبرار متصفا بصفات الأخيار- و ليعلم أن معرفة الله تعالى و علم المعاد و علم طريق الآخرة ليس المراد بها الاعتقاد الذي تلقاه العامي أو الفقيه وراثته و تلقفا فإن المشغوف بالتقليد و المجمود على الصورة لم يفتح له طريق الحقائق كما يفتح للكرام الإلهيين و لا يتمثل له ما ينكشف للعارفين المستصغرين لعالم الصورة و الذات المحسوسة من معرفة خلاق الخلائق و حقيقة الحقائق و لا ما هو طريق تحرير الكلام و المجادلة في تحسين المرام كما هو عادة المتكلم و ليس أيضا هو مجرد البحث البحث كما هو دأب أهل النظر و غاية أصحاب المباحثة و الفكر فإن جميعها **ظلماتٌ بعضُها فوق بعضٍ إذا أخرج يده لم يكد يراها و من لم يجعل الله له نورا فما له من نورٍ** بل ذلك نوع يقين هو ثمرة نور يقذف في قلب المؤمن بسبب اتصاله بعالم القدس و الطهارة و خلوصه بالمجاهدة عن الجهل و الأخلاق الذميمة و حب الرئاسة و الإخلاص إلى الأرض و الركون إلى زخارف الأجساد و إني لأستغفر الله كثيرا مما ضيعت شطرا من عمري- في تتبع آراء المتفلسفة و المجادلين من أهل الكلام و تدقيقاتهم و تعلم جربزتهم في القول و تفننهم في البحث حتى تبين لي آخر الأمر بنور الإيمان و تأييد الله المنان أن قياسهم عقيم و صراطهم غير مستقيم فآلقينا زمام أمرنا إليه و إلى رسوله النذير المنذر فكل ما بلغنا منه آمنا به و صدقناه و لم نحتل أن نخيل له وجهها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢

عقليا و مسلکا بحثيا بل اقتدينا بهداه و انتهينا بنهيته امتثالا لقوله تعالى **مَا آتَاكُمُ الرَّسُولُ فَخُذُوهُ وَمَا نَهَاكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانْتَهُوا** حتى فتح الله على قلبنا ما فتح فأفلح ببركة متابعتة و أنجح.

فابدأ يا حبيبي قبل قراءة هذا الكتاب بتزكية نفسك عن هواها **قَدْ أَفْلَحَ مَنْ زَكَّاهَا وَقَدْ خَابَ مَنْ دَسَّاهَا** و استحکم أولا أساس المعرفة و الحكمة - ثم ارق ذراها و إلا كنت ممن أتى **اللَّهُ بُنْيَانَهُمْ مِنَ الْقَوَاعِدِ فَخَرَّ عَلَيْهِمُ السَّقْفُ** إذ أتاهم و لا تشتغل بترهات عوام الصوفية من الجهلة و لا تركز إلى أقاويل المتفلسفة جملة فإنها فتنة مضلة و للأقدام عن جادة الصواب مزلّة و هم الذين إذا **جَاءَتْهُمْ رُسُلُهُم بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ فَرِحُوا بِمَا عِنْدَهُمْ مِنَ الْعِلْمِ وَ حَاقَ بِهِمْ مَا كَانُوا بِهِ يَسْتَهْزِئُونَ** وقانا الله و إياك شرهاتين الطائفتين و لا جمع بيننا و بينهم طرفة عين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣

الأسفار الأربعة و اعلم أن للسلاك من العرفاء و الأولياء أسفارا أربعة - أحدها السفر من الخلق إلى الحق. و ثانيها السفر بالحق في الحق.

و السفر الثالث يقابل الأول لأنه من الحق إلى الخلق بالحق.

و الرابع يقابل الثاني من وجه لأنه بالحق في الخلق.

فرتبت كتابي هذا طبق حركاتهم في الأنوار و الآثار على أربعه أسفار و سميته بالحكمة المتعالية في الأسفار العقلية فها أنا أفيض في المقصود مستعينا بالحق المعبود الصمد الموجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٩

الجزء الأول من الأمور العامة أو العلم الإلهي بالمعنى الأعم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠

السفر الأول و هو الذي من الخلق إلى الحق في النظر إلى طبيعة الوجود و عوارضه الذاتية و فيه مسالك

المسلك الأول في المعارف التي يحتاج إليها الإنسان في جميع العلوم

و فيه مقدمة و ستة مراحل

المقدمة في تعريف الفلسفة و تقسيمها الأولي و غايتها و شرفها

اعلم أن الفلسفة استكمال النفس الإنسانية بمعرفة حقائق الموجودات على ما هي عليها و الحكم بوجودها تحقيقا بالبراهين لا أخذا بالظن و التقليد بقدر الوسع الإنساني و إن شئت قلت نظم العالم نظما عقليا على حسب الطاقة البشرية - ليحصل التشبه بالباري تعالى و لما جاء الإنسان كالمعجون من خلطين صورة معنوية أمرية و مادة حسية خلقية و كانت لنفسه أيضا جهتا تعلق و تجرد لا جرم افتنت الحكمة بحسب عمارة النشاطين بإصلاح القوتين إلى فنين نظرية تجردية و عملية عقلية - أما النظرية فغايتها انتقاش النفس بصورة الوجود على نظامه بكماله و تمامه - و صيرورتها عالما عقليا مشابها للعالم العيني لا في المادة بل في صورته و ورقشه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١

و هيئته و نقشه و هذا الفن من الحكمة هو المطلوب لسيد الرسل المسئول في دعائه ص إلى ربه حيث قال

: رب أرنا الأشياء كما هي

و للخليل ع أيضا حين سأل **رَبِّ هَبْ لِي حُكْمًا** و الحكم هو التصديق بوجود الأشياء المستلزم لتصورها أيضا و أما العملية فثمرتها مباشرة عمل الخير لتحصيل الهيئة الاستعلائية للنفس على البدن و الهيئة الانقيادية الانقهارية للبدن من النفس و إلى هذا الفن أشار بقوله ع

: تخلقوا بأخلاق الله

و استدعى الخليل ع في قوله **وَالْحَقْنِي بِالصَّالِحِينَ** و إلى فني الحكمة كليهما أشهر في الصحيفة الإلهية **لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ** و هي صورته التي هي طراز عالم الأمر **ثُمَّ رَدَدْنَاهُ أَسْفَلَ سَافِلِينَ** و هي مادته التي هي من الأجسام المظلمة الكثيفة **إِلَّا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا** إشارة إلى غاية الحكمة النظرية **وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ** إشارة إلى تمام الحكمة العملية و للإشعار بأن المعتبر من كمال القوة العملية ما به نظام المعاش و نجاة المعاد و من النظرية العلم بأحوال المبدأ و المعاد و التدبر فيما بينهما من حق النظر و الاعتبار قال أمير المؤمنين ع

: رحم الله امرأً أعَدَ لنفسه و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢

استعد لرمسه و علم من أين و في أين و إلى أين

و إلى ذينك الفنين رمزت الفلاسفة الإلهيون حيث قالوا تأسيا بالأنبياء ع الفلسفة هي التشبه بالآله

كما وقع في الحديث النبوي ص: تخلقوا بأخلاق الله

يعني في الإحاطة بالمعلومات و التجرد عن الجسمانيات.

ثم لا يخفى شرف الحكمة من جهات عديدة منها أنها صارت سببا لوجود الأشياء على الوجه الأكمل بل سببا لنفس الوجود إذ ما لم يعترف الوجود على ما هو عليه - لا يمكن إيجاده و إيلاده و الوجود خير محض و لا شرف إلا في الخير الوجودي و هذا المعنى مرموز في قوله تعالى **وَمَنْ يُؤْتَ الْحِكْمَةَ فَقَدْ أُوتِيَ خَيْرًا كَثِيرًا** و بهذا الاعتبار سمي الله تعالى نفسه حكيما في مواضع شتى من كتابه المجيد الذي هو **تَنْزِيلٌ مِنْ حَكِيمٍ حَمِيدٍ** و وصف أنبياءه و أوليائه بالحكمة و سماهم ربانيين حكماء بحقائق الهويات فقال **وَإِذْ أَخَذَ اللَّهُ مِيثَاقَ النَّبِيِّينَ لَمَا آتَيْتُكُمْ مِنْ كِتَابٍ وَحِكْمَةٍ وَقَالَ خُصُوصًا فِي شَأْنِ لُقْمَانَ **وَلَقَدْ آتَيْنَا لُقْمَانَ الْحِكْمَةَ** كل ذلك في سياق الإحسان و معرض الامتنان و لا معنى للحكيم إلا الموصوف بالحكمة المذكورة حدها التي لا يستطيع ردها و من الظاهر المكشوف أن ليس في الوجود أشرف من ذات المعبود - و رسله الهداة إلى أوضح سبله و كلا من هؤلاء وصفه تعالى بالحكمة فقد انجلى وجه شرفها و مجدها فيجب إذن انتهاج معالم غورها و نجدها فلنأت على إهداء تحف منها و إيتاء طرف فيها و لنقبل على تمهيد أصولها و قوانينها و تلخيص حججها و براهينها بقدر ما يتأتى لنا و جمع متفرقات شتى واردة علينا من المبدأ الأعلى فإن مفاتيح الفضل بيد الله **يُؤْتِيهِ مَنْ يَشَاءُ*****

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣

المرحلة الأولى في الوجود وأقسامه الأولية

و فيها مناهج

الأول في أحوال نفس الوجود

و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في موضوعيته للعلم الإلهي و أولية ارتسامه في النفس

اعلم أن الإنسان قد ينعت بأنه واحد أو كثير و بأنه كلي أو جزئي و بأنه بالفعل أو بالقوة و قد ينعت بأنه مساو لشيء أو أصغر منه أو أكبر و قد ينعت بأنه متحرك أو ساكن و بأنه حار أو بارد أو غير ذلك ثم إنه لا يمكن أن يوصف الشيء بما يجري مجرى أوسط هذه الأوصاف إلا من جهة أنه ذو كم و لا يمكن أن يوصف بما يجري مجرى آخرها إلا من جهة أنه ذو مادة قابلة للتغيرات لكنه لا يحتاج في أن يكون واحدا أو كثيرا إلى أن يصير رياضيا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤

أو طبيعيا بل لأنه موجود هو صالح لأن يوصف بوحدة أو كثرة و ما ذكر معهما فإذن كما أن للأشياء التعليمية أوصافا و خواص يبحث عنها في الرياضيات من الهيئة و الهندسة و الحساب و الموسيقى و للأشياء الطبيعية أعراضا ذاتية يبحث عنها في الطبيعيات بأقسامها كذلك للموجود بما هو موجود عوارض ذاتية يبحث عنها في العلوم الإلهية - فموضوع العلم الإلهي هو الموجود المطلق و مسأله إما بحث عن الأسباب القصوى لكل موجود معلول كالسبب الأول الذي هو فياض كل وجود معلول من حيث إنه وجود معلول و إما بحث عن عوارض الموجود بما هو موجود و إما بحث عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥

موضوعات سائر العلوم الجزئية فموضوعات سائر العلوم الباقية كالأعراض الذاتية لموضوع هذا العلم و سيتضح لك من طريقتنا في تحقيق مباحث الوجود التي هي حقيقة دار الأسرار الإلهية أن الماهيات من الأعراض الأولية الذاتية لحقيقة الوجود كما أن الوحدة و الكثرة و غيرهما من المفهومات العامة من العوارض الذاتية لمفهوم الموجود بما هو موجود فاستقام كون الموضوعات لسائر العلوم أعراضا في الفلسفة الأولى و بالجملة هذا العلم لفرط علوه و شموله باحث عن أحوال الموجود بما هو موجود و أقسامه الأولية فيجب أن يكون الموجود المطلق بينا بنفسه مستقيما عن التعريف و الإثبات و إلا لم يكن موضوعا للعلم العام و أيضا التعريف إما أن يكون بالحد أو بالرسم و كلا القسمين باطل في الموجود.

أما الأول فلأنه إنما يكون بالجنس و الفصل و الوجود لكونه أعم الأشياء لا جنس له فلا فصل له فلا حد له.

و أما الثاني فلأنه تعريف بالأعرف و لا أعرف من الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦

فمن رام بيان الوجود بأشياء على أنها هي أظهر منه فقد أخطأ خطأ فاحشا و لما لم يكن للوجود حد فلا برهان عليه لأن الحد و البرهان متشاركان في حدودهما على ما تبين في القسطاس و كما أن من التصديق ما لا يمكن إدراكه ما لم يدرك قبله أشياء آخر مثل أن نريد أن نعلم أن العقل موجود نحتاج أولا إلى أن نحصل تصديقات أخرى و لا محالة ينتهي إلى تصديق لا يتقدمه تصديق آخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧

بل يكون واجبا بنفسه أوليا بينا عند العقل بذاته كالقول بأن الشيء شيء و أن الشيء ليس بنقيضه و أن النقيضين لا يجتمعان و لا يرتفعان في الواقع و عن الواقع - فكذا القول في باب التصور فليس إذا احتاج تصور إلى تصور يتقدمه يلزم ذلك في كل تصور بل لا بد من الانتهاء إلى تصور يقف و لا يتصل بتصور سابق عليه كالوجوب و الإمكان و الوجود فإن هذه و نظائرها معان صحيحة مركوزة في الذهن مرتسمة في العقل ارتساما أوليا فطريا فمتى قصد إظهار هذه المعاني بالكلام فيكون ذلك تنبيها للذهن و إخطارا بالبال و تعيينا لها بالإشارة من سائر المرتكزات في العقل - لإفادتها بأشياء هي أشهر منها.

و أما إثبات الوجود لموضوع هذا العلم أي الموجود بما هو موجود فمستغن عنه بل غير صحيح بالحقيقة لأن إثبات الشيء لنفسه غير ممكن لو أريد به حقيقة الإثبات و خصوصا إذا كان ذلك الشيء نفس الثبوت فإن الثابت أو الموجود أو غيرهما من المرادفات نفس مفهوم الثبوت و الوجود كما أن المضاف بالحقيقة هو نفس الإضافة لا غيرها إلا بحسب المجاز سواء كان الوجود وجود شيء آخر أو وجود حقيقته و ذاته و هو بما هو هو أي المطلق لا يأبى شيئا من القسمين و ليس يستوجب برهان و لا تبين بضرورة أن الكون في الواقع دائما هو كون شيء فقط أو كون نفسه البتة بل البرهان و الحس أوجبا القسمين جميعا الثاني كالوجود الذي لا سبب له و الأول كالوجود الذي يتعلق بالأجسام فالوجود الغير المتعلق بشيء هو موجودية نفسه و الوجود العارض هو موجودية غيره

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨

غشاوة وهمية وإزاحة عقلية

لما تيقنت أن الفلسفة الأولى باحثة عن أحوال الموجود بما هو موجود و عن أقسامه الأولية أي التي يمكن أن يعرض للموجود من غير أن يصير رياضيا أو طبيعيا و بالجملة أمرا متخصص الاستعداد لعروض تلك الأقسام سواء كانت القسمية بها مستوفاة أم لا و ربما كانت القسمية مستوفاة و الأقسام لا تكون أولية فلا يكون البحث عنها من الفن الأعلى بل يكون من العلم الأسفل كقسمة الموجود إلى الأسود و اللاأسود بالسلب المطلق فتأمل في ذلك و اقض العجب من قوم اضطرب كلامهم في تفسير الأمور العامة التي يبحث عنها في إحدى الفلسفتين الإلهيتين - بل تحيروا في موضوعات العلوم كما سيظهر لك فإنهم فسروا الأمور العامة تارة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩

بما لا يختص بقسم من أقسام الموجود التي هي الواجب و الجوهر و العرض فانتقض بدخول الكم المتصل العارض

للجوهر و العرض فإن الجسم التعليمي يعرض المادة و السطح يعرض الجسم التعليمي و يعرضه الخط و كذا الكيف لعروضه للجواهر و الأعراض و تارة بما يشمل الموجودات أو أكثرها فيخرج منه الوجوب الذاتي و الوحدة الحقيقية و العلية المطلقة و أمثالها مما يختص بالواجب و تارة بما يشمل الموجودات - إما على الإطلاق أو على سبيل التقابل بأن يكون هو و ما يقابله شاملا لها و لشموله الأحوال المختصة زيد قيد آخر و هو أن يتعلق بكل من المتقابلين غرض علمي - و اعترض عليه بعض أجلة المتأخرين بأنه إن أريد بالمقابلة ما ينحصر في التضاد و التضاييف و السلب و الإيجاب و العدم و الملكة فالإمكان و الوجوب ليسا من هذا القبيل إذ مقابل كل منهما بهذا المعنى كاللاوجوب و اللإمكان أو ضرورة الطرفين أو سلب ضرورة الطرف الموافق لا يتعلق به غرض علمي و إن أريد بها مطلق المباشنة و المنافاة فالأحوال المختصة بكل واحد من الثلاثة مع الأحوال المختصة بالآخرين تشمل جميع الموجودات و يتعلق بجميعها الغرض العلمي فإنها من المقاصد العلمية.

ثم ارتكبوا في رفع الإشكال تمحلات شديدة.

و منها أن الأمور العامة هي المشتقات و ما في حكمها.

و منها أن المراد شمولها مع مقابل واحد يتعلق بالطرفين غرض علمي و تلك الأحوال إما أمور متكررة و إما غير متعلقة بطرفيها غرض علمي كقبول الخرق و الالتيام و عدم قبولهما بمعنى السلب لا بمعنى عدم الملكة.

و منها أن المراد بالتقابل ما هو أعم من أن يكون بالذات أو بالعرض و بين الواجب و الممكن تقابل بالعرض كما بين الوحدة و الكثرة و غفلوا عن صدقها بهذا المعنى على الأحوال الخاصة إلى غير ذلك من التكاليفات و التعسفات الباردة - و أنت إذا تذكرت أن أقسام الحكمة الإلهية ما يبحث فيها عن العوارض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠

الذاتية للموجود المطلق بما هو موجود مطلق أي العوارض التي لا يتوقف عروضها للموجود على أن يصير تعليميا أو طبيعيا لاستغنيته عن هذه التكاليفات و أشباهها إذ بملاحظة هذه الحيثية في الأمر العام مع تقييده بكونه من النعوت الكلية ليخرج البحث عن الذوات لا بما يختص بقسم من الموجود كما توهم يندفع عنه النقوض و يتم التعريف سالما عن الخلل و الفساد و مثل هذا التحير و الاضطراب وقع لهم في موضوعات سائر العلوم بيان ذلك أن موضوع كل علم كما تقرر ما يبحث فيه عن عوارضه الذاتية - و قد فسروا العرض الذاتي بالخارج المحمول الذي يلحق الشيء لذاته أو لأمر يساويه - فأشكل الأمر عليهم لما رأوا أنه قد يبحث في العلوم عن الأحوال التي يختص ببعض أنواع الموضوع بل ما من علم إلا و يبحث فيه عن الأحوال المختصة ببعض أنواع موضوعه - فاضطروا تارة إلى إسناد المسامحة إلى رؤساء العلم في أقوالهم بأن المراد من العرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢

الذاتي الموضوع في كلامهم هو أعم من أن يكون عرضا ذاتيا له أو لنوعه - أو عرضا عاما لنوعه بشرط عدم تجاوزه في العموم عن أصل موضوع العلم أو عرضا ذاتيا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣

لنوع من العرض الذاتي لأصل الموضوع أو عرضا عاما له بالشرط المذكور و تارة إلى الفرق بين محمول العلم و محمول المسألة كما فرقوا بين موضوعيهما بأن محمول العلم ما ينحل إليه محمولات المسائل على طريق الترديد إلى غير ذلك من الهوسات التي ينبو عنها الطبع السليم و لم يتفطنوا بأن ما يختص بنوع من أنواع الموضوع ربما يعرض لذات الموضوع بما هو هو و أخصية الشيء من شيء لا ينافي عروضة لذلك الشيء من حيث هو هو و ذلك كالفصول المنوعة للأجناس فإن الفصل المقسم عارض لذات الجنس من حيث ذاته مع أنه أخص منها- و العوارض الذاتية أو الغريبة للأنواع قد تكون أعراضا أولية ذاتية للجنس و قد لا تكون كذلك و إن كانت مما يقع به القسمة المستوفاة الأولية فاستيعاب القسمة الأولية قد يكون بغير أعراض أولية و قد يتحقق أعراض أولية و لا تقع بها القسمة المستوعبة نعم كل ما يلحق الشيء لأمر أخص و كان ذلك الشيء مفتقرا في لحوقه له إلى أن يصير نوعا متهيئا لقبوله ليس عرضا ذاتيا بل عرض غريب على ما هو مصرح به في كتب الشيخ و غيره كما أن ما يلحق الموجود بعد أن يصير تعليميا أو طبيعيا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤

ليس البحث عنه من العلم الإلهي في شيء و ما أظهر لك أن تتفطن بأن لحوق الفصول لطبيعة الجنس كالاستقامة و الانحناء للخط مثلا ليس أن يصير نوعا متخصص الاستعداد بل التخصص إنما يحصل بها لا قبلها فهي مع كونها أخص من طبيعة الجنس أعراض أولية له و من عدم التفطن بما ذكرناه استصعب عليهم الأمر حتى حكموا بوقوع التدافع في كلام الشيخ و غيره من الراسخين في الحكمة- حيث صرحوا بأن اللاحق لشيء لأمر أخص إذا كان ذلك الشيء محتاجا في لحوقه له إلى أن يصير نوعا ليس عرضا ذاتيا بل عرضا غريبا مع أنهم مثلوا العرض الذاتي الشامل على سبيل التقابل بالاستقامة و الانحناء المنوعين للخط و لست أدري أي تناقض في ذلك سوى أنهم لما توهموا أن الأخص من الشيء لا يكون عرضا أوليا له- حكموا بأن مثل الاستقامة و الاستدارة لا يكون عرضا أوليا للخط بل العرض الأولي له هو المفهوم المردد بينهما.

و مما يجب أن يعلم أن بعض الأمور التي ليست ماهياتها مفتقرة في الوجودين العيني و الذهني إلى المادة لكنها مما قد يعرض لها أن يصير رياضيا كالكم أو طبيعيا كالكيف قد لا يبحث عنها في العلم الكلي بل يفرد لها علم على حدة كالحساب للعدد- أو يبحث عنها في علم أسفل كالبحث عن الكيفيات في الطبيعيات و ذلك بأحد وجهين- الأول أنه يعتبر كونها عارضة للمواد بوجه من الوجوه و يبحث عنها بهذا الاعتبار في علم مفرد فإن العدد يعتبر تارة من حيث هو و بهذا الاعتبار يكون من جملة الأمور المجردة عن المادة و يبحث عنه في باب الوحدة و الكثرة من الأمور العامة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥

و يعتبر أخرى من حيث تعلقه بالمادة لا في الوهم بل في الخارج و يبحث عنه بهذا الاعتبار في التعاليم فإنهم يبحثون عن الجمع و التفريق و الضرب و القسمة و التجذير و التكعيب و غيرها مما يلحق العدد و هو في أوهام الناس أو في موجودات متحركة منقسمة متفرقة مجتمعة.

و الثاني أن يبحث عنها لا مطلقا بل عن بعض أنواعها التي لا توجد إلا باستعداد المادة و حركاتها و استحالاتها فاللائق

بالبحث عنه إنما هو العلم الأسفل فإن اتفق أن يذكر بعض أحوالها فيه على الوجه العام كان ذلك على سبيل المبدئية لا على أن يكون من المسائل هاهنا

فصل (٢) في أن مفهوم الوجود مشترك محمول على ما تحته حمل التشكيك لا حمل التواطؤ

أما كونه مشتركاً بين الماهيات فهو قريب من الأوليات فإن العقل يجد بين موجود و موجود من المناسبة و المشابهة ما لا يجد مثلها بين موجود و معدوم فإذا لم يكن الموجودات متشاركة في المفهوم بل كانت متباينة من كل الوجوه كان حال بعضها مع البعض كحال الوجود مع العدم في عدم المناسبة و ليست هذه لأجل كونها متحدة في الاسم حتى لو قدرنا أنه وضع لطائفة من الموجودات و المعدومات اسم واحد و لم يوضع للموجودات اسم واحد أصلاً لم تكن المناسبة بين الموجودات و المعدومات المتحدة في الاسم أكثر من التي بين الموجودات الغير المتحدة في الاسم بل و لا مثلها كما حكم به صريح العقل و هذه الحجة راجحة في حق المصنف على كثير من الحجج و البراهين المذكورة في هذا الباب و إن لم يكن مقنعة للمجادل و العجب أن من قال بعدم اشتراكه فقد قال باشتراكه من حيث لا يشعر به لأن الوجود في كل شيء لو كان بخلاف وجود الآخر لم يكن هاهنا شيء واحد يحكم عليه بأنه غير مشترك فيه بل هاهنا مفهومات لا نهاية لها و لا بد من اعتبار كل واحد منها ليعرف أنه هل هو مشترك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦

فيه أم لا فلما لم يحتج إلى ذلك علم منه أن الوجود مشترك. و أيضاً الرابطة في القضايا و الأحكام ضرب من الوجود و هي في جميع الأحكام - مع اختلافها في الموضوعات و المحمولات معنى واحد و من الشواهد أن رجلاً لو ذكر شعراً و جعل قافية جميع أبياته لفظ الوجود لا يضر كل أحد إلى العلم بأن القافية مكررة بخلاف ما لو جعل قافية جميع الأبيات لفظ العين مثلاً فإنه لم يحكم عليه بأنها مكررة فيه و لو لا أن العلم الضروري حاصل لكل أحد بأن المفهوم من لفظ الوجود واحد في الكل لما حكموا بالتكرير هاهنا كما لم يحكموا في الصورة الأخرى.

و أما كونه محمولاً على ما تحته بالتشكيك أعني بالأولية و الأولية و الأقدمية و الأشدية فلأن الوجود في بعض الموجودات مقتضى ذاته كما سيجيء دون بعض و في بعضها أقدم بحسب الطبع من بعض و في بعضها أتم و أقوى فالوجود الذي لا سبب له أولى بالموجودية من غيره و هو متقدم على جميع الموجودات بالطبع و كذا وجود كل واحد من العقول الفعالة على وجود تاليه و وجود الجوهر متقدم على وجود العرض.

و أيضاً فإن الوجود المفارقة أقوى من الوجود المادي و خصوصاً وجود نفس المادة القابلة فإنها في غاية الضعف حتى كأنها تشبه العدم و المتقدم و المتأخر و كذا الأقوى و الأضعف كالمقومين للوجودات و إن لم يكن كذلك للماهيات فالوجود الواقع في كل مرتبة من المراتب لا يتصور وقوعه في مرتبة أخرى لا سابقة و لا لاحقة - و لا وقوع وجود آخر في مرتبته لا سابق و لا لاحق و المشاءون إذا قالوا إن العقل مثلاً متقدم بالطبع على الهيولى و كل من الهيولى و الصورة متقدم بالطبع أو بالعلية على الجسم فليس مرادهم من هذا أن ماهية شيء من تلك الأمور متقدمة على ماهية الآخر - و حمل الجوهر على الجسم و جزأيه بتقدم و تأخر بل المقصود أن وجود ذلك متقدم على وجود هذا.

و بيان ذلك أن التقدم و التأخر في معنى ما يتصور على وجهين - أحدهما أن يكون بنفس ذلك المعنى حتى يكون ما فيه

التقدم و ما به التقدم شيئا واحدا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧

كتقدم أجزاء الزمان بعضها على بعض فإن القبلات و البعديات فيها بنفس هوياتها المتجددة المقتضية لذاتها لا بأمر آخر عارض لها كما ستعلم في مستأنف الكتاب إن شاء الله.

و الآخر أن لا يكون بنفس ذلك المعنى بل بواسطة معنى آخر فيفترق في ذلك ما فيه التقدم عن ما به التقدم كتقدم الإنسان الذي هو الأب على الإنسان الذي هو الابن - لا في معنى الإنسانية المقول عليهما بالتساوي بل في معنى آخر هو الوجود أو الزمان - فما فيه التقدم و التأخر فيهما هو الوجود أو الزمان و ما به التقدم و التأخر هو خصوص الأبوة و البنوة فكما أن تقدم بعض الأجسام على بعض لا في الجسمية بل في الوجود كذلك إذا قيل إن العلة متقدمة على المعلول فمعناه أن وجودها متقدم على وجوده - و كذلك تقدم الاثنين على الأربعة و أمثالها فإن لم يعتبر وجود لم يكن تقدم و لا تأخر - فالتقدم و التأخر و الكمال و النقص و القوة و الضعف في الوجودات بنفس هوياتها لا بأمر آخر و في الأشياء و الماهيات بنفس وجوداتها لا بأنفسها و سيأتي لك زيادة إيضاح في هذا الباب عند مباحث التشكيك في هذا الكتاب و قد استوضح هاهنا أن الوجود بحسب المفهوم أمر عام يحمل على الموجودات بالتفاوت لا بالتواطؤ مطلقا

فصل (٣) في أن الوجود العام البديهي اعتبار عقلي غير مقوم لأفراده

بيان ذلك أن كل ما يرسم بكنهه في الأذهان من الحقائق الخارجية يجب أن يكون ماهيته محفوظة مع تبدل نحو الوجود و الوجود لما كانت حقيقته أنه في الأعيان - و كل ما كانت حقيقته أنه في الأعيان فيمتنع أن يكون في الأذهان و إلا لزم انقلاب الحقيقة عما كانت بحسب نفسها فالوجود يمتنع أن يحصل حقيقته في ذهن من الأذهان فكل ما يرسم من الوجود في النفس و يعرض له الكلية و العموم فهو ليس حقيقة الوجود بل وجهها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٨

من وجوهه و حيثية من حيثياته و عنوانا من عناوينه فليس عموم ما ارتسم من الوجود في النفس بالنسبة إلى الوجودات عموم معنى الجنس بل عموم أمر لازم اعتباري انتزاعي - كالشيئية للأشياء الخاصة من الماهيات المتحصلة المتخالفة المعاني.

و أيضا لو كانت جنسا لأفراده لكان انفصال الوجود الواجبي عن غيره بفصل - فيتركب ذاته و أنه محال كما سيجيء. و أما ما قيل من أن كل ما يحمل على أشياء بالتفاوت فهو عرضي لها و الوجود قد سبق أنه يحمل على أفراده كذلك فيكون عرضيا لها فغير تام عند جماعة من شيعة الأقدمين كما سينكشف لك إن شاء الله

فصل (٤) في أن للوجود حقيقة عينية

لما كانت حقيقة كل شيء هي خصوصية وجوده التي يثبت له فالوجود أولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩

من ذلك الشيء بل من كل شيء بأن يكون ذا حقيقة كما أن البياض أولى بكونه أبيض مما ليس ببياض و يعرض له

البياض فالوجود بذاته موجود و سائر الأشياء غير الوجود ليست بذواتها موجودة بل بالوجودات العارضة لها و بالحقيقة أن الوجود هو الموجود كما أن المضاف هو الإضافة لا ما يعرض لها من الجوهر و الكم و الكيف و غيرها كالأب و المساوي و المشابه و غير ذلك قال بهمنيار في التحصيل - و بالجملة فالوجود حقيقته أنه في الأعيان لا غير و كيف لا يكون في الأعيان ما هذه حقيقته.

بحث و مخلص

و أما ما تمسك به شيخ الإشراق في نفى تحقق الوجود من أن الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠

لو كان حاصلًا في الأعيان فهو موجود لأن الحصول هو الوجود و كل موجود له وجود فلو وجوده وجود إلى غير النهاية. فلنائل أن يقول في دفعه أن الوجود ليس بموجود فإنه لا يوصف الشيء بنفسه - كما لا يقال في العرف أن البياض أبيض فغاية الأمر أن الوجود ليس بذى وجود كما أن البياض ليس بذى بياض و كونه معدوما بهذا المعنى لا يوجب اتصاف الشيء بنقيضه عند صدقه عليه لأن نقيض الوجود هو العدم و اللاوجود لا المعدوم و اللاموجود. أو يقول الوجود موجود و كونه وجودا هو بعينه كونه موجودا و هو موجودية الشيء في الأعيان لا أن له وجودا آخر بل هو الموجود من حيث هو موجود و الذي يكون لغيره منه و هو أن يوصف بأنه موجود يكون له في ذاته و هو نفس ذاته كما أن التقدم و التأخر لما كانا فيما بين الأشياء الزمانية بالزمان كانا فيما بين أجزائه بالذات من غير افتقار إلى زمان آخر.

فإن قيل فيكون كل وجود واجبا إذ لا معنى للواجب سوى ما يكون تحققه بنفسه. قلنا معنى وجود الواجب بنفسه أنه مقتضى ذاته من غير احتياج إلى فاعل و قابل - و معنى تحقق الوجود بنفسه أنه إذا حصل إما بذاته كما في الواجب أو بفاعل - لم يفتقر تحققه إلى وجود آخر يقوم به بخلاف غير الوجود فإنه إنما يتحقق بعد تأثير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١

الفاعل بوجوده و اتصافه بالوجود و الحاصل أن الوجود أمر عيني بذاته سواء صح إطلاق لفظ المشتق عليه بحسب اللغة أم لا لكن الحكماء إذا قالوا كذا موجود - لم يريدوا بمجرد ذلك أن يكون الوجود زائدا عليه بل قد يكون و قد لا يكون كالوجود الواجب المجرد عن الماهية فكون الموجود ذا ماهية أو غير ذي ماهية إنما يعلم ببيان و برهان غير نفس كونه موجودا فمفهوم الموجود مشترك عندهم بين القسمين.

و بذلك يندفع ما قيل أيضا من أنه إذا أخذ كون الوجود موجودا أنه عبارة عن نفس الوجود فلم يكن حمله على الوجود و غيره بمعنى واحد إذ مفهومه في الأشياء أنه شيء له الوجود و في نفس الوجود أنه هو الوجود و نحن لا نطلق على الجميع إلا بمعنى واحد و إذ ذاك فلا بد من أخذ كون الوجود موجودا كما في سائر الأشياء و هو أنه شيء له الوجود و يلزم منه أن يكون للوجود وجود إلى غير النهاية و عاد الكلام جذعا لأننا نقول هذا الاختلاف بين الأشياء و بين الوجود ليس في مفهوم الموجود - بل المفهوم واحد عندهم في الجميع سواء طابق إطلاقهم عرف اللغويين أم لا و كون

الموجود مشتملا على أمر غير الوجود أو لم يكن بل يكون محض الوجود إنما ينشأ من خصوصيات ما صدق عليها لا من نفس مفهوم الوجود ونظير ذلك ما قاله الشيخ في إلهيات الشفاء إن واجب الوجود قد يعقل نفس واجب الوجود كالواحد قد يعقل نفس الواحد وقد يعقل من ذلك أن ماهيته مثلا هي إنسان أو جوهر آخر من الجواهر وذلك الإنسان هو الذي هو واجب الوجود كما أنه يعقل من الواحد أنه ماء أو هواء أو إنسان وهو واحد قال ففرق إذن بين ماهية يعرض لها الواحد أو الموجود - وبين الواحد والموجود من حيث هو واحد وموجود وقال أيضا في التعليقات إذا سئل هل الوجود موجود أو ليس بموجود فالجواب أنه موجود بمعنى أن الوجود حقيقته أنه موجود فإن الوجود هو الموجودة و يؤيد ذلك ما يوجد في الحواشي الشريفة وهو أن مفهوم الشيء لا يعتبر في مفهوم الناطق مثلا وإلا لكان العرض العام داخلا في الفصل ولو اعتبر في المشتق ما صدق عليه الشيء انقلبت مادة الإمكان الخاص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢

ضرورية فإن الشيء الذي له الضحك هو الإنسان وثبت الشيء لنفسه ضروري - فذكر الشيء في تفسير المشتقات بيان لما رجع إليه الضمير الذي يذكر فيه وكذا ما ذهب إليه بعض أجلة المتأخرين من اتحاد العرض والعرضي وإن لم يكن متبنا فيه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣

وكذا ما أدى إليه نظر الشيخ الإلهي في آخر التلويحات من أن النفس وما فوقها من المفارقات إنيات صرفة ووجودات محضة ولست أدري كيف يسمع له مع ذلك نفي كون الوجود أمرا واقعيا عينا و هل هذا إلا تناقض في الكلام. ثم نقول لو لم يكن للوجود أفراد حقيقية وراء الحصص لما اتصف بلوازم الماهيات المتخالفة الذات أو متخالفة المراتب لكنه متصف بها فإن الوجود الواجب مستغن عن العلة لذاته و وجود الممكن مفتقر إليها لذاته إذ لا شك أن الحاجة والغنى من لوازم الماهية أو من لوازم مراتب الماهية المتفاوتة كمالا ونقصانا و حينئذ لا بد أن يكون في كل من الموجودات أمرا وراء الحصة من مفهوم الوجود وإلا لما كانت الوجودات متخالفة الماهية كما عليه المشاءون أو متخالفة المراتب كما رآه طائفة أخرى إذ الكلي مطلقا بالقياس إلى حصصه نوع غير متفاوت.

وأما قول القائل لو كانت للوجود أفراد في الماهيات سوى الحصص لكان ثبوت فرد الوجود للماهية فرعاً على ثبوتها ضرورة أن ثبوت الشيء للآخر فرع على ثبوت ذلك الآخر فيكون لها ثبوت قبل ثبوتها فغير مستقيم لعدم خصوصية ذلك بكون الوجود ذا فرد بل منشؤه اتصاف الماهية بالوجود سواء كانت له أفراد عينية أو لم يكن له إلا الحصص. وتحقيق ذلك أن الوجود نفس ثبوت الماهية لا ثبوت شيء للماهية حتى يكون فرع ثبوت الماهية والجمهور حيث غفلوا عن هذه الدقيقة تراهم تارة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤

يخصصون القاعدة الكلية القائلة بالفرعية بالاستثناء وتارة ينتقلون عنها إلى الاستلزام - وتارة ينكرون ثبوت الوجود لا ذهنا ولا عينا بل يقولون إن الماهية لها اتحاد بمفهوم الموجود وهو أمر بسيط كسائر المشتقات يعبر عنه بالفارسية

بهست و مرادفاته و ليس له مبدأ أصلاً لا في الذهن و لا في الخارج إلى غير ذلك من التعسفات

فصل (٥) في أن تخصص الوجود بما ذا

و ليعلم أن تخصص كل وجود إما بنفس حقيقته أو بمرتبة من التقدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥

و التأخر و الشدة و الضعف أو بنفس موضوعه أما تخصص الوجود بنفس حقيقته التامة الواجبية و بمراتبه في التقدم و التأخر و الشدة و الضعف و الغنى و الفقر - فإنما هو تخصص له بشئونه الذاتية باعتبار نفس حقيقته البسيطة التي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦

لا جنس لها و لا فصل و أما تخصصه بموضوعه أعني الماهيات المتصفة به في اعتبار العقل فهو ليس باعتبار شئونه في نفسه بل باعتبار ما ينبعث عنه من الماهيات المتخالفة لذوات و إن كان الوجود و الماهية في كل ذي ماهية متحدين في العين و هذا أمر غريب سيتضح لك سره فيما بعد.

قال الشيخ في المباحثات إن الوجود في ذوات الماهيات لا يختلف بالنوع بل إن كان اختلاف فبالأكد و الضعف و إنما تختلف ماهيات الأشياء التي تنال الوجود بالنوع و ما فيها من الوجود غير مختلف النوع فإن الإنسان يخالف الفرس بالنوع - لأجل ماهيته لا لوجوده فالتخصص للوجود على الوجه الأول بحسب ذاته بذاته و أما على الوجه الثاني فباعتبار ما معه في كل مرتبة من النعوت الكلية قال في التعليقات الوجود المستفاد من الغير كونه متعلقا بالغير هو مقوم له كما أن الاستغناء عن الغير مقوم لواجب الوجود بذاته و المقوم للشيء لا يجوز أن يفارقه إذ هو ذاتي له و قال في موضع آخر منها الوجود إما أن يكون محتاجا إلى الغير فيكون حاجته إلى الغير مقومة له و إما أن يكون مستغنيا عنه فيكون ذلك مقوما له و لا يصح أن يوجد الوجود المحتاج غير محتاج كما أنه لا يصح أن يوجد الوجود المستغني محتاجا و إلا قوم بغيره و بدل حقيقتهما انتهى أقول إن العاقل اللبيب بقوة الحدس يفهم من كلامه ما نحن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧

بصدد إقامة البرهان عليه حيث يحين حينه من أن جميع الوجودات الإمكانية و الإنيات الارتباطية التعلقية اعتبارات و شئون للوجود الواجبي و أشعة و ظلال للنور القيومي - لا استقلال لها بحسب الهوية و لا يمكن ملاحظتها ذواتا منفصلة و إنيات مستقلة لأن التبعية و التعلق بالغير و الفقر و الحاجة عين حقائقها لا أن لها حقائق على حيالها - عرض لها التعلق بالغير و الفقر و الحاجة إليه بل هي في ذواتها محض الفاقة و التعلق - فلا حقائق لها إلا كونها توابع لحقيقة واحدة فالحقيقة واحدة و ليس غيرها إلا شئونها و فنونها و حيثياتها و أطوارها و لمعات نورها و ضلال ضوئها و تجليات ذاتها -

كل ما في الكون وهم أو خيال أو عكوس في المرايا أو ضلال

و أقمنا نحن بفضل الله و تأييده برهانا نيرا عرشيا على هذا المطلب العالي الشريف - و المحجوب الغالي اللطيف و

سنورده في موضعه كما وعدناه إن شاء الله العزيز و عملنا فيه رسالة على حدة سمينها بطرح الكونين هذا وقيل تخصص الوجود في الممكنات إنما كان بإضافته إلى موضوعه - لا أن الإضافة لحقته من خارج فإن الوجود ذا الموضوع عرض و كل عرض فإنه متقوم بوجوده في موضوعه فوجود كل ماهية متقوم بإضافته إلى تلك الماهية لا كما يكون الشيء في المكان فإن كونه في نفسه غير كونه في المكان و هو ليس بسديد - فإن كون العرض في نفسه و إن كان نفس كونه في موضوعه بناء على ما تقرر من أن وجود الأعراض في أنفسها هو وجودها لموضوعاتها لكن الوجود ليس بالقياس إلى موضوعه كالأعراض بالقياس إلى موضوعاتها فإنه ليس هو كون شيء غير الموضوع - يكون كونه في نفسه هو كونه للموضوع بل الوجود نفس كون الموضوع لا كون شيء آخر له كما أن النور القائم بالجسم نفس ظهور الجسم لا ظهور شيء للجسم ففرق إذن بين كون الشيء في المكان و كون الشيء في الموضوع و هو المفهوم من كلام القائل المذكور.

ثم فرق آخر أيضا بين كون الشيء في الموضوع و بين نفس كون الموضوع - نص على هذا الشيخ الرئيس في التعليقات حيث قال وجود الأعراض في أنفسها هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨

وجودها في موضوعاتها سوى أن العرض الذي هو الوجود لما كان مخالفا لها لحاجتها إلى الوجود حتى تكون موجودة و استغناء الوجود عن الوجود حتى يكون موجودا - لم يصح أن يقال إن وجوده في موضوعه هو وجوده في نفسه بمعنى أن للوجود وجودا كما يكون للبياض وجود بل بمعنى أن وجوده في موضوعه نفس وجود موضوعه و غيره من الأعراض وجوده في موضوعه وجود ذلك الغير و على هذا يجب أن يحمل أيضا لا على ما فهمه قوم من الحمل على اعتبارية الوجود و كونه أمرا انتزاعيا مصدريا ما ذكره في موضوع آخر من التعليقات و هو قوله فالوجود الذي للجسم هو موجودية الجسم - لا كحال البياض و الجسم في كونه أبيض لأن الأبيض لا يكفي فيه البياض و الجسم و قال تلميذه في كتاب التحصيل نحن إذا قلنا كذا موجود فلسنا نعني به الوجود العام بل يجب أن يتخصص كل موجود بوجود خاص و الوجود إما أن يتخصص بفصول فيكون الوجود أي المطلق على هذا الوجه جنسا أو يكون الوجود العام من لوازم معان خاصة بها يصير الشيء موجودا.

و قال فيه أيضا كل موجود ذي ماهية فله ماهية فيها صفة بها صارت موجودة - و تلك الصفة حقيقتها أنها وجبت. أقول و لا يغرنك قوله فيما بعد إذا قلنا وجود كذا فإنما نعني به موجوديته - و لو كان الوجود ما به يصير الشيء في الأعيان لكان يحتاج إلى وجود آخر فيتسلسل - فإذا الوجود نفس صيرورة الشيء في الأعيان انتهى فإن مراده من الموجودية ليس المعنى العام الانتزاعي المصدري اللازم للوجودات الخاصة بل المراد منها صرف الوجود الذي موجوديته بنفسه و موجودية الماهية به لا بأمر آخر غير حقيقة الوجود به تصير موجودة فعبر عنه بنفس صيرورة الشيء في الأعيان و عن ذلك الأمر الآخر المفروض بما به يصير الشيء في الأعيان ليتلاءم أجزاء كلامه سابقا و لاحقا و ما أكثر ما زلت أقدم المتأخرين حيث حملوا هذه العبارات و أمثالها الموروثة من الشيخ الرئيس و أتباعه و أتباعه على اعتبارية الوجود و أن لا فرد له في الماهيات سوى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩

الحصص فقد حرفوا الكلم عن مواضعها وإني قد كنت شديد الذب عنهم في اعتبارية الوجود و تأصل الماهيات حتى أن هداني ربي و انكشف لي انكشافا بينا أن الأمر بعكس ذلك و هو أن الوجودات هي الحقائق المتأصلة الواقعة في العين و أن الماهيات المعبر عنها في عرف طائفة من أهل الكشف و اليقين بالأعيان الثابتة ما شمت رائحة الوجود أبدا كما سيظهر لك من تضاعيف أقوالنا الآتية إن شاء الله و ستعلم أيضا أن مراتب الوجودات الإمكانية التي هي حقائق الممكنات ليست إلا أشعة و أضواء للنور الحقيقي و الوجود الواجبي جل مجده و ليست هي أمور مستقلة بخيالها و هويات مترئسة بذواتها بل إنما هي شئون ذات واحدة و تطورات لحقيقة فاردة كل ذلك بالبرهان القطعي و هذه حكاية عما سيرد لك بسطه و تحقيقه إن شاء الله تعالى.

و بالجملة فقد تبين لك الآن أن مفهوم الوجود العام و إن كان أمرا ذهنيا مصدريا انتزاعيا لكن أفراده و ملزوماته أمور عينية كما أن الشيء كذلك بالقياس إلى أفراده من الأشياء المخصوصة فنسبة مفهوم الوجود إلى أفراده كنسبة مفهوم الشيء إلى أفراده لكن الوجودات معان مجهولة الأسامي سواء اختلف بالذات أو بالمراتب الكمالية و النقضية شرح أسمائها أنها وجود كذا و وجود كذا و الوجود الذي لا سبب له ثم يلزم الجميع في الذهن الوجود العام البديهي و الماهيات معان معلومة الأسامي و الخواص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٠

فصل (٦) في أن الوجودات هويات بسيطة و أن حقيقة الوجود ليست معنى جنسيا و لا نوعيا و لا كليا مطلقا

اعلم أن الحقائق الوجودية لا يتقوم من جنس و فصل. و بيان ذلك بعد ما تقرر في علم الميزان أن افتقار الجنس إلى الفصل ليس في تقومه من حيث هو بل في أن يوجد و يحصل بالفعل فإن الفصل كالعلة المفيدة للجنس باعتبار بعض الملاحظات التفصيلية العقلية هو أنه كان لحقيقة الوجود جنس و فصل لكان جنسه إما حقيقة الوجود أو ماهية أخرى معروضة للوجود فعلى الأول يلزم أن يكون الفصل مفيدا لمعنى ذات الجنس فكان الفصل المقسم مقوما هذا خلف - و على الثاني يكون حقيقة الوجود إما الفصل أو شيئا آخر و على كلا التقديرين يلزم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥١

خرق الفرض كما لا يخفى لأن الطبائع المحمولة متحدة بحسب الوجود مختلفة بحسب المعنى و المفهوم و هاهنا ليس الأمر كذلك.

و أيضا يلزم تركيب الوجود الذي لا سبب له أصلا و هو محال.

و أما ما قيل في نفي كون الوجود جنسا من أنه لو كان جنسا لكان فصله إما وجودا و إما غير وجود فإن كان وجودا يلزم أن يكون الفصل مكان النوع إذ يحمل عليه الجنس و إن كان غير وجود لزم كون الوجود غير وجود فهو سخيف فإن فصول الجواهر البسيطة مثل جواهر و هي مع ذلك ليست بأنواع مندرجة تحت الجوهر بالذات بل إنما هي فصول فقط

و كذا فصل الحيوان مثلاً يحمل عليه الحيوان - وليس يلزم من ذلك أن يكون فصل الحيوان نوعاً له و سيجيء كيفية ذلك من ذي قبل إن شاء الله تعالى.

و إذا تقرر نفي كون الوجود جنساً من نفي المخصصات الفصلية عنه فبمثل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٢

البيان المذكور يتبين انتفاء نوعيته.

و بالجملة عمومها و كليته بانتفاء ما يقع به اختلاف غير فصلي عنه كالمخصصات الخارجية من المصنفات و غيرها فإن تلك الأمور إنما هي أسباب في كون الشيء موجوداً بالفعل لا في تقويم معنى الذات و تقرير ماهيتها و كما أن النوع لا يحتاج إلى الفصل في كونه متصفاً بالمعنى الجنسي بل في كونه محصلاً بالفعل فكذلك الشخص لا يحتاج إلى المشخص في كونه متصفاً بالمعنى الذي هو النوع بل يحتاج إليه في كونه موجوداً و هذا إنما يتصور في غير حقيقة الوجود فلو كان ما حقيقته الوجود - يتشخص بما يزيد على ذاته لكان المشخص داخلاً في ماهية النوع فثبت أن ما هو حقيقته الوجود ليس معنى جنسياً و لا نوعياً و لا كلياً من الكليات و كل كلي و إن كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٣

من الثلاثة الباقية فهو راجع إلى الجنس أو النوع كما لا يخفى فظهر أن الوجودات هويات عينية و متشخصات بذواتها من غير أن توصف بالجنسية و النوعية و الكلية و الجزئية بمعنى كونها مندرجة تحت نوع أو جنس أو بمعنى كونها متشخصة بأمر زائد على ذاتها بل إنما هي متميزة بذاتها لا بأمر فصلي أو عرضي و إذ لا جنس لها و لا فصل لها فلا حد لها و إذ لا حد لها فلا برهان عليها لتشاركهما في الحدود كما مرت الإشارة إليه فالعلم بها إما أن يكون بالمشاهدة الحضورية أو بالاستدلال عليها بآثارها و لوازمها فلا تعرف بها إلا معرفة ضعيفة

فصل (٧) في أن حقيقة الوجود لا سبب لها بوجه من الوجوه

إني لأظنك ممن يتفطن مما تلوناه عليك بأن الوجود لا يمكن تأليف حقيقته من حيث هي من كثرة عينية خارجية أو ذهنية فعلية أو عقلية تحليلية ألسنت إذا نظرت إلى ما يتألف جوهر الذات منه و من غيره وجدت الذات في نسخها و جوهرها مفتاقة إليهما و إن لم يكن على أنها الأثر الصادر منهما بل على أن حقيقتها في أنها هي متعلقة القوام بهما بل جوهر الذات بعينه هو جوهر ذينك الجوهرين سواء كان بحسب خصوص الخارج أو الذهن أو الواقع مطلقاً فإذا فرض لحقيقة الوجود من حيث هي مباد جوهرية قد ائتلف منها جوهر ذاته فكل واحد من تلك المقومات أو بعضها إما أن يكون محض حقيقة الوجود فالوجود قد حصل بذلك المبدأ قبل نفسه و إما أن يكون أو واحد منها أمراً غير الوجود فهل المفروض حقيقة الوجود إلا الذي هو ما وراء ذلك الأمر الذي هو غير الوجود فالذي فرض مجموع تلك الأمور عاد إلى أنه بعضها أو خارج عنها.

و أيضاً يلزم أن يكون غير الوجود متقدماً على الوجود بالوجود و هو فطري الاستحالة قطعي الفساد.

و أيضاً كان حصول حقيقة الوجود لتلك المقومات أيضاً أقدم من حصولها لما يتقوم بها أي الوجود فيلزم حصول الشيء قبل نفسه فدار الوجود على نفسه و هو ممتنع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٤

فإذن حقيقة الوجود يستحيل أن يجتمع ذاته من أجزاء متباينة في الوجود كالمادة و الصورة أو ينحل إلى أشياء متحدة الحقيقة و الوجود.

و بالجملة يمتنع أن يتصور تحليل حقيقته إلى شيء و شيء بوجه من الوجوه - كيف و صرف الحقيقة لا يتكرر و لا يتثنى بحسبها أصلا لا عينا و لا ذهنًا و لا مطلقًا - و إذ قد علمت استحالة قبلية غير الوجود على الوجود بالوجود لاح لك أن الوجود من حيث هو متقرر بنفسه موجود بذاته فهو تقرر نفسه و وجود ذاته فلا يتعلق بشيء أصلا بحسب ذاته بل بحسب تعيناته العارضة و تطوراته اللاحقة له فالوجود من حيث هو وجود لا فاعل له ينشأ منه و لا مادة يستحيل هي إليه و لا موضوع يوجد هو فيه و لا صورة يتلبس هو بها و لا غاية يكون هو لها بل هو فاعل الفواعل و صورة الصور و غاية الغايات إذ هو الغاية الأخيرة و الخير المحض الذي ينتهي إليه جملة الحقائق و كافة الماهيات فيتعاضم الوجود عن أن يتعلق بسبب أصلا إذ قد انكشف أنه لا سبب له أصلا لا سبب به و لا سبب منه و لا سبب عنه و لا سبب فيه و لا سبب له و ستطلع على تفاصيل هذه المعاني إن شاء الله تعالى.

إشكالات و تفصيلات

أنه قد بقي بعد عدة شبهات في كون الوجود ذا حقائق عينية -

منها ما ذكره صاحب التلويحات

بقوله إن كان الوجود في الأعيان صفة للماهية فهي قابلة إما أن تكون موجودة بعده فحصل الوجود مستقلا دونها فلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٥

قابلية و لا صفتية أو قبله فهي قبل الوجود موجودة أو معه فالماهية موجودة مع الوجود لا بالوجود فلها وجود آخر و أقسام التالي باطلة كلها فالمقدم كذلك.

و الجواب عنه باختيار أن الماهية مع الوجود في الأعيان و ما به المعية نفس الوجود الذي هي به موجودة بدون الاحتياج إلى وجود آخر كما أن المعية الزمانية الحاصلة بين الحركة و الزمان الذي حصلت فيه بنفس ذلك الزمان بلا اعتبار زمان آخر حتى يكون للزمان زمان إلى غير النهاية.

ثم إن اتصاف الماهية بالوجود أمر عقلي ليس كاتصاف الموضوع بسائر الأعراض القائمة به حتى يكون للماهية وجود منفرد و لوجودها وجود ثم يتصف أحدهما بالآخر بل هما في الواقع أمر واحد بلا تقدم بينهما و لا تأخر و لا معية أيضا بالمعنى المذكور و اتصافها به في العقل.

و تفصيل هذا الكلام ما ذكره بعض الحافين حول عرش التحقيق من أنه إذا صدر عن المبدأ وجود كان لذلك الوجود هوية مغايرة للأول و مفهوم كونه صادرا عنه غير مفهوم كونه ذا هوية فإذا هاهنا أمران معقولان.

أحدهما الأمر الصادر عن الأول و هو المسمى بالوجود.

و الثاني هو الهوية اللازمة لذلك الوجود و هو المسمى بالماهية فهي من حيث الوجود تابعة لذلك الوجود لأن المبدأ الأول لو لم يفعل شيئا لم يكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٦

ماهية أصلاً لكن من حيث العقل يكون الوجود تابعا لها لكونه صفة لها انتهى فقد علم مما ذكره و مما ذكرناه أن الماهية متحدة مع الوجود في الواقع نوعاً من الاتحاد و العقل إذا حللتهما إلى شيئين حكم بتقدم أحدهما بحسب الواقع و هو الوجود لأنه الأصل في أن يكون حقيقة صادرة عن المبدأ و الماهية متحدة محمولة عليه لكن في مرتبة هوية ذاته لا كالعرض اللاحق و يتقدم الآخر بحسب الذهن و هي الماهية لأنها الأصل في الأحكام الذهنية و هذا التقدم إما بالوجود كما ستعلمه أو ليس بالوجود بل بالماهية و سيجيء أن هاهنا تقدماً غير الخمسة المشهورة و هو التقدم باعتبار نفس التجوهر و الحقيقة كتقدم ماهية الجنس على ماهية النوع بلا اعتبار الوجود.

و بالجملة مغايرة الماهية للوجود و اتصافها به أمر عقلي إنما يكون في الذهن لا في الخارج و إن كانت في الذهن أيضاً غير منفكة عن الوجود إذ الكون في العقل أيضاً وجود عقلي كما أن الكون في الخارج وجود خارجي لكن العقل من شأنه أن يأخذ الماهية وحدها من غير ملاحظة شيء من الوجودين الخارجي و الذهني معها و يصفها به.

فإن قلت هذه الملاحظة أيضاً نحو من أنحاء وجود الماهية فالماهية كيف تتصف بهذا النحو من الوجود أو بالمطلق الشامل له مع مراعات القاعدة الفرعية في الاتصاف.

قلنا هذه الملاحظة لها اعتباران.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٧

أحدهما اعتبار كونها تخلية الماهية في ذاتها عن جميع أنحاء الوجود - و ثانيهما اعتبار كونها نحواً من أنحاء الوجود فالماهية بأحد الاعتبارين موصوفة بالوجود و بالآخر مخلوطة غير موصوفة به على أن لنا مندوحة عن هذا التجشم حيث قررنا أن الوجود نفس ثبوت الماهية لا ثبوت شيء للماهية فلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٨

مجال للفرعية هاهنا و كان إطلاق لفظ الاتصاف على الارتباط الذي يكون بين الماهية و الوجود من باب التوسع أو الاشتراك فإنه ليس كإطلاقه على الارتباط - الذي بين الموضوع و سائر الأعراض و الأحوال بل اتصافها بالوجود من قبيل اتصاف البسائط بالذاتيات لا اتحادها به.

و منها أن الوجود لو كان في الأعيان لكان قائماً بالماهية

فقيامه إما بالماهية الموجودة فيلزم وجودها قبل وجودها أو بالماهية المعدومة فيلزم اجتماع النقيضين - أو بالماهية المجردة عن الوجود و العدم فيلزم ارتفاع النقيضين.

و أجيب عنه بأنه إن أريد بالموجودة و المعدومة ما يكون بحسب نفس الأمر - فنختار أن الوجود قائم بالماهية الموجودة و لكن بنفس ذلك الوجود لا بوجود سابق عليه كما أن البياض قائم بالجسم الأبيض بنفس ذلك البياض القائم به لا ببياض غيره و إن أريد بهما ما يكون مأخوذاً في مرتبة الماهية من حيث هي على أن يكون شيء منهما معتبراً في حد نفسها بكونه نفسها أو جزءها فنختار أنه قائم بالماهية من حيث هي بلا اعتبار شيء من الوجود و العدم في حد

نفسها وهذا ليس ارتفاع النقيضين عن الواقع لأن الواقع أوسع من تلك المرتبة فلا يخلو الماهية في الواقع عن أحدهما كما أن البياض قائم بالجسم لا بشرط البياض واللابياض في حد ذاته ووجوده وهو في الواقع لا يخلو عن أحدهما والفرق بين الموضعين بأن الجسم بهذه الحثية له وجود سابق على وجود البياض ومقابلته فيمكن اتصافه في الخارج بشيء منهما بخلاف الماهية بالقياس إلى الوجود فإنها في الخارج عين الوجود فلا اتصاف لها بالوجود بحسبه إذ اتصافها به في ظرف ما يقتضي لا أقل المغايرة بينهما وإن لم يقتض الفرعية وكذا في العقل للخلط بينهما فيه كما في الخارج إلا في نحو ملاحظة عقلية مشتملة على مراعاة جانبي الخلط والتعرية فيصفها العقل به على الوجه الذي مر ذكره - وقد علمت أنا في متسع عن هذا الكلام فإنه لا يلزم من كون الوجود في الأعيان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٥٩

قيامه بالماهية أو عروضه لها إذ هما شيء واحد في نفس الأمر بلا امتياز بينهما - فإن الماهية متحدة مع الوجود الخارجي في الخارج ومع الوجود الذهني في الذهن - لكن العقل حيث يعقل الماهية مع عدم الالتفات إلى شيء من انحاء الوجود يحكم بالمغايرة بينهما بحسب العقل بمعنى أن المفهوم من أحدهما غير المفهوم من الآخر كما يحكم بالمغايرة بين الجنس والفصل في البسائط مع اتحادهما في الواقع جعلاً ووجوداً وقريب مما ذكرناه ببعض الوجوه ما ذهب إليه بعض أهل التدقيق من أنه لا يجوز عروض الوجود المصدري أو مفهوم الموجود للماهية في نفس الأمر لأن عروض شيء لاخر وثبوته له فرع لوجود المعروض فيكون للماهية وجود قبل وجودها. وأيضاً مفهوم الموجود متحد مع الماهيات والمتحدان يمتنع عروض أحدهما للآخر حيث اتحداً ولا عروض للوجود بالمعنى المصدري لها بحسب الاعتبار الذهني أيضاً لأن العقل وإن وجد الماهية خالية عنه إذا أخذها بذاتها بلا ضمنية لكنه لا يجدها بعد هذه المرتبة موصوفة به لأنه يجدها حينئذ موجودة ولا يلزم من ذلك قيام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٠

الوجود بها فإن من صدق المشتق لا يلزم قيام مبدأ الاشتقاق وأما الوجود بمعنى الموجود - فهو يعرض للماهية بحسب الاعتبار الذهني يحث يجد العقل الماهية إذا أخذت بذاتها بلا ضمنية عارية عنه ويجده في المرتبة الثانية عارضا لها ولهذا يحكم بأنه عرض لها ولا يجوز عروضه لها في نفس الأمر لأنهما في نفس الأمر أمر واحد لا تغاير بينهما فيه أصلاً ضرورة أن السواد والوجود في نفس الأمر واحد ذاتاً ووجوداً - فلا يتصور هناك نسبة بينهما بالعروض وغيره وأما في الاعتبار الذهني فهما شيان - لأن العقل قد يفصل هذا الشيء الواحد إلى ماهية متقدمة ووجود متأخر فيتصور بينهما النسبة بهذا الاعتبار انتهى ملخص ما ذكره ولا يخفى على المتفطن أن بين كلامه وبين ما حققناه نحواً من الموافقة وإن كان بينهما نحو من المخالفة أيضاً - فإن الوجود عنده إما أمر مصدري وإما مفهوم محمول عام بديهي وكلاهما اعتباريان وعندنا أمر حقيقي عيني بذاته وجود وموجود بلا اعتبار أمر آخر وأما اتحاد الوجود مع الماهية فهو مما فيه جهة الموافقة.

ثم إن في كلامه وجوهاً من النظر أورد عليه بعضاً منها معاصر العلامة الدواني ويرد على المورد أيضاً أشياء كثيرة لو اشتغلنا بها لكان خروجاً عن طور هذا الكتاب.

و منها ما في حكمة الإشراق و التلويحات من أنه ليس في الوجود ما عين ماهيته الوجود فإننا بعد أن نتصور مفهومه قد نشك في أنه هل له الوجود أم لا فيكون له وجود زائد و كذا الكلام في وجوده و يتسلسل إلى غير النهاية و هذا محال و لا محيص إلا بأن الوجود المقول على الموجودات اعتبار عقلي.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦١

و جوابه بما أسلفناه من أن حقيقة الوجود و كنهه لا يحصل في الذهن و ما حصل منها فيه أمر انتزاعي عقلي و هو وجه من وجوهه و العلم بحقيقته يتوقف على المشاهدة الحضورية و بعد مشاهدة حقيقته و الاكتناه بماهيته التي هي عين الإنية لا يبقى مجال لذلك الشك.

و الأولى أن يورد هذا الوجه معارضة إلزامية للمشائين كما فعله في حكمة الإشراق لأنهم قد استدلوا على مغايرة الوجود للماهية بأننا قد نعقل الماهية و نشك في وجودها و المشكوك ليس نفس المعلوم و لا داخلا فيه فهما متغايران في الأعيان فالوجود زائد على الماهية و الشيخ الزمهم بعين هذه الحجة لأن الوجود أيضا كوجود العنقاء مثلا فهمناه و لم نعلم أنه موجود في الأعيان أم لا فيحتاج الوجود إلى وجود آخر فيتسلسل مترتبا موجودا معا إلى غير النهاية لكن ما أوردناه عليه يجري مثله في أصل الحجة فانهدم الأساسان.

و منها ما ذكره أيضا في حكمة الإشراق -

و هو أنه إذا كان الوجود للماهية - وصفا زائدا عليها في الأعيان فله نسبة إليها و للنسبة وجود و لوجود النسبة نسبة إلى النسبة و هكذا فيتسلسل إلى غير النهاية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٢

و جوابه أن وجود النسب إنما هو في العقل دون العين فذلك التسلسل ينقطع بانقطاع الملاحظات العقلية على أن الحق عندنا كما مر أنه ليس بين الماهية و الوجود مغايرة في الواقع أصلا بل للعقل أن يحلل بعض الموجودات إلى ماهية و وجود و يلاحظ بينهما اتصافا و نسبة على الوجه المسفور سابقا.

و منها أيضا قوله إن الوجود إذا كان حاصلًا في الأعيان و ليس بجوهر فتعين أن يكون هيئة في الشيء

و إذا كان كذا فهو قائم بالجوهر فيكون كيفية عند المشائين لأنه هيئة قارة لا يحتاج في تصورهما إلى اعتبار تجز و إضافة إلى أمر خارج - كما ذكروا في حد الكيفية و قد حكموا مطلقا أن المحل يتقدم على العرض من الكيفيات و غيرها فيتقدم الموجود على الوجود و ذلك ممتنع لاستلزامه تقدم الوجود على الوجود.

ثم لا يكون الوجود أعم الأشياء مطلقا بل الكيفية و العرضية أعم منه من الوجه.

و أيضا إذا كان عرضا فهو قائم بالمحل و معنى أنه قائم بالمحل أنه موجود بالمحل مفتقر فيفتقر في تحققه إليه و لا شك أن المحل موجود بالوجود فدار القيام و هو محال و الجواب أنهم حيث أخذوا في عنوانات حقائق الأجناس من المقولات - كونها ماهيات كلية حق وجودها العيني كذا و كذا مثلا قالوا الجوهر ماهية - حق وجودها في الأعيان أن لا يكون في موضوع و كذا الكم مثلا ماهية إذا وجدت في الخارج كانت بذاتها قابلة للمساواة و اللامساواة و على هذا القياس كيف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٣

و سائر المقولات فسقط كون الوجود في ذاته جوهرًا أو كيفًا أو غيرهما لعدم كونه كليًا بل الوجودات كما سبق هويات عينية متشخصة بنفسها غير مندرجة تحت مفهوم كلي ذاتي كالجنس أو النوع أو الحد و ليس عرضًا بمعنى كونه قائمًا بالماهية الموجودة به و إن كان عرضيًا متحدًا بها نحوًا من الاتحاد و على تقدير كونه عرضًا لا يلزم كونه كيفية لعدم كليته و عمومته و ما هو من الأعراض العامة و المفهومات الشاملة للموجودات إنما هو الوجود الانتزاعي العقلي المصدري - الذي اشتق منه مفهوم الوجود بما هو موجود و لمخالفته أيضًا سائر الأعراض - في أن وجودها في نفسها عين وجودها للموضوع و وجود الوجود عين وجود الماهية - لا وجود شيء آخر لها ظهر عدم افتقاره في تحقيقه إلى الموضوع فلا يلزم الدور الذي ذكره على أن المختار عندنا أن وجود الجوهر جوهر بجوهرية ذلك الجوهر لا بجوهرية أخرى و كذا وجود العرض عرض بعرضية ذلك العرض لا بعرضية أخرى - لما مر أن الوجود لا عروض له للماهية في نفس الأمر بل في الاعتبار الذهني بحسب تحليل العقل

توضيح و تنبيه

قد تبين و تحقق من تضاعف ما ذكرناه من القول في الوجود أنه كما أن النور قد يطلق و يراد منه المعنى المصدري أي نورانية شيء من الأشياء و لا وجود له في الأعيان بل وجوده إنما هو في الأذهان و قد يطلق و يراد منه الظاهر بذاته المظهر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٤

لغيره من الذوات النورية كالواجب تعالى و العقول و النفوس و الأنوار العرضية المعقولة أو المحسوسة كنور الكواكب و السرج و له وجود في الأعيان لا في الأذهان كما سيظهر لك وجه ذلك إن شاء الله تعالى و إطلاق النور عليها بالتشكيك الاتفاقي و المعنى الأول مفهوم كلي عرضي لما تحته من الأفراد بخلاف المعنى الثاني فإنه عين الحقائق النورية - مع تفاوتها بالتمام و النقص و القوة و الضعف فلا يوصف بالكلية و لا بالجزئية - بمعنى المعروضية للتشخيص الزائد عليه بل النور هو صريح الفعلية و التميز و الوضوح و الظهور و عدم ظهوره و سطوعه إما من جهة ضعف الإدراك عقليًا كان أو حسيًا أو لاختلاطه بالظلمة الناشئة من مراتب تنزلاته بحسب اصطكاكات وقعت بين مراتب القصور الإمكانية و شوائب الفتور الهولائي لأن كل مرتبة من مراتب نقصان النور - و ضعفه و قصوره عن درجة الكمال الأتم النوري الذي لا حد له في العظمة و الجلال و الزينة و الجمال وقع بإزائها مرتبة من مراتب الظلمات و الأعدام المسماة بالماهيات الإمكانية كما سبق لك زيادة اطلاع عليه فيما سيقرر سمعك كذلك الوجود قد يطلق و يراد منه المعنى الانتزاعي العقلي من المعقولات الثانية و المفهومات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٥

المصدرية التي لا تحقق لها في نفس الأمر و يسمى بالوجود الإثباتي و قد يطلق و يراد منه الأمر الحقيقي الذي يمنع طريان عدم و اللاشيئية عن ذاته بذاته و عن الماهية بانضمامه إليها و لا شبهة في أنه بملاحظة انضمام الوجود

الانتزاعي الذي هو من المعدومات إلى الماهية لا يمنع المعدومية بل إنما يمنع باعتبار ملزومه و ما ينتزع هو عنه بذاته و هو الوجود الحقيقي سواء كان وجوداً صمدياً واجبياً أو وجوداً ممكناً تعلقاً ارتباطياً و الوجودات الإمكانية هوياتها عين التعلقات و الارتباطات بالوجود الواجبى لا أن معانيها مغايرة للارتباط بالحق تعالى كالماهيات الإمكانية - حيث إن لكل منها حقيقة و ماهية و قد عرضها التعلق بالحق تعالى بسبب الوجودات الحقيقية التي ليست هي إلا شئون ذاتة تعالى و تجليات صفاته العليا و لمعات نوره و جماله و إشراقات ضوئه و جلاله كما سيرد لك برهانه إن شاء الله العزيز و الآن نحن بصدد أن الوجود في كل شيء أمر حقيقي سوى الوجود الانتزاعي الذي هو الموجودية - سواء كانت موجودية الوجود أو موجودية الماهية فإن نسبة الوجود الانتزاعي إلى الوجود الحقيقي كنسبة الإنسانية إلى الإنسان و الأبيضية إلى البياض و نسبته إلى الماهية كنسبة الإنسانية إلى الضاحك و الأبيضية إلى الثلج و مبدأ الأثر و أثر المبدأ ليس إلا الوجودات الحقيقية التي هي هويات عينية موجودة بذواتها لا الوجودات الانتزاعية التي هي أمور عقلية معدومة في الخارج باتفاق العقلاء و لا الماهيات المرسله

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٦

المبهمه الذات التي ما شمت بذواتها و في حدود أنفسها رائحة الوجود كما سنحقق في مبحث الجعل من أن المجعول أي أثر الجاعل و ما يترتب عليه بالذات هو نحو من الوجود بالجعل البسيط دون الماهية و كذا الجاعل بما هو جاعل ليس إلا مرتبة من الوجود لا ماهية من الماهيات فالغرض أن الموجود في الخارج ليس مجرد الماهيات - من دون الوجودات العينية كما توهمه أكثر المتأخرين كيف و المعنى الذي حكموا بتقدمه على جميع الانصافات و منعه لطريان العدم لا يجوز أن يكون أمراً عدمياً - و منتزعا عقلياً و الأمر العدمي الذهني الانتزاعي لا يصح أن يمنع الانعدام و يتقدم على الاتصاف بغيره فمن ذلك المنع و التقدم يعلم أن له حقيقة متحققة في نفس الأمر - و هذه الحقيقة هي التي يسمى بالوجودات الحقيقي و قد علمت أنها عين الحقيقة و التحقق لا أنها شيء متحقق كما أشرنا إليه فما أكثر ذهول هؤلاء القوم حيث ذهبوا إلى أن الوجود لا معنى له إلا الأمر الانتزاعي العقلي دون الحقيقة العينية.

و قد اندفع بما ذكرناه قول بعض المحققين من أن الحكم بتقدم الوجود على فعلية الماهيات غير صحيح لأنه ليس للوجود معنى حقيقي إلا الانتزاعي.

لأننا نقول ما حكم بتقدمه على تقوم الماهيات و تقررهما إنما هو الوجود بالمعنى الحقيقي العيني لا الانتزاعي العقلي و مما يدل على أن الوجود موجود في الأعيان ما ذكره الشيخ في إلهيات الشفاء بقوله و الذي يجب وجوده بغيره دائماً إن كان فهو غير بسيط الحقيقة لأن الذي له باعتبار ذاته غير الذي له باعتبار غيره و هو حاصل الهوية منهما جميعاً في الوجود - فلذلك لا شيء غير الواجب عري عن ملابسة ما بالقوة و الإمكان باعتبار نفسه و هو الفرد و غيره زوج تركيبى انتهى.

فقد علم من كلامه أن المستفاد من الفاعل أمر وراء الماهية و معنى الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٧

الإثباتي المنتزع و ليس المراد من قوله و هو حاصل الهوية منهما جميعاً في الوجود - أن للماهية موجودية و للوجود موجودية أخرى بل الموجود هو الوجود بالحقيقة - و الماهية متحدة معه ضرباً من الاتحاد و لا نزاع لأحد في أن التمايز

بين الوجود و الماهية إنما هو في الإدراك لا بحسب العين.

و بعد إثبات هذه المقدمة نقول إن جهة الاتحاد في كل متحدين هو الوجود سواء كان الاتحاد أي الهو هو بالذات كاتحاد الإنسان بالوجود أو اتحاده بالحيوان أو بالعرض كاتحاد الإنسان بالأبيض فإن جهة الاتحاد بين الإنسان والوجود - هو نفس الوجود المنسوب إليه بالذات و جهة الاتحاد بينه و بين الحيوان هو الوجود المنسوب إليهما جميعا بالذات و جهة الاتحاد بين الإنسان و الأبيض هو الوجود المنسوب إلى الإنسان بالذات و إلى الأبيض بالعرض فحينئذ لا شبهة في أن المتحدين لا يمكن أن يكونا موجودين جميعا بحسب الحقيقة و إلا لم يحصل الاتحاد بينهما بل الوجود الواحد منسوب إليهما نحوًا من الانتساب فلا محالة أحدهما أو كلاهما انتزاعي و جهة الاتحاد أمر حقيقي فالإتحد بين الماهيات و الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٨

إما بأن يكون الوجود انتزاعيا و اعتباريا و الماهيات أمور حقيقية كما ذهب إليه المحجوبون عن إدراك طريقة أهل الكشف و الشهود و إما بأن تكون الماهيات أمورا انتزاعية اعتبارية و الوجود حقيقي عيني كما هو المذهب المنصور. و بالجملة الوجود العيني و إن كان حقيقة واحدة و نوعا و بسيطا لا جنس له و لا فصل له و لا يعرض له الكلية و العموم و الجزئية و الخصوص بل التعدد و التميز له من قبل ذاته لا بأمر خارج إلا أنه مشترك بين جميع الماهيات متحد بها صادق عليها لاتحاده معها - فإن الوجود الحقيقي العيني معنى الوجود فيه هو معنى الموجود فهو من حيث إنه منشأ لانتزاع الموجودية هو الموجود و من حيث إنه باعتبار ذاته منشأ لذلك الانتزاع و به يحصل موجودية الماهيات هو الوجود فكل من مفهومي الوجود أي الحقيقي و الانتزاعي مشترك بين الماهيات إلا أن الانتزاعي يعرض له الكلية و العموم لكونه أمرا عقليا من المفهومات الشاملة كالشيئية و المعلوماتية و الإمكان العام و أشباهها بخلاف الحقيقي - لأنه محض التحقق العيني و صرف التشخص و التعيين من دون حاجة إلى مخصص و معين بل بانضمامه إلى كل ماهية يحصل لها الامتياز و التحصل و يخرج من الخفاء و الإبهام و الكمون فالوجود الحقيقي ظاهر بذاته بجميع أنحاء الظهور و مظهر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٦٩

لغيره و به يظهر الماهيات و له و معه و فيه و منه و لو لا ظهوره في ذوات الأكوان - و إظهاره لنفسه بالذات و لها بالعرض لما كانت ظاهرة موجودة بوجه من الوجوه بل كانت باقية في حجاب العدم و ظلمة الاختفاء إذ قد علم أنها بحسب ذاتها و حدود أنفسها معرأة عن الوجود و الظهور فالوجود و الظهور يطرا عليها من غيرها فهي في حدود أنفسها هالكات الذوات باطلات الحقائق أزلا و أبدا لا في وقت من الأوقات و مرتبة من المراتب كما قيل في الفارسي -

سياه رویی ز ممکن در دو عالم جدا هرگز نشد و الله اعلم

ترجمة

لقوله ع: الفقر سواد الوجه في الدارين

فظهر الوجود بذاته في كل مرتبة من الأكوان و تنزله إلى كل شأن من الشئون يوجب ظهور مرتبة من مراتب الممكنات و عين من الأعيان الثابتة و كلما كان مراتب النزول أكثر و عن منبع الوجود أبعد كان ظهور الأعدام و الظلمات بصفة الوجود و نعت الظهور و احتجاب الوجود بأعيان المظاهر و اختفائه بصور المجالي و انصباغه بصيغ الأكوان أكثر فكل برزة من البرزات يوجب تنزلاً عن مرتبة الكمال و تواضعاً عن غاية الرفعة و العظمة و شدة النورية و قوة الوجود و كل مرتبة من المراتب يكون التنزل و الخفاء فيها أكثر كان ظهورها على المدارك الضعيفة أشد و الحال بعكس ما ذكر على المدارك القوية كمراتب أنوار الشمس بالقياس إلى أعين الخفافيش و غيرها و لهذا يكون إدراك الأجسام التي هي في غاية نقصان الوجود أسهل على الناس من إدراك المفارقات النورية التي هي في غاية قوة الوجود و شدة النورية لا أشد منها في الوجود و النورية إلا باريها و مبدعها و هو نور الأنوار و وجود الوجودات حيث إن قوة وجوده و شدة ظهوره غير متناهية قوة و مدة و عدة و لشدة وجوده و ظهوره **لَا تُدْرِكُهُ الْأَبْصَارُ** و لا تحيط به الأفهام بل تتجافى عنه الحواس و الأوهام و تنبو منه العقول و الأفهام فالمدارك الضعيفة تدرك الوجودات النازلة المصحوبة بالأعدام و الملكات المختفية المحجوبة بالأكوان - المنصبغة بصيغ الماهيات المتخالفة و المعاني المتضادة و هي في حقيقتها متحدة المعنى - و إنما التفاوت فيها بحسب القوة و الضعف و الكمال و النقص و العلو و الدنو الحاصلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧٠

لها بحسب أصل الحقيقة البسيطة باعتبار مراتب التنزلات لا غيرها كما سينكشف من مباحث التشكيك و لو لم يكن المدارك ضعيفة قاصرة عن إدراك الأشياء على ما هي عليها لكان ينبغي أن يكون ما وجوده أكمل و أقوى ظهوره على القوة المدركة و حضوره لديها أتم و أجلى و لما كان واجب الوجود من فضيلة الوجود في أعلى الأنحاء و في سطوع النور في قسب المراتب يجب أن يكون وجوده أظهر الأشياء عندنا و حيث نجد الأمر على خلاف ذلك علمنا أن ذلك ليس من جهته إذ هو في غاية العظمة و الإحاطة و السطوع و الجلاء و البلوغ و الكبرياء و لكن لضعف عقولنا و انغماسها في المادة و ملابستها الأعدام و الظلمات تعتاص عن إدراكه و لا تتمكن أن نعقله على ما هو عليه في الوجود فإن إفراط كماله يبهرها لضعفها و بعدها عن منبع الوجود و معدن النور و الظهور من قبل سنخ ذاتها لا من قبله فإنه لعظمته و سعة رحمته و شدة نوره النافذ و عدم تناهيه أقرب إلينا من كل الأشياء كما أشار إليه بقوله تعالى - **وَنَحْنُ أَقْرَبُ إِلَيْهِ مِنْ حَبْلِ الْوَرِيدِ** و بقوله تعالى **وَإِذَا سَأَلَكَ عِبَادِي عَنِّي فَإِنِّي قَرِيبٌ** فثبت أن بطونه من جهة ظهوره فهو باطن من حيث هو ظاهر فكلما كان المدرك أصح إدراكاً و عن الملابس الحسية و الغواشي المادية أبعد درجة كان ظهور أنوار الحق الأول عليه و تجليات جماله و جلاله له أشد و أكثر و مع ذلك لا يعرفه حق المعرفة و لا يدركه حق الإدراك لتناهي القوى و المدارك و عدم تناهيه في الوجود و النورية **وَعَنَتِ الْوُجُوهُ لِلْحَيِّ الْقَيُّومِ**.

و مما يجب أن يحقق أنه و إن لم يكن بين الوجودات اختلاف بذواتها إلا بما ذكرناه من الكمال و النقص و التقدم و التأخر و الظهور و الخفاء لكن يلزمها بحسب كل مرتبة من المراتب أوصاف معينة و نعوت خاصة إمكانية هي المسماة بالماهيات عند الحكماء و بالأعيان الثابتة عند أرباب الكشف من الصوفية و العرفاء فانظر إلى مراتب أنوار الشمس التي هي مثال الله في عالم المحسوسات كيف انصبغت بصيغ ألوان الزجاجات و في أنفسها لا لون لها و لا تفاوت فيها إلا بشدة اللمعان و نقصها فمن توقف مع الزجاجات و ألوانها و احتجب بها عن النور الحقيقي و مراتبه الحقيقية التنزلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧١

اختفى النور عنه كمن ذهب إلى أن الماهيات أمور حقيقية متأصلة في الوجود- و الوجودات أمور انتزاعية ذهنية و من شاهد ألوان النور و عرف أنها من الزجاجات و لا لون للنور في نفسه ظهر له النور و عرف أن مراتبه هي التي ظهرت في صورة الأعيان على صبغ استعداداتها كمن ذهب إلى أن مراتب الوجودات التي هي لمعات النور الحقيقي الواجبي و ظهورات للوجود الحق الإلهي ظهرت في صورة الأعيان و انصبغت بصبغ الماهيات الإمكانية و احتجبت بالصور الخلقية عن الهوية الإلهية الواجبية و مما يجب أن يعلم أن إثباتنا لمراتب الوجودات المتكثرة و مواضعنا في مراتب البحث و التعليم على تعددها و تكثرها لا ينافي ما نحن بصدده من ذي قبل إن شاء الله من إثبات وحدة الوجود و الموجود ذاتا و حقيقة كما هو مذهب الأولياء و العرفاء من عظماء أهل الكشف و اليقين و سنقيم البرهان القطعي على أن الوجودات و إن تكثرت و تمايزت إلا أنها من مراتب تعيينات الحق الأول و ظهورات نوره و شئوناته ذاتة لا أنها أمور مستقلة و ذوات منفصلة و ليكن عندك حكاية هذا المطلب إلى أن يرد عليك برهانه و انتظره مفتشا.

و ذهب جماعة أن الوجود الحقيقي شخص واحد هو ذات الباري تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧٣

و الماهيات أمور حقيقية موجوديتها عبارة عن انتسابها إلى الوجود الواجبي و ارتباطها به تعالى فالوجود واحد شخصي عندهم و الموجود كلي له أفراد متعددة و هي الموجودات- و نسبوا هذا المذهب إلى ذوق المتألهين.

أقول فيه نظر من وجوه- الأول أن كون ذات الواجب بذاته وجودا لجميع الماهيات من الجواهر و الأعراض غير صحيح كما لا يخفى عند التأمل فإن بعض أفراد الموجودات مما لا تفاوت فيها بحسب الماهية مع أن بعضها متقدم على بعض بالوجود و لا يعقل تقدم بعضها على بعض مع كون الوجود في الجميع واحدا وحدة حقيقية منسوبة إلى الكل فإن اعتذر بأن التفاوت بحسب التقدم و التأخر ليس في الوجود الحقيقي بل في نسبتها و ارتباطها إليه بأن يكون نسبة بعضها إلى الوجود الحقيقي أقدم من بعض آخر- نقول النسبة من حيث إنها نسبة أمر عقلي لا تحصل و لا تفاوت لها في نفسها بل باعتبار شيء من المنتسبين فإذا كان المنسوب إليه ذاتا أحدية و المنسوب ماهية و الماهية بحسب ذاتها لا تقتضي شيئا من التقدم و التأخر و العلية و المعلولية و لا أولوية أيضا لبعض أفرادها بالقياس إلى بعض لعدم حصولها و فعليتها في أنفسها و بحسب ماهيتها فمن أين يحصل امتياز بعض أفراد ماهية واحدة بالتقدم في النسبة إلى الواجب و التأخر فيه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧٤

و الثاني أن نسبتها إلى الباري إن كانت اتحادية يلزم كون الواجب تعالى ذا ماهيات غير الوجود بل ذا ماهيات متعددة متخالفة و سيجيء أن لا ماهية له تعالى سوى الإنية و إن كانت النسبة بينها و بين الواجب تعالى تعلقية و تعلق الشيء بالشيء فرع وجودهما و تحققهما فيلزم أن يكون لكل ماهية من الماهيات وجود خاص متقدم على انتسابها و تعلقها إذ لا شبهة في أن حقائقها ليست عبارة عن التعلق بغيرها فإن كثيرا ما تصور الماهيات و نشك في ارتباطها إلى الحق الأول

و تعلقها به تعالى بخلاف الوجودات - إذ يمكن أن يقال إن هوياتها لا يغير تعلقها و ارتباطها إذ لا يمكن الاكتفاء بنحو من أنحاء الوجود إلا من جهة العلم بحقيقة سببه و جاعله كما بين في علم البرهان و سنيين في هذا الكتاب إن شاء الله تعالى.

الثالث أن وجودات الأشياء على هذه الطريقة أيضا متكررة كالموجودات إلا أن الموجودات أمور حقيقية و الوجودات بعضها حقيقي كوجود الواجب و بعضها انتزاعي كوجودات الممكنات فلا فرق بين هذا المذهب و المذهب المشهور الذي عليه الجمهور من المتأخرين القائلين بأن وجود الممكنات انتزاعي و وجود الواجب عيني لأنه تعالى بذاته مصداق حمل الموجود بخلاف الممكنات إلا أن الأمر الانتزاعي المسمى بوجود الممكنات يعبر عنه في هذه الطريقة بالانتساب أو التعلق أو الربط أو غير ذلك - فالقول بأن الوجود على هذه الطريقة واحد حقيقي شخصي و الموجود كلي متعدد - دون الطريقة الأخرى لا وجه له ظاهرا بل نقول لا فرق بين هذين المذهبين في أن موجودة الأشياء و وجودها معنى عقلي و مفهوم كلي شامل لجميع الموجودات سواء كان ما به الوجود نفس الذات أو شيئا آخر ارتباطيا كان أو لا فإن أطلق الوجود على معنى آخر و هو الحق القائم بذاته لكان ذلك بالاشتراك و سيايتك تفصيل المذهب في موجودة الأشياء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧٥

فصل (٨) في مساواة الوجود للشيئية

إن جماعة من الناس ذهبوا إلى أن الوجود صفة يتجدد على الذات التي هي ذات في حالتها الوجود و العدم و هذا في غاية السخافة و الوهن فإن حيثية الماهية و إن كانت غير حيثية الوجود - إلا أن الماهية ما لم توجد لا يمكن الإشارة إليها بكونها هذه الماهية إذ المعدوم لا يخبر عنه إلا بحسب اللفظ فالماهية ما لم توجد لا تكون شيئا من الأشياء حتى نفس ذاتها لأن كونها نفس ذاتها فرع تحققها و وجودها إذ مرتبة الوجود متقدمة على مرتبة الماهية في الواقع و إن كانت متأخرة عنها في الذهن لأن ظرف اتصاف الماهية بالوجود هو الذهن كما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧٦

علمت و الموصوف من حيث إنه موصوف متقدم على الصفة في ظرف الاتصاف فاحتفظ بذلك فإنه نفيس و قالوا أيضا إن الصفات ليست موجودة و لا معدومة و لا مجهولة و لا معلومة بل المعلوم هو الذات بالصفة و الصفة لا تعلم و سلموا أن المحال منفي - و أنه لا واسطة بين النفي و الإثبات.

و ربما أثبتوا واسطة بين الموجود و المعدوم حتى يقال الثابت على بعض المعدوم - و هو المعدوم الممكن و على نفس الوجود و على أمر ليس بموجود و لا معدوم عندهم مما سموه حالا و كان هذه الطائفة من الناس إما أن يكون غرضهم مجرد اصطلاح تواضعوا عليه في التخاطب و إما أن يكونوا ذاهلين عن الأمور الذهنية فإن عنوا بالمعدوم المعدوم في خارج العقل جاز أن يكون الشيء ثابتا في العقل معدوما في الخارج و إن عنوا غير ذلك كان باطلا و لا خبر عنه و لا به - و مما يوجب افتضاحهم أن يقال لهم إذا كان الممكن معدوما في الخارج - فوجوده هل هو ثابت أو منفي فإنه باعترا فهم لا يخرج الشيء من النفي و الإثبات - فإن قالوا وجود المعدوم الممكن منفي و كل منفي عندهم ممتنع

فالوجود الممكن يصير ممتنعاً وهو محال وإن قالوا إن الوجود ثابت له و كل صفة ثابتة للشيء يجوز أن يوصف بها الشيء فالمعْدوم يصح أن يوصف في حالة العدم بالوجود فيكون موجوداً و معدوماً معاً و هو محال فإن منعوا اتصاف الشيء بالصفة الثابتة له فالماهية المعْدومة يجب أن لا يصح أن يقال لها إنها شيء فإن الشيئية ثابتة لها وإن التزم أحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧٧

على هذا التقدير بأنه لا يصح أن يوصف الشيء بأمر ثابت له فليس بشيء و قد قال بأنه شيء و كذا الإمكان. ثم إنهم كما اضطروا في كون الذوات مشتركة في أنها ذوات إلى صفات تفترق بها كذلك يضطربهم كون الصفات غير مختلفة في أنها صفات إلى فرض قسم ثالث يفترق بها و يتمادى الأمر إلى غير النهاية و يتبين أنه إذا لم يعلم الشيء لم يعلم به الشيء - و تبين عليهم أن الصفة مخبر عنها كما أن الذات مخبر عنها. و من هذا القبيل جماعة أيضاً تحاشوا أن يقولوا إن الباري موجود أو معدوم لكون اللفظ على صيغة المفعول يقصدونه عن ذلك و ما بحسب اللفظ أمر سهل فيما يتعلق بالعلوم و المعارف - كيف و جل الألفاظ المطلقة في وصفه تعالى بل كلها إنما المراد منها في حق الباري تعالى معان هي تكون أعلى و أشرف مما وضعت الأسماء بإزائها فكما أن المراد من السمع و البصر السائغين إطلاقهما بحسب التوقيف الشرعي عليه تعالى ليس معناهما الوضعي - لتقدسه عن الجسمية و الآلة فكذا العلم و القدرة و الوجود و الإرادة معانيها في حقه تعالى أعلى و أشرف مما يفهمه الجمهور و ليس لنا بد من وصفه و إطلاق لفظه من هذه الألفاظ المشتركة المعاني مع التنبيه على أن صفاته صريح ذاته البعيدة عن المعنى الذي تنصوره من تلك اللفظة هذه في صفاته الحقيقية و أما السلوب و الاعتبار فلا يبعد أن يراد من الألفاظ الموضوعية بإزائها المستعملة فيه تعالى معانيها الوضعية العرفية.

و أما من احتج على عدم إطلاق لفظ الموجود فيه تعالى بأنه يلزم منه كونه تعالى - مشاركاً للموجودات في الوجود فقد ذهب إلى مجرد التعطيل فإنه لا يصح حينئذ أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧٨

يقال إنه حقيقة أو ذات أو شيء من الأشياء و إلا لزم اشتراكه مع غيره في مفهوم الحقيقة و الذات و الشيء فإذا لم تكن شيئاً يكون لا شيئاً لاستحالة الخروج عن السلب و الإيجاب و كذا الهوية و الثبات و التقوم و أمثالها فينسب باب معرفته و وصفه بصفات جماله و نعوت كماله.

و العجب أن أشباه هؤلاء القوم ممن يعدون عند الناس من أهل النظر و هذا هو العذر في إيرادنا شيئاً من هوساتهم في هذا الكتاب إذ العاقل لا يضيع وقته بذكر هذه المجازفات و ردها و ذكر صاحب الإشراف في كتاب المطارحات بعد ذكر ما تهوسوا به من شيئية المعْدوم و إثبات الوساطة و من العجب أن الوجود عندهم يفيد الفاعل و هو ليس بموجود و لا معدوم فلا يفيد الفاعل وجود الوجود مع أنه كان يعود الكلام إليه - و لا يفيد إثباته فإنه كان ثابتاً في نفسه بإمكانه فما أفاد الفاعل للماهيات شيئاً فعطلوا العالم عن الصانع قال و هؤلاء قوم نبغوا في ملة الإسلام و مالوا إلى الأمور العقلية - و ما كانت لهم أفكار سليمة و لا حصل لهم ما حصل للصوفية من الأمور الذوقية و وقع بأيديهم مما نقله جماعة في عهد بني أمية من كتب قوم أساميهم تشبه أسامي الفلاسفة فظن القوم أن كل اسم يوناني فهو اسم فيلسوف فوجدوا فيها

كلمات استحسنا و ذهبوا إليها و فرعوها رغبة في الفلسفة و انتشرت في الأرض و هم فرحون بها و تبعهم جماعة من المتأخرين و خالفوهم في بعض الأشياء إلا أن كلهم إنما غلطوا بسبب ما سمعوا من أسامي يونانية لجماعة صنفوا كتباً يتوهم أن فيها فلسفة و ما كان فيها شيء منها - فقبلها متقدموهم و تبعهم فيها المتأخرون و ما خرجت الفلسفة إلا بعد انتشار أقاويل عامة يونان و خطبائهم و قبول الناس لها

فصل (٩) في الوجود الرابطي

إطلاق الوجود الرابطي في صناعاتهم يكون على معنيين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٧٩

أحدهما ما يقابل الوجود المحمولي و هو وجود الشيء في نفسه المستعمل في مباحث المواد الثلاث و هو ما يقع رابطة في الحملات الإيجابية وراء النسبة الحكمية الاتحادية التي هي تكون في جملة العقود و قد اختلفوا في كونه غير الوجود المحمولي بالنوع أم لا ثم تحققه في الهليات البسيطة أم لا و الحق هو الأول في الأول و الثاني في الثاني - و الاتفاق النوعي في طبيعة الوجود مطلقاً عندنا لا ينافي التخالف النوعي في معانيها الذاتية و مفهوماتها الانتزاعية كما سيتضح لك مزيداً إيضاح على أن الحق أن الاتفاق بينهما في مجرد اللفظ.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٠

و الثاني ما هو أحد اعتباري وجود الشيء الذي هو من المعاني الناعية و ليس معناه إلا تحقق الشيء في نفسه و لكن على أن يكون في شيء آخر أو له أو عنده لا بأن يكون لذاته كما في الوجود القيوم بذاته فقط في فلسفتنا و جملة المفارقات الإبداعية في الفلسفة المشهورة فإن وجود المعلول من حيث هو وجود المعلول هو وجوده بعينه للعللة الفاعلية التامة عندنا و عندهم لكننا نقول بأن لا جهة أخرى للمعلول غير كونه مرتبطاً إلى جاعله التام يكون بتلك الجهة موجوداً لنفسه لا لجاعله حتى يتغاير الوجودان و يختلف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٨١

النسبتان و هم لا يقولون به إذ المعلول عندنا هو أنحاء الوجودات بالجعل الإبداعي و عندهم إما نفس الماهيات كما في طريقة الرواقيين أو اتصافها بوجوداتها كما في قاعدة المشائين فإذن هذا الوجود الرابطي ليس طباعه أن تباين تحقق الشيء في نفسه بالذات بل إنه أحد اعتباراته التي عليها إن كانت و أما الوجود الرابطي الذي هو إحدى الرابطين في الهلية المركبة فنفس مفهومه يباين وجود الشيء في نفسه و في قولنا البياض موجود في الجسم اعتباراً اعتبار تحقق البياض في نفسه و إن كان في الجسم و هو بذلك الاعتبار محمول لهل البسيطة و الآخر أنه هو بعينه في الجسم و هذا مفهوم آخر غير تحقق البياض في نفسه و إن كان هو بعينه تحقق البياض في نفسه ملحوظاً بهذه الحيثية و إنما يصح أن يكون محمولاً في الهل المركبة و مفاده أنه حقيقة ناعية ليس وجودها في نفسها لنفسها بل للجسم.

ثم وجود الشيء الناعتي بعد أن يؤخذ على هذه الجهة يلحظ على نحوين تارة ينسب إلى ذلك الشيء فيكون من أحواله و تارة إلى المنعوت فيقال الجسم موجود له البياض - فيكون بهذا الاعتبار من حالات المنعوت و على قياس ما تلوناه

عليك يقع لفظ الوجود في نفسه أيضا بالاشتراك العرفي على معنيين أحدهما بإزاء الوجود الرباطي بالمعنى الأول و يعم ما لذاته و هو الوجود في نفسه و لنفسه و ما لغيره كوجود الأعراض و الصور و هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٢

الوجود في نفسه لا لنفسه و الآخر بإزاء الرباطي بالمعنى الأخير و هو ما يختص بوجود الشيء لنفسه و لا يكون للنوعات و الأوصاف.

و الحاصل أن الوجود الرباطي بالمعنى الأول مفهوم تعلقى لا يمكن تعقلها على الاستقلال و هو من المعاني الحرفية و يستحيل أن يسلك عنه ذلك الشأن و يؤخذ معنى اسميا بتوجيه الالتفات إليه فيصير الوجود المحمولي نعم ربما يصح أن يؤخذ نسبيا غير رباطي و بالمعنى الثاني مفهوم مستقل بالتعقل هو وجود الشيء في نفسه - و إنما لحقته الإضافة إلى الغير بحسب الواقع خارجا عن ماهية موضوعه فله صلوح أن يؤخذ بما هو هو فيكون معنى اسميا بخلاف الإضافات المحضة و النسب الصرفة و هذه الأقسام متأتية في العدم على وزان ما قيل في الوجود و كثيرا ما يقع الغلط من اشتراك اللفظ فلو اُصطلح على الوجود الرابط لأول الرباطين و الرباطي للأخير - و بإزائهما الوجود المحمول لأول المعنيين و الوجود في نفسه للأخير و كذا في باب العدم يقع الصيانة عن الغلط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٣

المنهج الثاني في أصول الكيفيات و عناصر العقود و خواص كل منها و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في تعريف الوجوب و الإمكان و الامتناع و الحق و الباطل

إن من المعاني التي ترسم النفس بها ارتساما أوليا هو معنى الضرورة و اللاضرورة و لذلك لما تصدى بعض الناس أن يعرفها تعريفا حقيقيا لا لفظيا تنبيهيا عرفها بما يتضمن دورا فعرف الممتنع بأنه ليس بممكن ثم عرف الممكن بما ليس بممتنع و هذا دور ظاهر و عرفوا أيضا الواجب بأنه الذي يلزم من فرض عدمه محال و الممكن بأنه الذي لا يلزم من فرض وجوده و عدمه محال و هذا فاسد لا لما توهمه بعضهم من أن هذا يوجب الدور من جهة تعريفهم الممتنع بما ليس بممكن فإن المراد منه الممكن العامي و ما عرف بأنه الذي لا يلزم من فرض وجوده و عدمه محال هو الممكن الخاصي فلا يلزم الدور من هذا الوجه بل من أجل أن من عرف الممتنع بما يجب أن لا يكون عرف الواجب بما ذكرناه فيكون تعريفه دوريا فهذه الأشياء يجب أن تؤخذ من الأمور البينة فإن الإنسان لا يتصور بعد مفهوم الوجود و الشيئية العامتين مفهوما أقدم من الضروري و اللاضروري فإذا نسب الضرورة إلى الوجود يكون وجوبا و إذا نسبها إلى العدم يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٤

امتناعا و إذا نسب اللاضرورة إلى أحدهما أو كليهما حصل الإمكان العام أو الخاص - على أن التعريفات المذكورة مشتملة على خلل آخر و هو أن مفهوم الواجب ليس ما يلزم من عدمه محال بل هو نفس عدمه محال و ليس لأجل محال آخر يلزم بل قد لا يلزم محال آخر أو لا يكون ما يلزم أظهر و لا أبين من نفس فرض عدمه و كذا الكلام في الممتنع فإن

المحال نفس الممتنع لا ما يلزم من فرض وجوده فيكون تعريفاً للشيء بنفسه وعلى هذا السبيل معنى الإمكان بل جميع المفهومات الشاملة المبحوث عنها في العلم الكلبي كما نبهناك عليه سابقاً وإن انتهيت أن تعرف شيئاً من هذه المعاني الثلاثة - فلتأخذ الوجوب بينا بنفسه كيف وهو تأكد الوجود والوجود أجلى من العدم لأن الوجود يعرف بذاته والعدم يعرف بالوجود بوجه ما ثم تعرف الإمكان بسلب الوجوب عن الطرفين والامتناع بإثبات الوجوب على السلب.

ثم اعلم أن القوم أول ما اشتغلوا بالتقسيم للشيء إلى هذه المعاني الثلاثة نظروا إلى حال المهيئات الكلية بالقياس إلى الوجود والعدم بحسب مفهومات الأقسام من غير ملاحظة الواقع الثابت بالبرهان فوجدوا أن لا مفهوم كلياً إلا وله الاتصاف بأحد منها فحكموا أولاً بأن كل مفهوم بحسب ذاته إما أن يقتضي الوجود أو يقتضي العدم أو لا يقتضي شيئاً منهما فحصل الأقسام الثلاثة الواجب لذاته والممكن لذاته والممتنع لذاته وأما احتمال كون الشيء مقتضياً للوجود والعدم جميعاً فيرتفع بأدنى الالتفات وهذا هو المراد من كون الحصر في الثلاثة عقلياً ثم لما جاءوا إلى البرهان وجدوا أن احتمال كون الماهية مقتضية لوجودها أمر غير معقول بحسب النظر العقلي وإن خرج من التقسيم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٥

في أول الأمر فوضعوا أولاً معنى الواجب على ذلك الوجه فإذا شرعوا في شرح خواصه - انكشف معنى آخر لواجب الوجود كما سنذكر على وجه التصدير وهذه عاداتهم في بعض المواضع لسهولة التعليم كما فعلوا من إثباتهم الوسائط العقلية والنفسية والطبائع الجسمية ونسبة العلية والإفاضة والآثار إليها أولاً ثقة بما بينوا في مقامه أن لا مؤثر في الوجود إلا الواجب وإنما ينسب العلية والتأثير إلى ما سواه من المبادي العقلية والنفسية والطبيعية من أجل أنها شرائط ومعدات لفيض الواحد الحق وتكثرات لجهات جوده ورحمته ونحن أيضاً سالكون هذا المنهج في أكثر مقاصدنا الخاصة - حيث سلكنا أولاً مسلك القوم في أوائل الأبحاث وأواسطها ثم نفرق عنهم في الغايات لثلاث طبائع عما نحن بصدد في أول الأمر بل يحصل لهم الاستيناس به - ويقع في أسماعهم كلامنا موقع القبول إشفافاً بهم فكما أنهم غيروا معنى الواجب عما فهمه المتعلمون من التعريف الخارج من التقسيم فكذلك نحن غيرنا معنى الممكن في بعض ما سوى الواجب عما فهم الجمهور كما ستقف عليه.

فالتقسيم الأقرب إلى التحقيق ما يوجد في كتبهم أن كل موجود إذا لاحظ العقل من حيث هو موجود و جرد النظر إليه عما عداه فلا يخلو إما أن يكون بحيث ينتزع - من نفس ذاته بذاته الموجودية بالمعنى العام الشامل للموجودات و يحكم بها عليه أم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٦

لا يكون كذلك بل يفترق في هذا الانتزاع إلى ملاحظة أمر وراء نفس الذات والحقيقة كانتسابه إلى شيء ما أو انضمام شيء ما إليه أو غير ذلك فالأول هو مفهوم الواجب لذاته - الحق الأول ونور الأنوار على لسان الإشراف الوحدة الحقيقية عند الفيثاغورثيين - و حقيقة الحقائق عند الصوفية والثاني لا يكون ممتنعاً لذاته بعد ما جعلنا المقسم الموجود - فلنسمه ممكناً سواء كان ماهية أو إنية إلا أن موجودية الماهيات بانضمام الوجود إليها وانصبغها به و موجودية

الوجودات بصدورها عن الجاعل التام كوقوع الأضواء والأظلال على الهياكل والقوالب بل بتطوره بالأطوار الوجودية المنسوبة إلى الماهيات بنحو الانصباع والاتصاف والاستكمال وإلى القيوم الجاعل على نحو القيام والنزول والتشعشع والالتماع والتجلي والفيض والرشح إلى غير ذلك مما يليق بتقدسه وغناه عما سواه فمصدق حمل مفهوم الموجود العام ومبدأ انتزاع هذا المعنى الكلي في الواجب لذاته هو نفس ذاته بذاته بلا ملاحظة جهة أخرى واعتبار أمر آخر غير ذاته من الحثيات الانضمامية أو الانتزاعية التعليلية أو التقيدية وفي الممكن بواسطة حثية أخرى انضمامية اتحادية - إذا أريد به الماهية أو ارتباطية تعليلية إذا أريد به نحو من الوجود و إذ سينكشف لك بنحو البرهان أن وجودية الممكن ليست إلا باتحاده مع حقيقة الوجود كما أشير إليه و أن مناط إمكان وجوده ليس إلا كون ذلك الوجود متعلقا بالغير مفتقرا إليه و مناط الواجبية ليس إلا الوجود الغني عما سواه فإمكان الماهيات الخارجة عن مفهومها الوجود عبارة عن لا ضرورة وجودها وعدمها بالقياس إلى ذاتها من حيث هي و إمكان نفس الوجودات هو كونها بذواتها مرتبطة و متعلقة و بحقائقها روابط و تعلقات إلى غيرها فحقائقها حقائق تعلقية و ذواتها ذوات لمعانية - لا استقلال لها ذاتا و وجودا بخلاف الماهيات الكلية فإنها و إن لم يكن لها ثبوت قبل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٧

الوجود إلا أنها أعيان متصورة بكنهها ما دام وجوداتها و لو في العقل فإنها ما لم يتنور بنور الوجود لا يمكن الإشارة العقلية إليها بأنها ليست موجودة و لا معدومة في وقت من الأوقات بل هي باقية على احتجابها الذاتي و بطونها الأصلي أزلا و أبدا و ليست حقائقها حقائق تعلقية فيمكن الإشارة إليها و الحكم عليها بأنها هي و أنها ليست إلا هي و أنها لا موجودة و لا معدومة و لا متقدمة و لا متأخرة و لا مصدر و لا صادر و لا متعلق و لا جاعل و لا مجعول و بالجملة ليست محكوما عليها بحسب ذواتها و لو في وقت وجودها المنسوب إليها مجازا عند العرفاء بنعت من النعوت إلا بأنها هي هي لا غير بخلاف الوجودات فإن حقائقها تعلقية لا يمكن للعقل الإشارة إليها مع فرض انفصالها عن القيوم الجاعل - بأنها هي هي إذ ليست لها هويات انفصالية استقلالية و مع هذا فإنها عينيات صرفة بلا إبهام و وجودات محصنة بلا ماهيات و أنوار ساذجة بلا ظلمة و هذا مما يحتاج تصورها إلى ذهن لطيف ذكي في غاية الذكاء والدقة و اللطافة و لهذا قيل إن هذا طور وراء طور العقل لأن إدراكها يحتاج إلى فطرة مستأنفة و قريحة ثانية فكما أن الماهيات الغير البسيطة التي لها حد لا يمكن تصورها بحدودها و الاكتناه بماهياتها إلا بعد تصور ما سبق عليها من مقوماتها الذاتية فكذلك لا يمكن اكتناه شيء من أنحاء الوجودات الفارقة للذوات إلا من سبيل الاكتناه بما هو مقوم له من مبادئه الوجودية و مقوماته الفاعلية و من تعمق تعمقا شديدا فيما ذكره المنطقيون في كتاب البرهان أن الحد و البرهان متشاركان في الحدود و أن الحد الأوسط في البرهان بعينه هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٨

الحد المتأخر الذي هو الفصل في الحد و ما ذكره المعلم الأول في أثولوجيا أن الجواب عما هو و لم هو في كثير من الأشياء واحد يجد إشارة لطيفة غامضة بل واضحة إلى صحة ما قلناه. و بالجملة تجريد الممكن عن مقوماته بحسب الماهية أو الوجود ليس إلا من تعاملات النفس و تصرفاتها.

وقد تبين مما ذكر من معنى الإمكان والوجوب أن ما حظه في نفس ذاته الإمكان والافتقار لا يصح أن يقتضي وجود ذاته لا تاما ولا ناقصا ولا ترجيح وجوده أو عدمه سواء بلغا حد الوجوب أو لا فإذن تجويز كون ذات الممكن مقتضيا لرجحان الوجود وأولويته رجحانا متقدما على وجوده وألوية باعثه لتحقيقه إنما نشأ من الغفلة عن كون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٨٩

الممكن في نفسه مع انقطاعه عن سببه باطلا محضا وليس له امتياز ولا تأثير ولا اقتضاء أصلا. وأيضا لو اقتضى ذات ممكن ما أولوية وجوده ورجحانه لزم الترجيح من غير مرجح لأنه لما لم يكن قبل وجوده تميز ولا تخصص فحيث اقتضى ممكن ما أولوية وجوده وتخصصه بمرتبة من مراتب الوجود ولا يقتضي ممكن آخر أولوية وجوده وتخصصه بتلك المرتبة مع عدم تميز شيء منهما عن الآخر لبطانتهما في تلك المرتبة يلزم ما ذكرناه من الترجيح بلا مرجح والتخصيص بلا مخصص - وأشير إلى معنى الإمكان الذاتي الشامل لجميع الممكنات في قوله تعالى **كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلَّا وَجْهَهُ** إذ الهلاك عبارة عن لا استحقاقية الوجود فاستثنى وجهه وهو جهة الوجوب الذي هو فعلية الوجود وبهذه النعمة الروحانية قيل اهتزت نفس النبي اهتزازا علويا لا سفليا حيث سمع قول لبيد -
ألا كل شيء ما خلا الله باطل و كل نعيم لا محالة زائل

و طربت طربا قدسيا لا حسيا وقال اللهم إلا أن العيش عيش الآخرة. وأما الحق فقد يعنى به الوجود في الأعيان مطلقا فحقيقة كل شيء نحو وجوده العيني - وقد يعنى به الوجود الدائم وقد يعنى به الواجب لذاته وقد يفهم عنه حال القول والعقد من حيث مطابقتها لما هو واقع في الأعيان فيقال هذا قول حق وهذا اعتقاد حق وهذا الاعتبار من مفهوم الحق هو الصادق فهو الصادق باعتبار نسبته إلى الأمر وحق باعتبار نسبة الأمر إليه وقد أخطأ من توهم أن الحقيقة عبارة عن نسبة الأمر في نفسه إلى القول أو العقد والصدق نسبتها إلى الأمر في نفسه - فإن التفرقة بينهما بهذا الوجه فيها تعسف وأحق الأقاويل ما كان صدقه دائما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٠

وأحق من ذلك ما كان صدقه أوليا وأول الأقاويل الحققة الأولية التي إنكاره مبني كل سفسطة هو القول بأنه لا واسطة بين الإيجاب والسلب فإنه إليه ينتهي جميع الأقوال عند التحليل وإنكاره إنكار لجميع المقدمات والنتائج وهذه الخاصة من عوارض الوجود بما هو موجود لعمومه في كل موجود ونقاوة ما ذكره الشيخ في الشفا - لسبيل مقابيح السوفسطائية أن يسأل عنهم إنكم هل تعلمون أن إنكاركم حق أو باطل أو تشكون فإن حكموا بعلمهم بشيء من هذه الأمور فقد اعترفوا بحقيقة اعتقاد ما - سواء كان ذلك الاعتقاد الحققة في قولهم بإنكار القول الحق أو اعتقاد البطلان أو الشك فيه فسقط إنكارهم الحق مطلقا وإن قالوا إنا شككنا فيقال لهم هل تعلمون أنكم شككتكم أو أنكم أنكرتم و هل تعلمون من الأقاويل شيئا معينا - فإن اعترفوا بأنهم شاكون أو منكرون وأنهم يعلمون شيئا معينا من الأشياء فقد اعترفوا بعلم ما وحق ما وإن قالوا إنا لا نفهم شيئا أبدا ولا نفهم أنا لا نفهم ونشك في جميع الأشياء حتى في وجودنا وعدمنا ونشك في شكنا أيضا وننكر الأشياء جميعا حتى إنكارنا لها أيضا ولعل هذا مما يتلفظ به لسانهم معاندين فسقط

الاحتجاج معهم ولا يرجى منهم الاسترشاد فليس علاجهم إلا أن يكلفوا بدخول النار - إذا النار واللائم واحد و يضربوا فإن الألم واللائم واحد ذنابة قسمة المفهوم بحسب المواد الثلاث إلى الواجب والممكن والممتنع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩١

قسمة حقيقية أو في مرتبتها لأن احتمال ضرورة طرفي الوجود والعدم أو الإيجاب والسلب ساقط عن الاعتبار مع صحة القرينة وهي جارية في جميع المفهومات بالقياس إلى أي محمول كان فكل مفهوم إما أن يكون واجب الحيوانية أو ممتنعاً أو ممكنها - لكن حيثما يطلق الواجب وقسيمه في العلم الكلي يتبادر الذهن إلى ما يكون بالقياس إلى الوجود فهذه بعينها هي المستعملة في فن الميزان لكن مقيدة بنسبة محمول خاص هو الوجود.

وأما ما توهمه بعض من أن هذه مغايرة لتلك بحسب المعنى وإلا لكانت لوازم الماهيات واجبة لذواتها فمندفع بأن اللازم منه هو أن يكون الأربعة واجبة الزوجية لا واجبة الوجود فاختلف المعنى بحسب اختلاف المحمول - لا بحسب اختلاف مفهوم الوجوب الذي هو المادة والجهة وبعض أجلة أصحاب البحوث حيث لم يتفقه أن لازم الماهية كثبوت الزوجية للأربعة إنما ينسب بالذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٢

إلى نفس الماهية ولا يتوقف ذلك الثبوت الرباطي على جاعل الماهية إلا بالعرض في الطبائع الإمكانية الغير المتحققة إلا بالجعل ولا على وجودها إلا بالعرض أيضاً - من جهة أنها حالة الاقتضاء مخلوطة بالوجود لا بالذات حتى يكون العلة المقتضية - مركبة عند العقل من الماهيات وحيثية الوجود لها على أن يكون القضية المعقودة لذلك الحكم وصفية ظن أن كون اللوازم واجبة لملزوماتها نظراً إلى ذواتها إنما يتصور إذا كانت الملزومات واجبة الوجود لذواتها إذ لو لم يكن كذلك لاحتاج ثبوت اللوازم لها إلى ما يوجدها وظن أن الضرورة في قولنا الأربعة زوج ما دامت موجودة بالضرورة ضرورة وصفية مقيدة بقيد الوجود ولم يتميز الضرورة الذاتية عن الضرورة بشرط الوصف ولا الضرورة الذاتية الأزلية كما في قولنا الله قادر وحكيم بالضرورة عن الضرورة الذاتية الصادقة حالة الوجود أي مع الوجود لا بالوجود كما في هذه الضرورة ليس بين الضرورة بالشيء زمانية أو غيرها - وبين الضرورة ما دام الشيء كذلك وبين الضرورة الأزلية السرمدية الذاتية فرق محصل فاتخذ سبيلاً مستتبناً إلى تحصيل الضرورة الذاتية مع الوصف لا بالوصف - وهذه الضرورة التي هي مع وصف الوجود لا به مشترك عندنا بين ذاتيات الماهية المتقدمة ولوازمها المتأخرة والفارق هو التقدم والتأخر بنحو واحد منهما هو ما بحسب الذات والماهية لا بحسب الطبع والعلية المشهورة

فصل (٢) في أن واجب الوجود لا يكون بالذات وبالغير جميعاً وفي عدم العلاقة للزومية بين واجبين لو فرضنا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٣

كل ما لا علة له في ذاته لا يجب بعلة لأنك قد علمت أن مناط كون الشيء واجباً بالذات هو كونه إذا نظر إليه من حيث ذاته بذاته مطابقاً للحكم عليه بأنه موجود ومحكياً عنه بذلك من غير حيثية أخرى انضمامية أو انتزاعية تقييدية أو

تعليلية فإن مصداق الحكم على الأشياء قد يكون نفس ذات الموضوع من غير اعتبار آخر مطلقا وهو الضروري الأزلي الدائم وقد يكون نفس الموضوع من دون شرط و علة لكن ما دام اتصاف ذات الموضوع بالثبوت - فالحيثية المذكورة تؤخذ على نحو الظرفية البحتة لا على تعليل الحكم أو تقييده به - كقولنا الإنسان حيوان والإنسان إنسان و يقال له الضروري الذاتي وقد يكون ذات الموضوع باعتبار حيثية تعليلية خارجة عن مصداق الحكم وقد يكون مع حيثية أخرى غير الذات تقييدية سواء كانت سلبية كزيد أعمى أو إضافية كالسماء فوقنا أو اعتبارية كزيد ممكن أو انضمامية كزيد أبيض فصدق الوجودية على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٤

الواجب الوجود من قبيل الضرورة الأزلية إذ معنى كون الشيء واجبا لذاته أن يكون بحيث إذا اعتبر ذاته بذاته من غير اعتبار أي معنى كان و أية حيثية كانت غير نفس الذات يصدق عليه مفهوم الوجود و الوجودية فحينئذ نقول إذا فرض كون تلك الذات مستندة في موجوديتها إلى علة موجبة خارجة عنها لا يخلو إما أن يكون بحيث لو ارتفع المقتضي لوجودها أو فرض ارتفاعها عنها أو قطع النظر عن ملاحظة تأثيره فيها يبقى كونه مطابقا لصدق الوجود و محكيا عنها بالوجودية أم لا يكون - فإن كان الأول فلا تأثير لايجاب الغير لوجودها لتساوي فرض وجوده و عدمه - و اعتباره و لا اعتباره و قد فرض كونه مؤثرا هذا خلف و إن كان الثاني فلم يكن ما فرض واجبا بالذات واجبا بالذات فكل الشقين من التالي مستحيل و بطلان التالي بقسميه يوجب بطلان المقدم فكون واجب الوجود بالذات واجب الوجود بالغير باطل فكل واجب الوجود بغيره فهو ممكن الوجود بذاته.

و من هاهنا تبين أنه لا يصح أن يكون لواجب الوجود علاقة لزومية مع واجب وجود آخر لو فرضنا إذ العلاقة العقلية إنما يتحقق بين أمور يكون بعضها علة موجبة لبعض آخر أو بين أمور تكون معلولة لعلة واحدة موجبة بلا واسطة أو بوسط فإننا نعلم أن الأمور التي ليست بينها علاقة العلية و المعلولية و الافتقار و الارتباط بغير وسط أو بوسط يجوز عند العقل وجود بعضها منفكا عن الآخر - فإذن لو فرضنا بين الواجبين المفروضين تلازما ذاتيا و تكافؤا عقليا يلزم معلولية أحدهما أو كلاهما فيلزم إمكان شيء من الواجب و هو ينافي الوجوب الذاتي هذا خلف.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٥

طريق آخر لو كان بين الواجبين تلازم لزم اجتماع وجودين معا في ذات واحدة و الملازمة تظهر بأدنى تأمل و كذا بطلان اللازم فالذات الواجبية بما هي واجبية لا يعرض لها الوجوب بالقياس إلى ما لا يحتاج إليه سواء كان واجبا أو ممكنا كما لا يعرض لها الوجوب بالغير و لا يأبى طباع مفهوم الواجبية عن أن يكون للواجب إمكان بالقياس إلى الغير و للغير إمكان بالقياس إليه إلا إذا لوحظت بينهما علاقة العلية و المعلولية و ارتباط الإيجابي و الوجوبي و شيء من ذلك لا يتحقق بين الواجبين كما علمت فلو فرض وجود واجبين لا يكون بينهما معية ذاتية و لا علاقة لزومية بل مجرد صحابة اتفاقية يثبت لكل منهما إمكان بالقياس إلى الآخر و المضافان اللذان وجوب كل منهما مع الآخر لا يكفي في تحققهما موضوعاهما - بل يفترقان إلى ثالث جامع بينهما موقع الإضافة كما فصل في كتاب البرهان - حيث تبين فيه كيفية تحديد كل منهما و أنه يجب أن لا يؤخذ فيه المضاف الآخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٦

بل إنما يؤخذ في التحديد السبب الموقع للإضافة بينهما

فصل (٣) في أن واجب الوجود إنيته ماهيته

بمعنى أنه لا ماهية له سوى الوجود الخاص المجرد عن مقارنة الماهية بخلاف الممكن كالإنسان مثلاً فإن له ماهية هو الحيوان الناطق و وجوداً و هو كونه في الأعيان و فيه وجوه.

الأول لو لم يكن وجود الواجب عين ذاته

يلزم كونه مع بساطته كما سنبين قابلاً و فاعلاً بيان اللزوم أن وجوده لكونه عرضياً لماهيته يكون معلولاً لأن كل عرضي معلول إما لمعروضه و إما لغيره فلو كان معلولاً لغيره يلزم إمكانه إذ المعلولية للغير ينافي الواجبية هذا خلف فإذن الماهية يكون قابلاً للوجود من حيث المعروضية فاعلاً له من حيث الاقتضاء و في بطلان التالي كلام سيرد عليك إن شاء الله.

الثاني لو كان وجوده زائداً عليه يلزم تقدم الشيء بوجوده

على وجوده- و بطلانه ضروري من دون الاستعانة بما ذكره صاحب المباحث من أنه يفضي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٧

إلى وجود الشيء مرتين و إلى التسلسل في الوجودات لأن الوجود المتقدم إن كان نفس الماهية فذاك و إن كان غيرها عاد الكلام فيه و تسلسل وجه اللزوم أن الوجود حينئذ يحتاج إلى الماهية احتياج العارض إلى المعروض فيكون ممكناً ضرورة احتياجه إلى الغير فيفتقر إلى علة هي الماهية لا غير لامتناع افتقار الواجب في وجوده إلى الغير و كل علة فهي متقدمة على معلولها بالضرورة فيكون الماهية متقدمة على وجودها بوجودها.

الثالث لو كان زائداً يلزم إمكان زوال وجود الواجب

و هو ضروري الاستحالة- بيان الملازمة أن الوجود إذا كان محتاجاً إلى غيره كان ممكناً و كان جائز الزوال نظراً إلى ذاته و إلا لكان واجباً لذاته مستقلاً في حقيقته غير متعلق بالماهية هذا خلف-

و هاهنا بحث-

و هو أن إمكان الشيء لذاته لا ينافي وجوبه للغير نظراً إلى ذات ذلك الغير فإن أريد بإمكان زوال الوجود إمكان زواله نظراً إلى ذات ذلك الوجود العارض المفروض زيادته على ذات الواجب فهو مسلم لكن لا يستلزم إمكان زواله نظراً إلى ذات المعروض لأن الذات بذاتها مقتضية و موجبة لوجودها على ذلك التقدير و الإيجاب ينافي الاحتمال و الإمكان الخاصي و إن أريد بإمكان الزوال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٨

ما هو بحسب الذات الموجبة للوجود فهو ممنوع و السند ما مر.

و حاصل ما ذكره صاحب المباحث في الاعتراض على الوجه الثاني الذي هو العمدة من الوجوه الثلاثة أنه لم لا يجوز أن يكون علة الوجود هي الماهية من حيث هي هي فيتقدمه لا بالوجود بل بنفس ذاتها بذاتها كما أن ذاتيات الماهية

متقدمة عليها لا بالوجود بل بالماهية و كما أن الماهية علة للوالمها بذاتها لا بوجودها و كما أن ماهية الممكن قابل لوجوده مع أن تقدم القابل أيضا ضروري.

ورده الحكيم الطوسي في مواضع من كتبه كشرح الإشارات و نقدي التنزيل و المحصل بأن الكلام فيما يكون علة لوجود أو موجود في الخارج و بديهة العقل حاكمة بوجوب تقدمها عليه بالوجود فإنه ما لم تلحظ كون الشيء موجودا امتنع أن تلحظه مبدءا لوجود و مفيدا له بخلاف القابل للوجود فإنه لا بد أن يلحظه العقل خاليا عن الوجود أي غير معتبر فيه الوجود لئلا يلزم حصول الحاصل - و عن العدم لئلا يلزم اجتماع المتنافيين فإذن هي الماهية من حيث هي و أما الذاتيات بالنسبة إلى الماهية و الماهية بالنسبة إلى لوازها فلا يجب تقدمها إلا بالوجود العقلي لأن تقومها بالذاتيات و اتصافها بلوازها إنما هو بحسب العقل لا كالجسم مع البياض.

و مما يؤيد كلام هذا المحقق ما ذكره الشيخ الرئيس في كتاب المباحثات كلاما بهذه العبارة الوجود لا يجوز أن يكون معلول الماهية لأن الوجود ليس له حال غير أن يكون موجودا و علة الموجود موجودة و علة المعدوم معدومة - و علة الشيء من حيث هو شيء و ماهية شيء و ماهية فليس إذا كان الشيء قد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٩٩

يكون من حيث هو ماهية علة لبعض الأشياء يجب أن يكون علة لكل شيء - و كل ماهية لها لازم هو الوجود لا يجوز أن يكون لازمها معلولا لها و قد بين هذا في الشفا و في الإشارات و بالجملة لا يجوز أن يكون سبب الشيء من حيث هو حاصل الوجود إلا شيئا حاصل الوجود و لو كانت ماهية سببا للوجود لأنها ماهية لكان يجوز أن يكون يلزمها مع العدم لأن ما يلزم الماهية من حيث هي يلزمها كيف فرضت - و لا يتوقف على حال وجودها و محال أن يكون ماهية علة لوجود شيء و لم يعرض لها وجود فيكون علة الموجود لم يحصل لها الوجود و إذا لم يحصل للعلة وجود لم يحصل للمعلول وجود بل يكون للعلة ماهية فيتبعها ماهية المعلول مثل أن المثلث يتبعها كون الزوايا مساوية لقائمتين لكن لا يوجد كون الزوايا كقائمتين حاصلًا موجودًا إلا و قد عرض للمثلث وجود فإن لم يعرض للمثلث وجود لم يعرض لكون الزوايا كقائمتين وجود و ليس يجوز أن يقال للوجود ماهية ليس يعتبر معها الوجود كما يجوز أن يكون لكون الزوايا كقائمتين ماهية لا يعتبر معها الوجود - فإن تلك الماهية في حال وجود المثلث تكون موجودة و في حال عدمها تكون معدومة و ما لم يوضع للمثلث وجود لم يكن لتلك الماهية وجود فليس يمكن أن يقال ماهية الأول عرض لها وجود حتى لزم عنها الوجود و لا يجوز أن يقال إنها و إن لم يوجد يكون للوجود عنها وجود و لا يجوز أن يقال إنها من حيث هي ماهية يلزمها ماهية الوجود و من حيث يعرض لها وجود يلزمها وجود ماهية الوجود - فإن ماهية الوجود لا يخلو عن أن تكون موجودة و ليس كماهية كون الزوايا كقائمتين - من حيث لا يجب لها دائما وجود ما دامت ماهية بل هذه الماهية توجد بعد وجود المثلث و إن عدم المثلث عدمت هذه الماهية فإن قال قائل و أيضا فإن عدمت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٠

ماهية واجب الوجود عدم الوجود فيكون حينئذ ليست الماهية سببا للوجود بل كونها موجودة سبب للوجود فيحتاج إذن أن تكون موجودة حتى يلزمها وجود الوجود و إلا لم يلزمها إلا عدم الوجود فتكون قبل اللازم الموجود موجودة -

فيكون قد عرض لها الوجود قبل أن لزم عنها الوجود و هذا محال فاحتفظ بهذا الكلام فإنه لم يوجد نظيره في هذا المقام.

نقد وإشارة:

قد دريت أن نسبة الوجود إلى الماهية ليست كنسبة العرض إلى الموضوع - بأن يكون للماهية كون و لوجودها كون آخر يحل الماهية بل الوجود نفس كون الماهية و حصولها و ما به تتحصل فهي في حد نفسها في غاية الكمون و البطون و الخفاء و إنما تكونت و تنورت و ظهرت بالوجود فالنسبة بينهما اتحادية لا تعلقية و الاتحاد لا يتصور بين شيئين متحصلين بل إنما يتصور بين متحصل و لا متحصل كما بين الجنس و الفصل بما هما جنس و فصل لا بما هما مادة و صورة عقليتان فانصبغ الماهية بالوجود إنما هو بحسب العقل حيث يحلل الموجود إلى ماهية مبهمة و وجود حاصل لها و يصفها به كما مر فالمبهم بما هو مبهم لا يكون علة للمتحصل و خصوصاً للمتحصل الذي يتحصل ذلك المبهم به و لا تحصل له إلا به بل ذلك المتحصل نفس تحصله كما أن المضاف بالحقيقة نفس إضافة الموضوع له. و أما تقدم الذاتيات بحسب الماهية على ما يتألف منها و تقدم الماهية على لازمها فهذا نحو آخر من التقدم سوى ما بالعلية و الكلام في التقدم الذي يكون بحسب العلية و التأثير.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠١

فإن قيل فليكن تقدم الماهية بالقياس إلى وجودها من هذا القبيل. نقول هذا فاسد من وجوه منها أنا قد بينا أن العلاقة بينهما اتحادية - من دون تقدم أحدهما على الآخر في الواقع فإن الموجود في الحقيقة هو الوجود - و الماهية منتزعة عنه و متحدة معه و من قال من المحققين بتقدم الوجود بحسب العين على الماهية معناه أن الوجود هو الأصل في الصدور من الجاعل و التقرر في الأعيان - لكونه نفس التقرر في الأعيان و الماهية مفهومة منه متحدة معه فيكون فرعاً له بهذا الاعتبار لا بمعنى المعلولية و التأثير إذ الماهيات غير مجعولة و لا متأثرة لا بالجعل البسيط و لا بالجعل المؤلف كما ستطلع عليه. و بالجملة ما لم يصدر الوجود الإمكانى عن الجاعل لم يكن هناك ماهية و إذا صدر الوجود تقررت الماهية لكن في مرتبة الوجود لا في مرتبة متأخرة و لا متقدمة - إذ لا استقلال لها في الكون و الحصول في الواقع. و منها أن لوازم الماهية أمور انتزاعية غير متأصلة و قد حققنا أن الوجود أمر حقيقي فكيف يكون من لوازم الماهية و التقدم و التأخر بين الماهية و لازمها - و إن كانا متحققين من دون مدخلة الوجود في شيء منهما لكن مع انسحاب حكم الوجود عليهما لا به لعدم انفكاكهما عن الوجود اللائق بهما فالماهية في مرتبة اقتضاؤها للازمها مخلوطة بالوجود و إن لم يكن اقتضاؤها بحسب الوجود فكيف يكون الوجود لازماً لها مع كونه في مرتبتها غير متأخر عنها.

توضيح و تنبيه: الشيء إما ماهية أو وجود

إذ المراد بالماهية غير الوجود - و لا محالة يكون أمراً يعرضه الكلية و الإبهام فنقول كل ما هو غير الوجود و إن أمكن أن يكون سبباً لصفة و يكون صفته سبباً لصفة أخرى لكن لا يمكن أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٢

يكون سببا لوجوده فإن السبب متقدم بالوجود و لا شيء من غير الوجود بمتقدم بالوجود على الوجود و هذا مما ينبه على أن الواجب الوجود ليس غير الوجود- فإن الذي هو غير الوجود لا يكون سببا لوجود فلا يكون سببا لوجوده فلا يكون موجودا بذاته فلا يكون واجب الوجود بذاته بل واجب الوجود هو الوجود الذي هو موجود بذاته

وهم وإزاحة-

و لك أن تقول ما ذكرت في غير الوجود فهو بعينه آت في الوجود- فإن الوجود لو كان سببا لوجوده و كونه و السبب متقدم بالوجود كان الوجود متقدما بالوجود على وجوده و أنه محال لكننا نجيبك بأننا لا نسلم أنه محال فإن تقدم الوجود على موجوديته إنما هو بنفسه و هو الوجود و غير الوجود يتقدم لا بنفسه بل بوجوده و لا شبهة في عدم استحالة ذلك و لزيادة الإيضاح نقول كل ما هو غير الوجود فهو معلول لأن الإنسان مثلا إما أن يكون موجودا للإنسانية و لأنه إنسان- و إما موجود بسبب شيء آخر من خارج لا سبيل إلى الأول لأن الإنسان إنما يكون إنسانا إذا كان موجودا فلو كان كونه موجودا لأنه إنسان لكان كونه موجودا لكونه موجودا فيكون الإنسان موجودا قبل كونه موجودا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٣

و هو محال فبقي أن لا يكون الإنسان موجودا إلا عن علة و ينعكس بعكس النقيض إلى أن كل ما لا يكون معلولا لا يكون غير الوجود بل هو نفس الوجود.

فلو قيل الوجود أيضا كذلك لا يجوز أن يكون موجودا لأنه وجود لأنه إنما يكون وجودا لو كان موجودا فيكون موجودا لأنه موجود فيعود المحال.

فالجواب أن الوجود إنما يكون موجودا لا بوجود آخر بل بنفسه فلا معنى لقولنا الوجود موجود لأنه موجود إلا أن الوجود موجود بنفسه فلا يلزم أن يكون الوجود موجودا قبل كونه موجودا بل اللازم أن الوجود متقدم بنفسه على نفس كونه موجودا و لا محذور فيه.

فقد ظهر أن ما هو غير الوجود إنما يكون موجودا بالوجود و الوجود موجود بنفسه كما أن الزماني يتقدم و يتأخر بحسب الزمان و الزمان كذلك بنفسه و كما أن الأجسام يختلف بالمادة و المادة كذلك بنفسها و كما أن الأشياء يظهر بين يدي الحس بالنور و النور بنفسه لا بنور آخر هذا ما قرره بعض الحكماء و فيه تأمل.

الرابع ما أفاده صاحب التلويحات-

و هو أن الذي فصل الذهن وجوده عن ماهيته إن امتنع وجودها بعينه لا يصير شيء منها موجودا و إذا صار شيء منها موجودا فالكلي له جزئيات أخرى معقولة غير متمتعة لماهياتها بل ممكنة إلى غير النهاية و قد علمت أن ما وقع من جزئيات كلي بقي الإمكان بعد و إذا كان هذا الواقع واجب الوجود و له ماهية وراء الوجود فهي إذا أخذت كلية أمكن وجود جزئي آخر لها لذاتها إذ لو امتنع الوجود للماهية لكان المفروض واجب الوجود- متمتعة الوجود باعتبار ماهيته و هذا محال غاية ما في الباب أن يمتنع بسبب غير نفس الماهية فيكون ممكنا في نفسه فلا يكون واجبا لأن جزئيات الماهية وراء ما وقع ممكنات كما سبق فليست واجبة فإذا كان شيء من ماهياتها ممكنا فصار الواجب أيضا باعتبار ماهيته ممكنا و هذا محال فإذا كان في الوجود واجب فليس له ماهية وراء الوجود بحيث يفصله الذهن إلى أمرين فهو الوجود الصرف البحث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٤

الذي لا يشوبه شيء من خصوص و عموم هذا كلامه نور الله سره و أرى أنه برهان متين و تحقيق حسن و الإراد عليه بأنه لم لا يجوز أن يفصل العقل أمرا موجودا إلى وجود و معروض له يكون ذلك جزئيا شخصا لا كليا و تخصيص إطلاق الماهية على الكلية لا ينفع إذ المقصود أن الوجود غير زائد بل هو نفس حقيقة الواجب - مندفع بأن كلامه مبني على أن تشخص الشيء في الحقيقة نحو وجوده كما هو رأي أهل الحق المصرح به في كلام أبي نصر الفارابي فكل ما يفصله الذهن إلى معروض و عارض هو الوجود كان في مرتبة ذاته مع قطع النظر عن وجوده كليا لا محالة و كل ما له ماهية كلية فنفس تصورهما لا يأبى عن أن يكون له جزئيات غير ما وقع إلا لمانع خارج عن نفس ماهيته فحاصل برهانه أنه لما كان الوجوب و الإمكان و الامتناع من لوازم الماهيات و الذوات إذ المنظور إليه في تقسيم الشيء إلى الأمور الثلاثة حاله في نفسه مقيسا إلى الوجود فلو كان المفروض واجبا معنى غير نفس الوجود يكون معنى كليا له جزئيات بحسب العقل فتلك الجزئيات إما أن يكون جميعها ممتنعة لذاتها أو واجبة لذاتها أو ممكنة لذاتها و الشقوق الثلاثة بأسرها باطلة إذ الأول ينافي الوجوب و الوجود و الثاني ينافي العدم فيما لم يقع - و الثالث ينافي الوجوب فيما يفرض واقعا و بطلان شقوق التالي بأسرها مستلزم لبطلان المقدم و هو كون الواجب معنى غير الوجود فإذن إن كان في الوجود واجب بالذات - فليس إلا الوجود الصرف المتأكد المتشخص بنفسه لا يلحقه عموم و لا خصوص.

و ما أشنع ما أورده عليه بعض الأعلام من أن دعوى عدم امتناع الجزئيات - الغير المتناهية ممنوع و لم لا يجوز أن يكون لماهية كلية أفراد متعددة متناهية - لا يمكن أن يتعدى عنها في الواقع و إن جاز في التوهم الزيادة عليها و لو سلم عدم التناهي فهو بمعنى لا يقف و بطلان اللازم حينئذ ممنوع و لو سلم أنه غير متناه بالمعنى الآخر فغاية ما يلزم أن يكون الواجبات غير متناهية فلقاتل أن يمنع بطلان هذا قائلا إن دلائل بطلان التسلسل لو تمت لدلت على امتناع ترتب أمور غير متناهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٥

موجودة معا و لزوم ترتب الواجبات غير بين و لا مبين.

لأننا نقول أما بطلان ما ذكره أولا فبأن كل ماهية بالنظر إلى ذاتها لا يقتضي شيئا من التناهي و اللاتناهي و لا مرتبة معينة من المراتب أصلا فإذا قطع النظر عن الأمور الخارجة عن نفس الماهية لا يأبى عند العقل عن أن يكون لها أفراد غير متناهية - و أما فساد ما ذكره ثانيا و ثالثا فبأن الكلام هاهنا ليس في بطلان التسلسل في الواجبات - عدديا أو لا يقفيا مترتبا أو متكافئا حتى قيل إن بطلانه بعد منظور فيه بل الكلام في أنه إذا كان للواجب ماهية كلية يمكن أن يفرض لها جزئيات سوى ما هو الواقع - إذ الماهية لما لم يكن من حيث هي إلا هي كان الوقوع و اللاوقوع كلاهما خارجين عن نفسها فلا يأبى بالنظر إلى نفسها من حيث هي أن يكون لها أفراد غير واقعة - و لما كان كل من الوجوب و الإمكان و الامتناع من لوازم المعنى مع قطع النظر عن الخارجيات بمعنى أن لا معنى من المعاني في ذاته خارجا عن أحد هذه المعاني - فإذا وجب لذاته فرد من ماهية كلية كانت جميع أفرادها واجبة لذاتها و كذا امتنعت لو امتنع و أمكنت لو أمكن.

فنقول تلك الأفراد المفروضة الغير الواقعة لم تكن واجبة لذاتها وإلا لما عدت ولا ممتنعة وإلا لكان هذا الواقع أيضا ممتنعا هذا خلف لأننا نتكلم بعد أن نجزم بوجود الواجب لذاته ولا ممكنة وإلا لكان الواجب لذاته ممكنا لذاته هذا خلف أيضا فثبت أنه لو كان الواجب تعالى ذا ماهية غير الإنية لزم كونه غير واحد من هذه المواد الثلاث وهو محال.

شك وإزالة:

ولعلك تقول إنهم صرحوا بأن تشخص العقول من لوازم ماهياتها - بمعنى أن ماهية كل واحد من الجواهر المفارقة تقتضي انحصار نوعه في شخصه فليكن الواجب ذا ماهية يقتضي لذاتها الانحصار في واحد فكيف حكمت بأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٦

الماهية لا تقتضي شيئا من مراتب التعيين.

فاعلم أن كون تشخص كل جوهر عقلي من لوازم ذاته ليس معناه أن الماهية المطلقة تقتضي التعيين فقد أشرنا إلى أن التعيين بمعنى ما به التعيين في الأشياء نفس وجودها الخاص والوجود مما لا يقتضيه الماهية كما عرفت بل اللزوم قد يراد منه عدم الانفكاك بين شيئين سواء كان مع الاقتضاء أم لا وهو المراد من قولهم تعيين كل عقل لازم لماهيته وأما التعيين بمعنى المتعينة فهو أمر اعتباري عقلي لا بأس بكونه من لوازم الماهية بأي معنى كان لأنه ليس أمرا مخصوصا يتعين به الشيء

الوجه الخامس

وهو قريب المأخذ مما ذكره صاحب الإشراف ويناسب مذهب المشائين وهو أن الوجود لو كان زائدا على ماهية الواجب لزم وقوعه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٧

تحت مقولة الجوهر فيحتاج إلى فصل مقوم فيتركب ذاته وهو محال.

وأيضا كل ما صح على الفرد صح على الطبيعة من حيث هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٨

وكل ما امتنع على الطبيعة امتنع على أفرادها ولما لزم قول الإمكان على بعض الجواهر ضرورة لما يشاهد من حدوث العنصریات وزوالها صح وقوع الإمكان على مقولتها لذاتها فلو دخل واجب الوجود تحت مقولة الجوهر للزم فيه جهة إمكانية باعتبار الجنس فلا يكون واجب الوجود بالذات هذا خلف فكل ما له ماهية زائدة على الوجود فهو إما جوهر أو عرض والواجب ليس جوهرًا كما عرفت ولا عرضًا لعدم قيامه بغيره فلا يكون له تعالى ماهية سوى الوجود.

شكوك وإزاحات

قد أورد على كون واجب الوجود محض حقيقة الوجود بلا مقارنة ماهية وجوه من الإيراد -

منها لو كان وجود الواجب مجردا عن الماهية

فحصول هذا الوصف له إن كان لذاته لزم أن يكون كل وجود كذلك لامتناع تخلف مقتضى الذات فيلزم تعدد الواجب و

هو محال كما سيجيء وإن كان لغيره لزم احتياج الواجب في وجوبه إلى غيره ضرورة توقف وجوبه على التجرد المتوقف على ذلك الغير.

لا يقال يكفي في التجرد عدم ما يقتضي المقارنة.

لأننا نقول فإذن يحتاج إلى عدم ذلك المقتضي.

و أجب بأن حصول هذا الوصف له لذاته الذي هو الوجود الخاص المخالف بالحقيقة لسائر الوجودات عند المشائين و بالتمامية و النقص أو الغنى و الفقر عند حكماء الفرس و الخسروانيين و هذا تفاوت عظيم جدا فإن حقيقة الوجود ما لم يشبه ضعف و قصور لا يلحقه معنى من المعاني التي هي غير الوجود التي يعبر عنها بالماهيات - و القصور و الضعف من مراتب الإمكانيات و التنزلات كما أن الظل من مراتب تنزلات النور إذ المعنى من الظل ليس أمرا وجوديا بل هو من مراتب قصورات النور و القصور عديمي و كذلك تنزلات مراتب الوجود الذي هو حقيقة النور عند هؤلاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٠٩

العظماء من الحكماء الفهلويين و قصوراتها إنما تنشأ من خصوصيات هوياتها- التي لا تزيد على حقيقتها المتفقة في أصل الوجود و النورية

و منها أن الواجب مبدأ للممكنات

فلو كان وجودا مجردا فكونه مبدأ للممكنات إن كان لذاته فيلزم أن يكون كل وجود كذلك و هو محال لاستلزامه كون كل وجود ممكن علة لنفسه و لعله و إلا فإن كان هو الوجود مع قيد التجرد- لزم تركيب المبدأ الأول بل عدمه ضرورة أن أحد جزءيه و هو التجرد عديمي و إن كان بشرط التجرد لزم جواز كون كل وجود مبدأ لكل وجود إلا أن الحكم تخلف عنه لفقدان شرط المبدئية و هو التجرد.

و الجواب كما مر أن ذلك لذاته الذي هو وجود خاص مخالف لسائر الوجودات ذاتا و حقيقة كما هو عند الجمهور من المشائين أو تأصلا و غنى كما هو عند الأقدمين.

و منها أن حقيقة الله لا يساوي حقيقة شيء من الأشياء

لأن حقيقة ما سواه مقتضية للإمكان و حقيقته تعالى منافية للإمكان و اختلاف اللوازم يستدعي اختلاف الملزومات على أن وجود الواجب يساوي وجود الممكن في كونه وجودا- ثم ليس مع ذلك الوجود شيء آخر غير ذاته بل ذاته مجرد الوجود فيكون جميع الوجودات الممكنات متساوية في تمام الحقيقة لذاته.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٠

و أجب بأن وجود الممكنات ليس نفس ماهياتها و لا جزءا منها بل عارض لها- و هذا الجواب ضعيف لأن عروض الوجودات للممكنات لا ينافي مشاركة الواجب إياها في معنى الوجود.

و أيضا كما خالف حقيقة الله تعالى ماهيات الممكنات في اللوازم كذلك يخالف وجوداتها في اللوازم لأن وجوده يقتضي التجرد و الوجوب و وجودات الممكنات تقتضي الإمكان و القيام بالغير فإن صح الاستدلال باختلاف اللوازم على اختلاف الملزومات وجب أن يكون حقيقة الله تعالى مخالفة لوجودات الممكنات في الماهية و هو خلاف ما

ذهبوا إليه.

فالحق في الجواب على طريقة المشائين أن يقال أن وجود الواجب لا يساوي وجودات الممكنات في حقيقة الوجود بل يشاركها في مفهوم الموجدية العامة التي هي من المعقولات الثانية وهذا المفهوم وإن كان معنى واحدا لكنه لازم خارجي و اتحاد اللازم لا ينافي اختلاف الملزومات بحسب الحقيقة.

و منها أن الواجب إن كان نفس الكون في الأعيان

أعني الوجود المطلق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١١

لزم تعدد الواجب ضرورة أن وجود الجوهر غير وجود العرض وإن كان هو الكون مع قيد التجرد لزم تركب الواجب من الوجود و التجرد مع أنه عدمي لا يصلح أن يكون جزءا للواجب أو بشرط التجرد لزم أن لا يكون الواجب واجبا لذاته و إن كان غير الكون في الأعيان فإن كان بدون الكون فمحال ضرورة أنه لا يعقل الوجود بدون الكون و إن كان مع الكون فإما أن يكون الكون داخلا فيه و هو محال ضرورة امتناع تركب الواجب أو خارجا عنه و هو المطلوب لأن معناه زيادة الوجود على ما هو حقيقة الواجب.

و بوجه آخر أنا لا نشك في أن معنى الوجود الكون و التحقق فالوجود الخاص إما أن يشتمل على معنى الكون و الثبوت أو لا فإن لم يشتمل فليس بوجود قطعا - إذ لا معنى للوجود الخاص بالشئ إلا كونه و تحققه و إن اشتمل على معنى الكون - كان الوجود المطلق ذاتيا له فهو إما أن يكون جزء الواجب أو نفسه و أيا ما كان يلزم أن يكون له ماهية كلية و أنه محال.

و الجواب أما عن الأول فبأن الواجب نفس الوجود الخاص المخالف لسائر الوجودات لأنه متقدم قاهر بالذات عليها غني بالذات عنها مؤثر بالذات فيها و لا نزاع في زيادة الكون المطلق الذي هو أمر عقلي كالشيئية و نظائرها عليه كما مر لكن موجدية الواجب بمعنى ما به الوجود ليست أمرا وراء نفس ذاته كما صرح به الشيخ في كتاب المباحثات من أن ماهية الحق موجودة لا بوجود يلحقه أي من خارج و ليس كالإنسانية التي هي موجودة بأن لها وجودا خارجا عنها بل هي نفس الوجود بلا وجود ملبوس و هو نفس الواجبية و هي معنى بسيط و إن كان المعبر يعبر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٢

عنه بلفظ مركب أو إن كان له وجود مشترك فيكون ذلك لازما حتى يجب له أو يؤخذ الوجود بالمعنى العام فيكون لازما لا يرفع دائما و هو له من وجود الحق لكونه موجودا أو جعل أنه موجود في أصله و ماهيته فسأل سؤال التضعيف هل هو ذو وجود أم لا فسومح بأن له وجودا أي بالمعنى العام على أنه لازم أو نوقش و قيل ليس هو بموجود على أن وجوده صفة لشئ هي فيه و اختار في التعليقات الشق الثاني حيث قال إذا قلنا واجب الوجود موجود فهو لفظ مجاز معناه أنه بحث وجود و صحفوه بأنه يجب وجوده و هو سهو.

و الحاصل أن حقيقة الواجب عند الحكماء وجود خاص معروض للوجود المشترك المقابل للعدم على ما لخصه بعض من حاول تلخيص كلامهم بأن الحصة من الكون في الأعيان زائدة على الوجود المجرد المبدأ للممكنات الذي هو نفس

ماهية الواجب - وليس فيه اعتراف بكون وجود الواجب زائداً على حقيقته و بأنه يستلزم كون الواجب موجوداً بوجودين مع أنه لا أولوية لأحدهما بالعارضية و الآخر بالمعروضية إذ لا نزاع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٣

لأحد في زيادة مفهوم الكون العام و حصته التي هي نفس ذلك المفهوم مع خصوصية ما - لا ما صدق عليه هو من الوجودات المتخالفة إنما النزاع في الوجود الخاص هل هو عين حقيقة الواجب أم زائد عليه فإن وقع في كلامهم أن الوجود المشترك عين في الواجب زائد في الممكن كان معناه أن مصداق حملة و مطابق صدقه في الواجب ذاته بذاته و في الممكنات ليس كذلك و أما عن الوجه الآخر فإن الوجود ليس بكلي و إن كان مطلقاً مشتركاً فتأمل في هذا المقام فإنك لو عرفت هذا المعنى في الوجود صرت من الراسخين في العلم

و منها أن الوجود معلوم بالضرورة و حقيقة الواجب غير معلومة

و غير المعلوم غير المعلوم ضرورة.

و أجيب عنه في المشهور أن المعلوم هو الوجود المطلق المغاير للخاص الذي هو نفس حقيقة الواجب.

لمعة إشرافية

أما أن حقيقة الواجب غير معلومة لأحد بالعلم الحسولي الصوري فهذا مما لا خلاف فيه لأحد من الحكماء و العرفاء و قد أقيم عليه البرهان - كيف و حقيقته ليست إلا نحو وجوده العيني الخاص به و ليس الوجود الخاص للشيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٤

متعدداً بخلاف الماهية فإنها أمر مبهم لا يأبى تعدد أنحاء الوجود لها و العلم بالشيء ليس إلا نحواً من أنحاء وجود ذلك الشيء للذات المجردة و أما أن حقيقته غير معلومة لأحد علماً اكتناهاً و إحاطياً عقلياً أو حسياً فهذا أيضاً حق لا يعتريه شبهة - إذ ليس للقوى العقلية أو الحسية التسلط عليه بالإحاطة و الاكتناء فإن القاهرة و التسلط للعلة بالقياس إلى المعلول و المعلول إنما هو شأن من شئون علته و له حصول تام عندها و ليس لها حصول تام عنده و أما أن ذاته لا يكون مشهوداً لأحد من الممكنات أصلاً فليس كذلك بل لكل منها أن يلاحظ ذاته المقدسة عن الحصر و التقيد بالأمكنة و الجهات و الأحياز على قدر ما يمكن للمفاض عليه أن يلاحظ المفيض فكل منها ينال من تجلي ذاته بقدر وعائه الوجودي و يحرم عنه بقدر ضعفه و قصوره و ضيقه عن الإحاطة به لبعده عن منبع الوجود من قبل ضعف وجوده أو مقارنته للأعدام و القوى و المواد لا لمنع و بخل من قبله تعالى فإنه لعظمته و سعة رحمته و شدة نوره النافذ و عدم تناهيه أقرب إلى كل أحد من كل أحد غيره كما أشار إليه في كتابه المجيد بقوله **وَنَحْنُ أَقْرَبُ إِلَيْهِ مِنْ حَبَلٍ** **الْوَرِيدِ** و قوله **وَإِذَا سَأَلَكَ عِبَادِي عَنِّي فَإِنِّي قَرِيبٌ** فهو سبحانه في العلو الأعلى من جهة كماله الأقصى - و الدنو الأدنى من جهة سعة رحمته فهو العالي في دنوه و الداني في علوه و إليه أشير في الرواية عن النبي ع لو دلتهم بالأرض السفلى لهبطتم على الله تعالى قال يعقوب بن إسحاق الكندي إذا كانت العلة الأولى متصلة بنا لفيضه علينا و كنا غير متصلين به إلا من جهته فقد يمكن فينا ملاحظته على قدر ما يمكن للمفاض عليه أن يلاحظ المفيض فيجب أن لا ينسب قدر إحاطته بنا إلى قدر ملاحظتنا له لأنها أغزر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٥

و أوفر و أشد استغراقا و قال المحقق الشهرزوري في الشجرة الإلهية الواجب لذاته أجمل الأشياء و أكملها لأن كل جمال و كمال رشح و ظل و فيض من جماله و كماله فله الجلال الأرفع و النور الأقهر فهو محتجب بكمال نوريته و شدة ظهوره و الحكماء المتألهون العارفون به يشهدونه لا بالكنه لأن شدة ظهوره و قوة لمعانه و ضعف ذواتنا المجردة النورية يمنعنا عن مشاهدته بالكنه كما منع شدة ظهور الشمس و قوة نورها أبصارنا اكتناهاها لأن شدة نوريتها حجابها و نحن نعرف الحق الأول و نشاهده - لكن لا نحيط به علما كما ورد في الوحي الإلهي **وَلَا يُحِيطُونَ بِهِ عِلْمًا وَعَنْتِ الْوُجُوهُ لِلْحَيِّ الْقَيُّومِ**.

و اعلم أن معنى كون شدة النورية العقلية أو الحسية حجابا للعقل أو الحس عن الإدراك يرجع إلى قصور شيء منهما و فتوره عن نيل مطلوبه و الاكتناه به فإن الحجاب عديمي و حقيقة الواجب صرف الوجود و محض النورية بلا مصحوبية شيء - من الأعدام و الظلمات و النقائص و الآفات.

فإن قيل إذا جوزت كون ذاته معلوما بالحضور الإشراقي للنفوس المتألهة - و لا شك أن المشهود بالشهود الوجودي ليس إلا نفس حقيقته البسيطة لا وجهها من وجوهه فكيف لا يكون معلوما بالكنه و المشهود ليس إلا نفس حقيقته الصرفة لا غير.

قلنا لا يمكن للمعلولات مشاهدة ذاته إلا من وراء حجاب أو حجب حتى المعلول الأول فهو أيضا لا يشاهد ذاته إلا بواسطة عين وجوده و مشاهدة نفس ذاته فيكون شهود الحق الأول له من جهة شهود ذاته و بحسب وعائه الوجودي لا بحسب ما هو المشهود - و هذا لا ينافي الفناء الذي ادعوه فإنه إنما يحصل بترك الالتفات إلى الذات و الإقبال بكلية الذات إلى الحق فلا يزال العالم في حجاب تعينه و إنيته عن إدراك الحق لا يرتفع ذلك الحجاب عنه بحيث لم يصر مانعا عن الشهود و لم يبق له حكم و إن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٦

أمكن أن يرتفع تعينه عن نظر شهوده لكن يكون حكمه باقيا كما قال الحلاج
بيني و بينك أني ينازعني فارفع بلطفك أني من البين

حكمة عرشية:

اعلم يا أخا الحقيقة أيدك الله بروح منه أن العلم كالجهل قد يكون بسيطا و هو عبارة عن إدراك شيء مع الذهول عن ذلك الإدراك و عن التصديق بأن المدرك ما ذا و قد يكون مركبا و هو عبارة عن إدراك شيء مع الشعور بهذا الإدراك و بأن المدرك هو ذلك الشيء إذا تمهد هذا فنقول إن إدراك الحق تعالى على الوجه البسيط حاصل لكل أحد في أصل فطرته لأن المدرك بالذات من كل شيء عند الحكماء بعد تحقيق معنى الإدراك و تلخيصه عن الزوائد على ما يستفاد من تحقیقات المحققين من المشائين كما سيقع سمعك ليس إلا نحو وجود ذلك الشيء سواء كان ذلك الإدراك حسيا أو خياليا أو عقليا و سواء كان حضوريا أو حصوليا و قد تحقق و تبين عند المحققين من العرفاء و المتألهين من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٧

أن وجود كل شيء ليس إلا حقيقة هويته المرتبطة بالوجود الحق القيوم و مصداق الحكم بالموجودية على الأشياء و مطابق القول فيها هو نحو هوياتها العينية متعلقة مرتبطة بالوجود الإلهي و سنقيم البرهان على أن الهويات الوجودية من مراتب تجليات ذاته و لمعات جلاله و جماله فإذن إدراك كل شيء ليس إلا ملاحظة ذلك الشيء - على الوجه الذي يرتبط بالواجب من ذلك الوجه الذي هو وجوده و موجوديته و هذا لا يمكن إلا بإدراك ذات الحق تعالى لأن صريح ذاته بذاته منتهى سلسلة الممكنات و غاية جميع العلاقات لا بجهة أخرى من جهاته كيف و جميع جهاته و حيثياته يرجع إلى نفس ذاته كما سنبين في مقامه اللائق به إن شاء الله تعالى فكل من أدرك شيئاً من الأشياء بأي إدراك كان فقد أدرك الباري و إن غفل عن هذا الإدراك - إلا الخواص من أولياء الله تعالى كما نقل عن أمير المؤمنين ع أنه قال

: ما رأيت شيئاً إلا و رأيت الله قبله و روي معه و فيه

و الكل صحيح فظهر و تبين أن هذا الإدراك البسيط للحق تعالى حاصل لكل أحد من عباده و لا يلزم من ذلك إدراكه تعالى بكنه ذاته لشيء لا متناع ذلك بالبرهان كما مر.

و أما الإدراك المركب سواء كان على وجه الكشف و الشهود كما يختص بخلص الأولياء و العرفاء أو بالعلم الاستدلالي كما يحصل للعقلاء المتفكرين في صفاته و آثاره فهو ليس مما هو حاصل للجميع و هو مناط التكليف و الرسالة و فيه يتطرق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٨

الخطأ و الصواب و إليه يرجع حكم الكفر و الإيمان و التفاضل بين العرفاء و المراتب بين الناس بخلاف النحو الأول فإنه لا يتطرق إليه الخطأ و الجهالة أصلاً كما في الفارسية -

دانش حق ذوات را فطری است دانش دانش است كان فکری است

فإذن قد انكشف أن مدركات الخمس كمدركات سائر القوى الإدراكية مظاهر الهوية الإلهية التي هي المحبوب الأول و المقصود الكامل للإنسان فبعينه يشاهده و ينظر إليه لا على وجه يعتقده الأشاعرة و بأذنه يسمع كلامه و بأنفه يشم رائحة طيبة و بجميع ظاهر بدنه يلمس لا على وجه يقوله المجسمة تعالى عن ذلك علواً كبيراً - فيدرك المحبوب الحقيقي بجميع القوى و الجوارح مع تقدس ذاته عن الأمكنة و الجهات - و تجرد حقيقته عن المواد و الجسمانيات و ما ذكرناه مما أطبق عليه أهل الكشف و الشهود الذين هم خلاصة عباد الله المعبود بل جميع الموجودات عندهم بالمعنى الذي ذكرناه عقلاء عارفون بربهم مسبحون له شاهدون لجماله سامعون لكلامه - و إليه الإشارة بقوله تعالى **و** **إِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يَسْبِجُ بِحَمْدِهِ وَلَكِنْ لَا تَفْقَهُونَ تَسْبِيحَهُمْ** و التسبيح و التقديس لا يتصوران بدون المعرفة و قوله تعالى **إِنَّمَا أَمْرُهُ إِذَا أَرَادَ شَيْئًا أَنْ يَقُولَ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ** دليل واضح على كون كل من الموجودات عاقلاً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١١٩

يعقل ربه و يعرف مبدعه و يسمع كلامه إذ امتثال الأمر مترتب على السماع و الفهم بالمراد على قدر ذوق السامع و استطاعة المدرك و بحسب ما يليق بجناحه المقدس عن الأشباه و الأمثال و قوله تعالى للسموات و الأرض **اَتْتِيَا طَوْعًا أَوْ كَرْهًا قَالَتَا أَتَيْنَا طَائِعِينَ** مبين لما ذكرناه و منور لما قلناه.

وهم وإزاحة:

و لعلك تقول إن الوجود طبيعة نوعيه لما ينتم من كونه مفهوما واحدا مشتركا بين الكل و الطبيعة لا تختلف لوازمها بل يجب لكل فرد ما يجب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٠

للاخر لامتناع تخلف المقتضى عن المقتضى فالوجود إن اقتضى العروض أو اللاعروض - لم يختلف ذلك في الواجب و الممكن و إن لم يقتض شيئا منهما احتاج الواجب في وجوبه إلى سبب منفصل. و الجواب في المشهور منع كونه طبيعة نوعيه متواطية و مجرد اتحاد المفهوم لا يوجب ذلك لجواز أن يصدق مفهوم واحد على أشياء متخالفة الحقائق فيجوز أن يكون الوجودات الخاصة متخالفة الحقيقة فيجب للوجود الواجب التجرد و لغيره المقارنة مع اشتراك الكل في صدق مفهوم الوجود المطلق عليها سواء كانت مقوليته عليها بالتواطؤ كالماهية للماهيات و التشخيص للتشخيصات أو بالتشكيك كالنور الصادق على نور الشمس و غيره مع أن نورها يقتضي إبطار الأعشى بخلاف سائر الأنوار فلا يلزم من كون الوجود مفهوما واحدا مشتركا بين الوجودات كونه طبيعة نوعية و الوجودات الخاصة أفرادا متوافقة الحقيقة و اللوازم لا تفاوت فيها كيف و قد سبق أن الوجود مقول عليها بالتشكيك و أنه في الواجب أقدم و أولى و أشد منه في الممكن

بحث و تحصيل

و هذا الجواب على هذا الوجه غير صحيح لما أشرنا إليه أن أفراد مفهوم الوجود ليست حقائق متخالفة بل الوجود حقيقة واحدة و ليس اشتراكها بين الوجودات كاشتراك الطبيعة الكلية ذاتية كانت أو عرضية بين أفرادها إذ الكلية و الجزئية من عوارض الماهيات الإمكانية و الوجود كما مر لا يكون كلياً و لا جزئياً - وإنما له التعيين بنفس هويتها العينية و لا يحتاج إلى تعيين آخر كما لا يحتاج في موجوديته إلى وجود آخر لأن وجوده ذاته و سنيين في مبحث التشكيك أن التفاوت بين مراتب حقيقة واحدة و التميز بين حصولاتها قد يكون بنفس تلك الحقيقة فحقيقة الوجود مما تلحقها بنفس ذاتها التعينات و الشخصيات و التقدم و التأخر و الوجوب و الإمكان و الجوهرية و العرضية و التمام و النقص لا بامر زائد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢١

عليها عارض لها و تصوره يحتاج إلى ذهن ناقد و طبع لطيف. و العجب من الخطيب الرازي حيث ذهب إلى أنه لا بد من أحد الأمرين - إما كون اشتراك الوجود لفظياً أو كون الوجودات متساوية في اللوازم فكأنه لم يفرق بين التساوي في المفهوم و التساوي في الحقيقة. و أعجب من ذلك أنه صرح في بعض كتبه بأن الوجود مقول على الوجودات بالتشكيك مع إصراره على شبهته التي زعم

أنها في المتانة بحيث لا يعترىها شك - وهي ما مر من أن الوجود إن اقتضى العروض أو التجرد يتساوى الواجب و الممكن - وإن لم يقتض شيئا منهما كان وجود الواجب من الغير و جملة الأمر أنه لم يفرق بين التساوي في المفهوم و في الحقيقة و الذات.

و من الناس من توهم أن الوجود إذا كان زائدا فهو المطلوب و إلا فاختلفا في اللاعروض و العروض على تقدير التواطؤ محال.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٢

و على تقدير التشكيك تهافت لاستلزامه العروض في الكل.

فيقال له كلاهما فاسد - أما الأول فلأن المتواطى ربما لا يكون ذاتيا لما تحته من الوجودات المختلفة في العروض و اللاعروض و مطلوبك زيادة الوجود الخاص و هو غير لازم - لجواز أن يكون أحد معروضات مفهوم الوجود الانتزاعي وجودا قيوما بذاته - لكونه حقيقة مخالفة لسائر المعروضات من الوجودات الخاصة ذوي الماهيات - خصوصا على قاعدتنا من كونه أصل الحقيقة الوجودية و غيره من الوجودات تجليات وجهه و جماله و أشعة نوره و كماله و ظلال قهره و جلاله.

و أما الثاني فلأن في وجوب كون المشكك خارجا عن حقائق أفراد و مراتب حصصه كلاما سيأتيك إن شاء الله تعالى

فصل (٤) في أن الواجب لذاته واجب من جميع جهاته

المقصود من هذا أن الواجب الوجود ليس فيه جهة إمكانية فإن كل ما يمكن له بالإمكان العام فهو واجب له و من فروع هذه الخاصة أنه ليس له حالة منتظرة فإن ذلك أصل يترتب عليه هذا الحكم و ليس هذا عينه كما زعمه كثير من الناس فإن ذلك هو الذي يعد من خواص الواجب بالذات دون هذا لاتصاف المفارقات النورية به إذ لو كان للمفارق حالة منتظرة كمالية يمكن حصولها فيه - لاستلزم تحقق الإمكان الاستعدادي فيه و الانفعال عن عالم الحركة و الأوضاع الجرمانية و ذلك يوجب تجسمه و تكدره مع كونه مجردا نوريا هذا خلف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٣

و للأصل المذكور حجتان.

إحدهما ما تجشمنا بإقامتها و هو أن الواجب تعالى لو كان له بالقياس إلى صفة كمالية جهة إمكانية بحسب ذاته بذاته للزم التركيب في ذاته و هو مما ستطلع على استحالته في الفصل التالي لهذا الفصل فيلزم أن يكون جهة اتصافه بالصفة المفروضة الكمالية وجوبا و ضرورة لا إمكانا و جوازا.

و ثانيتهما أن ذاته لو لم تكن كافية فيما له من الصفات لكان شيء من صفاته حاصلًا له تعالى من غيره فيكون حضور ذلك الغير و وجوده علة لوجود تلك الصفة فيه تعالى و غيبته و عدمه علة لعدمها و ذلك لأن علية الشيء للشيء يستلزم كون وجود العلة علة لوجود المعلول و عدمها لعدمه و شيئيتها لشيئيتها و إذا كان كذلك لم يكن ذاته تعالى إذا اعتبرت من حيث هي بلا شرط يجب لها الوجود لأنها إما أن يجب مع وجود تلك الصفة أو يجب مع عدمها فإن كان الوجوب مع وجود الصفة المذكورة لم يكن وجودها من غيره لحصولها بذات الواجب من حيث هي بلا اعتبار حضور الغير

ولو جعلت القضية وصفية لم يكن الوجوب له تعالى ذاتيا أزليا وإن كان مع عدمها لم يكن عدمها من عدم العلة و غيبتها ولو جعلت الضرورة مقيدة لم تكن ذاتية أزلية تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا وإذا لم يجب وجودها بلا شرط لم يكن الواجب لذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٤

واجبا لذاته هذا خلف.

بحث و تحصيل

و هاهنا إيراد مشهور و هو أنه غاية ما لزم من هذا الدليل أن يكون وجود الصفة أو عدمها بالغير لا أن يكون الواجب في ذاته أو تعينه متعلقا بذلك الغير و ذلك لأنه إن أريد باعتبار الذات ملاحظتها مع عدم ملاحظة الغير فالملازمة ممنوعة إذ لا يلزم من عدم ملاحظة أمر عدم ذلك الأمر و إن أريد به اعتبارها مع عدم الغير في نفس الأمر وجودا و عدما فالملازمة مسلمة لكن بطلان التالي ممنوع - فإن اعتبار الذات مع عدم الشرطين على الفرض المذكور محال و المحال جاز أن يستلزم محالا آخر و هو عدم كون الواجب واجبا فلا يظهر بطلانه الخلف.

فالأولى أن يقرر الحجة المذكور هكذا إذا اعتبرت ذات الواجب على الفرض المذكور من حيث هي هي بلا شرط أي مع قطع النظر عن ذلك الغير وجودا و عدما فإما أن يجب وجوده مع وجود تلك الصفة و هو محال لاستحالة وجود المعلول مع قطع النظر عن وجود العلة أو مع عدم تلك الصفة و هو أيضا محال بعين ما ذكرناه و لا يخفى أن وجوب الذات لا يخلو في نفس الأمر عن هذين الأمرين المستحيلين على تقدير اعتبار الذات بلا شرط فيكون وجوب الذات أيضا مستحيلا لو لم يعتبر مع الشرط فلا بد من اعتباره و هو تالي الشرطية فثبت الملازمة و بطلان التالي معلوم فيلزمه بطلان المقدم و ليس لقائل أن يقول عدم اعتبار العلة وجودا و عدما ليس اعتبارا لعدم وجودها و عدم عدمها حتى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٥

ينافي تحصيل معلولها وجودا و عدما و الحاصل أن عدم اعتبار العلة بحسب العقل لا ينافي حصول المعلول بها في الواقع و أيضا كما أن اعتبار الماهية من حيث هي هي ليس اعتبارا لوجود ما يلحقها أو عدمه و مع ذلك لا تخلو الماهية عن أحدهما في الواقع فكذلك في الفرض المذكور نقول اعتبار ذات الواجب بلا اعتبار وجود صفته و ما يكون سببا له و عدمها و ما يتحصل ذلك لعدم به - لا ينافي حصول أحد الطرفين و السبب المقوم له لأننا نقول مرتبة الماهيات التي يعرضها الفعلية و التحقق من خارج ليست وعاء للكون الواقعي لشيء و لا لعدمه إذ لا يحصل لها أمر غير ذاتها و ذاتيها إثباتا و نفيا و لا علاقة لها مع غيرها وجودا و عدما فلذلك يمكن للعقل ملاحظتها مع عدم ملاحظة الغير و إن كان مصحوبا لها غير منفك عنها في الواقع بخلاف الوجود الذي هو عين الواقع لغاية فعليته و فرط تحصيله فلا يمكن أن يكون مرتبته بحيث لا يكون لها تعلق بشيء لا وجودا و لا عدما كيف و هو ينبوع الوجودات و منشأ الأكوان - و ملاك طرد الأعدام و ردع فقدان و رفع البطلان عن الأشياء القابلة للوجود فمرتبة وجوده في ذاته إما بعينه مرتبة وجود معنى آخر كما في صفاته الكمالية له تعالى إذ هي التي درجتها في الوجود درجة ذاته تعالى بذاته أو مرتبة عدمه لقصور ذاته في الوجود فلا يساوق الواجب فيه و لا يسع له إلا أن يكون متأخرا عنه بمراحل لائقة به فيكون عدمه سابقا على

وجوده بتلك المراحل و تضاعف الإمكانيات و أعداد مراتب الفقر لأجل تضاعف النزولات و القصورات عن الوجود التام الغني عما عداه بالذات فقد ثبت أن كل صفة مفروضة له تعالى - يكون لها مع اعتبار ذاته تعالى بذاته إما الوجود أو العدم و أيا ما كان يلزم اعتبار علته معه - إذ كما أن حصول ذي السبب وجودا و عدما مستفاد من حصول سببه وجودا و عدما - فكذلك اعتباره و تعقله مستفادان من اعتبار سببه و تعقله كذلك هذا غاية ما يتأتى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٦

لأحد من الكلام في هذا المرام و ربما يقال فيه أن هذا الحكم منقوض بالنسب و الإضافات اللاحقة لذات المبدأ تعالى لجريان الحجة المذكورة فيها فيلزم أن يكون تلك الإضافات واجبة الحصول له تعالى بحسب مرتبة ذاته بلا مدخلية الغير فيها و أن يمتنع تجددتها و تبدلها عليه مع أن ذات الواجب غير كافية في حصولها لتوقفها على أمور متغيرة متجددة متعاقبة خارجة عن الذات ضرورة و هذا مما التزمه الشيخ الرئيس في الهيئات الشفا حيث قال و لا نبالي بأن يكون ذاته مأخوذة مع إضافة ما ممكنة الوجود - فإنها من حيث هي علة لوجود زيد ليست بواجبة الوجود بل من حيث ذاته و لا يرتضي به من استشرق قلبه بأنوار الحكمة المتعالية و إن قلبه كثير من الاتباع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٧

و المقلدين كصاحب حواشي التجريد و غيره حيث قالوا بأن واجب الوجود بالذات - قد يعرض له الإمكان بالقياس إلى الغير و للغير أيضا إمكان بالقياس إليه و إن امتنع عليه الإمكان بالذات و الإمكان بالغير أيضا و لم يتفطنوا بأن الواجب بالذات كما أنه واجب بالذات واجب بالقياس إلى الممكنات المستندة إليه و هي أيضا واجبة الحصول له تعالى لأن وجوداتها روابط فيضه و جوده نعم لو تصور هاهنا واجب وجود آخر أو ممكنات آخر مستندة إلى واجب وجود آخر لكان لما ذكره وجه صحة - تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا و ذلك لأن وجوب وجود الأشياء مما ينشأ منه تعالى فكما أن لها وجوبا بالغير الذي هو مبدعها و موجبها فكذا لها وجوب بالقياس إلى ذلك الغير و وجوب له أيضا إذ الوجوب بالقياس إلى الغير ضرورة تحقق الشيء بالنظر إلى الغير على سبيل الاستدعاء الذاتي و يرجع إلى أن الغير يأبى إلا أن يكون الشيء واجب الحصول سواء كان من جهة الاقتضاء و الفيضان أو من قبل الحاجة الذاتية و الاستدعاء الافتقاري من حيث كون الشيء رشحي الوجود ظلي التجوهر استنادي الحقيقة تعلقي الذات و هذا لا ينفك عن كون الشيء واجب الحصول للغير الذي هو ينبوع فيضه و سحاب رشحه و بحر نداه فالممكن مع ذاته بالإمكان و الجواز و مع جاعله التام بالوجوب و الضرورة سواء أخذ هذا اللصوق و الالتحاق و الالتجاء من قبل ذاته الفاقرة الرشحية التعقلية أو من قبل اقتضاء مبدعه الفياض الوهاب الباسط على من يشاء بغير حساب فالحق أن إضافات ذات الواجب تعالى إلى الممكنات و نسبة الخلاقية القيومية إليها و أضوائه الساطعة على الذوات القابلة للوجود ليست متأخرة عن تلك الماهيات الممكنة و ليست إضافته كسائر الإضافات التي تكون بين الأشياء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٨

و تكون متأخرة عن المنسوب إليه بل إنما يكون مصداق صفاته الإضافية ذاته بذاته يعني أن نفس ذاته بذاته كافية

لانتزاع النسبة و المنسوب إليه فكما أن بعلمه الكمالى الإجمالى يعلم جميع الأشياء و نسبتها إليه تعالى و بقدرته التامة الكاملة يقيم جميع المقدورات فكذلك ذاته كافية في انتزاع جميع اللواحق - و كيفية لحوقها و نسبتها و إضافتها إليه تعالى فليس في عالم إلهيته و صقع ربوبيته شيء من المعاني العدمية كالعدم و الإمكان و الظن و الهزل و الحدوث و الزوال و التجدد و التصرم و الفقر.

و العجب من الشيخ و شدة تورطه في العلوم و قوة حدسه و ذكائه في المعارف - أنه قصر إدراكه عن فهم هذا المعنى. و أعجب من ذلك أنه مما قد تفتن به في غير الشفاء حيث ذكر في التعليقات - أن الأشياء كلها واجبات للأول تعالى و ليس هناك إمكان البتة و في كتاب أثولوجيا المنسوب إلى المعلم الأول تصريحات واضحة بأن الممكنات كلها حاضرة عند المبدأ الأول على الضرورة و البت و أما ما يتراءى من تجدد الأشياء و تعاقبها و تغييرها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٢٩

فهذا بالقياس إلى بعض أوعية الوجود فإن الزوال و الغيبة عن بعض الموجودات - لا يستلزم الزوال و الغيبة عن بعض آخر فكيف عن حقيقة الوجود المحيط بجميع الأشياء الحافظ لكل المراتب و الأنحاء و سيأتي تحقيق هذا المقام من ذي قبل إن شاء الله المفضل المنعم

فصل (٥) في أن واجب الوجود واحد

لا بمعنى أن نوعه منحصر في شخصه على ما توهم - إذ لا نوع لحقيقة الوجود كما مر فمجرد كونه متشخصا بنفس ذاته لا يوجب استحالة واجب وجود آخر من دون الرجوع إلى البرهان كما زعمه بعض الناس حيث قال إن ما بينا من أن التعيين نفس حقيقته يكفي في إثبات توحيده فإن التعيين إذا كان نفس ماهية شيء كان نوعه منحصرًا في شخصه بالضرورة و إنما قلنا لا يكفي ذلك - لاحتمال الوهم أن يكون هناك حقائق متخالفة واجبة الوجود و تعيين كل منها نفس حقيقته فلا بد مع ذلك من استيناف برهان على تفرد واجب الوجود في معنى واجب الوجود. فنقول لو فرضنا موجودين واجبي الوجود لكانا مشتركين في هذا المفهوم و متغايرين بحسب ذاتيهما بأمر من الأمور و ما به الامتياز إما أن يكون تمام الحقيقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٠

في شيء منهما فيكون وجوب الوجود المشترك بينهما خارجا عن حقيقة أحدهما و هو مستحيل لما مر من أن وجوب الوجود نفس حقيقة الواجب و إما أن يكون جزء حقيقته فيلزم التركيب فيه و التركيب يستلزم الاحتياج إلى الأجزاء و كل محتاج ممكن و إما أن يكون خارجا عن الحقيقة فيلزم أن يكون الواجب في تعيينه محتاجا إلى غيره لأن تعيين الشيء إذا كان زائدا على حقيقته عرضيا لها يلزم أن يكون معللا لأن كل ما هو عرضي لشيء فهو معلل إما بذلك الشيء و هو ممتنع - لأن العلة بتعيينها سابق على المعلول و تعيينه فيلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه و أما بغير ذلك الشيء فيكون محتاجا إليه في وجوده كما في تعيينه إذ التعيين للشيء إما عين وجوده أو في مرتبة وجوده و الاحتياج في الوجود ينافي كون الشيء واجبا بالذات - قيل هاهنا بحث لأن معنى قولهم وجوب الوجود نفس حقيقة واجب الوجود - أنه يظهر من نفس تلك الحقيقة أثر صفة وجوب الوجود لا أن تلك الحقيقة عين هذه الصفة فلا يكون اشتراك موجودين واجبي الوجود

في وجوب الوجود إلا أن يظهر من نفس ذات كل منهما أثر صفة وجوب الوجود فلا منافاة بين اشتراكهما في وجوب الوجود و تمايزهما بتمام الحقيقة و نحن نقول إن معنى كلام الحكماء وجوب الوجود عين حقيقة واجب الوجود هو أن ذاته بنفس ذاته مصداق للموجودية و محكي عنها بالوجود بلا انضمام أمر أو ملاحظة حيثية أخرى أية حيثية كانت حقيقية أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣١

إضافية أو سلبية.

و توضيح ذلك أنك كما قد تعقل المتصل مثلا نفس المتصل بما هو متصل - كالجزء الصوري للجسم من حيث إنه للجسم و قد تعقل المتصل شيئا ذلك الشيء هو الموصوف بكونه متصلا كالمادة فكذلك قد تعقل واجب الوجود نفس واجب الوجود - و قد تعقل شيئا ذلك الشيء واجب الوجود و مصداق الحكم و به مطابقة و المحكي عنه في الأول حقيقة الموضوع و ذاته فقط و في الثاني هي مع حيثية أخرى هي صفة قائمة به و كل واجب الوجود لم يكن بحسب صرف حقيقته و نفس ماهيته واجب الوجود بل يكون تلك الحقيقة متصفة بكونها واجبة الوجود لا في مرتبة ذاته بل بحسب درجة ذاتها من حيث هي حتى يكون وجوب الوجود عرضيا لا ذاتيا لها - ففي اتصافها به و لحوقه بها يحتاج إلى سبب إذ كل عرضي كذلك فلا بد لها في اتصافها به من عروض هذا الأمر و إلى جاعل يجعلها كذلك أو يجعلها بحيث ينتزع منه هذا المعنى غير ذاتها إذ جاعلية الشيء لنفسه في وجوده و وجوبه مما قد أبطلناها بالبرهان الشديد القوة فإذن تلك الحقيقة تكون في حد ذاتها ممكنة و بالجاعل صارت واجبة الوجود فلا يكون واجبا لذاته فكل واجب الوجود لذاته فهو نفس واجب الوجود لذاته لا أنه شيء ذلك الشيء مما قد عرض لها واجب الوجود عروضاً لزومياً أو مفارقياً هذا.

رجم شيطان:

و ليعلم أن البراهين الدالة على هذا المطلب الذي هو من أصول المباحث الإلهية كثيرة لكن تتميم جميعها مما يتوقف على أن حقيقة الواجب تعالى هو الوجود البحت القائم بذاته المعبر عنه بالوجود المتأكد و أن ما يعرضه الوجوب أو الوجود فهو في حد نفسه مع قطع النظر عن ارتباطه و تعلقه بغيره ممكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٢

و وجوبه كوجوده يستفاد من الغير و هذه المقدمة مما ينساق إليها البرهان - و يصرح بها في كتب أهل العلم و العرفان و قد أسلفناه القول فيها و بها يندفع ما تشوشت به طبائع الأكثرين و تبلدت أذهانهم مما ينسب إلى ابن كمونة و قد سماه بعضهم بافتخار الشياطين لاشتهاره بإبداء هذه الشبهة العويصة و العقدة العسيرة الحل - فإني قد وجدت هذه الشبهة في كلام غيره ممن تقدمه زمانا و هي أنه لم لا يجوز أن يكون هناك هويتان بسيطتان مجهولتا الكنه مختلفتان بتمام الحقيقة يكون كل منهما واجب الوجود بذاته و يكون مفهوم واجب الوجود منتزعا منهما مقولا عليهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٣

قولا عرضيا فيكون الاشتراك بينهما في هذا المعنى العرضي المنتزع عن نفس ذات كل منهما و الافتراق بصرف حقيقة كل منهما و وجه الاندفاع أن مفهوم واجب الوجود لا يخلو إما أن يكون فهمه عن نفس ذات كل منهما من دون اعتبار حيثية خارجة عنها أية حيثية كانت أو مع اعتبار تلك الحيثية و كلا الشقين مستحيلان أما الثاني فلما مر أن كل ما لم يكن ذاته مجرد حيثية انتزاع الوجود و الوجوب و الفعلية و التمام فهو ممكن في حد ذاته ناقص في حريم نفسه و أما الأول فلأن مصداق حمل مفهوم واحد و مطابق صدقه بالذات - و بالجملة ما منه الحكاية بذلك المعنى و بحسبه التعبير عنه به مع قطع النظر عن أية حيثية و أية جهة أخرى كانت لا يمكن أن يكون حقائق مختلفة الذوات متباينة المعاني غير مشتركة في ذاتي أصلا.

و ظني أن من سلمت فطرته التي فطر عليها عن الأمراض المغيرة لها عن استقامتها - يحكم بأن الأمور المتخالفة من حيث كونها متخالفة بلا حيثية جامعة فيها لا يكون مصداقا لحكم واحد و محكيا عنها به نعم يجوز ذلك إذا كانت تلك الأمور متماثلة من جهة كونها متماثلة كالحكم على زيد و عمرو بالإنسانية من جهة اشتراكهما في تمام الماهية لا من حيث عوارضها المختلفة المشخصة أو كانت مشتركة في ذاتي من جهة كونها كذلك كالحكم على الإنسان و الفرس بالحيوانية من جهة اشتمالهما على تلك الحقيقة الجنسية أو في عرضي كالحكم على الثلج و العاج بالأبيضية من جهة اتصافهما بالبياض أو كانت تلك الأمور المتباينة متفقة في أمر خارج نسبي كالحكم على مقولات الممكنات بالوجود من حيث انتسابها إلى الوجود الحق تعالى عند من يجعل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٤

وجود الممكنات أمرا عقليا انتزاعيا و موجوديتها باعتبار نسبتها إلى الوجود القائم بنفسه أو كانت متفقة في مفهوم سلبي كالحكم على ما سوى الواجب بالإمكان لاشتراكها في سلب ضروري الوجود و العدم لذواتها و أما ما سوى أشباه تلك الوجوه التي ذكرناها من الجهات الاتفاقية فلا يتصور الحكم فيها بأمر مشترك بلا جهة جامعة ذاتية أو عرضية فإذا حكمنا على أمور متباينة الذوات بحكم واحد بحسب مرتبة ذواتها في أنفسها بلا انضمام أمر آخر أو اعتبار جهة أخرى غير أنفسها فلا بد هناك مما به الاتفاق و ما به الاختلاف الذاتيين فيها فيستدعي التركيب بحسب جوهر الذات من أمرين أحدهما يجري مجرى الجنس و المادة و الآخر يجري مجرى الفصل و الصورة و التركيب بأي وجه كان ينافي كون الشيء واجب الوجود بالذات.

بل نقول إذا نظرنا إلى نفس مفهوم الوجود المصدري الانتزاعي المعلوم بديهية أدانا النظر و البحث إلى أن حقيقته و ما ينتزع هو منه أمر قائم بذاته هو الواجب الحق و الوجود المطلق الذي لا يشوبه عموم و لا خصوص و لا تعدد و لا انقسام إذ كل ما وجوده هذا الوجود فرضا لا يمكن أن يكون بينه و بين شيء آخر له أيضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٥

هذا الوجود فرضا مباينة أصلا و تغاير فلا يكون اثنان بل يكون هناك ذات واحدة و وجود واحد كما أشار إليه صاحب التلويحات بقوله صرف الوجود الذي لا أتم منه كلما فرضته ثانيا فإذا نظرت فهو هو إذ لا ميز في صرف شيء فوجوب وجوده الذي هو ذاته بذاته تعالى يدل على وحدته كما في التنزيل **شَهِدَ اللَّهُ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ** و على موجودية

الممكنات به كما في قوله تعالى **أَوْ لَمْ يَكْفِ بِرَبِّكَ أَنَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ شَهِيدٌ**.

برهان عرشي:

ولنا بتأييد الله تعالى وملكوته الأعلى برهان آخر عرشي على توحيد واجب الوجود تعالى يتكفل لدفع الاحتمال المذكور- و يستدعي بيانه تمهيد مقدمة وهي أن حقيقة الواجب تعالى لما كان في ذاته مصداقا للواجبية- و مطابقا للحكم عليه بالموجودية بلا جهة أخرى غير ذاته و إلا لزم احتياجه في كونه واجبا و موجودا إلى غيره كما مر من البيان و ليست للواجب تعالى جهة أخرى في ذاته لا يكون بحسب تلك الجهة واجبا و موجودا و إلا يلزم التركيب في ذاته من هاتين الجهتين ابتداء أو بالآخرة و قد تحقق بسلطته تعالى من جميع الوجوه كما سيجيء فحينئذ نقول يلزم أن يكون واجب الوجود بذاته موجودا و واجبا بجميع الحثيات الصحيحة و على جميع الاعتبارات المطابقة لنفس الأمر و إلا لم يكن حقيقته بتمامها مصداق حمل الوجود و الوجوب إذ لو فرض كونه فاقدا لمرتبة من مراتب الوجود و وجه من وجوه التحصل أو عادما لكمال من كمالات الموجود بما هو موجود- فلم يكن ذاته من هذه الحثية مصداقا للوجود فيتحقق حينئذ في ذاته إمكانية أو امتناعية يخالف جهة الفعلية و التحصل فيتربك ذاته من حثيتي الوجوب و غيره من الإمكان و الامتناع و بالجملة ينتظم ذاته من جهة وجودية و جهة عدمية فلا يكون واحدا حقيقيا و هذا مفاد ما مر في الفصل السابق أن واجب الوجود بالذات واجب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٦

الوجود من جميع الحثيات.

فإذا تمهدت هذه المقدمة التي مفادها أن كل كمال و جمال يجب أن يكون حاصلًا لذات الواجب تعالى و إن كان في غيره يكون مترشحا عنه فائضا من لدنه.

فنقول لو تعدد الواجب بالذات لا يكون بينهما علاقة ذاتية لزومية كما مر من أن الملازمة بين الشيئين لا تنفك عن معلولية أحدهما للآخر أو معلولية كل منهما لأمر ثالث فعلى أي واحد من التقديرين فيلزم معلولية الواجب و هو خرق فرض الواجبية لهما فإذن لكل منهما مرتبة من الكمال و حظ من الوجود و التحصل لا يكون هو للآخر و لا منبعثا عنه و مترشحا من لدنه فيكون كل واحد منهما عادما لنشأة كمالية و فاقدا لمرتبة وجودية سواء كانت ممتنعة الحصول له أو ممكنه فذات كل واحد منهما بذاته ليست محض حثية الفعلية و الوجوب و الكمال بل يكون ذاته بذاته مصداقا لحصول شيء و فقد شيء آخر من طبيعة الوجود و مراتبه الكمالية فلا يكون واحدا حقيقيا و التركيب بحسب الذات و الحقيقة ينافي الوجوب الذاتي فالواجب الوجود يجب أن يكون من فرط التحصل و كمال الوجود جامعا لجميع النشآت الوجودية و الحثيات الكمالية التي بحسب الوجود- بما هو وجود للموجود بما هو موجود فلا مكافئ له في الوجود و الفضيلة بل ذاته بذاته يجب أن يكون مستند جميع الكمالات و منبع كل الخيرات و هذا البرهان و إن لم ينفع للمتوسطين فضلا عن الناقصين لا بتناؤه على كثير من الأصول الفلسفية و المقدمات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٧

المطوية المتفرقة في مواضع هذا الكتاب لكنه عند من ارتاضت نفسه بالفلسفة يرجح على كثير من البراهين الشديدة

فصل (٦) في استيناف القول في الجهات و دفع شكوك قيلت في لزومها

إن من التشكيكات الفخرية في هذه الجهات العقلية التي هي عناصر العقود و موادها بحث لا يخلو عنها شيء من الأحكام و الأوصاف أن الوجود الواجب لو كان ملزوما للوجوب لزم كون الوجوب معلولا له و كل معلول ممكن لذاته و كل ممكن لذاته واجب لعلته فيتقدم على هذا الوجوب وجوب آخر لا إلى نهاية.

و الجواب على ما ذكره الحكيم الطوسي أنه لا يلزم من كون الوجوب لازما كونه معلولا فإن الحق أن الوجوب و الإمكان و الامتناع أمور معقولة تحصل في العقل من استناد بعض المتصورات إلى الوجود الخارجي و هي في أنفسها معلولات للعقل بشرط الإسناد المذكور و ليست بموجودات في الخارج حتى يكون علة للأمور التي تستند إليها أو معلولا لها كما أن تصور زيد و إن كان معلولا لمن يتصوره لا يكون علة لزيد و لا معلولا له و كون الشيء واجبا في الخارج هو كونه بحيث إذا عقله عاقل مسندا إلى الوجود الخارجي لزم في عقله معقول هو الوجوب.

و منها أن نقيض الوجوب و هو اللاوجوب عديم

فيكون هو ثبوتيا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٨

و أيضا هو تأكد الوجود فكيف يكون عديما.

و الجواب أنه ليس عديما بمعنى المعدم المطلق أو بمعنى ما يؤخذ في مفهومه سلب شيء بل بمعنى المعدم العيني الموجود في الذهن و النقيضان و إن اقتسما جميع المفهومات لكن لا يلزم صدقهما كلياً على جميع الموجودات العينية ليس الممتنع و الممكن العام نقيضين و أحدهما و هو الممتنع معدوم و ليس يلزم أن يكون كل ممكن بالإمكان العام موجودا في الخارج بل ربما لا يوجد إلا في الذهن.

و منها أن ثبوت شيء لشيء لا يستلزم ثبوت الثابت في ظرف الاتصاف

كما هو المقرر عندهم بل إنما يستلزم ثبوت المثبت له فحينئذ إذا كان بعض الأمور الذهنية - كالعمى مثلا ثابتا في الخارج لشيء و من المشهورات المسلمة أن وجود الصفة في نفسها - هو وجودها للموصوف بها بعينه فإذن يكون لمثل هذا الأمر وجود عيني فيكون من قبيل الأعراض الموجودة في الخارج و العقل يأبى من عد هذا المفهوم و أمثاله - من الموجودات العينية فضلا عن جعله من الأعراض.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٣٩

و الجواب يستفاد مما سبق من الفرق بين معنبي الوجود الربطي و أن أحدهما و هو الوجود الذي في الهليات المركبة غير الآخر و هو وجود الأعراض و الصور الحالة و أن قولنا وجود ج مثلا هو بعينه وجوده لب معناه غير معنى قولنا وجود ج في نفسه هو أنه موجود لب و أن ج في الأول لا بد و أن يكون من الأمور الموجودة في أنفسها لا بالأعرض بخلاف الثاني و من لم يحصل الفرق بين المعنيين تحير بل ربما يسلم الفساد اللازم و التزم و من حقق الأمر يعرف أنه قد يكون الشيء ممتنع الوجود في نفسه بحسب الأعيان ممكن الوجود الربطي بالقياس إلى الغير - و من هاهنا أيضا

نشأت الشبهة التي أوردتها طائفة من أهل الشعب والجدال - على المحصلين من الفلاسفة العظام وهي أنه إذا لم يكن للإمكان صورة في الأعيان - لم يكن الممكن ممكناً إلا في الأذهان وفي اعتبار العقل فقط لا في الأعيان فيلزم أن يكون الممكن في الخارج إما ممتنعاً أو واجبا لعدم خروج شيء عن المنفصلة الحقيقية - ولك أن تدفعها بما تحصلت أنه لا يلزم من صدق الحكم على الشيء بمفهوم بحسب الأعيان أن يكون ذلك المفهوم واقعا في الأعيان. وأيضا يجري هذا الاحتجاج في الامتناع وليس لامتناع الممتنع صورة في الأعيان - فالحل ما ذكرناه

تصالح اتفاقي:

إن ما اشتهر من الحكماء المشائين أتباع المعلم الأول من الحكم بوجود هذه المعاني العامة كالوجوب والإمكان والعلية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٠

والتقدم ونظائرها وأنهم يخالفون الأقدمين من حكماء الرواق حيث قالوا بأن وجود هذه المعاني إنما هو بملاحظة العقل واعتباره فمنشأ ذلك ما حققناه - وفي التحقيق وعند التفتيش لا تخالف بين الرائيين ولا مناقضة بين القولين فإن وجودها في الخارج عبارة عن اتصاف الموجودات العينية بها بحسب الأعيان وقد دريت أن الوجود الرابط في الهلية المركبة الخارجية لا ينافي الامتناع الخارجي للمحمول فعلى ما ذكرناه يحمل كلام أرسطو وأتباعه فلا يرد عليهم تشنيعات المتأخرين - سيما الشيخ المتأله صاحب الإشراف.

و مما تحققت انكشف لك ضعف ما وقع التمسك به في بعض المسطورات الكلامية - من أن عدم الفرق بين نفي الإمكان والإمكان المنفي وهما مفاد لا إمكان له وإمكانه لا - يوجب كون الإمكان ثبوتيا وأن كل عدم فإنه يتعرف ويتحقق بالوجود فما يكون له عدم يكون له ثبوت وما له ثبوت فهو ثابت فإنه إن عني به إثبات أن الإمكان من الموجودات العينية فالكذب فيه ظاهر وإن عني به أنه ليس من الأعدام - بل من المحمولات العقلية على الماهيات العقلية والعينية فذلك هو المرام عند المحصلين من الحكماء العظام ومعنى إمكانه لا سلب الوجود العيني عن مفهوم الإمكان ومعنى لا إمكان له عدم صدق الإمكان كما في سائر الطبائع الذهنية التي هي أوصاف الأشياء ولا يحمل عليها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤١

الوجود في الأعيان وعدم حمل الموجود على شيء لا ينافي حمله على الأشياء العينية و صدقه عليها وهذا أحد معاني الوجود الرابطي وأما التعريف بالوجود فإنما يلزم في العدم لكونه سلب الوجود لا في مطلق السلوب للأشياء فإن من السلوب سلب لطبيعة العدم فضلا عن طبيعة أخرى نعم لا يكون السلوب سلبا لسلبه فيكون ثبوتا إضافيا وهو المعتبر في تحديد السلوب بهذه الطبيعة الإطلاكية كما في الشفاء - أن الثبوت وأعني به الإضافي المطلق أعم من أن يكون حقيقيا في نفسه أو بالإضافة فقط يقع جزء من بيان السلوب لا أنه موجود في السلوب كما ذهب إليه بعض أتباع المشائين من مفسري كلام أرسطاطاليس فالسلوب يستحيل أن يوجد مع سلبه و من قال أن البصر جزء من العمى وأن الأعدام تعرف بملكاتها ليس يعني به أن البصر موجود مع العمى بل يريد أن العمى لا يمكن أن يحد إلا بأن يضاف السلوب إلى البصر في حده فيكون البصر جزءا من البيان لا من نفس العمى و ستعلم في مباحث الماهية أن الحد قد يزيد على المحدود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٢

و منها أن جعل الإمكان و قسيميه و أشباهها من المعاني العقلية

إنما يقطع لزوم السلاسل المتولدة إلى لا نهاية في الخارج و ليس يحسم لزوم التسلسل في اعتبار العقل بحسب الملاحظة التفصيلية فإن اتصاف الشيء بالإمكان يلزم أن يكون على سبيل اللزوم و إلا لزم جواز الانقلاب فيكون لإمكان الشيء وجوب في العقل - و اتصافه بذلك الوجوب على سبيل الوجود و هكذا إلى غير النهاية على أن كون الاتصاف بالإمكان على أي حال من عناصر العقود يوجب اللانهاية أيضا.

و الجواب أن التسلسل هاهنا بمعنى لا يقف لأنه حاصل من اعتمال الذهن - من غير أن ينساق إليه الأمر بحسب نفسه و ينقطع بانقطاع اعتبار العقل.

و تحقيق هذا المقام أن كون الشيء معقولا منظورا فيه للعقل غير كونه آلة للعقل في تعقله إذ لا ينظر فيه بل إنما ينظر به ما دام كونه كذلك مثلا إذا عقلنا الإنسان مثلا بصورة في عقلنا و يكون معقولنا الإنسان فنحن حينئذ لم ننظر في الصورة التي بها نعقل الإنسان و لا نحكم عليها بحكم و لا نحكم عليها حين حكمنا على الإنسان - أنه جوهر بكونه جوهر أو عرضا ثم إذا نظرنا في تلك الصورة الحاصلة و جعلناها معقولة منظورا إليها وجدناها عرضا قائما بغيره و ما وجد في كلام أهل التحقيق أن الصورة الحاصلة في العقل هي المعقولة بالذات لا ما خرج عن التصور عنوا بذلك أنها في كونها معقولة لا تحتاج إلى صورة أخرى تكون هي آلة إدراكها لا أننا إذا عقلنا ماهية الإنسان و حكمنا عليه بكونه جوهر حيوانيا جرميا يكون المنظور إليه هو الصورة العقلية التي من جملة الكيفيات النفسانية لأن هذا بين الفساد - فكذا الإمكان و مقابله كآلة للقوة العاقلة بها يتعرف حال الماهيات بحسب نحو وجودها و كيف يعرض لها و لا ينظر في هذه الملاحظة إلى كون شيء من الثلاثة موجودا أو معدوما ممكنا أو واجبا أو ممتنعا.

ثم إن التفت العقل إلى شيء منها و نظر في نحو وجوده لم يكن هو بذلك الاعتبار إمكانا لشيء و لا وجوبا و لا امتناعا له بل كان عرضا موجودا في محل هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٣

العقل و ممكنا في ذاته فما كان قبل هذا وجوبا مثلا أو إمكانا صار شيئا ممكنا - و هكذا قياس المعاني الحرفية و المفهومات الأدوية إذا صارت منظورا إليها معقولة بالقصد محكوما عليها أو بها انقلبت اسمية استقلالية بعد ما كانت حرفية تعلقية - و هذا الانقلاب غير مستحيل لأنه كانقلاب المادة إلى الصورة و الجنس إلى الفصل و القوة إلى الفعل و الناقص إلى التام لا كانقلاب الصورة إلى الصورة و النوع المحصل إلى النوع المحصل لأن الروابط و الأدوات حين كونها كذلك ليست شيئا من الأشياء المحصلة التامة بل نسب إلى الأشياء و فرق بين الشيء و نسبة الشيء - و كذا فرق بين كون الشيء شيئا أو قوة على شيء إذ القوة بما هي قوة ليست شيئا من الأشياء أصلا اللهم إلا باعتبار آخر غير اعتبار كونه قوة حتى ينجر الأمر إلى ما لا جهة فيه سوى كونه قوة كالهيمولي الأولى التي لا تركيب فيها من جهتين يكون بإحدهما بالقوة و بالأخرى بالفعل و ما قرع سمعك أن المعنى الأدوي كالوجود النسبي و الاستقلالي كالوجود المحمولي هما متباينان بالذات يرام به ما أفدناك تحقيقه لا أن لهما ذاتين متباينين فإنه الرابطة لا ذات لها أصلا كالمرآة التي لا لون لها و

لا حقيقة أصلا و لهذا تقبل الألوان و يظهر به الحقائق و التباين بين شيئين قد يكون بحسب المفهوم و العنوان من غير أن يكون لكل منهما بحسب ذاته حقيقة محصلة يتغايران بها بل الاختلاف بينهما كالاختلاف بين المحصل و اللامحصل الذي له أن يصير محصلا و الشيء و اللاشيء الذي في قوته أن يصير شيئا.

قاعدة:

و إذا تحققت الأمر في هذه المعاني و معنى انقطاع سلسلتها بانقطاع اعتبار العقل فاجعله أسلوبا مطردا في جميع الطبائع العامة المتكررة كالوحدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٤

و الوجود و اللزوم و مضاهياتها سواء كان بإزائها في الأعيان شيء أم لا فإن الوجود و الوحدة مع أن حقيقتهما واقعة في الأعيان بل حقيقة الوجود هي أحق الأشياء بالوقوع العيني لكن مفهومهما من المعاني المتكررة في العقل فإن لحقيقة الوجود موجودة و لموجوديتها موجودة أخرى و هكذا إلى أن يعتبرها العقل - لكن مصداق هذه الاتصافات الغير المتناهية بحسب اعتبار العقل حقيقة الوجود التي هي بنفسها موجودة و كذا الكلام في الوحدة.

فإن رجع أحد و قال إن العقل يجد أن شيئا من اللزومات الصحيحة الانتزاع إلى لا نهاية لو لم يكن محكوما عليه بامتناع الانفكاك عن اللزوم الأول لانفسدت الملازمة الأولى فيجب أن يصدق الحكم الإيجابي الاستغراقي باللزوم على كل لزوم لزوم إلى لا نهاية و الموجبة تستدعي وجود الموضوع فيلزم تحقق اللزومات لكونها موضوعات لإيجابيات صادقة. قلنا له ألم تتذكر ما بيناه لك و سقنا إليه فطانتك كيلا تعمل رويتك من أن اللزوم إنما يكون لزوما إذا اعتبر رابطة لا مفهوما ما من المفهومات فإذا هو بما هو لزوم ليس بشيء من الأشياء حتى يحكم عليه بلزوم أو عدم لزوم.

ثم إذا لوحظ بما هو مفهوم من المفهومات و وصف ما من الأوصاف - استؤنف النظر في لزومه أو لا لزومه فالموصوف بامتناع الانفكاك عن الملزوم - ليس إلا اللزوم الملتفت إليه و المنظور فيه بالذات لا بما هو لزوم و لا ضرورة في كون كل لزوم ملتفتا إليه منظورا فيه بالذات فلا محالة تنقطع خطرات الأوهام في مرتبة من المراتب و هذا أولى مما تجشمه صاحب حواشي التجريد في فك هذه العقدة - أن تلك اللزومات موجودة في نفس الأمر بوجود ما ينتزع هي منه و ليست موجودة بصور متغايرة و الوجود الذي هو مقتضى صدق الموجبة أعم من الثاني فإن الموجبة إذا كانت خارجية اقتضى صدقها وجود موضوعها في الخارج أعم من أن يكون بصورة يخصه كوجود الجسم أو لا كوجود الجزء المتصل الواحد بوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٥

كله فإن هذا الجزء قد يصير موضوع الموجبة الصادقة كما إذا كان أحد قسمي المتصل حارا و الآخر باردا فيصدق الإيجاب الخارجي عليه و إن كانت ذهنية اقتضى صدقها وجود الموضوع في الذهن على أحد الأنحاء و كما أن خصوص القضية الخارجية - قد يقتضي نحوا خاصا من الوجود كالحكم بالتحيز فإنه يقتضي الوجود المستقل - و صدق الحكم على الجوهر بخواصه فإنه يقتضي النحو الخاص به كذلك خصوصيات الأحكام الذهنية قد يقتضي خصوصيات الوجود و كما أن المطلقة تقتضي وجود الموضوع بالفعل و الممكنة بالإمكان و الدائمة بالدوام نقول أيضا لزوم شيء

لآخر قد يكون بحسب الوجود بالفعل من كلا طرفي الملزوم و اللازم - بأن يمتنع انفكاك الملزوم في وجوده بالفعل عن وجود اللازم بالفعل و قد يكون بحسب الوجود بالفعل من أحد الطرفين بخصوصه دون الآخر كلزوم انقطاع الامتداد للجسم فإن معناه أنه يمتنع وجود الجسم بدون كونه بحيث يصح أن ينتزع منه انقطاع الامتداد فانقطاع الامتداد بحسب كونه صحيح الانتزاع منه لازم لوجود الجسم بالفعل و قد يكون من كلا الطرفين بحسب حيثية صحة الانتزاع و من هذا القبيل لزوم اللزوم فإن مرجعه أن اللزوم لا يمكن صحة انتزاعية من شيء إلا و هو بحيث يصح منه انتزاع اللزوم و هكذا فيكفي في صدق الحكم عليه صحة انتزاع اللزوم منه في هذا النحو من الوجود أي صحة انتزاعه عن موجود بالفعل كما أن القضية الممكنة يكفي في صدقها إمكان وجود الموضوع انتهى كلامه.

و ذلك لأنه مع كونه قد عنى نفسه و بالغ في التدقيق لم يبلغ كلامه حد الإجداء - لأن اللزوم بمجرد كونه صحيح الانتزاع عن شيء بالقوة من غير أن يصير منتزعا بالفعل - لا يصح أن يقع موضوعا للإيجاب و يحكم عليه باللزوم أو اللالزوم لأنه بهذا الاعتبار من الروابط الغير المستقلة في الملحوظية و إذا لوحظ بالفعل و حكم عليه باللزوم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٦

صار مفهوما من المفهومات الموجودة في العقل الملحوظة بالقصد فله بهذا الاعتبار وجود في نفسه و إن كان في النفس و ليس بهذا الاعتبار موجودا بالعرض انتزاعيا بل حقيقيا ذهنيا فموجوديتها بوجود ما ينتزع منه من قبيل الأول الذي يمتنع أن يكون موضوعا لحكم إيجابي بل و لا سلبي أيضا و وجود الموصوف لا يمكن أن يكون بعينه وجود الصفة سواء كانت حقيقية أو انتزاعية و إلا لبطل الفرق بين الذاتي و العرضي فإن وجود السماء مثلا في ذاتها غير وجود الفوقية الثابتة إذ السماء في مرتبة وجود ذاتها سماء لا غير و إنما الفوقية تعرضها بحسب وجود ثان لها يكون متأخرا عن وجود ذاتها لذاتها فالحق ما مر من أن اللزوم له تحقق رابطي يكفي في كون أحد الشئيين لازما و الآخر ملزوما و هذا النحو من الوجود الرابطي و إن كان منسوبا إلى الخارج إذا كان اتصاف الملزوم بالأمر اللازم في الخارج لكن ليس هو نحو وجود الملزوم في نفسه لأن نحو وجوده في نفسه و الحصول الذي يليق به حين تحققه مع قطع النظر عن كونه رابطا بين شئيين بل عند ملاحظة ماهيته و حقيقته في نفسه ليس إلا في ظرف الذهن و إن كانت ملاحظته في نفسه لا ينفك عن اتصافه بكونه رابطة بين شئيين و هذا كما في ملاحظة السلوب و الأعدام فإنها و إن كانت حقيقتها سلوب الأشياء و أعدامها لكن للعقل أن يلحظها كذلك و إذا صارت معقولة قد عرض لها نحو من الوجود ثم مع ذلك لا ينسلخ عن كونها سلوبا و أعداما - لأن ماهيتها كذلك و قد مر أن الوجود مما وقع ظله العمومي الانبساطي على جميع الماهيات و المفهومات حتى على مفهوم العدم و شريك الباري و اجتماع النقيضين - فمفهوم المعنى الرابطي معنى رابطي بحسب الحمل الذاتي الأولي لا بحسب الحمل الشائع الصناعي فتدبر فيه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٧

ثم إن في كلامه بعضا من مواضع الأنظار أما أولا فلأن أبعاد المتصل الواحد قبل أن يقع فيه كثرة و اثنيانية بنحو من أنحاء القسمة الخارجية و لو بحسب اختلاف عرضين قارين لا يمكن الحكم الإيجابي عليهما بشيء حكما صادقا بحسب الخارج فإذا حدثت الاثنيانية الخارجية - صار كل واحد منهما مما له وجود في الخارج و قبل القسمة ليس شيء

منهما موجودا أصلا إنما الموجود هو المادة القابلة لهما بعد وجودهما المستعدة لهما قبل حدوثهما ثم الوجود على رآيه أمر عقلي انتزاعي نسبي لا تحصل له إلا بما ينتزع منه - فيكون واحدا بوحدة ما ينتزع منه كثيرا بكثرتة فكيف يكون الأشياء المتعددة - من حيث تعددها موجودة بوجود واحد.

و أما ثانيا فلأن خصوصيات الأحكام وإن اقتضت خصوصيات الوجود لموضوعاتها لكن ليس يكفي في الحكم على شيء بحال خارجي وجود الانتزاعي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٨

بل نقول ما ذكره من أن خصوصيات الأحكام مما يقتضي خصوصيات الوجود للموضوعات - ينافي ما فرعه عليه من الاكتفاء في الحكم على شيء بحال واقعي بالفعل بوجوده الانتزاعي الذي هو بالقوة و بعد أن يخرج من القوة إلى الفعل يكون ظرف تحققة و وعاء ثبوته الذهن فقط دون الخارج.

و أما ثالثا فلأن طبيعة القضية الممكنة وإن لم يقتض صدقها الوجود بالفعل للموضوع في الأعيان لكنها اقتضت الوجود في الذهن على وفاق سائر القضايا و لا شك أن القضايا التي كلامنا فيها أشد استدعاء لوجود الموضوع من الممكنات - فكيف يتصور الاكتفاء في وجود موضوعها بنحو من الثبوت الانتزاعي الذي مرجعه إلى عدم الثبوت لا خارجا و لا ذهنا إلا بعد أن يصير منظورا إليه.

و أما رابعا فلأن عدم اقتضاء الممكنة وجود الموضوع بالفعل ليس معناه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٤٩

أنه يمكن لنا أن نحكم على زيد بأنه كاتب بالإمكان من غير أن يكون موجودا في الأعيان كيف و الكتابة بالإمكان حال خارجي لزيد و الحال الخارجي لشيء لا ينفك عن وجوده الخارجي بل معناه أن القضية الممكنة من جهة إمكان الاتصاف بالمحمول لا يستدعي وجود الموضوع أي كيفية الرابطة إذا كانت إمكانا فالقضية من حيث كون جهة الرابطة فيها إمكانا لا تستدعي الوجود للموضوع بخلاف الضرورة و الدوام و غيرهما و هذا لا يستلزم عدم اقتضاءها له من حيثية أخرى كما باعتبار أصل الحكم الخارجي مع قطع النظر عن جهاته و عدم اقتضاء بعض الجهات لوجود الموضوع - لا يستلزم عدم اقتضاء نفس الحكم له و الكلام في نفس الأحكام لا في جهاتها على أن الجهة فيما نحن فيه هي الضرورة

فصل (٧) في استقراء المعاني التي يستعمل فيها لفظ الإمكان

إن لفظ الإمكان في استعمالات الجمهور من الناس يقع على ما في قوة سلب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٠

امتناع ذات الموضوع أو سلب امتناع النسبة بين طرفي العقد و الامتناع هو ضرورة انتفاء الموضوع في نفسه أو ضرورة عدم النسبة و بالجملة ضرورة الجانب المخالف - بالقياس إلى أحد هذين الأمرين فصار معنى الإمكان بحسب استعمالهم سلب ضرورة الطرف المقابل و إنما توصف به النسبة المتحققة على طريقة المجاز من باب وصف الشيء

بحال متعلقة الغير الواقع في نفس الأمر فعندهم ما ليس بممكن فهو ممتنع و الممكن واقع على الواجب و على ما ليس بواجب و لا ممتنع و لا يقع على الممتنع الذي يقابله لا على أن هناك طبيعة جامعة لهما في نفس الأمر لأن ما في نفس الأمر إما الوجوب أو الإمكان و إنما ذلك في تصور العقل و اعتباره مفهوما جامعا لهما هو في نفس الأمر و بحسب الواقع ليس إلا أحد الأمرين لا طبيعة مبهمة متحصلة بهما مع قطع النظر عن اعتبار العقل و عمله و لذلك ليس هو مادة بل جهة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥١

ثم انصرف عن الوضع الأول بأن اعتبر ذلك المعنى تارة في طرف الإيجاب كما في الوضع الأول و تارة في طرف السلب إذ من شأن الامتناع الدخول على كل منهما- و حينئذ وقع على الممتنع و على ما ليس بواجب و لا ممتنع و تخلى عن الواجب فصار الإمكان مقابلا لكل من ضرورتي الجانبين إذ بحسب دخوله على الإيجاب قابل ضرورة السلب و بحسب دخوله على السلب قابل ضرورة الإيجاب و لما لزم وقوع الإمكان على ما ليس بواجب و لا ممتنع في حالتيه جميعا وضع منقولا خاصيا لسلب الضرورة في جانبي الإيجاب و السلب جميعا و هو الإمكان الحقيقي المقابل للضرورتين جميعا و هو أخص من المعنى الأول فكان المعنى الأول إمكانا عاما أو عاميا و الثاني خاصا و خاصيا بحسب الوجهين و صارت الأشياء بحسبه على ثلاثة أقسام واجب و ممتنع و ممكن كما كانت بحسب المفهوم الأول قسمين واجبا و ممكنا أو ممتنعا و ممكنا.

ثم قد يستعمل و يراد به ما يقابل جميع الضرورات ذاتية كانت أو وصفية أو وقتية و هو أحق باسم الإمكان من المعنيين السابقين لأن هذا المعنى من الممكن - أقرب إلى حال الوسط بين طرفي الإيجاب و السلب كالكتابة للإنسان لتساوي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٢

نسبة الطبيعة الإنسانية إلى وجودها و عدمها له و الضرورة بشرط المحمول و إن كانت مقابلة هذا الإمكان بالاعتبار فربما يشاركه في المادة لكنها توصف بتلك الضرورة من حيث الوجود و بهذا الإمكان من حيث الماهية و أخصيته هذا المعنى من اللذين قبله ليست إلا بضرب من التشبيه و نوع من المجاز و قد يطلق الإمكان على معنى رابع و هو ما بحسب حال الشيء من إيجاب أو سلب في الاستقبال و هو الإمكان الاستقبالي لكون ما ينسب إلى الماضي و الحال من الأمور إما موجودا أو معدوما فالضرورة قد أخرجه من حاق الوسط إلى أحد الطرفين و لذلك اعتبره

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٣

فرقة من المنطقيين لأن الباقي على الإمكان الصرف ليس إلا المنسوب إلى الاستقبال - من الممكنات التي يجهل حالها و من اشترط منهم في هذا أن يكون معدوما في الحال فقد غفل عن أن حسابه إن جعله موجودا قد أخرجه إلى ضرورة الوجودات مثله هاهنا إذ فرض عدم الحالي أيضا يخرج به إلى ضرورة عدم فإن استضر بذلك فيستضر بهذا فترجيح أحدهما على الآخر ليس من مرجح و هذا قول يناسبه النظر المنطقي و الأنظار البحثية.

و أما التحقيق الفلسفي فيعطي أن الممكن في الاستقبال أيضا لا يتجرد عن إحدى الضرورتين الوجوب باعتبار أحد

الطرفين و الامتناع باعتبار مقابله من جهة إيجاب العلة له كما في الحال فإذن معنى الإمكان واحد يتساوى نسبته إلى ما بحسب الحال أو الاستقبال للممكن نعم الصدق والكذب لا يتعينان في الإمكان الاستقبالي - فإن الواقع في الماضي و الحال قد يتعين طرف وقوعه و لا وقوعه و يكون الصادق و الكاذب بحسب المطابقة و عدمها واقعين و أما الاستقبالي فقد نظر في تعيين أحد طرفيه - أهو كذلك في الواقع أم لا و هذا أيضا بالقياس إلى علومنا الغير المحيطة بما في الأزال و الآباد جميعا بخلاف علوم المبادي و أوائل الوجود فإن علومهم عليه إحاطية إيجابية بنية لا أنها انفعالية إمكانية ظنية إنما الإمكان و الظن بحسب حال الماهيات - الغير المستدعية لشيء من طرفي الوجود و العدم و هو لا ينفك عن إيجاب الوجود - الناشي من اقتضاء السلب التام و الجمهور يظنون ذلك في الواقع و التحقيق يأباه لأن الممكن ممكن بذاته واجب بوجود علته و ممتنع بعدمها فما لا يعلم من الممكن إلا الإمكان فلا يتصور أن يعلم منه أنه واقع أو غير واقع و إن علم وجود سببه كان وجوده واجبا لا ممكنا و إن علم عدم سببه كان عدمه واجبا لا ممكنا فإذن وجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٤

الممكنات باعتبار السبب واجب فلو اطلعنا على جميع أسباب شيء واحد و علمنا وجودها قطعنا بوجود ذلك الشيء لأنه صار واجبا باعتبار وجود أسبابه و الأول تعالى يعلم الحوادث المستقبلية بأسبابها لأن الأسباب و العلل ترتقي إلى الواجب الوجود و كل حادث ممكن فهو بسببه واجب و لو لم يجب بسببه لما وجد و سببه أيضا واجب بغيره إلى أن ينتهي إلى مسبب الأسباب من غير سبب فلما كان هو عالما بترتب الأسباب كان عالما بلا وصمة شك يعتريه و المنجم لما تفحص عن بعض أسباب الوجود و لم يطلع على جميعها لا جرم يحكم بوجود الشيء ظنا و تخميناً لأنه يجوز أن ما اطلع عليها ربما يعارضه مانع فلا يكون ما ذكره كل السبب بل ذلك مع انتفاع المصادمات و المعارضات فإن اطلع على أكثر الأسباب قوي ظنه و إن اطلع على الكل حصل له العلم كما يعلم في الشتاء أن الهواء سيحمر بعد ستة أشهر لأن سبب الحمى - كون الشمس قريب الممر من سمت الرأس و ذلك في وسط البروج الشمالية لسكان الأقاليم الشمالية و يعلم بحكم الأوضاع السماوية و عادة الله فيها و سنة الله التي لا تبدل لها أن الشمس لا يتغير مسيرها و أنها ستعود إلى الأسد بعد هذه المدة و سنزيدك إيضاحاً لهذا من ذي قبل في كيفية علم الله تعالى بالمتغيرات إن شاء الله تعالى.

ثم قد يطلق الإمكان و يراد به الإمكان الاستعدادي الذي هو تهيو المادة و استعدادها لما يحصل لها من الصور و الأعراض و هو كيفية استعدادية من عوارض المادة تقبل التفاوت شدة و ضعفا بحسب القرب من الحصول و البعد عنه لأجل تحقق الأكثر و الأقل مما لا بد منه و هو ليس من المعاني العقلية الانتزاعية التي لا حصول لها خارج العقل كالسوابق من معاني الإمكان بل إنه مما يحدث بحدوث بعض الأسباب و الشرائط و ينقطع استمراره بحدوث الشيء كزوال النقص بعد حصول التام - و رفع الإبهام عند تعيين الأمر على ما في فلسفتنا من أن نسبة المادة باستعدادها إلى الشيء الحادث نسبة النقص إلى التمام كما سيتضح في موعده إن شاء الله تعالى و هذا الإمكان لا يعد من الجهات بل يجعل محمولاً أو جزءه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٥

فصل (٨) فيه إرجاع الكلام إلى أحكام هذه المفهومات العقلية التي هي مواد العقود على أسلوب آخر

إن كلا من هذه الطبائع العقلية يحتمل في بادي الأمر أن يكون بالذات أو بالغير أو بالقياس إلى الغير ثم العقل بعد التدبر فيها يحكم بأن الإمكان لا يكون بالغير - بل بالذات و بالقياس إلى الغير فسقط من الاحتمالات التسعة واحد فبقي المتحققة منها ثمانية اعتبارات و الثلاثة التي هي بالذات من تلك الجملة منفصلة حقيقة حاصرة لجميع الطبائع و المفهومات بحسب نفس الأمر و مراتبها اللهم إلا في الماهيات الإمكانية فإنها في مرتبة ذاتها من حيث هي لا تكون متصفة بإمكانها الذي هي حالها في نفس الأمر لا بحسب مرتبة ماهياتها فإنها من تلك الحثية ليست إلا هي نعم لما كان جميع السلوب صادقة في حق كل واحدة منها من تلك الحثية إلا سلب نفسها بحقيقتها التصورية لا بهليتها البسيطة أو المركبة لأن إيجاب نفسها أو غيرها إياها أيضا مع الوجود فيصدق فيها من جملة السلوب سلب ضروري الوجود و العدم - و كذا سلب سلبها أيضا إلا أن صدق هذه السلوب على طريقة العقود السلبية عنها - لا على طريقة إيجاب تلك السلوب لها و بينهما فرقان عظيم و حمل الإمكان على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٤

الماهية كنظيره من قبيل الثاني دون الأول كيف و لو كان المقسم في الأقسام الثلاثة حال الشيء بالقياس إلى الوجود و العدم بجميع الحثيات و الاعتبارات أعم من أن يكون بحسب الواقع أو بحسب أية مرتبة منه لم يكن القسمة عقلية حاصرة - فإن الماهية بحسب نفس مرتبتها ربما لم يكن لها شيء من الثلاثة عند العقل و لو سلم ثبوت شيء من الثلاثة لها بحسب نفس ذاتها فيكون نفسها أيضا مع ذلك الشيء ثابتة لنفسها فيكون نفسها نفسها و ذلك الشيء فلا يكون القسمة حاصرة و لا الانفصال الحقيقي المشتمل على منع الجمع و منع الخلو حاصلًا في الأقسام الثلاثة و كون بعض هذه الأقسام حاصلًا في مرتبة ذات موضوعه كما في الواجب تعالى إنما نشأ من خصوصية القسم لا باعتبار حصوله و خروجه عن مفهوم المقسم فإن مجرد ذلك - لا يستدعي أن يكون الواجب بالذات مثلا مصداق وجوب وجوده نفس مرتبة ذاته بذاته و إلا لما احتجنا بعد تحصيل كل قسم إلى استيناف بيان و برهان على كون وجوب وجوده تعالى عين ذاته من دون صفة عارضة لذاته أو اعتبار آخر متأخر عن نفس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٧

ذاته تعالى و فرق بين كون الذات مصدوقا عليها لصدق مفهوم و كونه مصداقا لصدقه فلا تنافي بين هذا الكلام و بين ما سنذكره أن الماهية الإمكانية لا ينفك عنها الإمكان في أية مرتبة أخذت

و اعلم أن مفهوم واجب الوجود لذاته شامل لعدة أقسام.

منها واجب يمتنع انتفاء المحمول عنه بنفس ذاته

من غير اقتضاء و عليّة من الذات لثبوته لها و هو القيوم تعالى و الضرورة هناك ذاتية أزلية مطلقة.

و منها نسب ضرورية لمحمول إلى موضوع لا يكون الموضوع علة لثبوت المحمول له

ككون الإنسان إنسانا أو حيوانا و الضرورة هاهنا مطلقة ذاتية مع وصف الوجود للموضوع لا به.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٨

و منها نسب ضرورية يكون لها علة هي نفس ذات الموضوعات

ككون المثلث ذا الزوايا القوائم و ضرورتها أيضا ذاتية بالنظر إلى اقتضاء ذات الموضوع و لكن مع وصف الوجود لا بالوصف و كذا مجرد مفهوم الممتنع بالذات يتحصل في أقسام.

منها ما يمتنع الوجود بالنظر إلى ذاته

من حيث هي لا بعلة و اقتضاء منها كشرية الباري تعالى و المعدوم المطلق و الشر المحض.

و منها ما يمتنع وجود المحمول له بالنظر إلى ذاته

لا بعلة منه لضرورة عدم ذلك المحمول عنه ككون الإنسان جمادا.

و منها ما يمتنع وجود المحمول له بالنظر إلى ذاته بذاته

و لكن باقتضاء من ذاته لضرورة عدمه عنه ككون الأربعة فردا فإن اقتضاءها للزوجية عين اقتضاءها لنفي الفردية عنها و كذا مفهوم الممكن بالذات يستوعب أمورا ممكنة تصدق في كل منها بحسب الإمكان الخاص إمكانان عامان موجب و سالب و الموجب فيه يستلزم السالب و يكون العقد مركبا من قضيتين موجبة و سالبة و أمورا مركبة فرضا من الواجبين أو الممتنعين أو ضدين فإن ضرورة الوجود أو عدم تلك المركبات - ليست لذواتها بما هي مركبات بل لعللة هي خصوصية الأجزاء و الاثنان اللذان هما بالغير - أي الوجوب و الامتناع إنما يعرضان لجميع الممكنات و لا يعرضان البتة و لا أحدهما - لشيء من الواجب بالذات و الممتنع بالذات و قد مر أن الواجب بالذات لا يكون واجبا بغيره و أما الثلاثة التي هي بالقياس إلى الغير فهي لا تصادم التي هي بالذات - في التحقق و إن خالفتها في المفهوم فالوجوب بالقياس إلى الغير يعم جميع الموجودات - إذ لا موجود إلا و له علة أو معلولية لشيء آخر و كل من العلة و المعلول له وجوب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٥٩

بالقياس إلى الآخر لأن الوجوب بالقياس إلى الغير ضرورة تحقق الشيء بالنظر إلى الغير على سبيل الاستدعاء الأعم من الاقتضاء و مرجعه إلى أن الغير يابى ذاته إلا أن يكون للشيء ضرورة الوجود سواء كان باقتضاء ذاتي أو بحاجة ذاتية و وجود تعلقي ظلي

و قد وقع في الأحاديث الإلهية: يا موسى أنا بذك اللازم

و الامتناع بالقياس إلى الغير يعرض لكل موجود واجبا أو ممكنا بالنسبة إلى عدم معلوله أو عدم علته أو ما يلزم عدم معلوله أو عدم علته و كذا يعرض لكل معدوم بما هو معدوم ممتنع أو ممكن بالنظر إلى وجود معلوله أو وجود علته. و بالجملة وجود ما يصادمه وجوده و الإمكان مقيسا إلى الغير لا يعرض للواجب القيوم بالقياس إلى شيء من الموجودات الممكنة إنما يعرض له بالقياس إلى المفروض واجبا آخر و بالقياس إلى ما فرض من مجعولات واجب آخر و يعرض أيضا لموجودات ممكنة بعضها مقيسا إلى بعض أو لمعدومات ممكنة كذلك أو لموجود ممكن مقيسا إلى معدوم ممكن أو بالعكس كل ذلك بشرط أن لا يكون بين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦٠

المقيس و المقيس إليه علاقة علية أو معلولية و يعرض لأمور ممتنعة بالذات بالقياس إلى عدمات أشياء ممكنة بالذات و

ما يلزمها لعدم العلاقة الاستدعائية بينها.

تنبيه: وجوب العلة بالقياس إلى وجود المعلول

عبارة عن استدعائه بحسب وجوبه لها أن يكون هي مما وجب لها الوجود إما بنفسها كما في العلة الأولى أو بغيرها - و وجوب المعلول بالقياس إلى وجود العلة كونها بتماميتها متأبئة إلا أن يكون معلولها ضروري الثبوت في الخارج مع عزل النظر عن أن المعلول له وجوب حاصل له من العلة - فإن هذا حال المعلول في نفسه وإن كان من جهة إعطاء العلة إياه و يعبر عنه بالوجوب بالغير و وجوب أحد المعلولين لعل واحد بالقياس إلى الآخر عبارة عن كون الآخر يابى أن يكون هذا غير ضروري الوجود بحسب اقتضاء الغير ضرورتهما جميعا مع عدم الالتفات إلى أن هذا في نفسه موصوف بضرورة التحقق لأن هذا حال شقيقة لا حالة - و الوجوب بالغير هو كون الشيء ضروري الوجود في نفسه بحسب إعطاء الغير ذلك لأنه اعتبار في الشيء بحسب ما يلائم حال الغير عند ما يلحظه مقيسا إليه لا من حيث هو له في نفسه من قبل إفاضة الغير وهذا فرق صحيح بحسب المفهوم و في الفلسفة العامة - و أما في طريقتنا فسيلوح لك ما فيه إن كنت من أهل الطريق ففي قاعدتهم المعلول واجب بالعلة و بالقياس إليها جميعا بخلاف العلة فإنها واجبة بالقياس إلى المعلول لا به - و كذا كل واحد من معلولي علة واحدة نظرا إلى الآخر و الامتناع بالغير هو ضرورة عدم الشيء من قبل اقتضاء الغير و الامتناع بالقياس إلى الغير ضرورة عدم وجوده بحسب استدعاء الغير و هو يجتمع مع الامتناع بالغير في وجود المعلول بالنسبة إلى عدم العلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦١

أو عدمه بالنسبة إلى وجودها و يفترق عنه بالتحقق في عكس هاتين الصورتين - و في عدم أحد معلولي علة واحدة بالقياس إلى وجود الآخر أو وجوده بالنظر إلى عدم الآخر و الإمكان الخاص بالقياس إلى الغير هو لا ضرورة وجود الشيء و عدمه بحسب استدعاء حال الغير وجودا و عدما حين ما يلحظ مقيسا إليه و هذا إنما يتحقق في الأشياء - التي لا يكون بينها علاقة طبيعية من جهة العلية و المعلولية أو الاتفاق في معلولية علة واحدة

فصل (٩) في أن الإمكان يستحيل أن يكون بالغير

لما تيقنت أن قسمة الشيء إلى الواجب و الممكن و الممتنع منفصلة حقيقية إذ كل مفهوم فهو في ذاته إما ضروري الوجود أو لا فإما ضروري عدم أو لا و هذا في التحقيق منفصلتان حقيقتان كل واحدة منهما يتركب من الشيء و نقيضه و هكذا حال كل قضية منفصلة يكون أجزاءها أكثر من اثنين فإنها تكون بالحقيقة منفصلتان أو أكثر فحينئذ الشيء بأي اعتبار و حيثية أخذ لا يكون إلا أحد هذه الثلاثة فإذا كان حاله بحسب ذاته أو بحسب وصفه مع قطع النظر عن تأثير الغير فيه من جملة هذه الثلاثة المنفصلة الإمكان فلو فرض أن يكون له إمكان بالغير لكان لشيء واحد بالنظر إلى حيثية واحدة إمكانان أحدهما بالغير و الآخر بالذات بمعنى كون الذات كافية في صدقه لا بمعنى اقتضاءها له - لاستحالة ذلك كما سيظهر و من المستحيلات أن يكون إمكان واحد مستندا إلى الذات بالمعنى المذكور و إلى الغير جميعا كما مر في الوجوب من أنه لو كان بالذات لم يكن بالغير و لو كان بالغير لم يكن بالذات و أما تحقق إمكانين لشيء واحد باعتبار واحد فهو مستبين الفساد فكما لا يتصور لشيء واحد باعتبار واحد وجودان أو عدمان فكذلك لا يتصور لواحد بعينه من الذوات أو الحثيات المكثرة للذات ضرورتا وجود واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦٢

أو ضرورتا عدم واحد أو لا ضرورتان لوجود واحد و عدم واحد كيف و هذه المعاني طبائع ذهنية لا يتحصل إلا بالإضافة و لا يتعدد كل منها إلا بتعدد ما أضيفت هي إليه فلو فرض إمكان بالغير لشيء ما فهو مع عزل النظر عن الغير أ هو في حد ذاته ممكن فكان لشيء واحد بعينه إمكانان و قد علمت بطلانه أو ضروري أحد من الوجود و العدم فقد أزاله ذلك الغير عما يقتضيه ذاته و كساه مصادم ما استوجبه بطباعه و ليس كذلك إذا كان الوجوب أو الامتناع بالغير حين كون الذات متصفة بالإمكان الذاتي لأنه عبارة عن لا اقتضاء الذات إحدى الضرورتين لا اقتضاءها سلبهما و بينهما فرق إذ الأول سلب تحصيلي لا إيجاب سلب أو إيجاب عدول و الثاني إيجاب لأحدهما و السلب البسيط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦٣

التحصيلي بما هو كذلك لا يحوج صدقه على شيء بحسب ذاته إلى اقتضاء من تلقاه تلك الذات له بل يكفي فيه عدم الاقتضاء على الإطلاق فالإمكان لأجل هذا ليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦٤

من لوازم الماهيات على المعنى المصطلح الشائع في اللوازم بل على مجرد كون الماهية - كافية لصدقه عليها لا بمقتض و لا باقتضاء نعم تساوي طرفي الوجود و العدم نظرا إلى نفس الذات الإمكانية حين ما هو موجود أو معدوم في الخارج و ثابت في العقل أو صحة إيجاب سلب الضرورتين لماهيتها بحسب حكم العقل من لوازم الماهيات على المعنى الشائع فيها لكن ليس شيء منهما حقيقة الإمكان كما يسوق إليه البرهان بل أشد محوضة في عدم التحصل و أوكد صرافة في القوة و الفاقة و منهم من يجعل الإمكان بمعنى تساوي الطرفين نظرا إلى الذات أو بمعنى السلب العدولي أو التحصيلي لكن يجعله من اللوازم الاصطلاحية للذات المحوجة إلى اقتضاء من قبلها ثم يعتذر من لزوم الانقلاب عند فعلية أحد الطرفين أو تخلف مقتضى الذات عند ترجيح أحد الطرفين المتساويين أن الأمر أوسع من مرتبة الذات من حيث هي هي و أن انتفاء شيء في خصوص نحو من أنحاء نفس الأمر بخصوصه لا يستلزم انتفاءه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦٥

في نفس الأمر فيجوز أن يكون حقيقة الإمكان اقتضاء ذات الممكن تساوي الطرفين - بالنظر إلى ذاته من حيث هي هي لا اقتضاء ذاته تساويهما في نفس الأمر و كذا ما ينافي مقتضى ذات الممكن ترجيح أحد الطرفين بالنظر إلى الذات من حيث هي لا ترجحه بالنظر إليها في نفس الأمر من جهة تأثير العلة و إفاضة الجاعل. و أنت بعد الإحاطة بما نبهناك عليه من أن الممكن في مرتبة ذاته من حيث ذاته له القوة الساذجة و الفقر المحض من غير تحصيل بوجه من الوجوه أصلا في جهة من الجهات علمت بطلان ذلك إذ الماهية الإمكانية حيث لا تحصل لها فلا فعلية لها في حد ذاتها و ما لا فعلية له لا اقتضاء منه لشيء ما لم ينصغ بصيغ الوجود من جهة إفاضة الجاعل القيوم و إلا لكان لما بالقوة من حيث هو بالقوة مدخل في إخراج شيء من القوة إلى الفعل و من الإبهام إلى التحصل و الفطرة

الإنسانية تأتي ذلك فإذاً الممكن بحسب ذاته المبهمة لا يقتضي شيئاً من الأشياء حتى سلب شيء أيضاً.

إيضاح وتنبيه:

إن من الذاهبين إلى أن الإمكان الذاتي من لوازم الماهيات بالمعنى الاصطلاحي في اللزوم بين شيئين ربما يجعل من براهين إبطال الإمكان بالغير أنه لو كان كذلك لزم تواردهن علتين مستقلتين على معلول واحد - أو انقلاب شيء من الواجب بالذات والممتنع بالذات إلى الممكن بالذات.

و يرد عليه أنه يجوز أن يكون علة الذات و استقلالها مشروطة بانتفاء الغير - فإذا وجد لم يكن لها علة أو استقلال فلا يلزم التوارد المذكور كما في أعدام أجزاء المركب فإن كلا منها علة مستقلة لعدمه عند الانفراد وإذا اجتمع عدة منها بطل الاستقلال من الأحاد و دفع بأن في التصوير المذكور لا يكون الإمكان ذاتياً أصلاً - إذ لا يزال للغير مدخل وجوداً و عدماً.

و الحق في علة كل من أعدام أجزاء المركب لعدمه أنها على سبيل التبعية لاقتها بما هو علة بالذات لأن ما هو علة بالذات لعدم المعلول هي طبيعة عدم إحدى علة من الشرائط و الأجزاء أو غيرها و ذلك أمر كلي مبهم لا تعدد فيه بحسب نفسه و الأفراد و إن تعددت لكنها ليست عللاً بخصوصها بل العلة هي القدر المشترك و كون العلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦٦

أضعف تحصلاً من معلولها ليس بضائر في علل الأعدام و لا حاجة في ذلك إلى ما قد تكلفه بعض الأعاض من أن علة عدم المعلول الشخصي عدم علته التامة الشخصية.

و ربما قالوا لو كان إمكان الشيء معلولاً لغيره لكان هو في ذاته جائزاً أن يكون ممكناً أو واجباً لذاته أو ممتنعاً لذاته و إمكان كون الشيء واجباً لذاته أو ممتنعاً لذاته مشتمل على التناقض و أيضاً إذا فرضنا عدم تأثير الغير فيه كان واجباً أو ممتنعاً و كلاهما مستحيلان لأن سلب تأثير الغير فيه أمر مغاير لذاته و كون الشيء بسبب الغير واجباً بذاته أو ممتنعاً بذاته تهافت.

و هذه كلها هوسات جزافية بعد ما حقق الأمر بأن معنى الإمكان الذاتي هو كون الشيء بحيث إذا اعتبر بذاته من غير ملاحظة أمر آخر وراء نفسه معه - كان مسلوب الضرورة للوجود و العدم عنه من غير اقتضاء و لا علة منه لذلك بل مع قطع النظر عن جميع ما يكون غير ذاته و إن كان من السلوب و الإضافات العارضة لذاته - و كذا الحال في الوجوب و الامتناع الذاتيين إذ المقسم في الأقسام الثلاثة هو حال الشيء

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على هذا الوجه الذي ذكرناه

دفاع شك:

إنك بعد أن لوحنا لك إلى أن كون الشيء بحسب مرتبة نفسه - مما يصدق عليه سلب أي معنى كان سوى ذاتياته لا يستلزم أن يكون ذاته مصداق تلك السلوب بأن يكون حيثية الذات بعينها حيثية تلك السلوب - لست في أن يسع لك أن تقول إن الماهية المأخوذة من حيث هي يصح سلب كل ما ليس من جوهريات ذاتها عنها من تلك الحيثية و سلب

الضرورة إذا أخذ سلباً تحصيلياً - صح صدقه عليها من تلك الحثية فيلزم أن يكون نفس هذا السلب من جوهريات الماهية مع أن الإمكان الذاتي من عوارض الماهيات لا من جوهرياتها.

إزالة ريب:

و حيث ينكشف لك من ذي قبل في مباحث الماهية فائدة تقديم السلب على من حيث هي هي في قولنا الماهية ليست من حيث هي إلا هي حتى تعود الحثية جزءاً من المحمول و يكون السلب وارداً على الثبوت من تلك الحثية لا أن يؤخر حتى يصير تتممة للموضوع و قيده إذ لو فعل هكذا لربما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦٨

يكذب الحكم مطلقاً كما إذا كان مدخول السلب مما لا يجوز أن يكون الموضوع مجرداً عنه في نفس الأمر بوجه أصلاً فيسهل عليك دفاع شك استصعب حله كثير من الأذكياء و هو أنه لما صح سلب كل ما ليس من ذاتيات الماهيات إذا أخذت من حيث هي هي فكذاك يصح سلب ذلك السلب من تلك الحثية و كما أن الإنسان المأخوذ من حيث ماهيته و طبيعته تسلب عنه الكتابة من تلك الحثية كذلك تسلب عنه سلب الكتابة أيضاً لكونهما جميعاً من العوارض التي هي غير الذات و الذاتي له فنقول كل ماهية إمكانية كما صح سلب ضرورة الطرفين عنه من حيث هي - فكذاك يصح سلب سلب ضرورة الطرفين من تلك الحثية فإذا الإنسان من حيث هو هو كما أنه ليس بواجب و لا ممتنع بحسب ذاته فكذاك هو من تلك الحثية ليس بممكن بالذات و قد مر أن لا شيء من الأشياء بأي وجه أخذ خال عن الوجوب و الامتناع و الإمكان الذاتيات و أن الممكن في مرتبة ذاته ممكن بالذات لا ينفك عنه الإمكان الذاتي في تلك المرتبة و ذلك لأن الماهية و إن لم يصدق عليها من جهة ذاتها شيء من العرضيات اللاحقة بأن يكون جهة العروض هي الماهية من حيث هي لكن يصدق على الماهية المأخوذة من حيث هي كثير من العرضيات و هي التي لا تخلو الماهية عنها في نفس الأمر على نحو لا يكون جهة العروض هي الماهية من حيث هي فالعوارض التي لا تنفك الماهية عنها أبداً يمتنع صدق سلوبها عليها بخلاف العوارض التي تلحقها بشرط الوجود فإنها حيث تخلو الماهية عنها في مرتبتها التي لها متقدمة على الأوصاف الوجودية يصدق سلوبها على الماهية إذا أخذت تحصيلية لا عدولية لكن الإمكان ليس من هذا القبيل إذ هي من المراتب السابقة على الوجود - فسلبه لم يصدق على الماهية أصلاً.

و مما ذكرناه علمت ضعف قول من أراد التفصي عن تلك الشبهة بأن انفكاك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٦٩

الماهية من حيث هي عن الإمكان لا يستلزم جواز انفكاكها في نفس الأمر لأنها أوسع من تلك المرتبة قياساً على عوارضها الوجودية التي يكون القضايا المعقودة بها وصفية و هي العوارض التي تلحق الماهية لا بما هي هي بل بشرط الوجود و لا حاجة أيضاً إلى ما ذكره بعض الأماجد أن الإمكان لما لم يكن حقيقتها إلا سلب ضرورة الطرفين سلباً بسيطاً تحصيلياً فيكون صادقاً في مرتبة الماهية من حيث هي و إن كان خارجاً عن جوهرها فإن مجرد كون الشيء سلباً تحصيلياً لا يوجب صدقه في مرتبة الماهية المأخوذة بنفسها و إلا لصدق سلب الإمكان أيضاً.

ثم قد مر أن المقسم في الأمور الثلاثة هي حال الماهية بالقياس إلى الوجود و العدم و هذه حالة ثبوتية اتصافية و إن كان

بعض القيود كالإمكان سلبية حتى يكون المعقودة به من القضايا موجبة سالبة المحمول لا سالبة بسيطة فكون الشيء ممكنًا عبارة عن اتصافه بسلب ضرورة الطرفين لا لا اتصافه بضرورة الطرفين فصدق الإمكان على شيء معناه صدق الاتصاف به وقد صرح بذلك بعض المحققين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٠

وهم وتنبيه

: ثم لعلك تقول معلولية شيء لشيء يستلزم معلولية عدمه لعدم ذلك الشيء إذ عدم العلة علة لعدم المعلول فإذا كان وجوب الممكن بالغير وهو ضرورة وجوده فنقيضه وهو سلب ضرورة الوجود يكون بالغير - وإذا كان امتناعه بالغير وهو ضرورة عدمه فنقيضه وهو سلب ضرورة عدمه يكون بالغير - فإذا ثبت الإمكان بالغير. فنقول قد مر أن إمكانية الشيء هي اتصافه بسلب الضرورة الذي في قوة موجبة سالبة المحمول لا نفس سلب الضرورة الذي في قوة السالبة البسيطة وظاهر أن نقيض ضرورة الوجود هو المعنى الثاني لا الأول الذي هو إمكانية الشيء. وأيضا ليس مجموع ضرورة الوجود و ضرورة عدم صفة واحدة لها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧١

وحدة اجتماعية يكون لها علة واحدة وحدة تأليفية حتى يكون لها سلب واحد - مستند إلى سلب علة واحدة بل هما صفتان متخالفتان بالذات مستندتان إلى علتين متخالفتين غير مجتمعتين فلا يكون نقيضاهما صفة واحدة مستندة إلى السلب واحد وإن كانت الوحدة تأليفية فضلا عن الحقيقية. وأنت تعلم أن الوحدة في جميع التقسيمات معتبرة وإلا لم ينضبط الأقسام في شيء من التقاسيم. وقد قررت هذه الشبهة في كتاب الأفق المبين بوجه آخر وهو أن الوجوب بالغير هو ضرورة الوجود بالغير ونقيضه سلب ضرورة الوجود بالغير وهو ممكن بالنظر إلى ذات الممكن وكذلك نقيض الامتناع بالغير وهو سلب ضرورة عدم بالغير فإذا ثبت الإمكان بالغير وهو مقابل الوجوب بالغير والامتناع بالغير. ثم ذكر الجواب عنها بأن نقيض ضرورة الوجود بالغير سلب ضرورة الوجود بالغير على أن يكون بالغير قيذا للضرورة لا لسلب الضرورة وكذلك نقيض الامتناع فاللازم سلب الضرورة الآتية من الغير لا سلب الضرورة الآتية منه والمستحيل هو إتيان سلب الضرورة من الغير لا سلب إتيان الضرورة منه.

إحصاء وتنبيه:

المشهور من الأوائل أنهم يأخذون كلا من الوجوب والإمكان والوحدة والوجود أمورا زائدة في الأعيان والمتأخرون على أن تلك الأمور زائدة في العقل على الماهيات إلا أنها من العقلية الصرفة التي لا صورة لها في الأعيان يحاذي بها ما في الأذهان وقد علمناك ما فتح الله علينا من طريق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٢

القصد و سلوك الأمة الوسط في نحو وجود هذه المعاني وأنها على أي سبيل تكون ثابتة ومنفية معا وربما قرع سمعك

من أقوام ليسوا من أهل المخاطبة و التوهين لكلامهم و البحث عن مرامهم أن هذه الأمور لا يزيد على ما يضاف هي إليها من الماهيات الموصوفة بها لا ذهنًا و لا عينا فإنك تعلم بأول الفطرة أنه إذا قيل الإنسان ممكن الوجود أو الفلك ممكن الوجود لا يعنى بإمكان الوجود في الإنسان نفس معنى الإنسان - و في الفلك نفس معنى الفلك على قياس ما نقلناه عنهم في الوجود بل هو معنى واحد يقع عليهما فلو حمل الإمكان على الإنسان و عني به نفس معنى الإنسان ثم حمل على الفلك و عني به نفس الفلكية فلم يكن معنى واحد وضع بإزائه لفظ واحد غير ما وضع بإزائه الإنسان و الفلك و إن قيل على الفلك بالمعنى الذي قيل على الموصوفات بالإنسانية فقد كان المفهوم من الإنسان و الفلك شيئًا واحدًا و ذلك بديهي البطلان.

فقد ثبت أن معنى الإمكان إذا حمل على الماهيات المختلفة فليس هو عين تلك أو واحدًا منها بل أمر آخر يعمها عموم العرض العام اللاحق و قد قضى العجب عنهم و عن قولهم هذا بعض أبناء الحكمة و التحقيق حيث قال إن هؤلاء يوافقون أبناء الحقيقة في الاحتجاج على وجود الصانع تعالى بأن العالم ممكن مفتقر إلى سبب مرجح - ثم إذا باحثوا في الإمكان يقولون هو نفس الشيء الذي يضاف إليه فكانهم قالوا العالم محتاج إلى الصانع لأن العالم عالم.

قاعدة إشراقية:

قد وضع شيخ الإشراقيين قاعدة لكون الإمكان و أشباهه أوصافا عقلية لا صورة لها في الأعيان بأن كل طبيعة عامة يقتضي نوعه إذا كانت له صورة خارجية أن يتكرر متسلسلا مترادفا يتولد منه في الوجود سلاسل متولدة معا إلى لا نهاية كالوجوب و الوجود و الإمكان و الوحدة لا تكون موجودة في الأعيان فكما أنه إذا كانت للوجود صورة عينية وراء الماهية الموجودة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٣

كان له وجود عيني و لوجوده وجود أيضا إلى لا نهاية له ثم لمجموع السلسلة وجود آخر يتسلسل مرة ثانية إلى لا نهاية أخرى و هكذا و لا يكون للوجود الأصل حصول إلا بحصولها جميعا فكذلك الوحدة إذا كانت في الأعيان وراء الماهية كان للماهية دون الوحدة وحدة و للوحدة دونها وحدة أخرى و للوجود وحدة و للوحدة وجود و تعود اللانهاية مترادفة متضاعفة و كذلك في الإمكان و الوجوب - و يتولد سلسلة أخرى على التضاعف من الإمكان و الوجود فلإمكان وجود و لوجوده إمكان إذ لو وجب لم يكن عارضا و وراء تلك السلاسل سلاسل إلى لا نهاية في التضاعف بين الإمكان و الوجوب بالغير و بين الوجود و الوجوب و بين الوحدة و الوجوب فإذن كل مفهوم هذه سبيله فإنه لا يكون له صورة في الأعيان - و لا هو بحسب الأعيان شيء وراء الماهية فإذن هذه الأمور طبائع انتزاعية و اعتبارات ذهنية لا يحاذي بها شيء في الخارج و لا مبلغ لها متعين في الذهن يقف عنده و يتخصص به من التكرار في الحصول لدى العقول

بحث و تنقيح و مما تزلزل به هذه القاعدة أمور

منها كون الواجب عند القائلين بصحتها و استحكامها - وجودا صرفا

و وجوبا بحثا قائما بذاته واجبا بنفسه فضلا عن كونه في الأعيان فقد ناقضوا أنفسهم في باب الوجود و كونه عندهم اعتباريا محضا لا صورة له في العين و ذات الباري تعالى عندهم صورة الصور و أصل الحقائق.

و منها أن مقنن هذه القاعدة و مخترعها قائل بجواز أن يكون مفهوم واحد

و معنى فارد يوجد تارة صفة لشيء و تارة متحصلا بنفسه متقوما بذاته و بالجملة متفاوتا في أنحاء الكون و الحصول متخالفا في أطوار القوة و الضعف و الكمال و النقص - فليجوز مثل ذلك في بعض هذه المعاني كما أسلفناه في الوجود و الوحدة من قبولهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٤

أطوارا مختلفة في التحقق و أنحاء متفاوتة في الفضيلة و النقصان فغاية كمال كل منهما - أن يكون ذاتا أحديا قيوما واجبا بالذات و غاية نقصه أن يكون اعتبارا عقليا و معنى رابطيا لا حقيقة متأصلة بإزائه فموجودية الماهيات التي لا حقيقة لها بأنفسها إنما هي بالوجود لا بأنفسها و موجودية الوجود بنفس ذاته لأن الوجود نفسه حقيقة الماهيات الموجودة به فكيف لا يكون له حقيقة و حقيقته عين ذاته و لا يحتاج في موجوديته إلى وجود ليتضاعف الوجود لكن للعقل أن يعتبر لها موجودية أخرى كما في حقيقة النور على ما هو طريقته فإن حقيقة النور ظهور الأشياء و مظهرها فالأشياء ظاهرة بالنور و النور ظاهر بذاته لا بنور آخر ليتضاعف الأنوار إلى لا نهاية لكن للعقل أن يفرض للنور نورانية اعتبارية و لنورانية النور نورانية أخرى و هكذا إلى أن ينقطع بانقطاع اعتبارات العقل و ملاحظاته و كذا الكلام في الوحدة التي هي صفة عينية لأنها عين الوجود ذاتا و غيره مفهوما و كثيرا ما يكون للشيء حقيقة و ذات سوى مفهومه و ما حصل منه في العقل كالوجود و صفاته الكمالية و قد يكون للشيء مجرد مفهوم - لا حقيقة له في العين كالإمكان و الامتناع و اجتماع النقيضين و شريك الباري و أمثالها - و كذا سائر السلوب و الإضافات و ربما يكون مفهومات متعددة موجودة بوجود واحد بل متحدة مع حقيقة واحدة كمفهومات العلم و القدرة و الحياة التي هي عين وجود الحق تعالى.

و بهذا يندفع ما ذكره هذا الشيخ الجليل القدر في كتاب المشارعات و وصفه بالقوة و المتانة و هو قوله إنا نتسامح مع من قال الموجودية نفس الوجود فنقول الوجود و الوحدة حالهما واحد في أنهما ينبغي أن يكونا في الأعيان عندكم و أن كلا منهما اعتبار عقلي عندنا و هب أنكم منعمتم السلسلة الغير المتناهية في الوجود بأنه هو الموجودية فلا شك أن الوجود و الوحدة مفهومهما مختلف و يعقل أحدهما دون الآخر فلا يرجع أبدا معنى الوحدة إلى الوجود و لا معنى الوجود إلى الوحدة فنقول إذا كان الوجود موجودا كان له وحدة و إذا كانت الوحدة موجودة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٥

كان لها وجود له وحدة أخرى موجودة بوجود آخر و هكذا فيلزم بالضرورة سلسلة مترتبة غير متناهية من وجود وحدة و وحدة وجود و لا يكفي أن يقال إن وحدة الوجود هو أو وجود الوحدة هي فإن مفهوم الوجود غير مفهوم الوحدة و لا يكون شيئا شيا واحدا في نفسه هذا خلاصة كلامه في هذا المرام و بناؤه على أن المفهومات المختلفة - لا يمكن أن ينتزع من مصداق واحد و ذات واحدة و امتناع ذلك غير مسلم فإن أمرا واحدا و حقيقة واحدة من حيثية واحدة ربما كان فردا و مصداقا لمفهومات متعددة و معان مختلفة ككون وجود زيد معلولا و معلوما و مرزوقا و متعلقا فإن اختلاف هذه المعاني ليس مما يوجب أن يكون لكل منها وجود على حدة و كاختلاف الصفات الحقيقية الإلهية التي هي عين الوجود الأحدي الإلهي باتفاق جميع الحكماء - و الحاصل أن مجرد تعدد المفهومات لا يوجب أن يكون حقيقة كل منها و نحو وجوده غير حقيقة الآخر و وجوده إلا بدليل آخر غير تعدد المفهوم و اختلافه يوجب أن يكون ذات كل

واحد منها غير ذات الآخر.

و مما يؤيد هذا قول الشيخ الرئيس في إلهيات الشفا في بيان أن كون الشيء عاقلا و معقولا لا يوجب اثنيية في الذات و لا في الاعتبار و أن المتحرك إذا اقتضى شيئا محركا لم يكن نفس هذا الاقتضاء يوجب أن يكون شيئا آخر أو هو بل نوع آخر من البحث يوجب ذلك و يبين أنه من المحال أن ما يتحرك هو ما يحرك و لذلك لم يمتنع أن يتصور فريق لهم عدد أن في الأشياء شيئا محركا لذاته إلى وقت إن قام البرهان على امتناعه و لم يكن نفس تصور المحرك و المتحرك يوجب ذلك و كذلك المضافان يعرف اثنييتهما لأمر لا لنفس النسبة و الإضافة المفروضة في الذهن انتهى.

أقول معنى كلامه أن مجرد اختلاف المعاني و المفاهيم لا يقتضي أن يتعدد ذواتها أو يتحد بل يحتاج إلى استيناف نظر و برهان غير اختلاف المفاهيم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٦

يقتضيان تعددها أو وحدتها في الذات و الحقيقة فكما أن مفهوم التحريك غير مفهوم التحرك و مفهوم الأبوة غير مفهوم البنوة فكذلك مفهوم العاقلية غير مفهوم المعقولية - لكن النظر و البرهان قد حكما في القبيل الأول بتعدد الذوات دون الثاني بل حكما بأن عاقلية الذات المجردة عين معقوليتها بحسب الذات و الوجود مع اختلافهما بحسب المفهوم بلا شك و ريب فأتقن ذلك المقام فإنه قد زلت فيه الأقدام.

فإذن انكشف وهن قاعدته في بعض هذه الأمور كالوحدة و الوجود و إثباتها لعدميته في الخارج فلا تأثير لها فيما سوى ذلك و بيان كونها كونها اعتبارا عقليا فيجب الاستعانة بغيرها و قد مرت الإشارة إلى كيفية لحوق هذه المعاني بالحقائق و الماهيات فعليك بحسن التأمل و قوة التدبر.

ثم إنك قد علمت أن الإمكان وصف للماهية باعتبار ملاحظتها من حيث هي مع قطع النظر عن انتسابها إلى الفاعل التام و معلوم أن ما يتصف به الماهية - المأخوذة على هذا الوجه لا يكون أمرا عينيا بل اعتباريا.

و أيضا الإمكان مفهومها سلبي و السلوب بما هي سلوب لا حظ لها من الوجود لا عينا و لا ذهنا و مما يفتضح به الفرقة المجادلة القائلة بكون الإمكان موجودا عينيا وراء الماهية النظر في المعلول الأول و أنه ممكن الوجود لأنه من الحوادث الذاتية عندهم فلا بد و أن يمكن أولا ثم يوجد لأن ترجح الوجود بالغير لا يتصور إلا بعد كون الشيء ممكنا في نفسه فإذا تقدم الإمكان عليه فإمكانه يكون ممكنا أيضا - لاستحالة كونه واجبا بالذات لكونه صفة متعلقة بغيره و لامتناع تحقق واجبين فإذا كان ممكنا فلا بد له من مرجح و علة فإن كان مرجحه واجب الوجود بذاته فيلزم منه محالان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٧

أحدهما كون الواحد بحيث يحصل منه الشيء و إمكانه و حصول شيئين من واحد يستدعي جهتين فيه و هذا محال في الذات الأحدية.

و الثاني أن يكون إمكان الممكن بفعل فاعل فيكون إمكان الممكن معللا بغيره - و قد علمت أن الإمكان لا يكون معللا فضلا عن كونه معللا بغير ذات الممكن - و ليس لأحد منهم أن يقول إن الإمكان لا يتقدم على المعلول الأول و سائر الأزليات - فإنه يلزم أن يكون الإمكان إنما يحصل بعد أن يوجد الشيء و قد اعترف بأن الممكنات لها حدوث ذاتي

فإذن إمكانها متقدم على وجوبها الذي يحصل لها بغيرها إذ الوجوب بالغير منوط بإمكان الشيء في نفسه كيف و حال الشيء في نفسه من نفسه متقدم على حاله من غيره.

و لا يمكن الاعتذار بما يقال إن إمكان الأزليات له معنى آخر غير الإمكان في غيرها- فإن الإمكان الحقيقي الذي هو قسم الوجوب و الامتناع لا يخلو عنه شيء من المعلولات- كيف و إن لم يكن الإبداعات الدائمة ممكنة في ذاتها بالمعنى القسم للواجب و الممتنع كانت واجبة بذاتها أو ممتنعة بذاتها و ليس كذا.

و كذا لا ينفع الاعتذار بما وجد في مسودات بقيت من الشيخ الرئيس سماها بالإنصاف و الانتصاف من أن جود الحق الأول لا يمكن المعلولات من تقدم الإمكان عليها فإن الكلام ليس في التقدم الزمني حتى يحصل الفرق بين المبدع و الكائن- في سبق الإمكان على أحدهما دون الآخر إنما الكلام في التقدم بالذات أو بالطبع- و لا شك أن الإمكان إذا كان أمرا في العين و الوجود بالغير مشروط بالإمكان في نفسه- و ما للشيء من ذاته يتقدم على ما له من غيره سيما إذا كان ما له من غيره مشروطا بما له من ذاته فلا مخلص من هذا الإشكال للقائلين بموجودية الإمكان إلا بالمصير إلى ما حققناه في الاعتذار عنهم و هو كون الإمكان و نظائره موجودات لغيرها معدومات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٨

في ذاتها كيف و لو كان للإمكان صورة موجودة في نفسها و إن كانت حاصلة لغيرها كسائر الأعراض الخارجية التي لها صور في الأعيان لم يكن من لوازم الماهيات مع قطع النظر من ملاحظة الوجود و العدم معها لأن لازم الماهيات مطلقا سواء بالمعنى المصطلح أم لا يجب أن يكون عقليا.

و أيضا لو كان للإمكان الممكن صورة عينية لما أمكن لحوق الوجود بالغير للماهية لأن لا ضرورة الوجود و العدم إذا كان حالا وجوديا خارجيا لكان حالا للماهية الموجودة فينا في ضرورة أحدهما التي هي أيضا صفة خارجية نعم إذا كان الإمكان صفة للماهية باعتبار ملاحظتها في نفسها مع قطع النظر عما يستند إليه وجودها أو عدمها فلا يضر إثباتها للماهية المأخوذة على هذا الوجه وجودها أو عدمها الحاصل لها لا من ذاتها بل من غيرها فبالحقيقة موضوع الوصفين متعدد و ملحوق النعتين مختلف.

و أما ما قيل إن الإمكان للممكن عبارة عن لا ضرورة وجوده و لا ضرورة عدمه- الناشئين عن ذاته المقيسين إلى ذاته فسخافته ظاهرة لأن مناط القسمة إلى الواجب و الممكن و الممتنع حال الشيء بالقياس إلى طبيعة الوجود مطلقا من دون تقييده بقيد و مقياسته إلى شيء.

إشكالات و تفصيلات:

إن الذين يقولون إن الإمكان و نظائره كالوجوب و الوجود و الشيئية و الوحدة لها صورة في الأعيان و هوية زائدة على ذات الممكن و الواجب و الموجود و الواحد و الشيء ربما احتجوا على إثبات دعواهم بحجج

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٧٩

أولها أنا إذا حكمنا على الشيء بأنه ممكن في الأعيان ندرك تفرقة بين هذا و بين ما نحكم أنه ممكن في الذهن و ليس إلا أن الممكن الخارجي إمكانه في الخارج- و الممكن الذهني إمكانه في الذهن و قس عليه نظائره.

و ثانيتهما أنه إن لم يكن الشيء ممكنا في الأعيان لكان في الأعيان إما ممتنعا أو واجبا إذ لا مخرج للشيء عن أحد هذه الأوصاف و لو لم يكن موجودا في الأعيان لكان معدوما و لو لم يكن واحدا لكان كثيرا فيلزم أن يكون المحكوم عليه بأنه ممكن أو موجود أو واحد في الأعيان ضروري وجود أو ضروري عدم و معدوما و كثيرا و هذا تناقض مستحيل. و ثالثتها لو كان هذه الأشياء محمولات ذهنية و أوصافا عقلية لا أمورا عينية في ذوات الحقائق كان للذهن أن يضيفها بأية ماهية اتفقت فكان كل مفهوم و إن كان من الممتنعات كشريك الباري و اجتماع النقيضين و العدم المطلق ممكنا و قس عليه غيره.

و رابعتها مختصة بالإمكان و هو أن كل حادث يجب أن يسبقه الإمكان - و لا يوجد الفاعل إلا لأنه ممكن في الأعيان لا لأنه ممكن في الذهن فحسب و إلا ما حصل له تحقق إلا في الذهن فما وجد في الخارج فلا بد من أن يكون له إمكان في الخارج - و هذه الحجج أقوى ما يمكن أن يذكر من قبلهم في كون الإمكان و سائر الأمور العقلية و الأوصاف الذهنية التي يجري مجراها لها صورة عينية لكن لطالب الحق أن يدفع هذه الاحتجاجات بأن المسلم هو أن الإمكان و نحوه أمور زائدة على الحقائق التي أضيفت هي إليها في العقل بأن العقل إذا لاحظ ماهية الإنسان أو غيرها مثلا وجدها في حد نفسها بحيث لم يكن الإمكان ذاتها أو ذاتها و كذا سائر النعوت التي ليست نفس الماهية و لا جزأها و أما أن هذه الأمور الزائدة لها صور في الأعيان فغير مسلم اللهم إلا في النعت الذي هو الوجود و كذا الوحدة الشخصية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٠

التي هي نفس حقيقة الوجود عند الراسخين ببرهان خاص بالوجود و لا تأثير لشيء من هذه الحجج في أن للوجود صورة في الأعيان بل هو مما حصلناه بإلهام غيبي - و تأييد ملكوتي و إمداد علوي و توفيق سماوي و قول من قال أنه ممكن أو موجود في الأعيان فيستدعي أن يكون إمكانه أو وجوده في الأعيان غير صحيح إذ لا يلزم من صحة حكمنا على شيء بأنه ممكن في الأعيان أن يكون إمكانه واقعا في الأعيان - لما علمت من أن الوجود الرابط قد يفترق من الوجود في نفسه للشيء بل الممكن محكوم عليه من قبل الذهن أنه في الأعيان ممكن كما مر و محكوم عليه أيضا من قبله أنه في الذهن ممكن فالإمكان صفة ذهنية أي نحو وجودها الخاص به في الذهن - لكن يضيفها العقل تارة إلى ما في الخارج و تارة إلى ما في الذهن و تارة يحكم حكما مطلقا بتساوي النسبة إلى العين و الذهن و كما لا يتأتى لأحد أن يزعم أن الامتناع - إن لم يكن له صورة في الأعيان لم يكن الممتنع في الأعيان ممتنعا فيه و إن لم يكن له امتناع في الأعيان لكان إما واجبا أو ممكنا فكذا ليس له أن يقول ما ذكر في الحجة الثانية بل الامتناع و الوجوب و الإمكان حالها واحد في أنها من الأوصاف العقلية - التي لا صورة لها في الأعيان مع اتصاف الأشياء بها في الأعيان و الأذهان جميعا فبطلت الحجة الأولى و الثانية و أما ما وجد في المطارحات لصاحب الإشراق في إبطال كون الإمكان و الوجوب - و الامتناع و الوجود ذا صورة في الأعيان من أن حالها كحال المعقولات الثانية كالكلية و الجزئية و الذاتية و العرضية و الجنسية و الفصلية و غيرها من موضوعات علم الميزان - حيث إن الأشياء تتصف بها في الأعيان و لا صورة لها في الأعيان و لا منافاة بين أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨١

زيد جزئيا و الإنسان كليا في الأعيان و بين كون الكلية و الجزئية من الأمور - الممتنعة التحقق في الأعيان فكذلك الحال في اتصاف شيء بالإمكان و الامتناع و نظائرها فمنظور فيه لأن قياس الإمكان و الامتناع و نظائرها إلى الكلية و الجزئية و نظائرها قياس بلا جامع فإن مصداق اتصاف الأشياء بموضوعات علم الميزان ليس إلا نحو وجودها الذهني بخلاف الاتصاف بأمثال هذه الأوصاف التي تذكر في العلم الكلي - فإنه قد يكون بحسب حال الماهية في العين و إن كان ظرف تحقق القبيلين في أنفسها - إنما هو في الذهن فقط.

و أما الحجة الرابعة المختصة بالإمكان فنقول إن أريد بالإمكان الكيفية الاستعدادية المقربة للشيء إلى فياض وجوده المهيئة له لقبول الفيض عن فاعله التام - من جهة تحصيل مناسبة و ارتباط لا بد منه بين المفيض و المفاض عليه فسلمنا الآن أنه يسبق لكل حادث زماني إمكان بهذا المعنى موجود في العين إلى أن يحين وقت بيانه و تحقيق القول فيه أنه بأي معنى يقال فيه إنه من الموجودات العينية و إن أريد به ما هو بحسب نفس الذات من حيث هي فالمسلم أنه سبق الإمكان الذاتي على الوجود بحسب اعتبار ذهني و ملاحظة عقلية حتى إن الممكن و إن لم يكن له عدم زماني سابق على وجوده تصور العقل حاله لا كونه بل نقول لا يتصور أن يكون لكل حادث إمكان عيني متقدم على وجوده لأن الممكنات غير متناهية و في المستقبل من الحوادث ما لا يتناهى الذي هو بسبيل الحصول و بصدد الكون شيئا بعد شيء - كحركات أهل الجنة و عقوبات أهل النار على ما وردت به الشرائع الإلهية و أقيمت عليه البراهين العلمية فإن وجب أن يكون لكل حادث أو ما هو بصدد الحدوث إمكان يخصه على ما هو موجب هذه الحجة فيحصل في المادة إمكانات غير متناهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٢

و إن لم يكن لبعض الحوادث إمكان فيكون من الحوادث ما لا يسبقه إمكان فيلزم على مقتضى الحجة أن يلتحق بالمتنوع أو الواجب.

و ربما يرتكب منهم مرتكب حصول سلسلة الإمكانات الغير المتناهية بأن يقول هي غير مترتبة بل متكافئة لكل حادث إمكان يخصه لكننا نبين أن اجتماع الإمكانات الغير المتناهية مستحيل من وجهين.

الأول أن الإمكان معنى واحد و الممكن بما هو ممكن و من حيث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٣

طبيعة الإمكان غير مختلف و تلك الطبيعة لا يمكن اختلافها من جهة الهيولى التي هي حاملة الإمكانات لأنها قوة محضة و إبهام مطلق كما ستعلم فليس اختلاف الإمكانات الذاتية إلا لاختلاف ما هي إمكاناته و هي الحوادث المعدومة بعد الغير المتناهية و يستحيل أن يمتاز شيء بسبب إضافته إلى شيء معدوم فإن ما لا ذات له لا يميز به شيء عن شيء. و ليس لأحد أن يقول إنا إذا عقلنا تلك الأمور الغير المتناهية يصح إضافة الإمكانات الغير المتناهية إليها فيمتاز بها بعض الإمكانات عن بعض.

لأننا نقول هذا ممتنع أما أولا فلاستحالة تحصيل العقل أمورا غير متناهية العدد بالفعل في الذهن مفصلة نعم يجوز أن يخطر بالبال على سبيل الإجمال إمكانات غير متناهية و فرق بين ما يخطر بالبال الإنسان العدد الغير المتناهي مطلقا كليا و

بين أن يحصل في نفسه و يفصل في ذهنه أعداد غير متناهية بالفعل فإن هذا مستحيل دون ذاك فإذا خطرنا بالبال إمكانات غير متناهية مجملة بإزاء حوادث غير متناهية مجملة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٤

كانت نسبة كل من إحدهما بكل من الأخرى سواء فلم يتميز إمكان عن إمكان كما لم يتميز حادث عن حادث. و أما ثانيا فلأن كلامه على تقدير التسليم في الحقيقة اعتراف بما هو مقصودنا- فإن ظرف الحصول بعينه ظرف الامتياز فإذا لم يكن الامتياز بين أعداد الإمكانات- إلا بحسب العقل و تصويره لم يكن ظرف تحصيله و تحققه إلا الذهن لأن تعقلنا لامتياز الإمكانات إذا فرضنا كون امتيازها واقعا بحسب الأعيان يكون تابعا لنفس امتيازها فإذا حصل الامتياز بينها بنفس تصور العقل و اعتباره لزم توقف الشيء على نفسه و تابعيته إياها و هو محال الوجه الثاني أن المادة الحاملة للإمكانات الغير المتناهية إذا قطعناها بنصفين- فإما أن يبقى في كل من النصفين إمكانات غير متناهية هي بعينها الإمكانات التي كانت- أو يحدث لها إمكانات غير متناهية في تلك الحال أو يبقى في كل واحد إمكانات متناهية و أقسام التوالي باطلة فكذا المقدم.

أما بطلان الأول فلاستلزامه أن يكون شيء واحد بعينه موجودا في حالة واحدة في محلين و هو محال. و أما الثاني فلأن الإمكانات إذا حدثت في كل واحد منهما فيسبقها لكونها أيضا من الحوادث إمكانات أخرى. ثم إن كانت حادثة تحتاج إلى إمكانات أخرى حادثة فلا يوجد الفاعل طبقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٥

منها إلا و قد حصل قبله في حالة القطع طبقات غير متناهية و الموقوف في حالة واحدة- على ما لا يتناهى مترتبا ممتنع الوقوع و يلزم أيضا أن يكون الحوادث التي كانت إمكاناتها هذه الإمكانات الحادثة ممتنعة قبل حدوث إمكاناتها على ما هو مقتضى الحجة المذكورة من أن كل ما ليس له إمكان في الخارج يجب أن يكون ممتنعا- فيلزم انقلاب الأشياء من الامتناع الذاتي إلى الإمكان الذاتي.

و أما الثالث فلأن مجموع العددين المتناهيين عدد متناه فيتناهى الإمكانات في مادة واحدة و الحوادث في كل واحد لا يتناهى و لا يصح أن يفرض في كل واحد من الجزئين إمكانات غير متناهية ليست بحادثة بل هي نصف المبلغ الغير المتناهي الذي كان في الكل فإن القسمة في الجسم غير متناهية فعند كل قطع يلزم ما يلزم في القطع الأول و ليست الإمكانات تحدث حين القسمة كما هو المفروض فإذا قبل الانقسام كانت متميزة المحال حتى يبقى بعد الانقسام بعض منها في جزء و بعض منها في جزء آخر لعدم انتقال الأعراض و عدم كون الإمكانات حادثة على ما فرضناه فإذا كانت متميزة المحال و هي غير متناهية العدد بالفعل ففي الجسم أبعاض غير متناهية متميزة بالفعل - بأعراضها التي هي الإمكانات فيلزم إما أجزاء لا تتجزى و هو محال كما سيجيء برهان امتناعه أو مقادير غير متناهية العدد المستلزم لمقدار غير متناه للمجموع المركب منها و هو أيضا مستحيل سيأتي بيانه و كيف يصح في جسم واحد متناهي المقدار محال متميزة بأعراضها القائمة بها غير متناهية عددا بالفعل مع كونه محصورا بين الحواصر- على أن الكلام يتأتى بعينه في كل واحد منها بحسب إمكان قسمته.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٦

و مما يرد أيضا على القائلين بأن إمكان الحادث موجود في الخارج أن إمكان الشيء يلزمه الإضافة إلى ذلك فإذا كان صفة عقلية تلزمه الإضافة إلى أمر معقول يضاف هو إليه في العقل بخلاف ما إذا كان صفة عينية فإنه يلزمه أن يضاف إلى موجود عيني إذ الإضافة الخارجية إلى معدوم خارجي غير صحيح نعم للعقل أن يتصور صورة الشيء الذي يمكن حصوله في الخارج فيصف بصحة كونه و لا كونه إما بحسب حاله في نفسه كما في الإمكان الذاتي أو بحسب أسباب وجوده و استعداد قابلية و عدم أضداده و رفع موانعه عن مادته المتهية له كما في الإمكان الاستعادي

فصل (١٠) يذكر فيه خواص الممكن بالذات

و إنما أخرجنا ذكر خواص الواجب بالذات إلى قسم الربوبيات لأن اللائق بذكرها أسلوب آخر من النظر لجلاله ذكرها عن أن يكون واقعا في أثناء أحكام المفهومات الكلية و خواص المعاني العقلية الانتزاعية إلا شيئا نرأ منها يتوقف عليه صحة السلوك العلمي و تنوط به العبادة العقلية و هو الذي قد مر بيانه و سنعود إليه على مسلك قدسي و طريق علوي.

إخاذا:

كما أن الضرورة الأزلية مساوقة للبساطة و الأحدية - و ملازمة للفردية و الوترية فذلك الإمكان الذاتي رفيق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٧

التركيب و الامتزاج و شقيق الشركة و الإزدواج فكل ممكن زوج تكويني إذ الماهية الإمكانية لا قوام لها إلا بالوجود و الوجود الإمكانية لا تعين له إلا بمرتبة من القصور - و درجة من النزول ينشأ منها الماهية و ينتزع بحسبها المعاني الإمكانية و يترتب عليها الآثار المختصة لا الآثار العامة المطلقة الكلية التي تفيض عن الواجب بالذات على كل قابل و إن كانت الآثار الجزئية المختصة بواحد واحد من الوجودات الإمكانية - أيضا من إبداع الحق الأولي و أضواء النور الأزلي و نسبتها إليها بضرب من التشبيه و التسامح كما سيظهر فإذن كل هوية إمكانية ينتظم من مادة و صورة عقليتين هما المسماتين بالماهية و الوجود و كل منهما متضمن فيه الآخر و إن كانت من الفصول الأخيرة و الأجناس القاصية - و أيضا كل من الذوات الإمكانية فإنها في نفسها و من حيث طبيعتها بالقوة - و هي من تلقاء علتها بالفعل فإن لها بحكم الماهية الاليسية الصرفة و بحكم وجود سببها التام الإيسية الفائضة عنه فهي مصداق معنى ما بالقوة و معنى ما بالفعل من الحثيثتين - و كل ممكن هو حاصل الهوية منهما جميعا في الوجود فلا شيء غير الواجب بالذات - متبريء الذات عن شوب القوة و ما سواه مزدوج من هذين المعنيين و القوة و الإمكان يشبهان المادة و الفعلية و الوجوب يشبهان الصورة ففي كل ممكن كثرة تركيبية من أمر يشبه المادة و آخر يشبه الصورة فإذن البساطة الحققة مما يمتنع تحققها في عالم الإمكان لا في أصول الجواهر و الذوات و لا في فروع الأعراض و الصفات.

و أما الوترية فهي أيضا مما يستأثر به الحقيقة الإلهية لأن كل ممكن بحسب ماهيته مفهوم كلي لا يأبى معناه أن يكون له تحصيلات متكررة و وجودات متعددة - و ما من شخص إمكانية إلا و هو واقع تحت طبيعة كلية ذاتية أو عرضية لا يأبى معناها أن يكون هناك عدة أفراد تشترك معه فيها و إن امتنع ذلك بحسب أمر خارج عن طبيعتها فإذن لا وحدة و لا فردانية لممكن ما على الحقيقة بل إنما هي بالإضافة إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٨

ما هو أشد كثرة و أوفر شركا فوحدات الممكنات وحدات ضعيفة في البساطة بل الوحدة فيها اتحاد والاتحاد مفهومه متألف من جهة وحدة و جهة كثرة و جهة الوحدة في الممكنات ظل من الوحدة الصرفة الإلهية و هي التي أفاضت سائر الوحدات على الترتيب النزولي فكلما كان أشد وحدة كان أقرب إلى الوحدة الحققة كالوحدة الشخصية للعقل الأول التي هي بعينها وجوده و تشخصه ثم وحدة سائر العقول الفعالة ثم وحدة النفوس ثم وحدة الصور ثم الوحدة الاتصالية الجسمية التي هي كثرة بالقوة من غير أن تجمعها ثم وحدة الهيولى التي هي بعينها جامعة لكثرتها و تفصيلها إلى الحقائق النوعية و الشخصية لأنها وحدة إبهامية جنسية.

ثم اعلم أنه كما أن الإمكان عنصر التركيب كذلك التركيب صورة الإمكان - فإن المركب بما هو مركب من دون النظر إلى خصوصية جزء أو أجزاء منه حالة عدم الاستقلال في الوجود و الوجوب و في العدم و الامتناع و كيف يتحقق الافتقار و لا يكون هناك إمكان و أما المركب من واجبين مفروضين أو ممتنعين مفروضين أو واجب و ممتنع أو نقيضين أو ضدين مفروضي الاجتماع فهذه مجرد مفهومات ليست عنوانات لذوات متقررة في أنفسها متجوهرة في حقائقها و تلك المفهومات لا تحمل على أنفسها بالحمل الصناعي الشائع فكما أن مفهوم شريك الباري ليس إلا نفس مفهوم شريك الباري لا أن يحمل عليه أنه شريك الباري بل يحمل عليه أنه من الكيفيات - النفسانية الفائضة عليها لأجل تصرفات المتخيلة و شيطنة المتوهمة فكذلك هذه المركبات الفرضية مفهوماتها ليست من أفراد أنفسها بل من أفراد نقائضها و مع ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٨٩

وجوبها أو امتناعها تابع لوجوب أجزائها أو امتناع أجزائها و ليس لها إلا مرتبة الفقر و الحاجة و الإمكان و التعلق سواء كان بحسب الوجود أو بحسب العدم و المستحيل في النقيضين أو الضدين هو الاجتماع بينهما في الوجود لموصوف واحد لا نفس ذاتيهما على أي وجه كانتا.

و هاهنا دقيقة أخرى

و هي أن الوحدة معتبرة في أقسام كل معنى يكون موضوعا لحكم كلي و قاعدة كلية فقولنا كل مركب ممكن و كل واجب بسيط و كل حيوان كذا أي كل مركب له صورة واحدة فهو ممكن و كل واجب الوجود فهو واحد بسيط و كل ما له طبيعة واحدة حيوانية فهو كذا فالمركب من الواجبين إذا فرضهما الوهم ليس له ذات سوى ذات كل منهما و لا له امتناع و لا إمكان و لا وجوب ثالث غير وجوب كل منهما و كذا المركب المفروض من الممتنعين ليس له امتناع مستأنف سوى الامتناعين للجزئين و في المركب المفروض من الواجب و الممتنع ليس له إلا وجوب هذا و امتناع ذاك لا غير و المركب من الحيوانين ليس فيه إلا حيوانية هذا و حيوانية ذاك و ليست هناك حيوانية أخرى سوى الحيوانيتين المنفصلتين إحداهما عن الأخرى فإن كان أحد الحيوانين ناطقا و الآخر صاهلا ليس المجموع من حيث هو مجموع ناطقا و لا صاهلا بل و لا موجودا إنما الموجود فيهما موجودان هذا و هذا - لا أمر ثالث له حيوانية ثالثة و سيجيء في مباحث الوحدة أنها لا تفارق الوجود و أن ما لا وحدة له لا وجود له.

و أما ما قيل لو كان المركب من الممتنعين بالذات ممكنا ذاتيا كان عدمه مستندا إلى عدم علة وجوده و علة وجود المركب هي علة وجود أجزائه و ذلك غير متصور في أجزاء هذا المركب لعدم الإمكان. فمردود بأن علة عدم المركب بما هو مركب عدم الجزء أولا و بالذات كما أن علة وجوده كذلك وجود الأجزاء حتى لو فرض للأجزاء وجود بلا علة لكان المركب موجودا و إنما الاحتياج إلى علة الأجزاء إذا كانت ممكنات الوجود فكان عدم جزء ما و هو الذي يكون بالحقيقة علة تامة لعدم المركب بما هو مركب مستندا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٩٠

إلى عدم علتها فلم يعدم إلا بانعدامها فيستند إليه عدم ذلك المركب بالواسطة - فإذا كان جزء المركب ممتنع الوجود بالذات فينتهي عدم المركب إلى عدمه الضروري الذاتي و لا يتجاوز منه إلى عدم أمر آخر كما يقف سلسلة الوجودات إلى الوجود الضروري الذاتي الأزلي

فصل (١١) في أن الممكن على أي وجه يكون مستلزما للممتنع بالذات

إن كثيرا من المشتغلين بالبحث من غير تعمق في الفكر و النظر يحيلون الملازمة بين الممكن و الممتنع و يحكمون أن كل ما يستلزم وقوعه في نفس الأمر ممتنعا ذاتيا فهو مستحيل بالذات و بنوا ذلك على أن إمكان الملزوم بدون إمكان اللازم يستلزم إمكان الملزوم بدون اللازم و هو يصادم الملازمة بينهما. و هذا لو صح لاستوجب نفي الملازمة بين الواجب و الممكن بل بين كل علة موجبة مع معلوله لأن العلة قد تجب حيث لم يكن المعلول واجبا سواء كان الوجوب من الذات أو من الغير كما سنحقق. و أعجب من ذلك ما قيل في بعض التعاليق إن إمكان الملزوم إنما هو بالقياس إلى ذاته و هو يستلزم إمكان اللازم بالقياس إليه أعني ذات الملزوم لا إمكانه بالقياس إلى ذاته و مقتضى الاستلزام بين الممكن و المحال كون نقيض اللازم غير

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ضروري بالقياس إلى ذات الملزوم لا كونه لا ضروريا بالقياس إلى حد ذاته سواء كان اللازم ضروري العدم أو ضروري الوجود أو لا ضروري الوجود و العدم جميعا نظرا إلى ذاته من حيث هي و لا يتوهم أن هذا إمكان بالغير و هو من المستحيل كما مر - بل هذا إمكان بالقياس إلى الغير و قد وضح الفرق بينهما. و نحن نقول هذا الكلام و إن كان في ظاهر الأمر يوهم أنه على أسلوب الفحص و التحقيق إلا أنه سخييف لما علم أن الإمكان بالقياس إلى الغير إنما يتصور بين أشياء - ليست بينها علاقة الإيجاب و الوجوب و الإفاضة و الاستفاضة و بالجملة العلاقة الذاتية - السببية و المسببية في الوجود و العدم.

و يقرب منه في الوهن كلام المحقق الطوسي و الحكيم القدوسي حيث ذكر أن استلزام عدم المعلول الأول عدم الواجب لذاته ليس يستوجب استلزام الممكن المحال بالذات لأنه إنما استلزم عدم عليه العلة الأولى فقط لا عدم ذات العلة الأولى - فإن ذات المبدأ الأول لا يتعلق بالمعلول الأول لو لا الاتصاف بالعلية لكون المبدأ الأول واجبا لذاته ممتنعا على ذاته العدم سواء كان لذاته معلول أو لا فإذا لم يستلزم الممكن محالا إلا بالعرض أو بالاتفاق و هو عدم كون العلة بما

هي متصفة بالعلية واجبة في ذاتها فإنه إنما صار محالاً من كون العلة في الواقع واجبة في ذاتها- وإنما ذلك من حيث ذاته لا بما هي متصفة بالعلية وهذا بخلاف عكسه أعني فرض عدم العلة الأولى فإنه يستلزم عدم المعلول الأول مطلقاً لأن ذاته إنما إفاضتها العلة الأولى لا غير.

وليت شعري كيف ذهل مع جلالة شأنه و وثاقه رأيه و دقة نظره في الأبحاث الإلهية عن كون الواجب لذاته واجبا بالذات في جميع ما له من النعوت و أن العلة الأولى إنما موجب عليتها نفس الذات من دون حالة منتظرة أو داعية زائدة و أنها هي

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القيوم الجواد التام القيومية و الإفاضة و أنها بما يتحقق ذاتها يتحقق عليتها من دون المغايرة الخارجية أو العقلية بحسب التحليل فلو فرض سببية السبب الأول شيئاً ممكناً لتصح الملازمة بينها و بين المعلول الأول نقلنا الكلام إلى الملازمة بين السببية و السبب الأول لإمكانها و وجوبه فإما أن يتسلسل الكلام في السببيات أو يعود المحذور الأول كيف و ليس في الموجود الأول جهة إمكانية أصلاً سواء كان بحسب الذات أو بحسب كمال الذات أو بحسب خيراته الإضافية و رشحاته الإفاضية- فالحق في هذا المقام أن المعلول له ماهية إمكانية وجود مستفاد من الواجب- فيتركب بهوية العينية من أمرين شبيهين بالمادة و الصورة أحدهما محض الفاقة و القوة و البطون و الإمكان و الآخر محض الاستغناء و الفعلية و الظهور و الوجوب و قد علمت من طريقتنا أن منشأ التعلق و العلية بين الموجودات ليس إلا انحاء الوجودات و الماهية لا علاقة لها بالذات مع العلة إلا من قبل الوجود المنسوب إليها و قد مر أيضاً أن معنى الإمكان في الوجود الممكن غير معناه في الماهية- و أن أحدهما يجامع الضرورة الذاتية بل عينها بخلاف الآخر فإنه ينافيها.

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فنقول إن المعلول الأول إن اعتبر ماهيته التي هي عبارة عن مرتبة قصوره عن الكمال الأتم و خصوصيته تعيينه المصحوب لشوب الظلمة و العدم و إن كان مستورا عند ضياء كبرياء الأول و مقهوراً تحت شعاع نور الأول فعدمه ممكن بهذا الاعتبار بل حال عدمه كحال وجوده أزلاً و أبداً من تلك الجهة ما شَم رائحة شيء منهما بحسب ماهيته من حيث هي هي و ليس يستلزم عدمه عدم الواجب بهذه الحيثية- لعدم الارتباط بينه و بين الواجب من هذه الحيثية و إن اعتبر من حيث وجوده- المتقوم بالحق الأول الواجب بوجوبه فعدمه ممتنع بامتناع عدم قيومه و وجوده مستلزم لوجوده استلزام وقوع المعلول وقوع العلة الموجبة له فلم يلزم استلزام الممكن للمحال أصلاً و ليس لعدمه في نفسه أي نفس ذلك العدم جهة إمكانية كما للوجود من حيث الوجود و لا يلزم من ذلك كون كل وجود واجبا بالذات على ما مر من الفرق بين الضرورة الأزلية و بين الضرورة المسماة بالذاتية المقيدة بها فلذلك لا يلزم هاهنا كون كل عدم ممتنعاً بالذات لأجل الفرق المذكور و هذا في غاية السطوع و الوضوح على أسلوب هذا الكتاب و أما على أسلوب الحكمة الذائعة فلا يبعد أن يقول أحد إن كان يعني بأول شقي الكلام أن العقل إذا جرد النظر إلى ذات المعلول الأول و لم يعتبر معه غيره لم يجد فيه علاقة للزوم فذلك لا ينافي استلزام عدمه عدم الواجب بحسب نفس الأمر بل هو محفوظ بحاله و إن أريد به أنه على ذلك التقدير لا يكون مستلزماً له بحسب نفس الأمر فهو ظاهر البطلان فإنه معلول له بسحب نفس

الأمر فكيف لا يكون

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مستلزمًا لعلته.

أقول نختار الثاني قوله المعلول كيف لا يكون مستلزمًا للعلة الجواب أن المعلول ليس نفس ماهية الممكن بل وجوده معلول لوجود العلة و عدمه لعدمها.

و يقول أيضا إن كان يعني بأخير الشقين أن عدم الممتنع بالعلة ليس ممكنا بالذات فهو مستبين الفساد فإن الامتناع بالغير ليس يصادم الإمكان بالذات و ليس ينفيه بل إن معروضه لا يكون إلا الممكن بالذات.

أقول عنينا به أن عدم بما هو عدم ليس إلا جهة الامتناع كما أن حقيقة الوجود بما هو وجود ليس إلا جهة الوجود كيف و عدم يستحيل أن يتصف بإمكان الوجود كما أن الوجود يستحيل عليه قبول عدم و إلزم الانقلاب في الماهية - و كون معروض الامتناع بالغير و الوجود بالغير أي الموصوف بهما ممكنا بالذات بمعنى ما يتساوى نسبة الوجود و عدم إليه أو ما لا ضرورة للوجود و عدم بالقياس إليه بحسب ذاته غير مسلم عندنا إلا فيما سوى نفس الوجود و عدم و أما في شيء منهما فالموصوف بالوجود الغيري هو الوجود المتعلق بالغير و بالامتناع الغيري عدم المقابل له.

فإن قلت فعلى ما ذكرت من جواز العلاقة اللزومية بين الممكن و الممتنع بالوجه الذي ذكرت كيف يصح استعمال نفسي هذا الجواز في القياس الخلفي حيث يثبت به استحالة شيء لاستلزام وقوعه ممتنعا بالذات فيتشكك لما جاز استلزام الممكن لذاته ممتنعا لذاته فلا يتم الاستدلال لجواز كون البعد الغير المتناهي مثلا ممكنا مع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٩٥

استلزام وقوعه محالا بالذات هو كون غير المتناهي محصورا بين حاصرين.

قلنا هذا الإشكال قد مضى مع جوابه و الذي ندفعه به الآن هو أن الإمكان المستعمل هناك هو لا ضرورة الطرفين بحسب الوقوع و التحقق في نفس الأمر و عدم إباء أوضاع الخارج و طبيعة الكون لوقوعه و لا وقوعه و الممكن الذي كلامنا فيه هاهنا هو ما يكون مصداقه نفس ماهية الشيء بحسب اعتبار ذاته بذاته لا بحسب الواقع فإن حال المعلول الأول و سائر الإبداعات في نفس الأمر ليس إلا التحصل و الفعلية على ما هو مذهبهم دون الإمكان و قد مر أن ظلمة إمكانه مختلف تحت سطوع نور القيوم تعالى فالممكن بهذا المعنى مستلزم للمحال لا من حيث ذاته بل من حيث وصفه الذي هو عدمه كما أنه مستلزم للواجب لا بحسب ذاته بل بحسب حاله الذي هو وجوده و ما يستعمل في قياس الخلف أن الممكن لا يستلزم المحال هو الممكن بحسب الواقع لا بحسب مرتبة الذات و بينهما فرقان كما أن الامتناع الذاتي أيضا قد يعني به ضرورة عدم بحسب نفس الذات و الماهية المقدرة كما في شريك الباري و اجتماع النقيضين و قد يراد به ضرورة ذلك في نفس الأمر سواء كان مصداق تلك نفس الماهية المفروضة أو شيء آخر وراء ماهيته مستدع له مقتض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٩٦

إياه في نفس الأمر أو علة مقتضية له بحسب طور الوجود و هيئة الكون و طباع الواقع و كذلك الضرورة الذاتية قد يراد

بها ما هو بحسب مرتبة الذات في نفسها- وقد يراد أعم من هذا وهو ما يكون بحسب نفس الأمر مطلقا سواء كان بحسب مرتبة الذات أيضا كذات القيوم الأحدي تعالى أو لأجل علة مقتضية له وقد يقال للأول الدوام الأزلي وللثاني الدوام الذاتي فإذن قد ثبت أن أمثال الأقيسة الخلفية- وكثيرا من الشرطيات الاستثنائية إنما يستبين فيها بالبداهة العقلية أن ما يلزم من فرض وقوعه ممتنع بالذات لا يكون ممكنا في نفس الأمر بل لا ينفك عن الامتناع الذاتي سواء كان بنفسه وبماهيته ممتنعا أو بواسطة سبب تام سببية لامتناعه كما يقال مثلا الجواهر البسيطة العقلية يستحيل عدمها سابقا ولاحقا وإلا أي وإن كانت ممكنة العدم بوجه لكان عدمها بعدم علتها الفياضة لذواتها وكانت لها مادة قابلة للوجود والعدم وكلا التالين مستحيل بالذات كما بين فذلك المقدم وظاهر أن الإمكان المذكور في هذا القياس ليس المقصود منه ما هو بحسب مرتبة الماهية فقط إذ لو كان المراد فيه نفي إمكان العدم عنها بحسب مرتبة الماهية من حيث هي- يلزم عليهم كون كل جوهر عقلي واجبا بالذات تعالى القيوم الواحد عن ذلك علوا كبيرا وهم متبرءون عن هذا التصور القبيح الفضيح

وهم وإزاحة:

ربما قرع سمعك في بعض المسفورات العلمية شبهة في باب اتصاف الشيء بالإمكان وهو أن الموصوف بالإمكان إما موجود أو معدوم وهو في كل الحالين يمتنع أن يقبل مقابل ما يتصف به وإلا اجتمع المتقابلان في موضوع واحد وإذا امتنع أحدهما امتنع إمكان واحد منهما بالإمكان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ١، ص ١٩٧

الخاص لأن امتناع أحد الطرفين يستلزم وجوب الطرف الآخر فلم يتحقق هاهنا المحكوم عليه بالإمكان أصلا وأيضا الشيء الممكن إما مع وجود سببه التام فيجب أو مع رفعه فيمتنع فإين ممكن. فتسمعه يقولون في دفع الأول إن التردد غير حاصر للشقوق المحتملة- إن أريد من الوجود والعدم التحييث إذ يعوزه شق آخر وهو عدم اعتبار شيء منهما- إذ الموصوف بالإمكان هو الماهية المطلقة عن الوجود والعدم ولا يلزم من عدم قبول العدم من حيثية الاتصاف بالوجود عدم قبوله من حيثية أخرى وكذلك بالعكس- بل المصحح لقبول كل منهما حال الماهية بحسب إطلاقها عن القيود وإن أريد بهما مجرد التوقيت فلنا أن نختار كلا من الشقين قوله في كل من الحالين أي الوقتين يمتنع أن يقبل مقابل ما يتصف به قيل هذا ممنوع والمسلم هو امتناع الاتصاف بشيء مع تحقق الاتصاف بمقابله وهو غير لازم في معنى الممكن فالمحذور غير لازم واللازم غير محذور- وفي الثاني يقال إن قوله الشيء إما مع وجود سببه أو مع عدم سببه التردد فيه مختل إن أريد المعية بحسب حال الماهية واعتبار المراتب فيها إلا أن يراد في الشق الثاني رفع المعية لا معية الرفع وإن أريد المعية بحسب الوجود فيصح التردد لكن اتصاف الماهية بالإمكان ليس في الوجود سواء كانت مع السبب أم لا بل في اعتبارها وأخذها من حيث هي فقد ثبت أن كل ممكن وإن كان محفوفًا إما بالوجوبين السابق واللاحق للذين أحدهما بسبب اقتضاء العلة والآخر بحسب حاله في الواقع- وإما بالامتناعين للجانب المخالف السابق واللاحق كذلك لكن لا يصادم شيء منهما ما هو حاله بحسب ماهيته من حيث هي هي هكذا قالوا.

و العارف البصير يعلم أن هذا اعتراف منهم بعدم ارتباط الماهية بعلة الوجود وأن المتصف بالوجود السابق واللاحق

إنما هو وجود كل ماهية إمكانية لا نفسها من حيث نفسها فإن حيثة الإطلاق عن الوجود و العدم ينافي التلبس به سواء كان ناشئا من حيثة الذات أو من حيثة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٩٨

العلة المقتضية له فالماهية الإمكانية لم تخرج و لا تخرج أبدا بحسب نفسها من كتم البطون و الاختفاء إلى مجلى الظهور و الشهود فهي على بطلانها و بطونها و كمونها أزلا و أبدا و إذا لم يتصف بأصل الوجود فعلى الطريق الأولى بسائر الصفات الخارجية التي هي بعد الوجود فلم يتصف بشيء من الحالات الكمالية و الصفات الوجودية إلا نفس الوجود - و الماهية في جميع تلك الصفات تابعة للوجود و كل نحو من أنحاء الوجود تتبعه ماهية خاصة من الماهيات المعبر عنها عند بعضهم بالتعين و عند بعضهم بالوجود الخاص - تابعة الصورة الواقعة في المرآة للصورة المحاذية لها فكما أن العكس يوجد بوجود ذي العكس و يتقدر بتقدره و يتشكل بتشكله و يتكيف بتكيفه و يتحرك بتحركه و يسكن بسكونه و هكذا في جميع الصفات التي تتعلق بها الرؤية كل ذلك على طريق الحكاية و التخيل لا على طريق الأصالة و الاتصاف بشيء منها بالحقيقة فكذلك حال الماهية بالقياس إلى الوجود و توابعه فإن الماهية نفسها خيال الوجود و عكسه - الذي يظهر منه في المدارك العقلية و الحسية فظهر ما ذهب إليه المحققون من العرفاء - و الكاملون من الأولياء أن العالم كله خيال في خيال.

قال الشيخ العارف المتأله محي الدين الأعرابي في الباب الثالث و الستين من الفتوحات المكية إذا أدرك الإنسان صورته في المرآت يعلم قطعا أنه أدرك صورته بوجه و أنه ما أدرك صورته بوجه لما يراه في غاية الصغر لصغر جرم المرآة أو الكبر لعظمه و لا يقدر أن ينكر أنه رأى صورته و يعلم أنه ليس في المرآة صورته - و لا هي بينه و بين المرآة و ليس بصادق و لا كاذب في قوله رأى صورته و ما رأى صورته - فما تلك الصورة المرئية و أين محلها و ما شأنها فهي منفية ثابتة موجودة معدومة معلومة مجهولة أظهر سبحانه هذه الحقيقة لعبده ضرب المثل ليعلم و يتحقق أنه إذا عجز و حار في درك حقيقة هذا و هو من العالم و لم يحصل علم بحقيقته فهو بخالفها إذن أعجز و أجهل و أشد حيرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ١٩٩

فصل (١٢) في إبطال كون الشيء أولى له الوجود أو العدم أولوية غير بالغة حد الوجوب

لعلك لو تفتنت بما سبق من حال الماهيات في أنفسها و من كيفية لحوق معنى الإمكان بها لا تحتاج إلى مزيد مئونة لإبطال الأولوية الذاتية سواء فسرت باقتضاء ذات الممكن رجحان أحد الطرفين بالقياس إليها رجحانا غير ضروري لا يخرج به الشيء عن حكم الإمكان أو بكون أحد الطرفين أبقى بالنسبة إلى الذات لياقة غير واصله إلى حد الضرورة لا من قبل مبدأ خارج و لا باقتضاء و سببية ذاتية على قياس الأمر في الوجوب الذاتي ليس قد استبان من قبل أن علاقة الماهية إلى جاعل الوجود إنما هي تبع للوجود و الوجود بنفسه مفاض كما أنه بنفسه مفيض بحسب اختلافه كمالا و نقصا و قوة و ضعفا و الماهية في حد نفسها لا علاقة بينها و بين غيرها فما لم يدخل الماهية في عالم الوجود دخولا عرضيا ليست هي في نفسها شيئا من الأشياء - حتى نفسها حتى تصلح لإسناد مفهوم ما إليها إلا بحسب التقدير البحث و الإمكان و إن كان من اعتبارات نفس الماهية قبل اتصافها بالوجود لكن ما لم يقع في دار الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٠

و لم يحصل إفادة وجودها من الجاعل لا يمكن الحكم عليها بأنها هي أو بأنها ممكنة - وإن كان كونها هي أو كونها ممكنة من أحوالها السابقة على وجودها و صفات وجودها - و قد علمت تقدم الماهية بحسب العقل على موجوديتها تقدم الموصوف على الصفة - فقس عليها تقدم أحوالها الذاتية على أحوالها الوجودية و أما في الخارج من اعتبار العقل فلا موصوف و لا صفة متميزا كل منهما عن صاحبه بل شيء واحد هو الوجود و الموجود بما هو موجود ثم العقل بضرب من التعامل و التحليل يحكم بأن بعض الموجود يقتزن به - معنى غير معنى الوجود و الموجود و يتصف أحدهما بالآخر في العقل و العين على التعاكس - لأن اللائق بالعقل تقدم الماهية على الوجود لحصولها بكنهها فيه و عدم حصول الوجود بالكنه فيه كما مر و اللائق بالخارج تقدم الوجود على الماهية إذ هو الواقع فيه بالذات فهو الأصل و الماهية تتحد معه اتحادا بالعرض فهي العارض بهذا المعنى اللطيف الذي قد غفل عنه الجمهور.

و الحاصل أن الحكم على ماهية ما بالإمكان إنما هو بحسب فرض العقل إياها مجردة عن الوجود أو مع قطع النظر عن انصباعها بنور الوجود و إما باعتبار الخارج عن فرض العقل إياها كذلك فهي ضرورية بوجودها الناشئة عن الجاعل التام بالعرض و ليست لها بحسب ذاتها صفة من الصفات لا ضرورة و لا إمكان و لا غيرهما أصلا.

و الفرق بين المعدوم الممكن و المعدوم الممتنع هو أن العقل بحسب الفحص يحكم بأن المعدوم الممكن لو انقلب من الماهية التقديرية إلى ماهية حقيقية مستقلة - كان الإمكان من اعتبارات تلك الماهية بخلاف الماهية التقديرية الممتنعة فإنها و إن صارت ماهية حقيقية مستقلة بحسب الفرض المستحيل لم ينفك طباعها عن الامتناع و لم يصلح إلا إياه لا أن المعدوم بما هو معدوم موصوف بالإمكان و الامتناع كيف و المعدوم ليس بشيء فحينئذ من أين ماهية قبل جعل الوجود حتى يوضع أولوية الوجود أو شيء ما من الأشياء بالقياس إليها فاما تجويز نفس كون الشيء مكون نفسه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠١

و مقرر ذاته مع بطلانه الذاتي فلا يتصور من البشر تجشم ذلك ما لم يكن مريض النفس. فقد ثبت أن الحكم بنفي الأولوية الذاتية بعد التثبت على ما قررناه من حال الماهية بشرط سلامة الفطرة مستغن عن البيان.

و للإشارة إلى مثل هذا قال المعلم الثاني أبو نصر الفارابي في مختصر له يسمى بفصوص الحكم لو حصل سلسلة الوجود بلا وجوب لزوم إما إيجاد الشيء نفسه و ذلك فاحش و إما صحة عدمه بنفسه و هو أفحش.

و توضيحه أن الأولوية الناشئة عن الذات إما أنها علة موجبة للوقوع فيكون الشيء علة نفسه و إما أنه يقع الشيء لا بمقتضى و موجب و لا باقتضاء و إيجاب من الذات و هو صحيح العدم لعدم خروجه عن حيز الإمكان الذاتي بكونه ذا رجحان أحد الطرفين و ليس يصلح لعلية العدم إلا عدم علة الوجود و ليس هناك علة للوجود فإذاً يكون الشيء بنفسه صحيح العدم ثم على تقدير وجود الممكن بالرجحان يكون متصفاً بالوجود و ليس عينه فذاته كما أنها مبدأ رجحان الاتصاف بالوجود كذلك علة الاتصاف بالوجود إذ لا نعني بالعلة إلا ما يترجح

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٢

المعلول به و مع كونه علة لا تصاف نفسه بالوجود يجوز عدمه لعدم بلوغه حد الوجوب - فإذن قد صار العدم جائز الوقوع لا بمرجح بل مع بقاء مرجح الوجود و هذه محض السفسطة.

و حيث إن هذا البحث إنما الحاجة إليه قبل إثبات الصانع و قبل ثبوت نفس الأمر مطلقا فليس لقائل أن يقول لعل شيئا من الماهيات في وجوده العلمي أي في وجوده في علم الباري تعالى أو ارتسامه في بعض الأذهان العالية يقتضي رجحان وجوده الخارجي على أن الكلام في الوجود الذهني و مرتبة اتصاف الماهية به بعينه كالكلام في الوجود الخارجي في أن الماهية لا توجد به إلا بجعل جاعل الوجود لعدم كون الماهية ماهية إلا مع الوجود ثم مع عزل النظر عن استحالة الأولوية يقال لو كفت في صيرورة الماهية موجودة يلزم كون الشيء الواحد مفيدا لوجود نفسه و مستفيدا عنه فيلزم تقدمه بوجوده على وجوده

هدم:

إياك و أن تستعين بعد إنارة الحق من كوة الملكوت على قلبك بإذن الله بما يلتزم من بعض الأنظار الجزئية في طريق البحث و هو ما ذكره الخطيب الرازي في شرحه لعيون الحكمة و استحسنة الآخرون - من أن ما يقتضي رجحان طرف فهو بعينه يقتضي مرجوحية الطرف الآخر للتضاييف الواقع بينهما و معية المتضاييفين في درجة التحقق و مرجوحية الطرف الآخر يستلزم امتناعه لاستحالة ترجيح المرجوح و امتناعه يستلزم وجوب الطرف الراجح فما فرض غير منته إلى حد الوجوب فهو منته إليه فظهر الخلف.

و يفسده أنه إذا كان اقتضاء رجحان طرف بعينه على سبيل الأولوية كان استدعاء مرجوحية الطرف المقابل أيضا على سبيل الأولوية لمكان التضاييف و المرجوحية المستلزمة لامتناع الوقوع إنما هي المرجوحية الوجوبية لا ما هي على سبيل الأولوية - فلذلك ثبوتها على هذا الوجه لا يطرد الطرف الآخر أي راجحية الطرف المرجوح بته بل بنحو الأليقية و بالجملة فحال مرجوحية الطرف المرجوح

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٣

كحال نفس ذلك الطرف و حال راجحيته كحال نفس الطرف المقابل له فكما أن الوجود يترجح على سبيل الأولوية و الرجحان فكذلك أولوية الأولوية و كما أن العدم مرجوح على سبيل الأولوية و الرجحان فكذلك راجحية المرجوحية على نهج الرجحان و هكذا في الطرفين و كما أن راجحية طرف على سبيل الرجحان - تستدعي مرجوحية الطرف الآخر على سبيل الرجحان فكذلك مرجوحية الطرف الآخر كذلك لا تقتضي إلا سلب وقوعه على سبيل الرجحان فكيف تقتضي الامتناع - ثم لو فرض تسليم ذلك فمن المستبين أن مرجوحية الطرف المرجوح إنما يستدعي امتناعه بالنظر إلى الذات مع تقييدها بتلك المرجوحية أعني الذات المحيثة بالحيثية المذكورة لا الذات بما هي هي و هذا امتناع وصفي فيكون بالغير و لا يستدعي إلا وجوب الطرف الراجح كذلك أي بالغير لا بالذات فليس فيه خرق الفرض و الامتناع بالوصف الذي هو ممكن الانفكاك يكون ممكن الانفكاك - فكيف ظنك بالوجوب الذي بإزاء هذا الامتناع و بهذا ينهدم سائر الأساسات التي ذكروها في هذا المطلب و قلما يسلم في الوجوه المذكورة من هذا الإيراد.

أوهام و جزافات:

من الناس من جوز كون بعض الممكنات مما وجوده أولى من عدمه بالنظر إلى ذاته لا على وجه يخرج عن حيز الافتقار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٤

إلى الغير و يسد به إثبات الصانع له لكونه مع ذلك في حدود الإمكان بل على وجه يستدعي أكثرية وقوع وجوده بإيجاب العلة وإفاضة الجاعل أو أشد وجودا أو أقل شرطا للوقوع و بعض آخر بالعكس مما ذكر. و منهم من ظن هذه الأولوية في طرف العدم فقط بالقياس إلى طائفة من الممكنات بخصوصها. و منهم من ظنها بالقياس إلى الجميع لكون العدم أسهل وقوعا و المتقولون بهذه الأقاويل كانوا من المنتسبين إلى الفلسفة فيما قدم من الزمان قبل تصحيح الحكمة وإكمالها. و عند طائفة من أهل الكلام كل ما هو الواقع من الطرفين فهو أولى لمنعهم تحقق الوجوب فيما سوى الواجب و إن كان بالغير.

و ربما توهم متوهم أن الموجودات السيالة كالأصوات و الأزمنة و الحركات - لا شك أن العدم أولى بها و إلا لجاز بقاؤها و يصح الوجود أيضا عليها و إلا لما وجدت أصلا و إذا جازت الأولوية في جانب العدم فليكن جوازها في جانب الوجود أولى و أن العلة قد توجد ثم يتوقف اقتضاؤها معلولها على تحقق شرط أو انضمام داع أو انتفاء مانع و لا شبهة في أن تلك العلة الأولى بها إيجاب المعلول و إلا لم يتميز علة شيء عن غيرها في العلية فإذن العلة قبل تأثيرها و إيجابها يصح عليها الاقتضاء و اللاقتضاء جميعا مع كون الإيجاب أولى بها من عدمه فليكن الوجود أيضا بالنسبة إلى ماهية ما من هذا القبيل فيكون ذلك الوجود أكثريا لا دائما كما في ذلك الإيجاب كما ترى من العلل ما يكون تأثيرها أكثريا لا دائما كطبيعة الأرض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٥

في اقتضاءها الهبوط مع ما قد يمنع عنه عند ما يرمى إلى العلو قسرا و كلا القولين زور و اختلاق. ففي الأول اشتباه بين قوة الوجود و ضعفه و بين أوليته و لا أوليته بالقياس إلى الماهية و قد مر أن لكل شيء درجة من الوجود لا يتعداها و بعض الأشياء حظه من الوجود أكد و بعضها بخلافه كالحركة و نظائرها لا أن الوجود أولى بها من العدم أو بالعكس فاستقرار الأجزاء و بقاؤها ليس نحو وجود الموجود الغير القار بل يمتنع ثبوته له و كلامنا في مطلق الوجود الممكن لماهية ما فإن ما بالقياس إليه يعتبر طباع الإمكان الذاتي إنما هو مطلق الوجود و مطلق العدم فامتناع نحو خاص منهما لا يخرج الشيء عن الإمكان الذاتي المستلزم لتساوي نسبة طبيعتي الوجود و العدم إلى ذلك الشيء و كل من الاستمرار و عدمه متساويا النسبة بالقياس إلى ذات كل أمر غير قار و تخصيص كل واحد منهما بالوقوع يحتاج إلى مرجح خارج من غير أولوية أحدهما بحسب الماهية من الآخر فماهية الحركة و أشباهها من الطبائع الغير القارة إذا قيست إلى وجودها التجديدي و رفعها كان لها مجرد القابلية البحتة من غير استدعاء طرف بعينه لا بته و لا رجحانا و إنما يتخصص الوجود أو العدم بإيجاب العلة التامة أو لا إيجابها و إذا قيست إلى الوجود الاجتماعي للأجزاء التحليلية لها كان سبيلها بالقياس إلى هذا النحو من الوجود الامتناع البتي بلا ثبوت صحة و جواز عقلي - و قد مر أن امتناع نحو من الكون لا ينافي الإمكان الذاتي مطلقا.

و في الثاني وقع الغلط بحسب أخذ ما ليس بعلة علة فإن الفاعل قبل شرائط إيجابه ليس بفاعل و موجب أصلا و مع الشرائط موجب بته و أما القرب و البعد من الوقوع لأجل قلة الشرائط و كثرتها فلذلك لا يقتضي اختلاف حال في ماهية الممكن - بالقياس إلى طبيعي الوجود و العدم بل إنما يختلف بذلك الإمكان بمعنى آخر أعني الاستعداد القابل للشدة و الضعف الذي هو من الكيفيات الخارجية لا الإمكان الذاتي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٦

الذي هو اعتبار عقلي و للمسترشد أن يجمع بالأصول المعطاة إياه التهويسات التي وقعت من طائفة متجادلين في هذا المقام لا فائدة في إيرادها و ردها إلا تضييع الوقت بلا غرض و تفويت نقد العمر بلا عوض

فصل (١٣) في أن علة الحاجة إلى العلة هي الإمكان في الماهيات و القصور في الوجودات

إن قوما من الجدليين المتسمين بأهل النظر و أولياء التمييز العارين عن كسوة العلم و التحصيل كان أمرهم فرطا و تجشموا في إنكارهم سبيل الحق شططا و تفرقوا في سلوك الباطل فرقا.

فمنهم من زعم أن الحدوث وحده علة الحاجة إلى العلة.

و منهم من جعله شطرا داخلا فيما هو العلة.

و منهم من جعله شرطاً للعلة و العلة هي الإمكان.

و منهم من يتأهب للجدال بالقدح في ضرورة الحكم الفطري المركوز في نفس الصبيان بل المفطور في طباع البهيمة من الحيوان الموجب لتنفره عن صوت الخشب - و العيدان و الصوت و الصولجان و كلامهم كله غير قابل لتضييع العمر بالتهجين - و تعطيل النفس بالتوهين لكن نفوس الناس و جمهور المتعلمين متوجهة نحوه طائعة إليه.

فنقول أليس وجوب صفة ما و امتناعها بالقياس إلى الذات يغنيان الذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٧

عن الافتقار إلى الغير و يحيلان استنادها إليه بحسب تلك الصفة فلو فرض كون الحدوث مأخوذا في علة الحاجة شرطاً كان أو شطراً كان إنما يعتبر و يؤخذ فيما هو ممكن للذات لا واجب أو ممتنع فقد رجع الأمر أخيراً إلى الإمكان وحده و هو الخلف.

و بسبيل آخر الحدوث كيفية نسبة الوجود المتأخرة عنها المتأخرة عن الوجود المتأخر عن الإيجاد المتأخر عن الحاجة المتأخرة عن الإمكان فإذا كان الحدوث هو علة الحاجة بأحد الوجهين كان سابقاً على نفسه بدرجات و ليس لأحد أن يعارض بمثله على نفي علية الإمكان من جهة أنه كيفية نسبة الوجود لأن الإمكان حالة تعرض لنسبة مفهوم الوجود إلى الماهية بحسب الذات في لحاظ العقل و ليس مما يعرض في الواقع لنسبة خارجية فإنما يلزم تأخره عن مفهومي الوجود و الماهية - بحسب أخذها من حيث هي لا عن فعلية النسبة في ظرف الوجود و أما الحدوث فهو وصف الشيء بحسب حال الخارج بالفعل و لا يوصف به الماهية و لا الوجود إلا حين الموجودية لا في نفسها و لا ريب في تأخره عن الجعل و الإيجاد.

و أما قول من ينكر بداهة القضية المفطورة بأن متى عرضنا قولكم الطرفان لما استويا بالنسبة إلى الذات في رفع الضرورة

عنهما فامتنع الترجيح إلا بمنفصل على العقل مع قولنا الواحد نصف الاثنين وجدنا الأخيرة فوق الأولى في القوة و الظهور - و التفاوت إنما يستقيم إذا تطرق الاحتمال بوجه ما إلى الأولى بالسببة إلى الأخيرة - و قيام احتمال النقيض ينقض اليقين التام.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٨

فالظلم فيه ظاهر إذ لم يعلم أن التفاوت في الفطريات كثيرا ما يكون بحسب التفاوت في طرفي الحكم و الحكم في نفسه مما لا يتفاوت على أن الحكم الفطري و الحدسي كالاقتناصي مما يجوز فيه التفاوت بالقياس إلى الأذهان و الأزمنة و خصوصيات المفهومات و العقود لتفاوت النفوس في استعداداتها الأولية غريزية و استعداداتها الثانوية كسبية فالسلائق العقلية في إدراك نظم الحقائق و تأليفها وزانها وزان السلائق الحسية السمعية في وزن الألفاظ و تأليف الأصوات و جهة الوحدة في العقلية كجهة الوحدة في السمعية و التخالف كالتخالف و كل من سلمت ذائقة عقلية من القصور و الاختلال أو من الأمراض النفسانية و الاعتلال الحاصل من مباشرة الجدل و المناقشة في القيل و القال لم يرتب في استحالة رجحان الشيء على مثله من كل جهة إلا بمنفصل - و من استحل ترجيح الشيء بلا مرجح يوشك أن يسلك سبيل الخروج عن الفطرة البشرية لخباثة ذاتية وقعت من سوء قابليتها الأصلية و عصيان جبلي اقترفت ذاته الخبيثة في القرية الظالمة الهيولانية و المدنية الفاسقة السفلية

ظلمة وهمية:

المستحلون ترجيح أحد المتساويين بلا سبب تشعبوا في القول - ففرقة قالت إن الله سبحانه خلق العالم في وقت بعينه دون سائر الأوقات من دون مخصص يتخصص به ذلك الوقت. و فرقة زعمت أن الله سبحانه خصص الأفعال بأحكام مخصوصة من الوجوب و الحظر و الحسن و القبح من غير أن يكون في طبائع الأفعال ما يقتضي تلك الأحكام - و كذلك الهارب من السبع إذا عن له طريقان متساويان من كل الوجوه و الجائع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٠٩

المخير بين رغيفين متساويين كذلك يخصص أحدهما بالاختيار من غير مرجح. و فرقة تقول ما يختص من الأحكام و الأحوال بأحد المتماثلين دون الآخر غير معلل بشيء لأنه بأي شيء علل فسد. و فرقة تقول الذوات متساوية بأسرها في الذاتية مع اختصاص بعضها دون بعض بصفة معينة دون سائر الصفات. فهذه متشبثاتهم في الجدل و لو تنبهوا قليلا من نوم الغفلة و تيقظوا من رقدة الجهالة لتفطنوا أن لله في خلق الكائنات أسبابا غائبة عن شعور أذهاننا محجوبة عن أعين بصائرنا و أن الجهل بالشيء لا يستلزم نفيه و في كل من الأمثلة الجزئية التي تمسكوا بها في مجازفاتهم بنفي الأولوية في رجحان أحد المتماثلين من طريقي الهارب و قدحي العطشان و رغيفي الجائع مرجحات خفية مجهولة للمستوطنين في عالم الاتفاقات فإنما لهم الجهل بالأولوية لا نفي الأولوية و أقلها الاتصالات الكوكبية و الأوضاع الفلكية و الهيئات الاستعدادية فضلا عن الأسباب القصوى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٠

التي بها قدر الله سبحانه الأمور و قضى من صور الأشياء السابقة في علمه الأعلى على الوجه الأتم الأولى. و أما الذي نسب إلى أنبأ دقلس الحكيم و أنه قائل بالبخت و الاتفاق فالظاهر أن كلامه مرموز على ما هو عادته و عادة غيره من القدماء حيث كنمو أسرارهم الربوبية بالرموز و التجوزات. و قد وجه كلامه بعض العلماء بأنه إنما أنكر العلة الغائية في فعل واجب الوجود بالذات لا غير إذ هو معترف بأن ما لم يجب لم يوجد بل قد سمى هو و غيره الأمور اللاحقة بالماهيات لا لذاتها بل لغيرها اتفاقية و حينئذ يصح أن يقال إن وجود العالم اتفاقي لا بمعنى أنه يصير موجودا بنفسه كلا أو يفعله الباري جزافا بل إن وجوده ليس لاحقا به من ذاته بل هو من غيره.

و يقرب من هذا ما خطر ببالي في توجيه كلامه و هو أن ماهيات الممكنات لما علمت من طريقتنا أنها في الموجدية ظلال و عكوس للوجودات و إنما تعلق الجعل و الإبداع في الحقيقة بوجود كل ماهية لا بنفس تلك الماهية و كذا علته الغائية إنما تثبت لأنحاء الوجودات دون الماهيات فماهية العالم إنما تحققت بلا غاية و فاعل لها بالذات بل وجوده يحتاج إليهما بالحقيقة فعبر الرجل عن هذا المعنى بأن العالم اتفاقي أي هو واقع بالعرض نظير الجهات التي ضمت إلى المعلول الأول البسيط عندهم و صح بها صدور الكثير عنه إذ لا ريب لأحد أن الصادر عن الواجب بالذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١١

على رأيهم إحدى تلك الجهات كوجود المعلول و غير ذلك كالماهية الإمكان و الوجوب بالغير إنما صدر بالعرض بلا سبب ذاتي و إلا لزم إما صدور الكثير عن الأمر الوجداني - أو التركيب في الموجود الأول تعالى عن ذلك علوا كبيرا عظيما.

و بالجملة القدماء لهم الغاز و رموز و أكثر من جاء بعدهم رد على ظواهر كلامهم و رموزهم إما بجهله أو غفلة عن مقامهم أو لفرط حبه لرئاسة الخلق في هذه الدار الفانية و طائفة ممن تأخر عنهم اغتروا بظواهر أقاويلهم و اعتقدوها تقليد الأجل اعتقادهم بالقائل و صرحوا القول بالاتفاق و ضلوا ضلالا بعيدا و لم يعلموا أن المتبع هو البرهان اليقيني أو الكشف و أن الحقائق لا يمكن فهمها عن مجرد الألفاظ فإن الاصطلاحات و طبائع اللغات مختلفة

عقود و انحلالات: إن للقائلين بالاتفاق متمسكات.

الأول أن وجود الأشياء لو كان بتأثير العلة فيها

لكان تأثيرها إما حال وجود الأثر أو حال عدمه و الأول تحصيل الحاصل و الثاني جمع بين المتناقضين. و الحل يكون بالفرق بين أخذ الأثر في زمان الحصول و بين أخذه بشرط الحصول فالحصول في الأول ظرف و في الثاني سبب و شرط و لا استحالة في الأول بل هو بعينه شأن المؤثر بما هو مؤثر مع أثره فإن كل علة مؤثرة فهي مع معلولها زمانا أو ما في حكمه من غير انفكاك أحدهما عن الآخر في الوجود و كل علة مؤثرة فإنها تؤثر في معلولها في وقت الحصول لكن من حيث هو هو لا بما هو حاصل حتى يلزم المحذور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٢

الأول ولا بما ليس بحاصل حتى يلزم المحذور الثاني والحاصل أن تأثير العلة في حال حصول الحاصل بنفس ذلك التأثير وذلك تحصيل للحاصل بنفس ذلك التحصيل - لا بتحصيل غيره وهذا غير مستحيل.

و بوجه آخر إن أريد بحال الحصول المعية الوجودية بين المؤثر والأثر - نختار أن التأثير في حال وجود الأثر وإن أريد المعية الذاتية العقلية بينهما - نختار أن التأثير ليس في حال وجوده ولا في حال عدمه ولا يلزم شيء من المحذورين - إذ تأثير العلة حال الوجود في ماهية المعلول من حيث هي لا من حيث هي موجودة أو معدومة والماهية من تلك الحثية ليست بينها وبين العلة مقارنة ذاتية لزومية - وأما الماهية الموجودة أو المعدومة فهي متأخرة عن مرتبة وجود العلة أو عدمها ومقارنة لها بحسب الحصول في الواقع فتدبر فيه.

وللجدلين مسلك آخر وهو أن تأثير العلة في حال حدوث الأثر وهو غير حال الوجود وحال العدم وربما زاد بعضهم غباوة ومنع وجوب المقارنة بين العلة والمعلول ومثله بالصوت لأنه يوجد في الآن الثاني ويصدر من ذي الصوت في الآن السابق عليه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٣

الثاني أن التأثير إما في الماهية أو في الوجود أو في اتصافها به

والأول محال لأن ما يتعلق بالغير يلزم عدمه من عدم الغير وسلب الماهية عن نفسه محال والثاني يستلزم أن لا يبقى الوجود وجودا عند فرض عدم ذلك التأثير فإن ظن أنه لا يلزم أن يكون الإنسان مثلا مع كونه إنسانا يصير موصوفا بأنه ليس بإنسان بل إنما ينتفي الإنسان ولا يبقى دفع بأن نفى الإنسان قضية ولا بد من تقرير موضوعها حال الحكم فيكون الفاني هو الثابت فيكون الشيء ثابتا ومنفيا متقرا وغير متقرر وكذا الكلام في الوجود إيرادا ودفعا والثالث غير صحيح لكون الاتصاف أمرا ذهنيا اعتباريا لا يجوز أن يكون أول الصوادر بالذات ومع ذلك ثبوته لكونه من النسب بعد ثبوت الطرفين على أن الاتصاف أيضا ماهية فيعود السؤال بأن أثر الجاعل نفس الاتصاف أو وجوده أو الاتصاف بالاتصاف بالوجود وكذا الكلام في الاتصاف بالاتصاف حتى يتسلسل الأمر إلى لا نهاية.

و يزاح في المشهور بأن الجعل يتعلق بنفس الإنسان و يترتب عليه الوجود والاتصاف به لكونهما اعتباريين مصداقهما نفس الماهية الصادرة عن الجاعل - والإنسان وإن لم يكن إنسانا بتأثير الغير لكن نفس ماهية الإنسان بالغير بمعنى أن مجرد ذاته البسيطة أثر العلة لا الحالة التركيبية بينها وبينها وبين غيرها كقولنا الإنسان إنسان أو الإنسان موجود فالإنسان إنسان بذاته لكن نفسه من غيره وبين المعنيين فرق واضح فإذا فرض الإنسان على الوجه البسيط وجب إنسانيته بسبب الفرض وجوبا مترتبا على الفرض فيمتنع تأثير المؤثر فيه لأن وجوب الشيء ينافي احتياجه إلى الغير فيما وجب لذاته ولاستحالة جعل ما فرض مجعولا أما قبل فرض الإنسان نفسه فيمكن أن يجعل المؤثر نفس الإنسان ولك أن تقول يجب نفس الإنسان وأردت به الوجوب السابق وقد ثبت الفرق بين الوجوبين السابق واللاحق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٤

في ميزان المعقولات وكثيرا ما يقع الغلط في هذا من جهة الاشتراك اللفظي ومن جهة وضع ما ليس بعلّة علة فإن كون الإنسان واجبا من العلة - لا يوجب كونه واجبا في نفسه وكذا كونه مفتقرا إلى العلة لا يستلزم كونه إياه مفتقرا إليها

فكون نفس الإنسان من الغير لا يدل على عدم كون الإنسان إنساناً عند ارتفاع الغير وإنما يدل عليه كون كون الإنسان إنساناً من الغير.

و كذا الكلام في كون نفس الوجود مجعولا كما اخترناه إلا أن المتأخرين عن آخرهم اختاروا مجعولية نفس الماهية و سيرد عليك في هذا المقام ما بلغ إليه قسطنطين من عالم المكاشفة و معدن الأسرار و المشهور من المشاءين اختيار الشق الثالث أي كون تأثير المؤثر في موصوفية الماهية بالوجود فقد وجهوا كلامهم بأن مقصودهم أن أثر الجاعل أمر مجمل يحلله العقل إلى موصوف و صفة و اتصاف لذلك الموصوف بتلك الصفة فأثر الجاعل في الإنسان مثلاً هو مصداق قولنا الإنسان موجود و ليس أثره بالذات ماهية الإنسان وحدها و لا وجوده وحده بل الأمر التركيبي المعبر عنه باتصاف الماهية بالوجود و الاتصاف بالوجود و إن كان أمراً عقلياً لكنه من الاعتبارات المطابقة للواقع فيجب ارتباطه إلى سبب وراء اعتبار العقل إياه هو نفس سبب الماهية.

و قد ظهر مما ذكرناه أن التقسيم المذكور منفسخ الضبط لأن الموصوفية المترتبة على تأثير الفاعل يمكن أن يؤخذ على أنها معنى غير مستقل في التصور بل هي مرآة ملاحظة الطرفين و المعاني الارتباطية من حيث إنها ارتباطية لا يمكن أن يتعلق بها التفات الذهن إليها و استقلالها في التصور كما أشرنا إليه و أما إذا استؤنف الالتفات بأن انفسخت عما هي عليها من كونها آلة الارتباط و صارت أمراً معقولاً في نفسه مباين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٥

الذات للطرفين فكانت كسائر الماهيات في أن تعلقها بالجاعل بما ذا و تأثير الجاعل فيها بحسب أية حيثية تكون من الأمور المحتملة المذكورة

فصل (١٤) في كيفية احتياج عدم الممكن إلى السبب

ربما يتشكك فيقال إن رجحان عدم الممكن على وجود لو كان لسبب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٦

لكان في العدم تأثير لكن العدم بطلان صرف يمتنع استناده إلى الشيء ثم قولكم عدم الممكن يستند إلى عدم علة وجوده يستدعي التمايز بين الأعدام و كونها هويات متعددة بعضها علة و بعضها معلول فحيث لا تمايز و لا أولوية فلا علية و لا معلولية.

فيزاح بأن عدم الممكن ليس نفيًا محضًا بمعنى أن العقل يتصور ماهية الممكن - و ينضاف إليها معنى الوجود و العدم و يجدها بحسب ذاتها خالية عن التحصل و اللاتحصل سواء كانا بحسب الذهن أو بحسب الخارج فيحكم بأنها في انضمام كل من المعنيين إليها تحتاج إلى أمر آخر و كما أن معنى تأثير العلة في وجود ماهية ما ليس أن تودع في الماهية شيئاً تكون هي حاملة له في الحقيقة أو متصفة به في الواقع - بل بأن يبدع أمراً هو المسمى بالوجود ثم هو بنفسه ذو ماهية من غير تأثير و الماهية منصبة بصبغ الوجود مستضيئة بضوئه ما دام الوجود على ما علمت من مسلكنا - فكذلك معنى تأثيرها في عدم الماهية ليس إلا أن لا تبدع أمراً يتحد بالماهية نوعاً من الاتحاد أي بالعرض نعم للعقل أن يتصور ماهية الممكن و يضيف إليها شيئاً من مفهومي العدم و الوجود بسبب تصور وجود العلة أو عدمها من جهة علمه

بالأسباب المسمى بالبرهان اللمبي أو بسبب ملاحظة وجدان الآثار المترتبة على الشيء الدالة على وجوده أو عدمها الدال على عدمه كما في البرهان المسمى بالإن فلعلم أن مرجح عدم كمرجح الوجود ليس إلا ما له حظ من الوجود لا ذات عدم بما هو عدم إلا أن مرجح طرف الوجود يجب أن يكون بنفسه أمرا متقدرا حاصلا بدون الفرض والاعتبار و أما مرجح البطلان و عدم فلا يكون إلا معقولا مجردا من غير تقرر له خارجا عن الملاحظة العقلية فعدم العلة وإن كان نفيا محضا في ظرف عدم إلا أن له حظا من الثبوت بحسب ملاحظة العقل و ذلك يكفي في الترجيح العقلي و الحكم باستتباعه - لعدم المعلول ذهنيا و خارجا كل واحد منهما بوجه غير الآخر فإن استتباع عدم العلة عدم المعلول في الخارج هو كونهما بما هما كذلك باطلين بحيث لا خبر عنهما بوجه من الوجوه أصلا حتى عن هذا الوجه السلبي و أما استتباع عدمها عدمه في الذهن فهو كون تصور عدم العلة و الحكم به عليها يوجب تصور عدم المعلول و الحكم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٧

به عليه و في تصور عدم المعلول مجرد استتباع لتصور عدم العلة من دون ترتب الحكم بعدمها على الحكم بعدمه و بالجملة الامتياز بين الأعدام بحسب مفهوماتها العقلية و صورها الذهنية بوجه من الوجوه يكفي في كون بعضها مرجحا لآخر إنما الممتنع الامتياز بين الأعدام بما هي أعدام و ذلك لم يلزم هاهنا.

خلاصة إجمالية:

إن للماهيات الإمكانية و الأعيان المتقدرة حالات عقلية - و اعتبارات سابقة على وجودها في الواقع مستندة في لحاظ العقل بعضها إلى بعض من غير أن يكون في الخارج بإزائها شيء و ليس في الخارج عندنا أمر سوى الوجود ثم العقل يتصور الماهية متحدة به و يجد الماهية بحسب المفهوم غير مفهوم الوجود و يجدها بحسب نفسها معرفة عن الوجود و عدم خالية عن ضرورتيهما و لا ضرورتيهما بالمعنى العدولي أيضا فيحكم بحاجتها في شيء من الأمرين - إلى مرجح غير ذاتها موجب لها فلعلم من ذلك أن الشيء أي الماهية أمكنت فاحتاجت فأوجبت فوجدت فوجدت و هذا لا ينافي كون الوجود أول الصوادر و أصلها لأن الموضوع في هذا الحكم الوجود و فيما ذكر المنظور إليه حال الماهية بقياسها إلى وجودها و إلى جاعل وجودها و هذا كما يقال إن الشيء كثيرا ما يتأخر بحسب وجوده الرابطي عن الذي يتقدم عليه بحسب وجوده في نفسه - و كما يثبت في العلم الطبيعي وجود مبدأ الحركة بعد إثبات الحركة و وجود المحرك الغير المتحرك اللامتناهي القوة و القدرة بعد إثبات الحركة الدورية و ذلك لأن حال الجسم في نفس ماهيته المتغيرة متقدمة على حال كونه ذا مبدأ محرك غير متناهي القوة واجب بالذات مع كون الواجب بالذات بحسب ذاته تعالى متقدما على جميع الأشياء - فلا تناقض أيضا بين كون الوجود متقدما في نفسه على الماهية و حالاتها متأخرا عنها و عن مراتبها السابقة بحسب تعلقها و ارتباطها به.

تبصرة تذكيرية:

قد لوحنا إليك و سنوضح لك بيانه أن المفهوم الكلبي ذاتيا كان أو عرضيا ليس أثر الجاعل القيوم الموجود بالذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٨

فالحكم بأن المنسوب بالذات إلى العلة ليس إلا نفس الوجود بذاته سواء كان متصفا بالحدوث أو بالبقاء بل الوجود

الباقى أشد حاجة في التعلق بالغير من الوجود الحادث إذا كانا فاقرين و أنت إذا حللت معنى الوجود الحادث إلى عدم سابق و وجود- علمت أن عدم ليس مستندا بالذات إلى علة موجودة و كون الوجود بعد عدم من لوازم هوية ذلك الوجود فلم يبق للتعلق بالغير إلا نفس الوجود مع قطع النظر عما يلزمه فليس للفاعل صنع فيما سوى الوجود ثم بعض من الوجود بنفسه يوصف بالحدوث بلا مقتض من غيره أو اقتضاء من ذاته كما أن الجسم في وجوده متعلق بالعلة ثم هو بنفسه موصوف بلزوم التناهي مطلقا و كما أن حاجة الماهيات إلى علة وجوداتها من حيث إنها في ذاتها متساوية النسبة إلى الوجود و عدم و المستفاد لها من العلة وصف الوجود و أما وصف كونها متساوية النسبة أو كون وجودها بعد البطلان سواء كان بالذات أو بالزمان فأمر ضروري غير مفتقر إلى العلة فكذلك حاجة الوجود إلى العلة و تقومه بها من حيث كونه بذاته و هويته وجودا ضعيفا تعلقيا ظليا و المستفاد من العلة نفسه الضعيفة لا كونه متصفا بالحدوث أو القدم و يلائم هذا ما وجد في كلام بعض متأخري العلماء أن الذات المستفادة من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢١٩

الغير كونها متعلقة بالغير مقوم لها كما أن الاستغناء عن الغير مقوم لواجب الوجود لذاته فالذات التي هي من تلقاء الغير كونها من تلقاء الغير و فاقتها إلى الغير مقوم لها- فلا يسوغ أن يستمر الذات المفتقرة ذاتا مستغنية كما لا يجوز أن يتسرمد المستغني عن جميع الأشياء مفتقرا و إلا فقد انقلب الحقائق عما هي عليه و هذا شديد الوضوح فيما عليه سلوكنا من كون استناد الممكن إلى الجاعل من جهة وجوده الذي يتقوم بوجود فاعله لا من جهة ماهيته فنفس الوجود مرتبط إلى الفاعل و ارتباطه إلى الفاعل مقوم له أي لا يتصور بدونه و إلا لم يكن الوجود هذا الوجود كما أن الوجود الغير المتعلق بشيء هو بنفسه كذلك فلو عرض له التعلق بالغير لم يكن الوجود ذلك الوجود فالافتقار للوجود التعلقى ثابت أبدا حين الحدوث و حين الاستمرار و البقاء جميعا فحاجته في البقاء كحاجته في الحدوث بلا تفاوت لا بمعنى أن كونه بعد عدم أثر الفاعل أو كونه بعد كون سابق أثره بل هما لازمان لنفس الوجود بلا جعل و تأثير كما مر إنما المفعول و أثر الجاعل نفس الوجود لا تصييره ذا اللوازم التي من جملتها كونه غير أزلي فليس للحق إلا إفاضة نور الوجود على الأشياء و إدامتها و حفظها و إبقاء ما يحتمل البقاء قدر ما يحتمل و يسع له بحسب هويته و أما النقائص و القصورات فهي لها من ذاتها مثال ذلك على وجه بعيد فيضان نور الشمس على الأجسام القابلة بلا منع و بخل فلو حجب بعض الأجسام عن ورود شعاعها عليه لكان من جهته لا من جهتها فالذات الأحدية لا تزال تضيء هياكل الممكنات و يخرجها من ظلمة ليل عدم إلى نور نهار الوجود بحيث لو فرض الوهم أنه تعالى يمسك عنها إفاضة الوجود لحظة- لعادت إلى ظلمة ذاتها الأزلية فسبحان القوي القدير الحكيم الذي يمسك السماوات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٠

و الأرض أن تزولا و لئن زالتا إن أمسكهما من أحد من بعده و ما أشد سخافة وهم من يرى أن حاجة العالم إلى قيوم السماوات و الأرض و من فيهما و ما عليهما في حال الحدوث لا في حال البقاء حتى صرح بعض من هؤلاء القائلين بهذا القول جهلا و عنادا- أن الباري لو جاز عدمه لما ضر عدمه وجود العالم بعده لتحقيق الحدوث بإحداثه و هذا غاية الجهل و الفساد في الاعتقاد على أن كل علة ذاتية فهي مع معلولها وجودا و دواما كما سنذكره في مباحث العلة و

المعلول.

و من الشواهد في ذلك حرارة النار الفائضة من جوهرها أعني صورتها على ما حولها من الأجسام للتسخين و هكذا يفيض من الماء الرطوبة و البلل على الأجسام المجاورة له و الرطوبة جوهرية و ذاتية للماء كما أن الحرارة للنار كذلك و هكذا يفيض من الشمس النور و الضياء على الأجرام الكوكبية و العنصرية لأن النور جوهرى للشمس و الفعل الذاتى لا يتبدل و كذلك يفيض الحياة من النفس على البدن إذ الحياة جوهرية لها و صورة مقومة لذاتها فلا يزال ينشأ منها الحياة على البدن الذي هو جسم ميت في ذاته حي بالنفس ما دام صلوحه لإفاضة الحياة عليه من النفس باقيا فإذا فسد صلوحه لقبول الحياة تخلت و لخراب البدن ارتحلت و كذلك نسبة كل علة ذاتية مع معلولها و يجيء أن نسبة الإيجاد إلى المؤلف و المركب كالبناء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢١

للبيت و الخياط للثوب مغالطة نشأت من عدم الفرق بين ما بالذات و ما بالعرض - و أخذ ما ليس بعلة علة و البارى أجل من أن يكون فعله مجرد التأليف و التركيب كما زعموه بل فعله الصنع و الإبداع و إنشاء الوجود و الكون و ليس الإبداع و الإنشاء تركيبا و لا تأليفا بل تأسيس و إخراج من العدم إلى الوجود و المثال في الأمرين المذكورين يوجه كلام المتكلم و كتابة الكاتب فإن أحدهما يشبه الإيجاد و الآخر يشبه التركيب فلاجل هذا بطل الأول بالإمساك دون الثانى فإنه إذا سكت المتكلم بطل الكلام و إذا سكن الكاتب لا يبطل المكتوب فوجود العالم عن البارى جل مجده كوجود الكلام عن المتكلم فالوجودات العقلية و النفسية و الآليات الروحية و الجسمية كلها كلمات الله التي لا تنفذ و لو كان بحر الهيولى العنصرية مدادا لكلمات ربه الوجودية لنفذ البحر قبل أن تنفذ كلمات ربه و لو جئنا بمثله مددا من أبحر الهويلات الفلكية تثنية لقوله تعالى **وَلَوْ أَنَّ مَا فِي الْأَرْضِ مِنْ شَجَرَةٍ أَقْلَامٌ وَالْبَحْرُ يَمُدُّهُ مِنْ بَعْدِهِ سَبْعَةُ أَبْحُرٍ مَا نَفِدَتْ كَلِمَاتُ اللَّهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌ**

فصل (١٥) في أن الممكن ما لم يجب بغيره لم يوجد

لما يتيقن أن كل ممكن ما لم يترجح وجوده بغيره لم يوجد و ما لم يترجح عدمه كذلك لم ينعدم فلا بد له في رجحان كل من الطرفين من سبب خارج عن نفسه - فالآن نقول إن ذلك السبب المرجح ما لم يبلغ ترجيحه إلى حد الوجوب لم يكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٢

السبب المرجح مرجحا فالأولية الخارجة الغير الواصلة إلى حد الوجوب بسبب الغير غير كافية كما ظنه أكثر المتكلمين فما دام الممكن في حدود الإمكان لم يتحقق وجوده أليس إذا لم يصل إلى حد الوجوب بسبب الغير يجوز وجوده و يجوز عدمه - فلا يتعين بعد التخصيص بأحدهما دون الآخر فيعود طلب المخصص و المرجح جذعا و الأولوية مستوية النسبة إلى الجانبين فيحتاج المعلول رأسا إلى ضم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٣

شيء آخر ثالث مع العلة والأولية ثم مع انضمامه لو لم يحصل الوجوب بل كان بحسبه جواز الطرفين فلم يقف الحاجة إلى المرجح لأحدهما وهكذا حتى ينتهي الأمر إلى مرجحات وأولويات غير متناهية ولا يكون مع ذلك قد حصل تعيين أحد الطرفين إذ كل مرتبة فرضت من المراتب الغير المتناهية يأتي الكلام في استواء نسبة الأولوية المتحققة فيها الغير الموجبة إلى الجانبين بحاله مع فرض حصول ما فرض سببا مرجحا - فاستواء نسبة هذه الأولوية إلى طرفي الفعلية واللافعلية مع تحقق تلك الأسباب الغير المتناهية باق على شأنه من دون أن يفيد تعييناً لأحد الطرفين فلا يكون ما فرض سببا مرجحا سببا مرجحا فقد ظهر أن المفروض مستحيل من غير أن نستعين في بيانه باستحالة ذهاب السلسلة الغير المتناهية من العلل والمعلولات لأنها مما لم يحن حينه بعد - بل من جهة أن ما فرضناه علة مخصصة لم يكن إياها فكان الشيء غير نفسه وهو محال.

و بالجملة الوجوب منتهى سلسلة الإمكانيات والفعلية الذاتية مبدأ انبثاث شعب القوى وإعدام الملكات فلهذا قيل إن وجوب الشيء قبل إمكانه وفعليته قبل قوته - و صورته سابقة على مادته وخيره مستول على شره بل وجوده قاهر على عدمه - و رحمة الله سابقة على غضبه كما سيتضح بك في مباحث القوة والفعل.

و بالجملة فقد صح إذن أن كل ماهية ممكنة أو كل وجود إمكاني لا يتقرر ولا يوجد ما لم يجب تقررده و وجوده بعلته فلا يتصور كون العلة علة ما لم يكن ترجيحها للمعلول ترجيحاً إيجابياً فكل علة واجبة العلية و كل معلول واجب المعلولية و العلة الأولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٤

كما هو واجب الوجوب كذلك واجب العلية فهو بما هو واجب الوجود واجب العلية فكونه واجبا بذاته هو كونه مبدأ لما سواه كما سنبين إن شاء الله العزيز

فصل (١٦) في أن كل ممكن محفوف بالوجوبين وبالامتناعين

إن ما مضى في الفصل السابق هو ثبوت الوجود السابق للممكن الناشي من قبل المرجح التام لأحد طرفي الوجود و عدم قبل تحققه و بإزائه الامتناع السابق اللازم من اقتضاء العلة ذلك الطرف بعينه ثم بعد تحقق الوجود و عدم يلحق وجوب آخر - في زمان اتصاف الماهية بأحد الوصفين من جهة الاتصاف به على الاعتبار التحيثي - فإن كل صفة يجب وجودها للموصوف حين الاتصاف بها من حيث الاتصاف بها - وهذا هو الوجوب اللاحق المسمى بالضرورة بحسب المحمول و بإزائه الامتناع اللاحق بالقياس إلى ما هو نقيض المحمول فكل ممكن سواء كان موجوداً أو معدوماً لنفسه أو لغيره فإنه يكتنفه الوجوبان و الامتناعان بحسب ملاحظة العقل و لا يمكن الخلو عنهما بحسب نفس الأمر أصلاً لا باعتبار الوجود و لا باعتبار عدمه و إن كانت ماهية الممكن في نفسها و بما هي بحسبه على طباع الإمكان الصرف خالية عن الجميع - أما عدم الخلو عن الوجوب السابق وجوداً و عدماً و كذلك الامتناع السابق اللازم له فقد مر و أما الوجوب و الامتناع اللاحقان فلأن الوجود محمولاً كان أو رابطة ينافي عدمه و عدم الوجود المقابل له فإمكان عدمه في زمان الوجود و معه يساوق جواز الاقتران بين النقيضين فيلزم استحالة ذلك الإمكان و استحالته يقتضي استحالة عدمه - المساوقة لوجوب مقابلة الذي هو الوجود و كذلك حكم إمكان وجود الشيء حين عدمه فقد ثبت ما ادعينا.

و مما يجب أن يعلم أنه كما أن الوجوب السابق للممكن بالغير فكذلك وجوبه اللاحق أيضاً و هكذا قياس الامتناعين في

كونهما جميعا بالغير إذا أريد من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٥

الممكن ماهيته و أما إذا أريد وجوده فالأخيران من الوجوب و الامتناع ذاتيان له أما بيان الأول فلأن الموصوف بالوجوب على التقدير المذكور إنما هي الماهية - بشرط الوجود على أن يكون الوجود خارجا عنها لا مجموع الماهية و مفهوم الوجود - فالماهية الموجودة متقدمة على وجوبها اللاحق و ضرورة وجودها بحسب الواقع - لا تنفك عن إمكانه لها بحسب نفسها و أما بيان الثاني فلأن صدق مفهوم الوجود - على حقيقة كل وجود من قبيل صدق ذاتيات الشيء عليه حيث إنها ضرورية ذاتية ما دامت الذات متحققة و ليست نسبة الشيء إلى نفسه بالإمكان بل بالوجوب نعم لو جرد الوجودات الخاصة بالإمكانية بحسب الفرض عن تعلقها بجاعلها لم يبق لها عين و ذات أصلا بخلاف الماهيات فإنها حين صدور وجودها عن العلة فهي بحسب ذاتها ممكنة الوجود فكل عقد اتحادي أو ارتباطي لا يخلو عن الوجوب اللاحق و الضرورة بحسب المحمول سواء اقترن ذلك بالضرورة المطلقة الأزلية كقولنا الله موجود قادر - أو بالضرورة الذاتية المقيدة بالذات أو الوصفية المقيدة بالوصف داخلا أو خارجا أو بالإمكان الذاتي و بالجملة إذا وقع أحد طرفي الوجود و العدم لماهية وقتا ما - فإن نسب طرفه الآخر إلى الماهية من حيث هي كان ممكن للحوق لها في ذلك الوقت البتة و إن قيس إلى نفس ذلك الطرف أو إلى الماهية من حيث تلبسها به كان ممتنعا عليها لا بحسب ذات تلك الماهية بل بحسب قيدها أو تقييدها به المنافيان لهذا الطرف الآخر فالامتناع امتناع بالغير على أحد الاعتبارين و بالذات على ثانيهما.

وهم و تنبيه:

ربما توهم متوهم أن ذات الممكن المأخوذ مع الوجود ممتنع له العدم امتناعا ذاتيا نظرا إلى المجموع لكون اجتماع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٦

النقيضين محالا لذاته فيكون ما بإزائه وجوبا ذاتيا لا بالغير فيلزم كون الممكن المركب واجبا بالذات فيجب عليه أن يتنبه مما كررنا الإشارة إليه أن الضرورة هاهنا ليست مطلقة أزلية بل ضرورة بشرط الذات فكما أن الإنسان إنسان بالضرورة ما دام كونه إنسانا فكذلك الإنسان الموجود موجود بالضرورة ما دام كونه موجودا - فهذا بالحقيقة وجوب بالغير لأن الوجودات الإمكانية و اتصاف الممكنات بها إنما يكون بعد تأثير الفاعل إياها و من هاهنا وضح أن وجوب الوجود في المركب من الواجبين المفروضين إنما هو بالغير لا بالذات و كذا الامتناع في المركب من الممتنعين امتناع بالغير لأن المجموع في مرتبة أحد الجزئين ليس واجبا و لا ممتنعا بل ما دام كونه مجموعا.

و ما أسخف ما اعتذر بعضهم من لزوم الوجوب الذاتي في الماهية المأخوذة مع الوجود أن هذا المجموع أمر اعتباري لكون الوجود عنده اعتباريا فمجموع الذات مع القيد لا يكون إلا من الاعتبارات العقلية فكيف يكون معروض الوجوب. و ذهل عن أن أحدا لا يروم أن نفس مفهوم هذا الملحوظ مع قطع النظر عن ما يحكي عنه و يطابقه له الوجوب اللاحق بل ما رام إلا أن مطابق هذا المفهوم في نفس الأمر و هو الذات المأخوذة من حيث كونها موجودة له الوجود و الوجوب - أعني ما إذا عبر عنه العقل حيث الماهية بالوجوب سواء كان للوجود صورة في الخارج - كما هو المذهب

المنصور أم لا.

و لبعض الأماجد الكرام مسلك آخر في هذا المقام تلخيصه أنه كلما امتنع طرف العدم مثلاً حين الوجود على الذات يجب أن يجب للذات اللابطلان حين الوجود وهو أعم من الوجود حين الوجود و من العدم رأساً في الآزال و الأباد - فلم يلزم من ضرورة هذا الأعم ضرورة هذا الأخص بل يمكن تحقيقه في ضمن العدم في جميع الأزمنة و الأوقات فإذن لحق وجوب الوجود حين الوجود بسبب الغير و يمكن انسلابه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٧

في نفسه و بحسب ذات الممكن.

و أنت تعلم أن هذا الكلام على تقدير تمامه إنما يجدي لو لزم وجوب الوجود - من مجرد امتناع العدم و أما إذا قيل إن الماهية المحيثة بالوجود يجب لها الوجود وجوب الجزء للكل و وجوب العلة للمعلول باعتبار كونه معلولاً فإن الممكن الموجود سواء كان حيثية الوجود له بحسب التقييد و الجزئية أو بحسب التعليل و الشرطية - لا بد له من الوجود لا يتصور انفكاكه عنه و كل ما كان كذلك كانت ضرورية ذاتية - و كذا الحال في الممكن الموصوف بكونه صادراً عن الجاعل يجب له وجود الجاعل من حيث كونه صادراً عنه و لهذا لا يتصور انفكاك العالم من حيث إنه صنع الباري عن الباري فالعلة مقومة لوجود المعلول و المقوم للشيء واجب له و لهذا

ورد: أن الله تعالى قال مخاطباً لموسى بن عمران يا موسى أنا بذك اللزم

فالمصير إلى ما حققناه.

و بعض من تصدى لخصومة أهل الحق بالمعارضة و الجدل و التشبه بأهل الحال بمجرد القيل و القال كمن تصدى لمقابلة الأبطال و مقاتلة الرجال بمجرد حمل الأثقال و آلات القتال قال في تأليف سماه تهافت الفلاسفة إن قياس الطرف الآخر إلى الممكن له اعتبارات - أحدها أن يقاس إلى ذات الممكن من حيث هي مع قطع النظر عن الواقع فيها - و بهذا الاعتبار يكون ممكناً لها في ذلك الوقت بل في جميع الأوقات. و ثانيها أن يقاس إليها بحسب تقييدها بالطرف الواقع على أن يكون قيداً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٨

لا جزءاً و حينئذ إن اعتبر ثبوت الطرف الآخر لنفس الذات المقيدة بذلك الطرف من حيث هي من غير أن يكون للتقييد دخل فيما ثبت له الطرف الآخر يكون ممكناً لها دائماً و ممتنعاً لها بالغير في ذلك الوقت و إن اعتبر ثبوته لها لا من حيث هي بل من حيث تقييدها بذلك الطرف فقد يكون الطرف الآخر ممكناً بالذات بل واقعا و قد يكون ممتنعاً بالذات مثلاً إذا اعتبر الممكن الموجود من حيث إنه موجود فالعدم ممكن له بل واقع بل واجب و لا يلزم من هذا اجتماع النقيضين لأن الموصوف بأحدهما الذات من حيث هي و بالآخر الذات من حيث التقييد و إذا اعتبر الممكن المعدوم من حيث هو معدوم فالوجود ممتنع له بالذات.

و ثالثها أن يقاس إليها مع تقييدها بحيث يكون المقارن جزءاً لما ثبت له الطرف الآخر و يتأتى فيه أيضاً التقسيم المذكوران في الثاني و لزوم توهم اجتماع النقيضين هنا أبعد فقد حصل من ذلك أن ما وقع هذه الاعتبارات بالقياس إليه

في الاعتبارين الأولين ممكن بالذات و في الأخيرين ممتنع بالذات انتهى ما ذكر و فساده يظهر بالتدبر فيما أسلفنا بيانه من أن الكلام ليس في امتناع أحد الطرفين - بالقياس إلى الطرف الآخر بحسب ما يعتمله الذهن من دون محاذاته لما هو الواقع - كما ينادي إليه كلام هذا القائل بل المنظور إليه في الطرف الآخر نحو وقوعه في نفس الأمر فإن الذات المتلبسة بالوجود مثلاً سواء أخذت على الوجه الثاني أو على الوجه الثالث يستحيل عدمه في الواقع و ظاهر أن موضوع أحد الطرفين هو بعينه ما يقاس إليه الطرف الآخر و يحكم بامتناع لحق ذلك الطرف به امتناعاً ذاتياً و ليس المراد من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٢٩

التحيث بأحد الطرفين في الاعتبار الثاني أن يؤخذ مفهوم التحيث و يضم إلى أصل الذات - حتى يحصل منه مركب اعتباري و حكم بوجوب عدمه و قيل يتعدد موضوع المتقابلين - فالمراد من الذات المتلبسة بأحد الطرفين كالوجود مثلاً هو اعتبار تلك الذات على وجه يكون مصداقاً لما يعبر عنه و يحكي عنه العقل بهذا المفهوم الذهني الذي هو مفهوم التحيث بهذا الطرف و لا شبهة في أن الذات المأخوذة على هذا الوجه الذي يمكن الحكاية عنها بحسبه بما ذكر يمتنع لحق الطرف الآخر له بالذات و لا شبهة أيضاً أن ليس في تلك الذات المحكي عنها بما ذكرناه تركيب بحسب الواقع إلا في الاعتبار الذهني حتى يختلف موضوع الطرفين فثبت الامتناع الذاتي للطرف الآخر - و من امتناعه الذاتي يلزم الوجوب الذاتي لمقابله على أن ما يتمحل هذا القائل لا يجري في نفس الوجود الذي هو بعينه جهة الوجوب اللاحق في كل شيء و هو بعينه ذات موجودة كما قررناه و بمجرد نفسه ينحل إلى موضوع و صفة هي أحد المتقابلين في قولنا الوجود ثابت و يمتنع له لذاته قولنا لا ثابت فلا محيص إلا فيما أسسناه في هذا المقام من الفرق بين الوجوبين اللازم منهما غير محذور و هو الوجوب المقيد بدوام ذات الموضوع و المحذور منهما غير لازم و هو الوجوب المطلق الأزلي.

ذيل:

كل ممكن لحقه الوجود و الوجوب لغيره في وقت من الأوقات فإنه كما يمتنع عدمه في ذلك الوقت كذلك يمتنع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣٠

عدمه في مطلق نفس الأمر أي ارتفاعه عن الواقع مطلقاً بلا تقييده بالأوقات المبينة لذلك الوقت لأن ارتفاعه عن الواقع إنما يصح بارتفاعه عن جميع مراتب الواقع و المفروض خلافه فمعنى جواز العدم للممكن الموجود في وقت جوازه بالنظر إلى ماهيته لا بالنظر إلى الواقع

فصل (١٧) في أن الممكن قد يكون له إمكانان و قد لا يكون

إن بعض الممكنات مما لا يأبى مجرد ذاته أن يفيض من جود المبدأ الأعلى بلا شرط خارج عن ذاته و عما هو مقوم ذاته فلا محالة يفيض عن المبدأ الجواد بلا تراخ و مهلة و لا سبق عدم زمني و استعداد جسماني لصلوح ذاته و تهيو طباعه للحصول و الكون و هذا الممكن لا يكون له إلا نحو واحد من الكون و لا محالة نوعه منحصر في شخصه إذا الحصولات المختلفة و التخصصات المتعددة لمعنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣١

واحد نوعي إنما يلحق لأجل أسباب خارجة عن مرتبة ذاته و قوام حقيقته فإن مقتضى الذات و مقتضى لازم الذات داخلا كان أو خارجا لا يختلف و لا يتخلف فلا مجال لتعدد الشخصات و تكثر الحصولات و بعضها مما لا يكفي ذاته و مقوماته الذاتية - في قبول الوجود من دون استعانة بأسباب اتفافية و شروط غير ذاتية فليس له في ذاته إلا قوة التحصل من غير أن يصلح لقبوله صلوحا تاما ثم بعد انضياف تلك الشروط - و المعدات إلى ما يقبل قوة وجوده و هو المسمى بالمادة يتهيأ لقبول الوجود و يصير قريب المناسبة إلى فاعله بعد ما كان بعيد المناسبة منه فلا محالة ينضم إلى إمكانه الذاتي إمكان آخر متفاوت الوقوع له مادة حاملة ذات تغير و زمان هو كمية تغيرها و انتقالها من حالة إلى حالة أخرى حتى انتهت إلى مواصلة ما بين القوة القابلة و القوة الفاعلة ليتحصل من اجتماعهما و يتولد من ازدواجهما شيء من المواليد الوجودية - و لما تحقق و تبين أن الممكنات مستندة في وجودها إلى سبب واجب الوجود و القيومية لكونه بالفعل من جميع جهات الوجود و الإيجاد و كل ما كان كذلك استحال أن يخص بإيجاده و فيضه بعض القوابل و المستعدات دون بعض بل يجب أن يكون عام الفيض فلا بد أن يكون اختلاف الفيض لأجل اختلاف إمكانات القوابل و استعدادات المواد.

ثم إن للممكنات طرا إمكانا في أنفسها و ماهياتها فإن كان ذلك كافيا في فيضان الوجود عن الواجب بالذات عليها و جب أن تكون موجودة بلا مهلة لأن الفيض عام و الجود تام و أن لا يتخصص وجود شيء منها بحين دون حين و الوجود بخلاف ذلك لمكان الحوادث الزمانية و إن لم يكن ذلك الإمكان الأصلي كافيا بل لا بد من حصول شروط آخر حتى يستعد لقبول الوجود عن الواجب بالذات فلمثل هذا الشيء إمكانان. فقد ثبت أن لبعض الممكنات إمكانين. أحدهما هو وصف عام و معنى واحد عقلي مشترك لجميع الممكنات و نفس ماهياتها حاملة له.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣٢

و الثاني ما يطرا لبعض الماهيات لقصور إمكانه الأصلي في الصلاحية لقبول إفاضة الوجود فلا محالة يلحق به إمكان بمعنى آخر قائم بمحل سابق على وجوده سبعا زمانيا به يستعد لأن يخرج من القوة إلى الفعل و هو الذي يسمى بالإمكان الاستعدادي و قد مر ذكره من قبل و بحسبه يمكن لماهية واحدة أنحاء غير متناهية من الحصول و الكون لأجل استعدادات غير متناهية يلحق لقابل غير متناهي الانفعال - ينضم إلى فاعل غير متناهي التأثير فيستمر نزول البركات و ينفتح باب الخيرات - إلى غير النهاية كما ستطلع على كفيته و لو انحصر الإمكان في القسم الأول لغلق باب الإفاضة و الإفادة و يبقى في كتم العدم عدد من الوجود لم يخرج إلى فضاء الكون أكثر مما وقع و هو مبرهن الاستحالة فيما بعد إن شاء الله تعالى و ليس في هذه الأحكام حيص عما ذهب إليه المحققون من أهل الشريعة و لا حيد عما يراه المحققون من أهل الحكمة القويمة إنما الزيغ في الحكم بقدوم المجعولات الزمانية و لا نهاية القوى الإمكانية فإن الحوادث المتسابقة و إن لم يكن حدوثها إلا بعد حركة و تغير و مادة و زمان و لكن الحوادث الإبداعية سواء تجردت عن الزمان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣٣

و المكان أو اقترنت بهما لا على وجه الانفعال و التجدد لا يعترىها المسبوقية بالزمان و المكان بل هي فاعلة الحركات سواء كانت متحركات أو مشوقات و الباري تعالى فوق الجميع هو الأول بلا أول كان قبله و الآخر بلا آخر كان بعده و هو جل مجده فعل كله بلا قوة و وجوب كله بلا إمكان و خير كله بلا شر و تمام كله بلا نقص و كمال كله بلا قصور و غاية كله بلا انتظار و وجود كله بلا ماهية و إنما يفيض منه على غيره من كل متغيرين أشرفهما و المقابل الآخر من اللوازم الغير المجعولة الواقعة في الممكنات لأجل مراتب قصوراتها عن البلوغ إلى الكمال الأتم الواجب و لمخالطة أنوار وجوداتها الضعيفة بشوائب ظلمات الأعدام اللاحقة بها بحسب درجات بعدها عن ينبوع النور الطامس القيومي و بالتفاوت في مراتب النزول - و البعد عن الحق الأول يتضاعف الإمكانات و بتضاعفها يتفاوت الموجودات كمالاً - و نقصاً و استنارة و انكسافاً و قد سبق أن نسبة الوجوب إلى الإمكان نسبة تمام إلى نقص و أن كل ما وجب وجوده لا بذاته فهو لوضع شيء ما ليس هو في مرتبة ماهيته صار واجب الوجود مثاله الاحتراق ليس واجب الحصول في ذاته و لكن عند

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣٤

فرض التقاء القوة الفاعلة بالطبع و القوة المنفصلة بالطبع أعني الصورة المحرقة و المادة المحترقة يجب حصوله فتفطن و تيقن أن مثار الإمكان و الفقر هو البعد عن منبع الوجوب و الغنى و مجلاب الفعلية و الوجود هو القرب منه و الإمكان جهة الانفصال و عدم التعلق و ملاك الهلاك و الاختلال و الوجوب جهة الارتباط و الاتصال و مناط الجمعية و الانتظام و حيث يكون الإمكان أكثر يكون الشر و فقدان أوفر و الاختلال و الفساد أعظم و إذا قلت جهات العدم و سدت بعض مراتب الاختلال بتحقيق بعض شرائط الكون و ارتفاع بعض صوامد البلوغ إلى الكمال حصل الإمكان الاستعدادي الذي هو كمال ما بالقوة من حيث هو بالقوة في خصوص الطرف الخارجي كما أن الإمكان الذاتي هو كمال الماهية المعرفة عن الوجود على الإطلاق من حيث هي كذلك في أي نحو من الظروف و هو أوغل في الخفاء و الظلمة و النقصان من الإمكان - الذي هو إحدى الكيفيات الاستعدادية لكونه بالفعل من جهة أخرى غير جهة كونها قوة و إمكاناً لشيء فإن المني و إن كان بالقياس إلى حصول الصورة الإنسانية له بالقوة لكن بالقياس إلى نفسه و كونه ذا صورة منوية بالفعل فهو ناقص الإنسانية تام المنوية بخلاف الإمكان الذاتي الذي هو أمر سلبي محض و ليس له من جهة أخرى معنى تحصيلي و لأن المقوي عليه في الإمكان الاستعدادي هو أمر معين و صورة خاصة كالإنسانية في مثالنا بخلاف ما يضاف إليه الإمكان الذاتي لأنه مطلق الوجود و العدم و إنما التعيين ناش من قبل الفاعل من غير استدعاء الماهية بإمكانها إياه - و لأن الإمكان الاستعدادي يزول عند طريان ما هو استعداد له بخلاف الإمكان الذاتي الذي هو بحسب حال الماهية في مرتبة بطلان نفسها و باعتبار عدم ذاتها لا بحسب حالها قبل وجوده الخارجي ففعالية الشيء و تحققه و وجوبه في نفس الأمر لا يطرد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣٥

إمكانه الذاتي لكونه بحسب مرتبة الماهية و ما بحسب الماهية لا يزول بعلة خارجية - بخلاف إمكانها الاستعدادي الذي

هو بحسب الواقع فلا يجمع الفعلية فيه فأحد الإمكانين أشد فيما يستدعيه الممكنية من القوة والفاقة والشر ولأن الإمكان الذاتي منبع الإمكان الاستعدادي وذلك لأن الهيولى التي هي مصححة جهات الشرور والأعدام إنما نشأت من العقل الفعال بواسطة جهة الإمكان فيه ولأجل أن الإمكان الاستعدادي له حظ من الوجود يقبل الشدة والضعف بحسب القرب من الحصول والبعد عنه فاستعداد النطفة للصورة الإنسانية أضعف من استعداد العلقة لها وهو من استعداد المضغة وهكذا إلى استعداد البدن الكامل بقواه وآلاته وأعضائه مع مزاج صالح لها وإنما يحصل الاستعداد التام بعد تحقق الإمكان الذاتي بحدوث بعض الدواعي والأسباب وانبتات بعض الموانع والأضداد وينقطع استمراره و اشتداده إما بحصول الشيء بالفعل وإما بطرو بعض الأضداد.

و بالجملة فإطلاق الإمكان على المعنيين بضرب من الاشتراك الصناعي لاقتضاء أحدهما رجحان أحد الجانبين وقبوله الشدة والضعف وعدم لزومه لماهية الممكن - وقيامه بمحل الممكن لا به وكونه من الأمور الموجودة في الأعيان لكونه كيفية حاصلة لمحلها معدة إياها لإضافة المبدأ الجواد وجود الحادث فيه إما بالذات كالصورة والعرض أو بالعرض كالنفس المجردة بخلاف الثاني لأنه بخلافه في جميع تلك الأحكام ثم الإمكان الاستعدادي إذا أضيف إلى ما يقوم به يسمى استعداد - وإذا أضيف إلى الحادث فيه يسمى إمكان ذلك الحادث فالإمكان الوقوعي بما هو إمكان وقوعي للشيء قائم لا به بل بمحله فهو بالوصف بحال المتعلق أشبه.

و منهم من يرى أن المسمى بالإمكان الاستعدادي هو بعينه الكيفية المزاجية وغيرها من

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حيث انتسابها إلى الصورة التي ستحدث بسببها فمزاج النطفة إذا اعتبر بذاته كان كيفية مزاجية وإذا نسب إلى الصورة الحيوانية كان استعدادا لها وكذلك صحن الدار صفة الدار وإذا أضيف في الذهن إلى عدد ما يسهه من الناس كان إمكانا له و ستسمع في تحقيقه ما هو الحق القراح في فصل القوة والفعل بإذن الله العليم الفعال

فصل (١٨) في بعض أحكام الممتنع بالذات

و اعلم أن العقل كما لا يقدر أن يتعقل حقيقة الواجب بالذات لغاية مجده و علوه و شدة نوريته و وجوبه و فعليته و عدم تناهي عظمته و كبرائه كذلك لا يقدر على أن يتصور الممتنع بالذات بما هو ممتنع بالذات فغاية نقصه و محوطة بطلانه و لا شيء - فكما لا ينال ذات القيوم الواجب بالذات لأنه محيط بكل شيء فلا يحاط للعقل - فكذلك لا يدرك الممتنع بالذات لفراره عن صقع الوجود و الشيئية فلا حظ له من الهوية حتى يشار إليه و يحيط به العقل و يدركه الشعور و يصل إليه الوهم فالحكم بكون شيء ممتنعا بالذات بضرب من البرهان على سبيل العرض والاستتباع كما أن الدليل على وجود الحق المبدع إنما يكون بنحو من البيان الشبيه بالبرهان اللمي - و كما تحقق أن الواجب بالذات لا يكون واجبا بغيره فكذلك الممتنع بالذات لا يكون ممتنعا بغيره بمثل ذلك البيان و كما لا يكون لشيء واحد وجوبان بذاته و بغيره أو بذاته فقط أو بغيره فقط فلا يكون أيضا لأمر واحد امتناعان كذلك فإذا قد استبان أن الموصوف بما بالغير من الوجوب و الامتناع ممكن بالذات و ما يستلزم الممتنع بالذات فهو ممتنع لا محالة من جهة بها يستلزم الممتنع و إن كانت لها جهة أخرى إمكانية - لكن ليس الاستلزام للممتنع إلا من الجهة الامتناعية مثلا كون الجسم غير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣٧

الأبعاد يستلزم ممتنعاً بالذات هو كون المحصور غير محصور الذي مرجعه إلى كون الشيء غير نفسه مع أنه عين نفسه فأحدهما محال بالذات والآخرة محال بالغير فلا محالة يكون ممكناً باعتبار غير اعتباره علاقته مع الممتنع بالذات على قياس ما علمت في استلزام الشيء للواجب بالذات فإنه ليس من جهة ماهيته الإمكانية بل من جهة وجوب وجوده الإمكانية - و بالجملة فكما أن الاستلزام في الوجود بين الشئيين لا بد له من علاقة عليية و معلولية بين المتلازمين فكذلك الاستلزام في العدم و الامتناع بين شئيين لا ينفك عن تعلق ارتباطي بينهما و كما أن الواجبين لو فرضنا لم يكونا متلازمين بل متصاحبين بحسب البخت و الاتفاق كذلك التلازم الاصطلاحي لا يكون بين ممتنعين بالذات - بل بين ممتنع بالذات و ممتنع بالغير و هو لا محالة ممكن بالذات كما مر و بهذا يفرق الشرطي اللزومي عن الشرطي الاتفاقي فإن الأول يحكم فيه بصدق التالي وضعاً و رفعاً على تقدير صدق المقدم وضعاً و رفعاً لعلاقة ذاتية بينهما و الثاني يحكم فيه كذلك من غير علاقة لزومية بل بمجرد الموافقة الاتفاقية بين المقدم و التالي.

فما فشى عند عامة الجدليين في أثناء المناظرة عند فرض أمر مستحيل ليتوصل به إلى استحالة أمر من الأمور بالبيان الخلفي أو الاستقامي أن يقال إن مفروضك مستحيل - فجاز أن يستلزم نقيض ما ادعيت استلزامه إياه لكون المحال قد يلزم منه محال آخر واضح الفساد فإن المحال لا يستلزم أي محال كان بل محالاً إذا قدر وجودهما - يكون بينهما تعلق سببي و مسببي فإذن المتصلة اللزومية من كاذبتين قد تصدق و قد لا تصدق لأنهما إذا تحققت بينهما علاقة لزومية كحمازية الإنسان و ناهقيته صدقت لزومية و إذا لم تتحقق تلك العلاقة بينهما فإما أن يجد العقل بينهما علاقة المنافاة - فكذب الحكم بينهما بالاتصال رأساً أو لا يكون بينهما إلا مجرد الاتصال الاتفاقي - من غير لزوم و تناف ذاتيين لعدم العلاقة بينهما أصلاً فصح الحكم بينهما بالاتصال على نحو التجويز و الاحتمال لعدم إجراء البرهان اليقيني إلا في اللزوميات فإن الضرورة و الوجوب مناط الجزم و اليقين و الجواز و الإمكان مثار الظن و التخمين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣٨

فصل (١٩) في أن الممتنع أو المعدوم كيف يعلم

كل ما كان معلوماً فلا بد أن يكون متميزاً عن غيره و كل متميز عن غيره فهو موجود فإذن كل معلوم موجود و ينعكس انعكاس النقيض أن ما لا يكون موجوداً لا يكون معلوماً لكننا قد نعرف أموراً كثيرة هي معدومة و ممتنعة الوجود و مع ذلك فهي معلومة مثل أنا نعلم عدم شريك الباري و عدم اجتماع النقيضين فكيف يمكن الجمع بين هذين القولين المتنافيين ظاهراً.

فنقول المعدوم لا يخلو إما أن يكون بسيطاً و إما أن يكون مركباً فإن كان بسيطاً مثل عدم ضد الله تعالى و عدم شريكه و عدم مثله و غير ذلك فذلك إنما يعقل لأجل تشبيهه بأمر موجود مثل أن يقال ليس له تعالى شيء نسبته إليه نسبة السواد إلى البياض و لا له ما نسبته إليه نسبة المندرج مع آخر تحت نوع أو جنس فلو لا معرفة المضادة أو المماثلة أو المجانسة بين أمور وجودية لاستحال الحكم بأن ليس لله تعالى ضد أو مماثل أو مجانس أو ما يجري مجراها من المحالات عليه و إن كان مركباً مثل العلم بعدم اجتماع المتقابلين كالمضادين فالعلم به إنما يتم بالعلم بأجزائه الوجودية - مثل أن يعقل

السواد والبياض ثم يعقل الاجتماع حيث يجوز ثم يقال الاجتماع الذي هو أمر وجودي معقول غير حاصل بين السواد والبياض فالحاصل أن عدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٣٩

البسائط إنما يعرف بالمقايضة إلى الأمور الوجودية و عدم المركبات إنما يعرف بمعرفة بسائطها هذا ما قيل في هذا المقام.

و أنا أقول إن للعقل أن يتصور لكل شيء حتى المستحيلات كالمعدوم المطلق و المجهول المطلق و اجتماع النقيضين و شريك الباري و غير ذلك مفهوما و عنوانا- فيحكم عليه أحكاما مناسبة لها و يعقد قضايا إيجابية على سبيل الهليات الغير البتية- فموضوعات تلك القضايا من حيث إنها مفهومات في العقل و لها حظ من الثبوت و يصدق عليها شيء و ممكن عام بل عرض و كيفية نفسانية و علم و ما يجري مجراها- تصير منشأ لصحة الحكم عليها و من حيث إنها عنوان لأمر باطل تصير منشأ لامتناع الحكم عليها و عند اعتبار الحيتين يحكم عليها بعدم الإخبار عنها أو بعدم الحكم عليها أو بعدم ثبوتها أو أشباه ذلك و بهذا تندفع الشبهة المشهورة في قولنا المجهول المطلق لا يخبر عنه و السرف في ذلك صدق بعض المفهومات على نفسه بالحمل الأولي و عدم صدقه على نفسه بالحمل الشائع العرضي فإن مفهوم شريك الباري و المجهول المطلق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٠

يصدق على نفسه بأحد الحملين و مقابله يصدق عليه بالحمل الآخر و هذا مناط صحة الحكم عليه بأنه ممتنع الوجود

فصل (٢٠) في أن الممتنع كيف يصح أن يستلزم ممتنعا آخر

و اعلم أن من عادة عامة الجدليين أن يقولوا هذا المفروض لما كان محالا جاز أن يستلزم محالا آخر أي محال كان و هذا ليس بصحيح كلية إذ لا فرق بين المحال و الممكن في أن الاستلزام بين شيئين لا يثبت إلا بعلاقة ذاتية فإن معنى الملازمة هو كون الشئيين بحيث لا يمكن في نظر العقل نظرا إلى ذاتيهما وقوع تصور الانفكاك بينهما و هذا مما يستدعي العلاقة العلية الإيجابية إما بين نفس العلة و معلولها و إما بين معلولي علة واحدة على الوجه الذي سيجيء في مبحث التلازم بين الهيولى و الصورة- ألم تسمع قول الميزانيين إن الشرطية اللزومية ما يكون الحكم فيها بصدق التالي- على تقدير صدق المقدم لعلاقة بينهما طبيعية و لهذا يمتاز عن الشرطية الاتفاقية و كما أن الاستلزام لا يتحقق إلا بتحقيق العلاقة الطبيعية بالفعل فجواز الاستلزام لا يكون إلا بجواز تحقق العلاقة فكل ما صح عند العقل أن يكون بين المحالين على تقدير تحققهما علاقة ذاتية يكون بحسبها اللزوم جاز أن يحكم بالاستلزام بينهما و إلا بطل بته فإذن المحال قد يستلزم محالا آخر إذا كان بينهما علاقة ذاتية سواء كانت معلومة بالضرورة كاستلزام تحقق مجموع ممتنعين ذاتيين تحقق أحدهما و كاستلزام حمارية زيد مثلا ناهقيته أو بالاكساب كما أن الدور يستلزم التسلسل و قد لا يستلزم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤١

إذا لم يكن بينهما علاقة عقلية بل ربما ينافيه إذا كان العقل يجد بينهما علاقة المنافاة- إما بالفطرة كما في تحقق المركب

من الممتنعين بالذات بالنسبة إلى تحقق أحدهما فقط أو حمارية الإنسان بالنسبة إلى صاهليته وإما بالاكتساب كما في حمارية الإنسان - بالنسبة إلى إدراكه للكليات على تقدير الحمارية فإذاً قولنا المحال جاز أن يستلزم المحال قضية موجبة مهمة و قولنا الواقع لا يستلزم المحال سالبة كلية فالمتصلة للزومية من كاذبتين إنما تصدق إذا كان بينهما علاقة للزوم فإذا لم يكن بينهما علاقة للزوم - فإما أن يكذب الحكم بالاتصال رأساً إذا وجد العقل بينهما علاقة المنافاة وإما أن يصدق الاتصال الاتفاقي دون للزومي إذا لم يكن هناك علاقة أصلاً لا علاقة للزوم ولا علاقة المنافاة وذلك أيضاً إنما يصح على سبيل الاحتمال التجويزي - لا الحكم البتي من العقل إذ الاتفاق إنما يكون بين الموجودات و أما الكاذبات الاتفاقية أي المعدومات و الممتنعات فعلى سبيل التجويز فلعن التحقق التقديري يتفق لبعضها دون بعض فإذاً لا يصدق الحكم البتي بأن الكاذبين المتفقين كذبا يتفقان صدقا أصلاً.

و من الناس من يكتفي في الحكم بجواز الزوم بين محالين بعدم المنافاة بينهما - وإن لم يجد العقل علاقة للزوم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٢

و منهم من يعتبر علاقة للزوم.

و منهم من يعتبر العلاقة و يظن أنها قد تتحقق مع المنافاة فإذاً تحققت حكم بجواز الاستلزام و المنافاة و هما متصادمان بته و ربما يتشبث بأن اجتماع النقيضين مستلزم لارتفاعهما لأن تحقق كل من النقيضين يوجب ارتفاع الآخر.

و لا يخفى فيه الزور فإن تحقق أحد النقيضين في نفس الأمر مستلزم لارتفاع الآخر لا تحققه على تقدير محال و هو اجتماعه مع الآخر فتحققه على ذلك التقدير مستلزم لتحقيق الآخر لا لارتفاعه فمن أين يلزم من تحققهما ارتفاعهما.

تفريع:

و من هناك ينحل ما ربما يتشكك أحد فيقول إن الزوميات لا تنتج متصلة لأن الملازمة في الكبرى يحتمل أن لا يبقى على تقدير ثبوت الأصغر مثلاً إذا قلنا كلما كان هذا اللون سواداً و بياضاً كان سواداً و كلما كان سواداً لم يكن بياضاً بطلت الملازمة في الكبرى إذا ثبت الأصغر فإذاً لا يلزم من ذلك كلما كان هذا اللون سواداً و بياضاً لم يكن بياضاً و الحل أن الوسط إن وقع في الكبرى على الجهة التي بها يستلزم الأكبر لزمت النتيجة بته و إلا فلم يكن الوسط مشتركاً ففي هذا المثال السواد في الكبرى بالمعنى المضاد للبياض و في الصغرى بالمعنى المجامع له فلذلك لم تبق الملازمة مع الأصغر فالخلل إنما وقع بسبب عدم تكرار الوسط لا بسبب العارض التابع فإذاً الحد الأوسط في مثل هذا القياس إن أخذ على وجه يجوز أن يحمل أو يصدق عليه النقيضان و الضدان في كلتا المقدمتين كذبت الكبرى لا محالة و بطل لزوم النتيجة و إن أخذ في إحدى المقدمتين على وجه و في الأخرى على وجه آخر لم يتكرر الوسط و من هذا القبيل ما أورد الشيخ في الشفاء شكاً على الشكل الأول من اللزوميتين و هو أنه يصدق كلما كان الاثنان فرداً كان عدداً و كلما كان عدداً كان زوجاً مع كذب قولنا كلما كان الاثنان فرداً كان زوجاً و دفع بأن الكبرى إن أخذت اتفاقية لم ينتج القياس لأن شرط إنتاج الإيجاب أن يكون الأوسط مقدماً في اللزومية - و إن أخذت لزومية كانت ممنوعة الصدق و إنما تصدق لو لزم زوجية الاثنيين عدديته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٣

على جميع الأوضاع الممكنة الاجتماع مع العددية و ليس كذلك إذ من الأوضاع الممكنة الاقتران مع عددية الاثنين كونه فردا و الزوجية ليست ملازمة على هذا الوضع - و ربما يقال فيه ضعف فإننا نختار أن الكبرى لزومية و فردية الاثنين ليست ممكنة الاجتماع مع عدديته لكونها منافية للاثنينية فتكون منافية لذات الاثنين فزوجية الاثنين لازمة لعدديته على جميع الأوضاع الممكنة الاجتماع معها فتصدق لزومية و حق الدفع و الحل ما في الشفا - أن الصغرى كاذبة بحسب نفس الأمر لا بحسب الإلزام لأن بحسب الإلزام كما تصدق الصغرى تصدق النتيجة أيضا لأن من يرى أن الاثنين فرد فلا بد أن يلتزم أنه زوج أيضا و إلا لم يكن يلتزم أن الاثنين فرد بل غير الاثنين و لك أن تقول إن الدفيعين متشاركا المسلك في الإصابة و لا ضعف في الأول فإنه إن أريد أن بين عددية الاثنين و فرديته منافاة في نفس الأمر فهو حق و لا ضير إذ الأوضاع الممكنة الاقتران مع فرض المقدم ليس يجب أن لا يكون شيء منها منافيا له في نفس الأمر و إن أريد أن المنافاة تكون متحققة بحسب جميع الاعتبارات فهو ليس بحق فإن الملازمة بين فردية الاثنين و عدديته صارت متحققة بحسب وضع ما و تسليم ما - فإذن زوجية الاثنين ليست بلازمة لعدديته على جميع الأوضاع الممكنة الاقتران معها و لو بحسب الوضع و التسليم

فصل (٢١) في كون وجود الممكن زائدا على ماهيته عقلا

زيادة وجود الممكن على ماهيته ليس معناه المباينة بينهما بحسب الحقيقة - كيف و حقيقة كل شيء نحو وجود الخاص به و لا كونه عرضا قائما بها قيام الأعراض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٤

لموضوعاتها حتى يلزم للماهية سوى وجودها وجود آخر بل بمعنى كون الوجود الإمكانى لقصوره و فقره مشتملا على معنى آخر غير حقيقة الوجود منتزعا منه محمولا عليه منبعثا عن إمكانه و نقصه كالمشبهكات التي تتراءى من مراتب نقصانات الضوء و الظلال الحاصلة من تصورات النور و المشهور في كتب القوم من الدلائل على زيادة الوجود على الماهيات و جوه لا يفيد شيء منها إلا التغاير بين الوجود و الماهية بحسب المفهوم و المعنى دون الذات و الحقيقة. فمنها إفادة الحمل فإن حمل الوجود على الماهية مفيد و حمل الماهية و ذاتياتها عليها غير مفيد.

و منها الحاجة إلى الاستدلال فإن التصديق بثبوت الوجود للماهية قد يفتقر إلى كسب و نظر كوجود العقل مثلا بخلاف ثبوت الماهية و ذاتياتها لها لأنهما بينتا الثبوت لها - و منها صحة السلب إذ يصح سلب الوجود عن الماهية مثل العنقاء ليس بموجود و ليس يصح سلب الماهية و ذاتياتها عن نفسها.

و منها اتحاد المفهوم فإن الوجود معنى واحد و الإنسان و الفرس و الشجر مختلفة.

و منها الانفكاك في التعقل فإننا قد نتصور الماهية و لا نتصور كونها لا الخارجي و لا الذهني.

لا يقال التصور ليس إلا الكون الذهني - لأننا لا نسلم أن التصور هو الكون في الذهن و إن أسلم فبالدليل و إن سلم فتصور الشيء لا يستلزم تصور تصوره و عبارة الأكثرين أنا قد نتصور الماهية - و نشك في وجودها العيني و الذهني فيرد عليها الاعتراض بأنه لا يفيد المطلوب لأن حاصله أنا ندرك الماهية تصورا و لا ندرك الوجود تصديقا و هذا لا ينافي الاتحاد و لا يستلزم المغايرة بين الماهية و الوجود لعدم اتحاد الحد الأوسط في القياس.

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فهذه الوجوه الخمسة بعد تمامها لا يدل إلا على أن المعقول من الوجود - غير المعقول من الماهية مع أن المطلوب عندهم تغايرهما بحسب الذات والحقيقة أو لا ترى أن صفات المبدأ الأعلى عند أهل الحق متغايرة بحسب المفهوم واحدة بحسب الذات والحيثية لأن حيثية الذات بعينها حيثية جميع صفاته الكمالية كما سيجيء إن شاء الله تعالى

فصل (٢٢) في إثبات أن وجود الممكن عين ماهيته خارجا و متحد بها نحواً من الاتحاد

لأنه حيث بينا أن الوجود بالمعنى الحقيقي لا الانتزاعي المصدرى العام من الأمور العينية فلو لم يكن الوجود الإمكانى متحدا بالماهية الممكنة اتحاد الأمر العيني مع المفهوم الاعتباري لكان نفس الماهية بحسب المفهوم أو جزء منها كذلك وقد تبين بطلانه اتفاقا وعقلا لإمكان تصورهما مع الغفلة عن وجودها - ولغير ذلك من الوجوه المذكورة أو زائدا عليها قائما بها في الأعيان قيام الصفة بالموصوف وقيام الشيء بالشيء و ثبوته له فرع قيام ذلك الشيء لا بما يقوم به و ثبوته في نفسه فيلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه أو تكرر أنحاء وجود شيء واحد من حيثية واحدة - وكلاهما ممتنعان لأن ما لا كون له في نفسه لا يكون محلا لشيء آخر فكون الماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٦

إما بالوجود العارض فيلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه ضرورة تقدم وجود المعروض على وجود العارض وإما بوجود آخر فيلزم المحذور الثاني وينجر إلى التسلسل في المترتبات من الوجود المجتمعة وهذا التسلسل مع امتناعه بالبراهين واستلزامه لانهصار ما لا يتناهى بين حاصرين الوجود والماهية يستلزم المدعى وهو كون الوجود نفس الماهية في العين لأن قيام جميع الوجودات العارضة لها بحيث لا يشذ عنها وجود عارض يستلزم وجودا لها غير عارض وإلا لم يكن الجميع جميعا.

طريق آخر لو قام الوجود بالماهية فالماهية المعروضة إما معدومة فيتناقض - أو موجودة فيدور أو يتسلسل. والجواب بأن قيامه بالماهية من حيث هي لا بالماهية المعدومة ليلزم التناقض ولا بالماهية الموجودة ليلزم الدور أو التسلسل كما أن قيام البياض ليس بالجسم الأبيض ولا بالجسم اللاأبيض ليلزم إما التناقض وإما الدور أو التسلسل بل قيامه بالجسم من حيث هو غير نافع لأن الماهية من حيث هي مع قطع النظر عن الوجود والعدم ليس لها تحصل في الخارج إلا باعتبار وجودها لا سابقا عليه - فلا يجوز أن يثبت لها في الخارج شيء من هذه الجهة بل كل ما يعرضها من هذه الجهة يكون من لوازمها الانتزاعية التي لا وجود لها في العين - بخلاف الجسم من حيث هو أي مع قطع النظر عن البياض واللا بياض فإنه موجود في الخارج بهذه حيثية وجودا سابقا على وجود البياض ومقابلة و أيضا ثبوت البياض للجسم ليس فرع بياض الجسم بل فرع وجود الجسم وكذا ثبوت كل صفة بياضا أو غيره لكل موصوف جسما أو غيره يتفرع على ثبوت الموصوف في نفسه لا حصول تلك الصفة فلا يلزم توقف الشيء على نفسه ولا التسلسل بخلاف الوجود فإنه لو كان صفة للماهية لكان وجود الماهية متوقفا على وجودها فيتوقف الشيء على نفسه فقياس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٧

الوجود لو كان صفة زائدة لشيء على سائر الصفات مغالطة فالحق كما سبق أن زيادة الوجود على الماهية في التصور لا

في العين بأن يلاحظ العقل كلا منهما من غير ملاحظة الآخر و يعتبر الوجود متصلا و يلاحظ معنى له اختصاص ناعت للماهية لا بحسب الخارج كاتصاف الجسم بالبياض ليلزم تقدمها عليه بالوجود تقدما زمانيا أو ذاتيا فيلزم المحالات بل غاية الأمر أنه يلزم تقدمها عليه بالوجود العقلي و نلتزم ذلك لجواز أن يلاحظها العقل وحدها من غير ملاحظة وجود خارجي أو ذهني معها و ملاحظتها مع عدم ملاحظة شيء من الوجود معها وإن كانت نحوها من الوجود الذهني لكن لا يلاحظها العقل من حيث ذلك الوجود إذ لا يلاحظ ذلك الوجود وإن كان هو نفس تلك الملاحظة فإن عدم اعتبار الشيء غير اعتبار عدمه فللعقل أن يصف الماهية بالوجود المطلق في هذه الملاحظة لا بحسبها ثم إن اعتبر العقل وجودها الذهني لم يلزم تسلسل في الوجودات بل ينقطع بانقطاع الاعتبار و من الناس من منع لزوم تقدم المعروض على العارض بالوجود على الإطلاق قائلا إن ذلك في عوارض الوجود دون عوارض الماهية.

وهم وفهم:

و ما يقال إنا نتصور الماهية مع الذهول عن وجودها إنما هو بالنسبة إلى الوجود الخارجي إذ لو نذهل عن وجودها الذهني - لم يكن في الذهن شيء أصلا و لو سلم ذهولنا عن وجودها الذهني مع عدم الذهول عنها لا يلزم أيضا أنها تكون غير الوجود مطلقا لجواز أن تكون الماهية وجودا خاصا - يعرض لها الوجود في الذهن بوجه و هو كونها في الذهن كما يعرض لها في الخارج و هو كونها في الخارج فيحصل الذهول عن وجودها في الذهن و لا يحصل عنها و الوجود قد يعرض لنفسه باعتبار تعدده كالوجود لعرض العام اللازم للوجودات الخاصة و من هنا قيل إن الوجود هو الكون و الحصول فالحق كما ذهبنا إليه وفاقا للمحققين من أهل الله هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٨

أن الماهيات كلها وجودات خاصة و بقدر ظهور نور الوجود بكمالاته تظهر تلك الماهيات و لوازمها تارة في الذهن و أخرى في الخارج و قوة ذلك الظهور و ضعفه - بحسب القرب من الحق الأول و البعد عنه و قلة الوسائط و كثرتها و صفاء الاستعداد و كدرة فيظهر للبعض جميع الكمالات اللازمة للوجود بما هو وجود و للبعض دون ذلك و صور تلك الماهيات في أذهاننا هي ظلال تلك الصور الوجودية - الفائضة من الحق على سبيل الإبداع الأولى الحاصلة فينا بطريق الانعكاس من المبادي العالية أو بظهور نور الوجود فينا بقدر نصيبنا من تلك الحضرة و لذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٩

صعب العلم بحقائق الأشياء على ما هي عليه إلا لمن تنور قلبه بنور الحق و ارتفع الحجاب بينه و بين الوجود المحض فإنه يدرك بالحق تلك الصور العلمية على ما هي عليه في أنفسها و مع ذلك بقدر إنيتته محتجب عن ذلك فغاية عرفان العارفين إقرارهم بالعجز و التقصير و علمهم برجوع الكل إليه و هو العليم الخبير

تفصيل مقال لتوضيح حال:

اختلف كلمة أرباب الأنظار و أصحاب الأفكار - في أن موجودية الأشياء بما ذا. فذهب بعض الأعلام من الكرام إلى أن موجودية كل شيء هو كونه متحدا مع مفهوم الموجود و هو عنده مفهوم بديهي بسيط يعبر عنه بالفارسية به هست - و ذهب أبو الحسن الأشعري إلى أن وجود كل شيء عين ذاته بمعنى أن المفهوم

من وجود الإنسان هو الحيوان الناطق و لفظ الوجود في العربية و مرادفاته في سائر اللغات مشترك بين معان لا تكاد تنحصر.

و جمهور المتكلمين على أن الوجود عرض قائم بالماهية في الواجب و الممكن جميعا قيام الأعراض.
و المشهور من مذهب الحكماء المشاءين أنه كذلك في الممكنات و في الواجب عين ذاته.
و توجيه مذهبهم كما سبق أن وجود الممكن زائد على ماهيته ذهنا بمعنى كون المفهوم من أحدهما غير المفهوم من الآخر ذهنا و نفس ذاته حقيقة و عينا بمعنى عدم تمايزهما بالهوية و وجود الواجب عين ذاته يعني أن حقيقته وجود خاص قائم بذاته من دون اعتبار معنى آخر فيه غير حيثية الوجود بلا اعتبار انتسابه إلى فاعل يوجده أو محل يقوم به و لو في العقل و هو عندهم مخالف لوجودات الممكنات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥٠

بالحقيقة و إن كان مشاركا لها في كونه معروضا للوجود المطلق و يعبرون عنه بالوجود البحت و الوجود بشرط لا بمعنى أنه لا يقوم بالماهية كما في وجود الممكنات - و قالوا لو كان الواجب ذا ماهية فإما أن يكون الواجب هو المجموع فلزم تركبه و لو عقلا أو يكون أحدهما فلزم احتياجه ضرورة احتياج الماهية في تحققها إلى الوجود - و احتياج الوجود لعروضه إلى الماهية و لو عقلا.

و حين اعترض عليهم بأن الوجود الخاص أيضا يحتاج إلى الوجود المطلق - ضرورة امتناع تحقق الخاص بدون العام. أجابوا بأنه وجود خاص متحقق بنفسه لا بالفاعل قائم بذاته لا بالماهية - غني في التحقق عن الوجود المطلق و غيره من العوارض و الأسباب و وقوع الوجود المطلق عليها وقوع لازم وجود خارجي غير مقوم كما أن كون الشيء أخص من مطلق الماهية لا يوجب احتياجه إليها و كيف و المطلق اعتباري محض و الوجودات عندهم حقائق متخالفة متكثرة بأنفسها لا بمجرد عارض الإضافة إلى الماهيات لتكون متماثلة الحقيقة و لا بالفصول ليكون الوجود المطلق جنسا لها إلا أنه لما لم يكن لكل وجود اسم خاص كما في أقسام الشيء توهم أن تكثر الوجودات إنما هو بمجرد الإضافة - إلى الماهيات المعروضة لها و ليس كذلك.

و منهم من فرق فقال بالاختلاف بالحقيقة حيث يكون بينهما من الاختلاف ما بالتشكيك كوجود الواجب و وجود الممكن.

و زعمت جماعة من الآخرين أن الوجود أمر عام عقلي انتزاعي من المعقولات الثانية و هو ليس عينا لشيء من الموجودات حقيقة نعم مصداق حمله على الواجب ذاته بذاته و على غيره ذاته من حيث هو مجعول الغير فالمحمول في الجميع زائد بحسب الذهن و مبدأ انتزاع المحمول في الممكن ذاته من حيثية مكتسبة من الفاعل و في الواجب ذاته بذاته و إلى هذا المذهب مال صاحب الإشراق كما يظهر من كلامه و كتبه و خلاصة ما ذكر من احتجاجاته مع المشاءين في هذا الباب أنه لو وجد الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥١

فإما بوجود زائد فيتسلسل أو بوجود هو نفسه فلا يكون إطلاق الموجود على الوجود - و على سائر الأشياء بمعنى واحد

لأن معناه في الوجود أنه الوجود وفي غيره أنه ذو الوجود وأنه على تقدير تحقق الوجود إما أن يكون جوهرًا فلا يقع صفة للأشياء - أو عرضًا فيتقوم المحل بدوره و التقوم بدون الوجود محال وأنه لو وجد الوجود للماهية فله نسبة إليها و للنسبة وجود و لوجود النسبة نسبة إلى النسبة و يتسلسل - وأنه لو وجد فأما قبل الماهية فيكون مستقلًا دونها لا صفة لها أو بعدها فهي قبل الوجود موجودة أو معها فهي موجودة معه لا به.

و قالت طائفة أن موجودة الواجب بكون ذاته تعالى وجودًا خاصًا حقيقيًا - و موجودة الممكنات بارتباطها بالوجود الحقيقي الذي هو الواجب بالذات فالوجود عندهم واحد شخصي و التكثر في الموجودات بواسطة تكثر الارتباطات لا بواسطة تكثر وجوداتها فإذا نسب الوجود الحقيقي إلى الإنسان مثلاً حصل موجود و إذا نسب إلى الفرس فموجود آخر و هكذا فمعنى قولنا الواجب موجود أنه وجود و معنى قولنا الإنسان أو الفرس موجود أن له نسبة إلى الواجب حتى إن قولنا وجود زيد و وجود عمرو بمنزلة قولنا إله زيد و إله عمرو فمفهوم الموجود أعم من الوجود القائم بذاته و من الأمور المنتسبة إليه نحوا من الانتساب لأن صدق المشتق لا ينافي قيام مبدأ الاشتقاق بذاته الذي مرجعه عدم قيامه بالغير و لا كون ما صدق عليه أمرًا منتسبًا إلى المبدأ لا معروضًا له بوجه من الوجوه كما في الحداد المأخوذ من الحديد - و التامر المأخوذ من التمر على أن أمر إطلاق أهل اللغة و أرباب اللسان لا عبرة به في تصحيح الحقائق و قالوا كون المشتق من المعقولات الثانية و المفهومات العامة و البديهيات الأولية لا يصادم كون المبدأ حقيقة متصلة متشخصة مجهولة الكنه و ثانوية المعقول و تأصله قد يختلف بالقياس إلى الأمور و نسبوا هذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥٢

المذهب إلى أذواق المتألهين من الحكماء و قد مر القدر فيه من قبلنا. و ما يفهم من أواخر كتاب التلويحات للشيخ الإلهي صاحب الأنوار هو أن وجود المجرد سواء كان واجبًا أو ممكنًا عقلاً أو نفسًا عين ذاته فالمجردات عنده وجودات محضة قائمة بذواتها بدليل لاح له أولاً على كون ماهية النفس الإنسانية هي الوجود ثم حكم به على تجرد وجود ما فوقها و اقتصر في بيان ذلك على قوله و إذا كان ذاتي على هذه البساطة فالعقول أولى و مراده أن العقول علل النفوس على ما سيجيء و هي أقرب في مرتبة المعلولية إلى الواجب لذاته و العلة لا بد و أن تكون أشرف من المعلول و أقوى تحصيلًا و قوامًا فما هو أقرب إلى الواجب فلا بد و أن يكون أفضل من الأبعد منه و أكمل و إذا كانت النفوس وجودات مجردة غير مركبة الذات من جنس و فصل إذ كل ما ماهيته نفس الوجود فهو بسيط الحقيقة لا تركيب فيه فما فوقها من العقول و ما هو فوق الجميع و وراء الكل أولى بذلك إذ كل كمال و شرف يمكن بالإمكان العامي للموجود بما هو موجود و لا يوجب تجسماً و لا تركيباً و لا نقصاً بوجه من الوجوه فإذا تحقق في المعلول فقد وجب تحققه في العلة - إذ المعلول رشح و فيض من العلة و حيث توجه عليه الإشكال في كون النفس وجودًا قائمًا بذاته من وجهين - أحدهما أن الوجود الواجب إنما كان واجبًا لكونه غير مقارن لماهية إذ لو كان مقارنًا للماهية لكان ممكنًا و إذا كان كذا فكل وجود لا يقارن ماهية فهو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥٣

واجب فلو كانت النفوس ماهياتها القائمة بأنفسها هي عين الوجود لكانت واجبة و هو محال.

و ثانيهما أن الوجود من حيث هو وجود لو اقتضى الوجود لكان كل وجود واجبا بالذات.

و أجاب عن الأول بأن النفس وإن شاركت الواجب لذاته في كونه وجودا محضا لكن التفاوت حاصل بينهما من جهة الكمال و النقص و هو تفاوت عظيم جدا فإن الوجود الواجب لا يتصور ما هو أعلى منه في التمام و الكمال لأنه غير متناهي الشدة في قوة الوجود و وجود النفس ناقص إذ هو معلول له بعد وسائط كثيرة و مرتبة العلة في الكمال فوق مرتبة المعلول كما أن نور الشمس أشد من النور الشعاعي الذي هو معلوله و هذا تمثيل لمطلق كون المعلول أنقص من العلة و إلا فالتفاوت بين كمال الباري و كمال النفس لا يقاس إلى هذا و قد حقق روح الله رمسه في سالف القول - أن تفاوت الكمال و النقص لا يفتقر إلى مميز فصلي ليلزم من ذلك تركيب الواجب لذاته و إمكان النفوس هو نقص وجودها و كذا إمكان غيرها من المعلولات - و مراتب النقص متفاوتة تفاوتاً لا تكاد تنحصر و أما الوجود الواجب فوجوبه هو كمال وجوده الذي لا أتم منه بل و لا يجوز أن يساويه وجود آخر لاستحالة وجود واجبين.

فإن قيل الأشياء القائمة بأنفسها لا يجوز أن يكون بعضها أشد من بعض إذ لا أشد و لا أضعف فيما يقوم بنفسه.

قلنا إن دعواكم تحكم محض ليس لكم عليه حجة إلا عدم إطلاق أهل اللسان و هو مما لا عبرة به في تحقيق الحقائق.

و أجاب عن الثاني بطريقتين المنع و المعارضة

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أما الأول فهو أنا لا نسلم أنه كان واجبا لذاته بمجرد عدم مقارنته لماهية بل وجوبه لأنه وجود لا أتم منه و من لوازم كونه لا أتم منه أن لا يكون مقارنا لماهية فلو لا التفاوت فيما يقوم بنفسه بالتمامية و النقص لكان هذا السؤال متوجهاً - لكنه اندفع بالتام و الناقص و إنما يقع هذا موقعه في المتواطى لا المشكك.

و أما الثاني فبأن نقول لمن اعترف و هو جمهور المشاءين بتجرد الوجود عن الماهية في الواجب تعالى و مقارنته لها في الممكن أن مفهوم الوجود من حيث هو وجود إن اقتضى التجرد عن الماهية فيجب أن يكون كل وجود مجردا و هو بخلاف ما زعمتم في الممكنات و إن اقتضى اللاتجرد عنها فالوجود الواجب يجب أن لا يتجرد عنها و هو بخلاف ما اعترفتم به و إن لم يقتض شيئا منهما وجب أن يكون تجرد وجود الواجب لعله فيفتقر إلى غيره فلا يكون واجبا هذا خلف فإن لم يلزم هذا الإيراد هاهنا لم يلزم إيرادكم هناك و إن كان مدفوعا هناك بأن المفهوم المشترك - ليس مقولا بالتواطؤ بل بالتشكيك فقد دفع هنا أيضا.

بحث و تحصيل:

الفرق بين الموضعين واضح فإن الوجود المشترك عندهم ليس طبيعة نوعية و لا جنسا لأن الماهية و كذا جزؤها لا يمكن أن يقع عندهم على أشياء مختلفة بالتشكيك بل إنما يكون الواقع بالتشكيك عرضا خارجيا لازما يختلف ملزوماً بالحققة و الماهية و عند الشيخ حقيقة واحدة بسيطة نوعية فلهم أن يدفعوا السؤال عن أنفسهم بوجه آخر غير جهة التشكيك - و هو أن الوجود المشترك عرض لازم للوجودات الخاصة ليس ماهية و لا جزءا لشيء منها و اتحاد اللازم لا يوجب اتحاد الملزومات في الحقيقة كما أن النور معنى واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥٥

مشترك واقع على الأنوار لا بالتساوي مع أن نور الشمس يقتضي إِبصار الأعشى - دون سائر الأنوار فيكون مخالفا لها في الحقيقة و كذلك الحرارة المشتركة بين الحرارة مع أن بعضها يوجب استعداد الحياة دون البواقي و ذلك لاختلاف ملزومات النور و الحرارة المتخالفة شدة و ضعفا المتباينة نوعا عندهم و إن اشترك في مفهوم واحد عرضي نعم الكلام في أصل قاعدتهم في أن الواقع على أشياء بالتشكيك إنما يكون عرضيا و ارد كما ذكره في كتبه و لما كان نسبة الوجود الانتزاعي إلى الوجودات الحقيقية كنسبة الإنسانية المصدورية إلى الإنسان و الحيوانية المصدورية إلى الحيوان حيث إن المأخوذ عنه و المنتزع منه نفس ذات الموضوع بلا حيثية أخرى غيرها - كان الوجود حقيقة واحدة لامتناع أخذ مفهوم واحد من نفس حقائق متباينة - و انتزاع معنى واحد من صرف ذواتها المتخالفة بلا جهة جامعة يكون جهة الاتحاد - و قد مر ذكر هذا الأصل في نفي تعدد الواجب لذاته على أن حقيقة الوجود ليست ماهية كلية و إن كانت متفقة السنخ و الأصل في جميع المراتب المتعينة لا بتعين زائد على نفسها و جوهرها بل بالامتنياز بينها بنفس ما يقع به الاشتراك فيها لا غير.

ثم إن الدائر على السنة طائفة من المتصوفة أن حقيقة الواجب هو الوجود المطلق تمسكا بأنه لا يجوز أن يكون عدما أو معدوما و هو ظاهر و لا ماهية موجودة بالوجود أو مع الوجود تعليلا أو تقييدا لما في ذلك من الاحتياج و التركيب فتعين أن يكون وجودا و ليس هو الوجود الخاص لأنه إن أخذ مع المطلق فمركب أو مجردا لمعروض فمحتاج ضرورة احتياج المقيد إلى المطلق و ضرورة أنه يلزم من ارتفاعه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥٦

ارتفاع كل وجود و هذا القول منهم يؤدي في الحقيقة إلى أن وجود الواجب غير موجود و أن كل موجود حتى القاذورات واجب تعالى عما يقول الظالمون علوا كبيرا لأن الوجود المطلق مفهوم كلي من المعقولات الثانية التي لا تحقق لها في الخارج - و لا شك في تكثر الموجودات التي هي أفرادها و ما توهموا من احتياج الخاص إلى العام باطل بل الأمر بالعكس إذ العام لا يحقق له إلا في ضمن الخاص نعم إذا كان العام ذاتيا للخاص يفتقر هو إليه في تقومه في العقل دون العين و أما إذا كان عارضا فلا و أما قولهم يلزم من ارتفاعه ارتفاع كل وجود حتى الواجب فيمتنع عدمه و ما يمتنع عدمه فهو واجب فمغالطة منشؤها عدم الفرق بين ما بالذات و ما بالعرض - لأنه إنما يلزم الوجوب لو كان امتناع العدم لذاته و هو ممنوع بل ارتفاعه يستلزم ارتفاع بعض أفراد الذي هو الواجب كسائر لوازم الواجب مثل الشيئية و العلية و العالمية و غيرها فإن قيل بل يمتنع لذاته لامتناع اتصاف الشيء بنقيضه.

قلنا الممتنع اتصاف الشيء بنقيضه بمعنى حمله عليه بالمواطاة مثل الوجود عدم لا بالاشتقاق مثل قولنا الوجود معدوم كيف و قد اتفقت الحكماء على أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥٧

الوجود المطلق العام من المعقولات الثانية و الأمور الاعتبار التي لا تحقق لها في الأعيان.

فانظر ما أعجب حال الوجود من جهة الاختلافات العقلاء فيه بعد كونهم متفقين على أنه أظهر الأشياء و أعرفها عند العقل.

فمنها اختلافهم في أنه كلي أو جزئي فقليل جزئي حقيقي لا تعدد فيه أصلا- وإنما التعدد في الموجودات لأجل الإضافات إليه و الحق أن الموجود بما هو موجود كلي و الوجودات أفراد له و حصص لحقيقة الوجود باعتبار أن تشخصاتها لا يزيد على حقيقتها المشتركة بينها المتفاوتة الحصول بذاتها فيها و حقيقة الوجود ليست كلية و لا جزئية و لا عامة و لا خاصة و إن كانت مشتركة بين الموجودات و هذا عجيب لا يعرفه إلا الراسخون في العلم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥٨

و منها اختلافهم في أنه واجب أو ممكن فقد ذهب جمع كثير من المتأخرين - إلى أن مفهوم الوجود واجب و ذلك هو الضلال البعيد.

و منها اختلافهم في أنه عرض أو جوهر أو ليس بعرض و لا جوهر لكونهما من أقسام الموجود و الوجود ليس بموجود فقليل هذا هو الحق و في كلام الشيخ الرئيس و أتباعه ما يشعر في الظاهر بأنه عرض و هو بعيد جدا لأن العرض ما لا تقوم بنفسه - بل بمحلله المستغني عنه في تقومه و لا يتصور استغناء الشيء في تقومه و تحققه عن الوجود- و الحق عندي كما مر أن وجود الجوهر جوهر بنفس جوهرية ذلك الشيء و وجود العرض عرض كذلك لاتحاده معها في الواقع و إذا اعتبر حقيقته في نفسها فهو ليس بهذا الاعتبار مندرجا تحت شيء من المقولات إذ لا جنس له و لا فصل له لكونه بسيط الحقيقة و لا له ماهية كلية ليجتاج في وجودها إلى عوارض مشخصة فليس كليا و لا جزئيا بل الوجودات هي حقائق متشخصة بذواتها متفاوتة بنفس حقيقتها- مشتركة في مفهوم الموجودية العامة التي هي من الأمور الاعتبارية كما سبق القول إليه.

و منها اختلافهم في أنه موجود أو لا فقليل إنه موجود بوجود هو نفسه فلا يتسلسل و قيل بل اعتباري لا تحقق له في الأعيان و قيل ليس بموجود و لا معدوم- و الحق أن العام اعتباري و له أفراد حقيقية.

و منها اختلافهم في أن الوجودات الخاصة بنفس الماهيات أو زائدة عليها- و الحق أنه نفس الماهيات الممكنة في الواقع و غيرها بحسب بعض الاعتبارات في الذهن- و منها اختلافهم في أن لفظ الوجود مشترك بين مفهومات مختلفة أو متواط يقع على الموجودات بمعنى واحد لا تفاوت فيه أو مشكك يقع على الجميع بمعنى واحد هو مفهوم الكون لكن لا على السواء و هذا هو الحق.

و منها اختلافهم في أن الوجود سواء كان حقيقيا أو انتزاعيا معتبر في مفهوم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٥٩

الموجود و قيام المبدأ بالشيء حقيقة أو مجازا شرط في كونه موضوعا للحكم عليه بأنه موجود أم لا بل الموجود مفهوم بسيط من غير دخول المبدأ فيه و ليس للمبدأ تحقق لا عينا و لا ذهنيا و لا قيام بالموضوع لا حقيقة و لا مجازا بل موجودية كل شيء اتحاده مع مفهوم المشتق لا غير و الأول هو الحق الذي لا شبهة فيه

نقاوة عرشية:

قد تبين مما قرع سمعك أن حقيقة الوجود من حيث هو غير مقيد بالإطلاق و التقييد و الكلية و الجزئية و العموم و الخصوص و لا هو واحد بوحدة زائدة عليه و لا كثير و لا متشخص بتشخص زائد على ذاته كما سنزيدك انكشافا و لا

مبهم بل ليس له في ذاته إلا التحصل والفعلية والظهور وإنما تلحقه هذه المعاني الإمكانية والمفهومات الكلية والأوصاف الاعتبارية والنوع الذهنية بحسب مراتبه ومقاماته المنبه عليها بقوله تعالى **رَفِيعُ الدَّرَجَاتِ** فيصير مطلقاً ومقيداً وكلياً وجزئياً واحداً وكثيراً من غير حصول التغير في ذاته وحقيقته وليس بجوهر كالماهيات الجوهرية المحتاجة إلى الوجود الزائد ولوازمه وليس بعرض لأنه ليس موجوداً بمعنى أن له وجوداً زائداً فضلاً عن أن يكون في موضوع المستلزم لتقدم الشيء على نفسه وليس أمراً اعتبارياً كما يقوله الظالمون لتحققه في ذاته مع عدم الاعتبارين إياه فضلاً عن اعتبارهم وكون الحقيقة بشرط الشركة أمراً عقلياً وكون ما ينتزع عنها من الوجودية والكون المصدري شيئاً اعتبارياً لا يوجب أن تكون الحقيقة الوجودية بحسب ذاتها وعينها كذلك وهو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦٠

أعم الأشياء بحسب شموله وانبساطه على الماهيات حتى يعرض لمفهوم العدم المطلق - والمضاف والقوة والاستعداد والفقر وأمثالها من المفهومات العدمية وبنور الوجود يتميز الأعدام بعضها عن بعض عند العقل حيث يحكم عليها بامتناع بعضها وإمكان الآخر إذ كل ما هو ممكن وجوده ممكن عدمه وغير ذلك من الأحكام والاعتبارات - وهو أظهر من كل شيء تحقّقاً وإنية حتى قيل فيه إنه بديهي وأخفى من جميع الأشياء حقيقة وكنها حتى قيل إنه اعتباري محض على أنه لا يتحقق شيء في العقل ولا في الخارج إلا به فهو المحيط بجميعها بذاته وبه قوام الأشياء لأن الوجود لو لم يكن - لم يكن شيء لا في العقل ولا في الخارج بل هو عينها وهو الذي يتجلى في مراتبه ويظهر بصورها وحقائقها في العلم والعين فيسمى بالماهية والأعيان الثابتة كما لوحنا به - وهي مع سائر الصفات الوجودية مستهلكة في عين الوجود فلا مغايرة إلا في اعتبار العقل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦١

والصفات السلبية مع كونها عائدة إلى العدم أيضاً راجعة إلى الوجود من وجه والوجود لا يقبل الانقسام والتجزّي أصلاً خارجاً وعقلاً لبساطته فلا جنس له ولا فصل له فلا حد له كما علمت وهو الذي يلزمه جميع الكمالات وبه يقوم كل من الصفات فهو الحي العليم المريد القادر السميع البصير المتكلم بذاته لا بواسطة شيء آخر به يلحق الأشياء كمالاتها كلها بل هو الذي يظهر بتجليه وتحوّله في صور مختلفة بصور تلك الكمالات فيصير تابعاً للذوات لأنها أيضاً وجودات خاصة وكل تال من الوجودات الخاصة - مستهلك في وجود قاهر سابق عليه والكل مستهلكة في أحدية الوجود الحق الإلهي - مضمحلة في قهر الأول وجلاله وكبريائه كما سيأتي برهانه فهو الواجب الوجود الحق سبحانه وتعالى الثابت بذاته المثبت لغيره الموصوف بالأسماء الإلهية المنعوت بالنعوت الربانية المدعو بلسان الأنبياء والأولياء الهادي خلقه إلى ذاته أخبر بلسانهم أنه بهويته مع كل شيء لا بمداخلة ومزاولة وبحقيقته غير كل شيء لا بمزايلة وإيجاده للأشياء اختفاؤه فيها مع إظهاره إياها وإعدامه لها في القيامة الكبرى ظهوره بوحدته وقهره إياها بإزالة تعيناتها وسماتها وجعلها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦٢

متلاشية كما قال **لِمَنْ الْمُلْكُ الْيَوْمَ لِلَّهِ الْوَاحِدِ الْقَهَّارِ** و **كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلَّا وَجْهَهُ** وفي الصغرى تحوله من عالم الشهادة إلى عالم الغيب فكما أن وجود التعينات الخلقية - إنما هو بالتجليات الإلهية في مراتب الكثرة كذلك زوالها بالتجليات الذاتية في مراتب الوحدة فالماهيات صور كمالاته و مظاهر أسمائه و صفاته ظهرت أولا في العلم ثم في العين و كثرة الأسماء و تعدد الصفات و تفصيلها غير قاذحة في وحدته الحقيقية و كمالاته السرمدية كما سيجيء بيانه إن شاء الله تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦٣

المنهج الثالث في الإشارة إلى نشأة أخرى للوجود غير هذا المشهود و ما ينوط به و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في إثبات الوجود الذهني و الظهور الظلي

قد اتفقت السنة الحكماء خلافا لشرذمة من الظاهريين على أن للأشياء سوى هذا النحو من الوجود الظاهر و الظهور المكشوف لكل واحد من الناس وجودا أو ظهورا آخر عبر عنه بالوجود الذهني مظهره بل مظهره المدارك العقلية و المشاعر الحسية.

تمهيد: إنا قبل أن نخوض في إقامة الحجج على هذا المقصود و الكلام عليها و فيها نمهد لك مقدمتين -

الأولى هي أن للممكنات كما علمت ماهية و وجودا

و ستعلم بالبرهان ما قد نبهناك عليه و كاد أن تكون من المدعين له إن أخذت الفطنة بيدك أن أثر الفاعل و ما يترتب عليه أولا و بالذات ليس إلا نحوا من أنحاء وجود الشيء لا ماهيته لاستغنائها عن الجعل و التحصيل و الفعل و التكميل لا لوجوبها و شدة فعليتها بل لفرط نقصانها - و بطونها و غاية ضعفها و كمونها و الوجود قد مرت الإشارة إلى أنه مما يتفاوت شدة و ضعفا و كمالا و نقصا و كلما كان الوجود أقوى و أكمل كانت الآثار المرتبة عليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦٤

أكثر إذ الوجود بذاته مبدأ للأثر فقد يكون لماهية واحدة و مفهوم واحد أنحاء من الوجود و الظهور و أطوار من الكون و الحصول بعضها أقوى من بعض و يترتب على بعضها من الآثار و الخواص ما لا يترتب على غيره فكما أن الجوهر معنى واحد و ماهية واحدة يوجد تارة مستقلا بنفسه مفارقا عن المادة متبرئا عن الكون و الفساد و التغير فعلا ثابتا كالعقول المفارقة على مراتبها و يوجد تارة أخرى مفتقرا إلى المادة مقترنا بها منفعلا عن غيره متحركا و ساكنا و كائنا و فاسدا كالصور النوعية على تفاوت طبقاتها في الضعف و الفقر فيوجد طورا آخر وجودا أضعف من ذينك الصنفين - حيث لا يكون فاعلا و لا منفعلا و لا ثابتا و لا متحركا و لا ساكنا كالصور التي يتوهمها الإنسان من حيث كونها كذلك.

و الثانية هي أن الله تعالى قد خلق النفس الإنسانية

بحيث يكون لها اقتدار - على إيجاد صور الأشياء المجردة و المادية لأنها من سنخ الملكوت و عالم القدرة و السطوة و الملكوتيون لهم اقتدار على إبداع الصور العقلية القائمة بذواتها و تكوين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦٥

الصور الكونية القائمة بالمواد و كل صورة صادرة عن الفاعل فلها حصول له بل حصولها في نفسها نفس حصولها لفاعلها و ليس من شرط حصول شيء لشيء أن يكون حالاً فيه وصفاً له بل ربما يكون الشيء حاصلًا لشيء من دون قيامه به بنحو الحلول و الوصفية كما أن صور جميع الموجودات حاصلة للباري حصولاً أشد من حصولها لنفسها أو لفاعلها كما ستعلم في مباحث العلم و ليس قيامها به تعالى قياماً حلولياً ناعتياً- و كل صورة حاصلة لموجود مجرد عن المادة بأي نحو كان فهي مناط عالمية ذلك المجرد بها سواء كانت قائمة بذاته أو لا و مناط عالمية الشيء بالشيء حصول صورة ذلك الشيء له سواء كانت الصورة عين الشيء العالم فيكون حصولها حصوله كعلم النفس بذاتها- أو غيره فيكون حصولها إما فيه و ذلك إذا كان الشيء قابلاً لها و إما عنه و ذلك إذا كان فاعلاً لها فالحصول للشيء المجرد الذي هو عبارة عن العالمية أعم من حصول نفسه أو الحصول فيه أو الحصول له فللنفس الإنسانية في ذاتها عالم خاص بها من الجواهر و الأعراض المفارقة و المادية و الأفلاك المتحركة و الساكنة و العناصر و المركبات و سائر الحقائق يشاهدها بنفس حصولاتها لها لا بحصولات أخرى و إلا يتسلسل و ذلك لأن الباري تعالى خلاق الموجودات المبدعة و الكائنة و خلق النفس الإنسانية مثلاً لذاته و صفاته و أفعاله فإنه تعالى منزّه عن المثل لا عن المثل فخلق النفس مثلاً له ذاتاً و صفاتاً و أفعالا ليكون معرفتها مرعاة لمعرفته فجعل ذاتها مجردة عن الأكوان و الأحياء و الجهات و صيرها ذات قدرة و علم و إرادة و حياة و سمع و بصر و جعلها ذات مملكة شبيهة بمملكة باريها يخلق ما يشاء و يختار لما يريد إلا أنها و إن كانت من سنخ الملكوت و عالم القدرة و معدن العظمة و السطوة فهي ضعيفة الوجود و القوام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦٦

لكونها واقعة في مراتب النزول ذات وسائط بينها و بين باريها و كثرة الوسائط بين الشيء و ينبوع الوجود يوجب وهن قوته و ضعف وجوده فلهذا ما يترتب على النفس و يوجد عنها من الأفعال و الآثار الخاصة يكون في غاية ضعف الوجود بل وجود ما يوجد عنها بذاتها من الصور العقلية و الخيالية أطلال و أشباح للموجودات الخارجية الصادرة عن الباري تعالى و إن كانت الماهية محفوظة في الوجودين فلا يترتب عليه الآثار المرتبة عليه بحسب وجودها في الخارج اللهم إلا لبعض المتجربين عن جلباب البشرية من أصحاب المعارج فافهم لشدة اتصالهم بعالم القدس و محل الكرامة و كمال قوتهم يقدرّون على إيجاد أمور موجودة في الخارج مترتبة عليها الآثار و هذا الوجود للشيء الذي لا يترتب عليه الآثار و هو الصادر عن النفس بحسب هذا النحو من الظهور يسمى بالوجود الذهني و الظلي و ذلك الآخر المترتب عليه الآثار يسمى بالوجود الخارجي و العيني و يؤيد ذلك ما قاله الشيخ الجليل محي الدين العربي الأندلسي قدس سره في كتاب فصوص الحكم بالوهم يخلق كل إنسان في قوة خياله ما لا وجود له إلا فيها و هذا هو الأمر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٦٧

العام لكل إنسان و العارف يخلق بالهمة ما يكون له وجود من خارج محل الهمة و لكن لا يزال الهمة تحفظه و لا يثودها حفظ ما خلقه فمتى طرأ على العارف غفلة عن حفظ ما خلق عدم ذلك المخلوق إلا أن يكون العارف قد ضبط جميع الحضرات و هو لا يغفل مطلقاً بل لا بد له من حضرة يشهدها فإذا خلق العارف بهمته ما خلق و له هذه الإحاطة ظهر

ذلك الخلق بصورته في كل حضرة و صارت الصور يحفظ بعضها بعضاً فإذا غفل العارف عن حضرة ما أو حضرات و هو شاهد حضرة ما من الحضرات حافظ لما فيها من صورة خلقه انحفطت جميع الصور بحفظ تلك الصورة الواحدة في الحضرة التي ما غفل عنها لأن الغفلة ما تعم قط لا في العموم و لا في الخصوص و قد أوضحت هاهنا سرا لم يزل أهل الله يغارون على مثل هذا أن يظهر قال و هذه مسألة أخبرت عنها أنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٨

ما سطر أحد في كتاب لا أنا و لا غيري إلا في هذا الكتاب فهي يتيمة الدهر و فريده - فإياك أن تغفل عنها فإن تلك الحضرة التي يبقى لك الحضور فيها مع الصور مثلها مثل الكتاب الذي قال تعالى فيه **مَا فَرَطْنَا فِي الْكِتَابِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ** فهو الجامع للواقع و غير الواقع و لا يعرف ما قلناه إلا من كان قرانا في نفسه فإن المتقي الله يجعل له فرقانا انتهى كلامه و لا شبهة في أنه مما يؤيد ما كنا بصده تأييدا عظيما و يعين إعانة قوية مع اشتماله على فوائد جملة ستقف على تحقيقها و تفصيلها في مباحث النفس إن شاء الله تعالى - فأتقن ما مهدنا لك كي ينفعك في مباحث الوجود الذهني و الإشكالات الواردة عليه

فصل (٢) في تقرير الحجج في إثباته و هي من طرق

الطريقة الأولى

أنا قد نتصور المعدوم الخارجي بل الممتنع كشريك الباري - و اجتماع النقيضين و الجوهر الفرد بحيث يتميز عند الذهن عن باقي المعدومات - و تميز المعدوم الصرف ممتنع ضرورة فله نحو من الوجود و إذ ليس في الخارج فرضا و بيانا فهو في الذهن.

و اعترض عليه بأنه لا يجوز أن يحصل العلم بالمعدوم لأن العلم كما مر عبارة عن الصور الحاصلة عن الشيء فصورة المعدوم إما أن تكون مطابقة له فيجب أن يكون للمعدوم و خصوصا الممتنع ذات خارجية تطابقها صورته الذهنية و المعدوم لا ذات له أو لا تكون مطابقة له فلا يحصل لنا العلم بالمعدوم إذ العلم عبارة عن صورة مطابقة للمعلوم. و أجيب عنه بأن المراد بحصول الصورة ليس أنه يحصل في الذهن شبح و مثال له محاكاة عن الأمر العيني مغاير له بالحقيقة بل المراد بالصورة الذهنية هو حقيقة المعلوم من حيث ظهورها الظلي الذي لا يترتب به عليها أثرها المقصود منها فالعلم بالمعدوم لا يكون إلا بأن يحصل في ذهننا مفهوم لا يكون ثابتا في الخارج فلا يجري

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٤٩

الترديد أن هذه الصورة مطابقة للمعدوم أو لا و لا يلزم شيء من المحذورين إذ المسمى بالصورة هو بعينه المعدوم في الخارج هذا على رأي المحققين و أما على قول من ذهب إلى أن الحاصل في الذهن شبح المعلوم لا حقيقته فيقال العلم بالشيء عبارة عن حصول شبح و مثال في الذهن فإن كان له مطابق فهو العلم بالموجود و إلا فهو العلم بالمعدوم فصورة المعدوم غير مطابقة له بالفعل إذ لا ذات له عينية و لا مطابق له إلا بحسب التقدير بمعنى أنه لو كان له وجود يطابقه هذه الصورة و العلم بالمعدوم عبارة عن حصول شبح لا يكون له مطابق بالفعل هكذا قيل و هو ليس بكاف في المقصود إذ لقاتل أن يقول هذا الجواب إنما يجري في المعدومات التي لها حقائق سوى كونها معدومة و أما إذا تصورنا

المعدوم المطلق بما هو معدوم مطلق فيلزم من قولكم المراد بالصورة الذهنية حقيقة المعلوم من حيث وجودها الذهني و ظهورها الظلي التناقض - إذ المعدوم بما هو معدوم لا يكون له وجود أصلا و الخفي بما هو خفي لا يكون له ظهور مطلقا و هذا بالحقيقة راجع إلى أشكال المجهول المطلق المشهور و سيايتك ما ينفك في دفعه إن شاء الله تعالى.

الطريقة الثانية

أنا نحكم على أشياء لا وجود لها في الخارج أصلا بأحكام ثبوتية صادقة و كذا نحكم على ما له وجود و لكن لا نقتصر في الحكم على ما وجد منه - بل نحكم حكما شاملا لجميع أفراد المحققة و المقدرة مثل قولنا كل عنقا طائر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٠

و كل مثلث فإن زواياه الثلاث مساوية لقائمتين و صدق الحكم الإيجابي يستلزم وجود موضوعه كما تصدق به الغريزة الإنسانية و إذ لا يكفي في هذا الحكم الوجود العيني للموضوع علمنا أن له وجودا آخر هو الوجود الذهني هذا ما قرره. و فيه بحث من وجوه - الأول أنه لا شك أن أمثال هذه القضايا ليست فعلية خارجية حتى يكون معنى قولك كل عنقا طائر أن كل ما هو فرد للعنقا و لو بحسب التقدير فهو طائر بالفعل كيف و من ينكر الوجود الذهني ينكر صدق هذا الحكم و أمثاله بل هي قضايا حقيقية موضوعاتها مقدرة الوجود و معناها كل ما لو وجد و كان متصفا بعنوان كذا فهو بحيث لو وجد صدق عليه محمول كذا و الحكم بهذا النحو لا يقتضي إلا وجود الموضوع بحسب التقدير فجاز أن يكون هو الوجود الخارجي فلم يثبت وجود آخر أصلا.

الثاني لو تم هذا الكلام لزم منه وجود جميع الأفراد المقدرة الغير المتناهية - لأمثال هذه العنونات على التفصيل في ذهننا عند هذا الحكم فإنا إذا قلنا كل مثلث كذا يوجد في ذهننا جميع المثلثات المقدرة على التفصيل لأنه مما تقرر على مدارك المتأخرين أن الحكم في المحصورة على ذوات الأفراد فوجب لصدقها وجود الأفراد لا وجود العنوان و إن سلطنا مسلك التحقيق و قلنا إن المحكوم عليه في المحصورة هو العنوان لكن الفرق بينها و بين الطبيعية أن الحكم فيها على وجه يسري إلى الأفراد بخلاف الطبيعية فينحل الإشكال لكنه على هذا يجب الاقتصار على عقود ليس لموضوعاتها وجود عيني أصلا و إلا فلاحد أن يقول إن الطبائع موجودة بوجود الأفراد فإذا كان للموضوع فرد عيني يوجد العنوان بوجوده فالحكم عليه بذلك الاعتبار.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧١

فإن قيل إنا لا نأخذ الموضوع في المحصورة على وجه مشخص جزئي حتى يكون الحكم في قولنا كل إنسان كذا على إنسان موجود بوجود جزئي مشخص بل نأخذه بحيث يقبل الاشتراك بين كثيرين فهو بهذا الاعتبار ليس موجودا في الخارج ضرورة.

قيل كما أن الموجود الخارجي مشخص لا يقبل الاشتراك كذلك الموجود الذهني له تعيين يمتنع فرض اشتراكه مع ذلك التعيين ضرورة أن الوجود لا يعرض المبهم من حيث هو مبهم غاية الأمر أن للعقل أن يلاحظ الوجود الذهني من حيث هو مع قطع النظر عن تعيينه فكما جاز أن يلاحظ الموجود الذهني المتعين بحسب الوجود الذهني من حيث هو فليجز ذلك في الوجود العيني لا بد لنفيه من دليل.

و الحق أن المأخوذ على وجه الاشتراك ليس تحققه إلا في العقل لكن مع عدم اعتبار تحققه فيه و سيجيء تحقيق ذلك عن قريب إن شاء الله تعالى.

الثالث أنا قد نتصور شخصا كان موجودا و نحكم عليه بحكم خارجي كما أنا نحكم على جسم قد فني أنه كان صلبا ثقيلًا متحركا فيلزم أن يكون صورته الذهنية و الشخص الخارجى واحدا بالعدد لأن هذه الأحكام إنما كانت للشخص الخارجى لكنه محال بالبدئية و التزم بعضهم في الجواب اتحادهما بالعدد قال إن الشخص الخارجى مع تشخصه الخارجى و تعينه العيني يوجد في الخيالات و هذا فاسد جدا فإن الذات الواحدة لا يكون لها إلا وجود واحد كيف و الوجود إما مساوق للتشخص أو متحد معه بل الجواب أن يقال إن المحمول الخارجى أيضا كالموضوع له صورة ذهنية مطابقة للأمر العيني متحد مع الموضوع الذهني لكن المنظور إليه في القضية الخارجية ليس حال الموضوع و المحمول بحسب وجودهما الذهني بل حكاية حالهما بحسب الخارج و لا حجر في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٢

كون الشيء الموجود في الذهن حكاية عن الأمر الخارجى المحكى عنه لأن المنظور إليه في الحكاية ليس حال الحكاية نفسها بل حال الشيء المحكى عنه على وجه يطابقها الحكاية

الطريقة الثالثة

أن لنا أن نأخذ من الأشخاص المختلفة بتعيناتها الشخصية - أو الفصلية المشتركة في نوع أو جنس معنى واحدا ينطبق على كل من الأشخاص بحيث جاز أن يقال على كل منها أنه هو ذلك المعنى المنتزع الكلي مثلا جاز لك أن تنتزع من أشخاص الإنسان المتفرقة المختلفة المتباينة معنى واحدا مشتركا فيه - و هو الإنسان المطلق الذي ينطبق على الصغير و الكبير و الحيوان العام المحمول على البغال و الحمير مجامعا لكل من تعييناتها مجردا في حد ذاته من عوارضها المادية و مقارناتها و هذا المعنى لا يوجد في الخارج واحدا و إلا لزم اتصاف أمر واحد بصفات متضادة و هي التعينات المتباينة و لوازمها المتنافية فوجوده إنما هو بشرط الكثرة - و نحن قد لاحظناه من حيث إنه معنى واحد فهو بهذا الاعتبار لا يوجد في الخارج فوجوده من هذه الجهة إنما هو في العقل.

فإن قلت قد تقرر عند المحققين من الحكماء أن الأجناس و الأنواع و بالجملة الحقائق المتأصلة دون الاعتباريات لها وجود في الأعيان فإنهم قد صرحوا بأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٣

معروضات مفهوم الكلي و النوع و الجنس من الحقائق التي هي معقولات أولى بالقياس إلى تلك العوارض التي تسمى عندهم بالمعقولات الثانية أمور موجودة في الخارج - فيلزم على رأيهم أن يكون في الوجود إنسانية واحدة هي بعينها مقارنة للعوارض التي يقوم بها شخص زيد و شخص عمرو و غيرهما من أشخاص الناس و هي مع كل هذه العوارض غيرها مع العارض الآخر بالاعتبار و غير متغيرة بنفسها و إذا عدم شخص من تلك الأشخاص فقد فارقها الأعراض الخاصة بذلك الشخص فقط و أما غير تلك الإنسانية فهي باقية غير فاسدة و إنما يفسد مقارنتها لتلك الأعراض فقط فهي ذات واحدة مقترنة بعينها بأعراض كثيرة و تعيينات شتى تصير مع أعراض كل شخص إنسانية ذلك الشخص و كذا

الحال في حقيقة الحيوان بالقياس إلى القيود و الفصول المتباينة - فلا حاجة إلى القول بوجودها في نحو آخر من الوجود المسمى بالذهن.

قلنا هذا اشتباه وقع لبعض منشوء الغفلة عن رعاية الحثيات و الإهمال في جانب الاعتبارات فإن قولهم بوجود الطبائع النوعية و الجنسية ليس معناه أن النوع بما هو نوع أو الجنس بما هو جنس و بالجملة الكلي الطبيعي بما هو كلي طبيعي أو معروض الكلي من حيث كونه معروض الكلي و الكلية له تحقق في الخارج فإن هذا مما لا يتفوه به من له أدنى ارتياض بالفلسفة فضلا عن الحكماء الأكابر و قد بينوا في كتبهم و تعاليمهم أن الكلي بما هو كلي مما لا وجود له في الخارج و للشيخ الرئيس رسالة مفردة في هذا الباب شنع فيها كثيرا على رجل غريز المحاسن كثير السن قد صادفه بمدينة همدان قد توهم أن معنى وجود الأنواع و الأجناس في الأعيان هو أن يكون ذاتا واحدة بعينها مقارنة لكل واحد من الكثرة المحصلة المختلفة مطابقة لها مشتركا فيها أمر موجود فيها قائلا هل بلغ من عقل الإنسان أن يظن أن هذا موضع خلاف بين الحكماء و كان ذلك المرء لما سمع من القوم أنهم يقولون إن الأشخاص تشترك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٤

في حقيقة واحدة و معنى واحد موجود فتعذر عليه تحصيل غرضهم في استعمال لفظ الواحد في هذا الموضع فسبق إلى وهمهم أنهم ذهبوا إلى أن الحقيقة الواحدة و المعنى الكلي بصفة الوحدة و الكلية واقعة في الأعيان و هو فاسد نعم المعنى الواحد و المشترك - و الكلي و العام و النوع و الجنس إلى غير ذلك من اللواحق قد يوجد في الأعيان لكن لا بهذه الاعتبارات فحقيقة الإنسان مثلا من حيث هو إنسان موجودة في الأعيان منصبة بالوجود لا من حيث نوعيته و اشتراك الكثرة فيه بل من حيث طبيعته و ماهيته - و قد فرض العموم لاحقا بها في موطن يليق لحقوقه بها فيه و هو الذهن لا الخارج - و قد نص الشيخ في سائر كتبه أن الإنسانية الموجودة كثيرة بالعدد و ليس ذاتا واحدة - و كذلك الحيوانية لا كثرة يكون باعتبار إضافات مختلفة بل ذات الإنسانية المقارنة لخواص زيد هي غير ذات الإنسانية المقارنة لخواص عمرو فهما إنسانيتان إنسانية قارنت خواص زيد و إنسانية قارنت خواص عمرو لا غيرية باعتبار المقارنة حتى يكون حيوانية واحدة تقارن المتقابلات من الفصول.

فإن قلت كما أن الموجود الخارجي مشخص لا يقبل الاشتراك كذلك الموجود الذهني مشخص لا يقبل الاشتراك و لا ينطبق على كثيرين و المنطبق على كثيرين إنما هو الماهية من حيث هي هي و هي موجودة في الخارج أيضا فلا يتم الدليل.

قلت ليس المقصود أن الإنسان الموجود في الذهن مثلا ليس شخصا و ليس معه ما يمنعه عن الاشتراك بل المراد أن لنا أن نتصور معنى الإنسان المطابق لكثيرين و نحضره عند العقل كذلك و معلوم يقينا أن الإنسان المعلوم كذلك من حيث أنه معلوم كذلك ليس في الخارج و لا متشخصا بتشخص خارجي أصلا.

و من الاستبصارات في هذا الباب أنا نتصور الأمور الانتزاعية و الصفات المعدومة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٥

في الخارج و نحكم بها على الأشياء فلا محالة لها ثبوت فثبوتها إما في الخارج و هو محال لأنها أمور اعتبارية فهي

موجودة في الذهن و هو المطلوب.

و من العرشيات الواردة أن كل فاعل يفعل فعلا لغاية و حكمة لو لم يكن لما يترتب على فعله من الغاية و الغرض نحو من الثبوت لم يفعل ذلك الفاعل فعلا لأجله- و لو كان له تحقق في الخارج عيني لزم تحصيل الحاصل فلا بد و أن يكون له نحو من التقرر لا يترتب عليه آثاره المخصوصة به المطلوبة منه و هو المعنى بالوجود الذهني.

و مما ينبهك على ما نحن بصدده كون الأشياء الوهمية الغير الواقعة في الأعيان- سببا للتحريكات و التأثيرات الخارجية و إن لم يترتب عليها آثارها المخصوصة المطلوبة أ و لا ترى أن تخيلك لمشتهى لطيف كيف يحدث في بدنك شيئا و تخيلك للحموضة يوجب لك انفعالا و قشعريرة و لو لم يكن لصورة بيت تريد بناءه نحو من الثبوت لما كان سببا لتحريك أعضائك.

و قد حكى عن بعض حذاق الأطباء معالجة بعض الملوك حيث أصابه فالج لا ينجع فيه العلاج الجسماني دفعة بمجرد تدبيرات نفسانية و أمور تصورية باعثة لاشتعال الحرارة الغريزية حتى دفعت المادة.

و بعض النفوس قد يبلغ في القوة و الشرف إلى حيث يقوى تصورات و جودا و ظهورا حتى يقوم وجودها مقام الوجود العيني فيبرىء المريض و يمرض الأشرار- و يقلب عنصرا إلى عنصر آخر حتى يجعل غير النار نارا أو يحرك أجساما عجزت عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٦

تحريكها نفوس أبناء النوع كل ذلك باهتزاز علوي و تأييد ملكوتي و طرب معنوي. فإن قلت إنهم صرحوا بأن للطبائع غايات في أفعالها الطبيعية فإن لزم أن يكون لتلك الغايات نحو من الوجود الغير العيني لزم أن يكون تلك الطبائع ذوات أذهان شاعرة بنتائج أفعالها و نهاية حركاتها مع كونها جرمانية. قلنا هذا الكلام مما أورده الخطيب الرازي على الفلاسفة رادا عليهم حيث ذهبوا إلى أن للطبائع العالية و السافلة غايات طبيعية و نهايات ذاتية و أن الغاية علة بماهيته لفاعلية الفاعل و استكمالها بما يستدعي التوصل إليه في فعله. و أجاب عنه الشارح المحقق لمقاصد كتاب الإشارات بالتزام أن لها شعورا بمقتضاها و غاية في أفعالها غاية ما في الباب أن يكون شعورها ضعيفا- و النظر في إناث النخل و ميلانها إلى صوب بعض ذكرائها و إن كان على خلاف ذلك الصوب مما يؤكد ذلك و كذا مشاهدة ميل عروض الأشجار إلى جانب الماء في الأنهار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٧

و انحرافها في الصعود عن الجدار و إخراجها الأوراق الكثيرة بين الفواكه ليسترها عن صنوف الآفات و إحرازها لب الثمار في الوقايات الصائنة يهديك إلى ما ذكره و هاهنا لمعات نورية لا يناسب هذا المقام ذكرها عسى أن يأتي بها حين ما قدر الله إتيانه فيه بمنه و كرمه

فصل (٣) في ذكر شكوك اعتقادية و فيه فكوك اعتقادية عنها

قد تقرر عند المعلم الأول و متبعيه من المشاءين و الشيخين أبي نصر و أبي علي- و تلامذته و جمهور المتأخرين أن ظرف الوجود الذهني و الظهور الظلي للأشياء فينا إنما هو قوانا الإدراكية العقلية و الوهمية و الحسية فالكليات توجد في

النفس المجردة- و المعاني الجزئية في القوة الوهمية و الصور المادية في الحس و الخيال فوَقَّعت للناس في ذلك إشكالات ينبغي ذكرها و التفصي عنها.

الإشكال الأول:

أن الحقائق الجوهرية بناء على أن الجوهر ذاتي لها و قد تقرر عندهم انحفاظ الذاتيات في أنحاء الوجودات كما يسوق إليه أدلة الوجود الذهني يجب أن تكون جوهرًا أينما وجدت و غير حالة في موضوع- فكيف يجوز أن يكون الحقائق الجوهرية موجودة في الذهن أعراضًا قائمة به ثم إنكم قد جعلتم جميع الصور الذهنية كصفات فيلزم اندراج حقائق جميع المعقولات المتباينة بالنظر إلى ذاتها مع الكيف في الكيف.

و الجواب عنه على ما يستفاد من كتب الشيخ-

أن معنى الجوهر الذي صيروه جنسًا و جعلوه عنوانًا للحقائق الجوهرية ليس هو الموجود من حيث هو موجود- مسلوبًا عنه الموضوع لأن هذا المعنى لا يمكن أن يكون جنسًا لشيء و إلا لكان فصله الذي فرض مقسمًا له مقومًا له ضرورة أن الفصول المقسمة للجنس لا يحتاج إلى شيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٨

منها الجنس في تقومه من حيث هو بل هي من الخواص العارضة للجنس كما أنه عرض عام لازم لها بل احتياجه إليها في أن يوجد و يحصل تحصيلًا وجوديًا لا تألفيًا- فكل فصل كالعلة المفيدة لوجود حصة من الجنس فإذا كانت ماهية الجنس هو الوجود بالفعل مع قيد عديمي هو سلب الموضوع لكان فصله المفروض محصل وجوده- مقوم معناه و ماهيته كما سبقت الإشارة إليه.

و بوجه آخر يلزم على فرض كون هذا المعنى جنسًا للجواهر انقلاب الماهية حين انعدام شيء من أفرادها. و بوجه آخر لزم تعدد الواجب لذاته فإن نفس الماهية لا يتعلق بها جعل و تأثير فلو كان الوجود عينها أو جزؤها يلزم الضرورة الأزلية فيها تعالى القيوم الواحد عن الشريك و النظير علوا كبيرا.

و أما الوجودات الإمكانية فحقائقها نفس العلاقات بفاعلها و ذاتها عين الاحتياج بمبدعها و فاطرها.

و كذلك قولنا الشيء الموجود بالفعل غير صالح لأن يكون عنوانًا للحقيقة الجنسية الجوهرية لازما لها و إلا لكان كل من علم شيئًا هو في نفسه جوهر علم أنه موجود بل معنى الجوهر الذي يصلح للجنسية هو ما يعبر عنه بأنه الشيء ذو الماهية- إذا صارت ماهيته موجودة في الخارج كان وجودها الخارجي لا في موضوع و هذا المعنى ثابت له سواء وجد في العقل أو في الأعيان و حلوله في العقل لا يبطل كونها- بحيث إذا تحققت في خارج العقل كانت غير حالة في المحل المتقوم بنفسه فالمعقول من الجوهر جوهر لأنه لا في موضوع بالمعنى المذكور.

و مما يؤكد ما ذكر أن حمل الجوهر بهذا المعنى على الأنواع و الأشخاص المندرجة تحته غير معلل بشيء خارج و أما حمل كونها موجودة بالفعل الذي هو بعض من مفهوم كونها موجودة بالفعل لا في موضوع فلا محالة بسبب و علة خارجة عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٧٩

الماهية وإذا لم يكن حمل الموجود بالفعل على ما تحته من عوالي الأجناس والمقولات العشر إلا بسبب لا كحمل الذاتي الغير المعلل فلم يصير بإضافة معنى عدمي إليه وهو قولنا لا في موضوع جنسا لشيء منها وإلا لصار بإضافة معنى وجودي إليه وهو قولنا في موضوع جنسا للبواقي بل هذا أولى وهو خلاف ما تقرر عندهم هذا بيان مقصودهم في كون المعقول من الجوهر جوهرًا.

و هاهنا دقيقة أخرى سنشير إلى بيانها في تحقيق الحمل إن شاء الله تعالى حاصله أنه لا منافاة بين كون الشيء مفهوم القائم بنفسه و كونه مما يصدق عليه القائم بغيره - على قياس مفهوم العدم والاشياء واللاممكن و شريك الباري و الحرف و الوضع - و الحركة و ممتنع الوجود و اللاتناهي و نظائرها حيث يصدق على كل منها نقيضها بحسب المفهوم هذا.

فقد علم بما ذكروا أن مفهوم العرض أعم من مقولة الجوهر باعتبار الوجود الذهني فالجوهر الذهني جوهر بحسب ماهيته و عرض باعتبار وجوده في الذهن فلا منافاة بينهما إنما المنافاة بين المقولات التي هي ذاتيات للحقائق المتخالفة المندرجة تحتها.

و أما أن القوم قد عدوا الصور العلمية من باب الكيف و يلزم منه أن يكون صورة الجوهر في العقل جوهرًا و كيفًا فيندرج تحت مقولتين فقل إن هذا من باب المسامحة و تشبيه الأمور الذهنية بالأشياء الخارجية لأنه إن أريد بالكيف ماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨٠

حقها في الوجود الخارجي أن يكون في موضوع و غير مقتضية للقسمة و النسبة فهو بهذا المعنى يصلح لأن يكون جنسا من عوالي الأجناس كما أن الجوهر بالمعنى المذكور له جنس عال فهما باعتبار هذين المعنيين متباينان لا يصدقان على شيء في شيء من الظروف و إن أريد منه عرض لا يكون بالفعل مقتضيا للقسمة و النسبة فهو بهذا المعنى عرض عام لجميع المقولات في الذهن فلا تمنع بهذا الاعتبار بينه و بين ماهية الجوهر و كذا بينه و بين ماهيات بواقي الأعراض على نحو ما مر في مفهوم العرض - فلا يلزم اندراج الصور العقلية تحت مقولتين هذا تقرير كلامهم على ما يناسب أسلوبهم و مرامهم و الحق ما سنذكر لك إن شاء الله تعالى.

و ليعلم هاهنا أن معنى قولهم إن كليات الجواهر جواهر ليس أن المعقول من الجوهر الذي يوصف بأنه في الذهن و له محل مستغن عنه أنه قد يزول عنه صور الجواهر العقلية و يعود إليه و يكون تلك الصور بحيث توجد تارة في الخارج لا في موضوع و تارة في الذهن في الموضوع كالمغناطيس الذي هو في الكف فإنه بحيث يجذب الحديد تارة كما إذا كان في خارج الكف و لا يجذبه أخرى كما إذا كان فيه - فإن هذه مغالطة من باب تضييع الحثيات و إهمال الاعتبارات و أخذ الكلي مكان الجزئي فإن الكلي الذي ذاته في العقل على رأيهم يستحيل وقوعها في الأعيان و استغناؤها عن الموضوع و المغناطيس الذي هو في الكف يجوز عليه الخروج و الجذب للحديد ثم الدخول و عدم الجذب مع بقاء هويته الشخصية و ليست الصور العقلية كذلك بل المراد بالكلي المذكور في كلامهم أن كلي الجوهر جوهر الماهية من حيث هي بلا قيد و شرط من الكلية و الجزئية و سائر المنضافات الذهنية و الخارجية إليها - و يقال لها الكلي الطبيعي أيضا كما يقال للماهية المعروضة للكلية الكلي العقلي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨١

و الكلي بالمعنى الثاني لا يصلح للشخصية و الوجود في الخارج بخلاف المعنى الأول- فإنها لفرط إبهامها تصلح لكثير من القيود المتنافية كالوحدة و الكثرة و الحلول- و التجرد و المعقولية و المحسوسية فالمعقول من الجوهر و إن كان عرضا بحسب خصوص وجوده الذهني و كونه كلياً و لكنه جوهر عندهم بحسب ماهيته فإن ماهيته ماهية شأنها أن يكون وجودها في الأعيان لا في موضوع و أما التمثيل للجوهر العقلي بالمغناطيس حيث وقع في كلامهم فهو إنما كان باعتبار أن ماهيته تتصف بجذب الحديد مع قطع النظر عن نحو وجودها فإذا وجد مقارنا لكف الإنسان و لم يجذب الحديد أو وجد مقارنا لجسمية الحديد فجذبه لم يلزم أن يقال إنه مختلف الحقيقة في الكف و في خارج الكف مع الحديد بل هو في كل منهما بصفة واحدة- و هو أنه حجر من شأنه جذب الحديد و هذا القدر يكفي في المناسبة بين المثال و الممثل له فإن قلت قد صرح الشيخ في الهيئات الشفاء و غيرها بأن فصول الجواهر لا يجب أن يكون جواهر بحسب ماهياتها و إن صدق عليها مفهوم الجوهر صدق اللوازم العرضية حتى لا يلزم أن يكون لكل فصل فصل إلى غير النهاية فعلى ما ذكره من كونها لا تندرج تحت مقولة الجوهر يلزم أن تكون مندرجة تحت مقولة أخرى- من المقولات العرضية فيكون حقيقة واحدة جوهرًا و عرضًا في وجود واحد لا تحاد كل نوع مع فصله.

قلت لا يلزم من عدم اندراج فصول الأنواع الجوهرية تحت مقولة الجوهر لذاتها اندراجها تحت مقولة أخرى حتى يصدق عليها مفهوم العرض لكونه عرضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨٢

عاما لازما للمقولات العرضية إذ لا مانع بحسب العقل و النقل من عدم وقوع الحقائق البسيطة التي لا جنس لها و لا فصل تحت مقولة من المقولات أصلا نص عليه الشيخ في كتاب قاطيقورياس من الشفاء.

قال بعض أهل الكلام في دفع الإشكال المذكور

و هو كون شيء واحد جوهرًا و عرضا كلياً و جزئيا علما و معلوما أنا إذا تصورنا الأشياء يحصل عندنا أمران أحدهما موجود في الذهن و هو معلوم و كلي و هو غير حال في الذهن ناعتا له- بل حاصل فيه حصول الشيء في الزمان و المكان و ثانيهما موجود في الخارج و هو علم و جزئي و عرض قائم بالذهن من الكيفيات النفسانية فحينئذ لا إشكال فيه إنما الإشكال من جهة كون شيء واحد جوهرًا و عرضا أو علما و معلوما أو كلياً و جزئيا.

فنقول إن أراد أن هناك أمرين متغايرين بالاعتبار موافقا لما ذهب إليه الحكماء و المحققون فلا يفي إلا بدفع إشكال كون شيء واحد علما و معلوما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨٣

و كونه كلياً و جزئيا و أما إشكال كونه جوهرًا و عرضا فبمجرد ما ذكره لا يخرج عنه الجواب و إن أراد أنهما اثنان متغايران بالذات فيرد عليه سوى كونه مخالفا للذوق و الوجدان و إحداث مذهب ثالث من غير دليل و برهان أنه قد تقرر عندهم و سنتلو عليك إن شاء الله تعالى أن كل صورة مجردة قائمة بذاتها فإنها علم و عالمة بذاتها و معلومة لذاتها و بنوا على ذلك إثبات علم الله تعالى بذاته و علم الملائكة الروحانيين بذواتهم فيلزم عليه أن يكون النفس

الإنسانية عند تصوّره المعقولات محصلة مكونة باختيارها لذوات مجردة عقلية علامة فعالة بناء على اعترافه بأنه يحصل عند تصوّرنا الأشياء أمر معقول غير قائم بالذهن ولا بأمر آخر غير الذهن كما هو الظاهر.

و كون النفس فعالة للجوهر العقلي المستقل الوجود وإن كان بمعنى الإعداد من المستبين فساده واستحالته كيف و النفس قابلة للمعقولات بالقوة وإنما يخرجها من القوة إلى الفعل ما هو عقل بالفعل فإذا أفادت النفس العقل فكانت إما علة مفيضة لها فكان ما بالقوة بحسب الذات مخرجا و محصلا لما بالفعل بالذات من القوة - هذا محال فاحش و إما علة قابلية لها فهو ينافي ما ذهب إليه لأن قابل الشيء يجب أن يكون محلا له و إن لم يكن شيئا منهما و ليست بغاية أيضا و هو ظاهر و لا هي صورة لها بل العكس أولى فلا علاقة لها مع المعقولات فكيف يكون منشأ لوجودها - على أن الحدوث و التجدد ينافي كون الشيء عقلا بالفعل كما تقرر عندهم و أيضا يلزم على هذا كون المعلوم كلياً و جزئياً باعتبار واحد أما كونه كلياً - فلكونه معقولا مجردا عن المشخصات الخارجية و أما كونه جزئياً فلضرورة كون المعلوم إذا كان حاصلا عند النفس حصولا استقلاليا من غير قيامه بها يكون متشخصا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨٤

بنفسه إذ الوجود خارج الذهن يساوق التشخص كذلك و تحقيق المقام أن تشخص الماهية المتكثرة الأفراد إنما يكون بهيئات و لواحق خارجية فما لم يحصل الماهية حصولا آخر غير ما هو بحسب الواقع يكون في ذلك الحصول معرفة مقشرة - عن تلك الغواشي و اللبوسات بتعرية معر و تقشير مقشر لا يوصف بالكلية و الاشتراك بين كثيرين فلا بد أن يكون للماهية حصول للشيء المعرّى لها من المقارنات المانعة من العموم و الاشتراك إذ تعرية الشيء للشيء لا ينفك عن وجود ذلك الشيء له و لا بد أيضا أن يكون وجودها المعرّى عين جودها الحاصل لذلك الشيء أي الذي عراها عن الغواشي و إذا كان الوجود التجردى لماهية ما عين وجودها الارتباطي للذهن - الذي من شأنه انتزاع الصور عن المواد الجزئية و تجريدتها عن العوارض الهيولانية فلا محالة يكون وجودها له على نعت الحلول و القيام لا غير إذ معنى حلول الشيء في الشيء أن يكون وجود الحال في نفسه عين وجوده لذلك المحل فعلم مما ذكر أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨٧

الصورة الحاصلة في موادها من غير ارتباطها و قيامها بالنفس جزئية و محسوسة لا كلية و معقولة لعدم استخلاصها بعد عن الغواشي و اللبوسات المادية التي تمنع المدرك أن يصير معقولا للنفس و قد فرضنا أنها معقولة للنفس موجودة بوجود آخر غير وجودها الخارجي الذي يصحبها الأغشية و الأغشية الجسمانية المادية فتدبر ثم ليت شعري إذا كان المعلوم موجودا مجردا عن المادة قائما بذاته و النفس أيضا كذلك فما معنى كونه فيها و ما المرجح في كون أحدهما ظرفا و الآخر مظلوما.

و الظرفية بين شيئين مع مباينة أحدهما عن الآخر في الوجود إنما يتصور في المقادير و الأجرام.

نعم من استنار قلبه بنور الله و ذاق شيئا من علوم الملكوتيين يمكنه أن يذهب إلى ما ذهبنا إليه حسبما لوحناك إليه في صدر المبحث أن النفس بالقياس إلى مدركاتها الخيالية و الحسية أشبه بالفاعل المبدع منها بالمحل القابل و به يندفع كثير من الإشكالات الواردة على الوجود الذهني التي مبناها على أن النفس محل للمدركات و أن القيام بالشيء عبارة عن

الحلول فيه.

منها كون النفس هيولى الصور الجوهرية.

و منها صيرورة الجوهر عرضا و كيفا.

و منها اتصاف النفس بما هو منتف عنها كالحرارة و البرودة و الحركة و السكون - و الزوجية و الفردية و الفرسية و الحجرية إلى غير ذلك من العويصات المتعلقة بهذا المقام.

فإنه إذا ثبت و تحقق أن قيام تلك الصور الإدراكية بالنفس ليس بالحلول - بل بنحو آخر غيره لم يلزم محذور أصلا و لا حاجة إلى القول بأن ما هو قائم بالنفس غير ما هو حاصل لها و هذا في المحسوسات ظاهرة كانت أو باطنية.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨٨

و أما حال النفس بالقياس إلى الصور العقلية من الأنواع المتأصلة فهي بمجرد إضافة إشراقية تحصل لها إلى ذوات عقلية نورية واقعة في عالم الإبداع نسبتها إلى أصنام أنواعها الجسمية كنسبة المعقولات التي ينتزعها الذهن عن المواد الشخصية - على ما هو المشهور إلى تلك الأشخاص بناء على قاعدة المثل الأفلاطونية و تلك الذوات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٨٩

العقلية و إن كانت قائمة بذواتها متشخصة بأنفسها لكن النفس لضعف إدراكها و كلالها في هذا العالم بواسطة تعلقها بالجسمانيات الكثيفة لا يتيسر لها مشاهدة تامة إياها - و تلق كامل لها بل مشاهدة ضعيفة و ملاحظة ناقصة كإبصارنا في هواء مغبر من بعد أو كإبصار إنسان ضعيف الباصرة شخصا فيحتمل عنده أن يكون زيدا أو عمرا أو بكرا أو خالدا أو يشك في كونه إنسانا أو شجرا أو حجرا فكذا يحتمل المثل النوري و الصورة العقلية عند النفس و بالقياس إلى إدراكاتها الكلية و الإبهام و العموم و الاشتراك و غيرها من الصفات التي هي من نتائج ضعف الوجود و وهن المعقولية - أعم من أن يكون ناشئا من قصور المدرك أو من فتور الإدراك فإن ضعف الإدراك و قلة النيل كما يكون تارة من جانب المدرك بأن يكون قوته الدراكة في نفسها ضعيفة كعقول الأطفال أو معوقة عن الإدراك التام لمانع خارجي كالنفوس المدبرة للأبدان المتعلقة بعالم الظلمات فكذلك قد يكون أيضا من جانب المدرك و ذلك يكون من جهتين إما من جهة قصوره و نقصه و خفاءه في نفسه و إما من جهة كماله و جلاله و غاية ظهوره و جلالة فالأول كما في الأمور الضعيفة كالزمان و العدد و الهیولی و نظائرها فلا محالة يكون تعلقها ضعيفا لاتحاد العقل و المعقول بحسب الحقيقة - و الثاني كما في الأشياء التي تكون رفيع السمك و بعيد الدرك فلا يحتملها النفس لغاية قوتها و ضعف النفس كالعقول الفعالة و ربما يغلب فرط جماله و جلاله على القوة المدركة و يجعلها مقهورة مبهورة من شدة نوريته و فرط قوته و استيلائه و قهره بحيث لا يمكنها إدراكه على التمام كما في إدراك العقل لواجب الوجود جل كبرياؤه.

و الحاصل أن النفس عند إدراكها للمعقولات الكلية تشاهد ذواتا عقلية مجردة لا بتجريد النفس إياها و انتزاعها معقولها من محسوسها كما هو عند جمهور الحكماء بل بانتقال لها من المحسوس إلى المتخيل ثم إلى المعقول و ارتحال من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٠

الدنيا إلى الآخرة ثم إلى ما وراءهما و سفر من عالم الأجرام إلى عالم المثال ثم إلى عالم العقول و في قوله تعالى **وَلَقَدْ عَلِمْتُمُ النَّشْأَةَ الْأُولَىٰ فَلَوْلَا تَذَكَّرُونَ** إشارة إلى هذا المعنى فإن معرفة أمور الآخرة على الحقيقة في معرفة أمور الدنيا لأنها من جنس المضاف و أحد المتضايفين يعرف بالآخر و كأننا قد كدنا أن نخرج من أسلوب المباحثة - فلنعد إلى ما كنا فيه فنقول العلم لما كان مرجعه إلى نحو من الوجود و هو المجرد الحاصل للجوهر الدراك أو عنده كما سنحقق في موضعه و كل وجود جوهري أو عرضي يصحبه ماهية كلية يقال لها عند أهل الله العين الثابت و هي عندنا لا موجودة و لا معدومة في ذاتها و لا متصفة بشيء من صفات الوجود من العلية و المعلولية و التقدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩١

و التأخر و غيرها كما مر بيانه فكما أن الموجود في نفسه من المحسوسات و المعقولات إنما هي وجودات مادية أو مجردة و لها ماهيات متحدة معها موجودة بوجودها بالعرض فكذا الموجود الرابطي أي المعلوم للقوى الإدراكية و المشهود لها و الحاضر لديها إنما هي الوجودات الحسية أو العقلية أما الحسيات فباستيناف وجودها عن النفس الإنسانية و مثولها بين يديها في غير هذا العالم بواسطة مظهر لها كالجليدية و المرأة و الخيال و غيرها من غير حلولها فيه و أما العقليات فبارتقاء النفس إليها - و اتصالها بها من غير حلولها في النفس و تلك العقليات في ذاتها شخصية و باعتبار ماهياتها كلية صادقة على كثيرين من أشخاص أصنافها النوعية و حصول الماهيات و المفهومات العقلية و وقوعها مع أنحاء الوجودات حصول تبعي و وقوع عكسي - وقوع ما يترأى من الأمثلة في الأشياء الصيقلية الشبيهة بالوجود في الصفاء و البساطة و عدم الاختلاف من غير أن يحكم على تلك الأشباح بأنها في ذاتها جواهر أو أعراض - فكما أن ما يتخيل من صورة الإنسان في المرأة ليس إنسانا موجودا بالحقيقة بل وجوده شبح لوجود الإنسان متحقق بتحقيقه بالعرض فكذلك ما يقع في الذهن من مفهوم الحيوان و النبات و الحركة و الحرارة و غيرها هي مفهومات تلك الأشياء و معانيها - لا ذواتها و حقائقها و مفهوم كل شيء لا يلزم أن يكون فردا له و بالجملة يحصل للنفس الإنسانية حين موافاتها الموجودات الخارجية لأجل صقاتها و تجردها عن المواد - صور عقلية و خيالية و حسية كما يحصل في المرأة أشباح تلك الأشياء و خيالاتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٢

و الفرق بين الحصولين أن الحصول في المرأة بضرب شبيه بالقبول و في النفس بضرب من الفعل. و لا تظن أن ما ذكرناه هو بعينه مذهب القائلين بالشبح و المثال إذ الفرق بين الطريقين أنهم زعموا أن الموجود من الإنسان مثلا في الخارج ماهيته و ذاته - و في الذهن شبحه و مثاله دون ماهيته و نحن نرى أن الماهية الإنسانية و عينه الثابتة محفوظة في كلا الموطنين لا حظ لها من الوجود بحسب نفسها في شيء من المشهدين على ما قررناه إلا أن لها نحوا من الاتحاد مع نحو من الوجود أو أنحاء كالإنسان مثلا - فإن مفهومه يتحد أما في الخارج فبنحو من الوجود يصدق عليه أنه جوهر قابل للأبعاد نام حساس مدرك للمعقولات و بنحو آخر يصدق عليه أنه جوهر مفارق عقلي مسمى بروح القدس على رأي أفلاطون و من سبقه و أما في الذهن فبنحو آخر يصدق عليه أنه عرض نفساني غير قابل للقسمة و النسبة حال أو ملكة

تحقيق وتفصيل:

اعلم أن حمل شيء على شيء واتحاده معه يتصور على وجهين - أحدهما الشائع الصناعي المسمى بالحمل المتعارف و هو عبارة عن مجرد اتحاد الموضوع و المحمول وجودا و يرجع إلى كون الموضوع من أفراد مفهوم المحمول سواء كان الحكم على نفس مفهوم الموضوع كما في القضية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٣

الطبيعية أو على أفرادها كما في القضايا المتعارفة من المحصورات أو غيرها و سواء كان المحكوم به ذاتيا للمحكوم عليه و يقال له الحمل بالذات أو عرضيا له و يقال له الحمل بالعرض و الجميع يسمى حملا عرضيا. و ثانيهما أن يعنى به أن الموضوع هو بعينه نفس ماهية المحمول و مفهومه - بعد أن يلحظ نحو من التغير أي هذا بعينه عنوان ماهية ذلك لا أن يقتصر على مجرد الاتحاد في الذات و الوجود و يسمى حملا ذاتيا أوليا إما ذاتيا لكونه لا يجري و لا يصدق إلا في الذاتيات و إما أوليا لكونه أولي الصدق أو الكذب فكثيرا ما يصدق و يكذب محمول واحد على موضوع واحد بل مفهوم واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٤

على نفسه بحسب اختلاف هذين الحملين كالجزئي و اللامفهوم و اللاممكن بالإمكان العام و اللاموجود بالوجود المطلق و عدم العدم و الحرف و شريك الباري و النقيضين و لذلك اعتبرت في التناقض وحدة أخرى سوى الشروط الثمانية المشهورة و تلك هي وحدة الحمل فالجزئي مثلا جزئي بالحمل الذاتي ليس بجزئي بل كلي بالحمل المتعارف و مفهوم الحرف حرف بالأول اسم بالثاني. فإذا تمهدت هذه المقدمة فنقول إن الطبائع الكلية العقلية من حيث كليتها و معقوليتها لا تدخل تحت مقولة من المقولات و من حيث وجودها في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٥

النفس أي وجود حالة أو ملكة في النفس يصير مظهرا أو مصدرا لها تحت مقولة كيف فإن سألت عنا ليس الجوهر مأخوذا في طبائع أنواعه و أجناسه و كذا الكم و النسبة في طبائع أفرادهما كما يقال الإنسان جوهر قابل للأبعاد حساس ناطق - و الزمان كم متصل غير قار و السطح كم متصل قار منقسم في الجهتين فقط نجيبك يا أخا الحقيقة بأن مجرد كون الجوهر مأخوذا في تحديد الإنسان لا يوجب أن يصير هذا المجموع الذي هو حد الإنسان فردا للجوهر مندرجا تحته كما أن كون مفهوم الجزئي و حده و هو ما يمتنع فرض صدقه على كثيرين عين نفسه لا يوجب كونه جزئيا و كون حد الشيء عين محدوده و إن كان صحيحا لكن لا يستدعي كون الحد فردا للمحدود و كذا كون مفهوم الجوهر عين نفسه لا يصيره من جزئيات الجوهر و أنواعه و كذا باقي المقولات و إنما يلزم لو ترتب عليه أنه يكون نفس مفهوم الجوهر مثلا من حيث هو بشرط الكلية إذا وجد في الخارج كان لا في موضوع - و هذا المفهوم بشرط الكلية يمتنع وجوده في الخارج إذ كل موجود خارجي مشخص - و كذا نقول في أكثر الحدود و المفهومات فإن حد الحيوان و هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٦

النامي الحساس لا يصدق عليه هذا المفهوم بالحمل الشائع وإن حملة عليه حملا أوليا فإن قلت إذا لم يكن الطبائع النوعية مندرجة تحت المقولات بذواتها في أي نحو كان من الوجود لم يكن المقولة ذاتية لها وصادقة عليها على أي وجه أخذت - ولم يكن الأشخاص أيضا مندرجة تحت تلك المقولات على هذا الوجه إذ حقيقة الشيء ليس إلا الماهية النوعية له - قلت كون موجود مندرجا تحت مقولة يستتبع أمرين أحدهما أن يكون مفهوم تلك المقولة مأخوذا في حقيقته كما يقال السطح كم متصل قار منقسم في جهتين فقط فإنه اعتبر فيه هذه المفهومات اعتبار أجزاء الحد في الحد. و ثانيهما أن يترتب عليه أثره بأن يكون باعتبار كميته قابلا للانقسام والمساواة وباعتبار اتصاله ذا أجزاء مفروضة مشتركة في الحدود وباعتبار قراره ذا أجزاء مجتمعة في الوجود.

إذا تمهد هذا فاعلم أن الطبائع النوعية إذا وجدت في الخارج و تشخصت بالتشخصات الخارجية يترتب عليها آثار ذاتياتها لكون شرط ترتب الآثار هو الوجود العيني وإذا وجدت في الذهن من حيث طبيعتها و تشخصت بالتشخصات الظلية - يكون تلك الطبائع حاملة لمفهومات الذاتيات من غير أن يترتب عليها آثارها إذ الآثار للموجود لا للمفهوم مثلا الحاصل من السطح في الذهن متضمن لمعنى الكم - لكن ليس بحيث يترتب فيه آثار الكمية أي ليس الحاصل في الذهن من حيث إنه - موجود ذهني و قائم به قابلا للانقسام إلى الأجزاء لذاته بل هو معنى بسيط مجرد - بحيث إذا وجد في الخارج يترتب عليه آثار الكمية لذاته و مثل ذلك الحاصل من مفهوم الإنسان هو معنى الحيوان الناطق مجملا لكن ليس حيوانا يترتب عليه آثار الحيوانية من الأبعاد بالفعل و التحيز و النمو و الحس و الحركة في الذهن بل يتضمن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٧

لمعنى الحيوان المجرد عن العمل المعزول عن الآثار و الأفعال و كذا حال الناطق. فإن قلت ما حسبه من آثار الذاتيات منفكة عن الأنواع في الذهن هي نفس الذاتيات فإن معنى الكم ليس إلا نفس المنقسم بالذات فكيف يكون الحاصل في الذهن كما و لا يكون قابلا للانقسام لأنه معنى عقلي مجرد بسيط و إذا كان منقسما بالذات فلا يكون كيفاً.

قلت بل هو باعتبار أخذ مفهوم الكم فيه و أدلة الوجود الذهني بعد تمامها - لا يستدعي إلا حصول نفس ماهيات الأشياء في الذهن لا أفرادها و أنحاء وجوداتها - و قد أقمنا نحن البرهان على امتناع انتقال أنحاء الوجودات و التشخصات من موطن إلى موطن و ناهيك من ذلك تعريف العلم بالصورة الحاصلة عن الشيء.

و بالجملة حمل مفهوم الكم على هذه الأنواع كحمل مفهومه على نفسه بمعنى كونه مأخوذا في حدها كأخذ الشيء فيما هو ذاتيه أو ذاته فكما أن مفهوم الكم باعتبار - لا يصير فردا لنفسه و لا يصير منقسما لذاته كذلك الأنواع الحاصلة منه في العقل.

فبجملة ما قررناه ظهر لك أن شيئا من المعقولات الذهنية من حيث ماهياتها - ليست مندرجة تحت مقولة من المقولات بمعنى كونها أفرادا لها بل المقولات إما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٨

عينها أو مأخوذ فيها وإما من حيث كونها صفات موجودة للذهن ناعته له من مقولة الكيف بالعرض لا أن الكيف ذاتي لها وأصل الإشكال وقوامه على أن جميع المقولات ذاتيات لجميع الأفراد بجميع الاعتبارات وهو مما لم يقم عليه برهان - وما حكم بعمومه وجدان وهو الذي جعل الأفهام صرعى وصير الأعلام حيارى - حيث أنكر قوم الوجود الذهني وجوز بعضهم انقلاب الماهية وزعم بعضهم أن إطلاق الكيف على العلم من باب التشبيه والمسامحة فاختار كل مذهبا وطريقة ولم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٢٩٩

يهتدوا إلى حله سبيلا ولم يأتوا بشيء يضمن ولا يغني قليلا

الإشكال الثاني أنا نتصور جبلا شاهقة وصحارى واسعة مع أشجارها وأنهارها وتلالها وهادها

و نتصور الفلك والكواكب العظيمة المقدار على الوجه الجزئي المانع عن الاشتراك فوجب على ما ذهبوا إليه أن يحصل تلك الأمور - في القوة الخيالية التي ليست جسما ولا متقدرة بل كيفية وقوة عرضت لبخار حاصل في حشو الرأس و كذا إذا نتصور زيدا مع أشخاص أخرى إنسانية يحصل في تلك الكيفية المسماة بالقوة الخيالية أناس مدركون متحركون متعقلون موصوفون بصفات آدميين مشتغلون في تلك القوة بحرفهم وصنائعهم وهو مما يجزم العقل ببطلانه - وكذا لو كان محل هذه الأشياء الروح التي في مقدم الدماغ فإنه شيء قليل المقدار والحجم - وانطباع العظيم في الصغير مما لا يخفى ببطلانه ولا يكفي الاعتذار بأن كليهما يقبلان التقسيم إلى غير النهاية فإن الكف لا يسع الجبل وإن كان كل منهما يقبل التقسيم لا إلى نهاية.

و الجواب

أن هذا إنما يرد نقضا على القائلين بوجود الأشباح الجسمية - والأمثلة الجرمانية في القوة الخيالية أو الحسية ولم يبرهنوا ذلك بدليل شاف وبرهان واف كما لا يذهب على متتبع أقوالهم وليس لهذه القوى إلا كونها مظاهر معدة لمشاهدة النفس تلك الصور والأشباح في عالم المثال الأعظم كما هو رأي شيخ الإشراق تبعا للأقدمين من حكماء الفرس والرواقيين أو أسبابا وآلات للنفس بها يفعل تلك الأفعال والآثار في عالم مثالها الأصغر كما ذهبنا إليه والحاصل أنه لا يرد ذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٠

نقضا على من أثبت وجودا آخر للمدركات الحسية سوى هذا الوجود العيني في عالم المواد الجسماني. وبالجملة فإنما يثبت بأدلة الوجود العلمي للأشياء الصورية وجود عالم آخر - وأن لهذه الصور والأشباح وجودا آخر سوى ما يظهر على الحواس الظاهرة وبذلك الوجود ينكشف ويظهر عند القوى الباطنية بل ربما يشاهدها النفس المجردة المنزهة عن مقارنة شيء من هذين الوجودين المستعلية عن مخالطة هذين العالمين بمعونة القوى الباطنية كما يشاهد هذه الأشباح بمعونة القوى الظاهرة وبالجملة يستدل النفس المجردة بإدراك القوى الظاهرة على وجود هذا

العالم و بإدراك القوى الباطنة على ثبوت عالم آخر شبحي مقداري كما يستدل بإدراك ذاتها و الحقائق العقلية على وجود عالم عقلي خارج عن القسامين عال على الإقليمين لأننا ندرك ما شاهدناه مرة من أشخاص هذا العالم بعد انعدامه على الوجه الذي شاهدناه أولا من المقدار و الشكل و الوضع به ينتصب عند المدرك و به يتمثل بين يديه بخصوصه - وله وجود البتة و ليس في هذا العالم بالفرض فوجوده في عالم آخر فذهب أفلاطون و القدماء من الحكماء الكبار و أهل الذوق و الكشف من المتألهين إلى أن موجودات ذلك العالم قائمة لا في مكان و لا في جهة بل هو واسطة بين عالم العقل و عالم الحس - إذ الموجودات العقلية مجردة عن المادة و توابعها من الأين و الشكل و الكم و اللون و الضوء و أمثالها بالكلية و الموجودات الحسنة مغمورة في تلك الأعراض و أما الأشباح المثالية الثابتة في هذا العالم فلها نحو تجرد حيث لا يدخل في جهة و لا يحويها مكان و نحو تجسم حيث لها مقادير و أشكال.

و خلاصة ما ذكره الشيخ المتأله شهاب الدين السهروردي في حكمة الإشراق - لإثبات هذا المطلب أن الإبصار ليس بانطباع صورة المرئي في العين على ما هو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠١

رأي المعلم الأول و لا بخروج الشعاع من العين إلى المرئي كما هو مذهب الرياضيين فليس الإبصار إلا بمقابلة المستنير للعين السليمة لا غير إذ بها يحصل للنفس علم إشراقي حضوري على المرئي فيراه و كذلك صورة المرأة ليست في البصر لامتناع انطباع العظيم في الصغير و ليست هي صورتك أو صورة ما رأيته بعينها كما ظن لأنه بطل كون الإبصار بالشعاع فصلا عن كونه بانعكاسه و إذ تبين أن الصورة ليست في المرأة و لا في جسم من الأجسام و نسبة الجليدية إلى المبصرات كنسبة المرأة إلى الصور الظاهرة منها - فكما أن صورة المرأة ليست فيها كذلك الصورة التي تدرك النفس بواسطتها ليست في الجليدية بل تحدث عند المقابلة و ارتفاع الموانع من النفس إشراق حضوري على ذلك الشيء المستنير فإن كان له هوية في الخارج فيراه و إن كان شبحا محضا - فيحتاج إلى مظهر آخر كالمرأة فإذا وقعت الجليدية في مقابلة المرأة التي ظهر فيها صور الأشياء المقابلة وقع من النفس أيضا إشراق حضوري فرأت تلك الأشياء - بواسطة مرآة الجليدية و المرأة الخارجية لكن عند الشرائط و ارتفاع الموانع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٢

و بمثل ما امتنع به انطباع الصورة في العين يمتنع انطباعها في موضع من الدماغ فإذا الصور الخيالية لا تكون موجودة في الأذهان لامتناع انطباع الكبير في الصغير و لا في الأعيان و إلا ليراها كل سليم الحس و ليست عدما و إلا لما كانت متصورة و لا متميزة و لا محكوما عليها بالأحكام المختلفة الثبوتية و إذ هي موجودة و ليست في الأذهان و لا في الأعيان و لا في عالم العقول لكونها صورا جسمانية لا عقلية - فبالضرورة يكون في صقع آخر و هو عالم المثال المسمى بالخيال المنفصل لكونه غير مادي تشبيها بالخيال المتصل و هو الذي ذهب إلى وجوده الحكماء الأقدمون - كأفلاطون و سقراط و فيثاغورس و أنباذقلس و غيرهم من المتألهين و جميع السلاك من الأمم المختلفة فإنهم قالوا العالم عالمان عالم العقل المنقسم إلى عالم الربوبية و إلى عالم العقول و النفوس و عالم الصور المنقسم إلى الصور الحسية و إلى الصور الشبحية و من هاهنا يعلم أن الصور الشبحية ليست مثل أفلاطون لأن هؤلاء العظماء من أكابر الحكماء كما

يقولون بهذه الصور يقولون بالمثل الأفلاطونية- وهي نورية عظيمة ثابتة في عالم الأنوار العقلية وهذه مثل معلقة في عالم الأشباح المجردة بعضها ظلمانية هي جهنم عذاب الأشقياء وبعضها مستنيرة هي جنات يتنعم بها السعداء من المتوسطين وأصحاب اليمين وأما السابقون المقربون فهم يرتقون إلى الدرجة العليا ويرتعون في رياض القدس عند الأنوار الإلهية والمثل الربانية

نقد عرشي:

اعلم أنا ممن يؤمن بوجود العالم المقداري الغير المادي كما ذهب إليه أساطين الحكمة وأئمة الكشف حسبما حرره وقرره صاحب الإشراف أتم تحرير و تقرير إلا أنا نخالف معه في شيئين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٣

أحدهما أن الصور المتخيلة عندنا موجودة كما أومأنا إليه في صقع من النفس بمجرد تأثيرها و تصويرها باستخدام الخيال لا في عالم خارج عنها بتأثير مؤثر غيرها كما يفهم من كلامه لظهور أن تصرفات المتخيلة و دعاباتها الجزافية- و ما يعبث به من الصور و الأشكال القبيحة المخالفة لفعل الحكيم ليس إلا في العالم الصغير النفساني لأجل شيطنة القوة المتخيلة و أن هذه الصور الخيالية باقية ببقاء توجه النفس و التفاتها إليها و استخدامها المتخيلة في تصويرها و تشبيتها فإذا أعرض عنها النفس انعدمت و زالت لا أنها مستمرة الوجود باقية لا بإبقاء النفس و حفظها إياها كما زعمه و الفرق بين الذهول و النسيان أن للنفس في الأول ملكة الاقتدار على تصوير الصور الخيالية من غير افتقار إلى إحساس جديد أو غيره بخلاف الثاني فإن فيه يحتاج إلى ذلك أو ما هو بمنزلته كالعلامات الدالة.

و الثاني أن الصور المرآتية عنده موجودة في عالم المثل و عندنا ظلال للصور المحسوسة بمعنى أنها ثابتة في هذا العالم ثبوتا ظليا أي ثبوتا بالعرض لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٤

بالذات و كذا ثانية ما يراه الأحوال من الصور و ثانية الصوت الذي يقال له الصدى- كل ذلك عكوس و ظلال ثابتة بالعرض تبعا للصور المحسوسة الخارجية كما أن ما سوى أنحاء الوجودات أعيان ثابتة بالعرض تبعا للوجودات و ظلال و عكوس حاكية لها- و حكاية الشيء ليست حقيقة ذلك الشيء كما في النظم لبعض العرفاء

همه عالم صداى نغمه اوست كه شنيد اين چنين صداى دراز

الإشكال الثالث أنه لو كان للأشياء وجود في الذهن

على ما قررتم يلزم أن يكون لكل نوع من الأنواع الجسمانية و الأنواع العرضية فرد شخصي مجرد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٥

عن المادة و لواحقها من المقدار و الأين و الوضع و أشباهها يكون ذلك الأمر المشخص كليا و نوعا.

بيان ذلك أن كل مفهوم كلي تعقلنا فعلى ما قررتم يوجد ذلك المفهوم في الذهن فإما أن يوجد فيه من غير أن يتشخص

بل يبقى على صرافة إبهامه أو يصير متشخصا لا سبيل إلى الأول لأن الوجود لا ينفك عن التشخص و وجود المبهم مبهما غير معقول و على الثاني يلزم أن يحصل في ذهننا عند تعقل الإنسان إنسان مشخص مجرد عن الكم و الكيف و سائر العوارض المادية إذ لو قارنها لم يجز أن يحصل في العقل المجرد على ما تقرر عندهم من امتناع حصول الجسماني في المجرد - لكن التالي باطل بديهية و اتفاقا فالمقدم كذلك.

و الجواب عنه في المشهور

أن الموجود في الذهن و إن كان أمرا شخصيا - إلا أنه عرض و كيفية قائمة بالذهن و ليس فردا من حقيقة ذلك الجوهر المأخوذ منه هذا الفرد نعم هو عين مفهوم ذلك الجوهر و نفس معناه و كذا القياس في تعقل الأعراض الجسمانية. و قد علمت من طريقتنا في دفع الإشكال الأول أن المأخوذ من الجواهر النوعية الخارجية في الذهن معناها و مفهومها دون ذواتها و أشخاصها و أما كلية الموجود الذهني و صدقه على كثيرين فباعتبار أخذه مجردا عن الشخصات الذهنية - و الخارجية جميعا و لا حجر في كون شيء كلياً باعتبار و شخصياً باعتبار - سيما بالقياس إلى الوجودين الخارجي و العقلي و إن ألح ملح و ارتكب مرتكب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٦

أن الإنسانية التي في الذهن تشارك الإنسان في الحقيقة و هي جوهر أيضاً و حالة في الذهن و محلها مستغن عنها فقد وقع فيما لا مهرب عنه على ما علمت آنفا. و العجب أن المولى الدواني مصر على جوهرية المعاني الجوهرية الذهنية - قائلا إن الجوهر ماهية من شأنها أن يكون في الخارج لا في الموضوع و شنع على القائل بكون صورة الجوهر الذهنية من باب الكيف أنه يلزم حينئذ انقلاب الجوهر كيفاً.

و لم يعلم أن لزوم انقلاب الحقيقة على ما صورته و توهمه ألحق به و ألزم كما يظهر عند التعمق و التدبر اللهم إلا أن يلتزم في جميع الحدود التي للأنواع الجوهرية - التقييد بكونها إذا وجدت في الخارج كذا و كذا إذ كما أن جوهرية الإنسان الذهني كذلك فكذا قابليته للأبعاد و مقداره و نموه و حسه و نطقه و جميع لوازم هذه المعاني و حينئذ لا فرق بين القول بكون الصورة الذهنية كيفاً بالحقيقة و بين كونها نوعاً من الجوهر بهذه الوجوه التعسفية فالحق أن مفهوم الإنسانية و غيرها من صور الأنواع الجوهرية كيفيات ذهنية يصدق عليها معانيها بالحمل الأولي و يكذب عنها بالحمل المتعارف و دلائل الوجود الذهني لا يعطي أكثر من هذا في العقلية هذا لمن لا يدعن بوجود عالم عقلي فيه صور الأنواع الجوهرية كالمعلم الأول و أتباعه كما هو المشهور و أما من يؤمن بوجود ذلك العالم الشامخ الإلهي فله أن يقول إن كون بعض من أفراد الماهية النوعية مجرداً و بعضها مادياً مما لم يحكم بفساده بديهية و لا برهان و لا وقع على امتناعه اتفاق كيف و قد ذهب العظيم أفلاطون و أشياخه العظام إلى أن لكل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٧

نوع من الأنواع الجسمانية فرداً في عالم العقل و تلك الأفراد أسباب فعالة لسائر الأفراد الجسمانية لتلك الأنواع و هي ذوات عناية بها و الدليل الدال على أن أفراد نوع واحد لا يقبل التشكيك و التفاوت في وجوداتها بحسب التمامية و

النقص و التقدم و التأخر على تقدير تماميته و إنما يتم بحسب نحو واحد من الوجود و موطن واحد من الكون لا بحسب الوجودين و بحسب المواطنين - و الحق أن مذهب أفلاطون و من سبقه من أساطين الحكمة في وجود المثل العقلية للطباع النوعية الجرمانية في غاية المتانة و الاستحكام لا يرد عليه شيء من نقوض المتأخرين و قد حققنا قول هذا العظيم و أشياخه العظام بوجه لا يرد عليه شيء من النقوض و الإيرادات التي منشؤها عدم الوصول إلى مقامهم و فقد الاطلاع على مرامهم كما سنذكره لمن وفق له إن شاء الله تعالى على أن بناء مقاصدهم و معتمد أقوالهم على السوانح النورية و اللوامع القدسية التي لا يعترىها وصمة شك و ريب - و لا شائبة نقص و عيب لا على مجرد الأنظار البحثية التي سيلعب بالمعوليين عليها و المعتمدين بها الشكوك يلعن اللاحق منهم فيها للسابق و لم يتصالحوا عليها و يتوافقوا فيها بل كلما دخلت أمة لعنت أختها.

ثم إن أولئك العظماء من كبار الحكماء و الأولياء و إن لم يذكروا حجة على إثبات تلك المثل النورية و اكتفوا فيه بمجرد المشاهدات الصريحة المتكررة التي وقعت لهم فحكوها لغيرهم لكن يحصل للإنسان الاعتماد على ما اتفقوا عليه و الجزم بما شاهدوه ثم ذكروه و ليس لأحد أن يناظرهم فيه كيف و إذا اعتبروا أوضاع الكواكب و أعداد الأفلاك بناء على ترصد شخص كأبرخس أو أشخاص كهو مع غيره بوسيلة الحس المثار للغلط و الطغيان فبان يعتبر أقوال فحول الفلسفة المبتنية على أرصادهم العقلية المتكررة التي لا يحتمل الخطأ كان أخرى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٨

الإشكال الرابع أنه يلزم على القول بالوجود الذهني أن يصير الذهن حارا

حين تصور الحرارة باردا عند تصور البرودة معوجا مستقيما كرويا مثلثا مربعا - كافرا مؤمنا متحيزا لأن الحار ما حصل فيه الحرارة و البارد ما حصل فيه البرودة - و كذلك سائر المشتقات فيلزم اتصاف النفس بصفات الأجسام و الأمور المتضادة - و بطلانه ضروري.

بيان اللزوم أنه يلزم على التقدير المذكور أنا إذا تصورنا الأشياء يحصل في أذهاننا حقائق تلك الأشياء و تحل فيها و الحلول هو الاختصاص الناعت فيجب أن تكون حقائق تلك المعلومات أوصافا و نعوتا للذهن.

و الجواب عنه بوجوده.

الأول و هو من جملة العرشيات -

أن صور هذه الأشياء عند تصور النفس إياها في صقع من ملكوت النفس من غير حلول فيها بل كما أن الجوهر النوراني أي النفس الناطقة عند إشراق نورها على القوة الباصرة يدرك بعلم حضوري إشراقي - ما يقابل العضو الجليدي من المبصرات من غير انطباع كما هو رأي شيعة الأقدمين - فكذا عند إشراقه على القوة المتخيلة يدرك بعلم حضوري إشراقي الصورة المتخيلة الخارجية المباشرة للنفس من غير حلول الصور فيها و اتصاف النفس بها بل كما يرى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٠٩

و يحس صور الأشياء الخارجية بالباصرة و غيرها كذا ينظر إلى صورها الباطنية - و يشاهدها بحواسها الباطنية من غير حلولها في ذات النفس و الوجدان لا يحكم بالتفرقة بين المشاهدة في اليقظة و المشاهدة في النوم.

ثم على تقدير أن يكون للصور الخيالية قيام حلولي بالنفس نقول إن شرط الاتصاف بشيء الانفعال و التأثير منه دون مجرد القيام فإن المبادي الفعالة لوجود الحوادث الكونية مع أن لها الإحاطة العلمية على نحو ارتسام صور تلك الأشياء فيها كما هو مذهبهم لكن لا يتصف بالكائنات و أعراضها الجسمية لأن قيام الصور الكونية بمباديها العالية من جهة الفعل و التأثير في تلك الصور دون الانفعال و التأثير عنها و لا نسلم أن مجرد قيام الشيء بالشيء يوجب اتصافه بذلك الشيء من غير تأثير و تغير و لست أقول أن إطلاق المشتق بمجرد هذا لا يصح أم يصح لأن ذلك أمر آخر - لا يتعلق بغرضنا في هذا المقام أصلاً

الوجه الثاني و هو أيضاً مما يستفاد من الرجوع إلى ما سبق

من التحقيق في اختلاف نحوي الحمل فإن مفهوم الكفر ليس كفراً بالحمل الشائع فلا يلزم من الاتصاف به الاتصاف بالكفر حتى يلزم أن من تصور الكفر كان كافراً و كذا الحكم في أنحاء هذا المثال فليحسن المسترشد إعمال رويته في ذلك التحقيق لينحل منه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٠

الإيراد بنظائر هذه النقوض.

الوجه الثالث من الجواب و هو المذكور في الكتب

بأن مبنى الإيراد على عدم التفرقة بين الوجود المتأصل الذي به الهوية العينية و غير المتأصل الذي به الصورة العقلية فإن المتصف بالحرارة ما يقوم به الحرارة العينية لا صورتها الذهنية - فالتضاد إنما هو بين هوية الحرارة و البرودة و أشباههما لا بين صورتها المتضادين و بالجملة هذه الصفات يعتبر في حقائقها أنها بحيث إذا وجدت في المواد الجسمانية تجعلها بحالة مخصوصة و تؤثر فيها بما يدركه الحواس مثلاً الحرارة تقتضي تفريق المختلفات من الأجسام و جمع المتشابهات منها و الاستقامة حالة قائمة بالخط مما يكون أجزاءه على سمت واحد و قس عليه الانحناء و التشكلات فإذا عقلناها و وجدت في النفس المجردة حالة فيها لم يلزم إلا اتصاف بما من شأنه أن تصير به الأجسام حارة أو باردة أو متشكلة أو غير ذلك لا أن تصير النفس موضوعة لهذه المحمولات الانفعالية المادية.

و لقائل أن يقول هذا الجواب لا يجري في النقض بلوازم بعض الماهيات و الأوصاف الانتزاعية و الإضافيات كالزوجية و الفردية و الوجوب و العلية و الأبوة و أمثالها مما ليست من الأمور الخارجية و كذا لا يجري في صفات المعدومات كالامتناع و العدم و أمثالهما إذ لا يتيسر لأحد أن يقول إن اتصاف محل الزوجية و العلية و الامتناع - من الأحكام المتعلقة بوجودها العيني إذ لا وجود لأمثالها لأنها إما أمور اعتبارية عقلية من لوازم الماهيات أو عدمية من صفات المعدومات. و يمكن دفع هذا الإيراد بما حققناه في هذا الكتاب من أن لكل معنى من المعاني حظاً من الوجود فالزوجية مثلاً له وجود بمعنى كون موصوفها على نحو يدرك العاقل منه الانقسام بمتساويين هذا هو نحو الوجود الأصيل و الخارجي له

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١١

فأما إذا تصورت النفس معنى الزوجية فليس هذا نحو وجوده الأصيل إذ لا تصير النفس بسبب إدراكها مفهوم الزوجية بحيث يفهم منها الانقسام بمتساويين و كذا الحكم في نظائرها و أما العدم و أمثاله فلا صورة لها في العقل بل العقل

بقوته المتصرفة يجعل بعض المفهومات صورة و عنواناً لأمور باطلة و يجعلها وسيلة لتعرف أحكامها.

الإشكال الخامس أن الذهن موجود في الخارج و الأمور الذهنية موجودة فيه

على ما قررتم فيلزم من تعقلنا لها وجودها في العقل الموجود في الخارج و الموجود في الموجود في الشيء موجود في ذلك الشيء كالماء الموجود في الكوز الموجود في البيت -

و الجواب أن الموجود في الموجود في الشيء

إنما يكون موجوداً في ذلك الشيء إذا كان الوجودان متأصلين و يكون الوجودان هويتين كوجود الماء في الكوز و الكوز في البيت بخلاف الموجود في الذهن الموجود في الخارج - فإن الحاصل من المعلوم في الذهن صورة لا هوية و الوجود ظلي لا متأصل و من الذهن في الخارج هوية و الوجود متأصل و معنى في في الموضوعين مختلف و كذا استعمالها فيهما و في المكان و الزمان ليس بمعنى واحد بل بالحقيقة و المجاز لأن كون الشيء في الخارج ليس من قبيل الماء في الكوز بل معنى كون الشيء في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٢

الخارج هو أن يترتب عليه الآثار المطلوبة منه و كونه في الذهن هو أن لا يكون كذلك

الإشكال السادس

أنه يلزم أن يوجد في أذهاننا من الممتنعات الكلية أشخاص حقيقية يكون بالحقيقة أشخاصاً لها لا بحسب فرضنا لأننا إذا حكمنا على اجتماع النقيضين بالامتناع بعد تصورنا اجتماع النقيضين و يحصل في ذهننا هذا المعنى متشخصاً و متعيناً فالموجود في ذهننا فرد شخصي من اجتماع النقيضين مع أن بديهية العقل - يجزم بامتناع اجتماع النقيضين في الذهن و الخارج و كذا يلزم وجود فرد حقيقي للمعدوم المطلق و كذا شريك الباري تعالى فيلزم وجود ذلك الفرد في الخارج أيضاً لأنه إذا وجد في الذهن فرد مشخص لشريك الباري تعالى فيجب بالنظر إلى ذاته الوجود العيني و إلا لم يكن شريكاً للباري تعالى.

و الجواب أن القضايا التي حكم فيها على الأشياء الممتنعة الوجود

حملات غير بنية و هي التي حكم فيها بالاتحاد بين طرفيها بالفعل على تقدير انطباق طبيعة العنوان على فرد فإن للعقل أن يتصور مفهوم النقيضين و شريك الباري و الجوهر الفرد و أن يتصور جميع المفهومات حتى عدم نفسه و عدم علته و عدم عدم و مفهوم الممتنع لا على أن ما يتصوره هو حقيقة الممتنع إذ كل ما يتصور و يوجد في الذهن يحمل عليه أنه ممكن من الممكنات بل ذلك المتصور هو عنوان لتلك الحقيقة الباطلة و مناط صحة كون مفهوم عنواناً لماهية من الماهيات أن يحمل عليه المفهوم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٣

منها حملاً أولياً و إن لم يحمل عليه حملاً شائعاً صناعياً فالعقل يقدر أن يتصور مفهوماً - و يجعله عنواناً بحسب الفرض لطبيعة باطلة الذات مجهولة التصور و يحكم عليه بامتناع الحكم عليه و العلم به و باعتبار وجود هذا المفهوم في الذهن و كونه عنواناً لماهية باطلة يصير منشأ لصحة الحكم عليه بامتناع الحكم عليه و جواز الإخبار عنه بامتناع الإخبار عنه

فصحة الحكم يتوجه عليه من حيث كونه فردا لمفهوم ممكن و موجود و امتناعه يتوجه إليه من حيث كونه مما يحمل عليه الممتنع و المعدوم حملا أوليا و باعتبار كونه عنوانا لطبيعة مستحيلة من هذه الجهة و من هذا القبيل الأحكام الجارية على مفهوم الواجب الوجود بالذات كقولنا واجب الوجود و تشخصه عين ذاته و وحدته مغايرة لما يفهم من الوحدة فإن الحكم بعينية التشخص من حيث كونه حكما من الأحكام يتوجه إلى مفهوم واجب الوجود- لكن عينية التشخص غير متوجه إليه بل إلى ما يؤدي إليه البرهان أنه بإزائه و هو الحي القيوم جل ذكره و إن تقدر عن أن يتمثل في ذهن من الأذهان.

فعلم أن هذه القضايا و نظائرها عمليات غير بتية و هي و إن كانت مساوقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٤

للشرطية لكنها غير راجعة إليها كما يظن فإن الحكم فيها على المأخوذ بتقدير ما- بأن يكون التقدير من تنمة فرض الموضوع حيث لم يكن طبيعة متحصلة أصلا أو في الذهن لا بأن يكون الموضوع مما قد فرض و تم فرضه في نفسه ثم خصص الحكم عليه بالتقدير المذكور حتى يكون الموضوع من قبيل الطبيعة الموقته أو المقيدة ليلزم كون القضية مشروطة في المعنى

فصل (٤) في زيادة توضيح لإفادة تنقيح

اعلم أن قوما من المتأخرين لما ورد عليهم الإشكالات المذكورة في الوجود الذهني و تعسر عليهم التخلص عن الجميع اختاروا أن الموجود في الذهن ليس حقائق المعلومات بل أشباحها و أظلالها المحاكية عنها بوجه. و بيان ذلك أنه لما تعاضد البرهان و الوجدان على أنه يوجد في ذهننا عند تصور الحقائق أمر محاك لها به يشعر الذهن بها و يجري عليها الأحكام و يخبر عنها- و لا يسوغ لنا أن نقول تلك الحقائق بعينها موجودة في الذهن لورود هذه الإشكالات- فالمذهب الجامع بين الدليلين هو أن يقال الحاصل في الذهن ظل من المعلوم و أنموذج

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٥

له نوع محاكاة عنه كمحاكاة اللفظ و الكتابة إلا أن محاكاتها للمعاني بحسب الوضع و محاكاة النقوش الذهنية بحسب الطبيعة.

و يرد عليهم أنه لو تم دلائل الوجود الذهني لدلت على أن للمعلومات بأنفسها- وجودا في الذهن لا لأمر آخر مباين لها بحقيقتها كالنقوش الكتبية و الهيئات الصوتية- إذ لا يقول أحد أن كتابة زيد و اللفظ الدال عليه هما زيد بعينه بخلاف إدراكه و تصوره فإنه يجري عليه أحكامه و يحمل عليه ذاتياته و عرضياته فليس فيما ذكره جمع بين الدليلين بل إبطال لهما و إحداث مذهب ثالث.

و سلك بعض الأماجد مسلكا دقيقا قريبا من التحقيق لا بأس بذكره و ما يرد عليه تشجيذا للافهام و توضيحا للمقام. و بيانه يتوقف على تمهيد مقدمة هي أن ماهية الشيء متأخرة عن موجوديتها بمعنى أنه ما لم يصر موجودا لم يكن ماهية من الماهيات إذ المعدوم الصرف ليس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٦

له ماهية أصلاً وليس شيئاً من الأشياء فما لم يكن له نوع تحصل و تحقق إما ذهنًا أو خارجاً لم يكن ماهية من الماهيات. فإن قلت فما يصير موجوداً ثم يصير ماهية أما هذه الماهية فتصير هذه الماهية موجودة ثم تصير هذه الماهية وهو ظاهر البطلان أو ماهية أخرى وهو أفحش - مثل أن يقال وجد الفرس فصار إنساناً. قلت لا حصر بل يتصور شق ثالث أما أولاً فلأن هذا التقدم رتبي لا زمني - وارتفاع النقيضين في المرتبة جائز كما سنبين مراراً و أما ثانياً فلأن معنى قولنا وجد فصار إنساناً ليس أنه وجد شيء معين فصار إنساناً حتى يتأتى التردد بأن هذا الشيء إما الإنسان أو غيره بل هناك أمر واحد هو إنسان و موجود فتحققه و حصوله من حيث هو موجود أولاً بالحصول من حيث هو ماهية الإنسان و أيضاً لو تم ما ذكرت لزم أن لا يتقدم ملزوم على لازمه المحمول عليه كالأربعة على الزوج مثلاً بأن يقال لو وجدت الأربعة أولاً فصارت زوجاً فما وجد أولاً إما زوج فالزوج يصير زوجاً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٧

أو ليس بزواج فيكون الأربعة ليست بزواج ثم تصير زوجاً و بطلانهما ظاهر. إذا تمهد هذا نقول لما كانت موجودة الماهية متقدمة على نفسها فمع قطع النظر عن الوجود لا يكون هناك ماهية أصلاً و الوجود الذهني و الخارجي مختلفان بالحقيقة فإذا تبدل الوجود بأن يصير الموجود الخارجي موجوداً في الذهن - لا استبعاد أن يتبدل الماهية أيضاً فإذا وجد شيء في الخارج كانت له ماهية إما جوهر أو كم أو من مقولة أخرى و إذا تبدل الوجود و وجد في الذهن انقلبت ماهيته و صارت من مقولة الكيف و عند هذا اندفع الإشكالات إذ مدار الجميع على أن الموجود الذهني باق على حقيقته الخارجية فإن قلت هذا بعينه هو القول بالشبح و يرد عليه أنه على هذا لا تكون الأشياء بأنفسها حاصلة في الذهن بل أمر آخر مباين لها بالحقيقة. قلت ليس للشيء بالنظر إلى ذاته بذاته مع قطع النظر عن الوجودين حقيقة معينة يمكن أن يقال هذه الحقيقة موجودة في الذهن و في الخارج بل الموجود الخارجي بحيث إذا وجد في الذهن انقلبت كيفاً و إذا وجدت الكيفية الذهنية في الخارج كانت عين المعلوم الخارجي فإن كان المراد بوجود الأشياء بأنفسها في الذهن وجودها فيه و إن انقلبت حقيقتها إلى حقيقة أخرى فذلك حاصل و إن أريد أنها توجد في الذهن باقية على حقيقتها العينية فلم يبق عليه دليل إذ مودى الدليل أن المحكوم عليه يجب وجوده عند العقل و في الذهن ليحكم عليه و لا يخفى أن هذا الحكم ليس عليه بحسب الوجود الذهني بل بحسب نفس الأمر فيجب أن يوجد في الذهن أمر لو وجد في الخارج كان متصفاً بالمحمول و إن انقلبت حقيقته و ماهيته بتبدل الوجود. فإن قلت إنما يتصور هذا الانقلاب لو كان بين الموجودات الخارجية من الجواهر و الأعراض و بين الكيفيات الذهنية أي الصور العلمية مادة مشتركة يكون بحسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٨

الوجود الظلي كيفاً و بحسب الوجود الخارجي من مقولة المعلوم كما قرروا الأمر في الهيولى المبهمه في ذاتها حق الإبهام و تصير باقتران الصورة تارة ماء و تارة هواء و تارة ناراً و ظاهر أنه هناك مادة مشتركة بين جميع الموجودات.

قلت إنما استدعى هذا الانقلاب لو كان انقلاب أمر في صفته كانقلاب الأسود أبيض و الحار باردا أو صورته كانقلاب النطفة جنينا و الماء هواء و أما انقلاب نفس الحقيقة بتمامها إلى حقيقة أخرى فلا يستدعي مادة مشتركة موجودة بينهما نعم يفرض العقل لتصوير هذا الانقلاب أمرا مبهما عاما هذه خلاصة ما ذكره هذا الحبر العلامة في تعاليقه. و اعترض عليه معاصره العلامة الدواني بقوله لا يخفى على من له أدنى بصيرة - أن انقلاب الحقائق غير معقول بل المعقول أن ينقلب المادة من صورة إلى أخرى - أو الموضوع من صفة إلى أخرى و ليس لكل أمر يوجد في الذهن محل أو موضوع - سوى الذهن باعتبار حصوله فيه و معلوم أن الذهن لا ينقلب من الصورة الذهنية - التي هي عنده كيف إلى الأمر الخارجي الذي هو جوهر مثلا و ليت شعري ما هذا الأمر الواحد الذي زعم أنه بحيث إذا وجد في الخارج كان ماهية و إذا وجد في الذهن كان ماهية أخرى و كيف ينحفظ الوحدة مع تعدد الماهية ثم متقدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣١٩

الموجودة غير بين و لا مبين و على فرض التسليم لا يوجب جواز الانقلاب إذ العوارض متقدمة كانت أو متأخرة لا يغير حقيقة المعروض فإنها إنما تعرض لتلك الحقيقة فلا بد من بقائها معها ثم على فرض الانقلاب يكون الحاصل في الذهن - مغايرا بالماهية للحاصل في الخارج و هو خلاف مقتضى الدليل الدال على الوجود الذهني و ما ذكره من أن حصول الماهية في الذهن أعم من أن يبقى فيه على ما كان - أو ينقلب إلى ماهية أخرى من قبيل أن يقال حصول زيد في الدار أعم من أن يبقى فيه على ما كان أو ينقلب فيه إلى عمرو مثلا ثم من البين أنه إذا لم يكن بين الأمرين أمر مشترك يبقى مع الانقلاب كالمادة أو كالجنس مثلا لم يصدق أن هناك شيئا واحدا - يكون تارة ذلك الأمر و أخرى أمرا آخر و الفطرة السليمة تكفي مئونة هذا البحث - و أنت تعلم أن القائل بالشبح لا يعجز أن يقول وجود الأمر الخارجي في الذهن لا يمكن إلا بحصول شبحه فيه و أن الشبح لو وجد في الخارج يكون عين الأمر الخارجي بل هو قائل بذلك و أنه على ما ذهب إليه يتوجه أن يقال لو فرض وجود هذا الكيف النفساني في الخارج لم يكن عين الجوهر بل كيفا نفسانيا مثال الجوهر و لو فرض وجود الجوهر الخارجي في الذهن لم يكن كيفا نفسانيا بل جوهرًا قائما بالنفس - بل نقول إن الكيف النفساني القائم بالنفس موجود في الخارج كسائر الكيفيات النفسانية فإن أراد أنه على تقدير الوجود الخارجي عين الجوهر فلا يصدق أنه لو وجد في الخارج لكان عينه فإن حال قيامه بالنفس موجود في الخارج و ليس جوهرًا - و إن أراد أنه على تقدير وجوده خارج النفس أي قائما بذاته جوهر فكذلك لأنه على هذا التقدير يكون كيفا نفسانيا غير قائم بالنفس فلا يكون جوهرًا كيف و الكيف النفساني القائم بغير النفس ممتنع الوجود و الجوهر من أقسام ممكن الوجود و إن أراد أنه على تقدير وجوده خارج النفس و انقلاب حقيقته إلى حقيقة الجوهرية يكون جوهرًا فذلك على تقدير صدقه جار في الشبح أيضا انتهى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٠

و غاية ما يمكن لأحد أن يقول من قبل القائل بانقلاب الحقائق الخارجية - من الجوهر و الكم و غيرهما إلى الكيف في الذهن إن لكل من الحقائق العينية ربطا خاصا بصورة ذهنية به يقال إنها صورته الذهنية و يجد العقل بينهما ذلك الربط - و حقيقة ذلك أنها لو وجدت في الخارج كانت عينه و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يكون وجود كل شيء وجود كل شيء آخر

لأنه فرق بين أن يقال لو وجد ألف مثلا في الخارج - وانقلبت حقيقته إلى حقيقة ب كانت عين ب أو يقال لو وجد ألف في الخارج كان عين ب قولك إذا وجد كيف النفساني في الخارج بحقيقته الذهنية كان كيفا نفسانيا لا جوهرًا قلنا المفروض ليس هذا بل المفروض وجوده الخارجي فقط - لا مع انحفاظ كونه كيفية نفسانية فإن وجوده الخارجي يستلزم انقلاب حقيقته - إذ الحقيقة الذهنية مشروطة بالوجود الذهني والحقيقة الخارجية مشروطة بالوجود الخارجي وبالجملة فوجود الأمر الذهني في الخارج عبارة عن انقلاب حقيقته إلى الحقيقة الخارجية أو متضمن لهذا الانقلاب فليتأمل ففيه ما فيه ويمكن توجيه كلامه بوجه آخر أقرب من الحق وأبعد من المفاسد المذكورة - وهو أنه لما قام البرهان على أن للحقائق العينية ذاتيات بها يصدر آثارها الذاتية التي هي مبادي تعرف الذاتيات وامتيازها عن العرضيات كالجسمية المعتبرة في مفهوم الشجر المقتضية للتحييز وقبول الأبعاد والصورة النباتية المقتضية للنمو والتغذية وإذا حصلت تلك الحقائق في الذهن كانت صورًا علمية ناعمة للنفس صفات لها مع بقاء تلك الحقائق بوجه ما وصارت لها حقائق عرضيات من الكيفيات النفسانية فعلم أن الحقائق الكلية من حيث هي مثالها مثال الهيولى التي أثبتتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢١

المعلم الأول وأتباعه من حيث إنها ليست متعينة أصلاً وليست لها حقائق متحصلة - بها تدخل من حيث هي تحت مقولة من المقولات بل هي مبهمة غاية الإبهام إنما يتحصل ويتعين لها ماهيات بالقياس إلى أحد الوجودين فالحقيقة المائنة إذا لوحظت - من حيث وجودها العيني الأصيل كانت جسماً سيالاً رطباً ثقيلاً وإذا وجدت في الذهن وقامت به صارت عرضاً من الكيفيات النفسانية وهي بنفسها لا يتحصل بشيء منها ولا يندرج تحت واحد من المقولتين بالنظر إلى حقيقته المبهمة المأخوذة مع الوجود المطلق الغير المتخصص بالخارج أو العلم. فإن قلت ما ذكرته لا يطابق قواعد القوم ولا يظهر صحته أيضاً لأن الشيء لا ينفك عن ذاته بحسب الوجودين على ما تقرر من خواص الذاتى وأيضاً على هذا التقدير لا يكون لشيء واحد وجودان ذهني وعيني - قلت لما تقرر عند هذا القائل تقدم الوجود على الماهية وهو الذي ساق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٢

عندنا إليه البرهان فالشيء إنما يتعين بوجوده الخارجي أو الذهني ومع قطع النظر عن الوجودين ليس له حقيقة أصلاً لا جوهرية ولا عرضية ولا مبهمة ولا معينة فإذا وجد فإن كان من حيث الوجود لا يستدعي موضوعاً يقوم به كان جوهرًا وإلا لكان عرضاً وكذا بالنظر إلى وجوده الذاتى إن كان قابلاً للأبعاد كان جسماً وإن كان مقتضياً للنمو والتغذية كان نامياً وقس عليه الحساس والمتحرك والناطق والصاهل - فظهر أن انتزاع هذه الذاتيات من الذات إنما يمكن بشرط وجود تلك الذات في الخارج تحقيقاً أو تقديراً وإذا لم تلاحظ وجودها الخارجي بل لوحظت بشرط الوجود الذهني صلحت لأن ينتزع منها الذاتيات العرضية من العلم والكيف ومثالهما - وإن لوحظت بشرط مطلق الوجود من غير ملاحظة خصوص أحد الوجودين لم يصلح لأن يشار إليها وتعين لها حقيقة من الحقائق ولا يحيط بها تعبير الألفاظ - وتؤدي العبارات وتحديد الإشارات بل يكون لها الإطلاق الصرف واللاتعين البحث - فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول معنى انحفاظ الماهيات وعدم انفكاك الذاتى عن ذاتى الذاتى في الوجودين هو أن الذهن عند تصور الأشياء إنما يلاحظ هذه

الصورة الذهنية العرضية لا من حيث وجودها الذهني بل يلاحظها من حيث وجودها العيني الخارجي الذي به تعين مقولته من حيث إنه جوهر مثلاً و جسم و نام و يحكم عليها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٣

بما يقتضيه حقيقته العينية و ينتزع عنها الذاتيات الخارجية مثلاً ما وجد في الذهن عند تصور الماء ليس جسماً و لا سيلاً و لا رطباً و لا ثقيلًا بل هو كيفية نفسانية لكن الذهن لما حذف عن أشخاص المياه الموجودة مشخصاتها و عوارضها اللاحقة لوجوده حصلت له قوة و بصيرة روحانية ينظر إلى حقيقة واحدة هي مبدأ المياه الجزئية و كوشف له مفهوم كلي يصدق عليها فيجعل ذلك الأمر الصادق عليها مرآة لتعرف أحكامها و أحوالها الخارجية و كذلك يستنبط ذاتياتها طبق ما لوحناك إليه سابقاً و على هذا يحمل كلام القوم في انحفاظ الذاتيات هذا ما أردناه أن نقول في توجيه كلام هذا القائل المذكور.

و ليعلم أن كلام المتأخرين أكثره غير مبين على أصول صحيحة كشفية- و مباد قويمه إلهامية بل مبناه على مجرد الاحتمالات العقلية دون المقامات الذوقية- و على الذائعات المقبولة دون المقدمات البرهانية و لذلك من رام منهم إفادة تحقيق أو زيادة تدقيق إنما جاء بالحقاق منع و نقض فأصبحت مؤلفاتهم بتراكم المناقضات- مجموعة من ظلمات بعضها فوق بعض فما خلص عن دياجيرها إلا الأقلون **وَمَا ظَلَمَهُمُ اللَّهُ وَلَكِنْ كَانُوا أَنْفُسَهُمْ يَظْلِمُونَ**

فصل (٥) في بيان مخلص عرشي في هذا المقام

و هاهنا مسلك آخر في حل بعض الإشكالات الواردة على القول بالوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٤

الذهني من غير لزوم ما يلتزم القائل بانقلاب الحقائق و ارتكاب ما يرتكبه معاصره الجليل من أن إطلاق الكيف على العلم و الصورة النفسانية من باب المجاز و التشبيه- بل مع التحفظ على قاعدة انحفاظ الذاتيات مع تبدل الوجودات و كون الصور العلمية كفيات حقيقية و هو أنا نقول إن للنفس الإنسانية قوة بها ينتزع المعقولات الكلية من الأعيان الخارجية و من الصور الخيالية و الأشباح المثالية- و لا شك أنها عند انتزاع هذا المعقول المنتزع يتأثر بكيفية نفسانية هي علمها به- فيعلم حينئذ أن للنفس هناك كيفية حادثة عند انكشاف هذا المعنى و الحكماء قالوا- إنا إذا فتشنا حالنا عند التعقل لم نجد إلا هذه الصورة فتلك الكيفية النفسانية هي هذه الصورة العقلية فهي قائمة بها ناعته لها فلهذا فسر العلم بالصورة الحاصلة من الشيء عند العقل و لما دل الدليل على أنه تحصل الحقائق العينية لا من حيث وجودها العيني في الذهن صرحوا بأن العلم بكل مقولة من تلك المقولة فاستشكل الأمر و اشتبه الحق.

و تحقيق الحق فيه أنه كما يوجد في الخارج شخص كزيد مثلاً و يوجد معه صفاته و أعراضه و ذاتياته كالأبيض و الضحاك و المشي و الجالس و النامي و الحيوان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٥

و الناطق فهي موجودات توجد بوجود زيد ذاتاً بل عين زيد وجوداً فإن في الخارج ما هو زيد بعينه الضاحك و الكاتب

والحيوان والناطق ولا يلزم من اندراج زيد تحت الجوهر بالذات وكون الجوهر ذاتيا له أن يكون الجوهر ذاتيا للكاتب والضاحك والناطق فكذلك الموجود الذهني فإن من جملة الحقائق الكلية العلم وإذا وجد فرد منه في الذهن فإنما يتعين ذلك الفرد منه بأن يتحد بحقيقة المعلوم كما أن الجسم إنما يوجد في الخارج إذا كان فيه متكهما متشكلا متحيزا ناميا أو جمادا وعنصرا أو فلكا وبها يتعين حقيقة هذا الجسم كذلك العلم إنما يتعين ويتحصل - إذا اتحد بحقيقة المعلوم فكان العلم جنسا قريبا والكيف المطلق جنسا بعيدا.

وتحصل العلم وتعيينه إنما هو بانضمام الحقيقة المعلوم إلى متحدة معه - بحيث يكون في الواقع ذاتا واحدة مطابقة لها فهذه الذات الواحدة علم من حيث جنسها القريب وكيف من حيث جنسها البعيد ومن مقولة المعلوم من حيث تحصلها وتعيينها كما أن زيدا في الخارج حيوان من حيث جنسه القريب وجوهر من حيث جنسه البعيد ومن مقولة الكم والكيف وغيرهما من حيث تشخصه وتعيينه - ويكون اتحاد المعلوم معها اتحاد العرضي مع المعروف فصح أن العلم من مقولة الكيف والكيف ذاتي له من حيث إنه علم وهو في الواقع بعينه حقيقة المعلوم. وعلى هذا لا يتوجه الإشكال بأن العلم لكونه من صفات النفس وجب أن يكون من مقولة الكيف ومن حيث إن حقيقة المعلوم وجدت في الذهن يجب أن يكون من مقولة المعلوم فيلزم أن يكون حقيقة واحدة من مقولتين. لأن محصل هذا التحقيق أن العلم من مقولة الكيف بالذات لكون تلك المقولة جنسه ومفهوم المعلوم متحد مع العلم ذاتا وجودا في الذهن ومن تلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٦

المقولة بالعرض كما أن زيدا من حيث ذاته من مقولة الجوهر ومن حيث إنه أب وابن من مقولة المضاف وقد ذهب ذلك التحرير المحقق تبعا لعبارات القدماء - أن العرض والعرضي مطلقا متحدان بالذات ومتغايران بالاعتبار فإن الأبيض والبياض عنده أمر واحد بالذات مختلف من حيث أخذه لا بشرط شيء أو بشرط لا شيء كما أن الصورة والفصل واحدة بالذات متغايرة بالاعتبار المذكور كما سيقرع سمعك إشباع القول في ذلك وعلى هذا لا غبار على ما ذكرناه ولا يشوش الأفهام وساوس الأوهام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٧

المرحلة الثانية في تنمة أحكام الوجود وما يليق بأن يذكر من أحكام العدم

فصل (١) في تحقيق الوجود بالمعنى الرابط

ربما يتشكك بأنه إذا كان الوجود رابطا في الهليات المركبة فيلزم للمحمول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٨

وجود إذ الوجود للغير لا يعقل بدون الوجود في نفسه ثم إن ثبوته للموضوع ثابت أيضا للموضوع فيكون له أيضا ثبوت ثابت هو أيضا للموضوع وهكذا إلى غير النهاية.

فيفك عقدة التشكيك بما سبق من أن إطلاق الوجود على الرابط في القضايا - ليس بحسب المعنى المستفاد من مطلق

الوجود أو منه إذا كان محمولا أو رابطيا أي ثابتا لغيره و كثيرا ما يقع الغلط في إطلاق لفظ الوجود تارة بمعنى الرابطة التي هي في حكم الأدوات الغير الملحوظة بالذات و تارة بمعنى أحد قسمي مفهوم الوجود- الذي بمعنى التحقق و كون الشيء ذا حقيقة سواء كان لنفسه أو غيره و هو الذي يقال له الوجود الرابطي لا الرابط كما مر سابقا فكون ألف ب ليس مفهومه و لا مفاده هو وجود ب في نفسه و لكن للموضوع كوجود الأعراض و الصور لموضوعاتها و محالها- حتى يستلزم وجوده في نفسه بل إنما هو اتصاف ألف و ب أي الرابط بينهما- فيجوز أن يتصف الموضوع بأمر عدمي مما له ثبوت بنحو من الأنحاء و إن لم يكن في الخارج بل في الذهن و قد علم أن اللانهاية الحاصلة من تضاعيف لحظات الأفهام- و خطرات الأوهام غير ممتعة لانبثاته بانبتات الملاحظة إذ ما لم يلحظ حاشيتا الحكم و لم يعقل بالقصد لم يحصل الربط بينهما ليحكم بثبوته للموضوع أو المحمول- فإذا قلنا ألف ب فقد عقنا مفهوم ثبوت ب لألف على أنه مرآة لتعرف حال ألف و ب لا على أنه ملتفت إليه بالقصد فلا يمكن لنا في هذا الحكم مراعاة حال الثبوت- بكونها ثابتا لألف أم لا منسوباً إليه بالثبوت أم باللاتبوت فإنه في حكمنا بأن ألف ب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٢٩

نسبة محضة و النسبة بما هي نسبة لا تكون منسوبة نعم إذا قلنا ثبوت ب لألف كذا فقد جعلناه منظورا إليه بالقصد و قد انسلخ عن كونه بحيث لا يقع إلا بين الحاشيتين- و استصلح أن يصير إحداهما فيعتبر له ثبوت و ربط آخر و حينئذ يرجع الأمر إلى أن يكون ذلك الثبوت الآخر مرآة لتعرف حال الثبوت الأول من دون الالتفات إليه إلا بالتبع ثم إذا التفتنا إليه و قلنا ثبوت الثبوت كذا فقد عزلنا النظر عن الحاشيتين إلا بالعرض و انتقلنا إليه و نسبناه إلى موضوع فحصل هاهنا ثبوت ثالث غير ملتفت إليه و كذا إذا توجهنا إليه بتصويره أحد طرفي الحكم حصل رابع و كذا يوجد خامس و سادس إلى أن نقف عن هذه الالتفاتات و الملاحظات الحاصلة منا بالإرادة و الاختيار فتقطع به السلسلة.

و ما حكم به السلف الصالح من أولياء الحكمة أن المحمول بما هو محمول- ليس وجوده في نفسه إلا وجوده لموضوعه ليسوا عنوا بذلك أن وجوده في نفسه- هو بعينه وجوده لموضوعه كما في الأعراض و الصور إذ المحمول بما هو محمول ليس له وجود في نفسه يكون هو لموضوع ذلك المحمول بل عنوا أنه لا يوجد نفسه و إنما له ثبوت للموضوع لا وجود في نفسه و وجوده في نفسه هو مجرد أنه ثابت للموضوع و فرق بين قولنا وجوده في نفسه هو وجوده لموضوعه كما في العرض- و بين قولنا وجوده في نفسه هو أنه موجود لموضوعه فإن الأول يستلزم الوجود دون الثاني هذا إذا كان الكلام في مجرد مفهوم الهلية المركبة و أما أن حاشيتي الحكم هل هما بحسب الواقع مما يلزم أن يكون لهما وجود بنحو من الأنحاء فذلك كلام آخر.

ثم لا يخفى عليك حكاية ما سيقرع سمعك بيانه على الوجه اليقيني البرهاني مما نحن بصدد إن شاء الله تعالى أن وجودات جميع الممكنات في فلسفتنا من قبيل الروابط لوجود الحق تعالى فوق ما وقع في كلام بعض أئمة الحكمة الدينية و أكابر الفلسفة الإلهية أن وجود الطبائع المادية في نفسها هو بعينه وجودها لموادها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٠

و أن الوجود المعلول بما هو معلول مطلقا هو وجوده لعلته و أن وجود السافل مطلقا هو وجوده لدى العالي المحيط

بجملة السافلات فقالوا إن الممكنات طراً مادياتها و مفارقاتها موجودات لا لذواتها بل لغيرها الذي هو فوق الجميع و وراء الجملة و هو الواجب تعالى.

و لا يسع لأولئك الأكابر و لم يتيسر لهم إلا هذا القدر من التوحيد و هو كون وجود الممكن رابطياً لا رابطاً لأنهم لما قالوا بالثاني في الوجود أثبتوا للممكن وجوداً مغايراً للوجود الحق لكن على وجه يكون مرتبطاً إلى الحق و منسوباً إليه بحيث لا يمكن أن ينسلخ منه الانتساب إلى المعبود الحق تعالى.

و أما نحن فبفضل الله تعالى و برحمته أقمنا البرهان الموعود بيانه في مترقب القول و مستقبل الكلام أن الممكن لا يمكن تحليل وجوده إلى وجود و نسبة إلى الباري بل هو منتسب بنفسه لا بنسبة زائدة مرتبط بذاته لا بربط زائد فيكون وجود الممكن رابطياً عندهم و رابطاً عندنا و قد مرت الإشارة سابقاً إلى الفرق بينهما معنى - و عقد الاصطلاح المتفاوت عليها لفظاً ثلثاً يقع الغلط من اشتباه أحد المعنيين بالآخر - بسبب اشتراك اللفظ كما وقع لبعض

وهم و تنبيه:

إن بعضاً من أجلة العلماء المتأخرين أراد أن يصل إلى مقام الواصلين من أصحاب المعارج و أولياء الحكمة المتعالية فقال في رسالته المسماة بالزوراء المعقودة لبيان توحيد الوجود السواد إن اعتبر على النحو الذي هو في الجسم أعني أنه هيئة الجسم كان موجوداً و إن اعتبر على أنه ذات مستقلة كان معدوماً - و الثوب إن اعتبر صورة في القطن كان موجوداً و إن اعتبر مبايناً للقطن ذاتاً على حياله كان ممتنعاً من تلك الحيثية فاجعل ذلك مقياساً لجميع الحقائق تعرف معنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣١

قول من قال الأعيان الثابتة ما شمت رائحة الوجود و أنها لم تظهر و لا تظهر أبداً و إنما يظهر رسمها انتهت ألفاظه و قد ذكر فصولاً أخرى ليست معانيها في القوة و المتانة - أقوى من معنى هذا الكلام في هذا المقام. و إنني لقضيت من ادعائه الطيران إلى السماء بهذه الأجنحة الواهية فإن الخط و الخلط في هذا القول أوضح من أن يخفى عند المتدرب في الصناعات العلمية - أو لم يقع فيه وضع أحد معنيي الوجود الرابطي موضع الآخر فإن الأسود في قولنا الجسم أسود من حيث كونه وقع محمولاً في الهلية المركبة لا وجود له إلا بمعنى كونه ثبوتاً للجسم و هذا مما لا يأبى أن يكون للأسود باعتبار آخر غير اعتبار كونه محمولاً في الهلية المركبة وجود و إن كان وجوده الثابت في نفسه هو بعينه وجوده للجسم.

قوله و إن اعتبر على أنه ذات مستقلة كان معدوماً إن أراد بالذات المستقلة الحقيقة الجوهرية فكلامه حق لا ريب فيه لأن الحقيقة الجوهرية ممتنعة الثبوت للأعراض - لكن التردد غير حاصر لجواز أن يعتبر له ذات عرضية لها اعتبار غير اعتبار كونها صفة لشيء بل باعتبارها في نفسها إذ لا شبهة في أن الإضافة إلى الموضوع خارجة عن نفس ماهيتها المأخوذة بما هي هي و إن أراد بها اعتبار الأسود بحسب ماهيتها المأخوذة بنفسها فالحكم بكونها معدومة غير مسلم إذ كما أن للجوهر وجوداً في نفسه كذلك للعرض وجود في نفسه إلا أن وجود الأعراض في أنفسها هي بعينها وجودها لموضوعاتها فللجوهر وجود في نفسه لنفسه و للعرض وجود في نفسه لا لنفسه بل لغيره - إذ قد مر أن المراد من الوجود لنفسه أن لا يكون قائماً بغيره

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٢

فصل (٢) في أن الوجود على أي وجه يقال إنه من المعقولات الثانية و بأي معنى يوصف بذلك

إن كثيرا ما يطلق المعقول الثاني على المحمولات العقلية و مبادئها الانتزاعية الذهنية و من هذا القبيل الطبائع المصدرية و لوازم الماهيات و النسب و الإضافات - و قد يطلق على المعاني المنطقية و المفهومات الميزانية التي هي في الدرجة الثانية و ما بعدها من المعقولية و هي المحمولات و العوارض العقلية التي تكون مطابق الحكم و المحكي عنه في حملها على المفهومات و انتزاعها من الموصوفات هو نحو وجودها الذهني على أن يكون المعقودة بها من القضايا ذهنيات و هذه هي موضوعات حكمة الميزان بخلاف الأولى فالوجود بالمعنى المصدري لا ما هو حقيقته و ذاته

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٣

و كذا الشئئية و الإمكان و الوجوب و كذا المحمولات المشتقة منها من المعقولات الثانية بالمعنى الأول المستعمل في حكمة ما بعد الطبيعة لا بالمعنى الأخير المستعمل في الميزان إذ قد تحقق لك أن المعقولات الثانية هي ما يكون مطابق الحكم بها - هو نحو وجود المعقولات أولى في الذهن على أن يعتبر قيده لا شرطا في المحكوم عليه و هذا هو المراد بقولهم المعقولات الثانية مستندة إلى المعقولات الأولى و الوجود و كذا الشئئية و نظائرها ليس من هذا القبيل. و ليعلم أن النظر في إثبات نحو وجود تلك الثواني و أن وجودها هل في النفس أو في الأعيان و أن لها صلاحية الإيصال أو النفع في الإيصال من وظائف العلم الكلي إذ قد تبين فيه أن المعنى الكلي قد يكون نوعا و قد يكون جنسا أو فصلا أو خاصة أو عرضا عاما فالكلي بشرط كونه هذه الأمور مع صلاحية كونه موصلا أو نافعا في الإيصال يصير موضوعا لعلم المنطق ثم ما يعرض له بعد ذلك من اللوازم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٤

و الأعراض الذاتية يثبت في المنطق و الجهات أيضا كالوجوب و الامتناع و الإمكان - شرائط بها يصير المعقولات الثانية أو الثالثة موضوعا لعلم المنطق فإنه إذا علم في العلم الأعلى أن الكلي قد يكون واجبا و قد يكون ممكنا و قد يكون ممتنعا صار الكلي بهذه الشرائط موضوعا للمنطق و قس عليه سائر الموضوعات في أن إثباتها مع حيثية كونها موضوعات للعلوم موكول إلى علم هو أعلى منها و أما تحديدها و تحقيق ماهياتها فيكون في العلم الأسفل لا في العلم الأعلى و هذا أيضا يشعر لنا بأن الوجود للشيء متقدم على ماهيته و أن أثر الفاعل بالذات هو الوجود لا الماهية على ما نحن بصده

تبصرة: إن من الصفات ما لها وجود في الذهن و العين جميعا

سواء كان وجوده انضماميا كالبياض و هو ما يكون لها صورة في الأعيان أو انتزاعيا كالعمى بمعنى أن يكون وجود الموصوف في الخارج بحيث يفهم منه تلك الصفة و صورة كل شيء عندنا نحو وجودها الخاص به بناء على طريقتنا من نفي وقوع الماهيات في الأعيان و نفي مجعوليتها بل الواقع في الأعيان بالذات - منحصر في الوجود و لا حظ لغير حقيقة الوجود من الكون في الأعيان و كون الماهيات في الأعيان عبارة عن اتحادها مع نحو من حقيقة الوجود لا على الوجه الذي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٥

ذهب إليه النافون للكلبي الطبيعي و من الصفات ما ليس لها وجود عيني بأحد من الوجهين المذكورين أصلاً إنما وجودها العيني هو أنها حال ذهني لموجود ذهني كالنوعية للإنسان و الجزئية للأشخاص كما أنه ليس معنى قولنا زيد جزئي في الواقع أن الجزئية لها صورة خارجية قائمة بزيد فكذلك ليس معناه أن زيدا في الخارج - بما هو في الخارج جزئي في ملاحظة العقل.

و المعقولات الثانية بالوجه الأعم لا يلزمها أن لا يقع إلا في العقود الذهنية - إذ ربما يكون مطابق الحكم و المحكي عنه بها نفس الحقيقة بما هي هي لا بما هي معقولة في الذهن و لا بما هي واقعة في العين ك لوازم الماهيات و إن كان ظرف العروض هو الذهن فيصدق العقود حقيقية كقولنا الماهية ممكنة و الأربعة زوج و المعقولات الثانية في لسان الميزانيين قسم من المعقولات الثانية بهذا المعنى لكن المعقودات بها لا تكون إلا قضايا ذهنية كما علمت بخلاف ما هي بالمعنى الأعم الدائر بين الفلاسفة فإن المنعقد بها من القضايا صنفان حقيقية و ذهنية صرفة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٦

ذكر تنبيهي و تعقيب تحصيلي:

إن رهطاً من القوم قد جوزا كون الصفات عدمية مع اتصاف الموصوفات بها في نفس الأمر و بين بعض أجلتهم ذلك بقوله إن معنى الاتصاف في نفس الأمر أو في الخارج - هو أن يكون الموصوف بحسب وجوده في أحدهما بحيث يكون مطابق حمل تلك الصفة عليه و هو مصداقه و لا شك أن هذا المعنى يقتضي وجود ذلك الموصوف في ظرف الاتصاف إذ لو لم يوجد فيه لم يكن هو من حيث ذلك الوجود مطابق الحكم - و لا يقتضي وجود الصفة فيه بل يكفي كون الموصوف في ذلك النحو من الوجود بحيث لو لاحظته العقل صح له انتزاع تلك الصفة عنه و قس على ما ذكرناه الحال في الاتصاف الذهني فإن مصداق الحكم بكلية الإنسان هو وجوده في الذهن على وجه خاص - يصير مبدءاً لانتزاع العقل الكلية منه ثم الحمل عليه اشتقاقاً فمعنى كون الخارج أو الذهن ظرفاً للاتصاف هو أن يكون وجود الموصوف في أحدهما منشأ لصحة انتزاع العقل ذلك الاتصاف عنه انتهى كلامه و فيه محل انظار كما لا يخفى.

و الحق أن الاتصاف نسبة بين شيئين متغايرين بحسب الوجود في ظرف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٧

الاتصاف بالحكم بوجود أحد الطرفين دون الآخر في الظرف الذي يكون الاتصاف فيه تحكم نعم الأشياء متفاوتة في الموجودية و لكل منها حظ خاص من الوجود ليس للآخر منها فكل صفة من الصفات مرتبة من الوجود يترتب عليها آثار مختصة بها حتى الإضافيات و أعدام الملكات و القوى و الاستعدادات فإن لها أيضاً حظوظاً ضعيفة من الوجود و التحصل لا يمكن الاتصاف بها إلا عند وجودها لموصوفاتها.

و لا فرق في ذلك بين صفة و صفة فكما أن البياض إذا لم يكن موجوداً للجسم وجوداً عينياً به يكون موجوديته و نحو حصوله الخارجي لا يمكن وصف ذلك الجسم بأنه أبيض وصفاً مطابقاً لما في نفس الأمر فكذلك حكم اتصاف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٨

أعمى و اتصاف السماء بكونها فوق الأرض و غيرهما فما وقع في كتب أهل الفن كالشفاء للشيخ و التحصيل لبهمنيار تلميذه من أن الصفة إن كانت معدومة فكيف يكون المعدوم في نفسه موجودا لشيء فإن المعدوم في نفسه مستحيل الوجود لشيء آخر معناه ما ذكرناه فلا يوجب نقضا عليه اتصاف الأشياء بالإضافيات و الأعدام و القوى لما دريت من أن لها حظا من الوجود ضعيفا- هو شرط اتصاف موصوفاتها بها و بإزاء مرتبة وجودها سلب و رفع لها يمنع عن الاتصاف بها و ربما كان حظ الصفة من الوجود أقوى و أكد من حظ الموصوف بها منه- و ذلك كما في اتصاف الهيولى الأولى بالصورتين الجسمية و الطبيعية بل اتصاف كل مادة بالصورة كما ستقف عليه في بابہ إن شاء الله تعالى فاعتبار الوجود في جانب الموصوف دون الصفة كما فعله القائل المذكور ليس له وجه بل لأحد أن يعكس الأمر في تعميمه حسب ما لم يشترط وجود أحد الطرفين في الاتصاف بأن يقول معنى الاتصاف في كل ظرف هو كون الصفة بحيث يكون نحو وجودها فيه منشأ الحكم بها على الموصوف أعم من أن يكون بانضمامها به أو بانتزاعه منها ثم يدعي بعد هذا التعميم و التقرير أنه لا شك أن هذا المعنى يستلزم وجود الصفة في ظرف الاتصاف دون الموصوف بنحو البيان الذي ذكره. فقد تحقق أن ما ذكره من الفرق بين طرفي الاتصاف في الثبوت و عدمه سخيف من القول لا يرتضيه ذو تدبر.

تنبيه: و لعلك على هدى من فضل ربك في تعرف حال مراتب الأكوان

في الكمال و النقص و تحصلات الأشياء في القوة و الضعف و المتانة و القصور فعليك أن تدفع بهذا عارا عظيما يتوهم القاصرون عن غايات الأنظار و روده على أولياء الحكمة و أئمة العلم و تميظ به الأذى عن طريق السلاك الناهجين طريق الحق و هو أنهم عرفوا الحكمة بأنها علم بأحوال الموجودات الخارجية- على ما هي عليها في الواقع و عدوا من جملة الحكمة معرفة أحوال المعقولات الثانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٣٩

و أحوال المقولات السبعة النسبية بأن تذكر ما أصلناه من أن الوجود لكل شيء من الأشياء له مرتبة خاصة من الظهور و درجة مخصوصة من الفعلية و الحصول و غاية المجد و العلو أن يكون قيوما غنيا واجبا بالذات غير متعلق القوام بغيره أصلا فيكون بما هو هو فعلية محضة مقدسة عن جميع شوائب القوة و الإمكان و النقص و القصور و ما سواه مصحوب بالقصور و الإمكان الذاتيين على تفاوت مراتبها و تباين طبقاتها فيهما فكل ما بعد عن منبع الوجود و الوجوب كان قصوره أشد و إمكانه أكثر إلى أن ينتهي الوجود إلى غاية من النزول و الخسة يكون وجودها الجوهرية عين تقومها بالصورة الحالة فيه و فعليتها محض القوة و الاستعداد و وحدتها الشخصية بعينها كثرتها الانفصالية تارة و وحدتها الاتصالية أخرى و إذا علمت هذا النحو من القصور في الجواهر بحسب النزول فما ظنك بالأعراض إلى م ينتهي نحو وجوداتها في الوهن و الخسة بحسب مراتب إمكاناتها الذاتية و الاستعدادية فقد انتهت الأعراض في الخسة إلى عرض نحو حقيقتها و وجودها- نفس التشوق و الطلب و السلوك إلى عرض آخر كيفي أو إيني أو وضعي على سبيل التجزي و التدريج و المهلة فهذا حظ ذلك العرض المسمى بالحركة من الوجود العيني فإذا ثبت للحركة وجود في الفلسفة الأولى

أثبت لها هذا النحو من الوجود اللائق بها بحسب الأعيان لا بحسب الأوهام كيف وإثبات نحو آخر من الوجود وهو القار لها هو الجهل المضاد للحكمة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٠

فصل (٣) في أن الوجود خير محض

هذه المسألة إنما تتضح حق اتضاحها بعد ما ثبت أن لمفهوم الوجود المعقول - الذي من أجلى البديهيات الأولية مصداقا في الخارج و حقيقة و ذاتا في الأعيان و أن حقيقتها نفس الفعلية و الحصول و الوقوع لا بالمعنى المصدري كما ظنه المتأخرون كلهم بل بمعنى أنها نفس حقيقة الوقوع و ما به الوقوع سواء كان الوقوع وقوع نفسه أي نفس الوجود أو وقوع شيء آخر هو الماهية و أما من لم يضع للمفهوم من الوجود - عند العقل حقيقة و ذاتا سوى هذا المفهوم الانتزاعي البديهي التصور فيصعب عليه بل لا يجوز له دعوى كون الوجود خيرا محضا لأن معنى الخير ما يؤثر عند العقلاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤١

و يشترك إليه الأشياء و يطلبه الموجودات و يدور عليه طبعاً و إرادة و جبلة و بين أن الأشياء ليست طالبة للمعنى المصدري و لا يكون مبتغاهاً و مقصودها مفهوما ذهنياً و معقولا ثانوياً و هذا في غاية الظهور و الجلاء لا يليق أن يخفى بطلانه على أوائل العقول الإنسانية من غير رجوعها إلى استعمال الفكر و الروية. فإذا تحقق أن وجود كل شيء هو نحو ظهوره بإفاضة نور الوجود عليه من القيوم الواجب بالذات المنور للماهيات و مخرجها من ظلمات العدم إلى نور الوجود - فالخير بالحقيقة يرجع إلى حقيقة الوجود سواء كان مجرداً عن شوب الشرية - التي هي عبارة إما عن قصور الوجود و نقصانه في شيء من الأشياء أو فقدته و امتناعه رأساً أو لا يكون فالشر مطلقاً عديمي إما عدم ذات ما أو عدم كمال و تمام في ذات ما - أو في صفة من صفاته الكمالية الوجودية فالشر لا ذات له أصلاً.

و أما الماهيات الإمكانية و الأعيان الثابتة في العقول فهي في حدود أنفسها لا يوصف بخيرية و لا شرية لأنها لا موجودة و لا معدومة باعتبار أنفسها و وجودها المنسوب إليها على النحو الذي قررناه مراراً خيريتها و عدمها شربيتها. فالوجود خير محض و العدم شر محض فكل ما وجوده أتم و أكمل فخيريته أشد و أعلى مما هو دونه فخير الخيرات من جميع الجهات و الحثيات حيث يكون وجود بلا عدم و فعل بلا قوة و حقيقة بلا بطلان و وجوب بلا إمكان و كمال بلا نقص و بقاء بلا تغير و دوام بلا تجدد ثم الوجود الذي هو أقرب الوجودات إليه خير الخيرات الإضافية و هكذا الأقرب فالأقرب إلى الأبعد فالأبعد و الأتم فالأتم إلى الأنقص فالأنقص إلى أن ينتهي إلى أقصى مرتبة النزول و هي الهيولى الأولى التي حظها من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٢

الوجود عريها في ذاتها عن الوجود و فعليتها هي كونها قوة وجودات الأشياء و تمامها نقصانها و شرفها خستها و فعلها قبولها و تحصلها إبهامها و فصلها جنسها كما سيرد عليك برهانه في موضعه فهي منبع الشرور و الأعدام و معدن

النقائص و الآلام - على أنها شبكة بها يصطاد النفوس الناطقة التي هي طيور سماوية لها أفقاص عنصرية. ثم اعلم أن الوجودات باقية على خيريتها الأصلية و العرضية أيضا ما دامت هي غير نازلة إلى عالم التصادم و التضاد و لم ينته سلسلتها إلى حيز المكان و الزمان و أما إذا انجرت سلسلة الوجود إلى عالم الأجسام و الظلمات و مضائق الأكوان و الازدحامات فبعض الوجودات مع أنه خير محض بالذات و بالعرض بحسب ذاته - و بالقياس إلى ما لا يستضر به بل ينتفع منه و هو ما يناسبه هذا الوجود و يلائمه لكنه بالقياس إلى ما يستضر به أو يتأذى منه أو ينعدم به يوصف بالشرية لأنه يؤدي إلى عدم ذات أو عدم كمال لذات فيكون الشر بالذات أحد هذين العدمين لا الوجود بما هو وجود لأنه خير محض كما علمت.

فالشر الحقيقي غير مقضي البتة و الشر الغير الحقيقي مقضي بالعرض للزومه - لما هو خير حقيقي و مقضي بالذات و هو الوجود بسنخه و طبيعته و قد مر أن لوازم الماهيات غير مستندة إلى الجاعل و الشرور منبعها قصورات الأنبيات و نقصانات الوجود عن الكمال الأتم و الجمال الأعظم

فصل (٤) في أن الوجود لا ضد له و لا مثل له

تقابل التضاد من شرطه كون المتضادين مما يقعان تحت جنس واحد غير عال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٣

كما سيأتي في مباحث التقابل و الوجود من حيث هو وجود قد مر أنه لا جنس له فلا يقع فيه التضاد و أيضا من شرط المتضادين بما هما متضادان أن يكون بينهما غاية الخلاف و ليس بين وجود و وجود بما هو وجودان كذلك و لا أيضا بين طبيعة الوجود المطلق و شيء من المفاهيم القابلة للوجود كذلك و إذ لا طبيعة أعم من الوجود يندرج هو تحتها و يشاركه غيره فيها و في لوازمها فلا يتصور لطبيعة الوجود مثل أيضا نعم الوجودات الخاصة باعتبار تخصصها بالمعاني و المفاهيم التي هي غير حقيقة الوجود قد يقع فيها التضاد و التماثل فالوجود بما هو وجود لا ضد له و لا مثل له كيف و الضدان و المتماثلان موجودان متخالفان أو متساويان و موجودية الوجود بنفسه لا بما يزيد عليه فيخالف جميع الحقائق لوجود أضدادها و تحقق أمثالها فصدق فيه ليس كمثله شيء و به يتحقق الضدان و يتقوم المثلان بل هو الذي يظهر بصورة الضدين و يتجلى في هوية المثلين و غيرهما و هذه الحثيات إنما هي باعتبار التعينات و التنزلات و أما بحسب حقيقة الوجود بما هو وجود فيضمحل فيه الحثيات كلها و يتحد معه الجهات جميعها فإن جميع الصفات الوجودية المتقابلة أو المتشابهة مستهلكة في عين الوجود فلا مغائرة إلا في اعتبار العقل.

و أما ما يتمسك في ذلك بأن اشتراك طبيعة الوجود بين الأشياء يوجب عروضها لما فرض ضدا أو مثلا لها فيلزم اجتماع الضدين أو المثلين بالفعل أو بالإمكان و عروض أحد الضدين أو المثلين للآخر فليس بشيء لعدم تسليم عروضها لجميع المعقولات من جميع الحثيات لعدم عروضه للمعدوم بما هو معدوم لا بما هو أحد المعقولات فلو التزم أن يكون لها ضد أو مثل لا يمكن أن يتحقق في وجود أو وهم بما هو كذلك لا بما هو أحد المفاهيم لم تكن القاعدة شاملة ففات ما ادعي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٤

إثباته ثم عروض الشيء لصدده غير ظاهر الفساد.

تتمة:

فطبيعة الوجود مخالفة بحسب مفهومه للمفاهيم غير منافية لها كيف و ما من مفهوم إلا و له تحقق في الخارج أو في العقل - و الصفات السلبية مع كونها عائدة إلى العدم راجعة إلى الوجود من وجه فكل من الجهات المتغايرة و الحثيات المتنافية لها رجوع إلى حقيقة الوجود و عدم اجتماعها في الوجود الخارجي الذي هو مرتبة من مراتب الوجود و نشأة من نشأته لا ينافي اجتماعها في الوجود من حيث هو وجود و أما كونه منافيا للعدم فليس باعتبار كونه مفهومًا من المفاهيم فإنه بهذا الاعتبار لا يأبى اتصافه بالوجود مطلقًا بل هو بهذا الاعتبار كسائر المعاني العقلية و المفاهيم الكلية في إمكان تلبسها بالوجود بوجه ما بل المتأبى لشمول الوجود ما يفرضه العقل مصداقًا لهذا المفهوم بعقد غير بتي - و طبيعة العدم أو المعدم بما هي معروضة لمفهومها مما لا خبر عنها أصلاً و ليس شيئًا من الأشياء و لا مفهومًا من المفاهيم بل الوهم يخترع لمفهوم العدم موصوفًا - و يحكم عليه بالبطلان و الفساد لا على نفس ذلك المفهوم لكونه متمثلًا في الذهن - هذا في العدم المطلق - و كذا الحال في العدميات الخاصة إلا أن هناك نظرًا آخر حيث إن العدم الخاص كما أن مفهومه كالعدم المطلق باعتبار التمثيل العقلي له حصة من الوجود المطلق كذلك موصوفة بخصوصه له حظ ما من الوجود و لهذا حكم بافتقاره إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٥

موضوع كما تفتقر الملكة إليه.

ثم مطلق الوجود للشيء المتحقق بأي نحو من الأنحاء و طور من الأطوار - يقابله العدم المطلق المساوق لرفع جملة الوجودات و قد يجتمعان لا باعتبار التقابل - كما في تصور مفهوم المعدم المطلق المتعري عن الوجود مطلقًا إذ قد انسلب عنه جميع الوجودات في هذا الاعتبار مع أن هذا الاعتبار بعينه نحو وجود و هذا الانسلاب بذاته نحو انتساب و هذا التعري في نفسه نحو خلط لعدم انسلابه عن تصور ما - و التصور وجود عقلي فهو فرد من أفراد مطلق الوجود فانظر إلى شمول نور الوجود و عموم فيضه كيف يقع على جميع المفاهيم و المعاني حتى على مفهوم الاشياء و العدم المطلق و المتمتع الوجود بما هي مفاهيم متمثلات ذهنية لا بما هي سلوب و أعدام - و قد ذكرنا اختلاف حمل الشيء على الشيء بالذاتي الأولي و العرضي الصناعي و به يندفع إشكال المجهول المطلق و ما شاكلة ففي هذا الموضع نقول للعقل أن يتصور جميع المفاهيم حتى عدم نفسه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٦

و عدم العدم و المعدم المطلق و المعدم في الذهن و جميع الممتنعات و له أن يعتبر المجهول المطلق و مفهومي النقيضين و مفهوم الحرف و يحكم عليها بأحكامها - كعدم الإخبار في المجهول المطلق و نفي الاجتماع في النقيضين و عدم الاستقلال في المفهومية في الحرف لا على أن يكون ما يتصوره هو ذات المجهول المطلق و حقيقة النقيضين و فرد الحرف و شخص العدم المطلق و شريك الباري إذ كل ما يتقرر في عقل أو وهم فهو من الموجودات الإمكانية و المعاني الملحوظة بالذات بحسب الحمل الشائع و لكن يحمل عليها عنواناتها بالحمل الأولي فقط فلم يحمل على

شيء منها أنه اجتماع النقيضين أو المعدوم المطلق و شريك الباري مثلا بالحمل الشائع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٧

العرفي لأن هذه المفهومات ليست عنوانا لشيء من الطبائع الثابتة في عقل أو خارج - بل العقل بتعمله الذي له يقدر و يفرض أن شيئا من هذه المفهومات عنوان لفرد ما باطل الذات ممتنع التحقق أصلا فيحكم عليه لأجل تمثل هذا المفهوم الذي قدر كونه معنونا بها بامتناع الحكم عليه أصلا أو الإخبار عنه رأسا أو الوجود له مطلقا أو الاستقلال في مفهومه بوجه كل ذلك على سبيل إيجاب قضية حملية غير بنية - في قوة شرطية لزومية غير صادقة الطرفين فكان مفهوم المجهول المطلق من حيث يتمثل نفسه يتوجه عليه صحة الإخبار عنه و إن كان بعدم الإخبار عنه و إن امتنع الإخبار إنما يتوجه إليه باعتبار الانطباق على ما فرضه العقل أنه فرد له تقديرا.

و على هذا القياس حكم نظائره كالمعدوم المطلق في كونه لا يحكم عليه - بل في كل مفهوم لا يرتسم ذاته في العقل سواء كان عدم حصوله في الذهن لغاية الفساد و البطلان أو لفطر التحصل و الحقيقة مثلا إذا قلنا علم الواجب عين ذاته كان الحكم بالعينية على مفهوم الواجب لعدم ارتسام ذاته بكنهه في العقل و كذا المرتسم من صفاته الحقيقة ليس إلا مفهوماتها لكن عينية العلم و غيره من الصفات القدسية غير متوجه إلى المفهوم منها بل إلى ما يرشدنا البرهان إلى أنه بإزائه أعني الحقيقة المتعالية عن الحصر و الضبط في عقل أو وهم.

و سبيل ما أشرنا إليه سابقا في هذا الباب أن مفهوم المجهول المطلق لما كان اعتبارا لكون الشيء منسلخا عن جميع أنحاء المعلوماتية ففي هذه الملاحظة معرى عن كافة أقسام المعلوماتية حتى عن المعلوماتية بهذا الوجه و هذا هو مناط امتناع الإخبار عنه و حيث إن هذه الملاحظة نحو من أنحاء معلوماتية هذا الشيء فكان هو مشوبا بالمعلوماتية في ضمن سلب المعلوماتية و هذا هو مناط صحة الإخبار عنه بعدم الإخبار عنه.

و كذا نقول ملاحظة مفهوم المعدوم المطلق لما كان عبارة عن تعرية الشيء عن كافة الوجودات الخارجية و الذهنية كان مناط امتناع الحكم عليه مطلقا و حيث إن مطلق اعتبار الشيء و تصويره و إن كان في ضمن عدم الاعتبار و عدم التصور نحو من أنحاء وجود ذلك الشيء فكان هو متصفا بالوجود في هذا الاعتبار و بحسبه و هذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٨

منشأ صحة الحكم عليه بسلب الحكم أو بإيجاب سلبه فإذن فيه جهتان مصححتان لصحة مطلق الحكم و سلبه و إليه أشار المحقق الطوسي ره في نقد المحصل حيث قال - رفع الثبوت الشامل للخارجي و الذهني يتصور بما ليس بثابت و لا متصور أصلا فيصح الحكم عليه من حيث هو ذلك المتصور و لا يصح من حيث هو ليس بثابت و لا يكون متناقضا لاختلاف الموضوعين و لا مانع من أن يكون شيء قسيما لشيء باعتبار و قسما منه باعتبار آخر مثلا إذا قلنا الموجود إما ثابت في الذهن و إما غير ثابت في الذهن - فاللا موجود في الذهن قسيم للموجود من حيث إنه مفهوم أضيف فيه كلمة لا إلى الموجود و من حيث إنه مفهوم قسم من الثابت في الذهن

فصل (٥) في أن عدم مفهوم واحد

إن من الأمور المعلومة بأوائل العقول أن عدم في نفسه ليس إلا أمرا بسيطا ساذجا متحد المعنى ليس فيه اختلاف و

امتياز و تحصل إلا من جهة ما يضاف إليه- وليس في الواقع أو في الأوهام أعدام متمائزة في ذواتها أو في عوارضها لمعدومات متغايرة في معدوميتها ولا حصص من السلوب متكررة لمسلوبات متعددة بل كل ما يقع في بقعة العدم و كتم البطلان حاله كحال غيره من المعدومات من حيث هي معدومات- و كما أن المعدوم في ظرف ما ليس بشيء فيه فكذلك العدم و إنما التمايز في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٤٩

الأعدام باعتبار الملكات فالعقل يتصور أشياء متمائزة في ذواتها أو في عوارضها- كالعلة و المعلول و الشرط و المشروط و الضد و الضد و يضيف إليها مفهوم العدم- فيحصل عدم العلة متميذا عن عدم المعلول و مختصا من جملة الأعدام بالعلة له و يتميز عدم الشرط من عدم المشروط و عن سائر الأعدام و يختص بأنه ينافي وجود المشروط- و كذلك عدم الضد يتميز عنها و يختص بأنه يصح وجود الضد الآخر و أما مع قطع النظر عن ذلك فلا يتميز عدم عن عدم بل ليس عدم و عدم و معدوم و معدوم و الوهم حيث يجد اليد ممتازة عن الرجل فيغلط و يقول عدم أحدهما غير عدم الآخر و لو كان الأمر كما يحسبه لكان في كل شيء أعدام متضاعفة غير متناهية مرات لا متناهية. و أما تجويزهم التسلسل في العدميات كأعدام الحوادث الغير المتناهية فهو إنما وقع لأن مرجعه إلى اللايقفي و غير المتناهي فيه بالقوة أبدا و ما يخرج إلى الفعل متناه البتة بلا تعيين مرتبة من التناهي بخصوصها بل العقل يفصل العدم بعد أن يضيفه إلى المتعدد إلى عدم هذا و عدم ذاك تفصيلا يشبه تفصيل المتصل الواحد إلى هذا الجزء و ذلك الجزء و كما يصح الحكم على أجزاء المتصل الواحد بعد توهم الانفصال بينها بتقديم بعضها على بعض بالرتبة و على المجموع بالطبع فكذلك يصح

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥٠

الحكم بالتقدم و التأخر بين تلك العدميات بالعلة و المعلولية و كما أن اللانهاية في أجزاء المتصل بحسب القوة بمعنى عدم تعيين الانتهاء في القسمة الأجزائية بالوصول إلى جزء لا يمكن فرض جزء آخر فيه فكذلك التسلسل في الأعدام بمعنى عدم الانتهاء إلى عدم لا يصح للعقل اعتبار عدم آخر متقدم عليه بالعلة لا بمعنى ترتب أمور غير متناهية فالعدم ليس إلا عدم واحد لا تحصل له أصلا و ليس في نفس الأمر شيء هو عدم و لذلك لا يجاب عنه بشيء إذا سئل عنه بما هو و لا يجاب به إذا سئل عن شيء بما هو فإذا مرجع عليه العدم إلى عدم عليه الوجود و مرجع عروض العدم لشيء- إلى عدم عروض الوجود له و عدم عروض الوجود له ليس بعروض فرد أو حصة من العدم

فصل (٦) في كيفية عليّة كل من عديمي العلة و المعلول للآخر

اعلم أن العدم بما هو عدم لا يكون معقولا كما لا يكون موجودا لكن العقل الإنساني من شأنه أن يتصور لكل أمر مفهوما و يجعل ذلك المفهوم عنوانا و كما يضع لأنحاء الوجودات الخارجية معاني ذاتية هي ماهيات تلك الوجودات كذلك يضع للأمور الباطلة الذوات مفهومات يصدق عليها تلك المفهومات على التقديرية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥١

لذواتها كما سبق.

ثم اعلم أن الأشياء العدمية و الأمور الذهنية الصرفة التي ليست لها ذوات خارجية ليس لها تنوع و تحصل إلا بما يضاف هي إليه فالعدم المقيد بشيء ما إنما يعقل و يتحصل في العقل بسبب ذلك الشيء و يصح لحق الأحكام و الاعتبار به من حيث هو معقول و ثابت في العقل فيصح أن يحكم عليه بالعلية و المعلولية و غيرهما من الأحكام و الأحوال فيقال عدم العلة علة لعدم المعلول و لا يقال عدم المعلول علة لعدم العلة و إن علم من عدم المعلول عدم العلة على سبيل الاستدلال.

و تحقيق ذلك أن عدم العلة إذا صار متصورا صح الحكم عليه بالعلية من جهتين من جهة أن وجود عدم العلة في الذهن و مثوله بين يدي العقل مصحح أن يكون محكوما عليه بالعلية و إن لم يكن مطابقا للحكم فإن مطابق الحكم بالعلية على الوجه الذي أومأنا إليه و المحكي عنه بها هو ما يطابقه أعني رفع العلة بما هو رفع و بطلان لا بما هو صورة عقلية و مفهوم علمي فالمحكي عنه بالعلية على الوجه الذي مر ذكره هو الرفع للعلة و إن كانت الحكاية عنه ما وقعت إلا حين حضور مفهومه و صورته عند العقل و من جهة أن نفس حضور عدم العلة في العقل يوجب نفس حضور عدم المعلول فيه - و أما علة عدم المعلول لعدم العلة فليست إلا من الجهة الأخيرة فعلة أحد العدمين للآخر - يكون في كلا الطرفين العلم و العين و علة الآخر له في أحدهما و هو العلم دون العين فالعدمان بما هما عدمان أحدهما بخصوصه علة و الآخر بخصوصه معلول و إن كان الحكم عليهما بالعلية و المعلولية على الوجه المقرر في مرآة العقل و أما صورتاهما العقليتان فكل واحدة منهما سبقت إليه في الارتسام صارت سببا لارتسام الآخر فلا دور فكما أن إثبات العلة سبب لإثبات المعلول و إثبات المعلول دليل

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على إثبات العلة فكذلك عدم العلة سبب لعدم المعلول و عدم المعلول دليل كاشف على عدم العلة فإذا رفعت العلة فوجب رفع المعلول و إذا رفع المعلول لا يجب منه رفع العلة بل يكون قد ارتفعت حتى ارتفع معلولها فالمعلول عدمه مع عدم العلة و به - و العلة عدمها مع عدم المعلول لا به

فصل (٧) في أن عدم كيف يعرض لنفسه

العدم كما يعرض لغيره و يصدق اشتقاقا فكذلك يعرض لنفسه فيحكم عليه بأنه معدوم في الخارج فإن اشتبه عليك أن عدم المضاف إلى أي شيء كان يكون نوعا من العدم و مقابلا لمعرضه و ما يضاف إليه فإذا أضيف إلى نفسه و صار عدم العدم فقد اجتمع فيه النوعية و التقابل و هما متدافعان إذ النوعية يوجب الحمل بهو و التقابل يوجب نفيه فتذكر أن العارضية و المعروضية بين العدم و معرضه في الحقيقة - ليست إلا بحسب وجودهما في العقل لكن العروض العقلية الثابت للعدم كاشف عن بطلان معرضه فما يضاف إليه العدم و يعرضه بما له صورة عقلية قيد لمفهوم العدم محصل له مقوم لثبوته في الذهن ثابت معه فيه فيكون العدم المقيد به نوعا من العدم و بما هو عنوان لأمر عرض له الفساد و الهلاك بسبب عروض طبيعة العدم له يكون مقابلا له فموضوع النوعية و التقابل مختلف كيف و النوعية من أحوال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥٣

المعقول بما هو معقول كسائر المعاني المنطقية من ثواني المعقولات و التقابل من الأحوال الخارجية للأشياء لأن المتقابلين مما يجتمعان معا في الذهن و ما ذكرناه أليق بانحلال هذه العقدة مما هو المسطور في أرقام أهل التدقيق من الآخرين

فصل (٨) في أن المعدوم لا يعاد

العدم ليس له ماهية إلا رفع الوجود و حيث علمت أن الوجود للشيء نفس هويته فكما لا يكون لشيء واحد إلا هوية واحدة فكذلك لا يكون له إلا وجود واحد و عدم واحد فلا يتصور وجودان لذات بعينها و لا فقدانان لشخص بعينه فهذا ما رامه العرفاء بقولهم إن الله لا يتجلى في صورة مرتين فإذا المعدوم لا يعاد بعينه - كيف و إذا كانت الهوية الشخصية المعادة بعينها هي الهوية المبتدأة على ما هو المفروض - فكان الوجود أيضا واحدا فإن وحدة الهوية عين وحدة الوجود و قد فرض متعددا هذا خلف و يلزم أيضا أن يكون حيثية الابتداء عين حيثية الإعادة مع كونهما متنافيين هذا محال.

ثم إنه كما لم يكن فرق بين حالة الابتداء و حالة الاستيناف لم يتعين الاستيناف الأول من الاستيناف الثاني و الثالث من الرابع و هكذا فيلزم جواز تحقق إعادات غير متناهية لعدم تعيين مرتبة من المراتب إلا متناهية للوقوف عندها في الاستيناف دون

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غيرها بعد تسويغ ذلك أولا و هو مستبين الفساد و قس عليه حال تكرر عدم شيء واحد بعينه. فإن قلت كثير من الحوادث الزمانية كان معدوما ثم يوجد ثم ينعدم فيكون عدما لذات واحدة فإذا جاز ذلك في العدم جاز في الوجود أيضا كما اعترفت به.

قلت قد مر أن معنى عروض العدم لشيء ليس إلا بطلانا صرفا للذات و ليسية محضة لها و ليس في الواقع معروض يضم إليه أو ينتزع منه العدم بل العقل يعين ذاتا و يضيف إليه مفهوم العدم فلا يتعدد عند العقل إلا بتكثر الملكات فلا ذات قبل الوجود و لا بعده حتى يقال إنها واحدة أو متعددة متماثلة و إنما يضيف العقل نسبة العدم إلى ذات يختص وجوده بزمان معين قبل وجوده و بعد وجوده.

و حاصل كون الشيء كان معدوما قبل وجوده و سيكون معدوما بعد وجوده - انحصار وعائه الوجودي و ضيق استعداده عن الاستمرار و الانبساط سابقا و لاحقا - فالعدم ليس إلا عدما واحدا لا يتصف بالذات بالسبق و اللحق بل إنما يتصور العقل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥٥

بقوته الوهمية للحدث الزماني عدما أزليا ثم وجودا ثم عدما طاريا كطرفين و وسط حتى إن الأوهام العامية يتخيل أن العدم يطرأ على شيء و يرفع وجوده الخاص عن متن الواقع و يحك هويته عن صفحة الأعيان و ذلك لذهولهم عن أن وجودات الأشياء إنما هي عبارة عن تجليات المبدأ الحق و أشعة نور المبدأ الأول و شئونه الذاتية لا تتبدل كل منها عما هو له إلى غيره لكن المحجوب لقصور نظره عن الإحاطة بالجميع يتوهم أن كل واحد منها بطل عن صقع الوجود و

جاء غيره حل في مقامه وهكذا ولم يتفطن بأن طريان عدم على الشيء الثابت في الواقع - لا يخلو إما أن يكون في مرتبة وجوده وفي وعاء تحققه المختص به بعينه فيلزم اجتماع النقيضين في مرتبة واحدة أو في زمان واحد بعينه وإما أن يكون في غير مرتبة وجوده ووعاء تحققه فالشيء يستحيل أن يكون له وجود إلا في مرتبة وجوده و طرف فعليته و ظهوره فإن لكل شيء نحواً خاصاً من الوجود و مرتبة معينة من الكون مع توابعه و لوازمه من الصفات و الأزمنة و الأمكنة اللاتقة به الغير المتعدي عنها إلى غيرها - فإذا استحال أن يكون لكل شيء إلا نحو واحد من الوجود يقتضيه له أسبابه السابقة و شرائطه المتقدمة المنبثقة عن وجود المبدأ الأول تعالى فلم يتصور له طور آخر من الكون غير ما هو الواقع حتى يطرأ عليه عدم و يرفعه عن ساهرة الأعيان أو يقع عدم بدلا عنه في مقامه المفروض له.

و أما ما يقال من أن ذوات الممكنات لا يابى عن عدم و لو حين الوجود فمعناه أن مع قطع النظر عن الأمور الخارجية و أنحاء تجليات الحق الأول و كون الحقائق الوجودية من مظاهر أسمائه الحسنى و رشحات صفاته العليا إذا نظر إلى نفس ماهية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥٦

كل من الطبائع الإمكانية و المفهومات العقلية لا يابى مفهومها و معناها عن لحوق شيء إليها و زواله عنها مما هو غير ذاتها و ذاتياتها من الوجود و عدم و غيرهما و ذلك لعدم قيام الوجود بذواتها الناقصة في الواقع فلا يابى عدم و لو في زمان انصباغها بصبغ الوجود و ظهورها بنوره و أما بالنظر إلى إفاضة الحق و تجليه في صور الأسماء و الصفات و إبقائه للحقائق إلى غاية معلومة عند علمه المحيط بكل شيء على ما هي عليها فهي ممتنعة عدم مستحيلة الفساد فتجوز عدم على شيء باعتبار مرتبة من التحقق و درجة من الوجود من أغاليط الوهم و أكاذيب المتخيلة هذا تحقيق الكلام في هذا المرام - على ذوق أرباب العرفان و وجدان أهل الإيقان

وها هنا استبصارات تنبيهية

ذكرها شيوخ الفلسفة العامة و رؤساؤهم في زبرهم - يناسب أهل البحث و يكفي لصاحب الطبع المستقيم إذا لم يعرضه آفة من العصبية و اللجاج بل الحكم بامتناع إعادة المعدوم بديهي عند بعض الناس كما حكم به الشيخ الرئيس و استحسنة الخطيب الرازي حيث قال كل من رجع إلى فطرته السليمة - و رفض عن نفسه الميل و العصبية شهد عقله الصريح بأن إعادة المعدوم ممتنع -

الأول منها لو أعيد المعدوم بعينه لزم تخلل عدم بين الشيء و نفسه

فيكون هو قبل نفسه قبلية بالزمان و ذلك بحذاء الدور الذي هو تقدم الشيء على نفسه بالذات - و اللازم باطل بالضرورة فكذا الملزوم.

و رد بمنع ذلك بحسب وقتين فإن معناها عند التحقيق تخلل عدم بين زمانى وجوده و اتصاف وجود الشيء بالسابق و اللاحق نظراً إلى وقتين لا ينافي اتحاده بالشخص.

و أنت تعلم سخافة هذا الكلام بتذكر ما أصلناه من أن وجود الشيء بعينه هويته الشخصية فوحدة الذات مع تعدد الوجود غير صحيح و أما توهم الانتقاض بالبقاء فهو ساقط لأن الذات المستمرة و حداثتها باقية و التكثر بحسب تحليل الذهن ليس في الحقيقة إلا للزمان بهويته الاتصالية الكمية فينحل في الوهم إلى الأجزاء - و تكثر أجزاء الزمان مستتبع

لتكثر نسبة الذات الواقعة فيها المنحظة وحدتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥٧

الذاتية في كل الزمان فلا يلزم تخلل الزمان بين الشيء و نفسه بل بين متاه الأول و متاه الثاني مع انحفاظ وحدته المستمرة في جميع إفاضاته المتجددة الزمانية.

الثاني لو جاز إعادة المعدوم بعينه أي بجميع لوازم شخصيته و توابع هويته العينية فجاز إعادة الوقت الأول

لأنه من جملتها و لأن الوقت أيضا معدوم يجوز إعادته لعدم التفرقة بين الزمان و غيره في تجوير الإعادة أو بطريق الإلزام على من يعتقد هذا الرأي لكن اللازم باطل لإفضائه إلى كون الشيء مبتدأ من حيث إنه معاد إذ لا معنى للمبتدأ إلا الوجود في وقته و فيه مفاصد ثلاثة جمع بين المتقابلين و منع لكونه معادا لأنه الموجود في الوقت الثاني لا الموجود في الوقت الأول - و رفع للتفرقة و الامتياز بين المبتدأ و المعاد حيث لم يكن معادا إلا من حيث كونه مبتدأ و الامتياز بينهما ضروري.

و هذا الوجه لا يبتني على كون الزمان من الشخصات فإنه غير صحيح بل يكفي كونه من الأمور التي هي أمارات التشخص و لوازم الهوية العينية التي لها أمثال من نوعها واقعة في الأحياز و الأوضاع و الأزمنة. فإن قيل لا نسلم كون الوقت من الشخصات بأي معنى كان فإنه قد يتبدل مع بقاء الشخص بعينه في الوقتين حتى إن من زعم خلاف ذلك نسب إلى السفسطة.

قلنا معنى كون الزمان و الحيز و الوضع و غيرها من العوارض المشخصة أن كل واحد منها مع سعة ما و عرض ما من لوازم الشخص و علامات تشخصه حتى لو فرض خروج الشخص عن حدي امتداد شيء من تلك العوارض لكان هالكا كما في العرض الشخصي الذي يكون للكيفيات المزاجية و هذا لا ينافي قولهم إن اجتماع المعاني الغير المشخصة لا يفيد التشخص لأن ذلك في التشخص بمعنى امتناع الصدق على كثيرين بحسب نفس التصور و هو الذي ليس مناطه إلا نحوا من أنحاء الوجود و كلامنا في التشخص بمعنى الامتياز عن الغير يجعل المادة مستعدة لفيضان الهوية الشخصية ذات التشخص بالمعنى الأول و التشخص بهذا المعنى يكون لازما إياها علامة لها و يجوز حصوله عن اجتماع أمور عرضية عد من جملتها الوقت.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥٨

و اعترض على هذا الدليل بأن لا نسلم أن ما يوجد في الوقت الأول يكون مبتدأ البتة و إنما يلزم لو لم يكن الوقت معادا أيضا ثم بهذا الكلام أورد على ما يقال لو أعيد الزمان بعينه لزم التسلسل لأنه لا مغايرة بين المبتدأ و المعاد بالماهية - و لا بالوجود و لا بشيء من العوارض و إلا لم يكن له إعادة بعينه بل بالسابقة و اللاحقة بأن هذا في زمان سابق و هذا في زمان لاحق فيكون للزمان زمان فيعاد بعد العدم و يتسلسل.

دفع تحصيلي:

لا يحتجبن عن فطانتك أن السبق و الابتداء و الحقوق و الانتهاء - من المعاني الذاتية لأجزاء الزمان كما ستطلع عليه

حيث يحين وقته و بالجملة وقوع كل جزء من أجزاء الزمان حيث يقع من الضروريات الذاتية له لا يتعداه مثلا كون أمس متقدما على غد ذاتي لأمس كما أن التأخر عنه جوهرى لغد و كذا نسب كل جزء من أجزاء الزمان إلى غيره من بواقي الأجزاء - فلو فرض كون يوم الخميس واقعا يوم الجمعة كان مع فرض وقوعه يوم الجمعة يوم الخميس أيضا لأنه مقوم له لا يمكن انسلاخه عنه فحينئذ نقول الزمان المبتدأ - كونه مبتدأ عين هويته و ذاته فإذا فرض كونه معادا لا ينسلخ عن هويته و ذاته فيكون حينئذ مع كونه معادا بحسب الفرض مبتدأ بحسب الحقيقة لأنه من تمام فرضه فلو لم يكن مبتدأ لم يكن المفروض هو هو بل غيره فانهدم الأساسان و انفسخ الجوابان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٥٩

الثالث لو جاز إعادة المعدوم بعينه لجاز أن يوجد ابتداء ما يماثله

في الماهية و جميع العوارض المشخصة لأن حكم الأمثال واحد و لأن التقدير أن وجود فرد بهذه الصفات من جملة الممكنات و اللازم باطل لعدم التميز بينه و بين المعاد - لأن التقدير اشتراكها في الماهية و جميع العوارض و اعترض عليه بوجهين - أحدهما أن عدم التميز في نفس الأمر غير لازم كيف و لو لم يتميزا لم يكونا شيئين و عند العقل غير مسلم الاستحالة إذ ربما يلتبس على العقل ما هو متميز في الواقع.

و ثانيهما أنه لو تم هذا الدليل لجاز وقوع شخصين متماثلين ابتداء بعين ما ذكرتم و يلزم عدم التميز و حاصله أنه لا تعلق لهذا بإعادة المعدوم.

أقول و الجواب أما عن الأول فبان التميز بين شيئين بحسب نفس الأمر لا ينفك عن التخالف في العوارض الشخصية فإذا لم يكن لم يكن و قوله لو لم يتميزا لم يكونا شيئين من باب أخذ المطلوب في بيان نفسه لأن الكلام في أنه مع تجويز إعادة شيء و فرض مثله معه لم يكونا اثنين لعدم الامتياز بينهما مع أن أحدهما معاد و الآخر مبتدأ.

و أما عن الثاني فبان فرض المثلين من جميع الوجوه حيثما كان و إن كان رفعا للامتياز الواقعي لكن فيما نحن فيه يلزم ذلك مع الامتياز الواقعي بمجرد وضع إعادة.

لا يقال الامتياز بينهما ليس مرفوعا بالكلية لاتصاف أحدهما بكونه كان حاصلا قبل دون الآخر.

لأننا نقول هذا الامتياز هو الذي يوجب وضعه رفعه إذ بعد ما تبين أن العدم هو بطلان الذات و ليس للمعدوم بما هو معدوم ذات و لا تمايز بين المعدومات بما هي معدومات ينكشف أنه لا يكون موضوع الوجودين و العدم شيئا واحدا لعدم انحفاظ وحدة الذات في العدم بل ليس إلا اثنيية صرفة فامتياز المعاد عن المستأنف المفروض معه أو بدله و اختصاصه بأنه معاد إن كان من جهة الذات حال العدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٠

و كونها رابطة بين الوجودين السابق و اللاحق فالمعدوم لا ذات له و إن كان لأنه كان موجودا أولا دون المستأنف فهذا عين النسبة التي يقع النظر في إمكانها و كونها منشأ الامتياز بينهما و هما متساويان في استحقاق ذلك و الكلام في أنه مع فقد الاستمرار الموقع للاثنيية الصرفة كيف يتصور اختصاص أحدهما بالارتباط إلى الموجود السابق.

و ليس لأحد أن يقول إن الوجود الذهني للشيء عند الفلاسفة بمنزلة ثبوت المعدومات عند المعتزلة في تصحيح

الأحكام الثابتة للأشياء المعدومة فليكن هذا المقام من جملتها فالذات وإن عدمت في الخارج لكن يستحفظ وحدتها الشخصية بحسب الوجود الذهني في بعض المدارك المرتفعة عن التغير. لأننا نقول قد مر منا أن انحفاظ نحو الوجود والوحدة الشخصية غير متصور مع تبدل الظروف والأوعية إنما ذلك شأن ماهيات كلية يكون أنحاء الوجودات وأطوار الشخصيات من لواحقها الخارجة عن معناها وحقيقتها فالموجود في الذهن هوية مكتنفة بالمشخصات الذهنية واتحادها مع الموجود الخارجي ليس في نحو وجوده وتشخصه بل معنى ذلك أن بعد تجريد الماهية المقرونة بالتشخص ولوازمه - إذا جردت عنها يكون عين ما يقترن بشخص آخر منها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦١

الرابع أن إعادة كل ذات شخصية إنما يتصور لو أعيدت شيء من أجزاء علتها التامة

المقتضية لها واستعداد المادة لها بخصوصه وغير ذلك من متممات العلة ومصحات المعلول ونقل الكلام إلى آخر أجزاء علتها واستعداد استعداد مادتها - وهكذا إلى المبادي القصوى والعلل العليا وسينكشف لك إن شاء الله تعالى بطلان اللازم فالملزوم باطل مثله بيان الملازمة معلوم بأدنى التفات من العقل كيف ولو لم يكن الاستعداد والعلة هما هما بعينهما لم يكن المعاد المفروض إعاديا بل إنما يكون استينافيا مماثلا للابتدائي السابق ويتوهم أنه أعادي فإذن إنما يمكن إعادة الهوية الوجودية لو عادت الاستعدادات بجملتها والأدوار الفلكية والأوضاع الكوكبية برمتها وجملة ما سبقت في النظام الكلي بجميع لوازمها وتوابعها حتى في كونها ابتدائية والفطرة الصحيحة غير متوقفة في تكذيب هذا الوهم.

إهانة: القائلون بجواز إعادة المعدومات جمهور أهل الكلام

المخالفين لكافة الحكماء في ذلك ظنا منهم أن القول بتجوز إعادة في الأشياء بعد بطلانها يصحح الحشر الجسماني الناطق بوقوعه السنة الشرائع والكتب الإلهية النازلة على أهل السفارة وأصحاب الزلفى صلوات الله عليهم أجمعين. ولم يعلموا أن أسرار الشريعة الإلهية لا يمكن أن تستفاده من الأبحاث الكلامية والآراء الجدلية بل الطريق إلى معرفة تلك الأسرار منحصر في سبيلين إما سبيل الأبرار من إقامة جوامع العبادة وإدامة مراسم العدالة وإزالة وساوس العادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٢

وإما سبيل المقربين من الرياضات العلمية وتوجيه القوى الإدراكية إلى جانب القدس وتصفيل مرآة النفس الناطقة وتسويتها لئلا يتدنس بالأخلاق الرديئة ولم تصدأ بما يورده الحواس إليها من أوصاف الأجسام ولم يتعوج بالآراء الفاسدة - فإنها حينئذ يتراءى صور الحقائق الإيمانية ويشاهد الأمور الغائبة عن حواسها وتعللها بصفاء جوهرها فأما إذا كانت النفس مما قد تدنس بالأعمال السيئة أو صدأت بالأخلاق الرديئة أو اعوجت بالآراء الفاسدة واستمرت على تلك الحال كآثر أرباب الجدال بقيت محجوبة عن إدراك حقائق الأشياء الإيمانية عاجزة عن الوصول إلى الله تعالى ويفوتها نعيم الآخرة كما قال الله تعالى **كَلَّا إِنَّهُمْ عَنْ رَبِّهِمْ يَوْمَئِذٍ لَمَحْجُوبُونَ** فمن أراد أن يصل إلى معرفة الله و صفاته وأفعاله ومعرفة إرسال رسله وإنزال كتبه - وكيفية النشأة الآخرة وأحوال الإنسان بعد الموت وسائر أسرار المبدأ والمعاد بعلم الكلام وطريق المناظرة فقد استسمن ذا ورم وإذا جاء حين أن ينسبط القول في معاد النفوس و

كيفية رجوعها إلى بارئها في العالمين و وصولها إلى قيومها في الإقليمين - تبين لك كيفية الحشر الجسماني و ارتجاع النفوس كلاءة الأجساد بإذن ولي الإبداع و الإنشاء في المبدأ و المعاد على ما وردت به السنة الشريفة و نطقت به السنة الشريعة - ثم إن هؤلاء القوم بعد اتفاقهم في إعادة الجواهر اختلفوا في الأعراض فقال بعضهم يمتنع إعادتها مطلقاً لأن المعاد إنما يعاد بمعنى فيلزم قيام المعنى بالمعنى و إلى هذا ذهب بعض أصحاب الأشعرية و قال الأكثرون منهم بامتناع إعادة الأعراض التي لا تبقى كالأصوات و الأدوار لاختصاصها عندهم بالأوقات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٣

و قسموا الباقية إلى ما يكون مقدوراً للعبد و حكموا بأنه لا يجوز إعادتها لا للعبد و لا للرب و إلى ما لا يكون مقدوراً للعبد و جوزوا إعادتها و ذكروا في بيان كل واحد منها أدلة واهية شحنوا بها و بسائر هوساتهم الكتب و الدفاتر. و أكثر آرائهم الفاسدة في الفضيحة و القباحة من هذا القبيل كتعدد القدماء و إثبات الإرادة الجزافية و نفى الداعي في فعله و إبطال الحكمة في خلقه و كونه تعالى محل الكلام النفسي و الحديث الخيالي و ثبوت المعدوم و الجوهر الفرد مع ما يستلزمه من سكون المتحرك و تفكك الرحي و الطفرة إلى غيرها من المموهات و المزخرفات. كل ذلك لرفض الحكمة و معادات الحكماء و هم بالحقيقة أهل البدع و الضلال - و قدوة الجهلة و الأرذال شرهم كلهم على أهل الدين و الورع و ضرهم على العلماء - و أشدهم عداوة للذين آمنوا من الحكماء و الربانيين هذه الطائفة المجادلة المخاصمة - الذين يخوضون في المعقولات و هم لا يعرفون المحسوسات و يتعاطون البراهين و القياسات و هم لا يحسنون الرياضيات و يتكلمون في الإلهيات و هم يجهلون الطبيعيات. و أكثر ما يجادلون به من المسائل المموهة المزخرفة التي لا حقيقة لها و لا وجود إلا في الأوهام الكاذبة لا يصح لمدع فيها حجة و لا لسائل عنها برهان و إذا سئلوا عن حقيقة أشياءهم مقرون بها عند أكثر الناس لا يحسنون أن يجيبوا عنها - فإذا استعصى عليهم البحث أنكروها و جحدوها و يابون أن يقولوا لا ندري - الله أعلم و رسوله نعم عباراتهم في غاية الفصاحة و الفاظهم في نهاية الجودة و الملاحاة - فيوردون تلك الهوسات الفاسدة و العقائد الردية بأفصح العبارات و يكتبونه بأوضح الخطوط في أصح الأوراق و يسمعون الأحداث و العوام و يصورونها في قلوبهم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٤

و يمكنونها في نفوسهم بحيث لن ينمحي أصلاً. و مع هذه الدواهي و المحن كلها و المصيبة على أهل الدين يدعون أنهم - بهذه العقول الناقصة و الأفهام القاصر ينصرون الإسلام و يقوون الدين و إلى يومنا هذا ما سمعنا يهودياً تاب على يد واحد منهم و لا نصرانياً أسلم و لا مجوسياً آمن - بل تراهم بأديانهم إذا نظروا آراء هؤلاء المجادلة أعلق و أوثق نعوذ بالله من شرورهم على الدين و إفسادهم على المؤمنين.

و من عجيب الأمر أيضاً أن بعضاً من هؤلاء استدل على إمكان الإعادة بما قد سمع من كلام الحكماء الكرام أنهم يقولون كل ما قرع سمعك من غرائب عالم الطبيعة فذره في بقعة الإمكان ما لم يذكك عنه قائم البرهان و لعدم تعوده الاجتهاد في العقلات لم يتميز الإمكان بمعنى الجواز العقلي الذي مرجعه إلى عدم وضوح الضرورة لأحد الطرفين عند العقل عن

الإمكان الذاتي الذي هو سلب ضرورة الطرفين عن الشيء بحسب الذات فحكم بأن الأصل فيما لم يتبرهن وجوبه أو امتناعه هو الإمكان فثبت بظنه المستوهم أن إعادة المعدوم ممكن ذاتي و تشبث بهذا الظن الخبيث الذي نسجته عنكبوت وهمه كثير ممن تأخر عنه.

فيقال له و لمن تبعه إنكم إن أردتم بالأصل في هذا القول ما هو بمعنى الكثير الراجح فكون أكثر ما لم يقيم دليل على امتناعه و وجوبه ممكننا غير ظاهر و بعد فرضه غير نافع لجواز كون هذا من جملة الأقل و إن أريد به معنى ما لا يعدل عنه إلا لدليل على ما هو المستعمل في صناعاتي الفقه و أصوله فهو فاسد هاهنا إذ شيء من عناصر العقود ليس أصلا بهذا المعنى بل كل منها مقتضى ماهية الموضوع فما لم يقيم عليه البرهان لم يعلم حاله و ما قاله الشيخ الرئيس معناه أن ما لا برهان على وجوبه و لا على امتناعه لا ينبغي أن ينكر وجوده و يعتقد امتناعه بل يترك في بقعة الإمكان أي الاحتمال العقلي لأنه يعتقد إمكانه الذاتي كيف و من أقواله أن من تعود أن يصدق من غير دليل فقد انسلخ عن الفطرة الإنسانية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٥

فصل (٩) في أن عدم ليس رابطيا

الفلاسفة المتقدمون على أن النسبة الحكمية في كل قضية موجبة كانت أو سالبة ثبوتية و لا نسبة في السوالب وراء النسبة الإيجابية التي هي في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٦

الموجبات و أن مدلول القضية السالبة و مفادها ليس إلا رفع تلك النسبة الإيجابية - و ليس فيها حمل و ربط بل سلب حمل و قطع ربط و إنما يقال لها الحمالية على المجاز و التشبيه و أن لا مادة في السوالب بحسب السلب بل بحسب الإيجاب فلذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٧

لا تختلف المادة في الموجبة و السالبة بحسب النسبة الإيجابية و السلبية خلافا لما شاع بين المتأخرين و المتفلسفين من أن في السالبة نسبة سلبية هي غير النسبة الإيجابية و أن المادة كما يكون بحسب النسبة الإيجابية كذلك يكون بحسب النسبة السلبية و أن مادة النسبة السلبية مخالفة لمادة النسبة الإيجابية و لا يخلو شيء منهما من المواد الثلاث إلا أن المشهور رعايتها في الثوابت لفضلها و شرفها و لانخراط ما يعتبر في السوالب فيها فإن واجب عدم ممتنع الوجود و ممتنع عدم واجب الوجود و ممكن عدم ممكن الوجود.

فيجب عليك أن تعلم أن المادة هي حال المحمول في نفسه عند الموضوع من وجوب صدق أو امتناعه أو إمكانه و هي في مطلق الهليات البسيطة ترجع إلى حال الموضوع في وجوده بحسب قوة الوجود و وثاقة التجوهر أو ضعف الذات و سخافة الحقيقة أو بطلان التحقق و فساد الماهية لا حال المحمول في نسبته إلى الموضوع - و ثبوته له كما زعمه بعض على ما مر ذكره و في الهليات المركبة هي حال المحمول - في نسبته إلى الموضوع و ثبوته له باعتبار وثاقة النسبة أو ضعفها أو فساده و ليس في السالبة إلا انتفاء الموضوع في نفسه أو انتفاء المحمول عنه على أنه ليس هناك شيء أو ليس

شيء شيئاً لا أن هناك شيئاً هو الانتفاء أو له شيء هو الانتفاء فليس فيه شيء يكون مكيفاً بإحدى الكيفيات الثلاث فالمادة التي تسمى عند الأوائل بالعنصر - هي حال الموضوع في نفسه بالإيجاب في التجوهر من استحقاق دوام الوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٨

و دوام اللاوجود أو لا استحقاق دوام الوجود و دوام اللاوجود أو حال المحمول في نفسه بالقياس الإيجابي إلى الموضوع.

و كون نسبة الإمكان إلى الوجوب و الامتناع نسبة نقص إلى تمام و نسبة ضعف إلى قوة و فتور إلى وثاقة إنما يتبين حق التبين في هذا الكتاب و على فلسفتنا - كما يقع إليه الإشارة في عدة مواضع و لو دل على العنصر بلفظ لكان يدل بالجهة - و قد يكون العقد ذا جهة تخالف العنصر إذ العنصر يكون بحسب نفس الأمر و الجهة بحسب البيان و التصريح به بالفعل.

فقد بان أن السالبة توجد لمحمولها الحال التي له عند الموضوع بالنسبة الإيجابية بعينها فإن محموله عند الإيجاب يكون له استحقاقية أحد الأمور المذكورة - و إن لم يكن أوجبت.

و ما يتوهم أن العنصر الثابت على تقدير جعل العدم محمولاً غير الثابت على تقدير جعل الوجود محمولاً فكذا الثابت على تقدير جعل العدم رابطة يكون غير الثابت على تقدير جعل الوجود رابطة.

منفسخ بأن هذا الوهم ناش عن أخذ قولنا زيد معدوم مثلاً قضية موجبة و عن الغفلة من أنه ينقلب بذلك عن أن يكون سلباً لقولنا زيد موجود فيرجع الحكم إلى إيجاب سلب الوجود و القضية إلى موجبة سالبة المحمول فلاجل ذلك تختلف القضيتان بحسب العنصر فأى مفهوم أخذ من المفهومات فإن له بما هو محمول حال عند الموضوع المعين بالنسبة الإيجابية لا يتغير ذلك الحال عند سلب تلك و لا ينبغي أن يؤخذ زيد معدوم حين ما يرام سلب وجوده في نفسه حكماً إيجابياً بل يجب أن يعنى به انتفاؤه في نفسه و سلب ذاته في وجوده لتكون القضية من سوابل الهليات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٦٩

البسيطة لا ثبوت سلب الوجود له حتى يصير من الهليات المركبة الإيجابية و لا سلب الوجود عنه حتى يكون من سوابل الهليات المركبة و من لم يفرق بين مفاد الهيتين - و ظن أن طبيعة العقد مطلقاً يستدعي ثبوت شيء لشيء أو سلب شيء عن شيء لم يمكنه أن يصدق بأن قولنا الإنسان موجود أو وجد الإنسان مثلاً يفيد تحقق ذات الإنسان - لا تحقق أمر له هو وجوده و كذلك قولنا عدم الإنسان يعطي بطلان ذاته لا انسلاب صفة عنه هي الوجود و أما قولنا الإنسان كاتب أو كتب الإنسان يعطي ثبوت صفة له هي الكتابة و كذا قولنا الإنسان ساكن الأصابع يفيد انسلاب صفة عنه هي الكتابة و عدم الفرق بين الهيتين من علل الطبيعة الإنسانية و أمراضها التي يجب إزالتها و التدبر في خلاصها لئلا يضطر إلى استثناء المقدمة الكلية القائلة بفرعية وجود الثابت لوجود المثبت له في جملة الهليات البسيطة كما سبق ذكره في أوائل الكتاب

تتمة تحقيقية:

و إذ قد تحقق لديك أن السلب بما هو سلب ليس له معنى محصل يثبت له أو به أو يرفع عنه أو به معنى على سبيل

الوجوب و الامتناع و الإمكان فقد دريت أنه لا يكون نسبة سلبية مكيفة بضرورة أو دوام أو فعلية أو إمكان أو غير ذلك بل إنما يثول معنى ضرورية النسبة السلبية إلى امتناع النسبة الإيجابية التي هي نقيضها و معنى دوام النسبة السلبية سلب تلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٠

النسبة الإيجابية في كل وقت و وقت على أن يعتبر ذلك في الإيجاب و يجعل السلب قطعاً له بذلك الاعتبار فيرفع بحسب أي جزء فرض من أجزاء الأوقات فإذاً ليس فرق بين السالبة الضرورية و سالبة الضرورية أو بين السالبة الدائمة و سالبة الدائمة مثلاً- لا على ما اشتهر في الحكمة العامة بل على طريق الحكمة النقية الملخصة و كذلك قياس سائر الموجهات و قياس المطلقة التي هي مقابلة لها لأن الإطلاق عدم التوجيه- و التقابل بينهما تقابل العدم و الملكة فإن السالبة المطلقة هي بعينها سالبة المطلقة و لا سبيل لصاحب التأييد العلمي إلى فصل إطلاق السلب عن سلب الإطلاق- و إطالة الكلام في بيانه خارج عن طور هذا الكتاب إذ غرضنا فيه بيان طريق الوصول إلى الحق و كيفية السير إلى الله و إنما كفالتة إلى صناعة الميزان

فصل (١٠) في أن الحكم السلبي لا ينفك عن نحو من وجود طرفيه

إن محمول العقود الحملية سواء كانت موجبة أو سالبة قد يكون ثبوتياً و قد يكون عديمياً في الخارج و أما في الذهن فلا بد و أن يكون حاضراً موجوداً- لاستحالة الحكم بما لا يكون حاضراً عند النفس و أما موضوعها سواء كانت موجبة أو سالبة فلا بد و أن يكون له وجود في النفس لاستحالة الحكم على ما لا يكون كذلك و أما في الخارج فكذلك إذا كان الحكم بالإيجاب بحسب ظرف الخارج- لاستدعاء الحكم بحسب أي ظرف وجود الموضوع فيه لأن ثبوت شيء لشيء في أي موطن كان يتفرع على ثبوته في نفسه اللهم إلا إذا كان المحمول في معنى السلب المطلق نحو زيد معدوم في الخارج أو شريك الباري ممتنع فإنه و إن نسب إلى الخارج لكنه نفس السلب عن الخارج فكأنه قيل زيد المتصور في الذهن ليس في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧١

الخارج و إذا كان الحكم بالسلب في الخارج فلا يقتضي نفس الحكم وجود الموضوع فيه لجواز سلب المعدوم و السلب عن المعدوم هذا بحسب خصوص طبيعة السلب بما هو سلب لا بما هو حكم من الأحكام الواقعة عن النفس الإنسانية. فقولهم إن موضوع السالبة أعم من موضوع الموجبة المعدولة أو السالبة المحمول ليس معناه أن موضوع السالبة يجوز أن يكون معدوماً في الخارج دون موضوع الموجبة إذ موضوع الموجبة أيضاً قد يكون معدوماً في الخارج كقولنا شريك الباري ممتنع و اجتماع النقيضين محال و لا أن موضوع الموجبة يجب أن يتحقق أو يتمثل في وجود أو ذهن دون موضوع السالبة إذ موضوع السالبة أيضاً كذلك- بل بمعنى أن السلب يصح عن الموضوع الغير الثابت بما هو غير ثابت أصلاً على أن للعقل أن يعتبر هذا الاعتبار في السلب و يأخذ موضوع السالبة على هذا الوجه بخلاف الإيجاب و الموجبة فإن الإيجاب و إن صح على الموضوع الغير الثابت لكن لا يصح عليه من حيث هو غير ثابت بل من حيث له ثبوت ما لأن الإيجاب يقتضي وجود شيء حتى يوجد له شيء آخر.

ولهذا يجوز أن يقال المعدوم ليس من حيث هو معدوم بشيء ولا له من هذه الحثية شيء بل من حيث له وجود و تحقق في ظرف ما و أيضا يجوز نفي كل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٢

ما هو غير الثابت عن الموضوع من حيث هو غير ثابت بخلاف إثبات كل ما يغيره عليه من تلك الحثية بل إثبات شيء مما يغيره عليه من تلك الجهة اللهم إلا إذا كان أمرا عديميا أو محالا فإنه إذا كان ذلك لم يكن صدق الحكم من حيث خصوص المحمول أيضا مستدعا لوجود الموضوع كما أنه يستدعيه من حيث النسبة الإيجابية - فلذلك اشتهر أن موضوع السالبة أعم من موضوع الموجبة و هو غير صحيح إلا أن يصار إلى ما قدمناه و يراد بالعموم ما سيجيء ذكره و ليس معنى كلامهم على ما فهمه الجمهور أن العموم إنما هو لجواز كون موضوع السالبة معدوما في الخارج دون الموجبة.

و أما ما قيل إن موضوع السالبة إن كان أعم من موضوع موجبة المعدول أو السالبة المحمول لم يتحقق التناقض لتفاوت أفرادهما و إن لم يكن أعم زال الفرق.

فنقول هو أعم بالاعتبار المذكور و لا يلزم منه تغاير الأفراد إذ العموم بمعنيين - و الأعمية بحسب الاعتبار المذكور لا يوجب بطلان التناقض و نفي الأعمية بحسب الأفراد لا يستلزم زوال الفرق لكون الموضوع في السالبة أعم اعتبارا و إن لم يكن أكثر شمولاً و تناولا

تذكرة: فالموجبة بحسب الموضوع أخص من السالبة

مع مساواتهما الاتفاقية لتحقيق جميع المفهومات و الأعيان الثابتة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٣

في المبادي العالية و لاستدعاء مطلق الحكم الوجود الإدراكي إذ المجهول مطلقا لا حكم عليه بنفي أو إثبات و الشبهة به عليه مندفة باستعانة ما ذكرناه من الفرق بين الحملين إذ الشيء قد يكذب عن نفسه بأحدهما و يصدق عليه بالآخر على أن الفرق لا يجري إلا في الشخصيات و الطبيعيات لاشتغال المحصورات على عقد وضع إيجابي - هو اتصاف ذات الموضوع بالعنوان بالفعل فإن قولنا كل ج ب ليس معناه الجيم الكلي و إلا لكانت طبيعية أو كلية أو كله و هو ظاهر بل معناه كل ما يوصف ب ج ذهنا أو عينا دائما أو غير دائم بحيثاً به أو لا فهو ب.

إعضالات و انحلالات:

و من التشكيكات الواقعة في هذا الموضوع

التي ربما تراحم السائر إلى الله تعالى في سيره و تعوقه عن السلوك إليه تعالى - أن السالبة المعدولة المحمول أعم من الموجبة المحصلة لصدقها بانتفاء الموضوع بخلاف الموجبة و قد يكون نقيض المفهوم مما لا يصدق على شيء ما بحسب الواقع كاللاشيء و اللامعلوم و اللاممكن العام و سائر نقائص المفهومات الشاملة فلا ينتظم الأحكام الميزانية لصدق سلب نقيض الأخص عما يفرض صدق نقيض الأعم عليه إذا كان معدوما فيلزم صدق قولنا ليس بعض اللاجوهر بلا حيوان بانتفاء ذلك البعض و كذلك الحال في نقيضي المتساويين فيصدق بعض اللاجسم ليس بلا متحيز

لانتفائه في نفسه و تزلزل بذلك قاعدة تعاكس الأعمية و الأخصية في نقيضي الأعم و الأخص و ينثلم الحكم بتساوي نقيضي المتساويين و انعكاس الموجبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٤

الكلية كنفسها عكس النقيض و غيرها مما في القاعدة الميزانية بنقائض المعاني الشاملة. و أجابوا عنه في المشهور بأن أخذوا الربط في السوالب على أنه إيجاب لسلب المحمول و فصلوا الموجبة السالبة المحمول عن الموجبات في استدعاء وجود الموضوع و الحقوها بالسوالب في عدم الاستدعاء له و خصصوا الأحكام بما عدا نقائض الطبائع العامة و جميع هذه الآراء من مجازفات المتأخرين المتشبهين بالحكماء - من المقلدين الذين ليس لهم قدم راسخ في العلم و العرفان. و سبيل الحكمة في فك ذلك العقد ما أشرنا إليه سابقا أن أعمية السالبة عن الموجبة في باب استدعاء الوجود للموضوع و عدمه ليست بحسب الشمول الأفرادي - بل بحسب التناول الاعتباري أي لا بمعنى أنهما بحيث يكون أحدهما تصدق على فرد من الموضوع حيث تكذب عنه الأخرى بل بمعنى أن أحدهما تصدق على شيء باعتبار لا تصدق عليه الأخرى بذلك الاعتبار و إن كان الموضوع فيهما جميعا مما يلزم أن يكون موجودا بنحو من الأنحاء و إن الإيجاب سواء كان عدوليا أو تحصيليا - يقتضي ثبوت الموضوع بالوجه المقرر المفصل في موضعه ففي مطلق العقود لا بد من مطلق الثبوت عينيا أو عقليا أو تقديريا و ما يصدق الحكم معه في السوالب هو ما يقابله - و بذلك تنحسم مادة الشبهة فتصدق تلك الأحكام حقيقية و اللازم وجود موضوعاتها بحسب الفرض و التقدير و مطابق الحكم و مصداق العقد فيها إنما هو كون عنوان الموضوع بحيث لو تحقق في شيء أو صدق عليه تحقق فيه أو صدق عليه المحمول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٥

و إنما يلزم الوجود الخارجي أو الذهني لو حكم في تلك القضايا بثبوت المحمول للموضوع في العين أو في العقل على البت و ليس هكذا و العمومية بين المفهومين - ليس معناها و مقتضاها إلا كون أحدهما بحيث لو وجد في مادة وجد الآخر فيها كليا دون العكس و المساواة كونهما كذلك من الجانبين كليا و ليس في ذلك لزوم الاجتماع - في مادة ما بحسب الواقع بالفعل و لا شبهة لرجل منطقي أن الأمر في تلك الطبائع الشاملة على هذه الشاكلة كيف و الكلي الذي يجري عليه هذه الأحكام ليس مفهومه مما يحتاج إلى وجود فرد له في العين أو في النفس و كذا حاله مع عروض تلك النسب و أحكامها له بالقياس إلى كلي آخر في عدم توقفها على وجود موضوعات الأحكام في شيء من الأوعية و المواطن

و منها أنه صدق قولنا كل ممكن بالإمكان الخاص فهو ممكن بالإمكان العام

و هذا ظاهر و صدق أيضا قولنا كل ما ليس بممكن بالإمكان الخاص فهو ممكن بالإمكان العام لأنه إما واجب بالذات أو ممتنع بالذات و كل منهما ممكن عام - فلو وجب أن يكون نقيض العام مطلقا أخص من نقيض الخاص كذلك يلزم المقدمة الأولى كل ما ليس بممكن عام فهو ليس بممكن خاص و صار صغرى للمقدمة الثانية - ينتج كل ما ليس بممكن عام فهو ممكن عام و أنه تناقض مستحيل و كذلك يلزم الثانية كل ما ليس بممكن عام فهو ممكن خاص و

صار صغرى للأولى ينتج أيضا كل ما ليس بممكن عام فهو ممكن عام وإنه تناقض.
و أجاب عنه الحكيم الطوسي ره بأن الممكن العام ينقسم إلى قسمين هما مانعا للجمع و الخلو و إذا أطلق بحيث يشمل القسمين فسلبه يكون خارجا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٦

عن النقيضين و إذا تقرر ذلك فنقول القياس الأول من القياسين المذكورين و هو قولنا كل ما ليس بممكن عام فهو ليس بممكن خاص و كل ما ليس بممكن خاص فهو ممكن عام ليس فيه الحد الأوسط مكررا لأن المراد بما ليس بممكن خاص في الصغرى ما هو خارج عن النقيضين معا و في الكبرى ما هو داخل في أحدهما و أما القياس الثاني و هو قولنا كل ما ليس بممكن عام فهو ممكن خاص و كل ما هو ممكن خاص فهو ممكن عام فصغراه كاذبة لأن عكس نقيض قولنا كل ما ليس بممكن خاص فهو ممكن عام ليس هو هذه الصغرى بل عكس نقيضه أن كل ما ليس بممكن عام فهو ليس بممكن خاص و المراد منه ما هو خارج عن النقيضين - لا الممكن الخاص الذي هو داخل في أحدهما فأعيد القول في السؤال بأن الخارج عن النقيضين الذين يعبر عنه بليس ليس بشيء أصلا فلا يمكن أن يحمل عليه شيء حتى يكون أخص من شيء فإذن كيف يكون ما ليس بممكن خاص أعم منه - فأفاد الجواب مثني بأن ما ليس بممكن خاص يصدق مع الذي ليس بشيء أصلا الذي يعبر عنه بأنه ليس و مع الداخل في طرفي النقيض أي الواجب بذاته و الممتنع بذاته - و لا يراد بكونه أعم إلا هذا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٧

و بعض سادة أعظم الحكماء أدام الله علوه فصل الكلام في هذا المقام قائلا - بأن الإمكان العام هو ما يلزم سلب ضرورة عدم الشيء فإنه سلب الضرورة عن الجانب المخالف و الجانب المخالف إما عدم ما يتصف بذلك الإمكان أعني النسبة - إن كان الإمكان جهة أو عدم ذات الموضوع أعني انتفاءه في نفسه إن كان الممكن هو المحمول و ضرورة عدم كل مفهوم هي امتناع ذلك المفهوم فالإمكان العام سلب امتناع ذات الموضوع أو سلب امتناع الوصف العارض له و هو النسبة و على التقديرين لا يصدق الممكن العام على الممتنع و جمهور الناس يضعون أن الجانب المخالف هو ما يخالف الواقع من طرفي الوجود و العدم فالمخالف في الواجب هو العدم و في الممتنع هو الوجود و الممكن يقع عليهما فإن أريد بالممكن العام المعنى الأول لم يصدق قول المشكك الممتنع بالذات ممكن عام و إن أريد ما يوضع عند الأكثرين - فيقال إما أن يعتبر في كل من الواجب و الممتنع ضرورة أحد الطرفين فقط فيكون ما ليس بممكن خاص منقسما إلى ثلاثة أقسام واجب و ممتنع و ضروري الطرفين - فلا يصح حينئذ أن ما هو ضروري الطرفين مسلوب الضرورة عما هو غير واقع من طرفيه - و إما أن يعتبر في كل منهما ضرورة أحد الطرفين بلا شرط آخر من اعتبار ضرورة الطرف الآخر أو عدمها فلا يصح أن كل ممتنع مسلوب الضرورة عما هو غير واقع من طرفيه إذ ضروري الطرفين ممتنع و ليس يصح فيه ذلك.

و صاحب درة التاج أراد مناقضة قولهم كل ما ليس بممكن بالإمكان الخاص - فهو ممكن بالإمكان العام بأنه لا يصدق على الماهية من حيث هي هي الممكن بالإمكان الخاص و لا يصدق عليها من تلك الحيثية الممكن بالإمكان العام أيضا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٨

و هذه المناقضة غير مرضية إذ المراد التصادق بحسب نفس الأمر وإن لم يكن بحسب بعض مراتب الماهية في نفس الأمر من الاعتبارات العقلية

فصل (١١) في أن عدم الخاص بنحو هل يجوز اتصاف الواجب بالذات به

المشهور من أقوال الحكماء أن بعض أنحاء الوجود بخصوصه مما يمتنع بالنظر إلى الحقيقة الواجبة و ذلك مما لا ينافي كونه واجب الوجود بالذات كما أن امتناع نحو من الوجود للممكن لا يخرج عن حد الإمكان الذاتي و لا ينافيه بل يؤكد و يقرر إمكانه و كذلك امتناع نحو من عدم بخصوصه بالقياس إلى ذات الممكن - مما لا يابى عنه طبيعة الممكن و مفهوم الإمكان و كذا امتناع بعض أنحاء عدم بالقياس إلى الممتنع بالذات كعدم المسبوق بالوجود أو لا يرى أن أنحاء الوجودات الإمكانية - مما يمتنع اتصاف الواجب تعالى به و كذا الوجود الحادث و الوجود الزائل و الوجود الجسماني و الوجود الحلولي و العرضي و بالجملة الوجود اللاحق و إنما ذلك لخصوصيات القيود نقصانية و الأوصاف العدمية و أن بعض أنحاء الوجود يمتنع على بعض الممكنات و بعضها على الجميع أما الثاني فكالوجود الواجب على الجميع و أما الأول فكالوجود الجوهرى على الأعراض و الوجود المفارقة على المادي و الوجود القار على الغير القار و كذا يمتنع على الغير القار بالذات بحسب الماهية أن يكون له عدم سابق على وجوده أو وجود بعد عدمه أو عدم بعد وجوده - قبلية و بعدية مقدرة زمانية لا اجتماع بحسبهما بين قبل و بعد و إن لم يمتنع الوجود و لا عدم المطلقين عليه و كذا عدم الذي هو رفع الوجود المتحقق في وعاء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٧٩

الواقع بعد اعتبار وقوعه و تحققه عن موضوعه بحسب ما هو فيه من الجهات و الاعتبارات الزمانية و المكانية و الوصفية ممتنع على كافة الممكنات امتناعا وصفيا لا ذاتيا.

نقد و تلويح:

أما أن بعض أنحاء الوجود يمتنع على الواجب بالذات من حيث كونه مصحوبا بالقصور و النقص فمما لا شبهة فيه و أما امتناع اتصاف الواجب تعالى به من حيث كونه وجودا ما مطلقا فمنظور فيه كيف و الوجود بما هو وجود طبيعة واحدة بسيطة لا اختلاف فيها إلا من جهة التمام و النقص و القوة و الضعف و النقص و الضعف مرجعهما إلى عدم فكل مرتبة من مراتب الوجود يكون دون المرتبة الواجبة فهي ذات اعتبارين اعتبار سنخ الوجود بما هو وجود و اعتبار عدم بلوغه إلى الكمال و نزوله عن الغاية فبأحد الاعتبارين يمتنع اتصاف الواجب تعالى به و بالآخر يجب أما الأول فظاهر و أما الثاني فلأن واجب الوجود بالذات واجب من جميع الجهات كما مر.

و أيضا نقول لو امتنع طور من أطوار الوجود عليه تعالى باعتبار طبيعة الوجود - مع قطع النظر عن خصوصية قيده العدمي لزم أن يتحقق في ذاته جهة امتناعية بالقياس إلى طبيعة الوجود بما هو وجود مع الجهة الوجوبية التي كانت له فيلزم تركيب الجهات و الاعتبارات في ذاته بذاته تعالى شأنه عن ذلك علوا كبيرا.

لا يقال هذا النحو من التكثر و الاختلاف لو استحال عليه تعالى من أجل كونه - مستلزما للتركيب في ذاته على ما قررت

لزم مثل هذا التركيب فيه أيضا من اعتبار جهتي وجوب الوجود و امتناع العدم.

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لأننا نقول هذان الاعتباران غير مستلزمين للتركيب بوجه لعدم تخالف الجهتين فيهما بخلاف ما نحن بصدده و الفرق بين القبيلين متحقق لأن حثية وجود الوجود هاهنا هي بعينها حثية امتناع العدم بلا تغاير و اختلاف لا في الذات و لا في الاعتبار - لأن ذاتا واحدة بحسب صرافة وحدتها و بساطتها مصداق لصدق هذين المفهومين - بخلاف ما نحن فيه فإن ذاتا واحدة بالقياس إلى معنى واحد لا يكون لها إضافتان متخالفتان متنافيتان بضرورة من الفطرة الإنسانية و هذا الأصل من جملة الأصول التي تقرر ما نحن بصدده من كون جميع الموجودات بحسب موجوديتها رشحات - و فيوض و رقائق للوجود الإلهي و تجليات و شئونات للحق الصمدي.

و أما كون بعض أنحاء العدم ممتنعا للممكن بالذات أو للممتنع بالذات فهو أيضا محل بحث فإن العدم مما لا امتياز فيه حتى يمتنع بعضه دون بعض آخر كما مر - بل ربما كان هذه الأوصاف العدمية مما يستتبعها بعض الأوصاف الوجودية على سبيل الاستتباع و الاستجرار.

فالحق أن امتناع العدم المسبوق بالوجود للممتنع بالذات يرجع إلى امتناع ذلك الوجود السابق عليه فإنه إذا امتنع السابق على شيء امتنع اللاحق أيضا باعتبار كونه لاحقا به إذ اللاحقية لا تنفك عن السابقة و إذا اتصف اللاحق بالشيء بالامتناع لا بالذات بل باعتبار اللحق كان امتناعه تابعا لامتناع الملحق به فيكون امتناع العدم أي عدم كان للممتنع بالذات امتناعا بالعرض.

و هاهنا شك مشهور

استصعبوه و قد سهل اندفاعه بما حققناه من أن الواجب بالذات ما يجب له طبيعة الوجود مطلقا و الممتنع بالذات ما يمتنع عليه طبيعة الوجود كذلك على الوجه الذي بيناه و ذلك الشك هو أن الزمان إذا امتنع عليه لذاته العدم السابق و اللاحق لزم أن يكون الزمان واجب الوجود لذاته تعالى القيوم الواجب

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بالذات عن التغير علوا كبيرا.

و أجابوا عنه بأن الواجب بالذات هو الذي يمتنع عليه جميع أنحاء العدم - و الزمان ليس كذلك إذ لا استحالة في أن يكون منعما بالكلية أزلا و أبدا.

و هذا مع أنه لا يوافق أصولهم حيث تقرر عندهم و صرحوا بأن الوجود الإمكانى يمتنع عليه تعالى يرد عليه أيضا أن الوجود الذي يكون للزمان في مقابل العدم السابق و اللاحق يلزم أن يكون واجبا له فيلزم استغناؤه عن العلة في استمرار وجوده و من أصولهم أن الممكن كما يحتاج إلى العلة في وجوده الحدوثي - يحتاج إليها في وجوده البقائي.

ثم تكلفوا في الواجب عنه بأن مقابل العدم المتقدم أو المتأخر لشيء هو رفع العدم المتقدم أو رفع العدم المتأخر و هذا المعنى أعم من الوجود الاستمراري - لا مكان صدقه على ذلك و على عدمه رأسا أزلا و أبدا صدق رفع العدم اللاحق للزمان على عدمه المطلق.

ونحن بعون الله تعالى مستغنون عن هذه التجشّمات فإن مناط الوجوب الذاتي في فلسفتنا هو ضرورة طبيعة الوجود المطلق بما هو وجود مطلق و ملاك الامتناع الذاتي هو ضرورة رفع طبيعة الوجود مطلقا و تحقق طبيعة كلية من الطبائع العامة المتواطئة و إن كان بتحقيق فرد من أفرادها و ارتفاعها بارتفاع جميع الأفراد لها لكن الوجود ليس شموله و انبساطه من حيث عروض الكلية و العموم له بل له إطلاق و شمول بنحو آخر سوى العموم على ما يعلمه الراسخون في العلم فوجوب حقيقته الكاملة يستلزم وجوب جميع شعبه و مراتبه و فروعه و امتناع هذه الحقيقة يستلزم امتناع جميع مراتبه و أنحائه و تجلياته فالزمان بهويته الاتصالية التي هي

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أفق التجدد و التقضي و عرش الحوادث و التغاير شأن واحد من شئون العلة الأولى - و مرتبة ضعيفة من مراتب نزول الوجود فيكون أضعف الممكنات وجودا و أخس المعلومات رتبة. و يمكن أن يجاب عن الأخير بأن الأمر التدريجي الوجود بالذات كالزمان المتصل و ما يتكلم به كالحركة القطعية ليس له بقاء حتى يحتاج في بقاءه إلى سبب - بل زمان تحققه بعينه ليس إلا زمان حدوثه و هو مما سيحدث ذاته و هويته الاتصالية شيئا فشيئا سواء كانت متناهية الاتصال كالحركة المستقيمة العنصرية أو غير متناهية كالدورات الأكرية العرشية فإذا كانت أوقات بقاء شيء بعينها أوقات حدوثه بمعنى أن لا بقاء له في الحقيقة إلا التدرج في الحصول و الانتظار في أصل الكون فلا يسع لقائل أن يقول إن الزمان في بقاءه أ هو محتاج إلى العلة أم مستغن عنها. و لنا أيضا وجه آخر في هدم أساس الشبهة المذكورة و هو أن وجود الزمان و الحركة المتمكمة به ليس كوجود غيرهما من الأعراض التي لها ماهية متحصلة - إذ الحركة بما هي حركة ليس حقيقتها و معناها إلا طلب شيء من الكمالات و الاشتياق إليه و ليست هي شيئا بحيالها إنما الشيء ما يطلب و يشتاق إليه أو يصلح لأن يطلب و يشتاق إليه لا ما يكون ماهيتها نفس الطلب للشيء و الاشتياق إليه - و الزمان ليس إلا مقدار الطلب و الاشتياق و عددهما فهاتان الماهيتان ما دامت أخذتا - على هذا الوجه الذي هو مقتضى ذاتيهما فلا يمكن الحكم عليهما بأن شيئا منهما كيف نسبة الوجود إليه من الضرورة و اللاضرورة و الدوام و اللادوام و الانقطاع و اللانقطاع - بل هما في الاتصاف بهذه الأمور إنما يكونان على سبيل الاستتباع و العرض و إن

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لم تكونا مأخوذتين على هذا الوجه فقد انسلختا عن ذاتيهما و صارت كل واحدة منهما شيئا آخر له حكم آخر و بعد أن استوفى النظر في ذاته يظهر حكمه و كونه من أي طبيعة من الطبائع

فصل (١٢) في أن المتوقف على الممتنع بالذات لا يلزم أن يكون ممتنعا بالذات

إن توقف شيء على محال بالذات لا يقتضي استحالة المتوقف استحالة ذاتية - بل إنما بالغير فقط لاستحالة الموقوف عليه بالذات و أما أن الموقوف عليه إن كان موصوفا كالممتنع بالذات و الموقوف صفة كالامتناع بالذات كان استحالته بالذات - ملزوم استحالة الموقوف بالذات فذلك لخصوص الموصوف بما هو موصوف بالذات - و الصفة بما هي صفة كما قيل.

و أقول منشأ ذلك أن اتصاف الشيء بالوجود و مقابله ليس كاتصاف القابل بالمقبول و بعدمه و لا كاتصاف عدم القابل بعدم المقبول حيث يجب أن يتأخر الصفة عن الموصوف وجودا كان أو عدما و ذلك كاتصاف الجسم بالبياض و اللابيض بأن يكون للموصوف ثبوت و للصفة ثبوت آخر يتفرع عليه ثم يتصف الموصوف بتلك الصفة بعد تحقق ذاته بذاته و كذا في اتصاف عدم الجسم بعدم البياض فإن ثبوت الوجود لشيء موضوع و حمله إياه هو بعينه ثبوت ذلك الموضوع فلا اتصاف و لا ناعتية هاهنا إلا بحسب التحليل العقلي كما مر تحقيقه و كذا عدمه عنه هو عبارة عن عدمه في نفسه لا عدم شيء آخر عنه فإذا كان أن اتصاف الوجود بالوجود هو بعينه اتصاف

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الشيء الموجود بذلك الوجود بالوجود من غير تابعة و متبوعية هناك في نفس الأمر - إلا بحسب نحو من الملاحظة فكذا اتصاف عدم الشيء بالامتناع هو بعينه اتصاف ذلك المعدوم بالامتناع و كذا حال اتصاف ذلك الوجود بوجود آخر و حال اتصاف ذلك الامتناع بضرورة ثبوت الامتناع و هكذا إلى أن ينقطع بانقطاع الاعتبار العقلي - ففي جميع هذه الأوصاف اتصاف الموضوع بصفة منها عين اتصاف وصفه بتلك الصفة أو ما يلزمه من غير توقف و تابعة و متبوعية و لاحقية و ملحوقية.

فالحق عندنا أن المتوقف على المستحيل بالذات من حيث إنه متوقف عليه لا من حيث إنه عينه يكون دائما مستحيلا بالغير لا بالذات كما أن الواجب بالغير لا يكون إلا ممكنا بالذات لا واجبا بذاته و لا ممتنعا بذاته كما مر. و ستعلم في مستأنف القول أن ما اشتهر بين المجادلين أن المحال مما يستلزم محالا ليس بصحيح كليا بل إنما يصح جزئيا إذا تحقق بين المحالين علاقة عقلية كما بين المحال بالذات و المحال بالغير أي الموقوف على أمر ممتنع بالذات فلا استلزام بين محالين كلاهما مستحيل بالذات كما لا استلزام بين واجبين كلاهما واجب بالذات - لأن الاستلزام بين شيئين لا يتحقق إلا بمعلولية أحدهما لا محالة إذ لا بد في التلازم إما كون أحد المتلازمين علة و الآخر معلولا أو كونهما معا معلولي علة واحدة - فأحد المتلازمين لا بد و أن يكون معلولا بوجه و المعلول لا يكون إلا ممكنا بالذات - لما تحقق أن علة الاحتياج إلى الغير و التوقف عليه هي الإمكان لا غيره فالممتنع بالغير لا يكون إلا ممكنا بالذات فلا تلازم بين المحالين الذاتيين و كما لا استلزام بين محالين ذاتيين فلا استلزام بين الشيء و ما ينافيه.

وهم وإزاحة:

و لك أن تقول إذا بطل أن يستلزم مفهوم ما ممكن أو محال ما ينافيه فإذا ما شأن القياسات الخلفية حيث يثبت بها الشيء على فرض عدمه و يلزم فيها الشيء من فرض نقيضه كما يقال في إثبات عدم تناهي الكمية الغير القارة بالذات أعني الزمان إن عدمه قبل وجوده قبلية زمانية

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لا يجتمع المتقدم بها مع المتأخر و كذا عدمه بعد وجوده هذه البعدية مستلزم لوجوده - و كما يقال في إثبات تناهي الكميات القارة أعني المقادير التعليمية بأسرها أن لا تناهيها مستلزم لتناهيها. فيقال لك إن أردت أنه يتبين هناك أن الممتنع المفروض الوقوع لو كان حاصلًا في نفس الأمر كان عدمه واقعا فيها و لو

كان المتحقق فيها هو نقيض الشيء كان الشيء متحققا في نفس الأمر و أن الزمان لو كان عدمه واقعا قبل وجوده أو بعده وجوده لم يكن معدوما قبل الوجود أو بعده فذلك من الأكاذيب و المفتريات فإن تلك المفروضات لو وقعت كانت بحسب تحققها مستدعية للوازنها مقتضية لأحكامها و آثارها المختصة لا مناقضة لها منافية لأحكامها و آثارها. و إن أردت أنه يتبين بالبيانات الخلفية أنه لو فرض شيء من تلك الأمور مع بقاء سائر الأوضاع الممكنة و الواقعة بحالها كان يلزم هناك من فرض ذلك الشيء مع اجتماع أوضاع أخرى ممكنة ما يسوق إلى أن هذا الفرض غير مطابق للواقع من حيث إنه فرض لأمر و نقيضه و فرض لعدم الشيء و وجوده معا فذلك ما راموه في تلك المواضع و ليس فيها استيجاب استلزام الشيء ما ينافيه بل استيجاب امتناع الشيء لكون فرضه وضعاً أو رفعاً مؤدياً إلى ما يقتضي الوجود بحسب سائر الأوضاع الواقعة أو الممكنة نقيضه ففرضه بالحقيقة مساوق لفرض اجتماع المتنافيين عند التفتيش. و بالجملة الفرض الذي في البيانات الخلفية عبارة عن أنه مفروض لا على أنه محقق لأنه قد فرض نفسه و إن كان مع الأمور التي يستلزم نقيضه و لو كان فرضه ذلك الشيء على وجه أنه فرض أمر واقعي لوجب أن يوضع مع فرضه وضع جميع لوازمه و ملزوماته و رفع جميع مناقضاته و منافيته و منافيات لوازمه و منافيات ملزوماته - حتى يكون فرضه فرض أمر واقعي و ليس ما نحن فيه كذلك بل يقال في بيان الخلف

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إننا لو فرضنا ذلك الشيء و تصورناه لعلمنا تحقق نقيضه لا أنه لو تحقق هذا الشيء في الواقع لكان عدمه متحققا في الواقع فإذاً المستحيل المفروض في العقل بحسب تمثيل مفهومه في الذهن يحكم عليه باستلزام ما هو مفهوم له لا اجتماع المتنافيين و مفهوم اجتماع المتنافيين بما هما متمثلان في لحاظ الذهن ليس من المستحيلات بل من الممكنات كما وقعت الإشارة إليه ثم يبين أن المفهوم الملزوم ليس عنوانا لشيء من الأشياء الواقعة في عالم الإمكان فيرجع ذلك إلى الاستدلال بانتفاء اللازم على انتفاء الملزوم فيجعل الشرطية بحسب الوضع الفرضي و نفي لازمه جميعا موجبا لبطلان الفرض فيكون مجموع العقد الشرطي و العقد الاستثنائي ملزوما للحكم باستحالة المفروض لا فرض المفروض فقط

تسجيل:

إنك قد سمعت سابقا و تحققت أن الواجب بذاته لا يكون واجبا بغيره فاعمل رويتك و استعمل مثل ذلك البيان في الممتنع بالذات و احكم بأن ما يمتنع بذاته يستحيل أن يمتنع بغيره و إلا لبطل امتناعه ببطلان ذلك الغير و أيضا لا يتصور لذات واحدة عدمان و لا امتناعان و لا يتصور أيضا عدم واحد و امتناع واحد لذاتين كما يتصور لذات واحدة وجودان و لا وجوبان و لا وجود واحد و ضرورة واحدة لذاتين فقط ظهر أن كلا من الوجود و البطلان و ضرورة الوجود و ضرورة عدم لا يتكرر إلا بتكرر الموضوعات و لا يتحد إلا مع اتحاد الموضوع فإذاً يستحيل أن يكون امتناع ماهية مفروضة بحسب الذات و بحسب الغير معا أو على التبادل فالمستحيل بالذات يكون ضرورة عدمه بحسب نفس ذاته فقط بته.

فقد بزغ أن كل ما بالغير من الوجوب أو البطلان فموضوعه الممكن بالذات - و قد علمت أن معنى الإمكان الذاتي يجب أن يتصور على وجه نسبته إلى كل من الوجوب بالغير و الامتناع بالغير نسبة النقص إلى التمام حتى يستصح اتصاف

الممكن بأي منهما.

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و ليعلم و يتذكر أن العقل كما لا يستطيع أن يطبق إشراق نور الأول تعالى - و يتعقل كنه مجده و جلاله لغاية سطوع شمس كبريائه و فرط ظهوره و فعليته كذلك لا يقدر أن يتعقل الممتنع بالذات لفرط نقصه و بلوغه أقصى غاية النقصان إلى حيث تجاوز الشئية فإن الشيء لا ينفك عن الوجود فما لا وجود له لا شئية له و العقل الإنساني يقدر على إدراك ماهيات الأشياء و شئياتها و لا يقدر على تعقل الوجود الصرف الذي لا شئية له كما في الواجب جل اسمه و لا على تعقل العدم الصرف - الذي لا شئية له أيضا بوجه من الوجوه لكن هناك لفرط الكمال و الفعلية و هاهنا لفرط النقصان و البطلان و كل ما يقرب من الأول تعالى كان يقرب منه في ذلك الحكم - كالعقل الأول و ما يتلوه و كل ما يقرب من الممتنع كان يقرب منه في الحكم كالهولى الأولى و الحركة و ما يقربهما.

و ملخص القول أن من المعلومات ما وجودها في غاية القوة مثل الواجب الوجود و يتلوه العقول المفارقة و الجواهر الروحانية و منها ما وجوده في غاية الضعف - شبيه بالعدم لكونه مخالطا للعدم مثل الهولى و الزمان و الحركة و منها ما يكون متوسطا بين الأمرين و ذلك مثل الأجسام المادية عند القوم و مثل الأجسام التي في خيالنا عندنا إذ الجسم ما لم ينتزع صورته عن المادة نزعا ما لا يمكن العلم به كما سنحققه في مباحث الحواس و المحسوسات و العقول البشرية ما دامت مدبرة لهذه الأبدان العنصرية تعجز عن إدراك القسم الأول كما يعجز أبصار الخفافيش عن إدراك نور الشمس لأنه يبهز أبصارها و يعجز أيضا عن إدراك القسم الثاني لضعف وجود تلك الأمور و نقصاناتها كما يعجز البصر عن إدراك المدركات البعيدة و الصغيرة في الغاية فأما القسم الثالث فهو الذي يقوى القوة البشرية على إدراكه و الإحاطة به كمعرفة الأبعاد و الأشكال و الطعوم و الألوان و سبب ذلك أن أكثر النفوس البشرية في هذا العالم مقامها مقام الخيال و الحس و المدرك لا بد أن يكون من جنس المدرك - كما أن الغذاء لا بد و أن يكون من جنس المغتذي فلذلك سهل عليها معرفة هذه الأمور

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فصل (١٣) في أن حقائق الأشياء أي الأمور الغير الممتنعة بالذات يمكن أن تكون معلومة للبشر

ربما يوجد في بعض الكتب أن الحقائق المركبة يمكن معرفتها و ذلك لأجل إمكان تعريفها بأجزائها المقومة لها و أما البسائط فكلا لأنها لا يعقل حقائقها بل الغاية القصوى منها تعريفها بلوازمها و آثارها مثل أن يقال إن النفس شيء محرك للبدن فالمعلوم منه كونه محركا للبدن فأما حقيقة النفس و ماهيتها فهي غير معلومة و يحتاجون على ذلك بأن الاختلاف في ماهيات الأشياء إنما وقع لأن كل واحد أدرك لازما غير ما أدركه الآخر فحكم بمقتضى ذلك اللازم بحكم فأما لو عرفنا حقائق الأشياء لعرفنا لوازمها القريبة و البعيدة لما ثبت من أن العلم بالعلة علة العلم بالمعلول و لو كان الأمر كذلك لما كان شيء من صفات الحقائق مطلوبة بالبرهان هذا ما قيل.

و لعل هذا القائل لم يفرق بين العلم بوجه الشيء و بين العلم بالشيء بوجه فإن الأول يصلح موضوعا للقضية الطبيعية و لا يسري الحكم عليه إلى أفرادها فضلا عن لوازمه القريبة و البعيدة و الثاني يصلح موضوعا للقضية المتعارفة و لكن

يسري الحكم عليه بشيء إلى أفراده الحقيقية بالذات دون أفراده العرضية و لوازمه أو ملزوماته إلا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٨٩

بالعرض و سراية الحكم على الشيء بالذات إلى شيء آخر بالعرض لا يوجب أن يتعدى منه إلى ثالث فكيف إلى ما بعده.

ثم يجب لك أن تعلم أن العلاقة اللزومية بين الأشياء إنما يتحقق باعتبار وجوداتها لا باعتبار ماهياتها اللهم إلا في لوازم الماهيات من حيث هي و المتمثل في الذهن من الموجودات الخارجية هي ماهياتها و مفهوماتها لا هوياتها الوجودية و أشخاصها العينية كما سبق فالمعلوم للعقل ماهية الشيء و المستتبع للوازمه العينية هو وجوده العيني فلا يلزم من تعقل شيء من الأشياء الواقعة في العين تعقل لوازمه قريبة كانت أو بعيدة و بهذا تندفع تلك الشبهة.

و قال الإمام الرازي في المباحث المشرقية إن الحقائق البسيطة يمكن أن تكون معقولة و برهانه أن المركبات لا بد و أن يكون تركيبها من البسائط لأن كل كثرة فالواحد فيها موجود و تلك البسائط إن استحال أن تكون معقولة كانت المركبات غير معقولة بالحد و لا يمكن أيضا أن تكون معقولة بالرسم لأن الرسم عبارة عن تعريف الشيء باللوازم و تلك اللوازم إن كانت بسيطة فهي غير معقولة و إن كانت مركبة و بسائطها غير معقولة فهي أيضا غير معقولة و بالجملة فالكلام فيها كالكلام في الملزومات فإذا القول بأن البسائط لا يصح أن يعقل يوجب القول بأن لا يعقل الإنسان شيئا أصلا لا بالحد و لا بالرسم لكن التالي باطل ظاهر البطلان فالمقدم مثله انتهى كلامه.

و فيه بحث إذ لقائل أن يقول من اعترف أن الماهيات المركبة معلومة لا يلزمه تسليم أن يكون معرفتها حاصلة من معرفة بسائطها الحقيقية إذ لا نسلم أن معرفة الشيء المركب بحده عبارة عن معرفة أجزائه و أجزاء أجزائه حتى ينتهي إلى معرفة البسيط بل حد الشيء المركب لعله يكفي فيه معرفة أجزائه القريبة و لو بالرسم.

و أيضا لأحد أن يقول لا نسلم أن معرفة الأشياء المركبة لا بد أن يحصل من معرفة أجزائها سواء كانت قريبة أو بعيدة بل ربما يعرف بوجه آخر لا بكنهها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٠

و لا بالحد بل بالمشاهدة الحضورية أو بالرسم من جهة آثارها و لوازمها فإذا نقل الكلام إلى كيفية معرفة تلك اللوازم و الرسوم يقال تلك اللوازم سواء كانت بسائط أو مركبات إنما يعرف بوجه من الوجوه لا بكنهها و حقائقها و من قال إن البسائط غير معقولة أراد أنها غير معقولة بحقائقها و بحسب كنهها لا أنها لا تعرف بوجه من الوجوه - و لو بمفهوماتها العامة كالشيئية و الممكنية و غيرهما.

بل الحق في هذا المقام أن يستفسر من القائل بكون البسائط غير معلومة - أ كان المراد من البسيط مفهوما بسيطا أو موجودا بسيطا فإن أراد بها أن العقل لا يعرف الوجود الخارجي بهويته الشخصية بصورة عقلية مطابقة له فذلك مما له وجه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩١

كما مر سابقا من تحقيق مباحث الوجود وإن أراد أن العقل لا يعرف مفهوما من المفهومات البسيطة فهو ظاهر البطلان فإن العقل يدرك مفهوم الكون المصدري - و الشيئية و مفهوم الذي و ما و غير ذلك فإما أن يكون المعقول له من كل شيء مفهوما مركبا أو بسيطا فإن كان مفهوما بسيطا فهو إما كنه شيء بسيط أو وجهه - فعلى الأول عقل كنه ذلك الشيء البسيط و على الثاني أيضا عقل كنه ذلك الوجه بعينه و إن لم يعقل كنه ذي الوجه إذ لو كان تعقل كل وجه بوجه آخر و هكذا فيتسلسل الوجوه و تعقلاتها إلى غير النهاية أو يدور فيلزم أن لا يعقل شيئا أصلا و اللازم باطل فكذا الملزوم و إن كان مفهوما مركبا كان المفهوم البسيط جزءه لا محالة لاستحالة تركيب المفهوم من مفهومات غير متناهية متداخلة و على تقدير عدم التناهي في المفهومات - يكون المفهوم الواحد البسيط متحققا لأن الكثرة و إن كانت غير متناهية لا بد فيها من وجود الواحد لأنه مبدؤها و اعلم أن الشيخ الرئيس ذكر في التعليقات بهذه العبارة أن الوقوف على حقائق الأشياء ليس في قدرة البشر و نحن لا نعرف من الأشياء إلا الخواص و اللوازم و الأعراض و لا نعرف الفصول المقومة لكل واحد منها الدالة على حقيقته بل نعرف أنها أشياء لها خواص و أعراض فإننا لا نعرف حقيقة الأول و لا العقل و لا النفس و لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٢

الفلك و لا النار و الهواء و الماء و الأرض و لا نعرف أيضا حقائق الأعراض و مثال ذلك أنا لا نعرف حقيقة الجوهر بل إنما عرفنا شيئا له هذه الخاصة و هو أنه الموجود لا في موضوع و هذا ليس حقيقته و لا نعرف حقيقة الجسم بل نعرف شيئا له هذه الخواص و هي الطول و العرض و العمق و لا نعرف حقيقة الحيوان بل إنما نعرف شيئا له خاصية الإدراك و الفعل فإن المدرك الفعال ليس هو حقيقة الحيوان بل خاصيته و لازم له و الفصل الحقيقي لا ندركه و لذلك يقع الخلاف في ماهيات الأشياء لأن كل واحد يدرك غير ما يدركه الآخر فحكم بمقتضى ذلك اللازم و نحن إنما نثبت شيئا مخصوصا عرفنا أنه مخصوص من خاصة له أو خواص ثم عرفنا لذلك الشيء خواص أخرى بواسطة ما عرفناه أولا ثم توصلنا إلى معرفة إنيته كالأمر في النفس و المكان و غيرهما مما أثبتنا إنياتها لا من ذواتها بل من نسب لها إلى أشياء عرفناها - أو من عارض لها أو لازم و مثاله في النفس أنا رأينا جسما يتحرك فأثبتنا لتلك الحركة محركا و رأينا حركة مخالفة لحركات سائر الأجسام فعرفنا أن له محركا خاصا - أو له صفة خاصة ليست لسائر المحركات ثم تتبعنا خاصة خاصة و لازما لازما - فتوصلنا بها إلى إنيتها إلى آخر كلامه.

أقول تأويل كلامه ما أومأنا إليه و أقمنا البرهان عليه في مباحث الوجود من أن أفراد الوجود لا برهان عليها إلا على ضرب من الحيلة برهاننا شبيها باللم - حيث ذكرنا أن حقيقة كل موجود لا تعرف بخصوصها إلا بالمشاهدة الحضورية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٣

و فصول الأشياء عندنا عين صورها الخارجية فحق أنها لا تعرف إلا بمفهومات و عنوانات صادقة عليها و تلك المفهومات و إن كانت داخلية في المفهوم المركب المسمى بالحد - المشتمل على ما يسمى جنسا و ما يسمى فصلا إلا أنها خارجة من نحو الوجود الصوري الذي به يكون الشيء حقيقة أو ذا حقيقة و الشيخ ذكر في بعض مواضع الشفاء ما معناه أن فصل الحيوان ليس مفهوم الحساس بل جوهر نفسه التي بها تمام ذاته و هويته و حقيقته و كذا فصول سائر

الأنواع والأجناس والأول يسمى فصلا منطقيا- والثاني فصلا اشتقاقيا لأنه غير محمول على النوع المركب والمحمول عليه هو المفهوم المأخوذ منه وذلك بالحقيقة لازم من لوازمه ومن هذا الموضع يعلم أن للوجود أعيانا خارجية وليس عبارة عن مفهوم عقلي انتزاعي إضافي يتكرر بتكرر ما أضيف إليه كما زعمه المتأخرون وهذا الكلام من الشيخ كالنص على ما ادعيناه

فصل (١٤) في أقسام الممكن

الممكن ينقسم إلى ما يكون ممكن الوجود في ذاته وإلى ما يكون ممكن الوجود لشيء وكل ما هو ممكن الوجود لشيء فهو ممكن الوجود في ذاته ولا ينعكس - فإن من الممكنات ما هو ممكن في نفسه ولا يكون ممكن الوجود لشيء آخر بل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٤

إما واجب الوجود لشيء آخر كالصور للمواد والموضوعات للأعراض أو ممتنع الوجود لشيء كالجواهر القائمة بأنفسها. ثم ما يكون ممكن الوجود في ذاته فإما أن يكون إمكان وجوده كافيا في فيضانه من علته وإما أن لا يكون. وتحقيق هذا الكلام يحتاج إلى مقدمة وهي أن جميع الممكنات مستندة إلى سبب واجب الوجود لذاته وأنه واجب من جميع الوجوه والحيثيات وقد فرغنا من بيانه فكل ما كان كذلك استحالة أن يختص صدور بعض الأشياء منه دون بعض وأن يختص بعض المستعدات بالفيضان منه دون بعض بل يجب أن يتساوى نسبته إلى الكل ويكون عام الفيض بلا خلل لكن البرهان قائم بأن بعض الممكنات وجد قبل بعض في سلسلة العلية قبلية بالذات ونشاهد أيضا تقدم بعض الحوادث على بعض في سلسلة المتعاقبات تقدما زمانيا فنقول هذا الاختلاف في الإضافة والصدور ليس من قبل الواجب الوجود بالذات بل لأجل اختلاف الإمكانيات الذاتية في الماهيات والاستعدادية في القوابل فجميع الممكنات مشتركة في أن لها إمكانا في أنفسها وماهياتها فإن كان ذلك الإمكان كافيا في فيضان الوجود عليها من واجب الوجود فوجب أن تكون موجودة على سبيل الإبداع من غير تخصيص بزمان دون زمان ومع ذلك يجوز أن يكون إمكاناتها متفاوتة بالأولوية والأقدمية والأشدية فإن إمكان العقل الثاني ليس كإمكان العقل الأول إذ وجوده يمتنع على العقل الثاني فبالحقيقة إمكانه للوجود مطلقا يتحصل في إمكانه للوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٥

الذي بعد العقل الأول كما أن إمكان العقل الأول إنما يكون بالقياس إلى الوجود الذي بعد الوجود الواجب وهكذا القياس في سائر المبدعات وسيأتي لك ما في هذا المقام من الكلام وإن لم يكن مثل هذه الإمكانيات كافيا في الفيضان بل لا بد مع ذلك من شروط أخرى زائدة على أصل الماهية حتى تصير مستعدة لقبول الوجود فلمثل هذا الممكن قسمان من الإمكان أحدهما ذاتي للماهية وهو كونه بحسب الماهية - بحال لا يلزم من فرض وجوده ولا من فرض عدمه محال والآخر استعدادي وهو أيضا هذا المعنى بالقياس إلى نحو خاص من وجوده وذلك لا يحصل إلا عند اجتماع الشرائط وارتفاع الموانع فما قيل إن هذا معنى آخر من الإمكان ليس بصحيح - نعم هما مختلفان بالموضع كما ستعلم في مباحث القوة والفعل.

ثم اعلم أن تلك الشرائط لا بد أن تكون سابقة على وجود هذا الممكن سبقاً زمانياً وإلا فلا يكون الحادث حادثاً هذا خلف ولا بد أن يكون لحصول هذا الاستعداد من حوادث سابقة لا تنتهي إلى حد ولا بد أيضاً من أمر متجدد الذات والهوية يكون حدوثه وانقضاؤه من الصفات الذاتية له ثم إنه لا بد من محل لتلك الحوادث ليصير بسببها تام القبول لما يحدث بعده وذلك هو المادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٦

المرحلة الثالثة في تحقيق الجعل وما يتصل بذلك

فصل (١) في تحرير محل النزاع وتحديد حريم الخلاف في الجعل وحكاية القول في ذلك

الجعل إما بسيط وهو إفاضة نفس الشيء متعلق بذاته مقدس عن شوب تركيب وإما مؤلف وهو جعل الشيء شيئاً وتصويره إياه والأثر المترتب عليه هو مفاد الهلية التركيبية الحملية فيستدعي طرفين مجعولاً ومجعولاً إليه ومن ظن أن ذلك أيضاً يرجع بالآخرة إلى جعل بسيط يتعلق بشيء واحد - كنفس التلبس أو الصيرورة أو الاتصاف أو اتصاف الاتصاف أو شبه ذلك في بعض المراتب فقط خطأ فإن النسبة كالصيرورة أو الاتصاف أو غيرهما في النحو الأخير من الجعل إنما يتصور بين طرفيها على أنها مرآت لملحوظيتهما وآلة لملحوظية أحدهما بالآخر لا على وجه يصير ملتفتاً إليها بالذات فدخولها على الوجه المذكور في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٧

متعلق الجعل يكون على التبعية لا على الاستقلال فإذا لوحظت على الاستقلال بالالتفات إليها من حيث إنها في حد ذاتها ماهية من الماهيات ذهنية أو خارجية - استونف القول فيها هل هي في حد نفسها مفتقرة إلى جاعل أم تستغني عنه من تلك الحيثية ويفتقر إليه في اتصافها بما لا يدخل في قوامها والحاكم في ذلك هو البرهان النير. نظير ذلك بحسب الكون الذهني التصور والتصديق فإن التصور نوع من الإدراك لا يتعلق إلا بماهية الشيء أي شيء كان والتصديق نوع آخر منه يستدعي دائماً طرفين وهما موضوع ومحمول بأن يدخل النسبة بينهما في متعلقه على التبعية الصرفة فأثر التصور حصول نفس الشيء في الذهن وأثر التصديق صيرورة الشيء شيئاً - ثم إن الجعل المؤلف يختص بمتعلقه بالعرضيات اللاحقة لخلو الذات عنها بحسب الواقع ولا يتصور تخلله بين الشيء ونفسه أو بين الشيء وذاتياته كقولنا الإنسان إنسان والإنسان حيوان لأن كون الشيء إياه أو بعض ذاتياته ضروري والضروري مستغن عن الجاعل. لست أقول حصول نفس الشيء أو نفس مقوماته مستغن عن العلة بالضرورة إذ هو حريم التنازع بين أصحاب المعلم الأول وأتباع الرواقيين مع اتفاقهم على عدم انفكاك تقوم عن الوجود المطلق لصحة سلب المعدوم عن نفسه خلافاً لطائفة من المتكلمين وقد سبقت حكاية بعض من هوساتهم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٨

فجمهور المشاءين ذهبوا كما هو المشهور إلى أن الأثر الأول للجاعل هو الوجود المعلول وفسره المتأخرون بالموجودية أي اتصاف ماهية المعلول بالوجود - بالمعنى الذي ذكرناه لا أن الأثر الأول هو ماهية الاتصاف أو ذات

المعلول أو نفس الوجود لاستغناء الماهيات بحقائقها التصورية عندهم من الجاعل. و ذهب طائفة أخرى من الحكماء المعروفين بالإشراقيين إلى أن أثر الجاعل و ما يبدعه أولا و بالذات هو نفس الماهية ثم تستلزم ذلك الجعل موجودية الماهية - بلا إفاضة من الجاعل لا للوجود و لا للاتصاف لأنهما عقليان مصداقهما نفس الماهية الصادرة عنه كما أن مصداق كون الذات ذاتا نفس الذات بدون الاحتياج إلى أمر آخر فإنه إذا صدرت ذات المعلول كماهية الإنسان مثلا عن العلة لا يحتاج بعد صدوره إلى جاعل يجعل تلك الذات نفسها فهي مستغنية بعد صدورها عن جاعلها - عن جاعل يجعلها إياها. و لا يتوهم أن كون الذات ذاتا لما كان متفرعا على نفس الذات و الذات مجعولة محتاجة إلى الجاعل فيكون هذه النسبة أيضا محتاجة إلى الجاعل و مجعولة له و كذا كونها موجودة على هذه الطريقة يحتاج إلى الجعل السابق المتعلق بنفس الماهية.

لأننا نقول فرق بين الاحتياج الناشي من الشيء بالذات و بين الاحتياج الناشي منه بالعرض و على سبيل الاتفاق فإن صدق الذاتيات و لوازم الماهيات لا يحتاج إلى جعل جاعل و تأثير مؤثر بل جعلها تابع لجعل الذات وجودا و عدما فإن كانت الذات مجعولة كانت ذاتياتها و لوازمها مجعولة بنفس ذلك الجعل و إن كانت الذات غير مجعولة كانت الذاتيات و اللوازم لها غير مجعولة باللاجعل الثابت للذات و كما أن الضرورة الأزلية تدفع الحاجة إلى العلة كذلك الضرورة الذاتية و الفرق بينهما بعدم الاحتياج التبعي في الأول و ثبوته في الثاني فالجاعل يفعل ماهية الإنسان مثلا ثم هو بنفسه إنسان و حيوان و قابل للتعلم لا بجعل مؤلف أصلا و لا بنفس ذلك الجعل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٣٩٩

البسيط كما ظنه المحقق الدواني و تلاميذه زاعمين أن ذلك مذهب الإشراقيين و قولهم ذاتيات الماهيات مجعولة بعين جعلها ليس معناه أن كون الإنسان إنسانا أو حيوانا - أي مصداق حملهما عليه يتعلق بجعل الجاعل إياه بل إنما راموا به إن جعل الماهية - هو بعينه جعلها جعلًا بسيطًا بل الجعل البسيط يتعلق أولا بالذاتيات و المقومات ثم بالماهية و اللوازم مترتبة عليها من دون تعلق الجعل بها بالذات و كذا الحال على قاعدة مجعولية الوجود عند المشاءين في صيرورة نفس الماهية و صيرورة نفسها إياها أو ذاتياتها و صحة سلب المعدوم عن نفسه إنما يستدعي استلزام حمل الشيء على نفسه تعلق الجعل به ذاتا أو وجودا على اختلاف القولين لا الاحتياج إليه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٠

فصل (٢) في الإشارة إلى مناقضة أدلة الزاعمين أن الوجود لا يصلح للمعلولية

إن قدماء الفلاسفة لم يورثوا أخلاقهم حجة على صحة شيء من المذهبيين - بل الظاهر أن كلا من الفريقين ادعوا بداهة دعواهم إذ لم نجد في كلام الأوائل برهانا على شيء منهما بل اقتصروا على مجرد إشارات و تنبيهات. و ربما احتج بعض الناس على كون الوجود غير صالح للمعلولية بوجوه من الدلائل - يبتني على كون الوجود أمرا اعتباريا و عارضا ذهنيا فلا يوصف بالذات بالحدوث و الزوال و الطريان بل الماهية هي الموصوفة بهذه الصفات مثلا يقال الإنسان موجود و حادث أو معدوم و زائل لا الوجود إذ لا يرد عليه القمسة فكيف يمكن أن يجعل الوجود وحده

هو المعلول و نحن بفضل الله و تأييده فككنا هذه العقد و حللنا هذه الإشكالات في مباحث الوجود.
و من المتأخرين من أبطل كون الوجود معلولا بأنه لو كان تأثير العلة في الوجود وحده لكان كل معلول لشيء معلولا
لغيره من العلل و كل علة لشيء علة لجميع الأشياء و اللازم ظاهر البطلان فكذا الملزوم بيان الملازمة أن الوجود حقيقة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠١

واحدة فكانت علته صالحة لعلية كل وجود فإن الماء مثلا إذا سخن بعد أن لم يكن متسخنا فتلك السخونة ماهية من
الماهيات فصدورها عن المبادي المفارقة الفياضة - إما أن يتوقف على شرط حادث أو لا يتوقف فإن لم يتوقف لزم دوام
وجودها - لأن الماهية إذا كانت قابلة و الفاعل فياضا أبدا و جب دوام الفيض و إما أن يتوقف على شرط من الشرائط
فالمتوقف على تلك الشرائط وجود السخونة أو ماهيتها - فإن كان المتوقف هو وجود السخونة فهو باطل لأن ملاقة
الماء إذا كانت شرطا لوجود البرودة و وجود البرودة مساو لوجود السخونة فما هو شرط لوجود أحدهما - يجب أن
يكون شرطا لوجود الآخر لأن حكم الأمثال واحد و لو كان كذلك لوجب حصول السخونة في الجسم عند ملاقة الماء
له لأن الماهية قابلة و الفاعل فياض و الشرط حاصل عند هذه الملاقة فيجب حصول المعلول و يلزم من هذا حصول
كل شيء عند حصول كل شيء حتى لا يختص شيء من الحوادث بشرط و لا بعلة و كل ذلك باطل يدفعه الضرورة و
العيان فظهر أن المتوقف على ذلك الشرط هو ماهية السخونة فإذا كان المتوقف على الغير هو الماهية و كل ما يتوقف
على الغير يستدعي سببا - فالسبب سبب للماهية لا للوجود فعلة الممكنات ليست علة وجودها فقط بل علة لماهياتها أو
لهما معا انتهى كلام هذا القائل.

و هو مختل البيان متزلزل البنيان من وجوه - الأول أن الوجود و إن كان حقيقة واحدة إلا أن حصصها و مراتبها متخالفة -
بالتقدم و التأخر و الحاجة و الغنى و قد مر بيان هذا في أوائل هذا الكتاب و لو كان الوجود ماهية كلية نوعية يكون لها
أفراد متماثلة لكان لهذا الاحتجاج وجه و قد علمت أن الوجود ليس له ماهية كلية فضلا عن أن يكون نوعا أو جنسا أو
عرضا - نعم ينتزع منه أمر مصدري يعرض للماهيات عند اعتبار العقل إياها و هو ليس من حقيقة الوجود في شيء كما
مر مرارا فوجود كل ماهية بنفس ذاته يقتضي التعيين بتلك الماهية لا بسبب زائد و مع ذلك معنى الوجود غير معنى
الماهية و إدراكه يحتاج إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٢

تلطف في السر فالوجود بما هو وجود و إن لم يضاف إليه شيء غيره يكون علة و يكون معلولا و يكون شرطا و يكون
مشروطا و الوجود العلي غير الوجود المعلولي و الوجود الشرطي غير الوجود المشروطي كل ذلك بنفس كونه وجودا
بلا انضمام ضمائم.

و أما ثانيا فلا تنتقاض ما ذكره بكون الوجود الواجبي علة للمعلول الأول - لجريان خلاصة الدليل فيه فإننا نقول على قياس
ما ذكره إن وجود الواجب إذا كان علة للمعلول الأول فهو إما أن يكون علة لأجل وجوده أو لأجل ماهيته و الأول غير
جائز لأن الوجود حقيقة واحدة في الواجب و غيره من الممكنات فإذا جاز صدور المعلول الأول من وجود الواجب
لجاز صدوره من وجود كل من الممكنات كالأعراض و الحركات و غيرها و التالي ظاهر البطلان فالمقدم مثله و الثاني

أيضا باطل لأن الواجب لا ماهية له غير الوجود التام الذي لا أشد منه ولا ينفعه القول بأن الوجود في الواجب من لوازم ذاته و ليس عينه لنهوض البراهين القاطعة على أن الوجود يستحيل أن يكون من لوازم الشيئية بالمعنى الاصطلاحي فقد علم أن حقيقة الوجود بنفسه واجب في الواجب ممكن في الممكنات أي غني و مفتقر و متقدم و متأخر و الغنى و الفقر و التقدم و التأخر كالمعاني المقومة له لا كاللواحق العرضية.

و أما ثالثا فلأن قوله ماهية السخونة إذا لم يتوقف على شرط و علة يجب دوام وجودها لأن الفاعل فياض أبدا و الماهية قابلة دائما فيجب دوام الفيض غير موجه و لا صحيح فإن القائل بأن أثر الجاعل هو وجود الماهية لا نفسها لم يذهب إلى أن المعلول إذا كان نفس الوجود يلزم ذلك أن يكون للماهية قوام و تحصل دون الوجود حتى يتفرع عليه كون الماهية علة قابلية للوجود بل الموجود في الخارج على مذهبه ليس إلا الوجود بالذات و أما المسمى بالماهية فإنما هي متحدة معه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٣

ضربا من الاتحاد بمعنى أن للعقل أن يلاحظ لكل وجود من الوجودات معنى منتزعا من الوجود و يصفه بذلك المعنى بحسب الواقع فالمحكي هو الوجود و الحكاية هي الماهية و حصولها من الوجود كحصول الظل من الشخص و ليس للظل وجود آخر كما فهمناك مرارا

فصل (٣) في مناقضة أدلة الزاعمين أن أثر العلة هي صيرورة الماهية موجودة

استدل بعض المتأخرين على إثبات مذهب المشاءين بأن مناط الاحتياج إلى الفاعل هو الإمكان و الإمكان ليس إلا كيفية نسبة الوجود و نحوه إلى الماهية - فالمحتاج إلى الجاعل و أثره التابع له أولا ليس إلا النسبة. و بأن الوجود لما ثبت كونه زائدا على الماهيات الممكنة فنفس تلك الماهيات لا يمكن أن يصير مصداق حمل الموجود و هل هذا إلا شاكلة الماهية بالقياس إلى الذاتيات. و بأن سبق الماهية ليس من الأقسام الخمسة المشهورة للسبق و قد لزم من مجعولية الماهية في نفسها.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٤

و بأن سلب الشيء عن نفسه إذا كان وجوده عين نفسه و إن كان محالا مطلقا - لكن في الماهيات الممكنة إنما يستحيل مع اعتبار وجودها فقط إذ يصح سلب المعدوم عن نفسه و ربما يصدق السالبة بانتفاء موضوعها و ذات الممكن لا تأتي عن العدم فهو في حد ذاته ليس هو

و في الأسماء الإلهية يا هو يا من هو يا من لا هو إلا هو

فما لم يصير موجودا لا يصدق على نفسه فالمحوج إلى الجاعل أولا و بالذات هو كونه موجودا لا نفس ماهيته. و أجيب عن الأول بأن القول في الإمكان ليس كما يصفه الجمهور بحسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٥

ما هو المشهور بل الأرفع من ذلك و قد مر تحقيقه.

و عن الثاني بأن مصداق الحمل في الوجود نفس الماهية لكن لا مع عزل النظر عن غيرها كما في الذاتيات و لا مع انضمام حيثة أخرى كما في العوارض غير الوجود- بل من حيث إنها صادرة بنفس تقرررها عن الجاعل و هذه الحيثة خارجة عن المحكوم عليه معتبرة على نهج التوقيف لا التقييد و الحاصل أن الماهية ما لم تصدر عن جاعلها لم يحمل عليها شيء من الذاتيات و العرضيات أصلاً فإذا صدرت صدقت عليها الذاتيات لكن لا من حيث هي صدرت بل على مجرد التوقيت لا التوقيف و صدق عليها الوجود بملاحظة كونها صادرة أي بسببه و حينه.

و عن الثالث بأن سبق الماهية على الوجود نوع آخر من أقسام السبق ساق إليه البرهان و يسمى السبق بالماهية و ذاتيات الماهيات أيضاً لها تقدم بالماهية عليها- و تقدم بالطبع أيضاً باعتبارين.

و عن الرابع بأن جواز سلب المعدوم عن نفسه لا يستلزم جواز سلب الممكن مطلقاً عن نفسه و عدم اعتبار الوجود لا يوجب اعتبار العدم و صدق الشيء على نفسه حين الوجود لا يوجب صدقه عليها بشرط الوجود فحمل الذاتيات على الموضوع- ما دامت المجعولية و الموجودية و حمل الوجود و الذات في الحقيقة الواجبية بنفس ذاته الأزلية السرمدية من دون توقيت و توقيف و تقييد و بهذا الاعتبار ينحصر الهو المطلق فيه تعالى و لم يكن هو إلا هو فحمل الوجود يشابه حمل الذاتيات من وجه و يباينه من وجه.

و احتج صاحب الإشراف في المطارحات على مجعولية الماهيات بالجعل البسيط- بأن الوجود لما كان من الأمور الاعتبارية فلا يتقدم العلة على معلولها إلا بالماهية- فجوهر المعلول ظل لجوهر العلة و العلة جوهريتها أقدم من جوهرية المعلول.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٦

و يقرب من ذلك ما ذكره بعض الفضلاء بأننا نعلم بالضرورة أن الأثر الأول للجاعل ليس إلا الموجود المعلول و لا شك أن الموجود المعلول ليس إلا الماهية- لأن الاتصاف بالوجود و نحوه من الأمور الاعتبارية. و أجود منه ما قال سيدنا الأستاذ أدام الله تعالى علوه و مجده من أنه لما كان نفس قوام الماهية مصحح حمل الوجود و مصداقه فاحدس أنها إذا استغنت بحسب نفسها و من حيث أصل قوامها عن الفاعل صدق حمل الوجود عليها من جهة ذاتها و خرجت عن حدود بقعة الإمكان و هو باطل فإذا هي فاقرة إلى فاعلها من حيث قوامها و تقرررها و من حيث حمل الموجودية عليها و هي في ذاتها بكلا الاعتبارين في الليس البسيط و السلب الصرف و القوة المحضة و يخرجها مبدعها إلى التقرر و الأيس بالجعل البسيط و يتبعه الوجود على اللزوم بلا وسط جعل مؤلف هذه عبارته الشريفة نقلناها تبركا بها في هذا الكتاب

بحث و مقاومة مع هؤلاء القوم:

اعلم أن مدار احتجاجاتهم و مبناها على أن الوجود أمر عقلي اعتباري معناه الموجودية المصدرية الانتزاعية كالشيئية و الممكنية و نظائرها و نحن قد بينا لك أن الوجودات الخاصة أمور حقيقية بل هي أحق الأشياء بكونها حقائق و الوجود العام أمر عقلي مصدري- كالحيوانية المصدرية و الفرق بين القبيلين مما لوحنا إليه آنفاً و سيتضح ذلك و إذا انهدم المبنى انهدم البنيان.

ثم بعد تسليم أن الوجود أمر اعتباري لا غير لا نسلم أن مصداق حمل الوجود على الماهيات إنما هو نفس تلك

الماهيات كما قالوا وإن كان بعد صدورها عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٧

الجاعل حتى تكون في موجوديتها مستغنية عن الجاعل كيف و لو كان كذلك يلزم الانقلاب عن الإمكان الذاتي إلى الوجوب الذاتي فإن مناط الوجوب بالذات عندهم هو كون نفس حقيقة الواجب من حيث هي منشأ لانتزاع الموجودية و مصداقا لحملها عليه و مناط الإمكان الذاتي هو أن لا يكون نفس ذات الممكن من حيث هي كذلك فالممكن بعد صدور ماهيته عن الجاعل إذا كان بحيث يكون مصداقا لحمل الموجودية بلا ملاحظة شيء آخر معه بل مع قطع النظر عن أي اعتبار كان سوى نفس ذاته لكان الوجود ذاتيا له.

و لا يجدي الفرق بين حمل الذاتي و حمل الموجود بأن الذاتي للشيء ما يصدق عليه بلا ملاحظة حيثية تعليلية أو تقييدية و حمل الموجود يحتاج إلى ملاحظة صدور الماهية عن الجاعل.

لأننا نقول كون الماهية صادرة أو مرتبطة بالعلة أو غير ذلك إما أن يكون مأخوذاً مع الماهية في كونها محكياً عنها بالوجود أو لا فإن لم يكن عاد المحذور و هو الانقلاب عن الإمكان الذاتي إلى الوجوب الذاتي و إن كان مأخوذاً فيكون داخلاً في المحكي عنه بالوجود و مصداق حمل الموجود فيكون الصادر عن الجاعل و أثره المترتب عليه المجموع المسمى بالماهية و تلك الحيثية فليكن وجود الماهية تلك الحيثية فآثر الفاعل إذن هو اتصاف الماهية بالوجود كما هو رأي المشاءين على المعنى المسلف ذكره.

و العجب من المحقق الدواني مع شدة تورطه في كون الماهية من حيث هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٨

أثر الجاعل دون الوجود قال في بعض تعاليقه إن حقيقة الواجب عندهم هو الوجود البحت القائم بذاته المعرى في ذاته عن جميع القيود و الاعتبارات فهو إذن موجود بذاته متشخص بذاته عالم بذاته قادر بذاته أعني بذلك أن مصداق الحمل في جميع صفاته هويته البسيطة التي لا تكثر فيها بوجه من الوجوه و معنى كون غيره موجوداً أنه معروض لصحة من الوجود المطلق بسبب غيره بمعنى أن الفاعل يجعله - بحيث لو لاحظته العقل انتزع منه الوجود فهو بسبب الفاعل بهذه الحيثية لا بذاته بخلاف الأول.

ثم قال بعد كلام تركناه هذا المعنى العام المشترك فيه من المعقولات الثانية - و هو ليس عينا لشيء منهما حقيقة نعم مصداق حمله على الواجب ذاته بذاته كما مر - و مصداق حمله على غيره ذاته من حيث هو مجعول الغير فالمحمول في الجميع زائد بحسب الذهن إلا أن الأمر الذي هو مبدأ انتزاع المحمول في الممكن ذاته من حيثية مكتسبة من الفاعل و في الواجب ذاته بذاته فإنه كما سبق عندهم وجود قائم بذاته فهو في ذاته بحيث إذا لاحظته العقل انتزع منه الوجود بخلاف غيره انتهى.

و الحاصل أن موجودية الماهيات الإمكانية عندهم إما بانضمام شيء إليه و هو الوجود كما هو المنقول عن المشاءين و إما بإفادة الفاعل نفس الماهية كما هو المشهور عن الإشراقيين و إما بجعلها مرتبطة و منتسبة إلى نفسه كما هو مذهب طائفة من المتألهين و الأول باطل عند هؤلاء و الثاني بما ذكرناه فبقي و تعين لهم الثالث - فيكون المجعول كون الماهية

مرتبطة يعني الهيئة التركيبية فيثبت عليهم تعلق الجعل المؤلف و تخلله بين الماهية و الوجود. طريق آخر في فسخ هذا الرأي لو كانت الماهية بحسب قوام ذاتها مفتقرة إلى الجاعل لزم كون الجاعل مقوما لها في حد نفسها فيتقدم عليها تقدم الذاتي على ذي الذاتي أي التقدم بالماهية كما هم معترفون به فيلزم أن لا يمكن تصور الماهية مع قطع النظر عن الفاعل و ارتباطها به و ليس كذلك فإننا قد نتصور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٠٩

بعض الماهيات بكنهها مع قطع النظر عن غيرها فضلا عن الفاعل و نحكم على الماهية المأخوذة من حيث هي بأنها ليست إلا هي فعلم من ذلك أن نفس الماهيات و الطبائع الكلية في ذاتها غير متعلقة بغيرها بل التعلق مما يعرض لها بحسب حيثية أخرى سواء كانت انتزاعية عقلية أو انضمامية عينية و لا يلزم مما ذكرنا جواز انفكاك الماهية عن الوجود بحسب الخارج كما زعمته المعتزلة أو بحسب الذهن كما هو منقول عن الصوفية في الأعيان الثابتة على اصطلاحهم كيف و الممكن ما لم يوجد أصلا لم يكن شيئا من الأشياء و الشيئية غير منفكة عن الوجود بالبراهين القطعية - بل كما أن في طريقة هؤلاء القوم الماهية مفتقرة إلى الجاعل في نفس ذاتها لا في وجودها إلا بالعرض و لا يلزم منه الانفكاك بين الوجود و الماهية كذلك نقول في هذه الطريقة المحوج إلى السبب موجودية الماهية أي صيرورتها بحيث يصير منشأ للحكم عليها بالوجود لا نفس ذاتها من حيث هي و لا يلزم الانفكاك المذكور

طريق آخر

الماهيات الممكنة و الطبائع الكلية تشخصها ليس بحسب ذاتها - و إلا لم تكن كلية أي معروضا لمفهوم الكلي في العقل فتشخصها إنما يكون بأمر زائد عليها عارض لها و عند القوم إن الشيء ما لم يتشخص لم يوجد و المحققون على أن التشخص بنفس الوجود الخاص سواء كان أمرا حقيقيا خارجيا أو انتزاعيا عقليا لأن تلك الطبيعة الكلية نسبة جميع أشخاصها المفروضة إلى الجاعل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٠

نسبة واحدة فما لم يتخصص بواحد منها لم يصدر من الجاعل فالمجوعول إذن أولا و بالذات ليس نفس الماهية الكلية بل هي مع حيثية التعيين أو الوجود أو ما شئت فسمه - لا يقال تشخصها كوجودها بنفس الفاعل لا بأمر مأخوذ معها على وجه من الوجوه.

لأننا نقول هذا إنما يتمشى و يصح فيما إذا كان أثر الفاعل نحوا من انحاء حقيقة الوجود لا الماهية فإن الماهية لما كان مفهوما كليا يمكن ملاحظته من حيث ذاته مع قطع النظر عن الفاعل و غيره فهو من حيث ذاته إن كان متعينا موجودا لكان واجبا بالذات لما مر و إذا لم يكن كذلك فمن البين أنه إذا لم يكن بحسب نفسه متعينا موجودا في الواقع لم يصير متعينا موجودا في الواقع إلا بتغيير ما عما كان هو إياه في نفسه ضرورة أنه لو بقي الوجود على ما كان عليه في حد ذاته و لا يتغير عما هو هو في نفسه لم يصير متعينا موجودا و لو بالغير و التغير إما بانضمام ضميمة كالوجود و إما بكونه بحيث يكون مرتبطا بذاته إلى الغير بعد أن لم يكن كذلك بعدية ذاتية و الأول باطل عندهم و الثاني يلزم منه انقلاب الحقيقة و هو ممتنع بالذات.

طريق آخر

القائلون بالجمالية و المجعولية بين الماهيات يلزم عليهم كون الممكنات أمورا اعتبارية لكون الوجود أمرا اعتباريا عندهم فليس المؤثر و المتأثر في سلسلة الممكنات إلا نفس ماهياتها بدون اعتبار الوجود فيلزم كون المجعولات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١١

و خصوصا ما سوى المجعول الأول لوازم الماهيات و لازم الماهية عندهم اعتباري محض ليس له تحقق أصلا تأمل.

تنبيه عرشي:

إن صاحب الإشراق و متابعيه حيث ذهبوا على وفق الأقدمين من الفلاسفة الأساطين كاغاثاذايمون و أنباذقلس و فيثاغورس - و سقراط و أفلاطون إلى أن الواجب تعالى و العقول و النفوس ذوات نورية ليست نوريتها و وجودها زائدة على ذاتها فيمكن حمل ما نقلناه عنه في اعتبارية الوجود و تنزيل ما ذكره في هذا الباب على أن مراده اعتبارية الوجود العام البديهي التصور لا الوجودات الخاصة التي بعينها من مراتب الأنوار و الأضواء و أن يؤول احتجاجاته على عدم اتصاف الماهية بالوجود بامتناع عروض الوجود في الخارج لماهية ما لا على امتناع قيام بعض أفرادها بذاتها. لكن يشكل هذا في باب الأنوار العرضية التي هي وجودات عارضة فإن النور حقيقة واحدة بسيطة عنده و ليس التفاوت بين أفرادها إلا بالشدة و الضعف و غاية كماله النور الغني الواجبي و غاية نقصه كونه عارضا لشيء آخر سواء كان جوهرًا نوريا أو جوهرًا غاسقا.

أو نقول غرضه المباحثة مع المشاءين فإنه كثيرا ما يفعل كذلك ثم يسير إلى ما هو الحق عنده إشارة خفية كما يظهر لمن تتبع كلامه فنقول على التقدير المذكور لا يرد عليه في باب صدور الذوات الشخصية النورية و مجعولية بعضها عن بعض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٢

جعلنا بسيطاً ما يرد على المتأخرين في مجعولية الماهيات و الطبائع الكلية من لزوم كون الممكنات أمورا اعتبارية فإن تلك الذوات عندهم كالوجودات الخاصة عند المشاءين في أن حقائقها شخصية لا يمكن تعقلها إلا بالحضور الوجودي و الشهود الإشراقي و قد أسلفنا لك أن كل مرتبة من مراتب الوجود كونها في تلك المرتبة من مقوماتها فيمتنع تصورها و ملاحظتها إلا بعد ملاحظة ما قبلها فارتباط كل وجود بما قبله هو عين حقيقته لا يمكن تعقله غير مرتبط إلى علته فيجعل ذاته بعينه جعل ارتباطه مع الأول بلا انفكاك بينهما لا في الواقع و لا في التصور و ليست هي كالماهيات التي يمكن تصورهما منفكة عما سواها بناء على أنها تكون تارة في الخارج و تارة في الذهن و معانيها غير معنى شيء من الوجودين و غير ارتباطها مع الحق الأول و لا مع شيء من الأشياء إلا أجزاءها التي هي أيضا أمور كلية و المفهومات الإضافية أيضا و إن كانت مرتبطة بغيرها بحسب ماهياتها لكن المرتبطة و المرتبطة إليها في حكم واحد في عدم كونها مرتبطة بحسب ماهياتها إلى جاعلها و لذلك لا يمكن الحكم على شيء من الماهيات بالوجود إلا بعد ملاحظة حيثية أخرى غير ذاتها و معنى إمكانها تساوي نسبتي الوجود و العدم أو الصدور و اللاصدور إليها أو سلب ضرورتهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٣

إليها و معنى إمكان الذوات الوجودية النورية تعلقها بغيرها بحيث لو قطع النظر عن جاعلها لم يكن شيئاً لا وجوداً ولا ماهية أصلاً فقطع النظر عن جاعلها بمنزلة قطع النظر عن تجوهر ذاتها بخلاف الماهيات الكلية فإن معانيها متصورة مع قطع النظر عن غيرها و مناط العلية عند القائلين بالجعل البسيط من الإشراقين هو كون الشيء وجوداً صرفاً كما في اصطلاح التلويحات و نوراً محضاً على ما هو اصطلاح حكمة الإشراق و إن كان الموجد الحقيقي عندهم هو الوجود الواجب الذي لا أشد منه - أو النور الغني الذي لا فقر له أصلاً و الوجود كما علمت لا يعلم إلا بالعلم الحضورى اليهودي و كذا النور لا يدرك كنهه إلا بالإضافة الإشراقية و الحضور العيني إذ لو علم شيء منه بالعلم الصوري الإدراك الذهني يلزم انقلاب الحقيقة كما أوضحناه في بعض رسائلنا فإذا المعلومات الوجودية النورية عندهم لوازم خارجية لعلها الجاعلة جعلاً بسيطاً لا لوازم ذهنية و لم يلزم من كونها مجعولة لماهيات جاعلها - كونها لوازم في كلا الوجودين حتى يلزم كونها لوازم الماهيات مع قطع النظر عن الوجودين فتكون أموراً اعتبارية و إنما يلزم ذلك لو لم تكن ماهيات عللها إنيات صرفة لا يمكن حصولها في الذهن و قد قلنا إنها كذلك فقد ظهر أن الماهيات و الحقائق على ضربين ماهية هي عين الإنية و هي لا تكون كلية و لا جزئية بمعنى كونها متشخصة بتشخص يزيد على ذاتها بل هي عين التشخص فإن الوجود و التشخص شيء واحد عند المعلم الأول و جماعة من أهل التحقيق و العرفان و ماهية هي غير الإنية فهي مما تقبل الشركة و الكلية - فلوازم الضرب الأول لا تكون إلا لوازم خارجية و ذات شخصية بخلاف لوازم الضرب الثاني فإنها لا تكون إلا أموراً اعتبارية كلية لا وجود لها في الخارج كما أثبت في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٤

مقامه و حقية ما ذكرناه لا يظهر إلا بعد غور تام و تأمل كامل في أقوالهم مع فطرة سليمة عن الآفات غير سقيمة بزمائم الصفات.

و من الغرائب أيضاً أن أكثر القائلين بالجاعلية و المجعولية في الماهيات لم يجوزوا التفاوت في أفراد حقيقة واحدة جنسية أو نوعية بوجه من وجوه التشكيك - و بالغوا في مناقضة هذا الرأي مع حكمهم باعتبارية الوجود و قولهم صريحاً و التزاماً - بتقدم ماهية العلة على ماهية المعلوم و قد غفلوا عن أنه إذا كانت العلة و المعلوم - كلاهما من أنواع الجوهر كالعقل الفعال و الهيولى مثلاً يلزمهم الاعتراف بأن جوهر العلة في باب الجوهرية أقدم من جوهر المعلوم و هم يتحاشون عن ذلك و سيجيء تحقيق التشكيك على وجه يزول عنه و به الشكوك إن شاء الله تعالى.

حكمة عرشية:

فالحق في هذه المسألة على ما يؤدي إليه النظر الصحيح هو مجعولية الوجود بالجعل البسيط لا نفس الماهيات لعدم ارتباطها في حدود أنفسها بالفاعل و قد بينا أن المعلوم من حيث كونه معلولاً مرتبط بالعلة نحوه من الارتباط مجهول لكنه سواء كان الوجود ذا ماهية تقتضي لذاتها تعلقاً بماهية من الماهيات من دون الافتقار إلى تخلل بين الماهية و بينه أو لم يكن كذلك.

فإن قلت لم لا يكون الأثر الأول للجاعل اتصاف الماهية بالوجود كما هو المشهور عن المشاءين بالمعنى الذي حقق أعني متعلق الهيئة التركيبية.

قلت هذا فاسد من وجهين - الأول أن أثر الفاعل الموجود يجب أن يكون أمراً موجوداً والاتصاف بأي معنى أخذ فهو أمر اعتباري لا يصلح كونه أثراً للفاعل.

و الثاني أن اتصاف شيء بصفة وإن لم يتفرع على ثبوت تلك الصفة لكن يتفرع على ثبوت الموصوف فثبوت الماهية قبل اتصافه بالموجود إما بنفس ذلك الوجود فيلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه و تحصيل الحاصل أو بغيره فننقل الكلام إلى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٥

الوجود السابق و الاتصاف به فيتسلسل نعم لو قيل إن الأثر الصادر عن الجاعل أولاً - و بالذات أمر مجمل يحلله العقل إلى ماهية و وجود أعني مفاد الهيئة التركيبية كان له وجه لكن بعد التحليل نحكم بأن الأثر بالذات هو الوجود دون الماهية لعدم تعلقها من حيث هي هي بشيء خارج عنها.

فقد انكشف أن الصوار بالذات هي الوجودات لا غير ثم العقل يجد لكل منها نعوتاً ذاتية كلية مأخوذة عن نفس تلك الوجودات محمولة عليها من دون ملاحظة أشياء خارجة عنها و عن مرتبة قوامها و تلك النعوت هي المسماة بالذاتيات - ثم يضيفها إلى الوجود و يصفها بالموجودية المصدرية.

و هذا معنى ما قاله المحقق الطوسي ره في كتاب مصارع المصارع و هو أن وجود المعلولات في نفس الأمر متقدم على ماهياتها و عند العقل متأخر عنها فلا يرد عليها ما أورده بعضهم من أن تقدم الصفة على الموصوف غير معقول لأنك قد علمت أن المتحقق في نفس الأمر أولاً و بالذات ليس إلا الوجود ثم العقل ينتزع منه الماهية في حد نفسه و يحمل عليها الموجودية المصدرية المأخوذة من نفس الوجود - فما هو صفة الماهية بالحقيقة هي الموجودية المصدرية و ما يتقدم عليها بالذات هو الوجود الحقيقي فحال الوجود و الماهية على قاعدتنا في التأصل و الاعتبارية بعكس حالهما عند الجمهور فهذا مما يقضي منه العجب فأحسن تدبرك.

و يقرب من ذلك ما قاله بعض المدققين من أن تأثير القدرة في الماهية التي بعينها الموجود حتى يكون أثر الفاعل مثلاً هو السواد الذي هو نفس الموجود - لا وجوده و لا اتصافه بالوجود و لا حيثية الاتصاف لكن العقل ينسب السواد إلى الفاعل من حيث إنه موجود لا من حيث إنه سواد مثلاً فنقول هو موجود من الفاعل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٦

و لا نقول هو سواد منه أو عرض انتهى.

و هو كلام حق لو كان المعني بالموجود فيه هو الوجود الحقيقي الموجود بنفسه لا بأمر عارض كإضافة المضاف بنفس ذاتها لا بإضافة أخرى عارضة لها و غيرها من الأشياء و هذا القائل غير قائل به بل الموجود عنده مفهوم بسيط كلي شامل للجميع بديهي التصور و لا شك أن الموجود بهذا المعنى ليس أثراً للفاعل لكونه اعتبارياً محضاً - قال بهمنيار في كتاب التحصيل الفاعل إذا أفاد الوجود فإنه يوجب الوجود - و إفادة الوجود هي إفادة حقيقته لا إفادة وجوده فإن للوجود حقيقة و ماهية و كل ماهية مركبة فلها سبب في أن يتحقق تلك الحقيقة لا في حمل تلك الحقيقة عليها - مثل الإنسان له سبب في تحققه و تقومه إنساناً و أما في حمل الإنسان عليه فلا سبب له و يشبه أن يكون الموجود الذي له علة يجب أن يكون مركباً حتى يصح أن يكون معلولاً و أيضاً لأن الموجود المعلول في ذاته ممكن فيحتاج إلى أن يخرج إلى الفعل و

نعني بالمعلول أن حقيقته بذاته و مع اعتبار ذاته ليس بالفعل فكما أنك إذا تصورت معنى المثلث تصورت معه الخطوط الثلاث لا محالة فكذلك إذا تصورت وجود المعلول تصورت معه العلة انتهى قوله.

و فيه وجوه من التأييد لما نحن بصدده - منها أن أثر الفاعل و ما يترتب عليه هو الوجود بحقيقته البسيطة لا غير و تأثيره في الماهية بإفاضة الوجود عليها.

و منها التنصيص على أن حمل الذات على نفسها ليس بعلة أصلا لا بعلة جديدة و لا بعلة الوجود.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٧

و منها أن وجود المعلول بحسب حقيقته يتقوم بوجود علته بحيث لا يمكن تصور ذلك بدونه.

و اعلم أن مراده من الماهية المركبة الماهية الإمكانية مع اعتبار الوجود لها سواء كانت في حد نفسها بسيطة أو مركبة

شك و دفع:

ربما يتوهم متوهم أن الوجود وحده لا يمكن أن يكون معلولا لأن الوجود طبيعة واحدة فلو كان تأثير العلة فيه وحده لكانت علة صالحة لكل معلول مثلا سخونة الماء يحتاج في فيضانه عن العلة المفارقة إلى شرط و إلا لكانت دائمة بدوام المبدأ المفارق فالتوقف على ذلك الشرط لو كان وجود السخونة دون ماهيتها لزم أن يتحقق وجود السخونة بتحقيق ما هو شرط لوجود البرودة كالماء لأن وجود البرودة مساوق لوجود الحرارة فما هو شرط لذلك يكون شرطا لهذا فيلزم فيضان وجود السخونة عند ملاقة الماء لأن الماهية قابلة و الفاعل فياض و الشرط حاصل فيجب المعلول و من هذا يلزم حصول كل شيء - و هو بديهي البطلان يدفعه الحس و العيان.

و أنت بعد إتقان الأصول التي سبقت منا لا تفتقر إلى زيادة تجشم لإزالة أمثال هذه الشكوك فتذكر.

تنبيه: احذر يا حبيبي من سوء الفهم لدقيق كلام الحكماء -

و لطيف أقاويلهم و إشاراتهم إلى المعاني الدقيقة إذ كثير من الناس لما سمع قولهم إن الجوهر جوهر لنفسه و العرض عرض لنفسه و لم يفهم المراد فظن أنهم يقولون إنها مستغنية عن الجعل و التأثير رأسا و ليس الأمر كما توهموه وإنما قالت الحكماء هذا القول لأنك لما تأملت الوجودات و تصفحت أحوالها و لوازمها وجدت الوجودات موصوفات و ملزومات و المعاني الكلية و المفهومات الذهنية كلها صفات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٨

و لوازم عرفت أن علة اختلاف الموصوفات الوجودية بحسب العقل و المعرفة هي من أجل اختلاف تلك اللوازم و الصفات التي هي ذاتيات أو عرضيات و أما اختلاف تلك الصفات فهي لنفس اختلافها ذواتها و وجوداتها التي هي متخالفة المراتب كمالا و نقصا و شدة و ضعفا و سبقا و لاحوقا لأن الباري تعالى أبدعها مختلفة بأعيانها - لا لعل فيها بل لنفسها.

مثال ذلك أن اختلاف حال الأسود و الأبيض من أجل اختلاف السواد و البياض - و اختلاف السواد و البياض لذاتيهما لا لعل أخرى فمن ظن أن السواد و البياض في كونهما مختلفين لهما علة أخرى تمادى إلى غير النهاية فالسواد و البياض مختلفان بأنفسهما لا بصفة فيهما بل بذاتيهما اللتين هما عينا وجوديهما فهذا معنى كلامهم و لم يريدوا أن السواد مثلا

ليس بجعل جاعل ولا بصنع صانع كما توهم كثير ممن لم يرتاضوا بالعلوم الفلسفية و سياًتيك زيادة بصيرة.

توضيح فيه تلويح:

المعلول يجب أن يكون مناسباً للعلة وقد تحقق كون الواجب - عين الوجود والوجود بنفس ذاته فالفائض عنه يجب أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤١٩

يكون وجود الأشياء لا ماهياتها الكلية لفقد المناسبة بينها وبينه تعالى. قال الشيخ الرئيس في بعض رسائله الخير الأول بذاته ظاهر متجل لجميع الموجودات ولو كان ذلك في ذاته تأثيراً لغيره لوجب أن يكون في ذاته المتعالية قبول تأثير الغير وذلك خلف بل ذاته بذاته متجل ولأجل قصور بعض الذوات عن قبول تجليه محتجب بالحقبة لا حجاب إلا في المحجوبين والحجاب هو القصور والضعف والنقص وليس تجليه إلا حقيقة ذاته إذ لا معنى له بذاته في ذاته إلا ما هو صريح ذاته كما أوضحه الإلهيون فذاته متجل لهم ولذلك سماه الفلاسفة صورة فأول قابل لتجليه هو الملك الإلهي الموسوم بالعقل الكلي فإن تجوهره بنيل تجليه تجوهر الصورة الواقعة في المرآة لتجلي الشخص الذي هي مثاله ولقريب من هذا المعنى قيل إن العقل الفعالة مثاله فاحترز أن تقول مثله وذلك هو الواجب الحق فإن كل منفعل عن فاعل فإنما ينفعل بتوسط مثال واقع من الفاعل فيه وكل فاعل ينفعل في المنفعل بتوسط مثال يقع منه فيه وذلك بين بالاستقراء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٢٠

فإن الحرارة النارية تفعل في جرم من الأجرام بأن تضع فيه مثالها وهو السخونة - وكذلك سائر القوى من الكيفيات والنفس الناطقة إنما تفعل في نفس ناطقة أخرى مثلها بأن تضع فيها مثالها وهي الصورة العقلية المجردة والسيف إنما يضع في الجسم مثاله وهو شكله والمسن إنما يحدد السكين بأن تضع في جوانب حده مثال ما ماسه - وهو استواء الأجزاء وملاستها انتهى كلامه وقال بعض العرفاء إن كل معلول فهو مركب في طبعه من جهتين جهة بها يشابه الفاعل ويحاكيه وجهة بها يباينه وينافيه إذ لو كان بكله من نحو يشابه نحو الفاعل كان نفس الفاعل لا صادراً منه فكان نوراً محضاً لو كان بكله من نحو يباين نحو الفاعل استحالة أيضاً أن يكون صادراً منه لأن نقيض الشيء لا يكون صادراً عنه فكان ظلمة محضة والجهة الأولى النورانية يسمى وجوداً والجهة الأخرى الظلمانية هي المسماة ماهية وهي غير صادرة عن الفاعل لأنها الجهة التي تثبت بها المباينة مع الفاعل فهي جهة مسلوب نحوها عن الفاعل ولا ينبعث من الشيء ما ليس عنده ولو كانت منبعثة عن الفاعل كانت هي جهة الموافقة فاحتاجت إلى جهة أخرى للمباينة فالمعلول من العلة كالظل من النور يشابهه من حيث ما فيه من النورية ويباينه من حيث ما فيه من شوب الظلمة فكما أن الجهة الظلمانية في الظل ليست فائضة من النور ولا هي من النور لأنها تضاد النور ومن أجل ذلك توقع المباينة فكيف تكون منه فكذلك الجهة المسماة ماهية في المعلول.

فثبت صحة قول من قال الماهية غير مجعولة ولا فائضة من العلة فإن الماهية ليست إلا ما به الشيء شيء فيما هو ممتاز عن غيره من الفاعل ومن كل شيء وهو الجهة الظلمانية المشار إليها التي تنزل في البسائط منزلة المادة في الأجسام.

وقد أشار إلى ثبوت هذا التركيب في البسائط الشيخ الرئيس في إلهيات الشفا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٢١

حيث قال و الذي يجب وجود لغيره دائما فهو أيضا غير بسيط الحقيقة لأن الذي له باعتبار ذاته فإنه غير الذي له من غيره و هو حاصل الهوية منهما جميعا في الوجود - فلذلك لا شيء غير واجب الوجود يعرّى عن ملابسة ما بالقوة و الإمكان باعتبار نفسه - و هو الفرد الحقيقي و ما عداه زوج تركيبى انتهى فالذي له باعتبار ذاته هو ماهيته - و الذي له من غيره هو وجوده و هويته منتظمة من هاتين الجهتين انتظام الجسم من الهيولى و الصورة و لهذا أسند القوة و الإمكان إلى الماهية استناده إلى المادة - و إن كان بين هذا التركيب و تركيب الجسم من الهيولى و الصورة فرق و كذا بين معنيي الإمكان في الموضوعين كما ستطلع عليه إن شاء الله تعالى.

ثم لا يختلجن في وهمك أنهم لما أخرجوا الماهية عن حيز الجعل فقد ألقوا بها بواجب الوجود و جمعوها إليه في الاستغناء عن العلة لأن الماهية إنما كانت غير مجعولة لأنها دون الجعل لأن الجعل يقتضي تحصيلها ما و هي في أنها ماهية لا تحصل لها أصلا ألا ترى أنها متى تحصلت بوجه من الوجوه و لو بأنها غير متحصلة كانت مربوطة إلى العلة حينئذ لأن الممكن متعلق بالعلة وجودا و عدما و واجب الوجود إنما كان غير مجعول لأنه فوق الجعل من فرط التحصل و الصمدية فكيف يلحق ما هو غير مجعول لأن الجعل فوقه بما يكون غير مجعول لأنه فوق الجعل فافهم.

و لقد أصاب الإمام الرازي حيث قال إن القول بكون الماهيات غير مجعولة - من فروع مسألة الماهية المطلقة و إنها في أنفسها غير موجودة و لا معدومة.

تفريع: احتياج الماهية و الطبائع الكلية إلى أجزائها

كالجنس و الفصل أو كالمادة و الصورة احتياج تقويمي بحسب نفس قوامها من حيث هي أو بحسب قوامها موجودة و احتياجها إلى فاعلها و غايتها احتياج صدوري فالأوليان علتان للماهية سواء كان مطلقا أو بحسب نحو من الوجود و الآخرين علتان لوجودها - فإذا نسب العلية و المعلولية بمعنى الإصدار و الصدور إلى الماهيات لا تصح إلا باعتبار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٢٢

الوجود معها بخلاف نسبتها بمعنى التقويم و التقويم بحسب نفس الماهية فإنها تصح مع قطع النظر عن اعتبار الوجود و العدم معها و من هذين القبيلين موقع التصديق و موقع التصور بحسب الظرف العلمي.

ثم أعلم أنه قد ذكر الشيخ في الشفاء. في أول فصل موضوع المنطق ليس يمكن أن ينتقل الذهن من معنى واحد مفرد إلى تصديق شيء فإن ذلك المعنى ليس حكم وجوده و عدمه حكما واحدا في إيقاع ذلك التصديق لأن موقع التصديق علة التصديق و ليس يجوز أن يكون شيء علة لشيء في حالتي وجوده و عدمه فلا يقع في المفرد كفاية من غير تحصيل وجوده أو عدمه في ذاته أو في حالة له و أما التصور فإنه كثيرا ما يقع بمعنى مفرد.

و اعترض عليه العلامة الدواني بقوله فيه بحث أما أولا فلأنه منقوض بإفادته التصور فإن المقدمات جارية فيها و أما ثانيا فلأننا نقول هذا المفرد لوجوده الذهني - ربما يفيد التصديق بسبب وجوده في الذهن من غير أن يصدق بوجوده في الذهن كما في إفادة التصور بنفسه فظهر أن ما ذكره مغالطة و مثل ذلك غريب عن مثله هذا كلامه في رسالته المسمى

بأنموذج العلوم.

و قد علم مما ذكر الفرق بين الكاسيين من أن احتياج المطلوب التصديقي إلى مبادئه و تقومه بها بحسب الصدور و الوجود لا بحسب المفهوم و التصور إذ المطلوب التصديقي النظري مما يتصور أولا قبل إقامة الحجة عليها من دون تصور مبادئه و التصديق بها بوجه من الوجوه ثم تحصل النفس بعد تصور المطلوب مبادئه التصديقية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٢٣

و ينتقل منها إليه ثانيا بحسب التصديق فكانها كالعلل الفاعلية لوجود الماهية - في نفسها أو لوجود صفة من صفاتها. و يؤيد هذا ما قاله بهمنيار إن نسبة أولي الأوليات إلى جميع النظريات - كنسبة فاعل الكل إلى الموجودات و أما المطلوب التصوري و خصوصا الحدي - فاحتياجه إلى مبادئه القريبة و البعيدة احتياج تألفي و تقومه بها تقوم بحسب المفهوم و الماهية لا بحسب الصدور و التحقق كأجزاء الحد بالنسبة إلى المحدود.

فبذلك قد تحقق الفرق بين موقع التصديق و موقع التصور و اندفع النقص و كذا المنع أيضا بأدنى تأمل و تدبر

فصل (٤) في أن الوجود هل يجوز أن يشتد أو يتضعف أم لا

كل من الاشتداد و التضعف حركة في الكيف كما أن كلا من التزايد و التناقص حركة في الكم و معنى وقوع الحركة في مقولة هو أن يكون للموضوع في كل آن مفروض من زمان الحركة فرد من تلك المقولة يخالف الفرد الذي يكون له في آن آخر مخالفة نوعية أو صنفية أو نحوها آخر.

و ربما يعتقد أنها عبارة عن تغير حال تلك المقولة في نفسها و هو فاسد لأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٢٤

معنى التسود مثلا ليس أن سوادا واحدا يشتد حتى يكون الموضوع الحقيقي - للحركة في السواد نفس السواد كيف و ذات الأول في نفسها ناقصة و الزائدة ليست بعينها الناقصة.

و لا يتأتى لأحد أن يقول ذات الأول باقية و ينضم إليها شيء آخر - فإن الذي ينضم إليه إن لم يكن سوادا فما اشتد السواد في سواديته بل حدث فيه صفة أخرى و إن كان الذي ينضم إليه سوادا آخر فيحصل سوادان في محل واحد بلا امتياز بينهما بالحقيقة أو المحل أو الزمان و هو محال و اتحاد الاثنين من السواد أيضا غير متصور لأنهما إن بقيا اثنين فلا اتحاد و كذا الحال إن انتفيا و حصل غيرهما أو انتفى أحدهما و حصل الآخر.

فقد علم أن اشتداد السواد ليس ببقاء سواد و انضمام آخر إليه بل بانعدام ذات الأول عن الموضوع و حصول سواد آخر أشد منه في ذلك الموضوع مع بقاءه في الحالين و عليه القياس في التضعف.

إذا تحقق هذا فعلم أن لا حركة في الوجود أما على طريقة القائلين باعتبارية الوجود مطلقا و تكثره بتكثر موضوعاته فقط فواضح لا يحتاج إلى البيان و أما على ما اخترناه فلما علمت سابقا أن الوجود ليس عرضا قائما بالماهية بل هو نفس وجود الموضوع و موجوديته بل هو عين الموضوع في نفس الأمر فكيف يسوغ تبديله مع بقاء ما هو عينه جعللا و تحققا اللهم إلا باعتبار بعض الملاحظات العقلية.

و أيضا يلزم من الحركة في الوجود عدم بقاء المتحرك بالفعل ما دام كونه متحركا لأن المتحرك ليس له تلبس في أبعاض

زمان الحركة وآناته بما فيه الحركة فليس يمكن أن يتحرك الشيء فيما لا يتقوم هو إلا به كالوجود و الصور الجوهرية و فوق هذا كلام آخر سيرد عليك تحقيقه إن شاء الله تعالى.

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وهم وتنبيه:

ربما يتوهم أنه لو كان معنى وقوع الحركة في شيء ما ذكر - لزم أن لا يتحقق حركة في مقولة لأن الانتقال من فرد مما فيه الحركة إلى آخر إنما يتصور إذا كان للأفراد وجود بالفعل و ليس كذلك و إلا لزم تشافع الآنات و انحصار ما لا يتناهى من الموجودات المترتبة بين حاصرين - فيزاح بأن تلك الأفراد و إن لم تكن موجودة متميزة بالفعل لكنها موجودة بالقوة القريبة من الفعل بمعنى أن أي فرض لو انقطعت الحركة فيه تلبس المتحرك بفرد مخصوص من تلك الأفراد فيه.

و رد هذا بأنه يلزم أن لا يكون للمتحرك الأيني في زمان الحركة مكان بالفعل - و لا للمتحرك الكمي كم بالفعل و هو باطل بالضرورة.

و أجاب عنه العلامة الدواني بأن المتحرك إنما يتصف بالفعل حال الحركة - بالتوسط بين تلك الأفراد و ذلك التوسط حالة بين صرافة القوة و محوضة الفعل - و القدر الضروري هو أن الجسم لا يخلو عن تلك الأعراض و التوسط فيها و أما أنه لا يخلو من أفرادها بالفعل فليس ضروريا و لا مبرهنا عليه بل البرهان ربما اقتضى خلافه هذا كلامه.

و لا يخفى ما فيه فإن المتحرك في الأين مما أحاط به جسم في كل زمان حركته فبالضرورة له أين بالفعل و إلا فيلزم الخلاء و هو محال و أيضا الأفلاك غير منفكة عن الحركة الوضعية فيلزم أن لا يكون لها وضع في وقت أصلا.

فالحق في هذا المقام أن أفراد المقولة التي تقع فيها الحركة ليست منحصرة في الأفراد الآنية بل لها أفراد آنية هي معيار السكون و أفراد زمانية

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تدرجية الوجود منطبقة على الحركة بمعنى القطع بل هي عينها كما رآه بعضهم - فحينئذ يكون للمتحرك ما دامت الحركة باقية على اتصالها فرد واحد زمني متصل - غير قار ذو هوية متكمة اتصالية متضمن لجميع الحدود المفروضة في الآنات - نسبتها إليه نسبة النقط المفروضة إلى الخط فالفرد الزمني من المقولة حاصل - للمتحرك بالفعل من دون فرض أصلا و أما الأفراد الآنية و الزمانية التي هي حدود ذلك الفرد و أبعاضه فهي حصولها بمجرد الفرض فإذن لا يلزم خلو الجسم عن المقولة المتحرك فيها و لا تتالي الآنات و لا الآنيات و لا انحصار ما لا يتناهى بين حاصرين إذ لا يوجد فرد واحد آني بالفعل حال الحركة فضلا عن تشافع الآنيات - أو كونها غير متناهية.

و ليس لك أن ترجع و تقول فلتكتف في اشتداد الوجود و تضعفه بهذه المرتبة من قوام الموضوع و ثباته.

لأن استمرار موضوع الحركة شرط للحركة و الفرد الزمني من الشيء لا استمرار له أصلا لا في زمان وجوده و لا في غير ذلك الزمان و زيادة التوضيح موكولة إلى تحقيق مباحث الحركة و الزمان إن شاء الله تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٢٧

فصل (٥) في الشدة والضعف

لعلك كنت مقروع السمع في طبقات العلوم أن كل متميزين في الوجود أو العقل فتمايزهما وافتراقهما إما بتمام ماهيتهما من دون اشتراك ما جوهري بينهما - أو بشيء من سنخ الماهية بعد اشتراك طبيعة ما جوهري بينهما فالمشترك جنس و المعينات فصول و محصلات لطباع نوعية و التركيب تركيب اتحادي أو بأمور عرضية بعد اتفاقهما في تمام الحقيقة المشتركة و المتحصل أفراد شخصية أو صنفية و التركيب تركيب اقتراني.

و لا أجذك ممن تفتنت هناك بقسم رابع ذهب إليه فلاسفة الإشراق ينقدح به الحصر و هو أن الافتراق ربما لا يكون بتمام الماهية و لا ببعض منها و لا بلواحق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٢٨

زائدة عليها بل بكمال في نفس الماهية بما هي هي و نقص فيها بأن يكون نفس الماهية مختلفة المراتب بالكمال و النقص و لها عرض بالقياس إلى مراتب نفسها وراء ما لها من العرض بالقياس إلى أفرادها المتضمنة لها و غيرها من الفصول و اللواحق.

و هذا مما وقع فيه الاختلاف بين الفريقين فاحتجت اتباع المشائية على بطلانه بأن الأكمل إن لم يكن مشتملا على شيء ليس في الأنقص فلا افتراق بينهما - و إن اشتمل على شيء كذا فهو إما معتبر في سنخ الطبيعة فلا اشتراك بينهما و إما زائد عليها فلا يكون إلا فصلا مقوما أو عرضيا زائدا.

و هذا الاحتجاج مع قطع النظر عن انتقاضه بالعارض ردي جدا بل هو مصادرة على المطلوب الأول إذ الكلام في أن التفارق قد يكون بنفس ما وقع فيه التوافق بين الشئيين لا بما يزيد عليه.

و أيضا الاختلاف بين السوادين مثلا إذا كان بفصل فالفصل الذي يميز أحدهما عن الآخر ليس بمقوم لحقيقة السواد إلا لم يكن مميزا له بل هو فصل مقوم له مقسم للسواد المشترك بينهما الذي هو جنس لهما على هذا التقدير و لا شك أن الفصل عرضي لماهية الجنس و مفهومه خارج عنها فحاله بالقياس إلى ماهية الجنس كحال سائر العرضيات فإذا كان الاشتداد و التمامية في السواد من جهة الفصل الذي معناه غير معنى السواد فيكون التفاوت فيما وراء السواد و قد فرض فيه.

أجابوا عن ذلك بأن الذي يقال بالتفاوت على الأفراد هو العرضي المحمول كالأسود على معروضات مبدأ الاشتقاق كالسواد مثلا لأجل احتمال بعضها على فرد من أفراد المبدأ له تمامية في حد فرديته الغير المشتركة و بعض آخر على

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٠

فرد منها ليس كذلك أيضا بحسب نفس هويته مع عدم التفاوت بين أفراد المبدأ - بالقياس إلى المفهوم المشترك بينهما فطبيعة السواد على التواطؤ الصرف في أفرادها الشديدة و الضعيفة مطلقا و إنما المشكك مفهوم الأسود على معروضي الفردين - المختلفين شدة و ضعفا في حد هويتهما الفرديتين و فصول السواد و إن كانت ماهيتها بحسب ملاحظة العقل غير ماهية السواد الذي هو الجنس لكنها مما يصدق عليها معنى السواد الجنسي فالتفاوت بحسبها لا يوجب أن يكون

تفاوتا في غير معنى السواد.

و أنت تعلم أن القول بأن الشديد من السواد والضعيف منه ليس بينهما تفاضل في السوادية ولا اختلاف في حمل السواد عليهما بل التفاوت إنما هو بين الجسمين المعروضين لهما فيه بعيد عن الصواب كيف وإذا كان الاختلاف الذي بين المبدئين - موجبا لاختلاف صدق المشتق على المعروضين فليكن ذلك الاختلاف مقتضيا لاختلاف صدق المبدأ على الفردين بل هذا أقرب.

و من حججهم في هذا الباب أن ذات الشيء إن كانت هي الكاملة فالناقص والمتوسط ليسا نفس الذات و كذا إن كانت كلا من الناقص والمتوسط فالباقيان ليسا تلك الحقيقة بعينها.

و هذا غير مجد في الحقيقة النوعية فإن ما لا يحتمل التعميم والتفاوت إنما هي الوحدة العددية و أما الوحدة المعنوية فللخصم أن يقول الحقيقة النوعية هي الجامعة للحدود الثلاثة الزائد والناقص والمتوسط.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣١

فإن قلت الكلبي الطبيعي موجود عندهم في الخارج فالأمر المشترك بين المراتب الثلاث موجود في الخارج وإن كان ظرف عروض الاشتراك إنما هو الذهن - فما بقي عند العقل بعد تجريده عن الزوائد والمشخصات هو مطابق للكمال أو لغيره من الناقص والمتوسط وعلى أي تقدير فلا يكون مطابقا للجميع ولا مقتضيا إلا لمرتبة معينة من المراتب فيكون البواقي من المراتب مستندة إلى أمر خارج عن الطبيعة المشتركة فيلزم خرق الفرض.

قلت الكلبي الطبيعي على ما تصوره إنما يتحقق في المتواطي من الذاتيات فإن الماهيات التي إذا جردت عن الزوائد تكون متفقة في جميع الأفراد غير متفاوتة فيها - تنحصر في المتواطيات والمشكك ليس من هذا القبيل بل كل مرتبة توجد منه في الخارج في ضمن شخص أو أشخاص متعددة لو أمكن وجودها في العقل فهي بحيث إذا جردها العقل عن الخارجيات توجد تلك المرتبة بعينها في الذهن وكذا حال مرتبة أخرى له أيضا وتلك المراتب المأخوذة عن الأشخاص الخارجية الموجودة في الذهن ليست في التمامية والنقص بمنزلة واحدة فلا تعرض لواحدة منها الكلية بالقياس إلى جميع الأشخاص المندرجة تحت جميع المراتب - نعم الجميع مشترك في سنخ واحد مبهم غاية الإبهام و هو الإبهام بالقياس إلى تمام نفس الحقيقة ونقصها وراء الإبهام الناشئ فيه عن الاختلاف في الأفراد بحسب هوياتها

تنبيه تفصيلي:

ضابطة الاختلاف التشكيكي على انحائه هو أن يختلف قول الطبيعة المرسل على أفرادها بالأولوية أو الأقدمية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٢

أو الأتمية الجامعة للأشدية والأعظمية والأكثرية والخلاف بين شيعة الأقدمين - و اتباع المعلم الأول من المشاءين

في أربع مقامات.

الأول أن الذات أو الذاتي بالقياس إلى أفرادها إما يمنع أن يكون متفاوتا بشيء من أنحاء التشكيك سواء كان بالأولوية وعدمها أو بالتقدم والتأخر أو بالكمال والنقص أم يمكن فيها ذلك و من المتأخرين من ادعى البدهة و اتفاق الجميع في نفي التشكيك بالأولين في الذاتيات و هو مستبعد جدا و قد غفل عن أن الأنوار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٣

الجوهرية النورية عند حكماء الفرس و الأقدمين بعضها علة للبعض بحسب حقيقتها الجوهرية البسيطة عندهم.

و الثاني التشكيك بالأشدية و الأضعفية أ يوجب الاختلاف النوعي بين أفراد ما فيه الاختلاف ليكون منشأ الاختلاف فصولها الذاتية أم لا بل يجوز الاتفاق النوعي بين البعض و إن لم يجز بين الجميع.

و الثالث أن التفاوت بحسب الكيف و التفاوت بحسب الكم أ هما ضربان مختلفان من التشكيك أ ضرب واحد منه و إن لم يسم باسم واحد من أسامي التفضيل و أدوات المبالغة.

و الرابع أن الاختلاف بالشدة و الضعف و الكمال و النقص أ ينحصر في الكم و الكيف أ يتحقق في غيرهما مثل الجوهر.

فالمشاءون ذهبوا إلى أول الشقين المذكورين في كل من هذه المقامات الأربعة - و الرواقيون إلى الآخر منهما في الجميع فلنذكر القول في كل منها.

أما المقام الأول

فنقول إنك لما تيقنت أن الوجود حقيقة واحدة لا جنس لها و لا فصل و هي في جميع الأشياء بمعنى واحد و أفرادها الذاتية ليست متخالفة بالذوات و لا بالهويات التي هي مغايرة للذات بل بالهويات التي هي عين الذات - و قد مر أيضا أن الجاعلية و المجعولية لا تتحقق إلا في الوجودات دون الماهيات الكلية فاحكم بأن أفرادها المتعينة بنفس هوياتها المتفقة الحقيقة المتقدمة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٤

بعضها على بعض بالذات و الماهية مختلفة بأنحاء الاختلافات التشكيكية من الأولوية و عدمها و التقدم و التأخر و القوة و الضعف.

و مما ينبه على ذلك أن أجزاء الزمان متشابهة الماهية مع تقدم بعضها على بعض بالذات لا بما هو خارج عن نفسها.

و مما احتج به شيخ الإشراق في إثبات هذا المطلب قوله في كتاب المطارحات - و هو أن المقدار التام و الناقص ما زاد أحدهما على الآخر بعرض و لا فصل مقسم للمقدار فإنه عرضي أيضا لما يقسمه بالتفاوت في المقادير بنفس المقدار و ليس الزائد خارجا عن المقدار بل ما زاد به هو كما ساوى به في الحقيقة فليس الافتراق بين الخطين المتفاوتين بالطول و القصر إلا بكمالية الخط و نقصه و كذا بين السواد التام و الناقص فإنهما اشتركا في السوادية و ما افترقا في أمر خارج عن السوادية - فصلا كان أو غيره فإن التفاوت في نفس السوادية.

و اعترض عليه بأن طبيعة المقدارين الزائد و الناقص على شاكلة واحدة و التفاوت بينهما ليس بنفس المقدار المطلق و إن كان فيه فإن ما به التفاوت غير ما فيه التفاوت لأنه بنفس المقدارية المختصة بكل منهما في حد فرديتهما بحسب اختلافهما في التماذي على أبعاد محدودة إلى حدود معينة و ذلك أمر خارج عن طبيعة المقدارية تابع لها من جهة استعدادات المادة و انفعالاتها المختلفة فكل من الطويل و القصير من الخطين إذا لوحظا من حيث طبيعة الخط كان كل منهما طولا حقيقيا يضاهي الآخر في أنه بعد واحد و لا يعقل بينهما في هذا المعنى تفاضل أصلا و إذا لوحظ مقيسا إلى

الآخر كان الأزيد منهما طويلا إضافيا يفضل على الآخر بحسب الخصوصية الفردية - كما قال الشيخ في قاطيقورياس الشفاء و لست أعني أن كمية لا تكون أزيد من كمية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٥

و أنقص بل إن كمية لا تكون أشد و أزيد في أنها كمية من أخرى مشاركة لها و إن كان من حيث المعنى الإضافي أزيد منه أعني الطول الإضافي انتهى فالطول الحق لا يقبل الأزيد و الأنقص بل الطول المضاف و كذلك حكم العدد و قال أيضا فيه اعلم أن الكثير بلا إضافة هو العدد و الكثير بالإضافة عرض في العدد و كذا طبيعة السواد و الحرارة أيضا في السوادات و الحرارة على نسق واحد إنما الاختلاف بحسب خصوصيات الأفراد لا بنفس جوهر الماهية المشتركة و سنخها كما قال أيضا السواد الحق لا يقبل الأشد و الأضعف بل الذي هو سواد بالقياس عند شيء هو البياض بالقياس إلى آخر و كل ما يفرض من السواد فهو لا يقبل الأشد و الأضعف في حق نفسه بل إنما عند ما يؤخذ بالقياس فلذلك كان تقابل الطرفين يعم الأوساط و لا يزداد بذلك أقسام التقابل و لا يهدم اشتراط التضاد الحقيقي بغاية الخلاف فمعنى الأشدية و الأزيدية يرجع عند هؤلاء إلى كون أحد الفردين في نفسه - بحيث ينتزع منه العقل بمعونة الوهم مثل الفرد الآخر مع تجويز زيادة لا ازدياد طبيعة العام بعينها في بعض الأفراد و لا بأكثرية ظهور آثار الكلي في بعض الأفراد كما فسره بعضهم و إلا لكان كثير من الذاتيات قابلا للشدة و الضعف كالإنسان مثلا لاختلاف أفرادها في استتباع الآثار كثرة و قلة قالوا ثم مجرد ذلك ليس تشكيكا بل هو سبب لاختلاف صدق المشتق من الفردين على معروضيهما كما مر فيثول في الحقيقة إلى الأولوية.

و الحاصل أنه لا يتحقق عندهم في السوادين ما فيه الاختلاف بينهما بل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٦

يتحقق في كل منهما ما به الاختلاف و هو فصله المنوع له بل إنما يوجد بين الجسمين - الشديد السواد و الضعيف السواد ما فيه الاختلاف و هو مفهوم الأسود فإن أحدهما أوفر حظا مما يطلق عليه السواد و الآخر أقل حظا منه. و على هذا لا يرد عليهم ما ذكره الشيخ الإلهي في المطارحات بقوله و هؤلاء هم الذين يقولون إن السواد الأشد يمتاز عن السواد الأنقص بفصل و إذا كان السواد له فصل مقسم فيكون جنسا و هو واقع بالتشكيك فبعض الجنس واقع بالتشكيك - و قالوا لا شيء من الأجناس واقعا بالتشكيك انتهى.

و أما المقام الثاني

فالحق فيه ما ذهب إليه الرواقيون من الأقدمين و غيرهم لما ذكرناه أيضا في حقيقة الوجود من أنها ليست ذات أفراد متخالفة بالفصول مع أن بعضها في غاية الشدة و العظمة و بعضها بحسب هوياتها التي لا تزيد على مرتبتها - في غاية الوهن و الخسة كوجود الحركة و الهولوى و العدد و أمثالها من ضعفاء الوجود - و أيضا إن المشاءين قد أثبتوا اشتداد الكيفيات و تضعفها بمعنى حركة الموضوع الجسماني - في مراتب الكيفيات كالحرارات و السوادات و غيرهما و من المتحقق عندهم أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٧

الحركة الواحدة أمر شخصي له هوية اتصالية من مبدأ المسافة إلى منتهاها و أبعاض المتصل الواحد و حدودها أيضا متحدة بحسب الماهية النوعية و قد ادعوا بداهة هذه الدعوى في إبطال رأي ديمقراطيس في مبادي الأجسام فيلزم من ذلك أن يكون مراتب الشدید و الضعیف من السواد في تسود الجسم متحدة في الماهية النوعية و لا استحالة في أن السلوك الاشتدادي يتأدى إلى شيء يخالف السلوك فيه بحسب الحقيقة - و لكن ليس حصولها من جهة كونه مما فيه السلوك بل من جهة كونه مما إليه أو منه السلوك و إن كان نفسه مما يقع فيه السلوك بحسب مراتبه كالحمرة بين السواد و البياض فإن الفطرة حاکمة بأن الحمرة ليست بسواد ضعيف أو بياض ضعيف و لها أيضا مراتب شديدة و ضعيفة.

و أما المقام الثالث

فالشدة و الضعف قد يعنى بهما ما يعرفه الجماهير و يدل عليه أدوات المبالغة و إن كان موضوعها الأصلي بحسب اللغة هو القوة على الممانعة و منه نقل إلى هذا المعنى ففي العرف لا يقال إن خط كذا أشد خطية من خط كذا - كما يقال سواد كذا أشد سوادية من سواد كذا و كذا لا يقال هذا أخط من ذلك كما يقال هذا أسود من ذاك فمن نظر إلى استعمال العرب بحسب العرف حكم بأن الشدة و الضعف يختص قبولهما بالكيفيات دون الكميات و غيرها و الكميات إنما تقبل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٨

الزيادة و النقصان و الكثرة و القلة لا غير.

و لا خفاء في أن التعويل على مجرد اللفظ و إطلاق أهل العرف قبيح من أرباب العلوم العقلية و ليس من دأب الحكيم اقتباس الحقائق من العرفيات اللسانية مع أن هذا القياس العرفي فاسد في نفسه فإنه و إن لم يطلق في العرف أن خط كذا أشد خطية لكنه يقال إنه أشد طولاً من خط كذا و مفهوم الطول مفهوم الخط فالشدة هي الشدة في الخط و كذا يطلق أن هذا الخط أطول من ذلك أو أكبر منه مع أن المطلق يسلم أن الخط نفس المقدار.

و كذا في الكم المنفصل اعتمدوا في نفي الأشدية عنها على أنه لا يقال في العرف عدد كذا أشد عددية من كذا و مع ذلك فقد اعترفوا بأنه يصح أن يقال عدد كذا أكثر من عدد كذا و الكثرة و العدد شيء واحد فالكثرة شدة في العدد و على ذلك فقس حال الضعيف فيهما و قد فرق بعضهم بين الشدة و الزيادة بأن الشدة لها حد يقف عنده بخلاف الزيادة المقدارية و العددية فإن الطول لا ينتهي إلى حد لا يمكن تصور ما هو أطول منه و كذا العدد و أما السواد و الحرارة و ما يجري مجراهما فينتهي إلى ما لا يتصور ما هو أشد منه.

و يرد أولاً المنع من أن الكيفيات تنتهي إلى حد لا يمكن الزيادة عليه بحسب نفس الأمر و إن كان الذي في الوجود لا يكون إلا متناهما عند حد ليس في الوجود ما هو أشد منه و هكذا الطول و الكثرة من غير فرق. و ثانياً بأن هذا على تقدير التسليم مما لا تأثير له في بيان الفرق بينهما بأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٣٩

كلا منهما نحو آخر من أقسام التشكيك بحسب القسمة الأولية.

و من هذا القبيل ما قالوا في الفرق بينهما أن الزائد و الناقص إنما يقال فيما صحت إليه الإشارة إلى قدر به المساواة و زائد و إلى ما يمكن تعيين بعض منه بالمساواة و بعض زائد و الأشد و الأضعف ليس من هذا القبيل.

فعلى تقدير المساواة يقال لهم إن العدد متقوم الحقيقة من الوحدات دون الأعداد و كل مرتبة من العدد نوع بسيط غير مركب من الأعداد الأخر فالأربعة لا يتقوم بالثلاثة و لا الثلاثة بالاثنتين و إذا فصل بالعقل تبطل صورته و تحصل صورة أخرى - فالتفاوت الذي يتصور بين الثلاثة و الأربعة فبأي جزء من الأربعة يقع المساواة و بأي منها متفاوتة و كيف يتأتى تعيين قدر به التساوي و آخر به التفاوت في الأنواع البسيطة.

و أيضا قالوا التفاوت الكيفي و المقداري و العددي يستحق أسامي مختلفة بحسب مواضعه المختلفة فإن ما به الفضل في الكم المقداري بعض موهوم من هوية كاملة منه متحدة الحقيقة مع هوية ناقصة و مع مساويها من تلك و كذلك يتصور بينهما الاتحاد في الوجود و في الكم العددي بعض من هوية تامة مباينة الماهية و الوجود لهوية ناقصة و لمساويها من تلك فيمتنع بينهما الاتحاد في الوجود و في الكيف نفس هوية فاضلة بما هي تلك الهوية الفاضلة لا بشيء موهوم منها أو موجود فيها بل بكلية ذاتها الخاصة.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٤٠

و هذا إنما يستقيم لو كانت الطبيعة المشتركة بين الكامل و الناقص طبيعة جنسية و يكون كل منهما متحصلا بفصل لا يزيد على حقيقتها و وجودها حتى يكون واحد منهما بنفس حقيقته المختصة و كلية ذاته الخاصة أتم و أشد من الآخر لا بجزئه الممايز في الوجود أو الوهم للجزء الآخر.

فقد استوضح أن مناط الشدة و الضعف تباين الحقيقة النوعية و كذلك الكثرة و القلة مع ما ذكر من الفرق بخلاف الزيادة و النقصان فإنهما من توابع اختلاف الشخصات و تفاوت الهويات.

فيقال لهم إنا نسامح في مثل هذه الأشياء و نمكن لهم في وضع الاصطلاح فلهم أن يصطلحوا على الكمال و النقص في الكم المقداري بالزيادة و النقصان و في العدد بالكثرة و القلة و فيما سواهما من الكيف بالشدة و الضعف إلا أن هاهنا جامعا بين الجميع و هو التمامية في نفس المعنى المتفاضل فيه و النقص فيها.

و أما المقام الرابع

فاعلم أن الحكماء المتقدمين مثل أنبازقلس و أفلاطن و من بعدهما حكموا بأن جواهر هذا العالم الأدنى أطلال لجواهر العالم الأعلى و أرادوا بذلك أنها معلولة لتلك إذ المعلول كظل لما هو علته و العلة جوهريتها أقدم من جوهرية المعلول كما علمت من قاعدة الجعل و من أن الوجود عين الحقائق الخارجية - على ما قررناه فتقدم العلة على المعلول بماهيتها الحقيقية و الجوهرية إشارة إلى كماليتها في القوام و الاستقلال و إذا استفيدت جوهرية المعلول من جوهرية العلة فكيف يساويها في الجوهرية بل لا بد و أن يكون جوهرية العلة أتم من جوهرية المعلول - و لا معنى للشدة إلا ذلك فبعض الجواهر أشد جوهرية من بعض من حيث المعنى - سواء أطلقت عليه صيغة المبالغة أم لا إذ الحقائق لا تنقص من الإطلاقات العرفية.

هذا هو المراد مما أشار إليه الشيخ الإلهي في التلويحات بقوله إن الحكماء المتقدمين قاطبة على أن جواهر هذا العالم كظل للعالم الأعلى كيف ساوتها في الجوهرية.

ثم أورد بعد ذلك على نفسه سؤالا وهو قوله إن الأولوية والأشدية يقال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٤١

فيما بين ضدين يعني بذلك أن الجوهر لا ضد له فلا يقال إن منه ما هو أولى ولا أن منه ما هو أشد. وأجاب عنه بقوله الوجود الواجبي والعلي أتم من الوجود الممكني والمعلولي وأشد إذ لا أعني بالشدة القدرة على الممانعة ونحوها بل إنه أتم وأكمل ولا تعاقب لهما على موضوع واحد ولا ضدية ولا سلوك وقال في حكمة الإشراف قد حدوا الحيوان بأنه جسم ذو نفس حساس متحرك بالإرادة ثم الذي نفسه أقوى على التحريك وحواسه أكثر لا شك أن الحساسية والمتحركة فيه أتم فيكون حيوانية الإنسان مثلا أتم من حيوانية البعوضة مثلا- فبمجرد أن لا يطلق في العرف أن هذا أتم حيوانية من ذلك لا ينكر أنه أتم منه وقولهم لا يقال إن هذا أشد مائة من ذلك ونحوها كلها بناء على التجوزات العرفية انتهى.

فإن قلت ليس فصل الحيوان هو الإحساس والتحريك بالفعل بل هما من الآثار والخواص العارضة وإنما الفصل مبدؤهما حسب ما استيسر له والفعل مختلف من الآلات والمهيئات ورفع العوائق وإزالة الموانع فاما الذي للفاعل فغير مختلف- وكذلك ليس فصل الماء البرودة المحسوسة لعدم بقائها أحيانا بل القوة عليها حين عدم القواسر. قلت نعم ولكن هذه أمارات الفصول أقيمت مقامها لأنها أمور منبعثة عن ذوات تلك القوى التي هي الفصول الحقيقية ولذلك يؤخذ في حدودها كما يؤخذ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٤٢

البناء في حد البناء فزيادة تلك الآثار دليل شدة القوى وقلتها دليل ضعفها. وتحقيق ذلك أن الحدود قد تكون بحسب الذات في نفسها وقد تكون بحسب نسبتها إلى أمر وقد تكون بحسبهما جميعا ولكن بالاعتبارين فتحديد الملك والبناء من حيث حقيتهما شيء ومن حيث كونهما مضافين إلى شيء شيء آخر- فيؤخذ المملكة والبناء في حديهما بالاعتبار الثاني لا بالاعتبار الأول وكل من الاعتبارين ممكن الانفكاك عن الآخر وكذا البدن وتديره يؤخذ في تحديد النفس لا من حيث ذاتها وحقيقتها بل من حيث نفسيتها وتحريكها التدبيري فإن كانت الذاتية والنفسية- مما يتصور بينهما المغايرة والمفارقة كالنفوس المجردة يخالف الحد من جهة الماهية- والذات للحد من جهة الفعل والتحريك وإن لم يكن كذلك بل يكون الوجود الذاتي عين الوجود النسبي كبعض القوى والنفوس حيث إن حقيقتها في أنفسها عين كونها محركة لشيء أو متعلقة بشيء فالحدان متحدان فيها من غير اختلاف ولا بد في تحديدها من أخذ ما تعلقت هي به على أي وجه كان وكما أن كثرة الأفاعيل البنائية- يستدعي كون البناء في كونه بناء شديدا كاملا فكذلك كثرة الأفاعيل التدبيرية توجب كون النفس في نفسيتها أي تدبيرها شديدة كاملة.

إذا تمهد ذلك فنقول لما ثبت وجود نفوس وقوى مادية الذوات والأفاعيل- بمعنى أن وجوداتها في أنفسها وجوداتها المتعلقة بأعيانها بلا مفارقة ذهنها وخارجا- فيكون حد كل واحدة منها بحسب أحد الاعتبارين بعينه حدها بحسب الاعتبار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٤٣

الآخر إذ لا مغايرة بين الاعتبارين وإنهم اعترفوا بأن الأفعال يجب أخذها في حدود القوى لما ذكرناه وقد علم أن كثرة الأفعال مستلزمة لشدة القوة الفاعلة من حيث كونها قوة فاعلة و تلك الحيثية بعينها حيثية الذات فيما ذكرناها و معلوم أن هذه القوى بعينها مبادي فصول ذاتية لحقائق الأجسام الطبيعية المتخالفة بالقوى و الصور لا بالجسمية المشتركة بين الجميع فالتفاوت فيها بالكمال و النقص في تجوهر الذات - يوجب التفاوت في الأجسام النوعية بهذا الوجه و هذا ما أردناه.

بحث و تعقيب:

و من الأبحاث التي أوردتها أصحاب المعلم الأول على أنفسهم - أنكم قلتم الجوهر جنس و الجنس لا يقع على أنواعه بالتشكيك بوجه من الوجوه و قاعدتكم هذه تنتقض بكثير من المواضع كعلية المفارقات بعضها لبعض و سببية الهيولى و الصورة للجسم و سببية الأب لابن مع أن الجوهر جنس للجميع و كذا ينتقض بتقديم بعض أفراد الكم على بعض آخر كتقدم الجسم على السطح و السطح على الخط مع كون المقدار جنسا لها.

و أجابوا عن ذلك بأن التقدم و التأخر في معنى ما يتصور كما سلفت الإشارة إليه على وجهين أحدهما أن يكون بنفس ذلك المعنى المتفاوت فيه بالتقدم و التأخر - حتى يكون ما فيه التقدم بعينه ما به التقدم و الآخر أن يكون لا بنفس ذلك المعنى المتفاوت فيه فهناك يفترق ما فيه التقدم عما به التقدم مثال الأول تقدم وجود الواجب على وجود الممكن و وجود الجوهر على وجود العرض فإن وجود العلة متقدم على وجود المعلول في نفس المعنى المدلول عليه بلفظ الوجود و به أيضا و مثال الثاني تقدم الإنسان الذي هو الأب على الإنسان الذي هو الابن فإن هذا التقدم و التأخر ليس في معنى الإنسانية المقول عليها بالتساوي بل في معنى آخر هو الوجود أو الزمان فما فيه التقدم و التأخر فيهما هو الوجود أو الزمان و ما به التقدم و التأخر خصوص ذاتيهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٤٤

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول كلما تحقق على و تقدم في شيء من أفراد نوع واحد أو جنس واحد بالقياس إلى فرد آخر منه فليست سببته و تقدمه للآخر لأن يصير الآخر - بحسب نفسه أو بحيث يحمل عليه ذلك المعنى النوعي أو الجنسي و لا الفرد الذي هو سبب سببته باعتبار نفس معناه و مفهومه بل سببية السبب و مسببية المسبب باعتبار وجوديهما لا باعتبار ذاتيهما فحمل الوجود على الهيولى و الصورة أقدم من حمله على الجسم و كذا حمله على الأبوين أقدم من حمله على الابن و كذا يختلف حمله على جواهر العالم الأعلى و على جواهر عالما الأدنى فإن جواهر ذلك العالم أقدم و أقوم بحسب الوجود بالفعل من جواهر هذا العالم و أما حقيقة الجوهر فحملها على الجميع بالسوية فليست جوهرية شيء في أنها جوهرية علة لجوهر شيء آخر بل الجوهر العلي أحق و أولى بالوجود من الجوهر المعلولي لا بأن يكون جوهرًا فالوجود متقدم على الوجود بالطبع لا بأمر زائد فوجود الهيولى و الصورة متقدم على وجود الجسم بالطبع و أما الجوهرية فهي بالسواء في الجميع فكما أن الجسم جوهر فكذا أجزاءه بلا تقدم و تأخر فيها و كذا الكلام فيما شاكل ذلك من تقدم أفراد ماهية الكم و غيرها بعضها على بعض و هذا الجواب مقدوح بوجوه.

منها أن فيه وقوعاً فيما هربوا عنه و اعترافاً بصحة ما قالوا بفساده فإن انصراف المتقدم و المتأخر بنفس الماهية عن أفراد الجوهر أو الكم إلى أفراد الوجود أو أجزاء الزمان غير مجد إذ الكلام عائد بعينه في الوجود و الزمان بأن يقال تقدم أفراد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٤٥

الوجود بعضها على بعض إذا كان بنفس تلك الوجودات لزم منه التفاوت بالتقدم و التأخر - بين أفراد حقيقة واحدة في ذاتها بذاتها إذ الوجود قد علمت أن له حقيقة واحدة بسيطة لا اختلاف لها بالفصول و كذا تقدم أجزاء الزمان بعضها على بعض إذا كان لأجل أن حقيقتها حقيقة تقتضي التجدد و التصرم و تقدم بعضها و تأخر الآخر لزم التفاوت على النحو المذكور.

و منها أن هذا يناقص ما ذكره في نفي كون الجسم مفيداً لوجود جسم آخر - بأنه لو كان علة لتقدم هيولى العلة كالكرة التاسعة مثلاً على جسميتها و جسميتها على هيولى المعلول كالكرة الثامنة و هيولى المعلول مشاركة لهيولى العلة في الهيولية - و لا يقع الهيولى على هيولى الكرة التاسعة و على سائر الهيوليات بالتشكيك بل بالتواطؤ - كما أن الجسم الذي يحمل على جسميتها يحمل على جميع الأجسام بالتواطؤ - فيلزم أن يكون هيولى المعلول متقدمة على جسمية العلة فيتقدم الشيء على نفسه.

وجه المناقاة أن كون بعض أفراد حقيقة واحدة علة لفرد آخر لو استلزم تقدم الشيء على نفسه في بعض المواضع كما قرره لاستلزم في سائر المواضع من دون فرق - و إن لم يستلزم ذلك بناء على الاعتذار المنقول عنهم في عليية أفراد الجوهر بعضها لبعض - فانفسخ هذا الاحتجاج المذكور في نفي تقدم بعض الهيوليات على بعض أخرى.

و منها أن هذا الجواب و إن سلم جريانه في علة الوجود كالفاعل أو الغاية - لكنه غير جار في علة القوام كالمادة و الصورة فإن الجسم مما يتقوم ماهيته من ماهية الهيولى و الصورة لا من وجودهما فلو لا جوهرية أجزائه ما كان المجموع جوهرًا - و كما أنهم يقولون حمل الجسمية على الإنسان بتوسط حملها على الحيوان و حمل الحيوان على الإنسان فكذلك نقول حمل الجوهرية على الجسم بتوسط جزئيه.

و فيه تأمل لأنهم صرحوا بأن التشكيك إنما يتحقق إذا كان الكلي متفاوتاً فيه بحسب أفراده المتباينة الحقيقة أما التفاوت بالنسبة إلى أفراده المتداخلة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ١، ص ٤٤٦

فليس من التشكيك في شيء و كذا التفاوت بالعينية و الجزئية أو بالنوعية و الجنسية بالنسبة إلى الفرد الاعتباري و الفرد الحقيقي كالحيوان بالنسبة إلى الحيوان المأخوذ بشرط لا و المأخوذ بشرط شيء فإن طبيعة الحيوان بالقياس إلى الأول عين و نوع باعتبارين و بالقياس إلى الثاني جزء و جنس كذلك فهذه الأنحاء من التفاوت لا يسمى تشكيكاً إذ هي واقعة في الماهيات بالضرورة و الاتفاق.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول إنهم قد فرقوا بين أجزاء الماهية و أجزاء الوجود بأنها إذا أخذت لا بشرط شيء يكون أجزاء الماهية و إذا أخذت بشرط لا شيء يكون أجزاء الوجود كما سيجيء في مبحث الماهية فالمأخوذ بالوجه الأول جنس أو فصل و المأخوذ بالوجه الثاني مادة أو صورة فجزء الجسم إن أخذنا على الوجه الأول - فجوهريتهما متقدمة على جوهرية

الجسم و لا يلزم التشكيك لأنهما مع الجسم ليست من الأفراد المتباينة للجواهر من هذه الحيثية وإن أخذنا على الوجه الثاني فكل منهما وإن كان مباينا للجسم لكنهما ليسا مقومين لحقيقة الجسم بهذا الاعتبار بل لوجوده فهما من حيث وجودهما مقومان لوجوده فيلزم الاختلاف في الوجود لا في الجوهرية.

و الحمد لله أولا و آخرا و الصلاة و السلام على محمد و آله



الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢

[الجزء الخامس]

[تتمة السفر الثاني]

[تتمة المرحلة من العلم الطبيعي]

[تتمة الفن الرابع]

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وأما المطالب

فالمطلب الأول في أحكام الجواهر وفيها فنون

الفن الأول في تجوهر الأجسام الطبيعية وفيه مقدمة و عدة فصول

أما المقدمة ففي ماهية الجسم الطبيعي

اعلم أنك لما علمت في أوائل هذا السفر أن حقائق الأشياء عبارة عن وجوداتها الخاصة التي هي صور الأكوان وهويات الأعيان وأن الماهيات مفهومات كلية مطابقة لهويات خارجية ويعرض لها العموم والاشتراك في العقل ومعنى وجودها في الخارج صدقها على الوجودات وهي في حد نفسها لا موجودة ولا معدومة ولا كلية ولا جزئية.

و معنى عروض الوجود لها اتصافها عند العقل بمفهوم الوجود

العام البديهي لا بقيام فرد حقيقي من الوجود بها لاستحالة ذلك كما علمت مرارا وبالجمل الوجود هو بنفسه موجود في الخارج ويكون متقدما ومتأخرا و علة و معلولا و كل علة فهي في رتبة الوجود أشرف وأقوى وأشد وأعلى من معلولها و كل معلول فهو في رتبة الكون أخس وأدون وأنزل من علته حتى ينتهي سلسلة الوجود في جانب العلية - إلى مرتبة من الجلالة والرفعة والقوة يحيط بجميع المراتب والنشآت ولا يغيب عن وجوده شيء من الموجودات ولا يعزب عن علمه الذي هو ذاته ذرة في الأرض والسموات - وكذا ينتهي في جانب المعلولية و جهة القصور إلى حيث لا حضور لذاته عند ذاته - بل تغيب ذاته عن ذاته وهو الوجود الامتدادي ذو الأبعاد المكانية والزمانية وليس له من الجمعية والتحصيل الوجودي قدر ما لا ينطوي وجوده في عدمه ولا يندمج حضوره في غيبته ولا يتشابه وحدته في قوة كثرته وهو كالجسم فإن كل بعض مفروض منه غائب عن بعض آخر وكذا حكم بعض البعض بالقياس إلى بعض بعضه الآخر وهكذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣

فالكل غائب عن الكل فهذا غاية نقص الوجود في الذات الجوهرية ولا بد أن تصل نوبة الوجود لأن كل وجود هو مبدءا أثر وأثره أيضا نحو من الوجود أنقص منه وهكذا فلو لم ينته سلسلة الوجود إلى شيء يكون حيثية وجوده متضمنا لحيثية عدمه - يلزم عدم الوقوف إلى حد فلا يوجد الهيولى التي هي محض القوة والإمكان لكن لا بد من وجودها كما ستعلم وهذا أعني الصورة الجسمية وإن كان أمرا ظلما إلا أنه من مراتب نور الوجود فلو لم تنته نوبة الوجود إليه

لكان عدمه شراً وعدم إيجاده بخلاً وإمساكاً من مبدعه وهو غير جائز على المبدأ الفياض المقدس عن النقص والإمكان على مقتضى البرهان ولأن عدم فيضان هذا الجوهر الظلماني يستلزم وقوف الفيض على عدد متناه من الموجودات لنهوض البراهين الدالة على تناهي المترتبات في الوجود ترتباً ذاتياً عليها ومعلولياً فينسب بذلك باب الرحمة والإجادة عن إفادة الكائنات الزمانية المتعاقبة سيما النفوس الإنسانية الواقعة في سلسلة المعدات والعائدات وأيضاً لو لم ينته سلسلة الإيجاد إلى الجوهر الجسماني لزم أن ينحصر الممكنات في العقول فإن ما سوى العقول كالنفوس والطباع والصور والأعراض كالكم والكيف والأين والامتى وغيرها لا يمكن وجودها إلا مع الجسم أو بالجسم فهذه الوجوه وغيرها من القوانين الحكمية تدل دلالة عقلية على تحقق الممتدات الجوهرية في الوجود مع قطع النظر عن ما يوجب الحس من وجود جوهر ممتد فيما بين السطوح والنهايات حامل للكيفيات المحسوسة فهذا الجوهر الممتد هو المسمى بالجسم الذي من مقولة الجوهر وقد يطلق بالاشتراك على معنى آخر من مقولة الكم كما ستقف على الفرق بينهما وقد عرفوا الجسم بالمعنى الأول بحسب شرح اسمه بأنه الجوهر القابل لفرض الأبعاد الثلاثة. ونقل عن الشيخ أنه متردد في أن هذا التعريف للجسم حد أو رسم له - وأبطل الفخر الرازي كونه حداً بأن الجوهر لا يصلح جنساً للجسم ولا قابلية الأبعاد فصلاً له.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٥، ص ٤

أما الأول فلو جوه سبق ذكرها في كلامه من كون الجوهر معناه الموجود لا في موضوع والوجود لا يصلح للدخول في الماهيات فلا يكون جزءاً لأنواع الجوهر ولا في موضوع أمر سلبي والسلوب خارجة عن الحقائق الموجودة وأيضاً لو كان الجوهر جنساً لاحتاج إلى فصل وفصله إن كان عرضاً يلزم تقوم الجوهر بالعرض وإن كان جوهرًا احتيج إلى فصل آخر ويعود الكلام إليه فيتسلسل.

وأما الثاني فلأن معنى القابلية وإمكان الفرض وصحته ونحو ذلك من العبارات أمور نسبية لا تحقق لها في الخارج وإلا لقام بمحل قابل لها ضرورة أنها من المعاني العرضية فيحتاج إلى قابلية أخرى ويعود الكلام إلى قابلية القابلية فيلزم التسلسل في المترتبات الموجودة ضرورة توقف كل قابلية على قابلية سابقة عليها ومثله باطل بالاتفاق سيما وهذه السلسلة أمر محصور بين حاصرين هما هذه القابلية والمحل.

والجواب أما عن الأول فلما عرفت فيما مر فإنه وأكثر الناس زعموا أن قولهم الموجود لا في موضوع حد للجوهر وفهموا منه الموجود بالفعل مسلوباً عنه الموضوع وعليه يبتني اعتراضاتهم على جنسية الجوهر ولم يعلموا أن لا حد للأجناس العالية - لكونها بسيطة ولا حد لبسيط فما ذكر في تعريف الجواهر خواص ولوازم يصلح رسماً له وعدم جنسية رسم الشيء لا يوجب عدم جنسيته.

وأما عن الثاني فقد ذكر العلامة الطوسي في شرح الإشارات أن الفصل ليس قابلية الأبعاد لأنها لا تحمل على الجسم بل الفصل هو القابل المحمول وهو ليس بشيء فإن المراد من الألفاظ المشتقة المذكورة في التعاريف هي مفهوماتها البسيطة وحينئذ الفرق بينها وبين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٥، ص ٥

مبادئها الاشتقاقية بمجرد الاعتبار فإن مفهوم الأبيض بما هو أبيض بسيط كالبياض - و الفرق بينهما بأنه إن أخذ بشرط أن لا يكون معه شيء فهو عرض غير محمول و إن أخذ أعم من ذلك بلا شرط غيره كان عرضيا محمولا و كذا الحكم في جزء الحد كالناطق من جهة كونه جزءا غير محمول بالاعتبار الأول و فصلا محمولا بالاعتبار الثاني كما هو التحقيق - فالفرق بالوجود و العدم بين المشتق و مبدئه غير سديد.

بل الحري بالجواب أن يقال ليس المراد من الفصول المذكورة في أكثر الحدود بل هي ملزوماتها التي لا يمكن التعبير عنها إلا بتلك اللوازم كالناطق المذكور في تحديد الإنسان فإن المراد قوة النطق و كونه بحيث ينشأ منه إدراك الكليات لا نفس هذا الإدراك الذي من قبيل الإضافات ضرورة أن المضاف غير داخل فيما هو تحت مقولة الجوهر بالذات فهذه العنوانات المذكورة أقيمت مقام الفصول و المراد منها ملزوماتها.

و يؤيد هذا ما ذكره الشيخ الرئيس في إلهيات الشفاء إذا أخذ الحس في الحيوان - فليس هو بالحقيقة الفصل بل هو دليل على ما هو الفصل فإن فصل الحيوان أنه ذو نفس دراجة متحركة بالإرادة و ليست هوية نفس الحيوان أن يحس و لا هويته أن يتخيل و لا هويته أن يتحرك بالإرادة بل هو مبدأ لجميع ذلك انتهى.

و لعل من حد الجسم بأنه الطويل العريض العميق أراد به نحو ما ذكرناه لأن هذه المعاني مما يثبت عرضيتها كما مر فإن الجسمية قد تنفك عنها في مطلق الوجود أما انفكاكها عن الخط مطلقا ففي الوجود الخارجي و الذهني جميعا و أما عن السطح المستوي فكذاك مثل الكرة و الحلقة المفرغة و أشباههما.

و أما عن المستقيم و المستوي فهما جميعا فكالعدسي و الإهليلجي و أما عن المستدير فهما فكذاك مثل المكعبات. و أما عن الجميع فذلك و إن لم يتحقق في الوجود لكن مما يمكن تحقيقه في الوهم و العقل لأن التناهي ليس من لوازم ماهية الجسم فإن من تصور جسما غير متناه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٦

لم يتصور جسما لا جسما بل تصور جسما و شيئا آخر و هو كونه غير منته إلى سطح - فمن تصور في خياله جسما منبسطا في الجهات الثلاث من غير أن يتصور أو يعتبر معه تناهيه فقد أدرك و تصور جسما و لم يعوزه شيء من تصور حقيقة الجسم و إن لم يدرك تناهيه.

و من تصور جسما غير متناه لم يخطأ في التصور بل إنما أخطأ في التصديق - كمن قال إن الجسم عرض فقد تصور الطرفين البسيطين من غير خطأ فيهما لكنه أخطأ في التركيب الإيجابي فلو كان التناهي مقوما لحقيقة الجسم لم يكن الإنسان عند الفرض المذكور متصورا لحقيقة الجسم مع أنه قد تصورهما هذا خلف.

و أما مغايرة الجسم بهذا المعنى للجسم التعليمي الذي هو من باب الكم فلما سيأتي من الدليل إذ لا انفكاك بينهما في شيء من الوجودين حتى يثبت عرضيتهما بالانفكاك فقد ثبت أنه لا يجوز تحديد الجسم بهذا الأبعاد و لا بقبوله إياها بالفعل

بحث و تحقيق -

و ربما احتج القائل بصحة تعريف الجسم بهذه الأبعاد بأن الجسم لا يخلو عن صحة فرض الأبعاد و الخطوط و هذه الخطوط المفروضة إما أن تكون مفروضة في اتصال الجسم فيكون الاتصال حاصلًا بالفعل في الجسم و إلا لم تكن

مفروضة فيه بل في معنى آخر غير الاتصال و المتصل بنفسه هوى كان أو غيرها فلا بد أن يكون ذلك متصفا بالاتصال حتى يمكن فرض الأبعاد فيه و إلا لما كان الفرض صحيحا ضرورة أن ما لا اتصال له و لا بعد فيه لا يمكن فرض الأبعاد فيه.

فإذا كانت صحة هذا الفرض موقوفة على وجود الاتصال فوجب كونه موجودا قبل الفرض و إلا كان الفرض مستحيلا فيه و المقدّر خلافه و إذا كانت صحة الفرض موقوفة على وجود الاتصال فاستحال أن يكون وجود الاتصال موقوفا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٧

على صحة الفرض و لا أن يكون معها و إلا لزم توقف الشيء على نفسه إما بمرتبة أو بمرتبتين و هو محال فثبت أن الاتصالات في الجهات الكثيرة موجودة قبل فرض الخطوط - لازمة للجسم غير منفكة.

و الجواب أن للجسم اتصالا واحدا في نفسه هو المصحح لفرض الخطوط المتقاطعة فإن كان مرادكم بوجود الاتصال قبل فرض الأبعاد هذا فهو صحيح لكنه بنعت الوحدة هو الجسم و إن عنيتم أن في الجسم جهات متباينة موجودة بالفعل يفرض فيها الخطوط المتقاطعة المفروضة فليس الأمر كذلك بوجهين - أحدهما أنه لو كان عدد الجهات بالفعل بحسب الخطوط الممكنة الانقراض لكان الجهات غير متناهية كما أن الخطوط التي يمكن فرضها غير متناهية.

و ثانيهما أن الجهة ليست إلا منتهى الإشارة كما ستعرف و لا يتعين الجهات الخطية إلا بوجود الخطوط و لولاها لما كان لتلك الجهات من حيث إنها تلك الجهات حصول بالفعل فحق أنه وجد قبل فرض الخطوط الاتصال الذي عرض له الآن إن حكم عليه بأنه هذه الجهة أو في هذه الجهة و ليس بحق أنه وجد قبل الفرض هذه الجهة لأن قبل الفرض لما كانت هذه الجهة هذه الجهة كما أنه إذا حدث خط في سطح فإنه لم يكن هذا الخط موجودا قبل حدوث هذا الخط و إن كان الاتصال الذي وجد فيه الآن هذا الخط موجودا قبل هذا الخط.

ثم لقاتل أن يقول الاتصالات البعدية إذا كانت موجودة في الجسم بالقوة - و الانفصالات التي بإزائها أيضا موجودة بالقوة فإن الجسم في اتصاله و انفصاله بالقوة و ما بالقوة غير موجود فالجسم ليس بمتصل و لا منفصل هذا خلف.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٨

و الجواب عنه أن الاتصال بالمعنى الحقيقي الغير النسبي لفظ مشترك في الصناعة بين الخطوط و المقادير و بين الصورة الاتصالية كما سيتضح لك.

فنقول الاتصالات الخطية موجودة في الجسم بالقوة فاما الاتصال بمعنى الصورة الجسمية فذلك موجود بالفعل لأنه صورة مقومة لماهية الجسم المطلق فقد تقرر أن قابل الأبعاد ليس معناه القبول الإضافي المتأخر عن وجود القابل و المقبول - و لا ما يوجد فيه الأبعاد بالفعل و إلا لم يكن الكرة جسما بل المراد مبدأ هذا القبول كما علمت و علمت نظيره في تعريف الجوهر بالموجود الذي سلب عنه الموضوع.

طريقة أخرى

إن رهطا من المتأخرين لما تعسر عليهم تصحيح التعريف المذكور على الوجه الذي مر بيانه غيروا القول الموروث من القدماء إلى قولهم هو الجوهر الطويل العريض العميق.

و فيه أن كل واحد من هذه الألفاظ مشترك بين معان مختلفة فالطول يطلق تارة للخط كيف كان كما وقع في كتاب أقليدس ولأعظم الخطين المحيطين بالسطح مقداراً - ولأعظم الأبعاد المتقاطعة خطاً كانت أو غيره وللبعد المفروض أولاً وللبعد المفروض بين رأس الحيوان ومقابله من القدم أو الذنب وللبعد المفروض بين السماء والأرض وكذا العرض يطلق على السطح نفسه ولأنقص البعدين مقداراً وللبعد المفروض ثانياً وللبعد الواصل بين اليمين واليسار وكذا العمق يقال لما بين السطحين من الثخانة ولثالث البعدين المفروضين طولاً وعرضاً إذا كان متقاطعا لهما ولما يؤخذ ابتدأه من فوق حتى إنه يسمى المأخوذ عكسه سمكاً - وقد يطلق على الجسم نفسه.

وليس من شرط الجسم كما علمت أن يكون فيه خط أو خطوط كالكرة الغير المتحركة ولا أن يكون الجسمية مما يستدعي أن يكون ذا سطح وإن لم ينفك عنه في الوجود - ولا أيضاً يجب أن يكون ذا سطوح أو خطوط كثيرة بل ربما كان كالكرة والبيضي والشلجمي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩

ولا أن السطوح والأبعاد التي وقعت في الجسم مما يجب أن تكون متفاضلة بل ربما يكون كالمكعب ثم جسمية المكعب ليست بسبب السطوح الستة المحيطة به حتى إذا زالت زالت الجسمية بزوالها وكذا جسمية الأجسام ليست بأنها واقعة بين السماء والأرض أو في جوف المحدد حتى تعرض له الجهات وإن لم يكن بد من أن يكون الجسم إما محدداً أو في محدد.

فظهر من هذا أن وجود الأبعاد الثلاثة الموجودة بالفعل بأحد من المعاني المذكورة مما ليس مقوماً للجسم ولا لازماً من لوازم ماهيته ولا من لوازم وجوده بما هو وجود الجسم من حيث هو جسم حتى لا ينفك شيء من الأجسام الموجودة - عن تلك الأبعاد بشيء من الوجوه المفهومة منها بل يجب الرجوع في تأويل هذا الرسم - إلى ما وقع التحقيق أولاً في التعريف السابق فيقال معنى هذا الرسم أن الجسم هو جوهر يمكنك أن توقع أو تفرض فيه خطاً كيف ما وقع أولاً فيسمى طولاً وخطاً آخر مقاطعاً له على نقطة من النقاط الموجودة أو المفروضة تقاطعاً على زوايا قوائم - فيسمى هذا الثاني عرضاً وخطاً ثالثاً مقاطعاً لهذين على القوائم في النقطة المفروضة في التقاطع الأول حتى يكون موضع التقاطع القائم للخطوط الثلاثة نقطة واحدة - واستحال وجود بعد آخر عمودي على نقطة واحدة غير الثلاثة الموصوفة.

فالمراد مما ذكر في تعريف الجسم بأنه طويل عريض عميق هو كون الجسم بالحيثية التي مر وصفها و مر ذكر نظائرها وأشباهاها ثم سائر الأبعاد والسطوح والتعليمات الموجودة أو الموهونة في الجسم ليست داخلية في تجوهر الجسم بل هي أعراض خارجة لازمة أو مفارقة من توابع الجسم ولواحقه كما ستعلم ولفظ الاتصال مما يطلق تارة على صورة الجسم وتارة على المقادير التعليمية وغير التعليمية بحسب الاشتراك كما سنفصله إن شاء الله تعالى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠

تتمة استبصارية

قد علمت أن معنى كون الجسم طويلاً عريضاً عميقاً عند ما ذكرت عنواناً له وتعريفاً بها إياه هو كونه بالصفة المذكورة و

لما لم يفهم هذا المعنى من ظاهر اللفظ - ترى المتأخرين عدلوا عنه وذكروا في تعريف الجسم أنه هو الذي يمكن أن يفرض فيه أبعاد ثلاثة متقاطعة على الزوايا القوائم فزادوا قيودا ثلاثة هي الإمكان و الفرض و كون الأبعاد على وجه القيام العمودي.

أما قيد الإمكان فلما عرفت أن وجود الأبعاد ليس واجبا في الجسم لأنها ليست مقومة لماهيته و لا لازمة لوجوده فلو لم يقيد بالإمكان فهم منه الفعلية المطلقة - التي هي أدنى مراتب ما يغير الإمكان فلم يصدق التعريف على الجسم الذي لم يوجد فيه الأبعاد و لو في وقت من الأوقات فإذا قيد به دخل فيه ذلك الجسم فكل جسم و إن خلا عن وجود هذه الأبعاد لكن لم يخلو عن إمكانها.

و نقل صاحب المباحث المشرقية عن الشيخ الرئيس قدس سره أن هذا الإمكان هو الإمكان العام ليتناول ما يكون أبعاده حاصلة على طريق الوجوب كما في الأفلاك - و ما تكون حاصلة لا على طريق الوجوب مثل أبعاد الأجرام العنصرية و ما لا يكون شيء منها حاصلا بالفعل لكنه يكون ممكن الحصول كالكرة المصمتة فإننا لو حملنا هذا الإمكان على الإمكان المقارن للعدم لكان الطعن متوجها بأن يقال إنك لما جعلت هذا الإمكان جزء حد الجسم أو جزء رسمه فالجسم الذي قد فرض فيه بعض هذه الأبعاد أو ثلثها بالفعل فقد بطل جزء حده أو رسمه لأن القوة لا تبقى مع الفعل فقد بطل أن يكون جسما انتهى و فيه بحث أما أولا فلأن فرض الأبعاد المذكورة الموصوفة بصفة التقاطع القائم يمكن على أنحاء شتى و وجوه غير متناهية كلما خرج منها إلى الفعل بقي بعد في القوة وجوه غير متناهية منها حسب قبول الجسم انقسامات غير متناهية فكل نقطة من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١

النقاط الغير المتناهية المفروضة في الجسم يمكن فرضها مجمع تقاطع أبعاد ثلاثة في الجسم بالصفة المذكورة فلو حمل الإمكان المذكور على القوة الاستعدادية المقارنة لعدم ما هي استعداد له لم يلزم من وجود الأبعاد الثلاثة على الصفة المذكورة - بطلان مطلق الاستعداد بل بطلان استعداد مطلق الأبعاد الثلاثة أو بعضها و هو أيضا استعداد خاص لا يوجب رفعه رفع مطلق الاستعداد إذ الإمكان بهذا المعنى صفة وجودية ليس معنى سلبيا هو سلب ضرورة ما لجانب أو لجانبين كما سلف بيانه.

فبطلان فرد ما منه لا يستلزم بطلان طبيعته بخلاف بطلان فرد ما من المعنى السلبى المساوق لتحقيق طبيعة ما هو سلب له فإنه يوجب بطلان طبيعة ذلك السلب أ و لا ترى أن طبيعة رفع حركة ما في هذا اليوم يرتفع بوجود فرد ما من الحركة و لكن طبيعة الحركة لا يرتفع برفع فرد ما منها بل برفع جميع الأفراد لها و ذلك لأن تحقق الطبيعة بتحقيق فرد ما منها و ارتفاعها بارتفاع جميع أفرادها.

و أما ثانيا فلأن الإمكان المذكور في هذا التعريف على الوجه الذي قرره الرئيس في الهيئات الشفاء حيث قال يمكنك أن تفرض فيه ليس وصفا للجسم حتى يبطل بوجود ما هو قوة عليه بل هو وصف بحال متعلقه فإنه وصف للفراض فبعد تسليم أن هذا الإمكان إذا كان بمعنى الاستعداد مما يبطل طبيعته بوجود فرد ما من طبيعة ما هو إمكان له و قوة عليه يلزم أن يبطل صفة الإمكان من الفراض بتحقيق الفرض فيه لا بتحقيق البعد في الجسم.

و أما ثالثا فبعد تسليم أن الإمكان المذكور في تعريف الجسم وصف للجسم - و لا بد أن ينعدم بثبوت ما هو إمكان له

بأي وجه كان فهو إنما يلزم أن يعدم بوجود فرض الأبعاد لا بوجود نفسها و أين أحدهما من الآخر على أن معنى الإمكان غير منحصر في مفهوم الإمكان العام و الاستعدادي بل له معنى آخر يجوز أن يراد هاهنا و هو الإمكان الوقوعي بحسب نفس الأمر أعم من أن يكون معه استعداد أم لا فزيادة قيد الفرض لإدخال الفلك فظهر فائدة قيد الفرض أيضا و هو لا يغني عن قيد الإمكان إذ ربما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٢

لا يتحقق بالفعل و لا وقتا ما في جسم من الأجسام فيلزم حينئذ أن يبطل جسميته لعدم ذلك الفرض و هو مستحيل و ليس المراد منه نحو الفروض التقديرية التي قد تجري في المستحيلات بل التجويز العقلي الذي يستعمل في الرياضيات فلا يختل طرده بالجواهر المجردة و أما تقييد الأبعاد على النحو المذكور فلإخراج السطوح فإنها مما يمكن فيها الخطوط الكثيرة المتقاطعة لكن التقاطع على وجه القيام لا يمكن فيها إلا بين خطين لا أكثر منهما. و ذلك لأنه لم يتحقق بعد نحو وجود السطوح و لم يبرهن على أنها لا يمكن أن يكون إلا إعراضا و التعريف الاسمي لأمر يختلف الناس في نحو وجوده لا بد و أن يكون على وجه يتوافق فيه القوم حتى يكون التنازع المعنوي في معنى واحد بينهم - و إلا لجاز أن يكتفوا في تعريف الجسم ببعد واحد فإن الجوهر الممتد منحصر في الجسم لكن العلم بهذا الانحصار إنما يحصل بعد إقامة البرهان على نحو وجوده و هو مطلب ما الحقيقية. فذكر الأبعاد المتقاطعة على الوجه المذكور إما احتراز عما ذهب إليه بعض المعتزلة من تألف الأجسام عن السطوح الجوهرية و إما إيفاء بتمام تصوير ماهية الجسم - و إشعار بأن المعتبر في جسمية الجسم قبوله للأبعاد على الوجه المذكور و إن كان قابلا لأبعاد كثيرة لا على هذا الوجه فقد وضح هاهنا أيضا أن جسمي المكعب و غيره - ليس بحسب ما وجد فيها من الأبعاد حتى تبطل الجسمية بطلانها و لا بحسب إمكان وقوع أبعاد مخصوصة شخصية على الوجه المذكور حتى يبطل ذلك الإمكان بتحققها - و يبطل بطلانها الجسمية بل المعتبر في الرسم أو المأخوذ في الحد كون الجسم بحيث يمكن لأحد أن يفرض في داخل ثخنه بعدا و بعدا آخر عمودا عليه و بعدا ثالثا عمودا عليهما و هذا المعنى لا ينفك عن الجسم أبدا سواء وجدت فيه الأبعاد أم لا و سواء وجد الفارض أم لا و سواء تحقق منه الفرض أم لا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٣

عقد و حل

و ربما قال قائل إن هذا الرسم غير صحيح بوجوه - أما أولا فلصدقه على الهيولى الأولى لأنها جوهر يقبل الأبعاد و إن كان بواسطة الصور الجسمية فإن صحة فرض الأبعاد بالواسطة أخص من صحة فرض الأبعاد مطلقا و متى تحقق الخاص تحقق العام بالضرورة.

و أما ثانيا فلأن الوهم مما يصح فيه فرض الأبعاد الثلاثة كذلك للمقادير الموجودة فيه و التعليميات مع أن الوهم ليس جسما طبيعيا.

و أما ثالثا فلأن الصحة و الإمكان و نظائرها أمور عدمية و أوصاف لا ثبوت لها في العين و التعريف بالعدميات لو جاز

لجاز في البسائط التي لا سبيل إلى معرفتها إلا باللوامز و أما الجسم فماهية مركبة لوقوعها تحت جنس الجوهر فلها فصل يتركب هي منه و من الجنس و لتركبها من الهيولى و الصورة و التركيب في الوجود يستلزم التركيب في الماهية. فيقال في الجواب أما عن الوجه الأول فلأن الأبعاد أعراض قائمة بالجسم لأنه موضوع لها و ليس للهيولى الأولى وجود في ذاتها مستقل حتى يقبل شيئا شأنه أن لا يكون عارضا لأمر إلا بعد تمام تحصل ذلك الأمر الذي يقبله سواء كان بواسطة أو بدون واسطة بل لا يمكن لها في ذاتها إلا قبول ما يكملها و يحصلها موجودا بالفعل و تقومها ماهية نوعية خارجية.

نعم لو أريد بالواسطة الواسطة في العروض بإزاء ما هو المعروض بالذات دون الواسطة في الثبوت لكان صحيحا أن يقال إن الهيولى يقبل الأبعاد بالواسطة مثل ما يقال لمن يجلس في السفينة إنه متحرك بالواسطة لكن صحة هذا الإسناد الذي هو بحسب الواسطة في العروض بضرب من التجوز ليس كالإسناد الذي هو بسبب أمر متوسط في الثبوت كاتصاف الماء بالسخونة بتوسط النار لأن هذا إسناد بالحقيقة دون الأول و اللازم في التعريفات صدقها على أفراد المعارف صدقا بالذات و عدم صدقها على غيرها كذلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٤

فلا يقدح في صحة التعريف أن يصدق صدقا بالعرض على غير أفراد المعرف. و بهذا يندفع كثير من الإشكالات التي تكون من هذا القبيل فإن المعلم الأول حد المتصل بأنه الذي يمكن أن يفرض فيه أجزاء يتلاقى على حد مشترك و رسمه بأنه القابل لانقسامات غير متناهية و حد الرطب بأنه القابل للأشكال بسهولة و اليابس بأنه القابل لها بصعوبة فيتوهم ورود النقض بالهيولى الأولى في جميع هذه الحدود و نظائرها- و بما ذكرناه يندفع النقض عن الجميع و لك أن تقول إن ماهية الجسم مركبة بحسب الوجود الخارجي من الجزئين هما الهيولى و الصورة و الهيولى هو الجزء الذي به يكون الجسم قابلا متهيئا لحصول الأشياء له و الصورة هو الجزء الذي به يتحقق الحصول و الفعلية و لا دخل للصورة في القابلية إذ جهة القابلية إنما هي للهيولى فقط - فالقابل للأبعاد في الحقيقة هي الهيولى لا الصورة فينتقض التعريف طردا و عكسا لصدق على الهيولى و إن كان بشرط الجسمية و عدم صدقه على المجموع المركب منهما أي الجسم لما بينا أن الصورة لا مدخل لها في القابلية فليس القابل هو المجموع بل الهيولى بالشرط المذكور.

و لنا أن نجيب عنه بأن القبول هاهنا بمعنى مطلق الاتصاف بشيء سواء كان على وجه الانفعال و التأثر التجدي الذي يقال له الاستعداد أو لم يكن و الذي يكون من خواص الهيولى هو الاستعداد لا مطلق الاتصاف لوجود الأوصاف الكمالية في المفارقات من غير انفعال هناك فقبول الأبعاد الثلاثة بحسب الفرض لا يحتاج إلى انفعال مادة أصلا أو لا ترى أن الجسم لو كان محض الجسمية من غير هيولى لكان قابلا للأبعاد الفرضية باتفاق العقلاء و لهذا عرف الجسم به من لا يعتقد وجود الهيولى الأولى - أو نقول إن إمكان القبول للأبعاد صفة للجسم لا القبول فلا يناهض هذا كون القبول من جهة أحد جزئيه أو لا ترى أن إمكان الإنسانية صفة للمني و ليس المنى إنسانا فإمكان قبول الأبعاد من لوازم الجسم التي لا يحتاج ثبوتها له إلى قابلية و استعداد و إن كان

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القبول بالفعل من عوارض الهيولى المفتقرة إلى تغير و انفعال فافهم هذا فإن الإهمال فيه مما يغلط كثيرا- و أما الجواب عن الشك الثاني فلأن المراد من قبول الأبعاد أو صحة فرضها أو إمكان وجودها ما يكون بحسب الوجود الخارجي و النشأة التي نحن نتكلم فيها مع أحد أو نفيد له أو نستفيد منه و الوهم و إن قيل أشياء كثيرة و أبعادا و أجراما عظيمة إلا أن قبوله لها بنحو آخر من الوجود غير وجود هذا العالم و أبعاد هذا العالم هي التي يمكن أن يشار إليها بالحواس الظاهرة و عالم الخيال عالم آخر سماواته و أرضه أبعاده و أجرامه و أشخاصه و كفياته كلها مباينة الحقيقة لأبعاد هذا العالم و أجرامه و أشخاصه و كفياته و إليه الإشارة في قوله جل ذكره **يَوْمَ تَبْدُلُ الْأَرْضَ غَيْرَ الْأَرْضِ** و أما إذا قلنا في تعريف الرطب ما يكون قابلا للأشكال بسهولة لم يفهم إلا ما يكون قابلا لها في وجوده الخارجي و كونه الدنيوي و أما في غير هذا الكون فليس من شرط معنى الرطوبة- أن يقبل الشكل بسهولة أو صعوبة.

أما ترى أن القبر هاهنا قبر و أعداده متشابهة و في البرزخ إما روضة أو نيران- و الوضوء هاهنا وضوء و هناك حور و الجهاد هاهنا جهاد و هناك نور و الدار هاهنا جماد و في الآخرة حيوان.

و لنعرض عن هذا النمط من الكلام لأن الأسماع مملوءة من الصمم من استماع مثله و الأعين عماة عن مشاهدة نشأة أخرى و القلوب مغشوة غيظا و عداوة للذين آمنوا بها و عملوا بموجبها.

و أما الجواب عن الشك الثالث فبأن التعريف المذكور لم يقع بنفس القبول- لكونه غير محمول و لا بالقابل بما هو قابل حتى يرد عليه ما ذكره من كونه وصفا اعتباريا لا يليق لتعريف الحقيقة الخارجية بل وقع التعريف بكون خاص و نحو من الوجود و هو الجوهر الذي يكون بحيث يصلح لأن يفرض فيه الأبعاد أو الجوهر الذي يوجد فيه بحسب الفرض كذا و كذا فإن مفاد الذي ما يرادف الوجود أو يساوقه.

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و التعريف للشيء بنحو من الكون و الوجود ليس تعريفا بامر اعتباري لا تحقق له كيف و وجود كل شيء هو المتحقق بالذات لا ماهيته الكلية و كذلك الحال في أكثر التعريفات الحقيقية للأشياء كتعريف الحيوان بأنه الجسم الذي من شأنه أن يحس و يتحرك و تعريف الإنسان بأنه الحيوان الذي من شأنه أن يدرك الكليات أي يتعقل المعاني الكلية و يتصورها. ثم لا فرق في البسائط و المركبات فيما ذكره فإن تعريف الحقائق الموجودة- بنفس السلوب و الأعدام غير جائز سواء كانت بسيطة أو مركبة لأن الغرض من التعريف تحصيل أمر في الذهن و العدم و العدمي مفهومهما زوال شيء لا تحصيله

فصل (١) في ذكر اختلاف الناس في تحقق الجوهر الجسماني و نحو وجوده الذي يخصه

أما الاعتقاد بوجوده على الوجه الذي يستلزم الجوهرية مع ما يصحح الطول و العرض و العمق مطلقا فهذا أمر ضروري لا نزاع فيه لأحد من العقلاء و أما أنه متصل بنفسه أم لا أو أنه بسيط أو مركب من جوهرين أو من جوهر و عرض فليس بضروري- و لهذا وقع الاختلاف بين الناس في نحو وجوده.

فمن قائل من زعم أنه مركب من ذوات أو أوضاع جوهرية غير منقسمة أصلا لا وهما و لا فرضا و لا قطعاً و لا كسرا و هؤلاء أيضا تشعبوا إلى قائل بعدم تناهي الجواهر الفردة في كل جسم حتى الخردلة و هو النظام من المعتزلة و أصحابه.

و قائل إلى تناهيها و هم جمهور المتكلمين.

و من قائل أنه متصل في نفسه.

فمن هؤلاء من ذهب إلى أنه يقبل الانقسام بأقسامه لا إلى نهاية و هم جمهور الحكماء.

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و منهم من ذهب إلى أنه يقبل عددا متناهيًا ثم يؤدي إلى ما لا ينقسم أصلاً و هو صاحب كتاب الملل و النحل.
و منهم من ذهب إلى أنه لا يقبل من الانقسام إلا ما سوى الخارجي أعني الفك أو القطع لكون الجسم المفرد عنده صغيراً صلباً لا يقبل شيئاً منهما لصغره و صلابته و هو ديمقراطيس من الفلاسفة المتقدمين.
و القائل بانقسامه بأقسامه لا إلى نهاية اختلفوا ثلاث فرق ففرقة ذهبت إلى أنه جوهر بسيط هو الممتد في الجهات المتصل بنفسه اتصالاً مقدارياً جوهرياً قائماً بذاته و هو رأي أفلاطون الإلهي كما هو المشهور و مذهب شيعة المشهورين بالرواقيين و من يحذو حذوهم و سلك منهجهم كالشيخ الشهيد و الحكيم السعيد شهاب الدين يحيى السهروردي في كتاب حكمة الإشراق و فرقة إلى أنه جوهر مركب من جوهرين أحدهما صورة الاتصال و الآخر الجوهر القابل لها و هم أصحاب المعلم الأول و من يحذو حذوهم من حكماء الإسلام كالشيخين أبي نصر و أبي علي و فرقة إلى أنه مركب لكن من جوهر قابل و عرض - هو الاتصال المقداري و هو ما ذهب إليه الشيخ الإلهي في كتاب التلويحات اللوحية و العرشية - و قد شنع عليه بعض الناظرين في كتبه لما وجد تناقضاً بين كلاميه في هذين الكتابين - حيث حكم ببساطة الجسم و جوهريته المقدار في أحدهما و اختار أنه مركب من جوهر سماه هيولى و عرض هو المقدار بناء على تجويزه تركيب نوع واحد طبيعي من جوهر و عرض و بين الكلامين مخالفة بحسب الظاهر.
لكن الشارحين لكلامه مثل محمد الشهرزوري صاحب تاريخ الحكماء و ابن كمونة شارحي التلويحات و العلامة الشيرازي شارح حكمة الإشراق كلهم اتفقوا على عدم المنافاة بين ما في الكتابين في القمصود قائلين أن الفرق يرجع إلى تفاوت اصطلاحية فيهما و يتحقق ذلك بأن في الشمعة حين تبدل أشكاله مقدارين ثابت و هو جوهر لا يزيد و لا ينقص بتوارد الأشكال عليه و متغير هو ذهاب المقادير في الجوانب و هو عرض في المقدار الذي هو جوهر و مجموعهما هو الجسم و الجوهر منهما هو الهيولى على

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مصطلح التلويحات و ذلك الامتداد الجوهري هو الجسم على مصطلح حكمة الإشراق و هو الذي يسمى بالنسبة إلى الهيئات و الأنواع المحصلة الهيولى فلا مناقضة بين حكمة ببساطة الجسم و جوهريته المقدار في أحد الكتابين و حكمة بتركيب الجسم و عرضية المقدار في الآخر فإن ذلك الجسم و الامتداد غير هذا الجسم و الامتداد فتوهم المناقضة إنما طراً من اشتراك اللفظ.

بحث و إشارة

إن كلام هذا الحكيم العظيم في بعض مواضع من كتابه الكبير المسمى بالشارع و المطارحات صريح في أنه كان ينكر الاتصال و الامتداد سوى ما هو من عوارض الكم و فصوله و يبطل الاتصال الذي هو مقوم للجسم و ما ذكر في

التلويحات شيئا يدل على أن ما سماه هيولى يكون امتدادا جوهريا ممتدا بذاته أو مقدارا قائما بنفسه بل أثبت له خواص الهيولى التي هي عند المشائين أبسط من ماهية الجسم بما هو جسم أعني ما يصلح جنسا للأجسام النوعية البسيطة أو المركبة إذ صرح فيه بأن في الجسم ما يقبل الاتصال والانفصال جميعا- والاتصال نفسه لا يقبل شيئا منها فالقابل لهما أمر آخر وبأن الامتداد ليس خارجا عن حقيقة الجسم وإلا لما افتقر في تعقلها إلى تعقله أولا فهو جزؤه والقابل له هو المسمى بالهيولى جزء آخر للجسم.

وهذا صريح في أن رأيه هاهنا في الهيولى موافق لرأي جمهور الحكماء وفي حكمة الإشراق نص على أن ما هو المسمى بالهيولى مقدار جوهري قائم بنفسه- فالتناقض بين كلاميه بحاله في جوهرية المقدار وعرضيته بلا مخلص وكذا في بساطة الجسم وتركيبه فإن ما سماه هيولى في أحد كتابيه يجوز كونه جسما كما حكم عليه بناء على ما رأى من كونه متصلا بذاته ومقدارا جوهريا وليس كمال الجسم إلا بهذا المعنى أو بما يلزمه.

وأما الهيولى التي أثبتها في كتابه الآخر فإنها لا تصلح إلا جزء الجسم لأن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٩

الجسمية لا تتم ولا تتصور إلا بما يجري مجرى الصورة الامتدادية لا بمجرد القابل له فقط وسيظهر لك الفرق بين الامتداد والاتصال بالمعنى الذي هو مقوم للجسم عند أصحاب أرسطو وبين ما هي نوع من الكمية عارض للجسم عندهم ومجرد الجسمية عند صاحب الإشراق وهو منكر للمعنى الأول مطلقا فهذا تفصيل ما اشتهر من مذاهب الناس في حقيقة الجسم المطلق ونحن بصدد ترجيح قول الحكماء الذاهبين إلى تركبه من جوهرين جوهر مادي وجوهر صوري إن شاء الله العزيز الحكيم

فصل (٢) في شرح الاتصال المقوم للجوهر الجسماني وما يلزمه ويتوارد عليه أحاده مع بقاء الأول

إن أول ما يجب عليك هاهنا أن تعلم معنى لفظ الاتصال والمتصل بالمعنى الذي هو حقيقي لا بالقياس إلى شيء آخر وبالمعنى الذي هو مقيس إلى الآخر- أما ما هو صفة حقيقية فهو أيضا معنيان.

أحدهما كون الشيء في مرتبة ذاته و حد ماهيته صالحا لأن ينتزع منه الامتدادات الثلاثة

المتقاطعة مطلقا من غير تعيين مرتبة من الكمية والعظم فلا تفاوت بحسبه بين متصل ومتصل ولا مساواة أي مماثلة في القدر فلا يكون متصل بهذا المعنى جزءا من متصل آخر ولا مشاركا ولا عادا ولا معدودا ولا جذرا ولا مجذورا ولا مبائنا أيضا ولا أقل ولا أكثر.

وهو بهذا المعنى فصل مقسم لمقولة الجوهر وثابت للجسم في حد نفسه كما سنبرهن عليه إن شاء الله تعالى إذ هو بعد ما حقق أمره في عدم كونه مؤلفا من غير المنقسمات الجوهرية الوضعية في مرتبة ذاته مصداق لحمل المتصل والممتد عليه- مع قطع النظر عن العوارض والخارجيات كلها فاتصاله وامتداده نفس متصليته و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٠

ممتديته لا أمر آخر يقوم به فيصيره منشأ لصدق المتصل عليه وموضوعا لحمله عليه سواء كان الجسم مجرد الصورة الامتدادية أو مؤلفا من صورة الامتداد وجوهر آخر قابل له على اختلاف رأي الحكيمين العظميين المقدمين.

فإن قلت لو كان الجسم في حد نفسه متصلاً لا يمكن فيه فرض شيء دون شيء و لكان قابلاً للقسمة إلى الأجزاء المقدرية فيكون نوعاً من الكم لأن هذا المعنى يعرض للكم المتصل لذاته و لغيره بواسطته.

قلنا ليس هذا القدر أي مجرد كون الشيء متصلاً و ممتداً مساوياً لقبول القسمة المقدرية بل إنما يستتم ذلك بعد تعيين الكمية و تحصيل قدر الاتصال - إذ ما لم يتعين ذهاب قدر التماذي و الانبساط إما إلى حد معين من الحدود و النهايات - و مبلغ خاص من المبالغ و الغايات أو إلى اللانهاية فيهما لم يصح فيه فرض جزء معين دون جزء معين و لا يتميز فيه جزء عيني عن جزء عيني و لا وهمي عن وهمي بأحد أسباب القسمة من الفك أو القطع أو الوهم أو اختلاف عرضين قارين كالبلقة أو غير قارين كمحاذايتين أو موازيتين إذ المصحح و المهيب لجمع هذه الأنحاء في القسمة - هو تعيين المقدار سواء كان معروض القسمة و الاثنينية نفس المقدار أو معنى آخر كالهولي أو الجسم.

و ليس للجسم في مرتبة ذاته إلا نفس الامتداد في الجهات كلها من دون تعيين الانبساط و تقدر الذهاب و الاتصال و إنما يعرض كمية الاتصال و تقدره بعد نفس الاتصال.

و الدليل على أن كمية الاتصال غير الاتصال أن ماهية الجسم متصورة في الذهن مع قطع النظر عن الكميات المقدرية و العددية نعم لا بد له في الوجود الخارجي من تعيين مقداري و عددي فهو من اللوازم الوجودية دون المقومات و اللوازم الذهنية.

قال الشيخ الرئيس عظم الله تقديسه في التعليقات إذا قلنا جزء من جسم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢١

فمعناه جزء من مقدار الجسم فإن الجسم بما هو جسم ليس هو جزءاً و لا كلاً.

و مثاله في المنفصل إذا قلنا جسمان من جملة خمسة أجسام فمعناه اثنان من جملة خمسة أعداد عرضت للجسم لا أن الجسم بما هو جسم واحد أو كثير.

و قال في الشفاء فالجسمية بالحقيقة صورة الاتصال القابل لما قلناه من فرض الأبعاد الثلاثة و هذا المعنى غير المقدار و غير الجسمية التعليمية فإن هذا الجسم من حيث له هذه الصورة لا يخالف جسماً آخر بأنه أكبر أو أصغر و لا يناسبه بأنه مساو أو معدود به أو عاد له أو مشارك أو مباين و إنما ذلك له من حيث هو مقدر و من حيث جزء منه بعده و هذا الاعتبار غير اعتبار الجسمية التي ذكرناها.

و ثانيهما كون الشيء بحيث يوجد بين أجزائه المتخالفة الأوضاع الموهومة - حدود مشتركة

يكون كل حد نهاية لبعض و بداية لآخر و من خواص المتصل بهذا المعنى قبوله للانقسام بلا نهاية و هو فصل من فصول الكم و يتقوم به ما سوى العدد من الكميات كلها قارة كانت أو غير قارة منقسمة في الجهات كلها أو بعضها فقط فهذان المعنيان للمتصل كلاهما حقيقيان.

و الدليل على إطلاق المتصل على هذين المعنيين الذين أحدهما فصل الجوهر يتقوم به الجسم و الآخر فصل الكم يتقوم به الكم المتصل ما ذكره في فصل من إلهيات الشفاء معقود لبيان أن المقادير أعراض بقوله و أما الكميات المتصلة فهي المتصلات الأبعاد.

و أما الجسم الذي هو الكم فهو مقدار المتصل الذي هو الجسم بمعنى الصورة فهذه العبارة نص منه على أن نفس

الاتصال في الجهات كيف كان و على أي قدر و مبلغ كان هو مقوم للجسم و جزء حده. و أما مقدار هذا الاتصال فهو قسم من أنواع الكم يطلق عليه الجسم بالاشتراك - و ربما يقيد الجسم الذي هو الجوهر الطبيعي و الذي هو عرض فيه بالتعليمي إذ يبحث عن الأول في الحكمة التي تسمى بالطبيعيات و عن الثاني في التي تسمى

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بالتعليميات و أما ما هو صفة إضافية فهو أيضا يطلق على معينين. أحدهما كون المقدار أو الشيء ذي المقدار متحد النهاية بآخر مثله سواء كانا موجودين اثنين أو موهومين فيقال لأحدهما إنه متصل بالثاني بهذا المعنى. و الثاني كون الجسم بحيث يتحرك بحركة جسم آخر فيقال لهذا إنه متصل بذلك بهذا المعنى فالمعنى الأول من عوارض الكم المتصل و هذا المعنى من عوارض الكم المنفصل مطلقا كاتصال خطي الزاوية أو من جهة ما هو في مادة كاتصال الأعضاء بعضها ببعض و اتصال اللحوم بالرباطات و الرباطات بالعظام و بالجملة كل مماس يكون عسر القبول لمقابل المماس

تلخيص و توضيح -

فقد استوضح بطلوع نور المعرفة من أفق التبيان أن للجسم الطبيعي بما هو جسم طبيعي امتدادا و انبساطا في الجهات الثلاث مطلقا فهذا له بحسب سنخ طبيعته - لأنه من مقومات ماهيته و ليس له من تلك المرتبة أن يتعين تماديه بالنهاية و اللانهاية إن أمكنت بل أحدهما من عوارض الوجود له لا من لوازم الماهية كما مر فالجسم بهذه الحيثية في هذه المرتبة لا يساوي جسما آخر و لا يفاوته بالعظم و الصغر. ثم إذا اعتبر تعين الامتدادات لحق له إمكان انفراض الأجزاء المشتركة في الحدود المشتركة و عرض له الاتصال بالمعنى الذي هو مبدأ فصل الكم و مصحح قبول المساواة و المفاوطة. و لا يتوهم أحد أن هناك امتدادين و ممتدين بالذات جوهريا و عرضيا بل إنما الممتد بالذات موجود واحد إن اعتبر مطلقا فهو جوهر مقوم للجسم الطبيعي - و ليس له بحسب هذه المرتبة أن يكون ممسوحا و إن اعتبر متعينا في تماديه فصح أن يمسح بكذا و كذا مرة أو مرات متناهية أو لا متناهية إن جاز وجوده فكان جسما

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من باب التعليميات و كذلك السطح فيه اعتباران بأحدهما نهاية الجسم الطبيعي و ليس من الكميات و إن كان عرضا خارجا عن حقيقة الجسم و بالآخر نهاية للجسم التعليمي و يكون نوعا خاصا من المقادير القارة. و كذا القياس في الخط و الذي يكشف الأمر في جوهر الجسم المتصل بأحد المعنيين و عرضيته بالمعنى الآخر بقاء شخصية أحدهما مع تبدل شخصيات الآخر عند تبدل أشكال جسم واحد بعينه بالتدوير و التكعيب كالشمعة الواحدة فهناك شخص الاتصال بالمعنى الأول باق و المقدار المساحي بحيث يمسح بكذا و كذا باق و هو حقيقة نوعية من الجسم التعليمي لأن كل مرتبة من الكم بالذات نوع تام مباين لمرتبة أخرى فوقها أو تحتها و تبدل الأشكال مع انحفاظ

المساحة توجب تبدل الأشخاص المتساوية في الكم لأن التساوي يوجب المماثلة في الكم. فعلم من هذا أن الجسم التعليمي عرض في الجسم الطبيعي يفارقه في الوهم دون الوجود بحسب الطباع و كلاهما يفارقان المادة بتتابعهما في الوهم دون الوجود- إنما المفتقر إلى المادة في الوجودين الوهمي والعيني تغيرات كل منهما و انفعالاتهما الشخصية و سيظهر لك حقيقة هذه المعاني فصل ظهور و انكشاف في الفصول التالية- من بعد إن شاء الله الحكيم

فصل (٣) في أن جميع الامتدادات و الاتصالات مما يستصح وجودها بالجواهر المتصل

إن العقل بغريزته التي فطر الناس عليها يحيل أن يعرض المقدار و الكمية الاتصالية لما ليس ممتدا في نفسه و متصلا في ذاته كما قال الرئيس بلغة الفرس في كتاب دانشنامج الموصوف بالحكمة العلائية جسم در حد ذات پيوسته است كه اگر گسسته بودی قابل ابعاد نبودی فالأبعاد سواء كانت زمانية أو مكانية مما يتوقف

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وجودها على متصل بنفسه مجردا عن التعين الامتدادي و التجدد الانبساطي حيث لم يكن ذاته ذاتا مقدارية إذ لو كان في حد نفسه أمورا متفاضلة لكانت بعد عروض المقدار المتصل له إما أن يكون باقية على حالها من الانفصال أم لا فعلى الأول يلزم أن يكون المتصل منفصلا إذ تعدد المعروض يوجب تعدد العارض فإذا كان المعروض أمورا متباينة الوجود غير مشتركة في الحدود المشتركة كان العارض كذلك فلم يكن مقدارا متصلا و هو خرق الفرض. و أما الهيئة العارضة للعسكر و نظائره فليست عارضة لها في الخارج من حيث ذواتها المتعددة بل إنما عرضت لها في الذهن عند اعتبار العقل إياها أمرا واحدا- فثبت أن المقادير القارة عارضة للجواهر المتصل إما بلا واسطة كالجسم التعليمي أو بواسطة كالسطح و بعده الخط و كذا الحركة المتصلة من جهة المسافة و بحسب اتصالها المسافي صالحة لأن يتكلم بالزمان و يتقدر به فإن جملة الكميات المتصلة- مما ينصلح وجودها بتعلقها بالجواهر المتصل بالذات. و إن سألت الحق فالكمية المنفصلة و الكثرة العارضة لنوع متفق الأفراد- لا يستصح وجودها إلا بانفصال الجواهر الاتصالي لأن تكثر النوع الواحداني لا يعرض- إلا لما يعرض له الوحدة الاتصالية و ذلك لأن الموجب للتكثر لو كان أمرا ذاتيا له- أو لازما لطبيعته النوعية لكان كل فرد منه أفرادا كثيرة فلم يتحقق منه فرد واحد- فحيث لم يوجد واحد لم يوجد كثير هذا خلف.

فإذا لم يكن الكثرة لازمة و لا الوحدة لازمة و إلا لكان من حق نوعه أن لا يوجد إلا في شخص و المفروض خلافه فلا بد أن يكون مثل هذا النوع صالحا في وجوده للاتصال و الانفصال. و قد علمت أن المصحح للاتصال ليس خارجا عن حقيقة الجسم الطبيعي من حيث الجواهر الاتصالي و سيظهر لك عن قريب أن القابل للانفصال جزء آخر من الجسم بمدخلية الجزء الصوري و إعداده إياه لقبول الفصل.

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فعلم مما ذكرنا أن الكميات بجميع أجناسها و أنواعها مما لا يستصح إلا بالاتصال الجوهرى فليكن هذا عندك محفوظا

فصل (٤) في أنحاء التقسيم إلى الأجزاء المقدارية و هي أربعة

أحدها انفكاكية خارجية توجب كثرة بالفعل في الخارج.
و ثانيها وهمية جزئية توجب كثرة في الوهم ولا يخرج فيها إلى الفعل في الوهم إلا جزئيات متناهية العدد بالفعل مع إمكان آحاد أخرى لا إلى نهاية.
و ثالثها عقلية فرضية تحيط بجميع الأجزاء الممكنة الانفراض مجملة على ما هو شأن العقل البسيط الإجمالي في إدراك جزئيات الماهية العقلية.
و رابعها ما بحسب اختلاف عرضين قارين أو غير قارين فالأول مبدأ الافتراق الخارجي و الثاني منشأ انتزاع الوهم صفة الافتراق بحسب حال الموصوف في الواقع و القسمة بأقسامها إذا طرأ الجسم إنما ترد على الصورة الاتصالية في درجة مقدارها التعليمي إلا أن الانفكاكية مما يحتاج إلى تهيو من المادة و هي التي تقبلها و تحفظ معها كما ستعرف فهي من عوارضها بالحقيقة و إن كان المهيء لقبولها الانفكاك مقدار تعليمي عارض لصورة اتصالية.
و أما الوهمية فهي من عوارض التعليميات بما هي تعليميات من غير استعداد خاص للمادة.
و أما العقلية فهي أيضا من عوارضها بما هي متصلة اتصالا بالمعنى الأول من الأولين.
و مما يجب أن يعلم أن اسم الجزء يقع على ما يتركب منه الشيء و على ما ينحل إليه و على الجزء المقداري بضرب من الاشتراك أو على سبيل المسامحة و التجوز

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٦

فإن الأجزاء المقدارية أجزاء للمتصل بحسب الانفصال و الانحلال إليها لا بالحقيقة - بل بالمشابهة بأن يقدر و يفرض أنه لو كان للمتصل بما هو متصل أجزاء أي بحسب شخصه و وضعه لا بماهيته لكان أشبه الأشياء و أيقها بالجزئية هذه الأمور المسماة بالأجزاء - لأنها لما تأخرت وجودها عن وجود ما هو الكل فليست أجزاء بالحقيقة للحقيقة - بل جزئية كل منها بحسب وحدته الاتصالية الشخصية إنما هي بالقياس إلى عدد حاصل من الوحدات الاتصالية و لهذا تكون متوافقة و موافقة لكل في الحد و الاسم و العلم و الجسم فاحتفظ به كي ينفك في اندفاع ما ذهب إليه ديمقراطيس

فصل (٥) في إثبات المتصل الوحداني لينكشف به نحو وجود الصورة الجسمية

اعلم أن المتكفل لتحقيق الماهيات و إثبات نحو وجودها إنما هو العلم الكلي

و الفلسفة الأولى لا العلم الطبيعي كما أن إيجاد الحقائق الإبداعية لا يتصور إلا من العقول الفعالة - دون القوى الجسمانية المنفعلة الواقعة في عالم التغيرات و الاستحالات إذ العلم صورة للمعلوم و حقيقته.
و أقول إذا اشتدت معرفة الإنسان و حدث بصر بصيرته لعلم أن الفاعل لجميع الأشياء و كذا الغاية ليس إلا الباري جل اسمه بحسب قوة تأثيره في الأشياء و سرية نوره النافذ إليها فما من مطلوب إلا و يتكفل بإثبات وجوده العلم بالله عز اسمه و من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٧

عرف الله حق معرفته يحصل له بمعرفته تعالى معرفة جميع الأشياء الكلية و الجزئية فيكون علمه بأي شيء كلي أو جزئي من مسائل العلم الإلهي لأن علومه حصلت من النظر في حقيقة الوجود و توابعها و عوارضها و عوارض

عوارضها و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى الشخصيات.

و هذا هو العلم بالجزئيات على الوجه الكلي المسمى بالعلم الإلهي و الفلسفة الأولى إلا أن العقول الإنسانية لما كانت قاصرة عن الإحاطة بالأسباب القاصية - المستعلية البعيدة عن الجزئيات النازلة في هوى السفلى الثانية عن الحق الأول في هاوية البعد فلا يمكن لهم استعلام الجزئيات المتغيرة عن الأسباب العالية فضلا عن مسبب الأسباب فلا جرم وضعوا العلوم تحت العلوم و أخذوا مبادي العلم الأسفل من مسائل العلم الأعلى فشغلهم شأن من شأن و أما الأولياء و العرفاء فجعلوا الحق مبدأ علومهم بالأشياء الطبيعية و الرياضية و الإلهية كما أنه مبدأ وجود تلك الأشياء -

و قد روي عن أمير المؤمنين ص: ما رأيت شيئا إلا و قد رأيت الله قبله

و إليه الإشارة أ و لم يكف بربك أنه على كل شيء شهيد.

و بالجملة فإن الأشياء ذوي الأسباب لا يحصل العلم اليقيني بها إلا من جهة أسبابها و عللها و هي أربعة فاعل و غاية و صورة و مادة.

فمن الأشياء ما له جميع هذه الأسباب.

و منها ما لا يكون لها إلا الأولين و العلوم المختصة بمثلها يسمى علوم المفارقات و ما يخص بما له جميع الأسباب هو العلم الطبيعي إذا كانت أمرا مخصوصا و إلا فهو الرياضي فالبحث عن نحو وجود الجسم المطلق و إثبات المادة و الصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٨

و تشخصهما و تلازمهما على ذمة العلم الإلهي إذ لا مادة من حيث هي مادة لمثل هذه الأشياء و لا صورة. و لما كان اتصال الجسم و قبوله للانقسامات بلا نهاية مساوقا لامتناع تألفه من غير المنقسمات الوضعية فالبحث عن امتناع وجود الجوهر الفرد إنما يليق بهذا العلم لا بالطبيعات فذكر مسألة الجزء في أوائل الطبيعات على سبيل المبدئية. اللهم إلا ما يستدل به على اتصال الجسم بالبيانات الطبيعية من جهة حركاته و قواه و أفعاله المتصلة فإن شيئا واحدا يكون مسألة لعلمين مختلفين من جهتين مختلفتين - كبحث استدارة الفلك.

فإنه ثبت في الرياضي بالبرهان الإني و البيان التعليمي و في الطبيعي بالبرهان اللمي و البيان الطبيعي من جهة ما يعرض الطبيعة البسيطة من تشابه الآثار و كذا شيء واحد قد يثبت نحو وجوده من مبادئه المخصوصة ثم يجعل وجوده موضوعا لأحكام و أحوال خاصة ثم يصير تلك الأحوال بما يلزمها من الأحكام و وسائل لانكشاف حقيقة ذلك الشيء بنحو واضح لإثبات وجوده تارة أخرى و هذا مما يقع كثيرا عند تغاير الجهة.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول إن الجوهر إذا كان له وضع و إشارة و تخصص بحيز بوجه ما فلا بد أن يكون له وجه إلى فوق و وجه إلى مقابله فينقسم و لو وهما و كذا له وجهان إلى الشرق و الغرب فينقسم كذلك و هكذا له وجهان إلى كل جهتين متقابلتين من الجهات المتقابلة للعالم فيتكثر أجزاؤه بحسب محاذاته لكل جانب من جوانب العالم عينا أو وهما أو عقلا. فإن قلت يجوز أن يكون لأمر واحد غير منقسم محاذيات و نسب إلى أمور خارجة بلا استيجاب تكثر في جوهره و ذاته و غاية الأمر أن يتعدد أطرافه و نهاياته و عوارضه و تعدد العوارض لا يستلزم تعدد الذات مطلقا.

قلت أما تحقق المحاذيات و النسب المختلفة من غير تعدد فيما يوصف بها بوجه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩

من الوجوه أصلاً فهذا مما يحرم في شريعة العقل و يجزم بديهته العاقل ببطلانه.
والذي يوجب التنبيه عليه أن الشيء الذي له مماسات إلى أمور مختلفة بعينها إذا كان له انقسام بالفعل لكان كل من أجزائه مختصاً بملاقاة أمر واحد من تلك الأمور المختلفة دون غيره بحيث يستحيل أن يكون الجزء الملاقى لهذا عين الجزء الملاقى لذلك فقد علم من ذلك أن تخالف النسبة الوضعية و تعددها مما يوجب تخالف المنسوب و المنسوب إليه جميعاً.

ولهذا عد الحكماء الوضع من الأمور المتكثرة و المكثرة بذاتها لأن طبيعته تقتضي التغير و لو وهما فالشيء الواحد من حيث هو واحد كما لا يمكن أن يكون ذا أوضاع متعددة كذلك لا يجوز أن يكون له بما هو واحد نسب مختلفة أو متعددة إلى أشياء ذوات أوضاع مختلفة من غير عروض كثرة و تعدد في ذاته يصحح ثبوت هذه النسب الكثيرة.
و أما تجويز تعدد النهايات و الأطراف لشيء واحد ذي وضع من غير أن يتطرق إليه بحسبها كثرة و اثنيية لا في الخارج و لا في الوهم فهذا أشد سخافة و أوغل نزولاً في الباطل و أبعد بعباداً عن الحق.

اعلم أن للحكماء في باب اتصال الجسم و نفي تركبها عن الجواهر الفردة - حججاً قوية

و وجوها اضطرابية موجبة لوجود المتصل الجوهرى و لهم في هذا الباب طرق متعددة.
فمنها ما يبتني على أن تعدد جهات الجوهر المتحيز و نهاياته يوجب الانقسام.
و منها ما يبتني على الأشكال الهندسية.
و منها ما يبتني على الحركات و المسامات.
و منها ما يبتني على الظلال أما الطريق الأول فالمشهور منها في الكتب حجتان خفيفتا المؤنه لعدم ابتنائهما على إثبات الكرة و الدائرة و المثلث و نظائرها و لا على الحركة و الزمان و أشباههما.

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ففي الأول يفرض جوهر فرد بين جوهرين فردين فإن كان يحجز عن المماساة بين الطرفين فينقسم إذ يلقي كل منهما منه غير ما يلقي الآخر و إن لم يكن حاجزاً - فاستوى وجود الوسط و عدمه و هكذا الحكم في كل وسط فلم يبق حجاب في العالم - و لا تقدر و حجم فالتداخل مستحيل.
و في الثانية يفرض جوهر فوق اثنين و على ملتقاهما فإن لقي ب كله أو ببعضه كل كليهما فيتجزى أو ب كله كل أحدهما فقط فليس على الملتقي و قد فرض عليه و إن لقي ب كله أو ببعضه من كل منهما شيئاً فانقسم و انقسما جميعاً.
و الاحتمالات ترتقي إلى عشرة كما صوره بعض من المشتغلين بالتدقيق.
و من الحجج في هذا الطريق أنه إذا انضم جزء إلى جزء فإما أن يلاقيه بالكلية - بحيث لا يزيد حيز الجزئين على حيز الواحد فيلزم أن لا يحصل من انضمام الأجزاء حجم و مقدار فلا يحصل جسم أولاً بالكلية بل لشيء دون شيء فيكون له طرفان و هو معنى الانقسام و هذه الحجة أخف مؤنة من السابقتين في نفي التركيب من تلك الجواهر.
و أما في نفي الجوهر الفرد مطلقاً فلا أخف مما ذكر أولاً قبلهما.

و منها أنا نفرض صفحة من أجزاء لا يتجزى له الطول و العرض دون العمق - فإذا أشرقت عليها الشمس أو وقعت في شعاع بصر حتى يكون وجهها المضيء أو المرئي غير الوجه الآخر فينقسم.

و أما الطريق الثاني المبني على الأشكال و الزوايا و الأوتار فوجوه هذه الطريق كثيرة كما يظهر على المتأمل في كتاب أقليدس الصوري.

و نحن قد ذكرنا في شرحنا للهداية الأثرية قسطا صالحا من البراهين المبتنية على القوانين الهندسية الدالة على اتصال الجسم و قبوله للانقسامات بلا نهاية من أراد الاطلاع عليها فليرجع إليه

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عقدة و حل

قال شارح المقاصد إن برهان هذه الأشكال على ما بينه أقليدس مما يبتني على رسم المثلث المتساوي الأضلاع المتوقف على رسم الدائرة لكن لا سبيل إلى إثباتها على القائلين بالجزء لأن طريقه أن يتخيل خط مستقيم متناه يثبت أحد طرفيه و يدار حول طرفه الثابت إلى أن يعود إلى موضعه الأول فيحصل سطح محيط به خط مستدير حاصل من حركة الطرف المتحرك و في باطنه نقطة هي الطرف الثابت و جميع الخطوط الخارجة من تلك النقطة إلى ذلك الخط متساوية لكون كل منها بقدر ذلك الخط الذي أدير و لا نعني بالدائرة إلا ذلك السطح أو ذلك الخط.

و هذا البيان لا ينهض حجة على مثبتي الجزء إذ ما ذكر محض توهم لا يفيد إمكان المفروض فضلا عن تحقيقه و لو سلم فإنما يصح لو لم يكن الخط و السطح - من أجزاء لا تتجزى أو مع ذلك يمتنع الحركة على الوجه الموصوف لتأديها إلى المحال و على هذا القياس إثبات الكرة انتهى كلامه.

و الحل بأن إثبات الدائرة و الكرة و نظائرها بطريق الحركة و إن توقف على اتصال المقادير كما قرره المعترض و قد نص الشيخ عليه أيضا و غيره أيضا من الحكماء و ما فعله الفرجار ليس إلا دائرة عرفية لا حقيقية إلا أن طريق إثبات الدائرة - ليس منحصر في الحركة على الوجه المذكور.

بل للحكماء طريقان آخران لا يتوقف شيء منهما على نفي الجزء أولا فإن الرئيس قدس سره أثبت في الشفاء و النجاة الكرة أولا بطريق لمي مبناه على إثبات الطبيعة في الأجسام و كون مقتضاه في البسائط الجسمانية ليس من جملة الأشكال - إلا الاستدانة لتشابهها بل الكروية على الخصوص لأن شأن ما لا زاوية له من الأشكال البيضية و الشلجمية و المفرطحة أن يكون فيها اختلاف امتداد عن المركز و اختلاف تقدر في الطول و العرض و الطبيعة البسيطة لا توجب اختلافا و إذا أثبت الكرة

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بهذا الطريق فيثبت وجود الدائرة بسبب قطع يحدث أو يتوهم في الكرة الحقيقية.

ثم قال و أصحاب الجزء يلزمهم أيضا وجود الدائرة فإنه إذا فرض الشكل المرئي مستديرا مضرسا و كان موضع منه أخفض من موضع حتى إذا أطبق طرفا خط مستقيم على نقطة تفرض وسطا و على نقطة في المحيط استوى عليه في موضع كان أطول.

ثم إذا طبق على الجزء المركزي و على الجزء الذي ينخفض من المحيط كان أقصر - أمكن أن يتم قصره بجزء أو أجزاء فإن كان زيادة الجزء لا يستوي بل يزيد عليه فهو ينقص عنه بأقل من جزء وإن كان لا يتصل به بل يبقى فرجة فليدبر في الفرجة هذا التدبر بعينه فإذا ذهب الانفراج إلى غير النهاية ففي الفرج انقسام بلا نهاية وهذا خلف على مذهبهم انتهى.

فقد علم أن وجود الدائرة و الكرة و أمثالهما ليس موقوفاً على نفي الجزء - وإن كان جمهور المتكلمين القائلين بالجزء أنكروها فإن وجودها يؤدي إلى نفي وجودها أما الدائرة فلأنها لو كانت من الأجزاء الغير المتجزية فإما أن يكون ظواهر الأجزاء متلاقية كبواطنها أو لا.

فعلى الأول إما أن يكون بواطنها أصغر من الظواهر فينقسم أولاً فيساوي في المساحة باطن الدائرة أعني المقعر ظاهرها أعني المحذب و هو باطل فإن كنت متوقفاً في بطلانه فانظر إلى استلزام تساويهما مساواة الدائرتين المحيطة بها و المحاطة بها و كذا المحيطة بالمحيطة إلى أن يبلغ المحذب الأقصى و المحاطة بالمحاطة إلى أن ينتهي إلى المحيطة بالمركز و بطلانه ضروري و اللزوم واضح لأن التقدير تساوي الظاهر و الباطن و المطابق و المطابق.

و على الثاني و هو أن يكون ظواهر الأجزاء غير متلاقية يلزم انقسام الجزء لأن غير الملاقي غير الملاقي و لأن ما بينهما من الفرج إن لم يسع كلا منها جزء لزم الانقسام - وإن وسعه يلزم أن يكون الظواهر ضعف البواطن و الحس يكذبه.

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و أما الكرة فتحكمها يعرف بالمقايضة إلى ما ذكر من حكم الدائرة فقد انتظم أنه كلما صح القول بالدائرة أو الكرة لم يصح القول بالجزء لكن المقدم حق أو كلما صح القول بالجزء لم يصح القول بهما لكن التالي باطل.

فإذا تقرر ذلك فاعلم أن طريق إثبات الحقائق إما البرهان و الحكمة و إما المجادلة بالتني هي أحسن ففي الأول الغرض إثباتها مطلقاً تحصيلاً للمبرهن - ما هو كمال نفسه سواء صدقه غيره أم لا و في الثاني إصلاح المدينة و مصلحة الناس في هدايتهم إلى الحق و إرشادهم و صيانتهم عن الباطل في العقائد.

و كثير من الباحثين أهملوا في شرائط المباحثة مثل أنهم إذا حاولوا إقامة الحجة على نفي الجزء بطريق قياس الخلف استدلوا عليهم بوجود الدائرة بأن قالوا على تقدير وجود الدائرة و تركيبها من الأجزاء يلزم الانقسام.

فلهم أن يجيبوا عنه بأن الانقسام وإن كان محالاً عندنا لكن ثبوته على فرض أمر مستحيل ليس بمحال و ذلك الأمر وجود الدائرة لأدائها إلى انقسام الجزء - فأما إذا أقيم البرهان على وجود الكرة و الدائرة بأصول فلسفية مبتنية على إثبات الطبائع في الأجسام و إيجابها للأشكال المستديرة بالقوابل البسيطة فذلك وإن كان تاماً في نفسه لكن ليس نافعا في حقهم لإنكارهم تلك الأصول المبتنية على نفي الفاعل المختار على زعمهم.

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و هذا أيضاً نوع من الاختلال في المباحثة إذا أريد إلزامهم بهذا الطريق - إذ قد ثبت في الميزان مقدمة أن من جملة المغالطات الموقعة للخطأ في الاستدلال - أخذ مقدمة لا يسلمها الخصم في القياس الجدلي و إن كانت صحيحة برهانية في نفس الأمر.

ومن هذا القليل الاستدلالات التي وقعت لبعض الناس على إبطال الجزء الذي لا يتجزى مما يبتني على أشكال غير المربع والمثلث القائم الزاوية المتساوي الساقين - مما ينكره القائل بوجود الجوهر الفرد فإن المتكلمين المنكرين لاتصال الجسم - يحيلون من الأشكال إلا المربع والمثلث الذي هو يحصل من قطر المربع من الضلعين - اللذين يوترهما ذلك القطر فكل دليل يبتني على غير هذين الشكلين من الأشكال لا يكون برهانيا ولا جدليا. أما عدم كونه برهانيا فلأنه لقائل أن يمنع لزوم المحال والخلف على التقدير المذكور بأن يقول إن اللازم من الدليل وإن كان أمرا محالا في الواقع إلا أن محاليتها على التقدير المذكور غير مسلم لكون ذلك التقدير أمرا مستحيلا فيجوز أن يكون مستلزما لمستحيل آخر عند فرضه.

وأما عدم كونه جدليا فلأن الخصم لا يساعده لابتناؤه إما على أصل الاتصال وإما على أصول أخرى فلسفية كبعض الوجوه التي ذكرها العلامة الخفري في رسالة له - في نفي الجزء من فرض مثلث متساوي الساقين الذي عدد أجزاء قاعدته أقل من أجزاء كل من ساقيه كقوس الميل الكلي في الفلك مع الربعين من دائرتي المعدل ومنطقة البروج المنتهين إليها الأخذين من نقطة التقاطع الربيعي أو الخريفي و أن الانفراج

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بين الساقين يتصاغر إلى أن يصير بقدر جزء واحد و بعده يصير أصغر فيلزم الانقسام فيما لا ينقسم و كما في الدليل الذي ذكره حنين بن إسحاق من أنه لو تركب الجسم من الجزء لزم أن يكون قطر فلك الأفلاك مقدار ثلاثة أجزاء لا يتجزى.

بيان اللزوم أن نفرض ثلاث خطوط متماسة يكون كل منها مركبا من جواهر أفراد و يكون الوسطاني قطرا للمحدود و أحد جانبيه خط أ ب و الآخر ج د.

فإذا وصلنا بين نقطتي أ د بخط أ د لكان مارا بالمركز ملاقيا بالمحيط من الجانبين مع أنه مار بثلاثة خطوط متصلات فيكون مركبا من ثلاثة أجزاء و هو المطلوب.

و فساده يعلم مما ذكرناه فإن كون القطر مركبا من ثلاثة أجزاء وإن كان ممتنعا في نفس الأمر إلا أن استحالته على الفرض المذكور ممنوع فإنه على أصل إثبات الجزء و تماس الخطوط المذكورة الجوهرية المتألفة من غير المنقسمات لا يمكن وقوع خط جوهري مركب منها قطرا لمربع سطحي و مارا على الخطوط الجوهرية - إلا إذا كانت أجزاء الأضلاع و القطر متساوية.

و كذا يجب أن يكون هاهنا أجزاء الخط المار المتلاصقة و عدد الممرور بها - من الخطوط المتلاصقة متساوية. ثم العجب أن بعض الأعلام ذكر في بعض تعاليقه على شرح الهداية أن أصل هذا الوجه مأخوذ من كلام الشيخ في عيون الحكمة و الهيات الشفاء حيث استدل على بطلان تركب الجسم من الجواهر الفردة بأنه لو تركب الجسم منها لزم أن يكون قطر المربع و المستطيل مساويا لضلعه.

ثم نقل منها وجها آخر مع أن مسألة بطلان الجزء لم يذكر في الهيات الشفاء - أصلا فضلا عن هذا أو غيره. و ما يظهر بمراجعة كتبه كطبيعات الشفاء و غيرها ليس إلا أنه فرض سطحا

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متألفا من أربعة خطوط جوهرية تتركب كل منها من أربعة أجزاء يلزم مساواة القطر للضلع و هو طريق حسن في إلزام القائلين بالجزء لا غبار عليه.

و أما الطريق الثالث المبني على الحركات و تفاوتها التي ليس بتخلل السكنات - فكما احتجوا بحركة جزءين أحدهما فوق أحد طرفي خط مؤلف من أربعة أجزاء - و الآخر تحت طرفه الآخر يكون حركتهما متساويتين في السرعة و البطء و الأخذ - فيلتقيان لا محالة عند مقطع و هو ملتقى الثاني و الثالث أو بحركة جزءين كلاهما فوق طرفي مؤلف من ثلاثة أجزاء فإنهما يلتقيان على وجه يوجب انقسام الجميع وهما.

و كما احتجوا بعدم لحوق السريع البطيء عند كونهما آخذين في الحركة معا - كالسريع خلف البطيء بمقدار من المسافة بينهما.

بيانه أن السريع إذا قطع جزءا فلو قطع البطيء أقل منه لزم الانقسام و إن قطع مساويا له أو أكثر لم يلحقه السريع أبدا و المشاهد خلافه هذا خلف.

و كما احتجوا من جهة المساواة بقولهم إن من المعلوم أن للشمس سمتا بواسطة ذي الظل مع الحد المشترك بين الظل و الضوء و حركة الظل أقل من حركة الشمس - فإذا تحركت جزء تحرك أقل و إلا لكان ما سامته الشمس دائرة مساوية لمدارها على جسم صغير.

و كما احتجوا من جهة المماسية بأننا إذا وقعنا خطا مستقيما كالسلم على جدار قائم على سطح الأرض حصل هناك شبه مثلث قائم الزاوية كان الخط المذكور و ترا لها و فرضنا كل واحد من الضلعين المحيطين بالقائمة خمسة أذرع مثلا.

فلا محالة يكون السلم جذر خمسين لقوة شكل العروس فإذا جررنا السلم و الوتر من أسفله على خلاف جهة الجدار إلى أن ينحط أعلاه عن طرف الضلع المنطبق على الجدار مقدار ذراع و جب أن يكون ما ينجر منه من أسفله أقل من ذراع - إذ لو كان ذراعا صار ذلك الضلع أربعة و الضلع الثاني ستة فيصير مربع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٧

الضلعين اثنين و خمسين مع كون السلم و ما ينطبق عليه جذر خمسين و ذلك محال فثبت أنه ينجر أقل من ذراع. و أنت إذا فرضت بدل الأذرع أجزاء لا تتجزى فإذا انجر الوتر من أعلاه جزء و جب أن ينجر من أسفله أقل من جزء و ذلك يوجب الانقسام.

و أما الطريق الرابع المبني على الظلال فكقولهم إذا غررنا خشبة في الأرض فعند كون الشمس في الأفق الشرقي لا بد و أن يقع لها ظل.

ثم لا شك أن ذلك الظل لا يزال يتناقص إلى أن يبلغ الشمس وقت الزوال فعند ما تحركت الشمس جزءا واحدا لا بد أن ينتقص من الظل شيء فإما أن يكون جزءا واحدا - فيلزم أن يكون طول الظل مساويا لربع الفلك و إنه محال أو أقل فيلزم الانقسام

أوهام وإزاحات -

من الناس من استدل على اتصال الجسم

بأن الجسم لو كان مركبا من أجزاء لا تتجزى لكان متقوما بها فيكون تعقلها قبل تعقله و يكون بين الثبوت غير مفترقة إلى البيان و لا ينكرها كثير من العقلاء و بطلان التوالي بأسرها يدل على بطلان المقدم. و الجواب أن هذه مغالطة نشأت من الخلط بين الأجزاء المحمولة و الأجزاء الخارجية و أجزاء صفات أحدهما للآخرى فإن الصفات المذكورة إنما هي في الأجزاء العقلية كالأجناس و الفصول و مع ذلك يشترط كون الماهية متعلقة بالكنه و هو ممنوع.

و أما الجزء الخارجي فربما يفتقر إلى البيان كالهولي و الصورة عند الحكماء - و كذا العقلي إذا لم يتصور الماهية بحقيقتها كجوهرية النفس عند من يقول بجنسيتها لها - و لغيرها من الجواهر.

و منهم من زعم أنه لو وجد الجزء لكان متناهما ضرورة

فكان مشكلا كرة أو مضلعا لأن المحيط به إما حد واحد أو أكثر و كل منهما يستلزم الانقسام أما المضلع فظاهر و أما الكرة فلا أنه لا بد عند ضم بعضها إلى بعض من تخلل فرج بين الكرات يكون كل

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فرجة أقل من الكرة.

و الجواب بأن التشكل من عوارض المقدار الطويل العريض العميق و الجزء ليس له امتداد أصلا في جهة و إلا لكان خطأ فكيف في الجهات و إلا لكان جسما و لو سلم فذلك في الأجسام دون الأجزاء.

و منهم من تخيل أن ظل كل جسم يصير مثليه في وقت ما

و حينئذ يكون نصف ظله ظل نصفه فظل الجسم الذي طوله أجزاء و تر يكون شفعاً له نصف هو نصف ظل ذلك الجسم فينتصف الجسم و ينقسم الجزء.

و الجواب بمنع كلية الحكم المذكور و إنما ذلك فيما له نصف فالاشتباه في هذا الأخير كمتلوه إنما وقع من جهة أجزاء صفة الشيء على جزئه الغير المنقسم

فصل (٦) في ذكر ما يختص بإبطال مذهب النظام المعتزلي

اعلم أنه وافق الحكماء في قبول الجسم انقسامات بغير نهاية إلا أنه و غيره من المعتزلة لا يفرقون بين القوة و الفعل فيأخذ هو تلك الأقسام حاصلة بالفعل فمن هاهنا يلزم عليه الانتهاء إلى ما لا ينقسم فقد وقع فيما هرب عنه من حيث لا يشعر.

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و قد يستدل على إبطال مذهبه أولاً بالنقض بوجود المؤلف من أجزاء متناهية و لو في ضمن جسم آخر إذ لا كثرة إلا و الواحد فيها موجود فإذا أخذ منها آحاد متناهية أمكن أن يركب فيحصل منها حجم لأنها أجزاء مقدارية متباعدة في الوضع. ثم يستدل على تعميم الحكم بتناهي الأجزاء في جميع الأجسام بنسبة أجزاء ذلك الجسم إلى أجزاء سائر الأجسام و نسبة حجمه إلى حجمها ليلزم المطلوب إذ بحسب ازدياد الأجزاء يزداد الحجم فنسبة الحجم إلى الحجم كنسبة الأجزاء إلى الأجزاء و لما كانت الأحجام و الأبعاد متناهية كما سيحيي فلو لم يكن أجزاء كل جسم متناهية - لزم أن يكون نسبة

المتناهي إلى المتناهي كنسبة المتناهي إلى غير المتناهي.

و اعترض عليه بمنع توافق النسبتين على التقدير المذكور و تجويز كون النسبتين مختلفين مع أن الزيادة في الحجم بسبب الزيادة في العدد مستندا بأن ازدياد الزاوية على الزاوية في المثلث بحسب ازدياد الوتر على الوتر مع أن النسبة بينهما ليست على نهج واحد - فإن نسبة الزاوية الحادة في المثلث المتساوي الساقين القائمة الزاوية إلى القائمة بالنصف - وليست نسبة وترها إلى وتر القائمة كذلك بالشكل الحماري بل يجوز أن يكون نسبة الجسمين من النسب الصمم التي توجد في المقادير دون الأعداد فلا يوجد مثله في الأعداد لأن نسبتها عددية قطعا.

و رد هذا بأنه لما كان الجسمان عنده مركبين من الأجزاء التي لا تتجزى - فقد وجد لها عاد مشترك هو الجزء الواحد فيكون النسبة بينهما عددية فلا يكون صمية فإن التفرقة بين الأعداد و المقادير إنما هي بوجود انتهاء الأعداد إلى الواحد - بخلاف المقادير فإذا كانت المقادير كالأعداد في تألفها من الوحدات لم يبق فرق إلا بأن الوحدات في أحدهما وضعية و في الآخر عقلية.

و أما الجواب عما ذكر أولا بأن ازدياد الوتر ليس مما يوجه مجرد ازدياد الزاوية في الانفراج بل مع ازدياد تعاظم الخطين المحيطين بها على نسبة ازديادها - و عند ذينك الأمرين يكون ازدياد الوتر على النسبة المذكورة و هذا وإن كان بحثا

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على السند إلا أن الغرض التنبيه على فساد هذا التصوير.

و مما يختص أيضا بمذهبه من الفساد عدم قطع مسافة معينة في زمان معين و ذلك لأن قطع كل قسم من المسافة كالنصف موقوف على قطع قسمه و قسم قسمه إلى غير النهاية - و هي أمور مترتبة و الموقوف على أمور مترتبة غير متناهية محال فقطع المسافة يكون محالا على مذهبه.

و لهذا ارتكب الطفرة و هي مع شناعته لم ينفعه لأن المقطوع إن لم يكن أكثر من المطفور فلا أقل يكون مساويا أو أقل منه و جزء المسافة و إن قل كان حكمه في الانقسام حكمها و المشاهد من الحركة ليست إلا قطع المسافة لا تركها أصلا - و اعتبر بإمرار العضو اللامس على صفحة لمساء و بمد القلم على بيضاء بالسواد كيف يجد كلها ملموسا و مسودا.

و لو كانت نسبة المقطوع إلى المطفور نسبة المتناهي إلى غير المتناهي لوجب أن لا يقع الإحساس بالملموس و لا بالأسود الأعلى هذه النسبة فليس كذلك و على هذا القياس فساد اعتذاره عن ذلك بالتداخل.

و من الناس من حاول الاعتذار عن قبله في ذلك الأشكال بأن قطع المسافة المعينة إنما توقف على زمان غير متناه الأجزاء ينطبق كل جزء منه على جزء من الحركة و هو على جزء من المسافة و هذا لا يستلزم عدم تناهي الزمان لأن المحدود من الحركة و الزمان يشتمل كل منهما على أجزاء غير متناهية كالجسم المتناهي.

و زعم أن هذا مثل قول الحكماء القائلين بقطع المسافة المحدودة مع كونها محتملة للأقسام بغير نهاية في زمان محدود و ذلك لكون الزمان أيضا كذلك و ذهل عن الفرق بين المذهبيين بالقوة و الفعل جهلا منه أو تجاهلا حبا للتعصب أو رفضا للحكمة و عن أن ما يوجد شيئا فشيئا من بداية إلى نهاية فاستحالة كونه غير متناهي العدد معلوم بالضرورة كاستحالة كون المحصور بين حاصرين غير متناه

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فالقول به قرع لباب السفسطة و ضلال عن سنن الحق و صراطه المستقيم.
فمن كان ذا بصيرة يتفطن بفساد هذا المذهب من نفسه بدون الرجوع إلى قطع المسافة وإن كان عدم التناهي فيما له امتداد واحد أظهر و أجلى و لكن من لم يجعل الله له نورا فما له من نور.
ثم العجب أن المصحح لرأي النظام كيف صار بعينه نقضا على مذهب الحكماء - في اتصال الأجسام عند جماعة بأعيانهم

فصل (٧) في الإشارة إلى مفاسد مترتبة على نفي الاتصال في الجسم يشهد الحس ببطلانها

و قد التزمها مثبتو الجزء الذي لا يتجزى و هي تفكك أجزاء الرحي و سكون المتحرك و الطفرة و التداخل و عدم لحوق السريع البطيء و لقوة هذه المفاسد - انعطف بعض المتكلمين عن إصرارهم على إثبات الجزء راجعين إلى مذهب المحققين - منهم الإمام الرازي و غيره و توقف بعضهم.
قال في كتاب نهاية العقول اعلم أن من العلماء من مال إلى التوقف في هذه المسألة بسبب تعارض الأدلة فإن إمام الحرمين صرح في كتاب التلخيص في الأصول أن هذه المسألة من مجازات العقول و كذا أبو الحسين البصري و هو أحذق المعتزلة.

فنحن أيضا نختار هذا التوقف إذن لا حاجة لنا إلى هذا الجواب عما ذكره انتهى قوله و نقل في التاريخ أنه وقعت مناظرة في مجلس صاحب بن عباد بين جماعة من أصحاب تناهي الأجزاء و أصحاب النظام القائل بعدم تناهيها كما مر ذكره فالزم أصحاب التناهي أصحاب النظام أنه يجب من كون الأجزاء غير متناهية في الجسم أن

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لا يقطع مسافة محدودة إلا في زمان غير متناه لأنه لا بد عند الحركة من خروج كل جزء من حيزه و دخوله في حيز جزء آخر و انتقال جزء غيره إلى حيزه فإذا كانت الأجزاء غير متناهية كان زمان القطع غير متناه فارتكبوا في الجواب القول بالطفرة - ثم ألزمهم أيضا بأن كون الجسم مشتملا على ما لا يتناهي من الأجزاء يستلزم أن يكون حجمه غير متناه فالتزموا تداخل الأجزاء.

ثم إن أصحاب النظام ألزم أصحاب تناهي الأجزاء تجزية الجزء القريب - من قطب الرحي عند حركة البعيد و قطعه جزءا واحدا لكون القريب أبداً من البعيد - و التزموا أن البطيء يسكن في بعض أزمنة حركة السريع و لا يكون ذلك إلا بتفكك أجزاء الرحي عند حركتها على مثل دوائر دقية بعضها فوق بعض.

و شنت كل من الطائفتين على الأخرى و استمر التشنيع عليهما بالطفرة و التفكيك و كذا هؤلاء التزموا سكون المتحرك في لحوق السريع البطيء إذا تحركا على الوجه الذي مر بيانه.

و مما يقوي التشنيع عليهم في التزام التفكك و سكون المتحرك أن نقرر الأول فيما يتفق العقلاء في شدته و استحكامه و عدم تفككه كالفلك الدوار و قد وصف تعالى الأفلاك بالشدة في قوله **وَبَنَيْنَا فَوْقَكُمْ سَبْعًا شِدَادًا** أو في جسم لو تفكك أجزاؤه لتناثرت كالفرجار و كان له شعور بذلك بل يبطل حياته و حركته كالإنسان إذا دار على نفسه.

و الثاني فيما يقع التفاوت بين الحركتين بأضعاف أضعاف حركة البطيء- كحركة الفرس و الشمس فيما إذا كان نقطة محاذاة الفرس من الفلك الرابع عند ابتداء حركتهما متقدمة على مركز الشمس بقدر قوس من ذلك الفلك لئلا يبقى لهم مهرب من الأول إلى الاعتذار بالفاعل المختار و تعلق إرادته بتفكيك أجزاء الرحي تارة و إصاقها أخرى جهلا بأن إرادة الباري أجل شأنا مما تصوره.

ثم من العجائب أن يتفطن أجزاء الدوامة و الرحي و هما جسمان جماديان

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من الفطنة و الإلهام حتى علم الأبطأ منهما أنه ينبغي أن يقف حتى لا يزول سمته عن الأسرع- و علم مقدار الوقفة من الزمان بحسب نسبة التفاوت بين المسافتين الأسرع و الأبطأ و كيفية انضباط هذه النسب في أزمنة السكنات في كل جزء جزء من الأجزاء الدورات- على حوالي الدوائر.

و لا تيسر للصوفية المرتاضين عشر من أعشار أعشار هذه الفطنة مع دعواهم الكشف و الكرامات بل لا ييسر لإنسانين قصدا موضعا واحدا أحدهما أقرب منه من الآخر و أراد أن يبلغا معا إلى ذلك الموضع و يتما سيرهما دفعة واحدة إذ لا يعلم الأقرب منهما أنه كم يجب أن يقف في حركته و لا يعلم الأبعد أنه كيف ينبغي أن يسرع- حتى يكون وصول كل منهما موافقا لوصول صاحبه.

و من الثاني بأن عدم شعورنا بالسكون في المتحرك للطافة أزمنة السكون جهلا بأنه إذا كانت نسبة زمان السكون إلى زمان الحركة كنسبة فضل مسافة السريع على مسافة البطيء لزم أن يكون زمان الحركة أطف بكثير من زمان السكون- فينبغي أن لا يحس بالحركة أصلا و لا أقل من أن يرى تارة متحركا و أخرى ساكنا. و مما يؤكد فساد قولهم لزوم وجود المعلول بدون العلة في حركة الشمس

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و سكون الظل و وجود العلة بدون المعلول فيما إذا فرضنا بئرا عميقا مائة ذراع مثلا و في منتصفها خشبة شد عليها طرف حبل طوله خمسون ذراعا و على طرفه الآخر دلو ثم شددنا قلابا على طرف حبل آخر طوله خمسون ذراعا أرسلناه في البئر بحيث وقع القلاب في الجبل الأول على طرفه المشدود في الخشبة ثم جررناه فيكون ابتداء حركة القلاب من الوسط و الدلو من الأسفل معا و كذا انتهاؤهما إلى رأس البئر و قد قطع الدلو مائة ذراع و القلاب خمسين مع أن حركة القلاب من تمام علة حركة الدلو فلو كان له سكنات في خلال حركته لزم وجود المعلول بدون علته التامة

فصل (٨) في تقرير شبه المثبتين للجزء و مبنى خيالاتهم و كشف الغشاوة عن وجه المقصود بإزالتها

اعلم أن مبنى خيال القائلين بالجواهر الفردة أن الجسم إن لم يتناه القسمة فيه- فيستوي الجسم الأصغر كالخردلة و الأكبر كالجبل في المقدار لاستوائهما في عدم نهاية القسمة و يلزم أن يكون مقدار كل منهما غير متناه ضرورة أن مجموع المقادير الغير المتناهية غير متناه.

و هذا مما يندفع بأن الجسم المفرد لا جزء له بالفعل بل بالقوة و عديم النهاية بالقوة يمكن فيه التفاوت كالمئات و الألوف الغير المتناهيين و بينهما من التفاوت ما لا يخفى.

و الحاصل أنه ليس لأحدهما أقسام ما لم ينقسم و إذا قسما مساويا كل منهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٥

صاحبه في العدد فكل واحد من الأقسام التي للخردلة أصغر و التي للجبل أكبر و هكذا بالغ ما بلغ لا إلى نهاية.
نعم من ذهب إلى أن قسمة الجسم إلى الأجزاء الغير المتناهية حاصلة بالفعل كالنظام فهذا نعم دليل على إبطال مذهبه.

و أما ما قال بعض الأفاضل في هذا المقام

من أن المقادير الغير المتناهية إذا كانت متساوية أو متزايدة كان مجموعهما غير متناه بالضرورة و أما إذا كانت متناقصة فلا- ألا ترى أن أنصاف الذراع المتداخلة الغير المتناهية بمعنى نصفه و هكذا لو فرضت موجودة لم يحصل منها إلا الذراع و الجسم إنما يقبل الانقسام إلى أجزاء غير متناهية متناقصة فمدفوع بما قيل إذا كان هناك أقسام غير متناهية بالعدد فإذا انضم بعض متناه منها إلى بعض متناه آخر يزيد مقدار المجموع على مقدار أحدهما لا محالة فإذا انضم إليه بعض بعض مرات غير متناهية يحصل المقدار الغير المتناهي قطعاً و المنع مكابرة.

و أما أن أنصاف الذراع المتداخلة الغير المتناهية لم يحصل منها إلا الذراع- فصحيح لو كانت تلك الأنصاف بالقوة و أما وجودها بالفعل فأمر محال و المحال إذا فرض وقوعه قد يستلزم محالاً آخر و هاهنا من هذا القبيل على أن المقادير إذا كانت متناقصة من جانب تكون متزايدة من الجانب الآخر لكون أحدهما مضاف الآخر- فيكون المجموع المركب منها غير متناه في المقدار على ما اعترف به.

اللهم إلا أن يفرق بين أن يكون تزايد الأجزاء من جانب اللاتناهي أو من جانب التناهي و قال بلزوم عدم تناهي المقدار في الأول دون الثاني.

و هذا تحكم محض بعد أن يكون أعيان تلك الأجزاء باقية بحالها بالفعل في السلسلتين المفروضتين متزايدة و متناقصة على أن وجود الأجزاء الغير المتناهية على ذلك الوجه مما يبطله برهان التطبيق و التضاف و غيرهما لكونها مترتبة.

شبهة أخرى قريبة المأخذ مما ذكر

و هي لزوم تغشية وجه الأرض بحبة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٦

[بخردلة] إذا قسمت بأجزاء و لا يخفى و منها و سخافتها فإن وجه الأرض سطح متناه- يمكن أن يغشيه أجزاء متناهية صغيرة الحجم جدا كثيرة العدد.

شبهة أخرى لو كانت القسمة تمر بغير نهاية لكان قطع المتحرك المسافة- يحتاج إلى قطع نصفها

و قبل ذلك نصف نصفها و هلم جرا فلا يقطع أبدا و يلزم أن يكون الزمان الذي يقطع فيه الأنصاف الغير المتناهية غير متناه و هذه الشبهة مما ذكره مرة مقبولة لتصحيح مذهب النظام و تأييداً له و مرة مردودة لانتقاص مذهب الحكماء.

و جوابها أن المسافة المقطوعة شيء واحد غير منقسم إلى أجزاء غير متناهية إلا وهما و فرضاً لا وجوداً و فصلاً و كذا الزمان الذي مقدار الحركة الواقعة فيها- و الكلام وارد على النظام كما مر.

شبهة أخرى ذكرها أبو ریحان البيروني

معترضاً على أرسطاطاليس في رسالة أرسلها إلى الشيخ الرئيس و هي أنه يلزم على أصل اتصال الجسم و قبوله للقسمة بغير نهاية أن لا يدرك متحرك متحركاً في سمت واحد و إن كان المقدم منهما أبداً بكثير كالشمس و القمر فإنهما إذا كان بينهما بعد مفروض و سار القمر سارت الشمس في ذلك الزمان مقداراً - إذا سار القمر سارت الشمس في ذلك الزمان مقداراً أصغر و كذلك إلى ما لا نهاية له على أنا قد نراه يسبقها.

و نقل الشيخ الرئيس أن هذه الشبهة مما أورده الفيلسوف على نفسه و أجاب عنه بجواب و هو مما لا يرتضيه الشيخ لأنه قال بعد ذلك و أما ما أجاب به أرسطاطاليس عن هذه المسألة و فسر المفسرون فهو ظاهر السفسطة و المغالطة.

و تلخيص الجواب الذي ذكره الشيخ أن ليس يعني بتجزية الجسم بلا نهاية أن يتجزى أبداً بالفعل بل يعني بها أن كل جزء منه له في ذاته متوسط و طرفان - فبعض الأجزاء يمكن أن يفصل بين جزئيه اللذين يحدهما الطرف و الواسطة و بعضها لا تقبل لصغره الانقسام بالفعل فيكون القسمة فيها بالقوة.

فمن قال إن جزء الجسم يتجزى بالفعل لزمه هذا الاعتراض و من قال إن بعض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٧

أجزائه منقسم بالفعل و بعضه بالقوة لم يلزم شيء لأن الحركة إنما يأتي على تقسيم المسافة المتناهية في الأجزاء المنقسمة بالفعل.

و إنني أقول إن المتحرك ليس لمسافة حركته حد أني موجود ما دام كونه متحركاً فإذا لم يكن لكل من المتحركين المذكورين ما دام كونهما متصفين بالحركة حد معين موجود بل حد نوعي فكذلك البعد الذي بينهما ليس بعداً معيناً شخصياً - بل بعداً مطلقاً و إنما يكون لكل منهما في كل آن فرض حد معين من المسافة و بينهما مقدار معين منها و كما أن وجود الآتات في زمان الحركة المتصلة بحسب الوهم فقط فكذلك وجود حد معين لكل منهما و مقدار مخصوص بينهما.

نعم وقوع المناطق و التقاطعات و الأقطاب في الأفلاك مما يجعل بعض الحدود محصلاً بالفعل لا بمجرد الفرض لكن الحدود الحاصلة بسبب مرور المناطق أو تقاطع بعضها ببعض أو حصول الأقطاب أو مواضع هي غاية التباعد بين الدائرتين - و غاية التباعد بينهما ليست إلا عدداً متناهياً بين كل اثنين منها مقدار و حداني الذات و الصفة غير منقسمة إلا بمجرد الفرض.

شبهة أخرى إذا تدرجت الكرة على سمت واحد في بسيط مستو يكون ملاقة دائرة منها بخط مستقيم من البسيط

بنقطة بعد أخرى و يلزم منه تجاوز النقط و تركيب الخط منها و رفعت بأن مماسة الكرة البسيطة و إن كانت في حال الثبات و السكون بنقطة لا غير و لكنها في حال الحركة إنما هي بخط غير قار متدرج الأجزاء في الوجود و كذا يكون المماسية بينهما في كل آن فرض وجوده بنقطة إلا أن الآتات حالها في التحقق و الوجود حال النقط المفروضة في الخط في أن وجود الجميع بالوهم و الفرض لا بالفعل و الفصل.

فالاستدلال بتجاوز الآتات على تجاوز النقط من قبيل المصادرة على المطلوب الأول إذ التنازع فيها كالتنازع في النقط من جهة أن الحركات و الأزمنة كالأجرام و الأبعاد غير مؤلفة مما لا يتجزى و أن سبيل الآن من الزمان بعينه سبيل النقط

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٥، ص ٤٨

من الخط وإن كان الآن السيال نسبته إلى الزمان نسبة النقطة الجواله إلى الدائرة و الراسمة للخط إلى الخط و للناس كلمات عجيبة في دفع هذه الشبهة.

فتارة يقولون إن حديث الكرة و السطح قوي و تماسهما بجوهريهما ضروري.

و تارة يقولون إن زوال الملاقة لا يكون إلا بالحركة و هي زمانية لا آنية فلزوم تتالي النقاط و الآنات ممنوع إذ زوال الانطباق في الزمان كما ذكرنا- و حصول الانطباق على نقطة أخرى في آن بينهما زمان و لما استحال الجزء الذي لا يتجزى لا يكون لزوال الانطباق أول فلم يلزم محذور.

و تارة بأن المتحقق ليس إلا نقطة واحدة فلزوم تتالي النقاط ممنوع بل ينعدم نقطة و يتحقق أخرى و كذا الحكم في تتالي الآنات و كلا هذين القولين بعيد عن الصواب.

أما الأول فلأنه لما وقع الاعتراف منه بأن الانطباق الأول في الآن و الثاني في آن آخر بينهما زمان فيتوجه السؤال بأنه كيف يكون الحال في ذلك الزمان بين الكرة و السطح أ بينهما تلاق أم تفارق و التفارق بينهما بين البطلان.

و إن شئت فافرض الكرة من الحديد أو جسم في غاية الثقل لا يرتفع عن السطح إلا بمحرك خارج فرض عدمه.

و أما التلاقي فهو إما بنقطة أو بخط فإن كان الثاني لزم الانطباق بين الخط المستدير و المستقيم و إن كان بنقطة و التلاقي النقطي لا يكون إلا في آن فننقل الكلام إلى الزمان الذي بين آن وقعت فيه الملاقات الأولى و هذا الآن و يعود الشقوق بعينها من رأس و الكل محال.

و كذا القول بتجاوز الآنات كما زعمه المتكلمون فلم يبق متسع إلا بالاطلاع على الحق الذي ذكرناه في الجواب.

و أما الثاني فلأن تجاور النقاط و اجتماعها متجاوزة في الزمان يكفي للاستحالة و إن لم تكن مجتمعة في آن واحد فذلك أمر مستحيل لاستلزامه انتهاء قسمة المقدار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٥، ص ٤٩

إلى ما لا ينقسم و لو بالقوة كما ذهب إليه محمد الشهرستاني و لما سيأتي حسب ما يقام عليه البرهان من أن المتجددات بحسب الزمان من الحوادث و غيرها مجتمعات في الدهر المحيط بالزمان و ما معه و فيه فيكون النقاط التي كل منها في آن مجتمعة في الواقع على نعت التجاور و لأن تجاور الآنات اللازمة لها على أي وجه أمر مستحيل في ذاته لانطباقها على الحركة المنطبقة على المسافة و المنطبق على المتصل الوجداني لا بد و أن يكون متصلا وحدانيا فإذا كان أحد المتطابقين مركبا من الأفراد المتشافة الغير المتجزية أصلا لزم أن يكون الآخر أيضا مركبا منه و قد ثبت اتصال الجسم و عدم تألفه من الجواهر الفردة فكذلك حكم ما يطابقه من الزمان و الحركة

شبهة أخرى إن ما يمكن خروجه إلى الفعل من الانقسامات في المستقبل

إن كانت متناهية فيقف القسمة إلى ما لا يقبل القسمة أصلا عند فرض وقوع تلك الانقسامات جميعا و إن كان ممكن الخروج إلى الفعل عددا غير متناه فيلزم منه ما يلزم من مذهب النظام.

و جوابها باختيار الشق الأول و القول بأنه و إن كانت القسمة الممكنة الوقوع متناهية إلا أنها ليست في مرتبة معينة من التناهي حتى لا يقبل الانقسام بعدها- و هكذا حال الزمان و الحوادث التي في المستقبل عندهم. فإنهم ذهبوا إلى أن كلما يوجد من الحوادث بعد هذا اليوم عددها متناه و كذا كل ما يحصل من أيام الزمان و ساعاتها مقدارها متناه و مع ذلك ما من جملة من الحوادث و الأيام و الساعات إلا و يوجد بعدها حادث آخر و يوم آخر و ساعة أخرى- فليس معنى كونها متناهية أنها تقف عند حد لا يتجاوزه.

و التناهي بهذا المعنى يصح في العرف اتصافه باللاتناهي إلا أن كثيرا ما يقع المغالطة باشتراك الاسم بين اللاتناهي بمعنى عدم الوقوف عند حد و بينه بمعنى عديم النهاية في المقدار و العدد.

شبهة أخرى إن وجود الأطراف يستدعي محلا غير منقسم

كالجوهر الفرد أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٥٠

ما في حكمه و إلا لكان انقسام المحل يوجب انقسامه و هو محال. و الجواب بمنع استلزام انقسام المحل انقسام الحال مطلقا. اللهم إلا أن يكون المحل محلا من حيث ذاته المنقسمة و أما إذ كان المحل هي الذات المنقسمة مع حيثية أخرى غير مجرد الذات فلا يوجب انقسامه انقسام ما حل فيه. أو لا ترى أن الإضافات تنقسم بانقسام محالها و قد لا تنقسم. فالأول عند ما يكون عروضها بمجرد الذات المنقسمة و ذلك كمحاذاة الجسم لجسم آخر و انطباقه له فينقسم المحاذاة و المطابقة نصفاً و ثلثاً و ربعاً و غيرها حسب انقسام الجسم ذي المحاذاة أو المطابقة إلى النصف و الثلث و الربع و ذلك لأن مماسة نصف الجسم هي نصف مماسة كله و مماسة ثلثه ثلث مماسة كله و هكذا. و الثاني عند ما يكون عروضها لا لمجرد المقدار كالأبوة فإنها لا تعرض للإنسان الأب من أجل قدره و جسميته فقط بل لأجل فعله النفساني الشهوي و إخراجة فضلا من بدنه يستعد لصورة من نوعه و كالبنة فإنها تعرض للابن بواسطة انفعال جسم قليل المقدار يصير مادة لبدنه بعد استحالات و تغيرات كثيرة كما و كيفاً عن شخص آخر مثله انفعالا مثل قبول الإفراز و الإنزال عنه.

و هاتان النسبتان ليستا عارضتين للأب و الابن من جهة جسميتهما فقط حتى يتزايدتا بتزايد الجسمين و يتناقصا بتناقصهما و ينقسمان حسب انقسام البنية إلى الأعضاء- فيكون ليد الأب أبوة بالقياس إلى جزء من بنوة الابن التي تكون في يده ليكون الأبوة التي في اليد الأبوة التي في الكل.

فإن ذلك واضح البطلان بل كل من الأبوة و البنوة عارضة للحيوان بما هو حيوان أي ذو نفس مقيسا إلى مماثله أو مجانسها و كون الشيء ذا حياة و نفس ليس مما يوجب الانقسام فكذا ما يتبعه من الأعراض التي تعرض من جهة الحيوانية- فإن الحيوانية و إن كانت قابلة للتفاوت بالكمال و النقص و القوة و الضعف عند بعض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٥١

المحققين من الحكماء كما مر ذكره إلا أن تفاوتهما في مراتب الكمال و النقص - ليس بإزاء تفاوت الجسمية في العظم و الصغر حتى يكون الكامل في التجسم كاملاً في الحيوانية و الناقص الصغير فيه ناقصاً فيها فيكون الإبل و الفيل أتم حيوانية من الإنسان و القردة.

فإذن نقول إن حلول الأطراف بما هي أطراف ليس في الجسم من حيث جسميته بل بانتهاؤه و عدمه و لهذا ذهب جمع إلى أنها عدمية.

فالسطح ينقسم في الجهتين لا في الجهة الثالثة لأن وجوده إنما يحصل بقطع وقع في الجسم من جهة امتداد واحد من امتداداته الثلاثة فلا جرم لما كان عروضه للجسم بواسطة القطع الذي وقع في هذه الجهة لم ينقسم في هذه الجهة لا بالذات - لأنه من هذه الجهة عدمي و لا بالعرض بتبعية انقسام الجسم فيها لكون عروضه للجسم - ليس من حيث وجود امتداده الحاصل فيها بل من حيث فنائه و عدمه فيها و لكن ينقسم في الجهتين الباقيتين بالذات و بالعرض جميعاً.

أما انقسامه بالذات فلكون ذاته متحصلة من الجهتين الباقيتين من جهات الجسم عند عروض القطع على الجهة الثالثة له. و أما انقسامه بالعرض و بتبعية المحل فلأن عروضه للجسم ليس لأجل قطع ما سوى الواحد من امتداداته بل لأجل قطع الواحد و بقاء الآخرين و إلا لكان خطأ أو نقطة فلا جرم ينقسم بانقسام الجسم في الامتدادين الآخرين. و أما الخط فينقسم في جهة واحدة بالذات و بالعرض بتبعية المحل و لا ينقسم في جهة أخرى أصلاً بمثل الذي ذكرناه و على هذا قياس عدم انقسام النقطة في جهة أصلاً فاعرف و تدبر.

شبهة أخرى يلزم منها طرفة الزاوية

و هي عقدة عسيرة الانحلال و إشكال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٥٢

صعب الزوال مبناها على وجوب الاتصال في المقادير و ما يحصل منها كالزوايا و الأشكال. تقريرها أن الزاوية المسطحة مقدار سطحي بين خطين يلتقيان على نقطة أو كيفية عارضة للسطح من الجهة المذكورة على اختلاف مذهبي الرياضيين و غيرهم فيها و على أي تقدير لا خلاف بين الحكماء في قبول القسمة بغير نهاية في الجهة التي بين الضلعين.

و الزاوية قد تكون متفقة الخطين مستقيمتها أو مستديرتها سواء وقع تحديباهما و تقعرهما من جهة واحدة أو كل منهما في جهة أخرى مقابلة للجهة التي للآخر و هو أعم من أن يكون جانب التحديب منهما موضع الملاقاة أو جانب التقعير بشرط أن لا يصيرا في شيء من هذه الصور متحدين في الوضع بحيث ينطبق عليهما جميعاً خط واحد و إلا لم يكن بينهما زاوية.

و قد تكون مختلفة الخطين و هي إما أن يكون بحيث وقعت حذبة خطها المستدير إلى الداخل كزاوية حدثت من خط مستقيم بدائرة من خارج أو إلى الخارج كما إذا حدثت من تقاطع قطر الدائرة و محيطها فالأولى مما برهن أقليدس في كتابه - بالشكل الخامس عشر من المقالة الثالثة منه على أنها أحد من جميع الجواد المستقيمة الخطين و الثانية أعظم من جميع تلك الجواد.

فإذا تقرر هذا نقول إذا فرضنا خطا منطبقا على الخط المماس تحرك إلى جهة الدائرة مع ثبات نقطة التماس منه حركة ما فأي قدر يتحرك يحصل زاوية مستقيمة الخطين أعظم من الزاوية المذكورة من دون أن يصير أولا مثلها وهذا هو الطفرة بعينها في الحركة وكذا إذا فرضنا حركة القطر أدنى حركة مع ثبات أحد طرفيه تصير تلك الزاوية منفرجة من غير أن يصير أولا مثل القائمة لزيادة ما هو أزيد مما نقصت هي به عن القائمة عليها وكذا إذا فرضنا رجوع كل من الخطين المذكورين إلى موضعه

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الأول يلزم المحذور المذكور.

و استصعب كثير من الأذكياء حل هذه العقدة وذكروا فيها وجوها غير سديدة - و تشبث بعض العلماء بأن الزاوية من مقولة الكيف و مراتب الكيف مما يجوز سلوكها على وجه الطفرة - و بعضهم ذكر أن هذه الحركة من أحد الضلعين ليس في جهة هي بين الضلعين - و هي جهة عرض البسيط الواقع بينهما بل في جهة أخرى هي جهة طول ذلك البسيط - و الزاوية لا يقبل الانقسام إلا فيما بين الخطين لا فيما بين الرأس و القاعدة و السفسطة في الجميع ظاهرة. و ذكر شيخنا و سيدنا أدام الله تعالى ظله الظليل على مفارق مريديه بإدامة وجوده الشريف و عزه الجليل و أضاء إشراق نوره مستديما على تنوير قلوب السالكين و تطهير نفوس المستعدين ما يشفي العليل و يروي الغليل بحمد الله و قوته من وجه و جبه نذكره تبركا بإفادته و تيمنا بإضاءته و هو أن الزاوية المختلفة الضلعين لها اعتباران اعتبار أنها سطح و اعتبار أنها أحيطت بمستقيم و مستدير و هي إنما تقع في طريق تلك الحركة بالاعتبار الأول فقط دون الاعتبار الثاني لأن شيئا من الزوايا المستقيمة الخطين - لا يمكن أن تساوي زاوية أخرى مختلفة الضلعين و كذلك العكس. فإنه إذا طبق الضلع المستقيم من المستقيمة الخطين على المستقيم من مختلفتيهما - فإما أن يقع المستقيم الآخر بين المختلفتين أو خارجا عنهما إذ لا يمكن الانطباق بين المستقيم و المستدير فلا ينطبق الزاوية المستقيمة الخطين على مختلفتيهما.

و بالجملة يختلف حقيقة الزاوية من جهة اختلاف الضلعين استقامة و استدارة - لأنهما من الفصول المنوعة للخط فكذا لما يحاط به من جهة كونه محاطا و لما كانت الحركة أمرا متصلا اتصال المسافة و الجسم و قد تقرر أن الأمور المتخالفة بالنوع - لا يكون بينهما اتصال وحداني موجود بوجود واحد فما يقع في طريق الحركة - لا بد و أن يكون أفراد و مراتبه من نوع واحد فشيء واحد من أفراد أحد

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المقدارين المختلفين بالماهية لا يقع في مسافة الحركة و مسلكها.

أ و لا ترى أن المتزايد بحسب المقدار الخطي لا يصل و لا يبلغ بحركة في شيء - من المراتب مقدارا ما سطحيا و بالعكس و كذا المتزايد في السطح لا يبلغ بالحركة في حدودها إلى مساواة جسم ما و بالعكس فكل فرد من أحد نوعي الزاوية إذا تحرك ضلعه و صار أكبر إنما يبلغ بالتدريج إلى مساواة جميع الأفراد المتوسطة في القدر بين المبدأ و المنتهى من ذلك النوع و هي التي تكون واقعة في مسلك تلك الحركة و لا يمكن أن يبلغ إلى مساواة شيء من أفراد النوع الآخر

و لا هي واقعة في مسلك تلك الحركة أصلا فلا يلزم أن يبلغ الزاوية التي هي بين الدائرة و الخط المماس في التعاضم إلى زاوية مساوية لمستقيم الخطين و لا التي بين القطر و المحيط في التعاضم إلى مساواة القائمة و لا التي بين الخط المماس و القطر العمود عليه في التصاغر إلى مساواة ما هي أعظم الجواد

بحث و تميم-

و للباحث أن يقول إذا قيست زاوية إلى زاوية بأنها أعظم أو أصغر أو أزيد أو أنقص فلا بد أن يصلح ما يجري بينهما قياس المساواة أيضا إذ الأعظم و الأزيد بالنسبة إلى الأمر لا بد و أن يشتمل على مثل ذلك الأمر و شيء زائد عليه فالمماثلة بين المستقيمة الخطين و المختلفة الخطين ثابتة بالإمكان.

و جوابه بأن الأزيدية كمقابلها يقال بالاشتراك الاسمي أو بالحقيقة و المجاز على ما يتحقق بين مقدارين يوجد بينهما عاد مشترك و يقال لهما المتشاركان و النسبة بينهما لا محالة عديدة رسمت بأنها أيّة أحد المقدارين المتجانسين من الآخر بأن يقال هذا المقدار من ذاك المقدار ثلثه أو رבעه أو جزء من عشرين جزء منه- و هذه هي التي تقتضي التجانس بين المتناسبين و يلزم كون أحدهما مشتملا بالقوة على الآخر مع شيء زائد و على ما يتحقق بين مقدارين لا يمكن أن يقال

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لواحد منهما أي شيء هو من صاحبه و هو لا يقتضي كونهما من نوع واحد أو جنس قريب و لذا عرف أرشميدس الخط المستقيم بأنه أقصر الخطوط الواصلة بين نقطتين - مع أن الاختلاف بين الخط المستقيم و المستدير و كذا بين الخطوط المستديرة المختلفة في التحديب بالفصول المنوعة.

و أما المساواة فلا معنى لها إلا المماثلة في المقدار و الكمية فلا بد أن يكون المتساويان متحدين في نوع من الكمية فعلى ذلك قد ظهر أنه يصح أن يصير أصغر المقدارين أعظم من الأعظم بدون أن يصير مساويا له كما إذا فرضنا درجة واحدة من الدائرة يزيد بحركة الفرجار إلى أن يبلغ نصف الدور فيصير أعظم من القطر و قد كانت أصغر منه لا محالة بدون أن يصير وقتا مساوية له فاعرف هذا.

و أما ما لزم من كون سدس المحيط من الدائرة مساويا لوتره الذي يساوي نصف القطر لكونهما ضلعي مثلث متساوي الأضلاع في البرهان الترسّي فالوتر يكون ستين جزء كنصف القطر من أجزاء بها يكون القطر مائة و عشرين جزء مثل سدس المحيط الذي أجزاءه ستون أيضا سدس ثلاثمائة و ستين هي أجزاء المحيط عند الحساب.

فأوجه فيه أن عدد ستين لسدس المحيط حقيقي و لنصف القطر وضعي - إذ ليست أجزاء القطر بحسب الحقيقة مائة و عشرين بل هي بحسب الوضع عندهم - لمصلحة راعوها هي السهولة في الحسابات و إنما أجزاء الحقيقة هي مائة و أربعة عشر و كسر فلم يلزم المساواة بين القوس و وترها إلا في الوضع لا في الحقيقة - فالمحذور غير لازم و اللازم غير محذور.

فالقدماء منهم أرشميدس أثبتوا بين المقادير المتخالفة الأنواع نسبة بالأزيدية و الأنقصية الصميتين لا بالمساواة فهي تتصف بالمفاوتة بين المختلفين بوجه الصمم - دون المساواة و سائر النسب العددية و اشتراط التجانس في النسب مطلقا على ما اشتهر بين المتأخرين تفيد فيما إذا كانت عددية لا مقدارية أي صمية.

و هاهنا شبهة أخرى كثيرة متفقة المآخذ مشتركة الأصل في الجواب تركنا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٥٦

ذكرها على وجه التفصيل مخافة الإسهاب في التطويل و لأن بناء الأجوبة عن الكل على تحقيق الحركة كما سيجيء حيث يحين حينه فانتظره مفتشا إن شاء الله.

و هي كاستلزام حضور شيء غير منقسم من الحركة و الزمان شيئا غير منقسم بإزائها من المسافة كما يجب حركة النقطة بحركة ما هي فيه كمخروط مثلا تتالي أحياء غير منقسمة و كإقتضاء عدم الآن في آن يليه تتالي الآتات المستلزمة لتركب المسافة من غير المنقسمات و كاستلزام حدوث اللاوصول في آن يلي أن الوصول تجاور الآتين و كذا اللانطباق و اللامحاذاة و كاستيجاب كون الزمان مركبا من الآتات و الحركة من الأكوآن الدفعية بكون الحاضر من الزمان أمرا غير منقسم - مع انفصاليه عما مضى و عما سيأتي بعدهما فإذا عدم وجدان آخر منفصل عنه بمثل ما ذكر و يكون الحركة لا أول لحدوثها لعدم حدوثها في آن هو مبدأ الحركة و إلا لكان الزمان موجودا في الآن و لا في آن آخر يكون بينهما زمان و إلا لم يكن ما فرض مبدأ مبدأ بل في آن يلي الآن الأول الذي هو آخر زمان السكون.

فيكون معناها الكون الأول في الآن الثاني و كاستلزام اتصال الجسم عدم وجدان التفاوت بين الحركتين سرعة و بطوءا إذا اتفقتا في الأخذ و الترك لكون كل منهما في كل آن يفرض من زمانهما في أين فأيون كل واحدة منهما مساوية لأيون الأخرى و اللازم باطل و كذا الملزوم.

و قد مر شبه هذه الشبهة في إلزام مساواة الخردلة للجبل

فصل (٩) في أن قبول القسمة الانفكاكية ثابتة إلى غير النهاية

اعلم أنه ذهب جمع من القدماء منهم ديمقراطيس إلى أن ما يشاهدون من الأجسام المفردة كالماء و الهواء مثلا ليس بسائط على الإطلاق بل إنما هي حاصلة من تماس بسائط صغار متشابهة الطبع في غاية الصلابة غير قابلة للقسمة الانفكاكية

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بل الوهمية فقط و بهذا و بتسميتها أجساما يمتاز هذا المذهب عن مذهب القائلين بالجزء. ثم اختلفوا في أشكالها فذهب الأكثرون منهم إلى أنها كرات لبساطتها و التزموا القول بالخلاء. و قيل إنها مكعبات و قيل مثلثات و قيل مربعات و قيل على خمسة أنواع في الأشكال فللنار أربع مثلثات و للأرض مكعب و للهواء ذو ثماني قواعد مثلثات و للماء ذو عشرين قاعدة مثلثات و للفلك ذو اثني عشر قاعدة مجسمات [مخمصات].

هذا ما نقله الخطيب الرازي و ذكر الشيخ في الشفا أنهم يقولون إنها مختلفة الأشكال و بعضهم يجعلها متفقة الأنواع. و قد قرر بعض المتأخرين الدليل في بطلان هذا المذهب بأن تلك الأجزاء - لما كانت متشابهة الطبع باعترافهم جاز على كل منها ما جاز على الآخر و على المجموع الحاصل من اجتماعها و القسمة الانفكاكية مما يجوز على المجموع فيجوز على كل جزء إذ لو امتنعت على الجزء نظر إلى ذاته لامتنت على المجموع و فيه بحث.

أما أولاً فلكونه مبنياً على تساوي تلك الأجسام في الماهية ولا يجدي اعترافهم بكونها متساوية بالطبع إذ غاية الأمر فيه أن يحصل إلزامهم بذلك فلم يكن البيان برهانياً.

و لقائل أن يدعي أنها متخالفة بالماهية ولا يوجد جزءان متحدان في الماهية - فلم يثبت أن كل جسم قابل للقسمة الانفكاكية فلم يتم دليل إثبات الهيولى فضلاً عن أن يعم.

و أما ثانياً فلأن صحة هذا الدليل على هذا التقرير موقوف على تساوي الأجسام المحسوسة و مبادئها التي يتركب منها الأجسام و هو غير ثابت و لا هم معترفون بها أيضاً - لأن هذه الأجسام المحسوسة متخالفة للطبائع بالضرورة فإذا كان مبادئها متفقة

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الطبع جميعاً فلم يكن الكل و الجزء متفقين في الطبيعة و إن كان المراد من المجموع - العدد الحاصل من مجرد الأجزاء المادية من غير ملاحظة الصورة الحاصلة لكل - فليس لها حقيقة متأصلة لها وحدة طبيعية حتى يحكم عليها بأنها متساوية لغيرها في الحقيقة أم لا و كأنه أخذ هذا الحكم عن قول الشيخ أن القسمة بأنواعها تحدث اثني عشر في المقسوم يساوي طباع كل واحد منها طباع المجموع و لم يدر أن المراد منه القسمة الواردة على الجسم المفرد و إلا فلا يخفى فساد -

ظل غربي مع نور شرقي

و ليكتف في إثبات هذا المرام بما ذكر من كلام الشيخ مع مزيد شرح و إتمام.

فالطباع معناه مصدر الصفة الذاتية الأولية للشيء حركة أو سكونا كان أو غيرهما و هو أعم من الطبيعة و المراد من أنواع القسمة ما يكون بحسب الفك و القطع أو بحسب الوهم و الفرض أو بحسب اختلاف عرضين قارين أي ما هو للموضوع في نفسه كالسواد و البياض أو غير قارين أي ما هو له بالقياس إلى غيره كالتماس و التحاذي و قد مر ذكر هذه الأقسام.

و الدليل على انحصار القسمة في هذه الأنواع أن الانقسام إن تآدى إلى الافتراق فالأول و إلا فإن كان في مجرد الوهم فالثاني و إلا فالثالث.

و بما قيدنا الوهم بالمجرد صار هذا بقسميه قسماً ثالثاً و إلا فهو من قبيل الانقسام الوهمي سيما ما يكون بحسب العرضين الغير القارين.

و قد أشرنا سابقاً إلى التفرقة بين قسميه بأن أحدهما وهمي منشأ انتزاعه في الخارج و الآخر خارجي عرض لقسميه اتصال إضافي بالمعنى الذي يعرض لأعضاء الحيوان و استدلال بعضهم على كون الانقسام بهما وهما بقولهم أن الجزء ما لا ينقسم لا كسراً و لا قطعاً و لا وهماً و لا فرضاً من غير تعرض لما يكون باختلاف عرضين

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ضعيف كما لا يخفى.

لأن الغرض منه تعريف الجوهر الفرد لا ضبط أنحاء القسمة و قد ظهر من نفي الأنواع المتباعدة في معنى واحد عن

الشيء نفي النوع المتوسط عن ذلك الشيء - وكذا قولهم إنا نقطع بأن الجسم الذي بعضه تسخن أو وقع عليه الضوء أو لاقى ببعضه جسماً آخر لم يحصل فيه الانفصال بالفعل و لم يصر جسمين ثم إذا زال ذلك التسخن أو الضوء أو الملافة عاد جسماً واحداً.

و كذا قولهم لو كان كذلك يصير المسافة أقساماً بلا نهاية في الخارج بحسب موافاة المتحرك حدودها ثم تعود في ذاتها متصلة واحدة في نفسها عند انقطاع الحركة - فإن ترويج سلب الوقوع في الخارج عن التي باختلاف عرضين قارين بانضمامهما مع التي صح فيها ذلك السلب نوع من التدليس و المغالطة فإننا قاطعون بأن محل السواد من الجسم غير محل البياض منه و إن ارتفع الوهم و الفرض و خصوصاً إذا انغمرا في باطنه و بأن السطح الأسود غير السطح الأبيض و بأن الماء الحار غير الماء البارد.

ثم من الذي قال إن موافاة المتحرك للمسافة متعددة ليلزم تعدد المسافة بوجه فضلاً عن عدم تناهي العدد. و من الذي قال إن للمسافة المتصلة حدوداً في الواقع و هل هذا إلا من أغاليط المتأخرين أن الموجود من الحركة في كل وقت جزء غير منقسم و سنعطف إشراق العرفان على تحقيق حقيقة الحركة و الزمان بوجه لم يبق لأحد مجال هذا الهذيان حسب ما وعدناه إن شاء الله تعالى - و مما يؤكد تصريح الشيخ في منطق الشفا بأنه انفصال بالفعل. و ما ذكر أيضاً في شرح الإشارات من أن الانفصال بحسب اختلاف العرضين - انفصال في الخارج من غير تأد إلى الافتراق ينور ما قررناه فمعنى كلامه أن كل متحيز مما يوجد أو يفرض فيه طرفان بأحد أسباب القسمة يتميز كل واحد منهما عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٦٠

الآخر إما في الوهم أو في الخارج يساوي طباع كل من القسمين طباع الآخر و طباع المجموع المنحل إليهما و ذلك لأن الاتصال عبارة عن وحدة في الوجود - بل هو نحو من الوجود الوجداني و الوجود الواحد لا يعرض لأمر متخالفة في الماهية المتحصلة التامة المستغني كل منها في تمام ماهيته عن الآخر بخلاف المادة و الصورة و الجنس و الفصل المحتاج بعضها إلى بعض لنقصانه و إبهامه.

فإذن لا يخلو إما أن يكون طباع كل جسم من الأجسام الديمقراطية يساوي للآخر و لا أقل واحد منها لواحد آخر أو يكون الجميع متخالفة الطباع بحيث لا اشتراك في الطباع بين اثنين.

أما على الشق الأول فنقول التحام النصفين أعني اتصالهما و افتراق الجسمين أعني انفصالهما إما بحيث يمتنع ارتفاعه أو لا و على الثاني ثبت المرام من تجويز الفصل - و الوصل في تلك الأجسام - و على الأول لا يخلو إما أن يكون الامتناع لأمر ذاتي أم عرضي لازم أو مفارق - فإن كان الثاني فكذلك لأن المطلوب تمهيد إثبات الهيولى كما سيظهر و هو إنما يثبت بإمكان شيء منهما و إن لم يقع بعد في الخارج لمانع لازم كالفلك أو مفارق كالصغر و الصلابة في بعض الأجسام التي سماها الرياضيون المحسوس الأول لا يحتمل القسمة عند الحس و بإزائه الزمان الذي يقطع فيه الحركة ذلك الجسم و هو المحسوس الأول من الزمان عندهم كما ذكره العظيم أفلاطون في كتاب النواميس الإلهية - و هو الزمان الذي إذا تحرك المتحرك كالنقطة الجواله أو الهابطة فيه دائرة عظيمة أو خطاً طويلاً يراها الحس مجتمعي الأجزاء معا و إن لم يكن كذلك في الواقع - و إن كان الأول فيجب أن يكون نوعه محصوراً في واحد و المفروض خلافه - و أما على

الشق الثاني فنقول تلك الأجسام وإن تخالف بحسب الطباع والصور إلا أن الجسمية المشتركة بين جميع الأجسام ماهية نوعية متحصلة في الخارج - وإنما يختلف أفرادها من حيث هي أفرادها بأمور منضفة إليها من خارج.

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وقد مر في مباحث الماهية بيان الفرق بين الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو مادة الأنواع وبين الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو جنس فالفصول عوارض خارجية منضمة بالقياس إلى المعنى الأول و متممات داخلية مضمونة منضمة بالقياس إلى المعنى الثاني فجسمية إذا خالفت جسمية أخرى كانت بأمور خارجية سواء كانت جواهر صورية أو أعراضا - وأما جسم إذا خالف جسما آخر مباينا له في النوع كانت بأمور داخلية و عدم الفرق بين هذين المعنيين مما يغلط كثيرا.

و بالجملة لا شبهة في أن الصور الامتدادية و هي تمام حقيقة الجسم بما هو جسم - في جميع الأجسام أمر واحد نوعي محصل و مقتضاها فيها واحد و ما يجوز و يمتنع لها في بعض الأفراد يجوز و يمتنع في الكل فحينئذ لو كان الالتحام بين الجزئين المتصلين مقتضى ذات الطبيعة الامتدادية يلزم أن يكون الأجسام و الامتدادات كلها متصلا واحدا و لو كان الانفكاك بين الجسمين المنفصلين ذاتيا لها لم يوجد شيء من تلك الطبيعة متصلا واحدا بل لم يتحقق لا في العين و لا في الوهم و ذلك ضروري البطلان و الجواهر الفردة مع استحالة وجودها ليست من أفراد تلك الطبيعة بحسب مفهوم الاسم و شرحه.

فهذا تقرير البرهان على أن القسمة الانفكاكية لا يقف عند حد في شيء من الأجسام من حيث الجسمية و لا حاجة إلى دعوى التشابه في الأجسام سواء كانت الدعوى مقدمة برهانية أو مسلمة عند الخصم كما في الأقيسة الجدلية.

و لذلك اكتفى الشيخ ببيان واحد في إثبات القسمة في الأجسام الديمقراطيةية و الفلكية و جعل المانع عن الانقسام في الفلك لازما و فيها زائلا و جعل المانع في القبيلتين خارجا عن الطباع المشترك و إن كان المانع في الفلك داخلا في جوهره بما هو نوع خاص من الجسم لا بما هو جسم فقط و كلما لزم المانع أو دخل فيه فمن حق نوعه أن لا يكون إلا شخصا واحدا لم ينقسم

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مخلص آخر

لو قطع النظر عن تشابه الأجسام المنفصلة لثم البرهان لأن النظر في جسم مفرد و قبوله للتبعيض الوهمي يوجب أن يقبل الجزء المقداري ما يقبله الكل و بالعكس لتشابه الكل و الجزء فإن من الحقيقة الامتدادية و ما يطابقها أيضا أن أجزاءها المقدارية جزئياتها للكل وجود بالفعل و تشخص عيني و للجزء وجود بالقوة و تشخص فيجوز بحسب الماهية المشتركة أن يعرض لأحدهما ما يعرض للآخر و بالعكس فليجز أن يكون المتصل منفصلا و المنفصل متصلا.

س جزء الجسم يلزم أن يصح كون مقداره كمقدار الكل فلم يبق فرق بين الجزء و الكل.

ج كلية الكل يمنع أن يكون المقدار الجزء مثله فهذا من ضروريات تعيين الكل كلا و الجزء جزءا و إلا فالتبادل كان جائزا من حيث الطبيعة.

س فما تقول في الفلك من حيث كونه فلكا حيث امتنع الفصل على أجزائه لا على المجموع.

ج ليس للفلك بما هو فلك جزء مقداري لأن طبيعته المتنوعة لجوهره أمر روحاني غير سار في الجسم فالمقسوم بحسب الفرض مادة الفلك لا فلكيته كما أن المقسوم من الحيوان قلبه لا حيوانيته.

و هاهنا شبهة مشهورة أعيت الفحول في حلها هي أن مبنى الاستدلال على استعمال لفظ مشترك بين المعنيين بمعنى واحد في الموضوعين فيكون مغالطة لا دليلا و هو أن ما يقبله الأجسام الديمقراطيةية و أجزاءها ليس إلا انفصالا فطريا و اتصالا خلقيا و ما يقاس عليهما من تجويز التحام الأجسام و انفصال الأجزاء صفتان طاريتان و كذا لفظ القبول في الأولين بمعنى الاتصاف الذي يجمع الفعلية و لا ينافي اللزوم و في الأخيرين بمعنى الاستعداد المتجدد الذي لا يجمع الفعلية فمقتضى اطراد حكم

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الطبيعة الواحدة في جميع الجزئيات هو جواز الاتصال و الوحدة في كل من تلك الأجسام بحسب أول فطرتها و الانفصال و التعدد في أجزائها كذلك.

و لا يكفي ثبوت هذا المعنى في تمهيد إثبات الهيولى بل لا بد من التوصل فيه إلى إمكان طء الوصل بعد الفصل أو الفصل بعد الوصل فإن المحوج إلى الهيولى في كل موضع الإمكان الاستعدادي المغاير للفعلية في الوجود دون الإمكان الذاتي المجامع لها فيه إلا في ضرب من ملاحظة العقل و اعتباره كما ستعلم إن شاء الله.

و قد أجاب شيخنا و أستاذنا سيد أعظم الأعلام و سند أكابر الكرام ضاعف الله قدره بأن قبول القسمة الوهمية مساوق لإمكان القسمة الانفكاكية بالنظر إلى نفس طبيعة الامتداد و إن منع عنها مانع لازم أو زائل إذ لو امتنع الانفكاك عليه لذاته - لكان فرض الانقسام فيه من الأوهام الاختراعية و لم يكن حينئذ فرق بين فرض الانقسام فيه و بين فرضه في المفارقات الذوات و لا شك أن فرض الانقسام الوهمي من

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المعاني الانتزاعية و خصوصا إذا كان منشؤه اختلاف عرضين.

بحث و كشف -

هذا منقوض بالزمان فإنه عندهم متصل قابل للقسمة الوهمية غير قابل للقسمة الانفصالية و أيضا توهم القسمة و إن سلم كونه مساوقا لتجويز وقوعها في الخارج - لكن تجويز العقل وقوع أمر لا يستلزم إمكانه الذاتي فضلا عن الاستعدادي إذ ربما جوز العقل شيئا في بادي النظر.

ثم إذا قام البرهان ظهر خلافه ثم إذا لم يكن ممتدا قابلا للانفكاك الخارجي - لا يلزم أن يكون توهم القسمة فيه كتوهم القسمة في المجرد لظهور الفرق بينهما بأن هذا ممتد و ذاك خارج عن جنس الامتداد و ما لا امتداد و لا وضع له يكون تقدير القسمة فيه اختراعا محضا من العقل.

ثم إن لإبطال هذا المطلب دليلا آخران.

أحدهما وجود التخلخل و التكاثر الحقيقيين في الأجسام كما يدل عليه التجربة في القارورة الضيقة الرأس الجذابة للماء بعد المص الصياحة في النار بعد السد مع كون الخلاء محالا.

و ثانيهما أن كلا من تلك الأجسام لو كان بسيطا ذا طبيعة واحدة كانت كرية الأشكال لما سيجيء فيحصل بينها فرج خالية و الخلاء محال و إن كان مركبا من أجسام مختلفة الطبائع لم يكن متصلا واحدا هذا خلف و أيضا أجزاؤها يكون متداعية إلى الانفكاك و الرجوع إلى أحيائها و أشكالها الطبيعية فيلزم ما لزم أولا من وقوع الخلاء

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الفن الثاني في البحث عن حال الهيولى ماهية و حقيقة و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في الإشارة إلى ماهية الهيولى من جهة مفهوم الاسم و إثبات وجودها و تحقيق إنيتها بحيث ما أنكر أحد له أقل تمييز

إن في الأجسام سنخا يتوارد عليه الصور و الهيئات و لها خميرة يختلف عليها الاستحالات و الانقلابات و لا يحتاج الجمهور في إثبات وجود أمر يصدق عليه مفهوم هذا الاسم - أعني المادة القابلة لوجود هذه الحوادث و اللواحق و زوالها فإن كل من له استيهال مخاطبة علمية يعلم و يعتقد يقينا بالفكر أو الحدس أن التراب يصير نطفة و النطفة تصير جسد إنسان أو حيوان و البذر يصير شجرا و الشجر يصير رمادا أو فحما. و إذا قيل إنه خلق من الماء بشرا و من الطين حيوانا لا يخلو إما أن يفهم من هذا القول أن النطفة باقية نطفة و الطين طينا و مع هذا فهو بشر و حيوان حتى يكون في حالة واحدة نطفة و جسد إنسان أو طينا و حيوانا و إما أن يكون بطلت النطفة بكليتها حتى لم يبق منها شيء أصلا و كذا الطين.

ثم حدث حيوان أو إنسان فحينئذ ما خلق الإنسان من نطفة و لا الحيوان من طين بل ذلك شيء بطل بكليته و هذا شيء آخر حصل جديدا بجميع أجزائه و إما أن يكون الجوهر الذي كان فيه الهيئة النطفية أو الطينية بطلت عنه تلك الهيئة و حصلت فيه هيئة إنسانية أو صورة حيوانية و القسمان الأولان باطلان عند الكافة و ليست مما يعتقدهما العامة و لذلك كل من زرع بذرا لينبت شيء منه أو تزوج ليكون له ولده يفرق بين ولده و غيره بأنه من مائه و يحكم على الزرع بأنه من بذره و على الفرخ بأنه من بيضه.

أ و لا ترى أنه لا يحصل في الزراعة من البر غير البر و من الشعير غير الشعير و لا في التوليد

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من الإنسان غير الإنسان و من الفرس المحض الغير الفرس و من الحمار غير الحمار و من المزدوج من القسمين غير المزدوج من صفات كل منهما.

ثم إن جحد جاحد و عاند معاند لا يلتفت إليه العاقل الفطن بل يكذبه مجرد الحدس الإنساني و مثل هذا الإنسان يكذب نفسه في أحكام كثيرة إلا أنه لا يستحيي عن نفسه و من لا يستحيي عن نفسه لا يستحيي عن الله لأنه أقرب إليه من نفسه.

فظهر أن الهيولى من حيث المفهوم لا خلاف فيها لأحد بل وقع الاتفاق من العقلاء مع افتراقهم في الآراء على ثبوت مادة يتوارد عليها الصور و الهيئات إلا أنها عند الإشرافيين و من تبعهم نفس الجسم الذي هو أمر واحد لا تركيب فيه عندهم بوجه من الوجوه فمن حيث جوهريته يسمى جسما و من حيث إضافته و قبوله للصور و المقادير يسمى مادة.

وعند المشاءين و من يحذو حذوهم جوهر أبسط يتقوم بجوهر آخر يحل فيه يسمى صورة يتحصل من تركيبهما جوهر وحداني الحد قابل للمقادير و الأعراض و الصور اللاحقة و هو الجسم فالجسم عندهم مركب في حقيقته من الهیولی و من الاتصال القابل للأبعاد الثلاثة و عند أصحاب ديمقراطيس أجسام متعددة بسائط غير قابلة للفصل. و عند قوم آخر هم المتكلمون على تشعبهم و تكثرهم هو الجواهر الفردة التي يتقوم بها التأليف فيحصل الجسم فالتأليف عندهم بمنزلة الصورة عند المشاءين إلا أنه عرض لا يقوم بذاته بل بمحله و الصورة جوهر يقوم بذاته و يتقوم به محله الذي هو الهیولی.

نعم من زعم أن الامتداد الجسماني عرض في المادة و الجسم مركب من الهیولی - و الاتصال العرضي يكون مذهبهم أشبه بمذهبه من مذهب المشاءين و بقي الفرق بينهما - بأن تقوم جوهرية المحل في الوجود يكون عنده بما سماه صورة و عند هؤلاء بذاته - مع اتفاقهم على تقوم الجوهر المركب بالعرض القائم بالجزء الآخر منه بحسب الماهية و يكون المحل شخصا واحدا عنده و أشخاصا متعددة عندهم. و نسبة مذهب المتكلمين إلى هذا المذهب كنسبة مذهب ديمقراطيس إلى

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مذهب الإشرقيين لأن هذين مشتركان في عدم جسمية الهیولی مع جوهريتها و قبولها للانقسام و مفترقان في فعلية الأقسام و عدمها و ذاك مشتركان في جسميتها و مفترقان في كون الأقسام جميعها حاصلة بالفعل أو بالقوة. و الهیولی عند المشاءين استعداد محض و عند غيرهم ذات وجهين قوة من وجه و فعل من وجه و ستعلم أن جوهرية الهیولی لا يوجب كونها أمرا بالفعل محصلا.

فإن قلت المذكور في كتب المعتزلة أن مبادي الأجسام عند النظام و أصحابه - هي ألوان و طعوم و روائح و نحو ذلك من الأعراض فلم يكن هیولی الأجسام عند المتكلمين كافة جوهرًا. قلت نعم إلا أن هذه الأمور عندهم جواهر لا أعراض.

و تقرير هذا المذهب على ما صودف أن مثل الوهميات و العقلیات كالأكوان و التأثيرات في كتبهم و الآراء و الاعتقادات و الآلام و اللذات و ما أشبهها كلها أعراض لا دخل لها عندهم في حقيقة الجسم قطعا و أما الألوان و الأصواء و الطعوم و الروائح و الأصوات و کیفیات الملموسة من الحرارة و البرودة و غيرهما فعند النظام و من تبعه جواهر بل أجسام حتى صرح كما هو المنقول عنه بأن كلا من ذلك جسم لطيف - مركب من جواهر مجتمعة.

ثم إن تلك الأجسام اللطيفة إذا اجتمعت و تداخلت صار الجسم الكثيف الذي هو الجماد أما الروح فجسم لطيف هو شيء واحد و الحيوان كله من جنس واحد و عند الجمهور كل هذه الأمور أعراض إلا أن الجسم عند ضرار بن عمرو و الحسين النجار مجموع من تلك الأعراض و عند الآخرين جواهر مجتمعة يحلها تلك الأعراض.

و قد وجد قريبا من زماننا هذا شخص من المشتغلين بالبحث و كان مصرا على أن الماء رطوبة متراكمة و أن الأرض يبوسة متراكمة و هكذا سائر العناصر [الأعراض] - و هذا أشنع ما نسب إلى النظام و ما وقع في بعض الكتب كالمواقف و غيره من أن الجسم

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ليس مجموع أعراض مجتمعة خلافا للنظام و النجار ليس على ما ينبغي.
و الصواب أن يذكر مكان النظام ضرار على ما في سائر الكتب.
و ربما يوجه كلام الموافق بأن الكلام فيما هو جسم اتفاقا و النظام يجعله مجموع أعراض بسببها جواهر بل أجساما فهو يوافق النجار و يخالف القوم في المعنى - إلا أن الاحتجاج عليهما بأن العرض لا يقوم بذاته بل لا بد من الانتهاء إلى جوهر يقوم به و لهما بأن الجواهر متماثلة و الأجسام متخالفة فلا يكون جواهر لا يلائم هذا التوجيه و لا ينتظم على رأي النظام حيث زعم أن كلا من تلك الأمور كالسواد مثلا جسم مؤلف من جواهر متماثلة في أنفسها قائمة بذواتها و إن لم تكن متماثلة لجواهر الآخر كالحلاوة أو الحرارة مثلا.
و بهذا يظهر أيضا أن الاحتجاج بأن الأجسام باقية و الأعراض غير باقية لا تنهض عليه مع أن بقاء الأجسام غير مسلم لديه.

و أما الجواب بمنع تماثل الجواهر فجذلي لا يتأتى على مذهب المانعين - حتى لو قصد الإلزام لم يتم المرام بل الأقرب أن الأجسام بما هي أجسام متماثلة عند الحكماء و المتكلمين لأن ذلك مناط إثبات الصورة النوعية عندهم و إثبات الفاعل المختار عند هؤلاء و القائل بالاختلاف إنما هو النظام.
و ما أسخف ما في كلام صاحب الموافق تأييدا لمذهب النظام و إصلاحا لفاسده و ترويجا لكاسده و لن يصلح العطار ما أفسد الدهر من أنه لا محيص لمن يقول بتجانس الجواهر عن أن يجعل جملة من الأعراض داخلة في حقيقة الجسم فيكون الاختلاف عائدا إليها و كأنه لم يفرق بين التجانس بحسب المفهوم و التركيب الذهني و بين التماثل في الوجود و التركيب الخارجي و على تقدير التركيب العقلي و الاتحاد الجنسي.
فقد دريت أن المميز الفصلي لا يجب أن يكون ماهية مندرجة تحت مقولة عرضية و لا جوهرية فالأجسام إذا اتحدت مع سائر الجواهر في الجوهرية ذهنا و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٦٩

كان الجوهر جنسا لها عقلا فلا بد من امتيازها بفصول يتحد معها في الوجود يكون كل منها جزءا عقليا لا تأصل لها في الخارج و الطعوم و الروائح ليست كذلك و أما إذا اتحدت الأجسام بعضها مع بعض أو الجواهر بعضها مع بعض اتحادا نوعيا أو كان كل منها مركبا من الجوهرية أو الجسمية مع أمر آخر على اختلاف رأي الحكماء و المتكلمين حتى يكون التركيب خارجيا و جنسية الأمر المشترك جسما كان أو جوهرًا ذا وضع بضرب من الاعتبار على الوجه الذي أشرنا إليه من تصيير المادة الخارجية جنسا مع كونها متحدة الحقيقة خارجا و عقلا باعتبار فلا يلزم إلا دخولها في حقيقة بعض الأنواع بما هي أنواع لا في حقيقة الجسم بما هو جسم كما هو مذهب الإشراقيين من تقوم الأجسام النوعية بالأعراض كما هو مذهب النظام فإن مذهبه أنها محض الجواهر فكيف توجه بما ذكر لا في حقيقة الجسم بما هو جسم.
ثم العجب كيف ذهل عما ذهل في توجيهه مذهبه و إصلاحه من الوقوع في ورطة أخرى و هي عدم بقاء الأجسام ضرورة انتفاء الشيء بانتفاء ما يتقوم به و هو جملة الأعراض الغير الباقية باعترافه.
و قد أشار إليه بقوله و لذلك إن الأعراض لا تبقى و الجواهر باقية فلو تم كون الجواهر غير مختلفة بذواتها لما كانت

الأجسام المختلفة محض الجواهر المجتمعة - بل مع جملة من الأعراض و حينئذ يلزم عدم بقائها لعدم بقاء الأعراض و هل هذا إلا تناقض في الكلام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٧٠

فصل (٣) في الإشارة إلى ماهية الهيولى عند المحصلين من المشاءين

قد عرفوا الهيولى بأنها الجوهر القابل للصورة و هو بحسب الظاهر منقوض بالنفس لأنها جوهر قابل للصور فالأولى أن يقيد الصورة بالحسية - و منهم من قيد التعريف بكون القابل بحيث لا معنى له إلا القابلية. و فيه خلل لا لما ذكره الشيخ الإلهي في المطارحات على ما سنذكره بل لأن في النفس جوهرًا هيولانيًا لا معنى له إلا القابلية لأنه استعداد محض نحو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٧١

المعقولات الصورية كما سنحققه و ليس هو نفس النفس لأن النفس بما هي نفس صورة كمالية للمادة الجسدانية فلا يكون استعدادا نحو الكمال العقلي لاستحالة أن يكون أمر واحد بما هو واحد فعلا و قوة و إن كان بالقياس إلى شيئين و لا أن يكون صورته لأمر و مادة لأمر و إن كان الأمران متغايرين. و ذلك لأن اتصاف الشيء بمتخالفين بالإضافة إلى أمرين إنما يجوز و يصح إذا لم يكن ذلك الشيء حقيقته محض حقيقة أحد المتخالفين و فيما نحن فيه كذلك. أما الهيولى فإنها محض القابلية و الاستعداد عند المشاءين. و أما النفوس و الصور فإنها فعلية في أنفسها متعلقة بالقوة و الاستعداد مشوبة بها شوب وجودها بوجود الهيولى الخارجة عن ذاتها و على ذلك بناء مذهبهم في تركيب الجسم المطلق من الهيولى و الصورة. و أما ما أورده الشيخ الإلهي في أوائل طبيعيات كتابه بأن القابلية و استعداد القبول ليست أمورا جوهرية بل ينبغي أن يتحقق القابل في نفسه حقيقة حتى يقبل أمرا آخر و يضاف إليه أنه قابل لأمر آخر و حامل الصور ليس نفس الاستعداد - فإن الاستعداد هو استعداد لشيء له في نفسه حقيقة.

بلى لا يمنع أن يكون الجوهر الحامل للصورة ربما يسمى هيولى باعتبار القبول كما أن النفس يسمى نفسا باعتبار تدبيرها للبدن فيكون هذه الإضافات أجزاء لمفهوم الاسم لا للحقيقة الجوهرية.

ففيه بحث لأن نسبة القابلية و الاستعداد إلى الهيولى كنسبة الفاعلية و الإيجاد إلى البارئ تعالى فكما دل البرهان على أن سلسلة التأثير ينتهي إلى مؤثر يكون بذاته مؤثرا و إلها و ليست إلهيته و تأثيره بصفة زائدة و إلا لكان مفتقرا في اتصافه بتلك الصفة إلى أمر يضم إليه و إلى إلهية سابقة على هذه الإلهية و هو ممتنع لانجراره إلى لزوم الدور أو التسلسل الباطلان بالذات كما سنحقق في مقامه فكذاك سلسلة الحاجة و الافتقار الاستعدادي ينتهي إلى شيء ذاته محض الفاقة و الافتقار و كما أن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٧٢

معنى عينية الصفات في الموجود الأول جل اسمه ليس أن المفهومات الإضافية التي لا وجود لها إلا في العقل هي عين ذات الشيء الذي هو صرف الوجود المجهول الكنه.

بل معنى ذلك كونه بذاته منشأ لحكاية تلك الصفات و منبعاً لانتزاعها عقلاً - كما أنه منبع لوجودات الأشياء خارجاً فكذلك حكم عينية الاستعداد للهيولي فإنها عبارة عن جهة فقر الأشياء و قصوراتها في الوجود العيني كما أن الإمكان الذاتي عبارة عن جهة فقر الذوات و قصورات الماهيات بحسب تقومها في مرتبة الذات و الماهية.

و لا يذهب على أحد أن كون الشيء بحسب جوهر ذاته متعلق الوجود بغيره لا يوجب كونه من مقولة المضاف بالذات لأن المتضائفين مفهومان ذهنيان كليان يعقل كل منهما مع الآخر و ليس كذلك حال الوجودات العينية إذا كان بعضها مستحيل الانفكاك عن الآخر و إلا لكان جميع الوجودات داخلية تحت جنس المضاف بالذات و ليس كذلك.

بيان ذلك أن الجاعل بنفس ذاته جاعل و المجعول بنفس جوهره مفاض و بالجعل البسيط مجعول فالباري بنفس حقيقته القدسية فياض للأشياء و مع ذلك تعالى عن أن تكون واقعة تحت جنس فضلاً عن وقوعه تحت جنس المضاف الذي هو أضعف الأعراض.

و أما النفس في نفسيتها فإن كانت بجوهرها متعلقة الوجود بغيرها تعلقاً شوقياً تدبيرياً أو طولياً كان حالها ما ذكرنا من حال الوجودات المتعلقة بغيرها بالذات و إن كان نحو العلاقة مختلفاً و إن كانت النفسية جائزة الزوال و الانفكاك عنها فقياس ارتباطها على ارتباط الهيولي بغيرها قياس بلا جامع و أما قوله قدس سره بعد ذلك و لا يجوز أن يقال الأمر الجوهري حقيقة نفسه - متقومة بالقوة و الاستعداد و هو نفس الاستعداد فإن جزء الجوهر من جميع الوجوه لا يصح أن يكون عرضاً و إلا لم يكن الشيء جوهرًا محضاً بل مجموع جوهر و عرض.

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فالجواب أن كثيراً ما يعبر عن حقائق الفصول الذاتية بلوازمها العرضية كما مر ذكره غير مرة و هذا من باب تعريف القوى بأفعالها الذاتية فالقوة الفاعلة يعرف بفعلها الخاص و القوة الانفعالية يعرف بانفعالها.

و الحق أن تعريف العقل بإدراك المعقولات و تعريف القوة الحيوانية بالإحساس و التحريك و القوة النباتية بالتغذية و التنمية كلها مما أقيمت مقام الحدود و إن كانت المذكورات بظواهر مفهوماتها أعراضاً نسبية لكن الفصول الحقيقية هي ما يعبر عنها بهذه الأمور التي هي علاماتها و لوازمها.

إذاً لا يمكن الحكاية عنها إلا بهذه اللوازم فكذلك الحال في الهيولي و سائر القوى الانفعالية من حيث إنها انفعالية و السر في الجميع أن أنحاء الوجودات البسيطة لا سبيل إلى معرفتها إلا باللوازم أو بالمشاهدة الإشراقية و أن ذا الحد المنطقي المركب من الجنس و الفصل ليس إلا الماهية الكلية النوعية.

و ربما يكون الوجود نحواً بسيطاً و الماهية اللازمة له مركباً حدها من جزئين - كل منهما داخل في الماهية خارج عن ذلك الوجود إلا أنها بجزءيه حكاية عن حقيقة ذلك الوجود لازمة له بحسب حاق مرتبته فيضطر الإنسان إلى ذكرهما عند الإشارة إليه فيقال لهما حد ذلك الوجود اضطراباً مع أن الوجود مما لا حد له و قد حقق الشيخ هذا في الحكمة المشرقية.

و قريب منه ما أورده شرف الله نفسه في كتاب المباحث جواباً عن مثل ذلك الإشكال حيث قال و هاهنا سؤال و هو أنه

إن كان فصل الهيولى هو الإمكان و الهيولى جوهر و فصول الجواهر جواهر فيجب أن يكون الإمكان جوهرًا و قد أبطل هذا و إن لم يكن الإمكان فصله و لأنه لازم فقد كان قبل الإمكان ممكناً لأنها لا تنفك عن الإمكان. و الجواب عن هذا أن فصل الهيولى لا يعرف لأن الهيولى من حيث هي هيولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٧٤

مجردة ليس ممكناً و لا غير ممكن بل يلزمه الإمكان معناه أنه إذا عقلت عقل معها الإمكان فلا ينفك عنه انتهى كلامه. و هو كما يظهر عند التعمق عين ما ذكرناه إذ غرضه أن الهيولى لكونها جوهرًا بسيطًا و فصول البسائط الوجودية يكون بحيث لا يمكن التعبير عنها إلا بلوازمها المنتزعة عن حاق حقيقتها عندنا يتصور في الذهن و لو بحسب التقدير و الهيولى ليست حقيقتها إلا قوة الحقائق و إمكانها الاستعدادي كما يدل عليه برهان وجودها. فهذا الإمكان تمام ذاتها و كمال حقيقتها من حيث هي قوة الصور الجوهرية - كما أن الحركة كمال ما بالقوة من الأوصاف العرضية من حيث هو بالقوة فيها. و أما ما اعترض ثالثًا بقوله و الاستعداد لا يكون حاملًا لما هو استعداد له - كيف و قد قيل إن الاستعداد للشيء لا يبقى مع حصوله فإذا كانت الهيولى هي الاستعداد أو جزؤها الاستعداد للصورة فلا يبقى مع الصورة و كلامنا في حامل الصورة.

فجوابه أن وحدة الهيولى كما سنحقق وحدة مبهمة لأن لها في ذاتها استعداد كافة الصور و الأعراض و كلما خرج منها إلى الفعل بطل ما بحسبه من الاستعداد فلم يكن الهيولى استعدادًا له بل لغيرها. و لهذا قيل إن وحدة الهيولى جنسية ليست شخصية و أولوا كلام من قال من الحكماء إن هيولى عالم العناصر واحدة بالشخص بأن غرضه أن الهيولى لها تشخص حصل لها من الهيئة العارضة من الصور و الأعراض جملة و لا شك في أن مجموع الجواهر و الأعراض شخص واحد. و تحقيق ذلك أن للهيولى في ذاتها لكونها أمرًا عقليًا وحدة كوحدة عارضة للمعقولات المشتركة بين الحقائق المتكثرة النوعية في الذهن عند ملاحظة العقل إياها واحدة في الذهن متشخصة بتشخصات العقل فحال الهيولى في وحدتها الشخصي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٧٥

العقلي كحال الأجناس في وحدتها الذهني الاشتراكي. و كثيرا ما يصرح الشيخ و أتباعه أن للجنس الذي للمركبات استعدادا لوجود الفصول و مع ذلك اتصافه ببعض الفصول لا يبطل استعداده لسائر الفصول و ذلك لأن وحدته مبهمة تجامع التكثر كما أن تشخصه لا يابى العموم و الاشتراك فكذلك حكم الهيولى في كونها استعدادا فإنها ليست استعدادا واحدا بل في كل مرتبة يقترن بصورة تصير استعدادا لصورة أخرى.

و أيضا الحكماء فرقوا بين القوة و الاستعداد بوجوه ثلاثة ذكرها الشيخ الرئيس في بعض رسائله و ذلك لأن القوة يكون على الضدين بالسوية فإن كل إنسان يقوى على أن يفرح و يحزن إلا أن منهم من هو مستعد للفرح و منهم من هو

مستعد للحزن و كذلك الحكم في الغضب و الخوف و سائر الانفعالات.
و لأن القوة ما تكون بعيدة و الاستعداد يكون قريبا و القوة يتفاوت شدة و ضعفا و الاستعداد لا يكون إلا واحدا هو القوة الشديدة.

و بالجملة الاستعداد استكمال للقوة بالقياس إلى أحد المتقابلين فالهيولى الأولى هي بالقوة كل شيء فبعض ما يحصل فيها يعوقها عن بعض فيحتاج المعوق عنه إلى زواله و بعض ما فيها لا يعوق عن بعض آخر ولكنه يحتاج إلى ضميمة أخرى حتى يتم الاستعداد و هذه القوة هي قوة بعيدة.

و أما القوة القريبة فهي التي لا يحتاج إلى أن يقارنها قوة فاعلية قبل القوة الفاعلية التي ينفع عنها فالشجرة مثلا ليست بالقوة مفتاحا بل يحتاج إلى أن يلقاها أولا قوة قالة ثم ناشرة ثم ناحته ثم بعد ذلك يتهيا لأن ينفع من ملاقة القوة الفاعلية المفتاحية فيصير مفتاحا.

فظهر أن الهيولى ليست استعدادا واحدا نحو صورة واحدة حتى يبطل ذاته بوجود تلك الصورة بل هي قوة مطلقة لجميع الصور و ليست في ذاتها واحدة بالعدد بل بالمعنى.

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و ليست أيضا جوهرًا مستقلا في الوجود حتى يكون وحدتها وحدة معينة - بل هي في وجودها تابعة لوجود صورة ما مطلقة يحصل طبيعتها المطلقة محصل واحد بالعدد مستقل في الوجود و يقيمها مقيم عقلي مشخص.
و إن أردت إيضاح ذلك فانظر إلى حال البدن كيف يصحبه قوة مستمرة للهيئات و الصور المتبدلة للأعضاء و غيرها و استعداداتها المتعاقبة فلم يزل يلزمه ما دام في هذه النشأة نقص و بحسبه قوة مستمرة نحو الاستكمال طور بعد طور و حالا غب حال - بحيث يتبدل فيه جميع الصور التي للأعضاء و الأمشاج و مع ذلك محفوظ الوحدة الشخصية للصور المطلقة و للاستعداد المطلق بنفس شخصيته باقية من أول العمر إلى آخر الأجل.

فقس عليه حال عالم العناصر في وحدتها الشخصية و وحدة الهيولى التي هو قوة محضة مستمرة إلى آخر الدهر مع تبدل الصور و تعدد الاستعدادات و سيجيء فصل إيضاح في مباحث التلازم إن شاء الله تعالى.

و من هناك يظهر خطأ جماعة من المتأخرين كالعلامة الخفري و غيره - زعموا أن الهيولى شخص واحد يتوارد عليه الصور و الهيئات و مثلوها بالبحر و الصور بالأمواج و لو عكسوا الأمر لكان يشبه أن يكون أولى فإن وجود الهيولى تابعة لوجود الصورة فكيف يكون المتنوع متعددا و التابع بما هو تابع واحدا شخصيا.

و قد برهن على أن ما بالفعل مطلقا متقدم على ما بالقوة و أما القوة الجزئية - فهي متقدمة على الفعل الذي هو قوة عليه و كل قوة تابعة لفعل متقدم و هي إمكان لفعل يتقدم عليه و يضاف إليه فالقوة على الرجولية تابعة للصورة الطفولية مقترنة بها و القوة على الطفولية تابعة للصورة المنوية و القوة عليها تابعة للصورة الدموية و القوة عليها تابعة لصورة الغذاء.

و هكذا متعاقبة إلى ما يقارن صور البسائط ثم يعود إلى صور المركبات تارة أخرى بغير واسطة أو بواسطة تردها من بسيط إلى بسيط حتى ينتهي إلى

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المركب فلا يزال الاستعدادات تابعة للصور بوجه آخر كالمد و الجزر للبحر و الطلوع و الغروب للفلكيات و القبض و البسط للصوفي.

و أما النقص على التعريف الذي ذكرناه للهيولى أي الجوهر القابل للصور الحسية بأن من الصور الجسمانية ما ليست بحسية سيما صور الأفلاك فإنها غير محسوسة.

فالجواب أن المراد منها ما يقبل الإشارة الحسية و إن لم يكن أمرا مدركا بإحدى الحواس الظاهرة و إطلاق الحسي على ما يقابل العقلي شائع كثير.

و لأحد أن يورد في تعريف الهيولى بدل الحسية الجسمانية فيقول الهيولى جوهر قابل للصور الجسمانية ثم يعرف الجسم بأنه جوهر من شأنه أن يعقد بالإشارة الحسية أو يمكن فيه فرض ثلاث متقاطعات على التقاطع العمودي كما مر

فصل (٣) في إثبات الجوهر الهولاني

لما بطل المذاهب القائلة بانفصال الجسم إلى أجزاء لا تقبل القسمة المقدارية أصلا جوهرية كانت كما عليه المتكلمون تبعا لعبارات بعض من تقدم عهده عهد أفلاطون و أرسطو من الفلاسفة قبل نضج الحكمة و تمامها أو عرضية كما عليه النظام و الضرار و النجار أو لا تقبل الفكية فقط دون غيرها كما رآه بعض آخر مثل ديمقراطيس و أصحابه ثبت أن حقيقة الجسم غير خارجة عن اتصال و متصل

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في نفسه كما هو عند الحس قابلا للانفصال و ليس انفصاله و اتصاله تباعد الأجزاء و تجاورها بل زوال الوحدة و حدوث الانفصال أو زوال الانفصال و حدوث الاتصال.

و بالجملة مثل هذه الحقيقة لا بد أن يكون وحدتها الشخصية هي نحو اتصالها و متصلتها كما أن وحدة العدد و شخصيتها ليست إلا انفصالها و تعددها و كما أن بطلان كثرة العدد يبطل هويتها الانفصالية فبطلان وحدة الاتصال في الجسم يبطل هويته الاتصالية فإذا تحقق للجسم اتصال و تحقق قبوله الانفصال و تحقق أن القابل و ما يلزمه يجب بقاء وجوده مع المقبول و الاتصال نفسه لا يبقى مع الانفصال - لما علمت أن الوحدة مقابلة للكثرة فلو لم يكن في الجسم شيء يقبل الانفصال لكان إما أن يقبل الاتصال مقابلة ضده أو عدمه.

و إما أن يكون الفصل إعداماً لهويته الاتصالية بالتمام و إيجاد الهويتين الاتصاليتين الآخرين من كتم العدم من غير رباط بحسب الذات بين هاتين و تلك و كذا عند التحام الهويتين متصلا واحدا إذا لم يكن قابل غير الاتصال يقبل الاتصال يلزم أن يقبل الشيء نفسه - أو يكون الوصل إعداماً لهويتين و إحداثاً لهوية واحد من غير جامع بين هذه و بين تينك و الأولان باطلان بالضرورة.

و كذا الثانيان للفرق الضروري بين الفصل و بين إعدام جسم بكليته و إحداث جسمين آخرين و كذا بين الوصل و إعدام جسمين و إحداث جسم ثالث كماء الجرة يجعل في الكيزان أو ماء الكيزان يجعل في الجرة فذلك الأمر الباقي في الحاليين - هو المراد بالهيولى و هو استعداد محض ليس في نفسه هوية اتصالية ليمتنع طريان

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الكثرة و الانفصال عليها مع بقائها بحالها و لا هوية انفصالية كالوحدات الجوهرية - أو غير الجوهرية ليمتنع طريان الوحدة و الاتصال عليه بل وحدتها و اتصالها بحلول الصورة الاتصالية فيها و كثرتها و انفصالها بطريان الانفصال عليها. ثم إذا ظهر لك أن أدنى مراتب الوجودية بالفعل هو الوجود الاتصالي و الانفصالي - الذين لا جامعية لشيء منهما بالقياس إلى نفسه و أجزاء ذاته و أن الوجود الانفصالي - لما كان أدونهما مرتبة في الخسة و القصور فلم ينل من منبع الوجود إلا مرتبة أنزل - من أن يتصف بالتجوهر من دون حامل يحمل ذاته حسب ما برهن على استحالة جوهرية الأفراد الانفصالية.

و بطل كون المنفصلات و الآحاد الوضعية موجودا مستقلا و الموجود من الموجود العددي ليس إلا عرضا قائما بغيره و إنما المتألف من الوحدات لا يستحق إلا نحوا عرضيا من الوجود و كذا الغير القار من المقادير لا يسع إلا الوجود العرضي كما سنحقق.

فظهر أن لا أدون منزلة من الجواهر الصورية إلا الهوية الاتصالية الجسمية - و لا شك أن مادة الشيء وجودها أنقص من ذلك الشيء كيف و نسبتها إليه نسبة الشيء إلى التمام و قد فرغنا من تحقيق هذا في مباحث العلل الأربع فما ظنك بأمر يكون مادة يكون صورتها أضعف الصور فهل إلا قابل محض لا حظ لها من الفعلية.

فمثل هذه المادة يجب أن يكون حقيقتها قوة متقومة بفعل ما أي فعلية كانت - و مادة متحصلة بتعيين ما أي تعيين كان حتى إنها يستتم ماهيتها بالفصل ما يستتم بالوصل - و يتقوم بالكثرة كما يتقوم بالوحدة و يبقى مع الفساد كما يبقى مع الكون و يقبل الخير كما يقبل الشر و إنما يحصل الاستمرار و البقاء لأنها لازمة لمطلق الصور المنحفظ نوعيتها بتعاقب الأشخاص بإبقاء مقيم قدسي يديم بعنايته عالم الأجسام و صورها و توابعها اللازمة و يحفظ أنواعها بتوارد أفرادها و يبقى وجوداتها و خيراتها و يجبر نقصاناتها و ضرورها و آفاتها و نقائصها بتعقيب أمثالها و أشباحها

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أبحاث و تحقيقات -

[بحث]

قال صاحب البصائر و هو ابن سهلان الساجي معترضا على الحجة المذكورة - إن الانفصال عدمي و العدمي لا يحتاج إلى قابل يقبله و إلا لكان في العدم قوابل موجودة غير متناهية قبل وجود الأشياء.

و دفعه بأن الانفصال إن كان عبارة عن حدوث هويتين اتصاليتين فذاك و إن كان عبارة عن عدم اتصال فليس كل عديم الاتصال منفصلا حتى يكون العقل منفصلا و النقطة منفصلة بل لا بد مع ذلك من إضافة إلى محل يبقى معه و له استعداد ما يقابله فكما أن البصر يضاف إلى محل و عضو يتصور بصورة المرئي و يقبل قوة بها يرسم الألوان فكذلك العمى الذي هو بطلان تلك القوة عن العضو القابل نوعا أو شخصا و كما لا يقبل السواد البياض بل محله كذلك لا يقبل البصر العمى بل محله - فعلى هذا القياس لا يقبل الاتصال الانفصال بل محله.

و قد علمت أن قابل الاتصال لكونه محض القابلية يكفيه أقل جهة يتهيأ بها لورود الأشياء عليه لغاية عرية في ذاته عن الصورة فنسبته إلى الاتصال و زواله ثم عوده كنسبة واحدة فيقبل العود ثم العود بخلاف غيرها من القوابل الشواني لتصورها بصورها المقومة إياها الموجبة لاستعدادها و قبولها لما يحتاج إلى مزيد تأثير من مؤثر قوي لينفعل به و ينتقل

من أحد المتقابلين إلى الآخر بل ربما يفعل من أحد الطرفين بحيث يبطل استعداده لغيره أو للطرف الآخر كالمصور بصورة تامة لا أتم منها و كالمصور بصورة فلكية أو كوكبية لا ضد لها ولا ند ولا فساد يعترىها إلا على نحو الفناء المطلق كما هو عند أشرف الملة والحكمة فليس حال الهيولى الأولى من هذه الجهة بالقياس إلى الوصل والفصل حال العين بالقياس إلى البصر والعمى وحال الإنسان بالقياس إلى العلم والجهل.

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بحث آخر -

قالوا سلمنا أن الانفصال يحتاج إلى قابل ولكن قابله نفس الجسم وهو الهيولى الأولى لا غير. وجوابه أنا نهنا على أن الاتصال المقوم للجسم ليس ما يتبدل عليه كأبعاد الشمعة وامتداداتها فإنها لا يخل تبدلها بحقيقة الجسمية بل بكميتها التعليمية واما الاتصال المقوم للجسمية فمتى زال لم يبق جسم كان أولا حتى يقبل الانفصال فالقابل له معنى مباين للجسمية.

ثبت أن الاتصال ليس نفسه هو الجسم وتوضيحه على نمط ثاني الأشكال أن الجسم قابل للانفصال وليس الاتصال بنفسه قابلا للانفصال فليس الجسم هو الاتصال بنفسه وفي قوة هذا الكلام أن الجسم لا يعقل إلا بالاتصال وكل ما هو كذلك فليس الاتصال خارجا عن حقيقته.

فظهر من هذا القول القياسي أن الاتصال غير خارج عن حقيقة الجسم ومن القول القياسي السابق أنه ليس كل حقيقته فكل ما ليس خارجا عن حقيقة شيء - ولا كل حقيقته فهو جزؤه فالأصل يكون جزء الجسم.

فإذا ثبت هذا لزم أن يكون الهيولى غير الجسم نفسه فبطل أن يكون القابل للاتصال نفس الجسم بل جزءه فله جزء آخر غير الاتصال فيتركب حقيقة الجسم عن الاتصال وما يقبله فيكون للاتصال صورة جوهرية والقابل مادة جوهرية وهذا هو المرام.

بحث آخر -

إن بناء الحجة المذكورة على تركيب الجسم من جوهرين على وجود الاتصال - الذي هو بمعنى الممتد الجوهري و نحن لا نسلم في الجسم إلا الاتصال الذي قيل إنه

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من فصول الكم وما سواه ممنوع إذ القدر الذي ثبت من نفي الجواهر الفردة ليس إلا جوهرها شأنه الاتصال والامتداد و قبوله للأبعاد و أما أن الامتداد نفس حقيقة الجسم أو جزؤه فلم يثبت.

وما قيل من أنك إذا شكلت الشمعة بأشكال مختلفة تغيرت أبعاده مع بقاء اتصال واحد فغير مسلم فإن الشمعة المتبدلة الأشكال لا يخلو عن تفرق اتصال و توصل بعد افتراق فالمطولة إذا جعلت مستديرة يجتمع فيها أجزاء كانت متفرقة و المدورة إذا جعلت مستطيلة يفترق فيها أجزاء كانت متصلة فاتصال واحد مستمر على تفرق الاتصال و توزع الامتدادات غير صحيح.

و بوجه آخر أن نقول الاتصال الذي يبطله الانفصال ثم يعود منه بعد زوال الانفصال لا شك في عرضيته فإن الجسم عند

توارد الانفصال والاتصال عليه باق بماهيته و نوعيته لا يتغير فيه جواب ما هو و كل ما لا يتغير بتغيره جواب ما هو عن شيء فهو عرض فالاتصال الذي يبطله الانفصال عرض.

و بوجه آخر إنكم أثبتتم في الجسم امتدادا جوهريا هو الصورة الجسمية و امتدادا عرضيا هو المقدار التعليمي و الامتداد من حيث ماهية الامتداد حقيقة واحدة- و الحقيقة الواحدة لا تختلف بالجهرية و العرضية. فإذا ثبت عرضية بعض أفرادها عندكم على ما ذكرتم من حديث تبدل أشكال الشمعة الواحدة فقد وجب عرضية الجميع فهذه وجوه ثلاثة يشترك جميعها في نفي الامتداد الجوهري عن الجسم فهي في الحقيقة ترجع إلى إنكار الصورة لا إنكار الهيولى.

و قد مر أن صاحب التلويحات ذهب إلى أن حقيقة الجسم مركب من جوهر قابل و امتداد عرضي هو نفس المقدار المسمى بالجسم التعليمي بناء على تجويزه تقوم الجوهر الجسماني من جوهر و عرض قائم به و لكن يجاب عن إشكالاته من قبل المشاءين.

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أما عن الأول فبأن الجسم من حيث هو جسم لا يتصور بدون قابلية الأبعاد الثلاثة على نعت الاتصال. و لهذا حدد بها و لو لم يكن متصلا في مرتبة ذاته لم يصح قبوله للمقدار كما سبق من العبارة المنقولة عن الشيخ في الحكمة الفارسية.

و حاصلها أن نفس ذات الجسمية بما هي هي لو لم تكن متصلة واحدة في حد جوهريتها بل كان اتصالها من قبل العارض لكانت بحسب وجود ذاتها إما متألفة من الجواهر الأفراد متناهية أو غير متناهية أو يكون من قبيل المجردات عن الأحياء- و الأبعاد و الجهات ثم يعرضها الاتصال و قابلية الانفصال أو يلحقها التعلق بالأبعاد و الجهات و كلا الشقين باطل.

فبقي أن يكون الجسم متصلا في حد حقيقته و ذاته فقابلية الجسم للأبعاد إنما يتصور إذا كان متصلا باتصال ثابت له في حد نفسه و ما ثبت للجوهر في حد نفسه يكون إما تمام ذاته أو جزءها و جزء الجوهر جوهر فيكون الاتصال جوهرا. و لقائل أن يقول إن هذا الكلام إنما يتم لو ثبت أن تقوم الجوهر بالعرض ممتنع و لم يقد برهان بعد على استحالة تقومه بعرض هو أحد جزأيه القائم بجوهر هو جزؤه الآخر كالجسم عند القائلين بتركبه عن الهيولى و عن امتداد عرضي يقوم بها فذلك الامتداد و إن كان معتبرا في حقيقة الجسم عندهم لكنه عرض البتة.

لا يقال نحن نجري الكلام إلى جزئه الجوهري فيلزم أن يكون ممتدا في حد نفسه مع قطع النظر عن عروض الامتداد له. لأننا نقول هذا بعينه و ارد عليكم منقوض بالهيولى التي أثبتتم فإن الهيولى عندكم متصلة باتصال يرد عليها من قبل الصورة فهي في حد ذاتها غير متصلة و لا منفصلة.

و أما قولكم لو لم يكن الجسم في حد ذاته متصلا واحدا يلزم أن يكون أجزاء لا تتجزى كما يستفاد من عبارة الشيخ في الحكمة العلائية و التجرد له عن الأحياء

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و الأمكنة فهو أيضا مشترك الورد.

و الجواب عن الموضوعين أن عدم اتصال الشيء في نفسه لا يوجب له التركيب من المنفصلات الأفرادية و لا يستلزم فيه التجرد له عن الأحياء و الأمكنة في الواقع - بل خلوه عن الاتصال بحسب مرتبة ذاته بذاته و إنما يلزم ذلك لو أوجب خلوه الشيء بحسب مرتبته عن الاتصال و المقادير و الأبعاد خلوه عنها بحسب الواقع و ليس كذلك بل القابل للاتصال لا ينفك عن لزوم اتصال ما و انفصال يقابله في الواقع لامتناع تجرده عنه.

فقد ظهر أن قابليته للأبعاد لا يوجب أن يكون القابل متصلا في حد نفسه.

هذا لكننا نجيب عن ذلك بأن هذا الذي ذكرتم من حكاية كون الشيء متصلا في نفس الأمر غير متصل في مرتبة الذات و لا منفصل و لا متحيز و لا متجرد إنما يصح إذا كان ذلك الشيء مما لا قوام له بنفسه و لا في مرتبة نفسه بل يكون نفسه مع نفسه بالقوة و الإمكان و يكون ذاته استعدادا محضا متحصلا بما يقترنه متصلا باتصاله منفصلا بانفصاله و هذا مما يوجب الاعتراف بكون الجوهر الذي ليس في نفسه متصلا و لا منفصلا هيولى متقومة باتصال واحد و انفصال متعدد غير مستغنية عما يجعلها متصلة - أو منفصلة في نفس الأمر فيكون الاتصال جوهرًا صوريا يقوم الهيولى بوحدته عند الاتصال الواحد و بكثرته عند الانفصال المتعدد حتى لا يلزم خلوه الهيولى في نفس الأمر عن التجسم و التحيز و لا كونهما مع قطع النظر عن الصور إما جوهرًا فردًا أو أمرًا مفارقًا لكون مرتبة ذاتها على تقدير جوهرية الصورة متأخرة الوجود عن وجود صورة ما فجوهرية الاتصال الصوري و تقوم الهيولى بها يوجب أن لا يكون للهيولى مرتبة في الواقع يكون بحسبها عارية عن الأحياء و الأبعاد.

و أما لو كانت الهيولى متجوهرة بذاتها مع قطع النظر عن الاتصال و يكون الاتصال عرضًا قائمًا غير مقوم لها بل مقوما للجسم فقط كما زعمه صاحب التلويحات فالمحذور لازم لا مدفع له.

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و هذا هو الذي حداهم إلى إثبات جوهرية الصورة.

فقد ثبت بهذا البيان أن الحال قد يكون جوهرًا و بنزع الأمر أيضا فيما ادعيناه من أنه لو لم يكن امتداد جوهرى في الوجود لم يكن لشيء من الكميات المتصلة و المقادير القارة و غير القارة وجود أصلا فكن على بصيرة في هذا الأمر.

و أما الجواب عن الإشكال الثاني فبان بقاء جسم واحد شخصي بشخصيته - عند تعاقب الاتصال و الانفصال غير صحيح بل الصحيح خلافه و بقاءه بنوعه لا ينافي جوهرية الاتصال.

قوله كل ما لا يتغير بتغيره جواب ما هو فهو عرض كلام مجمل يفتقر إلى ما يبينه.

و الحق أن كل ما لا يتغير بتغيره جواب ما هو عن شيء مع بقاءه بحالته الشخصية و لو بحسب ذاته و هويته فهو من عوارض حقيقته و أما إذا تبدل بتبدله الشخص إلى شخص آخر فهذا مما يصح كونه من الذاتيات و الجسم إذا طرأ عليه الانفصال لم يبق هويته الشخصية بحالها بل ينعدم و يحدث بدلها هويتان أخريان.

أ و لا ترى أن استمرار طبيعة نوعية جوهرية مع تواردها أشخاصها و انحفاظ جواب ما هو فيها عند تبادل جزئياتها لا يدل على كون تلك الأشخاص أعراضا.

نعم ما ذكرناه إنما يدل على كون الأشخاص و المشخصات أمورا عرضية للطبيعة فإن كل ما لا يتبدل بتبدله جواب ما هو

فهو عرضي بمعنى محمول خارجي - لا أنه عرض بمعنى المفتقر في تقومه إلى الموضوع فرب عرضي لشيء يكون جوهرًا في نفسه كما سلف فكل واحد من الاتصالات الشخصية عرضي لماهية الجسم - ومع ذلك الجسم متقوم بطبيعة الاتصال ماهية و الهولي متقومة بها وجودا وهذا شأن الجواهر الصورية كما سيجي. و أما الجواب عن الإشكال الثالث فهو من جهتين.

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الأول أنا لا نسلم أن الامتداد و الاتصال طبيعة واحدة و مفهوم واحد بل قد مر أن هاهنا اشتراكا لفظيا يطلق تارة على مفهوم جوهرى هو كفصل مقوم لماهية الجسم مقسم لجنس الجوهر و أخرى على مفهوم عرضي هو بمنزلة فصل مقسم لجنس الكم.

و الثاني أن الامتداد و إن كان مفهوما واحدا إلا أنه قد يؤخذ طبيعة مطلقة من غير تخصص بحد معين و مساحة معينة و هو بهذا الاعتبار مقوم للجسم بحسب التقرر و محصل للهولي بحسب الوجود و قد يؤخذ متخصصا بحد معين ممسوحا بمساحة كذا و كذا متناهية أو غير متناهية لو صح غير المتناهي في المتصلات و هو بهذا الاعتبار عرض خارج عن حقيقة الجسم إذ بتغيرها و تغير شخصياتها عند تبدل الأشكال على الشمعة مثلا لا يتغير الجسمية المعينة و إن تبدل مقدارها المعين.

لست أقول مرتبة ممسوحيتها لأنها أمر كلي محفوظ عند تبدل خصوصيات أبعاد الشمعة و إنما يتغير المساحة بالتدخل و التكاثف الحقيقيين.

و تحقيق الكلام في هذا المرام بحيث لا يزل أقدام الأفهام بأغاليط الأوهام - الموهومة لعقول الأنام يحتاج إلى بيان حقيقة الجسم يعني التعليمي بالمعنى الذي هو من عوارض الجسم و كمياتها و امتيازها عن الاتصال الجوهرى الداخل فيها من حيث القوام.

اعلم أنهم اختلفوا في حقيقته و تشعبوا إلى أقوال.

فأحدها أنه عرض متصل يمكن فيه فرض الخطوط الثلاثة على وجه التقاطع بالزوايا القوائم و يكون اتصاله غير اتصال الجوهر الممتد فعلى هذا يكون في الجسم متصلا.

أحدهما صورة جوهرية و الآخر صفة عرضية و يكون أحدهما كما و الآخر متكاملا به و أحدهما قابلا للقسمة العقلية الكلية غير متعينة الأبعاد و الآخر قابلا للقسمة الوهمية الجزئية متعينا في أبعاده الثلاثة ممسوحا بمساحة معينة لكنهما متحدان في

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الوضع و الإشارة الحسية و لا يخفى فساده لورود ثالث الإشكالات عليه.

و ثانيها أنه متصل بالذات و يكون به ممتدية الجسم الطبيعي بالعرض - و هذا مردود بما علمت أن الجسم في مرتبة ماهيته متصل و فصله الذي يمتاز به عن الجواهر الغير الجسمانية ليس إلا مفهوم قولنا قابل للأبعاد الثلاثة و علمت بالبرهان أنه لو لا اتصال الجوهرى في الموجودات لما صح لشيء من الأشياء الموجودة - صفة الوحدة الاتصالية و لما

صدق على شيء حمل المتصل لا بالذات ولا بالعرض.
و ثالثها أنه مجموع أمور ثلاثة هي الطول و العرض و العمق للجسم و فيه أن هذه الأبعاد ليست بنعت الكثرة موجودة في الجسم و الجسم التعليمي من الموجودات الخارجية بالفعل.
و رابعها أن في الجسم اتصالا واحدا منسوبا إلى الصورة الجسمية بالذات - و إلى مقدارها التعليمي بالعرض فحينئذ إما أن يراد بالجسم التعليمي نفس تعيين امتداد الجسم و تحدد انبساطه في الجهات فلزم أن لا يكون من مقولة الكم و إما أن يراد به الصورة الجسمية مأخوذة مع التعيين المذكور محيثة بالحيثية المذكورة فكان له اتصال بالذات لا بأمر خارج عن ذاته بل من جهة اشتمال ذاته على الصورة الجسمية و يشبه أن يكون هذا هو الذي اختاره المحققون و يوافقه كلام الشيخ في الشفاء و التعليقات - و كلام تلميذه في التحصيل.
و توضيحه ما أفاده بعضهم أن ليس في الجسم إلا ممتد واحد في الجهات - فإذا اعتبر ذلك الممتد في الجهات على الإطلاق بدون تعيين امتداداته تعينا في التقدير

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٨٨

و تحصلا مقداريا سواء كان مقدارا مطلقا أو مقدارا مخصوصا فكان بهذا الاعتبار صورة جسمية و جوهرًا و إن اعتبر من حيث هو متعين بتعين مقدار ما كان جسما تعليميا مطلقا و إذا اعتبر من حيث هو متعين مخصوص كان جسما تعليميا مخصوصا.
و أورد عليه أنه لزم أن لا يكون الجسم التعليمي عرضا بل يكون مركبا من جوهر هو الجسمية و عرض و هو تعيين الامتداد.
و قد أجيب عنه بما حاصله أن المفهوم المركب من الجوهر عند القدماء و العرض و إن لم يكن عرضا إذ لا يكون له محل أصلا لكن المركب من معنى الجوهر عند مثبتي الهيولى حيث أخذوا الموضوع في تعريفه بدل المحل و العرض يجوز أن يصدق عليه تعريف العرض فيكون عرضا إذ لا خفاء في أن المجموع المركب من الصورة و حيثيتها العرضية مندرج تحت مفهوم العرض فإن الهيولى و إن لم تكن بالنسبة إلى الصورة وحدها موضوعا لاحتياجها في التقوم إليها لكنها بالنسبة إلى المجموع المركب منها و من العرض يكون موضوعا لاستغنائها عن المجموع من حيث هو مجموع.
و فيه بحث لأن الإشكال هاهنا ليس مجرد كون هذا المجموع مما يصدق عليه مفهوم العرض أم لا بل العمدة في الإشكال أن أفراد المقولات ليس بعضها داخلا في بعض و هاهنا يلزم أن يكون ماهية واحدة مركبة من مقولتين مقولة الجوهر و مقولة الكم فلم يكن واحدا نوعيا له حد حقيقي بل أمرا اعتباريا له وحدة اعتبارية

مخلص عرشي -

الحق أن معنى الجسم التعليمي الشيء الممتد المتعين الامتداد بحيث يسمح بكذا و كذا لذاته مساحة حاصلة من تكرار مكعب واحد أو ما في حكمه و ليس كون الممتد جوهرًا داخلا في هذا المفهوم أصلا كما ليس داخلا في شيء من المشتقات كونها جوهرًا أو عرضا من حيث مفهوماتها و إن لم تكن في الوجود منفكة عن إحدى الخصوصيتين - فهذا الامتداد الذي هو في الجسم إذا أخذ على الإطلاق يكون مقوما للجسم و محصلا للهيولى - و إذا أخذ متقدرا متعينا في جهاته و قطع النظر عن كونها جزءا للجسم أو صورة للهيولى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٥، ص ٨٩

لأن كون الشيء جزءا لشيء آخر إضافة خارجة عن مفهوم ذاته و كذا كون الشيء صورة لأمر قابل بحسب المفهوم غير داخل في مفهوم ذلك الشيء.

فيصح للعقل أن يعتبره مطلقا عن هذين الاعتبارين النسبيين فهذا الممتد المتعين الامتداد داخل تحت مقولة الكم بالذات و مفهومه بسيط عن اعتبار دخوله في الجسم و تقويمه للهولي و ليس مركبا عن المعنى الذي هو به مقوم للجسم و عن معنى آخر عرضي ليلزم تركبه عن جوهر و عرض.

و نظير ذلك أن الأبيض داخل عندهم في مقولة الكيف بالذات كما صرحوا به في مسفوراتهم و لا يكون في الوجود إلا جسما ذا بياض و ليس هو بمعنى الذي هو بحسبه نوع من الكيفيات المحسوسة مما يدخل فيه الجسمية و لا الجوهرية لا في المفهوم و لا في الوجود بل مفهومه أمر مطلق عن الخصوصيتين اللتين هي غير البياض و وجوده أيضا ليس إلا وجود ما ينفع عنه الحاسة البصرية بتفرق نورها سواء كان معه جسم أم لا و ليس كون الشيء مفتقرا في وجوده إلى مقارنة أسباب مهيئات و أمور معدات و مقدمات في عالم الحركات مما يوجب له أن يكون وجوده من حيث ذاته متقوما بها بل لو جاز أن يكون في الوجود بياض مجرد عن قابل جسماني لكان بياضا و أبيض بذاته كما أن البياض المفتقر في وجوده إلى الجسم المركب العنصري بياض و أبيض بنفسه لا بذلك الجسم فيباضية البياض و أبيضيته ليست بسبب الجسمية بل وجوده يفتقر إلى حامل يحمله لكونه نحوا ضعيفا من الوجود عرضيا فالجسم الذي له البياض قسم من الجسم مطلقا داخل في مقولة الجوهر بلا شك.

و أما إذا سقطت عنه خصوصية الجسمية و أخذ مجرد ما له البياض فهو قسم من اللون داخل في مقولة الكيف فهكذا قياس كمية الجسم التعليمي فإن الممتد القابل للأبعاد إذا أخذ كونه مقوما للجسم يكون من باب الجوهر و إذا أخذ مجرد امتداد متعين في الجهات ممسوح بعاد مشترك خطي في طوله و عرضه و عمقه أو بعاد مشترك على هيئة المكعب فهو من مقولة الكم.

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و هكذا في خصوصيات أشكاله التعليمية مثل الكرة و المكعب و المخروط و الأسطوانة و غيرها فإن الكرة بما هي كرة أي مقدار محاط بنهاية واحدة تفرض في داخله نقطة يتساوى الأبعاد الخارجة إليها من تلك النقطة من مقولة الكم و بما هي مستغنية القوام عن الموضوع مستقلة في الإشارة الحسية فهي من مقولة الجوهر - و ليس مما يدخل في تقومها الجوهرية و لا في تحصلها الجسمانية الطبيعية كونها متعينة الشكل الكروي و لا متعينة الامتداد المساحي.

و قس عليه سائر الأشكال المجسمة على هذا المنوال و اشكر لله في تأييدك لدفع هذا الإشكال.

بحث آخر -

هب أن الجسم لا يخلو عن اتصال جوهرى لكنه هو المقدار لا غير و ليس في الجسم متصل سواء و هو القابل للانفصال لا ما سميتوه مادة و لا يجدي قولكم أنه لا يبقى مع الانفصال لأن ما يبطله الانفصال هو الاتصال العارض لا الاتصال الجوهرى.

و بيانه أن لفظ الاتصال كما مر قد يطلق على المعنى الحقيقي الذي لا يستدعي أن يكون بين شيئين و هذا اصطلاح خاص لا يفهمه الكافة من لفظ الاتصال و هو الممتد الجوهرى على اصطلاحهم.

و قد يطلق على المعنى الإضافي المتعارف بين الجمهور الذي لا يتصور أن يعقل إلا بين شيئين متصل و متصل به سواء كانا متعددين في الخارج ثم يحدث أو يتوهم بينهما اتصال أو يتصور للجسم المتصل الواحد أجزاء وهمية فيقال عليها إنها متصلة بعضها ببعض أو يكون في الجسم الواحد اختلاف عرضين فيقال إن محل أحدهما متصل بمحل الآخر و لا شك في عرضية الاتصال بهذا المعنى النسبي و هو الذي يقابله الانفصال - فلا يصلح أن يكون جزء الأمر جوهرى محض.

فلقائل أن يقول الاتصال بالمعنى الأول نفس الجسم و هو بعينه المقدار و لا يقابله الانفصال بل هو يقابل الاتصال بالمعنى الثانى و هما يتعاقبان على الموضوع

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مع بقاءه بعينه فى الحالين.

و أما ما يقال إن الممتد شيء ذو امتداد أو ما له امتداد فيلزم أن يكون محل الامتداد غيره.

فقد مر أن ذلك غير لازم بل الممتد و غيره من المشتقات لا يدخل في مفهومها غير مبدأ الاشتقاق و لو سلم فيكون هذا من المجازات اللفظية و الإطلاقات العرفية على أنه لا يبتنى الحقائق العلمية على أحكام الألفاظ.

أ و لا ترى أنه يقال بعد بعيد و جسم جسيم و خط طويل و ليل أليل و غير ذلك من المشتقات التي لا يوجب زيادة ما يشتق منه على ما يحمل عليه.

فإن قيل توارد المقادير المختلفة بالصغر و الكبر على الجسم الواحد إذا تخلخل و تكاثف مع بقاءه فى الحالين يوجب عرضية المقادير فكيف حكمتهم بجوهريتها.

يجاب بأن وجود التخلخل و التكاثر الحقيقيين من فروع وجود الهيولى و إثباتهما يتوقف على إثباتها فإذا لم يكن المقدار غير الجوهر المتصل الذي هو تمام حقيقة الجسم فلم يتصور زيادة المقدار و نقصانه من غير ورود مادة عليه أو انفصالها عنه فإن زيادة المقدار على هذا التقدير بعينها زيادة أجزاء الجسم و نقصانه بنقصانها - فمرجع التخلخل و التكاثر حينئذ إلى تخلل الجسم اللطيف بين أجزاء الجسم و انفصالها عنها و اجتماعها لا الحقيقيين اللتين هما حركة جسم واحد شخصي في المقدارية - إلى حد زائد على ما كان عليه أو حد ناقص عنه فإنهما غير ثابتين بالبرهان و إنما البرهان هو المتبع فى الأحكام العقلية.

و أما إثباتهما بالقارورة المموصصة إذا كبت على الماء أو بالقمقمة الصياحة إذا وقعت فى النار فهو فى غاية الضعف سيما و قد شوهد عند الكب الحبابات الدالة على خروج الهواء و لا سبيل لنا أيضا إلى الحكم بأن الماص لم يعط من الهواء بقدر ما يأخذ منها حتى يلزم التخلخل.

و ذكر الشيخ الإلهي فى حكمة الإشراف أنه قد جرب رشح بعض الأدهان من

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩٢

الزجاج فلا يمنع مثل ذلك في الهواء الذي هو أطف كثيرا من الدهن.
فإن قيل اشتراك الأجسام في الجسمية وافتراقها في المقادير يوجب مغايرة المقدار للجسم فيقال لدفعه بما في حكمه الإشراف من قوله اشتراكها في الجسمية بعينه - اشتراكها في نفس المقدار المشتركة بين المقدار الصغير والكبير و اختلافها في المقادير هو بعينه اختلافها في خصوصيات الكبر والصغر و كما أن التفاوت بين المقدار الصغير والكبير - ليس بشيء زائد على المقدار بل بنفس المقدار فكذا إذا بدل لفظ المقدار بالجسم و التفاوت بالصغر والكبر بالتفاوت في المقادير يكون الاختلاف بنفس الجسمية لا غير.

و يرجع هذا الاختلاف إلى الاختلاف بالكمال و النقصان و الشدة و الضعف في نفس ماهية الشيء على ما هو رأي الإلهيين و القدماء من الرواقيين كما مر ذكره مستقصى.

و أما الجواب من قبل المشاءين فهو إنما يتأتى بأحد أمرين - أحدهما بإثبات المغايرة في التحقق بين الاتصال بالمعنى الذي هو مقوم للجسم و ليس بمقداري و بين الاتصال بالمعنى الذي هو من مقولة الكم و في إثبات هذه المغايرة طرق - أحدها أن عند طريان الانفصال ينعدم أمر جوهري عن الجسم إما تمامه أو أحد جزأيه و ذلك لأن الجسم مع الاتصال الواحد شخص واحد له وجود واحد فإذا طرأ عليه الانفصال و حصل متصلا أحدهما ساكن في المشرق و الآخر يتحرك في المغرب أحدهما أبيض و الآخر أسود مثلا فلا شبهة في أن ذلك الوجود لم يبق بشخصيته - بل انعدم و حدث شخصان آخران لاستحالة كون موجود واحد متحركا و ساكنا أسود و أبيض و إلا لزم اجتماع المتقابلين في شخص واحد لكن البديهة تحكم بثبوت جهة ارتباطية باقية في ذات المتصل الأول و هذين المتصلين الحادثين و ما هو إلا ما ادعياه و عيناه بالهيولى.

و إذا ثبت وجود جوهر استعدادي يجمع مع المتصل العظيم و الصغير و لا يخلو عن متصل ما على سبيل البدلية تحقق أن المقوم للمادة ليس إلا المتصل مطلقا في أي امتداد كان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩٣

و المقوم للجوهر المحصل لوجوده لا محالة يكون جوهرًا كما سيتضح بيانه إن شاء الله و تحقق أن خصوصيات المقادير مما لا مدخل لها في تقويم الهيولى فثبت عرضيتها.

و قد مر الفرق المحصل الدقيق فيما بين طبيعة الامتداد الواحد بالمعنى الذي هو جوهر مقوم للجسم و مفتقر إليها الهيولى و بينها بالمعنى الذي هو كمية خارجة عن ماهية الجسم مستغنية عنها الهيولى.

و ثانيهما إثبات التخلخل و التكاثر الحقيقيين في الأجسام و له دلائل كثيرة سوى ما ذكره من حديث اتفاق الأجسام في الجسمية و افتراقها في المقادير.

و الحق أن هذا الدليل ضعيف كما ذكره لقوة ما أورده عليه عند الإنصاف - من تجويز الاختلاف بين أفراد حقيقة واحدة بالكمال و النقص في أصل الحقيقة - سيما إذا كانت تلك الحقيقة من الحالات الخارجية الراجعة إلى انحاء الوجود للشيء.

فإن العدد و المقدار و نظائرها حالات مخصوصة عارضة لهويات الأجسام و وجوداتها و الوجود قد مر أنه مما يتفاوت و يتميز بنفس حقيقته من دون انضمام شيء إليه به يحصل التميز و التعين و التفاوت بين أفراد و أنحائه و لكن إنكار

الحركة في الكمية بحسب التزايد و التناقص و التخلخل و التكاثر الحقيقيين لا يخلو عن مكابرة لكثرة الشهادات و وفور العلامات الدالة على وجود التخلخل و مقابله مع ملاحظة امتناع الخلاء كانكسار القمقمة الصياحة و دخول اللحم في المحجمة بعد المص و بقاءه فيه ما دام رأسه مسدودا و غير ذلك من الأمور الجزئية التي يجزم العقل عند مشاهدتها بإشراق شارق الوجدان من مشارق العرفان بأن جسما واحدا يزيد و ينقص مقداره و سنعيد القول إليه في موضعه

زيادة توضيح لإعادة تهذيب و تنقيح -

قد ظهر مما سبق أن أصحاب المعلم الأول و أتباعهم كالشيخين فارابي و أبي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩٤

علي و من يقتفي آثارهم يفترون بين مفهومي الممتد أحدهما الصورة الجسمية التي معناها الممتد على الإطلاق و الآخر المقدار المصحح لفرض الحدود المشتركة بين أجزاء المتصل الواحد و معناه الممتد المتعين الامتداد في الجهات. و ظهر أيضا أن الأول مقوم للجسم و الآخر عرض فيه و أن الامتداد بالمعنى الأول لا يتفاوت بحسبه جسم و جسم و ممتد في الجوانب عن ممتد في الجوانب فلا يكون بسببه شيء من الأجسام صغيرا أو كبيرا و لا جزءا أو كلا و لا عادا أو معددا و لا ماسحا أو ممسوحا و لا مشاركا أو مباينا بخلاف الثاني.

و لهذا اشتهر أنهم قائلون بالامتدادين الموجودين بوجودين و ليس كذلك بل لا يكون على رأيهم في الجسم إلا ممتد واحد لكنه إذا أخذ بما هو هو من دون تعيين في الامتداد فهو جوهر محض مقوم للجسم و محصل للمادة و إذا أخذ على التعيين الامتدادي المقداري متناهيًا كان أو غير متناه فهو مقدار غير مقوم للجسم و لا محصل للمادة. و يظهر الفرق بينهما بما مر منا و بإثبات التخلخل و التكاثر في الجسم - لا بتبدل أشكال شمعة واحدة فإن في موارد التخلخل و التكاثر يتبدل نفس المقدار.

و هاهنا يتبدل عوارضه التي هي مراتب انبساطه و خصوصيات أبعاده الطولية و العرضية و العمقية و أما الشيخ المؤيد بالإشراق فهو ممن أنكر الممتد بالمعنى الأول - في كتاب حكمة الإشراق محتجا عليه بوجوه ثلاثة. أحدها أنه لو يقوم الجسم الموجود في الأعيان بامتداد جوهري لكان ذلك الامتداد إما كليا أو جزئيا لا جائز أن يكون كليا لأن الكلي من حيث هو كلي لا وجود له في الأعيان و ما لا وجود له في الأعيان لا يتقوم به الموجود العيني و لا جائز أن يكون جزئيا لأنه إن كان هو الذي ثبت عرضيته و ليس في الجسم غيره فلم يكن فيه امتداد جوهري و إن كان في الجسم امتداد عرضي و آخر جوهري فذلك محال لأن الامتداد طبيعة واحدة و مفهوم واحد لا يختلف فيه جواب ما هو فلا يكون بعض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩٥

جزئياته جوهرًا و بعضه عرضًا و لما ثبت عرضية البعض ثبت عرضية الباقي. و ثانيها أنه لو كان في الجسم امتداد جوهري لكان في كل الجسم و في جزئه - و ما في الكل أعظم مما في الجزء فيكون قابلا للتجزية فيكون كما مقداريا.

و ثالثها أنه إذا تخلخل الجسم إن بقي الامتداد الجوهري كما كان و هو مقدار لا شك فليس في كل الجرم المتخلخل

الزائد مقدار الصورة الجسمية و هو محال و إن لم يبق ذلك الامتداد كما كان فهو إذن صار أزيد فالامتداد الجوهرى كم لذاته و هو عرض للجوهر يكون عرضا.

قيل في الجواب عن الوجه الأول بما حاصله أنه إن أراد بالكلية الكلية العقلية - اخترنا أن الممتد المقوم للجسم العيني ليس كليا بهذا المعنى لعدم وجود الكلية بهذا المعنى في الخارج و إن أراد به الكلية الطبيعية أي ما يصير معروضا للكلية إذا وجد في العقل اخترنا أنه كلي باعتبار ماهيته و جزئي بتشخص الجسم.

قوله و إن كان هو الذي ثبت عرضيته و ليس في الجسم غيره قلنا ما ثبت عرضيته إنما هو أمر عارض هو تعين امتداداته بالانقطاع إما مطلقا أو مخصوصا و هذا العرض ليس موافقا لمفهوم الممتد في الماهية ليلزم من عرضيته عرضية ذلك المفهوم.

أقول لا يخفى ما في هذا الجواب من الوهن و الفساد أما أولا فلأن ماهية المقدار على ما سبق من مختار المحققين فيه ليست مجرد تعين الممتد الجوهرى بل المتصل القابل للقسمة المقدارية الجزئية و الحدود المشتركة المعينة. و أما ثانيا فلأن تشخص الشيء على ما حققناه ليس إلا بنحو وجوده الخاص - و إليه مآل كلام بعض المحققين من الحكماء كالمعلم الأول.

و ربما يستفاد من بعض عبارات الشيخ الرئيس و عند الآخرين من المحصلين إما بذاته - كما يراه الشيخ الإشراقي أو بارتباطه إلى الموجود الحقيقي كما نسب إلى أذواق المتألهين و إما باتحاده مع مفهوم الموجود كما ذهب إليه صدر المدققين و أما الأعراض القائمة بالشيء المستتبع إياها بحسب هويته الشخصية فليست بداخلة في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩٦

إفادة التشخص و المتشخصية عند المعتبرين من الفضلاء الذين يعتد بهم و بكلامهم - و إنما هي لوازم و أمارات للتشخص كما مر سابقا في مبحث التشخص فالممتد المقوم للجسم العيني لو كان جزئيا موجودا في الخارج فيجب أن لا يكون مناط جزئيته الأمور العارضة له إلا بمعنى كونه من اللوازم و العلامات.

فإذا صار ذلك الممتد الجوهرى جزئيا متعينا في الخارج مع قطع النظر عن العوارض و الخارجيات فلو كان عين المقدار فقد ثبت عرضيته فيلزم أن يكون الجوهر عين العرض و إن لم يكن عين ما هو المقدار بل هو غيره فيعود المحذور الذي ذكره من استلزام أن يكون في الجسم الواحد ممتدان متعينا أحدهما جوهر و الآخر عرض متباينان في الوجود و هو خلاف ما تقرر عندهم.

و أيضا إذا تعين الممتد الجوهرى مع قطع النظر عن الممتد العرضي فهو إما مساو لهذا أو أزيد أو أنقص و على كل تقدير يلزم تقدره بذاته مع محذورات أخرى - كاجتماع المثليين و التداخل و التعطل في وجود أحدهما.

فالصواب أن يجاب عن الوجه الأول بما حققناه من أن الامتداد الواحد الجرمانى له مفهومان مفهوم كونه ممتدا على الإطلاق و مفهوم كونه مقدارا خاصا متعينا في الحدود و المساحة فهو بالمعنى الأول مقوم للجسم و بالمعنى الثانى عرضي خارج عنه و كثيرا ما يكون مفهومات متعددة ينتزع من نحو وجود واحد خاص شخصي بعضها داخل في الحقيقة الشيء ذاتي له و بعضها خارج عنه عرضي له كوجود زيد مثلا ذاته بذاته أنه مصداق للإنسانية و مصداق لكونه مفهوما و شيئا و ممكنا عاما.

فلا عجب من أن يكون وجود واحد مما يصدق عليه مفهومان مختلفان بحسب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩٧

المعنى أحدهما مقوم له باعتبار و الآخر عارض له فالممتد من حيث معنى الاتصال الوجداني في أي حد كان مقوم للجسم و من حيث إن له صفة الكمية و المقدارية عارض و التعين في القدر غير معنى التشخص و كذا الإبهام فيه غير مستلزم للكلية فإن مرتبة معينة من المقدار ربما يوجد في أشخاص كثيرة كل منها يتفق مع الآخر فيها - و جسم معين شخصي ربما يتوارد عليه مراتب متفاوتة في المقدار كما في الحركة الكمية و الامتداد الجوهرية أي الممتد نفسه بنفس ذاته المقوم للجسم العيني الشخصي - أمر متعين الذات مبهم المقادير التي كل منها عبارة عن متعين مقداري و التعين الذاتي لا ينافي الإبهام المقداري و إنما الذي ثبت عرضيته ليس إلا المتعين المقداري من حيث كونه كما لا من حيث كونه منبسطا في الجهات على أي حد كان من حدود النهايات - و ليس المتصل الجوهرية المقوم للجسم ممتدا و المتصل المقداري ممتدا آخر غيرها في الوجود بل هما متغايران في المعنى و المفهوم و تغايرهما في المفهوم صار موجبا لتوهم أن الحكماء ذهبوا إلى أن في الجسم الواحد ممتدان جوهرية و عرضية و جسمان طبيعي و تعليمي.

و أما الجواب عما ذكره ثانيا أن الممتد بالمعنى الجوهرية ليس بحيث يتحقق له كلية و جزئية و كبر و صغر إنما هذه من عوارض الممتد بالمعنى الذي هو مقدار كيف و القائلون بجوهرية الامتداد الوجداني أجل شأننا من أن يذهلوا عن أن القابل - للجزئية و الكلية و المساواة و عدمها و العظم و مقابله ليس إلا من مقولة الكم فكون الممتد الجوهرية ذا جزء مقداري أول هذه المسألة.

و أما عن الثالث فليس معنى الحركة في الكم و لا الازدياد فيه أن يكون للموضوع مقدار معين باق من أول زمان الحركة إلى آخره و قد زيد عليه و ضم إليه آخر مثله أو أزيد أو أنقص بل معناها أن يتوارد في آتات زمان الحركة و أجزائه الفرضية على تمام الموضوع مقادير متفاوتة كل مقدار يكون بتمامه بدلا عن المقدار الذي كان للموضوع في آن سابق أو لاحق.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩٨

فليس في التخلخل مقدار باق من أول الأمر إلى آخره حتى قيل إنه يزداد أو ينقص أو يبقى بحاله بل الباقي في تمام الزمان الذي هو زمان حركة التخلخل مثلا - هو نفس المادة مع مقدار ما على سبيل التبادل و المسافة هي خصوصيات هذه المقادير - و المبدأ هو مقدار صغير قد بطل بمجرد التلبس بهذه الحركة و المنتهى هو مقدار كبير قد حدث في آخر آن من الآتات المفروضة لزمان الحركة و كذا القياس في الاشتداد و التضعف من الحركات الكيفية و قد مر تحقيق ذلك.

ثم العجب أن هذا العظيم التال و البحث بجلالة قدره ممن حقق الأمر الذي ذكرناه في كتابه المسمى بالمشارع و المطارحات في صدر الفصل المعقود لبيان الشدة و الضعف فكيف وقع منه هذا المقال المغلط الموجب للإضلال حاشاه عن أن يتعمد في ذلك

بحث آخر معه

ثم إنه ربما يورد معارضة أوردها بعض المحققين على ما ذكره بأنه قد اختار في التلويحات أن الجرم العيني مركب من

الجوهر الذي سماه هيولى و من الاتصال و الامتداد العرضي فيقال الامتداد العرضي الذي اختار أنه مقوم للجرم العيني إما كلي أو جزئي و كلاهما باطلان على النحو الذي ذكره في الدليل.

أما الأول فظاهر و أما الثاني فلتبدل الامتدادات المعينة مع بقاء الجرم العيني - في الصورتين اللتين ذكرهما فإن كان المقوم هو الامتداد الذي ثبت عرضيته بالتبدل و ليس في العيني غيره لم يكن الامتداد مقوما للجرم لتبدله مع بقاء الجرمية و إن كان للجرم امتداد عيني باق و آخر زائل فذلك محال لأنه ليس فيه امتدادان عرضيان جزئيان.

فما أجاب عن هذا البحث فمثله جواب عن دليله غاية ما في الباب أن المعنى الثاني هو جوهر عند الحكماء و عرض عنده.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٩٩

و أقول هاهنا فرق دقيق يجب التنبيه عليه و هو أنه فرق ما بين نحو تركيب الشيء كالجسم الطبيعي من مادة و صورة عند المشاءين و بين تركيبه من موضوع - و عرض عند صاحب التلويحات.

و عند تحقيق هذا الفرق بين نحوي التركيب في المذهبين لقائل أن يقول بقاء الجرم العيني المقوم من جوهرين يتقوم كل منهما بالآخر مع تبدل أحدهما الذي هو الاتصال الجوهرى غير صحيح عند صاحب الفطرة السليمة - بخلاف الجرم العيني المقوم من جوهر هو في الحقيقة تمام ماهية الجسم بما هو جسم و عرض هو من معيناته و منوعاته فإنه مما لا استحالة عند العقل في بقاء مركب بعينه - ببقاء أحد جزأيه بالعدد و بقاء الجزء الآخر لا بالعدد بل بالمعنى و النوعية بورود الأمثال المتبادلة و ذلك لانحفاظ وحدته الشخصية العديدة باستمرار وحدة أحد جزأيه بعينه.

فما ذكره هذا المعارض المحقق لا يصلح للمعارضة لوجود الفارق المذكور - و ليس أيضا لقائل أن يقول إن هذا العظيم النحرير قد اعترف بوجود الامتداد الجوهرى في حكمة الإشراق فكيف يتأتى له الاستدلال على نفيه.

لأننا نقول ذلك الامتداد معنى آخر مقداري عند الحكماء و هو غير الامتداد المقوم للجسم عندهم إلا أن [إلا أنه] هذا المقدار عرض عندهم و جوهر عنده و قد مر مرارا أن للممتد معينين - أحدهما صورة مقومة للجسمية عند المشاءين و الآخر عرض خارج عن حقيقة الجسم لازم لها.

و الشيخ الإلهي قد أنكر المعنى الأول مطلقا جوهرًا كان أو عرضا و أثبت المعنى الثاني و ذهب إلى جوهريته و عينيته للجسم في حكمة الإشراق و إلى عرضيته و جزئيته للجسم في التلويحات كما بينا فإنه هناك بالحقيقة منكر للصورة لا للهيولى.

و محصل هذا الكلام أن بناء اعتراضه المذكور على ما فهم من ظواهر أقاويل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠٠

الحكماء من أن الصورة الجسمية أي المتصل بالمعنى الأول عندهم أمر مبهم في الواقع - فأورد عليهم أنه كيف يتقوم أمر عيني بأمر مبهم في الواقع.

و أما المقدار الجوهرى عنده فليس أمرا مبهما في الواقع و إن عرض له الإيهام بحسب وجوده الذهني فإن للعقل أن ينتزع من الأشخاص ماهياتها و يأخذها على وجه لا يأبى عن الصدق على كثيرين فكما أن للجسم مرتبة إطلاق و تعيين عند

العقل - فكذاك للمقدار بحسبه اعتباران فإذا حلله العقل إلى ذينك الاعتبارين يحكم بأن أحدهما المقدار المقوم للجسم و المطلق منه مقدار مقوم للجسم المطلق بل هو عينه و المقادير الخاصة مقومة للأجسام الخاصة بل هي عينها كما هو رأيه.

و أما ما ثبت عرضيته عنده في ذلك الكتاب فليس إلا مراتب الطول و العرض و العمق و ليس شيء منها مقدارا للجسم بل هي عوارض للمقدار الجرمي و عرضيتها لا يوجب عرضيته.

و قد علمت أنه ممن ينكر وجود التخلخل و التكاثف الحقيقيين بل الحركة في المقدار مطلقا فلا يقام عليه الحجة الدالة على عرضية المقدار بتوارد المختلفات من المقادير هذا توجيه كلامه على ما يوافق رأيه.

و أما الجواب الحق عنه فهو أن الممتد المقوم للجسم العيني عند الحكماء المشاءين ليس إلا أمرا محصلا متعينا في نفسه غاية الأمر أنه مبهم من حيث المقدارية - و التعين الشخصي بحسب تجوهر الذات لا ينافي الإبهام الكمي بحسب العارض كما لا ينافي الإبهام الكيفي فإن الجسم في حد نفسه شخص جوهري معين و قابل للحركات و الاستحالات الكمية و الكيفية و المتحرك ما دام كونه متحركا لا يتعين له فرد من المقولة التي يقع فيها الحركة.

و به يخرج الجواب عن الوجه السابق أيضا منه فليدرك.

بحث آخر على نمط آخر -

سلمنا أن في الجسم باعتبار الامتداد أمورا ثلاثة الأول جوهر غير خارج عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠١

ماهية الجسم و الأخيران عرضان فيه زائدان عليه بتبدل أحدهما عن الجسم بالتخلخل و التكاثف و الآخر بتوارد الأشكال عليه لكن لم قلت إن الجسم إذا انفصل يجب أن ينعدم عنه أمر ذاتي فإن اللازم ليس إلا أن حقيقة الجسم يجب أن يكون لذاتها قابلة للاتصالات و الانفصالات.

و أما أن القابل يجب أن يكون واحدا بالعدد بالوحدة الاتصالية فلا و إنما يلزم ذلك لو كانت الوحدة الشخصية تساوي الوحدة الاتصالية و يلزمها و هو غير مسلم فإن الإنسان الواحد أو السرير الواحد مثلا لكل منهما وحدة شخصية مع تألفه عن متصلات متعددة ينضم بعضها إلى بعض فالجسمية لا تساوق الاتصال الوجداني - بل اللازم كون القابل للاتصال و الانفصال أمرا واحدا شخصا و يجوز أن يكون ذلك الواحد أمرا متصلا بذاته و مع استمرار وحدته الشخصية بتعدد اتصاله الذاتي.

فحينئذ لأحد أن يقول طريان الانفصال لا ينافي استمرار الاتصال بل إنما ينافي وحدة الاتصال فما كان متصلا واحدا بعينه صار متصلا متعددا فالممتد الجوهري باق في الحالين بشخصه و الزوال و التبدل إنما هو لعارضه أعني الوحدة و الكثرة.

و قد أجاب عنه بعض الأذكيا بعد تمهيد أن وجود كل شيء ليس إلا عبارة عن نفس تحصله و تحققه سواء كان في العين أو في العقل و هو مساوق للتشخص بل عينه - كما ذهب إليه المعلم الثاني فتعدد كل من التشخص و الوجود و وحدته يوجب تعدد الآخر و وحدته هو أن المتصل الواحد من حيث هو كذلك لما لم يكن إلا موجودا واحدا له ذات واحدة و تشخص واحد فليس لأجزائه الفرضية وجود بالفعل و تشخص خاص بحسب نفس الأمر.

كيف وقد تبين أن الأجزاء الفرضية غير متناهية حسب قبول الجسم الانقسامات بلا نهاية. فإما أن يكون لبعض أجزائه وجود و تشخص بالفعل و هو الترجيح من غير مرجح أو لجميعها فيلزم المفاسد التي ترد على أصحاب لا تناهي الأجزاء للجسم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠٢

و إذا طرأ عليه الانقسام وجد موجودان مشخصان و هويتان مستقلتان. فإما أن يكونا موجودين حال الاتصال مع تعيينهما و هو باطل لأن أجزاء المتصل الواحد بعينها ليس إلا بحسب الفرض. و هذان التعينان بحسب نفس الأمر أو بدونها. فحينئذ إما أن يكون وجودهما حال الانفصال هو بعينه الوجود الذي لهما حال الاتصال أو لا لا سبيل إلى الأول لأنه خلاف ما تقرر من المساواة بين التعين و الوجود- فالتعين الحادث بعد الانفصال يلزم الوجود الحادث بل عينه و لا إلى الثاني لأنه يلزم أن يكون ذات واحدة يوجد بوجود واحد ثم يزول عنها هذا الوجود و يوجد بوجود آخر و هو أيضا خلاف المفروض من أن الوجود ليس إلا نفس تحقق الشيء فلا يتصور تعدده مع وحدة الذات. و إما أن يكونا موجودين حين الاتصال بالفعل بل بالقوة القرينية فلا بد لهما من مادة حاملة لقوة وجودهما و تعيينهما حين الاتصال و إذا خرج وجودهما أو تعيينهما بطريان الانفصال من القوة إلى الفعل تصير حاملة لهما و متلبسة بهما و ليس تلك المادة هي نفس ذلك المتصل الأول لما علمت بطلانه سابقا فيكون القابل له و لهما معا جوهر آخر و هو المطلوب

بحث و تعقيب

إن القول بأن تعدد الوجود عين تكثر الأشخاص الموجودة أو مستلزم له و توحده عين توحيد الشخصية أو مستلزم له و أن الاتصال و الانفصال عبارتان عن توحيد الجسم و تكثره مما لا شبهة فيه و نحن نساعد كيف و من أصولنا المقررة أن الموجود ليس إلا نحو وجود كل شيء و الوجود بنفسه متشخص و هو عين الهذية و الهوية إلا أن هاهنا فرقا ما بين المتصل بالذات بأحد المعنيين و ما هو بالعرض متصل بذلك المعنى فإن كون القسمة و إن كان موجبا لتحويل الوحدة الشخصية إلى الكثرة الشخصية و بطلان موجود واحد و حدوث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠٣

موجودين متعددين لكن الموصوف بوحدة الاتصال و تعيينه المقداري ليس إلا ما سميتوه المقدار و هو القابل للقسمة المقدارية عند الوهم و في الخارج بواسطة الأمر الحامل له أي الجوهر الجسماني- و قد مر مرارا أن الامتداد و الممتد بنفسه على الإطلاق شيء و المأخوذ ممتدا متعينا بالتعين المقداري أو العددي من كونه واحدا أو كثيرا شيء آخر. و ليس المراد من قولنا إنه الممتد بنفسه مطلقا أن الصورة الجسمية بصرافة إطلاقه موجود في الخارج و جزء للجسم بل الغرض كما مر أنها بذاتها مع قطع النظر عن التعين بحسب المقدارية و العددية موجودة. فحاصل الكلام في هذا المقام أن الوحدة الشخصية للجوهر المتصل ليست عين الوحدة المقدارية فكما أنه فرق بين معنيي المتصل فكذلك فرق بين وحدتهما و تعددهما فأحد المعنيين للمتصل مما يقبل الوحدة الخارجية تارة و الكثرة

التي بإزائها أخرى من جهة حامل يقبل ذاته بوجود متعدد أخرى.

و أما المتصل بالمعنى المقوم لحقيقة الجسم وهو الممتد بذاته على الإطلاق - في أي امتداد كان وفي أية وحدة أو كثرة بحسب المعنى الآخر كانت فهو مما لا يقبل في نفسه إلا نحواً واحداً من وجود حقيقته وهذا النحو الواحد لضعف وجوده و وحدته - مما لا يأبى قبول الأضداد [الامتداد] و الاختلافات لسائر الأشياء.

بل نقول القابل للأبعاد حقيقة منحصرة في شخص واحد له مقدار مساحي واحد من حيث المساحة و الكمية و هو ما حواه السطح الأعلى من الفلك أعني كرة العالم و هو شخص واحد سواء كان في اتصال واحد أو في اتصالات متعددة حادثة أو فطرية و هذا الشخص له تشخص واحد مستمر و له أيضاً تشخصات و تعيينات متبدلة حاصلة فيه - من تبدلات مقاديره اتصالا و انفصالا أو تعيينات أحواله و صورته و أعراضه المتبدلة.

و هذا كما أن هيولى العنصریات عند الحكماء شخص واحد لا يزول وحدته الشخصية بورود تعددات الصور الجسمية و توحداتها عند توارد الانفصال و الاتصال و ورود الكون و الفساد في الصور النوعية و سائر الاستحالات.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠٤

فإن قلت الهيولى لما كانت أمراً مبهماً يمكن الحكم ببقاء ذاتها حين تعدد الاتصال و وحدته بخلاف الجسم. قيل كون ذات الهيولى أمراً مبهماً بالمعنى الذي لا يصح ثبوته و جريانه في الجسم غير بين و لا مبين بعد فكما أن معنى إبهام الهيولى كما هو المشهور و عليه الجمهور ليس إلا أنها متعينة الذات مبهمة الصور فإن لها تعيينين أحدهما ذاتي مستمر و الآخر عرضي متبدل فكذا يقال في الجوهر الممتد من أنه متعين الذات مبهم وحدة الاتصال و كثرته و لها تعيين ذاتي مستمر و تعيين مقداري يتبدل على نحو ما قالوه في الهيولى بحسب ما هو المشهور عند الجمهور.

مخلص عرشي

و أقصى ما لأحد أن يقول في التفصي عن هذا الإشكال و يتم دليل إثبات الهيولى - من جهة مسلك الاتصال و الانفصال هو أنه لا ريب لأحد من العقلاء في أنه ينعدم عند طرو الانفصال على المتصل الوحداني عن الجسم المفرد أمر كان موجوداً له في الواقع [في الخارج] عند الاتصال كما أنه يوجد له عند حدوث الاتصال بينهما أمر لم يكن موجوداً للمتصلين المتعددين قبل الاتصال.

فحينئذ نقول ذلك الأمر الذي زال عن المتصل الواحد المأخوذ مجرداً عن جميع الخارجيات و العوارض المفارقة عند طريان الانفصال ثم عاد بعد زواله و طريان الاتصال لا محالة يكون وحدة ما للاتصال البتة فهي لا تخلو إما أن تكون وحدة ذاتية و اتصالاً حقيقياً أو وحدة ارتباطية و اتصالاً إضافياً.

فعلى الأول يثبت المقصود من وجود الهيولى الأولى لاتفاق الفريقين على أن المنعدم بالذات من الجسم عند الانفصال لو كان اتصالاً جوهرياً فلا بد من اشتغال الجسم على جزء آخر حتى لا يكون الفصل إعداماً و إفناء للجسم بالمرة و الوصل إبداعاً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠٥

و إنشاء نشأة أخرى.

وعلى الثاني يلزم أن يكون في الجسم المفرد إضافات و وحدات اتصالية غير متناهية موجودة مجتمعة محصورة بين حدين حاصرين حسب قبول الجسم لانقسامات غير متناهية و يلزم المفسد الواردة على مذهب النظام وأصحابه القائلين من جهة قبول الجسم.

هذا ما تيسر لنا بفضل الله و ملكوته من المقال في تتميم الاستدلال على وجود الهيولى من جهة قبول الجسم لطريان الاتصال و الانفصال.

شك و هداية

قد وقع هنا إشكال لبعض المتقدمين من تلامذة الشيخ الرئيس و هو أن الوجود و الوحدة و سائر الأمور العامة التي لا تنقسم في المقدار و لا يحتاج في وجودها و تعقلها إلى المادة فكيف يتعلق بالمادة و يقبل الانقسام في المقدار ثم كيف ينقسم الوحدة و يتعدد الهوية.

ثم إن هذه الأمور لوازم و أعراض فهي لموضوعات و ينقسم لا محالة و لو كانت هذه الأمور غير حالة في الموضوعات لكانت مفارقة و لكانت جواهر بل عقولا مفارقة.

فأجاب عنه الشيخ في بعض مراسلاته إليه بقوله هذه المعاني ليست من المعقولات المجردة بالوجوب بل بالإمكان و الوجود و الوحدة المادية ينقسم و الوجود مطلقا و الواحد مطلقا ممكن له الانقسام كما يمكن المعنى النوعي في المعنى الجنسي.

بلى قوله إن هذه لوازم و أعراض فهي لموضوعات فيجب أن ينقسم قول يحتاج أن يتأمل أما أنها لوازم لموضوعات فحق و أما أنها يجب أن ينقسم في كل موضوع لأنها أعراض فليس كذلك فإنه يجب أن ينقسم ما كان منها عارضا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠٦

للموضوعات المادية الجسمانية فيكون الوحدة فيها اتصالا و الاتصال يبطل بالانفصال - و يبقى متصلا بفرض الاثنينية الموهومة المشتركة في الحد الواحد فيكون واحدا فيه اثنينية و قسمة وضعية ذهنية هذا كلامه.

و فيه تصريح بأن الوجود و الوحدة في المتصل الحقيقي نفس الاتصال القابل للتعدد و الانفصال إن الانفصال فيه ليس إلا تعدد وجوده و تكرار وحدته مع أن الوجود و الوحدة المطلقين من الأمور الشاملة و المعقولات العامة لجميع الموجودات.

و هذا أيضا من المؤيدات لما ذهبنا إليه حسب ما حققنا و بسطنا القول فيه - في أوائل هذا السفر أن الوجود بنفسه موجود و ما ذهبنا إليه أيضا من أن الوحدة لكل واحد هي عين الوجود له فليكن هذا عندك من المتحقق الثابت الذي لا يعتره و صمة ريب و لا تهمة عيب.

و ظهر أيضا أن الوجود و الوحدة و ما يلزمها و سائر الأمور الحقيقية الشاملة لجميع الأشياء اللازمة لكل الموجودات هي أعم و أشمل من أن يكون معقولا محضا - أو محسوسا محضا لظهورها تارة في العقول و هي بهذا الاعتبار لا يحتمل القسمة إلا بأجزاء مختلفة المعاني كالأجناس و الفصول و تارة في الموارد البسيطة الاتصالية - و هي بهذا الاعتبار لا تقبل القسمة إلا بأقسام مقدارية وضعية متشاركة في الحدود المشتركة - و هي مع ذلك كما مر بحسب حقيقتها بريئة عن الماهية و المادة مقدسة عن القسمة بحسب الحد و المعنى و بحسب الوضع و الهيولى.

فما أجلها و ما أرفع شأنها و أحاط شمولها للكل لا بمعنى المخالطة و ما أقدم طور ذاتها و تجردها عن الكل لا بمعنى المزايلة.

ثم ما أشد غفلة العقلاء المدققين في البحث حيث لم يرتفع أذهانهم و لم يرتق عقولهم عن ملاحظة خواص الوجود و لوازمه من شموله معها لجميع الأشياء على الوجه المذكور إلى أن يحققوا الأمر في شمول مبدأ الوجود لجميع الأشياء شمولا

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إحاطيا انبساطيا لا على نحو شمول المعنى الكلي العقلي لأفراده الخاصة بل نحو أرفع و أجل من ذلك. و ممن تفتن بنحو آخر من الشمول هو الشيخ الرئيس حيث قال في كتاب المباحثات ذيل نحو ما نقلنا منه من المقام و المعاني العقلية هي الصور ليس إنما يمنع أن يكون فيها قسمة منع كيف كان بل أن يكون فيها قسمة ما هو واحد من جهة كثير من جهة كثرة وضعية فقد بان أن المعنى المعقول من حيث هو معقول - لا ينقسم إلا إلى أجزاء مختلفة فلا يحل الأجسام و أما هذه فإنها ليست معقولات الذوات بل يكون يمكن لها أن تكون معقولة و أن تكون غير معقولة فيقبل هذا ضربا من القسمة حينئذ و لا يبعد أن يكون الواحد بالاتصال و الوجود الجسماني ينقسم إلى اثنين منه و إلى موجودين متشابهين و لا يمنع ذلك الوحدة الجسمانية و غير ذلك انتهى كلامه - فافهم و اغتنم

بحث آخر على جهة أخرى -

إن تعدد الجسمية بعد وحدتها لو كان مقتضيا لانعدامها و محوجا إلى مادة فمادة المتعدد إن كانت واحدة لزم كون شيء واحد في أحياء متعددة و جهات مختلفة و إن كانت متعددة فتعدها إما أن يكون حادثا بالانفصال أو مفطورا بحسب الذات فإن كان حادثا فحدوثة بعد انعدام مادة الجسم الواحد أو مع بقائها. فعلى الثاني يلزم كون ذات واحدة شخصا واحدا تارة و أشخاصا متعددة أخرى - و على الأول يلزم التسلسل في المواد إذ كل حادث عندهم مسبوق بمادة قابلة لها - و هي أيضا حادثة على التقدير المذكور و مع ذلك فهو ينافي المقصود من وجود أمر يكون باقيا حالتي الفصل و الوصل لئلا يكون التفريق إعداما بالكلية و الوصل إيجادا و لو كان التعدد واقعا في المادة بحسب أصل الفطرة لكان الجسم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠٨

المفرد مشتملا على أجزاء غير متناهية حسب قبول الانقسامات الغير المتناهية إذ لو لم يكن عدد تلك المواد غير متناه بل واقفا عند حد لوقف عدد انقسامات الجسم إذا استوفى المواد و وصل إلى ذلك الحد و ليس كذلك كما مر هذا خلف. و الجواب أن الهيولى و إن كانت واحدة في حد ذاتها و شخصيتها لكن لا يتهيأ لقبول الإشارة الحسية و الأبعاد المقدارية و تحصيل الجهات و حصول الفصل و الوصل و الوحدة و التعدد بالذات بل إنما يتهيأ لشيء من هذه الأوصاف و النعوت بالعرض - بعد تعيينها المستفاد من قبل الصور الجسمية فمع المتصل الواحد واحدة و مع المتعدد متعددة و هي في حد ذاتها بريئة عن الجميع بحسب ملاحظة العقل إياها كذلك و لا يلزم مما ذكرنا أن يكون الهيولى من المفارقات في مرتبة ذاتها كما نبهناك عليه و لا أيضا متألفة من غير المنقسمات متناهية و غيرها لما مر من الإشارة إلى ما سيجيء

من تقدم الصورة الجسمية في الوجود عليها فإن ذاتها لا تخلو من الاتصاف بشيء من تلك الأوصاف المذكورة في نفس الأمر وإن كان بواسطة الصورة الجسمية - وأما اعتبار ذاتها مجردة عن الصور كلها فهو مجرد فرض يخترعه الوهم. وستعلم أن ما بالفعل مطلقا يتقدم على ما بالقوة فالهيولى حين الاتصال لها وحدة شخصية ذاتية و وحدة اتصالية من جهة الصورة و الوحدة الأولى يتقوم إما بالوحدة الثانية - أو بما يقابلها فإذا طرأ عليها الانفصال زال عنها الوحدة اتصالية بدون زوال ذاتها وزوال شخصيتها وهذا بخلاف الجوهر الجسماني فإن وحدته اتصالية هي عين وحدته الشخصية لما علمت من أن الوجود فيه نفس وحدة الاتصال وهي عين الشخص فلا جرم لم يبق ذاته الشخصية عند الانفصال فمادة الجزئين الحادتين عند الانفصال واحدة في ذاتها متعددة الجزئين وهي محفوظة الوجود في جميع المراتب باقية الذات في حالتي الانفصال و الاتصال غير حادثة بحدوث شيء منهما ليلزم التسلسل في المواد الحادثة و لا متكرر بتكرر الانفصال ليلزم اشتغال الجسم على أجزاء غير متناهية بل الزوال و الحدوث و الوحدة اتصالية و الكثرة الانفصالية إنما تعرض للجوهر الممتد بالذات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٠٩

و الهيولى لا يقتضي في ذاتها شيئا منها و لا أيضا مما يتأبى عنها فهيولى الجسمين اللذين أحدهما في المشرق و الآخر في المغرب لها وحدة عقلية تجامع الاثنينية الوضعية و يقبلهما لها نحو وحدة تجامع الاثنينية كما أن وحدة العشرة تجامع الكثرة و التعدد كما أن لكل من الحركة و الزمان ثباتا يجامع التغير و التجدد و إنما ذلك لضعف الوحدة فيها و ضعف الثبات و الوجود فيهما فحصول الهيولى في الجهات المتخالفة و الأحياء المتباعدة عبارة عن قبولها الأجسام المتعددة و الجسميات المتكثرة الموصوفة بالذات بالوقوع في الإشارة الحسية.

و قبول الأيون و الأحياء و الجهات بوحدتها الشخصية لا ينافي كثرتها الانفصالية بخلاف وحدة الاتصال. و قد قال بعض الحكماء إن الوحدة قد تكون من لوازم نفي الكثرة و قد يكون من لوازمه نفي الكثرة فهناك نقول يشبه أن يكون وحدة الهيولى من قبيل الوحدة بالمعنى الأول - فإن وحدتها ليست صفة وجودية بل هو مفهوم سلبي من لوازم نفي الكثرة عن ذاتها بذاتها بل هو عين نفي الكثرة الذاتية و وحدة الصور الجسمية من قبيل الوحدة بالمعنى الثاني لأنها وحدة وجودية قابلة للانفصال و التعدد كيف و لو لم تكن وجودية فكيف يزول بورود الانفصال و ينعدم عن المادة بحدوث الاتصال

فصل (٤) في ذكر منهج آخر للفلاسفة لإثبات حقيقة الهيولى و نحو وجودها الذي يخصها

اعلم أن الجسم من حيث هو جسم له وجود اتصالي و صورة عينية و هو لا محالة معنى بالفعل و من حيث استعدادة لقبول الفصل و الوصل و غيرهما من الأشياء المفقودة عنه المستعد هو لها كالسواد و الحركة و الحرارة و الصور النوعية المكملة له اللاحقة به فهو بالقوة فيكون في كل جسم من حيث مجرد جسميته جهتا فعل و قوة و حيثيتا وجوب و إمكان و الشيء من حيث هو بالفعل لا يكون هو من حيث هو بالقوة

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لأن مرجع القول إلى أمر عديمي هو فقدان شيء عن شيء و مرجع الفعلية إلى حصول حقيقة لشيء و الشيء الواحد من

الجهة الواحدة لا يكون مصححا لهاتين الصفتين و منشأ لاجتماع هاتين الحالتين فلا يكون الجسم من حيث هو متصل بالفعل هو بعينه نفسه من حيث هو بالقوة منفصل أو متحرك أو ذو سواد أو نفس أو صورة بل يكون كونه جوهرًا متصلاً غير كونه جوهرًا قابلاً للأشياء فإذا كان فيه قوة قبول ما يقابل المتصل فيكون فيه أيضاً قوة قبول المتصل - لأن إمكان شيء يلزمه إمكان مقابله إذ لو كان أحد المتقابلين ضرورياً كان المقابل الآخر ممتنعاً و قد فرضناه ممكناً هذا خلف.

فعلم أن الجسم كما أنه متصل قبل القسمة ففيه ما يقبل المتصل أيضاً إذ لو كان عين المتصل أو لازماً له الاتصال حتى يكون النسبة ضرورية لم يكن له قوة الانفصال و هو باطل بالبديهة فصحة قبول شيء آخر غير المتصل الواحد كاشف عن صحة قبول المتصل كما ذكرنا فإذن الجسم بما هو جسم مركب في ذاته مما عنه له القوة و مما عنه له الفعل و هما الهيولى و الصورة و هو المطلوب.

تذكرة قياسية

إن سبيل البيان على نظم القياس البرهاني هو أن الجسم بالفعل من جهة ذاته و كل ما هو بالفعل من جهة ذاته لا يكون بالقوة فالجسم لا يكون بالقوة - و يجعل هذه النتيجة كبرى لقياس آخر من الشكل الثاني و هو أن الهيولى بالقوة و لا شيء من الجسم الموجود بالقوة ينتج لا شيء من الجسم الموجود هيولى.

و لمزيد التوضيح نقول لا شك أن في الجسم قوة على أن يوجد فيه أمور كثيرة.

فتلك القوة إما أن يكون نفس حقيقة الجوهر المتصل أو ثابتة في أمر يقارنها أو قائمة بذاتها فلو كانت هو بعينه نفس الاتصال المصحح لفرض الأبعاد حتى يكون الجوهر المتصل هو بعينه نفس القوة لأشياء كثيرة مما يطراً للجسم فيلزم أن يكون إذا فهما

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١١

الاتصال الجوهرى فهما أنه استعداد لأمر كثيرة و ما أمكننا تعقل الاتصال دون تعقل هذه الأشياء و ليس كذلك و أيضاً لو كان الاتصال الجسمي هو بعينه أنه بالقوة كذا و كذا - لكان صورة الجسم عرضاً لأن هذا المعنى أمر اعتباري عديم أو إضافي و الإضافة من أضعف الأعراض و لو كان الاتصال حاملاً لقوة تلك الأشياء لم يصح أن يعدم عند خروجه فيما يقوى عليه إلى الفعل فوجب أن يبقى مع الانفصال و ذلك لأن ذات القابل يجب وجوده مع المقبول.

لست أقول بوصف القابلية و الاستعداد لأن القوة تبطل عند وجود ما يقوى عليه و لو كانت القوة قائمة بذاتها لكان الإمكان جوهرًا لكنه عرض كما علم.

فالحامل لقوة هذه الأشياء غير الاتصال و غير المتصل بما هو متصل بل الذي يكون فيه قوة الاتصال و الانفصال و غيرهما من هيئات غير متناهية و كمالات غير واقفة على حد هو الهيولى و هذه الحجة و الحجة السابقة متقاربتا المأخذ و فيها أبحاث من وجوه -

الأول ما ذكره بعض شيعة الأقدمين نيابة عنهم

أن قولكم الجسم أو الاتصال نفسه ليس قوة على أمر فمسلّم لكن لا يلزم أن لا يكون القوة موجودة فيه و ليس إذا كانت القوة تابعة لشيء يلزم أن يكون هي هو.

فإن قلتم لو كانت القوة للانفصال موجودة في الاتصال لكان الاتصال باقياً مع الانفصال.

قلنا هو [هذا] بعينه عود إلى الحجة السابقة و قد مر الكلام فيها و إن قلتم إنه إذا كانت القوة حاصلة للاتصال قائمة به و هي شيء متحصل بالفعل فيلزم أن يكون شيء واحد بالقوة و بالفعل معا و هو محال.

قلنا الحق الصحيح امتناع كون شيء واحد من جهة واحدة بالفعل و بالقوة معا و أما امتناع أن يكون شيء واحد بالفعل و له قوة شيء آخر فغير مسلم و لا امتناع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١٢

الأول أيضا مستلزم لامتناع الثاني فالفعل و القوة يجوز أن يجتمعا في ذات واحدة من جهتين مختلفتين بأن يكون جهة الفعلية ذاته و جهة القوة عدم شيء آخر عنه و لا منافاة بين وجود شيء و عدم أشياء كثيرة عنه و كثيرا ما يعرض الغلط في العلوم من إهمال الحثيات و الاعتبارات فيستعمل منشأ الاتصاف بشيء موضع الحامل له و لا يلزم أن يكون الحامل لمعنى القوة هو بعينه منشأ تلك القوة أو حيثية ثبوتها.

مخلص عرشي.

أقول إن كل صفة خارجية سواء كانت لها صورة وجودية أو كانت أمرا انتزاعيا بحسب الواقع أي بأن يكون وجود الموصوف بحيثية يصدق عليه في الواقع تلك الصفة فلا بد لها من مبدأ قريب يكون جهة ثبوت تلك الصفة بل التحقيق أن كل معلول يكون من لوازم علته التامة كما سبق و كل صفة يكون من لوازم موصوفها الحقيقي فحينئذ لا يجوز أن يكون صفة من الصفات الوجودية أو العدمية تكون مأخوذة منتزعة من مقابلها أو ضدها فكما أن السواد لا يجوز أن يكون صفة للبياض أو لما هو ملزوم للبياض و كذا العدم لا يجوز أن ينتزع من الوجود أو مما يلزمه الوجود - فكذا القوة و الاستعداد لا يجوز أن يكون منتزعا من جهة نفس الصورة و التمامية - و لا مما يتصف بهما المعنى الصوري بما هو معنى صوري بل يجب أن يكون المحكي عنه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١٣

بهما أو المنتزع عنه لهما معنى مادي يكون نفس الإبهام و القصور و كأنك مما قد قرع سمعك من مباحث العلة و المعلول و خصوصا في فصل بيان مناسبة العلة لمعلولها لكنت تستغني عن الزيادة في شرح هذا المقام بشرط سلامة الذوق لكن نزيدك بيانا و نقول - كل حيثية ثابتة لشيء ما في نفس الأمر فلا بد له من مبدأ لانتراعها و منشأ لحصولها و القوة و إن كانت عدما أو عدميا لكن لما كانت مضافة إلى شيء فلها حظ من الثبات فإنها عدم شيء عما من شأنه أن يكون له أو لنوعه أو لجنسه وجود ذلك الشيء و لكن ليس بالفعل حاصلا كما بين في علم الميزان فلا محالة لهذا العدم من موصوف و قابل يصح تلبسه بملكة هذا العدم بوجه من الوجوه المذكورة فالقابل لهذا العدم هو بعينه مما يجوز أن يصير قابلا لما هو عدم له عند ما خرج من القوة إلى الفعل كما أشرنا إليه فلو كان حامل قوة الانفصال هو نفس الاتصال لكان نفس الاتصال قوة على ذاته كما مر إلا أنا لا نكتفي بهذا القدر لئلا يرد عليه أنه متوقف على الحجة الأولى في كون الانفصال مقابلا للاتصال فيكون رجوعا إليها بل نقول إذا ثبت أن لهذا العدم حظا من الوجود و أن له قابلا و موصوفا بالذات فلنفتش لما هو القابل الموصوف له بالذات و لنعمد إلى بيانه و تحقيقه.

فنقول إن المبادي للأمور الطبيعية أربعة فالقبول مطلقا صفة نسبية لا بد له - من ارتباط بأحد هذه الأسباب فهو إما نعت

للمادة أو الصورة أو الفاعل أو الغاية و للنظر في مثال واحد كقبول المادة لصورة الكرسي فهذا القبول ليس يجوز أن يكون صفة الفاعل و لا صفة للغاية لأنهما منشئان للفعالية و الحصول لا للقوة و القبول و لا يجوز أن يكون صفة للصورة الكرسية لأن وجودها نفس الفعالية لنفسها فلا يكون قبولاً لها فالموصوف بها يكون مادة الكرسي و مصحح قبولها للقوة هو قصورها عن درجة التمام فإذا علمت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١٤

هذا في مادة الكرسي فننقل الكلام إلى مادة هذه المادة هل هي نفس القابل بما هو قابل أو معنى صوري له قابل. فنقول معناه الصوري كالخشب مثلاً لكونه أمراً تاماً في نوعيته و حقيقته - لا يجوز أن يكون جهة قوة و إمكان للصورة الكرسية بل القابل هو مادة ذلك الخشب لا صورته و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى قابل ليس هو في نفسه معنى من المعاني - التي هي بالفعل و الاتصال للجسم بما هو جسم أمر صوري لكونه مبدأ الفصل للجوهر الجرمي فلا بد من أمر آخر يكون هو مصحح القوة و الاستعداد لا بأن يكون القوة صورة طبيعية حادثة له حتى يحتاج إلى أسباب أربعة لثبوته فيحتاج إلى قابلية أخرى و يتسلسل بل بأن يكون لازماً لماهية القابل من غير قابلية أخرى في الواقع. اللهم إلا بمجرد اعتبار العقل و التفاته فتقطع بانقطاع الالتفات كسائر خطرات الأوهام المتكررة. فقد ثبت أن المصحح لقبول الحوادث الكونية في الجسم ليس هو نفس الاتصال بل القابل له ثم لا يخفى أنه و إن اشتركت هذه الحجة مع الحجة الأولى في المآخذ أو في البيان في الجملة حتى وقع الرجوع في بعض المقدمات إلى ما ثبت هناك لكن لهذه مزيد تدقيق و تحقيق حيث يظهر فيها أن أحد جزئي الجسم أمر قابل محض و معنى استعدادي صرف و هذا مما لا بد فيه حتى يظهر أن أحد حاشيتي الوجود قد انتهت إلى ما يجاور العدم المحض بحيث لا يمكن التخطي عنه إلى ما هو دونه فلم يبق شيء في الإمكان الذاتي إلا و قد أفاده القیوم الجواد و بذلك يظهر أيضاً أن كل ما لا يوجد أو يوجد غير تام الخلقة أو مع آفة أو خلل أو فساد فإنما هو لعجز المادة و قصورها عن احتمال ما هو أتم - و أشرف و أفضل مما وقع.

و بذلك يعلم أن وجود العالم أشرف ما يتصور من النظام و أتم ما يمكن من الفضل و التمام -

البحث الثاني أن أصل هذه الحجة منقوضة بوجود النفس الإنسانية

بل بوجود كل جوهر مجرد مدبر للجسم بالمباشرة و التحريك سواء كان إنسانياً

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١٥

أو سماوياً لأنها من حيث ذاتها جوهر صوري و لها قوة قبول التغيرات و الانفعالات و سنوح الإرادات و التصورات فكبرى القياس الأول و هو قولهم كل ما هو بالفعل لا يكون بالقوة تكون منسوخة بقياس من الشكل و هو أن النفس الإنسانية مثلاً أمر بالفعل من جهة ذاتها و كل نفس إنسانية يكون لها قوة أمر ما فينتج بعض ما هو أمر بالفعل يكون له قوة أمر ما.

و الجواب عنه أن النفس الإنسانية و أمثالها و إن كانت مجردة بحسب الذات - لكنها مادية بحسب الأفعال و الصفات و كما أن الشيء الواحد بحسب الماهية يجوز أن يكون جوهرًا و عرضًا باعتبارين مختلفين فكذلك قد يكون أمر واحد

مجردا و ماديا- من جهتين مختلفتين فحيثية كون النفس بالفعل إنما هي من قبل ذاتها المستندة إلى جاعلها التام و حيثية كونها بالقوة إنما هي من جهة أفاعيلها و آثارها الموقوفة على تهيو المادة التي هي آلة لصدور تلك الأفاعيل و السر فيه أن النفس في أول تكونها في غاية القصور و الضعف ففيها مع بساطتها حيثتان عقليتان نسبتهمما إليها نسبة الجنس و الفصل إلى النوع البسيط فمن حيث إنها صدرت من المبدأ الفياض الذي هو بالفعل من جميع الوجوه فهي موجودة بحسب الذات و من حيث وجودها الحدوثي متعلق بالمادة فهي قاصرة عن رتبة الكمال في أول نشوؤها محتاجة إلى الاستكمال بما يكملها من العوارض التي يفتقر إلى مادة يحمل قوة حصولها و تجددتها فجهة الافتقار إلى الكمال و حامل قوة الاستعداد له هي المادة التي تعلقت بها و جهة الوجود و الفعلية هي نفس ذاتها المفاضة عن الجواد المحض. فقد صح من هاهنا أيضا أن جميع جهات الفعلية و التمام يرجع إلى القيوم الواجب سبحانه و جهة القوة و العدم يرجع إلى الهيولى الأولى الصادرة عن الوسائط العقلية بواسطة جهة الإمكان الذاتي فيها فالمادة منبع الشرور و العدم و القصور و منبعها الإمكان الذاتي المندمج في كل وجود إمكاني لأجل نزول مرتبته عن الوجود التام القيومي جل مجده و عظمت كبرياؤه.

و بهذا الأصل يندفع شبهة الثنوية القائلين بصانعين قديمين لما وجدوا من

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تحقق الخير و الشر و النفع و الضر في هذا العالم و شاهدوا الأنوار و الظلام و النفوس و الأجرام و الأرواح و الأشباح و الحياة و الموت و العلم و الجهل و النهار و الليل و الضوء و الظل و القوة و الفعل و سائر المتضادات التي تجمعها الخير و الشر و الله تعالى نور محض لا يشوبه شوب ظلمة و وجوب محض بلا إمكان و حياة محضة بلا موت و فعل بلا قوة و وجود بلا بخل و عطاء بلا منع تعالى عما يقوله الظالمون علوا كبيرا

البحث الثالث النقض بوجود العقول فإنها مؤثرة فيما تحتها

منفعلة عما فوقها ففيها جهتا فعل و انفعال فذاتها مركبة من أمرين أحدهما يفعل و بالآخر ينفع.

و الجواب أن انفعالها عما فوقها ليس إلا بنفس وجوداتها و ليس الانفعال هناك بقوة استعدادية سابقة على وجودها ليكون مقابلا للفعل و لفظ القبول و الانفعال مشترك بين المعنيين أحدهما مقابل للفعل و هو منشأ التركيب الخارجي بخلاف آخر فهي بنفس وجودها الفاض عليها من علتها تفعل فيما تحتها.

البحث الرابع النقض بوجود الهيولى

فإنها في نفسها جوهر موجود بالفعل - و هي أيضا مستعدة لها قوة قبول الأشياء فيلزم تركيبها من صورة يكون بها بالفعل و من مادة يكون بها بالقوة ثم ننقل الكلام إلى مادة المادة و هيولى الهيولى.

و الجواب عنه حسب ما ذكر الشيخ الرئيس قدس سره في كتبه أن فعلية الهيولى فعلية القوة و جوهريتها جوهرية القبول للأشياء لا فعلية وجود من الوجودات المتحصلة - و جوهرية حقيقة من الحقائق المتأصلة و لا يستوجب بهاتين الجهتين أن يكون ذات جزئين أحدهما يكون بالفعل و بالأخرى يكون بالقوة.

اللهم إلا بحسب اعتبار العقل و ذلك المدعى ينكشف بأمرين - أحدهما بأنه لو كانت هاتان الجهتان موجبتين لموصوفين متغايرين لهما في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١٧

الخارج لكان الكلام عائدا إلى ما هو بمنزلة القابل ولأدى ذلك إلى التسلسل في وجود القوابل المترتبة المجتمعة الغير المتناهية فلا محالة يجب الانتهاء إلى قابل يكون الجهتان فيه عقليتين من غير تكثر في الواقع إلا بمجرد الذهن. والثاني بأننا نقول إن نسبة الهيولى إلى الجوهرية والاستعداد ليست كنسبة المركب الطبيعي إلى المادة والصورة بل كنسبة النوع البسيط إلى ما هما بمنزلة الجنس والفصل وقد مر مثل الكلام في مباحث المادة والصورة في المرحلة التي تذكر فيها أحوال الماهية فليذكر فإذا الهيولى نوع بسيط جنسه الجوهر وفصله أنه مستعد لأي شيء مخصوص وإلا لكان مركبا من القابلية ومن الخصوصية التي بها قابل. اللهم إلا أن يكون منشأ تلك الخصوصية أمر وارد عليها من الصور اللاحقة أو يكون من الجهات الناشئة عما هو أرفع من المادة والصورة جميعا كالانتساب إلى جهة فاعلية مخصوصة فإن التحقيق أن الاختلاف بين جواهر الهيوليات الفلكية و تشخصاتها وكذا الاختلاف بينها وبين هيولى العناصر وتعيينها يرجع إلى الاختلاف بين مبادئ القرية الفعلية المنتظم تشخص كل من تلك المبادي و وحدته الجمعية من وحدة شخصية للمفارق القدسي المقيم لواحدة منها شخصية و وحدة نوعية للصورة الطبيعية - التي يقام وجود الهيولى بها من ذلك المقيم إما بورود شخص من تلك الطبيعة دائما عليها إن قبلت الدوام الشخصي أيضا بورود أمثالها إن لم يقبل كما في العناصر على ما سيجيء تفصيله و توضيحه في بحث التلازم.

فالحاصل أن الهيولى الأولى للجسم الطبيعي في ذاتها هي بما هي بالقوة يكون بالفعل و بما هي بالفعل يكون بالقوة لكل شيء أو لأشياء مخصوصة على الوجهين المذكورين ثم لا يبعد لأحد أن يقول إن القابلية والاستعداد والإمكان ليست أمورا جوهرية لأنها حال الشيء بالمقايضة إلى الخارجيات إذ الاستعداد إنما يكون استعداد شيء لشيء آخر له في نفسه حقيقة و تحصل فينبغي أن يتحصل ذلك الشيء بحسب حقيقة نفسه ثم يلحقه هذه الإضافة. نعم لا مانع من دخول الإضافات في مفهومات أسامي الأشياء لا في حدودها الجوهرية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١٨

فالجوهر الهيولى الحامل للصورة ربما يسمى هيولى باعتبار القبول فيكون إضافة القبول داخلية في شرح اسمه و مفهوم وصفه لا في ذاته بذاته كما أن النفس و الملك إنما يسميان نفسا و ملكا باعتبار تدبيرهما للبدن و المملكة لا باعتبار ماهيتهما فيكون إضافة التدبير جزءا لمفهوم الاسم لا للحقيقة الجوهرية. وأيضا لا يصح أن يكون فضل الهيولى القوة والاستعداد لأن جزء الجوهر المحض لا يجوز أن يكون عرضا وأيضا الاستعداد لا يكون حاملا لما هو استعداد له لأنه لا يبقى مع حصوله فالهيولى يلزم أن يبطل عند وجود الصورة و كلامنا في حامل الصورة.

فنقول إن هذه الإشكالات مما قد مضى ذكرها في تحقيق ماهية الهيولى مع أجوبتها على وجه لا مزيد عليه لكننا نعيد الجواب كما أعدنا السؤال بضرب آخر من البيان في المقال تكثيرا للقوائد بما فيه من الزوائد فليعلم أن أرباب العلوم كثيرا ما يطلقون ألفاظا موضوعة لأمر عرضية أو إضافية و يعبرون بها عن الأمور الذاتية مثل ما يذكرون في فصول

الأنواع الجوهرية أمورا إضافية كالناطق في فصل الإنسان و المتحرك المريد في فصل الحيوان. و غرضهم منها المبادي التي يترتب عليها تلك الأمور حتى إن الشيخ صرح - بتسمية هذه المبادي بالفصول الحقيقية و بتسمية هذه المفهومات كمفهوم الناطق و الحساس و المتحرك بالفصول المنطقية فكذا المراد بالاستعداد و المستعد ليس نفس هذا المفهوم الإضافي بل المبدأ القابلي له و قد علمت أن محلته لمفهوم القبول ليست على سبيل القبول الاستعدادي بل كسائر لوازم الماهيات نعم لا يكون مصداق معنى القوة و القابلية إلا أمرا غير متحصل كما أن مصداق الموجودية المصدورية بنفس ذاته ليس إلا صرف الوجود و مصداق الزوجية بنفس ذاتها ليس إلا زوجا صرفا لا شيئا له زوجية عارضة أو لازمة.

فائقن هذا البتة و لا تغفل عنه فإن في الغفلة عنه و الإهمال في رعايته ضررا عظيما في تحقيق الحقائق.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١١٩

و لهذا مما قد كررنا ذكره و اجعل هذه المعاني المصدورية مرئي لملاحظة الحقائق الخارجية و مقاييس لمشاهدة أنحاء الوجودات التي لا يمكن وجودها في العقل إلا بهذه المرائي و العنوانات. و أما قول القائل القوة تبطل عند وجود ما هي قوة عليه فلا تكون باقية عند وجود ذلك الشيء فصحيح إن أراد القوة الخاصة لشيء خاص و أما القوة المطلقة لحصول الأشياء الغير المتناهية فإنما يبطل إذا حصل جميع تلك الأشياء و هو محال و إذا لزم انتهاء مقدورات الله تعالى و قد برهن على أن قدرته تعالى و قوته غير متناهية. و أما قول الباحث جزء الجوهر لا يجوز أن يكون عرضا فإن أراد بالعرض ما يعرض لذات لا يفتقر في تقومها إليه فلا نسلم أن فصل الهيولى عرض بهذا المعنى - و إن أراد ما لا يكون بحسب حقيقته جوهر و إن صدق عليه معنى الجوهر صدقا عرضيا فممنوع و لكن لا نسلم امتناع تقوم الجوهر بالعرض بهذا المعنى. و قد سبق الكلام في أن فصول الجواهر البسيطة بأي معنى يكون جوهر و على أن الحقائق الغير المتأصلة يصح عدم اندراجها في مقولة الجوهر و لا في مقولة الأعراض هذا ما يمكن أن يقال من قبل المشاءين المحصلين و الله الهادي إلى طريق الحق و اليقين

فصل (٥) في الإشارة إلى منهج آخر لهذا المرام

إن للجسم ماهية مركبة من جنس و فصل و جنسها مفهوم الجوهر و فصلها هو مفهوم قولنا ذو أبعاد ثلاثة على الإطلاق و كل ماهية لها حد أي جنس و فصل إذا كانت بحيث يمكن أن يعدم في الخارج فصلها عنها و يبقى معنى جنسها كان لا محالة جنسها - و فصلها يحاذيان جزءين خارجين هما مطابقا صدقهما و مبدأ انتزاعهما عن الخارج

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٢٠

أعني مادة خارجية يستفاد منها جنسها الذي هو بعينه مادة عقلية باعتبار أخذها بشرط لا شيء و صورة خارجية يستفاد منها فصلها الذي هو بعينه صورة عقلية باعتبار أخذها بشرط لا شيء لكن الجسم ماهية بالصفة المذكورة أي يمكن أن يعدم فصله الذي هو مفهوم قولنا الممتد في الجهات الثلاث على الإطلاق المستلزم لنعت الاتصال مع صدق معنى الجوهر عليه فيلزم تركبه من مادة هي الهيولى الأولى و صورة هي الصورة الجسمية و هو المطلوب.

أقول وهذه الحجة أيضا قريبة المأخذ من الحجتين السابقتين و يرد عليها أكثر المناقشات التي سبق ذكرها وإن كانت بعنوانات و عبارات أخرى غيرها- لكن المآل واحد كما يظهر بالتأمل تركنا استئناف الكلام فيها و إعادة القول عليها- مخافة التطويل و الإسهاب و الله ولي الحق و ملهم الصواب.

فإن قلت إذا كان جعل الجنس و الفصل في المركبات واحدا لأنهما من الأجزاء المحمولة فيلزم أن يكون وجودهما معا و عدمهما معا فإذا انعدم عن الجسم قابلية الأبعاد فيلزم أن يكون زوال الاتصال عن الجسم عن زوال الجوهرية عنه فانهدم أساس هذه الحجة لأن مبناها على زوال الاتصال و بقاء الجوهرية و ليس كذلك.

قلت قد مر مثل هذا الكلام في مباحث الماهية و ذكرنا هناك أن زوال الفصل و إن استلزم زوال الجنس من حيث هو جنس لكن لا يستلزم زواله من حيث هو مادة.

حتى إن من زعم أن الشجر إذا قطع و الحيوان إذا مات زالت الجسمية عنهما بالكلية بزوال النمو و الحياة و هما مبدأ فصل النامي و الحساس و حدث الجنس في كل منهما بحدوث جسمية أخرى بالكلية و بنية أخرى بالتمام و التزم أن جسمية الشجر المقطوع بالعدد غير ما كان قبل القطع و كذا جسمية القالب الحيواني الباقي بعد الموت- غير ما كان قبل مفارقة الروح بلحظة.

فقد كابر مقتضى عقله و حسه جميعا و ليس ارتكاب هذا منه بأقل من ارتكاب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٢١

الطفرة في الحركة و التفكك في الرحي و غيرهما من مجازفات المتأخرين بل الحق في هذا المقام أن يتمسك بما ذكرناه بعد اختيار اتحاد الجنس و الفصل جعلاً و وجوداً لكونهما من الأجزاء المحمولة للحقيقة الموجودة من الفرق بين استمرار ذاته الجنس أو استمراره من حيث هو جزء لمركب محمول عليه.

أ و لا ترى أن [مع ظ] انهدام البيت بقي اللبنة بأنفسها قد زال عنها وصف الجزئية للبيت لأن الجزئية و الجنسية من الصفات الإضافية يكفي لانعدامها انعدام ما أضيفت هي إليه

فصل (٦) في ذكر ما تجشمه بعض المتأخرين من أهل التحقيق لهذا المطلب و سماه برهان خاص الخاص

و تحريره بعد التلخيص عن الزوائد هو أن جميع الممكنات لما وجدت عن الوجود الحقيقي و الواحد الحق الذي ليست فيه شائبة من الكثرة بوجه من الوجوه.

و من جملة الموجودات الممكنة هي الممتدات و لا بد لكل معلول أن يناسب علته مناسبة مصححة لصدوره عنها دون غيرها و لا يجادها له و تلك المناسبة مفقودة بين الصورة الجسمية و الموجود الحقيقي المنزه عن شائبة التركيب و كذا بينها و بين العقول التي لا يمكن فيها فرض جزء دون جزء فلا بد من أن يتحقق بينها و بين واحد من العقول أمر له مناسبة بكل واحد منها من حيثية و هو الهيولى إذ هي من جهة كونها غير ممتد بحسب ذاتها يناسب أن يوجد من المبدأ المفارق و من جهة قبولها للامتداد تصوير واسطة لصدور الممتدات عنه.

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بحث وإشارة

كلامه هذا مبني على تقدم الهيولى على الصورة الجرمية بالذات وليس كذلك بل الأمر بالعكس لما علمت أن جهة الفعلية في كل شيء سابقة على جهة القوة و قد مر في مباحث الماهية و في مباحث العلة و المعلول أن الصورة في كل شيء متقدمة على المادة و الفصل متقدم على تحصل الجنس بحسب الوجود و إن لم يكن متقدما عليه من حيث المفهوم.

و ممن يصرح بكون الصورة الجرمية أصلا في الجسم و الهيولى متقومة بها أي قائمة عليها العلامة التفتازاني في شرح المقاصد حيث قال و الصورة جوهر يقوم بذاته و يتقوم به محله الذي هو الهيولى.

و سينكشف لك هذا المعنى في مبحث التلازم و ما ذكره من عدم المناسبة- بين الجسمية و العقل المفارق مسلم إلا أن عدم المناسبة بين الهيولى و بينه أشد و أكد- لكون أحدهما بالفعل من كل الوجوه و الأخرى بالقوة من كل الوجوه و لأن المفارق هو النور المحض على لسان الأشراف و الوجود الصرف عندنا و إن كان نورا مفتقرا إلى نور الأنوار و وجودا مجعولا للواجب بالذات و الهيولى محض الإمكان و الظلمة- فلا يمكن أن يكون بين موجود و موجود هذه المخالفة التي بين المفارقات و الهوليات- حتى إن المتضادين يشترط فيهما الاتفاق في الجنس القريب.

فجهة المناسبة بينها و بين المفارق في الصدور هي الوجودات المتوسطة التي غلبت فيها جهة الإمكان و تضاعفت فيها جهة الحاجة بالتدرج بحسب مراتب النزول الموجبة لتكثر الحاجة إلى العلل و الأسباب لنقص الوجود حتى انتهى إلى هوية متصلة- ذات أجزاء فرضية متخالفة الأوضاع و الحدود التي ليس شأنها الحضور و الجمعية و يكون بحيث يكون وحدتها ذات قوة الكثرة و اتصالها ذا استعداد الانفصال و بقاؤها قرين استيجاب الزوال إلا بسبب صورة أخرى يحفظها عن الزوال و يقيمها على الوحدة و الاتصال شخصا

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كانت كما في الأفلاك أو نوعا كما في العناصر ثم بتوسطها وجدت الهيولى التي لا وجود لها و لا وحدة و لا اتصال بالفعل فضلا عن أن يكون في معرض الزوال و الانتقال إلى الكثرة و العدم و الانفصال بل حقيقتها كما مر محض استعداد الوجود و العدم لغيره و قوة الوحدة و الكثرة و إمكان الاتصال و الانفصال.

فظهر أن الهيولى هي عين جهة الإمكان و القوة و ذاتها ماهية تعليلية بأمر له تجوهر في الوجود و الفعلية لأن حقيقتها كحقيقة الأغراض تابعة إلا أن لها وحدة جنسية يتحد بالجواهر الجسمانية و يحمل عليها فيكتسب الجوهرية منها و إن كانت ماهيتها نفس معنى الجوهر إلا أن هذا كما علمت لا يقتضي في مصداق الجوهر

فصل (٧) في حجة أخرى أفادها صاحب المباحث المشرقية

هي أن جسمية الفلك يلزمها شكل معين و مقدار معين لعدم قبولها الكون و الفساد على رأيهم.

فنقول هذا اللزوم إما النفس الجرمية المشتركة فيكون كل جسم كذا لا اشتراكها في الجسمية و ليس هكذا هذا خلف أو لأمر آخر فهو إذن إما حال في جرمية أو محل لها أو مباين عنها فإن كان ذلك الأمر حالا فيها فإن لم يكن لازما لها لم يكن سببا للزوم الشكل و المقدار المعينين و إن كان لازما عاد التقسيم في كيفية لزومه فإما أن يتسلسل و هو محال أو ينتهي إلى ما يلزم الجرمية فيعود المحذور المذكور من أنه يجب أن يكون كل جسم كذا و إما أن يكون لزومه بسبب شيء لا حال في الجسمية و لا محل لها فلا يخلو إما أن يكون ذلك الشيء جسما آخر أو قوة موجودة فيه أو أمرا مفارقا ليس

بجسم ولا جسماني و الأول باطل لأن ذلك الأمر إذا اقتضى ذلك للزوم لجسميته وجب أن يكون كل جسم كذلك و كانت الجسمية التي هي الملزومة لتلك الفلكية أولى بذلك الاقتضاء من جسمية أخرى و قد أبطلنا ذلك و إن لم يكن لمجرد الجسمية بل لقوة

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زائدة على الجسمية فهذا هو القسم الثاني.

فنقول تلك القوة إن كانت من لوازم محلها عاد السؤال في المقتضي لذلك للزوم - و إن لم يكن من لوازم محلها فإذا فارت محلها فإما أن تنعدم أو لا فإن عدمت عدمت الملازمة - لزوال ما يقتضيها و ذلك محال و إن لم تنعدم عند مفارقتها محلها كانت غنية في وجودها عن المحل فكل ما كان كذلك لم يكن لها اختصاص بمحل دون محل اختصاصا بالوجوب.

فهي إذن قوة غنية عن المحل في وجودها فيكون تأثيرها في جميع المتماثلات تأثيرا واحدا فلا بد في اختصاص بعض الأجسام لقبول الفلكية عن تأثيرها دون بعض من مخصص و يعود الكلام في كيفية لحوق ذلك المخصص و إن كان ذلك الأمر مبائنا.

فقد علمت أن نسبة المباين إلى جميع الأمثال واحدة فلا يقتضي في بعضها الفلكية إلا برابط مخصوص و يعود الشقوق في ذلك الرابط بمثل ما مر فبقي من الاحتمالات المذكورة أن لزوم الفلكية بسبب شيء حلت فيه الجسمية و حلت الفلكية و ما يلزمها فيه.

ثم إن ذلك الشيء لذاته يقتضي صورتين معا فلا جرم أنه صارت مقارنتها واجبة - فإذا لجسمية الفلك محل و ذلك هو المسمى بالهيولى و يجب أن يكون تلك الهيولى مخالفة لسائر الهيوليات و الإعادات المحالات المذكورة و إذا ثبت أن جسمية الفلك محتاجة إلى محل يحل فيه و جب احتياج جسمية العناصر إلى الهيولى فهذا تمام الحجة التي ذكرها. قال و قد أوردتها على كثير من الأذكاء فما قدحوا في شيء من مقدماتها - قال و لكنه قد عرض لي الشك و كان حاصل شكه منع اشتراك الجسمية - في جميع الأجسام مستندا بجواز أن يكون جسمية بعض الأجسام مخالفا لجسمية غيره لئلا يلزم عند استناد الشكل و المقدار المعينين في الفلك إلى جسمية اشتراك جميع الأجسام في الفلكية و لوازمها و طول الكلام في توجيه ذلك المنع بما لا فائدة في ذكرها

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و سيجيء بيان كون الجسمية أي مصحح فرض الأبعاد حقيقة نوعية امتيازها بلواحق خارجية.

ثم العجب منه أنه مع شدة خوضه في تتبع العلوم و مهارته في البحوث كيف اعتقد أن هذه الحجة منه قوية لا يرد عليها بحث و لا فيها قدح سوى ما ذكره من الشك على أن ما ذكره في غاية الوهن و الضعف و سيجيء من الكلام ما لم يبق معه شك في أن الجسمية مشترك في جميع الأجسام.

كيف و هو أصل محقق يبنى عليه كثير من المطالب كإثبات الصور النوعية في الأجسام و إثبات الهيولى في الأفلاك و إثبات الشكل الطبيعي في كل جسم و الحيز الطبيعي له و مباحث النفوس و القوى و الكيفيات و غيرها من المسائل

الباحثة في العلم الطبيعي - وأما الذي ينقدح به الحجة المذكورة و يرد عليها فأبحاث - الأول النقض بتوجه مثل ذلك السؤال بعينه في بيان لزوم القطبية و السكون لبعض مواضع الفلك و لزوم المنطقة و الحركة السريعة لبعض آخر و لا يمكن استناد ذلك إلى الهيولى لكونها واحدة في كل فلك فلا توجب الاختلاف فإن استند لزوم القطبية لموضع من الفلك و الدائرة لموضع آخر إلى الأمور الإلهية و العناية التي هي علمه تعالى بالنظام الأفضل أو الإرادة التي ينسبونها بعضهم إليه من غير مرجح - فيسند لزوم أصل الفلكية و ما يلزمها إليها.

و بالجملة كل ما وقع به الجواب عن هذا فليقع به عن ذلك من غير تفاوت.

الثاني أن إيجاب لزوم الشكل و المقدار لا يمكن أن يسند إلى الهيولى لأنها جوهر قابل و معنى القبول الصحة و الإمكان و هو ينافي الإيجاب و الاقتضاء بل لا بد من أن يكون للفلكية و لوازمها مقتضى آخر حتى يقبلها الهيولى التي شأنها قبول الصور و الهيئات لا إيجاب شيء من الأشياء.

الثالث أن الذي ذكره هو في الحقيقة شبهة يجب حلها حتى ينكشف جليلة الحال و ارتفع و زال أصل الإشكال و ظني أن هذه الشبهة هي التي قد كان الإمام

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معتقدا منذ ثلاثين سنة فيها أنها برهان ثم ظهر له بعد تلك المدة أنها مغلطة و كان قد بكى على ذلك مدة.

و وجه الحل أنا نختار من الشقوق التي ذكرها في السبب المقتضي للزوم المقدار و الشكل المعينين للفلك أن ذلك السبب هو أمر حال في جسمية الفلك لازم لها فإن أعيد السؤال في علة لزومه لجسمية الفلك دون غيرها مع تماثل الأجسام في الجسمية.

قلنا الحال إذا كان مقوما للمحل كالصورة النوعية فهو في وجوده متقدم على وجود محله بالذات فمنشأ لزومه لذات المحل هو نفس ذات الحال فبالحقيقة هو الأصل و المنشأ في الملازمة و المحل لازم له كما في الملازمة بين الجسمية و الهيولى حيث إن الجسمية أصل في الجوهرية و منشأ للملازمة و الهيولى لازمة لها متفرعة عليها بل أصل الإشكال و الجواب جاريان في جميع الصور النوعية و محالها و كذا الفصول اللازمة لحصص الأجناس التي يكون في الأنواع.

مثلا النطق لازم لحيوانية الإنسان لعدم انفكاك أحدهما عن الآخر فإذا سئل عن سبب لزوم النطق للإنسان أنه إن كان لأجل كونه حيوانا لزم أن يكون الحيوانات كلها ناطقا للاشتراك في الحيوانية و إن كان لأجل أمر حال في حيوانية مخصوصة فالكلام في تخصصه عائد و إن لم يكن حالا في حيوانية مخصوصة هي حيوانية الإنسان فإن كان حالا ممكن الزوال عنه فيزول بزواله الناطقية و إن كان أمرا لازما لها كان الكلام عائدا في سبب لزومه و يتسلسل أو ينتهي إلى الحيوانية فيعود المحذور المذكور.

ثم الأمر اللازم للماهية المشتركة كان مقتضاه مشتركا في الجميع و إن كان أمرا مباينا و المباين متساوي النسبة إلى جميع حصص الأنواع لتمامها مع قطع النظر عن فصول فيلزم الترجيح من غير مرجح و إن كان لأمر هو محل الحيوانية - يرد الكلام في تخصص المحل به و لا يمكن هاهنا القول بأن المخصص هو الهيولى لأن

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الهيولى في العنصریات كلها واحدة بدلیل انقلاب بعضها إلى بعض.

فالجواب الحق فيه أن الفصل مقدم في الوجود على حصة الجنس فلزوم الجنس للفصل معلل بالفصل لأنه من لوازم ذاته و اللازم البين للزوم للماهية لا يحتاج إلى سبب للزوم لها سوى ذات الملزوم.

نعم لو لم يكن الحال مقوماً للمحل و لا يفتقر إليه المحل في تحصيله نوعاً لافتقر لزومه إلى مخصص خارج عن نفس ذلك الحال كالحرارة للنار و البياض للثلج - فهناك يستند جهة الزوم إلى ذات المحل من غير محذور لجواز استناد اللازم الواحد - إلى ملزومات متخالفة و قد بقي في تحقيق هذا الموضع كلام تركناه إلى موضع آخر لضيق المقام فإن ما اختاره من الشقوق المذكورة و هو إسناد جهة الاقتضاء لتخصيص جسمية الفلك بلوازمه المخصصة إلى المحل و إن لم يصح في المخصصات الكلية كالأبداعات و مبادي الفصول للأنواع الثابتة كما بينا لكنه إذا جرى الإشكال في تخصيص الأشخاص بلوازمها الشخصية بأنه هل للماهية أو لأمر هو حال فيها أو محل لها أو مباين عنها كان المختار من الشقوق هو المحل القابل لتعين الشخص المعين و لوازمه الشخصية لعدم استغناء الشخص و وجود الشخص و وحدته عن الحاجة إلى المحل المستغني عن ذلك الحال و إن كان الحال من أشخاص الماهية الجوهرية الصورية.

و ذلك لأن المقوم للمحل المادي حقيقة الصورة الحالة فيه لا الشخص المعين منها بحسب هويته فلا يمكن تقدمه من حيث الشخصية على المحل فالمحل علة للشخص سابق عليه.

و إذا نقل الكلام إلى تخصصه بالتخصيص مع تماثله لسائر المحال ينجر الكلام إلى مسألة ربط الحادث بالقديم كما سيجيء كشفها و توضيحها إن شاء الله العليم

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تتميم -

و مما يختلج بالبال أن الهيولى و الصورة إذا كانتا من ذاتيات الجسم و مقوماته - فلم يقعا و لا شيء منهما في مطلب لم بل يقعان في الجواب عن السؤال بما هو فلا يكتسب شيء منهما بالبرهان كيف و الذاتي لا يحتاج إلى وسط فيجب أن يعلم أجزاء الشيء بحسب الماهية و هي الأجزاء العقلية اصطلاحاً كالجنس و الفصل المتحصلين في العقل - عند ملاحظة الإبهام و التعيين للماهية غير الأجزاء الوجودية أعني المادة و الصورة و ما لا يطلب بلم أصلاً لا بحسب الثبوت لشيء و لا بحسب الإثبات له إنما هي المقومات بحسب الماهية من حيث هي هي.

و أما الأجزاء الوجودية و هي أجزاء الشيء بحسب نحو خاص من الوجود فهي مما يطلب بالبرهان أنها بالنسبة إلى الماهية المطلقة كالعوارض و إن كان وجودها بالنسبة إلى وجود الماهية كالمقومات و مقومات الوجود يطلب بلم كما أن مقومات الماهية يطلب بما.

و من هاهنا علم أن منزلة وجود العلة لوجود المعلول كمنزلة مفهوم الماهية للماهية كما لوحنا إليه سابقاً فإذا نتركب الجسم من الهيولى و الصورة ليس يستوجب الاستغناء عن البرهان بل يتعرف أولاً بجوهرياتها المحمولة فيطلب بالحجة أجزاء الوجودية و إن اشتملت الأولى بالقوة على الثانية فالقبول المأخوذ في حد الجسم تدل على مادته الأولى و الأبعاد تدل على صورته أي الجوهر الممتد بالذات

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الفن الثالث في تصاحب الهيولى و الصورة بالعلاقة الذاتية و فيه فصول

فصل (١) في أن الجسمية من حيث هي لا تنفك عن الهيولى

قد استفيد من برهان وجود الهيولى من طريق القوة و الفعل

أن لا شيء من الأجسام حال عن الهيولى إذ ما من جسم إلا و فيه شوب قوة الكمال أو قصور في أوضاع و أفعال و تجدد و انتقال من حال إلى حال و إن كان في أيسر غرض و أسهل معنى فعلي أو انفعالي فإن الفلك و إن كان بالفعل من جهة جوهريته و كمه و كيفه و أين و وضعه في نفسه و جميع هيئاته القارة إلا أن فيه القوة من جهة أوضاعه بالقياس إلى الغير لعدم إمكان الجمع بين سائر الأوضاع و قد علمت أن جهة القوة يرجع إلى شيء هو محض القبول و الإمكان و لا محالة يكون لازماً للجسمية كما مر من عدم استقلاله في التجوهر و القوة لا تنفك عن ذي القوة و ذو القوة لا يمكن أن يكون مفارقاً عقلياً و النفس بما هي نفس لا تنفك عن الجسمية فالمشتمل على القوة أولاً و بالذات هو الجسم بما هو جسم.

و هذا برهان متين لا يحتاج إلى كون الجسمية طبيعة نوعية متماثلة في جميع الأجسام على أن ذلك أمر ثابت لا خلل فيه.

طريق آخر -

ذكره الشيخ الرئيس في إلهيات الشفاء مبناه على أن الجسمية حقيقة واحدة - بيانها أن جسمية إذا خالفت جسمية أخرى في أن إحداها حارة و الأخرى باردة أو أن إحداها لها طبيعة فلكية و الأخرى لها طبيعة أخرى و لحقوق الأعراض أو الطبائع إنما كان بعد

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تحصل ذاتها و نوعيتها من غير حاجة لها في الجسمية إلى انضمام شيء من هذه المعاني و هذا بخلاف المقدار حيث مثلاً لا يكمل له ماهية إلا بعد تعيين أن كميته الاتصالية القارة منقسمة في جهة حتى يكون خطأ أو في جهتين حتى يكون سطحا أو في ثلاث جهات حتى يكون جسماً تعليمياً.

فالمقدار بما هو مقدار مطلق لا وجود له و لا قوام إلا بأن يكون خطأ أو سطحا أو جسماً و أما الجسم بما هو جسم فليس اقتران أي معنى و صورة إليه كاقتران فصل الخط أو فصل السطح بالمقدار بل الجسمية متصورة أنها وجدت بالأسباب التي لها أن يوجد بتلك الأسباب و هي جسمية فقط بلا زيادة إلا بحسب استكمالات أخرى في كمالاتها الثانوية كالجمادية و النباتية و الحيوانية فكما أن الطبيعة الجمادية إذا حصلت للجسم فهي تمام له من غير حاجة إلى صورة أخرى في كون ذلك الجسم نوعاً مخصوصاً - لكن لو حصلت له صورة أخرى صار أكمل مما كان أولاً فكذلك الصورة الامتدادية - فقد علم أن لحقوق الصور المكملة للأجسام بها ليس من جهة أن مجرد الجسمية ماهية مبهمه جنسية كيف و الجنس بما هو جنس ليس تمام التحصل و الحصول لا في الذهن و لا في العين كالمقدار المطلق فإنه إذا جرد عن الفصول و أخذ في العقل محذوفاً عنها ما عداه لم يكن لها وجود في الخارج أصلاً و يكون بهذا الاعتبار مادة عقلية محضة و إذا أخذ مطلقاً عن الحذف و الحقوق كان ماهية ناقصة غير محصلة و الجسمية ليست كذلك لأن الأجسام

المختلفة الصور والهيئات وجدنا أنها إذا حذف عنها العقل تلك الصورة والأعراض كانت قد عقلت فيها ماهية تامة جوهرية موصوفة بقبول الأبعاد و جواز العقل لها أن يكون بصرافتها موجودة في الخارج. فعلم أنها ماهية نوعية إذ لو لم يكن كذلك لكانت بعد التجريد عن الصور المختلفة والهيئات المتفاوتة إما حقائق مختلفة متخالفة بذواتها البسيطة أو متفاوتة بفصول ذاتية غير تلك الصور والهيئات أو حقيقة واحدة غير الحقيقة الواحدة المسماة بالجواهر القابل للأبعاد أو هي مع طبيعة أخرى يكون بمنزلة الفصل لها و الكل فاسد عند العقل

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الصحيح فبقي كون الجميع مشتركة في طبيعة واحدة نوعية هي الجسمانية أي الجوهر المصحح لفرض الأبعاد. فإذا ثبت هذه الدعوى فببني عليها كثير من المقاصد منها إثبات افتقار الأجسام من حيث جسميتها إلى الهيولى وله طريقان ذكرهما الشيخ الرئيس في الإشارات - لتعميم وجود الهيولى في الأجسام الممتنعة عن قبول الفصل والوصل بسبب خارج من طبيعة الامتداد مقارن له سواء كان لازما لها كما في الأفلاك أو زائلا كما في الأجسام الصغار الصلبة بعد إثباتها في الأجسام القابلة لتوارد الوصل والفصل عليها.

أما الأول فلأن الطبيعة الامتدادية إما أن تكون بذاتها غنية عن الهيولى أو لم تكن فإن كانت غنية فاستحال حلولها في المحل لأن الحلول في محل عين الافتقار إليه - والغنى عنه إذا كان ذاتيا استحالة زواله و لو بالغير لأن ما بالذات لا يزول ولا يزال فاستحال حلولها لكن الحلول ثابت في بعض الأجسام و هو ينافي كون الغناء ذاتيا للجسم من حيث الجسمانية وإن لم تكن غنية لذاتها فتكون مفتقرة لذاتها فيلزم حلولها في المحل أينما تحققت سواء كانت في الأجسام القابلة للانفصال الخارجي أو في غيرها

وهم وإزاحة -

قد توهم بعض الناس ورود النقص على هذا الدليل بجريانه في المحل الواحد - ليلزم اجتماع المتماثلات في محل واحد و كون صورة واحدة حالة في جميع المحال - و كون هيولى واحدة محلا لجميع الصور و كون كل جسم مركبا من جميع الصور والهيوليات إلى غير ذلك من المحالات و هو منفسخ.

لأننا نختار عند التردد أن الطبيعة المطلقة لا يفتقر لذاتها إلا إلى المحل المطلق لا المحل المخصوص بل المفتقر إليه هي الطبيعة المخصوصة فيجوز عروض الافتقار الخاص لها إلى المحل المعين لأجل خصوصية عارضة لها لا لذاتها بل لأسباب خارجة عنها - والاستغناء الذاتي عن المحل المخصوص لا ينافي الافتقار العارض لخصوص فرد من

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الأفراد و هذا مثل لوازم الماهيات فإن ماهية المثلث إذا اقتضت تساوي الزوايا لقائمتين - لا يقتضي في كل فرد إلا تساويا مخصوصا بهذا الفرد دون غيره فالتساوي المطلق مقتضى ذاته و ليس شيء من خصوصيات التساوي مقتضاها لذاتها. فلا يرد حينئذ أن هذا التساوي المخصوص إن كان لازما للطبيعة بالذات فكان يوجد في كل مثلث هذا التساوي لقائمتين و يوجد في هذا المثلث جميع أفراد التساوي للقائمتين لأن الكلام يجري في كل مثلث و لازمه المعين.

فالحل فيه أن طبيعة المثلث مطلقا لا تقتضي إلا مطلق التساوي و الطبيعة الخاصة تقتضي التساوي الخاص فالمطلق

للمطلق و المقيد للمقيد فكذلك قياس معنى الافتقار إلى المحل للجسمية فإن الافتقار إلى المحل المطلق لازم للجسمية المطلقة و الافتقار إلى المحل المعين يستلزمه الجسمية المعينة و كما أن نفس الأفراد من عوارض الطبيعة كما تقرر عندهم فلوازمها على الوجه الأولي.

فليس لأحد أن يقول كما جاز أن لا يكون افتقار الطبيعة إلى المحل الواحد لذاتها ثم يحصل [يعرض] الافتقار لأجل خصوصية و سبب فليجز مثل ذلك بالقياس إلى المحل مطلقا.

لأننا نقول إذا جردنا الطبيعة الجسمية عن الخصوصيات فإن لم تكن مفتقرة إلى المحل كانت في ذاتها مستغنية القوام عن المواد كلها و ما كان بحسب ذاته متحصل القوام بلا تعلق بغيره كان ذلك نحو وجوده الذاتي و نحو الوجود الذاتي لماهية واحدة- لا يكون متفاوتا فلا يجوز أن يكون نحو وجود الماهية المختص بها من حيث هي هي مختلفا- بحسب اختلاف الأسباب الخارجة عنها و عن مقوماتها.

نعم هذا إنما يجوز في الوجودات العرضية و النسب و الإضافات مثلا الافتقار إلى الأكل إنما يعرض للإنسان لا بسبب أصل البقاء على الإنسانية بل بسبب الحرارة المحللة للمواد و قد يزول بزوالها و كذا الاستغناء عن اللباس الذي بالذات لا ينافي عروض الافتقار إليه بسبب برد مفرط لأن كونه آكلا و لابسا ليس نحو وجود الإنسان المختص به. و هذا هو الذي يوهم لبعض الناس إمكان الوساطة بين الافتقار و الغنى الذاتيين

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أو جواز عروض الافتقار لعله و أما عروض الافتقار إلى المحل بعد أن لم يكن بسبب أمر آخر فهو ممتنع لما مر من أن الحلول عبارة عن نحو وجود ماهية الحال و كذا عروض الاستغناء عنه بعد افتقاره إليه لذلك و لأن الصورة لو انفكت عن المحل تقدرت بمقدار معين فتشكلت بشكل خاص فانفعلت و تأثرت عن فاعل خارج يقتضي المقدار و الشكل المعينين إذ لو كانا لازمين لماهية الجسمية لم يتغيرا مع بقائها و كل ما يحدث بسبب فاعل مؤثر فلا بد فيه من قابل متأثر.

و قد علمت من أن جهة الانفعال يتصحح من الهولي الأولى فيلزم أن يكون مقارنة لها و قد فرضت منفكة عن المحل هذا خلف.

و أما الطريق الثاني و هو ما يبتني على إثبات إمكان القسمة الانفكاكية في جميع الامتدادات من حيث الطبيعة الامتدادية النوعية و هو الذي قد مر بيانه في إبطال مذهب ديمقراطيس و نحن قد أتممنا الحجة المشهورة على إبطال مذهبه بوجه لا خدشة فيها.

فظهر هناك أن كل جسم بما هو جسم مما يقبل لذاته الانقسام الفكي كما يقبل لذاته الانقسام الوهمي و جواز الانفكاك بحسب الطبيعة الامتدادية يكتفي في الافتقار إلى الهولي و إن عاق عن ذلك عائق طبيعي كما في الأفلاك أو غير طبيعي كما في الأجسام الديمقراطيةية.

و ذلك لأن الجسم إذا لم يكن مقارنا للمادة لكان قبولها للقسمة الفكية مستحيلا و قد فرض جائزا فإمكان قبول الجسم للقسمة المذكورة كاشف عن وجود

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الهيولى فيه.

قال الشيخ قدس سره و لعل هذا العائق إذا كان لازما طبيعيا كان لا اثينية بالفعل - و لا فصل بين أشخاص نوع تلك الطبيعة بل نوعه في شخصه مراده على ما سنع لنا في كلامه أن الجوهر الممتد من حيث هو هو لو لزمه ما يمنعه عن الانفكاك و الانفصال بحسب الطبيعة فلا يمكن تعدد أشخاصه في الوجود بل ينحصر نوعه في شخصه إذ لو تعدد شخصه - لكان كل واحد منهما قابلا للانفكاك بالبيان السابق في رد مذهب ديمقراطيس - مع وجود المانع هذا خلف.

ثم يثبت بطريق عكس النقيض أن المانع للقسمة ليس لازما للجوهر الجسماني - من حيث هو هو و إن كان لازما لبعض أفراده كالفلك فالصورة الفلكية العائقة للقسمة و إن كانت لازمة للفلك لكنها ليست لازمة لطبيعة الجسم مطلقا و اللازم لبعض الأفراد فقط عارض للطبيعة المشتركة فيجوز زواله نظرا إلى الطبيعة فجسمية الفلك تقبل القسمة لذاتها و إن لم يقبلها من جهة الفلكية لجواز زوال العائق للقسمة عنها و القابل للقسمة الانفكاكية غير مفارق عن الهيولى.

فثبت بذلك عموم الافتقار إلى الهيولى في الأجسام و هو المرام

تحقيق و بحث

لما كانت طبائع الأفلاك أي صورها النوعية كما سيجيء مانعة عن قبول الفلك و الفصل فعلى ذلك و جب أن يكون كل نوع من الفلك محصورا في شخص واحد كما هو مذهبهم إذ لو تحقق فلكان أو كوكبان من نوع واحد لصح بينهما من الوصل ما حصل بين الجزئين الموهومين لواحد منهما و بين الجزئين الموهومين ما حصل من الانفكاك بين الفلكين أو الكوكبين فيكون في قوتها من جهة الطبيعة النوعية قبول الفصل و الوصل مع أن المانع ذاتي لهما.

و لذا حكموا بامتناع الاثينية في الأفلاك من حيث الطبيعة الفلكية و كذا في كل جرم من الفلكيات من حيث طبيعته المخصوصة و إن جازت القسمة فيها من حيث جسيميتها

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فإذا كان هذا هكذا فنقول يرد عليهم النقض لموضع من الفلك فيه كوكب أو تدوير أو خارج فيوجد له في الخارج جزءان منفصلان من فلك واحد كجنتي الكواكب أو التدوير أو الخارج و الاثينية الخارجية في طرفي الخارج المركز أظهر كالمتممين و ذلك لأن البيان الموجب لعدم الاثينية جاز فيهما بأنه يمكن على الجزئين المنفصلين على الجنبتين من فلك واحد ما صح على الجزئين المتصلين و يصح على المتصلين ما أمكن على المنفصلين فيلزم الخرق و الالتيام على الفلك من حيث طبيعته الخاصة و هما ممتنعان عليه عندهم فإن اعتذروا عن هذا بأصل الفطرة هاهنا يعارض بمثله في شخصي نوع واحد من الامتداد هناك.

مخلص عرشي

هذا النقض عليهم قد أورده الشيخ المحقق و المكاشف المدقق صاحب الإشراق - في كتاب المطارحات بحثا على الحكماء و ما أجاب عنه أصلا و لكنني أفاض الله على قلبي وجه التفصي عنه و هو أن الفلكية ليست من الصفات السارية في جسيميتها كالإنسانية و ذلك لأن صورتها التي تحصلها نوعا خاصا و يقوم جسيميتها موجودة ليست صورة تقوم بموادها لأن لكل جرم منها نفسا مجردة هي مبدء صفاتها و أوضاعها و أفعيلها - و حركاتها المختصة بأجزاء جسمية

فلك واحد سواء كانت وهمية محضة أو خارجية ليست أجزاءً مقدارية لذاته النوعية بل لمادته و جسميته و توارد الفصل و الوصل على جسمية الفلك - من حيث ذاتها الامتدادية غير مستحيل.

إنما المحال تعدد فلك واحد من حيث هو فلك إلى فلكين أو جزءين له من حيث هما جزءان للفلك لا من حيث هما جزءان لجسمية الفلك فالمتممان ليسا فلكين عندنا و إن كانا من الأجسام المنسوبة إلى الفلك و لهذا أصحاب الهيئة لم يذكرهما من جملة أعداد الأفلاك

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فصل (٢) في ذكر أحكام كلية متعلقة بهذا المقام

منها أنه قد ظهر مما ذكر أن مادة الشيء ليست داخلية في قوام ماهية ذلك الشيء

و إلا لكانت بينة الثبوت و لم يفتقر في إثباتها إلى برهان لكن الجسم بما هو جسم قد حصل لنا معناه و هو الجوهر الذي يمكن أن يفرض فيه أبعاد ثلاثة على الوجه المذكور و شككنا في أنه هل له مادة تحمل معناه أم لا إلى أن جاء البرهان الحاكم بوجود جوهر آخر مادي.

فظهر لنا أن الجسم المحسوس مركب من جوهرين حال و محل فيتبين من هذا أن المادة غير داخلية في قوام ماهية الجسم ثم إننا بعد ما أثبتنا المادة لبعض الأجسام - توقفنا في بعض آخر مع علمنا باشتراك معنى الجسم النوعي بين الذي انكشف لنا مقارنته لها و بين ما يتوقف في الحكم بوجودها له.

فبهذا أيضا يتأكد ما قلنا من عدم حاجة الشيء إلى المادة في حقيقة ذاته و إن احتاج إليها في قوام وجوده و كما علمت هذا في الجسمية بالقياس إلى ما قامت بها أي المادة فاعلم أيضا بالقياس إلى ما يقوم بها كالتبائع النوعية كما مر.

و قد تأكد الشيخ في الهيئات الشفا هذا الحكم بقوله - و أما الجسمية التي نتكلم فيها فهي في نفسها طبيعة محصلة ليس تحصل نوعيتها بشيء ينضم إليها حتى لو توهمنا أنه لم ينضم إلى الجسمية معنى بل كانت جسمية لم يمكن أن يكون متحصلا في أنفسنا إلا مادة و اتصال فقط.

و لذلك إذا أثبتنا مع الاتصال شيئا آخر فليس لأن الاتصال نفسه لا يتحصل إلا بالإضافة إليه و قرنه به بل بحجج أخرى تبين أن الاتصال لا يوجد بالفعل وحده - فليس أن لا يوجد الشيء بالفعل موجودا هو أن لا يتحصل طبيعته فإن البياض و السواد كل شيء منهما متحصل الطبيعة معنى مخصصا أتم تخصيصه الذي في ذاته ثم لا يجوز أن يوجد بالفعل إلا في مادة و أما المقدار مطلقا فيستحيل أن يحصل له طبيعة مشار إليها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٣٧

إلا أن يجعل بالضرورة خطأ أو سطحا حتى يصير جائزا أن يوجد لا أن المقدار يجوز أن يوجد مقدارا ثم يتبعه أن يكون خطأ أو سطحا.

و قال أيضا و أما صورة الجسمية من حيث هي جسمية فهي طبيعة واحدة بسيطة محصلة لا اختلاف فيها و لا يخالف مجرد صورة جسمية لمجرد صورة جسمية بفصل داخل في الجسمية - و ما يلحقها إنما يلحقها على أنها شيء خارج عن طبيعتها فلا يجوز إذن أن يكون جسمية محتاجة إلى مادة و جسمية غير محتاجة إلى مادة و اللواحق لا يغنيها عن

المادة بوجه من الوجوه لأن الحاجة إلى المادة إنما تكون للجسمية و لكل ذي مادة لأجل ذاته و للجسمية من حيث هي جسمية لا من حيث هي جسمية مع لاحق فقد بان أن الأجسام مؤلفة من مادة و صورة.

و منها أن قول الحكماء كلما استغنى فرد من أفراد طبيعة نوعية عن المحل لذاته

فيلزم استغناء سائر أفراد تلك الطبيعة عنه يجب أن يخصص الطبيعة بالطبيعة الموجودة و الأفراد بأفراد الخارجية لئلا ينتقض هذه القاعدة بالجواهر المجردة- و بالجواهر الصورية المستغنية عن الموضوع فإن كلا منها قد يوجد في الذهن مفتقرا إليه و قد يزول عنه و هو المحل المستغني عن الحال فلو لزم من افتقار الفرد الذهني للجواهر إلى الموضوع افتقار سائر الأفراد له إليه فيلزم أن لا يتحقق جوهر في العالم لا تسام الجواهر في المبادي العالية هذا خلف.

ثم إنك لما علمت من طريقتنا المختارة عند القدماء تجويز كون ماهية واحدة نوعية مختلفة المراتب في الحاجة إلى المحل و عدمها فلا استدلال على افتقار الجوهر- الممتد إلى الهيولى في الفلكيات بتحقيق الافتقار إليها في الأجسام القابلة للفصل و الفك غير صحيح على هذا الرأي فلا بد من المصير إلى أحد المسلكين الآخرين في

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٣٨

بيان هذا المطلب

فصل (٣) في استحالة تعري الهيولى الجسمية عن مطلق الصورة

هذا المقصد مما يمكن فهمه من أحد مسالك الهيولى

و هو مسلك القوة و الفعل فإن الهيولى إذا تجردت عن كافة الصورة لكانت أمرا بالفعل و لها قوة قبول الأشياء و لا أقل لها استعداد شيء ما و إلا لم يكن هيولى فيتربك ذاته من جهة بها يكون بالفعل و من جهة بها يكون بالقوة و قد فرضت بسيطة هذا خلف.

و هذا برهان تمام لا يرد عليه شيء عند التحقيق لكن القوم لم يكتفوا به- بل ذكروا مقدمة أخرى هي أنها عند التجرد يلزم أن يكون جسما و كل جسم مركب من الهيولى و الصورة و المفروض خلافه.

بيان ذلك أنها إذا تجردت فإن كانت ذات وضع و حيز فكانت إما منقسمة فيكون أحد المقادير الثلاثة و قد فرضته مجردة عنها و عن ما يستدعيها أو غير منقسمة فيكون جوهر فردا لا يتجزى و قد مر بطلانه.

إذ النقطة عرض لا يجوز أن تكون موجودة منحازة و إن لم يكن ذات وضع و إشارة فلا يخلو إما أن يستحيل اتصافها بالتجسم و التقدر أو يمكن فإن كان الشق الأول- فكانت من الجواهر العقلية بالفعل فتكون خارجة عن جنس الجواهر القابل و المفروض خلاف ذلك.

و إن كان الشق الثاني فلا يخلو إما أن يحل فيها البعد المحصل لها دفعة أو

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٣٩

تدريجا على نهج الحركة في حيز مخصوص أم لا فعلى الأول إذا صادفها المقدار و قد كانت في حيز مخصوص لكانت قبل التجسم متجسمة و متحيزة و إن لم تكن محسوسة و هو محال و إن لم يكن صادفها في حيز مخصوص فلم يكن فيها و لا في نفس المقدار ما به يقع التخصيص فلم يكن حيز أولى به من حيز و لا محالة لا بد أن يكون عند المصادفة

في حيز فهو إما في جميع الأحياز أو في بعضها دون بعض.

فالأول محال لأن الجسم الواحد لا يكون له في كل وقت إا حيز واحد.

و الثاني يستلزم الترجيح من غير مرجح فعلم من هذا أن هيولى جسم خاص - كالمدرّة إذا تجردت لا يكون لها في ذاتها ما به لبست الصورة المدرية و إذا لبست تلك - فليس يصح أن يختص بحيز معين من أحياز كلية عنصرها و هو الأرض إلا بجهة مخصصة - توجب لها نسبة إلى ذلك الحيز و ليست تلك الجهة إلا علاقة وضعية إذ غيرها من الأسباب و المعاني و الصفات لا يخصص القابل بحيز دون حيز لتساوي نسبة نفس كونها هيولى - و نفس الفاعل المفارق و نسبة سائر الأوصاف الفاعلية و الدواعي الغائية عند المفارقة إلى صورة معينة شخصية دون غيرها فلا تأثير لها إلا بمناسبة وضعية.

و أما على الشق الثاني أي كون قبول الهيولى لمقدار معين بكماله لا دفعة بل على سبيل تدرج و انبساط فيلزم أن تكون أيضا ذات وضع بل جسما و ذلك لأن كل منبسط في المقدار يلزمه لا محالة الجهات و الأطراف الست الفوق و التحت و القدم و الخلف و اليمين و الشمال و كل جوهر يلزمه الأبعاد و النهايات يكون جسما و قد فرض لا كذلك

طريق آخر

المادة عند التجرد أيضا يكون جوهرًا قابلاً كما علمت فيكون لازمة القبول للأشياء لأن لوازم الماهيات لا ينفك عنها و هذا هو التحقيق.

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إلا أنا نقول مع قطع النظر عن هذا هل هي وجودها عند التجرد وجود قابل بالفعل فيلزم أن يكون عند التجرد متصورة بالجسمية بالفعل و هو ممتنع و إن لم يكن وجودها وجود قابل بالفعل فيكون متقوما بذاته من غير تقدر و تكمم فلا يكون ذا جزء بالذات و لا بالعرض و لا بالقوة و لا بالفعل.

ثم إذا عرض له المقدار صار ذا أجزاء بالقوة عند الوحدة الاتصالية و ذا أجزاء بالفعل عند الكثرة فيكون عروض أمر لأمر مما يغير حقيقته عما كانت عليه و يبطل ذاتها و نحو وجودها المختص بها فكيف يكون للشيء تقوم بأنه لا جزء له أصلاً لا بالقوة و لا بالفعل ثم عرض له أن يصير ذا أجزاء بالقوة في وقت و بالفعل وقتاً آخر و التبديل في حد الشيء و قوامه ممتنع و لا كذلك الحد بالنسبة إلى المحدود فليس لأحد أن يتوهم أن الحد لما كان عين المحدود و مع ذلك وجد المحدود في الخارج أو في الذهن مجرداً عن الأجزاء كالجنس و الفصل - ثم يوجد في الذهن عند ملاحظة العقل معناه الحدي فيكون قوامه بالأجزاء بعد ما كان قبل هذه الملاحظة بسيطاً.

لأننا نقول التفاوت بين الحاليين إنما هو بحسب الأوصاف و الاعتبارات لا بحسب وجود معاني الأجزاء و عدمها فإن ذوات تلك الأجزاء لا تتبدل في الحد و المحدود - بل يتعدد عند التفصيل ما كان واحداً عند الإجمال و بالعكس إذ الإجمال و التفصيل نحوان إدراكيان من غير تفاوت و في ماهية المدرك ففي المحدود يكون وجودات الأجزاء بما هي وجودات بالقوة و في الحد يكون بالفعل و كذا حكم المقدار عند الاتصال و عند الانفصال.

و أما الجوهر المفارق فلا يمكن أن يكون فيه أجزاء مقدارية لا بالفعل و لا بالقوة فلو فرض أن الجوهر المفارق صار ذا بعد و مقدار يلزم المحال المذكور و هو التبديل في نفس قوام الشيء و حقيقته و زيادة التفصيل و التوضيح في هذا

المطلب يطلب من كتاب الشفاء.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٤١

طريق آخر

ذكرها بهمينار في التحصيل وهو أنه لو قبلت الهيولى صورة لا تقبل الانقسام - لكنت ضدا للصورة الجسمية وليس للجسمية ضد وإن لم يقبل صورة أصلا لم يكن جوهرًا قابلاً بل يكون جوهرًا بالفعل فإن كانت في نفسه قابلة للإشارة فكانت جسماً وقد فرضت مجردة عن الجسمية وإن لم يكن في نفسها مما إليه الإشارة لزم من المحالات ما ذكرناه.

طريق آخر

لما تقرر عندهم أن مصحح القسمة الخارجية في المقدار هو المادة باستعدادها فلو فرض تجرد الهيولى عن الصورة لما صحت القسمة الخارجية في المقادير و بطلان التالي كيان الملازمة بين فالمقدم كذلك.

تفريع

قد صح واستتم من كلام الشيخ وتلميذه أن الصورة الجسمية ليست بالنسبة إلى الهيولى كالأعراض اللازمة التي تلحق الشيء بعد أن يتم له نحو من انحاء الوجود أي وجود كان سواء كان ذلك اللازم بحيث يتحصل به للملزوم تقوم ثانوي وله وجود طبيعي آخر كجسمية الفلك و صورتها الفلكية أم لم يتحصل كالمثلث و مساواة زواياه لقائمتين فإن للمثلث وجوداً تاماً سواء اعتبرت معه المساواة للقائمتين أم لا فاعتبار هذا اللازم و عدمه لا يؤثر في الملزوم وجوداً و كمالات بخلاف الصور الطبيعية فإنها يستكمل بها المحل و ينفع عنها بكمال بعد كمال أول.

و أما الجسمية بالقياس إلى ما يتقوم بها فليست من أحد هذين القسمين إذ لا وجود لمحلها مستقلاً بوجه من الوجوه أصلاً بل الهيولى ما شأنها قوة الوجود بما هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٤٢

قوة الوجود في الخارج فبقيد قوة الوجود يخرج الملزوم بالقياس إلى لازم الماهية - و بقيد الحيثية يخرج المادة الثانية كالجسم مثلاً بالقياس إلى ما يكملها من الطبائع الصورية و بقيد الخارج يخرج الإمكان و الماهية.

طريق آخر

لو جاز للهيولى بقاء بلا صورة جرمية أي توجد وجوداً عقلياً بلا وضع و إشارة حسية يلزم أن يخالف هيولى لهيولى أخرى و ليس لهما مقدار بحسب المقدار و اللازم باطل بالضرورة فالملزوم كذلك.

وجه اللزوم أنا إذا قسمنا جسماً بنصفين فيفرد هيولى كل جزء بصورة فتوهمنا تجريد الصورة عن هيولائها قبل وقوع القسمة و توهمنا تجرد كل من النصفين عن هيولاه بعد القسمة فيكون صورة كل واحدة من المادتين غير منقسمة لا بالفعل و لا بالقوة.

فلا محالة حينئذ يكون هيولى ذلك الجسم يخالف لهيولى كل واحد من النصفين و هذه المخالفة إما بالماهية و لوازمها و هي واحد في الجميع و إما بالوضع و المكان و هما لا يكونان عند عدم الجسمية و إما بالمقدار و هو مسلوب عنهما فيكون حكم وجود الشيء و عدمه واحداً و إما باتحاد الهيوليين بعد التجريد هيولى واحدة كما كانت قبل القسمة -

فيكون حكم الشيء لو لم ينفصل منه شيء ما هو غيره هو بعينه حكمه و قد انفصل عنه غيره و حكمه مع غيره و حكمه وحده من كل جهة حكما واحدا.

و إما بفساد أحدهما و بقاء الأخرى فإن كان المعدم لها زوال الجسمية عنها فهو مشترك بينهما فلا يختص أحدهما به دون الأخرى و إن كان بامتزاجهما شيئا واحدا و هو أيضا ممتنع في عديم المقدار.

فلم يبق من الشقوق إلا كون أحدهما جزءا للأخرى و ليس جزءا محمولا عليها- فيكون لا محالة جزءا مقداريا لها مع أنهما مجردتان عن المقدار هذا خلف.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٤٣

تفريع آخر

يتحقق من هاهنا أن الهيولى ليست في ذاتها إلا شيئا جسمانيا و ليس لها نحو من الوجود لم يكن به غير جسمانية و إلا لكانت بحسب ماهيتها محتملة القوام من غير تجسم- فكل ما يحصل منها في الذهن فهو وجه مباين لماهيتها غير صادق عليها إلا بحسب التقدير و الفرض.

فقولنا الهيولى أمر بالقوة معناه أن كل ما لو وجد كان هيولى فهو بحيث لو وجد كان بالقوة لأن كل ما يلتفت إليه العقل استقلالا و يحكم عليه بحكم بتي فهو أمر معقول القوام بالفعل و ليس أمرا بالقوة و هكذا الحال في نظائرها من الأمور الناقصة التحصل و الوجود كالعدد و الزمان و الحركة و الحرف و اللاتناهي و التناقض و أمثالها.

تفريع آخر-

لما ثبت أن كل ما يقبل المقادير و الأبعاد فلا يمكن أن يكون بحسب قوام ذاته- و فعلية تجوهره مما يتأبى عن قبول القسمة و التعدد و إلا لكان ما كان وجوده وجودا وحدانيا- غير انقسامي مما يقبل وجودا منقسما في ذاته قسمة بالقوة كالمقدار أو بالفعل كالعدد و هو مستحيل عند العقلاء و لهذا يحكم كل من له فطرة مستقيمة باستحالة طريان الجسمية على الجوهر المفارق أو الجوهر الفرد من ذوات الأوضاع لو فرض وجوده فلا بد أن يكون مادة الجسمية و المقدار أمرا داخلا تحت جنس التقدر و التجسم فلو تشكك متشكك أنا ننقل الكلام إلى نفس مادة الجسم هل هي في ذاتها مع قطع النظر عن قبول الصورة- تكون متصلة فيكون نفسها صورة الجسم لا مادته إذ لا نعني بحقيقة الجسم إلا جوهرًا متصلا بنفسه.

فبهذا يتم تلك الحقيقة بلا قصور فلا حاجة لها إلى جسمية أخرى غير ذاتها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٤٤

يلحقها أو يكون جوهرًا عقليا أو جوهرًا ذا وضع غير منقسم فيلزم منه من المحذور ما قد برهن على استحالة.

فهذا هو الباعث الكلي لمن أنكر وجود الهيولى الأولى على ذلك.

قلنا قد مر سابقا ما يفي بدفع هذا الشك فإن بناءه على الذهول عن معنى المادة- و مرتبة وجودها من الصورة إذ ليست نسبة الصورة الجسمية إليها نسبة لازم خارج أو صورة مكاملة لحق كل منهما إلى الشيء بعد تمام حقيقته و وجوده و ليس للهيولى وجود مستقل بالفعل إلا بالصورة بمعنى أن الصورة نحو وجودها الخارجي و جهة تحصلها و تمامها

فوجودها عبارة عن نقصان وجود الصورة بحسب التشخص دون نقصان الماهية الخارجية لها و قصور كل شيء من توابع حقيقته المطلقة.

وقد مر أن الصورة في غير المادة الأولى من المواد الثانية من ذوات الطبائع الثانوية إنما يفيد لموضوعاتها وجودا كماليا بها يصير الموضوع موجودا مستكملا له تنوع آخر من حيث الصورة بعد وجوده في ذاته و تحصله و تنوعه في نفسه. ولهذا يكون موضوعا و مادة أيضا من جهتين فمن حيث له في نفسه و صورته مع قطع النظر عن لحوق صورة أخرى نوعية خارجية يكون مستغنيا عن الحال - يكون نسبته إليه نسبة الموضوع إلى العرض و باعتبار أن نسبة ذاته إلى هذا التحصل الثانوي و التنوع الأخرى نسبة النقص إلى التمام و القوة إلى الفعل يكون مادة. و أما الهیولی الأولى فهي عارية في ذاتها عن جميع مراتب التحصل و التنوع إلا بما ضم إليها و لذلك لا حقيقة لها إلا بما انضم إليها من صورة الجسمية أولا ثم من صورة كمالية أخرى كما سيجيء إثباتها

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فصل (٤) في كيفية التلازم بين الهیولی و الصورة ليظهر نحو وجود كل صورة بالقياس إلى ما هو حامل لها و تقدمها في الوجود على هیولاهما

اعلم أنك لما علمت أن الصورة الجسمية لذاتها غير مستغنية عن الهیولی و أن الهیولی أيضا مفتقرة لذاتها إلى الصورة فعلمت أن بينهما علاقة ذاتية ليست بمجرد اتفاق و كل شيئين يكون العلاقة بينهما ذاتية فلا يخلو إما أن تكون تلك العلاقة علاقة التضاييف - أو علاقة العلية و المعلولية أما الأولى فغير ثابتة بينهما لأن ذات كل واحدة منهما غير معقولة بالقياس إلى الأخرى نظرا إلى ذاتيهما و إن كانت الهیولية بحسب المفهوم - داخلية تحت المضاف إذ لا يعقل إلا بالقياس إلى ما هي قوة أو ذات قوة له أو استعداد أو ذات استعداد له و كذا مفهوم كون الشيء صورة لا يعقل إلا بالقياس إلى ما يتم و يكمل بها لكن الكلام في نفس حقيقة كل منهما مع قطع النظر عن مفهوم اسم كل منهما و إلا لم يحتج في استلزام كل منهما للآخر إلى برهان لأن المتضاييفين يعقلان معا.

و أما الثانية فهي و إن كانت في بادي الأمر يحتمل قسمين أحدهما أن يكونا متكافئين و الآخر أن لا يكونا كذلك. لكن الشق الأول و هو كون الشيئين بحيث يكون كل منهما علة للآخر - ينفسخ بأدنى توجه من العقل الصحيح من غير حاجة إلى كلفة الاستدلال و فرق بين كون الشيئين بحيث يستلزم وجود كل واحد منهما وجود الآخر أو عدمه عدمه - و بين كون كل منهما سببا للآخر وجودا أو عدما.

فالثاني فاسد و الأول صحيح بشرط أن يكون معنى الاستلزام في الثاني هو أن يكون وقوعه كاشفا عن وقوع ما هو سبب له أولا.

ثم الشق الثاني أيضا يتصور قسمين أحدهما أن يكون كلاهما معلولي علة واحدة.

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و الآخر أن يكون أحدهما بخصوصه علة و الآخر بخصوصه معلولا لكن يستحيل أن يكون كلاهما معا صادرين عن ثالث من غير علاقة أخرى بينهما و إلا لم يلزم التلازم بينهما بالذات و هو خرق الفرض.

إذ قد ثبت امتناع ثبوت كل من الهيولى و الصورة نظرا إلى ذاتها بدون صاحبها فحينئذ لو لم يكن إحداهما أقرب إلى الثالث يلزم أن يكون وجود كل واحدة منهما عن الثالث بواسطة الأخرى فيعود المحال المذكور الذي قد لزم من كون شيئين كل واحد منهما سببا للآخر فيجب أن يكون إحداهما في درجة المعلولية أقرب إلى العلة لا على وجه الاستقلال ليعود إلى جواز تحقق إحداهما في مقام لم يكن الثانية بعد في ذلك المقام و يكون خرق الفرض بل على وجه آخر سيظهر.

ثم الأقرب المتوسط لا يجوز أن يكون هي المادة لأن لها القبول و الاستعداد لا الفعل و الاقتضاء و المستعد بما هو مستعد لا يكون سببا لوجود ما هو مستعد له فإنه لو جاز ذلك لوجب أن يوجد عنه ذلك المسمى مستعدا له دائما من غير استعداد و أيضا لو كانت المادة سببا للصورة لوجب أن يكون لها ذات بالفعل مع قطع النظر عن الصور. و هذا هو معنى التقدم العلي و المعدوم لا يكون علة للموجود و قد علمت أن الهيولى في ذاتها قوة محضة.

فروع

من هاهنا ينكشف لدى العاقل البصير أن الجسم لا يكون سببا لوجود أصلا - لا بتمامه و لا بأحد جزئيه و ذلك لأن المادة أمر عديم و كذا ما يشتمل عليها من حيث

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يشتمل عليها و أما الصورة فلأن تأثيرها في شيء بتوسط المادة لأنها لو استغنت عن المادة في فعلها فالأولى أن يستغني عنها في وجودها في نفسها إذ الإيجاد يتقوم بالوجود و التالي محال كما علمت فكذا المقدم فإذا كان تأثيرها بواسطة المادة فيكون المادة علة قريبة لوجود الشيء و هو محال.

فقد علم من هاهنا أن الأجسام كلها في أنفسها مكافئة في درجة الوجود من غير علاقة و تلازم بينها و إنما قيدنا الكلام بقولنا في نفسها لأنها قد توجد التلازم و التعلق بينها من جهة الأمور اللاحقة و الأوصاف الثابتة فإن الأجسام المستقيمة الحركات - كالعنصرية يتوقف وجودها على وجود المحدد للجهات لكن من حيث كونها ذوات جهات و حركات و من حيث كون المحدد محددا لا من حيث كونه جرما فلكيا و بذلك يثبت وجود أمر قدسي مفارق عن الأجسام و أعراضها بالكلية لتناهي الأجسام قدرا و عددا و استحالة التسلسل مطلقا فينتهي إلى موجود واجب بالذات غير جسم و لا جسماني - و هذا أحد الطرائق لإثبات وجود الواجب و أيضا لما كان كل جسم مؤلفا من هيولى و صورة فلو كان جسم سببا لجسم آخر لكان يجب أن يكون أولا سببا لوجود جزئيه اللذين هما أقدم منه و هذا محال لأن المادة لا اختلاف لها في ذاتها و قد مر سابقا أن الصورة الجسمية حقيقة متماثلة الأفراد في الوجود و العلة يجب أن تكون مخالفة للمعلول في درجة الوجود و نحوه و ليس كذلك هذا خلف.

شك و إزالة -

ليس لقائل أن يقول اختلاف الصور يكون لاختلاف أحوال المواد لأن هذا فاسد من وجهين. أما أولا فلأنه حينئذ يكون تلك الأحوال هي الصور الأولى في المادة و الكلام فيها عائد بعينه فيرجع إلى أن الصورة الأولى يكون علة في وجود الصورة الثانية و يكون للمادة القبول فقط.

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و أما ثانيا فلأن بعد تسليم أن الصور تكون متخالفة بسبب الأحوال المكتسبة عن المواد فيكون العلية و المعلولية بين الحالين لا بين الصورتين الجسميتين.

فذلك إن صح كان حديثا آخر خارجا عن مقصودنا على أننا نقول كلاما مطلقا- إن ذلك غير متصور عند التحقيق لما أشرنا إليه أن الصورة قوة جسمانية فكما أن وجودها في نفسها لا يتحصل و لا يتشخص إلا بسبب المادة فكذا إيجادها لشيء آخر- لما علمت أن الوجود مقوم للإيجاد لأنه شرط له فلنرجع إلى ما كنا بصدد.

فنقول إذا لم يكن المادة هي الواسطة في صدور صاحبها من العلة فكانت الصورة هي الواسطة لصدور المادة و لا يمكن أيضا أن يكون واسطة مستقلة أو آلة مستقلة إذ فسادهما بعينه كفساد ما إذا كانت علة مطلقة كما عرفت و الفرق بين الآلة و الواسطة أن الآلة ما يؤثر به الفاعل في منفعله القريب و الواسطة معلول يقاس إلى الجانبين فيوجد علة قريبة لأحدهما فذاك المعلول المطلق و الآخر علة بعيدة.

ثم الصورة على ضربين صورة تفارق المادة إلى بدل عاقب و صورة لا تفارقها- أما الضرب الأول منهما فلا يتصور ذلك فيها لأنها إذا كانت علة متوسطة للمادة التي تعد منها لكانت تعدم بعدمها المادة فيكون للصورة المستأنفة مادة أخرى مستأنفة أيضا لما تقرر عندهم أن كل حادث يحتاج إلى مادة سابقة و قوة سابقة و استعداد لحامل القوة فيلزم أن يكون للمادة مادة.

و هذا مستحيل لأن الكلام في المادة الأولى و لأنه يلزم أن يكون المفروض مادة صورة و لأننا ننقل الكلام إلى مادة المادة و هكذا يلزم التسلسل في المواد المجتمعة و لأن العلة يجب أن تكون موجودة متشخصة قبل وجود المعلول و التشخص في النوع المتكثر الأفراد لا يمكن أن يكون بحسب الماهية و لوازمها و إلا لانحصرت الماهية في شخص

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٤٩

واحد و ليس كذلك بل يكون بعوارض مفارقة و كل صفة عارضة ليست من اللوازم- يحتاج وجوده إلى جهة انفعالية و الانفعال لا يكون إلا من جهة المادة فيلزم أن تكون المادة موجودة قبل ما تكون موجودة هذا محال.

فيجب أن يكون الصورة بنفسها جزءا من علة مستقلة و شريكا لعل متشخصة في إفادة وجود المادة فيكون المادة وجدت عن تلك العلة الموجبة بواسطة صورة غير معينة لا تفارق المادة إلا بورود صورة أخرى يفعل فعل ما عدمت عن المادة في إقامتها بإفاضة هذا الثالث المعطي دائما ما به تقوم المادة من الصور المتماثلة في التقويم و هو الواهب للصور الذي سنصف حاله من ذي قبل إن شاء الله.

و يلزم أن يكون جوهر روحانيا إذ لو كان جسما أو جسمانيا لكان الكلام فيه باقيا إلى أن يعود الكلام إلى جوهر قدسي

تسجيل

لما كانت الواسطة في التقويم يلزم أن يكون قد تقومت أولا بذاتها أولية بالذات لا بالزمان ثم يقوم غيره فيجب أن يكون الصورة قد تقومت أولا بالفعل من ذاتها أو من المبدأ فيقوم الهيولى بعد ذلك فالصورة وجودها أقدم من وجود الهيولى - و الصورة الجسمانية هي فعلية و تحصل للجسم و تمام له و قوة وجودها و جهة نقصها و إمكانها في المادة و المادة بالقوة إنما تصير بالصورة بالفعل فيكون الوجود أولا للصورة بما هي صورة و ثانيا للمادة بما هي مادة و كونها مادة عين

كونها مادة للصورة في الوجود وإن كان غيرها بحسب العقل عند فرضها ثم للصورة بما هي هذه الصورة المعينة. و أما الضرب الثاني من الصورة التي يلزم الهيولى أبدا لعدم تحقق أسباب الفساد من حدوث الانقطاع و الالتصاق و الاتصال و الانفصال إلا ما شاء الله فهي وإن كانت في أول النظر مما يجوز الوهم أن يكون واسطة مطلقة أو آلة مطلقة في إقامة

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الهيولى.

لكن العقل الصحيح يحكم بنفي ذلك بالبرهان و ذلك لأن تخصيص الهيولى بها دون غيرها مع اتفاقهما في الطبيعة النوعية يحتاج إلى علة.

و أيضا قد علمت أن تشخص أفراد الجوهر الامتدادي لا يتحقق إلا بعوارض انفعالية غير واجبة للزوم للطبيعة دائمة و إلا لما كان وجودها في مادة بل كانت الصورة قائمة بنفسها كالصور العقلية الخارجية و ليس كذلك فلو كانت علة مطلقة لقوامها لسبقها بالوجود و القوام بنفسها و بعلة المقومة لوجودها فيلزم من هاتين المقدمتين كون الهيولى سابقة على نفسها بالوجود بمرتبتين و هذا بين الاستحالة.

ثم لما علمت أن الإيجاد متقوم بالوجود و الوجود المتعين للصورة الجسمية متقوم بالهيولى لأنه إنما يكون بهيئات انفعالية متجددة الحصول غير منفكة عن التغير و الحدثان بسبب خصوصيات الاستمرار و البقاء و إن كانت لها جهة جامعة متفقة الحصول في تلك الخصوصيات لازمة التحقق للطبيعة دائما ليس بحسبها الانفعال و الافتقار إلا الهيولى إلا أنها مبهمه غير منفكة عن تجدد الأمثال و لا خالية عن توارد الحوادث و ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث في تحصلها فهو مفتقر إلى المادة و إن كان بالتبعية فكيف يكون سببا لوجود ما يفتقر إليه في تشخصه و التشخص متقدم على الإيجاد.

لأنها إما عين الوجود كما هو المذهب المنصور أو مساوق له فلو كانت الصورة سببا للهيولى و كانت المادة متقدمة إما عليها أو على ما معها و المتقدم على ما مع المتأخر متقدم عليه أيضا فيلزم أن يكون الهيولى سابقة على نفسها بمرتبتين - هذا محال - و لأن الصورة الشخصية لا تنفك عن التناهي و التشكل المخصوصين و هما من عوارض المادة إذ لو كانا من لوازم الطبيعة الجسمية لكانت الأجسام كلها في

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مرتبة واحدة من التناهي و نحو واحد من الشكل و ليس كذلك.

فالتناهي و التشكل اللذان من العوارض المسببة بالمادة إما أن يكونا في درجة الصورة الجسمية الشخصية أو سابقا عليها و السابق على السابق على الشيء سابق على ذلك الشيء و كذا السابق على ما مع الشيء سابق على المع فلو كانت الصورة سببا للهيولى لكانت الصورة سابقة على ما يسبقها إما بمرتبة أو بمرتبتين فيلزم سبق الشيء على نفسه إما بثلاث مرتبة أو بمرتبتين و كلاهما بين الاستحالة و استحالة التالي يستلزم استحالة المقدم.

فانكشف امتناع كون الصورة بأحد قسميها علة مستقلة أو واسطة أو آلة فبقي أن يكون شركة للعلة الفاعلية و جزءا للعلة التامة

فصل (٥) في تجويز كون المعلول مقارنا للعلة

لما علمت أن الوجود أولاً للصورة بحسب الذات و ثانياً للمادة و دريت أن العلية ليست مفادها إلا التقدم في الوجود بحسب الذات و وجود الصورة على نحو الحلول فيكون وجودها في الهيولى كوجود العلة مع المعلول و المعية بينهما لا ينافي كون الصورة مفيدة و الهيولى مستفيدة بل كما أن العلة إذا كانت علة بالفعل لزم عنها المعلول و أن يكون المعلول معها إذ المعية في الوجود غير المعية في فضيلة الوجود و استقلاله و الأول لا يستلزم الثاني. فكذا الصورة إذا كانت صورة و موجودة يلزم عنها غيرها مقارنا لها و المفيد لوجود شيء منه ما يفيد و هو مباين و منه ما يفيد و هو ملاق و العقل لا ينقبض عن صحة القسمين و الوجود يصدق فيهما و البرهان قائم على وجود هذين القسمين.

و هكذا حال الجواهر مع الأعراض فإن الجوهر واسطة في وجود الأعراض الحالة فيه بعد تقومه في ذاته بالفعل

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فصل (٦) في كيفية كون الشيء الواحد بالعموم علة لشيء واحد بالعدد بوجه خاص

لما تبين و تحقق أن الصورة ليست مع الهيولى في درجة واحدة بل لها درجة من السبق لم يكن الهيولى في تلك الدرجة.

و ظهر مع ذلك أن الصورة ليست سببا تاما و لا علة فاعلية و أن هناك لا محالة شيء وراء الصورة يتعلق به الهيولى ليفيض عنه و هو جوهر نوري إلهي و فعل قدسي سبحانه لاستحالة كونه جوهرًا نفسانيا فضلا عن كونه صورة أو طبيعة جرمية لكن يستحيل أن يكمل فيضانها عنه بلا توسط صورة أصلا بل إنما يتم الأمر بهما جميعا فهذا النور العقلاني يهب الصورة الجرمية بأذن رب الصور المجردة و يقيم الهيولى بذات الصورة من حيث هي مطلقة دون العكس بأن يقيم الصورة بذات الهيولى.

إذ لا ذات لها أصلا إلا بالصور كما مر و كيفية ذلك أنه إذا انقطعت صورة معينة - تلبست بها الهيولى أدامها و استبقاها بتعقيب صورة عاقبة فمن حيث إن اللاحقة تشارك السابقة في أنها صورة ما تعاون المقيم القدسي على الإقامة و من حيث إنها تخالفها - تجعل الهيولى بالفعل جواهر غير الجوهر الذي كان بالسابقة فالصورة من وجه واسطة بين العلة و معلولها فلا محالة تكون متقومة بالعلة و متقدمة مقدما بالذات - فهي أقدم تحصلا و ثبوتا من الهيولى و هي فعل و قوة فعليتها في الهيولى التي هي قوة محضة.

و لعلك تقول كيف يصح في فتوى العقل كون طبيعة مطلقة مبدءا لوجود

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٥٣

شخصي و وحدة عمومية علة لوحدة عددية مع أن العلة يجب أن يكون أشد تحصلا و أقوى تعينا من المعلول. فيجاب عما ذكرت بوجهين - أحدهما ما أفاده الشيخ الرئيس و غيره من القدماء قدس الله أرواحهم ملخصه - أن العقل لا ينقبض عن أن يكون الواحد بالعموم الذي يستحفظ وحدة عموميه بواحد بالعدد علة لواحد بالعدد و هاهنا كذلك فإن الواحد بالنوع مستحفظ بواحد بالعدد و هو المفارق و بالحقيقة الموجب الأصل هو ذلك المفارق إلا أنه إنما يتم إيجابه

بانضمام أحد أمور يقارنه أيها كانت لا بعينه.

و ذلك لا يخرج عن الوحدة العددية بل إنما يجعل الواحد بالعدد تام التأثير - من جهة حصول المناسبة بواسطته بين المفارق المحض الذي هو بالفعل من كل جهة و بين ما هو في ذاته قوة محضة.

و بالجملة لما كانت طبيعة الصور الامتدادية علة بالذات للهيولى من غير أن يدخل في سببيتها شيء من خصوصيات الأفراد إلا بالعرض فقد كانت العلة التامة لها مؤتلفة الذات من انضمام واحد بالعموم بواحد بالعدد ذاتا شخصية تامة التأثير باقية الوجود و التشخص غير متكررة بتكثر أشخاص تلك الطبيعة المرسله إذ ليست الأفراد و لا شيء منها جزء العلة فواحد بالعدد علة لما هو كذلك.

و ثانيهما ما خطر ببال الراقم بعون الله و هو أن الهيولى ليست شخصا متعين الذات كما توهم حتى يحكم عليها باستحالة استنادها إلى أمر عام الوجود بل إنما تشخصها ضرب آخر من التشخص و تعيينها نحو ناقص من التعيين لأن تعيينها قد حصل بمطلق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٥٤

الصور لا بصورة خاصة فما أشبه تعيين الأمور الذهنية كالمعنى الجنسي إذا لاحظ العقل من حيث هو مع قطع النظر إلى الفصول و غيرها.

فألوحة الشخصية التي للهيولى ليست وحدة شخصية أبت في ذاتها أن تكون مستندة لوحدة نوعية للصورة بل هذه إنما هي متعينة بذلك كما ينكشف للمتأمل المتدبر و أما الافتقار إلى انضمام الأمر القدسي فليس لأن مرتبة تحصل الهيولى و نحو تشخصها يستدعي الاستناد إلى واحد بالعدد دون واحد بالعموم بل لأن الصورة في كونها سببا افتقرت إليه لتكون محفوظة الوجود به و بواحد من أفرادها الشخصية كما مر.

و مما يوضح ذلك أنهم ذكروا في كيفية افتقار كل من الهيولى و الصورة إلى الأخرى في التشخص على وجه غير دائر دورا مستحيلا أن الهيولى سابقة الماهية و الشخصية - على شخصية الصورة القائمة فيها لا محالة و أما تشخص الهيولى فبنفس ذات الصورة المطلقة لا بهويتها الشخصية فالصور بماهيتها لا بشخصيتها أقدم من شخصية الهيولى و ماهيتها جميعا و أما الصورة الشخصية فهي إنما تفتقر إلى هيولى متعينة تعيينا مستفادا من الصورة لا من تعيين الصورة فكن على بصيرة

بحث و تحصيل

لك أن تقول من رأس لما تقرر بالبيان البرهاني أن كل طبيعة نوعية يحتمل أشخاصا كثيرة في العين فهي إنما تشخص بالمادة فتشخص تلك المادة إن كانت بمادة أخرى يتسلسل المواد إلى لا نهاية و إن كان بالصورة فيلزم الدور. فاعلم أن معنى تشخص الصورة بالهيولى غير معنى تشخص الهيولى بالصورة و ذلك لأن معنى الأول أنها تشخص بالهيولى من حيث هي قابلة للتشخص أو لما يلزمه من الأعراض المسماة بالمشخصات فإن حقيقة الهيولى هي القابلية و الاستعداد و ليست فاعلة للتشخص.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٥٥

و هذا معنى قولهم كل نوع يحتمل الكثرة فإنما تشخص بالمادة أي يحتاج إلى قابل يقبل الشخصية و القابل كيف يكون فاعلا لما هو قابل له بل الفاعل له هو المفيد القريب للشخصية من الأعراض المكتنفة للصورة كالوضع و الأين و متى و أمثالها المسماة بالمشخصات و أما معنى العكس أي تشخص الهيولى بالصورة المطلقة - فمن حيث هي فاعلة و مفيدة لتشخصها فلا يلزم الدور و لا التسلسل.

بحث و تحصيل

و لقائل أن يقول إن تشخص كل من المادة و الصورة بذات الأخرى على أي وجه كان غير صحيح لأنه متوقف على انضمام ذات كل منهما إلى ذات الأخرى و انضمام ذات كل منهما إلى ذات الأخرى متوقف على تشخص كل منهما فإن المطلق غير موجود و ما ليس بموجود فلا ينضم إليه غيره.

و الجواب عنه بمنع هذه المقدمة مستندا بأن انضمام الوجود إلى الماهية - لا يتوقف على صيرورة كل واحد منهما موجودا فكذا هاهنا مردود لأن المقدمة الأخيرة غير قابلة للمنع لكونها بديهية.

و أما النقض بحال الماهية و الوجود فغير وارد لأنهما ليسا في الخارج أمرين متعددين منضم و منضم إليه بل اثنتينيتهما بحسب التحليل العقلي في الذهن كما مر سابقا - بل الجواب بمنع المقدمة الأولى [الأخرى] و هي أن الشيء المطلق غير موجود - فإنها غير صحيحة و الصحيح أن المطلق بقيد الإطلاق عن القيد غير موجود و أما الشيء المطلق عن قيد الإطلاق و التقييد أي بلا ملاحظة شيء منهما لا بملاحظة عدم شيء منهما فهو موجود عند المعبرين من العقلاء القائلين بوجود الماهيات من حيث هي هي - بعين وجود أشخاصها.

فالحاصل أن الماهية يمكن أن يؤخذ بلا شرط إطلاق و تقييد و يمكن أن يؤخذ

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٥٦

بشرط الإطلاق و بين الاعتبارين فرق واضح فهي المأخوذة بأحد الوجهين موجودة خارجا و ذهنا و بالآخر غير موجودة إلا ذهنا و اللازم فيما نحن فيه هو الأول دون الثاني - فاللازم غير محذور و المحذور غير لازم. و اعلم أن هذين الجوابين المرضي و غير المرضي ذكر أحدهما المحقق الطوسي و ذكر الآخر الإمام الرازي و لعله أجاب به بناء على عدم تجويزه وجود الطبائع في الخارج.

تذنيب -

كل واحد من المادة و الصورة و إن كانت ترتفع برفع الأخرى إلا أنه لا يستلزم أن يصير كل منهما كالآخر في مرتبة الوجود و هكذا في كل علة مقتضية و معلولها و ذلك لأن إحداهما و هي العلة إذا رفعت رفع المعلول و أما الآخر و هو المعلول فليس إذا رفع رفعت العلة بل إذا رفع كانت العلة مرفوعة قبل رفعه قبلية بالذات.

فالأمر هاهنا بالعكس من ذلك فإن رفع المعلول متأخر و رفع العلة متقدم ذاتا - مع أنهما معا في زمان واحد كحركتي اليد و المفتاح حيث إن رفع حركتها متقدم على رفع حركته و هما معان في الزمان و أما بحسب التصور فكلما الوجهين من التقدم و التأخر الذاتيين جائز فيهما كما في برهاني اللم و الإن.

و قد مر هذا في مباحث العدم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٥٧

الفن الرابع في اثبات الطبائع الخاصة للأجسام والإشارة إلى جوهرية صورها المنوعة وما يلتصق بها وفيه فصول

فصل (١) في الإشارة إلى معناها

ذهب الحكماء المشاءون إلى أن لكل واحد من أنواع الأجسام الطبيعية معنى آخر غير الامتداد و قبول الأبعاد بها يصير الأجسام أنواعا مختلفة ولهذا سميت صورة نوعية أي منسوبة إلى النوع بالتقويم والتحصيل و ما يوجد في كل نوع جسمي يخالف ما يوجد في سائر الأنواع الجسمانية و هي أيضا عندهم مبادي آثارها المختلفة و مبادي حركاتها و سكناتها الذاتية فتسمى قوى و طبائع و تسمى أيضا كمالات لصيرورة الجنس بها أنواعا مركبة. فهذه عنوانات و أوصاف لأمر واحد في كل جسم طبيعي من الأجسام لأحد أن يأخذ بيان جوهرية ذلك الأمر من كل واحد من هذه النعوت و يجعلها طريقا موصلا إليه

فصل (٢) في إثباتها من جهة مبدئيتها للحركات والآثار

[الاستدلال على ذلك]

لا ريب في أن المقتضي للآثار المختلفة المختصة كل منها بقسم من أقسام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٥٨

الأجسام لا بد و أن يكون أمورا مختلفة غير خارجة عن ذاته لأننا نعلم أن للأجسام آثارا مختلفة كقبول الانفكاك و الالتيام بسهولة كالماء و الهواء أو بعسر كالأرض و النار و امتناعهما كالكواكب و السماء و كاختصاص كل قسم من أقسام الفلكيات و العناصر - بما له من الشكل و المكان و الوضع و الكيفية اللازمة له أو المجبول على حفظها عند الحصول و طلبها عند الزوال بقاسر و الرجوع إليها بمجرد زوال القاسر على أسرع ما يتصور في حقه. و نعلم بالضرورة أيضا أن العنصر الثقيل مثلا إنما يتحرك إلى المركز بحسب ذاته و العنصر الخفيف إنما يتحرك إلى السماء بحسب ذاتها أو بحسب أمر خاص بكل واحد منهما غير خارج عن ذاته و عن مقومات ذاته و محصلات وجود ذاته.

فتلك المبادي لا يمكن أن تكون هي الجسمية المتفقة و إلا لاتفقت الآثار و لا الهيولي لأنها كما علمت قابلة محضة و الكلام في المقتضي و لأنها واحدة في العناصر - فيعود مثل المحذور المذكور في مبدئية الجسمية المشتركة و هو اتفاق الآثار في أجسام هذه الدار و لا العقل المفارق لتساوي نسبته إلى جميع الأجسام و لا يجوز استنادها أيضا إلى الباري ابتداء بلا وسط لأن نسبة الباري إلى الأشياء نسبة واحدة - و الأشرف منها ماهية و إنية أقدم منه تعالى صدورا و فيضانا.

و هذا لا ينافي القول بالفاعل المختار ما لم يجوز الترجيح من غير مرجح و ما لم يبطل أخذ الحكمة و الترتيب فاختصاص بعض الأجسام بصفات و آثار مخصوصة - لا بد في حصوله من الفاعل الحكيم و الفاطر العليم من مخصص و هو المسمى بالصورة النوعية.

نعم إنما ينسد باب إثبات الصور النوعية بل سائر القوى و الكيفيات الغير المحسوسة بل المحسوسة أيضا عند من ثبت

الفاعل المختار بمعنى من له إرادة بلا داع و حكمة إذ مع تمكين هذه الإرادة الجزافية ارتفع الاعتماد على المحسوسات و لم يبق مجال للتأمل في المقدمات و النظر في العلوم النظريات و لا أيضا يأمن الإنسان أن يخلق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٥٩

فيه أمور يرى بها الشكل المنتج عقيما و العقيم منتجا و يرى الأشياء كلها على خلاف ما هي عليها و أكثر الناس يلتزمون هذا لإعراضهم عن الحكمة عاقبهم الله بها لسبق أعمال قبيحة و أخلاق و عادات سيئة من حب الجاه و التفوق على الأقران و سائر أمراض نفسانية استحكت في نفوسهم فصارت سببا لاستنكافهم عن التعلم و إنكارهم الحكمة لئلا يشوش أحد عليهم أصولا فاسدة أخذوها من معلمهم تقليدا و تلقفا من غير بصيرة فآلجأتهم تلك الأصول مع ما يعتريهم من تلك الأمراض و العادات و الإعراض عن العلوم الحققة و الحكميات شعفا بما عندهم من قشور الأفكار و الأنظار إلى القول بما سموه الفاعل المختار وقي الله السالكين شرهم و ضرهم في الدين.

لأن هؤلاء قطاع طريق الآخرة على المسلمين و هؤلاء المعطلة في الدورة الإسلامية بإزاء ما في دورة الأقدمين من السوفسطائية كما لا يخفى عند المنصف المتدبر قال بعض المحققين إن لظهور مثل هذه الآراء انقطعت الحكمة عن وجه الأرض و انطمست العلوم القدسية -

و اعترض على هذا الاستدلال بوجوه

الوجه الأول

لم لا يجوز أن يكون تلك المبادي للآثار المخصوصة أعراضا مخصوصة إذ كل موجب أثر في الأجسام لا يلزم أن يكون صورة جوهرية فإن الميل القسري و غير القسري مبدأ ما للحركة و ليس بصورة جوهرية و الحرارة في الحديد الحامية مبدأ الحرق لجسم و الحركة في بعض المواضع سبب للحرارة و ليست بصورة جوهرية و هكذا في مواضع كثيرة صارت الأعراض مبادي للآثار فليكن ما سميتوه صورا من هذا القبيل. لا يقال ليست هذه الأعراض مبادي للآثار بل هي معدات و الفاعل غيرها. لأننا نقول مثل هذا فيما سميتوه صورا و مما يؤكد ذلك أن الشيخ الرئيس - قد استدل في بعض رسائله على أن الطبيعة لا يجوز أن يكون مبدأ للصفات و الأعراض

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٦٠

الحاصلة في مادتها على ما هو المشهور عند جمهور الحكماء مثل الحركات و الكيفيات - كالحرارة و البرودة في النار و الماء حيث قال و ذلك لأن مصدر الفعل الجسماني - قوامه و وجوده بالجسم و لا يجوز أن يصدر عنه فعل بلا مشاركة وضع بينه و بين ما يصدر عنه.

فإذا كانت القوى المنطبعة في الأجسام لا يصدر عنها فعل بلا واسطة أجسامها و الطبيعة قوة جسمانية فلا يصدر عنها فعل إلا بواسطة جسمها و الفعل الذي واسطة جسمها شرط في إتمامه إنما يصح في أشياء خارجة عن الجسم لا في نفس الجسم و كيف يصح فعلها في الجسم و شرط كونها فاعلة كون جسمها واسطة و لا يمكن أن يكون الجسم واسطة بين الطبيعة التي فيه و بين ذاته فإذن فعلها في أجسامها محال قطعاً.

بل معنى قولنا إن الطبيعة هي مبدأ تلك الأشياء مثل الحركة و الحرارة و البرودة مثلا غير ذلك هو أن الجسم المنطبع بتلك الطبيعة إنما تستعد بحدوث الطبيعة لتلك الأشياء فإذا تم استعدادها لها أفاضها واهب الصور عليها بإذن خالقه جلت قدرته - فكما أن الطبيعة فاضت على الجسم بعد استعداد خاص و تهيؤ تام لذلك الفيض فكذلك القوى الأخرى يفيض على الجسم بعد استعداد تام لقبولها و الاستعداد التام يحدث بعد حدوث الطبيعة فيها إلا أنه لما كان وجود الطبيعة في الأجسام شرطا لقبول ذلك الفيض قيل إن الطبيعة سبب لذلك أو مبدأ لذلك.

و هكذا في غير هذا إذا تأملت وجدت بعض الهيئات و الصفات متقدما وجوده على وجود البعض و وجوده شرطا لوجود المتأخر أعني أن المادة القابلة لذلك البعض - إنما يستعد تمام الاستعداد لقبول بعض آخر بوجود ذلك البعض الذي هو شرط الاستعداد التام فبهذا الوجه يقال عليه إنه سبب للمتأخر و كذلك نسبة النفس إلى قواها و صفاتها نسبة الطبيعة إلى ما قلناه انتهى.

و هو صريح في أن هذه الأمور معدات للآثار و ليست فواعل فإنه لما ثبت أن فاعل الحرارة في النار و البرودة في الماء و الجمودة في الأرض ليس أمرا مقارنا لتلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٦١

الأجسام فليجز مثل ذلك في الحرارة التي تحصل في غير النار بواسطة النار و في البرودة التي تحصل في غير الماء بواسطة الماء و كذلك في سائر الآثار كالأحوال إلى شبيه جوهر المغذي و الإنماء و التوليد و التصوير و غير ذلك. فما يسمونها صورا لم يثبت إلا كونها من الشرائط و المعدات التي لا ينافي العرضية كالميل و الحرارة و البرودة و أمثالها. و أيضا القوى كالغاذية و النامية و المصورة أعراض مع أنهم يسمونها فعالة و عند المشاءين ينسبون إليها أفعالا كإفادة الصور و غيرها فإذا كانت هذه المؤثرات القوية عندهم أعراضا فغيرها أولى بالعرضية.

و الجواب أن استدلالهم على إثبات [أن] الصور [التي] تكون مبادي الآثار المختلفة في الأجسام يجب أن تكون جواهر ليس متوقفا على كون المبادي أسبابا فاعلية بل يكفي كونها عللا معدة فإن الآثار المختلفة لا بد لها من مخصصات مختلفة فتللك المخصصات إن كانت ذاتيات الأجسام و مبادي فصولها الذاتية حتى يكون الأجسام بها مختلفة الحقائق فتكون جواهر لا محالة إذ مقوم الجوهر عندهم و إن كانت أعراضا فتكون كالأثار الخارجية فيحتاج إلى مخصصات غيرها.

فننقل الكلام إلى مخصصات المخصصات فإما أن يتسلسل إلى غير النهاية أو يدور أو ينتهي إلى مخصصات هي ليست آثارا للأجسام بل صورا مقومة متنوعة ينقسم بها الجسم الطبيعي أنواعا مختلفة و الأولان مستحيلان فتعين الثالث و هو المطلوب.

و أما ما وقع منهم من نسبة الفعل و الإفادة إلى بعض القوى و الكيفيات و قولهم بأنها فعالة فمن باب المسامحة بعد ما حققوا الأمر من كون الفاعل في الإيجاد يجب أن يكون متبري الذات عن علاقة المواد و هم قد صرحوا بأن المسمى فعل الطبيعة - من باب الحركات و الانفعالات و أما غير ذلك فهي واسطة و الواهب غيرها.

و ليس هذا مما خفي إلا على الناقصين في الحكمة كالأطباء و الدهريين و المنجمين و من يحذو حذوهم.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٦٢

الوجه الثاني

أنا لا نسلم أن نسبة المفارق إلى سائر الأجسام على السواء لم لا يجوز أن يكون للمفارق خصوصية ببعض الأجسام دون بعض و لو سلم ذلك لكن لا نسلم أنه يلزم منه حينئذ أن لا يصدر عن المفارق الآثار المختلفة. وإنما يكون كذلك لو لم يكن للأجسام و هيولياتها استعدادات مختلفة - بحسبها يصدر عن المفارق الآثار المختلفة كما يصدر عنه الكمالات المختلفة الفائضة عليها.

و الجواب أن الأجسام بعد اتفاقها في الجسمية المشتركة لا بد لكل منها من استعداد خاص أو حالة خاصة أو ما شئت فسمه من خصوصية بها يطرا عليها ذلك الاستعداد أو غيره لأن الاستعداد كالقوة أمر عديم منشؤه صفة خاصة متقررّة في ذات المستعد - فتلك الصفة لو كانت أمرا عارضا لكان عارضا لجسمية مخصوصة. وإنما الكلام في خصوصية ذلك الجسم فلو كانت الخصوصية أيضا أمرا عارضا متأخرا عن ذات ذلك الجسم عاد الكلام جذعا فيتسلسل الأمر أو يدور - فلا بد أن يكون الخصوصية بالآخرة أمرا داخلا في ذلك الجسم المخصوص متقدما عليه مقوما له.

فإذا حقق الأمر هكذا فليس لأحد أن يقول إذا كان اختصاص الأجسام بعوارضها و آثارها مما يحتاج إلى صور مخصوصة يكون هي أسباب اختصاصات الأجسام بالعوارض و الآثار فيعود الكلام في أصل امتياز تلك الأجسام بتلك الصور فما سبب اختصاص كل نوع من الأجسام بصورته الخاصة به بعد اتفاقها في الجسمية. و ذلك لما أشرنا إليه من أن تلك الصور وجوداتها أسباب لحصول الجسمية المطلقة نوعا خاصا و هوياتها مقومات للأنواع بماهياتها الخاصة و لغفلة أكثر الناس عن هذا السر الحكمي يتشوش عليهم الأمر في كثير من المواضع حتى أنهم يتحIRONون

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في فصول الأنواع المركبة بل البسيطة و يطلبون سبب اختصاص الناطق بحصة الحيوان - التي في الإنسان و سبب اختصاص الصاهل بحصة الحيوان التي في الفرس و لا يعلمون أن الحيوان من اللوازم العامة للناطق و الصاهل و أمثالهما المتأخرة مرتبتها عن مرتبة هذه الملزومات فحصول الجنس للفصل أولى بطلب اللمية فيه من حصول الفصل للجنس - و اختصاصه بحصة من جنسه يطلبها فيهما.

الوجه الثالث -

أنه يجوز أن يكون للمفارق جهات مختلفة بها يختلف نسبته إلى الأجسام فيفيد لبعض الأجسام آثارا مخصوصة و لبعضها آثارا مخصوصة أخرى من غير حاجة إلى صور نوعية أو يكون عدد المفارقات كثيرة حسب تكثر الأجسام نوعا. كما ذهب إليه الأقدمون كأفلاطن و من يحذو حذوه من أشياخه و معلميه مثل سقراط و أناباذقلس و فيثاغورث و اغاثاديمون و هرمس و غيرهم من أعظم حكماء الفرس و ملوك الحكمة المشرقية و أساطين الفلسفة و الخسروانية حسب ما روى عنهم الشيخ الإلهي صاحب الإشراف في كتبه كالمطارحات المسمى بالمشارع و المقاومات - و ككتابه المسمى بحكمة الإشراف من أن لكل نوع من الأفلاك و الكواكب و بسائط العناصر و مركباتها ربا في عالم القدس و هو

عقل مدبر لذلك النوع ذو عناية به و هو الغاذي و المنمي و المولد في الأجسام النامية لامتناع صدور هذه الأفعال المختلفة في النبات - عن قوة بسيطة عديمة الشعور و فينا عن نفوسنا و إلا لكان لنا شعور بها. و هؤلاء يتعجبون ممن يقول إن الألوان العجيبة في ريش من ريش الطواويس - إنما كان لاختلاف أمزجة تلك الريشة من غير أن يستند إلى سبب كلي و قانون مضبوط و مدبر عقلي و رب نوع حافظ بل هؤلاء الأعظم من اليونانيين و الفرس ينسبون جميع أنواع الأجسام و هيئاتها إلى تلك الأرباب و يقولون إن هذه الهيئات المركبة العجيبة و النسب المزاجية و

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غيرها ظلال لإشراقات معنوية في تلك الأرباب النورية كما أن الهيئة البسيطة لنوع كرائحة المسك مثلاً ظل لهيئة نورية في رب طلسم نوعه. قالوا و انجذاب الدهن إلى النار في المصباح لما تبين أنه ليس لضرورة عدم الخلاء على ما ذكر في موضعه و لا لقوة جاذبة في النار بالخاصية فهو أيضاً لتدبير كلي من صاحب النوع لطلسم النار الحافظ لصنوبريتها و لغيرها. و هو الذي سماه الفرس ارديهشت فإن الفرس كانوا أشد مبالغة في إثبات أرباب الطلسمات و هرمس و اغاثاديمون و إن لم يذكروا الحجة على إثباتها بل ادعوا فيها المشاهدة الحقة المتكررة المبتنية على رياضاتهم و مجاهداتهم و أرصادهم الروحانية و خلعهم أبدانهم و إذا فعلوا هذا فليس لنا أن نناظرهم كما أن المشاءين لا يناظرون المنجمين كابرخس و بطليموس فيما حكموا عن مشاهداتهم الحسية بالآتهم الأرضية - حتى إن أرسطو عول على أرصاد بابل. فإذا اعتبر رصد شخص أو أشخاص معدودة من أصحاب الأرصاد الجسمانية في الأمور الفلكية حتى تبعهم غيرهم ممن تلاهم و بنوا عليه علوما كعلم الهيئة و النجوم - فليعتبر قول أساطين الحكمة و التأله في أمور شاهدوها بأرصادهم العقلية بحسب خلواتهم و رياضاتهم فيما شاهدوها من العقول الكثيرة و هيئتها و نسبها النورية. و هي بمنزلة أفلاك نورية هذه الأفلاك ظلال لأنوارها و هيئاتها الوضعية و غيرها ظلال لهيئاتها العقلية و نسبها النورية كما أشرنا إليه فيما مر.

و ليس كما قال الذاب عنهم و المتعصب لهم و هو الشيخ الإلهي للمشاءين دليل على حصر العقول في عشرة أو خمسين و بالجملة في السلسلة الطولية أي العلية و المعلولية و لا يلزم أن يأخذ الأفلاك في الترتيب حيث يأخذ العقول في الترتيب بل حصل منها مبلغ كثير على الترتيب الطولي و يحصل من تلك الطبقة على نسب بينها طبقة أخرى عرضية كالقواعد لتلك الأصول الأعلى يحصل من الفروع الأجسام الفلكية و العنصرية من البسائط و المركبات

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الأشرف من الأشرف و الأخس من الأخس و عدد الفريقين كثير كما في القرآن **وَمَا يَعْلَمُ جُنُودَ رَبِّكَ إِلَّا هُوَ**. قالوا و ليس صاحب النوع النفس فإن النفوس لا بد و أن يتألم بتألم أبدانها و صاحب النوع لا يتألم بتألم نوعه و للنفس علاقة بيدن واحد و لصاحب النوع علاقة و عناية بجميع الأبدان لنوعه و النفس يحصل منها و من البدن الذي يتصرف فيه حيوان واحد هو نوع واحد و رب الطلسم ليس كذا.

ثم رب طلسم النوع إذا كان فياضا لذلك النوع فلا يكون محتاجا إلى الاستكمال به بخلاف النفس فإنها مفتقرة إلى الاستكمال بالجسم وعلاقة الأجسام إنما هي لنقص في جوهر النفس يستكمل بالعلاقة ومن له رتبة الإبداع لجسم لا يقهره علاقة ذلك الجسم وشواغله وكمال المفارق التشبه بمبدئية الواجب بالذات فالعلاقة الجسمانية نقص له - و الذي ينوع الجسم ويحصل وجوده كيف ينحصر بعلاقة عرضية ذلك ظاهر لمن له أقل حدس.

و الجواب أنا وإن نساعدكم في إثبات هذه الصور العقلية المفيضة لهذه الأنواع الجسمية كما مر من كلامنا في مباحث الماهية وقد ذبنا عن إثبات المثل النورية الأفلاطونية - و أحكمنا بيانها بما لا مزيد عليه.

إلا أنا نعلم مع ذلك ضرورة أن تلك الآثار إنما تصدر من الأجسام التي قبلنا أو من المفارق بواسطة مبدأ قريب مقارن بها مباشر لحركاتها آثارها فإن الإحراق يكون من النار والترطيب من الهواء والتبريد من الماء والتجميد من الأرض إلى غير ذلك فلو لم يكن في هذه الأجسام إلا الهيولى والصورة الجسمية لم يحصل تلك الآثار من الأجسام.

كيف والشيخ الإلهي ممن قد برهن في كتبه كالتلويحات وغيرها على أن المفارق الصرف لا يمكن أن يكون محركا للأجسام على سبيل المباشرة أي الفاعلية القريبة لحركاتها بل على نحو بعيد عن المزاول كالعلة الغائية المشوقة للعلة الفاعلية كنفس المعلم التي يحرك لأجلها نفس المتعلم بدنها تقربا إليها وتشبها بها.

و بهذا الأصل حكموا بأن حركات الأفلاك كما لا بد لها من مباد عقلية هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٦٦

غايات لحركاتها الشوقية لا بد لها من محركات جسمانية هي قوى وطبائع مزاولة لتحريكها على سبيل التجدد و الانفعال لئلا يفقد المناسبة بين المفيض والمفاض بالكلية و ليحصل أمر متوسط بين المفارق المحض والجسماني المحض.

فلا بد أيضا في الأجسام من أمور تنفعل من تلك المبادي المفارقة و تفعل في الأجسام المادية و ما هي إلا القوى الانطباعية أو النفوس النباتية أو الحيوانية و على الجميع يطلق الصورة النوعية مع ما لها من التفاوت

فصل (٣) في إثبات الصور الطبيعية من منهج آخر و هو كونها مقومة للمادة

بيانه أنا نعلم بالضرورة أن في كل نوع من الأجسام أمرا غير الهيولى والجسمية - مختصا بذلك النوع مستحيل الانفكاك عنه فهو إما أن يكون عرضا أو جوهر - و الأول باطل لكونه مقوما لما لا يمكن قوامه بنفسه و مثل هذا المقوم يكون صورة كما مر إذ كما لا يتصور وجود المادة معرى عن الجسمية كذلك لا يتصور وجودها بدون أن يتخصص نوعا من أنواع الجسم.

فإننا لا نقدر أن نتصور جسما لا يكون فلكا و لا عنصرا و لا حيوانا و لا شجرا - فلا يوجد الجسم المطلق إلا بالمخصص فيقوم وجود الجسم بذلك المخصص و المقوم للجوهر جوهر لأنه سبب وجوده الخاص و السبب أولى بالجوهريّة من المسبب لأن الوجود يتعدى من الأول إلى الثاني فيكون المخصص للجسم المطلق نوعا جوهر قطعا.

فهو إما حال في المادة أو محل لها و الثاني باطل بالوجدان و لانقلابه إلى غيره كما في العناصر مع بقاء المادة في الحالين على ضرب من البقاء فيكون حالا و الجوهر الحال يكون صورة و هو المطلوب و الاعتراض عليه من قبل الرواقيين من وجوه من الأبحاث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٦٧

البحث الأول

أن الاحتجاج على حاجة الجسم و افتقار المادة إلى المخصصات التي سميتوها صورة بلزومها للجسم و عدم تصور خلوه عنها بعد أن يسلم أن لها ماهية و إنية حتى ينازع في أنها هل هي جواهر أو أعراض فإن الكلام في أصلها طويل غير منجح لأن استحالة الخلو لا يدل على جوهريتها و افتقار المحل إليها في تقوم الوجودي ليس الجسم لا ينفك عن مقدار ما و شكل ما و تحيز ما مع اعترافكم بعرضيتها و لا يخلو عن وحدة و كثرة و التزامم بعرضيتها. و ليس لقائل أن يقول إنها يصح تبديلها مع بقاء محلها فلا يكون جواهر لورود مثل ذلك عليكم في تبديل الصور على الهيولى مع بقائها بعينها و ما ذكرتم من البراهين على افتقار المادة إلى الصورة [لا يثبت] إلا مجرد أنه لا يتصور خلوها عن الصور فلا يمكنكم دعوى امتناع تجردها عن صورة بعينها بل عنها و عن بدلها فكذا لا يخلو الجسم عن شكل - و بدله و مقدار و بدله و كذا غيرهما.

ثم إن كون الجسم المطلق غير متصور الوقوع في الأعيان إلا بالمخصصات لو أوجب كون المخصصات مقومات لوجوده لوجب كون مخصصات الطبيعة النوعية كالإنسان مثلاً و مميزات أشخاصها مقومات لوجودها مع أن التقويم و التحصيل هاهنا أقوى مما يحتاج إليه في التخصيص النوع و هو أتم تحصيلاً أقوى في ذلك مما يحتاج إليه الجنس و هو أضعف تحصيلاً.

فكما سميت مخصصات الجنس صوراً فهلا سميت مخصصات النوع صوراً إذ لا يصح تفرده دونها.

وهاهنا أبحاث مترادفة على طريق الأسئلة و الأجوبة

ذكرها صاحب المطارحات تعصبا و نصرة للقائلين بعرضية الصور لا بأس بأن نذكرها أولاً حتى يحيط الناظر بأطراف الكلام ثم نعين ما هو الحق عندنا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٦٨

قال **س** مخصصات الأنواع تابعة للمتخصص الذي هو النوع مع أن التخصيص بها - **ج** فيلزمكم في صور الأجسام مثله - فنقول هي تابعة للماهية الجسمية و تخصصها بها كما ذكرتم في مخصصات الأنواع. **س** الماهية النوعية في نفسها تامة.

ج فكذا يقال في الجسمية فإن استدللتم على عدم تمامية الجسم باحتياجه إلى مخصصات فالإنسان أيضا غير تام لحاجته إلى الأمور المخصصة.

س لو فرض الإنسان نوعه منحصر في شخصه ما احتاج إلى مميز.

ج يقول القائل لو كان الجسم حقيقة محصورة في شخص واحد ما احتاج إلى مميز.

س كان لا بد للجسم من أن يكون في مكان أو وضع أو حيز.

ج إذا فرض الإنسان وحده أو الشجر أو نوع آخر جسمي لا بد له أيضا ضرورة من كونه على وضع و جهة و مقدار ثم إذا فرض الجسم وحده و لا يكون له مكان أو وضع إن كان هناك امتناع ففي انحصار الأجسام في جسم واحد و كذا الكلام

في نوع كالإنسان و الشجر.

س لا مانع للإنسان بما هو إنسان من أن يكون هو وحده في الوجود محصورا في شخص واحد وإن كان يمنعه مانع فهو خارجي.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٦٩

ج هكذا يقال في الجسم بعينه بما هو جسم.

س الأمور المخصصة للنوع يعرض عن أسباب خارجة و أمور يتفق و لا يتقوم بها حقيقة النوع.

ج ما فرضتموه صورا أيضا يلحق الأجسام أو الهيوليات بأسباب خارجة فإن الهيولى لا يقتضي أن يكون ما فرضتموه صورة مائية أو هوائية بل يلحقها بعض هذه الصور لأمر خارجة و هي ليست بمقومة لحقيقة حاملها.

س هي مقومة لوجود حاملها بخلاف مخصصات النوع.

ج كل الكلام في أنكم بما ذا تبين لكم أن المخصصات التي سميتها صورا مقومة لوجود الجسم إن كان بالتخصيص فكذا يقال في مخصصات الأنواع ثم إذا كان المخصص لا مدخل له في التقويم فليس لكم أن تقولوا في كثير من المواضع كما في تعدد الواجب الوجود إنه يحتاج إلى مميز فيصير الذي فيه الاشتراك معلولا للتمييز - ما لم يثبتوا أن المميز فصلي أو خارجي إلى هاهنا كلامه.

مخلص عرشي

إن التحقيق في هذا المقام يستدعي تقديم أصل يبتني عليه الجواب و هو أن لواحق المادة على ضربين ضرب منها ما هي كمالات يستكمل بها المادة و يتوجه إليها الطبيعة مثل صيرورة الجسم الطبيعي نباتا ثم حيوانا ثم إنسانا فصورة النباتية مما يستكمل بها الطبيعة الجسمية الأرضية صائرة بها نوعا خاصا يترتب عليها آثار مخصوصة غير ما تترتب على الجسمية العامة من الشكل الطبيعي و الحيز الطبيعي و المقدار و الوضع و غيرها.

و كذا صورة الحيوانية كالنفس الدراكة الحراكة كمال أتم و أفضل من القوة النباتية يصير بها الجسم الطبيعي بعد استعداده الأقرب و استكمال جسمه ناميا أمرا خاصا أكمل و أشرف مما كان في المرتبتين السابقتين يترتب عليه ما يترتب على الأجسام

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عموما من التشكل و الحيز و التقدر و التكيف بالكيفيات المحسوسة و غيرها و على الأجسام النباتية خصوصا من النمو و التغذية و التوليد و هي اللواحق الحيوانية من المشي و الشهوة و الغضب و الأكل و الجماع و غيرها.

و هلم إلى كمال لا يكون فوقه كمال آخر للجسم الطبيعي فيترتب عليه ما يترتب على كل كمال من اللواحق العامة و الخاصة مع لواحق مخصوصة يختص به لا يوجد في غيره - و الضرب الآخر منهما ما هي لواحق غير كمالية لا يصلح أن يكون غايات أخيرة و لا متوسطة للطبيعة بل يكاد أن يكون من اللوازم الضرورية للوجود العام الجسمي مثل المقدار الخاص و الشكل الخاص و الحيز الخاص.

فإن مجرد الجسمية مما يقتضيها من غير أن يصير أمرا مخصوصا فهي مكثرات العدد لا محصلات الأنواع و تكثيرها

لأعداد الإنسان و أعداد الفرس مثل تكثيرها لأعداد الجسم و أعداد النبات و الحيوان.

فالضرب الأول عندنا و عند المعبرين من المشاءين هي المسماة بالصور النوعية - و الطبائع الجسمية.

و الضرب الثاني هي العوارض الخارجية و الأولى لكونها متقدمة في الوجود على الجسم الطبيعي بالمعنى الذي هو مادة و محصلة للأنواع التي يخصها هي يكون لا محالة جواهر لأن علة تقوم الجوهر وجودا و محصل تجوهرها يكون جوهر لا محالة - و أما الثانية فلتأخرها عن الأنواع و لحوقها بعد تمامها أو كمالها الإضافية يكون أعراضا لكون محالها غير متحصلة القوام بها فتدبر

قاعدة عرشية -

إذا تركب أمر تركيبا طبيعيا له وحدة طبيعية من أمرين - أحدهما متيقن الجوهرية و الآخر مشكوك فيه الجوهرية و أردت أن تعلم حال الآخر هو جوهر أم عرض فانظر في درجة وجوده و مرتبة فضيلته في المعنى و الحقيقة

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بحسب الآثار المترتبة على وجوده بما هو وجوده فإن كان وجوده أقوى من وجود ما - تحققت جوهريته لما يتراءى من الآثار التي ترتبت عليه فوق ما ترتبت على ذلك المتحقق جوهريته.

فاعلم أن نسبة التقويم و العلية و التقدم إليه أولى من نسبة التقويم و المعلولية و التأخر بالقياس إلى قرينة و لقرينة الأولى عكس ذلك بالقياس إليه بعد أن تحقق عندك - أن لا بد في كل تركيب نوعي أو صنفى من ارتباط ما بالتقدم و التأخر و العلية و المعلولية - بين جزائه و الإلالم يكن نوعا و لا صنفا إلا بمجرد العمل الوهمي و إن كان وجود الأمر الآخر الذي لم يتحقق عندك بعد أنه جوهر أو عرض أضعف من وجود ذلك الأمر الجوهرى و رتبته أنقص.

فاعلم أن ذلك الأمر مستغنى القوام عنه فيجب أن يكون هذا متأخر الوجود عن وجود ذلك محتاجا إليه معلولا له فيكون إما مادة له أو عرضا قائما به إذ لو كان هذا جوهر غير محتاج إليه و ذلك أيضا كان مستغنيا عنه فلم يكن بينهما ارتباط و ائتلاف ما طبيعي أو غيره و إن كان عرضا قائما بغيره فكذلك عاد خلاف المفروض جذعا

فصل (٤) في إيراد منهج ثالث لإثبات جوهرية الصورة النوعية

و هو من جهة كونها أجزاء لماهيات الأجسام الطبيعية المحصلة.

تقريره أن الصور إذا تبدلت في الأجسام يتغير بتغيرها جواب ما هو فليست الصور أعراضا إذ الأعراض إذا تبدلت لم يتبدل بتبدلها ماهية الشيء فما يتبدل بتبدله جواب السؤال عن الشيء الجوهرى بما هو يكون جوهر لا عرضا و إلا لكان الجوهر متحصل الحقيقة من عرض.

و البحث عليه نيابة عن القدماء الذاهبين إلى عرضية كل ما يحل في غيره - أن من الأعراض ما يتغير بتغيره جواب ما هو فإن الحديد قبل أن يحصل فيه هيئة

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السيف إذا سئل عنه بما هو حسن الجواب بأنه حديد أو بحد الحديد.

ثم إذا حصلت فيه الهيئة السيفية فسئل أنه ما هو لا يجاب بأنه حديد بل بأنه سيف و لا يحصل فيه إلا الأعراض كالشكل

و الحدة و غيرهما و هكذا الطين إذا جعل لبنات و بني منها بيت لا يجاب بأنه طين بل بأنه بيت و لم يحدث فيه إلا اجتماع و هيئات و هي أعراض فقد علم أن تبدل الحدود لا مدخل له في كون المتبدل فيه جوهرًا أو عرضًا. و لا يجوز لأحد أن يقول هذه الهيئات جواهر لأنها خروج عن الفطرة و لا أن مجموع الأعراض يصير جوهرًا بعد الانضمام و هل كان الثوب الذي اتخذ من القطن إلا قطنًا أحدث فيه هيئات بالفتل و النسج فإذا سئل بعد صيرورته ثوبًا أنه ما هو لا يتأتى أن يقال إنه قطن بل إنه ثوب و على هذا القياس أمثاله و نظائره. فعلم أن من الأعراض ما يتبدل بتبدله جواب ما هو فتبدل الحدود لا مدخل له في كون المتبدل فيه جوهرًا أو عرضًا فسقط الاحتجاج بهذا الطريق.

بحث آخر -

ثم إن الاصطلاح المذكور في رسم الجوهر و العرض و في خاصية كل منهما - لم يكن بتبدل الجواب و عدم تبدله و أما الضابط في كون محل العرض متقومًا بنفسه و محل الجوهر متقومًا بما حل فيه و لزوم كون ما حل في الموضوع المستغني عن ذلك الحال عرضًا و ما حل في المحل الذي يتقوم به صورة و جوهرًا فلا يوجب هذا المعنى فإن ذلك التقوم تقوم بحسب الوجود لا تقوم بحسب الماهية بخلاف ما ذكرناه هنا. فإن الحال لا يجوز أن يكون مقوم حقيقة المحل و كيف يكون الشيء جزء

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ما يحله و المعقول من ماهية المحل غير المعقول مما هو من أحواله فليس كون المحل مفتقرًا إلى ما يحل فيه من الصور إلا باعتبار تقوم الوجود لا الحقيقة فيرجع الكلام إلى المنهج المقدم و البحث في حاجة المحل إلى بعض ما يحله و استغناؤه عن الأعراض هل هو بمجرد التخصيص و عدم الخلو و اللزوم أو بأن ماهية المحل ناقصة الوجود - يحتاج إلى مكمل جوهرى رجوع إلى الموقف الذي سبق الكلام فيه جرحًا و تعديلاً. هذا ما للذئاب عن الأقدمين أن يبحث مع أصحاب جوهرية الصور الطبيعية - من المشاءين في هذا الموقف و لنؤخر ما عندنا من الجواب إلى أن نقرر مسلكًا آخر في هذا المطلب قريب المأخذ إلى هذا المسلك استدلالًا و بحثًا و جوابًا. و لنذكر البحث الذي يرد عليه من شيعة المنكرين للصور فنشير إلى الجواب المناسب لأصحاب الأذهان البحثية. ثم نرجع إلى ما أَرانا الله من برهانه و كشف على ضميرنا و فتح على قلبنا من باب رحمته و رضوانه فنظهر نبذا منه و لا نستحي من قول الحق و إن كان فيه حيد عن المشهور

فصل (٥) في إيراد منهج رابع في هذا المرام

و هو أن هذه الأمور أجزاء الجوهر النوعية و جزء الجوهر جوهر مثلاً ماهية النار ليست مجرد الجسمية بل ماهيتها مركبة من جسم و أمر آخر يحصل من مجموعهما حقيقة النار و هكذا الماء و الهواء و الحجر و الشجر و الدواب و غيرها و للخصم أن يقول جزء الجوهر من جميع الوجوه جوهر أو جزء الشيء الذي باعتبار جهة واحدة جوهر جوهر. و الأول هو المسلم و الثاني غير مسلم فإن الأبيض أو الجسم الحار من حيث

هو جسم حار يصح حمل الجوهر عليه فيقال هذا الأبيض جوهر أو هذا الحار جوهر لأنهما من جهة واحدة جوهر لا من جميع الجهات.

فكذا نقول حينئذ الماء يحمل عليه أنه جوهر باعتبار أنه جسم و باعتبار أنه حامل صورة و الماء ليس من جميع وجوهه جوهرًا بل هو مجموع جوهر و عرض و حمل عليه الجوهرية لأجل أحد الجزئين لا لأجل أنه من جميع الوجوه جوهر كما يحمل الجوهرية على الأبيض المذكور و على الحار المذكور.

ثم لا يخفى أنك إذا عرفت الماء لا تعرفه إلا بأجزائه و لا يمكنك أن تحكم أن الماء جوهر إلا بعد أن تعلم أن أجزائه جوهر فيتقدم العلم بجوهرية أجزائه على الحكم - بأن الماء من جميع الوجوه جوهر لا أنه مركب من جوهر و عرض. فإذا عرفت هذا فيكون الاحتجاج بأن جزء الجوهر من جميع الوجوه جوهر - مصادرة على المطلوب الأول كيف و الجوهرية إذا كانت أجزائه فكذا لا يعقل الكل إلا بالأجزاء فكذا لا يعقل الأجزاء إلا بأجزائها و المتقدم بالطبع على المتقدم بالطبع على الشيء المتقدم بالطبع على ذلك الشيء.

و قد علم أن جزء الجوهر جوهر فلا يصح أن يعقل الماء إلا أن يعقل أجزائه - و لا يعقل أجزائه إلا بأنها جواهر فيلزم أن يكون إذا عقل جوهرية الماء عقل جوهرية جميع أجزائه فكيف يصح أن يثبت بعد هذا بالحجة أن شيئًا من أجزائه جوهر.

و في الجملة لا يصح لك أن تثبت أن جزء الماء جوهر إلا بأن تثبت أن الماء من جميع وجوهه جوهر لا بأنه مجموع جوهر و عرض حتى يلزم أن جزء الجوهر من جميع الوجوه جوهر و إنما يمكنك أن تثبت أن الماء من جميع وجوهه جوهر إذا ثبت جوهرية أحاد الأجزاء.

فقد أثبت في هذه الحجة الشيء بما لا يثبت إلا به.

هذا تمام ما ذكره صاحب المطارحات نيابة عن الأقدمين ذكرناه بعبارة إذ لم أجد فائدة في تغيير العبارة إذا كان المقصود تأدية المعنى بأي لفظ كان فلنذكر ما وعدناه

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في الجواب إن شاء الله تعالى

فصل (٦) في دفع المناقضة التي ذكرت على الاستدلال بالمنهجين الآخرين

اعلم أولاً أن من الأمور المتقررة في مدارك المحققين أنه لا يجوز أن يتحصل حقيقة نوعية لها وحدة طبيعية لا صناعية كالسائط الأسطقسية و المركبات الطبيعية التي فاضت صورتها على مادتها من المبدأ الفياض باستحقاقها التي حصلت من تغيرات المادة و تطوراتها بعقل و قوى ذاتية من مقولتين مختلفتين.

لما تقرر أن الوحدة في جميع التقسيمات معتبرة فالمقولة الواحدة إما جوهر أو كم أو كيف أو غير ذلك و أما المركب من الجوهر و الكم فليس جوهرًا و لا كمًا و كذا المركب من الجوهر و الكيف ليس أمرًا واحدًا بل اثنين جوهرًا و كيفًا.

و أما مجموعهما فلا وجود لهما حتى يكون به موجدًا ثالثًا يكون له علة مقتضية و علة غائية سوى علة هذا و علة ذاك و غاية هذا و غاية ذاك لا بمجرد تسمية أو اعتبار كما أن المركبات الصناعية لها وجودات صناعية و وحدات اجتماعية و فواعل عملية - و غايات تصنعية لأغراض عرضية اعتبارية.

ولهذا حكموا بأن المشتقات و ما في حكمها كالأبيض والأسود والرومي والزنجي أشياء لا حظ لها من الوجود بالذات إنما الوجود في نفسه في كل منها اثنان - جسم و كيفية أو جسم و إضافة إلى شيء لأن الملتئم من ذات ما جوهرية و عرض ما لم يكن مجموعهما من مقولة أخرى و لا لهما معا جنس واحد له فصل يحصله و امتنعوا عن تجويز أن يكون حقيقة واحدة مندرجة تحت مقولتين و ما فوقهما بالذات.

اللهم إلا بالعرض فإن الإنسان و إن صدق عليه حيوان و أبيض و طويل و قائم - و غيرها إلا أن مقوم وجوده من جملة هذه المعاني معنى الحيوان فيكون واقعا تحت مقولة الجوهر بالذات و ليس واقعا تحت مقولة أخرى إلا لأمر عارض فيكون قول

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الكم عليه لأجل الطول الذي عرض له قولاً بالعرض.

فكذا قول الكيف عليه لأجل عروض البياض له و هكذا في جميع المقولات - فهو و إن كان مندرجا تحت الجميع بواسطة حصول أفرادها فيه لكن ليس اندراجها تحتها كاندراج نوع تحت جنسه إلا الذي دخل في قوام ماهيته الوجدانية و هو الجوهر و غيرها خارج عن قوام ذاته من حيث هي هي و إنما صدقها عليه صدق عرضي لامتناع دخول مقولتين مختلفتين في قوام شيء له وجود فطري و وحدة طبيعية.

إذا تقرر هذا فنقول لا شك أن الجسم الناري و الهوائي و الحجري و النباتي و الحيواني و غير ذلك لكل منها حقيقة متحصلة لها وحدة طبيعية من غير اعتبار و تعمل - و هي غير حالة في موضوع فيكون جوهرها واحدا غير بسيط الحقيقة لأنها متقومة من جسمية مشتركة فيه جميع الأجسام و من أمر يتم بها نوعيته فلو لم يكن ذلك الأمر مندرجا كالجسمية المشتركة تحت مقولة واحدة هي الجوهر بل يكون هو في نفسه مندرجا تحت مقولة أخرى كالكيف مثلا فلم يكن بينهما ائتلاف طبيعي و اتحاد نوعي بل مجرد اجتماع.

و مثل هذا المجموع إذا اعتبره الفرض أمرا واحدا لا يكون نوعا من الجوهر و لا نوعا من الكيف و لا من إحدى المقولات العشر إذ لم يكن له حقيقة وحدانية له وجود فائض عليه من الحق و يكون كالحجر الموضوع بجانب الإنسان و الواقع خلاف ذلك بالاتفاق العقلي.

فيجب أن يكون للنار جزء مختص جوهرى غير الجسم هو المسمى بالصورة النوعية و كذا الماء و الأرض و الفلك و الشجر و الحيوان بل يجب أن يكون نسبة الصورة إلى الجسم بمعنى المادة كنسبة الفصل إلى الجنس من حيث يكون نسبته إليه - نسبة الكمال إلى النقص فكما أن ماهية المعنى الجنسي تكمل بالفصل المقسم كذلك جوهر الجسم يكمل بحسب وجوده بالصورة.

ولهذا الوجه يقال لها كمال الجسم و كمال الشيء ينبغي أن يكون من جنسه

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لا خارجا عن جنسه و كمال الجوهر ينبغي أن يكون محصلا لجوهريته و يكون أقوى جوهرية منه فكيف يكون عرضا تابعا له.

و إنما قلنا يجب أن يكون نسبتها إلى الجسم نسبة الفصل إلى الجنس لأن تلك المخصصات إنما هي مباد لفصول ذاتية لأنواع الجسم و هذا أمر مقرر عندهم.

كما مر من أن الجنس و الفصل مأخوذان في الماهيات المركبة من المادة و الصورة الخارجيتين و الأجزاء المحمولة إنما تكون محفوظة الحقائق في الذهن و الخارج كما مر في مباحث الوجود الذهني.

فإذا تقرر هذه المقدمات فنقول أما قول من قال في أحد المنهجين أن ما لا يتبدل بتبدله جواب ما هو فهو جوهر و ما تبدل فهو عرض ليس مراده في أي موضع كان على سبيل العموم و الكلية حتى لو فرض ماهية كالسود مركبة من جنس و فصل - يكون كلاهما عرضين كاللونية و قبض البصر.

فإذا سئل عن السود فأجيب بأنه لون قابض للبصر و إذا سئل عن غيره من الألوان فأجيب بجواب آخر يلزم كون المتبدل فيه الجواب جوهرًا بل غرضه أن كل ماهية نوعية لها وحدة طبيعية و مع ذلك تكون واقعة تحت مقولة الجوهر بالذات و يكون له صفة مخصوصة.

فإذا أردنا أن نعلم أن الصفة مقومة له أو غير مقومة له ننظر أ يتبدل بتبدله جواب ما هو أم لا فإن تبدل فهو جوهر لا محالة و إن لم يتبدل فهو عرض إذ قد ثبت أنه صفة قائمة بمحل.

فبهذا يعلم أن صفة النارية أي كونها بحيث تكون محرقة داخلية في قوام الجسم الناري و صفة الأبيضية ليست داخلية في قوام الجسم الأبيض.

لست أقول إن الحيوان الأبيض إذا أخذ مقيدا بالأبيض معتبرا معه حتى يكون مجموعا من عارض و معروض لا يكون البياض داخلا فيه و لا أنه لا يتبدل حينئذ بتبدل البياض جواب ما هو كيف و البياض بحسب هذا الأخذ ذاتي داخل نسبته

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نسبة الفصل.

بل أقول إن الحيوان الواحد له حد نوعي يجاب به عن ماهيته و لا يتغير فيه الجواب عما هو يتبدل مثل البياض و ما يجري مجراه عنه و أما المناقضة بالسيف و السرير و نحوهما فليست هي بأنواع طبيعية و كلامنا في الأنواع الطبيعية الواقعة - تحت مقولة الجوهر بالذات.

نعم الحديد ماهية طبيعية و الخشب نوع طبيعي لكل منهما فصل ذاتي يتبدل بتبدله جواب ما هو و لا شبهة لأحد في أن نوعية كل من النار و الهواء و الأرض و الماء و الدر و الياقوت و الإنسان و الفرس نوعية طبيعية لكل منها علل أربع كلها بالذات لا بالعرض.

اثنتان منها مقومتا الوجود و هما الفاعل و الغاية الخارجان عن عالم العمل و التصنع و اثنتان منها مقومتا الماهية و هما داخلتان في ذاته تلبست إحداهما بالأخرى في الوجود من غير وضع واضح و اعتبار معتبر و لها فصول ذاتية مأخوذة من أمور خاصة طبيعية فهي المسماة بالصور.

فالصور الطبيعية جواهر فإذا كان في حقائق الأجسام فصول ذاتية مختلفة هي الصور النوعية باعتبار فإذا نسب إلى هذه الأنواع شيء يجب أن يستند الآثار المختلفة المختصة بنوع نوع إلى تلك الصور نوعا من الاستناد و إن كان لكل نوع من

الأجسام مدبر عقلي ذو عناية من ملائكة الله الروحانيين يقوم بكلاءة هذا النوع بإذن مبدع الكل وأمره جلت عظمته. وإذا كان لها تقويم المادة و تحصيل الأجسام أنواعا فلا يكون لها مباد في المواد- بل يفيدها مفيد من خارج فإن الاستعدادات و الاستعدادات ليست بأمور محصلة في الخارج يتقوم بها أنواع بل هي توابع لأمور محصلة يتخصص بها الجسم تخصيصا أوليا- وإنما شأنها الإعداد لأنها من جهات القوة و القبول. ومنشأ اختلاف تلك الصور في الحقائق يرجع إلى اختلاف مبادئها المفارقة

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دون اختلاف ذوات الهيوليات أو اختلاف استعداداتها فإنها مقدمة كما علمت بحسب الذات على الهيوليات و اختلافها و اختلاف استعداداتها إنما يصحح اختلاف الشخصيات- و أنحاء الحصوليات لا الحقائق أنفسها. و الحق أن مفيض وجود الكل هو الواجب القيوم كما علمت مرارا على وفق علمه بالنظام الأتم الأفضل و العقول و النفوس و غيرها جهات فاعلية يتكثر بها أنواع الحقائق المحصلة و المواد و الحركات و الأزمنة و الاستعدادات جهات قابلية يتكثر بها أشخاص تلك الحقائق و أنحاء حصولاتها و أعداد تعييناتها كما ذهب إليه كافة الموحدون من العرفاء و المحققين من الحكماء هذا.

و أما معنى قول المثبتين للصور إن جزء الجوهر جوهر فهو أن ما علم مجملا ببرهان أو حدس أو فطرة أنه جوهر فجزؤه لا محالة يكون جوهرًا لأنه أقدم وجودا منه فيكون أولى منه بعدم الافتقار إلى موضوع و العلم بكون الشيء جوهرًا أي بصدق الجوهرية عليه لا يتوقف على العلم بكنه حقيقته و تصور أجزائه.

بل ربما يحصل ذلك بدون تصور الأجزاء تفصيلا كما أن العلم بجوهرية الجسم الطبيعي و كونه ذا أبعاد ثلاثة حاصل قبل أن يعلم أن له أجزاء و أنه مركب من هيولى و صورة هما جوهران أو أحدهما جوهر و الآخر عرض.

فقول المعترض إن العلم بجوهرية الشيء لا يحصل إلا بعد العلم بجوهرية كل جزء من أجزائه غير صحيح و كذا قوله جزء الجوهر إنما يكون جوهرًا إذا كان ذلك الجوهر جوهرًا من جميع الوجوه لا محصل له فإن جوهرية الشيء لا يكون بوجه دون وجه لأن الجوهر جنس لما تحته من الأنواع المحصلة فيكون مقوما لماهيتها- و مقوم الشيء لا ينفك عنه أصلا في اعتبار من الاعتبارات و حيثة من الحيثيات فالجوهر جوهر بأي حيثة أخذت معه و على أي وجه كان.

و أما تمثيله بالجسم الحار أو الأبيض فحمل الجوهر على الجسم من حيث ماهيته حمل ذاتي و حملة على الحار و الأبيض حمل عرضي لأنهما بالذات من أفراد مقولة

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الكيف و مجموع المعروض و العارض ليس أمرا واحدا حتى يكون مندرجا تحت مقولة بل هما نوعان لمقولتين كل منهما تحت مقولة أخرى كما مر ذكره.

و الكلام فيما هو جوهر بالذات مقول عليه الجوهرية قولاً ذاتياً لا عرضياً و كل ما هو جوهر بالذات لا ينفك عنه الجوهرية على أي وجه كان من وجوهه بعد ما انحفظت ذاته عن الازدواج مع غيرها من الأوصاف الزائدة على ذاته و جزء الجوهر أي الواقع تحت جنس الجوهر لا بد و أن يكون جوهرًا و إلا فيلزم أن يكون المركب المعلول مستغني

القوام ذاتا و وجودا عن الموضوع و ما هو جزؤه و علتة و أقدم وجودا منه بالطبع محتاجا إليه و العلة يجب أن يكون أقوى و أوكد وجودا من معلولها هذا خلف.

و أما تجويز كون جزء الجوهر عرضا قائما بجزئه الآخر الجوهرى فهو أيضا من مجازفات من أهمل شرائط الوحدة الطبيعية في الأنواع المحصلة و اشتبه عليه حال التركيب التآحدي الذي بين المادة و الصورة بحسب فعل الطبيعة بالتركيب التأليفي الذي بين الموضوع و العرض بحسب فعل الصنعة.

و ذلك لأن أحد الجزئين إذا كان ذاتا جوهريا مستغني القوام عن ما يقوم به فيكون تام النوعية فلا يفتقر في وجوده إلى ما يضمه و ما يضمه إنما يضمه بعد مرتبة وجوده فلا يحصل منه و مما يضمه في مرتبة أخيرة ذاتا واحدة مندرجة تحت مقولة الجوهر فيكون المجموع مجموع جوهر و عرض فالجوهر متقدم و العرض متأخر- و الذات الواحدة لا تكون متقدمة و متأخرة معا.

كيف و لو كان المجموع جوهرًا واحدًا له ذات واحدة غير ذات هذا الجوهر- و هذا العرض و له جوهرية غير جوهرية جزئه بناء على أن ذاته غير ذات كل منهما- فعند حصول جزئه الجوهرى لم يوجد بعد و إنما وجد بعد وجود العرض فيكون العرض سببا لوجود الجوهر متقدما عليه هذا محال و إن لم يكن العرض قائما به بل بغيره جزءا كان ذلك الغير أم خارجا و ذلك قوام العلة يجب أن يكون أقوى و أتم و

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العرض مطلقا أضعف قواما من أي جوهر كان و كذا يلزم تركيب موجود وحداني من مقولتين و قد مر فساد

تحصيل عرشي

قد سبق منا ما أفادنا الله بالهامة و فاض على قلبنا بتأييده في مباحث الماهية ما يتنور منه و ينكشف أن الصور النوعية هي محض الوجودات الخاصة للجسمانيات و الوجود بما هو وجود ليس بجوهر و لا عرض و ذلك لما أشرنا إلى أن فصول الجواهر متحدة الماهية في المركبات العينية مع الصور الخارجية و الجنس ليس بجنس لفصله المقسم- بل من لوازمه التي يعمه و غيره.

فجنس الجوهر و إن كان مقوما للأنواع المركبة الجوهرية لكنه عرضي خارج عن فصولها و صورها المأخوذة عنها تلك الفصول فالصور الطبيعية ليست ماهية جوهرية لكنها مفيد القوام للأجسام الجوهرية فلا يكون إعرضا بل هي أعلى ذاتا من الاندراج تحت إحدى المقولات فلبساطتها و نوريتها و كونها مبادي الآثار الخارجية- يتحدس اللبيب الفطن بعد تذكر أصول سابقة في أوائل هذا الكتاب أنها هي الوجودات العينية المحصلة التي تحصل الأنواع و تميز بعضها من بعض و هي بنفسها متحصلة و متميزة كما هو شأن الوجود المنبسط على هياكل الماهيات البسيطة و المركبة- حيث إنه متمايز الآحاد و الأفراد متفاضل المراتب و الدرجات بنفسه لا بأمر يلحقه- و تمايز الماهيات و تفاصلها تابعة لتمايز آحاد الوجودات و أفرادها و تفاصل مراتبها و درجاتها.

و أما حاجة الوجودات الصورية إلى الهيولى فهي ليست بحسب أنفسها و إنما يحوجها إلى المادة ما يلحقها و يلزمها من العوارض المسماة عند القوم بالعوارض المشخصة من كيف و الكم و الوضع و الأين و غيرها و هي من علامات التشخيصات و إنما التشخيص بنفس الوجود لأن تشخصه بنفسه و تشخص الأشياء به كما أن وجوده بنفسه و موجودية

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الأشياء به فهو تشخص و متشخص و مشخص كما أنه وجود و موجود و موجد كل منهما باعتبار فانظر

فصل (٧) في أن تقويم الصورة الطبيعية للجسمية ليس على سبيل البديل

لما كانت الصورة الجسمية تتبدل بتبدل الصورة لما علمت أن نسبتها إلى الجسمية - نسبة الفصل إلى الجنس و الفصل متقدم على الجنس وجودا فمهما تبدل المتقدم يتبدل المتأخر دون العكس.

و لما صرح الشيخ أيضا في التعليقات و غيرها بأن كل صورة تحدث من الصورة الطبيعية يحصل معها مقدار آخر و امتدادات أخرى فيحصل معها اتصال جوهرى آخر.

فلا ينبغي لأحد أن يقول إن الصور الطبيعية تقوم وجود الجسم على سبيل البديل كما أن الجوهر المتصل يقوم الهيولى حتى يكون الجسم بالقياس إلى الصور الطبيعية كالهوى بالقياس إلى الصور الامتدادية فإن الجسم جزء الاتصال القابل لفرض الأبعاد الثلاثة و إذا تبدل الاتصال الصوري يتبدل الصور الطبيعية بتبدل الجسم أيضا فيحدث مع كل صورة طبيعية جسم آخر فليس الجسم كالهوى التي يبقى نفسها و يقبل حدودا مختلفة يقومها على سبيل البديل.

و السر في هذا أن كل حال عرضا كان أو صورة يحتاج في لوازم تشخيصه إلى المحل إلا أن العرض كما يفتقر إلى المحل في تشخيصه كذلك يفتقر إليه في نوعيته لأن حقيقته حقيقة ناعية فالموضوع يقوم حقيقة العرض كما يقوم شخصيتها و الصورة بحقيقتها تقوم وجود محلها الذي هو المادة حيث كانت الجسمية نوعا واحدا محفوظة الحقيقة في حدود الامتدادات و مراتب المقادير المختلفة صغرا و كبرا.

فالهوى تنحفظ شخصيتها بانحفاظ نوعية الصورة الاتصالية فهي بنوعيتها تقوم الهوى و تشخصاتها متقومة بها و هذا بخلاف الجسم بالقياس إلى الصور الطبيعية

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المتخالفة الأنواع فإن كل صورة طبيعية إذا كانت بنوعيتها مقومة للجسم - فإذا تبدلت نوعيتها إلى نوعية صورة أخرى زالت الجسمية أيضا إلى جسمية أخرى و لأن الهوى لما كانت أمرا بالقوة مبهمة الذات و الحقيقة يكفي في تشخيصها مطلق الصور و أما الجسم بما هو جسم فهو ماهية نوعية تفتقر في تشخيصها إلى صورة مخصوصة فزوال الصورة المخصوصة يوجب زوالها و لا يوجب زوال خصوصيات الصورة و لا نوعياتها زوال الهوى ما دام يبقى مطلق الصور.

تفريع

و من هاهنا حكموا بأن الشجر إذا قطع و الحيوان إذا مات فقد عدم الجسم - الذي كان موجودا مع الصورة النباتية أو الحيوانية و حدث جسم آخر بخلاف الهوى الأولى فإنها مستمرة.

و هذا أيضا موضع الخلاف بين الفريقين لأنه متفرع على الخلاف بين جوهرية الصور و عرضيتها و كذا ما مر في مباحث الماهيات من أن الجنس و الفصل مجعولان بجعل واحد في المركبات كما في البسائط و عند اتباع الإشراقيين جعل كل واحد منهما غير جعل الآخر و التزموا ذلك.

مع أنهما من الأجزاء المحمولة و الحمل عبارة عن الاتحاد في الوجود لما زعموا أن الشجر إذا قطع زال عنه الفصل أي

النامي و بقي فيه الجنس و هو الجسم - و كذا في الحيوان إذا مات و الجسم إذا انفصل و قد أسمعناك ما يفني بتحقيق هذا المقام هناك فتذكر

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فصل (٨) في أن مرتبة وجود الصورة الطبيعية متقدمة على مرتبة وجود الصورة الجسمية

قد مضى من الأصول ما يستفاد منه هذا المقصد إلا أنا نبينه تبييناً آخر فنقول - إنه من المحال أن يكون الجسم المؤلف من الهيولى و البعد المنبسط في الأطراف مطلقاً أمراً قائماً بالفعل ثم يلحقه كونه على مقدار خاص و شكل خاص و مكان خاص - و على امتناع لقبول الخرق و الالتيام أو عدم امتناع لهما.

أما على نهج السهولة أو الصعوبة لأن مقتضى الجسم بما هو جسم بمعنى أنه ليس يوجد فيه إلا الهيولى و الصورة الامتدادية هو مكان مطلق و شكل عام جنسي و مقدار كذلك - و بالجملة مقتضاه من كل صفة أمر عام لا وجود له إلا في الذهن إذ وجوده كذلك لا يكون إلا في العقل كما علمت إذ ما لا ينفك وجوده عن خصوصيات أوصاف متخالفة بالنوع و ما يقتضيها من الصور المتخالفة الحقيقة فلا يجوز فرضه قائماً بالفعل مجرداً عن ما يخصه بإحدى هذه الصفات و لا سابقاً عليها و إن لم يكن سبقاً زمانياً بل يكون سبقاً ما بالطبع و ما يضاهيه إلا في العقل و محال وجود ما هذه صفته إلا مقترناً بإحدى الخصوصيات لا مجرداً عنها و لا متقدماً عليها أصلاً.

فمحال أن يكون الصورة الطبيعية متأخرة عن الجسمية و لا أن تكونا متكافئتين - من غير تقدم و تأخر لإحدهما على الأخرى إذ يلزم منه أن يقوم الهيولى الصورة الجسمية - على انفرادها و الصورة الطبيعة على انفرادها. و هذا من المستحيلات لأن المادة الواحدة البسيطة لا يجوز أن يقومها صورتان - لأن في تقويم إحدهما إياها غنى عن تقويم الأخرى إذا كانتا في درجة واحدة كما يستحيل أن يقوم معنى واحد جنسي فصلان منطقيان و ليس الحال في الحساس و

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المتحرك بالإرادة للحيوان هذا الحال بل هما لازمان لفصل واحد عبر بهما عنه كما بين في موضعه.

فيجب أن يتقوم الصورة الامتدادية أولاً بالصورة الطبيعية فيتنوع الجسمية نوعاً خاصاً ثم يقوم المادة و الجسم الذي يقومه الصورة الطبيعية تقويماً في الوجود - غير الجسم الذي يتركب منهما و هو الذي يقومه الصورة الطبيعية بحسب الحد و الماهية.

و قد علمت الفرق بين المعنيين فهذا الجسم هو معنى ثالث غير الجسم بمعنى المادة و غير الجسم بمعنى الجنس إذ هو متأحد من هذه الأمور الثلاثة الهيولى و صورتين تأحداً بالفعل لا بفرض فإرض كتأحد الجسم بالزنجي أو الأبيض فإن اتحاد الهيولى بالصورتين في المصورة ليس كتأحد الجسم بالحرارة في الحار و كتأحد الإنسان بالكتابة في الكاتب فإن لكل منهما قواماً بالفعل مجرداً عن الحرارة و الكتابة بخلاف حال الهيولى مع الصورة.

و لهذا يكون الاتحاد هاهنا بالذات و هناك بالعرض و هذا الاتحاد يجعل الأمر الجنسي أمراً نوعياً فهو اتحاد نوعي و اتحاد الجسم بالحرارة لم يجعل الجسم أمراً نوعياً بعد تحصله بما يلحقه لحوقاً طبيعياً ذاتياً و اتحاده بما يقومه نوعاً

خاصا تام التحصل و الخصوصية فلا يكون اتحادا نوعيا.

فانظر أ يجعل الكتابة ما ينضاف إليه أمرا يحتاج إليه الكتابة في تحصيله نوعا بل شخصا أيضا فإن الإنسان ما لم يتحصل شخصا معينا لم يتصف بالكتابة و لا بالبياض - و غيره من العوارض المتأخرة فقد ثبت أن المعنى الملتئم من الهيولى و الجوهر الامتدادي فقط وجوده كوجود الجنس في أن يفتقر إلى ما يكمله و يحصله نوعا من الأنواع الطبيعية و إن لم يكن جنسا بالحقيقة فإن الجنس المحض ما يكون غير تام المعنى لا في الذهن و لا في العين و الجوهر الممتد فقط و إن كان تام المعنى في الذهن - إلا أنه ليس تام الحقيقة في الخارج بل لنقص وجوده يحتاج إلى ما يحصله و يوجد.

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نوعا كاملا يترتب عليه آثار الوجود فوق ما يترتب على مجرد الجسمية و هكذا إلى أن يتم و يكمل تماما و كمالات لا مزيد عليه بحسبه فيكون نوعا حقيقيا مطلقا.

فإذا كان كذلك يجب أن يحصله أمر صوري هو إحدى الصور الطبيعية و المحصل للشيء يكون أقدم وجودا و أقوى قواما و تحسلا فالصورة الطبيعية متقدمة على الجسمية - تقدما بالعلية و على المركب من الثلاثة تقدما بالطبع أو بالماهية.

و هاهنا شك مشهور

و هو أن الهيولى أمر واحد فكيف اختصت ذاتها بصورة طبيعية دون صورة أخرى طبيعية و قد مر أيضا شبه هذا السؤال و هو أن اختلاف الأجسام بالآثار إذا كان منشؤه اختلاف الصور فما سبب اختلاف الصورة عليها بعد اتفاقها في الجسمية.

و نحن قد أشرنا إلى ما ينفسخ به هذا الإيراد لأن مبناه على الغفلة عن جوهرية الصور النوعية و تقدمها في الوجود و جعل على الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو مادة متفقة الحقيقة في الكل.

و أما الجسم بالمعنى الذي هو محمول على سائر الأنواع الجسمانية فليس هو واحدا متفقا في الكل و إنه يتحصل بفصول مأخوذة عن الصورة و يكون في كل منها بمعنى آخر.

و أما اختلافات تلك الصورة أو الفصول فهي بذواتها و بجهات راجعة إلى مبادئ الوجودية لا بصور و فصول أخرى لأنهما معان بسيطة غير ملتئمة من مادة و صورة أو جنس و فصل.

و بالجملة فالوجود بحسب مراتب تقدمه و تأخره و كماله و نقصه في ذاته أصل كل اختلاف و منشأ كل حقيقة و نعت و وصف ذاتي أو عرضي.

ثم إن ما يختلف من الهيوليات و الجسميات اختلافا نوعيا أعني اختلافا بالفصول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٨٧

و الصور كهيوليات الأفلاك و جسمياتها المختلفة و هيولى العناصر و طبائعها النوعية - فالأمر فيهما واضح لعدم تقدمها ذاتا و لا زمانا على تلك الطبائع الخاصة.

و أما الهيولى بما هي واحدة بالنوع بالجسمية المشتركة أو واحدة بالشخص - كما زعمه قوم ثم يتصور بصورة بعد

صورة فباستعدادات تلحقها و يختلف بها من أسباب علوية بإعداد الحركات الدورية كما ينكشف في موضعه إن شاء الله

فصل (٩) في أن وجود الصور الطبيعية و القوى الجسمانية ليست في أطراف و نهايات للأجرام

إن الصور و القوى لا يجوز أن يختص في الجسم بحد غير منقسم منه كنقطة أو سطح بل يجب أن يكون سارية فيه إذا كانت تحل في الجسم بما هو جسم أي في نفس ذاته المنقسمة إذ لو كانت موجودة في حد منه غير منقسم لا في الجسم كله لزم أن يكون لذلك الحد وجود منحاز عن وجود الجسم فلا يكون نهاية له هذا خلف.

و لأن من الأجسام ما ليس له حد خطي أو نقطي كالكرة و أشباهها و الجسم المستدير الفلكي لم يتعين فيه نقطة و لا خط كالقطب و المحور ما لم يتحرك فلو كان وجوده القوة المحركة في تلك النقطة أو ذلك الخط لكان وجودها بعد وجود الحركة بمرتبتين و هذا ممتنع فبقي أن وجودها ليس في أمر غير منقسم.

ثم إنك قد علمت أن المقدار و الوضع من لوازم الأجسام بل من مقوماتها كما ذهب إليه جماعة من المعتبرين فإذا قارن الجسم أمر لا يصح أن لا يوجد له المقدار - و الوضع و ما يجري مجراهما و إلا لم يكن وجوده في الجسم من حيث هو جسم بل مع زيادة معنى غير منقسم كالأبوة و أمثالها فيجب أن يعرض للطباع و القوى الجسمانية هذه الأمور بالعرض و ليست مقارنة القوى و الصور للوضع و المقدار و ما

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يجري مجراهما من الجسم كمقارنتها للسواد و الحركة و ما يشابههما.

إذ ليس هذه الأمور حالها حال مثل المقدار و الوضع بالقياس إلى الجسم و ما يقوم به فإنه يرتفع بارتفاعهما الجسم و ما يقوم به و لا يرتفع بارتفاع مثل السواد و الحركة.

فلهذا لا يؤثر مثل هذه الأمور في القوى و الصور و الأعراض الموجودة في الجسم كما لا يؤثر فيه إذ لو كانت مؤثرة كان ارتفاعها يوجب ارتفاع ما يؤثر.

أ و لا ترى أنه إذا عدم المقدار أو الوضع أو الشكل من الجسم لم يبق الجسم و لا القوة الموجودة فيه أو العرض الموجود فيه و إذا عدم نصف المقدار عدم نصف السواد و لا كذلك السواد مع غيره كالحركة فليس إذا عدم السواد عدم الحركة و لا إذا عدم نصفه عدم نصفها

تلويح عرشي

و مما يجب أن يعلم هاهنا أيضا أن الوحدة في بعض الأشياء عين الانقسام - كالعدد أو عين قبول الانقسام كالزمان و المقادير فإن حقيقة العدد التي بها تحصله و قوامه هي نفس المنقسم إلى الوحدات لا أمر يعرضه الانقسام إليها و حقيقة الزمان كما سيجيء نفس الاتصال المتجدد الغير القار و حقيقة المقدار نفس الكمية الاتصالية - التي لها قوة الانقسام و في بعض الأشياء تغاير الانقسام سواء ينافيها أو يجامعها من جهتين لا من جهة واحدة و إلا لكان عددا فالأول كالواجب الوجود و كالعقول - و كنفس جهة الوحدة و الثاني كالأشياء التي لها جهة تمام و جهة نقص.

فالفلك و الحيوان مثلا لكل منهما جهة جسمية بها يقبل الانقسام بالقوة أو بالفعل و هي الجهة التي بها يكون كل منهما ناقصا و جهة نفسية أو عقلية بها لا تقبل الانقسام لا بالقوة و لا بالفعل و هي الجهة التمامية التي بها يكون تاما فالفلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٨٩

فلكيته التي تمامه لا يصلح لأن يصير فلكين أي تصير النفس ذا نفسين و الحيوان بما هو حيوان لا يصلح لأن يصير حيوانين أعني ذا ذاتين وإنما صار جسمية كل منهما قابلة لأن يصير جسمين لأن بمجرد الجسمية لا يصير الشيء ذا حقيقة تامة لأن وحدتها كما علمت عين قبول الكثرة و تمامها عين النقصان.

و من هاهنا علم أن الجسم بما هو جسم كالجنس و أما الصور الطبيعية فهي أيضا ذات جهتين جهة قبول الانقسام و جهة عدم الانقسام و هي متفاوتة بحسب غلبة إحدى الجهتين على الأخرى.

فكلما كانت أنزل مرتبة و أشد إلصاقا بالجسمية و أقرب درجة إلى المادة الأولى - و أبعد وجودا عن وجود الفاعل الأول فهي أقبل للكثرة و الانقسام و أبعد عن التمام - و كلما كانت عكس هذه الأوصاف عليها أغلب فهي أقبل للوحدة و أقرب إلى التمام و أمتع عن قبول الخرق و الالتيام و الصق بعالم الصور المجردة عن الأبعاد و الأجرام - و كذلك حكم الأعراض و الكيفيات فإن بعضها أبعد عن الوحدة و التمامية من بعض - فإن السواد و البياض ليسا كالكرة و الدائرة إذ يتصور لكل من هاتين وحدة و تمامية بحسب الواقع و أما فيهما فليس شيء من الوحدة و التمامية إلا بحسب المقايسة و الاعتبار.

فالموجود من الشكل في كل جزء من أجزاء الجسم المشكل جزء منه و تمامه موجود في كلية الجسم و كلية الجسم الذي له وحدة طبيعية غير موجود في كل جزء من أجزائه و ليس كذلك حال مثل السواد و البياض.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٩٠

و أما القوى الجسمانية فإن كان لها تمام و معنى زائد على أنها قوة في الجسم - فإنها موجودة في كلية الجسم و أما أجزاؤها ففي أجزاء الجسم فالنفس من حيث إنها قوة في الجسم فلها أجزاء بحسب أجزائه الشريف من أجزائها في الشريف من أجزاء الجسم كالقلب و الدماغ و الخسيس من أجزائها في الخسيس من أجزائه كالعقب و العجز.

هذا إذا اعتبر الأجزاء المختلفة للبدن و أما إذا اعتبر أجزائه المتشابهة المقدارية فليس بإزائها من النفس إلا قوة متشابهة سارية في الجميع على نحو واحد متشابه و كأنها هي المسماة بالطبيعة التي عرفت بأنها مبدأ أول لحركة ما هي فيه و سكونه بالذات لا بالعرض أو ما هو كالألة للطبيعة و هو الميل فإن تلك الطبيعة قوة من قوى النفس سارية في الأجسام ذوات النفوس و هي في البسائط صورة نوعية مبدأ فصل أخير و في المركبات سيما ذوات النفوس ليست صورة مقومة بل حكمها حكم سائر القوى و الكيفيات.

و أما النفس من حيث إنها أمر في نفسها تامة الحقيقة مع قطع النظر عن أنها قوة في الجسم أو مباشرة لتحريكه أو تدبيره فليست هي ذات تجز من هذه الحيثية - و لا لها أجزاء في أجزاء الجسم لأنها ليست ناقصة كأجزائها أو قواها التي توجد في الجسم فحكمها حكم الذوات المفارقة عن المواد و من حيث لها قوة سارية فيه فهي أمر منقسم بانقسامه فما أشبه حال النفس بأمر مركب من مادة و صورة أو حيوان متألف من بدن و نفس لأنها ذات جهتين إحداهما قوة سارية في البدن حكمها حكم سائر الصور الطبيعية و الأخرى غير سارية فيه كالمفارقات.

فهذا حال النفوس المجردة الذوات و أما غيرها فجهة الوحدة فيها ضعيفة مغلوبة - كالنباتات و رب حيوان كالحيات إذا جزي بقسمين توجد في كل واحد من قسميه - قوة محركة حساسة زمانا مديدا كما يوجد في كل من قطعتي بعض الأشجار قوة نامية يظهر فعلها عند الغرس

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ١٩١

فصل (١٠) في الإشارة إلى نحو وجود الأشياء الكائنات

قد علمت مما سبق بعض الأسباب القريبة لوجود الأمور الطبيعية و هي المادة الأولى و الصورة و انجر البحث في تلازمهما إلى إثبات السبب العقلي الفاعلي للأجسام - و ستقف فيما يرد عليك من مباحث الحركات الكلية إثبات الغايات العقلية و هما سببان قاصيان لوجود الكائنات التي هي تحت السماويات فلو كان وجود هذه الأشياء على وجه يصح حصولها من ذينك السببين المفارقين فقط من غير حاجة إلى سببين مفارقين - لكانت سبيلها أن يبقى و يدوم و لكانت على تمامها اللائق في أول تكونها فكان أولها عين آخرها و لكن لما كان قوامها من مادة و صورة و كانت مع ذلك متضادة الصور - متفاسدة الكيفيات الأولية و كل مادة لتكونها قوة قابلة.

فإن من شأنها أن يوجد لها هذه الصورة و ضدها صار لكل واحد من هذه الأجسام حق و استيهال بصورته و حق و استيهال بمادته فالذي له بحق صورته أن يبقى و يدوم على الوجه الذي له و الذي له بحق مادته أن يتغير و يوجد لها وجود مضاد لوجوده الذي كان لها و إذا كان لا يمكن أن يوفى هذان الحقان معا في وقت واحد إذ لا يمكن أن يتصور المادة بصور متضادة في زمان واحد.

بل نقول إن جميع صور الموجودات التي في هذا العالم كانت في العالم العقلي بإبداع الواجب تعالى إياها كما ستعلم و قد مرت الإشارة إلى وجود هذه الصور وجودا مفارقا و كان وجود الفاعل الأول يقتضي تكميل المادة بوجودها في هذا العالم - لأنه من التوابع المتأخرة على سبيل الفيض و كان إيجادها في المادة على سبيل الإبداع مستحيلا إذ هي غير متأتية بل متعصية لوجود صورتين معا فضلا عن تلك الكثرة - فقدر بلطف حكيمته حركة دورية و زمانا غير منبث و مادة مستحيلة من صورة إلى صورة و لزم ضرورة أن يوفى هذه إلى مدة و ذا إلى مدة فيوجد هذه و يبقى مدة ما

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محفوظة الوجود.

ثم يتلف و يوجد ضدها ثم يبقى ذلك مدة ثم يفتنى و هكذا فإنه ليس وجود أحد الضدين أولى من وجود الآخر و لا بقاؤه أولى من بقاء الآخر فلكل منهما قسط من الوجود و البقاء.

و أيضا لما كانت المادة مشتركة بينهما فلكل منهما حق عند الآخر و يكون عنده شيء ما لغيره و عند غيره شيء ما له فعند كل منهما حق ما ينبغي أن يصير إلى صاحبه فالعدل في هذا أن تؤخذ مادته فتعطى لذلك و لذاك أن تؤخذ مادته فتعطى لهذا و تتعاقب المادة بينهما فلاجل الحاجة إلى توفية العدل في هذه الموجودات لم يمكن أن يبقى الشيء الواحد دائما على أنه واحد بالشخص كما قيل شعرا -

از آن سرد آمد این کاخ دل آویز که چون جا گرم کردی گویدت خیز

فجعل بقاء الدهر على أنه واحد بالنوع وهكذا بقاء المادة الأولى والحركة الأولى والزمان الذي بها وجود هذا العالم فإن لكل منها وحدة كوحدة الجنس وكل باق بالمعنى لا بالعدد فيحتاج في أن يوجد إلى أشخاص بعد أشخاص فيوجد أشخاص ذلك النوع مدة ثم يتلف ويقوم مقامها أشخاص آخر منه فيبقى مدة ثم يتلف ويقوم مقام الأشخاص السالفة أشخاص آخر أيضا من ذلك النوع وعلى هذا المثال إلى ما شاء الله وأراد

فصل (١١) في الإشارة إلى الصور الأول وما بعدها وإلى نحو بقاء الفاسدات

منها أن من الصور ما هي أسطقسات.

و منها ما هي كائنة عن اختلاطها فمن هذه ما هي عن اختلاط أكثر تركيبا.

و منها ما هي اختلاط أقل تركيبا.

و أما الأسطقسات فإن المضاد المتلف لكل واحد منها هو من خارجه فقط إذ كان لا ضد له في جملة جسميته و أما الكائن عن امتزاج أقل تركيبا فإن المضادات

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التي فيه يسيرة وقواها منكسرة ضعيفة فلذلك صار المضاد المفسد له في ذاته ضعيفا قليل التأثير لا يتلفه إلا المفسد من خارج فصار المفسد له أيضا من خارج و ما هو كائن عن امتزاج بعد امتزاج و عن اختلاط أكثر تركيبا فبكثرة المتضادات فيه و تراكيبها يكون تضاد المختلطات فيه أظهر و أقوى المتضادات فيه قوية.

و أيضا لما كان حصولها من أجزاء و أبعاد غير متشابهة لم يمتنع أن يكون منها تضاد و تفسد فيكون المضاد المتلف له من خارج جسمه و من داخله و ما كان من الكائنات يتلفه المضاد من خارج فإنه لا يتحلل من تلقاء نفسه دائما مثل الماء و الحجارة فإن هذين و ما جانسهما إنما يتحللان من الخارجيات فقط و أما غيرها من النبات و الحيوان فإنها تتحلل من أشياء متضادة لها من داخل و أشياء مضادة لها من خارج.

فلذلك إن كان شيء من هذه يتعلق عناية الله بأن يبقى صورته مدة ما أعطاه قوة تخلف بدل ما يتحلل من جسمه دائما و يكون ذلك شيئا يقوم مقام ما يتحلل و لا يمكن إلا بأن ينجذب إلى جسمه جسم آخر يتصل به فيخلع عن ذلك الجسم صورته - التي كانت له و يكتسي صورة هذا الجسم بعينه فجعلت في هذه الأجسام لصورها قوى أخرى هي الغذائية و ما يخدمها و يعينها حتى صار كل جسم من هذه الأجسام يجتذب إلى نفسه شيئا ما مضادا له فينسلخ عنده تلك الضدية و يقبله بذاته و يكسوه الصورة التي هو متلبس بها إلى أن ينفذ هذه القوة منه في طول المدة فيتحلل من ذلك الجسم ما لا يمكن للقوة الجابرة أن يرد مثله فيتلف.

فبهذا الوجه ينحفظ الأجسام من المتلف الداخل و أما انحفاظ الجسم من المتلف الخارج فبالآلات جعلت بعضها فيه كقوة النشو في النبات يخرج الأوراق للصيانة عن الحر و البرد المفسدين من خارج و كقوة الحركة الإرادية في الحيوان و بعضها من خارج جسمه متصلا كان أو غير متصل أما المتصل فكالأوراق للنبات و كالشعور - و المخالب و الأنف و الأظفار و الأنياب للحيوانات و أما المنفصل فكالألبسة و آلات الحروب للإنسان

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و كاليوت و المساكين للحيوان.

ثم إذا كانت العناية متعلقة ببقاء ما لا يبقى إلا بالنوع لا بالعدد لما علمت فاحتيج في أن يقوم مقام ما تلف من الأشخاص أشخاص أخرى يدوم بها الواحد النوعي إلى قوة أخرى تخلف مادة منفصلة عن مادة الشخص السابق يحدث فيها صورة غير الصورة السابقة بالعدد لينحفظ بها و بأمثالها النوع يقال لها القوة المولدة و لها أيضا خوادم و معينات ليس هذه مقام تفصيلها و موعدها مباحثها عن ذي قبل إن شاء الله الحكيم

الفن الخامس

في أن نحو وجود الأجسام الطبيعية ليس إلا على سبيل التجدد و الانقضاء و الحدوث الاستمراري من غير دوام و لا بقاء و كنا قد أحكمنا بنیان هذا المطلب و أوضحنا برهانه و سهلنا سبيله لمن وفق له فيما مضى من الكلام حيث تكلمنا في فصول المرحلة الرابعة التي في مباحث القوة و الفعل و أحكامهما و الحركة و السكون و نحو وجود الطبيعة التي هي العلة القريبة للحركة سيما الفصل المعنون بالحكمة المشرقية في فصل كيفية ربط المتغير بالثابت و فصل إثبات الحركة في الجوهر - و الذب عن الاشتداد الجوهر في الجواهر المادية لكننا نريد أن نذكر هاهنا نمطا آخر من الكلام ما فيه زيادة توضيح و تأكيد لهذا المرام إذ فيه غرابة عن ما ارتكز في أذهان الجماهير و حيد عن المشهور عند الناس من أن الفلسفة كأنها توجب القول بقدوم الأجسام سيما الأفلاك و الكواكب و كليات العناصر.

فلاجل ذلك أساءوا الظن بأعظم الحكماء السابقين فنسبوا إليهم القول بتسرمد الأفلاك و نحوها نعم هذا الطعن يتوجه إلى متأخريهم لقصور أنظارهم و عدم صفاء ضمائرهم و خواطرهم كل الصفاء.

فالذي وصل إلينا من مآثورات كلامهم خلاف ما اشتهر عند المتأخرين من أن مذهبهم قدم العالم و تسرمد الأفلاك كما ستطلع عليه من أقوالهم سنذكرها في هذه الفصول

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فصل (١) فيه لامعة عرشية

قد لوحنا لك فيما سلف من الكلام أن إدارة الأفلاك و تسيير الكواكب و جريان العالم على ما هو به إنما الغرض به أن يكون العالم كله خيرا و سعادة و أن أصل الإبداع و الإيجاد جود البارئ و رحمته و إيصال كل شيء إلى كماله و منتهاه و تحريكه إلى غايته و مناه و إبلاغ السافل إلى العالي و تصوير كل مادة بصورتها اللائقة بها و تصيرها أفضل ما يتصور في حقها.

فكما أن بلوغ المتحرك الطبيعي إلى حيزه سكونه و كذا بلوغ الطبيعة إلى القوة النفسانية غايتها فكذا بلوغ النفس إلى درجة العقل سكونها و هو نهاية النفس كما أن البارئ نهاية العقل و ما دونه فعند ذلك الراحة الدائمة و الطمأنينة التامة و الخير العظمى.

و هذا هو الغرض الأقصى في بناء العالم و تحريك السماوات و تسيير الكواكب و الأجرام و سائر الاستحالات و الانقلابات و في إنزال الملائكة و الرسل ع - من السماء بالكتب و الوحي و الأنباء أعني أن الغرض كله أن يصير العالم كله خيرا - فيزول منه الشر و النقص و يعود إلى ما بدأ منه فيصير لاحقا آخره بأوله و عاطفا نهاية دوره بمبدئه فيتم الحكمة و تكمل الخلقة و يرتفع عالم الكون و الفساد و يبطل الدنيا و يقوم القيامة الكبرى و ينمحق الشر و أهله و

ينقرض الكفر و حزبه و يبطل الباطل و يحق الحق بكلماته فهذا هو الغرض الأقصى و المعرفة العظمى.
 فظهر من هذا البيان أن الأجسام و طبائعها و قواها كلها عرضة للدثور و الفناء و لا حظ لها من الديمومة و البقاء فاحفظ
 هذا السر المخزون و العلم المكنون الذي لا يمسه إلا المطهرون.

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سر آخر في تلاشي عالم الطبيعة و دثوره و فناءه.

إن أصل اللذات الحسية و الأنوار و الألوان المبتهجة و الروائح و الطعوم اللذيذة و الأصوات المطربة كلها موجودة في
 الطبيعة من إفاضة النفس عليها بإذن الله سبحانه فإليها مساقها و معادها.
 و لأجل ذلك ترى نفوسنا ينتزع تلك الصور عن موادها إليها بقواها الحسية- و يتصرف فيها كيف يشاء بقوتها المتصرفية
 و المتخيلة فكل ما بقي في الطبيعة فهي في النفس- تنزل إليها غير أن الطبيعة شوشتها و كدرتها لما مازحتها و
 اختلطت بها إذ كانت دونها في الرتبة.

و قد مر بيان أن الوجود الجسماني ممزوج بالأعدام و مختلط لبه بالقشور و صفاه بالكدور فسميت تلك الشوائب
 المكدره شرا و وبالا لما كانت معوقة للخيرات- و حصلت من ذلك الأشياء المتضادة المخالفة بعضها لبعض من الشرور
 و النقائص و الآفات و المحن و سائر ما يوجد في هذا العالم الطبيعي و هو بجملته عالم الكون و الفساد و عالم التضاد
 سواء كان على نعت الاتصال كعالم الأفلاك أو على نعت الانفصال الانفكاكي كعالم الأسطقسات و المركبات و كل كمال
 و لذة في هذا العالم فأصله في عالم آخر و هو هناك على وجه أتم و أقوى و أشد و أعلى و ألد و أصفى.

و كيف يتوهم متوهم أن اللذات و الخيرات موجودة في المحل الناقص- و معدومة في المحل الفاضل و إذا كان الأمر
 كما وصفناه فكل شيء يعود إلى أصله و كل ناقص يتوجه و يرجع إلى كماله و كل سعيد ينقلب إلى أهله مسرورا و كل
 شقي يتعذب مدة بشقائه و يتبدل عليه جلوده نضجا بعد نضج حتى يصعد إلى دار النعيم أو يهوي إلى مقره في الحميم
**فَأَمَّا مَنْ طَغَىٰ وَ آثَرَ الْحَيَاةَ الدُّنْيَا فَإِنَّ الْجَحِيمَ هِيَ الْمَأْوَىٰ - وَ أَمَّا مَنْ خَافَ مَقَامَ رَبِّهِ وَ نَهَىٰ النَّفْسَ عَنِ الْهَوَىٰ
 فَإِنَّ الْجَنَّةَ هِيَ الْمَأْوَىٰ**

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سر آخر

قد انكشف لك مما شددنا عليك بيانه و أوضحنا برهانه أن الطبيعة الجسمانية فلكية كانت أو عنصرية مما يتلاشى و
 يضمحل شيئا فشيئا و لو نظرت إلى أحوال نفسك و كل ذي نفس ظهر لك أن شأن ما يتصرف فيه النفس من الطبائع و
 القوى و الأجرام أن تذوب و تذبل و يتحلل ذاتها و صفاتها على التدريج في خدمة النفس و طاعة الأمر الأعلى.
 و هكذا شأن كل سافل بالنسبة إلى العالي و دأب كل فرع بالنظر إلى أصله- و كل معلول بالقياس إلى علته.

ثم لو تأملت قليلا لوجدت أن النفس التي وقعت لها أدنى ارتفاع عن مقام الطبيعة و درجة الحس فهي غير راضية في
 الكون مع الطبيعة و لا مشتاقة في الرجوع إليها لأنها مجبولة في محبة البقاء و التفاخر على أتم الحالات و لو لم يكن
 ذلك مقتضى غريزة كل نفس لما كانت كل واحدة من النفوس البشرية بل الحيوانية يشتهي أن يكون أمير نوعه و سلطان

بلده و رئيس أهله.

و هذا شيء مركوز في جبلة كل ذي نفس أعني الارتقاء إلى مرتبة العقل و اشتياقها إليه أكثر من اشتياقها إلى مرتبة الحس و الطبيعة و سائر الأشياء الدنية و الشهوات الحسية إن لم يعقها عائق و لم يخرجها مخرج عن فطرتها الأصلية إلى فطرة الطبيعة و ما دونها.

فإذا كانت النفس سليمة الفطرة غير مريضة كان شوقها إلى ما فوقها إذ كانت معالي الأمور أشبه إليها كما أن سفسافها و نقائصها أشبه بالطبيعة فالنفس إذن مجتهدة دائما في طلب البقاء كارهة من التجدد و الزوال و البقاء كما علمت ليس من صفات الطبيعة و هو من صفات العقل.

فبهذا الاجتهاد الغريزي إذا وصلت إلى مرادها و هو مقام العقل تخلت عن الطبيعة و اتحدت بالعقل.

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و قد علمت أيضا فيما مضى صحة اتحاد النفس بالعقل و ليس أن النفس إذا انفصلت عن الطبيعة بقيت للطبيعة هوية منفصلة عن هوية النفس لأن هذا من سخيף القول كما مر بيانه غير مرة فإذا ارتحلت النفس عن مقام الطبيعة بطلت الطبيعة و دثرت لأن قيامها بالنفس كما أن قوام النفس بالعقل و قوام الكل بالحي القيوم و لأجل أن قوام الطبيعة بالنفس و كأنها كانت تحس بالفناء و الاضمحلال دون النفس صارت جذابة للنفس إليها و متروكة في عينها حائلة بينها و بين تقدسها و طهارتها و اتصالها بالعقل مخافة أن يبطل و يضمحل.

و هذا أيضا لحكمة و مصلحة من الله في اشتغال النفس برهة من الزمان - لتدبير عالم الطبيعة إلى أن يقضي الله أمرا كان مفعولا فإذا ثبت بالبرهان المأخوذ - من العلة الغائية أن جميع عالم الطبيعة دأثر هالك.

وهم وتعليم.

و لك أن تقول لم وجب الدثور و الفناء للطبيعة و كيف لا يلتحق بمنزلة النفس - كما يلتحق النفس بمنزلة العقل قلت قد علمت ذلك فيما سبق و أما البيان اللامي لذلك فهو أن النفس حيث كانت ذات جهتين لأنها من جهة ذاتها كأنها جوهر عقلي ثابت بالقوة و من جهة تعلقها بالطبيعة و نسبتها إليها جوهر متجدد غير ثابت و هاتان الجهتان مما يشبه أن يكون أحدهما مقومة للنفس داخلية في قوامها لأنها الجنبه العالية - و الأخرى لاحقة لذاتها و هي الجنبه السافلة المضافة إلى أمر متجدد.

فإذا سقطت عنها هذه الإضافات رجعت إلى منبعها الأصلي و حيزها العقلي و أما الطبيعة فهي سارية في أقطار الهاوية نائية عن عالم البقاء و النور متخلصة إلى محل التجدد و الدثور فهي لاهية عن الأمور العقلية غير عارفة بها و لا مشتاقة إليها فلا يمكنها اللحق بعالم البقاء و بما فيها من الجهة العقلية النوعية فحكمها حكم سائر المعاني النوعية.

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و الكليات الطبيعية لا وجود لها استقلالاً إلا بما يقومها وجودا و يحصلها شخصا - فهي أيضا جسمانية الكون و كل جسماني الكون فهو متجدد الوجود لا بقاء له و لا ثبات فيه فالطبيعة لا شعور لها بذاتها و لا غيرها فلا شوق لها إلى عالم العقل فلا يدوم و أيضا لا يمكن بقاؤها إلا بالنفس كما مر.

وقد علمت أن النفس لا تدوم فيها و معها بل يرتقي عنها و تخليها لأنها محنة و عذاب لها و إنما أهبطت النفس إليها و بليت بها لعصيان و نقصان اعتراها في النشأة الأولى و خطيئة صدرت عنها في مبدأ الوجود و أول الولادة فاستوجب الوقوع في موضع البلية و المحنة حتى يزول عنها النقائص و العيوب و درن الذنوب و وسخ الجرائم فتخرج عند ذلك عن السجن الطبيعي.

ثم إن مكان البلية لا يبقى عند خروج المذنب من ذنبه كما أن السجن إذا خرج عنه المسجون لم يبق له بيت مغلق بابه و لا أيضا حاجة إلى السجن بعد خروج المسجون.

و إليه الإشارة بقول الصادق ع

: لا يقوم الساعة و على وجه الأرض من يقول الله الله

فلذلك وجب في الحكمة الإلهية و السنة الواجبية زوال الطبيعة و تلاشيها و دثورها و اضمحلالها. فثبت بالبرهان الصريح أن ذهاب الطبيعة و دثور الأجسام أمر ممكن واجب في الحكمة و أن الطبيعة سواء كانت سماوية أو أرضية إذا استحالت و ذهبت تخلت النفس و لخراب البيت [البدن] ارتحلت كما قال سبحانه **إِذَا السَّمَاءُ انشَقَّتْ وَ أَدْنَتْ لِرَبِّهَا وَ حَقَّتْ وَ إِذَا الْأَرْضُ مُدَّتْ وَ أَلْقَتْ مَا فِيهَا وَ تَخَلَّتْ** فإن انشقاق السماء إشارة إلى ذهاب طبيعتها عند ما رجعت نفسها إلى بارئها- و أدنت داعيها و هو مفاد قوله تعالى **يَا أَيَّتُهَا النَّفْسُ الْمُطْمَئِنَّةُ ارْجِعِي إِلَىٰ رَبِّكِ رَاضِيَةً مَّرْضِيَّةً فَادْخُلِي فِي عِبَادِي وَ ادْخُلِي جَنَّتِي**

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فصل (٢) في إثبات أن كل متحرك جسما كان أو طبيعة أو نفسا سيؤول إلى فناء بل كل شيء هالك إلا وجهه كما نطق به القرآن و وافقه البرهان

و اعلم أن البارئ جل ذكره فاعل كل شيء و قد مر في مباحث العلل و المعلولات و أحكامها أن الغاية الذاتية لكل شيء يرجع إلى فاعله بوجوه صحيحة قوية لا حاجة إلى إعادتها ها هنا لحصول الغناء عنها بالرجوع إلى ما هناك لمن كان له قلب متوقد.

و بالجملة إنه جل مجده خير محض لا شرف فيه أصلا و وجود صرف لا يشوبه عدم و كل ما يكون خيرا محضا و وجودا بحثا يطلبه و يتقرب إليه كل شيء طبعاً و إرادة أو يطلب ما يطلبه و يتقرب إلى ما يتقرب إليه طبعاً و إرادة. **و هذا** أمر مركوز في جملة العالم و جزئياته و كلياته و محسوساته و معقولاته و أرضياته و سماوياته و مركباته و مبسوطاته كما قال سبحانه **و لِلَّهِ يَسْجُدُ مَنْ فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ طَوْعاً وَ كَرْهاً وَ ظِلَالُهُمْ** و قوله **وَ إِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا يَسْبُحُ بِحَمْدِهِ** و من تصفح أجزاء العالم لم يجد موجوداً إلا و له توجه غريزي أو حركة جبلية إلى ما هو أعلى منه طلباً للبقاء الأبد و الشرف الأقوم و تخلصاً عن الوجود الأنقص المشوب بالعدم و الفساد و هكذا.

فما من موجود إلا و له عشق و شوق غريزي إلى ما وراءه و هذا المعنى في بعض الأشياء معلوم بالضرورة و في بعضها مشهود بالحس و في بعضها مكشوف بالبرهان و في الكل متيقن بالاستقراء و التتبع مع الحدس الصحيح فضلاً عن البرهان المشار إليه من أن الوجود خير محض مؤثر لذاته و ما ذكر أيضاً فيما سلف من أن العالي لا يفعل شيئاً لأجل السافل بل لأجل ذاته كالبارئ أو لأجل ما هو أشرف من ذاته كما سواه.

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حتى أن النار لا يحرق شيئا كالحطب مثلاً لأجل أن يحترق المادة و كذا الماء لا يرطب شيئا كالشوب لأجل أن يبطل بل لأجل أن يكمل كل منهما ذاته و يحافظ على جوهره و طبعه.

و كذا النفس لا يدبر البدن لأن ينصلح حال البدن و يعتدل مزاجه و يستقيم نظام أجزائه بل لأن يبلغ إلى كماله أو يصل إلى غايتها و ينال بغيتها و شهوتها فكل موجود سافل له طريق إلى كماله العالي يسلكه طبعاً أو إرادة و كل من تصور في حقه نوع من الكمال فلا محالة يتوجه إليه و يطلبه أو يشاق إلى طلبه طبعياً أو شوقاً نفسانياً.

و هذا الطلب و الشوق المركوزان في جبلة الأشياء لو لم يكن لهما غاية ذاتية - و نهاية ضرورية لازمة لكان ارتكازه في الجبلة و الغريزة عبثاً و باطلاً و هباءً و معطلاً و لا باطل في الوجود و لا تعطيل في الطبيعة.

فقد علم أن لكل سافل قوة إمكان الوصول إلى ما هو أعلى منه.

و هذا الإمكان إما ذاتي فقط كما في المبدعات و إما استعدادي كما في المكونات - ففي الإبداعات إذ قد ثبت الإمكان و وجد المقتضي و رفع المانع و القاصر حصل المقصود و الغاية و المانع و القاصر لا يوجدان في المفارقات لعدم التضاد و التزاحم كما في عالم الحركات فالوصول متحقق أبداً.

و أما في هذا العالم فالقواصر و الشرور و إن كانت موجودة إلا أنها ليست دائمية و لا أكثرية لأنها من الأسباب الاتفاقية لا من الأسباب الذاتية للأشياء و قد برهن في مباحث العلة و المعلول أن العلل الاتفاقية أقلية الوجود لا تدوم و مع قلتها و انقطاعها لا يوجد إلا في غير الفلكيات.

و أما فيها فالطبائع الأثرية على مقتضى حالها من الفوز بمقاماتها اللائقة فلها الوصول الدائم إلى معاشيقها العقلية من جهة نفوسها الكلية و لها أيضاً في كل آن وصول تدريجي إلى مقصودها من جهة نفوسها الجزئية.

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و اعلم أن الغاية للطبيعة الجزئية أولاً و بالذات طبيعة جزئية أخرى و هكذا إلى ما شاء الله و الغاية في الطبيعة الكلية طبيعة عقلية أخرى فوقها بالعلية و الشرف.

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول إن لكل طبيعة حسية فلكية أو عنصرية طبيعة أخرى في العالم الإلهي و هي المثل الإلهية و الصور المفارقة و هي صور ما في علم الله و كأنها هي التي سماها أفلاطن و شيعته بالمثل النورية و هي حقائق متأصلة نسبتها إلى هذه الصور الحسية الدائرة نسبة الأصل إلى المثل و الشبح و إنما هي تكون أصول هذه الأشباح الكائنة المتجددة لأنها فاعلها و غايتها و صورتها أيضاً بوجه لأن تلك الأصول الأعْلون هي عقليات بالفعل و هذه لا يخلو عن القوة و الإمكان.

و هذه بحسب وجودها الكوني سالكة نحوها مشتاقة إليها فهي من حيث جزئيتها و تشخصها الزماني الاتصالي تنال منها شيئاً فشيئاً على التوالي حسب توارد الاستعدادات الزمانية فيحصل صورها على موادها حصولاً بعد حصول على التدريج و ذلك لأن لكل صورة مفارقة شئونا و جهات و وجوها و حيثيات لا يحيط بها إلا الله.

و أما بحسب وجودها العقلي فهي واصلية إليها متحدة بها اتحاد ذي الغاية بغايتها - عند بلوغ النهاية و تمام الحركة و أما

تلك العقلیات و المثل النوریات و العلوم الإلهیات فهي أبدا متصلة بفاعلها و غایتها ملاحظة لجمال بارئها مستغرقة في بحر اللاهوتية - مطموسة في نور الأحدية القيومية بحيث لم يرجع إلى ذاتها طرفة عين لأن الإمكان هناك لا يفارق الوجوب و القوة لا یباین الفعلية و النقص لا یخلو عن التمام.

فهي أبدا مستهلكة الذوات في ذات الحبيب الأول لا فرق بينهم و بین حبیبهم كما ورد في الحديث القدسي و لا مجال لهم في الأنانية و الغيرية.

و أما إبليس و جنوده و هم أصحاب الأوهام و الاحتجابات فليسوا منهم و لا من طبقتهم و إلا لما وقع منهم الافتخار و الأنانية و الإباء عن السجود لأن لكل من العالین سجود و ركوع و خضوع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٠٣

وهم وإزالة -

و ليس لأحد أن ينكر وجود العشق الرباني و المحبة الإلهية في هذه الصور المفارقة لما بینا أن محبة العالی مركوزة في جبلة السافل و لا له أن يقول المحبة لا توجب الوصول و إلا لما وجد في العالم محب مهجور و لو سلم الوصول فربما كان المطلوب نيل التشبه بالمعشوق أو القرب منه لا الوصلة و الاتحاد.

لأننا نقول إن كل ميل أو شوق جبلي مركوز في قوة ذات الشيء فمعنى ارتكازه فيها هو أن يمكن لها بحسبه حصول ما يميل و يشاق إلى إذا خلى و طبعه إلا لمانع خارج عن هوية ذات الشيء.

ثم إن التخلف عن مقتضى ذات الشيء لمانع و الحرمان عنه لا يكون إلا في عالم الاتفاقات و الأضداد و ذلك أيضا يوجد في بعض أشخاص النوع المعوقة عما يقصده بحسب فطرتها الأولى من جهة خصوص هوياتها الجزئية على سبيل الشذوذ لا من جهة طبائعها النوعية فإنها أيضا منتهية إلى غاياتها و أما ما ارتفع عن الكون فكل منه على مقتضى ما فطر عليه من غير تخلف عما يهيمه و يطلبه.

و إذا ثبت هذا فقول القائل يجوز أن يكون المطلوب أمرا نسبيا كالتشبه أو القرب من المطلوب مدفوع بأن هذه الأمور إن أريد بها نفس المعاني الإضافية فليس من المطالب الصحيحة إذ لا وجود لها استقلالاً سيما في الذوات العالية و كذا إن أريد بها أمر عرضي لأن العرض أخس رتبة من أن يكون غاية ذاتية لأمر جوهری فإن غاية الشيء و مطلوبه يجب أن يكون أعلى و أشرف منه.

و الجوهر أي جوهر كان أشرف من العرض فلو كان كذلك لزم كون شيء واحد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٠٤

شريفا و خسيسا معا من جهة واحدة كما لا يخفى.

ثم لو تكلف متكلف يجوز أن يكون الغاية المطلوبة كون ذلك الجوهر مجامعا لتلك الصفة العرضية الكمالية.

قلنا ذلك على تقدير صحته لا يضرنا لأن الكلام عائد إليه في أنه مع كونه على تلك الصفة فهو إما على غاية الخير و التمام التي لا أتم و لا أشرف منه أو يكون فوقه كمال أتم خيرية و أشرف وجودا و أعلى رتبة.

فعلى الأول يلزم المطلوب و على الثاني يتحقق له غاية أخرى تقتضي ذلك الشيء بحسب جبلته طلبه و الالتجاء إليه لما

مر من أنه ما من موجود سوى الواجب القيوم جل ذكره إلا وله غاية مطلوبة فوقه والكلام جار أيضا في غاية غايته و هكذا إلى أن يدور أو يتسلسل أو ينتهي إلى غاية قصوى لا غاية فوقها وهو الباري غاية الكل و فاعل الكل جل سبحانه فهو الواحد القهار.

فثبت و تحقق أنه لا قديم سواه وإليه يرجع الأمر كله فسبحان الذي بيده ملكوت كل شيء وإليه ترجعون.

حكمة مشرقية.

كل هوية سواء كانت واجبة أو ممكنة فلا بد لها من لوازم عقلية وفروع - هي معاليه كالشيئية والمعلولية و الموجودة و خصوصا الهوية التي أصل الهويات و منبع كل إنية و وجود و منشأ كل مفهوم و ماهية فإذا الذات الإلهية لها أشعة و أنوار و أضواء و آثار كيف و الوجود كله من شروق نوره و لمعان ظهوره. و تلك الأضواء و الأنوار سماها جمهور الفلاسفة بالعقول الفعالة و المشاءون و هم أصحاب المعلم الأول سموها بالصور العلمية القائمة بذاته تعالى و الأفلاطونيون و شيعتهم بالمثل النورية و الصور الإلهية و جمهور المتكلمين بالصفات القديمة و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٠٥

المعتزلة بالأحوال و الصوفية بالأسماء أو بالأعيان الثابتة و لكل وجهة هو مولياها. و تلك الأشعة كيف تفارق أصلها و منبعها و لو فارقت وجودا لم يكن أشعة و مثال هذا في الشاهد أشعة شمس عالم المحسوس و لله المثل الأعلى في السماوات إلا أن بين الأشعتين فرقا و هو أن أشعة شمس العقل أحياء ناطقة فعالة و أشعة شمس الحس أنوار لغيرها لا لذاتها و لهذا إنها غير أحياء و لا فاعلة. و أيضا تلك الصور الإلهية لها اتصال عقلي لمبدئها و غايتها بخلاف هذه الأشعة - فإن لها نسبة وضعية بالشمس فإين هذا من تلك

فصل (٣) في أن القول بحدوث العالم مجمع عليه بين الأنبياء ع و الحكماء

[لا خلاف بين الأمم في حدوث العالم]

اعلم أن ما ذكرناه و أوضحناه سابقا و لاحقا من حدوث العالم بجميعة من السماوات و ما فيها و الأرضيات و ما معها هو بعينه مذهب أهل الحق من كل قوم من أهل الملل و الشرائع الحققة و جميع السلاك الإلهية الماضية و اللاحقة لأن قاطبة أهل الحق و الموحدين في كل دهر و زمان لهم دين واحد و مسلك واحد في أركان العقيدة و أصول الدين و أحوال المبدأ و المعاد و رجوع الكل إليه سبحانه.

أولا ترى أن أديان الأنبياء كلهم و الأولياء صلوات الله عليهم و رحمته و أتباعه واحد لا خلاف ينقل منهم بينهم في شيء من أصول المعارف و أحوال المبدأ و المعاد. و من لم يكن دينه دين الأنبياء ع فليس من الحكمة في شيء و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٠٦

لا يعد من الحكماء من ليس له قدم راسخ في معرفة الحقائق و الحكمة من أعظم المواهب و المنح الإلهية و أشرف

الذخائر و السعادات للنفس الإنسانية و بها قيام العالم العلوى و ابتهاجات جميع الموجودات.

و من أعظم البلايا و الرزية

الإعراض عنها و الجحود لها كما قال تعالى **وَمَنْ أَعْرَضَ عَنْ ذِكْرِي فَإِنَّ لَهُ مَعِيشَةً ضَنْكًا وَ نَحْشُرُهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ أَعْمَى** الآية و قوله **كَلَّا إِنَّهُمْ عَنْ رَبِّهِمْ يَوْمَئِذٍ لَمَحْجُوبُونَ** و قد ران على قلوبهم ما كانوا يكسبون.

و اعلم أن الظن بأعظم الحكماء و أساطينهم حسب ما وجدنا من كلماتهم و آثارهم و قد اتفقت أفاضل كل عصر و زمان على فضلهم و تقدمهم و شهدت أمثال كل طائفة بزهدهم و صفاء ضمائرهم و انخلاصهم عن الحس و تجردهم عن الدنيا و رجوعهم إلى المأوى و تشبههم بالمبادي و تخلقهم بأخلاق الباري إنهم متفقون على اعتقاد حدوث العالم بجميع جواهره و أعراضه و أفلاكه و أملاكه و بسائطه و مركباته إلا أن هذه المسألة لغاية غموضها لم يكن لغيرهم من الباحثين و الناظرين في كتبهم - تحقيقها و فهمها على وجه يسلم عن التناقض و الانحراف عن القواعد العقلية.

و لعمرى إن إصابة الحق في هذه المسألة و أمثالها مع التزام القواعد الحكيمة و المحافظة على توحيد الباري و تقدسه عن وصمة التغير و التكثر من قصوى مراتب القوة النظرية المجاورة للقوة القدسية.

و نحن نريد أن نذكر في هذا الموضوع جملة من أقوال جماعة من الحكماء الأولين دالة على أنهم قد أصابوا الحق في هذه المسألة شاهدة بأنهم وافقوا أهل السفارة الإلهية في حدوث العالم و دثوره.

و اعلم أن أساطين الحكمة المعتبرة عند طائفة ثمانية

ثلاثة من الملطيين ثالس و انكسيمانس و اغاثاذايمون و من اليونانيين خمسة انباذقلس و فيثاغورث و سقراط - و أفلاطن و أرسطاطاليس قدس الله نفوسهم و أشركنا الله في صالح دعائهم و بركتهم

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٠٧

فلقد أشرقت أنوار الحكمة في العالم بسببهم و انتشرت علوم الربوبية في القلوب لسعيهم.

و كل هؤلاء كانوا حكماء زهادا عبادا متألّهي معرضين عن الدنيا مقبلين إلى الآخرة هؤلاء يسمون بالحكمة المطلقة ثم لم يسم أحد بعد هؤلاء حكيما بل كل واحد منهم ينسب إلى صناعة من الصناعات أو سيرة من السير مثل بقراط الطبيب - و اوميرس الشاعر و أرشميدس المهندس و ذييمقراطيس الطبيعي و يوداسف المنجم.

و لكل من هؤلاء الخمسة كلام كثير من أنواع العلوم.

فنحن نذكر ما وصل إلينا في حدوث العالم الجسماني من كلمات هذه الأساطين

الخمسة اليونانيين و الثلاثة من الملطيين مع ما وجدنا من كلمات غيرهم الذين كانوا بعدهم في الرتبة و ذلك لأن هؤلاء الثمانية أعلنوا بمنزلة الأصول و المبادي و الآباء - و غيرهم كالعيال لهم و ذلك لأنهم كانوا مقتبسين نور الحكمة من مشكاة النبوة و لا خلاف لأحد منهم في أصول المعارف و كلام هؤلاء في الفلسفة يدور على وحدانية الباري و إحاطة علمه بالأشياء كيف هو و كيفية صدور الموجودات و تكوين العالم عنه و أن المبادي الأول ما هي و كم هي و أن المعاد ما هو و كيف هو و بقاء النفس يوم القيمة و إنما نشأ القول بقدوم العالم بعدهم لأجل تحريف الحكمة و العدول عن سيرتهم و قلة التدبر في كلامهم و قصور الفهم عن نبيل مرادهم

فمنهم ثالس الملطي

و هو أول من تفلسف بملطية بعد ما قدم إليها من مصر و هو شيخ كبير نشر حكمته.
قال إن للعالم مبدعا لا يدرك صفته العقول من جهة هويته وإنما يدرك من جهة آثاره و إبداعه و تكوينه الأشياء.
ثم قال إن القول الذي لا مرد له هو أن المبدع كان و لا شيء مبدع فأبدع الذي أبدع و لا صورة له عنده في الذات لأن
قبل الإبداع إنما هو فقط و إذا كان هو فقط فليس يقال حينئذ جهة و جهة حتى يكون هو و الصورة أو حيث و حيث
حتى يكون هو ذو صورة و الوحدة الخالصة ينافي هذين الوجهين و الإبداع تأييس ما ليس بشيء

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٠٨

و إذا كان هو مؤيس الآيسات فالتأيس لا من شيء متقدم فمؤيس الأشياء لا يحتاج أن يكون عنده صورة الآيس بالآيسية.

قال لكنه عنده العنصر الذي فيه صور الموجودات و المعلومات كلها فانبعثت منه كل صورة موجودة في العالم على
المثال في العنصر الأول و هو محصل الصور و منبع الموجودات و ما من موجود في العالم العقلي و العالم الحسي إلا و
في ذات العنصر صورة و مثال عنه انتهى.
أقول كلام هذا الفيلسوف مما يستفاد منه أشياء شريفة.

منها أنه تعالى كان و لا شيء معه و سيكون و لا شيء معه و لا يبقى معه كما في قوله تعالى **لِمَنْ الْمُلْكُ الْيَوْمَ لِلَّهِ الْوَاحِدِ الْقَهَّارِ**.

و منها أن الأثر الصادر عنه تعالى وجود الأشياء و آيسيتها لا ماهيتها و علم من قوله هو مؤيس الآيسات أن الوجود
الممكني مجعول منه جعلاً بسيطاً و قد علمت ابتناء كثير من المقاصد التي منها حدوث الطبائع عليه.
و منها أن العالم العقلي ب كله جوهر واحد نشأ من الواجب بجهة واحدة و مع وحدته فيه صور جميع الأشياء و هو المعبر
عنه في لسان الفلسفة بالعنصر الأول و في لسان الشريعة بالعلم الأعلى إلى غير ذلك من الفوائد التي لو ذكرناها ل طال
الكلام.

و من العجب أنه نقل عنه أن أصل الموجودات الماء قال الماء قابل كل صورة- و منه أبدعت الجواهر كلها من السماء و
الأرض و لا يبعد أن يكون المراد به الوجود الانبساطي المعبر عنه في اصطلاحات الصوفية بالنفس الرحماني المناسب
لقوله تعالى **وَكَانَ عَرْشُهُ عَلَى الْمَاءِ**.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٠٩

و من هؤلاء الأعظم انكساغورس الملطي

رأيه في الوجدانية مثل رأي ثاليس - إلا أن في كلامه رموزاً و تجوزات يتوهم أن فيه تجسيم الإله تعالى الحق عن ذلك
علوا كبيرا مثل ما حكى أنه قال إن الحق الأول ساكن غير متحرك و الساكن في عرفهم عبارة عن الوجوب الذاتي و ربما
يطلق عندهم بمعنى عدم التفات العالي إلى السافل إذا كان مفارقاً محضاً و الحركة عبارة عن الفاعلية أي الإيجاد
التدريجي أو عن الوجود بعد العدم.

و حكى عنه فرفوروس أنه قال أصل الأشياء جسم واحد موضوع للكل لا نهاية له و منه يخرج جميع الأجسام و القوى

الجسمانية.

أقول لعله أراد بالجسم الأول الموجود الأول و عبر عنه بالجسم لأنه فاعله و مقومه و مصوره و لا يبعد أن يكون عنى به الهيولى الأولى المتقومة ذاتها من الجوهر الامتدادي مطلقا و هي المبدأ القابلي للكائنات و فيها القوة الغير المتناهية للانفعال - حسب ما يكتسبها من الفاعل الأول الغير المتناهي في الفعل.

و حكي عنه أن الأشياء كانت ساكنة ثم إن العقل رتبها ترتيبا على أحسن نظام - فوضعها مواضعها من عال و من سافل و من متوسط ثم من متحرك و من ساكن و من مستقيم الحركة و من دائرة و من أفلاك متحركة على الدوران و من عناصر متحركة على الاستقامة و هي كلها بهذا الترتيب مظهرات لما في الجسم الأول من الموجودات و يحكى عنه أن المرتب هو الطبيعة و ربما يقول المرتب هو الباري.

أقول قد علم من الأصول التي أسلفنا ذكرها وجه صحة ما ذكره فتدبر كي تدرك غوره و معنى قوله أن الأشياء كانت ساكنة أنها كانت لها كينونة عقلية قبل هذه الأكوان الطبيعية.

و من هؤلاء انكسيمانس الملطي

المعروف بالحكمة المذكور بالخبر كان يقول إن هذا العالم يدثر و يدخله الفساد و من أجل أنه سفلى تلك العوالم و ثفلها نسبته إليها نسبة القشر إلى اللب و القشر يرمى.

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قال و إنما ثبات هذا العالم بقدر ما فيه من قليل نور ذلك العالم و إلا لما ثبت طرفه عين و يبقى ثباته إلى أن يصفي جزؤه الممتزج جزؤها المختلط فإذا صفا الجزءان عند ذلك دثرت أجزاء هذا العالم و فسدت و بقيت مظلمة و بقيت الأنفس الدنسة في هذه الظلمة لا نور لها و لا سرور و لا راحة و لا سكون و لا سلوة.

و قال كل مبدع ظهرت صورته في حد الإبداع فقد كانت صورته في علم الأول - فالصور عنده بلا نهاية قال أبداع الواحد بوحدانيته صورة العنصر ثم العقل انبعث عنها ببدعة الباري فرتب العنصر في العقل ألوان الصور على قدر ما فيها من طبقات الأنوار و أصناف الآثار و صارت تلك الطبقات صوراً كثيرة دفعة واحدة كما يحدث الصور في المرآة الصقيلة بلا زمان و لا ترتيب بعض على بعض غير أن الهيولى لا يحتمل القبول دفعة واحدة إلا بترتيب و زمان فحدثت تلك الصور فيها على الترتيب انتهى.

أقول قد علم من كلامه أن مذهبه دثور هذا العالم و فساده و نفاذه و اضمحلاله و زواله و ظهر من كلامه أيضاً أن علومه تعالى قديمة قائمة بذاته من غير لزوم تكثر في صفاته و أن معلوماته حادثة لقيامها بالهيولى التي شأنها القوة و الاستعداد و قبول التغير و التجدد لصور الأجساد صورة بعد صورة.

و من عظماء الحكمة و كبرائها أنباذقلس

و هو من الخمسة المشهورة من رؤساء يونان كان في زمان داود النبي ع و تلقى العلم منه و اختلف إلى لقمان الحكيم - و اقتبس منه الحكمة ثم عاد إلى يونان.

نقل عنه أنه قال إن العالم مركب من الأسطقسات الأربع و إنه ليس وراءها شيء أبسط منها و إن الأشياء كامنة بعضها في بعض و أبطل الكون و الفساد و الاستحالة و النمو.

أقول و لكلا قوليه وجه صحة أشرنا إليه في رسالة إثبات الحدوث و كون الأفلاك عنصرية مما يمكن تصحيحه و لكن العناصر فيها على وجه أعلى و أشرف مما يوجد في السفليات و إلى هذا المذهب مال بعض العرفاء الكاملين. و أما مذهب الكمون فليس معناه ما فهمه الجمهور من أهل النظر أن في النار

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢١١

مثلا صورة مائية بالفعل إلا أنها أخفيت عن الأبصار و استبطنت و تعطلت عن فعلها من التبريد و الترطيب و غيرهما و كذا في الأجسام الأخرى فإن هذا الرجل أجل قدرا و أعظم علما من أن يذهب إليه مثل هذا الرأي بل المراد شيء آخر مرموز يدق إدراكه عن فهم الجماهير من الناس.

و مما قال أنبأذقلس في أمر المعاد أنه يبقى هذا العالم على الوجه الذي عهدناه من النفوس التي تشبثت بالطبائع و الأرواح التي تعلق بالشبابك حتى تستغيث في آخر الأمر إلى النفس الكلية فيتضرع هي إلى العقل و يتضرع العقل إلى الباري - فيسمح الباري على العقل و يسمح العقل على النفس و تسمح النفس على هذا العالم بكل نورها فيستضيء الأنفس الجزئية و تشرق الأرض و العالم بنور ربها حتى تعاین الجزئيات الكليات فتخلص من الشبكة فتتصل بكلياتها و تستقر في عالمها مسرورة مجبورة **وَمَنْ لَمْ يَجْعَلِ اللَّهُ لَهُ نُورًا فَمَا لَهُ مِنْ نُّورٍ** انتهى ما نقل عنه.

أقول هذا الكلام دال على بطلان هذا العالم و دثوره ب كله إذ قد بين البرهان أن وجود الأجرام لا يمكن بدون النفوس و الأرواح و أن الطبيعة الجرمية متقومة بالنفس كما نص عليه المعلم الأول في مواضع من كتابه المعروف بأثولوجيا حيث يشير إلى أن الأرض ذات حياة و نفس.

فيستفاد من كلامه أن كيفية رجوع الأشياء الكونية إلى بارئها حسب ما ورد في الشرائع الإلهية و حقه العرفاء المليون و الفضلاء المكاشفون و العلماء الراسخون من هذه الحركة الرجوعية التي للمكونات إلى الله تعالى بسبب ما ارتكز في جبلتها من التشوق إلى الخير و التوجه إلى الغاية و ثبوت معاد الخلائق إلى المبدئ الخالق بالقيامة الكبرى الموجبة لفناء الكل حتى الأفلاك و الأملاك و بقاء الواحد القهار.

و من هؤلاء فيثاغورس

و كان في زمان سليمان ع قد أخذ الحكمة من معدن النبوة و هو الحكيم الفاضل ذو الرأي المتين و العقل المنير و الفهم الثاقب كان يدعي أنه شاهد العوالم بحسه و حدسه و بلغ في الرياضة و التصفية إلى أن سمع صفيق الفلك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢١٢

و وصل مقام الملك و قال ما سمعت شيئا قط الذ من حركاتها و لا رأيت شيئا أبهى من صورها و هيئاتها و قوله في الإلهيات و مبادي الموجودات و أنها هي العدد معروف عند القوم.

و نحن قد وجهنا قوله إن المبادي هي العدد على معنى صحيح و قال إن شرف كل موجود بغلبة الوحدة و كل ما هو أبعد عن الوحدة فهو أنقص و أخس و كل ما هو أقرب منه فهو أشرف و أكمل.

و نقل عنه أنه قيل لم قلت بإبطال العالم قال لأنه يبلغ العلة التي من أجلها كان فإذا بلغها سكنت حركته.

أقول هذا كلام وجيز في غاية البلوغ و الإفادة و كأنه مستفاد من معدن الوحي و النبوة فقد دل على منشا حدوث العالم و

علة زواله و دثوره و كذا دل بوجازته على وقوع القيامة الكبرى كما ظهر من كلام أنبا ذقلس و كان فيثاغورس يقول إن ما في هذا العالم يشتمل على مقدار يسير من الحس لكونه معلول الطبيعة و ما فوقه من العوالم أبهى و أشرف و أحسن من أن يصل الوصف إلى عالم النفس و العقل فيقف فلا يمكن للنطق وصف ما فيها من الشرف و البهاء فليكن حرصكم و اجتهدكم بذلك العالم حتى يكون بقاءكم بعيدا عن الفساد و الدثور و تصيرون إلى عالم هو حسن كله و بهاء كله و سرور كله و عز كله و حق كله و يكون سروركم و لذتكم دائمة غير منقطعة.

أقول كلامه صريح في أن هذا العالم قابل للفساد و الزوال غير محتمل للبقاء و الدوام و كل ما هو كذلك فابتدأه من عدم و انتهاؤه إلى عدم.

ثم مما يدل أن فيثاغورس ذهب إلى حدوث العالم أنه كان حرينوس و زينون الشاعر متابعين له على رأيه في المبدع و المبدع و أنهما قالا الباري تعالى أبدع العقل - و النفس دفعة واحدة ثم ابتدع جميع ما تحتها بتوسطهما تدريجا و في بدو ما أبدعهما لا يموتان و لا يجوز عليهما الفناء و الدثور.

أقول معنى كلامهما أن هذا العالم قابل للدثور و الفناء لأنه تدريجي الحصول

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢١٣

متجدد الكون و الحدوث شيئا فشيئا فلا يوجد منه شيء إلا و ينعدم كالحركة حيث لا بقاء لها أصلا و أما العقل و كذا النفس بوجهها المرسل الذي يلي العقل فهما باقيان ببقاء الله لأنهما مطموسان تحت طوارق الجبروت و أما جهة النفس المقيدة التي تلي الطبع فهي أيضا دائرة فانية و من هؤلاء السادات العظام و الآباء الكرام سقراط الحكيم العارف الزاهد من أهل اثنية - كان قد اقتبس الحكمة من فيثاغورس و ارسلاوس و اقتصر من أصنافها على الإلهيات و الخلقيات - و اشتغل بالزهد و رثاظة النفس و تهذيب الأخلاق و أعرض عن ملاذ الدنيا و اعتزل إلى الجبل و أقام في غار به و نهى الرؤساء الذين كانوا في زمانه عن الشرك و عبادة الأوثان فثوروا عليه الغاغة و الجنوا ملكهم إلى قتله فحبسه الملك و سقاه السم و قصته معروفة.

و من جملة اعتقاداته أن علمه تعالى و حكمته و جوده و قدرته بلا نهاية و لا يبلغ العقل أن يصفها و لو وصفها لكانت متناهية فالزم عليك أن يقول إنها بلا نهاية و لا غاية - و قد ترى الموجودات متناهية.

فيقال إنما تناهيها بحسب احتمال القوابل لا بحسب القدرة و الحكمة و الجود - و لما كانت المادة لا تحتل صورا بلا نهاية فتناهد الصور لا من جهة بخل في الواهب - بل لقصور في المادة و عن هذا اقتضت الحكمة الإلهية أنها و إن تناهت ذاتا و صورة و حيزا و مكانا إلا أنها لا تنهاى زمانا في آخره إلا من نحو أولها و إن لم يتصور بقاء الشخص فاقتضت الحكمة بقاء النوع باستبقاء الشخص و ذلك بتجدد أمثاله استحضت الشخص بقاء النوع و يستبقي النوع ببقاء الأشخاص و لا يبلغ القدرة إلى حد النهاية - و لا الحكمة و قفت إلى غاية انتهى كلامه.

أقول إن كلامه دال على حدوث كل شخص جسماني من أشخاص هذا العالم - لأن جميعها مادية متناهية القوة و العلة و هي عدم احتمال المادة الديمومة الشخصية - مشتركة في الفلكيات و العنصريات فجميعها قابل للزوال و الدثور من حيث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢١٤

هوياتها الشخصية.

و أما بقاؤها بحسب الماهية و النوع فليس ذلك بقاء بالعدد بل بالمعنى و الحد و بالعلم و العقل على أن الماهية غير موجودة عندنا و لا مجعولة بالذات بل هي حكاية تابعة للوجود و ظل له كما مر.

و قد مر أيضا أن القدم و الحدوث إنما يراد بهما صفتان للوجود لأنهما متقابلان لا يجتمعان في شيء واحد و لا تقابل بين كون ماهية واحدة قديمة و حادثة حدا و عددا.

و من هؤلاء الكبراء الخمسة اليونانية أفلاطن الإلهي

المعروف بالتوحيد و الحكمة حكى عنه قوم ممن شاهدوه و تلمذوا له مثل أرسطاطاليس و ثافرطيس و طيماوس أنه قال إن للعالم صناعا مبدعا محدثا أزليا واجبا بذاته عالما بجميع معلوماته على نعت الأسباب الكلية كان في الأزل و لم يكن في الوجود رسم و لا طلل الأمثال عند الباري كما نقلناه.

و يحكى عنه أيضا أنه أدرج الزمان في المبادي و هو الدهر و أثبت لكل موجود شخصا في عالم الإله فسميت تلك الأشخاص بالمثل الإلهية و المبادي الأول و المثل عنده بسائط مبسوطات و الأشخاص مركبات و الإنسان المركب المحسوس جزئي ذلك الإنسان المبسوط المعقول و كذلك جميع الصور المحسوسة المادية و لهذا قال الموجودات في هذا العالم آثار الموجودات في ذلك العالم و لا بد لكل أثر من مؤثر يشابهه نوعا من المشابهة.

أقول و نحن قد أحيينا بعون الله تعالى رسمه في القول بهذه المثل و أحكمنا برهانه و قومنا بنيانه و شيدنا أركانه و سهلنا سبيله و أبطلنا النقوض عليه و التشنيعات التي ذكرها على مذهبه كل من أتى بعده إلى وقتنا هذا تقربا إلى الله و تشوقا إلى دار كرامته و محل أنواره.

قال و إنما كانت هذه الصور موجودة كلية دائمة باقية لأن كل مبدع ظهرت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢١٥

صورته في حد الإبداع فكانت صورته في علم الأول و الصور عنده بلا نهاية و لو لم يكن الصور عنده أزلية في علمه لم يكن ليبقى و لو لم تكن دائمة بدوامه لكانت تدثر بدثور الهيولى و لو كانت تدثر مع دثور الهيولى لما كانت رجاء و لا خوف و لكن لما صارت [كانت] الصور الحسية على رجاء و خوف استدلل به على بقائها و إنما يبقى إذا كانت صورة عقلية في ذلك العالم ترجو الحقوق بها و تخاف التخلف عنها.

قال و إذا اتفقت العقلاء على أن هاهنا في الوجود حسا و محسوسا و عقلا و معقولا و شاهدنا بالحس جميع المحسوسات و هي محدودة محصورة بالزمان و المكان - فيكون مثل عقلية انتهى.

أقول قد أفادت كلماته الشريفة النورية أصولا حكمية حقة لطيفة.

منها حدوث العالم الحسي بجميع صورته و أعراضه على وجه البرهان إذ قد صرح بأن كل صورة متعلقة بالهيولى فإنها تدثر بدثور الهيولى و ذلك لأن الهيولى شأنها الدثور و العدم و أن الصور شأنها التجدد و الحدوث شيئا بعد شيء و لهذا أدرج الزمان في المبادي كما حكى عنه.

و هذا كما أدرج بعضهم العدم في المبادي بمعنى أن كل ما هو زمني الوجود كالصور الطبيعية فلا بد و أن يكون عدمه

السابق مقوماً له مقتضياً لوجوده اللاحق - فزوال وجود الصور السابقة مبدأً بالذات لوجود الصور اللاحقة و من جعل من القدماء العدم من المبادي بالذات كان مراده ما ذكرنا لأن كل أمر تدريجي الوجود - يكون لنقص وجوده يتقوم وجوده بالعدم و يشوب كونه بالفساد و بقاءه بالزوال.

ولهذا يتصف وجود كل فرد منه أو جزء بعدم سائر الأفراد و الأجزاء يستلزم حدوث كل حد فساد سائر الحدود و الكل منه يغيب عن الكل و يغيب عنه الكل - فالكل عادم لنفسه مسلوب عن نفسه و كذا كل جزء عادم لنفسه مسلوب عنها. و منها أن لكل صورة محسوسة صورة معقولة من نوعها و هي صورة ذاتها و ماهيتها عند الله و هي المسمومة بالمثل الأفلاطونية أعني صور علمه تعالى بالأشياء التي

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عجزت العقلاء الذين جاءوا من بعده عن إدراك هذه المثل النورية على وجهها و التصديق بوجودها ما خلا المعلم الأول ربما مال إلى صحة القول بها في بعض كتبه - و أنكرها في الأكثر و كأنها يرى في الإنكار مصلحة و قد مر في هذا الكتاب ما فيه غنية للمستبصرين.

و منها الإشارة منه إلى أن هذه الصور الحسيات و الأكوان الدائرات راجعة إلى تلك العقليات صائرة إليها متحدة بها كاتصال الأشعة الشمسية بالشمس و كاتصال حواسنا بعقولنا مع أن إحداها دائرة و الأخرى باقية و كاتصال البدن بالنفس حتى صار وجوده وجودها و فعله فعلها مع أن البدن متحلل بتحليل الحرارة الغريزية - و غيرها و النفس ثابتة و ذلك لاستدلاله بالخوف و الرجاء الثابتين لبعض الصور الحسيات على بقائها من جهة اتصالها بالجواهر العقلية الباقيات عند الله فعلم أن لها نشأتين دائرة حسية و باقية عقلية.

و بالجملة إنه قدس الله روحه أخذ الوسط في البرهان على دئورها و زوالها من جهة إثبات الغاية الذاتية لها كما فعلنا سابقاً و هو أحد المناهج التي سلكتها في إثبات حدوث الأجسام و من أوثق البراهين أخذ الحد الأوسط من غاية الشيء.

و منها أن تلك الصور العقلية هي بعينها صفات الله و علومه التابعة لوجوده مع أن علوه و مجده بذاته لذاته لا لتلك الصور و لا يلزم من ذلك تعدد القدماء و لا استكمالهم تعالى بغير ذاته الأحدية الصمدية لأنها ليست موجودات مستقلة مباينة الوجود عن وجود الحق و لا متميزة الإنية عن الإنية الأولى.

و ذلك لأنك قد علمت أنها مطموسة مقهورة تحت جبروته مستهلكة الذوات تحت كبريائه فانية عن ذاته باقية ببقاء الله.

ولهذا المعنى قال الشيخ اليوناني ليس للمبدع الحق صورة و لا حلية فيه و لا قوة لكنه فوق كل صورة و حلية و قوة لأنه مبدعها و قال و ليس المبدع الأول شيئاً من الأشياء و هو جميع الأشياء لأن الأشياء منه.

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و لقد صدق الأفاضل الأوائل في قولهم مالك الأشياء هو الأشياء كلها إذ هو علة كونها بأنه أوجدها فقط و علة شوقها إليه و هو خلاف الأشياء كلها و ليس فيه شيء ما أبدعه و لا يشبه شيئاً منه فلذلك صار محبوباً معشوقاً يشتاقه الصور العقلية

العالية والسافلة- فالعاشق يحرص على أن يصير إليه و يكون معه انتهى أقول قد برهنا فيما مضى أن البسيط الذات هو كل الأشياء وأن مصير كل شيء إليه تعالى و نقل عن أفلاطن أيضا أنه كان يحيل وجود حوادث لا أول لها لأنك إذا قلت حادث فقد أثبت الأولية لكل واحد و ما ثبت لكل واحد يجب أن يثبت للكل. و قال أيضا إن صور الأشياء لا بد و أن تكون حادثة و أما هيولياتها و عنصرها فثبت عنصرا قبل وجودها فظن بعض العقلاء أنه حكم بالأزلية و القدم.

أقول أما صحة قوله الأول فليس بناؤها على قياس حكم الكل المجموعي- على حكم كل فرد فرد بل غرضه أن الحدوث لما كان هو المسبوقية بالعدم فإذا كان الكل مسبوقا بالجزء و الجزء مسبوقا بالعدم فكان الكل مسبوقا بالعدم بل له مسبوقية بعدم كل جزء من أجزائه فله مسبوقيات بأعدام كثيرة غير محصورة حسب إعدام الأجزاء. و أما ما اشتهر بين الجمهور من أن تعاقب الأشخاص لا إلى حد يوجب التسلسل في المتعاقبات إلى غير النهاية فهذا من سخيف القول لأن وقوع مثل هذا التسلسل ليس إلا بمجرد الفرض فيستحيل أن يتحقق في الواقع لأن المتحقق في الواقع لا يكون إلا متناهيًا و الترتيب بين شيئين أو بين أشياء متفرع على وجودهما أو وجودها معا.

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و قد علمت أن المادة لا يحتمل صورتين معا فضلا عن الصور الغير المتناهية- إذ لا اجتماع لها في الوجود بل لا تعدد كما في الاتصالات التدريجية من الصور الفلكية وغيرها و لا قوة الخيال مما يمكن له تصور المقدار الغير المتناهي و لا العدد الغير المتناهي و نسبة البقاء و الاستمرار للأنواع إنما هي من جهة وجودها العقلي و هو صورة علم الله تعالى. و أما قوله الثاني فليس مراده أن العنصر أي الهيولى أمر متحصل مستمر الوجود بالعدد لأن الهيولى كما مر أمر بالقوة و لا تحصل لها في الخارج إلا بالصور المتعاقبة و أن لها وحدة جنسية مستمرة و لها وحدات متجددة متصرمة حسب تجدد الصور و تصرمها و ليس في عالم الطبيعة موجود قديم بالهوية الوجودية لا من الصور و لا من المواد كما علمت مرارا. و يحكى عنه أيضا في سؤاله عن طيماوس ما الشيء الذي لا حدوث له و ما الشيء الحادث و ليس بباقي و ما الشيء الموجود بالفعل و هو أبدا بحال واحد و إنما يعني بالأول وجود الباري جل اسمه و بالثاني وجود الأكوان الزمانية التي لا تثبت على حالة واحدة و بالثالث وجود المبادي العقلية و الصور الإلهية و الأضواء الجبروتية و العلوم القضائية- التي لا تتغير.

و حكى من أسئلته أيضا ما الشيء الكائن و لا وجود له و ما الشيء الموجود و لا كون له يعني بالأول الزمان و الزمانيات المتجددة الأكوان لأنه لم يؤهلها اسم الوجود.

و قد علمت أنها ضعيفة الوجود مشوبة الوجود بالعدم و يعني بالثاني الصور المفارقة- التي هي فوق الزمان و الحركة و الطبيعة و حق لها اسم الوجود لكونها باقية عند الله.

و قد حكى أرسطاطاليس في مقالة الألف الكبرى من كتاب ما بعد الطبيعة أن أفلاطن كان يختلف في حديثه إلى افراطويس فكتب عنده ما روى عنه أن جميع

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الأشياء المحسوسة فاسدة و أن العلم لا يحيط بها ثم اختلف بعده إلى سقراط و كان مذهبه طلب الحدود من دون النظر في طبائع المحسوسات و غيرها فظن أن نظر سقراط في غير الأشياء المحسوسة لأن الحدود ليست للمحسوسات و لا يتناولها لأنها إنما تقع على أشياء دائمة كلية.

فعند ذلك ما سمى أفلاطون الأشياء الكلية صوراً لأنها واحدة و رأى أن الوجود في المحسوسات لا يكون إلا بمشاركة الصور إذا كانت الصور رسوماً و خيالات لها مقدمة عليها.

أقول قوله إن جميع الأشياء المحسوسة فاسدة شامل للآثريات و العنصريات - فكان مذهبه حدوث الأفلاك و ما تحتها جميعاً و المراد من الأشياء الكلية في قوله - إن لم يكن من سهو الناسخ بدل الجزئية هو المعاني و الماهيات الكلية للمحسوسات و غيرها إذ لا صورة لها من حيث هي و الضمير في لأنها راجع إلى الصورة.

معناه أن أفلاطون لم يعتقد لها وجوداً خاصاً و لا هوية عددية حتى يلزم من استمرار صدق الحدود على المحسوسات قدم شيء من العالم لما مر أن المعاني الكلية لا يتحقق في الخارج إلا بتبعية الأشخاص و ليست لها وحدة عددية مستمرة فيما يتجدد أشخاصها و قوله لا يكون إلا بمشاركة الصور أراد بها الصور العقلية التي تكون للمحسوسات في عالم المفارقات عنى به أن قوام هذه الحسيات بتلك الصور المفارقة لأنها فاعلها و غايتها لا المفهومات الكلية الذهنية التي لا وجود لها بالذات.

حكاية فيها دراية

[كلام الشيخ أبي الحسن العامري]

اعلم أن الشيخ أبا الحسن العامري حكى في كتابه المعروف بالأمد على الأبد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٢٠

و كان يذكر فيه أحوال الفلاسفة الأوائل و أما أفلاطون فقد اختلف في مذهبه في قدم العالم و حدوثه فإنه قال في أسولوطيقوس أي تدبير البدن إن العالم أبدي غير مكنون - دائم البقاء و تعلق بهذا القول ابرقلس و صنف في أزلية العالم كتابه المعروف الذي ناقضه يحيى النحوي.

ثم ذكر في كتابه المعروف بطيماوس أن العالم مكنون و أن الباري قد صرفه - من لا نظام إلى نظام و أن جواهره كلها مركبة من المادة و الصورة و أن كل مركب معرض للانحلال و لو لا أن تلميذه أرسطاطاليس شرح مغزاه من اختلاف القولين لحكم عليه بالحيرة إلا أنه بين أن لفظة المكنون مرتبة تحت الأسماء المشتركة و أن مقصوده من قوله إن العالم أبدي غير مكنون أي لم يسبقه زمان و لم يحدث عن شيء و أن مقصوده من قوله إنه مكنون و قد صرفه الباري من لا نظام إلى نظام أن وجوده متعلق بالصنعة النازمة للمادة بالصورة و ليس و لا واحد من هذين وجوده بذاته - دون الإيجاد لصاحبه فالمبدع لهما إذا قد أوجدهما على التآخيد النظامي فهو إذا بفعله الإبداعي صارف العالم من لا نظام إلى نظام أي من العدم إلى الوجود.

و لقد صرح بذلك في كتاب النواميس فقال إن للعالم بدواً علياً و ليس له بدو زمني أي له فاعل قد اخترعه لا في زمان فإن فاحص فحصى عن سبب اختراعه أجبنه بأنه يريد بذاته لإفاضة وجوده و قادر على إيجاد ما أراده و لمثله قد أطلق القول في كتابه المنسوب إلى فادن بأن جوهر النفس غير مكنون و أنه لا يموت.

و قال في كتابه طيماوس إنه مكون و إنه ميت غير دائم و قد تولى أرسطاطاليس بتبيين مراده من اختلاف اللفظين فقال
عنى بقوله الأول أنه لم يتدرج في حدوثه من القوة إلى الفعل لكنه أحدث دفعة ثم لم يعرض له موت في دار المثوبة و
عنى بقوله الثاني أنه معرض للاستحالة من الجهل إلى العلم و من الرذيلة إلى الفضيلة و أن ذاته ما كان ليفوز بالبقاء
الأبدي لو لا استبقاه الله على الدوام.
و قد صرح بذلك في كتاب طيماوس فقال إن خالق الكل أوحى إلى الجواهر الروحانية بأنكم لستم لا تموتون و لكني
استبقيكم بقوتي الإلهية انتهى كلام

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٢١

العامري

و أقول فيه مواضع مؤاخذات حكمية.

الأول

أن ما حكاه من أرسطاطاليس في التوفيق بين كلامية الأولين غير مرضي فإن ما ذكره في تأويل الأول و إن صح إذا أريد
بالعالم عالم المفارقات المحضة - إلا أن ما نقله عنه في تأويل القول الثاني منه الذي قاله في كتاب طيماوس غير
محتمل - فإن قوله صرفه الباري من لا نظام إلى نظام صريح في التقدم الزمني و لا يجوز حمله على مجرد التعلق
بالفاعل الذي مناطه الإمكان الذاتي دون القوة و الاستعداد كيف و ليست للماهية مرتبة سابقة على الوجود حتى يصح
أن يقال إنها مصروفة من العدم إلى الوجود.
لا سيما و قد علل أفلاطن حدوث العالم بكون جواهره مركبة من المادة و الصورة - و بأن كل مركب معرض للانحلال و
ذلك المعنى أي التعلق بالغير لا اختصاص له بالمركب دون البسيط فقد علم من كلامه أن للجواهر المادية خصوصية في
الحدوث - لأجل تركيبها و ليست تلك الخصوصية في العقلية البسيطة و أن للأجسام ضربا آخر من الكون.
و أيضا قوله كل مركب معرض للانحلال صريح في أن العالم سيخرب و يهلك و يضمحل و لو كان قديما لم يكن قابلا
للفساد عائدا إلى الزوال.

الثاني

أن ما حكاه من الفيلسوف في باب تأويل كلام أستاذه في قدم النفس و عدم كونها باقية من أن المراد منه أنها لم تتدرج
في الحدوث و أنها باقية بعد الحدوث في الدار الآخرة و في تأويل حدوثها و موتها أنها معرضة للتغير في الصفات و
أنها باقية باستبقاء الله إياها لا بذاتها فهو بعيد غير معتمد عليه بل المعتمد خلافه أما بعد الذي ذكره في الأول فمن
وجهين.
أحدهما أن مذهب هذا الفيلسوف كما نقل عنه تلميذه إسكندر الرومي أن النفوس الساذجة الواقعة في حد العقل
الهيولاني دائرة هالكة غير باقية بعد البدن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٢٢

و قد مال إليه الشيخ الرئيس في بعض رسائله و إن أنكر ذلك في سائر كتبه - زاعما أنها صورة مجردة حدوثا و بقاء و ما

لا مادة له لا يجوز عليه الفساد و الفناء.

و ثانيهما أن الحق كما بين في مقامه أن جوهر النفس من حيث تعلقه بالبدن - و كونه كمالاته و صورة مقومة إياه أمر تدريجي الحدوث كسائر الصور الطبيعية الحسية.

نعم إذا قويت ذاتها و خرجت من قوتها في التجوهر الذي لها إلى الفعل خلصت ذاتها عن احتمال الفساد فهي مادية الحدوث مجردة البقاء و أما بعد الذي ذكره في القول الثاني فهو أيضا من وجهين أحدهما من كونه في غاية البعد عن منطوق اللفظ و صورة البيان و مساق الكلام.

و ثانيهما لمخالفته مذهب هذا الفيلسوف في النفوس الناقصة من أنها هالكة كما مر فالأولى أن يقال في التوفيق بين كلاميه غير ما حكاه عن الفيلسوف و سنذكر ما عندي في التوفيق بينهما.

الثالث

أنا قد بينا بالبرهان أن العالم بجميع جواهره الحسية السماوية و الأرضية و أعراضه حادث حدوثا تدريجيا و أنه متكون فاسد لا يبقى زمانين و بينا أن العالم الربوبي عظيم جدا مشتمل على جميع حقائق ما في العالم و صورها على وجه أتم و أشرف و أنها باقية بقاء الله فضلا عن استبقائه إياها و فرق بين كونها باقية ببقائه تعالى و بين كونها باقية باستبقائه فما عند الله من الصور الإلهية لو ثبت أن لها ماهية غير الآليات و الهويات الوجودية فصحيح أنها من حيث الماهية باقية باستبقائه.

و أما من حيث إنها وجودات محضة متعلقة الهويات و الآليات بجاعلها التام فإنها عشاق إلهيون واصلون إلى حبيبهم و إنها وجوه ناظرة إلى ربها و عيون باصرة وجه ربها مع أنها متفاوتة في الشدة و الضعف و القرب و البعد فليس يتصور لها بقاء غير بقاء الله.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٢٣

و هذا مع ثبوته بالبرهان و وضوحه عند العرفان مما خفي تحقيقه إلا على الراسخين في العلم بكيفية الصنع و الإيجاد فعليك بالتجريد و التصفية كي تلحق بهم و تدرك غورهم.

فإذا تقرر ذلك فالحق أن يقال في التوفيق بين كلامي أفلاطن الإلهي أن يحمل مراده من العالم حيث يقول إن العالم أبدي و أنه غير مكنون على عالم الصور الإلهية لأنها حقائق الموجودات العالمة الثابتة في عالم علمه تعالى و حيث حكم بأنه مكنون و أن الباري صرفه من لا نظام إلى نظام فالمراد منه عالم الصور الحسية لأنها مادية منتظمة الوجود من القوة و الفعل و المادة و الصورة على الوجه الذي أوامنا إليه من أن شخصيات كل من المادة و الصورة حادثة مسبقة بالعدم الزماني.

الرابع

أن المعلوم من كلمات هذا الفيلسوف التي سننقله إن شاء الله أن مذهبه - يوافق مذهب أستاذه في باب حدوث هذا العالم و بقاء العالم الربوبي.

فما حكاه عنه هذا الشيخ يشبه أن يكون قولاً ملفقاً مختلقاً لفقّه بعض عامة الفلاسفة ممن لم يبلغ مقام الراسخين و لم يدرك شأن الكاملين.

الخامس

أن المختار عندنا في التوفيق بين كلاميه في قدم النفس و حدوثها وجهان آخران أحدهما أن يقال إن للنفوس الإنسانية بعد هذه النشأة الدائرة نشأتين أخريتين إحداهما عقلية محضة و هي للمقربين و الثانية مثالية صورية فأراد بموت النفس عند ما حكم بأنها تموت فقدان استعدادها للحياة العقلية و السعادة الأخروية التي للكاملين - و أراد بعدم موتها بقاءها بعد البدن و إن كان بحياة حيوانية حسية غير عقلية.

و ثانيهما أن نفسية النفس كما بينا نفس [نحو] وجودها و هذا النحو من الوجود غير باق للنفوس بالحقيقة لأنها متحولة من هذا الوجود إلى وجود آخر تنقلب إليه فإذا حكم بأن جوهر النفس غير مكنون و لا مائت أراد به جوهرها العقلي و هو غير

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واقع تحت الكون لأنه صورة علم الله و حيثما قال إنها مكونة مائتة أراد به جوهرها النفساني و صورتها التي تعلقت بالبدن العنصري.

و قد ثبت أن كل صورة مادية متكونة فاسدة و بالجملة كل نفس بما هي نفس ذائقة الموت ثم إلى الله ترجعون ثم الله ينشئ النشأة الآخرة فكلا قولي أفلاطون صحيح من غير تناقض و تحير.

و مما يدل على قوله بالحدوث أنه ذكر الأستاذ أبو الفضل بن عميد أن الحكماء أوجبوا لجملة السماء النفس و الحياة. فأما أفلاطن فزعم أن الأجرام العالية متنفسة حية بحياة غير سرمدية و لا باقية بذاتها و كان يقول إن الله تعالى حين أمر هذه الأجسام الشريفة بتعظيمه و تمجيدته أخبرها بأنه لم يخلقها خلقا يقتضي البقاء لكنه قرن بعد الخلق بها من مشيته ما يصيرها باقية.

و أما أرسطو فإنه بين أنها غير واقعة تحت الكون و الفساد.

و استدل على ذلك بأن الكون و الفساد يوجدان في المادة القابلة للمتضادات - و لا ضد للأجرام العالية و لا لحركتها فهي إذن غير كائنة و لا فاسدة انتهى كلامه.

أقول لا منافاة بين كلامي هذين الحكيمين على ما وقع التنبيه فيما سبق من الكلام و ما سيلحق و سيرد عليك ما فيه زيادة الانكشاف عند شرحنا لكلمات المعلم الأول الذي سننقلها عن قريب إن شاء الله تعالى.

و من هؤلاء الأسلاف المكرمين الفيلسوف الأعظم أرسطاطاليس

قد ذكرنا سابقا من كلامه ما ناص على أنه لا يمكن أن يكون جرم من الأجرام ثابتا قائما - لأن من طبيعته السيلا و الفساد فقد انكشف من كلامه لأهل البصيرة أن لا شيء من الجواهر الجسمانية بقديم عنده و مما يدل أيضا على أنه غير ذاهل عن الحدوث التدريجي للجواهر الجسمانية - هو ما حكاه عن أستاذه أفلاطن الشريف في كتابه المعروف بأثولوجيا حيث قال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٢٥

ففرق أي أفلاطن بين العقل و الحس و بين طبيعة الإنبيات الحقية و بين الأشياء المحسوسة و صير الإنبيات الحقية دائمة

لا تزول عن حالها و صير الأشياء الحسية دائرة واقعة تحت الكون و الفساد فلما فرغ من هذا التمييز بدا و قال إن علة الإنيات الحقيقية التي لا أجرام لها و الأشياء الحسية ذوات الأجرام واحدة و هي الإنية الأولى الحق.

ثم قال إن الباري الأول الذي هو علة الإنيات العقلية الدائمة و الإنيات الحسية الدائرة هو الخير المحض و الخير لا يليق لشيء من الأشياء إلا به و كل ما كان في العالم الأعلى و العالم الأسفل خير فليس ذلك من طباعها و لا من طباع الإنيات العقلية لكنها من تلك الطبيعة العالية و كل طبيعة عقلية أو حسية منها بادية فإن الخير إنما ينبعث من الباري في العالمين. ثم قال إن الإنية الأولى الحق هي التي تفيض على العقل الحياة أولا ثم على النفس ثم على الأشياء الطبيعية و هو الباري الذي هو خير محض انتهى كلام هذا الفيلسوف ناقلا عن أستاذه.

و قال في موضع آخر من كتاب أثولوجيا إن الأشياء العقلية يلزم الأشياء الحسية - و الباري لا يلزم الأشياء العقلية و الحسية بل هو ممسك لجميع الأشياء غير أن الأشياء العقلية هي إنيات حقيقية لأنها مبتدعة من العلة الأولى بغير وسط و أما الأشياء الحسية فهي إنيات دائرة لأنها رسوم الإنيات الحقيقية و مثالها و إنما قوامها و دوامها بالكون و التناسل كي تدوم و تبقى تشبها بالأشياء العقلية الثابتة الدائمة.

أقول كلامه نص على فساد هذا العالم و دثوره و أما معنى ما ذكره من لزوم العقليات للحسيات و عدم لزوم الباري للأشياء و كون الثابت له إمساك الكل و الفرق بين اللزوم و الإمساك فهو أن لكل طبيعة نوعية دائرة صورة عقلية ثابتة عند الله هي المقومة لها و ذات عناية بها و هي متعددة الإنيات حسب تعدد الأنواع الطبيعية و الباري أحدي الذات نسبة ذاته إلى الجميع نسبة واحدة قيومية.

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و إنما تلك العقليات جهات قيوميته و تكثرات فيضه و جوده من غير اختصاص له بواحد دون واحد و لهذا فرق بين نسبته إلى الأشياء و نسبة سائر العلل إلى معاليلها - بأن كلا منها يلزم معلوله بخصوصه لا يتعداه و الباري لا يلزم شيئا من أنواع العقليات و الحسيات بخصوصه بل هو الناظم للكل و الممسك لرباطها عن الانفصام و الحافظ لها عن الفناء على تفاوت مقاماتها في الوجود و البقاء حيث إن العقليات المحضة تبقى ببقاء الذات الأحادية و الحسيات إنما تبقى بتلاحق الأمثال و الأشباه و بقاء التدرج في الحدوث و تشابك العدم بالوجود.

فقله إنما قوامها و دوامها بالكون و التناسل أراد بالكون الوجود التدريجي على نعت الاتصال كما في الفلكيات و بالتناسل التعاقب في الكون على نهج الانفصال كما في العنصريات من الطبائع المنتشرة الشخصيات مثل أنواع الحيوان و النبات.

و قال أيضا في الميمر العاشر من كتاب الربوبية لما ابتدعت الهوية الأولى من الواحد الحق وقفت و ألقت بصرها على الواحد ليراه فصارت حينئذ عقلا فلما صارت الهوية الأولى المبتدعة عقلا صارت يحكي أفاعيلها للواحد الحق لأنها لما ألقت بصرها عليه و رآته على قدر قوتها و صارت عقلا أفاض عليها الواحد الحق قوى كثيرة عظيمة - فلما صار العقل ذا قوة عظيمة أبدع صورة النفس من غير أن يتحرك تشبها بالواحد الحق.

و ذلك أن العقل أبدعه الواحد الحق و هو ساكن فكذلك النفس أبدعها العقل - و هو ساكن أيضا لا يتحرك غير أن الواحد الحق أبدع هوية العقل و أبدع العقل صورة النفس في الهوية التي ابتدعت من الواحد الحق بتوسط هوية العقل.

و أما النفس فلما كانت معلولة من معلول لم يقو على أن يعقل فعلها بغير حركة - وهي ساكنة بل فعليته بحركة و أبدعت صنما ما و إنما يسمى صنما لأنه فعل دائر غير ثابت و لا باق لأنه كان بحركة و الحركة لا تأتي بالشيء الثابت الباقي بل إنما تأتي بالشيء الدائر و إلا كان فعلها أكرم منها إذ كان المفعول ثابتا قائما و الفاعل دائرا بائدا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٢٧

أعني الحركة و هذا قبيح جدا انتهت عبارته.
و لا يخفى ما فيها من التصريح على أن الأجسام الفلكية و غيرها أصنام دائرة بائدة مستحيلة الوجود كائنة فاسدة متبدلة الجواهر و الذوات.
و قال أيضا في صدر هذا الكتاب عند ذكر رءوس المسائل في الطبيعة و إنها صنم لحكم الكل وافق للنفس سفلا في الطبيعة و إنها تفعل و تنفعل و إن الهيولى تنفعل و لا تفعل في الأنفس و إنها غير واقعة تحت الزمان و إنما تقع تحت الزمان آثارها في الأنفس الكلية و إنها كانت تفعل الشيء بعد الشيء و لا محالة إنها تحت الزمان أم ليست تحت الزمان بل الأشياء المشتركة هي تحت الزمان و إن الكلمات الفواعل تفعل الأشياء معا و ليس في الكلمات المنفعلة أن تفعل الانفعال كله معا لكن الشيء بعد الشيء.
و من الشواهد الدالة على أن هذا الفيلسوف الأعظم كان يرى و يعتقد حدوث العالم أني قد وجدت منه كلمات دالة غير ما هو المشهور منه في السنة الجمهور و غير ما نقله منه ثامسطيوس و اعتمد عليه الشيخ الرئيس في هذه المسألة و هو أنه قال الأشياء المحمولة يعني بها الصور الجسمانية فليس كون أحدهما من صاحبه بل يجب أن يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٢٨

بعد صاحبه فيتعاقبان على المادة.
فقد بان أن الصورة تبطل و تذر و إذا دثر معنى وجب أن يكون له بدء لأن الدثور غاية و هو إحدى الحاشيتين ما دل على أن جائيا جاء به فقد صح أن المكون حادث لا من شيء و أن الحامل لها غير ممتنع الذات عن قبولها و حمله إياها و هي ذات بدو و غاية يدل على أن حامله ذو بدو و غاية و أنه حادث لا من شيء.
و يدل على أن محدثه لا بدو له و لا غاية لأن الدثور آخر و الآخر ما كان له أول فلو كانت الجواهر و الصور لم يزالا بغير جائز لأن الاستحالة دثور الصورة التي بها كان وجود الشيء و خروج الشيء من حد إلى حد و من حال إلى حال يوجب دثور الكيفية و تردد المستحيل في الكون و الفساد يدل على دثوره و حدوث أحواله يدل على ابتدائه و ابتداء جزئه يدل على بدو كله و واجب أن قبل بعض ما في العالم للكون و الفساد أن يكون كل العالم قابلا له و كان له بدو يقبل الفساد و آخر يستحيل إلى كون فالبدو و الغاية يدلان على مبدع و ذكر أنه قد سأل بعض الدهرية أرسطاطليس و قال إذا كان المبدع لم يزل و لا شيء غيره ثم أحدث العالم فلم أحدثه فقال لم غير جائزة عليه لأن لم تقتضي علة و العلة محمولة فيما هي علة عليه من معلل فوقه و ليس المبدع بمركب فيحمل ذاته العلل - فلم عنه منفية فإنما فعل ما فعل لأنه جواد فقيل فيجب أن يكون فاعلا لم يزل لأنه جواد لم يزل.
قال معنى لم يزل لا أول له و فعل فاعل يقتضي أولا و اجتماع أن يكون ما لا أول له و ذو أول في القول و الذات [و

[الفاعل] محال متناقض.

قيل له فهل يبطل هذا العالم قال نعم قيل فإذا بطل الجود قال يبطله ليصوغه الصيغة التي لا يحتمل الفساد لأن هذه الصيغة يحتمل الفساد انتهت كلماته الشريفة النورية أقول انظروا معاشر أهل اليقين وأولي البصيرة في الحكمة والدين هل جاء أحد بعده من الحكماء والمتكلمين بمثل هذا الكلام المحكم المتين في باب حدوث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٢٩

العالم وارتباطه بالمبدع الحق من غير تغير لا في ذاته ولا في إرادته وإضافته.

تفسير وتذكرة

إن في كلامه إشارات لطيفة وتحقيقات شريفة لعلها تخفى على بعض الناظرين - وتفتقر إلى التبيين فنريد أن نشرحها توضيحا للمرام فقوله فليس كون أحدهما من صاحبه إشارة إلى أن الصور السابقة ليست علة للاحقة من حيث شخصيتها لأن علة القوام والوجود لا بد وأن لا ينفك عن وجود ما يتقوم به فكل ما يكون متقدما بالزمان على شيء فلا يكون علة مقومة له.

وقوله وإذا دثر معنى وجب أن يكون له بدو لأن الدثور غاية إثبات لمعنى الحدوث والمسبوقية بالعدم من جهة دثور الشيء وانتهائه إلى الغاية وتنبيه على أن بدو الشيء على نحو غايته فما كان غايته العدم كان بدوه أيضا العدم مثله. ولك أن تقول كيف يكون عدم الشيء غاية له - قلنا الأعدام غايات بالعرض كما أنها مبادي كذلك بمعنى أنه إذا انتهى الشيء إلى غاية ذاتية هي كماله فلا يبقى هويته الناقصة وكذا القياس في عدمه السابق وقوله إن المكون حادث لا من شيء إشارة إلى التمييز بين ما منه الشيء وما به الشيء ولا يمكن أن يكون أحدهما هو الآخر بعينه لأن ما منه الشيء يجب أن يفارقه الشيء وما به الشيء يجب أن يجامعه لأن الأول سبب زماني معد والآخر سبب ذاتي مقوم فكل حادث يجب أن يكون حدوثه بشيء لا من شيء فقط إلا بمعنى التعاقب الزماني. لأن الذي يتوهم أنه منه حدث غير الذي به حدث لأن ذلك قد بطل عند حدوثه بخلاف هذا فكيف يكون الباطل سببا محصلا للشيء فكل حادث يفتقر إلى موجد - لا يكون تحت زمان ولأن كل زماني لا يوجد إلا شيئا فشيئا وكما أنه يوجد شيئا فشيئا - فهو أبدا لا يخلو عن ما بالقوة وما بالقوة لا يكون سببا لإخراج الشيء من القوة إلى الفعل.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣٠

ولذلك قال ويدل على محدث لا بدو له ولا غاية لكونه خارجا عن أفق الزمان - وقوله وأجب إن قبل بعض ما في العالم للكون والفساد أن يكون كل العالم قابلا له معناه أن الكل مما يتقوم وجوده بوجود جميع أجزائه فإذا كان جزؤه فاسدا كان الكل أولى بالفساد والحدوث بعد العدم وهو ظاهر سيما في الكل الذي كل واحد من أجزائه يكون فاسدا أعني الكل والجزء الزمانيين فإن وجود الكل الزماني بهويته الكمية الاتصالية لا يجامع وجود شيء من أجزائه حتى إذا وجد جميع الأجزاء فقد انقضى وجود الكل بانقضائها فلا اجتماع له مع الأجزاء إلا في الوهم فلا كلية لمجموع الزمانيات في الخارج بل هي فاسدة وداثرة بوجود كل جزء ودثور.

وما قيل إن لمجموع الزمان وجودا في الدهر - فجوابه أن لمجموعها عدما في الدهر لعدم أجزائها لأن كل

جزء كما أنه موجود في وقت بل سائر الأوقات كلها فالكل معدوم في جميع الأوقات كما حققناه سابقا في نحو وجود المتصل المقداري أن كل جزء منه معدوم عن الكل - وقوله معنى لم يزل لا أول له ومعنى فعل يقتضي أولا أراد بفعل ما هو تحت مقولة أن يفعل وهو التأثير التدريجي دون الإبداع و غرضه أن وجود الصور الجسمانية تدريجي الحدوث والفعل التدريجي لا يمكن بقاءه زمانين فضلا عن كونه باقيا لم يزل بل وجوده يلزمه زواله و كونه يستدعي فساده و قوله يبطله ليصوغه الصيغة التي لا يحتمل الفساد إشارة إلى أن لكل صورة جسمانية غاية عقلية ترجع إليها و تصير إياها و تتحد بها.

و قد علم بما ذكره كيفية حدوث العالم عن الباري الصانع و لمية بواره و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣١

خرابه و علم منه كيفية خراب الأفلاك و طي السماوات كطي السجل للكتب كما قال تعالى **كَمَا بَدَأْنَا أَوَّلَ خَلْقٍ نُعِيدُهُ وَعَدًّا عَلَيْنَا إِنَّا كُنَّا فَاعِلِينَ** و ذلك لأن الباري عز اسمه - محرك الأفلاك و مدير السماوات و مدبرها فاعل حكيم مختار في فعله و صنعه و كل فاعل مختار فله في فعله غرض و غاية و هي عناية الله السابقة على وجود أفاعيله و صنائعه قبل إظهار فعلها و صنعها و من أجل العناية السابقة يفعل ما يفعله بتوسيط الأسباب و تشويق المحركات و كل محرك فإذا بلغ فعله إلى غرضه و غايته قطع الفعل البتة و أمسك عن العمل بالضرورة.

فإذا كان محرك الأفلاك بإذن الله تعالى و موجد الإنيات الزمانية بإرادته نال غرضه في تحريكها فسيبيله أن يمسك عن تحريكها و إدارتها و كلما أمسك محرك الأفلاك و مشوق الأملاك عن التحريك و التشويق وقفت السماوات عن الدوران و الكواكب عن المسير و خرب العالم و فسد النظام و بطلت الفصول و انعدمت الموالي و الحرث و النسل و انتقلت الأكوان إلى الدار الآخرة.

و ذلك لأن قوام هذا العالم بالحركة التي هي صورة المكونات فإذا بطلت بطل الجميع و إذا نفذت نفذت بنفادها الأكوان و قامت القيامة فقد علم بما ذكره على هذا الشرح بوار العالم و خراب الأفلاك و طي السماوات و الأرضين إن في هذا لبلاغا لقوم عابدين

وهم و تحصيل -

ربما يتوهم متوهم أن الفاعل المتحرك لعله لم يبلغ إلى غرضه و لم ينل بغيته - فيزاج بأنه إذا علم المحرك أنه لا يبلغ غرضه فسيبيله أيضا أن يمسك عن الفعل و أيضا ما لا يمكن الوصول إليه لم يمكن أن يكون غرضا مركوزا في جبلة الفاعل لأجله - و قد فرضناه كذلك.

اللهم إلا أن الفاعل يقصده و يميل إليه مجازفة أو قسرا و شيء منهما لا يكون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣٢

دائما و لا في الأفاعيل الطباعية و المفروض أن محرك الأفلاك و مكون الأكوان الزمانية ملك كريم و فاعل حكيم و فعل الحكيم لا يكون بلا غاية تترتب عليه فلو وجود الأفلاك و ما فيها غاية يبتدىء منها علما و ينتهي إليها عينا. و أما ما ذهب إليه أهل الحكمة كما أسلفناه من أن الباري ليس لفعله غرض - فليس بمناقض لما نحن بصدده إذ ذاك في

الفعل المطلق والتأيس من الليس المطلق - و كلامنا في الفعل الزماني و غايته و الغرض الذي يعود إلى ذات الفاعل المباشر القريب.

و بهذا يندفع أيضا ما يتوهم من التناقض في كلام الفيلسوف حيث نفى الغاية و ذكر أن لم غير جائزة عليه ثم أثبت الغاية حيث ذكر أن الفاعل يبطل هذا العالم - ليصوغه صيغة لا يحتمل الفساد.

تسجيل

فقد تبين و تحقق بما نقلناه من كلمات هذا الفيلسوف الأعظم و نصوصه و إشارات - أنه كان مذهبه اعتقاد حدوث العالم و اعتقاد بواره و خراب السماوات و زوالها و أن لله ميراث السماوات و الأرض.

فإذن ما زعمه الجمهور و اشتهر بينهم أنه كان يعتقد قدم العالم فلعل مراده قدم ما سوى عالم الأجسام و الجسمانيات و حينئذ فلا يخلو حاله من أحد أمرين - فإما أن كان يريد من العالم العقلي عالم الإلهية و القدرة و مراتب القوة القيومية - و هي جملة الصور الوجودية العقلية المحضة التي هي بوجه ما غير الذات الأحدية - التي سماها بعض العرفاء غيب الغيوب فيكون القول بقدمها حقا و صدقا إذ لا يلزم منه تعدد القدماء لكونها غير زائدة على مراتب الإلهية و مقامات الربوبية و العلوم الربانية - و عالم القضاء العيني.

و إن أراد بذلك ذواتا قديمة متعددة منفصلة الوجود مستقلة الهويات لا أنها شئون إلهية و علوم قضائية فالقول بقدمها و تسرمد العقول الفعالة باطل لكونها مطموسة تحت سطوع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣٣

نور الأحدية لكن حسن الظن بهذا الفيلسوف يستدعي أن اعتقاده و مذهبه هو القول الأول كما يشهد به وفور علمه و قوة حدسه و أحكام براهينه في سائر الأصول الحكمية و لأن طرفيه و هما أفلاطون أستاذ و فرفوريوس تلميذه قائلان بذلك القول كما يستفاد من كلمات كل منهما و مذهبه و الله أعلم بالسرائر.

و مما يدل على أن هذا الفيلسوف كان يرى و يعتقد حدوث العالم الجسماني و دثوره - ما قاله في الميمر السابع من كتاب معرفة الربوبية و هو أنه لما قبلت الهيولى الصورة من النفس حدثت الطبيعة ثم صورت الطبيعة و صيرتها قابلة للكون اضطرارا و إنما صارت الطبيعة قابلة للكون لما جعل فيها من القوة النفسانية و العلل العالية ثم وقف فعل العقل عند الطبيعة و مبدأ الكون فالكون آخر العلل العقلية المصورة و أول العلل المكونة و لم يكن يجب أن يقف العلل الفواعل المصورة للجواهر من قبل أن يأتي الطبيعة.

و إنما ذلك كذلك من أجل العلة الأولى التي صيرت الإنيات العقلية عللا فواعل - مصورة للعلل [للصور] العرضية الواقعة تحت الكون و الفساد و أن العالم الحسي إنما هو إشارة إلى العالم العقلي و إلى ما فيه من الجواهر العقلية و ثبات قواها العظيمة و فضائلها الكريمة و خيرها الذي يغلي غليانا و تفور فوراً انتهى كلامه.

أقول قوله صورت الطبيعة و صيرتها قابلة للكون و الفساد اضطرارا معناه جعلتها جعلاً بسيطاً و هي في ذاتها قابلة للكون بحسب هذا الوجود لا أنها لم تكن في ذاتها كذلك - فصيرتها كذلك بحسب عارض غريب عن وجودها ناهيك به قوله اضطرارا يعني صفة الكون و الفساد من ضروريات هوية الصورة الطبيعية من غير تخلل جعل بينها و بين كونها على تلك الصفة.

وقوله إنما صارت الطبيعة قابلة للكون إلى آخره إشارة إلى لمية تجدد الطبيعة واستمرارها و هما متقابلان بوجه لما فيها من شوب قوة و فعلية و دثور و ثبات و ذلك لأن في أسبابها و عللها شبه هاتين الصفتين فالقوة النفسانية مما يلزمها النقص و الشوق و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣٤

يلزمها الكمال و العقل و الشوق نوع حركة من القوة الشوقية لطلب الكمال تناسب تجدد الطبيعة و دثورها و الكمال العقلي الذي يكون للعلل العالية مما يلزمه الثبات و الدوام - فهو يناسب دوام تجدد الطبيعة و اتصالها بتوارد الأمثال. وقوله ثم وقف فعل العقل عند الطبيعة إلى آخره إشارة إلى ضربى التأثير و الإيجاد و هما الإبداع و التكوين فبين أن سلسلة الإبداع انتهت إلى الطبيعة و أن سلسلة التكوين أخذت منها لما في وجود الطبيعة من حقيقة الثبات و التجدد لما علم مرارا أن التجدد فيها عين الاستمرار لكونه صفة ذاتية لها اضطرارية و لهذا يكون أبدا في التغير و الاستحالة فالتجدد لها ذاتي و لغيرها عرضي بواسطتها فيثبت من ذلك أن الطبيعة آخر الإبداع و أول التكوين و هاتان الحثيتان لا توجبان تركيبا في ذاتها بحسب الخارج لما مر مرارا أن ثباتها عين التجدد و الانقضاء على قياس فعلية القوة في الهيولى و توحيد الكثرة في العدد و غير ذلك من الأمثلة.

ثم إن هذا الفيلسوف عبر عن علل التكوين بالعلل العرضية لما ظهر من قوله سابقا أن حدوث الصورة اللاحقة ليست من الصورة السابقة بل من سبب أعلى نسبته إلى المتجددات الزمانية نسبة واحدة غير زمانية و إنما أطلق اسم العلة على الصورة السابقة بالزمان بمعنى آخر فقد صح الاصطلاح على العلل الأصلية المرتبة بالذات بالسلسلة الطولية و على المعدات المترتبة بالزمان بالعلل العرضية.

وقوله إن العالم الحسي إنما هو إشارة إلى العالم العقلي معناه أن كل صورة حسية في هذا العالم فلها صورة عقلية في عالم الإلهية و في علم الله سبحانه كما هو رأي كثير من الأقدمين مثل أفلاطون و سقراط و غيرهما و سموها بالصور المفارقة و قد أحكمنا بنيانها و أوضحنا طريقها مرارا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣٥

فصل (٤) في ذكر اعتقادات الفلاسفة الذين هم غير هؤلاء الأصول الأعلون في حدوث العالم و خرابه و بوار السماوات و الأرضين
فمنهم زينون الأكبر بن فارس -

و قد نقلنا في مباحث الحركة قوله الدال صريحا على حدوث العالم و هو قوله إن الموجودات باقية دائرة أما بقاؤها فبتجدد صورها و أما دثورها فبدثور الصورة الأولى عند تجدد الأخرى و ذكر أن الدثور قد لزم الصورة و الهيولى انتهى. و من علم كيفية تعلق كل من الهيولى و الصورة بالأخرى يعلم صحة القول بتجددهما في كل آن و من أقواله أيضا الدال على الحدوث قوله إن المبدع الأول - كان في علمه صورة إبداع كل جوهر و صورة دثور كل جوهر فإن علمه غير متناه و الصور التي فيه من حد الإبداع غير متناهية و كذلك صور الدثور غير متناهية فالعوالم يتجدد في كل حين و دهر ثم ذكر وجه التجدد بما نقلناه منه أولا.

أقول المراد من عدم التناهي في قوله فإن علمه غير متناه و الصور التي في حد الإبداع غير متناهية ليس عدم التناهي بالعدد بالفعل لاستحالته بالبراهين و لهذا الفيلسوف برهان مخصوص على هذا المطلب في رسالة نقله بعض أفاضل المتأخرين في تصانيفه و تلك الرسالة موجودة عندنا.

بل المراد إما عدم التناهي بالقوة كما في المتصلات الجوهرية و العرضية - الواقعة في الكون حيث لا يقف عند حد كالصور الحسية المتجددة و أفرادها المتعاقبة في الوجود شيئاً فشيئاً على نعت الاتصال.

و إما عدم التناهي من جهة الشدة في الوجود العقلي كما للصورة المفارقة - بحسب ما يصدر عنه من الأفراد و الحركات لا إلى حد و على أي تقدير ليس المراد منه ما بحسب ترتب الصور العقلية لأنها متناهية البتة طولاً و عرضاً.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣٦

و منها قوله إن الشمس و القمر و الكواكب يستمد القوة من جوهر السماء - فإذا تغيرت السماء تغيرت النجوم أيضاً ثم هذه الصور كلها بقاؤها و دثورها في علم الباري سبحانه و العلم يقتضي بقاءها دائماً و كذلك الحكمة و الباري قادر على أن يفني العالم يوماً إن أراد.

أقول مراده من جوهر السماء هو جوهرها العقلي و هو صورة ذاتها في علم الله و وجهها الذي يلي القدس و التغير إنما يلحق السماء بحسب وجهها الذي يلي المادة و هو الطبيعة لأنها فانية و هو باق كما قال تعالى **كُلُّ شَيْءٍ هَالِكٌ إِلَّا وَجْهَهُ** و مراده من قوله و الباري قادر على أن يفني العالم يوماً إن أراد هو يوم القيمة الذي مقداره خمسين ألف سنة.

و قد أوردنا من الأصول و المبادي الصحيحة ما يستفاد بقوتها تفسير كلامه و تبين مرامه فلا نخوض في بسطه و شرحه حذراً من الإطالة و من الفلاسفة القائلين بحدوث العالم ديمقراطيس و شيعة إلا أن له رموزاً و تجوزات قل من اهتدى إليها.

و لهذا اشتهر منه أشياء بظواهرها يناقض الأصول الحكمية مثل القول بالأجسام الصغيرة و مثل القول بالاتفاق و البخت و كان هذا الفيلسوف إنما أنكر الغاية بمعنى العلة الغائية في فعل واجب الوجود لا غير إذ ما من حكيم إلا و هو معترف بأن ما لا يجب لا يكون بل هو و غيره يسمون الأمور اللاحقة بالماهيات لا لذواتها بل بسبب غيرها أموراً اتفاقية و حينئذ يصح القول بأن وجود هذا العالم اتفاقي.

قال بعض العلماء إن هذا الرجل تصفحنا كلامه القدر الذي وجدناه قد دل على قوة سلوكه و ذوقه و مشاهدات له رفيعة قدسية و أكثر ما نسب إليه افتراء محض - بل القدماء لهم الغاز و رموز و أغراض صحيحة و من أتى بعدهم رد على ظواهر رموزهم إما لغفلة أو تعمداً لما يطلب من الرياسة انتهى.

فمن كلماته المرموزة أنه قال المبدع الأول ليس هو العنصر فقط و لا العقل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣٧

فقط بل الأخلاط الأربعة و هي الأسطقسات أوائل الوجودات كلها و منه ابتدعت الأشياء البسيطة دفعة واحدة و أما المركبة فإنها كانت دائمة دائرة إلا أن ديمومتها بالنوع.

ثم العالم بجملته غير دائر لأنه متصل بذلك العالم الأعلى كما أن عناصر هذه الأشياء متصلة بلطف أرواحها الساكنة فيها

و العناصر و إن كانت تدثر في الظاهر - فإن صفوتها من الروح البسيط الذي فيها غير دائر فإن كان كذلك فليست تدثر إلا من جهة الحواس فأما من نحو العقل فإنه ليس تدثر فلا يدثر هذا العالم إذا كان صفوها فيه و صفوها متصل بالعوالم البسيطة انتهى.

أقول كلامه في غاية القوة و المتانة إلا أن فهم كلامه و درك مراده يحتاج إلى قريحة صافية و ذهن ثاقب مع تعمق شديد في العلوم الإلهيات.

و العجب أن الحكماء مع شدة فهمهم و وفور علمهم كيف ذهّلوا عن غور كلامه و بعد مراده حيث اعترضوا على كلامه و بالغوا في التشنيع من جهة قوله إن أول مبدع هو العناصر و بعدها أبدعت البسائط الروحانية و قالوا هو ترق من الأسفل إلى الأعلى - و من الأكر إلى الأصفى و معلوم أن مراده منها غير صورة هذه العناصر الحسية.

و قد حكم صريحا بأنها دائرة فكيف يتناقض في كلامه و لو لا مخافة الإطباب لبينت صحة مراده و مع ذلك فكلامه صريح فيما نحن بصدد هذا العالم و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٣٨

دثور شخصياته الحسنية و هوياتها المادية بقاء صفوها أي صورها عند الله القيوم لأنه أراد بالأشياء البسيطة الصور العقلية الثابتة و بالأشياء المركبة الصور الجسمانية فلكية كانت أو عنصرية لتركبها من المادة و الصورة أو من الوجود و العدم كما علمت من تشابك الوجود و العدم في الممتدات المكانية و الزمانية.

و من الفلاسفة القائلين بحدوث العالم و خرابه فلاسفة فاداميا

و إنهم كانوا يقولون إن كل مركب ينحل فلا يجوز أن يكون من جوهرين متفقين في جميع الجهات و إلا فليس بمركب. فإذا كان هذا هكذا فلا محالة إذا انحل التركيب حل كل جوهر فاتصل بالأصل الذي منه فما كان منها بسيطا روحانيا لحق بعالمه الروحاني و هو باق غير دائر و ما كان منها جاشيا غليظا لحق بعالمه أيضا و كل جاش إذا انحل فإنما يرجع حتى يصل إلى اللطف فإذا لم يبق من الكثافة شيء اتحد باللطيف الأول فيتحد به فيكونان متحدين إلى الأبد.

و إذا اتحدت الأواخر بالأوائل كان الأول هو أول كل مبدع ليس بينه و بين مبدعه جوهر آخر متوسط فلا محالة ذلك المبدع الأول يتعلق بنور مبدعه فيبقى دهر الدهور خالدا مخلدا انتهى.

أقول كلام هؤلاء الفلاسفة في غاية الشرف و النفاسة و هو يشتمل على بيان مقصدين شريفيين هما اللذان أكثرنا ذكرهما و كررنا تنبيههما.

أحدهما دثور العالم الجسماني و دثور صورته و فساد مادته و اضمحلال وجوده - و انحلال تركيبه.

و ثانيهما اتصال ما تروح و تلتطف من الصور الحسية إلى الصور العقلية و رجوع ما صفا و نقي منها إلى العلة الأولى الإلهية فالكل عائد إليه راجع صائر إياه متحد بوجهه الباقي رجوع النقص إلى التمام و مصير الفرع إلى الأصل كما قال تعالى - **فَسُبْحَانَ الَّذِي بِيَدِهِ مَلَكُوتُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَإِلَيْهِ تُرْجَعُونَ** و قوله **الْأَلَى اللَّهِ**

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تَصِيرُ الْأُمُورُ.

و من الفلاسفة القائلين بحدوث العالم هرقل الحكيم

فإنه كان يقول إن أول الأوائل النور الحق لا يدرك من جهة عقولنا لأنها أبدعت من ذلك النور الأول وهو الله حقاً و كان يقول إن بدو الخلق و أول هذا العالم المحبة و المنازعة و وافق في هذا الرأي أنبا ذقلس حيث قال الأول الذي أبدع أولاً هو المحبة و الغلبة.

أقول دلالة هذا الكلام على الحدوث أن كل محب يحب شيئاً غير ذاته فهو يتحرك حتى ينقلب إلى محبوبه و يرجع إليه و يفنى فيه لأن كل ناقص مشتاق له غاية و كل ذي غاية يتحرك إليها و كل محبوب قاهر على جذب محبة إليه و محو آثاره بالكليّة حتى يصير راجعاً إليه كما قال تعالى **وَهُوَ الْقَاهِرُ فَوْقَ عِبَادِهِ***.

و هذا لا يوجب الالتفات من العالي إلى السافل لأن العالي لا ينفعل من السافل و لكن يحركه و يجذبه إليه و يمحى آثاره و يجعله صائراً إليه من غير تغيير و مباشرة.

و بالجملة وجود المعلول مطلقاً عين المحبة لكونها ناقصاً مفتقراً إلى ما يكمل به - و يتم به و يخرج من فقره إلى غناه فالعالم بجميع ما فيه و معه يخرج يوماً إلى الله و يرجع إليه و يصير إياه كما أنه بدأ منه.

و من القائلين منهم بحدوث العالم أبيقورس قيل إنه خالف أوائل في الأوائل - قال المبادي اثنان الخلاء و الصورة أما الخلاء فمكان فارغ و أما الصورة فهي فوق المكان و الخلاء و منها أبدعت الموجودات و كل ما كان كون منهما فإنه ينحل إليهما - فمنهما المبدأ و إليهما المعاد و ربما يقول الكل يفسد.

أقول كأنه أراد بالمبادي مبادي القوام المقارنة للمعلول كالمادة و الصورة - لا مبادي الوجود المفارقة له كالفاعل و الغاية فإن المادة و الصورة داخلتان في وجود هذا العالم و ماهيته و الفاعل و الغاية خارجتان عن وجود هذا العالم و أراد من الخلاء الهيولى الأولى لكونها عدمية خالية عن وجود الصورة في ذاتها و لها امتداد

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مكاني باعتبار امتدادها الجسماني و أراد بالصورة الطبيعة المنوعة للأجرام و هي بحسب وجودها النفسي أو العقلي فوق الهيولى و الأبعاد فوقية بالعلية و الشرف و كل من الهيولى و الصورة مبدأ للوجود أيضاً بمعنى ما منه الشيء لا بمعنى ما به الشيء - لكن الصورة مبدأ فعلية الشيء الحادث و كماله و المادة مبدأ قوته و قبوله و افتقاره.

ثم إن الصورة إذا كملت فهي غاية كماله و المادة إذا ادثرت و طرحت كالقشر المرمي فهي غاية عدمه و مرجع فقره و نقصه و لهذا قال منهما المبدأ و إليهما المعاد - إذ مبدأ كل معلول هو ما ينتهي إليه فخرج من كلامه أن الجسمانيات و سائر الصور الحسية يتجدد وجودها من الصور المفارقة الباقية عند الله ثم تعود إليها و هذه الحسيات دائرة فاسدة بدثور الهيولى و تلك باقية عند الله ببقاء ذاتهم فكل شيء هالك إلا وجهه.

و من حكم الشيخ اليوناني الدالة على حدوث هذا العالم أنه قال

على سبيل الرمز إن أمك رءوم لكنها فقيرة رعاء و إن أباك لحدث لكنه جواد مقدر يعني بالأم الهيولى و بالأب الصورة و بالرءومية انقيادها و بالفقر قوة قبولها و هي أمر عديمي و بالرءونة عدم ثباتها على حالة واحدة و وجود باق و أما حداثة الصورة فهي تجددتها في الوجود في كل آن و أما جودها فهو مبدئيتها للأعراض و الآثار أو موجوديتها فبحسب حقيقتها العقلية التي في علم و هي من جهات إفاضة الله و رحمته على القوابل المستعدة و هذه القوابل إنما تقبل الصور بقدر

معلوم من خصوصيات الأزمنة والأوقات كما قال سبحانه **وَإِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ وَمَا نُنْزِلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَعْلُومٍ**.

و من كلماته الدالة على حدوث عالم الطبيعة والجسم قوله النفس جوهر شريف كريم تشبه دائرة قد دارت على مركزها غير أنها دائرة لا بعد لها و مركزها العقل - و كذلك العقل دائرة استدارة على مركزها و هو الخير الأول المحض غير أن النفس و العقل و إن كانا دائرتين لكن دائرة العقل لا تتحرك أبدا بل هي ساكنة واقفة شبيهة

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بمركزها و أما دائرة النفس فإنها تتحرك على مركزها و هو العقل حركة الاستكمال و أما دائرة العالم السفلى فإنها دائرة تدور حول النفس و إليها تشتاق و إنما تتحرك بهذه الحركة الذاتية شوقا إلى النفس كشوق النفس إلى العقل و شوق العقل إلى الخير الأول المحض.

و لأن دائرة هذا العالم جرم و الجرم يشترك إلى الشيء الخارج منه و يحرص أن يصير إليه فيعانقه فلذلك الجرم الأقصى الشريف يتحرك حركة مستديرة لأنه يطلب النفس من جميع النواحي لينالها فيستريح إليها و يسكن عندها. هذا كلامه و هو صريح في استحالة الفلك و انقطاع حركته الذاتية و دثور الطبيعة و نفاذه و فناء العالم الجسماني و اضمحلاله و انتقاله إلى الدار الآخرة حسب ما أوضحنا سبيله و من الحكماء المبرزين المشهورين بالفضل و البراعة الإسكندر الأفرودوسي و هو من كبار أصحاب أرسطاطاليس رأيا و علما و كلامه أمتن و مقالته أرقن.

و قد وصفه الشيخ في الشفاء و في كتاب المبدأ و المعاد يفاضل المتقدمين وافق أستاذه في كثير من المسائل. منها أن الباري عالم بالأشياء كلها كلياتها و جزئياتها على نسق واحد و لا يتغير علمه بتغير المعلوم و لا يتكثر و خالفه في بعضها بحسب ظاهر الأمر و نحن قد وجهنا قوله بهلاك بعض النفوس كما ستعلم.

و مما انفرد به أنه قال كل كوكب ذو نفس و طبع و حركة من جهة نفسه و طبعه - و لا يقبل التحريك من غيره أصلا و من كلامه الدال على حدوث ما سوى الفلك المحدد أنه قال لما كان الفلك محيطا بما دونه فكان الزمان جاريا عليه لأن الزمان هو العاد للحركات أي عددها و لما لم يكن يحيط به شيء آخر و إلا لكان الزمان جاريا عليه - لم يجز أن يفسد و يكون فلم يكن قابلا للكون و الفساد و ما لا يقبل الكون و الفساد كان قديما.

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أقول كلامه ظاهر في أن ما يكون تحت الدهر و الزمان فهو من الكوائن الفواسد و لا شبهة في أن جميع الأجرام الفلكية و العنصرية مما يجري عليه الزمان - لأنها مادية فيها جهة القوة و الاستعداد و ما كان كذلك فالزمان من مشخصاته فيكون متغير الوجود قابلا للكون و الفساد فحينئذ إن ثبت أن المحيط بالجميع جسم طبيعي له قوة الحركة و التغير فهو أيضا لا محالة ذو صورة متجددة كائنة فاسدة فيحتاج إلى محدد آخر يحدد زمان وجوده و مكان كونه و إن لم يكن كذلك فيكون إحاطته بالجميع - ليست إحاطة وضعية مكانية كإحاطة السقف بل كان أمرا نفسانيا يحيط بالسماء إحاطة نفسانية فلم يكن بحسب جوهرها العقلي من جملة عالم الشهادة و الحس بل من عالم الغيب و عالم التدبير و القضاء الإلهي و ما عند الله ببقائه كما قال **مَا عِنْدَكُمْ يَنْفَدُ وَمَا عِنْدَ اللَّهِ بَاقٍ**.

و من عظماء الحكماء المتألهين الراسخين في العلم و التوحيد فرفور يوس صاحب المشائين

واضع إيساغوجي و هو عندي من أعظم أصحاب المعلم الأول و أهدى القوم إلى عيون علومه و أرشدهم إلى إشاراتِهِ و جميع ما ذهب إليه في علم النفس و علم الرب و كيفية المعاد و رجوع النفس إلى عالم الحق و دار الثواب و الاعتماد عليه في شرح التعليم الأول أكثر من غيره كإسكندر الرومي و ثامسطيوس و إن كان الشيخ أكثر تعويله على هذين دونه لإنكاره عليه في القول باتحاد العاقل بالمعقول و اتحاد النفس بالعقل الفعال.

و قد علمت تحقيق هذا المقام على وجه الكمال و التمام قال المكونات كلها إنما تتكون بتكون الصورة على سبيل التغير و تفسد بخلو الصورة و قال كل ما كان واحدا بسيطا ففعله واحد بسيط و ما كان كثيرا مركبا فأفعاله كثيرة مركبة - و كل موجود ففعله مثل طبيعته ففعل الله بذاته واحد بسيط و ما يفعلها من أفاعيله بمتوسط فمركب.

و قال أيضا كل ما كان موجودا فله فعل مطابق الطبيعة و لما كان الباري

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موجودا ففعله الخاص الوجداني هو الاجتلاب إلى شبهه يعني الوجود ففي كلامه دلالة على حدوث الطبيعة الجسمانية تصريحاً و تلميحاً.

أما الأول فحيث قال المكونات إنما تتكون بتكون الصورة على سبيل التغير - و تفسد بخلوها عنها. و أما الثاني فقوله كل موجود ففعله مثل طبيعته و لا شبهة في أن لكل جسم طبيعة هي مبدأ حركته و الحركة أمر دائم التجدد و الحدود فكذلك مبدؤها القريب - فيكون كل جسم طبيعي متجدداً حادثاً زائلاً كائناً فاسداً و أيضاً في قوله ففعله الخاص الوجداني هو الاجتلاب إلى شبهة إشارة إلى تبدل هذا العالم و رجوعه إلى الله سبحانه.

و من الفلاسفة المعبرين المشهورين ابرقلس

المنسوب إلى أفلاطون و قد اشتهر فيما بين القوم منه القول بقدم العالم و نسبته إلى الفلاسفة الأقدمين و منشأ ذلك إيراد ابرقلس في تصنيفه تلك الشبهات التسع التي نقلها و لو لا مخافة الإطناب لذكرتها و بينت وجه التقضي عن كل واحد واحد منها بحيث لم يبق منها لأحد مجال الشك في العالم و كيفية صدور الموجودات منه تعالى على أن لكل منها محملاً صحيحاً و وجهاً وجيهاً يصار إليه.

و لهذا ذكر الشهرستاني في كتاب الملل و النحل أنه قال بعض المتعصبين لابرقلس ممهداً له عذراً في إيراد تلك الشبهات إنه كان يناطق الناس بمنطقتين - أحدهما روحاني بسيط و الآخر جسماني مركب و كان أهل زمانه الذين يناطقونه جسمانيين.

و إنما دعاه إلى ذكر هذه الأقوال مقاومتهم إياه فخرج من طريقة الفكرة و الفلسفة من هذه الجهة لأن من الواجب على الحكماء أن يظهر الحكمة على طرق كثيرة - يتصرف فيها كل ناظر بحسب نظره و يستفيد منها بحسب فكره و استعداده فلا يجدوا على قوله مساعاً و لا يصيبوا عليه مقالاً و مطعناً لأن ابرقلس لما كان يقول بدهر هذا العالم - و أنه باق لا يدرثر وضع كتاباً في هذا المعنى فطالعه من لم يعرف طريقته ففهموا منه

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جسمانيته دون روحانيته فنقضوه على مذهب الدهرية.

و في هذا الكتاب لما اتصلت العوالم بعضها ببعض و حدثت القوى الطبيعية حدثت فيها قشور و استعلت لبوب فالقشور دائرة و اللبوب دائمة لا يجوز عليها الفساد لأنها بسيطة وحيدة القوى فانقسم العالم عالمين عالم الصورة و اللب و عالم الكدور و القشور فاتصل بعضه ببعض و كان آخر هذا العالم من بدو ذلك العالم فمن وجه لم يكن بينهما فرق - فلم يكن هذا العالم دائرا إذا كان متصلا بما ليس مدثر و من وجه دثرت القشور و زالت الكدور و كيف يكون القشور غير دائرة و لا مضمحلة و ما لم يزل القشور باقية - كانت اللبوب خافية.

و أيضا فإن هذا العالم مركب و العالم الأعلى بسيط و كل بسيط باق دائما غير مضمحل و لا متغير قال الذي يذب عن ابرقلس هذا الذي نقل عنه هو المقبول عن مثله بل الذي أضاف إليه القول الأول لا يخلو من أمرين إما أن لم يقف على مرامه للعلة التي ذكرناه سابقا و إما لأنه كان محسودا عند أهل زمانه لكونه بسيط الفكر واسع النظر سائر القوة و كانوا أولئك أصحاب أوهام و خيالات.

و الدليل على صحة ما ذكره هذا الذاب أن ابرقلس كان يقول في موضع من كتابه إن الأوائل التي منها كونت العوالم باقية لا تدثر و لا تضمحل و هي لازمة للدهر ماسكة إلا أنها من أول واحد لا يوصف بصفة و لا يدرك بنعت و نطق و أن صور الأشياء كلها منه و تحته و هو الغاية و المنتهى التي ليس فوقها جوهر هو أعظم منها إلا الأول الواحد و هو الأحد الذي قوته أخرجت هذه الأوائل و قدرته أبدعت هذه المبادي.

و قال أيضا إن الحق لا يحتاج إلى أن يعرف ذاته لأنه حق حقا و كل حق حقا فهو تحته إذ قد حققه الحق فالحق الذي امتد منه طباع الحياة و البقاء هو الذي أفاد بقاء هذا العالم بدوا و بقاء بعد دثور قشوره و زكا البسيط الباطن من الناس الذي كان فيه قد علق به.

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و قال أيضا إن هذا العالم قد اضمحلت قشوره و ذهب دنسه و صار بسيطا روحانيا - و بقي ما فيه من الجواهر الصافية النورانية في حد المراتب الروحانية مثل العوالم العلوية و بقي فيه جوهر كله قشر و دنس و خبث هذه كلماته. أقول قد انكشف و تبين من هذه الكلمات التي في غاية الحسن و الإتقان أن مذهب هذا الحكيم الرباني المشهور بين الناس بأنه دهري هو بعينه مذهب أفلاطن - و من تقدمه في حدوث العالم و خرابه و بواره و بقاء العالم الإلهي و الصور الربانية.

و أنه لما رأى و انكشف له اتصال أواخر هذا العالم بأوائل ذلك العالم اتصال المعلوم المفاض بعلة الفيضة و اتصال ذي الغاية بغايته و لحقوق الناس بكماله و تمامه - و ذلك العالم الربوبي باق بقاء الله دائم بديموميته حكم أحيانا بأولية هذا العالم بهذا المعنى كما يقال إن أبداننا باقية ببقاء نفوسنا مع أن البدن سائل زائل في كل آن كما علم.

فقوله بدهر هذا العالم ليس يعني به أن الصور الطبيعية الحسية التي للأفلاك و غيرها أزلية الأشخاص و الأعداد بل عنى به أن صورتها العقلية البسيطة الموجودة في علم الله باقية عنده غير دائرة بدثور هذه الحسيات المركبة و ذلك لأن الدثور يقتضي غاية و معادا غير دائر كما أن الحدوث يقتضي مبدأ و فاعلا غير كائن لا متناهي أن يكون لكل غاية غاية إلى لا نهاية أو أن يكون لكل مبدأ مبدأ لا إلى بداية ففي الطرفين لا بد و أن ينتهي الأشياء المتجددة إلى أمر لا بداية له و لا

نهاية له.

فإذن مرجع قوله إن العالم قديم على الوجه الذي مر تحقيقه إلى أن الصانع له قديم وهو المبدأ الذي منه بدو كل باد و المعاد الذي إليه أوب كل آتب فما ذكره قول حق و صواب بشرط أن يعلم قائله و يذعن بأن الصور العقلية الدائمة التي هي بواطن هذه الصور الدائرة الطبيعية ليست موجودات مستقلة الوجود مبائنة الذوات لوجود باريها و جاعلها الحق الأول ليلزم تعدد القدماء كما يقوله الصفاتية و لا حالة

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في ذات الأول ليلزم التكثُر في ذاته و لا أنها متحدة به تعالى عن ذلك في مرتبة ذاته - ليلزم الانقلاب له من الوجوب إلى الإمكان أو لها من الإمكان إلى الوجوب و الكل مستحيل.

بل الواجب واجب أبدا سرمدًا و الممكن ممكن دائما و الحق حق في الأزل و الباطل باطل لم يزل و هذا شيء لا يعرفه إلا أهل الأذواق و المواجيد و الراسخون في علم التوحيد على أن البرهان قائم كما أسلفناه على أن كل شوق و طلب غريزي يفضي بصاحبه إلى ما يطلبه و يحبه بالضرورة

فصل (٥) في نبذ من كلام أئمة الكشف و الشهود من أهل هذه الملة البيضاء في تجدد الطبيعة الجرمية الذي هو ملاك الأمر في دثور العالم و زواله

قد ذكرنا فيما سبق كثيرا من الآيات القرآنية الدالة على هذا المطلب الذي هو عمدة أصول الحكمة و الدين و هو مما يستفاد من الأحاديث المروية عن صاحب هذه الشريعة الماثورة عن أهل بيت العصمة و النبوة صلوات الله عليهم أجمعين.

منها كلام أمير المؤمنين ع في نهج البلاغة

: أذكركم الدنيا فإنها دار شخوص و محل تبغيض [تنغيص] ساكنها ظاعن و قاطننها بائن تميد بأهلها ميدان السفينة - يصفقها العواصف في لجج البحار

و منها أيضا قوله ع

: ما أصف من دار أولها عناء و آخرها فناء من ساعاها فائقته - و من استغنى عنها و اتته

هذا الكلام كما قبله في غاية البلاغة في الحكمة لا ينكشف حق معناه إلا على من أحكم القوانين الماضية و أمعن في الرياضات العقلية لطلب العلوم الإلهية.

و أما كلام أهل التصوف و المكاشفين

فقد قال المحقق المكاشف محيي الدين العربي في بعض أبواب الفتوحات المكية قال تعالى **وَأَنَّ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا**

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٤٧

عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ وَ مَا نُنْزِلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَعْلُومٍ أي من اسمه الحكيم فالحكمة سلطان هذا الإنزال الإلهي و هو إخراج هذه الأشياء من هذه الخزائن إلى وجود أعيانها.

ثم قال بعد كلام طويناه فبالنظر إلى أعيانها هي موجودة عن عدم و بالنظر إلى كونها عند الله في هذه الخزائن.

ثم قال وأما قوله **مَا عِنْدَكُمْ يَنْفَدُ** صحيح في العلم لأن الخطاب منها لعين الجوهر - و الذي عنده أعني عند الجوهر من كل موجود إنما هو ما يوجد الله في محله من الصفات والأعراض والأكوان وهي في الزمان أو الحال الثاني من زمان وجودها أو حال وجودها ينعدم من عندنا وهو قوله **مَا عِنْدَكُمْ يَنْفَدُ وَ مَا عِنْدَ اللَّهِ بَاقٍ** وهو تجدد للجوهر الأمثال أو الأضداد دائما من هذه الخزائن.

و هذا معنى قول المتكلمين العرض لا يبقى زمانين وهو قول صحيح حر لا شبهة فيه لأنه بعث الممكنات. قال وأما صاحب النظر فما عنده خبر بشيء من هذا لأنه تنبيه نبوي لا نظر فكري - و صاحب النظر مقيد تحت سلطان فكره وليس للفكر فيه مجال.

و قال أيضا في الباب السابع والستين و ثلثمائة يحكى عن عروج وقع بحسب الباطن حين مخاطبته مع إدريس النبي ع بهذه العبارة - قلت له إني رأيت في واقعتي شخصا بالطواف أخبرني أنه من أجدادي و سمي نفسه فسألته عن زمان موته فقال أربعون ألف سنة فسألته عن آدم لما تقرر عندنا من التاريخ لمدته فقال لي عن أي آدم تسأل عن آدم الأقرب قلت بلى فقال صدق إني نبي الله و لا أرى للعالم مدة يقف عليها بجملة إلا أنه بالجملة لم يزل خالقا و لا يزال دنيا و آخرة و الآجال في المخلوق بانتهاء المدد لا في الخلق فالخلق مع الأنفاس بتجدد. فقلت له فما بقي لظهور الساعة فقال اقتربت الساعة للناس حسابهم و هم في غفلة معرضون.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٤٨

فقلت عرفني بشرط من شروط اقترابها فقال وجود آدم من شروطه فقلت فهل كان قبل الدنيا دار غيرها قال دار الوجود واحدة و الدار ما كانت دنيا و لا آخرة إلا بكم - و الآخرة ما تميزت إلا بكم و إنما الأمر في الأجسام أكوان و استحالات و إتيان و ذهاب لم يزل و لا يزال انتهى كلامه الشريف

الفن السادس

من علم الجواهر في المبادي والأسباب للطبيعات التي يتسلمه العالم الطبيعي أخذنا من العالم الإلهي على وجه الحكاية والتسليم وأما البرهان عليه فضمامه على ذمة العالم الرباني أخذنا من الله من جهة ملائكته المقربين الذين هم وسائط أمره في خلقه وفيه فصول

فصل (١) في تعريف الطبيعة

لا شبهة لنا في أن هذه الأجسام التي قبلنا قد يصدر عنها أفعال و انفعال و حركات و استحالات نجد بعضها من جهة أسباب غريبة خارجة مثل حركة الحجر إلى فوق و النار إلى تحت و مثل تسخن الماء و تبرد الهواء و نجد بعضها لا يستند إلى سبب غريب كحركة الحجر إلى تحت و حركة النار إلى فوق و كتبريد الماء و تسخين النار. و قريب من هذا استحالة البذور و النطف نباتا و حيوانا و نصافد أيضا من الحيوانات تصرفا إراديا في أنواع حركاتها و سكناتها من غير متصرف خارج عنها يصرفها هذه التصاريف و قاسر غريب يقسرها على هذه الأفاعيل. فهذا ما ارتسم في أذهاننا في أول النظر من غير أن يجزم أولا أن كلا من الوجهين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٤٩

صادرة بإرادة مريد أو لا بإرادة مريد وكلا منهما لازم طريقة واحدة لا ينحرف عنها أو غير لازم طريقة واحدة بل متفنن الطرق ولا أيضا أن هذه الأجسام التي ليست محركاتها من خارج مشهود لنا هل لها محرك خارج لا نحسه أم لا.

و على الأول هل من شأنه أن يحس حتى يكون محسوس الذات غير محسوس التأثير كمن شاهد انجذاب الحديد إلى جهة و لم ير مغناطيس يجذب الحديد أو عساه - أن يكون مفارق الذات غير محسوس البتة على أنه من الواضح الجلي لكل عاقل - أن الجسم بما هو جسم لا يجوز أن يفعل فعلا خاصا ولا أن يحرك تحريكا فالذي لا بد أن يتسلمه الطبيعي و يبرهن عليه الإلهي أن هذه الأجسام المتحركة هذه الحركات إنما يقع حركاتها و أفعالها عن قوى موجودة فيها هي مبادي آثارها و أفعالها.

فمنها قوة يصدر عنها الفعل و التغيير على نهج واحد من غير إرادة.

و منها قوة يصدر عنها كذلك مع إرادة.

و منها قوة متقننة الفعل و التحريك من غير إرادة.

و منها قوة كذلك مع إرادة و هكذا حال القسمة في جانب السكون بحسب الاحتمال العقلي.

فالأولى يسمى طبيعية بحسب هذا الاصطلاح و لا يخلو عنها جسم عندنا كما للحجر في هبوطه و سكونه في وسط الكل و معنى قولنا لا يخلو عنها جسم أنه ما من جسم إلا و يوجد فيه قوة مباشرة لفعل بالحركة أو السكون على نهج واحد بلا شعور لها في مرتبة وجودها الخاص بلا شرط أن لا يكون معها قوة أخرى فوقها كنفس أو عقل أو تكون و إذا كانت فسواء اتحدت هذه معها ضربا من الاتحاد أو لم يكن.

و الثانية يسمى نفسا فلكيا كما للكوكب في دورانه على نفسه عند محققي الحكماء.

و الثالثة تسمى نفسا نباتية كما للنبات في تغذيته و نشره و توليده.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٥٠

و الرابعة تسمى نفسا حيوانية كما للحيوان في إحساسه و مشيه و شهوته و غضبه.

و ربما قبل اسم الطبيعة على كل قوة يصدر عنها فعل بلا إرادة فتعم النفس النباتية و ربما قيل لمبدأ كل فعل بلا روية فتعم النفس الفلكية و غيرها حتى العنكبوت في نسج شبكتها و النحل في هندسة بيوتها إنه بالطباع لكن التي هي مبدأ للعلم الطبيعي الباحث عن أحوال المتغيرات هي الطبيعة بالمعنى الأول التي لا يخلو عنها جسم و ليس على الطبيعي أن يتكلف إثباتها بل عليه أن يلتمس إثباتها عن صاحب الفلسفة الأولى.

و على الطبيعي أن يعرف تحقيق ماهيتها و لا يتعرض لمن ينكر وجودها إذ فيه كلفة شاقة كما مر ذكرها من قبل من جهة أن لكل متحرك محركا.

فالتطبيعي حكمه في هذه المسألة و أمثالها حكم المحل القابل و الرجل الإلهي حكمه فيها حكم المعطي الفاعل و قد حدت الطبيعة بأنها مبدأ أول لحركة ما هو فيه و سكونه بالذات لا بالعرض و هذا الحد موروث من الإمام الأول لتعليم الفلسفة و شرحه كما وجد في الشفاء أن معنى قولنا مبدأ أول للحركة أي مبدأ فاعلي يصدر عنه التحريك في غيره أعني الجسم المتحرك و قد وقعت الإشارة منا سابقا أن معنى الفاعل في استعمال الطبيعيين و في الأفعال الطبيعية هو الذي يكون تأثيره زمانيا - و على التدرج.

ثم ينبغي أن يعلم أن الطبيعة لا يجب أن يكون في كل شيء مبدأ للحركة - والسكون معا ولا أيضا يجب كونها مبدأ للحركة المكانية فقط بل المراد أنها مبدأ لكل أمر ذاتي يكون للشيء من الحركة إن كانت والسكون إن كان و سواء كانت الحركة في أين أو كم أو كيف أو جوهر أو نحو آخر.

و معنى قوله أول أي مباشر قريب لا واسطة بينه و بين تحريكه فعسى أن يكون النفس مبدأ لبعض حركات الأجسام التي هي فيها و لكن بواسطة الطبيعة حتى أن قوما اعتقدوا أن النفس في ذوات الأنفس تفعل حركة الانتقال بتوسط الطبيعة.

و هذا حق عندنا في الحركات الانتقالية الإرادية التي تكون للحيوانات دون

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٥١

ما تكون كسقوط أبدانها من فوق إلى تحت كما لوحناه إليك سابقا من أن مباشر كل حركة هو الطبيعة سواء استقلت أو استخدمت للنفس.

و أما الشيخ فقد أنكر ذلك و استبعده حيث قال و لا أرى الطبيعة يستحيل محرقة للأعضاء خلاف ما توجه ذاتها طاعة للنفس و لو استحالت الطبيعة كذلك لما حدث الإعياء عند تكليف النفس إياها غير مقتضاها و لا تجاذب مقتضى النفس و مقتضى الطبيعة و قد مر اندفاع ما ذكره.

و حل الإشكال بأن الطبيعة ليست واحدة بالنوع و وحدتها جنسية و التي في العناصر و المعادن غير التي يتوسط بين النفس و تحريكاتها الأينية و الكمية و الكيفية.

ثم العجب منه أنه جوز مثل هذا التوسط و الاستخدام في غير التحريكات المكانية و لم يجوز فيها و إن كان الذي جوزه على طور غير الطور الذي نحن عليه لأن القوى النباتية و الحيوانية عنده أعراض و كفيات فعلية أو انفعالية و عندنا جواهر صورية و قوله هو ما فيه ليفرق بين الطبيعة و الصناعة و القواسر.

و أما قوله بالذات فقد حمل على وجهين أحدهما بالقياس إلى المحرك و الآخر بالقياس إلى المتحرك فمعناه على الوجه الأول أن الطبيعة تحرك لذاتها لا عن تسخير قاسر فيستحيل أن لا يحرك حين خلوها عن مانع حركة غير الحركة التي لأجل قاسر - و معناه على الوجه الآخر أن الطبيعة تحرك لأمر يتحرك عن ذاته لا عن خارج.

و قوله لا بالعرض أيضا يحمل على وجهين أحدهما بالقياس إلى الفاعل و الثاني بالقياس إلى القابل فالأول أن الطبيعة مبدأ لما كان حركته بالحقيقة لا بالعرض و الحركة بالعرض مثل حركة ساكن السفينة بحركة السفينة.

و الثاني أنه إذا حركت الطبيعة صنما من نحاس فهي تحركه بما هو صنم بالعرض - لأن تحريكها بالذات للنحاس لا للصنم و لذلك لا يكون الطبيب طبيا إذا عالج نفسه - و حرك الطب ما هو فيه لأنه فيه لا من حيث هو مريض بل من حيث هو طبيب فلم يكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٥٢

برؤه عن المرض لأنه طبيب و لكن لأنه متعالج فإنه من حيث هو معالج شيء و من حيث هو متعالج شيء لأنه بالحيثية الأولى صانع للعلاج و بالحيثية الأخرى قابل له مريض.

تبصرة

قد سنح لبعض الواردين بعد السابقين أن يستقصر هذا التحديد و توخى بعد استقصاره أن يزيد عليه زيادة. فقال إن هذا التعريف إنما يدل على هذه الطبيعة لا على جوهر ذاتها بل على نسبتها إلى ما يصدر عنها و يجب أن يزداد في حدها فيقال إن الطبيعة قوة سارية في الأجسام - تفيد التخليق و التشكيل و تحفظهما و هي مبدأ لكذا و كذا. و الذي عليه الشيخ أن هذه الزيادة تكلف مستغنى عنه و أن ما فعله ردي فاسد - غير محتاج إليه و لا إلى بدله. فقال أما الزيادة التي رأى بعض اللاحقين بالأوائل أن يزيدها فقد فعل باطلا فإن القوة التي كالجنس في رسم الطبيعة هي القوة الفاعلية و إذا حدثت حدث بأنها مبدأ الحركة من آخر في آخر بأنه آخر و ليس معنى القوة إلا مبدأ تحريك يكون في الشيء و ليس معنى السريان إلا الكون في الشيء. فإن المحل إذا كان أمرا منقسما كان الذي يحله من حيث ذاته أيضا منقسما ساريا فيه و ليس معنى التخليق و التشكيل إلا داخلا في معنى التحريك و ليس معنى حفظ الخلق و الأشكال إلا داخلا في التسكين فيكون هذا الرجل قد كرر أشياء كثيرة من غير حاجة إليه و هو لا يشعر. و مع ذلك فإن هذا المتدارك لخلل هذا الرسم بزعمه قد حسب أنه إذا قال قوة فقد دل على ذات غير مضافة إلى شيء و ما فعل فإن القوة مفهومها هو مبدأ التحريك و التسكين لا غير فالقوة لا ترسم إلا من جهة النسبة الإضافية هذا تلخيص كلامه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٥٣

أقول كون الطبيعة مبدأ لأفعالها الذاتية من الحركة و غيرها ليس على سبيل أن يكون من الصفات العارضة لذاتها بعد ذاتها كالمضاحك و الكاتب للإنسان بل وجودها في نفسها و وجودها مبدأ لكذا و كذا شيء واحد بلا تغاير. فالمذكور في تعريفه ليس كما يفهم من كلام الشيخ أنها حد بحسب مفهوم الاسم رسم بحسب الحقيقة و الذات و كذا ينبغي أن يعلم أن كون هذا المبدأ طبيعة و قوة و صورة و إن كان بحسب مفهومات متغايرة لكن قد علمت أن تكثر المفهومات و تغايرها لا يقتضي تغاير نحو الوجود الذي هو مصداق الجميع. فهذه القوة في كل واحد من أنواع الجسم شيء واحد جسماني يترتب عليه بها أفعاله و آثاره الذاتية الجسمانية من الحركات و الاستحالات و غيرها سواء كانت متحصلة القوام بجوهر نفساني أو لا و سيأتي لهذا شرح

فصل (٢) في نسبة الطبيعة إلى ما فوقها من الصورة و النفس و إلى ما تحتها من المادة و الحركة و الأعراض

[نسبة الطبيعة إلى الصورة]

قال الشيخ في الشفاء إن لكل جسم طبيعة و مادة و صورة و أعراضا فطبيعته هو القوة التي يصدر عنها تحركه أو تغييره الذي يكون عن ذاته و كذلك سكونه و ثباته - و صورته هي ماهيته التي بها هو ما هو و مادته هي المعنى الحامل لماهيته و الأعراض هي التي إذا تصورت مادته بصورته و تمت نوعيته لزمّت أو عرضت له من خارج و ربما كانت طبيعة الشيء هي بعينها صورته و ربما لم يكن.

أما في البسائط فإن الطبيعة هي الصورة بعينها فإذا قيست إلى الحركات و الأفعال - سميت طبيعة و إذا قيست إلى تقويمها للنوع سميت صورة فصورة الماء مثلا قوة أقامت هيولى الماء نوعا هو الماء و تلك غير محسوسة و عنها تصدر الآثار

المحسوسة من البرودة و الثقل و هو الميل الذي لا يكون للجسم و هو في حيزه الطبيعي فيكون فعلها في

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جوهر الماء إما بالقياس إلى المتأثر عنه فالبرودة وإما بالقياس إلى المؤثر فيه المشكل له فالرطوبة و أما بالقياس إلى مكانه الغريب فالتحريك و بالقياس إلى مكانه المناسب فالتسكين و أما في المركبات فالطبيعة كشيء من الصورة و لا يكون كنه الصورة.

فإن تلك الأجسام لا تصير هي ما هي بالقوة المحركة لها بالذات إلى جهة وحدها- وإن كانت لا بد لها في أن يكون هي ما هي من تلك القوة فكان تلك القوة جزءا من صورتها و كان صورتها تتجمع من عدة معان فيتحد كالإنسانية فإنها تتضمن قوى الطبيعة- و قوى النفس النباتية و الحيوانية و النطق.

و إذا اجتمعت هذه كلها نوعا من الاجتماع أعطيت الماهية الإنسانية و أما كيفية نحو هذا الاجتماع فالأولى أن يبين في الفلسفة الأولى هذا ملخص كلامه و فيه أمور صحيحة على طور حكمتنا المشرقية و أمور متزلزلة كما يظهر على من تأمل و تدبر في مواضع من كلامنا فقولنا صورة الشيء هي ماهيته التي بها هو ما هو و مادته هي المعنى الحامل لماهيته كلام حر صحيح يجب التعويل عليه في جميع المواضع- و هذا الذي ذكره أصل يبتني عليه كثير من مقاصدنا سيما التي في علم المعاد- فكل حقيقة نوعية فهي بصورتها التي مقوم نوعها و محصل جنسها و يتفرع عليه أمور. منها كون النفس الإنسانية في ذاتها مصداقا لجميع المعاني التي توجد في الحيوان و النبات و المعدن على وجه الإطلاق. و منها مسألة اتحاد العاقل بالمعقول.

و منها جواز حركة الاشتداد في الجوهر و أما قوله و ربما كانت طبيعة الشيء- هي بعينها صورته كالبسائط و ربما لم يكن كالمركبات فلا يخلو من اضطراب أما أولا فلأن قوله كالبسائط عنى به العناصر الأربعة كما يعلم من مواضع آخر من كلامه من أن الفلك لا طبيعة له و كذا الكواكب لا طبيعة لها و إنما لها ميل فقط و هو من الكيفيات كالثقل و الخفة.

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و فيه ما مر من أن الأفلاك و كذا الكواكب لها طبيعة خامسة. و أما ثانيا فقولنا ربما لم يكن إلى آخره أراد به أن المركب الحيواني و النباتي صورته النوعية هي نفسه و هي بالعدد غير طبيعته و كأنه أراد هاهنا بطبيعة الحيوان مثلا صور العناصر التي هي أجزاء مادته. و أنت تعلم أن شيئا منها ليست طبيعة الحيوان بما هو حيوان و لا النبات بما هو نبات و إن أراد به غير تلك الطبائع بل التي هي مبادي حركات النشو أو الإرادة- فالحق أنها عين الصورة الحيوانية و النباتية وجودا و هوية و غيرها معنى و ماهية و قوله فالطبيعة كشيء من الصورة و لا يكون كنه الصورة و كذا قوله و كان تلك القوة جزءا من صورتها يحتمل وجهين أحدهما ما هو المختار عندنا و هو أن معنى الطبيعة المذكورة أحد معان يتضمنها الصورة النوعية التي للمركب فتلك الصورة مع تأدها يتضمن مع تلك القوة من كونها مبدأ قريبا للحركات و الاستحالات الناشئة عما هي فيه بالذات لا بالعرض و إن جاز وجود تلك القوة مفردة في مادة أخرى بالنوع لا بالشخص باعتبار أخذها بشرط لا شيء آخر.

و ثانيهما و هو الذي قصده الشيخ كما يظهر من مواضع أخرى من كلامه و هو أن هذه القوة توجد في مادة المركب من الأسطقسات و معنى الصورة محمول على المركب لأنها تتحد مع الفصل باعتبار أخذ معناها لا بشرط شيء و الفصل محمول على المركب و معنى الحمل هو الاتحاد في الوجود فيكون تلك القوة جزءا من الصورة بهذا الوجه.

و هذا و إن كان وجهها صحيحا إلا أن النظر يعطي أن صورة الشيء التي هي مبدأ فصله الأخير يتضمن وجوده البسيط جميع المعاني الموجودة في القوى التي تحتها بوجه أعلى و أبسط و كذا قوله و كان صورتها يجتمع من عدة معان فيتحد إلى آخره يجري فيه الاحتمالان المذكوران.

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و كذا الكلام في قوله و أما كيفية نحو هذا الاجتماع فالأولى أن يبين في الفلسفة الأولى فإن الذي يستفاد من كلامه في غير هذا الموضوع في كيفية هذا الاجتماع المناسب لسائر ما قاله هو أن صورة كل نوع هو مركب من عدة قوى كالإنسان مثلا يجب كونها مبدأ لسائر قواه على ترتيب و نظام كأنها يجمع الكل في واحد لكونها مرتبطا بواحد على وجه التناسب و الترتيب و الترتيب يجعل الكثير شبيها بواحد.

و أما الذي ينتهي إليه النظر العميق أن الصورة كالصورة الإنسانية مثلا و هي نفس الناطقة على وحدتها جامعة لجميع قواها الحيوانية و النباتية و المعدنية على وجه مبسوط شريف و كذا الكلام في كل صورة بالقياس إلى ما دونها.

فإن قلت إذا كانت الصورة مبدأ فاعليا لسائر القوى قاهرا عليها فيلزم أن لا تنفعل عنها و لا يستكمل بها.

قلنا هذه الصورة المقومة للمواد و قواها ليست في قوة الوجود كالمبادي العقلية حتى يتبرى عن المواد و قواها كل البراءة فلكل منها جهتان جهة حاجة و استكمال و جهة غناء و تكميل.

و قد مر في مباحث التلازم بين المادة و الصورة كيفية تحقق هاتين الجهتين - فالصورة مقومة للمادة من جهة أصل حقيقتها بإعانة جوهر عقلي يتصل به ضربا من الاتصال و هي مفتقرة إلى المادة في عوارضها الانفعالية و هيئتها المسماة بالمشخصات - و كلامنا في الصورة من جهة أصل حقيقتها لا من جهة تأخرها عن المادة و افتقارها إليها فإنها ليست من تلك الحيثية صورة بل هيئة و لا المادة من تلك الحيثية مادة بل موضوعا و هكذا الحال في كل صورة و مادة حتى النفس و البدن فإن النفس محصلة للبدن و قواه من حيث اتصالها بالمبدأ الفعال على نحو الشركة دون الاستقلال إلا مع تمام الاتصال و حينئذ يستغني عن البدن كل الاستغناء و هي قائمة بالبدن مفتقرة إليه في طلب الكمال من حيث انفصالها عن المبدأ و من جهة قصورها و نقصها هذا.

[نسبة الطبيعة إلى النفس]

و لنرجع إلى ما كنا فيه فنقول قد علمت نسبة الطبيعة إلى الصورة و منه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٥٧

يستفاد نسبته إلى النفس كما أو مانا إليه أما البسائط كالفلك و ما فيه فإن طبيعتها و نفسها شيء واحد في الوجود و ذلك الواحد ذو شئون و درجات بعضها عقلية و بعضها نفسانية مدركة للجزئيات و بعضها طبيعية سارية في الجسم مباشرة للحركة الدورية التي على نهج واحد من غير إرادة بحسب هذه المرتبة أعني القوة السارية في الجسم و إن كانت الحركة

إرادية بحسب قوة نفسانية يتحد بها هذه القوة الطبيعية ضربا من الاتحاد- وهذه القوة القريبة من فعل الحركة حادثة شيئا فشيئا متجددة حسب تجدد الحركة- كما سبق تحقيقه

و أما نسبتها إلى المادة

فالتقويم بوجه و التخصيص بوجه و التنوع بوجه كما علمت في مباحث الماهية-

و أما نسبته إلى الحركة و السكون

فلاستلزام و الاستتباع من غير تخلل جعل مستأنف بينهما و أما نسبتها إلى الأعراض ففي بعضها الإفادة و التحصيل و في بعضها التهيئة و الإعداد.

و أيضا فمن الأعراض ما يعرض للجسم الطبيعي من خارج

و منها ما يعرض من جوهر الشيء فبعضها تابع للمادة كالسواد للزنجي و انتصاب القامة و حسن الشكل و الخلقة و بعضها تابع للصورة كالذكاء و الفرح و حسن الخلق بالضم و غير ذلك في الناس و قوة الضحك. قال الشيخ في بيانه إن هذه الأمور و إن لم يكن بد من وجودها أن يكون في مادة فإن منبعها من الصورة و مبدئها و ستجد أعراضا تتبع الصورة و ينبعث منها أو يعرض لها بوجه آخر لا يحتاج لها إلى مشاركة المادة و ذلك إذا حقق لك في علم النفس أقول جميع الأعراض تابعة للصورة و هي منبعها و مبدؤها إلا أن الصور متفاوتة قوة و ضعفا و تجردا و تجسما و ليس شأن المادة إلا القبول و الانفعال فلا فرق بين عرض و عرض في ذلك- بل كل عرض نسبتها إلى الصورة بالوجود و الصدور و إلى المادة بالاستعداد و القبول لكن بعض الصور قريبة الذات من أفق المادة الجسمانية كالصور المعدنية و النباتية فكذا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٥٨

الأعراض التابعة لها كالأشكال و الألوان و بعضها بعيدة الذات عنها كالنفوس سيما الإنسانية و الفلكية فكذا الأعراض الناشئة منها.

و لما كانت تلك الصور العالية الشريفة حيثما وجدت وجدت معها في المادة صور و قوى متوسطة بينها و بين المادة المتوسطة السافلة الجسمية فلا جرم يوجد منها في تلك المادة أعراض متفاوتة القرب و البعد منها فلاجل ذلك يقع الاشتباه فيقال لبعضها إنها تابعة للصورة و لبعضها إنها تابعة للمادة و التحقيق ما أشرنا إليه.

و بالجملة فأعلى الصور ما لا مادة له أصلا لا بحسب الذات و لا من جهة أفعالها القريبة كالعقول القادسة فكذاك أعراضها التابعة لأنها المعاني الكلية و الصفات العقلية- كالعلم الكلي و القدرة التي ليس معها شوب تغير و الإرادة التي هي عناية محضة- لا التفات معها إلى السافل و بعدها صور لا تعلق لها بالمادة ذاتا و لها تعلق إضافي من جهة أفعالها المتغيرة الزمانية كالنفوس الفلكية و نحوها و كذلك أعراضها التابعة كالعلوم النفسانية المتغيرة و الإرادات المتجددة.

و بعد هاتين المرتبتين صور قوية التعلق بالمواد شديدة النزول إليها على طبقات متفاوتة في النزول و غايتها في النزول ما تكون سارية في جميع أجزاء المادة- التي فيها على نسبة واحدة من غير تفاوت كالطبائع الأسطقسية و المعدنية فإنها ذات أجزاء مقدارية كأجزاء الجسم و أرفع منها قليلا الصورة النباتية فإنها ببعض أجزاء النبات أربط و أعلق دون البعض فلها شيء من المادة كالأصل لا يبقى الصورة أعني النفس النباتية بدونه فإذا قلع يجف النبات و يفسد كله و لها شيء

كالفروع إذا قطعت لم يفسد صورة الكل ما دام الأصل باقيا و أيضا يتبدل أجزاء النبات بحسب التغذية و التحليل و النفس باقية ضربا من البقاء و أرفع درجة من صورة النبات صورة الحيوان - فإن بعضها يكاد أن يبقى عند فساد البدن بشخصه بقاء شخصيا.

و بالجملة فقد وضح غاية الوضوح أن قوام كل مركب نوعي طبيعي بصورته - أو ما هو كالصورة أقوى و أكد من قوامه بمادته أو ما هو كالمادة حتى يصح أن يقال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٥٩

طبيعة الشيء هي صورته و ما أشد سخافة رأي طائفة من المتقدمين حيث فضلوا جانب المادة في التقويم على جانب الصورة متمسكين بحجة واهية هي أنه لو كانت الصورة هي الطبيعة في الشيء لكان السرير إذا غصن و صار بحيث يفرع غصنا و ينبت فرع سريرا - و ليس كذلك بل يرجع إلى طبيعة الخشبية.

و هذا القائل كما ذكره الشيخ كأنه رأى أن الطبيعة هي المادة و لا كل مادة بل المحفوظ ذاتها في كل تغير و كأنه لم يفرق بين الصورة الصناعية و الطبيعية - و لا أيضا بين العارض و الصورة و لم يدر أن مقوم الشيء يجب أن لا يكون منه بد عند وجود الشيء لا عند عدمه أيضا بل الصورة للشيء ما يجعل به الشيء هو ما هو بالفعل و مادته هي ما به يكون بالقوة فلا يفيد المادة وجود الشيء بالفعل بل إن أفادت فإنما أفادت قوة وجود الشيء لا غير.

ألا ترى أن الطين و اللبنة إذا وجدت كان للبيت وجود بالقوة و أما كونه بالفعل فمستفاد من صورته حتى لو جاز أن يقوم صورة البيت لا في مادة لاستغنى عن اللبنة و ما يجري مجراها فالحاجة لبعض الصور إلى المادة لنقص وجودها الشخصي - و ضعفها لا لأجل أصل حقيقتها النوعية.

و سيظهر لك في مباحث المعاد ظهورا أتم مما سبق في مباحث المثل الإلهية - أن جميع هذه النوعيات المركبة لها وجود صوري في عالم مقداري مجرد عن هذه المواد و استعداداتها و ذلك العالم كله صورة بلا مادة و الوجود فيه فعل بلا قوة و كمال بلا نقص و قرار بلا حركة و دوام بلا تجدد و الحركة لا توجد في ذلك العالم أصلا لا فيها نصب و لا فيها من لغوب.

و اعلم أن هاهنا ألفاظا مشتقة يستعملها أهل العلم فيقال الطبيعة و الطبيعي و ما له الطبيعة و ما بالطبيعة و ما بالطبع و ما يجري مجرى الطبيعي أما الطبيعة فقد يستعمل على معانٍ متقاربة المأخذ عندنا و أليق ما يذكر منها ثلاثة - فيقال الطبيعة للمبدأ الذي قد عرفتها أعني ما يباشر الحركة و الاستحالات

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٦٠

و مقابلاتها و يقال لما يتقوم به جوهر كل شيء و يقال طبيعة لحقيقة كل شيء و ذاته.

و أما الطبيعي فهو كل منسوب إلى الطبيعة و ذلك إما ما فيه الطبيعة و إما ما عن الطبيعة فالأول هو المتصور بالطبيعة أو الذي للطبيعة كالأجزاء من صورة و أما الثاني فالآثار و الحركات و غيرها من المكان و الزمان و ما يجانسها و أما ما له الطبيعة فهو الذي له في نفسه مثل هذا المبدأ أعني الجسم المتحرك بطباعه و الساكن بطباعه.

و أما بالطبيعة فهو كل ما وجوده بالفعل عن الطبيعة بالوجود الأول كالأشخاص الطبيعية أو بالوجود الثاني كالأنواع

الطبيعية.

و أما بالطبع فهو كل ما يلزم الطبيعة كيف كان على مشاكلة القصد كالأشخاص و الأنواع الجوهرية أو لازما لها كالأعراض اللازمة و الحادثة و أما ما يجري مجرى الطبيعي فمثل الحركات و السكونات التي يوجبها الطبيعة بنفسها لذاتها لا خارجة عن مقتضاها و الخارج عن مقتضاها ربما كان عنها نفسها بسبب قابل فعلها و هو المادة. فإن الرأس المسفط و الإصبع الزائدة ليس جاريا مجرى الطبيعي ولكنه بالطبع و بالطبيعة بمعنى أن سببه الطبيعة و لكن لا لنفسها بل لعارض هو حال المادة بحسب كمية أو كيفية يقبل ذلك

حكمة مشرقية

اعلم أن الطبيعة قد تكون جزئية و قد توجد كلية و الأولى هي الطبيعة الخاصة بشخص شخص و الثانية هي التي توجد مفارقة الهوية عن المواد الجزئية- نسبتها إلى هذه الشخصيات نسبة الفاعل إلى فعله و نسبة الأصل إلى فروعه و الكلي بهذا المعنى غير الماهية الكلية التي لا توجد بالاستقلال في الأعيان بل تابعة في الوجود لوجود الأشياء التي تحمل هي عليها بل إنما هي عينها في الوجود و غيرها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٦١

بحسب التصور عند التحليل و أما الكلي الذي كلامنا فيه فهو صورة عقلية مجرد الوجود و المعنى جميعا عن المواد الجزئية.

و الشيخ قد أنكر وجودها في الأعيان حيث قال لا وجود إلا للقوى المختلفة التي في القوابل و لم تكن النسبة متحدة ثم انقسمت نعم لها نسبة إلى شيء واحد و النسبة إلى الشيء الواحد الذي هو المبدأ لا يرفع الاختلاف الذاتي بين الأشياء و لا يقوم المنسوبات مجردة بأنفسها بل لا وجود للطبيعة بهذا المعنى لا في ذات المبدأ تعالى. فإنه من المحال أن يكون في ذاته شيء غريب عن ذاته و لا في طريق السلوك إلى الأشياء كأنه فائض لكنه بعد لم يصل و لا له وجود في الأشياء متحد بلا اختلاف بل طبيعة كل شيء آخر بالنوع أو بالعدد انتهى.

أقول قد استقصينا الكلام فيما سبق في إثبات أن لكل طبيعة نوعية صورة واحدة عقلية في عالم المفارقات نسبتها إلى هذه الطبائع الجزئية نسبة الكمال إلى النقص و نسبة الأشد إلى الأضعف فلا نعيد ذكره.

و العجب أن الشيخ معترف بأن للطبائع الجزئية غايات و أن الغاية في تعاقب الأشخاص هي بقاء النوع و ذكر أن الكلي ربما كانت كلية بحسب نوع و ربما كانت كلية على الإطلاق و كلاهما لا وجود لهما في الأعيان ذواتا قائمة إلا في التصور لا وجود إلا للجزئي.

أما أحدهما فهو ما نعقله من مبدأ مقتضي التدبير الواجب في استحفاظ النوع- و الثاني ما نعقله من مبدأ مقتضي التدبير الواجب في استحفاظ الكل على نظامه.

فنقول إذا لم يكن للصورة الكلية وجود عقلي مستقل في الأعيان فأي معنى لاستحفاظه في هذا العالم من جهة نسبة الجزئيات إليه و ذكر أيضا في الإلهيات في فصل إثبات الغاية في حل شبهة من أبطل الغاية في أشخاص الكائنات التي لا يتناهى حيث لا ينتهي إلى غاية بهذه العبارة.

و أما أشخاص الكائنات الغير المتناهية فليست هي بغايات ذاتية في الطبيعة و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٦٢

لكن الغاية الذاتية هو أن يوجد مثلاً الجوهر الذي هو الإنسان أو الفرس أو النحلة - وأن يكون هذا الوجود وجوداً دائماً ثابتاً و كان هذا ممتنعاً في الواحد المشار إليه - لأن كل كائن فاسد فاستبقى بالنوع و الغرض الأول هو بقاء الطبيعة الإنسانية مثلاً فهو العلة التمامية لفعل الطبيعة الكلية و هو واحد.

لكن هذا الواحد لا بد في حصوله باقياً من أن يكون أشخاص بعد أشخاص بلا نهاية فيكون لا تناهي الأشخاص غرضاً على المعنى الضروري أقول و من تأمل في كلاميه أحدهما أن لا وجود للطبائع النوعية مستقلة و الآخر أن الغاية و الغرض الأصلي في فعل المبدأ الفاعلي هي الطبيعة النوعية دون الأشخاص إلا على وجه التبعية و على قسم من الضروري المذكور في موضعه لحكم بالاضطراب و الحيرة فإن الغاية بالحقيقة و التي يؤمها القصد و الغرض بالذات يجب أن تكون موجودة في الأعيان وجوداً أقوى من وجود ما لا يؤمها القصد من الفاعل إلا بالعرض و على وجه الاستتباع

فصل (٣) في أن فعل الطبيعة بالذات سواء كانت كلية أو جزئية ليس إلا الخير و الصلاح لا الشر و الفساد

قال الشيخ إن كثيراً مما هو خارج عن مجرى الطبيعة الجزئية ليس بخارج عن مجرى الطبيعة الكلية فإن الموت و إن كان غير مقصود في الطبيعة الجزئية التي في زيد فهو مقصود في الطبيعة الكلية من وجوه - أحدها لتخلص النفس عن البدن للسعادة في السعداء و هي المقصودة و لها خلق البدن و إذا اختلفت فليس بسبب من الطبائع بل لسوء الاختيار و ليكون لقوم آخرين حالهم في استحقاق الوجود حال هذا الشخص وجوداً فإنه إن خلد هؤلاء - لم يسع للآخرين مكان و لا قوة و في قوة المادة فصل للآخرين و هم يستحقون مثل هذا الوجود و ليسوا أولى بالعدم الدائم من هؤلاء بالخلود.

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فهذه و غيرها مقاصد في الطبيعة الكلية و كذا الإصبع الزائدة هي مقصودة في الطبيعة الكلية التي تقتضي أن تكتسي كل مادة ما تستعد لها من الصور و لا تعطل فإذا فضلت مادة تستحق الصورة الإصبعية لم تحرم و لم تضع انتهى أقول فيه موضع بحث من وجوه - أحدها ما مر من لزوم التدافع في كلامه حيث أثبت هاهنا وجود طبيعة كلية في الأعيان و قد أنكرها بعينه فيما مر.

و ثانيها أن مثل الموت و الفساد و ما يجري مجراها غير منسوب بالذات إلى الطبيعة الكلية كانت أو جزئية فإن منشأ الموت أن الطبائع الشخصية متوجهة إلى كمالاتها بحركاتها الجوهرية التي مرت الإشارة إلى ثبوتها فإذا انتقلت الطبيعة الجزئية من فطرتها الأولى إلى كمال صوري آخر و غاية ذاتية أخرى يطراً الزوال على نشأتها الأولى لطريان نشأتها الأخرى قبل أنها فسدت أو ماتت و ليس الفساد و لا الموت فعل الطبيعة بالذات و على سبيل القصد بل الغرض على سبيل التبعية.

و ثالثها أن الذي ذكره سبباً لفعل الموت من الطبيعة الكلية من إيصال النفس إلى السعادة الأخروية مختص بالنفوس الإنسانية و لا يجري ما ذكره في النفوس الحيوانية - فضلاً عن النباتية مع أن الموت أو الفساد لحقها أيضاً من جهة الطبيعة.

و رابعها أن تلك السعادة على ما قرره في بحث المعاد حسب ما ذهب إليه هو و أكثر أتباع المعلم الأول عقلية صرفة فهي

لا تحصل إلا لجماعة من النفوس الإنسانية - هي أقل عددا من البواقى والذى يفعلها الطبيعة الكلية من الغايات الذاتية لا بد وأن يكون عاما أو أكثرها كما مر في بحث الغاية فلو كان قضاء الموت من الطبيعة لبلوغ النفس إلى تلك السعادة لزم أن يكون جميع الناس أو أكثرهم سعداء ولا يكون الشقي إلا النادر منهم وليس الأمر كذلك عندهم. فالحق أن جميع الطبائع متوجهة لذاتها إلى كمالاتها وغاياتها والتخلف عن البلوغ إما لقسر قاسر أو عروض قاطع أو قصور طبيعة وأن حكمة عروض الموت ليست

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٦٤

مقصورة على البلوغ إلى السعادة وأن السعادة العقلية غير مطلق الكمال والفعلية - وأن جميع النفوس المفارقة عن هذه الأبدان لها وجود آخر أشد وأكد من هذا الوجود وتأكد الوجود لا ينافي الشقاوة والنكال كما سيأتي بيانه في علم المعاد

فصل (٤) فى موضوع العلم الطبيعى ومبادئه

قد تقرر في علم الميزان وفي فن البرهان منه أن العلوم منها كلية ومنها جزئية - والمراد من العلم الكلي ما يبحث فيه أحوال الموجود بما هو موجود وعوارضه الذاتية التي تلحقه من غير أن يحتاج إلى أن يصير نوعا مقداريا أو عدديا أو نوعا واقعا في التغير كالعلمين الآخرين أعني التعليمي والطبيعي فالطبيعي علم جزئي ولكل علم جزئي موضع خاص جزئي.

فموضوع العلم الطبيعى هو الجسم المحسوس من حيث هو واقع في التغير - والمبحوث عنها فيه هي الأعراض اللاحقة له من هذه الحثية سواء كانت صورا أو أعراضا أو نسبا ويسمى كلها طبيعيات من جهة نسبتها إلى القوة التي تسمى طبيعة كما قد عرفت فبعضها موضوعات لها وبعضها آثار وحركات تصدر عنها ولا شك أن للأمور الطبيعية مباد وأسباب.

وقد ثبت أن العلم بذى السبب لا يحصل إلا من جهة العلم بسببه فلا سبيل إلى تحقيق معرفة هذه الأمور الطبيعية إلا بعد الوقوف على معرفة مبادئها وأسبابها وتلك المبادي لا يخلو إما مباد لكافتها ورمتها فيشترك فيها الجميع أو لبعضها دون بعض.

أما التي تعم جميعها وتشترك فيها الكل وهي المبادي لموضوعها المشترك - ولأحوالها المشتركة فلا يمكن إثباتها إذا احتاجت إلى الإثبات في صناعة الطبيعيين - كما علم في فن البرهان من الميزان بل إثباتها على ذمة صاحب العلم الكلي وليس على الطبيعى إلا قبول وجودها وضعها وتصور ماهيتها إنية وأما المبادي التي لجزئي جزئي منها

الحكمة المتعالية فى الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٦٥

من غير اشتراك الجميع فيها فلا يبعد أن يفيد العلم الطبيعى إثباتها إنية و ماهية معا. ثم إن الأشياء الطبيعية إذا كانت لها مباد عامة مشتركة وأخرى جزئية مختصة - مثل مباد النمو والحس فطريق التعلم والتعليم فيها أن يتبدى في السلوك مما هو أعم - وينتهي إلى ما هو أخص وهذا في مبادي القوام والحد معلوم لكل من له أدنى بصيرة - فإنك إذا أردت أن تعرف ماهية الإنسان بحدده وحقيقته فمعرفتك لجنسه وهو جزؤه المادي أقدم من

معرفتكم لنوعه فثبت أن العالم أعرف عند العقل من الخاص.
و من ارتاضت نفسه بالفلسفة الإلهية يعرف أن مبادي الوجود أيضا كالفاعل و الغاية أقدم تعرفا في ذاتها من معلولاتها و كانا قد أوضحنا هذا فيما قبل.

و بالجملة المنهج الأشرف في التعليم أن يكون السلوك العلمي مطابقا للسلوك الوجودي النازل من الأعلى إلى الأسفل و من الأعم الأشمل إلى الأخص الأقل فمن أراد أن يعرف الأمور الطبيعية فينبغي له أن يأخذ أولا من مبادي الطبيعة المشتركة إلى تلك الطبيعة و أحوالها و منها إلى الطبائع المختصة و أحوالها من جهة مبادئها الغير المشتركة إذ الأمور العامة أعرف عند عقولنا من الأمور الخاصة.

و أما عند الطبيعة فإن كانت جزئية فالشخص الجزئي أعرف عندها من المعنى النوعي - و بعده المعنى الجنسي فإن المقصود في الطبيعة الجزئية ليس أن يوجد حيوانا مطلقا و لا جسما مطلقا بل أن يوجد أولا جسما خاصا ثم حيوانا خاصا ثم إنسانا و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى حقيقة خاصة جامعة لكل كمال في الطبيعة و أما المقصود في الطبيعة الكلية بالمعنى الذي حققناه فهو أولا و بالذات وجود ما هو أعلى و أشرف منها في الحيطه و الجمعية - ثم ما يليه على وجه التبعية و اللزوم و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي في النزول إلى الجسمية و الهيولى.

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فالمقصود في فعل الطبيعة ليس إلا نحوا من الوجود و الوجود كما علمت متفاوت في القوة و الضعف و الحيطه و القصور و ليس مقصودها كما زعمه بعض ماهية كلية نوعية كانت أو غيرها إذ الماهية غير مجعولة و لا مقصودة بالذات كما سبق و إنما المجعول و الغاية في القصد من أي مبدأ كان هو الوجود لكن الوجودات قد يشترك في معنى نوعي أو جنسي أو غيرها للعقل أن يتصورها و يتوصل من تعرف بعضها إلى تعرف الآخر.

و لأجل ذلك يقال العام أعرف عند العقل من الخاص لأن الذي يتفطن به أولا من صفات الموجودات هو المعنى المشترك بين الكل كالشيئية و الموجودية ثم المعنى الذي دون ذلك في الاشتراك كالجوهرية و العرضية ثم كالجسمية و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى معنى محصل كامل نوعي و لذلك الناس كلهم كالمشتركين في معرفة العمومات و أوائل المفهومات التي لا كمال معتد به فيها و إنما يتميزون بأن بعضهم يعرف الخصوصيات و ينتهي إلى النوعيات ممعنا في التفصيل.

و هذا الإمعان في تحقيق الخصوصيات ينتهي ببعض من هؤلاء إلى أن يشاهدوا بعين عقولهم صورا عقلية وجودية و ذواتا كاملة نورية هي مبادي النوعيات و هذا هو الطرف الأعلى من الكمال و هو النتيجة الكبرى من معرفة المعاني العامة و الخاصة.

و لذا قيل المعرفة بذر المشاهدة و هذه المشاهدة غير الإحساس لأن حصول الإحساس كان متقدما على حصول تلك العمومات و المخصصات و المشاهدة بعد ذلك و ربما وقف بعضهم في المعرفة على الجنسيات العامة كمن عرف الجسمية دون أن يحصل معها المعاني الفصلية كالنامي حتى يعرف معنى النبات أو حصل الجسم النامي و وقف عليه دون معرفة الحساس حتى يعرف معنى الحيوان.

فإذا انتهت المعرفة إلى الطبائع النوعية و أحوالها وقف النظر البحثي و ليس بعده إلا المشاهدة الحضورية للطبائع العقلية و

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٦٧

الجزئية فليس يبالي العقل بما يفوته من معرفتها لأن وجودها إنما هو كمال للموضوع الجسماني و ليس كمالا للموضوع العقلي

فصل (٥) في تعدد المبادي التي للطبيين أن يأخذوها على سبيل المصادرة و الوضع اعلم أن الأشياء الطبيعية مباد و أسباب

سنشير إليها أما ماهية الموضوع أعني الجسم الطبيعي من حيث قبوله للتغير فهي كأنها مركبة من معنى الجسم الطبيعي و الحيشية المذكورة و أما الجسم الطبيعي فقد مضى تحقيق ماهيته و أما معنى الحركة و التغير فهو أيضا قد علم و أما المبادي فللجسم الطبيعي من حيث هو جسم طبيعي و هو كالجزم من ماهية الموضوع للعلوم الطبيعية مباد و له من حيث هو كائن الجوهر فاسد- بل متغير في الجملة زيادة في المبادي.

فالمبادي التي يحصل بها الجسمية منها ما هي أجزاء من وجوده و حاصلة في ذاته و هويته و هو اثنان أحدهما المادة كالخشب للسريـر و ثانيهما الصورة كالهئية للسريـر- فالأول استعداد محض يسمى هيولى و موضوعا و مادة و عنصرا و أسطقسا كل اسم بحسب اعتبار معنى آخر و الثاني هو الصورة الجسمية و هي كون الجسم بحيث يصح أن يوجد فيه أبعاد خطية متقاطعة على زوايا قوائم و هي أيضا أضعف الصور وجودا و وحدة يبقى مع آحاد التشكلات و التكممات و كل من هذين كما هو مباد للجسم بما هو جسم كذلك مباد للجسم الذي هو نوع من أنواع ذلك الجسم. لأن سائر الصور التي للطبيعات التي هي مبادي أجناسها و أنواعها لا تنفك عن مقارنة الجسم الطبيعي مطلقا فيكون المادة الأولى التي هي أحد مبادي الجسم التي منزلته من الجسم منزلة الخشب من السريـر نسبتها إلى الأجسام ذوات تلك الصورة هذه النسبة فيكون جوهرها إذا نظر إلى ذاتها غير مضافة إلى شيء من الصور بل خالية عنها لكن من شأنها أن يقبلها

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مجتمعة أو متعاقبة سواء كان ذلك من شأن طبيعة مطلقة جنسية لها حتى لا يكون لها وحدة إلا وحدة ذهنية غير متحققة الوقوع في الأعيان بصفة الوحدة أو من شأن طبيعة شخصية لها هي بصفة الاشتراك للجميع مجتمعة أو متعاقبة واقعة في الأعيان على اختلاف المذهبين.

و الذي سبقت الإشارة إليه أن وحدتها الخارجية الشخصية باعتبار المعنى الذي هي به مادة في الضعف كالوحدة الجنسية للمعنى الجنسي للأشياء و ذلك لفرط نقصان وجودها في ذاتها خالية عن الصور فيكون في طبيعتها و طبيعة كل مادة لما بعدها من الصور أن يكون لها مناسبة ما إليها بالنقص و التمام و الضعف و الشدة و الغنى و الفقر كأنها رسم فيها و ظل و شبح و خيال و من الصور و يكون الصورة هي التي يكمل الجوهر المادي لوجودها جوهر آخر بالفعل بعد ما كان بالقوة.

فإن ينبغي أن يوضع الطبيعي أن للجسم بما هو جسم مبدئين قريبين

ذاتين - أحدهما هيولى والآخرة صورة إن شئت صورة امتدادية مطلقة وإن شئت صورة كمالية بعدها من صور الأجسام وإن شئت صورة عرضية كما في الأصناف الجسمانية كالأبيض والماشي والضاحك وليوضع أن الهيولى الأولى لا يقوم بنفسها مجردة عن الصور الجسمية - بل كل هيولى بما هي هيولى لا تجرد عن الصورة التي تقومها قائمة بنفسها و يكون الصورة التي تزول عنها لو لا أن زوالها إنما هو مع صورة أخرى موت عنها و يقوم في التقويم مقام الأولى لبطلت الهيولى.

لست أقول إن تقويم اللاحقة من الصورة بعينه هو تقويم السابقة بالعدد بل الهيولى جوهر مبهم الوجود له تحصلات متعددة ينحفظ وحدتها الذاتية بأي تحصل جاء من الصور و ينبغي أن يوضع أيضا للطبيعي آخذا من الفلسفة الأولى و العلم الكلي أن كل صورة أخذت تماما لحقيقة نوع من الأنواع لا يجوز تبديلها إلى صورة أخرى نوعية و النوع هو النوع الأول و لا إلى شخصية أخرى ماثلة الوجود و الشخص هو الشخص الأول بل يفسد.

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و هذا بخلاف كل جوهر أخذ مادة لنوع أو لشخص فإن المادة إنما اعتبرت في الشيء المتقوم على وجه الإبهام فيجوز تبديلها و النوع بل الشخص باق بحاله ما دامت الصورة باقية بحالها و لأجل هذا لا يجوز الحركة في الجوهر الصوري و يجوز في الجوهر المادي و لأجل ذلك لا يجوز حركة الصورة الجسمانية و لا المقدار الجسماني في الكم لأنه بما هو نوع مقداري لا بد له من بقاء صورة الامتداد المعين فيه و بقاء الموضوع شرط في الحركة و المتبدل لا يجوز أن يكون عين المتبدل فيه.

و يجوز هذه الحركة على ما هو كالصورة المقيمة لهذه الجسمانية التعليمية - كالصورة المقومة لنوع من النبات فإنها ما دامت باقية بالعدد يكون تلك الحقيقة باقية بالعدد و إن تبدلت عليها المقادير الجسمانية بحسب الخصوصيات الامتدادية - فإن جسمانية ما و مقدارا ما يكفي لأن يكون جزءا ماديا لحقيقة معينة من النبات و هكذا قياس نوع من أنواع الحيوان في جواز تبدل القوى النباتية عليه عددا أو نوعا مع بقاءه بالشخص ما دامت صورته الحيوانية المعينة أعني نفسه باقية بالعدد.

فهذا هو الكلام في المبادي الداخلة في قوام الجسم و للأجسام مباد أيضا فاعلية و غائية و الفاعل هو الذي طبع الصور التي للأجسام في مادتها تقوم المادة بالصور وجودا و قوم منهما المركب ماهية تفعل صورته في مادته و ذلك المركب يفعل ما يفعل صورته و ينفع عما ينفع بمادته و الغاية هي التي لأجلها طبعت هذه الصور في المواد و الكلام هاهنا لما كان في المبادي المشتركة فيكون الفاعل المأخوذ هاهنا فاعلا مشتركا و كذا الغاية المعتبرة هاهنا هي الغاية المشتركة. قال الشيخ في الشفاء و المشترك فيه هاهنا يعقل على نوعين أحدهما أن يكون الفاعل على وجه يفعل فعلا أو لا يترتب عليه سائر الأفاعيل كالذي يفيد المادة الأولى الصورة الجسمانية الأولى إن كان شيء كذلك على ما تعلمه في موضعه فيفيد الأصل الأول - ثم بعد ذلك يتم وجود ما بعده و يكون الغاية مشتركا فيها بأنها الغاية التي تؤمها جميع

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الأمور الطبيعية إن كانت غاية كذلك على ما تعلمه في موضعه.

فهذا نحو و النحو الآخر أن يكون المشترك فيه مشتركا بنحو العموم - كالفاعل الكلي المقول على كل واحد من الفاعلات الجزئية للأمور الجزئية - و الغاية الكلية هي المقولة على كل واحد من الغايات الجزئية لا الأمور الجزئية. أقول فيه بحث أما أولا فلأن الذي ذكره أولا في تبين الفاعل المشترك مما ليس له وجه صحة فإن الصادر أولا من المبدأ الفاعل في هذا العالم ليس هو الجسمية المشتركة ثم الصور الكمالية النوعية بل الطبائع الخاصة الكمالية أقدم صدورا و فعلا - من الأمور الجنسية.

كيف و قد حقق في مقامه أن الذي يجري مجرى الصور مقوم للذي يجري مجرى المادة و أيضا الصورة الجسمية لو كان لها وجود محصل قبل لحوق الصور النوعية لم يكن الصور صورا بل كانت أعراضا لاستغناء الجسمية عنها في الوجود. و أما ثانيا فلأن الغاية على المعنى الذي يكون بإزاء الفاعل بهذا المعنى يلزم أن يكون أخس الغايات لأنه يلزم أن يكون غاية للجسمية أولا و لغيرها بتوسطها كما أن الفاعل كذلك.

و أما ثالثا فلأنه قد صرح الشيخ في الإلهيات في فصل القوة و الفعل بأن ما بالفعل دائما أقدم مما بالقوة و بين ذلك بوجوه كثيرة و أيضا أبطل في موضع آخر منها في فصل تكون الأسطقسات كون الوجود أولا للجسم و ليس له في نفسه إحدى الصور المقومة غير الصورة الجسمية ثم يكتسب سائر الصور.

و أما رابعا فلأن الذي ينبغي أن يوضع للطبيعي من أحوال المبادي يجب أن لا يكون مبحثا عنه في علمه فعلى هذا الفاعل المشترك و الغاية المشتركة بالنحو الذي ذكره ثانيا لا يجوز أيضا أن يكون من المبادي التي يتسلمه الطبيعيون على وجه المصادرة.

فالحق أن يعرف معنى الفاعل المشترك و الغاية المشتركة على نحو آخر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٧١

غيرهما و إن كان قريبا من النحو الذي ذكره الشيخ و هو أن يكون الفاعل المشترك - و هو الذي يبتدى منه وجود جميع الأشياء الطبيعية بوسط أو بغير وسط و أن الغاية المشتركة هي التي ينتهي إليها و لأجلها وجود جميع الأشياء الطبيعية بوسط أو بغير وسط و ميل هذا الفاعل سواء كان واحدا بالعدد أو كثيرا بالعدد و سواء كان فاعلا لغير الأمور الطبيعية أيضا أو كان مقصور الفعل على تلك الأمور فهو فاعل مشترك لجميع الأشياء الطبيعية من حيث صدورها عنه بعينه واحدا أو متعددا و كذا القياس في الغاية المشتركة بما هي غاية مشتركة بالمعنى المذكور فالصادر أولا من الفاعل المذكور هو أشرف الطبائع النوعية المتعلقة بالأجسام كالنفوس الحيوانية على تفاوتها في التقدم حسب تفاوتها في الكمال ثم النفوس النامية من أكملها إلى أنقصها.

ثم الطبائع المعدنية ثم الأسطقسات ثم الصور المقدارية ثم المادة المشتركة - و العائد إليه في الانفعالات الإعدادية الزمانية في سلسلة الرجوع الصعودي على العكس - من الترتيب الأول الصدوري النزولي فيبتدى الوجود من الأخس فالأخس كالصور الجسمية و العنصرية إلى الأشرف فالأشرف كالنفوس و ما بعدها و الفرق بين وجودي النظيرين في كل مرتبة مما يحتاج إلى كلام مشبع - لا يناسب هذا الموضع و ظاهر أن الفاعل بهذا المعنى و كذا الغاية بالمعنى المشار إليه - خارج عن عالم الطبائع الماديات و المتغيرات و أما أنه واحد في ذاته أو كثير واجب أو ممكن فمما تبين في موضع آخر ليس على الطبيعي أن يبرهن عليه و لا أيضا وجب عليه أن يضعه و يتسلمه.

و أما أن المبادي المشتركة في الأجسام الطبيعية هي هذه الأربعة فعليه أن يضعه و هو مبرهن عليه في الفلسفة الأولى و أما الجسم من حيث وجوده الخاص المتغير - أو المستكمل أو الكائن الفاسد فإن له زيادة مبدأ فإن كون الشيء متغيرا تغيرا طبيعيا أولا و أن يصير بصدد الاستكمال كمالات ذاتيا أو عرضيا أو كائنا و إن كان المفهوم من كونه متغيرا غير المفهوم من كونه مستكملا و المفهوم من كونه كائنا أو حادثا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٧٢

غير المفهوم من كليهما جميعا لا بد و أن يكون فيه شيء ثابت هو المتغير و صفة كانت موجودة فعدمت و صفة كانت معدومة فوجدت.

و معلوم أنه لا بد للكائن من حيث هو متغير في ذاته من أن يكون له أمر - قابل لما تغير عنه و لما تغير إليه و صورة حاصلة و عدم سابق لها مع الصورة الزائلة و عدم مقارن معها للزائلة و هذا في التغيرات التي في الصفات الزائدة على جوهرات الأشياء معلوم لأكثر الناظرين.

و أما نحن فبفضل الله و جوده فقد بينا ذلك في جوهرات الطبائع المادية على وجه لم يتيسر لأحد بعد المعلم و من يحذو حذوه من الفلاسفة حيث سلف ذكره من كيفية تجدد الطبيعة و تقوم وجود كل جزء منها بالعدم و عدم كل منها بالوجود.

فعلى هذا يجب أن يكون العدم معدودا من جملة المبادي المقومة للكائنات - فإن العدم شرط في كون الشيء متغيرا و إذا كان التغير في جوهر الشيء و قوامه - كان للعدم شركة في تقويمه مع سائر المقومات فرفع العدم بالكلية عما هو متغير في ذاته يوجب رفع ذاته من غير عكس فالعدم على هذا الوجه مبدأ بمعنى أنه لا بد منه في وجود الشيء. و لو نوقش في إطلاق اللفظ و قيل المبدأ هو الذي لا بد من وجوده في وجود شيء فلا مبالاة لنا في ذلك مع قابله فليستعمل بدل المبدأ المحتاج إليه فالعدم لا بد من أخذه في تحديد المتغير المستكمل و كذا لا بد من أخذ الصورة فيه على أن هذا العدم ليس هو العدم المطلق بل عدم له نحو من الوجود كأنه عدم شيء مع تهيو و استعداد في مادة معينة فإن الإنسان لا يتكون عن كل لا إنسانية بل لا إنسانية في قابل الإنسانية لكن الكون باعتبار الصورة لا العدم و الفساد باعتبار العدم لا الصورة.

و قد يقال إن الشيء كان عن الهیولی و عن العدم و لا يقال عن الصورة فيقال

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إن السرير كان عن الخشب أو كان عن اللاسرير.

و اعلم أن في كثير من المواضع يصح أن يقال إنه كان عن الهیولی و عن العدم - و في كثير منها لا يصح و دائما يقال كان عن العدم فإنه لا يقال كان عن الإنسان كاتب و السبب فيه أن بعض المتغيرات فيه استكمال للمادة بصورة كمالية يوجب وجودها فساد الصورة الأولى أو حالة وجودية لها.

فالأول كالنطفة إذا تكون عنها إنسان حيث تزول عنها صورة النطفية.

و الثاني الخشب إذا تكون عنه سرير فإنه و إن لم يزل عنه صورة الخشبية مطلقا - لكنه قد خلا عن صورة ما و تشكل ما

بالنحت و النجر و بعضها ليس فيه استكمال - بصورة يقتضي وجودها زوال شيء من الهيولى كالإنسان إذا صار كاتبا فإن الإنسانية باقية فيه بذاتها و صفاتها الوجودية ففي الضرب الأول من الموضوعات و الهيوليات - يقال فيها عن بمعنى بعد و في الضرب الثاني إذا استعمل لفظة عن أو لفظة من كان على معنى آخر و هو أن الكائن متقوم منهما كما يقال عن الزاج و العفص مداد.

و تفصيل هذا المقام يطلب في الشفاء و الذي لا بد أن يعرفه الرجل العلمي أن جميع التغيرات الطبيعية يلزمها أن ينتقل مادة الشيء من صورة إلى صورة كمالية - فإن الصورة الأولى و إن زالت من حيث وجودها الناقص لكنها لما اشتدت و استكملت - فهي كأنها باقية من حيث السنخ و الذات فيجوز استعمال لفظة من أو عن بحسب كل من المعنيين و بعض التغيرات الغير الطبيعية أيضا يجري هذا المجرى كالإنسان إذا صار كاتبا فصح فيه الاعتباران بخلاف البعض كالسرير إذا تفرق أو الإنسان إذا هرم و الحيوان إذا مات.

فإن الهرم و الموت و أشباههما ليست عندنا من الغايات الذاتية التي توجبها التغيرات الطبيعية بالذات بل هي من الضروريات التابعة للاستكمالات فيجوز عدها من الأمور الغير الطبيعية كالاتفاق و القسر و مما ذكره القدماء في مثل هذا الموضوع - حال شوق الهيولى إلى الصورة و تشبيهها بالأنثى و تشبيه الصورة بالذكر.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٧٤

قال الشيخ و هذا شيء لست أفهمه.

أقول قد مر الكلام منا في مباحث العلل في تصحيح هذا الدعوى و إذا أريد من الهيولى مطلق المادة المستكملة بالصورة حتى يشمل المواد البدنية بقواها الحسية المستكملة بالنفوس بل يشمل العقل الهولاني المستكمل بالعقل بالفعل لم يكن في إثبات التشوق للمادة إلى الصورة و لو باعتبار بعض الأفراد كثير إشكال

فصل (٦) في كيفية كون هذه المبادي المقارنة أعني المادة و الصورة و العدم مشتركة

أما الهيولى

فالمشهور من رأى الفلاسفة أنه لا يوجد هيولى مشتركة لجميع الصور الطبيعية بناء على أن الأجسام - منها ما هي قابلة للكون و الفساد.

و منها ما ليست بقابلة للكون و الفساد بل وجودها بالإبداع فلا يكون لها هيولى مشتركة تارة تقبل صورة الكائنات الفاسدة و تارة تقبل صورة ما لا يفسد في طباعها - و لا له كون هيولاني فإن ذلك مستحيل نعم ربما جاز وجود هيولى مشتركة لمثل الأجسام الكائنة الفاسدة التي يفسد بعضها إلى بعض و يتكون بعضها من بعض لا للجميع هذا ما ذكره الشيخ.

أقول ما الذي ذكروه من الفرق أن بعض الأجسام مبدعة و بعضها كائنة فاسدة.

فهذا فرق من جهة الصورة لا من جهة المادة فجاز في الاحتمال العقلي أن يكون جوهر الموضوع للصورة المبدعة و الصورة الكائنة شيئا واحدا صالحا في ذاته - لقبول كل صورة لكن بعض الصور في نفسها بحيث يكون لها ضد مفسد و بعضها في نفسها مما له ضد فيكون الاختلاف بين القسمين من جهة الصورة لا من جهة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٧٥

المادة.

و الذي يقوي هذا الظن أن الهيولى الأولى في نفسها ليست إلا قوة لقبول الأشياء من غير تخصص لها في ذاتها وإلا لكانت مركبة من قوة و فعلية و مادة و صورة فلا تحصل لها إلا بالصور و لأجل ذلك يكون التركيب بينها و بين الصور اتحادية على أنك قد علمت في مباحث حدوث العالم أن صورة الأفلاك و الكواكب بحسب خصوصياتها و جزئياتها كائنة فاسدة و أما طبائعها الكلية فليست مادية بل عقلية و أما المبدأ الصوري المشترك.

فالشيخ قد جوز ذلك واحدا بالعدد في الصورة الجسمية الامتدادية دون غيرها من الصور الكمالية و قد أشرنا إلى فساده. و العجب أن الشيخ لم يجوز كون الهيولى واحدة مشتركة بواسطة اختلاف الصور مع أن أول ما يتحصل به الهيولى عنده هو الصورة الامتدادية الجسمية كما هو المشهور و نسبة الصورة الكمالية النوعية إلى الجسمية هذه النسبة فكيف لم يصير اختلافها موجبا لاختلاف الجسمية و قد صار موجبا لاختلاف الهيوليات مبطلا لاشتراكها للكل على أن الهيولى ضعيفة الوجود لا يقدح في وحدتها الشخصية كثرة الصور كما مر بيانه بخلاف الجسمية فإنها تتبدل بالاتصالات و الانفصالات و غيرها من الأسباب.

فالحق أن المبدأ الصوري المشترك بين الأمور الطبيعية يمتنع أن يكون هو الصورة الامتدادية لتبدلها في كل كون و فساد و اتصال و انفصال بل لأنسب الصور في أن يكون مبدأ صوريا مشتركا هو ما جعله جماعة من الحكماء المتقدمين حيث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٧٦

أخذوا العالم كله حيوانا واحدا له نفس واحد هي نفس الكل و صورة الكل و هذا مما لا يبعد عن الصواب سيما عند من يجعل الفلك الأعظم جسما واحدا مشتملا على جميع السماويات له حركة واحدة دائرة حول مركز الكل فإن اختلاف الأبعاد بالنوع إذا روعي فيها ترتيب و نظام بين الأشرف و الأخس و اللطف و الأكنف لا يقدح في الوحدة الشخصية بصورة الجميع كإنسان الذي هو عالم صغير.

ثم قال الشيخ و لو كان للأجسام مبدأ صوري مشترك بهذه الصفة لكان مداوم الاقتران بالهيولى و لا يكون و لا يفسد بل متعلق أيضا بالإبداع.

أقول قد علمت فيما سبق أن كون الشيء دائم الاقتران بالهيولى يناقض كونه إبداعا وجود غير كائن و لا فاسد فإن الهيولى عبارة عن أمر حامل لقوة وجود الشيء و إمكانه الاستعدادي ثم لحدوثه و كونه حتى لو كان الشيء مسلوب القوة و الاستعداد و الحدوث استحالة تعلقه بالهيولى و مثل ذلك الشيء صورة محضة إذ كل ما يتعلق وجوده بالهيولى فلا بد أن يكون للعدم شركة في قوام وجوده فإنه لا يحصل إلا بالحركة و الزمان فلا يكون إبداعا.

و أما الذي قررناه من الصور في أن يكون مبدأ صوريا مشتركا فينبغي أن يكون لذاته جهتان إحداها عقلية حاصلة بالإبداع و الأخرى طبيعية متعلقة بالهيولى و الكون و الفساد و النفس الفلكية من هذا القبيل فإنها من حيث جوهرها العقلي صورة إبداعية من عالم الأمر و من حيث قواها الطبيعية و غيرها متعلقة الوجود بالهيولى سارية فيها كائنة فاسدة.

و أما العدم

فلا يجوز أن يكون من جملة عدم مشترك بالنحو الأول من النحويين المذكورين في الاشتراك لأن هذا العدم عدم شيء

من شأنه أن يكون وهو معنى القوة والاستعداد فلم يبعد أن يبطل عند وجود ذلك وأما المشترك بالمعنى الآخر من النحوين المذكورين للاشتراك فلا شبهة في أن المبادي الثلاثة مشتركة بهذا المعنى - إذ يصدق على كل من الحوادث والكائنات والمتغيرات أن له هوى و

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صورة و عدما.

و هذا المفهوم الكلي المشترك يقال إنه لا يكون ولا يفسد على نحو ما يقال للكليات الطبيعية أنها لا تكون ولا تفسد هذا ما قرره الشيخ.

و أقول قد أشرنا سابقا أن الأشياء المتجددة الوجود هي بحيث يكون وجودها يخالط عدمها ويتشابه فيها الوجود والعدم وأن لعدمها حظا من الوجود ولوجودها حظا من العدم إذ وجود كل جزء من أجزائه عدم الجزء الآخر ووجود ذلك الجزء عدمه و كذا كون كل جزء هو فساد الآخر و فساد كون الآخر.

و بالجملة الكل كما أن له وجودا لكل فيما يعتبر من الزمان فكذلك له عدم عن الكل في ذلك الزمان و كذلك حال الاتصال المكاني للجواهر المقداري المسمى بالقار الوجود في نسبة وجود كل جزء مكاني منه إلى عدم الجزء الآخر المكاني و نسبة وجود الكل إلى عدم الكل مقيسين إلى كل المكان.

و قد علمت أن نحو وجود الطبيعة الجسمانية هذا النحو بحسب كلتا الحثيتين - فإذن لو كان لمجموع العالم الجسماني صورة واحدة مشتركة كما جوزها الشيخ - لم يبعد أن يقال إن له عدما واحدا مشتركا بالمعنى الأول أيضا وإن كان ذلك العدم متضمنا لأعدام كثيرة لا تحصى.

ثم قال الشيخ إن لهذا العدم نحو من الكون أيضا بالعرض و من الفساد أيضا بالعرض فكونه هو أن يفسد الصورة عن المادة فيحصل عدم بهذه الصفة و فساد أن يحصل الصورة فلا يكون حينئذ العدم موجودا و لهذا العدم عدم بالعرض كما أن له وجودا بالعرض و عدمه هو الصورة و لكن ليس قوام الصورة و وجودها بالقياس إليه بل ذلك يعرض له باعتبار و قوام هذا العدم و وجوده هو بنفس القياس إلى هذه الصورة.

أقول هذا الذي أفاده من أن للعدم كونا و فسادا بالعرض إنما يجري في حوادث قارة الوجود دفعية الحصول و أنت تعلم أن في الوجود أشياء متدرجة الكون

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غير مستقرة الذات كالحركة و الزمان و ما ينطبق عليهما من أفراد مقولات يقع فيها الاستحالات حتى الجواهر الطبيعية عندنا فإذن العدم في مثل هذه الأشياء كالوجود في أن له كونا و فسادا بالذات لأن كل جزء من أجزاء المتصل التدريجي كما يصدق عليه بهويته معنى الوجود كذلك يصدق عليه بهويته معنى عدم الجزء الذي بعده و به فساد الذي قبله و لأن وجود كل جزء كائن بحيث يعتبر في قوامه من حيث هويته فساد الجزء السابق.

و لأجل ذلك يعد العدم من المبادي لا كل عدم بل عدم جزء سابق - كونه على هذا الجزء فكما أن الصورة متجددة الوجود متصل بعضها فللصورة كون متصل و فساد متصل فكذلك الأعدام متصل بعضها ببعض فللعدم أيضا

كون متصل و فساد متصل و فساد العدم هو كون الصورة كما أن كون الصورة هو فساد العدم. فليس لأحد أن يقول إن إطلاق العدم على هوية الأمر التدريجي الحصول - بما هو تدريجي الحصول إطلاق مجازي بالعرض فإن التدرج في الوجود لا يحصل إلا بالتدرج في العدم فيكون لكل من الوجود و العدم له كونا و فسادا بالذات نعم إطلاق الكون و الفساد على الصورة بما هي صورة أولى من إطلاقهما عليها بما هي عدم. ثم لا يخفى عليك أن إطلاق الاسم على أفراد كل من هذه المبادي الثلاثة أعني المادة و الصورة و العدم بحسب معنى مشترك في أفراد كل منها بلا شبهة و مع ذلك ليس يمكن لنا أن نقول إن كلا منها يدل على ما تحته بالتواطؤ الصرف بل يجب أن يكون دلالتها دلالة التشكيك كدلالة الوجود و المبدأ و ذلك لأن تحت كل منها أمورا شتى - يختلف في معنى تلك المبدئية بالتقدم و التأخر و الأشد و الأضعف فلجميع ما يقال إنها هيولى طبيعة مشتركة في أنها أمر هو بالقوة شيء آخر فقد يكون بسيطا و قد يكون مركبا و قد يكون بعيدا و قد يكون قريبا. و كذا الصورة فمنها جوهر و منها هيئة إذ المراد من الصورة في هذا المقام - ما به يخرج الشيء من القوة إلى الفعل سواء كان جوهرًا أو عرضًا و جميع ما يقال

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إنه عدم فهو لا وجود صورة بالمعنى المذكور و لا شك في أنه في التقدم و التأخر و الشدة و الضعف مقيس إلى الصورة. ثم لا يخفى أن النظر هاهنا في مبدئية الصورة و الاعتبار التي فيها إنما يتصرف إلى حيثية كونها جزءا و بحسب أنها أحد جزئي الكائن إلا أنها مبدأ فاعلي و إن جاز أن يكون مبدأ فاعليا للجزء الآخر أو لهيئة أو لحركة. ثم إنه قد مرت الإشارة إلى أن الطبيعي لا اشتغال له بالمبدأ الفاعلي و الغائي المشتركين بالنحو الأول و لا بالنحو الآخر أيضا من حيث اشتراكهما و عمومهما و إن كان يبحث عن أفراد كل منهما و أما الفاعل المشترك أو الغاية المشتركة بالنحو الأول - لطائفة من الأمور الطبيعية لا للجميع فللطبيعي بحث عنهما

فصل (٧) في أن أي العلل ينبغي أن يكون أشد مطلبا و اهتماما للطبيين

لا شبهة في أن صورة الشيء أحق بأن يطلب من مادته لأجل تقرير ماهيته لما علمت من أن بها يكون الشيء هو هو بالفعل دون مادته التي هو بها هو بالقوة و كذا لا شبهة في أن كلا من الفاعل و الغاية للشيء أولى بالاهتمام به لتحقيق وجود ذلك الشيء من مادته و أما الترتيب بين هذين المبدئين و الصورة فطلب الصورة يشبه أن يكون أقدم من طلبهما. و لهذا قيل في علم البرهان إن مطلب ما مقدم على مطلب لم لكن طلبهما أشرف منالا و أعلى مرتبة من طلب الصورة فإن الفاعل و الغاية هما تمام وجود المعلول - كما أن الصورة تمام ماهيته و معناه و تمام الشيء هو ذلك الشيء مع أمر زائد هو كماله فبالصورة فقط لا يتم وجود الشيء ما لم يحصل معه فاعله و غايته فالمادة أنقص العلل اهتماما. و أكثر الجمهور تراهم كثير الاهتمام لمراعاة المواد دون الصورة و الطالبين

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للأجساد دون الأرواح و إن كانت تلك المواد صورا لمواد هي أخس منها وجودا و حكي الشيخ في الشفاء أن بعض الطبيعيين رفض مراعاة أمر الصورة رفضا كليًا و اعتقد أن المادة هي التي يجب أن يحصل و يعرف فإذا حصلت فما بعد

ذلك أعراض و لواحق غير متناهية لا تضبط و يشبه أن يكون هذه المادة التي قصر عليها هؤلاء نظرهم هي المادة المجسمة المنطبعة دون الأولى فكأنهم عن الأولى غافلون يعني لو تفتنوا لعلوموا أن الذي حصلوه و عرفوه على زعمهم و جعلوه مادة فهي بالحقيقة صورة.

قال و ربما احتج بعض هؤلاء ببعض الصنائع و قايس بين الصناعة الطبيعية النفرية- و بين الصناعة المهيئة فقال إن مستنبت الحديد وكده تحصيل الحديد و الغواص وكده تحصيل الدر و ما عليهما من صورتها و الذي يظهر لنا فساد هذا الرأي إفقاده إيانا الوقوف على خصائص الأمور الطبيعية و نوعياتها التي هي صورتها و مناقضة صاحب هذا المذهب نفسه فإنه إن أقنعه الوقوف على الهيولى الغير المصورة- فقد قنع من العلم بمعرفة شيء لا وجود له بل كأنه أمر بالقوة ثم من أي الطريق يسلك إلى إدراكه إذ قد أعرض عن الصور و الأعراض صفحا و هي التي تجر أذهاننا إلى إثباته- فإن لم يقنعه الوقوف على الهيولى الغير المصورة و رام للهيولى صورة كالهوائية و المائية و غير ذلك- فما خرج عن النظر في الصورة ثم ذكر أن مستنبت الحديد ليس الحديد بموضوع صناعته بل هو غايتها و موضوعها الأجسام المعدنية التي يكتب عليها بالحفر و التذويب و فعل ذلك هو صورة صناعته ثم تحصيل الحديد غايته و هو موضوع لصنائع أخرى و بالجملة طلب كل شيء فهو بالحقيقة طلبه بما هو صورة لا بما هو مادة.

ثم قال و قد قام بإزاء هؤلاء طائفة أخرى من الناظرين في علم الطبيعة فاستخفوا بالمادة أصلا و قالوا إنها إنما قصدت في الوجود ليظهر فيها الصور و إن المقصود الأول هو الصورة و إن من أحاط بالصورة علما فقد استغنى عن الالتفات إلى المادة إلا على سبيل شروع فيما لا يعنيه.

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قال و هؤلاء مسرفون في جهة إطراح المادة كما أولئك في جهة إطراح الصورة- فقد يقنعون بأن يجهلوا المناسبات التي بين الصور و المواد إذ ليس كل صورة مساعدة لكل مادة و لا كل مادة ممهدة لكل صورة و إذا كان العلم التام الحقيقي هو الإحاطة بالشيء كما هو و ما يلزمه و كانت ماهية الصورة النوعية مفتقرة إلى مادة معينة فكيف يستكمل علمنا بالصورة- ثم قال و لا مادة أعم اشتراكا فيها و أبعد عن الصورة من المادة الأولى و في علمنا بطبيعتها أو أنها بالقوة كل شيء يكتسب علما بأن الصورة التي في مثل هذه المادة إما واجب زوالها بخلافه أخرى غيرها أو ممكن غير موثوق به بل الطبيعي مفترق في براهينه و محتاج في استتمام صناعته إلى أن يكون محصلا للإحاطة بالصورة و المادة جميعا لكن الصورة مكتسبة علما بما هو هوية الشيء بالفعل أكثر من المادة و المادة مكتسبة العلم بقوة وجوده في أكثر الأحوال و منهما جميعا يستتم العلم بجوهر الشيء أقول ليس إسراف هؤلاء في إطراح المادة مثل إسراف أولئك في إطراح الصورة بل ما ذكروه لا يخلو عن وجه قوة.

و إن الذي ذكره الشيخ من افتقار ماهية الصورة إلى مادة معينة ليس بمسلم فإن ماهية الصورة بحسب مطلق وجودها مقومة لتلك المادة كما أن ماهية الصورة الجسمية مقومة لوجود المادة الأولى و إنما حاجة الصورة إلى مادة مشتركة أو معينة هي بحسب تشخيصات أفرادها و لوازم هوياتها و أما بحسب مطلق وجود ماهيتها بما هو وجود تلك الماهية الصورية فلا حاجة إلى مادة من المواد أصلا.

كيف و قد أقمنا البرهان على أن لكل من هذه الصور الطبيعية نحوا من الحصول مجردا عن المواد و لواحقها فمن أطرَح

المادة في تحصيل العلم بماهية كل من الأنواع الطبيعية من حيث ماهيتها المطلقة المجردة عن الأشخاص الخارجية فلم يبعد عن الصواب كثير بعد وذلك لأن معرفة الأشخاص المعينة بما هي أشخاص غير مطلوب في العلوم الحقيقية - لأن مطالبها يجب أن تكون ثابتة غير متغيرة.

نعم لو بحث عن الأشخاص بما هي أشخاص لطبيعة نوعية على الوجه الكلي

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كان من المطالب و حينئذ يكون البحث حريا بأن يكون جامعا لطرفي المادة و الصورة معا. ثم نقول إن ما ذكره من أن لا مادة أعم اشتراكا فيها و أبعد عن الصورة من الهيولى الأولى و في علمنا كذا و كذا لا يدل دلالة واضحة على ما هو بصده فإن البحث عن أحوال المادة الأولى و أنها مادة للصور كافة و أنها بالقوة كل شيء و أنها واحدة أو متعددة و أن وحدتها أي نوع من الوحدة أو غير ذلك يكون جميع ذلك في الحقيقة بحثا عن الصورة لا عن المادة بما هي مادة فإن الهيولى أيضا يعتبر فيها معنيان شبيهان بالمادة و الصورة أعني جنسها و فصلها فالجوهرية جنسها و كونها مادة للأشياء فصلها - و كذا كونها بالقوة كل شيء هو فعليتها التي بها تمت نوعيتها البسيطة. فإن البحث عن كون الهيولى قوة محضة في بابها ليس يجب أن يكون بحثا عن شيء من الأنواع التي ركبت منها و من الصورة فكم من نوع جسماني وقع البحث عنه و عن أحواله من غير أن يقع الالتفات إلى جانب مادته الأولى فلو كان معرفة المادة لكل نوع - مما يجب البحث عنها في معرفة ذلك النوع لاستحال لأحد من الناس معرفة شيء من أنواع الأجسام في الكمال إلا لمعرفة الهيولى الأولى و المراجعة إليها و الأمر على خلافه. كيف و كثير من الحكماء السابقين أنكروا أن يكون لها حقيقة و الذي سنح بالبال في هذا المقام أن يقال إن الأنواع المادية بما هي واقعة في عالم التغير و الحركة متقومة بالعدم و الحدوث و الحركة و الكمال فهي لا محالة لا بد أن يكون لها جهة قوة و جهة فعلية فإذن ينبغي للحكيم أن يعرف كل واحد من جانبي نقصه و كماله و جهتي قوته و فعليته و مادته و صورته - لأن صورته صورة شيء تحرك نحوها و استكمل بها

فصل (٨) في معرفة كيفية تركيب الجسم الطبيعي عن مادته و صورته

الحق عندنا

موافقا لما تفتن به بعض المتأخرين من أعلام بلدتنا شيراز حرسها الله و أهلها أن التركيب بينهما اتحادي بيان ذلك يستدعي تمهيد مقدمتين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٨٣

إحداهما أن الموجودات كما مر متفاوتة في فضيلة الوجود فيكون بعضها في الكمالية بحيث يكون بوحدته عين معاني كثيرة لا يوجد تلك المعاني برمتها في غيره إلا متفرقة و بعضها ليس كذلك لنقصه في الوجود مثال الأول الإنسان إذ قد يوجد فيه جملة ما يوجد متفرقة في الحيوان و النبات و الجماد و ثانيتهما أن التركيب قسمان - أحدهما أن ينضم شيء إلى شيء آخر يكون لكل منهما ذات على حدة و في المركب كثرة بالفعل كتركيب البيت من اللبنة و مثل هذا التركيب لا يكون تركيبه طبيعيا بل إما صناعي كالبيت و إما اعتباري كالحجر الموضوع بجانب الإنسان - و إما طبيعي بالعرض لا

بالبذات كتركيب بعض أجزاء الحيوان مع بعض كما ستعلم.

و الثاني أن يتحول شيء في ذاته إلى أن يصير شيئاً آخر و يكمل به ذاتاً واحدة فيكون هناك أمر واحد و هو عين كل واحد منهما و عين المركب كالجنين إذا صار حكيماً و بالجملة كل مادة طبيعية إذا تصورت بصورة جوهرية و التركيب في هذا القسم لا بأس بأن يسمى تركيباً اتحادياً.

و هذا لا ينافي قول الحكماء إن هذا المركب أجزاءه خارجية و لا يبطل به الفرق بين البسيط و المركب و لا بين التركيب العقلي و الخارجي فإن هذا المركب يجوز لبعض أجزائه أن ينفرد في الوجود أي الذي بإزاء الجنس من الذي بإزاء الفصل بخلاف المركب العقلي فقط.

ألا ترى أن اللونية لا يمكن وجودها مفارقة عن قابضية البصر و مفرقته - بخلاف الحيوانية إذ قد يكون لها وجود مفارق عن الناطقية و كذا الجسم النامي إذ قد يوجد في غير الحيوان مفارقاً عن الحياة و الحس.

و الحجة على هذا الاتحاد كثيرة

إحداها صحة الحمل بين المادة و الصورة

كقولنا الحيوان جسم نام و النبات جسم و الجسم جوهر قابل و مفاد الحمل هو الاتحاد في الوجود إلا أن جهة الحمل و الاتحاد غير جهة الجزئية و التركيب كما علمت في مباحث الماهية.

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و بالجملة كيفية كون الجزئين في التركيب الطبيعي واحداً في نفس الأمر - هو أن اعتبار هذا التركيب كما أشرنا إليه من حيث إن للعقل أن يحلل هذا الواحد الطبيعي إلى جزئين و اعتبر كلا منهما غير الآخر نظراً إلى أن أحد الجزئين قد يكون موجوداً و لا يكون عين الجزء الآخر ثم يصير عينه لا أن لهما وجودين في هذا المسمى بالمركب كما هو المشهور و عليه الجمهور إذ البرهان يكذبه أو نظراً إلى شيء آخر - و هو أن يكون أمر واحد له معنيان جنسي و فصلي ثم انعدم ذلك الأمر من حيث إنه عين أحدهما و يبقى من حيث إنه عين الآخر فالنظر الأول في التغيرات الاستكمالية الطبيعية و الثاني في التغيرات الاتفاقية و القسرية.

مثال الأول الحبة إذا صار نباتاً و النطفة إذا صارت حيواناً - مثال الثاني الشجر إذا قطع أو قلع و الماء إذا صار هواء فالشجر إذا قطع فالمقطوع منه انعدم من حيث إنه عين النامي و يبقى من حيث إنه عين الجسم و كذا الكلام في الماء إذا صار هواء انعدم من حيث إنه ماء و يبقى من حيث إنه جسم فالأجزاء في هذه المركبات الطبيعية تحليلية عقلية أيضاً كما في البسائط الخارجية لا أنها ذوات متعددة في الخارج.

إذ لو كانت المادة و الصورة ذاتين مختلفتين في الجسم بحسب الخارج لم يجر صدق إحداها على الأخرى بأي اعتبار أخذت كما نقل عن بعض المحققين أن الأجزاء المتغايرة بحسب الوجود الخارجي يمتنع أن يحمل إحداها على الآخر - و يقال هو هو أو يقال المجموع منها هو هذا الواحد أو ذاك الواحد و إن فرض بينهما أي ارتباطاً أمكن يشهد بهذا بديهية العقل لكن المادة تحمل على المركب المذكور - إذا أخذ بوجه كما علم في موضعه.

و صرح به أكثر المحققين كالشيخ الرئيس و من يحذو حذوه فيكون عين المركب و كذا الصورة تحمل عليه و كل منهما يحمل على الأخرى فالكمل واحد لا محالة.

الحجة الثانية

أن الأجزاء العنصرية ليست حاصلة بالفعل في المواليد الثلاثة مثلاً

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ليس في الياقوت جزء ناري بالفعل و إلا كانت الصورة الياقوتية حالة فيها لأن حلولها في مجموع الأجزاء حلول السريان كما أطبق عليه جمهور مثبتيه و لو كانت الصورة الياقوتية حالة في الجزء الناري و هو حينئذ نار بالفعل يكون جسم واحد نارا و ياقوتا معا و هو محال و يتحقق ياقوت غير مركب من العناصر الأربعة و هو خلاف ما اتفقوا عليه و كيف يكون الجزء الناري موجودا فيه و لا ينطفي في الزمان الطويل الذي يكون الياقوت موجودا فيه مع صغر حجمه و مجاورته للأجزاء المائية و إن الأجزاء العنصرية ليست حاصلة بالفعل كان أي جزء انفرض فيه و إن كان في غاية الصغر ياقوتا فإذا لم يكن الأجزاء العنصرية حاصلة بالفعل في المواليد الثلاثة لم يكن تركيب المواليد منها و من صورها إلا تركيبا من هذا القبيل.

فإن العناصر تنقلب أخلاطا و الأخلاط تنقلب نطفة و النطفة تنقلب علقة و هكذا إلى أن تنقلب حيوانا و ليس ما هو السابق في هذه الانقلابات باقيا بالفعل فيما هو اللاحق حتى تكون فيه كثرة في نفس الأمر بل كل واحد من الغذاء و أجزاءها أمر واحد - طبيعي لا كثرة في نفس الأمر نعم للعقل أن يقسم كل واحد منها بحسب آثاره و خواصه - إلى أقسام بعضها مادة له باعتبار و جنس باعتبار و بعضها صورة له باعتبار و فصل باعتبار - و يعضد ذلك ما ذكره الشيخ في الحكمة العلائية من أن الهيولى و الصورة واحدة بحسب الذات متعددة بحسب المعنى.

الحجة الثالثة

أن مادة الشيء هي التي بها يكون الشيء بالقوة و صورته هي التي بها تصير بالفعل فلا بد أن يكونا متحدين و يكون الصورة للشيء بعينها ذلك الشيء - و لذلك حكموا بأن الهيولى قوة محضة لكل شيء. قال المحقق الطوسي قدس سره في شرح الإشارات و ظاهر أن الشرف و البراءة عن القوى مرتب في صنفى المراتب على التكافؤ منته من الجانبين إلى الهيولى الأولى و التي

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وجودها ليس إلا كونها بالقوة فهي نهاية الخسة - و كذا ما ذكره الشارح القديم في شرحها من قوله لأن الهيولى شيء بالقوة متى حصلت فهي الجسم و ما ذكره بهمنيار في إلهيات كتاب التحصيل أن الهيولى شيء ليست في موضوع فهي إذن جوهر و الجوهرية التي لها ليست يجعلها بالفعل شيئا من الأشياء بل يعدها لأن يكون بالفعل شيئا بالصورة. كيف و لو كان تركيب الجسم منهما على أن يكونا ذاتين حاصلتين في نفس الأمر لم يصح تعريف الصورة بأنها ماهية الجسم كما لا يصح تعريف السقف بأنه ماهية البيت لكنهم عرفوا الصورة بأنها ماهية الشيء التي بها هو كما عرفها الشيخ في الشفاء بها حيث قال إن لكل جسم طبيعة و مادة و صورة و أعراضا و صورته هي ماهيته التي بها هو هو و مادته هي المعنى الحامل لماهيته و أما إذا كان تركيب الجسم منهما على أن يكونا ذاتا واحدة صح تعريف صورة الجسم بماهيته لأن هذا الأمر الواحد هو صورته غاية الأمر أن يجوز للعقل أن ينتزع منه أمرا آخرامبهما و قد صار عين هذا الأمر

الواحد الموجود في نفس الأمر.

الحجة الرابعة

أن النفس صورة البدن و البدن مادة له كما ذهب إليه المحققون من الحكماء و صرح به الشيخ و أتباعه. ثم إن النفس تتصف بصفات معينة للبدن و كل ما اتصف بصفة معينة لشيء فهو عين ذلك الشيء فالنفس عين البدن أما الصغرى فهي مما يعلم كل أحد بالوجدان أن الذي يشير إليه منه بأننا هو المتحرك الجالس الأكل الشام الذائق فنقول أنا أجلس و أكل و أشم و أذوق و غير ذلك من غير تجوز و استعارة و هذه كلها بخصوصيتها صفات البدن و قد اتصفت بها النفس و أما الكبرى فلما ثبت في مقامه أن الصفة الواحدة المعينة لا تقوم بموصوفين لأن العرض وجوده في نفسه هو بعينه وجوده لموضوعه و لا يمكن أن يكون وجود واحد في نفسه وجوداً لأمرين مختلفين من غير أن يتحداً بنحو من الوجود - فثبت أن النفس يكون عين البدن فإذا ثبت أنها عين البدن ثبت أن كل صورة عين مادتها إذ لا قائل بالفصل و لأن غير النفس من الصور أولى بأن يكون عين المادة من النفس

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بأن تكون عين البدن

أعضالات و تفصيلات -

أحدها أنه قد صرح القوم بأن الصور علة للهيولى

و مع اتحادهما لا يتصور ذلك و جوابه أن العلية المذكورة فيها ليست من حيث إنهما شيء واحد بل إذا صار هذا الواحد كثيراً بتعمل من العقل يحكم بعلية بعض منه لبعض و لا حجر في أن يكون في الوجود شيء واحد يعرض له كثرة عقلية يتحقق بينهما علية و معلولية في اعتبار الكثرة كما في أجزاء حد الماهية كالسواد من جنسه و فصله حيث يحكم العقل بعد التحليل بأن فصله و هو قابض البصر علة لجنسه و هو اللون و كل منهما علة الماهية. هذا باعتبار التجريد و أحدهما محمول على الآخر و على الماهية باعتبار الإطلاق - فكذلك المادة و الصورة و إن كانتا ذاتاً واحدة لكن إذا أخذت إحداهما مقيداً بكونه فقط - لم يصدق حملها على تلك الذات لأن تلك الذات ليست إحداهما فقط بل هي عين هذه و الأخرى معاً فأحد الجزئين مأخوذ بهذا الاعتبار يسمى مادة أو صورة و إذا لم يؤخذ بهذا الاعتبار بل أخذ مطلقاً لصدق حملة على الماهية و على الآخر فيسمى جنساً و فصلاً فإذاً الجنس و المادة معني واحد إذا أخذ مطلقاً كان جنساً و إذا أخذ مقيداً بأنه لا يكون جزؤه [غيره] كان مادة و كذلك حال الفصل و الصورة. فظهر أن الجنس و المادة متحدان ذاتاً مختلفان بالاعتبار و كذلك الفصل و الصورة.

و ثانيها كون المادة و الصورة ذاتاً واحدة

على ما ذكرت إنما يتم في المركب المتشابه الأجزاء كالياقوت إذ هناك أمر واحد بالفعل فجاز أن يكون مادة و صورة باعتبار و جنساً و فصلاً باعتبار و أما المركب الغير المتشابه الأجزاء كالفرس فلا يتصور فيه ذلك إذ هناك أمور متعددة مختلفة الحقيقة كالعظم و اللحم و العصب فكيف يكون هذه الأمور المختلفة عين الصورة الفرسية و هي أمر واحد.

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أقول ليس يلزم أن يكون كل ما يوجد من الصورة و الكيفيات مع مادة الشيء داخلا في قوام ماهيته و لا في قوام هويته بما هي تلك الهوية بل ربما يكون من اللواحق أو المعدات إذ قد مر أن مادة الشيء يعتبر فيه على وجه الإبهام فالصورة الفرسية هي أمر واحد يصدر عنه هذه الأفاعيل على المادة بنحو من الترتيب و هي بالحقيقة ذات الفرس و هويته التي بها هو هو و هذه الأعضاء من آثارها و لواحقها و ليست هي داخلة في مادته.

و لهذا قد لا يفسد عند زوال الصورة و لو كانت هذه الأمور كلها أجزاء لمادة الفرس بخصوصها لم يبق شيء منها عند موته و فساد صورته و ليس كذلك و ذلك لأن الصورة على أي وجه كانت علة للمادة المخصوصة و إذا بطلت العلة بطل المعلول بخصوصه بل الفرس بالحقيقة أمر واحد طبيعي له معان كثيرة تصدق عليه و هو الجسم و النامي و المغتذي و الحساس و غير ذلك فلا كثرة بالفعل فيما هو فرس بالحقيقة - و ليست جسمية الفرس بالحقيقة هذا المحسوس المركب من هذه الأعضاء المتباينة الوجود.

و قد أشرنا أيضا فيما سبق أن مادة الشيء بمعنى حامل قوته و إمكانه بالعدد غير مادته للصورة بصورته بالفعل فمادة الإنسان مثلا بالمعنى الأول هي النطفة بل الجنين بخلاف مادته بالمعنى الآخر فإنها أمر مبهم في ذاته متعين بالصورة. و هذا الجواب أولى مما ذكره السيد السند من قوله الفرس أمر طبيعي لا كثرة فيه بالفعل و ليس جسم الفرس موجودا واحدا في نفس الأمر بل هو بعض من موجود واحد طبيعي و كذا حكم سائر أجزائه كما أن الياقوت أيضا كذلك غاية الأمر أن الأجزاء التحليلية المفروضة في الياقوت حقيقتها واحدة و الأجزاء التحليلية المفروضة في الفرس حقائق مختلفة ألا ترى أن الأجزاء التحليلية الواقعة في الكرة الواحدة الحقيقية التي هي فلك الثوابت مختلفة الحقائق بعضها جرم الفلك و بعضها كواكب مختلفة الصور - و ذلك لأن القول بأن العظم و اللحم و غيرهما أجزاء تحليلية للفرس مع تخالفها

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٨٩

بالماهية و أنها ليست موجودة بالفعل مخالف لبديهية العقل و لما حققه الشيخ و غيره من أن القسمة الفرضية المقدارية إنما يكون إلى أجزاء متحدة الماهية.

و بذلك أبطلوا مذهب ديمقراطيس قال في الهيئات الشفاء الوحدة بالاتصال إما معتبرة مع المقدار فقط و إما أن يكون مع طبيعة أخرى إلى قوله لا ينقسم إلى صور مختلفة و كون الفلك و الكواكب كلها متصلا واحدا ينافي ما حققه الحكماء من أن لكل كوكب حركة أخرى غير حركة فلكه.

و ثالثها أن التركيب الاتحادي الذي ذكرتم غير معقول في الإنسان

لأن نفسه التي هي صورته جوهر مجرد عن المادة كما ذهبت إليه الحكماء و بدنه جسم - و التركيب الاتحادي بينهما مستلزم لتجرد الجسم أو لتجسم المجرد.

أقول إنما يلزم ما ذكر لو كانت النفوس الإنسانية مجردات بالفعل في أول تكونها و صيرورتها صورة نفسانية مدبرة للمادة و ليس كذلك بل النفوس بما هي نفوس جسمانية البتة ثم إذا استكملت و قويت في جوهرها تصير مجردة و هي بما هي صورة مجردة ليست مع البدن و معنى قولهم الإنسان حيوان ناطق أي حيوان من شأنه إدراك المعقولات بالفعل لأن كل واحد من أفرادها له أن يعقل صورة عقلية بالفعل - فكل إنسان هو عاقل و معقول بالقوة فيكون مجردا

بالقوة لا بالفعل والعقل والمعقول أمر واحد كما مر و

لو كان تركيب الإنسان من النفس و البدن كما توهمه الجمهور من مذهب الحكماء لزم منه أمور شنيعة -

منها أنا نفهم ضرورة من ذاتنا المشار إليها بأنا و مرادفاته معنى يصدق عليه

أنه المدرك للأشياء و المتحرك و الجالس في المكان فإن كان هذا المعنى هو البدن - لا يصدق عليه أنه مدرك إذ الجسم بما هو جسم غير مدرك و إن كان هو النفس فلا يصدق عليه أنه الجالس في المكان و إن كان المجموع فلا يصدق على مجموع مجرد و مادي أنهما مدرك و لا جالس كيف و الوحدة مساوقة للوجود بل هي عين الوجود فما لا وحدة له لا وجود له.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩٠

و منها أن القوم عرفوا الإنسان بالحيوان الناطق و فسروا الناطق بمدرك الكليات

و هذا التعريف لا يصدق على النفس المجردة وحدها و هو ظاهر و لا على البدن وحده لأنه ليس مدركا فضلا عن الكليات و لا على المجموع.

و منها أن التركيب الحقيقي بين المجرد بالفعل و المادي بالفعل

بحيث يكون مجموعهما أمرا واحدا طبيعيا هو نوع من أنواع الجسم غير معقول و لهذا أنكره السيد الشريف في حواشي حكمة العين مستدلا عليه بأن كلا منهما واقع تحت جنس آخر أو النفس تحت الجوهر المجرد و البدن تحت المقارن فلا تركيب بينهما أصلا.

اللهم إلا باعتبار عقلي و لو ساغ ذلك لجاز أن يكون العقل الفعال مع ما يفعله و يدبره أمرا واحدا بالحقيقة و أما الذي تفصى به العلامة الدواني عن هذه الوجوه فغير سديد كما نذكره أما الذي أورده على الأول بقوله لا نسلم أنه يصدق على مفهوم أنا أنه جالس بل ذكر الشيخ و غيره أن المشار إليه بأنا هو النفس المجردة و وصفه بصفات الأجسام من حيث تعلقها بالجسم حيث يتوهم أنها هو و الإطلاقات العرفية لا يقتنص منها الحقائق ألا ترى أن العرف يصف الباري تعالى بصفات الأجسام و يشير إليه حال التوجه إليه إلى السماء مع تنزهه عن الجهات و صفات الأجسام ففيه نوع مكابرة و إن ارتكبه بعض الأكابر حتى صاحب الإشراق في المطارحات.

فإن القول بهذه الإطلاقات كلها على الإنسان مجازية عرفية من النامي و المتحيز و الماشي و الأكل و المشتهي و النائم و غير ذلك مما يصادم الوجدان و البرهان - جميعا أما الوجدان فظاهر فإننا نجد من أنفسنا هذه الصفات و الأفعال الجسمانية و أما البرهان فلأن المشار إليه بأنا إنسان و كل إنسان حيوان و كل حيوان جسم محمول - عليه هذه الصفات بالحقيقة لا بالمجاز و أما إجراء الصفات التشبيهية على الباري جل عزه فله خطب عظيم لا يعلمه إلا الراسخون في علم التوحيد.

و أما ما ذكره عن الوجه الثاني بقوله إن المعرف بالحيوان الناطق هو مجموع النفس و البدن فإن هذا المجموع جسم كما حققه الشيخ في الشفاء أنه جوهر يمكن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩١

فيه فرض الأبعاد إذ لا يلزم أن يكون لجميع أجزائه دخل في قبول الأبعاد فإن الجسم الطبيعي لا دخل للصورة النوعية التي هي جزؤه في ذلك بل قبوله لها الصورة الجسمية لا غير فكذلك هذا المجموع يمكن فرض الأبعاد فيه وإن لم يكن للنفس التي هي بمنزلة الصورة دخل فيه.

ثم هذا المجموع مدرك للكليات لاشتماله على النفس المجردة التي هي المدركة لها وليس شرط صدق المشتق على الشيء قيام مبدأ الاشتقاق و عن الوجه الثالث بأن لا نسلم أن التركيب الحقيقي بين المجرد والمادي غير معقول إذا كان ذلك المجرد متعلقا به تعلق التدبير والتصريف و كون كل منهما تحت جنس آخر لا يقدح في كلاهما مقدوح مردود. أما الأول فلأن ما ذكره لو كان حقا يلزم أن يصدق على مجموع السماء والأرض - أنه سماء وأرض بأي اعتبار أخذت لأن هذه الاعتبارات التي يكون الشيء بحسب بعضها محمولا و بحسب بعضها جزءا غير محمول إنما يجري و يصح في معان تكون موجودة بوجود واحد لا في الأمور المتباينة الوجود.

ثم ما تشبث من كون قبول الأبعاد للجسمية لا للصورة النوعية مع أنه يصدق على المجموع أنه قابل للأبعاد فهو بعينه مصادرة على المطلوب الأول فإن الكلام هاهنا في اتحاد المادة بالصورة والصورة للشيء هي بعينها مصداق جميع المعاني التي تصدق على مادتها مع ما يزيد عليها من جهة الصورة فالصورة المتنوعة للحيوان هي بعينها قابلة للأبعاد نامية حساسة و الجسمية المنفصلة عنها عند الموت و الفساد غير التي تكون متحدة معها بالشخص كما أو مانا إليه و الذي ذكره من عدم اشتراط صدق المشتق على قيام المبدأ و إن كان له وجه لكن يجب إما القيام وإما الاتحاد و مجرد النسبة إلى المبدأ غير كاف للصدق و الأمثلة التي يستدل بها على ذلك كالحداد و التامر و الشمس و غيرها لا تعويل بها إذ أكثرها إما مجازات و إما أن يوضع فيها ما ليس بمبدأ مبدأ.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩٢

و أما الثاني فالبرهان حاكم بأن مادة الشيء هي التي تصورت بذلك الشيء - لا التي لا يمكن أن يتصور به و الجسم لا يمكن أن يتصور بجوهر مفارق و إن كان مع أي إضافة فرضت له

تذكرة فيها تبصرة

اعلم أن السيد السند سلك في الجواب عن الإشكال الثالث مسلكا آخر غير ما سلكناه حاصله أن شيئا من النفس و البدن غير موجود بالفعل بمعنى أن هذا الوجود الذي به يتحقق المركب ليس وجودا لواحد منهما بل لأمر آخر قابل للتحليل العقلي إليهما و كذا في كل مركب من مادة و صورة فإنه قال لا نسلم أن التركيب الاتحادي بينهما مستلزم لذلك أي لتجسم المجرد أو تجرد المجسم لما عرفت من أن الصورة و المادة ليسا أمرين مختلفين في الخارج حتى يكون هناك مجرد و مادي بالفعل و لزم من صيرورتهما واحدا - أحد الأمرين المذكورين.

فإن الإنسان قد انقلب النطفة إليه بالوسائط و هو واحد طبيعي ليس له في الخارج جزء أصلا لا مادي و لا مجرد كسائر مراتب الانقلابات المذكورة و العقل يقسمه بحسب آثاره إلى جوهر قابل للأبعاد نام حساس مدرك للكليات و إن كان تلبسه ببعض هذه الآثار كقبول الأبعاد و النمو مستلزما لأن يكون له وضع و مقدار و حيز و تلبسه بإدراك الكليات لا يستلزم تلبسه بشيء من هذه الثلاثة فهو مدرك الكليات من حيث إنه مجرد عن هذه الثلاثة.

و هذا هو المراد بالمجرد عندهم فإن المجرد بمعنى العريان و أرادوا به العاري عن هذه الثلاثة ثم لما جاز أن ينقلب

الحيوان إلى أمر آخر يكون فيه بعض صفات الحيوان دون بعض آخر منها كان مات الفرس مثلاً فإنه يبقى فيه المقدار و الشكل و اللون دون النمو و الإحساس.

فإذا انقلب الإنسان إلى أمر لا يبقى المقدار و الوضع و التحيز و يبقى فيه إدراك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩٣

الكليات فحينئذ انقلب إلى أمر مجرد يخرج المجرد الذي كان فيه بالقوة إلى الفعل و لا دليل على امتناع ذلك فمنشأ السؤال أخذ ما بالقوة مكان ما بالفعل فإذاً يكون النفس المجردة - التي هي صورة الإنسان جزءاً تحليلياً كما هو شأن سائر الصور لا جزءاً تركيبياً انتهى.

أقول ما ذكره ليس بصحيح فإن معنى اتحاد المادة بالصورة كما أشرنا إليه مراراً - أن موجوداً واحداً هو الصورة وجودها بعينه وجود ما هو المادة يعني أن كلا منهما مطلقاً موجود بهذا الوجود بالفعل و التحليل العقلي بهما إنما هو بحسب أخذ كل منهما - باعتبار التجريد عن الآخر مثلاً الجسم مادة للصورة النباتية و قيل صيرورة الجسم نباتاً - يصدق عليه أنه جوهر قابل للأبعاد فقط و إذا تصور بصورة النبات و انقلب إليها صار من أفراد مفهومات أخرى أيضاً غير الجوهرية و قبول الأبعاد و هي المتغذي و النامي و المولد.

فجميع هذه المعاني موجودة بالفعل لا بالقوة بوجود واحد لكن مطلقاً لا باعتبار تجريد بعضها فالجسم إن أخذ مطلقاً هو جنس صادق على النامي و إن أخذ مقيداً بعدم شيء آخر فيه يكون مادة و هكذا الفرق بين اعتبار الفصل و الصورة في معنى النامي فالحاجة إلى التحليل إنما هي بحسب وصف الجزئية.

و معنى كون هذه المعاني بالقوة إنما هو باعتبار وجوداتها التفصيلية عند الافتراق كما يقال السواد الشديد فيه بالقوة أمثال السواد الضعيف أو في المتصل الواحد الكبير أمثال الصغير بالقوة و لا يمكن لأحد أن يقول ليس هذا الحيوان جسماً بالفعل بل له أن يقول ليس جسماً محضاً بالفعل و كذا لا يمكن له أن يقول ليس هو حساساً بالفعل - بل له أن يقول ليس حساساً محضاً فكذلك الإنسان يوجد فيه بالفعل جميع المعاني الموجودة في ماهية الحيوان المطلق مع زيادة قوة فيها قبول العقل بالفعل لكن لما كان بين المعاني السابقة و إدراك الكليات بالفعل نحو تناقض و المتناقضان لا يوجدان بوجود واحد بالفعل يرد الإشكال المذكور و دفعه بما بيناه من أن المراد بالناطق - هو العاقل المدرك للكليات بالقوة و ليس للإنسان بحسب هذا الوجود الجسماني إدراك

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩٤

المعقول بالفعل إلا بعد أن ينسلخ عنه هذا الوجود المادي و عن كثير من الغواشي و القشور - حتى ينتهي إلى وجود آخر و ينقلب إلى جوهر مفارق أخيراً و ذلك بأن تصير نفسه عقلاً - و الصورة الحسية له مادة معنوية لصورة عقلية هي عقل و معقول بالفعل

فصل (٩) في حل شكوك تتوهم ورودها على القول بالاتحاد بين الصور و المواد

مما أوردها صاحب حاشية التجريد على معاصره -

و إن كان بين ما ذهب إليه من الاتحاد و بين ما رأيناه بونا بعيداً قال إن التحليل العقلي يجري في البسائط فإن العقل

يحللها إلى جنس و هو اللون و فصل يميزها كالتقايض للبصر بالنسبة إلى السواد و المفرق للبصر بالنسبة إلى البياض فلو كان الحال على ما ذكره لكان لتلك الأعراض مادة و صورة.

مع أن الشيخ قد صرح بأن ليس للأعراض مادة و صورة بل نقول هذا التحليل يجري في المجردات فإنها جواهر مخصوصة لكل منها جنس هو الجوهر و فصل يميزه عن غيره فيلزم أن يكون لها مادة فلا تكون مجردة هذا خلف فعلم أن مرادهم من الهيولى - ليس ما تخيله من الجزء التحليلي الذي هو الجنس و لا بالصورة ما توهمه من الجزء التحليلي المميز في العقل الذي هو الفصل و إلا لكان ما سوى الواجب مطلقا ماديا عندهم فإن التحليل إلى الجنس و الفصل يجري في جميع الممكنات عندهم.

أقول الفرق بين البسيط و بين ما سمي مركبا ليس كما توهمه من أن الوجود في الأول للمعنى الجنسي و المعنى الفصلي واحد و في الثاني متعدد حتى يكون في النوع الواحد الطبيعي كالإنسان مثلا موجودات كثيرة حسب أجناسه و فصوله القريبة و البعيدة و إلا لم يكن زيد مثلا موجودا واحدا بل موجودات كثيرة لها وحدة اعتبارية - كوحدة العسكر إذ يمتنع أن يكون الموجودات المتباعدة الوجود بأي اعتبار أخذ موجودا واحدا لأن موضوع الوحدة العددية يستحيل أن يكون بعينه موضوع الكثرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩٥

و لو باعتبارين.

نعم الواحد العددي يجوز أن يكون مركبا من معان كثيرة بحسب المفهوم - واحدة بحسب الذات و الوجود بل الفرق بين ما يسمى بسيطا و ما يسمى مركبا هو الذي أومأنا إليه من أن معنى الذي فيه إزاء الجنس و المادة قد يوجد على حدة من غير معنى الذي إزاء الفصل و الصورة كالبذر للنبات و النطفة للحيوان.

فالصورة إذا وجدت بعد استعداد المادة بطل ذلك الوجود الذي كان للمادة فقط و حصل لمعناها وجود آخر أفضل و أتم من ذلك الوجود حيث يصدق عليه جميع المعاني الصادقة على تلك المادة على وجه أشرف مع معنى آخر هو الفصل القريب - و يترتب على هذه الصورة الفائضة جميع ما كانت مترتبة على مادتها و ليست المادة التي كانت هي قبل فيضان الصورة بشخصها هي المعنى الجنسي الذي يتحد بالصورة.

بل المعنى الجنسي إذا جرده العقل عن المعنى الفصلي كان مادة عقلية اتحدت بالمادة الخارجية ماهية و نوعا و كذا المعنى الفصلي إذا جرده العقل عن المعنى الجنسي - يقال له الصورة العقلية و هي في الوجود غير الصورة الخارجية لأنها في العقل و هذه في الخارج.

و أما قولهم ليس للأعراض مادة و صورة

و لا للمجردات مادة و صورة معناها ليس لها مادة جسمانية خارجية لا أنه ليس لها معنى نسبته إليه عند التحليل نسبة مادة الشيء إليه كيف و هم جعلوا نسبة الماهية إلى الوجود نسبة المادة إلى الصورة.

و قال الشيخ فالواجب بسيط الحقيقة و ما سواه زوج تركيب و ليس إطلاق المادة و الصورة على المركب و البسيط على مجرد الاشتراك اللفظي دون الاتحاد في المفهوم لأن مادة الشيء هي ما لا يتم بحسبها حقيقة ذلك الشيء و صورته هي تمام حقيقتها.

ثم قال إن ما تخيله من نفي بقاء صور العناصر في المركبات يخالف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩٦

لما أطبق عليه المعتبرون من الحكماء و ما ذكره من أن حلول الصورة الياقوتية مثلا في جميع الأجزاء حلول السريان و دعوى اتفاقهم على ذلك ممنوع بل الذي يستفاد من كلام الشيخ أن الصورة الياقوتية مثلا سارية في جميع أجزائه المركبة التي هي معروضة للكيفية المزاجية دون أجزائه البسيطة العنصرية - و لا بأس بأن يكون الشيء ساريا في بعض أجزاء الشيء دون بعض أو من بعض الحثيات دون بعض كالخط فإنه سار في السطح من حيث الطول فقط و السطح سار في الجسم التعليمي من حيث الطول و العرض دون العمق.

أقول أولا المتبع هو البرهان دون النقل عن أولئك الأعيان ثم إن بقاء صور العناصر على تقدير ثبوتها غير داخل في قوام الصورة الياقوتية مثلا و لا في قوام مادتها بما هي مادتها إذ المادة أمر مبهم الصور في ذاتها حتى لو فرض تحقق الصورة الياقوتية في مادة أخرى أو لا في مادة لكان ياقوتا على أنا سنبين في مبحث المزاج زيادة تبين أن شيئا من العناصر غير موجودة بصرفته في هذه الأنواع الطبيعية.

و الذي يدل على أن وجودات العناصر على تقدير تحققها في الياقوت لا مدخلية لها في الماهية الياقوتية و كذا وجودات العناصر و الأخلط لا مدخلية لها في الحيوان ما قاله بهمنيار في كتاب التحصيل و هو أنا نرى أجساما مركبة من العناصر و الأخلط - تحس و تحرك بالإرادة تغذو و تنمو و تطلب بدل ما يتحلل فيجب أن يكون أولا لهذه الأجسام خصوصية جسمية ليست لأجزائها فإن ما ليس لها خصوصية جسمية لم يصدر

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٢٩٧

عنه فعل خاص و النمو و الاغتذاء و طلب ما يتحلل يختص بهذا الجسم فإنه ليس لكل واحد من أخلطه و أجزائه العنصرية نمو و لا تحلل و لا اغتذاء كما ليس لكل واحد من أجزاء العين إبصار بل الإبصار للعين بما هو عين و النمو للبدن بما هو بدن.

فتبين أن للحيوانات و النباتات خصوصية أجسام ليست لكل واحد من أجزائها فوجود الأجزاء فيها إذن بالقوة لأن كل ما يكون وحدته بالفعل فالأجزاء فيه بالقوة انتهى كلامه ثم قال الفاضل الدواني إن ما نقله في معرض الاستدلال من كلام الشيخ في الحكمة العلائية لا يدل على مطلوبه لجواز أن يكون مراده من اتحاد الهول و الصورة بالذات اتحادهما من حيث كونهما جنسا و فصلا لا من حيث كونهما هولي و صورة بل نقول مراده من اتحادهما بالذات أن الوحدة العارضة لهما بالتركيب وحدة حقيقية لا وحدة اعتبارية كوحدة العسكر و العشرة و لذلك ما يتألف منهما ذات واحدة.

و كذلك ما نقل عن الإشارات و شرحه فإن معناه أن الهولي إذا تحصلت بحلول الصورة المائية مثلا صارت ماء بالعرض كما أن الجسم إذا حل فيه السواد صار أسود بالعرض فالأجزاء الذي هاهنا كالاتحاد بين العرضيات و موضوعاتها هو اتحاد عرضي - و لا ينافي ذلك أن يحصل منهما ثالث كما في العرضيات و معروضاتها انتهى أقول أما الذي ذكره أولا أن الاتحاد بين الهولي و الصورة إنما هو من جهة كونهما جنسا و فصلا فهو في الحقيقة اعتراف بالمقصود فإنا لا ندعي أن الهولي - بحسب أي وجود لها تكون متحدة بالصورة بل ندعي أن لها نحو من الوجود بحسبه - يكون عين الصورة و

ذلك الوجود هو بعينه وجود الصورة في الخارج و للصورة وجود آخر في العقل مجردا عن المادة. و أما الذي ذكره ثانيا من أن الوحدة العارضة لهما بالتركيب وحدة حقيقية لا اعتبارية في غاية الرداءة فإن كون الوحدة حقيقية في شيء عبارة عن كون ذلك الشيء بوجوده الذاتي عين أشياء كثيرة فيكون وحدتهما وحدة بالفعل و كثرتهما

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بالقوة و هذا هو المطلوب بعينه لنا من كون الصورة لذاتها مصداقا لحمل معنى المادة عليها و أما الذي ذكره ثالثا فهو أيضا باطل سخيف من وجهين أحدهما أنه ينافي ما اعترف به سابقا من أن الوحدة العارضة لهما حقيقية لأنها متى كانت الوحدة بين شيئين حقيقية كان الاتحاد بينهما بالذات لا بالعرض لأن ما بالعرض هو ما بالمجاز عند المحققين كما اعترف به هذا الحبر المدقق و الفرق بين الصورة و العرض في ذلك مما لا يخفى على أهل التحقيق. و كيف يذهب على أهل البصيرة أن يقول إن الاتحاد بين الجسم المطلق و الماء - اتحاد بالعرض و الماء ماء بصورته و يقول الاتحاد بين الجنس و الفصل اتحاد بالعرض كيف و الجنس و الفصل موجودان بوجود واحد فكذلك المادة و الصورة إذا أخذتا مطلقتين و لعل منشأ هذا الوهم لبعضهم أنهم لما سمعوا قول الحكماء بأن الجنس عرض عام لفصله و الفصل خاصة للجنس و لم يفرقوا بين عوارض الماهية و عوارض الوجود فزعموا أن العارضية و المعروضية بينهما في الوجود و ذلك باطل فإن وجود الفصل بعينه وجود الجنس الذي يحصله و إنما الفرق بينهما بحسب الحد و المفهوم بمعنى أن مفهوم أحدهما غير مفهوم الآخر فمفهوم الناطق مثلا خارج عن المفهوم من الحيوان و كذا العكس مع أن وجود الناطق بعينه وجود الحيوان.

ثم قال و أما ما نقل أن الشيخ عرف الصورة بأنها ماهية الشيء حيث وصف صورة الجسم بأن الجسم هو بها هو هو فمراده أن حصول الجسم بالفعل بسبب الصورة - فالباء في قوله هو بها للسببية. و أما الباء في تعريف الماهية بما به الشيء هو هو فالمراد بها نفي السببية إذ الإنسان مثلا لا يصير بسبب ماهيته إنسانا ثم ما توهمه من أنه على تقدير اتحادهما في الوجود يصح تعريف صورة الجسم بماهيته غير مسلم كما لا يجوز تعريف الفصل بماهية الشيء و لو صح ذلك نظرا إلى اتحادهما في الوجود لجاز تعريف الهيولى أيضا بها

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فإن الاتحاد مشترك بين الهيولى و الصورة عنده.

ثم لو كانت الصورة تمام ماهيته و هو بعينها الفصل عنده كانت الهيولى التي هي الجنس عنده خارجا عن الماهية و هذا مما لا يقول به عاقل و لو كانت الصورة ماهية الشيء لجاز وقوعه [عنها] في جواب السؤال عنه [عنها] بما هو و حينئذ يكون مأخوذا مطلقا ليصدق عليه فكان فصلا فيقع الفصل في جواب ما هو هذا خلف انتهى.

أقول إن الظاهر أن الباء في الموضعين استعملت بمعنى واحد هو معنى السببية - لكن يراد بها نفي سببية الغير فإذا قيل ماهية الشيء هي التي بها هو هو أي ليست هويته بسبب شيء آخر و كذا إذا قيل صورة جسم هي التي بها ذلك الجسم معناه أن الصورة إذا حصلت لا يحتاج ذلك الجسم في حقيقته إلى شيء غيرها ثم عدم تسليمه تعريف صورة الشيء بماهيته مما لا وجه له و لا مستند فيه.

وقوله كما لا يجوز تعريف الفصل بماهية الشيء فيه مغالطة ناشئة من الخلط بين مفهوم الفصل وطبيعته و مفهوم الماهية و مصداقها أو من الخلط بين مطلق التعريف و بين التحديد و إلا فلا حجر لأحد في تعريف فصل الشيء بماهيته بأن يعرف الناطق مثلا بالإنسان فإن مفهوم الإنسان صادق على الناطق مساو له في الصدق و ربما كان أشهر و أعرف من الناطق عند قوم.

نعم لا يمكن تحديد الفصل بالماهية بل لا حد للفصل سيما على ما ذهبنا إليه من كون الصورة التي يحاذي بها الفصل هي بعينها وجود من الوجودات و الماهية خارجة عن الوجود حدا و مفهوما متحدة معه وجودا و من ذهب إلى أن صورة هذا الشيء هي تمام ماهيته و عرفها بما ذكر لم يفعل ذلك لمجرد الاتحاد بينهما في الوجود حتى لزم أن يكون المادة أيضا كذلك و جاز تعريفها بما ذكر.

و أما قوله لو كانت الصورة تمام ماهية الشيء لجاز وقوعها في جواب ما هو إلى آخره ممنوع فإن الإنسان مثلا تمام ماهية الحيوان و غير واقع في جواب السؤال عنه بل ما ذكره مغالطة نشأت من الاشتباه بين الماهية و الوجود.

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ألا ترى أن وجود كل شيء تمام ماهيته و عينها و لا يمكن وقوع وجود الشيء - في جواب السؤال عنه بما هو و قد علمت أن صورة الشيء هي وجوده بعينه و وجود كل شيء بعينه وجود جميع ذاتياته بالذات و عرضياته بالعرض. و اعلم أن الشيخ نص في بعض رسائله بأن كل شيء بصورته هو ذلك الشيء لا بمادته و بالغ في بيان ذلك حتى قال السرير سرير بهيئته لا بخشبته و السيف سيف بحدته لا بحديده و الحكماء ذكروا في فائدة اقتناء الحكمة و غايتها أنها تصوير نفس الإنسان بها عالما عقليا مضاهيا لهذا العالم الحسي مستدلين بأن العالم عالم بصورته لا بمادته فإذا حصل في النفس صور هذه الموجودات من الأفلاك و العناصر و ما فيها على وجه عقلي كانت النفس عالما عقليا فعلم من هذا الكلام أن صورة كل شيء تمام حقيقته و وجودها وجود ماهيته.

تبصرة

و اعلم أن التعويل و الاعتماد منا في هذا المطلب الذي هو من المهمات العظيمة و غيرها ليس على مجرد النقل من الحكماء بل على البرهان إلا أن أقوالهم إذا وافقت توقع للقلب زيادة اطمينان على أن طبيعة اللفظ مثار الخلط و الاشتباه و هذا المطلب لشدة غموضه لم أعرف أحدا من المشهورين بالحكمة بعد الأوائل كالشيخ و أتباعه كان مدعنا لهذا الأصل على وجه الأحكام و الإتمام لا بتناؤه على عدة قوانين مخالفة للمشهور.

منها كون الوجود في كل شيء موجودا.

و منها كون الوجود الواحد يقبل الاشتداد و التضعف.

و منها أن الجوهر يقبل الحركة و الاشتداد في ذاته.

و منها أن مادة الشيء هي بعينها جهة ضعفه في الوجود و صورته هي شدة وجوده.

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و منها تجويز أن بعض الصور الجسمانية كالنفس مع كونها طبيعة جسمانية - فيها قوة أن تصير مادة للصور المجردة و

متحدة بها بحيث يكون هي هي وقد كانت قبل ذلك هي عين المادة الجسمانية.

و منها تجويز أن يكون أمر بسيط عين ماهيات كثيرة قد وجدت بوجود ذلك البسيط على وجه أعلى و أشرف من وجوداتها الخاصة التفصيلية إلى غير ذلك من المباحث الغامضة فالذي نقلنا من كلمات الشيخ و غيره كبهمنيار و الشارحين للإشارات - مما أجرى الله به الحق على لسانهم فالغرض من نقله كسر سورة إنكار المنكرين - و صولة استبعادهم ذلك و إلا فالذي شاع و ذاع في الكتب كالشفاء و غيره هو أن المركب الطبيعي يوجد فيه جزءان موجودان بالفعل بوصف الكثرة.

قال في الهيات الشفاء و كل بسيط فإنه ماهية ذاته لأنه ليس هناك شيء قابل لماهيته لم يكن ذلك الشيء ماهية المقبول الذي حصل له لأن ذلك المقبول كان يكون صورته و صورته ليس هو الذي هو قابل لماهيته و لو كان هناك شيء يقابل حده و لا المركبات بالصورة وحدها هي ما هي فإن الحد من المركبات ليس هو من الصورة وحدها بل حد الشيء يدل على جميع ما يتقوم به ذاته فيكون هو أيضا يتضمن المادة بوجه.

و بهذا يعرف الفرق بين الماهية في المركبات الصور [بين الماهية و الصورة في المركبات] - و الصورة دائما جزء من الماهية في المركبات و كل بسيط فإن صورته أيضا ذاته لأنه لا تركيب فيها و أما المركبات فلا صورتها ذاتها و لا ماهيتها ذاتها و أما الصورة فظاهر أنها جزء منها - و أما الماهية فهي ما به هي ما هي و إنما هي ما هي بكون الصورة مقارنة للمادة - و هو أزيد من معنى الصورة و المركب ليس هذا المعنى أيضا بل هو مجموع الصورة و المادة فإن هذا هو ما هو المركب و الماهية هي نفس هذا التركيب فالصورة أحد ما يضاف إليه هذا التركيب و الماهية هي نفس هذا التركيب الجامع للمادة و الصورة - و قال في موضع آخر منها الأشياء التي يكون فيها اتحاد على أصناف.

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أحدها أن يكون كاتحاد المادة و الصورة فيكون المادة شيئا لا وجود له بانفراد ذاته بوجه و إنما يصير بالفعل بالصورة على أن يكون الصورة أمرا خارجا عنه - ليس أحدهما الآخر و يكون المجموع ليس و لا واحدا منهما. و الثاني اتحاد أشياء يكون كل واحد منها في نفسه مستغنيا من الآخر في القوام إلا أنها تتحد فيحصل منها شيء واحد إما بالتركيب و إما بالاستحالة و الامتزاج.

و منها اتحاد أشياء بعضها لا يقوم بالفعل إلا بما انضم إليه و بعضها يقوم بالفعل - فيقوم الذي لا يقوم بالفعل بالذي يقوم بالفعل و يجتمع من ذلك جملة متحدة مثل اتحاد الجسم و البياض و هذه الأقسام كلها لا يكون المتحدات منها بعضها بعضا و لا جملتها أجزاءها و لا يحمل البتة شيء منها على الآخر حمل التواطؤ.

و منها اتحاد شيء بشيء قوة هذا الشيء منهما أن يكون ذلك الشيء لا أن ينضم إليه فإن الذهن قد يعقل معنى يجوز أن يكون ذلك المعنى بعينه أشياء كثيرة إلى آخر ما ذكره في كيفية اتحاد الجنس بفصله.

أقول كلما وجد من عبارات القوم حكموا فيه بالمغايرة بين المادة و الصورة - و بمغايرة الماهية للصورة في المركب يمكن توجيه ذلك الكلام بوجه لا ينافي الاتحاد.

أما في الأول فبان يقال الحكم بالمغايرة بينهما بحسب اعتبار كون المادة مادة و الصورة صورة لا بحسب اعتبار كونهما جنسا و فصلا.

و أما في الثاني فبان المراد من الصورة حيث حكم بأنها غير الماهية هي الصورة - بحسب وجودها الكوني الخارجي و قد علمت أن كل صورة طبيعية في الخارج هي مركبة من القوة و الفعل و الكون و الفساد حيث حكم بأنها عين الماهية أريد بها الصورة بحسب وجودها الاستقلالي العقلي

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فصل (١٠) في تتمة القول في الاتحاد بين المادة و الصورة جرحا و تعديلا

قال العلامة الدواني و أنت تعلم أن البرهان قد دل على أن مدرك الكليات - لا يكون إلا مجردا فإذا كانت النفس متحدة مع البدن في الوجود و إنما تصير مجردا بالموت كما تخيله لم ينطبع فيه الصورة الكلية فيلزم أن لا يكون مدرك الكليات إلا بعد الموت.

و أيضا كيف يتصور استحالة المادي إلى المجرد فإذا كانت النفس من مراتب استحالات البدن لا يكون الآثار المترتبة على التجرد حاصلا بالفعل ما لم يتحقق الاستحالة كما أن آثار النطفة لا توجد في الغذاء و آثار العلقة لا توجد في النطفة و آثار البدن لا توجد في العلقة انتهى.

أقول ما دل برهان على أن أفراد البشر في آن تكونهم مدركين للكليات بما هي كليات بحسب وجودها العقلي المشترك بين الكثرة من غير شائبة مقدار و وضع و تحيز بل كما أن الماهية الموجودة في الخارج كلية بالقوة جزئية بالفعل - من شأنها أن تجرد عن المواد و تنتزع عنها الغواشي بتعمل و تجريد و نزع كذلك القوة الإنسانية المدركة لها عاقلة بالقوة إذ من شأنها أن تنتزع عن نفسها المادة و غواشيها - فتصير عند ذلك عاقلة أي مدركة للكليات بالفعل كيف و قد أقمنا البرهان على أن العاقل متحد بالمعقول فالمدرك ما لم يصير وجودها وجود الكلي بالفعل يمتنع أن يدرك كليا بالفعل. و بالجملة مرتبة المدرك و المدرك في كل إدراك مرتبة واحدة فما أسخف قول من زعم أن الهوية الجسمانية القريبة النشأة من نشأة الجماد و النبات كالجنين تكون صورته التي بها هو ما هو عاقلة لذاته و لذات الكليات المجردة بالفعل و قوله فيلزم أن لا تكون مدركة للكليات إلا بعد الموت

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أقول الموت إن كان عبارة عن انصراف النفس عن عالم الطبيعة فلا بد منه في كل تعقل و إدراك لمعقول لكن التعقل التام للمعقولات يلزمه الانصراف التام و التعقل الناقص يلزمه الانصراف الناقص و ربما يكون النفس مجردة بجهة مادية بجهة أخرى و وحدة النفس ليست كوحدة النقطة و أشباهها حتى لا يتحد بأشياء كثيرة - بل لها وحدة جامعة لمقامات شتى و إن كان الموت عبارة عن فساد البدن عن قابلية تعلق النفس فليس ذلك شرطا في صيرورة النفس عقلا بالفعل و لا كونها عقلا بالفعل مما ينافي أن يدبر الجسم الطبيعي ببعض قواها التي هي بمنزلة شعاع من نور العقل شبه ما كانت النفس أولا قبل الاستكمال سيما البدن الذي ضعفت قوته و وهنت مادته إذ يكفيه لمعة من نور العقل الفعال ألا ترى أن النفس في حالة النوم مجردة عن البدن و لكن تدبر البدن ببعض قواها و أما إنكارها لاستحالة المادي إلى المجرد فمبناه على نفي الاشتداد للجوهر و قد أثبتناه فيما سبق بيانه.

و أما قوله لو توقف إدراك الكليات على استحالة النفس إلى درجة العقل لم يترتب على النفس قبل ذلك.

فالجواب ما أشرنا إليه من أن المترتب عليها أولاً قوة ذلك الإدراك واستعداده وهذه القوة أعني قوة وجود العقل بمنزلة فصل النفس كما أن قوة وجود الجسم بمنزلة فصل الهيولى إذ النفس أولاً عقل هيولاني ثم يصير عقلاً بالفعل بعد استحالات كثيرة لها في التجوهر النفساني.

ثم قال لا نسلم أن التركيب الحقيقي بين المجرد والمادي غير معقول إذا كان ذلك المجرد متعلقاً به تعلق التدبير و التصرف كما بين النفس والبدن و كون كل منهما تحت جنس آخر لا يقدر فيه. و ليت شعري إذا لم يكن الاختلاف في الحقيقة مانعاً من الاتصال الحقيقي في أجزاء الياقوت بل من الاتحاد في الوجود كما في المادة والصورة فلما ذا يمنع من التركيب الحقيقي.

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و الأستاذ أي السيد الشريف جوز التركيب الحقيقي بين الجوهر والعرض كالسرير فلما ذا لا يجوز بين جوهر و جوهر و عدم التركيب بين العقل الفعال و بين الأجسام لأنه ليس متعلقاً بها تعلق التدبير و التصرف و لو كان كذلك لكان نفساً لا عقلاً - على أنه لو جاز اتحاد النفس مع البدن فلما لا يجوز بين العقل والجسم فما هو جوابكم فهو جوابه انتهى. أقول قد اعترف هذا التحرير بأنه لا بد في المركب الطبيعي أن يكون له وحدة حقيقة و مجرد تحقق الإضافة بينهما لا يجعلهما ذاتاً واحدة و إلا لكان كل اثنين في هذا العالم واحداً إذ ما من جسمين أو عرضين في هذا العالم إلا و بينهما إضافة وضعية - لا أقل و نسبة التدبير و التصرف نسبة ضعيفة لا يحصل بمجرد وحدة حقيقة بين المتضامين و نسبة الإيجاد و التأثير أكد و أقوى من نسبة التصرف و التحريك و مع ذلك لم يحصل بين العقل الفعال و الجسم وحدة حقيقية فقد علم أن ملاك الأمر في حصول الوحدة الحقيقية لنوع من الأنواع هو أن يكون النسبة بين جزئيه المادي و الصوري بالاتحاد دون غيرها من النسب و عدم كون العقل الفعال نفساً للأجسام ليس لأن ارتباطه بها أضعف من نسبة التحريك و التدبير بل لأن وجوده أرفع و أقدس من أن يتصل به الأجسام بما هي أجسام بخلاف النفس فإنها بما هي نفس متصلة بالبدن.

و العجب أن نسبة الحلول كما بين النوع و العارض له لا يوجب عنده حصول الوحدة الحقيقية بينهما و نسبة التحريك و التدبير يوجب ذلك مع أن تلك النسبة أقوى و أشد فإن قلت إذا لم يكن نسبة التدبير و التصرف كافية في الاتحاد فكيف يحكم بأن النفس متحدة بالبدن و ليس نسبتها إلا نسبة التدبير و التصرف.

قلنا لا نسلم أن لا نسبة بينهما إلا هذه النسبة بل هي من وجه متحدة بالبدن و من وجه متصرفة فيه تصرفاً طبيعياً و من وجه مدبرة فيه تدبيراً اختيارياً كما أن الطبيعة تقوم المادة بوجه و تتحد [بها] بوجه و تفعل بها فعلاً في غيرها بوجه. و قوله كون كل منهما تحت جنس آخر لا يقدر فيه إلى آخره مدفوع لأن الأمور

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المتخالفة بالجنس يستحيل أن يحصل منها أمر واحد حقيقي لأن لكل جنس نحواً آخر من الوجود و كذا الأمور المتخالفة بالنوع إذا كانت متحصلة بالفعل و أما الاختلاف المعنوي بين أجزاء ماهية واحدة كاجناسه و فصوله البعيدة و القريبة فليس ذلك اختلافاً جنسياً و لا نوعياً فإن الفرق بين كل جنس و فصله المقسم له من حيث هما جنس و فصل ليس إلا

بالإبهام والتعيين لا بأن يكون الجنس شيئا والفصل شيئا آخر وكذلك نسبة الجنس إلى نوعه ونسبة جنس الجنس إلى فصله ونسبة فصل نوع النوع إلى جنسه.

و أما الجنس والفصل من حيث اعتبار كونهما مادة و صورة فهما بهذا الاعتبار وإن كانتا متخالفتين نوعا إذ قد اعتبر في كل منهما قيد ينافي بحسبه أن يكون عين صاحبه لكن ليس مناط الاتحاد بينهما هو هذه الجهة بل الجهة الأولى. ثم ما نقل عن أستاذة الشريف من تجويز التركيب الحقيقي بين الجوهر والعرض مبرهن الفساد والتمثيل بالسرير إن وقع من جهة الخشب والهيئة المخصصة - فهو باطل كما سبق وإن كان من جهة المقدار التعليمي والشكل المعين فليس بين الجزئين تخالف في الجنس لأن نسبة أحدهما إلى الآخر بعينها النسبة التي يكون بين الجنس والفصل وقوله على أنه لو جاز اتحاد النفس بالبدن فليجز اتحاد العقل بالجسم علمت جوابه ببيان الفرق بين الارتباطين. ثم قال العلامة الدواني ثم من البين أنه على تقدير اتحاد النفس والبدن - يكون الصور العلمية ذا وضع معين ومقدار معين فلا يكون كلية ولا يجديده اختلاف الحيثية.

أقول اختلاف الحيثية وإن صح أنه غير كاف في هذا الباب لكن يكفي فيه اختلاف أطوار النفس بواسطة تحولاتها الذاتية واختلاف نشأتها كنشأة التعلق ونشأة التجرد وكذا اختلاف القوى والدرجات لنفس واحدة و قل لي لعمر حبيبك أ ليست القوة اللمسية والقوة النظرية كلتاهما من قوى نفس واحدة وأين مقام إحداهما من

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مقام الأخرى للنفس الإنسانية أطوار متفاوتة مع كونها ذاتا واحدة لها وجود واحد - والنفس بحسب بعضها متصلة بالبدن وبحسب بعضها متصلة بالعقل.

ثم قال إن ما ذكره يقتضي أن لا يكون الهيولى أمرا حاصلًا بالفعل بل يقتضي أن لا يكون شيء من الأنواع حاصلًا بالفعل ضرورة أن كل نوع متحد مع العوارض الصادقة عليه ثم إذا كانت الهيولى متحدة مع الصورة في الوجود الخارجي فلا يكون جزءا خارجيا فلا يتحقق الفرق بين المادة والجنس بما ذكره القوم من أن الجنس محمول دون المادة.

أقول التركيب الاتحادي بين الشئيين لا يقتضي أن لا يكون أحدهما موجودا بل يقتضي أن يكون كلاهما موجودا بوجود واحد لا بوجودين متعددين حين التركيب وإن جاز أن يكون لأحدهما أو لكل منهما وجود آخر منحازا عن صاحبه ولا يلزم من كون المادة متحدة بالصورة محمولة عليها أن يكون اتحادها معها من حيث كونها مادة خارجية أو عقلية بل هي بحسب كونها مادة عقلية جزء عقلي للماهية والجزء غير محمول بل إنما اتحادها وصحة حملها من حيثية أخرى وهي أن تؤخذ مطلقا لا بشرط خروج الجزء الآخر منه.

و أما النوع العارض المحمول عليه فليس بينهما اتحاد بالذات عندنا بل بالعرض - وأما كون هذه الأجزاء خارجية فلما أشرنا سابقا من أن لها نحو آخر من الوجود في الخارج وكذا الفرق بين المادة والجنس بأن المادة بما هي مادة أي بوصف القابلية والاستعداد توجد بوجود مباين لوجود الصورة بخلاف المادة بما هي جنس أي مأخوذ مطلقا فإنها محمولة على الصورة كما مر وتحقيق هذا المقام كما وقع التنبيه عليه مرارا أن لكل من المادة والصورة تجردا وتلاحقا بالأخرى على وجه دون وجه ولنمثل في ذلك بالهيولى الأولى والجسمية.

فنقول الهيولى مع كونها من وجه قوة قابلة وسببا معدا لفيضان الصورة - لكن من وجه آخر تكون تابعة للصورة و

الصورة مقتضية لها و مقتضي الشيء كيف

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٠٨

يكون مفتقرا إلى ذلك الشيء فعلم أن الهيولى السابقة غير الهيولى اللاحقة. ثم لما كانت السابقة و إن كانت قوة قابلة للصورة لكنها لا تقوم أيضا بذاتها بل بالصورة فعلم أن الصورة السابقة المقومة للهيولى غير اللاحقة المفتقرة في الحدوث إليها و هكذا القياس في غيرهما من المواد و الصور و بهذا يندفع كثير من الإشكالات.

منها الإشكال المذكور في بيان الفرق بين جامع أجزاء المني و حافظ تركيبه. و منها الإشكال الذي سبق من أن بدن الحيوان و هو مادته لما كان متقوما بنفسه التي هي صورته كيف تكون باقية بعد زوال نفسه و الحل كما علمت من أن هذا غير ذاك بالعدد.

و منها الإشكال في عدم بقاء صور العناصر في مادة المواليد حيث يظهر تلك الصور بالعمل بالقرع و الإنبيق. و الجواب أن المادة الكائنة فيها هذه الصور بهذا العمل غير المصورة بالصورة الجامعة إلى غير ذلك من الإشكالات و سنرجع في بعض الفصول الآتية إلى تحقيق عدم بقاء العناصر في مبحث المزاج.

و اعلم أن هذين التحريرين قد أفرغا جهدهما و بلغا غاية سعيهما في تبين هذا المقام و بسطا الكلام فيه حتى رمى كل منهما إلى صاحبه أي سهم كان في كنان علمه و مع ذلك لم يصل واحد منهما إلى رتبة التنقيح و مشرب التحقيق حيث ارتكب أحدهما نفي وجود الأجزاء المحسوسة و الأعضاء كالعظم و اللحم و غيرهما في الحيوان - و نفي وجود النفس و البدن في الإنسان بل نفي وجود المادة و الصورة في كل نوع جمساني.

و أما الآخر فحيث أهمل بل أبطل الوحدة الحقيقية في هذه الأنواع الطبيعية - و لم يحصل الفرق بين صيرورة الهيولى ماء و بين صيرورة الجسم أبيض لجعله الاتحاد

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٠٩

بين المادة و الصورة بالعرض كما بين الموضوع و العرض كل ذلك لعدم تحصيلهما حقيقة الوجود و الموجود بما هو موجود حيث زعم أحدهما أن موجودية الشيء بنفس هذا المعنى المصدر الذي يتكثر بتكثر الماهيات و المعاني الكلية.

فعلى هذا لا معنى للاتحاد بين الشئيين و أما الآخر فحيث زعم أن موجودية كل شيء هو عبارة عن نحو اتحاده بمفهوم الموجود المشتق أي هذا المفهوم الكلي الذهني و لم يحصل أحد منهما أن الوجود هوية عينية تشتد و تضعف و تكمل و تنقص و تصور المادة بصورة عبارة عن اشتدادها و استكمالها و إذا اشتد الوجود أو كمل يصدق عليه بعض ما لم يصدق عليه قبل ذلك فالاتحاد بين الشئيين لا بد منه من جهة وحدة - و جهة تعدد فالوحدة من جهة الوجود و التعدد من جهة المعنى و الماهية و لا حجر و لا ركافة فيه كما زعمه العلامة الدواني حيث قال لا ريب أن التركيب يقتضي الأجزاء و تغايرها و الاتحاد ينافي ذلك و هذا كما اصطلح بعض الصوفية على التعيين الإطلاقي و الهوية اللاهوتية و حكم بأنه ركيك جدا - لأنه يوهم أمرا غير صحيح.

أقول كل الركاقة في هذه المناقشة في التسمية و المضايقة في الاصطلاح بعد تصحيح المعنى

فصل (١١) في تنمة القول في أحوال العلل من حيث كونها مبادي للمتغيرات و الطبيعيات

قد مر فيما سبق أحوال العلل الأربع و أحكامها على وجه لا يختص بالمعلول المتغير و هاهنا نتكلم فيها على وجه يختص بالمتغير و يقتضي سهولة السلوك من جهتها- إلى معرفة المعلولات الطبيعية فنقول إن لكل جسم سببا عنصريا و سببا فاعليا و سببا صوريا و سببا غائيا أما إثبات أن لكل واقع في التغير هذه الأربعة فأمراً لا يتجشمه نظر الطبيعيين و هو

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أمر موكول تحقيقه إلى العالم الإلهي.

و أما تحقيق ماهيتها تصورا و الاطلاع على أحوالها و وضعها و تسليمها فأمراً لا محيص عنه لباحث الأمور الطبيعية المتغيرة فليعلم أولاً أن الفاعل في الأمور الطبيعية هو مبدأ الحركة في آخر من حيث هو آخر.

و المراد بالحركة هاهنا كل خروج من القوة إلى الفعل في أي مادة كان- و النفس إذا عالجت نفسها فالمعالج يحرك العليل بما هو طبيب لا بما هو عليل و المستعلاج يقبل العلاج بما هو عليل لا بما هو طبيب و هذا أيضاً إنما يتم على مذهبنا في النفس في كونها ذا مقامات مختلفة لأن موضوع القبول و الفعل مما لا يكفي فيه التغير بالاعتبار إذ ليس هذا التغير كتغير العاقل و المعقول مثلاً.

اعلم أن الفاعل بهذا المعنى إما مهيب أو للحركة أو متم لها فالمهيب هو الذي يصلح المادة بالإحالات و الإنضاجات المعدة لقبول الصورة و المتمم هو الذي يفيد الصورة و هي تمام الحركة.

و الحق أن الأول مباشر للمادة ملاصق و الثاني مفارق و لا شبهة في أن مفيد الصور المقومة للأنواع الطبيعية سيما التي للأنواع الشريفة كالفلك و الإنسان مثلاً- يجب أن يكون مبدأ خارجاً عن عالم الطبيعة و ليس على الطبيعي أن يعلم ذلك أنه ما هو و أنه واحد أو كثير بعد أن يضع أن هاهنا أمراً يعطي الصور و كل من المهيب و المعطي مبدأ للحركة و مخرج للمادة من القوة إلى الفعل و كل منهما عند التحقيق صورة أيضاً لكن غير الصورة التي يترتب وجودها على وجود الحركة و القوة.

أما المهيب فصورة جزئية أحسن وجوداً من التي إليها الحركة و أما المعطي فصورة كلية أشرف من الصورة المعطاة و كلاهما بعد المثير أي المشوق فإن من جملة مبادي الحركة هو الذي يقال له المثير أو المشوق فهو المبدأ البعيد للحركة- بتوسط أمر آخر و ذلك لأنه سبب للصورة النفسانية التي هي مبدأ حركة إرادية فهو مبدأ المبدأ.

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بل نقول ذلك المثير المؤتم به ربما يكون مبدأ لصور نفسانية مستحيلة متجددة- كإرادات متتالية يكون تلك الصور النفسانية المتجددة مبدأ قريباً لحركات بدنية حيوانية يقال لها الحركة الإرادية و الحركة الإرادية يشبه أن تكون هي التي في النفوس لا التي في الأبدان و لو سميت هذه تسخيرية و التي في النفوس الإرادية لم يكن بعيداً.

و بالجملة المثير هو مبدأ المبدأ و هذا هو معنى الفاعل في الطبيعيات و هو أخص من فاعل الوجود مطلقاً سواء كان متغيراً أو لا و أما المبدأ القابلي أعني المادة- فنقول المبادي المادية كلها مشتركة في معنى و هو كونها حاملة لأمور

غريبة عن ذاتها و بهذا خرج نسبة الملزومات إلى لوازمها و لها نسبة إلى المركب و نسبة إلى الهيئة الصورية فالأولى كنسبة الجسم إلى الأبيض أعني المركب من الجسم و البياض و الثانية كنسبة الجسم إلى بياضه و نسبتها إلى المركب نسبة الجزئية و وجود الجزء في ذاته أقدم من وجود الكل و هو مقوم للكل.

و أما نسبتها إلى الهيئة فذكر الشيخ أنها لا تعقل إلا على أقسام ثلاثة إما أن لا يكون أحدهما و لا الآخر متقدما أي سببا و لا متأخرا أي مسببا و إما أن يكون مفتقرة في التقوم بالفعل إلى أمر و هو يكون متقدما عليها في الوجود الذاتي كان وجوده ليس متعلقا بالمادة بل بمباد أخرى و لكنه يلزمه إذا وجد أن يقوم مادته و يحصلها بالفعل - كما أن كثيرا من الأشياء تكون متقومة بشيء و مقومة لشيء آخر لكنه ربما كان ما يقوم لمفارقة لذاته و ربما كان تقويمه بمخالطة من ذاته.

أقول إن الشيخ كاد أن يتكلم في هذا المقام بصريح الحق لو قال إن هذا المبدأ المقوم للمادة يكون تقومه بأسبابه بحسب المفارقة و تقويمه للمادة بحسب المخالطة فلمثل هذا الأمر وجهان وجوديان أحدهما مفارق و الآخر مخالط و هذا الأمر هو الصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣١٢

الجوهرية و قال أيضا و له قسط في تقويم المادة بمقارنة ذاته أو هو كل المقوم القريب و بيان ذلك في الصناعة الأولى. أقول ذلك البيان قد مضى في هذا الكتاب في مباحث التلازم بين الهيولى و الصورة و لا يتم ذلك إلا بأن يذعن أن للصورة الجوهرية وجودا ماديا و وجودا عقليا بأحدهما تقوم المادة تقويما بعيدا بالمشاركة و بالآخر تقومها تقويما قريبا بالاستقلال.

أما القسم الثالث فهو أن يكون المادة أقدم وجودا من ذلك الأمر لأنها متقومة في ذاتها حاصلة بالفعل ثم تقوم به ذلك الأمر و هو المسمى بالعرض و الهيئة بالمعنى المقابل للصورة.

فالقسم الأول أوجب إضافة المعية و القسمان الآخران إضافة تقدم و تأخر قال الشيخ و القسم الأول ليس بظاهر الوجود و كأنه إن كان له مثال فهو النفس و المادة الأولى - إذا اجتمعا في تقويم الإنسان.

أقول الحق في هذا المقام تثنية القسمة و الاكتفاء بالقسمين الأخيرين فإن الكلام في المبادي الذاتية للأمر الطبيعية و لا يمكن التركيب الطبيعي بين أمور لا تعلق لأحدهما بالآخر و أما الذي مثل به من النسبة بين الهيولى الأولى و النفس و إن كانت الهيولى مادة للنفس و إن كانت بوسط و النفس صورة مدبرة لها أو صورة لصورتها فهي متقومة بالنفس و للنفس مرتبة التقويم و التحصيل لها فيكون متقدما عليها في الوجود و وحدة الهيولى وحدة ضعيفة لا تنافي بين تأخراتها من أشياء و تقدماتها على أشياء و إن لم يؤخذ الهيولى بالقياس إليها و لا النفس بما هي نفس متعلقة بها أو بالمركب منها و من هيئة أخرى فلا المادة مادة و لا النفس نفس كل منهما غير مضافة إلى أخرى إضافة تعلقية.

ثم قال و للمادة مع المتكون عنها الذي هي جزؤه من وجود أنواع أخرى اعتبار المناسبة و يصلح أن ينتقل هذه المناسبة إلى الصور مع المتكون فإن المادة قد تكفي وحدها في أن يكون هي الجزء المادي لما هو ذو مادة في صنف من الأشياء و قد لا يكفي ما لم ينضم إليها مادة أخرى و ذلك في صنف آخر منها كالعقاقير للمعجون و الكيموسات للبدن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣١٣

و ذلك إما بحسب الاجتماع فقط كاشخاص الناس للعسكرية و المنازل للمدينة و إما بحسب الاجتماع و التركيب معا فقط كاللبن و الخشب للبيت و إما بحسب الاجتماع و التركيب و الاستحالة كالأسطوانات للكائنات فإنها لا تكفي نفس اجتماعها و لا نفس تركيبها بالتماس و التلاقي و قبول الشكل لأن يكون منها الكائنات بل بأن يفعل بعضها من بعض و يفعل بعضها عن بعض و يستقر للجملة كيفية متشابهة يسمى مزاجا فحينئذ يستعد للصورة النوعية انتهى.

أقول المادة لصورة واحدة آية صورة كانت لا تكون إلا واحدة و في جميع هذه الأمثلة التي ذكرها ليس و لا يكون لصورة واحدة إلا مادة واحدة أما المجتمعات التي لا استحالة فيها لأجزائها فالمادة فيها بالجملة هو مقدار المجموع مع قابلية ضرب من الوحدة الاتصالية لها كاللبنات و الأخشاب لصورة البيت و شكله و أما المجتمعات التي وقعت فيها استحالة لأجزائها فهي بعد الاستحالة تصير مستعدة للصورة - و هي حينئذ بما هي مادة لشيء واحد واحدة و أما اعتبار اجتماعها قبل الاستحالة بل قبل التماس فهي بذلك الاعتبار أيضا مما يتصور له صورة واحدة لمادة واحدة أما الصورة فهيئة اجتماعها في الوجود و لو مع التباعد و أما مادتها فنفس ذواتها بلا اعتبار تلك الهيئة و في بعض الأنواع لفرط نقص صورتها لا فضيلة للصورة على المادة مثل العدد فإن كل مرتبة من العدد صورتها الوحدانية و هي كمية الوحدات عين مادتها المتكثرة و هي الوحدات.

قال الشيخ فإذا قسمنا المادة إلى ما يحدث عنها فقد يكون المادة مادة لقبول الكون و قد يكون لقبول الاستحالة و قد يكون لقبول الاجتماع و التركيب و قد يكون لقبول التركيب و الاستحالة و أما الصورة فقد يقال للهيئة التي إذا حصلت في المادة - قومتها نوعا و يقال صورة لنفس النوع و يقال صورة للشكل و التخطيط خاصة و يقال صورة لهيئة الاجتماع كصورة العسكر و صورة المقدمات المقترنة و يقال صورة للنظام المستحفظ كالشريعة و يقال صورة لكل هيئة كيف كانت و يقال صورة لحقيقة كل شيء جوهرًا كان أو عرضًا و تفارق النوع فإن هذا قد يقال للجنس الأعلى.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣١٤

و ربما قيل صورة للمعقولات المفارقة للمادة و الصورة المأخوذة إحدى المبادي - هي بالقياس إلى المركب منها و من المادة أنها جزء له توجهه بالفعل في مثله و المادة جزء لا يوجهه بالفعل و أما تقويم الصورة للمادة فعلى نوع آخر و العلة الصورية قد تكون بالقياس إلى الصنف و هي الصورة التي تقوم المادة التي قد قامت دونها نوعا و هي طار عليها كصورة الشكل للسريـر و البياض بالقياس إلى جسم أبيض.

أقول جميع ما جعل المادة مقيسة إليه بنسبة المقبول كالاجتماع و التركيب و غيرهما فهي في الحقيقة صور محصلة للمادة ضربا من التحصيل و مقومة لماهية نوعية مركبة من تلك المادة و وصف الاجتماع مثلا أو وصف التركيب أو وصف الاستحالة فالنوع الحاصل منهما هو ماهية المجتمع مثلا أو ماهية المستحيل و إن لم يكن النوع نوعا جوهريا و لا الصورة صورة جوهرية و كذا جميع ما عدده أنه مما أطلق عليه لفظ الصورة فهي مشتركة في معنى الصورة التي عدت من المبادي للوجود أو للقوام سواء كانت جواهر أو أعراضا و سواء كانت بالقياس إلى النوع أو الصنف.

إذ كل منهما يحصل بمادة ما من المواد نحوا من التحصيل و يقوم للمركب المأخوذ منهما ضربا من التقويم لكن الأشياء مختلفة في أنحاء الوجود و التحصل - قوة و ضعفا و الوحدة كما علمت عين الوجود فما قوي وجوده كانت وحدته

قوية بعيدة عن الكثرة بل عن قوة الكثرة أيضا و ما ضعف وجوده ضعف وحدته حتى تصير وحدة مجامعة للكثرة أو لقوة الكثرة بوجه آخر.

و ربما كانت جهة الوحدة في شيء هي بعينها جهة الكثرة فيه كالعدد نفسه مثلا و كالهولي و الحركة و الزمان فالصورة في أمثال هذه الأنواع تكون مغمورة في المادة حتى كأنها عين المادة وجودا و اعتبارا لفرط خسة الوجود و في مقابلتها أنواع قوية الوحدة و الوجود حتى لا يتصور فيها تركيب من قوة و فعلية أو نقص و تمام فهي صورة لا مادة لها و كان المادة اضمحلت و استهلكت هناك لفرط الفعلية و

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التمام فالمادة هناك كأنها عين الصورة.

و أما الغاية فهي المعنى الذي لأجله تحصل الصورة في المادة و هو الخير الحقيقي مطلقا أو بالإضافة أو الخير المظنون فإن كل تحريك يصدر عن فاعل لا بالعرض بل بالذات فإنه يروم به ما هو خير بالقياس إليه فربما كان بالحقيقة سواء كان على الإطلاق أو من بعض الوجوه و ربما كان بالظن لا بالحقيقة و الواقع

فصل (١٢) في تعيين المناسبات بين هذه المبادي

لما علمت أن لماهية واحدة قد تكون أنحاء من الوجود و أنحاء من النسب و الإضافات - فاعلم أن الغاية بحسب نحو من الوجود متقدم على الفعل بل على الفاعل - بما هو فاعل و بحسب نحو آخر من الوجود متأخر عن الفعل مترتب عليه فالغاية غاية بوجه فاعل بوجه و الصورة أيضا فاعل بوجه لتحصيل المادة و علة صورية بوجه لتحصيل النوع و قد يكون غاية بوجه لانتفاء الحركة عن مادة إليها و ربما كانت مادة لصورة أخرى من جهة قوتها و إمكانها فقد جمع في شيء واحد أقسام العلل بأسرها من غير استيجاب تركيب في الموضوع إلا من جهة اجتماع المادة و الصورة فإن جهة القوة غير جهة الفعلية البتة و إن كانت بالقياس إلى أمرين متعددين.

قال الشيخ الفاعل من جهة سبب الغاية و كيف لا و هو الذي يحصل الغاية موجودة و الغاية من جهة سبب الفاعل و كيف لا و إنما يفعل الفاعل لأجلها و إلا لما كان يفعل فالغاية تحرك الفاعل إلى أن يكون فاعلا و لهذا إذا سئل لم تراض فتقول لأصح فيكون هذا جوابا كما إذا قيل لم صححت فتقول لأنني ارتضت و يكون جوابا - فالرياضة سبب فاعلي للصحة و الصحة سبب غائي للرياضة ثم إذا سئل لم تطلب الصحة - فقيل لأرتاض لم يكن جوابا صحيحا.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣١٦

ثم إن قيل لم تطلب الرياضة فقيل لكي أصح كان الجواب صحيحا و الفاعل ليس علة لصيرورة الغاية غاية و لا لماهية الغاية في نفسها و لكن علة لوجود ماهيتها في الأعيان و فرق بين الماهية و الوجود انتهى كلامه.

أقول الفرق بين الماهية و الوجود ليس مما يصحح كون الماهية سببا لشيء - من غير مدخلية ضرب من الوجود معها كيف و الشيء ما لم يوجد لم يكن سببا لوجود شيء بل المؤثر في الأشياء ليس إلا الوجود فما هي الغاية لا يجعل الفاعل فاعلا بل وجودها السابق كما أن الأكل مثلا لغاية هي الشبع مثلا فلا بد أن يكون للشبع وجود لفاعل الأكل قبل الأكل حتى يأكل لأجله فأحد وجودي الشبع يحرك محرك المادة لحصول وجوده الآخر لكونه أكمل و أتم من ذلك

الوجود.

فالغاية بحسب أحد الوجودين جزء صوري للفاعل بما هو فاعل فهي سبب لكون الفاعل فاعلا وليس الفاعل علة للغاية في كونها غاية بل لتحصيل وجودها لنفسه سواء كان وجودها في نفسها هو بعينه وجودها المحصل للفاعل كما في الغايات - التي تحت الكون لفعل الحركات والاستحالات أو يكون وجودها في نفسها غير وجودها الحاصل من الفعل المرتبط بالفاعل كما في الغاية التي هي فوق الكون - كالعقل الفعال في كونه غاية لاستكمال النفس فإن وجوده في نفسه غير وجوده للنفس المترتب على استكمالها.

و علم أن لكل من هذه العلل الأربع مبدءين بالقياس إلى شيئين أو بالقياس إلى شيء واحد بوجهين أما المادة والصورة فلكل واحدة منهما عليه لشيئين لأنهما علة لصاحبهما بوجه و علة للمركب منهما بوجه فكان كل منهما علة قريبة لشيء و علة بعيدة لشيء فهما كأنهما علتان غير قريبتين للمركب بنحو من العلية وقريبتان بنحو آخر من العلية وهي التقويم و كذا الفاعل فإن الفاعل إما أن يكون مهبطا للمادة فيكون سببا لإيجاد المادة القريبة من المعلول لا سببا قريبا منه أو يكون معطيا للصورة فيكون سببا لإيجاد الصورة القريبة من المعلول لا سببا قريبا منه و الفاعل أيضا سبب بعيد للغاية بوجه لأنه سبب للصورة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣١٧

و الصورة مستلزمة للغاية و الغاية سبب فاعلي للفاعل في أنه فاعل فيكون سببا فاعليا بعيدا للصورة و بتوسطها للمركب لكن الغاية سبب غائي قريب لوجود الصورة في المادة - بتوسط تحريكها للفاعل للمركب. فالمبادي القريبة من الشيء المركب من جهة مطلق المبدئية هي الهيولى و الصورة بما هما جزءا و إن اختلف تقويم كل منهما للمركب و بهذا الاعتبار يقال لهما العلة المادية لا المادة و العلة الصورية لا الصورة لكنه ربما عرض أن كانت المادة و الصورة علة بالواسطة أيضا أما المادة فكما في المركبات الصنعية التي كانت الصورة فيها هيئة عرضية فيحتاج إلى المحل فيكون المادة علة لذات ذلك العرض المقوم لذلك الصنف من حيث هو صنف فيكون علة ما للعلة و مع ذلك فإنها من حيث كونها جزءا من المركب - علة بلا واسطة.

و أما الصورة فكما في المركبات الطبيعية التي كانت الصورة فيها مقومة للمادة - و المادة علة قريبة للمركب فالصورة علة بالواسطة لكنها علة صورية بلا واسطة فكل من المادة و الصورة علة للمركب بوجه و علة له بوجه فكل منهما علة للآخرى بوجه واحد قريب لكن ذلك الوجه مختلف فيه من الجانبين و علة للمركب بوجهين مختلفين في القرب و البعد و في نحو التقويم فالمادة إذا كانت علة علة المركب فليس من حيث كونها علة مادية له بل من حيث كونه مادة لصورته و الصورة إذا كانت علة علة المركب - فليس من حيث كونها علة صورية له بل من حيث كونها صورة لمادته. و ليعلم أن هذه الأحكام كلها إنما يجري في المركب من جهة اعتبار تركيبه - و من جهة اعتبار المغايرة بين المادة و الصورة لكن بحسب اعتبار وحدتهما نحو من الوجود فلا تكن من الخاطئين

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣١٨

فصل (١٣) في كيفية دخول العلل في المباحث و الأفكار و طلب اللمية و الجواب عنها

اعلم أن بعض الأشياء مما لا علة له أصلاً بل هو علة العلل كواجب الوجود وبعضها مما له بعض العلل دون بعض كالفاعل والغاية دون المادة والصورة كضرب من المفارقات والأشياء الصورية لأنها عين الصورة التامة فلا صورة لها ولا مادة وبعضها مما له جميع هذا العلل كالمركبات والأنواع الطبيعية وجميع المتحركات والمستحيلات التي يبحث عنها في العلوم الطبيعية - فالعالم الطبيعي يجب عليه أن يكون معنياً بالإحاطة بجميع هذه العلل ليدخلها في براهينه وخصوصاً بالصورة والمادة حتى يتم إحاطته بالمعلول وأما التعليمي فليس عليه أن يعلم المادة إذ لا مدخل للمادة والحركة في مطالبه فليس عليه أن يعلم مبدأ حركة ولا غاية حركة ولا المادة أيضاً البتة بل الذي يجب عليه أن يتأمل فيها من العلل هي العلل الصورية فقط.

ولا يخفى عليك أن سؤال السائل قد يتضمن شيئاً من العلل فيجب الجواب بغيره لا به وإلا لكان الشيء سبباً لنفسه فإن تضمن الفاعل كقولك لم قتل زيد عمرو فيجوز أن يجاب بالغاية فيقال لكي ينتقم منه ويجوز أن يجاب بالمشير أو بالداعي وهو الفاعل المتقدم فيقال لإشارة فلان أو لأنه غضب حقه وهذا هو الفاعل لصورة الاختيار الذي ينبعث منه الفعل وأما أنه هل يجاب بالصورة أو بالمادة فظاهر أنه غير صحيح.

أما الصورة فلما أشرنا إليه فإن صورة الفعل هاهنا هو القتال نفسه وليس السؤال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣١٩

إلا عن علة وجودها عن الفاعل والشيء لا يكون علة لنفسه اللهم إلا أن يكون تلك الصورة غاية الغايات كالخير مثلاً فيكون الصورة حينئذ لذاتها لا بسبب آخر هي محركة للفاعل ومع ذلك فلا يكون علة قريبة لوجودها في تلك المادة عن الفاعل بل علة لوجود الفاعل فاعلاً فلا يكون من حيث هي موجودة في المادة علة للفاعل بل من حيث ماهيتها ومعناها وأما المادة فظاهر أنه لا يكفي الجواب بها حينئذ هذا إذا ذكر في السؤال خصوص الفاعل وأما إذا تضمن السؤال الغاية كما يقال لم صح فلان فيجوز الجواب بالمبدأ الفاعلي فيقال لأنه شرب الدواء ويصلح أن يجاب بالمبدأ المادي مضافاً إلى الفاعل فيقال لأن مزاج بدنه قوى الطبيعة ولا يكفي ذكر المادة وحدها.

وأما الصورة فقلما يقنع ويقطع السؤال بذكرها وحدها بأن يقال جواباً عن السؤال المذكور لأن مزاج بدنه اعتدل بل يحوج إلى جواب آخر يؤدي إلى مادة أو فاعل وأما إذا كان السؤال عن المادة واستعدادها بأن يقال لم بدن الإنسان يقبل الموت فقد يصح أن يجاب بالعلة الغائية فيقال ليخلص نفسه عند الاستكمال عن البدن.

وقد يجوز أن يجاب بالعلة المادية ويقال لأنه مركب من الأضداد ولا يجوز أن يجاب بالفاعل في الاستعداد الذي ليس كالصورة لأن الفاعل لا يجب أن يعطي المادة أي استعداد كان إلا أن يعني بالاستعداد التام فيعطيه الفاعل كما يقال في المرأة - إذا سئل إنها لم تقبل الشبح فيجاب لأن الصقلي صقلها وأما الاستعداد الأصلي فلازم للمادة فيجوز أن يجاب بالصورة إذا كانت هي المتممة للاستعداد فيقال في المرأة لأنها ملساء صقيلة.

وبالجملة السؤال لا يتوجه إلى المادة إلا وقد أخذت مع صورة ما فيسأل عن علة وجود الصورة في المادة وأما إذا تضمن السؤال الصورة فالمادة وحدها لا يكفي أن يجاب بها بل يجب أن يضاف إليها استعداد ينسب إلى الفاعل والغاية يجاب بها والفاعل يجاب به.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٥، ص ٣٢٠

و إذا شئت أن ترفض ما يقال على سبيل المجاز و تذكر الأمر الحقيقي فإن الجواب الحقيقي أن يذكر جميع العلل التي لم يتضمنها المسألة فإذا ذكرت و حتمت بالغاية الحقيقية وقف السؤال و الله ولي التوفيق.

و لنختم هذا الفن بذكر المزاج و تحقيق القول فيه لكونه مناسباً لما مر من إثبات التركيب الاتحادي بين المادة و الصورة لتوقف بيان ذلك عليه كما علمت و قد وعدناك تحقيقه

فصل (١٤) في تحقيق ماهية المزاج و إنيته

العادة جرت بذكر هذه المسألة في فن الطبيعيات لكننا أوردناها هاهنا للعلة المذكورة و لعلة أخرى و هي أن البحث عن ماهية شيء و نحو وجوده مناسب لأن يذكر في العلوم الإلهية.

فنقول إن المزاج كيفية ملموسة من جنس أوائل الملموسات متوسطة بين الأربع الأول توسطاً ما متشابهة الأجزاء حتى إنها تكون بالقياس إلى الحرارة الشديدة برودة - و بالقياس إلى البرودة الشديدة حرارة و بالقياس إلى اليبوسة رطوبة و بالقياس إلى الرطوبة يبوسة و إنها في الجسم ذي المزاج بحيث يكون ما وجد منها في كل جزء من أجزائه - مثل ما وجد منها في جزئه الآخر لا تفاوت بينها إلا في الموضوع ذاتاً و وصفاً كما هو عند الجمهور أو وصفاً فقط كما هو عندنا.

و أما سبب إنيتها فاعلا و قابلاً فالمشهور أن العناصر إذا تصغرت و امتزجت و تماسست و فعل كل منهما في الآخر انكسرت سورة كفياتها فحصلت للجميع كيفية متوسطة متشابهة هي المزاج مع انحفاظ صور العناصر المتخالفة بحالها قالوا هذا التفاعل لا يحصل إلا عند مماسة بعضها لبعض و إلا فإما أن لا يعتبر بينها حصول نسبة وضعية أصلاً سواء كانت مماساً أو غيره أو يعتبر نسبة أخرى كالمحاذاة و ضرب من القرب

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج٥، ص ٣٢١

و البعد لا سبيل إلى الأول لما تبين في موضعه أن كل تأثير و تأثر جسماني فهو متوقف على نسبة وضعية مخصوصة بين المؤثر و المتأثر فبقي الثاني.

فنقول حينئذ إذا لم يكن النسبة بينهما بالملاقاة فلا بد أن يكونا على ضرب من المحاذاة و البعد فحينئذ إن كان بين المسخن و المتسخن مثلاً جسم فلا يخلو إما أن يتسخن المتوسط قبل أن يتسخن المنفعل المفروض أو لم يتسخن و الثاني باطل لأن أثر التسخين لا يصل إلى الأبعد إلا بعد وصوله إلى الأقرب ضرورة و الأول يوجب المطلوب - لأن المتوسط لو لم يكن ملاقياً للمسخن كان بينهما متوسط آخر و نقل الكلام إلى متوسط آخر حتى ينتهي إلى المتوسط الملاقي و إن كان ملاقياً فالتسخين لا يحصل أولاً من المسخن إلا للجسم الملاقي ثم إلى ملاقي الملاقي بتوسط الملاقي.

فظهر أن كل تأثير و تأثر طبيعي لا يكون إلا بالتماس و التلاقي.

هذا تقرير ما ذكره الشيخ في طبيعيات الشفاء و اعترض عليه الإمام الرازي - بأن هذا يناقض ما ذكره في الفصل السابع من المقالة الثالثة من علم النفس منها حيث قال في جواب من أنكر تأدي أشباح المبصرات في الهواء من غير أن يتكيف الهواء - بأنه ليس بينا بنفسه و لا ظاهراً أن كل جسم فاعل يجب أن يكون ملاقياً للملموس - فإن هذا و إن كان موجوداً

استقراء في أكثر الأجسام فليس واجبا ضرورة بل يجوز أن يكون أفعال أشياء في أشياء من غير ملاقاته فيكون أجسام تفعل بالملاقاة وأجسام تفعل لا بالملاقاة.

و ليس يمكن أن يقيم أحد برهانا على استحالة هذا ولا أنه يجب أن يكون بين الجسمين نسبة و وضع خاص بل يجوز أن يؤثر أحدهما في الآخر من غير ملاقاته إنما يبقى ضرب من التعجب كما أنه لو كان اتفق أن كانت الأجسام كلها يفعل بعضها في بعض بمثل تلك النسبة المباشرة و كان إذا اتفق أن شوهد فاعل يفعل بالملاقاة تعجب منه كما تعجب الآن من مؤثر بغير ملاقاته فإذا كان هذا غير مستحيل في أول العقل و كان صحة مذهبنا المبرهن عليه يوجب و كان لا برهان البتة ينقضه.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٢٢

فنتقول من شأن الجسم المضيء بذاته أو المستنير الملون أن يفعل في الجسم الذي يقابله إذا كان قابلا للشبح قبول البصر و بينهما جسم لا لون له تأثيرا هو صورة مثل صورته من غير أن يفعل في المتوسط شيئا إذ هو غير قابل لأنه شفاف. **هذا** ما ذكره في هذا الموضع و قد ذكر هذا المعنى أيضا في الفصل المشتمل على المقدمات التي يحتاج إليها في معرفة الهالة و قوس قزح و لا يخفى أن ذلك منه مبالغة في بيان أن الفعل و الانفعال بين الأجسام لا يتوقف على الملاقاة و المماسمة مع أنه تصدى في فصل حقيقة المزاج لإقامة البرهان على أن الفعل و الانفعال لا يتمان إلا باللقاء و التماس. **و أنه** ليكثر تعجبي بوقوع أمثال هذه المناقضات الظاهرة لهذا الشيخ قال - و من الإشكالات أن الشمس تسخن الأرض مع أنها لا تسخن الأجسام القريبة فإنها لا تسخن الأفلاك و كذا تضيء الأرض مع أنها لا تضيء الأجسام التي تتوسط بينها و بين الأرض لأنها شفافة فإذا كان كذلك فكيف يجوز للرجل الذكي مع هذه الإشكالات أن يجزم بأن الفعل و الانفعال لا يتمان إلا باللقاء و التماس انتهى كلامه.

أقول هذا الرجل سريع المبادرة إلى الاعتراض على مثل الشيخ و نظرائه قبل الإمعان في المبحث لعجلة طبعه و طيشه و العجلة من فعل الشيطان أما نسبة التناقض في الكلام إلى الشيخ فغير مسلم فإن الذي منع فيه وجوب اللقاء و التماس هو مطلق التأثير و التأثير بين الجسمين و الذي أوجب فيه ذلك تأثير و تأثر مخصوصان - كالتسخين و التسخن و لا تناقض بين وجوب حكم على نوع مخصوص و عدم وجوبه على نوع آخر.

إذ ربما يكون نحو التأثير و التأثر مختلفا فيه في الموضوعين فإن الفعل قد يكون دفعيا و قد يكون تدريجيا و كذا الانفعال فالذي أوجب فيه الملاقاة هو الانفعالات التدريجية التي من باب الحركات و الاستحالات و لا بد فيها من مباشرة الفاعل المحرك للقابل المتحرك و من هذا القبيل فعل العناصر بعضها و في بعض في الأمور

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٢٣

التي هي من متمماتها و كمالاتها كأوائل الكيفيات الملموسة مثل الحرارة و البرودة و الرطوبة و اليبوسة و الذي لم يجب فيه الملاقاة ما ليس كذلك كالفعل الدفعي و القبول الدفعي **و التحقيق** في هذا المقام أن الموجودات بعضها طبيعي و بعضها تعليمي و بعضها عقلي و كذا الأفعال فالفعل الطبيعي لا يصدر إلا من فاعل طبيعي زماني الوجود - و ذلك الفعل هو الذي يجب استحالاته و تجددته في مادة منفصلة مستحيلة و أما الفعل التعليمي فلا مدخل فيه للحركة و الانفعال

التجديدي التدريجي وإن لم يكن مفارقاً عن الحركة والطبيعة بالكلية وإنما المحتاج في ذلك الفعل مجرد الكمية و الوضع اللازم لها دون حركة و استحالة لا من جانب الفاعل و لا من جانب المنفعل.

و أما الفعل العقلي فلا حاجة فيه إلى زمان و آن و لا إلى حركة و حد منها - إنما المحتاج إليه نفس الفاعل و ماهية القابل إن كان هناك قابل مثال الفعل الطبيعي كالتحريكات و الإحالات من التسخين و التبريد و التسويد و التبييض و التغذية و التنمية و التوليد و مثال الفعل التعليمي كالإنارة و الإضاءة و وقوع العكوس و المحاذيات - و حدوث الأشكال كالتربيع و التكعيب و الدائرة و غير ذلك من الأمور التي لا تحدث إلا دفعة مع كمية ما و مقدار ما و مثال الفعل الإلهي كمطلق الإيجاد و الإفاضة و الجود و الإبداع و الرحمة و على هذا القياس أقسام المدركات و العلوم.

ألا ترى أن أفعال مشاعر الإنسان بعضها طبيعي كاللمس و الذوق و بعضها غير طبيعي كالإبصار و التخيل و بعضها غير طبيعي و لا تعليمي كالتوهم و التعقل به إذا تقرر هذا - **فنقول** إن كل فعل طبيعي يصدر عن فاعله القريب فهو لا يكون إلا بالملاقاة - و المباشرة بينه و بين منفعله سواء وقع منه في قابله كسخونة النار التي هي من طبيعتها في مادتها أو فيما هو بمنزلة قابله لأجل الاتصال به أو الامتزاج و السر في ذلك أن الفاعل الطبيعي من حيث هو فاعل طبيعي منغمر في المادة كل الانغمار لأن وجوده

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٢٤

في نفسه هو بعينه وجوده في مادته على نحو الاستغراق و السريان بحيث يكون في كل جزء من المادة جزء منه فكما أن وجود نفس المادة وجود ذات منقسمة فكذا وجود الأمر المادي ما يكون منقسماً حسب انقسام نفس المادة و ذلك كالصور النارية و الأرضية - و سائر الصور الطبيعية بما هي صور طبيعية و كذا كيفياتها و أعراضها التابعة و كمالاتها الثانية.

و ليس من هذا القبيل الصورة الحيوانية بما هي حيوانية فلكية كانت أو عنصرية - و قد مر سابقاً أن فاعلية الشيء يتقوم بوجوده و المفتقر إلى الشيء في وجوده مفتقر إليه أيضاً في إيجاداه فلو سخنت الحرارة الفاشية في جسمية النار مثلاً جسماً آخر من غير أن تلاقيه و تماسه حتى يصيرا كأنهما بالاتصال جسم آخر يلزم أن يكون وجود تلك الحرارة في نفسها غير مفتقرة إلى إلقاء محلها لما علمت من أن الإيجاد فرع الوجود و متقوم به لكن اللازم باطل فالملزوم مثله.

فثبت أن كل ما وجوده وجود أمر فاش مفتقر إلى محل يفشو فيه و يسري إليه بجميع أجزائه فإيجاداه و تأثيره أيضاً كذلك أي يكون إيجاداً و تأثيراً على نعت الفشو و السراية في المحل المتأثر منه و يلزم من هذا أنه لا يجوز أن يكون مثل ذلك المؤثر مباين الذات للمتأثر منه و هذه قاعدة شريفة ينتفع بتحقيقها و أعمالها في كثير من المواضع.

و أنك إذا استقرت و تصفحت وجدت أن مراتب تأثيرات المؤثرات على حسب مراتب وجوداتها و نسبتها إلى المادة و افتقارها و استغنائها في التأثير و الإيجاد على حسب نسبتها إليها في الوجود و الكون.

فإذن قد ظهر صدق ما ذكره الشيخ من أن الجسم المتسخن من النار ما لم يكن ملاقياً لها حتى يكون وجود القوة المسخنة بالنسبة إليه كوجودها في جسمية النار و مادتها لم يتسخن عنهما و كذا الحال في التبريد و الترطيب و التجفيف و غيرها من التأثيرات الطبيعية و أما الأفعال التي هي كالإنارة و الإظلام و وقوع الأشباح و الأظلال

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٢٥

فليست من هذا الباب كما أشرنا إليه فلا تناقض بين كلامي الشيخ.
و أما قوله الشمس تسخن وجه الأرض من غير ملاقة و قولك إنها تجفف الأرض المبتلة كالطين و أيضا تبيض ثوب القصار و تسود وجهه من غير ملاقة- **فنقول** فعل الشمس أولا و بالذات ليس إلا واحدا متشابها هو الإضاءة و الإنارة- و هذا أمر يحدث دفعة في هذه الأجسام القابلة له المنفصلة ثم إذا قبلت النور دفعة و مضى على وجود الضوء في مادة قابلة للضوء و السخونة منفصلة بفعل الضوء فيها فعل السخونة- لأجل مناسبة الحرارة للنور فيتسخن الجسم ثم يفعل السخونة في الجسم الكثيف سوادا **بعد تجفيفه** و في الجسم اللطيف بياضا بعد تصفيته و تصقيه على حسب اختلاف الأحوال القوابل.

و بالجملة الجسم الحار مثلا كالنار لا يؤثر بالسخونة في شيء إلا بالملاقة و التماس و أما أن قابل الحرارة لا يقبل الحرارة من أي فاعل كان إلا بالتماسة و بملاقة فاعل السخونة فهو أمر آخر غير لازم من القضية المذكورة و ليس بمعلوم الاستحالة إذ لا استحالة في أن تأثر جسم من غير مباشرة جسم و أن يتسخن قابل من غير مسخن ملاق له أو من مسخن غير متسخن كالحركة و نحوها كما أن كل متحرك لا يجب أن يكون من محرك متحرك بل قد يتحرك من محرك غير متحرك لا على نحو المباشرة بل على نحو المفارقة كحركات نفوس الأفلاك من محركات عقلية على سبيل التشويق و الإمداد.

فإذا تقرر هذا الكلام فنقول لا امتناع في أن يكون جسم بارد رطب مثلا ثم لا يزال يستحيل في كلتا كيفيته الفاعلة و المنفصلة بسبب أسباب داخلية أو خارجة كإضاءة الكواكب و هبوب الرياح حتى يميل برودته إلى الحرارة و الرطوبة إلى اليبوسة فيحصل له كيفية معتدلة بسيطة متوسطة بين هذه الأربع الأوائل الملموسة فيوجد مزاج من غير امتزاج فيكون هناك صورة واحدة لها كيفية مزاجية من غير حاجة إلى تركيب أجزاء- متصغرة متماسة و من منع عن تجويز وقوعه فعليه البرهان على استحالة ذلك.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٢٦

و نحن لم نجد إلى الآن برهانا يعطي الحاجة إلى تركيب العناصر و تصغرها و تلاقيها في حصول المسمى بالمزاج بل الحجج قائمة على خلاف ما قرروه و الإشكالات ناهضة في هدم ما أصلوه أما الإشكالات فمشهورة أشهرها أن هاهنا أمورا ثلاثة الكاسر و المنكسر و الانكسار أما المنكسر فليس هو الكيفية لما بين أن الكيفية الواحدة لا يعرض لها الاشتداد و التنقص بل إنما يعرضان لموضوعها و أما الكاسر فليس هو الكيفية أيضا و إلا لزم أن يكون المكسور يعود كاسرا بعد صيرورته مكسورا أو يكون حين انكساره كاسرا و حين كسره مكسورا كما فصل بيان بطلانه فبقي أن الكاسر هو الصورة و المنكسر هو المادة و هذا مشكل بوجهين- **أحدهما** أن الماء الحار إذا امتزج بالماء البارد و اختلطا انكسر البارد بالحار- و ليس هاهنا صورة مسخنة هي مبدأ التسخين بذاتها و الثاني أن الصورة و إن كانت فاعلة- ففعلها بتوسط الكيفية كما أن تحريك الطبيعة بتوسط الميل و لأجل ذلك الصورة المائيه يفعل فعل التسخين بواسطة سخونتها فحينئذ يعود الإشكال المذكور في كون الكاسر هو الكيفية من لزوم كون المنكسر كاسرا و كذا الأمر من جهة القابل فإن المادة و إن كان شأنها الانفعال مطلقا لكن لا يستعد بالفعل لقبول الأمر إلا بتوسط كيفية قائمة بها و إلا لكان كل مادة يقبل كل

شيء فيعود الإشكال في كون المنكسر هو الكيفية.

و لك أن تقدح في الوجه الأول بأنه كما أن فاعل الحركة القسرية بالذات - هو طبيعة المقصور لأجل حدوث حالة غريبة يعدها لا القاسر فهأنا أيضا إذا تسخن الماء بالنار قسرا فمفيد تلك السخونة في جسمية الماء ليس هو طبيعة النار لأنها معدة و المعد ليس من الأسباب الذاتية كما سبق بيانه في مباحث العلل بل الصورة المائية هي المعطية للسخونة الموجودة في الماء و لذلك قد يبقى تلك السخونة مع فساد تلك النار التي من جهتها حصلت السخونة لكن الوجه الثاني سالم عن القدح

و أما الحجج

فمنها

أن الحكماء المشاءين ذهبوا إلى أن الجسم النوعي إذا تصغر في الغاية

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٢٧

لم يبق له صورته الخاصة النوعية بل الذي يبقى له حينئذ هو الصورة الامتدادية فقط و لا شك أنه إذا بطلت صورته بطلت كيفيته التابعة لها و اتصلت مادته بمادة ما يجاوره - فيصير المجموع مصورا بصورة واحدة نوعية فظهر من هذا المذهب أن القول بحصول المزاج من جهة تصغر العناصر و تماس بعضها بعضا مع بقاء صورها المتخالفة ليس بصحيح.

و منها

أن كل واحدة من العناصر متداعية إلى الافتراق و الميل إلى الأحياز الطبيعية فالذي يجبرها على الاجتماع و يسخرها للالتيام شيء آخر و ذلك الشيء لا بد أن يكون جوهرًا صوريًا قائما بها متصرفا فيها لأن العرض لا يستولي على الجوهر و الجوهر الجسماني المبائن في الوضع لا يتصرف في مادة الشيء كما مر تحقيقه ليكون حافظا لتركيبها على التشتت و الافتراق سيما في المواد الطبيعية المستعدة للأموال الكمالية من الأنواع المحفوظة دائما فإن مثلها لا يكون اتفاقية و لا قسرية فالمتصرف فيها صورة متنوعة متقدمة عليها تقدما ذاتيا و هي قائمة على المادة بالتقويم و الإدامة و الحفظ فلا شك أنها صورة واحدة و إلا لم يكن لذلك النوع وحدة طبيعية.

و قد بين أن الحقيقة الواحدة لا يتقوم بصورتين و أن الصورة الواحدة لا تكون إلا لمادة واحدة لأن تحصل المادة و تقومها لا يكون إلا بالصورة فهي في وحدتها و كثرتها تابعة للصورة و كما أن المادة الواحدة لا تتقوم بالصورتين إلا واحدة بعد واحدة و كذا الصورة الواحدة لا تقوم لمادتين إلا بتقدم و تأخر و ضرب من الترتيب فإذا ثبت أن كل نوع طبيعي له صورة واحدة و مادة واحدة فبقاء صور العناصر فيما فرض مركبا غير صحيح.

و أيضا إذا ثبت أن قوام هذا المفروض مركبا طبيعيا ليس إلا بصورة واحدة - و كل ما له طبيعة واحدة فكل ما يصدر عنه بما هو ذلك النوع الواحد يجب أن يكون مصدره و مبدؤه تلك الطبيعة و الصورة الواحدة ثم إن أول ما يصدر عن هذه الأنواع العنصرية هي التي من باب الميول و الحركات و هي من جنس أوائل الكيفيات الملموسة - فيجب أن يكون الكيفية المسماة بالمزاج صادرة عن تلك الصورة المنوعة لا عن

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٢٨

صور متخالفة لأن الأفعال المتخالفة بالذات متخالفة بالذات

حجة أخرى من العرشيات قريبة المأخذ مما سبق -

وهي أنه قد ثبت فيما مضى أن المادة إذا استعدت لصورة كمالية و حدثت فيها صورة أخرى بعد الأولى فجميع ما كانت يصدر من الصورة السابقة من الأفاعيل و الانفعالات و اللوازم و الآثار تصدر من هذه الصورة اللاحقة الكمالية مع أمور زائدة تختص باللاحقة لأن نسبتها إليه نسبة التمام إلى النقص.

فنقول إذا حصلت للممتزج من العناصر صورة أخرى كمالية فيجب أن يكون مبدأ صدور الكيفية المزاجية في ذلك النوع هو هذه الصور الكمالية دون العناصر فإذا كانت الكيفية المسماة بالمزاج صادرة عن هذه الصورة غير مستندة إلا إليها كان بقاء صور العناصر في هذه المواليد الكائنة ضائعا معطلا مع أنه لا معطل في الوجود كما هو مبرهن عليه فهي بصرافة صورها غير موجودة في المواليد فضلا عن تقويمها للمركب.

حجة أخرى -

إن أجزاء الكيفية المزاجية المفروضة أنها سارية في جميع أجزاء المحل - لا شك أنها واحدة بالنوع كثيرة بالعدد و الشخص كما هو عندهم حيث صرحوا بأن التي في النار من هذه الكيفية كالتي في الماء فحينئذ نقول علة تكثر أفراد هذا النوع المزاجي إما الماهية أو لازمها أو مادتها أو صورتها أو أمر مبين و الكل مستحيل - فتكثر أفرادها محال أما الأولان فظاهر البطلان لأن ماهية واحدة و كذا لازم الماهية الواحدة واحد مطرد في الجميع و فعل الواحد واحد فلا تعدد لأفراد نوع واحد من جهة الماهية و لازمها.

و أما الثالث فهو باطل أيضا لأن المادة إما المادة الأولى فهي في الجميع

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٢٩

واحدة فمادة العناصر لا تكون من أسباب التكثر و التعدد و إما المادة الثانية أعني العناصر فهي أيضا لا تكون علة تكثر أفراد المزاج الواحد و ذلك لأنها لو كانت هي منشأ تكثر أفراد المزاج فمنشئيتها للتكثر إما من جهة جسميتها أو من جهة اختلافها بالصور و الأول باطل لأن الجسمية مشتركة في الجميع واحدة و الأمر الواحد لا يقتضي الاختلاف و التعدد و الثاني يوجب أن يكون اختلاف أعداد المزاج من قبيل أعداد صور العناصر و اختلاف آثارها و كيفياتها و ليس كذلك لأن هذا بالعدد و ذلك بالنوع.

و أيضا يلزم أن يكون عدد هذه الكيفيات المزاجية تابعة لعدد اختلاف صور العناصر فيكون عددها أربعا لا غير كما أن للعناصر أربع صور لا غير و اللازم باطل عندهم لأن تعدد أفراد المزاج على حسب تعدد الأجزاء المتصغرة المتماسة التي في المركب.

و أما الرابع فتلك الصور التي فرض أنها علة التكثر إن كانت الصور الكمالية فهي واحدة كما علمت و أثر الواحد واحد و إن كانت صور العناصر فلكل منها أثر و فعل - نسبته إلى فاعله الذي هو الصور بالصدور و إلى قابله الذي هو المادة بالقبول و الحلول لا بالصدور فالاختلاف بين أفراد هذه الكيفية المزاجية لما علمت أنه ليس بالماهية و لوازمها فليس أيضا بالصور و إلا لكان اختلافها بالماهية لما ثبت أن الصورة من حيث هي صورة هي مبدأ الماهية و تمامها لأنها بعينها

بمنزلة الفصل الأخير و مبدأ المبادي و الفصل تمام ماهية الشيء فلو كان اختلافها بالصور و الصور متخالفة ذاتا و ماهية كانت متخالفة الماهيات و الذوات و المقدر خلاف هذا.

و أما الخامس فنسبة المباين إلى الجميع واحد فلا بد من مخصص آخر فيعود الشقوق المذكورة في لحوق ذلك المخصص و يتسلسل الكلام فبقي أن لا اختلاف بين أعداد المزاج للطبيعة الواحدة بحسب الهوية بعد اتفاقها في تمام الماهية إلا بمجرد القسمة الفرضية أو الأجزاء الوهمية و بحسب الفك و الكسر كما في أجزاء المتصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٠

الواحد التي لا انقسام فيها إلا بسبب من أسباب القسمة المقدارية لأمر متصل سواء كان اتصاله بالذات أو بالعرض فوجب أن يكون موضوع الكيفية المزاجية متصلا واحدا لأن موضوع المتصل الواحد متصل واحد وإذا كان متصلا واحدا فلا اختلاف فيه بين الصور لما تقرر عندهم و قرروه في إبطال رأي ديمقراطيس من أن الأمور المتخالفة نوعا لا يمكن أن يكون متصلا واحدا فإذاً ليس فاعل الكيفية المزاجية - إلا صورة واحدة لا غير و ذلك ما أردناه.

حجة أخرى -

لو كانت صور العناصر باقية في المواليد البتة يلزم بقاء الأجزاء المائية و الهوائية في المذاب من الحديد و النحاس و الذهب و غيرها من المعادن التي تذوب و تصير في النار ثم ترجع إلى حالها و القول ببقاء الجزء المائي و الهوائي في المذابات حال ذوبانها مما يصادمها الوجدان و القول ببطلانها عند الإذابة و عودها عند الجمود أبعد منه.

حجة أخرى -

لو كانت الأجزاء العنصرية باقية في المواليد يلزم أن يكون الجزء الناري في الياقوت مثلا له صورتان فيكون جسم واحد نارا و ياقوتا معا و هو باطل و قد مر تقرير هذه الحجة و تزييف ما ذكر في الجواب عنه و هذه الحجة مما أوردها الشيخ على نفسه و أجاب عنها بجواب غير مرضي عندنا كما ستعلم

فصل (١٥) فيما ذكره الشيخ في هذا المقام و دفعه

لعلك تكون من المغترين بكلام الشيخ في هذا المقام حيث قال في فصل

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣١

من طبيعيات الشفاء لكن قوما قد اخترعوا في قريب من زماننا مذهبا عجيبا و قالوا - إن البسائط إذا امتزجت و انفعل بعضها عن بعض تأدى ذلك بها إلى أن ينخلع صورها - و تلبس حينئذ صورة واحدة فيصير لها هيولى واحدة و صورة واحدة.

فمنهم من جعل تلك الصورة أمرا متوسطا بين صورها ذات الحمية و يرى أن الممتزج بذلك يستعد لقبول الصورة النوعية للمركبات.

و منهم من جعل تلك الصورة صورة أخرى من صور النوعيات و جعل المزاج عارضا لها لا صورة لها ثم قال ما حاصله أن هذا لو كان حقا لكان المركب إذا تسلط عليه النار لفعلت فعلا متشابها فلم يكن القرع و الإنبيق يميزه إلى شيء قاطر متجز لا يثبت في النار و إلى شيء أرضي لا يقطر و إنا وضعنا قطعة من اللحم في القرع و الإنبيق - يميز إلى جسم مائي

قاطر وإلى كلس أرضي غير قاطر.

فنقول تلك الأجزاء التي كانت في المركب إما أن لا تكون بينها اختلاف في استعداد التقطير و عدمه أو يكون فعلى الأول يجب أن يكون الكل قاطرا أو الكل ممتنعا عن القطر و على الثاني فذلك الاختلاف إما بنفس ماهياتها أو بأمر خارج عنها و الأول يوجب اختلاف الأجزاء بالصور و أما الثاني فذلك الخارج إن كان لازما يرجع إلى أن الاختلاف بالصور و إن لم يكن لازما بل كان عارضا فجاز زواله - فأمكن أن يوجد مركب لم يكن أجزاؤه مختلفة لقبول بعضها لحال و بعضها لحال أخرى و ذلك يقتضي أن يوجد في اللحوم لحم يقطر كله أو يكلس كله و كذلك القول في سائر المركبات فيبطل القول بهذا المذهب.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٢

ثم ذكر حجة أخرى حاصلها أن صور البسائط لو تفسدت و إن كانت فساد كل منها مقارنا لفساد الآخر مع أن فساد كل منها معلول لوجود الآخر لكانت صورتان موجودتين عند كونهما معدومتين و ذلك محال و إن سبق فساد أحدهما فساد الآخر استحال أن يصير الفاسد مفسدا لمفسدة.

أقول أما الحجة الأولى ففي غاية الضعف فلأن لأحد أن يمنع هذا الاختلاف في كل جسم من المواليد و التجربة لا تجري إلا في المركبات التي لها مزاج ثانوي - و أن يختار الشق الأخير من الشقوق التي ذكرها و هو أن الاختلاف بين أجزاء الجسم في التقطير و الرسوب بأمر خارجة [قوله] فيلزم أن يوجد جسم يقطر كله و يرسب كله. قلنا أكثر المعدنيات التي هي متشابهة الأجزاء كالذهب و الفضة و الأسرب و غيرها من هذا القبيل و لا يلزم من ذلك أن يوجد في اللحوم لحم هذا شأنه إذ اللحم غير متشابه الأجزاء كالحيوان و يده و رجله و غيرها و كذا ما يجري مجرى اللحم من الأعضاء المسماة بالبيضة.

و ما قيل من أن العضو البسيط يجب أن يكون كل جزء من أجزائه مساويا

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٣

لكله في اسمه وحده قول مجازي معناه أن كل جزء بحسب الحس حكمه كذلك أو كل جزء كذلك بحسب الحس. و بالجملة ليست تلك الأجزاء اللحمية مثلا المتفاوتة في قبول فعل النار و أثرها فيها من التقطر و التكلس أجزاء عنصرية أولية بل هي تجري مجرى الأجزاء الثانوية المختلفة - في الصور أو في العوارض و من ذهب إلى خلع صور العناصر البسيطة في المواليد لم يلزمه القول بانخلاع صور أي أجزاء كانت في أي تركيب فيمكن أن يكون لبعض المركبات أجزاء أولية متخالفة الصفات فإذا تسلط عليه النار و تفعل و تؤثر فيها أثارا مختلفة فتذيب بعضها و تجمد بعضها و تبخر بعضها و حينئذ لو أورد الشقوق في المركب الذي هو مثل اللحم و العظم فنختار من الشقوق أن اختلاف أجزائه بالماهية و الصورة و لا يلزم منه بقاء صور العناصر فيه و إن أردت في مثل الذهب و الياقوت - فيمتنع أصل الاختلاف في قبول الآثار و الترديد المذكور متفرع على اختلاف الأجزاء في الآثار و هو غير ثابت بتجربة و لا برهان.

و أما الحجة الأخيرة فهي أيضا مقدوحة بوجهين - أحدهما أنه غير واردة على ما اخترناه فإن الذي ذهبنا إليه غير المذهب المستحدث الذي حكاه الشيخ و هو أن العناصر بعد ما تصغرت و امتزجت و تماست - و انفعل بعضها عن بعض أدى

الأمر بها إلى أن يخلع صورها و تلبس صورة أخرى و الذي ذهبنا إليه أن حدوث صور المواليد مما لا يحتاج أن يكون مادتها مركبة من أربع عناصر بل يكفي أن يكون هاهنا عنصر واحد يستحيل في كيفية الفاعلة و المنفعلة - بأسباب خارجة إلى أن ينتهي الأمر به إلى أن ينقلب صورته إلى صورة أخرى من صور المواليد الثلاثة. و ثانيهما أن ما ذكره من الإشكال يرد مثله على المذهب المشهور المختار - عنده من لزوم كون المنكسرين من حين انكسارهما كاسرين أو كون المنكسر بعد انكساره كاسرا لكاسره و إن أجيب عن هذا بأن الكيفية الكاسرة علة معدة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٤

لانكسار صاحبها و المعد لا يجب وجوده عند حصول المعد له يجري مثله جوابا عما ذكره على أن الجواب المذكور في الموضوعين مصادم للتحقيق عندنا فإن العلة المعدة لا تغني عن العلة الموجبة في حصول المعلول فتلك العلة إن كانت صورة و كانت صورة بعضها علة لفساد صورة البعض كان المفسد مفسدا لمفسده و إن كانت كيفية شدة لكان الكاسر كاسرا لكاسره و كذا إن فرض أن الصورة للبعض علة لاستحالة كيفية البعض الآخر لأن الصورة لا تفعل فعلا إلا بواسطة الكيفية لأن المباشر القريب للأفاعيل - التي هي من باب الحركات و الاستحالات إنما هي الكيفيات و الميول

فصل (١٦) في تنمة الاستبصار و دفع ما يمكن إيراده على المذهب المختار

قال الشيخ أيضا ثم لننظر أن هذه العناصر إذا اجتمعت فما الذي يبطل صورها الجوهرية و ساق الكلام بما حاصله ما قلناه من ثانية حجتيه [إلى أن قال] فيكون الحاصل أن الماء و الأرض لما عدمتا أبطل أحدهما صورة الآخر و هذا محال و إن كان شيء خارج أبطل صورتهما إذا اجتمعت فإما أن يحتاج في إبطالهما و إعطاء صورة أخرى إلى أن تكونا موجودتين فقد دخلنا في هذه المعونة فعاد الكلام من رأس و إن لم يحتج فلا حاجة إلى المزاج بل البسيطة يجوز أن يكون منه الكائنات بلا مزاج إلى آخر ما ذكره.

أقول هذا أيضا لا ينتهض حجة علينا بل على صاحب ذلك المذهب المحكي عنه لأن الذي ذهبنا إليه لا يوجب حاجة يكون الكائنات إلى اجتماع العناصر و تفاعلها و إنما المحتاج إليه في حدوث صور المواليد هو المزاج دون الامتزاج و الذي ذكره الشيخ لا يستدعي الاستغناء في تكون المواليد عن المزاج بل عن الامتزاج فاللازم غير ضائر لنا و الضائر غير لازم علينا فإن المزاج كيفية بسيطة - واقعة في حدود التوسط بين الكيفيات الملموسة و به تصير المادة مستعدة لفيضان إحدى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٥

صور المواليد الكائنة من الجمد و النبات و الحيوان و هي منحفظة قبل حدوث صورة كائنة منها بصورة أخرى إما من صور المواليد أو من صور العناصر مع معين خارجي قسري يخرج به كيفية ذلك العنصر من صرافة سورتها و يدخل في حدود التوسط على حسب مناسبة ذلك المكون فكلما كان أشرف صورة و أكمل كمالاته كان مزاج المادة المستعدة له أمعن في التوسط و أقرب إلى الاعتدال الحقيقي من غير ضرورة أن يكون هناك تركيب و امتزاج بين أجزاء المحل و هذا غير ممتنع و لا مستبعد مع أن البرهان أوجه.

ثم اعلم أن الشيخ أورد إشكالا على نفسه بأنه إذا كان جواهر البسائط باقية في الممتزجات و إنما يتغير كمالاتها فيكون

النار موجودة لكنها مفترقة قليلة- و الماء موجود لكنه يتسخن قليلا ثم يستفيد بالمزاج صورة زائدة على صور البسائط - و تكون تلك الصورة ليست من الصورة التي لا تسري في الكل فكانت سارية في كل جزء فكان الجزء المذكور من الأسطوانات و هو نار مستحيلة و لم تفسد اكتسب صورة اللحمية فيكون من شأن النار في نفسها إذا عرض لها نوع من الاستحالة أن يصير لحما و كذلك كل واحد من البسائط فيكون نوع من الكيف المحسوس و حد من حدود التوسط فيه بعد الأجسام العنصرية لقبول اللحمية و لا يمنعها عن ذلك صورها- كما لا يمنع صورة الأرض في الجزء المدخن أن يقبل حرارة مصعدة فيكون حينئذ من شأن البسائط أن يقبل صورة هذه الأنواع و إن لم يتركب بل استحالة فقط - فلا يكون إلى التركيب و المزاج حاجة انتهى كلامه.

و هو بعينه من الحجج التي ذكرناها على بطلان القول ببقاء صور العناصر في المواليد و قد مر ذكره في مباحث إثبات التركيب الاتحادي بين المادة و الصورة استدلالا عليه و هي حجة قوية.

و العجب أن الشيخ حاول دفعها بأنها مشتركة الورود بين المذهب المشهور- و المذهب المخترع الذي حكاه قال ليس اعتراضها على أحد المذهبين أولى من

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٦

اعتراضها على الآخر و ذلك لأن اجتماع تلك الأجزاء شرط في حصول الصورة للمركب عنده بسبب ما يقع بينها من الفعل و الانفعال و أنها أولا يعرض لها تغير في كفياتها ثم يعرض لها أن تخلع صورها و تلبس صورة أخرى و لولا ذلك لما كان لتركيبها فائدة فإذا تركبت فإنما يقع بينها تركب في كفياتها بالزيادة و النقصان حتى يستقر على الأمر الذي هو المزاج و يحدث صورة أخرى بعد المزاج و لا يكون ما يظن أنه وارد بعد المزاج- إلا لاستحالتها في كفياتها.

فيجب أن تلك الاستحالة إذا عرضت للمفرد منها قبل المفرد وحدة تلك الصورة و إن كان لا يقبلها لأن تلك الاستحالة يستحيل إلا بتصغير أجزائها فاعلة و منفعة على أوضاع مخصوصة و أن تلك الصورة لا تحدث و لا تحل إلا لمادة يستحفظها غيرها من العلل و المعاليل فهو جواب مشترك بين الطائفتين معا انتهى كلامه.

أقول هذا الكلام بطوله لم يفد حل الإشكال و دفعه عن شيء من المذهبين- و لم يفد إلا تشريكهما في ورود الإشكال لا في دفعه بل لصاحب المذهب المخترع أن يقول إن أصل الإشكال هو كون كل جزء من أجزاء الممتزج عنصرا و ياقوتا مثلا- و هذا يختص بما إذا بقيت صور العناصر في المركب غير منسلخة و الذي ذكره أنه مشترك الورود إشكال آخر غير ذلك الإشكال و له أن يدفعه أيضا عن نفسه بأن الحاجة إلى الاجتماع و التركيب إنما إذا كانت في أول الأمر لحصول الاستحالة و التغير في الكيفيات و بعد حصول تلك الاستحالة يستعد كل جزء لأن ينسلخ عنه صورته الخاصة و تلبس صورة أخرى من صور المواليد و لا استحالة في أن قبل الجزء المفرد- وحده تلك الصورة الأخرى لكن عقيب استحالة و خروجه عن صرافة كفيته الشديدة- إلى كيفية فاترة السورة و على أي وجه فلا إشكال على ما ذهبنا إليه لعدم الحاجة إلى تصغير البسائط و امتزاجها لحصول المزاج المهيء للمادة لقبول صورة أخرى من صور المواليد.

و أما الذي ذكره المحقق الدواني في دفع الإشكال فقد مر تزييفه فيما سبق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٧

والذي يزيدك إيضاحاً في بطلان ما تفصلي به عن ذلك من القول بأن الصورة الكمالية سارية في بعض أجزاء الممتزج وهو حامل الكيفية المزاجية دون بعض قياساً على الخط والسطح حيث إن كلا منهما يسري في بعض جهات المحل دون بعض هو أن ما ذكر لا يجدي نفعاً فإن كل جزء من أجزاء الممتزج هو حامل معروض لتلك الكيفية الحاصلة بالاستحالة من جهة التفاعل لا أن بعضها معروض لها وبعضها غير معروض.

كيف وهم مصرحون بأن المزاج كصفة متشابهة الأعداد وليست واحدة بالعدد في كل ممتزج بل كثيرة العدد حسب تعدد الأجزاء الموجودة في الممتزج من البسائط ولا اختلاف بين أعدادها الحاصلة في الممتزج إلا بالموضوع وأن الذي من أعداد المزاج في الجزء الناري بعينه كالذي في الجزء المائي فإن الصورة الكائنة بعد المزاج إذا سرت فيما سرى فيه المزاج يلزم المحذور المذكور وهو كون جسم واحد ذا صورتين نوعيتين متميزتين.

فلا مخلص عن هذا الإيراد إلا بأن الصورة العنصرية غير باقية عند حدوث الصورة الكائنة سواء كان حصول المزاج مشروطاً بالتركيب والامتزاج كما هو المشهور أو لم يكن مشروطاً به كما هو عندنا و أما الإيراد عليه بأنه يلزم أن يكون - لكل من هذه المواليد مادة واحدة و صورة فلم يكن مركباً بل بسيطاً بهذا المعنى - فلا استحالة فيه إذ إطلاق المركب على هذه الأجسام باعتبار أن حدوثها من مادة سابقة و صورة لاحقة أو باعتبار الغالب فيها بحسب المزاج الثانوي كما في الحيوان والنبات.

و بالجملة أمر الإطلاقات اللفظية مما لا تعويل عليه في تحقيق الحقائق

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٨

فصل (١٧) في أن هذا المذهب أي عدم بقاء صور العناصر في المواليد يشبه أن يكون غير مستحدث

لعل القول به كان في الأوائل والذي يدل على هذا ما حكاه الشيخ في الشفاء - حيث نقل في الفصل السابق على الفصل الذي تكلم في بطلان القول بعدم بقاء تلك الصور أنه قال المعلم الأول لكن الممتزجات ثابتة بالقوة و ظاهر هذا الكلام يدل - على أن صورها غير موجودة بالفعل بل بالقوة لكن الشيخ أوله بأنه عنى بذلك القوة الفعلية التي هي الصورة أو لم يعن أن تكون موجودة بالقوة التي يعتبر في الانفعالات التي تكون للمادة في ذاتها فإن الرجل إنما أراد أن يدل على أمر يكون لها مع أنها لا تفسد و إنما يكون ذلك إذا بقيت لها قوتها التي هي صورتها الذاتية و أما القوة بمعنى الاستعداد فإنما يكون مع الفساد و الرجوع إلى المادة فإنها لو فسدت أيضاً لكانت ثابتة أيضاً بتلك القوة فإن الفاسد هو بالقوة الشيء الذي كان أولاً.

ثم شنع على المفسرين بغير ما ذكره في هذا الفصل المذكور قال أما المعلم الأول فقال إن قواها لا يبطل و عنى بها صورها و طبائعها التي هي مبادي هذه الكمالات الثانية التي إذا زال العائق عنها صدرت عنها الأفعال التي لها فحسب هؤلاء أنه بمعنى القوة الاستعدادية انتهى.

أقول الحق أن ما فهمه المفسرون و ظنوه صحيح مطابق للواقع و موافق لظاهر كلام المعلم الأول و ليس ما ذكره الشيخ ما يدل على بطلان تفسيرهم و حملهم كلام الفيلسوف عليه فإن كون القوة بمعنى الاستعداد ثابتة مع فساد الصورة و التي بمعنى

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٣٩

الفعلية و التحصل كائنة مع الصورة بل هي عين الصورة لا يوجب بطلان تفسيرهم القوة في كلامه المذكور بمعنى الاستعداد إذ القوة الاستعدادية للشيء لا يقوم بذاتها بل بصورة أخرى غير الصورة المستعد لها فقول الفيلسوف لكن الممتزجات ثابتة بالقوة معناه أنها ثابتة بالقوة في الأمر الكائن المصور بصورة أخرى غير صورة الممتزجات. وقوله إن الرجل إنما أراد أن يدل على أمر يكون لها مع أنها لا تفسد غير مسلم بل لعله أراد به ما ذكرنا من أن الكائن من الممتزجات فيه قوة وجود تلك الممتزجات لأن المادة الحاملة لصورة هذا الكائن فيها قوة سائر الأشياء ولا يلزم من حصول القوة على الشيء حصول ذلك الشيء بل لا بد من صورة يقوم بها بالقوة التي بمعنى الاستعداد. نعم فرق بين قوة الشيء و القوة على الشيء فقوة الشيء توجد معه و القوة على الشيء لا توجد معه وإنما توجد مع حامل قوته مقترنا ذلك الحامل بصور مناسب للمقوى عليه.

توضيح لمي -

لما علمت أن الحجج و البراهين ناهضة على بطلان صور العناصر الأولى في الكائنات المعدنية و النباتية و الحيوانية سيما في المتشابهة الأجزاء السارية القوى - فاعلم أن السبب اللمي في ذلك أن هذه العناصر كالأفلاك من شأنها أن تقبل صورة الحياة و العلم لكن المانع لها عن قبولها لتلك الصورة الحيوانية خسة وجودها و قبولها للتضاد و التفساد لأن صورتها سارية في مادتها الجسمانية و من شأن الجسم بما هو جسم القسمة و التزاحم و التضاد و من شأن ما له ضد أن ينفسد بضده فكل ما له ضد موجود معه لا تقبل الحياة لأن الحياة كون الشيء بحيث يدرك و يحرك بإرادة منبعثة عن الإدراك و الإدراك عبارة عن حضور صورة شيء عند أمر و الجسم بما هو جسم لا حضور له

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٤٠

عند شيء لا عند ذاته و لا عند غيره لأن حضوره يلزم غيبته و وجوده الذي هو اتصاله يساوق قبوله الانفصال و ما يكون وجوده قابل عدمه لا يكون له وجود إلا نحوا ضعيفا من الوجود. و لهذا لا يدرك ذاته و لا أمرا آخر غير ذاته فكل ما يدرك ذاته أو غير ذاته فله وجود آخر غير وجود الجسم بما هو جسم فقط فالقابل بضرب من الحياة لا بد أن يكون وجوده وجودا بعيدا عن قبول التضاد و التفساد فإن هذه البسائط الأسطقسية لتضادها و تفسادها - بعيدة عن قبول أثر الحياة و كلما كسرت صورة كفييتها المختصة و هدم قوة تضادها و تفسادها حصل لها كيفية لأنها واسطة بين الكل و لكونها واسطة كأنها جامعة لكل بوجه و مطلقة عن الكل بوجه قبلت ضربا آخر من الوجود و قبلت بهذا الوجود الجمعي ضربا من الحياة الشبيهة بحياة الأفلاك التي هي مشتملة على ما تحتها بوجه يليق بها فكلما أمعت المادة الجسمية في الخروج عن أطراف هذه الكيفيات الأربعة و سورتها إلى جانب التوسط الجمعي الذي بمنزلة الخلو عن الأربع - قبلت صورة أتم و كاملا أكمل و حياة أشرف حتى إذا وصلت إلى غاية التوسط نالت أرفع الكمال و غاية الفضيلة التي للجسم أن ينالها و هي الحياة النطقية التي تكون لمثل الكواكب و الأفلاك التي لا تضاد فيها و لا تفساد في جواهرها و لا في حال من أحوالها القارة إلا في أمور نسبية لأوضاعها. و أول ما ينال المادة العنصرية صورة معدنية يترتب عليها بعض آثار الحياة - و هي حفظ الجسم و تركيبه عن المفسد المبطل فإن مجاورة الماء و الأرض و الهواء و النار بعضها لبعض يوجب الفساد في أقل زمان بخلاف مجاورة المعادن

لغيرها من العناصر و المكونات فإن الصورة تحفظها عن أن يؤثر فيها غيرها بسرعة. فهذا أثر من آثار الحياة و البقاء ثم إذا ازدادت توسطاً بين الكيفيات و خرجاً عن أطرافها المتضادة قبلت و نالت من آثار الحياة ضرباً أقوى فيفيض عليها صورة نفسانية يترتب عليها مع المحافظة على أصل الهيئة و التركيب إيراد للبدل و زيادة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٤١

على الأصل في الخلقة و الكمية و أفادت للمثل فتكون حافظة غذائية منمية مولدة ثم إذا أمعنت في التوسط و الخروج عن الأضداد قبلت الحياة و النفس المدركة المتحركة بالإرادة على تفاوت درجاتها من الحياة و الإدراك و الفعل ثم إذا بلغت إلى الغاية و اللطافة نالت الشرف الأعلى و الحياة الأتم الأبقى فيكون ذا صورة نفسانية كمالية حياتها حياة نطقية و إدراكها تعقل و حركتها فكرية و أفعالها حكمية.

إذا تقرر هذا عندك فعلمت أن هذه الصور الوجودية المتعاقبة المترتبة في الشرف و الخسة و الكمال و النقص كلما هو أقوى و أشرف فهو أشد براءة عن هذه العناصر المتضادة و أيضاً كلما هو أتم و أعلى فيزول عنه النقائص التي كانت فيما هو أنقص و أدنى أكثر فليس الحيوان ذا نفس نباتية بل يكفي نفسه الحيوانية لإفادة نظائر ما كانت تفيده النفس النباتية على الوجه اللطيف و هكذا في النفس النباتية في إفادتها أصل الحفظ و غنائها فيه عن أن يكون معها صورة أخرى يصدر معها حفظ النبات عن صنوف الآفات من الحر الشديد و البرد المفسد و غيرهما.

فمن هذه المقدمات كلها يثبت و يتحقق أن صور العناصر المتضادة غير موجودة بالفعل في شيء من المواليد الثلاثة و أنها لو وجدت في شيء منها بالفعل لمنعت ذواتها عن ورود صورة كمالية عليها و لأنك قد علمت أن كل مادة نسبتها إلى الصورة نسبة النقص إلى التمام و أن التركيب بين الصورة و المادة تركيب اتحادي و كذا كل ناقص تم نقصانه كخط قصير إذا طال و قوس دائرة إذا عظمت حتى صارت نصف دائرة أو دائرة تامة.

و إذا كان الأمر كذلك فلا يمكن أن يكون لمادة المواليد صورة أخرى غير الصورة التي بها هي ما هي فالياقوت ليس إلا ياقوتا و لا فعل له إلا فعل الياقوت و كذا النبات و الحيوان حتى الإنسان فإنه موجود واحد له ماهية واحدة لكنه أكمل الكائنات وجوداً و أتمها ماهية و أشدها وحدانية و بساطة و مع أنه أبسطها وجوداً و أشدها وحدانية - يترتب على وجوده الخاص الجمعي ما يترتب على العناصر و الجماد و النبات

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و الحيوان متفرقا.

و هكذا يجب أن يقاس الحال في كل ما هو أشرف وجوداً و أشد وحدانية - و أكثر ارتفاعاً من المواد الجسمانية فإنه أكثر جمعا للأشياء و أوفر آثاراً و أفعالا - حتى أن البسيط الحقيقي المقدس عن التعلق بمادة و قوة استعدادية أو إمكان واقعي - يجب أن يكون ذاته كل الأشياء و وجوده مبدءاً كل الوجودات كما بينا سبيله و أوضحنا دليله بما لا مزيد عليه فليذكر من وفق له

فصل (١٨) في بيان أن الموجودات الطبيعية متفاوتة في الفضيلة و الشرف

و أن المواد الجسمية متهيئة لقبول الفيض الوجودي على التدرج فكان هاهنا طبيعة واحدة شخصية متوجهة نحو

الكمال سائرة إلى عالم القدس مترقية من أدنى المنازل إلى أرفعها

و الحق أن دار الوجود واحدة و العالم كله حيوان كبير واحد و أبعاضه متصلة بعضها ببعض

لا بمعنى الاتصال المقداري و اتحاد السطوح و الأطراف بل بمعنى أن كل مرتبة كمالية من الوجود ينبغي أن تكون مجاورة لمرتبة يليها في الكمال الوجودي - و أن لا يكون بينها و بين مرتبة أخرى فوقها من الشدة أو تحتها في الضعف خالية - بحيث يتصور إمكان درجة أو درجات لم يتحقق بعد فإن ذلك غير جائز عندنا و البرهان عليه مستفاد من قاعدة الإمكان الأشرف و قاعدة أخرى هي قاعدة الإمكان الأخس.

أما الأولى فموروثة عن المعلم الأول.

و أما الثانية فنحن واضعها بعون الله و يجيء ذكرهما في موضع يليق به إن شاء الله - و القاعدتان جاريتان فيما تحت الكون بحسب الأنواع و إن لم تكونا جاريتين بحسب حال كل شخص.

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فإن قلت مراتب الشدة و الضعف غير متناهية بحسب الفرض كمراتب المقادير - فإذن لو وجب حصول الجميع يلزم منه بين كل شديد و ضعيف عدد غير متناه محصور بين حاصرين و ذلك مممتنع سيما و هي مترتبة.

قلت إنما يلزم ذلك لو لم يكن طائفة منها موجودة بوجود واحد بأن يكون شخص واحد ذا درجات وجودية بعضها أرفع و أشرف من بعض من غير انفصال و افتراق بينها و من هذا القبيل الشخص الواحد من الإنسان فإنه موجود واحد ذو قوى متعددة - بعضها عقلية و بعضها نفسانية و بعضها طبيعية و لكل من الأصناف الثلاثة مراتب متفاضلة - في صنفها و الكل ذات واحدة كما ستعلم في مباحث النفس إن شاء الله.

فإذا تقرر هذا فنقول إذا نظرت إلى حال الأكوان العنصرية في تدرجها في الوجود و تكاملها و ترقّيها من أدنى المنازل إلى أن تبلغ إلى مجاورة الإله المعبود - وجدت البرهان مطابقاً للوجدان و ذلك أن هيولى العناصر و هي الغاية في الخسة و النقيصة - بحيث لا يتصور ما هو أخس منها إلا العدم المحض لأن نحو وجودها في ذاتها هو قوة الوجود و تهيو قبول الصور و الهيئات لا غير فأول ما قبلتها الامتداد القابل للطول و العرض و العمق إذ لا قوام لها إلا بالجسمية كما لا استقلال للجسمية إلا لصورة أخرى نوعية - و أدنى النوعيات الصورية هي الصور النوعية العنصرية فقبلتها بعد الجسمية المطلقة فحصلت العناصر الأربعة إما في درجة واحدة كما هو المشهور أو على تقدم و تأخر من جهة انقلاب ما سبق منها في الوجود إلى البواقي.

و لو كان المذهب الثاني حقاً لكان الأسبق في الوجود منها ما هو الأدنى و الأخس إذ الترتيب في هذه السلسلة العودية من الأخس فالأخس إلى الأشرف فالأشرف و لكن الجزم بأن الأخس المطلق بين هذه الأربعة أيها كان لا يخلو من صعوبة.

ثم التي تفاض على المادة بعد العناصر البسيطة هي الصورة الجمادية و هي

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٤٤

أفضل منها فإن البسيط العنصري سريع قبول الفساد عند مجاورة غيره فينقلب بعضها إلى بعض عند المجاورة إذا كان

التخالف بكلتا الكيفيتين الفاعلة و المنفعلة فيستحيل المقهور المغلوب إلى جوهر الغالب القاهر و أما الصورة الجمادية فليست كذلك بل يرجى بقاؤه زمانا طويلا أو قصيرا لأنها في فضيلة الوجود بالقياس إلى تلك الأربعة - كأنها جامعة لها متضمنة إياها على وجه أعلى فكانها توحدت و صارت عنصرا واحدا متوسطا في تلك الكيفيات الأربع المتضادة حدا من المتوسط ثم يتفاضل أصناف الصور الجمادية و أعدادها بعضها على بعض في فضيلة الوجود و قبول الآثار الشريفة فإنها منها ما هي أدنى و أخس قريبة الرتبة إلى رتبة العنصر الأول كالجص و النورة و النوشادر و غير ذلك. و منها ما هي أعلى و أشرف قريبة إلى رتبة النبات كالمرجان و نحوه و ما بين هذين الطرفين أنواع و أصناف كثيرة لا تحصى متفاضلة متفاوتة في قبول الآثار و مبدئية الأفعال و هكذا يتدرج الطبيعة فيها من الأدنى حتى تبلغ بالمادة في الفضيلة إلى ما يقبل صورة زيادة آثار على آثار الصورة الجمادية و هي الصورة النباتية. و تلك الآثار هي الاغتذاء و التماذي في الأقطار بالنمو فلا يقتصر النبات على حفظ المادة فقط كالجماد بل يجتذب ما يوافقه من المواد و يضمها إليه و يكسوها صورة كصورته فيتكامل بذلك شخصه ثم ضرب منه لا يقتصر على هذا بل يقصد الديمومة في الوجود لا شخصا و عددا لأن ذلك ممتنع في هذا النمط من الوجود بل نوعا و ماهية فيفرز من مادته بقوته المولدة قسطا يصلح لقبول صورة مثل صورته.

فبالجملة للنبات حالات زائدة على حال الجماد

و أفراده متفاضلة في تلك الحالات كما و كيفا و كثرة و شدة فيتدرج فيها شيئا فشيئا فبعضها ينبت من غير بذر و لا يحفظ نوعه بالثمر و البذر و يكفيه في حدوثة امتزاج الماء و التراب و هبوب الرياح و طلوع الشمس فذلك هو في أفق الجمادات و قريب منها ثم يزداد هذه الفضيلة في النبات فيفضل بعضه على بعض بنظام و ترتيب حتى يظهر فيه قوة الإثمار و حفظ النوع بتوليد المثل بالبذر الذي يخلف به مثله فتصير هذه الحال زائدة فيه مكملة له مميزة إياه

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الأربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٤٥

عن حال ما قبله ثم يقوى هذه الفضيلة في النبات حتى يصير فضل الثالث على الثاني - كفضل الثاني على الأول. و هكذا لا يزال يتدرج و يشرف و يفضل بعضه على بعض حتى يبلغ إلى أقصى مرتبته و أفقه و يكاد أن يدخل في أفق الحيوان و هي كرام الشجر كالزيتون و الكرم و الجوز الهندي إلا أنها بعد مختلطة القوى أعني قوتي ذكورها و إناثها غير متميزتين فهي تتحمل زيادة و لم تبلغ غاية أفقها الذي يتصل بأفق الحيوان ثم يزداد و يمعن في هذا الأفق - إلى أن يصير في أفق الحيوان فلا يحتمل زيادة.

و ذلك أنها إن قبلت زيادة يسيرة صارت حيوانا و خرجت عن أفق النبات - فحينئذ يتميز قواها فيحصل فيها ذكورة و أنوثة و يقبل من فضائل الحيوان أمورا - يتميز بها عن سائر النبات و الشجر كالنخل الذي طالع أفق الحيوان بالخواص العشر - المذكورة في مواضعها و لم يبق بينه و بين الحيوان إلا مرتبة واحدة و هي الانقلاع عن الأرض و السعي إلى الغذاء.

و قد ورد في الخبر ما هو كالإشارة و الرمز إلى هذا المعنى في قوله ص -

: أكرموا عمتكم النخلة فإنها خلقت من بقية طينة آدم

فإذا تحرك النبات و انقلع عن أفقه و سعى إلى غذائه و لم يتقيد في موضعه إلى أن يسير إليه غذاؤه - و كونت له آلات

أخرى يتناول بها حاجاته إلى تكمله فقد صار حيوانا و هذه الآلات تتزايد في أفق الحيوان من أول أفقه و تتفاضل فيه فيشرف بعضها على بعض كما كان في النبات.

فلا يزال يقبل فضيلة بعد فضيلة و كمالات فوق كمال حتى يظهر فيه قوة الشعور باللذة و الأذى فيلتذ بوصوله إلى منفعه و يتألم بوصول مضاره إليه ثم يقبل إلهام الله عز و جل إياه فيهتدي إلى مصالحه فيطلبها و إلى أضدادها فيهرب منها و ما كان من الحيوان في أول أفق النبات لا يتزوج و لا يخلف المثل بل يتولد كالديدان و الذباب و أصناف الحشرات الخسيسة ثم يتزايد فيها قبول الفضيلة كما كان ذلك في النبات سواء ثم يحدث

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٤٦

فيه قوة الغضب الذي ينهض بها إلى دفع ما يؤذيها فيعطى من السلاح بحسب قوتها فإن كانت قوته الغضبية شديدة كان سلاحه قويا و إن كانت ناقصة كان ناقصا و إن كانت ضعيفة جدا لم يعط سلاحا البتة بل يعطى آلة الهرب فقط كشدة العدو و القدرة على الحيل التي تنجيه من مخاوفه.

و أنت ترى ذلك عيانا من الحيوان الذي أعطي القرون التي تجري مجرى الرماح و الذي أعطي آلة الرمي تجري مجرى النبل و النشاب الذي أعطي الأنياب و المخالب التي تجري مجرى السكاكين و الخناجر و الذي أعطي الحوافر التي تجري مجرى الدبوس و الطبر و أما ما لم يعط سلاحا لضعفه عن استعماله أو لقلته شجاعته و نقصان قوة غضبه و لأنه لو أعطيه لصار كلا عليه فقد أعطي آلة الهرب و الحيل بجودة العدو و الخفة و قوة الطيران كالغزلان و الحيتان و الطيور أو المراوغة كالآرانب و الثعالب و أشباهها و إذا تصفحت أحوال الموجودات من السباع و الوحوش و الطيور رأيت هذه الحكمة مستمرة فيها.

فأما الإنسان فقد عوض عن هذه الآلات كلها بأن هدي إلى اتخاذها و استعمالها كلها و سخرت له هذه كلها و سنتكلم في ذلك في موضعه الخاص فنعود إلى ذكر مراتب الحيوان فنقول - إن ما اهتدى منها إلى الازدواج و طلب النسل و حفظه و تربيته و الإشفاق عليه بالكن و العش و الكناس [الكناس] كما نشاهد فيما يلد و يبيض و تغذيته إما باللبن و إما بنقل الغذاء إليه فإنه أفضل مما لا يهتدي إلى شيء ثم لا يزال هذه الأحوال تتزايد في الحيوان - حتى يقرب من أفق الإنسان فحينئذ يقبل التأديب و يصير بقبوله الأدب ذا فضيلة يتميز بها من سائر الحيوانات الأخر ثم تتزايد هذه الفضيلة في الحيوانات حتى يتشرف بها ضروب أشرف كالفرس المؤدب و البازي المعلم و الكلب المفهم ثم يصير في هذه المترتبة إلى مرتبة الحيوان الذي يحاكي الإنسان من تلقاء نفسه و يتشبه به من غير تعليم و تأديب كالقردة و ما أشبهها و تبلغ من كمال ذكائها إلى أن يكتفي في التأديب بأن يرى الإنسان

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٤٧

يعمل عملا فيعمل مثله من غير أن يحوج الإنسان إلى تعب بها و رناسة لها. و هذا غاية أفق الحيوان الذي إن تجاوزها و قبل زيادة يسيرة خرج بها عن أفقه و صار في أفق الإنسان الذي يقبل العقل و التميز و النطق و الآلات التي يستعملها و الصورة ثلاثتها فإذا بلغ هذه المرتبة تحرك إلى المعارف و اشتاق إلى العلوم و حدثت له قوى و ملكات و مواهب من الله عز و جل يقتدر بها على الترقى و الإمعان في هذه الرتبة كما كان ذلك في

المراتب الأخر التي ذكرناها وأول هذه المراتب في الأفق الإنساني المتصل بآخر ذلك الأفق الحيواني من مراتب الإنسان للذين يسكنون في أقاصي المعمورة من الشمال والجنوب كأواخر الترك من بلاد ياجوج و مأجوج - وأواخر الزنج و أشباههم من الأمم التي لا يتميز عن القردة إلا بمرتبة يسيرة ثم يتزايد فيهم قوة التميز و الفهم إلى أن يصيروا إلى حال من يكونون في أوساط الأقاليم فيحدث فيهم الذكاء و سرعة قبول الفضائل.

و إلى هذا الموضع ينتهي فعل الطبيعة التي وكلها الله تعالى بالموجودات المحسوسة عند الجماهير من الحكماء و أما عندنا فإلى أوائل أفق الحيوان ينتهي - فعل الطبيعة و الأكوان المحسوسة المادية و من هناك يبتدىء فعل النفس و الأكوان الخيالية الصورية المجردة عن هذا العالم المادي المستحيل الكائن الفاسد حتى يبلغ إلى هذا الموضع و من هاهنا يقع الشروع في اكتساب الفضائل الزائدة على فضائل الحيوان بما هو حيوان و اقتناء العقليات بالإرادة و السعي و الاجتهاد حتى يصل إلى أفق الملائكة الأعلى و الملائكة العلويين و هذه أعلى مرتبة الإنسان بما هو إنسان و عندها يتأحد الموجودات و يتصل أولها بآخرها و آخرها بأولها و هو الذي يسمى دائرة الوجود و نصفها الأول قوس النزول و نصفها الآخر قوس الصعود لأن الدائرة هي التي قيل في حدها إنها خط واحد يبتدىء بالحركة من نقطة و ينتهي بها إلى تلك النقطة بعينها.

فدائرة الوجود هي المتأحدة المتصلة حدودها و قسيها بعضها ببعض التي جعلت

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٤٨

الكثرة فيها وحدة و هي التي تدل دلالة صادقة برهانية على وحدانية موجدتها و مبدعها و حكمته و قدرته و كرمه و جوده تبارك اسم ربك ذي الجلال و الإكرام لأن دار الوجود إذا كانت واحدة فبانيها لا يكون إلا واحدا و الله من ورائهم محيط و أنت إذا تصورت قدر ما أومأنا إليك و فهمت اطلعت على الحالة التي خلقت لها و ندبت إليها و عرفت الأفق الذي يتصل بأفقك و الذي يحركك و ينقلك في مرتبة بعد مرتبة و يصعد بك طبقا عن طبق فحدث لك الاعتقاد الصادق و الإيمان الصحيح بنشأتك الباقية و شهدت ما غاب عن عينيك و بلغت إلى أن تتدرج إلى العلوم الشريفة التي اكتسبت إلى الآن بعض مبادئها و ما هو كالات في تحصيلها أو تقويم الفهم و تشحيذ الذهن و تقوية العقل الغريزي و تصل إلى معرفة الخلائق و طبائعها و منها إلى العلوم الإلهية و حينئذ تستعد لمواهب الله عز و جل و عطايها و يأتيك الفيض الإلهي و السكينة - فتسكن عن قلق الطبيعة و حركاتها نحو الأغراض النفسانية و تلحظ طبقات الأكوان - و تحيط بالمراتب التي ترقيت فيها شيئا فشيئا و تقلبك في الساجدين من منازل الموجودات.

و علمت أن كل مرتبة منها محتاجة إلى ما قبلها في وجودها و إذا وصلت الطبيعة إلى التي بعدها بأعداد التي قبلها صارت موجبة لما قبلها على وجه آخر و علمت أن الإنسان لا يتم له كماله إلا بعد أن يحصل له جميع ما قبله و أنه إذا حصل كاملا و بلغ غاية أفقه أشرف نور الأفق الأعلى الإلهي إليه فتصير إما حكيما إلهيا يأتيه الإلهامات فيما يتصرف فيه من التصورات العقلية و الأحكام العلوية و إما نبيا مؤيدا يأتيه الوحي على سبيل المشاهدة لقوة باطنه فيصير حينئذ واسطة بين الملائكة الأعلى و الملائكة الأسفل و مبدأ هذه الترقيات و التحولات التي تختص بالإنسان هو الشوق و الإرادة فإن الشوق إلى اقتناء العلوم و المعارف ربما ساق الإنسان على منهاج قويم و قصد صحيح فيتأدى به إلى غاية كماله و هي السعادة التامة.

لكن ربما أعوج به عن السمات المستقيم و السنن القويم و ذلك لأسباب كثيرة

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٤٩

يطول شرحها فكما أن الطبيعة للأجسام على وجه التسخير ربما شوقت [سأقت] إلى ما ليس بتمام للجسم الطبيعي لعلل تحدث و آفات تطرأ عليه بمنزلة من يشاق إلى أكل الطين و ما جرى مجراه مما لا يكمل طبيعة الجسد بل يهدمه و يفسده كذلك أيضا النفس الناطقة ربما اشتاقت إلى علم و تميز لا يكمله و لا يسوقه نحو سعادته بل يحركه و يسوقه إلى الأشياء التي تعوقه و تقصر به عن كماله.

فحينئذ يحتاج إلى معالجة نفسانية يرشده إليها طبيب روحاني من نبي هاد - أو شيخ مرشد أو أستاذ معلم كما احتاج في الحالة الأولى إلى طبيب جسماني يرشده إلى طبيب طبيعي و لذلك يكثر حاجات الناس إلى الأنبياء ع و المعلمين و المؤدبين فإن وجود تلك الطبائع الفائقة التي يستكفي بذاتها من غير توفيق إلى السعادة الحقيقية نادر لا يقع إلا في الأزمنة الطوال و المدة البعيدة.

فإذا وقع أحد منها كان وجوده بمحض موهبة الله عز و جل لأسباب سفلية و تعاملات إرادية و ترقيات كسبية فكان زيت نفسه في فتيلة طبيعية تكاد تضيء و لو لم تمسسه نار التأديب و الفكر و الرضاة و كان نور الله في ظلمات الأرض و آية عظيمة من آياته كما قال تعالى **قَدْ جَاءَكُمْ مِنَ اللَّهِ نُورٌ وَ كِتَابٌ مُبِينٌ** و نحن بصدد إثباته بالبرهان فيما بعد إن شاء الله.

و غرضنا في هذا الفصل الإشارة إلى أن الوجود كله من أعلاه إلى أسفله و من أسفله إلى أعلاه في رباط واحد مرتبط به بعضه إلى بعض متصل بعضه ببعض و الكل مع كثرتها الخارجية متحدة و اتحادها ليس كاتصال الأجسام بأن يتصل نهاياتها و يتلاقى سطوحها و العالم كله حيوان واحد بل كنفس واحدة و قواه الفعالة كالعقول و النفوس و غيرهما كقوى نفس واحدة فإن قوى النفس عند البصير المحقق متحدة الكثرة لا كما رآه قوم أنها آلات النفس متباينة الوجود متفاضلة الذوات و لا كما رآه قوم آخرون من أنها واحد الذات كثيرة المواضع و الآثار و سياًتي تحقيق ذلك في علم النفس.

الحكمة المتعالية في الاسفار العقلية الاربعة، ج ٥، ص ٣٥٠

و يجب أن يعلم أنه ما من جسم طبيعي إلا و له مادة و صورة و أن للمادة مادة أخرى و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى مادة هي قوة محضة لا فعلية لها أصلاً إلا لغيرها و أن لصورته أيضاً صورة و هكذا إلى أن ينتهي إلى صورة محضة هي فعلية محضة لا قوة لها و كمال محض لا نقص فيه و أن الإنسان آخر موجود ختم به عالم الطبيعة كما مر.

و قد جمع فيه حقائق العالم الأعلى و الأسفل و هو الذي أضاف إلى جمعية حقائق العالم حقائق الحق من أسمائه و صفاته التي بها صحت خلافته الكبرى في العالم الكبير - بعد خلافته الصغرى في عالم الطبيعة.

و بهذه المنزلة الرفيعة أعني جمعية الحقائق خضعت له الملائكة بالسجود بأمر الله تعالى و إذا سجد له الملائكة الكريم الأخص فما ظنك بالملائكة الأسفل الأنزل و لو لا ذلك ما قال **وَسَخَّرَ لَكُم مَّا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ جَمِيعاً** و لو لا ذلك ما قال **لَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ فِي أَحْسَنِ تَقْوِيمٍ** و ما قال ثناء على ذاته في خلقه إياه **فَتَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ**

THE SEALS OF WISDOM



THE ESSENCE OF ISLAMIC MYSTICISM

Fusus al-Hikam

The Seals of Wisdom



Muhi-e-Din Ibn Arabi

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1) The Seal of Divine Wisdom in the Word of Adam

When Allah - glory be to Him! - willed that the source of His most Beautiful Names - which are beyond enumeration - be seen (or you can equally say that He willed His source to be seen), He willed that they be seen in a microcosmic being which contained the entire matter, (1) endowed with existence, and through which His secret was manifested to Him. For how a thing sees itself through itself is not the same as how it sees itself in something else which acts as a mirror for it. So He manifests Himself to Himself in a form which is provided by the place in which He is seen. He would not appear thus without the existence of this place and His manifestation (tajalli) to Himself in it.

Allah brought the entire universe into existence through the existence of a form fashioned without a spirit (rûh), like an unpolished mirror. Part of the divine decree is that He does not fashion a locus without it receiving a divine spirit, which is described as being "blown" (2) into it. This is nothing other than the result of the predisposition of that fashioned form to receive the overflowing perpetual tajalli which has never ceased and which will never cease. Then we must speak of the container (qâbil). The container comes from nothing other than His most sacredly pure Overflowing. So the whole affair has its beginning from Him, and its end is to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) as it began from Him. Thus the command decreed the polishing of the mirror of the universe. Adam was the very polishing of that mirror and the spirit of that form.

The angels are some of the faculties of that form which is the form of the universe, which the Sufis designate in their technical vocabulary as the Great Man (al-Insân al-Kabîr), for the angels are to it as the spiritual (rûhânî) and sensory faculties are to the human organism. Each of these faculties is veiled by itself, and it sees nothing which is superior to its own essence, for there is something in it which considers itself to be worthy of high rank and an elevated degree with Allah. It is like this because it has an aspect of the divine synthesis (jam'îya). In it is something which derives from the divine side and something which derives from the side of the reality of the realities. This organism carries these attributes as determined by the universal nature which encompasses the containers of the universe from the most exalted to the basest. However, the intellect cannot perceive this fact by means of logical investigation for this sort of perception only exists through divine unveiling by which one recognises the basis of the forms of the universe which receive the spirits.

This being was called both a human being (insân) and khalif. As for his humanness, it comes from the universality of his organism and his ability to embrace all of the realities. He is in relation to Allah as the pupil, (3) being the instrument of vision, is to the eye. This is why he is called "insân". It is by him that Allah beholds His creatures and has mercy on them. So he is a human being, both in-time [in his body] and before-time [in his spirit], an eternal and after-time organism. He is the word which distinguishes and unifies. The universe was completed by his existence. He is to the universe what the face of the seal is to the seal - for that is the locus of the seal and thus the token with which the King places the seal on his treasures.

Allah named him khalif for this reason, since man guards His creation as treasure is guarded with the seal. As long as the seal of the King is on the treasure, no one dares to open it without his permission. He made him a khalif in respect of safeguarding the universe, and it

continues to be guarded as long as this Perfect Man is in it. Do you not see then, that when he disappears and is removed from the treasury of this world, nothing that Allah stored in it will remain? Everything that was in it will leave it, and all the parts will become confused, and everything will be transferred to the Next World. Then Man will be the seal on the treasury of the Next World for endless time and after-time. All the Divine Names contained in the divine form (4) appear in this human organism. Thus it possesses the rank of containing and integrating this existence. It was by this that Allah set up the proof against the angels, (5) so remember that! Allah admonishes you through others. Look at where that originates and where it ends up. The angels did not realise what was implied by the organism of the khalif, nor did they realise what the presence of the Truth demanded as 'ibâda (6) (worship). Each one only knows from Allah what his essence accords him. The angels do not possess the universality of Adam, and they did not understand the Divine Names with which he has been favoured, and by which he praises Allah and proclaims His purity. They only knew that Allah had names whose knowledge had not reached them, so they could not praise Him nor proclaim His purity through them. What we mentioned overcame them and this state overpowered them. They said about this organism, "Why put on it one who will cause corruption on it?" (2:30) This is only the argument which they were voicing.

What they said regarding Adam is exactly the state they were with regard to Allah. Had it not been that their nature was in accord with it, they would not have said what they said in respect of Adam, "and yet they were not aware." If they had had true recognition of themselves, they would have had knowledge, and had they been in possession of knowledge, they would have been protected and would not have resisted by belittling Adam and thus exceeding their claim of what they possessed of His praise and glorification. Adam was in possession of Divine Names which the angels did not have, so that their praise and glorification of Him was not the same as Adam's praise and glorification of Him. Allah describes this to us so that we may ponder it and learn adab (7) with Allah, and so that we will not lay claim to what we have not realised or possessed by pinning down. How can we allege something which is beyond us and of which we have no knowledge? We will only be exposed. This divine instruction is part of Allah's discipline of those of His slaves who are well-mannered, trusting and khalifs.

Let us return to the wisdom under discussion. Know that universal matters which have no existence in themselves are without a doubt intelligible and known in the mind. They are hidden and continue in their invisible existence. These universal matters have jurisdiction and effect on everything which has an individual existence. Indeed, they are the same thing and nothing else, i.e. the sources of existent individual things, and they continue to be intelligible in themselves. They are manifest in respect of the sources of existent things just as they are hidden in respect of their intelligibility. Each individual existent thing depends on these universal matters which cannot be dislodged from the intellect, nor would their existence be possible in the source once they ceased to be intelligible, whether that individual existent is in-time or out-of-time. The relationship of that which is in-time or out-of-time to this universal intelligible matter is the same. This universal matter only has jurisdiction in individual existent things according to what the realities of these individual existent things demand of it. It is like the relationship of knowledge to the knower, and life to the living. Life is an intelligible reality; knowledge is an intelligible reality. Knowledge is as distinct from life as life is distinct from knowledge. So we say that Allah has knowledge and life, and that He is the Living, the Knowing. We also say that the angel has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. We say that man has life and knowledge, and is living and knowing. The reality of knowledge is one thing and the reality of life is another, and their relationship to the

knowing and the living is the same relationship. We say that the knowledge of Allah is in non-time and the knowledge of man is in-time. So look at the evaluation that this relationship has brought about in this intelligible reality!

Examine this connection between individual intelligibles and stence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself. As knowledge determines the one who participates in it as he is called knowing so the one who is described by it can determine the knowledge. It is in-time in relation to the one in-time and non-time in relation to the one in non-time. Each of the two is determining and determined. It is known that these universal matters, even if they are intelligible, lack a source although they still have an authority. When they are determined, since they are ascribed to an individual existent thing, they accept the principle in the existent sources and do not accept distinction or fragmenting, for that is impossible for them. They themselves are in everything described by them, as humanity is in every person of this particular species, without distinction or the numbering which affects individuals; and it continues to be intelligible.

Now, as there is a connection between that which has an individual existence and that which does not have one and it is a non-existent relationship so the connection of existents to each other is easier to conceive because, in any case, there is a common factor between them which is individual existence. In the other, there is no common factor, yet there is a connection despite the lack of a common factor. So it is stronger and more real when there is a common factor. Without a doubt, the in-time establishes itself as being put into time and it needs something in time to put it into time. It has no place in itself so it exists from something other-than-it, and it is linked to That by the dependence of need. This dependence must be on That whose existence is necessary, which is independent in Its existence by Itself without need. It is That which, by Its own essence, gives existence to the in-time which depends on It. Since the existence of Its essence is necessary and what appears from It depends on It for its essence, it nevertheless depends on its form for everything which is from a name or attribute, except for the essential necessity. That is not the property of it in-time, even if its existence is necessary, rather, it is necessary by another, not by itself.

Since the matter is based on what we said about its manifestation in its form, Allah communicates to us knowledge of Himself through contemplation of the in-time. He tells us that He shows us His signs in the in-time, (8) so we draw conclusions about Him through ourselves. We do not describe Him with any quality without also possessing that quality, with the exception of that essential autonomy. Since we know Him by ourselves and from ourselves, we attribute to Him all that we attribute to ourselves. For that reason, divine communications came down on the tongues of our interpreters, (9) and so He described Himself to us through ourselves. When we witness, He witnesses Himself. We are certainly numerous as individuals and species, yet we are based on a single reality which unites us. So we certainly know that there are distinctions between individuals. If there were not, there would be no multiplicity in the One.

Similarly we are described in all aspects by that by which He describes Himself, but there must be a disinction and it is none other than our need of Him in our existence. Our existence depends on Him by virtue of our possibility and He is independent of that which makes us dependent on Him. Because of this, one can apply before-timeness and timelessness to Him which negates that firstness which is the opening to existence from non-existence. Although He is the First, firstness is not ascribed to Him, and for this reason, He is called the Last. Had His firstness been the firstness of the existence of determination, it would not have been valid

for Him to be the Last of the determined because the possible has no last - for possibilities are endless. So they have no last. Rather, He is the Last because "the whole affair will be returned to Him" (11:123) after its attribution to us. So He is the Last in the source of His firstness and the First in the source of His lastness.

Then know that Allah has described Himself as the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden; (10) He brought the universe into existence as a Visible world and an Unseen world so that we might know the Hidden by the Unseen and the Manifest by the Visible. He described Himself with pleasure and wrath, and so He brought the world into existence as a place of fear and hope so we fear His wrath and hope for His pleasure. He described Himself with majesty and beauty, so He brought the universe into existence with awe and intimacy. It is the same for all that is connected with Him, may He be exalted, and by which He calls Himself. He designates these pairs of attributes by the two hands (11) which He held out in the creation of the Perfect Man. Man sums up all the realities of the universe and its individuals. So the universe is seen and the Khalif is unseen. It is with this meaning that the Sultan veils himself, even as Allah is mentioned and described as having with veils (12) of darkness, which are natural bodies, and luminous veils which are subtle spirits (arwâh). The universe is composed of both the gross and the subtle.

The universe is its own veil on itself and cannot perceive the Truth since it perceives itself. It is continuously in a veil which is not removed, since it knows that it is distinct from its Creator by its need of Him. It has no portion of that essential necessity which belongs to the existence of Allah, so it can never perceive Him. In this respect, Allah is never fully known by the knowledge of tasting and witnessing because the in-time has no hold on that.

Allah only applied "between His two hands" to Adam as a mark of honour, and so He said to Iblis, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My two Hands?" (38:76) That is none other than the union in Adam of the two forms - the form of the universe and the form of the Real: (13) and they are the two hands of Allah. Iblis is only a fragment of the universe and does not possess this comprehensive quality. It is because of this quality that Adam was a khalif. Had he not had the form of the One who appointed him khalif, he would not have been khalif. If there were not in him all that is in the world, and what his flocks, over whom he is khalif, demand of him because of their dependence on him (and he must undertake all they need from him) he would not have been khalif over them.

The khalifate is only valid for the Perfect Man, whose exterior form comes from the realities of the universe and its forms, and whose inner form is based on His form, may He be exalted! For that reason, Allah has said of him, "I am his hearing and his sight." (14) He did not say, "his eye and his ear." So He differentiated between the two forms. It is the same for every existent in the universe which appears according to what the reality of that existent demands of it. Nonetheless no one totally comprehends what the khalif has. One only surpasses others by this comprehensiveness. If it were not for the diffusion of Allah into the existents by the form, the universe would not have any existence. Similarly, were it not for these universal intelligible realities, no principle would have appeared in individual existent things. From this reality the universe depends on Allah for its existence. So all is in need, and nothing is independent.

This is the truth
and we have not spoken metaphorically.
If I speak of a something independent

without any need, you will know Who I mean by it.
The whole is tied to the whole
and cannot be separated from it, so understand what I have said!

Now, you have learnt of the formation of the body of Adam his outer form and the formation of his spirit, his inner form, so he is the Real and a created being. Now you have learnt of the formation of his rank which is the comprehensiveness by virtue of which he is worthy of the khalifate. Adam is the unique self from which the perfect human species was created according to His words, "O mankind, be fearful of your Lord who created you from a single self, and created its mate from it, and disseminated many men and women from the two of them." (4:1)

His words, "Be fearful of your Lord," mean to make of what has appeared from you a safeguard for your Lord and make what is concealed of you, which is your Lord, a safeguard for yourselves. The matter consists of blame and praise, so be His safeguard in the blame and your safeguard in the praise, so that you will be among those of knowledge and adab. Then He showed him what He had placed in him, and He put that in His two hands - one handful contained the universe and the other handful contained Adam and his descendants - and He showed them their ranks in Adam.

Then Allah informed me in my inner heart (sirr) of what He placed in this Imam, the great progenitor. I have put in this book some of what was allotted to me but not all of what I realised. A book could not contain that and not even the present existent universe could contain it. I have put some of what I have witnessed in this book, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, defined it. It was the divine wisdom in the word of Adam, that is, this chapter.

Then there is the wisdom of the breath of angelic inspiration in the word of Shith (Seth), the wisdom of divine inspiration in the word of Nuh (Noah), the wisdom of purity in the word of Idris, the wisdom of being lost in love in the word of Ibrahim (Abraham), the wisdom of truth in the word of Ishaq (Isaac), the wisdom of the elevation of the word in the name of Isma'il (Ishmael), the wisdom of the spirit in the word of Yusuf (Joseph), the wisdom of unity in the word of Hud, the wisdom of revelation in the word of Salih, the wisdom of the heart in the word of Shu'ayb, the wisdom of the power of the word of Lut (Lot), the wisdom of the decree in the word of 'Uzayr (Ezra), the wisdom of prophethood in the word of 'Isa (Jesus), the wisdom of mercy in the word of Sulayman (Solomon), the wisdom of existence in the word of Da'ud (David), the wisdom of the soul in the word of Yunus (Jonah), the wisdom of the unseen in the word of Ayyub (Job), the wisdom of majesty in the word of Yahya (John the Baptist), the wisdom of possession in the word of Zakariya (Zachariah), the wisdom of intimacy in the word of Ilyas (Elias), the wisdom of benevolence in the word of Luqman, the wisdom of the Imam in the word of Harun (Aaron), the wisdom of sublimity in the word of Musa (Moses), the wisdom of what one turns to in the word of Khalid, and the wisdom of uniqueness in the seal of Muhammad.

There is a seal for each wisdom. So I have condensed these wisdoms according to what is established in the Mother of the Book, and I complied with what was written out for me, and stopped at what was set as a limit for me. Even if I had desired to do more than that, I would not have been able to do so. Indeed, the Presence forbids that, and Allah is the One who grants success. There is no Lord but Him.

Notes to Chapter 1:

1. al-Insân al-Kâmil, the Perfect Man.
2. Nafkh, Qur'an 32:9, etc.
3. Insan, as well as meaning human being, also means the pupil of the eye.
4. The form chosen by Allah for the human being.
5. Qur'an 2:30-33.
6. 'Ibada: All the acts of worship: giving, praying, fasting, etc..
7. Adab: Manners. Here meaning the much deeper quality of spiritual manners, that is a courtesy engendered in the ritual acts of worship, the prostrations of the prayer, the fast, and giving gifts to the needy. Such a quality is imbued with awareness that you are the dependent, and the Real is the independent. You are poor, He is rich.
8. Qur'an 41:53, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons and in themselves..."
9. i.e. the Prophets.
10. Qur'an: 57:3.
11. Qur'an 38:75, "What I created with My two hands."
12. Hadith: "Allah has 70,000 veils of light and darkness. If they were to be removed, the splendour of His face would consume."
13. Hadith: "Allah created Adam on His form."
14. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)



2) The Seal of Wisdom of the Breath of Angelic Inspiration (1) in the Word of Shith (Seth)

Know that the gifts and favours which appear in phenomenal being through human beings or without them fall into two categories: the gifts of the Essence and the gifts of the Divine Names. These two categories are distinct among the people of tasting according to whether as they come from a specific request for a specific thing, from a general request, or without any request. This applies whether they are gifts of the Essence or gifts of the Divine Names. They are specific when someone says, "O Lord, give me such-and-such a thing," and specifies something which occurs to him. They are general when someone says, "Give me what You know is good for all my parts, subtle and gross," without specifying it.

The askers fall into two groups - one group makes the request from a natural impulse to hasten its attainment, "for man is impetuous;" (17:11) and the other group asks because they know that there are matters with Allah which, in the foreknowledge of Allah, are only obtained after a request. They say, "Perhaps what I ask of Him is something of that sort." Their request takes into consideration this possibility. They do not know what is in the knowledge of Allah, nor what their capacity to receive will grant them. This is because it is one of the most difficult things to know capacity at any moment, for it refers to the capacity of the individual at that time. Furthermore, had he not been disposed by his capacity to make the request, he would not have made that particular request.

The goal of the people of presence, (2) who do not possess such a knowledge, is to know it in the moment in which they find themselves. They know by their state of presence what Allah has given them in that moment. and they only receive it by their predisposition for it. They are of two sorts: one group knows their predisposition from what they have already received, and the other group knows what they are going to receive based on their predisposition. This latter group has the most perfect recognition of predisposition.

Among this group are those who make a request, neither to hasten it nor for the possibilities of favour, but rather to comply with the command of Allah when He says, "Call on Me and I will answer you." (40:60) This sort of person is the pure slave and when he asks, his aspiration (himma) is not attached to what he asks for, be it specific or not, rather his aspiration is merely in or not, rather his aspiration is merely in obedience to his Lord's command. When his state requires, he asks for slavehood, and when it requires entrustment [to Allah] and silence, he is silent. So Ayyub and others were tried, and they did not ask Allah to remove their affliction from them. Then at another moment, their state required that they ask that it be removed, and Allah removed it from them.

The immediate granting of a request, or its deferment, depends on the decree which has been determined for it by Allah. If the request coincides with the moment, the answer comes quickly, and if the moment is deferred - either in this world or the next, the answer is also deferred except for the answer from Allah which is, "At your service" (3) - so understand this well!

As for the second category, it is received without making a request, and by "without request" we mean verbal expression of it. In actuality, there must always be a request - be it articulated, or by a state, or from a predisposition. Similarly, unrestricted praise only takes place through verbal expression. The state determines the meaning, for that which induces

you to praise Allah is determined for you by a Name of Action (4) or a Name of Disconnection. (5) In the case of the predisposition of the slave, its possessor is not conscious of it, but he is aware of his state because he knows both what his motive is and the state itself. Predisposition is the most hidden form of making requests.

That which prevents some people from asking is their knowledge that Allah has predetermined their destiny, so they have prepared themselves to receive whatever comes from Him, and they have withdrawn from their selves and their desires.

Among these people are those who know that the knowledge which Allah has of them in all their states is their basic constitution in the state of their permanent source-form from before existence. They know that Allah will only give them what their source allows them according to Allah's knowledge of it when they were in their permanent source-forms. Thus these people know that Allah knows the way they will obtain anything.

There is no higher, nor more unveiled group among the People of Allah than this group, who understand on the secret of the Decree. They, in turn, fall into two sorts: those who know it in general and those who know it in particular. Those who know it in particular are higher and nearer perfection than those who know it in general. Such a person knows what is in the knowledge of Allah for him - be it by Allah informing him of the knowledge his own source has accorded to Him, or be it by direct unveiling to him from his permanent source-form whose unfolding states are endless. So he, in his knowledge of himself, is in the position of having Allah's knowledge of him, because it is derived from the same source. In respect of the slave, concern from Allah is predestined for him, and it is constituted by the sum of the states of his source which the possessor of this unveiling perceives when Allah allows him to perceive it, i.e. the states of his source. When Allah informs him of the states of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of his permanent source-form upon which the form of his existence depends, it is not in the capacity of the creature in this state to perceive what Allah perceives of these permanent sources in the state of their non-existence, since they are but essential relations without any form. In this respect, we say that divine concern precedes the slave's need because of this equivalence in the communication of knowledge.

In this way Allah speaks so that we will know, and it is an expression which is completely specific - not as is imagined by those who do not drink from this source. The goal of disconnection is to make that in-timeness in knowledge belong to Knowledge. It is the highest aspect of this question which the mutakallim (6) can comprehend with his intellect - unless he considers knowledge to be distinct from the Essence. If he does this, he ascribes relativity to knowledge, and not to the Essence, and because of this, he sets himself apart from the realised ones among the People of Allah, who are endowed with unveiling and real existence.

Let us return to those gifts which are either the gifts proceeding from the Essence or the Names. As for the favours, gifts and graces of the Essence, they only come by means of divine tajalli. (7) Tajalli only comes from the Essence by means of the form of the predisposition of the one to whom the tajalli is made. It never occurs otherwise. The one who receives the tajalli will only see his own form in the mirror of the Real. He will not see the Real, for it is not possible to see Him. At the same time, he knows that he sees only his own form. It is the same as a mirror in the Visible world inasmuch as you see forms in it or

your own form but do not see the mirror. At the same time, however, you know that you see the forms, or your own form, only by virtue of the mirror. Allah manifests that as a model (8) appropriate to the tajalli of His Essence, so that the one receiving the tajalli knows that he does not see Him. There is no model nearer or more appropriate to vision and tajalli than this. When you see a form in a mirror, try to see the body of the mirror as well - you will never see it. It is true that some people who perceive this say that the reflected form is imposed between the vision of the seer and the mirror. This is the most that it is possible to say, and the matter is as we have mentioned. We have clarified this in the The Makkan Revelations.

If you wish to taste this, then experience the limit beyond which there is no higher limit possible in respect of the creature. Neither aspire to, nor tire yourself out in trying to go beyond this degree, for in principle, there is only pure non-existence after it.

Thus Allah is your mirror in which you see yourself, and you are His mirror in which He sees His Names. His Names are not other than Himself, as you know. The matter is confusing. One of us implied ignorance of the matter as part of knowledge and said, "The incapacity to achieve perception is perception." (9) Some of us know but do not express it in this way, even though it is the highest of words. Knowledge does not give incapacity to know as the first one said, but rather knowledge gives him the same silence which incapacity gives. This is the highest level of those who have knowledge of Allah.

This knowledge only belongs to the Seal of the Messengers and the Seal of the Awliyâ'. The Messengers and Prophets only see it from the niche of the Messenger who is the Seal. The awliyâ' only see it from the niche of the walî who is the Seal. Even the Messengers only see it to the extent that they see it from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya', for Message and Prophethood - by which I mean the Prophethood of bringing the Sharî'a and its message - ceases, but wilâya never ceases. Thus the Messengers, in much as they are awliya', see what we have mentioned only from the niche of the Seal of the Awliya'. How could it be different for other awliyâ'? Although the Seal of the Awliyâ' is subject to the judgement which the Seal of the Messengers brought through the Sharî'a, that does not diminish his station nor does it detract from what we have said, for something which is lower from one point of view can be higher from another. Confirmation of this occurred in the history of our Sharî'a in the excellence of the judgement of 'Umar regarding the prisoners of Badr (10) and their treatment, and in the story of fertilization of the date-palms. (11) It is not necessary that the perfect have precedence in everything and in every rank. The Rijâl (12) regard precedence as being in the degrees of knowledge of Allah. Here is their goal. As for the things which are in-time, they do not attach their thoughts to them, so realise what we have mentioned!

Al-Khidr said to Musa, "I have knowledge which Allah has taught me, and which you do not know, and you have knowledge which Allah has taught you and which I do not know." (13)

It is like the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in relation to a brick wall which was complete except for one brick, (14) and the Prophet was that one brick although he himself only saw the place for the single brick. The Seal of the Awliyâ' must also have this sort of vision. He sees the same as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, saw, but he sees a place for two bricks in the wall, and that the bricks are made of gold and silver. He sees that there are two bricks missing in the wall, and he sees that they are a silver brick and a gold brick. He must see himself as being disposed by nature to fill the place of these two bricks. The Seal of the Awliyâ' is these two bricks by which the wall is completed. The necessary reason for which he sees himself as two bricks is that he follows

the Shari'a of the Seal of the Messengers outwardly - which is the place of the silver brick. This means the outward Shari'a with all that pertains to it of ordinances which are taken from Allah by the secret, according to the outward form which conforms to the secret because he sees the matter for what it really is. He must see the matter in this manner, for it is the place of the golden brick in the inwardly hidden. It is taken from the source from which the angel brought it, the same angel who brought the revelation to the Messengers. If you have understood what I have alluded to, then you have indeed acquired useful knowledge!

All the Prophets, from Adam to the last of the Prophets, take their light from the niche of the Seal of the Prophets, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. Even though the existence of his clay was deferred, the last Prophet was nevertheless present in his reality, according to his statement, "I was a Prophet when Adam was between water and clay." (15) Every other Prophet only became a Prophet by being described by divine qualities inasmuch as Allah is described as the Praiseworthy Wali.(16)

The Seal of the Messengers, in respect to his wilâya, is connected to the Seal of the Awliyâ' in the same way in which Prophets and Messengers are connected to it. He is a walî, Messenger, and Prophet. The Seal of the Awliyâ' is a walî and the heir who takes directly from the source, contemplating the ranks. He is the most beautiful of the beauties of the Seal of the Messengers, Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, the overseer of the community, and the master of the sons of Adam by reason of opening the door of intercession. He specified a particular state which is not universal. (17) In this special state, he has precedence over the Divine Names. So the All-Merciful only mediates with the Avenger for the people of affliction through the intercession of the mediators. Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, obtained mastery in this special station. Whoever understands the ranks and the stations does not find this discourse difficult.

As for the gifts of the Names, know that Allah bestows mercy on His creation which is wholly from the names. Either it is a pure mercy, like the excellence of the provision which they have in this world or on the Day of Rising which is bestowed by that name, the Merciful, and so is a gift of mercy, or it is a mixed mercy like the taking of a disagreeable remedy which is followed by relief - it is still a divine gift. Divine gifts can only possibly be given through the intermediary of the guardians of the Names. Sometimes Allah gives it to the slave by means of the All-Merciful, and so the gift is pure from any adulteration which would be contrary to the nature of the moment, otherwise he would not receive the object and what would resemble it. Sometimes He gives by means of the the Boundless, so it is general - or by the Wise, so He looks at what is fitter at the moment, or by the Giving, who gives what is good without those who receive it having to compensate for it by gratitude or deed. He gives by the Compeller, and so He looks at the environment and what is necessary to it. He gives by the Forgiving and so He looks to the environment and what is happening to the individual. If he is in a state which merits punishment, He veils him from it, and if he is in a state which does not merit punishment, He protects him from a state which would merit it. He is "protected from wrong action", "safeguarded", and other descriptions of that sort. The Giver is Allah in the sense that He is the Treasurer of all that is in His treasury, and Allah only brings forth from it according to a predestined decree through the intermediary of a name particular to that matter. So He gives everything its created form (18) according to the name, the Just, and its brothers.

The Names of Allah are endless because they are known by what comes from them, and what comes from them is endless, even though they can be traced back to the limited roots which

are the matrices of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but one of the Names or the presences of the Names. In reality, there is but One Reality which assumes all these relations and aspects which are designated by the Divine Names. The Reality grants that each of the Names, which manifest themselves without end, has a reality by which it is distinguished from another Name. It is that reality by which it is distinguished which is the Name itself - not that which it shares.

It is the same with the gifts - every gift is distinct from another by personal nature, although they come from a single source. It is evident that this one is not that one. That is because the Names are distinct. Because of its boundlessness, in the Divine Presence there is nothing at all which repeats itself. This is the truth which is determined.

This was the knowledge of Shith, peace be upon him, and its spirit aids every spirit which discusses the like of this, except for the spirit of the Seal who receives replenishing knowledge directly from Allah, not from any spirit. No, rather it is from his spirit that his substance flows to all spirits, although he may not perceive that of himself at the time when his elemental body existed. However, in respect to his reality and his rank, he knows all of that essentially, just as he is ignorant of the composition of the elements (of his body). So he has knowledge and is ignorant, and he is capable of being described by contrary attributes even as the Origin admits of description with opposites such as the Majestic and the Beautiful, the Outward and the Inward, the Last and the First - and they are the same, and not other than Him. Therefore, he knows and does not know, and he perceives and does not perceive, and he sees and does not see. It is by this knowledge that Shith received his name because it means "the gift". In His hand is the key to the gifts in their various types and relationships So Allah gave him to Adam, and he was the first gift, and He only gave it from Himself.

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All gifts in phenomenal being are manifested in this fashion - so no one receives anything from Allah and no-one receives anything which does not come from himself. Not everyone recognises this. Only a few of the people of Allah know it. When you see one who recognises that, rely on him, for that one is the source of the purest purity and the elite of the elite of the Men of Allah. Whenever a person of unveiling sees a form which communicates to him gnosis which he did not have and which he had not been able to grasp before, that form is from his own source, no other. From the tree of himself he gathers the fruits of his cultivation, as his outer form opposite the reflected body is nothing other than himself, even

though the place of the presence in which he sees the form of himself presents him with an aspect of the reality of that presence through transformation. The large appears small in the small mirror and tall in the tall, and the moving as movement. It can reverse its form from a special presence, and it can reflect things exactly as they appear, so the right side of the viewer is his right side, while the right side can be on the left. This is generally the normal state in mirrors, and it is a break in the norm when the right side is seen as the right and inversion occurs. All this is from the gifts of the reality of the Presence in which it is manifested and which we have compared to the mirror.


Whoever recognises his predisposition, recognises what he will receive. Not everyone who knows what he will receive, knows his predisposition, unless he knows it after receiving it, and this one knows it in a general way. Some people who are weak of intellect think that since it confirmed with them that Allah does what He wills, they deem it admissible that He could contradict wisdom and what the matter is in itself. (19) Because of this, some of them go so far as to deny the possibility and affirm that which is necessary by essence and by other. The man who has achieved realisation, however, admits the possibility and knows its presence and knows what is possible and how it is possible, since in its source it is necessarily existent because of something other-than-it. From where is the name of other, which determines its necessity, valid for it? No one knows this distinction except those with particular knowledge of Allah.

It is in the footsteps of Shith that the last of this human species will be born, and he will carry his secrets. There will none of this species born after him, so he will be the Seal of the Begotten. A sister will be born with him, and she will emerge before him, and he will follow her with his head at her feet. He will be born in China, and he will speak the language of his country. Sterility will spread in men and women, so there will be much cohabitation without conception. He will call people to Allah, but will not be answered. When Allah takes him and the believers of his time, those who remain will be like beasts, not knowing what is lawful (halâl) from what is unlawful (harâm). They will act according to their natural instincts with lust, devoid of reason and law. Upon them the Last Hour will occur.

Notes to to Chapter 2:

1. Nafth, to puff, blow or spit, hence inspiration. Hadith, "He (Jibril) inspired or put (nafatha) into my heart..." Hence poetry is called the nafth of Shaytan.
2. The people of the presence are those who see everything as coming to them from Allah and everything as effected by Allah.
3. Labbayk.
4. Like the Giving, the Provider.
5. Tanzih, making Allah free of any connection to His creation. Names like the Absolutely Pure (al-Quddûs).
6. The people of words - theologians and philosophers. They are unable to enter the realm of reflection and meditation that is the Sufic domain, and thus some of them oppose the Sufic teaching - mistaking the doctrine's meanings since they cannot intellectually identify them with a specific set of physical practices and direct inner experience.
7. A manifestation by which something is made clear and unobscured, as the bride is displayed to the husband or the rust removed from a sword or mirror so that it shines. The tajalli is the unveiling of a spiritual reality in the realm of vision. It is a direct-seeing into the nature of existence, a showing forth of the secrets of the One in the celestial and terrestrial realms.

8. Mithâl, a Qur'anic term which indicates learning not by logical but by analogical method. It is simply the ACCESS to the parable and not the parable or any idea that the "metaphor" equals its interpretation. It has no specificity. Mithal is grasped "on the wing" so to speak. It cannot be explored or analysed or extended. That is to say it must not be approached rationally but emphatically with direct and clear seeing-into.
9. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq.
10. After Badr, Abu Bakr asked the Prophet to either forgive or allow the prisoners to be ransomed. 'Umar said that they should be killed. Eventually, the Muslims reached a consensus that the captives should be ransomed and they were. Later the verse was revealed, "It is not for a Prophet to take captives..." (8:67)
11. When the Prophet had been asked about whether palm-trees should be pollinated and then later said, "You have the best knowledge of these things of your world."
12. Rijal (sing. rajul): The men. Meaning the men of gnosis and illumination. Those who know - that is - who know how-it-is, and not the veiled fantasy experience of so-called ordinary sensory perception which is, as we now know, in direct contradiction to the physical reality of matter according to high-energy physics.
13. cf. Qur'an 18:65.
14. Hadith in al-Bukhari (2815) and Muslim.
15. Hadith in at-Tirmidhi and Musnad Ibn Hanbal.
16. Qur'an 42:28, "It is He who sends down abundant rain after they have lost all hope, and He unfolds His mercy; He is the Praiseworthy, the Wali."
17. He only can open the door of intercession because it is a special gift to him alone.
18. Qur'an 20:50: "Our Lord is He who gives each thing its created form and then guides it."
19. i.e. they permit that He do the impossible, like making existence non-existence or non-existence existence.



3) The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath of Divine Inspiration (1) In the Word of Nuh (Noah)

Know that disconnection (tanzīh) among the people of realities in respect to Allah is the same as limitation and qualification, so the one who disconnects is either ignorant or ill-mannered if he only applies disconnection to Him and believes that about Him. (2) When the believer who follows the Sharī'a disconnects and stops at that, and does not see anything else, he displays ill manners and slanders Allah and the Messengers - may the blessings of Allah be upon them! - although he is not aware of it. He imagines that he has reached the target and yet he has missed it, so he is like the one who believes in part and rejects part. (3)

One especially knows that when the language of the various Sharī'as speaks about Allah as they do, they speak to the common people in the first sense, and to the elite in every sense which can be understood from the various aspects of that expression in any language in the usage of that language.

Allah manifests Himself in a special way in every creature. He is the Outwardly Manifest in every graspable sense, and He is the Inwardly Hidden from every understanding except the understanding of the one who says that the universe is His form (4) and His He-ness (huwiyya), and it is the name, the Outwardly Manifest. Since He is, by meaning, the spirit of whatever is outwardly manifest, He is also the Inwardly Hidden. His relation to whatever is manifested of the forms of the world is the relation of the governing spirit to the form. The definition of man, for example, includes both his inward and outward; and it is the same with every definable thing. Allah is defined in every definition, yet the forms of the universe are not held back and He is not contained by them. One only knows the limits of each of their forms according to what is attained by each knower of his form. For that reason, one cannot know the definition of Allah, for one would only know His definition by knowing the definition of every form. This is impossible to attain, so the definition of Allah is impossible. Similarly, whoever connects without disconnection has given limits to Allah and does not know Him. Whoever combines connection and disconnection in his gnosis, and describes Allah with both aspects in general - because it is impossible to conceive in detail because we lack the ability to encompass all the forms which the universe contains - has known Him in general and not in particular, as he knows himself generally and not in particular. For that reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, linked knowledge (ma'rifa) of Allah to knowledge of oneself and said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Allah says, "We will show them Our signs on the horizons (what is outside of you) and in themselves (what is your source) until it is clear to them (the contemplators) that it is the Truth," (41:53) inasmuch as you are His form and He is your spirit. You are to Him as your body-form is to you, and He is to you as the spirit which governs the body.

The definition contains your inwardness and outwardness, for the form remains when the spirit which governs it departs, and it is no longer man, but one can speak of it as resembling the form of man. There is no difference between it and the form made of wood or stone, upon which the name of man is only applied by metaphor and not by reality. Allah cannot vanish from the forms of the universe, as His definition of His divinity is by reality, not metaphor, as the definition of man applies only so long as he is alive. As the exterior of the form of man praises both his spirit, and the self governed by it, with his tongue, similarly Allah made the forms of the universe which glorify His praise, but we do not understand their glorifying. (5) We do not embrace all forms in the universe. All are tongues of Allah uttering the praise of

Allah and for that reason He said, "Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," (1:1) i.e. all types of praise refer to Him. He is the Praiser and the One praised.

If you speak of disconnection, you limit Him,
and if you speak of connection, you define Him.
If you speak of the two together,
then you are free of error
and you are an Imam and a master in knowledges of gnosis.

He who affirms duality, falls into shirk, and whoever speaks of uniqueness is a unifier. (6)
Take care lest you be a dualist by connection, and take care lest you be a isolator by disconnection.

You are not Him, rather you are Him
and you see Him in the source of thing,
absolute and limited at the same time.

Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," and so He disconnects, "and He is the Hearing, the Seeing," (42:11) so He connects. Allah says, "There is nothing like Him," so He connects and doubles it, (7) and "He is the Hearing, the Seeing." Then He uses disconnection and makes Himself Unique.

If Nuh had combined these two calls for his people, they would have answered him. He called them openly (71:8), and he called them secretly (71:9). Then he said to them, "Ask forgiveness of your Lord. Truly He is Endlessly Forgiving." (71:10) He said, "I have called my people night and in the day, but my calling has only made them more evasive" (71:5-6) because they knew what they had to do in answering his call.

So the knowledge of those who know Allah is what Nuh indicated in respect to his people by praising them through blame. He knew that they would not answer his call because of the furqân (8) it contained. The command is the Qur'an, not the Furqân. Whoever is established in the Qur'an does not incline to the Furqân. Even if the Furqân is in the Qur'an, the Qur'an contains the Furqân but the Furqân does not contain the Qur'an. For this reason, no one was favoured by the Qur'ân except Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and this community which is the "best community ever to be produced before mankind." (3:110)

So "there is nothing like Him" unified several matters in one single matter. If Nuh had articulated something like of this âyat, his people would have responded to him, because it contains connection and disconnection in a single âyat, rather in half an âyat.

Nuh, peace be upon him, peace be upon him, called on his people at night in respect to their intellects and spirituality (rûhânîyya), which are unseen; and by day he called on them in respect to their outer forms and arrival. In his call, he did not unify with anything, like "there is nothing like Him." So their inward had a distaste for this separation, and it increased them in evasion. Then he said of himself that he called upon them that He might forgive them, not that He be unveiled to them. They understood that from him. That is why "they put their fingers in their ears and wrapped themselves in their clothes," (71:7) and this is the form of veiling to which he called them. So they answered his call by action, not by saying, "At your service."

There is both the confirmation of likeness and its negation in "There is nothing like Him." For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said of himself, "I have been given all the words." (9) Muhammad, peace be upon him, did not call on his people by night and day, but rather he called upon them by night in the day and by day in the night. Nuh said in his wisdom to his people, "He will send heaven down on you in abundant rain," (71:11) which is intellectual gnosis in meanings and metaphorical speculation, and "He will reinforce you with wealth," i.e. by what comes to you from Him.

Thus it is your wealth in which you have seen your form. So whoever among you imagines that he has seen Him, does not have gnosis, and whoever of you knows that he has seen himself, he is the gnostic. For this reason people are divided into those who know Allah and those who do not know. "And sons" is what results from their logical speculation while the knowledge of the business (to which Nuh called them) is based upon contemplation which is far from the results of thought. Their trade did not profit them, (10) so what they had in their hands, which they only imagined they possessed, vanished from them.

The kingdom belongs to the people of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, for Allah says "Give of that to which He has made you successors." (11) (57:7) For the people of Nuh it is, "Do not take anyone besides Me as a guardian." (17:2) The kingdom was confirmed for the people of Muhammad, and the guardianship in it belongs to Allah. The people of Muhammad are the khalifs in it. The kingdom belongs to Allah and He is their guardian, and that is the kingdom of being appointed khalif. For this reason, Allah is the "King of the kingdom" (12) as at-Tirmidhi says. "They have hatched a mighty plotting," (71:22) because calling to Allah is the plotting of the the One called; since He does not lack the beginning, He is called to the end, so they call to Allah. This is the source of devising according to inner sight. Nuh said, "The affair belongs entirely to Him," so they answered Him with plotting as He called them.

The people of Muhammad came and knew what the call to Allah was in respect of its He-ness, rather what it is in respect to His Names. Allah says, "The day those who are godfearing are gathered to the All-Merciful." (13) So He used the "particle of the end" (ilâ - to) and joined it to that Name, and we recognise that the universe is under the care of a Divine Name which requires them to be among the "godfearing". The reality of taqwâ (14) is that man avoids ascribing blessings, perfections and praiseworthy attributes to himself or to others, except for Allah. He fears Allah through His acts and attributes. These things are evils from the spring of possibilities. They said in their plotting, "Do not abandon your gods. Do not abandon Wadd or Suwa' or Yaghuth or Ya'uq or Nasr." (71:22) Then they abandoned them ignorant of the Truth according to what they left of the idols. Allah has an aspect in every worshipped thing. Whoever recognises it, recognises, and whoever is ignorant of it is ignorant among the people of Muhammad. Your Lord decreed that you should worship only Him that is the judgement of your Lord.

The one who possesses knowledge knows who the slave is and in what form he is manifested as far as he is a slave. Separation and multiplicity are like the limbs of the sensory form and like faculties of meaning (15) of the spiritual form. He only worships Allah in every worshipped object. The lowest one is the one who imagines that godness is contained in it. Were it not for this illusion, stones and other things would not have been worshipped. This is why He said, "Say: Name them!" (13:33) If they had named them, they would have named stone, tree, or star. If they had been asked, "Who do you worship?" they would have replied, "God". They would not say "Allah" or "the god".

The highest knower does not use this imagination, (16) but rather he says that this is a divine tajalli which one must exalt, and he does not restrict himself. The lowest one is the one possessed of fantasy: "We only worship them so that they bring us neared to Allah." (39:3) The highest knower says, "Your god is One God, so submit to Him," (22:34) wherever He is manifest, "and give good news to the humble-hearted" who humble the fire of their nature. They spoke to it (the fire), and did not say "nature". "They have misguided many people," (71:24) i.e. they perplexed many in the multiplicity of the One by aspects and relations. "Do not increase not the wrongdoers" because their selves are from the totality of the chosen ones who inherited the Book and they are the first of the three, (17) which precedes the ambivalent and the outdoor, "in anything but misguidance", except in the perplexity of the man of Muhammad who says, "Increase me in perplexity." (18) "Every time it shines on them, they walk in it. When the darkness comes over them, they stop." (2:20) So the perplexed one turns about, and the circular movement is about the axis which he does not leave.

The one who has a stretched-out path is inclined to leave the goal, seeking what the possessor of imagination has in it, and his end is that imagination. He has "from" and "to" and what is between them. The one who has a circular movement has no beginning, "from", which clings to him, and no end, "to", is judged of him. Thus he has the most perfect existence. He "is given all the words" (19) and wisdoms. "And because of their errors" which is that which is recorded for them, "they were drowned" in the seas of the knowledge of Allah which is perplexity among the men of Muhammad. When the seas were heated up, (20) "they were put into a fire" in the source of water, "and they found no one to help them besides Allah." (71:25) Allah is the source of their helpers, and so they were destroyed in it for time without end. If He had brought them out to the shore, the shore of nature, He would have brought them down from this high degree. All belongs to Allah and is by Allah, rather it is Allah.

Nuh said, "My Lord!" and he did not say, "My God," for the Lord has immutability, and "God" differs according to the Names. So "every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29) By Lord, he meant something with an immutable quality. "Do not leave upon the earth" and he called on them to go into its Muhammadan interior. "If you let down a rope, it would fall on Allah," (21) "to Him belongs what is in the heavens and what is in the earth." When you are buried in it, you are in it and it is your container, and "We will return you into it and We will bring you forth from it again," (20:55) by the difference of existence. "...of the unbelievers" who wrap themselves in their garments and put their fingers in their ears, seeking veiling because he called on them that He might forgive them. Forgiveness is the veiling of wrong actions, "not even one" so that the benefit will become universal like the call. "If You leave any," i.e. if You call them and then leave them, "they will misguide Your slaves," i.e. confuse them and so bring them out of their service to what they have of the secrets of lordship. They will think themselves lords after they were slaves in themselves. Thus they are slaves and lords. "They will spawn nothing" i.e. they will not have any result or manifest anything except their being shameless that is, the manifestation of what veils the unbelievers is that they were veiled from what appeared after their manifestation. They manifested that which veils, so they were veiled after their appearance.

The thinker is confused and does not recognise the goal of the shameless in shamelessness, (22) or the unbeliever in his disbelief, yet the person is but one. "My Lord, forgive me," i.e. veil me and that which concerns me so that my rank and station are unknown, as the rank of Allah are unknown in His statement, "They do measure Allah with His true measure"; (23) "and my parents" of whom I am a result, and they are the intellect and nature; "and all who enter my house," i.e. my heart, "as believers" believing in what it contains of divine reports,

and it is what their selves occasioned, "And all the believers, men (the intellects) and women (the selves)."

"Do not increase the wrongdoers (dhâlimîn)" who are from the darkness (dhulumât), the people of the unseen, hiding behind the veils of darkness, "except in ruin" i.e. in destruction. Thus, they do not recognise themselves because they see the Face of Allah outside of them. Among the men of Muhammad, "All things are passing except His Face." (28:88) Ruin is destruction. Whoever wishes to understand the secrets of Nuh must rise into the sphere of Nuh. (24) It is in our book, at-Tanazzulat al-Mawsuliyya.

Notes to Chapter 3:

1. Subbûh, name applied to Allah, the All-Perfect, disconnected from imperfections.
2. If he does not go on to include tashbih, connection.
3. cf. Qur'an 4:149: "Those who reject Allah and His Messengers and desire to make division between Allah and His Messengers, saying, 'We believe in some and reject some.'"
4. By manifesting His attributes and Essence since everything is a proof and indication of Him.
5. Ref. to Qur'an 17:44, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise, but you do not understand their glorification."
6. In this case, ignorant of the multiplicity of His Names and Attributes.
7. "Like Him" = "ka-mithlihi", the word "like" occurs twice: "ka" and "mithl", so like negates like, like a double negative.
8. Furqan: One of the names of the Qur'an, meaning a "discrimination" that which separates or distinguishes. Here presented as an opposite in a dyad: Qur'an/furqan, that is, discrimination/gathering.
9. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
10. Reference to Qur'an, 2:16, "Those are the people who have sold guidance for misguidance. Their trade has brought no profit. They are not guided."
11. Khalifs.
12. Since He answers His slave who is the "kingdom". Technical term used by al-Hakim at-Tirmidhi and Abu Madyan, discussed by Ibn al-'Arabi in the Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Chapter 24, vol. I, p. 182.
13. ref. Qur'an 19:85.
14. Fearfulness of Allah which is reflected in one's behaviour.
15. Meaning. Meaning does not carry the ordinary connotative significance that it has in the science of semantics. In the Sufic science meaning is not allied, but inseparable from the experience of the recognition of meaning. In other words, it is not a "thing" which can be apprehended with the qualities of thingness. It is a mode of experiencing which takes place in a zone of awareness that is in itself a realm of the inward reality cognised in the waking state. Meaning/sensory, ma'na/hiss.
16. Khayal: An important term. Khayal means imagination, but in the special technical language of Ibn al-'Arabi the khayal contains an outer and inner meaning. Its outer (not inner) meaning is imagining in the ordinary sense of a "tangible reality" which is experienced mentally yet remains unreal, that is, untouchable and non-physical. Its inner meaning, however, is that faculty by which we solidify the objects - which are according to unveiling basically "not-there" - spatiality itself. There is much resistance to this in "rational" and programmed intellects as there is of the hand to the rock in "common sense" experience. The rock is there, it does not budge. There is, it must not be forgotten, a threshold situation where this is not so, for if the

subject were brain-damaged, subjected to a hallucinogen, or hypnotic trance, then the object would experientially melt away. That is still not the same as seeing in which things are seen as-they-as in one unified field without differentiation, while alert within that condition of experiencing. And this state brings with it wisdom beyond the recognition of how-it-is at that moment - in other words a new understanding is established by the experience.

17. Ref to Qur'an 35:32, "...but some of them wrong themselves, some are ambivalent, and some outdo each other in good."

18. Hayra: Bewilderment. A Key term. Hayra is not a negative situation - it is the condition in which the seeker finds every intellectual channel blocked, every pathway of reason clashing against the other in contradiction so that it induces in the seeker a state of intensity. This intensity by virtue of its inner tension creates a condition we call hayra. It is a collapse of separation - a kind of "white hole" - which results in gatheredness. That is, the hayra creates a new condition which is its result and that result is a breakthrough into an illumination of the Real.

19. Meaning the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, who was given all the words.

20. By the oven (from which the water gushed out of the earth in the Flood.)

21. Hadith.

22. The manifestation of lordship.

23. 6:91, 22:84, 39:67.

24. The Sphere of the Sun.



4: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sanctification (Quddûs) in the Word of Idris

Elevation has two references - one of place and one of rank. Elevation of place is "We raised him up to a high place," (19:57) and the highest of places is that upon which the mill of the world of the spheres revolves. It is the sphere of the sun and in it is the station of the spirituality of Idris, peace be upon him! There are seven heavens under it and seven heavens above it, and it is the fifteenth. That which is above it is the red heaven, i.e. Mars, the heaven of Jupiter, Saturn, the heaven of fixed stars, the Starless Heaven and the heaven of the constellations, the heaven of the Kursi and the heaven of the 'Arsh. That which is below it is the heaven of Venus, Mercury, the Moon, the circle of ether, the circle of air, the circle of water, and the circle of earth. It is the axis of the heavens, and it is a "high place".

As for the elevation of rank, it is for us, the people of Muhammad. Allah said, "When you are uppermost and Allah is with you" (47:35) in this height. He exalts Himself above place, not above rank. When the selves of those among us who do deeds are afraid, He follows the mention of "being with" with His words, "He would not cheat you of your deeds." The deed demands place and knowledge demands rank. So He joined the two heights for us - elevation of place by deed and elevation of rank by knowledge. Then to disconnect the association of being with, He said, "Glorify the name of your Lord, the Most High," (87:1) above this association in meaning.

It is one of the most wondrous of matters that man is the highest of existent things - I mean the Perfect Man, and elevation is only attributed to him by subordination either to place or rank which is a degree. So he is not high by his essence, he is high by the height of place and the height of rank, for these possess height. Height of place is like the All-Merciful settling on the throne, (1) and it is the highest of places. Height of rank is "All things are passing except His Face," (28:88) and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:123) and nothing has existence along with Allah.

When Allah said, "We raised him up to a high place," He made high an adjective for place. Since your Lord said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif in the earth," (2:30) this is height of rank. He said about the angels, "Were you overcome by arrogance, or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) so He gave elevation to the angels. If the angels had possessed that elevation by simple virtue of the fact that they are angels, then all the angels would have been included in this elevation. It was not common to them in the definition of angel. We recognise that this is elevation of rank with Allah. It is the same for the khalifs of the people. If their elevation with the khalifate had been an elevation by essence, every man would have it. It is not general and so we know that that elevation is by rank.

One of His names is the High. Over whom, when there is nothing except Him? So He is the High by His Essence. Is He is High over that which is particular, when there is no He except Him? His elevation is by virtue of Himself, and He, in respect to existence, is the source of existents. Those in-time things which He calls high in themselves are not other than Him. He was the High when there was no height of relativity because the source-forms in non-existence had not smelt the scent of existence. They remain in their state in spite of the multiplicity of forms in existents, but the source is the same from the whole in the whole. The existence of multiplicity lies in the names which are the relationships, and they are non-existent matters. There is only the source which is the Essence. He is High through Himself,

not by any ascription to another. From this standpoint, there is no height of relative relation in the universe, but the aspects of existence which are distinct. The height of relativity exists in the one Source in respect of the many aspects. For that reason, you say of Him, Him and not Him, and you and not you.

Al-Kharraz, (2) may Allah have mercy on him, who is one of the aspects of Allah and one of His tongues with which He speaks of Himself, said that one only has gnosis by joining opposites together in respect of Him. "He is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden." (57:3) He is the source of what appears and the source of what is hidden in the state of its manifestation. There is none who sees Him other than Him and there is none who is hidden from Him. So He is manifest to Himself and hidden from Himself. He is called Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz and other than that from the names of things in-time.

The Hidden says "No" while the Manifest says, "Me," and the Manifest says, "No" while the Hidden says, "Me". This is found in every opposite, yet the speaker is one, and he is the same as the hearer in the statement of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, about what their selves say, (3) for they speak and hear what they say, and know what their selves say. The source is but one, even if the judgements are different. There is no way that anyone can be ignorant of this sort of thing. Every man knows from himself, and it is the form of the Real.

So things are mixed and numbers appear by the one in the known ranks. Thus "one" brought number into existence, and number divides the One. The principle of number only appeared through the numbered. Part of the numbered is non-existent, and part is existent. The thing is non-existent in relation to the senses while it is existent in relation to the intellect. There must be number and numbered. That must grow from one and it grows because of it. Every rank of the numbers has one reality like 9, for example, and 10 and down to 2, and upwards without end, and its reality is not a sum.

A name is not perceived by the addition of ones. 2 is one reality, and 3 is one reality, and so on until the end of these ranks. Even though the source [of numbers] is one, the source of one of them is not the source of the others. Addition encompasses them all, and it speaks of them from them and judges them by them. Twenty ranks (4) appeared in this statement, so composition entered into them. You will continue to affirm the source of what you deny in itself. Whoever recognises what we have related of the numbers, and that negation is the same as their affirmation, knows that the Real, who is disconnected by disconnection, is creature by connection, even though the creature is distinct from the Creator. The matter is the creature/Creator and it is the Creator/creature. That is from one source, rather is is the One source and it is many sources. Look at what you see!

Ibrahim's son told him, "My father, do what you are ordered." (37:102) The child is the same as his father, so he only saw himself sacrificing himself, "and He ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." (5) That which was manifested as a ram was manifested in the form of a human, and manifested in the form of a son. Rather, it is by the principle of the son being the same as the father. "He created from (one self) his mate." (4:1) He (6) married his own self, and from him are both his companion and his child. The matter is one in number. It is the same for nature and what is manifested from it. We do not see it diminishing by what appears from it nor increasing by the lack of what other than it manifests. That which is manifested is not other than it, nor is it the same as what is manifested according to the variety of forms in principle. This one is cold and dry, and that one is hot and dry. They are joined by dryness,

and distinct by another quality. The common source is nature, and the world of nature is composed of forms in one mirror. Rather, it is one form in different mirrors.

There is only bewilderment (hayra) by the dispersal of perspectives. Whoever knows what we have said is not bewildered. If he increases in knowledge, it is only from the principle of place, and place is the same as the source-form in which the Real varies in the locus of His tajalli. Conditions vary, so He assumes every condition. There is no condition except for the source in which He make tajalli of Himself, and there is nothing except this.

By this aspect, Allah is creature, so interpret!
And by this aspect, He is not creature, so remember!
The inner sight of whoever understands
what I have said is not confused, and only
the one who perceives it possesses sight.
The source of joining and separating is the same,
and it is multiplicity which never remains or departs.

The One who is High in Himself is the One who possesses the perfection in which all matters of existence are absorbed, as are all non-existent relations, inasmuch as it is not possible that any of these attributes be lacking from Him, be they praiseworthy by custom, logic, or law, or blameworthy by custom, logic or law. That belongs only to the One named Allah. As for what is named other-than-Allah, it is either a locus of His tajalli or a form which is in it. If it is the locus of His tajalli, it contains distinction. Be-cause of that, there must be distinction between the One who makes tajalli and the place of tajalli; if it is a form in it, that form is the source of the essential perfection because it is the same as what is manifested in it. That which belongs to Allah belongs to that form. However, it is not said that it is Him nor that it is other-than-Him.

Abu-l-Qasim ibn Qasi (7) indicated this in his book, The Removal of the Sandals, and he said, "Each Divine Name is qualified by all the Divine Names, and described by their description." It is so. Each Name indicates the Essence and the meaning which is set out for it and which demonstrates it. In respect to its indication of the Essence, it possesses all the names, and in respect to its indication of the meaning which is singular to it, it is distinct from others, such as the Lord, the Creator, the Fashioner, etc. The Name is the same as the Named in respect to the Essence, and the Name is other than the Named in respect to the meaning which is particular to it.

If you have understood that the "high" is as we have mentioned, you know that it is neither place nor height of rank, for height of rank is particular to the administration of authority, like the Sultan and the judge, wazirs and qadis, and all who have rank, be they worthy of that rank or not. Height is by attributes which are not like that. The most knowledgeable of people can be ruled by the person with the position of power, even if that person is the most ignorant of people. This is the height of rank according to the principle of what he has over me in himself. When he retires, his high rank vanishes. The one with knowledge is not like that.

Notes to Chapter 4:

1. Qur'an 7:54, "...then He settled Himself firmly on the Throne."
2. Abu Sa'id Ahmad ibn 'Isa al-Kharraz, died in Cairo 286/899. He said, "I only knew Allah by joining the opposites," and then recited, "He is the First and the Last, the Outward and the

Inward."

3. Hadith, "Allah forgives my people what their selves say to then as long as they do not act upon that."

4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 1000.

5. "And We ransomed him with an immense sacrifice." Qur'an: 37:107.

6. Adam.

7. Sufi leader of rebellion against the Murabitun in the Algarve.



5: The Seal of the Wisdom of Being Lost in Love (1) in the Wisdom of Ibrahim (Abraham)

Ibrahim is called the intimate friend, and he was an intimate friend (khalîl), because he was penetrated (takhallal) and gathered all the qualities of the Divine Essence. The poet says:

You pervaded the course of my spirit,
and that is why the intimate friend is called the intimate friend.

It is like the colour which permeates the coloured, so it is a non-essential matter ('arad) in respect to its essential substance (jawhar), and it is not like the place and that which it occupies. Or it means the penetration of the Real into the existence of the form of Ibrahim. Each of these two principles is true as was mentioned, for each points to an aspect which appears without overstepping it.

Do you not see that the Real is manifest in the qualities of beings in-time and He gives news of that from Himself, and He is even manifest in the attributes of imperfection and the attributes of blame? Do you not see that the creature is manifest with the qualities of the Real from first to last, and all of them belong to him as the attributes of in-time things belong to the Real? "Praise belongs to Allah," so the results of praise from every praiser and one praised go back to Him, and "the whole affair will be returned to Him," (11:132) It includes what is blameworthy and praiseworthy, and there is only one or the other.

Know that when something is penetrated by something the first is contained by the second, so the penetrating is the name of the actor veiled by the penetrated, which is the name of the one acted upon, and it is the Outwardly Manifest. The name of the actor is the Veiled, the Inwardly Hidden. It is its food, as water permeates wool and so makes it expand. If the Real is the Outwardly Manifest, then the creature is veiled within Him, and creation is all the Names of the Real, His hearing and seeing, and all His ascriptions and discernments. If the creature is outwardly manifest, then the Real is veiled and hidden in him, and so the Real is the hearing of the creature, and his seeing, hand and foot, and all his faculties as it related in sound hadith. (2)

If the Essence were exempt from these relations, it would not be divinity. These relations are made by our sources, so we make Him god by our dependence on His godness. He is not recognised until we are recognised. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." Such a person is the creature with the most knowledge of Allah. Some sages, especially Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, claim that one can have gnosis of Allah through disregarding the world. This is false. Indeed, the non-time pre-time is not recognised as god until that which depends on its being God is known. Thus it is a proof of Him. Then after this, in the second state, (3) unveiling accords you that the Real Himself is the source of the proof of Himself and His godness. The universe is but His tajalli in the forms of their source-forms whose existence is impossible without Him. He assumes various forms and modes according to the realities of these sources and their states, and this is after our knowledge of Him that He is our God.

Then the last unveiling comes, so our forms appear to you in Him, and some of us appear to others in the Real, and then some of us recognise each other and some of us are distinct from one another. Among us are those who recognise that our recognition of ourselves occurs in

the Real, and some of us are unaware of the presence in which this recognition of ourselves takes place. "I seek refuge with Allah from being one of the ignorant." (2:67)

By the two unveilings together, He only judges us by ourselves, rather we judge ourselves by ourselves, but through Him. That is why He says, "Allah's is the conclusive argument," (6:149) meaning against those who are veiled when they say to the Real, in conformity with their desires, "Why did you do this or that to us?", thinking that it was not in conformity with their desires. "On the Day when the legs are bared," (68:42) means the matter which the gnostics unveil here. They see that the Real did not do to them what they allege that He did, but that it was from themselves. For He only lets them know what they are in themselves. From this their argument will dissolve, and the decisive proof of Allah will remain.

If you say, what is the benefit of His words, "If He had willed, He could have guided every one of you," (6:149; 16:9) we say in If He willed "if (law)" is a particle of impossibility showing impossibility. He only willed the matter as it is. But the source of possibility accepts the thing and its opposite in the principle of logical proof, and it is the same with any two logical principles. That which occurs is that which the possibility implies in the state of its immutability. The meaning of "If We had guided you" is, had He shown you the Truth. Allah does not open the inner eye of every possibility in the universe to the perception of the matter as it is. There are those who know and those who are ignorant. Allah did not so will, so He did not guide all of them, and He will not will it, and it is the same as if He had willed it. How would He will this which is not? His volition is unified in its connections. It is a relationship dependent on the known, and the known is you and your states. Knowledge does not have an effect on the known, rather the known has an effect on knowledge, and so it accords from itself what it is in its source.

Divine discourse relates according to what agrees with the ones addressed and what logical reflection accords it. It does not come according to what unveiling gives. For that reason, there are many believers, but the gnostics who possess unveiling are few. "There is not one of us who does not have a known station," (37:164) and it is what you are in your state of immutability which you manifest in your existence. This is if it is confirmed that you have existence. If existence is confirmed to the Real and not to you, the judgement is yours without a doubt in the existence of the Real. If it is confirmed that you are existent, then the judgement is yours without a doubt, even if the judge is the Real. It is only the overflowing of existence on you.

You only praise yourself and you only blame yourself, and praise is only due to Allah for the overflowing of existence, for that is His, not yours. You are His nourishment by conditions, and He is your nourishment by existence. He is specified by what specifies you. The command comes from Him to you, and from you to Him, even though you are called obligated, a passive name (mukallaf), and He is not called obligated since there is no imposition upon Him.

He praises me, and I praise Him.
He serves me and I serve Him.
In one state I draw near to Him,
and in sources I deny Him.
So He knows me and I do not know Him,
and I know Him and I witness Him.
Where is independence

when I help Him and assist Him?
That is why the Real brought me into existence.
Then I knew Him and manifested His existence.
Hadith (4) brought us that,
and in me He achieved His goal.

Then the intimate friend, Ibrahim, peace be upon him!, possessed this rank by virtue of which he was called the intimate friend. For that reason, he made hospitality to guests a sunna. Ibn Masarra (5) associates him with the angel Mika'il in respect to provisions. Provision is that which nourishes those provided for: when provision permeates the essence of the one provided for until nothing remains in it except permeation and nourishment flows in all the parts of the one nourished. There are no parts in divinity, so all the divine stations are penetrated which are designated by the Names, and by which His Essence is manifested.

We are His as our proofs confirm,
and we are ours.
Only my being belongs to Him,
and we are His as we are ours.
I have two aspects: Him and me,
but He does not have "me" through me.
However, His place of manifestation is in me,
so we are His - like me.
"Allah speaks the truth, and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 5:

1. Huyûm is the intense love and passion which causes bewilderment and distraction.
2. ref. to hadith qudsî via Abu Hurayra, "My slave does not draw near Me with anything I love more than what I have made obligatory for him. My slave continues to draw near me with superogatory actions until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 81:38:2)
3. The first unveiling was annihilation (fanâ') and the second is going-on (baqâ').
4. "I created existence so that I might be known."
5. Muhammad ibn Masarra al-Jabali, Andalusian Sufi and thinker, born in Granada 269 /883 and died near there in 319/931.

6: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Real in the Word of Ishaq (Isaac)

The ransom of a Prophet by an animal's sacrifice
as an offering!
How can the bleating of a ram be equal
to the voice of a man?
Allah Almighty magnified the ram out of concern for us or for it,
but I do not see by what measure.
There is no doubt that the bodies
of cows and camels are larger,
but they relinquished the rank of sacrifice
to the offering of the ram.
Would that I knew how a ram
replaced the khalif of the All-Merciful with its small body!
Do you not see that the command to sacrifice
implies correspondence and promises gain and diminishes loss?
There is no creature higher than the mineral,
and after it comes the plant according to its ranks and measures.
The animal comes after the plant,
and each one had gnosis of its Creator by unveiling and evident proof.
As for the one named Adam, he is limited
by intellect, thinking, and the conventions of belief.
It is that which Sahl (at-Tustari) (1) and the realizer
said as we do (2) - because we and they are in the degree of Ihsan.
Whoever witnesses the matter I have witnessed
will say what I have said, both secretly and openly.
Do not pay any attention to words
which contradict our words and do not sow grain in the land of the blind!
They are the "deaf and dumb" in the text of the Qur'an
which the one protected from wrong action brought for our ears.

Know, may Allah support us and you! that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, peace be upon him, told his son, "I saw in a dream that I must sacrifice you." (37:102) He did not interpret it although the dream is the presence of the imagination (khayâl). It was a ram which appeared in the form of Ibrahim's son, and Ibrahim confirmed the vision. So his Lord ransomed his son from Ibrahim's illusion with the "mighty sacrifice", which was the interpretation of the vision with Allah, but Ibrahim was not aware of it.

The tajalli of form in the presence of the imagination requires another knowledge by which one can perceive what Allah means by that form. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said to Abu Bakr when he interpreted a dream, "You have guessed part of it rightly, and you have missed part of it." Abu Bakr asked him to inform him of what was right in it and what was wrong, but the Prophet did not do so.

Allah said to Ibrahim when He called him, "Ibrahim, you have discharged your vision." (37:105) He did not say to him, "You have confirmed the vision that it is your son" because he did not interpret it. He took what he dreamt literally, whereas dreams require interpretation. That is why the 'Aziz, the ruler of Egypt, said, "...if you can interpret dreams."

(12:43) The meaning of interpretation is the transposition from the form of what one dreamt to another form. The cattle represented the hard years and the fertile years. If Ibrahim had been faithful to the dream, he would have sacrificed his son, since he believed in the dream that it really was his son, whereas with Allah it meant the "mighty sacrifice" in the form of his son. He ransomed him by what occurred in Ibrahim's mind, but it was not ransomed in actuality with Allah.

There is a common form to the sensory form of the sacrifice and the imaginary form of Ibrahim's son. If he had seen a ram in his imagination, he would have interpreted it as his son or something else. Then Allah said, "This was a most manifest trial," (37:106) i.e. his clear test, meaning his experience in knowledge - whether or not he knew what the perspective of the dream required in the way of interpretation. He knew that the place of the imagination required interpretation, but he neglected it and the condition inherent in it, and for this reason he believed in the vision.

Taqi ibn Mukhallad, the transmitter of traditions, did so too, having heard in a tradition he was sure of, that the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Whoever sees me in a dream, sees me when awake, for Shaytan cannot assume my form." (3) So Taqi ibn Mukhallad saw the Prophet in a dream in which the Prophet gave him milk to drink. Taqi ibn Mukhallad believed his dream, but he made himself vomit and threw up the milk. If he had interpreted the dream, he would have known that milk means knowledge, equal to the quantity that he drank. Do you not see that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received a goblet of milk in a dream and he said, "I drank it until satiety came out of my nails, and then I gave the surplus to 'Umar." It was said, "Messenger of Allah, what do you interpret it as?" He replied, "Knowledge." (4) He did not leave it as milk in its dream form since he had knowledge of the state of dreams and how they must be interpreted. It is known that the form of the Prophet, peace be upon him, which the senses see, is buried in Madina, and that the form of his spirit and his subtle form have never been seen by anyone nor by himself. For this reason, the spirit of the Prophet takes on material existence in the form of his body as he died, and nothing is missing from it. So it is Muhammad, peace be upon him, who appears in dreams through his spirit in a bodily form which resembles his buried body, for Shaytan cannot assume the form of his body, (5) may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and Allah protects the one who sees him. For this reason, whoever sees this form takes from it all that it orders or prohibits or gives good news of, even as he takes judgements from him in the life of this world - according to what they indicate from text, immediate or implicit. If he gives him something, that thing is subject to interpretation, unless it is manifest in the senses as it is in the imagination, and so does not require interpretation. It is based on this aspect that Ibrahim, the intimate friend, relied, even as Taqi ibn Mukhallad did. The vision has these two aspects. (6)


Allah taught us adab in what He did with Ibrahim and what He said to him when He gave him the station of prophethood. We know that when we see Allah in a form which logical reason rejects, we must interpret that form according to the Sharf'a, whether it is in the state of the one who sees Him, or in the place in which He is seen, or the two together. If logical reason does not refute it, then we take it as we saw it, just as when we see Allah in the Next World.

So the One, the All-Merciful,
has forms in every place from what is hidden and what is manifest.
If you said, "This is the Real!" you spoke truly;

and if you said, "It is something else," you interpreted.
His principle is not in one place rather than another,
but it brings the Real to the creatures.
When He manifests Himself to the eyes,
the intellects deny him by insistent proofs.
He is accepted in the tajalli to the intellects,
and in that which is called the imagination (khayâl).
That which is sound is the seeing.

Abu Yazid, (7) may Allah be pleased with him, says of this station, (8) "Had the Throne, and all it contains a hundred million times over, been in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have felt it." This is the magnitude of Abu Yazid in the world of bodies, but I say, "If the limitlessness of that which exists could be conceived of as being limited, and had it been contained as an existent source in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he would not have been aware of it in his knowledge." For it is confirmed that the heart contains Allah, although it is not described by satiety. Had it been filled, it would have saturated.

Abu Yazid also said, "We have pointed to this station, saying:
O Creator of things in Yourself,
You encompass all You have created!
You create that whose being has no end in You,
for You are narrow and vast!
Had that which Allah created shone in my heart,
this shining dawn would not have shone.
But that which contains Allah
does not exclude creation.
How is that, O Hearing?"



Anyone can create by illusion in his imagination that which has no existence save in the imagination. This is a common matter. By aspiration (himma), the gnostic creates that which has an outside existence in his aspiration. However, it continues only as long as the aspiration continues to preserve it without being tired by preserving what it created. (9)

When it happens that the gnostic neglects to preserve what he created by concentration, that creature ceases to exist, unless the gnostic has mastered all the presences and does not neglect anything. Rather, he must witness at least one of these presences. If the gnostic creates something by his aspiration and possesses this encompassment, that creature's form will appear in every presence, and the form will preserve itself. If the gnostic neglects a presence or many presences while seeing one of the presences, and while preserving the form of what he created in the presence he is in, all the forms will be preserved by the preservation of that form in the presence which he does not neglect. For neglect is never universal, either among the common or the elite. I have exposed a secret here which the People of Allah have guarded jealously, for it contains a refutation of their allegation of being the Real. For the Real is never unconscious of anything, and the slave must be unconscious of something in favour of something else. Inasmuch as he preserves that which he has created, he says, "I am the Real," (10) but he does not maintain it the way the Real maintains it that is the difference. Inasmuch as he is unconscious of any form and its presence, the slave is distinguished from the Real. He must be distinct, although all the forms are maintained by his preservation of a single one of these in the presence of which he is conscious. This is preservation by inclusion, and the

preservation of the Real of what He created is not like that. Rather, His preservation is of each form in particular. This matter which I have just communicated has never been written about by anyone - neither by me nor by any others - except in this book. It is unique in time. Take care lest you forget it!

The presence which you remain conscious of, with the form which resembles it, is like the Book about which Allah said, "We have not omitted anything from the Book." (6:38) It therefore integrates the tangible and the intangible. None will recognise what we have said except the one who is himself a Qur'an. (11) The one who fears Allah will have a furqân, (12) which is, as we mentioned, this matter in which the slave is distinct from the Lord. This furqân is the highest furqân.

At one moment, the slave is the Lord without a doubt,
and at another the slave is most certainly the slave.
If he is the slave, he is vast by Allah,
and if he is the Lord, he is in a restricted life.
Insofar as he is the slave,
he sees the source of himself,
and without a doubt
his hopes expand from him.
Inasmuch as he is a lord, he sees all of creation,
from the presence of angels and the kingdom, demanding from him,
And he is unable to answer their demands by his essence.
For this reason, some of the gnostics weep.
Be the slave of a Lord, and do not be the lord of His slave,
so you will not be suspended and tested in the fire.

Notes to Chapter 6:

1. Famous Sufi who studied under Sufyan ath-Thawri. d. 282/896. Wrote a short commentary on the Qur'an.
2. That the inanimate has more greater gnosis of Allah and obeys Him more than other creatures.
3. Al-Bukhari (6592); Muslim 42:10.
4. In Abu Dawud and Ibn Hanbal.
5. As in the hadith of al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. Either it remains on its dream form or it is subject to interpretation.
7. Al-Bistami, d. 261/874. Famous Sufi known for his ecstatic expressions.
8. The station of the vastness of the heart.
9. Language derived from Qur'an 2:255, "...their preservation does not tire him."
10. Al-Hallaj.
11. i.e. The Perfect Man.
12. Qur'an 8:29, "O you who believe! If you have fear of Allah, He will give you a furqan..."

7: The Seal of the Wisdom of Elevation in the Word of Isma'il (Ishmael)

Know that the one called Allah is Unique (Ahad) by Essence and by all His names, and every existent thing is only attached to Allah by its own lord exclusively, for it is impossible for an existent to possess the whole. As for Divine Unity (ahadiyya), no existent possesses any of it because one cannot have one part of it while another has another part. Unity does not admit of divisibility. His Unity integrates all of Him by potentiality.

The happy one is the one who is the one "who was pleasing to his Lord." (19:55) There is no one who is not pleasing to his Lord because it is by him that lordship (rububiyyah) (1) is sustained. He is pleasing to Him, and so he is happy. This is why Sahl at-Tustari said, "Lordship has a secret, and this secret is you." He was addressing every source. "Had the secret been disclosed, lordship would have been invalidated." He used the word "law" (2) which is the particle of impossibility - so it is never manifested, and lordship is never invalidated - for the source has no existence except by its Lord. The source is always existent, therefore lordship is never invalidated.

He who is pleasing is beloved, and all that the beloved does is beloved, so everything is pleasing, because the source could not act unless the act belonged to its Lord. The source is made tranquil by having an act attributed to it, but it is content with what appears in it and from it of the acts of its Lord, and is pleased with these acts, because every doer and producer is pleased with his act and product. He completes his act and product according to its basis. "He gives each thing its created form and then guides it," (20:50) that is, He revealed to it that He gave everything its creation, so it does not admit of decrease.

Isma'il, peace be upon him, by his discovery of what we mentioned "was pleasing to his Lord." In the same way, every existent thing who is pleasing to its Lord is also pleasing to the Lord of another, because lordship is only obtained from each of the names, not from the One of Unity. What is specific to it from the whole is only what is attributed to it. So He is its Lord. None is attached to Him in respect of His Unity. For this reason, the people of Allah are forbidden tajalli in the Unity. If you look at Him by Him, He is the One who is looking at Himself, and He continues to be Himself looking at Himself by Himself. If you look at Him by yourself, unity vanishes because of you. If you look at Him both through Him and through you, Unity also vanishes because the pronoun of the second person implies that there is something else besides that which is regarded. There must be some relationship which necessitates the duality of the regarder and regarded, and so Unity vanishes, even though there only exists the One who sees Himself by Himself. It is known that in this description, He is the Regarder and the Regarded.

It is not possible that the one who is pleasing be totally pleasing, unless all that he manifests comes from the act of the One who is pleased with him. Isma'il was distinguished from other individuals by how Allah described him, namely, that "he was pleasing to his Lord."

It is the same for every "self at peace" to which it is said, "Return to your Lord." He only commanded it to return to its Lord who called it, and so it recognised Him among the totality, "well-pleasing and well-pleased. Enter among My slaves!" (89:28) to the degree that they have this station. The slaves mentioned here refer to every slave who has gnosis of his Lord, who is content with Him, and does not turn to the Lord of another while preserving the unity

of the source which is necessary. "Enter My Garden," which is My veil, (3) and My Garden is not other than you, so you veil Me by your essence. There is only gnosis of Me by you and you only exist by Me, so whoever has gnosis of you has gnosis of Me, and there is no gnosis of Me, for there is no gnosis of you. If you enter into the Garden, you enter into yourself, so you will know yourself by a gnosis other than the gnosis by which you had knowledge when you knew your Lord. You will have two sorts of gnosis: gnosis of Him in respect of yourself, and gnosis of yourself and Him in respect of Him, not in respect of you.

You are a slave and you are a lord
to whomever you are a slave in respect of.
And you are a lord and you are a slave
to whoever possesses the covenant in speech.
Every knot has a person over it who unravels it
by one who has another knot.

Allah is pleased with His slaves, and "they are well-pleasing and well-pleased with Him." He is pleasing, so the two presences confront each other and accept likes, and the likes are opposites because the two likes are a single reality which does not unify them since they would not then be distinct. There is only the distinct, so there is no like. There is no like in existence, and so there is no opposite in existence. Existence is one reality, and the thing is not opposite to itself.

Only the Real remains,
no phenomenal being remains.
There is nothing connected, nothing distinct.
For that reason, the proof of the eye-witness came,
so I only see His source with my eye when I see!

That is for "the one who fears his Lord" lest He makes distinction by his knowledge. By that distinction, we indicated the ignorance of sources in existence according to what the knower brought, so distinction occurs among the slaves, and distinction occurs among the lords. If distinction had not occurred, one divine name would have been interpreted in all its aspects by that by which another name is interpreted. The explanation of the Exalter is not that of the Abaser, and so on, but from the aspect of unity, as we said, every name indicates the Essence and its reality in respect to what it is. The One Named is but One. The Exalter is the Abaser in respect to the Named. It is not the Abaser in respect to itself and its reality. That which is understood differs in the understanding in respect to each of them.

Do not look at the Real.
Free Him from creation.
Do not look at creation,
and garb it in other than the Real.
Disconnect Him and connect Him,
and stand in a seat of honour. (4)
Stay in the state of gatheredness (jam') if you wish,
and, if you wish, in the forms in separateness (farq).
You will win all,
even if all set out to carry the day.
You will not be annihilated
and you will not have going-on

and the forms will not be annihilated
and will not have going-on.
Revelation will not be given to you
in respect to another, and you will not receive it.

Praise is by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat. The Divine Presence demands praise which is praiseworthy in itself. So one extols the Divine Presence by the truth of the promise, not the truth of the threat, for one goes beyond it, "and do not imagine that Allah break His promise to His Messengers." (14:47) He did not say, "and his threat", rather He said that He will pass over their wrong actions even though he threatens not to. He praised Isma'il because "he was true to his promise." (19:54) Possibility vanishes in respect to the Real, since in it is that which demands the probable.

Nothing remains except the One
who is true to His promise alone,
and an eye does not remain
seeing the threat of the Real.
If they enter the abode of misery,
in it they are in possession of delight, and a different bliss.
Than the bliss of the gardens of endless-time, but the matter is the same.
The difference between them occurs in the tajalli.
It is called punishment ('adhab) from the sweetness ('udhuba) of its food,
that is like the husk of it, and the husk protects it.

Notes to Chapter 7:

1. Rububiyyah: Lordship, the quality of being a lord. A term derived from the Qur'anic descriptions of Allah's lordship over creation. One might say the ecology of natural existence. It is an essential element in Sufic cosmology and is a most sophisticated concept which surpasses the crude specificity and mechanistic views of evolutionist biology. It is an energy system of relationships in constant change and altering dynamics. It functions through the different realms, the atomic, the mineral, the plant, and so on. It relates the levels of living organisms from the uni-cellular up to man, and the interpenetrations of organism and environment. It re-defines "event" from crude historicity to a picture of organism/event in a unified field. It is the underlying concept which allows us to abandon the dead mind/body split of the dying culture. It permits us to utilise and develop the energy concepts of Islamic/Chinese medicine - which hold a common energy concept at base. Rububiyya permits us to observe ONE PROCESS at work throughout every level of the creational realities.
2. "Law" (if, but probably not) expresses an unlikely condition, while "in" (if, but probably yes) expresses a probable condition.
3. Garden, Janna, also carries the connotation of veiling, concealing.
4. Qur'an 54:53-55, "The fearfully aware will be amid Gardens and Rivers on seats of honour in the presence of an All-Powerful King."

8: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Spirit (Rûh) in the Word of Ya'qub (Jacob)

The Din (1) is two Dins: the Din with Allah and with the one whom the Real knows, and who has recognition of the fact that the Real knows him; and the Din with creation; and Allah takes account of it since its goal is conformity with what Allah has willed of the Shari'a set down with Him. Allah said, "Ibrahim directed his sons to this, as did also Ya'qub, 'My sons! Allah has chosen this Din for you, so do not die except as Muslims'" (2:132) that is obeying Him. The Din brought the alif and the lam (2) of definition and acquaintance. It is the recognised Din. It is His words, "The Din with Allah is Islam," (3:19) and it is submission. So the Din is an expression of your obedience. That which is from Allah is the road which leads you to Him. Din is submission and the law (namus) is the road which Allah has set down.

Anyone who is described by submission to what Allah has prescribed for him is the one who has based himself on the Din, and it raises him up and establishes him as does the prayer. The slave is the product of the Din. Allah sets down judgements, and thus submission is the source of your action, and so Din is from your action. You will only achieve happiness by what comes from you. As happiness is established for you by your actions, so the Divine Names are only established by His actions, which are you and which are in-time. As He is called god by His effects, so you are called happy by your effects.

Allah bestowed His rank upon you since you established the Din and obeyed what He prescribed for you. I will enlarge on that, if Allah wills, in a useful manner, after we have clarified the Din which creation has which Allah takes account of when He says, "The Din is Allah's alone," (8:39) and all of it is from you, and not from Him except in respect to origin. Allah says, "They invented monasticism," (57:27) and monasticism consists of arbitrary esoteric rules (an-nawâmis al-hikmiya) which the known Messenger did not bring to the people from Allah by the traditional Prophetic method. When wisdom and clear benefit corresponded to these rules regarding the divine decision about the goal of the Shari'a of Allah, (3) Allah took it into account according to what He Himself prescribed. Allah did not prescribe it for them. Then Allah opened between Himself and their hearts the door of divine concern and mercy while they were not aware of it, and in their hearts He made them esteem their rules by which they seek "the pleasure of Allah" beyond the Prophetic method known by Divine definition. Allah says, "They did not observe it" those people who devised these rules and what was prescribed for them "as it should have been observed" - "unless it was purely out of the desire to gain the good pleasure of Allah." That was what they believed about it.

"To those of them who believed We gave their reward, but many of them are deviators." (57:27) "Many of them," i.e. those who have this worship prescribed for them, "are deviators," that is, do not submit to it and observe it properly. Allah does not accord to the one who does not obey it, a law which pleases Him, but the command requires submission. Its proof is that the one who is obligated either obeys with agreement or opposes it. The one who agrees and is obedient has no need of any discourse on it to prove it. The one who opposes it is seeking one of two matters from Allah to be judged regarding him: either overlooking of wrong actions and forgiveness, or being taken to task for that. One of the two is necessary because the command is true in itself. In any state, it is true that Allah guides His slave by his actions whatever state he is in, and so the state is the influencing factor.

Thus the Din is a reward, that is, the exchange for what is easy and for what for is not easy. "Allah is pleased with them, and they are pleased with Him" (97:8, 58:22) is the easy reward, and "As for any one of you who has done wrong, We will make him suffer great punishment" (25:19) is the reward of what is not easy. He passes over their wrong actions and this is their reward. It is proven that the Din is the reward. As the Din is Islam, and Islam is the same as being led, it leads to what is easy (the reward) and what is not easy (the punishment), and so it is the repayment. This is the language of the people of outwardness.

As for its secret and inwardness, it manifests itself in the mirror of the existence of Allah, so it does not refer to possibilities from Allah other than what their essences in their states accord. They have a form in every state, and their forms differ according to the difference of their states. The tajalli differs according to the difference of the state. The effect occurs in the slave according to what he is. None gives him good except himself, and none gives him the opposite of good except himself. Thus he gives bliss to his essence, and he also punishes it. He only blames himself and only praises himself. "Allah's is the conclusive argument" (6:149) in His knowledge of them since knowledge depends on the known.

The secret which is above this in this sort of question is that possibilities are based on their origin from non-existence. The existence of the created reality is only by the forms of the states on which the possibilities are based in themselves and their sources. Thus you know who has pleasure and who has pain, and from each of these states you know what follows ('aqaba); and since it follows, you derive punishment ('uquba) and penalty ('iqab) from it. It permits good and evil as two opposites which custom calls the good reward, and the evil punishment.

For this reason, He designates and elucidates the Din by custom because He relates to it what is necessary and what his state demands. Din is custom or habit, and the poet said, "Like your habit (Din) with the mother of little Harith...", that is, like your custom. What is understood by custom or habit is that the matter itself recurs. This is not the case in Din. Custom is repetition, but custom is only one intelligible thing while resemblance in forms exists. We know that Zayd is the same as 'Amr in respect to humanness, but humanness does not recur since, had it done so, it would have multiplied. It is but one reality, and the one does not multiply itself. We know that Zayd is not the same as 'Amr in respect to personality. The person of Zayd is not the person of 'Amr in spite of the realisation that personality is common to both. In the sensory, we say that humanness recurs because of this resemblance, and we say in sound judgement that it does not. From one aspect, there is no habit in reward, and from another aspect, there is habit even as there is reward by one aspect and no reward by another aspect. Thus reward is also a state in the possible. This is a question about which those who know this matter are unaware, and it is part of the secret of the Decree which governs creatures. Know that it is as if it were said of the doctor that he is the servant of nature - in the same way, it is said of the Messengers and heirs 4 that they are the servants of the Divine Command among people. In the heart of the matter, they serve the states of possible things, and their service derives from the sum of their own states on which they are based in the state of the immutability of their sources. See how wondrous this is!

Is not the the desired servant here the one who performs what is commanded by the one who is served, either by state or by word? So it is valid that the doctor be called the servant of nature if he acts according to the principle of assisting it. Nature produces in the body of the one who is ill a special state of being by which he is called "ill". If the doctor were to assist nature by service, he would also increase the magnitude of the illness by it when he wants to

repel the illness, seeking health. Health is also a part of nature by the growth of another state of being which differs from this state of being. Then the doctor is not the servant of nature, and yet he serves it inasmuch as he only heals the body of the one who is ill and changes that aspect, not the general one, for generalities are not valid in this sort of question. Thus the doctor is both a servant and is not a servant of nature.

In the same way, the Messengers and their heirs are in the service of the Real, and the Real has two aspects of judgement in respect to the states of the obligated. The matter proceeds from the slave according to what the will of Allah demands of it, and the will of Allah is attached to it according to what the knowledge of Allah demands of it. The knowledge of Allah is attached to it according to what the known accords it of its essence. The known only appears in its form. The Messenger and the heir serve the divine command by will, and yet they do not serve the will. The Messenger answered it seeking the happiness of the one who is under obligation. Had he served the Divine Will, he would not have given counsel, and yet he only gave counsel by it, i.e. the will. The Messenger and the heir are the doctors of the selves for Next life, obedient to the command of Allah when He commands them. So he looks at Allah's command, and sees that He has commanded him to do that which opposes His will. The command is only what He wills, and for this reason, it is the command.

He wills the command and it occurs, and He did not will the occurrence of what He commanded the commanded one to do, and so it did not occur from the commanded one therefore it is called opposition and rebellion. The Messenger conveys the news, and this is why he said, "The Sura of Hud (and its like) made me white-haired," when they came to him from His words, "Go straight as you have been commanded." (11:112) He did not know whether he was commanded to what complies with the will, so that it occurs, or to what does not comply with the will, so that it does not occur.

No one recognises the judgement of the will except after what is willed takes place, unless he is one whose inner eye has been unveiled by Allah. If he is, he will perceive the source-forms of the possibilities in their fixed state for what they really are. Then he judges according to what he sees. This belongs to certain people at certain moments, but they do not have it all the time. The Messenger said, "I do not know what He will do with me or with you." (5) So he made the veil clear, and he only meant that it emerges in a particular command, and no more.

Notes to Chapter 8:

1. Din: The life transaction, literally the debt or exchange situation between two parties, in this usage the Creator and the created, or as some say between the conditioned and the unconditioned, the limited and the limitless, or the many and the One.
2. The definite article.
3. Which is the achievement of human perfection through knowledge and actions.
4. Hadith, "The people of knowledge are the heirs of the Prophets."
5. Hadith in al-Bukhari.

9: The Seal of the Wisdom of Light in the Word of Yusuf (Joseph)

This luminous wisdom spreads its light on the presence of the imagination (khayal), and it is the first of the beginnings of divine revelation in the people of divine concern. 'A'isha, may Allah be pleased with her, said, "The first of what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had of revelation was the true dream. Then he only saw dreams which came like the breaking of dawn, and there was nothing hidden in it," (1) and her knowledge only extended to this. This lasted for six months, and then the angel came to him. She did not know that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had said, "People are asleep, and when they die, they waken up." Everything seen in the state of wakefulness is of that sort, although states differ. She spoke of six months, but all his life in this world was like that, as a dream in a dream.

Everything reported of this nature is called the world of the imagination (khayal), and for this reason, there must be interpretation: the matter which has a form in itself appears in a form other than it. The interpreter passes from these forms which the sleeper sees to the form upon which the matter is based. If he is correct, as in knowledge appearing in the form of milk, then he interprets the source of the form of knowledge from the form of milk, He discovers the source and says, "This form of milk refers to the form of knowledge."

When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, received revelation, he was taken from the ordinary sensory world. He was covered and withdrew from those who were present with him. When that left him, he returned, and he only received revelation in the "presence of the imagination", although it could not be said of him that he had been asleep.

It was the same when the angel appeared to him as a man. That was also from the presence of the imagination, for it was not a man, but rather an angel who had entered into the form of a man. The gnostic onlooker interpreted it until he reached its form in reality. Then he said, "This is Jibril who came to teach you your deen." (2) He told them, "Answer the greeting of the man," so he called him a man in respect to the form in which he appeared to them. Then he said, "This is Jibril," and he looked at the form to which this imaginary man would return. He spoke the truth both times, with the truth of the vision of the physical eye, and the truth in that this was Jibril without a doubt.

Yusuf, peace be upon him, said, "I saw eleven stars and the sun and the moon prostrate themselves in front of me." (12:4) He saw his brothers in the form of the stars and his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon. This is from the point of view of Yusuf. Had it been from the point of view of what was seen, the appearance of his brothers in the form of stars and the appearance of his father and mother in the form of the sun and moon would have been from their volition. Since they had no knowledge of what he saw, that which Yusuf perceived was in the repository of his imagination.

Ya'qub knew that when he related it to him, so he said, "O my son, do not tell your vision to your brothers in case they should devise some scheme to injure you." (12:5) Then he absolved his sons of deceit and ascribed it to Shaytan, who is the source of deceit. He said, "In truth, Shaytan is a clear-cut enemy to man," i.e. he manifests enmity. Then Yusuf said at the end of the affair, "This is now the interpretation of the dream that I had. My Lord has made it all come true," (12:100) that is, that He manifested it in the world of senses after it

was in the form of the imagination.

The Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said about it, "People are asleep". Yusuf spoke of what his Lord had rendered true in the status of one who dreams that he has awakened from his dream and interprets it, and does not know that he is still asleep. Then later when he wakes up, he says, "I dreamt such-and-such a thing, and then I dreamt that I woke up and interpreted in such-and-such a way." This is similar to that. Look at how great the difference of perception is between Muhammad, peace be upon him, and Yusuf, peace be upon him, at the end of the affair when Yusuf said, "This is the interpretation of my dream of long ago which my Lord has rendered true," that is, made sensory or sensed. It was always sensed, since the imagination only gives out sensed things, and it has nothing other than that. See how noble is the knowledge of the heirs of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace!

I would say more on this presence on the Muhammadan tongue of Yusuf, as you will soon understand, if Allah wills. Know that that which is referred to as other-than-Allah, or the universe, is related to Allah as the shadow is related to the person. The universe is the shadow of Allah. It is the same as the relation of existence to the universe, since the shadow exists in the senses without a doubt. But there must be something by which that shadow appears. If one were to remove that by which the shadow appears, the shadow would be intelligible but would not exist in the senses. Rather, it would be a potential in the essence of the person on whom it depends. The locus of the manifestation of this divine shadow called the "universe" is the sources of the possibilities by which this shadow extends itself. This shadow is perceived according to what it projects itself on from the existence of this essence, but perception occurs through His name, the Light. This shadow is projected on the sources of possibilities in the form of the unknown unseen.

Do you not see that shadows incline to the darkness, indicating the hiddenness they contain because of the distance of the relationship between them and the persons who project them? Even if the person is white, his shadow is like this. Do you not see that when mountains are distant from the eye of the onlooker, they appear black? In their actual sources they are other than the colour the senses perceive. This is only due to the effect of distance. It is like the blue of the sky. This is the effect distance has on the senses with non-luminous bodies. It is the same for the sources of possibilities which are non-luminous because they are non-existent. Even if they are described as unchanging, they are not described by existence since existence is light. Distance makes luminous bodies appear small in the senses, so this is another effect of distance. The senses perceive them as small in size, whereas in their sources they are large according to that degree and greater in magnitude. One knows by proof that the sun is larger than the earth, but it appears to be the size of a shield. That is also an effect of distance.

You only know the universe according to the amount you know the shadows, and you are ignorant of the Real according to what you do not know of the person on which that shadow depends. Inasmuch as He has a shadow, He is known, and inasmuch as one is ignorant of what is in the essence of the shadow of the form which projects the shadow, he is ignorant of Allah. For that reason, we say that Allah is known to us from one aspect and not known to us from another aspect. "Do you not see how your Lord stretches out shadows? If He had wished, He could have made them stationary," (25:45) i.e. it still would be a potential in Himself. It is as He said, that Allah would not give a *tajalli* of Himself to possibilities until He manifests the shadow. The shadow is as if it remains outside of the possibilities which do

not have a source manifested for them in existence.

"Then We appoint the sun to be a pointer to them," that is to His name, the Light of which we spoke, and the senses witness it, for shadows have no source in the absence of light. "Then We draw them back to Ourselves, in gradual steps," so Allah draws it back to Himself because it is His shadow which appeared from Him, and it is not other-than-Him. All that you perceive is the existence of Allah in the sources of possibilities. Inasmuch as the He-ness of Allah is He, it is His existence. Inasmuch as forms differ in it, it is the sources of possibilities. As the name of the shadow does not leave it by the difference of forms, in the same way the name of the universe or the name other-than-Allah does not leave it by the difference of forms. In regard to the Divine Unity of His being, the shadow is Allah, because He is the One, the Unique; and in respect to the multiplicity of forms, it is the world, so understand and realise what I have explained to you! Since the matter is as I mentioned, the universe is illusory, and it does not have a real existence. This is the meaning of the imagination, that is, you imagine that the universe is an autonomous extra thing outside of Allah. It is not like that in itself. Do you not see that in the senses, the shadow is connected to the person who projects it, and it is impossible that it be detached from that connection since it is impossible for something to be detached from its own essence? Recognise your source ('ayn), and who you are, what is your he-ness and what your relation to Allah is, and by what You are the Truth and by what you are the universe, "other", and whatever resembles these expressions. In this, those that know vie in excellence, so there is the one who knows and the one who is more knowing.

The Real is, in relation to a particular shadow, small or large, pure or more pure, as light is in relation to what veils it from the onlooker through coloured glass which tints it. At the same time, it has no colour, and so you see it as making a mirror-image of your reality to your Lord. If you say that the light is green by the greenness of the glass, you will have spoken the truth as your sensory vision testifies. If you say that it is not green and has no colour as evidence accords you, you will have spoken the truth as sound logical consideration testifies. This is light projected across the shadow, and it is the same as the glass which is a luminous shadow because of its purity. It is the same for one of us who has realised the Real. His form manifests itself in him more than it manifests itself in another. Among us there is the one for whom Allah is his hearing, seeing, and all his faculties and limbs, (3) according to the signs which the Shari'a gives in a transmission from Allah. In spite of this, the source of the shadow exists, so the pronoun of "his hearing" refers to him. Other slaves are not like this. The relation of this slave is nearer to the existence of Allah than the relation of other slaves.

Then the matter is as we have confirmed. So know that you are imagination and that which you perceive and of which you say, "It is not me" is also imagination. All of existence is imagination within imagination. True existence is Allah, the Real, in particular in respect to essence and source, not in respect to His Names, because the Names have two meanings. One meaning is His source which is the same as the "Named", and the other meaning is what it indicates and that by which the Name is separate from this other Name, and so distinct. The Ever-Forgiving is separate from the Manifest and the Hidden, and the First is distinct from the Last. Thus it is clear to you that each Name is the same as the other Name, and yet it is not the other Name. Inasmuch as the Name is the same, it is the Real, and inasmuch as it is not it, it is the imaginary Real which we discussed.

Glory be to the One who is only proven by Himself and Whose being is only confirmed by His source! The Hidden is pure non-existence, so whoever holds to multiplicity, holds to the

universe and the Divine Names and the names of the world. Whoever holds to Divine Unity holds to Allah in respect to His Essence which is independent of the universe, not in respect to its divinity and form. If the Essence is independent of the universe, then He is the source of its independence from the ascriptions of the Names, because it has the Names, and they indicated it as they indicate other named things in which their effect is realised. "Say: He is Allah, Absolute Oneness" (112:1) in respect of his source, "Allah, the Everlasting Sustainer of all" in respect to our dependence on Him. "He has not given birth" in respect to His He-ness and us, "and was born born" the same way, "and no one is comparable to Him" in the same way.

This is His description so He singled out His Essence in His statement, "Allah is Unique (Ahad)". Multiplicity appears by His attributes which are known with us. We beget and are begotten, we depend on Him, and we are equals to one another. This is the One who is pure above these attributes. He is independent of them as He is independent of us. There is no description of Allah except for this sura, the Sura al-Ikhlās (112), and it was revealed in that. The Divine Unity (ahadiyya) of Allah is in respect to the Divine Names which demand the unity of multiplicity on our part, and the Divine Unity of Allah, in respect to His independence from us and from the names, is the Divine Unity of the source. Both of them are included in the name, the Unique One (al-Ahad).

Know that Allah has not manifested the shadows and made them prostrate themselves, casting themselves to the left and the right, (4) except as indications for you of yourself and Him. In this way you are able to recognise who you are and what your relationship to Him is, and what His relationship to you is, until you know from where and by which divine reality that which is other-than-Allah is described, through its complete poverty to Him as well as the relative poverty of some to others. In this way also, you are able to know from where and by what reality it is that Allah is described by independence from people and the universe, and the universe is described by independence, i.e. the independence of some from others in an aspect which is the source of its need of some. For the universe is in need of causes without a doubt by essential need. The greatest of its causes is the causality of Allah, and there is no causality of Allah by which the universe is in need except for the Divine Names. The universe is in need of each of the Divine Names, whether from the universe like it or, from Allah Himself. Thus it is Allah, and not other-than-Him.

This is why Allah said, "Mankind! you are the poor in need of Allah whereas Allah is the Rich Beyond Need, the Praiseworthy." (35:15) It is known that we depend on each other. Our names are the Names of Allah since everything is, without a doubt, in need of Him. At the same time, our sources are His shadow, and not other-than-Him. So He is our he-ness, and He is not our he-ness. We have prepared the way for you, so look!

Notes to Chapter 9:


1. In al-Bukhari and elsewhere.
2. In Muslim, also an-Nawawi's Forty Hadith.
3. Hadith, see. p.11.
4. Ref. Qur'an 16:48, "Do they not see the things that Allah has created, casting their shadows to the right and to the left, prostrating themselves before Allah in complete humility."

10: The Seal of the Wisdom of Divine Unity (Ahadiyya) in the Word of Hud

Allah has the straight path which is manifest
and unhidden among the common people.
Its source exists in great and small,
in those who are ignorant of matters
and those who know.

For this reason, 'His mercy encompasses everything,' (1) great and small. "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) So all that walks on the Straight Path of the Lord, and is not of those "against whom Allah is wrathful" from this aspect, nor is he "astray". (2) As being astray is a non-essential quality, so divine wrath is also a non-essential quality. The source to which they return is the "mercy which extends to all things", and which preceded wrath. Everything which is other-than-Allah is a creature which crawls and which has a spirit. There is nothing which crawls by itself, rather it crawls by other than it. It crawls by the principle of following the One who is on a Straight Path. It is only a path by virtue of the fact that it is walked on.

If creation draws near you, Allah draws near you.
If Allah draws near you, creation does not follow.
So realise what we say on it,
and everything I have said to you is true.
There is no existent thing in phenomenal being
that you see which does not have articulation.
The eye only sees of creation
that its source is Allah.
But He is stored in it,
and for this reason, its forms are true.



Know that divine knowledges of taste (dhawq) which are acquired by the people of Allah differ according to the different faculties acquired from them, even though they derive from a single source. Allah said, "I am his hearing by which he hears and his sight by which he sees and his hand by which he strikes and his foot by which he walks." (3) So He mentioned that His He-ness is the source of the limbs which are the same as the slave. Thus He-ness is one, but the limbs are different, and every limb has one of the knowledges of taste which are specified from a single source, and differ according to the different limbs. It is like water which is but a single reality, yet differs in taste according to the different locations. The water of the Euphrates is sweet, and brackish water is salty, yet it is water in all its states and its reality does not change, even though the taste differs.

This wisdom is from the wisdom of the feet. It is the words of Allah, that whoever establishes His Books will eat "from beneath their feet" (5:66). The path which is the Straight Path is travelling on it, and walking and running on it. It is only by the feet. So this witnessing of the taking by the forelock by the hand of the One who is one the Straight Path only results in this special art from the knowledges of taste. "We will drive the evildoers" (19:86), (4) who are those who deserve the station to which they are sent, and destroy them by the west wind. (5) The wind takes them by the forelocks and carries them on, and it is the source of the passions which take them to Jahannam. It is the distance (6) which they imagined. When it carried

them to that abode, they reached the source of nearness, and so distance vanished. What is called Jahannam vanished in respect to them. They win the bliss of nearness in respect to merit since they were wrong-doers.

This pleasurable station of taste was not given to them as a favour. They received it by what they realities merited from the acts which they were doing. They were running with their actions on the Straight Path of the Lord because their forelocks were in the hand of the One who has this attribute. They did not walk by themselves, but by the principle of compulsion to reach the source of nearness. "We are nearer to him than you, but you cannot see." (56:85) Rather it is seen, and so the covering is stripped away, and "his sight is sharp." (7) What is specified as dead is from the dead, i.e. what distinguishes the happy from the wretched in usage. "We are nearer to him than his jugular vein." (50:16) What is specified as man is from man, so divine nearness is from distance as is not hidden in divine transmissions. There is no nearness nearer than that His He-ness be the source of the limbs of the slave and his faculties. The slave is not other than these limbs and faculties, so he is Allah witnessed in illusory creation. Creation is intelligible and Allah is felt and witnessed with the believers and the people of unveiling. Allah is intelligible with other classes, and creation is witnessed. So they are in the station of the salty, brackish water. The first group is the station of the sweet water which is pleasant to drink.

People are of two classes those who walk on the path recognising it and its end, for it is a straight path in respect to him; and those who walk on the path being ignorant of it and not knowing its end. It is the same path which the other class knows. The gnostic calls to Allah by inner sight, and the non-gnostic calls to Allah by limitation and ignorance. This is a special knowledge which comes from the lowest of the low (8) because the feet are the lower part of the person, and what is lower than them is none other than the path. Whoever recognises that Allah is the same as the Path, recognises the matter for what it is. Then Allah is travelling on it since there is no known except Him, and He is the source of the wayfarer and the traveller. There is no knower except Him. He is you, so know your reality and your Path (tariqa). The matter has been made clear to you on the tongue of the interpreter, (9) if you but understand. It is the true tongue, so the only one who will understand is the one whose understanding is Real.

Allah has many ascriptions and their existence varies. See how 'Ad, the people of Hud, said, "This is a storm cloud which will give us rain." (46:24) They thought good of Allah, and He is with the opinion of His slave. (10) Allah turned this word away from them. He informed them of what was more perfect and higher in nearness. When it rained upon them, that was the earth's portion and the seed was watered. He told them, "No, rather it is what you desired to hasten a wind containing painful punishment." He made the wind (rîh) an indication of what rest (râha) it contained for them. By this wind, He gladdens their spirits (arwah), delivering them from dark forms, difficult paths and black veils. There is punishment ('adhab) in this wind, i.e. a matter which they find sweet (ista'dhaba) when they taste it. It only pains them by the separation from familiar things. Thus punishment gives them good news. And the command is nearer to them than they imagine.

"Destroying everything at its Lord's command ! When morning came you could see nothing but their dwellings." (46:25) That is, their corpses, in which their true spirits lived, so the trueness of this special relation vanished from them; and a special life in their forms remains to them from Allah of which their skins, hands, and feet speak, (11) so does the punishment of the blows and thighs. (12) All that is related in a divine text.

Allah described himself by jealousy (ghayra). Out of jealousy He forbade actions unrestrained by limits (fawahish). The unrestrained act is only what is evident. As for the unrestrained which is hidden, it belongs to the one who manifests it. When He made the unrestrained haram, that it, forbade that the reality of what we mentioned be known, and that is the source of things, He hid it by other (ghayr). So other says: hearing is Zayd's hearing. The gnostic says that hearing is Allah. Thus nothing remains of the faculties and limbs. Therefore not everyone recognises Allah. People vie in excellence and ranks are differentiated, and the exceeding and exceeded are clear.

Know that Allah revealed to me and caused me to witness in a vision, which I received in Cordoba in 586, the sources of His Messengers and all His Prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. None of this group spoke to me except for Hud, peace be upon him. He told me why they were gathered together. I saw that he was a very large man of good appearance, subtle in reply, gnostic in matters of unveiling. My proof of his unveiling is His words, "There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a Straight Path." (11:56) What gift to creatures is greater than this? Then it is from the bestowal of favours on us by Allah that this speech reached us from Him in the Qur'an.

Then Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant us peace, completed its gathering for everyone by what he was told by Allah, for He is the source of "hearing, sight, the hand, the foot and tongue the source of the senses. The spiritual faculties are nearer than the senses. He is content with the defined and distant more than with the defined unknown which is nearer. Allah translated the speech of Hud to his people to inform us, and the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, translated the speech of Allah in turn to give us good news. Knowledge is perfected in the breasts of those who are given knowledge, "and none denies Our signs but the unbelievers," (29:47) for they cover up the signs when they recognise them through envy, meanness and injustice. We only see from Allah in respect of Himself disconnection (tanzih) or non-disconnection by definition in any ayat which He has sent down or in transmissions which have reached us from Him. Otherwise He has the Great Mist (al-'Ama') (13) which has no air above it and no air beneath it. Allah was in it before He created creation. Then He mentioned that He "established Himself firmly on the Throne." (57:4) This is also definition. Then He mentioned that "He descends to the nearest heaven." (14) This is also definition. Then He said that "He is in the heaven and in the earth," (15) and "He is with us wherever we are." (16) and He tells us that He is our source. We are limited, so He only describes Himself by limitation.

His statement, "There is nothing like Him," (42:11) is also limitation if we take the kaf ("like") as an appendage to other than the attribute. Whoever is distinct from the defined is defined by his phenomenal being which is not the source of what is defined. Freedom from limitation is limitation, and the absolute is limited by absoluteness for whoever has understanding. If we attach the kaf of ka-mithli (like) to the attribute, we define it. If we take "There is nothing like Him" as the negation of "like (mithl)", we realise the given and the sound transmissions that He is the source of things, and that things are defined. If their definitions differ, He is defined by the definition of everything with a definition. Nothing is defined unless it is a definition of Allah's. He moves in the designation of creatures and creation. Had the matter not been like that, existence would not have been valid, for He is the source of existence. He preserves everything by His Essence, and the preserving of something does not oppress Him. (17) His preserving of all things is His preserving of His form in that the thing is other than His form. Only this is valid. He is the witness in the

witness and the witnessed in the witnessed. (18) He is the spirit of the universe which is managed by Him, and it is the Macrocosmic or Great man (al-insan al-kabir).

He is all phenomenal being
and He is the One (al-Wahid)
who establishes my phenomenal being by His being,
For that reason, I said that He is nourished.
So my existence is His food, and we imitate Him in Him from Him,
if you look by the aspect of my taking refuge.

For his sorrow breathed, so the breath is related to the All-Merciful because He is Merciful by it. Divine ascriptions demand it from the bringing into existence of the form of the universe which we have said is what is manifest by Allah since He is the Manifest. It is His inward since He is the Hidden; and He is the First since He was when they were not. He is the Last since their source is in their manifestation. The Last is the source of the Manifest, and the Hidden is the source of the First. He has knowledge of all things since he knows Himself. When He brought forms into existence in the Breath, and the power of the ascriptions designated by the names appeared, the divine ascriptions then became valid for the universe. They depend on Allah. He said, "Today, I set down your ascriptions and raise up My ascriptions," i.e. I take from you your dependence on yourselves and return to you your dependence on Me. Where are those who are fearful of Allah? (19) they those who take Allah as a safeguard. Allah is their manifest part, i.e. the source of their manifest forms. They are the greatest of people, the most pure and the strongest among all. The one who has taqwa is the one who makes himself a safeguard for Allah by His form since the He-ness of Allah is the faculties of the slave. The one called the slave makes a safeguard for the One called Allah based on witnessing, so that the knower is distinct from the one who does not know. "Say: 'Are they the same those who know and those who do not know?' It is only people of intelligence who pay heed," (39:9) and they see into the core of the thing (20) which is sought from that thing. The negligent one does not precede the diligent, and similarly the hireling does not resemble the slave, Since Allah is a safeguard for the slave by one aspect, the slave is a safeguard for Allah by another aspect. Say what you like about phenomenal being. If you like, say that it is creation. If you like, say that is the Real. If you like, say that it is both the Real and creation. If you like, say that it is not Real from every point of view and not creation from every point of view. If you wish, say it is bewilderment in that. The goals are made clear by your specification of ranks. If it had not been for definition, the Messengers would not have reported the changing of the Real in forms, nor would they have described Him by the dropping of forms from Himself.

The eye only looks to Him,
and authority only rests with Him.

We are His, and by Him, in His hand, in every state, so we are with Him. For that reason, He is denied and recognised, disconnected and described. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by His eye is a gnostic. The one who sees Allah from Him in Him by his own eye is not a gnostic. The one who does not see Allah from Him nor in Him, and waits to see Him by his own eye is veiled and ignorant.

On the whole, each person must have some doctrine of his Lord by which he refers to Him and in which he seeks Him. So when Allah manifests Himself to him in it, he knows Him and goes near Him. If He manifests Himself to him in other than it, he denies Him and takes

refuge from Him and has bad adab in that matter while claiming he shows adab with Him. (21) He only believes in a divinity according to the [subjective] form he gives that in himself. The divinity of creeds is based on subjective positing. People only see themselves and what they formulate in themselves.

Look at the ranks of people in knowledge of Allah. That is the source of their ranks in vision on the Day of Rising; and I have taught you the necessary cause of it. Take care lest you be limited by a particular creed and deny what is other than it, so that a great blessing may pass you by. Indeed, knowledge of what the matter is based on may pass you by.

Make yourself a vessel for all the forms of belief. Surely Allah is vaster and greater than being contained by one creed rather than another. So Allah says, "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." (2:115) He did not mention one "where" less than another. He said there is the face of Allah. The face of the thing is its reality. By this He spoke to the hearts of the gnostics, that they might not occupy themselves with non-essentials in this life through seeking the like of this. The slave does not know in which breath he will be taken. He may be taken at the time of his negligence, and then he will not be equal to the one taken in a state of presence.

Then the slave who is perfect knows that this is linked to exterior form and to the state limited by turning the prayer toward the Masjid al-Haram. He believes that Allah is in his qibla when he prays. Those are some of the ranks of Allah from "Wherever you turn, the face of Allah is there." The direction of the Masjid al-Haram is one of them. In it is the face of Allah, but do not say "He is here", rather stop with what you perceive and cling to adab in turning towards the Masjid al-Haram, and cling to adab in the non-encompassment of the face in this particular whereness. Rather whereness is part of the sum of directions to which one turns. So Allah makes it clear to you that He is in the "where-ness" of every direction.

There are only creeds, so all directions are correct. Every correct thing has a reward. Every rewarded thing is happy. Every happy one is approved. If he is wretched at one time in the Next Abode, the people of preservation experience illness and pain in this life in spite of our knowledge that they are happy and the people of Allah. Among the slaves of Allah are those who are overtaken by these pains in the other life in an abode called Jahannam. Even so, none of the people of knowledge to whom the matter is unveiled for what it is declares that they do not possess a bliss particular to them in this abode. As for the loss of pain, they denied it, and so it was lifted from them. Their bliss is their rest from feeling that pain, or else bliss is particular and extra as is the bliss of the people of the Garden in the Garden. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 10:

1. ref. Qur'an 7:156, "My mercy extends to all things."
2. ref. Qur'an 1:7.
3. Hadith qudsi.
4. "We will drive the evildoers to Jahannam."
5. The worst of winds which does not fertilise trees or raise clouds. It is said that it was a west wind which destroyed 'Ad. It blows in the hot season and is very thirsty.
6. Jahannam comes from a root which means "deep", as in a deep well.
7. See Qur'an 50:22.
8. Ref. Qur'an 95:5, "We reduced him to the lowest of the low."

9. The Messenger of Allah in the hadith, "...I am his hearing, his sight, etc."
10. Hadith qudsi, "I am according to My slave's opinion of Me..."
11. Ref. Qur'an 41:21, "...that your hearing, eyes, and skin should not testify against you."
12. In the grave according to hadith.
13. "He was in the Great Mist with air neither above nor below it. "Hadith in Ibn Majah, Ibn Hanbal and at-Tirmidhi.
14. Hadith qudsi from Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim: "Our Lord who is blessed and exalted descends every night to the lowest heavens when two-thirds of the night has passed and says, 'Who supplicates to me so that I may answer him?'"
15. Qur'an 6:3, "He is Allah in the heavens and the earth."
16. cf. Qur'an 57:4.
17. Qur'an: 2:255.
18. cf. Qur'an 85:3.
19. i.e. have taqwa.
20. Lubb means both the core of a thing and or understanding.
21. Hadith in Muslim (Belief, 302) about the Day of Rising.



11: The Seal of the Wisdom of Revelation (Futuh) (1) in the Word of Salih

Among the signs are the signs of the mounts. (2)
That is due to the difference in destinations.
Among those with mounts are those
who make their mounts stand by the command of Allah,
and among them are those who cross
the deserts with their mounts.
As for those who stand,
they are the people of the source, (3)
and those who cross the deserts are the aliens.
Each of these has the revelation (futuh) of the Unseen worlds
brought to him from Allah on every side.

Know, may Allah grant you success, that the business (of bringing into existence) is based on uniqueness (fardiyya), and uniqueness has triplicity which is from three and upwards. Three is the first singular. The universe exists from this Divine Presence. Allah, may He be exalted!, says, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, 'Be' and it is." (16:40) This is an essence which has volition and speech. (4) Had it not been for this essence and its volition, which is connecting attention to something particular in order to bring anything into being (and when He turns to that thing, He says, "Be"), that thing would not have been. Then tripartite uniqueness also appeared in that thing, and it is by this uniqueness in respect to the thing that it is valid that it take and that it be described by existence. Its triplicity is its thingness, its hearing, and obeying the command of the One who gives it form by bringing it into existence. It accepted three by the threeness of its fixed essence when it was in the state of its non-existence in counterbalance to the essence of the One who brought it into existence. Its hearing is in counterbalance to the volition of the One who brought it into existence. Its agreeing to comply with the command to take form is in counterbalance to His word "'Be!' and it is." Taking form is thus related to the thing. If it not had the capacity to take form from within itself when this is said, it would not have been. Allah only brought the thing into existence after it was not in the command of taking form, by the thing itself.

Allah confirmed that taking-form (takwin) belongs to the thing itself, not to Allah; and that that which belongs to Allah is His command. Similarly, He told us about Himself when He said, "Our Word to a thing when We desire it is just to say to it, "Be!" and it is." He ascribed taking-form to the thing itself from the command of Allah. Allah speaks the truth, so this is understood in the command itself. Someone who is feared and not disobeyed commands His slave: "Stand!" and the slave stands in obedience to his master's command. When this slave stands, the master only has the command to the slave to stand. Standing is the slave's action, not the master's action.

Thus taking-form is based on triplicity, i.e. from three, on both sides the side of Allah and the side of creation. That applies to bringing meanings into existence by proofs. The proof must be compounded of three in a special structure and special condition. There must be a result from it. The result is that the thinker constructs his proof from two propositions. Each one proposition contains two singulars, and so it four. One of the four is repeated in the two propositions in order to link one to the other as is marriage. It is three and no more because of one is repeated in both of them. That is how it is the goal exists. Then this compound occurs

in a special aspect which is that the two propositions are connected to each other by the repetition of that one singular, by which triplicity, and the special condition that the principle be more general by cause or equal to it, is valid. Then the principle is true. If it is not like that, then it will give a result which is not true. This existent thing in the universe is like the ascription of actions to the slave, removed from their ascription to Allah, or the ascribing of taking form, the object of our discussion, to Allah absolutely. But Allah only ascribed it to the thing which was told, "Be!" A representation of that is if we wish to prove that the universe exists from a cause, (5) we say that every thing which is in-time has a cause. (6) Thus we have the in-time and the cause. Then in the other proposition we say that the universe is in time. The "in-time" is repeated in the two propositions. The third singular is "the universe". From this it follows that the universe has a cause and the conclusion appears in what was mentioned in the first proposition - that is the cause.

The special aspect is the repetition of the "in-time", and the special condition is the generality of the cause ('illa) because the cause is what effects the existence of the in-time. The principle is general in the in-timeness of the universe in relation to Allah.

We therefore make the judgement that every being which is "in-time" has a cause, i.e. in the greater proposition, unless that cause is equal to the principle or the principle is more general than the cause. So the universe would thus fall under the principle of the cause [in both cases]. The result is true.

The principle of triplicity also appears in bringing meanings into existence, which makes use of proofs. The root of phenomenal being is triplicity. For this reason, the wisdom of Salih, peace be upon him, is what Allah manifested in the delay of three days when He promised to punish the people of Salih, and the promise was kept. The truth was the result, and it was the Cry by which Allah destroyed them, and "morning found them lying flattened in their homes." (11:67) On the first of the three days, the faces of the people became yellow, and on the second day red, and on the third day black. When the three days had passed, their predisposition was proved and corruption appeared in them. That manifestation was called "destruction".


The yellowing of the faces of the wretched is in counterbalance to the shining of the faces of the happy in the words of Allah, "Some faces on that day will be radiant (musfira)" (80:38) which comes from sufur, when the dawn becomes white. This is a manifestation as the yellowing of the faces on the first day was the manifestation of the sign of the wretchedness of Salih's people. Then came the counterbalance offered to His word about the happy, "laughing".(80:39) Laughter is one of the causes which produces redness in the face. Among the happy, it is the cheeks which are red.

Then He made the complexion of the wretched turn black as a counterbalance to His word, "joyous (mustabshira)". (7) That is the effect that joy has on their skins as black effected the skins of the wretched. For this reason, He spoke of the two groups with good news (bushra). He spoke a word to them which affected their skin (bashara) which turned a colour by which skin had not been described before this event. Allah said in regarding the happy, "Their Lord gives them the good news of His mercy and good pleasure," (9:21) and He said about the wretched, "Give them the news of a painful punishment." (9:34) There was an effect on the skin of each group because of the effect of the discourse on them. It only appeared in them outwardly by virtue of the understanding which was fixed inside them. So it is them who have that effect on themselves just as taking form only comes from them. "Allah's is the

conclusive argument." (6:149) Whoever understands this wisdom and confirms it in himself and witnesses it, gives his self rest from connection to other. He knows that good and evil only come from him. By good, I mean what agrees with his goal and suits his nature and temperament. By evil, I mean what does not agree with his goal or suit his nature and temperament. The one who possesses this witnessing makes out excuses for all existent beings, even if they do not make excuses. He knows that all he has for himself is from himself, as we mentioned at the beginning, since knowledge follows the known. When something which does not agree with his goal comes to him, he tells himself, "Clench your fists and puff out your cheeks!" "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 11:

1. Opening. Salih has this in view of the fact that the mountain split open to reveal the she-camel, he opened belief to those who believed in him. The camel is a mount.
2. Mounts which are miracles proving the truthfulness of the Prophets - like the Buraq of Muhammad and the she-camel of Salih.
3. Eyewitnessing.
4. i.e. a triplicity: Essence, volition, and speech (qawl).
5. Here he uses sabab, something by which something is brought about, rather than 'illa, which is something which alters or effects something, as in cause and effect. 'Illa is the reason behind judicial reasoning.
6. First proposition.
7. Comes from a root meaning skin (bashara), the root of bashshara, to give good news, is to announce something which produces a change in the complexion.



12: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Heart in the Word of Shu'ayb (Jethro)

Know that the heart of the gnostic of Allah is from the mercy of Allah, and it is vaster than mercy. The heart encompasses Allah, but His Mercy does not encompass Him. (1) This is the language of the general public from the door of indication (ishara). Allah is merciful (rahim) and is not the one to whom mercy is shown (marhum). Mercy has no power over Him. As for the indication from the tongue of the elite, Allah describes Himself by the breath which is from breathing. The Divine Names are the same as the Named, and the breath is none other than Him. They require what they give the breath of realities, so the realities which the Names demand are not other than the universe. Thus divinity (ulûhîya) demands the object of worship (ma'luh) and sovereignty (rubûbiya) demands the object of lordship (marbub). (2) They have no source except by the universe in existence and determination (taqdir). Allah, in respect to His essence, is independent of the universe, but sovereignty does not possess this principle. The matter remains between what the sovereignty demands and what the essence deserves of independence from the universe. Sovereignty is based on reality and the description is only the same as this essence.

Then the matter changes according to the relationships. It is reported that Allah only describes Himself with compassion for His slaves. The first of what was breathed from sovereignty by Himself is related to the Merciful by His bringing into being the universe, which sovereignty demands by its reality and all the Divine Names. By this aspect it is confirmed that "His mercy encompasses everything." (3) It encompasses Allah. It is wider than the heart or equal to it in capacity.

Know that Allah, as it is confirmed in sound tradition, changes in the forms of the tajalli. When the heart contains Allah, it does not contain other-than-Him of creatures along with Him. It is as if He filled it, and the meaning of this is, that when it looks to Allah in His tajalli to it, it is not possible to look at another with Him.

The heart of the gnostic in respect to vastness is as Abu Yazid al-Bistami said, "If the Throne and what surrounds it a million times over were in one of the corners of the heart of the gnostic, he still would not feel it." Al-Junayd said about this meaning, "If the in-time were compared to the out-of-time, not a trace of it would remain." The heart encompasses the out-of-time, so how can it sense the in-time as existent? If Allah varies His tajalli in forms, then by necessity, the heart is expanded and contracted according to the form in which the divine tajalli occurs. There is nothing left in the heart apart from the form in which the tajalli occurs. So in relation to the seal, the heart of the gnostic or the Perfect Man, is at the stage of the place that is the face of the seal. It does not exceed it, rather it is its size and shape in respect to roundness. The face is round, square, hexagonal, octagonal, etc. in form. If the face is square, hexagonal, octagonal or whatever form, its place in relation to the seal is like it and it is not like other than it.

This is the opposite of what one group alluded to, saying that Allah gives a tajalli according to the predisposition of the slave. This is not how it is. The slave is manifest to Allah according to the form in which Allah gives him a tajalli of Himself.

The exact clarification of this question is that Allah has two tajalli: an unseen tajalli and a visible tajalli. From the unseen tajalli He accords the predisposition on which the heart is

based, and it is the tajalli of the Essence of which the Unseen is the reality. It is the He-ness which merits it by His word from Himself: "He". His He-ness is always He. If this predisposition comes to the heart, then the visible tajalli is manifested to it in the Visible world, so the heart sees it. He is manifest by the form of whatever tajalli he has, as we mentioned. Allah gives it the predisposition by His word, "He gave everything its creation, then guided it." (20:50) Then He lifted the veil between Him and His slave, so He sees Him in the form of his belief in Allah. Allah, who is in the belief, is He whose form the heart contains. He is the One who gives it a tajalli, and so it knows Him. The eye only sees by belief, not hidden in the varieties of belief.

Whoever limits Allah, denies Allah in other than what he limits Allah to, and confirms Allah in what he limits Him by, when Allah gives him a tajalli. Whoever frees Allah from limitation does not deny Allah, and so confirms Allah in every form in which Him changes. He is given from himself according to the form in which the tajalli infinitely occurs. The forms of the tajalli are without end. Similarly knowledge of Allah has no limit in the gnostic who understands the forms. Rather, he is a gnostic at every moment, seeking increase of knowledge by "Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge! Lord, increase me in knowledge!" (4)

The business is endless from both sides. This is as if you said: Allah and creation. If you looked at His words, "I am his foot by which he runs, and his hand with which he strikes and his tongue by which he speaks," and so on of the faculties whose location are the limbs which are not separate, then you said that the matter is all Allah or the matter is all creation. It is creation by one ascription and it is Allah by another ascription, yet the source is one. The source of the form is what gives the tajalli of the source of the form which did not exist before the tajalli. It is the one giving the tajalli and the one receiving it. See how wondrous is the command of Allah in respect to His He-ness and in respect to His relationship to the universe in the realities of His most Beautiful Names!

Who is He and what is He and what is His source?

He is He!

Whoever is of His commonality is of His elite,
and whoever is of His elite is of His commonality.

There is no source except source,
so the light of His source is His darkness.

Whoever is ignorant of this
experiences grief in himself

And none recognises what we have said
except for the slave who has aspiration (himma).

He said, "There is a reminder in that for anyone who has a heart," (50:37) because the heart (qalb) is transformed (taqallaba) in the various forms and attributes. He did not say, "to him who has an intellect" because the intellect limits. (5) It confines the matter to a single description, but reality refuses to be contained. It is also a reminder for those who have intellect, and they are those who have creeds by which some deny others, and some curse others, and they do not have helpers. (6) The god of the one with a creed does not have jurisdiction over the god of someone with another creed. The one who has a creed defends it; he defends the matter which he believes of his god, and supports it. He does not support that which is not in his creed. For this reason, he has no effect on the creeds of his dissenters, and similarly his dissenters have no help from the god who is in his creed; so they have no

helpers. Allah excluded help from the divinity of creed based on the isolation of one creed to the exclusion of others. The helped is gathered and the helper is gathered.

For the gnostic, Allah is the Recognised Who is not denied. The people of recognition in this world are the people of recognition in the Next World. This is why Allah said, "anyone who has a heart (qalb)" (50:37) since he knows the transformation (taqlib) of Allah in forms by the transformation in shape. He recognises himself from himself. His self is not other than the He-ness of Allah. There is nothing in phenomenal being from what is, or what will be, which is other than the He-ness of Allah. Rather, He is the source of He-ness. So He is the gnostic and the knower and the acknowledger in this form. He is the one who is neither gnostic nor knower. He is also the one who denies Him in the other form. This is the portion of the one who knows Allah from the tajalli and the witnessing in the source of gatheredness (jam'). It is His word, "anyone who has a heart" which transforms the shapes by His transforming.

As for the people of belief (iman), they are the ones who imitate those who imitated the Prophets and Messengers in what they transmitted from Allah. They are not those who imitate the people of concepts and those who interpret the transmissions received by basing them on their logical proofs. These are the ones who imitate the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace. They are the ones who are meant by His words, "or listens well" (50:37) to what divine transmissions relate of the sunna of the Prophets. He means this is the one who "will listen well, having seen the evidence" (50:37) with awareness of the presence of the imagination and its use.

That is what the Prophet said about ihsan, "Worship Allah as if you saw Him," (7 and "Allah is in the qibla of the one who prays." (8) For that reason, he is a witness. Anyone who imitates the people of logical speculation and is limited by them is not the one who will listen well. The one who will listen well must witness what we have mentioned. When he does not witness what we have mentioned, he is not the one meant by this ayat. These are those of whom Allah has said, "When those who were followed disown those who followed them." (2:166) The Messengers do not disown their followers who follow them.

Realise, my friend, what I have mentioned to you in this wisdom of the heart. As for its specification with Shu'ayb, there is some branching off (tash'ib). Its branches are not numbered because every creed has a branch, and so they are all branches or creeds. If the covering is removed, it is removed for everyone in accordance with his creed. The covering might be removed in a manner contrary to his creed in principle. It is His words, "What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with." (39:47) Most of them in principle are like the Mu'tazilites, believing that Allah will execute the threat on the rebel should he die without repentance. If he dies and is given mercy from Allah, then concern preceded it, for He did not punish him. Thus he found Allah Ever-Forgiving, All-Merciful, and there appeared to him from Allah something he did not reckoned with.

As for He-ness (huwiya), some people are firm in their belief that Allah is such-and-such. When the covering is removed, they see the form of their belief, and it is true. They believe in it. Then the knot is unravelled and the creed vanishes and becomes knowledge through contemplation (mushahada). After vision is sharpened, weak vision does not return. It appeared to some people by the variety of the tajalli in forms through vision, since the tajalli is not repeated. He verifies it in he-ness; and there appeared to them from Allah in Allah's He-ness what they never reckoned with before the covering was removed. (9)

We mentioned the form of the ascent in divine recognitions after death in our Book of the Tajalliyat, in which we mentioned what we gathered from the group regarding unveiling, and the benefits we derived from them in the question that they did not know about. One of the most wondrous of matters is that man is always in ascent, but is not aware of that due to the fineness of the veil and its delicateness. It is like His words, "They were only given a simulation of it." (2:25)

He, the One, is not the same as the Last. Therefore the two semblances with the gnostic are similar dissimilars. The one possessed of realisation sees multiplicity in One, as he knows what the Divine Names indicate. Although their realities differ and are numerous, it is yet One Source. It is an intelligible multiplicity in the source of One. In the tajalli, it is multiplicity witnessed in the one source even as it matter which you obtain in the definition of each form. It and the multiplicity of forms and their variety derive, in fact, from one substance (jawhar). It is its own matter (hayula). Whoever recognises himself with this recognition recognises his Lord. Allah is in His creation due to His form, rather He is the source of its he-ness and its reality.

For this reason, the only ones among the 'ulama' who tumble on the recognition of the self (nafs) and its reality are the divinely inspired messengers and the great among the Sufis. As for the philosophers and masters of thought among the ancients and the mutakallimun in their discourse on the self and its whatness, none of them stumbled on its reality, and logical speculation can never provide it. (10) He who seeks knowledge of it by means of logical speculation, swells himself up and boasts without vigour or substance. "They are those whose efforts in the life of this world are misguided while they suppose that they are doing good." (18:104) He who seeks the matter by other than its path will not achieve its realization.

How excellent is what Allah said about the universe - He changes it with the breaths into a new creation in one source. He said in respect to some, rather to most of the world, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) This means that they do not know the renewal of the command in breaths. However, the Ash'arites stumbled on it in some existent things, and these are non-essentials (a'râd). The Hisbaniya (11) stumbled on it regarding the entire universe. The logical philosophers consider them ignorant of it. However, the two groups erred. As for the error of the Hisbaniya, in spite of what they said regarding change in the entire universe, they did not stumble on the oneness of the source of the intelligible substance (jawhar) which underlies the form. The universe only exists by the oneness, as the oneness is only intelligible by the universe. If they had said that, they would have obtained the degree of realisation in the matter.

As for the Ash'arites, they do not know that the entire universe consists of a collection of non-essentials (a'râd). It changes in every moment since accidents do not last for two moments. That appears in their definition of things. So when they defined the thing, its phenomenal being is clear in the definition of non-essential matters. These non-essentials mentioned in its definition are actually the source of this independent substance and its reality. Inasmuch as it is a non-essential, it is not independent, but by the sum of what is not independent, comes what is independent. It is like occupation of space in the definition of the independent essential substance, and its acceptance is non-essential in its essential definition. There is no doubt that that the containing-of-form is an accident since it is only in the container, and that is not independent it is in the essential nature of the substance. Occupation of space is a non-essential, and it only occurs in the thing occupying space, and so it is not independent. Occupation of space and containing-of-form are not based on the source of the

defined substance by an extra matter, since essential

definitions are the source of the defined and its he-ness.

That which does not last two moments becomes that which lasted two moments or indeed several moments! What was not independent became independent in their view! They do not understand the basis of this, and these people "are dubious about the new creation."

As for the people of unveiling, they see Allah in a tajalli of Himself in every breath, and there is no repetition of the tajalli. They also see by witnessing that every tajalli grants a new creation and takes away a creation. Thus its departure is annihilation in the presence of the tajalli, and it is going-on by what the other tajalli grants. So understand!

Notes to Chapter 12:

1. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My earth nor My heaven contain Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."
2. lit. "god-ed" and "Lord-ed".
3. cf. Qur'an 7:156.
4. Ref Qur'an 20:114: "Say, 'My Lord, increase me in knowledge!'"
5. The root meaning from which intellect ('aql) comes means to hobble a camel.
6. ref to Qur'an 29:25, "You have adopted idols apart from Allah as tokens of mutual affection in this world. But then on the Day of Rising you will reject one other and curse one another. The Fire will be your shelter. You will have no helpers."
7. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari.
8. Hadith in al-Bukhari.
9. Ref. Qur'an 39:47, "If those who did wrong were to possess all that If those who did wrong owned everything on earth, and the same again with it, they would offer it as a ransom to save themselves from the evil of the punishment on the Day of Rising. What confronts them from Allah will be something they did not reckon with. them from Allah that they never reckoned with."
10. Being veiled by limitation.
11. The Hisbaniya were sophists, a group known in the history of philosophy for doubts, scepticism and sophism who held that the universe changes at every moment since there is no objective Reality. All is subjective.

13: The Seal of the Wisdom of Power (Malk) in the Word of Lut (Lot)

Malk is power and force, and the strong man with power says, "I have power over the kneading, since I am forceful in kneading it." When the poet, Qays ibn al-Hatim, described his attack with a spear in verse, he said:

I have power over it
and so I made its rupture wide,
and you see standing under it what was behind it.

That is to say that he used enough force in the thrust. It was what Allah said regarding Lut, peace be upon him, "If only I had the power to combat you, or could take refuge in some powerful support!" (11:80) The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Allah showed mercy to my brother Lut, and he took refuge in a powerful support." So the Prophet said that Lut was with Allah who is strong. It was Allah whom Lut, peace be upon him, meant by the strong pillar, and resistance when he said, "If only I had the power". Here it is aspiration (himma) in relation to man in particular.

The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "From that time, the time in which Lut, peace be upon him, said, 'or could take refuge in some powerful support,' after that, Prophets have only been sent with some power from their people." His tribe protected him as Abu Talib protected the Messenger of Allah. His words, "If only I had the power to combat you" is because he heard Allah say, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning," (30:54) by origin, "and then after weakness, gave you strength." Strength is by appointing, and it is non-essential strength. "Then after strength ordained weakness and grey hair." Appointing is connected to grey hair. As for weakness, it returns to the basis of its creation as He said, "He created you from a weak beginning." Allah returns him to that from which He created him, as He says, "then some of you revert to the lowest form of life that, so after having knowledge, they may know nothing at all." (16:70) Allah mentions that he returns to the first weakness. The old man is judged to be as weak as the child is. A Prophet is only sent after he has reached the age of forty. It is the time which is the beginning of decrease and weakness. For this reason, Lut said, "If only I had the power to combat you," although that demands effective aspiration (himma). If you were to ask: "What prevents him from using effective aspiration while it is present in the wayfarers (sâlikûn) among the followers when the Messengers are more entitled to that?" you spoke the truth. However, you lack another knowledge, which is that gnosis does not leave the aspiration freedom of action. Whenever gnosis is great, then its freedom of action with the aspiration is weak. That has two reasons one is his realisation of the station of slavery and his regarding the root of his natural creation; (1) and the other reason is the oneness of the actor and the acted upon. The aspiration of a Messenger does not appear, since the latter aspect prevents it.

In this witnessing, he sees that his opponent does not turn from the reality on which he is based in the state of his source-form and the state of his non-existence. He only appears in existence through what he had in the state of non-existence by his source-form. He does not overstep his reality nor does he abandon his path. That is called dissent; yet it is a non-essential matter manifested by the veil which is over the eyes of the people, as Allah says, "but most people do not know." They know what is manifest and outward of the life of this world, but they are ignorant of the Next life. It is the other way round, so it is from their

words, "our hearts are veiled," (2) that is, in coverings. It is a covering which veils them from perceiving the matter for what it is. This and its like prevent the gnostic from acting freely in the world.

Shaykh Abu 'Abdullah ibn al-Qa'id said to Shaykh Abu's-Su'ud ibn ash-Shibli, "Why do you not act freely?" Abu's-Su'ud replied, "I have left Allah to act for me as He wishes." He meant the command of Allah, "so take Him as your Guardian." (73:9) The Guardian is the one with freedom of action, especially as He heard Allah saying, "Give of that to which He has made you successors (khalifs)." (57:7) Abu's-Su'ud knew, and the gnostics know that the command which he has is not his, and he is only a successor to it. Allah told him, "this command is the deen to which I have you successors and over which I have given you power, so take Me for a guardian in it," Abu's-Su'ud obeyed the command of Allah and took Him for a Guardian.

How can there remain any aspiration for the one who witnesses the like of this command? Aspiration (himmah) only acts by the property of concentration that which its possessor does not have, and acts on other than his concentration. This gnosis separates him from that property of concentration. The complete gnosis manifests gnosis at the end of incapacity and weakness. One of the Abdal (3) said to Shaykh 'Abdu'r-Razzaq, (4) "After you greet Shaykh Abu Madyan, (5) tell him, 'O Abu Madyan! Why is nothing difficult for us, yet things are difficult for you, and we long for your station and you do not long for ours?'" Similarly, although Abu Madyan had that station as well as the other, we are more complete than him in the station of weakness and incapacity. His badl said this to him; he did not say it.

The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said that this station is from the command of Allah to him: "I do not know what He will do to me or you. I only follow what is revealed to me." The Messenger acts according to what is revealed to him. He does not have anything else. If He reveals to him that he should act by ordinance, he acts. If he is prevented from acting, he does not act. The best part of choice is to abandon freedom of action unless the person is deficient in gnosis.

Abu's-Su'ud ash-Shibli said to his believing companions, "Allah gave us freedom of action fifteen years ago, and we abandoned it through politeness." This is the language of conceit. As for us, we did not abandon it through politeness, for abandoning would imply preference. Rather, we abandoned it by the perfection of gnosis. Gnosis does not oblige it on the strength of choice. When the gnostic acts by aspiration in the world, it is from divine command and compulsion, not by choice.

There is no doubt that the station of the Messenger demands freedom of action for the acceptance of the Message which he brings. Allah informs him of what will be accepted in his community and among his people in order to manifest the deen of Allah. The wali is not like that. Nevertheless, the Messenger does not seek Him in the manifest, because the Messenger has compassion for his people. He does not want them to exceed by having the proof appear against them because that would entail their destruction. He spares them.

The Messenger also knew that when something inimitable (6) is manifested to the community, some of them believe in it, and some recognise it but deny it out of injustice, arrogance or envy. Some of them attribute it to magic and deception. The Messenger sees that, and he also sees that no one will believe unless Allah illuminates his heart by the light of belief. When the person does not look by that light called belief, the inimitable miracle has no benefit for him. Their aspiration does not seek inimitable matters, since the effect is not

uniform among those who see it, nor is it in their hearts as He said in respect to the most perfect of Messengers and the most knowing of creation and the most truthful in state, "You cannot guide those you would like to but Allah guides those He wills." (28:56)

If aspiration did have an effect, no one would be more perfect than the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, nor have a higher nor stronger aspiration than him, yet even so his aspiration did not bring about Abu Talib, his uncle, becoming Muslim, and it was to the Prophet that the ayat which we mentioned was revealed. Similarly, Allah said of the Messenger, "It is only his to deliver the message." (7) And He said, "You are not responsible for their guidance, but Allah guides whoever He wills," (2:272) and He added in Surat al-Qasas, "He has best knowledge of the guided," (28:56) those to whom knowledge of their guidance was given in the state of their non-existence in their source-forms. It is established that knowledge follows the known. Whoever is a believer in his source-form and in the state of his non-existence, appears in that form in the state of his existence. Allah knew that of him, so that is what he is like. For that reason, Allah said, "He has best knowledge of the guided."

When Allah said the like of that, He also said, "My Word, once given, is not subject to change," (50:29) because My Word is based on My knowledge of My creation. "and I do not wrong My slaves," that is, I do not decree that disbelief (kufr) on them which makes them wretched and then I demand of them what is not in their capacity to do. Rather, We only deal with them according to what We gave them knowledge of, and We only gave them knowledge of what they gave Us from themselves by that on which they are based. So if they do wrong, they are the ones who are unjust. For this reason, He said, "but they wronged themselves. Allah did not wrong them." (8) Finally, We only said to them what Our essence accorded that We say to them. Our Essence is known to Us by what it is based on; so, if We say this, and do not say that, then We only spoke by what We knew to say. We spoke the word from Us, and obedience or lack of obedience is up to those who hear.

So all is from Us and from them, (9)
and acceptance is from Us and from them.
If they are not from Us,
We, without a doubt, are from them.

So,. my friend, realise this wisdom of power in the word of Lut. It is a gate which belongs to gnosis. The secret (10) has been made clear for you, and the command is clear. It is included in the even which is called the odd.

Notes to Chapter 13:

1. Which is weakness, and the slave obeying the command of the Master, as in Qur'an 30:54, "It is Allah who created you from a weak beginning."
2. Two places: 2:88; 4:155.
3. Abdal, plural of badl, a substitute. Shaykh al-Akbar says, "They are seven. Whoever travels from one place and leaves his body in its form so that no one recognises that he has gone, that one is only a badl. He is modelled on the heart of Ibrahim, peace be upon him."
4. A jurist and one of Abu Madyan's disciples.
5. Abu Madyan: Shu'ayb ibn al-Husayn al-Andalusi, great Maghribi Sufi, born ca. 520/1126 near Seville and died near Tlemcen in 594/1197.
6. Mu'jiza, a miracle performed by a Prophet to prove his truthfulness and which others are

unable to do.

7. Ref. Qur'an 5:99 and several other places.

8. 2:57, 9:70, etc. in many places in the Qur'an.

9. The apparent sources. The Word is from him and obedience from them.

10. The secret of the Decree.



14: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Decree (Qadar) in the Word of 'Uzayr (Ezra)

Know that fate (qada') is the judgement of Allah on things, and Allah's judgement on things is according to His knowledge in them and of them. The knowledge of Allah in things is based on that which known things accord Him of what they are in themselves. The decree (qadar) is the timing of how things are in their source without increase. (1) Fate is only decreed for things by themselves. This is the source of the secret of the Decree for the one who has a heart or gives ear. He is a witness "Allah's is the conclusive argument." (6:149)

Properly speaking, the judge (hâkim) studies the source of the question which he judges according to what its essence demands. The one sentenced to what is due him is, in fact, a judge over the judge when he sentences him to that. Every "judge" is sentenced to what he sentences, and in it he is the judge, whoever he is. Grasp this question! The decree is only unknown by the force of its appearance. It is not recognised, so there is much seeking and earnest request in it.

Know that the Messengers, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, inasmuch as they are Messengers not inasmuch as they are awliya' and gnostics are in ranks according to that on which their communities are based. They only have the knowledge with which they were sent, according to what the community of that Messenger needs, no more and no less. Communities differ, some have more need than others, so Messengers differ in the knowledge of the message just as their communities differ. It is what Allah said: "Those Messengers: We favoured some of them over others." (2:253)

In the same way, they also differ in what springs from their essences, peace be upon them, in the varieties of knowledges and judgements they have according to their predispositions. This is what Allah said: "We have preferred some of the Prophets over others." (17:55) And Allah said in respect of creation, "Allah has favoured some of you over others in provision." (16:71) Provision from Allah can be spiritual like knowledges and sensory like food. Allah "only sent it down in a known measure." (15:21) It is the due which creation seeks. Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) He sends down according to what He wills. (2) He only wills what He knows, and so He commands it. What He knows is as we have stated. It is only by what the known accords.

Timing basically belongs to the known. Fate, knowledge, will and volition follow the Decree. So Allah only gives the understanding of the secret of the decree in respect to knowledges to the one who has been given complete gnosis. Knowledge gives complete rest to the knower, and it gives painful punishment to the knower as well. It gives two opposites. By knowledge, Allah describes Himself with both wrath and pleasure, and by knowledge the Divine Names are opposite one another. A reality (3) governs the absolute existent and the limited existent. It is not possible that there be something more complete than it or stronger or greater than it, because of the universality of its jurisdiction, both limited and unlimited.

The Prophets, may Allah bless them and grant them peace, only take their own knowledges from a particular divine revelation. Their hearts are free of logical speculation because they know the limitations of the intellect in respect to its cognitive perception. The intellect is unable to perceive matters for what they really are. Simple communication is also unable to perceive that which is only accorded by taste (dhawq). Perfect knowledge remains only in the

divine tajalli and in what Allah removes of veils from the springs of the inner sight and the eyes. They perceive matters - their non-time and in-time, their non-existence and existence, their impossibility, necessity and possibility - for what they truly are in their realities and sources.

Since the request of 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, occurred on the elite path, censure fell on him as is related in tradition. (4) Had he sought the unveiling which we mentioned, perhaps censure in that would not have fallen on him. The proof of the simplicity of his heart is in his statement, "How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?" (2:259) His form, peace be upon him, is in this statement of his, as the form of Ibrahim is in His words, "Show me how You bring the dead to life." (2:260) That necessitates the response by the action which Allah manifested when He said, "Allah caused him to die a hundred years, then He brought him back to life," and He said, "Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh." So he saw how bodies grow with the witnessing of realisation. He showed him how it was. He asked about the decree which is only perceived by unveiling to things in the state of their permanence in their non-existence. That was not granted. That is one of the properties of divine cognisance, so it is impossible that any except Allah know it. They are the keys of the First (5) the keys of the unseen which only He knows. Allah informs only those slaves whom He wills on such matters.

Know that they are only called keys in the state of opening. (6) The state of opening is the state of connecting taking-form to things, or rather the state of connecting the decree to the decreed. None has any taste in that except Allah. Neither tajalli nor unveiling occur in it since only Allah has power and action in view of the fact that He has absolute existence which is unlimited.

When we saw that Allah censured 'Uzayr, peace be upon him, when he asked about the Decree, we knew that 'Uzayr was seeking this cognisance. Thus he was seeking to possess the power (qudra) which is connected to the decreed (maqdur). That is only claimed by the One Who has absolute existence. Thus he sought the impossible. How-things-are is only perceived by taste.

As for what we relate of what Allah revealed to him, "If you do not desist, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood," it means I will remove the path of transmission from you and give you matters based on tajalli. Tajalli only occurs according to what you have of the predisposition by which the perception of taste occurs. You know that you only perceive according to your predisposition. You look at this matter which you are seeking. If you do not see it, you know that you do not have the predisposition which it requires. That is one of the properties of the Divine Essence. You have learned that Allah "gives everything its created form." (20:50) So if He did not give you this particular predisposition, then it is not your creation. If it had been your creation, then Allah, who informed you that "He gives everything its created for," would have given it to you. It is you who desist from this sort of question in yourself. There is no need for any other prohibition. This is a mark of concern Allah showed to 'Uzayr, peace be upon him. He knew that from his own knowledge and was ignorant of that from his own ignorance.

Know that wilaya (7) is the universal encompassing sphere. This why it is not intersected, and so it is informed about things. As for the prophethood of law-giving and the Message, it is intersected, and it was cut off in Muhammad, peace be upon him. There will be no Prophet after him, either giving law or bound by law. There is no Messenger after him, and he is the

lawgiver. This hadith (8) is a fragment of the manifestation of the awliya' of Allah, because it contains the cutting off of the taste of complete perfect slavery, so the name of slavery, which is particular to it, was not used. The slave does not want to share with his Lord, who is Allah, in the same name. Allah is not called "prophet" or "messenger." However, He is called Wali and is described by that name. (9) Allah says, "Allah is the Wali of those who believe," (2:257) and He says, "He is the Wali, the Praiseworthy." (42:28) This name, "wali", continues to be applied to the slaves of Allah both in this world and the Next. A name which is particular to the slave and not to Allah no longer remains since prophethood and the message have been cut off.

"Allah is gentle to His slaves," (42:19) so they still have the general prophethood in which there is no law (shari'a), and they still have the law in striving in the confirmed ordinances. They still have heirs in the laws. The Prophet said, "The 'ulama' (men of knowledge) are the heirs of the Prophets." (10) The only inheritance here is that they strive with the ordinances, and so they legislate them.

If you see a Prophet speaking a language outside the simple ordinances of the Shari'a, that is due to the fact that he is a wali and a gnostic. For this reason, his station in respect to his being a man of knowledge and a wali is more perfect and complete than it is due to the fact that he is a Messenger or someone who legislates and has a Shari'a. If you hear one of the People of Allah speaking, or it is related to you that he said, "Wilaya is higher than prophethood," that speaker only means what we mentioned. Or if he says that the wali is above the Prophet or the Messenger, he means in the same person. He is the Messenger, and inasmuch as he is a wali, he is more complete than he is by simply being a Prophet. It does not mean that the wali who follows him is higher than him. The follower never overtakes the followed in that in which he follows him. If he had overtaken him, then he would not be his follower. So understand that!

The starting point of the Messenger or Prophet who brings a Shari'a is wilaya and knowledge. Do you not see that Allah commanded him to seek increase of knowledge, not increase of anything other than it? Allah commanded him, "Say: 'Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" ((20:114) This means: you know that the Shari'a consists of making certain deeds obligatory and prohibiting certain actions. These actions take place in this world, so they come to an end. Wilaya is not like that. If it had been cut off, it would have been cut off in respect to itself just as the message is cut off in respect to itself. If it had been cut off, it would not still have a name. Wali is a name which Allah will continue to have. (11) This belongs to the slaves by following a model, realisation and attachment. (12)

He told 'Uzayr, "If you do not desist from asking about how the decree is, I will efface your name from the register of prophethood. The business will come to through unveiling by tajalli and the name "prophet" and "messenger" will vanish from you." Allah will still have his wilaya. The context of the state indicated that this speech came as a threat. Whoever has this state when he is addressed in this fashion, knows that he is threatened with the cutting off of some of the special ranks of wilaya in this abode, since prophethood and the message are a special rank in wilaya based on some of the ranks which wilaya contains. He knows that he is higher than the wali who has neither law-giving prophethood nor the message.

If someone has another state which necessitates that the rank of prophethood be confirmed for him, that then is the promise and not the threat. 'Uzayr's question was accepted because the Prophet is the elite wali. Because of the context, he knows that since the prophet has this

prerogative in wilaya, he cannot engage in what he knows that Allah will dislike him doing. He cannot engage in what he knows it is impossible for him to attain. When these circumstances exist for the one who has them and they are affirmed, then this divine statement, "I will efface your name for the register of prophethood" becomes a promise. Thus it becomes a transmission indicating a lasting rank. It is a lasting rank for the Prophets and Messengers in the Next Abode, which is not a place where a Shari'a is prescribed for any of Allah's creatures after they have entered the Garden or the Fire.

We define that as an entry into the two abodes of the Garden and the Fire. When the Day of Rising begins for the people who lived in the times of the gaps between the Prophets, (13) young children, and madmen, all of them will be gathered on one plain for the establishment of justice, recompense for wrong actions and the rewards for works which are due to the people of the Garden. Then they will be gathered separate from other people on one plain, (14) and a Prophet from the best of them will be sent among them. The Fire will be shown to them. This Messenger sent to these people will bring it, and he will say to them, "I am the Messenger of Allah to you." Some will affirm him and others will deny him. Then he will say to them, "Plunge into this fire. Whoever obeys me will be saved and will enter the Garden. Whoever disobeys me and opposes my command will be destroyed and he will be one of the people of the Fire." Whoever obeys his command and casts himself into this fire will be happy and receive his reward. He will find this fire to be "coolness and peace".(15) Whoever disobeys him deserves the punishment and will enter the Fire and descend into it because of his deed of opposition so that that justice from Allah might be set up among His slaves.

That is like the words of Allah, "Upon the day when legs are bared," (68:42) (16) i.e. for one of the immense matters of the Next World, "and they are called on to prostrate." This is obligation and Shari'a. Some will be able to prostrate and some will not be able to do so. (17) These are the one about whom Allah says, "They are called on to prostrate, but they will not be able to do so," just as some of the slaves cannot obey the command of Allah in this world like Abu Jahl (18) and others. This is according to what remains of the Shari'a in the Next Abode on the Day of Rising before people enter the Garden and the Fire. This is why we have written it down, and praise belongs to Allah, the Wali.

Notes to Chapter 14:

1. Qadar has a specific time and qada' does not. So qadar refers to the particular instances of qada'.
2. Ref. Qur'an, "Were Allah to expand the provision of His slaves, they would act as tyrants on the earth. But He sends down whatever He wills in a measured way." (42:27)
3. The secret of the decree.
4. Qur'an 2:259 "Or the one who passed by a town which had fallen into ruin. He asked, 'How can Allah restore this to life when it has died?' Allah caused him to die a hundred years then brought him back to life. Then He asked, 'How long have you been here?' He replied, 'I have been here a day or part of a day.' He said, 'Not so! You have been here a hundred years. Look at your food and drink it has not gone bad and look at your donkey so We can make you a Sign for all mankind. Look at the bones how We raise them up and clothe them in flesh.'" According to 'Ali, Ibn Jarir, Ibn 'Abbas, al-Hasan and Qatada, that is 'Uzayr.
5. The realities of sources.
6. Miftah, key, comes from the root, fath, opening.
7. According to the commentator, wilaya is annihilation in Allah, and Allah encompassed all, and "All things are passing except His face." (28:88).

8. "I am the Seal of the Messengers."
9. Wali means the friend of Allah, and refers to the gnostic. It is also one of the Divine Names which means the Guardian or the One who manages people's affairs.
10. Al-Bukhari.
11. As Yusuf said about Allah, "...You are my Wali in this world and the Next." (12:101).
12. According to al-Qashani, it is acquired and realised through annihilation in the Divine Attributes and Essence and attached by the going-on (baqa') after annihilation in the station of drawing near.
13. i.e. those who did not have a Prophet to follow.
14. According to the commentator, al-Qashani, the plain on which they are gathered may be as-Sahira, as in the Qur'an (79:14), "But it shall be but a single scare, and behold they are at as-Sahira!" As-Sahira which, according to some, is the earth Allah will create anew on the Day of Rising.
15. As was the case with Ibrahim, Qur'an 21:69.
16. The expression means to get ready for something difficult.
17. This is also reflected in a hadith in al-Bukhari in which the Prophet said, "Our Lord will unveil what is hidden, and every believer, man and woman, will prostrate to Him. Those who prostrated out of eyeservice and reputation in this world will go to prostrate and find their backs rigid."
18. The Prophet's uncle who was a violent opponent of Islam.



15: The Seal of the Wisdom of Prophethood in the Word of 'Isa (Jesus)

He was manifested from the water of Maryam
and the breath of Jibril in the form of man existing from clay.

The spirit was in an essence purified of nature
which it called prison.

For that reason, the spirit stayed in it
for more a thousand years in the designation of time. (1)

A spirit from Allah, no other.

For that reason, he revived the dead and formed the bird from clay.

Since his relation with his Lord is proven,
by it he has effective action in both the higher and lower worlds.

Allah purified his body, and made his spirit pure,
and He made him a model of taking-form.

Know that among the special qualities of the spirits (arwah) is whenever they touch anything life flows into it. This is why the Samiri (2) seized a handful of dust from the track of the messenger, who was Jibril, and he is the Spirit. The Samiri had knowledge of this matter. When he recognised that it was Jibril, he knew that life would flow into whatever he had walked on, so he took a handful of dust (3) from the track of the messenger or he filled his hand or the ends of his fingers, (4) and threw it into the Calf. The Calf made a noise like the sound of a cow mooing. If it had been in another form, the name of that form's sound would have been ascribed to it - as grumbling to the camel, baa-ing to rams, bleating to sheep, and voice or articulation and speech to man. That power from the life which flows in things is called lâhût. The nâsût is the locus on which the spirit is based. The nâsût may be called a spirit by what is based on it.

When the Trusty Ruh, who is Jibril, presented himself to Maryam, peace be upon her, in the form of a "handsome, well-built man", (5) she imagined that he was a man wishing to have intercourse with her. She took refuge with Allah from him with all her being, with the whole of her existence, that Allah might save her from him since she knew that that was among the things which are not permitted. She was given a complete presence with Allah, and it is the meaning-without-form spirit. If Jibril had breathed into her at that moment in this state, 'Isa would have been born in such a manner that no one could tolerate him due to the harshness of his nature which was the state of his mother.

When he said to her, "I am only your Lord's messenger of your Lord so that He can give you a pure boy," she relaxed from that contraction (qabd) and her breast expanded. It was at that time that Jibril breathed 'Isa into her. Jibril conveyed the word of Allah to Maryam as the Messenger conveyed the word of Allah to his community. 'Isa was "His word that He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him." (6) Then appetite filled Maryam. The body of 'Isa was created from the actual water of Maryam and from the imaginary water of Jibril which was infused in the moisture of that breath, since the breath of the living is moist because of the water content in it. So the body of 'Isa is from imaginary water and real water. He emerged in the form of a man in respect to his mother and inasmuch as Jibril had appeared in the form of a man, since taking-form only occurs in the human species according to the normal principle.

'Isa brought the dead to life because he is the Divine Spirit, and bringing to life belongs to

Allah. The breath which 'Isa has is like the breath which Jibril has. The word belongs to Allah. The bringing the dead to life by 'Isa is an actual revival inasmuch as it was manifested from his breath as he was manifested from the form of his mother. His bringing to life is also imagined to be from him, but it actually belongs to Allah. He joined the two by the reality on which he is based even as we said that he is created from imaginary water and actual water. Bringing-to-life is ascribed to him by means of actualisation in one aspect, and by imagination in another aspect. In respect to actualisation, it is said of him that he brings the dead to life. In respect to imagination (tawahhum), it is said that he breathes into it and it becomes a bird by the leave of Allah. (7) The agent is in the prepositional phrase "by Allah's permission", even though He did not breathe into it. It is also possible that the agent is the one who breathes into it. It became a bird as regards physical form. In the same way, 'Isa healed the blind and the lepers.

All was ascribed to 'Isa as being "by Allah's permission." (8) "Permission" (idhn) is an indirect expression, as in His words, "By My permission" (9) and "by the permission of Allah". If the prepositional phrase is connected to breathing, the breather has leave in the breathing, and so it is a bird by the leave of Allah. If the breather breathed not by leave, then the taking form of the bird as a bird is not by the leave of Allah. The agent in that is then the verb "it becomes (yakûn)." If there had not been something real and something imaginary in the matter, then these forms would not have accepted these two aspects. Rather, it has these two aspects because the constitution of 'Isa accords that. 'Isa showed humility to the extent that he prescribed that his community "pay the jizya (10) tax with their hands in a state of willing submission," (11) and that if one of them were slapped on the cheek, he should offer the other cheek to the one who slapped him, and not rise up against him nor seek revenge. This came from his mother's side. Since the woman is lower, she has humility because she is subject to the man legally and physically. The power to bring to life and heal that he had came to him the side of the breath of Jibril in the form of a man. 'Isa brought the dead to life by the form of man. If Jibril had not come in the form of man, but in another of the elemental forms of phenomenal beings from the animals, plants or minerals, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life without taking on that form for that moment and appearing in it. If Jibril had come in a luminous form beyond the elements and natural humours, since luminosity is part of his nature, 'Isa would not have been able to bring the dead to life unless he appeared in that form of non-elemental light, while still maintaining the human form in respect of his mother.

When he brought the dead to life, it was said that it was him and not him. The onlookers fell into bewilderment (hayra) just as the man of intellect becomes bewildered in his logical reflection when he sees an individual human being bringing the dead to life, as that is one of the divine qualities - bringing to life with speech, not mere bringing with animation. (12) The beholder is bewildered because he sees the form of a man who possesses a divine effect. That led some of them to speak of that as "incarnation" and say that 'Isa was Allah since it was by Him that 'Isa brought the dead to life. Thus they are charged with disbelief (kufr) which is the veil because they veil Allah, who brings the dead to life, by the human form of 'Isa. Allah said, "They are unbelievers who say, 'Allah is the Messiah, the son of Maryam.'" (13) They fell into both error and disbelief at the end of all they said, not because they say that he is Allah nor by calling him the son of Maryam. But they made the attribution that Allah, insofar as He brought the dead to life, was contained in the human form of the nasut which is called the son of Maryam. There is no doubt that 'Isa was the son of Maryam. The hearer imagines that they have attributed divinity to the form, and so they make divinity the same as the form. That is not what they do. Rather, they make divine He-ness the subject in the human form

which is the son of Maryam. They should differentiate between the form of 'Isa and the divine principle because they have made the form the same as the principle. Jibril was in the form of man who did not breathe and then he breathed. One differentiates between the form and the breath, and the breath from the form. The form existed without the breath - thus the breath is not part of its essential definition. For that reason, differences occurred among the people of different [Christian] parties regarding 'Isa and what he was. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal human form, says that he is the son of Maryam. Whoever looks at him in respect to his mortal representational form relates him to Jibril. Whoever looks at him in respect to what was manifested from him of bringing the dead to life, relates him to Allah by the quality of the spirit, and says that he is the Spirit of Allah, (14) that is, by Him life was manifested in whomever received his breath. Sometimes Allah is imagined to be the passive principle in 'Isa, and sometimes the angel is imagined in him, and sometimes mortal humanity is imagined in him. So the conception of everyone is based on what predominates that person. 'Isa is the Word of Allah, (15) the Spirit of Allah, (16) and the slave of Allah. (17) That is something which no one else has in the sensory form. Indeed, each person is attached to his father of form, not to the One who breathed his spirit into the human form. When Allah fashioned the human body as He said, "When I have shaped him," (15:29;38:72) then He breathed into Him, that was from His spirit. Thus in its being and source, the spirit is ascribed to Allah. That is not the case with 'Isa. The shaping of his body and mortal form is implied in the breath of the spirit. Others, as we mentioned, are not like that.

All existent things are the words of Allah which are inexhaustible (18) because they are from "kun" and "kun" is the word of Allah. Is the word ascribed to Him according to what He really is? His what-ness is not known. Or is it that Allah descends to the form of the one who says, "kun", and so the word "kun" is the reality of that form to which he descended or in which He is manifest? Some of the gnostics take one side and some take the other side, and some of them are bewildered in the business and do not know. This is a question which can only be recognised by taste (dhawq), as was the case with Abu Yazid al-Bistami when he breathed into the ant which he had killed and it returned to life. He knew in that action by Whom he had breathed, and that was an 'Isawian witnessing. As for the revival of meaning by knowledge, that is the divine life, essential, eternal, sublime, and luminous, about which Allah said, "Is someone who was dead and whom We brought to life, supplying him with a light by which to walk among the people..." (6:123) Whoever gives life to a dead soul by the life of knowledge in a particular problem connected to knowledge of Allah, has brought him to life by it, and it is "a light for him by which he walks among the people, i.e. among his likes in form.

Were it not for Him and not for us,
that which is would not have been.
I worship Him in truth,
and Allah is our Master.
I am his source so know!
If you said, "man,"
Then do not be veiled by "man".
He has given you a proof.
So be Allah and be creation,
and you will be merciful by Allah.
Feed His creation through Him,
and you will be spirit and sweet scent.
We give Him what appeared by Him in us,

and He gave to us.
The command is apportioned between Him and us.
My heart was given life by the One who knew it
when He gave us sensory life.
At that time (before time),
we were beings, sources and times in Him.
That did not endure in us, but that gave us life.

Part of what proves what we mentioned concerning the breath (nafkh) of the spirit with the elemental form is that Allah has described Himself by the "breath of the All-Merciful". Everyone described by an attribute must follow the attribute and all that attribute demands of him. You realise that breath is necessary for the one who breathes. For that reason, the divine breath accepts the forms of the universe. It is like the primordial substance, (19) which is not other than the source of nature.

The elements are one of the forms of nature, and what is above the elements and what issues from them are also part of the forms of nature. They are sublime spirits going right up to the seven heavens. As for the spirits of the seven heavens and their sources, they are elemental, so they issue from the vapour of the elements. The angels from every heaven are from the elements, so they are made from the elements, and there are no beings of nature above them. For this reason, Allah described them with dispute, (20) i.e. the Highest Assembly, because nature has polarisation. Polarisation is that which is in the Divine Names, and they are ascriptions given by the "breath of the All-Merciful." Do you not see how the Essence is not subject to this principle, and that it is independent of the worlds? This is why the world appeared in the form of the One who brought it into being, and it is not other than the divine breath.

The divine breath ascends by what it has of heat, and descends by what it has of humidity and cold, and fixes itself and solidifies by what it has of dryness. Thus precipitation comes from cold and humidity. Do you not see that when the doctor wants to give someone a remedy, he looks at his water (urine) in a long-necked bottle? If he sees precipitation, he knows that the digestion is complete. He gives the remedy to speed progress. The precipitation is produced by his natural coldness and humidity.


Then Allah kneaded the clay of this human person with "His two hands." These are opposite to each other. Even though each of these two hands may be a right hand, the distinction between them is not hidden. They are only two in themselves - two hands because He only causes effects in nature according to what is in conformity with it. Nature consists of opposites, so He said "two hands". Then He brought man into existence with two hands, and called him man (bashar). (21) This refers to the direct contact (mubashara) of the two hands as befits the Divine Presence. That arises from His concern for this human species. Then Allah said to the one who refused to prostrate himself before Adam, "What prevented you prostrating to what I created with My Own Hands? Were you overcome with arrogance (towards the one who is your like, made of the elements) or are you one of the exalted?" (38:75) meaning those who are above the elements. "You are not like that."

By the exalted, (22) He means those who, by their essence, are above being elemental by their luminous constitution, even though they are part of nature. Man is only better than the other species by virtue of his being made of clay (bashar). He is the best species of all that was created from the elements by direct contact with the two hands. So in rank, man is above

the terrestrial and celestial angels, although the lofty angels are better than the human species according to a divine text. (23)

If anyone wishes to recognise the divine breath (nafas), let him recognise the universe, because "whoever knows himself knows his Lord" (24) who is manifest in him. The universe was manifested in the breath of the Merciful which Allah breathed from the Divine Names. They brought the manifestation of their effects into existence from the non-manifestation of their effects. He was generous to Himself by what He brought into existence in Himself. The first effect of the breath took place in that Presence. Then the command continued to descend (25) by breathing out from the universal to the last of what Allah brought into existence.

All is contained in the source of the breath,
like light is contained in the essence of darkness
at the end of the night before daylight.
Knowledge comes by proof at the end of the day
for the one who is sleepy.
He sees what I have said as a dream which indicates the breath,
And it gives him relief from every grief.
In the recitation of the Qur'an, it is, "He frowned." (26)
He has given a tajalli of Himself
to the one who came to fetch a firebrand. (27)
So Musa saw Him as a fire, while He is a light
for kings and seekers.
If you have recognise what I said,
then know that you are in a state of grief. (28)
If Musa had sought something else
(other than the brand),
he still would have seen Him in that,
and not the opposite.



When Allah establishes this 'Isawian word in the Station (29) so that we would know and he would be known, 'Isa will be asked about what was ascribed to him and whether or not it was true, even though Allah already knew whether or not that matter had taken place. Allah will say to him, "Did you say to people: 'Take me and my mother as gods, besides Allah?'" (30)

Adab demands a response to the one asking the question because when He gave him a tajalli in this station and form, wisdom necessitated the response in separation by the source of gatheredness. So he put disconnection first and said, "Glory be to You!" using the kaf (pronoun of the second person singular) which defines who is indicated by encounter and speech. "It is not mine," inasmuch as I belong to myself rather than You, (31) "to say what I have no right to," that is, what my he-ness rather than my essence necessitates. "If indeed I said it, You know it," because You are the Speaker, and whoever says something knows what he has said. You are the tongue by which I speak, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, reported to us in a divine transmission in which Allah said, "I am his tongue by which he speaks." He made His He-ness the same as the tongue of the speaker, but ascribed the speech to His slave.

Then the man of right action completed his response by saying, "You know what is in my self," and the speaker is Allah, "and I do not know what is in it," so this is in knowledge of the he-ness of 'Isa in respect of His He-ness, not in respect of the fact that 'Isa speaks and has

an effect. "It is You", so He brought distinction and support to confirm the proof and dependence on Him, since Allah only knows the Unseen. So He separated and gathered, unified and made many, made wide and narrow.

To end his reply, 'Isa said, "I said to them nothing but what You ordered me to say." He negated to begin with, (32) alluding to the fact the he has no existence. The statement required adab with the questioner. If he had not acted thus, he would have been described as lacking knowledge of the realities, but he certainly was not like that! Thus he said, "only what You ordered me," and it is You are the One who speaks on my tongue, and You are my tongue. Observe this divine polarity of the spirit! What is finer and more subtle than this!

'Isa said that he said, "Worship Allah." So he used the name of Allah because slaves differ in forms of worship and Shari'a. So he did not specify one name rather than another name. Instead he used the name which joins all of them. Then he went on, "my Lord and your Lord." It is known that His relationship to one existent being by lordship (rubûbiya) is not the same as His relationship with another existent being. That is why he made a distinction when he said, "my Lord and your Lord," by two references one to the speaker and one to the one addressed. He said, "nothing but what You ordered me," and thus he affirmed that he is one who is commanded. The quality of being commanded is not other than slavery, since one is only commanded when obedience is expected of one, even if one does not comply.

Since the command descends according to ranks, all that appears in a certain rank is coloured with what the reality of that rank gives it. The rank of the one commanded has a principle which appears in everyone who is commanded. The rank of the commander has a principle which appears in every command. Allah said, "Establish the prayer." He is the commander and the one who is subject to the obligation is the commanded. The slave says, "Forgive me!" so he commands and Allah is the commanded. What Allah demands of His slave by His command is the same as what the slave demands of Allah by his command. This is why every supplication is answered, and it must be answered, even if the answer is delayed, just as some who are under obligation delay the prayer. Whoever who is obligated to perform the prayer and does not pray it at its proper time, delays obedience and prays it at another time when he is able to perform it. There must be an answer, if only by intention.

Then he said, "I was a witness against them (and he did not say over himself with them as when he said, 'my Lord and your Lord') as long as I remained among them" because the Prophets are witnesses over their communities as long as they are in them. "But when You took me (i.e. raised me) back to You," and You veiled them from me and me from them, "You were the One Watching over them," no longer in my substance, but in their substance, since You are their eye which necessitates observation.

He wanted to make a distinction between him and his Lord so that it would be known that he was a slave and that Allah is Allah and He is his Lord. He referred to himself as a witness (shahid) and he referred to Allah as the Watcher (raqib). He mentioned "them" before himself when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them," (33) preferring them in priority and with adab. He put "them" after Allah in relationship to Him when he said, "You were the One Watching over them" because of what the Lord merits in priority of rank.

Then know that Allah has the name the Watcher (Ra'iqib) which 'Isa applied to Him, and He is the Witness in His words, "a witness against them," and "You are Witness of all things."

(5:117) He referred to all things and "thing" is the most indefinite of things. He used the name, "The Witness," and Allah is the Witness over every witnessed thing according to what the reality of that witnessed things demands. He indicated that Allah was the Witness over the people of 'Isa when he said, "I was a witness against them as long as I remained among them." This is the witnessing of Allah in the substance of 'Isa, as it is confirmed that Allah is his tongue, hearing and sight.

Then he said something which is both 'Isawian and Muhammadan. As for its being 'Isawian, that is the speech of 'Isa by the transmission of Allah from him in His Book. As for its being Muhammadan, it happened that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood in one place for an entire night reciting it without turning to anything else until dawn broke. It is, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves. If You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (34) "They" is the pronoun of those who are absent as "he" is the pronoun of someone who is absent. as He said, "they are those who disbelieve," with the pronoun of those who are not present. Absence is their veil to what is meant by the witnessed one who is present. He said, "If you punish them," with the pronoun of the absent, and that absence is the source of the veil which hides them from the Real.

The Prophet mentioned them to Allah before the time when they are present (35) so that when the actual time came when they were present, the heaven would already have acted on the dough, and the dough might have had time to become equal to the heaven. (36)

Then by "they are Your slaves," he singled out the unity (tawhid) on which they are based. There is no submissiveness greater than the submissiveness of slaves because they have no freedom of action with themselves. They act according to what their master wishes of them when he has no partner in them. He said, "Your slaves," and singled out what was meant of the punishment which is their humiliation. There are none more lowly than them since they are slaves. Thus their essence necessitates that they be lowly, so You do not degrade them, for You do not degrade them with anything more lowly than the fact that they are slaves.

"If You forgive them," if You veil them from the punishment which they deserve because of their opposition if You put forgiveness on them, You veil them from the punishment and protect them from it, "You are the Almighty," the Protector, the Guardian. When Allah gives this name ('aziz) to one of His slaves, then Allah is called the Exalter (Mu'izz). This name is given to him by the 'Aziz, so he has strong protection from the revenge and punishment which the Avenger and Punisher desire for him. He also used distinction and dependence to confirm the proof, and so the ayat is the same sort of His words, "You are the Knower of the Unseen Worlds," and "You are the Watcher over them," and "You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." (37)

The question from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and his supplication to his Lord in which he repeated the phrase for the entire night until dawn was a request for the answer. If he had heard the answer in the first questioning, he would not have repeated it. Allah showed him the judgements in detail by which they deserved punishment. As each instance was presented to him and specified, the Prophet said to Him, "If You punish them, they are Your slaves, and if You forgive them, You are the Almighty, the All-Wise." If he had seen in what was presented to him anything which would make it necessary that Allah had already decided and that His presence must be preferred, he would have invoked Allah against them rather than for them. So what they deserved is changed by what this ayat accords of submission to Allah and exposing themselves to His pardon.

The Prophet related that when Allah loves the voice of His slave when he makes supplication to Him, He delays the answer to his supplication so that the slave will repeat the supplication. This comes from His love for the slave, not because He has turned away from him. For that reason, the Prophet mentioned the name of the Wise, and the Wise is the one who puts everything in its proper place, and who does not turn away from the qualities which their realities necessitate and demand; so the Wise is the One who knows the order of things. When the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, kept repeating this ayat, he was in possession of a great knowledge from Allah. If anyone recites it, let him recite it in that manner. (38) Otherwise, it is better that he remain silent. When Allah lets the slave articulate any request, He does so when He wants to answer it and grant his need. Let no one be slow in whatever has been guaranteed to him, but let him persevere as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, persevered with this ayat in all his states, so that he either hears with His ear, or with hearing, whichever you like. How else will Allah make you hear the answer? If He permits the question on your tongue, He will let you hear the answer with your ear. If He permits the meaning to you, He will let you hear the answer by your hearing.

Notes to Chapter 15:

1. As he was born more than five centuries before the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and is still alive, waiting to descend.
2. The story is found in the Qur'an 20:75-95, where as-Samiri convinces the tribe of Israel to cast their ornaments into the fire out of which he brought the figure of a Calf which lowed, and which they worshipped. He told Musa, "I beheld what they did not behold, and I seized a handful of dust from the messenger's track and cast it into the thing."
3. With dad, qabda.
4. With sad, qabsa.
5. Qur'an 19:17.
6. Qur'an 4:171, "The Messiah, 'Isa son of Maryam, was only the Messenger of Allah and His Word, which He cast into Maryam, and a Spirit from Him."
7. Qur'an 3:49; 5:110.
8. Qur'an 3:49.
9. Qur'an 5:110.
10. The tax paid by the People of the Book to the Muslim State.
11. Qur'an 9:29.
12. i.e. the dead person can speak and answer him. This not simply causing the dead limbs to move of their own accord.
13. Qur'an 5:17, 5:72.
14. Ruh Allah.
15. See Qur'an 3:45, 4:171.
16. Qur'an 14:171.
17. Qur'an 19:30.
18. See Qur'an 18:109, "Say: 'If all the sea was ink to write down the Words of my Lord, it would run out long before the Words of my Lord ran out,' even if We were to bring the same amount of ink again."
19. Al-jawhar al-hayulani.
20. Qur'an 38:69, "I had no knowledge of the Highest Assembly when they disputed." It can also mean mutual rivalry.
21. Qur'an 15:28, "I am creating a mortal (bashar)."
22. "The exalted" are the angels who wander in love and those who are near, like Jibril and

the angels of the Throne.

23. "Or are you one of the exalted?" 38:75.

24. As the Prophet said.

25. See Qur'an 65:12, "It is Allah who created the seven heavens and of earth their like, the Command descending down through all of them."

26. Sura 80.

27. Musa in Qur'an 20:10; 27:7. Refers to empirical knowledge, but he found unveiling in the form of the Burning Bush.

28. By standing behind the veil or seeking other-than-Him.

29. On the Last Day.

30. Qur'an 5:116.

31. To slaveness rather than lordship.

32. (ma qulta = I did not say).

33. Literally in the Arabic, "I was against them a witness."

34. This is the end of what 'Isa said in this verse.

35. On the Day of Gathering.

36. According to the commentator, the leaven is the predisposition for the arrival in the presence of Allah. The dough is the clay of his substance.

37. All used in this verse.

38. i.e. with knowledge, weeping, and maintaining adab.



16: The Seal of the Wisdom of Mercy in the Word of Sulayman (Solomon)

Bilqis said, (1) "It (the letter) is from Sulayman and it says 'In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, Most Merciful.'" Some people criticise the fact that the name of Sulayman comes before the name of Allah. That is not the case, and in saying this they say something that does not befit the gnosis which Sulayman, peace be upon him, had of his Lord. How could what they say be connected to him when Bilqis said of it, "a noble letter had been delivered to me," that is, a letter which honoured her. In this they were influenced by the story of how Chosroes tore up the letter of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. (2) He did not tear it up until he had read all of it and knew what it contained. It was the same with Bilqis. Had she not accepted what was established, respect for its author would not have prevented her from tearing up the letter, whether his name, peace be upon him, had been mentioned before or after the name of Allah.

Sulayman mentioned the two mercies: the mercy of graciousness and the mercy of obligation, and they are ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. So Allah freely dispenses His bounty by the Rahman, and it is incumbent on Him by the Rahim. This obligation comes from graciousness, so Rahim is contained in Rahman. Allah "has prescribed mercy for Himself," glory be to Him! in order that the slave might have what Allah spoke about of the deeds which this slave brings, expecting his due from Allah who has required Himself to have this mercy for them, the mercy of obligation. When one of the slaves is like this, he knows that He is the author of the deed.

The deed is divided according to the eight organs of man. Allah informed us that He is the He-ness of each organ. So the author of the action is none other than Allah while the form is that of the slave. He-ness is embodied in him, i.e. only in his name because Allah is the source of what is manifested and which is called "creation". Because of this, the names of the Manifest and the Last belong to the slave since he was not and then was. By the fact that his manifestation depends on Him and action issues from Him, there is the name the Hidden and the First. Thus, when you see creation, you see the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden.

This recognition was not hidden from Sulayman, peace be upon him. Indeed, it is a part of a kingdom which "belonged to no one after him," (3) in terms of its manifestation in the visible world. Muhammad, peace be upon him, was given what Sulayman was given, but he did not manifest it. Allah gave him the power to vanquish the 'ifrit (4) who came in the night to attack him. (5) When the Prophet wanted to take the 'ifrit and tie him to the one of the columns of the mosque until morning so that the children of Madina could play with him, he remembered the prayer of Sulayman, and so Allah made him drive the 'ifrit off in disgrace. The Prophet did not manifest his power as Sulayman had done. He spoke of "a kingdom" which is not universal, and we know that he meant a particular kingdom. We see that the Prophet shared in every part of the Kingdom which Allah had given him and so we know by this that he is privileged with the whole kingdom. In the story of the 'ifrit, he was only given the manifestation while Sulayman might have been given the whole and the manifestation. If the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had not said in the story of the 'ifrit, "and Allah gave me power over him," we would have said that when he wanted to seize the 'ifrit, Allah reminded him of Sulayman's prayer so that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, would know that Allah had not given him power to seize him.

He then made him send off the 'ifrit off in disgrace.

When he said, "Allah gave me power over him," we knew that Allah had given him freedom of action in that. Then Allah reminded him and he remembered Sulayman's prayer and showed adab towards him. We know from this that that no creature after Sulayman had the general manifestation of that kingdom.

Our goal in this question is only discussion and instruction about the two mercies which Sulayman mentioned in the two names which are expressed in Arabic as ar-Rahman ar-Rahim. (6) Allah stipulated the mercy of obligation (7) and made the application of the mercy of graciousness universal when He said, "My mercy extends to all things," (7:156) even the Divine Names, which are the realities of ascriptions. He was gracious to us in them. We are the result of the mercy of graciousness by the Divine Names and divine ascriptions of lordship. Then He prescribed mercy for Himself by our own manifestation. He informed us that He is our He-ness, that we might know that He obliged mercy on Himself only for Himself. Mercy never departs from Him. Who could be gracious to you when there is only Him?

There must be a principle for clarifying differences in merit this is in relation to what is manifested of the differences in merit that creatures have in knowledge, so that it might be said that this person knows more than that person, even though the source is but one. This means the shortcoming connected to the will (irada), apart from the connection of knowledge. This difference in merit exists in the divine attributes. (8) The connection and merit of will and its increase is connected to power. In the same way, hearing, sight and all the divine names are arranged in ranks, some having more merit than others. Similarly what is manifested in creation differs in ranks of merit, so that it can be said that this person knows more than that person even though the source is the same.

As each Divine Name which I have set forth is implied by all the Names and described by them, similarly that which creation manifests accepts all of that which is subject to differences of merit. Each part of the universe is from all the universe, i.e. it is a vessel for all the separate realities of the universe. Our statement that Zayd is inferior to 'Amr in knowledge does not contradict the fact that the He-ness of Allah is the source of both Zayd and 'Amr, but it is more perfect and knowing in 'Amr than in Zayd, even as the Names differ in merit. They are not other-than-Allah. Allah, inasmuch as He is Knowing, has a more encompassing connection than Allah as the Transformer, the All-Powerful. But He is still He and not other-than-Him.

O my friend! do not then know Him in one aspect and be ignorant of Him in another! Do not negate Him here and affirm Him there, unless You affirm Him by an aspect through which He affirms Himself and negate Him by an aspect through which He negates Himself, as in the ayat which combines affirmation and negation in respect to Him when He said, "Nothing is like Him," negating, "and He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (42:11) and so He affirmed an attribute which is general to every hearing and seeing living being. Nothing exists but that it is alive, although this is hidden in the world from the perception of some people. It will appear to all people in the Next World, for it is the Abode of the Living (ad-Dar al-Hayawan). Similarly, the life of this world is only veiled from some of the slaves so that election and difference of merit might be manifested among the slaves of Allah according to what they perceive of Him from the realities of the universe.

In one whose attainment is more comprehensive, Allah is in principle more manifest in him than in someone who does not have this comprehensiveness. So do not be veiled by the difference in merit and say that it is not correct to say that creation is the He-ness of Allah after we have shown you the difference in merit in the Divine Names. You have no doubt about them being Allah, and what is designated by them is not other than Allah.

How then could Sulayman place his name before the name of Allah as they allege? He is part of the whole which the mercy of graciousness brought into existence. The name, ar-Rahman ar-Rahim, must come first for the dependence of the one receiving this mercy to be valid. Advancing the one who should come afterwards and delaying the one who should come before in the place he merits is contrary to the realities.

Part of the wisdom of Bilqis and the sublimity of her knowledge lies in the fact that she did not mention who cast the letter to her. She only did that so that her companions would know that she had communications on matters whose means they did not know. This is part of divine management in ruling because when the means of communication reaching the ruler are unknown, the people of the government fear for themselves in their actions. Therefore they only act with prudence in a matter because that will reach their ruler, and they are guarding themselves from the potential danger of that action. If they knew precisely by whom information reached their ruler, they would have tried to flatter him and bribe him so that they could do whatever they wanted without their ruler hearing about it. Therefore the Queen said, "a noble letter has been delivered to me," without naming the one who cast it. That was an act of policy on her part would insure respect for her among the people of her kingdom and the nobles under her rule. By this, she merited her superiority over them.

As regards the superiority of the human man of knowledge over the man of knowledge of the jinn in the secrets of the disposal of things and the special properties of things, that is known by the amount of time, for the movement of the eye in perceiving what it perceives is quicker than the movement of the body when it moves. (9) The moment in which the eye moves is the same moment which it connects to the object, in spite of the distance between the viewer and the object. The moment that the eyes open is the moment in which they are connected to the heaven of the fixed stars. The moment when its glance returns is the same moment that its perception is absent.

Rising from one's place is not like that. It does not possess this speed. Asaf ibn Barkhiya (10) was more perfect in the deed than the jinn was. What Asaf ibn Barkhiya said is the same as the action in the same moment. Sulayman, peace be upon him, at the same moment saw Bilqis' throne "settled before him" so one must not imagine that he perceived it while it was in its original place without being moved. We do not think that the displacement takes place in one and the same moment, but that it involves going into non-existence and returning to existence inasmuch as the only one who is aware of that is the one who has recognition of it. This is what Allah said, "Yet they are dubious about the new creation." (50:15) Not a moment passes them but that they see what they saw. Since it is like this, the time of its non-existence (the absence of the throne from its place) is the same as the time of its existence with Sulayman because of the renewal of creation with the "breaths". No one knows this power, or rather, man is not aware with regard to himself that he ceases to exist in each breath and then is again.

Do not think that "this" (thumma) implies a delay. That is not true. However, it demands a high rank of knowledge in Arabic, as when the poet says:

As he brandished the straight Rudayni, (11) it quivered.

There is no doubt that the moment of brandishing the spear is without a doubt the same as the moment of quivering of the thing which is brandished. It happened without delay. It is the same with the renewal of creation with breaths. The time of non-existence coincides with the time of the existence of its like. It is similar to the renewal of accidents in the theory of the Ash'arites [tajrīd al-a'rād].

The question involving the moving of Bilqis' throne is one of the most difficult problems, except for someone who has recognition of what we have mentioned in its story. Asaf did not have any merit except for acquiring renewal in the assembly of Sulayman, peace be upon him. The throne was not moved across place nor did it rise above the earth nor break the laws of space for the one who understands what we mentioned. That was done by one of the companions of Sulayman in order to elevate Sulayman's honour in the selves of those who were present with Bilqis and her suite. The reason for that was that Sulayman was Allah's gift to Da'ud as He said, "We gave Sulayman to Da'ud," (38:30) so the gift is the giving of the donor by providing a blessing, not by means of fitting recompense or merit. So he is the abundant blessing, the decisive word and the cutting sword.

As for the knowledge of Sulayman, Allah said of him, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it (in spite of his opposite judgement to that of Da'ud), and Allah "gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79) Da'ud's knowledge was knowledge given by Allah, and Sulayman's knowledge was the knowledge of Allah in the matter inasmuch as He is the Judge without intermediary. So Sulayman is the interpreter of Allah in the seat of sincerity.(12) It is like the man who is striving to hit on the judgement of Allah by which Allah would judge the question. If he were to find it by himself or by what was revealed to His Messenger, then he would have two rewards. The one who errs in this particular judgement has one reward as well as its being knowledge and judgement. The community of Muhammad was given the rank of Sulayman in judgement (13) and the rank of Da'ud in wisdom, (14) so there is no better community than it.

When Bilqis saw her throne, and she knew how great the distance was and the impossibility of moving it in that space of time, she said, "It seems the same." (28:42, lit. "it is as if it were.") She spoke the truth according to what we mentioned regarding the renewal of creation by similarity. It was it. The matter is true, as you are the same at the time of renewal as you were in past time. Part of the perfection of Sulayman's knowledge was in the instruction he gave regarding the pavilion when he told Bilqis, "Enter the courtyard." (15) The courtyard was very smooth without any curvature in its glass. When Bilqis saw it, she thought that it was water and had depth, so she bared her legs so as not to let the water dampen her clothes. By that, Sulayman informed her that the throne which she saw was of this sort. This is the utmost fairness. He informed her that she had hit the mark when she said, "It seems the same." At that point, she said, "My Lord, I have wronged myself but I have submitted with Sulayman to the Lord of all the worlds."

So she did not submit to Sulayman, but to the Lord of the worlds, and Sulayman was part of the worlds. She did not restrict her submission as the Messengers do not restrict their belief in Allah, contrary to Pharaoh who said, "to the Lord of Musa and Harun." (26:48) Although this submission is related to Bilqis' submission in a certain respect, it does not have the same force. She had more discernment than Pharaoh in submission to Allah. Furthermore, Pharaoh was governed by the principle of the moment when he said, "I believe in the One in whom

the Children of Israel believe." (10:90) He specified, but he also specified when she saw the sorcerers articulate their belief in the "Lord of Musa and Harun." The Islam of Bilqis was the Islam of Sulayman since she said, "with Sulayman." She followed him in all that he adhered to in the way of beliefs.

This is how we are on the straight path which the Lord is on, for our forelocks are in His hand, (16) and it is impossible for us to separate from Him. We are with Him implicitly, and He is with us by open declaration. Allah said, "He is with you wherever you are," (57:4) and we are with Him as He takes us by our forelocks. He, may He be exalted! is with Himself wherever He goes with us on His path. So everyone in the world is on a straight path, and it is the path of the Lord. It is this that Bilqis learned from Sulayman, so she said, "To Allah, the Lord of all the worlds," without referring to a particular world.

As for the subjection which was the privilege of Sulayman, peace be upon him, and by which he was distinguished from others, and the kingdom which Allah gave him which none after him would have, it is from his command when He said, "We gave him the fiercely blowing wind, speeding at his command." (21:81) It was not subjection in itself, for Allah said in respect of each of us without exception, "He has made everything in the heavens and everything on the earth subservient to you." (45:13) He also mentioned the subjection of the winds, stars and other things, (17) but that is not by our command. It is from the command of Allah. If you reflect with your intellect, Sulayman was privileged by this command neither by mental concentration nor by aspiration (himma) rather, it was by nothing more than the command itself. We said that because we recognise that the physical bodies of the world can be affected by the himma of the self when someone is in the station of concentration. We have seen such things happen in this Path. Sulayman only had to articulate the command in whatever he wished to subject without either concentration or himma.

Know, may Allah support us and you by a spirit from Him, that when any slave receives a gift like this, that does not detract from his portion of the kingdom of the Next World, nor is he called to account for it. That was true of Sulayman. Although he sought it from his Lord, the tasting (dhawq) of the Path (18) demands that it was advanced to him from what was stored up for others, and He will call him to account for it when he wants it in the Next World. Allah told him. "This is Our gift (and He did not say "to you: or to anyone else); bestow or withhold without reckoning." (38:39) We knew by the tasting of the Path that his request was from the command of his Lord. Thus the request was from the divine command, and the one who requested it received full recompense for his request.

If the Creator wishes, He grants his need in what he seeks from Him, and if He wishes, He withholds it. The slave has fulfilled what Allah demanded of him to obey His command in what he asked of his Lord. If he had asked that from himself without his Lord commanding him to do that, then he would be held to account for it.

That is true in all that Allah is asked for, as He said to His Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "Say: 'O Lord, increase me in knowledge!'" He obeyed his Lord's command and sought increase in knowledge to such an extent that each time he was given milk, he interpreted it to be knowledge even as he interpreted it as knowledge in a dream in which he received a glass of milk. In the dream, he drank the milk, and gave the rest of it to 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. The people asked, "What is its interpretation?" He replied, "Knowledge." Similarly, when Allah took him on his Night Journey, the angel gave him a vessel which contained milk and a vessel which contained wine. The Prophet drank the milk,

and the angel said, "You have chosen the true nature (fitra). Allah has bestowed you on your community!" When milk appeared, it was the form of knowledge. Therefore it is knowledge taking on the form as milk, just as Jibril came to Maryam in the form of "a handsome, well-built man." (19:16)

When the Prophet said, "People are asleep and when they die, they wake up," he meant that everything that man sees in the life of this world is in the rank of the dreams of someone who is asleep, so it must be interpreted. Phenomenal being is imagination (khayal), but it is Allah in reality. (19) Whoever understands this has received the secrets of the Path. When the Prophet was offered milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and increase us in it" because he saw it as the form of knowledge, and he had been commanded to seek increase in knowledge. When he was offered something other than milk, he would say, "O Allah, bless us in it and give us better than it."

When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it to him by a request which arises from a divine command, He does not take him to account for it in the Next Abode. When Allah gives something to someone, and He gives it by a request which is not by a divine command, the business in it is up to Allah. If He wishes, He will take him to account for it, and if He wishes, He will not take him to account for it. I hope for knowledge from Allah in particular for which He will not call one to account, for He commanded the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, to seek increase of knowledge, and it is the same command which is addressed to the Prophet's community. Allah said, "You have an excellent model in the Messenger of Allah," (33:21) and what greater model is there than this model who is a source of solace (20) to the one who possesses understanding from Allah?

Had we discussed the station of Sulayman in its entirety, you would have seen a matter whose revelation would have struck you with terror. Most of the men of knowledge of this Path have no knowledge of the state and rank of Sulayman. The business is not as they claim. (21)

Notes to Chapter 16:

1. In Qur'an 27:30. The story is found in Sura 27. When Sulayman hears of the kingdom of Queen Bilqis in Sheba', he sends the hoopoe to take a letter to her.
2. When the Prophet sent Chosroes or Khosrau a letter inviting him to Islam, he tore it up after it was read to him.
3. Ref. Qur'an 38:35, where Sulayman says, "My Lord, forgive me, and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me."
4. Type of malicious jinn.
5. Hadith. "Yesterday Shaytan rushed up suddenly to stop my prayer. Allah gave me power over him and I seized him. I wanted to tie him to one of the pillars of the mosque so that all of you could look at him, but then I remembered the supplication of my brother Sulayman, 'O Lord, forgive me and give me a kingdom the like of which will never be granted to anyone after me.' (38:35) Allah turned him away in humiliation." via Abu Hurayra in al-Bukhari and Muslim.
6. The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful.
7. When He said, "I will write (mercy) for those who are godfearing...." (Qur'an 7:156)
8. i.e. Knowledge is more perfect than will.
9. Sulayman asked his council, "'O Council, who among you will bring me her throne before they come to me in submission?' An 'ifrit of the jinn said, 'I will bring it to you before you get

up from your seat...' He who possessed knowledge of the Book said, 'I will bring it to you before your glance returns to you.'" (27:38-40)

10. The name of the man of knowledge in Sulayman's council.

11. Rudayna was a woman who was famous for straightening spear shafts which were tested by shaking.

12. See Qur'an 54:55.

13. i.e. by the Qur'an and hadith.

14. By ijtiḥad.

15. This is in the same sura (27), ayat 44.

16. Qur'an Ref. 11:56, "I have believed in Allah, my Lord and your Lord. There is no creature He does not hold by the forelock. My Lord is on a straight path."

17. Various places in the Qur'an: 14:32, 16:12, 22:65, 31:20.

18. One variant has "reality" instead of Path (Tariq).

19. Inasmuch as phenomenal being is a divine shadow.

20. Uswa is model, or a person to be imitated and through whose emulation one gains consolation. The source of solace is the verbal noun from Form V of this verb, ta'assa, which means to become consoled by the example of another who had suffered in a similar fashion and been patient in it.

21. His kingdom does not decrease what he has in the Next world.



17: The Seal of the Wisdom of Existence (Wujud) in the Word of Da'ud (David)

"We subjected the mountains to glorify with him in the evening and sunrise, and also the birds, flocking together, all of them turned to him." Then Allah combined the kingdom and speech and prophethood in Da'ud when He says, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech." (1) Allah clearly and openly appointed Da'ud Khalif. This was Da'ud, peace be upon him. His freedom of action in the kingdom with this subjection was by a mighty command which was not completed in him alone. Allah also gave it to Sulayman who shared in it as He says, "And We gave knowledge to Da'ud and Sulayman who said, 'Praise be to Allah who has favoured us.'" (27:15) He says, "We gave Sulayman understanding of it. We gave each of them judgement and knowledge." (21:79)

Know that since prophethood and the message are a divine privilege, and cannot be acquired. This is the prophethood which lays down a Shari'a. It is Allah's gift to them. Gifts of this sort are not recompense, nor is recompense demanded from them for these gifts. Allah bestows it on them as pure blessing and favour. So He says, "We gave him (i.e. Ibrahim) Ishaq and Ya'qub." (2) He says of Ayyub, "We gave him his family, and the same again with them." (38:43) He says of Musa, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet," (19:53). There are more instances like that. What they received first of all is what they will receive at the last in the totality of their states, or most of them. It is only His name, the Giver.

Allah says in respect of Da'ud, "We gave Da'ud great favour from Us." (34:10) He did not accompany that with a demand for recompense from Da'ud, nor did He say that He gave him what He mentioned as a reward. When He demanded gratitude for that by action, He demanded it of the people of Da'ud, and did not mention Da'ud himself, asking Da'ud's people to thank Him for the blessing which He gave to Da'ud. For Da'ud himself, it is a gift of pure blessing and favour. It is not like that for his people, but rather like the demands of barter. So Allah said, "Work, family of Da'ud, in thankfulness! But very few of My slaves are thankful." (3)

If the Prophets, peace be upon him, thanked Allah for what He had bestowed on them and given to them, that was not from the command of Allah. They undertook that freely from themselves, as the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, stood thanking Allah until his feet were swollen, when Allah had forgiven Him his wrong actions, past and present. When people commented what he did, he said, "Am I not a thankful slave?" Allah said that Nuh was a thankful slave. (4) So the thankful among the slaves are few.

The first blessing which Allah bestowed on Da'ud was that He gave him a name which does not have any connected letters in it:

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By this, He cut him off from the world and He told us this by the name itself which is dâl, alif, and wâw. Allah named Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, with both connected and separated letters:

So in this Allah both joined him and separated him from the world. He combined the two

states for him in his name as He combined the two states for Da'ud through meaning (ma'na) (5) although He did not put that in his name. That was a privilege which Muhammad had above Da'ud, i.e. calling him by this name. The matter was thus completed for Muhammad in all its aspects. It is the same in his name Ahmad.

AHMAD

That is from the wisdom of Allah.

Then He spoke about the blessing He gave Da'ud in the mountains' echoing of glorification with him. (6) So they glorified with his glorification that the deed might be his. It was the same with the birds. He gave him power and described him by it, (7) and He gave him wisdom and decisive speech.(8)

Then the greatest blessing and nearest rank which Allah appointed for him was that his khalifate was mentioned in the divine text. He did not do that with any of his kind, and there were khalifs among them. Allah said, "Da'ud, We have made you a khalif on the earth, so judge between people with truth and do follow your own desires," i.e. whatever comes to your mind in judgement without revelation from Me, "letting them misguide you from the Way of Allah," (38:26) from the path which I revealed to My Messengers. Then Allah showed adab with him and said, "Those who are misguided from the Way of Allah will receive a harsh punishment since they forgot the Day of Reckoning." He did not say to him, "If you go astray from My Path, there is a terrible punishment for you." If you said that Adam is mentioned as the Khalif in divine text, we will say that it is not the same as in the text regarding Da'ud, for Allah said to the angels, "I am putting a khalif on the earth." (2:30) He did not say, "I am making Adam a khalif." Even if He had said that, it still would not be the same as His words, "We have made you a khalif," in respect of Da'ud. One is implied and the other is explicit. Mentioning Adam in the story after that did not indicate that he is the same as the khalif of whom Allah spoke. Occupy your mind with the transmissions of Allah on His slaves when He transmits them. It is the same in respect to Ibrahim the friend, "I will make you an Imam for the people." (2:124) He did not say "a khalif". We know that the imamate here means the khalifate, but it is not the same because He did not mention it by the most specific of its names which is the khalifate.

Then part of bestowing the khalifate on Da'ud is that He made him a khalif of judgement. That is only from Allah. He told him, "Judge between people with the truth." (5:42) The khalifate of Adam was not of this rank. Da'ud's khalifate was that he follow what was in it previously, not that he delegated with the divine judgement of Allah in His creation. If that had been the case, it would have occurred. However, our discourse is only regarding the khalifs on the earth from Allah, and they are Messengers. As for the khalifate today, it is from the Messengers, not from Allah, so they only judge by what the Messengers prescribed for them. They do not go beyond that except when there is a small point which is only known by those like us. That is in taking what they judge by, from what is in the Shari'a of the Messenger, peace be upon him.

The khalifate is from the Messenger. He takes the judgement from him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, by transmission or by ijtiḥad, whose basis is also transmitted from him. Some of us think that the one who takes the judgement takes it from Allah, for he is a khalif from Allah by the source of that judgement. The substance is his inasmuch as it was the Messenger's - the source of his judgement is that of the Messenger's. Outwardly he follows,

not disputing his judgement, as will be the case with 'Isa when he descends and judges. It is the same when the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Those are the ones whom Allah has guided, so be guided by their guidance." (9) This relates to what he recognises as one who is singled out and one who conforms. It is in him by the degree of what the Prophet established of the Shari'a which from the previous Messengers since he confirmed it. We follow him in relation to its confirmation, not because it is a Shari'a of someone else before him. In the same way, the Khalif takes from Allah the same thing that he takes from the Messenger.

In the language of unveiling, we call him "the khalif of Allah", and with outward knowledge, we say "the khalif of the Messenger of Allah". For this reason, the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, died and did not transmit the khalifate from himself to anyone else for he knew that among the slaves of Allah are those who will take the khalifate from their Lord. Thus the khalif from Allah is in conformity with the judgements of the Shari'a. Since the Prophet knew that, he did not hinder the matter. Allah has khalifs in His creation who take from the mine of the Messenger and the Messengers that which the Messengers took. They recognise the virtue of their predecessor there because the Messenger is a vessel for increase. The khalif is not a container for the increase which, had he been the Messenger, he would have received. He only gives knowledge and judgement in what he legislates through the specific legislation of the Messenger. Outwardly he follows the Messenger without opposition.

Do you not see that in the case of 'Isa, peace be upon him, when the Jews imagined that he did not add to Musa, as is the case with what we said about the Khalifate today with the Messenger, they accepted him and confirmed him? When he added judgement and abrogated judgement, Musa confirmed it, for 'Isa was a Messenger. They did not accept that because he differed from their creed, and the Jews did not know the matter for what it was - this is why they sought to kill him. His story is what Allah relates to us about them and him in His Mighty Book. He was a Messenger before increase. As for decrease of the judgement or its increase, it is confirmed since decrease is increase of judgement without a doubt.

The khalifate today does not have this rank, but it decreases or increases based on the Shari'a which is confirmed by itjihad, not on the Shari'a which Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, articulated. The khalif might do something which is counter to a hadith in a certain judgement, and so he imagines that that comes from itjihad. That is not the case, but rather this Imam has not confirmed that the transmission with respect to unveiling is from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. If it had been confirmed, he would have judged by it. If the path in it is fairness in justice, he is not protected from illusion. It is not by transmission in meaning.

Something like this occurs in the khalif today. Similarly, it also applies to 'Isa for, when he descends, he will remove much of the Shari'a established by itjihad. By removing that, he will clarify the form of the legislated truth which he had, especially when the judgements of the Imams differ in the same event. We know absolutely that when revelation descended, it descended in a certain way. That is the divine judgement and none other! Allah confirmed it and it is the Shari'a of confirmation by the removal of interdiction from this community and the vastness of its judgements in it.

As for the statement of the Prophet, "If there are two khalifs, then slay one of them," this is the outward khalifate which has the sword. If they are in agreement, then one of them must

be killed by the conflict of the khalifate of meaning. There is no actual killing in it, but killing comes with the outward khalifate. If the khalif does not possess this station, being the khalif of the Messenger of Allah - it is just being from the principle of the basis by which the existence of two gods could be imagined: "If there had been any gods besides Allah in heaven or earth, they would both be ruined," (21:22) even if they are in agreement. We know that if they differ implicitly, the judgement of one of the two will be valid. The one with the operative judgement is the god properly speaking. The one whose judgement is not operative is not god.

From this, we know that every valid judgement in the world today is the judgement of Allah even if it differs from the established judgement in its outward manifestation called the Shari'a. The only judgement which is valid belongs to Allah in the heart of the matter, because the matter which occurs in the world is based on the judgement of the Divine Will, not on the judgement of the established Shari'a, (10) whose establishment itself comes from the Will. For that reason, He put His determination into effect. Therefore, Will only has determination in the matter, not in the act which it brings.

The power of the Will (mashi'a) is immense. (11) This is why Abu Talib (12) considered it to be the Throne of the Essence, since the will itself necessitates judgement. Nothing occurs in existence nor disappears from it without the Will. When there is opposition to the divine command here, it is called "rebellion". It is only commanding the means, not the command which brings things into being. None opposes Allah at all in what He does in respect to the command of the Will. Opposition only occurs in respect of the command of means. So understand that!

Properly speaking, the command of the Will is directed to bringing the action itself into existence, not to the one at whose hands the action manifests itself. It is impossible that the action should not be. However it takes place in a particular locus, and so, at one moment, it is called opposition to the command of Allah, and at another moment it is called agreement and obedience to the command of Allah. The language of praise and blame follow the action accordingly.

Since the matter itself is based on what we have stated about it, creation of all sorts therefore hopes for happiness. He designated this station as "mercy which encompasses everything." (13) It preceded divine wrath, and the predecessor comes before as is its right. That which the latter judges is what the former judged. Mercy obtained it since nothing preceded it, so this is one meaning of "His mercy preceded His wrath" that mercy judges the one who reaches it. It stands at the end. Therefore the end must be reached, and thus mercy and parting from wrath must be reached. It has jurisdiction over everything which reaches it according to what is given to it by the state of the one who arrives.

Whoever possesses understanding
witnesses what we have said.
If they do not understand,
they should take it from us.
There is only what we mentioned in this matter,
so rely on it and be in it now as we were.
What we recited to you came from it to us,
and from us to you is what we gave you from us.

As for the softening of iron, (14) hard hearts are softened by reprimand and threat as fire softens iron. The hardness of hearts is a stronger hardness than that of stone. Fire breaks stone, calcifies it and does not soften it. Iron was only softened for him so that protective coats of mail could be fashioned. This is an instruction from Allah that the thing is only protected by itself.¹ Mail protects against the spearhead, the sword, the knife and the arrowhead - protection against iron is by iron. The Muhammadan Shari'a brings, "I take refuge with You from You." Understand this! This is the spirit of the softening of iron. He is the Avenger, the Merciful, and Allah grants success.

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. Qur'an 38:18-20.
2. 6:84; 19:49; 21:72; 29:29.
3. Qur'an 34:13.
4. Qur'an 17:3.
5. As he had prophethood, the message, the khalifate, the kingdom, knowledge, wisdom, and discrimination.
6. Qur'an 34:10, "O mountains and births! echo with him in his praise!"
7. Qur'an 38:17, "Remember Our slave Da'ud, who possessed true strength."
8. Qur'an 38:20, "We made his kingdom strong, and gave him wisdom and decisive speech."
9. Qur'an 6:90.
10. See the Qur'an 74:54-56, "It is truly a reminder to which anyone who wills may pay heed. But they will only pay heed if Allah wills."
11. The reality of the will necessitates judgement because it is the same as making a demand.
12. Al-Makki.
13. Qur'an 7:156, also 40:7.
14. Qur'an 34:10, "We softened iron for him: 'Fashion wide coats of mail and measure well the links.'"

18: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Breath (Nafas) in the Word of Yunus (Jonah)

Know that this human organism in its perfection consists of spirit (ruh), body and self (nafs). Allah created it in His form. The disintegration of its structure is only undertaken by the One who created it either by His hand - and it is only that - or by His command. Whoever undertakes to do that without the command of Allah has wronged himself and exceeded the limits of Allah in it and rushed to the ruin of the one whom Allah has commanded to thrive. Know that compassion to the slaves of Allah is more proper through preservation than jealousy in Allah.

Da'ud, peace be upon him, wanted to build the Bayt al-Muqaddas, (1) and built it many times. Whenever he finished it, it was destroyed. He complained about that to Allah. Allah revealed to him, "This House of Mine will not be built by the hands of one who has shed blood." Da'ud said, "O Lord, was that not for Your sake?" Allah said, "Yes, but are they not My slaves?" Da'ud said, "O Lord, let it be built at the hands of someone who is from me!" Allah revealed to him, "Your son Sulayman will build it."

What is meant in this story is that the preservation and maintenance of this human organism is better than its destruction. Do you not see that Allah has prescribed jizya (2) and research of peace with those who had opposed the Din in order to spare them. He said, "If they incline to peace, you too incline to it, and put your trust in Allah." (8:61)

Do you not see that for the one who has responsibility for retaliation, accepting blood-money or pardoning is prescribed for the next-of-kin who is the responsible guardian? If he refuses to accept either, then the killer can be slain in retaliation. Do you not see how when the next-of-kin consists of a group of people, and one of them accepts the blood-money or pardons the person while the rest of the group want him killed, Allah observes the one who pardoned and prefers him to the one who did not pardon. Do you not see that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever is in a position to retaliate and slays the person is like him"? Allah says, "The repayment of a bad action is one equivalent to it," (42:40) so He made retaliation an evil deed, i.e. that deed is evil even though it is part of the Shari'a. Whoever pardons and makes amends has a reward due from Allah because he is based on His form. Whoever pardons and does not slay, his reward is due to the One on whose form he is based, because the One who fashioned is more entitled to it, and his existence only appeared by the name the Manifest.

Whoever preserves the person, preserves Allah. Man is not blameable by his source, but by his action, and his action is not the same as him. We are discussing his action, and action belongs only to Allah, even though some actions are blamed and some are praised. The language of blame in respect to purpose which is reprehensible with Allah, and the only thing reprehensible is what is made to be so by the Shari'a. The Shari'a makes something reprehensible because of what Allah made known or which He made known through someone He has instructed. So Allah prescribed retaliation by necessity for the preservation of the human race and to prevent people exceeding the limits of Allah. Allah says, "There is life for you in retaliation, O you who possess intelligence (lit. cores)!" (3) (2:179) They are the people of the core who stumble onto the secret of divine laws and wisdoms.

Since you know that Allah preserves this organism and preserves its continuance, you should also preserve it since you have that happiness. While man is still alive, he hopes that he will

obtain the attribute of perfection for which he was created. Whoever strives to destroy it, strives to prevent the acquisition of that for which he was created. How excellent is what the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, "Shall I tell you what is better and more excellent for you when you meet your enemies, smite their necks and they smite yours? Remembering Allah."

That is because the only one who knows the value of this human organism is the one who remembers Allah with the invocation (dhikr) demanded of him. (4) Allah sits with the one who remembers Him, (5) and the sinner is witnessed by the one doing the invocation. When the one doing the invocation does not witness Allah who sits with him, then he is not doing invocation. When Allah is mentioned, He flows in all parts of the slave, not just in his invocation with the tongue. Allah, at that moment, is only the Companion of the tongue in particular. The tongue sees Him, inasmuch as the man, (6) in respect of his sight does not see Him. (7)

Understand this secret in the invocation of those who are heedless! The heedless person who does invocation is present without a doubt, and the One mentioned sits with him and so he witnesses Him. In respect of his heedlessness, this person does not do invocation and Allah does not sit with the heedless. Man is many but with a single source. Allah is one source but has many Divine Names, just as man has many parts. What is required of the invocation of one part is not the invocation of another part. Allah sits with the part which is invoking Him, and the other part is described as heedless. There must be some part of man doing invocation, so Allah sits with that part, and He preserves the rest of the parts by His concern.

When Allah undertakes the destruction of this organism by what is called "death", that is not negation (i'dam) , but rather separation. He takes man to Him, and what is meant is only Allah's taking man to Him, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." (11:123) When He takes him to Him, He fashions him a different composition than this composition. The new composition is from the genus of the abode to which he has moved, that is, the Abode of Going-on, because equilibrium exists. The creature thus will never die, i.e. his parts will never be separated.

As for the people of the Fire, they will return to bliss, but it will be in the Fire since after the end of the duration of punishment, it must become cold and peace according to the mercy which preceded it. This is their bliss. The bliss of the people of the Fire, after claims are settled, is the bliss of the friend of Allah, Ibrahim, when he was thrown into the Fire.⁸ He was punished by the sight of it since his knowledge told him that it is a form which causes pain to any living being which is near it. He did not know what Allah intended by it and from it in respect to him.


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Had a slain person or one who had died not returned to Allah when he died or was slain,

Allah would not have decreed their deaths nor prescribed their slaying. All is in His hand, and there is no loss in respect to Him. He prescribes slaying and decrees death by His knowledge that His slave will not pass from Him, for he returns to Him as Allah says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned." So freedom of action occurs in it, and He is the One with freedom of action. Nothing is outside of Him of which He is not the source. Rather, His He-ness is the source of that thing, and He is the One who gives it its unveiling when He says, "and to Him the whole affair will be returned."

Notes to Chapter 17:

1. The Temple (Beth ha-Mikdash) in Jerusalem. The chapter is an evident proof against the lies circulated by the occupier of al-Aqsa, Mr. 'Ikrimah Sabri, after the Ahlu-s-Sunnah were expelled from it.
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
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19: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Unseen in the Word of Ayyub (Job)

Know that the secret of life flows in water, for it is the basis of the components and the basic elements. For this reason, Allah made every living thing of water. (1) There is nothing which is not alive, so there is nothing which does not proclaim His praise, but their extolling is only understood by divine unveiling. (2) Nothing extols unless it is alive. So the basis of everything is water. Do you not see how the Throne is on the water because it was formed from it? (3) It oppresses the water while the water underneath it maintains it. In the same way, Allah created man a slave. Then he was haughty towards his Lord and put himself above Him. In spite of this, Allah preserves him from underneath in respect of the height of this slave who is ignorant of himself. This is what the Prophet said, "If you let a rope fall, it would fall on Allah." So he indicated that "below" is related to Him as "above" is related to Him when He said, "They fear their Lord above them," (16:50) and "He is the Absolute Master over His slaves." (6:18; 6:61) So He has "above" and "below" For this reason, the six directions only appeared in respect of man, who is on the form of the All-Merciful.

There is no nourisher except Allah. He said of one group, "If they had implemented the Torah and the Gospel," using the indefinite and being general, "and what was sent down to them from their Lord," and this includes every judgement sent down on the tongue of a Messenger or someone inspired, "they would have been fed from above their heads," and He is the Nourisher in respect of the aboveness which is ascribed to Him, "and beneath their feet," (5:66) as He is the Nourisher in respect of the belowness which He ascribes to Himself on the tongue of His Messenger, who translates from Him. If the Throne had not been on the water, its existence would not have been maintained. The existence of the living sustains life. Do you not see that when the living dies the customary death, the parts of his structure disintegrate and his faculties are eliminated from that particular structure? Allah said to Ayyub, "Stamp your foot! Here is a cool bath," (38:42) meaning that since he had an excess of the heat of pain, He would alleviate it by the coolness of the water. For this reason, the medicine was decrease from excess and excess in decreasing. What is meant is the demand of balance, and the only way to it is by approaching it.

However, we said that there is no way achieve equilibrium because realities and witnessing constantly accord taking-form with every single breath. (4) Taking-form (takwin) only comes from an inclination which is called deviation or decomposition in nature. In Allah it is the will, and it is inclination to one particular goal rather than another. Equilibrium denotes sameness in all, but this does not occur. For this reason, we are deprived of the principle of equilibrium. Allah's description with pleasure and anger and the attributes is related in prophetic divine knowledge. Pleasure obliterates anger, and anger obliterates pleasure from the pleasing. Perfect equilibrium would mean that anger and pleasure are the same. The Wrathful would not be wrathful towards the one he is angry with, but would be pleased with him. He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him that is, inclination. And Allah would not be pleased with the one He is pleased with and would be angry with him, and so He is described by one of the two principles in respect to him - that is, inclination.

We said this, however, in respect of the one who thinks that Allah's wrath will continue against the people of the Fire forever, as he claims. So they do not have the principle of pleasure from Allah. What is meant is true. It is as we have said, so the hopes of the people of the Fire lies in the removal of pains. Even if they still dwell in the Fire, that is pleasure, so

wrath is removed when the pains are removed since the source of pain is the source of wrath if you understand! Whoever is wrathful has suffered hurt. He only strives to avenge the object of his wrath by causing him suffering so that the wrathful might find relief by that. He transfers the pain which he has to the object of his wrath. If you separate Allah from the universe, then High indeed is He exalted above this attribute! If Allah is the He-ness of the universe, then all principles appear only in Him and from Him. It is His word, "to Him the entire affair will be returned" in reality and unveiling, "so worship Him and put your trust in Him" (11:123) in veil and covering. There is nothing in the realm of possibility more original than this universe because it is based on the form of the Merciful which Allah brought into existence - He manifested His existence by the existence of the universe as man manifests the existence of the natural form. We are His manifest form, and His He-ness is the spirit of this form which governs it. There is no management except in Him as it is only from Him. He is the First by meaning and the Last by form, and the Manifest by the changing of judgements and states, and the Inner by management. "He has knowledge of all things." "He witnesses everything" (5) so He knows by direct witnessing, not by thought. It is the same with the knowledge of tasting (dhawq) which does not derive from thought. Tasting is sound knowledge. Other things are only conjecture and surmise, and that is not knowledge at all.

Then Ayyub had that water to drink to remove the pain of thirst which was from the weariness and punishment with which shaytan (6) had touched him, (7) that is, distance from the realities which he perceived for what they were. Ayyub perceived them for what they were, and by his perception, he was in the place of nearness. Every witnessed one is close to the eye ('ayn=source), even if it is far away by the interval of distance. Vision reaches it, since it is witnessing. If it had not been for that, he would not witness it, nor would what is witnessed be reached by vision, however you want to put it. The witnessed is near between the sight and the seer. This is why Ayyub alluded to touch and ascribed it to Shaytan in spite of the nearness of touch. He said, "The one distant from me is near because of his power over me."

You know that distance and nearness are two relative matters, for they are two ascriptions. They have no existence in the source in spite of the fact that there judgements are established in the far and near. Know that the secret of Allah in Ayyub (whom He made an example for us in a written existing book which this Muhammadan community reads in order to learn what is in it, and they attach honor to the one who possesses it), is that Allah praised him for his patience in his supplication to remove affliction from him. We know that when the slave calls on Allah to remove affliction from him without that lessening his patience, then he is patient and the best of the slaves, as Allah said, "What an excellent slave! He truly turned to his Lord." (8) (38:44) This means he goes back to Allah, not back to the cause.

Allah affects by the cause because the slave depends on it since the causes which will remove any one matter are many, but the Causer is but one. It is more fitting that the slave return to the One Source in order to remove that pain by the cause of that than to the particular cause. It may be that it will not conform to Allah's knowledge in it, and then some will say, "Allah did not answer me." Yet he did not call on him, but he inclined to a particular cause which neither the time nor the moment requires. Ayyub acted by the wisdom of Allah since he was a Prophet. He knew that with one group, patience is what holds the self back from complaint. That is not our definition of patience (sabr). Its definition is to hold the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah, not to Allah. The first group is veiled in their view that the complainer is lessened in contentment (rida) with the decree by complaint. That is not the case.

Contentment with the decree is not lessened by complaint to Allah or to others, but contentment with the decreed is lessened. We are not speaking about contentment with the decreed. Affliction is what is decreed and not the same as the Decree. Ayyub knew that holding the self back from complaint to Allah for the removal of affliction is to oppose divine force. It is ignorance if, when Allah afflicts someone by what gives him pain, he does not call on Allah to remove that painful matter from him. The one who has realization must supplicate and ask Allah to remove that from him. For that gnostic who possesses unveiling, that removal comes from the presence of Allah. Allah describes Himself as "hurt", so He said, "those who hurt Allah and His Messenger." (33:57) What hurt is greater than that Allah test you with affliction in your heedlessness of Him or a divine station which you do not know so that you return to Him with your complaint so that He can remove it from you? Thus the need which is your reality will be proven. The hurt is removed from Allah by your asking Him to repel it from you, since you are His manifest form.

One of the gnostics was hungry and wept. Someone who had no tasting (dhawq) in that area censured him for that. The gnostic said, "But Allah makes me hungry so that I might weep. He tests me by affliction so that I might ask Him to remove it from me. This does not lessen my being patient." We know that patience is holding the self back from complaint to other-than-Allah.

By "other" I mean a particular aspect of Allah. Allah specified a particular one of Allah's aspects, and it is called the aspect of He-ness, so he calls on Him from that aspect to remove affliction from him, not from the other aspects called causes. They are only Him in respect to elaboration of the matter in itself. The gnostic's request does not veil him from the He-ness of Allah in removing affliction from him and the fact that all the causes are Him from a particular point of view. This path is only obliged on the people of adab among the slaves of Allah who are entrusted with the secrets of Allah. Allah has guardians whom only Allah recognizes, and some of them recognize each other. We have counselled you, so strive, and ask of Allah!

Notes to Chapter 19:

1. Qur'an See 21:30.
2. See Qur'an 17:44.
3. See 11:7. As for the connection between Water (al-ma') and the Throne (al-'arsh), see the hadith narrated by Imam al-Bukhari, "Allah existed and there was nothing with Him, then His Throne was on the water, and then He created the heavens and the earth."
4. Tajdid al-khalq, instantaneous renewal of creation.
5. See Qur'an 5:117; 22:17, etc.
6. The root of the name Shaytan is shaytana, meaning "to be remote from".
7. Qur'an 38:41.
8. Awwab, which means one who frequently turns to Allah.

20: The Seal of the Wisdom of Majesty in the Word of Yahya (John the Baptist)

This is the wisdom of firstness in the names. Allah called him Yahya, i.e. the dhikr of Zakariyya was Yahya brought to life by him, and "a name We have given to no one else before." (19:7) He joined the attainment of the attribute, which is in the one who has passed on but left a son to revive his memory and his name through him. He called him "Yahya". His name Yahya is like knowledge by tasting. The memory of Adam, peace be upon him, was revived by Shith and that of Nuh by Sam. It is the same with the Prophets, peace be upon them; but Allah did not combine the name of knowledge from Him and the attribute for anyone before Yahya. It was an act of concern for Zakariyya from Allah, since Zakariyya said, "Give me an heir from You." (19:5) He mentioned Allah before the mention he mentioned his son, as Asiya (1) mentioned the neighbor before the abode when she said, "Build a house in the Garden for me in Your presence." (66:11) Allah was generous to Zakariyya, for He granted his need and named him by His attribute. Yahya's name was a remembrance for what His Prophet Zakariyya asked of Him; because he preferred the going-on of dhikr-Ullah after his death, since the son is the secret of his father.

He said, "to be my inheritor and the inheritor of the family of Ya'qub." (19:6) Nothing is inherited in respect of these except for the station of dhikr-Ullah and calling to Him. Then Allah gave him the good news of what He appointed for him from His words, "Peace be upon him the day he was born, and the day he dies, and the day he is raised up again alive." (19:15) He brought the attribute of life, which is his name, and He informed him of His peace upon him. His words are true. He completed it, even if it is the word of the spirit, "Peace be upon me the day I was born, the day I die, and the day I am raised up again alive," (19:33) and this is more sublime and more perfect in oneness and belief in the interpretation. That in which the order of nature (2) was broken in respect to 'Isa was articulation. His intellect was given mastery and perfected at that time when Allah made him speak. In any case, mastery of articulation is not necessary.

'Isa spoke the truth in what he articulated but this is different than the one who was testified to, as in the case of Yahya. (3) Allah's greeting on Yahya was higher than the greeting of 'Isa on himself in this way since the ambiguity occurring in divine concern was removed. The immediate circumstances indicate his proximity to Allah in that and his sincerity, since he spoke in the cradle the form which indicated the innocence of his mother. He was one of the two witnesses. The other witness was the shaking of the dried trunk of the palm tree. (4) Fresh, ripe dates came tumbling down without the male palm tree or pollination. In the same way, Maryam bore 'Isa without a man, that is, without normal and customary intercourse. If a Prophet had said, "My sign and my miracle is that this wall will speak," and then the wall speaks and says, "You have lied, you are not the Messenger of Allah," then the sign is proven and it is confirmed by it that he is the Messenger of Allah. One does not pay any attention to what the wall said.

He introduces this probability into the words of 'Isa when his mother pointed to him while he was in the cradle. Allah's greeting on Yahya is higher than this element. The passage which indicates that he is the slave of Allah is in respect of the claim made about him that he was the son of Allah. The indication is completed by sheer articulation. He is the slave of Allah according to another group who speak of Prophethood. It increases the principle of probability in logical thought until his truthfulness appeared in the future regarding all that he

spoke about when he was in the cradle. So understand our allusion!

Notes to Chapter 20:

1. The wife of Pharaoh who was one of the perfect women.
2. Kharq al-'adat, miracle, literally, the breaking of the normal pattern of things.
3. 'Isa was a witness, not one who is the object of witness, since he testified on behalf of his mother.
4. See Qur'an 19:29.



21: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sovereignty (1) in the Word of Zakariyya (Zachariah)

Know that the mercy of Allah encompasses everything in existence and judgement, and the existence of wrath comes from the mercy of Allah by wrath. His mercy preceded His wrath, that is, the ascription of mercy to Him preceded the ascription of wrath. Then every source has an existence which demands that Allah's mercy encompass every source. For that reason, we say that the mercy of Allah encompasses all things in existence and principle.

The Divine Names are "things", but they derive from a single Source. The first thing that His mercy encompassed before time was its thingness, that source which gives existence to mercy by mercy. Thus the first thing that His mercy encompassed was itself, then the thingness indicated, then the thingness of every existent existing without end in this world and the Next, non-essential ('arad) and substance (jawhar), composite and simple. Neither the acquisition of a goal nor harmony of nature is taken into account rather, harmonious and inharmonious things are all encompassed by divine mercy in existence. We mentioned in The Makkan Revelations that effect only belongs to the non-existent, not the existent. If the existent had it, it is by the principle of the non-existent. It is a strange knowledge and a rare question. Only those who possess illusions (awhâm) know its realisation, and that is by their tasting (dhawq). (2)

The mercy of Allah pervades phenomenal beings, and circulates in essences and sources. The most ideal position of mercy is when it is known from witnessing with sublime thoughts. Everyone mercy designates is happy. There is only what mercy designates, and the mention of the mercy of things is the source of its bringing them into existence. Every existent thing has been shown mercy. O friend! Do not be veiled from the perception of what we have said by what you see of the troubles people experience and what you believe about the pains of the Next Abode which will not depart from the one whom they afflict.

First of all, know that mercy is in bringing-into-existence in general. In mercy by pains, only pains come into existence. So mercy has an effect in two ways - the first effect is by the essence, which is its bringing every existent source into existence. It does not regard desire or lack of it, suitability or lack of suitability. It looks at the source of every existent before its existence, or rather, it looks at its source-form. For this reason, it saw Allah-as-creature in creeds as a single source-form among the source-forms. Its mercy to itself is by bringing-into-existence. This is why we said that Allah-as-creature in creeds is the first thing shown mercy after its mercy to itself in its connection of bringing those shown mercy into existence.

It has another effect by request. Those who are veiled ask Allah to have mercy on them in their beliefs, and the people of unveiling ask for the mercy of Allah to settle on them. They ask for it by the name of Allah, and so they say, "O Allah! Have mercy on us!" and He only has mercy on them by carrying out mercy through them. It has authority because authority in reality belongs to the meaning based on place.

He is the Merciful in reality, so Allah is only merciful to His slaves, attentive to them by mercy. When mercy settles on them, they experience its authority through taste (dhawq). The one designated by mercy has had mercy known to him. The active participle is the Merciful (Rahîm) and the Mercy-Giver (Râhim), and this principle does not describe creatures because it is a matter of directing meanings to their essences.

States are neither existent nor non-existent they have no source in existence because they are relationships. They are not non-existent in principle because what knowledge establishes is called the "knower", and it is a state. The knower is an essence described by knowledge, but it is not the same as the essence nor is it the same as knowledge. There is only knowledge and the essence on which this knowledge is established. The being of the knower is a state of this essence when it is described by this meaning. The relationship of knowledge occurred to him, so he is called knowing. Mercy, properly speaking, is a relationship from the Mercy-giver, and it is necessarily part of the principle, so it is merciful. The One who brought it into existence in the one shown mercy did not bring it into existence in order to be shown mercy by it; He brought it into existence to show mercy to the one on whom it settled.

Allah is not in a place by events, so He is not in a place by bringing mercy into existence. He is the Mercy-Giver, and the Mercy-Giver is only Mercy-Giver by the establishment of mercy. He confirmed that He is the source of mercy. Whoever has not tasted this matter and has no part in it, does not dare to say that He is the source of mercy or the source of the attribute. Such a person says, "He is not the same as the attribute nor other than it." In his view, the attributes of Allah with Him are not Him, nor are they other-than-Him because he cannot deny them nor can he make them the same as Him. Thus he (3) moves to this interpretation, and it is a good interpretation. Yet there is another interpretation more appropriate to the matter than this one, and more likely to remove ambiguity. It is to deny the sources of the attributes any existence based on the essence of the one described. Rather, they are relationships and relative ascriptions between the one described by them and their intelligible sources. Although mercy is common to all of them, it is different in relationship to each Divine Name. (4)

For this reason, Allah is asked to show mercy by each Divine Name, so the mercy of Allah and its indirect reference, which is that which encompasses everything, has many branches according to the number of the Divine Names. It is not general in relation to that particular divine name in the statement of the one who asks, "O Lord, have mercy!" and other Divine Names, even the Avenger. So he says, "O Avenger, have mercy on me!" That is because these Names indicate the designated Essence and, by their realities, indicate different meanings. They call on Him by these Names in mercy with respect to their indication of the Essence called by that Name and no other not by what is indicated by that Name, separating it from another and distinguishing it. The Name is not distinguished from another, and with him it is the indication of the Essence. It is distinguished in itself from other-than-it by its essence, as it is generally agreed that, by any expression, this Name is a reality distinct in its essence from other-than-it.

The whole is set forth to indicate one designated source. There is no disagreement that each name has an authority which another does not have. That also must be taken into account, as one takes into account their indications of the named essence.

For this reason, Abu'l-Qasim ibn Qasi said regarding the Divine Names that each Name is, in its isolation, designated by all of the Divine Names since they preceded in mentioning its description by all the Names, that is, by their indication of one source. Although the Names based on it are many and their realities differ, i.e. the realities of these Names, the mercy is obtained by two means. The first is the path of obligation, and it is His word, "I shall prescribe it for those who are godfearing and pay zakat," (7:156) and He binds them by it through the attributes of knowledge and action. The other path by which mercy is obtained is the path of divine graciousness which is not connected to action. It is His words, "My mercy

embraces all things." Of this, it is said, "So that Allah may forgive you your earlier errors and any later ones." (48:2) And of this, there are His words, "Do what you want, I have already forgiven you." (5) So know that!

Notes to Chapter 21:

1. Al-Mâlikiyya. His state was dominated by the name al-Mâlik, the Sovereign, who prevails in His orders. This strength was shown in his himma whose fruit was Yahya.
2. Because they connect the imagination (wahn) to things and bring them into existence and thus have experiential knowledge of this. As for the one on whom illusion has no effect, he is far from this question.
3. The Imam of Ahlu-s-Sunnah wa-l-Jama'ah, Shaykh Abu-l-Hasan al-Ash'ari.
4. There is a specific mercy of Allah, of al-Rahman, of ar-Rahim, of al-Malik, etc.
5. This refers to an incident involving Hatib ibn Abi Balta'a. When the Muslim army prepared to set out to conquer Makka, Hatib sent a letter to warn the Quraysh which was intercepted. 'Umar wanted kill him for intelligence with the nemy in war, but the Prophet said, "O 'Umar, perhaps Allah has looked with favor on those who already fought at Badr and said, 'Do whatever you want. I have already forgiven you.'"



22: The Seal of the Wisdom of Intimacy in the Word of Ilyas (Elijah)

Ilyas (Elijah) is none but Idris (Enoch), peace be upon him. He was a Prophet before Nuh, and Allah raised him to a high place. (1) He dwells in the heart of the spheres, the sphere of the sun. Then he was sent to the town of Baalbek (Ba'labakk). Baal is the name of an idol and "bakk" is the power of the village. The idol was called Baal and was singled out with domination. It was Ilyas who was Idris, who was given the example of the splitting of the mountain called "Lubnan (Lebanon)" which comes from lubana (desire, goal). What he needed was a horse of fire with all its trappings of fire. When he saw it, he rode it and appetite fell from him, and so there was intellect without appetite. There remained for him no connection with that which is connected to the desire of the self. For him, Allah was pure without connection. He had only half of gnosis of Allah. When the intellect is free of the self in respect to gathering knowledges by its discernment, its gnosis of Allah is based on disconnection (tanzih) not connection (tashbih).

When Allah gives gnosis by tajalli, then gnosis of Allah is perfected.
Disconnection is used in one place and connection in another place.

The gnostic sees the diffusion of Allah by existence in natural and elemental forms. There is no form but that he sees the source of Allah in its source. This is the complete perfect gnosis which is brought the roads (shara'i) revealed from Allah. By this recognition, all illusions (awham) have authority. For this reason, illusion has a stronger power in this human organism than the intellect, because the man of intellect even if his intellect reaches maturity is not free of the power which illusion has over him and over the formation of what he reasons. Illusion is the greatest power in this perfect human organism. The revealed roads brought it, and so you use both connection and disconnection. You use connection in disconnection by illusion, and disconnection in connection by the intellect. So the whole is connected to the whole. It is not possible that disconnection be free of connection nor connection from disconnection. Allah said, "Nothing is like Him," so He used connection and disconnection. "He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing," (2) and He used connection, and yet it is the greatest of ayat revealed on disconnection. Even so, it is not free of connection because of the Kayf (like).

So He has the most knowledge of Himself of those who know. He only designated Himself by what we mentioned. Then He said, "Glory be to your Lord, the Lord of Might, beyond anything they describe," (37:180) and they only describe according to what these realities accord them. He exalted Himself above their disconnection since they limit Him by that disconnection. That is due to the inability of the intellect to perceive the like of this.

Then all the roads (Shara'i) brought what the illusions dominate. They do not free Allah of an attribute in which He is manifest as they said. They brought that, and so communities acted on it. Allah granted them the tajalli. The heirs followed the Messengers closely, and said what the Messengers of Allah said. Allah knows best where He puts His message, and so Allah knows best who turns his face to Him in a particular aspect by transmission to the Messenger of Allah. One aspect of His begins with "He knows best where to place His message." (6:124) There is a reality in each of the two aspects for that reason, we speak of connection and disconnection, and disconnection and connection. After this (3) is established, we will lower the screens and drop the veils on the eye of the critic (4) and the one who simply follows a

creed. Both of them are among the forms in which Allah gives tajalli, but He has commanded the veil for us in order that different levels of excellence of the predisposition of forms might appear. One is given a tajalli in a form according to the predisposition of that form. What its reality and exigencies accord him is ascribed to him. That must be. The example of the one who sees Allah when he is asleep and does not deny it is this. Without a doubt, it is Allah Himself. He attaches to it the exigencies of that form and its realities in which He gives the tajalli in sleep. Then after that, he interprets, i.e. he transfers it to another matter which disconnection logically demands. If the one who interprets it has unveiling and belief (iman), then he does not transfer it to disconnection at all. Rather, he gives it the disconnection that is due it and what is due to that which is manifest in it, i.e. its connection/resemblance. Properly speaking, "Allah" is an expression for the one who understands the indication (ishara). (5)

The spirit of this wisdom and its seal is that the command is divided into the effector and the one effected. These are two expressions. The effector in every aspect and in every state and in every presence is Allah. The effected by every aspect and in every state and in every presence is the universe, even if it is Allah who comes. (6) Allah is everything at its foundation which corresponds. That which appears is forever and ever a branch from the root; divine love is a branch from the supererogatory acts of the slave. So this is an effect between the effector and the effected. Allah is the hearing of the slave and his sight and faculties from this love. (7) This is an established effect which, if you believe, you cannot deny because it is confirmed by the Shari'a.

As for the person of sound intellect, he is either in possession of a divine tajalli in a natural locus of tajalli, (8) so he recognizes what we have said, or else he is a believing Muslim who believes in what was reported in sound tradition. The power of illusion must govern the man of intellect investigating what has been brought to him in this form because he believes in that form. As for the one who is not a believer, he judges illusion by illusion; and so he imagines by his logical discernment that he assigns to Allah what the tajalli gives him in dream. Illusion in that does not depart from him inasmuch as he is not aware because of his disregard for himself. From that is what Allah says, "Call on Me and I will answer You." (40:60) Allah also says, "If My slaves ask you concerning Me, I am near. I answer the call of the caller when he calls on Me," (2:186) since He only answers when there is someone who calls to Him. The source of the caller is the source of the answerer, but there is no disagreement about the difference of forms. They are two forms without a doubt.

All these forms are like Zayd's limbs. It is known that Zayd is one reality in personality, yet his hand is not the form of his foot nor his head nor his eye nor his eyebrow. He is one multiple - multiple by forms, one by source. That is like man who is one by source without a doubt. There is no doubt that 'Umar is not Zayd nor Khalid nor Ja'far, and that the individual persons of this one source are endless in existence. Even if man is one by source, he is many by forms and persons. If you are a believer, you know absolutely that Allah Himself will appear in a tajalli in a form on the Day of Rising. He will be recognized and then He will change form and be denied. (9) Then He will change from it again into another form and will not be recognized. He is the One giving tajalli and it is not other than Him in each form, even though it is known that this form is not that other form.

It is one source which has the same function as the mirror. When the viewer looks in it at the form of his belief in Allah, he recognizes Him, and so draws near Him. When it happens that he sees in it the belief of someone else, he denies Him since he sees his form and the form of someone else in the mirror. The mirror is but a single source while the forms are many in the

eye of the viewer. There is no form in the mirror which comprises them all at once. Although the phenomenal being of the mirror has an effect on the forms from one aspect, it does not have an effect on the forms from another aspect. The effect which it has makes the form change shape in smallness, largeness, length, and width, so it has an effect in quantities. This is attributable to it, but this changing of it is by the difference of the size of the mirrors. In the example, look at one of these mirrors, and do not look at all of them. It is your perception in respect to His being essence, and so He is independent of the universe, and in respect to the divine names. In that moment He is like the mirrors. Whatever Divine Name in which you look at yourself or simply look at. He manifests the reality of that Name in whoever looks. The matter is thus. If you understand, do not be anxious, and do not fear. Allah loves bravery, even to the extent of killing a snake. The snake is not other than your self, and the snake is alive through its self in form and reality. The thing is not killed by itself, even if the form is destroyed in the senses, The definition determines it, and imagination does not make it depart.

Since the matter is based on this, this is the safeguard of the essences and might and invincibility. You cannot destroy the definition. What might is greater than this might? You imagine by illusion that you have killed. By intellect and illusion, the form does not vanish from existence in the definition. The proof of that is, "You did not throw when you threw, but Allah threw." (8:17) The eye only perceived the form of Muhammad which had the throwing confirmed to it in the senses. It is what Allah denied the throwing to at first, and then confirmed in the middle, only to return to the perception that Allah was the One who threw in the form of Muhammad. One must believe this. So look at this effector when Allah descended into a Muhammadan form. Allah Himself informs His slaves of that, and none of us said that of Him, rather He said it of Himself. His report is true, and it is obligatory to believe it whether or not you perceive the knowledge of what He said, being a knower or believing Muslim.

Part of what shows you the weakness of the intellect's discernment in respect to its thought, since the intellect passes judgement on cause ('illa), is that cause is not an effect of the one who is the cause. This is the judgement of the intellect which is evident. There is only this in the knowledge of tajalli, and it is that the cause is an effect to whoever is the cause. That which the intellect governs is sound when discernment is clarified. Its goal in that is that, when it sees the matter differently than what logical proof would accord it, it says that the source after it is confirmed that it is one in this multiple, and inasmuch as it is cause in one of these forms belonging to any effect is not an effect of its effect, so that its effect would become a cause to it. This is his goal when he sees the matter for what it was, although he does not continue in his logical discernment.

Since the command in causality is of this sort, your opinion by the scope of logical discernment is not in other than this narrow limit. None are more reasonable than the Messengers, may the blessings of Allah be upon them, and they brought what they brought in transmission from the Divine Presence. They confirmed what the intellect confirmed. Then they gave more in what the intellect alone does not possess by its perception and what the intellect does not imagine directly, but one draws near to it in the divine tajalli. When he is alone with himself after the tajalli, he is confused about what he saw. If he is the slave of a Lord, his intellect returns to him, and if he is the slave of reasoning, Allah gives him back judgement. This is only as long as he is veiled in the dimension of this world from his dimension in the Next World.

The gnostics appear here as if they possessed the form of this world by virtue of the fact that its principles operate on them. However, Allah has transformed them inwardly to the dimension of the Next World. That must be the case. They are unknown by form except to whomever has had his inner eye unveiled by Allah so that he perceives. (10) There is no gnostic of Allah in respect of divine tajalli who is not based on the dimension of the Next World. He has been gathered in this lower world of his and has been called from his grave. He sees what they do not see, and he witnesses what they do not witness - as a mark of concern from Allah to some of His slaves in that respect.

Whoever wishes to find this wisdom of Ilyas-Idris to whom Allah gave two formations, so that he was a Prophet before Nuh, and then he raised him up and brought him down after that as a Messenger and so Allah joined for him the two degrees, let him descend from the authority of his intellect to his appetite and be an absolute animal so that he will be shown what every creature that crawls is shown except for the jinn and men. Then he will know that he has realized his animality, and it has two tokens. One is this unveiling so he sees who is punished in his grave and who has bliss. He sees the dead alive and the silent speaking and the sitting walking. The second token is muteness since, had he wanted to utter what he had seen, he would be unable to do so. Thus he has realized his animality. We had a pupil who acquired this unveiling although dumbness did not take hold of him, and so he did not fully realize his animality. When Allah established me in this station, I realized my animality with a complete realization. So I was seeing and wishing to utter what I was witnessing but I could not. So there was no difference between me and the mute who cannot speak.

When he realizes what we have mentioned, he will move to being pure intellect in natural matter. He will witness matters which are the roots of what is manifested in natural forms. He will know from where this principle is manifest in the natural form with the knowledge of tasting. Had it been unveiled that nature is the source of the breath of the All-Merciful, he would have been given much good. If he is restricted in what we have mentioned, this power from the gnosis which governs his intellect will be enough for him. He keeps company with gnostics, and by that he knows tasting. "You did not kill them, it was Allah who killed them," (8:17) yet only iron, the blow and that which is behind this form killed them. In the whole, killing and throwing took place. So he witnesses matters by their roots and by their forms, and he is complete. When he witnesses the breath, he is completely perfect. The breath of the All-Merciful is the source of the overflowing of existence and life on all, rather the source of Allah's descent to all forms.

Notes to Chapter 22:

1. A place from which, according to Sidi Muhiddin, Idris (Enoch) descended in order to become Ilyas (Elijah). See Qur'an 19:57, "Mention Idris in the Book. He was a true man and a Prophet. We raised him up to a high place."
2. Qur'an 42:11.
3. The rule of joining tanzih and tashbih.
4. The one who uses logical proof.
5. i.e. what he recognises from the word "Allah" extends only so far as his predisposition and understanding.
6. In the wârid.
7. "When I love him, I am his hearing with he hears, his sight by which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks".
8. i.e. the human form.

9. Hadith in Muslim: 1: 299, 302.

10. See Qur'an 50:22, "We have stripped you of your covering and today your sight is sharp."



23: The Seal of the Wisdom of Ihsan in the Word of Luqman

If Allah wishes, He wills provision for Him,
so all of phenomenal being is His food.
If Allah wishes, He wills provision for us,
so He is our food as He wishes.
His volition is His will, so say that He wished it.
So it is wished.
He wills increase and decrease.
So what He wishes is wished.
This is the distinction between them, (1)
so understand!
From a certain point of view,
their source is the same.

Allah says, "We gave Luqman wisdom," (31:12) and He says, "Whoever has been given wisdom has been given much good." (2:269) By the divine text, Luqman had much good as Allah has testified. The example of what Luqman said to his son is, "My son, even if something weighs as little as a mustard-seed, and it is inside a rock or anywhere else in the heavens or earth, Allah will bring it out." (31:16) This is a wisdom which is articulated, and that wisdom is his setting out that Allah is the One who brings forth. Allah confirmed that in His Book and did not refute what the speaker said.

As for the silent wisdom in it, and you know it by the circumstances, he is silent about the one to whom that grain is given. He did not mention him nor did he say to his son, "Allah will bring it to you or to other than you." He used bringing in general terms and denoted the thing brought in the heavens or in the earth as an instruction that the looker might regard His words, "He is Allah in the heavens and in the earth." (6:3) Luqman gave instruction by what he said and by what he remained silent on, so Allah is the source of every knowing thing because the known is more universal than the thing, so it denies unknown things.

Then he completed the wisdom and brought it to its full value in order that the structure might be complete in it. He said, "Allah is Latif (Subtle, Kind)." (31:16) Part of His subtleness (latâfa) and His kindness (lutf) is that He is in the thing named by such-and-such a definition in such-and-such a source of that thing, so it is only what its name indicates by convention and usage. It is said that these are names: heaven, earth, rock, tree, animal, angel, provision and food, and yet the source of everything is One. Thus the Ash'arites say about this that the entire universe is homogeneous in substance (jawhar), so it is one single substance.

It is the same as our statement that the source is One. They said that it varies by non-essentials. Thus our statement that it varies and becomes many through forms and relationships so as to provide distinction. It is said, "This is not that in respect to its form or its non-essential or natural disposition (mizâj)." Say whatever you like, but this is the same as that in respect to its substance. For this reason, the source of the substance is put in the definition of every form and disposition. However, we say that it is not other-than-Allah. The mutakallim thinks that it is called substance. Even though it is true, it is not the source of Allah of which the people of unveiling and tajalli speak. This is the wisdom of the "Latîf".

Then He is described when He says "the All-Aware (Khabir)," the One who knows by experience. It is His words, "We will test you until We know." (47:31) This is the knowledge of tastes. Allah put Himself with His knowledge of what the matter is in (our) profitable knowledge. No one can deny what Allah has written about Himself. Allah differentiated the knowledge of tasting and absolute knowledge. The knowledge of tasting is limited by the faculties. He said of Himself that He is the source of the faculties of His slave when He said, "I am his hearing," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his sight," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his tongue," which is one of the faculties of the slave, "and his foot and his hand." He did not restrict Himself to specifying the faculties, but He mentioned the members. The slave is not other than his members and faculties. The source called the slave is the Real, but the source of the slave is not the Compassionate Master.

Relationships are distinct by their essence. The one brought into relationship is not distinct. (2) Then He equalized His source in all relationships, for it is but one source with various ascriptions, relationships and attributes. Part of the completeness of Luqman's wisdom in instructing his son is what has come in the ayat of these two Divine Names, Latif and Khabir - Allah is called by them. If He had put that in phenomenal being (kawn) which is existence, and said, "He was (kana)," it would have been more complete in wisdom and more eloquent in admonition. Allah related the words of Luqman in meaning as he said it and did not add anything to it. His statement that Allah is the Latif, the Aware, is from the statement of Allah. Then Allah knew of Luqman that, had he said it (kana), it would have been utterly perfected by this.

As for his words, "If it should be but the weight of one grain of mustard-seed," it is for the one who has it as food. It is only the atom mentioned in His words, "Whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it." (99:7-8) A mustard-seed is the smallest thing consumed. If there had been anything smaller, Allah would have used it as He said, "He is not ashamed to make an example of a gnat." (2:26) Then since He knew that there is anything smaller than the gnat, He said "or of an even smaller thing," i.e. in smallness. This is the word of Allah, and that which is in the Sura of the Earthquake (az-Zalzal, 99) is also the word of Allah. So know that! That which is smaller than the gnat is the atom, and then there is another subtlety (latifa). That is that the atom, in spite of its smallness, is also lighter in weight because it is alive, since the living is lighter than the dead. So the meaning is that when the deed is the weight of an atom in smallness and lightness, the recompense must be seen. We know that Allah did not restrict Himself to the weight of the atom, and there is nothing smaller than it. He used it by way of intensification, and Allah knows best.

When Luqman used the diminutive for his son, (3) it was the diminutive of mercy and thereby he gave him a legacy which contains his happiness if he acts according to it. The wisdom of Luqman's legacy lies in his prohibition to his son, "Do not associate anything with Allah. Associating others with Him is a terrible wrong." (31:13) The one wronged establishes apportioning in respect to His description even though it is the same source. So he is only associating His source with Him, and this is the very greatest ignorance.

The reason for this is that the person who has no recognition of the matter nor of the reality of the thing, does not know that diversity is actually contained in a single source although forms vary in that single source. So such a person puts the form shared by another in that station, and so he makes every form a part of that station. It is known of the associate that the matter which indicates him through what occurs in him of partnership is not the source of the other

with whom he is associated, since it is the other. In reality, there is no associate. Everyone is based on his portion whenever it is said about him that there is a partnership between the two in it. The reason for that joint association, if it is joint, is that the action of one of them eliminates the collective aspect. "Say: Call on Allah or call on the All-Merciful." (17:110) This is the very heart of the question.

Notes to Chapter 23:

1. The difference between volition (mashi'a) and will (irada).
2. In respect of its reality, the Essence is not distinguishable.
3. Bunayya, "little son".



24: The Seal of the Wisdom of the Imam in the Word of Harun (Aaron)

Know that the existence of Harun, peace be upon him, was from the presence of mercy (rahamut) by His words, "We endowed him with Our mercy, making his brother Harun a Prophet." (19:53) So his Prophethood was from the presence of the Rahamut. He was older than Musa, and Musa was greater than him in Prophethood. The Prophethood of Harun is from the presence of mercy (rahma) and, for that reason, he said to his brother Musa, peace be upon him, "O son of my mother!" (7:150) So he called to him by his mother, not by his father, since, in principle, mercy belongs in greater abundance to the mother than the father. Were it not for that mercy, the mother would not have the patience necessary for upbringing. Then he said, "do not seize me by the beard or by the hair," (20:94) and do not let my enemies gloat over me. All this is one of the breaths of mercy. The reason for that is the lack of ascertainment in looking at the tablets which had been given into his hands. If he had looked at them with ascertainment, he would have found guidance and mercy in them.

Musa would have found guidance, which is an elucidation of what happened in the matter which made him angry and of which Harun was innocent, and mercy towards his brother. He did not take him by the beard because of that state in which he saw his people because of his age, for Harun was older than him. That was compassion for Musa from Harun because the Prophethood of Harun is from the mercy of Allah. Only the like of that issued from him.

Then Harun said to Musa, "I was afraid that you would say: 'You have caused division in the Tribe of Israel'," (20:94) and you would make me the cause of their division since the worship of the Calf divided them. There were some of them who worshipped it following and imitating the Samiri, and there were some of them who refused to worship it until Musa returned to them so that they might question him regarding it. Harun was afraid that he would have that division between them attributed to him.

Musa knew the matter better than Harun because by his knowledge he knew the One the people of the Calf worshipped since Allah decreed that only He would be worshipped. When Allah decrees something, it must occur. Musa chided his brother Harun since the business consisted of disavowal and inadequacy. The gnostic is the one who sees Allah in everything, rather he sees Him as the source of everything. Musa was teaching Harun with the instruction of knowledge even though Musa was younger than him in age.

For that reason, when Harun said what he said, he turned to the Samiri and said to him, "What did you think you were doing, O Samiri," i.e. what were you doing in turning aside to the form of the Calf, and in your making this shape from the jewelry of the people so that you captured their hearts for the sake of their wealth? 'Isa used to say to the Tribe of Israel, "O Tribe of Israel! Every man turns to where his wealth is, so put your wealth in heaven, and then your hearts will be in heaven." Wealth is only called that (mâl) because by essence it inclines (yumîl) the hearts to worship. It is the greatest and most exalted goal in the hearts since they need it. Forms have no going-on, so the form of the Calf must vanish. If Musa had not hastened to burn it, jealousy would have overcome him. So he burned it and then scattered the ashes of that form in the sea. He told the Samiri, "Behold your god." He called it a god to alert him in order to teach him that he did know some of the places of divine tajalli, "I will surely burn it!"

The animality (hawayâniyya) of man has freedom of action over the animality of animals since Allah has subjected animals to man, especially in view of the fact that man's origin is not animal. Man has greater subjugation because that which is not-animal does not possess will. In fact, the non-animal is under the jurisdiction of whoever administers it without any recalcitrance whatsoever. The animal, on the other hand, has both will and instinct. Recalcitrance appears in some of its actions. If it has the power to manifest that, reluctance and resistance to what man wants appears from it. If it does not have that power or if what the man wants agrees with what the animal itself wants, then the animal obediently follows what is wanted of it.

Even so, man's "like" follows a command in whatever Allah has called him to in respect of the wealth which he hopes for from Him, which is designated in some states by "the other World" as when Allah says, "We have raised some of them above others in rank so that some of them are subservient to others." (43:32) His like is only subjugated to him by his animality, not by his humanness. The two likes are two opposites. The higher is degree subjugates the lower in degree by wealth or by rank with his humanness, and that other was subjected to him either by fear or greed from his animality, not from his humanness, so his like is not subjected to him.

Do you not see that what is among the beasts in the way of jostling against one another is because they are likes? Two likes are two opposites. That is why He said, "and He raised some of them above others in rank," so he is not with him in rank, and so subjugation occurs in respect of rank. Subjection is of two kinds. First, there is subjection intended by the subjector like the active conqueror when he subjects this subjected person - like the subjugation by the master of his slave although he is his like in humanness, and like the subjugation of the Sultan of his subjects who are his like in humanness, He subjugated them by rank.

The second sort is subjugation by the subjects of the king establishing their command that he drive harm away from them, protect them, do battle against those who attack them, and preserve their property and lives. All this is subjection through state by the subjects who subjugate their king in this act. In reality, it is called the subjection of rank. Rank has jurisdiction over him by this act. There are kings who work just for themselves, and there are those who recognize the matter and know that their subjects' subjugation of them is by rank. He knows their power and rights. Allah rewards him for that with the reward of those who know. The reward of the like of this is up to Allah, in Allah's being involved in the affairs of His slaves, for all the universe is subjected by state. Who is there who cannot be referred to as being "subjected"? Allah said, "Every day He is engaged in some affair." (55:29)

Lack of power was in fact the armour of Harun which saved him from the people of the Calf by mastery over the Calf as Musa had mastery over it. This is a wisdom from Allah which is manifest in existence that He should be worshipped in every form. When the form departed after that, it only departed after it had been clad with divinity by its worshipper. For this reason, there is no species but that it is worshipped, either by the worship of making divine or by the worship of subjugation. That must be so for the one who has intellect.

Nothing is worshipped in the universe except after it is clad in elevation for the worshipper and its rank is manifest in his heart. For that reason, Allah called Himself for us, "the Exalter of ranks," and He did not say the "Exalter of rank," for ranks are many in the same source. He decreed that we worship only Him in many ranks. Each rank accords a divine locus of tajalli

which is worshipped in it, and the greatest locus of tajalli in which He is worshipped and the highest, is passion (hawa). As He said, "Have you seen him who takes his passion to be his god?" (45:23) It is the greatest idol. Nothing is worshipped except by it, and it is only worshipped by itself. Of it I say:

The truth of passion is
that passion is the cause of passion.
If there had not been passion in the heart,
passion would not have been worshipped.

Do you not see how perfect Allah's knowledge of things is? How it is completed in respect of the one who worships his passion and takes it as a god? He said, "he who Allah has misguided knowingly." (45:23) Being astray is bewilderment (hayra). That is when this worshipper sees that what he worships is only his passion, by following it in obedience to Him in what He commanded him of worship of whichever person worships Him, until his worship is for Allah the Great. That too is from passion because if passion had not occurred in him in that pure presence and it is the will to love he would neither have worshipped Allah nor preferred Him to others. In the same way, everyone worships a certain form among the forms of the universe, and takes it as a god, and he only takes it by passion. The worshipper is under the power of his passion. Then he sees that idols take on various forms among the worshippers. Each worshipper, for some reason, denies the one who worships another. What he has is a nearer perception which is confused by the unity (ittihâd) of passion, rather by the oneness (ahadiyya) of passion as He mentioned. It is the same source in every worshipper. Allah led him astray, i.e. confused him in respect to a knowledge that every worshipper only worships his own passion, and only seeks to worship his passion whether or not it agrees with the command of the Shari'a.

The complete gnostic is the one who sees that every idol is a locus of Allah's tajalli in which He is worshipped. For that reason, they are all called "god" in spite of having a particular name of a stone, tree, animal, man, star, or angel. This is the nature of the personality in it. Divinity is a rank which the worshipper imagines it to have, and it is the rank of his idol. In reality, it is a locus for the tajalli of Allah belonging to the sight of this particular worshipper devoted to this idol in this particular locus of tajalli.

This is why some of those who did not recognize an ignorant statement said, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" (39:3) although they called them "god", as they said, "Has he turned all the gods into One God? That is truly astonishing." (38:5) They do not deny Him, rather they are amazed. They stop at the multiplicity of possible forms and the ascription of divinity to them. That is why the Messenger came and called them to one God who is recognized and not witnessed by their witnessing. They confuse Him with them and believe in Him when they say, "We only worship them so that they may bring us nearer to Allah" by their knowledge of those forms in stones. This is why the proof went against them when He said, "Say: Name them!" and they only named them by what they know those names to have in reality.

As for those who recognize the matter for what it is, they manifest the form of denying what is worshipped in the way of forms because their rank is in knowledge, and their rank is in accord with their being based on the principle of the moment, since they know that the moment is one of the mighty places of the tajalli of Allah in which He gives tajalli at each moment by some of His attributes. This is why time (ad-Dahr) is one of Allah's Names. The

Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Do not curse time, for time is Allah!" At every moment, people are overcome by the principle of the quality in which He gives tajalli at that particular moment. The Messenger who is sent in that moment is the greatest manifestation of the perfection of that quality. He calls creation to Allah, manifested by tajalli in him, by obedience to him, which is obedience to Allah, as Allah says, "Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah." (4:80) This is why it is obligatory to trust in him and obey him.

However, the gnostics know that they do not worship the forms themselves. Rather, they worship Allah in them according to the power of the tajalli which they know of these forms. The one who denies and has no knowledge of what Allah has manifested in tajalli is ignorant of this. The complete gnostic veils himself from the Prophet and Messenger and their heirs. He commands himself to leave that form which the Messenger of the moment left in order to follow the Messenger desiring Allah's love for them by His words, "Say: if you love Allah, then follow me and Allah will love you." (3:31) He called on a God to whom one has recourse and Who is known in respect to the whole and is not witnessed, "nor do the eyes perceive Him, but He perceives the eyes" (6:103) by His lutf and His diffusion in the source of things. The eyes do not perceive Him as they do not perceive their spirits which govern their shapes and outward forms. "...He is the Latif, the All-Aware."

Experience is tasting, and tasting is tajalli. Tajalli occurs in forms. They must be and it must be, and the one who sees Him by his passion must worship Him, if you only knew! Allah possesses the goal of the path.



25: The Seal of the Wisdom of Sublimity in the Word of Musa (Moses)

The wisdom of the killing of the male children in respect to Musa was in order to give him the support of the life of each of those killed for his sake because each of them was killed for being Musa. There is no ignorance, so the life of the one killed for his sake had to return to Musa. It is pure life in the natural state (fitra). The desires of the self have not soiled it; rather, it is in its natural state of "Yes (bala)." (1) Musa was the sum of the lives of those killed for being him. All that was prepared for the murdered ones in the way of the predisposition of their spirits was in Musa, peace be upon him. This is a divine favour to Musa which no one before him had.

The wisdoms of Musa are numerous. If Allah wills, I will enumerate them in this chapter according to what the divine command puts into my mind. This is the first about which I shall speak in this chapter.

Musa was only born being a synthesis of many spirits. He was a concentration of effective forces since the young have an effect on the old. Do you not see how the child has an effect on the older person by the special quality the child has? The older person descends from his leading position to play with the child and rock him in his arms and to show himself at the child's level of intellect he descends to the level of the child's intellect. He is under subjugation even though he is not aware of it. He occupies himself with instructing and protecting the child, seeing to his needs and consoling him so that the child is not distressed.

All this is part of the effect of the young on the old. That is due to the strength of his station. The young has a new covenant with his Lord because he has newly come into being. The old person is further from Him. Whoever is nearer to Allah subjects whoever is further away from Him, just as the elite of the near angels subject the further ones. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, used to expose himself to the rain when it came down and to uncover his head so that it would fall on him. He said that it has a new covenant with Allah. Look at this recognition of Allah on the part of this Prophet! What is more glorious, more sublime and clearer than this? The rain subjected the best of men due to its proximity to its Lord. That is a likeness of the Messenger on whom the revelation descends. The rain called him by its own state, (2) and so he exposed himself to the rain in order to receive from it what it brought from his Lord. If he had not received this divine benefit from it by the rain, he would not have exposed himself to it. This is the message of water from which Allah has fashioned every living thing (3) - so understand! As for the wisdom of Musa being put into the ark and then cast into the river, the ark (tâbût) is his human nature (nâsût). The river is what he received of knowledge through his body by what the power of discernment and the sensory imaginative faculties accorded him. Only by the existence of this elemental body does the human self have these faculties or their like. When the self comes to this body and is commanded to freely dispose of it and manage it, Allah gives it these faculties as instruments by which it obtains what Allah wills that it obtain in the management of this ark which contains the sakina (4) of the Lord. Musa was cast into the river in order to receive various knowledges by these faculties. Thus Allah taught him that the spirit which manages him is the ruler. He is only managed by it. It gives him the command of these faculties of phenomenal being which are in this nâsût that is designated by the ark in the field of indications and wisdoms.

Allah manages the universe in the same way, and it is only managed by it or by its form. It is only managed by Him inasmuch as the arrival of the one begotten depends upon its being brought into existence by the begetter. Caused things depend on their causes, proven things depend on their proofs, and true things depend on their realities. All of this is part of the universe, and it is Allah's management of it, and he only manages by it.

As for our statement, "or by its form," I mean the form of the universe, and by it I mean the Most Beautiful Names and sublime attributes by which Allah is named and described. Nothing of a name by which He is called has reached us but that we found the meaning and spirit of that name in the universe. The universe is also only managed by the form of the universe.

For that reason, the Prophet said in respect of the creation of Adam who is the blueprint which gathers all the attributes of the Divine Presence which is the essence, the attributes and the actions: "Allah created Adam in His form." His form is only the Divine Presence. In this noble epitome, which is the Perfect Man, He brought into existence all the Divine Names and the realities of that which is outside of him in the Macrocosm separate from him. He made Adam a spirit (rûh) for the universe, and so He subjected to him the high and the low through the perfection of his form. As there is nothing in the universe that "does not glorify Allah's praise," (5) in the same way, there is nothing in the world which is not subject to this man according to what the reality of his form accords him. Allah says, "He has made everything that is in the heavens and the earth subservient to you. It is all from Him." (22:65) All that is in the universe is subject to man. He who knows that from his knowledge is the Perfect Man. He who is ignorant of that is the Animal Man.

The form of casting Musa into the ark and then casting the ark into the river is outwardly a form of destruction. Inwardly, it was his rescue from being killed. He was brought to life as the self is brought to life by knowledge from the death of ignorance as Allah says, "Is someone who was dead (i.e. by ignorance) and whom We brought to life (with knowledge) and supplied with a light by which to walk among the people (which is guidance) the same as someone who is in utter darkness (in being astray) unable to emerge from it (i.e. will never be guided)?" (6) In itself the matter has no end at which it stops.

Guidance is that man is guided to bewilderment (hayra). He knows that the business is bewilderment. Bewilderment is being unsettled and movement. Movement is life. There is no non-movement nor death. There is existence and not non-existence. It is the same with the water which gives life to the earth. Its movement is His word, "so it quivers" and conceives, "and swells" with pregnancy, "and sprouts plants in beautiful pairs." (7) It only gives birth to what resembles it, i.e. has a nature like it. It has being linked in pairs (zawjiya) which is the state of being doubled by what is born from it and what appears from it.

Similarly, the existence of Allah has multiplicity and the many Names. It is this or that according to what appears from it of the universe which demands the realities of the Divine Names by its development. They are doubled by it and stand in opposition to the unity of multiplicity. It is one by source in respect to its essence, as the primal substance (hayûla) is a single source in respect to its essence, while it has many forms which it supports by its essence. It is the same with Allah through the forms of tajalli which are manifested from Him. So the locii of the tajalli are the forms of the universe, in spite of the intelligible unity (ahadiyya). Look at the excellence of this divine instruction which Allah gives by granting its recognition to whoever He wishes among His slaves.

When the family of Pharaoh found him in the river by the tree, Pharaoh called him Musa. Mu is water in Coptic and sha is tree. He named him by where he found him, for the ark stopped by the tree in the river. Pharaoh wanted to kill him. His wife, speaking by divine articulation in what she said to Pharaoh about Musa since Allah had created her for perfection as Allah said about her when He testified that she and Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, have the perfection which men have (8) - said, "he may be a source of delight for me and for you." (28:9) She would be consoled by him with the perfection which she received as we have said.

The consolation of Pharaoh was with the belief Allah gave him when he was drowning. So Allah took him pure and purified. There was no impurity in him since He took him in his belief before he had acquired any wrong actions. Islam effaces what was before it. He made him a sign of His concern so that none might despair of the mercy of Allah, for "no one despairs of solace from Allah except for the unbelievers." (12:87) If Pharaoh been of those who despair, he would not have embarked on belief. Musa, peace be upon him, was, as the wife of Pharaoh said, "a source of delight for me and for you. Do not kill him. It may well be that he will be of use to us." That is what happened. Allah gave them use of Musa, although they were not aware that he was a prophet who would destroy the kingdom of Pharaoh and his family.

When Allah protected him from Pharaoh, his mother's heart was freed of the anxiety which had befallen her. Then Allah forbade him to be suckled until he had received his mother's breast, so she suckled him that Allah might complete her joy. The knowledge of the roads (sharâ'i) is like that. It is as Allah said, "to each We have made a road," (5:48) i.e. a path (tariq), "and a direction (minhaj)" from that path. This statement is an indication of the root from which he came (minhuja). It is his food as the tree has branches and yet is only nourished by its root. What is haram in one Shari'a can be halal in another Shari'a - I mean in a certain form it can be halal, while in the heart of the matter it is not really the same as what passed because the matter is new creation, not repetition. This is what we instruct you! It is referred to in connection with Musa when the wet-nurses were made haram.

In reality, the one who suckled him, not the one who bore him, is his mother. The mother of birth carried him in regard to the trust. He is formed within her and fed by her menstrual blood without any volition on her part in that, so that does not come from her benevolence towards him. He is only fed by what would destroy her or make her ill had he not been nourished on it, or had that blood not gone out of her. The embryo is a gift to its mother since it feeds on what would cause her harm had that blood remained with her and not gone out of her, or had not the embryo been nourished on it.

Suckling is not the same. By her suckling, she intends to give him life and to sustain him. Allah gave that to Musa in the mother who bore him. No woman outside of his mother by birth had any right over him that she also might find consolation in bringing him up and watching him grow in her room, and so she was not sad.

Allah saved him from the grief of the ark, so he pierced natural darkness by what Allah gave him of divine knowledge, while he did not depart from nature. He tested him with many trials (9) and gave him experience in many places so that he might realize patience in himself in the trials Allah gave him.

The first of Allah's trials was the killing of the Copt which Allah inspired him to do and gave him success in his secret yet he did not know this. However, Musa did not feel any anxiety

over killing him, although he was unsure until the command of his Lord told him, since the Prophet is inwardly protected without being aware of it until he is informed, until transmission comes to him. For this reason, al-Khidr showed him the killing of the boy, (10) so Musa criticized the killing but did not remember how he had killed the Copt. Al-Khidr told him, "I did not do it of my own volition," (18:82) and he informed him of his rank before he told him that his movement was protected in reality, but he was not aware of it.

Al-Khidr also showed him the piercing of the ship. Outwardly it was destruction, but inwardly it was rescue from the hand of the tyrant. He made that an analogy of the ark which was in the river its outward aspect was destruction, while inwardly it was rescue, for his mother did it fearing the hand of the tyrant, who was Pharaoh, that he might not kill Musa in captivity. She looked at him with the revelation Allah had inspired in her while she was not aware of it. She felt in herself that she would suckle him. When she feared for him, she cast him into the river because, as the proverb says, "What the eye does not see does not afflict the heart." She did not fear for him with the fear of the witnessing of the eye, and she was not sad with the sorrow of seeing him. It came over her thoughts that perhaps Allah would return him to her, for she had a good opinion of Him. She lived by this thought in herself and by the hope which was opposite fear and despair. When she was inspired to do this, she said, "Perhaps he is the Messenger who will destroy Pharaoh and the Copts." She lived and took joy in this, which was illusion and thought in respect of herself, but, in the heart of the matter, it is knowledge.

When they searched for Musa (after he had killed the Copt), he left in flight, fearful outwardly and in the meaning, it was love of deliverance for movement is always by love, but the onlooker is veiled from it by other causes, which are not the movement. This is because the root is the movement of the universe from non-existence which was immobile in existence. That is why it is said that the matter is movement from immobility. The movement which is the existence of the universe is the movement of love. The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, quoting Allah, "I was a hidden treasure, therefore I wanted (lit. loved) to be known." (11)

If it had not been for this love, the universe would not have appeared in its source. Its movement from non-existence to existence is the movement of the love of the One who brings into existence for this purpose. The universe also loves to witness itself in existence as it was witnessed in immutability. Thus by every aspect, the movement from immutable non-existence to the existence of the sources is a movement of love, both in respect of Allah and in respect to itself.

Perfection is loved for itself. Allah's knowledge of Himself is His, since He is independent of the worlds. It belongs only to Him. The perfection of the rank of knowledge only remains by the in-time knowledge which comes from these sources. When the sources of the universe exist, then the forms of perfection appear with timeless and in-time knowledge. Thus the rank of knowledge is perfected by two aspects.

In the same way, the ranks of existence are perfected. Existence from it is before-time and not before-time, which is in-time. Pre-temporal (azali) time is the existence of Allah by Himself, and non-pre-temporal-time is the existence of Allah by the forms of the immutable universe. It is called in-time because it manifests some parts to others. He is manifest to Himself by the forms of the universe, and so existence is perfected.

The movement of the universe is by love of perfection, so understand! Do you not see how what the Divine Names bring into existence is breathed from the absence of the manifestation of their effects in a entity called the universe? It loves rest (12) which is only reached by the existence of form, high and low. Thus it is confirmed that movement occurs by love. The only movement in the entire cosmos is by love.

Among the 'ulama' are those who know that and those who are veiled by the nearer cause because it rules their state (hâl) and overpowers them. Musa was aware of his fear by what occurred through his killing the Copt. That fear implied love of deliverance from killing. So he fled by fear. In the meaning, he fled when he loved deliverance from Pharaoh and his deeds. He mentioned the nearest cause which he was aware of at that moment, which is like the form of the body of man, and love of deliverance is contained in it as the body contains the spirit which manages it.

The Prophets had the language of the outward with which they addressed people in general and on which they relied to make the one who listened understand what was said. The Messengers make allowances for people in general by their knowledge of the rank of the people of understanding. It is as the Prophet, peace be upon him, said about gifts, "I give to this man, while another man is more beloved to me than him for I fear that Allah might throw him down into the Fire." He made allowances for those whose intellect and discernment are weak and who are overcome by greed and nature.

Similarly, what they brought of knowledges, they brought wearing a robe (13) which nearer to the understanding, so that the one who has no "diving" might stop at the robe and say, "How excellent this robe is!" and he will see it as the limit of rank. Because of what this robe from the king demands, the one with subtle understanding, the one who dives for the pearls of wisdom, looks at the quality of the robe and its type of material. By it, he knows the degree of the one it covers, and so he stumbles onto a knowledge which no one else has obtained from those without knowledge of such matters.

Then the Prophets and Messengers and heirs knew that in this world and in their communities, there are those who, in this manner, express themselves in the outward language which the elite and common share. The one who is elite understands of it what the common understand, and more, inasmuch as it is valid that he be called elite. He is distinguished from the blind. Those who have obtained knowledges are content with this. This is the wisdom of his words, "I fled from you when I was in fear of you," (14) but he did not say, "I fled from you by love of safety and well-being."

Musa came to Madyan and found two women and got water for them without being paid for it. Then he turned away to the divine shade and said, "O my Lord, I am truly in need of any good You have in store for me." (28:24) He made the source of his getting water the same as the good which Allah sent down to him, and he described himself as being in need of Allah in the good which he had. Al-Khidr showed him the setting-up of the wall without wage, but Musa chided him for it. So al-Khidr reminded him of his drawing water without wage, and other things which were not mentioned. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, wished that Musa had remained silent and had not left him so that Allah would have related more about them.

Al-Khidr alerted Musa to the fact that what had come to him and would come to him was by the command of Allah and His will which it is impossible to contradict. Knowledge of that is

one of the prerogatives of wilaya. As for the Messenger, He might not acquaint him with it, for it is the secret of the decree.(15) If He had acquainted him with that, it might have been a reason for his lassitude in conveying what he was commanded to convey. Allah withholds the knowledge of this from some of the Messengers as a mercy to them from Him. He did not withhold it from our Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, because of the strength of his state. This is why our Prophet said, "I call on Allah by inner sight." (75:14)

By this he knew what Musa had succeeded in had been without knowledge on his part. If it had been from knowledge, Musa would not have criticized what al-Khidr did, since Allah had testified before Musa as to al-Khidr's purity and justice. In spite of this, Musa was heedless of the fact that Allah had made him pure, and of the conditions set down for following him. This was a mercy for us if we forget the command of Allah. If Musa had known that, al-Khidr would not have said to him, "What you have never encompassed in your knowledge," meaning I have a knowledge which you have not received by tasting as you have a knowledge which I do not know. He was just.

As for the wisdom of his parting from him, it is because Allah said of the Messenger, "Take what the Messenger brings you, and avoid what he prohibits you." (59:7) The 'ulama' of Allah who recognize this quality of the Message and the Messenger stop at this statement. Al-Khidr knew that Musa was the Messenger of Allah. He regarded what came from him to preserve the adab which is due to the Messengers. Musa said to him, "If I ask you about anything after this, then you should no longer keep me company." So he forbade al-Khidr to keep his company. When that occurred for the third time, al-Khidr therefore said, "This is where you and I part company," Musa did not tell him, "Do not do it," nor did he seek to keep him company for he knew the level of the rank he was in when he spoke of the prohibition against keeping him company. Musa was silent, and the parting took place.

Look at the perfection of these two men in knowledge and the completion of divine adab as right, and the justice of al-Khidr, peace be upon him, in what he acknowledged to Musa when he said, "I have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know, and you have a knowledge which Allah has taught me which you do not know." This information which al-Khidr imparted to Musa was a remedy for the wound inflicted on him in his words, "How indeed could you bear with patience something you have not encompassed in your knowledge?" (18:68) although he knew the sublimity of his rank with the message, and al-Khidr did not have this rank.

This appeared in the community of Muhammad in the hadith regarding the fertilization of the date tree. The Prophet, peace be upon him, told his Companions, "You know more about the matters of your daily life."16 There is no doubt that the knowledge of the thing is better than ignorance of it. Allah praises Himself, saying, "He has knowledge of all things." The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, acknowledged to his Companions that they knew more about the exigencies of this world than him because he had no experience of them. It is knowledge of tasting (dhawq) and experience, and the Prophet, peace be upon him, had not occupied himself with this sort of knowledge. Rather, he was occupied with what was more important. I have informed you about a great adab by which will benefit you if you occupy yourself with it.

Musa's statement, "My Lord gave me right judgement," (26:21) means the khilafah, "and made me one of the Messengers," means the message. Not every Messenger is a Khalif. The Khalif has a sword, duties and governance. The Messenger is not the same rather, he

transmits what he has been sent to transmit. If he does battle and defends with the sword, then he is both Khalif and Messenger.

As for the wisdom of Pharaoh's question regarding divine whatness (mâhiya) when he said, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" (26:23) that question did not arise from ignorance, but it was posed in order to test Musa and to see what answer he would give when he claimed that he had a message from his Lord. Pharaoh knew the rank of the Messengers in knowledge of Allah and he wanted to test Musa's answer to ascertain the validity of his claim. In order to inform those present, he invited an answer which would have been misleading as far as they were concerned since they did not know what Pharaoh himself knew about the question. Musa answered him with the answer of those who have knowledge of the matter. Then Pharaoh, in order to preserve his position, asserted that Musa had not answered his question. So because of the inadequacy of their understanding, it seemed clear to those who were present that Pharaoh knew more than Musa. For this reason, when Musa answered him with what was not appropriate and outwardly it is not an answer to what he was asked about and Pharaoh knew that he would only give that answer, Pharaoh then said to his companions, "Your Messenger" who was sent to you "is mad" since the knowledge of what I question him about is veiled from him (17) since it is inconceivable that it be known at all.

The question is valid. The question of the what-ness is a question about the reality of what is asked about - it must be real in itself. As for those who make definitions which consist of category and genus, these are matters shared by various things. Whoever has no category must have a reality in Himself which belongs to no other. The question is invalid in the school of the People of Allah, sound knowledge and sound intellect. The only answer to it is the answer Musa gave.

Here is a great secret! He mentioned the "act" in giving the answer to the one who asked for a definition of essence. He made the essential definition the source of the attribution to what appeared of Him in the forms of the universe, or what appeared in Him of the forms of the universe. In answer to, "What is the Lord of the worlds?" he said that He is the One in whom the forms of the universe are manifest on high which is the heaven - and below - which is the earth, "if you but have certainty," (18) or He who is manifest by them.

When Pharaoh told his companions that Musa was mad, (majnûn) in the sense that he was possessed, Musa added to the elucidation in order to inform Pharaoh of his rank in divine knowledge because he knew that Pharaoh already knew that. Musa said, "The Lord of the East and the West," bringing what was manifest and what was hidden, in the outward and the inward, "and what between them is" which is Allah's words, "He has knowledge of everything," "if you have intellect," (19) i.e. if you possess qualification since this comes from intellect.

The first answer is for those who are certain, and they are the people of unveiling and existence. Musa said, "If you have certainty," i.e. if you are the people of unveiling and existence. I have given you knowledge of what you are already certain about in your witnessing and existence. If you are not of this category, I have answered you in the second answer: if you are among the people of intellect and qualification, and you limit Allah according to what the proofs of your intellects accord.

Thus Musa manifested both aspects in order to inform Pharaoh about his question and his veracity. Musa knew that Pharaoh knew that because he asked about the what-ness of Allah.

He knew that his question was not couched in the language the ancients used in their questioning by means of what. That is why he answered him. If he had known anything else from him, he would have been mistaken in the question. Musa treated that about which he was asked as the source of the universe, and Pharaoh addressed him by this language (20) although the people present were not aware of that.

Pharaoh said to him, "If you take any god other than me, I will certainly make you one of the imprisoned." (26:29) The letter sin in prison (sijn) is one of the letters of increase, (21) meaning I will veil you, for you answered by what supported me so that I might say the same to you. If you say to me, "O Pharaoh! I do not I do not recognize your threat to me while the source is but one, so how can you separate?" Then Pharaoh replied, "The ranks are separate, but the source is not separate and it is not divided in its existence. My rank right now is power over you by actual fact, O Musa! I am you by the source and other than you by rank!"

When Musa understood that from him, he gave him his due in respect to himself and told him, "You will not be able to do that." Pharaoh's rank gave him power and influence over Musa because Allah is in the rank of Pharaoh in respect of the outward form which has authority over the rank in which Musa appeared in that assembly.

Therefore Musa told him that Allah had manifested a barrier to his hostility against Musa. He said, "Even if I were to bring you something undeniable?" Pharaoh could only reply, "Produce it then, if you are someone telling the truth" so that Pharaoh would not appear to be unjust among those of his nation who were weak-minded. They had doubts about him, and they were the group Pharaoh made unsteady. However, they obeyed Pharaoh because they were a corrupt people; (22) that is, lacking sound intellects' rejection of taking Pharaoh's claims literally. The intellect stops at a certain limit, and only those of unveiling and certainty can cross that limit. This is why in his answer, Musa first addressed those of certainty and then address those of the intellect.

"So he drew down his staff ('asa)" (26:32) which is the form with which Pharaoh defied (23) ('asa) Musa when he refused to answer his call. "And there it was, unmistakably a snake," i.e. an evident snake. Thus rebellion, which is evil, changed into obedience, which is good, as Allah says, "Allah will transform their evil deeds into good deeds," (25:70) meaning in judgement. Here the judgement manifested a differentiated source in a single substance (jawhar) so it is a staff, a snake, and a manifest serpent. It devoured its likes among the snakes in the form of a snake, and the staffs in the form of a staff. The proof of Musa overcame the proofs of Pharaoh in the form of staffs, snakes and ropes. The sorcerers had ropes, but Musa did not have a rope. The "rope" is the small hill; (24) that is, their powers in relation to the power of Musa is as the hills are to the lofty mountains.

When the sorcerers saw that, they recognized Musa's rank in knowledge and they saw that he possessed a power which was not mortal. If it had been within the power of a mortal, it would only belong to someone who could distinguish sure knowledge from imagination and illusion. So they believed in "the Lord of the Worlds, the Lord of Musa and Harun" - that is, the Lord to whom Musa and Harun summoned them because they knew that the people understood that they were not being called to Pharaoh. Pharaoh was in the position of authority, and he was the master of the moment since he was the Khalif with the sword, even though he broke the customary divine laws when he said, "I am your Lord most high" - i.e. since all are lords, (25) I am the highest of them through the power which you have outwardly given me over you. The sorcerers knew that he spoke the truth in what he said, and

they did not deny it. They affirmed that to Pharaoh, and said, "You only judge in this passing life, so judge as you like, for the kingdom is yours." So the statement of Pharaoh, "I am your Lord most high," was valid. Although the source is from Allah, the form is Pharaoh's. He cut off the hands and feet, and crucified through a real source in false form in order to attain the ranks which are only attained by that act.

There is no way to neutralize causes because the source-forms necessitate them. They only appear in existence by the form on which they are based at the source since "there is no changing the words of Allah." (10:64) The words of Allah are not other than the sources of existent things. Timelessness is ascribed to Him in respect to their permanence, and in-time ness is ascribed to them in respect of their existence and appearance. Thus we say, a certain man or guest happened (26) to be with us today." That does not mean that he did not have any existence before this event. For that reason, Allah says about His Mighty Word which is timeless, "No reminder (dhikr) from their Lord comes to them lately renewed (27) without their listening to it as if it were a game," (21:2) and "but no fresh (28) reminder reaches them from the All- Merciful, without their turning away from it." (26:5) The Merciful only brings mercy, and whoever turns away from mercy advances the punishment which is the absence of mercy.

As for the words of Allah, "but their belief when they saw Our violent force was of no use to them. That is the pattern Allah has always followed with His slaves," (29) (40:85) that did not mean that it did not profit them in the Next World through His exception, "except for the people of Yunus." He meant that that did not prevent them being punished in this world. For that reason, Pharaoh was seized in spite of the existence of his belief even though his affair was that of someone who is certain that his death is approaching. The circumstances accord that he was not certain that he was going to die because he saw the believers walking on the dry path which had appeared when Musa struck the sea with his staff. Pharaoh was not certain that he would perish since he believed that he would not die until the moment actually reached him. He believed in the One in whom the Tribe of Israel believed, in certainty of his deliverance.

It was indeed certain, but it was in a form other than the one he wanted. He was saved from the punishment of the Next World in himself and his body was saved as Allah says, "Today We will save your body that you might be a sign for those after you," (10:92) because, if his form had vanished, his people might have said that he had gone into occultation. His known form appeared as a corpse that it might be known that it was really him. Deliverance was encompassed both in the senses and in the meaning.

The one who has the word of the punishment in the Other World realized for him (30) will not believe, even if every ayat had been brought to him, "so that they might see the painful punishment," that is, taste the punishment of the Next World. Pharaoh left this class of people. This is the literal meaning of what the text of the Qur'an brought us. We say, and the matter belongs to Allah, that the fixed idea which the common people have regarding the wretchedness of Pharaoh is not based on anything in the divine text. As for his family, that is another judgement. This is not the place to mention it.


Know that Allah only takes someone while he believes that is, affirms what divine transmissions bring, and I mean those who are consciousness at death. This is why dislikes sudden death and being killed while unaware is disliked. The definition of sudden death is that the incoming breath goes out and the outcoming breath does not come in. This is sudden

death and when that happens, one is not conscious of death.

It is the same if a man is killed unawares by a blow from behind on the back of the neck. He is then taken with whatever belief or disbelief he possesses at that moment. For that reason, the Prophet said, "One will be gathered in the state in which one dies," as one is taken in whatever one is doing at the time. The one who is conscious of death is only the one who sees it coming. He believes what he sees. He is only taken in what he is doing because that is an existent expression connected to time by the circumstances. We distinguish between the unbeliever who is conscious at death and the unbeliever either killed while unaware or who dies suddenly as we have said in the definition of sudden death.

As for the wisdom of tajalli and the discourse on the form of the fire, this was because it was the object of Musa's desire. Allah gave him a tajalli in what he was searching for so that Musa would turn to Him and not turn away. If Allah had given the tajalli in other than the form which he was seeking, Musa would have turned away because his interest was concentrated on a particular goal. If he had turned away, his action would have rebounded on him, and Allah would have turned away from him. Musa was the chosen one and the one brought near. When Allah brings someone near to Him, He gives him a tajalli in the object he desires, without him knowing it.


Like the Fire of Musa
which he saw as what he needed.
It was Allah,
but he did not perceive it.



Notes to Chapter 25:

1. "Yes, we testify." Qur'an 7:172. Before the selves were created, Allah asked them, "Am I not your Lord?" They replied. "Yes, we testify."
2. In the form of knowledge and life descending from Allah.
3. See Qur'an 21:30.
4. Divine Presence which causes calmness and tranquillity in the hearts of the Believers. It is also related to the Ark of the Covenant and to Bayt al-Maqdis, when the invisible Sakina/Shechina descends from above. See 2:249: "The sign of his kinship is that the Ark will come to you, containing a Sakina from your Lord, and certain relics left by the families of Musa and Harun left. It will be borne by angels."
5. Qur'an 17:44.
6. Qur'an 6:122.
7. Qur'an 22:5.
8. Qur'an 66:11: "Allah has made an example for the believers - the wife of Pharaoh when she said, 'My Lord, build a house in the Garden for me in Your Presence, and rescue me from Pharaoh and his deeds.'"
- Also the hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Musa, "Many men have been perfect, but among women only Maryam, daughter of 'Imran, and Asiya, wife of Pharaoh, were perfect."
9. See Qur'an 20:40, "We rescued you from trouble and tested you with many trials."
10. See the story in the Qur'an 18:65-82.
11. Hadith qudsi.
12. i.e. reaching the perfection of love. This is called or love or yearning after the parting.
13. khil'a, a robe of honor.
14. Qur'an 26:21.

15. Sirr al-Qadar.
16. Hadith narrated by Imam Muslim.
17. Madness "junun" is related to veils.
18. "The Lord of the heavens and the earth and what is between them is you have certainty."
Qur'an 26:24.
19. Qur'an 26:28.
20. of unveiling.
21. Zawa'id, the augmentative letters, i.e. the ten letters which are added to the radical letters in Arabic words sin, hamza, alif, lam, ta', mim, waw, nun, ya' and ha'. If you take away the sin from sijn (prison), you get "jinn" meaning veil.
22. See Qur'an 43:54, "In that way he swayed his people and they succumbed to him. They were a people of deviators."
23. 'Asâ as a noun means "staff", and 'Asâ as a verb means "to rebel against , oppose."
24. Habl meaning "rope" also means mound or small hill.
25. Lord being a relative name, demanding a subject, also because it means owner, so one says the lord of the house, the "lord" of a herd, etc. Also one who looks after, the "lord" of a child.
26. Huduth means coming into existence for the first time. It also means an event or occurrence.
27. Muhdath.
28. Muhdath.
29. It like is in Qur'an 10:98, where the punishment is removed from the people of Yunus after they believed.
30. See Qur'an 39:71.



26: The Seal of the Wisdom of What One Turns to (as-Samad) in the Word of Khalid

As for the wisdom of Khalid ibn Sinan, (1) by his call he manifested the Prophethood of the interspace. He claimed that he would tell them about what happens after death. He commanded that he should be disinterred and questioned in order that he might report that the judgement in the Interspace occurs in the form of the life of this world. Thus it would be known that all the Messengers spoke the truth in what they related in this life regarding what happens after death. Khalid's goal was that all the world would believe in what the Messengers brought so that there would be mercy for all. He was honored by his Prophethood being near the time of the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. He knew that Allah had sent Muhammad as a mercy to the worlds, but Khalid was not a Messenger. He wanted to receive a generous share of this mercy contained in the message of Muhammad. He was not commanded to convey the message, but he wanted to have that share in the Interspace so that there would be stronger knowledge about the creation, and for this reason his people squandered him.

The Messenger of Allah described them as having squandered their Prophet because they did not do what he wanted them to do. Did Allah give him the reward for what he wanted? There is no doubt and no disagreement that he had the reward of what he wished, but there is doubt and disagreement about the reward of the goal. Is wishing for it the same in the Next World as its occurrence even though it did not occur or not? In the Shari'a, equality is not supported in many places such as in the case of the one who performs the prayer in the group. (2) The one who prays it in the group has a reward from the presence of the group. He is like the person who, in spite of poverty, desires to be able to give charity as the people of wealth and property do. He has the like of their rewards, but the like of their rewards can be in their intentions or their deeds. The people had both the intention and the action. The Prophet, peace be upon him, did not prescribe both of them, nor one of them, and outwardly they are not the same. For that reason, Khalid ibn Sinan sought the proclamation to confirm for him the station of joining both matters so that he would receive two rewards. Allah knows best.

Notes to Chapter 26:

1. Al-Qashani, the commentator, says that Khalid lived in Aden, and was a man of great himma who was overcome in the contemplation of divine unity. One day a great fire appeared from a cave among his people. It destroyed the crops and the livestock, and the people called on him to protect them from it. He struck the fire with his staff, saying, "Away! Away!" until it became cold and retreated to the cave. Then he told his people that he would enter the cave in order to extinguish the fire, and he told them to call him after three full days had passed. Should he call him before that, he would come out and die. If they were patient, he would emerge in good health.

They waited two days, and then Shaytan made them restless, and doubts came to them and they were afraid that he might have been destroyed. They shouted to him. He emerged from the cave with his hand on his head from the pain their shouting had caused him. He told them, "You have killed me and squandered my word and my covenant." He then told them of his death and commanded them to bury him and then watch for forty days. Then, he said, a flock of sheep led by a donkey with slit ears and its tail cut off would come to them. When it stood opposite his grave, they were to disinter him and he would rise and tell them of the true state of things after death from witnessing and vision so that all creation would receive certainty as to what the Messenger related. Then he died and they buried him.

They waited until the forty days had passed. The flock of sheep came led by a donkey with slit ears. It stopped opposite his grave, so they understood that they should disinter Khalid as he had commanded them so that he might inform them as to the truth of the Prophets. Some of his older sons were adverse to that and said that it would shame them among the Arabs and that they would be called, "the sons of the disinterred one." There was the vehemence of the Jahiliya in that. They squandered their legacy and destroyed him. After the Prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was sent, a daughter of Khalid came to him, and he said to her, "Greetings to you, O daughter of a Prophet whose people squandered him!"

2. His Prophethood did not appear in this world.



27: The Seal of the Unique Wisdom in the Word of Muhammad

Muhammad's wisdom is uniqueness (fardiya) because he is the most perfect existent creature of this human species. For this reason, the command began with him and was sealed with him. He was a Prophet while Adam was between water and clay, (1) and his elemental structure is the Seal of the Prophets. The first singular is three, and what is more than this firstness of individuals comes from three. The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, is the surest proof of his Lord, so he was given all the words, (2) which are everything that is named by the names of Adam. (3) He resembles the proof in its threefoldness, and the proof is a proof of itself. Then his reality grants the first uniqueness which is threefold in structure. For that reason, speaking about the domain of love which is the root of existence, he said, "I was made to love three things in your world," (4) because of what this world has of threefoldness. Then he mentioned women, and perfume, and that the coolness of his eye was in the prayer.

The Prophet began by mentioning women and ended with the prayer. That is because woman is part of man in the root of the manifestation of her source, and because man's recognition of himself preceded his recognition of his Lord. That is why the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "Whoever knows himself knows his Lord." If you wish, you can say that this tradition is the forbidding of gnosis and stating the inability to attain to Him - and that is a permissible statement; and, if you wish, you can say that it is the affirmation of gnosis. The first is that if you do not know yourself, so you will not know your Lord. The second is that you recognize yourself, so you do recognize your Lord. Muhammad was the clearest proof of his Lord. Every part of the world indicates its root which is its Lord, so understand!

The Prophet was made to love women, so he yearned for them because as the whole yearns for what is part of it. The matter is self-evident through what Allah says regarding this elemental human constitution, "and I breathed My Ruh into him." (15:29; 38:72) Then He described Himself with intensity of yearning to meet those who yearn for Him. He said, "O Dawud! I have intense yearning for them," i.e. those who yearn for Him, and it is a particular encounter. The Prophet said in a hadith about the Dajjal, "None of you will see his Lord until after he dies." (5) Allah must yearn for those near ones - because even though He sees them and wants them to see Him, that encounter is still prevented by man's station. That is like His words "until We know" although He is Knowing. He yearns for this particular attribute which only is achieved existence through death.

By this, He tests their yearning for Him as He said in the hadith of hesitation which concerns this matter, "I do not hesitate in anything I do, but I hesitate to take the breath of My believing slave because he hates death, and I hate to make him die. But He must meet Me." He gave him good news and did not say to him, "he must die" because He did not want to distress him by mentioning death. Man only meets Allah after death as the Prophet says, "None of you will see his Lord until he dies." That is why Allah says, "He must meet Me," for Allah desires the existence of this relationship. He made it clear that He breathed into him some of His spirit (rûh) so He only yearns for him. Do you not see that He created him on His form because he is from His Spirit?

Man's constitution is based on these four elements which are called the "humors" in his body. The combustion of the moisture found in the body occurs from his breath. The spirit of man

is fire as regards his constitution. For this reason, Allah only spoke to Musa in the form of fire, (6) and put his need in it. If his constitution had been from nature, (7) then his spirit would have been light. Allah alluded to it with the blowing (nafkh) which indicates that it is from the breath (nafas) of the All-Merciful. It is by this breath, which is the blowing-out that he manifested from Him, and by the predisposition of the one blown into, that combustion is fire and not light. The breath of Allah is hidden in that by which man is man.

From man, He derived a person in his form called "woman". She appeared in his form, and he yearned for her with the longing of that thing has for itself, and she yearned for him with the longing of that thing has for its home. Allah made him love women. Allah loves the one whom He created in His form, and He made the luminous angels, in spite of the power of their might and their station and the sublimity of their natural constitution, prostrate to him. (8) From this comes the affinity which occurs in the form which man and woman share, which is like that between Allah and man. The form has the greatest affinity, as well as the most glorious and perfect. It makes a pair that is, doubles the existent belonging to Allah, as the woman, by her existence, doubles man, and makes him one of a pair. So three appeared: Allah, man and woman. Man yearns for his Lord who is the origin as woman yearns for man.

His Lord made him love women as Allah loves the one who is in His form. Love only occurred by the One by whom he is formed. His love was for the One he was formed by, and He is Allah. This is why the Prophet said, "He made me love...", and he did not say, "I loved" as coming from himself because his love is connected to his Lord in Whose form he is. In his love for his wife, he loves her by Allah's love for him as a divine nature. (9)

When a man loves a woman, he desires union, that is, the goal of union which exists in love. In the elemental form, there is no greater union than marriage. (10) By this appetite encompasses all parts. For that reason, complete ritual washing is prescribed after intercourse. Purification envelops him as annihilation in the woman was complete in the obtainment of appetite. Allah is very jealous of His slave if He believes that he finds pleasure in other than Him. So man purifies himself by ritual washing in order to return to Him in whom he was annihilated, since that is all there is.

When man witnesses Allah in women, his witnessing is in the passive; when he witnesses Him in himself, regarding the appearance of woman from Him, he witnesses Him in the active. When he witnesses Him from himself without the presence of any form from him, his witnessing is in the passive directly from Allah without any intermediary. So his witnessing of Allah in the woman is the most complete and perfect because he witnesses Allah inasmuch as He is both active and passive. Regarding himself, He is passive in particular. For this reason, the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, loved women because of the perfection of the witnessing of Allah in them since one does not ever witness Allah free of matter. Allah by His essence is independent of the worlds. So from this aspect, the business is impossible, yet witnessing only occurs in matter. The witnessing of Allah in women is the greatest and most perfect witnessing. The greatest union is marriage.

It is like the projection of His will on the one He created in His form in order to create him. He sees His form in him, rather, He sees Himself. He fashioned him and balanced him and breathed into him of His spirit (rûh) which is His breath. Outwardly he is creation, and inwardly he is Allah. For this reason, Allah describes Himself with having management of this frame. He "directs the whole affair from the heaven," which is the height of the earth, "to earth," (32:5) which is the lowest of the low, because it is the lowest of all the elements.

He called them women (an-nisâ') which is a plural which does not have a singular form. For that reason, he said, "He made me love three things in your world: women..." and he did not say, "woman". He took note of the fact that they came after him in existence. The word an-nisa' also means postponement. Allah says, "The month postponed is an increase in disbelief," (9:37) and the sale of "nasi'a" is said to be by postponement, that is, by credit. That is why he said an-nisa'. He loved them only by rank, and they are the place of the passive. They are to him as nature is to Allah in which Allah opened the forms of the world by the projection of the will and the divine command which is marriage in the world of elemental forms, and aspiration (himma) in the world of luminous spirits, as in the order of premises and their meanings through deduction. All of that is the marriage of the first uniqueness in each of these aspects. Whoever loves women in this measure, loves with a divine love. Whoever loves them in respect to natural appetite in particular, deprives himself of the knowledge of this appetite. For him it is a form without a spirit (rûh). That form in the heart of the matter is the essence of a spirit, but it is not witnessed by the one who comes to his wife or any woman by pure gratification, and he does not perceive the one it is for even so, he has no knowledge of himself, as others have no knowledge of him, since he has not been verbally named so that he could be known.

One of them said:

It is confirmed with people
that I am a passionate lover,
although they do not know
the object of my passion.

It is the same with the one who loves gratification - he loves the place in which it occurs, being the woman, but the spirit of the question is obscure to him. If he had known it, he would have known by whom he has pleasure and who it is that has pleasure. He would have been perfect.

Similarly, the woman has a lower degree than the man by the words of Allah, "As for men, they have a degree over them." (2:228) The one created on the form is lower in degree than the one who is fashioned in His form, (11) even though he is in His form. This is the degree by which He is distinguished from the form. So Allah is independent of the universe, and He is the first Doer. The form is the second doer, and does not have the firstness which Allah has. Sources are distinguished by ranks. "He gives each thing its creation," (12) as every gnostic gives each thing with a right its due.

That love that Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, had for women came from divine love. "Allah gives everything its creation," and that is the source of its truth. He only gave creation to it by merit, so it merits what He called it that is, by the essence of the created thing.

He put women first because they are the place of the passive as nature precedes that which exists from it by means of form. Nature in reality is only the breath of the Merciful. The forms of the universe, high and low, are introduced into it by the diffusion of the breath (nafkha) in the primal substance (jawhar hayulânî), particularly in the world of bodies. As for its diffusion by the existence of the luminous spirits and non-essentials (a'râd), that is another kind of diffusion.

In this tradition, the Prophet put the feminine before the masculine because he meant to attach

importance to women. He said, "Three (thalath, the feminine form of the number) and he did not say thalatha (the masculine) with the ha' which is by the number of the masculine since scent (tīb) is one of the three, and it is masculine. The custom among the Arabs is that the masculine takes precedence over the feminine. When they say, "The Fatimas and Zayd went out," they saw kharajû (mas. pl) and do not say kharajna (fem. pl). The masculine, even if it is only one, take precedence over the feminine, even if they are a group. The Prophet was Arab, so he respected the meaning which was intended by showing love for what did not happen through his own love. Then Allah informed him of what he did not know, and Allah's bounty to him was great. (13) The feminine took precedence over the masculine by his word, thalath without ha'. Who knew the realities better than him, may Allah bless him and grant him peace? Who had greater care to observe rights and dues?

Then he placed the seal with what was like the first since it is also feminine (salat, prayer, is feminine), and he placed the masculine between them, as in existence. He began with "women" and ended with "prayer", both of which are feminine while perfume is masculine. The man is between the essence from which he appeared and then the woman appeared from him. So man is between two feminines, the form of the Essence (14) from which he appeared, and a real feminine, woman, who appeared from him. Similarly, women is a real feminine, and the prayer is not a real feminine. Scent is the masculine between the two, as Adam is between the essence from which he has existence and Hawwa' (Eve), who existed from him. If you wish, you can say "attribute (sifa)" which is also feminine. If you wish, you can say, "power (qudra)" and it is feminine. Be of whatever school you wish. You will always find that the feminine takes precedence, even among the people of cause ('illa) who make Allah a cause in the existence of the form, and cause is also feminine.

As for the wisdom of the perfume which he mentioned after women, because women have fragrance in their form, the most fragrant of perfumes is the embrace of the lover as they say in the common example. When the Prophet was created a slave, by the nobility of his origin, he did not lift his head at all to mastery rather, he continued to prostrate himself in humility and to remain passive in spite of who he was until Allah formed from Him what He had intended. He gave him the rank of action in the world of breaths, and the breaths are fragrant scents. So Allah made him love perfume. For that reason, he put perfume after women.

He observed the ranks which belong to Allah in His words, "Raiser of ranks is He, Possessor of the throne" (40:15) by His sitting on it by the name of the All-Merciful. There is none among those that the Throne encompasses but that divine mercy touches him. That is the words of Allah, "My mercy embraces all things," (7:156) and the Throne encompasses everything, and the One who sits on it is the Merciful. By its reality, mercy is diffused through the universe as we explained in another part in this book and in The Makkan Revelations.

Allah put perfume in this marital connection in the innocence of 'A'isha, (15) may Allah be pleased with her! He said, "Corrupt (16) men are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; and good (17) women are for good men, and good men are for good women. The latter are innocent of what they say." (24:26) He made their scent fragrant because the word is breath, and it is the source of the scent. It goes out with fragrance and putrefaction according to what appears in the form of speech. As it is divine by the nobility of its origin, it is all good, and so it is good. As for what is not praised and is censured, it is good and bad. The Prophet said in respect to the badness of garlic, "It is a plant whose scent I dislike." He did not say, "I dislike it." The source is not disliked, but he disliked what appeared from it.

Dislike for that is either by custom or unsuitability of nature, by something in the Shari'a, or a lack of perfection or something other than what we have mentioned.

Since the command is divided into corrupt and good as we confirmed, he was made to love perfume rather than repulsive odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. He described the angels as being offended by unpleasant odours. Since there is putrefaction in this elemental structure as it is created of "dry clay from mud moulded (or fetid)," (18) so the angels dislike it by essence. The nature of the dung-beetle is offended by the scent of the rose which is one of the pleasant scents. For the dung-beetle, the scent of the rose is not a pleasant scent. If someone has the same sort of nature (as the dung beetle) in meaning and form, the truth offends him when he hears it, and he is gladdened by the false. It is what Allah said, "those who believe in falsehood and reject Allah." (29:52) He described them with loss, and said, "those, they are the losers" who have lost themselves. Whoever does not distinguish goodness from corruption, has no perception.

Allah made the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, love only the good (the perfume) of everything, and there is only that. Can it be conceived that there is a disposition in the universe which only finds good in everything but does not recognize the bad? We say that there is not. We find it in the very root from which the universe appeared which is Allah; we find that He hates and loves. The corrupt is only that which He hates, and the good is only that which He loves. The universe is the form of Allah, and man is in both forms. There is no nature which only perceives one matter in everything - rather, the nature distinguishes the good from the corrupt in spite of the fact that it knows that it is corrupt by tasting and good without tasting. The perception of the good in it diverts him from the sensation of its corruptness. This can happen. As for the removal of the corrupt from the universe that is, from phenomenal being it is not admissible. The mercy of Allah extends to both the corrupt and the good. The corrupt considers itself good, but the good in itself is corrupt. There is nothing but good but that an aspect of its disposition is bad, and vice versa.

As for the third by which uniqueness (fardiyya) is completed, it is the prayer. The Prophet said, "and the coolness of the eye (19) is in the prayer" because it is contemplation. That is because it is intimate discourse between Allah and His slave as Allah says, "Remember Me, and I will remember you." (2:152) It is worship ('ibâda) which is divided in two parts between Allah and His slave one part belongs to Allah and one part to His slave, as has come in sound transmission from Allah in which He says, "I divided the prayer into two parts between Me and My slave. One part is Mine and one part is My slave's, and My slave will receive what he asks for. The slave says, 'In the name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has mentioned Me.' Then the slave says, 'Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds,' and Allah says, 'My slave has praised Me.' The slave says, 'The All-Merciful, the Most Merciful,' and Allah says, 'My slave has glorified Me. My slave has given Me authorisation.'" (20) All this part belongs purely to Allah.

"Then the slave says, 'You alone we worship. You alone we ask for help,' and Allah says, 'This is between Me and My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" Sharing occurs in this ayat. "The slave then says, 'Guide us in the straight path, the path of those You have blessed, not of those with anger on them nor of the misguided,' and Allah says, 'This is for My slave, and My slave has what he asks for.'" This is purely for His slave as the first part is purely for Allah. The knowledge of this makes the recitation of the Fatiha obligatory. Whoever does not recite it has not prayed the prayer establish between Allah and His slave.

The prayer is then a secret conversation (munajat). It is remembrance/invocation (dhikr). When someone mentions Allah, he sits with Allah and Allah sits with him. It is a sound divine transmission that Allah said, "I sit with the one who mentions Me." (21) Whoever sits with the One he mentions and has sight, sees the One with whom he sits. This is contemplation (mushahada) and vision. If he does not have sight, he does not see Him. Thus the one who prays knows his rank, and whether or not he sees Allah with this vision in the prayer. If he does not see Him, then let him worship Him by belief (iman) as if he saw Him, imagining Him to be in the qibla of his conversation, and let him listen for Allah's reply.

Without a doubt, everyone who prays is an Imam, so the angels pray behind the slave when he prays alone, as is related in tradition. If he is the Imam for his particular world and the angels pray with him, then he has attained the rank of the Messenger in his prayer which is deputyship from Allah. When he says, "Allah hears whoever praises Him," (22) he informs himself and whoever is behind him that Allah has heard him. The angels and those present say, "Our Lord, praise belongs to You."

Allah says on the tongue of the slave, "Allah hears whoever praises Him." Look at the sublimity of the rank of the prayer and where it takes the one who has it! Whoever does not achieve the rank of vision in the prayer has not reached the goal nor does he have the coolness of the eye in it because he does not see the One he addresses. If he does not hear the answer of Allah, he is not one of those who listen. Whoever is not present in the prayer with his Lord, and does not hear nor see Him, is not one who prays at all, and he is not along those "who listen well, having seen the evidence." (30:37)

The prayer is the only form of 'ibada during which one is forbidden to perform any other action. The mention of Allah in it is greater than the words and actions it contains. We mentioned the attribute of the perfect man in the prayer in The Makkan Revelations and his nature, because Allah says that "the prayer precludes indecency and wrongdoing" (29:45) since it is set down in the Shari'a that the one performing the prayer cannot act in anything except this 'ibâda as long as he is in it, and he is called the one the prays (musalli). "The remembrance of Allah is greater still" (29:45) in it that is, the mention which is from Allah to His slave when He answers him in his request, and his praise of Him is greater than the mention of the slave of his Lord in it, because greatness belongs to Allah. (23) This is why He says, "Allah knows what you do," and He says, "He who listen well, having seen the evidence" he gives ear to what Allah mentions in the prayer.

Therefore, since existence is from an intelligible movement which transported the universe from non-existence to existence, the prayer encompasses all movements. There are three movements: vertical, which is the state of standing in the prayer, the horizontal, which is the state of bowing, and the downward movement, which is the state of prostration. The movement of man is vertical, the movement of the animal is horizontal, and the movement of plants is downward. The inanimate does not have a movement from its essence. If a rock moves, it moves by other means than itself.

As for the words of the Prophet, "The coolness of my eye is in the prayer," he did not ascribe the action of putting it there to himself, so Allah gives the one who prays a tajalli which stems from Him, not from the one who prays. If he had not mentioned this attribute from himself, he would have commanded the prayer without tajalli from Him to him. Since that is from Him by means of graciousness, the contemplation is also through graciousness. He said, "the coolness of my eye is in the prayer," and it is only contemplation of the Beloved by

which the eye of the lover is delighted by continuance. The eye remains seeing Allah. It does not look with Him to other than Him in anything, and for that reason, it is forbidden to turn away in the prayer. The glance is something which Shaytan steals from the prayer of the slave in order to forbid him the contemplation of the Beloved. (24) If Allah had truly been the Beloved of the one who turns aside, he would not have turned aside in his prayer to another qibla. Man knows his state in himself, whether he is like that in this particular act of worship or not. "Man will be clear proof against himself in spite of any excuses he might offer." (75:14) He recognizes his lie apart from his truth in himself, because man is not ignorant of his state, his state has tasting (dhawq) for him.

The prayer has another portion. Allah commanded us to pray to Him, and He told us that He prays for us. The prayer is from us and from Him. When He prays, He prays by His name, the Last, for it comes after the existence of the slave, and it is the source of Allah which the slave created in his qibla by logical discernment or by imitation. He is the God of the one who has a creed. It varies according to what the place of the tajalli has and according to the established predisposition as al-Junayd said when he was asked about recognition of Allah and the gnostic. He said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel." It is a masterly answer giving information about the matter for what it is. This is Allah who prays for us. If we pray, we have the name, the Last, so we are in it, as we mentioned, in the state of the One who has this name we are with Him according to our state. He only regards us by the form which we bring to Him.

The one who prays is behind the one who precedes him in the place. It is His words, "Each one knows its prayer and its glorification " (24:41) that is, its rank in being behind the worship of its Lord and the extolling which his predisposition accords him of disconnection (tanzih). "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise" of its Lord, the Forbearing, the Forgiving. For that, we do not understand the extolling of the universe distinctly, (25) creature by creature.

Then a rank refers the pronoun to the extolling slave in His words, "There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise," that is, the praise of that thing. The pronoun which is in His word, "His praise (bi-hamdihi)" refers to the thing - that is, with the praise that is from it.

As we said of the one who has a creed other than Islam, he praises the God who is in his creed and attaches himself to Him. What is from his work returns to him, so he only praises himself. It is from the praise of fabrication the artisan is praised without a doubt, and so the excellence of what he creates or its lack of excellence returns to the artisan. The god of a creed is the product of the one who looks at it, and it is his fabrication; his praise for what he believes is his praise for himself. For this reason, he condemns the creed of another if he had been fair, he would not have done that. Indeed, the possessor of this particular object of worship is certainly ignorant in his rejection of other than what he believes about Allah, since had he recognized what al-Junayd said, "The color of water is the color of its vessel," he would have conceded to everyone who has a creed what he believed in, and he would have recognized Allah in every form of worship of every person with a creed, He has opinion but does not know it. For that reason, Allah says, "I am in My slave's opinion of Me," (26) that is, I only appear to him in the form of his creed. If he wishes, he generalizes, and if he wishes, he limits. The god of creeds is taken from definition, so He is the God which the heart of His slave encompasses. (27)

The Absolute Divinity is not encompassed by anything because He is the source of things and

the source of Himself. It is not said of the thing that it encompasses itself, not that it does not encompass itself, so understand! "Allah speaks the truth and He guides to the Way." (33:4)

Notes to Chapter 27:

1. Hadith, "I was a Prophet when Adam was still between water and clay."
2. Hadith, "I was given all the words."
3. Qur'an 2:31, "And He taught Adam the names of all things..."
4. Hadith in an-Nasa'i and Ibn Hanbal: "I was made to love three things in your world: women, perfume, and the coolness of my eye in the prayer."
5. Hadith in Muslim (fitan:95) and at-Tirmidhi.
6. The Burning Bush.
7. i.e. from the nature of the world of Purity.
8. Qur'an 2:34.
9. Since his nature (khuluq) was immense or mighty ('adhim) as Allah said, "You are truly immense in character," (68:4) and as 'A'isha said of the Prophet, "His nature was the Qur'an."
10. Nikah, or marriage, actually means lawful intercourse.
11. See Qur'an 6:98.
12. See Qur'an 20:50.
13. Qur'an 4:113, "Allah's favour to you is indeed immense."
14. Dhat, essence, is feminine.
15. The following verse was revealed about 'A'isha in the affair of the Lie and declared her innocence in the affair.
16. Khabith, also meaning with a repulsive odor.
17. Tayyib, means good, wholesome, fragrant, from the same root as perfume, tîb.
18. See Qur'an 15:26.
19. i.e. that which delights me.
20. Muslim 4:38, 41, etc.
21. Hadith qudsi in Ibn Majah and Ibn Hibban.
22. When he comes up from ruku' in the prayer.
23. See Qur'an: 45:37.
24. Hadith in al-Bukhari and Muslim. "(Looking aside in the prayer) is something which Shaytan snatches from a slave's prayer."
Also the hadith in Ibn Hanbal and elsewhere: "Allah continues to turn favorably towards a slave while he is engaged in the prayer as long as he does not look to the side. But if he does so He departs from him."
25. See Qur'an 17:44, "The seven heavens and the earth and everyone in them glorify Him. There is nothing which does not glorify Him with praise; but you do not understand their glorification. He is the All-Forbearing, Ever-Forgiving."
26. Hadith in Muslim and al-Bukhari, "I am in My slave's opinion and I am with him when he remembers Me..."
27. Hadith qudsi, "Neither My heaven nor My earth contains Me, but the heart of My believing slave contains Me."

Meter - 1

1.

Translator's Note

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This is a humble attempt of an English translation of the late distinguished Turkish Scholar Abdalbaki Golpinarli's (d.1982) seven volumes of the *Divan-i Kebir* of Mevlana Celaleddin.

According to Golpinarli, his translation of the *Divan* was based on the following sources:

1. Two volumes of *theDivan* which were compiled between July 2, 1367 and October 13, 1368 by Hasan ibni Osman-al Mavlavi. This *Divan* has 290 pages, and the volume dimensions are 0.325 x 0.47 meters. It is registered at the Mevlana Museum in Konya as No. 68 and No. 69.

2. The *Divan* registered at the Library of the University of Istanbul, No. 334, which was compiled in the 15th century.

3. The *Divan* owned by Golpinarli, prepared in 1691 in Baghdad. Later, this *Divan* was donated to the Mevlana Museum in Konya.

4. Eight volumes of *Kulliyat-i Shems yaDivan Kebir* prepared by Bedi-uz-Zaman Furuzan-fer, prepared in 1965 (1345 S.H.).

There are many other versions of the *Divan-iKebir*, but these are the most dependable ones.

Mevlana did not write, but rather recited the poems. Most of them were recorded by assigned people called Secretaries of Secret (Katibal esrar).

The *Divan's* language is 13th century colloquial Farsi. However, there are numerous *gazels*, or poems, written in Arabic and Greek. In addition, there are Turkish words and phrases spread throughout the *Divan's* pages.

There are 21 meters in the *Divan*. The first volume has 12,493 verses; the second has 4,052; the third has 4,526; the fourth has 4,180; the fifth has 6,684; the sixth has 4,002; and the seventh has 8,892. All together, the *Divan* has 44,829 verses.

We are starting with the first meter, *Bahr-i Recez*. In the original *Divan-i Kebir*, the meters were compiled according to their ending rhyme scheme and the last alphabet letter of their rhyme, not in chronological order. This first meter has the rhyme scheme *Mustef'ilun Mustef'ilun Mustef'ilun Mustef'ilun*.

I am grateful to the Ministry of Culture of Turkey and, in particular, the Minister of Culture Ercan Karakas, for their support and encouragement which have enabled me to bring the first meter of this gigantic work to reality.

I am also indebted to Mrs. Terry Peart for the years she has spent not only reading my handwriting, but understanding, typing and editing it.

I would like to thank our Editor, Ms. Millicent Alexander, our Art Director, Ms. Susan Archibald, our Publisher, Mr. David Hiatt of *Current*, and Ms. Laura Sjoberg, Mr. Ali Mahabady and Dr. Erdogan Erol, as well as the many others, too numerous to name here, for their help and encouragement.

It is with great excitement and humility that I bring this treasure, in its entirety for the first time, to the English-speaking world.

Nevit Oguz Ergin

Translator

Verse 1

☺ Beloved, whose Love gives arms and wings
To the flyers in the sky of happiness
And makes them go higher and higher,
Different ecstasies come to the spiritual person
Through Your chains of Love.

"I don't like anything to set." [\[1\]](#)
Those words are devoid of appearances.
Forms and shapes from You
Are seen every moment
By those eyes that see hidden things.

Hearts are upside down because of You.
The earth has turned into a sea of blood.
I cannot call You "Moon," O Beloved,
Who has been above the moon, above time.

The mountain is split open with Your grief,
And that grief falls down to the bottom
To blaze with glittering flames.
All these favors, all these beauties
Have grown and developed
Because they acquired a drop of blood
From Your favor and Grace.

O the support and confidence of all great men,
Consider us among them.
As You know, tails will follow heads.
You have created such a great man out of dust [\[2\]](#)

That all the angels are jealous.
The Soul is penniless compared to Your wealth.
All goods and fortune fall to the ground underfoot.

A person reaches the height of the sky
If You become his arms and wings.
That person carries the sign of beauty on his face
And becomes more and more beautiful.

Assume I'm a thorn, a bad one.
But the thorn and rose go together.
When a jeweler weighs gold,
He puts barley as a weight
On the other side of the scale.

Actions go with ideas;
Goods come from the earth.
This situation appears in words;
The words are the sign of situations.

The beginning of the universe
Is confusion, tumult.[\[3\]](#)
The end is a shake and a quake.
Love and gratitude are the same as complaints.
Peace and comfort go hand-in-hand
With jolts and shakes.

Dawn is the decree of the sun.
Love of God, the Sultan's monogram,
And "the time of Union has come now:"
Love is interpreted this way.

Look at the One
Who is the compassion of the universe. [\[4\]](#)
Look at how He uplifts, gives status to the poor.
Mantles are as bright as the moon.
Shawls smell like roses.

Love is the whole thing.
We are only pieces.
Love is the sea of no end.
We are a drop of it.
He brings forth hundreds of proofs.
We can find our way only through them.

The sky turns only with Love.

Without Love, even the stars
Are eclipsed, extinguished.
With Love, hunched back *dal* [5] become *elif*. [6]
Once *elif* loses Love, it turns into *dal*.

The word is the Fountain of Life,
Because it originates
From the Love of the knowledge
Of the real truth of things.
Don't keep Love away from your Soul,
So that your good deeds may bear fruit
And keep growing.

The word is enough, even if it is scarce,
For the one who understands its meaning,
But it is never enough for the one
Who sees only appearances.
To him, the words are weak and pale.

It doesn't matter
If too many poems have been said.
Wouldn't it be better
If the sea were full of pearls?
The camel can keep going stage by stage
With the pleasure derived from poems.

2

Verse 18

That hodja's [7] feet got stuck in the mud
In our neighborhood.
Let me tell you his story.
Do you remember the proverb,
"The eye becomes blind when fate comes?"

He used to boast cruelly,
Tuck up his trousers
So they wouldn't touch the ground.
He used to walk pompously.
He made fun of Lovers
And used to accept Love as a plaything or toy.

There are so many birds unaware of the trap,
Flying without knowing that an arrow of trouble

Is coming from the hand of fate.

That man was also dead drunk,
Passed out of himself,
Clapping his hands, making fun of Lovers,
And, with the illusion of his greatness,
He attempted to wrestle with God.

He wasn't aware of what was coming to him.
He used to raise his head to the sky.
Gold and silver were in his pockets.
Bravo, bravo sounded in his ears.

He was exalted by the people's applause,
By those who knelt down in front of him,
By those poets who praised him
And gave foolish talks.

Nobility has its own disaster,
Because kindness appears as greatness in man.
The ones who fawn create illusion
And make the person ill.

Hodja gave money thinking he was doing favors.
Actually, he didn't create that money.
How could someone be generous
With someone else's money?

He turned into a pharaoh and a Sheddad.[\[8\]](#)
He became a sack filled with air.
He was an ant, then changed into a snake,
And finally into a dragon.

Love is like the staff of Moses.
With the Divine secret,
Love threw an arrow from ambush.
Our hodja was bent like a bow
From the wound of that arrow.

He fell suddenly to the ground
Like a man with a seizure,
Started growling and convulsing.

He lost everything,
Became naked and disreputable.
Even his enemies felt sorry for him.

His relatives cried
As if there were a death in the family.

He was turned into a pharaoh like Nemrud.[\[9\]](#)
Really, he kept saying, "I am God."
When his neck was broken,
He realized his state
And started crying and calling out,
"O our God, O our God."

His face became pale like saffron.
He had no wound but the one opened
By the eyes of a beautiful face with sugar lips.

Shall we be more amazed
By the arrow of that beauty or by her bow?
Are her eyes more beautiful than her lips?
Is she more disloyal than the world?
Is she more concealed, or is the phoenix?

Let me tell you the secret of how to test Lovers.
Come back to your senses, free yourself
From this secret lock and chain.
Open your ears. Listen.

But how can a person open his ears
If he's out of himself
And doesn't know where his ears are?
"God does whatever He desires" [\[10\]](#)
Is the only rule that restores the mind.

Hodja's wings were broken like a mosquito's.
He yelled and screamed in torment
And started to cry from Ayse's [\[11\]](#) love-telling.
"A curtain has been drawn over my eyes,"
Said the hodja.

"Since you've gone, we've been ruined.
We're separated from you.
Alas, alas! Without you,
Life is death.
Please come back to us of your own will."

"My mind has been pawned to you.

Is there anyone to help me in my grief?'
My Heart is subject to your trials.
It has fallen in the middle of death's hell
And keeps burning."

O yelling, crying hodja,
Your hands and feet were safe before
Whenever fate and accident hit them.
But you broke so many Hearts
Before this moment
That now their punishment has found your feet.

Be thankful to God that your punishment
Came from the side of Love.
But leave temporary Love,
Because real Love is God's Love.

The experienced veteran puts a wooden sword
In the hand of his son
Simply as a tool for training.

To Love another human
Is like that wooden sword.
When it ends in disaster,
Love turns toward a merciful God.

At first, Joseph, son of Jacob,
Was in love with Zeliha.
This lasted for years.
In the end, he experienced God's Love,
And it was then
That Zeliha fell in love with Joseph.

At first, she stayed away from Joseph,
Who had tried to touch her shirt.
In the end, Zeliha tried to tear Joseph's shirt.

"That's my retaliation," she said, "I got even."
Joseph said, "God's Love makes this
Such a funny kind of thing."

The one who desires becomes the desired one.
The one at the bottom rises to the top.
With His blessing, He makes many people

The Kible [\[12\]](#) to their prayer.

Here, words become thinner.
Breath doesn't fit in the mouth.
Now I want to use tongue-twisting words,
Because it's the right place.

He said, "Who am I?
I'm a figure made out of dust."
The one who casts Remil [\[13\]](#)
Draws, right or wrong, many lines on the ground.

Tell these words to our hodja, then listen.
Hodja said,
"Love set fire to my beard and burnt me.
Why have you left me?"

"O noble hodja, I left, but I came back quickly
To tell your situation to the people."

What could a silly man possibly tell?
How could a particle from the sun
Or a drop from the ocean
Explain this endless adventure?

When He shows you a small piece,
You'll understand the rest,
Just as you do when merchants show you
A handful of wheat from the barn
For buying and selling the grain in the silo.

When you see the sample,
You'll know the rest;
You'll know what kind of flour you'll get.

You're also like an old barn.
Dip in your hand
And pick up a handful of wheat from the pile.
See what kind of wheat you are,
Then dike it to the mill.

That world looks like a mill.
This one is like a threshing floor.
Whatever you are here, bran or wheat,

That's what you are there.

Go on. Leave this obstinacy, O obstinate one.
Look. That hodja is waiting.
The one who has done his work halfway
Is rushing.
He says, "Come on now."

"O hodja, tell us, how are you?
Why did you stay in this land of troubles?
You're tired and afflicted with incurable pains,
Covered with blood and dirt."

The hodja answered, "Help, O Moslems.
Watch your Hearts. I've been wounded.
Be careful that something like this
Doesn't happen to you.

"I used to blame lovers
When I saw them suffering.
I laughed at them with a Heart full of malice
And called them names, using bad words."

"Woe to the one
Who slanders and ridicules people.
The one who says bad things,
He will get back exactly what he says. "[14]

Is this the mouth of a human
Or the hole of a snake, a scorpion?
Close this hole with mud and straw.
Don't let friends be bitten.

Fall in Love. Forget names and titles.
Leave the grains, leave the trap.
Name the stone 'gold.'
Name sugar 'grief and suffering.'

3.

☞ parrot who has Jesus' breath,[\[15\]](#)
O sweet-voiced Beauty, nightingale,
Come with the melodies,
Adding Soul to Soul.
Make Venus confused and lost in space.

Claim your Beauty.
Let hundreds of enemies,
Hundreds of friends, known and unknown,
With yellow saffron faces and wet eyes
Become the witnesses.

Grief makes everyone cry.
Men, women, all wail
Because of grief.
Save us from grief,
Because it's become like a dragon of cruelty.

O beautifully-voiced Sweetheart,
Poke the belly of grief
With Your hard, soft melodies.
With Your justice, a tumult will be dropped
In the land of Absence.

Remember, our Cupbearer fills
Hundreds of water bottles with air,
Turns Souls into Ferhad [\[16\]](#)
For the Love of sweet-faced Shirin.
Your Heart, like an Archangel,
Gives life to man, who is made of mud.
Please blow the breath of God in our ear.

We've fallen to the ground
Like a heap of winnowed grain.
Grain and straw are mixed in us.
Give us a breeze from the wind of Soul.
Separate the grain from the straw.

Do us a favor. Let grief go to grief,
Joy to the joyful,
The rose to the rose garden.
Soul will rise to the sky.

Those beautiful grains' ears
Listen for God's compassion.

Their hope is in the morning breeze.
That's why they remain in the prison of earth.

Do a favor. Soul's work shines like gold,
Embraces the Beauties.
Soul's feet will become its head;
Straws will turn into amber.

Be silent! In one breath, if permitted,
I would tell the secret
That no one dares utter in the ear of his brother.

4.

Verse 73

☞ restless wind of ours
Which doesn't stop anywhere,
Say this to the rose for us:
"O rose, the one who escaped
From the rose garden
To be made into rose petal preserve
By mixing with sugar!

"O rose, you were sugar originally,
You deserve the sugar."
Sugar is good.
To be a rose is also good,
But to be loyal is better than both.

Touch your cheek to the cheek of sugar.
Get the taste of it. Give perfume to it.
Try to alleviate the pain of separation
With the help of sugar.

Once you become the conserve of roses,
You are food for the Soul,
Light for the eyes.
Pull your Heart away from the rose.
It's different now.

You were living with thorns
Just like the mind
Who is the friend of Soul.

Ascend from earth to the sky stage by stage
Until you meet Him.

When you walk among the people,
You walk on a secret path
From garden to garden.
You go to the Source
Where all these forms and shapes appear.

O rose, you are a rare bird,
Flying the opposite way of others
Because your news comes
From that other direction.
Leave your arms and wings.
Come without head or feet.

O rose, you've seen all.
That's why you're smiling at the world.
That's why you're tearing your clothes.
O red-kaftaned trickster!
O strong, healthy brave!

The roses are raining
From the sky to the rose garden, shouting,
"Anyone who wants stairs to the sky
Should throw his Soul to grief."

Come to your senses.
Try to get out of the bottle of the Master
Who makes rosewater like sweat.
Become like a Soul out of its container.

We were like you once.
Now we've become Soul.
Come. You must become Soul, too.
You'll have good luck, good fortune,
And a very rosy face.
When I say 'conserve of roses,'
I mean the Grace of God and our existence.
You see, our existence is like iron;
God's Grace is the magnet.

The mind is like a mirror.
The mirror maker
Causes torture with His flames Because He doesn't want us.
He says, "I want you without you."

O the One who says words smells like musk!
Come back to yourself.
There is no end to these talks.
I won't tell anyone
The things You've told me.

O Shems of Tebriz,
Tell the secret of the Sultans
Without sound, without color, without smell.
If there is no sun,
There will be no light of dawn.

5

Verse 88

☞ Sultan of our body and Soul!
O One who makes us smile and show our teeth!
O One who puts salve
On our body's and Soul's eyes!

O my Beautiful, the moon is embarrassed
Seeing Your light, Your height.
Our blood should be sacrificed to You.
When Heart sees You, it says,
"Divine fate has come. Divine fate has come."

We become a ball for You,
Fitting the curved end of Your club.
Sometimes You call us into places of fun.
Sometimes You push us into places of trouble.

Sometimes You put us to sleep.
Sometimes You send us to reason.
Sometimes You throw us
To the world of existence,
Sometimes to the desert of Absence.

He gives thanks to the Master.
Sometimes he yells and screams, "Alas!"
Sometimes he goes to serve Leyla.[\[17\]](#)
Other times he becomes God's drunk,
God's crazy one.

You torment the Soul,

Make him crazy, insane.
Sometimes You make him enjoy solitude.
Sometimes *You* make him fond
Of ostentation and hypocrisy.

Sometimes he wants gold,
Then other times spreads earth on his head.
Sometimes he thinks he's Caesar.
Sometimes he wears
Old, patched and worn-out mantles.

What a strange tree he is.
Sometimes an apple is grown,
Sometimes a pumpkin.
At one time he yields poison,
At another, sugar.
He causes trouble sometimes,
And other times he is the remedy.

What a strange river he is.
Sometimes he becomes water, sometimes blood.
He turns into ruby-colored wine or milk,
Or sometimes health-giving honey.

Sometimes he weaves knowledge in the Heart.
Sometimes he destroys one's knowledge.
Sometimes he achieves superiority,
Other times he sees
Every trouble and misfortune.

One day he becomes Master Muhammed.
One day he turns into a tiger, then a dog.
Sometimes he becomes a mean enemy.
Other times he becomes a father, mother or kin.

Sometimes he becomes a thorn, then a rose.
Sometimes he is the vinegar,
Other times the wine.
Sometimes he plays the drum.
Sometimes he becomes a drum
And is hit by a mallet.

Sometimes he falls in love
With his five senses and six dimensions.
Sometimes he wants good spirits.
But sometimes, like a lost camel in the desert,
He wanders around.

Sometimes his aims and hopes
Are as deep as a well-digger's.
Sometimes he is among the treasures
Of a Karun[\[18\]](#) who hides his treasures.
Sometimes he is like Jesus
And ascends to the sky.

In the end, when Your grace opens his way,
Our Sheyyad[\[19\]](#) sings one tune
And is saved from changing from color to color.
He becomes crazy and dips into one color
Like an early morning sun.

He dives into the sea like a fish.
His garden, his meadow, his country become sea.
His coffin, his grave and everything else
Are dead, a plague to him, except that sea.

When he slips out of those colors,
He slips into the jar of Jesus.
God's color appears to do God's wishes.

He is saved from malice, from modesty.
He is saved from running and stopping
Like the millstone turning around the pin.
He is saved from 'come and go.'

"We open your door, really,
So you can keep your friend next to you.
We merge your coming generation with you.
This is the reward of Love.[\[20\]](#)

"We tie your waist tightly.
Really, we forgive your sins.
You gave thanks to God. That's the reason.
Thanks brings contentment."

Müstefîlün, Müstefîlün, Müstefîlün, Müstefîlün.[\[21\]](#)
The door of explanation is closed.
It is better for us to be silent.

Verse 109

☞ Cupbearer, O Cupbearer,
 Today *You* and I exist here
 And have fallen into deep water.
 Let's find out who knows how to swim.

If a flood covers the earth
 With waves as big as camels,
 The birds don't have to worry.
 They think of nothing
 While flying in the sky.

Our face shines with gratitude.
 We are mixed like fish into the waves of the sea.
 Sea and flood give life to fish
 And make them more lively.

O Master, give us a boat.
 O water, rise, engulf us with your waves.
 O Moses, Son of Imran,
 Hit the sea with your staff. [\[22\]](#)

This wine causes a different kind of drunkenness
 In every head,
 But the Love of that Cupbearer
 Is enough for me.
You can have the rest of it.

The Cupbearer grabbed
 All the drunks' hats yesterday.
 Today He's serving cup after cup of wine
 To take our mantles away.

O Beautiful One, of whom
 The moon and Jupiter are jealous,
You are with me secretly, like a fairy,
 Pulling me nicely, but not telling me
 Where *You're* leading me.

O both of my eyes, light of my eyes,

Wherever I go, You are with me.
If *You* want, pull me toward the tavern,
Make me drunk,
Or pull me toward Nothingness.
Annihilate me!

Accept this world as Mount Sinai.
We also want manifestation like Moses.
Every moment God manifests,
And every moment
The mountain is broken into pieces.

A time comes when it becomes green,
Another time, extremely white,
Clear and beautiful.
One time it becomes pearl,
Then later, red amber.

O the ones who want to reach Him, see Him,
Look in the mountain places where He manifests.
O mountain, what kind of wine did you drink?
We've become drunk. Come, O friend, come.

O Owner of the garden, Gardener,
Why do You hold us?
Why don't *You* let us be free?
If we eat the grape, You take our turban.

7

Verse 121

☪ Beloved whose light
Comes from behind the curtains,
Your light and warmth
Are like summer for us.
Take us to the rose garden.
Our Hearts are fiery like summer.

O salve for the eyes of my Soul,
Where did you go?
Come, come, so the water
Will spring from our oven.

Come, so the barren land will be green,
The cemeteries will become a garden,
Grapes will ripen,
And our bread will be baked.

O sun of Soul, sun of Heart,
O Beauty who shames the sun with His beauty,
Come and see how this sticky mud
Got stuck to our Soul.
We can't get rid of it.

The kindness of Your face
Has changed so many thorns
Into so many rose gardens
That our faith has been acknowledged
Hundreds of thousands of times.

O eternal Love, in order to deliver our Soul
Out of this dungeon to God,
How beautifully You show Your face
From behind this mold.

O our bright morning,
Make joy during the time of gloom.
Show in the evening
A bright, wonderful day.

You make pearls out of blue beads.
You scare Venus.
You make kings out of the penniless.
Good for You, our Sultan.

Where are the eyes
That can see a trace of Your dust?
Where are the ears
That hear our testament?
Where is the mind
That understands our evidence?

If the Heart sees the beauty of that sugar cane
And tells of its grace and favors,
Taste and flavor will sing songs
At the bottom of our every tooth.

The sound of drums coming from the land of Soul

Says, "Particles are reaching wholeness,
Sweet basil to sweet basil, rose to rose.
Everything is becoming free
From the jail of our thorns."

8

Verse 132

☞ rainy season, like sad lovers
Crying because of the absence
Of our beloved ones,
Pour your rain on our friends.

O eyes of the clouds,
Pour your tears out of cups,
Because you are jealous of our Beauties,
The Ones with faces like the moon.

Look at the crying of this cloud.
Look at the smile of this garden.
Now our patients get well
And are saved
From their father's cries and begging.

This cloud which rains continuously
Resembles God's blessing
To the thirsty, chapped-lipped friends,
God is the One who offers this huge jar to rinds.[\[23\]](#)

The sky is spreading pearls
Over the barren plains of earth
Which lost their harvest
Because of our deceitful Beauty's failure
To give provisions.

This cloud is like Jacob.
The rose in the garden is Joseph.
Josephs are smiling
Because of our crying clouds.

One drop becomes pearl,
The other, narcissus.
The hands of the ones
Who make a living on the plains by crops

Are filled with goods and blessings.

The garden and meadow that offer wines
Were decorated with flowers yesterday,
Because our men who are fond of wine
Drank it on an empty stomach.

Close your mouth like an oyster.
Don't bring your drunkenness
In front of the naïve,
So that our knowledgeable friends
Will come back from the land of Absence.

9.

Verse 141

☞ Heart, what excuses have you given
For all these faults?
Loyalties come from Him;
From you, all these troubles.

Kindness comes from Him;
From you, all this nonsense.
Favors come from Him;
From you, these mistakes.

Benevolence, goodness, gifts
Come from Him;
From you, this jealousy,
These bad thoughts and surmises.

Why so many favors?
So your bitter Soul
Can become better and sweeter.
Why is He pulling you to Himself?
So you can reach the Ones
Who have attained the truth.

The moment you repent your faults
And start calling Him,
That's the moment He pulls you to Himself
And gets you out of trouble.

When you're afraid of the sin you've committed,

Of asking for His help to get out of it,
Then, right then, why don't you see the one
Who scares you inside of yourself?

In His hands you are like a small crystal ball.
He rolls you, then covers you
And throws you in the air
Just to be amused.

Sometimes He leaves you to your own nature,
The way you were born.
You fall in love with gold, silver
And the love of women.
But sometimes He shines on you
With the light of Mustafa's [\[24\]](#) image,
So that you'll be illuminated.

When He pulls you this way,
You join with good people.
When He pulls you that way,
You mix with bad people.
He either passes your ship
Through this turbulence
Or breaks and wrecks it.

Pray, pray secretly,
Cry, moan and groan so much through the night
That a voice will come to your ear
From the seven layers of sky.

At last at dawn, a voice came to Shuayb's [\[25\]](#) ear
After he yelled and cried and cried
And shed tears like the dew.

"I'll pardon you if you're guilty,
Forgive your sins.
If you want the heaven I give you,
Stop this praying and be silent."

Shuayb said, "I don't want this or that.
Clearly, I want to see the beauty of God.
To reach Him, even if the seven seas
Become fire,
I will plunge in and pass through them.

"If you expel me from Your temple,

Deprive me of that Beauty,
If my wet eyes don't see that Beauty,
I might as well stay in hell.
Heaven is not for me."

"At least, don't cry so much," they said.
"When you cry so much,
Your eyes lose their sight."

"If, at the end, both my eyes see Him,
Why should I worry about becoming blind?
My every particle will turn into eyes.

"If my eyes are deprived of seeing Him,
If they don't deserve the Beloved,
Let them become blind."

In this world, everyone gives life
For his own beloved.
One beloved is a bag of blood,
The other is sunlight.

Since everyone chooses a beloved, good or bad,
Isn't it sad for us
To become nothing for nothing?

One day on the road
Someone became a companion to Beyazid.[\[26\]](#)
Beyazid asked, "O bad man, what do you do?"

The man said, "I ride a donkey.
I've become a slave to the donkey."
Beyazid said, "Go away," then said,
"My God, kill this man's' donkey
So that he can become a slave to God."

10.

Verse 162

☪ Joseph, whose name is beautiful,
How nicely you walk on your roof!
O the One who breaks our glass!
O the One who tears open our trap!

O our light, our wedding, our assembly!
O our kingdom!
Boil our bitter water.
Ferment our grapes
That they may become wine.

O our charmer, our desire,
Our Kible,[\[27\]](#) our God,
You throw our aloe wood on the fire.
Now watch the smoke.

O our deceitful Beloved, O our friend,
The One who set a trap for our drunken Heart,
Don't go away.
Pawn our turban.
The feet of Heart got stuck in the mud.
Never mind Heart.
I am giving Soul to Him, Soul.
Alas to Heart for the Love in which Heart fell.
Alas to us.

11.

Verse 167

☞ One who sweetens our Soul,
The one by himself, make him go beyond,
And the one beyond,
Make him come back to his senses.
Give something to the poor.

Do favors for Lovers.
Lighten the daybreak.
Turn the antidote to poison.
Give something to the poor.

Look at us with Your face like a moon.
With kindness You search for the poor.
Give us mercy, make us Your companion.
Give something to the poor.

You give the sense of Love to the Soul
With Your Grace, like the moon.
How have You come into our company?

Give something to the poor.

What is the sign of the dervish?
A soul sprinkles pearls,
A tongue sprinkles pearls,
Not a mantle made with hundred of patches.
Give something to the poor.

You are Adam and, at the same time,
Jesus and Mary.
You are the secret and, at the same time,
The One who knows the secret.
Give something to the poor.

Bitter becomes sweet with You.
Blasphemy becomes faith with You.
Thorns change to the roses of August.
Give something to the poor.

O my Soul, my Beloved,
My blasphemy, my religion,
Give something to the poor.

O one who falls into grief,
The one who worships the body,
Don't struggle with flesh.
Don't fight with Soul.
Don't look at the body.
Don't look at me.
Give something to the poor.

O my Light, I'll do something today.
I'll turn around Your spiritual light,
Then I'll give life to Love.
Give something to the poor.

Are You the One who is looking to blame us?
Are You a snake or a fish?
Will You tell who You are?
Give something to the poor.

My Beautiful, You can't be you
And, at the same time, Him.
This is not the way for You.
Throw this soul to Absence.
Give something to the poor.

12.

Verse 179

☪ Joseph, at last come to this Jacob
Who has become blind.
O hidden Jesus,
Appear from the dome of this sky.

My Heart is darkened because of separation.
My Heart was like a bow string
Now turned into hair.
Poor Jacob has become old.
O young Joseph, come.

O Moses, son of Imran,
I have such Mount Sinais
In my Heart for you.
Come now from Mount Sinai.
They're worshipping the oxen as a god.

The pale color of my face is like saffron.
My bent neck has turned into a harp.
I have been tightened and squeezed
In the grave of my body.
Come, O Soul, give cheer and spaciousness.

My eyes, which watch Muhammad, tell You
That I have been longing with grief for You.
O Secret of the verse,
"We send you to the universes
To show God's compassion!" [\[28\]](#)
Show Your face through that scattered hair.
Come!

The sun is like a sunset in front of You.
O One who grabs the reward from the King!
O the eye which looks with God, sees with God! O the Heart which knows everything!
Come!

All Souls are like body for You.
You are the Soul.
What's the good of a body without Soul?

I've given You my Heart for a long time.
Come, O Beloved, I'll give You my Soul, too.

The crops of my Soul have been harvested
Since You took my Heart.
The last trouble is You. Go.
The last cure is You. Come.

O Beloved, my medicine is You.
My remedy is You.
The light of my Heart
Which has been broken into a hundred pieces
Is You.
Everything in this helpless Heart except You
Has gone. Come.

I have not been able to appreciate You.
Destiny tells me:
"Wound your Heart with arrows.
Break your head with stones. Come."

O One whose level is stated in the verse,
"The distance between them
Is only two arrow throws," [\[29\]](#)
O One who has an exalted state,
O my Sultan,
No one could be Your confidant.
Come from the level of
"Maybe it is much closer." [\[30\]](#)

O Sultan as beautiful as the moon!
O One more beautiful
Than a hundred beauties!
O water, O fire, come!
Come, O pearls. Come, O sea!

O One to whom my Soul
Has become a slave and servant,
O Shemseddin, O my Archangel Gabriel,
Because of You,
Tebriz became the mounted throne of God.
Come from Mescid-i Aksa. [\[31\]](#)

Verse 192

☞ Spring of the Lover,
The green has been made pregnant by you.
O One who makes the garden and meadow smile,
Do you have any news
From our Beloved?

O winds which have the cleanest breath,
O One who comes
To help the wailing Lovers,
O breeze which is purer than Soul and space,
Where were you then?
Where were you?

O mischievous one from the land of Rum,
O deceitful one from the land of Ethiopia,
I am confused.
This beautiful smell is either
From the skirt of Joseph
Or the mantle of Muhammad.

O river of truth,
You are flowing in our Beloved's canal.
You are the Mount Sinai of the Heart.
You add Soul to Souls.

O Charmer whose manners are pleasant,
His essence, His worlds are beautiful.
O Friend to whom month and year
Have become slaves,
Your months, Your years are beautiful.

14.

Verse 197

☞ suddenly-risen uproar!
O endless compassion!
O fire which sets the forest of thought ablaze!

Today You came with a smile
Like the key to the dungeon.

You came like God's favor to the needy.

You are the doorkeeper of the sun.
You are the One for whom to be hoped,
The One to be depended upon.
You are the One to be desired
And the One who desires.
You are the beginning; You are the end.

You appear in hearts and adorn the mind.
You make wishes and, at the same time,
Make wishes come true.

O peerless One who gives gratis to the Soul!
O the taste and flavor of knowledge
And the pleasure of keeping that knowledge,
All except *You* is a fake and an excuse.
Everything else is an illness.
You are the remedy.

We fall in the trap and become cross-eyed.
Without sin, we face all kinds of grudges.
Sometimes we become drunk
With black-eyed Houris;[\[32\]](#)
Other times, we're fond of soups and breads.

See this drunkenness
And leave the mind behind you.
Watch only this snack. Forget the other.
It's not worth even one piece of bread and a meal
To jump into this adventure.

That invisible Master puts you to work.
You take hundreds
Of different-colored precautions,
Reach the brightness and fall into darkness.
In between, you keep struggling.

O my brave man, pull the ears of Soul secretly.
Pray to God with all your Heart and Soul
So you can stay away from people.
I swear to God, they all are nonsense.

Be silent! I have urgent things to do.
I'll get under the flag.

Throw away the paper. Break the pen.
Here is the Cupbearer, coming, coming.

15.

Verse 207

A word came from sky to Soul:
"It's time. Come back."
Soul answered, "Greetings,
O Beauty who invites me.
I'm coming."

"With pleasure," Soul continued.
"I'll give hundreds of Souls for *You*.
Call me back once more
So I can reach the state of a Hel-eta." [\[33\]](#)

O peerless guest, You took away
The patience and decisions of our Soul.
Where should I search for You?
Where can I find You?
"Beyond Soul, beyond places," He answered.

I'll untie the heavy chains
Of those in the dungeon
And put a ladder to the sky
So Soul will ascend.

Your beauty adds Soul to Souls.
You are from our town.
Even so, why are you favoring strangers?
Is this fair to your friends?

You drank vagrancy like a syrup
And forgot the way home.
That woman, that witch of Kabil,
Has cast many spells upon you.

Why don't you feel dizzy?
Don't you get that urge in your Heart
When all these caravans
Are going there one after the other?

Haven't you heard
The caravan Master and the sound of bells
Ringing from front to back?
There are so many friends waiting for us.

So many people are waiting for us.
All of them are our drunks.
Thinking of us, they passed out of themselves.
They are yelling in our ears,
"O poor ones, come to the side of the Sultan."

16.

Verse 216

Look at His beauty. Watch His manner,
That figure, that stature,
That face, those eyes.
Look at His hands and feet.
Watch His color,
That dignity, that calmness.
Watch that One dressed
Like a full moon.

Shall I start with the cypress,
Or tell about the tulips,
Or describe the jasmine?
Shall I talk about the candle and bowl,
Or the roses that dance in the morning breeze?

Love looks like a pulpit for fireworks,
Dressed to become the form
Which came and cut the road
For the caravan of Heart.
O young one, give a moment of mercy.

All night I've been in the fire,
Burning until morning.
I'm so bright and happy from the morning sun.

I've been turning around His face
Which resembles the Moon.
I send greetings to Him
Without lips or tongue.
I throw myself to the ground

Before He invites me in.

You are the rose garden of the earth
And the eyes and light of the universe.
Yet when You step into the land of cruelty,
You become all the sorrow and grief of the world.

I come to Your temple to sacrifice my life.
"Don't give me trouble, go away," You say.
I return to serve You.
"Oh, stupid one, where are you?" You say.

Your reflection is having an affair
With a fiery Lover.
I hope my eye won't lose sight of Your face
For even one moment.

O Heart, what has happened
To your patience, your decision?
Where is your work, your occupation?
Why do you lose your sleep day and night?

Heart, expound upon the beauty of Your face
And praise those charming
Narcissus eyes of Yours.
Talk about that hair which looks like hyacinth,
Those beautiful eyebrows
And those ruby-colored lips
That tell such fascinating stories.

O Love, You have many different names
Among the people.
But yesterday I gave You yet another name.
I call You
Pain which has no remedy.

O Beautiful, my Soul is enlightened by You.
I whirl around like the sky because of You,
My Soul, my Beauty.
Send some wheat
So that the mill won't become confused.

I won't talk about Him anymore.
After this verse, I'll be silent.
It's enough.
My Soul has been burned by this desire.
My God, You take good care of us.

17.

Verse 229

Our Joseph, Your name is so beautiful.
You climb our roof so nicely.
We've opened the door.
Come down from the roof
And enter through the door.

O my ocean full of coral,
I swear in God's name
That my anxious Soul has no patience.
Its head is so dizzy
From the rolling of this mill.

Caravan Master, for my sake,
For God's sake, don't move the caravan
Out of this place.
Don't go away. Let the camels rest here.

No, no, go insane one. Go like a madman.
Walk nicely in the blood.
Don't talk about what or how.
Walk without what, without how,
Because there is no resting place for the Soul.

When your body goes into the ground,
Your Soul rises to the sky.
Don't worry if your mantle is torn.
There is no end for your Soul.

You're not a stranger
To the secrets of Heart.
Show your face because you are a mirror.
And because you've fallen in Love,
You will certainly go through
Many trials and much turbulence.

You ask me,
"How and where are you going,
Running carelessly like that?
Be careful! You're sailing through blood.
How far do you plan to go?
You're not telling me."

I answer, "You're going through the fire of Heart,
Jumping over the hearts
That are spread over the ground,
Rolling with the Love of Heart
Until you reach the sea of
'God does whatever He desires.' "[\[34\]](#)

Every moment an envoy comes,"
Grabs the Soul by his neck and pulls.
Every moment an image appears.
They all tell the Soul,
"Come back to your own source."

The Heart is running away
From this world of color and smell
By yelling and screaming,
"Where is that source? Where is that origin?"

18.

Verse 239

ﷲ have seen the Beloved.
I have seen that Beauty today,
The One who gives light
To every action, every force.
His glory was shining in the sky
Like the Soul of Muhammad.

The sun was ashamed after seeing His face.
The sky split open and fragmented like a Heart.
Water and ground became brighter than fire
Just from His sparks.

"Show me," I said,
"Show me the stairs so I can ascend the sky."
He answered, "The stair is your head.
Put your head under your feet."

When you put your feet over your head,
You step on the stars.
If you overcome your fancies and pleasures,
You step on air.
Why don't you come?

Hundreds of roads become apparent to you.
Every dawn you ascend the sky like prayers.

19.

Verse 244

O our friend, our Beloved,
Our confidant, our Joseph,
The light of our bazaar and our demand!

Look! Last year fell in Love
With our present time.
We are all spendthrifts.
You are hundreds of treasures to us,
Hundreds of our spent monies.

We are lazy.
You are hundreds of pilgrimages,
Hundreds of businesses and occupations.
We fall asleep.
You are hundreds of states of awakeness.

We are the sick ones.
You are hundreds of salves for our wounds.
We are all ruined.
Your kindness, your favor
Is our architect.

I said yesterday to Love,
"O our crafty Sultan of Sultans,
Don't deny that You hid our turban."

He answered me by saying,
"No, what We do comes from you,
Because Our mountain echoes your voice to you."

"Yes," I said, "true. We are the mountain.

This is our voice.
But, O Friend who does what He wishes,
The same is not true for us.
We cannot do what we wish."

20.[\[35\]](#)

Verse 251

Our feast, our wedding
Will be auspicious to the world.
God fit the feast and wedding
To our length like a proper garment.

Venus and the moon
Will be matched to each other,
The parrot with sugar.
The most beautifully-faced Beloved
Makes a different kind of wedding every night.

With the favor of our Sultan's prosperity,
Hearts become spacious
And men pair up with each other.
Troubles and anxieties are all gone.

Here tonight, You go again
To the wedding and feasting.
O Beauty who adorned our city,
You will be groom to the beauties.

How nicely You walk in our neighborhood,
Coming to us so beautifully.
O our river, O One
Who is searching for us,
How nicely You flow in our stream.

How nicely You flow with our desires,
Unfastening the binding of *our* feet.
You make us walk so nicely, holding our hand,
O Joseph of our world.

Cruelty suits You well.
It's a mistake for us to expect Your loyalty.
Step as You wish on our bloody Soul.

O Soul of my Soul, pull our Souls
To our Beloved's temple.
Take this piece of bone.
Give it as a gift to our Huma.[\[36\]](#)

O wise ones, give thanks
To our Sultan's kindness, who adds Souls to Soul,
Keep dancing, O considerate ones.
Keep whirling and dancing.

At the wedding night of rose and Nesrin[\[37\]](#)
I hang the drum on my neck.
Tonight, the tambourine and small drum
Will become our clothes.

Be silent! Venus becomes the Cupbearer tonight
And offers glasses to our sweetheart,
Whose skin is fair and rosy,
Who takes a glass and drinks.

For the sake of God, because of our praying,
Now Sufis become exuberant
At the assembly of God's Absence.
They put the belt of zeal on their waists
And start Sema.[\[38\]](#)

One group of people froth like the sea,
Prostrating like waves.
The other group battles like swords,
Drinking the blood of our glasses.

Be silent! Tonight, the Sultan
Went to the kitchen.
He is cooking with joy.
But a most unusual thing,
Tonight, the Beloved is cooking our Halva.[\[39\]](#)

21.

Verse 265

O angel of death, afraid of us,
Afraid of our battle,
Afraid because you can't wear our colors,
You can't.

If you get in a fight with us,
If you dare to challenge us,
None of your vessels will remain intact
Because of the wounds
That will be inflicted by His soldiers.

First you have to drink wine.
You must get so drunk
That you pass out of yourself.
Then you might join our harmony.

If you want to drink this wine,
First you must squeeze like a bottle.
When you become a bottle,
Hit yourself on our stone,
Hit yourself on our stone.

Whoever drinks that red wine
Grows and attains his desire,
Reaches pleasure from our squeezed Heart.

Our doorkeeper plays many two-stringed lutes
And six-stringed berbad[40] in that river.
Whoever drinks will rub shoulders with Sultans.

Here even time's Mars is female
At the strike of this dagger.
No one comes with a headscarf to our fight.
No one comes with a scarf to our battle.

If you want an arrow from the sun,
You should get a shield from the full moon.
If you are a Caesar, walk.
Pass through our light,
Pass through our light.

If we slaughter you,
Become Isaac for us.
Plunge in our ocean and be silenced.
Be silent so that
Our power won't destroy your boat,
Won't destroy your boat.

Verse 274

☞ sit at Your door
Hoping Your generosity, Your blessing
Might open it and invite me in.

O Beautiful, the One
On whose face hundreds of sparks
Of mercy's light and kindness shine,
My Soul is overwhelmed at Your door
From the smell of musk and ambergris.

We are drunk. Our heads are dizzy.
We have nothing to do with others' business.
We don't even care if the world
Turns upside down,
As long as Your Love lasts forever.

Your Love claps its hands,
Creating new universes, new centuries
Beyond the sky, out of the great emptiness.

O Love, smile like a rose.
O One whose looks are similar
To that beautiful universal intelligence,
O peerless rider of the land of Hel-eta,[\[41\]](#)
Catch the sun. Put it into a sack.

We are Your guest today.
We are the drunk of Your smiling face.
I swear to God, my Heart leaves me
Once I mention Your face.

Is there any roof besides Yours?
Any name besides Your name?
O sweet, beautifully-mannered Cupbearer,
There is no cup but Yours.

I will grab him and beg for his help
If I find an awakened Soul.
I wish I could sleep
So that I could see Your face in a dream.

O great man, slaves, people

Are gathered at Your door.
Get out, stagger along.
I am out of myself. I am drunk
Because of Heart-catching, drunken eyes.

See the bloody tears, the hundreds of torn shirts
By Your grief.
Listen to all the yelling and screaming.
Look at the blood of my lungs
Smeared allover my face, my back, my front.

The one who sees Your face
Runs from town to town and becomes mad.
Why should I curse him,
Want him to face all that trouble?
He is going to eat stones and soil anyway.

The very worst comes to the one
Who doesn't know You.
O Sultan of mankind,
Don't prevent me from seeing You.
Don't make me blind.

The blood runs like a torrent
To the shore of the sea of Soul.
It merges with the sea.
The ones who know the sea
Forget everything else.

One astonished river runs smoothly;
Another one is lost.
The first one thanks God;
The other prays for help.
"God is the only One
Able to change one condition to the other." [\[42\]](#)

O One who rises like a sun
And falls in Love with the poor,
Please do a favor for Your people.

The rose has passed out of himself
After seeing You,
Suddenly torn his dress and petals to pieces.
The harp begins to cry after hearing Your harp,

And bends its head down in shame.

Venus doesn't have a better song than Yours.
What kind of flute could she play?
She puts her lips to Yours
To learn new tunes.

With just a little hope
All the sugar canes keep swaying.
You give the kingdom to whomever You please.[\[43\]](#)
They also want to rise.

The harp is no good without You.
The reed flute is engulfed in grief.
Take one in Your arms. Kiss the other.
The tambourine says, "Hit, hit my face
So I may become more valuable."

Make this Heart,
Which has broken to pieces
And been scattered around,
Well drunk, so that it can find today
The things it lost yesterday.

O great Sultan, from now on,
It's a pity to stay sober.
I made an oath to God
That I would not mention Him
When I'm sober.

Don't bring any more proof.
Either give wine or talk.
Like one who found You through Grace,
Follow the adventure of the Sufi.

23.

Verse 296

Who cares if death comes
And grabs my being?
I'll welcome death.
If I have hundreds of lives, I'll give them all.

I'll ascend first to the sky,

Then with joy to the land of Nothingness.
I'll tell the Master of the house,
"You took away all my patience, all my decisions.
You should have come sooner."

You snatch the stars from the moon
And carry them off piece by piece.
Sometimes you take away the baby sucking milk.
Sometimes you take away the nanny.

I have a Heart like the earth.
It pulls huge mountains.
Why should I be loaded with straw?
I am a man who moves mountains.
Save me from this barn.

Every hair in my body has become a lion.
But I'm tired of dead wishes.
I am flour, not grain.
Why did I come to the mill?

Grain was born from an ear of corn
And goes to the mill.
Yet I am not the son of an ear of corn.
I was born from the moon.
My place is not the mill.

No, no, moonlight also reflects the mill
Through the window.
But it returns to the moon,
Not the bakery store.

If I were a friend,
With my mind I would tell you more.
But be silent now
So that the wind in the air
Won't hear this fable.

24.

Verse 304

☞love You with all my Heart and Soul.
That's my sin.
Why do You turn Your face

From my pale saffron face?

Either take care of this bleeding Heart
Or give the patience of
"God does whatever He desires." [\[44\]](#)

We came to the crossroads after a long walk.
One road was 'Be patient.'
The other was 'Give thanks for the blessing.'
But I can't see either one
Without the light of Your face.

No water flows in any canal
When You turn Your face away.
Particles don't appear
If the sun doesn't rise at early dawn.

The Hearts of beauties can't be dizzy and drunk
Without Your wine.
How can the devil run from Lahavle [\[45\]](#)
If You don't protect us?

If You don't add a palmful of Helie [\[46\]](#)
To the medicine with Your own hand,
It can be neither pill nor paste.

Without the uproars of Your clouds,
The sun doesn't enter the sign of the lion.
Without You, no artery pulsates
In the hands and feet of the devout.

You hide meaning in death,
Awakeness in sleep.
You get spring water from stone.
You manifest faithfulness in lightning.

The dark torrent of the night
Carries away mind and intelligence everywhere.
Who better to bring them back
Than the follower of Hel-eta? [\[47\]](#)

O Soul of the whole or Soul of the part!
O the One who provides a dress
To cover the garden and meadow!

O the One who invites Soul with the drumbeat,
Chanting, "Come, O wandering Soul!"

Everyone wants to cheat
And take Oshur[\[48\]](#) from me.
But I don't have the mind
To understand this word.

From wherever understanding comes,
One has to go in that direction.
Whoever makes your life longer,
Pray for him to have a long life.

The One who squeezes your Heart,
The One who makes you green and grow,
Gives the color of rose to your face.
He is the One who forces you to pray
And accepts your praying,
Grants your prayers.

He adds *R* to be,
Nun to *elif* [\[49\]](#)
In order to say the word *Rabbena*,[\[50\]](#)
Which gives breath and power to your mouth.

I follow Your orders, saying,
"Lebbeyk, Lebbeyk," [\[51\]](#)
O munificent One.
With Your Love in my Heart,
I keep turning like a millstone.

The millstone turns and turns,
But the mill doesn't understand
That our nourishment comes from that.
So does the miller's income.

Water is the one that turns the stone.
When God stops the water, nothing moves.

Be silent. All these words
Are coming from our secret.
You be silent, so that the One
Who doesn't slip in His talk can tell.

Verse 322

☞ should wail.

I should do so much that, in the end,
I would clean the rust off the mirror
Of the disbeliever's Heart.

The Heart is riding
The horse of Your Love.
Your Love's horse is so fast
That every step
Is passing the land of Soul by miles.

If You show Your bright ruby lips
In spite of all the darkness,
Hard rocks will rain from the sky
On the Hearts of the stone-hearted ones.

Do You know why they deny such brightness?
They see the splendid glory,
But are ashamed of themselves.
They're jealous of You.

If that isn't really the case,
Even though they're blind now,
Their eyes will be opened eventually,
And they will see thousands of beauties,
Of moon-pieces like stars
Clustered on the side.

The joy of Your glory
Opens the eyes of the blind.
The beauty of Your roads
Causes the lame to walk.

Even though they walk,
They still lose themselves suddenly on the road.
In fact, every mind that grows in Your garden,
Follows that air.

I've seen so many people,
Their insides empty, wailing like a flute.
For that reason, many brave necks
Are bent by grief like a harp.

For that reason, so many caravans
Are lost on the road.
For that reason, so many ships
Are wrecked and run aground.

All those broken and ruined ones,
With their Hearts and Souls,
Keep their hopes pinned on You,
Expecting to get something
From Your endless knowledge.

It is expected that Your favor,
Which is the favor of favors,
Will alleviate suffering.
Every place will turn into peace
And be done with struggling.

It is expected that this humdrum world
Will stop.
It will be a different road and journey.
New melodies will appear in every Heart,
And Hearts will be attached
To each other like chains.

With the beautiful invitation
Of Shems of Tebriz,
Every particle would rise
And ascend to the sky,
Every hair would become a brave.

26.

Verse 335

O Sultan of Sultans, blood never sleeps.
O beautiful Moon face,
A sea of blood comes from trouble and grief,
Boiling, flowing over my eyes.
How could sleep possibly get there?

If I closed my lips,
My Heart would overflow.
When I pour water on it,
It boils and rises more.

If people don't condone my Love
And criticize me, I understand.
But how can an accused one
Ever reach light and glory?

My blood overflows, becomes words in my mouth,
Then drops out of my pen.
The alphabet goes to Solomon
Like ants begging.

O Solomon, O Sultan,
O the One who grants favors,
Your favors exalt every goodness.
Souls are the shells for Your pearl.
Grasses are the hearts in Your garden.

We are a helpless bunch of ants,
Separated from the place of harvest,
Wandering from one side to the other.
Come and help us.

We are a handful of dirt in Your hand,
Your slave and Your servant.
Even with all this blindness,
We can see and watch the Beauties.

Don't look at us.
Remember Your kindness.
"He doesn't need anything.
Everything needs Him. "[\[52\]](#)
As You praise Yourself,
You may forgive the one
Who did all the sinning,
Committed bad deeds in both worlds.

O warmth of greatness,
O Beautiful, Heart has seen You.
Give him an alm.
How can I see anything else in this world?
How can I watch anything else in the sky?

The Heart has drunk wine
From the Sultan of Sultans.

If such a Heart were to drink,
Even from the clean, pure Fountain of Life,
It would stick in its throat.

To the One who sees that Beauty
Who is bright like a moon in beauty and charm,
The sun is seen as a dark annoyance
Resembling only a small spark in His eye.

To the Lovers who have been separated
From that beautiful Sultan
Who has not been extolled,
Despite hundreds of honors,
Their sweet life becomes sandy, sour.

O Soul, cut the words short. While you're talking,
Try to go as far as Tebriz,
To the way of the Sultan of Sultans.

O flesh, don't be lazy like a dog.
Don't try to bark.
Give up your being
In order to go toward the Sultan of beings.

O beautiful One, hundreds of existences
Are nothing but a handful of dust.
Hundreds of Sultans of Sultans are nothing
But servants at His side.
O Charmer to whom hundreds of Asafs [\[53\]](#)
Turn into slaves,
Even Solomon becomes astonished with His Love.

Solomon felt he would fall
Into all kinds of tricks because of that Love,
Would go through lots of trouble.
He started trembling because he knew
All these exaltations would degrade him.

Suddenly a devilish trick came.
A glass of loftiness and fame inflated his ego
And took his greatness away.

That peerless Sultan at one time worried
About his belongings.
He put giant fairies
Row upon row to protect himself. [\[54\]](#)

He then realized he had fallen
Into a trap of his desire and fancy,
Turned his back on those gardens
And understood that all his belongings
Actually did not belong to him.

He had cut the neck of the giant fairies' necks
With the sword of distress,
Because they kept him away
From the Beloved on the other side.

At once, the grace of Shemseddin,
To whom everyone is a slave and servant,
Rose like a moon and said,
"O choice man,
Don't burn and hurt the universe."

When he heard that order from the Sultan,
He prostrated himself.
He received such assurance from Tebriz
That he would gladly sacrifice both worlds.

27.

Verse 357

☞ don't know how much I should cry and moan
To make the Beloved feel sorry for me,
How much blood these eyes should shed
So I can see the rose garden.

When the sun shines,
I don't complain that much about separation.
But if the Heart would show me a new road,
I would start all over again.

O universal mind
Which has all these skills,
Teach me a spell,
A way for me to go
So that the beauty of the beautiful Beloved
Will have pity on me. '

The Heart cannot find the light

Of Cigil's [\[55\]](#) candle,
Is unable to reach that Glory.
One is water; the other is dirt.
How could water and dirt understand
The desire of this deceitful Beauty's Heart?

The Archangel Gabriel
Is understanding and tolerant.
But how can he know
The taste of well-fed suckling calf meat?
How can one hunt the beautiful phoenix
With a trap of grain?

Even a small fly looks like a phoenix
In front of a phoenix who has been trapped.
O mind which resembles a spider,
How long will you keep making this web?

Where is Jesus, whose breath is so holy
That even without the means of Mary
He would be so exalted, so overflowing,
That the Christians' Hearts would become untied
And throw off their Zunnar? [\[56\]](#)

Deccal [\[57\]](#) of grief
Who looks like fire
And burns everything like fire,
Who lays a carpet of fire,
Where is Jesus
Who will draw a knife on that Deccal?

All the health and soundness
Which comes to the body
Comes from You.
The uproar which comes to the Soul
Comes from You.
The signs of Jesus' return
Before the Last Day of Judgment
Also come from You.

Once a stone is thrown at glass,
It falls down because of its sorrow.
The thorn would feel as if it were on fire
If it didn't have the rose.

I became like Vamik,

Who is separated from Azra,[\[58\]](#)
Because I didn't deserve Him.
But even then, in the Lover's Heart,
There still is Love's drunkenness, dizziness.

As in a stately game of chess,
Wherein a hundred Souls
Provide provisions for the Shah,
He puts hundreds of mountains
On top of one straw.
For the one who suffers one grief,
He gives a hundred times
More grief and calamities.

I see the Soul has reached the Sultan,
Passed beyond himself, separated from self.
With the Sultan's favor,
He has made the window and door for Soul.

It is possible that the great Sultan
With innumerable favors
Would exempt us from the custom
Of asking forgiveness for those sins.

The Soul who turns to Him
Will become like Bayezid,[\[59\]](#)
Or turn his face to Senai [\[60\]](#)
Or give perfumes to Attar.[\[61\]](#)

The Beloved in whose temple the Soul is served
Is such a Beloved
That even days are drunk
After drinking from His glasses.
Once you mention His name,
You'll have to repeat it again and again.

He is the great Sultan Shemseddin.
Because of Him,
Tebriz became the land of Soul,
Filled with lights like Arsh.[\[62\]](#)
All the halos are jealous of His luminous lighting.

Hundreds of thousands bravo the moment
When Archangel Gabriel will reveal His secrets.
Hundreds of thousands bravo this holiest

Of His holy hour.

You sit at His Love assembly
Without affection and hatred
And see that the curtain
Has been put up and secured
With hundreds of nails
So that the disbeliever cannot see through.

28.

Verse 376

At dawn, I saw that Sultan
At the main street of Hel-eta. [\[63\]](#)
He was in the sleep of heedlessness.
He did not know about Abu-Ali [\[64\]](#) or Abu-l Ala.[\[65\]](#)

I filled a cup from the wine
Which made my head dizzy
And put it in front of him.
"Come, my Sultan," I said, "drink."

"O so-and-so," he said, "what's this?"
"That is the blood of Lovers," I said.
"On top of the fire of Love,
It became pure like Soul."

"Since you drank, you've become exuberant
At the cup of Soul,
At the garden and meadow
Of the secrets of God," he said.
"I will drink that wine."

My drunk Beloved took the glass from my hand
And drank the wine
Which adds Soul to Soul-like Souls.

He passed the Soul in joy and cheer
Hundreds of times.
The sky said that now evil eyes
Won't stay away from You.

29.

Verse 382

The Cupbearer offers lots of wine,
Offers that hope and fear will both disappear.
Cut the neck of thought!
Where are we?
Where is He?

Bring the cup. Give us more and more wine.
Pull our mind up from the roots.
Untie the daily struggle which barely covers
His face and wide open pleasure
From existence.

Come to the assembly as a drunk.
Take the veil from your face.
O the secret of
"God does whatever He desires,"[\[66\]](#)
Come as you did before.

See those tired, scattered insane Ones?
See the Ones who've freed themselves
From the ties of existence?
Watch the Ones who fall in Love with Love.
That's when trouble starts.

Come even faster. Put your senses in your mind.
It's getting late.
My Heart is tired and sick of this town.
Make Him drunk and save Him,
Again saying, "Come fast. Come."

Take this rope from my hands
And tie the feet of Abu-l Hasan.[\[67\]](#)
Offer me a glass so I can lose my head and feet.

Among every-day events,
In the gossip of every moment,
The one who keeps talking
About the subjects of Abu-l Ala,[\[68\]](#)
Abu-l Ala is simply absurd.

Don't give water and bread.

Don't give peace and sleep, O Beautiful.
To the thirst of His Love,
The blood of hundreds like us would be sacrificed:

I'm Your guest today.
I'm Your drunk.
I'm all over the place today.
That news is spread over the entire city.
Everyone knows it.
Today is the day of drink.
Come all, come.

If anyone is looking for any purchaser
Other than God,
He is nothing but a donkey.
He's searching for something to eat
Like a donkey at the green of that stock hole.

Be advised that the green
Which grows around the stock hole
Makes your mouth and beard smell bad.
As Muhammad said, "Stay away from the rushes
And the green around the sewage,
Because it makes your mouth and beard
Smell bad." [\[69\]](#)

I am away from the green
Which grows around the sewage,
I am away
From the beauties of garden and meadow.
I am away from pride, free from self.
I am drunk with the divine wine.

How the moon appears above the horizon!
How the rose appears among the grasses!
That is how, suddenly, the image of a Beauty
Appeared in the Heart.

All earthly images
Start running toward His image,
Just like pieces of iron
Run toward a magnet.

Rubies are like stones in front of Him.
Lions are wild donkeys,
Swords are like shields,

And the sun is a bunch of particles.

The earth became Mount Sinai.
Every part was shining.
The Soul, like Moses,
Lost his mind and passed out
Because of manifestation.

Every drunk is at a different world of union,
Merges with His Source of Source.
Absence beats time in the timelessness.
He claps His hands openly.

Every blade of grass is green.
Every particle is yelling,
"Patience is the key to grief;
Gratitude is the key to contention."

The rose says to the Nightingale,
"O One to whom hundreds like me
Will be sacrificed,
You were a guard. You've now become King.
How long will you keep saying,
'May you live long'?"

While praying and crying,
Lightning struck every needy particle
With such confusion
That they forgot praying.

For peace is the way to wish.
Mildness is the stair of joy.
Fire is a good judge for gold.
Glory is the judge for Love.

Love is the light of nights.
Separation prepares, matures for union.
O One who walks on my chest,
Union is the antidote for separation.

The sun is one of our horses.
The full moon is one of our guards.
Love is one of our close friends
With whom we hang around.
Who knows what we have in our head?
Who knows?

O one who is asking me about His Love,
You honor Him. Be grateful for Him.
Because once He appears,
All the wishes and desires about Him
Will be scattered like particles.

O one who is asking for my story,
I have a share of Love,
But drunkenness eradicates my trouble.
What fortune and happiness for me!

Growing, spreading because of your apples, [\[70\]](#)
Our mornings are the cause of pulling together.
A Soul is from Your Soul.
There is hope and begging
Turning from one state to another,
Changing from hand to hand.

The wind coming from You
Gives light to the eyes,
Makes blind Jacob see again.
Our Joseph among the people
Becomes generous with the things God sells.

The sun, moon and eleven stars
Prostrate themselves
And fall in front of You to worship,
Whereas Joseph saw this
When he had a short sleep.

O the one who keeps complaining
Either because of Love
Or the sharp nails of separation,
Be aware that all this favor and goodness
Is our gain
And the things people spend
Are our goodness and favor.

30.

Verse 411

Who am I that I could listen to advice,

O Cupbearer?
Turn the wine glasses, O Cupbearer.
Pour the wine for our Soul
Which adds Soul to our Soul, O Cupbearer.

O Cupbearer who holds Lovers by their hands,
The One who helps Lovers,
Give the glass of Soul to my hand.
Keep it away from the stranger's lips.
Offer it to me secretly.

Give the bread to bread eaters.
Give the loaf of bread
To those greedy, helpless ones.
Bread's lovers
Don't deserve Your treasure, O Cupbearer.

O the One who becomes Soul to the Soul of Soul,
We didn't come here to eat bread.
Jump. Get up. Don't put on a poor face
At the assembly of the Sultan.

Just take this big glass
And offer it to that old man.
Once the old man of the village gets drunk,
Go to the side of the drunks, O Cupbearer.

O Cupbearer,
Whose favor and kindness are expected,
Be quick, offer more and more.
Where is bashfulness? Where is the drunk?
If you are shy, pour one glass
Over the head of shyness.

Get up, O Cupbearer.
Come, O One who is the enemy of bashfulness.
Come to us with a smile,
So our fortune will smile, O Cupbearer.

31.

Verse 418

Every moment, a revelation
Comes to Hearts from the sky.

"How long you do you intend
To stay on earth like sediment?
Ascend to the sky."

Only heavy Souls
Drop to the bottom like sediment.
Once they are purified,
They go to the top.

Don't stir up the mud all the time.
Let turbid water stay still to cleanse itself.
Your dregs can become clean.
The remedy can be found in your grief.

There is a Soul like lightning,
But it is smoke more than light.
When smoke exceeds the limit,
One cannot see the houses' lights.

If you get rid of the smoke,
You'll be enlightened with glory,
Illuminate this and the other world
With your light.

You don't see the moon or sky on muddy water.
The sun and moon are hidden
When the air gets dark.

The South wind cleans the air.
The breeze of early dawn
Can light up the world.

Every breath we take
Cleanses the grief and discomfort in the Soul,
Shines inside of man.
When a man stops breathing one moment,
Nothingness touches his being.

Our bizarre Soul longs
For the land of Nothingness.
Yet I don't know why
The animal self is out to pasture.

O Soul, whose essence is clear and clean,
How long will you wander, take journeys?
You are the falcon of the King.

Fly to the whistle of your King.

32.

Verse 428
Terci- Bend

Your face is pleasant, Your disposition good.
The curl of Your hair's sidelock,
Your head, Your face are beautiful.
Your grace, Your manner, Your fruit
Are all pleasant.
Your kindness is as good as your cruelty.

O the appearance of eternal Love,
O His beauty beyond the extreme,
O His face more beautiful than the moon,
O His stature resembles the cypress.
O the most beautiful One adds Soul to Soul,
Gives joy to the Heart.

O the Soul of garden, meadows and jasmine,
O the light of earth and sky,
O the One who comes to help Lovers,
O the peerless cavalry of the square of Hel-eta.[\[71\]](#)

O the One who sets the table of favors,
O the One who is kind to the bad and greedy,
The parrot is praising You.
So are the partridge and dove.

O eyes of the Chinese beauties,
O Beauty who never frowns,
Never puts on a sour face,
Don't leave the poor.
Don't scratch the face of contention
With your fingers.

O Beauty who makes sultans
Slave-servants to Him,
Even sultans are poor in front of You.
They put their heads down in Your temple
And praise You, searching for words to praise You,
O Sultan who deserves to be praised.

O the One who gives patience to the devout
And belief to the worshipers,
O the One who becomes
A rose garden to the wise,
When they reach union,
Heart's spaciousness becomes vast.

I am with Lovers.
I don't want to sleep tonight.
I will pray for You, O Beloved, until dawn.

I have friends outside
And workers inside of my Heart,
A bunch of charming brothers at home.
They are clean and pure
On the table of Ihvan-i Sefa.[\[72\]](#)

O the light of gardens and greenery,
O the Cupbearer of cypress and jasmine,
When I mention You, my mouth is sweetened.
I will tell Terci.

* * * * *

You are about to go on a trip alone,
Either to the drunks or to the Beloved,
Swaying from side to side.

I become like a ball, headless and footless,
In front of the club of destiny.
If you are going to the square,
Take me with You. Take me back to my essence.

You are so bright that You fault the sunshine.
The moon looks dark because of You.
If You run around, even the sky will be too small.

You are such an unprecedented Beloved.
You are such a peerless Beauty.
You came so late with so much difficulty,
But you are going so quickly and easily.

O Beautiful, with His face like the sun,
O Jesus, looking for ills,

How fortunate is the crowd
To whom You are going.

Either You are entirely Soul,
Or Hizir[\[73\]](#) of the present, or the Fountain of Life.
That's why You're hidden from the people.

O the Kible[\[74\]](#) of thoughts,
O God's lion in the middle of the forest,[\[75\]](#)
O guide of talents,
You keep walking in the Soul like a mind.

When You take the road of separation,
Lovers lose the glass of mind and intelligence.
Please tear the curtain of shame and modesty
That makes the mistake of calling Soul *mind*.

Never mind separation.
Wherever You go to look for something,
A bright moon with cloudy wet eyes follows You.

O the light of every eye, every mind,
O the One who is brighter than the moon or sun,
Look at the third Terci.
Look at it carefully.

* * * * *

O light inside of the light,
I will ask you a question.
What spell do You cast
That grief becomes joy?

Such sweet lips You have to cast a spell,
Like the Prophet David.
You also soften iron,
Melt and cast different shapes. [\[76\]](#)

No. You may be a Sultan who refuses
To be limited by any restrictions.
You may be the governor of the land of God,
Or the private pupil of the Creator
Who gave up all spells.

I have ridden so many stately horses
Since I have known You.

At last, I threw myself out of trouble.
I am free from fear,
Have reached the land of security.

I am a new Soul in every moment.
I go to a different garden every time.
If You put Your hand on me,
Neither my hand nor my Heart will remain.

I know neither the sky nor the star of Suha.[\[77\]](#)
I know neither the garment nor its price.
I know nothing.
All I know is, O my One as beautiful as the moon,
You are my peace and comfort.

O One who gives sustenance
To angels, to people,
O the pivot of this thoughtful sky,
With all these beauties,
Will You forget this guest in Your Heart?
That's impossible.

What a wonderful moment it is
That my cypress-statured Beauty Grows in the green
And I stand in front of Him,
Trembling like a willow tree in the wind.

The tulip would be washed with blood.
Narcissus would keep looking with jealousy.
The bud would throw its hat from its head.
The iris would pass out from being iris.

O Cupbearer of the assembly of all kindness,
I am Your drunk, Your ruined one.
O rose garden, O garden of Eden,
I am Your guest today.

* * * * *

Look at those playful eyes
Coming drunk from the tavern.
He tucked His shirt in His belt
To shed the blood of Lovers.

The Beauty of Beauties took an oath:
"I will offer this wine constantly.

Not father, not mother, not anyone
Will remain sober."

"I'll serve so much of this wine,
I'll play such a game with this wine," He said,
"I'll make you all crazy.
In the end, you won't find one sane person
In the world of humans."

Our Leyla,[\[78\]](#) Cupbearer of Soul,
All the world is her Mecnun.
Everything else is useless, worthless
Besides Leyla and Mecnun.

Either He takes our stage horse from us
And makes it gallop,
Or pillages everything we have.
Neither ordinary places
Nor places of worship are safe.
How can you be safe from our Love?
Is that possible?

If I don't see you drunk,
I'll throw all your belongings in the fire.
I'll yell and scream.
I'll force you to drink.
I'll make you drunk.

The time for the wise is gone.
This is the time for the Cupbearer.
Give a big glass to the one who denies that.

Winter is gone. Spring is here.
That's the moment the wine meets the glass.
Drink. Listen to the reed.
The time for eating is gone.

That deceitful old woman has left.
So has the winter, rain and mud.
Spring has arrived.
Hundreds of beauties
And hundreds of sweethearts are born.

O Cupbearer, now serve that red wine.
Serve it so the ears will be opened,
And I will tell one more Terci.

* * * * *

Threaten as harshly as possible.
Fight as viciously as you can.
Know this:
The smoke coming
From the stokehole of a bath
Doesn't rise very high in the sky.

Even if it does,
It cannot cover the sky.
Even with that, the sky acquires
All its purity and light from the smoke.

O brother, don't hurt yourself.
Don't hit your head against the stones.
You cannot fight with that burned, flamed self.

If you spit at the moon,
Your saliva will land on your face.
If you pull on His shirt,
Your dress gets shorter.

Lots of immature ones before you have also
Boiled, overflowed, fought and struggled
In the kettle of this world.
But they all gave up at the end,
Finding nothing but contention.

One porcupine grabbed the tail of a snake
And pulled its head inside,
Then became like a ball.

That stupid snake started throwing itself
From one spike to another
And became riddled with holes.

That impatient, ugly face,
Without knowing the game,
Killed itself.
If it had waited awhile,
It might have been saved.

You also put yourself together.
Don't throw yourself on the spikes

Of every porcupine of trouble.
Relax when you have accidents.
Say to yourself, "Even the airspace will shrink."

The Creator of all universes said,
"I am with the One who has patience."
O the One who stays with patience,
Pour patience on our head.
Give us patience.

I've gone to another valley.
You tell the rest of it.
Give our greetings to the patient One
Again and again.

33.

Verse 479

Put Your mind in Your head,
O Doctor of Love.
Have you ever seen any Lover like us?
O Beloved, I would be long gone without You.

O Joseph, of all the hundreds gathering,
Have you ever seen a Jacob like me
Who has been engulfed by grief?
My face turned a pale yellow
Because of the grief of Love.
My eyes became blind from crying.

O Joseph, look at me and see the tears
Coming from the eyes of poor Jacob.
Because of Love,
Tears keep coming from my eyes.

There are hundreds of Egypts,
Hundreds of reed beds in the Heart of Joseph.
"Either small or big,
Game is in the stomach of wild donkeys."[\[79\]](#)

The chance for drink, joy and pleasure
Have all gotten better.
Whatever my Heart has desired has happened.
But rest assured, "Time is a sharp sword."[\[80\]](#)

Don't think of the past.

For Love, play with your Soul.
Don't say, like the Israelites said to Moses,
"You and your God go and fight.
We'll stay here."[\[81\]](#)

You cannot find milder people
Than these Lovers of this world.
Tell the wise and intelligent people,
"Be kind to Lovers."

If you have fallen into grief,
In the end, with the favor of God,
Whose compassion and justice cover the arch,
You will be helped and relieved.[\[82\]](#)

If you know us, if you are familiar
With our beautiful, graceful Cupbearer,
Grab Him. Don't let Him go.
Nobody else has anything for you.

O One who teaches tricks to the wise,
We have tried all the tricks and deceits,
But You are the One
Who sees and does everything,
The One who sees and knows the unseen.
Be silent! Listen to the rest of it
From the One whose disposition is kindness.
As a matter of fact,
Understanding is given
As a remedy for every bad thing
Because of His favor.

34.

Verse 490

That hodja[\[83\]](#) became ill suddenly
In the middle of the night.
He had lost himself
And kept hitting his head against the wall
Until morning.

The sky and earth cried and yelled for him.

He looked like he had fallen into fire.
Even his breath was burning.

He had a bizarre sickness.
He didn't have a headache.
He didn't have malaria.
There is no cure in this world for this disease,
Because it; came from the sky.

Galinos^[84] came and examined his pulse.
He said, "Leave my hand alone.
Look at my Heart.
My disease is not in the books."

There was much talk and discussion in our city:
"What kind of disease is that?
He has no bile, no passion,
No muscle aches, no edema.

"He doesn't sleep, doesn't talk.
He is fed by Love.
Love is like a nanny, like a mother to him."

"O my God," I said. "Help him
So he can rest for a moment.
He hasn't hurt anyone.
He hasn't stolen anything."

A voice came from the sky.
"Leave him alone
Because there is no medicine
For the illness of Lovers.

"Don't bother this hodja.
Don't tie him up. Don't advise him.
The place he has fallen into
Is neither the place of worship
Nor the place of bad things."

What do you think about Love?
You haven't heard about Love, even from Lovers.
Be silent. Don't try to cast a spell.
Love is neither a tale nor a game.

O Shems of Tebriz, come,
O Source of mine, O Source of light!

This great stately Soul
Is dull and lifeless without Your light.

35.

Verse 501

Be lost in grief, O Soul.
Patience is the key to suffering.
Be lost in grief
That in the end He will show His face.
Patience is the key to suffering.[\[85\]](#)

Plunge into pain and suffering
So deeply that at the bottom,
The Throne of God [\[86\]](#) comes suddenly
To your temple.
Patience is the key to suffering.

Smile with the light of the earth.
Be the wedding feast of the earth.
Leave mourning, reach security,
Because patience is the key to suffering.

O my Heart, give up men and women.
Pull their love out from inside you.
With Love, He becomes
Your paternal and maternal uncle,
Because patience is the key to suffering.

If you bend double like the sky
And go with God's command,
You'll be saved from destiny and its twisted ways.
Patience is the key to suffering.

At the same time, you'll be saved from self,
Grab the hair of the devil and cut his throat.
Patience is the key to suffering.

Your fortune comes to your feet,
Success to your side.
Be honored by His presence.
Patience is the key to suffering.

A trouble bothers you inside;

That's the reason things don't go well for you.
Tie up that trouble neatly.
Patience is the key to suffering.

There is a wonderful world of God.
Don't look for it in this imaginary world
For even one moment.
God is the only confidant
For this world.
Patience is the key to suffering.

Be silent! Don't tell the secret.
Strangers cannot reach the secret of Min ledun.[\[87\]](#)
Patience is the key to suffering.

36.

Verse 511

Kind[\[88\]](#) are greeting you.
Their Souls become slaves and servants to you.
They become drunk with your cup.
"Drunks are greeting you."

I became the topic of talk for everyone
Because of Your Love,
Which made me meaner.
"Drunks are greeting you."

Look at this divine struggle.
Watch this flood-like torrent.
See this Sun of God.
"Drunks are greeting you."

One is casting spells on me.
One is expecting me to repent.
One keeps running without feet, like me.
"Drunks are greeting you."

O desire of desires, lift this curtain.
I don't know anyone but Him.
"Drunks are greeting you."

O cloud which rains so beautifully!
Come, O drunkenness of friends.

Come, O Sultan who steals the Heart.
"Drunks are greeting you."

Astonish us. Get us out of trouble.
Ruin us, but fill us up with treasures.
Count the eternal money which is in our hand.
"Drunks are greeting you."

The entire town turned upside down for you.
At times, they all have known you.
Other times, they haven't known you at all.
O the One who gives the Heart
The power to see and perceive,
"Drunks are greeting you."

Tell the One whose face
Is more beautiful than the moon,
The One whose eyes are like a magician,
Tell that good-mannered Sultan,
"Drunks are greeting you."

Tell the man of the brawl,
The brave of the war,
That confusion, that Love,
That fresh green cypress,
"Drunks are greeting you."

To the place where no one with right mind exists,
To the place where no one but one drunk fits,
To the land with no road, no religion, no creed!
"Drunks are greeting you."

Tell the Soul who is beyond
The question of what and how,
Tell the sweetheart who trapped Mecnun,
Tell the hidden pearl,
"Drunks are greeting you."

The One who is a trap for the people,
The One who is the Soul of the world,
Tell that Love, that constant companion,
"Drunks are greeting you."

Tell that blue sea,
Tell that watching eye,
Tell Mount Sinai,

"Dunks are greeting you."

Tell the One who broke my repentance,
The One who patches my mantle,
Tell the light of my days,
"Dunks are greeting you."

Tell my Kurban bayram,[\[89\]](#)
Tell that light of the Koran,
Tell the One who is praised
At the door of Heaven,[\[90\]](#)
"Dunks are greeting you."

O our Sultan Husameddin,
O the man whom all saints praise,
O the One with whose help
All become aware of their Soul,
"Dunks are greeting you."

37.

Verse 528

Go tell that Rebab player,
"Dunks are greeting you."
Run tell that moor hen,[\[91\]](#)
"Dunks are greeting you."

Tell that man who is serving drinks,
"Dunks are greeting you."
Tell that permanent life,
"Dunks are greeting you."

Tell the man of this tumult,
"Dunks are greeting you."
Tell that confusion, that Love,
"Dunks are greeting you."

O most Beautiful
Whose face makes the moon ashamed,
"Dunks are greeting you."
O peace and comfort of the Heart,
"Dunks are greeting you."

O the One who is the Soul of Soul,
"Drunks are greeting you."
O that much Beauty and beyond,
"Drunks are greeting you."

There is nobody by himself there.
Here, there is nobody but one who is drunk.
"Drunks are greeting you."

O wish of wishes,
"Drunks are greeting you."
Lift the veil off of your face.
"Drunks are greeting you."

38.

Verse 535

No one's advice will ever help Lovers.
Love is such a torrent
That no one can stand in front of it.

The mind will never understand
The pleasure of the drunk.
The wise will never know
The value of the dirt in front of the door
Of the One who has gone beyond himself.

Kings would give away their throne
For the smell of the wine that Lovers drink
At the assembly of Heart.

Husrev[\[92\]](#) left his kingdom for Shirin.
Ferhad[\[93\]](#) tried to make a tunnel in the mountain
For the same reason.

Mecnun[\[94\]](#) stays out of normal people's circle
Because of his love for Leyla.
Vamik[\[95\]](#) keeps smiling
At the beard and mustache of the unruly ones
Because of Love.

O my Beauty,

Without the awareness of Soul,
Life is frozen.
The One who doesn't know the pass
Finds the abyss on the road.
Without news from the Beloved,
His brain is decayed.

If this sky weren't in Love like us,
If this sky's head weren't as dizzy as ours,
It would give up this whirling
And say, "Enough!"
How long would I whirl? How long?

The whole universe is like a reed flute.
He keeps blowing from every hole.
Every cry knows the pleasure
Of those two sweet lips.

Look and see. Every time He blows
On a bit of earth, on every Heart,
He gives them a need, offers a Love,
And they cry with grief
Because of that sorrow.

If you take God out of your Heart,
With whom are you going to be in Love?
Tell me.
The one who takes Him out of his Heart
For even one moment
Is lifeless.

I'll be silent. *You* go quickly
And climb up on the roof at night.
O Soul, send an uproar to the town.

39. [\[96\]](#)

Verse 546

Today, we are smiling and happy
Because that good fortune is coming.
Our beautiful Sultan of Sultans is coming.

Today I will break my vow.

I'll throwaway my diet,
Because the Beauty of Joseph
Is coming from the land of Canaan.

I go swaying like a drunk.
I go secretly like a Soul
In the direction of that Sultan,
Searching, asking along the way.

The stately palace is built.
The sky has untied its turban
And is walking with great difficulty,
Because it's coming
From the assembly of the drunks.

O son, follow our orders.
Be faithful to us, O son.
Don't go buy on terms, O son.
Look. Orders are coming today.

Be enlightened like the sky.
Blossom like the rose garden.
Try to swim like a fish.
That endless sea is coming.

Come to your senses, O son.
Come to your senses.
Don't look at me. Look at yourself,
Because the smell of saffron^[97]
Makes the one who talks laugh.

You came back again, clapping your hands.
You'll ruin the houses again,
Because the bright sun
Is coming to the run-down places.

O the one who's stayed at home,
You've grown in the shade.
Go outside,
Because the Sun turns ordinary stone
Into the Ruby of Bedehsan.^[98]

Sometimes He is bloody.
Other times He drinks blood.
Sometimes He takes care of the ill
And cures them,

Especially this hopeless one,
Because he came from their side.

Look for the drunks today.
See my secret things.
Don't see or talk about my shames.
I am so drunk because of Him
That words are coming from my mouth
And falling all over the place in utter confusion.

40.

Verse 557

The Soul who is not in Love with the faithful
Is so disloyal.
God will curse the one
Who is not in Love with the Grace of God.

O Sultan who deserves the words:
"His eyes haven't moved
From what he has seen! "[99]
He has visited all around the world,
Has seen a figure,
But he wasn't in Love with figures.

I heard this yesterday from a bunch of fairies.
They gathered at the door of the town.
They said, "Give a house in the village
To the one who doesn't like our city."

Pity the fish
That falls on dry soil.
Pity the copper
That hasn't been in Love with chemistry.

Where is the Soul that hasn't tried
To merge with his origin?
Why won't iron fall in Love
With the magnet?

The door of death is closed to him.
He can't escape soon.
He doesn't deserve to live,
Yet he isn't in Love with death.

41.

Verse 563

Who is the One who gives grief to the Heart,
But when you cry at His temple,
Your grief is sweetened?

At first, He appears to be a snake.
In the end, He becomes a treasure, a pearl.
He is such a Sultan
That He turns suffering into sweet pleasure.

He makes the devil
Into the most beautiful girl in heaven
And changes mourning into a wedding party.
He makes a wise man out of one born blind.

He enlightens the dark
And turns the thorn into a rose garden.
He pulls the sliver out of your palm
And makes a cushion out of rose petals.

He gives fire to His Abraham,
But He transforms the fire of Nimrod [\[100\]](#)
Into the roses of August.

He is the One who gives light to the stars.
He is the One who helps the needy.
He does favors for His creatures,
Then He gives praise to them.

He drops the guilt of the guilty,
Like autumn leaves,
And suggests words of apology
To the ear of the one
Who says bad things about Him.

He says, "O loyal man,
Ask for forgiveness for your guilt."
When the man starts praying,
He secretly says, "Amen."

Because He knows the Amen

Of the one to whom
He gives the pleasure of praying,
After prayers, He turns that person
Inside out like a fig, sweet and beautiful.

He gives power to hands and feet
In good work and bad,
In such pleasure that the body assumes
The strains of Rustem.[\[101\]](#)

With enjoyment, the lean man becomes Rustem.
Without it, Rustem falls into pain and suffering.
If this pleasure is not
The companion of the Soul,
The Soul won't have peace and- quietness.

I sent the Soul to Tebriz in early dawn
To praise Shemseddin.
He knows the way to go.

42.

Verse 575

The spring of the Lovers has come
To make the earth a garden and meadow.
A voice is heard from the sky
For the bird of Soul to fly.

The sea is filled with pearls.
At the same time, bitter water
Becomes a river of Kevser.[\[102\]](#)
Stone turns to ruby in the mine.
At the same time, the body becomes Soul.

The Soul's eyes of Lovers
Rain a flood like clouds,
But their hearts shine
Like lightning in God's clouds.

Do you know why the eyes of Lovers
Turned into clouds with Love?
Because that moon was hidden in the clouds.

What a happy, joyful moment it is

When those clouds cry.
My God, what an auspicious moment it is
When those lightnings laugh.

There is not even one drop
That comes to earth
Out of those hundreds of thousands of drops.
If one did,
It would destroy the whole world.

The whole world would be ruined by Love.
So many would board Noah's ark,
So many turn to be confident
And not worry about the flood.

If the flood calms down, the sky won't turn.
That wave can't fit any dimension.
Because the six dimensions keep moving.

O the One who is bound with six dimensions,
Be oppressed by sorrow or not.
At the same time, those seeds
Will shove up from the ground,
Grow and become date palms.

There will be a day
When that root raises its head above the ground
And becomes a new branch.
Even if a few of the branches become dry,
The rest of them will bud and grow.

Those dried branches burn and become fire.
This fire is good for the people, like Soul.
If this is not the case,
Then the opposite is:
One either becomes green or becomes fire.

Something is closing my mouth.
I am at the edge of the roof,
At the same time, I am drunk.
The thing which admires you
Is also admired by Him.

Verse 587

The sun went to sleep. Time is gone.
It's night now.
The sun has descended into the well.
The sun of the Lover's Soul
Has gone to God's privacy.

A Turk among Indians
Is like a day in the night.
Don't make noise at night
Because that Turk has gone to his tent now.

If you get a smell from this brightness,
You set your sleep on fire, burn it.
Even Venus becomes a friend of the moon
By walking and serving at night.

We're running away at night.
The Indians are pursuing us,
Because we've stolen gold,
And the doorkeeper has gotten the news.

We've learned how to walk in the night,
How to get rid of hundreds of doorkeepers.
Our cheeks blaze and glitter like candles
And make kings out of our pawns.

What glory to that face
That rubs His face.
What greatness to that Heart
That is turned into the abode
Of all Heart's desire.

Who hasn't sighed on the way to Heart?
It's good for the one
Who has plunged into the waters of this sigh.

If he sinks into the sea,
The sea carries him to its head,
Like Joseph who fell in the well
And then reached glory.

It is said that man comes from earth
And eventually returns there.
Why would the one who is the earth of this door

Become earth?
Is it possible?

Crops are all alike until harvest.
But at the threshing,
Half becomes grain, the other straw.

44.

Verse 597

It's too late, too late.
The sun has gone down the well.
But O good fortune, Beauty,
It's time for the moon to rise again.

Cupbearer, walk toward the glass.
Doorkeeper, climb to the roof.
O restless, uneasy Soul,
Go. That Sultan wants privacy.

The tears which enlightened the eyes,
The patience which burned my harvest to ashes,
Even the mind
To whom you teach the rules of the game,
They've all left.
They disappeared in the middle of the night.

O men whose bright eyes enlightened the night
With their glory!
The night that resembles an Indian [\[103\]](#)
Has escaped screaming,
Yelling, "That Turk is coming into the tent!"

With good moves,
The pawn will be gone, and Vizier will come.
With the help of that auspicious Beauty,
The Vizier is gone, and the Shah has come.

At night, Souls reach their proper places,
And intentions are realized.
The One who understands and appreciates this
Will acquire a Soul as bright as day.

O day, are you the Last Day of Judgment?

O night, are you the Night of Kadir?[\[104\]](#)
Or the tree in which God manifested to Moses?

The moon threshes the stars at night.
O day, go 'away.
The Milky Way is filled with straw,
Because that galaxy entered the sign of Virgo,
Its face covered with straw.

Don't be heedless at the well of the flesh.
Grab the bucket of sky.
Joseph got out of the well
Because he held that bucket,
Freed himself from the well,
Reached glory.

Look for purification in the dark night,
Like Muhammad.
That Sultan ascended in one night
And became a unique, peerless One.

The whole universe becomes silent
Because of the night.
Start searching and carrying on wholeheartedly.
The peace at the land of privacy
Is disturbed because of noises.

O Shems of Tebriz,
You don't need the cover of night.
You've slipped out of it.
You don't belong to the East and West.
Now the words have ceased.

45.

Verse 609

It's late night now.
The sun has descended into the well.
The sun of the Souls of Lovers
Has gone to God's privacy.

A Turk among the Indians
Is like a day in the night.
Be quiet at night,

Because that Turk has already gone to his tent.

If you get the smell of this daylight,
You bum the night.
Venus became the peer of the moon
By walking and serving at night.

We're running away at night.
The Indians are after us,
Because we've stolen gold.
The watchman knows that.

We've learned to walk at night.
We got rid of, burned, hundreds of watchmen.
Our cheeks shine like the moon
Because our pawns became Shahs.

The bazaar of the earth is all gone.
Watch the bazaar of the stars.
Dawn is becoming like a bazaar,
Full of stars and priceless pearls.

How long will I be suffering
From this body's horse?
It keeps asking constantly for straw and barley.
Yet in the sky, the galaxy of the Milky Way
Is full of straw for him.

The saddle horse doesn't have
A share of this glory.
That peerless Soul is the One
Who has a share of that Kingdom.

You've seen the body,
Now look at the Soul.
You've seen the jewel,
Now look at the mine.
Look at the peerless, strange fate that,
Once it gets into Him,
Loses its way.

Meaning constantly says,
"Don't dress me in these old clothes."
Words are really old shirts,
Such old shirts that everyone makes fun of them.

I say, "O meaning, come.
Get in a form like the Soul
So that old shirts and clothes
Become silk with Soul's light."

Quit washing clothes
So that the fairies won't hear.[\[105\]](#)
Never mind the fairies.
That Soul is tired.
Even from the angels who are close to God,
He wants privacy.

46.

Verse 621

Since I have seen Your glory,
The world has fallen into disesteem in my eyes.
And given up the surmise of existence.

Lightning has flashed from the place
That has no beginning of the beginning.
The whole universe has burned to ashes.
When the glory of union opened the flag,
All I's and we's fell to pieces.

We're separated from the motherland;
That's why we're tired and in trials.
How can one be confident
When he's away from his country?

The Cupbearer grabbed a glass
Instead of the Koran.
A spark dropped on our shirt
From that hot glass.
We are burning.

47.

Verse 625

A vain man came to the garden of Soul
To eat melon.

Have you ever seen a donkey
Eat goat meat in this world?

The wise and brave eat the early melon
Grown at the garden of Soul,
Not the oxen or donkeys.

Food for the one who lives in the West
Comes from Spain.
The one who lives in the East
Is nourished with food from Hurmuz.[\[106\]](#)

The one who serves the Kaiser
Gets food from the Kaiser.
If he is the servant of Urbuz,[\[107\]](#)
He is fed by Urbuz's kitchen.

The one who steals and bullies
Is eventually handled by law officers
And subject to the torture of Oguz.[\[108\]](#)

The one called Turk is such
That the village is sure to pay taxes
Because they're afraid of him.
Not so for the one
Who is hit and slapped by everyone
Because of his greed.

The smart person doesn't worry
About not having beaver fur in springtime.
He doesn't bother with furs then.

The one who has excess bile
Doesn't like sweet pomegranates
Because of his bad character.
He likes bitter ones.
That's good for him.

Be silent! The one who has
The appetite of an ox
And eats the beans and grapes of ten people
Is unable to drink the Soul's wine.

Verse 634

Four Love flows like the Fountain of Life
In the canal of Soul.
Even the Fountain of Life
Runs with Your Love in the canal,
Searching for You.

The world is full of the melodies of birds
Which are praising You.
The bird of my Heart flies away
Once birds are mentioned.

I give my Soul with pleasure
When I hear these melodies.
Why shouldn't the Soul smile
While leaving the flesh,
Remembering the Beloved?

Every bird of Soul makes circles.
Each one of them has his own cage.
Each one is like me,
Going toward the temple of Solomon.

There is every moment a spiritual ecstasy
From the Soul of the Ones
Who go to the Throne of God drunk,
Without existence.

What is Soul?
The jar of great Sultans.
There is wine of sky inside.
Because of that,
The words are going, scattered like Lovers.

There is another pleasure
In my eating, my living.
There is another pleasure In my talking.
The rest of them go like that.

In the meantime,
We've been playing with You at this place.
O most Beautiful, what a nice place!
But this is not a square for those
Whose horse is limping;
They all leave this place.

The moon has put itself like a ball
In front of Your club.
The sun is playing with its Soul,
Rolling like a ball.

The moon and sun are always running,
But they haven't found the way to Your temple.
They're just covered by Your halo.
They walk out of the tent.

If the brilliance outside is like that,
O my God,
How could the One who reaches Your glory
Be sober?
He shines and shines, O my God.

49.

Verse 645

Don't think of profit and self-interest.
Those are the signs of poverty.
Clean people make contributions.
They get into God's habit.

With Love, in the end,
There will be no greed and no generosity.
Some hidden return is expected
In every generosity.

Generosity is like taking a journey.
Greed is like standing still.
But if you've boarded Noah's Ark,
Journeys and stations are not important.

All those forms and names
Which have piled up in hundreds of layers
Will lose their quality and quantity
At the sea of glory which covers every where,
The sea where everything turns to Him
And becomes Him.

O poor shepherd, Love is the staff of Moses
In this world of existence.

In real existence, in front of Him,
His manifestations and appearances
Are nothing but forms created by a magician.

Escape from drowning
In front of the whirlpool of flesh.
Existence and joy all come
From that world which gives light
To this six dimensional world.

Shake yourself off like a tree.
Shake off green leaves as well as dry ones.
Once the colors of goodness and badness
Disappear,
Union and Oneness appear.

Go on your way.
Don't ask what or why,
Because He is beyond quality and quantity.
You are a gazelle.
What are you doing with lions?

Be silent. Words are the sign of separation.
When a brave man is chewing bread,
How can he ask for more bread?

50.

Verse 654

Why has the Sufi sobered?
Why has the Cupbearer stopped serving?
If one drunkenness goes to sleep,
Another drunkenness is awakened.

When the sun goes down,
The world is illuminated by You.
When Your beautiful eyes become languid,
Earth squeezes its eyes.

If the first drink dries up,
There are hundreds of new ones.
Since Your hair became a chain,

We've become crazy.

O beautifully-voiced singer,
Watch the first and last drinking.
Now no one listens to the other's spell,
Because everyone has learned the secret.

My Sultan, we are Moses.
You are sometimes a staff, sometimes a dragon.
O beautiful ones, your prices come down
Because it is the time
When Bulgars[\[109\]](#) come looting.

Your ruby lips have sucked the sugar cane.
Your eyes are ruined with envy.
The Soul has cleaned and prepared
The house of the Heart.
Come back to yourself.
It is time for Union.

You give excuses all the time,
Avoiding and running away from me.
O Soul, why are you ignoring me?
Isn't it enough yet?

O stone-hearted Beauty,
No excuses tonight.
You are the moon, we are a star.
Tonight the moon will meet the star.

O the moon cannot fit into the dawn.
Tonight we are Your guest.
Once the night covers the world with curtains,
It's time for people to walk alone.

I have suffered from your pain and troubles.
You thought I was dead.
No, you are pure and clean.
I am sediment.
Nowadays drinks are not pure and clean.
They are drinking sediment.

With Your Union-like mornings,
With Your separation that burns the worlds,
With Your Love that teaches deceit,
So many naive ones have become deceitful.

I didn't have a fever.
I didn't have a heartache.
Yet I knocked my head on the wall until morning.
I became ill because of the desire
For rose marmalade.

51.

Verse 666

We don't do anything
But serve our Cupbearer.
The Cupbearer offers more cups
So that I will be saved from good and bad.

God created everyone for one job.
He created us for the art of joblessness.

Every day we keep playing
In front of this light, like particles
Every night we turn like stars
Around the Beloved
Whose face is like the moon.

If You expected work from us,
You wouldn't offer this wine.
The one who drinks this wine
Doesn't bend his head down to earth.

What kind of job can a drunk do?
A drunk does whatever the wine wants.
God's wine would destroy both worlds
Until man reaches God,
Who doesn't need anything.

You'll wake up from the drunkenness of this world
After a good night's sleep.
But the drunkenness from God's wine
Will last until the grave.

O neighbors, free wine comes from Grace.
Those Cupbearers
Are kind, protective and sweet to the child,
Like nannies.

Heart, get drunk beyond the limit.
Wherever you go, go drunk.
Makes others drunk, too,
So that He will offer you one more cup.

Wherever you see a Beauty,
Sit in front of her like a mirror.
As for the ugly, cover the mirror with carpet.

Play with the Beautifuls around town.
Say secretly, "I make an oath to this town."[\[110\]](#)
What holy, happy town is that?

My head is dizzy from this wine.
I've become drunk.
It's time to be quiet, engulfed in silence.
It's impossible to count
All the favors and kindnesses
That I have received.

52.

Verse 677

When the Lover breathes,
Flames spread through the universe.
One breath shatters this illusionary world
Into particles.

The world becomes an ocean
From beginning to end,
And the ocean disappears in its majesty.
If this were made manifest for even a second
To the people,
There would be no humanity left.

Smoke rises to the sky, so thick
That no human, no angel can exist there.
Suddenly a fire comes out of this smoke
And covers the whole sky.

The sky splits at that moment.
Time, space and existence all disappear.
An uproar fills the world,

A wedding joy descends after the mourning.

Sometimes He puts fire into water.
Sometimes water extinguishes the fire.
Sometimes He blows a wind
To send the waves of the sea of Absence
To the eighth level of the Atlas sky.

Even the sun loses its light
Because of the brilliance of a human's Soul.
Don't ask anything from the people
When even the confident talk little of the secret.

In front of this secret,
Mars loses its masculinity;
Jupiter burns its book;
The moon's greatness disappears,
Its joy turned into grief.

Mercury becomes stuck in mud;
Saturn burns with fire;
Venus loses its posture
And starts striking tunes of joy.

There will be neither rain nor rainbow,
Neither wine nor glass,
No drink, no cheer, no salve for the wound.

Water doesn't form designs;
Wind doesn't cover the ground;
The garden doesn't become beautiful;
And April's rain doesn't kiss the earth.

Neither illness nor remedy stays,
Neither friend nor enemy.
There is neither reed flute nor melody;
Neither a high-pitched tune
Nor a low one is played.
Causes stay behind.
The Cupbearer gives wine to himself.
Soul says, "God is great."
Heart says, "God knows better."

Get up. Look.
The painter of eternity has started to work again,
To design unmatched figures

On the clothes of the creatures He desires.

God started a fire to burn all untrue things.
Fire burns the Heart
And takes him to the middle of that universe.

God is sun. Heart is dawn's sky,
Such a dawn that every ray of light
Reflects on Edhemogul [\[111\]](#)
And Jesus, son of Mary.

53.

Verse 692

Once the fire of the Heart blazes,
It burns the faithful as well as the unfaithful.
Once the bird of essence flies,
All of existence disappears.

The world is demolished.
The Soul plunges into flood.
The same water which melts pearl into water
Creates pearl again.

Hidden secrets become obvious.
The forms of earth are broken down.
Suddenly a gigantic wave
Comes and rises to the emerald sky.

At times it becomes paper and pen.
At times, he passes out.
The Soul becomes an enemy to good and bad
And keeps wounding them every moment.

The Soul who reaches God
Enters the privacy of the Sultan.
If it was a snake, then it became a fish,
Escaped from the ground and plunged into the sea
To merge with the River of Kevser. [\[112\]](#)

While in space,
He reaches the world of Absence.
He appears in that universe.
Wherever he is dropped afterwards,

He smells musk and turns it into ambergris.

He is in poverty in Absence,
But He is a guide to the stars.
He becomes dust at the door of Hakan,[\[113\]](#)
Then knocks at the door of Sencer.[\[114\]](#)

A voice comes to the Heart from flame,
Flame that burns the sun:
"Leave this light alone
So the light of your Soul
Will be awakened and illuminate the universe."

You serve the Beloved.
Why are you hiding yourself?
O gold, after being hammered
By that goldsmith's hand,
Say, "This is better. It is better this way."

The Heart which is drunk
From the wine of eternity
Passes himself through the telling of this gazel.
If he held his breath and remained silent,
He would do even better.

54.

Verse 702

Drunkenness is sending its greetings,
Giving information secretly to You.
The one whose Heart You grabbed
Makes his Soul a slave to You.

O One who turns existence
Into non-existence,
Receive the greeting of the drunk.
He is so drunk
That he keeps catching his hands and feet
In Your trap.

O sky of Lovers,
The one who becomes Soul to the Soul of Lovers,
Your beauty offers wine among the Lovers,
Saying cheers to your Love.

Your Love made you pray
For the goodness of Lovers.

O the One who is the taste of every lip,
The Kible[\[115\]](#) of every creed,
Moon is turning around Your house every night,
Guarding You.

O Heart, what kind of drunk are You?
How nice are You?
You turned into a Sultan.
You are the Sultan.
With all this greatness,
How does Love subjugate you to Himself?

The One who pulls his Heart out of this earth,
Whose fortune goes to the star of Saturn,
O flesh made from dirt,
O smoke which comes from the fire of Heart,
See what shape He puts you in
If you stay on the ground or fly to the sky.

Take the glass from the hand
Of the Sultan's Cupbearer.
Be drunk like the One who has reached eternity.
If you are half drunk,
You haven't been completed yet.
You are deficient.
He wants to make you totally drunk.

O unique, peerless person,
Your greeting comes like lightning from Your lips.
This greeting cannot be contained
By the lips of the mouth.
The One who attains Your greeting
Gives You the whole favor.

The moon has been split in two with your grief.
Faces have turned silverish.
They look very pale and straight.
A stature like *elif*[\[116\]](#) has become *cim*. [\[117\]](#)
That *cim* shapes you like a cam.[\[118\]](#)

Hear all those yells and screams
That are caused by Love.
Look at all the tears.

Watch all the things that the jar does,
How it cooks the rawness and matures you.

Look at the wine.
Its color and bouquet are so beautiful.
With His generous hands,
Look how nicely He gives You to the Soul,
But denies the body.

I should be Soul instead of body.
I should be the source instead of the pearl.
O Heart, don't be afraid of having a bad name.
He is giving you a good name.

Enough! Quit talking back and forth.
Don't say any more poems or prose,
Because this deceitful Beauty
Has started talking with you.

55.

Verse 715

Drunkenness is sending its greeting to you.
Is sending news to you secretly.
The one whose Heart You grabbed
Makes his Soul a slave to You.

O the One who makes existence non-existent,
Hear the greeting of the drunk.
He is so drunk
That he keeps catching his hands and feet
In Your trap.

O sky of Lovers,
Your beauty, which is Soul to Lover's Soul,
Offers wine and cheers to Your Love,
And asks you to pray
For the goodness of Lovers.

O the One who is the taste of every lip,
The Kible[\[119\]](#) of every creed,
The moon is turning around Your house
Every night, guarding *You*.

O the One who makes a body out of earth
And changes smoke into the stars of Saturn!
What a shape it makes
Out of your earthen body, your smoky Soul!

Sometimes He gives you wings and you fly.
Other times, He gives you iron
And you anchor like a ship.
One moment, He makes you morning.
Another, He makes you evening.

One moment He makes you tremble.
Another moment, He makes you laugh.
One moment He makes you drunk
The next, He turns you into a wine glass.

You are like Muhre[120] in His hand.
Sometimes you are wine.
Sometimes you are drunk because of Him.
But once He breaks this Muhre,
I swear by God, He makes you wholly mature.

Sometimes this, sometimes that,
But your end is to realize the truth.
Putting you through this color or that one
Is maturing you, subjugating you.

You were like Noah once
And went through lots of trouble.
You endured.
Now He makes you sail like a ship
Without feet, without steps.

Be silent. Sit with astonishment.
Be astonished by astonishing.
You are a man with wise words,
But words sometimes get out of condition.

56.

Verse 726

Again, another sour-faced someone dropped in.
He's like cold winter.
O sugar-like, sweet Cupbearer,

Pour a glass of wine on his head.

Either give him wine or get rid of him,
Because it's not proper to have a devil
Among the rose faces, O son.

Give him the wine of the Prophet
So the donkey won't be a donkey anymore.
With the wine of Jesus,
He would grow two wings and fly to the sky.

Don't let any sober ones
Enter: the assembly of the Heart's drunk.
As you know,
Drunks can do something good or evil
While they are drunk.

O doorkeeper, sit at the door.
Don't let anyone in
Except the Lover whose mouth smells his lungs,
His Heart full of fire.

Other than this kind of Lover,
If you ask for a hand, he gives you a foot.
If you ask for a foot, he gives you a head.
If you want to borrow a spade,
He gives you an axe.

When I'm covered with blood,
Neither my mind nor my modesty stays with me.
I become a crazy, insane Lover.
I'm not safe or sane.
I'm like a shield in front of the sword.

I'm looking for a singer
To become the living Fountain of Life
And sing sometimes until early dawn,
Throwing sleep to the fire.

If you find that one vessel of my body
Is sober while I am at His door,
If he is not drunk at the square of God,
If he is unable to hunt the lion,
Consider him a dog on this way.

One group of people is ruined, drunk, nice.

The other is the slave of five and six.[\[121\]](#)
One is different than the other.

I've drunk beyond the limit.
I've gone beyond the boundary.
Tie my hands. Close my mouth.
It's necessary to protect the drunk.

Relieve our suffering.
Hear our cry.
Pass us beyond ourselves, just like You.
Watch us in that shape.

57.

Verse 738

☪ most Beautiful, whose chin is so sweet,
Give us the golden wine
So that our Heart will become enlightened
And our eyes more shiny.

Out of obstinacy to the sober,
Give this big glass.
The body becomes Soul;
Night turns into dawn.

When You make sleep go away, offer God's wine.
It's not Your Grace
To close two doors at the same time.

O one who drinks the wine of benevolence,
Don't blame me for anything,
Because the one who thanks will be saved,
Not the one who denies favor.

O the one who stays at the tavern,
Drunk and ruined,
Even then, O one born bad and no good,
Why are you blaming us?

58.

Verse 743

Really, we opened your eyes.
Try to see the hidden things.
Really, we stand among you
And watch the good news come
From the One who came to help you.

O morning breeze, O One
Who brings good news,
Take my Heart for the good news.
I have a Soul in my hand.
I will gladly sacrifice it for You.

If the swords become armour,
The ruins become rose gardens.
The day becomes shinier
If we have attained Your look.

O grief which doesn't have teeth to bite,
O kindness which smiles
Hundreds of hundreds of times,
Since the Soul has reached victory,
Now the Soul smiles.
The universe smiles.

O greatest of the great,
Whoever has seen You in that greatness
And still talks about skill
Should be ashamed in front of God.

That lion of the forest
Hasn't left one vessel in our existence.
We have only half our mind left,
And that is only to rave about the difference
Between day and night,
To talk about separation.

Praise the beauty of the Sultan.
The moon is ashamed after seeing Him.
The blind one opened his eyes and said,
"Wonderful,"
Over and over again.
Even the deaf heard His favors.

I am like a cloud for Him.

He is my moon.
He is my day. I am His night.
He is my Soul. I am like His body.
I admire His beauty, anyway.

How will my Soul be filled
With the Love of my Sultan?
Why won't I need that medicine, that remedy?
I have an oxen's appetite in my Soul.

Even my joy and pleasure are gone.
My mind is clouded with insomnia.
I swear to God,
My Soul hasn't given Him up,
Hasn't denied His favor.

O from prayer without a hearer,
Guilt without a forgiver,
Disease without a proper doctor or remedy,
My face is so pale, like gold,
Without that silver-statured beauty.

When will it be time
For me to give thanks to God
Because I have obtained my pearl?
When that time comes,
I will lay down with joy under that tree.

When I see my Beloved,
When I look for relief from my grief,
I will tell my story of separation
And then show the blood of my lungs.

O pearl of existence and eternity,
You are concealed like God.
Your face has been hidden.
The Beauty whom everyone serves,
The One who is Master of everyone
Is Shemseddin,
Whose town is Tebriz.
He is known and famous there.

Spring is here.
The time of joy and cheer is here;
Winter has gone.
With the grace of God,
Who pardons all mistakes and sins,
We have passed the dangerous season.

God is revealed to you, saying,
"We forgive your sins.
Don't worry about the things you've lost.
Be content, for contentment is the best virtue."

There are many who say secretly
That we are the only ones who know His favor.
Never mind this.
We know His secret.
Don't pay much attention
To things already seen and heard.

O young man, the secret is in you.
Don't ask for it from a stranger,
From the one who comes and goes.
There is no use in something
Which has already been explored.

Look at all the humiliated people.
Most of them have seen
The light of the right way.
Once the moon is split,
Their curtain won't be raised again.

O our God, O God who has compassion, favor,
If You don't pity us, who will?
To lead us the right or wrong way
Is all under Your power.
The rest is illusion and deception.

O desire, where is purification, realization?
How long will you struggle with the rhyme?
We have clean dispositions;
We eliminate grief and anxiety.

If my words are scattered,
My Love, the One who protects and watches me,
Has grown, spread.

Love is a long, very long time for us,
And the great Sultan is among us.

This is such a secret
That it's hard to talk about.
It is such a sword
That it gleams too much.
The sun cannot be hidden in the early morning
Unless a sorcerer puts a spell on it.

O magician who closes our eyes,
You've already put us under Your spell.
Comfort us now,
Or accept the place where we choose to live.
That is the place of insomnia.

O people of Moses,
We are also lost in the desert.
How did you find the way out?
Tell us. Don't hide this from us.

It didn't matter
If water took away our food and belongings.
Food rained on us from the sky.[\[122\]](#)
God put us in an orderly way.
Now it is a pleasure to travel
Or to make a stop on the journey.

Love cheated us after it made us happy.
You repair the damage with Your kindness.
The Prophet said, "Produce no harm."[\[123\]](#)

We will consider what we'll do about you.
They said, "We'll open your ears.
We'll put a pillar where you stand.
You are the light of humanity."

Here is the ladder to reach You.
Here are the steps
Of that ladder to reach eternity.
Give the blessings of that destiny.
Entertain us at that stage.

Real life is your life.
Real death is yours.
This world is yours.

The next world is yours.
This is the reward given to the one
Who gives thanks to God.

Be silent my brother. Don't say too much,
Unless you have nothing else to do.
There is no place to hide
Where the wind of Love blows.

60.

Verse 774

Accept only the Lover,
The One who makes man fall in Love,
The drunk and intelligent Lover,
Into the assembly.
That drunk is such that
He cannot differentiate his belt from his hat.

Talk brings fights and war all the time.
Because of talk, men like Rafizi [\[124\]](#)
Argue with Omer, [\[125\]](#)
And Omer argues with Ali. [\[126\]](#)

Be silent! Cut talks short.
Watch the One whose face
Is more beautiful than the moon.
He is such a moon
That if He appears to the moon,
The moon will be split in two
Because of His light.

O moon-faced Master, cover Your face.
O Soul of Lover, exalt.
Give Your ecstasy to us
And watch us when we are out of ourselves.

61.

Verse 778

Go, open the eye of the Soul

And look at the Lovers.
They're like the Heart.
It's an upside-down gathering,
An assembly that has no head, no feet.

They all keep working
Without earning, without profit.
They are all boiling like a kettle.
They are all without curtain and drapes.
Their Hearts are like a shield
In front of His commands.
Whatever comes, they accept.

Their Hearts are more cheerful
Than the garden and rose,
More free than the cypress.
They are above mind and thought,
Cleaner than the Fountain of Life.

They have passed
Through the waves of the blood's sea
Without getting smeared
With one drop of blood.
They are pure and clean.

They are in thorns, but like a rose.
They are in jail, but like wine.
They are in mud, but like Heart.
They are in night, but like dawn.

They are in air like particles.
The sun is like a robe of honor for them.
They step in mud,
But appear in the middle of the Heart.

You also become company, even for an instant,
To their Soul.
You drink their wine from their cup.
You become nice and drunk
And pass beyond good and bad
With their wine.

Enough now, son. Be silent.
Not every bird can swallow figs.
Parrots eat sugar.
For ravens, it's something else.

62.

Verse 786

Why did God bring us into this world?
To make an uproar.
His chain makes the crazy ones more insane.

How can we be saved from this Love?
Even the sky is on a big bow string.
It's stretched like Lovers, upside down.

It is amazingly beautiful, amazingly charming,
This Love which gives joy to our Soul.
Yes, every night, come in as a drunk
Without knowing yourself.
Come in through the door.

O Love, you took my patience, my decision.
You drank my blood.
Because of Your trials day and night,
I've been hidden like the dawn.
Neither my day nor night is apparent.

How can I hide from the Soul?
Even if I become very subtle and Soul-like,
He would see me in the land of Absence,
Even if I roll over in that land.

O One who becomes a treasure chest
In our absence!
O One who opens the door
To existence from Absence!
Aren't you the One who created us?
Aren't you the One
Who brought us from Absence?

Existence is good for You.
It's for Your drunk.
The ear of Absence is in Your hand.
Both are Your slaves, Your creatures.
Both accept Your command,
Put it at the top of their heads.

Demolish the house. Make the smart crazy.
Pour that wine into the glass, then offer it
So that both will be saved
From losses and dangers.

O agile, dependable Love,
A drunk is greeting You.
Accept his greeting.
Don't be stone-hearted.

Since You broke his hand,
Since You took his sleep,
Come and end his hangover.
Stop at the village of the drunks.

63.

Verse 796

The stars and that lovely sky
Both become drunk after seeing Your face,
Which is more beautiful than the moon.
O sweet Charmer, Your face is beautiful.
Your eyes, your brows are beautiful.
That different charm of Yours
Is beyond beauty.

The sky doesn't have a Soul of Leyla[\[127\]](#) like You,
Nor a beautiful Mecnun like me.
In fact, the world has never seen
This kind of Leyla and Mecnun.

The smart person will know
And will be a charmer
Who has Moses' Heart like You
And a beautiful Harun[\[128\]](#) like me.
But there won't be any resemblance to them
In this dark, muddy land.

O the pivot of seven mills,
You are a gold mine,
At the same time, a rare and precious thing.
O Jesus of the present time,
Come and cast Your spell on us

So we can come to life.

Since I am a whole, unpierced pearl,
Never mind raw, never mind mature
I am asleep in Your shadow,
Under the spell of Your opium.

Is it no wonder that particles
Dance to Your melodies?
Right here, the Mount Sinai of Moses
Has also passed out of itself.
So has that beautiful writing.
Keep playing.

O Heart, in order to please Your Heart,
You gather gold, show Your talent.
But have You seen any Harun
After he gathered the gold
Who hasn't gone to the ground?

That money, that wealth
Looks beautiful at first,
But has no way to real beauty.
It looks like poison inside of the antidote,
Like the poison of a mountain snake.

It looks like a grave of infidels
Who are full of troubles
And covered with wounds inside,
Yet all dressed up on the outside
In black satin garments.

Your ears and looks are
Like cim,[\[129\]](#) your eyes like *sad*,
Your statute life *elif*
And Your eyebrows like *nun*.

Yes, because of all these letters of the alphabet,
I have become a student of reading and writing
On board Soul.
In that beautiful sea, I've become a boat
And turned into a sailor.

The arch of the sky's roof,
Which has the catapult of greatness,
Doesn't resemble me.

O Beauty who is balanced in every way,
Since I've fallen in Your love,
How can I be balanced?

O One who is the foundation
Of hundreds of states of drunkenness,
Yesterday You took the lead.
You asked me, "My indescribable beauty,
Are you happy in this world of wonder?"

The justice of Your face
Has cut the neck of every injustice.
The bad thing is
That he became drunk on his own blood
While you were gone
And found what he deserved.

O Shems of Tebriz,
You are such a great man
That there is no limit to Your greatness.
You are great
On hundreds of levels above greatness.
My Soul is such a fish
That there is a Jonah like You
Inside his belly.

64.

Verse 811

☞ If you are in a deep, Heart-felt Love,
Suffer through the Beloved's grief and torture.
If you are not, go and pull thorns for nothing.

A Soul which looks like pure, clear pearl
Is necessary in order to find the way
To the Beloved.
Get that Soul out of Your body.
Put it on the gallows.

Sometimes he plunges in darkness.
Sometimes he wanders,
Becomes sick of that Soul
And covers him with words of disgust.

Don't look at yourself. Look at me.
Look and see: No trace of Soul is left on me.
Be as drunk as the nightingale.
Put all your belongings in the rose garden.

This violent, unruly horse of luck
Is not submissive to your Soul.
You are the fast cavalry of this temple.
Tame this horse. Control him.

You are a peerless horseman.
How long will you be a slave to the donkey?
The donkey tells you to carry a donkey's load.
Doesn't that shame you?

You are living under guilt like an Israelite.
You might as well put a sober, yellow fur
On your turban.

Or, in order to open your eyes,
Take some earth from the steps
On which Muhammad stood.
Put that on your eyes like salve.

65.

Verse 819

Isn't it a strange thing?
We're in autumn,
But the sun has entered the sign of Aries.
My blood started to boil
In the river of body,
Danced like a camel
And made the body dance.

Watch the dances of the blood's waves.
See the valley full of Mecnun.[\[130\]](#)
Watch this unseen drinking,
Totally saved from the sword of death.

Even carcasses come to life.
The old get younger.
Even copper changes into pure smelted gold.
Better and more beautiful is coming,

Instead of the one who left our town.

This is a city full of abundance and drinks.
Every drunk has a glass in his hand.
Some offer more drink;
Others offer health, happiness.
This is a river of milk;
The other is honey.

There is only one Sultan in every town;
This one is full of Sultans.
There is only one moon in the sky;
This sky is full of Moons and Saturns.

Go. Go tell the doctors,
"You don't have any business there,
Because nobody gets ill there.
There is no sickness there."

This town has no judge,
No deputies, no rulers, no accounting.
Conflicts, animosities and fights
Can't walk on top of the sea.

66.

Verse 826

☪ Heart, You are such a kind, gracious Heart
That my beautiful One
Will find peace in the beauty of Your face.
O the One who is nice enough
To ask how my Heart is!
That kindness towards my Beautiful
Gives peace to my Heart.

We are alive because of Your kindness.
O Charmer to whom both worlds are submitted!
O the One who becomes Soul
To the name of Heart
With the life His name gives,
Make him alive!

The 'Heart becomes a circle around the body.
It embraces my body,

Wears the same mantle as my Soul.
In the end, both have been submerged in You,
O Beautiful, who does favors for the Heart.

O body of the One holding Heart's feet,
Here there is no mention of Heart's name,
No place for Soul.
On days after the Heart is brighter with You,
Nights are happier.

O the One who Loves me,
The One whom I Love!
Throw everything in the fire but Love.
You are like a dot in the body's *cim*[\[131\]](#)
And resemble the clearness in the glass of Heart.

The sound of drums keeps coming
From the temple of universal intelligence.
The sky's army is coming.
At this moment, it is announced that
"The Order of Heart is arriving."

The roads and plains are full of blood
From the swords of this army.
Having killed the enemy of that Sultan,
The road is drinking the blood of the Heart.

The head of the body's devil is crushed
By the attacks to the enemy line.
Sermons are delivered in the name of the Sultan.
The Council of State is filled
With the Order of the Heart.

O beautiful One,
Your words are as sweet as sugar.
Even Your ear-pulling is beautiful.
It's an award to hear from You,
Even if You look down on me.

If I didn't hide Your secrets,
I could tell so many things.
Then all people, top and bottom,
Would know the state of my Heart.

Verse 836

Friends, spring has come.
We should go to the cypresses.
There we will wake up the fortune
Who keeps sleeping face down,
Like the fortune of the cypress.

We'll go to that strange land
By walking while our feet are tied,
Like the bride of grasses
Who runs without feet.
What a trick!

The name of the Soul
Who is freed from the land
Is going, flowing.
We'll pick up the Soul whose knees are tied
And take Him there.

O leaf, certainly you found the power
To split a branch and get out of the dungeon.
Tell us, tell us,
So we can do the same
And be freed from this jail.

O cypress, you came from the ground
And reached such a height.
What a spectacle the great One has shown you.
We want to know and see the same.

O bud, you came with the color
Of the rose beyond yourself.
How did you do that?
Tell us, so we can do the same.

Where is this white color?
From which direction
Is that smell of ambergris coming?
Where is the door to that house?
We will become the slave of the doorkeeper.

O nightingale, they come for your help.
I'll give everything for your song.
You are cheerful because of the rose.

I am cheerful because of you.
How can I thank you for that favor?

O cypress of the garden,
Turn into Hizir[\[132\]](#) who tells hidden secrets.
Tell them so I can put them up to my ears
Like earrings made of pearl and coral.

O nightingale, listen to the secret
From the rose garden.
Hear the truth without sound or alphabet.
If you understand this story,
You tune your voice and sing along.

The cooing of the dove has reached the Moon.
Parrots have gotten the sugar.
The Beauty is singing new songs;
We will make our Soul drunk with the melodies.

68.

Verse 847

☞ Cupbearer of the One
Whose Heart is so bright,
Offer the glass of Your kindness,
Because that's why You brought us
From the valley of Absence.

Give the glass to the Soul,
That he would give up thoughts
And tear that curtain,
Because thoughts are harmful to the Soul.
Thoughts shorten life every moment.

O Heart, don't talk about Him.
Be silent. You wouldn't know His manners.
You look like a Moon,
But you don't have His mole on your cheek.[\[133\]](#)

That mole is the beauty
Of the man of knowledge and the wise.
But where are the eyes to see that
And the knowledge to understand?
Where is the rose garden that perfumes

And the nose to smell it?

The wine which in the end becomes a vineyard
Won't relieve the bitterness of the face.
Don't look for this wine.
Look for the other.
Where is the glass of grief?
Where is the glass of Cem?[\[134\]](#)

O Cupbearer whose face is so beautiful,
Offer us a wine that grows the flower of wisdom,
Nourished by the sea of Soul,
That comes and turns the inside of man
Into a bowl of pearls.

Pour on the head of the disbelievers
That big cup of wine.
Put that coldness in the fire.
Their no will turn into yes.

If there is no one in the assembly,
My words become greater.
Either turn into glory
Or stay away from us.
Don't reproach us.

You stick to the eyes like sores.
Turn the page, hodja.
Otherwise, I will break the pen.

The One who says, "Hey, hey,"
His Hey, hey comes from somewhere.
There must be some reason.
They don't raise the flag for nothing.
There must be either a king or an army there.

The Yurt[\[135\]](#) refuses to be empty.
Shake this body out of myself.
Free myself from this body.
The Soul that got stuck in the mud was drunk.
My feet are slipping.
I am afraid.

O Shems of Tebriz, O beautiful Helper,
Take care of us.

O the One who is the power of our feet
When we are walking
Is also health to our Soul
When we are sick.

69.

Verse 859

☞ Lovers, O Lovers,
I'll turn dirt into jewels.
O players, O players,
I'll fill your tambourines with gold.[\[136\]](#)

O, thirsty ones, O thirsty ones,
I will become the Cupbearer today,
Turn this barren land to Heaven,
Make it flow with the River of Kevser.[\[137\]](#)

O lonely ones, O lonely ones,
The time for salvation has come,
The time for salvation has come.
I will make every sufferer a Sultan, a Sencer.[\[138\]](#)

O unbelievers, O unbelievers,
I will open your locks,
Because I am absolute ruler.
I will make believers
Of whomever I please
And disbelievers of whomever I please.

O great man, O great man,
You are like a candle in Our hands.
If you are a dagger, I'll make you a glass.
If you are a glass, I'll turn you into a dagger.

You were a drop of sperm,
You became blood, then turned into a Beauty.
O human, come close to Me,
So I can make you more beautiful.

I'll turn sorrow into joy,
Make leaders out of the crazy ones.
I'll change the wolf to Joseph, poison to sugar.

O glasses, O glasses, I opened My mouth,
Told My secret to make every thirsty mouth
Resemble the lip of the wine cup.

O rose garden, O rose garden,
When you make sweet basil
Equal to lilies,
Come to My rose garden, pick roses.

O sky, O sky,
When I make ambergris out of earth
And change thorns to flowers
Which smell like musk,
You'll be more astonished than the narcissus.

O Universal Intellect, O Universal Intellect,
Whatever You say, You are right.
You are the judge, You are the ruler.
I'll do better making less gossip.

70.

Verse 870

☞ Lovers, O Lovers,
I have lost the glass.
I have drunk the wine
Which cannot be contained by glasses.

I am drunk with the wine of Min Ledun. [\[139\]](#)
Go, complain to the judge about me.
I brought a taste of this wine
For you and the judge.

O Sultan of Truth,
Have You seen any double-faced ones like me?
I am alive with the live ones,
Dead with the dead ones.

With charmers, I will open up
Like a rose garden and smile.
With winter-like, cold disbelievers,
I become winter and turn to frozen ice.

O the one who wants bread, look at me.
God is my witness. I am drunk.
I don't know anything,
But neither have I turned around the jar,
Nor squeezed the residue of the grape.

I am drunk. Because of Him I sink,
But I sink in His river.
I have become rose marmalade
Because of His rose, because of His sugar.

Some day, Your face will be reflected
On my pale face.
I will shine like the Beauty of the land of Rum
And turn into a moon.
I won't be dark anymore.

I grabbed the cup of wine.
I shed the blood of thoughts.
I became one with the Beloved,
But you don't see me. I am behind the curtain.

I've hung thoughts,
Because thoughts keep man awake.
I'm tired of them. I'm confused because of them.

Time is my time.
The universe admires me.
My excursion into the land of Absence
Brought orders from the Khan of Truth.

There is another Soul in my body,
Another mind in my Soul,
A different touch in my Beauty.
I followed His trace. I reached Him.

If you tell me, "there is not much time left,
You have to go," I'll tell you,
"Tell this to the one who is alive:
I have given my life to my God.
I have been dead, long gone."

Be silent! The nightingale asked the falcon,
"Why do you keep silent? Why don't you sing?"
The falcon answered,
"You'll see me when the Sultan is hunting.

I'm better than a hundred soldiers."

71.

Verse 883

☞ the One who is with me like my Heart,
But is hidden at the same time, Greetings to You.
You are the Kaaba[140] of my prayers.
Wherever I go, I turn toward You.
I want to reach You.

Wherever You are, You exist everywhere.
You look at us from a distance.
If I mention Your name,
The house is illuminated, even at night.

Sometimes like a tamed falcon,
I flutter my wings over Your hand.
Sometimes I come to a landing on Your roof
Like a pigeon.

If You are absent,
Why do You keep hurting my Heart?
If You are present,
Why do I set a trap in my Heart for You?

Your body is away from me,
But there is a window open
From my Heart to Yours.
From this window, like the moon,
I keep sending news secretly to You.

The sun, who is far away from us,
Is still sending its light.
O the Soul of everyone away from You,
I make my Soul a slave and servant to You.

I've been shining
The mirror of my Heart with You,
Making my ears like a book
To contain all the wonderful words
You've kindly said to me.

You're the one in the ears, mind and Heart.
What are all these things?
You are me. That's the way I praise You,
Explain You totally as a whole.

O Heart, in this adventure,
Didn't that Charmer say,
"If you are missing something,
I will complete it?"

O One who is the remedy for all trouble,
Look at, admire and see what kind of form
I'll put you in at this moment.

At times, I'll make you straight like *elif*.[\[141\]](#)
Other times, I'll bend and twist you
Like other letters of the alphabet.
One moment you become ripe, mature;
Another, I make you raw.

If you go for hundreds of years,
You are still in my hand, like a burnisher.
I'm the one who gives you joy
And the pleasure of things
Which are submitted by you.

O Sultan Husameddin Hasan,[\[142\]](#)
Tell the Beloved,
"I am turning the Soul
Into a sheath of knowledge for Your sword."[\[143\]](#)

72.

Verse 899

This time I really got involved with Love
And separated completely from devoutness.

I tore down my Heart.
I'm alive with something else.
I burned the mind from the bottom up,
Did the same with the Heart and thoughts.

O people, O people,
Don't expect me to act

Like an ordinary human anymore.
I fell in such reflection
That not even the insane
Could think my thoughts.

The insane have seen my craziness
And run away from me with foaming mouths.
I joined with death
And flew to the land of Nothingness.

My mind is totally annoyed with me today.
He tried to scare me,
As though I'd never seen him before.

Why should I be afraid of him?
I've dressed a different form for him.
How can I be a treasure?
I've been hidden in the corner.

I care neither for the bowl of stars
Nor the table of fortune.
For the poor, I lick so many plates
And fall in so much disgrace.

Because of the donkey's jealousy and evil eye,
I've been engulfed by blood
In the dungeon of flesh,
Dragging my bloody shirt on the ground.

I entered this world's jail for only one affair.
Otherwise, where am I?
Where is the jail?
Whose goods did I steal?

I am nourished by blood
Like an embryo inside the mother's womb.
Man is born once.
How many times have I been born?

Look at me carefully as long as you want.
Still you won't recognize me,
Because you haven't seen enough of me.
I have hundreds of attributes.

Get in my eyes.
Look at me through my eyes.

I have chosen a different mansion
Beyond the eyes.

You're drunk with wine.
I'm drunk without it.
You're a Lover with a smile.
But I keep smiling without mouth or lips.

I am such a funny bird
That when I was hungry,
I flew from the meadow into a cage.
There was no hunter, no trap.

With friends, a cage is better
Than the garden and meadow.
For the honor of Joseph,
I stayed at the bottom of the well.
I made my home there.

Don't cry because of the suffering He gives.
Don't complain because you're sick.
I've bought these troubles
By giving hundreds of sweet lives.

The silkworm keeps busy knitting silk.
Listen to me. I'm also a silkworm.
I keep knitting trouble,
Winding the silk of trouble.

I've been decaying in the grave of flesh.
Go to my Archangel,
Who will blow the last trumpet for me.
I will be resurrected.
I've gone to pieces
By sleeping in this grave of flesh.

No, you should close your eyes by yourself
Like an experienced falcon.
Don't say you dress in heavy garments
Like a peacock.

Kneel down in front of the doctor
And ask for an antidote,
Because in this mighty trap,
I've drunk so much poison, so much poison.

You'll be sweetened in front of the person
Who sells sweetmeats.
Your Soul will be light and sweet.
I haven't heard anything but, "Come on,"
From the Soul's sweetmeat. [\[144\]](#)

He makes you sweetmeat itself,
Which is better than giving it to you.
I haven't found any place
To get the taste or to hear of the sweetmeats
Except from His lips.

Be silent. While talking,
You may drop the sweetmeat from your mouth.
Like *me*, everyone else
Can get the smell without words.

Every unripened grape is yelling,
"O Shems of Tebriz, come help *me*.
I'm crying from tastelessness and immaturity."

73.

Verse 923

An image came to my eyes, saying,
"I've come from the rose garden of my Beloved
And the quarters of the Tavernkeeper.
Look at my sleepy eyes.

"I am the essence of drunkenness
And the wish and desire of existence.
I am the top. I am the bottom.
I've come like a whirling sky.

"From the beginning of creation,
I came to merge and get along with the Soul.
I went back, returned again,
Like a compass making constant turns
Around one point."

I said to him,
"Welcome. I hope you've come to help me."
He answered,
"That's the reason I've come here."

"I am the Moon. You are my light," he said.
"You are the rose garden and water.
I've come from a long distance,
I've come without shoes and without a turban.

"Though you are still immature, son,
You have a good name.
Don't be sad.
I've brought lots of favors for you.

"Come in with a smile.
Change this suffering.
O most Beautiful suffering!
Be cheerful.
I've come like thorns,
But I will give you roses."

The rose said, "Patience is the key to suffering,"
And He appeared on the rosebud,
And every branch moved, saying,
"Because I endured,
Now I come as scattering pearls."

74.

Verse 931

☞ Universal intellect,
Don't keep creating figures.
O Universal Soul, break your pen.
O searching man, don't look for footprints
On the surface of water.

O pure-hearted Lover,
Walk like pure, clear running water,
Because this still, waveless water
Adds Soul to Souls every moment.

Don't blame the still water
For getting ripples because of the wind.
Don't blame the water in the creek.
It has no fear, no worry.

See the design in emptiness,
The shape in shapelessness.
There are hundreds of colors
And smells in every shape.
Look at the food in fasting.
There is a garden of Eden
In every tree branch.

That form which destroys all forms
Is the source of Soul and Heart.
The body is melting because of its shame.
The Soul has escaped to the harem.

Because of His wine and His wind,
Many of His free creatures
Hold their breath like a mine and keep silent,
Filling their bellies.

Are you talking
About either the sea or the pearls?
Or about "Better judgment and fate
Will always prevail?"
You cannot solve anything with words.
Go, ride your horse under the flag.

Be aware, this is a funny, bizarre back road.
On this road, position and fame
Are at the bottom of the well.
When you arrive on the rough sea of blood,
Look for the dining table of kindness Inside of the blood.

There is water in the fire.
Fire is hidden in the water.
The Soul is full of joy inside of His fire.
Soul falls in sorrow when it plunges in His water.

O One who gives all the blessings,
Keep our feet on dissent.
All comforts are discomforts without You.
All healths are illness without You.

O sky, I learned this whirling
From the One whose face is like the moon.
I am a particle to His sun.
I learned this trembling, this dancing from Him.

O Beloved whose veil is the moon,
The river of Soul flows in His canal.
I learned how to run face down from that river.

The rose garden kept asking me
How I stole this musk gazelle.
I am such a lion that I learned to steal musk
From His gazelle.

I learned to tightrope walk so beautifully
Like a pumpkin vine
From this garden, this dried, twisted date palm,
From the curly hair
That has fallen on His forehead.

I closed my eyes and my mouth
To the world's pictures and designs.
I learned how to paint without smell or color.

His kindness, generosity and creativity
Opened my eyes.
I learned dying instant by instant
From the One who gives favor and compassion.

In sleep, you walk without direction.
Don't go six directions when you're awake.
Don't talk about direction.
I've found a side beyond directions.

76.

Verse 948

*R*eally, we opened your door.
Don't separate your friends from yourself.
Don't send them away.
Don't worry about the one
Who separates Him from you.
Don't dirty your clothes. Stay clean.

Thanks to God, with the strength
Of the religion in which I believe
He did us a favor
And gave us the power to praise Him.
Don't close your door, then.

O friends, don't be sad.
I gave you wealth. I made you rich.
Don't deceive, don't cheat anyone.
I gave you strength and power,
Made your Heart brave.
Don't be afraid.
Don't love your name, your fame.

My God, open our Hearts.
Increase our dignity.
Show us our full Moon.
Don't worship self-made gods.

I don't have any God but Him.
Every creature has received His help,
His goodness.
His kindness kept His promise.
You don't deprive
The one who comes after you, either.

The words smell Heart,
And Heart appears from the words.
Say something which will be worth accepting.
Don't let the people around you down.

77.

Verse 954

☪ one who walked and has gone
As clean as the glass of Cem![\[145\]](#)
O one who is accused
Of the Love of the Moon-faced One!
This death will bring up your purity.
Don't worry that much.

O my dear, my Soul and your Soul
Are in the sea of blood.
Keep searching.

Let's see who's going to find the pearl.
Whoever finds it will come forward.

How could I possibly close my eyes
And lose hope, in the sea of pearl,
That every moment good news is coming
From the coast of the sea of Soul?

I became lazy after I fell in Love.
I gave up superiority,
Gave up being at the top of that leisure.
Because with the Love of the Sultan,
Top becomes bottom,
And bottom is considered top.

The sky of Heart has drunk wine from His table
And become pale.
When this Love saw me,
He recognized me and said,
"This is one who is from Us, separated from Me."

Look at my face, which goes from color to color
With the Love of the Sultan
Who doesn't change color.
Sometimes it looks like saffron
Because of His grief,
Sometimes red because of shyness.

I have slipped out of existence.
I am totally annihilated.
I've become the interpreter of God,
While sober or drunk.
Nobody can hear anything anymore,
Nothing less than His words.

I went to the bazaar in Egypt.
I entered the presence of a great person there.
I saw someone whose face resembles Joseph.
Then, by mistake, I asked his price.

The saint of Egypt said to me,
"You are in Love. I will give Him to you."
This must be either
An extraordinary favor from Him
Or His generosity and kindness.

I didn't appreciate that then.
I thought it was just a caprice.
I am so sorry now for my heedlessness.
I miss Him so much.

O the Beloved with His mighty power
Makes the impossible possible in two worlds.
I swear to God, there is no one
Who could ever realize things as you do.

O Tebriz, you get this honor.
"Way back in the time of Elest,"[\[146\]](#)
Before my praise to Shems,
The pen wrote this, and the inks have dried.

78.

Verse 966

Spring is here, friends.
Let's stay in the garden
And be guests to the strangers of the green.

We'll fly from one flower to the other,
Like bees making the six comers
Of this earth's hives prosperous.

An envoy came from this fortress
And said, "Don't beat the drum secretly.
With our yells, we would tear down the place
Where that Love's drum is beating."

Hear that voice which comes from the sky,
"Rise, all insane ones.
I sacrifice my Soul to the insane.
Let's scatter our Soul today."

Let's break all the chains.
Every one of us is a blacksmith.
Let's go to the fireplace where the pincers are.

Let's fan the flame of the Heart's fire
Like the furnace of blacksmiths
So we can have iron Hearts
Under our control with this breath.

We'll put fire in this universe,
Incite riots in the sky,
Make his sober, resisting mind
Turn around, become dizzy like ours.

We are like a ball, without hands and feet,
Sometimes at the end
And sometimes at the beginning of the square.
Who told you we could do what we want?
Who told you we are independent?

No, no. We are like a club
In the hand of the Sultan.
We send hundreds of thousands of balls
To His feet.

Let's be silent. Silence is made
With some material like craziness.
His mind is such a fire
That we hide this fire by wrapping it in cotton.

79.

Verse 976

☞ came again like a new Bairam.[\[147\]](#)
I came to break the door of the dungeon
And the teeth of fate,
Which are abusing and exploiting humans.

I came to put fire on the waters
Of the seven dry stars,
Which suck the blood of the people on earth.
I came to calm and extinguish their wind.

I flew like a falcon from the palace of the Sultan
Who has no beginning of the beginning.
I came to tear to pieces
The great eagle owl
Who eats the parrot in its ruined place.

I promised to give my Soul to the Sultan
Right at the beginning.

If I change my promise,
The back of Soul will be broken.

Today I am like Asaf.[\[148\]](#)
The sword of order is in my hand.
I will cut the head of the rebels
In front of the Sultan.

If you see green for a few days
At the garden and field of those rebels,
Don't worry.
I will pull those plants up from their roots.

I won't harm anyone
Except the unjust, cruel tyrant.
I would be an unbeliever
If I touched the good Ones.

Wherever there is a ball,
The club of union rolls it.
With that club, I will break the ball
Which doesn't come to the field by the club.

I sat at His assembly.
I saw His favor, how He grabs His work.
I became His paid servant
In order to break the legs of the devil.

I was a small particle and became a mine
In the hand of the Sultan.
Make this very clear:
I got so heavy
That if, you had put me on a scale,
The scale would have been broken.

How can you take home
Someone who is so drunk
That he falls on the ground as I do?
Don't you know
That I will break this, tear that?

If the watchman asks what I'm doing,
I pour the wine glass over his head.
If the doorkeeper tries to pull my hand, I break his.

I will stop and pull the sky out by the roots

If it doesn't turn around Heart.
I'll break the neck of fate
If it becomes despicable.

You set the table of kindness
And invite me as Your guest;
So when I break a piece of bread,
Why do You pull my ear?

No, no, I am at Your table.
I am Your honored guest.
I will serve a glass or two of wine
To the guest so that he will overcome his shyness.

O the One who makes me say poems,
I'm afraid I will be rebelling against Your orders
If I close my mouth and keep silent.

I will walk without fear
And break the pole of Saturn
If I receive wine from Shems of Tebriz
And become drunk.

80.

Verse 993

☪ the One who becomes
The Moon and bright light to me,
Since I've seen Your face,
I'm full of joy wherever I stay.
It's a rose garden wherever I go.

Everywhere is a garden
If the reflection of the Sultan is there.
I set a table to drink
Wherever I arrive.

That Charmer whose face
Is more beautiful than the moon,
Rise from the land of Absence.
Put Your head through my window.
Come inside even if all the doors
In this six-door convent are locked.

He comes and says, "Hey, greetings.
I brought you hundreds
Of different kinds of appetizers.
I brought you hundreds of different kinds of wine.
I am the Sultan of Sultans.
I play melodies from Isfahan.[\[149\]](#)

"I am a bright sun.
I tear the curtains in such a nice way.
I am spring. I've come to remove the thorns.

"The One who wants the pleasure
Of drinking, joy and music day and night
Should know
That I am the taste of sugar, the oil of almonds."

"Please repeat that," I respond.
"Start giving favors and kindness again.
Tell me again why You're not sad.
I'm a little slow to understand.
I'm a little hard-of-hearing."

"That hard-of-hearing ear," He says,
"Is better than the others.
Your ears are one hundred times
Better than others,
Because there's air in others.
I am in your ear."

Go, go. You are stately, the Soul of life,
Pleasure and drink,
The angel at the gate of heaven.
You are heaven because You hold onto my shirt.

You are the mountain.
You are the phoenix, the strong rope.
You are the water and the giver of water.
You are my garden, my cypress, my jasmine.

Skies put their heads down in front of You.
Angels scatter their wings.
Heart tells You,
"I am wax for You; for others, iron."

Verse 1004

Yesterday, that Beloved
Put a golden crown on my head.
It doesn't matter how much You hit me.
The drunkenness of that wine
Doesn't leave my head.

The Sultan who sews the hat of eternity
Wears it at night.
He took it off His head
And put it on mine.
How can I say it will be eternal?

If I don't have a hat or a head,
The moon will turn out to be my head.
The pearl shines better
If it doesn't have a shell for a cover.

Here's my head. Here's a big hammer.
If you want to try, hit it.
If that head could be broken, rest assured
That I would be sweeter than the mind and Soul.

The walnut which chooses its shell
Usually stays empty.
How could it taste my Prophet's marzipan?

His marzipan is made
With walnuts, almonds and sugar.
It makes my mouth sweet
And, at the same time,
Gives light to my eyes.

Son, if you find what's inside,
You won't even look at the shell.
Wherever Jesus stands,
You don't look for the donkey.

How long will you talk about the Kullah?[\[150\]](#)
It's not a big deal
If one donkey is missing
Out of a bunch of donkeys.
Watch my big horseman;
Never mind the lean horse.

Power, strength and health come to the Lover
From the Beloved's strength,
Because the greatness of the Lover
Is from the greatness of my greater God.

O One who has fallen
Into all kinds of grief,
Don't say, "Ah, ah."
Say, "Allah."
O Joseph who is from the Soul,
Don't talk about the well.
Talk about glory and presence.

82.

Verse 1014

☉ Love, you crack me into pieces like an idol.
I'll take you to the judge.
Nobody asked me to be a witness.
I am a witness, completely unindebted.

You are the One who is judged.
You are the judge.
You are the past.
You are the future.
You are the One who gets into a rage.
You are the One who is contented.
You appear different with every moment.

O my beautiful great Love,
You are me. I am You.
You are the torrent.
You are the heap of grain for threshing.
You are joy, suffering and grief,
All at the same time.

These are from You. Those are from You.
You are pure from this and from that.
You are these plains. That mountain is You.
You are the valley of kindness.

You are the sweetness and drunkenness
Of close ones.

You are the sea full of pearls
And the mine full of gold and money.

You are the love of talking
And the passion of silence.
Comprehension is You. You are also ecstasy.
The right way, justice and reproach are all You.

O the One who became Sultan
To the Sultan of Sultans!
O mind, O the One
Who put His throne at the land of Soul!
O the One who offers hundreds of signs,
Still His face, His trace are unseen!
O the sea, the store of Absence!

For You, all the beauties and ugly ones
Are like a picture in front of Your brush.
If You desire it, You draw a beautiful picture.
If You want to draw ugliness,
Then You tear and throw them
To sickness and death.

If the pictures knew
They all came from the same pen,
They would get along fine with each other.

Your zeal says, "Go away,"
To the ones coming toward you
To give their Soul.
Your kindness invites them by saying,
"Yes, come here."

But Your kindness exceeds
And attracts the Lover more and more.
Like light is superior to darkness,
Your favor is much greater than Your grief.

He hooked everyone with one desire, one fancy
And kept pulling them behind Him
From place to place.
You are the One.
The flag in Your hand pulls the army of all fancies.

At first, you give desire for ownership, for power.
Then you give another fancy

And grab greatness from the one
To whom You have given it
And make him a slave to the other.

Every moment, a desire
Comes from the land of Soul to the body
Without the knowledge of the One
Who divides destiny and says, like a child,
"This is mine. This castle is mine."

I'll be silent. I'll close my mouth
So that this world won't become
Mixed up and confused.
You cannot be explained with words.
What can I say, more or less?

84.[\[151\]](#)

Verse 1029

This world has no patience, no consistency.
How long should I decide to stay in this mud?
My Beloved doesn't even need my Love.

I am not the black topsoil
Just so the wind can blow me to dust.
I am not the roof of the sky
Just so I can wear a gray mantle.

Since He is my store, my bazaar,
Why should I rent a store?
I am the Sultan of Soul.
Why should I watch and serve like a servant?

I will tear the store down.
My store is His Love.
I have found the mine of ruby.
How can I be a shopkeeper?

I don't have a cut on my head.
Why should I wear a bandage?
I am the doctor of the world.
Tell me, why should I look sick?

I am the nightingale of the garden of Heart.

It would be a shame to become an owl.
I am a rose sapling in His rose garden.
It would be bad for me to be a thorn.

I should stay away from troubled ones,
Since I am close to the Sultan.
I should be disgusted with my self,
Because I have reached His Love.

If I look for a job to do,
He ties my hands with chains.
If I intend to stay sober,
He drowns me in a jar of wine.

O hodja, I am a glass of wine.
How could I bring sorrow to the Heart?
I am the candle light.
How could I darken the house?

Come one night. Be my guest.
I'll put the full moon in front of you.
Give your Heart to me.
I'll do all the favors and take your Heart.

If you lose your life in Love,
I'll become your life, your Love.
This will be enough for you.
If the thief steals your turban,
I'll become a turban for you.

Don't give your Heart to others.
You can't find a pearl like me.
Come in slowly. Don't worry.
I'll worry for you.
I'll be responsible for you.

I've overcome laziness and boredom.
I've cleared my Soul of fear.
Death won't come unless it's at the given time,
Yet I command death. He listens to my orders.

My thanks to His pleasures.
My patience to His disasters.
O Cupbearer, get up.
Give me wine so that I will be drunk.

The wine is the wine I boiled. I made it.
Joy and pleasure are the ones
I have brought as good news.
My grape is ripe.
Why should I crush unripe grapes?

O the experienced player
Plays his tune until dawn.
As long as my head is like that, healthy,
Why should I be turned into a carcass?

You are a night bird tonight
Or in the arms of a beauty.
Stay awake like a fairy.
Stay awake and watch me dance.
I'll tell you all about everything.

I swear to God, our foundation is enforced.
Our evidence becomes obvious.
Thanks to God, I am a lion, not a hyena.

Joy and pleasures have come.
Sorrows are all gone.
Thanks to God, Who gives favors and kindness,
O customer, kneel down so I can buy you.

I've been playing the tambourine since dawn.
I have had a wedding.
I will throw the veil in the fire,
How long should I stay covered?

I've withdrawn myself
Like dawn from the sky,
Which is covered by a veil.
I will be the omnipotent of the universe.
I will repair all broken Hearts.

The homeless have the house.
The poor have the wealth.
Be silent! If you are silent,
I will talk for you.

If I have the same disposition
As Shems of Tebriz,
If we have the same star,
I will shine in six dimensions.

I will be enlightened in six dimensions.

85.

Verse 1052

٧ tried very hard to become
The mirror of virtue and goodness,
But as much as I tried,
You made me a tavern, a town of wine.

I became a private tavern for special ones
In order to be a doctor and cure diseases
And mend all the broken bones.
I became a sea for divers.
I became a whole sun.

You made forms of angels in this world of mud
Just so they would be charmers.
You exalted them.
You threw me away
In order to make me the elixir of closeness.

You set a flame for the way of Harut, [\[152\]](#)
Taught magic to lots of people.
As for me, You made me a candle
To enlighten the darkness.

The Turk always acts like a Turk,
The Tacik [\[153\]](#) like a Tacik.
I become a Turk one moment
And a Tacik another.

Sometimes I become the crown of the Sultan,
Sometimes the tricks of the devil.
One moment I become the smartest of minds,
Other times, a child
Who plays the game of tipcat.

In order to become the rose color of Your face,
The fineness of Your hair,
I shed the blood of duality,
Merge and unify with only Joseph.

Verse 1059

I will never kick out the drunk
 Who has fallen down at my door.
 If I have wine in my house,
 I'll put it in front of him.
 I'll sit and drink with him.

My drunk guest is my Soul, my crown, my Sultan.
 I put him on top of my head.
 He is that holy to me.

O my friend, my confidant, make me drunk.
 I don't count the day that I am not quite drunk
 As part of my life.

Since I sacrifice my life like gold
 To the Cupbearer,
 I don't look at anyone's face
 But the Cupbearer's.
 I don't listen to anyone but the Cupbearer.

How much more shall I try myself,
 This smart, this wise Soul?
 The day I am drunk,
 I am like a ship sailing around.
 The day I am sober, I stand still with an anchor.

Where is the wine for the body?
 Where is the wine for the Soul?
 Where is the sky? Where is the rope? [\[154\]](#)

There is a drunk who vomits.
 There is a drunk who brings distance near,
 Who passes over all the roads of earth.
 One is despicable on earth;
 The other, highly esteemed in Heaven.

O Caravan Master, if You are drunk,
 If Your Heart is bright,
 Don't sleep tonight.
 Be silent. Be silent.
 O One who is all kindness,
 Drink from this wine.

87.

Verse 1067

ⲓull yourself together. Come to your senses.
Don't look so confused.
The One from Mecca knows I am from Batha.[\[155\]](#)

The color of my face is turning to saffron
Because of that Heart-catching,
Tulip-faced Beauty.
Every moment my business is growing
Because of that Beauty, adding joy to my joy.

My Heart resembles the snow,
Melting every moment,
Wanting to be there all the time,
Because I am from there.

People are happier
Where there is a more orderly life.
Come and look at me.
I've become crazy from the calls
Coming from Soul.

That snow says, "I am melting
Every moment to become a torrent,
A cascade running to the sea.
I am from the sea. I am the sea."

I stay alone, stand still,
Freeze and become lifeless.
I have been chewed
Between the teeth of trouble.

Untie your knots, like water,
So that you'll be saved
From the torture of those teeth.
I will be tightly knotted.
Naturally, I'll be chewed up, crushed, beaten.

Come to your senses.
Leave the snow's water alone.
Look at the real wines. They are boiling up:

"We are sharp and could cause lots of trouble."

I talk too much.
You know I know only that much.
I'm like a reed flute without a head or feet
In the hands of the flute player.

I become more exuberant every moment,
Foam and froth.
I am flying like a mind without wings,
Because I am from the heights.

If you are tired of me,
Look at the Sultan of time.
See Him so He can give you wisdom.
That Beauty of a halvemaker makes you sweet.

O Beauty, the One who is existence
To the ones who deny existence!
O the cure for the ill ones!
O the One who says, "I am from Kafdagi,[\[156\]](#)
I belong to the phoenix and make the Soul fly!"

Enough. I'll be silent, stop staying all this.
But He won't stop.
He keeps saying all these words.
In fact, I'm like a parrot.
His Love is sugar.
I start talking because of His sugar.

88.

Verse 1080

☞ my Beloved, O my Beloved!
O the One who doesn't know mercy!
O my Charmer, the One who took my Heart!
O my confidant, the One who relieves my grief!

O the One who becomes a moon
For us on earth!
O the One who becomes dawn
In the middle of the night!
O the One who becomes a shield for us In the moment of danger!
O my cloud which rains sugar for me!

How beautifully You flow in my Soul.
How beautifully You cure my illnesses.
O my religion, O my faith,
O my sea full of pearls!

O the torch for night passengers!
O the chain for crazy Lovers!
O the Kible[\[157\]](#) for everyone!
O my Caravan Master!

You are a brigand and, at the same time, a guide,
A Moon and, at the same time, Jupiter.
You are on this side
And, at the same time, on the other one,
The corner where I stand,
The place on which I rely.

You came like the prophet Joseph,
Looking for a customer.
You've come to burn my Egypt, my bazaar.

You are the Moses of my Mount Sinai,
The Jesus who cures all my illnesses.
You are the halo of my light.
You are my Ahmed-i Muhtar.[\[158\]](#)

You are company for me in the dungeon,
Sometimes my smiling prosperity.
I swear to God
That You are hundreds of times more than that.
O my Beloved, who deserves more praise
Than my many, many praises!

You tell me, "Jump over to this side."
"How can I come to Your temple?" I ask.
You answer, "O my deceitful one, O my creature,
Don't try to find excuses."

I say, "You are an unmeasurable treasure
Who deserves Sultans."
"Yes," He answers, "but it is not free.
I want Soul, special Soul."
I say, "I agree, take the weight from me."

If you want treasure, put up your head.

If you want Love, give your Soul.
Come in rank. Don't return,
O my Hayder-i Kerrar. [\[159\]](#)

89.

Verse 1091

☞ gardener, autumn has come,
Autumn has come.
See the sign of sorrow of the Heart
On the leaves and branches.

O gardener, listen carefully.
Hear the cry of the trees.
There are hundreds of Souls
Wailing silently everywhere, hundreds of Souls.

Eyes won't tear without a cause.
Lips won't become dry without a reason.
Nobody's face becomes pale like saffron
Without suffering like saffron.

In short, the raven of grief
Has landed in the garden, asking,
"Where, where is the rose garden?"

Where is the iris? Where is the August rose?
Where is the tulip, the cypress?
Where is the jasmine?
Where are the beauties
Who dress the green of the grasses and meadows?

Where is the taste of the fruit?
Where is all the free honey and milk?
All the Hearts and lungs are dry,
Longing for milk.

Where are the nightingale's sweet melodies?
Where is the coo of the dove?
Where are the arrogantly beautiful peacocks?
Where are the parrots? Where?

After eating a grain, just like Adam,
It seems they've left the house of heaven.

Their crowns have been blown off their heads
With this test.
Their dresses have fallen
Because of it.

The rose garden has fallen into deprivation,
Just like Adam.
It cries and at the same time waits, saying,
"Don't abandon hope of the One
Who has all kindness and favors.
Don't give up."

All the trees draw a line.
They are all mourning, dressed in black.
They don't have even one leaf.
They have nothing left.
They are crying, yelling because of this test.

O stork, O head of the village,
Please answer my question.
Where did you go, underground
Or over the sky? Over the sky?

"O villainous raven," they say,
"That water will flow again to the rose garden.
The world will be filled
With color and smell again,
Just like heaven. Just like heaven."

O raven, who talks only nonsense,
Wait for only three months.
You'll see the festive days of earth.
Festive days will come again in spite of you.

With the sound of our Israfil,[\[160\]](#)
Our oil lamp will shine,
We will come back to life from death.
We will find new life
From that merciful Soul
That resembles the sun.

How long will this denial, this doubt last?
You are a mine of beauty.
You have taste, charm.
Ascend to the sky like the pupil of the eye,
Without stairs.

Fly to the sky like sight, without stairs.

Monster autumn is dying.
You kick its grave.
Guard, guard right now.
A kingdom is burning.

O morning, light up the world.
Expel the Indians. Warm up time.
Cast spells. Cast spells.

O sun who does all good,
Come to the sign of Aries.
Don't leave any ice or mud.
Spread ambergris, ambergris.

Fill the rose garden with laughter.
Bring life to the dead.
Light up the day of judgement.
Do it now, clearly. Do it now.

Seeds are freed from their jail.
We're also freed from inside our houses.
The garden has brought hundreds of gifts
From the land of Absence, hundreds of them.

The rose garden is filled with hundreds of roses.
Gossip stops.
Time starts giving birth.
Time becomes the father and helps to give birth.

The stork lands
On that great big house like the sky,
Saying, "Leylek."[\[161\]](#)
O the One whose help is asked, is begged,
It's Your property, Your property.

The nightingale is playing its lute,
The dove is saying, "coo-coo,"
And the other birds come
As players of young destiny.

I am so loaded with this tumult
That I can hardly talk. I'll stop.
In fact, it's impossible to explain
All the thoughts in my Heart With words.

Be silent. Listen.
New news is coming
From the garden, from the birds.
An arrow has come flying
From the land of Absence.

90.

Verse 1116

☪ Lovers, O Lovers, it's time
To leave this world.
I hear the sounds of the exit drums
With the ear of my Soul.

Here, right now, the Caravan Master is up,
Sets the string of camels and asks his fee.
Why have you slept all this time,
O people of the caravan?

The sounds which come from the front and back
Are the sounds of departure,
Sounds of the bells
Hanging on the necks of camels.
Every moment, Soul and breath
Appear in the land of Absence.

A bunch of amazing people
Came from the light of upside-down oil lamps
And from behind the deep blue curtains
To reveal the secret things.

You fall in deep sleep
Watching the wheel of the sky.
Cry for this life which has passed so quickly.
Wake up from that deep sleep.

Everywhere there are torches and candles,
Lots of noise and lots of action,
Because tonight the world has become pregnant.
The eternal world will be born.

You were earth and became Heart.
You were ignorant, but you learned much.

The One who pulls you here
Now pulls and drags you over there.

Don't make a face at Him.
His fire is like water.
His pulling, His other unpleasant things
Are very good.

His job is to sit on Hearts.
His fun is to break the repentant.
Even the hearts of particles are trembling
From His innumerable deceptions.

O this sarcastic smile
That jumps out of the slit of the mouth,
O the boasting that says,
"I am the head of the village,"
How long will you be jumping around?
Give up. Bend your neck, your head.
Otherwise, they will pull and bend you like a bow.

You kept sowing the seed of deceit,
Lamenting and denying God.
Now let's see you, O charlatan.

O donkey, better eat hay.
You deserve a black pot.
O the shame of your house, your family,
It would be better if you pass under ground.

I have another person in me.
These angers come from him.
If water burns, it's because
It's boiled from the fire.

There's no stone in my hand.
I don't fight or argue with anyone.
I'm as pleasant as the rose garden.

My anger is because of him, from that world.
The one who is angry isn't me.
He is the one who jumps
From one side to the other.
I sit at the threshold, moving nowhere.

The one who sits at the threshold
Is mute, but talks.
You give this hint. It's enough.
Be silent. Don't say anything else.

91.

Verse 1132

Who is He? Who is He?
He is the One who makes Lovers crazy, insane.
The earth becomes more beautiful than the sky,
With His light.

He is the One
Who guides the Soul away from himself,
The jewel of treasures,
The cypress of the garden,
The Archangel Gabriel himself.

He is the drunkenness
Of the Soul and universe,
The Beloved of the eyes and mouth.
He is the looter of profit and stores,
Abstinence from sins and religion.

The moon and sun are ashamed
After seeing Him.
He is a stone Heart who spreads pearls,
Such a tyrant, that even iron mountains
Are fragmented by fear of Him.

The sun has become richer because of Him.
Hundreds of moons are eating
Like the flying vulture star [\[162\]](#) at His harvest.

Come, O Soul of eternity,
Come, O beautiful face,
Come, O sun of dawn,
Come, O One who is understanding and light.

Come and shine on the faces.
Water the field of Hearts.
Take off your shoes and sit at the head of Souls.

O knowledge, go away.
O ear, hear the good news. O mind, get drunk.
O eyes, watch the kingdom.

The eyes of Job are opened.
The son of Jacob has returned.
The sun has become a peer to the moon
And sits at the drinking table.

I used to make purses;
I was burning with greed for gold.
I shouldn't appear poor anymore;
I saw treasure at the ambush.

O the One who has the best writer
Of the order of "Reveal," [\[163\]](#)
O the One in front of His mind,
The universal Soul has become
Like a child biting his nails.

The knowledgeable One who sees Him
Increases his knowledge a hundred fold.
He raises his hands above his head
And clapping, says,
"What a wonderful helper!"

Under the shade of His lotus tree
Man became the Archangel Gabriel.
It is not everyone
Who has a plump calf at his guest house.

He has found the way to God's table,
Has understood, become one
With the spiritually chosen Ones.
Black-eyed Houris [\[164\]](#) carry plates full of blessings.

How long will you be reading
The book of the Soul's secret with banal people?
This book is obviously reaching
The hands of the right people anyway.

Who is He? Who is He?
He must be a second Joseph
Or maybe Elijah, Hizir[\[165\]](#) or the Fountain of Life.

This must be a divine garden,
The assembly of God,
The salve of Isfahan,[\[166\]](#)
Or the Glory of God,
Devoid of all deficiencies.

He is the One who adds Soul to Soul.
He is the Heaven of Me'va.[\[167\]](#)
He is our beautiful Cupbearer,
Our wine of Soul.

This resembles sugar cane.
The mouth of the Beloved
Looks like a head in Love.
This resembles that silver statue.
This is joy and pleasure,
Ease and happiness.

We are drunk today.
O my Father, we broke our repentance.
O my Father, we came out of famine.
This day gives the most abundance of the year.

O player who has the voice of David,
Throw all my belongings in the fire.
Hit the high and low notes;
It's time for singing and playing.

I am Your drunk, Your ruined one.
I depend on Your rule.
I am Your sacrifice, Your Isaac.
That is the fate of sacrifice.

We're free from fear, from hope.
Where is Love? Where is modesty and shyness?
It's hell for the one who's ashamed;
This is the time to leave all shame behind.

Look at the red and yellow roses.
See this instigation, this disorder.
Watch the dust under the sea.
All these are from Imran, son of Moses.

He changes every substance into Soul,
Makes the Soul know God,
And turns everyone into Solomons of justice.
This must be holy order, a rule of giants.

Love, where is all Your nonsense talk,
That joy, that drink, that beauty?
No one understands You, not even one man.
They think it's Syriac.[\[168\]](#)

The brilliant sun is coming,
Swaying like a drunk,
Like a Sultan coming with a ball and club.

Whenever there is a ball,
It always rolls with a club.
You also become handless and footless.
This is the time for union.

If you become a ball, without hands and feet,
His club will become a foot for you.
You will go to the temple of God,
Because this is a divine journey.

That water runs into the river.
Now throw your jar on the stone.
Prostrate yourself, don't say anything,
Because this is the assembly of the Sultan.

93.

Verse 1162

Don't go there.
Come here, O my smiling sapling rose,
O one who is the mind of my mind,
The Soul of my Soul.

Look this way. Come to our side.
Exalt in the sugar cane,
O my Fountain of Life.

I want to come to you secretly
After the darkness of night has fallen.

Your face will lighten up the night
For night travelers.

In relation to your Love, who am I?
I'm the cupbearer for your bloody tears.
My eyes are a jar of wine.
My eyelashes are the filter for the wine.

I'm serving You wine from my tears,
My Heart is roasted.
These are the only things I have.

The sea of my eye won't be deprived of that pearl
For even one moment.
Your beautiful ruby will always
Stay in my mine.

Even with all this,
Where is your gratitude?
What happened to your oath?
Give up this oppression and cruelty,
O my Beautiful.

Look! My eyes are tearing.
My face is pale,
Trying to reach your agate-colored lips.

God wrote on your face,
"Renew your faith."
My faith has been increasing
Because of your beautiful face and this writing.

When You're angry,
Your *eyes* tell such words to my eyes;
They belong to *my* secret fire.

He says, "Don't be afraid of that Beauty's anger.
Don't give up out of coyness.
First, drink a cup *of* His wine with sediment
And watch the end *of* this affair.

"There is a thorn for every rose,
There is a snake at the top *of* the treasure.
My Soul will reward you
For your patience and suffering."

After I heard these words, I said,
"Since you want to torture me,
Your suffering is my treasure."
I am like Abu-Hurayra;[\[169\]](#)
Your grief, your troubles
Become my leather bag.

I pick up things from the bag,
Make the beggar a Sultan.
I give gold and silver to the people who ask,
Because the full moon became my guest.

I pull out from the bag
Whatever my Heart desires.
This way, color comes to my face,
And blessings come to my table.

He said, "*You* are right.
Put your mind in your head.
Don't lose the bag.
You've found a good key,
O my trustworthy doorkeeper."

Patience is the key to affliction and troubles.
Patience is the ladder *of* rank and ascension.
Patience is the antidote *of* depression,
O my Arabic-reading Turk!
O my Beauty who knows Arabic!

Quit saying Lahavle.[\[170\]](#)
O son, it's enough,
Because the devil *of* wine
Has become furious.
I quit Lahavle,
And my devil starts saying Lahavle now.

94.

Verse 1180

For some time I've been left on this journey
With the sound of 'start the journey.'
For some time I've heard the sound of go,
But I've lost the location of my tent.

When will you save me
From the voice that says things like,
"Go, get on the road,"
So that I can reach You, Your glory,
My Beauty whose face is like the moon,
The place of my harvest? [\[171\]](#)

O my Beloved! The One
Who is the light of the sun!
I've been happy with Your Love
On the journey through mountain and valley,
Plain and river, day and night.

But how is my road to be opened?
Where is that face? Where is that Sultan?
Tell me about that.
Tell me, tell me that.
I've been burned
By my desire for that Sultan.

How long will I be asking for Your news
From the morning breeze?
How long will I be searching through the image
Of the fish in the well's water?

I've been burned hundreds of times,
Flowered with the kindness of spring.
In all cases, I have admired the art of God.

95.

Verse 1186

Yesterday, my Beloved's image
Was turning around the Heart.
I said, "Come in, lighten up my insides
With the light of Your face."

O Sultan of Sultans,
O the One who threw
My sane Soul into the fire!

O the One whose spring made my life green!
My Soul and many others all have wondered
At the things I've done.

O the One who is the Soul
Of the angels in the sky,
O the one who is the rosary
Of the fish in the sea,
There is a taste and trace of You
On every Beauty and beautiful face.

You are the greatest of the great.
The proof of every prophet,
You reign and, at the same time,
Are the source of justice.
You are also the remedy
To my irremediable disease.

My earth turns into golden treasure
With the brightness of Your sun.
With Your light,
My wandering thoughts gained wings.

I am full of melodies
In the arms of Your favors, like a harp.
Strike gently, so my strings won't be broken.

When the kindness of Your spring
Reflected on the garden of Soul,
Either the thorns disappeared in the rose,
Or all my thorns became roses.

This blood-drinking Heart
Set hundreds of golden tables every night
Because of the grace of Your face.

The specter of my Beloved comes every night,
Puts out His hand and scratches my head.
In the end, that Beauty who patted my head
Took my turban away.

The One who brought me from Absence
Made me talk every moment.
In the end, the One who made me talk
Became all the words I have spoken.

Verse 1197

Of the rose with its beauty,
The jasmine with its fine three petals
See Your face, reach You,
They all grow so big, so beautiful.

O my Beautiful, life is Your rose garden.
O my Beloved, the wound You open
Is luck and prosperity for me.
To be a slave to Your slave
Is higher than being a king or sultan.

"I offer you life," *You* said.
No, no. Say, "I kill you," so that I will be brighter
And more alive, like a candle with its wick cut.

What do the devout look for?
Your mercy.
What do Lovers search for?
Your wound, Your oppression, Your cruelty.
He is death, dressed;
Others are alive in their coffins.

One runs for his life;
The other One sacrifices himself to Love.
One keeps his head down to save his, life;
The other becomes an enemy to himself.

O the One who shines in my Soul
Like a Sun entering the sign of Aries!
O the One who turns me into
Yemen's [\[172\]](#) ruby with the light of His face!

97.

Verse 1203

merged so completely with Love,
Was so fused, that I became Love
And Love became me.
That way, I was saved
From instigations, trials, tribulations.

Yes, with complete Union,
Man becomes strange to himself.
There wouldn't be any animosity
If people could solve this problem.

There is a sea that isn't far from us.
It's unseen, but not hidden.
It's forbidden to talk about,
Yet, at the same time,
A sin and sign of ungratefulness not to.

To talk about Him
Is like comparing Him to a human.
To keep silent denies His omnipotence.
This is a problem with no solution,
A disease which has no cure.
You save us, O One who has kindness and favors.

The shapes, colors, smells of this world
Ask for His help every moment,
Just like a baby who doesn't know Him,
Yet wants nourishment from Him.

The Heart is asleep.
At the same time, He is awake,
Boiling up constantly.
He is like a lidded saucepan
That sits on top of the fire.

O the One who offers that wine
Without saying words to us!
Every moment a legend comes with a shout
Out of that silence.

There are hundreds of pities in Your curse,
Hundreds of generosity in Your greed,
Hundreds of bits of knowledge in Your ignorance.
He talks silently, like one surmises.

The words You said when You were silent
Are heard by the Ones
Who fell in Love and lost their minds.
I am in silence, but I'm exuberant with You.
I look like the Sea of Aden.[\[173\]](#)

Your Grace is doing Godliness,

Grants all wishes.
My God, help the one who is separated from You
To pass through himself.

O the One who is our consent, our coyness,
Our origin and our beginning!
How can the father of Hasan[\[174\]](#)
Know this secret of ours?

O the One whose Love buys us,
Pulls us from others!
O the One who tears our clothes,
Put Your hand on our torn dresses!

O the One who sheds the blood of my mind
Smuggles the patience out of my Heart.
O the One who merges with my Soul
Breaks the Soul of every shape!

If a bird flies away from the place
Where the Lover was ruined
And finds that his prey is dead,
It will keep tearing its coffin.

98.

Verse 1217

The fortune of my Beauty never sleeps.
Neither do my eyes see sleep.
O the One whose beauty
Is a candle to this world,
My eyes become the basin for that candle.

With the food of Your Love,
Eyes and Heart have ceased sleeping.
They're nourished with Your Love.
Both of them, like a cypress,
Suck the juice of Your kindness
Without the need of a mouth.

The occupation of the Soul
Is not a bunch of nonsense.
The sustenance of Soul is not dirty.
It doesn't lose the state of canonical purity.

There is new form and shape born
Without man or woman
Every moment in the town of the Soul.

Every form is more beautiful than the moon,
Sweeter than sugar or honey.
They dress differently,
With hundreds of thousands of clamors,
And serve my Beloved.

They all admire the sovereignty of dervishes.
The water of the sky flows in their rivers.
O Heart, You came to their quarter as a drunk.
Clap Your hands.

Because of that charming Beauty's face,
Whose forehead is as bright as the Moon,
Earth turned into sky.
Help us, O Moslems, save us
From these designs filled with instigations.

99.

Verse 1223

Suddenly, I catch a smell.
Maybe it's coming from my Beloved.
Maybe my faithful, drunk Beauty
Is drinking wine and remembering me.

O the Charmer
Who stays in my Heart and Soul,
How can He not remember me?
How can I be out of His Heart?
He's making Macun[\[175\]](#) for my broken Heart.

Now, because of this exuberance,
God's compassion is flowing
Like a cascade in my sea of secrets,
Like the river of Ceyhun.[\[176\]](#)

My act, my talk
Are the curtains of my ecstasy.
My Heart, which resembles a rose garden,
Is shamed by my thoughts,

Which look like thorns.

Where is the shout and sound
Which deserves my Love?
Where are the moon and sun
That have brighter lights than I do?

Leave this alone.
Now a Kaiser comes to Ethiopia
From the land of Rum
To clean away my rust,
To instigate trouble among the blacks.

Climb His roof and watch.
His news is coming from the Heart's window,
Hitting my Soul,
Which is fed by fire.

How can I talk about meeting Him?
How can I describe His Beauty?
Those parrots don't even come close
To the trap of my words.

Don't look at my Beloved
With the worth of my words.
Watch the Mount Sinai of Moses
On the Heart of my ideas.

My awake Beloved will give a hint
With these words
To the ones who are awake.
Tonight He will give a sign.

I wonder why this elephant with insomnia
Sees India in its dream.
Leyla [\[177\]](#) came by,
Searching for her beloved in my Heart,
Which became Mecnun.

Tonight, all the earth will be washed away
From the torrent of my Heart,
Because the Source of my rivers is flowing
Through my Heart's canals.

He screams in my ears in such a way
That every particle

Becomes drunk with the sound.
I hear the sound of my flying Cafer's wings.[\[178\]](#)
I understand that he keeps flying.

My God, give another language to my Soul
Besides this one
So that when talking about Union,
My shingles won't untie.

You took the patience and decisions
From my Heart.
You made me drunk and threw me to the ground.
Where is my knowledge?
Where is my mind
Which used to understand everything?

Son, cover this
So that beautiful silver statue won't hear.
Beside Him, everything, including Soul,
Is a stranger to me.

O my peerless Beauty! O the One
Who is impossible to describe with words!
O the One whose quality
Cannot be contained with words!
O the One who covers my sins,
Give some beauty to these words.
Adorn these words.

O parrot with whom we are fed
At the same table,
Don't chew any sugars
Except the unconditional, uncircumstantial ones.
Don't talk about existence,
Attributes, signs, forms.

My Heart and Soul stay away
From faith and blasphemy.
They go only one way.
It would be hell for me
If I had anything else to do but You.

How can I beat the drum of others
While my table is full of Your sugars?
O One who has hundreds of musks
In every curl of His hair,

Who gives perfume
To hundreds of perfume sellers!

Son, put me up as your guest.
This is my food and drink;
This is my garden and field;
This is my gold and silver.
Play that tune until early dawn.

My Heart which has been sleeping is awake.
The One who has been drunk all night long
Is sobered
By a lightning strike to my Heart
From my clouds full of rain.

O One who has become
An admonition to my eyes!
The eyes of all the ones
Who came before or after
Have never seen a Love like this.

Many times I've become stone,
Many times pearl.
I've become a believer, then a disbeliever.
In this appeal, in this transformation,
Sometimes I was the head, sometimes the feet.

I'll go out of myself for one single day,
Give up good and bad
And start naming the attributes of God,
The One whom everyone needs,
The One who doesn't need anyone.

O the Owner of this watering sky, [\[179\]](#)
My Soul hasn't gotten any joy from it,
O my rose-faced One, O my rose garden,
My heaven and my flowers.

What is the night?
Hundreds of years have passed.
This fire hasn't been extinguished.
This hell hasn't cooled down.
I've turned into water with my shame,
But this fire keeps burning.

Every moment I become younger,

Keep hiding from myself.
This sound, straight kingdom
Makes me more beautiful, more attractive.

Since I'm part of the Soul,
I'll be the whole Soul.
Since I'm the thorn of the rose.
I'll be the rose.
I've become "we have heard."[\[180\]](#)
At the time my Beauty
Transforms me from one stage to another,
I'll become the words 'to tell.'

O the one who claps his hands for me,
Don't be confused.
O the one who plays for me,
Don't be tired.
There will be a day when
My Sultan will ask for your excuses.

There will be a day when you'll be His drunk.
There will be a day when you'll kiss His hand,
A day when you'll be scattered like my turban.

O Beautiful for whom my Soul became Ferhad,[\[181\]](#)
My Soul remembered Him tonight.
The strings of the harp are broken.
Help me tolerate this new rule.

Who would be Mecnun[\[182\]](#) in front of Him?
Anyone whose Heart is wounded by His Love
Becomes Leyla.
The good Leyla consumes
All the patience and decisions of other Leylas.

Son, hold your father's hand.
Take care of him until morning,
Because I have been overwhelmed
By the sparks of the cloud
Which rains fire over me.

Since wine is forbidden for him,
The Soul becomes restless.
Once he drinks, the unlucky Saturn
Won't let him see my moon-faced Beauty.

The Soul has been trembling because of Him,
But he deserves all this trembling.
Where are the eyes
That search the waves
Of my endless seas and being
Which are sacrificed in those waves?

O the King of the five senses
And the six dimensions!
I will talk about Him
Until the Last Day of Judgment.
Even amazement is astonished
That I am so close with Him.

Either tell or don't.
I have no patience for that game.
O Beloved whose face is mine this year,
His hair was mine last year.

People are scared of Him.
For me, death is like sugar in His temple.
Life without Him is my death.
Praise without Him is my shame.

O deceiving moon,
O star that doesn't befriend
My leftover knowledge!

My Beautiful, I will turn around this pivot;
I will hide in privacy from the stars.
But where is the morning
Of the Ones who drank the morning wine?
Where is the assembly of free people?

O One who speaks these words,
Be a friend to the wrestler of aged, bored people,
Because these languages, quatrains, poems
Have tired me.

Don't mention anyone except Shems of Tebriz.
Don't say anything
That isn't either help or victory.
Don't talk about anything
But Love and burning Hearts.
I won't acknowledge anything else.

100.

Verse 1266

You are just like a Soul inside of my Soul,
Flowing secretly and stealthily.
O light of my garden, my meadow,
You walk and sway like a cypress.

Since you're going, don't go without me.
O Soul of my Soul, don't go without the body.
O gleaming light, don't go away
From my eye. Don't go!

I'll tear the seven layers of sky,
Cross seven seas
If You look charmingly
At my dizzy-headed Soul.

O Beauty whose face is my faith,
Whose looks are my religion,
The believer and disbeliever become my slaves
When You are in my arms.

O Joseph of Canaan, you took my hands, my feet
And made me without hands and feet,
Cut me off from food, drink, sleep,
Came inside drunk and laughing.

I turned into Soul with Your kindness,
I passed out of myself.
O Beautiful whose existence
Has disappeared from my eyes
But is hidden within myself!

O Beautiful whose eyes
Make the narcissus drunk!
The rose tears its dress because of You.
Branches are full of buds with Your Grace,
O my endless garden meadow.

One moment You pull me
To the mountain next to the garden.
Another moment, in order to open my eyes,
You lead me to the source of light.

O the Soul who is better than all Souls,
O the mine which is better than
The most valuable mine,
O my most attractive, most charming Beauty!

Since this place is not our country,
Let this flesh be decayed, go to pieces.
I'm not afraid. I don't even think of the sky,
O One whose Union
Is like meeting with Saturn.

The Soul resembles little particles in the air
Without Your sun.
Why does my foundation
Of the four foundations, [\[183\]](#)
My pillar of the four pillars,
Become alone, without You?

O my Sultan Selahaddin,
O One who knows, shows the way,
Doesn't care for my composure,
The One who is above all possibilities!

101.

Verse 1278

How long do you think you can escape death
By watching the purple color of the Judas tree,
By listening to the sound of the organ?
Look and see.
They're pulling and dragging you away.
Really, we are returning to Him.

How long will you lock the houses with greed?
How long will you keep indulging in food,
Chasing the bait?
The trap of death has already exhausted you.

There is no need for a silver saddle
On a dead horse.
When you ride the wooden horse
And use the slab as a saddle,
You'll understand all the deceit and fables of life.

Take off your expensive dresses and skirts;
Surrender yourself to the shroud.
Move away from the greenness, the garden;
Try to stay on the ground with the blood.

You used to watch beautiful ones stealthily,
Used to be their confidant.
You used to come over, clapping your hands.
Where are they now? What happened to them?

You bent your jaw[\[184\]](#) to nice people,
Made fun of them.
Now they've tied your jaw.[\[185\]](#)
Your son, your wife have removed you
From the house.

Where are your night-drinking joys and parties,
Those sugar-tasting lips?
Where is the breath you used
To blow spells up to the moon
With your mind, your talent?

Where" is the time when you refused
To give bread to the needy?
Where are your fights,
In which you jumped over crumbs of bread?
O the One who was dumped in the hole
Upside down,
Where is your necklace?
Where are your headbands?

Where is your incongruous,
Nonsensical business?
Where is your annoyance, your discord?
Where is your ambition in work, in deceit?
Your tracks, O imposter?

O the one who says this garden is my garden,
This inn is my inn,
This one is mine, that one is mine!
The one who says "mine" weighs seventy tons.
Now, even a single piece of straw
Is more valuable than you.

Where is that stately pride,
Your sarcastic smile, your dislike of everyone?
Where are those attacks, those fights
In which your face got all red
Because of your crazy anger?

Not even one night did you repent until morning,
You didn't remember God,
Didn't even mention His name.

Today, you'll be beaten and sorry for the past,
Because of your crazy beliefs and loose faith.
You repent for loving the past.

You repent being a stranger to God,
And yet stay away from the prophets.
How does this happen, how?

My friend, be like a mirror,
Tell legends without tongue or lips.
If action gives sadness,
Drunkenness goes away.

102.

Verse 1293

☞ turn so much around my Heart,
That my body cannot carry my weight;
Nor can my Soul stand my fight.

I will turn around this mine
Until my being is totally disintegrated.
My wires will be entirely broken.

Son, you are obstinate. So am I.
Sometimes even the male lion
Bends his head when faced with my persistence.

How can the body
Not turn around the Soul,
Which looks like a sky with torches?
O Beauty! The attraction point
Of my compass-like Soul!

The millstone turns as water comes.
You wouldn't know that.
You said that it's enough
For all my wheat to become flour.

But the millstone doesn't care
For your floor or your grain.
As long as water comes,
It turns around my secrets
Like a whirling sky.

I am a sieve in His hands.
He moves and turns me around.
That is His business.
To be a sieve is my business.

Neither truth nor appearance remain.
Water is gone, grass is gone.
Seizing the moment, I say,
"O my rose-faced Beauty, come."

O One who becomes Soul
To my drunk Soul,
The One who escaped last night from my hand,
Be kind to me. Look at my broken heart.

O my Soul, beg that Beloved
That He calls you thus:
"O my Soul, O my sustenance, my livelihood!"

My body looks like a spindle
When I am in silence.
God, keep spinning my thread,
Make a ball out of the threads of my body.

The thread and spinning of the thread
Are invisible.
The spindle and its turns are visible.
The spindle says, "Without His hold and pull,
How can I do this work?"

The body is like a turban.
The Soul looks like a head.
The body covers the Soul
In every curve like a turban.

O Shemseddin, You are
Sometimes like a turban, sometimes a head.
I'm afraid You'll find an excuse
To change Your mind about meeting me
And disappear.

103.

Verse 1307

☞ my fast, quick flyer,
Fly to the land of Absence;
Don't stay on this side.
Go to the house of secrecy,
O my thought, my understanding.

What else does this world have
But a drum on the feast day
Of this universal intelligence?
In the harvest of my skies,
This sky offers nothing but a piece of straw.

I wounded your Heart,
Don't try to put salve on my wound.
I tore your mantle,
Don't try to grab my torn mantle.

It's better to look at what I do,
Because I am the complete Fountain of Life.
O one who is afraid
That I will destroy him,
Don't carry around that kind of feeling about me.

This sea isn't even a drop
On the coast of the sea of Soul.
Joy isn't even a grain
In my time of sorrow.

Rabbits, pheasant and gazelles
Are hunted by kings.
Look at the male lions
That are tied on my stirrups,
Hanging upside down.

Because of my Beloved,

Who is the Beauty of the land,
"I created the skies because of You."[\[186\]](#)
The Hearts of lions were turned into blood.
The valley was spread with blood.
The One who makes man is Mecnun,[\[187\]](#)
Becomes Mecnun.

If you're tired and bored,
Come, drink a small glass of God's wine,
The wine which moves and shakes man
And makes the mountain of Uhud[\[188\]](#) disappear.

This is the kind of wine
Whose light reflects
The sky which is not supported
By poles and walls. [\[189\]](#)
If you drink a drop of it,
You will understand
All the exuberance of my Soul.

This wine affects your insides,
Sharpens your mind,
Enlightens your eyes, your Heart,
So that in time, you will see
The pearl inside of this flimsy body.

The world is like a chicken
Sitting on an incubating egg.
The arms and wings of my angels
Are nourished by this egg.

One day, the chicken goes away
With the fear of a kick
And leaves the egg alone.
At that time, my seven-level sky disappears
In the light of my clean egg.

The bottomless sea says,
"O old earth, lift up your skirt.
Pick up a pearl from me.
My eyes are not jealous or protective."

I am beyond illusion.
The mind fails to understand me.
The one who can see my peer, my partner,
Is the one who sees double

Because of confusion.

My words are like a toothbrush
Which cleans your teeth,
Makes your mouth beautiful.
Even then, you should be silent,
Because when you're in silence,
You plunge more deeply
Into the world of ecstasy.

104.

Verse 1322

(Same as gazel 101, except these verses)

☞ One whose perfume fills the air on my way.
O One whose, "Ah," becomes my company.
With the Love of my Beloved Sultan of Sultans,
Color and smell fall in Love with me.

My Soul has ascended to the sky
Like a particle devoid of weights;
So why is the essence of my four pillars,
My foundation,
Without You, separated from You?

105.

Verse 1324

☞ My Beloved was walking about
The garden yesterday, saying,
"O greenness, there are hundreds
Who tolerate your oppressions,
But is there anyone like me?"

I asked Him, "Why don't you ask this of me?"
"My questions," He answered,
"Don't fit in the ear O
And don't come from the mouth."

"Even if You don't ask me openly,
Tell me secretly," I said.

"The Soul and body both will be burned
By secret explanations, hints
And signs of the Heart," He answered.

"In what manner do you go
On this journey?" I asked.
"Like the moon," He said.
"I go in my orbit, bright, beautiful and playful."

To turn around himself is only for the Pivot.[\[190\]](#)
Because he is on a journey in his country,
He walks while standing.

The caravan master and camels
Are all drunk from the Sultan of Sultans.
O caravan master, don't stay anywhere
Except my Beloved's place.

O our drink, our whims,
O our essence, our beginning!
How does the Soul of Hasan or Abu-l Hasan[\[191\]](#)
Know our secret?

O the One whose Love in my Soul
Resembles the sun in the sign of Aries,
Whose stature, face and eyes
Turn into Yemen's[\[192\]](#) ruby in my eyes!

The ones before, the ones after,
If they all get together
At the end of the world,
None will be more beautiful than You.

If Mecnun[\[193\]](#) sees You, he'll forget Leyla.
If Leyla sees you,
She'll get in the same trouble as Mecnun.

The rose has so many thorns in its feet
Just from searching for You.
The jasmine cries all the time
Because of its separation from You.

All the particles in both worlds
Wouldn't greedily open their mouths
If the sun of Your face didn't give us sustenance.

When an animal is sacrificed,
Its soul leaves its body.
Piece by piece, its meat comes back
To life on this side.

Fire teaches eternal living
To those pieces of meat.
"O the one just freed from the Soul,
Who becomes Nothing,
Tries to reach the Soul
Which cannot be damaged."

Those pieces of meat yell, saying,
"I wish my tribe could know
And understand that!"
If those yells ever come this way,
Arrogance and disbelief among the people
Will disappear.

There will be no fear in any Heart,
Nor thorn in the foot of any rose.
You'll march to reach this country, saying,
"I accept Your invitation,
I accept Your invitation!" [\[194\]](#)

There's an end to this longing.
I can tell it if the Cupbearer comes
And makes me go out of myself.

106.

Verse 1341

My Beloved, walking
Around the garden yesterday
And talking to the plants, said,
"There are hundreds of people
Who suffer because of you.
But is there anyone like me?"

You didn't appreciate my lips.
You argued with me.
See how much you've wasted me,
Making me admired by the people of our time.

O instigator!
The One who throws fire at the people
Hangs every Heart,
With invisible thread, from the sky.

All this world is like garbage
In Your clean, pure sea.
Only the Souls and Hearts of men and women
Play in Your sea.

You light so many candles
And lamps beyond the sky.
You make so many shapes
Beyond the house of Souls and bodies.

O most Beautiful,
If there isn't an image of Your face,
All of the realities turn into image.
If it isn't You,
The Soul in my body becomes dead,
Wrapped in its shroud.

O my eyes don't see anything
Without His glory.
O my Soul dies without His Soul,
Which adds Soul to Soul.

I said, "Why are you asking
All this from me?"
"Our questions," he said,
"Don't touch ears and mouths."

O the one who thinks
The shadow of the beloved is the Beloved
And doesn't differentiate a shirt from flesh!

When your limited, counted Soul
Merges with limitless, countless Soul,
Your Soul cannot fit in your body.
Your candle cannot be covered.

You flee in every direction,
But, no, don't flee from our circle.
Don't run away from our circle.
O moon, you're spoiling
The galaxies of the Pleiades.
No, no. Don't do that.

You are Nev-ruz,[\[195\]](#)
Full of fire, full of light.
We're like the night following you.
Wherever you stay, we go there.
No, no. Don't do that.

O Sun, at the sign of Aries,
Garden and field are dressed
By your kindness, your honor.
Without You, they were idle,
Wounded by winter.
No, no. Don't do that.

O the One whose Sun
Has become a nanny for us,
We're a shadow following You.
O nanny, without Your Grace, we're lonely,
No, no. Don't do that.

108.

Verse 1355

Your Love came later,
But surpassed the others,
So much greater than other Loves.
Clearly, God wrote His commandment to say,
"And the last ones went further."[\[196\]](#)

His imperial cipher has inscribed in gold,
"Truly, we did open!"[\[197\]](#)
His form has appeared
Out of the blue color of the Soul's sea.

Adam has come once more
To sit at the throne of religion.
The ones who are identified by

"We stay in line"[\[198\]](#)
Bend their heads gratefully
In an act of prostration.

Who is Rustem[\[199\]](#) compared to
The line of Lovers in this world,
Lovers riding their black horses
On the sea of blood every day.

Hundreds of bodiless heads are swimming
And saying with smiles,
"Truly we'll return to Him."[\[200\]](#)
They are in the sea of blood
Because of Your clamor and greatness.

When the shadow of the Lover
Falls on the stone mountain,
The mountain jumps to the nine-level sky.
"Really, it's the truth we believe,"
It says a hundred times.
Try it if you don't believe it.

He shines. His light reflects off that mountain.
Listen to all the noises in it.
What is the position of that poor mountain
Compared to Moses who became helpless?

The sky is an ordinary ladder in front of Moses.
Where is the sky? Where is the rope?
Where is the Soul?
Where in this degraded world?

You are the sun, a golden plate.
God boiled your kettle.
God cooked your meal.
Before, you were wanted.
How did you become the one who wants?

He was planted last year.
This year He grew leaves,
Raised them above the ground,
Casting spells on Himself.

The Soul became drunk with the glass He offered.
What a glass, what a cup!
It is such a cup that even the sky

Turned upside down to be prostrate before Him.

O Shems of Tebriz, more beautiful
Than the Garden of Eden,
You played my harp
With your Grace and kindness;
I became an organ in the universe of Love.

109.

Verse 1367

☞ve seen a thief.
He was stealing people's belongings and money.
But why does our Thief
Steal from that thief?

If a thief becomes too much trouble,
People ask the Sultan for help.
If the Sultan starts stealing,
Where do they go for help then?

Love is the Sultan
Who steals the Heart of all thieves.
In this way, God pulls these rebels,
By seizing their forelock, [\[201\]](#)
To the front of that unruly mob.

Love is the Sultan who steals
All the Shahnes' [\[202\]](#) Hearts,
And at His place,
There are all kinds of Shahnes.

Last night I yelled to the sleeper,
"There's a thief here."
That Thief quickly stole
My tongue from my mouth.

I tried to tie His hands,
But instead He tied mine.
I wanted to lock Him up in prison,
But He can't be contained
In the whole world.

Because of His sweet style of stealing,

The guards become thieves.
The smart ones disappear
Because of His cunning.

I saw a bunch of people
In the middle of the night, asking,
"Where is the Thief?"
He was also asking, "Where is the Thief?"
He was among them,
But nobody could see Him.

O the One who is the source of every word
Appears as an enemy,
Then puts on a friend's face.
O the One who is eternal life
Comes suddenly as a tragedy.

O the One who walks in the Heart's blood,
May the Heart be your lawful right.
Hit and wound me.
I'm not asking for Your mercy.

O the One who stretches the bow,
Shoot that beautiful arrow at me.
I would be sacrificed to Your bow and arrow.

The wound You open in my vessel is life for me.
It adds Soul to my Soul.
Even then, it's a pity
To cut my body,
Which has turned into a reed flute,
In half with Your sword.

Where is Ishmael's [\[203\]](#) neck
That gives thanks to Your knife?
Where is Circis, [\[204\]](#)
Who gives Life every moment
With the wound You open?

Maybe our King, Shems of Tebriz,
Returns from His journey.
There have only been a few like Him among men.
He's gone, disappeared like Semurg. [\[205\]](#)
Not even a trace of His dust appears.

110.

Verse 1381

This is the belief of the infidel;
This is the reward of the One
Who patiently waits;
This One is also the life
Which that One laid down on the ground
And found.
What a beautiful helper!
What a beautiful hope!

Hundreds of suns are ashamed
After seeing Your face, Your beauty.
The sun has been harvesting the clusters
At the sign of Sumbule.[\[206\]](#)
You are in business.
The Heart is beating,
Yelling and screaming in the chest,
So that you can see and understand clearly.

From great angels, there are words like
"O cleanest Soul,
God's compassion to the universe"
In every kind of food.

A door is opened to the truths
Which have been imprisoned.
A freshness, a light comes
To the garden of peonies.
News appears about difficult subjects,
Difficult to understand
Before the Last Day of Judgment.

O Heart, set a trap with your eye.
If you don't have an eye, borrow one.
O Soul, call everyone.
Do everything.
Jump, free yourself from this water, this earth.

O Soul, are you lazy?
You are the lion of great battles.
You have to break the lines
And conquer this enforced castle.

Hurry up, O One who Loves
And wants to be Loved.
Hear us praying "You grant our wishes."
If the Beloved is hidden, unseen,
Look carefully here, for Soul is going to Him.

When the talented Soul plunged
Into the sea of blood,
It wondered with whom it was and said,
"I wish my tribe knew."[\[207\]](#)

He said, "I'm a torrent flowing to the sea.
I'm Soul ascending to the sky.
I'm a ruby, reaching to the pearls,
And either I will become a crown
Or a ring's stone."

The one who has reached
This mind, this understanding,
Tastes that sugar which cannot be counted,
Then brings clear water from the stone,
Like Moses.

Since I've become drunk, I'll jump,
Put the saddle on the Heart's horse,
Because I have the desire for the Sultan,
The One who is greater than all the moons.

Never mind all these words.
Talking is the curtain in front of meaning.
If you will drink, drink that wine.
If you will select, select that wine.

It is better to be silent
While waiting and watching,
Because there is always grief with words.
The One who helps has come.
The One who helps has come.
O Moslem, ask for help.

Mustef'ilun, Mustef'ilun,[\[208\]](#) O Great One,
O the One who is closer to us than our self,
Closer than the vessel[\[209\]](#) of our Heart,
Either sitting drunk or up walking!

Verse 1395

Play, tambourine. Play, tambourine.
 You'll reach the kingdom.
 O One who is the confidant
 Of men and women,
 Be brave; don't worry.

Give power, take power.
 O One who is involved with trading,
 Don't give up, don't give up.
 Go to absolute profit.

If you're concerned about losing your honor,
 Don't be afraid.
 He'll give you hundreds of honors.
 Your Soul will come to life and be saved
 From the shame of going to the grave,
 The shame of needing the grave digger.

You come here today drunk,
 Hit the modesty and shame of each other.
 Now, O candle of Soul, shine,
 Shine and enlighten everywhere.
 Save yourself from the shame
 Of going under the basin.[\[210\]](#)

I burned that mantle.
 I gave up acceptance and denial of the people.
 Tell Abu-l Ala [\[211\]](#) I don't care if he treats me coldly,
 If Abu-l Hasan is mad at me.

If you're noble,
 Why are you after gain all the time?
 This will bring disgrace,
 Especially if you expect something
 From the beauty of Hutten.[\[212\]](#)

Hundreds of Souls are sacrificed
 To my Beloved.
 My crown, my turban are sacrificed.
 If I go to the stockhole of the bath with Him,
 Even heaven is jealous of that.

That stockhole turns into a rose garden.
Ashes and dust become iris.
Like the manners of my Beloved,
It changes in such a way
That it's impossible to describe.

I'll obey the order of my Beloved.
I'll be silent.
I'll follow the rhythm of the rope,
And jump like a rope.

112.

Verse 1404
Terci-i Bend

Never new, never thought
That that moon would take the shape of a human
And come to earth
And that His beauty would throw
All the Chinese beauties into the fire.

It never would have come to mind
That that male lion would come from the forest
And cover the Lovers with blood.

I told my Heart,
"Oh, Heart, once more
You're smeared with your own blood."
"Be silent," he said, "silent.
You should come and see His face once."

Shall I talk about His face or His character?
Shall I praise His bangs or His hair,
His drunk eyes, or His cheeks?
Or mention His forehead?

I've been captivated by Him.
I'm drunk with that wine.
I've fallen down to the ground because of Him.
From night until morning I asked God
And yelled to Moslems to come help me.

Where is some paper?
I'll make a painting,

A face as bright as that Beauty
Who resembles the sun.
Then I will set fire to the belongings
Of water and earth, burn them all.

Earth turns its face to the sky
Because of His separation.
But the sky also screams and says,
"I am as you are a hundred times."

Answers come from the secret land
To both of them.
"O Lovers, O unhappy ones,
Look here, right here.
Happiness is to lay an ambush."

The kingdom is everywhere
With the torch of complete visibility
In its hand, guiding Lovers
On the right way.

With this mighty flame,
The secrets of good ones or bad
Come to the surface,
Like the hair inside of milk.
Today is like the day of resurrection.

The one who has fallen in Love
With Our river won't be thirsty.
The door of the treasure won't close
To the one who is looking for treasure.

O garden, you endured and waited,
Then clouds came over you.
O really patient one,
Patience is the key to tightness and distress.

Is this Moon the sun of earth?
Did it come from the sky?
His Love is like Soul.
I should hide Him like a scream.

I should hide so Soul can taste Him alone.
Terci will grab His ear
And pull Him from behind the curtain.

* * * * *

Mustafa [\[213\]](#) asked God,
"Why are You disdainful of us?
Tell us, please.
What's all this about people?
What was the purpose of creating them?"

God said, "O Soul of the universe,
I was a hidden treasure.
I wanted this gift of treasure
And the favor to become apparent.[\[214\]](#)

"I created a mirror;
The back is the earth,
The front is the sky.
The back will be even better
If it escapes from hypocrisy and ostentation."

If the grape wants to be wine,
It has to stay in the jar and ferment.
If the back wants to be the front,
It has to be crushed and mended.

How can muddy water be a desirable mirror?
When it gets rid of the mud,
It becomes clear.

My Sultan says to the Soul
Who flew away from the body,
"Come. Since You left the bad ones,
You're my friend now."

It's well known
That with the treatment of the alchemist,
Copper becomes gold.
The secret Chemist turns copper into gold.

This sun is rich because of God;
It doesn't need a crown or robe.
It has become a hat for hundreds of bald ones
And clothes for all the naked ones.

Jesus rode a donkey
Because of His humility.
If that weren't the case,

How could the morning breeze
Ride a donkey?

You should yell, saying,
"O Soul, make your head
Food on the search.
O mind, be eternal for this eternity!"

Remember God so much
That you forget yourself.
While you're praying
You'll bend like the dal [\[215\]](#)
Of the word of praying.

As you know, the bazaar of desires
Is full of deceit and cheating.
O good man, put your mind into your head.
Don't get involved with those useless things.

If you want to reach Soul,
The smiling Kingdom,
Smile like a rose in disfavor
As well as in favor.

O the Soul gives life to every corpse.
This ready meal is carried away
And becomes more and more.
But the third Terce is coming.

* * * * *

If my Cupbearer were here,
I would drink the wine offered to me.
I would learn how to cast
A permanent spell from His magician eyes.

If my cowardly Heart would turn brave
And become His lion hunter,
I would catch one male lion now
And put a saddle on it.

I would be freed from the oxen of body [\[216\]](#)
And ascend to the sky
With the help of hyacinth-like eyebrows [\[217\]](#)
And beautiful harvest moons.

I would leave the assembly of my Sultan
As a drunk,
Rule every town I visit,
Be the cure for every trouble.

I would neither harvest nor sow.
I would become absolute reflection.
I would be neither wet nor dry,
Neither hot nor cold.

I wouldn't get involved with daily bread
Or the trouble of life.
Neither would I roll over the earth, like a ball,
Nor fly to the sky, like dust.

I would turn into neither a dizzy cypress
Nor a dancing hyacinth,
Neither a ruby-dressed tulip, nor yellow saffron.

I wouldn't close my mouth, like a bud
Because of the secret ailment of my Heart.
I would give up this and the other world,
Be nourished by the Glory of God.

The Sultan of Faith says, "Yes, every moment
You have gone through all
And a hundred times more,
Because I was on your track
Saying, 'open the door.'
I was the one sending you
From one situation to the other.

"I am helping the earth, like rain helps greenness!
I am the pair of everyone,
But I am exempt from every pair.
I am the One.

"When Solomon lost his throne,
He started selling fish.
If he had stayed out of trouble,
Why would I hurt him?
I wouldn't even hurt an ant.

"Thorns wouldn't get into the foot of the rose
If there were a summer without winter.
I wouldn't crush the grape

If there were wine without a hangover."

If that witch-woman's knot were untied
From the feet of my Soul,
I would be hundreds of Rustems,[\[218\]](#)
Hundreds of brave ones,
In spite of the harm
Of the blind hold of man.

Our eyes are bright because of You.
Your life would be eternal, O our joy.
O generous One,
O Charmer who understands us,
My life and hundreds like mine
Would be sacrificed to You.

113.

Verse 1446

☞ Lovers, O Lovers,
The One who sees His face
Loses his mind, becomes crazy,
Insane, spread around.
His manners change.

Start looking for the Beloved.
His store is demolished,
Runs face down like water in the river,
Makes His feet His head.

When He becomes Mecnun [\[219\]](#)
In the world of Love,
He starts turning like a universe.
But the ones who are afflicted with this ailment,
In the end, they find His remedy and are cured.

The angel would prostrate
To the one who becomes black dirt for God.
The sky would be a slave and servant
To the one who is a black slave to Him.

His Love picks up the wounded Heart in His hand
And keeps smelling it.
How can the Heart

That's picked up and smelled by Him
Not be good?

He has wounded so many Hearts,
Made so many lose sleep.
This magician's narcissus eyes
Have tied the hands of so many magicians.

All the kings are His poor ones.
All the beauties gather His favor.
Lions are tamed and sit on their tails
In front of His neighborhood dogs.

Look at the sky.
Look at the castle of angels.
On its tower and sides
There are so many torches and lights.

The warden of the castle
Of that Sultan who is without drums
Is the universal intelligence.
Whomever He sees at the castle
Grows and matures.

O moon, have you seen Him?
Did you get this beauty from Him?
O night, have you seen His lovelock?
No, no, no. The most you have seen
Is maybe one lock of His hair.

Tonight is dressed in black.
It must be in mourning.
It's dressed in black,
Like a widow whose husband has died.

Don't believe the night is dying.
It secretly drinks with Him.
It doesn't have eyes,
But sees His eyes and makes Him frown.

O night, I don't ask your help
For my yelling and screaming.
You're also rolled like His ball
With the club of fate.

The One who becomes a ball for His club

Acquires the ball of happiness.
In front of His club,
Like a ball without head and feet,
It keeps running like the Heart.

O our face is saffron-colored
Because of His tulip-red features.
O the Heart is plunged into grief,
Like a comb inside of His hair.

Trust Love. Love is completely
A face and eyes turned this way, watching you.
There is nothing next to Love
Except face and vision.

He doesn't have shape,
But all His work is to make shapes and forms.
O Heart, you cannot do without forms and shapes,
Because you are not from the same origin.

Anyone who has a clean Heart
Will be able to differentiate
The sound of the Heart
From the sound of the body.
This voice is His lion's,
Roaring in the shape of a gazelle.

The things which are woven
By God's hands
Still come from the weaver's hand,
The weaver's shuttle.

O Beautiful One,
Who is the shuttle of the Soul,
O the One
Whose face is the direction in which we pray,
The sky is the one
Who creates and decorates this place.
Earth is his wife.

My Heart has been burning
Because of my jealousy of Him.
My eyes turn into a leather bottle.
But how can I get Him wet?
Even the ocean comes only to His heel.

This Love has become a guest to me;
It hits and hurts my Soul.
This is a reward, a favor for me.
Hundreds of thanks to His arms, His hands!

I gave up my hands, my feet
And quit searching.
O the Friend who wipes out our search
With His searching!

How long will I say, "O Heart, O Heart?"
Give up the Love of Heart. Be silent.
When Heart hears His voice saying, "Hu," [\[220\]](#)
There'll be no use for my worries and troubles.

114.

Verse 1470

On the morning before the sun rises,
Light sparkles on the glass dome of the sky.
At night, the blood-red glass of the west
Comes from Your blood-stained arrow's head.

Waters cascade from the canyons.
Torrents eventually reach the coast of Your sea
And merge, mixing with the sea.

With all its height, even the moon
Raises its head to see You,
Dropping its hat to the ground.

In the early dawn the nightingale
Sings songs in Your garden
To the tunes of the ones who have reached You.
They scream like Lovers.

O Beautiful! Souls search for Your face,
For all the Hearts, for the Beloved!
O Charmer, whose big garden
Carries the four overflowing rivers [\[221\]](#)

In one river water runs through.
Another is the river of honey.
See the next one?

It's the river of fresh milk.
The last one is Your river of red wine.

When will You give me a break?
When will You fill me up with wine,
Giving me jar after jar?
How can I tell the mind
The things that this wine does?

Who am I?
Even the sky keeps turning,
Drunk from this great big jar.
He can't be away one moment from Your Love.
For even one moment,
He can't be out of this wine.

O silver-belted moon,
you have known Love for a long time.
O sky, it's obvious from your face
That you are a Lover.

Love which has been a friend to the Heart
Is tired out by the words of the Heart.
Be silent, O Heart.
How long will You be working, searching?

Heart answered me, "I am His reed flute,
I cry with His breath."
I said, "Cry, O One
To whom my Soul will be sacrificed
For His Love."

Really, we opened your door.
Don't separate from your friends.
Thank God for the Love
Which totally covers and holds you.

115.

Verse 1482

The tactless one
Who has been jealous and frustrated
Because of Jesus
Should die.

Hundreds of dogs should soil his beard.[\[222\]](#)

How can a donkey hunt gazelle?
How can a donkey
Give off the gazelle's smell of musk?
Who smells the urine of the donkey?
Who looks for the smell of it?

It doesn't hurt running water
If the bitch donkey urinates in it.
But even that one should not drink that water.
It's better to stay thirsty.

O the One whose coquetry and coyness
Are worse than a deviate's,
Whose face-scratchings look like a prostitute's.
Because of such deceit, such cheating,
Even animals become ashamed.
Hear from God,
"They are more deviate than animals."[\[223\]](#)

I'll be silent.
God will make him ashamed for eternity.
I will go to the Cupbearer.
I am drunk from His manners, His humors.

116.

Verse 1487

☞ Love, are You taller and better
Than the apple trees in Your orchard?
O new moon, offer new life to Your admirer.

Bitter becomes sweet if it comes from You.
Blasphemy and deviation turn into religion.
Your pieces and bits become August's rose.
Hundreds of Souls will be sacrificed to Your Soul.

O the One who makes people's heads dizzy,
Put up a ladder to the sky.
Give wings to the men,
Involve them in hundreds of fights.

What a beautiful disposition you have, O Love.

What a beautiful face you have, O Love.
You like so much drinking, O Love,
O One who gives joy to His friends.

It is Your color in the best peony.
Every truth becomes confused in front of You.
Every particle, expecting kindness and generosity,
Turns to You.

Without You, all the bazaars are ruined and lost.
The garden expects Your rain.
So does the orchard, grape and flower.

The trees learn to move from You.
The fresh leaves step on the ground with You.
The leaves and fruits all become drunk
After drinking Your Fountain-of-Life's water.

The garden wants an autumnless spring
As a gift from You,
Because it wants to spread its hair
With Your rose-perfumed winds.

Your shining star brightens the star of Saturn,
Then feels shame on seeing the darkness
Of all these stationary and moving stars.

You have such nice invitations
In Your garden of joys.
The Soul who becomes your guest
Eats joy instead of bread.

I have it tried once;
I cannot find pleasure without You.
How can I find a taste for life
Without Your endless salt?

I went on a journey, came back.
I reached the end, started all over again.
This elephant of Soul [\[224\]](#)
Saw Your India in its dream.

Your India is a square for Your drunks.
Even virgins are pregnant
Because of the pleasure of Your melodies.

I took measures, but they didn't help.
The Heart broke its chains
And dragged the Soul
In front of Your imperial tent.

There, I didn't see any obstinate or cold people.
There was a new life every moment
There were new, abundant favors.

The mountain looks at Your gentleness
And is ashamed.
The Heart becomes insolent
And wants like crazy to jump to Your tent.

You've opened so many doors in iron, in stone,
That Heart turns into an ant
Looking for a crack in Your bowl, Your glass.

I'm incapable of describing You,
To the Last Day of Judgment.
How Your endless sea would be depleted
If I took a glass of water!

117.

Verse 1505

Wake up! Wake up! Night is over.
Be disgusted. Be disgusted even with yourself.

Right now, an idiot is selling
Joseph in Egypt.
If you don't believe me,
The bazaar is right here.
Go and see for yourself.

Totally Absolute God
Would devoid you of conditions,
Give you that rose face.
Take the thorns out of your feet,
Then go to the rose garden.

Don't listen to every trick, every deceit.
Why are you washing blood with blood?
Stay upside down like a glass

So that you can drink the wine with sediment.

For His club, be like a ball.
As an appetizer for His vultures,
Be like a carcass.

A voice is heard from the sky, saying,
"The Doctor of Love has come.
If you want Him to come to your side
Become ill, become ill."

Assume His Heart is a cave,
A place of union for the Beloved.
If you are the cave's friend,
Come to the cave, come to the cave.

You are a nice, naive, gullible man.
You lost your gold to thieves.
If you want to know the thief
And get your money back,
Be a pickpocket, be a pickpocket.

Be silent. Don't try to describe
The sea and the pearl in His ocean.
If you want to be a diver,
Hold your breath, hold your breath.

118.

Verse 1514

Give up cheating, O Lover.
Be ruined, ruined.
Jump right in the middle of the fire,
Get inside Heart. Be a moth.

Be a stranger to yourself.
Come. After you give up your house,
Stay at the same place,
The same house with Lovers.

Go wash your Heart clean of hate
Seven times, like trays, then come.
Be a glass for the wine of Love.

In order to deserve the Beloved,
Be pure Soul.
If you go to the drunks, be drunk, drunk.

You are the night of Kadir.[\[225\]](#)
Be the night of Kadir here.
Be a palace to the Souls,
Like the night of Kadir.

Wherever your thought goes,
It drags you behind, pulls you there.
Give up thought
So that you may walk in front
Like fate and destiny.

Fancies and pleasures are like a lock
Which closes our Heart.
Be a key.
Be a thread of the key, thread of the key.

You are not lower than the Pole of Hannane,[\[226\]](#)
Which the prophet Muhammed caressed.
Be the Pole of Hannane, Pole of Hannane.

Solomon tells you,
"Hear, learn the language of the birds,"
Yet you have become a trap.
The bird escapes from you.
Don't be a trap.
Be the nest, be the nest.

If Beauty shows His face,
Fill yourself with Him, like a mirror.
If that Beauty opens, spreads His hair
In front of you,
Be a comb, be a comb.

How long will you be running
With two feet like a Ruh,[\[227\]](#)
One foot like a pawn,
Or crisscrossing like a queen?
Put your mind in your head. Be wise.

For gifts and possession
You give Love as gratitude.
Never mind possession and gifts,

Give yourself to Love as gratitude.

For some time you were fire,
Then became wind, turned into water,
Became earth.
For some time you became an animal,
Stayed around in the animal kingdom.
Since you are now Soul,
Try to be a Soul who deserves the Beloved,
A Soul who deserves the Beloved.

O with the ability to talk,
How long will you stay at the roof, at the door?
Go into the house. Quit using words.
Quit talking. Be silent!

119.

Verse 1528

Cupbearer, if You haven't had much wine,
Pawn our cup.
As long as this wine
Comes from Your kindness, Your favor,
I would never hesitate to pawn my Soul.

So many eunuchs, so many lords
Have pawned their belongings in our town,
With the drunkenness of God's wine.

Look at Ibrahim Edhem, [\[228\]](#)
Who is riding the horse of knowledge.
That king gave up his throne, his crown.

If that unique, peerless Beauty
Were to drop a little sip of that wine
Into the foundation of that idol,
The infidel would pawn his faith
For the Love of the black stone.

I'm the drunk of that tavern.
I haven't pawned my wings
To just any trap, like a bird.
I've been trapped
Only by a grain of that pearl, only that pearl.

Since you've put your belongings in pawn,
Why are you trembling?
Give up your life for Him.
It's nothing to pawn your Soul for Him.
I wish I had a hundred Souls.
I would pawn them all.

Abu-Bekr[229] pawned his head;
Omer, his son; Osman, his lung.
Abu-Hurayra put up his leather bag
As pawn for Him.

If He treats kings in that way,
Why do you wonder
When the poor pawn all the people for wine?

Be silent. Don't act
Like the nightingale in the rose garden.
The nightingale pawns its head and wings
For this smiling rose.

120.

Verse 1537

❧ If you see a drunk who knows the secret,
For sure, he is His drunk.
If you see one whose Heart is alive,
For sure, He is the One
Who made him like that.

If you see a head full of joy and music,
Who can't differentiate day from night,
For sure, He is the One who scratches that head.

Everyone on this earth is against each other,
Thirsty for each other's blood.
They're all full of malice, looking for fights,
But this is impossible to talk about
Because of the majestic ties
He has put on our feet.

The one who is offered wine every moment
Grows like a tree.

The devil and also the fairy
Admire his jump and growth.

When you see someone like a lion,
Twirl your mustache slightly.
But if he is fat and ugly
That's what you deserve.
You should see the ones who deserve Him.

Particles are molded
To form your shape with His favor
So that your condition functions
Together with His favor.

What a beautiful valley
Is that valley where only Love walks,
Slowly and gracefully.
There is nothing but God above this valley
And nothing but Absence underneath.

Knitted loosely, the word's fishing line
Is not catching anything anyway.
Knitted loosely, the line will catch only prey
That are also drunk with His line and net.

121.[\[230\]](#)

Verse 1545

It's impossible to have
A Moon like that in the world.
Concede it, concede, O Heart.
You're threatening me with a fight.
Let's fight.

We are God's drunks,
Drunk from that eternal wine.
You are smart and skillful.
Go and stay where there are names and games.

We dressed in paper clothes [\[231\]](#)
And went to see the King.
You're in love with appearances,
Stay with colorful pencils.

Give your life with the Beloved's love.
A knot cannot be untied without Love.
O Soul, become drunk here,
O mind, become lame here.

Rum[\[232\]](#) saw Your face and became drunk.
Zenci[\[233\]](#) saw Your hair and was ruined.
Either go to the land of Rum or Zenci.

You have fallen into His buttermilk.
As a matter of fact, you were born from His Love.
Even if you run hundreds of miles,
You cannot get away from that idol.

If you are a believer,
He is searching for you.
If you are a disbeliever,
He is calling you.
Walk this way, become faithful,
Go there, become unfaithful.
Both are the same to Him.

Your eye is still in His garden.
Your ear is still in His sweet talk.
Plunge into His wealth, become a bee.
Grab His date branch, grow, spread.

Sky is a bow to His arrow.
Water is under His command.
If you are straight, be like an arrow.
If you are crooked, turn into a crab.

He has an endless, big, beautiful country.
Whatever or whomever you are,
You are needed there.
Become an agate, ruby, brick or stone.
All are necessary in that country.

Ruby or stone, come.
Fall into this torrent of trouble.
Go to the sea with the torrent.
Be the guest for that lively Love.

That sea resembles Hızir's[\[234\]](#) Fountain of Life.
No matter how much you drink
It doesn't decrease.

If it does, you feel bad
In your Heart and Soul.

Swim like a fish in the sea.
When you remember dryness,
Go toward the land.

Sometimes He puts His lips to yours;
Other times He puts you on His lap.
First be a reed flute;
Then become a harp.

He has no enemy. His drunks are all around.
Don't stay in the land of solitude.
The day of parade has come for Lovers.
Walk in the front. Be a leader.

Whoever is unaware of His vineyard
Is needy for wine.
It's a vineyard full of wine and grapes.
Sometimes it becomes wine; other times, opium.

Be silent like Mary.
Let the One who has Jesus' breath talk.
Who told you to be a friend
Of the donkey between jobs?

122.

Verse 1562

☞swear to God, I'm tired
Of glass, earthen and wooden jars.
Where is the Cupbearer
With a Heart as large as the sea
Who offers me the pitcher like a glass?

Offer me the one
To which I'm accustomed.
Don't hide surreptitiously from me.
You have it. Don't search here and there.

You've fooled me every time, saying,
"Why don't you come to Our gathering?"
You say, "Whatever you want,

Come and whisper it in my ear."

Well, I swallowed Your lie.
I didn't look, I didn't think.
Since I'm like a doorbell on the outside,
How can I place my lips to your ear,
Say anything to You?

I'm at the door you've already reached.
My Soul is like foam.
Your Heart like the sea.
For God's sake, quit being lazy.
Pour wine as though You're shedding
My enemy's blood.

As long as mind is my friend,
There is no essence to my words.
Every moment, an image comes
And puts its head on the ground in His temple.

My God, day is added to his day
By the one whose face becomes rose-red
With Your wine,
Because he becomes Hizir [\[235\]](#)
And, like Hizir,
He performs ritual ablutions
With the Fountain of Life.

A voice came from the sky and said,
"We are all to be sacrificed to your assembly.
How lucky for friends, how lucky!
Be happy with these favors.
Keep drinking."

The gathering that drinks this wine
Has become cheerful,
With glasses here, glasses there.
In the end, their insides
Have turned into bazaars.

Everyone has passed out.
No one is aware of himself.
Everyone has closed the door, loosened his belt.
Oh son, we are gone. Wash your hands of us.

I am drunk with Your lively eyes,

The tuft of Your hair.
I am saved from color and smell
Because of that rose-colored wine.

Be silent. Don't make the sounds
Of noise and confusion.
Neither noise nor confusion fit here
With the Grace of God.

I was out of myself last night until dawn.
My mind was out of my head.
For one moment, where was the beginning?
Where was the end?

O Shems of Tebriz,
O the one Heart and Soul that became a slave!
Although You wrote my name on the river,
Maybe You've forgotten me.
Even so, come back, come.

123.

Verse 1576

☞ One who has good intentions,
Start the journey.
Find the one who can direct you the right way,
Seek the roads.
To reach Him, search everywhere.
The One who will give you happiness,
Where is that great One?
How can you find Him?

Love is a light, exalted,
A secret river to be drunk,
Purified and flowing forever,
A fire burning, never extinguished.

Love goes together with suffering,
But it is the greatest.
If they say the one who Loves can fly,
It's true. Don't deny it.

It's better to be a slave
And serve Him with pleasure,

Than to be a free wanderer.
The one who cries with Love
Doesn't have an eye ache;
His eyes are not sick.

No one knows a Lover's business.
There is no cure for his illness.
Suffering is the best cure for him.
Don't think too much about anyone
Who hasn't fallen in Love,
Hasn't stayed in the valley of Love.

Friends, don't be discouraged.
Compassion comes after trouble.
Don't put on any dress but Love.
Don't cover yourself with any garment but Love.

Knots have been tied
On the strings of Love's spell.
The pain and suffering of Love's fire
Is all ablaze.
Love is such a lost blessing
That anyone who doesn't try to find it
Is deprived.

The day I met my Beloved,
I screamed, I lost my mind.
My trials to avoid guilt all disappeared.
But this is Absence inside of Presence.
This is eternal blessing.

If Love slips out of your hand
Don't fall into despair. Keep searching.
Fight to find it.
Until you reach Him, see Him,
Don't sleep, don't eat, don't relax.

124.

Verse 1585

☪ Lovers, O Lovers, I'm crazy, insane.
Where is the chain?
O One who rattles the chain of Soul,
The world is filled with these rattles and jingles

Because of You.

You made another chain
And hung it around my neck.
To stage a hold-up of the caravan,
You ride a horse from the sky.

Get up, O Soul, free yourself
From the land of soil. Ascend.
That torch in the sky
Is turning around just for us.

How could rain stop the journey
Of one who has grief in his Heart?
How could the mud slow him?
He halts only for Love.
No other place is for him.

A coward yelled one day.
"Bad shepherd," he said,
"That goat in the herd looks at me.
Do you think it will bite me?"

The shepherd answered the coward,
"Even if it bites you
Or kills you under its feet,
The brave one wouldn't mind,
Wouldn't be afraid of the goat."
The coward said, "You're right."

Where is the mind that lets you talk?
Where are the legs that let you
Run from the land, jump in the sea,
Be safe from earthquakes?

You'll be the Sultan of Sultans.
Your sovereignty will be permanent.
Your place will be higher than Saturn.
You'll be free from this rubbish heap.

You'll do the business of universal intelligence,
Be exuberant and overflowing
Like a river of honey.
You'll be the sun at the sign of Hamel,[\[236\]](#)
The moon at the sign of Sunbule.[\[237\]](#)

A hundred ravens, a hundred owls
And a hundred doves will make tunes for you.
If you give up loitering,
You'll hear the secrets of the Heart.

If you have Heart, fall in Love.
Lose your Heart.
If you have mind, be crazy,
Because this individual mind
Looks like a drop of water
To the eyes of Love.

In the end, Absence comes
And pulls you out of this world of appearances.
Things have become confused
Because of his curly black hair;
It doesn't straighten easily.

But even so, you're to raise up your skirt nicely
On that road
Because there is so much Lovers' blood there.

Go, O Heart, go with the caravan.
Don't try to walk alone,
Because this pregnant time
Gives birth to many troubles.

If you go the way I've told you,
You'll have no trouble.
Your journey will be
With the Mercy of God.
You'll sail like a ship on the sea.
O Heart, since you're going,
You may as well go the easy way.

If you take your Heart away from your Soul,
You'll be saved from war and peace.
You'll need neither the store nor provisions.

Your Soul will be separated from thoughts.
The road to danger will be closed.
Your desire will reach you
And be friendly with you.

You're saved during the day
From that troublemaker from the land of Rum.

Don't be afraid
When the black of night comes with bells.

Be silent, O sweet face.
Go', water carrier,
Tie the head of the water sack,
Because waves cannot be contained
By jars and glasses.

125.

Verse 1604

☞ Beautiful, whose Love
Makes the Archangel Gabriel dance in the sky
And the stars and universe
Become exuberant and overflow!

Under the sky, everything
From the oxen to fish is cheerful.
Everything above the sky
From the sign of Taurus
To the sign of Pisces is dancing.

The Lover whose Heart is full of blood
Has gone to the tavern,
Has put such a fire into the wine
And started playing inside the jar.

Heart has seen that honor and respect
Have been poured on His soil
And has started playing with fire, with difficulty.

Souls, like the Prophet Job's,
With the joy of Your kindness, Your favor,
Are dancing in troubles,
Their bodies full of worms.

The Souls of generations
Coming from the family of Adam
Are dancing in Your land of Absence.

The Sultan of Sultans goes on dancing
Without the robe of honor
In the tavern of Absence,

Then becomes Hakan [\[238\]](#)
Without throne and crown.

A group of people have seen
Just a little bit of something,
But they've ended up with greed.
Because of honor and pride
They started dancing alone,
Without being seen by others.

The ones who are full of pride and self
Cannot deserve to be Sultan.
Greatness and exaltation keep dancing
Because of the greatness of that Sultan.

One group of people plays for bread and soup;
The other falls in Love.
They don't care; they just keep dancing.

How nice for that pearl
That it plunged into His sea.
In the end, He Himself turned into a choice sea,
Dancing with that choice.

Where is the one
Who tries to imitate with his mind,
Then turns with fear, acquires hope,
And starts dancing with that hope?

Even then, this one is better
Than the one who denies or is heedless.
At least, time by time, he conforms
And is relieved from the world
Of is not,
Then starts dancing.

There are some who've given up
Existence as well as non-existence
With His Love.
Still others, with His Love,
Say, "I am annihilated and keep dancing."

Bats in the dark are dancing
With the Love of darkness.
The birds which Love the sun
Dance from dawn to sunset.

O fast-blowing morning breeze,
Go and tell Shems of Tebriz,
"Tell me about Yourself.
Come and dance with me."

126.

Verse 1620

Look at the drunks.
They've all gathered around our drunk,
Left their minds, thoughts and health.
They've all gotten into trouble.

I told them, "O Soul's drunks,
"O ones who drink wine from the hand of Soul,
Hundreds of thousand of Hearts and Souls
Come close to you, holding you."

They answered, "Thanks to God!
With His Grace, that moon has risen.
We were stuck with deprivation
At the bottom of poverty.

"We escaped from His cruelty,
Stayed away from Him for awhile.
We were like an enemy
And suffered torture and cruelty.

"We put aside the glass of loyalty,
Left work and business,
Gave up the profitable, but tasteless stores."

The mind which puts salve in its eyes
Knows everything
And becomes the friend
Of the ones who have beautiful eyes,
Then starts hanging around with them.
The raven spies upon and lands
Where there's a hanging corpse.

If you have taste in your mouth
You can taste His sweet, bitter jars.
Is it better to give up pleasure and fancies,

Or get hung up on them?

My Heart has been like a vagabond all my life
Because of His Love, looking for Him.
Once I looked, I saw that poor Heart
Has been glued to God.

O brave one, if you trust this house of earth,
I will show you the One who hangs you,
Chains you in, then sets you free.

See the ones who have been murdered
In the land of eternity,
But whose Souls are alive?
They are hung on the gallows of consent,
Like young Mansur.[\[239\]](#)

O Love, You are my Sultan.
Set gallows for me.
The lamp which isn't suspended
Doesn't illuminate the house.

I'm the ground for the feet of the person
Who is attached to the brave One.
I'm a slave and servant to the copper
Which is attracted by secret chemistry.

Get up, jump, tune the instrument,
Start the pleasure, Sema.
It isn't nice for the reed flute
To stay without a melody
Or the tambourine to hang on the wall.

The tambourine unties the Heart;
The reed flute gives new Soul to the ill.
How can the Soul-giver stay closed,
The Heart-opener stay hung?

Today, try to be generous.
Give your Heart.
Haten[\[240\]](#) was saved from being a disbeliever
Because of his generosity.

Generosity is like a trap for bread,
But cleanliness and joy are the trap for the Soul.
Where is the One who holds generosity?

Where is the Other
Who brings our joy and cleanliness?

Generous is the one who gives all his possessions
In the cave with fear.
Sufi, on the other hand, is like Abu-Bakr[241]
Who was held by Muhammed in his arms.

This one fell in Love with a Beauty,
Sacrificed his life to Hakan.[242]
The one who is after advantage
Is hindered by money and goods
And keeps bargaining like a customer.

This One is like a shark
Which plunged into the sea;
The sea admires him.
The other is like a novice swimmer,
Looking for someone to hold.

All these jobs, this work,
This noise and clamour are real or show.
But at the place where we are with Lovers,
Real and show become the same truth.

Night comes, O my dear Soul,
O the eye and light
Of the One who travels at night.
O Charmer who resembles the moon,
For You the moon has been suspended in the sky
Because of its admiration.

I'm as cheerful as the new moon.
You're adding Soul to Soul
Like a new position, a new kingdom.
O Beautiful, whose grief
Bends the new moon down, like me!

Soul is like a great mountain with its knowledge.
Flesh is like a piece of straw.
Who has ever seen a piece of straw
Elevate the mountain?

You've left the one who's been on the road.
Don't get involved with strangers.
You'll get in trouble.

You'll turn into the one
Who's hoping to get help from troubled ones.

Even the Soul of the great One
Turned into blood by thinking
Of the end of the road.
The ones who are assumed to be bad,
Their souls were hanging upside down.

Clean Souls of great men gave up
Thinking of the end,
After seeing what seed the Soul has sown,
And turned back to the beginning.

Heart is the one who calls.
The sound of Heart echoes
On the mountain of body.
O the one who hangs on sound,
Be silent.
Instead, embrace the place
From whence sound comes.

The words coming from the mouth
Give contempt.
Finish your pleading.
Leave contempt. Grab the wisdom of greatness.

127.

Verse 1648

Who is that? Who is that?
He came nicely as a drunk,
Put his shoes under his arms
And walked slowly into our house.

He admires him.
The head of thoughts is dizzy.
Hundreds of minds and Souls
Are handless and footless in front of him.

That ruby-lipped Beauty played a trick
And came with a shovel in his hand,
Asking for fire.
I wonder what the purpose was

Of his coming alone like that.
Who was he going to burn?

O source of the fire, come.
Why do you ask fire from us?
O Beloved, with your untimely arrival,
I swear to God, this is a trick;
This is a spell.

O his face is as bright as the morning sun!
O corner of the house
Which has become a plain, a valley
From the glory of his face,
How could the veil hide you?

O Joseph over the well,
Your reflection shines on the well's water.
That water boils, overflows
From the light of your face.

Welcome, welcome!
You are even a teacher to magicians.
You came from the assembly of the phoenix
Like the Prophet's bird of hoopoe.

O one who is the Fountain of Life
In my lungs,
Every one of your tortures is sweeter
Than ten tons of sugar.
You appear in a different form every moment
From great God.

O Heart-catching Beauty,
You can't fit any angle.
O Beloved, I shed more tears than the oceans
For your beauty.

Earth and sky are a mirror
To your Moon face.
That mirror came to life,
Started watching you.

My God, save me from science, from deeds
Before my last day,
Especially from the words
That come out of the mouth.

Save me from the science of language itself.

O Love's longing has penetrated my mind!
O Beloved! Be silent, be silent.
Hear me telling things
In a different way from now on.

128.

Verse 166O

Who is this? Who is this
Who has come suddenly into our circle?
He is the Glory of God. He has come from God.

See this favor, this kindness?
Watch this fortune, this kingdom.
He came like the moon to help the unlucky ones.

Look at the beautiful Leyla, [\[243\]](#)
How much she desires Mecnun.
Look at the amber of Soul,
Come just to attract the grasses to itself.

Souls come to the door
Because of the taste of His perfumes, His beauty,
His beautiful manners, His saying, "Come." [\[244\]](#)

He draws hundreds of pictures
Of men and the Sultan who has the flag
To Absence.
He paints many different paintings.
All these images please the Heart.

That Beauty who needs nothing
Gives life to these images.
These last forms come to life one by one.

Ascend from this bitter water's well
By hanging on the bucket of the Koran.
O Joseph, this bucket
Was sent to the bottom just for you.

O words, when I give you up,
Then I will reach

The shade of the Sultan
With the sun of knowledge.

My God, save me from science, from deeds
Before my last day,
Especially the talk and words
Which come from my mouth.
Save me from them.

129.

Verse 1669

Soil becomes body with Your favor.
From talk and thought,
So many forms and shapes
Become pregnant in the land of Absence.

You feed growth in every form and shape,
But there is meaning, which You freeze.
Shapes and forms are the source of it.

The one who doesn't know the origin of ice
Will know it without doubt
Once he sees ice become water.

Don't think anything but good things,
Because thoughts are the strings
Of the fabric of shapes.
Good thoughts make the best shapes.

They come the way you look at them.
Forms are structured by way of look,
Then they are dressed as men and women.

Stay with the enlightened One,
Because a window is open for Him in the Heart.
Earth grows roses and irises,
But water becomes land for them.

If you associate with God,
You become a beautiful, unconditional Soul,
And so bright, O my God.
O the One who becomes Soul to my Soul!

A kingdom, a glory has come from somewhere.
The time for sorrow is gone.
Now is the time for joy.
A halo has surrounded
The full moon without hands and feet.

How can I see the One
To whom my Soul, my faith
Has become a slave, a servant?
O my God, where is my dignity
In front of Him?
He is the One who gives composure to my mind.

He is the confidant of every particle,
Company for every breath.
The one who doesn't see
Becomes devout because of Him.
The One who sees
Becomes unconventional because of Him
And doesn't care for anything.

O the One whose passion becomes God's Love,
The One who searches in the searcher,
The One who blows His own reed,
The One who wants mine!

He is the One who desires to be desired,
The One who Loves and is Loved.
He is Joseph. He is Jacob.
He is the necklace. He is the neck.

Cut short the descriptions.
Don't search too much.
He doesn't have an end like you.
How long will I play with water and oil,
Pass time with the impossible?
However, my water and oil are both gone.
I have attained my desire.

130.

Verse 1682

☞ Beautiful!
Heart and Soul have fallen in Love

And keep dancing at Your assembly.
O the One!
Innumerable heads have been cut
And dropped to the ground in Your battle.

O Archangel Gabriel!
Once you desired to come to this earth,
All the particles on the ground heard;
They all started dancing.

When your timely order came that
"The blood of the Heart should be shed,"
O my Sultan, blood put on make-up
To beautify other blood.
Appreciate that order. Start dancing.

O One who is most capable
Among all the Sultans, from the Prophet to Adam,
Pawn my Soul. He is in the game
Because he heard Your desire.

Kharezms [\[245\]](#) have denied
God's absolute countenance,
But because of Your sight,
They start dancing by tapping their feet.

O the Sun of His face routed the moon,
Which is happy with Your embrace.
Start dancing.

If Shems of Tebriz
Looks at the Koran of the Heart just once,
That Koran's learning lines
Will start dancing with Your desire.

131.

Verse 1689

On this side, there are a few unconventional ones
Hidden in His shadow.
That Sun, through the roof of Heart,
Reflects and shines in their Heart.

Every star turns into Venus.

Every particle becomes the sun.
The sun and stars change into particles
In front of them.
They keep whirling.

Every one of them who's lost his mind
Ascends seven layers of sky,
Where the star of Saturn is, like Keyhusrev, [\[246\]](#)
Without a tent and flag, a Sultan.

You've been on a ride a long time,
Turned around the world.
This time, journey to the land of Soul;
See the tribe of Souls.

Even with God's favors,
God's Beauty, God's grace,
Still, they are overwhelmed by command
And stay under orders.

Their Hearts are like a mirror
Without dirt or rust.
Their Hearts have become square like the sky,
And the Sultan has landed on the square.

Snakes and sugar have
Become cheaper in our town
Because of their sweet yells and ruby lips.

If I were in ecstasy like I was last night,
If it wouldn't worry the instigator,
I would tell the rest of it,
Being out of myself.

But I close my mouth
Because I'm by myself now.
I'll keep silent until my Heart
Becomes drunk with that wine.

O the Sultan of Soul,
God's Shems of Tebriz,
Every Soul becomes a sea because of Him,
Every body turns into coral.

Verse 1699

☞ One who is tired
Of me and my work,
I become more thirsty every moment.
What do You lose
If You grant one of my wishes?

If Absence becomes apparent
Because of You,
If Non-existence finds a dress, puts it on
And has one flag from existence,
What do You lose?

It would reach the level
Which deserves Your pity,
Where it reads a verse
From the Tablets of God's decree [\[247\]](#)
In Your school.

O favor of universes, offer a pearl
From the sea of Divine understanding
To the one who made this land a home,
Peace and comfort to the fish in the sea.

The wave of that sea sometimes gives pearls;
Other times, carries ships.
With its favor,
There is a trace of joy and manner
In every creature, from Him.

Most parts of this sea
Are an act of prostration,
Like the one who gives thanks to God.
Time by time,
Its waves rise to do some service.

The seven oceans of this world
In front of this secret sea
Are like a person who bestows a kindness
Or a worshiping priest.

The sea which is full of pearls and coral
Is our long life, our Soul.
Our life becomes eternal.

There won't be any end for us,
Thanks to Your kindness.

O particle, if you once understand,
You'll become a companion to the torrent
Which carries you to the sea.
You won't get hurt on the way.

If you try to go your own way
And that torrent of Love,
Which covers everything,
Grabs your ear to pull you on the way,
You'll be saved and protected.

Mustef'ilun, Mustef'ilun,[\[248\]](#)
Now I should hide my sugar,
Because they send a bunch of parrots
To loot it.

Watch all these new kinds of sugar.
Hear the sounds which come from chewing.
These sugars do not have form,
Nor do the parrots have jaws or feet.
None of them is visible.

There is another sugar from God
That isn't in the sugar cane.
The parrot doesn't have the power to eat it,
Nor are men able to swallow it
Down their throats.

That sugar resembles Shems of Tebriz.
Neither can He be contained by the sky.
His sun rises in the land of wonder.[\[249\]](#)

133.

Verse 1712

☞ One who. put a tent of hair
On the garden of earth!
O One who put fire in the material
And made a whole,
Adorned and ornamented Soul!

The roots of the trees
Were tied to the ground
Before You untied them.
You laid down pearl on the ground
Where roses were standing.

The bird who tells riddles
Learned to talk from You.
You give hundreds of wings
To the sick, pale falcon of Heart.

O One who gives life without death,
Provisions without food!
You give the best shield
For the arrow of death.

The Lover is like a pen
Which walks wobbling on this road.
In order to walk straight,
You draw a straight line.

It isn't surprising
That You made man from an animal, an oxen.
You made ambergris
Out of the water buffalo's left-over excrement.

The person who conquered the universe for You
Received hundreds of swords,
Hundreds of soldiers from their own particles,
Like sun and sunshine.

Angels prostrate themselves
In front of Adam.
Even the sky becomes a water carrier,
A slave for humans.

You gave power to the stars
And affect to the soil and stones.
You spread this power to the earth,
then You built stairs,
Made a passage from Heart to sky.

You gave the temptation of lust to black dirt.
In order to give birth
And make delivery,
One bit of soil

Became the father; the other, mother.

You have the power to open doors
To the heavens from the grave.
You created the five senses in the body's grave
And opened the doors to the universe.

You hid hundreds of raindrops of compassion
In the anger of the father,
Hid hundreds of sparks of fire
In the Hearts of a generation of men.

You built a tent for the Soul
From the mantle
Made by our saliva, blood, bile and Love,
O my Sultan.

There will be a time
When this world will argue
With the One who listens and says,
"I've spoken words like the 'Fountain of Life.'
You have not heard because of your deafness."

O Shems of Tebriz,
Explain the meaning, hair by hair.
Since You made a head,
Give him hands and feet, too.

134.

Verse 1727

O Sun of rebellion!
O Beauty who bows to no one!
You're in agreement
With the Milky Way up in the sky.
You've become friendly with people,
Like milk and honey.

O You've given joy to every particle,
Like the wine which adds Soul to Soul.
O You've merged and saturated the earth
With a rain of favors.

You've plunged in fire so much

That You've flamed, burned the fire.
We've looked for Your trace so much
That You've unified with the One
Whose trace cannot be found.

O secret of God,
Who has no wants,
O One who has no need for good or bad,
You've given up Your self.
You've merged with Absolute might.

You were searched for everywhere by Souls,
But no one ever got a smell of You.
They all became desperate;
Their Hearts were ruined.
Then suddenly, You joined them.

It's no wonder
That the same kind will unite.
Otherwise, different people cannot become one.
But You are not this or that.
Even so, You came to an understanding
With this, with that.

Both worlds are Your guests,
They sit around Your table.
You offer them hundreds of blessings.
You join the guests.

You've merged with Him so much
That He cannot differentiate himself from You.
How could He differentiate,
Since You merged like a body
United with the Soul?

You've become the beauty and freshness
Of this rose garden.
O great old man, be rejuvenated.
O arrow, you'll reach the target
Because you're joined to the bow.

O everyone's kingdom and destiny,
You've stolen everyone's belongings.
You came very quickly,
Staged a hold-up on our way,
But agreeing with the caravan,

Joined them, then left.

You thought that fate
Is to keep walking.
You agreed with the universe.
Soul is flying high.
So is the universe.

I admire Your kindness.
When stress becomes overpowering,
Like the butcher,
Who bends the lamb's head toward its hind legs,
You hold the head of stress
And bend it in the same way.

You taught Joseph-faced beauties
How to kill the Beloved.
You are the One who merged.
The devil is looking for thorns
Within the rose garden

The One who knows and understands,
Leave this alone.
Look at Him. Watch Him with the cleanest eyes.
You're freed from the particles of earth.
You've reached and merged with the sky.

O bird of Soul, you're free from the trap.
You've landed on the branch of the rose tree.
You're saved from the anxieties of the Heart,
Entered the heavens, reached that universe.

O Fountain of Life, honor of the water of vitality,
You came from the roof of the sky,
Ran around our roof, then merged
And flew through the gutter pipe.

How could a robber find You at night?
You're not at home.
You hid Your cane on the roof.
You made a deal with the watchman.

Tell the secret of this without words,
Without the alphabet of one hair to the other,
O One who, while talking, merges
And becomes one with the sounds and alphabet.

135.

Verse 1745

☞ One who gives ecstasy
Better than eternal drunkenness
To the Soul, without a wine cup!
Come, if only for one moment.
Give us our blessing, that moment
Which is so clean of everything,
Including cleanness.
How long must we wait for that unique moment?

You are such a Sultan of plunder
That even the enemy is waiting to be pillaged,
Because of the greatness of Your pillage.

Is it His form or the form of the universe?
Why doesn't the Soul know this?
For sure, feet know
If the shoes fit him, belong to him.

Feet are comfortable in their own shoes.
Someone else's shoes will feel
Tight and uncomfortable.

The mind has this capability,
But is unable to withstand that moment
When it is jailed in this world.

The Soul also knows his peers, his friends,
Because in the world of Absence,
That knowledge is given to the Soul
According to his limits, his capacity.

This is just the same
As the grown-up clothes of the prince
Being hidden in the basement chest.

Open the lock of the Heart, Walk toward the treasure.
If you have this treasure,
You'll have the answers
To all the questions in two worlds.

The tavern of man is the Heart
If you know what kind of drunkenness
You can have there.
But you are a little child yet.
Your feet are stuck in the mud.
You'll have to wait awhile.

Wait awhile, then luck
May bring a bunch of grapes.
Look. There is dust far away,
Raised like a flag.

On this flag is written,
"This is the proof, the evidence
Of the sign of Shems of Tebriz,
To whom all Tebriz and China
Are singing praises. "[250]

136.

Verse 1757

Unique Hasbek[251] rider,
You rode from the land of Soul
To the tavern,
Incited one against the other,
And went all the way to the square.

The Ones who stay in the sky
Pulled our ear.
You curl Your mustache
And ride Your horse toward them.

O One who, when He takes one step,
Goes beyond the two worlds,
Do You know to what place
You ride Your horse?

All modesty and rhymes
Have been ruined by Your love.
Since You've gone toward them,
No curtain is left.

When You ride toward the Soul, start looting,
The mind loses its mind.

Love becomes Your admirer.
Only one name lives in the body.

137.

Verse 1762

Please, be content with the Beloved
One moment.
Give honor to the sky,
O One whose face
Is more beautiful than the moon!

His name, when mentioned between words,
Gives the drunkenness of aged wine.
Teach the translator how to please the Heart
For even one short moment.

The sea is a touch of humidity in Your palm.
Even with all Your generosity,
You still deprive one confidant.
Don't. Put the watchman to sleep one moment.

Your Love is giving me a wine
Which cannot be described
And keeps putting opium in it.
How could the drunk
Who's been drinking this wine
Be able to show a trace from the One
Whose trace cannot be found?
How can he show a sign from Him?

Enlighten the world with Your face.
Make the eyes of fate drunk.
For one moment, take the troubles
Out of the universe's Soul.

O One who is a hundred times
Sweeter than the Soul,
How difficult to describe You with language!
Only the sufi can do that.
Bring that sufi for one moment.

I repent.
O mind, how would the sufi find the way to Him?

Hold your tongue.
Not every bird can fly on that side.

O sun of God, even the moon
Tears its colored shirt with Your Love.
O red colors of sunset,
Leave him alone for one moment,
For the Love of ruby-colored lips.

You should have only His Love in your Heart.
Don't take useless measures.
Don't stay any place for the night.
Annihilate all of your beings.

O the One whose rest and decisions are hidden
Around His search,
Safety and comfort in His fear!
The Soul desires You so much
That just to reach You
He left safety; he left mercy.

My body is like a bow;
My Heart is the bow string.
O Soul, aim high in the sky.
For a moment, put the ladder to the sky.

A young one in every place
Has grown old for no reason
Because of Your grief.
Show Your brow, so I can see the kingdom.
I'll reach eternity in one moment.
I won't grow old forever.

Look at this crying one.
Be true to Your own work for a moment,
My Sultan.
Be generous, be just, have pity.
Turn the head of Your horse this way.
Gallop here.

Come here for one moment.
Have the Soul chew sugar.
Show Your halo to our eyes for one moment.
We'll see You.

When I want to be jumped and thrown down,

I turn into an arrow
And fly over the village to get better.
Show me Your brow.
I will stretch that bow.

O raven of separation
Which has no essence, born from illusion,
When will you leave me and flyaway
Like a raven?

O light which every eye with sight desires,
O light of the kingdom,
When will You ask, "I want such and such?"

O lion self, how can you be separated from Love?
O lion-natured self,
Throw this tasty food, this table
In front of the dogs. Throw it.

O One who has no idea about the Soul's wine,
How long will you be talking about skill, ability?
Even for one moment, throw that trap of bread
To the bottom of hell.

Where is the Sultan of time, Shemseddin,
The One to whom everyone
Is a slave and servant?
O Tebriz, for the Sultan
Whose kingdom is so obvious,
Build a temple, be His slave.

138.

Verse 1782

Our King, our Sultan,
You came from the kingdom of the Sultan
Who has no beginning,
No end to His sovereignty,
Penetrated the Heart of the Moon
And conquered the flags of the King.

You rose from the land of Absence,
Which is the source of the working place
Of the Soul.

You came, causing hundreds of suns in the skies
To collide with each other.

You lit such a torch
That You burned night as well as day,
Made up such an excuse
That even goodness
Became shameful from malice.

O Venus of hundreds of Jupiters,
O Secret of God's favor,
O Fairy, in order to avoid jealousy,
Come to the land of Soul secretly.
Take the Soul's Heart in Your hand.

Oh Beauty of Beauties, *You* came
By swaying from side to side,
Because You are at the harem.
You are the desired beauty of the one who prays
And also the direction to the house of prayer.

His face, which shines with the
The Glory of the Creator,
Has matchless beauty.
The curly hair coming down to the forehead
Is adorned with Ahmets' taylasan.[\[252\]](#)
Nothing resembles the way His hair looks
And smells like black musk.

When Shems of Tebriz goes,
Soul follows Him like a shadow.
The earth He steps on
Is either salve for the eye
Or make-up for the light of eternity.

139.

Verse 1789

☞ Heart, you're not telling
What has happened to you.
You've fallen in love,
Which adds life to your life.
Sometimes you become mad with grief;
Other times turn into blood with trouble.

When I talk about your love,
Lots of trouble appears
In the land of Absence.
O lucky, good-fortuned one,
Play until dawn.

When the time came to drink wine,
We became indebted up to our necks
Because of that wine.
No, no, leave this 'wine' word alone.
Watch the One who gets drunk
Without a glass and wine.

You insist like burning fire,
I'm spread like soil on the ground.
You sent fire to me. I'm burning.
O Beautiful, you are surely beautiful.

O Absence, attack existence.
Destroy, be drunk.
Give your heart to drunkenness.
Clap your hands, clap your hands.

"Oh moon," I said, "Look at us!
Watch the eyes which have turned into sea.
Don't go there. Look here!"
"Congratulations, how nice," he said.
"Look at Love."

O nightingale, talk about the rose garden.
Say something about that cypress,
Tell about this pregnant branch.
Don't hide. Tell it like it is.

Don't look at forms all the time.
See the graceful Soul
That earth turned into sky,
With the sparkle of the Archangel Gabriel.

Forms are like shields
In the hand of the painter.
They hide His eyes and face.
Shapes are like drapes.
The One who makes the shapes
Is behind the curtain of Azer.[\[253\]](#)

140.

Verse 1798

O my Beautiful,
You are the moon, You are Jupiter.
The moon turns around Your face
And worships You.
The sun, the sky are whirling with Your Love.

O my God, am I looking for You,
Or are You looking for me?
What a shame for me
That 'I' stays with 'am.'
As long as I cannot free myself from me,
I am one, You are another.

O the One who surrounds me, surrounds us,
Sheds the blood of us and me and both,
Makes someone appear in the middle!
But He is, neither a man nor a fairy.

It's alright if the foot doesn't exist.
The foot takes us to thorns anyway.
It's alright if the head doesn't exist.
The head makes duality and disbelievers anyway.

There is water running in the creek.
Other water is frozen on the side.
This goes fast, the other very slow.
Put your mind into your head.
Run fast, so that you won't be frozen.

The sun tells the stone,
"In order to make you a jewel,
I shine on you and enlighten you,
So that you'll be free from being a stone."

The unfading sun of Love
Also reflects on your Heart
To raise you from manhood.

The sultan says to the falcon,
"I cover your eyes

So you'll feel cold to your peers
And see only my face."

The sun tells the unripe grape
"I came to your kitchen
So you won't sell the vineyard.
You'll learn how to make Halva."[\[254\]](#)

The falcon says, "Yes," to the sultan, says,
"I obey your order. I see only your face,
Dream only of you. I'll become
The slave by Heart."

The rose tells the garden,
"I put everything I have in front of you
So that you'll give up everything that's yours.
Stay, eat and drink with us."

If anyone takes gold from here,
Goes and spends it with another beauty,
He has to be a donkey.
He sits awry, but talks straight.

Jesus turns your copper into gold,
Then gold into jewelry, even makes your jewelry
Better than the moon or sun.

He's not like a penniless customer.
He makes you aware of the secret,
"God has bought."[\[255\]](#)
If you are Joseph, you'll get the smell
From that shirt.

Fresh dates are given to us from the dry branch,
Just like Mary.
Holiness is destined in the cradle without asking,
Just like Jesus.

Look at the grape which has no garden.
Watch the glory shine without night.
See God's blessed kingdom
Devoid of all troubles and fights.

My fiery face warmed the earth's bath.
Don't cry like children.
Look at the pictures

On the glass of the bath.[\[256\]](#)

You'll see tomorrow
That his face became food for snakes and rats,
That his narcissus eyes became a window
For the ants to come and go through.

The wall stays in the dark
And doesn't read the verse,
"Really, we will return to Him,"[\[257\]](#)
As long as the moonlight doesn't warm it
And the moon doesn't reflect on it.
If you see, have sight, look at it that way.

Either go to Tebriz and get pleasure from Shems
Or believe the One telling all this.

141.

Verse 1818
Terci-Bend

☪ Soul, the One who is pulling us
From earth to the green sky,
How beautifully You are pulling us!
Pull us faster!

I woke up so beautifully today,
Making all kinds of noise, struggling.
Today, I'm even more exalted,
Because You're pulling me better today.

You're throwing all the thirsty ones
Into the river today,
Pulling Abraham to water and fire with Zun-nun.[\[258\]](#)

People have been burned and ruined today.
Their eyes have been kept on You.
Who is the one You'll be pulling first?
They're all waiting to see him.
Will You be taking him on Your arm?

O the Source of the Beauty of Beauties,
You are something else today.
How nicely You took

The Heart from the chest,
The mind from the head.

O sky, you are a tent.
O earth, you are a nice country.
O sun, you are spreading pearls.
O night, you are making ambergris.

O early dawn, how beautifully becoming
Your light is.
O breeze, what a nice friend you are.
O sun killing the stars!
O moon pulling the armies!

O rose, you're going to the rose garden.
O bud, growing secretly,
O cypress, how beautifully
You suck the nectar from under the ground.

O Soul, You are peace to the body,
Wine to the flesh.
O religion, you are my keys.
O Love, You are lively, crossing people's path.
O mind turning the book pages!

O wine, you are the one who gets rid of grief,
Salve for our wounds.
O beautiful Cupbearer, You are the One
Who drinks oceans with the cup.

O morning breeze, you are the messenger
Who brings news from the Beloved
Every morning.
You take such gifts from His ambergris hair.

O earth, you are under every step.
In your Heart you hide so many rose gardens.
The water runs, making its head like feet.
You run, but you gather pearls from the sea.

O fire, which wears a ruby kaftan,
You blaze from Lave.
You open your mouth like a dragon
And swallow everything.

Terci means that You pull us to the heights,

Grab the Saul, pulling us to the place
Where Souls have been grown, matured.

* * * * *

You are pulling the Jesus of Soul
To the star of the Pleiades.
There is no. up, no dawn in such a universe.
You are leading Saul high,
Highest to the most exalted God.

Like Moses, You brought springs out of the eye,
Pulling the Moses of Soul to Mount Sinai.

Keep pulling this undecided mind.
In what a nice way You carry
This blood-thirsty Soul.

You are the Soul of our Soul.
You are the essence of all.
From there, You are pulling our self to Us.

We came like *la*,[\[259\]](#) upside dawn.
You keep pulling us from nothing
To the land of *illa*.[\[260\]](#)

Self is nothing but a house of idols,
But with You, it becomes a Mescid-i Aksa.[\[261\]](#)
You're pulling mind,
Which is nothing but a small candle,
To the roof of the sky.

Sultans have put all the guilty ones in jail.
You pull them out of jail
And take them today and pleasure.

You fill the body that You've purified
With musk and ambergris,
Give the wings of a phoenix to a fly.

You make the body,
Which resembles a dirty raven,
Like a carcass,
And, at the same time, having Soul
Which resembles a clean parrot chewing sugar,
Pull him high in the sky.

You give fresh dates
From the dry branch of the date palm
To the tired, sorrowed Mary.

You pull Joseph, who is soiled with blood,
From the bottom of the well.
Every moment, you're pulling him
Through secret roads to the heights of the sky.

When Jonah was caged inside the fish,
You took him to Your side,
Like a pearl from the bottom of the sea.

You set the table of angels
At the assembly of Heart's drunks
And offer Jesus' meals
To the drunk of Hearts.

This is another Terci.
You are bringing the heaven of Soul
In front of the guest with Your kindness, favors.

* * * * *

You pull the troubled hearts of lovers
To the place of remedy
And lead every longing, thirsty one
Toward the Fountain of Life.

How could You pull the one
Who doesn't have an understanding Heart
And who isn't a Sultan?
You pull every human like that.

You are the Sultan of Sultans.
You are endless compassion.
You are the One who set a table of favor
In the time of scarcity.

You show such modesty
To the few poor, needy ones.
You are just a humble person
Taking meals to the Sultan.

You are filling their baskets

With rubies and pearls
And carrying those baskets
Like the rain carries straw.

There is the order, "God is calling." [\[262\]](#)
Come, free the ones in the dungeon.
But they fall in sorrow
As though You were calling them to the dungeon.

You scare the pharoah with snakes,
But in reality Your kindness and Your favor
Save him from himself, which resembles a snake.

With Your kindness, You said to the pharoah,
"I am taking you to the throne, the crown.
Don't resist, let Me pull you,
Because you cannot do it."

The pharoah said, "This bond is from You.
Moses is a pretext. Pull me like Moses, secretly."

He answered, "If he were Moses,
Why did the staff became a dragon?
His palm shone like the moon.
You turned your head from forgiveness.

"We sent Moses to Shuayb, [\[263\]](#) uninvited.
Why are you jealous and greedy
Like a helpless lover?

"Moses did not complain,
Served Shuayb for ten years as a shepherd.
How would you be, if called shepherd?"

O Shems of Tebriz,
Oratory has been refined by You.
Boiled, overflowing with bubbles,
This bubble jumped over the head,
Because You are pulling him to Saturn.

That is another Terci.
Soul, You pull every moment.
If You do so slowly,
The trouble of my Heart increases.

* * * * *

O One who pulls and leads us,
You are the sun.
We resemble humidity;
You pull us to the heights.

You give life once more
To these dead bones.
You are taking on a cruise
The ones who are jailed in sorrow and grief.

Soul was drinking wine before
With angels in the sky.
Soul is clapping His hands,
Because You're pulling him back up there again.

O Sun, O Moon, O Brightness!
You are the place for safety and comfort.
Stage a hold-up on our road.
How nicely you do it. Pull us nicely.

O Sun who protects the good one,
O young fate, fresh destiny,
You hold us like a water bag,
Taking us to that river.

When I saw Your jar,
I pawned my turban, my Heart.
I told thought, "Go away,"
Because You are pulling me to Love.

O mind, you make me exist.
O Love, You make me drunk.
Although You humiliate me,
You are taking me
To the Greatest of the Great Almighty.

O Love, give Your order.
Separate us from everyone except You.
O torrent, you are taking us
To the sea with the cascade.

O Soul, come and confess.
O flesh, go and deny.
O Absence, hang me on the gallows,
Because You are taking me to essence.

Everyone pulls everything to themselves,
Good or bad,
Yet You pull us toward ourselves.

O head, you become head with His Grace.
O feet, you become feet
With His kindness acting as a guide.
But You turned away from Him.
Why do you raise your head with arrogance
And pull your feet with laziness?

O head, if you want the sky,
Put your head on the ground.
O feet, if you want to go to the valley,
Don't get stuck in the mud.

O eye, don't look at the people.
O ear, don't hear good or bad.
O mind, don't be a donkey-brain.
You are going to Jesus.

I swear to God, you are really pulling nicely,
Without hand and dagger.
You are pulling us to the temple
Of timelessness and spacelessness,
Leading us in the direction of no direction.

142.

Verse 1874

☺ friend, if you do good to others,
You better yourself a hundred times.
Even if you turn your face this way,
Maybe you will get to know Us.

I spread water on the ground
To settle the dust
And decorated every place.
Even if I forgive your sins,
Maybe you will get to know Us.

I have made you out of nothing,
Put you on the throne.

I gave you a mirror so you can work for us.
Maybe you will get to know Us.

O son of My pillar, My foundation!
O one who is asking help from Me,
Come now, see My favors
Maybe you will get to know Us.

Be wine to My cup.
Become a stranger to yourself, feel My pain.
If you stay in the same house with My suffering,
Maybe you will get to know Us.

O Sultan's son, be just.
Liberate yourself from your self.
Remember the day of death.
Maybe you will get to know Us.

The phoenix of Soul flies off
Just like an arrow from the bow.
You such and such, think about that.
Maybe you will get to know Us.

Fasten your ties with your religion.
Keep your oath.
Fall in Love with your faith.
Maybe you will get to know Us.

O the one who collects gold and silver,
Falls in love with every sweet pair of lips,
Come and see what real Beauty is.
Maybe you will get to know Us.

I've sown the seeds of faithfulness.
I've drawn wonderful pictures
And opened so many curtains.
Maybe you will get to know Us.

143.

Verse 1884

☪ One who rides the horse of eternity
And leaves this temporary monastery,
You know Your way.

You're going to the place You know.

Without becoming friends
With material things and symptoms,
Without falling into the trap,
Without slowing down with illness,
You're going from bitterness to sweetness
From deprivation to Your intention.

You are the Soul of Souls.
That's the way You're going;
Not like the mind which gathers bait;
Not like the self, full of hatred and grudges;
Not like the souls of the creatures
Which live on earth.

O One who makes the web of fate,
O One who shines like the moon,
The One who found a track, a trace on the road,
You're going to the One
Who has no track, no trace.

O One who is overwhelmed by His Love,
O One who has gone
Beyond himself with wine,
You are going from Medrese, [\[264\]](#)
Where His names have been taught,
To their meanings.

You should not give the impression to people
That You're going without gifts.
Your manners, which resemble
The water in the creek,
Give smell and color to time.

At night, hundreds of caravans go
To the sky from this world.
You're going alone.
But by Yourself, You are hundreds of caravans.

O Sun of that world,
Why are You hiding in one particle?
O Sultan of Sultans,
You're going like a guard.

You cast spells beyond day and night

So that eyes will think
You're going somewhere, to some country.

O Favor of the unknown,
How many times You've come dressed like spring!
O Absolute Justice,
How many times You've appeared,
Then disappeared in the fall season!

Get out of these forms.
Take this cover off Your face.
How long will You act
Like a shepherd in human form?

O One whose sign appears,
But whose essence is hidden like the Soul,
O One who became slave and servant
At the temple of earth,
When am I going to see You secretly,
Like the Soul?
You are going to the world of silence.

144.

Verse 1896

☞ Joseph, whose name is beautiful,
O beautiful charmer, you won't find
Any companion on the journey.
Don't be separated from the reason of Jacob
To keep from falling into the well.

The dog is the one who sleeps idle
In front of every door.
The donkey is the one who gets tired
And goes to any tent it sees.

Where is this Love, this greed
Which comes from the Heart?
Only the One who makes the Heart knows;
The One who understands
Makes you understand.

Lean over, don't leave the egg.
Watch like a bird.

But once your Heart's egg is hatched
And the chick comes out,
Drunkenness, union, and laughter
Are all for you.

Uncle, no one but Him
Has the shirt for this and that favor;
The rest are all poor.
Hang on.
Entreat the Sultan of Sultans
With both hands.

Fall into His grief, follow sorrow.
Walk with fire until evening,
Like the sun.
At night, keep turning nicely around His roof,
Like the moon.

Those stars keep guard around His roof
With their batons until morning.
I swear to God, it's a great temple,
It's a great door.

Those prophets who turn their faces to the sky
Are saved from the traps of earth
And from the stupid people
Who attribute a partner to God.

They are trapped in the other world
The way iron is attracted to a magnet,
An armless, legless piece of straw
Which flies toward amber.

Know for sure that without His favor
No food ever grows.
Without His order, His creation,
Not even a shadow would fall to earth.

Souls are like drunk camels
Which wander around the desert
When they hear the sound 'travel.' [\[265\]](#)
He is the desert Arab. He says, "Uh, uh,"
And makes the camels kneel anywhere He wants.

If the Remil [\[266\]](#) maker of the Soul
Casts the sand of Truth

On the Heart's signboard,
All the numbered sands turn into real gold.

Friends, go nicely on your journey.
A kind of doctor came to this earth,
Who brings every death to life
And opens the eyes of all born blind.

All these things could happen,
But when He lifts the veil from His face,
It won't be Venus
Or the sounds of the professional criers.

Be silent! If you are a nightingale,
Fly to the rose garden.
Even the nightingale lands on thorns,
But that is very seldom.

145.

Verse 1911

Sounds are coming from the sky every moment,
But no one hears them
Except the Ones who are in a state of ecstasy.

O the one who bends his head down
Like a donkey,
Drink less of this water,
Eat less of this grass.
For a moment, lift your head up.
Maybe you can see a sign or proof.

Nowadays, the Cupbearer opens
The top of the jar of sky.
He has an army of Souls
And flags from the wine.

Where is that lion-hearted one in this world,
That brave hero?
Who will meet him?
He will be brave enough to hunt lions.
The one who drinks wine with the brave Sultan
Has to be Sultan.

What a pity it is that the ear
Which attributes a partner to God
Is open, but doesn't hear the voice
Coming from the sky!
The soul that hasn't received
Peace and Love from God,
What a helpless and lost soul that is!

Would it be possible
That just one night,
You wouldn't have the Soul say,
"O my God,"
That you would pull and free him
From the dungeon of the body,
And be led to a large space?

When you untie the rope from your feet,
You'll fly to the sky.
Like the sky, you'll be immune
From wear and tear and all hazards.

You'll be saved from the sword of death.
You'll join the Union of Soul.
You'll be in such a garden
That fall's looking will never take place.

I'll be silent.
The silence that Love would tell to Love,
That would be a narration
Which would feed the Soul
And have no end.

146.

Verse 1920

△ Heart-catching smell has come from the sky,
Saving every tired, broken-hearted prey
From the trap of the flesh.

Every bird has gained hundreds of wings,
Keeps flying to the star of Pleiades.
Every weight, every mountain
Has started flying with its own weight.

Look at the birds of Abraham?[\[267\]](#)
Even though they were torn to pieces,
They came back flying.

I asked, "Oh particle, you have no wings, no head.
How do you fly?"
He said, "With the wind of Love."

From now on, you can hear no yell
But the shrill pipe from the city.
You can hear no cry
But the harp from the house.

The tambur[\[268\]](#) says,
"Life is our life,"
Then starts all the melodies.
The bee of the soul
Learned architecture from that honey.

Today, the Cupbearer,
Whose offers are as generous
And endless as the sea,
Has given up greatness
And mixed with ordinary people.

He whispers instigations
To the ear of chance and fate.
But today, we are saved from this sorrow,
O my God!

The singer of the Soul sings and blows
Like the Son of Mary.
The Cupbearer attacks like God's lion
Again and again,
Then offers wine,
Then attacks repeatedly.

If He breaks a few idols,
He then carves' hundreds more immediately.
If He breaks two or three jars,
It doesn't matter.
His ability, His art in making
New jars from kneaded mud
Hasn't been decreased.

O nightingale, you learned

All these beautiful melodies
Because of the rose.
But once you reach the Beloved,
You'll be with Him.
You will say very little
And forget all of them.

147.

Verse 1931

☞ If you go to the garden of Heart,
You'll have beautiful perfume like a rose.
If you fly to the sky,
Your face will turn into a moon like the angels.

You'll turn into light
Even if He burns you like oil.
You'll become like hair because of grief,
But they'll put you at the head of the table.
Like a candle, you'll illuminate the assemblies.

You'll become a Sultan.
You'll become supreme sovereignty,
Heaven, and an angel at the door of heaven.
You'll become sky and faith.
You'll turn into a lion
And, at the same time, a gazelle.

You'll leave place.
You'll go to the land of Absence.
You'll separate from yourself.
You'll go alone, walking without riding,
Without feet, like water in the river.

You'll become One like Heart and Soul,
You'll keep appearing even if you are invisible.
You'll become bitter-sweet, like wine.

You'll be free from the qualities
Of wetness and dryness, like Jesus.
You'll pierce the turbulence
And make a road of it.
You'll be free of dimensions;
Every side will become one for you.

You'll be free from desires
And the fancy of your insides.
You'll become empty.
You'll stay alive without breath.
You'll be plunged into the sea of Ya Hu,[\[269\]](#)
And then you'll quit saying, "Ya Hu."

You'll turn sweet into bitter
And hear all, from a distance.
When you reach the ninth level of the sky,
You won't be a curtain to the light.

Be a Sultan with a kingdom.
Reach the height. Become a moon.
How long will you keep searching
By saying, "Coo-coo," like the dove?

You'll become a window for every house.
You'll be a rose garden in every field.
If you leave your self, drop your existence,
You'll become Me without me.

Don't take the lead. Don't brag.
Be joyful, bend your head,
Like a branch of the peach tree.
Smile. Be beautiful.

You won't ask for light.
You won't need your self.
You'll look after
The feeding and care of the poor,
Like the Sultan.
You'll look for darkness, like the moon.

You won't look for Soul;
You'll give Soul.
You'll find a remedy for every ill.
Don't look for salve for your wounds.
You'll be salve for all wounds.

☞ want peace from You,
Understanding and Union.
You showed me a sign,
Said something about peace yesterday.

The Soul became so happy, so cheerful
That it started singing and playing.
That's His most important job,
To sing songs about peace.
Is there anything more important than that?

When the Soul is angry with someone,
The world becomes a jail for him.
When does the idea of getting along with body
Come to Soul, O my God?

When you're angry with someone,
You head somewhere else.
But if your head is angry with you,
What happens to peace?

If my Heart should kiss the hand of Union
While searching for You,
At that time it will also kiss the dust
Of the feet of peace
And keep kissing.

The goodness which the body does
Is always from the kindness of Soul.
Whenever I was generous,
This was the generosity of peace.

I cried like winter rain.
No leaves, no fruits. I am naked, new.
I want to dress in the kaftan of peace
And roar suddenly.

I would be Sultan.
To become Sultan to the Sultans,
I will do favors, even for the moon.
I will smile when I see the face of peace.

O Soul of hundreds of gardens
And hundreds of greens,
Come, give Your honor to this country.
When there is no room for peace

Because of my bad thoughts, bad measures,
Even then, be kind to me.

Come, give this charm to the earth
From unthinkable, unbelievable spring.
That way, there won't be a fog of grief
In the sky of peace.

It isn't good to have these fights and struggles
Against the sea of Soul.
It isn't good to do evil things,
To try and boast
Against the greatness of peace.

O one who does things beyond modesty,
Be silent. Don't even say one thing
With the tip of your lips
So that the prayer for peace becomes modest.

149.

Verse 1956

His image in the heart offers endless favors
So that you won't look anywhere else.

If you step out of this six-doored chapel, [\[270\]](#)
You'll meet the sufi whose fate is clean;
You'll reach His ecstasy.

You have a secret door.
Every night you flyaway through that door.
Don't look for six directions, six doors.

They tie an imaginary string to your feet
When you fly
So that you won't get lost.
They pull you back every morning
With that string.

This world looks like a womb.
That's why you're fed by blood.
Return to the dungeon of this womb
Until your creation is complete.

When the Soul grows wings,
The shell of the body is broken.
In order to show Cafer,
Become Ca'fer-i Tayyar.[\[271\]](#)

150.

Verse 1962

Spring has come, see?
The gardens and meadows are full
Of Houris [\[272\]](#) and fairies.
It's just like Solomon
Showing his ring to the army.

Rum-faced charmers were born
In the land of Ethiopia.
Just like you, many beautiful Moslems
Become faithful, cease to be infidels.

Look at the rose garden.
Watch the flowers of the pomegranate.
See the reflection of the Beloved on the water.
Admire these drunk, narcissus eyes.
Admire these red, rosebud lips.

Look at the petals of the rose.
How nicely gold and silver mix with each other.
They're like matchless jewels
Which came from no jeweler's art.

See the rose in the Soul of the nightingale.
See universal intelligence in that rose.
Fly from color to colorlessness.
Maybe you can find the road there.

The rose loots the mind.
Other flowers make signs as though saying,
"The One who made this painting, this form
Is here, right behind this curtain."

O One who gives peace to war,
Who brings water out of stone,
How do You bring all these colors
Out of this ordinary soil?

There is freshness in the branches,
Greatness and height in the cypresses,
Hundreds of beauties in the rose.
But, O Soul, you are altogether different.

It isn't the place for garden, valley and rose,
Nor the time for food and wine glasses,
Not even for Soul and universal intelligence,
Because you are better and more beautiful
Than the Soul of Soul.

151.

Verse 1971

If the garden knew Him,
Blood would drip from its fresh branches.
If the mind understood Him,
A river would overflow from its eyes.

If that beautiful piece of Moon
Ever rose and appeared
From the circle of sun,
Every particle would become
Leyla and Mecnun. [\[273\]](#)

If His treasures of mind
Would ever reflect down from one corner.
Hundreds of treasures of Karun [\[274\]](#)
Would be in every ruin.

If the Beauty reflected in the Heart
Were seen in the eyes,
Every person who washes the dirt from his face
Would become Seyh Zun-nun. [\[275\]](#)

O merchant who looks around,
How long will you keep looking?
If to reach the Beloved were so cheap,
The Beloved would come forward with that look.

When a new guest comes,
That blessing in the world is enough.
If more people come to earth,

More blessings will come.

152.

Verse 1977

Last night I saw the secret of Heart
On the face of the stone-hearted,
Ruby-lipped Charmer
Who offers belief to blasphemy,
Increases the faith of unbelievers.

Who will talk about Soul and Heart
In front of such a Beloved?
Who will mention gold and silver
In the presence of that silver statue of Beauty?

If Love had a mouth,
The whole world would become a morsel.
If Love had a door,
The Soul of Sultans
Would become doorkeeper at that door.

I used to hear people say, "Heart, Heart!"
It's happened to me so that I understand.
O the Beautiful to His Beauty,
Soul and Heart become ashamed.
O the Charmer with His love,
Even Duldul [\[276\]](#)
Becomes a donkey stuck in the mud.

O Soul, come gather pearls.
O Soul, come and see the Beauty,
Mercy from this disaster, from grief,
O Moslems.

Where is the body
That would spread under His cavalry of sorrows?
Where is the head that wouldn't bend
At the assembly of such a Sultan?

Earth will become green and beautiful.
Spring has come, friends,
Like the time of Union with my Beloved.
It is so sweet, so charming, like His ruby lips.

Every moment His face is asking me
If I have any beautiful-faced Beloved like Him.
My heart is asking Him,
"Do You have any servant like me?"

Friends, let's go to the rose garden.
Spring is here.
But You are my spring,
I don't look at anything else.

Flowers and fruits have air,
Tone and gracefulness.
But we are like water lilies around Your face
Which looks like a rose garden.

Nightingales are playing tambourines.
Leaves of the trees keep clapping their hands.
Every bud is asking,
"Is there a fresher, more beautiful bud, than I?"

That kind, gracious, green spring
Has come dragging its skirt,
Swaying from side to side
So that the garden would be adorned.
Birds have taken wing and are flying.

Spring has come so that people will be happy.
Out of obstinacy to the blind
Who don't see this face,
To the deaf
Who don't hear this voice,
Spring has come.
Our Beloved becomes Soul to our Soul.

If He is the Sultan in one place,
The rest of the Sultans
Become slaves and servants.
If He is the Beloved in one place,
Every Heart turns into Lover's grass.[\[277\]](#)

The specter of my Beloved
Walks, swaying in the Heart,
A moon which has
The greatest exaltation and beauty,
With favor and kindness

Like a magnificent Sultan.

153.

Verse 1992

☞ was looking for a buyer for my words,
Wanted someone who would have them.
Now, I want You to take my words.

I've carved so many idols
To deceive everyone,
But I'm tired of being Azer.[\[278\]](#)
Today, I am the drunk of Abraham.

Such an idol has come my way
That has no color, no smell.
I lost my words just by looking at Him.
You find another master for the house of idols!

I've given up the store, left words.
I appreciate the value of insanity.
I've given up the mind.

When a form comes to my Heart, I say,
"Go away, O One who made me lose my way."
If it moves slowly,
I crack and break it into pieces.

The One who becomes His Mecnun,[\[279\]](#)
Cannot deserve Leyla.
The One who comes from there,
Whose Soul belongs there,
His place is under the flag.

154.

Verse 1998

☞ turning those two to Kible [\[280\]](#) would go away
From mind and Soul for one moment,
Our mind would be Adam,
Our self would be Eve.

If Adam hadn't descended
From the canopy of Heart
And gotten stuck in this mud,
His holy teaching would be better
Than the attributes of God.

The one who falls in doubt and says,
"I don't believe that,"
If he would have believed
And surrendered like Abraham,
His shadow,
Which falls on the ground upside down,
Would have become a sun in the sky.

If the existence of body were annihilated,
Self would become exalted.
His head would reach the sky.
When completely he became Nothing,
He would reach the Union of Existence.

If there weren't weakness in the eyes
Of the self who looks like a bat,
Instead of one sun,
A hundred suns would rise
And add Soul to Souls.

If good and bad were the same
At the final time in God's place,
The devil would be as beautiful
As moon-faced Gabriel.

If man knew the secret,
Evil and benevolence wouldn't appear.
Everything he didn't know
Would appear, become obvious.

This sense of ours
Which looks and watches everything
Is in our trap, becomes our prisoner.
Since he doesn't see the truth of anything,
I wish he would go blind.

The feeling of the banal self
Is like a fly which has landed
On the side of the basin.

If the fly would choose a better place for landing,
It would immediately turn into a phoenix.

The stars resemble the bowls, those golden bowls.
They are adorned for the greedy ones.
It would be better
If they were not adorned or decorated.

Be silent. The word comes
From the land of Absence.
If your eyes are over there,
How can you fly there with words?

Because of Shems of Tebriz,
Know for sure that every particle
Is the light of certainty.
If the pleasure were in the talking and saying,
Every particle would start talking.

155.

Verse 2010

☞ brightness of every Heart's garden!
O window of every house!
Your sun shines in every particle,
Like a piece of pearl.

O One who comes to aide
Every helpless one,
The place for every homeless one,
You correct everything untidy.
You are the purpose and moral
Of every story.

O longing of the tall, straight cypress!
O brightness of the Sultan of Sultans!
I plead of You, give to Lovers
A Lover deserved by Lovers.

Your Love is in every head.
Your wine is on every lip.
Without the abundance of Your sherbet,
The world would become an empty glass.

Every king is Your pawn,
A lousy prey of Your falcon.
O the One who changes
Everyone and everything,
One situation to the other,
Becomes the chain for every insane one.

There is a fire for every light,
A thorn for every rose.
There is a snake in the ruins
To protect every treasure.

O One whose rose garden
Doesn't have thorns!
O One whose clean light has no fire!
There is no snake, no snake bite,
No teeth marks around Your treasure.

You set forth such drink,
Sow hundreds of seeds for testing.
You haven't left one rational man in our town.

Thoughts, arts, talents are all beautiful
Because they've taken color from Your Love.
Harp players play until dawn
In front of the rising moon of Your sky.

Wisdom and insanity are mixed with each other,
Joined and spread hundreds of appetizing meals
On Your way.
Thought is like a comb
Plunged into Your curly black hair.

O One whose eyes resemble narcissus,
Sleep becomes a thorn to my eye.
I see lots of dreams when I'm awake,
But I see behind the loaded bale.

Even if he has sour yogurt,
The grocery man's Heart
Is still with the customer.
His lips closed, he sits and waits
At the corner of the store,
Awake until morning.

In the morning, he runs for profit

And starts bargaining.
In the end, because of his customer,
His dried mints come to life
And become green, fresh mint.

O one who leaves the field
And sows wheat in the garbage place,
In the barren land!
O one who thinks light is a window!
You resemble a moth.

Some day He will dress you,
Give you power of description, explanation,
Join your particles with universal intelligence
And offer you a Beloved.

Be silent. You are saved from that.
You've jumped out of those traps.
You gave your Heart and Soul
To this seducing charmer.

156.

Verse 2026

☞'s only dawn, and the Cupbearer
Has already filled the glass.
He is as beautiful and bright
As the stars of Ursa Minor,[\[281\]](#)
Great as the cypress,
And sugar-lipped as a piece of the Moon.

His eyes are drunk. His curly hair,
Coming down on his forehead,
Resembles a trap.
He is help for the helpless.
The glass in His hand
Is a remedy for the sick one.

Black-eyed Houris [\[282\]](#) dance
In front of the sprinkling fountain,
Holding their harps on their arms
And playing at left and right
In the garden full of jasmine.

O sweet Cupbearer, pick up the glass
In spite of all the trouble and grief.
For the Soul of Ali[\[283\]](#) and Abu-l Ala[\[284\]](#) offer wine.

Turn like the sun in the sky, spread jewels.
Offer drink to the thirsty of this mean world,
To the occupants of this land of mud.

O the one who makes magic, who has talent,
O the one who is in the hand of insanity,
The time for work has arrived.
We are already the most competent ones
For that work.

I threw off the dress of modesty once.
I drank a glass, started Love-play
With a cruel, conceited, playful Beauty.

Even the ones in the sky
Are drunk from the smell of that wine.
Their heads are dizzy.
Every great person is prostrating
In front of my moon-faced Beauty
Like a drunk in ecstasy.

The seas of wine are flowing here and there.
Fifty rivers are in every garden.
Hit this jar on the stone and break it
For the obstinacy of mad people

Blessings and the elixir of Absence are raining.
The Sultans of drunkenness
Are met with large armies

If you see the ones who are passing
Above the roof,
You will tear down the tent of daily struggle,
Throw it in the fire.

The one who's called drunk
Goes like a ship up and down,
Wobbling on rough seas.
He goes like timber, awry, gnarled.

I ask, "O busy brave
Whose Soul has been saved from all ailment,

There is no door, no window.
How could you have freed yourself
From the dungeon of death?

"How have you been freed
From this bitter, sour earth;
From this old firmament who eats his own child;
From this place where he tells stories
And at the same time keeps silent,
A slave and at the same time a master?"

He told me, "The Sultan of the world
Secretly offered me a glass.
Once I drank, I turned into a star
Which goes around that town of Soul."

The entrance and exit are both concealed
In this world of trials.
They're hidden, well-covered
From men and women
At the wish of God.

Watch and see. There is no opening, no door.
How did I pass through?
How did I get out?
I'm like water
Which comes from a stone without a spring.

O taste of sugar,
Give some from this big earthen jar.
Like a mother, nurse me.
Pull, pick me up from the cradle.

O all the possessions,
The joy and pleasure of wise men!
O the One who adds more wonder
To the wonders of narcissus!
O the One who give sustenance
To that muddy world and those who live there,
The purpose of every idle one!

The thoughts of troubled ones
Are prostrating because of that wine
Which saves the person
From the guard, from thieves,
And the rest of the ordinary people.

O the glass which searches the Soul
And looks after the comfort of the wounded ones!
O the Cupbearer who has a face like the sun
And who keeps bleeding every star!

O One who gives sustenance to Hearts,
O One who becomes Soul
To the good and no-good ones!
You are the One who catches and loots
And, at the same time, over praises and calms.
You are straight sometimes,
Then reverse and become one with whom
It's hard to get along.

You give life to these forms.
You are the sound of Gabriel's trumpet.
You turn this world into the Day of Judgment,
Incite everyone against each other.
Your chain is like a necklace,
Every cabbar [\[285\]](#) gives Him honor.

You took away the smartest thought
From the Soul,
Diverted, dismissed the mind.
You gave smartness to the silly fool,
Made him tricky and deceitful.

He attacks the master, the pasha
To cut the neck of doubt,
To beat time on the head of mind,
Or to make a tune on the order of the deceitful.

Enough! Be silent, join the crowd.
Come where men and women are together.
You also make shapes and figures
At the place of the solitude of the Master
Who makes statues out of mud.
Then you break and throw all those figurines.

You talk and, at the same time, are silent
Like a rose.
You don't make a face.
You are at the top corner
Of the house of the Heart.
At the same time, You are at the highest summit

Like a flying bird.

157.

Verse 2053

All our belongings have been stolen
By a gentle, gracious, graceful charmer.
His deceits have not left
Even one carpet in the mosque.

The mantle of fate has been torn in ten pieces
Because of Him.
Kamer's [\[286\]](#) moon is pierced because of him.
What would happen if someone
As naive as I am
Were to fall into His hand?

He put fire to our aloe tree.
Our smoke went up to the sky.
The Cupbearer got rid of our useless works,
Wiped them out with that unseen wine.

It makes things difficult, staying at sea.
The Soul is telling the story of Heart.
Where is the Lover who gives his Heart?

The Lover who gives his Heart
Is not like you who goes about everywhere,
Then falls in one corner.
The true Lover has patience and persistence.

You are sad and sorrowful.
You've fallen into grief.
How can you be a Lover who has given his Heart?
You're either caught in the desire of a whore
Or caught in the anxiety of a pimp.

Shame on your beard, your cluttered beard.
In the end, you close your eyes
And open your mouth
To a lot of nonsense.

A good mind belongs on the other side,
Quick to see the outcome.

It is cleansed from greed, from lust.
It is ready to be a Lover.

Be silent. My Heart's bird
Is flying fast to the green.
It cannot be pawned to the book
Kept in a small room.

158.

Verse 2062

A deceitful, pickpocket
Has grabbed my skirt,
Pulling me toward an idol house.
I'm following this blood-thirsty one,
Like a skirt.

He pulls me up one minute;
The next, he lets me down.
One moment he makes himself drunk;
That drunk thinks only of himself.

I am in his hand, like a small crystal ball.
Like a fish, I am in his net.
I bend down to the well of Babel
Because of his magician's eyes.

He is my divinity, my humanity,
He is my two angels.
For the ones who get involved in bad deeds,
He is my ruby, he is my coral.

You look like beautiful water.
A moon in the sign of fire.
But you are a marble Heart
In the chest of the Beloved, like a rock.

I will tell you the secret
Of that world's treasure,
But give me time, a little time
So that I can come to myself.

I took the jar to the river
With the image of Your face.

I saw the reflection of light
Like a star on the water.

I said to myself,
"What I was looking for in the sky,
I found on the earth."
God's favor suddenly becomes help
For the helpless one.

I'm thanking God at the garden of Union.
In my hand is a sword made in India.
I will settle with the light
Of the rose-faced One.

I used to be bent down like a bow,
Under grief and sorrow.
Those times are gone.
My body was like a bone
In the hand of every greedy person, then.

My old bow became new with the order to exist.
It came from the curl of the Sultan's monogram.
Jesus started talking,
Even when He was tied to the cradle.

Such a fire was dropped in the Heart
That no bad person could stand in front of me,
No renegade could rebel.
There is no self left
That could be the source of malice.[\[287\]](#)

The world of Lovers is beautified.
The time has come for Lovers to be united.
Their hearts have been freed
From all instigators and troublemakers.

Soul won't turn under Soul, tasteful, graceful Soul,
Is turning above the arch, like fate.
It cannot come down
And make the lower place home.
Like the stars, Soul won't turn under the sky.

Mind and Soul have crowded
The plate of earth, like ants.
Secretly, a curtain is opened
To the ones looking for a crack there.

Now the rose sapling is free from the thorn,
Because it is sure of the Heart.
It doesn't have any enemies;
There is no one to gather the rose now.

Be silent, be silent, O Heart.
Become an eye like the language
Of the iris and narcissus.
Keep looking at the garden.

159.

Verse 2079

Last night, the Heart like a drunk
Had fallen here and there
Because of Him.
The Soul acquired hundreds of languages
Like the iris
Because of His stature,
Which resembles a rose sapling.

Hearts are like sugar,
Full of sweetness because of His lips.
But once He is hidden,
They start crying like Ferhad.[\[288\]](#)

This body, which is made of soil,
Becomes hundreds of heaven's gardens
Because of His favor.
The wind coming from His side
Enlivens death, makes Jesus jealous.

He shows a caliph, suddenly, from nature,
Which resembles the stoke hole of a bath.
Baghdad starts praising Him
Because of the head of the devouts.

The angels in the sky find
The pleasure of their rosaries
Because of the light of His face.
The eyes of guidance,
The light of showing the way,
Were given to the worshipers because of Him.

Thousands of Souls are around Him.
He is at the center like a moon.
Going by, swaying like a drunk.
God saves Him from evil eyes.

The brightness of the full moon
Comes from the glory of His face.
The smell and color of ambergris
Of the hair of Shimshad,[\[289\]](#)
Coming down on his forehead,
Are curls that are also from Him.

What would happen if the world were destroyed
Because of the soldier of Love's Sultan?
The Soul of Souls would create
Hundreds of worlds again.

Even those looks in the eyes
Which torture lovers, favor kindness to beauty,
Those charms still come from Him.

You stepped on the sky with coyness, greatness.
In one moment the earth should understand
That the Sultan of Beauty was born
From Him
And grew with His kindness.

Hundreds of idols and idol makers
Have fallen into commotion
Because of His beauty.
In the end, idol makers start yelling
And quit idol making.

What is that? What kind of sun is that,
Shining at the sky of Beauty?
Why did this Fountain of Life
Overflow and become a sea?

Someone put his head
On the cover of Shemseddin's saddle blanket
At the temple where He is served.
But who could that be?
Shemseddin is such a man
That even the Archangel Gabriel
Would spread his wings under His feet.

Because of Him, Tebriz may open its secret,
The Eyes of the Soul start seeing,
And the eyes of the ones who are jealous
Become totally blind.

159.[\[290\]](#)

Verse 3567

☞ Lover, Lovers, the time for Union has come.
A voice is heard from the sky, saying,
"O moon-faced ones, be ready."

O drunks, drunks, joy and pleasure
Come by holding His skirt.
He has held our chains.
We grabbed His skirt.

Fiery, strong red wine has come.
O grief, go to the corner and sit there.
O Soul who is thinking of death, go away.
O One who offers the wine, Cupbearer, come.

O my Beautiful!
Seven layers of sky are drunk
Because of You.
We are a crystal ball in Your hands.
Our being comes from Your Being,
Saying hundreds of thousands of times,
"Welcome," to this whole Being.

O sweet-breathed player,
Ring the bell every moment.
O drinking One,
Put the saddle on the horse.
Blow on our Soul,
O morning breeze.

O flute, the stories you tell us at night
Are so lovely.
Your Soul has the sweetness of sugar.
The smell of loyalty comes from your sounds
Day and night.

O beautiful-faced sun,
Start once more.
Play the same tunes.
Be coy with all the beautiful ones.

Be silent. Don't tear the curtain.
Drink from the glass
From which the silent ones drink.
Cover the others' faults.
Get into the habit of God.

160.

Verse 3775

☞ told the beloved yesterday,
"O, peerless Beauty,
Even the moon has become jealous of you
And is folded in two in the sky."

You were beautiful.
Now your beauty has increased a hundred fold.
You were the doorkeeper.
Now you've become a Sultan.
You resembled Joseph.
Now you've acquired the glow of Mustafa [\[291\]](#)
And His manner.

O Fairy, let me praise you tonight,
Because tomorrow
You cannot be described by words.
While describing you,
Tomorrow, earth and sky
Will disappear altogether.

Let me take the opportunity tonight.
I will be your servant, your slave.
Tomorrow the angel will pass out of himself.
The Arsh [\[292\]](#) will be torn.

Suddenly, a storm breaks out,
Leaving no door, no roof.
How could a fly be able to fly?
Not even an elephant could withstand it.

Suddenly, His beauty, His light
Shines inside of this storm.
Every particle smiles with joy,
With the light of the morning sun.

Those poor particles regain their beauty
And their charm
From that one whose face is like the sun
And become attractive particles again.

161.

Verse 3582

☞ I am at the head of the table
Of His favor and loyalty every night.
I am the guest of the Sultan every night.
I am the guest of the One
Whose kingdom would be eternal.

One night, a monkey sat at the lion's table.
Don't insist, be fair.
Where is the monkey?
Where is the lion?

Even the heart of the brave
Is scared by the sword of the Sultan,
Of bleeding drop by drop.
What insolence is this?
In God's name, this is not right,
It is not right.

It's alright if a lion cub
Claws its mother's face.
But if you aren't your own enemy,
Don't even try to play with Him.

The one who drinks milk from the lion
Becomes a lion.
He isn't human anymore.
I have seen so many human-shaped creatures.
They were really monsters.

Noah was in the shape of a human,

But he was the flood who wiped out humans.
If there is a fire in one particle,
It must be the light in there.

I am a sword. I shed blood.
I am soft and, at the same time, hard and sharp.
I resemble this temporary world,
Pretty outside, troubles inside.
I am Absence in reality.

162.[\[293\]](#)

Verse 3589

☞ wayward, amiable friend,
The one who became insane!
His cup had fallen from the roof,
His secret became known.
Here, look. Once he was sent
To the lunatic asylum.

He was looking for water
By turning around the pool like a thirsty One.
Suddenly he fell into Our pool
And, like dry mint,
Got wet and became relish for our bread.

O learned man, don't take these words seriously,
Close your ears, don't hear this spell.
He became a legend with our spell.
What has happened to him
Has become a story for everyone.

People won't forget this.
Ears won't get free of this earring,
Because He took thoughts
And intelligence from heads
And poured them into a cup
Like grain ready to become ground in the mill.

O Soul, don't take this too lightly.
Don't think it is just play.
Try to work with your Soul,
Take a personal interest in that.
So many combs turned upside down

Because of His black curly hair.

Don't be over-confident with your mind.
So many masters in this world
Stand upright, wail
And cry more than the pole of Hannane. [\[294\]](#)

I've been separated from Soul.
I tore my clothes like a rose.
I became such a shape
That even my mind became a stranger to me.

That drop of mind
Has been annihilated in His sea.
That particle of Soul has been spent and depleted
On the way to the Beloved.

I should be silent,
What's the use of this candle
In front of the One whose light
Makes the sun and moon like a moth?
I should extinguish this candle.

163.

Verse 3598

This Love puts a tray on top of His head
And walks around from street to street, yelling,
"Wherever there is death, I will give life,"
Adding, "No cheating, no deceit."

He continues, "I become a meal with My favors,
My kindness goes around,
But never comes to an end.
Where is the beggar who would
Come and fill his bag?"

"I overwhelm you with pearls,
Sometimes with poison.
Recognize Me, know Me.
You are like a bushel in My hand.

"I will make gold mines
If a small grain comes and submits itself to Me.

If there is a steep, bare hill,
I'll make an endless sea of it.

"Poverty is from you, favor from Me.
You'll be satisfied; I'll give away a fortune.
I'll put out hundreds of satins for the silkworm,
Dress him with hundreds of heavy garments.

"I give such a crop to helpless ones
Who have never sown nor harvested;
I give such a feeling to the dervish
Who has neither suffered nor struggled.

"I'll pour a fountain of sweets
On the narrow heart of sugar cane.
I'll put nice, happy thoughts
In the mind.

"Ride your horse in the way of religion,
If your horse gets hurt, don't worry.
You'll find Yilki, [\[295\]](#) a wild, unbroken horse,
Instead of a pure one."

Be silent, don't say, "It is not like that."
Don't look for anything but God's favor.
The Halva [\[296\]](#) of contention
Is overflowing from the pot to the fire.

See every particle to know of a certainty
From the light of God's Shems of Tebriz.
Every particle starts talking
If there is pleasure in talking.

The end of

Bahr-i Recez

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "I don't like anything to set." This refers to a story about Abraham's disappointment that the sun and moon, which at first he thought were God, always set and about his desire for a permanency in God. Koran VI, 76-79.

[2] "You have created...": Refers to story of creation as described in the Koran, VII, 10; X, 3; XI, 7; XX, 59; XXXII, 3; L, 38; LII, 4.

[3] "The beginning..." Koran, XXII, 1.

[4] "Compassion of the universe": Koran, XXI, 107.

[5] Dal: Eighth letter in the Arabic alphabet. A line descends slightly to the right, then curves left.

[6] Elif: First letter in the Arabic alphabet. A straight vertical line.

[7] Hodja: Slang for man.

[8] Sheddad: Founder of the city of Irem who announced himself as God. Koran LXXXIX, 7.

[9] Nemrud: Ruler of Keldenishtan in the time of Abraham who threw Abraham into the fire. God turned the fire into a rose garden. Koran XXI, 57-70.

[10] "God does whatever He desires": Koran XIV, 27.

[11] Ayse: The name of the hodja's lover.

[12] Kible: Direction to Mecca for Muslim praying.

[13] Remil: Arabic word meaning sound. Ancient way of fortune-telling based on sounds.

[14] "Woe to every slanderer and defamer": Koran CN, 1, 2.

[15] Parrot: Koran, XI, III, 49-110.

[16] Ferhad & Shirin: Persian love story.

[17] Leyla & Mecnun: Arabic love story.

[18] Karun: According to legend, an exceedingly rich man who hid his treasures.

[19] Sheyyad: A musician, minstrel.

[20] Reward of Love: Koran, L, 11-21.

[21] Mustef'ilun: This represents the meter of this portion of the poetry of the Divan-i Kebir.

[22] Staff: The rod of Moses.

[23] Rinds: Certain type of Sufi.

[24] Mustafa: The Prophet Mohammed.

- [25] Shuayb: Father-in-law of Moses.
- [26] Beyazid: Bistami, died in 874 A.D.
- [27] Kible: Direction Muslim faces when praying.
- [28] "God's compassion..." Koran XXI, 107.
- [29] "Two arrow throws..." Koran LIII, 9.
- [30] "Level of much closer": Koran LIII, 9.
- [31] Mescid-i Aksa: The chapel of Jerusalem.
- [32] Houris: Beautiful women in heaven.
- [33] Hel-eta: Mature man. Koran LXXVI, 1.
- [34] "God does whatever..." Koran III, XIV, 27.
- [35] Gazel20: Recited at the wedding of Mevlana's son Veled.
- [36] Huma: Legendary bird which eats bone. The person on whom she casts her shadow becomes a Sultan. Also called stately bird.
- [37] Nesrin: A variety of rose.
- [38] Sema: Ritual of the Whirling Dervishes.
- [39] Halva: Sweetmeats.
- [40] Berbad: Musical instrument. Bârbet
- [\[41\]](#) Hel-eta: A mature man, mentioned in the Koran LXXVI, 1
- [42] "God is the only one..." A saying called "Lahavle" attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.
- [43] "You give Your kingdom..." Koran III, 26.
- [44] God does whatever..." Koran III, XIV, 27.
- [45] Lahavle: Praise.
- [\[46\]](#) Helie: Medicinal herb called terminalia.
- [47] Hel-eta: A mature man, mentioned in the Koran LXXVI, 1.
- [48] Oshur: A 10 percent tax owed to the government.
- [49] Nun & elif: Arabic letters.

[50] Rabbena: A name of God.

[51] Lebbeyk, Lebbeyk: "I accept Your invitation." As pilgrims turn around Mecca, they say these words.

[52] "He doesn't need..." Samed. Name of God mentioned in the last chapter of the Koran and the second verse names of God which mean, "Everything, everybody needs Him, but He needs none."

[53] Asaf: Vizier of Solomon.

[54] "Giant fairies..." Koran, XXXVIII, 31-33.

[55] Cigil: A city in Central Asia.

[56] Zunnar: A rope girdle formerly worn by early Christians in Turkey.

[57] Deccal: A legendary one-eyed evil person who will come just before the world ends.

[58] Vamik & Azra: Persian love story written by Unsuri (d. 1040). Lovers like Romeo and Juliet.

[59] Bayazid: Melometi Sufi who died in 875.

[60] Senai: Died in 1130.

[61] Attar: Died in 1221.

[62] Arsh: Throne of God. Ninth level of sky.

[63] Hel-eta: Koran LXXVI, 1.

[64] Abu-Ali, died 1037. Famous philosopher Ibn-sina.

[65] Abu-l Ala, died 1057. Famous poet Al-Maari.

[66] "God does whatever...": Koran III, XIV, 27.

[67] Abu-l Hasan: An Arabic philosopher.

[68] Abu-l Ala: An Arabic poet. Died 1057 (Ibn-i sina), 1037 (Abu-l Malri).

[69] "Stay away..." Hadis (Al-Dimna).

[70] "Apples": The story of Joseph and Zeliha. Women cut their hands because they were peeling apples and trying to watch the beauty of Joseph at the same time. Koran XII, 30-31.

[71] Hel-eta': A mature man.

[72] Ihvan-i Sefa: Clean brothers, Sufis on the same road, a secret Moslem sect which applies pre Christian Greek philosophy to Moslem.

[73] Hizir: Legendary person who attained immortality by drinking the water of life and comes to aid in

a critical moment.

[74] Kible: Direction Moslems face to pray.

[75] "God's lion...": Signifies Khalife Ali.

[76] "Melt & cast...": Koran XXXIV, 10-11.

[77] Suha: A small star in Ursa Major.

[78] Leyla & Mecnun: Famous Arabic love story.

[79] "Game...": Arabic saying.

[80] "Time...": Arabic saying.

[81] "Israelites...": Story from Koran.

[82] "You will be...": Koran V, 24.

[83] Hodja: Slang for man.

[84] Galinos: Famous doctor who lived in the city of Bergama and who died in 131 A.D.

[85] "Patience is the key...": Old saying.

[86] Throne of God: Koran II, 255.

[87] Min ledun: According to Sufis, a knowledge comes to the Heart without books or teacher. Based on Koran XVIII, 65.

[88] Rinds: Certain Sufis. A jolly, humorous, unconventional man.

[89] Kurban bayram: Moslem festival of sacrifice. Tenth day of Arabic month, Zilhicce

[90] Door of heaven: Ridvan.

[91] Moor hen: Seagull.

[92] Husrev: A Persian mythological hero.

[93] Ferhad: Persian love story.

[94] Mecnun: Arabic love story.

[95] Vamik: Love story.

[96] Gazel 39: Written about the return of Shems from Damascus.

[97] Saffron: Old saying. Saffron made people laugh.

[98] Bedehsan: City famous for its rubies.

- [99] "His eyes...": Koran LIII, 17.
- [100] Nimrod: An impious king who is said to have cast Abraham into the flames.
- [101] Rustem: A legendary man with great power.
- [102] Kevser: River of heaven.
- [103] Indian: Symbolizes night. The Turk symbolizes day or brightness.
- [104] Kadir: The night the Koran came to Muhammad.
- [105] Fairies: Old folk tale. The fairies lived around fountains and waterfalls.
- [106] Hurmuz: City in Central Persia.
- [107] Urbuz: The name of a Mongol ruler of this time.
- [108] Oguz: An old Turkish tribe.
- [109] Bulgar: A Turkish tribe.
- [110] "I make an oath...": Koran XC, 1.
- [111] Edhemogul: Died in Damascus, 777-778. His life resembles Buddha's.
- [112] Kevser: The river of heaven.
- [113] Hakan: Head of the Khan.
- [114] Sencer: Ruler of Khorosan Selcuks from 1117 to 1157.
- [115] Kible: Direction that Moslems pray.
- [116] Elif: First line of Arabic alphabet. A straight line.
- [117] Cim: A letter from the Arabic alphabet. A curved line.
- [118] Cam: A wine glass.
- [119] Kible: Direction Moslems pray.
- [120] Muhre: Burnished glass ball used to polish paper.
- [121] Five and six: The five senses and six dimensions.
- [122] "Food rained...": Koran II, 57.
- [123] "Produce no harm": Khadis AI Cami al sagiyr II, p. 192.

- [124] Rafizi: The one who quit. Later Suni called him Shii.
- [125] Omer: First with Suni.
- [126] All: Considered first by Shii.
- [127] Leyla and Mecnun: Arabic love story.
- [128] Harun: Legendary rich man from Moses' tribe. Koran XXVIII, 76-82.
- [129] Cim; sad; elif; nun: Letters of the Arabic alphabet combined to resemble the face.
- [130] Mecnun: Arabic love story.
- [131] Cim: Curved letter in Arabic alphabet.
- [132] Hızir: Legendary figure who is a Godsend.
- [133] "His mole on your cheek": Refers to spots on the moon.
- [134] Cem: A mythological Persian king.
- [135] Yurt: Tent or country.
- [136] "I'll fill...": Mevlana put dirt to Kemal-i Kowval. Menakubil-Arifin T.Yazici. P. 94-86, 1-942.
- [137] Kevser: River of heaven.
- [138] Sencer: Selcuk king (d. 1167).
- [139] Min ledun: According to Sufis, the knowledge which comes to the Heart without teachers or books. Based on Koran XVIII, 65.
- [140] Kaaba: Direction.
- [141] Elif: Letter of the Arabic alphabet.
- [142] Husameddin Hasan: Died 10/25/1284. Precursor of Mesnevi. He followed the path of Mevlana with Sultan Veled after the death of Mevlana.
- [143] Verses 896-898 (gazel 71) do not appear in Golpınarlı's translation of Di'van-i Kebir. Most probably, this is due to misnumbering.
- [144] "From the Soul's sweetmeat...": Taalav. Koran III, 61-64, 167; IV, 61; V, 104; VI, 151; LXIII,S).
- [145] Cem: Mythological Persian king.
- [146] Elest: "Am I not your God"? Koran VII, 171-173. "
- [147] Bairam: Religious holiday.

[148] Asaf: The vizier of Solomon.

[149] Isfahan: Mode of Near-Eastern music.

[150] Kullah: A conical hat.

[151] In Golpinarli's translation of Di'van-i Kebir, there is no gazel⁸³. Most probably, this is due to misnumbering.

[152] Harut-Marut: Two angels in the Koran who blamed the people for being bad. God told them it was because the people had lust. The angels couldn't understand, so God gave them lust and sent them to earth, to Babel. During the day they would teach magic, and at night they would get in trouble with women. One angel wanted a woman's favor, and in order get it, he taught her the names of God. When she went up to the sky, God punished her and made her the planet Venus. When asked what kind of punishment the angels on earth would get, God caused them to be hung upside down at the well in Babel. Magicians still go to the well hoping to learn tricks. Koran II, 102.

[153] Tacik: Tribe in Central Asia.

[154] "Where is the sky, where is the rope?": Old Persian proverb.

[155] Batha: Another name of Medina.

[156] Kafdagi: Fabulous mountain inhabited by Donjinns.

[157] Kible: The direction for Moslem prayer.

[158] Ahmed-i Muhtar: The Prophet Muhammad, Koran LXI, 6.

[159] Hayder-i Kerrar: A hero who attacks like a lion, back and forth.

[160] Israfil: Angel who blows the trumpet on judgment day.

[161] Leylek: Stork.

[162] Vulture star: Name given a certain star in the west side of the sky.

[163] Reveal: This order comes from God to the Prophet Muhammad many places in the Koran.

[164] Houris: Beautiful women in heaven.

[165] Hızir: A legendary Godsend who attained immortality by drinking from the water of life and comes to aid in a critical moment.

[166] Isfahan: Name of a city in Persia.

[\[167\]](#) Me'va: One of the eight paradises where martyrs and prophets are allowed to go.

[168] Syriac: Northern Iraqi Christian.

[169] Abu-Hurayra: Muhammad's disciple. Nicknamed "father of cats." He used to carry a leather bag. He said, "I received two bags full of knowledge from God's messenger: one for people; the other, I

couldn't say. (d. 677).

[170] Lahavle: The beginning of the Koran states that only God makes it possible to change from one condition to another.

[171] Verses 1180 & 1181 were included in Farsi in Golpinarli's translation of Di'van-i Kebir as follows: 1180: Iy bes ki ez avaz-i dus vamendeem ez rah men/ ey bes ki ez avazi kos gum kerddem hargah men. 1181: Key varehani zin kosem/ Key varehani zin dusem ta deressem/ Der dovletet der man/O hirmangah men.

[172] Yemen: The country.

[173] Sea of Adan: A gulf from whence the best pearls come.

[174] Hasan: Common name.

[175] Macun: A sweet fruit with medicinal value.

[176] Ceyhun: A river in southeast Turkey.

[177] Leyla & Mecnun: Arabic love story.

[178] Ca'fer-i Tayyar: Flying Cafer, one of the uncles of Muhammad who lost his arms in war. The Prophet said he will have wings in heaven.

[179] "Owner of this watering sky": Koran LI, 7.

[180] "We have heard": Koran II, 285; III, 193; XXIV, 51.

[181] Ferhad: Persian love story.

[182] Mecnun & Leyla: Arabic love story.

[183] Four foundations: Fire, air, water and earth.

[\[184\]](#) Jaw bending: Sign of contempt.

[185] Tie the jaw: Moslems tie the jaw of a corpse.

[186] "I created the skies because of You": Khadis-i Kutsi.

[187] Mecnun & Leyla: Arabic love story.

[188] Uhud: Mountain near Medina.

[189] The sky has been described in the Koran XIII, 2; XXXI, 10.

[190] Pivot: According to Sufis, the universe is a body for humans. Humans are the soul of the universe. There is one Man among humans who is the soul of humanity. All the Universe turns around him. He is like a Pivot. That's why he is called (Kutup) Pivot. He turns around himself.

[191] Hasan or Abu-l Hasan: Husameddin. Follower of Mevlana. Precursor of Mesnevi. Succeeded him. (d. 1284). Koran XXXVI, 26.

- [192] Yemen: The country.
- [193] Leyla & Mecnun: Arabic love story.
- [194] "I accept Your invitation": Lebbeyk, Lebbeyk, or Pilgrim's yell.
- [195] Nev-ruz: New day when the sun enters the sign of Aries. The beginning of spring.
- [196] "And the last one went further": Ahadis-i Masnavi, p. 67-68.
- [197] "Truly we did open...": Koran XLVIII, 1.
- [198] "We stay in line": Koran XXXVII, 165.
- [199] Rustem: Persian mythological hero.
- [200] "We'll return to Him": Koran II, 156.
- [201] Forelock: Koran XCVI, 15-16.
- [202] Shahne: Police magistrate.
- [203] Ishmael: Son of Abraham.
- [204] Circis: A prophet who was killed by his people seventy times and came back to life seventy times.
- [205] Semurg: The fabled King of the Birds.
- [206] Sunbule: The sign of Virgo.
- [207] "...my tribe knew...": Koran, XXXVI, 26.
- [208] Mustef'ilun: This represents the meter of this portion of the poetry of the Divan-i Kebir.
- [209] Vessel: We created man, and we know what doubt his self gives to him, and we are closer to him than his carotid artery. Koran, 50-16.
- [210] "Going under the basin": To extinguish the candle.
- [211] Abu-l Ala & Abu-l Hasan: Abu-l Ala was an Arabic poet. Abu-l Hasan was an Arabic philosopher.
- [212] Hutun: Chinese beauty.
- [213] Mustafa: The Prophet Muhammad.
- [214] "...become apparent": David asked, "My God, why did you create man?" God said, "I was a hidden treasure. I wanted to be known. I created man." Badi-al Zaman Firuzan-fer, Ahadis-i Masnavi, 29.
- [215] Dal: the 8th Arabic letter of the alphabet. The beginning of prayer.

[216] Oxen of body: Sign of Taurus.

[217] Hyacinth-like eyebrows: Sign of Virgo.

[218] Rustem: A legendary man with great power.

[219] Mecnun & Leyla: Arabic love story.

[220] Hu: Beginning of a Dervish chant.

[221] "Four overflowing rivers": Before his ascension, the Archangel Gabriel showed four rivers to the Prophet Muhammad. Two of them were the Euphrates and Tigris. The other two were the rivers in heaven.

[222] "...should soil his beard": Not a complete translation. This verse in Farsi is: *Iy kun-i har kez hasidi isi buved tesvis-i u Sed Kiri har der kun-i u sed suz-i sek der ris-i u.*

[223] "More deviate than animals": Koran VII, 179.

[224] The elephant of Soul: According to folklore, when the elephant sees India (its own country), it becomes exuberant.

[225] Kadir: The night of Kadir. The night the Koran is revealed to the Prophet.

[226] Pole of Hannane: Crying pole. Prophet Muhammad leaned on it while giving his sermon. It was a branch of a date tree. Later they built a pulpit in the mosque and, according to legend, a crying noise came from that pole. The crying stopped when the Prophet put his hand on the pulpit.

[227] Ruh: Name of legendary bird like the phoenix, able to catch an elephant. One of the chess characters is named for it.

[228] Ibrahim Edhem: d. 777-778 in Damascus. Like Buddha, this son of a king gave up everything for the way of Truth.

[229] Abu-Bakr: Flying from Mehhhe, the Prophet stayed in a cave with him on the way to Mechna.

[230] The 7th & 10th verses of this gazel were recited during a Sema. (Eflaki-T. Yozici, 20-a)

[231] "We dressed in paper clothes": In these days, someone with a grievance who wanted to get the attention of the ruler would dress in paper clothes and put a candle on top. (Golpinarli)

[232] Rum: People from the land of Rome. (Asia Minor, denotes day, light.)

[233] Zenci: Denotes black, night, darkness.

[234] Hızir: A legendary Godsend who attained immortality by drinking from the water of life and comes to help in a critical moment.

[235] Hızir: See footnote #234.

[236] Hamel: Sign of the zodiac.

[237] Sunbule: Sign of the zodiac. Virgo.

[238] Hakan: Oriental potentate.

[239] Mansur: Hallaj Mansur: Famous Mystic who was killed in 922 because of his beliefs.

[240] Heten: A generous man who lit campfires at night for those who had lost their way.

[241] Abu-Bakr: Flying from Mehhe, the Prophet stayed in a cave with him on the way to Mechna.

[242] Hakan: Oriental potentate.

[243] Leyla & Mecnun:, Arabic love story.

[244] "Come": Taalav: Koran III, 61-64; IV, 61; V, 104; VI, 151; LXIII, 5.

[245] Kharezm: Rulers in Central Asia in 12th & 13th centuries.

[246] Keyhusrev: Persian king (d. 519) who took Babel in 554, freed the Jews and united Persia with Mesopotamia. Persian name is Kurus-i Kebir.

[247] Tablets of God's decree: Levh-i Mahfuz.

[248] Mustef'ilun, Mustef'ilun: This represents the meter of this portion of the poetry of the Divan-i Kebir.

[249] The numbering "Verse 1712" appears twice in G6lpinarli's translation of Di'van-i Kebir, as the last verse of gazel132 and again as the first verse of gazel133, most probably due to misnumbering.

[250] Verse 1756 does not appear in G6lpinarli's translation of Di'van-i Kebir, most probably due to misnumbering.

[251] Hasbek: Someone close to the palace.

[252] Taylasan: Material which turns around a turban and then connects with the hands and waist.

[253] Azer: This name is mentioned in Koran VI, 74. May be uncle of the Prophet Abraham.

[254] Halva: Sweetmeats.

[255] "God has brought": Koran II, 3.

[256] "On the glass of the bath": It was an old custom that the glass on public baths had drawings. Sa'di (d. 1293) mentioned that someone saw satan in his dream as a handsome young man, and he said to the devil, "Why do they draw your ugly picture on the glass of the bath?" The devil answered, "What can I do? The pen is in the hand of others."

[257] "Really, we will return...": Koran II, 156.

[258] Zun-nun: Letter of Arabic alphabet.

[259] La: No, absent.

[260] Illa: There is nothing but Him.

[261] Mescid-i Aksa: Holy shrine in Jerusalem.

[262] "God is calling": Koran II, 221; X, 25.

[263] Shuayb: The father-in-law of Moses.

[264] Medrese: Moslem theological school.

[265] Travel: Koran III, 137; VI; XVI, 36-20; XXV, 42.

[266] Remil: Sand. Denotes old fortune telling with sand.

[267] Birds of Abraham: Abraham asked God how He brought death to life. God said, "Go get four birds. Tear them to pieces and put them on top of the mountain. Now call them." And four birds came flying. Koran II, 260.

[268] Tambur: Stringed instrument.

[269] Ya Hu: Names of God.

[270] Six-doored chapel: Earth. The five senses and six dimensions.

[271] Ca'fer-i Tayyar: Flying Cafer, one of the uncles of Muhammad who lost his arms in war. The Prophet said he will have wings in heaven.

[272] Houris: Beautiful women in heaven.

[273] Leyla & Mecnun: Arabic love story.

[274] Karun: Legendary rich man. Moses' cousin.

[275] Seyh Zun-nun: Melameti Sufi (d. 859).

[276] Duldul: White horse of the Prophet.

[277] Lover's grass: A kind of grass which fades quickly.

[278] Azer: This name is mentioned in Koran VI, 74. May be uncle of the Prophet Abraham.

[279] Leyla & Mecnun: Arabic love story.

[280] Kible: Direction Muslims face to pray.

[281] Ursa Minor: Star of Ul-ker.

[282] Houris: Beautiful women in heaven.

- [283] Abu-Ali, died 1037. Famous philosopher Ibn-sina.
- [284] Abu-l Ala, died 1057. Famous poet Al-Maari.
- [285] Cabbar: Bully.
- [286] Kamer's Moon: Sign of zodiac. Cancer.
- [287] "Source of malice...": Koran XII. 53. Nefsi emmare.
- [288] Ferhad & Shirin: Persian love story.
- [289] Shimshad: Gracefully grown young person.
- [290] The following gazels were translated by G6lpinarli at a later date than the rest of this meter, Bahr-i Recez. The numbering is his. The numbering for gazel 159 appears twice, first as beginning with verse 2079, and second, as beginning with verse 3567.
- [291] Mustafa: Prophet Muhammad.
- [292] Arsh: Ninth heaven. Throne of God.
- [293] Gaze1162: According to Eflaki, this gazel was told to one of the Katib-al-esrd (The Secretary of Secrets). Eflaki said that Fahreddin Sivasi (45b-46 1259) changed some words while copying Mevlana's words and became insane.)
- [294] Pole of Hannane: Crying pillar (pole) while the Prophet Muhammad was preaching.
- [295] Yilke: Wild, unbroken horse.
- [296] Halva: Sweetmeat.

Meter - 2

1.

Verse 2093

For some time he has poured
 So much wine on our soil
 That there is a yell and scream
 In every particle of our earth and body.

Our chest is split wide open.
 Our hearts start weaving love

With the Almighty's cup.
Our glass is cleaned and purified.

Though flowers have bloomed,
Bad eyes don't see them.
Zeal says to me, "Don't drool, drink the wine."

O Soul, as soon as you appeared
You snatched my heart and soul.
Because you were the customer,
The garment became valuable.

Your cloud rains grass.
Your glass gives soul.
Your trouble sets inside so nicely,
Don't add anymore.

O love, I will be drunk with your wine
As long as I am alive.
When I approach the "He-drew-near-then-nearer" level.[\[1\]](#)
I am exalted with your kindness,
I am down with your kindness.

How can I call you moon?
The moon has fever and becomes pale.
It is true I could call you cypress,
But the cypress can be burned.

The moon hasn't shown the last three nights.
There is no substance to anything
But the source of the source of the soul.

The moon and sun eclipse.
If you are the Abraham of the time,
Tell them you don't want them.
Turn your face away from them.

They say, "All our friends have died, are gone."
The one who loves God
Lives with His love and never dies.

The fountain of life is God.
The soul will be slave to
The one who escapes to God.
Gabriel will be his nanny.

Beside the laughter which comes from Soul
With the Grace of God,
The laughter of these people
Is like lightning,
It comes and goes.

2.

Verse 2105

☪, watermaster, open the fountain.
Let the garden be awakened,
The eyes of the flower be opened.

In the darkness of your eyes
Your kindness is hidden
Like the fountain of life.
With those pupils, he turns the eyes
Into a sea.

Without your favor,
Neither the people, nor the embryo
Inside the womb would move.

Moving in the womb or in absence is nothing.
Even the bones in the grave
Dance with your radiance.

We dance around a lot
With the tunes of this world.
Come on friends, be ready
For the dance in another world.

Souls are moving with these rough, coarse covers.
Once they throw these heavy covers off,
Watch their dances.

Before birth, we were kicking
And moving in the darkness
Of the womb
Just to express our sincere thanks.

We are all Sufis
Who came dancing from the dervish convent
To give thanks for these free blessings.

It is proper to give our life
For these blessings.
What is life for
But this generous treasure?

The sky is the top of this cup,
Which contains earth's blessings.
How can I talk about the dining table?

We are Sufis on the journey.
Eat the blessings of our Sultan.
May God make this cup,
This table, eternal.[\[2\]](#)

We have nothing but an empty cup
To hold the Sultan's favors.
We have no profit
But to extend our cup
For those blessings.
In any case, the wrong one
Could not get this bowl, this bread.

To the fly-the creature which
Gives shame to the host
There is no difference between
A bowl full of blessings
And an empty, dirty one.

But the true one sometimes
Bites his tongue,
Even without seeing and tasting,
And keeps his silence.
At other times, he starts talking
And praising them.

3.

Verse 2119

☞ expelled all the philosophical denials
From my heart entirely.
I purified my heart entirely
I put the forms that belonged to Joseph
In my eye.

It should be a beauty unseen
And impossible worlds to praise
Like Adam in front
Falls down and worships.

This is an imperial cipher.
With a kind of radiance of its own.
Every moment gives a glow.
Every extinguished light.
Bum them, light them.

When the sun rises,
Every particle appears.
It would be necessary that a secret particle
Would need another light to shine.

The source of existence is that
Sea of abundance which has
Been catching all unseemly things.

4.

Verse 2124
Terci-Bend

☯ sparing cupbearers,
Love is increased.
And increased again.
Give color to these pale faces.

O, Master of cupbearers,
O, One who holds
The hand of my soul,
O, my Master,
This is the time for business.
Act bravely.

Beloved, the mind is your drunk,
So is the soul.
What are you holding in your hand?
Bring it forth, put it in front.
Don't hide it.

O, One who makes the sky restless,

The mind drunk,
Open your arms just once.
I fell in depression, depression.

O; greatest of Futu-i vet [\[3\]](#)
O, introduction of the Books of the Prophet,
O, Sultan of humanity,
Don't eat halva alone.

You have escaped from us
And gone far away,
Holding a mirror to hide
Your face from others.

O, One whose face
Is like the sun,
They open a window at every stop,
Every staging place,
So the Universe will be illuminated by You.

If you don't drink this,
And have no mercy for me,
I'll write a new Terci.
Maybe you'll be enthusiastic with that one.

* * * * *

O; light of the eyes of Soul,
You'll guide us like eyes.
The Soul tried that, O Beloved.
You are adding soul to his Soul.

Wherever Soul turns its face,
It turns to You,
But still doesn't know
Where You are, O Soul.

Wherever You are, You call
Elest's invitation. [\[4\]](#)
You make us drunk,
Give us existence
With Your generosity and kindness.

You give temptation to the heart.
Pull in every direction.
Sometimes You lead us to the bottom,

At other times, drag us to joy and happiness.

If you want to help, gain something.
Hopelessness will cease immediately.
Even the dog that took refuge in your cave
Became a saint.[\[5\]](#)

When a man runs that direction,
The moon rises from Your sky
And reflects on him, lighting his way.
He acquires the property of Absence
And the mind of consent.

Who can tell anything about Him?
When the needy look for Him,
He fills their pockets with gold.
When the poor look for Him,
Just to be kind, He acts like a beggar.
He becomes the beggar's beggar.

Now, tell all its branches and roots
In different ways.
Show this hidden sea.
Bring its track to the surface.

* * * * *

When I start to talk
About the Beloved,
I lose my heart.
Once I lose myself,
How can I look for Him?

It is all His decision.
What do I say?
For what do I search?
He is the cupbearer.
He is the final One.
I am only a ladle.

If I am a thorn, a porcupine,
You turn me into silk.
I have a thousand layers.
I became a string on this road.

If I kiss you once,

I will become the Holy Ghost, like Jesus.
If I smell your apple,
I will give my soul, like Moses.

I am an old ruined house,
Saved for your treasure.
You are the fountain of life.
I lay under your feet, like a river.

I used to hang around people.
I was magnanimous and tolerant of everyone.
I am changed .
In order not to have anybody else.
My heart has become very narrow now.

Because of your peerless beauty
And very delicate image,
My love, even my worries,
Have lost their confidentiality.
Nobody understands anything from me.

Love came as a rushing torrent
From the great abyss.
For God's sake,
Build a dam for this torrent.

5.

Verse 2148

Somebody is hidden.
Don't think yourself alone.
Someone hears with sharp ears.
Don't say bad things.

That fairy put an obstacle
At the springs of the Heart.
Every form that comes to your
Imagination is from that fairy.

One has to be very cautious
When going near the fountains,
Because there are lots of fairies there.

As long as the springs of these five senses

Keep running in your body,
That fairy opens the dikes
And lets those five springs flow away.

Let those springs flow away
Through your five inner senses,
Like imagination, surmise, and other perceptions.

Every spring has two fortresses
And fifty passengers.
If you clean the mirror of your heart
They show their faces to you.

If you don't follow good manners
At the source of the water,
You suffer from fairies
Because this kind of fairy is hard and ferocious.

It doesn't matter how hard you work,
Fate always spoils the measures.
His rules carry away
The carpets of hundreds like us.

Look at those birds in the cage,
Those fish in the net.
Watch all the hearts crying
Because of this deceitful beauty.

Don't look at every beauty
With evil eyes,
So that beautiful Sultan
Won't give you up.

There are a few verses left,
But that spring is dried.
Maybe tomorrow we will jump,
And that spring will start flowing again.

6.

Verse 2159

The spring of Souls has come.
Dance, O green branches.
Sugar came to this world

Like Joseph returned to Egypt.
Start dancing.

O Sultan who grows with love
Like a baby with its mother's milk,
Come, be exuberant.
O Soul of his father, get in the dance.

You came running like a ball
After seeing His hair,
Which resembles the club.
You gave up your head, your feet.
And danced without head or feet.

A bloody murderer came suddenly,
With the sword in his hand,
And asked me how I am.
I said, "Good news, I hope."
"No," he answered, "It is evil,
Start dancing."

With love, even kings turn
Into rain in His sky.
What's the use of a caftan?
O, one who has this beautiful belt,
Start dancing.

Oh, you who are drunk with your own being,
Absence is written on you.
The decree of Absence came to you.
Be ready for the journey.
Start dancing.

My beauty came walking
With the wine cup in his hand.
If you are not a woman, start dancing
With the love of this male lion.

The war is ended.
The harp is playing.
Joseph got out of the well.
O clumsy, no-good one,
Start dancing.

How long will these promises last?
How long will this head stay in prostration?

How long will I stay on the floor in worship?
How long is this separation which will ruin colors
And works in which I am involved?
Come, start dancing.

When will he tell me, that one
Who is not aware of anything, to get lost?
The one who is aware of everything,
Get up, start dancing.

When will our peacock come,
Those colors appear,
And tell the Bird of Soul,
"Come and dance without wings, without arms?"

The deaf and blind
Have found their cures from Jesus.
Mary's son, Jesus, told them,
"O deaf and blind, keep dancing."

Shems is the one who became an idol, a deity.
Even China is jealous of Tebriz.
Oh branches, trees, dance.
Dance in the spring of his beauty.

7.

Verse 2172

You brought the wine of eternity,
But we couldn't enjoy drinking
Even one cup of this wine.

Play, leave the glass.
Play this kind of wail.
O Soul, try to price that priceless beauty.

Price the chain of love that ties you.
That calamity, the well of Babil,
That mine of spells.

Bring it back.
Offer that cup again,
That our affairs will turn into pure gold
To return to the customs of loyalty.

Even the devil,
Whose essence is kneaded by evil,
Becomes an angel with your favor.
Your imperial cipher is drawn
To the country of cleanliness and truth.

Oh, chosen man. Oh, exalted one.
I see Mohammed's glory every moment
In your radiance.

Once roads are folded,
Everything in my hand turns into a sigh.
Even mountains become a piece of straw
Against Love that resembles amber.

Only Tebriz understands Shems.
Who, like a moon
Hears the praying, but says Amen
Every once in a while.

8.

Verse 2180

Arouse the music and joy.
Give yourself to me, follow me.
Turn your face from evil eyes.
Look at me.

To be enlivened,
Give yourself to me,
Then read that dependable spell.
Breathe on death, like Jesus.

Oh, One whose face
Is more beautiful than the moon,
Put Your face over mine
So your slave would
See eternal prosperity.

Once you said,
"This kiss is only
For the engaged ones."
I saw in my dream, it was me.

I was kissing your sweet lips,
Tasting that sugar.

O, my God,
What would happen to the angels
If the verse of
"Nobody could be His son,"⁶[\[6\]](#)
Appeared on His face?
If He made His matchlessness
Known to the universe?

Since I have held your hand
I haven't seen anyone.
But I have gone so far from myself
That no reason, no mind, is left.
Everything there has disappeared.

Offer that pomegranate-colored cup.
Fill it up to the rim
So my eyes will be full.
No envy will be left.

Offer the wine that comes
From the height of the assembly of
"There is no One but Him to be worshipped."⁷[\[7\]](#)
There, Soul sees God
And breaks and destroys the mold.

Once the mirror of the mind
Is out of its woolen cover,
You can beat the wool
As much as you want.

9.

Verse 2189

☪,watermaster of the water of Soul,
Break the jar, break the carafe
So eyes will be open.
Like bowls in front of You.

Strike our nonsense.
O, One who blows our minds,
Make man confused.

Strike, so that this mind will give up
All these trials, all this silliness.

Since You broke the bell of body,
Take the modesty from the mind
So that sneak can do no harm.

If he casts a spell and ties people's tongues,
You walk like Moses' staff
And untie tongues.

Lovers should be silenced.
It is better for the sea to boil up.
But the words have been spoken in silence
Resembling images on the face of a mirror.
They look better.

10.

Verse 2194

Beloved, be tolerant to our searching.
We are the creatures of love,
The disciples of love.
Grab our hair and pull us toward You.

The rose is prostrate in front of us
After seeing our faces
When You have offered us
Tulip-colored wine
Without a glass or jar.

Make our eyes drunk, sleepy,
And tender today.
Change our village so much that
Even Heaven will be jealous of it.

We resemble the gold and silver mine.
No one is an enemy of gold.
We are the ones who give prosperity
To our friends, as well as our enemies.

We turn into the candles of Taraz.[\[8\]](#)
We get taller, our heads get higher,
Our necks grow, our hearts get spacious.

You made all these things with that wine.

O, Fountain of Life,
Your torrent snatches us,
Breaks our jar now.

If you don't know our disposition,
Ask it of the charm of wine.
It turned our disposition into wine.

Even if You pour the sea,
We can't be filled our satisfied.
Because You put the scoop
To our mouths upside down.

Another guest came.
Pick up another cup
Because this one doesn't
Have enough even to wash us.

Look, a bunch of drunks are
Coming to the garden.
How could they resist?
They get our smell.

If Mercury had heard our guiding voice,
It would have given up its talent
And erased all its notebooks.

The one who falls in love and boasts
Will be beaten like a tambourine.
You pick up the plectrum,
Play our three-stringed instrument.

It is enough. Be silent now.
If they hear the gossip of our words,
Suddenly, even Earth will become a bitter place
For the worldly.

11.

Verse 2207

Now, I've set a nice trap for that beauty
Who became Kible^[9] to our eyes.

I'll catch that beauty who is
The essence of all forms and beauties.

There is an ear on the wall.
O, mind, go to the roof and watch.
O, heart, lock your door.

Enemies are waiting in ambush.
If they hear, they will talk to each other,
And make a lot of gossip.

From this heart
A world of secrets were heard.
He runs to the enemies
And tells them, one by one.
True or false, he told all of them.

Even particles are hidden.
They are enemies to each other.
They talk at the bottom of the well.
If you look for privacy,
Choose the early dawn.

O Soul, one day, not the enemy
But the image of the enemy,
While passing by,
Stopped in my heart.

Since then we decided,
The beloved and I,
To hide the secret.
Bend our head down.

We are also brave men.
We are not worse than
The stone cover of the mine.
The mine doesn't show its gold
Without being hit by the pick.

Even the sea tightened its purse,
Frowned, sour-faced, and said,
"Where did I see the pearl?
I don't know anything."

Verse 2216

The ones who meet you
Add hundreds of souls to their soul.
But when you meet a woman
You become withered;
Your backbone loosened.

Because to meet the dead,
Freeze the body,
Look at all these early people.
Understand.

Their rulers are worn out.
So are the merchants.
Throw dirt to the heads
Of these kinds of beauties.

Go and see the beauties in divine love.
Their faces light up
And adorn the whole sky.

A secret Beauty offered youth
As a gift to every old man.
Look at the soul coming
To the Judas tree from that house.

If you don't stop talking,
I'll leave here.
Look at that sinister tongue of yours.
Close your mouth.

13.

Verse 2222

Untie your hair, which spreads ambergris.
Put the soul of Sufis to dancing.

The sun, moon, and stars
Are turning around the sky.
We are in the middle.
Turn the one in the middle.

Your singing and playing is such a favor,
Even the lowest tones in the melody
Start turning the Sufis of the sky.

The spring breeze comes running,
Singing and making the world smile.
It causes a commotion among the young.

How many sneaks become friends?
The rose and thorn are one of a pair.
Kindness of time turns the garden
Into the likeness of a Sultan

The garden turns within,
Gains distance and tells you,
"You. too, reach the end
Of the road from within.
To Soul would be added your soul."

At last, a bud opens,
Whispers the secrets of the iris and cypress.
The tulip gives good news, with the willow,
To the Judah tree.

Secrets of every sampling
Raise their heads from the bottom,
Then grow taller and spread.
The Ones resurrected
Put letters from the gardens to the sky.

Birds and nightingales
Are in the branches like guards.
They get their sustenance from treasure.

These leaves resemble tongues.
This fruit is like hearts.
When hearts smile,
The ties of the tongues will loosen.
Words will become valuable.

The stars remarked, "It is very bright tonight."
When I heard that, I said to the stars,
"For sure, the Moon is with me tonight."

Climb the roof of greatness
To call everybody; to talk with them.
Tonight is the night to gather roses.
Tonight is the night to drink wine.

Our beloved has been in our arms
Until morning, like a heart.
His hands have been around
Our neck tonight.

Negroes have been fighting with
The people of Rum until morning.[\[10\]](#)
Musicians have been singing
Their musical rhythm[\[11\]](#) from morning 'til night.

Wine glasses have been
Turning around until morning.
Favors are coming.
The rose and iris have been
In privacy, night until morning.

I will offer the wine of Union
To the people, prominent or not,
To everyone.
The Beauty with a moon face
Is at the window looking at us.
I will offer the wine with that joy, to everybody.

Iron has been softening and turning into wax
The same way it happened to David.
Because the Beloved is a magnet,
Heart is iron tonight.

Untie the hands of the heart
So he can put his head on the feet of Love.
Because that poor one who has been crying
And waiting because of evil eyes
Is in a safe place tonight.

O, fortune, keep kissing my
Golden, pale face, because Cut,
chipped gold has returned

And is mine again.

The one who constantly tries
To stage a hold-up, deceiving us,
Should have the saddle of the donkey on his back.
He is so confused, so stupid tonight.

His sharpened sword doesn't work.
It looks like it is wooden tonight.
His long spear turned into
A small needle tonight.

His inaccessible fortress
Looks like a spider's web.
His armor, his horse's bit
Melted like oil tonight.

Be silent! Because the one
Who desires and expects is always lisping.
Why are you betting with him?
He is lisping tonight.

15.

Verse 2245

☞ soul of hundreds, on Regaib's night[\[12\]](#)
Pay attention to lovers,
Sit among the drunks.
Here is the moon, here are the stars.

That day which hasn't been
Seen by anyone is full of wonders;
Turned out to be a day of resurrection,
Is submerged in wonders and
Has disappeared in the face of your beauty.

"Clean things," you said, flare for the clean."[\[13\]](#)
But who is more clean than you are,
O mine of cleanliness?

A kingdom is given to soul
Every moment from you.
Who should I thank for that?
The Sultan, or the doorkeeper?

You put clean-hearted ones under the ground.
They all bend their heads to their mantles
Like Sufis in meditation.

Once your love came,
Thoughts died in front of Him.
Your love is the real dawn,
Mind is a phoney morning.

O mind, don't look
For either Union or Separation.
How can you desire to meet
Someone who is not absent?

What is Soul? Absence? Need?
Who is the One who gives Soul?
Oh, the Kible of needs,
The sweetheart of demands.

Now the last day of judgment has come.
Here is the sign of it
The sun rose from the west.

O One who pulls so great,
Pull the one who is scared,
The ones who are in trouble,
With one of your Soul's pullings.

Pull, that these two eyes
See the daybreak of God's morning,
The net of desire tom to pieces,
And understand
That the One who was desired
Is the One who desires.

What is Love's desire?
The mirror of manifestation.
What are Self and Greed?
The mirror of shame.

Where is the nightingale of the garden?
I will tell words to him
That have never been told
Nor written by anybody.

Those words are not for
The design of forms,
Nor pure things, nor turbid;
Not for past, nor present,
Not for asceticism, nor presence.

I have lost my mind.
You tell the rest
O One from whose door
Nobody has ever returned deprived,
Without reaching his hope.

16.

Verse 2260

The works of lovers
Turned into gold tonight.
The souls of the greedy
Are blind and deaf tonight.

God's beautiful sea became rough.
Waves overflowed.
The dirt on the road
Became amber with His arrival.

We are pleasant, good all the time,
But with the Grace of God,
We are different tonight.
He is different tonight.

Don't turn your face away.
He is such a friend, next to you.
Bend your head down, because this
Head is good and drunk from that.

Since He came to hold your hand,
Clap your hands and dance tonight.
A branch of the Kingdom
Is green and fresh tonight.

I swear to God,
Sleep is forbidden to me tonight,
Because the Soul, which looks like a water bird,
Plunged into the Kevser.[\[14\]](#)

17.

Verse 2266

Today our town is so bright,
So lively, because
The Sultan of Beauty is among us.

How come this town won't smile And admire the fact
There there is the gallant
Of time here?

When that sun of beauty
Shines on the world,
The muddy earth
Is better than sky.

Angels with green dresses
Are flying and saying,
"He is our King, our Sultan.
He's worth a hundred worlds."

Give our greeting and tell him,
"O Soul of the Beloved,
Pity the poor.
Your love has no mercy."

How could the world not be green
Since you are the spring?
How could there be no security
If the lion is the guard?

The Soul understood from His smell,
Even before he knocked
On the door of the heart,
That the tender-hearted beloved was coming.

The One who holds your hand
And pulls you is your creator.
The One who is company to your Soul
Is the Sahib Kiran.[\[15\]](#)

He is such a moon, such a sun
That never eclipses;

Such a wine that never gives a hangover.
He is profit without loss.

That great Sultan has set such
An assembly today that
Candles, wine, and beauty are all free.

When people get drunk,
The real truth comes out.
Then, the one who pretends
To be brave and strong
Is understood by the poor ones.

With the help of the morning breeze,
The rose is separated from the thorn.
Rain is trying to help
The grasses of the garden.

Be silent, let Him talk
Without alphabet or tongue.
If the tongue is His,
What's the use of these tongues?

18.

Verse 2279

Who is there?" he asked.
"Someone who wants to be your slave,
Your servant," I answered.
"What do you want?" he said.
"O, my moon face, I wanted to greet you."

"How long will you be waiting there?" he asked.
"Until you accept me."
"How long will you be exuberant?"
"Until the day of resurrection." I said

I have sworn, saying,
"I got involved with that business of love.
I made an oath. I lost all my belongings,
My name, my reputation,
Because of Love."

"The judge would ask a witness," he said.

"My tears are my witnesses.
My pale face is my evidence," I answered.

He said, "Your witness is not acceptable;
It comes to eye, he has no good reputation.
He is involved in many bad things."
"I swear, your great Honor," I said.
"They both are innocent,
They both are just."

"Who was your company," he asked,
"While you were coming here?"
"Your spectre." I said. "Your spectre, my Sultan."
"Alright," he said. "Who called you here?"
"The smell of your glass," I said.

"What is your intention?" he asked.
"I want to be a loyal lover."
"What do you want from me?" he asked.
"The favor. I want the favor
You give to everybody and everything," I said.

"Where is that most beautiful one?" he asked.
"In the palace of the Kayser," I said. [\[16\]](#)
"What did you see there?" he asked.
"Many kindnesses. Many favors," I said.

"Why is the road so empty?"
"From fear of the brigand," I said.
"Who is the brigand?" he asked.
"That blame, that reproach," I answered.

"Where is a safe place?" he asked.
"Devoutness and withdrawal," I said.
"What is devoutness?" he asked.
"The road to happiness." I answered.

"Where is disaster?" he asked.
"Around your love," I said,
"What kind of shape are you in there?" he asked.
"I am with exact truth there," I said.

Be silent.
If I keep telling His witticisms,
You will go out of yourself.
You will have neither door nor roof.

19.

Verse 2291

Every moment he brings greetings.
Says, "This letter is from so and so,"
As if greeting and paper are
Very expensive in our town.

No dwarf has ever received
A free kiss from any beauty with that trick.
It is only the male donkey
Who puts out his nose and sniffs.

Whoever has money and wealth,
That silver statue of beauty is there.
Don't keep saying "My soul, my world."
That soul will flyaway from you.

You scratch the mine with your finger.
Do whatever is necessary.
Just obtain the gold and then don't hide it;
Because if gold is hidden,

The beauty doesn't appear.
If it wasn't gold, the earring
Wouldn't be put on the ear.
The earring will tell
The importance of the person who uses it.

Even if you don't have
Gold, silver, or money,
Still try to get a beauty.
Somehow, by chance, that kingdom
Will come into your hand.

But this Beloved can't be bought with gold.
You offer him a soul
Which looks like gold.
Dead gold won't do much there.

Gold is nothing but ordinary stone.
There, a kind of stone is split in half
And the seed of instigation is inserted.

Anyone who is after minted gold
Is a raw charlatan.

Be silent.
Once love comes in one place,
Words become worthless.
Be silent so you won't be worse than gold:
Because the Beloved also has no tongue.
He is silent.

20.

Verse 2300

☞ accept every cruelty
That comes from you
As a favor to my soul.
I hang my neck with my own guilt.

O, moon-faced Beauty,
Your hundreds of cruelties
Are like clothes made
Of material valuable to the body,
Happiness for the soul.

Everybody in this universe
Has his share from You.
Mine is Your love.
It is wonderful. You gave me that.

Because of the taste of Your wine,
Sometimes the glass becomes drunk.
Sometimes the wine overflows
Because of the taste of Your glass.

Meanings prostrate as soon as they see Your face.
Every alphabet starts dancing
As soon as it hears Your words.

When the lover becomes too drunk,
He starts blaming himself
Because to be blamed
Is the appetizer for wine.

Verse 2306

They put you in their eyes
 Because of your greatness.
 They gave you a place in their eyes,
 Then, see, they've all gone
 And left you alone at the end.

O, Joseph, your untrustworthy
 Brothers sold you.
 They sold you cheap, lowered your price.

The ones who have seen
 The unfaithfulness of this world
 Have already left the living
 And gone.

You have so many secret enemies
 You don't see them.
 You have tried every trick,
 But they defeat you in the end.

The invisible Sultans have seen that.
 Because of their love for you,
 They all pray for you.

Stay with the ones who have space in the heart.
 The ones who have a grudge against you
 Turn you into a new student.
 You don't have hands or feet.

These are the hidden ones.
 The others are masters of the servants.
 They set a trap and bend you
 Like a harp, suddenly.

Be afraid of them.
 They know your thoughts.
 And others have no loyalty.
 See, they did the same thing to you.

Verse 2314

A house full of drunks.
Even then, more drunks came.
All the crazies broke-their chains.

We have been very careful.
Took every measure so they wouldn't hear us.
But fate announced an accident like a drumbeat.
They all heard the sound of the drum.

All the souls of the drunks,
And hearts of lovers,
Broke from their cages
And flew away like birds.

Yesterday, I came from a journey
And met that kind of crowd.
I tried to stay away from them,
But they pulled me to themselves.

The only eyes which could see the soul
And the One who chooses the sky for a house,
Is the talented one who has an inside view.

A cupbearer came forward,
Spread all kinds of instigation to the sky,
Created all kinds of commotion.
Since then, the wine is overflowing and pungent.
That's why they tear the skin of its bag.

Drunks broke the jars,
Sat in the cellar.
My god, what kind of wine
Did they drink, and what did they eat?

23.

Verse 2321

The sea doesn't need fish.
Fish are just ordinary
Creatures for the sea.

You cannot find fish
In the endless sea.
But there are many fish
In God's sea.

The sea resembles a nanny.
Fish are like nursing babies,
Keep crying for milk like hungry babies.

If this indifferent sea feels
Some attraction toward the fish,
This is a great favor
And kindness for the fish.

There is a fish which the whole sea wants.
Whoever knows this fish,
Understands his greatness
And will step on Esir.[\[17\]](#)

The sea doesn't care for anything
Except when this fish points out
Or directs something.
The sea will react and follow him.

The fish who receives this favor
Is like a Sultan.
And that endless sea is his minister.

If anyone dares to call him a fish,
Every drop of the sea
Becomes an arrow and destroys him.

For how long will you
Be speaking in symbols?
Your symbols confuse the 18Pple.
speak openly, so the eyes of the heart
Will see and understand.

Shemseddin, whom everybody serves, Is master and protector.
Because of him, Tebriz
Turned into musk and ambergris.

If the thorns of the world
Received his favor,
They would become as silk
For softness and grace.

I would lose my soul,
If my soul was aware of itself,
With his wine
And the drunkenness of his beauty.

24.

Verse 2333

The one who is sick with a bile disorder
Would not know the taste of sugar.
Every stone-hearted one
Couldn't tell pearls from stones on his way.

The spider that is busy making its web
Wouldn't have any pleasure
Besides that of making a spider web.

The one who lost his position, his job,
Will get into wine, hold the glasses.
He gets so drunk that he couldn't
Differentiate his head from his feet.

25.

Verse 2236

This is a wonderful time.
What we need now is wine.
At a time like this,
We would give our soul
Just to drink a cup of wine.

Our wine comes from the jar of Absence,
The place where we set our assembly
Is at the great throne of God.

Wherever you see a poor one,
Stay with him.
Avoid the fortune teller, the witch doctor.

But stay away from the poor

Who are fond of food.
We need a poor one like Beyazid[\[18\]](#)
Who became poor by giving up
His belongings, his Being.

The one who was born from
Cleanliness and brightness,
Looks for clean.
The one from the dirty, needs dirt.[\[19\]](#)

Fake and real gold sometimes look the same.
But they are differentiated
Under the light of God.

God put a lock on the heart and sealed it.[\[20\]](#)
You have to struggle in grief
In order to open it.

It doesn't matter to the donkey
If the door is locked.
It falls asleep outside.
But the one in the house
Has to open the lock in order to go outside.

Only the ignorant celebrate
Two holidays in a year.[\[21\]](#)
We are Sufis on a journey.
There are two holidays in every moment for us.

The soul says, "I am newborn with your order."
New sustenance is necessary for the newborn.

Fresh daily bread comes to us
From the place of Salvation and Union.
Naturally, dry bone for the ones not new.

O one who comes to the assembly of Sema
Like a cypress,
Death should come to life.
Lifeless personalities should be enlivened now.

If you are a dead, dry branch,
You have to go in the fire.
But if you are a green branch,
You'll come up with leaves and fruits
And bend down.

You reached the pleasure that comes
Flowing to the breast of the mother.
He put this into your mouth,
You must suck it.

You have spent your whole life
With elegant speeches.
For some time you should
Walk alone in the gardens of silence.

Oh, God's sun, Shems of Tebriz,
You are the one who attracted me to words.
You made me talk.
I should breathe for two days
In the world of silence.

26.

Verse 2352

What else could come out of sugar
But kindness and sweetness?
What else could the moon do
But lighten the sky?

What else would be in the rose garden
But heart-catching colors?
What else could grow in fresh branches
But leaves and flowers?

What can you find in the star of Jupiter
But good luck?
What else could be found in a gold mine
But shining gold?

What could the bright sun
Give to the ruby?
What shape can a lung become
From the fountain of life?

What would happen to the eye
That sees the beautiful One
Who created beauty?
See and understand what would happen

To your sight, once you looked at God.

We gave ourselves to exuberance.
To drunkenness, to the worship of beauty.
As long as we live,
What else could come from us?
What can we do?

There is a trace of Being left in us.
Be brave, cupbearer. Give that red wine.
Is there any talk more brief than that?

You are drunk, be more drunk.
No up, no down would be left for you.
Go beyond yourself, know nothing.
What comes out of knowledge, anyway?

Let's go out with rose-colored dresses, like roses.
Let's be crazy, insane.
What's in sleep?
What's in food and drink?

O, Sultan Selahaddin, don't leave that form.
Don't go away from this world.
Show the angel what is in man.

27.

Verse 2362

After Sema, you said,
"What has happened to all the exuberance;
Our flowing excesses?
Where did they go?"
Just like nothing has happened.

Don't deny it. Look at the staff of Moses.
It was a staff once,
And become a dragon afterward.

The body resembles a dragon with closed lips.
But in reality, he swallowed the whole universe,
Then turned into a staff.

A pearl of egg size became exuberant,

Then melted, turned into sea.
Its waves made the earth.

Its vapors, the sky.
Really, a secret cavalry,
Dressed like a Sultan
Comes and attacks every moment,
Then goes back to its origin.

He just went to another world,
Which is hidden from us.
That doesn't mean he doesn't exist.

All behavior is like arrows
At the bow of the body.
When they leave the bow,
They are directed to the target.

A shell grabs a drop of water
And disappears.
But a good diver knows
Where to look for that drop.

Blood boils because of
The love of man and woman,
And becomes sperm, ovum.
Then a tent is set in the sky
From these two drops.

After the soldier of man came
From the land of soul,
Mind became the minister.
Heart is the Sultan and sits at the throne.

After a while, heart missed
The town of soul and returned there.
The rest of the army
Went back to the land of existence.

If you ask how senses come and go,
Pay attention to the time
Just before you fall asleep.
That period will explain many things for you.

The following verses are in "Guldeste,"

Organs are like laborers.
They do different things in different places.
The heart is their controller.

They all work under Him.
I won't tell you all these activities.
I will keep silent now.
Pate's back is bent because of His sorrow.

My heart, my soul, my body
Are shining from the reflection
Of the light of Shams of Tebriz on my heart.

28.

Verse 2374

What would happen if you
Gave up thought for one moment,
Plunged into our sea like fish,
And swallowed the waves there?

If you sleep from your thoughts,
Give them up.
You will be one of the Ashab-i Kehf
And turn into a holy light,
Exempt from thought.
Why don't you become like this?

You are a piece of straw.
We are stately amber.
Why don't you slip out
Of this earth and turn into amber?

You promised a hundred times
To become Earth.
Why don't you keep your promise this time?

You are a hidden pearl.
But look to be the color of the soil in this barn.
O Beautiful one, why don't you
Wash all that dirt from your face?

You are the Son of the Sultan.

Even Gabriel prostrates in front of you.
What wonderous things would happen, oh poor one,
If you looked for your Father's land?

O, one who thinks that
Saints and friends of God
Are different than God,
Why don't you have
A better idea about Saints?

You are a fragment,
Separated from the whole,
Hand out of body.
Why don't you stay with us from now on?

Then you won't have a head.
You'll lose your belongings,
Be out of ambition and pride.
But at the same time, you appear
At the land of greatness and are seen.
Why don't you do that?

Drink some juice from God's praise
And be saved from thought.
O, one who is honored by God's consent,
Why don't you stay out of struggles?

It is enough. You look like a mountain.
Search the gold mine in the mountain.
Don't make noise so the mountain echoes you.

29.

Verse 2385

This soul is like a glass.
How does the soul know that?
It is filled by someone very clean
And the glass empties its contents
To the man who is made of earth.

The glass is busy with its work constantly.
It takes from the Throne of God
And spreads to the Earth.

It doesn't know the place
Where it is serving.
It would be nice if it knew the place
From whence it was taking.

The Earth is shining like a mine
To give its blessing to souls.
It they could talk,
Would they give us epigrams?

If they could talk,
They would say the same thing
About that forest, that eternal forest.
What would this forest offer to our soul?

Here, the tiger yells and shouts, "Ya hu."
The gazelle is asking, "O shelter of sighs,
Who is pulling and dragging us?"

Such a lion, that gives nothing
To our existence but his own milk.
Free Self from ourselves, from our being.

That lion shows himself to us as a gazelle,
And pulls us to the forest with that trick.

Sometimes he gives us Fatiha,[\[22\]](#)
Gives us abundance.
Sometimes he gives us only
A piece of straw, lowers us.
But when we become Fatiha,
He hesitates, doesn't even read us.

30.

Verse 2394

The glorious sun
Has appeared in the sky again,
Raised from the peace of dawn.
The wishes of the souls come again
From the way of the Soul.

With the permission of Ridvan,[\[23\]](#)
The doors of heaven are opened.

Every soul plunged in the pool
Of Kevser up to his neck.

That Sultan came again
Who is Kible to the Sultans.
That moon came again,
Which is greater and better than the moon.

The ones who are dizzy with love
Ride their horses
Because that peerless, unique rider
Came to the center, the heart of the army.

Eyes of all
The particles of black soil are blurred, admired.
Hear the call from the land of Absence,
"Get up, it is time for the last day of judgment."

This unconditional voice is not
Coming from inside nor out,
Neither from the left nor right.
It is not from the back nor the front.

"Alright," you say. "Where is that side?"
The side which has been kept searching.
"Where shall I turn my face?" you say.
From wherever that head comes.

It's the side where ripeness comes to fruit,
The side where the stone becomes a jewel.
The side that, with its abundance,
Brought to life the cooked fish in front of Hizir.[\[24\]](#)
The side from which favor comes
Turned the hand of Moses
Into a shiny moon.

That fire was borne on our hearts
Like a full moon.
This judgment was put on our head
Like a crown.

The soul doesn't have permission
To talk about that.
If he ever talks, all disbelievers
Will be saved from doubt.

Even the disbeliever turns to this side
In difficult times.
When he has problems on this side,
He believes in the other side.

Suffer. Suffer that.
The suffering guides you,
Takes you toward that side.
The only one to see this side
Is the one who is frustrated from troubles.

The greatest of the great Sultans,
Dressed with a human mantle today,
Came through locked doors.

31.

Verse 2408

The bird which was in our trap
Suddenly broke all the traps
And flew to the land of Absence.

The meaningless, ordinary wine
Has been purified.
It's become the purest of the pure;
Has overflowed from the troubles
Of the two worlds, fermented.
Sediment went down deep, and
The wine came to the surface of the jar.

Heart has cleansed this Soul
From the Earth, then ascended
And found a better abode there.

He found many sweet pleasures
In that land of freshness and brightness.
His face became pale like saffron
By describing the tulip faces.

Whoever hasn't met that moon,
Whoever cannot read this form and design,
This writing of His Beauty,
Only stays at the level of religious designs.
I swear to God, he becomes unfaithful.

I have given up my epithets.
I have undressed myself,
Become stark naked.
The sun is the only
Cover for the naked.

It is not nice to say "God is Great,"
While one is still in the world of existence.
When this head is sacrificed,
Then "God is Great" words
Become reality,
The real essence of God manifest.

Greatness is far away from the Soul,
Which gets easily wearied.
If you are bored with love,
Your ship stops sailing and is anchored.

O, God's Sun, Shems of Tebriz,
Heart has fallen in the abyss
In front of your sun,
And has become so small,
Has become more worthless than
Even the smallest of the small particles;
Has turned into nothing.

32.

Verse 2417

Get angry with the one
You can get away from;
The one you don't need,
The one you don't expect to hold your hand
And help. Accept the ground under your feet.

Assuming you let him go, you left him.
You are the king. Nobody is like you.
But, for sure, the day will come
When Death will stand in front of you
Like a master.

You are superior, peerless,
And drink from the Fountain of Life, like Hizir.

The one who doesn't drink His water
Will be in the trap of death.

O, Master of the Soul of creation!
O, Master who is not an illusion!
The One who appears in reality,
Not the one who gets old;
The one whose hair becomes milk-white.

O, Master, don't be a master
To the one who pretends
To be master to the real Master
With deceit, lies and insolence.

Be Master to the one who
Dies for you.
Becomes humble for your greatness.

How can the sun appear as a circle
To the one who sees the hair
Of his eyebrows as a new moon?

How can the one who swaggers
Constantly because of his greatness
Be enlightened by the light of greatness?

O, wealthy one, don't show
Off your possessions.
Annihilate yourself
So that the particles of your existence
Become the sun.

Put a dam to those black torrents,
To block and protect the five senses.
At the end, universal intelligence will
Rain mercy from six directions.

If you don't put the yeast
Of that dough to your flesh,
Even if you cook a hundred years
In the oven, the bread
Won't be ready.

Be straight, like an arrow,
If you want to approach
"Two bows distance."[\[25\]](#)

Only the one who gets into His bow,
The one who looks like an arrow,
Will be thrown to the target.

Be silent!
Say the meaning without the alphabet
If you can.
Say it without words, so the heart
Can take over the conversation.

33.

Verse 2430

Welcome. The holiday is here.
The Beloved, who attracts
Hearts, has come.
The dead jump out of the grave
And come to His temple.

The word came to Heart
To invite the Soul to war.
That friend came to the front.
Soul will come by dragging his feet.

The soul has been submerged
In honey and sugar from the fountain.
The moon has fallen on the harvest
And is surrounded by a halo
From that Turk who resembles the moon.

The soul has become Kible
To the angels, because of
The light of his breath.
Even water resembles fire
If it stays close to the fire.

The heart and souls of the angels
Come so close to God
That the sky becomes a carpet, a cover
To the angels.

Be brave.
Polish the mirror of your heart

And read all the writing
And designs reflected there.
Six directions are also filled
With a variety of designs and
Writings without signs and designs.

You will find that garnet
In your bosom.
Its light spreads to
The heart of the pure person.

He became drunk and fell asleep
From the opium of Bidat's sherbet.[\[26\]](#)
The kingdom has set a throne and seat
At the top of the pole of Mercy.

How smart is that ear,
That His hand held and pulled?
How clean and honest is that face
Which He has scratched?

Be silent.
Listen to the turns
Of the five times of the sky,
Which is beyond the five senses
And the six directions.

34.

Verse 2440

*R*ise, jump, wake up from sleep.
Bright daylight has come.
Pull your heart from sleep.
It is time to go.

All these signs keep coming.
How long will you ignore them?
I am afraid love will say,
"This Hodja is getting senile,
Becoming an imbecile."

All the gleaners are gone.
This one is left to sit here.
He has become so heavy, so soft,

He turned into a heap of grain.

35.

Verse 2443

☪, Lovers, the moon that exceeds
Everybody's beauty is sending messages to you.

He wrote a line on the roll
Of paper of the sky.
Whoever knows how to read
Comes and reads that line.

That line is the secret
Of Soul, written by saffron.
Every word is a blazing fire,
Burning the heart.

We took refuge in one comer,
Fell in love, wore a patched mantle.
Where are we? Where are the people?
But He grabbed our necks and kept pulling.

We are like a ball, armless, footless,
Rolling over in His direction.
His hair is like a club which
Keeps us running that way.

If I run in this direction,
His club hits me to His side.
Tell me, who knows this secret?

Wherever I am, I am drunk.
I worship His club.
Until He asserts His authority,
I exist in the middle of Absence
Or as I appear, as I exist.

Because you are tired and bored,
Go to sleep.
Put your head down,
Conform with the sleeper.
Because sleep saves the one
Who is cold and frozen.

If my Shems shows up,
Comes forward from Tebriz,
I swear to God that no dregs,
No trouble, will remain in two worlds.

36.

Verse 2452

Will it be any cause for decision in the heart
If we see your drunk eyes?
Stars won't be counted if your face,
Which resembles the moon, should be seen.

When your pleasure's player starts
Playing the harps of joy,
It won't be any gain or loss
For Venus up in the sky.

No town or country will remain
If the commanders of Yagma,[\[27\]](#)
For your beauty,
March their soldiers in that direction.

If your rose garden,
Which adds Soul to souls,
Smiles on the garden of soul,
The roses lose their minds
And thorns lose their sharpness.

Once the spy of your love,
Who resembles the Sultan,
Enters the heart,
Nobody finds a place but love.

What a happy, joyful time it is
When, with good luck, You suddenly
Take the Soul in Your arms
And cast the body aside.

Such drunkenness comes to the head
From such Beauty,
That the heart doesn't look for a crown or throne.
Shame and bashfulness go away.

I beg God that
God's Sun, Shems of Tebriz,
Rises to the cave of heart
And stays there with his friend.

37.

Verse 2460

Charmer, whose temple of beauty
Can only be visited by noble hours,
Is it fair that grief will get
In the house of your image?
Is it suitable for grief to stay there?

Every Being is from You.
You are the origin of existence.
The only thing for us to do
Is annihilate ourselves in Your Being.

O, Grief, pull yourself together.
Here, there is an army of joy.
Keykubad, [\[28\]](#)king of joy, is coming
To this country with hundreds of flags.

Don't worry, O heart.
Right now a harp is coming.
A harp which is full of melody
But which is empty inside.

That cupbearer who belongs to God
Is coming from the assembly of the Sultan.
The player of meanings
Will start the melodies now.

O, Grief, how insolent you are.
You are such a desperate one,
Still trying to force yourself in my door.

At last, O Grief, I will submit myself
To the One who adds Soul to soul,
And be free from your fire.

Verse 2467

One has to be alive in love.
Death is no good.
Do you know which one is alive?
The one who is borne by love.

The anger of roaring lions,
And the bravery of all men,
Are nothing to love.

There are some who stage a hold-up on the road.
These fellow travelers are women.
Their feet are dyed with henna
And are not good for this road.
They cannot complete the journey.

War drums are beating to invite
The great Rustem [\[29\]](#) to fight.
A big army is gathered with the invitation of love.

His thunder comes from the heart.
His soul flashes like lightning from the body.
But he doesn't stay the same for even one moment.

The sword of death cannot cut a head like that.
Because his head is so great
That it touches the Throne of God.

A heart like that doesn't contain
Any grief or sorrow.
Earthly grief increases his joy.

Don't believe it if you see him looking angry.
He resembles the clouds of spring.
The whole world smiles and becomes sweet with him.
He does this as a joke;
Pretends to look angry.

The gazelle doesn't look for the lion.
Its lion is Him.
Disbelievers eat lots of grass,
Chew lots of thorns in this pasture.

Look for us in love,
And for love in us.
Sometimes I praise love.
At other times, love praises me.

When he opens his mouth
Like a shell in the ocean,
He swallows the sea of me and us
Like a single drop.

39.

Verse 2478

Neither should the eye
Indulge every heart,
Nor the Sultan show his face
To every common person.

However, our contemptible
And despicable ones are different.
He showed them the rose garden,
Saved them from the thorns.

He attracts our dark black smoke
To the light of holiness;
Changes our old devoutness
Into a fully drunk tavern keeper.

He neither gives up nor sells his creatures.
He prepares a crown and throne right here.
But He shows this power
Like a sale in the bazaar.[\[30\]](#)

Humanity is like a lion,
Caged and locked in the Earth's box.
It looks very tired and frustrated.

Once this idle lion roars
And breaks the cage,
Then you can see what he is able to do.

Mohammed and Siddiyk[\[31\]](#)
Appear to be in a cave.
But, in reality, they are in

The seventh level of the sky.

Love is only One,
But it manifests in different forms.
Only, it appears to the eyes of
Cross-eyed illiterates as two or four.

God's Shems is such a sun
That its light reflects on the mirror.
This and that will be able
To see his shadows on the wall.

Whichever tray I open,
The same sweets come from the same sugar.
The shopkeeper is the one
Who shows them differently.

40.

Verse 2488

When I said, "Dear master,
Don't do that. Grief has designs against us,"
He answered, "It is impossible."

How dare grief touch you.
If he goes beyond his boundary,
I will burn and ruin him.

Grief is afraid of us.
He knows us very well.
If he doesn't behave,
I'll put him in the fire
So that billows of smoke will come
From his fire.

Grief knows his enemy and his place.
It is like Earth, and can be
Spread out for the believers.

Since you are with us, from us,
Even if you drink poison,
It will become honey.
It couldn't harm you.

Halil[32] was happy and comfortable
In the fire, in the smoke.
Only God knows that.
He doesn't tell the people
Because they are not dependable.

The one who is trustworthy
Will reach the land of Absence.
Be companion to those of that world.
Similar people accompany each other.

O One whose hands shine
Like the hand of Moses,
I wish Moses wouldn't put his hand
In his pocket.
It would light the world.

Because the rose of happiness
Doesn't grow without Your face, my Master,
Without "We only worship You,"
We only expect help from You.

41.

Verse 2497

You ask, "How are you? What do you do?"
There is nothing I can do
While I am with you.
Only wailing and crying will be for me
When I am separated from you."

Even if I drink the wine of heaven
From the golden cup,
The only hangover I get
Is without you.

Whatever I weave is at the loom of your love.
Without you, I swear to God,
There is no woof nor warp to the material.

You look like a river with
No beginning and no end.
The world is like a bridge over this river.
How can one pass this river

With that kind of small bridge?

This world has four seasons,
Each one against the other.
To fight all of them
Leaves no peace, no life for man.

O spring of Beauty,
You come. You are the essence of the seasons.
Come, all the seasons
Will be ended and burnt out.
They all become spring.
Only spring will stay.

42.

Verse 2503

There is a preacher in the pulpit.
He is advisor to himself and
The ones who listen to him.
He is like a spring of water,
Clean and cleanser.

There is one at the pulpit of greatness.
Another one at the lower steps
Who repeats what he hears from above.

Every word is like a world,
Clear as the sky.
He talks in such a way that
It is easy to explain, easy to be understood.

This opens the door to you
From the dark and muddy
Dungeon of the Earth.

He made stairs with the art of language
To the roof of the round sky,
Which kept whirling.

Light is what pulls
The fire out of the wood.
Fire is not something that sparkles
And shines by itself.

Man makes fire by
Hitting iron to stone.
Stars are also created by order,
Following their course of action.

Every prophet brought a brand new miracle.
How is it that miracle doesn't
Spread around, hasn't been recognized?

With that, happy becomes unhappy.
Heaven changes to a dungeon.
Self, because of that, starts lying,
Uses cunning, cheating,
And, at the same time, is cheated.

This pulpit, this preacher
Are all inside of you.
Don't fail to look for them.

43.

Verse 2513

☞ One who is annihilated in Love
And reaches Absence,
You are Soul beyond Soul.
You have such charm
That it is beyond charm.

You read the secret of the sky,
The condition of this and situation of that
Before it has been written on the board.
You even read more than that.

You keep asking about
The throne of God from the people.
Yet you know all about it, even more.

There is an ocean of Ruby,
Brightest of the bright.
You are a mine of priceless garnet,
And you have many more gems.

You execute the commands given to the Soul

On the day of Elest,
And all the other orders.

That cross-eyed one got confused
At the first step. Saw many from one.
Talked to the first, then the second,
Then saw many and kept talking.

The one who hasn't reached
The world of existence,
Hasn't existed like God's Shems;
Is mortal at the world of truth,
Even worse than that.

44.

Verse 2520

Four face is a beautiful sunny day;
More beautiful than the brightness of the day.
Brighter than the day.
Wine is good, but the cupbearer
Is better than the wine.

Every hidden thing opens today.
The heart reaches endless wishes.
Like a falcon catching a pigeon.

Every lover gets his deserved
Blessing from the Beloved.
Everyone who is thirsty
Sits by the side of Kevser.

Every moment, the Beloved offers
A new glass and says,
"Today our assembly is open,
Give this to the lovers."

It is such a thin glass that
It appears as if the wine has become the glass.

45.

Verse 2525

☪ mirror of Absence,
You are Absence, even beyond that.
a one inside of the heart,
You are everything in the heart, even beyond.

You know the secrets of the sky;
Hidden thoughts,
Situations of this and that,
Even beyond.

You read the history of past periods,
The unwritten and written,
To the people, to the angels.
You read even beyond.

You give them their deserved share
From the land of Absence.
You push sorrow out of the heart.
You do many other things,
Many other.

46.

Verse 2529

☪ one Soul of the Soul of Souls,
You are Soul and even beyond that.
O, chemistry of the mines,
You are the mine and even beyond.

O eternal Sun, O cupbearer of everywhere,
All the coasts, the comers, every store, bazaar,
The disposition of every joy and pleasure,
Are your beauty and charm, even beyond.

O torch for certainty,
For growth and maturity on earth,
Second to the Universal Intelligence, even beyond.

O one who is honored by God,
O light of the Sultan,
What kind of art do you want?

You could do as well, even beyond.

You know things which have no sample,
Everything which has been wondered about,
Every unknown and invisible thing, even beyond.

You make some like Leyla,[\[33\]](#)
Others like Mecnun,[\[34\]](#)
With that love which looks like opium.
O One whose light brightens the sky,
You are something else.

O glory to the chest,
Hope to the patience,
You drag the clouds to the heights,
And do many other things.

O exalted person praised by prophets;
O provision of saints;
O One who builds the house of choice,
You build many other things.

O treasure of mercy,
O sea of pity,
There is no other door on which to rely but yours.
There is nothing beside that anyway.

An eye that sees any other face
To be adorned, besides Yours,
Any other beauty, beside You,
Commits adultery and other wrong things.

O Origin, Beginning of the Beginning,
O helper for tomorrow,
I bend down in the hands of love,
Become something different.

My mouth is full of words,
But I don't talk to anybody but you.
Because other's ears are temporary.
They disappear, even go beyond that.

☞ One who frowns in front of me,
You said many bad things about me.
The vulture's mouth smells bad all the time.

The signs of those bad words
Showed on your face.
The ugliness of someone who
Is not good
Appears on his face.

Beloved and Beautiful are ours.
You go and die, eat grief,
Plunge into sorrow.
The sea won't be dirty
Because of the dog's mouth.

If the crusader is filled with hogs,
The name of this holy mosque of Beyt-i Mukaddes
Won't be bad.

This is the face of the mirror.
The beauty of Joseph reflects on this face.
For the stranger,
This is the back of the mirror.

The sun doesn't mind
If bats talk too much.
If the shadow comes reverse to the ground,
The sun doesn't care.

Jesus used to keep smiling.
John the Baptist was very somber.
One smiled because of his confidence in God,
The other frowned because of fear.

They asked God,
"Who is better on this
Already arranged world?"

The one who has a better
Opinion of Me is better.
If the guilty has a good opinion,
He'll cleanse himself.

Coming up to you, you are

Neither making a face because of fear,
Nor for the hope of religion.
You frown only because of hate.
Your face is pale, like saffron, with greed.
Blackened from the cheers of the enemy.

Those don't do any good.
Throw them both in the fire.
How sad to the one who saw
The seed of envy in his heart.

Leave him alone.
"His hand would be dry."[\[35\]](#)
This saying is enough for him.
The one who falls in the dark
Is the one who hates the moon.

O Sun, know this very well.
Your enemies are bats,
The other birds are ashamed of them.
Besides, they are caged by darkness.

The one who is the enemy of the sun will perish.
Nothing will remain of him.
If a chip gets into the eye,
How could anybody see or be comfortable?

48.

Verse 2555

Your face is the Soul of Souls.
Don't deprive Soul of this face.
Don't hide in the Earth the thing that is
Bigger and better than Earth.

O Beloved, who is at the pole of sky,
Stays at the sky of the Soul,
You should know that Soul
Turns around you. Make him restless.

Earth became like a smiling pomegranate.
Showed its teeth.
He is uncontrollably impatient.
Calm him down.

His Sun doesn't leave a trace
Of choice for me.
If I have any choice,
What would happen to His?

The wind of love threw me
Around like dust from the ground.
Naturally, where there is wind,
There will be dust.

His spring grows
Everything on the Earth with love.
The seeds have the same hope;
That they become His prisoner in the ground.

The earth, new moon, houris,
Beauty, garden, and sapling
Are all waiting for Him,
Just like me.

Is it His wine? I trust in God.
Is it His trap? God saves us.
Is it His name? O, my God.
I swear to God, nothing is like Him.

I am like roses.
He is my gardener.
My Soul blooms because of Him.
But I will sacrifice this Soul to Him.

I am swaying, about to fall
Like a leaf, but trembling
Lest I fall somewhere other than in his arms.

All his works are trickery.
Bang the cup, tear the curtain.
But not like the vagabond.

He tears my throat.
Shall I tell or not?
You are not the intimate of the secret,
Let Him tear my throat.

Verse 2567

My Beloved has become drunk.
Look at his narcissus eyes.
He starts mumbling,
Starts talking confusedly.

He sways from one side to the other.
It is obvious, he is drunk.

His eyes trouble the drunks,
But don't try to scare us with them.
I am drunk, too.
I am not afraid of the sticks
Of the security men.

O, Love. My God, my God.
The Sultan of Sultans has become drunk.
Jump. Grab his hair.
Pull; bring him over here.

When a thought comes to the heart,
He starts talking about the Beloved.
Then I spread my Soul like hair
To his head. Fill his mouth with gold.

O one whose face opens roses,
O beloved, who talks
Like a singing nightingale,
My God, this gracefulness,
For whom do you do that?

His appearance is all pretext.
He is the light of the sky.
Give up the design of appearance.
His essence is the beautiful one.

With His favor, cold winter
Changes into spring;
Night becomes day.
This dead earth is alive
With His other world.

Verse 2575

Of Soul desires anyone but You,
We push him from Self and throw him away.
If skies don't bend their heads for You,
We crush them against each other.

If He asks for his belongings,
We give them to Him.
If He hides in the castles,
We demolish the castles down to earth.

If this world resembles the Soul,
We are the Soul of Soul.
If this sky is like a head,
We are its bright two eyes.

The roots of the tree are the ground,
This sky is its branches and leaves.
The Earth is an olive tree,
We are like its oil.

Since the love of Shems of Tebriz
Is our magnet,
We are iron
On the way to his service.

51.

Verse 2580

His playful eyes told the black hair,
Fallen on his forehead,
I do tricks like so and so.
You grab his hat.

I said to Jacob,
"Joseph is at the bottom of the well.
When he comes to the surface,
Pick him up. Give him a kingdom.
Prosperity."

We show ourselves like pilgrims.

In reality, we are spies for the robbers.
When pilgrims start a journey,
We set the stage to hold them up.

We fool the pathfinders
With the reverse horseshoe and nails.
Like the moon and his army of stars
Reflecting on water in reverse positions.
We are like the branch of the Judas tree,
Which reaches the heights but
Reflects in the water upside-down.

The fox saw a fat tail in the grass.
Told himself, "Isn't it strange?
A prey in the green grass,
Without a trap."

Whereas a wolf fell right down
On the tail in anger.
It didn't even see the trap.

When a fool falls, or gets into trouble,
He says, "That's not my fault."
Isn't his foolishness enough
Fault for him, O brother?

Love also makes a man a fool.
At least, choose a kind of love
That the Beloved's beauty, charm,
And kingdom are worth the foolishness.

If your foot hurts,
Cast a spell to your Soul
And your Soul's foot.
Because this foot is an oxen's foot.
Its spell is only straw.

When your throat is tightened,
You will be relieved by taking a breath.
How can you feel better without sighing?

His love's deed registers "How? What?"
Until you reach the temple of His love.
But when we surrender,
Even the lowest place will be the highest for us.

What beauty that Beautiful one has,
That even forms and shapes
At the work place
Burn our Soul.

I am frustrated trying to figure
What kind of trick or trap
I could use for the one who has been
Taught trickery by God.

The mind helps to find the way
For the one who loses his way.
But what could he do
For the one who lost his mind?

Aren't we men of the Sultan?
We don't want either mind or Soul.
What is mind? His binding.
What is the advice which comes from mind?
What is Soul?
What are his "Hi's" or "Why's"?

Drunkenness is increasing. Be silent.
Never say a word or make a sign,
O, one fearlessly trying to hurt
The one who wants to do him good.

52.

Verse 2596

☪ one who talks with God's inspiration,
O eyes of truth,
O one who saves people from this sea of fire,
You are an old Master. .

There is no beginning of Your beginning.
You are a very great, peerless Sultan.
The one who holds the Soul's hand
And saves him from the disasters
Of the world's attachments.

You are the One who catches the Soul
When death releases it.
I wonder whose Soul, among the preys',

Is the one deserving to be caught.

Who is the creature that could
Talk about your love?
Even the Glory of God is in love
With your face, your beauty.

I have been caught up in this love.
I have been sick with this love.
I cry. I wail. O, good doctor,
What do you advise me to do?

Your favor asks me to come.
Your grief says to go back.
Which one is true among these?

O Sun of Soul, O God's Shems of Tebriz,
Every particle turned into a Soul
With your light and
Became graceful and talkative.

53.

Verse 2603

☞ haven't seen any joy,
Pleasure, or music in both worlds
Besides you, O Beloved.
I have seen many wonderful things,
But I haven't seen anyone like you.

I was told that fire
Is for the unbelievers.
They are the ones who burn with it.
But I haven't seen anyone
Deprived of your fire but Abu-Lehib.[\[36\]](#)

I put my ear on the window of heart.
I listened a long time.
I have heard many words,
But I haven't seen the lips that speak them.

Suddenly you blessed this
Humble servant of yours.
I haven't found any reason for that

Except unaccountable favors.

O choice cupbearer,
O apple of my eye,
A beauty like you came
Neither from the land of Acem,[\[37\]](#)
Nor from among the Arabs.

Pour the wine from glass that
Cannot be found, even in Alepo;[\[38\]](#)
The wine that doesn't come to the trough
When it is crushed.

Serve so much that I will come down
From the horse of existence
And walk on foot;
For I see nothing but fatigue
When I am sober.

You are the Sun.
You are the Moon.
Honey is you. So is sugar.
You are the mother and father.
I have had no family but you.

O love which doesn't allow
One to fall into destitution,
O place where God
Looks and is Manifest,
You are shelter and support.
I haven't found a nickname,
A word, to describe you.

We are pieces of iron.
Your love is the magnet.
You are the source of desire,
Though I haven't seen any desire in you.

Brother, be silent. Leave these matters
Of manners, knowledge, and talent.
The more you talk about manners,
The less I see in you.

O God's Shems of Tebriz,
O the one essence of the Souls,
I haven't seen fresh dates

Without your Basra's [\[39\]](#) date of existence.

54.

Verse 2615

☞ player, sing this Gazel.

I gave up my Beloved and
All kinds of roses and thorns.
I vow not to do it again.

I was either drunk, or sleepy and languid.
I gave up that business.
I vow not to do such business again.

I was down deep, up to my neck
In the sin of repentance.
Now, I repent all the repentances
I have made in the past.

O you who sells wine in this village,
O cupbearer, give me the biggest jar.
I gave up honor. I repent the shame.

I resemble a fallen drunk.
I am out of four natural qualities.
I repent hot and cold, wet and dry.
Gave up all four of these.

My heart has been tom to pieces
Looking for help.
When I understood that helplessness
Is the only help, I repent helplessly.

Enlighten this dark night.
Show your moon face.
I repent so much
With the pleasure of that sin.

I said, "It is time to repent."
A lover answered me,
"I did yesterday.
I am an older repentant."

The one who denies the land

Of Selahaddin's yakiyn,[\[40\]](#)
Who says with love,
"I repent denials."

55.

Verse 2624

O sky that seeks my fault,
O roof that is full
Of noise and fights,
How long must I hide
From your trickery?

O fate, the one which sucks people's blood,
I am a cloud that looks like blood.
Why shouldn't I rain blood on your head?

Heart, keep burning nicely.
Don't try to flee from those two fires.
They are good for you.
Your Soul is mixed with love.
You need love.

Intention is like a light.
The universe is the oven.
This love resembles the fire.
People are the wood.

I cheerfully plunged, like a moth,
And sat in the middle of the fire,
The way God's Abraham did.
I cannot get up from there.

56.

Verse 2629

The sound of the Beauty
Came right from my Soul.
When I heard that,
I ran to your love like the wind,
Like water, like fire.

The ones who were watching
The beauty of Joseph cut their hands.
Put your hand in our Soul.
See what we cut?

The situations of the penniless
And rints[\[41\]](#) are obvious.
What else is left?
We also put this tom mantle
In front of your feet.

There are many like us,
Who give their Souls to the land of Love.
But we haven't seen anyone
Like you. Even in a dream.

We were frightened,
Seeing our shadow on the water
Like animals, while drinking water.

57.

Verse 2634

Yes, while I struggle, insist,
You are fighting back.
But I am not that weak,
That frustrated yet. I won't run.

You didn't come to me.
Pretended to be asleep.
If you sleep, I swear
I'll pour this wine on you.

O, great happiness,
Give me the glass.
Don't try to send me back quickly.
I won't get up from my place that fast.

Your face says, "I am the light
That illuminates every moment."
Your hair, "I am the belly button
Which drops musk all the time."

O Beauty, whose skin is like jasmine,
I won't settle for less than eighteen glasses.[\[42\]](#)
Be nice, be easy, a tough, stem Beauty.

O favor beyond boundary,
Hug me nicely. It would be so nice
To resurrect on the last day
If I die in your arms.

Offer wine. Quit this joking, being playful.
I am not after the bride's trousseau.
I am drunk for the bride.

I want to have a wine like fire,
Like a pomegranate.
You'll push a big kettle in front of me.
How long will I turn around this kettle?
Am I a skimmer?

I am not like a braying donkey,
Nor in love with urine.
O friend Jesus, give me
The wine of monks.

Be silent! If you are not a hypocrite,
Listen to love.
I am the friend of Rustem,
Not the shameless.

58.

Verse 2644

☞ One who broke my repentance,
Where shall I run away from You?
O One who settled down, sat on my heart,
Where can I escape from You?

O light of both my eyes,
How could I see without You?
O One who tied my neck,
Where can I escape from You?

O Beautiful One, the lights of your eyes
Turned six dimensions into a six-faced mirror.

O One whose face is blessed,
Where can I escape from You?

Heart is a creature
Which jumped out of You.
Nourished and was nurtured from you.
Soul, on the other hand, is exhausted from You.
Where can I escape from You?

Even if I close my eyes,
You are still in my heart.
You don't go away from there.
Where can I escape from You?

59.

Verse 2649

☞ came, swaying, to die again
In your presence,
O one who saves me
Again and again from grief and suffering.

I am like the dried, cracked earth.
My cloud is from favor.
My musk is from favor.
I don't want anything but thunder.
I don't take anything in my hand
But your curly hair.

Being your slave is
A hundred times better
Than being free and a king.
Especially when you say,
"O, my sick-hearted slave."

A hand full of dirt that will come
Reaches you better than the gold
Which stays away from you.
Especially the moment you say,
"O, my poor, hungry one."

Leave adventure. Where is the mind
Which will deal with that?
The harp is my ecstasy, my remembrance.

Wine is my sheik, my master.

O Soul of the Soul of drunks,
O one whose hand is treasure for the needy,
I have been engulfed in honey
And milk at the heaven of your beauty.

I have seen the last day of Judgment.
I have lost myself.
My existence has become invisible.
I am bent like a bow,
But I fly like an arrow.

O friend from whom it is impossible
For me to separate,
I was a handful of dust.
The wind coming from you lifted me up
In the air, gave me great height.
But where could I go without you?

O light of my eye, glory of religion,
You said, "Sit down wisely."
O one who tears my curtain,
Are you leaving me alone?

I am the slave of Elest,
I have been yours since then;
But your cruel separation
Is driving me crazy.

How could my tree
Smile without your spring?
How could my dough
Be cooked, if you don't knead it?

Since I have seen your table, your blessing,
I have been saved from crumbs.
Since I have seen your Being,
I am running away from my existence.

I'll lose my mind, my Soul
If you leave me or stay away from me.
I'll climb to the top of the tower of Aeter^[43]
If you appear to me;
If you are with me.

O Soul, when I sit at the last ritual
Of prayer, give me a greeting and take mine.
This is the last part of the ritual.
It is not possible without salutation.

How can I stop clapping my hands?
My Beautiful One is in my hand.
How can I stop tapping my feet?
My base tones become high-pitched.
I am upside-down already.

Give our greetings to Shems of Tebriz.
It is good to set a temple to such an East.
I am glorified by the glory of his face.
I want glory from him.

60.

Verse 2665

How can I not be death? Not be crazy?
Not be insane? Not be chained
For such a Beauty who gives Soul?

I drank your wine.
How can I be destroyed?
It looks like you are wine, I am water.
You are honey, I am milk.

Open your mouth. Spread countless sugars.
If you don't listen to excuses,
I'll endure your coyness, your caprices.

Do you understand why I am smiling?
Because of your great zeal.
Because I am the master of lovers
In the city of your love.

I was in the same womb
With everlasting love.
I was born from the same mother.
I am his twin brother.
I swear to God, I'll create a brand new love
Even when I become very old.

You only see yourself with those eyes.
But if you open the eyes of the Soul,
You'll understand there is nobody
Like me.

I fire the ovens of cold people.
In the hot oven,
I am the best-cooked bread
Among the others.

I resemble the milk for drinking.
I don't stay in the throat.
Don't make a wrong judgment
If you find me as salty as cheese.

I am a Sultan with a crown and throne
With the love of Shems of Tebriz.
But if he sits on the throne,
I am a Vizir in his presence.

61.

Verse 2674

☞ I want to boil the kettle
Of the Soul. Spread bloody foam.
I want to say the words of
The two universes in one breath,
In one effort.

I am out of myself.
I became a slave for Love.
I want to make all the universe
Go out of itself.

I twist the rope girdle
Of bad self around his neck.
He says, "When I scream
I'll be free and flyaway."

But how could he be free?
I will pull in such a way that
He will turn all around the world.
His smoke-colored Soul will
Be engulfed in fire.

I will snatch the veil
From the face of the bride of Soul.
I will deprive the ones who are the leaders of love
Of wealth and property.

I'll make this Earth a harp of Love.
I'll make three hundred languages.
Out of this mute harp.

Shems of Tebriz stretched such a bow
At the land of love that,
When I let go, not only the arrow
But the bowstring will flyaway.

62.

Verse 2681

You're hiding your heart from me.
Pretending you don't know.
You are mixing all the words
And alphabet together, like saying
You don't know how to write.

I am the one who wrote
All those things on your imagination.
How can I not know the secret
Of your heart?
I am inside of your Soul.

I am better and brighter than the sun.
Particles of Souls are dancing in front of me.
They all turn toward my temple,
Where I scattered pearls.

How could particles be visible
Without sunshine?
O atoms, how can you stay
Away from my gravity?

Earth has been turning
Around my light like a moth.
I am the one who burns its wings.

This cracking up, piece by piece;
This indescribable love,
Is union with the Beloved.
If you want to understand love,
I'll take you to His presence.

If you are in doubt, make sure
The doubt comes from me to you.
I draw down deep the one
Who denies with that trick.

If you are faithful,
This also comes from me.
I catch the ones who are at the top
With the same net.
Save them from blasphemy.

If you have any grief, any trouble,
Find me in this grief. See me in this trouble.
Because the arrow of distress
Flys out from my bow.

When difficulty turns into comfort,
When arrows become shields, pay attention.
This also comes from my favors.
This is a gift for you.

Wherever this beauty exists,
Relations are alright there.
But I cannot talk
Where the master of greatness exists.

63.

Verse 2692

Give us wine constantly
So we will be together, become one.
For just one moment,
Throw away our forms.

If we give ourselves up,
We will all have the color of the same water.
We are branches of the same tree.
We are all neighbors.

We have the same character of love.
Hidden, at the same time obvious.
We are hidden at the city of love,
But wide open at the quarters of love.

If we see ourselves dead,
We go and sit at our grave.
If we see ourselves alive,
We start yelling and screaming,
And tear our faces.

Every shape reflects
On our mirror of heart.
Looks are not bound with anything,
Because we are not bound with anything.

We are a bunch of fish
Walking on the surface of the water.
We throw this ever-changing soil
From one desire to the other,
To the face of Earth.

We have seen the glory of love
Turned into the heart of the penniless.
We had love as cash,
Became merchants without garments.

64.

Verse 2699

☞ am not myself.
I fell into the world of ecstasy.
There, what a nice joy
And beautiful shape I am in.

In order not to see anyone else,
That Beauty closed my eyes.
At the end, I opened my eyes
And suddenly, I saw Him.

The Soul has started fighting with me.
"Don't hurt me," he said.
"I'll divorce you," I said.

"Go ahead," said he. "I just did."

My mother saw on my face
The mountain on which
Your love is reflected.
Cut my umbilical cord with that love.
I have been in love with you since my birth.

Even though I ride a horse to the sky,
Read the tablet of Absence,
Without you, O One who controls my Soul,
I am in complete defeat and disorder.

O, One who lifts the curtain,
Brings death to life,
I remember the oath of Elest
When I see the holy light of your face.

O Soul, I have been out of myself so much.
I have been hidden from myself,
From people, so much it seems
Like I was born from a fairy.
I almost became one.

I asked my body,
"What are you in front of Shemseddin of Tebriz?"
"Earth," he answered.
My Soul said,
"Someone who is as dizzy as the wind."

65.

Verse 2707

☞ solemnly promised. I said,
"I broke the bad oath."
He said, "How could you solemnly promise?
How could you break the things I tied?"

I am like honey and milk with Him.
I would hold onto His skirt, but I can't
My hands are broken.

But only the ones whose hands are broken
Can hang onto his skirt.

He cast me down with sorrow and grief.
But now he has lifted me up.

When I go up, His justice
Would put me down.
First I was annihilated,
Then He made me exist again.

O One who has tied
His love-lock on my neck,
Wail from his drunken eyes.
They are the Ones who made me drunk.
Made me drunk.

His drunken image came
Like a drunk attack on me.
I have used every excuse,
But couldn't getaway from Him.

I knocked at the door of the Beloved.
"Nobody is here," he said.
That means, "I am here.
Make sure of that."

"Your slave has arrived," I said.
"Those words of yours are a trap," he answered.
"Do you think I'll bite this bait?"

"If you want to burn, burn me.
I deserve it, O Beautiful,
Because I worship such an idol, such a Beauty."

I've become dry so you can burn me good.
If you burn me, I will be saved from fire.

I go wherever you go.
You come wherever I go.
I am happy with you
In life or in death.

O water of vitality, as long as
I am with you, death won't touch me.
I swear to God,
I am saved from death with your help.

66.

Verse 2719

I have died hundreds of times.
I have found this:
Once your smell comes,
I become alive.

I have dropped dead
Hundreds of times.
But once I heard your voice,
I was born again.

I lose myself. I become nothing
When I see your face, O charmer
Who turns me into a feast day and
Burns me like Aloe wood.

I set a trap in my heart
To hunt the falcon of Love.
But he fooled me with many tricks.
Came and snatched me.

O, flame which keeps whirling
The hearts of men,
I turn around your moon
Like the sky.

What a happy moment it was
That I made that oath again and again.
But then I broke them all.
I became the same as I was.

He put the idea in my mind
That I could only reach the Sultan through him.
I went to the side of the mind,
But I couldn't find any help there.

67.

Verse 2726

The ones who denied You

Became the enemy of my drunk Soul.
But Your beauty is the answer for them.

Once you show your face from a distance,
Once you pull the ear of
The one who reproaches you,
I am saved.

I don't believe it if he says,
"Neither pearl nor jewel"
It is not even that, O brother.
I am as I am.

Yesterday, Heart became drunk
Because of the beautiful One.
He became so drunk that I broke
A glass in front of the Sultan.

I am drunk with that Beauty
Whose face is more beautiful than the moon.
I am happy because of that Sin.
I am the culpable one of that Sultan.
Come and break my hand.

I am easy and deceitful.
Belong to the religion of love.
That is why my name is all around.
Who am I to send gifts to the Sultan?

Heart is a thief, a first-class thief,
Waiting in front of the treasure's door.
After I tied the hand of that thief,
The door was opened.

O one who doesn't know that Sultan,
You keep asking, "Where are you?
Where are you going?"
Like a fish in a net,
I go wherever the net pulls me.

God's Shems is my secret,
Tebritz is my supplication.
He is the one, my Kible
At Namaz. [\[44\]](#) He is the light of my Abdest. [\[45\]](#)

68.

Verse 2735

I am such a dark evening
That I am mad at the moon.
I am such a stark naked, poor one,
That I am mad at the Sultan.

That peerless, unique Beauty
Kindly invited me to his house.
But I am mad at the road of the journey.

If my Beloved is obstinate and coy,
It throws me into grief, makes me helpless.
Even then, I won't say "Ah."
I am even mad at "Ah."

He fools me sometimes with gold.
Sometimes with power and armies.
I am already mad at power.

I am such an iron that
I am running away from the great Magnet.
I am a piece of straw,
Mad at the magnet of the universe.

We are such particles
That we rebel at the four elements,
The five senses, and the six dimensions.
What are four, five and six?
I am even mad at the only God.

You cannot take this world
Because you are out of the water.
I am getting mad at the ones
Who are like the sun
Because they look like the sun.

69.

Verse 2742

I entered the road of love pure, clean.

I walk on that road, pure, clean.
I don't spread the seeds of grudge.
Even Absence takes shelter in me.
I don't scratch the back of greed.

Neither do I worry about people,
Nor have fear of anyone.
I am a free bird. I don't need
The leftovers of the cages.

I am a raining cloud,
A sky which spreads pearls.
I give the water of life
To the thirsty on the Earth.

It looked like fire to Moses,
But it was the Glory of God
Coming to the heart.
I also look like fire from a distance.
But I am the Glory, O my friend.

The branches of the tree tremble
But its roots stay still.
I may be restless here,
But I settled down at the world of Soul.

I am such a strange universe
That I can be hidden in a handful of dust.
I am light to every night;
Spring to every fall.

I am night for the bird of night;
Day for the bird of day.
But when I come to myself,
I am different from both of them.

I come to myself
When I am totally annihilated,
Out of myself.
I become completed when
I am free from the four elements,
The five senses.

The Soul of man gets
Into an endless dispute of "choice."
His great "choice" took my "choice"

Out of my hand. Left me without choice.

The smart mind has such wind in his head.
But when you offer a glass of wine,
That wind blows away.

70.

Verse 2752

My God, what kind of Beloved have I?
It seems like I have been hunting a lion.
There are hundreds of fields and meadows
In my heart for him to walk and enjoy.

When he comes close to me,
He says, on purpose,
"I have a problem with you.
How long are you going to stay
Away from me?"

Last night, I asked my Beloved
About the new moon. He said
"I have been running after Him.
My feet are full of dirt."

When the sun rose, I asked,
"Why is your face yellow like that?"
He answered, "I saw His face.
I felt so ashamed that my face
Turned into this color."

"O water, you fall down prostrate.
You make your head, feet. You are
Running face down," I said.
He answered, "With His spell,
I keep running and curling like a snake."

"O head of Justice, head of discipline;
O fire, why do you writhe and wriggle," I said.
He answered, "I have such a restless
Heart because of the flame from His face."

"O messenger of the world, the wind,
Why are you so restless?" I asked.

"If I had a choice, never mind restlessness.
My heart would be burned and destroyed," he said.

I said, "O Earth, why- are you
In silence? What do you think?
You are in such deep thought."
"Never mind my silence," he said.
"I have gardens and springs inside of me."

Give up all those elements. God is enough for us.
I have drunkenness in my head.
Wine is in my hand.

If you take my sleep away,
The door of drunkenness is wide open.
For sure, he would serve wine, jar by jar
Since my Beloved's hand is in my hand.

Be silent. That Heart speaks
Without tongue or lips.
When I hear words of the Heart
I am ashamed of words of the mouth.

71.

Verse 2763

O bird in the sky,
It is time to fly.
O gazelle of meaning,
It is time to spread musk.

O unique lover,
O one who was chosen among the lovers,
It is time to give up "created."
Watch creation. See the Creator.

Enlightenment has come to you.
You are Soul. Such a Soul,
Who knows to run like a specter
Through the eyes.

Orders come now.
They will teach you
To see without eyes,

Hear without ears.

He knows how to curl a mustache;
At the same time, to bring the dead to life.
He knows how to give the throne of destiny;
At the same time, to educate and bring up humans.

Even the Joseph of Meaning,
That free treasure, lowers his price.
But I wonder if you know how to buy him?

Where is that customer who knows
How to tune in two different notes
At the same time; tear the fret
Of the stringed instrument?

O successful lover,
O one who has been proven,
You should turn around your own pivot,
Like the sky.

Search for yourself in Absence
And find it is difficult
To be contrary or separated from God.

Clean your lips of the devil's milk.
After that, you can drink
From the breast of the heart.

O love of universe,
You keep pulling us.
O one who pulls,
How beautifully you pull.
O one who is pulled,
Bravo for you, too.

The sun knows how to show
Its face from the East.
Otherwise, it is impossible
To reach Him by running,
To know Him by seeing.

Be silent. If it was possible
To tell the conditions of the Heart,
Mountains would start to move
And flutter like the sea.

If you see Shemseddin of Tebriz suddenly,
You can also see the sparks of the wine
Of eternity because of him.

72.

Verse 2777

An army came from the land
Of dark people.
Attacked the center of the army.
O brave one whose head is up,
Attack fearlessly.

Attack like fire.
They are all wood.
With the fire of your heart,
Burn the dry one, burn the wet one.

If the sea starts a war,
Has a grudge with you,
You turn all the waves of hatred into fire.
Destroy all its pearls and coral.

The arrow came from your bow
And pierced the seven layers of sky.
O arrow of state,
Only two distant bows remain.
Attack with His shield.

Put your hand to the head
Of the one who comes headless,
Caress him.
Cut with the dagger the one
Who comes with a head.

The Soul who shines and is enlightened
Keeps burning in your love.
If you want him to regain his freshness
Throw him in the fountain of Kevser.

Make the Earth green
With ruby lips of yours, which give wine.
Take the harp from the hand of Venus,

Throw stones to its glass, break it.

Attack with the power of faith
The infidel Soul of the one
Who denies God's Shems of Tebriz.

73.

Verse 2785

Today, your love brought
All the boasting leaders
To your temple with their necks
Tied with his coyness.

Go. Go to the rose garden.
Watch the ones who worship the rose.
One moment they prostrate,
One moment they drink wine.

That sweet-mannered Beloved
Hasn't left even a piece of hair to us.
That is what shaving the Sufi head means.
Giving up his head.[\[46\]](#)

When you lose your loose tooth,
A new one comes.
Death is the same for the believer.

O enemy of Shems of Tebriz
O thief who stages hold-ups,
The worst disbeliever;
Shrink yourself, have grief, torture yourself.

74.

Verse 2790

O vain, useless people,
Run, struggle for bread.
O ones who have reached
The kingdom's fortune,
Walk toward the Soul,

Try to get Soul.

Animals pull grass, eat grass,
Don't know anything else.
Humans are the ones
Who search for agates and coral.

Those gardens are asleep,
There is nothing there.
These gardens are open,
Flowers are in bloom.
This is the share for
The palace of the Sultan,
Harvested from these gardens.

There are Souls, far away,
Who haven't reached the Beloved;
Who stay in misery.
There are Souls who have flown, gone,
Who have already reached the Beloved.

There is also a Soul, hard to describe,
Above the sky.
Fine and agile, it looks like
The moon in the sign of Libra.

There is still another Soul,
Hard like fire; rigid, ugly,
Which has a short life.
Looks like the shadow of the devil.

My Hodja, which one are you?
Are you cooked, or still raw?
Are you drunk with wine and snacks,
Or are you only the rider of the field?

One day, while I was traveling
In the valley, I saw a great man.
He was up in the air, dancing
Upward toward the heights.

Everywhere was exuberance
Overflowing because of Him.
But he was very calm, silent.
He was wearing green.
My Soul admired Him.

I asked, 'What's this excitement?
You are away from people's illusion.
Are you the glory of the Glory of Glories,
Or a shining sun?"

"My heart was squeezed," He said.
"My body became light as a result of this.
My feet were freed from
The cross of the four elements."

"Master," I said. "How wonderful.
Can I embrace you?"
I begged, begged fervently.
"Impossible," he said.

I said, "Show some sign of faithfulness.
Leave this coyness.
Give me just one sugar cane.
Be generous.
What would be lost from that mine?"

"I am Absent. A reed in the riverbed.
I appear in this form
Just as a remedy for suffering."

"To talk like that is not for You,"
I said. "You can always get rid of me.
O One who speaks well,
Tell me something else."

"How do you believe a one-sided secret
Spoken only from one side?
You are a child," He said.
"Go and learn how to read and write."

I said, "Punish me right away.
It is alright.
Get rid of me with hundreds of excuses.
Kill me with your separation."

Suddenly; He started talking sweetly,
Gave me hundreds of suggestions.
Read all of them by heart.
I was devastated. Became drunk.

I shed many tears.
Stayed there as a drunk for a long time.
Then I saw that Sultan, suddenly come out
Like a Soul in human shape.

A scorch is left on the heart
From this conversation.
A kind of scorch; its pleasure
Worth a thousand favors.

He offered me such unexplainable things.
There was such amazing advice
In those words.
Be silent. It is not easy
To put them into words.

75.

Verse 2811

Look for that Beauty
Here among the beauties.
If someone tells you,
"Don't wake up that troublemaker,"
Don't listen to him.

The Soul smiles with joy
When his image settles the heart.
The suffering of the patient ones
Brings out hundreds of sweet things.

Lights come from his shining face,
Like a full moon reflecting in the eyes.
How could the blind see that?

76.

Verse 2814

Heart, don't run away
From the houri's Sultan;
The Kible of the patient ones;
Like someone who stayed away from him.

Don't excite him.
Don't wake the troublemaker.

I am already someone who looks for trouble.
I can't leave him. I can't give him up.
I can't wash my hands of him.
But don't you excite,
Don't wake the troublemaker.

I am head of the lovers,
Master of wanderers.
I am in love with someone.
But don't you excite,
Don't wake the troublemaker.

Don't ask me how I am,
Look and see yourself.
Drowned in the blood, even worse than that.
But don't stir, don't excite,
Don't wake the troublemaker.

I am Rustem; Soul,
Float for the tribe of Noah,
Drunk from the mornings wine.
Don't wake the troublemaker.

You cannot read this writing
Because you are earthbound.
You only know this much:
Don't excite,
Don't wake the troublemaker.

77.

Verse 2820

☪ stone-hearted one,
Turn the Soul into a sea full of pearls.
O, the hair of the Beloved looks
Like night. Create dawn in
The middle of the night.

Tune the harp that is played
By heart and Soul with love.
Fill the silent reed with sugar

From the love of that sweet Beauty.

You have hundreds of thousands
Of pearls in your ears and eyes.
Give a handful of them
To the blind and deaf.

Give to lovers the blood
Of heart which smokes,
Smells love as a cup of soup,
Feed them.

Souls have been going different ways
But haven't reached anywhere.
O one who is the answer for Souls,
Teach them a new way.

The wings of birds in water
And in air, got stuck in mud.
O Huma bird, fly.[\[47\]](#)

Go like the devil. Run around the world.
Find that fairy. Turn your heart
To gold in front of his silvery heart.
Become pale, tired, to reach him.

Signs and orders are coming
From everywhere to you.
To stop asking "why" and "how,"
Walk together with that hot-tempered Beauty.
You beg when he gets more difficult.

Take the Soul that is
Like the feet of an ant
As a gift to His temple,
And wait at every corner
Where the army of Solomon will pass.

The Sea is salty, bitter water,
But there are pearls at the bottom.
You pass through the salty water
And dive for the pearls.

There is a kind of snake
That has an antidote in its head.
If you want to get it,

Pass through the poison.

If you are looking for the tree of Tuba,[\[48\]](#)
Here is God's Shems of Tebriz.
If you look for eternal pleasure, joy, or life,
Sit in the shade of this tree.

78.

Verse 2832

☉ one who is lost in Absence
On the journey, go even further.
Leave even that behind you.
Look from heart to Heart itself.
See the essence.

Heart is like a Chinese mirror.
If you sit with Heart, you'll see
Hundreds of swords. Don't be afraid.
Make a shield of your eyes,
Put it in front of them.

I know you gave up everything.
You have been annihilated in Heart.
You are right in Absence,
But one more effort is necessary.

Attack once more. Cut your prey
To pieces around this fountain.
Lay a hand on your liver
O lion of the heart.

Since you pawn your carpet
For that peerless pearl,
For one more big test,
Try to put your hand to your belt.

We are particles in sunshine.
Get a little bit of soil
From the particle and put it
On the eye of the moon as salve.

No Soul is left for us
From love and craziness.

O Sultan who sees and knows,
You are the one. Tell us about yourself.

Sweep. Throwaway all these forms
And pictures from this earth.
Create a live image of yourself,
O love that resembles fire.

They died, passed away from themselves,
Drank wine. Even that rind
Has greetings for you. .
O Sultan, go to their side just one time.

Even the Phoenix would get up
And fly from Kafdagi^[49] with the love
Of Shems of Tebriz.
You pull the wing of existence
From its roots. Tear it to pieces.
Get an arm and wing from love.

79.

Verse 2842

A moth, plunging into the fire,
Told me "Do the same."
He was burning, fluttering his wings
And telling me,
"Be like me."

The oil lamp is filled with oil.
Its wick is knotted, burning
With its broken neck,
And at the same time, telling me softly,
"Be like me."

The candle was burning and melting.
It gave itself for heat and suffering.
At the same time, it was telling me,
"Burn and melt like this.
Be like me."

"It isn't worth it to spend
Gold and silver to earn profit

In this world," he was saying.
"Try to bum. Melt this way.
Be like me."

The sea filled his lap with pearls,
Sat at the head, so as not to be conceited;
Showed itself bitter and salty.
It is trying to tell you,
"Be like me."

The Phoenix has given up good and bad,
Is free from traps.
It has settled down on Kafdagi,
Is trying to tell you,
"Be like me."

The rose purified its face,
Tore its robe, enduring the thorns,
Telling you to do and
"Be like me."

Wine gave up hundreds of names
And fame, free from shame and modesty.
Became an enemy to the mind.
Keeps running in man's brain,
Saying to you,
"Be like me."

The shrill pipe became completely empty;
Closed its eyes; only gave its lips
To the one who blows, and was saying
"Be like me."

Adam was in mourning forty years.
Kept crying, telling his children
"Be like me."

Be silent. Learn, at last
A lesson from the hard rock.
It also stays silent, but cries
"Be like me:"

See Shemseddin of Tebriz
Fill the valley with the light of Soul;
The plains with greatness, saying
"Be like me."

80.

Verse 2854

Death is the sweetest thing for us,
As long as You take the Soul.
Dying with You is sweeter
Than sweet life for us.

Lift this cover. Don't hide the truth.
Death is like fire, but
For God's Abraham, it is a garden,
The fountain of life.

Death is on this side.
The other side is a birth.
There, nobody dies.
Death is only on this side.

Leave this body, become Soul.
Go to that world with pleasure.
Death is sad and terrible now,
But don't be afraid of death.

I made an oath to the Glory of God,
For whom nine skies became dirt.
That death is like the one who makes
Halva[\[50\]](#) with the sugar of union.

Why should I run away from Soul?
Giving life is Soul. To reach the Soul,
Why should I escape from the mine?
Death is a gold mine.

If you are out of this cage,
You are in the rose garden.
When you break this shell,
Death is the pearl.

When God calls you,
Pulls you to His side,
Going is like Heaven.
Dying is like Kevser.

Death is a mirror.
Your beauty reflects there, appears there.
The mirror keeps telling you
He is the One showing you to yourself.

If you are a believer, a nice person,
Your death is safe, secure, and pleasant.
If you are a disbeliever, a bitter person,
Death is also bitter and bad for you.

If you are like Joseph, beautiful,
Your mirror is also beautiful.
If you are ugly, your mirror
Inevitably shows your ugliness.

Be silent. You are a sweet-tongued
Immortal, like Hizir.[\[51\]](#)
Death is blind and deaf
For the fountain of life.

81.

Verse 2866

☞ Beloved, make us man first.
Keep us that way, then give us wine.
Keep filling the wine glasses.

O Soul, nothing comes from us
Nor from our temple.
You started building.
You finish it.

You turned our land of happiness
To a land of reproach.
Turn it back
To the land of happiness again.

This endless road is too far, too long.
But, with Your favor,
It is made a two-step road.

You made us hostage to this "Self."
But You are the Master of this Self,
Who orders us to do bad things.

Make us the master, Self the slave.

You give general favors to special ones.
Today, make those special favors
That You give your close ones,
General favors.

Give a new sun to every particle
With Your kindness.
Raise Your sun of favor and kindness
To everyone.

Sweeten the praying for us.
Prayers become like milk and honey
For our mouths.
Favor the one who says "Amen."
Turn him to someone who wants
To do everybody good.

82.

Verse 2874

Look for January's advice.
Stack wood in a big pile.
If the cold doesn't come,
I'll take the blame of the winter and wood.

When the weather gets cold,
Throw wood on the fire.
Trying to save wood?
Is wood better than your health, your body?

Wood is the symbol of Absence.
Fire is the love of God.
O clean Soul, burn forms and shapes.

Your Soul feels frozen if you
Don't burn the forms and shapes.
Stay away from spring and security
As an idol-worshipper.

Fire becomes a rose, tulip, and flower.
Turns into mint and willows
By the order of God.

Plunge into love, which looks like fire.
Keep your heart good, like silver.
Inside of that fire, beautify.
Since you are the son of Abraham,
Fire is your place.

Believers change the fire to a full moon
By the spells they know.
The fire doesn't burn anymore.

Bravo, for that spell
That melts iron to a small needle.

The moth sees fire like a window
And jumps into the flame for that reason.

The arrow and spear look like
A branch of roses for Hamza.[\[52\]](#)
Nobody wears armor against roses.

The Pharaoh went down like yogurt in water,
But Moses stayed above the water, like oil.

Fine horses carry the Sultans.
Dumb, ordinary ones carry only
Saddles and dried dung.

Words are senseless,
Annoying chatter in the mill of meaning.
The millstone turns with water,
Not with chatter.

Because of these senseless words,
Grain jumps out of the tray
And falls under the millstone.
In the other world,
That's the way to be ground.

I am hot, not because of
Gossip or empty words, my friend,
Because of a pure gold mine, like Shemseddin.

Verse 2889

Go, put your head on the pillow.
Leave this sorrowful, burned one
Who walks around all night long.

At night, we struggle through
The wave of love until morning.
If you want, forgive us.
If you want, torture us.

You run away from me
So you'll stay out of trouble.
Be on the way to safety, not grief.

We are suffering at the corner of sorrow,
Shedding tears.
You can run hundreds of miles,
In hundreds of places,
From our flowing tears.

There is someone who is a cruel tyrant,
Who has a marble, granite heart.
He is the One who pulls us.
He would kill man and
Nobody would ask the cost of his blood.

It is not necessary for
The Sultan of Beauty
To be loyal to lovers.
O Lover, whose face turned to pale yellow,
You be patient. You be loyal.

There is a disease
Whose only remedy is death.
How can I ask to find the cure
For that disease?

I saw a master in my dream.
He was at the village of Love.
He signaled with his hand,
Bidding me to come to his side.

He told me "If there is a dragon
On the road, you have love like an emerald.
Go, repel that dragon with

The shine of emerald-like lightning."

Enough. I am not myself anymore.
If you want to increase your knowledge,
Read the stories of Abu-Ali[\[53\]](#) or
The advice of Abu-Ala.[\[54\]](#)

84.

Verse 2899

☺, my eyes. It is morning.
Look through my window.
You are the source, the essence of the sun.
Since you came, the dawn is made clear.

Take the ones who desire.
Pass them through seven seas.
Don't look at the oxen and fish,
Go beyond hundreds of them like that.

Find what you are looking for.
Bring up what you search for.
You are free from all creatures.
Turn this old house upside-down.

The universe is nothing but Absence.
You make it exist in one moment.
A poisonous snake is this world.
Try to change this poison into sugar.

Wherever you see a dryness,
Make a running spring.
Wherever you see a stone,
Shine on it, make it a jewel.

If you see an enemy
In front of or behind the lover,
Slap him, destroy him.

How long will you give
Excuses as they are?
The blind cannot see.
Give them the power to see
If you don't want them to be blind.

If you don't want curtains
Over their eyes, give orders
For the curtains to be lifted,
So they won't be blind anymore.

Among all these crowds,
Command is absolutely yours.
I folded the Kaftan of idleness
Rose and ordered, "Put on the belt of zeal."

O Sun of the Throne of God,
O God's Sun of Tebriz,
I am pale and weak like a new moon.
Turn my face into a full moon.

85.

Verse 2909

You asked, "How are you?"
Look at our face.
You'll understand how we are.
Were you alright when I was gone?
Never mind this sarcasm.

You said with a smile,
"Have a good day."
If you are not around,
Nobody has a good time.
Tell me another story.

"I am tired of how long
You keep talking about love," you said.
Tell that to the one who is not in love.
Cut the story short.

I cannot find a confidant.
I am in fire, in water.
I'll go to some corner.
Make this sword like a shield, O God.
I'll be silent; a friend; a confidant.
Tell my situation.

You made us insolent the first day.

Ask me whatever you want.
Now listen to our problems.

"I have been perturbed because
Of penniless friends," you said.
Open your lips and fill the worlds
With pearls and jewels.

"Get ready to serve with respect," you said.
If that's so, open your arms of kindness
And embrace me.

86.

Verse 2916

I have sat in fire up to my neck
Lots of times.
But today, I am in the water of union
With my Beloved, up to my neck.

I have been blessed with
All kinds of favors, up to my neck.
The Beloved was not satisfied with that.

"Are you not good for even a thorn?"
He asked while waiting for roses.
The thorn was in the ground
For nine months, up to its neck.

"What is the thorn?" I said.
"For your rose garden, like a rose,
I stayed in blood for a long time."

"You are freed from the world of struggles,
Have reached the world of love," He said.
"You were submerged, up to your neck,
In fights and troubles there."

You're free from that world,
But haven't freed yourself from you.
Your being is the shame, the fault.
You are in that shame up to your neck.

Don't set up lots of tricks

Like a pickpocket.
He is in this trap up to his neck.

The trap of this world is such a trap
That kings and lions have fallen
In its gut like dogs.
Stayed there up to their necks.

There are even more fascinating traps.
If you observe, you'll see.
The one who is out of himself is only on his hill.
But the one who has all his mind in his head
Is up to his neck.

Quit talking
You'll become short of breath.
If I wasn't tired, I would engulf you
In words up to your neck.

87.

Verse 2926

☞ I have no fear of anyone.
Especially now that my Beloved is with me.
Why should I be afraid of even one needle?
I have Zul-fekar.[\[55\]](#)

How can I be thirsty?
That "river" is looking for me.
How could my heart suffer?
The One who relieves my grief is with me.

How can I be bitter?
I have been immersed in sugar.
How could winter come close to me?
My spring is next to me.

Why should I suffer fever?
Jesus is the doctor of my mind.
Why should I be afraid of the dog?
The master of the hunt is with me.

Why shouldn't I come to the assembly?
The Cupbearer is attracting me.

How can I not conquer those cities?
The Sultan is with me.

The wind in this big jar
Is fermenting, overflowing for us.
There is no place for difficulty
And lightheadedness here for us.

If I fight with fate,
Tear it to pieces,
I don't have to make excuses.
The Beautiful One is with me, next to me.

I have been immersed in wealth and blessings.
Drunk with favor and Grace
In the arms of fortune.
The Beloved, who embraces so beautifully,
Is with me.

O, the talent of orators.
O, the talent of fighters.
I am tired of words. Be silent now.
The master of conversation is by my side.

88.

Verse 2935

For a long time, the singer of the heart
Sang with love.
Then my Beloved entered from the door
With the glass in his hand.

He took all the love,
Which is like smoke in clouds,
From my head, then poured
It back into my head.
The thousand-year-old wine
Renewed our love.

The ties of sects and religions
Have killed me.
Now, I am drunk with the present moment.
I neither recognize credit of the past,
Nor future gains.

I gave the vineyard of the Soul.
I bought the barrel where grapes are crushed.
I wrote the deed of this transaction
On a glass of wine.

O clown of time,
Give up all your house of belongings.
This cup of wine has more value than that.
Once you give up everything
You will understand its value.

Close this mouth,
Open the mouth of Soul;
Then you will see.
This world is nothing but a morsel.

But when your soul becomes drunk
It doesn't even want a morsel.
Anyone who is drunk with his face,
His beauty mark,
Doesn't care for thick soup.

Souls belong to the sky.
Great souls are all
Drunks of Shems of Tebriz.
They ascend to the heights
Like drops of mist.

89.

Verse 2943

☞ my Beautiful, I have been
Free from you for some time; have given you up.
Still, my heart is not content.
I have been burning, melting,
At the same time, have been frozen
From you and have become ice.

Sometimes you squeeze me in your hand.
Sometimes you crush me under your feet.
Yes, you are right.
The grape won't become wine
Without being squeezed and crushed.

You reflected on Earth like sunshine.
Then slowly you took us back to that side.
You went in that direction.

You returned to the circle of Sun
Like a light through our body,
From the window of our body.

The one who sees the circle of Sun
Says, "He is alive."
The one who sees the window,
Says, "Somebody died."

He has hidden; covered
Our source, our essence,
In the glass of grief and joy.
Our origin is pure.
The rest is sediment.

O Source of the Source of heart;
O God's Shems of Tebriz,
Hundreds of hearts are roasted for you.
What's the value of
The thin layer of bread dough?

90.

Verse 2950

☉ Beautiful One who is pure
From water, from earth,
Step just once on my ground.
I have no hand left, no heart.
Put Your hand on my heart.

I became turbid water,
Lost in the mud.
Pick me up, pour me in Your chest.
My home will be there.

The curls of your hair
Have made my life very complicated.
Spread your hair
On my utterly disordered affairs.

Whatever I have gained,
Isn't worth anything without You.
Send the torrent of love
Over my gains.

If you want, even the Soul
Becomes a moth around my light.
Give your fire to my talented light.

I have been like a mohair garment,
Tied by hundreds of knots
Because of your hair.
But, still do me the favor
That ties me to your curly, wavy hair
For even a short time.

Beloved, the well of Babil
Is filled with spells because of your eyes.
Make a good spell. Drop me there.

You said Elest.
Since then, my Soul has been pregnant.
Make an amulet with the word "trouble."
And give it to my pregnant Soul.

When will you disperse the cloud
From your face and call me?
Put your face to mine,
Which becomes like a full moon.

O God's Shems of Tebriz,
If my Soul is happy,
Give the blessing of Union
To this happy Soul.

91.

Verse 2960

☞ If the wind snatched the cover
From your face and flew,
Death, wherever it is,
Would come to life and move.

O One who separates
Those belongings from ours,
Stop the fight. Come to peace.
Quit anger and coyness.

O One who raises us like a happy destiny,
Gives us our wishes; one morning of joy.
You offered that big glass of Keykubad,
And we drank it.

Then mind, when it has fallen
Into the valley of separation,
Becomes drunk, passes out of itself.
If your turbid wines are like that,
How would the pure ones be?

You are our Sun.
Once you rise behind the mountain,
This cold frozen earth
Becomes warm and exuberant.

Last night you opened your lips.
Sugar and honey spread around.
You made a beautiful promise.
We started counting the days.

The drunkenness of your love
Is better than wine or opium.
Your face is brighter
Than the Sun and moon.

O Lion who catches every prey,
You wouldn't deem it proper for the heart
To burn in fire like chips and straw
By counting his faults and shame.

I am in this world
But my heart never falls into the greed
Of making the thin, half dough
Bigger or rounder with stretching.

O Love, until when will you
Be asking me why my face is so pale?
My temper is bilious.
I boil and overflow
Because of my own exuberance.

I am turning yellow, like saffron.

When will the time come
That you'll spread your black, curly hair
Over my face out of obstinacy to evil eyes?
Say, "O One who gave his heart to us,
I am giving you all."

I am neither with you,
Nor can I stand this separation.
This ruins me, destroys me.

You talk because your words remain
Like the inscriptions on stone.
Ours will be forgotten quickly.

92.

Verse 2973

O One who makes his lover
A slave and tortures him with jealousy,
All your lovers gave up the throne,
And gain with Your love.

You filtered hundreds of raindrops,
Made wine and put it in one glass.
You drank hundreds of glasses
From that wine and still stayed sober.

You threw a rope and
Pulled us to the sky.
But I stayed in the air.
The rope is broken in my hand.

So many lions have been skinned.
Their bones were broken
Because of your gazelle eyes.

What luck to see your moon face
In a dream at night.
What happiness to see
Your beauty in the morning.

O Beautiful One, even your cheapest

Slave turned into a mirror.
When the mirror was broken,
Hundreds of hands and feet were wounded.

I have glimpsed the Beauty
Of Shems of Tebriz.
Said "What a beauty. God saves
You from evil eyes."
But the arrow was already
Thrown away by jealousy.

93.

Verse 2980

Since you have been burning
With that pure, clean love now,
You will see the face
Of hundreds of houri's tomorrow.

Look at your affection, your desires.
How pure, clean, and colorless.
Look at, and see, that Earth full of beauties,
Born from that clean love.

Your Soul, which looks like a bee,
Is not seen. But look at
The honeycomb which made it.
It is full of honey.

Look at the height of your body.
Two yards, maybe even less.
But look at your Soul.
It is higher than nine skies.
Maybe even larger than that.

How long will you be licking this bowl?
Throw this jar to the ground.
Remove the cap which is made of mud
And show the top of the wine barrel.

Turn your praying rug into fire
So your prostration will be clean.
Someone with a fire-face would be born
And show his face under the praying rug.

Comes riding, the love
Of Shems of Tebriz.
The moon and sun come by foot
Behind that Sultan.

94.

Verse 2987

Someone is hidden here,
Holding my skirt.
He bent backward and grabbed
My hair, kept pulling me.

There is someone secret here,
Like Soul; better than Soul.
He has shown a garden,
Taken over my house and belongings.

Someone is hidden here
Like an image in the heart.
But the light of his face
Covers my whole Being.

Someone is secret here,
Like sugar in the sugar cane.
It is a candy man. Sweet, sweetest.
He took over my store.

Magician? Sorcerer?
Nobody sees him.
A merchant who knows all the businesses
Has taken the scale from my hands.

I am mixed with him like rose marmalade.
I took his habits.
He gained my dispositions.

I don't even see the beauties of this earth.
Only his beautiful image
Has been absorbed by my eyelashes.

I am ill. I have turned
Around the world.

Haven't found help from anyone.
At the end, I have seen his trouble.
Have taken my remedy from his hand.

You'll also find the remedy
If your heart is burned and roasted;
If you still keep turning around your troubles.

You'll bring pearls and coral
If you give up hope yourself
And plunge into the sea of desperation.

Break the spell of appearance.
Open the Soul's eye
And see my power, my splendor,
Which covers both East and West.

When you open the Soul's eye
You see the Cupbearer of Absence has come.
Greed, you kept my promise.
Offered a glass of wine.

O Noah, who knows and sees the Soul.
I hold your shirt and pull;
Because, as you see, my
Float covers the whole world.

I am asking, "Is it proper?
If you are our throne, how come
Our head is wounded?
You are our cave's friend.[\[56\]](#)
How come our friend
Would be a slave?"

He answered, "Quit crying.
Look at the direction from which
Your crying comes. Lovers become Soul
And obtain my sustenance."

Heartbroken friends,
Sit at the top of heart's house.
The drunks and wine worshippers
Fill all my space.

Hunt your prey like sporting dogs.
Get your wine. Don't be like

A barking dog in my barn.

You see Shemseddin of Tebriz
Has risen in the sky of Soul.
The glory of his face covers
And sparkles light on my world.

95.

Verse 3005

☺ my Beautiful, your love,
Just like amber, attracts the heart.
Heart has gone to you
And we, like lovers, run behind him.

The heart has stolen
A bunch of love dresses
From your beauty.
The police of Separation
Cut the hands of the heart.

My Soul eats so much sugar
At the Egypt of Love,
That sugar comes
From the reed of my wails.

O stately bird of good fortune,
Landed at the throne of God,
From the shadow of your love,
Every moment, Souls fly
To the throne, like falcons.

What a happy garden and meadow,
Where roses and iris grow
With the water of love,
And gazelles are spread all around.

The eye doesn't see itself.
But, because of your mirror,
All eyes are watching themselves
In the mirror now.

O God's Sun of Shems of Tebriz,
With your stately shrill pipe,

Tune the Rebab[\[57\]](#) of the Soul. .
With that Soul's Rebab is His voice heard.

96.

Verse 3012

That singer came again
And started singing with the harp.
Opened the door of joy to love.

He freed the "Bazaars of Josephs" from jail;
Made the sugar stores more valuable.

He cut the heads off great men
With a sword,
But raised them up with meaning.
Gave them real greatness.

He wounded and killed lovers.
Sat in the middle of their blood,
Then got up and performed their
Namaz,[\[58\]](#) one by one.

I don't know who will
Have the pleasure of sharing
The curls of your hair.
We also put our necks in front
Of those curls, O my Beauty.

Eternal destiny has told you,
"I am your least important slave."
And rubbed his face at your feet.
You even showed him coyness.

For your endearment, God made
The heads of the Graceful
Bow in supplication
To the ground on which you walk.

O Jeweler of the Truth,
O God's Shems of Tebriz,
Sometimes you prune me like a vine stump.
Sometimes you make me the pruning knife.

97.

Verse 3020

Tell the intolerant bigots
It is time for repentance,
That troubled times have come.
But how can one repent
When he has such beauty, such charm?

Religious bigotry is finished.
The repentant vow not to repent again,
Because lovers have other things
To do than repent.

You escaped from the world,
Reached the light of the Soul,
Broke the foot of repentance,
When you cut your own head like a candle.

To be restless
To the gazelle of Tartar land
Is a must in love.
When Hitay's Turk comes, [\[59\]](#)
Repentance is a big mistake.

When He starts hunting,
He gets lots of Soul.
One arrow from his looks
Is worth hundreds of blood repentances.

His image hits, crushes the lover every dawn.
The dust which his horse breaks
Is a salve for hundreds,
A remedy for the eyes of repentance.

You repent while God's Sun,
Shems of Tebriz, is away.
But once he returns and shows his face,
Pity to repentance. Pity, pity.

98.

Verse 3027

Wake up from sleep. Jump.
Look, a brand new morning is coming,
Asking for friends; dancing
And tapping his feet.
The brand new morning is coming from the sky.

O my life, why did you sit?
It is time to drink wine, get drunk.
Nobody could get his feet loose
From this world of struggle. Fight.

Get up. For the thought of drunkenness,
The memory of a drunk, clap your hands.
Pick up the glass. Know that you have
Surpassed the chosen tent
Of the great dome of sky.

Don't look at us like ordinary drunks.
Whatever I drink, it becomes wine.
The bread I eat turns into opium
And makes my eyes dreamy.

That charmer who is the sign of resurrection,
And resurrection, itself;
The One who no eyes could see
And no ears could hear,
Doesn't let me achieve austerity.

The Fountain of Life offered me,
Free, such a wine
That one drop of it
Grew the Garden of Paradise.

Whatever I say about the Beloved,
Is all about the outside.
How does the Soul know
The secret of the inside?
How could stumpy-tailed words
Explain the secrets?

Even if His zeal
Wouldn't close my mouth,
If He let me talk,
You would see the curtains

Of hundreds of skies be torn.

What would cold, frozen soil
Know about the Sun? Know about light?
How would created Soul know Creation?

Even he doesn't know that
If he gets a small droplet,
Its drunkenness will destroy,
And pass him out of himself.

O Tebriz, how would you know
The secrets of Shemseddin?
You haven't been out
Of the hunchbacked sphere of fate.

99.

Verse 3038

☞ my Life, who stays in the house of heart?
Who could sit at the throne
Besides the King or Prince?

"Tell me, what do you want from me?"
The one who got drunk with wine
Pointed his hand at me and asked.
For what else would he ask
Except an appetizer and glass of wine?

An appetizer even the heart cannot reach.
A glass of wine, made by Absolute brilliance.
God is the only One who set
An eternal assembly at His solitude.

There are so many cheaters and imposters
In the gathering of wine drinkers.
They sell many deceits.
Put your mind in your head,
O soft and naive one.
Don't fall in their traps.

If you enter the circle of indifference,
If you sit with the ones who are free from care,
Don't be like a bud with its eyes closed.

Be like a rose with its mouth open.

The universe is like a mirror.
Love is the reflection of Absolute Beauty.
O people, why should the One who sees the whole
Look only at the parts?

Be on foot, like the green
At this rose garden;
Because the Beloved is the only one
Who rides a horse.
The rest of them here are on foot.

He is the sword,
Then the only one who pulls the sword.
He is the one who is killed,
Then he is the killer.
He turns into complete reasoning,
Then he is the one
Who throws reason to the wind.

That Sultan is Sellaheddin.
Pray he will be eternal,
Live a long life.
His hand of kindness and favor
Is like a necklace around my neck.

100.

Verse 3047

☞ have seen my Beloved
Turning around the house.
He had a stringed instrument
And kept playing a tune.

He was lost in that beautiful melody
With fiery strokes.
He was drunk with the wine of Mugh,[\[60\]](#)
Attracting many hearts.

He was singing the tune of Irak,[\[61\]](#)
Playing for the name of the cupbearer.
But his real purpose was wine.
The cupbearer was his pretext.

A beautiful cupbearer came
From somewhere, with the jar in his hand,
And put the jar between them.

First helmed the glass
With wine like fire.
Have you ever seen water bum with flame?

He picked up the glass
And offered it to that charmer
Who catches hearts,
Then prostrates and kisses the threshold.

The Beloved took the glass
And drank the wine.
The flame of this wine covered his face.

He was watching his Beauty
And telling the evil eyes,
"Nobody like me has ever come to this world,
And will never come."

101.

Verse 3055

☞ wise man, open the jar of wine.
Be careful so the mirror of heart
Won't be rusted and broken;
So hatred and contempt
Cannot get in between.

If you break the glass,
Lots of feet will be hurt.
In any case, this is a bad thing.

But if you put on salve,
Express your sorrow,
Caress and scratch the head of the wounded,
Thousands of them will kneel down
To the shoes of your love and kiss your feet.

Drink the wine, as much as you can.
Get better and better. Go out of

The five senses and six dimensions.
Don't leave any malice
Around the house of the heart.

But not the wine made by grapes
That grow in the ground.
Drink the wine offered by the hand of God
Without jar, without barrel.
It comes from the land of cleanliness.

If you drink this wine,
You'll find whatever you desire.
You'll get whatever you want
At the assembly of Union.
At the land of struggle and trouble.
Either this doesn't exist,
Or that can't be found.

Brand new joys come from
God's Shems of Tebriz to the Soul
Which has been plunged in grief
And trouble after trouble.
Not the old worn-out joys.

102.

Verse 3062

☞ charmer, whose deceits
And tricks are sweet and beautiful,
How long will You keep fooling me?
Why do You cheat the person who belongs to You?

The whole Universe is Your domain
By one good omen.
Who exists beyond Your domain?
Who are You fooling?

You deceived David with wealth and power.
In a different way, You did the same
To Job with grief and calamities.

You attract some with bait,
You lead others to the trap.
O Beautiful face, since You are

The One who deceives,
That trap becomes bait.

Pharaoh cheated the whole world,
But that villain didn't know
You were the One cheating him.

Even Your minor deceit is better
Than his hundreds of bloody ransoms.
How great is the person
Who You attract to Yourself
Without showing any valuable bait?

O Heart, if you have learned
How God persuades someone,
Then you will be able to persuade
And get everything from God.

103.

Verse 3069

☞ If you get a smell of Soul
From that unseen, hidden Beauty,
If you find a trace, a sign from Him,
You won't be able to be contained
In hundreds of worlds.

If you see the Sun of Soul,
You become king without an army.
You'll have the land of Absence
And reach the One who knows
All the hidden secrets.

If you cannot find the treasure
You are looking for on Earth,
You will find it in the sky.

If you are not ungrateful to Love,
If you are sure,
You'll see and have
Many Chinese beauties for nothing.

You will see the Beauties
And beautiful things in Heaven

While you are still on this Earth,
In the clean, pure mirror of the heart.

If you are wounded with the arrow of Love,
If the Beloved made you drunk,
Don't worry if life goes out of your hand.
You will get hundreds of them.

If you free yourself
From the heart's anxieties,
You will find the key to the secret
Of breaking all difficult spells.
You will break them.

You break all the idols
For the sake of the Sultan of Soul
And see the sculptor who makes them.

You will obtain hundreds of interpreters
To know the signs and symbols freely
From that God's and Sheriat's [\[62\]](#)
Shems of Tebriz:
The one who has realized himself in God.

104.

Verse 3078

☞ Imam [\[63\]](#) of Love,
Pronounce God's greatness.
Extend your hands to the sides.
Be disgusted with your existence.
Give up your Being.

You were waiting anxiously.
It is time. Time for praying.
Get up. Jump. Don't sit.

You are worshipping hundreds of idols
Because of the love of that Beauty;
Looking in hundreds of different Kibles
To find the real Kible.

O Soul, fly high a little bit. Fly high.
O Beloved, on whose orders

Did the Soul become a slave?
Because the moon is always at the top,
Shadows are at the bottom.

Don't go to every door,
Like the poor of every house.
You are alright. Have power.
Knock at the door of the sky.

If the jar of the sky
Made you like that,
If you are out of yourself,
Be indifferent to the whole world.

I keep asking, "How do you do?
How are you?"
But who could inquire like that
To the invisible Soul?

You are very drunk tonight.
When morning comes you will see
How many glasses you have broken.
How many bags you have deflated.

Even then, I still depend on you;
Because you are the one
Who repairs all those thousands
Of broken ones.

O painter who makes secret forms
Inside of our Soul,
You have hundreds of thousands
Of paintings besides the moon and sun.

If you close one door,
You open a hundred doors.
If you break one heart,
You'll give hundreds of hearts
Hundreds of Souls.

I become crazy, insane.
Whatever I say, I say from my craziness.
If you are the confidant of Elest,
You say, "Yes, yes," to my crazy words.

Verse 3090

☞ one who makes a face
 Like he's been drinking vinegar,
 What would happen if you smiled once?
 I swear to God, you haven't
 Changed from this sour-faced one at all.

Take the bitterness, give sugar.
 Give your life. You are a nice person.
 Have a high opinion of yourself.
 At least die with a smile.

The moon has become thin, like hair,
 Still, it keeps laughing.
 What would happen if
 You also become like that?

Flowers grow and bloom in the wetland.
 You are an unripe grape.
 Don't you have a Soul? ,
 How long will you live, being needy?

How can a rat rise to the heights
 From the rat hole?
 You settled down at the mine of troubles.
 What can you see from there?

They will find the Archangel Gabriel
 Above the dome of the sky.
 They find safety and security on the ground,
 Where the clean, harmless people walk.

Your face, the color of your face
 Tells where you are from,
 Who your friends are, what your secret is.

It is obvious to the one who can see,
 Whether you are wise and intelligent
 Or someone who has just opened his eyes.

Karun[64] went down the well
 Like a bucket.
 Jesus ascended the dome of the sky

With the rope he threw to the sky.

Even if it ascends,
The bucket would only carry well water.

Rot and decay are at the bottom of the well.
O Graceful ones, fly above, to the heights.
Free yourselves from specters;
From the bounds of "how" and "what."
Fly to the heights.

106.

Verse 3101

☺ smiling spring, bring us something
From the land of Absence.
Tell us about our Beloved.

You are smiling. Your face is clean, fresh.
You are full of green and smell like musk.
You either have the same color as our Beloved,
Or you took this color from Him.

O season, You are nice,
Like soul hidden from eyes.
You manifest with your signs,
But you are concealed.

O Rose, why don't you smile?
Your separation is ended.
O cloud, why don't you cry?
You are separated from your Beloved.

O Rose adorning the green, smile openly,
Because you kept hiding
Inside the thorns
For the last three months.

O Garden, feed and grow
These newcomers well.
Because you heard from thunder
How they came.

O Wind, move the branches.

Someday you will blow them
To the time of Union.
Remember that. Move the branches.

Look at the trees. Cheerful like lucky people.
O Violet, why is your neck bent with sorrow?

The Iris said to the bud,
"Your eyes are closed, but day by day
You are reaching a happy destiny.
Congratulations. You are lucky."

107.

Verse 3110

☞ One who made rose marmalade
Out of our Soul,
You took the Soul and heart,
Then You left us.

You have seen us fall to the ground
Without feet, like a shadow.
Like a cypress which grows from the top.
O Beloved, You gave up the shadow.

We are running this way and that,
Like the torrents in the forest,
To the top of the mountain, after you.
You, like the fountain of spring,
Are running in a different direction.

You are such a moon.
Catching the one who comes to Your harvest
And pulling to the gold's mine like the sun.

You kill us with jealousy.
Since You have an eye on us,
Keep us, like tears in Your eyes.
Don't drop us out of Your eyes.

Your lover has been hurt
On a hundred sides.
People keep blaming him in every way.
But You are shielding him

With Your mercy and kindness.

You tricked some people.
Tied them up with gold chains.
The others, with proof and evidence,
You threw to hell.

Alas, one bad person
Has hurt several naive people.
But You pity the one whom
You lead into evil things.

Your lovers' sleep is all gone.
Their eyes are open all night long,
Because You pulled them to Yourself at dawn.

O Love, You don't have
A heart to burn, to ruin,
Even though You are
The One who attracts all hearts.

Enough. Be silent now.
You are not by yourself. You are drunk.
You took the snack which was to serve Jesus
To the stable and put it in front of the donkey.

108.

Verse 3121

☞ If you make a nest
For a bird in the pigeon loft,
It doesn't matter how big or long it is,
A camel can't fit there.

That pigeon loft is the mind.
That nest is your body.
The camel, with his height, is Love-
The beauty of Love.

That bird cannot drink
From the big jar of the Sultan.
Even if you open hundreds of narrows
Or open closed boxes,
You cannot get the smell.

Beloved, don't look for
The secret of that truth from us.
I have been involved and overwhelmed
By temporary witticisms.

I have seen a paper
Written at great length.
I hung it on my neck
Like an amulet, as a joke.

But that divine amulet
Became heavier and heavier.
Reached the point that
A thousand Arab horses couldn't carry it.

While I tore the curtains
With the flame that comes from Hicaz,[\[65\]](#)
My own curtains have been torn.

It is time to love,
God's Shems of Tebriz.
When His love roars and overflows,
It will tear all the curtains.

109.

Verse 3129

Since you are in the casino,
You'll surely gamble.
Since you started this business,
Even if it is temporary,
At the end you will reach the truth.

O my dear friend,
Be kind. Get along with everyone.
This is the place to make a profit.
Why don't you take the opportunity
To make a big profit?

You say I am busy praying, day and night.
But, O my brother,
Your words don't belong in prayers.

Don't get involved with unsavory ones.
If your head is high,
If you are great,
Be involved with Kings.

You put on human clothes.
You have the most beautiful,
The most distinguished, shape.
Since things are like that,
Why do you keep getting black
Like a frying pan?

O one who hangs around with Sultans,
Since so many Arab horses, under your order,
Are waiting for you,
Why do you ride this donkey?

Hit this glass heart
To the stone of the Beloved.
Come to His assembly and
See how to please
And take care of the heart.

The Sultan will blow such
A breath to your heart
That you'll be free from music,
From the mode of Hicaz.

You tap your feet on the ground like a drunk
And enter the assembly
Of the moon-faced Beauty.
You keep looking at the face
Of that Beauty and sway like a Sultan.

The Sultan compliments you, saying
"O purest of the pure, guide the close ones.
Always be at our temple,
Because you are the confidant
Of the secrets of the trusted one."

Sometimes, you admire his Beauty.
Sometimes, you drink wine, become drunk.
Sometimes, you give yourself to him, get closer.
Sometimes, you are coy with him.

I mean Shemseddin when I say,

"Throne, our master, our owner."
I am like two different, unrelated people
At his temple. Where is he? Where am I?

Whoever has air from Tebriz,
Even if he is Indian,
Will become a rose-faced Turk.

110.

Verse 3142

☞ If that moon-faced one rose in your heart
Would you be able to recognize him?
How does He come to the Heart?
Unexpectedly, and not the customary way.

If you say, "I will recognize Him,"
This is a very important word. A big matter.
If you say, "How would I know?"
This is a denial, almost a blasphemy.

In fact, people keep busy, turning around
With the dilemma of "I know, I don't know."
They are like a camel.
When its eyes are covered, it keeps turning around.

Keep turning in silence, involuntarily.
Don't even try to raise your head or complain.
You are tied. Your ropes are in His hand.

A blind man bought Joseph
With eighteen counterfeit coins.
Because the owner was greedy,
The seller was blind.

You are like Joseph,
Fallen into the well of the flesh.
Here is the rope. Climb outside.
Free yourself from the grief
And frustration of the Earth.

O Nefs-i Mutmainne, [\[66\]](#)
Cover yourself with God's attributes.
Here are the heavy dresses.

How long will you wear that tom, old mantle?

The moon comes out of eclipse
When metal cups bang against each other.[\[67\]](#)
I am the One who covers your moon.
Give me a sound. The moon will be free
And shine again.

Adam ate a grain from the wheat,
Which will eventually be harvested.
But You are the Hyacinth of Union,
You are sure You won't be cut with a sickle.

If I don't tell a gazel,
He splits my mouth and says,
"Play. Sing. Increase the words, the joy.
After all, you are the drummer," he says.

111.

Verse 3152

We don't hold a shield
In front of our face in the war.
When we do Sema,[\[68\]](#) we are aware
Of neither the reed nor tambourine.

We have been annihilated with His love.
Spread under the feet of love.
We are layer upon layer of love.
Not bald or deaf.

We have struggled with ourselves.
Annihilated our existence.
Become the absolute lover.
We don't have anything but Nazar.[\[69\]](#)
What will salve do for us?

The body that is nothing but attributes,
Becomes Soul and heart for malice
And will bum to ashes, melt all sicknesses.
The worst disease is to be frozen.

From the intensity of that fire and melting,
From the love of that favor,

My lungs have turned into blood.
I don't have lungs anymore.

My heart has been broken
Into a hundred pieces.
Has become a vagabond.
If you look for a heart in me today,
You won't see a trace of it.

If you look at the circle
Of the moon in the sky,
It becomes smaller every day.
At the end, it disappears entirely.

The moon's disappearance from the sky
Is the result of the sun.
It comes back later,
But it is not the same.

My Sultan, send the planet Venus
To the land of heart to play and sing;
Because the reed and tambourine are not suitable
At the Sema gathering of Souls.

No. No, in the place where even the sun
Feels incapable of what Venus can do,
Not every player or instrument
Would be able to stand the temperature.

112.

Verse 3162

You came to confuse;
To ruin us with excitement.
You are the present-day David
With the melody of that Zebur?[\[70\]](#)

You are either Egypt, full of sugar cane,
Or the beauty of Joseph, full of life.
Why don't you ask Jacob
If he could stand that suffering
With this patience?

That tumult came again

With instigations and blame.
"You are either the Sun," I said,
"Or the glory of Glory."

O sky, you keep turning with indecision.
O Earth, you keep silent with sorrow.
Stay calm, in repose.

O Charmer, who is more beautiful than fairies;
O Charmer, who has such sweet instigation,
Heart doesn't want to tell his name
Because he is so jealous.

After the sun rises, I wonder
Why it shows its face
So blindly and ignorantly,
Since your face is so much brighter.

Why have you stayed behind the curtain?
Why haven't you been disgraced publicly?
This is not from obstinacy.
This is from stupidity.

That falcon came again:
The one who hunts criers and beggars.
If you are not an owl of ill omen,
Not sinister, why are you
Flying away from Him?

The one who knows doesn't care for this idea.
You took this and put it in your head.
Pay attention and see how far
You are from Him. How far?

He became manifest
From the Greatest of the Great temple.
O Soul, yell and scream.
You are the Mount Sinai of Moses.

O Kible of our time,
Come home again.
I swear to God that you
Are the Salah of religion[71]
And keep appearing all the time.

Verse 3174

With thousands of tales and deceits,
The image of such a friend comes,
That wherever there is such a beauty,
He would die in front of His feet.

You have seen many beauties.
You have heard charmers like the houris.
But come here and look
At the Beloved. See His charm.

When my Soul found Him,
My being disappeared.
When I touched His feet,
I lost my hand. Can't do anything now.

O player, my God,
For the sake of the Sultan
Play that tune with the harp.

There is new, unseen excitement in the heart
From those beautiful faces.
My pale face will turn
Into pure gold because of Him.

They asked me, "Why are you crying
In these two worlds? What is this wail?"
I told them, "Yes. That wail is
Enough for me in two worlds."

I have seen the Sultan while hunting.
That moon was filled with joy, laughing,
Riding his horse in the dust.

He threw an arrow with his eyes.
A big, hard arrow.
He threw to such a lean prey.

A thorn has pierced my heart
From the rose garden of His love.
A thorn, but such a thorn,
That hundreds of rose gardens
Would be slave and servant for it.

What is Soul for the pleasure
Of your love? A piece of dust.
What is Soul for the light of your sun?
Only a drop of mist.

God should be your enemy
If you talk about roses
Or mention the Plain tree in
The Love garden of your face.

We became poets because of
Your magic eyes.
We cannot fall in love with someone else.
We have a big excuse.

Will I be able to see a day
That the Sultan comes swaying;
Sending glory to the whole of existence
From His fiery face?

Will I be able to see
My bitter soul sweetened by His honey?
Will I be able to see a new excitement
Fall on my Soul with His spark?

Tebriz of love, now become
A song for every ear, an excursion
For every eye with
The love of Shemseddin.

114.

Verse 3189

☞ have complaints for you.
Why are you like that, Beloved?
I am sick. I feel weak.
Why don't you come and see me?

You have seen me so pale
You thought I had died.
How could anybody
Who has been your friend die?

You haven't even bothered
To ask how I was doing while
I was burning with fever.
O my Master, my Soul,
You haven't even heard my moaning.
O, my health, my cure.

I hesitated. I waited patiently
For a long time.
But today, I started showing coyness
To the source of coyness and gracefulness.

The medicine of my Soul
Comes when the moon rises tonight.
Then, a troubles and griefs,
You will turn into wax
Even though you are towers of iron.

Night inquires about this poor one's health
Regardless of how late the time is.
And, without that big jar, without anything
To eat, would become drunk and leave.

O wail, how long will you last?
You are more than morning dew.
You also set a trap for that poor, worthless man.

115.

Verse 3196

☉ Brother, what would happen
If you didn't sleep one night?
If you stayed awake like a candle, a spark?

The doors of the sky are open at night.
Fortune is open at night.
If you stay awake like the moon,
Your star will shine, become beautiful.

If you belong to the sky
You always desire that world.
You don't stay anywhere but the sky.
Don't sleep anywhere but the heights.

When Abyssinian soldiers
Attack the land of Rum,
Don't sleep. Defend the land like Caesar.

Your are the Jesus of time.
Journey at night, walk straight, circle.
Don't sleep in the mud like a donkey, a Soul.

Good times are made at night.
Stages are reached at night.
If you want the Sultan,
Don't sleep on the journey.

Lucky, auspicious people
Are in the shadow of God.
Don't ever sleep anywhere else, brother.

Didn't Joseph get in trouble
When he left his father?
You are also Joseph.
Be careful. If you sleep,
Sleep with your father.

Your brother plotted against you.
Put your mind into your head.
Be aware if you sleep among them.

Shems of Tebriz, keep going
On the road.
You are also on a journey.
Don't sleep on the road.

116.

Verse 3206

Beloved, don't cover your
Flaming, shining face for one moment.
I will be overjoyed, will overflow.
Then you ask me "How long
Will you be boiling, overflowing?"

When you set the rule
Of wine drinking like that,
How can that poor Soul,

That poor mind, be calmed,
After being so exuberant?

You are the one who keeps
Blowing the reed of Soul every moment.
If you are in ecstasy and rapture,
Why do you blame the reed?

Brilliance like that cannot be covered.
If hundreds of veils cover your face,
It still cannot be hidden.

O naive, inexperienced love,
You are fooled by appearance.
Keep turning around the blaze.
You are either a bloody murderer
Or a dazzling jackal.

If you were wise,
How did you become insane?
If you don't belong to love,
Why did you get involved with love?

I have seen all my particles
In silence at that temple.
But under every silence
I heard shouting.

I asked Shems of Tebriz,
"Who are these silent ones?"
He said, "When the time comes,
You'll learn all about them."

117.

Verse 3214

He spread a cover in the fire.
Be like that, my Beloved.
Then he was hidden inside the fire.
Be like that, my Beloved.

The cover became so beautiful.
My candle has burned with so much desire,
Cried, shed so many tears, and melted.

Be like that, my Beloved.

Since we came back to love,
We cannot sleep at night.
Be like that at the gathering
Of the drunks, my Beloved.

Lovers are all up.
They can't sleep at night.
Don't leave the gathering. Don't run away.
Be like that, my Beloved.

Union runs like a torrent.
Mecnun becomes Leyla.[\[72\]](#)
Now is night, tomorrow will be day.
But with all this,
Be like that, my Beloved.

.
God has become manifest,
Showed kindness and favor to the speaker.
I saw a fire in reality.
Be like that, my Beloved.

118.

Verse 3220

You are smelling like roast.
Your heart has burned, is fried.
Come back to your senses.
Find whatever you have lost.

If you act too big in this world,
Your head will be bowed in the real one.
But if you make yourself a slave to Him,
I will become a slave to you.

My Hodja,[\[73\]](#) never mind this road.
Tell us about the Sultan.
If you are drunk with that wine,
Open your mouth. Let me smell your breath.

Yesterday, the charmer offered
A golden cup and said,
"If you are half sleepy-drunk,

Drink one more glass."

"I cannot get up," I said.
He insisted. "Even if you fall
On the ground, I will pour
This glass on your head."

Really, he poured the glass on my head.
I saw the Earth completely disappear;
Turn into a rough sea with big waves.
I was like a seagull there.

Hodja, don't get mad, be calm.
Don't keep shaking your head.
It is not our fault if you don't understand.

I told the secret of God,
But I told it at the bottom of the well.
You are intimate to the curtain and veil,
That is why I said, "The moon is black."

O God's Sun of Tebriz,
I closed my mouth; will keep silent now
Because you are such a sun, that not
Every eye could stand your light.

119.

Verse 3229

" want to go hunting," you said.
You have gone, become hunted.
They hunt you.
"I will find peace," you said.
You have become totally restless, without peace.

How can I not call you Hizir?
You drank from the Fountain of Life.
How can I not die in front of you?
You have become Beloved to the Beloved.

How can I not turn around you?
You are the house of God.
How can I not kiss your feet?

You drag your feet,
And have reached eternity.

How can I not drink your cup?
You are the cupbearer to Being.
How can I not eat your snack?
You keep spreading sugar.

How can you not be Faruk? [\[74\]](#)
You are saved from separation.
How can you not be Siddiyk?
You have become a friend
To the friends of the cave.

Since you've become a slave to Him,
You are a sultan now.
Since you've become weak and tired with grief,
You have grown and become stronger now.

You have seen His rose garden;
Gathered hundred of different roses.
At the same time, you touched
His hyacinth and returned to the tulip garden.

Did you see his eyes, God?
We trust in God from those eyes,
Which stage a hold-up, even in sleep.
Those eyes half-closed, half-sleepy from wine.

You stole so many mantles
When you were poor.
Alas for the poor.
Now you've become the Zul-fekaar? [\[75\]](#)

Get up. Pull up and throwaway
The dead roots.
Because you are the sound of Gabriel's trumpet,
Cut the neck of the fallen.
You are the springs.

You are saved from Judgment Day
Because You are the last day of time.
You are free from counting
Because you cannot be contained by numbers.

You don't need bread

Like the fish in the sea.
You don't care for water either.
You turn into a lizard.

O pure Soul, the one kneaded with God's glory,
You are free from choices and willpower.
Look at this.
You've become willpower and choice.

You stayed away from the desires of Self.
Gave up your wishes in two or three days.
Now, you want everyone to reach their desires
Because you have already reached yours.

You were a game for grief
Before you had a helper.
Now, you have all the power
And have reached God,
Who is absolute power
And manages everything.

If you shed the people's blood,
Fight with destiny,
You don't need any excuses.
You become a rose-cheeked Beauty.

Your coyness is tolerated
Because you are beautiful and charming.
If you act great, it is alright,
Because you belong to the great ones.

You turned out to be earrings to the ears.
But still, to say something meaningful,
Get in the circle of silent ones
And be silent.

120.

Verse 3247

You made an oath, repented yesterday.
Today, you broke both.
Yesterday, you were a bitter sea.
Today, you become a pearl.

Yesterday, you were Beyazid,[\[76\]](#)
Adding Being to your Being.
Today, you fall on the ground,
Selling wine with sediment;
And you are drunk.

Drink that sedimented wine, O Soul.
Quit. Give up the mind, O Soul.
While worshipping idols, don't dress in green.
Don't try to appear Sufi, O Soul.

Today, you are a river,
At the same time, a glass
Filled by the sun.
You are neither a bridegroom
Of a moon-faced beauty,
Nor the husband of the moon.

You can't fit in with a house and family.
You are beyond meaning.
You don't resemble anyone.
You are as you are.

There was a comer. That comer was closed.
You were worried and unhappy about it.
Now, you opened that closed place
And freed yourself.

Animals don't ride, they are
Usually ridden for work.
You are not an animal.
You are higher than that.
You are saved from being ridden to work.

You are the messenger in the sky.
When will you ride like the moon
With the news arrow in your hand?
Send this to the world.

Be silent. Don't show any sign or trace,
Although every word of yours
Is like medicine for those whose heart is hurt.
Still, be silent.

Verse 3256

Even though you wear course woolen stuff,
You are Keykubad.
Even though you are hidden from eyes,
You are the fire in the Soul,
The remembrance in the heart.

You entered as a form,
Dressed with shape.
But You are in the sky.
You are the pole for
The nine-level sky;
The lamp in it.

You have tied our Being
To the land of Absolute Absence.
To attain our desire,
You gave us failure and frustration.

You did this because You wanted
Only the lion and lion cub
To reach your temple.
Not the one whose legs are shakey.

You wished that man would
Leave his head before he enters Your temple,
And hear the voice of "O my creature,"
Without the use of his ears.

You get one month's road
In one day, because you are
Riding the horse of the wind, like Solomon.

What is gold?
What is silver?
Bring the storehouse of Soul
And give Soul if you are generous.
Never mind money and wealth.

O my Beauty, for your way
There is no need for a guide.
Because on this road,
The one who goes and the one who guides
Are halo and moonlight.

The moon carries its light
From place to place
Like the Arab drags
His camel from stage to stage.

A large bouquet will come
From the sweet basil
Which grows from the trouble
You go through-the beliefs you have.

Don't blame Solomon
Because you were lost.
It doesn't matter.
The Hoopoe bird is looking for you.
That's enough for you.

O my friend, this is just
The beginning of salvation;
Reaching your wishes.
Daylight broke. Wake up from sleep.

The Sun is shining without cover or curtain.
Victory and help keep coming
Without even trying.

The Soul is dipped into wine.
The glass keeps turning.
Grief and sorrow were chased away.
Thanks are getting longer.

122.

Verse 3270

There is an Aloe wood
In the land of Absence, burning.
This Love is its smoke.
There is an existence
Painted with non-existence,
From which comes every Being.

A Being is free from any defect, any fault.
Put a curtain at the Land of Absence.
That Absence is like a fire

Behind this curtain.

Smoke, although it is born from fire,
Still covers the fire.
Pass through the smoke of existence.
There is nothing in that smoke.

If the Soul passes through the smoke,
It will be Glory itself.
Soul is like a candle;
Body is the dish in which it stands.
Soul is like water;
Body is the riverbed.

Soul will go up when man falls down;
Even break the circle of fate.
If Soul grabs Absence, he will be better
Than existence, reaching to Absolute Being.

Soul will prepare the Universe for you,
From the Pleiades to the throne of God;
Will pick up the pearl of eternity
From the bottom of the seven oceans.

He will give up wet or dry gladly, happily.
Will go to that side.
Become confident of Love and reach Beauty.

If Shems of Tebriz accepted
Him as a confidant,
He would see Absence with the eye
Of certainty, and appear in that world.

123.

Verse 3278

Either I became funny
Or you did. You drank
Of all those glasses.
Didn't offer me one.

You are drunk with wine.
I am drunk with hope and wishes.
There is no lack of hope and wishes

At the assembly of such a Keykubad.

You killed so many lovers.
But still you are innocent
Because you didn't kill them
With pain or brutality.
You killed them with joy and pleasures.

The world opens and enlightens with You.
Humans reach their attainment and desire with You.
If things are like that, O my Beauty,
Why have you made the village
Of hopelessness your home?

Yes, I know why.
Because a bright light appears
In the darkness of night.
Cure come to the troubled one.
That is the important point.

In order to drink nothing but your grief,
Neither tell the subtle point of Amid,[\[77\]](#)
Or hear the words of Imad?[\[78\]](#)
You hold my mouth, my ear.

Carry greetings to Shems of Tebriz
From drunks. And after
You prostrate yourself to him,
Ask "Did you run away to Solitude,
O my life, my Soul?"

124.

Verse 3285

☞ If you are dizzy with last night's wine,
And if you are still half drunk,
Don't touch our glass.
You have nothing to do with that.

If your drunkenness is gone,
Come. Sit and drink this glass.
Don't scratch your head
By falling into the reflections of the past.

You'll have no interest with others
If you worship stone.
You don't deserve the sea
As long as you remember the creek.

Those people who strive and scheme
Are not tolerated at the King's temple.
Every poor one's basket
Is extended to the Sultan.

Where are they,
The generosity of the Badya?[\[79\]](#)
It is impossible to be in heaven
And at the same time in
The flames of the fire.

If you see a single thread
Of that Chinese beauty's hair,
Neither the notes nor wails
Of the Zir[\[80\]](#) tunes will remain.

You neither boil unripened grapes,
Nor sell the vinegar.
You only drink wine and squeeze grapes.

To squeeze this grape
Of existence is good for you.
Assume: If you didn't have any existence,
To whom would it be of interest?

If you escape to the side
Of Shems of Tebriz,
God knows what kind
Of tulip garden you have entered.

125.

Verse 3294

My friend, either you are
Dark or bright-hearted.
Don't give up the Beloved.
Don't become separated from Him.

In both cases,

To draw back from him is blasphemy.
For lovers, to run away from the Beloved
Is a hundred times more
Blasphemous than blasphemy.

Your cleanness becomes dirty
When you give up Beauty.
But if you plunge into the fountain,
Even your dirt will be cleansed.

If you grabbed the tail of a lion,
You would always have roast meat.
If you are a friend of a rich man,
How can you be hungry?

Give up malice.
You have been hiding.
Don't cover yourself.
In wisdom, in understanding,
You are like a hair that
Appears inside of the glass of milk.

For poison, "What would God miss
From that?" you asked.
It is true. God is disdainful of that.
You'll die from poison.

Even if you are tired, lazy,
Or very old, try to go
Under the date tree, like Mary.

Under the shade of the date tree
You'll be sweetened like a date.
Mature from the maturity of the date tree.

126.

Verse 3302

☞ turned into earth
So you would spread pearls on me.
I became very thin, like hair,
So you could scratch my head.

In order for you to hold my hand,

I am washed away from my Being.
I turned into a specter
So you would come into my heart.

I have been in love day and night,
So you would rise like a moon
From the East of my heart.
I tear my collar with love.

I thought the springs of your Beauty
Would turn me into a spring.
I shed tears like spring's cloud.

I put around my neck and carry
The Trust,[\[81\]](#) which skies couldn't carry,
With the help of your grace.

You change every moment
To a new shape and form
For the plate of Heart.

Do a favor please.
Show a shape and form that
Cannot fit in the heart,
So idol worshippers will quit worshipping
And idol makers will quit making idols.

127.

Verse 3309

O Beloved, what a beautiful time.
Listen, for the sake of friendship.
Listen, for the sake of Love.
Mercy to the wishes of my heart.
Don't try to hurt and trouble me.

Don't treat my heart with contempt.
Don't be withdrawn from our side.
See, watch, know our situation.
Don't go away. Don't make our life bitter.

You are the real cupbearer of Soul.
Give us the morning's wine.
Night turned its face away

And is gone. The full moon is hidden.

O one who took our mind and thought,
Remember what shape we were in last night.
You offered cup after cup to us.
We are still drunk.

You ruined us, drowned us with wine.
In the end, all our secrets
Came out and spread around.

You are our Sultan
The Leyla of our nights,
The beauty of our days.

O secret of Mount Sinai,
O light of the seeing eyes,
You are great among us.
Mercy to the small ones.

Now a bout of craziness comes.
Our drunkenness is increased,
O Beautiful one who intoxicates the mind,
Who destroys shame and dignity.

Sultans of words came.
The wave of the words overflows.
But we are only voices.
The one who recites the most
Auspicious things says
The most beautiful words are God.

128.

Verse 3318

It was ordered for us.
Pleasure, peace, weddings,
They are all for us.
They were given for us to increase
The pleasures of the Moslem,
Blind the eyes of the heretic.

Every day, our new sermon is read.
Every night is a new wedding night for us.

Every moment, a handful of pearls
Are spread on us.

Love is more beautiful than it appears.
Absence is sounder than it stands.
If you kiss the hands of both,
You step to the sky.

Soul is a light
Hidden under the basin of body.
Even the sun obeys his light;
Fawns on him.

He has hundreds of different possessions and wealth.
Has hundreds of thrones and destinies.
His throne is made of greatness;
Not like the night's,
Which is made of black ebony wood.

His wealth and possessions are made
Of the light of Glory,
Protected in the chest of God;
Neither is carried on the groom's horse,
Nor has moth holes eaten in it.

I became a fire worshipper because
Of the pleasure of the Heart's fire;
And am burning with fire.
But not like Zoroastrian's
Involvement with fire.

The poor Soul became a friend
With the flesh for a few days.
But, like Merguzle with Rey'li,
Or like Magribli with Tuslu,[\[82\]](#)
They never knew or understood each other.

The earth is like a sieve.
We are the flour in it.
Once we go through the sieve
We are pure.
Before that, we are straw.

Every day in the bazaar
Of these ordinary people,
Such things are heard:

"O poor immature man, come here.
Our material is good.
Our garment won't wear out."

Break the mold of the jar.
Pick up the cup that is filled to the rim.
How long will you be licking the bowl?
How long will you be fawning?

Will you allow me to tell the end of this:
That the destiny which has no bad omen,
No bad luck, covers East and West?

129.

Verse 3330

Since you are drunk with wine,
Hit yourself on a stone like a bottle.
Let it be broken.
You'll have a bad name for the love of Soul,
But you'll have a good reputation.

If you sit, sit like a carafe full of pleasure.
If you get up, raise up like a glass
To give joy to the people.

Your mind is a tie to your feet.
Your love is greatness.
Mind is in the land of reproach.
Love is to drink ecstasy.

The rooster, every morning, announces
The end of night.
Morning appears from the heart of darkness.

There is no Beloved but ourselves.
No wine, but our blood.
Soul is the master and slave
At the same time.

O Soul, you burned the heart,
Turned blood into wine.
O the leader of creatures,
The greatest of men!

If you want to drink this vintage wine,
Get down from the horse of thought.
Be on foot.

Mustef'ilun, faulun. Don't get excited.
Calm down, because it is time
To mature. Don't be vain.

The wine blows like the wind.
Grief escapes like a fly.
Don't forget drunks. Take care of them.

Say what You wish.
Your order is our command.
You are the Sultan, greetings to You.
You have our submission.
We are under Your order.

Tebriz should cheer because
Of the shining of Shemseddin.
Because when the Sun rises and walks,
It will enlighten everywhere
And protect both East and West.

130.

Verse 3341

☞ Soul, forget having
A good name and reputation.
Take it out of your heart completely.
Then you will learn all
The secrets, one by one.

O God's lover, you worry
About people's blame.
You are concerned with shame and dignity.
In the world of love, it is immature
To be bound with shame or dignity
Or to act like a Sultan.

A lover should be sweet
Beyond the bonds of why and how.
He should have great soul,

Because that temple is very high.

All this existence is like
A sty growing on Soul's eye.
Throw this robe if you are in love.
In love, those hairs are dark like evening.

Knowledge is ignorance
In the land of love.
Knowledge is not honorable there.
The uneducated lover is much greater
Than the scholar of everyday sciences.

Love came from an unseen traceless side.
The side of different knowledge, or ignorance;
From the place where
Your Soul gets the Soul of Souls.

I saw Him as a full moon
Above the roof without a house.
I admired His grace so much,
I got stuck at the door.

Either I became drunk,
Or I became wine.
I am not the drunk of reed nor tambourine.
I drank His grace,
That made me drunk.

There is a face like fire,
Covered with hair,
Which attracts heart.
Soul is trapped in the curls of that hair
And becomes a slave with its own desire.

Your grief says, angrily,
"It is time to shed your blood."
O heart; O Soul,
Who are you in front of Him?

O Soul, you surrendered to Him
On the night you were born.
You gave whatever He asked.
You submitted yourself.

O Soul, you flew to a coast.

You stayed, grew there.
You gave your heart, but you earned Beauty.
You became a slave, a servant.

O Shems, the Sun of every person
Whose mind is diverted or gone,
O rule and order of Tebriz,
Be either unconventional or mean.
You are our companion. You are our peer.

131.

Verse 3354

Once you pull the string
Of the bow of supplication,
Once you strike the plectrum of desire,
The lazy ones in the street
Become busy, hard workers.

O love, when you come
With that beauty and charm,
You pull the skirt of the soul
And take him to the Beloved.

You give such security to the soul
Out of contrariness to
The blind ones on the road.
You are hanging on the gallows
Those who steal heart.

You offer a relaxing medicine
For lovers of the Soul.
You make them cry, and pull those
Whose faces become pale
With the color of gold
Because of their love for gold.

You show the rose garden
To the one who is separated
From the Beloved, pulling thorns.
But you are sending those with
Faces like roses, and tempers
Like thorns, toward thorns.

You send Moses, who walks on ground,
To the sea.
Drive the Pharaoh, who wants to be great,
To malice and embarrassment.

Moses had a staff for help and company.
You turned this into a snake.
He carries it like a snake.

When Moses touched the snake,
He found his staff.
You did that upside down,
The way a horseshoe is nailed.

You'll find a way to dip in water
The one who falls into fire.
You send to the fire
The one who dives in water.

He drank wine, open-hearted, drunk.
How beautiful, a heart.
You'll bring him out in the open
By pulling him by his turban
From behind the curtain.

Don't give us to someone else.
He would pull us toward himself.
You pull us. Your attraction
Is so beautiful, so royal.

When a friend is well and alive,
You block his way with a mountain.
When You kill him with grief,
You take him to the cave
And become his friend.

Be silent. Drink the secret with silence.
Because when you are silent,
You look like you are smoking hashish.

132.

Verse 3367

Tremble, 0 gold leaves, silver birdsongs.

You are the essence of essence.
Be sure of what you look for.
It is you. It is in you.

The Sun rises, wants Particles to dance.
You may as well, O Particle.
Keep dancing. Keep whirling your skirt.

There will be a day, O Particle,
When the sun will embarrass you
And take you in his arms.
Do you know this subtle point?

He'll offer you wine and say,
"O Particle, drink this."
When you drink, you'll be annihilated.
You'll reach nothingness
In the Sun of the Soul's existence.

With the Glory of Manifestation,
Particle becomes Sun without reproach of
"You won't be able to see me."[\[83\]](#)

We are unripened fruits.
We will keep dancing under
The heat and light of the Sun.
Because you are the mature One, ripen us.

Bravo, O mature One.
Applause to you, O maturation;
O apprentice of the Sun of the Soul,
The One whose trace
And sign unseen are not apparent.

O Soul, O heart, as you know,
All Souls have surrendered to you.
My Shemseddin, whom everybody serves,
You are the Sultan of Sultans
Grown in Tebriz.

133.

Verse 3375

🌀 pearl of God, mirror of meaning,

With the light of your face,
You are a gift to the throne of God.

Even the throne asked God,
"From where is that light coming,
Which reflects on me?"
God felt jealous and said to the throne,
"You don't know this."

Throne was surprised at God's jealousy.
Because "You will never be able to see me."
That news also comes from his jealousy.

If one sparkles from this light,
Reflects to the sky,
Hundreds of moons will
Appear in the sky.

Eternal kindness would be
Seen on every moon.
Every lover would see the love
Of his heart's desire.

It won't be the trouble of desire
On the route of the people's journey.
It won't be fear of nothingness
On the earth.

You breathed into it once and
Life came to a skeleton.[\[84\]](#)
Breathe once more for Soul
To come forth.

One spark of Your face
Changed the land of nothingness
To the land of existence.
Your lightning will reverse this
Back to the land of nothingness.

If You put Your ruby ring
In front as a charm,
All the ruby mines will scream and yell.

You offer one glass.
Everything we have has gone to the pawnshop.
Offer one more to find

The remedy for that, as You know.

A kind of Soul came to us
From God's Shems of Tebriz,
That keeps pleasing all the souls
In the land of nothingness.

134.

Verse 3386

O one who has a sign
Of his existence on both worlds,
You know well. You wounded
This sign so much.

Wound once more. I don't
Want salve from you.
It is not grief if the
Whole universe disappears.
You are hundreds of universes.

It is impossible to describe you.
You are the explanation of God's secret.
You are the Soul of Soul.
Why don't you come to the Soul?

Your art of influence is like
A wind which blows here and returns.
We are like trees. The wind is unseen;
Hidden, but knows what to do.

Because of this wind,
We become green, yellow.
But if you drop the leaves,
How can you grow fruit?

In appearance, the garden comes first;
But in truth, fruit comes first,
Because the purpose of the garden is fruit. [\[85\]](#)
You show the first pearl at the end.

I want to talk about you all the time,
Only to tell you to forget everyone else.
But you always hide and put us in line.

135.

Verse 3393

○ the shame of living.
Look at the face of the pure Beloved,
So the color of life
Will come to your face.

Every particle is running to find life.
Don't you have a desire for life?
Not even a particle?

If life was a stone, for instance,
Springs would still come.
Rivers would flow from that living stone.

I have seen a passing image
In the mirror. I asked, "What is that?"
He answered, "I am the dust of life."

You will find real life
In the world of Eternity.
Who are they?
They are the ones who suffer
During their lives.

The ones who love peace, escape;
Give up life.
The no-good ones are the ones
Who stay in the struggle of life.

136.

Verse 3399

○ This Soul was hurt, bruised.
That new, better one has appeared.
This world has gone down.
That new, different one came forward.

The mine is full of holes;

With the wound of pickaxes.
But look at the goldsmith's store.
There, there is gold everywhere.

Thought doesn't come to your mind
Until you become quiet.
When Heart opens his mouth,
This mouth will be closed.

Thousands of houses fill the earth.
Thousands of buildings secretly existed
In the mind of the architect
Before coming to this world.

There is another secret:
That all which comes to the mind
Of the architect, or heart of others,
Also comes from there, from that secret.

When heart is purified,
That secret covers the world.
At that time, nobody dies.
Because of the rotation of the land of Absence,
All of them become eternal.

Beg Shems of Tebriz. Say
"Kindly look at us once
From the garden of Absence."

137.

Verse 3406

Don't look for salvation
Except at the burning deep inside,
Because Heart is not enlightened
From outside fire.

When a patient's suffering and pain increase,
The Sultan of Absence comes from
The secret door inside of the heart
And kindly asks, "How are you?"

Look for the scent of that Musk Gazelle,
The hair of that Beauty, in trouble and poverty.

There is no such thing in enjoyment.

An Angel won't claim the Soul
Until man dies.
Who would fall in love with a murderer?
The one who is content with death.

His Love has told you,
"Either We go, or you go."
Advance. It doesn't matter if you
Are on the move or standing still.

When your heart is wounded,
Heart will know the secret of Soul
And understand.
Then, no shame, no blame,
No rebellion stays in Self.

If grief makes you suffer,
Separates you from yourself,
It rains glory on you from the blue sky.

Sit in the middle
Of troubles and sorrows
And think of the Beloved.

☉ poor lazy one, why are you after a spell?

If God's Shems showed himself,
Tebriz would add Soul to your Soul.
You'd be happy; not miserable like that.

138.

Verse 3415

☉ sword of time,
Pull out of the sheath of space.
Dive in the sea like a fish.
Swim this endless sea of meanings.

Don't wish to unite.
Union is attributed to the body.
I see such closeness
That it is closer than closeness.

Even man doesn't want several owners.
Why would God want a second one
In His Providence?

Is there a lover who
Would have two Beloveds?
Fall in love in such a way
That love will free you
From all captivities.

Love is the light of my Soul,
My morning wine.
Love is such a hope that
All hope gathers there.

Do you know what Love is?
Love is leaving "Me," "We,"
And all claims of "Being" behind.
Destroying all desire and longing
In the Creator of Beauty.

That smoke, those words, are mine.
My fires are in the heart
Behind that smoke.
My love is increasing every day.

My heart wants you more and more.
My God, don't stop me from that wish.
My God, You see me
Absolving You from all defects.
You increase my fire more and more.

I absolve from defects
The One who sees me.
I absolve from defects
The One who sees and watches.
I absolve from defects
The One who calls me
With His grace, not to try me.

Be silent. The color of my face,
My tears, explain my situation.
The shape I'm in from the Love
Which is greater than pure meaning,
Cannot fit in meaning.

139.

Verse 3425

Player, when you hit
Your *plectrum* to the strings,
You are encouraging the ones
Who become lazy on this road.

O Love, you came
To this land of Separation
To help the stranded ones.
To lead them to the Beloved.

You give security to the Earth
In spite of the blindness
Of the one who holds-up
The stage on the roads.
You catch the thieves
On the tavern of Heart
And drag them to the gallows.

You see the swindlers.
You blind them with one trick.
When you see a friend
You lead him to the cave.[\[86\]](#)

You put a golden saddle
On the fast horses.
The ones which have a bad saddle,
You make pack animals.

You caress our lovers all the time,
But drag the ones who are dealers
In the market, fond of money,
Here and there; making them cry.

You show the rose garden to the lover
Who suffered from the thorns.
But the one who wanted
To control the rose of joy for himself
You pushed onto the thorns.

You favor the one who plunged into fire

With an open road to the water.
The one who escaped the water,
You threw into the fire.

You give greatness to Moses,
Who walks oil the earth modestly.
Face the Pharaoh, who wants greatness,
With shame and disgrace.

You lead Moses to the snake
With the horse which has reversed shoes.[\[87\]](#)
Nobody could question your divine wisdom.

140.

Verse 3435

☞ One who took our choice,
Our willpower, You are our choice.
You are our willpower.
I am a branch of saffron,
You are our tulip garden.

"You grief has killed me," I said.
"How dare Grief," he answered.
"Didn't it know that you
Are our last friend?"

"I am a garden, a meadow," I said.
"But autumn burnt me.
Bring back the smile to my garden.
You are the ultimate spring."

"You are our harp," he said.
"It is our voice which comes through you."
"In a situation like that,
What is that cry?
You are already in our arms."

I said, "Every imagination hurts my head."
"Cut the neck of the images," he said.
"You are our Zul-fekar.

I put my hand to my head.
"I have a hangover," I said.

"Didn't we give you this hangover?" he asked.
"You are our drunk."

"I swear to God," I said,
"Like a whirling sky, I have no decisions."
"Didn't you decide on us?" he said.

Your lips are like sugar." I said.
He bit his lips.
"Hide this secret," he said.
"Aren't you our own confidant?"

O, the nightingale who sings
In the early morning
Often inquires about us.
You are from our country.

You are the bird which flies in the sky,
Not the one on the ground.
You are from our garden, our meadow.

You have been annihilated from your Being.
You've been wrapped up by the Beloved.
You exist with His existence.
You are either the Glory of God,
Or You are our God.

You were born from mud,
Fell into fire.
Since you are gambling with us,
Take gain and losses as the same.

Duality doesn't fit here.
What is this me and we?
Since you are with our numbers,
Count them both the same.

Be silent! There is a Soul
In every subtle point.
Don't give Soul to everyone.
Didn't you give Soul to us?

☞ held his skirt.

"O pearl of kindness and generosity,
Don't leave by saying "Goodnight."
Don't hurt us. Tonight you are for us," I said.

His face, which attracts the heart,
Is flushed, becomes red like fire.
"Enough," he said. "Get your hand off.
What is this hunger?"

I told the messenger of God,
"If you want something, ask it
Of the ones who have beautiful faces."

He answered me, "The beautiful-faced one
Desires whatever he desires after his own wishes.
He has a bad temper because his only worth
Is his coyness, his oppression."

"If this is the case," I said,
"His oppression offers Soul to the Soul.
Just try. Everything you try
Is the spell of a treasure."

He said, "These are just empty words.
Where is this beautiful face?
This shape, this color are all a trap;
Disloyalty and a fake."

If there is no Soul of the Soul
In someone, make sure there is no attraction.
But so many people sacrifice their lives
To shape, it may soon disappear.

I said, "O beautiful face,
You make nothing into something again.
Change our copper to gold.
You are the secret chemical itself."

When the secret chemical comes,
Copper gives itself.
You are a grain, but out of the mill.

He said, "You don't even give thanks.
Don't know the copper.

You have doubt about things.
You show, you talk, you compare."

I started to cry. "Command is yours,"
I said. "Come to my crying.
Help me, O Source of Brightness."

He smiled when he saw my tears.
With that kindness, with that intimacy,
East and West came to life.

O friends, cry.
Shed tears like rain
So the beauties will send you
A beautiful-faced charmer
From the green fields.

142.

Verse 3462

Play the three-stringed instrument.
I reached Union. Don't double talk.
Either play from a Rehavi^[88] tune,
Or sing from the tune of salvation.

If you don't have the zir and bem^[89]
For the lute notes, don't play them.
We are engulfed in grief.
Find a Neva tune with the reed.
Find and blow the sounds.
Wail from lack of music and melodies.

The remedy of this separation
Is the song from Irak's tune.
You will take the heart away
Without saying one word.
But where, and how far, will you take it away?

O Beauty who all the Sultans know,
Caress our Soul with the tune of Isfahan.
Be intimate with us.

Go to the gathering of our drunk friends
By composing some Zengule tunes.

Finish this matter.
Why this anxiety, this sluggishness?

Restrain our heart,
O one who falls down from non-union.
He is One, but he appears
To us as two.

Play a tune of Rast
If you are a good and faithful friend,
So you will arrive to the tune of Hicaz.

Get into Ussak through
The melodies of Huseyni.
Bring joy to the heart
With the tunes of Buselik and Maye.

The are asking for Dugah,
You sing from Cargah.
You are the candle, the light
Of this place, this country.
O my Beautiful, how nice
That you sing and play.

143.

Verse 3471

☞ matchless, peerless Creator,
You sometimes make a dog
Superior to a lion.
Other times, You make a black stone
Appear as a water carrier.

So many Sultans. Feridun,[\[90\]](#)
With their bloody swords
And tulip-like faces, eventually
Become beggars, slaves, and shoe cleaners.

That will be the day
The greatest of the Greats
And tyrants who are more fiery than fire
Will turn around the neighborhood of love.
They will fall into poverty and become beggars.

It is for the fire to destroy.
It is for the candle to cry.
It is for us to be faithful and in service.
For the Beloved
Unfaithfulness is expected.

The fire doesn't smile;
It is ashes and smoke.
The candle doesn't cry;
It is a piece of wood or thick stick.

The one who comes to the garden of Earth
And doesn't look for the owner,
Is the donkey out in the thorn pasture.

O donkey, first look for the owner
Of the garden. His kindness, His greatness
May help you to be better than a donkey.

A stranger came from somewhere;
Became the guest of a distinguished person,
Who treated him with respect.

Every day, he served better, fresher fish
To him than the day before.

One night, the stranger told him,
"This is fine, but if you come
To our town, I will treat you much better."

The distinguished man wondered,
"What could be better than
These meals; these clothes?"
He was bewildered.

Those words made the host sick.
They stuck in his throat.
He didn't know what it was
To be entertained in the sky;
To be a guest in the sky.

The fruits of this world
Are like colorful roses;
But Earth's benefaction is nothing
But bread and grabbing the bread.

"O, my God," he said.
"Take me to this stranger's town
So I can untie this knot in my heart."

Several years elapsed
In expectation of this trip.
Even medicine doesn't have effect
Without waiting.

"O One," he said,
"Who creates reason,
You are the One to create
The way out of this trap of troubles."

His praying increased.
In the end, God accepted his praying.
"O one saying 'my God'," he said,
"See the power of God?"

The King wanted to send an emissary
To that town to carry a message.

This man, who bribed openly,
Managed, in his secret way, to have
The king send him on that mission.

The King said, "All right. You sound
Like a nice parrot. Go there
And relate our news to them."

The man did all the preparations
For the journey. Gathered a squadron of soldiers
And had them carry a big, moon-like torch
In front to light the roads.

He started the journey,
Moving from one stage to another,
Flowing like a torrent and
Prostrating toward the side of secret sages.

Like Moses, in order to find
The Hızir who is the enlightener,
He flew with hundreds of wings,
Like a Hoopoe bird.

Like the Archangel Gabriel,

That messenger of the throne
Set forth on a journey
In order to apply His orders.

A bright eye is always on the journey.
O one whose face is like a moon,
You also are the light of this land.
You also are set on the journey.

Every stage of your journey
Is like a different sign of the Zodiac.
There is a door there. There is a cover.
Sorrows are like fire and lightning.
Your joys are like lights.

To make the story short,
The Emissary reached there
Like a piece of straw, attracted
By the Beloved's magnet.

We are like a caravan, constantly moving.
The hand of the One who pulls us is hidden.
Nobody will be able to get away from that hand.

He pulls this one to the left;
The other one, He leads to the right.
He pulls this one to Union;
The other, He pushes to separation.

This side shows all the signs of Union.
In order to make the one who comes, drunk and warm.
The other side shows the forms of separation
With all the tricks and deceptions.

That distinguished man was going
Like a ship in a rough sea.
After he arrived, he ran here and there
Saying, "What is my purpose? Where is my wish?"
He was looking for his purpose, his wish.

The One who searches by heart,
Eventually finds what he looks for.
We know You are searching for us.

Suddenly, in one place he smelled something.
His mind flew from his head.

He became drunk, his legs gave up.

He forgot the news the king
Had given to him to carry.
How could he enter the assembly
To give the news?

He stayed there for forty days,
Drunk from that smell.
Those with him were all puzzled.
Wondered what had happened to him.

There was no order left. No authority,
No ritual ablution, no cleanliness,
No words, no sign, no desire for Earth.

The one who wishes one thing so strongly,
Becomes bewildered and says yes to everything.
In confusion, Yes and No are the same.

Where is the tent? Where to ride?
Where is business or occupation?
Where are tricks and deceits?
Where is Dimme Kelile?[\[91\]](#)
Where is the emissary?

The torrent of Love came
And no house, no roof was left.
When the torrent mixes with the sea,
There will be no source, no beginning,
No end or merging.

The man told the stranger,
“My friend, you did what you promised.
You took us from the bottom
And put us at the top of greatness.”

This is a lesson. It is not in the Vasisht,[\[92\]](#)
Nor in the Muntakaa.[\[93\]](#)
I have never read this lesson.

Your case is better than your means.
Your means more beautiful than your case.
Soul turns his face to you.
You are the Kible for praying.

These are the beginnings.
Tell the end of the story.
I won't tell. You ask for the end
From the One who gives you
The seeing eyes, the hearing ears.

My God, I do wrong to myself.
You tear the curtain of the senses.
If copper acted like copper,
What would happen?
You are the Alchemist.

The head of the table where the big ones sit
Is the place where troubles are.
I made an oath to God.
We get higher only with contrition.

O my people, my great men,
From those who keep their promises,
Those who are in the habit of righteousness,
Loyalty has never been deprived.

144.

Verse 3518
(Terci-i Bend)

Our master, our leader,
As long as you are around
Our fortune smiles. Our luck is good.
O my Beautiful, your coqueties,
Your gracefulness remain.
You are the Soul of Grace and coquetry.

You cause lips to smile.
Brighten sorrowed eyes.

I made an oath to myself. I said,
"I won't laugh as long as I live."
But when you uncovered your face
And appeared to me, I broke my oath.

Whichever death body you want to try,
If you go next to his grave,
He tears his coffin, rises up

And grabs the glass.

You pass by my grave when I die,
And watch how I rise up.
Watch the real resurrection.

How could a person die
When You are the cupbearer?
The place You water is always green;
Never fades, bums, nor decays.

Be our companion.
We pass, even, though there are
Hundreds of deserts in front of us,
Because You are our hands and feet.

I asked the moon and stars,
"How long will you go on making
Your heads like feet?
Is that because the road is too far,
Or because of confusion?

"O moon," I said, "Your effort is great.
You are the top height. You are great.
But even then, time after time,
You become thin, decrease in size.
At other times, you mature, become a full moon.
You disappear during the day, like a bat.
At night, you raise your flag."

One thing grows and matures,
On thing declines.
One dies, disappears,
The other ailment finds the remedy.

Be a student to my moon-faced one
And walk under his flag.
Walk, and with the help of God,
Be saved from changing
From one condition to the other.

He told me, "If you have doubt,
I'll get rid of it.
I'll clean up all your problems.
Enter another Terci
So I can tell all about me.

O, the moment the bird
Of Soul flies away,
When the Beautiful One goes to His temple,
Souls will return at the time
Coffins and clothes are tom.

O One who says, "What is Soul?"
What is the world?
O, the Soul just comes to the lip.
This is the time of Union.
This is the time of which
You have been asking.

O heart, you opened your hand,
Grabbed a few things from this one and that one.
Nothing but struggle is left to you now.

Sometimes you earned gold and silver.
Sometimes you took the silver-bodied
Beauty in your arms.
At the time of death
Those were dreamy memories for you.

O one who hurt everything
From bird to fish with his wildness,
Now you have to suffer through
All they suffered and have gone through.

How lucky for such a person
That he, who acquired the power to do
The impossible from God, learned
To run like a lion before death.

He learned to close his ears
To the words of flirts and Beauties.
Gave up the things which would
Eventually leave man and disappear.

You were born from the soil.
You are drunk from the garden.
Filled from the earth.
If you want to eat the food of heart,
Wash your mouth. Its milk
Won't stay on your lips.

The teeth of Heart won't grow
When you are sucking milk.
The teeth of Heart grow
To make you able to eat the food of Soul.

Your fondness is to eat roasted meat,
To drink wine, to increase your milk sucking.

O one who pursues his desires;
O one who closes both ears,
Take the cotton from your ears
And listen to this.

Even if you don't remove the cotton,
Don't add more of it.
Another Terci comes, come to your senses.

Night time, coming untimely, you are ours.
You are an untimely risen sweetheart.
It is night now, come home. Where are you?

You don't have food in the cage.
Have no desire for anybody but us.
You don't have anybody.
You are alone. Come, leave this duality.

Give your Soul to love.
Show your loyalty to us.
Leave yourself. Come to us.
That's better for you.

Give up the dry and wet.
Come quickly to the house.
Instead of being more loyal than others,
Why are you so unfaithful?

Your kindness is different than others'.
Nobody appreciates you.
Love attracts you toward us
Because you deserve us.

If sleep has slipped away
From the eyes because of the sparks of love,
Just answer our questions

O Soul, who earned everybody's satisfaction.

If that Sultan named Shems of Tebriz
Insists and hides,
You give Soul to him
So you can reach eternal life.

145.

Verse 3549

☞ one who plays the Harp of Meaning,
You have given enough water
To the one whose heart has been thirsty
For you with your beautiful melodies.

Soul is your eternal thirst.
This thirst has gone beyond the limit.
Either you cut this with the sword of separation,
Or offer the cup of grace and kindness.

O adorned, decorated Venus,
Play us those two tunes.
Either the tune of Rehavi
Or the tune of Salvation.

If you play the harp in such a bad way,
You will dissolve and melt
Under the nails of grief.
Play well. Sing nice. Otherwise
You'll be dead without food, without music.

Without hitting the strings with the plectrum,
No instrument has cheer and joy.
No sound, no voice comes from the instrument.
If you are loyal to your friend,
Hit the strings of the instrument
With the plectrum, the plectrum.

If they break your strings,
They put you on their laps.
They will adjust you again.
What's your worry? Why are you so sad?

You are a dear friend.

You are always on a lap
In the assembly of the Sultan.
You are in the world
Beyond the Soul, beyond the place.

Be silent. I am very drunk.
Tie both my hands.
If you come, if I see you a moment,
I'll break the glass.

I am the head of the one
Who is out of work or business.
I keep hurting myself.
I don't appreciate not showing
Respect to the drunk.

I am torn to pieces.
Sometimes I am against any help.
Also, I am like a rock
For resistance and hunger.

I am tough and rebellious.
I have been at the hell of separation
For some time, being burned so much.
Even hell stays away from my burning.

The one who sells perfume
At the assembly of Greatness
Broke his tables when he saw
My exuberance, my bittersweetness.

I have spoken hundreds of words to Shemseddin
At the Assembly of God's Union at Tebriz,
Without sound and alphabet.

146.

Verse 3562

A sound came from the reed of Kingdom.
O Soul, clap your hands.
O Heart, tap the floor. Start dancing.

A jewel, a mine, starts sparkling,

The whole world smiles.
A table is set and prepared.
The sound of invitation is coming.

We have smelled a spring;
Have seen green grass and meadow.
We fell in love with a beautiful face.
That's why we are drunk, yelling "Hey. Hey."

He is the sea; we are clouds.
He is treasure; we are a ruined place
We are particles in the sunlight.

I am drunk beyond bounds.
Forgive me for whatever I said.
Let me. Let me split the moon in two
With the glory of Mustafa.

147.

Verse 3567

All day we were with You.
Day has passed, with all kinds of happiness.
Alas. Alas, I am afraid
You'll leave me by saying goodnight.

You are saying goodnight.
How will the fire be good?
Your separation is like fire;
Even worse than that.

The Lover couldn't live
Without You at night.
He would die.
But Your beautiful image comes,
Asks about him. That's the only way
The Lover could survive.

You told my ears a few words.
To pair with You, to unite with You.
Don't deny it.
How could I know this secret otherwise?

I have heard Your secret.

I will have the night as my witness.
But night has seen so many guilty ones
He worships secretly. .
I wonder if it would be my witness.

Notes

[1] Koran LIII, 8.

[2] This verse is said as a prayer before eating by the Mevlevis.

[3] Futu-i vet: A social organization with Sufi influence (12-13 century and after).

[4] Elest: "Am I not your God?" Koran VII, 172-173.

[5] Ashab-i Kehf: Seven friends and a dog took refuge in a cave so they wouldn't have to worship idols. God put them to sleep for three hundred years. When they woke up, they thought they had slept for only half a day, Koran, XVIII, 9-26.

[6] Koran XVII-III.

[7] Koran XLVII, 19.

[8] A city in central Asia- Turkestan. Famous for beautiful women.

[9] Kible: Direction to Mecca for prayers.

[10] Negro symbolizes darkness, versus people of Rum, who symbolize brightness, day.

[11] Literally, "Saying 'ten-ten-ten. . .'"

[12] Fifteenth day of the eighth lunar month. A holy day.

[13] Koran XXIV, 26.

[14] Kevser: River in Heaven.

[15] Sahib Kiran: A sultan who was crowned at the time the sun and Venus were in the same sign of the zodiac.

[16] Kayser: Julius Caesar was called Kayser in the East. Denotes the one with the most power.

[17] Esir: The layer above the sky, lighter than air, which becomes a conduit for light and heart.

[18] Beyazid-i Bistami: d. 874-75.

[19] Koran XXIV, 26.

[20] Koran II, 7.

[21] Two holidays in the Arabic calendar: First day of Sevvat and 10th day of Zilhicce.

[22] Fatiha: First Sure of Kuran.

[23] Ridvan: The angel at the door of heaven.

[24] Hızır: legendary person who attained immortality by drinking from the fountain of life.

[25] Koran, LIII, 3.

[26] Bidat: Events which happened after Prophet Mohammed.

[27] Yagma: A Turkish clan.

[28] Keykubad: King of Kings, First king of Persia.

[29] Rostem: A Persian king who became a legendary hero.

[30] Refers to Joseph being sold in a bazaar.

[31] Siddik: Nickname of First Caliph, Abu Bekr means "proven."

[32] Halil: the prophet Abraham

[33] Arabic love story.

[34] Mevnun: A character in an Arabic love story.

[35] Koran.

[36] Abu Lehib: Prophet Mohammed's uncle. A disbeliever.

[37] Adem: Everyone who is non-Arab.

[38] Aleppo: The city where the best glass was made.

[39] Basra: A city famous for its dates.

[40] Yakin: A certainty.

[41] Rind: An unconventional, jolly person or Dervish.

[42] Eighteen is a lucky number for Mevlevi.

[43] Aether: The clear, upper regions of the sky-ether.

[44] Namaz: Ritual praying.

[45] Abdest: Ritual Ablution.

[46] The Melameti order takes a few hairs from the head, beard, and mustache of the aspirant.

- [47] Huma: A bird of legend. If its shadow is cast upon someone, he becomes a Sultan.
- [48] Tree of Tuba: The legendary tree that covers the universe.
- [49] Kafdagi: A fabulous mountain inhabited by djinns
- [50] Halva: Sweetmeats.
- [51] Hızir: legendary person who comes to help in critical moments; a godsend.
- [52] Hamza: Uncle of the Prophet Mohammed, known for his bravery.
- [53] Abu-Ali (ibni sina) d. 1037. Famous philosopher.
- [54] Abu-ala: d. 1057. Famous poet
- [55] Zul-fekar: The sword of Ali.
- [56] Koran, IX, 40.
- [57] Rebab: Three-string violin
- [58] Namaz: Prayer.
- [59] Hitay: A city in Eastern Turkistan, famous for beautiful women and gazelles that give musk.
- [60] Mugh: Zarathrustan priest.
- [61] Irak: A mode in music.
- [62] Sheriat: Religious law.
- [63] Imam: Religious Leader.
- [64] Karun: Legendary rich.
- [65] Hicaz: Mode of Near-Eastern music.
- [66] Nefs-i Mutmainne: Pious, saintly self: Koran LXXXIX, 27.
- [67] Old belief.
- [68] Sema: Dance ritual of whirling dervishes.
- [69] Nazar: Glance of the guide.
- [70] Zebur: (Mezamir): Name of the Prophet David's book.
- [71] Salah of Religion: Righteousness of religion, referring to Salahaddin.
- [72] Mecnun and Leyla: Arabic love story.
- [73] Hodja: Teacher or guide
- [74] Faruk: Nickname of Second Caliph: Omer.

[75] Zul-fekaar: Caliph Ali's famous sword.

[76] Beyazid: (died 874-75).

[77] Amid: Vizir in Selchuck's famous literature. Generosity (d. 1063).

[78] Imad: Founder of Al-i Buvah government in Iran (d.949).

[79] Badya: A large wooden or earthen bowl.

[80] Zir: Tunes in near-Easter music.

[81] Trust: According to Sufis, Names of God

[82] Merguzle and Rey'li, and Magribli and Tuslu are allusions to opposites.

[83] Koran, VII, 143.

[84] Koran, XV, 29 - XXXVIII, 72.

[85] According to Sufis, man comes first. The universe is his manifestation.

[86] Koran, IX, 40.

[87] To lose trackers, the shoes on the horses would be put on backwards.

[88] Rehavi is a mode of near-Eastern music. In this poem, the following modes of music are mentioned: Neva, Irak, Isfahan, Zengule, Rast, Hicaz, Ussak, Huseyni, Buselik, Maye, Dugah, and Cargah.

[89] Zir and bem: Top or bottom strings.

[90] Feridun is an idol in Indi-Persian mythology.

[91] Dimme Kelile is the Indian book of manners, written by Baydaba.

[92] Vasiit: Book by Ebu Hamid Muhammed el Gazali (d.1111-12).

[93] Muntakaa: Abu-i Fadi Muhammed al Hakim (d.945-46).

Notes From Eflaki

In the Bahr-i Recez, according to Eflaki (Yazici T., 1953-57, Volume I and Volume II. A publication of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Turkey.):

Gazel 20 was read at the wedding of Sultan Veled, son of Mevlana (V. II, p. 165).

Gazel 69 was recited during a Sema. Mevlana dropped a handful of dirt into the Kemal-i Kavval's tambourine (V. D, p. 94).

Gazel 79 was recited after staying seven days at Zirva Hamam (bath house) while leaving Hamam because of his son's (Sultan Veled) pleading (V. II, p. 92).

Gazel 150 was recited for the birth of his grandson, Ulu Arif Celebi (V. II, p. 284).

Gazel 162 was for Katib-i Esrar Fahreddin Sivasi, when he had a mental disorder while acting as one of the secretaries (V. I, p. 259).

In the Bahr-i Muzari,

Gazel 30 was recited when Shemseddin-i Mardini entered Medrese, where Mevlana was teaching (v. I, p. 162).

Gazel 130, tenth verse, was recited during Mevlana's last illness (V. II, p. 12).

Gazel 133 was Mevlana's last gazel, recited on his last night (V. D, p. 13-14).

Meter - 3

1.

Verse 1 [\[1\]](#)

P. 66 of original Divan

The charmer of the tavern
Came to take us home.
He brought the spring to rejuvenate us,
To make us very young.

He staged a hold-up on the way.
He opened his leather bag,
Lightened his belt,
Put his arrow in and stretched his bow.

He made hundreds of witty remarks,
Played hundreds of tricks,
And played strange moves in chess
In order to defeat us.

He will pull us up by our roots
Like a sapling, but don't worry.
Go behind him, be his shadow,
Keep running in front, behind him.

My friend, endure, don't run away.
If you have a heart like marble,
First He kills, but later
He takes us in His arms.

If the secret Beloved in our heart
Starts to be coy,
We also act the same
To all Sultans.

That long life came back,
Came back to bum our heart,
That beauty with his coyness
Came back again.

That soul of the world,
That secret treasure came,
That beauty to whom even
Sultans give praise,
Came to tear our curtain.

It is proper if our hearts come
To our mouth because
That important beauty is coming.

God's Shams of Tabriz came
To the sign of Hamel[2] in order
To grow and mature us
At the top of creation's tree.

2.

Verse 11

Even if you are not a searcher,
You will still follow us,
You'll keep searching with us.
Even if you don't know how
To play and sing,
You will become like us.
You will start singing, dancing with us.

If you are Karun[3] when you fall in love,
You become poor.
Though you are a Sultan, you become a slave like us.

One candle of this assembly is worth
A hundred candles; it's light is as great.
Either you are alive or dead.
You will come back to life with us.

You untie your feet.
Show the rose garden,
Start laughing with all
Your body, like a rose, with us.

Put on the mantle for one moment
And see the ones whose hearts are alive.
Then, throw your satin dresses out
And cover yourself with a mantle, like us.

When a seed falls into the ground,
Germinates, grows and becomes a tree,
If you understand these symbols,
You'll follow us, fall to the ground with us.

God's Shams of Tabriz says
To the heart's bud,
"If your eyes are opened,
You'll see the things worth seeing."

3.

Verse 18

You who have all the wealth and good fortune,
You don't see that day of judgment.
You don't see that Joseph of beauty,
That figure and stature.

O my Sheikh, you don't see
The pearl of Sheikhdом.
That spark of a halo,
That height and greatness.

You don't see this land of soul,
The garden of glory, fortune and splendor.
O good-hearted, honest person,
Who is crazy, you or me?
Just drink one glass

With me, forget blaming.

O moon, you turn around,
But never lose weight.
Your light of glory has pierced
And consumed the stars.

Since you have seen the
Running water, forget Tayammum [\[4\]](#)
The feast of union is here,
Rejoice, put austerity aside.

If you are coy, you are immature,
If you are tolerant, you submit yourself.
But, if you carry the burden,
Then you see the beauty.
You achieve the glory.

Be silent! Silence is better
Than the juice of honey.
Bum the words, forget the allusion and symbols.

O God's Shams of Tabriz
Souls are your East.
This Sun gets the warmth from
Your glory, from your sparks.

4.

Verse 27

Cupbearer, fill the cup with God's wine.
Offer that divine wine
To the burned, thirsty hearts.

Don't talk too much about bread
At the assembly of drunks.
The one who likes water,
Wants to hear all about drink.

The body has been ruined
By your water, your talk.
Adorn this ruin with that treasure.

Your love will turn that

Barren land into a rose garden.
Your wave will change the eye which resembles clouds
Into a shape that scatters pearls.

Increase our wine, offer more and more.
Make our sleep light; How can the one
Who falls asleep know the night?

The guest of God drinks water
From the same cup as the angels.
The wine comes from the sky
To the one who does good deeds.

The lips of His best friend
Touches His cups, His pitcher,
Drinks from His glasses.
You can only find that pure, clear wine
In the jug of abstinence and avoidance.

How can a sober man know
The ecstasy of the drunk?
How can Abu Jahl[\[5\]](#) understand
The feelings of Sahabe?[\[6\]](#)

A Sufi's master is
God without an intermediary.
And believers in the book of revelations
Are the book.

If you become God's confidant,
You don't need an intermediary.
Snatch the veil of beauties
Whose faces are covered by veils.

The one who denies and says,
In desperation, "You cannot find that."
Those words "You cannot,"
Are the block in his way.

He is not a white falcon,
Nor a nightingale with a beautiful voice.
He is a black raven at the ruins of the earth.

Be silent! Don't talk to increase
The confusion and evil.
The voice that comes from the land of Absence

Is the One that deserves to be addressed.

5.

Verse 40

Give more of this clean pure wine
Today, offer more and more.
Hit, break and demolish this fast-turning wheel.

Assuming the glass of Absence
Is not visible to the eye,
Still, what about drunkenness and devastation,
How can you hide that?

O Love, you are fond of joy and music,
Whose speech and thoughts are good.
Snatch the cover from the Sultan
Who covered his face.

Snatch, O auspicious cupbearer,
Snatch so that lamenting and grieving
Will disappear from this side and that side.
O rose-faced cupbearer,
Fill the glass, fill the cup.

If you didn't want to flirt
With the rose garden,
Why did you open a store
Where rose water is sold?

You tempt us by letting this river flow.
Throw the goose which was born in water
Into the water quickly.

We resemble crops, my friend,
Grown in this place.
Our lips are dried, searching,
Looking for rain clouds,
Waiting with all our heart.

Everywhere there is a new emissary,
"Go away," he says.
Don't listen, hit the stone of La hawle [\[7\]](#)
On the head of that black raven.

O you who instigate every Soul,
O you who snatch the purse of everyone,
O you who stole the rebab
From Rebabi Abu-Bakr[\[8\]](#)

Today I want this expert of Hadith[\[9\]](#)
To make the Soul drunk.
That expert of Tefsir [\[10\]](#)
To make the mind senile.

O our fountain of life,
Although the milk of the mangy camel
Is like Soul for the desert's Arab,
Still, don't hide. come forward
Like the day of judgment.

Be silent, a one whose essence and face are beautiful,
Hold your breath.
Don't make our situation known
To every ignorant one who has fallen asleep.

6.

Verse 52

☞ cupbearer, throw the goose
Which was born in water into the water,
Be quick, impulsiveness fits impatient drunks.

O Soul of spring and winter,
O cupbearer, you who are fond
Of wine and snacks,
Turn Rebabi Abu-Bakr[\[11\]](#) into sugarcane.
Fill him with sugar.

O cupbearer of bewilderment and agitation,
Go ahead, fill the cups and glasses with wine.
Start to drink again.

Fill this side and that side with pleasure
And joy screaming from that auspicious wine.
Snatch the veil from the face of the beloved
Who hides his face with the veil.

What a beautiful Beloved he is,
What a wonderful thornless rose sapling he is,
What good medicine for a burned heart he is.

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Look and see, hundreds of groups
Of people become crazy, insane
With this invisible wine.
This wine made hundreds
Of filtered, pure wines worthless.

Secret flowers, drunk with green,
Fall from branches, and hundreds
Of mountains, like pieces of straw
Go sinking and rising in the torrent
Full of bubbles.

Even that bright glass becomes Soul,
And is hidden from the body. It is
Impossible to hide the drunkenness and devastation.

We resemble crops, we have to grow
In that place, thirsty,
"Looking and waiting for rain clouds.

You keep talking like thunder,
Because your mind is like a curtain to you.
Be patient, plunge into Absence,
Kill this chattering parrot.

7.

Verse 62

At last, that moon has heard
Our wails at early dawn,
Our gathering was different tonight.

When that moon rises in my heart,
"O Time of the Moon,[\[12\]](#)" I say,
"See our moon's time."

Where is Zaloglu Rustem?[\[13\]](#)
I'll show him new tricks, new games.

Where is Joseph?
He should come and see our charms, our beauty.

Our sugar mine cannot be
A mouthful, cannot be swallowed.
It is better for you to be a morsel on His sweet plate.

His grace and kindness want
To embrace us every moment.
For that reason, He prepares
A remedy for our ailments, gives
Favors all the time.

Burned, roasted liver cannot
Be eaten without salt.
For that reason, He spreads
Salt on our burned, roasted liver.

Let's do Tavaḥ[\[14\]](#) without feet,
Prostration without head.
Because He made us without feet, without head.

We would do Tavaḥ around
The door of our beloved, without feet,
Because that drunk of Alast[\[15\]](#)
Came and broke our door.

Our face, our color turned into gold
Because of His silverish chest,
Hundreds of treasures would
Be sacrificed for our gold and silver.

How could His glory, which turns
Our body into angels, have color and shape?
Is this possible?

This is not possible,
Even though he allows us to make comparisons
Because He knows our sight,
Our view is limited.

“My Glory,” He said, “resembles a lamp.”[\[16\]](#)
Hearts and chests are like
The glass and the container.

Be silent, so nobody hears that.

Even then, who will understand
Our excellence, our evil?

8.

Verse 75

☞ Cupbearer of Soul,
Give this old, aged wine.
The one which will be a guide
On the way to heart and faith,

Pour the wine which boils
The heart and mixes with Soul,
Which overflows and makes the eyes
Soft and tender, and able to see God.

That grape wine is for Jesus' community.
This Mansur's wine for Yasin's [\[17\]](#) community.

There are jars full of that wine.
There are jars for this wine.
But, unless you break the jars,
You cannot taste this wine.

If you drink that wine
It won't cheer the heart,
Won't remove sorrow and hatred
From their roots.

But, even one drop of this wine
Turns your work into gold.
I would sacrifice my life
For this golden cup.

This would happen only to
The one who gathers up
His bed in the early dawn.
Awake, man achieves this
Progress in the early morning.

Don't slip, stagger,
Or break your oath with Sultans.
Because, bad friends can't
Be deceived with apprehension.

If your face is lacerated, never mind,
Go, look for another wound.
Even if it is Rustem.[\[18\]](#)
What could he do against
A bouquet of roses
He faces in the line of battle.

9.

Verse 84

☪ is the "Fountain of Life"
To drink for the One who adds Soul to Soul.
The fish of God's sea
Must be pure Soul.

This ruin which is made of mud
Is the house for an owl.
It is not for the Phoenix
Who flies so high.

Sparks of this kingdom
Dazzled hundreds of eyes.
Don't bring every blind one,
Who can hardly walk with his cane,
Here by pulling their ears.

If you have good money,
How come you get in debt
And become drunk on borrowed money.
What do you think about this
Treasure of favor and generosity?

The one who is in distress,
Knows where to find His kindness and generosity.
It is proper to sacrifice hundreds
Of hearts for the eternal Soul.

'The heart is not worse than iron.
Even iron knows a stone
In front of a magnet
Won't be pulled.

Mind came to this muddy earth,

This universe, to fall in love.
Otherwise, what's the use of mind
To someone who has no loyalty, no mind?

The Sun of Truth is God's Shams of Tabriz.
The heart fell to the ground and kissed the earth
At the temple of that Soul which
Is like a blessing for us.

10.

Verse 92

The Beloved is adorned and has become beautiful;
I wish it would always be like that.
His blasphemy turns into faith as long
As He exists.
I wish it would always be like that.

Because of the bad omen of the Devil,
That splendor has been turned upside-down,
The country has been ruined.
The kingdom has passed to Solomon again.
Everything is under his possession
I wish it would always be like that.

The Beloved who broke my heart,
Who closed the door in front of my face,
Has started sharing his friend's grief.
I wish it would always be like that.

He used to enjoy drinking wine alone.
Now, he has become the master of ceremonies.
I wish it would always be like that.

Sparks from His Royal face,
The torch which lights the house,
Every corner is turned into open space.
I wish it would always be like that:

Earth became the house of sugar
From his fake anger and sweet coquetties,
His charms.
I wish it would always be like that.

Night is gone, it is time for morning wine.
Sorrows are all gone, joys and abundance
Show their faces; the sun rose and shines brightly.
I wish it would always be like that.

That chain started to swing
Because of the glory and help of the one
Who has passed out of existence
With grief, who has become insane and crazy.
I wish it would always be like that.

The holiday is here, festivities are here.
The Beloved, the One who went away, returned.
Joys and pleasures of the holiday increased.
I wish it would always be like that.

O you who have heart,
O player who understands us,
Don't stay so long on the bass string,
Because that planet Venus entered the sign of Libra.
I wish it would always stay there like that.

The poor became Feridun[\[19\]](#)
His treasure is the same as that of Karun.
He spends from the same purse,
And eats from the same cup as the Sultan.
I wish it would always be like that.

Look at that wind, that blowing wind
Of love, harmonizing with the reed
By the charms of those sweet lips.
I wish it would always be like that.

That unlucky Pharaoh with all
His harshness and vulgarity,
Suddenly changed into Moses, son of Imran.
I wish it would always happen like that.

That wolf with all its ugliness,
Ignorance and absent-mindedness
Became Joseph of Canaan.
I wish it would always be like that.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
You merged and mixed so much with us,
Tabriz became Korasan.

I wish it would always be like that.

The secret of "my devil became Muslim."
Appeared that your self became divine Self.
The devil came to Islam.
I wish it would always be like that.

This moon rises, both worlds
Turn into rose gardens.
All those of flesh become Souls.
I wish it would always be like that.

Your light reflects on Soul
It sets it on fire, shines
As long as Soul is permanent.
I wish it would always be like that.

His subjugation has changed to compassion.
His poison turned into sweetness.
His clouds rained sugars.
I wish it would always be like that.

Since this oxen is sacrificed,
Now it cannot be exalted and glorified
Because it came to a rich house
Or be ashamed of its horns.
I wish it would always be like that.

Senai's[\[20\]](#) wishes are realized
When earth turns into sky.
I wish it would always be like that.

Be silent, I am drunk.
Somebody tied my hands,
Thoughts have flown away.
I wish it would always be like that.

11.

Verse 114 **Terci-i Bend**

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☾ moon-faced Beloved,

The month of Ramadan came.
Cover the top of the table,
Open the road of exaltation.

O inconstant busybody,
It is time to change your ways.
Look at the one who sells halvah.[\[21\]](#)
How long do you want halvah?

Just seeing the halvah maker once,
Made you too sweet.
Even honey says to you, "I'll be the soil you step on,
I worship at your temple."

Your chick is left in the egg
Because of your eating and vomiting.
Get out of that egg so you can grow wings.
You'll be able to fly.

The lips of the Mehter [\[22\]](#) are dry
With the calls of the Beloved,
Yelling so nicely with
An empty stomach like a horn.

There should be nothing inside of you.
Be empty; give your lips to the lips of the reed.
When you fill with His breath like a reed,
You'll chew sugar.

Sweetness is hidden in the breath
Which blows the reed.
The reed resembles Mary
Who became pregnant by the sweetness of that breath.

What will you lose
If you repent of eating bread?
Where is the table, that
Its bread increases in time?
Where is the Beloved who
Adds Soul to Soul?

I will be purified by sediments,
Even go beyond that, climb the Kafdagi.[\[23\]](#)
The sparrow which flies to fasting's Kafdagi
Becomes a Phoenix.

Losing weight and paleness come from fasting;
It makes you dizzy, but this weight loss,
This paleness will give "Yed-i Beyza"[\[24\]](#)
To the people.

Every year, they dredge the canal,
Clean the mud in order for the water to flow
So they can grow the green crops.

You also give this bread
To the one who cleans and opens the canal.
You obtain the fountain of life.
Your particle comes back to life.

O one who listen to me,
Accept these words like a cascading torrent
Calling Soul to the sea.

O Beautiful One, whose face
Is more beautiful than the moon,
The first words of your description
Have already filled seventy-two books.
In the hand of envious Venus,
Seventy-two tambourines got wet,
And could not make another sound.

* * * * *

We dosed the door of hell,
Gave up the desire of eating and drinking.
You also open the door of Heaven,
Open the door of your bright Heart.

You served the donkey enough;
You carried its grasses and straw.
Now, it is time to serve Jesus,
Time to help Him.

If we were not donkeys,
This earth wouldn't be our country, our home.
The sky will pull us like Jesus,
Pat its eyes and it will embrace us.

But, if the one whose armpit stinks
Puts us under his arm,
We shouldn't bear any grudge against that idiot

Whose heart's eyes are blind.

As long as you watch a tableful
Of bread and meat,
Where will you see the Soul?
O my world and Soul, go and look
For the world, search the Souls.

All those things have come and passed,
My dear friend, *you* look at once for the needy.
We haven't had leaves or flowers like the rose
Because of the cold winter.

We are full of this harvest,
This wheat and barley.
Show me one without the signs
Of Virgo and Libra.

We hold the string of the sky
To put up our tent,
Next to the hyacinth and iris.

How long will you say coo-coo, "where, where?"
Like a stork or a dove.
Look for a way to the height
Because this earth bruises and destroys
Every silver-bodied beauty.

Each Beauty is like a moon,
Standing on a road, staging a hold-up.
Each one of them like a Sultan of Sultans,
Each one is more beautiful than the others.

Oh my life, give your Soul.
Don't be afraid, don't be stingy.
You bum lots of light,
For sure, you need oil.

Look for the throne, exaltation.
You say, "I don't care for those little things."
Snatch that disposition from the lion.
You are a man, not a woman.

Step on the road full of blood,
put your face on the face of Majnun.
Pull out the sword of war,

Skin the lion.

O musician who resembles the parrot,
Tell the third Terci,
That the Soul flows like water in the river.

* * * * *

O Jesus, You who are exalted
Passing through the sky of fire,
Bend Your head; look down from the sky
And pull us up there.

I am like soil, stepped on everyday.
You give me capacity;
Then the soil becomes a floor for me.

This eye couldn't look at that divine light.
But You put some salve in my eyes.
In this common world they become
Like an ocean.

Without the drunkenness from that glass
Heart is unaware of himself; he is emaciated.
Without the salve Caesar puts on,
The eyes are blind.

Go to the forest of lions
Where you can hunt gazelles.
Go to the assembly of Sultans
If you want to drink the Sultan's wine.

On every comer there is a cupbearer
Holding a cup of wine, pure and clear.
In every place, there is a musician;
His dewlap is sweet.
They all look like the moon.

You keep asking the Beloved,
"Are you bayram feasting?"
O God, how did You give this beauty, this magnificence?

How could this lion fit
The six comers of this world?
The paw which this lion deserves,

Is beyond the six dimensions.

The Sun burns for that Beauty
The moon becomes dry.
This brightness, this sparkle
Comes from the secret of
"God has spread His Holy light to them." (Hadith)

That brilliance is such that Soul
Becomes eternally drunk with it.
It is such light that the Sun
Won't be able to reach its dust.

I was talking with my head above water.
Words were coming from my lips, discussing nicely.
Now I have become submerged,
How can I describe the river?

You are not submerged in the river
If you are not a fish.
Nobody comes to this meadow
But the rose sapling.

That Sultan of Sultans who resembles no one,
Explained this in such a way.
How can you convey this explanation?
It doesn't fit the words or the pictures.

The heart, which became your house,
Is bigger and better than two worlds.
Layla became crazy, insane
Because of that heart, so did Majnun.

* * * * *

O moon-faced friend,
O player who chews sugar,
Your voice adds Soul to Soul,
Don't stop to rest until morning.

You are help, you are a joy to all.
You have become better than everyone.
You have been like that, don't stop.
Sit until morning.

The news went to a hundred cities, like,

"O lovers, O ruined ones, that
Sleeping Beloved has awakened."
Don't you rest either;
Sit until morning.

That instigator has awakened,
He is such an instigator that,
If He reproaches the mountain,
The mountain is split. Don't stop,
Rest until morning.

There is such a gathering in the house,
Such a light in the gathering.
I expect things from you, don't stop,
Rest until morning.

The Bey^[25] came, bey came,
That bright full moon came.
Sugar and milk came, don't stop
Or sleep until morning.

O charmer, whose voice
And melodies are more beautiful and sweeter
Than a morning breeze,
You are the one seducing us.
You play continually until morning;
Don't stop; don't sleep.

Drinking and gathering are happy
And lively because of your breath, your melodies.
You illuminate everything like a candle.
Don't stop or rest until morning.

This sky is like a tent put over the earth.
Has anybody ever seen a tent like that?
O pole of this tent,
Don't fall until morning.

This gathering is filled with You
And has reached honor and glory with You.
It is becoming upside-down because of You.
Don't stop or rest until morning.

That oar moves all the time,
Like it is in the hand of the boatman.
This will go on like that

Until it reaches the prosperous land.
Keep on until morning.

O beautiful breath which blows through the reed,
How nice and fresh you are!
Why don't you respect everybody?
Don't stop or rest until morning.

The tambourine is stretched
By a stroke of the hand,
Not the breath of a drunk.
Its sound is lighter than the reed.
Keep playing until morning.

We are in silence like the Soul,
But how can Soul sleep?
O Beloved, you become our tongue.
Don't stop; don't rest. Sing and play.

12.

Verse 170

Laugh not only with my mouth,
But with my whole body,
Because I am out of myself.
I am in privacy with the Sultan of the world.

O one who comes with a torch
In the early morning to take the heart away,
Take the Soul to the sky, too.
Don't leave the heart alone.

Don't make the Soul a stranger
To the heart with anger and greed.
Don't leave this here;
Call the other one to come along.

Send the news the Sultan deserves;
Make a general invitation.
O my Sultan, how long will
This one be with You
And that one stay alone?

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If you don't come tonight,
Close your lips tonight like last night.
O my master, not only will I make noise,
I will make a scene and cause an uproar.

13.

Verse 175

For God's sake, Beloved,
Look at my face, pale like gold.
For God's sake, wherever
You go, take us with you.

When you come to the heart,
Lift the skirt of your garment,
So it won't be spoiled with blood, O Beloved.

Despite the blindness
Of those moon-faced beauties
Who don't see you,
Rise and draw a black cloud
Over the face of the moon.

Alas, O sugar-lipped friend,
Since your mother gave birth to you,
The sugar market in the bazaar
Has been depressed.

We said, "Health and happiness for you:
That voice covered the whole world."
The heart is prostrated,
Soul put the belt of effort around his waist.

I used to bum at night like a candle;
Was put out every morning.
But tonight, I cannot differentiate
Night from day, O Beloved.

14.

Verse 182

O Beloved, from whose face,
The rose garden, red and yellow roses smile;
I wish you would become like that
All the time. Mix like honey and milk with us.

O friend to whom the sky has become a slave,
His grace will give life to the people.
Wonderful; what beauty, what charm this is.

If your sea of beauty suddenly froths
And becomes rough, the lower world
Will fill with pearls, and the upper world
Turn into heaven.

Wherever you turn, roses will grow
In front of you.
Whenever you go out and come back,
The soil under your feet, I pray,
Will change to gold.

When you get angry and talk reproachfully
And bitterly, don't worry; your injustice,
Your cruelty are totally sweet and pleasant.

Although his heart is stone,
You look and see what his color is.
When the torch sees it, when the
Red rose sees it, they become ashamed of themselves.

God, give him an open, wide-awake heart,
Give him long life.
He will live hundreds of years,
Praising, exalting, acting shy,
So we will be praising Him.

15.

Verse 189

For your Soul's sake,
For your head's sake,
Don't leave us like that, Beloved.
O walking cypress, show that
Stature to us.

Cheer and illuminate the dirt floor,
Show another sun to the roof of this sky.

Make the Soul knowledgeable,
Guide, fill the mines with gold.
Give an earthquake to shake
The bottom of the ocean.

Even the sun takes shelter
Under the shadow of your kingdom.
Is there any other way than to go
Under the shadow of your blessing?

My dear friend, the one who
Has a bad idea, that idea does not suit him well.
The incapable, lazy ones,
Are lazy and incapable of love.

You are the mercy of Merciful God,
You are the salve, the remedy.
Give us the medicine which controls
The bile, like a doctor.

You are the nightingale of the rose garden,
The cupbearer of good people.
You listen to the secrets.
At the same time, you have no head, no feet.

My God, what do You have there?
You are spring with Your kindness.
You put the granite stones
And rocks to work.

You shine with such a light,
You instigate such mischief,
That hundreds of floods
Are unable to calm that.

16.

Verse 198

O moon-faced one, welcome.
You brought joy and happiness to our Soul.

You were always like that.
I wish you would be like that
As long as you live.

O you who are the shape
And form of every joy,
O symbol of pure love,
You always stay in our heart.

My dear Beloved, help us grow
From this childhood, from
The needs and service of nannies.

We fall in grief, and hang onto
Our friends and relatives.
O tambourine, yell from the heart.
O reed, wail and cry.

O Heart, you are beautiful,
Be more beautiful because of that Husrev.
If you are a sweet Husrev, Shirin's Husrev
Will fall in love, and become Ferhad.[\[26\]](#)

17.

Verse 203

☞ If you don't want to be disgraced
Publicly, take my advice.
I am like a jar full of opium;
Don't lift my lid.

If you want to throw me into the fire,
What could the fire do to me?
I bum hearts with hundreds of different fires,
And cause hundreds of uproars and tumult.

Though the sky becomes a head
From beginning to end,
Though the earth becomes feet,
I will neither put my head on this,
Nor step on that.

O cupbearer of the jar
Of the clean, pure wine of our Master,

Give us a big glass.
That's best for us to be grateful to God.

18.

Verse 207 [\[27\]](#)

Earth is illuminated
With the light of our fire.
The full moon is our cupbearer;
The Pleiades is our glass.

Love is my belief.
Solitude is my garden, my meadow.
The blazing fire is my drinking friend.
The rose garden is the place
Of our joy and pleasure.

Whoever is in love, this is his assembly.
Whoever still has a mind
Should stay away from us.
Where is he? Where are we?

The one whose country is ruined,
The one who became thirsty with fire
Should come to us.
We'll show him the spring-such a source of water.
He'll return satiated.

The one who has no eye
To see the world of Absence
Should come to our temple
With love and enthusiasm and serve there.

O time, have your eyes
Ever seen a man like
God's Shams of Tabriz
Who is the master of my heart?

What happiness it is for you,
O one who has found the right way,
You gave up form and shape
In order to find our meaning.

Whoever has grief or trouble,

Whoever is ruined or destroyed,
Should come and drink our master's coffee,
And become drunk and free from suffering.

19.

Verse 215

My Hodja, you don't see
The day of resurrection;
You don't see this beautiful stature.

The wall of the house
Has become crazy, insane,
The door and chimney, too.
I climb the wall in order to be noticeable.

It is such a moon that
It keeps turning, but it hasn't
Been notched or thinned.
The Sun of His Beauty
Pierced the darkness.

O chaste, beautiful Hodja,
Who is crazy, you or me?
Have a glass with me. Quit blaming.

Before you, how many fools kept
Looking for miracles?
Once they see the face of the cupbearer,
They should get rid of miracles.

20.

Verse 220

Beloved, how lucky for us
That we have fallen into your grief.
We are confident of your love
And at the same time are your confidant.

We become lost by looking at
And watching your face

When we have drunk from your cup.
Sometimes, we climb onto your roof
And are cheered by you.

You are the Soul of Solomon,
The halting place for the Soul
To rest and be calm.
O Beloved, the giant became crazy
For your ring, so did the fairy.

O Beloved, Souls have lost themselves
By looking at your beautiful face.
Hearts are shining because
Of your breath, your presence.

I have been drunk with your love.
Your hangover is in my head.
I am happy, joyful because of your beauty.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
You are the Kaaba[\[28\]](#) of lovers.
O friend, even Zamzam[\[29\]](#) is mixed with sugar,
Sweetened because of your zamzam.

21.

Verse 226

O sleep, for your Soul's sake,
Don't trouble us tonight.
For God's love, pass by;
Don't stop here.

O sleep, wherever you fly and land,
You destroy the gathering.
Don't come to our assembly tonight.

Beloved, tonight the eye is nourished
With your beauty.
Don't be sorry because of sleeplessness.
O eye, keep watching His beauty tonight.

"By the night enshrouding,"[\[30\]](#)
God forbid. Go away sleep; go away tonight.
You will obtain-hundreds of gifts

From the hearts of those who are awake.

People fall asleep, thank God.
O heart, you didn't sleep last night,
But tonight, you are worse than last night.
You are fully awake tonight, too.

I am like the moon, talking until morning.
O caring friend of the one who is longing,
The eyes of your heart are open tonight.
See me. Listen to me.

The moon is my witness; stars are my army.
O moon, you are my shield against the arrows of stars.

22.

Verse 233

Beloved, don't sleep tonight.
Don't leave us without you, beloved.
Beware, don't start a race drinking with us.
Please, don't sleep tonight.

We are not ourselves tonight;
We became different with love.
Look and see what shape we are in this time.
Please, don't sleep tonight.

O One whose ring encircles every neck,
Don't leave us alone every night.
Please, don't sleep tonight.

We are bait for grief's fishing.
We are confused, and drunk with sorrows.
Don't hand us over to grief.
Please, don't sleep tonight.

O cypress of the rose garden,
O moon which illuminates the evening.
Be kind to moon worshipers.
Please, don't sleep tonight.

23.

Verse 232

The Soul and body become drunk
Because of that sugar-lipped cupbearer.
O friend, don't sleep tonight.

In order to have him hear and understand me,
I keep wailing for that light of the whole world
And tell of all his charms and shy manners.
O friend, don't sleep tonight.

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Sometimes because of resentment,
Sometimes because of confusion,
You have been deprived of this drink.
Don't be deprived tonight.
O friend, don't sleep tonight

If one day you become a thorn,
Despicable and contemptible,
And another day you die and become a corpse,
How will you have any idea about us?
O friend, don't sleep tonight.

Give up both of them.
Ah, men, time has passed. Get up.
The rose is smiling.
O friend, don't sleep tonight.

I am afraid of your departure;
I live day and night with your love.
O my God's Shams of Tabriz,
O friend, don't sleep tonight.

24.

Verse 244

O Soul, I am your guest,
Don't sleep tonight.

O Soul and heart of the guest,
Don't sleep tonight.

Your face rose like a full moon;
Tonight has become the Night of Qadr.[\[31\]](#)
O the Sultan of all Beauties,
Don't sleep tonight.

O cypress of five hundred rose gardens,
O you who are peace within the sound
And heart of the drunk.
You took the heart away with you;
Take the Soul, too.
Don't sleep tonight.

O beautiful, smiling garden,
Both worlds are prisons without you.
You were such a charmer, even better than that.
Don't sleep tonight.

25.

Verse 248

☞ One who is exempt from changing
From one state to another,
O One who was created with no peer, no equal,
O You who bring man constantly
From one state to another,
You who give him wonders,
And make some like Majnun, others like Layla,
O Artist, who needs no tool,

O One who gives hundreds of states
To Layla and Majnun, making
Them yell and cry at His temple, saying,
"O You who only give and have no needs."

It is Solomon's ring which
Answers all needs,
Which does all the work that is pledged to You.
Don't let this proof slip from your hand.

The Moon of Repentance[\[32\]](#) has passed.
A new moon has risen in the sky.

In a single moment this One will break
Hundreds of agreements and oaths of repentance.

How foolish is the head that
Won't be stunned and frozen because of Him.
How silly is the heart that
Won't lose everything in front of Him.

We limped here. Close the door of the house.
The one who is scattered or the one who flies
Both are lame in this temple.

O Love, You are a whole Being,
You are a crown, and at the same time a chain.
You are the invitation of the Prophet,
And at the same time You are the changes of beliefs
And the mood of the people.

From Absence You created us
With thirst and turned our eyes
To that fountain of Your kingdom.

My thorn changed into a rose;
My particle became whole.
"Our beginning is God's compassion;
So is our end [\[33\]](#)."

See the rose in the thorn.
Everybody sees a rose without thorns.
See the whole in the part;
That is competence.

See the wine in the unripened grape;
See existence in Absence.
O Joseph, watch the Kingdom
Of the Sultan of Sultans at the well.

Thorns without roses won't
Sit on top of the meadow
Where a handful of dirt finds
The head and mustache without Soul.

You clap your hands and understand
That you are the source of the sound.
It is coming from you.
Because, if Union and Separation didn't happen,

You wouldn't be able to hit your hands together.

Be silent now; spring has come.
The rose and thorn have come.
Beauties have come leaping
From the land of Absence to invite us.

26.

Verse 262

One page is left from our book of Life.
The Soul has seen this grace,
And has become jealous and fallen into grief.

He wrote a sweet alphabet,
Sweeter than sugar, in that book.
When the moon read that
It caused him to sweat
Because of his bashfulness.

Eternal life is shining
On the leaves of the garden.
It is such eternal life,
That it has no fear of being changed
From one sign of the Zodiac to another;
Neither does it become diminished or decreased.

It is called a leaf,
But eternal glory is there.
All the clean people's secrets are there,
Like the redness after sunset.

The Glory of God comes
From God's Shams of Tabriz,
Reflected over a rolled, twisted page.

27.

Verse 267

Have been admiring the greatness
Of that world where your contempt,

Your boasting came like wind to me.
The one who is drunk with that kingdom,
Why shouldn't he exalt Him,
Why wouldn't he see His greatness?

Each moment I have been drinking
Hundreds of cups of wine
Which come from neither a big earthen jar
Nor from any container.

I have been catching, without any nets,
All the birds in the sky
And God's falcons in the world of Absence.

Even surprisingly wonderful birds
Are flying away from my hands.
With that, wine overflows into my mouth.

A grain of wheat which has grown
In His ear of corn, the one Adam ate,
I would sell it with heaven.
Then, I would hold the other
Heaven, like a Soul, in my arms.

28.

Verse 272

There were two Turks with bows
In their hands at Balasagon,[\[34\]](#) saying,
"If one of those two people
Disappears, it doesn't matter to us.

O one who falls into useless grief
Because, "That has happened or this didn't happen,"
That one has a purse full of gold.
This one has a plate, a full table,
Saying and becoming sick with that.

You are exasperated with greed
If a man donates a saddle
To someone at nightfall.

I vow to God that every living thing
With Soul has no thought, but for

That gaze of the Sultan,
And knows no anxiety, but the fear
Of the wrath of the Sultan.

I would rather be crazy, insane
Than think of absurd things.
O you who see everything
With the eyes of Soul,
I have been crazy and insane
From the beginning.

Since I don't have a mind, come to me.
You are my reason. You are
The sense and intelligence for one
Who has a shepherd like You.

If my worship is not enough,
You are my worship, my prosperity.
Anybody who worships You
Frees himself from fear.

O you who make different shaped jars,
Don't try to sell me one.
What would I do with it,
Since I have the river.

You dedicate yourself
To someone who is dead.
I dedicate myself to the One
Who possesses the Soul and the Universe.

Come and become our friend because
There is a trace of our Soul in yours.

God's Shams of Tabriz is a sun
Of the sky of existence.
What a sky that is where he keeps turning.

29.

Verse 283

Today, your face
Is a different face.
Today, there is another

Taste upon your sweet lips.

Today, your ruby lips
Which resemble an open rose,
Bloomed on another branch.
Today, your cypress-like stature
Grows in a different way.

Today, your moon face
Cannot be fit into the sky.
There is another cheerfulness, another spaciousness,
In your chest which resembles the sky.

Which side of the bed
Did the instigator get out of today?
I don't know. All I know is
There are different fights
And uproars on the earth today.

Today that Gazelle, who is beyond
These two worlds,
Spread out on another plain,
Hunts lions appearing in your eyes.

The heart that has fallen in love is gone.
Heart and love both have disappeared.
He has a much better love now.

Though the lover doesn't have feet,
He will fly with eternal wings.
Though He doesn't have a head,
He has many other heads.

The sea of both eyes was looking for Him
And was unable to find Him.
He didn't know that pearl had another sea.

I turned both worlds upside down with love,
But I couldn't find it.
I didn't know that He has another place.

Today, my heart is love;
Tomorrow, it is the Beloved.
I have another tomorrow
At the heart of my heart.

Though Sultan Selahaddin is hidden,
No wonder God is so jealous of him,
For every moment he has a new tutor.

30.

Verse 234

The Soul cannot be broken or divided;
Take a slice from the loaf of bread.
The one who falls in love, becomes out of work,
But cannot be called a vagabond.

If I become a mantle for someone,
He will never be naked.
If I help someone,
He will never be helpless.

If I become a representative for someone,
He cannot be dismissed.
A stone turned into a jewel
Cannot become a stone again.

The Qibla[\[35\]](#) of the ones with longing
Will never be destroyed.
The Koran of the ones who keep silent
Won't be divided into thirty sections.[\[36\]](#)

My eyes shed tears, just like the cupbearer,
But without His languid eyes.
Neither do I become drunk nor serve wine.

Love becomes sick, but never dies.
The moon becomes notched, but won't be a star.

Be silent. Enough. Don't worry.
The Self that has been in love,
Won't turn and do bad things.

31.

Verse 301

The lover should be like me,
Consumed constantly with passion.
If he cannot be like that,
He should keep playing with his knuckle bones~

O charmer to whom even the moon
Became a slave, a servant,
The one who has a face like the moon
Should be like you who are better than
All the moon-faced ones,
And flirt with everyone.

The one you call a lover should be like me.
He should be so drunk, so much out of himself,
That neither would he get along with people
Nor would he have any use for himself.

O my Sultan, you who ride so uniquely,
The horseman should be like you.
He should ride his horse from illusion
And doubt, to that side further away.

Love is the fountain of life.
It saves you from death.
How lucky is the one who
Gives himself to love.

P. 71 of original Divan

This Soul resembles a green branch;
Keep pulling it toward yourself.
The harder you pull, the more you get.

My Soul, my heart have been absorbed
By that essence and become drunk.
Every day looks for a new way
Like the first time of falling in love.

He holds you in His arms,
Caresses you, loves you,
When you bend double, like a harp, with grief.

The gazelle who admires the lion
When his blood is changed, rejuvenated
The lion takes him to his right side
To walk together.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
It is possible that one day
Your light will reflect on the sun,
On the sky and make it better and more beautiful.

32.

Verse 311

When will that time come, when friends
Who rise in the early dawn will find us
Like particles which have been
Spread upside down and gone?

How lucky is that person who comes
To drink water from the river
And finds the reflection of that moon.

Who is that person who resembles Jacob
While searching for his son's smell?
From the shirt of Joseph he will
Bind the light of his eyes and start seeing again.

Or, like the desert Arab who drops his
Bucket in the well-
When he pulls it up, he finds
A sweet and peerless beauty.

Or, like Moses while looking for a fire,
He turns his face toward the tree
And instead of fire he finds
Hundreds of dawns, hundreds of mornings.

Or, like Jesus, in order to be safe
From the enemy, he enters the house.
There He finds a way to ascend to the sky.

Or, like Solomon, he opens the belly
Of the fish and finds that golden ring there.

Who is that man who comes like Omar,
With the sword in his hand to make
An attempt on the life of God's messenger,
Then falls in God's trap and acquires

God's inspiration with good luck?

Or, like Edhemoglu, while riding his horse
To hunt Gazelle, he was hunted by someone else?

Or like a thirsty shell which opens
Its mouth, swallows a drop, and then makes a pearl?

Or like the person who gathers plants
And straw from one corner to another,
And suddenly discovers the treasure in the ruins?

Get on the road, advance.
Leave the gossips, the fables behind.
Know well, so the stranger will find
The door from the light of "didn't we
Open and enlarge your chest"[\[37\]](#)
And will reach this light.

33.

Verse 323

That drifter came again,
Came to burn and melt like a candle
In front of You.

He came to make supplication
To your narcissus-sweet face.
Don't close the door, O my Soul.

Because if you close the door,
He'll accept your order.
Nevertheless, supplication for the slave
And coyness for the Sultan.

Every candle which has been consumed
With passion gives light to the eye.
Whoever burns and melts will
Be able to find the secret.

If I separate the poison
That comes from His hand from the wine,
That means my soul might fall in temporary
Love on the way of Soul.

I have to take some more poison.
I have to advance much more.

How will the animal be able
To drink His fountain of life?
How could closed eyes
See His face?

I stop traveling; I stay with the Beloved.
I am saved from death
Because of that long life.

O heart, how long will you
Be looking for water in this river?
How long will you be expecting
A call to prayer?
Prayer time is here.

Whoever takes a step toward
Shamseddin with good heart,
Even if he can't walk, love
Will put wings on him.
He can fly with them.

34.

Verse 332

Every particle, at the height of exaltation,
Who drinks wine, and dances, with the love of God,
By tapping his feet, sees the sun of eternity.

The one He makes smile
Dances by swinging his arms and sleeves;
The one He makes scared,
Moves his lips by praying.

Even His beautiful great sky
Became drunk with that wine.
Keep playing the prayer bells.

This love came as a drunk,
Entered the garden of Alast,[\[38\]](#)
Put the grape of existence under
His feet and started crushing.

Why should love come to the vineyard
And crush grapes, if he is not drunk?

You are also jumping, stamping your feet
On the floor, but you don't see the grapes.
Your Sufi-like Soul, on the other hand,
Is crushing grapes all the time.

Every moment He seems to be giving
Grief and troubles to me.
If the vineyard is yours,
Whose grapes will you be crushing?

You keep stomping your feet
Because you wear the same mantle Job did.
Whoever hears the voice of
"hit your foot to the ground."[\[39\]](#)
Stamps on the foot of loyalty and enters the dancing.

Jacob started dancing
From the chanting of Joseph.
That sweet-lipped Joseph
Was also dancing, standing,
And stomping with his feet.

O Souls, since you are in
The presence of the Beloved,
Stomp your feet; dance.
It is possible that the foot
Of luckiness may touch you and dance with you.

My friend, this love is like rain that
Comes over the leaves, the grass, and the meadow.
It will make them green and grow.

God's Abraham has danced in the fire of Nimrod.
God's Ishmail's neck has moved
In front of grief's sword.

The Soul of God steps on the oceans
Like a bird and dances with the bird
Which has ascended.

Say "long life" to that Beauty
Without words or sounds

Or concern about evil eyes
On that Beautiful one.

35.

Verse 346

My beloved friend, don't fall into desperation.
There is a hope; the expectation
Of all Souls comes from the world of Absence.

Although Mary is gone,
The divine light that pulled
Jesus to the sky has come.

O Soul, don't be desperate.
The Sultan who freed Joseph from jail
Came from the darkness.

Jacob came from seclusion,
And reached Joseph, who tore
The curtain of Zeliha.

O you who wail every night,
"My God, my God," until morning,
Mercy has heard your cry and arrived.

O old chronic trouble,
The cure has come.
O locked closet door,
The key has come.

O you who keep fasting
After eating Sahur,[\[40\]](#)
Break your fasting; eat a good meal of Iftar.[\[41\]](#)
Because the crescent of Bayram[\[42\]](#) has appeared.

Be silent. Confusion comes after His order of "Be."
Become better than words.

36.

Verse 354

The month of fasting has passed.
Bayram came, bayram came.[\[43\]](#)
The night of separation is gone,
The Beloved appeared, suddenly came.

Your Azra became Vamik [\[44\]](#)
In the bright morning.
Your beloved fell in love with you.
Your master became your disciple,
And gave his pledge to you.

War has died, peace came,
Poison disappeared, sugar came.
The stone turned into a jewel.
For every lock, a key came.

The sun shines on the clean
As well as on the dirty.
Nevertheless, Soul went
To the land of the pure
From this dirty flesh.

The heart falls in your trap
By the taste of your glass.
When Soul understands that
It comes running.

So many repentants have been
Hit by your stone and broken to pieces.
So many devout worshipers tore their mantles
And came to your temple.

The garden and meadow have closed
Their mouths for three months
Because of this winter, they didn't talk.
At the end, a breeze came
From the world of Absence,
To your smell of spring.

37.

Verse 361

☞ you who spent the dark evening sleeping,

The time for worshipping has come.
O Self, whose custom is cruelty,
The time for loyalty has come.

Look out through the window,
Open the door of repentance,
Put the house in order,
Hurry, it is our turn now.

Why don't you wash your hands
From sins and cruelty?
Slap water on your face,
The time for Namaz[\[45\]](#) has come.

When you turn your face to the grave,
You'll remember His Qibla.[\[46\]](#)
When you postpone Namaz,
All your begging and crying
Won't do you any good.

Look for a light from this Qibla.
It may become a candle for the grave,
That light brightens your tomb.
When God's glory comes,

The grave becomes a rose garden.
The one who has little zeal
Is the one who remains in the house of grief.
How can you find your secret
From that one's heart?

Your value is measured
By whatever you care for the most.
For that reason, the lover's heart
Is greater than the throne of God.

Your trouble comes from the medicine you take.
Your loyalty is deceit and fraud.

How could the Soul fit into
The place from which love comes?
How could reason fly
To the place ruled by insanity?

How could you trap the heart
Of the lover, which resembles a Phoenix?

The place where that kind of bird flies
Is beyond the world of existence.

The heart that is full of fire
Is whirling around the common people.
How could it be that a constant
In the sky turns like that?

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
Drink a glass from Moses' wine.
That bloody Nile will become clean, pure water.

39.

Verse 373

P. 72 of original Divan

The Soul is wondering about Your Presence,
Dying to know,
How could anybody dare
To talk with You?

Somebody's head is rising,
From every place you step,
Wanting to know how could anyone wash his hand
And wondering how anybody could give up on You.

Only the Soul knows what fragrance
He gets from the Beloved the day he starts
To fly with the pleasure of Your fragrance.

The head will wail hundreds of times.
Every hair weeps miserably
If your hangover decreases in my head.

I emptied the house,
I arranged Your property and possessions.
In order to increase Your love day by day,
I have been melting, declining.

With the love of God's Shams of Tabriz
My Soul is advancing
On the sea like a ship without feet.

40.

Verse 379

My friend, is sugar better
Than the *one* who makes sugar?
Is the Moon's beauty greater
Than the one who created the Moon?

O Garden, are you better
Than the roses on you?
Is the rose more perfect
Than the one who grows the rose
And makes hundreds *of* narcissuses?

O mind, are you better in knowledge,
Or the One who creates hundreds
Of minds every moment?

O Love, you are
Scattered and energetic,
But there is someone or something
Who has put a fiery belt around you.

I have been in ecstasy because of Him.
I feel dizzy because of Him.
I am confused, sometimes He bums
My arms and wings,
Sometimes He gives me a head and arms.

The sea of heart, with His grace,
Makes a string *of* pearls out of words
Given to Husrev and Shirin.[\[47\]](#)

But, He crushes all these pearls with Love.
There is something else in that amazing Love.

God's Shams of Tabriz, turns our heart,
Which resembles the sun, into a sword for work,
And a shield for essence.

41.

Verse 387

☞ Soul, I will be surprised
If sleep finds a way to come tonight.
The eye that finds a Sultan
Like you won't sleep.

O well-mannered lover,
Don't even sleep tonight,
Because that Beloved who always looks
For excuses considers this a sin.

I am an admirer of a lover
That makes the moon like a Kullah [\[48\]](#)
With his agility and sleeplessness at night.

He should be in the service of the Sultan,
Keep company with the Moon at night
And have an army of angels like the Moon.

That ruler has taught the hair
Of the Sultan to act like ropes for a bucket.
That is to say, he thought Joseph's kingdom
Was at the bottom of the well.

That desperate camel gave up getting water,
Now it is turning around the threshing wheel
Hoping for a handful of straw.

If he cannot make a pillow
For your satin-smooth face,
I wish he could obtain a black shawl
From the hair that resembles Qadr's night. [\[49\]](#)

Everyone who falls in love
Has affection toward you.
They wrote your name on the horseshoe
And put it in the fire.

Go after the sun, advance
With hope that you'll reach it.
That way your great moon
Might resemble the Moon.

Tonight became the Night of Power.

Be silent. Serve Him, so
The hearts belonging to God
Will receive admiration from God.

42.

Verse 397

My good man, he broke my glass,
His shoulder is clumsy.
But it doesn't matter, one broken glass.
It is only natural where
There are so many drunks.

I don't mind if he breaks my glass.
That Cupbearer has another glass
Under His arm.

The body made of clay
Is like a cup.
Soul is like clean, pure wine.
He will give me another glass.
This one is already cracked.

He is such a loyal cupbearer
That he wears a Kullah made of love and tenderness.
He is such a cupbearer that there is
A patch in his dress made by softness and pity.

He gives relief and joy to the heart
That is in grief and sorrow.
He gives good sight to the one
Whose hair has grown over his eyelids.

The mind that sits at
The window guards this house.
If you know anything, go and
Lie down at His door, become dirt or dust.

Bow could the one who has seen
The face of the Sultan, lose the game?
How could the one who
Became a sea of honey turn bitter?

The one who leaves His Fountain of Life

Finds hundreds of deaths
At the source of everyday life.

The Sun is beautiful
In every sign of the Zodiac,
But its clamor is at the sign of Aries.

Whatever I have seen besides
The appearances of God's love,
Half were deceptions, the other half lies.

I have given so many names for Him,
But He is so unique, peerless and incomparable,
That it is impossible to
Describe Him with examples.

43.

Verse 408

Bayram[50] has come, Bayram has come.
That blessed fortune came.
Grab the drum, start playing,
Because the moon showed His face.

O crazy fool, Bayram is here.
Listen to the tumult in the sky.
The trusted one who stayed at the lotus tree
Suddenly came from the throne of God.

Reciting gazels, playing, dancing, laughing,
Bayram came.
The Caesar of the moon-faced one
Left the house and came to us.

Hundreds of the sources of knowledge
And understanding became crazy, insane,
Fell in love because of that charm.
That beauty has appeared in a wonderful way.

That permanent strength
Made the prophet David drunk
By softening the rock and iron in his hand.

Bayram came, we were in bad shape without Him.

Come and reach Bayram,
Because that table, that tirit[51] came.

Poison turns into sugar because of Him.
Wherever there is skin, bone, and skeleton,
It becomes alive and beautiful.

Get up, come to the front,
Join the circle of rint.[52]
Walk to meet the guest,
Who came from such a long way.

His griefs are entirely cheer and joy,
His ties are freedoms.
You gave him a seed,
He is giving you hundreds of gardens.

I am a slave of that East,
Submerged in His blessing.
Whatever is left besides His blessing
Is dirty and bad luck to me.

Close your lips, be silent like a bud,
And iris, wait to speak,
Because patience is like a key
And that is the time for that.

44.

Verse 419

☞f the one who has a love and a desire in his heart,
Goes to the door of the heart
And the heart doesn't open the door,
There must be some reason.

Go and sit at the door of the heart,
Because that secret Beauty may
Come one early dawn.
Maybe one midnight he'll suddenly show up.

The Soul who abandons everything,
Looking only for God,
Is a peerless, wonderful Soul.

The eye that sees a different canopy
Than this has good sight.
His eye has a good reputation.

The person who is like that,
Becomes the peer of the Soul.
He will have a different
Kind of pleasure at the time of dying.

If a stone hurts his feet,
A pearl drops in his hand.
When his Soul comes to his lips
He kisses the lips of the sweet-lipped one.

Even if his crown which deserves a king
Is not visible, this fatherless,
Motherless being has great family and relations.

Be silent. Don't spread the secrets everywhere
It is possible that among the gathering of
The light-hearted, competent people
There will be one Abu-Lahab.[\[53\]](#)

45.

Verse 427

Whoever has my fire
Has worn my mantle.
He is wounded like Huseyn,
And has a glass like Hasan's.[\[54\]](#)

If his beloved moon falls in the water,
Don't worry. He parts his
Hair with his hands and reveals his face again.

Self becomes devout, but it won't change.
If you are looking for honesty and simplicity,
It only exists in the cypress of the meadow.

If a hundred moons join with the Moon,
He doesn't see.
That Beauty of Hutem[\[55\]](#) has a different beauty.

O Soul, the light in the sky

Is His reflection, a smiling rose,
A fresh jasmine in the garden.
All are from Him.

It doesn't matter if His candle
Is under the basin of strangers,
Even the candle under the basin
Shines on the ceiling.

You are with others, looking at us.
You should know that we have,
Besides this body, a pure soul.

If this heart gets out of hand,
Becomes smaller, or gets thin,
It is because of those twisted strands of hair.

God's Shams of Tabriz
Is the Sultan of all lions.
That lion has stayed in the forest
Of our Soul, made a home there.

46.

Verse 436

☞ catch your fragrance
From the tall symmetry of the cypress.
I almost see the color of your face in the Moon.

Every sugarcane comes to your temple
To wear the belt of service.
Every bit of sugar comes to be
A servant in your halva.

Every light which shines,
Comes from the glory of your face.
Wine gives good news by saying,
"Your next day is coming."

P. 73 of original Divan

The rose becomes master to the iris,
Adorning the meadow.
Because it reminds them

Of your beautiful smile.

When I run away from your love, I'm teasing.
Your love is being spread
To my head from six directions.

When I was raised from this despicable earth,
I undressed from existence.
Even in that land of Absence your voice
Comes to my ear.

Every sound is full of exaltation and instigation.
I understand this comes from your reed flute.

My night is day because of You.
My lips are dry because of You.
But I don't mind;
Your rivers are coming.

Nobody is sober under Your satin sky,
Because Your wine is coming back and forth.

I am afraid of Your oppression, Your torment,
But once they come,
I see they are also from Your sea.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
Words and thoughts are refreshing
The Soul like breezes,
That come from your valley.

47.

Verse 447

The moon that illuminates the night
Might cover His face. Let's say it did.
How could he hide His fragrance?

Even if He covers His face,
And hides His fragrance,
There are a hundred bits of evidence
Of His Spiritual manifestations.

That moon came behind the house,

Running like a thief.
But the crazy heart
Does a hundred different prayers.

Grief is like an enemy, but tell me,
"I am thinking of Him, I have affection for Him."
Then tell my heart,
"Where, where did that charmer set His trap?"

48.

Verse 451

Is there anything missing in the
Happiness of the one who has You?
O charmer, whose face is
More beautiful than the moon,
Is there any grief or sorrow
In the one who has seen You?

Your oppression, Your torment
Are very strong, at times
Unbearably heavy, but they are also
Painted with Your crystal color
And they are sweet.

O Beautiful One, who brings
Along a hundred moons like students,
The coyness of Houris, the gleaming
Of the holy ones are all from You.

He becomes the Sun alone,
Even if He doesn't have people walking
In front of and behind Him.
His beauty is enough for Him,
That Beauty has hundreds of drums and flags.

Many disorganized lovers slept safely
And in peace because of Your curly hair.

I told my beloved, "Don't break me
And hurt me with torment." He answered,
"If I don't break you, you'll stay
Inside of your shell like a pearl, hidden."

O crazy fool, if you don't
Crack that shell a pearl won't come out.
That pearl is the idol I worship,
Or it is in the same shape.

When the name of God's Shams of Tabriz
Appears on the paper, I make an oath to God,
He does such favors to paper and pen.

49.

Verse 459

Listen to the love that souls serve
Because of His cleanliness and charm;
Listen to what He is saying.
He has such an auspicious breath.

He has hundreds of armies
In the secret world of Absence.
Even though He fits into the smallest body.
He gives relief to your Soul,
Frees you from the world of existence.

If you get stuck in this mud,
Turn your face to the One
Who offers an eternal kingdom
And an eternal crown.

O Heart, you have seen the world
And been around for awhile,
Have you seen anybody
Who has an imperial edict from Love in his hand?

O one who rides over himself,
Wander around the world, then return,
Come to the Sun who has kindness in His heart.

That heart is such a heart
That He even shines mirrors.
He has hundreds of Gardens of Eden.

His love keeps saying that,
"The heart who is looking for me
Should step on every fire, like gold."

I want a Beauty with a silver body.
I want someone like me.
I am tired of the ugly rich
Who have gold and silver.

When the name of Selahaddin appears in the paper
It comes there for pity
It puts so much kindness and favors to the pen.

50.

Verse 468

That moon is so full,
So brilliant, that nobody could look at it.
Eyes won't see Him.
Soul keeps giving birth, without a man,
Just with the pleasure of His love.

Reason with the joy of His fragrance,
With the sparks of His face,
Becomes bewildered, laughs
And at the same time, bites his fingers.

I watch Him every dawn with amazement.
In any case, He doesn't show
His face unless the Soul becomes His admirer.

Whatever you see, you see
When you are not by yourself.
He doesn't even open the curtain
When you are with yourself.

Breath cannot breathe with Him,
Soul cannot be His confidant.
Thought knows that, but
Cannot be worthy of Him.

The body stayed under the curtain,
And the soul burned the curtain.
The heart has wondered about these opposite actions,
There's no way to reach and join Him.

Two strange armies in this house

Keep fighting, they can do nothing
But turn around, and never go anywhere.

If you want to save yourself
Run to the side of the Sultan.
Poison won't be poison anymore
Next to the antidote.

Stay under His tree
With His happiness,
Then the soul full of trouble
Will reach peace until resurrection.

The eye may be able to see God
Because of Sultan Selahaddin.
The heart turns his face
To an open field, and the soul gains a torch.

51.

Verse 478

You fell in love O heart.
Congratulations.
You are free from place and time,
Congratulations.

Give up the two worlds, be alone.
Eat and drink alone.
Destiny and angels will say
"Congratulations."

O brave one, you went ahead bravely;
You reached your wish today.
O devout one, who expects and waits
For tomorrow, congratulations
To you and your tomorrow.

Your blasphemy turned into faith;
Your bitterness became sweet halvah.[\[56\]](#)
Congratulations for your halvah.

There is fighting and tumult
At the poor people's convent of the heart.
O Heart who has no hatred, no blame,

Congratulations for your fight.

The eyes who see the heart
Shed so many tears that two seas were formed.
Even the seas congratulate those eyes.

O lonely love, that Beloved
Became your friend.
O you who wanted exaltation,
Congratulations for your exaltation.

O soul who is admired,
Constantly searching, working soul,
You grew wings,
Congratulations for your wings.

Be silent. You have made a fine purchase,
Obtained very rare garments.
Congratulations for your garment.

52.

Verse 487

☞ Heart, give your life
For your trouble, isn't it worth it?
Lose your head, your belongings,
Isn't it worth it?

You became dizzy from the love of such a club.
Roll around in His field like a ball.
Isn't it worth it?

You have seen His ruby lips
Steal a kiss.
Now you are His ruby farm.
Get up, isn't it enough?

He became headless, footless,
Turned into a wandering dervish.
Applaud how cheaply he attained this.
Isn't it worth the applause?

You started a new fire,
You took my mind like a pawn.

I turned into soil for you
And spread out on the ground.
O my Sultan, isn't it worth it?

I fell in love,
Became your slave, your servant.
Isn't that holiday
Worth this sacrifice?

Crazy, I demolish this house.
I mean, isn't that union worth this separation?

I gave my heart to the moon.
I am joyful for his whirling.
I start turning like the sky.
Isn't it worth it?

53.

Verse 495

The eye is necessary
To see wonderful, amazing things.
Soul is necessary to experience
Joy and pleasure.

The head is to become drunk
For someone beautiful.
The feet are to be tired on the road
Of the Beloved.

Love is necessary to fly to the sky.
Mind is to learn knowledge,
Manners, and modesty.

There are so many secrets,
Amazing things beyond reasoning.
The eye that got stuck in the land of reason
Is blind.

The lover who has many accusations
And a bad name is here.
When his time comes for union
With the Beloved, he will have
Hundreds of names and titles.

Going to the desert, sinking in the sand,
Fighting with lions, riding camels,
Being looted by Arabs,
All these are worth the pilgrimage.

The pilgrim kisses the black stone^[57]
With the hope of getting pleasure
From the ruby lips of the Beloved.

My friend, don't try to put
A seal on the money of words.
The one who has a wish, a desire,
For sure will find the gold mine.

54.

Verse 503

☪ merchants of the bazaar,
sugar has arrived from Egypt.
Joseph, who is sweet like sugar,
Suddenly came from a journey.

Soul came, wine came,
The Macun^[58] of salvation.
If you want something else,
That something else also came.

p, 74 of original Divan

The fruit of Jacob, fountain of Job
Have become visible through the windows.
The time for care has come.

Khidr^[59] reached the Fountain of Life
With the Grace of God.
Here, look, Venus has entered
The sign of the moon by singing gazels.

The Sultan who has ascended, came.
Night was saved from need.
Sky arrived with gold in his shirt
To spread over Him.

Moses, who was hidden, has come.
Hundreds of springs started overflowing.
Soul became a staff and came,
So the body came as a stone.

Jesus doesn't like people
Who make lots of noise, who fight
And create unnecessary work for others.
Jesus doesn't eat halva in their house,
Because this is the barn for the donkey.

That spell, that abundance
Was not hidden, but destiny has
Suffered a lot, looking for it
In the six directions of the earth.

The Sultan, who never walks without a crown
Like a hoopoe, was born with the belt
On his waist from his mother, like an ant.

He has reached maturity in love.
He doesn't care for the crown or belt anymore,
Because he has received the imperial edict
From the throne of God.

Expect the rest of the words
From the Sultan who has such generosity.
Ask for news from the source of the news.

55.

Verse 514

My friend, is sugar better
Than the One who made the sugar?
MY friend, is the moon beautiful,
Or the One who created the moon?

Never mind sugar, never mind the moon.
He has something else,
He does something different.

There are so many amazing things
In the sea besides the pearl.
But the Sultan, who created the sea and

Made the pearls, is a different Sultan.

He keeps turning this amazing wheel constantly
With different water than this water.
He prepares food for the soul.

Even a picture of the public bath house
Cannot be drawn without mind.
Think about the knowledge
Of the One who created the mind.

You cannot make oil from suet,
Not without knowledge.
Think of the One who gave the
Power of seeing to the eye
That looks like suet.

Souls are amazed and confused,
For the assembly is set for early dawn.
They cannot eat and drink.
They don't know what to do.

What a happy night that was.
The Beloved, for whom every Moon feels longing,
Put his hands around my waist
And covered me like a belt.

The firmament will laugh at the fool
Who makes himself a donkey
For two or three donkeys.

This donkey jumps to gold
Like the other donkey does to barley.
But doesn't know the Sultan
Who changes stones to jewels.

I become silent and quit talking;
So the Beloved who gives sight to the eye
Will talk.

56.

Verse 525 [\[60\]](#)

My sun, my moon came.

My ear, my eye came.
My silver body came.
My gold mine came.

The drunkenness of my head came.
The light of my eye came.
What else you ever wanted, that came.

The one who has staged a hold-up
On my way, came.
The one who broke my repentance came.
That jasmine-bodied Joseph
Suddenly came into my arms.

Old friend, today is
Better than yesterday.
I was drunk because of him, yesterday.
Today, I received news from him.

The friend I was looking for
With a candle last night,
Came my way like a bouquet of roses today.

He made a belt of his hands, embraced me, and
Held me in his arms.
I obtained an unseen belt from that Beauty
Who is the crown to every beautiful head.

Look at his garden and meadow,
Watch his wine and drunkenness.
Pay attention to his eating and assimilating,
Because my rose marmalade came.

Why should I be afraid of death,
When a Fountain of Life like him came?
Why should I be scared of reproaches
When I obtained a shield like him?

I am Solomon today, because you gave me the ring.
That crown which deserves the Sultan
Has come and landed on my head.

My suffering has gone beyond that.
I set out on a journey with love.
My God, what a happiness I get,
What a happiness.

It is time to drink wine,
I'll drink, so my mind will have lightning.
It is time to fly, because my wings have come.

It is time to shine like early dawn,
To brighten the world.
It is time for roaring,
Because my male lion has come.

Beloved, a few more verses remain,
But they took me out of myself
To somewhere else.
This world is looking awfully
Small to me from there.

57.

Verse 538

The status of the Bey[\[61\]](#)
Isn't worth the pain of dismissal.
Man smiles one day,
And trembles for hundreds of years.

The one who serves a donkey,
At the end, dies for the donkey.
He became a companion of thorns
For a faded rose.

Don't try to smile until he makes you smile.
Because all the smiles come from that smile.

O you who frown, look at
The One who gives you trouble.
If you turn your face to Him,
He will put sugar in the vinegar and
Make you sweet.

O you who have fallen to the ground tired,
Look at the One who made you fall.
You turn your face to Him,
He will lift you up, again.

Because the lion is afraid

The dog living in His quarters,
Will leave behind its fear.

58.

Verse 544

When that morning of happiness shines,
The Soul starts crowing like a rooster.

The sun rises and shines.
The body is the color of dust and soil.
The Beloved comes and embraces the soul.

That poor, desperate heart,
When he hears that, this helps cheer him,
He comes dancing.

At that moment soul,
Who went to eternity, reached Absence,
And appeared with his two-folded height.

Heart, who has become pregnant, like Mary,
Starts showing coyness and flirts with me.
Body, which resembles a two day-old Jesus,
Starts talking.

Heart becomes the light of the universe.
Soul shines and sparkles.
Heart starts dancing, soul claps his hands.

Wherever God's Shams of Tabriz steps,
That place becomes free from the boundaries of space.

59.

Verse 551

Sleep comes to take your
Mind away from you.
But, how do the insane sleep?
How does he know the night?

In the mind of the insane,
There is no day and night.
He knows whatever he has.

The days and nights of this world
Result from the turning of the sky.
But the sky cannot turn
The crazy ones of the other world.

Even if the eyes in his head sleep,
He turns completely into eyes, head, and feet.
He reads the eternal writing
With his soul's eye.

If you want craziness,
Turn into a bird, become a fish.
If you fall asleep and lose your way,
How can you catch Him?

Get busy at night, be skillful
In the love of the Beloved.
Get on the road.
Your work will be in order,
Because of that scattered, curly hair.

The one you call crazy
Is a different person.
He was pregnant to the Soul.
His eyes are fixed on the Beloved.
That pregnancy doesn't resemble
The other's pregnancy.

If you want to understand this well,
Ask God's Shams.
He is such a Sultan that
He sends new lights
To the Tabriz of the Universe.

60.

Verse 559

Whoever has my heart,
Has worn my mantle.
He is wounded like Huseyin,[\[62\]](#)

He has a glass of poison in his hands.

Self becomes devout, but still won't change.
If you are looking for straightness,
For plainness, ask it of the Cypress
Standing in the meadow.

You have a pure, clean Soul,
Your shape was born from that Soul.
Look for the pure Soul, devoid of shape.
See what kind of a body he has.

Look at the mirror of Soul,
It is pure from shape,
At the same time, full of shape.
Every moment it creates
A new idol, just like a shaman.

Sometimes he runs to the side of the heart;
Sometimes he worries about the mind.
With his ambition, he looks like
A man who has two wives.

How could a Sultan, who is not aware
Of the Soul become happy?
How could death, covered by
A hairy coffin, rise and show coyness?

That man is like a camel who moves his mouth
To give the impression there is food there.
But, chewing the cud, without food,
Only tires the jaw.

Be a man, be madly in love,
Dip in the pitcher full of blood.
Don't be a sometime man, a sometime woman,
That's not for humans, that's for Caylak.[\[63\]](#)

Don't change from your heart's desire
By getting scared like His Moses.
Don't repent of your trouble.
The Beloved says, "You'll never,
Never see me," but stay firm
Until He says, "You'll see me."

When you are immersed in His favors

And become drunk,
You will have no grief, no worry.
How would a drunk know what the sky is saying?

Your mouth is sweetened if
The spring water is good and your heart wants it.
But pearls are in Aden's sea, not in the spring.

61.

Verse 570

○ my Sultan, what is faith
In front of Your curse?
The Phoenix that passes through the sky
Is nothing but a fly in front of You.

The faith which resembles the Fountain of Life
And curses which resemble black dirt
Are all like brushwood for Your fire.

Faith is an attribute of the soul,
And this Soul is the soul, only with breath.
But, Heart is engulfed in ocean,
Is it time for breathing?

Night is the curse, faith is the candle.
When the sun rises,
The candle says to the curse,
"Let's go, nothing is left for us."

Faith is the horse of religion,
The ride is for the great Self.
But the Sultan whose customs are brand new
Doesn't need a horse.

Faith tells you, "Come here."
Curse says, "Go away."
But, when your body's candle becomes Soul,
There will be no front, no back, no here, no there.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
I stand firm on your way.
Your rank has been so high
That nothing but my hand could reach it.

62.

Verse 577

The one who drinks our wine
Should be served by our Cupbearer.
With all His sweetness,
If our Cupbearer frowns, it will be proper.

That moon-faced Beauty,
With all the charms,
If he shows coyness from time to time,
I swear to God, he will
Snatch the hat of the Sultan.

O my friend, give me a full glass.
I am not senile enough to sit and wait till death
To see what this destiny will give birth to.

Order the cupbearer, that he shouldn't
Breeze by like the wind.
Offer us wine for the sake
Of the one who keeps drinking, without passing out.

That Cupbearer will wipe out hundreds
Of thoughts and worries from
Your confidant, or stranger.
The confident man neither falls into
Grief or mourning, nor offers his hand to anyone.

When he throws his hair behind,
And adorns his face,
The poor moth will bum like a candle.

When there is no life left in the moth,
He borrows new life
From that fiery soul
With a big cup.

A glass from this eternal wine
Will give you such a state
That every shape which comes into your mind
Will appear in your heart.

O Love of God,
O God's Shams of Tabriz,
The more you offer this wine,
The more abundant it becomes.

63.

Verse 586

☞ will dance and glitter so much
From the shine of Your sun
That every particle would remember
Me when they start moving.

With the light of your face,
Every particle becomes pregnant.
Each one gives birth to hundreds of particles.

Look at the soul in the body's mortar.
He is so much in love that
He constantly crushes and thrashes
Himself to become a particle.

Either be a pearl or coral,
Crush yourself to particles,
Because nothing but particles deserve His temple.

Look and see the pearl of Soul
Through the shell of the body.
He is tired and sick from sluggishness
And biting his fingers.

When soul flies away, that
Jailed pearl will reach his origin like other particles.
He won't come back even if you call.

He would get stuck in blood,
Burn to the extent of how strong
His ties to this jail are.
But his fur stays clean
Even if he spends his life with blood.

Be won't stay anywhere
Until he arrives at the well of Babil.

The soul won't be happy
Until he becomes a magician.

O Tabriz, if Shamseddin rises
From your sign, he goes behind the clouds
Like the moon and at the same time
Adds more light to light of the moon.

64.

Verse 595

How are you? How do you do?
"How" and "What" won't be able to understand you.
Except for the Sultan, who is beyond
"How" and "What," nobody will understand you.

O my Beauty, the universe
Is illuminated by you, filled with light.
But the sky and earth won't be able
To appreciate you.

There is a wind which moves
This blue curtain,
But this is not the air
Blowing in and out.
It is a wind that only God knows.

Do you know who knits
That mantle of joy,
That mantle of grief?
How come this mantle thinks
He is different than the one who knits him?

Do you know what image
Shines in the heart of the mirror?
The only one who knows,
Is the One whose heart is clean and pure.

This universe, which resembles a flag,
Moves all the time.
Your heart sees only the flag,
Your Soul thinks air is moving it.

But, the one who knows

Bow air is a helpless creature,
Accepts that everything is nothing but God.

O God's Shams of Tabriz
God has so many tricks.
Without your dice, how could the Soul
Get in this difficult backgammon game?

65.

Verse 603

The lover breaks his chains when
He goes to the side of Lovers.
The one who is insane keeps turning,
And tears all his measures.

How can you find fault
In the lover's careless, fast walking?
Fire from His love,
Burns all faults and mistakes.

When a youth catches that fire
What shape will he be in?
Never mind, O youth, if an older person gets this fire
It tears the mantle of piety.

If there are hundreds of curtains
In one eye, his arrow-shaped eyebrow
Pierces them all at once.

Once he breaks the egg and gets out,
The bird of every lover destroys
The remains in a hurry.

This universe is like tar,
Everybody's feet get stuck in it.
But, once the fire of love comes,
It melts the tar.

God's Shams of Tabriz
Is a Sultan of Sultans,
And at the same time a bey.[\[64\]](#)
He is such a bey, that he will

Pull and tear every patient person's shirt.

66.

Verse 610

The one whose origin is the raven
Cannot become a falcon.
Bow can *you* smell onion
From the mouth of one who just ate garlic?

The lion won't fall down
From the attack of a catamite or whore.
Can you hear the sound of *Ezan* [\[65\]](#)
From the fart of a donkey?

O little one, your feet are squeezed
Small because of the
Tightness of your shoes.
Take off your shoes, relax, and expand.

Be hopeful, open the eye of Eternity.
That Sun will shine from the throne of God,
Everywhere, it will shine and sparkle.

O Harp, leave thought,
Come to the circle,
Empty yourself so that you'll
Be filled with melodies,
Give joy to the gathering.

67.

Verse 615

What a happiness for the eye.
Today I saw his face.
A new desire came and settled
In the head. Congratulations.

Roses come to the rose garden,
Laughing at the whole world.
O friend, who laughs with the rose

And hundreds like the rose,
Congratulations for your joy.

Beauties have stumbled after seeing
Your face, and fallen.
The heart also stumbled at the door
Of this house.
Congratulations for his stumble.

I saw your face like Nevruz [\[66\]](#)
Shed tears like rain.
Congratulations to earth for that
Kind of rain in Nevruz.

Without speech or writing,
Your ear hears the voice of congratulations
From the inside.

68.

Verse 620

Even giants and angels protect
With sword and shield.
When God's order comes,
This measure will be turned upside down. . . gone.

Can you get what you expect?
The thing which comes into
Your possession sometimes becomes
A staff, sometimes a double-headed snake.

When you were sorry yesterday, saying,
"Why didn't I try to find a solution
For this problem?" the measures misled you.

Even if you took those measures,
What has happened to that project?
Hundreds of traps appear behind those measures.

"I took all those measures,
Still I failed," you said.
That lame measure didn't help, as you see.

Accept losses as food.

Be a ruby to Him; be Him.
That is the shelter, that's where to run.

69.

Verse 626

Hear the right news from the Prophet's words.
He said this for the believer,
"The one who believes is like a Kopuz[\[67\]](#)."

That Sultan of Sultans came.
How nice, how beautiful.
Earth is filled with the perfume of musk and ambergris.

Since the believer is like a Kopuz for wailing,
How could the Kopuz cry without somebody
Striking him with the plectrum.

The greatest of great joys came.
Honor of the honorable joy arrived.
Everlasting favor, the Moon of moons came.

It is the custom of the Kopuz,
That it can't stand not being struck
With the plectrum.
It puts its face to the players feet and begs.

Our kingdom is our livelihood,
Our coffee comes from the throne,
Almonds and sweetmeats
Are scattered among our assembly.

Before you read the Ayat of,
"The one who hates you,
Their generation will be extinct."[\[68\]](#)
Here are fifty gazels for you right away, five extra. . . .

God is the cupbearer; prosperity
Is permanent with Him.
Happiness is to praise Him.
O you who are afraid, don't be scared.

Soul became drunk from our
Big cup of coffee.

Earth is adorned by green and red flowers.

Be silent. Be confident that you
Will keep drinking wine at the divine assembly
Without lips, mouths and cups.

70.

Verse 636

Turkistan's [\[69\]](#) Yagmabey[\[70\]](#) has attacked
The land of blacks with his army.
Come to your senses, escape to
The castle of ecstasy.

How long will this black
Night give us a headache?
The Sultan of Sultan's morning arrived,
Plunged his dagger into his head.

They sacrificed the black night's oxen
To the early dawn.
For his sake the Muezzin[\[71\]](#) calls, "Allahu Akbar."[\[72\]](#)

The sky has brought out such a candle
Under the basin that
All the stars left with shame.
There is not even one star remaining in the sky.

The Sun is sick at the beginning,
But later it gets better.
It becomes more beautiful every moment.

The eye that filled with trouble,
Sits in His shade, but don't
Look to Him in that condition.

The bright-hearted preacher who puts
The particles to dancing,
Spreads so much divine light from this pulpit.

Applaud this light.
Be is such a light that,
In spite of the blindness of the blind
He is visible to them,

And never covers His face.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
If I ever see anything but God
On your clean mirror,
I will become worse than a disbeliever.

71.

Verse 645

O one who has been friend
And company for my soul,
Soul is in your hand.
Offer me the heavy jar,
I'm in a hurry.

The Cupbearer makes every lean one
Fat with the wine that comes without a glass.
O friend, you are quick, but become faster.

Souls are gathering at your door,
And your roof to drink morning wine.
Because of the taste of your glass
I am the first one who came here.

The wine brought by your love
Doesn't cause man to vomit.
Your love goes from heart to eye
Faster than clear light.

72.

Verse 649

How long are you going to hurt
Me with your denials?
I am not calling you
An old, dead, decayed man.

You are black like a cloud,
Except you don't have rain.
Don't blacken my day, O cloud,

Give at least one drop of rain.

All these orders came from destiny,
O ignorant fatalist.
You are unaware of the taste,
The salt of this business.

Who will tell the blind,
"Pass the thread through the
Eye of the needle?"
Nobody asks the man whose
Feet are tied to go hunting.

Who will tell a two year-old child
About wine and beauty?
Who will talk about dreamy eyes with animals?

You can't do anything,
Go and sit with the women.
Leave the circle of the One.
Who plays with their soul, stay aside.

If you plunge into the sea with the power
Of God's Shams of Tabriz, who every creature worships,
And swallow the waves, at the end
You will see God very clearly with your eyes.

73.

Verse 656

☪ Charmer, who hides his head
After seeing me at the door,
Later, showing that narcissus
Face to me, secretly,

One moment you appear, as if to say,
"I am here."
From time to time you laugh sweetly at my confusion.
You shut the door in my face
As if to say, "Go away."
Then climb the roof and look back.

You shake your head, as if saying,
"Go away, there's a problem."

May I prostrate myself, saying,
"Don't do that to me."

I become totally eyes from head to feet.
Then you look at me stealthily only;
Many instigations and confusions
Come from your behavior.

You bite your hands, saying,
"See all these marks, because of you?"
Me? I fall on the ground,
Kiss the ground and ask your forgiveness.

When will the time come, that,
Instead of kissing the ground
I will kiss your red lips?
I will kiss and you can scratch
My pale cheeks like saffron.

O Charmer, whose infidel tresses
Are the Sultan of dark creatures,
Help, help, even faith became an unbeliever
By falling in love with your head.

When you part the hair on your face,
Even musk would fall at your feet.
When you throw curly hair behind,
The fuzz on your cheeks gives ambergris.

What a beautiful shape that is.
His sneeze brings life to the Soul.
O my Beauty, hundreds of Mani[\[73\]](#) and Azer[\[74\]](#)
Would die for your presence.

Suddenly, lightning came, this house burned.
Doors, roof are all gone.

I said, in the middle of Absence,
"O Sultan of Sultans, with this fire
All the shapes and forms are melted, gone."

"These words also come from that lightning,"
He said, "In that flash the red rose became invisible."

"O Moon," I said, "even the Sun prostrates
Toward the sparks of your face

Like a common slave."

"Please," I said, "look at me once."
"Aren't you afraid of the fire of my face?
You are not a semender," [\[75\]](#) He said.

"I close my eyes, cover myself
With a cloud of zeal,
I wear that helmet, dive in deep," I said.

"This love," he said, "will give you
Such power that you'll deserve
To look and be looked at."

"How do I know the proof
Of that promise?" I asked.
"Look at the flash of the soul
In the fire of the heart, like melted gold.

After watching the spectrum of fineness
Of the soul, while it is shining,
Get your share," he said.

I told him, "While seeing my Soul
I am scared I will lose this pearl,
It will go away from me."

O Beauty of jasmine body,
I put that pearl
In a space in my eye, that pearl
Is made by the beauty of your image.
"Don't be afraid," he said, "I am
The one who keeps telling you, you'll
Always get your share from my Beauty.
Also see the light of my Beauty."

This form of divinity is God's Shams of Tabriz.
The universe is full of his Glory.
Tabriz is brightly illuminated because of him.

He is the summary of the order, "Be." [\[76\]](#)
You prostrate in front of Him
And hear the words "God is Great,"
From yourself, from your essence.

Verse 680

☺ my Beloved, You are honey,
Your words are a different kind of honey.
O Love, You have a different work and trace
In every heart and-Soul

In every Soul; there is a garden, a meadow
From Your face, a green smile.
There is a different bunch of musk
In every heart from Your curly hair.

The moon sometimes becomes thin, sometimes fat,
Changes into a full moon because of Your pain.
This suffering gives the moon
Hundreds of different griefs.

Your spring offers kindness and favors,
But Heart keeps trembling as if it lives in the meadow,
Afraid fall will come and bring different orders.

Salve and medicine not made
By the dirt of your door,
Cause different diseases to the eye of the heart,
Grows different hair at the eye of the heart.

Even the devil hasn't ceased expecting Your favor.
There is new hope. It shines every
Moment (on him from You, and a new desire appears.

Even the Pharaoh gave up his throne.
"I believe," said my heart,
Then saw a new patch
On the mantel of soul because of faith.

If your Sun of union
Reaches the sign of Aries,
It will find another sign of Aries
At the sky of my soul.

Look at the particles on the earth,
How they move and dance.
Once this group stops, new ones come.

Light and exaltation for the Soul
Are from Him on the earth.
Time and power to grow the body,
Like a seed under the ground
Are also from Him.

How long will you speak gazels
With alphabet and forms.
Speak another gazel by soul,
Without words and forms.

75.

Verse 691

We are not the sea but
At last a grain of pearl.
We are not in front,
But we have glory and beauty.

If you offer wine, it is fine.
If not, that's alright.
The wine he gave us yesterday
Made us so drunk we have no idea
Of giving or not giving.

O Love, how beautiful, how clean
And pure you are, how great and nice.
What would happen if the gold
In our purse were lost?
At least we are in a gold mine.

O you who blame us, talks against us,
If you are vain and useless, don't touch us.
We are very drunk.

A thief who has no money,
No inheritance from his father,
If he doesn't steal, he says,
"Alright, what are we going to eat?"

We don't have much shame or modesty.
We are full of fun and joy.
We don't have a job or income.
Well, what else can we steal

Besides the Muslim's possessions.

If we took the basket away,
We would be filled with dates.
If we drink water from the Nile,
Never mind, we are sugarcane.

If the police catch us
And put us in jail,
We will drink water from
The well of the dewlap.

His well, His jail is nice.
His cupbearer is beautiful, so are His drunks.
Even the penniless people are saying
They have silver bodies.

Soul, tell the body,
"O body, be silent, close your mouth,
Your lips. Open your eyes and have vision."

76.

Verse 701

Half of you is like poison,
The rest is sweet, very sweet.
For God's sake, don't look at us
Like that, don't look at us like this.

Even then, the poison you serve us
Is the source of sugar.
You are such glory, such a light.

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He has a brilliance that I cannot describe.
Even if he fell from his feet and said,
"O poor ones, come and see us better."

I am you, look at me, be like that.
O Beautiful One who is nothing but glory
From head to feet.
Don't talk about feet, don't mention the head.

When you appear in the eyes of the people
You are all appearance.
But You are more immersed in the blood
Of my heart than I am.

If you have pearls, come and see
The sea of my eyes.
If you have a touchstone,
Look at my golden face.

Don't even consider as a dog
Someone who has not reduced himself
To smallness and has become crafty
In front of God's shams of Tabriz.

77.

Verse 708

Our Soul and mine have been tied
To each other so much, that good or bad
We should take the same color;
We will be the same; that's my desire.

O my charmer, O essence
And origin of my color, my condition,
O sugar in my load,
O my friend, better than a load of sugar,

O Beloved, who strikes hard,
But whose jokes heal my heart,
I am totally annihilated,
Completely out of myself, I become You.

You were our neighbor while
You were showing your face.
Then you joined the house with us, a bright moon.

Attack this house once more, like a sultan.
All will be destroyed but You.
The secret of "God is Great" becomes apparent.

If He makes me lost, what should I look for?
Everybody knows gold doesn't
Need any magic elixir to become gold.

Even copper says,
"I became gold from the heat
And brightness of that oven,
Because its heart started shining
From that sacred fire."

When copper comes back to himself,
His pleasure becomes sorrow,
His joy turns into grief.
Then, he goes back to the temple
Of that famous elixir of magic.

78.

Verse 716

You are in good moment. You are in good time.
Sweet as sugar.
Jamshid^[77] is your slave.
The sun is spread on your footsteps.

Come this moment, amble, walk.
I swear to God that neither coyness, grace,
Nor fruit, nothing but You can fit in this place.
This is not for the sky, the moon, nor moon-faced beauty.

There is a place for no one here,
Except you, us and the Cupbearer
Who has generous hands like the sea.
Don't boil down with grief like a kettle.
Come and keep drinking, like sand.

I gave up six directions and five senses
Once I passed from that side.
I broke them altogether.
My God, who could fight that six, that five.

O beautiful one, whose time is right,
Whose breath is happy,
I was caught in your trap when I was unprepared.
When it was unexpected I fell for you
O beautiful wine, beautiful fire.

No, no, be silent, be mute.

Because this is not the kind
Of reading that Ahfesh[\[78\]](#) would understand.

79.

Verse 722

ⲓull him here, this frowning
Churlish beloved. Bring him to this side.
Have him taste this rose-colored wine.

He hasn't drunk from this wine,
That's why he is acting so cold.
Even so, offer him a glass,
Make him ripe and mature.

Why does he bring a vineyard?
Squeeze the unripe grape. Do you know why?
You should all know that.
That's why he pours all these poisons.

That grape wine doesn't do anything
But increase blindness.
For God's sake, don't get close
To that kind of wine. Don't bring it to the front.

It is possible that the blind one
Is completely out of himself,
That it won't affect him.
That's the time to pour a handful
Of the water of Khidr down his throat.

80.

Verse 727

O nightingale, O bird of dawn,
It's time to come and drink morning wine.
Enter the circle of drunks with Venus
By singing songs.

Wherever there is a confidant,
Wake him up.

Leave the others alone.
They will sleep until the day of resurrection.

Speak slowly to the ear of the heart
Symbolic words about Him,
So even blasphemy will turn into faith,
Spread hundreds of pearls of belief.

Lightning strikes the sky
From the love of the Sultan,
Bums the moon, shakes its foundation.

In the place where His grace offers miracles,
What would striving and struggling do?
What knowledge would understanding talk about?

Anywhere sight, the abundance of sight
Is in control, everything moves smoothly,
Turns to gold.
The ball is hit by a club there,
Without hands and arms.

God's Shams of Tabriz pulls every
Lover's heart toward the temple of the Sultan.

81.

Verse 734

Spread that hair which has
The value of Soul, and offers Soul.
There is much musk hidden there.
Help, have mercy, spread that hair.

There are hundreds of mornings
In the night of his divided hair.
Spread that hair hundreds
Of times every moment.

Disperse that state of earth,
That happy heaven.
Rose gardens are being
Grown in the soul because of Him.

The wine ferments, overflows,

But He hides this from the people.
Spread that hair so that
Our face shines, revives from drunkenness.

Mary's heart and eyes are
Brightened from that date.
He is a sapling from that date,
Spread his hair.

My poor heart has been lost
In the curls of his hair.
It may come out someday,
Spread, scatter that hair.

God's Shams of Tabriz
Is a Jesus in the world of love.
Whoever wore zunnar,[\[79\]](#)
Became ruined by him.

82.

Verse 741

☞ Joseph of the moon-face,
O charmer whose honor and beauty are pleasant!
O Husrev, O Shirin, O Beloved whose eyes
And full disposition, are beautiful!

O friend whose face resembles the moon!
Your face is like water,
But there is a fire in the water.
Your fire is an unseen fire.
Your water is a clear, pure water.

O shape and form of God's Grace,
Really, your shape and form is so beautiful.
O shape and form of divine Beauty,
Your brilliance is the greatest beauty.

O drunkenness of heads,
Become exuberant with love.
O beloved, the morning
Of His union is beautiful.
Help us to reach union with You.

Morning comes from Your face,
Nights are the shadow of Your hair.
O One whose fate and fortune
Is so beautiful, rise like the moon tonight.

You are mixed with the soul.
Either kindly let me reach your union
Or cruelly torture me with unusual grief,
O charmer whose grief and cruelty
Are also so beautiful.

The heart told me one day
"A month became a year, and came back again:"
Soul said to the ear of heart,
"Your month is beautiful.
Your year is beautiful"

O Tabriz, tell the eyes of Shamseddin,
O instigator to the magician,
O one who tries them,
The beautiful one whose permissible
Magic is so beautiful.

83.

Verse 749

What would rejuvenate my soul?
To reach and be with You, O Beloved.
What makes a patient well?
Change his whim, his temperament

You take him in your arms, embrace him,
But he won't be satisfied or contented.
Do you know what makes him content?
To reach You, to be with You.

Can ten days thirst be satisfied
With a jar of water?
Only if he is immersed in Your water for repletion.

He tried to reach you,
But was unable to ask to be happy again with
The pleasure of last year's togetherness
Because of shyness.

Man plans for something,
But fate smiles at that.
O man who falls in the sleep
Of ignorance, in order to attain
That goal, try to reach Him, be with Him.

Because with union, an earthen brick
Becomes a big house.
Pieces of garment become a dress.

Even one thorn becomes hundreds
Of rose gardens
In union with the meadow of love
Of God's Shams of Tabriz.

84.

Verse 756

His face is beautiful.
His hair is beautiful,
Coming down his forehead,
Twisted and curly.
A hundred mercies to your soul, your faith.

Every moment is sweeter
Than the previous moment.
Coyness and grace appear in different charms.

When the wind blows the curls
Of his hair, hundreds in China and Indochina
Will disappear in their waves.

His beauty struck the moon
On the face, on the head.
His poor ones make fun of Kharun. [\[80\]](#)

O my eye, my light,
Lose yourself in that indescribable moon
Which keeps smiling.
Hold your breath, watching Him constantly.

His fountain of life turns hundreds
Of skies like a wheel.

Hundreds of mountains enter His service
In front of His serious, dignified look.

Are you stupid, O crafty one?
Why have you remained here?
Go hunting, see the falcon acting like a king.

If soul doesn't have a horse
It goes to His temple by limping.
That rider puts the soul on the back of His saddle.

If he doesn't have feet,
He puts a head-band on his head,
Lies down on the bed, puts
His head on the pillow.
That Sultan comes to his side like a doctor.

Love is all One but appears in
Hundreds of different shapes.
I have been crazy for His games and jests.

That unseen beauty, that charmer came
With the form of love to the soul
To help the soul beautify
And find peace with His presence.

He set an unseen calendar'
With the destiny of months and years.
Look for that calendar in the Wa Tin.[\[81\]](#)

O my life, if the Sun kills someone
With its sword, He sets his coffin
His dowry, by its light.

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Following His way,
Ferhad went to the mountain
To change marble to ruby with his mace.

O Player, you make a tune of this.
I'll be silent. You hear the clamor
Of Him from the melodies.

Be silent. The walnut and almond
Halva has been brought in front of us.

One will pray, the other will say, "Amen;"

85.

Verse 772

Go. Go away. You are not a lover,
O one of little hair, little self.
O one who is reluctant and angry,
O poor man, whose feet are decorated with bangles.

Since you are in that shape,
How could your poor hair, your side lock
Wriggle with the fear of death?
How could your poor little
Arms and wings fly to the sky?

O delicate-hearted, spoiled darling,
Try to gain heart,
Because when you are separated from
Your dear gold, your dear belongings,
Heart is the only thing which
Will remain with you.

Why are you torn to pieces
And full of foreboding?
O one whose heart is squeezed like
The poor Mim's eye,
O you whose neck is bent like Dal.[\[82\]](#)

You are Rustem-i Destan.[\[83\]](#)
Why are you afraid of Zal?[\[84\]](#)
God will save you from the fear
Of that kind of poor Zal.

I saw you in my dream last night.
You were a little bit drunk,
Floating up in the sky in a playful mood.
This dream, I believe, will come true.

You were floating in the sky,
You were saying, at the same time,
"O Venus, look at me, watch me.
I am drunk, free from your good and bad luck."

Poverty, at the same time sorrow, grief
And not much wine for the drunk.
Go and serve one short year
With the one who has a moon-face.
Free yourself from these troubles

Pass through seven skies.
Don't mind the spell of Saturn,
Never mind all those astrological signs and words.

I have a mantle of solar rays,
Ruby, like pearls from mohair.
Why do I need a mantle, a shawl?
Do I cover myself with that?

I told an Arab friend of mine,
"Look at my wet eyes." "
He answered me and said
With a half-smile, "Don't fool me."

I was talking and at the same time
Planning a hundred deceits in my heart.
He asked me, "How long will you be hiding?"

Be silent, look at the sultan,
Because you are a white falcon,
Not a nightingale who is bereft of words.

86.

Verse 784

Look at this phony man, this liar.
He poses on the saddle of his horse, boasting,
His gold-decorated turban on his head.

He denies death and asks,
"Where is it? Where is it?"
Death comes from six directions, saying,
"Here I am. Here I am."

"O Donkey," Death tells him,
"Where is that glamour, pretension, that swagger?
Where is your big nose, your pride, your hates?"

Where are those beauties?
Where is the joy, the fun?
To whom did you give the carpets and rugs?
Your pillow is a brick.
Your mattress is the ground now.

Quit eating and drinking.
Quit resting and sleeping. Look for real faith
So you may go to the kingdom
Where there are no rules and restrictions.

Don't leave the soul without zeal.
Don't turn this bread to manure,
O poor man who lost pearls in the manure."

We are all locked in the place
Which is filled with manure,
Looking for pearls.
O one who is so proud and pompous,
Bend your back, your neck,
Search for pearls.

Wherever you see a man of God,
Be of service to him, behave.
If you are in grief and suffering,
Don't make faces.

These words are to blame myself.
I am that man.
How long am I going to
Talk about this one or that one?

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
You are the fountain of life.
That water is found only
In your attractive eyes.

87.

Verse 795

Greetings to you, O soul.
Every dawn, hundreds of greetings
While you are talking or in silence.

From the soul's point of view
You are completely clean.
For the flesh, you are nothing
But pretension and deceit.
You are a rose which heals the broken ones.
Greetings to you from the thorns.

I am a Turk, drunk,
Girth on my arms, like a Turk.
I went to the village
And said to the chief,
"Greetings to you."

He offered me a glass of wine and told me,
"Hold this valuable gift,
Keep it safe, be careful." I said,
"Greetings to you."

I told him, "I am crazy, insane,
Always in the fire, like Abraham."
I thank my God, my Owner and say,
"Greetings to You."

When I am outside, the universe
Is filled with my greetings.
When I entered the cave with
The beloved, I said, "Greetings to you."

There is His art, His work
In every form and every shape.
And good night, O sneaky one
"Greetings to you."

David says, from the throne,
"I will be sacrificed for you."
Mansur greets you from the gallows.

The one who is longing for your praise
Greets you without expecting anything.
The one who is in need, sends
Greetings from helplessness.

The king salutes you with flag and drums.
Sick ones move their tongue to greet you.

I pawned my clothes when I drank

The wine of soul. I have been undressed from my being
So that the drunk will see and greet me.

This year has been so nice and lucky
Because of your moon face.
Don't turn back and greet last year.

Every string wished health to the next
On the harp of fate because of the
Pleasure of your plectrum.

The Birds of Abraham[\[85\]](#) were scattered,
Their necks were cut coming forth
From that world bringing good health
And greetings to you.

I let a torrent of words flow,
Read Sura Qaria,[\[86\]](#) left my work, my business.
O work and business, greetings to you.

88.

Verse 810

☞ thank God, this heart
Is better today than yesterday.
Today my heart has a different
Color from this love.

He was drinking wine
Under the rose sapling yesterday.
That's why this heart
Is upside-down today.

The reed of love has been
Wailing that tune a long time.
That heart turned into sugar from
The pleasure of that reed of love.

O my beauty, O one who is dressed so neatly,
I will become a belt for you.
This heart has embraced you like a belt.

O sea of sweetness and pleasure,
This body has turned into shell.

The heart is a pearl from the nourishment
I received from your water.

God's Shams of Tabriz shines
Brightly like the sun, with the light of his sun,
This heart turned into early dawn.

Every house of the faithful has
Been demolished by your love.
Because of this confusion, that heart has
Run to the roof, taken shelter under the door.

89.

Verse 817

☞ I look sleepy but I am fully awake,
Aware of everything.
I am out of myself,
But in Your business, I am all there.

I join the ones who are
Crushing Your grapes, because of You.
I entered the trough of love,
Kept crushing Your grapes.

You see only my feet,
You don't see the grapes.
Take a glass of juice, drink,
Understand I am crushing the grapes.

If you keep kicking the floor,
Come to the trough of soul,
Swallow waves in the depth of the juice.

This wine doesn't make you sick,
Doesn't make your head dizzy.
Come and taste my wine.

Your wine makes you drunk,
Gives you a hangover.
I know what you have,
But I don't want to reproach you.

O my kept bird, don't look

At the trap you are in.
See the one who set the trap.
That way you will learn
To search for the truth.

Even a trap as deep as
The bottom of a well,
God can change into heaven.
If it is full of thorns and garbage,
God can make that place a rose garden for me.

When Joseph fell into the well,
News came to him, "I will take care of you,
O My tired one, O My sick one.

I am preparing your medicine,
I am cleaning your tent.
I am making opposites from the opposite.
My power reaches everywhere.
I am mighty, overpowering."

"I order stone to come to life.
I make nothing into something.
I ask the garden and meadow to turn into winter.
Do you acknowledge Me now?"

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
You are the light of day.
I resemble the night
Which comes after the day.

90.

Verse 829

☞ don't take my hand from You
For one moment, because
You are my job, my business.

I taste Your sugar, drink Your sherbet,
I have been trying to untie Your feet.
I am Your prey, my heart is sick.
You are the lion eating my heart.

My soul and Yours look like

They've become one. I made an oath to that Soul,
I am tired of anybody else.

I am like a bouquet of flowers,
A bundle of grass from the garden of Your beauty,
A kulah[87] made by Your grace and kindness.

This universe is made up of thorns
Spread over the walls around You.
I keep chewing, tom with hope
To smell the rose of Union.

If the thorn is like that,
How is Your rose garden,
O Beauty Whose mystery wipes out all my secrets?

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O my life, even in the sky,
The moon becomes a partner to the sun.
I understand that You won't
Leave me alone at the gathering of strangers.

I went to see a dervish,
He told me, "God is your help."
It looks like, with his prayer
A sultan like you has become my helper.

I have seen the whole world,
Like the pictures on the wall
Of the public bath.
O Beautiful One who snatched
My turban and ran,
I will still look for You, attach to You.

Every race goes to His group
By dragging their chain.
What race do I belong to, that
I got stuck here in this trap.

Beloved, you have been turning
Around my heart like a thief.
O my deceitful beauty, I know
What you want, for what you are searching.

You hide a secret candle under

Your dress, O beloved,
You want to burn my barn, my harvest,
That's what you want.

O my rose, my rose garden,
O my health, my sickness, a my Joseph's face,
O the demand of my trade,

You are turning around my heart.
I keep turning around your door.
I am like a pelker,[\[88\]](#) I turn dizzy.

I deserve grief and sorrow
If I start telling the story
Of grief and sorrow in front
Of Your beautiful face.

These people would dance
With the tambourine of Hikmet.[\[89\]](#)
But until Your tune is played,
Nobody will start dancing.

The sound of the tambourine is hidden.
The dance of the people is evident.
The spot I scratch is obvious,
But the One who scratches is hidden.

I would be silent with my jealousy,
Because I became a cloud spreading sugar.
I don't rain anything but sugar.

I am in water, in soil, in fire.
I blow with the wind.
These four elements are around me,
I am not out of them.

Sometimes I am a Turk, sometimes an Indian.
Sometimes I am from the land of Rum,
Other times, I am a Negro.
O my life, both my denial, and my acknowledgment
Come from You.

Now, I don't give a headache with my body.
In appearance I am here,
But the Tabriz of my heart and soul
Are with God's Shams.

Verse 850

He cracked everybody's head,
 Then he frowned, complaining of a headache.
 He has snatched the mantle
 Of destiny, then complained, "I am naked,
 I don't have anything to wear."

Alas, for that stony heart,
 Alas, for his different coyness and flirtation.
 But he is not the one who is like stone.
 It is me; I instigate the world
 And provoke everybody.

I am at the bottom of a sea of blood,
 I became drunk drinking that blood.
 But I am so nice, so cheerful
 That it looks like I am
 The juice of the grape, not blood.

O Love, You are so big, so great,
 That the sky cannot contain You.
 How come You fit into this invisible heart?

You jumped into the house of the heart,
 Closed and locked the door
 So nobody could come in.
 I am the glass that covers the candle,
 Or I've become the light, the brilliance.

This body is like a pregnant black woman.
 This heart is a beauty of Rum inside her womb.
 That's why half of me is musk
 And the other half is camphor.

You took my heart.
 I am looking for it in others
 Without perceptibly looking.
 But I am not one who has no sight.

O my dear, if some day, when I die,
 My pale face is buried,

A yellow rose will grow next to my tomb.

Didn't Solomon hear the complaint of an ant?
You are a Solomon, in a sense and
I am like an ant.

Didn't I ask you, "Why are you crying
And moaning? You have hundreds of honeycombs."
I wear the same mantle as the honeybee.
I make honey at the same time I cry and moan.

I wail from this suffering,
But I wouldn't change His incurable
Wound for a hundred glories.

I cry out like a harp,
Because I am the nightingale of the rose garden.
I curl, wriggle like a snake
Because I am next to the treasure.

I am reminded by you that, "You say
I am great, I am full of self."
I say, "No, I am not great, have no self.
My 'self' comes from You,
My greatness is a reflection of Your greatness."

I am raw, cooked, and burned,
Laughing and crying.
Sometimes I wonder if I amaze people.
I am in union, and at the same time, separated.

92.

Verse 864

☞ It doesn't matter whether
Its hard for me to learn
Or if I have a crooked mouth.
I am your student.
I want to learn to smile from your smiling lips.

O Source of understanding and feeling,
Don't you want a student?
What should I do in order
To be accepted and stay with you?

Make a spark through the opening of the door
So I can see your face.
I will light hundreds of candles
From this fire and enlighten everything.

One minute you say, "I am a tithe collector,"
And take all my belongings.
The next minute, you go in front of me, saying,
"I am your guide."

Sometimes you push me to sin,
Other times you lead me to regret.
You twist my beginning, my end,
Because I am like hamza, in words of hamza. [\[90\]](#)

I look like a fish in the pan,
Frying first on one side then the other,
At the bazaar.

You are the one who turns me
From side to side in the pan.
I am brighter than the day
If I am with you at night.

In work or in business, in thought or in a dream,
I am too tired to change from one situation
To the other. One minute I am turquoise blue,
The next I become happy.

93.

Verse 872

☞ have such a shape,
Who do I look like, Hodja?
One moment, I look like a fairy.
In the next moment, I am calling the fairies.

With the fire of longing, I am altogether.
Sometimes I am a candle, illuminating
The gatherers. I am light. I am smoke.
I am organized and scattered at the same time.

I won't twist or pull anything

Except the ear of the heart's rebab.[\[91\]](#)
I won't strike anything with the plectrum
Except the harp of happiness.

I am like sugar or milk.
I beat myself, then hold on.
When my craziness comes,
I keep shaking my chains.

Hodja, what kind of bird am I?
I am neither a partridge nor a falcon,
I am not beautiful, nor ugly,
Neither this nor that.

I am neither a merchant in the bazaar,
Nor a nightingale of the rose garden.
Hodja, give me a name, so I can
Call myself by that name.

I am neither a slave nor free.
I am neither candle nor iron.
I have neither given my heart to anyone
Nor have I become anyone's beloved.

Neither my good deeds nor wickedness are from me.
They are from Him,
Wherever He pulls me, I go.

94.

Verse 880

☞ became Solomon in love,
A friend of the birds.
I have the love of a fairy.
Sometimes I am the one who calls the fairy.

Whoever has a fairy-like disposition,
I grab, put him inside of a bottle.
I cast a spell; I scare him with my sword.

I am in terror of that business.
I am all together; at the same time
I am out of myself.
Sometimes I talk and other times keep silent.

I am a blackboard for the one who is silent
And the one who talks with silence.

Alas, Mary changed to different
Colors and different conditions.
Alas, that I cannot wail anymore
For that situation.

How did I become colorless
Because of that color?
I turned into a hanging bunch of grapes
Because of that curly hair falling on his forehead.
My God, I have scattered, vanished
Like a moth because of that candle.

I said, "O Moon, you are soul
Today, you have another 'beauty. "
"Go," he said, "Don't look at me
With the eyes of humans."

O Hodja, if you are a man,
Why do you fall for all this illusion and worry?
My soul is filled with the smoke
Of your fire of greed.

Either become a crazy, insane Lover,
Or go away from us.
Don't come to this curtain with your Being.
I will cover your face with it.

I am blood and also milk.
I am a child and old as well.
Slave, at the same time, master.
I am this and that.

I am Shams who distills sugar,
Also the land of Tabriz.
I am the cupbearer, as well as the drunk.
I am famous to all
And, at the same time, hidden from all eyes.
Nobody sees me.

Come, come to our gathering.
Then we will continue our drink.
Don't treat me so bitterly,
So that I'll become a load of sugar.

O charmer, I plunged into your
Shapeless, colorless love.
Pull me out of this jar,
So I can cover myself with another color.

My heart is smaller than the eyes
Of the Mim, because I am expectant,
I am in fear. I look like half
A divided circle, like the moon.

O you who became sultan for
Hundreds of foot soldiers because of
The king of soul, ride your horse.
I will carry the cover of your saddle.

I was concerned. I was good and bad
Because of the wind of obstinacy.
I was with myself.
But, I swear to God, from now on
I will be much more absorbed in You.

I am secure because of you.
O moon-faced one, I reached confidence
Thanks to you.
I hope I will have safety on this side,
Or I follow a dangerous road.

The cypress bent down for me.
The rose garden received munificence from me.
Faith has flown away from me.
I am afraid to fall in the way of blasphemy.

You have such an eye that
You are making a shield out of arrows.
If you throw your arrow,
How can I protect myself?

God's Shams of Tabriz is the top
And the bottom of my love.
I made my soul up and down

With his love.

96.

Verse 899

Don't lose your way by trying
To be visible in this world of existence.
In the valley of the brave, it is not only you,
Your shoes will also disappear.

Try to be annihilated in this world full of fire,
Pay attention and see, even the ermin
Is killed by arrows for its fur
In this world of existence.

You are the leader of wakefulness
Under the sky of this fire,
But, at the end, no head or tail
Remains in you.

Your distress increases in time,
So does your trouble.
At the end you will be destroyed,
Reach the holiday.
Your drum will be banged, tu-dum.

Understand the wretchedness of my words.
O piece of wood, go to the fire.
Read me a verse of "It won't be anybody from
You that won't stop there."[\[92\]](#)

What else will grow in this valley
But a mouthful of morsels for the table?
How could a donkey whose nails
Are made by wool fly to the sky?

Even if he flies like a vulture,
Earth's gravity will bring him down.
Everything turns around
And comes back to its origin.

If you are a man, go toward that
Secret jewel. It is like the fountain of life
In this jar-like body.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
We will stay and incubate like an egg
Beneath your wing until
You tell us to get up.

97.

Verse 908

Since I fell in love with this Beloved,
I am busy and at the same time, idle.
My head is spinning, my feet
Are fixed to the ground.
I look like a compass.

I am mad with the moon and earth-like Mars.
I am ashamed and bored with
This golden glorious sky.

If you are close to me, O my friend,
Come and see me.
See how I am in deep ecstasy.
Why do you ask secrets of me?
I am already known, exposed.

That lion doesn't drink anything
But blood from the lover's heart.
I am the son of that lion.
I am looking for a heart
From which to drink blood.

I am sick, that's why you are praying the Fatiha.[\[93\]](#)
But, my friend, don't you see I am sick from Fatiha.

People put Hallac on the gallows
For a few symbolic words of truth.
I have such unendurable secrets,
That if Hallac were alive,
He would put me on the gallows.

O Hodja, if you don't want
To acknowledge me, don't.
I am not telling you anyway.
I don't wash corpses.

I don't scratch rocks.

O you who denies God's
Shams of Tabriz, to whom the universe
Became a slave and servant,
I am already sick and tired
Of the acknowledgments of blind people, like you.

98.

Verse 916

☞ have no heart, no hand.
My feet are also tied with your love.
Yet, I have broken so many ties,
Freed myself from so many bonds,
O my smiling beauty, go easy, I am drunk.

At the assembly of admiration,
A glass was offered to me
Like a soul from the Sultan.
Who do you know?
Be easy, I am drunk.

O my soul, come closer a moment.
Don't hurt me anymore.
O my cheerful charmer,
Go easy, I am drunk.

O cupbearer of the Beloved,
Never mind this clumsy, heavy soul.
Steal from the monks, offer wine slowly.
I am drunk.

You are unconventional.
You are in front of religion, indifference, and rakishness.
Why do you stay behind the curtain hiding yourself?
Come out slowly, I am drunk.

O wine, I became worse than you.
I am more wine than you are.
I am more exuberant, overflowing.
Then you be easy, I am drunk.

I am the same kind with

The boiling, overflowing wine.
I am with the one who sells their mantle.
Why should I hide or cower from the Beloved?
Go easy, I am drunk.

I went beyond myself, chose your love.
Then I saw I am annihilated.
Go slowly with me because I am drunk.

I am the light of Enoch's soul.
I even dressed like a monk
And fooled the people.
Go easy, I am drunk.

In the creed of the one who is free
From the restriction of religion,
Even the indifference of knowledge is worthless.
This is empty air for them.
Go easy, I am drunk.

O one who stirs hundreds
Of instigations and deceits,
The time is late.
Drunks are dropping into drunken slumber.
Also, take those young ones away.
But be easy, because I am drunk.

99.

Verse 927

☞ came to start trouble,
To fight the gathering of Rustem,[\[94\]](#)
To sit and break hundreds of glasses.
Come slowly, because I am drunk.

O one who keeps talking nonsense,
Who plays a drum and laughs
Who became a donkey and a donkey's slave,
Come slowly, because I am drunk.

O wise one who sits awkwardly and stays,
O one whose face is darker than a blacksmith,
Come and see my charmer, watch him, but
Come slowly, because I am drunk.

You're almost like a wooden man.
You should approach, come closer.
You may become alive and see
Hundreds of blood-filled Tigris rivers.
Come slowly, because I am drunk.

Don't be lazy O cupbearer,
We haven't drunk it all, we still have wine.
Fill this with pure, clean wine, give it to us, but
Come slowly, because I am drunk.

The ones who fall in grief
And sorrow on this road
Are fools or people with no sense, but
Come slowly, because I am drunk.

God's Shams, free from everything,
Tabriz, clear and pure wine,
I have fallen down until the Day of Judgment, but
Come slowly, because I am drunk.

100.

Verse 934

When I see Your face in the mirror
I start talking, but the mirror
Doesn't want to be misted over with the breath of words.
Alas, my words, alas.

I see You in the water,
I reach for You with my hand,
The water ripples, becomes muddy,
So does my work and business.

O friend, even the word "friend"
Doesn't fit between us.
If I try to say, O Beloved,
I am unable to say "O Beloved."

Even "Ah," goes back to the place
From which it comes.
I closed the road to my mouth,
I can't wail.

Even if I wail "Ah," that's
Because I can't see that Moon when
It is covered by clouds.
O my charmer of the full moon,
Certainly it is more pleasant
To look at the moon.

101.

Verse 939

☞ told one charmer, whose face
Is like the moon, that
"I have hundreds of different
Pleasures and joys because of You."
Be answered me, "I have a hundred more
Amazing things besides that."

"Show me some reason to hang on,
To be ahead in this game," I said.
"I came to this game from beyond reason," he answered.

Each community comes from one tribe,
Close to one nation.
I am close with the grief of Your love.

O Glorious One who is loved and admired,
Settle down by my eyes,
Don't be absent from my sight.
I achieved the things that are desired, wished for,
With the Kingdom of that Glory.

I am such a person, that everyone
Of my sighs raises the sky, burns it with flame.
I obtained this hot, angry fire from that blazing love.

102.

Verse 944

☞ Love, you turned my sleep upside down.
My sleep has been spoiled

With the blood of my heart.

To look for the source of sugar
And bring it over, among other thoughts,
Made my sleep melt like sugar at
The time of evening which
Is pregnant with many incidents.

I have turned into something like
His eyebrow. I resemble a new moon.
Without reaching the favor of His union,
I became thinner.
It is impossible to sleep at this phase of the moon.

In spite of all these times, I am awake.
When night comes, I beg that Love
To take my sleep away.

When sleep sees me, it can't sit with me.
It runs away, finds somebody else to overwhelm.

Love belongs to the Kingdom of Heaven.
Greatness, love of purity, took
Sleep out of my human eyes.
For that reason, whenever I was able,
I kept my friends with me and kept them awake.

If you are a lover, if you are
Seriously in love, follow me.
I don't feel sleepy until early dawn,
And I don't sleep.

103.

Verse 951

☞ I am a painter.
I paint beautiful paintings
Every moment. When I see You,
I destroy them in front of You.

I paint hundreds of paintings,
Give them life.
But when I see You,
I throw them in the fire.

You are either a cupbearer serving wine,
Or the enemy of mind and sobriety,
Destroying every house I build.

Soul has been spread and broken,
Ran toward You and merged with You.
I smell You from the soul,
That's why I should caress and love the soul.

My blood flows on Your soil, says,
"I am the same color as Your love."

Soul is devastated in this
House of mud, without You.
Beloved, either You come home,
Or I'll destroy the house from its foundation.

104.

Verse 957

☞ don't repent of that guilt.
I even resent and avoid the ones
Who repent of that guilt,

O my soul, Majnun did not
Repent of his love of Layla.
I have hundreds of Laylas,
Majnun's loves are my secrets.

What kind of love is it that has
No head, no feet, no beginning, no end.
I am the lover and also the beloved.
I wail, I am sick, and at the same time,
I am the cure for the sick.

The thought that flew away
Has already left this burned love.
Because I am sometimes a narrow cage,
Sometimes Jafar-i Tayyar.[\[95\]](#)

105.

Verse 961

☞ went to the doctor of soul and told him,
"Take my pulse, examine me.
My heart doesn't belong to me, I am sick,
I am in love and drunk at the same time.

I have hundreds of different problems.
I wish it was one.
Even with all these troubles,
I keep searching beyond this."

He asked me, "Haven't you died?"
I said, "I was dead, but when I smelled
Your scent I jumped out of my grave."

O beautiful one, who has divine beauty,
O charmer, who belongs in God's East,
O Joseph of Canaan, who made me cut
My hand while watching your Beauty,

He approached me slowly, nicely,
Put his hand to my heart and asked,
"Where are you from? How are you?"
I said, "I am from here, my situation is like that."

When I started to argue, he offered
Me a glass of wine. Fire came to my pale face.
I gave up the fight.

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Then I took my clothes off,
Became crazy, insane with drunkenness,
Entered the circle of drunks
And sat on the right side.

I've worn hundreds of kinds of garments.
I have shown hundreds of different exuberances.
I spilled hundreds of cups, broke hundreds of bowls;

That tribe worshipped the golden calf.
If I didn't worship Love,
I would become a toy calf made of wool.

That Divine Sultan is calling me.
I am a falcon, He pulls me
To the height of His Kingdom.

You tied my feet, Beloved.
I am Your drunk.
Either as the arrow or the string of the bow,
I am in Your hand, Beloved.

If I fly off into space its because of You.
If I am drunk its because of You.
If I come down, You lowered me down.
If I exist, I exist because of You.

You made me drunk, let me dance around.
When You closed the top of the jar,
I shut my mouth.

106.

Verse 974

☞ One for whom I became drunk from this grief,
Yes, I am drunk, I broke the glass.
I also broke all the promises I made yesterday.
I am saved from all of them.

Break all your thoughts with the glass, Beloved.
Because, I've become prey for that cupbearer today.

I am mature now, I threw him off the roof.
His meeting, his talks were all a trap.
I was caught.
I don't have anything to do with the trap anymore.

A snake jumped out of my hand,
Ran to the mountains and entered a cave.
Now I have employment again. Thanks a hundred times.
These thanks became my trade.

There are many black scorpions in human shape,
But we are protected from them.
That's why I am giving thanks.

Verse 979

Ɖodja, greetings to you,
I want to start a journey.
I have found a passage,
A road on the roof of the sky.

Soul decided to return to its origin.
Eye returned to the place
Where sight was given to it.

Now the torrent is carrying
Me to my destination.
How thirsty my heart was,
Burned by the separation from that sea.

I will ride my horse like a Turk
With joy to the door of Hakan's [\[96\]](#) temple,
Because He gave me a belt
As big and wide as a nomad's tent.

I disappeared under the sun like a shadow.
I reached nothingness.
For that reason, I follow Him like the moon.
Like a ruby, I have different sparks,
A different love by His heat and light.

Never mind my shell, even if
He breaks my essence, my marrow.
I am still marrow and essence, quite fresh.
Even if He breaks me like a reed,
I have lots of sugar.

My feet are tied like a cypress,
Like an iris, but I am free.
I am like stone, like iron
But I have sparks in my heart.

O Charmer of my heart,
I am losing my manners, my modesty,
But the things I obtain from you
Are enough for me, forever.

O my Master, I don't have any more patience.

Don't leave my heart, don't push me away.
Your separation is intolerable.

O Love, You let me know you
Are coming, welcome, come.
If I am kept away from You,
To whom would I be close?
Who will give me peace and tranquility?

Even if I die and am put in a coffin,
My food is still Your love.
I appear human,
But I am nourished with angel's food.

Master, how auspicious you are.
Nobody has your beauty.
Nobody could kiss your lips.
Nobody could talk about your lips.
I mention your name every night.
I keep telling your stories.[\[97\]](#)

O generous sultan, who has
A temper like the sea,
You tell the rest of it.
I'll close my mouth like a shell.
I mean, I have a pearl inside of me.

108.

Verse 993

☞ drunk cupbearer, take
The glass away from my hand,
I am drunk.
I got out of the circle of sober ones,
I am free of them.

Separation is the opposite of the rind[\[98\]](#)
I am either at the top or bottom.
You color yourself with the same color, my hodja.

Anything you think about war,
I am separate from.
Anything about love, I am that, I am there.

Since I have fallen into your love,
I stay out of all feuds.
I am at peace with you.

Accept me like spinach,
Cook me sweet or sour.
Whatever I am cooked with,
I reached You, I mixed with You.

His musical instrument has been idle.
It is all my fault, that instrument
Was always ready to be played,
I first came as a drunk.

You are drunk, and so am I.
Our drunkenness is mixed with each other's.
We are like mortar and pestle,
We look like two, but, in reality, are only one.

109.

Verse 1000

The cupbearer was my Sultan,
That's why I drink more than anyone else.
I felt dizzy from drunkenness.
I started acting funny, did all kinds of wrong things.

When the cupbearer who tied my feet
Saw me like that, he came and held my hand,
Kissed my pale face.

I said, "You are the Sultan, You are Soul,
Worth hundreds more.
You are the salt pan, but I brought
You a different saltiness.
You were attractive, but I brought
A different charm for You.

The place has been filled
By noise and fights because
Of that pure, clear wine cup.
But, I am not afraid of that,
I am the one who makes all the trouble.

Either thirsty or sleepy,
I don't drink without Him.
Either in a pair or alone,
I am matched to His sight.

I am a green branch, but
How could I move without wind?
I am the shadow of that cypress.
If the cypress was not there,
What would I turn around?

If I become a cloud, that moon
Is the source of light for the heart of the cloud.
If I am a man, that Sultan is the Sultan of man.

That Charming Sultan was about to leave.
"Kindly," I said, "Sit a little bit longer,
O drunkenness of every particle of mine,
O answer to my troubles."

The Sun at the sign of Aries is nothing,
O One whose head is in infinity,
O Beloved, with whom all my
Warmth and cold disappear.

I have fallen in Your basin,
Because I drank Your wine.
I am the dice of that backgammon.
Because of that I was dropped
In Your bowl like a glass ball.

If He is not the One who excites
And makes me talk, I'll be silent, quit talking.
He is the rider, I am only dust under His feet.

110.

Verse 1011

☞ If you don't want to sleep,
You sit, I'll go to sleep.
You keep telling your story, I finished mine.

I finished that story.

I have so much sleep
I stagger like a drunk falling down.

Either asleep or awake,
I am thirsty for that Beloved
Whose image is always my company.

I am like a mirror which depends on that face.
Because of that, I show His attributes,
I hide His attributes.

When He smiles, I smile.
When He is exalted, scattered, open,
I am the same.

You tell the rest. Those pearls
Of meanings that I have been threatening
Are in Your threat, come from Your sea.

111.

Verse 1017

٭am out of myself, but 1 want
To go beyond that, 1 could say to your eyes,
"Here, that's what the drunk is like.
I want that kind of drunkenness."

My Beautiful Beloved grabbed my neck
And asked me what I wanted?
"That's all I want," I said.

I neither want a crown nor a throne.
I want to kiss the ground at your temple.

I want to tell my secrets to the breeze at dawn.
I want to make him my company.
But really, if I want a great confidant,
I should discuss it with Him.

I grabbed the doorknob of the place
They wear ihram,[\[99\]](#) I am at Harem.[\[100\]](#)
Out of all disasters, 1 was dropped into
A drunken slumber in which You put Your seal on me.
I want the imprint of Your ring.

O my Soul, there is another moon
Hidden in my heart. I know this very well.
I now have Knowledge of Certainty, (*ilm al-yaqin*)
But, I want to see neat and clear.
I want to reach Vision of Certainty. (*Ain al-yaqin*)

112.

Verse 1023

☞ pawned my mantle.
I am a stark naked person of the tavern.
I sold all my belongings and spent the money.
I am a guest of the tavern.

O beautiful-faced player, play, sing,
Clap your hands and say,
"You are the man of prayers,
I am the rind[101] of the tavern."

O one who is tied to the designs of the body,
You want to see me, but you cannot see the Soul.
I am the Soul of the Tavern.

I am fond of neither eating nor drinking,
Nor have I made this my problem.
I am tired of this eating and drinking.
I am at the head of the table in the tavern:

I am the crony of the Sultan.
Really, I am Solomon.
I turned completely into faith.
I am the faith of the tavern.

In this no-good place, I played,
Sang with your love, got drunk.
I saw someone and asked, "Who are you?"
"I am the sultan of the tavern," he said.

Wherever I am, I drink from the same cup with Him.
Wherever I walk around, I am in the same tavern.

You must have evidence for that claim.
You said, "I'll show you one better

Than you ask.
I am the evidence, evidence of the tavern."

I lost my gold and silver, but I lean
Against the jasmine-bodied Beauty.
I am in His arms.
I don't have any property, good.
But I've become all the belongings of the tavern.

O cupbearer, who became Soul to my soul.
You watch out for my ruined heart.
I fell and was ruined in the tavern.

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"The devil made you fall into this ruin," you said.
But, there is a beauty of an angel in
The devil of the tavern.

When I keep silent I am the bottle in the tavern.
If I start to talk, I become only the doorkeeper.

113.

Verse 1035

☞ swear on Your Soul,
I am congenial now with You.
I will be tomorrow.
I am spreading sugars here and there.

Heart drank Your wine and took the road.
We don't have heart; heart is with You.
Even then, it is still with us,
Still without us.

O Heart, you are on the way to
A known destination.
All we want from you is to
Take our greetings to Him and tell Him that.

We are waiting for the right time.
But, heart is always with You,
Watching Your face, on one hand he is in peace,
Otherwise, he is overflowing,

He is struggling, has troubles.

This heart turned into a wave
From your wind, your wine.
It is pleasant when it swells
Nice even when it is down.

The beautiful cloud of Your favor
Made our soul and heart very pleasant,
Had its effect on soil, stone and rock.

After going away from this earth,
Being free from human form,
To merge souls with You,
And reach the privacy of
The assembly of souls with You
Would be wonderful.

The ones who know
And the ones who are ignorant,
Are puzzled with your drunken eyes
And your magic.

As you know, I am crazy, insane.
I have no shame.
Love and craziness are in my blood.
That's the way I was born.

O one who is looking
For a sign, and evidence of His fire, His water.
Look at the color of our face,
The tears in your eyes.

There is peace,
And at the same time, turbulence
In the land of mud.
This trouble, this fight is all because of love.

For that curly hair coming
Down on His forehead
With those chains of Soul,
Muslim, as well as Christian,
Will put on Zunnar.[\[102\]](#)

Verse 1047

Isn't that the fragrance of the wine
That I became very drunk with
And passed out of myself?
O cupbearer, You understand
My situation from that wine.

O my drunk cupbearer,
Look what terrible shape I'm in.
O one who flies out of my hand,
Whatever has happened to me
Happened because of that hand.
You understand that I belong to this hand.

I have been ruined in your traps.
But I also broke your glass.
You are drunk and so am I.
We both break and tear everything.

Keep my word, O Soul
And Heart of the drunks, talk with me.
You say, "I am not your confidant."
I swear to God, I am a confidant, I am.

Pour this vintage wine into the glass.
Come to my arms, come,
So even if I am asleep, I'll wake up.

Give the wine to us now.
For your soul, your head's sake,
Don't fool us by saying,
"I'll offer it to you tomorrow."

How can I give up on you?
I certainly won't leave you.
I will fight to the point you'll say,
"I am tired and sick, I give up this fight."

I want you to bum with
The wind of the wine.
I desire you to love me down to earth
And spread me with your water.

115.

Verse 1055

My soul will be sacrificed
To the charmer whose name
I never mentioned.
If there is a day I don't look for Him,
It will turn into a dark evening.

If He comes to my neighborhood tomorrow,
If I worried about the hearts,
I would be damned and ashamed in the town.

I said, "O one whose face
Is as beautiful as the moon,
Look for me time by time
So I can wash my face with the blood of heart."

"I came looking for you,
But you weren't home."
My God, how could he tell
Such a lie in front of my face.

I swear that one day I will
Die by telling a gazel.
Because I wept bitterly for
Such a long time, I turned into hair.

116.

Verse 1060

O one who invites me as a guest.
Come over next to me, I am confused,
I don't know where the house is.

O one who caused the whole
City to become bewildered,
The one who amazes the villager
And the city people at the same time,
Where is the house? Show it to me.
I don't know where the house is.

Don't look for reason, mind
Or knowledge from the one whose soul you become.
Don't hurt him.
I don't know where the house is.

Excuse the one who has seen You,
Then becomes exuberant.
Don't let him go from the house,
I don't know where the house is.

I am in love, burning with desires.
My reputation is known everywhere.
Don't leave me alone at the house.
I don't know where the house is.

O player, who is at the front of all the singers,
Hit the tambourine with your hand.
Close the road to the house, I have lost the way.
I don't know where the house is.

O my God's Shams of Tabriz,
I cannot be intimate with anyone but you.
I don't know where the house is.

117.

Verse 1067

Do you know where you can find me?
Around that eye, that narcissus,
Which is pregnant to all instigations.

When that beauty reflects on the heart,
His image appears and shines.
The heart breaks its dam, overflows, runs;
It becomes impossible to control.

The heart's baby, who is full of love,
Gets in fights, starts struggling,
Then the time of nursing passes.
And he starts running.

The heart learned this hustling from his fire of love.
Flying from the chest, jumping, and escaping
He learned from Him.

118.

Verse 1071

Make sure of that creed.
That the way of lovers is the road that lovers walk
Entirely opposite to others.
Even their ostentations, their lies
Are better than other's truths, kindnesses and favors.

There is nothing impossible for the lover.
Even his guilt is a meritorious act.
His cruelty is justice,
His false accusation is a compliment, a favor.

The stern face of love is like a soft smile.
His fire temple is Ka'be.[\[103\]](#)
The thorn He pokes is better than the rose, or reyhan.[\[104\]](#)

When it makes a face, that feeling
Is better than sugar.
When He is tired and bored,
That gives a better feeling
Than being hugged and kissed.

If he says, "I am tired of you"
These words are like the fountain of life
Of Khidr which comes from the
Source of eternal life.

When He says, "No, it is impossible."
There are thousands of "Yes, it is possible,"
Hidden in his words.
When he acts strange, that is acceptance
In the creed of people in ecstasy.

His cursing becomes total faith,
His stone changes into coral.
His greed is a favor.
His guilt and sin are mercy and forgiveness.

How can you blame me and accuse
Me of going the wrong way?
I gave my soul and followed

The way of His eyebrows,
That's the direction I went.

If I became drunk from this road,
I stopped, was silent, closed my lips.
You look at the bright Soul,
The rest is not important.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
How much sugar are you spreading?
You are telling hundreds of truths
Through my tongue, bringing
Hundreds of clear proofs.

119.

Verse 1081

☪ Cupbearer who creates
Hundreds of loves,
You keep doing that.
O Beloved, Your grace, Your manners are so beautiful.
Keep being like that.

You control beauties.
When you raise your eyebrow, this slave would tell you,
"Do that, do this, this is beautiful,
So is that."

Fill up the glasses of monks
With the blood of Muslims.
Burn and destroy religion
With your infidel hair.

You kick from your side,
The one who has been pardoned as a traitor.
With your brigand jealousy
You waylay those on the road of Gabriel.

The command that cannot be contained
In the sky with its heaviness,
You put on the shoulders of the people,
And spread it in daily life.

Give life to death with your Jesus breath.

Give your secret chemistry to the poor,
Make him reach it with gold.

The order is yours as long as time passes.
O God's Shams of Tabriz
Yes, you keep the command.

120.

Verse 1088

☉ heart, words and alphabets
Are not enough to explain You.

That player plays the instrument
With my strumming, plays for my heart
Instead of my tongue.
All my existence turns around that tune.
It tells the stories of my heart with that strike.

Because of this Cupbearer,
The wine is drunk, the glass is drunk.
Soul and universe admire my soul and my universe.

A garnet came from the land of Absence
To this world, but it was also puzzled
Seeing the greatness of my mine.

If you look for us, hair by hair,
Minutely, in a subtle manner,
You cannot find us, because our place is His hair.

Last night, soul was telling that
Moon-faced one, "You hurt my heart, O my hard bow,
Look at this spear which is full of blood."

"Is there a better prey for me than the lion?"
Said He who found my trace better than
The ruby of Bedehksan.[\[105\]](#)

O One who holds and pulls *on* my mantle,
Which is made in hundreds of pieces,
That's all I have.
Where are your garments?

God's Shams of Tabriz,
Is above time and space.
That's why my fate is greater
And nicer than any time.

121.

Verse 1097

Put those silver arms around my neck.
My soul is your place,
Come to my bosom.

I am drunk, O soul,
I am out of control, O soul,
Wake me up with your ruby lips.

O cupbearer of every great man,
O you who melts and seduces everybody,
From which jar did *you* pour this wine?
O Beautiful One, to whose torture I've
Become a slave and servant,
Pull me out of my roots.

Tear my curtain and
Shed the blood of my heart.
As long as you are with me at the end,
I'll be happy.

A friend doesn't complain,
And the drunk is forgiving.
Why are you hurting me?

O my soul, get out of your source, come forward.
Even gold doesn't sparkle when it is in the mine.

No soul will fall in grief with someone like you,
As a ruby that is just out of the mine.
Nobody is wrapped with a shroud
While his soul is in his body.

122.

Verse 1104

Now this well, the ways of
The drunk are fights and struggles,
And being exposed to all bad things.

For the lover, it is even worse.
The lover is also from
The same town as the drunks.

What is it to fall in love?
I'll tell you.
Love is to fall into a gold mine.

Even then, what is gold?
Love is the salvation from death.
To be free from the fear
Of having the crown fall from the head.

The Dervish is wrapped up in his mantle,
But he has a pearl under his arm.
Why should he be ashamed
To be a vagabond?

That beauty with the moon-face
Came suddenly last night.
He dropped his belt on the road.
He was so drunk he didn't even know about it.

I said, "O Heart, get up, offer wine
To the soul, this is the right time,
The right opportunity to fall.

It is time to be company .
To the nightingale in the rose garden.
It is time to eat sugar with the divine parrot.

My heart is not with me.
I gave it to you.
I fall in your way.
I don't know anywhere else to fall.

If I broke your glass,
I am drunk my beautiful, drunk.
Bold my hand, save me from dangers.
As you see, I am drunk.

That is a new rule, a new order;
To break the glass and embrace the glass maker.

123.

Verse 1114

☉ playful-hearted beloved,
Don't cheat, come forward.
Since you are hurting us,
You might as well hit hard, hurt hard.

If you will put up a throne for us,
Do it in the middle of the ocean.
If you will put up a gallows for us,
Put it at the top of the sky.

Give sherbet to the compatible peers,
Blow on their sherberts, [\[106\]](#) but the incompatible,
Mixed up, double-faced ones,
Mix and destroy them.

Rub the elixir of Ledun[\[107\]](#) on frozen thoughts
So they can come to life, become gold.
Give that forbidden wine to the
Old lonely one so he would be a peer to others.

Show an altogether brand new justice
To this world.
Give a new intelligence to the earth.
Send the Gazelle of the land of Ya-Hu[\[108\]](#)
Over to the well-trained hunting dog,
So that he hunts the dog.

Blow once more this kneaded mud.[\[109\]](#)
Bend over and blow that curly hair
So it will touch the mud of Adam.

If you are the truth who bends.
His head to truth,
Enter the cave of happiness.
If you are a Muslim,
Reach the land of submission.

O my Soul, You asked for soul,
Here I am, here is the soul.
The soul that won't be sacrificed
To You, throw to the bottom of hell.

If you want to have a new Jesus
Born every moment, send a breeze
From your rose garden to the garments of Mary.

If you want the land of Absence
To change into existence,
Set the fire that Moses, son of Imran, saw,
Into the harvest of mourning, burn it up.

If you want those two universes
To drink from the same cup,
Become the same way, put the salve of
"I am God," on their eyes.

O bright-hearted player,
I will be silent, you play high notes
When you have satisfied the
Audience with "low pitches."

You are the enemy of grief and sorrows,
Silence doesn't fit you.
Throw a new stone to the head of grief every moment.

124.

Verse 1127

A new canal is opened from
The source of Soul to every
Poor one's home without a pick or mace.

Heart turned his face to soul,
"O lover who is engulfed in trouble
Go to the Beloved's window." he said,
"Don't stay home."

O lover Hodja, O merchant
Who worries for profit, turn
Your face to the valleys.
Go to the rose gardens of joy.

Don't get into the grief of those
Who are oppressed with anxiety.

This heart is like leather,
Grief is a fire, through which,
The heart turns into a wrinkled table cloth.

If the eyes of your heart are filled
With the soil of grief,
How could you find Tabriz?
How could you arrive at the temple of Shamseddin?

125.

Verse 1132

Watch these black people
Behind the curtain of night.
Tonight, have a soul drink
With these black people.

People are asleep.
Lovers are all scattered,
Telling secrets to each other.
What a beautiful custom.

Friends are all exalted,
Their hearts and souls are all burned.
They keep looking for that beautiful one
Who has no dowry
And shows his beauty free of charge.

Since your love became submissive to me,
That love is forbidden.
Since your hair has become my trap,
Night has become my place.

The Negro of Night became drunk.
Everything turned into a glass of wine.
Watch the drunkenness of every existence
In the eye of that Negro,

That water wheel would stop
If water didn't come.
But how could the wheel

Know why it was not turning?

That poor one kept turning,
He has no love, no hate.
The reason Ferhad made a tunnel
In the mountain was just to reach Shirin[\[110\]](#)

The Sultan has sent intermingled soldiers
To that hashish-addict Indian,
To the source of coyness and grace,
To that King of the Negroes.
(That curly hair keeps hanging
Down to the mole on his cheek.)

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
You will illuminate the night
Which resembles an Indian,
With your face that has a hundred Pleiades.

126.

Verse 1141

☞ turned into a harp,
Opened the door of melodies.
Set forth to play the harp.
On return, took hundreds of souls
And started showing coyness.

Since You are Jesus,
Sit us at the same table as Mary.
We eat from the same bowl.
Play the same tune on our Heart's tambour[\[111\]](#)

O one who plays the harp,
Take the pulse of the elderly.
Pour the blood of that grape's heart
Into the glass and offer it to us.

Show today's beauty to the dervishes
Promise tomorrow to the devout.

If you want to exalt the crazy people,
Show your hair which resembles chains,
Then watch them from a distance.

I have seen a beautiful one
Made from Your Beauty.
Soul said, "Say that we depend on God."
Heart said, "Cry, shout and roar."

Since that day, this poor man
Has neither mind nor religion.
Turn me into a cross. I open
My arms and wait for you to crucify me,
Because of your hair which looks and smells like musk.

O heart, wear zunnar, and go to the monastery.
Ask a kiss from the monk
Who made everything disappear
Except himself.

If you see a longing and enthusiasm for us
On the face of Shams of Tabriz,
Whom the whole universe serves,
Start anew this beautiful story.

127.

Verse 1150

Make sure there are two things
Impossible in the two worlds.
Neither could God's lover repent,
Nor could a saddle bag be filled with air.

If repentance becomes a sea,
I wouldn't get a drop of it.
If I was buried in the ground.
That soil would smoke and burn.

Every particle of it keeps turning
Like a heart which is in love
Because of my soul that followed fancy and desire.

That's my essence, my work, my occupation.
Wherever I go, that's what I am;
The saddle maker makes saddles wherever he goes.

Every living thing will go into the grave,

Be a slave to the ground.
But musk in the small box,
Won't fall into decay.

If your heart grows merry in your dark chest,
That chest is not considered a dungeon,
It becomes open space.

When a baby is happy inside
Its mother's womb,
Blood is better than wine for him.
That small space is nicer than a rose garden.

If I spread these words,
I am afraid the wrong one
Will misunderstand this
And lose his head.

128

Verse 1158

You are personified Soul.
If anybody sees you as flesh, Be looks in the mirror
And sees nothing but dark iron.

I swear by your greatness that
Your water of life won't stay
At the top like oil.
This is not your style.

O Beauty whose face is as bright as the moon
If soul kisses Your feet once, he'll lick
His mouth until the Day of Judgment.

I asked the Heart, "How are you?"
"Soul is added to my soul," he answered,
"Since I became home for His image."

Grief and sorrow won't come close to the heart
In which His image exists.
How can the one who plunges into
His fountain of life be afraid of death?

129.

Verse 1163

He came and adorned the garden and meadow.
What kind of face is His?
He blew and made us drunk.
What kind of smell is that smell?

Is this the house of heaven,
Or quarters for the tavern?
My God, what kind of house is this?
What kind of quarters are these quarters?

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There is a river of red wine
Flowing in the heart like the river of Kawthar.[\[112\]](#)
The heart is filled with love.
My God, what kind of river is this?

O Friend, although hundreds of men died
At the top of every hill for You,
You still hide yourself behind the curtain.
What kind of behavior is that?

Souls that have been overwhelmed by pleasure
And fallen in love, are of two kinds:
One turned into wine with love;
The other became the jars of love.

130.

Verse 1068

Burn my heart with the fire
Of Your face.
Take a flame from the fire
Of my heart and send it
To the sky, bum the hearts.

O Soul who has been freed
From all bonds.
O Soul who originally was born

From an angel, wherever you go, go nicely.
Whenever you breathe, breathe nicely.

If my soul separates your body
From the soul,
Hit the sword in your hand
To the top of my soul's head.

O Beauty, who has curly hair
With many knots, but unties
All the knots of the heart,
Put one knot in the curly hair.

131.

Verse 1172

O my Soul of souls, how are you?
O my Soul, please give me a kiss.
I want a load of sugar from your sweet lips.

O my cheerful Soul of souls,
I know you, you are very sweet.
For God's sake, smile for me.

I am a buyer, I want sugar.
O my Beauty who sells beautiful perfumes,
Don't close the store, O my Soul.

I learned your name, your address,
Then I went to the store.
"Greetings to you, O great-statured cypress," I said.

"You are deceitful, a cheater," I said,
"Don't trouble me so much,
Don't make me sick and ruined, O my Soul"

Come to play, to please our heart, O Beloved.
Use that hair like a snare
With coyness and grace, O my Soul.

O most Beautiful, O smiling rose branch,
Show me how beauties give kisses.

I am a slave, spread on the ground,

Burn and smoke nicely.
I am smoking, like rue seeds,
Inside the fire, O my Soul.

132.

Verse 1180

O cypress-statured rose of the rose garden,
Take care of the empty-handed ones.
Give them a loaf of bread; take hundreds,
But give something to the poor.

Hear what the Prophet said,
"Gold and silver are not diminished by alms."[\[113\]](#)
Give something to the poor.

If you sow one seed,
You'll harvest a hundred ears of com.
Why are you scratching your ear?
Give something to the poor.

Give a little, see more returned.
Make heart, watch being praised.
Solve problems, see your problem solved.
Come, give something to the poor.

You are sleeping safe and sound
In this night of confusion, because
Your alms have reached God.
He protects you.
Come, give something to the dervishes.

If He does a favor, you take shelter
In His shadow, rest and reach peace.
Come, give something to the poor.

Respect, you'll be respected.
Bless and you'll be blessed.
Show compassion, you'll get the same.
Give something to the poor.

O You who gives kindnesses and favor
To every poor one.
O You who feels sorry for every sufferer,

O You who commands at Judgment day.[\[114\]](#)
Give something to the poor.

My voice has reached you,
You have learned my secret.
Don't deprive me, come,
Give something to the poor.

I change from one minute to the other.
I feel dizzy from that.
I am full of gossip.
Look at this empty basket.
Come, give something to the poor.

You know I pray all the time,
Praise you everywhere.
Where do I go if I leave you?
To whom do I tell my troubles?
Come, give something to the poor.

You won't have any pain and suffering. Amen.
You'll be spared from accidents. Amen.
God will always be with you. Amen.
Come, give something to the poor.

Heaven is your surrounding,
Mercy is your disposition,
Especially now, this hour,
Come, give something to the poor.

We prayed, we walked,
We passed your quarters.
Stay well, we have gone.
Give something to the poor.

133.

Verse 1194

Āyāla is on one side, Majnun on the other,
Pulling my ears.
She pulls me to this side,
He to the other side.

One of my ears is in the hand of this one,

The other in the hand of that one.
This one pulls me above,
The other down to the valley.

Because of this pulling, this fiery sky,
I keep turning and crying all the, time.

When I am not myself, I am free of them.
I dress like a sultan with satin,
Put on heavy garments and walk,
Swaying from side to side.

I love the day I can tear
And repair my own mantle,
But you repair the mantle with invisible patches
Which are beyond words and conditions.

134.

Verse 1199

There is no way to walk away.
Open your mouth, say something.
It is impossible to sit or sleep without Him.

O you who constantly knocks at this door,
There is no way this door will be open.
Because you are awake, your mind
Is in your head all the time.
You want to be the leader.

To take the lead comes from greed.
That kind of person wants gold, sheds blood,
Will long for unusual food like a pregnant woman.

He gives his gold, his life
He flies away from this windowless dome
Like a bird of soul.

"This and that necessity comes from polytheism."
But if you are a believer, you'll be saved
From these anxieties like the flower of the Iris.

He produces whatever is necessary, spreads pearls.
My God, that charming cupbearer

Has everything, everything.

A house will be ruined if it has two owners.
He is the owner, I am the slave.
I am below like water, He is above, like oil.

135.

Verse 1206

☞ flag of God's help,
O torch of Yasin,[\[115\]](#)
My God, how light your Soul is,
Come, sit on my eye, my head.

O crown of the skill,
O ascent of wisdom,
There's no way to describe you.
You are Soul, entirely.

Every moving particle,
Every clapping hand tells you "Come."
Without tongue, without feet, come
And stay in the sky.

Beloved You are everybody's Soul,
O grace of our Master,
You saved the soul from the
Coyness of Fulaneddin.[\[116\]](#)

Angels grow wings when you blow.
They'll fly because of Your help.
The old firmament which has been impotent
For some time, will rejuvenate from Your
Sun and have descendants.

The whole universe is filled
With the sound of "Amen" without
Even one prayer, because of your
Fiery love and longing.

There was no path, no road.
Suddenly, one morning, the "Doctor of Soul"
Came and brought a jar of herbal medicine with him.

My sick body and crying heart came to life,
Was invigorated, raised its head from the pillow,

And told Him, "Welcome, O Sultan,
O remedy of every poor one,
O charmer, You look like Jesus."

You are the prophet of the ill,
You are better than rain for them.
What do you have in your jar?
The doctor answered, "Medicine for grieved hearts."

I am a remedy to the heart of Jacob.
I am the source of the river which gives relief to Job.
I am beautiful, I am ugly.
I am Khosrau, I am Shirin.

"How could a sea like that
Be confined in a jar like this," I asked.
"You wouldn't know this way, this business."

Who could know the absolute skill
Of a Master who could fill the world
Of Illiyni[\[117\]](#) to the world of Siccin?[\[118\]](#)

Joseph was watching seven layers of
Sky from the bottom of the well.
Jonah was above the star of Pleiades.

Wherever you are, above or below,
Ask for drunkenness, your destiny
Is not above or below.

Be silent, the moral of this story
Doesn't fit that story.
Go, turn your face to His moon-face.

136.

Verse 1222

Now that this world of existence
Is for nothing but pleasure, O soul.
Keep this sweet subtle point
In your soul, O soul.

Because pleasure is what
Makes essence and symptoms.
The pleasure of your father and mother
Brought you into this world, O soul.

Wherever there are pleasures,
There are two bodies there.
Out of the merging of those two bodies,
A pleasure comes out, O soul.

Every sense is one pair.
The ones who sense this, mix together.
Every intelligence is found
By the intelligent, O soul.

O Sense, if you become a pair
With the One who created you,
If you avoid the others,
You'll be a sultan, O soul.

Pleasures, which come from the people
Create the existent body.
The pleasure which comes from God,
Makes the heart and soul, O soul.

Where are the eyes to see?
Curtains are drawn everywhere.
Every particle secretly merged with its pair, O soul.

The lover has mixed and merged
With the Beautiful One; so has the devout.
They cannot fit in the world
Of existence from pleasure, O soul.

Young and old work with their mind
And intelligence in the world.
Their Souls are having wet dreams every moment,
Secretly from this world, a soul.

Don't hide, O Rustem.
I found the thing you hid.
I know you now, don't flirt.
Don't cheat me, O soul.

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We know that your sad, sour face
Is only a trick, and you are full of deceit,
Afraid of the consequences of all this, O soul.

A beautiful Houri has slept
At the corner of a bachelor's house
Like a drop of pearl.
You get up, grab her
Before the stranger's lips, a soul.

She plays lots of love games,
Flirts in a hundred ways.
Once she turns and raises her hand to you,
Get a kiss, a soul.

The amusement of fish cannot be
Seen at the surface of the sea.
Water is a curtain to hide
The ones who enjoy and make love, O soul.

All the animals over there
Are like a wolf which has stolen
A sheep behind the shepherd and
Keep chewing their prey, a soul.

Every particle claps its hands in rhythm
To the one who does wonderful things,
Even if they have no idea of it.
How will the animal know
The fountain of life, O soul?

There is a Sun that rises in the heart
Of every particle.
Hundreds of rivers are flowing
In the essence of every drop.

Be silent, everyone who shuts his mouth
Couldn't chew this morsel.
Be silent, close your mouth
So you won't drop this morsel, O soul.

☞ Self, who looks and acts like a dog,
How long will you grind your teeth?
You resent others being puffed up,
But you are puffing up a hundred times more.

You cry, you are full of poison.
Why do you bother the people?
You smile like a roasted sheep's head
And you call this laughter.

"I am a Sufi who is dressed in soft wool,
I command only good things," you are saying.
How could someone who is in jail
Be the sheriff of the town?

You are excused, because you see
Only yourself, through yourself.
Then pretending to be a mature person,
You are trying to excuse other people.

You change the Quran according to your knowledge
As you like and keep hitting the Quran
Like an anvil in front of the people.

If you turn yourself to soil on the way,
You'll find the fountain of life.
But if you are puffed up seeing
Yourself as great, you'll be tied
By bonds and thrown in the fire.

Pass through this passage, close your door
To everyone except God's Shams of Tabriz,
That sweet friend who is sweeter than sugar.

138.

Verse 1247

☞ To be spaceless in Union
Settle down in Absence.
Cut every head which carries
The idea of duality suspended
On the neck of idol worshippers.

Feed this divine parrot with sugar
In gratitude, before it grows wings
In the cage of existence.

If you become the drunk *of* Ezel,[\[119\]](#)
Take the sword of Ebed [\[120\]](#)
And start looking at existence.

Filter the sediment of your existence.
Purify and fill this bottle *of* meaning
With that clear, pure wine.

As long as you remain as the snake of this earth,
How can you be the fish *of* religion?
When you become a fish, throw everything in the sea.

Look at the animals,
Their heads are all bent down to earth.
If you are a man, raise your head to the sky.

If you become a confidant of God
At Adam's school, go and sit in front
And teach the angels the names *of* God.

If you want to reach the kingdom of Illa,[\[121\]](#)
Annihilate yourself and reach nothingness.
Take a broom from Absence
And sweep all of existence.

If you take a journey,
Ride the horse of meaning.
If you look for a place to stay,
Choose the very top of the sky.

Be thirsty like a man
Who has the disease of dropsy.
Don't be satisfied with just any drink.
Exalt as high as you can,
Yet try and ask for more.

The soul who has a head,
Turns his face toward the door.
If you have His love in your head,
Hang on to this love wholeheartedly.

The body cannot be without a shadow,
And a shadow cannot be bright.
Go toward the window, fly.

Follow the way of Majnun,
Become the source of fights and tumult,
Because His love asks you to
Stay away from people.

Be like a fire for burning,
At the same time be cooked and burned.
Be like a drunk,
At the same time become the wine.
Without them, you have the joys of both.

Be a leader, and at the same time a confidant.
Take a breath, at the same time, be a breath.
You become us, at the same time, ours.
Then be in our service.

In order to hide your monastery from Christians,
Sometimes fall in love with zunnar,
Sometimes embrace the cross.

Because of your being you become knowledgeable.
Never mind the eye of your existence.
Leave this, open the eyes of the soul.
See with the eyes of your soul.

Turn your feet into heads.
Walk toward God's Shams of Tabriz
Who is a Moses with Khidr's temper.
Try to see Yedi beyza.[\[122\]](#)

139.

Verse 1265

☞ silver-statured charmer of the drunks,
O you whose face turns all my work
And business into gold,
You take gold and silver from me
Then throw them to the wind.

When You ride your horse

In the middle of winter,
The heat in the ground
Would burn the summer.

If a day-old baby
Sees You jumping and playing,
He would be weaned from his mother's milk.

Alas, for that moment that,
My elephant-like heart became
Your drunk and remembered India.[\[123\]](#)

The day I experience the pain of death with Your love,
When the cramps of death cover my body,
Every particle of my body turns into a rose garden,
From the fire of that love.

When you show Your head
From the curtain of heart,
Then every hair of my body becomes drunk
An passes out again.

My every memory of You,
Is like a charming virgin being coy
At the roof and doors of Your love.

Then, with the sparks of Your face,
My memories will become
Pregnant by a Sultan like You.

O God's Shams of Tabriz,
If anybody asks you,
I immediately get curious
Or upset from my jealousy.
Try to see him, become upset with him.

140.

Verse 1274

Look through the curtains
And see hundreds of pregnant women
From the heart's corner,
From the place of adoration for the drunk.

Listen and hear what sounds
Are coming from that place,
"Come to this side," they say,
"Pick up the glass."

All these beauties are fighting
Because of love.
The army of India is locked in a battle
With the army of Turkestan.

I asked the mind, "Who are these
Famous beauties?"
It answered me, "They are all
Hidden, their deceptions are apparent."

They come and go to every
Garden and meadow with the
Help of the Sun of God's Shams of Tabriz.

141.

Verse 1279

☞ one who worries for nothing,
Go and read this verse,
"They left such gardens and fountains."[\[124\]](#)
O one who practices greed every day, read this verse,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

O you who gets mad because of
A little horse and a little saddle,
Falls into grief and sorrow,
Go and read this verse,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

You are in the guts, you are dirt,
You are nothing but the wind of hate and desire.
O smart one who has been soiled,
Go and read that Quranic verse,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

O Shaikh, who has so many problems,
O dressed shape, who has no meaning,
O one who is absent but appears to exist,
Read that verse from the Quran,

"They left such gardens and fountains."

Don't be proud of your kingdom, your stature.
You are dying, you'll be dead, burned under
A pile of soil. Think about that and read that verse,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

O small coquettish one,
O ugly selfish one,
Your little existence has become decayed
And is gone. Read the verse from the Quran,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

Don't put your cheeks to the cheeks of beauties.
Look to the end, your cheeks, your face
Are all decayed. Read that verse,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

When you have either garden, meadow, house or palace,
They are worthless in front of death.
You cannot beat death with them.
Go to the grave that has been
Plastered with mud and read,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

The one who sees the people's coffins
And smiles from a distance,
The one whose eyes have not
Yet opened, read these verses,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

Enough, quit talking.
What do you expect from words?
O one who measures the wind,
Cuts out the water, read these verses,
"They left such gardens and fountains."

142.

Verse 1289

﷽ was expecting Him, and at the same time, I wasn't.
Suddenly, that Beauty, that guest came to me.
Heart said, "That's it, come now."
Soul said, "Here is the Beautiful one whose

Face is like the moon."

He came to the house,
We went outside, looking for Him, attracted like moths,
To that one whose face is as beautiful as the moon.

He kept yelling and screaming from the house saying,
"Here I am. Here I am."
But I had no idea about that and was still
Calling Him, "Where are You? Where are You?"

That drunk nightingale was singing in our rose garden.
We were like pigeons flying over,
Cooing and asking stupidly,
"Where is He? Where is He?"

In the middle of the night,
People rose from their bed, started yelling,
"There is a robber, there is a robber."
He was also yelling and screaming with them,
"There is a robber, there is a robber."
He was the robber.

His voice mixed with the others so well,
Nobody could identify Him.

He is with you.[\[125\]](#)
He is also looking for you.
If you are searching, search for Him.

"He is closer to you than yourself."[\[126\]](#)
Why do you go outside?
Choose poverty, melt like snow,
Search yourself, in yourself.

When a man falls in love,
He becomes like an iris,
Starts talking, but you keep silent.
That's what the iris does,
It has a tongue, but it doesn't talk.

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Break the strings of "myself," and "yourself," from
The harp of the mind,
Start playing tunes of the heart.
One for me, one for you.

In longing, we are all together,
But once we start talking,
I become one friend, you become another.

When we get into a cave,
We turn into Ahmed and Ebu-Bekr,[\[127\]](#)
Because duality is a different cave for me,
A different cave for you.

We have had lots of journeys
In this land of thorns.
Now, remove the thorn of me and you
From my feet.

O heart, take refuge, go
Sleep like a drunk in
The shadow of Jesus.
He was gone, but both you and I
Have been crying for Him.

I got involved with gold.
You, O head, you keep prostrating.
It is not good to be idle,
Neither for you, nor for me.

Anybody looking for me,
Should come to your neighborhood.
If somebody becomes Layla, it should be you.
For Majnun, it has to be me.

The "robber" who staged the hold-up Has been caught.
You set one gallow for him,
I'll set one.

Be silent, there is honor in silence
For you and for me.
Impatience in that is shameful
For you and for me.

144.

Verse 1307

My heart starts beating fast,
Come and tell me again, O Soul,
Come and say, O world.
Move this chain, start talking
O cupbearer of soul.

The Sultan of Beauties has come.
That magnificent Beauty has come.
How long will you keep pulling my ear?
O one holding my ear, come, talk.

It is a secret that Semender[\[128\]](#) doesn't burn in the fire.
But Kalender[\[129\]](#) has a Soul even better than that,
More amazing than that.

Watch the gathering of the drunks;
Don't tell fables.
Come to the front with a big glass;
Talk with a deep voice.

Express through bow and arrow
How your gaze is like an arrow,
Your marksman brows, the secrets
Of that archer.

Speak, O my soul,
Speak in front of everybody,
But make His witty remarks secretly to Him.

The one who loves Him, who sees Him,
Is already drunk with His clear, pure wine.
Tell the news about His agate-looking lips,
O real pearl of the mine.

I am all upside down,
Thrown to the claw of that lion.
I am full of this world,
No interest in daily events.
Tell me about the condition of so and so.

The tune of grief is at the bottom.

Bass notes deserve the strings of joy.
One moment, sing and play this way,
Another moment, another way.

The Sun is your helper;
Kingdom is your friend, company.
You got what you wanted,
Reached your goal, talked openly.

O One who knows and understands the truth,
Once you passed through this trickling,
Dripping, melting mud and reached
The world of meaning, talk like Hatif[\[130\]](#)
Without name or surname, tell about that world.

Make your home in the world of soul.
Watch the land of absence. Walk in that direction.
Tell about the ones who go
Like fire, running like lightning.

I am not myself.
I've become drunk.
I closed this dog's mouth.
O Sultan, to whom I am a slave and servant,
You tell, without tongue and lips.

145.

Verse 1320

Look at our thirst
And play that cheerful tune.
O light of my eye, see all
These tears in my heart, play and sing.

Look at all that sugar come together,
Look at the ones who are watching us.
Look at those sweet looks, talk about them.

Today you are so drunk that
You jumped over the river of the universe.
There is that someone, if you wish
Tell us about Him today.

We know you are master of both worlds.

But, at the end, who really received you?
Tell us about Him today.

You have seen so many universes
With your heart, your eyes,
Without leaving your place.
Tell us about your journey.

You are in a boat, passing through oceans.
There is wave after wave.
Sometimes you go up, sometimes down.
Tell about the top, tell about the bottom.

You become a constant companion of patience,
Suffer nicely with grief.
Draw the sword of tongue,
Tell about patience, tell about the shield.

Look at the drunkenness of the gathering,
They made a pillow out of glasses.
God, You increase that drunkenness, Amen.
Come and tell us that story from the beginning.

Whoever finds this proof and reveals it,
Finds the Soul, a hundred souls.
If you don't believe me,
Go and talk with stone or wood.

He said if I follow him, listen to him,
"I'll scratch your face."
O one who knows the truth,
Tell this to Him in the early dawn.

"Put another kettle on the fire,
Other guests have come from the village."
Talk about pawning your belt,
If you already pawned your crown.

If you are talking with Rafizi,[\[131\]](#)
Mention the kindness of Ali.
If he is Sunni, talk about
The justice of Omar.[\[132\]](#)

How much could an ant talk
About the justice of Solomon?
You tell us the secret of exaltation.

146.

Verse 1333 [\[133\]](#)

Where are you, O my kind,
Gracious, moon-faced Master?
I am looking for you to ask,
“How are you? How am I?”

What a beautiful morning this is.
All the rinds[\[134\]](#) are drunk.
They are in the river, naked,
With the Beloved until evening.

O people, we came to you,
We gave you soul, sacrifice to you.
Our desires are purified,
Cleansed since we have seen you.

I will rejoice whether you
Offer me a glass of wine
Or cuss and swear at me.
Whatever you want, that's what I want.
That's what I'll do,

You hear all that nonsense
When this man gets drunk.
My God, help me,
I am saying lots of nonsense.

O my lady, fill my cup with coffee.
Give me one after another.
Pity the one who visits you awake.

O horseman of this place,
Keep turning like you're dizzy.
You are not less than the sky
In the service of that Beauty.

I love you, Celebi,[\[135\]](#) I love you,
But where are you, where?
You have no contempt, no pride,
Look for us now, take our heart in your hand.

Where did you sleep?
What dream did you see?
Tell me, O heart,
Since you are relaxed and drunk,
I wish you would never be sober again.

O my support, once the Beloved's mouth is opened,
The wine he serves gets better and better,
Sweeter and sweeter.

You are like a salt mine,
Also in the heart of the soul.
O you whose kindness and favors are expected,
Everybody's taste, everything's beauty
Comes from you.

Every beauty looks a little bit like you,
Otherwise I wouldn't look at the man or woman.
I would close my eyes and pass away from this world.

Even if people blame me,
Laugh at me, tie my hand,
It is impossible for me
To go away from here.

Heart becomes cold, frozen,
From cold people.
When Mazi [\[136\]](#) loses its color,
Heart feels the gloom.

Once he hears your voice,
Heart will fly like a pigeon
Over hundreds of curtains and walls,
Castles come to the tower of union.

There are people who were born
To do bad things.
They lie on the way to reach You.
But we don't hear them.

This obstinate self is like a little goat,
Wants to climb high mountains, get to the top.
But he doesn't have anything but a beard.
I can name him the bushy-bearded one.

Be silent, be silent, forget the words.

Put your mind in your head.
Don't come this way, try to fly
To the other side like a dove.

147.

Verse 1351

☞ Kalender-hearted friend, [\[137\]](#)
Why do you worry, and become restless?
Why do you think of the raven?
You are the Soul of the windfall.

Come slowly to the circle of
The ones who play with their souls
And play with your own soul.
Where are you, O one who
Has left home and town?

Your ruby lips reveal the treasure you have.

Meter - 4

1.

Verse 2246

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☞ What is the Turkish name of Suttur? Say camel.
What's the name of its calf, which runs behind?
That's the young camel, Koshek.

We are also the sons of fate and destiny.
Everybody's mother is fate and destiny. We keep
Running after fate and destiny, like children.

We were nursed by that. Either it flies to the East,
To the West or ascends the sky. We are after that.

The drum is beaten for the journey.
Let's ask for help, for the Grace of God,

And make the right start on the road.

We are company to the moon-faced
One in the town as well as on the desert;
Souls become slaves and servants
To that moon face.

Isn't there a place where the Sultan of Soul pulls us?
That's where the town is.
Isn't there a place where God calls us?
That's where the house is.

If He is Kible, if we turn our face to Him
The road won't be long. The desert becomes small.
We don't mind the journey. Everything will be
Green like the garden of Cypress.

Even the mountain in front of us will bend down.
Greetings, O one who is on the
Journey toward the Source of Greatness.

As long as He is our guide, this field
Of stones on our way turns into ground as soft as silk.

We run like a shadow behind that Moon.
O travelers on the same road with
Similar hearts, come and walk with us.

That brave man who doesn't
Hurt anybody gives the heart
As company for the road, because
Heart is quick, agile and speedy.

Heart goes to Egypt without boarding a ship,
Arrives at Mecca without joining a caravan.

God's secret doesn't manifest in the body.
Because of the lameness of the body, that blessing
Appears only in the heart because of its agility.

But there is such a body that becomes
The same color as the soul. It turns into water
And soil for the Sultan of Soul.

But if souls see a body like that they become amazed
And say, "Look at that black soil,

He went beyond us and became a sultan.
He turned out to be the one who is followed."

Here is someone to be followed.
If we step in the place before him,
Where he has already arrived,
We fall into confusion and bum out.

We were not expecting this.
We kept blaming him.
O poor one, don't look down on anyone.

We are on the road. We have flown inside the rose,
In the essence of Reyhan^[1] like water,
To make the barren land become green with grass.

The ground has no feet, no hands.
It's heart is burning with thirst.
Because of that, rivers and creeks run toward it.

The water wheel will keep bringing water
Because it is nursing it's children,
It's plants and flowers.

This pulling has attracted us from the town of soul
And, through hundreds of stages,
Has brought us to the land of absence.

Now and then, envoys come openly, or secretly,
From the town of soul, inviting us to,
"Come, come to your close ones.

You now have new friends. You left us.
You may be happy without us,
But we can't do without you."

My hodja, your sadness and your sorrows,
Come from the sadness of your friends.
To whomever you become a friend,
He has left you.

Be silent, their zeal is still with you.
Their efforts are saving you from troubles.

Verse 2271

Night has gone, but things come
To mind that are not finished.
We can't tell them all,
But we should tell them one by one.

I swear to God, that long road,
From the time of Adam until now,
Has not been shortened.
It won't be shortened until resurrection day.

But it looks like it is about to be finished.
The traveler asks the Turk, "How much road is left?"
The Turk answers, "Isbu".[\[2\]](#)

By that, the Turk means to give you encouragement,
To speed you on your journey.

How could he stop you and ask you to stay
At the stage where there is still road to go?
To stop here is like dying.

He is so kind, so generous.
He would give his life for you.
But if he stops you from your journey
You will get into trouble.

Don't think badly about the Turk.
Don't blame him. Don't be obstinate like a Hindu.
Run, O companion of the road. Run.

There, all friends and relatives
Are anxiously awaiting you.
They put three horseshoes in the fire.

O loyal friend, if you are for the kind
And the munificent, how come this
Clear water goes through your throat?

They will make you bitter
Even if you are submerged in honey.
If you become friendly with someone
Loyal, he will torment you.

Be silent. Keep going on the road
And make this known. The water
Kept the stranger's head whirling
Like a mill stone.

3.

Verse 2282

☞ cupbearer, who offers wine,
Come give wine, Our cup is empty.
Fill it with that love's wine.

O perfect beauty, O friend of complete
Greatness and favor, my body
Is the cup to me. Your love is the wine.

There is no lover who could see your face
For one moment and not suffer from
Your troubles; be melted down.

O full moon, even death is beautiful,
When I am with you, but you don't kill.
To reach you is to be saved from trouble.

When your love sings praises, it seems that
Pigeons and doves repeat it's words,
And coo in my heart.
You kindly offered me that beautiful wine
So that my heart became purified and shone.

4.

Verse 2288

☞ Every day, at early dawn, that sultan,
And the secret of the one who has
The consent of God, sit together there.
I say, "Greetings to both of you."

Heart is settled at his temple,
Expecting that sultan to scatter gold and gifts.

Soul has drunk from the cup of wine and passed out
Until judgment day. Heart has been putting our share
On the table of our body, time, and saying.

“The hand of Love’s Jesus offers happiness
To every dead one and health
To every sick one from that share.

With that share, the garden
Of drinks will have leaves
And become green and adorned.
The harp, which is bent over, will gain melodies.”

Body is dancing with “ten-ten” beats.
Soul has already gone to the land of Absence;
Is ruined and is falling to the ground.

Dungeons became heaven from the sound
Of love’s reed flute. The judge of reason
Became drunk at the bench of judgment.

The came to ask the teacher of reason,
“Form where did this instigation
Come to the Muslim world?”

The jurist of universal intelligence answers saying,
"Whether you deem it proper or not,
This moment is the moment of resurrection.
The last day of judgment is here."

Souls who became jewelers,
Scatter souls like pearls, like coral from the sea of Absence.

Preachers of love came to the place of festivity
With Zulfekaar,[\[3\]](#) and started praising that Sultan.

The purest of the pure had the desire to see him;
To sit at the door of the palace with the doorkeeper.

If He looks at them through the opening of the curtain,
So many yells and screams of love
And, "How are you?" would be heard.

He wanted to give light and glory to the sky,
But His chest, which resembles Mt. Sinai,
Could not fit the sky.

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Those four elements resemble
The boiling kettle that overflows.
There is no constancy in fire or soil;
No quietness in water or air.

Time by time earth gets the urge
To cover itself with green dresses.
Sometimes water becomes air
And ascends to the sky with that love.

Water is colored by red and turns into fire,
Then fire becomes air and goes into space.

Four poles, four elements walk square to square
Like chess men, but this moves with the love
Of the Sultan, not simple play like yours.

O one who doesn't know anything, walk toward
The pure clear water so its purity and clarity
Can clean your cloudiness, your dirt and dust.

Because water looks for .cleanliness, that cleanliness
Could only happen if you reach the sea of light.

If you turn your face from man,
Who is not separated from God,
You eat stone, like a devil, from the hand of God.

Yes, man is not God.
But it is God's usual custom that He
Manifest the secret of greatness in man.

If you prostrate in front of man
With heart, soul and body,
It is by God's order, not pretension.

You turn your face from Kible.
Wherever you turn, that place
Becomes Kaaba in your heart.

I cannot put myself together on the road.
How could my faithful friends gather
Themselves because of me?

O Heart, the wall of the house is built by putting
Stones on top of each other. After that,
People gather inside of the house.

How could I put myself together now that
God's Shems, who is the head of every
Great gathering, has settled down at Tebriz?

5.

Verse 2315

☞ man, come back to our door,
Hear the voice of "return" from our hearts.

O bare-footed man, we open the gate
Of the rose garden for you.
Why do you go to thorn bushes? What is this?

Soul, I created them, gave them trouble.
The One who gives trouble also gives relief.

Go to the garden of love if you want to have
The stature of a cypress, because
That hunchbacked fate bends your back here.

There is such a garden, such a meadow,
That it's leaves are alive.
They talk, so do the branches.
A garden without soul doesn't add soul to Soul.

O young, fresh Son of life,
How do you do with the smell of death?
Doesn't death bother you?

Both worlds are filled with the one
Who is eternally alive and gives life to all.
Don't be separated from us with
Contempt of these five days of life.

Everyone of these innumerable particles are like soul,
Moving like the sun in the sky of greatness. .

They were also a bat, like us, earlier,

But with His kindness and grace,
A bat became the sun.

Love Sufis, tear your mantles
Even the rose has torn hundreds of mantles
Because of the early morning breeze.

The rose has lost its patience and decision
Because it is separated from the
Beloved and afflicted with thorns,

Somebody showed his face from the land of Absence,
Sent his invitation, then disappeared.
Just before that he said, "This is a short distance,
Even if you don't have feet and have to walk."

I became silent. I went after the rose and gave
My regards to the tulips and sweet basil.

Heart is full of words, but it is hard to tell them all.
O soul of Sufis, open your lips. You tell our stories.

Tell about the situation which has not yet appeared.
To talk about the past is not a Sufi custom.

If the purse is not tightened, if the thief tears it,
How could money be contained in this purse?
None of the silver would stay there. It would slip out.

6.

Verse 2331 Terci-Bend

Drunkenness, being in love, youth and our Beloved,
Nevruz[4] spring and green all keep calling "Come here."

The eyes of the world have never seen
Spring like that. Rare and precious things
Are growing in the mountains and valleys.

There is an houri leaning on every tree.
If you have the power to see, watch them.

Flowers are drinking cups of Soul's wine.

Look, they are calling you.

If you haven't seen wine drinking,
At least enjoy watching them.
Bravo, O flower, Hello, O wine.

The iris is saying to the bud,
"How come you stay asleep, wake up, jump."
There are candles, beauty and wine.
There is flirting and instigation.

Sweet basil and tulips hold wine cups in their hands.
Where does this offer come from?
Is it from anyone else but God?

Everybody is poor and somber, except God.
They look rich on the surface
But down deep they frown.
Everybody is dark and poor.

It doesn't make sense to beg from a beggar.
He drinks one drop of wine and becomes drunk like us.

Hyacinth bends down to the ear of the rose
And says, "The shadow of God always stays over us."

Last year we threw off our mantles. Remember?
Two or three mantles are worth nothing.
We offer our life to Him.

Be said, "O one who gave the old mantle,
All this is nonsense and mean talking;
All these stingy people's eyes would be
Blind seeing that new mantle. Take it."

Every sultan gives a turban,
This one offers wisdom and reason.
This Sultan donates endless souls.

O smiling rose garden, walk,
Rain the cloud of gratitude.
He will tell the rest of the Terci. Be patient.

O one who rains mercy hundreds of thousands of times;

God's compassion gives new kindness
And grace every moment.
Give praise to that beautiful face.
I pray that it never fades for a moment.

All the faces of the beauties are a curtain to that face.
Once that charmer uncovers his face,
The rest of them will disappear.

How could Venus shove its face in front of sunlight?
How could a fly attack a storm?

How happy that spring is that Your wind blows.
How glorious that disciple is that
You are his intention.

I came to order at the presence of
A beloved one moment with your love.
He brought a golden crown and put it on my head.

His heart will be clean and his faith will be purified.
The one who undresses from his being dives in the ocean.

Would the one who girds himself with honesty
And truth be afraid of defeat and troublemakers?

The one who relies on your loyalty,
Becomes exalted and steps on that roof
Which stands with no pole and no support,

"His previous and future sins are forgiven." [\[5\]](#)
Your blessings won't be diminished.
He won't afflict bad luck, won't return to
His old shape, won't be deprived of your blessing.
He is sure of all of them.

Earth becomes entirely green because the head
Of water carriers offers a fountain of life
To people of our time.

The destiny that past centuries wanted to see
In their dreams was given to the people of our time.

Not to the one who has a long finger and eats halva,
But to the one who deserves Keykubad [\[6\]](#).

The sea of God's compassion is so full and has become
So rough that every moment the waves are saying,

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"This is the essence of spring,
At the same time, it is spring."
We come to the third Terci, put your
Mind in your head; listen to the story.

Night came, everybody was running to their houses.
At the time of night s Namaz, [\[7\]](#) a new day appeared.

A Soul came to help and educate the souls.
All the souls are His shadow.

He puts the saddle and girth on his horse in order
To free the people from this narrow place, this jail.

The ties of grief and the trap of sorrows,
Which block the people's way,
Have been removed every moment,
But the one who does this is not apparent.

Open your chest to the early morning breeze
So death will come back to life;
So freshness will come to old dried bones.

If you don't believe it, go and see in the
Garden how that soil has tasted a drop
Of wine from the wind of early dawn.

If cruelty has locked your heart, now they
Are playing the drum; announcing
That the key came to open your heart.

They blame the hope of lovers, but the sea won't
Become dirty from the mouth of those dogs.

This is a holiday for Sufis, these food trays are
Evidence of that. But even if there is no tray,
Nothing would be lost from the holiday.

This is the end of the Bazaar.
Come to your senses, let's see what you bought,

Lucky one who traded beads for pearls.

He has seen the truth about illusionary goods[8]
So he chose the love of the beloved
And acquired that peerless pearl.

You have a wonderful Muselles[9]. Drink it.
It is good for you. Happy is the one who drinks at
The tavern of eternity and creeps and crawls there.

Every moment, there is a new spring, a new wine.
The soul of the drunk tears his dress
A thousand times, like the rose.

I have seen the love who had the glass in his hand,
Saying, "Greetings from our assembly to the lovers,"

O friend, the flag of your love flies forever,
Never comes down. The one who doesn't have
Love is lost and deprived.

The wind of Your love is calling from the essence
Of all existence, "My greatness brought you
Back to life. My greatness is greater than great."

Love is the foundation, the essence of our lives.
The one who runs away from love and goes to
The other shady place is the one who is deprived.

How lucky is the one who could read them; such writings
Have been written on the face of the lover.

O one who is submerged in all this trouble
And is frowning, for God's sake watch me
And listen to my words.

O one who follows the desire of self, lowers his mind
And falls down; be sure that the fastest way to ascend
To exaltation is to lower the Self.

O one who was involved with the beloved and forgot
His livelihood, God is more than enough for support,
For a defender for you.

7.

Verse 2380

Spring came boasting to our side,
Friends have settled down right
Here in our home with a smile.

Be purified and honor Him.
Come in with good news to the Beloved.
Drink our wine.

The one who wants to have treasure
And pearls, has to row the boat
To the middle of the ocean.

8.

Verse 2383

Spring came happily; our beloved came to our arms
With hundreds of thousands of bales of sugar.

That moon came to wake us up from the drunkenness of
Rose-colored wine. Soul is enlightened from that moon.

Welcome a cypress of our rose garden,
Green grass of our tulip garden.
You arrived in such a royal way.

Shine and glitter a moon. Have a long life. Enlighten
Us at the jungle of this earth for hunting. Be eternal.

The sea praises and overflows, saying,
"You are as a peerless pearl."
The mountain roars, "O friend of our cave."

O day of assembly, our cupbearer, who offers donations
Like seas; a male lion of the battle's day;
Our Zulfekaar![\[10\]](#)

How are you in that foreign land on this lonely journey?
Let's go together to our land.

Verse 2390 [\[11\]](#)

☞ We cannot be satisfied with jugs and jars.
Take us to our river.

Have our drunken minds and restless hearts reach
The peace of the fairy face who stays at the fountain.

The sun is the only thing remaining as a
Gift for us from His face. The moon has
Melted and disappeared like us, with His love.

O brightness of our mornings,
O charming beauty who cheers our morning wine drinking!
O the glory that comes to us, one after the other!

You are very drunk, completely out of yourself.
Even so, don't refuse to drink more, because our
Drunkenness, our wine is well worth whatever you say.

Pick up the glass which is filled with
Fire and shines like the sun.
Drink as you look at the face of our sultan.

That one's work stayed unfinished.
My heart has also become idle.
But the one who is our work
And occupation will do that work.

9.

Verse 2397

☞ One who has separated and stayed away from
His home, his town; welcome back from
The journey from God's house.

In order to visit the Kaaba,
To see the face of Mohammed,
You have walked without
Provisions day and night.

You rubbed your face on God's house of kible.
You entered the House of God.
You reached the secret of "One who
Enters finds mercy and salvation."[\[12\]](#)

How have you survived on the road full of danger?
God saves people from all kinds of danger.

The sound of "Lebbeyk"[\[13\]](#) of pilgrims in the sky
Reaches the throne of God. The sky is full of humming.

O you who have seen Merve, have climbed Safa.[\[14\]](#)
Soul kisses your eyes and puts his head at your feet.

You have been a guest of God. He promised
To take care of those who became His guest.

Soul would become soil at the feet of the
Camel which carries the pilgrim to the
Stages of Mesar-al Haram and Mina.[\[15\]](#)

He came back from pilgrimage
But his heart stuck at the door of Kaaba.
His body is inflicted with troubles here.

The ones who come from Damascus
At Zat Cuhje and the ones from Basra
At Zat-al Arak are covered by coffins.[\[16\]](#)
They have only a sword.
"Our God, we are directed to You." they say.

You turned seven times around Kaaba.
Come to Makam,[\[17\]](#) and do two Rekat[\[18\]](#) Namaz.

Climb the hill of Safa, put your face
Down to the ground, say Tekbir.[\[19\]](#)
Exalt God, tell of His uniqueness. Pray.

Then climb Merve and do the same thing there.
Repeat seven times. Afterwards,
Come back to Kaaba and do Tawaf.[\[20\]](#)

On the day of Terviye[\[21\]](#) listen to the
Eloquent sermon, then come to Arafat.[\[22\]](#)

Come and stay near the mountain.

Spend the night there. Stay until morning.

Then turn your face to Mina. Afterward,
Pick up seven stones and throw them.[\[23\]](#)

Greetings from us to Hafin[\[24\]](#) and Rukn.[\[25\]](#)
How thirsty we are for Zemzem,[\[26\]](#)
That house of loyalty.

We wake up one morning, the morning breeze
Brings the smell of the separation of Mecca
From the stage place of Abraham.

10.

Verse 2415

You took my sleep away, a Moon,
Take the cover from your face so the sun can
Prostrate in our presence, with thanks.

I hold your skirt. You twist my arm.
I take my hand off now,
But don't turn your face from faithfulness.

"Don't rush," you said,
"Hurrying is the devil's work."
The devil is the one who doesn't
Come to you without rushing.

I say my God, wouldn't that be a day when
I would see myself praying at His temple?
All my desires, thousands of "My Gods"
Are waiting for an answer.

Fiery souls have fallen into the fire.
Hearts, who are thirstier than soil,
Have pitchers in their hands, asking for water.

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Pity the soil. It is the one among the four elements
That rolls and changes from one shape
To the other without hands or feet.

Once he becomes light and impatient,
He takes a few steps toward the clouds, limping.
That's his fastest, quickest move.

These steps of that lame one makes lightning laugh.
Soft-spoken thunder feels pity and helps him.

Cloud tells the water carriers to get up,
Run to the thirsty of the earth,
Save them from trouble.

Assuming I did not say these words,
Don't you get the smell of burned heart?

And then a cloud-like water carrier
Comes and spreads wine-filled jars,
Pitchers and sacks over the world.

Be silent. Look for the treasure of love at the ruins.
This treasure grows, in the spring, in run-down places.

11.

Verse 2427

Love has ruined my heart.
It is about time for the sun to shine on my broken heart.

That sultan has prayed for me,
Then he accepted his own prayer.
When I heard that, I became so ashamed,
I lost all control and fell to the ground.

In order to calm me down,
He showed His face many times,
But I told Him, "Every time I
Looked at Your face it was covered.
All I saw on Your face was the cover.

Even the light of that cover bums the universe.
What would happen if that Sultan uncovered His face?

Love met me, then passed by. I ran after.
He turned back to attack, like an eagle,
And swallowed me in one bite.

When He swallowed me I lost time and place.
I plunged into a most pleasant sea
And was saved from sorrow and torment.

The one who hasn't eaten and digested the morsel
Of grief wouldn't know the taste of this wine.

Prophets depend on that and drink trouble like juice,
With that trust; because water is never afraid of fire.

12.

Verse 2435

That moon, the one that fortune has never seen,
Rose again and flamed the fire
Which can never be extinguished.

Look at the house of body. Watch the soul.
This one is drunk with the wine of love,
The other has fallen to the ground.

When the tavern keeper became a friend of my heart,
My blood turned into wine with love.
My lungs were roasted.

Once my eyes are filled with His image, a voice comes,
"What a beauty you are O glass.
How wonderful you are, O wine."

Shemseddin's face, whom Tebriz praises,
Is such a sun that hearts will follow,
Will run behind him, like clouds.

13.

Verse 2440

O harp, I want the mode of Isfahan[27]
O reed flute, I want to have a nice wail
Which bums and bums.

Start a nice melody in the mode of Hicaz.[\[28\]](#)
I am a bird of Hoopoe,
I want the whistle of Solomon.

Take gifts from the mode of Irak to Ussak,
Because I desire Rast and good melodies from Buselik.

Go into Huseyni, because Maye[\[29\]](#) said,
"I want the melodies from my small and large ones."

You put me to sleep with the mode of Rehavi.
Wake me up with the mode of Zengule.
That's what I want now.

This knowledge of music is like making Shahadet.[\[30\]](#)
Since I believe, I want to pronounce my belief.
I want to make Shahadet.

O Love, break up the mind, let it go.
O Love, I want perplexed, subtle points.

O beautiful wind, you are coming from
The garden of love, stay a moment with me.
I want the smell of the rose garden.

Under the light of the Beloved,
Forms of beauties are seen.
I want to watch the face of the Beloved.
I want to see them.

14.

Verse 2449

Show your face. I want to watch
The meadow and the rose garden.
Open your lips, say something,
I want lots of sugar and honey.

O sun of beauty, appear one moment from behind
The cloud. I want to see that gleaming, sparkling face.

I have heard the sound of drums from the air around you.
I am a falcon. I come again.

I desire the hand and arm of the sultan.

"Go away," you said, "don't
Hurt me any more with your coyness."
The words, "Don't hurt me anymore."
I want those words again.

"Go away, the sultan is not at home," you said.
And then you drove me away.
I want that rude refusal of the doorkeeper.

There are pieces cut off from the source of
Beauty in everybody's hand. But I want
The whole mine, the treasure of Beauty.

The water and bread of this fortune
Resemble an unreliable creek.
I am a fish. I am an alligator. I want the ocean.

I keep saying what a pity, how sorry.
Like Jacob, I want the beautiful face of Joseph of Canaan.

Really, this town is like a jail for me without you.
I want to climb the mountains and go to the valleys.

I am tired of these slow, cozy friends.
I want God's lion, Zaloglu Rustem.[\[31\]](#)

I am bored with the Pharoah and his cruelty.
I want the glory of the face of Moses, son of Imran.

I am sick of these crying, complaining,
Wailing people I want to hear
The yells and shouts of drunks.

I would sing better than a nightingale,
But because of people's envy I seal my mouth.
Yet, I want to scream so much.

Yesterday, the sheik was running around
The city with the candle in his hand,
Saying, "I am tired of devils and giants.
I am searching for man."[\[32\]](#)

"We also searched for him," they said,
"But couldn't find him." He answered

"The one I want is the one you can't find."

I am broke but I don't want a small piece of agate.
I desire peerless and, at the same time,
A cheap mine of a gate.

The invisible source of eyes and sight;
I want this art of obvious secret.

In any case, things are all over now.
I am through with desires and greed all together.
I am looking for the footprints of the elements
In the world of place and existence.

My ears have heard the story of fate, have become drunk.
I want to see the beautiful eyes of faith.

I hold the wine glass in one hand,
The other is in the beloved's curly hair.
I want to dance like that at the square.

That rebab[33] is saying, "I am dying by waiting,
I want the hand, arm and bow of Osman.[34]"

I am also love's rebab. My love resembles
The love of rebab. I want God's favor
Of the bow and kindness of the plectrum.

O courteous, graceful player,
You finish the rest of this gazel.
But do it the way I want and desire it.

O Shems, to whom Tebriz gives praises,
Rise from the East. I am the hoopee,
I want the temple of Solomon.

15.

Verse 2473

It is a precept that the lover must search for,
And tell about, the Beloved. The lover must flow
To the river of the Beloved like a torrent,
With his head face down.

As a matter of fact, He is the one who asks and desires.
We are like shadows.
All our talks, our conversations belong to the Beloved.
In reality, He is the One who does the talking.
He tells about Himself.

Sometimes we go to the creek of the Beloved,
Like a cascading, running stream.
Sometimes we fill the jar of the Beloved,
Like water, and stay still there.

Sometimes we are boiled down like
Water in a cooking pot.
He stirs us with a skimmer.
That's the habit of the Beloved.

He puts His mouth to our ear,
Keeps saying something in order
To have our soul get the smell the Beloved.

He becomes Soul to the soul.
It is impossible to be separated from Him.
I haven't seen any enemy of the Beloved in this world.

He will melt you, weaken you with coyness
And coquetry. You'll become as slim as a hair.
But still you won't change one hair of
The Beloved of two worlds.

We sit with the Beloved. We stay with Him
Even though we are looking for Him.
We call, "Where are You?
Where are You?" in our drunkenness.

Bad thoughts and illusions all come
From our lousy nature.
It is not from the Beloved.

Be silent. He praises Himself.
Where are your worries and troubles?
Where are His?

It is like a life for us to see your face
Since early dawn. Today, your beautiful
Face became much more beautiful.
Bow nicely you catch our hearts.

You have a different beauty on your face today.
Whatever that crazy lover does; it is worth it today.

After seeing you, the one who was
Advising me yesterday apologized today.

I don't have enough eyes,
I should have hundreds more.
I could borrow from someone.
But who has eyes able to see You?

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For several days my heart has had a funny feeling.
It seems that I would have the good luck to reach
The Kingdom on a day like that.

If I say, "This is human." I am shamed by love.
If I say, "This is God." I become afraid of God.

My eyebrows keep twitching; my heart beating rapidly.
I didn't know I would be destined for such glory.

I move more than trees in this garden and meadow
Because I am the tree of fortune and glory.
The morning wind breezes through my head.

What would happen to the tree to which
You gave leaves? How is the stranger on whom
The bird of good luck nestles his head?

Out of obstinacy to the blind, who says the shadow
Is separated from the tree; we are wandering
Around the shadow of Your sun.

Soul yells and screams saying, "What a fiery love."
Since He stayed with you,
The fountain of life is also with Him.

When your specter is passing by heart's neighborhood,

Heart comes out of the door asking, "Where is Soul?"

Earth would be illuminated and adorned so much from
The moon that when you look at the ground you'll see
A thousand of the planet Venus and a thousand Suns.

Look through the window of my heart,
Shine like a Sun there. So the sky won't Say,
"That moon has no loyalty."

My neck is bent with grief.
That's why my words are coming out twisted.
But I am straight like an arrow with Your love.
That's the whole truth.

The picture of Tebriz is inscribed on heart
Because it is the Kible of acceptance there at
The house where prayers are answered.

17.

Verse 2499

Don't be concealed.
Your face is so auspicious to us.
It is great happiness to see and to watch you.

Don't keep your shadow out of our head
For even one moment. As You know, the
Shadow of the bird of luck is good luck for us.

O spring of beauty, come.
That nice air is good for garden and meadow.
It is a blessing to the rose garden and valleys.

Hundreds of thousands of souls will be sacrificed
To that sacred Soul that comes to the quarter of love.

We are roaming from one place to another with Your love;
No work, no occupation. But this idleness and
This kind of love are a blessing for us.

O ones who are tied to bodies, go and watch the soul.
"Outings and observing are auspicious," the Prophet said.[\[35\]](#)

Every leaf, every tree is an envoy from the land
Of Absence, bringing the news,
Saying the clean green is sacred.

How do the leaves and trees give this news without
Sound and words? You also hear without ears
Because this is good news.

O One who is the Soul of the four elements of universe,
Your beauty, Your face is the blessing of water and wind,
The holiness of fire and earth.

That means whatever you sow you always harvest.
It won't be lost. How auspicious
It is to sow the seeds of faith.

I would prostrate to the ground You stepped on,
Because that earth is a crown to heads.
I would walk on Your way,
Because that road is sacred for us.

At right that moment, Your image came to my-eyes.
By God, how nicely it came. How wonderful that is.

The shape which gets its color from this
Earth is temporary. The one that takes its
Color from the higher place is auspicious.

The face of spring is happiness for things on the ground.
Swimming and jumping in the sea is the blessing of fish.

That sun which shines from the heart and reflects
On the chest, is auspicious to the Throne of God;
To the sky as well as to the earth.

Heart doesn't have enough power to talk about that.
Soul keeps prostrating, saying, "This is auspicious.
This is auspicious."

The heart would be Your company tonight,
Follow Your way. It would be the
Happiest and luckiest heart tomorrow.

Keep serving wine until we stop talking.
It is better to save certain things in the heart.
That's the blessing.

18.

Verse 2517

☉ one who has already passed away,
There is not even a smell of soul in you,
Go away. Love of the one whose heart
Is alive doesn't wash death.

You resemble Autumn, getting colder day by day.
You haven't had a spark from the fire of love.

Fall will never become spring, never.
And spring doesn't have the bad manners of fall.

The lame fox started a journey for the love of the lion.
I told him, "There is nothing
You can do with humdrum words."

Let us suppose that you don't have the fire of lovers.
What has happened to your shame?
You are disgusting.

Love resembles the dragon.
You are not even a small worm.
Love is like a treasure.
You don't have a grain of treasure.

Let me tell you a few words about love.
Even I don't have the power
To talk about love. Listen:

First, you should know that there is no beginning
And no end for love. Wherever you look,
Love is free from that.

Nowadays, if you are looking for a donkey, go ahead.
Don't search for Jesus here. Jesus cannot be found here.

Jesus is separated from that donkey with
A hallowed heart. Heart is not filled
With layer upon layer of dirt like a pouch.

Don't come to the front with a donkey.

You cannot run, cannot attack riding a donkey;
Will not be able to hit the ball
With the club while riding a donkey.

My heart, which resembles an Indian cupbearer,
Set up a gathering to prevent the grief of a Turk
To ride a horse, because there is no banquet today.

I should come to town like a drunk so people
Would understand that; this man is not
Among the beggars of the neighborhood.

That love, who sells wine, and became
Drunk with the wine that cannot be
Contained by jar or pitcher, is raising hell.

The only tongue that tastes this wine
Belongs to the person who has no tongue.
This wine gives enjoyment to the throat
Of the person who has no throat.

Enough. No matter how much you want to talk,
I am drunk with that wine and have no desire to talk.

19.

Verse 2533

Today, even the sky is admiring our moon-faced one.
Even the Sun is embarrassed
Seeing the brightness of his face.

There is no other sun in the morning of existence.
His Sun of Union shines
On every piece and on total existence.

But he appears in a different shape every evening
And every morning. For that reason,
Each one looks different than the other.

He shows you different shapes opposite each other.
The differences are hidden among the opposite things.

If you have war, there seems to be many armies.
In peace-time you know there is only one army.

Abraham had goodness.
That's why fire appeared to him as water.
Nimrud[36] was nothing but a curse.
Water appeared to him as fire.

Joseph was like a wolf to the jealous ones.
They didn't look on him as a sweet-lipped brother.

This one cut her hands from love, watching his face.
The other considered him a bad person
And attempted to take his life.

That curtain is not woven by wool.
It is made by jealousy.
Don't look at the beloved behind this curtain.
He doesn't look very pleasant.

Self is such a devil that envy is only a
Small part of its nature. You think about
How ugly and dirty the whole Self is.

Now, you are feeding that ugly snake with milk.
It will turn into a dragon soon.
There is man-eating in its nature.

O lightning, which kills dragons, flash from the sky
Of exaltation. Remove the dragon, because soul falls
Into distress and anxiety because of him.

If you want to be put on a chest and sit at
The head of the table, become like the
Heart without an alphabet, quit talking.
Your tongue becomes like a beggar
Behind the door because of words.

20.

Verse 2546

You have no arms, no lap; even so embrace me.
God knows, to caress the lover and make
His heart happy is not a shame.

There is no beginning, no end of You.

O Sea without mercy, you don't wash the shore.
You show no pity.

There is no peace, no decision in anybody since you
Have shown your moon-face to lovers.
They all turned into a restless sky.

We have no hope but favors of Your
Sea of Grace and kindness, because it is
Impossible to scatter Your pearls of praise.

We have fallen in with Your whim, we have seen
Your clamor, Your magnificence, and have become
So confused that we can't do anything.

Show me a man who hasn't been trapped by You.
Show me a lion who hasn't been hunted by You.

We are birds that have escaped and flown from
Hundreds of traps.
But Your trap is such that there is no way to escape.

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The envoy of Your love came like a cupbearer offering
Morning wine, which doesn't give a hangover.

"I am tired and weak; sick from separation," I said.
"Come on," He said, "it is not time for excuses."

"I am not giving you excuses.
Look at me," I wailed, "I am ruined."

"It is too late. With pain and suffering I came close
To death. That's not the time for drinking," I said.

"Forget your situation, drink," He said,
"Lovers don't have a choice or will power."

If you don't give up comfort, torture and self pity,
They don't let you come close to the people of Union.
They don't allow you to go there.

Water the dust of thoughts and mind with this wine
So they will settle down, because anything else
Besides Love's moon, is dirt and dust.

21.

Verse 2560

The soul who has not known real love, has not
Been involved with love, would find it better to perish,
Because his existence is nothing but shame and disgrace.

Be drunk with love. Love is everything.
There is nothing better than to fall in love;
To deserve the Beloved.

"What is Love?" they ask. "Tell them that love is
To abandon all desires, all wishes and the will
To do or not to do; to reject choices and selections."
The one who doesn't give this up
Is not worth mentioning.

The lover is such a sultan of sultans that both worlds
Are scattered to his feet like gifts,
But the sultan doesn't need any of them.

Love and lovers are the only eternal things.
Don't pay attention to anything else.
Don't give your heart, because all of that is temporary.

How long will you be embracing a dead sweetheart?
Embrace the soul, which has no beginning,
No end and no sides.

Your rose, which was grown in the spring will die.
But love's rose garden doesn't need the help of spring.

The thorn is the friend of the spring rose.
The wine made from the grape pulp gives a hangover.

Don't stay idle. Move on this road.
I swear to God, this waiting is worse
Than any kind of death.

Don't leave it until tomorrow.
If you are not false today, embrace the heart right away.
Make this like an earring, if you don't have one.

Don't keep trembling at the top of body's horse.
Get down. Become a faster walking pedestrian.
God offers wings to the one who doesn't ride body's horse:

Remove the thoughts, purify your heart.
Be like a mirror, have no form, no ornament.

When the mirror is purified from all forms and pictures,
Every form and picture will reflect on it.
That mirror whose face is clean and shiny,
Is not ashamed of any face.

If you want to be free from fault and shame,
Try it yourself, look at it.
Because that clean mirror tells the truth.
It is not scared or afraid of anyone.

If the mirror, which is made of iron,
Became pure like that; think about
The heart which is free from one small
Piece of dust. What shape would that be?

I'll tell you what that would be.
No. I shouldn't tell. I'll keep silent,
So the beloved won't tell something
That he heard from me,
Because he cannot keep a secret.

22.

Verse 2576

Beloved, although soul's face is beautiful
And very bright. Your face,
Your beauty is something else.

O one who has kept praising soul, show one of
His attributes to be the same as His essence.

The glow of His specter comes to eyes more and more
Every moment. Even so, in front of His union,
This is nothing but a cloudy, weak image.

When I saw that beauty, that face, my mouth
Stayed open. I have the words, "God is great,"

In my heart and on my tongue every moment.

Heart has found an eye that has settled in Your air.
That air nourishes and matures
The eye and heart very nicely.

Talk about neither houris nor the moon.
Don't mention the soul or the fairy,
Because they don't resemble Him.
He is completely different.

His love caresses and embraces man,
Otherwise there is no heart which deserves this love.

The heart which stays with You one
Night turns into bright daylight.
The air becomes brighter and lighter.

The one who gives up his wishes and desires,
Becomes Your disciple. He will find
What he wants without looking.

The one who falls in this Love and burns,
Would be in the Kevser.[\[37\]](#)
Your love is like the river of Heaven.

I hit my head because of Your separation,
But my feet don't touch the ground
With the hope of union.

Don't be grieved with the cruelty of enemies,
Consider that the Beloved is just.
He will take care of you.

If the enemy enjoys seeing the color of my face,
He should know that my saffron-colored face
Is more red than the rose.

I am unable to describe the beauty of my beloved.
Because of that, I have a big problem;
My praises are very weak.

It is most common that when a patient's
Illness becomes worse, pain and suffering increase;
But moaning decreases.

Shemseddin has risen like a moon from Tebriz;
There's no comparison to the moon.
His face is brighter and more beautiful.

23.

Verse 2592

Today is the time to see and meet the Beloved.
Today is the day the great Sun rises.
We have the luck, the fate of the Sun.

The Beloved was cruel yesterday,
He was drinking blood. Today He became kind,
Nourishing the hopeless ones.

Don't even mention the sun and moon or the
Soul and fairy, because they don't resemble Him.
He is totally different.

If someone has seen His face and hasn't been ruined,
He is not a man, he is marble.

The believer who doesn't know His fire in the
The eyes of lovers, is considered an unbeliever.

O one who denies the wine of His lips,
And its existence, look at my eyes.
They look like two glasses full of wine.

The Angel Gabriel knocked on the door.
My moon-faced one asked, "Who is there?"
He answered, "Your old slave, your old servant."

"Who's with you? With whom did you come?"
The Beloved asked.
"Your Love, Your love," the Angel Gabriel said.
"Where?" asked the Beloved.
"In my arms," he answered.

O jasmine body," he said, "Look at me just
Once for the alms of Your beauty.
My eyes are filled with pearls and my face is pale.

I am holding the doorknob in one hand

My other hand is on my head.
Please, kindly look through the half-open door.

The Beloved said, "All the world is in love
With me, particle by particle. Go away.
The thing you brought is not worth anything."

Come, O shah of love, O Shems,
The one Tebriz praises.
Words are not enough to tell this fiery story.
It's beyond description.

24.

Verse 2604

🌹 rose, your face is graceful and delicate.
But don't put your cheek over the beloved's,
Because his is more delicate, more graceful than yours.

Don't bring him in your heart,
Because when you put your cheek over his,
He will know your secret.
The friend who takes heart is very graceful.

Prostrate secretly when desire is intensified.
But don't go beyond that, because he is very delicate.

If you are out of yourself, every time is your time.
But watch out if you are conscious,
Because secrets are very fragile.

Clean your heart from grief because
Heart is the house of his image.
The image of that charmer is very delicate.

The shadow of the rose, one day, has fallen
To the beloved's image, has done so much
To the beloved. Really it is a delicate thing.

Don't look down on the image of Shemseddin
Whom Tebriz praises, because that
Blood-drinking sultan is very graceful.

25.

Verse 2611

Soul came to the body. Body did not go to soul.
The bow doesn't follow the arrow.

Soul jumped out of body,
But the heavy body has fallen to the ground,
Unable to ascend to the sky.

Soul became the landlord of the body in
This mud house. When the landlord leaves,
Body likes to stay in that house.

Flesh became so lonely, however, that
Soul reached the place where even doubt
Would never be able to reach.

The end is separation.
Whoever has seen the one who came to this
World since the world became a world,
Hasn't gone from this world.

Death comes to your door, and squeezes your neck.
Then you wonder; just like nobody
Had come and told you this before.

Water has said so much about my freedom,
My liberation, has rained so much over me.
But it never bothers the ant colony;
Never went inside of the ant colony,
Never inside of the mouth of the ant.

26.

Verse 2618

Even when blame and reproaches are heard from
The right and left,
The lover won't deviate from the road of love.

The moon shines, spreads its light.
The dog keeps barking.
How could you blame the moon?
That's the dog's habit.

He is like a mountain.
He is not a piece of straw to be blown by the wind.
The things that the wind blows are a bunch of mosquitoes.

It is only natural for lovers to be blamed for love.
The same is true for the lover who has a deaf ear.

Prosperity, in this way, is the abolishing,
The complete destruction of two worlds.
The benefit in the way of love, is to give up all benefits.

Jesus is calling from the fourth layer of heaven,
"It is time for the meal.
Wash your hands and your mouth."

Go, annihilate for the beloved at the tavern
Of annihilation. Wherever there are drunks,
There are troubles and fights.

You are coming to the place of the devil, asking for help.
Here, everybody is a demon, a freak.
Ask for help from God.

The Prophet Mohammed told us not to
Take advice from women.
Our self, even when it becomes devout, is like woman.[\[38\]](#)

Drink so much wine that you'll forget how to talk.
Aren't you a lover? Isn't that love a tavern?

Even if you write poems and prose,
Like the gold of Cafer,[\[39\]](#) there is no value
For these counterfeit things at Cafer's place.

27.

Verse 2629

This is bizarre, unseen fire.
It is blazing from the Beloved's place.

At the same time, it is not with the Beloved.

Bow could the form stand in front of Him?
Form has no constancy.
How could meaning grasp Him?
He is not apparent.

The world is a place for hunting.
All the creatures are prey.
There is no trace of the One who is hunting.

There is a work-business in every comer where
There is bale-load. Everybody says He is great,
He is the boss.
But there is no bale-load at the side of the great One.

O Soul, take your hand away from your face.
Show your face.
Because all these appearances are forms;
Only shapes, dye and fussy ornaments.

Wherever dust rises, there must be an army.
Wherever there is fire,
Warmth and smoke will be there.

You cannot see Him because of the dust.
Find Him. Never mind the dust.

O good fortune, lucky one, if you search for Him,
He who has unlimited compassion also looks for you

When the torrent drags and carries you,
You'll understand that people think they have
Choices and willpower on their way; but they don't.

I wove poverty, decided to talk less,
But where can you find a rose without a thorn?

Be a witness brother, we are the thorn of such a rose.
But to be this kind of thorn is for praise, not for shame.

Last night was so dark because you were not here.
There was no brightness, no taste in our candle
No pleasure in our Sema gathering.

We were in torture all night.
This innocent heart was also thrown into jail.
There was nobody who could console and please him.

The world gets its confidence from You.
Even the moon doesn't feel secure without You at night.

The arrogance and selfishness of the people
Make a curtain around You.
The one who has no self could
Come to Your shadow, Your protection.

Heart is Yours, it is in Your palm like a
Drop of mercury which jumps and moves
Around and has no peace and quietness.

29.

Verse 2645

Cupbearer, offer wine. Days are very pleasant.
Today is the day to drink wine.
Put up otag[\[40\]](#) and build a fire.

The cupbearer is charming and graceful.
The wine is wonderful; days are great.
The assembly is as bright as the sky.

Listen to the reed flute. Keep playing melodies.
Drink wine. Grief has fallen;
So has its trouble and struggling.

Today there is nothing to break but your oath.
Today there is nothing to be scattered
But the beloved's hair.

Messenger of God, repent seventy times at night.[\[41\]](#)
But since God is the One who makes or breaks them;
All repentance will go away in the morning.

That beauty with whom the whole world is in love
Is made by mud. But is adorned and decorated by
The power of God.

Today, wherever there is death it will come to life.
The blind acquire new eyes today.

The branch which is green is relatively
Secure from the fire.
The arrowed porcupine is not afraid of the arrow.

Look at the lover who is kissed by the beloved.
Don't mind the pale color of his face and his crying eyes.

There is body that is slave to the earth, but his heart
Commands the sky. There is seed under the ground,
But the tree grown from that seed
Is way up above the ground.

How can the one whose heart becomes a treasure of
Pearl, of jewels settle down on earth? How could
The lover be bored when the beloved is in his arms?

O one who washes my dead body,
Tie my jaws tightly^[42] because my heart
And soul are tasting sugar, secretly,
Without mouth and lips.

Be silent, don't move your jaw.
Nobody washes you. Your halting place is
Neither the five senses nor six dimensions.

30.

Verse 2658

Brother, they say there is a window from heart to heart.
Don't leave any crack or hole open,
Even if its as small as a needle's eye, cover it.

Whoever is ignorant of this window of heart
Is blind and stupid,
Even if he is the greatest scientist.

Look through that window to the inside of the house.

Is it dark or bright in that house?

If it is bright, if its light reflects on you,
Make sure it is a garnet or an agate mine.
It is a treasure, that house.

Sit next to Him. He is the Master, the hero.
Scatter roses on His way.
He is the cypress. He is the iris.

Wrap your arms around him, hug him.
Enjoy this embracing.

Go, carry your belongings to His side.
Get a house next to Him.
Because His place is the halting place for angels.

I want to explain, but my heart is trembling.
He is peerless, unseen and unselfish.

If He is not in one place, this soul and body
Escape from each other like oil and water.

I have iron locks on my lips, my mouth.
But whether or not You scare me, I will say this.

What is it for the David of love to break the irons?
Be silent. That sultan of love is a bizarre Rustem.[\[43\]](#)

31.

Verse 2669

☞ I want my beloved to be cupbearer;
To offer me wine from his lips.
I want his narcissus-eyes to become languid, drunk.

The curly hair on his forehead is like
A fearless charmer who plays with a rope.
My heart wants the playfulness of the
Hair that catches heart and steals mind.

There are troubles from your sneaky eyes in my heart.
I want that trouble maker's old magician eyes.
I long for them.

His treacheries, his badness are very pleasant.
His cruelties are beautiful.
His meanness keeps burning me.
For these reasons I am looking for that ungrateful one;
Searching for that cruel one.

I want to bum like a moth around that peerless
Candle that shines in the land of Absence.

O rose garden of the beauty, open your face.
Even the moon became ashamed after seeing your face.
I want that rose garden.

Four years later, we will stay together.
I am begging for your union on one road.
That's all I desire.

Your mind did that thing. Love has succeeded this.
There is no use for that thing, That's why I want this.

We throw the pillow of the sultan,
Open the snake's wound. I want to stay
With the Mustafa of beauty in the cave.[\[44\]](#)

The Tartar[\[45\]](#) of separation scattered musk and ambergris.
I want the musk of the Tartar's gazelle.

I have such a heavy load on my heart.
I have been squeezed. I have lost patience
And decision. My Sultan, allow me.
Give your permission once. That's what I want.

O bat, what do you care for the coyness of the sun?
It is shame for you. Yet, I prostrate hundreds of times.
I want the thing which is shame for you.

You have been putting me off with
The promise of union. I have lost my patience.
Separation has blindfolded my eyes,
Pulling me to the gallows.

The army of your love bums the soul;
Brightens the heart at the same time.
I want the commandant of love's army.

The anti-Christ of grief is raising hell
With separation in my head.
I should ask for the breath of Jesus to get well.

I had a trick. Union had another,
But I repent now the deceits and tricks.
I want that deceitful impostor.

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I would come as a drunk, worn out,
To the rose garden of pleasure and joy.
I only want a thorn from your union.

I made a belt from the hairs curling
On your forehead and put it around my waist.
I came from town. I want to climb the mountains.

Moses of soul saw a tree in the fire's light.
I want the blaze of that tree. I want that fire.

Tebriz turned into heaven because of Shemseddin.
I want to go to heaven and see his face.

32.

Verse 2689

What news are the nightingales giving this year?
What kind of sugar was offered to the parrots?

Come to the garden this year and see
The dry branches that give such fruits.

Scissors are in the middle.
Dresses are cut out constantly.
Belts are offered to the one who loses his crown.

Under no obligation, no trouble to anyone,
Silver is minted.
Without the fear of repossession,
Gold is given.

Every thirsty heart is taken to the sea.
They offer jewels to the one who has pearls.

Who hasn't seen any gift like that?
Nowadays the lover offers heads and
The amount of hair on their head.

Is there any light seen like that?
The crazy and insane on the road
Gives talents and take love in return.

33.

Verse 2696

The tailor of time never cuts and sews the shirt
Right to the size of the one who wears it.

In this world, lots of stupid ones spend handfuls
Of gold to buy trouble from the devil.

There are appetizers made of colorful soil,
You eat them, but what you eat makes your face pale.

O one who takes the corpse in his arms,
And loves it as a sweetheart,
In the end the corpse cools your
Soul as well as your heart.

Be aware of God. Get rid of these devil's pictures.
When the time comes, you pass away having nothing.

Don't lay down and stretch your legs
On this world's upholstery. It is temporary.
Suddenly they roll up. Be afraid of that.

Don't throw a bar-shot at this time plate
Constantly, for nothing. [\[46\]](#)
Don't play backgammon with the Master.

Don't look at the dust of the body.
Watch the soul's rider.
He resembles the horseman inside of dust.

Surely rose cheeks came from the rose garden.
If there is no rose garden, where did this rose grow?

When you see a chin like an apple,
Make sure there is an apple tree.
This apple is not for eating.
It is offered as a sample.

Start work with great effort.
If you are loose and slow to start, the sultan's
Doorkeeper will kick you out of the door.

Be silent. Leave the word.
Talk without words and sound.
Like the talk of the angels
Above the dome of this sky.

34.

Verse 2708

That beautiful-faced Beauty has done all kinds
Of favors for me. If he didn't do any for you,
It's not my fault.

You blame that beauty who torments you.
But who has ever seen a beauty
Who hasn't done some cruelty?

If he hasn't given sugar,
Isn't his love enough sugar?
If he hasn't shown any loyalty,
Isn't his beauty complete loyalty?

Show me a house in which the light from Him
Hasn't been reflected.
Show me a table where His face hasn't shone.

That eye and this light are two glories.
When they merge, nobody will separate them.

When soul watched and passed out of himself,
He said, "Nobody has seen God's face, but God."

These are symbolic descriptions,
But sometimes they are misleading.
God only mentioned the face "by the
Morning sun."[\[47\]](#) Because of jealousy.

When the sun of Shem's face,
Who is the praise of Tebriz,
Reflects on any mortal, he becomes immortal.

35.

Verse 2716

The sea has pulled me toward itself, made me
A known acquaintance made me a diver.
The one that pulls me, takes me and
Also pulls and takes you, one by one.

The one that became iron was pulled by the magnet.
The one that became straw, by ambergris.

Karun[48] who was the anchor of the earth,
Was pulled and swallowed by earth.
The sky pulled and exalted
The greatest of the great, Jesus.

The land of Absence pulls every spiritual feeling.
Chemistry changes auspicious copper into gold.

The one who pulls and takes all his
Belongings to the side of prophets,
Will be safe from the looting of absence and death.

No evil eye would ever touch that beautiful eye,
Because He took the candle of beauty
To the place nobody reaches or sees.

We run away from fate and destiny to the side
Of God who takes care of needs and grants wishes.
The One who re-arranges fate and destiny
Will take care of what comes from fate and destiny.

All these things come and go.
How lucky for that heart that he saw
The beauty of that moon-faced one
And passed out of himself.

36.

Verse 2724

Terci Bend

The doorkeepers of the sky,
Who are the mothers of all secrets and things
Concealed, are pulling us to the sky.

Watch and see the angels come from the throne.
They are so bright with the light of that auspicious sun.
We run after them like shadows.
Those shadows also get their shares from the sun.

Because shadows worship the sun,
The way he came as a guest, they are also guests.

Thoughts that come to mind, come from
Universal Mind Their control and their measure
Comes from His control and measure.

You say, "He sowed the seed and the tree
Came afterward." But is it is not so.
Open your eyes and see.
There is no beginning for these, and no end.

The sun of Shemseddin is neither in the East nor West.[\[49\]](#)
For that reason, the shadow of the One who reaches him,
Turns around a different sky.

They are like a heart that runs around everywhere,
But they don't have the worry of shelter,
Nor of a camel and saddle.

Our water and our soul turn into heart
With the effect of that Sun.
Our particles fly over the sky like heart.

What is the sky that our heart will go that way?
Our body, soul and heart are totally in love with Him.
They are always with Him.

Our lips were dry, our eyes full of tears
With the grief of separation.
Since we met Him, with the light of union,
Neither is this dry, nor the other wet.

They come and they go.
Eventually they reach their purpose.
The others stay muddy in their turbid water and earth.

The nature of the lover and love is different
Than the other four natures;
Hundreds of times better than the four elements,
The five senses and the seven skies.

If five natures hold the halter of soul and pull,
Be silent. Don't talk about this world.
Start telling the Terci.

Direct yourself to the sky of truth.
The one who goes there has no horse and no feet.

O one who turns around love,
You won't be covered with dust. Keep riding
The horse like the sun, bright and warm.

On that journey, to follow a guide,
To imitate a great man,
Is like holding a stick in your hands.
With the brightness and greatness of the road,
Our stick becomes Zulfekaar.[\[50\]](#)

Moses hit the stone with his staff.
The stone split, and clear water sprang from it.
That staff was Zulfekaar.
That water was for Zulfekaar.
Because of that it was shining.

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The heart came today, suddenly, like the sky,
Without hands and feet.
It got rid of this hangover with ruby-colored wine.

I said, "O heart, what has happened to you?
Why are you acting so insolent?" He answered,
"The Beloved offered me wine in the morning,"

I am a lion hunter today.

I will attack even the male lion because
I came as a drunk from the meadow.

The Lion and the Oxen[\[51\]](#) are spread out in the meadows
Of the sky. If I drop fire in that meadow,
That Oxen and Lion will be burned.

Really, Kaf and Nun, like iron and stone,
Resemble light. Being and non-being struck each other;
As a result those stars came out.

Happy stars jump toward lovers.
Hundreds of beauties will be born from their sparks.

When unlucky and unhappy stars promise union,
They start torturing the rose. They jump to
The happy-faced, unlucky people who resemble thorns.

There is also another group of people that
Gave up wanting to be auspicious or not.
They have been destroyed like
The stars in the sun of the Beloved's beauty.

They have no fear, nor do they grieve.[\[52\]](#)
They have no hopes and know neither
Separation nor union; have no trouble or joy.
They are not obvious. They are not hidden.

My third Terci, like Muselles[\[53\]](#) adds joy to joy.
If you have a hangover, work with Muselles.
Its worth it.

Mind, love and soul; those three are straight Muselles.
They are a salve for every wound,
A remedy for every trouble.

If someone drinks this Muselles wine
Of mine and can't pass out of himself,
He certainly doesn't deserve this gift.
He must have some problems in his brain.

Every moment granite becomes garnet with the glass of
The Sun of Truth and turns into agate.
Earth gets its share and becomes cheerful.

But it is not the ruby which is not aware of itself.
It is not the agate you know.
That agate pulls the truth like ambergris.

That ruby is as cheerful, as hard a worker as the mind.
This sultan is neither with a bride, nor separated.

He is God's special man;
But when the man dies and becomes annihilated,
God remains.

Mind tried very hard to get a smell from Absence,
But didn't succeed. All his works were wasted.

The one who exists, receives the smell of
Absence and becomes totally annihilated.
That person has reached such being
That he is completely submerged in Absence.

He was undressed from his existence at the height
Of greatness. One annihilation is completed.
Absolute Being is reached.
There, no pride and no appearance exists.

When God's attributes come, humanity disappears,
Because he is a brilliant Sun.
This one is a light of Suha.[\[54\]](#)

His soul is a mirror for the beauty of God.
His eye is a glass that shows
The worlds at the assembly of love.

Whoever drinks the wine of secrets from this glass
Will be annihilated at the union of the Beloved.
He will go beyond himself with ecstasy.

Every copper, with the Glory of God,
Turns into a magical chemical.
This is an art of the unseen; a bizarre alchemy.

Look for the elixir of love from His Being.
Be like Him with His favor and kindness.

Verse 2765

☞ one who rides Burak^[55] of soul's eye,
O one who opens the eye of the soul, and eventually
Starts the journey; keep watching the face
Of the moon which has no dust and no cloud.

They throw the seeds of lust to the fire.
They escape this trap,
From which it is very difficult to be freed.
They jump through with one step.

They escape from the noises of this deaf nature
And go there. Their gathering becomes an assembly
And turns into rose gardens.

They tie the feet of shameless, ordinary people.
From then on sultans, whose souls reflect on
Their faces, become apparent to them.

They tie the feet of mind and beat
The hell out of this shameless self.

All particles of our bodies have died in
This narrow grave. Where is the trumpet of
Judgment day? They will all come back to
Life and raise their heads from the grave.

Your lust is like copper.
It's elixir is the glory of love. With that,
They will change your copper-like existence into gold.

Be fair. In front of His warm love-breath,
Who would be able to talk about talent?
Whoever can must be very cold.

They come to the kitchen of the mind like hungry Sufis
And receive the guilt which has heavy consequences.

Don't feed nature's raven with cascades of food.
Keep them fasting so they will become parrots;
So they can look for sugar.

The fires of nature can be harnessed and turned to ashes
With the sweetness of the cupbearer of

The fountain of life.

The reason for the blindness and deafness of the mind of
Maturity is the feeling toward that beauty and charm.

Besides God, the eye of whoever looks at him to see
Will be sealed with eternal blindness.
After that, he will know nothing.

In order to stay away from trouble even the sun will
Take refuge in Shemseddin, who is Tebriz's eye of Soul.

They searched diligently in the land
Of Soul a hundred thousand times.
They couldn't find anyone who resembles Him.

His shadow always stays on the head of the Sun.
Every particle of dust is decorated with his footsteps.

38.

Verse 2782

☞ If this is the Bairam[\[56\]](#) of your union,
I am a slave and servant to Bairam.
You are the preparation of Bairam,
The prostration and salute to Bairam.

I heard your name. The great sweetness
Of your name made the name of Bairam sweet.
Peace and comfort came to my heart.

How happy is the moment
When the time of your union comes.
We take some from the treasure of union
And pay the debt of Bairam.

Your beautiful face, which resembles the sun,
Rises so that Bairam's night turns into morning
With the daylight of your face.

O beautiful, whose specter of light
Becomes Iman[\[57\]](#) to Bairam,
Worshipping with auspiciousness and good luck,

It is the religious precept of Bairam
To prostrate at your door.
It is haram[\[58\]](#) to see yourself when you stand here.

Fill and offer the glass of union
With your grace and favor
So soul will reach his wish with
Bairam's glass, Bairam's wish.

Souls are running behind your horse.
But even Bairam takes hundreds of steps.
How could he reach Him? Is this possible?

This Bairam gave me the good news,
Coming from the dust of your road.
My soul goes out to meet Him.
Hold the halter of Bairam's horse.

And understand that this clarity and brightness,
This beauty of Bairam are from
The greatest of the great, Shemseddin.

But where is the brilliance of your beauty?
How could the lover be fallen to Bairam?

O Tebriz, when there is the wine
Of the greatest of the great,
It is haram for you to drink Bairam's wine.

39.

Verse 2794

*M*orning came and opened the polished, gleaming page.
A brightness, a color of camphor has appeared in the sky.

The Sufi of the sky has torn his blue mantle.
His shawl is up to his belly from his obstinacy.

After his defeat and exile,
The Rum of morning came suddenly
And dethroned the negro of night.

The Turk of joy and the Hindu of grief
Come and go from that side.

This coming and going is permanent
But the road is not apparent; doesn't exist.

My God, where did the Abyssinian army escape to and
Disappear? From where did the army of Rum's Kaiser
come?

Who gets the smell from this invisible, enigmatic road?
The one who tastes and drinks the eternal wine of wines.

Night is wondering who makes his face so dark?
Day is wondering who created him?

Earth is also astonished. Half of it is grass and plants.
The other half are animals. They are out of pasture.

Half of the world is the eater. The other half to be eaten.
Half is greedy, but clean. The other half is dirty.

Sleep, at night, is like dying.
To wake in the morning is like coming back to life.
Kill me a grief, I am Huseyn[\[59\]](#), you are Yezid.[\[60\]](#)

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When the pearl put himself up for sale
To see who would buy him, nobody had money.
He put up the money and bought himself from himself.

Cupbearer, we are all your guest today.
Our night became Kadir's Night.[\[61\]](#)
Because of you, our days are Bairam.

Offer the wine which has a pleasant ending.[\[62\]](#)
Nothing will relieve worry and thoughts
But to start drinking afresh.

If the ones who are thirsty keep drinking wine beyond
Their limit and pass out of themselves,
They will surely find the key.

Nuh-Lut,[\[63\]](#) Kerhiy[\[64\]](#), Sibli[\[65\]](#) and Beyazid[\[66\]](#)
All sat next to the jar of union.

Be silent.
Soul is flying with cheer.

At the end, this wine hits you on the head
And runs through the main vessels.

40.

Verse 2810

Auspicious spring is here.
Blessings are scattered to the earth.
The iris became as beautiful as Ali's Zulfekaar
And started shining.

Particles of earth are pregnant from the sky.
Nine months have passed.
They have all become restless.

The pomegranate is filled with bows.
The creek is wearing armor, it shines and sparkles.
The valley is full of violets.
The hills look like tulip gardens.

Flowers open their lips for kissing.
The cypress opens its arms for hugging.

After the rose garden of sky saw the heart's rose garden,
It became ashamed and covered its face with clouds.
It was embraced by heart. "

The thorn was crying, saying,
"Help, O One who covers other's faults."
His prayer is accepted so his cheeks become rose after rose.

The sultan of spring put on his belt, after apologies.
Every branch and tree is crowned by Him;
Is turned into a sultan.

It is not much that a stick in
The hand of Moses became a staff.
Every branch is adorned so much,
It looks like an assembly of the Master.

The ones who were dead in the winter
Came back to life.
The ones who denied the resurrection,
Lost face and reputation.

God's favor helped the garden's Ashabi Kehf.[\[67\]](#)
They woke up from sleep.

O one who came to life,
Where were you in the winter?
Isn't the place where soul goes at night, asleep?

Every night the senses of soul fly there.
Every night that is the place to be seen, and stand.

Even when the moon was a crescent it went there.
When it became a full moon,
It turned into a candle for the world.

These visible five senses and invisible five senses
Go there tired, worn out and troubled.
They come ambling back from there to their earth.

Close your mouth. Don't run in front of the wind.
Because the wind of words is
Raising dust on the road of observation.

41.

Verse 2825

Watch death. How does it come back to life?
Look at how the free cypress
Became a slave, a servant.

Watch and see how these loose, decayed boxes and coffins,
Are filled with soul, with love and knowledge.

That throat and mouth,
Which have been torn in the grave,
Are singing like a drunk nightingale now.

Watch Kaaba today.
It is raised and coming to the pilgrims.
For that reason thousands of caravans are blessed.

That soul who runs away from the needle
And enters the bottle,
Is today offering his soul to the sword of love.

You have seen how water comes out of rock so many times.
Watch now and see how milk springs from honey.

Look at the unripe grape. It becomes sugar out of its joy.
Look at all this barren land, how it becomes green.

Keep smiling O Earth. .
You gave birth to such a Caliph[68] that
Because of him stones and bricks are moving.

Grief is dead. Mourning time is gone.
You and I will stay well.
Wherever there was crying is now filled with laughter.

Such a rose garden grew and was so adorned
That all its thorns were utterly eradicated,
And without forks, by the power of the rose's smell.

Hizir has drunk from the fountain of life
And has become eternal.

Our pleasant life would become eternal,
Even if body was worn out like an old mantle.
Soul, no doubt, is eternal.

Be silent.
Sleep on the sugar-threshing floor.
Because sugar is scattered by words.

I have been kept silent,
But all the noises of parrot's sugarcane
Become lightheaded and keep being exuberant.

42.

Verse 2839

This love always kills the intelligent, wide awake people.
It cuts the head off without a sword.
And kills without the gallows.

We become a guest to someone
Whose custom is to destroy his guest.
We become a friend to someone who kills his friend.

If he sees a Joseph, he tears him to pieces, like a wolf.
If he sees a devout one,
He kills him like an unbeliever.

We gave our heart to Him.
Either He shows friendship and kindness to us
Or kills, wounds and destroys us properly.

No. No. He kills many lovers with His eyes,
But His breath brings the dead back to life.

Let Him kill you. Isn't He the fountain of life?
He doesn't show that the grim-faced beloved is like honey.
He kills the man sweetly.

Be sure your zeal is great,
Because this great zeal, this love
Only kills choice sultans and free people.

We resemble the night; look like the shadow of the earth.
He is the sun; kills night with the gleaming sword.

The negro of night has stolen our mind like a thief.
The police of the day came and killed the thief.

Black color covers the world at night from East to West
But the Rum of day killed all of them.

In sum, that drunkenness comes to me
From the rose garden, just like the nightingale.
Like the nightingale,
Separation from the rose garden kills me.

43.

Verse 2850

The valley and desert are beautiful
If the sun shines there.
The rose garden is beautiful
If the roses open and smell there.

There is another sun which shines
Only to finish the work under his command.

The Beloved doesn't kiss the one
Who offers gold and property.
He lets him be kissed by the lover
Whose face becomes pale with the troubles of love.

Look carefully. All the parrots are fluttering their wings
And flying to the sugar-lipped one
Who gives sugar to them.

Everyone in this world chooses
One of the sugar-lipped ones as a lover.
We also have a sugar-lipped one
But he gives an entirely different thing to us.

We have such a sugar-lipped one,
That even sugars are his servant and beggar.
We have such a Sultan of sultans that
He offers us a kingdom; gives victory to us.

Your zeal would be great, if you were the son of a sultan.
Don't be content by the sultan's coronation,
And his giving a belt to you.

Undress. Take your clothes off.
Run. Dive into the fountain of life.
Dive, so the piece of soil you step on
Gives rubies and scatters pearls.

Run to love. Take shelter there.
Avoid the beauty who flirts,
Charms and then bleeds your heart.

My eyes don't see any beauty from others.
The painter gives shapes and forms
To the body of soul from the land of Absence,
And adorns him in a different way.

The bird whose mind gets news from Kevser [\[69\]](#)
Won't drink bitter water like blind birds.

He fills our eyes with his own beauty.
He is so beautiful that when the moon sees him
It would sacrifice its head for him.

His poor ones see beauty as a piece of dirt.

Think about the eye to which God gave sight.
How would that eye see?

Quit talking, Be silent so that universal intellect
Will allow us to go through this particular intellect.

44.

Verse 2864

Bring wine my dear, because days are going by.
Only a taste of that glass overcomes the bitterness of grief.

This is the glass that is familiar to mind;
That hangs around with him.
It is not the glass that blind-eyed Self runs to.

When you enter the door with that fiery glass,
The devil of grief, which gives anxiety,
Will go away, out the chimney, like smoke.

If you put Kil[\[70\]](#) on your head for washing,
Don't wash. Leave. Run as you are
With the Kil on your head.
Come, because time is going by.

Excite the one who caught the mind.
Mature the one who talks immaturely.

You offered the same wine to the sun, moon and sky.[\[71\]](#)
Everyone of them submit themselves to You.
They turn with joy.

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By God, even the particles are drunk with that wine,
But still want more, come in that direction.

Give peace and comfort to this soul
Because the fever of that wine
Left no peace and decision, no comfort and repentance.

Even if donkeys smell that wine they would
Have the same mother's tender heart for orphans.

Today, earth has drunk one drop, slowly, from that wine.
Now turns the glass of kindness like the sun,
Offering favors and everything to anyone.

The way blood runs from the body
Through the bottle of Hacamatci [\[72\]](#)
Is the way one pulled goes to the one who pulls.

The way Kaaba goes to the door of God's friend,
The one who has arrived at the truth,
Is the way of God's compassion.
It runs and cascades with compassion.

If a saint is not drunk, he is behind all the lame ones.
But when he passes himself, he reaches Kaaba
In one step.

When he is sober, he behaves well, hides the secrets.
But when he is drunk he follows his heart.

Be silent.
Don't talk about wine in front of a raw person.
Because he immediately thinks of that ordinary wine.

45.

Verse 2879

Watch the nightingale, it is going to the rose garden.
Redness is on the way to the beloved's face,
That resembles the flower of the pomegranate.

Fruit has been ripened, went beyond itself.
It is going to hang, like Mansur.

Flowers are in bloom, adorned for the sultan,
Because the sultan intended to give
Favors in the springtime.

The heart of the tulip which resembles a monk,
Is burning with fires; is sunk in bloody tears.
It is on the road to the mountains.

The thorn has cried exactly nine months,
Because of the separation of the rose.

The rose saw that loyalty, is now going to the thorn.

The narcissus, bewildered by hearing the talks about union,
Watches the borders of the garden.

The fountain of life is flowing at the roots of the tree,
Like fire in the hearts of free people.

Every rose which has been
The slave of the ground in winter,
Is now burning, falling in love.
To show itself it is going to the bazaar.

God's divine inspiration of spring gave a general lecture.
The garden, the meadow, everything wrote this.
Kept reading it over and over.

That student, who worked hard to learn,
Finished his studies, earned his uniform,
And is now on his way to make a living.

Looks, like spring, said, "God has bought."[\[73\]](#)
And the rose advanced on these roads
To go to the "Buyer."

The rose heard these words of God better than others,
Right in his heart.
He threw away his turban and his heart,
To run better and faster than others.

The heart sees every branch, like the Beloved.
Looks for union with the Beloved.
Goes to the Beloved.

O Heart, you are penniless,
At the same time, thinking of buying pearls.
Nevertheless, there, they talk about loads of gold.

No. No. Who talks about loads of gold?
There, they talk about barns full of souls.

The food of "the soul who is at peace,"[\[74\]](#)
Believes and is silent.
Self is the one who keeps talking on the way to words.

46.

Verse 2895

My eye is twitching.
Is that beloved coming?
My heart is beating fast.
I understand the one who caught my heart is coming.

This hoopoe bird comes flying from Solomon's army.
This nightingale has arrived from the rose garden.

If you are penniless, sell your soul and get this glass.
Sell your self, the buyer is coming.

The ear of expectation drinks news like honey and sherbet.
Crying eyes meet the beloved.

That heart which was broken to pieces,
And became drops of blood and scattered,
Is now getting together.

The plectrum of joy and the bow of pleasure
Are touching the stature,
Which has bent like a harp, turned into strings.

The ruin of the garden and meadow is over.
Beautiful-faced roses are running toward thorns.

All the sighs and moans of the lover were for something.
Union's army is coming to find the remedy for those sighs.

The parrots of love have already
Spread their wings to fly.
Because bales of sugar are coming from Egypt.

The city is safe.
All the thieves ran away from fear of
The strong, fierce security of the town.

News came that "Cafer-i Tayyar is coming."[\[75\]](#)
All the Cafer's who were stealing at night, ran away.

Tell it as it is.
The qualities of human behavior are gone,
Because God's attributes, the ones that repair the broken,

Impellers of everything, are coming.

O poor ones of the garden,
You lost everything at the robbery staged by the fall.
The sultan of spring is coming
To refurbish all your losses.

The luminosity of the sun has no cover.
Curtains are made by silence.
Be silent. This curtain is coming from the words.

47.

Verse 2909

Such charm, such sweetness,
That drunkenness, that openness;
Bow did the painter of eternity
Give all of these to your eye?

Your eyes, every moment,
Open thousands of eyes, offer thousands of sights.
God gave you the same force and power He gave to Jesus.

The eyes that were blessed to see, by Him,
Are looking at Him with admiration,
And wondering how this has happened.

I asked the sky if it had ever seen a moon like that.
He swore, and told me, "I honestly don't remember."

Now, close your lips, open the eyes of your soul.
If you are with Him, if you have merged with Him,
Don't say anything.

48.

Verse 2914

Cruelty has destroyed hundreds of the sultan's cities.
Hundreds of seas of sovereignties have been dried;
Turned to hallucinations of oasis, by injustice. .

Hundreds of greed towers,
And meanness castles have fallen in ditches.
Half-sleepy fortunes have fallen into deep sleep.

The main street of the land of Absence
Has been closed to these people.
The moon of dark cruelty is covered
By a cloud; has disappeared.

That eye which sparks like lightning to burn people,
Is now wailing; has turned into a cloud from crying.

That heart which burned hundreds of thousands of people,
Now is, itself, burning in God's fire.

How lucky is the person who took lessons from that.
That trouble of the sultan helped to open a door for him.

He understood in the morning what he had done at night.
But it was too late.
He became ashamed and disgraced;
And was involved in lots of trouble.

He spent the night praying, like a bright morning.
Also, Noah's praying was accepted at night.

49.

Verse 2922[\[76\]](#)

Such charm, this sweetness,
That drunkenness, that openness.
How did the painter of eternity
Give them to your eye?

Your eyes create a thousand eyes every moment.
God gave power to them from His own.

All these eyes were lost, confused in Your eye.
They all send hundreds of thousands of prayers.

Your eyes were the seat at the throne of the Sultan.
The soul who sees your eyes yells, "Mercy, mercy."

I asked the sky if he had ever seen such eyes.

He swore, and told me, "I honestly don't remember."

50.

Verse 2927

How long will I tear my mantle
With fear and expectations?
Give me wine so that I will
Be saved from fear and expectation.

Bring the glass that burns thoughts and worries.
Because there are thoughts in my head
That come from fear and grief.

I am anchored with fears and expectations.
Sail me like Noah's ark.
That's the only way I can survive this flood.

Give me that red gold, that permanent pleasure.
My face became pale gold from expectation and fear.

Bring and pour in my mouth the thing you served
To the one who sat in that circle.
I became like a doorknob from fear and expectation.

Water once more this color, this smell,
Because I have a different color, a different smell now.

Offer me the water with which even
That river of Kevser will fall in love.
Wash me with that water because
I fall in the air of Kevser with hope and fear.

I am in the middle of the fire, like Abraham.
I have hopes and expectations, like Azer,
So that I make idols out of hope and fear.
Send me that water.

Out of obstinacy to blind eyes,
Don't hide from my eyes.
Bad eyes would be blind.
I am hidden from eyes with hope and fear.

Don't separate me from the sun of your face.
Because I am totally wet with fear and hope,
Like this gazel.

51.

Verse 2937

The beloved was pretending to sleep.
"Now," I said, "I will steal a peach from his garden."
Actually, he wasn't sleeping.

He smiled and said, "It's like the wolf
Trying to outsmart the lion to take its prey,
But, it's not that easy."

"Who will reach the sky and milk the cloud,
Unless the cloud becomes generous and does favors?"

Absence has no hands or feet to invent anything.
God's grace creates something out of nothing.

Sit like absence, because Selam[\[77\]](#)
Was given only at namaz, while sitting.

Water becomes confused, lets itself go
At the top of the fire,
Because fire is to make sacrifice.
Water is the prostration.

When the lips are silent,
The heart gains hundreds of languages.
Be silent. How many times will you
Keep trying Him? How many?

52.

Verse 2944

Fire leaned toward the ear of smoke,
Said secretly, "He can't do without me.
Aloe wood really likes me."

"He understands me. He thanks me,
Because the purpose of aloe wood is to bum out,
To become non-existent."
At that time its value becomes apparent.

Aloe wood is full of knots.
Once it opens up at Absence,
All these knots will be untied.

O my friend who eats flames and swallows lights, welcome.
O One who is annihilated in me,
O my Martyr, the One who gives soul, welcome.
O friend whom all my acquaintances praise and are proud!

Look and see.
Earth and sky are both submerged in existence.
Escape from this dome of sky,
From this blind world, to Absence.

The one who runs away from Absence
Is an unlucky, sad person,
Who escapes from glory, kingdom and happiness.

No one will benefit from the book of Absence
Before he is annihilated.
O God, who is loved and beloved.
Help me to make up with Absence,
To make peace with Absence.

Black soil, without giving of itself, its existence
Won't become abundant.
It will stay still, become motionless.

If sperm stays sperm, it will neither grow, get bigger
Nor have a head, face and rosy cheeks.

When bread and meals are digested in the stomach
They turn into mind and life,
So even the most envious will long for that.

Black stone won't be gold and silver
Or worth anything,
Unless it goes beyond its existence.

Just to be contemptible and humiliated,

Later to become the sultan of sultans,
This is the way it is.
Also at namaz, to first stand up, then later, sit.

We tried "existence" our whole life long.
Now we are due to try Absence.

The clamor of the kingdom of Absence is not fake.
Smoke doesn't come from the place
Where there is no fire.

Love comes every morning to lead us to the school
Of "the ones who kept their promise"[\[78\]](#)
By pulling our ears

If Love doesn't want us,
If He hasn't fallen in our way,
Why did He catch our heart and snatch our turban?
Just for nothing?

In order to clean his heart from grudges,
Purify it from evil, the tear of sorrow
Is flowing from the eye of the faithful.

You are asleep.
Hizir keeps sprinkling water on your face to wake you up,
So you can pick up the glass of eternity.

Love will tell you the rest of it secretly.
You will be asleep and, at the same time,
Awake like Ashab-i Khef.[\[79\]](#)

53.

Verse 2963

Heart has been watching your face,
Even though he is waiting to see you.
Soul has been drunk in your rose garden,
Is stuck with thorns,
Even though watching for roses.

He is looking for heart every moment;
From the light of His look,
A houri appeared at the right,

A beautiful charmer at the left.

In the early morning,
Once we tore apart the trap of evening and morning
We received a kiss from the Beloved.
We prostrate to Him a hundred thousand times.

Who cares if the life
That has been spent in love won't return?
We are at the circle which is made
By the intense longing of lovers.

Play the harp of love with immortal melodies.
Soul becomes a thread;
A thread of the melody of love.

There is such brightness of life
In the air of Your love.
There, the roots of the trees
Are not buried in soil, but still give fruits.

Soul was plunged into a sea,
Swallowed water, but obtained a pearl.
But, that sea and the pearl
Are both crying for your ruby lips.

The willow tree is dancing.
The plain tree is clapping its hands,
Because of the melodies of the parrots in the reed bed.

Once this event of joy and purification
Comes and passes,
The Sufis of love embrace each other.

Like the torrent keeps flowing tirelessly
To the sea, soul remembers the Union of Elest[80]
And jumps out from the body like a drunk.

Part has flown out from the bow
Of the whole, like an arrow.
But it has no target, no place to go but the wholeness.

Soul goes out from thousands of skins,
Starts the journey with joy.
His place is in the land of eternity.

The soul of truth embraced Him,
Held His skirt to reach known Soul; to attain their desires.

Souls hold His skirt with love.
He also bravely holds that eternal skirt.

O soul, go to Tebriz, ask this from Shems.
Ask and learn that you will mount the Burak[\[81\]](#) of meaning.

54.

Verse 2978

My beauty, everybody gets along,
And is merged with his own kind.
Everybody has found the friend
Who matches his own nature.

But the one who has Your brand
In his heart cannot choose anyone.
The one who has become prey for You
Cannot be hunted by anyone.

Since Your kindness took us out of our self,
Engulfed us in ecstasy,
Don't deprive us of Your favor.
Don't leave us without You.

Every species, everything,
Is united with the same and attracts the same kind.

The one who doesn't consort with the same causes trouble,
Like water with oil or snow with tar.

Until he separates from the other
And returns to his own, he becomes thirsty
And his thirst increases more and more.

Whoever runs away from You
And gets to like someone else,
Leaves You and stays with someone else.

He would sit at Your temple with a sour face
And frown like clouds,
Or smile like spring with someone else.

He seems to be saying,
"I have no share from the moon at the land of Absence;
The glass of soul, the wine of soul make my head dizzy."

Don't you remember the sound of the reed flute?
That wine of joy that you are drinking so nicely?
How come you drink wine
From the hands of a devil, to be stoned.

You will see what a bad and dirty shape you'll be.
Keep drinking hundreds of glasses of wine
From the devil's hand. Drink, O cheap beggar, drink.

Here, your head is down. Your face is sour.
Also you should know,
There is a dark monster here as big as a mountain.

When he is with his own,
He turns into an iris-like tongue.
With others, he is mute.
With his kind, he opens like a rose;
With others he is a thorn.

Go away, you can't be from the same species
With all creatures.
One branch cannot get pregnant for one fruit
From hundreds of trees.

If you belong to one tree like its branch,
Separate, break off from the others.
If you want to reach this one,
Take your hand away from the other.

How auspicious is that soul
That belongs to the same kind
As the one who is praised by Tebriz.
He reaches there and becomes enlightened.
Whatever he does, it is happy and auspicious.

55.

Verse 2994

☞ We are drunk; out of our Self.

You are hidden from us behind the curtain.
O Moon, appear, don't stay under the cloud.

We are a group of Your lovers.
We are called to instigate and create trouble;
To do a bunch of evil things.

At early dawn, the sun rose from Your face.
We were caught in the circle of Your face,
Climbed the roof to watch You.

We are drunk with the wine of sunshine.
Our heads are dizzy.
That flaming fire enlightened our head,
But, at the same time, we lost our head.

O player who fits in with the tunes
Of the heart of soul's lover,
Play better and more pleasant melodies of soul.

Play, so the Soul will get out of this mantle of flesh.
Soul, which is aware of everything,
Would pass from Self like a mantle.

Lift the id and bits of body
With pure, clean wine
So we will come close to Kingdom,
Face to face and chest to chest.

Eyes would see what is behind the curtains,
Be saved from house, roof and door.

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The stately bird of soul would see thousands
Of gardens from Shemseddin, whom Tebriz praises;
Obtain thousands of wings.

56.

Verse 3003

☞ my hunting master,
You hunted me.
I have no pleasure without you;

No sleep and no constancy.

You own my heart.
You are the base of all my trade.
Don't deem proper all that
Oppression to this poor slave.

O one who has no Beloved
In the world of love, look at me.
I yell and scream in the Universe,
"O Beloved, O Beloved."

Give us the wine You offered the first time.
And sober us from our hangover
With those drunken eyes.

O sky, send the wine that You served.
You took the mind of the head of mind.
Send that wine.

You take care of thousands of businesses
With one look. At last, look at me once,
So that we can take care of this business.

57.

Verse 3009

Make sure that nobody in this world
Will remain without somebody.
If you don't get along, someone else
Comes, instead, to that place.

If I leave this house,
If I vacate the house,
Either someone like me comes,
Or someone worse than me.

The world has been inherited for thousands of years.
When the father goes under the ground,
The son becomes the father.

It is not only men.
Animals are the same.
If it wasn't like that,

You wouldn't see any living creature.

At night when the sun leaves the roof of sky,
Stars and moon replace the sun.

When a person quits one profession, one business,
His nature will be occupied with another craft.

Because an agent is appointed to everyone's heart,
That agent won't leave them without work,
Business, provision or expedition.

58.

Verse 3016

*H*appy spring, the envoy of lovers suddenly came.
We are drunk. We are in love.
We are in a dream and have no constancy.

O eye, O candle, walk to the garden.
Don't keep waiting for the beauties of the green.

Envoys came from the land of Absence
To the garden and meadow.
Go and see, it is custom to meet their arrival.

The rose came to the garden
To celebrate your arrival.
The thorn became beautiful,
And was adorned seeing your face.

O cypress, give your ear, listen.
The iris turned into a tongue,
At the side of the river, to praise you.

The bud became a node-node, knot-knot.
But your grace opens the node, unties the knot.
That grace opens flowers for you,
And, again, scatters them over you.

Just like on the day of resurrection,
The ones who decayed in December,
The ones who died in January,
Are raising their heads from the ground.

The seed, which has been dead,
Came back to life. The water, which was
Hidden by the ground, has now appeared.

The branches, with fruits, shower coyness with joy.
The roots, which have no fruit, are hiding.

At the end, the trees of
Soul became like that, also.
The choice tree and stately branch
Would be known, become evident.

The Sultan of Sultans came with an army,
Dressed, put on a sash, and was armored
With a jasmine shield, a green Zulfekaar [\[82\]](#).

They say, "Let's cut so and so's neck,
Like a leek."
Look at the art of God; see the obvious.

Yes, that's what it is.
When God's help comes,
One mosquito can destroy Nemrud. [\[83\]](#)

59.

Verse 3029

Abandon thoughts and worries.
Don't give them any space in your heart,
Because you are naked.
Thoughts and worries are extreme cold.

You are in thought to be free from troubles and suffering.
But thought is the source of trouble and suffering.

There is no thought at the bazaar of art.
That place is beyond thought.
The one who is caught in atmosphere
Is the one who becomes a laughing stock to that.
Watch all the signs.

Look at the source of things that come to mind and thought.
Look for the One who turns ~s old, tough fate around.

The cheeks of the charmers are rosy with His art.
The face of lovers are pale because of His troubles.

Those thousands of birds come flying
From the land of Absence, very nicely.
Those hundreds of thousands of arrows
Were thrown from the same bow, at the same time.

Hundreds of wine makers are crushing grapes
In the land of Absence, without hands and feet,
Beyond the mind and imagination; making wine.

He makes bread without the fire
Of the tandir^[84] of the heart,
The oven of the stomach, and stores it.
But the baker is invisible to the eyes.

He makes hundreds of thousands of paintings
On earth's flat frame.
Boils the blood of females; and milks
Hundreds of jars of milk from that blood.

You called God.
A voice came from the sky.
Open your basket, O poor one,
A favor has come.

You opened your basket
But the favor was big and heavy and broke the basket.
Naturally, small things don't come from God's kitchen.

The one who sends quail
Sends manna from the sky,
Pulls the camel from the crack in the mountain.

The One who creates a strong,
Powerful man out of sperm,
Opens roads to the sleeper, to fly out from sleep!

He shows forms every moment in Absence
For the ones who fall asleep,
To wake up and go faster on their journey.

I follow the rule.
Since He told me, "Be silent!"

I am silent now.
That Ruler will tell the rest, one day, by Himself.

60.

Verse 3044
Terci Bend

☉ fiery Beloved!
O fiery Charmer who gives calm to hearts,
Kindly come over and scratch the head of Your slaves.

We are Your soil,
Thirsty for Your water, Your plant.
Sow the seed of abundance and loyalty with Your hand.

Sow, that new plants and colorful flowers
Will grow on the surface of the earth.

At the bottom of every well
A reflection of the beautiful,
Moon-faced, rose-cheeked Joseph appears.

Forget that story.
Listen to the new story that just came in.

A Saint came up next to me.
He had a rose in his hand.
I asked, "Where is that from?"
"From that country," he said.

I said, "There is no trace of that
Spring in this world. Here, there are
Two hundred wounds from thorns for each rose."

"No, that spring is also here," he said,
"But you don't see it.
Your eyes are confused and darkened,
Just like the person who smokes hashish.

Purify and cleanse your heart
From thoughts and illusions.
"Throw out that hashish from your hands.
Look at the garden and meadow."

Tell a verse of the Terci,
Because a glass came, full to its rim.
Soul is screaming.
Come, it is permissible to taste.

If you are fond of wine, if you are a brave master,
Don't be like the rose.
It drank one glass and dropped into a drunken sleep.

Come like hell and drink seven seas.
The Cupbearer calls you,
"O my sultan, may it do you good;
Become sugar and honey."

When man turns into a pearl,
His cup becomes an ocean.
When he opens his mouth,
The whole world becomes a morsel.

The world is only a mouthful.
But only for man, not for the mosquito.
It is a morsel for only
The one who was born of Adam.

Man doesn't give birth to mosquitoes.
Don't be a mosquito either.
Be a sultan.
Be a man like Cemshid, Husrev and Keykubad.[\[85\]](#)

There is no taste of my talks,
Because I am not drunk now.
It is mere ceremony to try hard to make art;
To give literary value to words.

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The mouth of the drunk resembles a beehive.
The honey bee flies around without aim or purpose.

Honey bees become drunk
From the honey in their mouth.
They keep flying with their
Honey and needle, into the wind.

They say, "We are free from the six-sided house.
The Sultan of Sultans, who gives
That sweet sherbet to the bees, saved us."

Terci wants bend[\[86\]](#).
But the drunk doesn't know
What a tie is; what a rope is.
He is not aware of them,
Because his mind is not in his head.

O Soul of Souls, bring the ruby glass.
Where are we?
Where do we listen to those long stories?

Open both your arms,
Embrace me like a belt.
Bring immortality; undress us.

You drank hundreds of glasses, then became
Silent like you had put a brick on your mouth.
But your drunken eyes
Keep inviting the drunks for drinking.

You are drinking constantly.
That wine's smell comes to two fersah.[\[87\]](#)
Go ahead, drink. You know better.

Except, don't hide from me,
Because, as you know, like others
I am your faithful servant. '

There is another thing.
Bow could you hide wine?
Its effect becomes obvious on the face and head.
For sure, it will show up.

When you mount the camel, it bends its head down.
You are going to town
And asking people not to see you.

You know that much,
Yet, your drunk camel keeps saying,
"Af-af, see both of us."

Forget the bazaar and the market.

Ride your camel to the rose garden.
That is the place for the drunk and people
Who are compatible with each other.

O my beautiful,
Thousands of God's blessings to your beauty.
We are just fine.
I hope you are well, too.

61.

Verse 3074

☉ one who shows coyness and seduces people,
Salvation and the attainment of wishes
Are only possible by reaching You.
How happy is the one
Who has attained and is saved.

I have a fiery tongue.
It is like a candle with Your love,
Telling me You turned head and feet to tongue,
To flame and bum.

When you see struggles,
The noises of the day become death
Like a candle, but at night they lighten up.

I said, "I only burned for You.
I have peace with You,
O my leopard-looking male lion;
Don't hide. Don't disappear from my eyes."

Since You attracted me,
Made me a slave, don't hide Your face from me.
Since You tore this curtain,
Don't put another one in front of me.

O Fountain of Life, have mercy, don't stay away.
Don't hide from the one who used to drink from You,
From this separation.

First such a favor, later this fire, burning, melting down.
What is this?
First, saying its permissible, then forbidden.

What kind of opinion on a matter of cannon law is that?

O smiling soul, smiling fate,
Smile on our face so, that in the depth of winter,
The cypress will smile, the rose will smile.

If you go to the garden of Soul in the middle of winter,
You'll see hundreds of months of July
In every corner in that cold.

"You go to the garden of Soul" he says.
I ask, "Where is the road?"
"Still," he says, "You haven't
Learned the road to the garden."

The place where words which have subtle meaning,
And witticisms resemble the soul,
Is the place where the road is,
O one who is fond of words that have subtle meaning
And witticism and gives his life to the wind.

You ask our look; don't get into subtle meaning
But, hard-to-understand words.
Why do you have the stately bow?
Don't hang on the dust of the bow.

If Self has become old; heart is young.
Soul is very fresh.
Its face is like a newly-opened violet.

If you don't have generosity in your heart,
By birth and wealth;
Possession and position won't make you rich.

Even if you are rich and hiding your wealth,
It doesn't matter.
There are so many sneaky ones looking
For the chance to come to the surface.

O one who wants pearls, jewels and stones,
How do you know what you have, in the darkness?

Pick up the broken odds and ends,
The stones from the road,
The pearls from the bottom of the sea.
Don't print counterfeit money at night.

You will be caught during the day.

Check the money with the right scale.
Throw away the one that is harmful to you.
Take the scale that helps you.

62.

Verse 3092

The phoenix suddenly came from Kafdag.[\[88\]](#)
The bird of my heart started to fly again.

The bird, which has been following you like a drunk,
Burned the feed, fluttered and flew.

The eye, that was full of blood
On the night of separation, saw daylight again.

Siddik[\[89\]](#) and Mustafa[\[90\]](#) became friends at the cave;
The spider is making webs at the door of the cave again.

The teeth of joy and pleasure have become blunt.
Their face has turned sour.
Today, they smiled
And started biting the sugar of union again.

He tore the armor, that he wore on battle day,
Down to his navel again.

The women of Egypt saw the face of Joseph again.
They picked up the orange,' while watching Joseph,
And cut their hands again.

Cry for help from Joseph
That Salome will give loads of rubies
To buy him from auction.

The beautiful bloody eyes of Joseph's lions
Spread out in the lover's blood again.

Soul's woman, who is staying at her house,
Fell in love, grabbed her cover
And started running again.

The Beloved's love kettle,
That cooks and matures the raw ones,
Was put, again, at the top of the brain and
Started boiling and cooking the brain again.

Look at Abraham.
He started sucking milk and honey
From the fingers of love.

The heart who repents the love of the Beloved
And retires at His side,
Starts feeling the magic of the Beloved
And will be persuaded again.

The heart which climbs the roof
Of the thoughts of sleepers,
Starts counting stars, one by one,
With our love again.

The melancholy of that no-good, deceitful thief
Starts climbing the hair, like a rope, again.

The coyness in the essence of love
Put scraps of gold, silver and copper in his hand,
Like a jeweler who is an expert in his business.

There is kindness and favor
At God's Shem's at Tebriz.
He starts pulling us to himself, by our ears again.

63.

Verse 3109

☞ beautiful, you run away for hundreds of years,
And don't come close to us.
Still, we turn your business upside-down,
Make it like ours.

Don't run away. Inevitably, you
Will pass through the wheel of fortune.
It doesn't matter whether
You are a roaring lion or a tamed lamb.

The body is like a boil

Grown on the shoulder of soul.
When it is ready,
It drains itself without a knife.

How lucky is that false one
Who stays away from false.
He stuck himself to God's love
Without glue, without paste.

They measure by yards,
Cutting and sewing the dress of life
Day and night.
It will surely come to an end one day;
Either at night or in the morning,

Poor man. Love has exhausted him.
That rider became too heavy for the horse.
Its back is hurt.

Be silent. Annihilate in the land of silence.
The job of His love
Is to kill the lovers of faith and sect.

64.

Verse 3116

They say the Sultan of Love has no loyalty.
It is false.
"There is no end of your night," they say,
"You cannot see daylight."
It is false.

They say, "Why are you killing yourself for love?
When the body dies, there is no life."
'It is false.

"It is useless to shed tears for love," they say,
"Once you close your eyes,
You can't see, you can't meet."
It is false.

They say, "When our time is up,
When we have finished our time,
Soul doesn't go to the other side."

It is false.

The ones who imagine and don't give up fancies say,
"The stories of prophets are fiction,
Only for the imagination."
It is false.

The ones who are not on the right road say,
"Men cannot reach the door of God."
It is false.

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The one who doesn't know the secret of heart says,
"God won't tell the secret; the Absolute Secret
To men without an intermediary."
It is false.

They say, "The secret of heart is not open to man,
He cannot be accepted in heaven."
It is false.

They say, "The man who is made of mud cannot
Be acquainted with the community of heaven."
It is false.

They say, "Clean soul cannot fly out of this nest
With the wings of love."
It is false.

They say, "The real sun won't award or punish
People for small goodness or badness."
It is false.

Be silent.
If someone tells you there is no speech possible
Without words or sounds,
It is false.

65.

Verse 3128

Today is the day of joy.
This year is the year of enjoyment.

We are good.
Also, good to the garden and meadows.

Spring is here.
The rose tells the narcissus, with a smile,
"We haven't seen the ugly face of the raven,
It is good news for you and, for me."

The rose is the appetizer for the nightingale.
Sugar for the parrots. It doesn't matter
If the raven can't see it, for its obstinacy.
Earth is green and full of tulips.

The pomegranate told the apple,
"Give me a peach."
The apple tree answered, "All the loafers
Of the gardens and meadows ask that."

One must give soul to Jesus to get the peach;
Especially real soul. Not the one
That grew up from heart and head.

The garden and meadow are both the drunks
Of the envoy who came from the Heaven of Absence.
Listen and hear, "The job of the envoy
Is only to carry the message. "[\[91\]](#)

Open new, fresh wings and arms
Under the sun of kindness,
Because clouds and fog
Are all gone in front of the sun.

The Cupbearer of spring poured such a wine
That even the thirsty of the land of Absence
Me fulfilled by the favor.
They called, "Enough."

Our Sun entered the sign of Aries
At the spring of soul, and stayed there.
There is neither fear of winter
Nor of December and January. It is wonderful.

Shake your head to tell me to, "Come this way."
I will come. Then scratch my head.
That's what I want. I cannot give this up.

Drag your feet today, the cupbearer is standing.
Soil is soaked in water. Sky is adorned
With hundreds of candles of light.

Sometimes He shows fire, other times water.
My heart was scorched.
I used to have mountains in my heart.
He saved me from all of them.

Grief is in the paws of the cat, screaming "geek-geek."
Say that either you cry "eek-eek" or "gek-gok."
There is no salvation for you.

Throw the distaff to the fire. Don't spin cotton.
These worlds, this alphabet
Became stuck in your throat.
Your neck turned into a spindle because of that.

66.

Verse 3142

Today is the day of joy.
This year is the year of the rose.
We are all fine.
We hope the rose will do well, too.

Help came to the rose
From the Beloved's rose garden.
From now on, our eyes won't see
The decline of the rose.

The eyes of the narcissus became drunk.
The garden is smiling
From the clamor and beauty of the rose.

The iris is telling secrets
About the love of the nightingale
To the ear of the cypress;
Explaining the good disposition of the rose.

The rose came running to help us
And tore its clothes
We also tear ours because of the joy of the meeting.

The rose is such a world that
It doesn't fit in this world.
Even the world of imagination
Cannot imagine the rose.

Who is the one who is called Rose?
A messenger from the garden of soul and heart.
What is the rose?
It is a small thing that indicates
The eternal beauty of the real Rose.

Let's hold the skirt of the rose.
And go to the eternal rose sapling
Together, with a smile.

The origin of the rose is that eternal rose sapling
Which has grown out of the sweat of Mustafa.[\[92\]](#)
Came out from his kindness and because of him,
The rose turned into a full moon from a new moon.

You pick leaves of the rose,
But they give life back, again and again.
They offer new arms and wings to the rose.

How did the rose accept the invitation of spring?
It was dead, not even in existence.
It came like four birds flying toward Abraham.

Be silent hodja.
Don't open your lips.
Sit in, the shade of the rose
And smile like a bud under closed lips.

67.

Verse 3154

Pity to ourselves for losing
All the advantages,
All the opportunities.
Pity to our soul.

I am separated from the Soul
Who is praised by every tribe.
Even the rocks feel sorry about my situation.

They cry and wail for me.

If they load my separation
On the top of Mount Sinai
Or on the hills of Safa [\[93\]](#) for one moment,
They will fall down with earthquakes.

When the sparks of love
Inside of us appear,
They will burn all the ones who blamed us.

If one particle from Your beauty
Reflects on the earth,
There won't be any dangerous desert for caravans.

I vow to the Union
That its greatness brightens the heart,
And to the glory that even
The greatest man won't understand.

I vow those secret things that
Have happened between us, I cannot tell
Openly, but only explain with metaphors.

I vow that Your generosity and blessing
Will always stay in my heart,
But they are impossible to talk about.

Have us reach union so our wishes
And our desires will be fulfilled.

My eyes are red, and swollen so much
That I don't have the power
Or strength to meet with guests.

I should put a handful of soil
From in front of his door to my eyes,
As a salve, so my eyes would be brightened.

Is all the soil of Tebriz like that soil?
Is this possible?
The body that says I am exactly like Soul,
Shouldn't exist.

Our master, our owner Shemseddin!
Have a long life.

His blessing is a ring on my neck.
He is the one who makes my business,
And my occupation, successful.

68.

Verse 3167

Don't get tired and discouraged with us.
We are very beautiful.
Because of our jealousy, we cover ourselves.

When we throwaway the cover
Of body from soul one day, you will see us.
The moon will be jealous of us;
So will the star of Ferkad[\[94\]](#).
They will both be longing for us.

Wash your face. Clean yourself.
If you don't wash and become purified
Our beauty is enough for us.
Stay away from us. .

Ours is not the beauty that will get old in time.
We are eternally young.
Our heart is in comfort.
There is no beginning to our beginning,
No end to our end.

If the cover becomes worn out,
The beauty will not get old.
The cover of our life is mortal,
But we are immortal.

When the devil saw the cover of Adam,
He turned his face.
Adam called to him, "You are exiled, denounced;
But we are not."

The rest of the angels prostrate to him,
And say, "We fall in love with a beauty."

There is such a beauty under the cover,
That his beauty took our minds.
"We fall in prostration," they said.

If our mind doesn't differentiate
The old and feeble from the beautiful
In the world of Love,
We should change our religion.

What is the word of beautiful?
Be is the Lion of God.
We are talking like a kid.
Actually, we are children reading our a-b-c's.

They persuade children with walnuts and raisins.
If we are not kids,
We don't deserve walnuts and raisins.

An old lady with worn armor and helmet
Is hiding behind them, saying,
"I am the hero of war, the great Rustem.[\[95\]](#)

It does not matter what she wears
And how much she decorates herself,
She is a woman.
How can we make that mistake.
We are submerged in the Glory of Ahmed.[\[96\]](#)

Believers would understand and differentiate,[\[97\]](#)
That's what Mustafa said.
Be silent. We found the right way without words.

Listen to the rest of it from Shems
Whom Tebriz praises, because
We haven't heard the whole story from our sultan.

69.

Verse 3182

☞ We are the thirsty during-the famine.
We eat many meals.
We are not helpless,
But we are the remedy of trouble,
Help to the helpless.

We are wine at the assembly, the sword in war.

We are like a fountain in thanks;
Like rock marble in endurance.

We are not the sultan of money,
Who takes a bribe.
We patch, we sew our mantles that are all in bits.

Don't try to hide secrets from us.
We are already in your heart.
Don't try to take your heart from us.
Your heart is in our hands.

We are the hidden sea under the straw.
Or the sun which shines on stars.

Don't look at the way we stand on the edge
Of the roof like a drunk.
Even the roof knows we have no edge or side.

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Why should moonlight be afraid
Of reflecting at the edge of the roof?
Why should we worry?
We are riding the moon.

It doesn't matter if our lungs
Have been a target for arrows.
Look and see. We are not
Concerned with trouble like that.
We are involved with so many other things.

The butcher of the village
Cut us by wailing and tearing.
Yet, we are at the pasture of the village,
Still hanging at the slaughterhouse.

We are Muhre[\[98\]](#), at the same time, Muhr i hokka.[\[99\]](#)
We are not involved with the uproar
Of the heart going up and down at the same time.
We passed to the other side, watching ourselves.

We are giving the good news of Ahmed,[\[100\]](#)
And talking in the cradle as a child, like Jesus.
But we will keep silent.

With the love of Shems,
Whom Tebriz praises day and night,
Burn and kill the devils with flames and sparks.[\[101\]](#)

70.

Verse 3194

We are looking at Your face.
We gave up the meadows and rose gardens.
We are lost in the view of Your eyes.
We gave up the wine and the wine maker.

We pawned the house, made home Your quarters.
We demolished the store and gave up work.

Love kept looking at all our belongings.
We gave up profits, losses and trading.

It is impossible for one hand to get involved with love,
The other hand to worry about name, fame and honor.
I gave up shame, bashfulness and modesty.

The land of joy and inner calmness were given to us.
We gave up the wealth and poverty of "more or less."

Our head has exalted over the top of the sky, because
We gave up head and turban with the pleasure of love.

"What," we are saying, "are you denying?"
We gave up the declaration and denial of both worlds.

Look at that handful of dogs.
How they fight with each other.
We are not dogs. We are not born from dogs.
We gave up the carcass.

Only God knows your secrets.
That is more than enough.
We have given up the evils of the bad ones,
And the deceits of the deceitful.

How could the lesson that love gave, be forgotten.
At last, we gave up talk about him and being
Involved with a war of words or repeating him.

Whatever you do secretly
Grows and becomes apparent.
Sow any seed you desire. We give up.

The magnet of the companions
Who attract us and make us talk;
We have given up talking this way.

We even gave up the sun that whirls around the sky,
Because of the grace of Shemseddin's face,
To whom Tebriz gives praise.

71.

Verse 3207

Rise, let's drink the wine
From the big earthen jars.
This is the assembly of the Sultan of Sultans.
Why shouldn't we drink wine at this assembly?

The Sultan is a sea,
And that wine is so sweet, so penetrating,
Offer that ruby-colored wine.
Offer it and see what our essence is.

The Sun scattered light to the earth
From such a glass that we also fly high
With drunkenness, like particles.

The eternal Sun has offered such a wine for us
That we don't look at the glass
Of this Sun out of our pride.

Bring this wine that burns the mind
And enlightens the heart.
Bring it so that we will be freed
From the mud of existence, like soul.

We drink full glasses because we know
The kindness and favors of the Sultan.
We are ahead in drinking,
But we are behind in rendering services.

Because, to be grateful
We impede those who render services.
On this side we are developed,
And on the other side we lean.

Enlighten us by the shining light
That is a niche wherein is a lamp [\[102\]](#).
We already radiate with the flame of that light.

Body is heated, by the flame of this wine,
Like an oven, then cooled.
Burn us like wood so we won't be cold.

Soul is like the lantern
Of the sky; full of fires.
The oven is to find out if we are false
Like copper, or real gold.

O rose-cheeked one,
Bring the glass that resembles a tulip.
We will harvest jasmine, like a rose,
Because of that tulip-looking glass.

Smile nicely, bring the essence
Of the beauty to the assembly.
We are nice to everybody;
But much better when we are with you.

Musician, play that new tune once more.
You are nice and pleasant,
But we are more pleasant.

Exalt! Your beautiful voice comes to us.
We ate like marble rock for loyalty to your love.

You inherited that breath from Jesus.
Blow in our ear, we are like a shrill pipe.
Give the same sounds that come to the 'ear.

Mouth is full of words;
But you keep silent
Because we are next to envious people
Who are full of denials.

Verse 3223

We cannot be understood or agreed with
By anyone in this earth.
We cannot build a house under the dome of the sky.

We are languid, drunk and thirsty.
We keep drinking.
Everybody said "enough"
And dropped into a drunken stupor.
We don't have enough.

This is the sea of God's compassion.
The enemy is the foam, the id and bid.
We cannot give away the wave of heart
For every id and bid.

Like the big-nosed Ad-Semud[\[103\]](#)
We don't build a house or hut
In the land of Absence.

We don't build anything but the house of love
On that property of the immortals,
Like Noah and Abraham.

When we want to hunt,
The place we go is the mountain of Kaf.[\[104\]](#)
We don't hunt carcasses, like a vulture.

When there are beautiful, clean houris,
We don't take the black devil,
Who persuades the whores, like a bride.

We don't plant the sapling,
Whose fruit is grief, in the soil of greed.

When the taste of His auspiciousness
Is in our eyes,
We don't even look at the auspicious soul.

Be silent.
From now on we don't pay attention
To the verse or the rhyme,
Because they are not from our kind.

73.

Verse 3233

My bloody tears are dripping, shlip, shlip, shlip,[\[105\]](#)
Because of this glass that fills the empty ones,
Every moment, with deep, red-colored wine.
These sounds remind me of a drum.
O Heart, beat the drum with gratitude, gum, gum, gum.[\[106\]](#)

You have found the drum of wine.
Go ahead, beat the drum of gratitude.
Beat it with zir[\[107\]](#) sometimes, O Heart.
At other times the bem[\[108\]](#) pitches, bem, bem, bem.

Buy one drum from the drum sellers.
I will play it so I can pull the roots,
Break the branches of grief from earth's garden.

For that reason, don't give up.
You can still drink wine.
We accept the cruelty, the reprimand.

An army came suddenly.
The commander of the army is love.
Everywhere was filled with flags and drums.
The mountain and the valley were filled.

We became full of wine,
But the cupbearer kept serving
In spite of that, like an ocean.

Do you know why the sea became rough and choppy?
Ask me, I am a man from the sea.

Its floor has become too small for the sea.
It wants a larger space.
That's why water rises to the air.

O my beauty, water made travel
Its habit when it was in the sky.
It rains from the sky,
Cascades from the mountain and runs in the river.

Our water of life is the same

As the water of the sea.
We also flow from existence
To Absence in waves.

There is no rest for the soul,
Neither on this earth made of dust,
Nor in the air under the tilted dome of the sky.

Whichever garden flourishes,
Soul is attracted there.
That means soul wants to reach the arms
Of the greatest of the great Sultans.

For that reason, don't give up.
You can still drink wine.
We accept the cruelty, the reprimand.

Be silent.
You instigate trouble in the city.
But the soul of your uncle is like an ocean.
Don't wait in vain for his silence.

74.

Verse 3246

Don't say anything.
I obtained a secret treasure.
I gave a soul but I received the universe.

My face looks like a jeweler's face.
He says, "I gave a bid for gold.
I bought a gold mine."

I have been hit with so many arrows
From the beloved's beautiful face,
But I received such arrows from his eyebrows.

I will tell this to the people, unequivocally.
I shouldn't tell that I bought this from so-and-so.

I was mute, like a fish,
But I saw someone who has sugar lips.
I bought a tongue from him.

Suddenly, I grew up like a tree in a garden.
I have found a trace in that invisible garden.

I said, "There is no end, no beginning for this garden."
But I found a corner in that nothingness.

I have met Shemseddin, to whom Tebriz gives praise.
Then I reached the Kiran[\[109\]](#) beyond two worlds.

75.

Verse 3254

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Rise, O lovers.
Let's all ascend to the sky.
We have seen this earth.
Let's see the other one.

No. No. Both gardens are beautiful and nice,
But let's give up both of them and go to the Gardener.

We run toward the sea by prostrating like the torrent.
Once we merge with the sea, we walk
And run, clapping our hands like foam over the sea.

To go on a journey from the world of grief
To the world of weddings and joy,
We leave this pale face that's like saffron,
And get a pink one, like the purple juda tree.

We'll arrive at the land of mercy
By trembling like a leaf
From fear of falling.

We are in a foreign land.
There is no way to stay away from trouble.
We are on the journey of the country of soil,
Impossible to be free from dust.

We will fly, fluttering our beautiful wings
Like green parrots.
We have become the land of sugar.
We'll go to the square of sugar.

All these forms are evidence of that painter,
Though His trace is not apparent.
We will go to that painter
Who is hidden from evil eyes.

It is a road full of danger and trouble,
But love is our guide.
Love teaches us how to journey on that road.

The Grace of the Sultan's shadow will protect us.
Even then, it is better to go with the caravan.

We resemble rain on a roof full of cracks and holes.
We should avoid the cracks, go through the gutter pipe.

We are bent like the bow,
Because the bowstring is in our throat.
We came here straight.
We should go like an arrow; fly out of the bow.

We have stayed at home like a mouse,
Because of the fear of cats.
If we are the sons of the Lion,
We should go to that Lion.

We purify our soul like a mirror,
For beauty, like Joseph's,
So we will arrive at His beauty with gifts.

We will keep silent.
The One who makes us talk would say,
"And we will go that way."

76.

Verse 3269

Open your eyes and look.
We are bright because of those eyes.
Never do we turn our eyes from that face.

Burn, flame, flame.
Enlighten your chest for your moth.
Brighten, so we can throw ourselves to the flame.

Increase the fear of love.
We don't want to be sure.
Our total security is in the fear of Your love.

Good news comes every day
From Your candle to the moth.
Say, "Die." Die so we can give
You a new soul., We have your ransom.

We go out of ourselves. We leave our existence.
The day when you say, "I exist only with love,"
Is the day we are in joy and happiness.

We have seen the beauty of your garden.
That's why our stature is like the cypress.
That's why we are as talkative as the iris.

Go and burn rose gardens of the present time.
Because we fell in love with your face
And went into that rose garden.

O one whose heart has been withered; and has
Become upside-down on the road of love.
Hurry, run to us, because we are an iron fortress.

We poured out all the water of our face,
Because of the pleasure of the fire
Of the Sultan of Tebriz, Shemseddin's, face.
We turned into pure fat.

77.

Verse 3278

☞ One who grabs and pulls my ear,
You are my clear eye.
Why do you want to lead me to the garden?
You are my meadow. You are my rose garden.

I have been on Your table all my life.
I eat Your blessing.
I have been beating the drum
Under the shadow of Your kindness.

Beloved, I rub my eyes to see
If it is a dream or reality.
I wonder, is it me or not?
I cannot believe it.

Yes, I am, I only leave "Self."
I undress from existence.
I stand in front of Your full moon
Like a pale, thin new moon.

I despise even the crown of the king of kings.
The desire of Your face is a collar on my neck.
That is only natural.

I am eating Your blessing
In Your sea with the fish.
I don't get along with the ones on land
Because of my jealousy; like water and oil.

If the nail of torment
Scratches my wish's vein,
I'll give beautiful melodies like the harp.

But You also understand that
I don't have one vein or artery.
If you find one, I'll cut it out from its roots.

You asked, "What is your business?
The one who is annihilated has no business."
Yes, it is true.
If I am not annihilated,
Why has Absence become my home and country?

You are the trumpet of the day of resurrection.
I am dead.
You are the soul of spring.
I am a cypress, an iris.

I say this with broken language.
You say the whole thing.
You are a mind, of the mind of mind, of the mind.
I am just a fool.

I made a painting,
It is for You to give soul.
You are the Soul of Soul, of the soul.

I am someone who asks only of the body.

78.

Verse 3291

You look like clear, clean water.
Don't make it turbid,
Don't put a curtain over your heart.
Don't close your heart,
Don't do this. Don't do it O Heart.

Clean people gathered around the heart
For an outing and, for looking.
Don't be bashful for them.
Don't make the heart shameful for them.

Heart is yelling to say,
"Pull yourself from love."
If you become totally soul,
Don't make heart stingy like that.

They change copper to gold.
This is another knowledge.
For the things you are doing
Copper won't become gold.
Quit those things.

O heart, it has been a long time
That you have been away from soul.
Thirty years have passed.
Don't make thirty become forty.[\[110\]](#)

The thing crushed in the mortar of sky is not salve.
Don't put this in your eye, like salve.

There is so much uproar.
Don't stop at every cross in the road.
Time has past.
Day is ending, don't loiter around.

79.

Verse 3298

Beloved, bring wine.
Complete my fortune.
Make my joy as auspicious
As the land of mercy and soundness.

Venus is like a small slave at your wine gathering.
Your heart's sun is eclipsed; bring the sun again.
That moon becomes a slave and a servant.

Bring meal from the sky, like Jesus.
Make the people give up this bread, this soup.

Bring back to life a handful of frozen people
With your warm breath.
Make the greatest of the great sultans
Out of a handful of poor beggars.

Give a smile to cheer this frowning wrinkled face.
Make eternal this cut-finished life.

O yearning of all heads, scratch the lover's head.
O pleasure of every stage,
Come to our arms, make a stage there.

There is no light in the house if there is no glass.
We have now found the house; look for the glass.

Your kindness keeps giving us
Hundreds of thousands of blessings.
Heart is bewildered.
It doesn't know what to say or what it wants.

Be silent, the Beloved answers without questions.
You just keep watching, quit talking.

80.

Verse 3307

See from your face and from
Your smell that you are mad.
You took your heart from the friend

Who loves, protects and feels sorry for you.

Because of the shape of the objects
That come from your face,
Which resembles the sun, my back is
Hunched like the sky. My chest is dark blue.

Your angry eyes look like thrown arrows.
Because of them, hundreds of stature-like
Straight arrows bend down like bows.

My questioning made you mad;
Closed your lips.
Because of the sorrow of this,
No heart, no soul, and no tongue is left in me.

Your favor was a ladder to the roof
Of kingdom and the house of fortune.
You have given up all these favors.
Break the ladder now.

O one whose image became the
Soul of hundreds of souls,
In the name of God,
My begging is not just to save my soul.

Remember, one night you wanted a sign, a trace
From the soul which turned to blood.
I'll show that to you.

For the sake of that night,
Put that black curly hair around my neck;
Pull me like a drunk.

Pull, so that soul will go with joy.
At the land of Absence your hair becomes a club.
Heart is a ball. Heart will roll with your club.

Establish the bench of justice
At Shemseddin's town, Tebriz,
That the throne would be enlightened
And earth would give praise.

Verse 3317 [\[111\]](#)

☞ heard you are contemplating a journey. Don't.
you want to love someone else;
To be the friend of someone else. Don't.

You are a stranger in this world.
There is no one like you.
You are peerless.
Why do you want to go to a foreign land? You are
Hurting the one whose heart is wounded. Don't.

Don't leave and go among the foreigners.
You are looking surreptitiously to others. Don't.

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O Moon-face, even the sky becomes
Upside down because of you.
You break and spread us to the ground,
Turn us upside-down. Don't.

Why do you make vows and promises? You are
Using your vows and coyness as a shield. Don't.

Where is the oath you made with me?
Where is your promise?
You are breaking the oath you made with this man.
You go back on your own word. Don't.

O His deed is higher, better than existence and absence.
You are leaving the world of existence. Don't.

Heaven and hell are under your rule.
You are changing heaven to hell for us. Don't.

We are safe and secure in your land of sugar.
But you are adding poison to the sugar. Don't.

My soul is like a stove full of fire.
Isn't it enough, what you have done?
You turned my face to gold.
I turn pale yellow. Don't.

If you hide your face, even the moon becomes dark.
Do you want the moon to be eclipsed?

If that's what you want. Don't.

When you become angry and silent,
Our lips also become dry.
Why do you wash our eyes with tears?
Don't do that.

Since you have no tolerance for the gathering of lovers,
Why do you go crazy?
Don't look at lovers, don't see them.

You don't give halva because of a diet.
You don't show a pleasant face,
But you are making your sick worse. Don't.

My eyes, which have been used
To look at forbidden things,
Are the thieves of your beauty.
You are punishing this thief of eyes. Don't.

You are leaving O my companion.
It is not time to talk.
Love has no head. Even then,
Why do you attempt to cut your head? Don't.

82.

Verse 3333

You are becoming tired and bored with us. Don't.
You are getting mad, turning your face from us. Don't.

You only think about yourself, your good,
And want to hurt us.
Nobody gains anything from that, including you.
Don't do that.

You agree not to hurt us.
But for whose sake do you put up with that?

Instead of wine you give a vineyard of grief.
Don't do that.
Why do you make blood flow on the river bed?
Don't do that.

You are taking away the joy of pleasure from my face.
Don't do that.
You target your look to my face.
Don't do that.

You are killing an innocent.
At the same time, you feel sorry.
You are the one who is cutting my way.
At the same time you are wailing.

My hands and feet are unable to do anything,
Because I am the drunk of the Beloved.
Let the drunk fall down.
Why are you pulling? Don't do that.

You are saying, "Come, I'll make
The patient like a shepherd for the sheep.
Why do you make the wolf a shepherd for the sheep?
Don't do that.

During the day, you are devout.
At night you kill the devout.
Tonight is the night of peace,
But you are still doing that. Don't.

O my Beautiful, all the friends have become
Enemies with each other because of jealousy.
Why are you making this friend
An enemy to the other? Don't.

"Don't drink wine," you say.
If you don't give wine,
Why are you making this one's lips so dry?
Don't do that.

"Go straight like an arrow,
Fly in our air," you say.
But how come you are bending the straight arrow,
Making a bow out of it? Don't do that.

You are saying to me, "Be silent."
But you are the one making me talk.
Every hair on my body turned into a tongue
Because of your love.

83.

Verse 3246

☞ see you are contemplating tormenting
And scolding me. Don't.
Getting ready to leave us. Don't.

O, apple of my eye,
You are shedding my blood like a roaring lion
At the grass of jealousy. Don't.

You are holding my fate upside-down like a pen. Don't.
You are bending my back like a branch. Don't.

O my Beautiful, you are God's grace and kindness.
In spite of that, why are you changing yourself
Into God's curse, God's torture? Don't do that.

You caught my heart with your kindness and favors.
Then why do you separate
My heart from this kindness and favor?

Why do you checkmate the pawn, who became
A king because of the beauty of your face, with grief
And turn him again into a poor beggar? Don't do that.

Why do you change the one who became a full moon,
With the light of your face, into a new moon with troubles?

Whether believer or unbeliever,
All are in your hands.
So why do you fight with the unbeliever? Don't.

Go out of yourself, like Moses.
Be silent like his staff.
Why do you echo like Mount Sinai? Don't.

84.

Verse 3355

☞ Beloved, bring wine, exalt my fortune.
Make your curly hair be a halter to my heart.

It is a beautiful gathering.
We are all friends and are happy.
Put some incense into the fire, for evil eyes.

Pour that wine that cannot be spared
To the head of thoughts and worries. Pass out of
Yourself and put this conceited heart in its place.

O grief, go away.
You have no business with drunks.
Wherever you find one who is sober, harm him.

Drunks are free from thoughts and worries.
You go and bother the ones who have not
Been able to free themselves.

The soul, who became drunk at the assembly
Of "the righteous shall drink of a cup whereof
The mixture is of the water of Kafur,"[\[112\]](#)
Will laugh to the cry of the one
Who followed his fun and fancies.

Look and see, all of these people's beards
Are in the hand of death.
See and pity; save them from death,
Make them benefit from that.

O moon, load all your belongings on the ox.
Start the journey.
Don't get in a discussion with
The drunken lion hunter. Quit advising.

Look at our eyes. See how drunk we are?
Make us ride the dun horse.
Offer red and gray-yellow wine.

If you find one sober hair in our body,
Reckon with it, scribble seventy books.

O black-faced nature, go to the land of the Hindu.
O love that resembles a Turk,
Ride your horse, go to the city of Cend.

Wherever you get drunk, stay there.
Make that place your house.

Wherever you drink wine, sleep there.

If there is no soul food for you at God's table,
Go, stick your head into the cowshed.

If you want to have beauties of the sky
Appear to you and flirt with you,
Give your heart to the One who makes the mirror.
He will make it shine, be clean.

O Heart, be silent. Talk without words.
When you talk about Absolute world,
Talk without tongue, without lips.

85.

Verse 3370

Hang around with lovers; always choose love.
Don't be a friend, for even *one* moment,
To the one who is not a lover.

If the Beloved will kindly uncover
His face From the curtains of greatness,
Go and admire His open face.

See the face of someone who
Has a trace from His face.
Watch the beauty when the sun
Shines on his forehead.

The sun put its cheek to His cheek
And gave such a light that,
When the moon sees His face
It passes out and falls to the ground.

That "Thee alone we worship" verse of the Koran
Is written on the hair falling to his forehead.
In his eyes there is the look of,
"Thee alone we ask for help."[\[113\]](#)

His body is like a specter. It has no blood, no veins.
His inside and outside consist of milk and honey.

The peerless Beloved hugged him so much,

Took him in His arms; that he now smells
Of the Beloved's smell.
No smell of that soil is left on him.

He is such a morning that he has no whiteness;
Such an evening that there is no color to paint it.
He is such an individual that he has no side or back;
Such a living being that he doesn't resemble this life.

Why should the sun borrow light from the sky?
Why should the rose sapling
Ask for smell from the jasmine?

Be silent like fish.
Become pure and clean like sea water so you
Will quickly obtain pearl and jewel treasures.

Let me tell you. Don't tell anyone.
Do you know who has all these qualities?
Shemseddin, the one who is praised by Tebriz.

86.

Verse 3381

My God, who is the one who
Pulls us to himself with the trap
Of the ones who plunge into silence in ecstasy?

O One who grabs and pulls us
From the collar of our soul,
From the group of the conceited,
To the ones who become drunk
And pass out of themselves!

O One who holds our ear,
Scatters our mind and intelligence!
O One who becomes Cupbearer to the mind,
Gives peace and comfort
To the one whose mind is not in his head!

You pull us without hands.
Kill us without swords.
Eyes and looks that kill lovers without reason
Are the student of your eyes, your looks.

The fountain of life
Is the shore of the martyr of Your love.
Satisfy the thirsty with that blessing.

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It is the breeze of Your union
That opens the knots of the heart.
Send a breeze to the branch of hope.

The beauty in the world of existence
Is at the motionless center.
All the searches and actions, above and below,
Originate from the One who sits motionless.

The goal of the passengers is to reach
The one who sits some place.
The purpose of the speaker
Is to make the silent one hear him.

Fire is hidden in the water.
When water boils it turns into fire;
Makes noises because of the fire.

When you give up forms, you will reach soul.
When you leave the one whose face is like a moon,
You ascend to the sky.

Why do you leave your wallet with the penniless?
Why do you throw your life at the feet of a wizard?

After the head of the gypsies took your hat and shoes,
It doesn't matter if you are peasant or cavalry.

Knowledge is your weapon,
Which is the sign of manhood.
If you are not a man it is better to have no weapons.

Don't say anything now because words
Are like sounds at the bottom of water.
If you are not blind, if your eyes see,
Lift your head and look at the sun.

87.

Verse 3395

☞ One who changes the soul, moment by moment,
To different shapes inside of the body!
O One who is closer to me than my
Thought of these subtle points!

Why should I think of the past, the future?
You are the taste of time, the Kible of time.

You are the soul of truth;
At the same time, dreams of the dream,
And of all these great big forms
And shapes beyond description.

88.

Verse 3398

☞ Youth, drunkenness and love all came.
Auspicious spring came
And brought them all together.

They all cover themselves with different shapes.
I mean, the thought that all were in mind
Form different shapes. Just watch them.

Heart is the corridor for the eyes.
Whatever comes from there goes to the eyes
And turns into different shapes and forms.

"Hidden thoughts shall be searched out."[\[114\]](#)
All hell broke loose in the garden and meadow.
Those Chinese beauties show their hearts.

In other words, they are saying if you
Have a heart, show it.
How long will your heart be hidden under the dust?

In the winter the garden prays,
"Thee alone we worship."
In the springtime the garden prays,

"To Thee alone we ask help."

"Thee alone we worship." means,
"I came to ask Your favor;
Open the door of joy and pleasure.
Don't leave us with sorrow and grief like that."

"Thee alone we ask for help." means,
My branches are full of fruits.
I am about to be broken.
O One who helps, O One from whom help is asked,
Help me."

The tulip says to the rose,
"How funny, the narcissus is looking at,
And constantly admiring, the jasmine."

The iris came to talk.
"Shame on you O big mouth,
Don't look down on anybody," says the jasmine,
"Don't be bitter about anyone."

The violet bent down, but it was all pretense.
He is a marvelous impostor.
My friend, the water lily,
Knows all about its deceptions.

The head of the hyacinth was bending
Left and right because of its drunkenness.
Spring breezes are at the left side,
Mints are at the right.

Grass is running after the cypress with bare feet.
The bud is hiding its face from evil eyes.

The willow tree is admiring and wondering
Why this fresh branch dropped its arm,
Dancing on the mirror of the river.

In order to gather,
It puts its hands down first.
Then, when it opens its arms it dances
And scatters whatever it gathered.

The Creator has set such a gathering
In the garden and meadow that the bird,

Like a musician, starts singing all melodies.

That master of musicians,
The one called the nightingale,
The drunk of the rose,
Is in love with the rose.
That's why he is no nice, so beautiful.

The dove asks the partridge,
"Where were you all this time?"
He answered, "You know of a side
Where there is no place and no time?
That's where I was."

The falcon asked the peregrine,
"Who hunted that beautiful prey
From Absence and brought you here?"

A group of rose-faced ones,
A group of charmers, who have just matured,
Are like angels behind the curtain of absence.
They were described as,
"They are great, they write,"[\[115\]](#)

"We are only a few who came as a vanguard," they say,
"An army of Beauties will come from hiding."

Joseph-faced beauties came from earth's Canaan.
Sweet-lip charmers came from the sea of honey.

Now, their letter came to the date, the sugar cane,
The pomegranate seed and the seedless fig.

What a beautiful valley that is.
The apple got its color and smell there.
The orange also received its smell and taste there.

The grape came later.
Because it did not have a horse, it came late.
It doesn't matter. It came late but is mature.
You are an instigator and a traitor;
At the same time, the greatest of the great.

O the first, which comes last.
O first fruit that always comes at the end!
O fruit that reached and grabbed God's "strong rope!"[\[116\]](#)

Your sweetness is wonderful.
Your bitterness lets not talk about.
You resemble the mind.
Good and bad come from that.
Faith and denial also come from that.

You look like sugar at the time of trouble.
In good, happy times you taste like grass.
You resemble manna at the top of the thistle;
Your bitterness is that sweet trouble of yours.

O One who has reached the essence of things,
Who has gone to the bottom of knowledge;
Your hands and arms are long.
Your power controls the whole. Time is in Your order.

The melon was put in such a house
That there is no door, no window, by Your hand.
Because You are Soul,
I am just like I am; the way You see me.

The pumpkin escaped from You,
Tried to climb the rope. [\[117\]](#)
But how could that broken jug
Be saved from the fountain?

They tied its neck because it did not listen to You.
You would have pulled its ear if it had one.
You would have made its ears ring.

"God tied her beautiful neck, with a rope
Made from palm fiber," [\[118\]](#) because it didn't
Pay attention to the most important news.

It is the donkey's ear
Which doesn't hear God's invitation.
Hear every moment God's open, clear invitation.

Desires of lust and quarrels of food fill your being.
you don't have an ear like the pumpkin.
The artery down deep in your heart is all tied up.

Be a ring on the sultan's ear,
So you will be freed from the halter on your neck.
Humans grow and mature through the ear.

That sultan writes the rest of these words.
That beautiful Chinese painter tells it.
Don't get lost in the paintings.
Look at the Painter.

I called real soul a Chinese painter.
That's the way I praised the only sultan of Tebriz.

89.

Verse 3436

Beloved, you are Moses.
I am your staff.
Sometimes people lean on me.
Sometimes I become your dragon.

I am a staff in your hand of kindness and favor,
But when You put me in a different condition,
I become a snake.

O Omnipotent God, there is no time, no place in You.
My time and day fall in Your air.

If You offer me hundreds of days and times,
They will all be sacrificed to Your love.

My eye told of Your unseen, peerless beauty
To the heart, without tongue or lips.
Heart became eye, from end to end.

My heart has been praying, thanking my eyes,
Since my eyes carried the news;
Begging for You, again and again, by saying,
"Long life to the eyes."

The sky has been searching
Your beautiful heart-catching eyes
With hundreds of candles, day and night.
Keep whirling.

If there is no bread left in the basket,
If the purse is empty, it doesn't matter.
Your face, which adds Souls to Soul,

Gives hundreds of hearts to us.

If my house, my family and my work
Have been ruined on your way,
Let it be.
Your light is reflected to these ruins.
You are the One who enlightened my ruin.

O my Soul, if my suffering is pleasing You,
I will give hundreds of hearts to grief to satisfy You.

Crush and thresh me in Your grief's mortar.
I become Your salve.
I will be put on eyes, enlighten them.

What is the soul?
A small, half-leaf from the garden of Your beauty.
What is the heart?
A flower that is opened in Your garden only.

I am not the One who speaks.
Even so, I will be silent.
Word is Yours.
What do people say?
It is only Your voice.

90.

Verse 3449

The image of Your face
That resembles the rose garden,
Came and gave sweet stories about Your lips.

I asked him, "How is the soul?
Any news from him?"
Soul knows neither anything about
The universe nor this world.

Who are you?
What is your origin?
What kind of pearl are you?
From what kind of mine are you?

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My guide was Love first.
He is the one who pulled and took me to you.
I am a servant, a slave of Him first, then you.

He reached to my heart, full of blood, and asked,
"Whose heart is that?"
I was embarrassed and said, "Yours."

His eyes have met mine.
"What are they?" he asked.
"O my moon-faced one, they are
Your two, wet clouds that scatter pearls."

He saw my saffron colored face, stained by blood,
Turned like a tulip garden. "O my rose-faced one,"
I said, "All of these are your work and your trace."

Whenever he smelled me,
He smelled his own perfume.
"Look good and see," I said,
"I made an oath to your soul."
That's who I am.

O Shemseddin, O the one Tebriz praises,
Our soul is at the circle of the ones
Who drink your old wine.

91.

Verse 3458

☞ one whose face becomes red because of shyness,
Should I beware of you or your modesty?

The rose garden saw your face
And turned into hundreds of colors.
Why is your rose-face reddened?

I have sewn hundreds of mantles with love.
I took different measures.
But your bashfulness has ruined them all in one moment.

The clear, clean bashfulness of yours
Is behind the curtain of Absence.

This apparent shyness is only the dregs of that
That was poured on your face-like rose garden.

The heart that became a stove is melted,
Turned into water, after seeing your bashfulness.
My God, what is that?
What did your modesty do to the sober one?

The mountain that is made
Of rock and soil became blood;
Was called ruby after falling
Into your mountain of modesty.

92.

Verse 3464

My beautiful, I saw my beauty in yours.
I became a mirror to your image, completely.

It is so bizarre that;
I can't close my eyes from your longing,
Even though my eyes have wet dreams
In the early dawn when they meet yours.

My mind, which resembles a woman,
Has kept giving birth every moment;
Pregnant by your light and your brightness.

In fact, nine months pregnant.
How could he stop, hold out?
How could he know
The pain and suffering I go through?

O love, if my blood should grow fond of someone else,
I'll sacrifice my blood before it reaches its desire.

I became the words of ecstasy, with love.
My wailing reached the sky.
I have been asking a formal question of you.

If a thousand worlds come to existence from Absence,
They all resemble a mole on the cheek of your beauty.

For some time I have been submerged

In your sweetness, like a fly.
But when I see your disposition,
I turn into a moth and jump into the fire.

O sky, prostrate in front
Of the Sultan of Tebriz, Shems.
That's all you can do.

93.

Verse 3473

☾ moon-faced Turk, [\[119\]](#)
Why don't you come to my room at morning?
"Come here," you say.

You are a moon-faced Turk.
Even if I am not a Turk,
I know they call "ab" [\[120\]](#), "su" [\[121\]](#) in Turkish.

Don't do bad things to kill me because
I made your fountain of life turbid.
O Turkish-mannered beauty, spare my life,
Don't shed my blood

O beauty who made layer upon layer
Of a thousand kingdoms of prosperity,
The length of our sustenance
Is determined by your small eyes.

Don't draw your sword to shed my blood, O lion.
Your love covered my body from hair to hair.

Your eyebrows which resemble beautiful bows,
Are casting a spell for us.
O one whose "Sozdesh" [\[122\]](#) is so scarce,
Where is Sozdesh? Go ahead, search.

I called him Turk; but just to confuse the people.
Because there are hundreds
Of enemies jealous of that love.

You said, "Be quite".
I heard. I became silent.
But my smell and my color are enough

To tell tales about me to my love.

94.

Verse 3481

My fever doesn't calm down,
Because God wants that.
Don't look at it this way;
The wish and desire are from the other side.

Don't blame the wetness of my shirt.
The sea made that.
If you are a pearl, look and see.
What kind of sea do you desire?

Soul is a fish.
Wish and desire is God's fishing line.
What a beautiful thing is this desire;
A fisherman that sacrifices souls.

There was God before this world was ever created.
He was Great, Exalted.
Why did He desire to bring us here?
I don't know.

It is enough to hold tight, to desire straight.
Even wishes are awry and crooked.
No. Desire, in reality, is neither straight nor crooked.

That stately mine has a bad name;
Is always remembered with a bad name.
As the old saying goes, "Sit wrong but talk right." Just like that.

The ant doesn't have wings but wanted to fly
And pierced the wall of love's palace.

Don't call him an ant because of ignorance.
He is the Solomon of time.
He wants a throne, a crown,
Demands to be Sultan.

Desire is such a thing that, we are not it.
But it is not different than us.
O Shems, to whom Tebriz gives praise,

You untie this knot.

95.

Verse 3490

Come, a beauty of the charmer,
Have a happy time.
We are very happy with you.
I hope you are the same.

Our situation and condition are nice.
The same to yours. The wheel of fortune
And destiny will also be well, I hope.
We reached this condition because of them.

I make an oath on your soul, your head,
That the wine which that happy moment
Offered us with a big jar, is still in our head.

Even your glass is yelling
Because of the power of your wine.
The moment which you are in is also yelling,
Because of the brightness of this joy.

The place where you stay is boasting so much,
It cannot fit in any place.
Your time pierces and goes
Through the mountain, like Ferhad.[\[123\]](#)

96.

Verse 3495

He quit making a noisy uproar.
There must be some reason for that.
Either he hid his grudge,
Or he became good and forgiving.

Either, when you have the chance,
Quit your uproar or pull out the root of hatred,
Layer by layer, from your heart.

Don't get hurt from bad friends;
Be offended from your own faults.
The enemy is yourself, your reflection.
Don't think double.

Don't be offended by others boasting and stinginess.
Be offended by yourself.
Because the river is frozen only in the winter time.

The one who is heated by love
Is not hurt by other's coldness.
The one who is hot in July looks for snow.

The anger of the Prophet resembles
The anger of the mother.
It is full of gentleness toward
The beautiful-faced children.

That anger also resembles parts of the earth,
But that earth grows fruits of different kinds;
Colors roses and irises.

There are also other parts which grow thorns.
Both are the same color,
But one is this. The other is different.

There is no snake in the grave.
You are the basket of snakes.
All the bad disposition you have,
Every bit of it is your enemy.

Look at sperm.
It doesn't matter if its from a Negro, a Hindu,
The tribe of Kuresh, or from some higher family.
They all have the same color.
They all do the same thing.

Substance or attributes are all made of soil.
But look and see;
Some at a lower, the other a higher level.

Every particle resembles a beggar's cup on His road.
He fills this one with gold,
The other one with dirt and ashes.

He is such an artist, He has such an art,

That He makes good give birth to bad,
From infidel to faithful;
Then He brings good, again, from bad.

It is a pity, you say, feel sorry for me.
You are spending too much, you say.
What I spend is not mine.
I expend His wealth.

You don't know this capital, the profit,
The earning of both worlds cannot be gained by
Working here and there;
Can be obtained only by generosity.

Spend for yourself. Offer to your friend.
Because your ambition and greed
Never come to an end.
Climb to the sky like pumpkin ivy;
Without hands and feet.

Insist on generosity.
Say no to greed.
Open your hand, your palm
Like Shemsheddin's hand,
Which was grown at Tebriz.

97.

Verse 3512

☞ went to the hodja's [\[124\]](#) neighborhood.
I asked for the hodja.
They told me the hodja is in love.
Hodja is drunk, wandering around the streets,
From place to place.

I said, "I have business with him.
I am his friend, not his enemy."

They said that the hodja had
Fallen in love with that Gardener.

1.

Verse 1

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☞ wish, O brave one,
That you were also a lover, like me.
You spend all your days with that craziness
And all your nights crying.

I wish the image of the beloved
Wouldn't go away for even one moment.
Two hundred glories would reach
Both eyes from that.
Eyes would have hundreds of
Points of brilliance from that light.

I wish you would give up friends and family
Stay out of both worlds.
And say, "I slipped out of myself and surrendered to you,"

When I talk, or try to be with people,
I am like water, they are like oil.
I am with them outside, but inside
I am separated from them.

I wish you would give up fancies and desires;
Become crazy, insane, be chained.
But, not the type of craziness
Caused by changes in your blood
Or personality problems that are
Treated by a doctor.

If doctors should ever taste this trouble,
They would be free from their boundaries;
Tear up their books.

Give up all this.
Search for the source of sugar.
Find the mine of sugar.
Get out of yourself.
Melt in the sugar
Like milk dissolves and disappears
In the grain.

2.

Verse 8

Open the door. Come in.
Because You are the source of faithfulness.
For the sake of drunken eyes, this is it.
It is forbidden for us to live without You,

My words have been tied in knots.
Scatter Your hair just once.
I vow to the sun, to early dawn,[\[1\]](#)
Your love has annihilated me.

I am the proof of love.
I am a verse in the Koran.
Read me to the people.
O community of love,
The ladder is in your hand,
Ascend to the sky.

I have seen Him.
He was passing by like a drunk.
"O One," I said, "Whose face
Is like a moon, where are You going?"
"Don't talk," He answered, "follow me."

I followed Him.
He started taking fast steps.
He accelerated so much that
The wind couldn't reach Him;
Lightning couldn't catch Him.

I have been annihilated since I have seen Him,
Undressed from my existence.
There remained "I," right in the middle without "me,"
Like a light in the glass lamp[\[2\]](#)
That illuminates the earth and sky.

His grace fills and shines on the heart.
Heart is purified, becomes the chosen one.
Anything which shines from His light
Shines like Him, illuminates everything.

Who could reach Him besides Him?

Whatever exists besides Him is nothing, nothingness.
Come to Me without yourself.
You are the one who is intimate with yourself.

I started, in the beginning, by praising Him,
"O, one who adds soul to soul."
At once He said, "Quit praising,
Because praising is duality."

Close your lips from duality.
Open the eyes of your essence.
If a word comes out of closed lips,
Keep talking, keep talking.

"Certainly it is for us to tell, to announce Him."[\[3\]](#)
Don't come between us.
When man sees the door of the house,
If it is too small he takes his clothes off.

Doesn't your soul leave your body every night?
Is there any unworthy attribute in your soul?

Your soul is not a heavy grain of sand
Which can't come back in the morning.
Haven't you reached the ocean
Of purity by going all night long?

As long as man stays man, and God is God,
Soul comes back again,
Like counterfeit gold or silver
Stays in the pocket of the body.

Put your soul in the hand of longing.
Because desire is like secret chemistry.
Stay with soul, when soul is separated from the body.

They empty the reed, make it hollow.
But, they won't leave without sound.
Go after the lion, hunt the lion,
Because you are Ali-Murtaza[\[4\]](#)

You were absent.
For centuries they read the Ayet[\[5\]](#) for you.
"In truth, human was not anything to be
Mentioned for a certain period of time."[\[6\]](#)
The writing in the heart is God's writing.

Don't call it false.

You are "elif" folded in two and become "lam."[\[7\]](#)
When you turn into "lam," wash
Your hands and mouth because you
Started the invitation by saying,
"Come on now."

You give up water and soil
When you are preoccupied with God.
Reach this mantle if you become
Handless and heartless.

3.

Verse 27

When your face is hidden like a moon
The heart of the sky becomes confused.
But when you give heart to the earth,
Every heart is enlarged, becomes the universe.

When you please hearts both worlds become heart.
All our hearts turn to earths.
All hearts start to play, beat and flutter.

There would be such a fire in the sky
That even angels would start screaming
Because the pain and smoke of lovers
Ascend to heaven.

The jealousy of Your love gushes
Out blood from the veins of lovers.
This blood appears like sunset in the sky;
Turns all the sky into blood.

When is that time coming that the earth
Will tremble because of You;
This place become a placeless place?

When spring starts smiling
With the image of my beloved,
His face scatters roses.
My eyes and my heart will become a rose garden.

Scatter roses, You are the rose garden.
You are everybody's bright eye.
If you would kindly favor and look
At me once, what would you lose?

Even if I bend my head to the wind,
Like trees, I am nice.
Because my eyes, my sight are gardeners
To the garden of Your Beauty.

If I become your drunk, pass out of myself,
Act funny and cannot hold my head up,
Who will be surprised at that?
When the fruits of a tree are mature
Branches bend down to the ground.
I've become like that.

I bend down like a violet,
Become faithless like jasmine.
The heart of the tulip is also burned,
Becomes dark with the pain of the juda tree.

My beloved's face resembles a rose garden.
Mine is like saffron because of crying and wailing.
If his face is like that,
Naturally, the lover's face becomes like this.

All narcissus turn into eyes
In order to see the rose garden.
The newly bloomed rose becomes
A mouth to kiss Him.

When the heart of the garden and meadow
Start smiling because they have reached spring,
Rivers cascade and flow like my tears
With the sorrow of separation.

The heart of that world of emptiness
Is so full of the Beloved that
Even its trees turn into a tongue
To give thanks to the Beloved.

When the trees raise their heads from
The ground, a voice comes, saying, .
"Whatever you hide will come to the surface."

Sweet basil opens its face
Of obstinancy to the double rose.
The rose says to the basil,
"Wait. I'll tell you when the time of trial comes."

Seeds get out of the ground and start growing above.
The one who is full of grace
Will find the ladder to ascend the sky.

Look at this earth that eats souls and drinks blood;
Decays seeds and, at the same time, nourishes them.
How funny that this hungry wolf
Keeps acting like a shepherd to this herd.

All the wolves changed into shepherds.
Thieves turned into guards.
Since God is the One guarding,
What robber will steal from the lover?

Don't rush. The table is set in the garden.
Lots of foods and favors are put on it.
Soon the time will come for the meal.
They will call you.

Don't stay away from the friends of the rose garden
Because of the scratches of the thorns.
An armed friend is needed at the caravan.

Be silent O heart.
The one who wishes and desires
Always stays silent.
Their silence tells of the seriousness
Of their wishes and desires.

4.

Verse 49

You are the sun and the moon.
Sight and senses all come from You.
Heart is looking at You.
Sight is purified and enlightened with You.

You said, "Patience is nice, the best."
But, patience is not possible.

We are sons of our time.
God will have mercy in passing by.

The brave ones of love came.
"O people, "I said, "what's new?"
They scared me with their mischief;
Ordered me to beware.

I said, "There is no harm in being killed by love.
It is only good and prosperous."
Love drew His sword. O people
Who have their mind in their heart, be quick.

Anyone who lives after that,
Wastes his time, his life, and others.
In fact, youth is like a wind blowing past;
A wind which extinguishes the sparks.

When fire and wind get together
Nobody knows what will happen.
They rejuvenate me now with the breeze of early morning.

Don't tell anything to that beautiful-eyed sultan.
Even news is not secret for him.
Don't be aware of anything
When you are next to him.

My heart becomes a curtain to my heart.
My eye and understanding become
A cover to my understanding.
O Beloved I said "If I have anybody besides You
My soul and my head are all here.

Cut my neck with Love.
I am not worth even a grain of barley."
He said, "I am all different; different in man's form."

"Are you Soul?" I asked.
"What do you mean when you say 'different'?"
O beautiful sound of the reed flute,
O wind that tears the curtains and blows with melodies!

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Go from ear to heart and see who is more drunk.
Tear our purse of obstinacy of the One who makes purses.

If my gold is finished, there's no grief.
I have a wine-like gold.
It is alright to say it in Arabic
But you'd better say it in Farsi, O son.

5.

Verse 61

*R*emember the night you were in trouble?
The night the doctor was with you
And removed all the thorns,
Which were stuck in the feet of your heart.
Remember that night?

When you fell in the well
Who gave you new life?
Tell me, don't go away.
Come to Him. Remember His favors.

Don't do it. Those favors were not few.
I swear to God,
There was no doubt about His favors. Come to your senses.
Remember those favors. Remember.

Remember while you still have the opportunity;
While there is still time.
Once it is over it doesn't matter
If you talk about the rose or mention the thorn.

He is the sun above.
Appreciate His value.
When you see that His face resembles the full moon,
Mention that meeting.
Remember that moment.

Appreciate his eyes, his looks.
His time will come again.
If you are sure of that,
Never mind talking with others.

O doctor, the one who comes to help when he is called,
If someone gives two loaves of bread,
Is he worthy of thanks?

Once your heart shows the doctor is small and worthless,
That his heart has been dead;
From then on, it doesn't do any good to yell,
"Remember this dead carcass"

Even if you become like that, don't give up.
Remember the spring of Husameddin[8] and the rose garden,
Like the seed in the soil in autumn.

Don't remember last year if your work
Turned to pure gold.
If your clothes were not pawned to
The one who washed them.
And, if this year of yours is a pearl.

Isn't it stupid getting involved with the rose,
Knowing how temporary it is?
That's the pity. Don't even mention it.

6.

Verse 72

God makes your joy clean and eternal,
And keeps us close to you.
God is your witness to that condition.
O uncle, turn your face to us.

When Cafer' s[9] hand left an imprint on the rock,
The mountain became like a separated lover.

If that hand print had a language,
It would tell of its trouble, saying,
"Listen, O nice and graceful one."
Saying it without a mouth or lips.

We are also the print of Cafer's hand,
Separated from that hand. Feel pity for us.
And make sure that our actions belong
To us only in appearance.
In reality He is the one who knows.

Because the shell moves
When it contains the pearl,
Be silent.

It is enough that those words kept coming
Even after they had been repelled.

7.

Verse 77

The one who has lost all his patience
Because of You, is the one
Who reaches and stays with You.
The one whose heart is hurt with your thorn
Is the one who reaches Your rose garden.

The rose is Yours. The iris is Yours.
All the rose garden is Yours.
They become ruined from Your autumn;
Sing and enjoy because of Your spring.

Everything which exists from sky to earth
Is talking and silent at the same time.
They become restless like the hearts of lovers,
Because of You.

Everything is worshipping Your love.
All the universe is in Your hand.
In one breath they become drunk in Your temple.
In another breath they fall in Your dreaminess.

Every being has turned upside-down because of You,
Even if they are not aware of You.
How strange it is to look at You and see with You.
How nice to wait for You, to long for You.

What would the cypress and garden do
If the raven had no eye, no perception?
You hear the wail of the nightingale,
He is the one who gives his will and choice to You.

I am the one who gave up work and business,
Ignored the buyer and seller,
Got involved in only Your work and Your business.

I gave up the sea and the bridge.
I ran away from part or whole.

What do I do to the face of the rose?
Your rose-face is not there.

What do I do with this dead life,
This frozen body and soul,
These two or three days of counted time?
I have become involved with Your count.

Heart, eyes and ears eat Your honey
And drink Your sherbet.
They open flowers every moment
Just to scatter them for You.

From now on, I will leave
This soul in this body to the silence.
But Your zeal, which gives soul and
Attracts hearts, won't let me be silent.

It is impossible to hide like prey
In the land of silence.
Because neither prey nor hunter
Can avoid being hunted by You.

Every existence grows with Your smell;
Is purified with Your separation.
The laughter of everything and everybody
Is Your work, Your gift; so is their crying.

8.

Verse 90

The pen is broken, and has fallen
In love writing of Your attributes.
My mind has lost its way because
Of the intense sorrow of Your separation.

Who could hang around You?
Who could be Your selected friend?
Who could be saved from Your trap?
Who could stretch Your hard bow?

My face turns into gold with Your love.
I have thousands of signs and traces from You.
O beautiful, just once, look and see my situation.

I am on fire like Abraham.
I am happy and comfortable
With the warmth of Your fire.
I am not the man who will complain;
Who will run away from Your merciless grief.

Help me on this difficult road.
I lost my heart. Help me find it.
My friend, my beloved, don't let me
Settle anywhere but in Your rose garden.

My beauty, what else could come close
To you except your smell?
What other reason is there to search for you
But to scatter roses to you?

Angel, human, fairy, man, general, army,
Sun and Jupiter are all ashamed at Your door.

If you want to get the phoenix of soul in trouble
It will fall in the yogurt on the first try, like a fly.

When every poor one becomes your interpreter
With Your great order,
Health-giving favors turn him into sultans.

All creatures run to Your harvest like ants.
All the universe obtains their portion
Of meals from Your table.

The soul who became a bewitching beauty
Won't be satisfied with a portion.
He expects to become Your guest.
He has that ambition and greed;
Waits for a chance from destiny.

So much relief comes to every disease and
Every difficulty from Your endless treasure.
Your world of Absence offers so many
Favors and kindnesses to the world of existence.

Your favors, Your blessing;
That's what a body expects.
Your beauty and charm is the soul's expectation.
The body looks for the bread You will give.

The Soul is waiting to be picked up
And put in Your palm, that's what he wishes.